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The Ghost of Brennus

Gaulish Themes in Classical Literature and Roman Policy in the West

Matthew J. Diskin
Declaration

I

[Signature]

hereby declare that:

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Summary

In this dissertation, I trace the origin and the evolution of the use of terms like “Κελτοί” and “Γαλάται” in Greek ethnographic and/or historical texts from the works of Herodotus and Hecataeus into the Roman period. More detailed textual analyses are undertaken of parts of the works of major authors who influenced or were strongly influenced by Latin discourse on the Celts or Gauls, principally Polybius, Diodorus, Strabo and Plutarch. I also discuss more general themes directly or indirectly relevant to Roman attitudes towards Gauls, such as Hyperborean myths and theories of environmental determinism.

This Greek background is the basis for a similar exploration of the development over time of the use of “Galli” in Latin literary discourse from the fragments of Cato to Late Antiquity. Considerable attention is devoted to the function and structure of the textual portraits of Gauls by Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, Florus and, perhaps most importantly, Caesar. However, there is also a systematic survey of the many briefer references to Gauls in Latin literature.

Central to the methodology employed is the application to political history of semantic, literary and inter-textual analyses and history of ideas. In the second part of the thesis, I argue that this approach can suggest more compelling explanations of Roman decisions and, more broadly, can provide a fuller understanding of the processes whereby the Roman state came to administer much of northwestern Europe.

The broad, indeed trans-continental, ethnographic category of the Celtic/Galatic/Gaulish was largely of Greek making, as were most of the specific stereotypes about Gauls that were ultimately accepted in Latin discourse. However, the traditional Roman narratives of the sack of Rome by the Senones in the early fourth century and the associated mythology and religious symbolism were equally important to later Roman views of Gauls and of northwestern Europe in general.
Roman anxieties about Gauls and the threat they were believed to pose, associated both with the sack of Rome and with a warlike, transgressive northern European stereotype partly inherited from Greek writings, are detectable very early on in the Latin literary record and show remarkable persistence over time. I shall argue that such worries, conventionally referred to as the *terror gallicus* or *metus gallicus*, contributed to the decision to extend Roman power over the Alps between 125 and 118 BCE into what would become the province of Gallia Narbonensis. That northward expansion seems not to have substantially reduced Roman anxiety about Gaul and its supposedly perilous inhabitants and the same anxiety, I would argue, continued to influence policy towards Transalpine polities and peoples in the first half of the last century BCE. In my view, both this ongoing concern at Rome about northwestern Europe and the instability in and around the Province generated in part by the resulting Roman policies contributed to Caesar’s decision to attempt his expansionist projects in Gaul rather than elsewhere.

Caesar’s *Commentarii* are the most extensive extant work on pre-conquest Gaul and a major monument in the history of Latin ethnography as well as historiography. He both used Gaulish imagery and stereotypes already established as stock themes by earlier authors and turned Latin discourse on Gauls and, especially, Germans in new directions. I shall argue that ways of thinking about northwestern Europeans derived ultimately from discourse on Gauls, as modified by Caesar, continued to influence policy after the conquest of all of Gallia Comata, both across the Rhine in trans-Rhenane Germany and across the Channel in Britain.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Brian McGing, for his assistance and advice over the last four years. Both he and Doctor Hazel Dodge also provided invaluable guidance on the direction of my research and how to communicate it. As I studied Classical literature only in translation for my two-subject primary degree, the patience and pedagogic excellence of Emily Lefebvre, Jessica Evans and Doctor Donncha O’Rourke in teaching me both Latin and Greek to a scholarly standard in a very short time was, quite literally, indispensable. I would also like to thank the staff of Trinity College Library Dublin, without whose efficient, professional and comprehensive services my research could not have been conducted. Although they have certainly helped me to reach my conclusions and to defend them cogently, none of the above necessarily agrees with all of those conclusions and, of course, all errors are entirely my own. Finally, I am grateful to my family not only for endless support and encouragement but also for proofreading a volume of drafts and redrafts collectively equivalent to an encyclopaedia and, in particular, for providing essential assistance with maps.
Note on Translation, Abbreviation and Quotation

All translations are my own except where otherwise indicated.

The translation in several important passages quoted herein of "virtus" as "manfulness" perhaps requires explanation. Undeniably, "virtue" best conveys what was meant by "virtus" in many instances and has the additional advantage of the etymological relationship to the Latin word. In Classical Latin, however, "virtus" never quite lost its semantic connection to "vir" and, more particularly, a gender-neutral word like "virtue" would be very inapposite in several cases (e.g. especially Caes. Gal. 6.24, quoted at 130 below). More subjectively, I feel that "manfulness" conveys the evaluative connotations of "virtus" (desirable in men rather than merely typical of men) slightly better than "manliness", which is used both by McDonnell (2006, 2007) and Kaster (2007), despite their differences of view. I therefore believe that the consistent employment of "manfulness" in translating "virtus" is the least misleading option for the range of texts which I will discuss. For a brief consideration of the competing merits of "courage" "manliness" and "virtue" as translations of "virtus", see Shackleton Bailey, 1971: 279

Classical and Byzantine sources included in either the Oxford Latin Dictionary or Liddell's and Scott's Greek Lexicon are referred to by the abbreviations used in those works of reference. Late Latin sources not included in the OLD are referred to by the abbreviations used in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, excepting those listed on the next page. The numbering for collections of correspondence, verse and fragments is from the Loeb Classical Library, where applicable. Other fragments are referred to in the usual manner, e.g. "Fra. 1 (Aaronson)" and their editions are included in the general bibliography. Quoted passages from primary sources are taken from editions used in the LCL.
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Introduction:
Scope and Subject-Matter, Sources and Methods

The first part of this dissertation is an analysis of the content and development of Roman discourse on the Gauls and their countries; the second is a discussion of the possible influence on Roman policy in northwestern Europe of beliefs and attitudes evident in that discourse.

Geographically, the principal focus of the historical component of the study is therefore on Gaul itself. However, I shall also argue that, after Caesar's conquests, aspects of Roman policy in Britain and Germany were still strongly affected by ideas originally concerned with Gaul. On the other hand, pre-conquest Roman interaction with Gaulish communities south of the Alps is not considered historically. Although the later recollection and re-imagination of prehistoric and protohistoric Romano-Cisalpine conflict are central to both the history of ideas and the literary analysis of this thesis, the impact on political and military interaction within Italy of stereotypes and myths concerning the Gauls has already been examined in some detail.1

Chronologically, I am concerned primarily with the interaction between the Roman state and independent polities it regarded as Gaulish, as the influence on post-conquest Roman policy of ideas about the conquered has been the object of discussion for some time already.2 The period of greatest interest for present purposes is therefore the century of increasing Roman involvement in Transalpine Gaul from the expedition of 155 BCE to the conclusion of Caesar's campaigns in 51 BCE.3 I shall argue that, just as policies developed over this period partly in response to events and circumstances actually encountered in the north and partly in ongoing response to Roman ideas and anxieties originating south of the Alps, the resulting approaches themselves formed part of the mental and habitual baggage carried

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3 See Maps 1, 2.
over into policy towards Britons and trans-Rhenane Germans; consequently, Roman policy across the Rhine in the first century CE and in Britain up to the second are also examined closely.

Visual means of expression will not be analysed in detail. Such sources are, of course, equally essential to the study of Roman attitudes towards the Gauls. Iconographic evidence supplies an alternative and complementary means of expression of the Greek and Roman views of themselves, foreigners and their relation to foreigners that I propose to investigate through their written expression. With regard to attitudes towards barbarians in particular, it provides many clear and extant examples of propaganda concerning conflict.4 Nor is there any quantitative dearth of evidence of this type on barbarian themes in general or Gaulish themes in particular.5 Indeed, a survey of the body of Roman iconography on Gaulish or related themes, in anything like the depth that the corpus of evidence deserves, would constitute an ambitious thesis project by itself. I have therefore felt that, for the present study, it was more productive to attempt a focussed, close analysis of the literary evidence, which is very substantial in its own right, than to attempt to sample from every category of extant Greek or Roman expression relating to Gaul or the Gauls.

In order to achieve, within those limits, the most comprehensive analysis possible of Latin discourse on peoples regarded as Gaulish or connected with the Gauls, no such limit is placed on the selection of Latin texts used as sources on beliefs about and attitudes towards Gaul; claims about the Galatians, for instance, can provide illuminating context for similar or related claims about Belgic Gauls or Germans. One of the main conclusions argued for is that,

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4 Perhaps the most prolific visual sources of victory-propaganda and the depiction of conflict with northern barbarians is Trajan’s Column, on which see Rossi, 1971 and Coarelli, 2000.
although there was of course important change, there was also a persistent continuity over time in certain aspects of the Latin depiction of Gauls; occasionally, Late Antique (e.g. Prudentius, Augustine) and even post-Roman (principally Bede) Latin authors shed interesting light on themes or concepts found in Caesar or Cato. The inclusion of non-ethnographic texts is especially important as the total quantity of textual data that can be accumulated from individually brief mentions of Gaul in texts from stage comedies to farming manuals to medical treatises is very considerable and forms a sizeable proportion of my source material. Greek texts that provide a background for understanding the later development of Latin ethnographic and geographical discourse, most importantly Polybius’s *Historiae* and the fragments of Posidonius, are also explored in some depth.

An important terminological issue to clarify at the outset is precisely what, for the purposes of the present study, is meant by “Gaul” and “Gauls”. Some scholars, especially those working with material evidence from ancient Britain, have argued that the continued employment of “Gauls” and “Celts” is unhelpful as it perpetuates discredited theories associated with those terms, especially the explanation of prehistoric cultural change exclusively through successive, large-scale invasions and the conflation of populations from Anatolia to Ireland with merely linguistic similarities into a single ethnic group or people. Others have preferred to retain such terms while defining them in exclusively cultural terms, as referring, say, to speakers of certain related languages or to participants in a certain material culture, for the purposes of a specific subject area. At the other end of the range, the whole issue can seem to scholars of medieval Irish and Welsh literature a semantic distraction, no more of a difficulty for Celtic Studies than the facts that Greeks, Romans,

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6 E.g. James, 1999.
Epirotes and Etruscans were not one people and did not describe themselves as Classical are difficulties for Classical Studies.  

Ultimately, the people and peoples who actually existed in late pre-Roman northwestern Europe are not the object of my investigation; nor am I concerned specifically with larger groupings of such people that scholars propose and modify in attempting to understand how their societies functioned, which may or not have actually existed. The primary object of the present study is the *Galli* of the Roman imagination, the culturally and morally inferior race which devoted itself above all else to an eternal, impious war against the Roman people and which, most certainly, did not actually exist. I use “Gauls” to refer to these creatures of fiction (in the broadest sense of that word) and I therefore define it, as a term in the present study, as no more or less than people classified under the term “Galli” in Latin texts in the period and text under discussion.

This sometimes means using “Gaul” and “Gauls” in a geographically definite manner (e.g. at one time anyone between the Pyrenees, Apennines, Rhine and Atlantic, later most peoples between the Pyrenees, Alps, Rhine and Atlantic, earlier perhaps anyone north of the Apennines), which should not be taken to imply any claim on my part of social or cultural unity in areas so categorized prior to their conquest. Much the same applies with “Celts”; discussion of Greek texts occasionally call for an analogous use of this term to refer to Greek authors’ *Keltoi* or *Galatai*, whoever they may have been (and however much or little they resembled the real inhabitants of northern Europe).

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8 Although this is not the only possible approach; the same distance from Iron Age archaeological evidence and its interpretation that makes the Celtic question an avoidable issue for medievalists also allows those who are not inclined to retain the concept of the Celtic (as traditionally construed) to drop it from their work without much difficulty, e.g. Carson, 2007: xx-xxi.
9 On the broader issues involved, especially theoretical approaches to the study of Roman imperialism, see Webster, 1996, Carr & Stoddart, 2002.
10 For a visual summary of this sense of the term, i.e. more or less what Caesar meant by “Galli”, see Map 1.
The narrative of the Senonian sack of Rome, familiar to Classicists in its highly polished literary form in Livy and Plutarch, made Roman anxieties about Gauls evident to scholars much earlier than views on or attitudes towards many other peoples. Prejudice towards Gauls was also more visible because, put crudely, it was readily apparent to European scholars that it was indeed prejudice; to many Victorian and earlier Classicists and historians, claims of Asian slavishness or Semitic deviousness could seem simply early observations of perennial Oriental faults. Jullian, writing his monumental *Histoire de la Gaule*, was rather less likely to be biassed by a belief in the superiority of modern Italians to modern Frenchmen. The *terror gallicus* or *metus gallicus*, as it has usually been called, has therefore had a venerable history in scholarly discussion of Romans, Gauls and the interactions between them. However, this *metus* and the imagery, stereotypes and terminology that went with it were much less often treated in any real depth; if Roman dislike of Gauls has been obvious for centuries, it is only very recently that it has seemed an interesting object of detailed examination.

More generally, the last quarter-century has seen a renewed interest in the application to ancient history of textual analysis of literary historical sources, stimulated in part by the work of T. P. Wiseman and A. J. Woodman, in particular the latter’s provocative *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*. While this trend reflects a less reverential approach to foundational texts, the methodology it encourages is also, in certain respects, very traditional. During the twentieth century, the pre-eminent authority in ancient history of the Classical authors was heavily diluted by the wealth of new information from archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics and documentary papyrology. While in previous decades a somewhat more critical attitude towards the Classics accelerated this liberation of history from literary scholarship, Woodman’s very

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11 Called by scholars, that is – naturally Romans did not regard themselves as having an irrational fear of Gauls. On these terms and their history in modern scholarship, see Woolf, 1998: 61, Rosenberger, 2003: 265 and also 7-8 below.
12 E.g. 1987.
much more critical attitude towards even the basic narratives of Classical historians has helped to make literary approaches to texts once again indispensable tools in their use as source material. The impact of this tendency has been greatest in domestic political history, perhaps because the basic attitude of literary sources is more difficult to ascertain in that area; while it is not terribly surprising that the final judgement of Caesar and Cato was, as it were, against rather than for the Gauls, there is clearly ample room for (hopefully constructive) disagreement on what Tacitus really thought about the Principate and how Thucydides ultimately judged the radical democracy. Addressing such ambiguities is a natural role for textual and literary analysis. Nonetheless, examining inter-textual relationships, intra-textual structure, literary function and authorial purpose and the selection and manipulation of wording are also applicable to writings on foreigners and foreign policy.

One of the most extensive and important developments in Classical studies has been the focus on the depiction and, where possible, the reality of various Others subordinate and/or opposed to the wealthy, urban, male elites to which the authors of the bulk of Classical literature belonged. The Others so considered have been endlessly various – lower socio-economic strata, rural labourers, slaves, groups or subcultures distinguished by dietary, cultic or sexual behaviour – and the approach can be extended to abstract concepts, such as opposites or inversions of Classical canons of aesthetic beauty or ethical behaviour; discussion of both personal and impersonal Others can, especially in the latter case, become a more theoretical discussion, often influenced by Structuralist theories of the construction of language and culture with pairs of opposed concepts, first and foremost Self/Other. Arguably the most far-reaching changes in the study of the ancient world are those concerning sex and gender, including but not restricted to the Other – women – present in texts

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14 For an accessible introduction to such approaches, as applied to visual media, see Cohen, 2000. On the formation in texts of concepts of collective Self and Other, see Hall, 1989.
from Homer to Procopius. The Others most pertinent for present purposes, however, are the (literally) external Others – independent enemies and imperial subjects of the polities to which our sources belonged. Most attention has been given to attitudes towards Africans and Asians, with Said’s Orientalism exerting a considerable influence, both directly, as on many other humanistic disciplines, and through scholars of specifically ancient Orientalist themes, such as E. Hall. While my chosen topic is different, I shall draw heavily on work exploring the overall structure and nature of the description and categorization of different peoples in Classical literature, as the Gauls were imagined not in isolation but in constant comparison to other peoples and their differing or similar supposed inferiorities.

Initially, analysis of prejudice and, more broadly, the depiction of Barbarians somewhat bypassed scholarship on the history of the Romans in northwestern Europe. Although some of the earlier scholarly forays into the field of stereotypy in the Classics (e.g. A. N. Sherwin-White’s Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome) concentrated on northern Europe, the overwhelming bulk of work done has concerned images of the peoples and countries to the south or east, rather than to the west or north, of Greece and Italy. This output was driven in part by the need to respond to challenges both from within Classical scholarship (in particular from Postcolonialists) and to Classical scholarship from outside it (in particular from Afrocentrists) that academic models of the past were still influenced by more subtle forms of Eurocentric bias. This stimulus has been absent with regard to Greek and Roman attitudes towards other Europeans and detailed discussion in this area, as distinct from offhand mentions of the terror gallicus, is consequently more recent.

16 1967.
17 For an exposition of this view, see Bernal, 1987, 1991; for a critique, see Lefkowitz & Maclean Rogers, 1996.
A very important exception is *Metus Gallicus, Metus Punicus: zum Furchmotiv in der Römischen Republik*,\(^{18}\) which proposes that fear, specifically of certain southern and certain northern enemies, skewed Roman foreign policy under the Republic very noticeably, as compared with actions towards southern or other northern peoples. Of the work done in this field in the last decade, the most directly relevant is *Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy*.\(^{19}\) This study, building directly on the work of Bellen, combines a thorough and systematic examination of the role of *Galli* in the world as the Romans imagined it with an exploration of how policy was affected. Although there are differences of approach and emphasis,\(^{20}\) my project is broadly complementary; where *Beyond the Rubicon* concentrates on Roman interaction with the original *Galli* – trans-Apennine Italians – I am concerned with the impact of the ideas and concepts developed during the long struggle against these early opponents on later Roman policy in northwestern Europe.\(^{21}\)

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20 In particular, Williams is also concerned with the (in his view persistent) influence of Roman categorizations, if not stereotypes, of *Galli*, on archaeological interpretation in northern Italy.
21 For the development over time of Roman power and policy in northwestern Europe, see Maps 2, 4.
Part 1
1: Hyperboreans, Celts and Galatians: 
The Greek Background

Latin discussion of foreign peoples, like many other aspects of Roman thought and literature, developed against a background of Greek writings with already established intellectual authority and artistic prestige. Greek literature on Gaulish or Celtic topics is, of course, a substantial subject matter in its own right and no more than a very summary account of it can be undertaken here. Also, what will be examined is weighted heavily towards the material most directly relevant to later Latin texts. Nonetheless, to achieve the most thorough elucidation possible of Roman attitudes towards the Gauls, some analysis of earlier views is required. Consequently, this first chapter is concerned primarily with the Greek theories, terminology and texts bequeathed to the Roman authors to be discussed in the rest of Part 1.

1: The Theoretical Framework: Environmental Determinism

The theory, originating in Hippocratic circles in the second half of the fifth century BCE (Aēr. 12-24) that the climatic and topographic environments of human populations had a determining and heritable influence on their physical, societal and mental characteristics, though not universally accepted even in antiquity (e.g. Fir. Mat. Mth. 1.2.1-4, 1.10.12), gained wide credence nonetheless and strongly influenced much subsequent Greek ethnographic and social thought. It provided non-mythological explanations for phenotypic differences like skin colour, leading to, for instance, a recognition of the connection between latitude, sunlight and pigmentation, although the mechanism was of course unknown. Its main relevance here, however, is as a

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1 Generalization about peoples on the basis of geographical metaphor or analogy was not, of course, peculiar to Greek or even to Mediterranean thought – the idea was, for instance, proposed in fairly strong terms in Chinese Legalist literature (Allyn Rickett, 1998: 106) – but it became a scholarly orthodoxy only in the Classical world.

2 On the Classical texts anticipating or appearing to anticipate ideas of evolution over time and/or natural selection, see Campbell, 2003, especially 1-8.
source of and justification for strongly prejudicial stereotypes of non-Greek peoples. The central position given in the Greeks’ cosmography to their homeland and its temperate climate were held to provide its inhabitants with various dispositional and social advantages, sometime held so great as to leave the non-Greeks lacking them naturally fit only for slavery to Greek masters (e.g. Arist. Pol. 1.2.13, 1.1.5). Moreover, Europe as a whole was regarded, from the start (Aër. 16), as providing its peoples with morally and politically important superiorities over Asians.\(^3\)

The environmental theory also provided an obvious justification for applying sharply different stereotypes to Barbarian peoples in different regions. Naturally, authors varied, often quite substantially, but there were nonetheless two discernible broad groups of stereotypes, one applied to countries to the north or west of Greece (mainland Europeans) and another applied to countries to its south or east (North Africans and Middle Easterners). The content of the two sets of reciprocal stereotypes and their relation to the supposed advantages of the Greek centre of the world are expressed neatly in the following Aristotelian claim (Pol. 7.6.1):

\[
\text{t ā mēn γάρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις έθνη καὶ τά περὶ τήν Εὐρώπην θύμῳ μὲν ἔστι πλήρῃ διανοίας δὲ ἑνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίων ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα τά δὲ περὶ τήν Ασίαν διαινοητικά μὲν καὶ τεχνικά τήν ψυχήν άθυμα δὲ διόπερ ἄρχομενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ. τό δὲ τῶν Ελλήνων γένος, διόπερ μεσεύει κατά τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως άμφοῦ μετέχει. καὶ γάρ ἐνθυμον καὶ διαινοητικόν ἐστιν διόπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων μίας τυγχάνον πολιτείας.}
\]

For, while the peoples in cold places and those in Europe are full of vigour but lacking in intelligence and skill and therefore remain freer but anarchic and unable to rule their surroundings, those in Asia, intelligent and skilful but languorous, therefore carry on a ruled and enslaved life. But the race of the Hellenes, just as it is intermediate between these places, thus

partakes of both. For it is vigorous and also intelligent; it is therefore free
and best organized and able to rule all, had it only a single government.

The southern or eastern stereotypes expressed here and others like them,
whether or not justified environmentally, have been the objects of considerably
more study. There are very natural reasons for this, principally their similarity
and, arguably, contribution to medieval and modern Christian European
prejudices towards North Africans and Middle Easterners and, more generally,
towards Muslims. Nonetheless, it is attitudes towards other Europeans
resembling Aristotle’s claims of unskilful vigour that will be more informative
for present purposes.

Adapted for a worldview centred on the Italian rather than the Balkan
peninsula, environmental determinism was eagerly adopted by many Roman
authors, eventually becoming as well accepted as in Greek discourse. In
sometimes very different forms, it was propounded by Cicero (Div. 2.96, Agr.
2.95), Vitruvius (6.1), Livy (5.48, 34.47.5, 38.17), Seneca (Dial. 4.15) Pliny
(Nat. 2.189-90) and Tacitus (Ger. 29.3). The explicit application of the theory
to the discussion of Gaulish peoples in Latin texts deserves detailed discussion
in its own right and will be examined below. For now, it is sufficient to note
that the northern or western image of barbarians heavily influenced virtually all
Roman writings on foreign peoples of the European mainland in general and,
as will be readily apparent throughout Part 1 of this thesis, Gaulish peoples in
particular, Asian as well as European. In seeking to understand the confidence
and the consistency with which such stereotypes were maintained, the
intellectual support for them provided by environmental theories must be kept
in mind.

---

5 On which see, e.g. Southern, 1962.
6 For the influence of Classical environmental determinism on some medieval Muslim thinkers, see
Lewis, 1990: 45-8, for its acceptance by certain Late Antique Christian writers and its influence on
early modern Western thought, see Isaac, 2004: 97-9 and 8-13, 77-8, 102-9 respectively. For the
history of environmental determinism more broadly, see Thomas, 1925.
7 96-100.
8 On the formative Greek influence on Roman historiography more generally, see Wiseman, 2007.
2: The Taxonomic Framework:  
The Development of the Category Celtic/Galatic/Gallic

As well as the stereotypical and theoretical context into which it fit, the very category of the Celtic or Galatic as opposed to, say, Tyrrhenian, Illyrian or Thracian (though perhaps not the actual word "Galli", which may have been cognate with "Γαλάται", derived independently from the same root in a Celtic language)⁹ was, in large part, a Greek legacy to Latin discourse.¹⁰ In the absence of Latin texts chronologically close to the Romans' violent early contacts with those they would come to refer to by the name "Galli",¹¹ therefore, the evolution of the concept it was used to express can only be examined in its Greek form.¹²

An important Archaic predecessor of the familiar Classical and post-Classical terms "Κέλτοι"/"Κέλται" and "Γαλάται" was "Ὑπερβορείοι" – 'Hyperboreans'. Strictly speaking, the Hyperborean country was purely mythical, one of several lands of varying degrees of narrative or aetiological significance, often associated with a divine or semi-divine patron (in this case Apollo) and a cardinal direction (the north) and representing a small survival of the blissful world of the Golden Age, exempt from time and mortality.¹³ However, although the Hyperboreans must be understood in this theological context, such legendary populations and locations could easily be identified with real ones in order to incorporate new geographical information; the most obvious example of such a transformation is probably that of "Αἰθιοπία",

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⁹ For some of the vast etymological complexity involved with the ultimate origin of these names, see Birkhan, 1997: 48.
¹⁰ On Celts in the Greek world and the Celts in Greek eyes, see Rankin, 1996: 34-48, 83-102, Tierney, 2007c.
¹¹ The earliest Latin references to Galli are, in verse and in adjectival form ("Gallici"), by Plautus (Aul. 495) and, in prose, by Cato the Elder in his Originum Libri Septem shortly afterwards – Fra. 2.2 (Jordan) – and are therefore separated from the sack of Rome by well over a century and a half; moreover, very little else on the Gauls in Latin has survived from before the second half of the last century BCE.
¹² For contrasting views on the history of the concept and category of the Celtic more broadly see Megaw & Megaw, 1996, 1998 and James, 1999.
¹³ Other examples within Greek mythology include Scherie, associated with Poseidon and the east (before its later identification with Corfu) and the Elysian Fields, associated with Rhadamanthus and the far west. More broadly, myths of a refuge from death and the ravages of time, intermediate between the mundane world and the divine, are far from uncommon; Shambhala (Shangri-La) and Tir na nÓg are among the more familiar analogues.
originally the name for a timeless land of Poseidon beyond the farthest south,\textsuperscript{14} then a catchall for Africa south of the Sahara and finally the Greek and Roman designation for a smaller area overlapping somewhat with the present-day country of the same name (Str. 1.2.27-8). Arguably, the Hyperborean myth might have derived in part from faint memories of prehistoric trade with the Hallstatt A-B palace economies north of the Alps.\textsuperscript{15} Certainly later authors identified the Hyperboreans with real Europeans north of Thrace and, in several instances, with the Celts specifically.\textsuperscript{16} However, the Hyperboreans did not fare as well as the Ethiopians in the hands of most post-Archaic authors – Herodotus, for instance, was an early doubter of their existence (4.36) – and their ultimate fate was not adoption into prosaic geographical discourse but replacement, in the far north and west of the Greek imagination, by other categories and relegation to the sphere of the purely poetic and mythic. In Latin authors, they appear only (and rarely) as an indisputably mythical people, located, if anywhere, at the North Pole (e.g. Plin. \textit{Nat.} 4.26).

The term that eventually predominated, "\textit{Κέλτοι}"/"\textit{Κελτικός}"/"\textit{Κελτική}", is first attested in a late sixth-century fragment of the geographer Hecataeus of Miletus:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Nárbov}: ἐμπόριον καὶ πόλις Κελτική ... Ἐκαταῖος δὲ
\textit{Μυσσαλίω}: πόλις τῆς Λιγυστικῆς κατὰ τὴν Κελτικὴν ἀποικὸς Φωκαέων.
\textit{Νύμα}: πόλις Κελτική. Ἐκαταῖος Εὐρώπη.
\textit{Narðon}: A Keltic trading station and city ... And Hekataios calls them "Narbaioi".
\textit{Massalia}: A city of Ligustikē [Liguria] below Keltikē, a colony of the Phokaeoi – Hekataios [in his \textit{Periplous}] \textit{Europē}.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Bridgman, 2005: 97.
\textsuperscript{17} Fra. 54-6 (Jacoby); the encyclopaedic style is due to the context of the fragment’s preservation, the \textit{Ethnika} of Stephanus Byzantinus.

Herodotus adopted the same word and, although he did not make much use of it (only at 2.33 and 4.49), its employment by such a prestigious historical and ethnographic author contributed greatly to its establishment in the standard Greek geographical vocabulary.

Nonetheless, his own use of the term was vague and expansive; it is not clear whether he meant by it people living north of the Pyrenees, northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar or around the headwaters of the Danube (and therefore north of the Alps, around the former centres of the Hallstatt culture). It is not even clear that his knowledge of physical geography extended far enough to the northwest to regard these places themselves as distinct. Although later authors would use the word somewhat more clearly and would of course assimilate detailed knowledge of Atlantic Europe into their geographies and ethnographies, this much broader application of the category of the Celtic or Galatic than that familiar from Latin usage remained a feature of Greek writing. Also reasonably consistent from then on was its use to designate people definitely to the west of the (non-mythical) northern peoples previously known to Greek literature, the Thracians and Illyrians in the Balkans and the Skythians and Sarmatians north of the Black Sea; for Herodotus the Keltoi were the second-farthest west of all European peoples, after only the even more mysterious Kūnetai. Broadly speaking, Greek Classical and Hellenistic geography grouped central and eastern European peoples into the four broad categories of (from east to west) Skythians, Thracians, Illyrians and Celts, in much the same way as Roman writers divided western Europeans into Germans, Gauls, Britons and Spaniards (although the latter were less consistently thought of as a single people).18

18 See 85-6 below and Map 1; the Latin division of that and other regions was of course much more specific and precise as regards the area inhabited by each people, due to the crystallizing effect on geographical discourse of Roman provincial boundaries, for which with regard to Gaul and Germany see Maps, 2, 4.
“Γαλάται”/“Γαλατικός”/“Γαλατία” is first attested in a fragment of the historian Timaeus of Tauromenium:

Γαλατία: χώρα ἄνωμάσθη, ὡς φησι Τίμαιος ἀπὸ Γαλάτου Κύκλωπος καὶ Γαλατείας υἱὸν. 19

Galatia: A country; it is so called, so Timaios claims, from Galatos, son of a Cyclops and Galateia.

This new term, introduced in the third century, gained wide currency during the second and was used frequently by Polybius. Its addition, however, involved no substantial semantic change; the meaning already borne by “Κέλτοι”/“Κέλται” remained intact and the newer word became, for the most part, simply an alternative way of expressing it.

Various historians and geographers tried to explain the origin of the two designations or to distinguish their meanings. Diodorus Siculus, for instance, considered “Κέλτική” (and, by implication, “Κέλτοι”) the older name and “Γαλάται” and “Γαλατία” the legacy of an eponymous king, Γαλάτης (5.24.2-3). He also claimed that “Κέλτοι” properly referred only to the more southerly Celts of Iberia, Narbonensis and Cisalpina (though he did not use those terms), while the true Γαλάται were those farther north and east (5.32.1). The same passage seems to have “Κέλτική” refer only to an area similar to Narbonese Gaul, although this is not made entirely clear. The Anatolian poet Parthenius of Nicaea, conversely, made “Κέλτοι” the eponym, after the royal couple Κέλτος and Κέλτινη (30). Strabo, instead of distinguishing a Celtic and Galatic region, made the former a part of the latter; he regarded the inhabitants of Ναρβονήτες (the Narbonese province) as the original Κέλται, one people of the Γαλάται. He considered the Greek word “Κέλτοι” a slight corruption of “Κέλται”, applied to all Γαλάται by the Greeks due to the early encounter of the Greeks with the Κέλται around Massalia (4.1.14). Strabo also related that the historian Ephorus of Cyme, in a mirror image of Diodorus’s extension of

19Fra. 69 (Jacoby).
the Γαλάται into northeastern Europe, considered Κελτική to include most of Iberia (4.4.6).

Despite these attempts at clarification, however, in practice “Γαλάται” was used more or less synonymously with “Κελτοί” from its introduction. While Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Strabo, Plutarch and Appian showed varying degrees of preference for “Κελτοί”, Dio Cassius more usually employed “Γαλάται”. Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Pausanias switched freely between the two and almost all authors used both to some extent. Much the same applied with “Κελτική” and “Γαλατία”; although the former was not much used in reference to the lands of the Asian Γαλάται, both could be applied interchangeably to the part of Europe considered Celtic/Galatic or to particular countries within that area. Strabo seems to have rather preferred “Κελτική”, even referring several times to Cisalpine Keltike (“ἡ ἐντὸς Ἀλπεων Κελτική”) instead of Cisalpine Gaul.

Latin usage had no such dual terminology; although names such as “Celtiberi” were of course employed for particular peoples, the single term “Galli” was equivalent to both “Κελτοί” and “Γαλάται”. There is an obvious orthographic parallel between “Κελτοί”/“Κέλται” and “Celti”/“Celtae” (which were largely interchangeable, the former being much the rarer version) but no corresponding semantic one. “Celtae” was used only very occasionally, for various purposes but its frequency of use was never even remotely comparable to its Greek counterpart and it certainly never posed any serious challenge to the supremacy of “Galli” in the Latin ethnographic vocabulary.

Although “Γαλάται” is of course the root of the English name for the Anatolian Gauls and its modern equivalents (respectively “Galatians” and “Galater”, “Galates” etc.), it was originally, as the foregoing should make

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20 It could be a deliberately stilted synonym of “Galli” in a poetic, especially epic, context (e.g. Sil. 4.153) but its most familiar appearance is as Caesar’s name for one of the inhabitants of one of his three divisions of Gaul (Gal. 1.1).

21 Partly due to the familiarity to Christian Europeans of “Πρὸς Γαλάτας” as the title of the (pseudepigraphical) fourth Pauline Epistle, reinforced by “Commentarii in Epistulam Pauli Apostoli ad Galatas” as that of Jerome’s exegesis on that epistle. On the philological implications of that exegesis, see Adams, 2007: 116 n. 2.
clear, a much more general term which merely included them among its referents. “Γαλατία” could be used without qualification to refer to Galatia in an Anatolian context (e.g. Str. 12.5.4), just as its unadorned usage could identify Cisalpine Gaul when Italy was the object of historical or geographical description (e.g. Plb. 3.106.6). In more general contexts, however, authors might refer to Asia’s Γαλαταί or the Γαλαταί in Asia to distinguish them from their equally Galatic compatriots in Europe (e.g. Zonar. 7.23). This is a second distinction to be drawn with Latin. Just as Strabo, independently of his own categorizations, wrote “Κέλται” when transliterating Caesar’s term “Celtae”, “Galatae” was, very occasionally, used simply to transliterate “Γαλάται” in Latin reference to Greek nomenclature (e.g. Amm. 15.9.3). However, it was also used much like “Galatians”, as a name for the Asian Γαλαταί (e.g. Cic. Att. 199.3), although the more descriptive (and semi-derogatory) term “Gallograeci” was also very common and shared the same range of reference.

If the category of the Celtic/Galatic/Gallic was a Greek contribution to European ethnographic thought, that of the Germanic was a Roman one. It interposed between the Galli and the steppe peoples (Scythae, Sarmatae etc. in Roman terms), thereby reducing very considerably the portion of Europe classed as Celtic/Galatic/Gallic, and represents an important, if partial, break from the Greek geographic tradition. Some Greek authors accepted the Germani; Strabo devotes a discrete tract to Φερμανία (7.1-2), with a level of detail roughly similar to that devoted to other countries in central and eastern Europe. Many, however, including some discussing Roman matters, clung to a more Hellenic usage in this and certain other respects with remarkable stubbornness. By itself, the categorization of the Cimbri and Teutones as Celtic or Galatic by some Greek authors (e.g. App. Gall. 1.2) is not very

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22 E.g. Zonar. 7.23.
23 4.1.1, discussing Caes. Gal. 1.1; “Κέλτικη” was similarly used to transliterate “[Gallia] Celtica”, cf. Polybius’s “Τρανσαλπίνοι” for “Transalpini” (e.g. 2.15.8).
24 The connotations of “Gallograeci” as used by Roman authors will be discussed at 103-8 below.
25 E.g. [Caes.] B. Alex. 67, 78, Liv. 37: 8.4, 38.3, 40-5-13, 38: 12, 18, 45, Vell. 2.39.2, V. Max. 6.1. ext. 2, Flor. Epit. 1.27, Amm. 22.9.5, August. CD 3.21.
26 Dealt with, for the most part, as a block in Book 7.
surprising, as several Latin writers thought likewise.27 Much more distinctive is the refusal to group settled and permanent Northern populations east of the Rhine differently from those west of it. Diodorus, for instance, rejected the category of the Germanic implicitly by writing of the Γαλάται across the Rhine whom Caesar crossed the river to conquer (5.25.4), and explicitly when he classed as Galatic all far northern mainland Europeans west of the Skythians (5.32.1). By far the most striking example of Greek recalcitrance in this respect, however, is that of Dio Cassius. As a governor and senator, the son of a governor and senator and a vocal supporter both of Roman imperialism and of the Empire as a form of government,28 he was not so much Romanized as simply a Roman. However, his intellectual Hellenic allegiance, at least in matters conceptual, was equally staunch. Not only did he use “Κελτοί” to refer to the Germans but he reserved it exclusively for them, employing “Γαλάται” for those west of the Rhine.29 The words “Γερμανοί” and “Γερμανία” themselves he suffered to use only in specific reference to the Roman provinces of the two Germanies (e.g. 53.12.6) and even then he reminded the reader that these Germans were, in fact, some of the Celts (Κελτῶν ... τίνες).

The following table summarizes the Latin equivalences with the main Greek names, including the more general ones discussed in this section. The equivalences are semantic rather than orthographic (although several coincide) and, as the foregoing should make clear, even the semantic correspondences are far from exact. Only two sorts of correspondence were precise; one was where Greek authors translated or transliterated the names of Roman administrative divisions with no established Greek counterpart, like “Cisalpina”, “Aquitanica” or “Belgica”, in which case the Greek expression can be regarded as meaning precisely whatever its Latin forbear meant. The other was where there was both a Hellenized and Latinized form of the name for a particular Gaulish civitas (e.g. “Οὐνδολικοί” and “Vindelici”,

27 Discussed at 34-5 below.
28 Cary, 1914: vii, x, xvi-xvii.
29 E.g. 38.34.1-3, 39.49.1.
“Οὐαλλαίοι” and “Vellavii”). As they require no further clarification, therefore, (at least as regards the relationship between their Latin and their Greek forms) none of either of these types is included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek Term</th>
<th>Closest Latin Equivalent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Γαλάται</td>
<td>Galli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Ασιάται Γαλάται /</td>
<td>Galatae / Gallograeci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Έλληνογαλάται</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Κέλται</td>
<td>Narbonenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(where distinct from “οἱ Κέλτοι”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Κέλτιβηροι/Κέλτικοι</td>
<td>Celtiberi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Κέλτοι/Κέλται</td>
<td>Galli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(where equivalent)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ Υπερβορεῖοι</td>
<td>Hyperborei</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3: The Textual Framework: Gaul in Greek Literature

The Greek legacy to Roman historians and geographers of Gaul, of course, was not restricted to general theories and basic concepts and categories, although these were essential contributions. The main documents of Greek history and geography on the Celts and their countries were also used, often directly and specifically, as models and as sources of information by Latin authors. I do not propose a survey of the history of Greek literary attitudes towards the Gauls in its own right but this section will briefly examine three of the Greek authors who most directly shaped Roman writings: Polybius, Diodorus and Posidonius.

Polybius’s description of the Italian Celts and their country at 2.14-35 is the first substantial, extant tract of literary Greek on the Gauls. The account opens with a brief geography of Cisalpine Gaul (14-6). This sets the scene for the entry of the Celts into Italy and their ejection of the Etruscans from the

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30 As glimpses into the partially or wholly lost Indo-European languages from which they were adapted, terms like these are of course invaluable, e.g. especially “Teutoni” (Beneviste, 1973: 296).
31 For the issues concerning specifically where Greek influence may or may not be at work regarding Latin writings on the Gauls, see Isaac, 2004: 413-4.
32 The two other major Gaulish ethnographies in Greek, those of Strabo and Athenaeus, are not examined in this respect as they came too late to have a formative influence on the Latin authors under consideration. Strabo, however, is discussed briefly at 27 below with regard to later Greek authors’ influences from, rather than on, Latin ones.
northern plains, which is related along with a description of the settlers' rustic habits and ethnic subdivisions (17). A summary narrative of Gallo-Roman conflict and northward Roman expansion up to the Battle of Lake Vadimon in 282 follows, starting with the sack of Rome (18-20). The larger conflict with the Cisalpine Gauls and their Transalpine allies, the Gaisatai, between the first two Punic Wars is then related in much greater detail (21-35, interrupted by a digression on Roman military organization in Italy at 24). Polybius felt that Cisalpine Gaul had been inadequately described by previous historians (16.15) and seems proudly aware that he was breaking new ground in Greek history and ethnography; he called the initial Celtic force in the war he was recounting the largest and most militarily proficient army ever to emerge from Gaul (22.6), its campaign in Etruria the most serious of all the Celtic invasions (31.7) and the war itself second to none in history as regards intensity and scale (35.2). He also compared his exégèsis to the contribution of those who recorded the Greco-Persian Wars (35.7), surely an implicit claim to be a successor of Herodotus.

Although the descriptions of the particularities of Gaulish material culture are of course fairly crude, slightly more interest is taken than in most comparable Latin histories; a similarity in habits and clothing to other, linguistically distinct, European peoples is noted (17.5), as are trousers (28.7), torques (29.8, 31.5) and the social importance of cattle and gold (17.11) and details of Celtic military practices are given (wagons and chariots, battlefield nudity, military trumpetry and the design of shields and swords). It is alleged that the Gauls are so consistently immoderate in their drinking that allies often fall out with each other and come to blows after a victory due to unrestrained celebration (18.6). This intemperance is associated with gluttony (plèsmonê); the overall picture is one of over-indulgence of appetites or passions, which Polybius also diagnosed as a serious defect of Galatic military decision-making.

33 At least the first half of it; the climactic phase of the Roman conquest of Cisalpina was really a near-continuous round of invasion, counter-invasion and rebellion stretching from the unrest of 236 to the physical expulsion of the Boii from Italy in 191, with Hannibal taking the place of the Gaisatic leaders Kogkolitanos and Anéroestos after only two years of peace between 220 and 218 and initiating, among other things, decades of further Romano-Cisalpine strife.
34 28.5-8, 29.6-8, 30.3, 30.8, 33.3-5.
Headhunting is mentioned but not discussed in detail (2.28.10, 3.67.3). He also mentioned and appears to have endorsed a Roman belief in Gaulish inconstancy (*athesia*).

Predictably but importantly, an ethical double standard is applied to Celtic and Roman war-making. Polybius approved of Roman expansion in general (6.50, 6.54-6, 18.44-6) and in the majority of particular cases. He also felt free not to endorse all senatorial decisions and criticized some quite harshly (e.g. 3.28.1-2), even occasionally questioning policy towards Gauls (2.21.8-9). This, however, is in no way inconsistent; it is only because Roman expansion was potentially legitimate, that Roman civilization was fundamentally rational, that it deserved rational scrutiny of the prudence and morality of its actions in specific instances.\(^{35}\)

There was a difference not merely of degree but of kind between the expansion of the Roman dominion and territorial acquisition by Celts. There is no criticism of specific decisions as untimely or unjust because Celtic expansion was, fundamentally, barbaric and illegitimate, comparable to the Achaemenid invasions of Greece (2.35.7). The Celtic irruptions into the Aegean in the early third century and the roughly contemporaneous round of Romano-Cisalpine conflict culminating in 282, for instance, he described as like a disease of war (*loimikê ... polemou diathesis*) afflicting all Gauls at that time (2.20.7). Given this double standard, a mutually violent Gallo-Roman history could be held to reflect badly only or primarily on the Celts, irrespective of either side’s conduct, as all Gaulish invasions, unlike Roman ones, necessarily constituted Barbarian aggressions.

The reduction to a fragmentary state of the entire corpus of the late Hellenistic polymath Posidonius of Apamea has left inconvenient gaps in many branches of Classical literature and thought; this is particularly the case with regard to Greek and Roman depiction of the Gauls. His extensive travels in Gaul, his intellectual prestige among the Roman elite as a successful proselytizer for the

\(^{35}\) On his ambiguous attitude to Rome itself, one of the central problems of Polybian scholarship, see Scott-Kilvert, 1979: 17, Green, 1990: 269-85.
Stoic philosophy at Rome, his systematic synthesis of personal observations with Stoicism, environmental determinism and ethnographic tradition, his strong support for Roman expansion as the inevitable and natural result of Italy’s central position in the cosmos and his sheer fame as one of the greatest Greek philosophers made his writings on Gaulish subjects almost uniquely influential in Latin as well as Greek literary circles.\textsuperscript{36} Just as Cicero, Caesar and Livy between them remoulded the Latin image of the Galli, eclipsing previous authors and strongly influencing all subsequent ones, Posidonius appears to have made himself the Greek authority on the Κέλτοι/Γαλάται.\textsuperscript{37} Lacking his works, however, it is impossible to move beyond generalities in discussing the content of his impact.

Judging by the surviving fragments, his description of the Celts and their character was broadly compatible with that of Polybius. As with that author, his account of the Celts (“Κέλτοι” appears to have been his preferred term) was situated in the context of a much larger and primarily historical work\textsuperscript{38} but, while Polybius’s digression was itself mostly historical, Posidonius’s, as was natural given his travels in Gaul, was ethnographic in the narrower sense. He certainly seems to have written more on Celtic culture and society than most Greek authors or any Latin one. For instance, he discussed their dining habits\textsuperscript{39} and also gave accounts of duels (68, 275), bardic praise-poetry (69) and female participation in religious rites (276); the level of detail is such that, short of assuming that Posidonius was writing an essay on these particular topics but nothing else, it is reasonable to infer that the total amount of ethnographic material was very considerable. Like Polybius, he noted the prominence of gold in Celtic society (67, 273) and described Helvetic smelting techniques but Posidonius also alleged that the Scordisci\textsuperscript{40} banned gold from their country (240a); Alpine silver was also mentioned (240b).

\textsuperscript{37} Although his influence should of course not be exaggerated or used as an explanation for anything puzzling in an extant author that cannot be easily understood otherwise; on the past tendency to over-use of Posidonius, especially with regard to Caesar, see Nash, 1976, Kidd, 1988: 309.
\textsuperscript{38} Kidd, 1999: 134.
\textsuperscript{39} Fra. 67 (Edelstein & Kidd).
\textsuperscript{40} Here referred to by “Σκορδίσται” and considered Celtic.
The geographical breadth of his interest was also wide. Celtiberia received independent treatment, although it is difficult to tell how far it was discussed ethnographically rather than merely historically (271). Nomadic or migrating Celtic peoples – Cimbri, Boii, Scordisci – were also discussed and Posidonius seems to have strongly criticized claims that the Cimbri’s wanderings were prompted by encroachment of the sea (272). He similarly and more plausibly rejected the legend that the Volcae Tectosages in Narbonensis had kept treasure at Tolosa taken by the second Brennus from Delphi (273).

Like the earlier historian, Posidonius reported headhunting but, unlike Polybius, his experience was direct and he claimed to have seen so much of it in parts of Gaul to which he travelled that he became accustomed to it, despite being nauseated on his first acquaintance (274).

Of extant authors, Diodorus Siculus was, in all likelihood, the most strongly influenced by Posidonius in his Gaulish ethnography. Indeed, quite apart from the direct quotations, the ethnography at 5.24-32 (immediately followed by a Celtiberian ethnography at 5.33-4), is probably the best surviving source on many aspects of Posidonius’s account of the Celts, especially evaluative judgement, as the process of fragmentation tends, through the use of citation to justify assertions or supply details, to select material that is merely factual.

Diodorus began with the explanation of their name already mentioned (24) and followed this with a moderately detailed geographical excursus on the Gauls’ lands (25-7). Next, the main description of their habits and character occupies 28-31. The account as a whole is rounded off at 32 with a concluding judgement of national character and a discussion of miscellanea like the peculiarities of Gaulish women and the distinction between Κελτοί and Γαλάται, followed by a very brief treatment of the Celtiberians (33.1-34.3).

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41 In the rationally ordered, pantheistic universe of Posidonius and his fellow Stoic Strabo, who supplies the fragment, regular tidal flow was permissible but large and unpredictable flooding of the North Sea was not and both refused to believe in it.


43 Discussed at 16 above.
The claim that Gauls were of great height (28.1, 32.2) was to be widely accepted by Latin authors. Also of more importance in later Latin than in earlier Greek texts is Diodorus’s mention of the breeches (brakai) of southern Gaul (30.1) and he may have been the very first ethnographic author to mention tartan. Overall, the Diodoran portrait of Gaul is the most detailed in extant Classical literature before the fourth century CE but still contains many familiar elements; gold, for example, is said to be abundant and to bear religious significance, torques are mentioned (27), feasting practices are described, complete with Posidonian after-dinner duels (28.3-5), and the roles of Druids and bards are discussed (31.2-5).

His assessment of the Gauls is substantially more negative than that of Polybius, but it is impossible to say to what extent this is because Diodorus’s directly ethnographic text called for more explicit evaluation and what judgement there is in Polybius runs in a very similar vein. The Gauls are said to be extremely intemperate, even drinking wine neat (26.3). They are greedy to excess (27.4), boastful and arrogant (31.1), the wildest of barbarians (31.5).

At 32.3, habitual cannibalism is alleged among the peoples bordering on Skythia (Germanic in the Latin scheme of things but Celtic for Diodorus). When headhunting is discussed, the Gauls’ attachment to the cedar-oil-preserved cephalic trophies captured by their ancestors is described as bestial (theriōdes – 29.4-5). Of more immediate relevance to Latin literature, however, are the accounts of human sacrifice at 31.3 and 32.6; while Roman authors for the most part found headhunting too distasteful to discuss, even as an example of northern immorality, Gaulish human sacrifice was a theme of major importance.

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44 See 72-5 below.
45 Oldfather, 1939: 175 n. 1.
46 The association of gold with the North and with religion or the gods was a venerable one and can be traced back to the Hyperborean myth (Bridgman, 2005: 96, 158-60).
47 As discussed at 50-1 below, torques never acquired a great significance as a symbol of Gaulish culture in Classical texts. They were considerably more prominent in visual media, most famously the Ludovisi Gaul and Dying Trumpeter statues (Sismondo Ridgway, 1990: 284, pls. 141a-b, 142a-b).
48 A symbol for wildness and immoral appetites in Greek literature since Homer – Od. 9.345-54.
49 As opposed to mere incidents of cannibalism resulting from famine or siege, discussed at 121 below.
50 Virtually the sole exception is Liv. 23.24.6-13.
51 See 118, 125-6 below.
Most importantly, Diodorus, like Polybius, saw territorial expansion by Gauls in an entirely different light to territorial expansion by Greeks or Romans. The double standard is taken so much for granted that no specific reasoning is given to account for or justify the disparity; a radically different ethical yardstick is simply applied without explanation when the aggression under discussion is by peoples other than the Greeks or Romans, most emphatically including aggression by Celts. This being the case, Celtic migration and conquest can justify a negative assessment of national character much more explicit than Polybius’s stereotypical remarks:

For they have desired to plunder from of old, invading the countries of others, and to overtake all. For they are the ones who captured Rome, despoiled the sanctuary at Delphi and subjected much of Europe and not a little of Asia ... And, in pursuit of their savagery, they also sin outlandishly with regard to sacrifices...

The loss of his works has made it impossible to reconstruct in detail the relationship to Posidonius of the main Golden Latin authors on the Gauls. However, the extent of the influence on Roman literary attitudes of the Gaulish digressions of Polybius and, through Diodorus and directly, of Posidonius is clear. The general thrust and many of the details of the Latin stereotypes of the Gauls to be analysed in succeeding chapters form, in essence, the same picture as that presented by these Greek authors. The innumerable modifications of this picture in particular texts and periods are important, indeed they

52 On the tension in Greek literature between the principle that seizure of territory was, in principle, hubristic and contrary to díke and the need to permit and indeed laud Greek colonization and on the ways in which this tension was resolved, see Bridgman, 2005: 161, Malkin, 2003: 115-27.
53 Although the influence must have been considerable; Cicero, for instance, was actually taught by him in his youth (Edelstein & Kidd, 1989: 10).
form much of the subject matter to be considered, but they remained, nonetheless, Latin variations on a Greek theme.

4: Latin Influence on Later Greek Authors

Much as Latin authors initially adopted then substantially adapted the category of the Celtic/Galatic, Greek literature's suite of related Galatian stereotypes, reviewed above, became a standard set of Gaulish stereotypes in Latin literature, with certain omissions and additions. The reaction of Greek literature to this newer discourse, however, was in certain cases quite different. A strong tendency to preserve Greek terminology and categorization with as little modification as possible was noted above; however, several later authors of Greek texts were in their turn strongly influenced in the details of their Galatic stereotypes by prestigious Roman authors like Livy. An awareness of this acceptance of specifically Roman forms of bias in later Greek historical texts on the Gauls is important in the critical use of such texts as historical sources on Gallo-Roman political and, especially, military interaction and is thus of immediate relevance to Part 2 of the present thesis.

One peculiarly Roman stereotype about the Gauls and one of the few positive prejudices was that of a noble or honest nature. A forthright, straightforward character is obviously far from incompatible with the image of non-Mediterranean Europeans current among Greek authors but this particular version of it was nonetheless of Latin origin. At 4.4.2, Strabo strongly endorses this picture.

I have argued that several Greek authors adopted a sceptical attitude towards the Romans' Germanic categorization of much of central Europe. The few distinctions drawn between the Gauls and the Germans in the passage used above as an example of Greek acceptance of the stereotype of Gaulish honesty (4.4.2) are therefore of interest. Specifically, although the Germans are still

54 18-9.
55 That is, a guileless and candid nature specifically; I do not mean to say that the usual Roman assessment of the Gauls' character was of a generally good or moral people. Quite the reverse was the case, as discussed at 118-23 below; on the honest stereotype itself, see 67-9 below.
56 E.g. Caes. Gal. 1.13, B. Afr. 73, Flor. Epit. 1.34, Scr. Sev. 4.1, Gall. 4.3-4.
regarded, contrary to Caes. *Gal. 6.21.1*, as culturally almost identical to the Gauls, they are described as exhibiting characteristics, especially martial vigour, that the Gauls had once possessed but had lost over time. The claim of progressive Gaulish enervation relative to the Germans is an entirely Roman invention and one of considerable propagandistic value, particularly to Caesar.\(^57\) Another striking instance of Roman influence on Strabo’s accounts of the Gaulish countries is his willingness to use the (transliterated) Roman term “Γαλλογρακία” – ‘Gallo-Greece’ to refer to Galatia (12.5.1).

Appian’s stereotypes of Gaulish physique are of a distinctly Roman variety; as mentioned above with regard to Diodorus Siculus, Gauls and northern Europeans in general were usually regarded in both Greek and Latin literature as universally tall but, while earlier Greek authors like Diodorus associated this height with lean, muscular strength (5.28.1), Latin authors tended to have the northern climate make Gauls large but pale and doughy, lacking in real toughness (e.g. Flor. *Epit.* 1.20); Appian endorsed the latter characterization quite forcefully at least twice in surviving fragments and also associated it with the Gauls’ physical environment (*Gall*. 7-8).

One of the most complex aspects of Latin authors’ attitudes to the Gauls is their assessment of Gaulish military potency.\(^58\) In brief, Gauls were often held, especially by Livy and Florus, to make devastating, frenzied charges but to lack the lean, wiry robustness and patient, determined perseverance that allowed Roman soldiers to defeat them once the first attack had been endured. *Gall*. 1.3, though describing Germans rather than Gauls (an unimportant distinction in a Greek context, as already discussed) uses almost exactly this assessment as an explanation for Caesar’s victory over the Suebi.

An instructive contrast is provided by Polybius’s *Historiae*, written more than two and a half centuries earlier, before Livy and Florus. Polybius did not set out to praise Gaulish warfare; one of his stated aims and, in his view, one of the most important tasks of history was to allay fear through reminding future

\(^{57}\) On whose use of it see 129-31 below.

\(^{58}\) See 80-4 below.
generations that Barbaric, including Celtic, invasions, though alarming and destructive, were ultimately destined to fail (2.35.4-10). However, the details of his assessment of the Gauls' performance against the Romans differ markedly from those of Latin authors. At 2.25.9, for instance, he referred to the courage \( (tolmê) \) with which Gaulish soldiers defeated the Romans at Faesulae in 225. At 2.30.7, he went farther and claimed that Roman and Gaulish fighters were on a par as regards warlike spirit \( (psukhai) \), the Gauls being inferior only in the armaments they were able to devise. An explanation at 2.33.2-4 of Roman tactics developed for use against Gauls appears to endorse the Latin claim that they lacked the tenacity and toughness required to maintain effort in a lengthy battle; it had been empirically observed by the military tribunes that the first Gaulish onslaught was the main difficulty to be overcome. However, it is immediately explained that the reason for this was the crude design of the Gauls' large swords, which were intended to overpower with one killing stroke and became bent so easily as to be useless for prolonged fighting against an enemy not routed by the first charge. A peculiarly Gaulish lack of stamina and tenacity is not even proposed, let alone endorsed. The difference between the two assessments of the defects of the Gaulish art of war is, in essence, between an authentically Greek assumption that northern Europeans must consistently lack \( tekhnê \) (and that the Gauls' poor weaponry is thus a reliable and predictable factor) and an acceptance of originally Roman views on the potency of Gauls, in particular Cisalpine Gauls, as fighting men.

A final example of the capacity of Golden Latin authors to place their own stamp on the Gauls can be provided by comparing Livy's narrative of the Senonian sack of Rome (from 5.32.6 to the end of Book 5) with Plutarch's (Cam. 13.2-32.3). I do not propose to examine the relationship between the two texts in detail but the following passages are illustrative of the Livian legacy to subsequent Greek as well as Latin literature on Gaulish subjects; not only did the Roman legend of the sack become the accepted narrative by

59 Cf. the quotation from Aristotle at 11 above.
60 Similarly, although Diodorus ascribed to the Gauls a great many faults, excessive eagerness to turn and run on being withstood is not among them; on the contrary he claimed that their agreement with Pythagoras on life after death caused them to be reckless to the extreme (5.28.5, 5.29.2).
Plutarch’s time but fine details of personality and motivation were fixed by Livy’s literary authority and even some of his imagery was repeated:

**eam gentem traditur fama, dulcedine frugum maximeque uini, nova tum voluptate, captam, Alpes transisse agrosque ab Etruscis ante cultos possedisse et inuexisse in Galliam uinum inliciendae gentis causa Arruntem Clusinum, ira corruptae uxor et tua quae poenae nisi externa uis quaesita esset requirent. hunc transeuntibus Alpes ducem auctoremque Clusium oppugnandi fuisset. (Liv. 5.33.2-4)**

Tradition relates that this race, captured by the charm of Italy’s fruits, and most of all wine (then a new pleasure to the Gauls), crossed the Alps and possessed itself of the lands previously cultivated by the Etruscans and that Arruns the Clusian brought wine into Gaul for this race’s enticement, in anger at his wife’s having been seduced by Lucumo, of whom he had been the guardian, the youth being so powerful that a penalty could not have been exacted from him unless a foreign force were solicited. This man was their guide crossing the Alps and the instigator of the attack on Clusium.

But the man having brought wine to them first and foremost and directed them towards Italy is said to have been Arrôn, a Tyrrenian, an illustrious man and not one wicked by nature but rather one having suffered

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61 Again, Polybius provides an informative contrast; his brief account of the sack, at 2.18 with a further mention at 2.22.3-5, not only lacks most of the various Roman legends and anecdotes dramatized by Livy but differs substantially in certain aspects of the overall narrative. Some even earlier Greek accounts, e.g. that discussed at 147-8 below were almost unrecognizable.
this misfortune: he was a guardian of an orphaned child, both first of the citizens in wealth and wondrous in appearance, Loukoumôn by name ... And for a long time, having seduced [Arrôn’s] wife and having been seduced by her, he concealed this ... But the husband, having brought a suit and been defeated by Loukoumôn through multitude of friends and expenditures of money, abandoned his own city. And, having learnt of the Galatai, he came to them and guided their expedition into Italy.

qui eorum curules gesserant magistratus, ut in fortunae pristinae honorumque ac uirtutis insignibus morentur ... ea uestiti medio aedium eburneis sellis sedere. sunt qui, M. Folio pontifice maximo praefante Carmen, deuouisse eos se pro patria Quiritibusque Romanis tradant. (Liv. 5.41.2-3)

Those of them who had exercised curule magistracies, that they might die in the ancient manner of their rank and with the marks of their virtue ... seated themselves, thus robed, amid their houses on ivory chairs. There are some who relate that, the chief pontiff M. Folius reciting the prayer, they devoted themselves [to the Dii Manes] for the fatherland and the Roman People of the Quirites.

οἱ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν ἱερεῖς οἱ τε γηραιοὶ τῶν ὑπατικῶν καὶ θραμβικῶν ἀνδρῶν τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐκλεπτεῖν οὐχ ὑπέμειναν ἵππας δὲ καὶ λαμπρὰς ἀναλαβόντες ἔσθήτας ἐξηγουμένου Φαβίου τοῦ ἄρχερέως ἐπενεχάμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς ἐαυτοὺς ὑπέρ τῆς πατρίδος τῷ δαιμονι καθεροῦντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλεφαντίνων δίφροιν ἐν ἀγορᾷ καθῆντο κεκοσμημένοι τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν τύχην ὑπομένοντες. (Plu. Cam. 21.2)

And the priests of the other gods and the elders who had been consuls or triumphators did not suffer to abandon the city but, having put on their sacred and splendid robes, Fabius the high priest leading, praying to the gods that they might be devoted to a daimôn for the fatherland, they seated themselves thus arrayed on ivory chairs in the agora, awaiting their impending fate.

63 Again, Polybius provides an informative contrast; his brief account of the sack, at 2.18 with a further mention at 2.22.3-5, not only lacks most of the various Roman legends and anecdotes dramatized by Livy but differ substantially in certain aspects of the overall narrative.
The relationship between Latin and Greek texts is, in this as in other respects, complex; the influence of Roman authors on later Greek ones in particular has only been touched upon in this chapter. However, some sense at least has been given of the Greek and Hellenistic intellectual milieu out of which Roman literature on the Gauls evolved and of the writers whom Cicero, Livy and Caesar succeeded. Having looked at the Greek foundation on which they were building, I shall begin my analysis of Latin texts in the next chapter with an examination of several individually minor Gaulish themes before proceeding to major topoi in Chapters 3-5.
2: Miscellanea Gallica: Some Minor Gaulish Themes of Latin Authors

Matters Gaulish were a major pre-occupation of Roman writers. Even those writing on entirely unrelated subjects often had occasion at least to mention Gaul or its inhabitants. This has important implications for the present study, which aims not at a detailed exegesis of a particular Gaulish theme but at a survey of the entirety of the role played by Gaul and the Gauls in extant ancient Latin literature. Along with major topoi there are subjects of only minor importance and the concerns of individual authors, which must also be covered. Since each of the three remaining chapters of Part 1 concentrates on a single major aspect of Latin writings on the Gauls, I have decided, in order to avoid cluttering them with matters of only tangential relevance to those themes, to devote this chapter solely to minor topics.

Although these themes are individually of limited prominence, their collective inclusion is very important to the achievement of this goal of comprehensiveness. Also, some comparative issues arise in connection with these minor themes – not to do with comparison of Romans with Gauls but comparisons of Roman views with modern ones on the Gauls, on empire and on the Romans themselves. Part of the function of this chapter is to delineate the subject matter more clearly by distinguishing between our Gauls and their Galli. I hope thereby to facilitate the detailed analysis of the Romans’ beliefs about their northern neighbours in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

The modern views that are relevant here are therefore not those of current scholarship on ancient Celtic-speaking peoples; what I am concerned with is the associations that spring more automatically to mind. Many of these, such as the ethnic associations of the ancient linguistic affinities termed “Celtic”, have actually been explicitly rejected by many or most contemporary scholars, especially those involved in the archaeology and prehistory of Britain and, to a lesser extent, Ireland. (Although many views with, at present, little academic currency are actually of scholarly origin in the eighteenth and early...
nineteenth centuries, especially those relevant to Sections 1 and 3). As such, I have deliberately avoided using as a basis for comparison a synthesis of contemporary scholarship on the subject, as this is precisely what would be least relevant.¹

1: Migrations and Origins

In general, when answering the basic question “who were they?” about ancient ethnic or cultural groups, modern discussion has, until comparatively recently, begun with mass immigration (real or imaginary).² It hardly needs to be said that this tendency can be fully and colourfully observed in the case of ancient and medieval Celtic-speaking peoples. Certainly, in ancient thought on national characters and origins, ultimate migratory origin was important³ but the bulk of ancient writing on the subject is Greek rather than Latin and, moreover, migration was counterbalanced to some extent by the seriousness with which myths of autochthony were taken.⁴ In the case of Latin commentary on Gaulish origins, migration is almost nowhere to be found, excepting the historical migration through the Balkans into Anatolia,⁵ and even this, for obvious reasons, receives more attention in Greek writings (e.g. D. S. 31.14-5). What little there is on ultimate, prehistoric, migratory origins, discussed in this section, almost never presents the Gauls as migrating in a single, ancestral group.

At Gal. 2.4, Caesar claimed a trans-Rhenane origin for most of the Belgae, although they were nonetheless regarded as Gaulish rather than German. Similarly, at 2.29, he claimed a Cimbric and Teutonic origin for the Atuatuci, in the course of relating their, and the Nervii’s, defeat at his hands. Again, the Atuatuci were considered no more or less Gaulish than their allies and neighbours, indeed as distinctive in no way, apart from the slight curiosity

¹ On Celtic studies in general see Green, 1995, Karl & Stifter, 2007a-d; as regards the Classical world in particular see Rankin, 1996.
⁵ Walbank et al., 1984: 114-5 & 415-6.
of their origin itself, which seems mentioned only in order to link his campaigns with Marius’s salvation of the state in the Cimbrian War, however indirectly.\(^6\) Here again, a contrast with modern interpretation is to be drawn; the associations of “Teutonic” and its various equivalents in the western European languages can go without saying; here, however, the Teutoni are implicitly Gaulish, inasmuch as their descendants are regarded as Gaulish. However, Caesar merely does not say that the Atuatuci are of partly German descent; he never says that he does regard their ancestors as Gaulish. Florus made a less ambiguous assessment of the Cimbri’s and Teutoni’s ethnic character (Epit. 1.38.1); they were ejected by Oceanic flooding from their original home in, quite explicitly, the remoter parts of Gaul (Galliae) rather than Germany.\(^7\)

Florus also gave the Senones a remote, northerly homeland in proximity to the Atlantic (which was supposed to curve northeastwards to become an ultimately northern rather than western boundary, with Arctic glaciation omitted entirely). In this case, the homeland in question was merely described as at the ends of the Earth (ultimis terrarum), without being specifically located in Gaul, but the Senones were still very clearly regarded as Gaulish (Galli Senones – the Senonian Gauls).\(^8\)

The only Latin accounts of Gaul being peopled from elsewhere by mass migration are among the collection of six briefly summarized stories on the subject collected by Timagenes of Alexandria in his lost history of the Gauls and preserved by Ammianus Marcellinus (15.9.2-8). Timagenes is said to have reported that one account, of unspecified origin, held the Gauls aborigines, while ascribing the name “Celtae” to an eponymous king and “Galatae” to his beloved mother. “Aborigines” is a rather dense word; it could bear the same vague sense as English “indigenous” (i.e. those present ab origine), with or

\(^6\) For the boundaries drawn by Caesar between the Belgae, other Galli and the Germans, see Map 1. For the changing official demarcation of the province of Belgica by the Roman state, see Maps 2C, 2D and 4.

\(^7\) Cp. Plutarch at Mar. 11.3-7, where he appears unsure whether the invaders were German, Cimmerian or Κύστοκσικόςκυθικος of mixed Gaulish and Skythian ancestry.

\(^8\) Flor. Epit. 1.7.4-10.
without the additional implication of physical autochthony, and it could also refer to the pre-Latin inhabitants of central Italy, who were scattered about the Roman literary imagination’s picture of prehistory in much the same manner as the Greeks’ Pelasgoi (e.g. Th. 4.109).

Another account, according to Ammianus, after Timagenes, claimed Dorian descent for the Gauls; one Hercules, who lived some time earlier than his better known namesake, extended the westward migration of a branch of the Doric Greeks to the Atlantic.\(^9\) This version of the Gauls’ beginnings is not immediately familiar but has found the occasional modern echo, such as its eighteenth-century reversal in the work of Breton scholar Paul-Yves Pezron,\(^10\) which has the (Doric) Spartans descended from the Celts (who were traced back, ultimately, to Japhet, son of Noah). The final unattested account has the Gaulish countries uninhabited until their settlement by Trojans fleeing the Greek destruction of their city.

The first account for which Ammianus alleges a source is that attributed to the Druids of Timagenes’s time; one part of the Gaulish people was indeed indigenous, while another had been driven from the north by several inundations, not only from across the Rhine but from across the Channel, reversing the now traditional (indeed, archaeologically outdated)\(^11\) account of cross-Channel Celtic colonization of Britain.\(^12\)

The inhabitants of Gaul themselves, Druids aside, are said to have claimed and inscribed on their monuments that (the more famous) Hercules killed the Spanish tyrant Geryon and the Gaulish tyrant Tauriscus and then married a native noblewoman, begetting many sons, who ruled various parts of Gaul and after whom, respectively, those parts were named. Nothing was alleged about the Gauls’ own view of the pre-Herculean population over which Tauriscus ruled, let alone stories of ultimate origins.

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\(^9\) A Herakles, whether or not identified with the son of Amphitryon, also featured in several of the Greeks accounts of the origins of the Celts or their names surveyed at 16-7 above (e.g. D. S. 5.24.2-3).

\(^10\) James, 1999: 51; Pezron, 2000.


\(^12\) James, 1999: 28-9.
The only story in which Ammianus himself expressed confidence is that of the Phocaean foundation of Massalia and the subsequent foundation of many nearby towns by Massaliot settlers. Nothing was said about the first colonization of Gaul and Greek inspiration was not claimed for the region’s culture or civilization, which were ascribed to a gradual development led by the Gaulish bards, *euhages* and Druids.

Neither Timagenes nor Ammianus, therefore, settled on a single account of Gaul’s first peopling, migratory or otherwise, and no firm conclusion was reached about the Gauls’ own views in that regard. Also, the accounts given show themes ubiquitous in Classical foundation-myths: the *Völkerwanderungen* of the Dorians, the establishment of societies by the many heroes bearing the name “Hercules”/“Herakles” and by the many sons of Herakles, son of Amphytrion, colonization in the western Mediterranean by refugees from Troy, royal eponymy (“Romulus” is the most obvious comparison) and a loose tie-in with recorded early history. Moreover, even this discussion is rare; the Gauls’ collective origins, unlike the origins of particular Gaulish peoples, especially those that came to blows with the Romans, appear simply not to have interested most Latin authors writing on the Gauls. What, positively speaking, they did regard as the decisive factor in determining the character of Gaulish, and more generally northern European, peoples — geographical environment — is discussed below.¹³

For now, however, this purely negative fact, the absence of the early modern, mass-migratory account of the formation of Classical Gaulish society, deserves attention, even if only for comparative purposes. It is the first major distinction to be drawn between the Romans’ *Galli* and our Gauls. When Latin authors talked of *Galli*, the entity to which they were referring, however much or little it corresponded to Gaulish realities, was not something mobile and culturally constituted, now in one place, now in another. Rather, it was a national personality, anchored to a particular place and fast losing its distinctiveness when, as with the Galatians, it was detached from that place.¹⁴

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¹³ Isaac, 2004: 90.
¹⁴ Isaac, 2004: 90.
(however imprecise the actual demarcation of that place might be). This is not to say that the Gauls were explicitly described as an autochthonous people but claims of environmental determinism, always in the implicit background, amounted, in this respect at least, to much the same thing. More importantly, modern views of the Celtic essence as something fundamentally ethno-linguistic, once located in east-central Europe,\(^{15}\) were as wholly absent as the inclusion in it of the British Isles.

### 2: Ligures as treacherous

One consequence of this less rigid ancient classification of peoples as Gaulish or non-Gaulish is occasional ambiguity or debate as to whether a given group was a Gaulish or non-Gaulish people. The writings on the Cimbri and Teutoni discussed above\(^ {16}\) exemplify this. Of greater importance for present purposes than purely geographical ambiguity, however, is ambivalence in the ascription to peoples of stereotypical qualities. As an example of such ambiguity in content, rather than location, it is interesting to explore the depiction of the supposedly typical qualities of the Ligures of the Italian and French rivieras.\(^ {17}\)

As is discussed below,\(^ {18}\) there was a persistent Roman belief that, however many and severe their other vices, on the whole Gauls were at least honest.\(^ {19}\) For this reason, the Ligurian reputation in Latin literature for dishonesty is puzzling and forms the next minor Gaulish theme to be discussed in this chapter. This deceitful or treacherous stereotype can be traced as far back as Cato:

\[\text{Ligures autem omnes fallaces sunt sicut ait Cato in secundo originum libro ... uane ligus aut fallax aut inaniter iactans ... \textit{Nigidius de}}\]

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\(^{15}\) James, 1999: 27.

\(^{16}\) 34-5.

\(^{17}\) On ancient uncertainty as to how to identify the Ligures ethnically, see 162 n. 98 below. The question in modern scholarship as to whether the Ligures were more Gaulish or more Iberian and/or Pre-Indo-European in their material culture and language does not affect the present discussion; for the Celtic view, see De Beloguet, 1868, for the Iberian/Pre-Indo-European view, see Arbois de Jubainville & Dottin, 1894, for a retrospective overview of that debate, see Mees, 2003.

\(^{18}\) 67-8.

Ligures, however, are all fallacious, as Cato says in his second *Book of Origins* ... discussing the vain or fallacious or inane Ligurian ... Nigidius, concerning countries, says “for also Ligures, who held the Apennines, were robbers, insidious, fallacious, mendacious”, while Cato, in the *Origins*, concerning the Ligures, says “but they themselves lack exact memory concerning whence their originated; they are illiterate and mendacious and little remember truths”.

Overall, there are comparatively few references to Ligurian treachery. Cicero had a decidedly low opinion of Ligurian collective character – he believed that the mountainous nature of their land naturally made the Ligures harsh and savage (*duri atque agrestes* – Agr. 2.95) – but made no specific claim of mendacity or bad faith. Livy, on the other hand, portrayed their conduct in the Hannibalic War as consistently dishonourable. He found the idea of a Ligurian playing a noble part in the Battle of the Ticinus implausible and even distasteful; the Ligurians fighting on the Punic side he depicted as doing so in a devious manner and with treacherous enthusiasm rather than under Carthaginian duress; part of their motivation was alleged to be a greedy jealousy of the fertile lands of (lowland) Italy.20

Nonetheless, Ausonius’s *Technopaegnion*, written in the fourth century CE, appears to confirms that the suspicion of *Ligustina Fides* was a persistent one. The following lines play on stereotypes that, in the main, are known to be consistent trends in ancient Latin literature, for instance the alleged brutality of the Thracians21 and the effeminacy of the Anatolians22 and the adjective used by Cato, “fallaces”, also qualifies the Ligurians here:

intulit incestam tibi uim, Philomela, ferus Thrax.

20 Respectively 21.46.10, 21.49.10, 30.33.9.
21 12.10.21, cf. Th. 7.29.
barbarus est Lydus, pellax Geta, femineus Phryx,
fellaces Ligures, nullo situs in pretio Car,
uellera depectit memoralia uestiflus Ser,
nota in portentis Thebana tricoporibus Sphinx,
nota Caledoniis nuribus muliebre secus Strix (12.10.21-6)

To thee, Philomela, incestuous violence was offered by the brutal king of Thrace.
Lydians are savages, Getae treacherous, effeminate are the children of Phrygia’s land,
Ligurians are cheats, worthless is counted the Carian breed.
Carding the woodland-fleece see the loose-robed Chink.
Famous among monsters of triple form is the Theban Sphinx.
Well known to Caledonian mothers is that bird, woman in kind, the screech-owl.23

One way to explain the seeming contradiction between this prejudice
and the more usual depiction of Gauls as honest is to conclude that the Romans
did not consider the Ligures Gaulish. Certainly, the term “Gallia Cisalpina”
was ambiguous and changeable, especially as regards the southern delimitation
of its area of reference.24 The Romans might simply have thought of Ligures as
generically treacherous and Gauls as generically honest. The fact that Liguria
is to the south of Gaul lends credibility to this interpretation, as being further
south or east (closer to North Africa and the Levant) was associated with
dishonesty (e.g. B. Afr. 73) and being further north or west (closer to northern
Europe and Iberia) was associated with a forthright, warlike character25. Also,
the fact that Ausonius was from Gaul and apparently claimed Aeduan descent26
would suggest that what was meant, particularly in the last of these examples,
was that Ligures and Ligures alone were treacherous, as distinct from honest
Gauls.

On the other hand, Liguria and the Ligures could certainly be
categorized as Gaulish if it suited an author’s historiographical purposes in a

23 Verse translation from Loeb Classical Library (Evelyn White, 1919: 301); Ausonius was playing a
game of verbal dexterity involving the combination of a loose metrical scheme with the rule that every
line must end in a monosyllable.
24 Salmon, 1969: 106.
26 E.g. 1.1.5-8, 4.4.1-6.
given text or part of a text. The term “Galloligures” (cf. “Celtiberi”, “Gallograeci”) could also be used to blur the dividing line between the Ligures and neighbouring peoples. Both the categorization or otherwise of the Ligures as Gaulish and a suspicion that they were involved in nefarious schemes threatening Italian security will be important to the discussion of Gallo-Roman political interaction in the second century BCE in Part 2.  

3: Attitudes towards Druids and Druidism

In many instances, particular Cicero’s *Pro Fonteio*, questions as to the honesty or trustworthiness of the Romans’ northwestern neighbours concerned religion and the gods. However, Druids and their practices and beliefs played a surprisingly minor role within Latin discourse on religion and the Gauls, with regard both to the amount of extant discussion and to its tone and content. While themes relating to Gaulish impiety will be of considerable importance throughout Part 1, themes relating to peculiarly Gaulish forms of piety serve primarily as context for this larger discussion.

In contrast to Section 1 above, Roman writing on Druids (sometimes “Druidae”, sometimes “Drasidae”), if not on Druidism, does resemble the familiar modern picture of an entrenched Gaulish priestly stratum, at least up to a point. This is not noticeable in the specific case of the only Druid of antiquity whose name was recorded; Caesar’s narration of events involving the Aeduan Druid, Diviciacus, is notable in this regard only for its lack of any commentary on Diviciacus’s priestly status. He was portrayed entirely positively, much as one would expect, given his consistently pro-Roman politics (*Gal. 1.19*) and his close co-operation with Caesar personally. The fact that, as well as being a *vergobret* of the Aeduan *civitas* and a person of substance (and of the correct political orientation), Diviciacus was a Druid,

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27 See in particular 162 n. 98.
28 E.g. at Amm. 15.9.4.
29 For general surveys of the very limited ancient evidence on Druids and its scholarly interpretation, see Piggott, 1968, Chadwick, 1997; for a briefer but more current overview, see Cunliffe, 2010; on the archaeology of late Iron Age ritual practices, see Woolf, 1998: 209-14.
30 E.g. especially Caes. *Gal. 1.41*.
31 *Gal. 1.19-20, 1.41, 2.14-5.*
Caesar seems to have regarded as no more relevant than his own possession of the office of *pontifex maximus*. Thus far, therefore, there is nothing that suggests a view of the Druids' position as substantially different from that of (most) Roman priests – a public office, one of several positions occupied by a person of no specifically sacred status in the course of a political career, distinct only in being held concurrently with subsequent offices.\(^{32}\)

However, this is deceptive; Caesar merely omitted whatever was inessential to his narrative. Diviciacus’s loyalties and some of his actions had to be included, his biography did not. The diminutive Gaulish ethnography at 6.11-20 presents a surprisingly recognizable Druidic image; the Gauls were divided unambiguously into three castes: one sacerdotal, one martial and one productive (with the latter treated almost as, but not actually being, slaves – seemingly contradicting the sharp free/unfree distinction drawn at 1.4). Needless to say, Caesar did not paint the entire Victorian portrait;\(^{33}\) the triune division of society is shorn of any notion of a cross-cultural template associated with Indo-European linguistic heritage, let alone Aryan racial origin. It lacks both comparison with Vedic priests or Plato’s *Republic* and connection to a tripartite division of the cosmos or the mind. Caesar never even suggested that the Druids straddled the Channel and specifically denied their presence in German society (6.21). Nonetheless, the portrayal of the Druids themselves and their role in Gaulish society is, more or less, the familiar one. Ausonius also referred to Druidic heredity (5.4).

Broadly speaking, Classical authors did not treat religion among foreigners, Classical or otherwise, as a set of mutually discrete and internally coherent systems; Herodotus, for example, reported what ‘the Persians believe’ (or say or do) not what ‘Zoroaster taught’ or what ‘the Mazdaists believe’ (or say or do).\(^{34}\) How the Persians supposedly worshipped differed slightly from how the Medes did so and more substantially from how the Greeks and Egyptians did

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\(^{33}\) For which see, e.g., Frazer, 1913: 7-9, 189 & 362-3, Scott Littleton, 1973: 16-7.

\(^{34}\) E.g. 7.114.
so, just as how they spoke and dressed differed, but no distinction was conceived of between believers and unbelievers in the faith of the Avesta. There were, of course, exceptions; Cicero referred to (and condemned) the Egyptian religion as a singular whole (ND 1.16) and, obviously, Classical pagan writers were eventually made uncomfortably aware of the trans-national nature and exclusivistic claims of Christianity. On the whole, however, and naturally enough given the nature of their own religious structures, Roman and ancient Greek writers did not deal in “isms”.

Latin discussion of religion among the Gauls exemplifies this tendency perfectly. Differences in religion were noted – principally the difference in religious personnel already discussed and variety in methods and frequency of divination (Cic. Div. 2.36), especially the Galatians’ apparent preference for avian augury (1.41), – different religions were not.\textsuperscript{35} Druidic prediction was written of as one instance of a universal practice, compared specifically to the work of augurs among the Carians, Eleans, Etruscans, Phrygians and indeed Romans, as well as to that of the Persian Magi, who were regarded as the soothsayers of that part of the world rather than as the clergy of the Zoroastrian religion (1.141). The same broadly syncretistic approach that led Herodotus to interpret Zoroastrian monotheism as preferential veneration of Zeus and, less plausibly, to mistake the yazata Mithra for Aphrodite Ourania (1.131) led Latin authors to assimilate Belenus to Phoebus Apollo (e.g. Auson. 5.4). When defending Deiotarus I before Caesar (and therefore seeking to present a positive image of his kingdom), Cicero assimilated Galatian religion particularly closely to Roman practices; not only were oaths kept by altars and hearths but there were even penates of the king’s household (Deiot. 3). Similarly, according to one of Ammianus’s ethnographic digressions, Alpine communities venerated the manes of their more illustrious ancestors (15.10.7). And, in his account (15.9.4-8), Druids resembled Greek philosophers and were subdivided into bardi, euhages and drasidae (Druids proper), concerned with poetry, natural philosophy and Platonic speculations respectively. Augustine’s

only mention of specifically Gaulish religion, at 15.23, also equates the Gauls’ *dusii* with fauns or *incubi* (pre-Islamic Christian writers partially continued interpretative syncretism, inasmuch as worshippers other than Christians and Jews were consistently conflated under the terms “pagani” and, later, “Hellènes”).

Consequently, there was little evaluative judgement of Gaulish religion as a whole; there was no discrete entity, such as English occasionally refers to by the word “Druidism”, to judge. There was occasional praise of religious practices but this was never a general recommendation or idealization of Gaulish religion. For example, in *De Divinatione*, Cicero had his brother point to Deiotarus’s attitude towards divination as that which he advocated and to Diviciacus (here called “Divitiacus”) as an example of someone competent in prediction (1.15, 1.41). Definite judgements certainly were made on specific Gaulish practices, principally those involving human sacrifice or, much more rarely, headhunting or cannibalism. Even these, however, tended to be regarded as (very highly) undesirable habits rather than parts of an undesirable religious system. More broadly, they form part of a theme of marginality or extremity in the depiction of Gauls, a general transgression of fundamental behavioural limits, associated more with alleged irreligion than with alleged religious fanaticism, as discussed below.  

4: Cleanliness

The relatively minor importance of Druids to the Romans’ view of Gaulish society is an obvious contrast with modern views, especially older ones. Another contrast, of a different sort, concerns the degree of tidiness of Gaulish society, as imagined by Roman authors, which will be discussed in this short section.

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36 More rarely mentioned, that is, especially in Latin rather than Greek texts. I do not mean to suggest that headhunting and cannibalism were less consistently disapproved of than human sacrifice; quite the reverse was the case.

37 118-23.
In the somewhat inchoate popular view of the Romans' view of both conquered Celts and invading Germans, a contempt of northern European dirt and shabbiness tends to be assumed, perhaps due to misinterpretation of Roman bathing as sanitary in function rather than social and recreational. In particular, the imputation to the Romans of the phrase “unwashed barbarians” seems obligatory in almost any popular treatment of the Germanic and Hunnic invaders in Late Antiquity and many popular treatments of Caesar’s conquests.

Obviously, the Romans never anticipated the discoveries of Semmelweis and Pasteur and, like surgeons well into the nineteenth century, were of course wholly innocent of the practical advantages of cleanliness in limiting the spread of disease. Nor does any evidence suggest that Roman religion prescribed a limited regimen of bodily ablution as a component of ritual purity, as in Islam and Sikhism. This should not be exaggerated; the condemnation of physical cleanliness and visual beauty of any sort by early Christian thinkers would likely have bemused earlier Latin writers and bathing, whatever its purpose, must at least have had a sanitary effect. Nevertheless, personal hygiene was certainly not considered an important virtue, whereof the alleged lack could be a way of articulating foreign inferiority, Gaulish or otherwise. The absence of any literary condemnation of Gaulish dirtiness is therefore unsurprising. What is interesting is how far Latin writers went in the opposite direction; the subject received very little attention and was clearly not an emotive one but what there is depicts Gauls, both male and female, as meticulously clean and tidy, even preening.

There is one significant exception in this respect, although it is not Gaulish as such: the Celtiberian use of urine for teeth-whitening. There was no serious disapproval; this habit was not regarded as a particularly important fact about the Celtiberi, who were, in general, one of the Spanish peoples most of interest to Roman authors. However, it was, perhaps understandably, regarded with distaste. Catullus in particular used it for the mockery of Egnatius, a

And, in simultaneous reaction and imitation, by some Late Antique pagans – Russell, 2000: 296.
Principally Amm. 15.12.2.
personal acquaintance of Spanish origin, in which regard it appears as the supreme example of *rusticitas* (37.18-20 & 39).

5: Descriptions of Gaulish Society

Essentially comparative points like these, about what was unexpectedly omitted or not emphasized, are helpful to keep in mind when considering the positive points about Gaul and the Gauls that were made and emphasized by Roman writers. Before discussing the direct discussion of the Gauls’ supposed collective character by Cicero, Caesar, Livy and others in subsequent chapters, I shall consider here indirect discussion of collective character arising out of Latin descriptions of Gaulish society and customs.

Latin discussion of the Gauls’ society and economic activity was heavily coloured by the belief in the enervating effects of trade and of the Romans, especially trade with the Romans.\(^{40}\) This curious theme, one of the aspects of Roman imperial thought that differs most markedly from the more familiar Colonialist justifications for overseas dominion, is too important to treat merely as a facet of Latin writing on Gaulish socio-economic matters and is discussed independently below.\(^{41}\) For now, I intend to postpone trade’s imagined relation to conquest and empire and concentrate on its imagined relation to agriculture and non-commercial economic activity generally.

Caes. *Gal.* 1.1 clearly regards trade itself as a Mediterranean import to the northern countries, one that radiates out from Narbonese Gaul, rarely reaches the Belgae and has not yet crossed the Rhine. Caesar seems to have taken for granted both that Gauls and Germans themselves would never have thought to engage in commerce on their own initiative and Gaul was not visited by German traders coming from the opposite direction. At 2.15, the same view appears, here more specifically; the Nervii forbid merchants to enter their country; trade is apparently believed never to originate among the Nervii. A partial exception is the description of the Venetic seafaring activities (3.8),

\(^{40}\) Isaac, 2004: 190 & 241.

\(^{41}\) 128-34.
which include cross-Channel trade with the Britons. The inconsistency, though clear, seems to have gone unnoticed by Caesar, who was, after all, more concerned with other matters. Even here, however, the trade conceded to occur is exclusively maritime, takes place over a narrow geographical range and has a distinctly martial flavour, listed as a detail in an account of the Veneti’s naval might and their use of it to impose tolls on their neighbours.

None of this applies to the Galatians of Anatolia; on the contrary, Late Antique slave traders were sometimes depicted as predominantly Galatian and this bore no negative connotation, especially when they were trading Goths enslaved while unsuccessfully invading the Empire (e.g. Amm. 22.7.8). More generally, trade was thought of as playing a very different and, overall, much greater role among peoples to the south and east of Italy than among those to the north. Commerce and maritime traffic were often seen as characteristic of Mediterranean peoples other than the Greeks and Romans, though with some of the same evaluative ambiguity already mentioned. An illustrative example is the following Ciceronian comment on Carthage and the cultural role of its rich trade:

_Carthaginienses fraudulenti et mendaces non genere sed natura loci quod propter portus suos multis et variis mercatorum et advenarum sermonibus ad studium fallendi studio quaestus vocabantur._ (Cic. _Agr._ 2.95)

The Carthaginians were fraudulent and mendacious not from heredity but from the nature of their location, which, because of their port, drew many and various merchants and foreign-language speakers who called them through the pursuit of profit to the pursuit of fallacy.

In this case also, social vices were assumed to result from the base (to agriculturally minded Roman aristocrats, in at least in theory) occupation of the trader and the cultural admixture which it encouraged. However, in the case of Carthage (and the above quotation is far from unrepresentative of Latin discourse on North African or Middle Eastern, especially Phoenician or Syrian, peoples), trade is portrayed as essential to the country and people of Carthage,
resulting from the very nature of their land itself rather than receiving it intrusively as in Gaul.

There was a considerably greater literary output on agriculture in Gaul, which was less likely to be regarded as socially or culturally different from farming in Italy. For example, Caesar seems to depict a Helvetic magnate at *Gal. 1.4.2* as rather like a Roman landowning nobleman, at least socio-economically:

\[ \text{die constituta causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit; per eos ne causam dicereet se eripuit.} \]

On the day appointed for pleading his case, Orgetorix drew to the court from various places all his household, to ten thousand persons; and led together to the same place all his clients and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a great number, and by means of whom he rescued himself from the necessity of pleading his case.

Here, he uses Roman social categories to describe Gaulish social strata, clearly regarding those categories as, if not necessarily universal, at least common to Italy and Gaul and operating comparably in the two countries. The bulk of the subordinates of Orgetorix whom he used to evade trial are described as his own *familia* and, moreover, are described as coming from *undique* in the Helvetic country. This seems to suggest that Caesar thought of Orgetorix (whether accurately or otherwise is unimportant for present purposes) rather like a great landowner in contemporary Italy, with human chattels working his various estates. Certainly, it is difficult to imagine how else 10,000 slaves belonging to a single master were supposed to have been employed, especially in a society to which Caesar regarded trade and crafts as largely foreign.

Also, some others are described as bonded to him by debt (*obaeratos*), a common source of Roman and ancient Greek slaves before the trans-
Mediterranean slave trade facilitated by empire; neatly distinct are the free clients attached to him, one can only presume, by Roman-style *patrocinium*. Caesar seems to have regarded Helvetic society as sharing not only Greco-Roman society’s clear distinction between the unfree and the free but of low station but even the Roman institution of patronage and slave-worked *latifundia* like those of contemporary Italy. Other references to non-commercial socio-economic relations or agriculture (e.g. 1.11, 1.23) likewise never describe them as northwards-moving imports originating in the Mediterranean.

It is possible, of course, to describe a foreign society using the categories and terminology borrowed from one’s own but it is equally possible to present a foreign society as an inversion or antithesis of the mores of one’s own. That Caesar chose the former in this case is interesting, as Latin writings on the Gauls more usually follow the latter course, the *Commentarii*, on the whole, very much included.

Contrariwise, although no agricultural distinction is drawn between the Mediterranean and Gaul, one is nonetheless drawn between Gaul and Germany, which is clearly regarded as less agriculturally productive (1.31, 2.4). This, however, is consistently ascribed to sheer telluric fertility, with which Gaul was supposed to be better endowed than Germany, rather than a northward movement of the habit of agriculture from Italy through Gaul in the same alleged way as with trade. The Germans are never said not to own slaves or not to farm, (indeed, it is specifically mentioned at 4.1. that they do), merely not to do so as successfully.

Caesar’s curt style obviously did not invite Herodotean digression and the rest of the limited attention paid to the society of the territories that he was conquering is mostly concentrated in the comparatively brief tracts that he devoted solely to this purpose. The few exceptions include mentions of marital connections between the elites of the different Gaulish polities (1.9,

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44 5.12-4, on the Britons, 6.11-20, on the Gauls and 6.21-8 on the Germans.
2.4), the concentration of Venetic towns at the coast, especially on headlands (3.12) and the Aquitani’s exploitation of their cupriferous resources (3.21).

Unfortunately for present purposes, foreign farming was not generally of much interest to Roman authors (with the one rather important exception of Carthaginian agricultural literature, especially Mago’s *magnum opus*)\(^45\) and most mentions of Gaulish husbandry are simply that: bland mentions of farmers or their practices. The descriptions of Gaulish agriculture by Varro,\(^46\) Columella\(^47\) and Ammianus\(^48\) are very brief and quite dispassionate in tone; however important these rare sources may be for the history of agriculture, it is difficult to detect the connections with broader attitudes towards Gaul or the Gauls of interest for present purposes. Much the same can be said with regard to the very occasional mentions of Gaulish fishing,\(^49\) hunting,\(^50\) brewing,\(^51\) travel,\(^52\) artisanship\(^53\) and medicine.\(^54\) Descriptions of economic and architectural decline in Gaul much later in antiquity\(^55\) in no way distinguish it from similar processes in most of the Rhenane and Danubian provinces.

A number of authors did notice the Gaulish taste for torques but not much was made of it;\(^56\) it never became a Latin symbol for Gaulish material culture as it has in the modern, especially popular, image. Claudian’s rather Valkyrian personification of Gaul at *Stil.* 2.241-6 (grandly thanking Claudian’s patron Stilicho for ridding her of Franks and other Germans), her blonde hair combed back, holding two spears and wearing an ornate torque, is an exception to this rule;\(^57\) perhaps, when the real inhabitants of Gaul had been Roman for

\(^{45}\) E.g. Col. 1.1.8.

\(^{46}\) R. 2.4.10-1.

\(^{47}\) 1 Pra. 20 & 2.10.22.

\(^{48}\) 17.8.1.

\(^{49}\) Auson. 18.5.

\(^{50}\) Cels. 5.27.3b.

\(^{51}\) Flor. *Epit.* 1.34.11-4.

\(^{52}\) Amm. 15.10.2, 15.10.4-5, Cl. *Carm. Min.* 18, *EV* 2.

\(^{53}\) Col. 12.23.1.

\(^{54}\) Cels. Pro. 30 & 7,7,15i.


\(^{56}\) On the archaeology of pre-Roman Cisalpina, see Barfield, 1971; on late La Tène material culture and archaeology in Celtic studies more generally, see Collis, 1984, Karl & Stifter, 2007b.

\(^{57}\) Cf. similar numismatic representations of personified Gaul, appearing occasionally from the first century CE (e.g. Sutherland, 1984: 236, pl. 25).
centuries, a divine personification of the region needed a strongly, but not negatively, stereotypical depiction to be effective. Most Latin references are in the context of the story of T. Manlius Torquatus receiving that cognomen for his defeat of a torque-wearing Gaulish champion.\textsuperscript{58} However, metallurgy, including torques but not restricted to them, was used as a more specific symbol for Gaulish danger or ferocity in battle, especially when discussing semi-legendary early battles against invading Gauls in peninsular Italy. The classic example of this sort of image is the tall, fierce Gaul, naked except for his weaponry and two bracelets, of Quintus Claudius.\textsuperscript{59} In recounting successive Insubrian defeats in Italy, Florus employed a veritable barrage of metallurgical imagery (Epit. 1.20):

\begin{quote}

hi saepe et alias et Britomaro duce non prius positorus se baltea quam Capitolium ascendissent iurauerant. factum est; uictos enim Aemilius in Capitolio discinxit. mox Ariouisto duce uouere de nostrorum militum praeda Marti suo torquem. inceperit Iuppiter uotum, nam de torquibus eorum aeruin tropaeum ioui Flaminius erexit. Viridomaro rege Romana arma Uvolcano promiserant. aliorsum uota ceciderunt; occiso enim rege Marcellus tertia post Romulum patrem Feretrio ioui opima suspendit.
\end{quote}

These [Galli Insubres] had often sworn at other times and with Britomarus their leader that they would not loosen their belts before they ascended the Capitol. So it happened; for Aemilius disarmed them as the defeated on the Capitol. Soon, with Ariovistus their leader, they vowed to their Mars a torque from the plunder of our soldiers. Jupiter anticipated the vow, for Flaminius erected a brazen trophy to Jove from their torques. With Viridomarus their king, they had promised the Roman arms to Vulcan but the vow befell differently; for Marcellus, having killed the king, hung up his arms to Jove Feretrius, the third [spolia opima] after those of Father Romulus.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{59} Preserved at Gel. 9.13.7.

\textsuperscript{60} A visual analogue to the sort of imagery used in this passage can be found in the numismatic image, popular from the time of Caesar, of a panoply of captured weapons next to a vanquished and bound Gaul (e.g. Hannestad, 1986: 22-3).
However, even though torques never became a general symbol for the Gauls, trousers (bracae), while obviously unsuitable as a shorthand for Gaulish habits in modern imagery, did become one in Roman mentions of their northern neighbours. The term “Gallia Bracata” referred to southeastern transalpine Gaul, the area constituting the province of Transalpina under the Republic and (with territorial variations) Narbonensis later on, roughly in modern geographical terms Midi-Pyrénées, Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and the southern half of Rhône-Alpes. Similarly, “Gallia Togata” could be used to refer to stereotypically toga-wearing Cisalpine Gaul (in provincial terms Cisalpina or Provincia Ariminum, in geographical terms roughly Liguria, Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto and the northwestern half of Emilia-Romagna). In the other direction, “Gallia Comata” could be used to refer to the stereotypically long-haired Tres Galliae (in provincial terms Aquitania, Lugdunensis and Belgica, including Germania Superior and Germania Inferior, in geographical terms the remainder of France, in addition to Belgium, Luxembourg, the German Rhineland and Zeeland, North Brabant and Utrecht in the Netherlands). The geographical delineation of Bracta/Transalpina/Narbonensis on the one hand and Togata/Cisalpina/Provincia Ariminum on the other is illustrated in Map 2A, while the geographical delineation of Bracata/Transalpina/Narbonensis on the one hand and Comata/Tres Galliae on the other is illustrated in Map 2B.

These bracae or Gaulish breeches bore a negative connotation in many instances; they were mentioned most often in disparagement, especially when that disparagement was mocking rather than serious: the foolish-looking trousered Gaul rather than the intimidating metal-wearing Gaul. Cicero, for instance, ridiculed Piso’s (alleged) Gaulish ancestry by referring to his bracae-wearing kinsmen (Pis. 23). In the Philippics, he could hardly make the same

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62 On the emergence of Transalpina and the later development of Narbonensis, see respectively Ebel, 1976 and Rivet, 1988.


accusation against Antony and so mocked instead the time he spent in Gaul (allegedly) avoiding military service, in Gaulish clothing (2.3), although trousers were not the object of this particular jibe. There does not, however, appear to have been a more serious disapproval of the practice of trouser-wearing itself as effeminate, as the Central Asian fondness for similar attire was often regarded in Classical literature (e.g. Arr. An. 4.8).

6: The persistence of Gaulish ethnic designations

One illustration of the vigour of this Roman literary conversation about Gaul and the Gauls is its persistence over time; this section and the next will provide two examples of that persistence. The first is the adoption by educated Gallo-Romans of the Latinized names of Gaulish civitates (and, by implication, the Roman narrative of early Gallo-Roman history that went along with the Romans' geographic and ethnographic terminology). The second is the vibrancy of Gaulish themes into Late Antiquity as demonstrated by their relevance even for Christian Latin authors like Augustine.

It has often been observed that the names of cities in the area constituting the Tres Galliae in Roman times, especially in the Francophone part of that area, more often recall those of Gaulish ethno-political designations than the Latin names of the cities themselves; the Assemblée nationale, for instance, is found not in Lutète but in Paris (from "Parisii"). Much the same applies with Latinized Gaulish town-names; "Amiens" derives from "Ambiani", not "Samarobriva". In many other cases, the Roman town's name itself derived from the name of a people (e.g. "Tolosates" → "Tolosa" → "Toulouse", "Treveri" → "Augusta Treverorum" → "Trèves"/"Trier"). Orléans (Roman Aurelianum) is one of the comparatively few exceptions. In other areas, such designations survived even more directly as regional rather than municipal toponyms, (e.g. "Arverni" → "Auvergne", "Petrocorii" →

67 See Cancik & Schneider, 2001: 4-6 on Samarobriva, Cancik & Schneider, 1996a: 577-8 on the Ambiani.
“Périgord”). The same trend is not seen, for instance, in Britain (e.g. “London”, from “Londinium”, “Manchester”, from Latin “Mamucium” + Old English “ceaster”, itself derived from “castrum”). There, Canterbury (Roman Durovernum, in the country of the Cantiaci) is very much in the minority. Likewise, though the broader regional name “Gallaecia” survives as “Galiza”/“Galicia”, “Toledo” (from “Toletum” rather than “Carpetani”) is more typical of Spanish city-names.

There were several reasons for this difference. For instance, Brythonic place-names and ethnic designations have had to contend not only with Latin competition but with an additional overlay of Scandinavian and Old English place-names (e.g. Birmingham, from Old English “Beorma” + “ingas”, Derby, from Old Danish “Deor-a-by”). The French, despite their name, obviously do not speak Frankish and therefore do not call their cities by Frankish names. The principal factor was the civitas system of administration employed in most of Transalpine Gaul, whereby Iron Age ethno-political entities, in a structurally modified, territorially crystallized and politically purged form, were preserved as the main sub-provincial administrative unit and focus for local civic activity. The diocesan structure of the Roman Catholic church in what had been Gaul was similarly delineated until the French Revolution, further perpetuating the associated regional and municipal terminology. This system led to the subordination of local capital towns to civitas-level regional magistracies and councils both administratively and, eventually, terminologically, in phrases like “Lutecia Parisiorum” and “Samarobriva Ambianorum”. The syntactical leap from this sort of usage to the complete eclipse of the imported municipal names behind the Latinized ethno-political designations was not a great one, especially given the established acceptability of pluralia tantum in Latin city-names (“Athenae”, “Thebae”, “Syracusae”

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68 On the Arverni and the Petrocorii, see respectively Cancik & Schneider, 1996b: 69 and Cancik & Schneider, 2000b: 670.
71 On which see Drinkwater, 1983: 22, 103-11 and 213-5 below.
etc.). However, the aspect of this terminological evolution most pertinent to the present study is the enthusiastic embrace of such designations in Late Antiquity by educated Gallo-Romans themselves. For example, when Ausonius proudly outlined his familial heritage at 1.1.5-8, the jewel in its crown was his mother’s Aeduan race (*gens Haedua*).

The same passage also provides clear evidence of the link between the ancient use of such terms as ethno-regional designations and their medieval/modern afterlife as city-names, in two respects. Firstly, the distinction between being of Aeduan ancestry and being from their capital was blurred, as his mother’s descent was listed as one of four ancient cities (*urbes*) which ennobled Ausonius’s lineage, without explanation, suggesting that a contemporary reader would be expected to equate the municipal and the ethno-regional in a similar manner. Secondly, the concept of the Aeduan or Haeduan had clearly lost any genuinely ethnic character. Ausonius did not say that he was an Aeduan, rather than an Arverian or a Sequanian, merely that he was of partly Aeduan descent. A modern equivalent might be an Englishwoman claiming to trace her family tree back to Normans or Vikings, not a Northern Irish Unionist claiming to actually be “an” Anglo-Saxon, on the basis of undiluted descent from English and Lallans planters or a Nationalist claiming to be “a” Celt (although the use or omission of an article could not of course be used to express this distinction in Latin).

Ausonius’s works have, throughout, a tone of genial antiquarianism and one is left with the impression that he was so ready to discuss his and his contemporaries’ supposed descent from Meduli, Santones, Aedui and so on precisely because these terms, despite retaining the grammatical form of common nouns referring to people from certain groups had, in practice, already become place-names, and politically neutral place-names at that (as opposed to politically loaded place-names, like “Palestinian Territories” or “Judaea and Samaria”), while retaining considerably more antiquarian flair than less ancient

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72 For examples of municipal *pluralia tantum*, see V. Max 8.11, Sen. *Phaedr.* 1191 (referring to Athens), Pl. *Am.* 97, Prop. 4.5.25 (Thebes, respectively Greek and Egyptian) and Nep. *Di.*, Ov. *Fast.* 4.873 (Syracuse).

73 E.g. especially 21, his *Ordo Ubiurium Nobilium*. 
Roman place-names like “Augustodurum” or “Augustodunum”. In all likelihood, the literary effect was not entirely unlike what one would achieve in English by consistently using such terms as “Liverpudlian”, “Mancunian” and “Glaswegian”.

A similar passage at 4.4.1-6 reinforces this point. Aeduan lineage (stemmate) may be a proud possession of Ausonius’s grandfather, Caecilius Argicius Arborius, but the Aedui, as a discrete group, are referred to only as having once ruled territory (the area where the Haedues were potentes), not as currently inhabiting it. Returning to the English comparison, a Yorkshirewoman might similarly claim descent from Danes without, presumably, calling herself “a” Dane or “a” Viking and would refer to the Danelaw, if at all, as the area where the Vikings lived, not an area where many Danes live. Arborius is never actually called Aeduuus or Haeduus; rather, Aeduan ancestors form one part of his noble heritage, ancestors from Gallia Lugdunensis form another, ancestors from Vienne another again. The same conflation of municipal or regional origin and supposed ethnic descent is encountered at 5.16.7-8:

*stemma tibi patris Haeduici, Tarbellica Maurae*

*matris origo fuit, ambo genus procerum*

Your father’s lineage was Aeduan; your mother’s – Maura’s – was in [Aquae] Tarbellae, both of lofty descent.

Ausonius’s first reference to Mediolanum Santonum (Saintes) is at 4.21.7, where it is referred to simply as Santonic land (*Santonica ... tellure*), with the “Mediolanum” omitted entirely. From this and many subsequent examples\(^74\), it is not difficult to see why the latter, genitive, part of the name was the one to survive. Again, these originally ethno-political terms were used only when referring to either lineage or (often municipal) geography.

\(^74\) E.g. Auson. 10.461-3, 18.4.3, 18.5.31, 18.7, 18.8, 18.10.5, 18.11.11-2, 18.27.79.
“Aremoricae”, “Pictones”, “Meduli” and “Sequani” or inflections thereof were used in a similarly geographical manner.  

At 10.23-4, Augusta Treverorum, the capital of Belgica Prima, is referred to simply as the Belgic city (moenia Belgae). At 10.438-9, Ausonius describes himself, Aeduan heritage notwithstanding, as of Viviscaan origin (Vivisca ... origine gentem), apparently on the basis of his birth at Burdigala (Bordeaux), the former capital of the Bituriges Vivisci.

Claims of Druidic descent, similarly, lost both stigma and political/religious meaning and were therefore used more, not less, to embellish familial and personal lineage. One must go back to Caesar’s writings on Gaul during and after his conquests to find such unashamed declarations of Druidic blood. An obvious example is Ausonius’s encomium to fellow Gallo-Roman scholar Attius Patera, which includes an assertion (5.4.7-8) that he was a descendant of the Druids of the Baiocasses (who gave their name to Bayeux). It is evident from tone and context (a Commemoratio to learned men of Burdigala) that this assertion was expected to be taken only as a compliment about lineage. It would seem, not altogether surprisingly, that the earlier inter-pagan divisions in Gaul evinced by the Julio-Claudian attempts to stamp out Druidism had lost all emotional resonance in Ausonius’s Late Antique world of victorious Christendom and bitter Nicene-Arian rivalry. Perhaps relevant in this regard is Ausonius’s own (rather half-hearted) profession of Christianity. A similar compliment to another scholar’s descent from the Druids of the Aremoric race (stirpe Druidum gentis Aremoricae) is made at 5.10.26-30.

Broadly analogous are the instances of the preservation of the Latin names of the three larger population-groups into which Roman geography divided the Transalpine Gauls: the Belgae, Galli proper and Aquitani. At HEGA 1.1, for instance, Bede used the term “Galliam Belgicam” in his geographical exposition of the relationship of the island of Britain to the

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76 For instance, that of the only Druid whose name has been preserved, Caesar’s Aeduan contemporary and client, Diviciacus (e.g. Caes. Gal. 1.1.3, 1.1.16-20).
77 Cook et al., 1934: 449.
78 Evelyn White, 1919: xiii.
mainland of western Europe. Ausonius also used the term “Belgae” several times\(^7\). This sort of antiquarian preservation of the term left it, too, bereft of genuinely ethnic character (not that it necessarily ever possessed it, except in the minds of Greek and Roman authors) and, as such, “Belgica” was both sufficiently well-known and sufficiently neutral to be brought back into non-academic usage as the name (“Belgique”/“België”) of the consociational Flemish-Wallonian state established in 1790. In the same passage, Bede also mentioned the Morini, which is a particularly striking example of Gaulish ethno-political designations’ persistence in Late Antique Latin literature, as he did not make much use of the equivalent pre-Roman British terms (“Dobunni”, “Ordovices”, “Carvetii”, “Iceni”, “Trinovantes” etc.), preferring instead the vaguer broad terms “Brettones”, “Picti” and “Scotti”, even when narrating the pre-Roman history of Britain (e.g. later in the same chapter).

7: St. Augustine’s Use of the Senonian Sack of Rome

One of the principal projects undertaken by Augustine in writing *De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos* was a thoroughgoing polemic against one of the major trends in the pre-Christian writing of history in Latin: the cult of the bucolic virtue and simple piety of the early and middle Republic. His principal target was Sallust; Augustine admired that historian’s accuracy and pessimistic honesty\(^8\) but this also made his ultimate acceptance of the traditional narrative (e.g. *Cat.* 7, 9-12) all the more vexing. However, variations on the same theme, the stern Republic of warrior-peasants laid low by the Oriental luxury available precisely because of its successes, formed a *leitmotiv* of Latin literature; the examples in Cicero and Livy are only the most explicit. Almost inseparable from this narrative were 1) the belief in collective divine punishment and reward through earthly (mis)fortune, 2) a belief that the society of the early Romans (as imagined by Late Republican and Julio-Claudian authors) was the sort of society likely to receive reward rather than punishment.

\(^7\) 10.23-4, 10.393-5, 10.438-9 & 10.461-3.
\(^8\) *CD* 1.5 & McCraken, 1957: 26 n. 2.
from the gods and 3) a high opinion of, specifically, the numenistic, ritualistic religion supposedly practised by the earliest Italians.

Not content with accepting this overall narrative and subtly changing it (unlike, for instance, Tacitus, for whom Augustus’s reign was a second, lesser, Golden Age, after which the same rot set in, culminating in Domitian, leaving the stage set for Trajan’s second restoration\(^8\)), Augustine was determined to excise it wholesale. He sought to establish in its place a view of Roman history compatible with the Christian belief in individual divine punishment and reward through damnation and salvation respectively and with the Christian narrative of Creation, Fall, Redemption and Paradise, one which extolled Christian piety, not pagan virtue, as the ideal for which one would be rewarded.

In his polemic, he drew on the whole range of Roman history and myth, in each case arguing carefully for a profoundly different interpretation of events without denying their actual occurrence. His subtly subversive rendering of Brennus’s sack of Rome in 390 BCE\(^3\^2\) served as the foundation, so to speak, of this edifice of argumentation and at its apex stood his startlingly different and aggressively counter-cultural reinterpretation of Alaric’s eight centuries later.

It is for this reason that a work of Christian theology found it necessary in nine separate places to discuss a war fought between pagans eight centuries beforehand. By contrast, Prudentius, who undertook an analogous, though far less ambitious, project in his *Libri Contra Symmachum*, mentioned Brennus only once in that work (at 2.562). As the Goths had not yet sacked Rome, Prudentius felt less need to draw on exotically distant times for argumentation; he actually argued that certain recent successes against invaders indicated that, whereas it had suffered defeats in the (recent and distant) past, the Roman state would thenceforth, being under Christ’s protection, be immune from further Barbarian encroachment (2.690-716).

At 2.17, Augustine’s first use of the Gaulish sack for this purpose illustrated the terrible injustice inflicted by the Romans on Marcus Furius

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\(^{81}\) Mellor, 1993: 24-5, 66-7 & 111.

\(^{82}\) CE equivalent of Varronian date; more probably 387/6 (Walbank *et al.*, 1984: 302-3).
Camillus. His exile after fine and noble service against the Veientanes was the main offence but the even nobler decision to save his fatherland again afterwards, through delivering it from the Gauls, was the crowning example of the contrast between his individual virtue (albeit wasted on a pagan who would, nonetheless, ultimately be damned) and the iniquity of the Romans in general at that time (and at all other times, instead of only later on).

Although this is an intriguing departure, Augustine’s main use of Brennus was in the devastating argument first introduced directly at 2.22:

*sed tamen haec numinum turba ubi erat cum longe antequam mores corrumpentur antiquí a Gallis Roma capta et incensa est? an præsentes forte dormiebant? tunc enim tota urbe in hostium potestatem redacta solus collis Capitolinus remanserat qui etiam ipse caperetur nisi saltem anseres diis dormientibus uigilarent unde paene in superstitionem Aegyptiorum bestias auesque colentium Roma deciderat cum anseri sollemnia celebrabant.*

But where was this crowd of divinities when, long before the old *mores* were corrupted, Rome was nevertheless captured and burnt by the Gauls? Perhaps they were present but were perchance sleeping? For at that time the whole city remained in the enemies’ power, except only the Capitoline Hill, which itself would likewise have been captured anyway had not geese awoken the sleeping gods, wherefore Rome nearly descended to the Egyptians’ superstition of worshipping beasts and birds when offerings were made to the goose.

If, he asked, the infant Republic had been under the gods’ protection due to its sturdy Italic virtue and later disasters like the civil wars and the Gothic sack were the result of Oriental corruption then how could the only fall of Rome to a foreign army under the Republic have taken place so early? Hannibal’s invasion of Italy served a similar purpose elsewhere (e.g. 3.20, 3.31) but did not have the same polemical force, due to his ultimately crushing defeat and his failure to actually take the city itself.
Although the legend of the Gaulish sack included a great deal of emotive religious symbolism, the specific question of its causation and the gods’ part or otherwise therein had never been a topic for theological discussion among pre-Christian authors. As far as can be ascertained from extant texts, therefore, Augustine’s usage of the Senones in this way was entirely original,

83 the following suggestion by Florus is virtually the only example of even an offhand mention of the subject:

hic siue inuidia deum siue fato rapidissimus procurentis imperii cursus parumper Gallorum Senonum incursione supprimitur. quod tempus populo Romano nescio utrum clade funestius fuerit, an uirtutis experimentis speciosius. ea certe fuit uis calamitatis, ut in experimentum inlatam putem divinitus, scire uolentibus inmortalibus dis, an Romana uirtus imperium orbis mereretur. (Epit. 1.7.1-3)

At this point, whether from the gods’ envy or from fate, the most rapid progress of the advancing dominion was checked by the incursion of the Senonian Gauls. I do not know whether this time was more destructive for the Roman people due to the disaster or more glorious due to the trials of manfulness. Such certainly was the force of the calamity in that trial that I consider it divinely inflicted, the immortal gods wishing to know whether Roman manfulness merited the dominion of the world.

Whether because he was unaware of it or he considered it insufficiently substantial to warrant criticism, Augustine made no mention of this passage, concerning himself primarily with the arguments of contemporary or near-contemporary non-Christian thinkers.

A briefer allusion to the same line of argumentation was made again at 3.8, with a comic flavour; why adopt the gods of Troy when Troy had fallen?

84 See note at v above.
And so how was it at all prudent that, after the demonstration with Troy itself, Rome was entrusted to the custody of the Ilian gods? Let someone say that when Fimbria took Ilium by storm they dwelt customarily at Rome by then; why therefore did the image of Minerva stand firm? Next I wonder if they were at Rome when Rome itself was captured and burnt by the Gauls. But, given that they were acute of hearing and swift in moving, they responded immediately to the call of a goose, in order to protect at least the Capitoline Hill, which remained. However, the warning was too late for them to return in time to defend anything else.

The allusion to that last element of the traditional narrative of the Gaulish sack (Liv. 5.47.4-6) again suggested theriomorphic divinity, like that of Egyptian religious representations. This comparison had been made explicitly at 2.22, though in a condemnatory tone rather than a semi-comic one as here.85

The basic point, the inefficacy of the pagan gods’ worship, as allegedly proven by their inaction against Brennus at the time of the Romans’ purest veneration of them, was made again at 3.17; the Senonian invasion appeared as the greatest in a list of successive disasters from the death of the consul P. Valerius Publicola in 460 to the plague contemporary with the Pyrrhic War, all during a period when the gods ought to have been rewarding the Romans’ pietas with boundless good fortune.

With these related points made and remade, Augustine felt confident enough to devote all of 3.29 to an explicit comparison of the Senones’ sack of...
Rome to the Goths’ and the seizures of the city during the Late Republican civil wars. There were two points to be argued. Firstly and less importantly, he sought to show that Marius and Sulla were far worse than Brennus, in order to discredit further claims of Republican virtue. In the work as a whole, this point was not laboured because of the obvious pagan rejoinder, which Augustine anticipated (e.g. at 2.22), that this could easily be explained as part of the moral decline over the course of the Republican period, from the virtuous early days to the alleged irreligion and luxury of imperatorial times. Far more important is his comparison of the two occasions of the City’s sack by barbarous Northmen. The City of God had opened with a spirited negative argument on the subject of Alaric, a defence against pagan claims that he was the instrument of the gods’ punishment for abandoning their worship for Galilean superstition, which was on this view merely the most extreme in a long and ignoble train of fanatical Oriental cults corrupting Italian society. Now he introduced a positive argument, that the Gothic sack, which would have happened anyway, was actually very much milder than it could have been, precisely because of the (partial) taming of the barbarians by even their heretical, Arian, version of the faith of Christ:

Galli quidem trucidauerunt senatum quidquid eius in urbe tota praeter arcem Capitolinam quae sola utcunque defensa est reperire potuerunt ... Gothi uero tam multis senatoribus pepercerunt ut magis mirum sit quod aliquos peremerunt. uero Sulla uivo adhuc Mario ipsum Capitolium quod a Gallis tutum fuit ad decernendas caedes uictor insedit.

The Gauls indeed massacred the Senate, wheresoever in the whole city they could find its members, except in the Capitoline citadel, which alone was defended to the last ... the Goths have however spared so many senators that it is more surprising that they killed any. However, despite Marius still being alive, victorious Sulla occupied the Capitol itself, which had been protected from the Gauls, instigating violence [there].
To demonstrate the improvement of the Goths effected by Christianity, he required the brutal example of the Senones, who supposedly demonstrated how much worse the Goths might have been, even if neither could compare to the worst of the Romans’ own military dictatorships. While the pagan gods do nothing to save their own earthly city from barbarians, Christ, through the Goths’ acceptance of his Gospels, not only saves (from damnation) the Eternal City that is His own but, for good measure, half-saves the earthly city of Rome as well.

The severity of the Gaulish sack according to the traditional narrative was thereby used to support Augustine’s positive argumentation on the subject of the Goths. The fact that it occurred at all was adduced in Augustine’s return to negative argumentation at 3.31, where he sought to lay to rest the Senatorial impudence (*impudentia*) of blaming the establishment of Nicene Christianity by the emperors for the subsequent military and political crises:

> si humanum genus ante bella Punicam Christianam numeret disciplinam et consequeretur rerum tanta vasterio quanta illis bellis Europam Africanamque contribuit nullus talium quales nunc patimur nisi Christianae religioni mala illa tribuisset. multo autem minus eorum voce tolerarentur quantum ad sit Romanos si Christianae religionis receptionem et diffamationem uel inruptio Gallorum uel Tiberini fluminis igniumque illa depopulatio uel quod cuncta mala praecedet bella illa ciuilia sequerentur.

If the human race had received the Christian discipline before the Punic Wars and if the same devastation of things had followed, damaging as greatly as those wars actually damaged Europe and Africa, none of those from whom we now suffer [the aforementioned criticism] would not have attributed those evils to the Christian religion. Moreover, how little could their voices have been endured, at least as regards the Romans, if the irruption of the Gauls or those same ravages of fire and the flooding Tiber or

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86 He was, however, careful not to go so far as to draw explicitly the logical conclusion of his broader theology of politics, that Gothic half-Christians robbing Roman half-Christians was not a defeat at all but merely a quarrel between two equally wretched earthly cities, in which the City of God – true Christendom – must ultimately remain neutral.
those same civil wars, which surpassed all such evils, had followed the receipt and spread of the Christian religion.

This *reductio ad absurdum* from past disasters was then extended; if Christ, who makes no promise of earthly felicity, can be blamed for Alaric, then the evil spirits, who claim to dictate the political affairs of earthly cities, can be doubly blamed for Brennus and, for that matter, Marius and Sulla.

In the next book (at 4.7), he generalized this last line of argumentation from the history of Rome and Italy to that of all earthly cities and sought to demonstrate that the demons, while efficiently drawing individual souls into heathendom (and therefore damnation), played no constructive role even in the formation or expansion of the earthly cities. Though he concentrated most closely on the Assyrians, there was still room for a mention of Camillus’s loyalty in heroically defeating the Senones, which would make him, though a mere man, far superior to the treacherous demons, who, by the pagans’ own admission, had often switched their support from one city to another and abandoned Memphis, Nineveh, Persepolis, Athens and Pella in turn before favouring Rome. Clearly, the Gaulish sack of Rome was, at least in Augustine’s view, a sufficiently emotive episode in Roman history (and/or myth), even centuries after the conquest of Gaul, to be useful in his argumentation.

Gaulish expansion was also adduced at 4.29 in the course of a somewhat more pedestrian argument against the providence of the god Terminus (the eternal guardian of the Roman frontiers) from change over time in the Roman state’s territorial extent.

Camillus, rather than Brennus, was again the focus in Augustine’s final use of the Senonian invasion, at 5.18. Here, he sought to dissuade his fellow Christians from letting their immense moral superiority over the pagans and other infidels lead them into pride or boastfulness (which would, ironically, erode that very superiority). If the Romans did not deserve praise for their

87 Augustine did not deny the existence of Jupiter, Juno and so on but rather claimed than they were demons (Russell, 2000: 355).
centuries of toil and their choice to endure even hell-fire for their earthly city's sake by practising its idolatrous religion, how much less were Christians to be praised for merely having the common sense to accept Christ's offer of a never-ending Sabbath on another world for pledging allegiance to the eternal city? Specifically, those who, though cast out by the Church, still devoted their energies to the intellectual defence of Nicene Christianity against heresy ought no more to be proud than Camillus, who saved Rome from the Gauls despite having been exiled by the same ungrateful city even after he had saved it from the Veientanes.
3: Stereotypes of the Gaul in Latin Literature

The remainder of Part 1 will discuss in detail the substantial body of Latin literature generalizing about the Gauls, demonizing them or, very occasionally, idealizing them. This chapter is concerned with what the *Galli* themselves were supposedly like, the next with how they supposedly measured up to other peoples and fitted into the broader systems that Roman writers developed to describe, and justify their political stance towards, non-Romans in general.

The specific stereotypes considered, some of which are strikingly consistent across widely varying texts and authors, range from those supposedly in common with most non-Romans (intemperance), to those shared with some non-Romans (wrathfulness and impulsiveness), to those primarily or exclusively Gaulish or northern (military competence and scrupulous honesty). Overall, the picture of the Gauls that emerges from the different literary depictions of them is that of a simple people broadly similar to other non-Roman Europeans, apart from the Greeks – one very fond of drinking, strongly attached to candour and, most importantly for present purposes, devoted to fighting.

1: The Honest Gaul

Not all Roman stereotypes of the Gauls were negative in content. Their literary reputation for honesty is not difficult to connect with less savoury themes – their suspect intellectual capacity is obviously not unrelated and most claims of honesty occurred in contexts also reminding the reader of Gaulish war-making – and the Ligurian exception is discussed above. However, so far as it went, there was a strong belief in, and even an admiration of, Gaulish forthrightness.

At *Gal.* 1.13, Caesar had Divico, a representative of his first Gaulish adversaries, the Helvetii, warn of their bravery and ascribe it partly to their ancestral abjuration of all tricks and stratagems. Caesar’s rather robust response to Divico’s message as a whole did not dispute this particular claim.

1 38-41.
B. Afr. 73 made a similar claim in the author's own voice. Time was required to accustom troops who had served in Gaul to the conditions of operations in Africa against Metellus Scipio and Cato the Younger; this was not exclusively or primarily due to differences of climate but because men used to the guilelessness of the Gauls might easily be caught off guard by North African cunning and manipulation. Nothing in the remarks suggested that such comments would have been regarded with any incredulity; on the contrary, such considerations were appealed to as the most reasonable explanation for the unwonted lack of rapidity of Caesar's marches in certain stages of the campaign.

In 43 BCE, L. Munatius Plancus wrote to Cicero about the progress of the war against Antony and Lepidus (in which, incidentally, he would soon switch sides)\(^2\) expressing his confidence in the trustworthiness of the Vocontii and expectation that they would honour their obligations (Fam. 10.23.2). No reference was made to more general traits; Plancus was merely attempting to predict which side the Vocontii's leaders would choose to support and the warm language in which this assessment is phrased probably reflects the comfort afforded him by having the Vocontian territory as an escape route were it needed. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a similarly positive assessment of, say, a Syrian or Phoenician people's chances of remaining loyal being expressed in a similarly trusting or gracious manner.\(^3\)

The high repute of Gaulish integrity rather considerably outlasted Gaulish independence. At Epit. 1.34, Florus expressed admiration for the good conduct of the Celtiberi after their victories and the honour (fides) with which they protected their allies. He also adjudged the terms of peace that they offered Scipio Aemilianus to have been eminently reasonable and in good faith. Even in the Historia Augusta, written after centuries of steady adoption of Roman culture in Gaul,\(^4\) the literary motif of Gaulish honesty was completely intact (Sev. 4.1 & Gall. 4.3-4).

\(^2\) Crook et al., 1994, 484-5.
\(^3\) For references to Punica Fides, see Sal. Jug. 108.3, Liv. 21-49.9, 22.6.12, 26.17.15, Sil. 12.737. On Plautus's surprisingly sympathetic depiction of a Phoenician in Poenulus, see Franko, 1996.
\(^4\) On which see Woolf, 1998.
Cicero’s oratorical purpose in *Pro Fonteio* required him to impugn the reliability of the Gaulish witnesses accusing M. Fonteius. His chosen strategy, aside from appealing to Fonteius’s respectability and status, was to concentrate on the fact that they were Gaulish. This makes that document uniquely informative on the Gauls’ supposedly characteristic honesty.

His first point in this regard (at *Font*. 6) was that, of the inhabitants of Fonteius’s Transalpine province, the Roman people’s recently reconquered Gaulish enemies opposed him while its allies the Massiliots and its own members resident at Narbo supported him. It was, he appeared to suggest, a question of which of the parties offering competing testimony had interests coinciding with the Romans’.

His next two points (at 7) against the witnesses were briefly snuck in as a mention in the course of a much more elaborate argument (to the effect that condemning Fonteius would set a precedent tending to loosen the obedience of the provincial populations to their governors); these were, firstly, that they ought not to be trusted because of their wrathfulness (*iracundia*) and secondly their disloyalty in having once committed rebellion.

At 10, he again briefly made insinuations that were ostensibly in aid of a larger argument. He purported to find it necessary to argue in detail that a jury is not always obliged to believe uncritically everything said by every witness and gave examples of legitimate reasons to disbelieve testimony: covetousness, anger, conspiracy and the absence of religion or conscience. These were, of course, specific allegations thereby made against the accusing witnesses. The charges of covetousness, anger and conspiracy in particular were transparent references to his accusation that the land-greedy provincial Gauls were conspiring to use the courts to best a Roman they had never been able to defeat in battle. The reference to the absence of religion and principle, on the other hand, is the first hint of a much more general point against Gaulish peoples that formed the crux of his case against their reliability.
Font. 12 simply remade the allegation of partiality; precedents were cited of individual Romans' accusatory testimony being disregarded due to their grudges against defendants and the Gauls' grudge against Fonteius was claimed to be greater than any of these.

Then, at 13, the earlier suggestion of irreligion was made explicit:

an uero istas nationes religione iurus iurandi ac metu deorum immortalium in testimoniis dicendis commoueri arbitramini? quae tantum a ceterarum gentium more ac natura dissentient, quod ceterae pro religionibus suis bella suscipiunt, istae contra omnium religiones; illae in bellis gerendis ab dis immortalibus pacem ac ueniam petunt, istae cum ipsis dis immortalibus bella gesserunt.

Do you think that those nations are influenced in giving their evidence by the sanctity of an oath and by the fear of the immortal gods, which are so widely different from other nations in their habits and natural disposition? For other nations undertake wars in defence of their religious feelings; they wage war against the religion of every people; other nations when waging war beg for sanction and pardon from the immortal gods; they have waged war with the immortal gods themselves.

This being the case, Induciomarus's testimony was automatically suspect as, being a Gaul and therefore an enemy of the gods, he would not feel bound by an oath to the gods such as would prick the conscience of a mendacious witness from among any other people. For Cicero, as for other authors in various genres, the bases for such claims were the attacks on Rome in the fourth century BCE and Delphi in the third by the two Brenni, although they were not yet mentioned by name. This strategy of exploiting the Gauls' reputation for unique savagery and irreligion makes Pro Fonteio an equally central document for the discussion in the last chapter of Part 1 of the

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5 None of this prevented Cicero from adducing Allobrogian testimony himself when, in connection with the Catilinarian conspiracy, he found it convenient. Nor was he, Pro Fonteio notwithstanding, bashful about mentioning this (e.g. Sul. 5).

6 Actually (a Latinized rendering of) a princely title rather than a personal name, cf. the Mabinogion's Bran and Tacitus's Brinno.
relationship between Gauls and Romans as Latin writers imagined it and it will be dealt with as such then.\(^7\)

The raid on Delphi and the siege of the Capitol were both referred to explicitly at 14, as was human sacrifice and, at 21, the relevance of these collective aspersions to the particular case at hand was reinforced by the suggestion that Induciomarus was the leader not only of the Allobroges but of the Gauls. This latter insinuation was, again, smuggled in as an unassuming aside in a long sentence, presumably to draw less attention to its (rather considerable) implausibility.

In my view, these oratorical tactics actually provide strong evidence for an expectation on Cicero’s part of an acceptance by his contemporary Italian audience that honesty was typical of Gauls.\(^8\) Firstly, there must have been absolutely no general stereotype of Gaulish dishonesty; Cicero would at least have mentioned it and would probably have used it very extensively. Secondly, the attempt to make the issue one of establishing where various interests lie, diverting attention from the basic question of the veracity or mendacity of their assertions, indicates a lack of confidence in winning a direct debate on the veracity or mendacity of those assertions.

Thirdly, the time and vitriol devoted to discrediting not so much the witnesses themselves as their people betrays a consciousness of vulnerability on this point. Cicero must have been aware of the tradition of the forthright Gaul, scorning the foreign weakness for plans and deceits, and needed to counter it. Even so, he was unable to argue that Gauls were deceitful \textit{per se}; Latin stereotypes on the subject simply provided no resources for such a claim. He was therefore forced to attempt the next best thing – to argue that Gauls were bad, for which Latin stereotypes on the subject provided ample resources. Being bad generally, they could reasonably be suspected of being bad in their current role as witnesses.

\(^7\) See 113-4 below.

\(^8\) On bias against and/or suspicion of \textit{peregrini} at Rome, see Balsdon, 1979. On invective in Roman oratory as practised under the Republic, see Corbeill, 1996.
Remarks in Classical literature about phenotype among foreigners, though obviously rather indelicate by the standards of contemporary English-language discourse on race, were not, for the most part, a focus for strongly bigoted attitudes or claims of racial superiority. However, they were consistently stereotypical, especially with regard to Gauls and Germans. The Classical explanation for phenotypic variation between human populations (aside from those provided by mythology, such as Greek myths about Ethiopians) was usually a generalized environmental determinism, which, especially when combined with an assumption of the heritability of acquired characteristics, was as close as ancient thought ever came to a formal, pseudo-scientific racial hierarchy. However, physique as such was never concentrated on in this respect; the harsh northern winter had harmful consequences (such as poor judgement) but it also had harmless, if curious, consequences (such as pale colouring). The sorts of physical difference most of interest to ancient writers, principally height, the colour of northern European hair and the pigmentation of sub-Saharan Africans (“Ethiopians”) and Indians (though not of other Asians), never had the importance, even in the most markedly prejudiced ancient texts, that skin colour has had for modern racist thought.

There was, nonetheless, a certain sensitivity with regard to height, especially height that supposedly exceeded that of Italians. Caes. Gal. 2.30, for instance, clearly imputed of the Gauls a belief in consistently greater stature on their part and a belief in consequently greater strength and clearly accepts the former but rejects the latter. This was related in connection with a muscular feat of Roman military construction said to have greatly impressed the sceptical Gauls and the passage was presumably intended to be rather satisfying for Caesar’s contemporary Italian audience:

9 Snowden, 1970: 75.
10 Ibid. 172-77.
11 Isaac, 2004: 74-82.
13 E.g. Aer. 16, Arist. Pol. 1.2.13, 1.1.5, 7.6.1, discussed at 10-2 above.
14 On the unimportance of skin colour in ancient prejudice more generally, see Snowden, 1983; on its importance in modern, Western, especially Anglophone, prejudice, see Jordan, 1968.
ubi uineis actis extracto turrim procul constituit viderunt, primum inridere ex muro atque increpitare uocibus, quod tanta machinatio a tanto spatio institueretur: quibusnam mallibus aut quibus uiribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae (nam plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum quorum breuitas nostra contemptui est) tanti oneris turrim in muro sese conlocare confiderent?

ubi vero mouerit et adropinguare muris viderunt, nova atque insusitata specie commoti legatos a d  Caesarem de pace miserunt.

When, mantlets having been put in place, they saw a siege tower at some distance, they at first made abusive remarks from the wall, ridiculing the idea of setting up such a huge apparatus at such a remove. How did those, they asked, of such little stature, imagine that they could mount such a heavy tower on top of a wall (for all the Gauls are inclined to be contemptuous of our short stature, contrasting it with their own great height.)

When they saw the tower in motion and approaching the fortress walls, the novel, unfamiliar spectacle so frightened them that they them sent legates to Caesar concerning peace.

The height of both Gauls and Germans was noted at B. Afr. 40, where Caesar is alleged to have stopped to admire the immensity of the bodies of the northern European soldiers among the slain Pompeians after his victory in a skirmish prior to the battle of Thapsus. Again, this augmented Caesar’s achievement and his stature as a general, which is unsurprising, as the author of De Bello Africo was probably one of his admirers, possible a close associate, and pursued a similar Caesarian agenda, if perhaps less subtly than the general himself in De Bello Gallico. In addition to their size, the Gaulish and German bodies were said to be of an extraordinary appearance (mirifica specie).

The writer of the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium often illustrated grammatical or oratorical figures through using them to express commonplaces. The content of such formulae was therefore deliberately clichéd – such as would not have distracted from the grammatical/rhetorical purpose by striking a contemporary reader as at all controversial or odd. This
and the tendency to select commonplaces of a rather grand variety, often concerning well-known or glorious episodes in Roman history, make it an occasionally useful source of information on the attitudes of the wealthy and educated Romans more likely to have required rhetorical handbooks of this sort. One such platitude, at 4.27 (illustrating the elegant use of the same main verb to end two or more clauses in a sentence) included in the large-bodied or strong-bodied category into which fit Gauls and Germans also the Celtiberi in Spain.

Varro, on the other hand, drew a distinction between the bodily attributes of Gauls on the one hand and Spaniards on the other, although the Celtiberi were not the Spaniards under discussion. In one of the passages of ancient Latin literature most strongly reminiscent of early modern racist literature,\(^\text{15}\) he gave advice to farmers on the efficient purchase and utilization of slaves and noted that not all races were equally suited for the most physically demanding tasks. Bastuli (from the Phoenician-influenced part of southern Spain) and the nearby Turduli he regarded as quite unfit for herding while Gauls were ideal, especially for larger animals like draught cattle.

At 5.35, Livy claimed that the appearance of the Gaulish invaders in northern Italy intimidated the Etruscans, clearly indicating a belief in consistent bodily difference between Gauls and Italians, but did not specify what this appearance was. A more explicit description was given at 5.44, where he had Camillus describe the greater size (but lesser resolve and endurance) of the Gauls in a successful attempt to convince the Ardeates of the Gauls' vulnerability to a new counterattack.

Florus likewise depicted Gauls as larger than Italians and especially as having huge arms (\textit{Epit.} 1.7.4-10) and he described the Germans very similarly (1.45.20-6). The Teutonic chieftain, Teutobocchus, was likewise said to have been so tall that he could clear six horses in one leap.

\(^{15}\) Though still not quite the equal of certain Greek remarks on the proper origins of slaves, e.g. Arist. \textit{Pol.} 1252a-b.
\(^{16}\) On which see Isaac, 2004: 8-14 & Popkin, 1980: 253-66.
This rather Nordic picture of Gaulish physique was surprisingly resilient and survived intact well into later antiquity. Ammianus, for instance, provided the complete physical stereotype of Gauls (15.12.1); they were almost all tall, strong and fair-haired, with ruddy skin and flashing eyes. Claudian also contrasted the appearance of Gaulish and Middle Eastern contingents in two Roman armies engaged in internecine war and depicted all the Gauls present as blonde (Ruf. 2.105-112).

4: The Simple Gaul?

More will said below\(^{17}\) about specific claims of environmental determination of Gaulish mental character. What is relevant here is that, of the specifically intellectual supposed consequences of northerly climes, defective judgement and decision-making predominated. Allegations of inferior thinking capacity \textit{per se} – sheer slower mental calculation of verbal or numerical information or reduced ability to understand the external world – such as formed the essence of modern racist claims about West Africans,\(^{18}\) were largely absent. (Although claims of cleverness, such as Classical literature sometimes made about non-Roman Mediterranean peoples,\(^{19}\) were entirely absent). For instance, at \textit{Gal.} 4.5, Caesar held forth on the Gaulish mind; it was unstable, changeable, credulous of rumours and, above all, impulsive. The claim of gullibility did, admittedly, verge on a straightforward allegation of simplicity or stupidity but, overall, Caesar’s main point was that the Gauls made important political decisions very rashly. This had been suggested more briefly at 3.8.

Quite apart from its importance for Roman attitudes towards the Gauls, this point forms the crux of Caesar’s justification for his conquests. Consistently, Caesar portrayed his decisions as ultimately reactive to Gaulish and German threats, whether to the Romans’ Gaulish allies, or to the safety of adjacent Roman territory over the short or the long term. The unstated conclusion which he suggested is one very much in the tradition of apologists

\(^{17}\) 96-100.
\(^{18}\) See, e.g., Frederickson, 2002.
\(^{19}\) Isaac, 2004: 350 & Hp. \textit{Aér.}
for Roman Republican expansion from Polybius to Cicero; he was, directly or indirectly, attacked but defended himself and those in his patronage firmly and successfully, taking hostages and territory as means of maintaining the security achieved through military victory.\footnote{For the spatial aspect of his depiction of the Gauls, see Map 1; the sharp distinction between Gauls and Germans this illustrates was complementary to the more direct justificatory arguments described here.}

At 4.13, again, Caesar gave a very low estimation of the Gauls’ capacity for sound judgement and, again, this was used directly to justify actions that he therefore claimed were, in essence, preventive:

cognita Gallorum infirmitate quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritas essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat. his constitutes rebus et consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato...

The Gauls’ mental weakness being known, he sensed how much authority the [German] enemies would acquire after even this one success; he therefore considered that no opportunity for concerting their counsels ought to be allowed them. These things being resolved and his decision having been communicated to his legates and quaestor...

Again at 5.54, the Gauls’ misbehaviour in defying Caesar was explained by appeal to the deep impression made on their febrile minds by the bold action of an initial few renegades.

In Gal. 3.10, Caesar briefly suspended his narration of events and addressed the reader directly, defending and explaining his subsequently narrated suppression of the first major Gaulish reaction to his conquest. This passage was perhaps his most frank use of a characterization of Gaulish mentality as a justification for military action. Two points were made about his enemies’ state of mind; all peoples naturally prefer freedom to subjection (Roman authors, however concerned to portray themselves as the wronged party in every war, were not shy about characterizing the resulting territorial
dominion as a form of servitude) and the people in question were naturally inclined to internal instability and external warfare.

Florus’s assessment was less clear. At Epit. 1.38.11-5 he wrote of the Cimbri acting with the stupidity (stoliditas) of barbarians, referring in particular to the Teutoni, whom he regarded as more or less Gaulish. At 1.45.6-8, on the other hand, he characterized the Aquitani as a cunning race (callidum genus) and enjoined the reader not to believe naïvely that the Gauls were merely fierce, making no use of ruses (fraudes), possibly a conscious rejection of the claims, discussed above, that the Gauls avoided trickery in warfare. His instances of this Gaulish guile were singularly unimpressive: firstly, the Aquitani and Morini retreating into their caves and forests respectively to evade Caesar, secondly, Indutiomarus and Ambiorix deciding to co-operate and rebel jointly. Nonetheless, the Epitoma certainly does not provide evidence for a consistent Latin denigration of Gaulish mental capacity. However, Florus clearly anticipated some expectation of Gaulish incapacity for forethought on the part of his readers, against which he adduced the examples in question. In all likelihood, this second passage represents his considered view; Florus’s pride in Roman achievements in the military sphere was very robust and the proximity of the earlier comment to an excitedly sanguinary account of Marius’s victory at Aquae Sextiae probably accounts for its contempt of Teutonic wits.

Overall, it must be admitted that explicit, specific claims that Gauls had a fundamentally lower level of basic intelligence than Italians are absent from extant Latin literature. However, they were clearly regarded as poor thinkers in certain areas, especially collective decision-making, and this was taken seriously enough to be useful in justifying their conquest.

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22 On the role of the closely related concept of levitas in justifying Roman dominion in general and its opposition to purported Roman gravitas, see Isaac, 2004: 413-4.
23 As discussed at 35 above.
24 67-7.
25 E.g. especially Epit. 1.38.6-10, which comes close to rejecting the tabu on cannibalism. However, he was almost moved to sympathy for the Celtiberi, whom he regarded as having a nobly fierce character themselves (Epit. 1.34).
5: The Drunken Gaul

Both Greek and Latin authors tended to doubt foreigners’ sobriety. This might, as with many Greek portrayals of Middle Easterners, especially Iranians, form a part of an overall picture of self-indulgence and superabundance. However, the stereotype of self-indulgence was quite detachable from that of superabundance and featured prominently even in the Classical stereotypes of a people of which a part was said to live wild on the Belgic coast and survive on fish and birds’ eggs. Intemperance was also one of the few Gaulish traits not supposedly shared by the Germans (Caes. Gal. 4.2).

Although Cicero’s systematic defamation of Gaulish character discussed above does not dwell on drunkenness it does adduce it once (Font. 4). At Deiot. 9, Cicero defended Deiotarus’s sobriety against accusations that he had drunkenly danced for joy at the news of Caesar’s reverses in the African phase of the civil war of 49-46 BCE and claimed to regard temperance and decorum as virtues not usually possessed by, but nonetheless to be commended in, kings. Unfortunately for present purposes, however, he made no comment one way or the other about the abstemiousness or indulgence of Galatians in general.

At 5.33, Livy related, though not with much confidence, a tradition that the Gauls were tempted into invading Italy by their first experience of wine, brought by Arruns of Clusium in an attempt to solicit foreign intervention in an inter-Etruscan feud. That there could have been such an explanation of the Gaulish inroads, even if given little credence by its reporter, demonstrates the strength of the belief in Gaulish weakness for liquors. A less specific subjection to appetites or passions was alleged at 5.37, as an aside from the author to the reader, indicating confidence in the remark’s veracity. Finally, Livy put into the mouth of his hero, Camillus, an assertion that the Gauls were unsuited for conducting long, dull sieges and would be undone by their excessive consumption of wine and food (5.44):

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26 E.g. Hdt. 1.133.
27 69-71.
Defeated by the tedium of a siege, they are giving it up and wandering through the fields in straggling parties. Gorged with food and the wine they drink so greedily, when night approaches they throw themselves down like wild animals, in all directions by the streams, without fortifications, without outposts and pickets on guard, now, after their successes, even more incautious.

Ammianus explicitly described the Gauls as greedy for wine and ingenious in devising new kinds of spirit (15.12.4), quoting Cicero (in one of the briefer extant fragments of Pro Fonteio) to the effect that the Gauls once regarded diluting wine with water as poisonous; the Classical associations of neat wine, from Polyphemus on,²⁸ hardly need elaboration. Moreover, Ammianus alleged that this resulted in unhealthy levels of public drunkenness among some Gauls, seemingly an allegation, accurate or otherwise, about the contemporary Gaul through which Ammianus had travelled rather than merely a long-surviving literary stereotype, although, of course, it was that as well.

Though lighter in tone than most of the Roman writings discussed in this thesis, the descriptions of drunken Gauls and of the Gauls as drunk did not lack a sharper edge. There was a tone of humour in the depiction of inebriated northerners but there was also an undertone tone of disgust, particularly in the Livian quotation above. It was not written in the author’s own voice and it of course reflected how Livy imagined a Roman, or anyone else, might feel about Gauls after his city had been attacked and demolished by them. Nonetheless, it also reflected the particular sorts of denigration that Livy imagined would spring to mind of such an orator, and would be plausible to his audience, concerning this particular invading people. More generally, allegations of collective intemperance were another example of a stereotype of poor decision-

²⁸ Hom. Od. 9.344-74.
making and slavery to short-term impulses that, I have argued, forms an essential part of Caesar’s justification for aggression (although Caesar himself never spoilt his laconic politico-military narrative with vignettes of intoxicated Gauls such as Ammianus provided).

6: The Warlike Gaul

In contrast, one of the ways that the literary images of different non-Roman peoples were most sharply distinguished from each other was in military competence. This was also one of the parts of the Latin imagination most heavily impinged upon by historical reality. For example, although Carthaginians were, in many respects, the single most consistent target for unflattering remarks by Roman authors, remarks about the supine, unwarlike character of the peoples under the warm African sun are singularly, indeed completely, absent in their regard. Not only would this have been implausible given the experience of the Punic Wars, it would have taken from the glory of the eventual outcome. Gauls were not in a part of the world such that they would be expected to have been made pacific by climate and had also played an important, if intermittent, part in Roman military history for almost four centuries. Consequently, the Latin literary estimation of Gaulish national character, as regards desire to make war and, to a slightly lesser extent, skill at making war, was unambiguous. Gauls, whatever their appearance and however strong their propensity for inebriation, were (disinterest in military ploys and stratagems notwithstanding), a nation of fighters.

Caesar’s endorsements of this assessment requires little explanation. The appearance of brisk, workmanlike truthfulness in the Commentarii hides, among other things, the usual Classical exaggeration of the numbers of hostile

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29 E.g. Vitr. 6.1.4.
30 For a comprehensive introduction to what can be reconstructed archaeologically of the reality of Gaulish war making, as distinct from the literary images under discussion in the present study, see Brunaux & Lambot, 1987. On Gaulish participation in the Hannibalic War, a comparatively well-documented early example of Gaulish warfare, see Rawlings, 1996.
31 Another medium of expression through which Romans represented foreign warfare and warriors to each other was triumphal display. On this performative medium, see Beard, 2007, Ostenberg, 2009.
32 On the broader question of the artfulness of Caesar’s reporting, see Welch & Powell, 1998.
combatants and endlessly repeated, seemingly factual, high estimations (as soldiers if not as statesmen) of the Gauls Caesar had nonetheless, and therefore more gloriously, managed to defeat.

At 1.1, mention was made of the particular bravery of the Belgae and the Helvetii. At 1.2-3, it was repeated that the Helvetii were a warlike people (bellandi cupidii) and, separately, that the Helvetii, Aedui and Sequani were most potent and sturdy peoples (potentissimos ac firmissimos), while the Nervii were fierce and manful (feros magnaee virtutis) (2.15 & 2.27). Another similar remark was made regarding the Helvetii at 1.10 and the Belgae's excelling other Gauls in martial matters was mentioned again at 2.4 and 2.8. None of this prevented the Treveri from having a unique (singularis) reputation for bravery among the Gauls (2.24) when Caesar's troops were about to face them for the first time.

Divico's claim at 1.13 to rely solely on bravery has already been discussed with regard to its implications for the Helvetii's supposed honesty; it is equally important with regard to the Helvetii's supposed courage. At 2.31, the Atuatuici were similarly made to speak of their bravery, the object of their neighbours' envy. Given the comments in the author's own voice already mentioned, it is reasonably clear that these assertions were not intended solely to mock an over-estimation by the Gauls of their own valour; the boast about their bravery by the envoys of the Atuatuici was promptly endorsed at 2.33.

At 1.40, Caesar related the speech with which he fortified his soldiers' courage when facing German enemies for the first time. This oration explained away Ariovistus's defeat of Gauls by pointing out that the latter people had been exhausted by a long, previous war and tricked by Ariovistus's cunning, which would, of course, be of no avail against shrewd Romans. The oratorical purpose of the speech was the reduction of Ariovistus's martial reputation; one of several literary implications of the passage is the preservation of the Gauls' martial reputation. At 5.34, Caesar even claimed that the Gaulish troops he faced were the equals, at least as soldiers, of the Romans. The suggestion that

the peoples of Gallia Comata had, in war and manfulness, exceeded all other races, made at 5.54, was however snuck in as a small part of a long sentence, purporting merely to be an explanation for something else (in this case, the Gaulish determination to continue rebelling).

There was a partial exception at 3.19, where the unskilfulness (*inscientia*) of the Venelli in running too quickly up a slope to charge the Romans, leaving themselves out of breath by the time they reached the top, was referred to. However, it was only partly to blame; fatigue was also adduced. Also, a fairly reasonable consideration (not leaving the Romans time to gather their equipment and arm themselves) is suggested as the motivation for the error, which was, in any event, clearly one of excessive ardour for battle. More in line with the work as a whole was the mention of the Gauls’ high military prestige at 5.29.

At 2.6, one of surprisingly few generalizations about the specific tactics that Gauls usually employed was made (regarding their preferred method of besieging fortresses), although no judgement either way was expressed concerning the efficacy of this Gaulish approach.

At *B. Afr.* 6, it was claimed that thirty mounted Gauls, this time on Caesar’s side, routed two thousand mounted Berbers. Exaggeration of defeated enemies’ numbers in Caesarian accounts of Caesar’s campaigns, including by the general himself, has been noted already but the ratio in this account outdoes even Herodotus’s proportions for the battle of Plataia. At 66½:1, it would have been implausible even for contemporary readers accustomed to numerical exaggeration in recounting victories but for the traditionally low estimation of North African martial competence (Carthaginians aside) and the traditionally high estimation of Gaulish bravery and martial competence. *B. Afr.* 40, already discussed with regard to its comments on Gaulish and German physiques, also showed an admiration for their fighting prowess.

Livy had the Senones claim at 5.36 that they (Gauls, not Senones) were more courageous than any other people. He also claimed that the defeat at the
Allia was due not only to the Senonian numbers but also to the Gauls’ more skilful tactics. Camillus’s thoroughgoing critique of Gaulish military competence at 5.44 was required by the narrative and was also selective; only stationary warfare is alleged to be difficult for Gauls. Also, although one could claim that the immediately subsequent (and entirely imaginary) Roman victory (5.45) indicates authorial credence of the assessment, it is clear that, overall, Livy regarded Camillus himself, who dominates this part of *Ab Urbe Condita*, as the decisive factor, not the Gauls’ ability or lack thereof. For instance, he claimed that, if anything in human affairs were certain, it would be that Camillus would have prevented the Gauls from prevailing at the Allia in the first place had he not been exiled.

Interestingly, Florus claimed at *Epit.* 1.33.13-7 that the Celtiberi, to whom he once referred simply as Celts (*Celticos*), constituted the bulk of the military strength of the peoples of Iberia. His afore-mentioned enthusiasm regarding Aquae Sextiae moved him to declare that barbarians (in general – not only Gauls) have no genuine valour but only a rage that soon spends itself (1.38.1-5) but, as with his uncharacteristic remarks on the Teutoni’s intelligence, this did not necessarily express a considered or firmly held view. He did firmly endorse Caesar’s characterization of the Helvetii as a bellicose people at 1.45.1-5.

In some Greek texts, Celtic or Galatic armies were described as making a greater and more intimidating clamour before battle than Greek armies. Polybius, for instance, described the Gaulish side at the battle of Telammon as intimidatingly loud (2.29). This is perhaps analogous to the intimidating reputation of Gauls as soldiers in Latin writings; certainly it seems to reflect Polybius’s own view of Gaulish armies as more frightening than actually dangerous. Several Classical authors also reported that barbarian armies encountered both in Britain and on the northwest European mainland, including in Gaul, practised war-trumpetry and used the word “carnyx” to refer to

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34 Discussed at 28-9 above.
instruments used for this purpose.\textsuperscript{35} Another medium of expression in which Romans represented foreign enemies to themselves was the performative medium of the triumph.

As with most of the other stereotypes of Gauls discussed in this chapter, their reputation for bravery and military competence survived in Latin literature long after their extinction as militarily independent entities. At \textit{Val.} 1.4, the writer(s) of the \textit{Historia Augusta} had the Sassanid shah Shapur I admire the mighty peoples the Romans had made subject, giving as examples only the Gauls and the Africans (in the narrow sense – Tunisians, no doubt with the Carthaginians principally in mind), both of whom had managed the unique feat of conquering Italy but ultimately been defeated. Likewise, Postumus’s Imperium Galliarum was portrayed as popular, Gaulish discontent with the (according to the \textit{Historia Augusta}) insufficiently warlike spirit of Gallienus (\textit{Gall.} 4.3-4). \textit{Tyr.} 3.7 repeated this characterization, even reinforcing it with a reiteration of Caesar’s claim (\textit{Gal.} 3.10) that the Gauls constantly desired a change of government. Occurring, as they do, in a work with an often ironical tone and much influenced by the comedic and satirical traditions, especially concerning Gallienus, these comments need not be taken too seriously. However, it is nonetheless worth noting that these features of shared cultural prejudice had a remarkably long run in ancient Latin literature.

\textsuperscript{35} E.g. D. S. 5.30. On archaeological evidence of the war-trumpetry actually practised by northwestern Europeans (although in the context of the ritual deposition of ornate versions of musical artefacts rather than battlefield use), see Maniquet 2005, 2008.
4: The Broader View: The Romans' Gauls in Context

The previous two chapters have examined Latin authors' *Galli* in isolation. In fact, of course, they were not written about in isolation. In various ways, their depiction formed parts of broader systems and classifications for the depiction of non-Romans (and, indeed, the Roman themselves) for broader purposes and in broader projects, literary, intellectual or propagandistic. Their depiction was irreducibly comparative.

This chapter attempts, therefore, to broaden the discussion by considering precisely how Gaulish stereotypes and depictions related to those of other peoples. This process is necessarily weighted heavily towards the Germans, who eventually, for the most part, usurped the Gauls' place in the Latin literary imagination as a hardy, ruddy, disorganized threat in the North. However, comparison and interrelation were not entirely restricted to the Germans; also considered in this chapter are the application to the Gauls of general theories of environmental influence on regional differences between human groups, attitudes of contempt or disdain expressed by those at the imperial centre for those on its northwestern fringe and depictions of the Galatians, who for many Roman authors were Gallo-Greeks.

1: Gauls, Germans and Britons

Very consistently, Latin authors tended to use the broad categories Gaulish, German and British\(^1\) to describe northern Europeans. Indeed, this division is so ubiquitous that it is easy to overlook its distinctiveness. There was no such tidy demarcation, for instance, in North Africa; one will, of course, find no Moroccans, Algerians or Tunisians in ancient Latin writings but one will also struggle to discover equivalently broad national or regional terms. North

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\(^1\) Strictly speaking, "Brittones" and "Britanni" referred, respectively, to the northern and southern inhabitants of the island of Albion (James, 1999: 53). In practice, however, this never prevented Latin authors implicitly regarding the Britons as a more or less unified whole, under the name "Britanni", especially when comparing them to non-Britons, much as *Galli* were confidently generalized about notwithstanding the subdivision into *Aquitani*, *Belgae* and *Celtae* or *Galli* proper.
Africans might be *Mauri* in one text, *Numidae* in another and *Lybici* in a third, each of which terms varied widely in import. An important complicating factor tending to prevent neat conceptual division into homogeneous imagined national blocks was Phoenician ancestry and culture on the coast, which led Classical authors to think of Punic Africans as sharply and persistently distinct from other Africans. While many individual African peoples were referred to – Garamantes, Gaetuli, Massyli, Massaesyli etc. – these were never grouped together into persistent, mutually exclusive supra-tribal categories. “Africa” referred, of course, to a territory not too different from present-day Tunisia but its usage was almost purely geographical, rather like “Asia Minor” and did not imply a cultural classification.

Greeks and Egyptians, on the other hand, were of course written of as clear groups but both Greeks and Egyptians actually were self-aware ethnic groups, functioning as such long before the Romans began to write about or to conquer them. Obviously, Latin authors discussing northern Europe were not repeating a self-categorization that they had heard from Maetatae, Cocosates, Paemani or Ubi. However, although there was a more or less universal consensus that northwestern Europeans divided naturally into Britons, Gauls and Germans, no such clarity is to be found as to where exactly the boundaries between these clear and distinct civilizations actually fell.

Caesar was concerned to set the limits of Gaul at the limits of his conquest, the Rhine and the Pyrenees, for which there are (at least) two reasons. One is that his use of trans-Rhenane encroachment as a justification for intervention and then occupation (e.g. especially 1.33) requires the Rhine to

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3 Sil. 3.274-324 gives a reasonably extensive, if rather imprecise, list.
5 For more general treatments of Roman ways of categorizing and classifying non-Italians and their relation to imperialism and, later, integration and enfranchisement, see Sherwin-White, 1973, Balsdon, 1979, Champion, 2004. For the divisions of Gaul and Germany that the Romans later found administratively and/or ideologically convenient, see Maps 2, 4.
6 Excepting the Channel, which, at least for Latin authors, delineated the southeastern limit of British territory almost as unambiguously as it does in modern geography; for (in very approximate form) the internal and external boundaries of Roman Britain, see Map 5.
amount, in a fairly robust sense, to a border. Otherwise, its crossing would no more justify Caesar’s interference than a migrating people crossing the Loire or the Garonne. Also, Caesar presented his campaigns as a pacification and stabilization, a struggle undertaken, ultimately, in order to guarantee Roman security. He therefore needed to create a sense of finality and order in his territorial settlement; the Rhine was not just a longer, farther-flung frontier than that with which he had begun but represented the completion of the conquest of the Gauls.  

From the start of the Commentarii, therefore, he was much concerned to extend Gaul to the Rhine. His opening remarks make this clear; Belgica (which term, in his day, embraced what later Romans would call, and administer as, Rhaetia and Upper and Lower Germany) is one of three regions of Gaul. The Belgae, however similar to the Germans they may be, are not Germani; the latter live across the Rhine and the Belgae war with them (again, a small war between two peoples straddling the Rhine constitutes Gallo-German conflict, an equally small war between two other peoples ten miles east of the great river or two more ten miles west is tribal squabbling). At 1.31, likewise, the Rhine marks the boundary that Ariovistus cannot overstep without leaving Germania and encroaching on Gallia. It is at 1.33, however, that this is stated most explicitly. Germans cannot safely be permitted to cross the Rhine; if they did so, their more warlike nature would enable them to conquer the Gauls and, like the Cimbri and Teutoni, to cross the Alps. This breathtaking exaggeration relies on, among other things, the unstated assumption that the migration of a northern people across the Rhine constitutes a violation of a frontier in a way that a migration that crosses any other river does not.

This all led up rather elegantly to the demand in Caesar’s ultimatum to Ariovistus (at 1.35) that he bring no more reinforcements across the Rhine. By this stage, a contemporary Roman reader (Caesar presumably hoped) would

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7 Cf. Hirtius’s less guarded comments to precisely that effect at Gal. 8.1.
8 On the actual distinction between Gaulish and Germanic peoples, insofar as there was one, see Rübecki, 2002. For Caesar’s ethnographic demarcation of northwestern Europe, see Map 1.
9 Amm. 15.11.7.
have regarded this issue as of great importance. This being so, such a reader would, on reading of Ariovistus’s arrogant rejection of this most basic demand, have been forced to concede that Caesar’s use of force against him was a necessity for the security of the Roman state. This was doubly important as the Helvetic and German campaigns led on to the conquest proper and their justification was, in large measure, the justification of the conquest as a whole. While subsequent campaigns could be justified as indispensable punishment for Gaulish misdeeds in retaliation for previous campaigns, Caesar’s initial advance beyond the frontiers of his allotted province still required independent justification.

Again at 4.3, the Ubii, who bordered on the Rhine, were said to live on the frontier of Gaul. Immediately afterwards, at 4.4, mention was made of the German bank of the Rhine and the Gaulish bank. On one side, there were *Germani*, on the other, Menapii, who, not being *Germani*, must be *Galli*. Once again, the occasion for this use of the Rhine as a precise border was the justification of campaigning; in this case those responsible for river-crossing mischief soon to be punished were the Suebi.

When describing his own forays across the great river, Caesar, though careful to make it difficult for the reader to notice that no permanent conquest was achieved, was careful also not to let this blur the line he had so painstakingly drawn between Gaul and Germany. At 4.16, he took particular care to discuss the very different states of mind of the Gauls on the one hand and the Germans on the other and how he intended to deter the Germans from renewed invasion of Gaul by causing them trouble inside Germany. He thereby imputed of the Germans themselves, albeit implicitly, a view of trans-Rhenane lands as theirs and Belgica as foreign. He even put words to this effect into their mouths when he imagined their insolent reaction to his expedition – why may he invade Germany if they cannot enter Gaul? Even the sheer length (4.15-8) of the discussion of an uneventful crossing that could have been related in a single sentence and the suspension of the narrative for

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11 Much as is the case with regard to his British campaigns – Handford, 1982: 233-4.
analysis at precisely that point emphasized its role as a border and frontier. Similarly, when Gaulish invasions of Germany (in earlier times when the Gauls had not yet been enervated and were more like contemporary Germans) were alleged, the Rhine was, once again, the border that they overstepped (6.24).

Nonetheless, Caesar was not entirely free to portray peoples as Gaulish or German as he pleased. Latin literature on the northern peoples had had a long history by his time and, although Gallia could of course extend to the Rhine, the Galli were another matter, particularly in Belgica. Caesar pushed the ethnic boundary as close to the Rhine as he dared but was careful not to strain his contemporary readers’ credibility too far. For instance, at 2.3 he referred to the Germani living among the Belgae, although they are sharply distinguished from them, thus reinforcing the latter’s Gaulish status. He went on to admit (2.4) that most of the Belgae had originally trans-Rhenane ancestry but maintained that their entry was very ancient. For instance, they were in their current homeland during the Cimbric War, when they alone of Gauls drove out the invaders (again making the point that they were Gauls). None of this ambiguity deters Caesar from frequently referring to all of his Belgic enemies, even the Nervii (e.g. 2.19) and the Treveri (2.24, 5.3), as Galli. The story of the origins of the author’s Atuatic opponents (briefly related at 2.29) has already been discussed with regard to migration and prehistoric collective origins. For present purposes, it can also be noted that its allusion to the Cimbric War as a precursor of Caesar’s endeavours is one of the series of such references now to be discussed. At 6.32, Caesar feels compelled to acknowledge that the Segni and Condrusi are generally counted as German (numero Germanorum) but the same sentence contrasts them with the Eburones and Treveri, whose (rather tenuous) Gaulishness is thereby reinforced.

12 Although, most unfortunately, almost none of it has survived – Cato in particular, judging by his extant fragments, might have been informative – Isaac, 2004: 411-2.
13 E.g. Plin. Nat. 4.17, Tac. Ger. 1, Flor. Epit. 1.45.9-15, Amm. 15: 10.2, 11.4, 11.6-8, Cl. Ruf. 2.111-2, Stil. 2.186-9 and, in a rather exaggerated poetic inversion, Stil. 1.225-7. This role of the Rhine survived in post-Roman Latin literature and is, if anything, more unambiguous than ever at B. HEGA 1.2.
The brief ethnographic digression also carefully distinguishes between Gauls and Germans. Its opening sentence describes Gauls (without any complicating distinction between Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani) and Germans as different nations (nationes, rather than the more common but vaguer gentes), between whom there are great differences, which he will now outline. Even the structure of the passage, with its two discrete ethnographies, further reinforces the separation of Gaul and German, as does the opening statement of the German tract, that the Germans’ customs are utterly different; the ethnographies thus contribute substantially to the Gaulishness of Caesar’s Belgae and, more generally, to the Commentariorum’s firm distinction between the two peoples. The creation and persistence of the provinces of Germania Superior and Inferior demonstrate the failure of Caesar’s great effort to shift the Romans’ ethnic frontier between Gauls and Germans all the way to the Romans’ geographical frontier between Gaul and Germany at the Rhine. Nonetheless, the motif does make an important contribution to Caesar’s justification for his conquests and, especially, his initial action in overstepping legal boundaries of his original Narbonese province in 58 BCE.

Other Latin authors, with fewer, or at any rate different, axes to grind tended to have a curve of German peoples inside the northwestern frontiers of Gallia Comata, from the Atlantic coast of Gallia Belgica, along the (geographically) Gaulish bank of the Rhine as far as, in one case (Liv. 21.38), the northeastern fringes of the Western Alps. At a minimum, this Hither-German classification included the Nemetes, Triboci, Vangiones (whom Caesar acknowledged to be German but made implicitly trans-Rhenane by including them in the trans-Rhenane forces of Ariovistus – Gal. 1.51), Ubii, Agrippinenses, Cugerni and Batavi. Tacitus’s picture of the area, in contrast to his insistence on autochthonous German purity on the other side of the Rhine (Ger. 2) is

\footnote{Notwithstanding the considerable persistence of Caesar’s influence on Roman geographical thought on Gaul, e.g. especially Plin Nat. 4.17, Amm. 15.11.1.}

\footnote{The Ubian but imperially favoured inhabitants of modern Köln, called after their benefactor and patroness, Julia Agrippina Minor – Bowman \textit{et al.}, 1996: 240, 491.}

\footnote{Plin \textit{Nat.} 4.17.
particularly strewn with German peoples, most especially the Tungri, to whom he ascribed the origin of the name “Germani” (ibid.), the Treveri and the Nervii (28). He imputes of the latter two peoples an acceptance of Roman beliefs about the effeminacy of Gauls as compared with Germans and consequent claims to German heritage. For him, there could be no question of Gauls extending as far as the hither bank of the Lower Rhine. Naturally therefore, for him (29) as for Pliny (Nat. 4.17) the islands of the Rhine were German rather than Gaulish. When discussing the Batavian rebellion, he again distinguished between the disasters in Germania (south and west of the Rhine) and the possibility of consequent revolt in Gallia.

However, he did consider certain peoples beyond the Rhine Gaulish (Ger. 29); although these are vastly outnumbered by those in what had been Gallia Comata whom he considered German, they do further muddy the waters of the Rhine as an ethnic barrier in his account. Similarly (perhaps deliberately) confusing is the categorization of the Canninefates and even the Batavi as Gaulish that he imputed of the rebel Civilis at Hist. 4.32. At 4.54, great dramatic effect is achieved by temporarily blurring the very distinction between Gauls and Germans itself; the impression said to have been made at Rome and on optimistic rebelling Druids by the coincidence of the fire on the Capitol and the Rhenane insurrection is expressed through writing of Transalpine races (transalpinis gentibus) instead of merely Batavi, Lingones and so on and through recalling Brennus’s sack of Rome. Contrariwise, Tacitus put into the mouth of the reconquering general Q. Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus at 4.73 a reference to the country of the Treveri and Lingones as a part of Gaul. He then had him justify Roman dominion in Gaul in markedly Caesarian terms, with a sharp distinction between Germani and Galli and the Romans’ purpose in the north being the protection of the latter from the former, of whom the Batavi under Civilis were simply the most recent example.

Also, the German status of the Cimbri and Teutoni, though sometimes ambiguous in Caesar and curiously absent from Florus, as discussed above,
was nonetheless fairly consistent overall. They are German races
(*Germanarum gentium*) in Velleius Paterculus (2.11.2-5) and Tacitus described
the Cimbric War as the beginning of a war between Romans and Germans that
had lasted, by his reckoning, 210 years thus far (*Ger*. 37).

Another example of ancient texts’ ambiguity as to the ethnographic
classification of peoples in the European interior is the shifting categorization
of the Bastarnae in eastern Europe. In Arrian’s accounts of conflict between
Macedonians and the Basternae on Peuke (*Ann*. 1.2), the latter were seen,
naturally enough given the context, through a Danubian lens and were not
described as at all different or distinct from other *Getai* or *Thraikes* either side
of the great river. Livy, writing in the context of the third-century irruptions
southward through the Balkans, claimed that they resembled in certain respects
the Galli Scordisci (40.57.7). Discussing the Bastarnae of his own day in the
first centuries BCE and CE, Strabo was even more emphatic in classifying
them as of German stock (*Germanikou genous* – 7.3.17). Tacitus ultimately
concurred, after some wavering, due to the similarity to the Sarmatians which
he claimed this particular German people exhibited (46.1-2). This tentative
suggestion of a more eastern European classification had become a firm
categorization by the time of Dio, for whom they were simply the Bastarnian
Skythians (*Skuthôn ... Bastarnôn* – 38.10.3); for Zosimus, likewise, there was
no question but that the Bastarnae were a Skythians people (*Bastarnas ... 
Skuthikon ethnos* – 1.71.1). These shifts illustrate both the mutability over time
of the ethnographic categorizations applied by Classical authors and the
importance of contemporary context and contemporary concerns in fixing a
definite classification on a people at any one time.

Comparison of northern peoples, of course, was not restricted to location or
categorization. Different, but intimately related, stereotypes were applied to
them. Crudely put, the qualities originally ascribed to Gauls slowly migrated
northwards, first through Gaul, so that Caesar could describe the Belgae as the
most vigorous and warlike of the Gauls (*Gal* 1.1), then into Britain on the one
hand\textsuperscript{18} and Germany on the other. The process was somewhat analogous to the westward migration of Eastern/Southern stereotypes;\textsuperscript{19} ultimately the Greeks themselves could be portrayed in a distinctly Oriental manner by those Romans who disliked them or their influence.\textsuperscript{20} This was a double migration; there was the real change over time in Latin texts resulting from the gradual loss of respect for Gaulish military prowess and the application of originally Gaulish stereotypes to other nearby peoples as they were encountered by the Romans and there was the imagined change over time in the Gauls themselves as they became soft and effeminate, losing their supremacy to the now more masculine Germans.\textsuperscript{21}

And as with the Belgae in the north, so with the Helvetii in the east; they are the closest to the Germans and, consequently, the last to retain their warlike spirit and masculinity, being, if not the equal of the Belgae, certainly the bravest of the Celtae (Caes. Gal. 1.5). Similarly, on the other side of the Rhine, the Ubii are the nearest to the Gauls and therefore the most prosperous and civilized of the Germans and the most Gallicized in their habits (\textit{ibid.} 4.3).

At 1.31, this contrast of Gauls and Germans has a Herodotean flavour (cf. Hdt. 1.71, 9.122); in a few years, (unless stopped by Caesar) the fierce Germans will migrate, in their entirety, across the Rhine into Gaul, so enamoured are they of the wine, good soil and relative luxury, where they will no doubt be softened in their turn, though Caesar does not draw this implication, which would rather defeat his alarmist purpose. At 1.39, the Gauls are said to have been so impressed by the military superiority of the Germans over themselves that their tales caused panic among Roman soldiers conversing with them. At 1.40, Caesar related an oration with which he calmed them

\textsuperscript{18} Tac. \textit{Ag}. 11.4 is particularly explicit on this point; the Britons, especially the independent or newly conquered Britons, are now as the Gauls once were.
\textsuperscript{19} A more familiar comparison would be the transference of the patronizing Early Modern mystical stereotype of East Asia as a whole to China in particular and then from China to Tibet – Lee, 1999: 3-4, Bishop, 1989.
\textsuperscript{20} For Roman claims of Greek decline and adoption of previously Asian vices, see Cic. \textit{Q.fr}. 1.1.16, Liv. 38.17.11. On Roman reception of Greek culture more broadly, see Gruen, 1992: 223-71.
\textsuperscript{21} Cf. in visual and performative culture the process whereby older gladiatorial categories like the Samnite and the Gaul were ultimately replaced by, but left a strong influence on, later ones like the Thracian (Junkelmann, 2000: 37). On the history of gladiatorial combat in the Roman world more broadly, see Wiedemann, 1992, Dodge, 2009.
down, pointing to the Helvetii’s successful defence of their territory against the Germans and the Romans’ recent destruction of the Helvetii and also to the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutoni. On the face of it, this would seem to reduce the difficulty of the author’s task and the glory accruing from it. However, the main function of the passage is to place him, yet again, in the role of Marius in the Cimbric War, saving Italy from the Northern menace. At 2.4, the Germanic origins of the Belgae are used to extol their military prestige and thus implicitly glorify Caesar’s defeat of them.

The most explicit general statement of German possession of originally Gaulish qualities in De Bello Gallico is at 6.24 – the Gauls were once not merely the equals of the Germans but their superiors, who bestrode the Rhine as well as the Alps. While the Germans, however, now preserve their ancient clothing and diet, the Gauls have so degenerated that they no longer even claim to be the Germans’ peers in military vigour.

Seneca went farther (Dial. 3.111.1-4); only German inability to control counterproductive anger prevents their tough bodies and hardy lifestyle from making them superior even to the Romans. In comparison, not only Galatians but Gauls in general are now so weak as to be comparable to Anatolians and Syrians – men weak in war (molles bello viri). Seneca, of course, wrote in different generic traditions from Caesar and Tacitus, in this case the philosophic dialogue. In the dialogue De Ira, Seneca explored the experience and the behavioural consequences of anger; the dialogue was written in the tradition of the Stoic school of philosophy and in it Seneca argued for the practical benefits and intrinsic value of control over and detachment from violent passions in general, taking anger as a particularly important case in point. In such an explicitly general and philosophical work, his generalizations and theories were not embedded in the overall narrative framework of a historical account; in contrast, both Caesar and Tacitus claimed empirical support for their generalizing judgements of peoples from particular

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22 Isaac, 2004: 429-39
23 On Stoic writing and thought in Roman contexts more generally, see Colish, 1985, Reydams-Schils, 2005.
24 For overviews of recent scholarship on Seneca’s life and work, see Veyne, 2003, Fitch, 2008.
alleged personalities and events featured in their respective narratives. However, the judgements actually expressed, I have argued, have deep roots in earlier thought and writing and were arrived at from an approach ultimately no less theoretical than that of Seneca.

Tacitus voiced some doubt about prehistoric Gaulish invasions of Germany but ultimately accepted them on Caesar’s authority (Ger. 28). On the overall narrative of Gaulish decline, however, he was more confident; one stated reason for wavering in the former case was precisely that both banks of the Rhine then shared the same properties, removing an incentive to expansion in either direction (whereas later there was the attraction of Gaulish wealth and weakness). However, Florus, who wrote at an even greater chronological remove from the events related, and with considerably less precision, described both the (Transalpine) Gauls and the Germans at the time of the conquest of Gallia Comata as the fiercest in the world (inmanissimi gentium) without distinguishing between them (Epit. 1.45.1-5).

Even the Gaulish physical stereotype, outlined above, was sometimes alleged to apply now more to the even taller, even blonder Germans. Suetonius, for instance, had Caligula make Gauls imitate captured Germans by, among other means, growing their hair long and dying it bright yellow (Cal. 47).

There were a few other supposed differences; a consistent and prominent stereotype, Gaulish drunkenness, was mostly absent from depictions of Germans, who were generally portrayed as sober to a fault (e.g. Caes. Gal. 4.2). This is not one of the many originally Gaulish traits ascribed more to the Germans through Gaulish enervation. It is much more straightforward than that; Gauls were drunkards from the start, even when they were also alarmingly

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26 72-5.
27 E.g. Man. 4.711-6, although Manilius of course regards this distinction, like all others, as not a decline over time but an aspect of the unchanging regional characters of Gauls and Germans, determined by the positions of their respective stars.
28 See 78-80 above.
29 With the partial exception of Tac. Ger. 23, which discusses the vulnerability of Germans to liquor introduced to them from abroad.
brave and hardy (e.g. Liv. 5.44). The same passage in De Bello Gallico also states that the Gauls' excessive and sentimental attachment to horses is not shared by the Germans, whose cavalry also differed in their maintenance of the rugged practice of riding without saddles.

2: Gauls and the Natural Environment

Roman ethnographic and geographic writing, like many other aspects of Roman thought and literature, developed against a background of Greek writings with long established intellectual authority, artistic prestige and educational usage (e.g. Quint. Inst. 1.1.12-4). Greek thought about difference among human groups, especially when discussed in the abstract, was dominated, though not to exclusion, by the related family of theories often known collectively under the term “environmental determinism”. In a nutshell, real phenotypic differences like Ethiopian colour were explained, and imaginary dispositional differences like Phrygian effeminacy supported, by appeal to an allegedly determining influence on collective human character of climate and topography. Difference of climatic origin could persist (like Meroitic children in Athens born dark-skinned) through the heritability of acquired characteristics that, not having discovered genes, ancient thinkers had no reason to doubt. The Latin stereotypes of Gauls outlined in the previous chapter conform closely to the Northern or Western set of stereotypes in this schema, rather like Thracians and Scythians in earlier Greek formulations of the theory, and were sharply distinct from the Southern or Eastern stereotype applied principally to North Africans and Middle Easterners.

However, although much of Latin literary prejudice towards the Gauls was so tightly integrated into a Greek-influenced framework of environmental determinism as to be hardly comprehensible except in this context, there is comparatively little explicit statement of the theory in Latin about the Gauls.

31 On which see Isaac, 2004: 74-82.
Such general theorizing was more favoured by Greek authors and claims of the climatic determination of Northern character in Latin literature more usually concern the Germans. However, there was a fairly consistent assumption that the cooler climate of Gaul than that of Italy made the Gauls significantly less able to tolerate the heat of more southerly countries or even the warmth of Gaul itself. Caesar, for example, suggested Gaulish dislike of heat as an explanation for a tendency to build houses in wooded areas or next to rivers (6.30).

This example is an isolated one; environmental determinism certainly played no important propagandistic role in the Commentarii. Latin literature did, however, make much use of one aspect of the environmental approach concerning early Gallo-Roman conflict in Italy. It served as an excellent way to explain the Gauls' eventual and total series of defeats without reducing the difficulty of, and therefore the glory earned through, the Romans' early struggles against the northerners. This solution was, in brief, to ascribe to the northern climate firstly an initial burst of energy and, secondly, both an inability to maintain this vigour for more than a short, if terrifying, time and a susceptibility to severe enervation in warmer conditions, such as those in Italy. The latter explained later Gaulish defeat and collapse as independent military and political entities south of the Alps, the former explained away early Roman defeat and humiliation and further glorified the few Roman victories (real or, as under Camillus, imagined) nonetheless achieved early on.

This immensely useful distortion therefore pervaded Latin writing on the subject. At 5.48, Livy gave an early, and rather moderate, example; the Senones' difficulties during their long siege of Rome were exacerbated by the difficulty, for people from such a cold and wet country (the difference between Italy's climate and that of what is, after all, the south of France was consistently and greatly exaggerated by Roman authors) in enduring the stifling heat of the unhealthy lowlands between the city's hills. He went much farther at 34.47.5; the Gauls, despite their wild charges, were unable to hold their ground in a pitched battle for any length of time because the pale-skinned northerners' soft, moist bodies were unfit for prolonged exertion, vulnerable to
heat and given to frequent thirst. Again, this explains their defeat in battle in Italy, albeit much farther north and much later on. Likewise at 35.5.7, the hot sun on the day of battle with the Boii is clearly regarded as a factor in the Romans’ victory, as the Gauls, despite two centuries between the Alps and the Po, are still fundamentally creatures of the North and, as such, wilt much more quickly under intense heat. This is extended to the Galatians at 38.17; as in Italy, they cannot fight Romans while struggling to endure Anatolian warmth. This passage also contains one of the most explicit references to Greek theorizing on environmental influences. The fertile soil and genial climate (genial, of course, except when trying to fight) of Anatolia have softened the Galatians as they soften everyone else in the same area. This clearly refers to the almost identical remarks about the same area (though not of course referring to Galatians) in the Hippocratic corpus (Aër. 12).

Tacitus, though not writing about the same period, also assumed that, in warm, unhealthy places in Italy, both German and Gaulish bodies were more susceptible than others to disease (Hist. 2.93).

Florus gave descriptions of the influence of climate on military history with regard to Gallo-Roman conflict south of the Alps similar to Livy’s. At Epit. 1.20, he claimed that Alpine bodies are, due to their wet atmosphere, moist and somewhat like Alpine snow. Consequently, it was empirically observed that they had no staying power but only an initial onrush, like an avalanche that melts when it reaches lower altitudes. In Florus’s characteristically pithy phrase, the Gauls’ attacks were more than those of mere men, their sustained performance in battle less than that of women. They are also said, once again, to be especially vulnerable to heat. At Epit. 1.38.11-5, he applied this also to the Cimbric War; having made the mistake of halting in

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32 Discussed more fully at 103-8 below.

33 Claims of the Galatians’ enervation are discussed in their own right at 103-8 below. The theme of enervation by natural agency (climate) is interestingly similar to that of enervation by human agency (culture), which formed a major part of Caesar’s overall argument in defence of his actions in Gaul (as I shall argue at 129-31 below). Cf also alleged enervation of Romans themselves, mentioned at 145 n. 42 below but not discussed in detail in the present study as it involves not so much my topic of Roman views of Gauls as the distinct (and larger) topic of Roman views of Asians.

34 Cf. in the Hippocratic corpus Aër. 12-24, discussed above at 10-1. Perhaps the archetype for the theme of decline or feminization of vigorous barbarian peoples is Herodotus’s depiction of the Persians (e.g. especially 1.71, 9.121).
Venetia, the invaders are enervated by the warmth that their frozen homes have ill equipped them to endure, thus contributing to Marius’s victory soon thereafter. Predictably, he also agreed with Livy on the influence of the sweet, warm air of Anatolia on the Galatians (1.27), again in distinctly Hippocratic language, though probably with Livy himself in mind rather than Hipp. *Aēr* 12.

The poet Manilius espoused a zodiacal form of environmental determinism derived from the Classical astrological tradition and propounded by most, though not all, writers in that tradition;35 the gods divided up the world among the twelve signs of the zodiac, each apportioned region with different properties, including, but not restricted to, human physique. Astrological regional determinism could be particularly rigid; for instance, although he did not discuss migration (conceivably for this reason), the logical conclusion of the position to which Manilius adhered is that, were the mother passing through Germany while giving birth, the offspring of a Nubian couple would be white-skinned and fair-haired. Regional horoscopy was also his explanation for the expansion of the Roman state – Italy, under Libra (the Scales, indicating that Italy’s natural role is that of an arbiter and adjudicator of the nations) had merely played its predetermined part in the divine plan (4.773-5). Gaul does not feature prominently in the *Astronomicon* but, when it does (e.g. 4.711-6) it respects the zodiacal laws as much as anywhere else; this is why all Gauls have red hair and why it is that, while Gauls have red hair, Germans36 are blonde (which, again, should apply to all Germans at all times). Which zodiacal house this is is not specified until 4.791-3, when it is named as Capricorn and Gaul is also described as a rich country.

Florus’s remarks about the farther north differ somewhat from those about the watery nature of Alpine Gauls. At *Epit.* 1.37, he claims that no part of the world has weather as unpleasant as the north of Europe, including Gaul, and that the inhabitants are likewise harsh. Ammianus made a similar remark

36 Towards whom, incidentally, Manilius expressed hostility (e.g. 4.794-5).
at 15.12.3, to the effect that men from Gaul made good legionaries because of having been toughened by their cold, windy homeland. A comment at 25.6.13-4, that Gaulish and German troops, or at least those from riverine districts, would make better swimmers is perhaps related, although one could of course come to this conclusion independently of any theory of climatic determination of hereditary character. At Stil. 1.350, Claudian inverted the tradition of Gaulish military enervation by the heat of the battlefield. He imputed such a naive expectation of Gildo before relating the latter’s defeat, at the hands of the poet’s revered patron, Stilicho, with an army that Claudian claimed included Gauls.

There was a certain indecision about whether this should apply to the Massiliots; they lived in Gaul and had done so for centuries but were reliable allies of the Roman state in Gaul and were, in origin, Greek, with the cultural prestige that that entailed. Were they, therefore, to be condemned to the same sorts of inferiority as the Gauls themselves? Quite simply, this is a question Roman authors avoided. It was touched on but not, probably because of this awkward dilemma, engaged with in detail or in a systematic manner. At Liv. 37.54.21-2, a remark is put into the mouths of Rhodian envoys to the Senate to the effect that the Massiliots have in no way been assimilated and are still as they would be if they resided in the middle of Greece. On the other hand, it is given as an example that the Rhodians adduce to deny environmental determination of collective character generally and, as argued above, this clearly does not reflect Livy’s own view of the matter. Indeed, writing in the persona of Gn. Manlius Vulso, Livy took it for granted that the Massiliots had been assimilated by their environment to a considerable extent – 38.17. At 3.301-56 of Lucan’s Belli Civilis Libri Decem, the Massiliots are referred to simply as Greeks, although this means very little as post-Classical epic and lyric poetry involved ubiquitous use of mythic aliases for peoples and cities (e.g. “Cecroprians” for the Athenians) and the term therefore implies nothing more than the Massiliots’ indisputable and undisputed Greek ancestry.

37 See 105-8 below.
3: Contempt and Disregard

Comments about Gauls in works of Latin literature are not always imputations of stereotypical qualities. Much was written that did not condemn at all and, very occasionally, there was a more general contempt, with no specific complaint made, a vague arrogance with no particular prejudice adduced to justify it. It is interesting, of course, to note how little of this there is and how profoundly attached Roman authors were to their stereotypical schemata and classifications of foreigners. It is equally interesting to note instances where it is the case, most of them in the Ciceronian corpus. An obvious example is Pro Fonteio. The orator’s systematic attack on the tradition of Gaulish honesty is discussed above. Much of his assault on the Gaulish witnesses against Fonteius and alleged victims of his misrule, however, is less specific and merely expresses a general contempt of foreigners in general and Gauls in particular. Font. 3 establishes the tone in this regard, with its criticism of the insolence (In Verrem notwithstanding) of prosecuting a Roman magistrate for offences against the provincials over whom he has legally ruled.

A lengthy contrast is drawn at 7 between the respectability of the witnesses on either side: on the one hand Roman knights conducting business in Gaul, Roman colonists ensuring the security of Italy, the loyal Massiliots and, on the other, a rabble of Gauls. Even if all Gauls were unanimous in their condemnation, he claims, it would stain the dignity of the Roman state to believe them over Fonteius and his associates. At 11, it is suggested that if, in previous difficult cases, even Roman witnesses have been disbelieved, then a fortiori one cannot sanely take the word of barbarians. Almost immediately afterwards (12), a very similar argument is made; if even the newer equestrian

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38 On which, see, e.g., Isaac, 2004: 412.
39 On the generally disdainful attitude taken by Cicero towards the provincial peoples, including the (Narbonese and Cisalpine) Gauls, see Isaac, 2004: 412-3.
40 69-71.
juries can reject dubious testimony from Roman citizens, then how much more can the present jurors doubt the babbling of Volcae and Allobroges? At 13, Cicero asks whether the jurors can seriously expect the opposing witness Induciomarus, with his crude language (no qualifying use of "puto" to indicate tentativeness) to have given to his role all the grave consideration and thought of a Roman. This image of Gaulish Induciomarus poring over ethical and legal questions with a furrowed brow was, in all likelihood, intended to achieve a comic effect, emphasizing the absurdity of subjecting a Roman citizen to a trial instigated by mere Gauls.

He returns at 14 to the theme of the stark difference in dignity between the two sets of witnesses and the dangerous silliness of submitting an innocent Roman to a punishment demanded by Gauls. Next (15), the distasteful spectacle of Gauls walking around Rome in national dress, including bracae, is pointed to; is this arrogance to be punished or rewarded? Finally (16), there is yet another contrast between Cicero's client, noble and honourable and the clients of M. Plaetorius (his opponent), blustering, over-passionate and weak.

Similarly, at Q. fr. 1.27, a contrast is drawn between Greeks and governing Gauls, Spaniards or Africans — immanibus ac barbaris nationibus. Even if one were charged with the former, he wrote to his brother, one would have to take some care for their welfare; how much more, therefore, must one attend to the interests of one’s gubernatorial subjects if one’s province contains Greeks. Here again, no specific condemnation is made but it is clear that Gauls, like Spaniards and Africans, are regarded as much inferior to Greeks and Romans.

Otherwise, although specific stereotypes and prejudices are of course frequent and colourful, such generalized contempt is rare. This is especially the case with regard to later writings; as Gaul became an important source of administrators and bishops⁴¹ and the chronological distance from its independence grew, while stereotypes might survive as literary commonplaces

⁴¹ Sivan, 1993.
(for instance in the poetry of Claudian, as discussed above), attitudes of
highhanded contempt and non-specific dislike were naturally expressed less
often. Writing contemptuously of Gauls, as at Amm. 15.11.1, is in later
writings generally restricted (as in this example) to the pre-Roman Gauls of the
country’s barbarous past, sharply distinguished from those of its assimilated
present.

4: Gauls and/or Greeks

Environmental determinism is one legacy to Latin literature of Greek thought
on race. Another concerns purity of collective lineage. This may be thought
of, again at some risk of oversimplifying a vast topic, as a claim that only
peoples’ unfortunate characteristics are adopted by others; mixing with Syrians
would make a people more effeminate but not more intelligent, while mixing
with Thracians would make a people more impulsive and brutish but not more
freedom-loving or better at fighting.

Consequently, names which imply mixed ancestry, like “Syrophoenix”,
“Libyphoenices” or “Gallograecus” can easily bear a negative connotation by
their very nature. That said, the latter term (and the associated “Gallograecia”)
became so ubiquitous as almost to displace “Galatae”/“Galatia” and is
therefore also found in numerous contexts with no discernible prejudice
towards the Galatians or their ancestry. However, even though usage of the
term “Gallograeci” to refer to them does not necessarily indicate an unfriendly
attitude towards them, it clearly does indicate that the Galatians were thought
of by Latin authors as (at least) half Greek. There are two points to note here.
Firstly, they were, most certainly, not believed to have retained a Gaulish

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42 75.
43 On Greek attitudes to (collective) descent and lineage, including some ancient criticism of the
dominant views, see Hall, 2000, Isaac, 2004: 45-6, 144-6.
44 This is one reason for the frequent emphasis, especially in Athenian writings, on autochthony, the
ultimate guarantee of unmixed ancestry – Hdt. 7.161, Th. 1.2.6, Isaac, 2004: 129-33.
46 E.g. [Caes.] B. Alex. 67, 78, Liv. 37: 8.4, 38.3, 40.5-13, 38: 12, 18, 45, Vell. 2.39.2, V. Max. 6.1. ext.
2, Flor. Epit. 1.27, Amm. 22.9.5, August. CD 3.21.
47 Almost but not quite – e.g. Cic. Att. 199.3, Plin. Nat. 24.67, 25.17 & 25.100, Amm. 22.7.8, Cl. Eut.
2.240.
character for very long after leaving Gaul. Secondly, the local influence which so redefined them in the Roman literary imagination was, very specifically, that of the Greeks with whom they warred and across whose coastlands they had migrated. Predictably enough, the role played by the non-Greek Asians whom they conquered and ruled is a purely passive one, except perhaps for adding a little additional lethargy; for Romans authors the Galatians were always Gallograeci, never Gallocappadoces or Gallophryges.\textsuperscript{48} It was, for instance, apparently taken for granted that, had Galatian ruler Deiotarus I been pleased at Caesar’s misfortunes, a likely way of expressing this was in reciting from memory a few appropriate lines of Greek verse (Cic. Deiot. 9).

Nonetheless, the frequency of names implying mixture should not be taken to demonstrate that they ever entirely lost their accusatory or derogatory sense, or that Gaulish-Greek admixture in general was not thought of as a process of enervation or deterioration. Roman writings on Greece, the Greeks and Greek culture are very numerous and very varied. It hardly needs to be said that there are many Latin encomia to Greek culture and literature (e.g. Cic. \textit{Q. fr.} 1.27). However, there were also many unflattering stereotypes of the Greeks, particularly Magna Graecians rather than other Greeks and contemporary Greeks rather than those of Classical times; many of these, ironically, were applied originally to Middle Easterners by Greek writers,\textsuperscript{49} especially languor and effeminacy. If one takes into account the generally dim view taken of racial admixture and, more specifically, the belief that it only transmitted a people’s more regrettable attributes, it becomes (comparatively) unproblematic for the Hellenization of the Galatians to be seen negatively.

While Latin views on Hellenization of Romans were tremendously complex and deeply ambiguous,\textsuperscript{50} those on Hellenization of Galatians were actually

\textsuperscript{48} They are alleged to be, in a sense, Phrygian, at Liv. 38.17 but this is an insulting claim about their military abilities, not an alternative name.

\textsuperscript{49} Isaac, 2004: 396-7.

\textsuperscript{50} Hor. \textit{Ep.} 2.1.156 captures the ambivalence rather neatly. For more straightforwardly negative views of the adoption of Greek culture by Romans, see Plu. \textit{Cat. Ma.} 23.1-3, Cic. \textit{de Orat.} 2.4; for qualifying argumentation as to how seriously such strictures should be taken, see Gruen, 1990: 158-92. On Roman attitudes towards Greeks and their culture in general, see Balsdon, 1979: 30-54.
rather straightforward; certainly there was no talk of a cultural debt owed by them to Greece or of their ennoblement through literature and high culture.

When Cicero called Clodius’s Galatian associate, Brogitarus, Gallo-Greek (*Brogitaro Gallograeco impuro ... ac nefario – Har. 13*), this was clearly intended to insult, and to do so rather harshly. In private correspondence (*Att. 119.3*), his view of the military vigour of his Anatolian auxiliaries, including Galatians, although by no means entirely contemptuous, was far from confident. Overall, “Gallograecus” lay somewhere between words like “Celtiberus” and words like “Syrophoenix”. Referring to people as *Celtiberi* was merely the usual and standard way to locate them, geographically and/or ethnographically, within a certain part of the Spanish world. “Syrophoenix” on the other hand was a largely literary creation, narrowly derogatory in content. “Gallograeci” was in fairly common usage as an alternative to “Galatae” but nonetheless always retained its pejorative undertones.

Livy’s judgement was more comprehensive and less ambiguous. At 38.17, he put into the mouth of Gn. Manlius Vulso (the consul for 189 who followed up the Roman victory in the Syrian War with extensive campaigns against the Galatians and other western and southern Anatolian peoples) a speech to his soldiers to the effect that they need not fear the Galatians because of their many faults, which he proceeded to list. This oration is very informative on Roman attitudes to the Galatians, as its general thrust must have been such as Livy felt would have been at least reasonably persuasive for Roman soldiers and at least reasonably likely for a Roman aristocrat to espouse. It is at least as informative on Livy’s attitude to the Galatians as, despite its hostility and prejudice, its highly abstract and theoretical character is unmistakably literary. The account of Manlius’s campaigns is preceded with a brief history of the Balkan and Anatolian Celts, not unlike a miniaturized

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51 Who are *Galatae* on this occasion, further suggesting, I would contend, that his use of “Gallograeco” in public was a deliberate choice, indicating an expectation of its having a negative connotation for his audience.

52 On this Livian oration see also Isaac, 2004: 307-9.

53 So much so, for some translators, that the improbability of such theorizing from a field commander to his troops interrupts the narrative rather inelegantly – e.g. Sage, 1936: 61 n. 1.
version of a Herodotean ethnography-then-narrative of Asian peoples being incorporated by earlier empires; Livy was clearly attempting to be as comprehensible as considerations of space allowed and apparently felt that an account of their enervation (and other weaknesses) was an essential element of his digression on the Galatians and their pacification.

Vulso/Livy opens the oration with an admission that the Galatians are the strongest people in Asia (militarily, not politically) but quickly adds that they could hardly but exceed their neighbours when, after traversing almost the whole world, they settled among Syrians and Anatolians. He admits also that their stature and red hair, together with their impressive appearance (shouting, clashing their shields, the use of unnecessarily large weapons) are intimidating but claims that this is an ultimately empty threat. He then proceeds to apply briefly to the Galatians much the same analysis as that already explored with regard to the Cisalpine Gauls (to whom there are several explicit references) – only their first charge is impressive; if that can be resisted by Roman fortitude then they will soon wilt under the Mediterranean sun that their pale and flabby bodies cannot withstand. This, however, is primarily the basis for an argument a fortiori; if genuine Gauls can be conquered, how much more easily can these half-breeds? This turn of thought leads to a line of criticism much more specific to the Galatians:

et illis maioribus nostris cum haudi dubiiis Gallis, in sua terra genitis, res erat; hi iam degeneres sunt, mixti, et Gallograeci iure, quod appellantur; sicut in frugibus pecudibusque non tantum semina ad seruandum indolem valent, quantum terrae proprietas caelique, sub quo aluntur, mutat.

And those facing our ancestors were without doubt Gauls, born in their own country; these are degenerates, mixed, truly Gallo-Greeks, as they are called; as with fruits and cattle, the seed does not protect the innate character so much as its lands and the skies under which it is raised change it.

This claim is then supported by some more general argumentation. All peoples, when removed from their original homeland, take on the
characteristics (implicitly, the negative characteristics) of their new ones; have not the Macedonians whom Alexander spread around the East become Egyptians, Syrians, Parthians? Have not the Massiliots taken on, at least to some extent, the attributes of Gauls? Have not the Tarentines lost any Spartan discipline and severity they may once have possessed? Plants wither and deteriorate when planted in alien soil, quickly taking on the nature of their new land. Wild animals, however resistant at first, quickly break and become docile in unfamiliar and captive surroundings. Nature likewise softens men under equivalent circumstances. The distinctly Hippocratic reference at this point to the influence of the natural environment of Anatolia has already been mentioned. Its use here reinforces the theme of enfeeblement; a supposedly enervating environment and supposedly enervating neighbours combine to make the Galatians so weak as opponents that Vulso claims to be more concerned with insufficient glory from the campaign as excessive difficulty.

The Gauls who had fought for Antiochus III were really Phrygians weighed down by heavy Gaulish broadswords. Indeed, the real danger (at this point the pretence that these words are those of a general encouraging his troops rather than a Julio-Claudian historian wears particularly thin)^54 is that the Romans too will also be infected with the femininity, indolence and slavishness of Greeks and Asians and suffer a decline of their own from their mid-second century peak. Returning to a (somewhat) less anachronistic theme, Livy’s Vulso concludes by pointing out that, although conquering the Galatians will therefore be straightforward, the Gauls’ strength, compared with their even weaker Anatolian rivals, will still guarantee his soldiers cheap glory among the Asian peoples and reinforce the impression of Roman might at little risk.

At 38.46, either L. Furius Purpurio or L. Aemilius Paulus (it is not made clear which; the two legates unsuccessfully opposed granting Vulso a triumph for his anabasis),^55 is also said to have pointed out that not only is the

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^54 This expedition came to mark the beginning of the Oriental corruption of Italian manhood for many authors. Even for Augustine, it retained this role (CD 3.21), although for him the change was from form of pagan vice to another, not from Roman virtue to Anatolian vice.

^55 On this passage by Livy, see Briscoe, 2008: 161-3. Briscoe discusses issues of textual criticism, and to a lesser extent literary criticism and interpretation, with regard to the passage rather than the legates Furius Purpurio and Aemilius Paulus as historical individuals.
Gallograeci’s name mixed but so are their bodies and spirits. Vulso attacked them illegally, without Senatorial sanction, and also recklessly, using unsafe tactics that would have failed had he not been so fortunate in his enemies; his victory was due solely to the Galatians’ enervation. This speech assumes that the Senators would also have shared the views already discussed on miscegenation in general, especially with those from the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and on the enervation of the Galatians in particular.

Vulso’s reply (38.49) includes a dilemma. If the legates were correct that the Galatians were weak and enervated, there would have been no risk, warranted or otherwise; if they were correct that he was in great danger, was not his victory on unfavourable ground deserving of great glory? Whether his apparently reduced faith in Galatian decline is due to dishonesty (or a change of mind) on his part or, as is difficult not to suspect, to Livy reporting him less imaginatively on the latter occasion is impossible to say.

Florus, as one might expect, endorsed Livy’s views; at Epit. 1.27, he repeated in brief both Livy’s environmental determinism (in this case Asia’s mild airs rather than its soil or temperature) and his botanical analogy to the effect than transplanted humans also lose their original properties. Vulso defeated mere relics of the Gauls who had cut their way through the Balkans, threatened Delphi and invaded Asia. As well as reporting the Galatians’ utter loss of Gaulish ferocity, he relates several colourful incidents that one might expect to change this opinion (the decapitation of a Roman soldier by the captured wife of Galatian ruler Orgiagon when he mistreated her, mass suicide by Galatian prisoners of war, attempts to bite through metal chains) but the author appears to have noticed no contradiction.

Claudian, on the other hand, though capable of invective impressive even by Roman standards did not depict the Galatians negatively (Eut. 2.247-51). After several centuries of continuous Roman possession of Anatolia, his attitude, however imperious, was necessarily different. The Galatians could no longer be regarded as entirely foreign and insulting them would merely insult

56 Principally Ruf. and Eut. but also Gild.
an established part of the Roman dominion. However, while the attitude is positive, the stereotypes are essentially the same; when they drink from the Halys instead of the Rhine, the Gauls lay down their spears and clothe themselves in Greek robes. Pacification and Hellenization still predominate, however altered the evaluative judgement attached to them. The same applies to other Anatolian peoples; the Phrygians, rather than effeminate, are uniquely ancient; again, Claudian restricts himself to, as it were, canonical material but selects from it the more complimentary tradition.

Yet, despite the profound Hellenization that the Galatians underwent (at least in Latin literature), they remained, curiously, more Gaulish in certain respects than the Iberian people that bore the even more persistent conjoined name “Celtiberi”. While there are passages in which Spaniards are referred to by the terms “Celtae”, “Celti” or even “Galli”, they are extremely rare. The Galatians, on the other hand, are simply *Galli* fairly often, especially in Livy. This is doubly incongruous as there was no tradition of an enervation or corruption of the Celtiberi, who were, if anything, regarded slightly more positively than other Celtic-speaking peoples. In this respect, the Galatians’ literary descriptions are rather more like those of the Cisalpine Gauls. This similarity and the undisputed Gaulishness of the Galatians, however orientalized their national characteristics, is important with regard to something else they shared with the Cisalpine Gauls in the Latin literary imagination – a desecration (of Rome in 391 and, unsuccessfully, Delphi in 279) that could, therefore, stain all Gauls, at all times, as sacrilegious and lawless, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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57 *Eut.* 251-4, referring to, though not explicitly mentioning, Hdt. 2.2.
58 Liv. 24.42.6-8, Mart. 4.55.8 and Flor Epit. 1.33.12 seem to be the only surviving examples; in Greek texts, however, Spaniards from central and south-central areas were often called *κέλτοι* or *κελτικοί*.
60 E.g. Flor Epit. 1.34, V. Max. 2.6.11.
5: Gauls and Romans

This chapter completes the project begun in the previous one, an examination of how Latin writers' Gauls related to their literary pictures of other peoples, by discussing how their depiction related to that of the Romans themselves: the impact that the Gauls were imagined to have had on the early Romans, the sort of danger and the degree of danger the Gauls were imagined to pose to the Romans, including especially the masterful use of this motif of Gaulish peril in contemporary political propaganda by Caesar, and finally the impact that the Romans were themselves imagined to have on the Gauls. The fact that the Roman polity came to administer Gaul naturally impinges heavily on all such depictions and not only in the obvious case of Caesar. Much of what was written on the subject by Latin authors involved at least some implicit or explicit commentary on Roman imperialism in Gaulish countries and, as often as not, a frank attempt to justify it. The political aspect of Roman writings on the Gauls involves many of the themes treated separately in previous chapters and this chapter therefore also draws together many of the various threads of Part 1 of this thesis.

1: The Senonian Sack of Rome

The most prominent and most consistent trait of Gauls in the Latin literary imagination, as well as one of the most complex and the most difficult to define precisely, is that of threat or danger, often associated with behaviour, alleged and/or real, violating fundamental norms of human decency. Curiously, it is also one of the least distinctive of the Gauls' supposed traits and one shared, in varying degrees, with the Roman portraits of many, perhaps most, foreign peoples. Effeminacy was common in the non-Roman world of the Roman imagination but it was by no means universal and assessments of foreigners'
martial potency varied widely. In most cases, however, one can find a sense of danger or threat, past, present or future. Phoenicians spread degeneration through their maritime trade and migration; Jews are dangerously secretive and loyal only to themselves and threaten Italian manhood through their deviant practices; Phrygians are, in the latter regard, even more shameless; Germans cannot control their impulses and are bent on theft and aggression; Greek, especially Italiot, inconstancy and fickleness, lead inevitably to revolutions and wars which entangle Rome politically, just as Greek culture and enervated character threaten to overwhelm native Italian vigour. At the very least, one can say fairly definitively that peril was not one of the many qualities ascribed only to one side or the other of an East-West or South-North classification of non-Romans.

Gauls did not, then, possess a monopoly on threat or transgression in the Latin literary imagination. However, the consistency with which Gauls could be condemned for transgressive conduct or portrayed as perilous and the degree of peril that they could be portrayed as posing are curious. Virtually every author to be discussed wrote either after the completion of the Roman conquest of the Gauls or during its later stages, when they posed no real threat to Italian soil or to the security of the Roman state. It is therefore puzzling that they could be depicted not merely as dangerous but as characteristically so and to an almost unique degree.

What forever blackened the Gauls’ name in Latin historiography, more than anything else, was Brennus’s sack of Rome in the fourth century. One example of the importance of the war in the Romans’ view of their own history is the ill-omened status of the traditional date for the defeat at the Allia, the Dies Alliensis, in the Roman calendar and of the river itself (Verg. A. 7.717).

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2 As discussed at 80 above.
3 Sal. Jug., 41.2, Cic. Agr. 2.95.
4 Juv. 14.102-4, Philostr. VA 5.33.
5 This is a major theme of Tac. Ger.
8 On this Virgilian reference to the Allia, see Horsfall, 2000: 470. Horsfall endorses the traditional identification of the river-course with the present Fosso della Bettina and discusses the sources (e.g.
When, for rhetorical purposes, Valerius Maximus set out to list the five worst disasters in all of Roman history, the Gaulish capture of Rome and the defeat at the Allia both figured, along with Cannae and the Late Republican civil wars (9.11 ext. 4).

Of course, that is not to say that imperial and late Republican authors were expressing a collective scar on the psyche of the Roman people that had been continuously present since 387 BCE. However, whenever it was useful, centuries later, to portray Gaulish persons, peoples or polities negatively, the sack did provide the Roman writers and orators of the day with a uniquely potent rhetorical resource. Simply put, the double sacrilege of first burning the City of Mars and then besieging Jupiter’s citadel, the Capitol, was not something of which one could accuse any other people.

For instance, when describing the opposing sides at the Battle of the Trebia in 218 BCE, Silius Italicus sought to establish the moral superiority of the doomed Roman forces by, among other means, emphasizing Hannibal’s Gaulish troops. However, it would have been inappropriate to his chosen genre, epic poetry, to establish the undesirability of such a Gaulish connection through the harsh language used by many prosaic authors. What was appropriate to Latin high epic was reference to mythical ancestry and to dramatic episodes from Classical history or myth; Silius therefore had Crixus, the leader of Hannibal’s Boian allies at the Trebia, pride himself on descent from the captor of Rome. The passage introducing Crixus (4.148-156) also features a rather concentrated burst of the metallurgical imagery discussed above:

\[
\textit{Boiorum ante alias Crixo duce mobilis ala} \\
\textit{arietat in primos obicitique immania membrā.} \\
\textit{ipse, tumens ataus, Brenni se stirpe ferebat.}
\]

Varro) to which Vergil might have referred in establishing that the anniversary of the Allia on July 18th was a dies religiosus; he does not, however, discuss however the second-century general Cn. Manlius Vulso or link the passage with the ancient texts that mention Vulso.

* On the subject of history and memory generally and with regard to the Classical world in particular, see, e.g., Le Goff, 1992, Shrimpton, 1997, Gowing, 2005.

51. Discussed at 118-23 below.
In front, Crixus leading a swift squadron of Boii,
He strikes first and hurls forwards their immense bodies.
He, boasting of his ancestors, claimed for himself the lineage of Brennus,
And so Crixus drew one of his titles from the Capitol’s capture.
The scene of, on the Tarpeian Rock’s sacred summit,
The Celts weighing gold, the fool displayed on his shield-boss.
On the man’s milk-white neck shone a vermilion torque,
With gold his clothes were striped, and his gloves were stiff
With gold; and his helm-crest glittered with the same metal.

The Senones themselves also featured in the Punic ranks and they are referred to simply as infandi Senones (4.160) – the unspeakable or accursed Senones; clearly the sack of Rome is here treated as a permanent stain on their collective reputation.

Similarly, in Tacitus’s discussion of the arguments made against Claudius’s admission to the Senate of eminent Gallo-Romans from beyond the Narbonese province in 48 CE, the last and most impassioned of the fervent pleas (studiis ... adseverantium) that he ascribed to those who spoke against extending the ius honorum was a reminder of the Senonian destruction of Rome (Ann. 11.23).

While the Commentarii de Bello Gallico provide perhaps the clearest example of the political use of the topos of the Gaulish threat, Cicero’s Pro M. Fonteio Oratio is certainly the clearest surviving instance of its legal and oratorical use. I have already discussed this oration’s employment of the stereotypes of Gaulish irreligion, aggression, disloyalty and inconstancy to discredit Transalpine witnesses and to counter the stereotype of Gaulish guilelessness
and honesty.\textsuperscript{12} I also mentioned that Cicero's main historiographical bases for this denigration, apart from conflicts on the northern borders of the Narbonese province in the recent past, were the sack of Rome and the attack on Delphi in the third century and I shall now discuss these latter aspects in more detail.

The first explicit reference is at 14, where the sack is linked with the unsuccessful attempt to capture Delphi by another Brennus in 279 BCE. This first mention clearly seeks to present these events in primarily religious terms:

\textit{hae sunt nationes quae quondam tam longe ab suis sedibus Delphos usque ad Apollinem Pythium atque ad oraculum orbis terrae uexandum ac spoliandum profectae sunt. ab isdem gentibus sanctis et in testimonio religiosis obsessum Capitolium est atque ille Juppiter cuius nomine maiores nostri uinctam testimoniorum fidem esse uoluerunt ... cum his vos testibus uestram religionem coniungetis?}

These are the nations that once set out so far from their settlements as to Delphi to harass and to plunder Pythian Apollo and the oracle of the whole earth. By the same races, scrupulous and religious in testimony, were besieged the Capitol and that very Jupiter to whose name our ancestors preferred that the honesty of witnesses be consecrated... Will you compare to your own religion that of these witnesses?

It is worth noting that there is no such robust Latin condemnation of Sulla's actions in successfully despoiling both Delphi and Olympia in 86 BCE during the First Mithradatic War\textsuperscript{13} and also that the Gauls did not actually plunder the site.\textsuperscript{14} For present purposes, however, the main points to observe are the supposed relevance of these events to Gauls from another country and another century and the portrayal of both attacks as supremely impious; these were wars against not only other men but the gods themselves and, as such, they stain the whole Gaulish race, in all places and at all times.

\textsuperscript{12} At 69-71 above.
\textsuperscript{13} Although Greek authors were naturally more vocal, e.g. Paus. 9.7.4-5, 9.33.6, 10.21.6, Plu. \textit{Sull.} 12.3-9.
\textsuperscript{14} Their attempt to capture Delphi resulted in decisive Greek victory and a costly northward retreat—Paus. 10.23. For a discussion of the legend of a Gaulish seizure and pillage of Delphi, see Str. 4.1.13 and, for an expression of credence in it, D. C. Fra. 90-1; incidentally, the myth still persists, e.g. Beresford Ellis, 1990: 82-4.
The elevation of the second Brennus in particular to the status of a direct, if unsuccessful, opponent of the gods was facilitated in particular by ascribing to divine intervention the violent storm that contributed to the Delphic campaign’s disastrous outcome for the invaders. At Prop. 3.13.51-4 this is only implied, by having a personified Mount Parnassus deliberately shaking his snows onto the Gaulish army, although the invasion is called a sacrilege (sacrilegium). Valerius Maximus was more explicit; at 1.1 ext. 9, two versions of the episode are related, both of which involve unambiguous divine intervention. The first is a legend to the effect that Brennus succeeded in entering the temple but was immediately compelled to commit suicide in punishment. The second exaggerates the Gauls’ military successes and claims that, when all human means of defence had failed, Apollo himself declared that he would fight the Gauls with white maidens and then overwhelmed their army with his snows.15

Similarly, although the account in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita of the invasion and subsequent reconstruction (5.32-55) is ambiguous in certain respects and seems, at 5.36-7, to place the blame for the war largely on Roman ambassadors rather than the Senones, it ultimately does characterize the conflict and the belligerents in religious terms.16 This is especially pronounced at 5.41, where Livy recounts the legend of the self-sacrifice of the curule senators, who refused to evacuate and waited patiently in front of their houses for the Gauls. Their dress is said to have been that which they wore when conducting the chariots of the gods. It is mentioned that some previous writers recorded that the pontifex maximus led his doomed fellows in reciting the sacred formula dedicating themselves, as sacrificial victims, for divine reward to the state and the Roman race.17 Before killing them, the Gaulish soldiers are so impressed by the Fathers’ more than human dignity (ornatum habitumque

15 Cf. D. S. Fra. 22.9.1-5, an earlier Greek account from which Valerius appears to have drawn the basic idea of the White Maidens, which in that version are Athena Pronaia and Artemis.
16 For additional interpretation of Livy’s account of the Senonian invasion, see Williams, 2001: 117-23 and on Livian commentary in general, see Dorey, 1971, Luce, 1977, Forsythe, 1999.
17 Human sacrifice, unlike cannibalism, was acceptable under certain circumstances, especially if one served as one’s own victim; self-dedication to the gods of the Lower World was an act occasionally undertaken by Roman aristocrats at times of military or natural disaster and much admired by Livy, e.g. 8.9, 10.28.12-29.20.
humano augstiorem) and their godlike expressions (simillimos dis) that they view them with religious awe (venerabundi intuebantur).

And, although this is, among passages of comparable length, the most overtly religious in its imagery, religion, in various ways, pervades virtually the entire account of the period of crisis. At 5.32.6, the Gauls are introduced by an omen from the gods, which the Romans foolishly ignore. At 5.55.2, the chastened Romans' acceptance of a second omen (also emphasized as a conclusion to the crisis in the Periocha to Book 5) brings the whole episode to a close. At 5.39.11-2, the Romans take great care after the rout at the Allia to preserve holy relics and even to maintain the proper observance of cult throughout. Immediately afterwards, the Citadel (arx) and Capitol, soon to be besieged, are called the seats of the gods (sedes deorum). The Gauls themselves are said to be moved by the Romans' piety at 5.46.3. And, of course, Livy relates in detail the story of the salvation of the beleaguered Capitol by the sacred geese of Juno (5.47.1-4). At 5.49, Camillus is said to fight a battle with the Gauls in the very sight of the temples to the gods and the latter are explicitly said to give aid (deorum opes) to the Roman side. After the victory, a debate on whether to remove to previously conquered Veii rather than to rebuild ashen Rome allows Livy to put into Camillus's mouth an oration at 5.51-4 on the peerless religiosity of the Romans and the unique sacredness of the city of Rome, the site of the Gauls' great blasphemy.

In Florus's Epitoma of Livy, the ambiguity as to the party initially in the wrong is entirely absent but Livy's heavily religious portrayal of the death of the curule senators is preserved; the episode is again characterized as sacrificial devotion to the diis manibus (1.7.9-10). More generally, the Romans during the crisis are described as concerned above all else with religion (1.7.12).

A final, very evocative evidence of the emotive powers of the Senonian sack and ransom of the young Rome for Latin authors is the need that most of them felt to deny it, at least partially. Livy, for instance, despite calling the sack a catastrophe (moles mali - 5.37.1) and portraying Roman leaders for
generations afterwards as terrified almost to paranoia by the Cisalpine Gauls (e.g. 8.17.6-7, 8.20.2-5, 9.29.2, 10.26.13),

\(^{18}\) nonetheless provided the legend in archetypal form.\(^{19}\) In brief, after the Dies Alliensis, the city indeed fell – but not completely; the Capitoline Hill was heroically defended for six months. Also, the Gaulish departure was the result not of an enormous ransom but of a band of survivors from the Allia, led by Camillus, effecting the gods’ vengeance on the impious invaders. Livy had him interrupt the very moment at which the gold was to be handed over and, after honourably offering the Gauls the option of surrender, which they imprudently refused, destroy their army to the last man (5.49). Not every author believed this – Suetonius denied it explicitly and even gave purported details of the circumstances of the ransom’s recovery, 187 years later, by M. Livius Salinator, a propraetor of Gallia Cisalpina (Tib. 3.2) – but Livy was very far from alone; Florus’s account of Rome’s Senonian crisis at Epit. 1.7, for instance, endorsed the legend in its entirety.

Tacitus similarly endorsed the story that throughout the whole ordeal, the Capitol remained inviolate (Hist. 3.72). Even this lesser legend fundamentally altered the implications of the episode; although the dominion of the Roman people had shrunk to well within the physical boundaries of the city of Rome, it had never been overthrown as a functioning state, not even for a day. The preservation of the Capitol meant that the Romans, on however small a scale, had always remained under arms and there was therefore no complete surrender, whether or not one wished to go to Livy’s romantic extreme of having the handover of the shameful ransom averted at the last moment by the national saviour riding up and turning the encounter into a crushing rout of the Gauls.

\(^{18}\) Cf. also Tac. Hist. 4.68, which recounts the exaggerated panic among metropolitan Romans over the seeming revival of Gaulish political fortunes during the Batavian rebellion of 69-70 CE.

The Gallo-Roman crisis of the early fourth century, therefore, forms the essential backdrop against which Latin writings on the Gauls and particularly those which cast them in the role of the troublemaker or aggressor, to which I now proceed, must be seen.

2: Gaulish Danger and Transgression in Latin Literature

At *Rep.* 3.9, Cicero mused on the great variety in human behaviour, especially with regard to religion. Human sacrifice is mentioned as an extreme example of outlandish behaviour, contrasted with the most just (iustissimi) Romans and is described as endemic among the Carthaginians, certain natives of the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Gauls. The extraordinary statement is also made that Gauls do not grow corn but rather take it by force from their neighbours. Two main components of Gaulish peril are to be observed here: transgression of basic decency (through human sacrifice) and a predatory or destructive stereotype (preference for theft over work).

At *Cat.* 40.1, when discussing the attempt of the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 BCE to induce the Allobroges to complement their insurrection with a simultaneous uprising in Narbonese Gaul, Sallust suggested that the plotters' expectation of a favourable response was partly due to a belief that Gauls were naturally inclined to such aggression (natura bellica). Sallust himself does not explicitly endorse this generalization but he does not dispute it either; rather, it seems to be an intrinsically plausible line of thought, proposed to help explain how the conspirators were led to the decision to reveal themselves to the Allobrogian ambassadors, which proved disastrous for them when the latter in turn revealed the conspiracy to Cicero. When discussing the Allobroges' private discussions at 42.2-4, Sallust was less ambiguous; the competing motives for siding with Catiline and for siding with the consul are listed in the author's own voice and the former include zeal for war (studium belli). Also, when relating his version of the speech of Cato the Younger on the subject of the Catilinarian revolt, Sallust had him regard as one of the
plotters’ (52.24) worst misdeeds their treasonous discussions with Gauls and call the latter the Romans’ bitterest enemies (gentem infestissimam nomini Romano), despite their demonstration of loyalty in exposing the plot and thereby contributing substantially to its failure.

Livy’s subject matter, the whole of Roman history up to Augustus, included much Gallo-Roman conflict and afforded him many opportunities to generalize about Gaulish culture and character. Overall, his attitude was consistently hostile. He claimed that, as a race, the Gauls were powerless to control their rage and were given to wild outbursts (5.37) and remarked that, while Italians could be fought by consuls, only a dictator would suffice against a Gaulish opponent (7.11.4). He put into the mouth of a Roman general encouraging his troops a claim that, while Italians could be humbled and then reasoned with, the Gauls were wild animals (belvas) who could only draw blood or shed it (7.24.4-8). At 8.14.9 and 10.10.11, the Gauls are called a feral race (gens efferata) and at 21.16.6 one always desirous of war (avidas semper armorum). At 21.20, their nature (ingenia) is described as ferocious and untameable, a comment repeated almost verbatim (indomita haberent ingenia) in the mouth of Cn. Manlius Vulso exhorting his troops against the Galatians at 38.12. At 44.26.7-14, Livy even has Perseus, the last Macedonian king of the Antigonid line, lecture his courtiers on Gaulish wildness (feritate). The following discussion of the Cisalpine Gauls’ participation in the Second Punic War at 22.1 portrays them in a particularly poor light:

Galli, quos praedae populationumque conciuerat spes, postquam pro eo ut ipsi ex alieno agro raperent agerentque, suas terras sedem belli esse premique uritusque partis exercituum hibernis uidere, werterunt retro in Hannibalem ab Romanis odia. petitusque saepe principum insidiis, ipsorum inter se fraude, eadem levitate qua consenserant consensum indicantium servatus erat.

After the Gauls, whom the hope of predation and plunder had roused [to the Carthaginian cause], saw, instead of themselves ravaging and taking
from foreign territory, their own lands becoming the seat of war, and being
drained by hosting both sides’ winter quarters, they turned their hatred from
the Romans to Hannibal. And [Hannibal], now often targeted by their
princes’ plots, was saved by some among them betraying these plots to him
with the same treachery, the same inconstancy with which they had
concocted them.

Again, when describing at 23.24.6-13 the ambush and destruction by the
Boii, at the Litana forest in 216 BCE, of two legions under a consul elect, L.
Postumius Albinus, Livy related a story to the effect that Boian Druids used
Postumius’s skull as a drinking vessel for some time afterwards. At 30.33.9,
when discussing the diverse motivations of the contingents of Hannibal’s army
at Zama in 202, he claimed that the Gauls who had followed the retreating
Carthaginians to Africa fought due to their people’s innate hatred of Romans
(\textit{insito in Romanos odio}).

And as with Gauls in general, so with Ligurians in particular; at 39.1
Livy stated that it was as if they were born to attack the Romans and, again,
that they behaved in a predatory manner towards others with more success at
honest agriculture. At 41.18.3-4 he similarly referred to the Ligurians’ innate
savagery (\textit{feritatis ingenitae}).

Above,\textsuperscript{20} I discussed Livy’s depiction of the senatorial debate in 187 on
the legality and the military merits of Vulso’s Galatian campaign of 189. Of
interest for the previous chapter’s examination of the theme of Galatian
enervation were the remarks on that topic that he had the speakers on both sides
make. The episode is also useful for present purposes as the speech that Livy
has Vulso make in defence of his actions, at 38.47-9, proceeds partly by
denigration of Gaulish collective character. The four main points of his case
against the Gauls of Asia are familiar ones from passages already discussed: a
dangerous hatred of Romans, allegedly habitual human sacrifice, a savage and
invidious nature and the Gaulish attempt to seize Delphi (38.47.9, 38.48.2,
38.48.12).

\textsuperscript{20} 105-8.
And, although Livy is one of richest sources of language characterizing the Gauls as bestial or feral, he is by no means the only such source; at 2.90.1, Velleius Paterculus also described the peoples of the Alpine districts straddling Cisalpine and Narbonese Gaul as feral and uncivilized (*feris incultisque*).

Relevant more generally is the allegation of cannibalism by the besieged Numantines in 133 BCE at V. Max. 7.6 ext. 2. Towards the end, it is claimed, the beleaguered Celtiberians were driven by hunger to eat flesh from the corpses of those who had died already.\(^21\) This transgression of the gravest taboo of Greek and Roman thought, though brought about by Roman actions, is severely condemned; Valerius declares that necessity was no excuse and the townsmen were quite free to die instead.\(^22\) At Ben. 5.16.1, Seneca sought to express the magnitude of Catiline’s immorality by emphasizing his attempt to incite rebellion among the Allobrogues. He also referred to the Gauls’ inborn hatred of Romans (*ingenita odia*) and then suggested that the result of a revolt would have been the march of a Gaulish army over the Alps, claiming that the Gauls would have used Italian victims for the sacrificial practices to which they had been longing to return. Lucan portrayed northern Europeans in general, including Gauls, as reckless and violent, utterly without fear of death (1.459-62). At 8.16-20, Silius Italicus described the Gauls as boastful (*vaniloquum*) and, more importantly, as inconstant (*mutabile mentis*).

Although Tacitus does not provide an example of consistent hostility comparable to that furnished by Livy, his account of the Treveric and Lingonic participation in the Batavian rebellion of 69-70 CE does include some fairly robust condemnation of Gaulish national character, though not in the authorial voice. At *Hist.* 4.57, he has C. Dillius Vocula, the main Roman commander in the earlier part of the war, address his troops with words to the effect that Gauls, when given an opportunity, would always attack and that they must therefore be dealt with as harshly as they were in Caesar’s time, their current

\(^{21}\) Cf. Flor. *Epit.* 1.34.11-14.

\(^{22}\) On the traditional religious and ethical programme indirectly argued for in the *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* more generally, see Mueller, 2002.
unquiet being a consequence of the naïve mildness of Galba’s policy in Gaul. Vocula also suggests that the Gauls, in their impious rebellion, are transgressing against or opposing the gods; the Olympians naturally assisted the Romans and, just as they had guaranteed the swift defeat of Sacrovir and Vindex, they would now doom Classicus and Tutor.

At 4.73, following his narration of the eventual Roman victory over the Treveri and Lingones, Tacitus again has a Roman commander, here Q. Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus, generalize about his Gaulish foes in a hostile, yet highly literary and rhetorical, manner:

\[\text{mox Treuïros ac Lingonas ad contionem uocatos ita adloquitur:}\]
\[\text{“neque ego umquam facundiam exercui, et populi Romani uirtutem annis adfirmauï; sed quoniam apud uos uerba plurimum ualent bonaque ac mala non sua natura, sed uocibus seditiousorum aestimantur, statui pauca disserere quae profìgato bello utilius sit uobis audisse quam nobis dixisse.”}\]

Next [Cerialis], having summoned the Treviri and Lingones to an assembly, thus harangued them: “I have never cultivated eloquence and have affirmed the Roman people’s honour with arms; but, since among you words are valued most and things good and evil are judged not by their nature but by seditious men’s voices, I have decided to hold forth on a few things, which, the war over, it will be more useful for you to hear than for me to say.”

And, when describing the arguments made against Claudius’s admission to the Senate of prominent citizens from Gallia Comata at Ann. 11.23, Tacitus portrayed those who took this position as disapproving strongly of the earlier induction of senators from Cisalpine Gaul by claiming that it was more than enough that Insubres and Veneti had burst into the curia. He also had them describe the Transalpine Gauls as hostile nations (hostilium nationum).

\[23\text{ Respectively an Aeduan insurgent in 21 CE and an Aquitanian mutineer in 68.}\]
\[24\text{ For the political and military history of early Roman Gaul, see Drinkwater, 1983, especially 27-30, 40-50. On the Year of Four Emperors, which created the circumstances under which rebellions on the scale of those of Vindex and the Batavi were possible, see Morgan, 2006.}\]
At Cl. 25.5, Suetonius called the religion of the Druids dire and monstrous (dirae immanitatis). Florus called the Senones a people ferocious by nature and one born for killing and the destruction of cities (natura ferox and nata ad hominem interitum, urbium stragem respectively – Epit. 1.7.4). At 1.33.8, he also described the Spanish peoples, including especially the Celtiberi, as most ferocious races (ferocissimas ... gentes). Juvenal, writing in the late first or even the second century CE, could still use the Gauls as an exemplar of aggression and immorality (8.231-4) and regard Gaulish discontent, unlike disquiet among Greeks, as genuinely dangerous (8.112-7). Tertullian also referred to Gaulish human sacrifice, although he described it as sacrifice to Mercury (Apol. 9.5) and used it as an example (one of many) of the depravity not merely of all Gauls but of all pagans. The Historia Augusta refers more than once to a Gaulish desire to change government continually and calls the Gauls most inconstant (inquietissima) – Tyr. 3.7 and FSBP 7.1. Even Claudian, who in all likelihood lived to see the beginning of the fifth century, could still write of ferocious Gaul (Gallia ... ferox – Stil. 2.241).

3: Gaulish Danger and Transgression in Caesar

In Caesar’s account of his conquests, this danger, and the associated implication that his actions were ultimately reactive, an unfortunately necessary but gloriously successful defence of the Roman state, are ubiquitous. In the first of the eight Commentaries, Gaulish misbehaviour is never once attributed to an unchanging collective personality. The reader’s confidence having been gained with this admirable display of seeming frankness, and Caesar’s

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25 On the broader literary and historiographical issues concerning the Commentarii, see papers in Welch & Powell, 1998. Goldsworthy argues that Caesar presented his own military decisions as conventional rather than innovative, making much use of stock themes in the depiction of the good Roman general, e.g. aggression in formulating strategy, caution in executing tactics. Hall examines in detail the vocabulary and syntax Caesar chose to use in the Commentarii. Levick defends the C. E. Stevens’s historical criticism of the Commentarii, especially regarding the Venetic campaigns, and also argues that, as a strategist, Caesar often kept his options open for as long as possible, leaving himself with maximal room for manoeuvre in making decisions and in later presentation of his intentions and aims. Welch argues that Caesar consistently avoided referring to or characterizing his legates, in order to emphasize his dominating personal influence on the course of the War. Wiseman speculates about the practicalities of the composition and dissemination of the Commentarii, arguing in particular that Caesar intended them to be consumed much more widely than in elite literary circles.
credentials as a formidable expert in matters Transalpine having been amply established, he opens the second commentary with a bold assertion that his conquest of the Belgic peoples was due to Gaulish fickleness and inconstancy (mobilitate et levitate animi – the latter noun also one much favoured in the denigration of foreigners by Cicero).26 The comparison of foreign, in this case Gaulish, levitas with stern Roman gravitas is also found in the Commentarii, heavily implied by the stark contrast drawn throughout between the Gauls’ petulance and caprice and Caesar’s determination and seriousness.

However, this first suggestion that the Gauls’ inner nature was ultimately behind the events of his decade in the North is, like some of Cicero’s more colourful contentions in Pro Fonteio,27 carefully smuggled in as part of a long list. Another of the possible reasons he suggests for the Belgic coalition against him is (to borrow B. Isaac’s phrase on a distantly related subject)28 a small but tactical concession to reality; it might, perhaps, have something to do with his unprecedented decision to quarter Roman troops at Vesontio even after the defeat of Ariovistus, in effect an extension of provincial rule far beyond Narbonensis,29 but if so this is merely a proud and parochial indignation at the practices of the Roman army and only one of many factors. Nonetheless, however cautious Caesar may still be, he has begun to advance one of the central rhetorical aims of his prose epic – the complete reversal of blame for the Gallic War – and this project is developed with great care in succeeding commentaries.

Again at 3.10, we are reminded that, in making his decisions, Caesar sensibly took into account his knowledge that nearly all Gauls are excessively fond of political change and excitably given to starting wars. Again, this is only one of a list and, again, another of these reasons for rebellion, that all men naturally prefer independence to subjection, the Gauls certainly no less so, seems quite reasonable – indeed, suspiciously reasonable; it is tempting to suspect that its presence was intended to maintain authorial credibility and thus

26 Isaac, 2004: 393.
27 See 69 above.
28 2004: 78.
29 On the turning point this decision represented, see Crook et al. 1994: 385.
lend support to the more tendentious claim. After a much smaller gap (at 3.17), there are some less guarded comments; the author’s confidence in the indulgence of a reader who has followed him thus far seems to be growing. Specifically, the army of his current enemy, Viridorix, is composed, to a considerable extent, of wild men and thieves (perditorum honimum latronumque), who, not unlike Tacitus’s Germans, are not built for dull, hard work on farms and prefer the excitement of attacking an army of the Roman people. Again at 4.5, we are reminded of the Gals’ unstable character and their natural tendency to alter their plans in a precipitate manner and to seek political change for no useful purpose.

At 5.56, we are informed of a detail of the Gals’ habits, the sacrifice of the last man to arrive at a muster. Irrespective of the veracity of this claim, its insertion at this point, relating the preparation of a force to challenge Caesar, when, the reader can only presume, many such sacrifices must have taken place, is clearly intended to remove any remaining doubt as to which side will occupy the moral high ground in the subsequently related struggle. This use of human sacrifice must be sharply distinguished from a mere expression of disapproval (indeed, there is not one – the practice is recorded without any evaluative judgement, as if it were a purely factual observation, located here for no particular reason); it is the deliberate employment of (presumed) disapproval on the part of Caesar’s readers to justify his actions.

Various other sorts of human sacrifice, including the use of Wicker Men, are described at 6.16. The point is not laboured; the passage is not long and, again, there is no explicitly evaluative judgement beyond a generalization that, as a nation (natio), the Gals are excessively attached to their religion. Nonetheless, it is one of the very few themes selected for the brief ethnographic digression and it seems rather unlikely that its inclusion was at random. Yet more varieties are related at 6.19, along with associated tortures (tormentis).

At 6.11-2, at the start of this mini-ethnography on the Gals and Germans, strife and mischief-making are alleged to be part of Gaulish culture,

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30 Ger. 4.2-3.
31 On Caesar’s depiction of his Gaulish adversaries as soldiers, see Rawlings, 1998.
an essential element in their collective character (and therefore not one that could reasonably be expected to stop without external intervention). The Aeduan-Sequanic dispute carried on around the time of Caesar’s arrival is elevated from a specific event with specific participants to an example of an unchanging, ritual insistence on discord and conflict. The Gauls as a whole are divided into rival, armed camps (and, by implication, always were and will be, until pacified by the author), each Gaulish polity is similarly divided (and, again, this is no mere set of disagreements, such as one would not struggle to find in contemporary Roman politics, but a national habit) and Caesar even claims to know that almost every family in Gaul is divided into two bitterly opposed factions. Faced with such an intractable and dangerous mess, who could have reached a different decision than Caesar’s? Faced with such stubborn, unreasoning resistance, who but Caesar could have succeeded in putting an end to the feuding? Who could doubt that the Gauls posed a very real threat to the security of the Narbonese province, Italy’s only territorial protection from the chaos farther north? None of these questions is posed explicitly but their implication is far from subtle.

At 6.20, even the Gauls themselves are alleged to acknowledge their tendency to dangerous rashness; some of their leaders prudently keep information from their populace, lest they be forced to precipitate action by the inevitable popular overreaction to some piece of news.

When the main narrative resumes, the Gauls’ supposed character now having finally been revealed in full, Caesar is somewhat less restrained in his authorial comments on them, although explicit remarks remain rare and their placing is still deliberate and precise. For instance, at 6.34, the Eburones[32] are described as a race of criminals (stirpem ... sceleratorum) with regard to whom Caesar’s goal is complete extermination (for the crime of the Eburonic rebel Ambiorix – attacking and destroying the legion and five cohorts under Sabinus and Cotta left occupying the Eburonic country after its initial conquest) but only after a

description of the difficulty of countering their guerrilla tactics. The reader is
invited to share, vicariously, in the frustration of losing soldiers to ambushes
while searching through endless woods and bogs for individual fighters and is
thus expected to endorse also the immediately subsequent outburst against the
Eburones as a whole.  

Similarly, the favour shown by Caesar to the civitas of the Aedui, the
Romans’ traditional clients in Gaul, is emphasized on many occasions
throughout the Commentarii, leading the reader to sympathize with Caesar
when, at 7.42, he expresses his irritation at their rebellion. This is then used
immediately as the basis for one of his clearest condemnations of the Gauls’
collective character:

impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et tacteritas, quae maxime illi
hominum generi est innata, ut leuem audietionem habeant pro re comperta.

Avarice compels one [of the rebels], another is compelled by rage
and rashness, which is innate among that race of people, so that they consider
a trivial rumour as something proven.

In connection with the same events, at 7.43, the unreason and
inconstancy (inscientiam levitatemque) of the Aeduan population is referred to.

Overall, therefore, the motif of Gaulish peril due to an inconstant and
bellicose national character and the associated reversal of blame for the Gallic
War form an indispensable component – I would argue the single most
important component – of his propagandistic presentation of the events of 58-52
in the Commentaries. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate,
Caesar did not invent this motif but was merely a more than usually active and
self-interested participant in a long tradition in Latin literature of Gaulish threat
and transgression deriving in part from the literary recollection of Brennus’s
sack of Rome.

31 On the depiction of massacre in the Commentarii more broadly, see Powell, 1998.
32 E.g. 2.15, 5.7, 5.54.
33 The final campaigns in 51 BCE were related in the posthumous eighth commentary by his legate A.
Hirtius.
4: Romanization as Enervation

I have already mentioned some of the more obvious differences between Roman and Colonialist presentation, especially justification, of empire. One of the more important of these differences can be summed up, admittedly somewhat simplistically, as the contrast between a Colonialist characterization of the agents of imperial expansion as benefactors, captured neatly in Kipling's enjoiner to "Take up the White Man's burden", and a Roman propagandistic characterization of those subject to imperial expansion as malefactors. It is with this in mind, particularly the theme of Gaulish peril, that one must consider one of the trains of thought in ancient historiography that can, at first sight, seem strange or even anti-imperial: the suggestion that Roman influence, invasion and occupation could sometimes effect a deterioration in provincial populations. In a way, this is the natural conclusion to much of the thinking already discussed; enfeeblement and enervation are, ultimately, the best and most reliable ways to de-fang feral populations like the Gauls.

Many of the ideas current among Classical writers implied, either singly or when combined with other theories, that subjection to imperial rule in general, perhaps not excluding Roman rule, could cause a decline or deterioration, on the part of the subjected population, in what the same authors regarded as masculine virtues like frugality, courage and self-restraint. In particular, the assumption that acquired characteristics could be inherited, would seem to suggest that subjugating people, compelling them to be servile for generations, would engender a collectively and heritably servile character. Likewise, the high esteem for supposedly pure national lineages and the associated tendency to regard miscegenation and cultural admixture as transmitting only negative characteristics should logically mean that coming

36 E.g. 46 above.
37 On this section as a whole, see also 145 n. 42 below.
38 On which see Isaac, 2004: 74-82.
39 On the Greek and Hellenistic background to which, see Hall, 2000, Isaac, 2004: 45-6, 144-6.
under a dominating Roman influence would involve the adoption of various Mediterranean vices but not the hardy Italic virtues.

Nonetheless, however heavily this might have been implied, relatively few authors stated it explicitly; although Roman justifications of imperialism never relied on an alleged service to or improvement of the governed, it was still going rather far to claim openly that the Romans were causing a vast decline in manful virtues throughout the Mediterranean.40

Only three extant Latin authors made a claim of this sort explicitly with regard to the Gauls. The earliest of these was Caesar. The Commentarii begin with a bold statement of the deleterious effect of Roman rule on masculine qualities:

*horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commanent atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt.*

Of all these [Gaulish peoples], the bravest are the Belgae, for the reasons that they are the farthest removed from the culture and civilization of the [Narbonese] Province, merchants visit them least often, the things that make the spirit effeminate reach them least easily and they are nearest the Germans across the Rhine, with whom they wage unceasing war.41

It was claimed that, through the corrupting effects of trade and the mollifying effects of peace, Roman expansion was doubly enervating. Those Gauls least touched by Italian influence and most exposed to the strife that was allegedly continuous outside of the Romans' empire were infinitely alleged to be more dangerous specimens than their contemptibly yet comfortingly tamed compatriots farther south. At 2.15, the Nervii were said to share this belief;

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40 On ancient claims of the enervation through Roman rule of provincial populations more generally, see Isaac 2004: 170, 189-92, 242-3.
41 This verbal description of Gaul is illustrated visually in Map 1. For the subsequent delineation of Roman Germany, see Maps 2C, 2D and 4.
they banned merchants from their territory to avoid a softening of just the sort described in the opening remarks.

In addition, there is explicit reiteration of the claim of Roman enervation of the Gauls at 6.24:

\[
nunc quod in eadem inopia, egestate, patientia qua Germani permanent, eodem uictu et cultu corporis utuntur; Gallis autem provinçiarum propinquitas et transmarinarum rerum notitia multa ad copiam atque usus largitur. paulatim adsuefacti superari multisque uicti proelii ne se quidem ipsi cum illis uirtute comparant.
\]

Now, having continued to endure the same dearth and poverty, the Germans remain unchanged and use the same food and clothing; on the Gauls, however, proximity to our provinces and access to maritime goods confer many resources. Gradually accustomed to being surpassed and defeated in many battles, they do not even compare themselves with those [Germans] in manfulness.

This characterization of provincial rule as a form of enervation served Caesar’s rhetorical purposes in two ways. Firstly, it helped him to portray his conquests as part, and hopefully the concluding part, of a long and successful process of pacifying even the Gauls’ innermost nature. This, in turn, lent additional weight to his overall portrayal of his campaigns as ultimately a great work of pacification and stabilization.

Secondly, the theme of enervation is intimately related to that of the Gallo-Germanic divide. The use made of alleged Germanic military superiority over the Gauls in Caesar’s propaganda (e.g. 1.31) have already been discussed.\(^{42}\) Claims of Gaulish enervation by provincial rule and Roman influence provided the causal explanation and theoretical basis for this alleged Gaulish inability to hold back the Germans. Also, there was more than a hint that Caesar’s conquests, as well as finally solving Rome’s Gaulish difficulties, would at least soften its Germanic troubles too; the enervation in the Province was clearly depicted as radiating widely across Gallia Comata, with at least

\(^{42}\) At 87-9 above.
some small effect even among the Belgae and Helvetii. If one accepted Caesar's premisses, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that his vast extension of direct provincial rule would soon spread a similar languor into Germany even without any territorial expansion beyond the Rhine.

Tacitus followed Caesar in also writing more frankly than most Latin writers about this particular implication of Classical theories on the consequences of subjection and cultural admixture. While there was nothing new about the lines of thought leading to the conclusion that the Romans had a debilitating effect on the heritable character of their subject peoples, it is in keeping with his direct style and more pessimistic tone that he drew the conclusion explicitly; he even seems to have regarded it as an important component of the process of Roman imperialism in northwestern Europe. At Ag. 11, the comparison to be drawn was with the Britons, especially those farther north in the island, rather than the Germans. However, although the comparison was different (Gauls and Britons as opposed to Gauls and Germans), very similar ideas were expressed about the Gauls and their progressive enervation due to the long, enforced *Pax Romana* in their country:

> plus tamen ferociae Britanni praeferunt, ut quos nondum longa pax emolliet. nam Gallos quoque in bellis floruisse accepimus; mox seignitiam cum oto intravit, amissa uirtute pariter ac libertate. quod Britannorum olim uictis evenit; ceteri manent quale Galli fuerunt.

Nevertheless, the Britons exhibit more fierceness, as the long [Roman] peace has not yet enfeebled them. For we learn that even the Gauls once succeeded in warfare; but soon sloth penetrated, along with peace, manfulness having been lost along with liberty. This has happened already to those of the Britons conquered for some time; the others remain as the Gauls were.43

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43 On Roman Britain, see Map 5.
And, again as with Caesar, this was not merely abstract theorizing; Tacitus regarded the unconquered Northern peoples as almost uniquely dangerous to the Empire and, in his writings, he showed an overall approval for territorial expansion rather than merely static defence of existing frontiers. Although he never, at least in the extant portions of his writings, explicitly set out prescriptive plans for new conquests, his depiction of Tiberius’s withdrawal from Elbe to Rhine (Ann. 1.52, 1.62, 2.5, 2.26) and Domitian’s failure to carry Agricola’s programme of conquest in far northern Britain to completion (Ag. 39-41) strongly suggest a disapproval of such decisions and depict them as dangerous loose ends or unfinished business. I would argue that this was one of his reasons for emphasizing the enervation of the Gauls by the Romans and, more generally, the debilitating effects of subjection to imperial rule; like Caesar, Tacitus wished to justify territorial expansion in northwestern Europe, albeit in his case projected rather than effected, and sought therefore to remind his readers of the success of past expansion in permanently quieting those who had once been the fiercest of barbari.

Ammianus mentioned the Belgae’s reputation among the Classical authors for greater bravery due to farther removal from the original centres of Roman civilization and drew the logical obverse of that stereotype, feebleness among the Aquitani at the opposite end of Gaul (15.11.4-5):

> horum omnium apud ueteres Belgae dicebantur esse fortissimi, ea propter quod ab humaniore cultu longe discreti, nec aduenticiis effeminati deliciis, diu cum transrhenanis certauere Germanis.

> Aquitani enim, ad quorum litora ut proxima placidaque, merces aduentiae comuehantur, moribus ad mollitiem lapsis, facile in dicionem uenere Romanam.

Of all these, the Belgae were said among the ancients to be the bravest, because, being farther separated from the more refined culture [of

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45 On how Tacitus situated his Britons in relation to other places more generally, see Clarke, 2001.
Italy] and not made effeminate by imported luxuries, they fought for a long time with the Transrhenane Germans.

Indeed the Aquitani, to whose coasts, being near and calm, foreign goods were conveyed, their character thus having fallen into enfeeblement, came easily into the Roman dominion.

His use of Caesar as a source has already been noted; almost certainly the passage quoted at 29 above was what he had in mind here, much as 15.11.1 paraphrases the opening lines of *De Bello Gallico*. Ammianus related the first opinion without judgement, which makes his attitude to the earlier author, at least on this point, rather unclear. Relating Caesar's words as a venerable ancient may indicate agreement, explicit endorsement being unnecessary with regard to the Divine Julius. On the other hand, Ammianus might easily have delicately refrained from stating his disagreement with so respectable a figure. Certainly, Ammianus's view of contemporary Gauls might have led him to dissent from Caesar; he admired what he regarded as their particular enthusiasm for military service and contrasted it with a supposedly less robust attitude in Italy (15.2.3).

The succeeding sentences at 15.11.5, however, clarify the issue somewhat. When discussing the Aquitani, Ammianus certainly gives no indication of tacit quotation, nor is there in any event a comment to precisely that effect anywhere in the Commentaries. Rather, the author gives the impression of having himself drawn the obvious conclusion that Roman domination naturally followed Roman enervation northwards through Gaul. Ammianus seems to have regarded Caesar's claims of Roman enervation of the Gauls as true of his time but without any real connection to the Late Antique present; such ancient theories could explain ancient events, like the much earlier conquest of the south of Gaul,40 but it appears never to have occurred to

40 Incidentally, the conquest of the Aquitani occurred during Caesar's 58-51 BCE campaigns before the Civil War, as with the other peoples of Gallia Comata; Ammianus was perhaps confusing the annexation of Aquitania with that of that of Narbonensis, which was undertaken much earlier (125-121). Certainly the reference to coasts easily accessible from Italy, though obviously applicable to Mediterranean Transalpina, seems distinctly odd with regard to Atlantic Aquitania (see Map 2).
Ammianus that their inescapable conclusion must be for the Gauls ever afterwards to be slavish and unwarlike.

This chapter concludes my study of Latin authors’ views on Gaul. I began, in Chapter 2, by collecting together some of the minor themes and thereby attempted to clarify the subject matter, at least to some extent, by comparing the Romans’ Galli with certain modern views and concepts that can cause confusion if not dealt with explicitly. I then proceeded to the detailed analysis of Gaulish depictions, looking firstly at literary stereotypes of the Gaul in isolation in Chapter 3 and then placing these, in Chapters 4 and 5, in the broader context of Latin images of the Gauls’ relations with their human (British, Germanic, Greek) and natural environment and finally the Romans’ own opinions of Gallo-Roman interaction.

I have argued that the events of the early fourth century, or at least the ways in which later Romans chose to remember them, form an indispensable background to the less flattering of the Latin literary depictions of Gauls. Conversely, as a whole, the Latin writings on Gaul and the Gauls that I have examined and the attitudes they reveal form, in turn, an essential background to the history of Roman policy towards the Transalpine Gauls and their northerly neighbours that I shall consider in Part 2.
Part 2
6: The Creation of the Narbonese Province

In this chapter, having surveyed the Roman attitudes towards Gaul and the Gauls preserved in literature in Part 1, I shall begin the project of using history of ideas and literary history as explanatory tools in Gallo-Roman political history. My focus will be on the conquest of Gallia Bracata¹ and foundation of Narbo Martius, 125-118, but before this and other specific episodes can be helpfully addressed, I shall outline in more detail the methodology I propose to employ.

1: The Lopsided Empire

In 30 BCE, when the suicide of Antony and Cleopatra completed Octavian’s monopolization of military and political power, the European part of the empire thereby reunited had a distinctly uneven shape. In the Balkan east, Roman territory was largely coastal and Mediterranean.² Although the longstanding patronage of the Thracian kings obviously extended Roman influence beyond the frontiers of Macedonia, that remained the only province in the entire peninsula until the Augustan conquests in Illyria, beginning in 35.³ The vast Danubian interior, though certainly not ignored by Roman traders,⁴ was largely beyond the direct or even the indirect control of the Roman state. In western Europe, however, provincial control extended over most of the Iberian peninsula and an immense stretch of Roman territory jutted northwards as far as the Channel and the North Sea, creating an immense length of continental frontier to be defended.⁵ This, most certainly, was not a consequence of proximity to Italy; Augustus’s new Alpine and Upper Danubian territories of Alpes Maritimae, Alpes Cottiae, Rhaetia and Noricum were all much nearer to Rome than Celtiberia (in a much expanded Hispania Citerior), Belgica or most

¹ See 52 above.
² On the Roman Balkans at this time, see Crook et al., 1994: 31-3, 149-59.
³ Bowman et al., 1996: 36, 171-4. Achaea was only detached from Macedonia as a separate province in 31 BCE.
⁴ On Roman mercantile penetration of the pre-Roman Balkans, see Mócsy, 1974: 28-30; on Roman culture and commerce in Europe outside the frontiers more broadly, see Woolf, 1998: 180-1.
⁵ See Map 2B.
Much of the military and administrative activity of Augustus’s principate was devoted to rectifying this situation, through covering both open flanks of Rome’s Gaulish empire – unconquered far northern Iberia and the independent or client territories of the western Alps – and also through an enormous and systematic programme of armed aggression in central and southeastern Europe, extending Roman rule to the Danube and the Black Sea. I do not wish to suggest that Augustus’s only or dominant motivation for his Danubian campaigns was to effect a territorial rationalization; matching Caesar’s western exploits with great deeds in the Balkans and north of the Alps brought him booty and glory and provided his potential heirs, especially Drusus and Tiberius, with military reputations and experience. In whatever proportion he saw it as a problem to be solved rather than an opportunity to be exploited, however, I would contend that Augustus was responding to a pronounced imbalance in the Romans’ temperate empire as it then stood; the fiscal, propagandistic and dynastic advantages he undoubtedly gained through expansion explain why, not where, it was undertaken.

In this chapter and the next, I shall argue that a large part of the explanation for this far more eager Republican and imperatorial advance into western Europe than into the Balkans and Upper Danube is to be found in the views on the Gauls outlined in Part 1. It must be admitted at the outset that such a project is, unavoidably, speculative. The mass of diaries, correspondence and other private documents indispensable to historical and biographical research on decision-makers in modern times are, with isolated and very partial exceptions like Cicero, absent for medieval and, especially, ancient leaders. This requires the intention and motivation of political and

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6 See Map 1.
7 The unsuccessful attempt to rationalize the borders even further through the conquest of trans-Rhenane Germany, which would have replaced the Rhine-Danube frontier with a considerably shorter Elbe-Danube line, will be examined in Chapter 8.
8 On the Augustan campaigns in central and eastern Europe, see Bowman et al., 1996: 169-88.
9 On the general issue of grand strategy under Augustus and his successors, see Luttwak, 1979 and Isaac, 1990.
military actions, great and small, to be inferred more or less plausibly from those actions themselves.\textsuperscript{10} While archaeology is of course of incalculable value in supplementing and sometimes correcting the patchy and tendentious literary record on the events and processes that followed Roman decisions, it is less well suited to revealing the thinking preceding those decisions. Both the level of detail to which such questions can be usefully pursued and the degree of consensus that can be expected concerning proposed answers are necessarily limited.

However, these difficulties are not of merely negative importance, as a limit to be acknowledged on how much can ultimately be known on such subjects but also, more positively, a criterion suggesting certain approaches over others. The obstacle, in essence, is the inaccessibility of the minds of individuals at so great a chronological remove. The problem, therefore, must be recast in the least individual form possible if it is to be addressed constructively. I would argue that this consideration favours the approach taken in the present study, investigation of policy through analysis of attitudes found in the broadest possible selection of texts. For example, an expectation on Caesar’s part that Gaulish enemies would receive little sympathy at Rome is a more promising prospect for elucidation of his decisions than a personal hatred of Gauls. In particular, the former approach permits other texts, of the general thrust of which Caesar can be assumed to have been familiar, to be taken into account, while the latter would allow only his own writings, a method that, in any event, could not be applied to decision-makers who were not also writers, such as Allobrogicus, Marius and Vulso.

The means through which I propose to undertake this confessedly uncertain project, analysis of Roman attitudes towards the Gauls as revealed, principally, in literature, is not a new one, although I propose to apply it to a somewhat different set of problems. Indeed, the phrases “terror gallicus” and “metus

"gallicus" have on occasion been used so frequently as to acquire a semi-technical ring in certain areas of scholarly discourse. However, little real connection has been made between literature and policy. On the one hand, historians of Roman Gaul have tended to proceed from a largely unsupported (though correct) assumption that there was strong and widespread hostility towards Gauls at Rome without close analysis of the texts that actually exemplify such attitudes. For instance, although J. F. Drinkwater's broad and authoritative account of the political history of non-Mediterranean Gaul uses the *terror gallicus* extensively and often persuasively in explaining aspects of Gallo-Roman politics under the Julio-Claudians, literature is not used even to demonstrate the existence of such antipathies, let alone to explore them in detail or to establish the applicability of their explanatory use for particular political events or states of affairs. Conversely, scholarship on prejudice in Classical literature has not tended to concentrate on Gaul and has certainly not focussed on its connections with the political or military history of the western provinces. Also, the history of Gaul under Roman rule, as opposed to that of Roman conduct towards independent Gaulish polities, with which I am primarily concerned, has tended to receive the bulk of this sort of treatment. The project of these four chapters is to attempt a more coordinated use of history of ideas and political history to elucidate questions of the formulation and motivation of policy, in particular conquests, effected or attempted, in Gaul, Britain and Germany.

2: Characterizing the Events of 125-118 BCE

The territories north of the Alps that were under Roman rule by the start of the principate had been acquired in two large wars, that of 125-120, followed by the establishment of Narbo in 118, and that of 58-51. At first sight, the latter

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11 On the former term, see Woolf 1998: 61, on the latter, Williams, 2001: 171.
14 An important exception is Williams, 2001, which employs, in certain questions of Cisalpine policy, a methodology broadly similar to that which I am attempting to apply to non-Italian Gaulish topics.
presents a considerably more promising candidate for questions of intent and motive. In that case, one identifiable individual, Caesar, made the decisions that led to the annexation of Gallia Comata and his Commentarii provide an obvious starting point for such study, as well as a substantial, if obviously biased, source of narrative information. The conquest of Gallia Narbonensis, on the other hand, in addition to the comparative dearth of information, was the work of several Republican generals, whose respective contributions are in certain respects difficult to disentangle\(^\text{16}\) and who were, in any event, subject to Senatorial direction or at least supervision.\(^\text{17}\)

However, it was nonetheless the result of a series of discernible choices made by the Roman leaders concerned. Although the Romans' involvement with both Spain and Transalpina can of course be traced back to the Second Punic War, the Roman conquest of the latter took place almost eight decades after the Carthaginians' surrender; it was not, as in the Two Spains, the continuation, as peacetime imperialism, of a wartime occupation of Punic territory. It was also not, as in Cisalpine Gaul, the culmination of a long series of wars and raids in both directions stretching back into proto-history. On the contrary, the extension of Roman power beyond the (relatively) stable borders of the Alps and Pyrenees initiated, rather than ended, a series of rebellions and frontier wars that continued until shortly before Caesar's campaigns in Gallia Comata.\(^\text{18}\) The choices made between 125 and 118 were ones that those who made them were entirely free not to make. It is clearly of interest to explore why they acted as they did.

Perhaps a more fundamental question as to the propriety of my methodology here concerns the nature of the change effected between 125 and 118. It is at least arguable that, in several important senses, the creation of the Transalpine province cannot be uniquely ascribed to those years. Cogent arguments have been advanced in favour of various dates for the start of the regular oversight of

\(^{\text{16}}\) For one of the most detailed attempts to do so see Ebel, 1976: 66-74; much of the issue turns on the interpretation of four entries in the Fasti Triumphales (Degrassi, 1954: 105-6).

\(^{\text{17}}\) On Roman decision-making under the Republic, see Millar, 1984, Lintott, 1999.

the territory by a periodically dispatched Roman magistrate, some quite late.\textsuperscript{19} As related below,\textsuperscript{20} it took some time to establish a stable imperial order in Transalpina and there is certainly no direct evidence that a formal \textit{lex provinciae} establishing it as a Roman possession was passed by 118 or even shortly afterwards. Conversely, it has been argued that relations of a broadly tributary nature obtained much earlier in the western part of Transalpina, between the Rhone and Hispania Citerior, albeit overseen by the governor of that province rather than independently.\textsuperscript{21} Undoubtedly, Roman military intervention took place in the territory on a large scale long before 125. It might very reasonably be asked whether it is helpful to inquire as to the motivation of the decision to expand if the foregoing implies that there was no single, identifiable decision to expand.

Addressing this question will require a brief consideration of the nature of Roman rule in the western Mediterranean at the time under consideration. The overseas administrative apparatus created and used by the Romans in the middle Republic was, even by pre-industrial standards, both minimal in personnel and flexible in structure.\textsuperscript{22} Pre-conquest institutions of merely local scale (in Greek terms, individual \textit{poleis} as opposed to \textit{koina} or the realms of \textit{basileis}), though firmly subordinated, were left intact as administrative entities and overseen by Roman \textit{rectores provinciarum} of varying ranks and terms of office. These magistrates would not necessarily be appointed in a regular or consistent manner and, although they would come to be assisted by subordinate magisterial or military officials or by small staffs, they never had at their disposal anything remotely resembling a colonial bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{23}

Moreover, the organizational category of the \textit{provincia} was itself fundamentally vague, and encompassed not only gubernatorial but civil and purely martial responsibilities;\textsuperscript{24} the allotted \textit{provincia} of a given magistrate or promagistrate for a given period might be the governance of a foreign territory.

\textsuperscript{19} For such a lower chronology, see Chevallier, 1966.
\textsuperscript{20} 167-75.
\textsuperscript{21} For the arguments in favour of this hypothesis, see Ebel, 1976.
\textsuperscript{23} Woolf, 1998: 40.
\textsuperscript{24} Ebel, 1976: 42.
the prosecution of a military campaign or the maintenance of Italy’s woods and drifts.\textsuperscript{25} Also, as that last example\textsuperscript{26} demonstrates, the allotment was a highly political matter, not one of rationalized administrative routine; a very loose analogy could perhaps be drawn with the shifting portfolios of junior ministers in Westminster system cabinets.

The extra-Italian empire at this time has been described by one theorist of Roman rule in later periods as a ‘conquest state’, in contrast to the territorial empire that it became through the extensive annexation of client territories and elaboration of provincial administrative structure under the late Republic and early Empire.\textsuperscript{27} More abstractly, it can be seen as the extension of Roman power merely ‘over’ rather than ‘down into’ non-Roman societies.\textsuperscript{28} The same aversion to direct administration of the conquered can be seen even more dramatically in the histories of the non-provincial client regimes of the Republican empire.\textsuperscript{29} This rather schematic picture is, of course, only a generalization of widely varying applicability, in particular with regard to the substantial differences between the middle Republic’s eastern and western Mediterranean possessions. Also, it does not apply at all to Italy, which, apart from its entirely non-provincial administrative structure (at least in the peninsula), underwent a drastic transformation under the Republic.\textsuperscript{30} Nonetheless, it does broadly describe the outlines of Roman provincial rule outside of Italy in the period in question.

This indeterminacy in the provincial administrative structure itself is one reason why so little scholarly consensus is achievable on administrative questions. Another is the pronounced tendency of the ancient sources to supply more information on what were to them the considerably more interesting

\textsuperscript{25} E.g. respectively Liv. 32.28.1-3, Liv. 31.8.5-7 and Suet. \textit{Jul.} 19.2.
\textsuperscript{26} An unsuccessful attempt by the Senate in 59 to use provincial distribution to deny Caesar the opportunity for further military success.
\textsuperscript{27} Woolf, 1998: 43, 182.
\textsuperscript{28} Woolf, 1998: 46-7.
\textsuperscript{29} On which in general see Braund, 1984.
\textsuperscript{30} Perhaps not incidentally, the spread of Roman modes of behaviour and organization in Italy was nowhere more rapid or more deliberate than in Cisalpine Gaul, which, in the first quarter of the second century, was subjected to one of the most intensive programmes of colonization, centuriation and road-building anywhere in the Roman world (Williams, 2001: 208-10). On the transformation of Italy more generally, see Astin et al., 1989: 197-243, 477-516.
matters of military history and high politics than on legal or administrative
arrangements. However, neither changeability in the provinces’ organization
nor our partial ignorance of what organization there was necessarily implies an
equal degree of difficulty in ascertaining underlying geopolitical changes.

The extension of the geographical range of this imperium or arkhē,
however informal and crudely militaristic it might have been, could sometimes
be both rapid and chronologically definite. The example of Sicily illustrates
this point. As far as can be confirmed, the dispatch of governors to the island
was only regularized in 227. A provincial lex formally establishing Sicilia as
the legal responsibility of the Roman state and specifying in law the manner in
which it was to be governed came more than a century later in 132. Moreover, the robustly autonomous position of the Syracusans until 215, like
that of the Massaliotes in Transalpina until 49, was distinctly anomalous. None
of those facts has ever prevented historians from asserting that the Roman
conquest of Sicily took place over the course of the First Punic War or from
regarding its status after the entry into force of the Peace of Lutatius in 241 as
that of an overseas possession of the Roman Republic. Using the campaign
narratives of Polybius and Livy, it is even possible to give, for many Sicilian
poleis, a single year for their abrupt and forcible transition to Roman rule.

In practice, the controversies as to Transalpina’s governors and its
provincial lex have never extended to the nature of the change effected between
125 and 118 and even the staunchest advocate of gradualism as regards the
formation of a provincial administration admits that the former year saw the
beginning of a new era for the territory geopolitically. Although Roman

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31 Ebel, 1976: 41. The precedent set at the very beginning of extant Classical historiography, by
Herodotus and Thucydides, was of course to write accounts based around narrative structures and
largely composed of narrative history. The details of what it actually meant for territory to be ruled or
conquered by a given state at a given moment never received anything like the same amount of
treatment.
32 Although it was not always; the amorphous and shifting interior borders of the two Spains provide an
obvious example of geopolitical, rather than merely organizational, indefiniteness (Ebel, 1976: 45-6).
33 Ebel, 1976: 44.
35 On the administration of the empire under the Republic and Principate more generally and its
evolution over time, see Richardson, 1976, Braund, 1988.
36 Ebel, 1976: 64.
culture would not seriously penetrate the area for several decades, Roman power was stamped onto the very landscape of Mediterranean Gaul, permanently fastening it to Italy and Roman Spain. Most importantly for my purposes, later Romans would look back on the war with the Arverni as the moment that all of Gaul fell into their orbit (though they magnanimously deigned to forgo the direct administration of most of it). From a Roman Republican perspective, a perspective that placed little importance on administrative minutiae, at least overseas, the events of 125-118 did indeed represent a decision to extend the *imperium populi romani*; for an analysis of Roman decision-making, rather than its consequences in Gaul, this is ultimately the decisive point.

### 3: Earlier Interactions and Recollections

The prehistoric events corresponding to the literary story of the sack of Rome by the Senones under Brennus fall outside both the chronological and the geographical boundaries of this research. Their later recollection, on the other hand, is essential to my subject matter. As discussed in the previous chapter, the invasion was held to be indicative of an irreligious and immoral Gaulish collective character. An additional point that is useful to note here is that it distinguished Gauls from other non-Romans through forming the basis for an attitude not merely of dislike or arrogance but of fear. There were, of course, profound anxieties about eastern Mediterranean subject peoples but the content

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37 If anything, the steady development in Transalpina of the distinctive and partially Hellenized culture that Drinkwater called 'Greco-Celtic' (1983: 207) accelerated under the newly restored influence of the Romans' Massaliot clients. On the development of a Roman, rather than merely Mediterranean, culture in Gaul more broadly, see Woolf, 1998.

38 Caes. *Gal.* 1.45.


40 The discussion at Cornell, 1995: 313-8 concentrates on the ancient textual sources, especially on historiographical and chronological issues, arguing for Polybius's date (387/386 BCE) rather than that of the Varronian chronology (390). In the same discussion, it is argued that the evidence from archaeological records “is equivocal, and serves neither to support nor to undermine Livy’s account” due to the difficulty with definitely identifying material remains as Gaulish or non-Gaulish.

41 For a detailed historiographical examination of the divergent traditions describing the Gaulish sack of Rome and a discussion of their implications for Roman policy between the Apennines and the Alps, see Williams, 2001: 140-184.
of these fears (contamination of Roman national character through excessive contact with enervated and luxurious populations as a consequence of conquering them) clearly did not motivate expansion.\footnote{They are, of course, indispensable to any full understanding of the operation, as distinct from the establishment, of Roman rule in the Middle East; see Isaac, 1998: 268-83. In attempting to follow this train of thought of ancient writers, with Roman expansion as a cause of both enervation of Italians and enervation by Italians, it may help to keep in mind the bipolar structure of barbarian stereotypes discussed at 11-2 above regarding Aristotle. One the one hand, Asian conquest was thought to have the negative side-effect of allowing hyper-lethargic eastern/southern peoples to affect Italians; on the other, European conquest was also thought to have the evaluatively ambiguous or positive effect of facilitating the enfeeblement of hyper-energetic western/northern peoples (see 129-34 above).}

The capture of Rome, after which its people's rise to imperial greatness began, was associated with more or less millenarian worries about Roman history eventually ending in a portentously symmetrical manner, with another Gaulish invasion and sack.\footnote{Williams, 2001: 170-1.}

Also, unlike much Roman national mythology and Latin literary prejudice, the Sack was not a Greek or Hellenistic intellectual import.\footnote{The Sack and similar Celtomachic themes from Greek thought and art certainly influenced each other (Williams, 2001: 158-70) but the former was never simply a geographically transposed version of the latter.} This suggests that the account of the invasion, although it certainly did not date from the events it describes,\footnote{The possibility of continuity is ruled out by the fact that the account, as we have it, is flatly contradicted by the archaeological record in important respects, in particular the amount of physical damage done to the city (Santoro, 1978: 229-30, Williams, 2001: 154). No version of the tradition can be free from very considerable reinvention, even ignoring the obviously mythical elements, such as the role of Juno's sacred geese.} was of considerable antiquity at Rome, which is helpful for any attempt to connect it or the attitudes associated with it to events in the second century. It is obviously pertinent, therefore, to confirm that the salient aspects of the traditional story of the sack were current by 125. As most of the full-length versions are later, this requires an exploration of some of the briefer accounts and fragmentary sources, including those of partially or wholly non-Roman origin. Polybius's is the earliest fully extant rendition:
At the beginning, not only did they dominate the country but they also made subject many of those nearby, having terrified them with their daring. And after a time, having defeated the Romans and their allies in battle and having pursued those fleeing, three days after the battle they occupied all of Rome but the Capitol. And, a diversion having occurred, — the Veneti having invaded their country — they then returned the city, having made a treaty with the Romans, left and set out homewards.

This account lacks most of the legendary material present in the narratives of Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. However, it is worth noting that this version, though presumably less satisfying than the variant wherein the evildoers promptly receive their comeuppance at Camillus’s hands, would have been, if anything, more likely to induce anger and fear on the part of believers. It leaves the sack unavenged and makes its perpetrators more militarily successful and therefore more potentially dangerous in subsequent conflicts. More importantly, the version preserved in Polybius’s account is one which was clearly being told in advance of 125, already in possession of the following details: 1) northern invaders of Gaulish race and barbarous character cross the natural boundary of the Alps, 2) those invaders (with or without a generational delay between the invasion of Italy and that of Latium) move southwards and inflict a painful defeat on the Roman people at the Allia and 3) they capture the city of Rome, subjecting it to the historically unique humiliation of foreign rule. Those elements were to be persistent and important ones.

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46 Respectively Liv. 5.32.6 to the end of Book 5 and D. H. 13.6-12.
The two offences that Polybius virtually conflated, crossing the Alps and conquering Rome, are more separate in other authors – Livy in particular seems to put more than a century between them – but their relation was clearly a close one; in the simplest terms, the invasion story “is generally told … as an explanation of how Gauls came to be where they should not have been, that is in Italy, in the first place.” Indications of an early acceptance of the migratory explanation for the Gaulish (at least in Roman categorization) culture of the plains of the Po also suggest a comparable antiquity for its narrative twin, the sack of Rome. This is important as regards Cato the Elder; the Origines seem to have included the traditional story of the Gaulish violation of the Alps, complete with the tempter Arruns. Although it obviously does not prove it, this strongly suggests that, whether or not Cato described Brennus’s invasion himself, it was already being described in something like the familiar manner by the time that he was writing.

Further evidence of the story’s deep roots in aristocratic Roman legend is provided by Suetonius’s Tiberius, which preserves a foundation myth of the Drusi claiming that the first of their line had earned the cognomen through recovering the ransom taken by the Senones (3.2). As Suetonius himself noted, this is incompatible with the claim of the Furii Camilli to have prevented a humiliating ransom being paid at all, which was the version that eventually predominated in the literary tradition. In all likelihood, tales of ancestral exploits associated in one way or another with the Sack, of which the Drusian story is a chance survival, were a common feature in the oral traditions of Roman noble families.

Other alternative narratives were of non-Roman origin. The main extant Greek sources, especially Plutarch and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, offer variants of the Roman recollection of the crisis but Plutarch also preserves accounts dating from before the historiographical Romanization of Greek literature. Both Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus wrote while the Romans,

48 For argumentation to the effect that he did, based on the (probable) original context of the fragments within the Origines and what is known of their structure, see Williams, 2001: 103-4.
49 As discussed at 29-32 above.
though prominent enough in Italy to deserve scrutiny, could still be examined in a thoroughly Greek manner, without much regard for the Romans’ views of themselves or their past:

For Hérakleidès Pontikos, not long after those times, in his treatise Peri Psukhès says that an account came from the west of how an army of Hyperboreans, having come from afar, seized a Greek city, Rome, situated somewhere around the Great Sea.

This is another indication that the sack of Rome, in however unfamiliar a form, became an important topic for historical discussion not very long after the events themselves and certainly well before 125. Also, even this version has certain elements in common with the later accounts; the events are significant in scale and devastating for the early Romans, who seem to be the wronged party rather than the aggressor. Above all, the attackers are migratory; they originate in the farthest Atlantic fringes of Europe (albeit viewed from a perspective looking west from Greece rather than north from Italy) and, when they depart from their remote homeland and move towards the Mediterranean, a disaster results.

Finally, there is the earliest fully extant and fully orthodox Latin reference to the Sack — its employment by Cicero in the Pro Fonteio:⁵⁰

hae sunt nationes quae quondam tam longe ab suis sedibus Delphos usque ad Apollinem Pythium atque ad oraculum orbis terrae uexandum ac spoliandum profectae sunt. ab isdem gentibus sanctis et in testimonio religiosis obsessum Capitolium est atque ille Iuppiter.

These are the nations that once set out so far from their settlements as to Delphi to harass and to plunder Pythian Apollo and the oracle of the whole

⁵⁰ Examined at pp. 71-4, 114-5 above.
earth. By the same races, scrupulous and religious in testimony, were besieged the Capitol and Jupiter.

Relevant here is the geographical and chronological location of the dispute — Narbonensis, not very long after its conquest. Cicero, at least, expected a Roman audience to take anxieties about Brennus seriously when deciding Narbonese policy, even on non-military matters. I would argue that this is a compelling reason to suppose that the *terror gallicus* at least could have influenced Roman policy during the genuinely alarming few years after 125.

This protohistorical and historiographical lesson to fear Gaulish invaders from beyond the Alps was further reinforced in the Romano-Cisalpine conflicts between the First and Second Punic Wars. The Cisalpine invasion of peninsular Italy in 225 was substantially assisted by allies and/or mercenaries from the Rhone valley, called Gaisatai by Polybius. This joint invasion achieved a worrying success at Faesulae and Transalpine troops were again prominent in the Gaulish army defeated later in the year at Telamon. More Gaisatai interfered with the subsequent Roman operations inside Cisalpina and were present in strength on the side of the Insubres at Clastidium in 222.

More important for present purposes than the events themselves, as with the sack of Rome, is the manner in which they were remembered. Polybius’s account can reasonably be taken to present Roman views authentically, given the relatively small chronological gap and his access to leading figures of his day, many of them near descendants of participants on the Roman side.

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52 On the Classical tendency to exaggerate the mercenary character of Gaulish warfare, see Williams, 2001: 90-3; this makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between assistance generated through longstanding intertribal ties and assistance generated through hiring wandering mercenary companies.
53 On the Gaisatai, see Plb. 2.22.1, 2.23.1, 2.28.3, 2.30.5, 2.34.2.
54 On this Cisalpine conflict, see Walbank et al., 1989: 431-6.
56 Cf. also the comparable depiction of the Gaisatai in Plutarch’s account of the same conflict (*Marc. 3-7*) and Polybius’s own broadly similar portrayal of earlier incidents of Gaulish invasions over the Alps (2.19.1-3, 2.21.2-6).
Unsurprisingly, the overall presentation is unflattering – in particular, the intervention is described as exclusively mercenary in nature, without a principled motive, even a misguided one. What is more interesting is that the Transalpine troops, those who crossed the Alps in order to participate, are more stereotypically Gaulish. The description of the battle of Telamon at 2.28 explicitly contrasts the Boii and Insubres, themselves outlandish enough in trousers (*anaxurides*), with the Gaisatai, naked but for their arms.\(^{57}\)

And, as well as corresponding more closely to the literary archetype of the Gaul, the Gaisatai appear more dangerous than their Cisalpine compatriots. Their principal motives for reverting to nude combat are a love of glory (*philodoxia*) and an audacity (*pharsos*) greater than that of their allies. Much the most memorable personalities on the Gaulish side in Polybius’s account are the Gaisatic leaders, Kogkolitanos and Anéroestos, who, though supposedly mere mercenary captains, are referred to several times as kings (*basileis*). These are even presented as having the greatest say in determining Gaulish strategy\(^{58}\) (e.g. 2.26.5-7). For Polybius, the ultimate failure of even this greatest Gaulish attempt at war-making was a reminder of the weakness of *barbaroi* and a reason not to fear them.\(^{59}\) For Roman leaders at the time and afterwards, the reappearance of their oldest enemy, once again crossing Italy’s Alpine ramparts with wicked intent and almost reaching Latium, is not likely to have been a source of comfort. I would argue that, taken together, the legendary and the early historical past of Romano-Transalpine relations formed

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\(^{57}\) On the use of clothing (or in this case lack of it) to define different groups of barbarians in Classical depictions of them, see DeVries, 2000, Shapiro, 2000, Tsiafakis, 2000. DeVries sets visual depictions of Phrygians and Lydians in the historical context of the “Hellenizing penumbra” of non-Greek peoples in Italy and Anatolia; he points out that the many visual depictions provide an important source on Greek attitudes to these peoples, for instance providing a markedly more positive depiction of Phrygians than written sources. Shapiro considers images of those at the opposite end of that penumbra – Archaic Etruscans; he examines the tension between the tendency for Attic black-figure to reflect often negative views of Etruscans as strange and luxurious and the need to produce imagery also appealing to Etruscans themselves, who were among the Athenians’ best customers. Tsiafakis argues that, in the case of depictions of Thracians, the negative northern and barbarian stereotypes of many texts are confirmed and reinforced by similar visual stereotypes. However, she also argues that this sense of the grotesque or hyper-exotic also exercised an allure that ensured the continuing popularity of Thracian iconography at Athens.

\(^{58}\) E.g. 2.26.5-7, which again ascribes their decisions to purely mercenary aims; they are depicted as concerned with war as a means to take human, animal and pecuniary booty from the Italians, not war as an extension of politics.

\(^{59}\) 2.35.4-10.
an important factor, though of course not the only factor, in the evolution of later Roman policy in Transalpina, to which I now turn.

4: The Conquest of (what would become) Transalpina

In 155/4, Roman intervention in southern Transalpina was solicited by the Massaliotes, who were unable to prevent damaging raids by the Ligurians on their settlements in what is now the French Riviera, most importantly Nikaia and Antipolis. The Romans, who, in the absence of provincial rule in Transalpine Gaul, had relied on the Massaliotes to provide a secure route to the two Spanish provinces since the end of the Second Punic War, acceded. At first, the Senate sent a commission of three high-ranking envoys and, when this failed to resolve the issue, the consul Q. Opimius was dispatched with an armed force. He defeated the Massaliotes' Ligurian rivals, the Oxubioi and the Dekiêtai, compelling them to give hostages to the Massaliotes regularly and, after wintering in the territory, he left.

Although it did not result in a lasting conquest, the invasion of 154 set an important precedent; if Massaliot security required it, Roman strength would be employed north of the Alps and Pyrenees. Nonetheless, it also provides an instructive contrast to the far greater changes effected after 125. Before attempting to explain the different responses by Roman leaders to very similar initial circumstances (another request from Massalia for military assistance with troublesome indigenes), I shall first briefly review the course of events between the outbreak of the second war and the foundation of Narbo.
In 125, the Massaliotes reported renewed Ligurian rebellion or depredation,\textsuperscript{64} this time by the Salluvii. Roman assistance was again willingly given and M. Fulvius Flaccus and C. Sextius Calvinus, consuls for 125 and 124 respectively, directed the first, most restricted, phase of the war. Fulvius's was the first Roman army to march over the Alps,\textsuperscript{65} attacking the Ligurians from the landward side rather than merely securing the more Hellenized coast. Between 125 and 123, the Salluvii in the plain of the Durance, adjacent Ligurian peoples and the Vocontii farther north and west were systematically subjugated and the Salluvii's principal oppidum,\textsuperscript{66} at what is now Entremont in Bouches-du-Rhône, was besieged and captured.\textsuperscript{67} The western Alps were then further opened up to Roman power through Sextius's installation of a small garrison or veteran settlement at Aquae Sextiae\textsuperscript{68} to maintain a secure passage between Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul. Of the area beyond the Alps thus acquired, only a relatively small strip of coastland was added to the Massaliotid.\textsuperscript{69}

Even these early campaigns demonstrated a substantially different response to an almost identical set of initial circumstances but they were eclipsed in both military scale and political significance by the subsequent spread of the conflict. The second (Allobrogian) and third (Arvernian) phases of the war were directed by Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Q. Fabius Maximus,\textsuperscript{70} respectively consuls for 122 and 121. Toutomotulus, a Salluvian leader made fugitive by the recent conquest, had escaped and been granted asylum by the Allobroges, who possessed an extensive territory between the Rhone Valley and Lake Geneva. On their refusal to surrender him and a

\textsuperscript{64} The predictably pro-Massaliot attitude of the sources tends to blur the distinction between insurrection and raiding.

\textsuperscript{65} The expedition of 154 having taken the more traditional coastal route (Ebel, 1976: 58, Rivet, 1988: 33).

\textsuperscript{66} For recent material from which see Berranger & Fluzin, 2007, Dufraigne et al., 2007.

\textsuperscript{67} On the archaeological evidence for the considerable scale of even the Salluvian phase of the conflict, at Entremont and elsewhere, see Benoit, 1968, Ebel, 1976: 68; Coutagne, 1987, Rivet, 1988: 40-1, Bishop & Coulston. 2006: 48, 52, 71 n. 2. The combined effects of the growth of nearby Aquae Sextiae and the damage inflicted in the war led to the virtual abandonment of the settlement.

\textsuperscript{68} Named for its founder and its hot springs.

\textsuperscript{69} Ebel, 1976: 64-9.

\textsuperscript{70} As mentioned above, the contributions of the two generals are confused in the sources, epigraphic as well as literary, although Fabius's were famous enough to earn him the agnomen "Allobrogicus"; there has been some difficulty even in drawing a clear distinction between the commands of Sextius and Domitius (Benedict, 1942, Ebel, 1976: 70-1).
request for intervention by the Allobroges’ rivals to the north, the Aedui, military operations resumed on a large scale in 122. Much as Toutomotulus had looked to the Allobroges for protection, the latter appealed successfully to Bituitus, son of Louernios, king of the Arverni, whose civitas was easily the most powerful of the Gaulish states. A royal emissary was sent not only to intercede on the Allobroges’ behalf but to obtain pardon for the Salluvii; unsurprisingly, this diplomacy was not successful. In 121, north of present-day Avignon, the Allobroges were decisively defeated in a pitched battle, probably near the oppidum at Mourre-de-Sève in Vaucluse.

There was, however, to be a final expansion of the geographical and military scale of the hostilities; although little is known about diplomatic custom among the Gaulish states, the display of wealth and bardic formalities which accompanied the unsuccessful embassy were probably meant to convey the seriousness with which the issue was taken and Bituitus’s willingness to employ Arvemian resources if satisfaction were not received. When the Allobroges were routed, a direct confrontation was almost inevitable. Another set battle took place where the Isère flows into the Rhone, this time against the Arverni and their allies. The Roman victory in this engagement not only established effective control over what would eventually become the Province but brought about the rapid collapse of the Arvemian primacy farther north. Bituitus was captured in violation of a truce for negotiation and taken to Rome in 120. He was exhibited in a triumph and spent the remainder of his life imprisoned at Alba Fucens; the overthrow of the House of Louernios was completed with the capture of Bituitus’s son, Congonnetiacus.

The new supremacy of Roman arms in southern Gaul was asserted forcefully to its inhabitants by Domitius, who made a progress across the conquered territory on the back of a war elephant. Lest the lesson be forgotten,

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71 Ebel, 1976: 70.
73 The might which faced the Romans in the event of a failure to resolve the issue peacefully was apparently outlined through the medium of praise-poetry; for an audience of Roman leaders already possessed of a stereotype of Gauls as bellicose riddlers, this cannot have been very persuasive.
75 Rivet, 1988: 41.
triumphal stone towers at the two battlefields where the Allobroges and Arverni had been humbled made a similar point in a more permanent manner. The war gains were consolidated more tangibly through the construction of the Via Domitia from Spain to the Rhone, binding Mediterranean Transalpine Gaul to Hispania Citerior, just as Aquae Sextiae already fastened it to Gallia Cisalpina. Finally, the orator L. Licinius Crassus, possibly in cooperation with Domitius, arranged for the foundation in 118 on this road of a much more substantial Roman settlement than Aquae Sextiae; Colonia Narbo Martius (Narbonne) would eventually overtake Massalia as the chief city of the territory later called Gallia Narbonensis.

As argued above, the irretrievability of the legal and administrative arrangements, if any, that were made need not obscure that the effect of these events amounted to territorial expansion on a very substantial scale. However, the consequences of the war for non-Mediterranean Gaul were equally important over the longer term. Insofar as it can be discerned, the longstanding geopolitical trend beforehand had been a gradual increase in the power of the Arverni among the Gaulish states, exercised forcefully by an entrenched hereditary dynasty. Roman military intervention and the Romano-Aeduan alliance that followed it sent inter-civitas relations in an entirely different direction. The Romans would guarantee the Aedui’s security and their position as one of the pre-eminent peoples of a permanently divided and mostly oligarchic Gallia Comata; the Aedui would provide the Romans both with advanced warning of any move towards a new hegemony, Arverian or otherwise, and with justification for halting it militarily. More than half a century later, Caesar could still claim, presumably with some exaggeration, that Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos.

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77 Built along the old Οδόν Ἡράκλειαν (Heraklean Way) and renamed after Domitius. The twentieth milestone from Narbo was excavated in 1947 (Ebel, 1976: 82-3); its considerable size strongly suggests that the propagandistic element in the road’s function was important, although the route to Spain was of course of great strategic use.
78 141-4.
alterius Arvernos (‘that all Gaul was in two factions; the Aedui held first place in the one, the Arverni in the other’ – *Gal*. 1.31.3). His own, vastly larger intervention in Gallia Comata was on the side of the Aeduan oligarchs and he made extensive use of their fraternal alliance with the Roman people in justifying it.

5: Explaining the Events of 125-118 BCE

The question I shall attempt to address in this section is why the relevant Roman leaders in 125-118 behaved so differently after their military victories than their predecessors had after theirs in 155-154. In the earlier case, had pretexts been desired, they undoubtedly could have been found, especially given the greater flexibility with which the Romans observed their *ius gentium* in Spain and Gaul. In the latter instance, had a *casus belli* not been desired, giving sanctuary to the leader of a very minor, comprehensively defeated and not especially infamous polity could surely have been ignored. Roman generals were not forced into necessary defensive campaigns in Gallia Bracata by unusually perilous circumstances, any more than Caesar was forced by circumstances to campaign in Gallia Comata. Although the justifications for the war reported by the primary sources are informative on expansionist thought and discourse and the mechanisms through which expansion was effected, it would be naïve to treat them as sufficient explanations of the war. This is uncontroversial; it would be extremely difficult to review the sequence of events and come to a different conclusion. However, little work has been done to provide a more convincing account; pointing out that the Roman behaviour, at least after the initial subjugation of the Salluvii and Vocontii, was transparently aggressive does not, by itself, explain that aggression. I shall argue that a partial explanation can be provided through considering prevalent

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79 At least initially; Caesar’s aggressive expansionism eventually alienated even the Aedui. Nonetheless, the previous alignments were still reflected in the predominant position of the Arverni, under Vercingetorix, among his opponents.

80 The abduction of Bituitus during a truce is a particularly striking example of this tendency.

81 Crook et al., 1994: 24-5.
Roman attitudes and anxieties concerning the Gauls and how Louernios and Bituitus therefore appeared when viewed through Roman eyes.

As with the broader issues referred to in the first section of this chapter, I am attempting to explain where and when, not why, expansion was undertaken – the choice of location in this particular case rather than the larger questions of what drove and what enabled the Roman state to expand so drastically between the middle Republic and the early Empire. Viewed from that more general perspective of Roman imperialism, Gallia Narbonensis of course appears by no means exceptional. Of the three rewards with which G. Woolf summarizes the motivation for Roman generals to expand rather than merely govern – booty, prestige and territory\textsuperscript{82} – none is absent. Plunder was a matter of course in any successful campaign,\textsuperscript{83} the agnomen “Allobrogicus”, the four triumphs generated by the war and the names of Aquae Sextiae and the Via Domitia amply demonstrate the glory earned in Transalpina and the citizen colony at Narbo represented an important and substantial new piece of ager romanus.\textsuperscript{84} But, by their very nature, these general motives cannot distinguish one potential target from another or reveal why southern Gaul rather than somewhere else on the edges of Roman power took priority in the 120s but not in the 150s.

When this more specific question – why Gallia Bracata at that time – has been addressed, perhaps the most common answer has been a tentative but plausible appeal to contemporary factional politics at Rome.\textsuperscript{85} On the optimas side, it has been argued that it was very convenient for the Senate that the consul Fulvius spend the bulk of his term in office on campaign. He had demonstrated worryingly radical tendencies and seizing on the Salluvian-Massaliot issue was a way of removing him from the central political stage that appeared eminently legitimate and traditional and to which Fulvius himself was

\textsuperscript{82} Woolf, 1998: ix.
\textsuperscript{83} For one illustrative example of the mark left in the archaeological record by Roman plundering even within Italy, see Astin et al., 1989: 109; on Roman armies and their practices under the Republic, see Sage, 2008.
\textsuperscript{84} On the broader issues of Roman imperialism and its explanation and interpretation, see Champion, 2004.
\textsuperscript{85} On this approach, see Ebel, 1976: 66-7.
unlikely to object, given the opportunities for personal advancement it presented. On the *popularis* side, the colonization of Narbo suggests that a desire for land might have played a role in motivating the conflict; territory in Gaul could easily have presented a prospect of converting Roman paupers into farmers without counter-productively arousing the hostility of the *optimates* as the Gracchan attempt to redistribute land within Italy was continuing to do.

I certainly do not wish to deny that factionalism could have been involved. In addition to this explanation’s inherent attractiveness — overall, Roman foreign policy under the late Republic clearly cannot be understood without reference to internecine strife — the evidence is clearly insufficient to rule it out with any confidence. However, I would contend that it is very far from complete, particularly concerning those parts of the war most in need of explanation. Fulvius was a member of the Gracchan triumvirate for the redistribution of farmland in Italy and early in his consulate he had proposed legislation to improve the legal position of the *socii Italici,* it is indeed highly probable, therefore, that his departure was greeted was considerable relief in *optimas* quarters. And, like any ambitious Roman nobleman, Fulvius surely welcomed the opportunity for personal and familial gain presented by military activity. The first of these two considerations is problematic as an explanatory mechanism; however glad they may have been, it is not likely that *optimates* in the Senate ejected the consul from Italy against his will. The second is an entirely reasonable generic explanation for Roman magistrates’ aggressive tendencies — clearly, the way that the Roman Republic was structured provided strong incentives for military command, offensive at least as much as defensive — but is uninformative on the particular desirability of the Gauls as targets. More fundamentally for present purposes, Fulvius’s contribution was the least surprising part of the war. His crossing the Alps evinces a more energetic approach than that of Opimius in 155/4 but nothing done during Fulvius’s time in Gaul ultimately requires any explanation beyond the need to defend loyal

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87 Ebel, 1976: 67; procedural arguments aside, the very forcefulness on Fulvius’s part that suggests this approach in the first place makes it unlikely that he would have meekly and promptly submitted to a sort of temporary exile.
allies and thereby keep open the route to Roman Spain that amply suffices for the earlier campaign. The shift in policy was visible to some extent in Sextius’s posting a garrison at Aquae Sextiae but the grand campaigns against the Allobroges and Arverni under Domitius and Fabius were the real novelty and they are in no way clarified by the factional tensions of 125.

The appeal to land-hunger does not suffer from these difficulties; one might imagine that Fulvius planned something along the lines of Narbo in 125 and was, for this reason, willing to forgo further reforming measures during his consulate and that consistent *popularis* pressure maintained an aggressive posture under his successors before reaping its eventual reward in 118. To be sure, such a speculative narrative would go some way beyond the surviving evidence but not very much farther than the appeal to history of ideas that I am proposing; the paucity of source material necessitates speculation to a greater degree than is the case with Caesar.

The problem is more to do with the scale of colonization, when seen in historical comparison with Cisalpina in particular. Narbo, the Via Domitia and, to a lesser extent, Aquae Sextiae were potent individual symbols of Roman power in a foreign landscape but that landscape did not itself become Roman for many decades thereafter. In Cisalpine Gaul, especially south of the Po, the land itself was not merely appropriated in an overall political sense, it was subjected to a violent physical transformation, principally through colonization and centuriation. When the Romans really did want to settle Gaulish land, they were capable of doing so with considerable vigour. Even the colonial activity in southern Gaul under Caesar considerably exceeded that of the second century. The conquest of an immense stretch of territory, across the symbolic boundary of the Alps and farther north than any existing Roman possession, is poorly explained by the single citizen colony planted on one small, albeit prosperous, corner of it.

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89 Williams, 2001: 208-10.
90 On which see Drinkwater, 1983: 17-8.
Undoubtedly, the decision to establish Narbo was motivated, at least in part, by a combination of the *populares*’ desire to resettle landless citizens and the *optimates*’ desire for their estates in Italy not to be broken up. This only convinces, however, as an explanation for that decision in 118, not Roman policy in Gaul between 125 and 120. An instructive, if partial, parallel is provided by the foundation of Colonia Iunonia Carthago in 122 under Gaius Gracchus;²¹ there can be no doubt of the profoundly domestic and factional impulses driving the project but it does not shed new light on the motivation of the Third Punic War.

A fuller explanation can be provided through an examination of the depictions of Bituitus and Louernios. If these are viewed in the light of the attitudes towards Gauls and Gaul encountered in the literature more broadly, they suggest a pronounced concern about the Arverni at Rome in the years leading up to the conflict.

The nature, degree and geographical extent of the Arverni’s power over other *civitates* cannot be established with confidence;²² fortunately, it is entirely unnecessary to do so. There is no doubt that the Classical authors who described this power, especially Strabo, exaggerated it very considerably. However, so long as there is good reason to suppose that such a robustly hegemonic picture of the Arverni was believed at Rome in the second century then, for present purposes, it would not matter if their primacy had been entirely imaginary, which it was clearly not.

Strabo’s is the most specific statement of antebellum Arvernian dominance in Gaul but it is by no means an unusual claim and expresses concisely the Classical historiographical assessment of Bituitus’s position:

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²¹ Crook et al., 1994: 78.
²² On state formation among Celtic-speaking peoples before the Romans, see Arnold & Blair Gibson, 1995; on the numismatic evidence suggesting that the prominence of the Arverni began in the third century, see Colbert de Beaulieu & Richard, 1969, Ebel, 1976: 65.
And the Arverni extended their dominion as far as Narbo and the frontiers of the Massaliotid and ruled the peoples as far as the Pyrenees and the Ocean and the Rhine.

Hyperbolic assertions as to the strength of which Bituitus disposed are, in themselves, not at all surprising; exaggerations of Arvernan imperialism might, for example, have become current in the decades after the war, as retrospective justification or, more simply, glorification. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that, already by the time of the crisis, the Arvernan kings were thought of as a breed apart among Gaulish foes. One is provided by the Fasti Triumphales, which interrupt their list of faceless nationes over which Roman magistrates prevailed (Liguribus, Vocontieis, Salluveis, Allobrogibus) with the named individual Rege Arverorum Betulto, whose people represents a major division of the Gaulish race (Galleis Arverneis). However, the decisive point in this respect is not so much Bituitus himself as his father. Louernios himself was, we can only presume uniquely among non-Mediterranean Gaulish leaders of his day, a figure already known by name in the Classical world. Moreover, the picture of him preserved by Posidonius, through Strabo and Athenaeus, is an anxious one. Nothing was known about either the political details of his reign within the civitas or his conduct towards the other Gaulish states and, consequently, no specific misdeed could be laid at his door. Injury, however, was not the only wrong of which one could accuse a foreign leader in Classical and especially Roman historiography. The illegitimacy of a

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93 Degrassi, 1954: 105-6.
94 "Betultus" is the Latin epigraphic equivalent of the literary "Bituitus", much like the textual "Rhaetia" and epigraphic "Raetia" (for examples of which see Mommsen, 1873: 706, 1129, 1134).
95 The attribution to Posidonius is in this case assured as Athenæus, unlike Strabo, explicitly names him as the source for the anecdotes about Louernios that they both relate (Ath. 4.152d).
96 For the civitates of Comata as they were in 58, see Map 3; although information about later periods provides useful context, it hardly needs to be said that the situation on the eve of Caesar’s march across the frontier cannot be safely retrojected onto the Gaul of the previous century.
97 Although it is telling that, quite literally, the very first Gaulish rivals to make a complaint against the Arverni and their allies - the Aedui - immediately became not only the allies but the ancestral brothers of the Roman people.
leader could also be conveyed through portraying him as monarchical, democratic or both (populism as a means to tyranny). Louernios, most emphatically, appears as a populist:

And again Poseidónios, describing the wealth of Louernios, father of that Bituis laid low by the Romans, says that he, courting the masses, proceeded through the plains in a chariot and scattered gold and silver to the myriads of Keltoi following him and that he made a twelve-stadion rectangular enclosure, in which he filled troughs with a costly liquor and prepared such an abundance of food that for many days those who wished to enter could partake of the continually served meal.

Even before the start of Bituitus’s reign, it would seem, the impression of the reges Arvernorum received in the Classical world, presumably through Massalia and Rome, was of 1) a stereotypically Gaulish society, with gluttonous, intemperate masses and chariot-riding leaders, 2) kings of a dangerously popular bent, pouring out public moneys to the least worthy and attaching the Gaulish hordes to themselves and 3) a vast concentration of wealth and power in the hands of these ambitious dynasts. Given the anxieties about Gaul and Gauls at Rome, this impression must have been a worrying one even in peacetime.

Examining the start of the war with an eye to inter-Gaulish and Gallo-Massaliot affairs, it is entirely possible today to conclude that the Salluvii

98 A singular irony of Latin literature is that Caesar himself used this topos skilfully in the Commentarii, which consistently depict him as the champion of oligarchs and oligarchy against rabble-rousing and/or power-seeking individuals like Dumnorix and Orgetorix.

99 As has, for instance, C. Ebel (1976: 66)
were prodded into action by Bituitus in order to discomfit the Massaliots and begin the process of extending Arvernian influence towards the Mediterranean coast. For Romans at the time, it was nearly inevitable that the Salluvii in 125 would be regarded very differently from the Oxubioi and Dekiētai in 155 and seen less as a westerly outlier of the contemptible Ligurians than as the southernmost wave of the perilous Gauls.\textsuperscript{100} Charismatic, pan-Gallic leadership in an earlier era was supposed to have led directly to the invasion of Italy and, thus, the fall and sack of Rome.\textsuperscript{101} Taking factors of this sort into account, it becomes easier to understand why the opportunity to intervene beyond the Alps was exploited to the full and why the resulting campaigns were not followed by a withdrawal like that of 154.

I propose this only tentatively, as direct, explicit, contemporary evidence of prejudices and anxieties about Gauls as factors influencing policy in this instance is lacking. However, that is not the case with Caesar; whether or not winning popularity through warring against the Gauls was a motivating factor in his choice of target, it is undeniable that he made extensive and skilful use of Roman views of Gaul and of Gallo-Roman history, including the conquest of Transalpina, in justifying his actions. Through clearly demonstrating at least the possibility of the relevance to practical politics of literary depictions of Gauls, the conclusions of this chapter are indirectly supported by the history of later Roman policy in Gallia Comata, which I shall examine in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{100} In Liv. Per. 60, for instance, they are not merely \textit{Transalpinos Liguras}, Transalpine Ligurians, as other contexts would lead us to expect, but also \textit{Salluvios Gallos} – the Salluvian Gauls.

\textsuperscript{101} Liv. 5.34.
7: The Creation of the \textit{Tres Galliae}

In the previous chapter I examined the events of 125-118 and discussed how the analysis of attitudes towards the Gauls already discernible by that time can contribute to their explanation. I shall now outline their consequences for the immediately subsequent generations of Romans and Gauls, including the ways in which Roman images of the northwest changed, or failed to change. This discussion of the period 118-58 will form the basis for an exploration of the motivation for and background to Caesar’s Gallic War.

1: Why a Gallic War?

The second, greater Roman expansion into Transalpine Gaul is far better known than the first. Needless to say, the source material is heavily biased, indeed literally one-sided as regards the written evidence, because Caesar’s Gaulish adversaries, unlike his Pompeian opponents,\(^1\) have left no surviving account of their own versions of events. However, this is no less the case with the conquest of Narbonensis; what is different is that for Caesar’s conquests there is a substantial body of fairly detailed narrative information on the course of events. The \textit{Commentarii}, Cicero’s correspondence and the works of later biographers and historians make his wars, including the Gallic War, among the best documented of all ancient conflicts.\(^2\) In addition, the intimidating scale and engineering of Caesar’s warfare in Gaul make it especially accessible to archaeological investigation.\(^3\)

Many, though of course not all, of the uncertainties encountered in the previous chapter are therefore absent. In particular, there can be little doubt that the Gallic War resulted from the decisions of a single, identifiable individual, Caesar. However, this fact poses its own methodological questions,

\(^1\) Lucan’s \textit{Belli Civilis Libri Decem}, for instance, although not flattering towards Pompey, are among the more obvious of the texts that express outright opposition to Caesar.

\(^2\) On Caesar’s presentation of his decisions and actions towards the Gauls in the \textit{Commentarii}, see Welch & Powell, 1998, especially the papers by Barlow, J. and Torigian, C.

\(^3\) On the discovery and excavation of sites involved with the Gallic War beginning in the nineteenth century, see Jiménez, 1996: 47, 99-100, 159-62, 182-3, 245-6.
different from but no easier than those raised by lack of information. Simply put, how is it informative to inquire as to the reasons for the decision to conquer Gaul when Caesar’s motives are so crudely transparent? In one respect, this difficulty is insurmountable; he needed to hold magisterial or pro-magisterial office to avoid prosecution, the Gallic War turned him from a near-bankrupt debtor to a distributor of largesse and, whether or not he specifically aspired to emulate Alexander as Suetonius claimed, he undoubtedly sought the contemporary *fama* and *dignitas* and posthumous *gloria* of a Roman conqueror.\(^4\) Whichever of these one considers the most important, domestic politics, the debts incurred in his electoral activities and sheer ambition, taken together, account more than adequately for what was clearly a firm intention to embark on a war of conquest.\(^5\)

What they do not explain at all is his eventual choice of target; he might equally have aspired to achieve those aims in an entirely different part of unconquered Europe. One can be (comparatively) sure of this because it is generally agreed that, at first, he did. His initial project was a campaign in the Balkans,\(^6\) perhaps one resembling the expansion actually undertaken there by Augustus or alternatively one directed specifically against Burebistas’s Geto-Dacian empire, which would have anticipated the Dacian Wars of Domitian and Trajan.\(^7\) The fact that his provincial command did not originally include Gallia Transalpina and the disposition of his legions prior to the Helvetic crisis make this clear, despite Caesar’s failure to mention his change of mind in the *Commentarii*. Four years later, far from planning unprovoked aggression in the Balkans, he failed even to take the opportunity to pick a quarrel when a Danubian frontier crisis not of his own making presented itself to him; when confronted in 54, as the magistrate whose *provincia* included Illyrian affairs, with raiding by the Pirustae from present-day Montenegro in the direction of

\(^4\) On his legal and financial difficulties, see respectively Crook et al., 1994: 369-71, 374, 408, 418 and ibid. 344, 440; for the Alexandrine comparison, see Suet. *Jul.* 7.


\(^6\) At any rate this has been the prevailing view for some time (e.g. Gelzer, 1968:86-7, Handford, 1982: 16-7, Williams, 2001: 2); for an alternative view in this regard, see Seager, 1979: 89.

\(^7\) On which see respectively Bowman et al., 1996: 169-88 and Bowman et al., 2000: 109-14, 497-503.
Roman Italy’s northeastern frontier, he did little more than appoint arbitrators to straighten out relations between the Illyrian peoples concerned. Even in the absence of any other evidence, this incident would leave little doubt that, by that time, Caesar’s territorial plans, at least for the war then being fought, were concerned exclusively with western Europe. In all likelihood, he made up his mind no later than the winter of 58-57, when he decided to consolidate his victory over the Suebi through occupying the territory of the Sequani in central Gaul.

There are thus two questions – why expansion and why Gaul. The first can be answered easily through pointing out that aggression abroad was what Caesar’s domestic ambitions and position required at that time. Of course, the nature and origin of Caesar’s domestic politics are not so easily assessed – to what extent they were personal and dynastic, to what extent ideological, how much the result of deliberate planning, how much the result of reaction to unpredictable events – and constitute one of the central concerns of Caesarian biography and of the political history of the late Republic. Nonetheless, ongoing inter-Roman struggles, however explained or interpreted, more than account for his successful attempt to match Pompey’s military glories. It is the second question that I wish to pursue here; why was it that, soon after he left Rome and became acquainted with the northern frontier, he found its Gaulish sector so much more promising than the Julian Alps as a field for expansion?

Caesar’s own explanation, as discussed in Part 1, was that there was no choice, that he was compelled to defend the Roman people’s empire and allies from Helvetic and Suebian invasion. As a denial of aggressive intent, this is so obviously disingenuous as to warrant no serious discussion other than as an example of justification to a contemporary Roman audience. The disputes concerned of course posed not the remotest real threat to the Roman state and

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8 Caes. Gal. 5.1.5-9.
9 For a discussion of Caesar’s motives and their scholarly interpretation since the nineteenth century, see Crook et al., 1994: 438-40, 463-7; on Caesar and his place in late Republican history more generally, see e.g. Gelzer, 1968, Jiménez, 2000, Freeman, 2008.
10 And, for that matter, Crassus’s unsuccessful and ultimately fatal attempt to do the same at the expense of the Parthians, on which see Crook et al., 1994: 398-403.
could certainly have been dealt with without permanently garrisoning Vesontio, let alone marching to and then across the Channel. However, the circumstances that Caesar so cleverly misrepresented were not fabrications; both disputes not only occurred in reality but predated his taking office as governor by several years. In short, Caesar quickly found that the westernmost stretch of the vast length of frontier under his command was much the least secure and by far the easiest in which to pick a fight.

"Why did Caesar choose to attack Gaul in 59 BC?" is precisely the question with which J. H. C. Williams begins his Beyond the Rubicon. The methodology through which he then proposes to answer it is, differences of emphasis aside, the coordinated examination of both Roman ideas and Roman actions that I have pursued. However, the initial question is, for the most part, left unanswered as Williams focusses instead on Cisalpine Gaul. I do not intend to dispute the conclusions reached; on the whole, I find the resulting parallel narratives of the Romans' formulation and eventual abandonment of the concept of Cisalpine Gaulishness, and their conquest and eventual enfranchisement of the inhabitants of northern Italy convincing. I would nonetheless argue that Transalpina and territorial expansion are as amenable to this approach as Cisalpina and assimilation. Ultimately, therefore, my project is complementary to that of Beyond the Rubicon, directly so in this chapter.

Traditionally, scholarship on Caesar, unlike that on the conquest of Gallia Bracata, has paid close attention to the associated ideas and attitudes discernible in literature. However, he has usually been considered in isolation, except with regard to the relationship between his writings and those of Posidonius. Of course it has always been obvious that, as J. F. Drinkwater succinctly put it, "given the terror gallicus, he was on to a winner so far as the Roman people were concerned: whatever the views of his political enemies, no-one was likely to object to his thrashing the hateful Gauls." The problem is

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12 Williams, 2001: 1.
rather that this has often, as in that example,\textsuperscript{14} been passed over as undeniable but unimportant or at least unworthy of detailed attention in its own right. The immediate historical background, the military and political history of Romano-Transalpine interaction between the two conquests, has been especially neglected.\textsuperscript{15} The natural focus on Caesar's own career and the intrinsic interest of the \textit{Commentarii} as masterpieces of propaganda and of Latin prose make this tendency very understandable and there is a great deal to be learned through examining them in this way.\textsuperscript{16} There is also, nevertheless, much to be gained through concentrating on the relationship of the Gallic War to previous Roman ideas and actions. Caesar's meticulous attention to traditional stereotypes and prejudices in his presentation of his actions has been examined at length in Part 1. What I wish to consider here is the broader historical context of the Gallic War, the previous Roman policies and their effects, successes and failures in Gaul between the two conquests.

Overall, it is my contention that, although Caesar's combination of aggressive ambition and military ability undoubtedly accelerated Roman expansion — it is difficult to imagine that any of his contemporaries, if attempting conquest in Gaul, would have reached Hertfordshire or Rheinland-Pfalz — the direction in which he conquered was one if not dictated then at least suggested to him by previous Roman policy and the conditions it created. In order to support this conclusion, I shall now examine some of the broad trends that emerge from a study of Romano-Transalpine political interaction between the two conquests.

2: The Romans North of the Alps, 118-58 BCE

The first serious challenge to Roman power beyond of the Alps came only a few years after its establishment. As discussed in the previous chapter, among

\textsuperscript{14} Drinkwater, 1983: 17.

\textsuperscript{15} Neglected with respect to its capacity to shed new light on Caesar and his campaigns, that is; the first half-century of Roman rule in southern Gaul has of course been studied as a chapter in the history of Narbonensis itself, e.g. Ebel, 1976: 75-101, Rivet, 1988: 41-63.

\textsuperscript{16} For an authoritative and detailed examination of Caesar's careful use of selection and omission, characterization, narrative structure, ethnographic/philosophical themes and even language for propagandistic effect in the \textit{Commentarii}, see Welch & Powell, 1998.
the most important consequences of the campaigns of 125-120 was the extension of the extra-provincial *clientela* of the Roman state north of the Alps. Over the longer term, the Romans’ most fateful alliance with a non-annexed people would of course be with the Aedui, in whose defence Caesar claimed to enter Gallia Comata. The first polity to take advantage of the Republic’s new willingness to intervene in the western European interior, however, was the otherwise poorly known kingdom of the Norici Taurisci, north of the Carnic Alps. In 112, a consul for the previous year, Cn. Papirius Carbo, led an army into Noricum to protest its violation by two migrating peoples from farther north, the Cimbri and the Teutoni. Although the latter were sufficiently intimidated by this display of military strength that they agreed to withdraw, Carbo attempted to gain an easy victory through attacking them anyway. However, his ambush, laid near the principal Tauriscan settlement, Noreia, failed disastrously and his army was badly mauled. Although the migrants made no attempt to follow up their successful defence through pursuing the Romans into Italy, the Romano-Cimbric enmity that had been so unnecessarily aroused would dominate Roman foreign policy in western Europe for more than a decade.

With the legionary impediment now removed, the Cimbri and Teutoni continued to meander in a broadly counterclockwise direction around the Alps, joined along the way by the Tigurini. After several years, this took them towards Transalpina and they again faced a Roman army barring their way in 109, under the command of one of that year’s consuls, M. Junius Silanus. They again halted, but this time only temporarily, to make the Senate an offer of allegiance in exchange for land within the Romans’ empire on which to settle permanently. When this was rejected, they resumed their southward march, came to blows with Silanus somewhere on the province’s northern frontier and soundly defeated him. The Tigurini then proceeded into the province, whereupon the Volcae Tectosages took the opportunity to rebel. The Tigurini themselves ambushed and killed another consul, L. Cassius Longinus,

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17 Str. 5.1.8, Rivet, 1988: 44, Crook et al., 1994: 37, 783.
near present-day Bordeaux in 107 but then wandered off, leaving the Tectosages to be reconquered by Q. Servilius Caepio. Two years after the Tigurini’s departure, the Cimbri and Teutoni returned to Narbonensis after roaming around Gallia Comata. They were again rebuffed in an attempt to exchange submission and military service for land and concluded the half-decade of intermittent conflict in southern Gaul through defeating Caepio and the consul for 105, Cn. Mallius Maximus, at Arausio.¹⁹

Although this was the Romans’ worst defeat of the second century, the subsequent courses taken by the migrants gave Marius, who was sent to Gaul immediately after his return from Africa, three years to prepare for the next clash. The Teutoni marched northwards, away from Transalpina, while the Cimbri passed through it in the opposite direction and entered Spain. After both peoples were repelled, the Teutoni by the Belgae and the Cimbri by the Celtiberi, they finally attacked Italy. In 102, after Marius had thoroughly reinforced the Transalpine province and (if his measures are to be ascribed to this period) reformed the Roman military system, the Teutoni, Cimbri and Tigurini each separately attempted to cross the Alps. Over the course of 102 and 101, all three were defeated, the Teutoni and their allies the Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae by Marius, the Cimbri near Vercellae by Marius and consul Q. Lutatius Catulus and the Tigurini in the eastern Alps by Sulla.²⁰

As the stimulus for both Marius’s reform of the legions and his successive consulates,²¹ the Cimbric War was of more than usual importance in internal Roman history. For the present study of Roman foreign policy, it is noteworthy in two main respects. Firstly, its very occurrence was a strikingly new development and a telling indication of future trends. Migration was nothing new or even uncommon in pre-urban northern and central Europe; folk-movements undoubtedly took place before Classical writers began to record them and they certainly continued after that of the Cimbri and Teutoni. What was different was the likelihood of the Romans becoming involved. A

²¹ On which see respectively Crook et al., 1994: 36-9 and pp. 95-7, 166 of the same. On Marius’s career as a whole, see Evans, 1994.
certain proportion of migrations had always chanced Italy’s way but, for the most part, northern peoples and their occasional wanderings were of very little importance to the middle Republic, in contrast with the long and bitter struggle against the settled, though to the Romans Gaulish, populations south of the Alps. 22

This changed almost immediately after 125; as noted above, the gap between the conquest of Transalpina and the first migratory war was very brief, in my view not coincidentally. Despite initial Roman provocation and a bloody war, the Cimbri and Teutoni showed an extraordinary reluctance to cross the Alps into Italy and there is no reason to suppose that, had the Romans had no Transalpine interests, Latin writers would so much as inform us of their existence. The projection of Roman power north of the Alps, at first in the form of the Province and the patronage associated with it, acted as a sort of geopolitical wind vane, standing athwart migratory routes that had previously been none of the Romans’ concern. Ultimately, the problem of containing folk-movement in the European interior, of which the Cimbric War was the first example, was one that the Roman state never managed to solve.

Secondly, how the Romans categorized the invaders is illuminating. Perhaps the best remembered Classical assessment of their ethnic character is that of Tacitus; looking back from a chronologically distant vantage point, it seemed obvious that the Cimbri and Teutoni were the first Germans to trouble the Roman people, indeed that they initiated the war two centuries long between Germani and Romani that still showed no sign of ending. 23 As discussed in Chapter 2, however, the judgement of Latin historiography as a whole was more ambiguous and the Cimbri and Teutoni were often considered Gaulish. Even in Tacitus’s day it was possible to come to this conclusion, as Florus did; 24 at and soon after the time of their arrival the migrants seemed paradigmatically and alarmingly Gaulish. 25 The rebellion of the Volcae

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22 On Roman interaction with migratory and/or nomadic populations in mainland Europe more generally, see Batty, 2007.
23 Ger. 37.2.
24 Epit. 1.38.1.
25 Williams, 2001: 137, 172-3; Sallust, for instance, took their Gaulish character so utterly for granted that he could refer to them at Jug. 114.1-3 simply as Gallos without even using the names “Cimbri” or
Tectosages triggered by the northerners’ invasion of the Province presumably strengthened the impression of pan-Gallic encirclement of Rome. In short, any relaxation of the traditional mistrust of Gauls and fear of a renewed Gaulish invasion that the defeat of the Arverni and their allies permitted must surely have been reversed by the Cimbric War, as evidence to be discussed in Section 4 confirms.\(^{26}\)

Moreover, the end of the war did not bring about a lasting peace in southern Gaul. In 90, the Salluvii rebelled and were subdued by the governor of the day, perhaps C. Coelius Caldus.\(^{27}\) In 81, C. Valerius Flaccus, who had presumably also had Gallia Bracata within his *provincia*, triumphed *ex Celtiberia et Gallia*.\(^{28}\)

Although the details are entirely obscure, it would seem that the upheaval in the Romans’ far western empire caused by Sertorius’s insurrection in the Iberian peninsula in 80 disrupted their control of Mediterranean Gaul. Around the same time, probably in 79, the governor L. Manlius was defeated by native forces in Aquitania, outside the province, under unknown circumstances and again by the Marian general L. Hirtuleius. Just as little is known about the subsequent resumption of effective Roman rule, which apparently involved a reconquest by Pompey on his way to and from Italy to Spain to finish off the Marian-Lusitanian rebellion between 76 and 72. During that time he and the governor of Transalpina from 74 to 72,\(^{29}\) M. Fonteius, thoroughly exploited the Province’s human and financial resources in order to support Pompey in his struggle with Sertorius and Perperna.\(^{30}\)

In his defence of Fonteius on charges of corruption and maladministration in Gaul, Cicero claimed that his gubernatorial tenure

\(^{26}\)"Teutoni", let alone "Germani".

\(^{27}\) It is also at least arguable that the shock inflicted on the Roman body politic by the struggle with the northerners was important in the history of the Transpadane Gauls within Roman Italy during the late Republic (Williams, 2001: 136-7).

\(^{28}\) Liv. *Per.* 73; on the difficulties with interpreting the passage, see Rivet, 1988: 54-5.

\(^{29}\) Rivet, 1988: 54-5; the intriguing triumphal designation appears at Grn. Lic. Fra. 36.5 (Criniti).

\(^{30}\) Or at any rate for a three-year period in the seventies, within which range the period given above is the most probable (Rivet, 1988: 58).

involved considerable war-making, in particular that he fought against the Vocontii and also raised a Gaulish siege of Narbo. His oratorical purpose would naturally lead Cicero to exaggerate this aspect of Fonteius’s career but in order for the following description of Gallia Bracata to have been at all credible to his audience, the achievement of stability in the territory, half a century after its conquest, must have been very incomplete indeed:

M. Fonteius governed the province of Gaul, which consists in those cities and races of men of whom ... some in our memory have waged bitter and protracted wars against the Roman people, some have recently been subdued by our generals, recently been conquered in war, have recently been recorded in triumphs and on monuments or have recently had their lands and towns confiscated by the Senate, those cities and races of men of whom some have striven with hand and sword against the same M. Fonteius and by his great toil and labour been brought under the dominion and authority of the Roman people.

The next known governor, C. Calpurnius Piso, suppressed a rising among the Allobroges in 66, an ominous warning of increasing discontent, and continued to organize recruitment of provincial troops in the territory for service under Pompey, this time against the Mediterranean pirates. He was also, again like Fonteius, prosecuted for extortionate practices in Gaul.31

In 63, the Allobroges sent two representatives to Rome to petition the Senate about provincial misrule. While they were there, leading participants in the Catilinarian conspiracy attempted to persuade them to reinforce the planned

coup with a simultaneous revolt in Gaul. The envoys decided that the optimates were the safer bet and informed Cicero, through the Allobroges’ patron, Q. Fabius Sanga. Through alerting the consul to the plot and providing sworn testimony against P. Autronius Paetus as well as several incriminating letters, the diplomats contributed substantially to Catiline’s defeat and, as individuals, they were appropriately rewarded. The grievances that they had originally sought to raise, however, still were not addressed. The Senate’s refusal to reform the corrupt and ineffective system of provincial tribute and administration in Transalpina succeeded where popularis incitement had failed and the next year a general rebellion of the Allobroges began.

In Cicero’s assessment, the Allobroges were in his day the most warlike race of the Gauls and their defection en bloc was the most serious challenge to the Roman state’s dominance in southern Gaul since the Cimbric War. The governor, C. Pomptinus, assisted by his legates, Manlius Lentinus, L. Marius and Ser. Sulpicius Galba, mounted at least two substantial campaigns against the Allobrobian rebels, led by Catugnatus, who extended the war well outside the territory of his own civitas. The rebellion was reduced to a manageable scale through successful siege operations at Ouentia and, under Pomptinus in person, at Solônion but Catugnatus escaped on both occasions and the Allobroges were only brought fully to heel in 60.

Overlapping somewhat with this latest and largest disruption within Transalpina was a crisis on the frontier that would prove more fateful, the dispute with the Helvetii. This people had experienced migratory pressure from the north and east for some time. During the 60s, the situation became

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32 On the significance of this extraordinary move in Roman eyes and the oratorical use of it made by Cicero in the Orationes in Catilinam, see Williams, 2001: 177-8.
35 Catil. 3.22.
36 Who served again as a legionary legate in Gaul under Caesar in 57.
37 His fate thereafter is unclear; he may, like some of Caesar’s Belgic enemies, have outlived his own rebellion and taken refuge outside Roman territory.
more urgent and moves were made to solve the problem in the traditional manner in pre-urban northern Europe, through simply shifting part of their own population some distance in the same direction to settle somewhere less congested, perhaps at the expense of other peoples in turn. In this case, however, as the peoples immediately facing the Helvetii in that direction were the Allobroges and the Aedui, exercising that option would involve the same Roman obstacle as that encountered by the Cimbri and Teutoni. The deterrent effect of Roman power significantly delayed a migration that, in all likelihood, would otherwise have begun earlier but towards the end of the 60s, the problem became acute and fear of Trans-Rhenane invaders began to outweigh fear of Roman legions.\(^{39}\)

Understandably enough, the Aedui were not inclined to trust the Helvetii to move peaceably through their rich and fertile territory and continue westwards. As with the Taurisci and the Cimbri, the Romans sided firmly with their settled clients against the migrants; the Senate decreed in 61 that Pomptinus and future governors of the province of Gaul must defend the Aedui.\(^{40}\) As the war with the Allobroges farther south was still dragging on, Cicero’s mention of a worried expectation in Rome early the next year of a general conflagration in Gaul is not difficult to understand.\(^{41}\) In 59 BCE, Pomptinus was relieved not, as had been expected, by the former consul Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer but by one C. Julius Caesar, whose immense \textit{provincia} embraced the entire northern frontier – Gallia Transalpina, Gallia Cisalpina and Illyricum.

As mentioned above, the plans that Caesar had made in Rome, before becoming acquainted with conditions in the north, involved a march into Illyria, not Gallia Comata. Viewed in broad retrospect, the quiet few months during which he assembled an expeditionary force in eastern Cisalpine Gaul in order to put this plan into effect were merely the end of a year-long lull in


\(^{40}\) Not many years later, Caesar was to use precisely this edict to justify leaving Gallia Bracata and campaigning in the north under circumstances remarkably similar to those envisioned in 61 (\textit{Gal.} 1.35.4).

\(^{41}\) \textit{Att.} 19.2.
Romano-Helvetic hostility. While Pomptinus narrowly avoided complicating his struggle against Catugnatus with a Helvetic war in 61-60, Caesar eagerly availed of the opportunities for conflict and subsequent expansion with which the Helvetii and the Suebi presented him in 58.

3: The Gallic War: Narrative Summary

Having examined the historical background to Caesar’s northern campaigns in the 50s, I shall very briefly review their course before discussing their interpretation in the next section. He first entered Gallia Comata in 58, in pursuit of the migrating Helvetii. After defeating them and sending them back to their Alpine homeland, he intervened in a dispute involving the Suebi from across the Rhine. Several years previously, the pro-Arverian civitas of the Sequani had sought and received the assistance of the Suebian chieftain Ariovistus. His considerable military strength had drastically altered the balance of power in central Gaul to the disadvantage of the Aedui but he had then refused to leave and subsequently dominated the Sequanian territory. After some brief and unproductive diplomacy, Caesar mounted a substantial expedition outside the Transalpine Province and soundly defeated Ariovistus, sending the Suebi back across the Rhine.

His decision at this point to winter six legions in the Sequanian oppidum of Vesontio (Besançon), in the absence of any military need for a Roman presence outside Narbonensis the following campaigning season, began the conquest proper. Had he withdrawn after ejecting Ariovistus, his actions would have amounted to a defence of the position of the Romans’ Aeduan clients and a restoration of a more traditional relationship between the larger Gaulish civitates and between them and the Roman state. Through refusing to

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42 On the relaxation of tension, see Cic. Att. 21.11. It is difficult to say why the war scare of 61-60 temporarily dissipated; possibly the final reconquest of the Allobroges bolstered Roman martial prestige sufficiently to prolong the indecision on the part of the Helvetic pagi by a year or two.
43 For the main civitates of non-provincial Gaul before and during the war, Caesar’s classificatory scheme for this multitude of groups and the subsequent growth and delineation of Roman power in Gaul, see respectively Maps 3, 1 and 2.
leave, he effectively assumed, at least with respect to the Sequani, more or less the position that Ariovistus had held. This, combined with renewed patronage of the Aedui, amounted to territorial expansion of substantial but indefinite scope.

His aggression provoked a forceful response from the only civitates in Gallia Comata with resources remotely comparable to the central Gaulish powers— the loose coalition of peoples in the western part of what the Romans called Gallia Belgica. In 57 the Suessonian chieftain Galba was appointed to lead a substantial allied army, which he quickly marched southwards. After Caesar defeated the pan-Belgic army, the rest of the year’s campaigning season was occupied with the systematic conquest of the individual Belgic civitates by Caesar personally and an entirely unprovoked subjugation of the seafaring Aremorican peoples in and around modern Normandy and Brittany by his deputy, P. Licinius Crassus, the son of his partner in the First Triumvirate.

The campaigning season of 56 followed a very similar pattern of mostly coastal consolidation and expansion, though shifted counterclockwise geographically. Caesar in person and his legate Q. Titurius Sabinus suppressed a determined Aremorican rebellion while Crassus attacked and subjugated the Aquitanian peoples of the southwest.

The conquest of Gaul itself thus seemingly completed, though in fact far from effectively consolidated, Caesar was occupied for the rest of the year and for the campaigning seasons of 55 and 54 with his unsuccessful effort to conquer the Belgic-influenced civitates in the southeastern corner of Britain. Control on the mainland was essential for this campaign; the occupation of the coastal territories of the Menapii and Morini in 56 was an indispensable prerequisite for the invasion and the conquest in Britain was interrupted by

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49 For Roman Britain as subsequently constructed after the more successful Claudian invasion, see Map 5.
50 Jiménez, 1996: 84.
campaigns in Belgica against the migrating Usipetes and Tencteri in 55\textsuperscript{51} and the rebelling Treveri in 54.\textsuperscript{52} Caesar also bridged and crossed the Rhine during this period, following the defeat and massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri from across the river.\textsuperscript{53}

The autumn and winter of 54 and all of the next two campaigning seasons were taken up with the suppression of two related and chronologically overlapping, though nonetheless distinct, rebellions. The first to start was a concerted and very tenacious insurrection in northern Gaul, led initially by the Eburonian leaders Ambiorix and Catuvolcus.\textsuperscript{54} The Belgae and their neighbours continued to resist throughout 53, with the assistance of the Sugambri from the other side of the Rhine, which Caesar crossed for a second time.\textsuperscript{55}

The next year, with the north still far from peaceful, a new revolt commenced in wealthier, proto-urban central Gaul. Diplomatically, Caesar’s simple refusal to leave after defeating the Suebi had effected a sort of annexation by default but militarily the three great states of the Arverni, Aedui and Sequani were almost untouched, their very substantial resources fully intact. If it was not at first clear how drastically their relationship to the Roman state was to change, Caesar’s subsequent activities dispelled any doubt; judging by their actions, it is clear that the local elites did not welcome this prospect. It is hardly surprising that the Arverni under Vercingetorix eventually led their central Gaulish allies and clients against the occupying legions. What is astonishing is that, once the rebels had demonstrated military competence through thwarting Caesar’s attempt to take the Arvemian capital, Gergovia, the Aedui abandoned the policy of the previous seventy years and took up arms against their patrons alongside their traditional enemies.\textsuperscript{56} Although Caesar’s depiction of Vercingetorix as directing a united and self-consciously pan-Gallic

\textsuperscript{52} Jiménez, 1996: 117.
\textsuperscript{55} Jiménez, 1996: 172.
\textsuperscript{56} Jiménez, 1996: 176-83.
war effort is not to be taken seriously, his successes at least inspired simultaneous renewal of insurrection in northern Gaul.

Nonetheless, over the course of 52 the central Gaulish states were humbled, through the decisive defeat of the allied army at the nearly impregnable mountaintop oppidum of Alesia, the capture of Vercingetorix himself and the seizure of the Aeduan capital, Bibracte. With the Arverni, Aedui and Sequani crushed as military powers, the conquest of Gaul was, in effect, complete. Caesar’s subsequent campaigns on the northeastern and southwestern edges of Gallia Comata, next to unconquered trans-Rhenane Germany and Cantabria respectively, can be seen more as the first of several decades of intermittent campaigning in those areas by various governors of the new province, most famously Agrippa. Like those later campaigns, the Bellovacan and Aquitanian troubles of 52 and 51 did not affect more than a small proportion of the total land area of Gallia Comata and did not prevent the Roman state’s exaction of a substantial tribute from the province.

4: The Gallic War: The Legacy of the Gallo-Roman Past

I argued in the previous chapter that the conquest of Mediterranean Transalpine Gaul in the second century cannot be properly explained without reference to the Gallo-Roman past. This includes not only previous military and political events within the territory and south of the Alps but also the proto-historical and mythical past of Gallo-Roman interaction as imagined by Romans. In my view, despite the undeniable importance of the contemporary situation at Rome, this is equally true of the conquest of Gallia Comata. Three points in particular emerge from a close consideration the history of Roman Transalpina

57 The siege component of the Alesia campaign, with Caesar’s characteristically intensive use of field engineering, left a considerable archaeological footprint, which has been the object of study and discussion since it was excavated in 1861-5 under Napoléon III; for more recent work on these material remains, see Reddé et al., 1995.


59 For what was in Caesar’s time the northwestern fringe of Gallia Comata, see Map 4.

60 On the prolonged struggle to pacify these two outlying regions, see Drinkwater, 1983: 19, 22, 120-3; the achievement of stability was made particularly difficult in the northeast by occasional migratory intrusions across the Rhine and, conversely, by the Julio-Claudian attempts to conquer territory on the other side of the river. Real security was not achieved in the Roman Rhineland until the Flavians’ systematic re-organization of the Rhine frontier (Drinkwater, 1983: 57-61).
between the conquests – the sheer instability of the territory, the problem of containing folk-movement and the extraordinary fear that could still be aroused at Rome by trouble involving *Galli*.

The first of these is perhaps the most obvious. Between the arrival of colonists at Narbo Martius in 118 and the departure of Caesar’s legions for the north in 58, southern Gaul saw very few peaceful years indeed. Rebellions were frequent; this is clear even from the exceedingly thin and discontinuous historical record on Gaul at that time. Moreover, this restiveness did not gradually diminish over time as the memory of independence faded; the last revolt before Caesar, that of the Allobroges under Catugnatus, was also the largest.

One of the persistent factors in this unquiet was the movement of peoples through or into the territory from the northeast. As noted in Section 2, this problem became noticeable soon after the extension of Roman power north of the Alps. And, far from being a passing difficulty of the last decade of the second century brought about by the Cimbric crisis, the same danger was still present in the 50s to serve Caesar as a moral and legal justification of his first march beyond his allotted *provincia*. In my view, it also made a genuine contribution to his decision to select Comata rather than Illyria as a target.

Another factor of at least equal importance must have been how he expected his actions to be viewed at Rome. This consideration would surely have kept his attention firmly on Comata once the Helvetii drew it there; pushing the Gaulish frontier back far beyond the Alps does not seem to have markedly eased the political and religious anxieties induced by wars with enemies considered to be *Galli*. A few of the more extravagant contemporary reactions to Gaulish crises in the period 118-58, which included Caesar’s youth and early career, amply demonstrate this point.

One of the rarest and least well known of Roman rites was that which entailed the sacrifice of a Gaulish and a Greek couple in the Forum Boarium at a time of military disaster or emergency. Interpretation of the rite is difficult
and complex, partly due to dearth of evidence, and consensus is unlikely to be reached. Nonetheless, Roman unease about Galli must at least have played some part; both the criterion for selecting victims and the coincidence of the sacrifice’s known performance with defeats by partly or wholly Gaulish armies make this reasonably clear. The third and final attested performance of the rite was in 114 or 113, after the Scordisci defeated the governor of Macedonia, C. Porcius Cato, and invaded Macedonia and Achaea. For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of this last performance of the rite was simply that it could still occur. Setbacks of moderate severity overseas could still be regarded as equivalent to the old Gallo-Roman crises in Italy if the enemies of the day were Gaulish; the terror gallicus, it would seem, had not been dispelled through the final conquest of Cisalpina or even the overthrow of Bituitus.

There is a great deal more evidence on the response to the Cimbric War. Sallust, the chronicler of the Jugurthine War, reminded the reader of the limited importance of even his own subject, with its urgent moral lessons, when compared with Gaulish wars; he explicitly stated that these, exemplified by Marius’s Cimbric campaigns, were rightly taken far more seriously than other conflicts as they alone threatened the very survival (salute) of the Roman people (Jug. 114.2). The unprecedented successive consulates to which Marius was elected confirm that the northern crisis made an incomparably deeper impression on the contemporary Roman mind than the long and bitter struggle in Africa. Both the importance ascribed to the conflict and its Gaulish character for the Romans are further emphasized by the contemporary comparison of Marius to Camillus.

Another well documented illustration of the Gauls’ continuing ability to cause alarm at Rome is Cicero’s masterful use of Gaulish themes in the third

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63 Which, as discussed in Section 2, was for Romans at the time, even if not necessarily for their descendants, a paradigmatically Gaulish war.
64 Conversely, the spate of prosecutions of generals who fared less well against the same foes, on which see Williams, 2001: 172-3, points in the same direction.
65 On which see Rawson, 1974.
and fourth *Orationes in L. Catilinam*. In the *Pro Fonteio*, he had successfully exploited Roman jurors’ simple dislike of Gauls; as consul, he worked on Roman senators’ and voters’ fear of Gauls, again successfully. Any prominent politician at the time, especially Cicero’s nervous opponents like Caesar, would have seen quasi-religious anxieties about *Galli* more appropriate to the fourth century used to tremendous effect in contemporary practical politics, first before a mass Roman audience and again before the aristocratic Senate.

The final example I shall adduce is the one chronologically nearest to the Gallic War and most directly related to it. Roman law permitted certain extraordinary measures for the defence of the state in the event of either of what were felt to be the two gravest emergencies possible – *tumultus Italicus* or civil war and *tumultus Gallicus* or Gaulish invasion. Of these, the latter was considered the more severe and a decree declaring a state of *tumultus Gallicus* gave magistrates the freest hand they could (legally) possess in Italy under the Republic; for instance, unlike in a *tumultus Italicus*, even priests and old men could be conscripted. Although this is a revealing indication of the seriousness with which the predatory and warlike image of the Gauls discussed in Part I was taken, in itself the *tumultus Gallicus* decree is not particularly surprising; there was a great deal of Romano-Cisalpine conflict before 191 and it was presumably put into effect on many occasions. What is noteworthy is that, as with the sacrifice in the Forum Boarium, it persisted into the period under discussion. The last probable declaration of a state of *tumultus Gallicus* was due to the Helvetic war scare of 61-60. That the threat posed by the displaced Helvetii could be held to require a defence more vigorous than that needed to deal with Mithradates or Sertorius simply because they were *Galli* is

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66 For a detailed thematic analysis of Cicero’s ingenious manipulation in these two orations of linked literary and mythological topoi concerning the *Galli*, the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol and moral deterioration, see Williams, 2001: 177-8.

67 Examined at pp. 71-4, 114-5 above.

68 Momigliano, 1975: 64, Astin et al., 1989: 207. The sense of threat with which these contingencies were viewed is illustrated by the ancient pseudoetymology of “tumultus” as “timor” + “multus” (Bellen, 1985: 10); such events were felt to be, literally, Great Fears.

69 Williams, 2001: 171.

perhaps the single most illustrative piece of evidence of an irrational *metus Gallicus* at Rome in all of Latin historiography. It is also difficult to imagine a precedent more likely to direct Caesar’s ambitions towards Gaul when, two years later, reports of renewed Helvetic restlessness interrupted his preparations for Balkan glory.

In this chapter and the last, I have concentrated on the hundred-year period of accelerating Roman intervention and expansion in Transalpine Gaul, 155-51 BCE, with two methodological aims principally in mind. Firstly, I have attempted to relate the political and military history of the conquest to the history of Roman ideas on their northwestern neighbours described and analysed in Part 1. I have also tried, albeit very provisionally, to connect what can seem like a series of disconnected incidents into a continuous narrative, which I hope has some explanatory power for the events it includes. In the present chapter in particular, I have attempted to relate Caesar’s Gallic War much more closely to previous Romano-Transalpine history than Caesarian scholarship has usually done. That is not to suggest, of course, that it is less informative to approach the Gallic War as an episode in Caesar’s extraordinary personal career or as a stage in his rise to power within the Roman state, which it undeniably was. I would contend, nonetheless, that taking a fresh and integrated look at the background to the *Bellum Gallicum* and the context of the *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* can give a much fuller and more nuanced understanding of both. The history of Gallo-Roman interaction under the Republic in turn provides a background against which, I shall argue in the next three chapters, several important aspects of the early emperors’ foreign policy in the European mainland can be better understood.
The previous chapter completes my discussion of Roman policy within Transalpine Gaul. However, the stereotypes, anxieties and imagery associated with Gaul did not instantly vanish on the death of Vercingetorix and, as discussed throughout Part 1, in fact persist in the literary record into late antiquity. As under the Republic, I would argue that Gaulish themes influenced policy under the Julio-Claudians and even, to some extent, as late as the High Empire. In this chapter and the next, I shall attempt to support this claim through an examination of aspects of Roman policy in Germany and Britain, the independent regions adjacent to Gaul, in the century and a half after the conquest of Gaul itself.

1: On the Limits of Pre-Industrial Imperialism

One of the ways in which modern European imperialism differed most radically from even the most territorially extensive pre-modern states was in its response to indigenous social complexity. The following passage from a historian of British expansion and colonization illustrates this point:

Where the British, like the Spaniards, conquered already sophisticated, urbanized societies, the effects of colonization were more commonly negative, as the colonizers were tempted to engage in plunder rather than to build their own institutions. Indeed, this is perhaps the best available explanation of that ‘great divergence’ which reduced India and China from being quite possibly the world’s most advanced economies in the sixteenth century to relative poverty by the early twentieth. It also explains why it was that Britain was able to overhaul her Iberian rivals: precisely

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Hereinafter, I shall use the phrase “social complexity” in the broad, semi-technical sense reasonably common in archaeological discourse, especially that of the late prehistoric Mediterranean (e.g. Diacopoulos, 2004), referring to the gradual development observed in many societies beginning with social stratification and skill specialization and leading, eventually, to state-level political and economic structures. The same phrase is used in much more specific ways in other social scientific disciplines, for instance SACS (as it is usually called; the acronym stands for “sociology and complexity science”).
because, as a latecomer to the imperial race, she had to settle for colonizing the unpromising wastes of Virginia and New England, rather than the eminently lootable cities of Mexico and Peru.2

I do not pretend to expertise on the sociology or history of modern imperialism;3 nonetheless it seems undeniable that modern, especially industrial, empires have been able to absorb areas of low population density, little infrastructure and traditional society at least as easily as they have absorbed large, urbanized populations. The most striking examples of this ability are the wholesale repopulation of North America, Australasia and Siberia and reconstruction there of originally European social, economic and physical structures. The “thin (or thinned)”4 populations of these areas were simply less of an impediment to imperialist projects over the long term than larger ones would have been. With ancient states, almost the reverse was the case; often, even polities with sufficient resources to defeat and subordinate rivals of similar complexity struggled to incorporate non-state societies. Hittite history provides an illustrative pre-Classical example. In the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, the New Kingdom extended its power southwards over most of the Syrian city-states and southeast to the Euphrates, rivalling or exceeding Ramesside Egyptian influence in the Middle East; before, during and after the period of greatest prominence, the pastoral, semi-nomadic Kaska, in the north of Anatolia itself, remained stubbornly unconquerable.5 Ultimately, the Kaska, along with other migrating peoples, played a substantial part in collapse of the Hittite state. Extending urban, Levantine civilization proved far more difficult than achieving a dominant position within it.

Taking a broader view, it would seem that both primary state formation6 – the entirely spontaneous development of a state society, as in Egypt,

2 Ferguson, 2004: 369.
3 Nor, incidentally, do I wish to endorse the more or less neo-Colonialist evaluative judgements that Ferguson draws from his interpretation of modern history.
4 As Ferguson delicately puts it (2004: 369).
5 On the history of the New Kingdom and the nomadic and/or migratory populations that changed Anatolia so drastically in the twelfth century, see respectively Edwards et al., 1975: 1-20, 252-73 and Sandars, 1979. For a broader overview of Hittite studies, see Collins, 2008.
Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, China and, later, Mesoamerica and the Andes – and the forcible, rapid and successful imposition of a high degree of social complexity on a very traditional society have been rare historically. Secondary state formation⁷ – the native development of state societies through contact with adjacent, pre-existing ones – has been much more common.

Superficially, the extraordinary Roman success in building a wealthy, durable Mediterranean civilization in Gaul⁸ seems a counterexample; at first sight, the reconstruction in the Tres Galliae of the physical artefacts of Roman civilization, from monumental architecture down to coarse pottery, rather resembles, albeit perhaps in miniature, the transformation of, say, North America after its conquest by Europeans. However, this revolution was financed almost exclusively by the Gaulish elite, not by the Roman state.⁹ Their wealth, generated through the considerable infrastructure and organization (oppida, roadways, cleared and tilled land, civitates etc.) of Late La Tène society,¹⁰ was an indispensable prerequisite for this process; in order for Gaul to be provided with porticoes over a few decades, it first had to be provided with fields over centuries.¹¹ The following two chapters will be concerned in large part with how Roman leaders attempted, and failed, to extend their rule to areas where wetlands and woodlands had not already been replaced with cornfields – in more abstract terms landscapes not already converted into taskscapes designed for use by humans.¹² The Roman state had neither the technical capacity to construct from scratch the physical basis for complex society and dense population over an extensive area nor the economic

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⁷ On which, in ancient Europe specifically, see Arnold & Blair Gibson, 1995.
⁸ For an overview and analysis of which see Woolf, 1998.
⁹ On the importance of prolific Gaulish euergetism in creating a Roman culture in Gaul, see Woolf, 1998: 1-2, 24-5, 40.
¹⁰ On the archaeology of Celtic-speaking peoples, see Karl & Stifter, 2007b.
¹¹ An illustrative example of the difference from modern imperialism with which this section began; the construction of the British colonies in eastern North America did not require investment by Iroquois matriarchs or Powhatan dynasts; if anything, the physical destruction of the bulk of the indigenous population through disease carried by European colonists (often interpreted by the latter as divine action against infidels – Ferguson, 2004: 66) facilitated the process significantly.
¹² On the application to Classical archaeology of the concept of the taskscape, see Oltean, 2007: 62.
organization to make such a project an investment to be exploited rather than an expense to be borne.\(^\text{13}\)

It would not be helpful to draw an unrealistically sharp or static distinction between state and non-state societies or to ignore other factors facilitating or limiting Roman expansion in particular or pre-modern imperialism in general.\(^\text{14}\) Nevertheless, pre-modern expansionism undeniably required a certain degree of pre-existing social complexity in a way that more recent imperialism has not. One of the cruder examples of this reliance is the collection of booty in wartime. Modern warfare may secure profitable resources but is itself a vast expense; under ancient conditions, however, war itself could be an opportunity for personal and collective enrichment. The indemnities exacted from the defeated (but not yet exterminated) Carthaginians and the confiscation of the former treasury of Cleopatra VII in 30 BCE are probably the most famous such expropriations in Roman history but are merely spectacular instances of a practice – plunder – entirely routine and essential to Roman war making. Both the Colosseum and Trajan’s Forum bore proud inscriptions boasting of having been financed out of the spoils (quite literally – *ex manubiis*) of victories over Jews and Dacians respectively.\(^\text{15}\) Such profits, however, required an adversary actually in possession of a treasury, or at least with enough movable wealth in their territory for looting to be worthwhile. Caesar’s haul of Gaulish gold\(^\text{16}\) is perhaps among the less well remembered of the great seizures of sovereign wealth in Roman military history but considerably more important in practical terms was the wartime supply of Gaulish, especially Aeduan, wheat for his armies.\(^\text{17}\) The conquest of Gaul, like its acculturation, was part-funded by Gauls.

\(^{13}\) Indeed, even for the early generations of wealthy Gallo-Romans who funded the new Mediterranean-style cities of Roman Gaul, with their ready access to local labour and resources, the financial strain was severe (Woolf, 1998: 238).

\(^{14}\) For instance, the Romans’ failure to conquer the Parthians, despite considerable effort, obviously was not due to any lack of social complexity in Iran.

\(^{15}\) Gel. 13.25.1, Claridge, 2010.

\(^{16}\) Discussed at p. 165 above.

\(^{17}\) Caes. *Gal.* 1.47.2, 2.5.5, 6.4.6, 7.10.1-3, 7.17.2-3, 7.32.1, 7.55.1-3. He also drew heavily on local resources in supplying his armies with horses; given the importance of flexibility and rapidity in Caesar’s tactics and strategy, this must have been an important factor, even if not as crucial as food.
One final point to note is that it was not always simply a matter of waiting for a society to develop sufficiently to support its own conquest; large stretches of infertile, hilly country might be physically unsuitable for dense population or arable cultivation. This might make an economy heavily weighted towards pastoralism more attractive locally even despite the availability of the knowledge and organization necessary for large-scale agriculture. In the ancient Mediterranean, with its urban civilization largely based on fluvial plains but with many mountain ranges, closely regulating nomadic, semi-nomadic or simply isolated upland populations posed a perennial challenge.

Classical authors often show a shrewd and realistic awareness of these limitations, although they of course explained them in terms of their own theories of society and human nature. The difficulty in establishing control over people not already organized into complex social structures was imagined, from Herodotus on, as a military difficulty in conquering them, due to the hardy toughness and virile energy a frugal lifestyle was supposed to guarantee. The difficulty in maintaining close control of isolated and/or pastoral populations was often explained through environmental determinism; the direct and heritable effects on hill-peoples of hilly geography naturally made the former unruly. Both in trans-Rhenane Germany and in parts of Britain the Romans faced populations and territories that they were likely to conquer only at ruinous expense and with immense effort, if at all. I shall argue that they behaved very differently on these northwestern limits of realistically conquerable territory than they did elsewhere, especially in eastern Europe.

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18 For a discussion of a British society loosely organized as a federal kingdom but spread thinly over a wide area and sustained mostly through pastoral production, see Frere, 1987: 41-2, 61, 301-2.
19 For a comprehensive overview of the interrelation of human and natural geography and of geography and history in the ancient Mediterranean, see Semple, 1931; for a methodologically current case study of the interaction of human community and natural environment in one area of Roman Europe, see Oltean, 2007: 26-40.
21 For a detailed exploration of discourse on highlands and highlanders in Classical literature, see Isaac, 2004: 406-11.
22 For a brief but very useful general discussion of the historical, archaeological and theoretical issues concerning the Roman frontiers and their eventual location (and, incidentally, the accelerated secondary state formation they stimulated among adjacent independent populations), see Bowman et al., 2000: 311-9.
2: Germanic Resistance and Roman Persistence

The first phases of Augustus's programme of territorial expansion in western Europe, the Cantabrian Wars of the 20s and the Alpine campaigns of 15 and 14,\(^\text{23}\) in addition to their independent importance, covered the rear and flank of the much more ambitious advance from Gaul into Germany. The attempt to conquer trans-Rhenane Germany began in 12 BCE, with Drusus in charge of the initial invasion and the first four years' campaigning, mainly against the Usipetes, Sugambri, Chauci, Chatti, Marcomanni and Cherusci. Drusus reached the Elbe in 9 but died the same year after a riding accident;\(^\text{24}\) his brother Tiberius immediately replaced him and campaigned against the Sugambri in 8. The suppression of a relatively small revolt in 7 was his only noteworthy military activity that year; it might have seemed that the new territory was rapidly quietening down after the fierce resistance offered to Drusus. It was not yet, however, felt safe to impose taxation on the trans-Rhenane peoples.\(^\text{25}\)

In 6, Tiberius began his first insular retirement, on that occasion to Rhodes,\(^\text{26}\) and the absence from Germany of Julio-Claudian dynasts in the immediately subsequent years greatly reduces the volume of literary evidence on the region. Nonetheless, it would seem that there was considerable hard fighting; in particular, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus again reached and even crossed the Elbe. Towards the end of his time in Germany, a war with the Cherusci broke out, which was prosecuted for three years by his successor, M. Vinicius.\(^\text{27}\) In 4 CE, Tiberius was formally adopted by Augustus and returned to the north, where he consolidated the progress made against the Cherusci by Vinicius and apparently fought several other peoples.\(^\text{28}\)

\(^{23}\) On which see respectively Bowman et al., 1996: 163-6 and Wells, 1972: 59-89.


\(^{26}\) On Tiberius's career before his accession, see Seager, 2005: 11-39; on Tiberius more generally, see Levick 1976.


\(^{28}\) Although there are interpretative issues with the main source, Vell. 2.104-5, making Tiberius's campaigns during his second period in Germany very difficult to disentangle from Vinicius's (Wells, 1972: 159); see also Bowman et al., 1996: 183.
A serious effort was now made to regularize the administration of the vast new conquests and to constitute them as an imperial province. Around this time and certainly before the disaster across the Rhine in 9 CE, the Ara Ubiorum was dedicated in present-day Cologne. This Altar, with its associated office of high priest \((\text{sacerdos apud aram})\), strongly resembles the Ara Romae et Augusti at Lugdunum. This monument and its immensely prestigious priesthood helped to make Lugdunum, though geographically close to the boundary with Narbonensis, socially and politically central to the Tres Galliae and were ultimately important in the creation of a Gallo-Roman provincial culture. Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium, as it later became, though on the geographical boundary of the older conquests west of the Rhine, was probably intended to provide a similar administrative centre and focus for the imperial cult in a new province that was to straddle the Lower Rhine.

Also, the first governor with predominantly non-martial experience, P. Quintilius Varus, was appointed. According to the later historiographical tradition, largely sympathetic to Augustus, the retreat across the Rhine was the result of Varus’s excessively rapid measures and subsequent military incompetence. In all likelihood, however, Augustus deliberately selected a consular governor with considerable prestige but little military experience to execute his, Augustus’s, policy of regularizing the Roman occupation between the Rhine and the Elbe. The natural culmination of this provincialization of trans-Rhenane Germany was for it to become a source of revenue rather than simply an expense through the imposition of some form of regular taxation. This measure Varus duly took, with the result that a major revolt, led by the Cherusci under Arminius, was precipitated or exacerbated. In the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, three mounted \(\text{alae}\), six auxiliary \(\text{cohortes}\) and the \(\text{legiones} XVII, XVIII\) and \(XIX\) were surrounded and killed to the last man, including

\(^{29}\) On this Altar and its chronology, see Fishwick, 2002: 20-1.
\(^{30}\) On which see Fishwick, 2002: 9-19.
\(^{32}\) Drinkwater, 1983: 23.
\(^{33}\) E.g. Vell. 2.117.
Varus himself. After this crippling and unexpected defeat, the isolated vexillations and auxiliary formations left in northern Germany were quickly eliminated, with the single exception of one stationed at Aliso that succeeded in reaching the Rhine. The replacement of a loss on such a scale would have been a significant undertaking even with the rest of the frontier entirely tranquil; with Roman military manpower already strained to the utmost by the Great Illyrian Revolt of 6-9 CE, an immediate return to trans-Rhenane Germany was out of the question.

Even after this reverse, however, the Julio-Claudian drive to expand on the west European mainland was suspended rather than ended and in 11, after only one full year on the defensive, Tiberius led a large army across the Rhine. Although there may have been activity in areas next to the North Sea, there was no larger move to recover the lost ground for several years, despite Tiberius’s impatient but ineffective demonstration in 11. The first two full years of his own reign, 15 and 16, did see a resumption of offensive operations on a large scale between Rhine and Elbe. Germanicus’s army never reached the latter river but he did cross the Weser in 16 and he defeated the Cherusci in more than one pitched battle, recovering the legionary eagles from the site of the clades Variana.

The questions why and precisely when Tiberius decided not to continue a policy of reconstructing the trans-Rhenane province are complicated by the tendentious nature of Tacitus’s account of Tiberius – his approval for territorial expansion and his disapproval of Tiberius’s reign combine unhelpfully in this respect – and definite answers will almost certainly remain elusive. What is clear is that at no point during his reign did the Romans fully withdraw west of

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35 For a discussion of the difficulties in identifying this location, see Wells, 1972: 152-3.
37 On which see Bowman et al., 1996: 176-8, 184.
38 An alternative possibility is that the coastal territories had not been lost after the clades Variana and were retained continually until Germanicus’s campaigns (Wells, 1972: 240).
41 For discussions of the issue from respectively the point of view of the early imperial frontier and that of Tiberius’s career and policies, see Wells, 1972: 241-5, Seager, 2005: 61-74.
the Rhine, acknowledge their loss of all territory east of it and restrict themselves to merely punitive campaigning ever after, whatever conclusions Tiberius himself ultimately came to about the viability of trans-Rhenane expansion in the near future. Legally, the restriction of the dominion of the Roman people to territory west of the Rhine was positively rejected and considerable effort was put into maintaining a symbolic control of the right bank of the river – continuous possession of at least some minute proportion of trans-Rhenane Germany. Moreover, Tiberius at least retained and may even have established a substantial bridgehead base on the far bank of the Rhine opposite Moguntiacum; this location, facing up the valley of the Main, one of the three main invasion routes into trans-Rhenane Germany, was clearly offensive and indeed allowed Moguntiacum to be used as an offensive base for the invasion of Domitian in 83. Caligula extended the bridgehead substantially and undertook abortive preparations for a new campaign of expansion in Germany. This refusal to accept that expansion on the mainland of western Europe had come to an end was also expressed architecturally in the bases along the Rhine, initially designed to facilitate outward movement as much as to repel inward encroachment. These remained wooden under Tiberius and Caligula and stone fortresses clearly designed with a defensive attitude and fixed positions in mind only replaced them under Claudius.

Only under the Flavians was a military system established on the Rhine that was designedly static and defensive, perhaps prompted by the collapse of Roman rule on the Rhine during the year of post-Neronian civil strife that brought them to power. However, even this process began, under Vespasian, with territorial expansion that grew, under Domitian, to a substantial scale. In addition to reinforcement and re-organization of the legions along the Rhine

42 Drinkwater, 1983: 27, 55.
45 Wells, 1972: xii, 247-8. Admittedly the semi-permanent pre-Claudian imperial bases were more substantial than the temporary forts of Caesar’s highly mobile campaigns (ibid. 99) but they were nonetheless structures positioned to facilitate marching out to attack (and thus, in theory, to conquer territory), rather than ones built to facilitate resisting attack from without (and thus to defend a fixed frontier).
46 On which see Drinkwater, 1983: 40-50, 56-7 and, more generally, Morgan, 2006.
and reform of the auxiliary system, the territories known as the Agri Decumates (the Black Forest, the Taunus and the surrounding area roughly as far north as the Main)\(^{47}\) were systematically invaded and occupied. This more modest but achievable expansion and the fortification and road-building that followed it closed the strategic gap between Rhine and Danube and opened a direct line of communication between Germania Superior and Rhaetia.\(^{48}\)

Before this was finally accepted as the farthest advance of Roman power into Germany, however, there was to be one last attempt to take a larger slice of the lands beyond the Rhine. The precise extent of his ambitions are unknown and there is no reason to suppose that a new march to the Elbe was being attempted but the scale of Domitian’s campaigns against the Chatti between 83 and 85 and the persistence with which he conducted them strongly suggest that some sort of grander expansion in southern trans-Rhenane Germany was planned. What brought an end to the war and induced Domitian to resume the construction of a permanent, defensive limes enclosing, from south to north, the Agri Decumates, Superior proper and Inferior was an unforeseen diversion – the Dacian invasions of Moesia from across the Danube in 85-6.\(^{49}\)

The campaigns in Germany under Augustus and Tiberius contrasted noticeably with those in Gaul a generation earlier in the manner in which the troops were supplied. While Gaulish corn fed the armies that conquered Gaul,\(^{50}\) Roman armies in trans-Rhenane Germany, even when engaged in far-flung campaigns during the ambitious first push to the Elbe, were compelled to quarter their main strength back across the Rhine each winter.\(^{51}\) There must have been some exploitation of local resources but given that even Caesar obtained the bulk of the food that allowed him to conduct campaigns on the Rhine from central

\(^{47}\) See Map 4.


\(^{50}\) Even foraging without indigenous cooperation required there to be tilled and sown fields to seize and to reap, as in southeastern Britain, where Caesar’s invading legions were fed in precisely this way (Jiménez, 1996: 126-8); confiscating the herds of pastoralists, however forcibly, could not realistically sustain a large army.

Gaul, it is to be expected that going so much farther would lead to logistical difficulties. This cannot but have made the Trans-Rhenane campaigns more expensive and must surely have been a great impediment to consolidating control over territory won during campaigning seasons, as the course of events confirms.

Another unavoidable difficulty that would have faced Roman would-be conquerors beyond the Rhine whatever tactics or strategy they employed was migration from the Baltic, particularly from the regions later known as Jutland and Prussia. It was argued in Chapters 6 and 7 that migration and the exaggerated alarm it often provoked at Rome helped to bring about Roman expansion in Gaul itself through destabilizing existing borders. In trans-Rhenane Germany, however, a much larger proportion of the population was not settled and the scale of the movement into the region during the first centuries BCE and CE often approached invasion.\(^{52}\) The direct effects of this trend—sheer disruption and a never-ending stream of reinforcements for the Romans’ opponents—were unhelpful enough. The really fatal consequence for the early imperial Trans-Rhenane adventure is that the infrastructural deficit causing such severe logistical difficulties could be expected not only to persist over much of the area but to increase; the relentless movement seems to have led to a contraction of the area of Late La Tène material culture and the relative social complexity associated with it, especially oppida.\(^{53}\) Given such a fundamentally problematic situation for pre-industrial state expansion in the area, it is astonishing that the effort was not given up sooner. Between the Rhine and the Elbe, as beyond the Severn and Trent in subsequent decades, Roman leaders and armies, already past the limits of profitable conquest,\(^{54}\) pushed on to the limits of possible conquest with remarkable obstinacy.\(^{55}\)

\(^{52}\) Sometimes, ironically, along the same latitudinal valleys used as invasion routes from the opposite direction by the Romans (Wells, 1972: 244).


\(^{54}\) In marked contrast to eastern Europe, where the expropriation of the substantial precious metal reserves of the Dacian treasury and the exploitation of the gold deposits of the Transylvanian plateau were postponed for a half-century through determined efforts to avoid direct annexation beyond the Danube.

\(^{55}\) On the Romans’ interaction with indigenous societies around and beyond the Rhine and, those societies themselves and theoretical issues in the study of those societies, see Willems, 1986, Roymans, 1990, Bazelmans, 1991.
3: Gaulish Themes and the Roman Image of trans-Rhenane

Germany

Many factors can be proposed to explain the early emperors' extraordinary persistence despite these profoundly unfavourable conditions – most obviously the natural tendency, once the Elbe was near, to aim stubbornly for that physical barrier, the generic motives for Roman territorial expansion and sheer policy inertia once Augustus had first selected Trans-Rhenane Germany as a target. Nevertheless, as with the conquest of Gaul itself considered in the previous two chapters, I would contend that prevalent images of non-Roman western Europe and attitudes towards its inhabitants also influenced policy significantly. I shall argue that, after Caesar removed Gaul itself from the set of locations in which Roman leaders could seek military glory, the two adjacent unconquered regions of Britain and Trans-Rhenane Germany took on much of its unique aura of threat and glamour. The similar stereotypes applied to northern and/or western peoples in Classical literature since the fifth century BCE, the Roman tendency to associate most non-Roman western Europeans, even some in Spain and Italy, more or less closely with the Galls or Gaulish habits and the use of theories of enervation to link contemporary Germans and Britons explicitly to pre-conquest Galls all helped to facilitate this inheritance.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, the concept of the Germani as a major division of northern Europeans between the Galli and the eastern European and Central Asian peoples was a Latin innovation in Classical ethnography in which Caesar played a major part. He succeeded, by and large, in imposing his view of northwest European human geography on subsequent Latin literature and even some Greek texts written from a Roman perspective, most importantly Strabo's Гερμανία. Where he failed was in his attempt to fix

57 Whom Classical authors tended to conflate, especially by means of the almost uniquely broad category of the Skythian ("Seythae"/"Σκόθαι" etc.), which could equally include a kingdom in what is now Rumania and Ukraine and nomadic peoples encountered by the Achaemenids in present-day Uzbekistan (Hdt. 1.201).
forever the ethnographic line between Galli and Germani at the Rhine. At Gal. 2.3.4, 2.4.10, 6.32.1, even Caesar felt compelled to admit that some Germanic peoples – Condrusi, Eburones, Caerosi, Paemani, Segni – lived west of the Rhine; he took care both to omit this complication in his introduction of the Gallo-Germanic distinction at 1.1.4 and to elide it in the ethnographic digression at 6.11-28, in which the river is reaffirmed as the boundary between the two nationes. As discussed above, the short-lived Augustan proto-province across the Rhine seems not to have only included much territory in Gallia Belgica but to have had its prospective capital west of the river. Ultimately, two extensive territories were detached from eastern and northeastern Belgica as the Upper and Lower German provinces. Germania Superior even included the lands of the Helvetii and the Sequani, both, according to Caesar, among the main victims of German attacks on the Gauls and the former among those resisting most forcefully.

Caesar’s image of Cis-Rhenane Galli who belonged to the Romans and utterly dissimilar, Trans-Rhenane Germani who would likely never belong to them was closely related to the Rhine frontier of his Comatan conquests; that image was unnecessary, even counterproductive, while an attempt was being made to abolish that frontier and replace it with a more ambitious one. A particularly instructive example of this connection between ethnographic categorization and geopolitical delimitation is provided by Tacitus. At Ger. 29.4, he stated explicitly that the inhabitants of the Agri Decumates, beyond the Rhine and Upper Danube but under Roman rule, were Gaulish. This statement was not an attempt to justify past aggression or advocate future expansion; the Flavian frontier system, in the establishment of which the conquest of the Agri Decumates was an important step, Tacitus, like most post-Flavian authors, consistently ignored or obscured. It does, however, illustrate how the military and political dividing line selected by the Roman state became a compelling place for Latin literature to draw an ethnographic line, indeed more attractive in that respect than a supposedly natural frontier like the river.

58 Drinkwater, 1983: 60.
59 Gal. 1.1.4 on the Helvetii, 1.31 on the Sequani.
Caesar’s implausibly neat ethnographic distinction, then, with its implication that to cross the Rhine was to travel instantly from a world of oppida to one of nomads, was not accepted. His portrayal of contemporary Germans as the true heirs of the fierce, frugal and restless past generations of Gauls, on the other hand, was. This capacity of sets of stereotypes to migrate from one region to another in the Classical literary imagination was examined in Chapter 4. Ammianus’s acceptance of Caesar’s claims, especially the increase in retention of ancestral vigour with distance from the Mediterranean, is a striking example of his enduring influence in this respect. The accounts by Suetonius and Dio of Augustus’s reaction to the clades Variana pertain more immediately to Julio-Claudian policy:

hac nuntiata excubias per urbiem indixit ne quis tumultus existeret et praesidibus provinciarum propagauerit imperium, ut a peritis et assuetis socii continerentur. uouit et magnos ludos Ioui Optimi Maximo si res p. in meliorem statum uerisset quod factum Cimbrico Marsicoque bello erat. adeo denique consternatum ferunt ut per continuos menses barba capilloque summisso caput interdum foribus illideret uociferans: “Quintili Uare legiones redde” diemque cladis quotannis maestum habuerit ac lugubrem. (Suet. Aug. 23)

This having been reported, [Augustus] ordered a watch on the City, lest some tumult occur, and prolonged the command of the governors of the provinces, in order that the subject-allies be restrained by those experienced with them and familiar to them. He vowed Great Games to Jove Optimus Maximus, should the state be returned to a better condition, which had been done only in the Cimbric and in the Marsic War. Indeed, so dismayed was he that, they say, his beard and hair having been let grow long for months on end, occasionally he would beat his head against a door crying ‘Quintilius Varus, return my legions!’ and annually he treated the day of the disaster as inauspicious and lugubrious.

tóte δὲ μαθὼν ὁ Αὐγούστος τὰ τῷ Οὐάρῳ συμβεβηκότα τὴν τε ἐσθήτα ὡς τινὲς φασὶ περιερρήξατο καὶ πένθος μέγα ἐπὶ τέ τοὺς ἀπολογοντὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τέ τῶν Γερμανιῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν Γαλατιῶν δέει ἐποίησατο τὸ

60 Discussed at pp. 133-4 above.
And then Augustus, having learnt what had happened to Varus, rent his clothes, as some say, and a great distress afflicted him, concerning the soldiers lost and in that he feared for the Germanics and the Gauls and, most greatly, in that he expected them to move against Italy and Rome itself ... And finally, as very many were not even then taking heed of him, he executed some. And he chose by lot as many as he could both from those already having served and from the freedmen and, once he had enrolled them sent them in haste with Tiberius to Germany. And since many Galatai and Keltoi, [i.e. respectively Gauls and Germans]61 were in Rome, some living there and some in the Strategic Guard [i.e. corporis custodes Germanici],62 he feared lest they revolt and these he sent off to some islands while those unarmed he ordered to leave the City.

Tactically, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest was a devastating defeat for a substantial Roman army and strategically it would prove a turning point in the effort to conquer to the Elbe. This does not, however, explain the extraordinary reaction it provoked, as even a momentary historical comparison makes clear. Local defeats of broadly similar scale and severity inflicted by Dacian armies, discussed in Chapter 10, would produce no such paroxysm at the imperial centre; Arminius’s rebellion posed considerably less real strategic difficulty for Augustus’s programme of European expansion than the contemporary Great Illyrian Revolt;63 it did not compare remotely in either scale or consequence to his own past struggles against Roman and Hellenistic

61 Dio’s insistence on this usage (less confusing in a Greek historiographical context than it seems in English) was discussed at p. 19 above.
rivals. Sincere concern on the part of such a shrewd and experienced strategist for the security of the City itself is only comprehensible in terms of Roman anxieties about a Gaulish Sack both beginning and ending imperial history. If this Gaulish prism through which post-Caesarian Germany was viewed is taken into account, it becomes easier to explain why it was only finally accepted three quarters of a century later that expansion there had ground to an irreversible halt.

Although most of the evidence considered in this study has been of aristocratic origin, there have been several strong indications that the attitudes encountered in Latin literature had a broader purchase in Roman society, for instance the *Pro Fonteio* and the electoral response to the Cimbric War. The widespread public panic apparently caused at Rome by the minor Gaulish revolt of 21 CE, confirms that popular hypersensitivity to disturbances in and around Gaul persisted into Julio-Claudian times. The unique public relief and gratitude that one would therefore expect to accrue from victory in the northwest of the Empire is another reason why early imperial strategy in Europe was so consistently skewed in that direction.

Further evidence both of the assimilation of contemporary Germans to the (pre-Caesarian) Gauls in the Roman imagination and of continuing unease about the northwest is provided by Tacitus's account of the Batavian Revolt. It is telling that he complains that the ignorant (*imperitos*) worried that the reduction due to drought in the Rhine, the defensive barrier ordained by Nature, indicated divine displeasure or even portended an evil fate (*fatum*) for the Empire; more interesting still is the reaction ascribed to the more superstitious on the opposing side to the fire on the Capitol in 69 CE in the final stage of the Flavian-Vitellian struggle:

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64 On Augustus's rise to power within the Roman Mediterranean, see, e.g., Shotter, 2005: 20-38 and of course Syme, 1939.
65 For additional analysis of the episode, in particular the distinctively Gaulish symbolism of the omens reported in connection with it, see Williams, 2001: 179-80.
66 Discussed above at respectively pp. 71-4, 114-5 and p. 181.
67 Tac. *Ann.* 3.44.
nam Civilis omissa dissimulatione in populum Romanum ruere ...
Galli sustulerant animos eandem ubique exercituum nostrorum fortunam rati ...
... sed nihil aequo quam incendium Capitolii ut finem imperio adesse crederent impulerat. captam olim a Gallis urbe sed integra Iovis sede manisse imperium. fatali nunc igne signum caelestis irae datum et possessionem rerum humanarum Transalpinis gentibus portendi superstitione vani Druidae canebant (Hist. 4.54).69

For Civilis, having discarded pretence, was making war on the Roman people ... the Gauls’ spirits rose, believing the fate of our armies to be the same everywhere [i.e. defeat] ... but nothing caused them to believe the end of the Empire to be at hand as much as the burning of the Capitol. Formerly, the City had been captured by the Gauls but, the seat of Jove being intact, the Empire endured. Now, the Druids sang, prophesying a vain superstition, that this fatal fire gave a sign of the anger of Heaven and the coming possession of the affairs of humanity by the Transalpine races.

The ascription to foreign peoples of familiarity with and belief in Classical protohistory and myth – in this case Brennus’s Sack of Rome, the inviolacy during that episode of Jupiter’s citadel, the Capitol and the prophetic link between the fate of the Temple and that of the Roman people – was nothing new.70 What is noteworthy is the distinctively Gaulish associations of the legends referred to and of the account as a whole. Earlier in the Historiae, Tacitus had referred to Civilis’s leadership of all Germany (Universa Germania) and mentioned the Trans-Rhenane intruders (Transrhenanos) he had allowed across the disintegrating frontier.71 In the passage quoted above, this is taken farther still and Trans-Rhenane migrants, provincial Lower Germans and the Gauls are all united in the supposedly self-conscious category of the Transalpine races (Transalpinis gentibus). Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the appearance of the Druids,72 whose utter absence from

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69 For further discussion of this passage and its place in the history of thought and writing on the Capitol, see Williams, 2001: 177.
70 Indeed, Classical historiography quite literally began with such an imputation, Herodotus’s claim at 1.1-5 that the Persians and Phoenicians explained the Greco-Persian Wars with reference to Io, Europa and Helen.
71 Tac. Hist. 4.28.
72 Itself something of an anachronism, decades after their suppression under Tiberius and Claudius.
Germany was one of Caesar’s clearest Gallo-Germanic distinctions. There could hardly be a clearer expression of the wholesale transposition of the complex of anxieties and stereotypes associated with the *Galli* to unconquered (or, as in this case, rebellious) *Germani*. Moreover, Tacitus’s very suspicion of the story – natural enough from a broadly sceptical author, especially several decades after Roman history’s conspicuous failure to end – supports its authenticity.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the distinction between *Galli* and *Germani* is drawn quite clearly, though not in the authorial voice, when the pacification of the Roman Rhineland is related. Far from a counterexample, however, this is precisely the point; although neither *Britanni/Britones* nor *Germani* were ever considered *Galli/Celtae* as such by Latin authors, unpleasant memories of the latter were consistently aroused when, and for the most part only when, they challenged the Romans effectively.

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74 Its authenticity as a fearful story told and believed by Romans at the time of Batavian Revolt, that is; I certainly do not mean to suggest that the account’s content was itself accurate.

75 For Caesar’s influential version of the developed ethnographic picture of the region, see Map 1.
9: Territorial Policy on the Rhine after Caesar: Gaulish Images, British Realities

Although there were to be vigorous if geographically limited expansionist efforts beyond the Rhine in the years after Vespasian’s victory, the most ambitious Flavian attempts to conquer in Europe, like the most successful Julio-Claudian attempts to do so, were in Britain, where the end of expansion was not accepted until well into the second century. Early imperial British policy, I shall argue, exhibits very similar behaviour and attitudes, providing additional evidence of the overall pattern that I propose as an explanation.

1: Following Caesar Across the Channel

Tacitus’s assessment of the geopolitical consequences of Caesar’s British adventure – that he *Britanniam ... ostendisse posteris, non tradidisse*¹ (‘showed, not bestowed, Britain to his successors’) – was of course accurate.² Nonetheless, the eventual failure of the expeditions should not obscure their military scale. For two years, 55 and 54, Caesar was heavily pre-occupied with his project of Oceanic conquest and the course of the Gallic War during this period was largely dictated by that overriding ambition. For the second invasion, in 54, five legions and mounted auxiliaries were carried to Britain by 600 transport vessels, the largest single military force to cross the Channel in either direction before the First World War.³ And, unlike Caesar’s demonstrations on the Rhine, territorial aggrandizement as such was the intended outcome; the language used in the *Commentarii* to describe the results of the second invasion is that of the establishment of new provincial territory⁴ and the unprecedented thanksgiving at Rome after the first⁵ clearly indicates that the impression of events received there, however premature, was of conquest and not merely victory. Despite the immense logistical and strategic

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¹ Tac. *Ag.* 13.2-3.
² More or less; for qualifying arguments in this respect, see Creighton, 2000.
⁴ Frere, 1987: 27.
difficulties caused by Roman unfamiliarity with Atlantic weather and the British coast, Caesar doggedly persisted in Britain until he received formal submissions. Although the consolidation of these very hard-won gains was prevented by the great rebellions in Gaul beginning in late 54 and then by the civil war of 49-45, it was undoubtedly his firm intention at the time to enforce the terms of surrender vigorously.

Augustus was initially undecided as to whether to follow Caesar across the Channel and expeditions seem to have been planned on at least three occasions, in 34, 28 and 27 BCE. Although the strength necessary for a new British adventure proved unavailable due to more urgent military commitments against Antony and then on the Elbe and Danube, vigorous attempts were nevertheless made by Augustus and also Tiberius to influence events on the island indirectly. Caligula attempted to avail of the opportunity for intervention provided in 40 CE by the exiled Catuvellaunian prince Adminius son of Cunobelinus but was obstructed by a mutiny among the troops he assembled at Gesoricum (Boulogne).

Only three years later, in 43 under Claudius, an invasion was actually undertaken, with the Catuvellauni its principal opponents. A. Plautius, a consul suffect in 29, led the expedition and defeated Adminius’s brothers, Togodumnus and Caratacus, killing the former in action. Claudius visited Britain to oversee his forces’ entry into Camulodunum (Colchester), the principal eastern Catuvellaunian settlement, and to receive formal submissions from several British rulers. The expansion of agriculture, trade, proto-urban settlements and coinage under culturally Belgic kings in southeastern Britain before Caesar had continued after his departure, soon accelerated by increased

10 Frere, 1987: 44-5; Claudius’s generals overcame a very similar mutiny with difficulty three years later (Frere, 1987: 48). Incidentally, both provide additional evidence of real and popular, rather than merely literary and aristocratic, fear of the northwest and its inhabitants, though in this case perhaps due more to concern about the impiety and danger of entering the outer world of Oceanus and Tethys – cf. Flor. Epit. 1.33.12 – than to (specifically) Gaulish anxieties.
trade with the Romans. This facilitated the maintenance of a substantial garrison after 43 and the administration of conquered territory, especially in the southeast. The capitulation of British leaders was also encouraged by the very generous terms that Claudius initially offered, in effect client kingship. In the case of Cartimandua, the queen of the Brigantes in the Pennine neck of the island, a client regime may well have been his sincere purpose; as subsequent policy made clear, however, a wide area very roughly coextensive with lowland England was intended for provincial annexation and this was to cause difficulties later on.

2: British Resistance and Roman Persistence

After Claudius’s departure, his legions advanced north and west from Camulodunum, executing these arrangements and pursuing Caratacus, who had retreated westwards. Vespasian, then legate of the legio II Augusta, advanced along the south coast, seizing Vectis (Wight) and conquering most of the Aremorican-influenced Durotriges and Dumnonii of what is now the West Country. The occupation of this hilly peninsula was the earliest and easiest Roman expansion into an upland region of Britain. By the time of Plautius’s departure in 47, the contiguous lowland proto-province described above had, for the most part, been occupied. The invasion of what is now Wales the next year by P. Ostorius Scapula was undertaken partly in pursuit of Caratacus, who lead or assisted the resistance there of the Silures and then the Ordovices. Thirteen years of hard fighting under Ostorius and his successors as governor, A. Didius Gallus, Q. Veranius Nepos and C. Suetonius Paullinus, saw Caratacus captured in 51 and the military operations extended onto the island.
of Mona (Anglesey), the site of a major religious sanctuary under Ordovician protection.

However, in 61 Suetonius was forced to abandon this endeavour and return to the southeast by the outbreak of Boudica's great rebellion there. Claudius's concession of (temporarily) continued independence within provincial territory to kingdoms like that of the Iceni had postponed rather than averted their resistance to annexation. This accounts for the extraordinary scale and slaughter of the revolt under Nero, which can be seen more as the long-delayed second phase of the Roman conquest than as a provincial rising; Roman strength on the island was devoted almost entirely to reconquest in the southeast and many of the recently subjugated peoples in the mountains and valleys of the far west promptly reasserted their independence. However, it was around this time and probably before rather than after the insurrection in the east that the conquest of Dumnonia begun by Vespasian was completed through the occupation of its southwestern tip, modern Cornwall.

In its original, lowland form, Provincia Britannia was bordered on the north by the more mountainous and largely pastoral territory of the Brigantes, roughly corresponding to the North of England. During the long reign of the client queen Cartimandua, the territorially vast but very loose Brigantian kingdom was held together through a combination of her own dominating influence and several Roman interventions to maintain her position. In 69, however, her intermittent seventeen-year struggle against Venutius, her anti-Roman former consort, finally ended in defeat. The response of the Roman

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16 The name (cf. modern Welsh “Môn”) had previously been applied to Man, which by the middle of the first century CE Classical authors denoted by “Monapia” or variants thereof. On the changing use of these names, see Caes. Gal. 5.13.3, Plin, Nat. 2.187, Tac. Ag. 14.4, Cancik & Schneider 2000a: 351-2.


19 The plan behind the unusual settlement, one can only presume, was that after a few years, once a functioning province had been constructed around the remaining de facto client kingdoms, they would have little option but to accept their own provincialization, in particular disarmament; in the event, violent reaction to the imposition of such measures began, at first on a smaller scale, as early as the tenure of Ostorius (Frere, 1987: 60-1).

20 Although this is far from certain; the purely archaeological nature of the evidence (on which see Frere, 1987: 76, Fox & Ravenhill, 1972) in this case makes chronological precision impossible.

21 On whom see Howarth, 2009.
state, under the Flavians, to this contraction of its influence on the island was northward expansion of the directly administered province. Q. Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus, governor from 71 to 74, and Cn. Julius Agricola, then legate of legio XX Valeria Victrix, overran most of Brigantia. Cerialis’s successor, Sex. Julius Frontinus, followed this expansion in the north with a westward drive during his tenure from 74 to 78. He resumed the conquest of what is now Wales that had been thwarted by Boudica, invading and systematically conquering the region from south to north and finally defeating the Silures. In 78, Agricola, returning to the island as governor, built on Frontinus’s methodical work, defeating the Ordovices and repeating Suetonius’s invasion of Mona.

Cerialis had routed the forces of Venutius and destroyed the Brigantian kingdom as a functioning polity but, perhaps diverted by Silurian raiding in the south, had left the bulk of its enormous former territory ungarrisoned. The first of the northward campaigns for which Tacitus was to make Agricola the most famous Roman governor of Britain therefore involved the systematic occupation of the lands of the Brigantes in 79. This march probably ended around the Tyne-Solway isthmus that had approximately delimited Brigantian royal power, extending effective provincial rule over most of what is now the North of England. The second and third campaigns, in 80 and 81, halted on the Forth-Clyde isthmus, overrunning much of what is now the Scottish Lowlands, though bypassing the Novantae of the southwesterly Ayrshire-Galloway peninsula. The Novantae themselves were subjugated and the flank of the earlier advance thereby secured in Agricola’s fourth campaign the next year.

21 Frere, 1987: 86.
24 For the purposes of the present discussion, “Scottish Lowlands” refers to the region between the Clyde-Forth and Solway-Tyne lines (later followed by the Walls of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius), and excludes the north-east lowlands.
Tacitus's *De Vita et Moribus Julii Agricolae* combines a familial loyalty to Agricola with an, at best, ambiguous political attitude towards the reign of Domitian. Perhaps in part as a result of these broader factors, Agricola's struggle to complete the conquest of Britain is contrasted with Domitian's personally motivated measures to restrain him. It seems clear, however, that the great effort to extend Roman power north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus was actually the deliberate policy of the Flavian government in Rome, though presumably policy of which Agricola heartily approved. The two campaigns of 83 and 84 against the Caledonian Confederation culminated in a victory at Mons Graupius. Agricola had used his fleet as an integral part of his invading forces in these campaigns and had also sent an expedition around the northern edge of Britain to survey the area to be conquered and to verify that it was an island; though not entirely implausible, Tacitus's claim that his father-in-law invaded the Orcades (Orkney), like the assertion that Agricola advocated an invasion of Ireland, is impossible to confirm.

Although tactically the victory was a rare feat in itself, it was dwarfed by the strategic challenges of holding such a large, distant and topographically difficult territory from which no significant revenue could realistically have been extracted for some time. Greco-Roman civic local administration, even in a heavily modified form like that of the Three Gauls, would have been a distant dream; the immediate prospect was of a permanent military occupation requiring manpower not much less than that of the initial invasion force.29


30 For a detailed account of the Flavian far north, including critical re-examination of the roles of Tacitus's account and recent archaeological discoveries, see Woolliscroft & Hoffmann, 2006. This work seeks to use archaeological discoveries to complement the historical sources, principally Tacitus, by considering the information from the Gask Ridge in Perthshire. It is argued (especially at 176, 193 and 211) that in several details of chronology and geography, there has been a scholarly over-reliance on the *Agricola* and that archaeological discoveries can contradict Tacitus's narrative in several cases.


32 The latter claim is certainly strengthened by Agricola's hosting an exiled Irish leader (*Ag.* 24), perhaps to play a role like that of Dermot MacMurrough in 1169 were an invasion to be undertaken.

33 On Agricola's coordinated use of naval and military force, an unusual approach given the traditional Roman military focus on heavy infantry, see Frere, 1987: 94-5.

34 On the occupying army in northern Britain at this time and its infrastructure, including a short-lived legionary base at Inchtuthil, see Somerset Fry, 1984: 84-7, Frere, 1987: 100, 142, 144.
Whether this would have been practicable concurrently with the ongoing occupation of Wales, Brigantia and the Lowlands even under ideal conditions it is impossible to say; when troops were urgently required from western Europe to drive the invading Dacians out of Moesia, Domitian made the inevitable decision with respect to Caledonia, even if not as eagerly as Tacitus was to claim.

Even after the departure of the legio II Adiutrix for eastern Europe, however, Britain still had an immense legionary and auxiliary garrison, most of it in the least profitable parts of the island, and a very substantial effort was made under Domitian and Nerva to maintain the occupation north of Brigantia. An extensive system of new forts and fortlets was constructed to hold the new conquests, older facilities were refurbished at considerable expense and, although the details are irretrievable, a great deal of blood was clearly spilt in fighting rebels south of the Forth-Clyde isthmus and/or Caledonii from north of it. Even Trajan did not withdraw immediately but an evacuation of the Lowlands was ordered a few years into his reign, perhaps in connection with his Dacian Wars of 101-2 and 105-6. The line to which the occupying troops retreated did not closely follow the route of the future Wall but it was clearly in the area of the Tyne-Solway isthmus. The delineation and construction of the limes that would eventually develop into the great Wall was ordered by Hadrian in 122. Although this was somewhat to the south of the Trajanic frontier, it was still a forward position, indeed a very ambitious and costly one. One of its most important functions was to divide unquiet populations north of its line from almost equally unquiet populations south of it and, more broadly, to facilitate the surveillance and control of northern Brigantia. This dual purpose helps to explain why an area in no way crucial for the Empire’s own survival like the long frontier on the European mainland was the site of the most heavily fortified of all Roman limites.

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36 On which see Breeze & Dobson, 2000.
However, this still was not fully accepted as the limit of Roman expansion in northwestern Europe. Antoninus Pius seems to have ordered a return to the offensive almost on his accession and by 143 the governor Q. Lollius Urbicus had prepared and mounted an invasion of the Lowlands, though immediately halting around the Forth-Clyde isthmus unlike Agricola.\textsuperscript{40} The Antonine Wall built to mark and hold this new border was of turf rather than stone, resembling the German \textit{limes} more than Hadrian’s Wall,\textsuperscript{41} but the expansionist intention was clear; even if the Flavian attempt to unite the island had proven over-ambitious, a concentrated effort was nonetheless being made to hold and to pacify the Lowlands in addition to Brigantia. This advance in Britain was Antoninus’s only notable warlike glory and he clung to the territory with remarkable tenacity for the remainder of his long reign, despite equally tenacious native resistance; the occupying army in northern Britain was even reinforced with troops from the vital German frontier.\textsuperscript{42} This was made all the more difficult by vigorous rebellion among the Brigantes, who, no longer closely supervised from Hadrian’s Wall, could once again coordinate insurrection with their traditional allies to the northwest, the Carvetii and Selgovae. Only under Verus and Marcus Aurelius were the Lowlands finally evacuated.\textsuperscript{43}

A remarkable and consistent feature of the history of Roman expansion in Britain is the determination of emperors and governors to enlarge the Roman dominion on the island long before territory they had already occupied was secure, let alone pacified or productive. The initial push beyond the easier terrain of lowland England was premature enough, as Boudica’s career was to demonstrate. What really requires explanation, however, is the Flavian and Antonine perseverance in expansion into present-day Scotland – at one time with the almost Caesarian goal of conquering the entire insular landmass –

\textsuperscript{41} On the nature and operation of the Anontine Wall, see Frere, 1987: 127-32, Mattingly, 2006: 121-2, 154-5, 159.
\textsuperscript{42} Frere, 1987: 134-41.
when large, restive populations farther south and west remained defiant and stood astride the flank and rear of the northward advance. The literary and archaeological record of rebellion in Wales provides one illustration of this point.\(^4\) The initial, bloody decade of crawling forwards valley by valley and the rapid reversal of this advance as a result of Boudica's revolt gave early and striking notice of the effort that would be required to subdue upland Britain. Nevertheless, as soon as the situation in the southeast and the north allowed it, Roman power, now under Flavian direction, returned to Snowdonia and even to Anglesey. The military occupation that followed was still felt necessary even during the Antonine reconquest of the Lowlands; given that rebellion continued until perhaps the end of the second century, this was not an over-cautious assessment.

Moreover, not only was the northward march beyond the Trent begun and continued while the large occupied area west of the Severn was still unquiet, within northern Britain the attempts were often made to advance the frontier farther while territory behind it was hardly more peaceful than that beyond it. The subjugation of the Brigantes began even before the post-Boudican reconquest of Wales and the duration of their resistance thereafter is perhaps the single most striking illustration in Britain of the limits to the Romans' capacity to consolidate territorial gains.\(^5\) They rebelled around the start of Hadrian's reign, perhaps contributing to his decision to adopt a more defensive posture in Britain. Another substantial rising occurred in 154, seriously hampering the Antonine adventure in the Lowlands, and continued restiveness in the Carvetian and northwest Brigantian highlands of what is now Cumbria certainly helped to make that re-occupation ultimately untenable. The Brigantes also participated actively in the temporary collapse of Roman rule in

\(^4\) For the details of the conquest, reconquest and protracted occupation involved in the long pacification of Roman Wales as well as the resistance to those processes, see Nash-Williams, 1954, Frere, 1987: 60-70, 86-9, 135, 144-6, 155, 167-9.

\(^5\) On the Roman pacification of the Pennine region over a century and a half, from the first invasion to the establishment of Eboracum (York) as a colonia, see Frere, 1987: 82-5, 90, 111, 133, 136, 143-6, 155, 171; on Roman Brigantia in general, see Branigan, 1980.
northern Britain due to the civil wars stemming from Commodus’s assassination and the Year of Five Emperors.\textsuperscript{46}

The detailed history of the occupation of northern and western Britain tentatively derived from the archaeology of its forts, fortlets, walls and roads often reveals direct competition between different areas of activity; the military blanket, as it were, was insufficient for the vast and difficult area assigned to it and could be shifted to cover one trouble spot only through leaving another zone exposed, risking an outbreak there. There is evidence of the impossibility of manning both Walls simultaneously, competition between the mural and the regional garrisons and similar competition between regions.\textsuperscript{47}

This crippling slowness in pacifying and evacuating territories after invading them was due in part to the logistical difficulties inevitably facing a Mediterranean power conducting operations on an Atlantic island under ancient technological and organizational conditions. The topographically difficult nature of the land being occupied must also have played a part. The economies of these areas were overwhelmingly pastoral\textsuperscript{48} and state structures, though clearly present, at least in Brigantia, were very weak. Moreover, Roman leaders were ignorant of none of these factors. Accounts of British expeditions strongly emphasize the country’s geographical remoteness in the Encircling Ocean.\textsuperscript{49} The following, not entirely inaccurate, remark by Caesar demonstrates a similar, if crude, awareness of the nature of the economy and society of non-southeastern Britain:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ex his omnibus longe sunt humanissimi qui Cantium incolunt, quae regio est maritima omnis, neque multum a Gallica differunt consuetudine. interiores plerique frumenta non serunt sed lacte et carne uiuunt pellibusque sunt vestiti.} (Gal. 5.14.1-2)
\end{quote}

Of all these [Britons] by far the most civilized are those who inhabit Cantium [the Kentish peninsula], which region is wholly maritime, nor do

\textsuperscript{46} On which see Hekster & Zair, 2008: 3-4, 12, Bowman et al., 2005: 1-4.
\textsuperscript{47} Frere, 1987: 138, 114 and 136 respectively.
\textsuperscript{49} Not every Latin author even regarded the Atlantic islanders as inhabiting, strictly speaking, the same world (\textit{orbis}) as that which had Italy at its political and geographical centre (e.g. Flor. \textit{Epit.} 1.45.16).
they differ much in conduct from Gaulish ways. Those inland [i.e. west and/or north] mostly do not sow corn but survive on milk and meat and are clothed in skins.

For centuries, Classical thinkers had, if anything, exaggerated and stereotyped both the difficulties of managing hill-peoples and those of cornering and subduing hunters and herders. Clearly, the defeat and permanent subjugation of the large, pastoral populations of the western and northern uplands cannot have been expected to be easy.

3: Gaulish Themes and the Roman Image of Britannia

In short, upland Britain, like trans-Rhenane Germany, was at that time a fundamentally unfavourable area for pre-industrial state expansion, especially for a power based on the European mainland. The quantities of blood and treasure that successive Roman leaders were willing to expend in pursuit of such expansion raises the question of what exactly the enduring appeal of Snowdonian and Pennine highlands and craggy Caledonian islands was. Economic motives have often been proposed for the Roman invasion of Britain. There can be little doubt that they contributed to the attention paid to the island up to 43 – the Oceanic islands were assumed to be rich in pearls and Irish gold exported through Britain may have given the latter a reputation for abundance in that metal – but a different explanation is required for the century of stubbornly pushing westwards and northwards within Britain from 48. Not only were the riches Britain actually yielded distinctly disappointing but the areas subjected to the more perplexing invasions and reinvasions were the poorest, as was clear already to Caesar, even with his rather hazy picture of non-southeastern British geography.

As with the attempt to expand beyond the Rhine, part of the answer is the understandable propensity, having initially crossed the Severn and the Trent, to push on to what might have seemed the next naturally stable position,

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50 Bowman et al., 1996: 506.
in this case the opposite coast or, later and less ambitiously, the Forth-Clyde line. But, again as with trans-Rhenane Germany, the aggressive persistence described above is, in my view, explained only partially by the desire for cartographic elegance; Roman ideas about northwest European peoples were at least as important a factor. Specifically, I shall argue that the Germans’ inheritance of the position occupied in the Roman imagination by the Gauls before their conquest was, to some extent, shared with the Britons.

In Caesar’s digression on Britain and the Britons at 5.12-4 he described them almost exclusively in relation to Gaul and the Gauls. He claimed that a large part of the population of the island was descended from migrating Belgae. He described British customs, in particular their manner of dwelling, as similar to Gaulish ones. While Spain, Ireland (Hibernia) and Germany were each mentioned once, solely to relate their (supposed) spatial relationship, otherwise Gaul was consistently the point of reference; in discussing Britain’s flora and its climate, the comparison or contrast was to those of Gaul and space was also made in the very brief British ethnography for some description of maritime trade with Gaul.

Tacitus’s British ethnography at Ag. 10-3 pertains more directly to the far northern campaigning of greatest interest for present purposes. He concurred with Caesar on the question of Belgic descent and claimed that the similar climates of Gaul and Britain would also tend naturally to produce similar national characteristics. As his account was much more detailed and was based on incomparably more accurate information, it did not rely on Gaul as a point of reference and comparison for inessential details to the same extent as Caesar’s; however, the content of his account went much farther in its description of the Britons’ habits as similar to the Gauls’. In particular, there is no qualifying remark about the resemblance being restricted to, or even more

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52 Not, as discussed at pp. 34-8 above, an uncontroversial assertion in Classical historiography; prehistoric movement was sometimes alleged in the other direction, with the most ancient roots of the Gaulish race located in the Oceanic islands.

53 In brief, he pictured the Iberian peninsula as bending to the west or northwest from its Pyrenean junction with Gaul rather than southwest and imagined Britain as a triangle with one side facing Spain (with Ireland half way between the two), one facing Gaul and the longest side facing out into the Ocean.
noticeable in the southeast. Tacitus, unlike Caesar, stated that the Brythonic language was similar to Gaulish and, again unlike Caesar, claimed that ritual practices on the island closely resembled Gaulish religion. Most interesting of all for the present study is the explicit comparison of contemporary Britons, especially those still independent, to past generations of Galls, before the latter people had been conquered, pacified and enervated. Past generations of Galls, every Roman reader could have been expected to know, were supposed to have been the earliest, worst and most persistent enemies of their people.

That thinking of conquest in Britain as a repeat of the (nobly necessary and comfortingly successful) conquest of Gaul was no merely literary conceit is strongly suggested by the administrative system set up by the Romans to succeed military occupation in pacified districts. An essentially cantonal system was employed, under which, in lieu of the townships (coloniae, municipia etc.) of most Roman provinces, territorially extensive entities — civitates peregrinae — with multiple centres subordinate to a local capital were treated as if they were themselves gigantic municipalities; these entities were then accorded autonomy, to a degree carefully varied from one canton to the next, determined as with more conventional provincial communities, according to status, favour, loyalty and the adoption of Roman habits. Locally self-governing communities within the territory of a civitas (vici etc.), including but not restricted to the capital town, answered to the leaders of the civitas rather than directly to the imperial government, despite being structurally far closer to real municipia like those of Italy.

The most obvious analogue for this distinctly unusual distribution of local power within provincial territory is the civitas system of the Tres Galliae. In Dacia, for instance, conquered by Trajan early in the second century,

54 Not, given the attitudes to the latter described at pp. 123, 126 above, a compliment to the former.
55 On the establishment and operation of the civitas system in Britain, see Frere, 1987: 189-94. On its Augustan origins in Gaul, see Drinkwater, 1983: 21-2, 103-11. For the locations of the civitates of Roman Britain, see Map 5.
56 On the formation, growth and later contraction of the urban society of civitas capitals, coloniae and Londinium within this cantonal and provincial administrative system, and its interaction with that system, see Wacher, 1995.
57 Perhaps not incidentally, a cantonal system was also introduced in the Agri Decumates, the Romans' one substantial possession in trans-Rhenane Germany, with, for instance, a Civitas Sueborum (Drinkwater, 1983: 61). Naturally the formerly Belgic civitates of the Cis-Rhenane Two Germanies,
a cantonal system was not used to organize the resulting new province. The reason for the adoption of this approach in Britain was not, most certainly, that British conditions simply suited it better than other late additions to the Empire. On the contrary, it more resembles the (only partially successful) imposition of a system perfectly designed for Gaulish circumstances on a territory in which awkwardly different circumstances actually obtained. As La Tène proto-urbanism had not proceeded nearly so far in Britain as in Gaul and the British civitates were significantly less stable politically, there was much more of a role for colonial cities than in Gaul; this resulted in conventional coloniae like Colonia Domitiana Lindensium (Lincoln) and municipia like Verulamium (St Albans) becoming enclaves stuck untidily within or between, but independent of, sprawling civitates like that of the Coritani or Catuvellaunii. In some areas, entirely new civitates had to be carved out of excessively large dynastic entities or, conversely, scraped together in areas with no traditional of a single native authority. Also different was the predominant type of organization at the top of pre-Roman society; despite many Gauls' willingness to follow Vercingetorix as a last resort to avoid subjugation, entrenched oligarchies were in internal control of civitates in most of Gaul, including its wealthy core, sometimes through almost Classical institutions like the office of vergobret. The conversion of these Gaulish elites (once thoroughly purged of uncooperative individuals and factions) into decurial civic aristocracies, in most cases still ruling the same civitates, was ultimately not too drastic a change. In Britain, however, monarchs like Cunobelinus, Cartimandua and Boudica were more common, leading to inconvenience and delay in the

such as the Sequani, continued without interruption despite their German status after the Flavian reforms.

58 Oltean, 2007: 226-7 explains this with reference to the unified kingdom in operation in pre-Roman Dacia. While I do not wish to dispute this, it somewhat misses the point. It is unsurprising that the former Dacian kingdom was treated, administratively if not demographically, more or less as every other annexed large kingdom was; what stands in need of explanation is why Britain was not organized in the usual manner.

59 On citizen and Latin, as distinct from peregrine, communities in Roman Britain, see Frere, 1987: 189-90.

60 Which office is known to have continued for some time under Roman rule in some civitates, sometimes later made collegiate, like an Italian municipal duumvirate (derived, ultimately, from the collegial consulate of the Republic), sometimes with the title actually changed to "duumvir", sometimes neither (Drinkwater, 1983: 107-8).
establishment of functioning *civitates peregrinae* and notable anomalies in the system eventually produced.

The most striking evidence of the conviction that Britain was the sort of place where a cantonal system was required and of the cross-Channel roots of this conviction is the establishment of the *Civitas Belgarum*. When this substantial *civitas*, stretching from the Severn estuary to the Solent, was established (with no single indigenous precursor), the Britons thereby grouped together were, for lack of an alternative, simply called the Belgae; presumably the Romans concerned agreed with Caesar about the Belgic origin of most of the southern Britons outside the Dumnonian peninsula.\(^{61}\)

When the degree to which Britain was thought of along Gaulish lines by those formulating and executing Roman policy there is taken into account, it becomes easier to believe that Tacitus's assimilation of unconquered contemporary Britons to the bellicose pre-conquest generations of Gauls was taken seriously. The refusal to halt the expansionist advance on the island until forced by circumstances to do so thereby becomes much easier to understand.

As with Gaul itself, there is a substantial and unavoidable element of speculation in this approach and, clearly, ample room for difference of interpretation and difference of emphasis concerning how and how much ideas on Gaul, or any other ideas from Latin literature, contributed to the policies ultimately enacted. Nevertheless, I do maintain that history of ideas can, if used with care, provide a very valuable supplement to the thin ancient historical record even on the most narrowly politico-military subjects.\(^{62}\) In the next chapter, I shall adduce one final piece of evidence in support of my arguments concerning the influence of Gaulish themes on late Republican and early Imperial foreign policy in Europe – a brief comparative study of aspects of policy with regard to the Danubian frontier which, I shall argue, contrasted sharply with policy in western Europe in the same period.

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\(^{62}\) On its importance for the history of Gaul under Roman rule (which I have generally avoided, as that issue has been very credibly addressed already), see Drinkwater, 1983: 25, 29, 37, 42, 48-50, 195 on the political history of Roman Gaul and Woolf, 1998: 48-76, 245-6 on Gallo-Roman cultural history.
10: An Alternative Territorial Policy: Daco-Roman Interaction in the First Century CE

One of the principal aims of Part 2 of the present study is to analyse the distinctive patterns in Roman foreign policy in western, especially northwestern, Europe. Temperate eastern Europe can provide an informative comparison in this respect; actual conditions were broadly comparable to those in northwestern Europe during the period under discussion but Roman images of the region were, in contrast, little influenced by Gaulish themes. I do not propose to examine Romano-Balkan history closely in its own right but before concluding I shall present an eastern European comparison to support my contention that policy in the northwest during the period under discussion was indeed distinctive. I shall take as an exemplar of the Romans’ post-Augustan conduct on the Danube an aspect particularly relevant to questions of territorial expansion and limitation – Daco-Roman relations down to the annexation of Dacia in 106 CE. I hope to use the contrast to contemporary Roman policy in the West that, I shall argue, this clearly demonstrates to throw the latter into sharper relief.

Around the middle of the first century BCE, a vast area east and north of the Danube, from the Black Sea to central Europe, was brought under the suzerainty of Burebistas.¹ This enormous but ephemeral Geto-Dacian dominion may or may not have been the target of Caesar’s abortive northeastern designs in 59; it does seem the most probable focus of his Balkan policy after the Civil War, in which Burebistas supported Pompey.² In the event, of course, his most geographically ambitious expeditions were across the Channel and the Rhine and his Julio-Claudian successors followed him into Germany and Britain rather than Dacia.³

³ On Daco-Roman military and political history in general, see Lica, 2000; on the archaeology of Roman Dacia, see Diaconescu, 2004, Oltean, 2007; on the spread of Roman culture in Dacia under provincial rule, see Hanson & Haynes, 2004.
Augustus's contributions to that Julio-Claudian drive to expand in western Europe have been examined in the previous two chapters. His extraordinary campaign of Danubian expansion, in contrast, was quite unique – the conquest, during his principate, of Rhaetia, Noricum, Pannonia, Illyricum and Moesia. Never before had Roman action in the non-Aegean Balkans extended much beyond repelling and punishing raids or piracy and never again would Roman territory in eastern Europe expand to a remotely comparable degree; on the final partition of the Roman Empire in 395 CE, the northern limit of its Balkan territories was, for the most part, Augustus's Danubian frontier. I would contend that this focus on expansion in (non-Greek) central and eastern Europe was exceptional, that Roman leaders after Augustus by and large reverted to type and, for as long as expansion in Europe seemed a realistic goal, preferred the West as a field for warlike exploits.

Between the Augustan conquest of the Balkans and Domitian's Dacian campaigns, raiding across the Lower Danube was dealt with much as similar problems had been dealt with by the Republican governors of Macedonia; the existing frontier was defended, rival leaders beyond it were played off against each other through selective patronage and, whenever possible, retaliatory expeditions were mounted. The sheer extent of the new Balkan empire provided governors with one new option – the physical capture of offending Trans-Danubian populations and their forcible resettlement in the ample free space of Moesia – but the permanent pacification of hostile territory through conquest was not attempted.

The contrast between this static reactivity and the strenuous efforts being made to conquer trans-Rhenane is all the more striking when one considers the frequency and aggression of trans-Danubian provocation. In the winter of 10 BCE, Pannonnia was attacked and another incursion into Pannonia or Moesia took place in 6 CE. There was one more attack before Augustus's death, probably in 12. The Getae attacked in 15 and the Dacians did likewise.

^{4} On which see Cameron & Garnsey, 1998.
^{5} Bowman et al., 1996: 175-6.
^{6} On the Danubian provinces between the campaigns under Augustus and those of Domitian, see Bowman et al., 1996: 558-85.
towards the end of Tiberius’s reign. It must also be remembered that the very thin historical record on the Danube between the conquest and Trajan’s Dacian Wars only preserves the few occasions when violence on the frontier got so out of hand that it could only reasonably be regarded as warfare; that there were several such incidents therefore suggests considerable and persistent insecurity along extensive stretches of the Lower Danube. The lack of (known) major military operations for several decades might seem to indicate that the new Danubian borderlands had settled down after a lengthy and bloody period of adjustment; instability, however, increased markedly again from the late 60s. The Roxolani attacked in the winter of 68-9, the Dacians did so in late 69 or 70 and the Sarmatae took their turn a year later.

In the winter of 85-6, Domitian’s expansionist projects in the West, directed in person in Germany and by Agricola in Britain, were interrupted by perhaps the greatest such incursion since the conquest; a new Dacian invasion of Moesia, assisted by a broad coalition of other Trans-Danubian peoples, badly dented the line of Roman fortifications on the *limes* and killed the consular governor, C. Oppius Sabinus. Domitian suspended his and Agricola’s commitments beyond the Rhine and the Clyde and set up his headquarters for retaliatory campaigning in Naissus (Niš). He sent his praetorian prefect, Cornelius Fuscus, across the Danube into Dacia, where he was defeated and killed in 87 at Tapae, with the loss of the *Legio V Alaudae*. Only in 88 did a second expedition under L. Tettius Iulianus achieve any military success.

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8 At which point it became interesting to ancient historians, who preferred to regard conquest as a chronologically discrete event rather than a protracted process both for literary and for political reasons (Woolf, 1998: 30-3) and therefore tended consistently to understate post-conquest instability within new provinces and on their borders.
9 On later Julio-Claudian policy on the Danubian frontier, see Conole & Milns, 1983.
10 Oltean, 2007: 51, Mócsy, 1974: 41-2. On conflict with Sarmatians in particular see Coulston, 2003b; on interaction with Sarmatians and Dacians around this time more generally, see Wilkes, 1983.
11 Contrary to the usual habit of ancient armies, many of these cross-river invasions, beginning in Augustus’s reign, were undertaken in winter, when stretches of the Danube froze over, greatly reducing its efficacy as a defensive barrier, as with the Mongols’ invasion of Hungary in 1241.
12 On the Dacian Wars of Domitian and Trajan, see Stefan, 2005.
13 Probably the Iron Gates, although the identification cannot be confirmed as the limited archaeological data on the Dacian Wars, including even Trajan’s great campaigns, necessitates a heavy reliance on the ancient historians.
which resulted not in a sustained effort to conquer Dacia but in a negotiated peace.\textsuperscript{14}

This was prompted by the combination of a worsening situation farther upstream, where the Pannonian sector of the Danubian frontier was under attack from the Iazyges, Marcomanni and Quadi, and the mutiny of L. Antonius Saturninus, governor of Germania Superior. Under the treaty, the new Dacian king, Decebalus, not only remained in power but received a substantial annual stipend\textsuperscript{15} in exchange for a merely nominal submission and no cession of territory. He was even given Roman artillery and lent military engineers to strengthen his fortifications, presumably on the assumption that the Dacian kingdom would serve thenceforth as a buffer against Trans-Danubian peoples farther north and east. Domitian’s extensive reconstruction and reorganization of the Roman fortifications on the Lower Danube strongly suggest that he intended for it to continue to serve as a frontier for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{16} The Danube was by no means at peace – in 92 there was more trouble both on the Pannonian frontier and downstream of Decebalus’s kingdom, where the \textit{Legio XXI Rapax} was destroyed by the Roxolani\textsuperscript{17} – but no attempt was made to convert Dacia into a province under Domitian or Nerva or even during the first two years of Trajan’s reign. The following passage is the explanation provided by Dio for the Trajanic change of policy:\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{14} Oltean, 2007: 51-2, Jones, 1992: 138-9, 141-3.
\item\textsuperscript{17} Mócsy, 1974: 95.
\item\textsuperscript{18} On Trajan’s Dacian Wars, see Strobel, 1984. On the Trajanic column, especially as an iconographic source for those events, see Rossi, 1971, Coarelli, 2000. On Trajan’s reign in general see Bennett, 2004.
\end{itemize}
And, having spent some time in Rome, [Trajan] marched against the Dacians, both considering what had been done by them and concerned by the moneys which they were receiving and seeing both their increasing strength and their pride. And Decebalus, having learnt of his attack, feared, due to knowing well that, while he had formerly conquered not the Romans but Domitian, this time he would be warring both against the Romans and against Trajan, the emperor.

Although it is more than possible that Decebalus was not minded to become a vassal, there is a suspicious absence of any mention of fresh aggression against Moesia; it therefore remains equally possible that the policy after 101 of an emperor much favoured by the ancient historiographical tradition was merely being justified by the suggestion of Dacian recalcitrance before 101. Undeniably, Trajan’s foreign policy was in general an expansionist one by the standards of the High Empire and his invasion of Dacia could have been pre-emption or sheer aggression. It cannot, therefore, be asserted with confidence that Trajan’s Trans-Danubian campaigns were, like Domitian’s, the undesired result of Dacian provocation.

Nonetheless, provincial annexation as such was still the option of last resort in eastern Europe. Even after a victory won through two years’ hard fighting, for which Trajan called himself Dacicus, one last attempt was made to convert Decebalus into a client prince. He was again left in place but a permanent garrison was installed and Decebalus’s own armed strength was now limited rather than funded by Roman power.¹⁹ This arrangement was not necessarily intended as a permanent solution; it bears more than a passing resemblance to the notionally client status of the Regnum Noricum after

Augustus’s Upper Danubian conquests, which persisted into the reign of Claudius, despite direct procuratorial administration of Noricum from 16 BCE.\textsuperscript{20}

Whether or not Decebalus would have remained quiescent under the humiliating treaty forced by circumstances on Domitian, he certainly did not accept Trajan’s imposition of real vassalage. After two years apparently devoted to covert preparations, he rebelled in 105 and, after quickly overwhelming the garrison in Dacia, crossed the Danube. Trajan employed an army of twelve legions to drive him out of Moesia and pursue him back to his capital in the Transylvanian plateau over 105 and 106. After Decebalus’s death, along with the destruction of a large part of his kingdom’s warrior elite and the capture of the very considerable precious metals reserves of his treasury, the natural result was of course provincialization.\textsuperscript{21}

The difficulties of insufficient social complexity described in the previous two chapters with regard to Germany and northern Britain were obviously not present in Dacia.\textsuperscript{22} The capacity of the Dacian state to marshal substantial resources in its own defence, the well trained and highly motivated Dacian warrior elite and, in later decades, Decebalus’s formidable proficiency in the business of making war combined to present a considerable military obstacle and, in the event, an immense concentration of troops was indeed required. However, unlike in trans-Rhenane Germany especially, this single effort could be expected to pay for itself promptly in gold and to be followed by a manageable, if not exactly tranquil, state of affairs after the initial victory.\textsuperscript{23} Nor is there any reason to suppose that the emperors and governors before Trajan thought otherwise; there is no indication in literary or other sources of

\textsuperscript{20} On the history of Roman Noricum, see Alföldy, 1974.
\textsuperscript{21} Oltean, 2007: 54-5, Bowman et al., 2000: 110-3. Provincialization was undertaken in the conquered, southern part of Dacia, that is; although, as a state, the Iron Age kingdom was destroyed in its entirety as a state, Roman rule never extended northwards over its entire former territory.
\textsuperscript{22} On the infrastructure and society of late Iron Age Dacia, see Oltean, 2007: 60-118.
\textsuperscript{23} In the event, post-invasion pacification in Dacia proceeded more quickly and easily than in Gaul; the centralization of wealth as well as administrative and religious power at terraced upland sites in the Orastie mountains like Sarmizegetusa Regia facilitated a sort of societal decapitation; with its native centre obliterated, the lowland hinterland of the Dacian civilization passed under Roman rule relatively intact (Oltean, 2007: 226) and without too much additional trouble.
exaggerated assessments of the Dacians’ strength, let alone that such expectations deterred action against them.

The occasional assaults on the Danube by various north Balkan or steppe peoples posed at least as much of a real threat as Suebi moving across the Rhine before it became a Roman frontier or Silures raiding the west of provincial Britannia. Decebalus clearly provoked the Romans at least as much as Bituitus or Caratacus. In eastern Europe, however, annexation of territory from which opposing armies were emerging was very consistently not considered an appropriate solution. All this stands in stark contrast to Roman behaviour in trans-Rhenane Germany and northern Britain.

Lacking any obvious negative factor deterring Roman action in Dacia, it seems reasonable to enquire as to whether an important positive factor encouraging it was absent. I have argued that Roman eagerness to conquer in Gaul and, subsequently and less successfully, Britain and Germany was partly due to the ways in which northwestern Europe was viewed; I would propose as at least a partial explanation for the comparative reticence to expand into Dacia that the ideas and attitudes most effective in accelerating expansion were largely absent from Roman views of Dacians and Getae.

The peoples of the northern Balkans – in Greek categorization Illyrians, Thracians and Royal Skythians from west to east – formed an early and important element in Greek ethnography, though certainly not as central as Gauls were to Roman thought. Both Thracians and Skythians were often used as extreme examples of qualities associated with the north, especially physical traits, often in paired contrasts with the Ethiopians. They were often

24 Indeed, it is difficult to find a parallel, once the Romans had gained military ascendancy over their regional neighbours by the middle of the third century BCE, for a policy towards them as stubbornly and unnecessarily suicidal as that of Decebalus; given the treatment which he received even despite his aggressions, mutually peaceful, if perhaps not amicable, coexistence clearly was an option available to him.

25 Respectively “Ἰλλυριοι”, “Θρακες” (with significant variation) and “Σκυθοί Βασιλείοι”, the latter distinguishing the Balkan Skyths from those farther east and referring to several dynastic states around the northern and northwestern shores of the Black Sea considered Skythian by Greek writers. The Thracian category was a very broad one and stretched into northeastern Anatolia and, at the other extreme, across the Danube to include the Getae and those the Romans referred to as Dacians (Hdt. 1.28, 5.2-8).

26 On Ethiopian-Thracian or Ethiopian-Skythian paired contrasts and their role in Greek literature, see Snowden, 1983: 56, 85, 99.
described in an unflattering manner; human sacrifice was alleged and
depictions were often stereotypically violent and/or hostile. Although, where
Latin writers had cause to mention Thracians or Illyrians, Greek models were
usually followed without much innovation, images of these peoples had none
of the same foundational importance in Latin ethnographic literature, let alone
a significant mythological role as the Gauls had. Consequently, Latin writing
on Pannonii, Illyri, Thraci and so on was much less independent of Greek
influence than literature on Galli. In short, neither the northern Balkans nor its
inhabitants captured the Roman imagination as western Europe and the Gauls
did (and, with rare exceptions, were not themselves classified as Gaulish in
Latin texts).

G. Woolf has argued that an important factor affecting the manner in
which and the degree to which Roman rule changed the culture of peoples
subjected to it was the content of Roman views concerning them; the cultures
of Greek cities in the eastern Mediterranean fared very differently, for instance,
than the equally urban, equally ancient cultures of Punic cities in the Maghreb.
In this study I have proposed a broadly analogous case for a strong influence of
ideas about peoples on pre-conquest political and military policy towards
peoples and I shall now summarize my argument and the evidence I have
adduced in its support.

27 To take one example, the massacre committed at Mukalēssos in Boeotia by Thracian mercenaries in
the service of the Athenians Thucydides attributed to Thracian and, more generally, Barbarian
collective character (7.29.4); needless to say, his many other accounts of atrocities committed in the
course of the Peloponnesian War did not lead him to conclude that the Greeks or sub-groups thereof
had an inherently savage character.
28 Or, for that matter, as Thrace and Thracians had in many Greek myths, most obviously those
concerning Orpheus, Rhesus and Ares.
29 For instance the Scordisci, on whose Gaulish character in certain texts see Williams, 2001: 174.
Summary of Findings

1: The Dual Greco-Roman Roots of Latin Literature’s Galli

Emerging in Greek thought no later than the fifth century and crystallizing as a stock theme in the fourth was a tendency to ascribe sharply distinct, often opposite, stereotypes, mostly but not exclusively negative, to peoples on either side of Greece or the Aegean; in this picture, the Greeks themselves, close to the Delphic centre of the world, possessed an ideal combination of the different virtues. The qualities usually assigned to northern or western peoples included greater vigour and less intelligence or capacity for organization. Vices of either type, northern/western or southern/eastern, could lead to misbehaviour like human sacrifice or invading Greece. This bipolarity in the collective traits of barbaroi were explained very differently by different authors (environmental determinism, purely cultural explanations etc.) and articulated very differently (most obviously, the poles might be north and south or east and west) but the belief, in its myriad forms, was extremely persistent over time in Greek and then in Latin literature.

One Greek ethnic category belonging to the northern or western group is that of the Celtic or Galatic. Although the term “Κέλτοι”/“Κέλτικος”/“Κέλτική” can be traced back to Herodotus and Hecataeus, the ethnographic category became important and took on its familiar form only in the third and second centuries, when it was used to classify the peoples who invaded Greece from the north in 279 and eventually reached Anatolia. The Latin term “Galli” was not itself a Greek loanword but it later became regarded as synonymous with “Κέλτοι”/“Κέλτικα”/“Γαλάται” and the Latin ethnographic category of the

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1 11-2.
2 Energy undirected by intelligence could be thought to lead to restless tribal wandering and predatory raiding, submissive intelligence could be thought to lead to (characteristically Oriental) despotism and, thereby, to aggressive expeditions under unrestrained tyrants.
3 10-2.
4 14-5.
5 16-20.
Celtic or Gaulish, was, like the images of the peoples classified under it, a complex fusion of Roman and Greek elements.⁶

"Galli" cannot be traced back nearly so far as can "Keltoi" and its earliest usage is difficult to reconstruct exactly; it can, nevertheless, be safely assumed that it referred to the northerly and especially the Trans-Apennine enemies of the early Romans within Italy (not including the Etruscans). The earliest extant prose description of the Gauls, that of Cato, was not incompatible with the Greek picture of restless, violent northerners but certainly contained distinctive elements; the Gauls were portrayed as riddling or excessively concerned with speech and, rather more importantly, at least some of the Roman legendary material known from later authors regarding Gaulish invasions of Italy and Latium was already present.⁷ Around the time of Polybius and perhaps in part due to his intellectual authority, Romans came to regard these Galli as the same people as the Galatai or Keltoi encountered by Greeks and Macedonians and to think of them in ways influenced by Greek thought. However, while most specific Latin stereotypes of the Gauls have antecedents in Greek stereotypes of northerners in general, the emotive power and almost eschatological role of stories concerned with the Senonian Sack were distinctively Roman.⁸ The closest Greek equivalents in this respect were, in different ways, the Persian invasion of 480-79 (as later dramatized and mythologized) and the Trojan War rather than Celtomachic themes.⁹

2: Specific Stereotypes

In Greek literature, even rigidly stereotypical depictions of northern or western peoples might include more than usually positive evaluative judgements, in

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⁶ 20-7.
⁷ 147.
⁸ 144-9.
⁹ A partial exception is the central importance of the victories of Attalus I Soter over the Galatians in the propaganda of the Attalids, for whose kingdom they became a Celtomachic charter myth, although this does not guarantee a degree of popular feeling comparable to that at Rome; on the Celts in Attalid art and the mutual influence between Pergamene and Roman accounts of Gaulish or Celtic aggressions, see Williams, 2001: 46, 160-4.
which cases they could resemble early modern images of the noble savage. Similarly, although the pre-conquest Gauls were never depicted in a wholly positive light in Latin literature, they were sometimes described as honest or guileless. Curiously, the Ligures, sometimes but not always classed as a Gaulish people, were far more consistently described as untrustworthy.

Thoroughly consistent with the broader Classical portrait of northern or western peoples were the many descriptions of Gauls as readily yielding to irrational appetites and impulses. In particular, Gauls were often stereotyped in both Latin and Greek texts as drunkards; given the strong disapproval of excess and indulgence in Classical thought, this was a damning claim.

Rashness and slavery to greedy appetites also both explained and predicted more serious misbehaviour on the part of Gauls as individuals and as groups. And, unsurprisingly, the bulk of the worst misbehaviour of which *peregrini* were accused in Latin historiography and ethnography – human sacrifice, violation of sacred spaces, aggression against the Roman people – is ascribed to Gauls or Carthaginians. Of the two (who, as depicted, form an archetypal north-south dipole of opposite faults leading to ultimately similar misdeeds), the former sinned more gravely through their capture and sack of the city of Rome itself and their attack on Apollo’s oracle at Delphi. For obvious reasons, anxiety about Gauls remained an active concern far longer than suspicion of *Punica Fides* and, in my view, also ran deeper, acute though the trauma of the Hannibalic War must have been for the immediately succeeding generations in Italy.

Opinions as to the Gauls’ ability, as distinct from their desire, to wage war varied widely; Polybius in particular argued vociferously for his low estimation of their worth as fighters and commanders. Although there is no reason to suppose that his view was widely held by Romans at the time, with the long, bitter struggle against the Cisalpini hardly finished, it certainly gained

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10 67-8.
11 38-41.
12 78-80.
13 114-8.
14 For an integrated discussion of both *metus*, *Gallicus* and *Punicus*, see Bellen, 1985.
15 80-4.
currency over time as even the Transalpine Gauls were defeated and subjected. An initial charge by Gauls was admitted to deliver a severe shock but only resist it, Polybius maintained, and lack of any real military skill would guarantee their defeat in a sustained battle. In the hands of Latin writers, most importantly Livy, this was broadened into an overall narrative of the Gaulish presence in Italy; the Gauls burst over the Alps in a furious surge, supplanting Etruscans and besieging Rome, but failed to consolidate their successes, were unable to maintain their ancestral vigour in the warm climate of the land in which they did not belong and ultimately wilted before the Romans’ steady, determined northward advance. This view of Gallo-Roman history, though believable and satisfying in Augustan times, at least as regards the Italian Gauls, should not obscure the fear of Gaul and the Gauls still felt at Rome in the last century BCE. The Gauls were depicted, from Cato on, as irreconcilably hostile, much concerned with the art of war, long practised in it and, at least under certain circumstances, almost impossible to withstand.

3: The Influence of Caesar

Caesar at once worked within the existing literary tradition through the brilliantly selective use of stock Gaulish themes for his own political purposes and took that tradition in a radically new direction followed by subsequent authors, for whom he acquired a unique intellectual authority on Gaul and Germany. He reminded his readers in great detail and a deceptively dispassionate tone of every possible variety of human sacrifice practised in Gaul. He emphasized the deleterious political consequences of the Gauls’ supposedly rash and impulsive collective character – inability to remain consistently loyal without compulsion and a proclivity for grandiose, warlike schemes. Rather than abandon his factual and realistic tone through crudely

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16 28-9, 150.
17 Which, not incidentally, was therefore really a recovery of originally Italian territory, even north of the Po.
18 And long afterwards, for that matter, despite Livy’s best efforts to lay Brennus’s ghost to rest.
19 125.
20 125-6.
assimilating his adversaries to the Senones who besieged the Capitol, he subtly but repeatedly compared them to the Cimbri and Teutoni. He even harnessed the physical stereotype of the Gaul (pale, blonde or fair, tall)\textsuperscript{21} to his propagandistic advantage; he put into his Belgic opponents’ mouths expressions of contempt for the Italians’ lesser stature and immediately followed this with a report of laborious feats completed by his men and a consequent Roman victory – surely one of the most satisfying episodes for the Commentarii’s contemporary audience.

Where he was most original was in his description, categorization and demarcation of the *Germani*. It is difficult to find a parallel in Classical ethnography for Caesar’s individually dominating influence on Latin writing on the Germans – almost an equivalent of the combined roles of Hecataeus, Cato, Polybius and Posidonius in the history of Classical discourse on Gauls or Celts. He did not invent the name “Germani”/“Germania” but he did establish the Germans as a major division of Barbarian Europe rather than a group of peoples around the lower Rhine and as neighbours of the Gauls rather than a Gaulish subgroup.\textsuperscript{22} He also fixed many of the stereotypical qualities of the German that became stock themes for later writers like Tacitus.

Germans as well as Gauls he linked to the Cimbri (and thus, indirectly, to the long and ignominious line of Gaulish invaders or would-be invaders of Italy stretching back to the Senones) when it suited him. He used his historiographical innovation, the German menace, to make his conquests appear both more just – protection of the Gauls as much as from the Gauls – and more directly important for the security of Italy and Rome. His attempt, incommpletely unsuccessful as it turned out,\textsuperscript{23} to fix the Latin ethnographic boundary between *Galli* and *Germani* at the limit of his conquests, the Rhine, was nevertheless a valiant attempt to give to his expansion an incomparably greater air of pacification and finality – the final act of the ancient Gallo-Roman enmity.

\textsuperscript{21} 72-5.
\textsuperscript{22} 86-90.
\textsuperscript{23} 90-2.
One of the Greek legacies to Latin ethnographic, geographical and historical discourse on Gauls and many other peoples was the idea of collective enervation over time. Livy claimed that the Cisalpini and Galatians, originally savage invaders, eventually exhausted peoples fit for subjugation, had been enervated by the fertile lands and warm climates in which they found themselves; Caesar alleged a growing enervation north of the Alps due to the influence of Roman civilization. This too was a reason to applaud his actions; they might therefore provide Italy, after a few decades to allow the changes to take full effect, with the surest possible protection from Gaulish attack. Moreover, with the Gauls progressively weakening, there could be no question of hoping that they could resist the Germans themselves. Both his drastic alterations to the political map of Europe and the ingenious ways in which he defended and promoted his actions brought about profound and lasting changes in the way that northwestern Europe was seen by Romans; they also led on very naturally, if perhaps ironically, to the explicit assimilation of contemporary Germans to pre-conquest Gauls in the first century CE.

4: Ideas and Actions, 155-51 BCE

The conquest of what would become the Narbonese province was a significant new departure in Roman external policy. The territory was the first Roman possession north of Alps and remained the northernmost province for many years thereafter in addition to hosting, almost from its annexation, one of the earliest coloniae outside of Italy. The campaigns of 125-120 also had substantial geopolitical consequences farther north - the drastic reversal in the previous rise in Arveranian power among the Gaulish civitates and the establishment of the Aedui as a substantial rival power, guaranteed by the Romans. The circumstances under which the war was provoked were very similar to those obtaining in 155, which resulted only in a single campaign to

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24 129-31.
25 154-5.
restore the Massiliotes’ position; the Romans’ vastly different responses to more or less the same situation requires explanation.

The very limited quantity of textual information compared with that available for the later conflicts considered in this study makes the attitudes and opinions motivating the first Transalpine expansion much more difficult to ascertain. However, there suggestive hints were left by Latin authors writing later, most importantly Caesar and Livy, of how southern Gaul might have been viewed at the time, in addition to the preservation by Athenaeus and Strabo of Posidonius’s nearly contemporary portrayal of Louernios and the contemporary evidence of the Fasti Triumphales. For instance, the Ligures involved in the struggle appear, most emphatically, as a subdivision of the Gauls, unlike those of the mid-century dispute. Caesar suggests that the war was remembered as one against the Galli as a whole and, while his purpose in mentioning this was propagandistic, that purpose would only have been served had such a recollection, accurate or otherwise, also been that of his Roman contemporaries. I have argued that an anxious reaction at Rome to the rise of the Arverni under Louernios and Bituitus drove much of the forcefulness of the policies enacted after an opportunity presented itself in 125 to rectify the, in Roman eyes, deteriorating situation.

Both the electoral response to the Cimbric War and the manner in which it was remembered textually show that Gaulish (as classified at the time) migration from the north towards Italy could still cause intense and sustained fear at Rome. Cicero’s use of stereotypes of and anxieties concerning the Gauls for forensic purposes in the Pro Fonteio is one illustration of the potency that they still possessed well into the first century. The political use to which he put them a decade later in the Orationes in Catilinam is another.

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26 151.

27 159-62.

28 In brief, Gallia was already the possession of the Roman people, giving his actions a defensive character, merely protecting a pre-provincial dominion from fresh aggression and, almost incidentally, completing its incorporation in the process.

29 182.

30 113-4.

31 172-3.
However, the geopolitical situation north of the Alps created between 125 and 118 was inherently likely to lead to conflicts with migrating groups in or near Gaul. The consistent willingness to intervene on behalf of actual or prospective clients like the Aedui and the Norici against migrating rivals like the Helvetii and the Cimbri naturally tended to involve the Romans in fresh conflicts of a sort they found alarming.\(^{32}\) Also, the very collapse in Arvernian power through which the Romans had tried to protect themselves from a potential Gaulish threat removed a stabilizing element in Gaul that would otherwise likely have obstructed folk-movement from farther north or east as effectively as Arvernian strength permitted. A final factor tending towards further conflict was the severe and persistent instability in the Province itself,\(^{33}\) the pacification whereof was only completed by Caesar, through his intensive colonization, recruitment and reform in the south.

When he assumed command of the entire northern frontier, its westernmost sector, in Gaul, was both the least stable and the most likely to arouse public emotion at Rome. I have therefore argued that not only did Caesar harness and reshape traditional ideas concerning Gaul in the presentation of his actions but those ideas and the circumstances arising out of them genuinely contributed to his decision to seek glory and booty in Gaul rather than elsewhere.\(^{34}\)

5: More Persistent Expansionism in Northwestern Europe than in Temperate Eastern Europe

The Germans, at least after Caesar, were not considered Gaulish as such by Latin authors and the Britons were never categorized as Gauls or Celts in Classical ethnography. The islanders’ culture was, however, described as very similar to that of the Gauls.\(^{35}\) Discussion of all three peoples was also influenced by the same set of generically northern or western stereotypes

\(^{32}\) 167-71, 173-5.
\(^{33}\) 171-3.
\(^{34}\) 163-7, 178-82.
\(^{35}\) 211-5.
bequeathed by Classical Greek authors. The claims that most closely associated unconquered Britons or Germans with pre-conquest Gauls and that were most closely related to propagandistic agendas concerned the progressive enervation of northern peoples under the influence of Roman expansion; while the post-Caesarian Gauls were at an advanced stage of the process of pacification, those adjacent to them but independent still retained much of the vigour and hostility they once possessed. An ironic result of Caesar’s stark Gallo-German distinction was therefore an assimilation of the Germans to the Gauls in certain respects. Moreover, perhaps the most emotive ideas about Galli were the millenarian anxieties concerning future repetition of the Senonian Sack and the ultimate fate of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus and these do seem to have been transferred wholesale to the post-Caesarian Germani, in the Roman popular imagination at least as much as in the aristocratic literary tradition.

Admittedly, the Britons clearly did not take up the Gauls’ former mantle in this last, crucial, respect. However, many of them were considered, especially after Caesar’s time, to have descended from ancient settlers from Gallia Belgica. Given this and the claims of alike habits mentioned above, there is reason to suppose that Britain in the first century CE was often thought of along broadly Gaulish lines, as the provincial administrative structure strongly suggests.

Neither Plautius nor Agricola left a written presentation of his motives, policies and campaigns as Caesar did. Agricola, however, had in his son-in-law Tacitus a biographer of comparable literary and intellectual calibre and the Vita, served as, among many other things, a defence and promotion of his actions in a broadly similar way; certainly Tacitus seems to have believed that the most effective way to recommend expansion in Britain to a Roman audience was to assimilate its unconquered inhabitants to earlier generations of

36 130-2.
37 196-200.
38 Unlike the supposedly autochthonous Germans, a curious irony given the considerably closer Latin assimilation of Germans to Gauls in most other ways.
39 213-5.
Gauls. I have argued that, as illustrated by the sharply contrasting Dacian example in particular, the legacy of ideas and attitudes deriving ultimately from thought and writing on Gaul tended to make Roman policy more consistently and more persistently aggressive in both northern Britain and trans-Rhenane Germany than in contemporary eastern Europe.
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1. Caesar’s Ethnographic Classification of Northwestern Europeans
2. The Growth and Organization of Roman Power in Gaul

A. Before Caesar

B. Under the Triumvirate
C. Under the Julio-Claudians

D. After Domitian
3. Main *Civitates* of Gallia Comata during the Gallic War
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