SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND

INTRA-PARTY ATTITUDES IN IRELAND

PhD in Political Science

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and that it is entirely my own work.

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SUMMARY

This thesis examines the extent to which the distribution of politicians' social background characteristics is associated with attitude variation within political parties. It addresses the research question with quantitative and qualitative methods by examining the substantive attitudes of elite members to political issues and their multi-dimensional interpretations of those issues. To maximise the potential for a study of intra-party attitudes this thesis is a case study of Irish political parties. The Irish party system has been a puzzling case in political science for decades due to 'left' and 'right' never being a basis for inter-party competition, as is commonly found elsewhere. In Ireland, there is typically more attitude variation within parties than between them. However, the Irish political elite conform to international trends in that they are not demographically representative of the Irish population.

The thesis begins by outlining the state of research on the potential explanations of intra-party attitude variation and the extent to which the social background of party representatives has been able to account for this variation in previous studies. It argues that instead of treating party affiliation and social background as competing explanations for attitude variation within a representative assembly, it is more appropriate to treat the two concepts as hierarchical explanations. The theoretical treatment of these explanations is thus party affiliation, or 'identity', is a contextualising or 'mediating' variable (Osborn 2012, 6) while the social background effect structures attitudes within the parties.

The analysis begins with an an assessment of the degree of intra-party variation on substantive political attitude items and the extent to which intra-party attitudes are delineated by the social background characteristics of its members. To test the relationship between social background characteristics and intra-party attitudes, the thesis draws on data from surveys, interviews and parliamentary speeches. This analysis finds that the gender and age are the strongest predictors of intra-party attitude variation.

The relationship between the attitudes of voters and elites is explored to discover whether socially representative parties would be attitudinally closer to voters. This analysis finds that greater social diversity within parties would increase the variance of attitudes at the elite level but, overall, better representation of the age spectrum at the elite level would increase congruence of attitudes while greater representation of class would have a negative effect on congruence of voters and elite attitudes.

The thesis then examines whether the causal link between social background, attitudes and ultimately behaviour is likely to remain beyond affective and cognitive perceptions of political issues. The strategic incentives of political life may work to negate the effects of socialisation experiences on attitudes and behaviour. The thesis examines whether social background is related to participation and attitudes in parliamentary speeches. It finds strong evidence that social background influences the policy priorities of politicians, but less so their stated positions.

Finally, the thesis examines the qualitative variation in political attitudes among Irish TDs and Senators. It finds that there are striking intra-party divisions of issue interpretation based on gender, age and social class on attitudes to economic policy, feminism and European integration.

The contribution of this thesis is that it takes a nuanced view of the relationship between social background, party affiliation and political attitudes. This is important if we are to understand whether the over-representation of demographic groups within political parties is a real problem for the health of democracy in Ireland and beyond. It finds that social diversity within political parties has significant effects on the attitudes of politicians.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Abstract

This chapter introduces the content of this research project – investigating the link between socialisation and attitudes within Irish political parties. It begins by justifying the study of intra-party attitudes and its position in the developing literature. It then introduces the theoretical framework of the analysis, which holds that substantive attitude representation is dependent on the descriptive representation of social groups. A discussion of attitude measurements follows. Finally, it outlines the chapter plan for the thesis and the significant findings therein.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Section 1: Introduction

Parties are among the most important actors in political science. They provide a linkage function between the electorate and the governing apparatus of a state (Kirchheimer 1966, 178) and thus it is not possible to overstate their importance. Political science can address many important research questions by assuming parties are unitary actors. Other inquiries necessitate an appreciation of individual-level phenomena such as how the social background characteristics of political actors affect their political attitudes.

This thesis contributes to the study of socialisation and political attitudes by treating party affiliation as a mediating group-level factor of the effect of social background at the individual level. Given that party affiliation has a grouping effect on political attitudes, this project investigates the extent to which social background explains the intra-party variation. This is not to say that the intra-party variation and its explanatory factors are a merely an inconsequential afterthought, but simply to recognise that attitudes within a legislature are hierarchically structured.

This analysis is a country-level case study of political parties in the Republic of Ireland. This case is important because it exhibits one of the lowest levels of inter-party ideological competition in democratic states. There is typically more variation within parties than between them. The thesis assesses the degree of inter and intra-party attitude variation and then tests the extent to which intra-party variation is attributable to the social background characteristics of gender, age, education, class and geographical origins of their elected members. Surveys, interviews and parliamentary speeches constitute the basis for the empirical tests of the theoretical framework.

This chapter outlines the overall framework of the thesis. Section 2 outlines the importance of the topic. Section 3 identifies areas where this project can make an important contribution. Section 4 outlines the broad theoretical

framework. Section 5 discusses the importance of the attitude measures employed by the thesis. Section 6 outlines subsequent thesis chapters. Section 7 concludes.

Section 2: Significance of the topic

A recent political event demonstrates the relevance of studying intra-party attitudes in Ireland. In 2013, the Irish government legislated for the provision of abortion in circumstances where a pregnancy posed an immediate threat to the mother's life. Though Labour, the junior party in the coalition government, was instrumental in ensuring the issue of abortion was on the legislative agenda, all parties supported the legislation to various degrees. The major political divisions occurred within the parties. In a political system known for its slavish devotion to the party whip, at least one member of each party voted against the legislation[1]. Intra-party attitude divisions have not been so evident in decades.

This thesis finds its academic justification in the larger dynamics behind the anecdote above; that there is more policy variation within parties than between them. It is practically a fact that Irish party competition does not and never has operated on a left-right divide in a comparative sense and the major parties, Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), have been difficult to distinguish in ideological terms (Gallagher 1985, 2). Though 'left' and 'right' are waning as basis of party competition in many European countries, this rhetoric was historically very common. Carty's (1983, 1) study of Irish politics was spurred by the repeated mention of 'except Ireland' in the footnotes of journal articles on party competition. Moreover Marsh *et al* (2008, 50) demonstrated that attitudes among Irish parties' voters span the ideological spectrum on almost every issue. Given the lack of ideological competition at the party level and the distribution of opinion among voters, it is reasonable to hypothesise that left-right divisions occur within Irish parties rather than between them.

[1] The members of Labour who voted against their party had already lost the whip for defying the party in previous votes.

There has been a renewed focus on intra-party competition in recent times (Gianetti and Benoit 2009; Ó'Muineacháin 2012). The former of these works focused on the effects of intra-party politics on government formation and the latter on explaining the persistence of factions in parties. This thesis takes parallel course to that of the latter. Stemming from Rose (1964, 37) the study of intra-party politics can be conceived of in two ways – as a tendency or a faction. Rose conceives a 'tendency' as a 'stable set of attitudes' while a faction is a 'stable set of politicians'. While Ó'Muineacháin (2012) studied the 'stable set of politicians' in a comparative framework, this study examines the extent to which a 'stable sets of attitudes' exist within Irish political parties. Furthermore, Ó'Muineacháin (2012, pp. 268-269) concludes that, at least in the case of Fianna Fáil, factions do not emerge due to the low costs of exiting the party and establishing a new one. This is a consequence of Ireland's very open PR-STV electoral system, and the level of patronage in the gift of the party leader, which in turn incentivises loyalty among the parliamentary party.

Studying intra-party attitudes is important from the perspective of representation if we consider the representative function of parliament over its legislative role (Pitkin 1967, 209; Marsh 1980, 59; O'Sullivan 2002, 8). Ideally, the process of passing legislation would begin with a deliberative discussion where the full range of opinion in society is present to debate and shape public policy (Dahl 1989; Philips 1995, 168). If this process does not begin with an unbiased distribution of opinion, a democratic deficit could emerge between the electorate and the political elite. J.S. Mill argued that the "in the absence of natural defenders, the interests of the excluded are likely to be overlooked" (Miller 2010, 172). Mill would have argued that the natural defenders of diverse social interests merely need access to the ballot box in terms of voting in order to have their interests represented in parliament on an equal footing to the traditional elites. The motivation for this thesis is rooted in the assumption that mere access to the ballot box is insufficient for the interests of diverse groups to be represented in parliament. The "natural defenders" of a group's interests need to be

physically 'present' in the Parliament itself. The next section elaborates on this idea.

Section 3: Theoretical approach

The theoretical basis of this thesis is Phillips' (1995) theory of 'the politics of presence'. The theory recognises that individuals have identifiable political interests and attitudes based on their shared social experiences. Phillips (1995, 168) argues that the political interests of women and ethnic/cultural minorities particularly may go un-represented in the political process if members of their group are not 'present'. This is not to say that, once elected, all members of these under-represented descriptive groups will speak with one voice but she does argue that this diversity of descriptive representation will in turn lead to a diverse expression of substantive attitudes and opinions in the representative process (Philips 1995, 176).

The emphasis here is a socio-psychological model of representation, but this is not to say such a model is wholly irrational. A core assumption of political science is that representatives' ultimate goal is to be re-elected by sufficiently responding to voters preferences (Pitkin 1967, 209) and it would be erroneous to ignore this assumption. Thus, the assumption of this thesis is, where there is scope for interpretation of the 'will of the people', personal socialisation experiences unconsciously inform the attitudes of representatives.

Personal attitudes are, by definition, a product of each individual's early socialisation experience (Allport 1935, 810) and group association or membership (Bishin 2006, 312). In order for a socially elite parliament or party to deliberate or act in a way other than they would have done in a state of proportionate descriptive representation, it must be demonstrated that there is, firstly, a link between socialisation and attitudes, and secondly that there is a link between attitudes and behaviour. Establishing a link between attitudes and behaviour in any context is difficult (Wicker 1969, 75: Fishbein 1975, 336).

Part of this problem is that it is common for attitudes to be cohesively conceptualised when a more nuanced conceptualisation is required. This nuanced conceptualisation divides attitudes into categories of affection (general feelings), cognition (evaluation proposals) and conation (intention of action towards a proposal). An individual may report a cognitive or affective response to an object, yet act, or intend to act, in a manner contrary to that initial response upon consideration of other factors (Malim and Birch, 1999: 650). Individuals may report a positive affective response to an attitude object, such as supporting the idea of getting more women into politics, followed by a negative cognitive response, such as opposing gender quotas for political parties, but ultimately capped by an intention to vote for legislation introducing gender quotas into law. The apparent disconnect between the second and third stages are, in particular, due to other factors such as the strategic considerations that necessitate obedience to the party whip in parliament.

To emphasis the potential importance of the link between descriptive representation, attitudes and actions, we can refer back to the writings of J.S. Mill, a cautious defender of popular participation. Mill argued against the idea of what we would characterise as descriptive representation. Although he was adamant that greater attention be paid to the interests of the working class, Mill thought that for the working class to be descriptively represented in proportion to their ratio in society would "spell disaster" (Miller 1960,182). He feared that the working classes would enact short sighted economic measures that would, *prima facie*, seem to be in their class interest, but would eventually work to their disadvantage, and the disadvantage of the nation. Mill was referring to the potential passage of laws to 'raise wages', limit 'competition in the labour market', 'restrict machinery' and protect 'the home producer against foreign industry' (Miller 1960, 182).

The study of attitudes as a precursor to action is thus theoretically justified. Despite this, the empirical link between attitudes and action is not as strong as would have been expected *a priori*. According to Wängerud (2009, 64), this lack of empirical support for the theory is due, in part, to a lack of

attempts to prove it. Nevertheless, Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler (2005, 407) tested the theory in 31 democracies and found that, at least in terms of the representation of women, descriptive representation was related to positive attitudes towards women-friendly policies and, ultimately, to women-friendly legislative outcomes. These policies included increasing weeks of maternity leave, marriage equality in law and indexes on women's political and social equality. As Mill predicted, the increase in descriptive representation led to a focus on legislative policies that benefitted "natural defenders'" group, although the effect of these policies were less than 'disastrous' for society.

While this thesis focuses on the link between socialisation and attitudes, the necessity of studying this link as it relates, theoretically and empirically, to substantive outcomes is justified.

I draw the the major hypotheses of this study from what has been outlined here regarding the links between descriptive and substantive representation, and between socialisation, attitudes and action. The null hypothesis is:

H_0: Intra-party attitudes are randomly distributed.

The hypothesised explanations for the variation in intra-party attitudes are:

H_1: Intra-party attitude variation can be explained by variation in social characteristics among its members.

H_2: Greater social diversity would increase the overall level of attitudinal congruence between politicians and voters.

H_3: Representatives of shared social backgrounds will support policies that favour or benefit their descriptive social group.

Section 4: Explaining intra-party attitudes – The research so far and the contribution of this study

One quarter of political science papers referencing the term 'intra-party' on Google scholar date from 2009 onwards. Despite 60 years of political science as we know it, the study of intra-party politics is only now picking up pace. Much of the previous research focused on pitting party affiliation and social background against each other as competing explanations for the variation in intra-parliament attitudes. This thesis argues that both

explanations have a distinct role in studies of political attitudes. The theoretical framework treats party affiliation as a mediating group influence (Osborn 2012, 6) on attitudes within the assembly, while social background works at the individual level to structure attitudes within each party.

Three empirical studies were particularly important guides for this project. These were *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament* (Norris and Lovenduski 1995); *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience* (Esaiasson and Heider 2000) and *Messengers of the People: An Analysis of Representation and Role Orientations in the Irish Parliament* (O'Sullivan 2002). The O'Sullivan piece is the direct predecessor of this thesis. The common factor underlying all three works is that they examine the distribution of attitudes within parliaments and assess whether party affiliation or social background are better predictors of attitudes. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 215) make a greater attempt to examine attitudinal dynamics within each of the British parties, but this thesis makes an overt claim to be a study of intra-party attitudes.

The first thing to note is that no parliament is or ever has been, in demographic terms, representative of its society. Irish representatives correspond to international patterns in being disproportionately male, older, more highly educated[2] and of higher status occupations (outside of being a parliamentarian) than the population they represent (Lawson 1976, 112; O'Sullivan 2002, 69; Gallagher *et al* 2006, 323; Gallagher *et al* 2010, 399). The major discrepancy here being the fact that women make up 51% of the Irish population but only 15% of TDs (Buckley and McGing 2011, 222). Chapter 3 explores the demographic imbalance between the electorate and political elites in depth.

We can draw some expectations of the likely effect of social background on attitudes within parties from this work. Generally, women are found to be

[2] In 1982 a comparatively low 38% of TDs were university graduates (Gallagher, 1985, 373), but this has since moved into line with international trends.

more left-wing, socially liberal and feminist than their male counterparts (Welch 1985, 133 Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 217, Narud and Valen 2000, 89; Wängnerud 2000a 67; Wängnerud 2000b, 141). However, O'Sullivan (2002, 17) found that female Irish TDs tended to be more conservative on average than males. Although the 2011 election barely increased women's representation in the Dáil, many centre-right women were, on aggregate, substituted by left-leaning women. Whether these left-leaning women lean as far 'left' as their intra-party male colleagues is the subject of investigation. Moreover, O'Sullivan (2002, 17) also found that younger TDs were more conservative than older TDs, which was contrary to previous findings from other countries, while higher educated TDs were consistent with the findings of previous research in being more liberal than those without university degrees.

Section 5: Measuring Attitudes

There are well-established practices of attitude measurement in political science. These include surveys and qualitative interviews. Recent innovations in computerised analysis of political text are also potentially applicable to the measurement of individuals' attitudes. This project incorporates these three established and cutting-edge empirical approaches. This is not to flood the thesis with data. Each method has its own theoretical worth and looking at the research question from three different angles will increase our appreciation of the extent of the effect social background is likely to have on politics in Ireland.

The Comparative Candidate Survey (Ireland 2011) (CCS) provides the first measure of attitudes for this study. This survey was carried out in collaboration with the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) co-ordinated by Hermann Schmitt. The project uses a standardised questionnaire to survey members of parliament and their election rivals. 27 countries worldwide have so far been included in the project. The project primarily surveys political elites on the details of the campaigns and on their attitudes. Michael Marsh and Gail McElroy of

Trinity College Dublin were the principal investigators for the Irish component in 2011 and the survey was administered by Laura Schwirz and myself to the 569 election candidates. 249 returned the survey of which 75 are members of parliament (TDs). The dataset of responses was compiled by this writer.

The CCS is a comprehensive survey and contained more than enough data for one project. However, as I was compiling the dataset of survey responses, I noticed many respondents had taken issue with the wording of the questions. For example, whether the environment and the economy are competing concepts that lie at either end of a spectrum of policy trade-offs. Some respondents indicated that this is a false dichotomy and that environmentally friendly policy initiatives can be drivers of economic growth. I felt that the survey only gave me part of the overall picture. Therefore, I conducted 81 interviews with members of the Irish parliamentary parties and independent members to get a multi-dimensional image of intra-party attitudes. The parties consisted of members of the upper house (Seanad) and the lower House (Dáil Éireann). Where I did not scientifically adhere to putting questions to politicians in person exactly as they were worded in the survey, I did so reluctantly and on the basis that refreshing the wording more accurately captured the underlying ideological dimension. Chapter 3 discusses this issue in more depth.

Finally, statements in parliament have a variety of purposes. Without exploring the theoretical merits of the activity here, and as speech-making is an individual act, we can assume that speeches are made to outline an individual political preference. The 'individual' preference may be that of the representatives' constituents, an echo of the party line or a personal preference. This thesis assumes that speeches reflect the latter and tests the hypothesis that the intra-party variation in positions as reflected in speeches are, like attitudes revealed in surveys, attributable to variation in social background characteristics of party members. The thesis infers attitudes from the relative distributions of words in TDs' speeches on substantive topics that reflect pertinent underlying ideological differences. I discuss these measures of attitudes further in Chapter 3**Section 6: Chapter outline**

Chapter 2 discusses the significant theoretical and empirical literature on explanations of political attitude variation. The emphasis here is on the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 'representative' democratic body. One strand of thought, particularly attributed to Pitkin (1967), is that substantive representation is achieved when politicians are 'responsive' to those they represent. Responsiveness is only dependent on the rational incentive structures of political life. The alternative argument is that substantive representation is dependent on descriptive representation (Philips 1995). A parliament comprised of members who do not share the socialisation experiences of society as whole, will not sufficiently reflect the distribution of attitudes within society and the process of deliberation will begin at a biased position. Due to the power of party affiliation in structuring attitudes within parliament, even in a political system famous for its lack of ideological competition, I formulate the hypothesis that attitude variation within parties is attributable to variation in the descriptive characteristics of their membership.

Chapter 2 also discusses other potential democratic linkages including constituency responsiveness and party responsiveness. Constituency responsiveness is excluded from consideration as an explanation of intra-party attitudes for theoretical and empirical reasons. The fact that Ireland has multi-member constituencies means that opposing TDs from the same constituency could attitudinally represent the interests of various sub-groups within the constituency, making comparisons with the median constituency voter redundant. Moreover, available survey data is only representative at the national level, not the constituency level. Responsiveness to party supporters may structure inter-party competition but a single value such as the attitude of the 'median party supporter' cannot explain multitude of values such as the range of attitudes at the elite level. However, given any observed attitudinal disconnect between voters and politicians it can be tested whether representatives of under-represented groups, to take the example of female politicians, are more congruent with the attitudes of party voters than men.

Chapter 3 introduces the data and methods used throughout the thesis. While the conceptual dependent variable is an individual's attitude, the thesis explores various measures of this concept. Three broad approaches, three quantitative and one qualitative, are employed here. The quantitative measures are surveys, coded interview responses, and the developing field of quantitative text analysis. I apply the latter to speeches made in the Irish parliament that are comparable with the issues explored in the interview and survey data. The qualitative measure is a descriptive account of Irish TDs and Senators interpretations of political issues. The chapter discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each method as a measure of attitudes. The chapter also outlines the distribution of the independent variables across the data sources.

Chapter 4 represents the core analysis of this thesis. It explores the variation in the reported attitudes of the political elite. While the focus is on elected members of Dáil Éireann, the wider membership of party elites is taken into account through the inclusion of losing candidates in the survey data and Senators in the interview data. The advantages of this are the increase in observations on the independent variables. Intra-party samples on selected background variables such as gender can typically be very low. With appropriate controls, expanding the definition of 'party elite' just beyond elected members of the lower house provides sufficient variation on the independent variables to make inferences about the effect of descriptive representation on substantive attitudes. Where intra-party variation significantly relates to social background characteristics, this is mostly attributable to gender divisions. Age and less so education, occupation and geographical background also relate to important findings here. The overall finding is that there is a tendency for women within parties to be more economically left-wing, feminist and socially liberal than men. Younger politicians tend to be more economically right-wing, and 'anti-feminist' but also more socially liberal than older politicians.

Chapter 5 employs a wide interpretation of 'intra-party politics'. This interpretation goes beyond political office holders to examine the consistency of attitudes between voters and elites. Three hypotheses are

tested here. First, that the distribution of attitudes within the Dáil matches the distribution of attitudes within the electorate. Secondly, that the larger parties are closer to the voters nationally than their own supporters while the opposite is true for smaller parties (Ezrow *et al* 2011, 275). Thirdly, those members of the political elite drawn from descriptively under-represented groups will be closer to voters than members of over-represented groups. The chapter finds that the distribution of attitudes within the Dáil significantly deviates from voter attitudes on most issues. It also finds that in terms of the larger parties 'national voter' and 'party supporter' are interchangeable terms. However, niche parties are slightly closer to their own voters on some issues. Descriptive representation has some significant effects on congruence. Farmers, women and under 40s are particularly congruent across electoral levels. Better representation of age would make the distribution of attitudes within parties closer to voters, while better representation of class, particularly of clerical and manual workers has the opposite effect, contrary to expectations.

Chapter 6 pushes the boundaries of the concept of attitudes by examining the politicians' publicly expressed attitudes in parliament. It assumes the decision to participate in parliamentary debates and the frequency of words in speeches reflects underlying attitudes to political objects. However, the public nature of these speeches introduces a strategic element, potentially eroding any link between attitudes and behaviour and thus the link between descriptive and substantive representation.

The first part of the analysis scrutinises the 'decision' to participate in parliamentary debates, assuming that the decision is wholly within the remit of each individual representative. The chapter then makes significant strides in the integration of quantitative text analysis into mainstream political science. Where the dependent variable in the statistical models of Chapter 4 was a survey value, here the dependent variable is a score based on the frequency of words in the individual's parliamentary speeches. It is assumed that those with similar ideologies will use similar words and with similar frequency. The statistical model then tests the extent to which politicians' social background characteristics explain the variation in word frequency

scores. If word frequencies are a similar measure of attitudes to surveys, we should see similar structural patterns emerge. The chapter analyses parliamentary debates on budgetary measures, the EU stability treaty, gender quotas and abortion. While the average positions are similar at the party level, the individual level patterns are not consistent with survey analysis. The results show though women are more likely to speak on the gender-specific issues, thus providing some support for the link between descriptive and substantive representation.

Chapter 7 is a qualitative exploration of the interview data. The interviews forming the basis for this analysis had sufficient scope to capture the multi-dimensionality of political issues. The chapter focuses on politicians' interpretations of left and right in Irish politics, attitudes to economic policy making, women in politics and the GAL/TAN index (Hooghe *et al* 2002, 965), a modern updating of the liberal-authoritarian (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 215) attitude index. The index is operationalised here as being comprised of attitudes to same-sex marriage equality, European integration, immigration and the environment. The chapters finds considerable variation in the meaning of left and right, even beyond that demonstrated by previous research, and intra-party variation in the level of agreement with specific policy proposals. There is also some evidence that these divisions are associated with the gender and age of respondents, particularly within the larger parties, supporting the theoretical link between descriptive and substantive representation.

Chapter 8 presents the overall conclusions of the thesis. The evidence presented in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 suggests that descriptive representation is more important for some groups in society over others. Gender has the strongest effect of these variables within parties, but that is not to say that if parties elect more women they will, on average, move attitudinally closer to voters. It is more likely that increased women's representation will increase the range of attitudes within parties without necessarily affecting the average position. Moreover, women are more likely to get gender specific issues on the political agenda. This is also the case for young people and representation and thus increasing the age distribution among elected

individuals should not be neglected by political parties. The chapter then suggests how research on the substantive representation of descriptive groups and other associated agendas in the Irish context might proceed. Finally, it outlines the implications of the study for the general political science community.

Section 7: Conclusion

This thesis addresses a persistent question political science; does the social bias of political institutions undermine the process of substantive representation? The thesis explores this question by appreciating the fact that party affiliation is the strongest predictor of attitudes within a representative assembly to focus on intra-party attitude variation. The investigation utilises data from interviews, surveys and parliamentary speeches. The thesis adds to the theoretical debate on representation by providing a nuanced view of the causal mechanism between socialisation experiences, party affiliation, attitudes and political behaviour. The Irish case provides an ideal testing ground for an explicit study of intra-party attitudes, as there is typically more attitudinal variation within parties than between them.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Abstract

This chapter provides a review of the literature on elite socialisation and political attitudes in the context of a theoretical framework on representation. The chapter begins by considering the importance of having a robust reflection of political attitudes in a representative assembly. It then identifies the likely cause of under-representation of political interests as being a result of the deficit in descriptive representation of minority groups. The implications of TDs' role orientations are then considered. The chapter then takes a wider view of intra-party attitudes to consider whether disagreement may exist between echelons of co-partisans, making the distinction between members of parliament, losing candidates, party identifiers and voters. The chapter then reviews the empirical findings of major studies that tested the link between descriptive and substantive representation. It concludes with a summary of hypotheses for the study.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Section 1: Introduction

This chapter discusses previous literature on political attitudes and representation to establish a theoretical framework for the analytical discussion. The previous chapter established the importance of studying intra-party attitude structures in the case of Ireland. This is found in the observation that ideological variance and political competition are more likely to occur within Irish parties than between them. The focus of the analysis then is to explain the attitudinal variation within parties with an emphasis on the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual politicians. The broad explanation is that intra-party attitude variance relates to the social make-up of the party. In political science terms, this means that the representation of substantive attitudes among social groups is dependent on their descriptive representation in parliament and parties. The implication being that the under-representation of certain social groups causes the Dáil to insufficiently represent the attitudes of the electorate.

Individuals tend to form their political attitudes through socialisation experiences and these experiences undoubtedly vary according to one's gender, age, education, class and residential setting. The question is whether these variables distinctively structure attitudes. It could be that each individual's life experience and political attitudes are so idiosyncratic that the variance appears to be random at the meso-level. This review begins by establishing the importance of increased focus on intra-party attitudes in political science. It then discusses the importance of theoretical models of representation to justify the focus on the link between descriptive representation and substantive representation.

The thesis also takes a wider view of intra-party attitudes beyond the elite level. It tests theories of intra-party attitudinal congruence between elites, party identifiers and voters. Thus, a discussion of the theoretical expectations of attitudinal congruence between levels of the party hierarchy follows. The thesis also examines the potential disconnect between private

attitudes as measured in anonymous surveys and public attitudes as expressed in parliamentary speeches. The purpose of making this distinction is to demonstrate that attitudes have a private and public dimension. Psychological theory would predict that while socialisation experiences may affect initial private attitudes, the strategic demands of public life potentially mitigate this effect. A discussion follows of the findings of previous research on these theoretical angles and a statement of hypothesis for the individual-level background variables. The final section summarises the discussion.

Section 2: Representation of substantive attitudes through descriptive representation

This section examines models of political representation and their implications for theorising the link between social background and intra-party attitudes in Ireland. It begins by outlining the enduring relevance of the descriptive under-representation puzzle and the theoretical link between demographic characteristics and political attitudes. This link is usually associated with Philips' (1995) theory on the *Politics of Presence*. It then discusses responsive models of representation, where the reflection of attitudes in the electorate is not dependent on descriptive representation, in the delegate model, or not the objective at all, as in the trustee model. It also discusses representation predicated on voters' support for policies put forward by parties but, as will be explained, this is insufficient to explain intra-party attitudes at the elite level. Finally, it examines the usefulness of May's Law as a tool for analysing attitudes at various levels of the party hierarchy.

A philosophical puzzle for centuries has been whether the dominance of demographic groups over political processes has any substantive effect. As early as the eighteenth century, Alexander Hamilton rebutted the notion that a legislative assembly consisting of particular classes, to the exclusion of others, could not adequately represent the interests of the society it governed. He argued in the Federalist Papers No. 35 (Hamilton *et al* 2009, 171) that an assembly comprised of " landholders, merchants, and men of

the learned professions" would adequately understand and attend to the feelings of all (occupational) "classes of citizens". The causal mechanism in Hamilton's logic is primarily that all industries are sufficiently inter-dependent that the interests of the mercantilist are aligned with the interests of the manufacturer. Moreover, "mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions or trades... They know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend." Despite the fact that Hamilton was arguing against the necessity for the descriptive representation of social groups in the assembly, the point of discussing his argument here is to demonstrate the longevity of the issue in political science.

In his writings on legislatures J.S. Mill also commented on the question of whether attitudinal clustering of social groups necessitates descriptive political representation. He claimed that a legislature should be "an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but every section of it, . . . can produce itself in full light" (Gray and Smith 1991, 116). Mill was not arguing for the descriptive representation of social groups in parliament as we would conceive of it today. However, he did consistently argue that the working classes should be enfranchised to some extent. Perhaps not given pure equality of the vote with upper classes, as "the workers' deficient education leaves them woefully unprepared to exercise power", but a voting system at most weighted in favour of the upper classes (Miller 2010, 182). For Mill, the upper classes were justified in their unequal political power, owing to their greater level of education and thus the ability to make more informed decisions for the benefit of all people. However, he thought the overall utility of society could only be increased by formally admitting the working classes into the political process.

The overall limitation here is that Hamilton and Mill were concerned, albeit from different angles, about representative imbalances between wealthy and less wealthy men. These were eras when women and minorities could not vote. In the modern context of enlarged electorates without much more

proportional descriptive representation, the potential democratic problem is even greater.

At the turn of the 20th century, the puzzle became more complex. Left-wing parties of varying extremes had evolved to represent the interests of the working classes. However, Robert Michels (1915, 215) noted that the leadership of Social Democratic parties was increasingly bourgeois. On its face, this dynamic appeared to be incongruent with the objective of representing working-class interests. If a party is mainly comprised by 'intellectuals' who do not share the socialisation experiences of those whose interests they are tasked with representing, the representatives may not act as faithfully as representatives do share the socialisation experiences of their party supporters would. However, Michels argued that the attitudes of bourgeois leaders of Social Democratic parties (bourgeois socialists) were unlikely to merely adhere to the right-leaning flank of left-wing parties, but would be characterised by a more passionate and idealistic leftism than their working-class colleagues. Conversely, the effect of taking paid employment in a party organisation would have a conservative effect on the attitudes of a working-class individual as his own livelihood depends on the organisational success of the movement rather than its ideological success.

Where Michels argued that the skills required to run an organisation will cause individuals to homogenise into an elite, other classical theorists such as Pareto argued that oligarchy is a consequence of the "unequal distribution of innate personal qualities" (Putnam 1976, 3). Mosca argued that societies, whether they are democratic or not, have two classes of people, "a class that rules and a class that is ruled" (Zuckerman 1977, 332). The emphasis of these authors is not to sow eternal fatalism, but to recognise the sometimes counter-intuitive effects of socialisation experiences on political attitudes. Ultimately though, there is much agreement among these philosophers that socialisation experiences are somehow related to political attitudes. This provides a philosophical justification for a modern study of the link between socialisation and attitudes.

The democratic puzzle addressed in this thesis is conceptualised around the idea of descriptive representation, where the political system proportionately comprises all broad demographic categories of people. The prominent thesis in descriptive representation studies is Anne Philips' *The Politics of Presence* (1995). Philips' argument is fundamentally that substantive representation is dependent on descriptive representation. When legislators are drawn from a narrow social pool, the range of policy considerations is similarly limited. Many of society's diverse views and attitudes are automatically excluded from the deliberative process on account of the absence or under-representation of certain groups in parliament and parties. Philips (1995, 168) is referring here to the exclusion of women, minority ethnic groups and any groups that that have come to see themselves as marginalized, silenced or excluded. Philips argues the most self-evident case is that of women's representation. Women make up fifty per cent of society yet typically make up a significantly smaller proportion of parliamentarians.

Descriptive representation can have further democratic benefits beyond the heightened likelihood of advancing salient substantive interests. Mansbridge (1999, 645) argues that political interests may not be crystallised on every issue at the point that voters authorise the representative to act for the descriptive group. In this context, the best way to have one's most important substantive interests represented is often to choose a representative whose descriptive characteristics match one's own. Then, as issues arise unpredictably, a voter can expect the representative to react more or less the way the voter would have done due to descriptive similarity (Mansbridge 1999, 644). Substantively, women legislators have typically been the ones to bring issues of sexual harassment and violence against women to the forefront of the political sphere, particularly when these issues had not been crystallised by the two main parties in the United States. Mansbridge (1999, 647) highlights the case of Illinois Commission on the Status of Women. Here a bipartisan legislative group, comprised entirely of women, proposed a bill of measures which, foremost among them, instituted the crime of rape in marriage. Mansbridge asserts that this descriptive effect on substantive issues has been evident in legislature after legislature.

There is a historical difficulty here when we are considering the substantive attitudes and interests of under-represented groups, particularly women, in the Irish case. Galligan *et al* (2000, 56) surveyed female TDs in the 1990s and discovered that they were unwilling to be typecast as speaking for women. Advocacy of women's issues was ranked seventh out of 14 policy areas. Nonetheless, from an objective standpoint, these TDs prioritised education, health, social affairs, and equality in their top five priorities – policy areas which, Galligan (2010, 282) argues, have particular implications for women.

If members of under-represented groups explicitly deny they are spokespeople for their group, it might lead one to dismiss the notion of studying the descriptive-substantive representation link within Irish parties. However, there is some evidence that the culture has changed with the election of the 31st Dáil. In her maiden speech to the House, newly-elected female TD Sandra McLellan unapologetically declared:

> "As a woman with a family I am acutely aware of the fact that, not only are women totally under-represented in politics, but also that we have borne the brunt of cutbacks and austerity measures foisted upon us by the previous government… I make a commitment to use my time as a deputy to stand up for women and to drive forward issues that are relevant to women in Ireland. Today, the political system is totally out of date … our political system is dominated by middle aged, middle class men in suits working for other middle aged middle class men in suits. We need real and radical reform (*Dáil Debates* 15/03/2011)".

Universally though, the link between descriptive representation and substantive attitudes in Philips' theory of the *Politics of Presence* is probabilistic rather than deterministic (Dodson 2006, 261; Wängnerud 2009, 59). Arguably, this is the case for all theories in the social sciences. The need to restate this in the case of descriptive representation theory owes to

the observation that institutional behaviour does not change as easily as its membership (Philips 1995, 83; Wängnerud 2009, 52).

Overall, the under-representation of social groups, particularly women, can potentially bias the distribution of attitudes of the political elite away from its 'reflective' state. Thus, there are two ways for descriptive representation to affect the substantive representation of social groups. First, the descriptive representative can bring an alternative view on issues in terms of agreeing or disagreeing with existing proposals. Second, the representative may assign higher priority to different issues even though attitudes between groups, such as men and women or middle and working class, on those issues may not differ substantially (Gordon and Whiteley, 1979, 113). One might argue that voters delegate this task of governing to a party based on ideological congruence rather than to individual representatives based on descriptive congruence. However, the Irish case makes these views less conflicting. The Irish electoral system allows voters to choose not only a party, but choose among candidates for the same party and across parties (Sinnott 2010, 117). Thus, a female voter could prioritise all the women on the ballot regardless of party, or prioritise parties as the basis for ranking candidates but rank female candidates highest within each group[1].

This review has so far emphasised a socio-psychological model of representation to explain the variation in intra-party attitudes. However, it begs the question where this model matters in democratic societies. Given that the minority groups referred to above, women, young people, the working class etc. all have the opportunity to vote, no major substantive interest would go neglected too long without an opportunistic politician discovering a political advantage in representing the substantive interests of a group, even if he is not a descriptive member of that group.

[1] I mention this purely for elaborating the theoretical possibilities though. McElroy and Marsh (2009, 832) found that Irish voters do not discriminate among candidates on the basis of gender.

Section 3: Role Orientations and Intra-party Attitudes

The importance of the socialisation effects on representatives' attitudes is intimately linked to the variety of role orientations which members of parliament can envisage for themselves. These role orientations have a conducive or constraining effect of the potential for the attitudes which representatives convey in parliament to be informed by their socialisation experiences. The range of role orientations, and the deliberation over which role type is most appropriate for representatives, is referred to as the mandate-independence controversy (Converse and Pierce 1986, 493). This study assumes that TDs' attitudes are independent of their constituents' views, allowing socialisation effects to be the most likely explanation of intra-party attitudes. The following discussion justifies this approach with reference to the relevant literature.

What is being proposed here is that representatives are 'trustees' of the public good in the Burkean tradition. This model reflects the 'independence' end of the mandate-independence controversy. The views of Edmund Burke on the role of the representative are commonly referred to as the origin of this line of political thought. Burke saw the representative and the institutions of the state as trustees of the people's welfare. However, he stopped short of declaring that the people should have formal input into public affairs. A legislator, in his view, should be extremely attentive to the wishes of the public but they should not sacrifice to them 'his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience' (Conniff 1977, 333). Burke based his opinions on what he saw as a population too poorly educated to understand and opine on the complexities of public administration. Moreover, he was not an advocate of remedying this situation. He was, however, a fierce advocate of legislators acting in the best interests of the population nationally. MPs should not, in his view be acting as local delegates, but as national representatives making policy in the best interests of the nation as a whole. The geographical origins of an MP's mandate should not restrict his actions in parliament.

The general hypothesis of this thesis rests on this 'trustee' model of MPs' role orientations. If MPs are not bound to represent the attitude of their

direct constituents, but rather their own attitude of what is best for their constituents, that attitude will not be a formed from a neutral consideration of all possible alternatives, but by their individual socialisation experiences. Moreover, attitudes within parties are thus clustered according to the similarity of socialisation experiences among the representatives of whom the party is comprised.

The remainder of this section outlines the arguments for the importance of institutional rather than socio-demographic representational linkages. Following that, I will discuss the social background variables included in the analysis and present previous evidence of the social background effect on the political attitudes of representatives.

The assumption of this thesis is that the attitudes of representatives on political issues matters for the purposes of formulating public policy outcomes. When it comes to influencing the direction of party policy, the representative has two options. She can represent her own view or the view of her constituents. In terms of representing a particular attitude within the legislature, she then has the additional option of representing her party's view. This theory of attitudinal relationships was most famously described by Miller and Stokes (1963, 50). The criticisms and alternative explanations of legislators' attitudes are discussed here to elucidate their implications, if any, for a model of Irish intra-party attitudes.

Critics of descriptive representation would argue that what matters for effective representation is not that the representative shares the socialisation experiences of those she represents, but that she has an institutional incentive to respond to the substantive interests of the under-represented. The leading author in this strain of literature was Hannah Pitkin. She insists that groups achieve substantive representation when representatives act "in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin 1967, 209). Pitkin places little emphasis here on descriptive representation for the simple reason that representatives cannot be held to account for their personal characteristics, only for what they have done as a representative.

There are thus several ways in which representatives can be sufficiently responsive to voters regardless of their own personal characteristics. They can faithfully represent those who voted for them, either on an individual basis or on a party basis. Alternatively, their attitudes can reflect their party's view, or the views of ordinary party members, where these views conflict with the attitudes of the party leadership. I will discuss these theoretical models and their implications for this research. The common thread in these models is that the socialisation experiences of legislators are relevant for the purposes of explain attitude formation and variation.

The first method of institutional responsiveness is for the representative to faithfully represent the average attitude of the voters in the district who voted for him. This is to disregard any party platform that may, in some instances, conflict with the preferences of the district. In the mandate-independence controversy (Converse and Pierce 1986, 493) this is the mandate side of the debate. It is also usually described as the delegate model of representation. Here, the representative merely relays the views of his constituents to the representative body, unfettered by his own opinion (Miller and Stokes 1963, 50). The representative is no more than a messenger of the people. McCrone and Kuklinski (1979, 298) argue that two conditions are necessary for delegate representation. First, the representative must think of himself as a delegate. Second, his constituency must organise to express their opinion. These cues must be consistent and the average cue is insufficient to ensure delegated representation. They conclude that delegated representation is unlikely to be entirely practicable. Only where a policy domain is salient, if the representative sees himself as a mere messenger of the people and his constituency provides adequate instruction is the model likely to work.

Even if a representative attempted to adhere to the 'delegate' model, a major issue arises in the task of interpreting constituent preferences. This is the distinction between 'absolute' and 'relative' policy preferences. The first assumes the preferences of legislators mirror the preferences of voters (Converse and Pierce 1986, 507). Absolute congruence occurs when the

preferences of voters and elites are perfectly aligned, for example, when both voters and the party favour the same level of spending in absolute dollar terms on a particular project. Voters who prefer a $7,000 of spending on a project will vote for the candidate or party who supports that same level of spending. Voters who prefer higher levels of spending, say $50,000 will support parties/representatives with similar absolute preferences. Elites' distance from voter opinion is then measured in terms of these figures. Alternatively, a measure of relative congruence (Golder and Stramski 2010, 94) would ignore absolute dollar terms and simply examine relative levels, so voters who prefer lower levels will support parties who also support low levels of spending, although the voter might prefer $7,000, the party might prefer $7 million. Similarly, a high preference for spending among voters might be $50,000 but realistically elites know that to complete the project takes much money and instead favour $50 million. This can also be applied to other attitudes such as left right self-placement, where all parties/candidates may be further left or right than voters, but the distributions are similar. So there is at least expected to be a positive relationship between voter/representative preferences, even if these are not absolutely congruent (Bouton and Page 2006, 82).

The delegate theory of representation faces further significant challenges in the Irish case and indeed others cases also. If TDs represent the attitudes of their constituents, the question arises; which constituents they should represent? In basic form Downs (1957, 137) hypothesised that parties compete ideologically to maximise votes, such that in a two party system where one seat is in competition, parties will converge on the median voter. This is due to the assumption that political preferences are transitive thus voters to the left of Party A, the left biased party, will not vote for the right biased party B, once Party A does not go further right than party B. With multiple seats in competition, there is greater scope for parties to represent the distribution of opinion among voters. Thus, the typical formulation of Downs' spatial model for PR systems would claim that parties have an incentive to distinguish themselves ideologically to prevent new competitor parties from shoring up support on the ideological extremes (Downs 1957,

144: Andrews and Money 2009, 815). If Irish representatives are delegates then, they are more likely delegates for their party rather than their geographic constituency. The larger parties are more likely to be responsive to the mean voter nationally, while smaller *niche* parties are more to likely to be closer to the mean voter for their party (partisan-constituency voter) (Ezrow *et al* 2011, 288).

However, this general rule of ideological party dispersion in PR systems is complicated further by the fact that the implementation of PR in Ireland includes the single transferable vote. In addition to giving high priority to party candidates or independents that rank high among their preferences, voters can also give lower and ultimately decisive preferences to less preferred candidates. Thus, all candidates have an incentive to appeal to all voters. This would have the centripetal effect of pulling all candidates, and thus parties, towards the mean or median voter. In this way, the system exhibits Downs' majoritarian effect of party competition and is an exception in PR systems (Mitchell 2003, 83).

This leads us to discuss the final model of representation. The responsible party model recognises the reality of political parties and the need for legislative cohesion. In this model of democracy, individual legislators vote with their party caucus as part of an "implicit contract with their supporters at the polls" (Converse and Pierce 1986, 500)[2]. In terms of the dichotomy between legislators acting in accordance with the will of their constituents (delegate model) or their best interests (Burkean independence model) the responsible party model is somewhat of a compromise between the two. The model typically focuses on legislative behaviour in the form of parties voting for legislative measures *en bloc*. One might then ask what, if any, implications the model might have for a study of attitudes, which may be sincerely held but strategically acted against in the legislature? If actors in a political system assume that voters vote for a party program they can also assume that they need not reflect the attitudes of their constituents, but of their party supporters. Moreover, at a causal level, if representatives assume

[2] See also Ranney 1954; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978, 230; Weissberg 1978; Wessels 1999, 137)

their responsibility is to be responsive to party voters, they will be more likely to come in contact with or 'socialise' with voters who support the party, which may have the effect of re-enforcing pre-existing attitudes. The net result is that the representative assembly is comprised of individuals who attitudinally reflect the preferences of their party supporters, even if opposing deputies share a geographical constituency with them.

The term 'party supporters' can be thought of two significantly distinct ways that may have implications when representatives' congruence with this group is referred. Party supporters may consist of, firstly, party identifiers (Campbell *et al* 1960, 120 ; Miller and Shanks 2006, 123; Lewis-Beck *et al* 2008, 112) and, secondly, voters who do not necessarily identify with the party but have voted for the party at least at the most recent election. Party identifiers are theoretically thought to hold stronger attitudes than voters, although a variety of relationships between elites, identifiers and voters can be imagined.

If identifiers do hold stronger attitudes and are more likely to communicate their views on policy issues to party elites, elites may in turn interpret those views as the position of their voters generally. May (1973, 135) made a distinction between "echelons of co-partisans" when he analysed intra-party attitudes. The echelons involved more formal attachment at the middle level than simply being party identifiers. He was interested in unelected formal party members. His 'law of curvilinear disparity' recognised that there is the potential for 'mid-level leaders' to be hold stronger attitudes than the general electorate.

Supposing there is a significant gap between the attitudes of identifiers and voters. This introduces a conflict for elites who, at the mass level, need many moderate individual voters' support at the polls to be elected but also need passionate and motivated party members to campaign on their behalf and sell their candidacy to the electorate. If the candidate is attitudinally closer to identifiers, he may be too far from voters' preferences and lose the election to an intra-party or inter-party challenger whose attitudes may be marginally closer to those of voters. If he is too far from identifiers, they

may not be too motivated about campaigning on his behalf and he may lose to a challenger who mounts a stronger campaign.

The evidence for the existence of May's law in practice is mixed. Kitschelt (1989, 420) found that it only applied to one of the two green parties in the Belgian case. Norris (1995, 47) found no clear tendency to an increased level of radicalism among party activists. Indeed, the top party leaders were the most radical group within the British parties, with activists positioned equidistant between elites and voters, in what could be described as a linear relationship between position in the hierarchy and attitude strength. In the absence of data on party members, party identification has also been used as a proxy for party membership to test for the existence of May's Law in the case of the largest Portuguese parties – the Partido Socialista and the Social Democratic Party. Belchior and Freire (2011, 56) found that May's Law is applicable in its entirety to the two Portuguese parties. Gallagher and Marsh (2002, 174) found that May's law is unlikely to apply in the case of Fine Gael.

Section 4: Empirical Research

As we shall see, many studies have shown that the party affiliation of a member of parliament is the strongest predictor of attitudes within parliaments. The implication is that there is more attitudinal variation between parties than within them and the importance of background variables reduces to insignificance. This section reviews the empirical findings of research on inter and intra-party attitude variation to establish hypotheses for this project. The section begins with an overview of what are the major divisions of inter-party competition. The left-right scale is an abstract concept that can be imposed on the observed dynamics of inter-party competition in a given polity. However, scientific inquiry would require some *a priori* definition of left/right party competition in order to provide a basis for comparative and intra-party analysis. We then evaluate the empirical findings from previous research in relation to the effects of social background on attitudes to establish hypotheses to test in the analysis.

This dominance of the party effect was evident in several studies both international and Irish. In Britain, being a conservative parliamentarian was correlated with right wing attitudes on the issues of left-right self-placement, social liberalism, post-materialism and feminism. Liberalism was measured as attitudes to homosexuals and "lack of respect among youth" (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 214). Similarly, in the Nordic countries conservative parties were more right-wing followed by populists, then Agrarians, Liberals and Christians. On the left of the divide were Green parties and Left Socialists. (Narud and Valen 2000, 93). Right and populist parties were less likely to demonstrate 'feminist' tendencies (Narud and Valen 2000, 138: 140)

From the outset this might not be the case in the Irish context as parties, particularly the historically biggest parties Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, are ideologically indistinguishable from one another (Weeks 2010, 141). This would imply that there would be more ideological variation to explain within parties than between them. O'Sullivan (2000, 232) concluded that party affiliation was a far more powerful predictor of policy stances than any socio-economic trait. Fianna Fáil TDs were the most right-wing and socially conservative party, being unfavourable towards tax increases, legalising marijuana and abortion, and more favourable to reducing the number of immigrants. Fine Gael TDs were, on average, centrist on these issues while Labour TDs were significantly opposed to Fianna Fáil's positions on tax increases, immigrants and abortion. They were also more favourable towards trade unions thus they could be described as economically 'left-wing and socially liberal'. The following discussion of the effects of background should be taken with the caveat that party is the greatest predictor of attitudes within parliaments. I take the modest results with regard to background variables to hypothesise the direction of the effect of these variables within parties. The 'intra-party' inference is partly based on the statistical approach to the quantitative data outlined in Chapter 3.

The demographic characteristic of greatest significance in representation studies is gender. Thus, I will discuss the relevant literature and empirical

findings thoroughly with regard to the gender variable and outline the findings for other social background factors summarily. The imbalance between the descriptive representation of men and women in parliaments worldwide is stark. Women make up only 21% of parliaments across the world and 25% of parliaments in Europe (www.ipu.org). Therefore any study of the relationship between social backgrounds and political attitudes generally prioritises a discussion of differentiations between male and female parliamentarians. The implication is that attitudinal differences are important because significantly divergent attitudes are under-represented in the deliberative democratic process. While a discussion of political attitudes would usually begin with the most salient issues in a polity, such as economic left-right attitudes, it would thus be logical to examine the issues on which the highest level of divergence between men and women.

Female attitude positions could be expected to diverge from males' attitudes on issues which more directly affect women. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 219) concretise the hypothesis that female attitudes may prove more distinctive in the area of 'feminist' values. These authors explain that many of the concerns of the women's movement – such as reproductive rights, domestic violence and rape – raise moral questions which cut across traditional party lines. Legislation (or lack thereof) on abortion and rape-in-marriage was historically formulated by men and tended to de-emphasise the agency of women. Marital rape was a particularly serious issue and was not a crime until very recently[3].

Norris and Lovenduski's (1995, 218) feminist index incorporated attitudes towards equal opportunities for women in the form of affirmative action policies, the availability of abortion on the NHS, the right to abortion within the first trimester, punishments for domestic violence, and the aforementioned rape in marriage. They found that women that within each party were more feminist due to their higher likelihood over men of supporting the above-mentioned policies. This gap over-rode traditional inter-party divisions as Conservative women were more feminist than

[3] Marital rape was criminalised in the Nordic countries in the 1970s, and in all 50 US states by the 1990s, and in England, Wales, and Ireland in the 1990s.

Liberal Democratic men. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 215) also found that women in the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties were more left-wing than men, though there were no significant differences within the Labour party. The liberal-authoritarian scale was also examined here. They hypothesised, given the experience of many women as the main 'carers' within the family and responsibility for children and elderly parents, that women are more 'tender' than 'tough' on moral values, such as tolerance of minority rights, respect for authority, and opposition to the death penalty. Post-materialist values included support for sexual and racial equality, and the protection of the environment, while opposing the deployment of troops. However, they did not discover any gender differences on items related to the liberal-authoritarian scale or their 'post-materialist' scale. Norris and Lovenduski's study nonetheless showed that women were more 'feminist' and left-wing than men within their own parties and in some instances across parties.

The politics of presence was tested on the attitudes among Nordic MPs most notably by Wängnerud (2000a 67; 2000b, 132) and Narud and Valen (2000, 83). The theory was strongly supported by Wängnerud's (2000a, 67) study of policy priorities and issue attitudes among Swedish MPs and voters. Here, while male and female voters in late 80s Sweden had similar top priorities in the form of jobs and the environment, female voters placed higher relative priority on social policy and health care Wängnerud (2000a 73). Substantively, female MPs were more in favour of promoting gender equality policies in society and in parliament than men. The effect of gender on the 'equality in parliament' item was greater than the effect of party affiliation. Female MPs also strongly emphasised gender equality policies, such as sex discrimination and affirmative action, and social welfare policies. However, the gender gap on the latter item has closed over the period of the study (1985-1994). While the emphasis of this study was on policy priorities, gender differences on substantive attitudes were also evident.

Comparatively, Wängnerud (2000b, 141) found that there were gender divisions between male and female MPs' attitudes across the Nordic

countries. Female MPs demonstrated greater support for gender equality and quotas for women in politics. One caveat here is that despite the significant gender division, party affiliation was a much stronger predictor of attitudes. Whether this is because women are better represented in the leftist parties is not entirely clear, so the author could be under-selling her results. If women are more likely to stand in elections for leftist parties because they are more receptive to gender equality policies, then the fundamental cause of the observed divisions is gender rather than party. Furthermore, female MPs have a much greater tendency to report regular contact with women's organisations and focused on parliamentary work with a bearing on gender equality Wängnerud (2000b, 143).

Narud and Valen (2000, 83) found that gender was the strongest indicator of attitudes across six attitude items. These patterns supported those found by Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 218) in that female Nordic MPs are more 'leftist' than men and 'feminist' as measured by their support for introducing women's quotas for higher positions and being more 'sceptical' about pornography. However, where Norris and Lovenduski found no effect of gender on 'post-materialist' issues Narud and Valen (2000, 92) found even greater support for the 'politics of presence'. Nordic female MPs were found to be more pro-environment on the similarly constructed 'new politics' index as they tended to support prohibiting cars in cities. Moreover, though there is a consistent tendency for voters' attitudes to be better represented by MPs of their own gender this tendency is less regular for women than men.

More recently Heider and Pederson (2006, pp. 192-218) conducted a comprehensive study on the intra-party effects of gender among party activists in Denmark and Norway. Although this is not a study of parliamentarians' attitudes, its sensitivity to intra-party divisions makes it worth referencing. These authors tested the effect of gender on a range of salient political issues. Across 15 parties and seven policy issues (105 observations), a quarter of these demonstrated significant differences between men and women. They argue that these findings makes the case for the existence of 'party feminism' – parties become more female friendly in

policy terms as more women join them. The evidence presented here seems somewhat strained though. Women were more left wing than men in left wing parties in Denmark but this dynamic was not significant for right-wing parties or Norwegian parties (Heider and Pederson 2006, 204). The substantive issues with the most striking gender differences were on crime prevention and European Integration/Membership. Danish women were much more likely to favour crime prevention measures than prison (a socially liberal stance) across all of the parties. Only in Norway's Christian People's party was the difference significant (Heider and Pederson 2006, 204). Overall, though, the effects of gender vary for almost every party across Denmark and Norway.

Studies of the U.S. Congress provide much of the basis for political science. However, the findings of the most prominent studies of gender differences in Congress are not directly applicable for institutional and methodological reasons. The first issue is that operation of Congress differs from other parliamentary systems in that the party whip is much less effective in the former than the latter[4]. This is because the legislature is much more powerful in relation to the executive and legislators do not aspire to get into cabinet. Thus, the executive implicitly threatening to withhold ministerial positions to rebels is not likely to make much difference to their legislative behaviour. Secondly, individual attitudes are inferred from the comparatively less cohesive voting patterns on legislation. However, untangling the alternative explanations of personal attitudinal influence and constituency influences makes clear inference about personal attitudes difficult to achieve here. As such, the findings regarding gender differences have been weak at best in the U.S. case.

In one of the original studies of the gender effects on roll-call voting Welch (1985, 132) found that female members of the House of Representatives across four congresses consistently voted in a more liberal direction than men, but the differences have decreased over time and were negligible

[4] Mellors (1978, 4) also drew attention to Hugh Berrington's study of attitudinal inferences from behavioural measures in the British case with his analysis of MPs signatures on Early Day Motions. These are typically social policy measure that are less affected by the party whip, thus providing a measure of intra-party attitudes.

among northern Democrats. Consistent with these findings, Vega and Firestone (1995, 215) found that gender differences in congressional voting were insignificant until 1991 and 1992 at which point they female legislators exhibited a more liberal voting pattern. They also found that congressional women introduced women-related legislation proportionate to their number. Recent studies also present mixed results. Griffin *et al* (2012, 35) found that the descriptive representation of women in Congress has no effect on substantive representation in the congresses correlated with George W. Bush's presidency (2001-2008). Frederick (2013, 16) generally concludes that gender exerts minimal influence on how legislators cast their votes but adds the caveat that female Republican senators are noticeably more liberal than all Republicans in the House and male Republicans in the Senate.

The evidence on gendered difference among Irish TDs is also mixed. In stark contrast to these studies of in similarly constituted polities, O'Sullivan's (2002, 106) findings diverge from the international pattern outlined in the previous mentioned studies. Female TDs were more likely to be more economically and socially conservative than male TDs. Here, women were more likely to agree that; trade unions are too powerful; there were too many immigrants in Ireland; and that Ireland should join the partnership for peace. The latter item was employed by O'Sullivan (2002, 106) as measure of latent attitudes to militarism with greater support for the policy indicating militaristic attitudes.

The average age of members in legislatures is much higher than the society they represent, even when the age restrictions for office are taken into account. In Phillips' formulation of the problem of under-representation of social groups, age is arguably as 'self-evident' an issue as gender, though she does not prioritise it at all. It is reasonable to assume that the priorities and attitudes of older generations nearing retirement will differ from younger generations. This may be a function of the needs and demands of the older community or early socialisation experiences of the older generation being a product of cultural values which have changed since. In Britain and the Nordic countries, youth was associated with more social

liberal policy stances among MPs (Mellors 1978, 120; Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 216: Narud and Valen 2000, 102). Conversely, in Ireland younger TDs were found to have a more conservative tendency than their older colleagues (O'Sullivan 2002, 107).

Attaining higher education was described by Inglehart (1970, 69) as a process of cognitive mobilisation, which served to develop and strengthen attitudes. Although Converse and Pierce (1986, 613) focused primarily on institutional relationships between voters and MPs, the limited evidence they found prompted them to take the education level of French deputies into account. Given the relatively higher level of education among deputies compared to the population, they found that deputies were attitudinally congruent with higher educated voters. The average discrepancy between deputies and the most educated six percent of voters on the thirteen policy issues was lower (0.24) than between deputies and the total electorate (0.44). The policy congruence literature assumes that some level of communication between constituents and representatives is necessary. Marsh's (1980, 59) statement that such communication is easiest between groups who share social background lends credence to Converse and Pierce's conclusion and further justifies the study of the social background of parliamentarians. Narud and Valen (2000, 92) and O'Sullivan (2002 107) also tested the effect of education on attitudes. In the Nordic countries higher educated MPs were more 'conservative' in that they were favour of reducing the number of refugees their countries accept. However, those with a university degree in the Irish case were more 'liberal' in that they were likely to disagree with joining the "Partnership for Peace" and that there is too many immigrants in the country while they supported liberalising the laws on marijuana.

Occupational class (Hooghe *et al* 2007, 330) and geographical background are usually considered after gender and age. In terms of occupation there is a hierarchical class-based operationalisation with, broadly, professionals on the "higher" end and manufacturing and manual workers on the "lower" end (Whyte 1974, 631). Typically, professionals are akin to the bourgeoisie and are more likely to hold economically right-wing attitudes, favouring lower

taxes and lower public spending. Lower classes, more likely the recipients of state spending on welfare and less likely to trust the market forces to provide public service are generally more likely to hold attitudes opposing those of the professionals. Farmers are a separate significant category with their own intra-group divisions between large and small farmers. Mellors (1978, 122) and Marsh (1980, 59) found, particularly in the British Labour party, that those from professional occupations were liberal on humanitarian and third world issues while working class MPs were ideologically moderate. This "material leftism" left them being slightly to the right of professionals on the broad ideological spectrum. However, Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 224) found that occupational class was not related to British MPs' social values, policy priorities, or legislative roles. In the Nordic countries lower occupation MPs are to the left of those from higher occupations on the left-right self-placement question and 'new politics' indices. (Narud and Valen 2000, 92).

In the Irish case O'Sullivan (2002, 109) found that individuals with the higher professional occupational backgrounds are more liberal in that they are less likely to agree with tougher action against criminals and job creation at the cost of the environment and more likely to favour decriminalisation of marijuana. The evidence for slightly lower occupational non-manual workers is slightly mixed. They were more socially conservative in that they were likely to agree with tougher action against criminals and that job creation should be prioritised over the environment, but at the same time favoured decriminalisation of marijuana. Farmers were the most distinctly right-wing conservative occupational group being most in favour of Ireland joining the "Partnership for Peace", against the decriminalisation of marijuana and in favour of tougher action against criminals. Farmers were also less likely to favour tax increases.

Regional variation in attitudes can be conceptualised as a distinct explanation from constituency congruence. Congruence measures do not take account of how the type of constituency causes the variation in inter-constituency opinion. Thus, we can consider geographical regions as a background variable rather than institutional variable. Urban and rural

populations have been shown to hold significantly different attitudes on a range of issues. Operationalised as a centre/periphery variable Valen, Narud and Hederson (2000, 120) found significant regional attitudinal differences on various items, though no consistent overarching ideological pattern emerges. Periphery voters (those who live significantly outside the capital area) in Norway and Sweden were less in favour of reducing the size of the public sector, while Danish periphery voters were more in favour of reducing it. Periphery voters in Iceland, Norway and Sweden are less favourable towards the EU, while periphery MPs are less in favour in Norway and Sweden (Valen, Narud and Hederson 2000, 125). In Ireland, rural TDs were, like farmers, more socially conservative, favouring tougher action against criminals, against a pro-choice position on abortion and the decriminalisation of marijuana, and in favour of the "Partnership for Peace". However, these effects were statistically weak (O'Sullivan 2002, 112).

Overall, international studies have shown that attitudes vary according to the descriptive characteristics of members of under-represented groups. However, the evidence in the Irish case seems to be in opposing attitudinal direction. Younger, less educated and lower occupational TDs tend to be more conservative than their colleagues from dominant social groups. The patterns for female Irish TDs are consistent with international findings. Table 2.1 below outlines the hypotheses to be tested for the effect of background variables drawn from this literature review.

Table 2.1 - Hypothesised relationships between social background characteristics and intra-party attitudes

Independent Variable	*Hypothesis*
Gender	Female politicians are more economically left-wing and socially liberal than males.
Age	Younger politicians more economically right-wing and socially conservative than older politicians.
Education	Politicians *without* a university degree a more economically right-wing and socially conservative than those with a degree.
Class	Politicians from lower socio-economic backgrounds are slightly more economically moderate and socially conservative than those from upper professional backgrounds.
Class	Politicians from farming backgrounds are very economically right-wing and more socially conservative than other occupational groups.
Rural	Politicians from rural backgrounds are more economically right-wing and socially conservative than those from urban backgrounds.
Hierarchy	TDs and voters are ideologically moderate compared to mid-level leaders.

Section 5: Conclusion

The literature on the effect of social background on the attitudes of representatives is vast. I have presented a selection of works that have guided the construction of my research design. As part of that process, I have outlined research that has direct implications for my own investigation. However, I have also discussed lines of inquiry that are not as relevant purely for the purposes of justifying their exclusion in the formulation of my hypotheses. The interested reader may have raised several concerns if the discussion had omitted prominent works often discussed in tandem with my primary line of inquiry on the relationship between social background characteristics and the attitudes of parliamentarians. I will briefly conclude by summarising the discussion.

The chapter began with a theoretical outline of the problem of under-representation of significant social groups. The assumption here is that identifiable group social membership is associated with substantive political interests. Thus to be under-represented in the political membership of a representative assembly or party may result in the under-representation of substantive interests in legislative outcomes. Worse still, policies may be enacted which are explicitly against the substantive interests of under-represented groups. However, this project is not concerned with legislative outcomes, merely how elite intra-party attitudes are structured. Ultimately, the study will investigate whether intra-party attitudes are random or structured according to social background characteristics. The evidence as to the effect to individual characteristics on attitudes within parties internationally and in Ireland is at times conflicting. It is reasonably well recognised that women tend to be more left-wing and socially liberal than men. The chapter hypothesised that individuals from the under-represented ends of the age, class and education spectrums would likely be more right-wing and conservative in the Irish case.

To simply discuss social background variations as an explanation for intra-party attitude variation would have biased the discussion away from some significant assumptions underlying political science. The chapter explained

how legislators have an institutional incentive to respond to their constituents, and thus legislators may strategically reflect their views, if they did not do so by default. Pertinently, voters have the opportunity at elections to choose representatives who are attitudinally closest to them, so even if representative do not seek to be delegates of their constituency, their attitudes should correlate with those of their constituents owing to their shared geographical origins. The institutional hypothesis here might be intra-party attitude variation is explicable by variation in the preferences of geographical constituencies. However, I explained why this is unlikely to the case in Ireland as TDs have the opportunity to represent diversity in constituency opinion through the mechanism of multi-seat districts. It is more likely that representatives reflect the view of their party voters. However, the variation in attitudes within parties cannot be explained by a single value such as the position of the "median party voter". Variation in social background characteristics is the only basis on which intra-party variation could reflect the variation in voter opinion and thus the project restricts itself to this line of inquiry. Attitudes within parties are either random or structured according to variation in social background variables.

In the next chapter I discuss the process of selecting and collecting data on the private and public attitudes of the Irish political elite.

CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHOD

Abstract

This chapter discusses and justifies the sources of data employed by the project and the methodological approach of the analysis for this thesis. The chapter first outlines the data options available at the outset of the project. It then discusses the processes of collecting the primary data in the form of the Irish component of the Comparative Candidate Survey 2011, one-to-one interviews with TDs and collating parliamentary speeches from the online Oireachtas database. Following this, there is an explanation of the construction of the empirical dependent variables beyond simple survey responses. These include the coding procedure for interview statements, measures of absolute and relative congruence and *Wordscores*. The chapter then presents the distribution of the independent variables across the data sources, including the secondary sources of the Irish National Election Survey (INES) and the comparative PartiRep dataset. The chapter concludes with a justification of the statistical approach to the analysis of the quantitative data to make inferences about intra-party effects of the independent variables.

CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHOD

Section 1: Introduction

This chapter details the mechanics of answering the research question. It outlines the choices available for measuring attitudes and the research techniques employed for this dissertation. It outlines the advantages and disadvantages of each data source and discusses the analytical techniques and statistical methods employed by the thesis. The analytical techniques are specific to each substantive chapter while the statistical methods are used throughout three of the four substantive chapters.

The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a justification of Ireland as a case selection and a brief overview of the available choices for collecting data on intra-party attitudes. Section 3 discusses the processes I undertook to collect and compile the data. Section 4 outlines the distribution of the independent variables across the data sources. The purpose of this is also to demonstrate the extent to which elected party members are unrepresentative of voters in terms of some social background characteristics. Section 5 details the analytical approaches applied to the data. Section 6 justifies and explains the statistical modelling technique applied to the quantitative data. This has important implications for the process of making 'intra-party' inferences throughout the thesis.

Section 2: Case selection and Choices for Data Collection

The Republic of Ireland is an interesting case for a study of the link between descriptive representation and political attitudes in the comparative context. There has typically been more ideological variance within Irish parties than between them. Many international studies note how the strength of party affiliation in other countries overwhelms the effect of social background on attitudes. Parties usually act as a mechanism to sort like-minded people, regardless of background, into groups prepared to take legislative action. Part of the explanation for the deviance of the Irish case is the electoral system. PR-STV incentivises parties to appeal to all voters in order to attract lower preferences. This leads to a minimisation of ideological polarisation between parties. But ideological variance exists among voters and the

parties can better cater to these attitudes on an intra-party basis than inter-party basis. Thus, the opportunity to measure social background effects on attitudes are maximised on an intra-party basis.

Moreover, proportional electoral systems are said to be conducive to the expression of a variety of alternative views and providing opportunities for under-represented groups to be elected (McAllister and Studlar 2002, 12). Indeed, PR-STV incentivises candidates to build up a strong local reputation to garner votes outside those guaranteed from partisan loyalties (McGing 2013, 325). Candidates have an incentive to differentiate themselves somehow from their intra-party competitors. Theoretically, one way of doing this may be to offer substantive representation of attitudes to descriptive groups. Some anecdotal evidence of this was provided in chapter 2 with the quote from Sandra McLellan TD. While the remainder of this chapter explains the nuances of testing and drawing inferences about social background effects, it is sufficient to say here that we would generally expect the effects of social background to be larger than those observed in international studies. To mark out a reference point from the empirical studies referred to in chapter 2, a strong, significant background effect would be a difference of 2.1 points on a ten-point left-right scale, with the social background aspect of the model explaining less than 20% of the variance (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 214: Narud and Valen 2000, 96). The implication of a positive finding in this regard is that descriptive representation is particularly important when the electoral system is conducive to the expression of political alternatives other than party. The Irish case maximises the opportunity detect a link between descriptive representation and political attitudes and draw conclusions for the benefit of political science generally.

The opportunities for primary research and the availability of comparable secondary data for this project were nothing short of exciting. The feasibility of exploring the big questions of attitudes and representation in Irish politics with reasonable accuracy would have been impossible for a graduate thesis prior to the establishment of the Irish National Election

Survey for the 2002 general election and each election since. O'Sullivan (2002, 51) details her difficulties collecting comparable data on Irish voters and elite attitudes from inconsistent sources. Systematic studies of Irish political elites were conducted following the 2007 and 2011 elections under the banner of the Comparative Candidates Survey. Rich comparative data sources have also become available in the form of the PartiRep survey. Moreover, the publication of parliamentary debates on the internet, and the relatively simple process of collating and analysing them, made these another feasible data source to incorporate into the thesis. They make a further theoretical contribution because they occupy a slightly more advanced position on the spectrum of attitudes and behaviour. Thus, we can evaluate the impact of social background on attitudes when a significant strategic element is introduced. Roll call voting in parliament consistent with Poole and Rosenthal (1991, pp. 228-278) or Benedetto and Hix (2007, pp. 755-781) was not an option because parliamentary parties vote *en bloc* in the Irish parliament, even more so than British parties, leaving no residual variance for individual-level analysis.

In addition to these existing data sources, I also constructed my own data source based on interviews with members of the Irish parliamentary parties. This included 81 interviews with members of the Dáil and Seanad. The purpose of this additional data-gathering exercise was to examine whether responses to survey questions accurately captured the aggregate attitudes of the parties on political issues. Mail surveys limit the range of questions that can be asked as they lend themselves to more brief and closed questions (Blair 1999,101-121), In addition, face-to-face meetings provide the interviewer with the opportunity to note an individual's body language and demeanour, observe that individual in his or her environment and clarify and follow-up responses where necessary (Manheim and Rich 1995, 143)

With three major surveys covering voters since 2002, elites since 2007 and parliamentary debates from 1922, there was also an opportunity to conduct time-series analysis. However, on the advice of my supervisor and departmental colleagues, I decided from the outset to examine the Irish

political system at a snapshot in time, that being the first two years of the 31st Dáil. Most of the data was collected within the months following the 2011 election. The interviews took place a year after the election and some of the parliamentary debates up to nearly two years after the election. Nonetheless, all of the data analysed in this project are considered to be drawn from one electoral snapshot, thus no time-series issues are considered to apply.

Section 3: Data Collection

Primary and secondary data sources are used throughout this thesis. I will briefly define these classifications. Primary data sources are those for which I had direct involvement in the generation of the data. The 2011 Irish component of the Comparative Candidate Survey and the qualitative interviews are within this category. While I collected and prepared the parliamentary debates for the purposes of this thesis, the data was generated independently and freely available on the internet, and are thus categorised as secondary data. Though I do not claim the debates data as a primary source, some notable effort was expended on my part to organise the data. This process will also be documented here. As I had no part in compiling them, I categorise The Irish National Election Study 2002-2011 (INES) and the PartiRep data as secondary. I will discuss the data collection process in the order in which they were introduced in this paragraph. I then provide a brief overview of the INES and PartiRep data sources.

In 2010, prior to any definitive rumblings of a general election in Ireland, it was agreed between my doctoral supervisor, Prof. Michael Gallagher, and I that there was an opportunity to conduct a thesis on the structure of attitudes within Irish political parties. We agreed that the primary data for the project would be drawn from an effort on my part to conduct approximately 50 interviews, similar to the approach of O'Sullivan (2002, 53). All Irish TDs were to be targeted for inclusion in the project with the goal of obtaining a representative sample of the variation in party affiliation, position in the hierarchy of Dáil Éireann and social background characteristics. It is entirely unlikely that 100% response rate would be obtained and I decided

that 50-60 interviews would be sufficient to maximise generalisability. However, as I was in the process of drafting my research design, a complementary opportunity presented itself.

(i) Comparative Candidate Survey

Having lost the support of Dáil Éireann in early 2011 the Irish government resigned and an election was held on February 25th. Prof. Michael Marsh and Dr. Gail McElroy approached another PhD student, Laura Schwirz, and I to administer a module of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) in the wake of the election. Having inspected the standardised CCS survey questions put to candidates in the previous Irish election, and to candidates for national elections throughout Europe, and the relevance of them to my own project, I could not turn down the opportunity to be involved in the project. The data collected by us were perfectly suited to my thesis and as such, I took a lead role in administering the survey and full responsibility for compiling the completed dataset.

In the absence of the general election and the CCS, I may have surveyed TDs prior to conducting interviews, but I know that it would not have been to the same standard as it is where Prof. Marsh and Dr. McElroy involved. My project benefitted further as many respondents indicated difficulties with question wordings on their survey booklets and I then had the opportunity to tweak the standardised question wordings and add additional relevant questions to my qualitative interview schedule. I am certain that my involvement in the CCS significantly increased my knowledge of survey design and developed my practical research abilities. I am grateful to Prof. Marsh and Dr. McElroy for putting their trust in me to carry out the task. I will discuss the data collection process in order of primary to secondary data by chronological order.

The administration of the CCS was a considerable task. At 566, more candidates ran for a seat in Dáil Éireann than ever before, the previous record set in 1997 with 484 (Gallagher 2011, 139). The aim was to survey every candidate who put themselves up for election to Dáil Éireann in 2011.

Although the main political parties carefully planned how many candidates to run in each constituency, with Fianna Fáil scaling back their numbers from 2007 and Labour and Fine Gael increasing their numbers in anticipation of electoral swing towards them, there was also a surge of independents. Ultimately, the CCS is primarily interested in party candidates, but every effort was made to survey all candidates. The survey achieved a response rate of 44%, equating to 249 surveys. Of these 30% won election to the Dáil equating to 75 surveys.

In the month following the election, the first part of the administration of the survey was to collect as close to a home address as possible for each candidate. Some candidates were newly elected or re-elected TDs with Leinster House addresses and constituency offices. More still were local councillors with traceable offices in local authority buildings. However, Prof. Marsh advised that candidates are more likely to respond if a survey is sent to their home address. This information was generally available for most candidates as it is a requirement of Irish electoral law to publish a home address next to the candidate's name on the ballot. The election websites of the Newstalk radio station (www.newstalk.ie) and the national broadcaster RTÉ (www.rte.ie) were valuable sources for this information. I also found copies of current and previous national ballots, and previous local election ballots from many constituencies. It is common that individuals running in a general election will have run either in previous general elections or local elections. Assuming these had changed little since the last national and local elections, we used these sources for candidates' addresses where more up to date information was not available.

The initial dispatch of 491 surveys resulted in 150 responses. 76 candidates were not sent a survey in the first round because we had a lot of difficulty getting an address for them. They were sent a survey in the second round where I also sent a second survey to non-respondents from the first round. For a handful of individuals, no address could be obtained. This resulted in a further 99 surveys being returned, bringing the total to 249. In total, approximately 750 survey booklets were administered by the team.

I took full responsibility for inputting the survey responses into an excel spreadsheet. The process took approximately 20 minutes to complete per survey and thus approximately 80 hours to complete the dataset. I also compiled an accompanying codebook and descriptive statistics for each of the questions, as was done for the Irish CCS in 2007.

This process made me sensitive to the behaviour of respondents and inconsistencies throughout the survey became very clear. I noticed how respondents may have misinterpreted the response items. Some respondents also wrote advice as to how the questions could have been better worded. For example, a question on protecting the environment was posed as a zero-sum trade-off between economic prosperity and economic growth. This prompted many respondents (even outside the Green party) to comment on their survey booklet that protecting the environment and economic growth are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, quite the contrary according to some.

(ii) Elite Interviews[1]

The candidate survey was completed on 29th September 2011. I then began work on organising interviews with TDs. I thought there might be some initial turbulence if I started to implement an interview schedule with TDs. I decided that it is justifiable to include Senators in the process. Although they are not elected by a popular vote, they are members of their respective parliamentary parties and thus entitled to attend and contribute to their party's parliamentary party meetings. However, a subtle hierarchy does exist between TDs and Senators, with the latter being at the bottom. Nevertheless, to get experience in scheduling and conducting interviews, I thought it would be worthwhile to interview a representative sample of Senators.

[1] Due to the complexity of the process of collecting this data, this section is considerably longer than the other sub-sections under the heading of data collection.

I sent a letter to each of the 60 members of Seanad Éireann in November 2011 inviting them to participate in my study with a 45 minute interview. I sent the same invitation to 165 members of Dáil Éireann in March 2012. I excluded the Ceann Comhairle, Seán Barrett TD, out of respect to the independence of his position (MacCarthaigh and Manning 2011, 170). I guaranteed that responses would only be reported in a way that would protect their anonymity. So while I may attribute a quote to being from a female senator, I would not, for example, refer to all of her characteristics by saying 'young, female, Labour senator based in Cork North West'. This would be to identify them in all but name. I mentioned in the invitation letter that I would be following up by email, thereby to put the onus on me to make further arrangements. However, many TDs and Senators responded to the letter by email or telephone before I had an opportunity to follow up. 31 Senators (52%) agreed to participate in the study. Due to the difficulties agreeing a specific time for the interviews, only 23 (38%) of these actually took place. Five Senators declined to participate and 24 did not respond. 68 TDs (41%) agreed to participate and 58 (35%) interviews were successfully arranged. 21 TDs declined to participate and the remaining 77 did not respond.

Of those who initially agreed to participate following the letter or follow up email, but who ultimately did not, the interviews fell through because of their busy schedules. Two TDs asked me to contact their *constituency* offices to schedule an interview in Leinster House. These were unsuccessful as I found these staff much more difficult to deal with. They were much less interested in accommodating a researcher than the political staff at Leinster House.

TDs and Senators are extremely busy seven days a week. To maximise their convenience and the potential for their participation, and as I live in North Dublin and can drive, I offered to meet TDs based in Dublin and the surrounding counties in their constituency offices. Ironically, I arranged these meetings with the TDs personally through email or on the telephone and did not have to interact with their constituency office staff save for

when I showed up for the meeting, at which point I found them to be extremely helpful and accommodating. 4 interviews were conducted this way. One was conducted in a coffee shop next door to a TDs constituency office, as her staff did not arrive on time that morning with the office keys. In another instance a Dublin-based Senator suggested that *he* drive to my hometown of Lusk on a Monday, when the Seanad is not in session, for a meeting in a local coffee shop, which he subsequently did.

The remaining 76 interviews took place in Leinster House. Many took place within the private confines of TDs' and Senators' offices. A sizeable proportion took place in the public areas of Leinster House. The Dáil bar and the 'LH2000' coffee dock, in the newer building attached to Leinster House, were frequent interview venues. One interview took place in the hall at the entrance to the Seanad, as the Senator was concerned about being called to a vote on short notice. I used a digital recorder to document the interviews and received respondents' expressed permission to do so, albeit with the guarantee of confidentiality. I had been aware that recording is not permitted in the public areas of Leinster House and asked respondents could we conduct the interview in their private offices. When I mentioned to TDs and Senators that it would be difficult for me to record their responses by hand, were the interview to be conducted in a public area, they indicated that recording was permitted in these areas with the interviewees' consent. Thus some interviews took place in the public areas around Leinster House.

I had initial concerns that conducting the interviews in public areas may have had the effect of making respondents less forthcoming with information for fear of being overheard. However, after a few interviews it became clear that the effect of holding them in public areas was only to make participants more likely to talk in timid tones, rather than withhold information. Overall, I found participants were surprisingly comfortable answering the questions.

At this point many TDs mentioned the historical incident where Brian Lenihan Snr.'s 1990 presidential ambitions were heavily damaged by an

academic who released the contents of an interview conducted for the purpose of an academic thesis, although this academic claimed that the interview was on-the-record. The tape from four years previous contradicted Lenihan's more recent public statements that he had not, while in opposition in 1982, tried to influence the actions of the President. Such an action is highly unconstitutional. Although this incident was mentioned by a considerable number of TDs, only one was seriously concerned about having the interview taped. This respondent reluctantly agreed to have the interview taped after he retrieved my initial letter, signed by me, explicitly guaranteeing confidentiality.

The average interview was approximately 40 minutes in length. The interviews with Senators were slightly longer because I was testing many different interview questions. Although my letter requested an hour's time with each respondent, I gave them an opportunity to define the parameters of the interview at the outset of each interview. If they mentioned they had only 30 minutes to give me, I stopped the interview after that amount of time had elapsed and asked whether they wanted to finish or could I ask a few more questions to round off the interview. Some respondents were happy to talk at length and I continually asked if they would allow me to ask more questions, so that they did not feel trapped. One Senator did become fatigued and took the opportunity to end the interview before completion of the question schedule, partly due to his inclination to give long, detailed answers, but also due to my initial lack of discipline in the number of questions being asked. That being said, the interview was 65 minutes old at that stage and it was 6pm in the evening, so his fatigue was understandable. One TD declared at the outset that she only had 30 minutes to spare. She was still talking 75 minutes later! I reasoned that her initial declaration was a polite get-out mechanism for her to implement in the event that she was not enjoying the interview.

Those that did not respond to my initial letter or follow-up email were very unlikely to respond if any further contact was attempted. In some instances, I felt the representativeness of my sample was slightly biased. I attempted to

correct this with further email and phone contact with the relevant deputies. Although their staff indicated they would ask the deputy for me, no further communication was received. After an initial letter and email then, further attempts at contact is time not well spent.

While obtaining interviews with members of parliament was a fairly difficult task that required careful management, I found that once the process started it was very easy to keep going. Again, technology made it easier to arrange and re-arrange interviews as I could access emails on my Smartphone. If a deputy wanted to delay the meeting by half an hour, I was easily contactable and just waited for them usually in the coffee dock at Leinster House or in the public gallery. I am sure that without this ability to be so contactable, my number of respondents would have been considerably lower.

Many who declined to participate from the outset were cabinet and junior ministers. Given the demands on their positions, this was unsurprising. However, one cabinet minister who initially declined granted me an interview after I met her assistant in Leinster House. The assistant is the sister of a personal friend and she offered to organise a meeting for me with the Minister.

The format of the interviews was determined after a review of the methodological issues and question wordings in previous research. My initial schedule of questions totalled 83 between open, closed and prompt questions. I tried to keep my question wordings similar to previous studies and major surveys where possible, particularly the INES, CCS and PartiRep. In addition to attitude items on political issues I also included questions of representational role orientation and parliamentary behaviour. The initial number of questions was pared down to about forty as I quickly learned which questions were redundant or difficult to obtain a clear response to. It is with the benefit of hindsight, and discussing many of the topics in depth with TDs in person, that I can see how some of the questions could have been better structured.

The selection of attitude items for this thesis was in some ways simpler than previous times and in other ways more open to difficulties. The process was simplified by the fact that tried, tested, and consistent question wordings have emerged in the study of Irish politics since the initiation of the Irish National Election Survey in 2002 and the Comparative Candidate survey in 2007. The process of selecting questions for the interview schedule was complicated because so many questions were included in recent Irish political science surveys that it was hard to discern which survey questions would work most efficiently in an interview setting where time may be limited. While I was clear about the general themes I wished to cover, I was concerned about the trade-off between response consistency and question wordings that were more conducive to one-word responses than a more discursive response. I undertook both approaches at the beginning of the interview process and I noticed how some wordings did not spark discursive responses. Moreover, some respondents seemed fatigued by questions which only necessitated an agree/disagree response.

In addition to prompting a discursive response, the two other major considerations of selecting interview questions were that they addressed general themes of political science and were issues upon which we would expect to see variation which is attributable to social background characteristics. In all, eight questions covering the general themes were consistently included in the interview schedule. Following previous research, I focused the general themes on the left-right scale, the GAL/TAN index and feminism (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 215; Narud and Valen 2000, 89; O'Sullivan 2002, 99; Hooghe *et al* 2002, 965). Hooghe *et al*'s (2002, 965). The GAL/TAN index incorporates the liberalism-authoritarianism and post-materialism dimensions which Norris and Lovenduski treat as separate. The initials stand for policy attitudes related to Green, Alternative, Libertarian/Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist issues. This index is put forward as a more comprehensive 'second dimension' of political competition than previous efforts. This index is a powerful predictor of party attitudes to EU integration. However, the

application of earlier findings to the Irish case is complicated, as we shall see, by the fact that attitudes to other elements of social liberalism and post-materialism, such as the environment, immigration and gay rights separate the two most nationalist parties in the Irish system, Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil. Although we can discuss 'left' and 'right' in terms of liberal-authoritarian issues, we refer to them here in terms of attitudes to economic policies. The wordings of items used in this analysis from the CCS, interview and PartiRep data are outlined in Appendix A.

The most common survey question in political science is that which asks respondents to place themselves on an undefined left-right scale, usually constructed as being between 0-10, or 1-7 where lower values represent left-ring attitudes and higher values represent right-wing attitudes. This is unproblematic here. The CCS and PartiRep surveys asked this question identically and this was incorporated into the interview schedule. The problem arises in choosing one or two questions that accurately tap fundamental left-right attitudes in some sort of substantive way. The options available from the CCS survey data included attitudes to state regulation of industry, state ownership of industry, raising or lowering taxes or spending and other items regarding the distribution of wealth in society. This attitude was tapped in the PartiRep survey by inquiring whether the respondent agreed that government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy. As I had one eye on the PartiRep data in the process of designing the interview questionnaire, I took the PartiRep question wording as the primary substantive interpretation of left and right. I also inquired of the respondents support for the disposal of state assets. This was a fairly important political issue at the time of the study as the IMF/EU bailout agreement required significant disposal of state assets. This took the place of the CCS item on state ownership of industry.

An example of an inappropriate question is evident in the CCS questionnaire. The survey asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "very strict limits should be placed on the number of immigrants coming in to Ireland". While survey respondents simply

answered this as it is presented many initial interview respondents challenged the premise of the question, highlighting that most immigrants to Ireland come either from the UK or within the European free movement area and therefore the Irish state cannot restrict numbers due to EU treaty arrangements. Any political dimension to the question would really focus on African immigrants and the numbers are so small they are hardly worth discussing. In light of this feedback I changed interview question to the similar item from the PartiRep survey asking whether the respondent thinks the "immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of our country".

Where I noticed that the political environment may have evolved beyond the issue being addressed in a survey question, I attempted to update the question for the interview stage. Although this raises problems of consistency, the benefit was a more enjoyable experience for the respondents, who were keen to talk about issues on the political horizon, and seemed frustrated when I raised issues which, at least at the elite level, were relatively settled.

Incidentally, many TDs were impressed with my conduct and preparation for the interviews. Several TDs mentioned how the questions were on the nub of each political issue. As one TD said:

> "You understand the politics behind the questions. I get so many interview requests from students who are unprepared that I usually don't do these things anymore. You got me on a good day and I really enjoyed talking to you."

It is good practice to transcribe research interviews as soon as possible after they take place. However, due to the willingness of many Oireachtas members to participate in the study, immediate transcription became unfeasible. A typical hour's worth of text took approximately five hours to transcribe. Interviews were most likely to take place on a Wednesday when members of the Dáil and Seanad were settled in Dublin for the three days of business. Thus, in one week at the height of the process, I had scheduled three interviews on the Tuesday, six on the Wednesday and three more on

the Thursday. Managing the schedules for these interviews was a considerable task and dividing my concentration by transcribing as I was going along may have been a risky trade-off. Missing one appointment would have been far more damaging to the process than forgetting the body language of a TD as he answered a question.

The transcription process took a further two months after the interviews were completed in July 2012. I utilised developments in technology to simplify the process. Smartphone applications like 'Audio Speed Changer' adjust the speed of a sound file without adjusting the pitch, as would be the case if you played back a cassette tape at slower speed. I transferred the audio files from the dictaphone to my Samsung Galaxy S2 phone and transcribed the interviews by listening back to them at 70% of the normal speed. This meant that I transcribed more words in tandem with the playback than would have been possible otherwise. Without the speed changer I found I had to listen back four or five times to a piece of speech to transcribe it accurately, greatly prolonging the process. This innovation brought the average transcription time down from 5 hours to 2 hours 30 minutes. As I had asked the questions quite systematically, I set up each interview transcription in Microsoft Excel, with my own speech in one column and the respondents' speech in the adjacent column. I set up my own speech as a template and adjusted it where necessary, further cutting down transcription time.

The transcription process was completed in early September 2012. The 81 transcribed interviews totalled approximately 400,000 words. In hindsight, I probably asked too many questions. For instance I asked an open question about what the respondent thought were the three most important issues facing Ireland today. I had similar data on this in the CCS but it was good to put this to them as it opened them up and got them comfortable talking and could be useful for future projects. Although not every question was of the utmost importance to this project, given the difficulty in scheduling interviews with members of the Oireachtas I decided to make the most of it. Only where there was an unusual interruption would some important

questions have gone unanswered. In those cases, respondents allowed me to follow up by email in order to ensure that primary issues were covered.

(iii) Parliamentary Speeches

Surveying politicians is a sufficient but potentially unnecessary method of studying intra-party attitudes. Many studies, particularly of the U.S. Congress, have used behavioural indicators of legislators' attitudes (Welch 1985, 132; Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 228; Vega and Firestone 1995, 213; Griffin *et al* 2012, 35; Frederick ,2013, 16). Here, the pattern of vote-casting among legislators is assumed to reflect underlying attitudes on salient political dimensions such as left and right on economic issues and liberal/conservative on social issues. This is problematic because casting votes is a public and highly strategic action. Some important information is potentially lost when the range of concepts from general beliefs to actions are considered. The positive trade-off is that collecting data on congressional votes is simple compared to surveying and interviewing legislators.

Replicating the strategy of analysing roll-call votes as an individual-level measure of attitudes in parliamentary systems is complicated by the closer relationship between the parliament and the executive. Parties vote as cohesive units with little individual-level variation. Party discipline in the Irish case is extremely strict, with the equivalent of a three-line whip applied to every vote, particularly by the government parties. For scholars of individual-level legislative behaviour, votes in parliament are not a fruitful basis of research.

Political science has responded to this methodological challenge by capitalising on technological developments. Increasingly, parliamentary debates are freely available on the internet. While the study of parliamentary speeches is not new, they have historically only been analysed in qualitative form, such as discourse analysis (O'Regan 2010, 19). But if larger trends and associations between political variables such as social background and attitudes are to be established, a more formal quantitative approach is

required. Political scientists have attempted to establish theoretical underpinnings for analysing large quantities of text. The key component of this theory is the inference that can be drawn from word frequencies. The assumption here is that word frequencies are related to attitudes on at least a single ideological, rather than linguistic, dimension. Quantitative text analysis is made all the more attractive by its much-reduced resource requirements. Long hours spent collecting materials in parliamentary libraries, surveying and interviewing politicians, transcribing interviews and coding responses may not be required for what is potentially analysis of equivalent value.

There are several options available for the analysis of parliamentary speeches and my final approach is justified here. Much of the initial groundwork for text analysis was laid by Michael Laver, formerly of Trinity College Dublin and Ken Benoit, who is currently a part-time professor at Trinity College. In association with John Garry, they developed the text analysis program *Wordscores* (Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003, 311). This program analyses the frequency of words in a text and assigns a score to it based on its similarity or otherwise with a set of reference texts. The program only assumes a two-dimensional ideological space which is problematic as parliamentary speeches can easily be multidimensional. However, the salient dimension can be forced by choosing reference texts that most strongly represent equidistant points on that dimension.

(iv) Secondary sources

This thesis uses two considerable secondary sources of data; the Irish National Election Study 2011 and the PartiRep MP dataset. The former is based on a survey of Irish voters and the latter is based on a survey of MPs in 13 countries. The INES 2011 (N = 1,853) was conducted on a similar basis to the INES 2002-2008. These were surveys of a representative sample of Irish people, in terms of demographics, party support and electoral constituencies. The questionnaire covered political participation items, party preferences, and attitude questions. Many of the attitude questions are similar in construction to those of the CCS. The major differences between

the INES 2011 and the INES 2002-2008 is that all but the latest module was publicly funded.

The PartiRep data primarily focused on the role orientations and parliamentary activity of MPs across 12 European countries and Israel. Across these countries, the representatives of 96 political parties were surveyed. The data included attitude questions on economic and social policies which were consistent with the INES, CCS and interview data. These questions and their response patterns are described in Appendix B. An Irish module from 2009 is included in the PartiRep data. However, I replaced this module with my own primary data from 2011. The purpose of this was to avoid time-series issues between the CCS and PartiRep. There is an opportunity here for a future study to conduct a time-series comparative analysis of the Irish data.

Section 4: Representativeness of the samples

As I was conducting the CCS and the interviews I kept track of the emerging patterns in response rates by party affiliations and social demographics, to ensure that my sample was representative. I used the INES as the basis for inferring the distribution of social background variables among the adult population of Ireland and thus the basis for assessing how socially representative of that population the membership of the Dáil and Seanad are.

Table 3.1 below outlines the proportionate distribution of respondents across sub-categories of the independent variables. These variables form the basis for the analytical model discussed in the next section. From the competing theories outlined above we can hypothesise whether congruence will be null or positive. The values in the table refer to the proportion of individuals at that electoral level who fall into the corresponding sub-category. Thus, in the 'voters' column, the first value (0.42) is the proportion of voters who voted for Fine Gael. The seventh value (0.5) is the proportion of voters who are male and so on. The urban/rural divide is institutionally fixed but a dichotomous control variable is included, where 0

is urban representative and 1 rural indicates rural representative, because geographical background type may have a strong influence on attitudes.

Table 3.1 Distribution of the independent variables across data sources

	INES	*Full Dáil*	*Losing Candidates*	*TDs*	*Interviews*	*Debates*	*PartiRep*
Party-level							
Fine Gael	0.42	0.45	0.18	0.39	0.40	0.42	
Labour	0.19	0.23	0.05	0.31	0.22	0.22	
Fianna Fáil	0.15	0.12	0.06	0.13	0.17	0.13	
Sinn Féin	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	
ULA	0.20	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.03	
Other	0.11	0.08	0.68	0.13	0.07	0.12	
Individual-level							
Senator					0.29	0.23	
TD					0.70	0.77	
Gender							
Male	0.5	0.84	0.85	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.72
Female	0.5	0.16	0.15	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.28
Age							
Age 18-39	0.42	0.26	0.19	0.19	0.26	0.26	0.16
Age 40-59	0.34	0.54	0.61	0.58	0.56	0.55	0.43
Age 60+	0.23	0.26	0.20	0.23	0.18	0.19	0.21
Education							
Less than University Education	0.58	0.30	0.57	0.27	0.34	0.28	0.26
University Education	0.42	0.70	0.43	0.73	0.66	0.72	0.74
Social class							
Class AB	0.15	0.52	0.44	0.61	0.50	0.58	0.62
Class C1	0.28	0.29	0.30	0.24	0.34	0.26	0.27
Class C2DE	0.51	0.10	0.17	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06
Farmer	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.04
Constituency type							
Urban	0.35	0.35	0.27	0.38	0.35	0.28	0.20
Rural	0.65	0.65	0.73	0.62	0.65	0.72	0.79
N	1853	166	174	75	81	156	897

Note: Distributions of characteristics for the parliamentary debates represent the average distributions across the four debates included in the analysis. The party figures are not reported for the PartiRep data as in the case of Ireland, they are the same as the CCS and there were 92 other parties in the dataset.

Table 3.1 also clearly demonstrates some systematic differences between voters and TDs, but the distributions are consistent between the population of the Oireachtas and the three Oireachtas data sources: TDs in the CCS, interviews and parliamentary debates. At the party level, the candidates for the established parties make up a smaller proportion of the sample than the voters and TDs for each party. This is because of the high volume of Green and non-party candidates who returned surveys but won very few votes. Among TDs, it is evident that Labour are slightly over-represented when compared with the proportion of Labour voters while the remaining parties are quite consistent.

In terms of individual-level characteristics, men are over-represented among candidates and TDs but there are not systematic differences between the samples. Younger TDs make up a slightly greater proportion of the interview sample than the CCS sample, but are still under-represented when compared with the general population. Government Ministers are more likely to be in the older 60+ category and were less likely to grant an interview, thus pushing up the proportion of younger TDs in the interview sample. Politicians with a university education are in the minority among voters. However, they are dominant among politicians. In terms of social class, the AB group are over-represented among politicians, at the expense of lower class C2Ds, who are typically low-level clerical and manual workers. The urban-rural divide is well-represented across the data sources, with a slight over-representation of rural politicians compared to voters among losing candidates in the CCS and the TDs' interview data.

Overall there is a good balance of characteristics across the samples. These characteristics varied somewhat across the parliamentary debates. The distribution of social characteristics is also consistent with the comparative data from the PartiRep survey.

Section 5: Data Preparation

The qualitative interview material and three distinct quantitative dependent variables are examined in the analyses throughout this thesis. These latter three are a measure of voter-elite congruence, attitude positions and *Wordscores*. The process of coding interview responses, and the construction of the congruence and *Wordscores* variables are discussed below, followed by an overview of the statistical method by which the theoretical model is applied. In chapter 6 the CCS survey items and coded interview responses are subjected to statistical analysis.

(i) Interview Data

8 attitude items from the interview data were subjected to quantitative coding. Members were asked to place themselves on the left-right scale between 0 and 10, so coding this item is unambiguous. For the remaining items I coded them 1 to 7 on an assumed economic left-right or liberal-conservative underlying dimension. Some respondents made this task easy with declaratory statements such as 'agree', or 'strongly disagree'. Others took considerably more time explaining their thoughts around certain issues. In these instances I elicited help with the coding of fellow PhD students in the department. I asked three students to take one, two or three questions, usually grouped by a general issue area, to code the statements thus minimising coder-bias. The scores appeared very consistent. For the final analysis, in some instances I accepted the student coder judgment, in others I split the difference between the two codes and in the remaining instances I knew from the tone or casual language of the interview, which would not be as familiar to the foreign PhD student coders, that my coding was correct. What looked like a particular position from the words on the page did not result in an accurate student code and I kept my original code.

To assess whether variation in question wording triggered significant variations in responses, I compared the binomial distributions of responses on the CCS state regulation item and the interview "government should have a smaller role in the management of the economy" item. The items were divided between those who indicated a 'right-wing' position on the

one hand and those who had a centrist or 'left-wing' position on the other hand. A 'right-wing' position meant disagreeing with heavy regulation of industry by the state and supporting a smaller role for government in the management of the economy. Technically this involved dividing responses to the first item by those who gave a response of 6 or higher and those who did not. On the second item the division was between those who at least slightly agreed (a score of 4 on the numeric scale) or higher. The consistency of responses on this basis is very high. 75% of CCS respondents place themselves at the middle position or less, indicating a strong preference for state regulation. Similarly, 74% of interview respondents responded *against* the statement "government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy". Such consistency is not as evident between the CCS "state ownership" item and the interview item tapping preferences for "selling state assets". Merely 37% of CCS respondents favour public ownership of industry while 56% oppose selling state assets.

Other question wordings were left aside in the interview process because they no longer make sense. For example, many survey respondents wrote notes on their returned surveys indicating that trade-offs between the economy and the environment are not zero-sum, and pro-environment innovation can be the driver of future economic growth. Therefore, to tap environmental attitudes I drew on an item previously employed in the INES inquiring whether the respondent thinks environmental threats are exaggerated while also asking whether the respondent was personally concerned with the environment. Similarly, the CCS item on immigration refers to immigration being "severely restricted". One respondent wrote "immigrants from where?" beside their response to indicate the complexity and possible redundancy of the question. In the context of free movement within the European Union, this is also a fairly redundant wording in substantive policy terms.

The PartiRep survey provided a workable alternative in terms of asking whether "immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Ireland". I included as a prompt whether the Muslim Burqa should be banned in

public spaces, an approach taken by France (*The Economist*, 2011) and Belgium (ww.BBC.co.uk, 2010), and proposed by a local city councillor in Co. Cork in Ireland (*Irish Examiner* 2011). The CCS question wording on EU integration was retained in the interview schedule. While the question on quotas for women in political parties is consistent between the CCS and the interview data, the PartiRep survey addressed the same issue by asking whether "affirmative action is a legitimate measure to address the under-representation of women in politics."

The interview data is subject to qualitative evaluation in Chapter 7. Here, I simply examine the dynamics of the responses to salient questions. With an emphasis on intra-party variation, the extent to which different individuals interpreted the wording of the same question, prompting a variety of responses, is explored. I also highlight how, on an anecdotal basis, different demographic groups responded to the question. For instance, how older members within parties based their support for further EU integration on the wider historical benefit of the union, while younger members based their lack of support on more recent turbulent events.

(ii) Voter – Elite congruence

The relationship between voter and elite attitudes is explored in Chapter 5. The analysis here looks at intra-party agreement through four identifiable levels of the hierarchy; TDs, losing candidates, party identifiers and voters. Marsh *et al* (2008, 64) concluded that in the Irish case, only a quarter of Irish voters have anything resembling a strong pre-disposition to vote for a party. This represents a drop of 50 points from 1970s. As there is data on party identifiers only for the four largest parties, only they are included in this stage of the analysis. I evaluate distance using the percentage difference index (PDI) (Norris 1995; Belchior and Friere 2011, 56). This is the proportion of respondents at each level of the hierarchy supporting one position minus the proportion supporting the opposite position. A negative value represent opinions predominantly aligned with the left, while a positive value represents predominantly right-wing opinion.

In Chapter 2 I highlighted the normative importance of a parliament reflecting the distribution of attitudes in society. To test whether such congruence exists I base further analysis on the analytical method outlined by Golder and Stramski (2010, 92). I use their many-to-many and many-to-one measure of congruence to answer two questions. First, to what extent does the distribution of opinion among TDs and candidates mirror the distribution of opinion among voters. Second to what extent would congruence change if the under-represented groups were better represented in the Dáil. To answer the first question I construct Golder and Stramski's 'many-to-many' congruence measure using the formula

$$\sum X\,|F_1(x) - F_2(x)|$$

F_1(x) and F_2(x) are the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for the citizen and representative preferences. The measure captures the area between the CDFs for the citizens and representatives. I construct a CDF for voters, defeated candidates and winning candidates (TDs) and perform bi-variate comparisons using a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for differences of probability distributions.

I also compare voters and elites purely on the basis of their social background characteristics, without reference to their party affiliation. This approach broadly follows Ågren *et al* (2005, 137). To do this I removed the losing candidates from the CCS data. I then combined these TD responses with the full voter dataset (N = 1928) and repartitioned this new dataset on the basis on the sub-categories of social background characteristics. Thus, there is now are now separate datasets for female and males, under 40s and over 40s etc. Ultimately, I run a statistical model which tests for differences between TDs and voters within these sub-category datasets. The model controls for all other social background characteristics. The test is conducted on all items for all social background sub-categories included in Chapter 5, thus there are 120 models. It is unfeasible to present all of these even in the appendix, but an example of the model (Table B.8) and a full table of beta coefficients for the differences between politicians and voters from each

model (Table B.9) are presented in Appendix B. The results on which the overall inferences are based are presented in a summary table in Chapter 5.

The second question can be answered in two ways. First, to what extent individual TDs and candidates are absolutely congruent with voters can be measured with the 'absolute congruence' formula

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mid Ci - R \mid$$

The measure captures the absolute distance of representatives from the citizens' most preferred point (*C*); the lower the score, the better the congruence between citizens and their representatives. The basis of comparison for each representative can be all voters nationally or just those who voted for their party. Second, for a variety of reasons, it may be that politicians are attitudinally more extreme than voters but still relatively congruent. If we find that politicians are not congruent with voters in an absolute sense, attention will turn to whether politicians' attitudes are relatively congruent. This measure of congruence ranges from 0 to 1. C_i is the ideal point of the *i*th citizen and *R* is the position of the individual representative.

$$= 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mid Ci - MC \mid}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mid Ci - R \mid}$$

The equation above calculates the relative congruence measure. If the ideological location of the representative (*R*) is at the position that minimises the sum of absolute distances between all the citizens (C_i) and the representative *relative* to the sum of distances between all citizens and the median citizen (*MC*), then congruence (distance) will be 0. The further the representative is away from *MC*, the closer the relative congruence measure will be to 1 (Golder and Stramski 2010, 96).

(iii) Wordscores

I have chosen to apply the method of quantitative text analysis to four parliamentary debates. These were chosen for their level of participation and relevance to the study. Thus in chapter 6 I analyse debates on the *Finance (No.2) Bill 2012*, the gender quotas element of the *Electoral Amendment (Political Funding) Bill 2011*, the *Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2012* and the *Thirtieth Amendment to the Constitution (Stability Treaty) Bill 2012*. The first debate on the Finance Bill is the closest potential manifestation of Irish political speech on a left-right dimension comparable to that of the classic survey item. The gender quotas debate reflects attitudes towards affirmative action for women and thus 'feminist' attitudes. The third debate examines the liberal-conservative dimension in terms of support or opposition to limited legislative provision for abortion in Ireland. The final debate examines attitudes to further EU integration through debates on the latest integration measure, the Fiscal Stability treaty.

The *Wordscores* program generates a score for each individual text based on the word frequencies of a set of pre-coded reference texts. Virgin texts that are similar in their word frequency to one or other of a set of reference texts will receive a score close to the appropriate reference text. However, as they are not exact copies of any reference text, matches for words in any other documents weight the score for the virgin text away from the closest matching reference text. I typically used five reference texts to score the remaining speeches as I found that this adequately forced the dimension of interest. With only two reference texts, less salient but linguistically dominant dimensions had a greater tendency to be the basis of the scores.

Another choice that had to be made here was which reference texts to use. Similar analyses have shown that it is justifiable to use the speeches of party leaders (Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003, 327) and aggregate party texts (Beauchamp 2010, 5) for this purpose. In the debates I have chosen to analyse, I use a mix of both party leaders' and opinion leaders' speeches, and aggregate texts for the following reasons. Issues such as gender quotas and abortion engender relatively simple 'for and against' types of debate. In

these instances I selected individual speeches at various points on the spectrum of agreement as reference texts. These may be party leaders or opinion leaders, if the party leader did not speak on the topic.

Other issues such as debates on the finance bill, which gives effect to most of the measures broadly outlined in the budget, may exhibit an underlying left-right structure but there are a multitude of issues on which a left-right position can be based. Individuals who are equally left-wing could identify different topics to highlight in their speeches on the finance bill, such as housing, student grants etc. To control for this, I use aggregate party texts as the reference texts. Although this forces each speech to be closest to their own party when they may in fact not be, the use of multilevel statistical modelling at the final analysis stage (explained below) addresses this problem. Basically, if there is an effect of an independent variable within each party, this will be captured, even if it has been measured relatively rather than absolutely.

Section 6 - Statistical modelling of quantitative data

This research incorporates significant developments in the application of statistical methods to political science since O'Sullivan (2002, 103). O'Sullivan's approach was consistent with the statistical standards of the time such as Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 214) and Narud and Valen (2000, 98). Depending on the type of survey scales being analysed, these authors used Ordinary Least Squares or Ordered Logistic regression models. The key assumption with either approach was the independence of observations. However, they demonstrated that party affiliation dominated over other independent variables such as social background characteristics.

Developments in statistical standards for political science have incorporated the repeatedly evident effect of party clustering on attitude items. Individuals within legislatures are not independent observations, but observations clustered around a party position of general ideology. Political science data is often multilevel in nature, but for a long time this was not fully appreciated. The danger of ignoring the multilevel structures is that the

model may suffer misspecification, causal homogeneity and lack of generalisability (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219)

Steenbergen and Jones (2002, pp. 218-237) introduced the statistical concept of multilevel models to the political science discipline. With this technique, instead of a fixed intercept position, with group affiliation such as parties or countries being one of several β slopes, each group is given a their own intercept α, and the slopes are estimated for individual-level variables, such as gender and age, taking these varying group intercepts into account. Thus, the environment which the individual inhabits, be it a country or a political party, may be having an effect on her attitudes to the extent her attitudes are in part dependent on that environment. The more individuals share common experiences, due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar to, and to a certain extent duplications of, each other (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998, 9).

The simplest multilevel model is a two-level model which allows the group intercepts to vary randomly and calculates a fixed slope for individual predictors across units. The model is similar to linear regression model and is specified as

$$y_i = \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

In this model, y_i is the level-1 dependent variable for a level-1 unit I (=1,…,*Nj*), nested in a level 2 unit *j* (=1,…,*J*). x_{ij} is the level-1 predictor and ε_{ij} is a level-1 disturbance terms. The only difference between this model and an OLS model, is that the regression parameters are not fixed, but vary across level-2 units. The *j*-subscript on the α regression parameter indicate this (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 221; Gelman and Hill 2007, 237). In the context of this project the *j*s are varying intercepts for each political party.

If there is no significant clustering on the group variable, there may be clustering on one or more of the individual-level predictors. So it would be of interest to hold the intercept fixed but let the slopes for the independent variables vary within groups. This is specified as

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_{j[i]}x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Furthermore, there may be clustering on both the group variable and one or other of independent variable. In which case the model is specified as

$$y_i = \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta_{j[i]}x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

α_j is the varying intercept for groups and is comprised of

$$\alpha_j = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} z_j + \delta_{0j}$$

while β_j is the slope for the independent variable and is comprised of

$$\beta_j = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} z_j + \delta_{1j}$$

In the full model then, the γ parameters indicate the fixed level-2 parameters and z_j denotes a level-2 predictor. The δ-parameters are disturbances. $\gamma 00$ is the grand mean intercept or constant. That is, the average value across all *i* observations before the varying intercepts and fixed or varying slopes are considered. γ_{01} is the effect of the level 1 predictor and γ_{11} is the cross-level interaction between the level-1 and level-2 predictors. The disturbance terms consists of δ_{0j}, δ_{1j} and ε_i[2].

In order to identify the appropriate type of model to be applied to a quantitative item, an ANOVA test is conducted to discover where the levels of variance are clustered. In applied terms, if there is clustering around the party position on a particular attitude item, but no clustering on the independent variables, a varying intercept, fixed slope model is fitted. An example of this is if there was variance in party positions $\alpha_{j[i]}$ across the left-right scale. Assume then that at the individual level, women within each party were on average two points to the left of their party average. This is the fixed effect β_j. Now assume there were differences in party positions and differences of the effect of gender within each party. For example, if gender was related to attitude strength, thus women in left-wing parties were more left-wing than men and women in right-wing parties were more right wing than men. Then we would fit a random slope $\beta_{j[i]}$. If there were no differences in party positions but differences of the gender effect within each party, we simply drop the $\alpha_{j[i]}$. Where there is found to be no clustering

[2] See Steenbergen and Jones (2002, 222) for more details.

on the party or individual level predictors, the multilevel model and the party variable are put aside and the individual predictors are fitted to an OLS or Ordered Probit model.

The thesis also conducts cross-national analysis in Chapter 4, thus adding another potential level of clustered variance (countries) to the data. These are three-level models with the random intercept term for the country-level (ψ) is added to the model, in addition to the party-level intercept terms (τ) and the individual-level variation (σ^2).

It is also important to mention another aspect of evaluating multilevel model when departing from OLS. There is typically no R^2, as the variance components are divided among groups. However, a pseudo-R^2 can be estimated though it is typically found that the "explained variance" for individual-level predictors in a multilevel model is quite low (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 232). The function R^2_{GLMM} in the MuMIn package (Bartoń 2013), built for the statistical program *R*, calculates a pseudo R^2 for multilevel models. The R^2 here is calculated on both a marginal and conditional basis. The marginal R^2 represents the variance explained by the individual-level variables while the conditional R^2 is the variance explained by both the individual and group-level variables combined.

This chapter has provided a detailed description of the data analysed in this thesis, as well as the processes of collecting and analysing these data. The data sources incorporated into the study include the Comparative Candidates survey of election candidates, interviews with TDs and Senators, the PartiRep survey responses from MPs from across 12 European states, a survey of Irish voters and individual parliamentary speeches in four Dáil debates. The analysis begins in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4: QUANTIFYING ATTITUDES

Abstract

This chapter represents the core analysis of this thesis. It aims to discover whether the variation in intra-party attitudes at the elite level is randomly distributed among TDs, Senators and defeated election candidates, or structured according to important social background characteristics. This is important in terms of the overall theoretical framework of the thesis as it assesses whether descriptive representation is likely to have any bearing on the representation of substantive attitudes. The latter is interpreted here as attitudes rather than policy outputs because, within the framework of attitude theory, if social background has no effect on attitudes, it is very unlikely to influence behaviour. The chapter uses survey items and coded interview responses to address the question. It finds significant intra-party divisions according to gender and age, particularly on social issues. However, these have little effect on the average party position, even if the parties were to be perfectly socio-demographically representative of voters.

CHAPTER 4: QUANTIFYING ATTITUDES

Section 1: Introduction

This chapter takes a quantitative approach to the application of the theoretical framework in order to assess whether statistically significantly structural differences exist between and within parties. The added value of this chapter over its closest predecessor, O'Sullivan (2002 Ch. 5, pp. 99-123), is that it does not treat party affiliation and social background variables as competing explanations for attitudinal divisions within the Dáil, but hierarchical explanations where the latter is nested within the former. Put simply, the reported effects are those between, say, men and women on their party positions rather than the average difference between men and women across the Dáil as a whole.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of studying attitudes in political science and establishes hypotheses on the effects of social background characteristics on elite attitudes, based on the findings from previous research. Section 3 outlines the data and methodological approaches. The analysis begins in Section 4 with an examination of how the attitudinal variance is partitioned between party-level differences and individual-level differences. It then proceeds to discuss the results of the statistical models, with subsections structured according to the independent variables[1], predicted values, and looking at the Irish case in a comparative context. The mean and predicted party positions are examined to assess whether significant effects of the independent variables substantially change the party positions. It also considers whether the party position would be substantially different were the party perfectly representative of voters in terms of these significant social background variables. The international comparative analysis of elite attitudes incorporates the Irish case into an analysis of 12 other countries. Section 5 concludes the chapter.

[1] Rather than structuring this section by discussing each policy area in turn I chose to focus on each variable and their significant effects. I found this to be more efficient as the first option necessitated a repetitive mentioning of null results.

The chapter finds strong evidence of attitudinal differences between male and female politicians. These differences are particularly evident on attitudes to social issues. Women and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds tend to be more supportive of socially liberal policies, such as same-sex marriage and adoption, than men. There is some evidence of generational differences also with younger politicians being more right-wing but also more socially liberal than their older colleagues. There was no consistent effect of the remaining background variables on attitudes. The next section discusses the theoretical link between descriptive and substantive representation to establish our expectations for the analysis.

Section 2: Theoretical framework and previous research

Political science has established that party affiliation is the most powerful predictor of attitudes within a legislature. However, the substantive effect of variation in the descriptive representation (Philips 1995; 1998) of social groups remains a persistent issue. As the typical MP, TD or Congressman is middle aged, well-educated, upper professional (Matthews 1985,18) and male, studies focus on how attitudes vary between groups who fit this profile and those that do not. Attention here is generally paid to women, young people, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, such as manual workers, and those who do not have a university education.

The reasons for these observed patterns of under-representation are also well established. The social groups which are observed to dominate political processes do so because they have the resources, motivation and favourable party recruitment procedures necessary to ultimately win election (D'arcy *et al* 1994; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Whether this recruitment bias has any bearing on attitudinal divisions between and, particularly, within political parties remains an open question. This section discusses why we would expect to observe attitudinal difference between politicians based on their social background characteristics and constructs hypotheses based on empirical findings from

previous studies, particularly in the US, the UK, the Nordic countries and Ireland.

The puzzle of descriptive representation is rooted in the theoretical link between socialisation experiences, attitudes and behaviour (Allport 1935, 810). There is little doubt that an individual's life experiences inform their attitudes, which are in a turn a precondition for behaviour. If a group that is tasked with the political representation of another does not share the represented group's life experiences, it is probable that they will hold a divergent set of attitudes on political issues. This divergence may produce political outcomes that are biased in favour of the preferences of representatives.

On its face, this puzzle makes some large assumptions. It assumes that social background has a deterministic affect on attitudes, which themselves have a deterministic effect on political behaviour. It lacks appreciation for the concept of attitudes having three sub-components: affection, cognition and conation (Fishbein 1975, 336). Affections involve a very general pre-disposition to an attitude object. Cognition involves the reasoned evaluation of the object, heavily influenced by affective pre-dispositions but not entirely determined. Conative attitudes are intentions for action in relation to that object. These are informed by the cognitive process but take into account many other strategic factors (Bishin 2006, 312). The major point here is political analyses that aim to demonstrate a link between socialisation and attitudes need to appreciate what elements of the sub-attitude spectrum survey questions are tapping, and the potential attrition of social background effects as the survey items come closer to evaluating behavioural intentions.

The study of descriptive political representation here is ultimately justified based on descriptive representation's potential effect on the substantive representation of political attitudes. It could also be justified on the basis of symbolic representation such that representative assemblies should be proportionately comprised of individuals from all significant demographic

groups in society, simply as a basic standard of democracy. However, any justification of symbolic representation will eventually be based on ensuring that the substantive interests and attitudes of demographic groups are represented in the democratic process. I will briefly recap the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2.

There are two competing criteria for the voters to receive sufficient substantive interests in a democracy. The lower standard is simply that the process of democratic accountability incentivises representatives to be 'responsive' to voters (Pitkin 1967, 209). Representatives that are not sufficiently responsive can be removed at periodic elections. The assumption here is that the pool of candidates on offer to the electorate is also broadly acceptable to the electorate. In the absence of sufficient representation we would see either major social unrest or severe threats of force by the state in order to pre-empt social unrest. But there is considerable scope for political elites to neglect the substantive interests of their electorate without triggering all-out revolution or even overt threats of force.

Therefore, sufficiently representing the electorate to the extent of ensuring social peace is a low standard of democracy. Philips (1995, 5) argues that substantive representation is achieved when the interests of significant social sub-groups are represented in the political process. For the interests of these sub-groups to be represented, they must elect a member of their group. When voters and politicians have shared socialisation experiences, the full range of voters' interests are more likely to be substantively represented. Moreover, voters' interests may not be crystallised on every issue. Mansbridge (1999, 645) argues that the best way for voters to mitigate the loss of their substantive interests on issues which may arise between elections is to elect individuals who share their socialisation experiences and, by implication, a similar political outlook. Despite this line of argument, voters do not typically elect members of parliament who reflect their social characteristics either because they prefer male candidates, those with more life experience and higher social status in terms of occupation

and education, or they are not so unhappy with the range of candidates offered by the political parties that they are willing to revolutionise the political system.

Drawing on the conceptual causal link between social background, attitudes and behaviour in political representation, the theoretical framework of this chapter assumes that individuals from under-represented social groups will hold significantly different attitudes to political issues than those from dominant groups. Hypotheses about the likely direction of these attitudes can be drawn from previous empirical research. These studies are based on investigations of representatives' attitudes in the United States Congress, the British Parliament, the Nordic Parliaments and the Irish Dáil.

We must first outline the expected inter-party ideological divisions. These hypothesised effects of social background discussed below are essentially interacted with the position of the party of which the politician is a member. Therefore we need to hypothesise what the party positions are likely to be. This is difficult because there has historically been little difference between the two major parties in particular (Weeks 2010, 141), both of whom could broadly be considered 'centre-right'. Despite this, O'Sullivan (2002, 232) found that Labour is economically to the left of Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG). FF has historically been the most socially conservative party, while FG was on average socially centrist (Sinnott 1986, 237, O'Sullivan, 2002, 232). Nationalism also separates FF on the one hand and FG and Labour on the other (Sinnott 1986, 237). This dynamic has been evidenced more recently by Benoit (2009, 458) who found much lower FF support for further EU integration compared to FG and Labour. Sinn Féin (SF) tend to be left wing and socially liberal as evidenced by their positive attitudes to immigrants, despite being the most nationalist party in the system (O'Malley, 960). These are just a flavour of the observed tendencies of Irish political parties. The United Left Alliance (ULA) are new party to the Dáil in 2011 and are, as the name suggests, an alliance of smaller hard left-wing groups such as the Socialist party and the Socialist Workers Party.

Women are the most overtly under-represented group in political life. They make up 50% of the population but struggle to achieve even 30% of the seats in many parliaments. The Irish Dáil performs particularly poorly here with only 15% female TDs (Buckley and McGing 2011, 222). However, this descriptive under-representation has not been found to have an overwhelming effect on the distribution of attitudes within legislatures. Nonetheless, female representatives have a tendency to be more economically left-wing than men. Welch (1985, 132) found this to be the case in the US congress, but more recent evidence suggests that female descriptive representation has no effect on substantive representation (Griffin *et al* 2012, 35) here.

It is important to note that the measure of substantive representation in these Congressional studies is whether the representative casted a vote in favour or against gender-specific legislation. This is a highly consequential action. If we refer back to the nuanced conception of attitudes outlined by Fishbein (1975, 336) above, it may be understandable that the social background effect is lost at the point of roll-call voting. Measures of cognition, such as interviews and surveys probing politicians' affective tendencies and meritocratic cognitive evaluations of proposals, have greater potential to establish a link between socialisation and attitudes. The importance of studying attitudes, even if the causal mechanism breaks down when it comes to political action, is to assess the potential for behaviour. Subsequent research can study in more depth why this potential does not manifest as behaviour, if it exists at all.

Survey based research is more commonly applied to the study of European political elites and I will review some of the major relevant findings here. Effects of social background characteristics on representatives' attitudes are more likely to be detectable as this method incorporates a confidentiality agreement, thus minimising any real-world consequences for the participants and incentivising sincere responses. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 215) found that female MPs tended to be more economically left-wing and 'feminist' than their male party colleagues to the point that some

women in the Conservative party were more left-wing than men in the Liberal Democrats. By 'feminist' they meant that female MPs supported many of the concerns of the women's movement such as reproductive rights, domestic violence and rape in marriage. The latter issue wasn't considered a crime until relatively recently. They did not find that women leaned either way on other issues of morality such as the death penalty, tolerance of minorities and respect for authority. Nor were there any gender differences evident on 'post-materialist' issues such as racial and sexual equality and the environment.

The evidence for gender effects was somewhat stronger in Narud and Valen's (2000, 89) comparative study of attitudes within Nordic parliaments. As well as finding effects of greater left-leaning and feminist attitudes among female Nordic MPs, they also found that women were more supportive of progressive post-materialist policies such as being more pro-environment. Wängnerud (2000b, 149) found that female Nordic MPs tended to report regular contact with women's organisations and focused on parliamentary work with a bearing on gender equality and were more favourable to gender equality policies than men. The evidence for gender effects on political attitudes in Ireland contrasts with international research as O'Sullivan (2002, 106) found that female TDs tended to be more right-wing and socially conservative than men.

Young people, typically those under 40, are also typically under-represented in national politics. This is usually of less concern than gender because becoming an MP is usually the result of an accepted process of party activism. However, as different generations are socialised in different eras, it is likely that they will hold substantively different attitudes to political issues. In previous studies, younger politicians were found to have more socially liberal policy stances among MPs in Britain and the Nordic countries (Mellors 1978, 120; Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 216: Narud and Valen 2000, 102). But the evidence from Ireland is again inconsistent with this trend as younger TDs tended to be more socially conservative than their older counterparts (O'Sullivan 2002, 107).

The evidence for attitudinal variation associated with social class is also mixed (Mellors 1978, 122; Marsh 1980, 59; Narud and Valen 2000, 92; Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 224). However, it has been found that MPs that have a high level of education, usually measured by the attainment of a university degree, tended to be more liberal on social issues however measured across contexts. Moreover MPs from lower socio-economic occupations tend to be more ideologically moderate than middle class colleagues.

The data used in this chapter incorporates responses from party politicians at different institutional positions to maximise variation on the social background variables. The CCS data is comprised of those who became TDs and those who lost the election. The interview data is comprised of TDs and senators. To ensure that any attitude differences between these groups is not falsely attributed to bias in the distribution of social background variables between institutional levels, a control variable recognising these institutional distinctions is included in the analysis. The next section discusses the data used in the analysis.

Section 3: Data and Variables

This chapter incorporates a diversity of sources on the attitudes of political elites. The common denominator is their quantitative nature. Data on Irish elites is drawn from the Comparative Candidate Survey 2011 (Ireland) and coded responses to face-to-face interview questions. Data on the political attitudes of elites in other European countries is drawn from the PartiRep survey. This section introduces the CCS survey items, interview data and the PartiRep survey items used in the analysis. The chapter draws on data from the Irish National Election Survey 2011 (INES) (N =1853) and the Comparative Candidates Survey: Ireland 2011 (CCS) (N = 249 of which N_{TD} = 75). The survey items use a range of response criteria from five-point and seven-point agree/disagree scales to 11-point (0-10) closeness scales, with opposing statements at each extreme point.

For the PartiRep data, the original Irish component from 2009 was replaced with the comparable CCS and interview data. For the left-right question, all unique individuals' responses across both the CCS and interview data were combined and added to the PartiRep data. The survey question on gender quotas and EU integration and the interview questions on government management of the economy, immigrants adapting to host customs and whether 'larger income differences are needed as incentives for individual effort' were combined with the corresponding PartiRep questions. The only caveat here is that only 53 of 59 TDs answered this last item as it was slightly lower priority than the economic management and state assets items.

In terms of response rates, with one exception on the item regarding state assets, all interview respondents (N = 81) answered the questions included here. The item on state assets was not put to one TD due to severe time constraints and the desire to get an indication of their position on the variety of themes, rather than the variety of measures on a single theme (the economy). The responses to the PartiRep survey questions varied to the maximum of 838 on the left-right question to a minimum of 782 on the immigration question. The EU integration was not put to Israeli MPs which accounts for the response rate drop on this item.

In order to keep the interpretation of statistical coefficients consistent across all of the items with the tables, all items were rescaled so that the mid-point lies at zero and items on a 7-point or 5-point scales were normalised to range between -5 and + 5. This is similar to the approach taken by Blaydes and Linzer (2012, 225), who rescaled items so that all values lie between 0 and 1. My modification simply makes the table coefficients, particularly the party intercept terms, more easily interpretable. Negative numbers represent left-wing liberal attitudes or the best interpretation of such.

Further to these specific survey items a new dependent variable can be generated for the latent ideologies, left-right, liberal-authoritarianism, post-materialism and feminism by predicting scores for each politician. The

statistical model can then be applied to this new variable as it is to the individual survey items. I apply this formal approach only to the CCS survey items as the interview data contained much fewer items for each latent ideology. I also include a battery of questions from the CCS measuring respondents' agreement with explanations for the lack of women in politics to construct the 'feminist' index. The additional question wordings included in the feminist index are outlined in Appendix A.

The statistical models report the effect of the individual-level independent variable on the party intercepts or the overall intercept depending on the model type. Chapter 3 detailed the construction and assumptions underlying the multilevel model approach employed in the analysis. I also run models of the CCS data which exclude independent candidates. Ultimately, we are interested in intra-party attitudes, so the unusual number of independents in the 2011 CCS data may add excessive noise to the data. Subsequently, it is of interest here whether the party position would shift taking into account the divergent distributions of the independent variables between voters and elites. I then calculate a predicted value for the party position from the statistical models under the hypothetical scenario of party elites demographically reflecting the party's voters. Put simply, when the party intercepts are interacted with a statistically significant coefficient for 'female', the weight is typically only 15% and the variable is thus unlikely to have a huge effect on the party average. But in a position of pure representativeness the weight would be approximately 50%, and the party position is much more likely to change substantially.

The basis for the parties' predicted values is the distribution of demographic characteristics and party affiliation in the Irish National Election Study. I then repeat the exercise based on models where the social background effects differed with independents excluded.

I also conduct a principal components analysis to determine whether items are related to an underlying common ideological dimension. Predicted scores can then be generated for each individual on this dimension and used

as dependent variables in the analysis. I investigate three underlying dimensions using this technique and create new variables based on each of them. All items in the construction of these latent variables are drawn from the CCS survey data. The principal components analysis examines the extent to which;

1) the economic questions load onto a left-right dimension
2) the gender-specific questions load onto feminism dimension
3) Environment, immigration, traditional gender roles and EU integration items load onto a GAL/TAN index.

Six items were included in the economic factor. A principal components analysis indicates that these items are highly related and load onto a single component, assumed to tap economic left-right attitudes. While the number of potential components is equal to the number of individual items, figure 4.1 illustrates that there is only one significant component.

Figure 4.1 - Screeplot of Variances for the Principal Components of CCS Economic Items.



Table 4.1 below presents the loading values for each item onto this underlying component and in doing so demonstrates that all items included in the economic factor are quite strongly related. Thus, it is safe to assume that these items capture the left-right dimension and we can proceed to predict values on this latent dimension for each of the respondents in the survey data. The predicted scores correlate highly with the left-right self-placement item and their distribution is presented in figure 4.2.

Table 4.1 - Principal Components Analysis of Left-Right Economic Attitudes	
	Item Loadings
Left-right scale	0.54
Regulation of Industry	0.45
Privatisation	0.39
There is nothing wrong with some people being a lot richer than others	0.40
Taxation	0.31
Ordinary people should get their fair share of a nation's wealth	0.31

Figure 4.2 - Distribution of Predicted Attitudes on the Economic Index



Several items were tested to their validity as measures of 'feminism'. The underlying dimension of these items is whether the lack of women in politics is due to a lack of supply of women coming forward or whether the natural process of candidate selection is biased towards men. Table 4.2 below outlines the extent to which these items load onto this assumed feminism component. The component also includes more general attitudes to women in the workplace. Most of the items have a loading of greater than 0.10 thus tapping a similar underlying dimension.

Table 4.2 - Principal Components Analysis of Feminist Items	
	Item Loadings
Things would improve with more women in politics	0.44
Gender quotas	0.44
Women are not given fair opportunities by parties	0.43
Just as easy for a woman to be elected as it is a man	-0.39
Confrontational nature of politics doesn't suit women	0.33
Women do not have the confidence to stand	0.33
Voters prefer male candidates	0.18
Working women have the same relationship with children	0.15
Women put their families above a career in the Dáil	0.07
Women are less interested in politics	0.06
Most men are better suited to political life	0.06
Women don't come forward to stand for parties	0.05

The distribution of predicted values on the feminism dimension is presented in figure 4.3 below. Negative values indicate feminist attitudes while positive values represent traditional or 'anti-feminist' attitudes.

Figure 4.3 - Distribution of Predicted Attitudes on the Feminist Index



The previous factors were composed of items for which it is easy to assume *a priori* are inter-related. Constructing a GAL/TAN index is not so straightforward. I included all of the non-economic items except the women in politics explanations in a principal components analysis. The loadings for each item on the first component are presented in table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3 - Principal Components Analysis of GAL/TAN Items

	Item loadings
Cut living standards to protect the environment	0.49
Restrict immigration	0.43
Prioritise environment/economy	0.43
Things would improve if there were more women in politics	0.40
Immediate Northern Ireland Re-Unification	-0.15
EU Integration has gone too far/should be pushed further	-0.12
Working women have equally good relationships with children	0.07

The items assumed to load onto a GAL/TAN dimension do so significantly with the exception of the 'working women item'. Note that the latter item was also included in the feminism index to which it relates more closely. Immigration and the environment are the major predictors of GAL/TAN attitudes though normative attitudes to women in politics are also positively related. As alluded to earlier, the nationalist questions are somewhat disconnected from the other GAL/TAN items. While the prior assumption is that nationalist attitudes are strongly associated with moral conservatism, the opposite relationship is evident. Nonetheless, the items are related but, in Ireland, it is more a case of GALN/TA than GAL/TAN (though we will proceed to refer to the scale as it is popularly known). The item tapping 'traditional' attitudes to working mothers does not relate to this so we omit it from the predicted GAL/TAN variable. Figure 4.4 below illustrates the distribution of predicted values on this component. The statistical analyses begin in the next section with the variables predicted from the principal components analysis included as dependent variables.

Figure 4.4 - Distribution of Predicted Attitudes on the GAL/TAN Index



Section 4: Results

This section reports the results of the statistical analyses for the survey and interview data. The comparative data are given separate treatment in the next section. For efficient reporting of the analytical results, this section is compartmentalised into the discrete stages of the task, rather than discussing each survey item in turn, necessitating re-iteration over the various stages. The analysis begins by examining the division of attitudinal variance between inter-party and intra-party components. This justifies the types of statistical models used. The position of the 'average politician' is then discussed by considering the mean response for each item. I then present the patterns of inter-party variation followed by the intra-party effects of individual-level variables. The analysis subsequently assesses whether these divisions are likely to have any bearing on the average party position according to the distribution of social characteristics in the event that the party was descriptively representative of its voters.

Variance components

The general motivation for this study is the understanding that there is more attitudinal variance within Irish parties than between them. This understanding is upheld upon investigation of the substantive attitude items. In order to specify the most appropriate models for each item, ANOVA tests determine the significance of attitudinal clustering due to variance between parties (group-level variance) and, on average, within them (individual-level

or intra-party variance). An intra-class correlation test assesses the proportions of inter-party and intra-party variances in the data. The division of variance on each item between the group and individual levels are discussed here. The results are based on intra-class correlation tests[2] and implemented in *R* with ICCest (Wolak 2012). The economic and GAL/TAN latent dependent variables are excluded for now as they are comprised of these individual items. For the most part, the component items of the feminism variable are not otherwise included here so it is unproblematic to include this index variable for the purpose of assessing the apportionment of variance across levels.

Table 4.4 below presents the ratio of between party variance to within party variance (intra-class correlation), the mean value and the 95% lower and upper confidence intervals for each item included in this analysis. The confidence intervals are included to determine whether the average response on that item leans significantly in one ideological direction or another.

The average level of variance between the parties (party-level variance) is 17%. Thus, the average level of variation within the parties (individual-level variance) is 83%. The inter-party variance ranges from 39% on the left-right self-placement item to 8% on attitudes to the relationship between working women and their children. Thus the majority of variance on most items is within parties rather than between them.

When independents are excluded inter-party variance increases by five points on average (Appendix B). The left-right item still displays the highest level of party clustering at 54% while "working women" displays the lowest. Moreover, party variance actually decreases by five points on the

[2] Intra-class correlation is the amount of group variance as a proportion of the total variance and is formally calculated as

$$\frac{\sigma_{\alpha}^2}{\sigma_{\alpha}^2+\sigma_{\epsilon}^2}$$

The ICC statistic reports the amount of variance between parties. The remaining variance (1-ICC) is the amount of variation within parties.

Table 4.4 –Intra-class correlation and mean values with confidence intervals across attitude items

CCS Data	*Intra-class correlation*	*Mean*	*Lower CI*	*Upper CI*
Left-right self-placement	0.39	-0.91	-1.20	-0.61
Privatisation of industry	0.29	1.16	0.79	1.54
Regulation of Industry	0.21	-0.90	-1.24	-0.56
British should withdraw from Northern Ireland	0.21	-0.54	-0.94	-0.14
European Union Integration	0.20	-0.48	-0.83	-0.12
Nothing wrong with some people being rich	0.19	0.07	-0.34	0.48
Prioritise the environment over economic growth	0.18	-1.07	-1.37	-0.77
Limits on immigration	0.18	0.32	-0.08	0.73
People should get a 'fair share' of nation's wealth	0.13	-3.10	-3.39	-2.81
Accept cut in living standards to protect the environment	0.11	-1.37	-1.75	-1
Feminist index	0.11	0	-0.22	0.22
Things would improve with more women in politics	0.10	-1.15	-1.50	-0.8
Cut/raise taxes and spending	0.10	-1.50	-1.78	-1.22
Working mothers have as good a relationship with their children as stay-at-home mothers.	0.08	-1.34	-1.74	-0.93
Gender Quotas	0.07	-0.70	-1.14	-0.25
μ survey inter-party variance	0.17			
Interview Data				
Left-right self-placement	0.58	-0.75	-1.15	-0.36
European Union Integration	0.31	0.53	0.27	0.79
Larger incomes differences incentivise effort	0.25	0.33	-0.63	1.29
Things would improve with more women in politics	0.15	-2.45	-3.03	-1.87
Same-sex adoption	0.14	-1.21	-1.86	-0.56
Privatisation of state assets	0.13	-0.20	-0.93	0.53
Same-sex marriage	0.13	-2.22	-2.82	-1.62
Environmental threats are exaggerated	0.11	2.02	1.43	2.61
Government should play a smaller role in economic management	0.10	-1.91	-2.68	-1.14
Immigrants should adapt to the customs of Ireland	0.07	-0.14	-0.74	0.46
Muslim Burqa should be banned in public spaces	0.04	-1.15	-1.74	-0.57
Gender Quotas	0	0.12	-0.61	0.85
How 'personally concerned' are you with environmental issues	0	3.05	2.8	3.31
μ interview party-level variance	0.15			
Economic index		0.00	-0.18	0.18
GAL/TAN index		0.00	-0.12	0.12

latter item but only that item. These general trends are robust across data sources. Among interview respondents, the average amount of party-level variance is 15%. The left right self-placement item demonstrates the highest proportion of between party variance at 58%, which is similar to the survey data. The lowest amount of party variance is evident on support for gender quotas and whether the respondent is "personally concerned" about environmental threats. All of the variance on these items is within parties rather than between them.

The striking finding here is that only one specification of one item (on the left-right item among party respondents in the survey data and among all respondents in the interview data) displays more than 50% party-level variance. For most of the items, the majority of variance is at the individual level. Thus, the generality of greater variance within Irish parties than between them is supported. The considerable amount of variance within parties may ultimately be either structured according to socio-demographic variables or highly random.

Although almost all items display some amount of inter-party variance, the question arises: at what point should we not be concerned about inter-party differences and fit a model without a varying intercept for party? To do this an ANOVA test is performed on each item to determine the significance of party affiliation as a grouping factor. Clustering on the individual-level variables is also tested for the appropriateness of fitting a random slope. Significant clustering is defined as being where the F value is significant at the $p < 0.05$. When independents are included, all of the survey items display highly significant party-level variance ($p < 0.001$). With independents excluded only the 'working women' item displays insignificant party-level variance ($F = 2.05$, $p > 0.05$). There is considerably more intra-party variance in the interview data with only half of the items having a significant p-value for party-level variance. Moreover, with the exception of the two economic items, these p-values tend to be only at the

95% level of significance. Therefore, multilevel models with varying intercepts are appropriate and fitted for all of the survey items and half of the interview items. The degree of party-level clustering is discussed below.

Significant clustering on the individual-level predictors was also evident, indicating that the effect of these variables may act in varying directions within each party. In the survey data there is significant clustering for gender on the items tapping attitudes to state ownership of industry ($F = 4.84, p < 0.05$), to taking a cut in living standards to protect the environment ($F = 30.44, p < 0.001$), and the effect of working women on family life ($F = 8.77, p < 0.05$). When independents are excluded gender is additionally significant on the taxes/spending item ($F = 4.00, p < 0.05$). Age is significant on taxation ($F = 6.28, p < 0.05$) and that citizens should get a fair share of the nation's wealth ($F = 11.24, p < 0.001$) with and without independents included. Education is significant on restricting immigration ($F = 5.11, p < 0.05$) and united Ireland ($F = 5.05, p < 0.05$) with independents included and on regulation ($F = 9.68, p < 0.01$), "things improving with more women in politics" ($F = 5.59, p < 0.05$) and Northern Ireland ($F = 5.40, p < 0.05$) with independents excluded.

In the interview data, gender was significant at the 95% level for economic left-right index ($F = 6.52, p < 0.05$), larger income differences ($F = 4.64, p < 0.01$), the positive effect of women in politics ($F = 4.61, p < 0.05$), same-sex adoption ($F = 6.10, p < 0.05$) and personal concern for the environment ($F = 7.32, p < 0.01$). Age is significant for the left-right self-placement scale ($F = 5.85, p < 0.05$), same-sex adoption ($F = 4.57, p < 0.05$) and personal concern for the environment ($F = 7.95, p < 0.001$). Having a university education was significant on the Women in politics item ($F = 4.22, p < 0.05$).

Although the fitting of multilevel models with varying intercepts and varying slopes has so far been justified, there are some caveats that may necessitate returning to simpler models. Where between-party variance was only significant at the $p < 0.05$ level, it was sometimes found that the party

coefficients converge onto similar positions when individual-level predictors are included in the model. In this case, the varying intercept is dropped and the model is re-run and reported as an OLS without the party affiliation variable. Where the varying slope correlates highly with the varying intercept, the varying slope is dropped from the model and either a varying intercept, fixed slope model or an OLS model is run depending on the remaining strength of the multilevel intercept.

In order to assess the average positions of parties on each item, I present 'empty' multilevel models which are models with varying intercepts for each party but no individual-level predictors. The reported coefficients approximate the average position of the respondents of that party while also indicating whether the intercept is significantly different from zero at the 95% interval. This is followed by a discussion of the models with the individual-level variables included. The party intercept coefficients are not reported here as they are reflective of the party position before the coefficients for the independent variables are included (and ultimately sum to the values for the party position from the empty model.) Alternative specifications of the full models are presented in Appendix B. However, the coefficients of interest from alternative specifications are explicitly referred to in the text.

In the multilevel scenario, where a clear distinction has been made between group-level and individual-level predictors, and intercepts are allowed to vary by group, it is uncommon that the "variance explained" by the model would be discussed. Such discussions are, in the strictest sense, reserved for OLS models. I attempt to address the issue of explained variance by outlining in the section above the proportion of variances attributable to the group level and proportions attributable to the individual level. However, the individual-level predictors may explain little variance at this level. Thus, although the majority of the variance may be within parties, this may be for all intents and purposes, highly random.

For the sake of completeness I use the *R* package *pclm* to approximate a pseudo R^2 for multilevel models. The function "*r.-squaredGLMM*" reports the variance explained at the individual level (R^2m) and the combined explained variance of the individual and group level predictors (R^2c). The tables with individual-level predictors included in the estimation present these statistics for the models. It also reports the traditional adjusted R^2 for the OLS models with no group partitioning.

Average Positions

In multilevel analyses, fixed effects of individual variables are estimated with the varying "group mean" intercepts taken into account, rather than the overall "grand mean". However, we are still interested in where the grand mean or "average politician" lies on each of the survey and interview items. These grand means will be discussed here prior to discussing the group means and effect of independent variables on the positions of politicians and parties. To do this the overall mean responses and the corresponding 95% confidence interval for each item outlined in table 4.4 above are discussed. Recall from section 3 that the items are rescaled so that the middle position lies at zero rather than 3, 4 or 5 and normalised so values range between -5 and +5. It can be inferred that the position of the average politician leans in a particular direction on each item if the 95% confidence intervals for the means do not include zero.

The mean value for most of the items from both data sources is significantly to the left or right of the middle position. Depending on the item, negative values indicate economically left-wing, socially liberal, feminist or nationalist attitudes. Economically, politicians are generally left-wing with the exception of their mild majority support for privatisation of industry in the survey data. On average, politicians in the CCS data are left-wing, support the privatisation and regulation of industry, raising taxes and the notion of whether 'ordinary people should get a fair share of the nation's wealth'. Despite this latter finding, the mean is not different from zero on the item about 'some people being a lot richer than others'. They also lean in a nationalist direction, supporting re-unification with Northern Ireland

and opposing further EU integration. There is on average a clear degree of environmentalism and feminism among politicians, with all of the items in these categories having significant negative values except the feminist index. The average politician does not lean either way on restricting immigration.

The interview data provides some consistent and some contrary results. Of the broadly comparable items, the averages for the left-right scale, larger income differences (which is considered equivalent to the 'nothing wrong with some people being a lot richer than others' item), things improve with more women in politics, government should play a smaller role in the economy and conditions on immigrants are broadly consistent with the CCS data. However interviewees were on average in favour of further EU integration and centrist on the privatisation and gender quotas items. While they are centrist on the issues of restricting immigration and making immigrants adapt to the customs of Ireland, they are firmly against banning the Burqa in public spaces.

The average politician takes a recognisable stance on most issues. However, at the individual level, politicians may cluster around their party position and some differences are evident based on the samples of respondents in the CCS and the interviews. I now investigate to what extent the parties are divided on these issues and the average substantive positions of their candidates and TDs.

Inter-party divisions

First, it must be pointed out that although the proportion of variance attributable to the party level is relatively low across most items, this does not preclude the party variable from being the strongest indicator of attitudes in the Irish system. It could be the case that variation within Irish parties is highly random. Thus, significant individual-level variables may explain considerably less variance than the varying party intercepts. This section discusses the party positions on the various issues as inferred from

the varying party intercept coefficients in 'empty' multilevel models. I present these results in Tables 4.5 - 4.9 below.

Table 4.5 - Estimation results of the party intercepts in empty multilevel models for economic items from the CCS data

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Fair Share*	*Lot Richer*
Fianna Fáil	0.01	-0.37	2.07*	-1.44*	-2.64*	0.81
	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.44)
Fine Gael	0.01	0.13	2.21*	-0.87*	-2.55*	1.21*
	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.44)
Labour	-2.45*	-2.37*	0.94*	-2.19*	-4.07*	-1.05*
	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.53)
Sinn Féin	-3.15*	-2.30*	-1.04	-2.67*	-4.64*	-2.57*
	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.64)	(0.44)	(0.48)	(0.70)
ULA	-4.42*	-4.01*	-4.43*	-2.28*	-4.36*	-3.33*
	(0.57)	(0.74)	(0.79)	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.86)
Greens	-1.27*	-1.47*	0.77	-1.92*	-2.46*	-0.76
	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.57)
Independents	-0.48*	-0.44	1.41*	-1.19*	-3.16*	0.31
	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.32)
Constant	-1.68*	-1.55*	0.27	-1.79***	-3.41***	-0.77
	(0.68)	(0.61)	(0.93)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.72)
Inter-party variance	3.08***	2.36***	5.74***	0.56*	1.01*	3.24**
	(1.75)	(1.54)	(2.40)	(0.75)	(1.01)	(1.80)
Intra-party variance	2.93	5.69	6.22	4.28	4.39	8.52
	(1.71)	(2.38)	(2.49)	(2.07)	(2.10)	(2.92)
Log-likelihood	-405.63	-536.39	-548.91	-496.36	-524.77	-610.17
N	202	231	231	229	240	242

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table 4.6 - Estimation of party intercepts in empty multilevel models for economic items from the interview data

	Left-Right	*Economic management*	*Privatisation*	*Income Differences*
Fianna Fáil	-0.93*	-1.45*	-0.30	1.02
	(0.33)	(0.71)	(0.67)	(0.94)
Fine Gael	0.69*	-1.09*	0.81	1.91*
	(0.22)	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.60)
Labour	-1.81*	-2.77*	-0.97	-1.73*
	(0.27)	(0.61)	(0.57)	(0.71)
Sinn Féin	-2.42*	-3.20*	-1.61	-1.09
	(0.49)	(0.89)	(0.85)	(1.18)
ULA	-3.67*	-2.59*	-0.97	-1.52
	(0.98)	(1.10)	(1.08)	(1.58)
Independents	-1.83*	-2.66*	-0.86	-0.12
	(0.46)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(1.28)
Constant	-1.66*	-2.29***	-0.65	-0.25
	(0.68)	(0.66)	(0.64)	(0.94)
Inter-party variance	2.43**	1.36*	1.32	3.42*
	(1.56)	(1.17)	(1.15)	(1.85)
Intra-party variance	1.61	11.24	9.68	9.41
	(1.27)	(3.35)	(3.11)	(3.07)
Log-likelihood	-142.88	-217.14 -	206.06 -	142.08
N	82	82	80	55

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.*

Table 4.7 - Estimation results of the party intercepts in empty multilevel models for non-economic items from the CCS data

	Environment/ Economy	*Environment/ Living Standards*	*Restrict Immigration*	*United Ireland*	*EU Integration*	*Things Improve*	*Gender Quotas*	*Working Women*
Fianna Fáil	-0.20	-0.94*	1.65*	-1.83*	-0.26	-0.89*	-0.80	-1.57*
	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.41)
Fine Gael	-0.43	-1.41*	0.91*	0.29	0.76	-0.83*	-0.55	-1.93*
	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.43)
Labour	-0.99*	-2.10*	-0.09	0.61	0.31	-1.76*	-1.20*	-2.20*
	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.48)
Sinn Féin	-1.95*	-2.42*	-1.84*	-4.02*	-2.44*	-2.41*	-1.21	-2.65*
	(0.52)	(0.58)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.61)	(0.54)	(0.64)	(0.58)
ULA	-2.90*	-1.20	-2.86*	0.66	-2.50*	-0.76	-0.41	-2.32*
	(0.64)	(0.68)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.76)	(0.63)	(0.74)	(0.67)
Greens	-2.81*	-3.21*	-1.22*	0.45	0.76	-2.67*	-2.36*	-1.19*
	(0.41)	(0.50)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.56)	(0.50)
Independents	-0.99*	-0.85*	0.65*	-0.66*	-1.26*	-0.83*	0.01	-0.57
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.31)
Constant	-1.47**	-1.73***	-0.40	-0.64	-0.66	-1.45***	-0.93*	-1.78***
	(0.48)	(0.43)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(0.60)	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.40)
Inter-party variance	1.39*	1.00*	2.99*	3.35**	2.25*	0.89**	0.89*	0.76*
	(1.18)	(1.00)	(1.73)	(1.83)	(1.50)	(0.94)	(0.94)	(0.87)
Intra-party variance	4.70	7.68	8.64	7.94	6.16	6.64	11.42	9.03
	(2.17)	(2.77)	(2.94)	(2.82)	(2.48)	(2.58)	(3.38)	(3.00)
Log-likelihood	-513.46	-592.53	-601.50	-594.49	-545.18	-577.49	-641.69	-605.96
N	231	241	238	239	231	242	242	239

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.*

Table 4.8 - Estimation results of the party intercepts in empty multilevel models for indices items from the CCS data

	Economic index	*GAL/TAN index*	*Feminist Index*
Fianna Fáil	0.62*	0.08	0.08
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.24)
Fine Gael	0.88*	0.54*	0.35
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.24)
Labour	-0.86*	0.31*	-0.32
	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.28)
Sinn Féin	-1.81*	-1.10*	-0.85*
	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.36)
ULA	-2.93*	-0.78*	0.15
	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.42)
Greens	-0.28	0.22	-1.05*
	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.30)
Independents	0.26*	-0.20*	0.34
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.18)
Constant	-0.59	-0.13	-0.18
	(0.54)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Inter-party variance	1.97**	0.39**	0.41*
	(1.40)	(0.62)	(0.64)
Intra-party variance	1.31	0.73	2.87
	(1.15)	(0.85)	(1.70)
	-399.71	-323.62	-490.43
	249	249	249

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.*

Table 4.9 - Estimation of party intercepts in empty multilevel models for non-economic items from the interview data

	Things Improve	*Quotas*	*Same-Sex Marriage*	*Same-Sex Adoption*	*Environmental concern*	*Environmental Threats*	*EU Integration*
Fianna Fáil	-3.21*	0.12	-1.60*	-0.31	-1.09*	-1.63*	3.39*
	(0.54)	(0.00)	(0.58)	(0.64)	(0.14)	(0.74)	(0.26)
Fine Gael	-1.78*	0.12	-1.59*	-0.57	-0.96*	-1.19*	3.90*
	(0.40)	(0.00)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.12)	(0.49)	(0.18)
Labour	-2.59*	0.12	-2.87*	-1.90*	-1.14*	-2.86*	3.77*
	(0.46)	(0.00)	(0.49)	(0.54)	(0.13)	(0.58)*	(0.21)
Sinn Féin	-3.15*	0.12	-3.39*	-1.98*	-1.08*	-2.85*	2.09*
	(0.67)	(0.00)	(0.75)	(0.85)	(0.15)	(0.80)	(0.37)
ULA	-2.01*	0.12	-2.96*	-2.26	-1.05*	-2.51*	2.66*
	(0.82)	(0.00)	(0.99)	(1.17)	(0.15)	(1.04)	(0.64)
Independents	-3.04*	0.12	-3.25*	-2.95*	-1.12*	-3.25*	2.62*
	(0.65)	(0.00)	(0.72)	(0.81)	(0.15)	(0.84)	(0.37)
Constant	-2.63***	0.12	-2.61***	-1.66*	3.07***	2.28***	3.07***
	(0.49)	(0.37)	(0.57)	(0.66)	(0.15)	(0.48)	(0.37)
Inter-party variance	0.76*	0.00	1.14**	1.67*	0.02	0.69*	0.67*
	(0.87)	(0.00)	(1.07)	(1.29)	(0.15)	(0.83)	(0.82)
Intra-party variance	6.47	11.00	6.71	7.65	1.23	6.66	1.05
	(2.54)	(3.31)	(2.59)	(2.77)	(1.11)	(2.58)	(1.02)
Log-likelihood	-217.14	-214.09	-196.72	-202.40 -	-116.85	-195.75	-122.35
N	82	82	82	82	76	82	81

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by
**** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.*

Fianna Fáil is considered the quintessential centrist party. Nonetheless, many of the items report a FF intercept coefficient that is significantly different from the centre value. In the survey data (Table 4.5), the party is, on average, pro-privatisation and are slightly right-wing on the economic index (Table. 4.8). However, they are left-wing on taxation and that ordinary people should get a 'fair share' of the nation's wealth. This dynamic is evident for Fine Gael also, with the exception of the 'lot richer' item which shows FG being comfortable with a significant wealth distribution in society. Labour are on average left-wing on all of the items with exception of privatisation, where they are slightly in favour of the idea. The Green party are either left-wing or centrist on these items while Sinn Féin, with the exception of privatisation, and the ULA are very left-wing on all of the items. The independents are slightly left-wing on the left-right scale but fluctuate between left, centre and right across the items.

In the interview data (Table 4.6) FF are left-leaning on the left-right scale and economic management items but centrist on privatisation and income differences being necessary to incentivise individual effort. FG leans to the right on the left-right scale and support larger income differences in society. However, they are centrist on privatisation and lean against less government involvement in the management of the economy. It must be noted that although all parties were opposed to this latter item, FF and FG were the least strong in their opposition to it, indicating that they are relatively right-wing here. SF, the ULA and independents are left wing on the left-right scale and strongly oppose less government involvement in the economy but are centrist on the privatisation and income differences.

The general pattern is that FG are the most economically right-wing party in the system, followed by FF. The Independents are centrist, with Labour leaning left. The Greens lean left while Sinn Féin are strongly left-wing and the ULA even more so.

For the non-economic CCS issues in Table 4.7 FF are centrist on the environment/economy trade-off but personally support the idea of taking a cut in their standards of living to protect the environment. However, they do favour restricting immigration, so there is no clear finding of underlying post-materialism here. This is supported by their centrism on the GAL/TAN index (Table 4.8). A nationalist tendency is evident from their support for a united Ireland and their lack of significant support for further EU integration. They have a positive attitude to the effect of women in politics in that they think things would improve if there were women in politics. They also think a woman working does not affect her relationship with her children, though they are centrist on gender quotas and the feminist index. Similar patterns are evident for Fine Gael, though the coefficients in a slightly more liberal (negative) direction. This means FF is the most socially conservative party in the system. The only significant differences between FF and FG are the latter's centrism on a united Ireland and being significantly right-wing on the GAL/TAN index. The GAL/TAN index is

comprised of items from all three sub-dimensions; so the conclusion is that it does not represent clear two-dimensional left-right divisions.

Labour are by all measures significantly pro-environment and feminist, though they are centrist on restricting immigration and slightly to the right of the average value on the GAL/TAN index. Sinn Féin are strongly supportive of environmentally friendly, pro-immigrant policies and have strong feminist affections, though they do not lean either way on gender quotas. They are also the most nationalist party in the system, significantly supporting a united Ireland and opposing further EU integration. The ULA are less extreme on the GAL/TAN items and the index itself. They are as opposed to further EU Integration as SF, but not as supportive of a united Ireland. They are also unlikely to demonstrate feminist tendencies. The Greens are socially liberal and feminist by each measure, except the GAL/TAN index itself, but do not lean either way on the nationalism items. The independents lean in a pro-environment and nationalist direction, but lean in favour of restricting immigration and are on average, neutral on most of the feminist items.

There are much less distinctive inter-party divisions on the non-economic interview items (Tables 4.9). In addition to environmental and immigration attitudes, social liberalism was also tapped by attitudes to same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption. All parties are generally concerned about the environment and do not think environmental threats are exaggerated. However, the FF and FG attitudes are slightly weaker on the latter item. All parties also think things would improve if there were more women in politics, though FG were the least enthusiastic about this idea. Although all parties significantly support same-sex marriage, FF and FG attitudes are the least strong. Moreover, FF and FG do not, on average, support the adoption of children by same-sex couples from third parties, though they are not significantly opposed. The remaining parties all support same-sex marriage and adoption. Here, FF, ULA and independents tend to think EU integration has gone far enough, while FG and Labour think it should be pushed further. SF are the most nationalist here, tending to think EU integration has gone

too far already. There was no inter-party divisions on the the adaption of immigrants, banning the Burqa or the personal levels of concern about environmental issues.

The general findings for party positions on the social liberalism-conservatism in the interview data support the findings from the survey data, with FF and FG being the least liberal on same-sex issues and the exaggeration of environmental threats. The other parties are clearly socially liberal and feminist, where inter-party division exist.

To illustrate these conclusions, figure 4.5 and 4.6 below present the distribution of attitudes between and within parties on the left-right scale, representing their general economic positions, and on restricting immigration, representing their general liberal-conservative positions. Both of these illustrations are based on CCS data. The next section discusses the extent to which intra-party differences are attributable to social background characteristics.

Figure 4.5 – Inter and Intra-party Left-Right Attitudes



Figure 4.6 - Inter and Intra-party Attitudes to Restricting Immigration



Intra-party attitudes

The previous section discussed party positions in models with no individual-level predictors. This sub-section discusses the statistical findings for individual-level predictors when they are applied to the models. Here, we retain the varying party intercepts in the models where appropriate, but only discuss the coefficients for the fixed and random slopes for the individual-level variables. If the party intercepts were extracted from these models it would be found that they have shifted compared to the values extracted from the empty models. This is because party intercepts are the 'pre-treatment' estimate of the party position when individual-level predictors are included. The models with independent variables included are presented in tables 4.10-4.14 below.

Table 4.10 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes to economic items in the CCS data.

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Fair Share*	*Lot Richer*
Constant	-1.34	-0.79	0.94	-0.54	-1.39	-1.16
	(0.89)	(1.01)	(1.15)	(0.74)	(0.81)	(1.16)
TD	-0.63*	-0.50	0.26	0.42	0.36	-0.93
	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.50)
Female	-0.11	0.08	-0.90*	-0.37	0.09	-0.67
	(0.34)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.52)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.04***	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
University	0.18	-0.59	0.38	0.13	-0.04	0.64
	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.43)
Class: C1	-0.48	-0.72	-0.83*	-0.10	-0.17	-0.21
	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.46)
Class: C2D	-0.61	-0.81	-0.47	-0.72	-0.20	-0.68
	(0.41)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.63)
Class: Farmer	0.68	0.10	0.94	1.22*	0.54	-0.98
	(0.50)	(0.66)	(0.70)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.79)
Rural	0.03	-0.23	0.54	0.31	-0.12	0.90*
	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.44)
Inter-party variance	2.58***	2.20***	4.09***	0.34	1.08*	2.54**
	(1.61)	(1.48)	(2.02)	(0.58)	(1.04)	(1.59)
Intra-party variance	2.89	5.67	6.00	4.13	4.28	8.41
	(1.70)	(2.38)	(2.45)	(2.03)	(2.07)	(2.90)
R^2m	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.04
R^2c	0.49	0.30	0.44	0.15	0.24	0.27
Log-likelihood	-404.63	-534.69	-542.58	-491.47	-521.96	-605.40
N	202	231	231	229	240	242

Table 4.11 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes to non-economic items in the CCS data

	Environment/ Economy	*Environment/ Living Standards*	*Restrict Immigration*	*United Ireland*	*EU Integration*	*Things Improve*	*Gender Quotas*	*Working Women*
Constant	-1.39	-2.00*	-0.16	-0.17	-0.15	0.02	-0.31	-2.52*
	(0.85)	(1.01)	(1.17)	(1.19)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(1.20)	(1.03)
TD	0.01	-0.51	0.02	0.08	0.37	-0.16	-0.44	-0.83
	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.47)
Female	-0.26	-0.86	-0.07	0.21	-0.12	-2.28***	-1.42*	-1.62**
	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.60)	(0.53)
Age	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
University	-0.33	-0.08	-0.76	0.82	0.55	-0.68	-0.02	-0.12
	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.50)	(0.43)
Class: C1	-0.16	-0.26	0.00	0.23	-0.18	0.49	-0.56	0.12
	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.53)	(0.47)
Class: C2D	-0.77	-0.05	-0.31	0.36	-0.52	-0.22	-0.20	0.59
	(0.48)	(0.59)	(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.70)	(0.62)
Class: Farmer	-0.01	0.77	0.51	-0.11	-0.57	0.71	1.00	0.50
	(0.61)	(0.75)	(0.82)	(0.78)	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.91)	(0.81)
Rural	0.43	0.11	0.59	-0.39	0.09	-0.27	-0.01	0.16
	(0.34)	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.50)	(0.44)
Inter-party variance	0.93	0.86	2.41	3.41	1.72	0.56	0.87	0.25
	(0.96)	(0.93)	(1.55)	(1.85)	(1.31)	(0.75)	(0.93)	(0.50)
Intra-party variance	4.79	7.68	8.70	7.90	6.20	5.91	11.28	8.78
	(2.19)	(2.77)	(2.95)	(2.81)	(2.49)	(2.43)	(3.36)	(2.96)
R^2m	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.14	0.04	0.08
R^2c	0.18	0.13	0.24	0.32	0.24	0.21	0.11	0.11
Log-likelihood	-514.10	-589.99	-598.97	-591.59	-543.79	-561.73	-636.54	-598.22
N	231	241	238	239	231	242	242	239

Table 4.12 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes to latent indices

	Economic index	*GAL/TAN index*	*Feminist Index*
Constant	0.10	0.03	0.83
	(0.62)	(0.36)	(0.57)
TD	-0.22	0.08	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.26)
Female	-0.26	0.01	-1.71***
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.28)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
University	0.09	0.20	-0.41
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.23)
Class: C1	-0.35*	-0.04	0.22
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.24)
Class: C2D	-0.39	-0.14	0.28
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.33)
Class: Farmer	0.40	-0.13	0.56
	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.42)
Rural	0.16	0.03	0.01
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.23)
Inter-party variance	1.64	0.34	0.30
	(1.28)	(0.58)	(0.55)
Intra-party variance	1.27	0.73	2.45
	(1.13)	(0.85)	(1.57)
R^2m	0.03	0.02	0.16
R^2c	0.58	0.33	0.25
Log-likelihood	-399.93	-331.14	-473.04
N	249	249	249

Table 4.13 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes to economic items in the interview data

	Left Right	*Manage Economy*	*State Assets*	*Income Differences*
Constant	-0.17	-1.41	-0.18	1.27
	(0.75)	(1.54)	(1.45)	(1.80)
Senator	0.39	2.22	0.84	2.40
	(0.33)	(1.28)	(0.80)	(2.17)
Female	-0.54	-1.52	-0.30	-3.22***
	(0.36)	(0.90)	(0.86)	(0.92)
Age	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.06*	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
University	-0.18	0.45	1.31	-0.80
	(0.33)	(0.83)	(0.78)	(0.93)
Class: C1	0.12	-0.35	0.24	-1.09
	(0.32)	(0.81)	(0.77)	(0.80)
Class: C2D	-1.83*	-2.37	-2.46	-6.28**
	(0.74)	(1.60)	(1.56)	(2.12)
Class: Farmer	0.13	-0.17	-1.39	0.61
	(0.52)	(1.30)	(1.24)	(1.58)
Rural	-0.34	-0.42	0.94	0.57
	(0.35)	(0.90)	(0.84)	(0.92)
senator x FF		0.11		
		(1.09)		
senator x FG		2.30*		
		(0.98)		
senator x Lab		-1.24		
		(1.16)		
senator x SF		-1.48		
		(1.49)		
senator x SP		0.00		
		(2.01)		
senator x Ind		0.31		
		(1.49)		
Random Slope		4.04		
		(2.01)		
Inter-party variance	1.16*	0.00	0.62	2.18**
	(1.08)	(0.00)	(0.79)	(1.48)
Intra-party variance	1.55	10.00	8.98	7.05
	(1.24)	(3.16)	(3.00)	(2.66)
R^2m	0.12	0.16	0.17	0.31
R^2c	0.50	0.16	0.22	0.48
Log-likelihood	-137.70	-202.19	-195.12	-124.85
N	81	81	80	55

Table 4.14 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes to non-economic items in the interview data.

	Things Improve	*Quotas*	*Same-Sex Marriage*	*Same-sex Adoption*	*Immigrants Adapt*	*Ban Burka*	*Environment (Personally Concerned)*	*Environ-mental Threats*
Constant	-2.04	0.10	-3.86**	-3.67**	0.84	-2.11	-0.01	1.18**
	(1.55)	(1.56)	(1.20)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.24)	(0.30)	(1.30)
Senator	2.75**	-0.41	1.36*	1.44*	0.08	0.15	-0.17	-1.32
	(0.87)	(0.90)	(0.66)	(0.70)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.29)	(0.70)
Female	-1.49	-1.01	-1.39*	-1.98**	-0.62	-0.32	-0.75*	-0.48
	(0.92)	(0.95)	(0.71)	(0.75)	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.30)	(0.76)
Age	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.06*	0.01	0.04	0.03**	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
University	0.58	-0.54	-0.10	0.58	-0.45	0.03	-0.30	-0.65
	(0.84)	(0.86)	(0.65)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.28)	(0.69)
Class: C1	-0.35	-0.09	0.48	-0.01	-1.27	0.95	0.08	0.08
	(0.83)	(0.85)	(0.64)	(0.67)	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.27)	(0.68)
Class: C2D	-2.26	1.95	-1.98	-1.28	-3.74**	-2.01	-0.18	-0.41
	(1.67)	(1.66)	(1.30)	(1.34)	(1.33)	(1.32)	(0.56)	(1.40)
Class: Farmer	0.00	0.94	-1.04	0.65	-0.63	0.05	0.17	-0.66
	(1.34)	(1.37)	(1.03)	(1.08)	(1.10)	(1.09)	(0.44)	(1.09)
Rural	-0.60	0.91	0.87	0.97	-0.11	-0.22	-0.28	-0.34
	(0.90)	(0.92)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(0.74)	(0.73)	(0.29)	(0.74)
Party-level variance	0.56		0.50	0.29				0.81
	(0.75)		(0.70)	(0.54)				(0.90)
Individual-level variance	10.53		6.17	6.87				6.95
	(3.24)		(2.48)	(2.62)				(2.64)
Adjusted *R2*		-0.02			0.03	0.00	0.20	
R2m	0.17		0.18	0.22				0.06
R2c	0.21		0.24	0.26				0.15
Log-likelihood	-203.18	-208.29	-184.32	-187.68	-190.43	-189.69	-107.19	-188.95
N	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81

The open nature of the Irish electoral system maximises the potential for variety in voter choice. Aside from the obvious inclusion of TDs, the CCS included losing candidates and the interview data included Senators in the pool of respondents. Although not all of the questions are directly comparable, these data provides a clearer birds-eye view of elite intra-party

attitudes than has previously been possible in Ireland. This section discusses significant attitude divisions between members of the party elites with TDs being the highest level, followed by senators and finally losing candidates. Senators are assumed to be higher in the party elite than losing candidates as they have the right to attend parliamentary party meetings with TDs and the party leadership.

The first finding in this group is on the classic left-right self placement item (Table 4.10). With all respondents included in the model, there is a small but significant difference in placements between losing candidates and TDs. TDs are on average almost one point to the left of candidates on the left-right scale. However, this difference is clearly being driven by the high proportion of independent candidates running in the election. When the focus is put purely on candidates who ran under the label of an established party, the results of which are presented in Appendix B, there is no difference between winner and losers (β = -0.30, $p > 0.05$). Furthermore, the responses to this item from the survey data can be easily combined with the responses from the interview data. A categorical variable indicating the respondent's position in this hierarchy is constructed with losing candidates as the base category and hypotheses tested for differences with the senator and TD categories. Whether independents are included (β = -0.27, $p > 0.05$) or not (β = -0.22, $p > 0.05$), there is no statistical difference between these categories. For completion, I ran a model solely on the interview data sources and no differences were evident between senators and TDs. Although independents tend to be more left than the average TD, the observed differences between candidates and TDs are driven by losing independents who are more right-wing than TDs and candidates of the political parties. There were no statistically significant differences between TDs and candidates in the remaining survey items.

The ANOVA test indicated that there is potentially a varying intra-party effect for Senators on the the economic management item in the interview data. Therefore, the model is fitted with a random slope and coefficient reported for the effect of being a senator within each party on attitudes to

this item. Only the coefficient for FG senators is significant (Table 4.13), with this group being much more likely to support a smaller role for government in the management of the economy than FG TDs. Within all parties, senators tend to be more socially conservative. They are less likely than TDs to think that things would improve if there were more women in politics and less likely to support same-sex marriage and adoption.

Women make up 51% of the Irish population in 2011 but only 15% of the membership of the Dáil. Given this representational deficit, if there is an attitudinal disconnect between citizens and the political elite, this variable is the most likely to be associated with that disconnect. While there is not a plethora of significant differences between male and female politicians, the variable matters on the issues that might easily be associated with gender differences.

There is a minimal amount of gender differences on the economic questions. Within all parties, women are more likely to favour public rather than private ownership by one point on the 11-point survey scale. Gender was not significant on any other economic items in the survey data. Removing independents from the CCS data demonstrated that women are more likely to favour public ownership of industry (β = -1.16, $p > 0.05$) and raising taxes (β = -0.85, $p > 0.05$). Moreover, in the interview data, women within parties were much more likely to disagree with the idea that larger income differences are need as incentives for individual effort, thus exhibiting greater left-wing affections.

The intra-party differences on social issues based on gender reach a higher level of statistical significance more consistently than any of the other socio-demographic variables. In the survey data women within parties are clearly much more feminist than men. They are more likely to think things would improve if there were more women in politics, quotas should be introduced for political parties and working women can establish just as warm and loving a relationship with their children as women who stay at home. They are also more feminist on the feminism index than men. Women are much

more likely to be towards the feminist end of the scale. However, this female feminism effect is not as evident in the interview data. Gender is not significant on the 'things improve' and gender quota items here.

More substantively, women are more likely to favour granting full marriage rights to same-sex couples and the right to adopt children from third parties. Moreover, the coefficient increases for the second item. The constant term has shifted slightly to the right so the substantive position of women does not change at all. This is because men see a distinction between granting marriage rights and adoption rights to same-sex couples, and are less enthusiastic about the latter, where women do not see a distinction. The finding also supports research that claims women have different interpretations of issues to those of men, particularly those around family life. Women are also more likely to be 'personally concerned' with environmental issues than their male colleagues.

Following gender, age is the next most consistently strong socio-demographic variable driving intra-party attitudinal differences. When the responses from the CCS and interview data are pooled (Appendix B) age is significant in the model where independents are removed (β = -0.03, p <0.01) where older respondents are slightly to the left of their younger counterparts within parties. This is borne out on substantive items as in the survey data older politicians are more likely to favour raising taxes and spending, and to think that ordinary citizens should get a fair share of the nation's wealth, while in the interview data they hold considerably greater preferences for keeping state assets in public ownership. There is less effect of age on non-economic items. Older politicians are slightly more likely to think things would improve with more women in politics. Moreover, in the interview data age has a conservative effect on social attitudes as older individuals are less supportive of same-sex adoption and less likely to be personally concerned with the environment.

The Irish political elite have become increasingly educated over the past thirty years (Gallagher 1985, 377; O'Sullivan 2002 69) to the point that

people with university degree are significantly over-represented. However, this variable has little effect on the attitudes of politicians. Of all the economic items included in this study, university education is only related to highly significant preferences, when non-party respondents are removed from the survey data, for greater state regulation of industry (β = -1.43, $p <$ 0.001) and that things would improve with more women in politics (β = -0.75, $p < 0.01$). The ANOVA test indicated that there was significant clustering due to education on the immigration item. This variable is a significant fixed effect in the model only when all other individual-level predictors are removed (β = -0.55, $p > 0.05$). Educated party respondents are more likely to think that things would improve with more women in politics. There are no effects of education on any of the items from the interview data.

Politics in Ireland is dominated by people drawn from a relatively narrow pool of occupational backgrounds. This is given much less attention in discussions around political reform and increasing the diversity of socio-demographic representation. Though there is little evidence here of attitudinal differences based on the occupational background of politicians, these results must be taken in the context of the fact there are very few individuals from lower socio-economic occupations such as C2s, Ds and Es among respondents. Those that there are among the TD group are concentrated in the Sinn Féin party, meaning any class effect is more likely to manifest itself in the statistical results as a SF party effect. However, even taking this into account and controlling for the SF party effect, some independent C2D effects are evident.

The table coefficients report the average intra-party differences between individuals' in the C1, C2D and Farmer occupational categories and those in the higher status AB base category. C1s are lower professionals and their proportion in the political elite is roughly equal to their proportion in society. They do not frequently differ from the AB group on attitudinal items. In the survey data, they do have a significant greater preference for the state ownership of industry but this is not significant when independents

are removed. This left-wing effect is also evident on the economic factor, though the significance drops off when independents are removed ($\beta = 0.08$, $p > 0.19$).

The position of C2Ds is more substantially interesting for the purpose of this thesis, given their significant under-representation in the political elite. There are no significant effects for C2Ds in the survey data with all respondents included. Removing the independents (Appendix B) demonstrates that C2Ds within the political parties tend to favour raising taxes rather than cutting spending ($\beta = -1.07$, $p > 0.05$). Although this finding is intuitive it is contrary to how the hypothesis for this variable was specified. Lower-socio-economic status individuals within parties are more left-wing rather than being more moderate as was initially assumed. The analysis of interview respondents also reveals left-wing and socially liberal attitudes among C2Ds. They are more left-wing on the self placement left-right item, significantly less likely to agree that larger income differences are needed for individual effort and much less likely to agree that immigrants should be made to adapt to the customs of Ireland.

Politicians from a farming background are more likely to favour cutting spending over raising taxes. In the interview data they were also much less likely to favour further European integration.

The balance between urban and rural deputies is institutionally fixed and thus the implication of any findings cannot be drawn out in the same way as other socio-demographic variables. Instead of implying "if more rural deputies were elected" we would instead say "as constituencies become more urbanised". This is hardly much of a dilemma as this variable is only evident on one general attitude item. Rural deputies are more likely to agree that it is justified for some people to be a lot richer than others and, when independents are excluded, are found to favour greater regulation of industry than rural deputies. Thus, as constituencies become more urbanised, negative attitudes to the unequal distribution of wealth in society are likely to become more common. Moreover, urban/rural differences

might be better captured by the "farmer" sub-category of the class variable. Nonetheless, the findings there were also not very extensive.

A striking finding from these models is that individual-level variables typically explain less than 10 per cent of the variance. This is despite some very high p-values observed for the coefficients, particularly for the effects of gender and age on some items. Indeed, the highest amount of variance explained by the individual level predictors is for items where gender was significant. The item on 'larger income differences' is the outlier with considerably more variation attributable to individual-level variables than the party level (0.31). Other items such as 'things improving with more women in politics' (0.11), same-sex adoption (0.13) and personal concern for the environment (0.13) also demonstrate reasonable levels of explained variance for individual-level predictors. The least amount of explained variance for a significant finding is for 'rural politician' on the income inequality item at 0.001. The average proportion of variance explained by individual-level predictors is 0.05.

It is unsurprising that party affiliation explains much higher amounts of variance. The ANOVA test indicated highly significant clustering on the party variable and the data was partitioned on that basis. However, in what seems like a contradiction, Table 5.1 showed that most of the variation on these items is within the parties rather than between them. The explanation is that while the majority of variation is within parties, the inter-party variation is more likely to be structured while the intra-party variation is more likely to be random, notwithstanding the significant findings discussed above.

The conditional R^2 is maximised in the party respondent survey model for the self-placement left-right item at 0.62. It is minimised among the multilevel models for the working women item at 0.09. Multilevel models were less likely to be applied to the interview items. Where they are applied, the highest amount of total explained variance is again for the left-right item

at 0.50 and minimised on the same-sex marriage item at 0.15. The average amount of total explained variance is 0.29.

The Effect of Social Representativeness

The major underlying motivation for this thesis is to understand whether the average attitude of Irish party politicians would change were the party to be socially representative of its voters. The findings above suggest that significant differences between sub-categories of demographic groups exist. The research question can be answered even more satisfactorily by predicting the average position of each party if it was socially representative of its voters. Therefore I predicted the position of each party on items where at least one socio-demographic variable was significant in the analysis, based on the distribution of these significant variables among party voters in the INES dataset. The analysis here compares these predicted values with the party positions from the empty multilevel models.

Due to the number of items being analysed and statistical models presented, and the fact that the party averages and predicted representative values are rarely equivalent, I set a reasonable standard for reporting the results of the difference between party averages and predictions. In table 4.12 below I only report results where the difference between the intercept value and either the fitted value or the predicted value is greater than 1 and one of those values is greater than 1 or -1. This omits results which are predicated on differences of less than 1 point and are less likely to be random variation around the middle position. So results where the two values are greater or less than 1 or are between -1 and 1 are dropped. The immediate finding is that, in most cases, significant individual-level variables are merely likely to affect the strength of the party's position rather than the direction. This leaves 17 instances of a party's position changing across 10 items. These changes are mostly attributable to the under-representation of women and those from the C2D social class in the interview data.

Four items demonstrate significant differences between the actual and predicted party positions. These are the interview questions on the extent to

which immigrant should be required to adapt to the customs of Ireland, whether larger income differences are necessary to incentivise individual effort, same-sex adoption and taxation.

The most widespread effects of under-representation are evident for attitudes to larger income differences in society. Women and C2Ds were more likely to disagree with the idea that these are necessary to incentivise individual effort. If all of the parties were to be representative of their voters in terms of gender and occupational backgrounds, their average positions would shift in a substantively left-wing direction. In the cases of FF and FG, the average direction of attitudes would even change from agreement to disagreement.

It was reported above that there are significant attitude differences on the immigrant item between politicians from an AB occupational background and the lower, and vastly under-represented, C2D group. As it stands, FF, FG and Labour lean towards disagree with the idea that immigrants should be made to adapt to Irish customs. If the membership of the parties included a representative proportion of C2Ds, the position of these parties would shift to a firmly liberal 'disagree' position.

The under-representation of women in FF significantly affects their average position on same-sex adoption. Were they to achieve 50% female representation, they would be more clearly in favour if same-sex adoption of children by third parties. The proportionate representation of women, young people and C2Ds within Sinn Féin would make the party even more strongly in favour of raising taxes over cutting public spending.

As the average values for independents are typically centrist, they are most likely to experience significant shifts in their position in a state of social representativeness. Within Sinn Féin, proportionate representation of those without a university degree, of women, young people and C2Ds would make the party even more strongly in favour of raising taxes over cutting public spending.

Table 4.15 - Post-estimation prediction of party positions based on representative distribution of significant social background variables

Item	*Party*	*Variable*	*Fitted Value*	*Fitted Position*	*Representative Value*	*Representative Position*
Immigrants Adapt	FF	C2D class	-0.3	neither	-2.21	disagree
Immigrants Adapt	FG	C2D class	-0.34	neither	-1.93	disagree
Immigrants Adapt	Lab	C2D class	-0.8	neither	-2.29	disagree
Fair share	Ind	Education	0.31	neither	-1.6	agree
Feminist Index	Ind	Gender	0.34	neither	-1.53	feminist
Immigration restrictions	Ind	Education	0.65	neither	-1.02	disagree
Income Differences	FF	Female & C2D class	1.02	agree	-3.15	disagree
Income Differences	Lab	Female & C2D class	-1.73	disagree	-4.89	strongly disagree
Income Differences	FG	Female & C2D class	1.91	agree	-1.22	disagree
Income Differences	SF	Female & C2D class	-1.09	disagree	-4.17	strongly disagree
Income Differences	Ind	Female & C2D class	-0.12	neither	-2.7	disagree
Income Differences	SP	Female & C2D class	-1.52	disagree	-3.22	strongly disagree
Quotas	Lab	Gender	-1.2	agree	-2.75	strongly agree
Same-Sex Adoption	FF	Female	-0.31	neither	-1.38	agree
Taxation	SF	Female, Age & C2D class	-1.04	raise taxes	-2.32	raise taxes
Things Improve	Ind	Gender	-0.83	neither	-1.79	agree
Working women	Ind	Gender	-0.57	neither	-1.76	agree

Independents were included in the original model estimations of background effects with the exception of the repoted effect for Sf on taxation

As the average values for independents are typically centrist, they are most likely to experience significant shifts in their position in a state of social representativeness. Proportionate representation of those without university degrees would make the independents agree, on average, that ordinary people should get a fair share of the nation's wealth and disagree with immigrations restrictions. They would also take more feminist positions if they were more descriptively representative of women, and hold more left-

wing affections towards larger income differences in society if they counted more women and C2Ds among them.

This exercise of predicting values in a state of social representativeness has highlighted the fact that as individual-level variables explain little variance, the overall direction of opinion within Irish political parties is unlikely to change were the parties to more representative of voters in terms of social background characteristics. Overall though, the the under-presentation of gender and class in particular leaves the parties in a marginally more right-wing and socially conservative position than they would be if these social groups were proportionately represented. These effects are particularly evident among independents

Ireland in Comparative Context

One of the key justifications for this study is the Irish political system's deviance from the norm in terms of inter-party competition in that there is more attitudinal variance within parties than between parties. This section demonstrates this point empirically. It also identifies where the political attitudes of Ireland as a whole and the Irish parties lie in comparative terms using the PartiRep data. It then applies applies the statistical model for the effects of social background variables to six attitudes items to determine whether the background effects observed in the earlier analysis above are consistent with international trends.

An ANOVA test indicates that there is highly significant group clustering at the country and party levels. Thus, we fit a three-level nested model. Individuals are nested within parties and parties are nested within countries. We then apply this to the six items. All of these items are measured on a 7 point scale except the left-right item, which is on an 11 point scale. Each item is centred so the middle value is zero.

Averaging the intra-class correlations in table 4.16 below for all six items across all 13 countries supports the proposition that Ireland is, if not *the* outlier, does typify a political system where there is more intra-party

variance than inter-party variance. Austria and Ireland demonstrate the lowest average levels of party variance, and thus the highest levels of intra-party variance, across the six items. The proportion of the variance at the party level in Austria is a mere 0.01 while it is a still minimal 0.13 in Ireland. The next lowest is Poland at 0.28. 6 of the countries demonstrate majority party-level variance, with Switzerland coming out the highest at 0.63. On an issue-by issue basis, the self-placement on the left-right scale maximises party divisions on average across all of the countries at 0.71. This is followed by the attitudes to the government management of the economy. All other items display more variance within parties than between with the party proportion being about 0.33. The level 3 country variance is much weaker than the party variance. The highest proportion of inter-country variance occurs on the immigration and EU integration items. On the remaining items, less than 0.1 of the variance is the country level.

Table 4.16 – Party-level Intra-class Correlations Across Countries and Items

Country	Left-Right	EU Integration	Income Differences	Economic Management	Immigrants Adapt	Gender Quotas	*μ intra-country party-level variance*
Austria	0.00	0.13	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.08	0.01
Ireland	0.56	0.04	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.06	0.13
Poland	0.73	0.29	0.07	0.11	0.30	0.15	0.28
Hungary	0.83	0.20	0.18	0.33	0.21	0.28	0.34
Israel	0.73	-	0.23	0.42	0.51	-0.01	0.38
Italy	0.79	0.25	0.43	0.80	0.41	0.12	0.47
Netherlands	0.78	0.18	0.77	0.81	0.10	0.31	0.49
Belgium	0.75	0.60	0.34	0.48	0.56	0.26	0.50
Portugal	0.76	0.62	0.32	0.54	0.42	0.42	0.51
Germany	0.73	0.14	0.54	0.71	0.40	0.60	0.52
UK	0.82	0.65	0.54	0.71	0.47	0.47	0.61
Norway	0.83	0.32	0.60	0.82	0.48	0.64	0.62
Switzerland	0.88	0.58	0.46	0.72	0.43	0.69	0.63
μ inter-country party-level variance	0.71	0.33	0.35	0.51	0.33	0.30	0.42

The constant term in each model indicates the average position of Europeans MPs on each of the attitude items. Only two of the six constant terms are significantly different from zero. MPs tend to disagree with the

notion that larger income differences are needed to incentivise individual effort. They also disagree with the proposal that government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy. This demonstrates a left-egalitarian bias among European political representatives.

The main statistical analyses are reported in Table 4.17 below. The country and party intercepts are included in the model. However, individual intercepts coefficients are not reported in the table as we are only interested here in the extent to which social background variables explain intra-party variation across Europe.

Table 4.17 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes in the PartiRep Data

	Left-Right	*EU Integration*	*Income Differences*	*Economic Management*	*Immigrants Adapt*	*Gender Quotas*
Constant	0.03	0.75	-1.14***	-0.85**	-0.29	0.15
	(0.56)	(0.66)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.28)
Individual level						
Female	-0.07	0.18	-0.10	-0.14	0.06	-0.39***
	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	-0.01*	0.01	0.01*	0.00	0.01	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
University	0.26*	0.18	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Class: C1	-0.13	-0.14	-0.05	-0.16*	0.02	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Class: C2D	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.21	-0.05
	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Class: Farmer	0.46	0.24	-0.13	-0.17	0.56**	0.82***
	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Rural	0.06	-0.41	0.38	0.44	0.38	-0.03
	(0.47)	(0.52)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.22)
Party-Level Variance	4.74***	2.66***	0.44***	0.76***	0.43***	0.41***
	(2.18)	(1.63)	(0.67)	(0.87)	(0.66)	(0.64)
Country-Level Variance	0.46*	0.39*	0.11*	0.09*	0.23*	0.07*
	(0.68)	(0.62)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.48)	(0.26)
Individual-Level Variance	1.87	4.52	0.99	0.84	0.77	0.87
	(1.37)	(2.13)	(1.00)	(0.92)	(0.88)	(0.94)
R^2m	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05
R^2c	0.74	0.40	0.37	0.52	0.49	0.38
Log-likelihood	-1584	-1808	-1256	-1214	-1089	-1206
N	838	800	835	838	782	837

Several background variables were significantly related to attitude positions among European MPs. Some of these findings are consistent with the findings in the Irish case specifically as outlined earlier in the chapter. Gender differences are only significant on the gender quotas item. Female MPs are more likely to support gender quotas than their male party colleagues, which is consistent with some of the earlier results in Ireland specifically. Age is significant on three items. Also consistent with the earlier analysis, older MPs are to the left of their younger party colleagues on the left-right scale. Somewhat incongruously, they are more likely to support larger income differences in society but they do lean towards supporting gender quotas. Higher education is only associated with a right wing tendency on the left-right scale. Lower professionals are more supportive of government management of the economy. The under-represented class group C2D do not differ here from their party colleagues who are members of the AB social group. MPs with a farming background are characterised by social conservatism. They are more likely to support integration requirements for immigrants and oppose gender quotas. While these results were not evident in the Irish analysis, recall that farmers in the interview data were much less likely to think that things would improve if there were more women in politics. The urban/rural divide is not associated with significant attitudinal differences. What might in some way be interpreted as an urban/rural divide may be better captured here by the AB/farmer divide in the occupational variable.

The multilevel R^2s for these models illustrate that very little variance is attributable to individual predictors and even less so than that observed for the Irish case. Less than 1% of the variance is explained by the age and education results on the left-right scale. Age, class and gender account for 2-4% on the remaining items.

Section 5: Conclusion

This chapter applied a theoretical model of descriptive representation to quantitative data on the political attitudes of Irish party elites. The purpose of the discussion was to assess whether variation in the social background

characteristics of political elites is associated with variation in intra-party attitudes. This is important to discover as confirmatory findings support the hypothesised link between descriptive representation and substantive representation. If there is no link between socialisation and political attitudes then descriptive representation would purely matter for symbolic purposes. Most parliaments and elected party elites are not representative of voters in terms of shared social characteristics and the Irish case is no exception.

The chapter first tested the theory that there is more attitudinal variance within Irish parties than between them. This was generally found to be the case as the amount of variance between parties amounted to 16% on average. The chapter then tested the theoretical model of demographic divisions within parties on attitudes to left-right economic issues, feminist issues and a variety of measures assumed to map onto the GAL/TAN index of social liberalism-conservatism. The inferences drawn from the statistical models took the varying average positions of the parties into account and subsequently estimated the effect of the hypothesised variables within parties.

At the individual level it was found that gender is the most important social background indicator of attitude divisions within parties. Female politicians tended to have left leaning affections in terms of disapproving of unequal distributions of wealth in society as well as cognitive evaluations in terms of supporting raising taxes to a greater extent than men. In line with international research, and in stark contrast to O'Sullivan (2002) and (to a lesser extent) Galligan (2000), women tended to be significantly more liberal on social issues and feminist than men within the parties. Consistent with previous research in the Irish context but against the international trends, younger politicians tended to be more economically right-wing. However, they were also more socially liberal. Moreover those from lower socio-economic status tended to be more left-wing and liberal than upper professionals.

Ireland is an extreme case in comparative politics as there is more attitudinal variance within political parties than between them. Internationally, higher salience items such as economic policy maximise inter-party competition. Although demographic variables are relatively weak predictors of attitude positions, there are some significant differences between demographic groups of MPs across Europe. Young MPs are generally more left-leaning and feminist. This conflicts somewhat with the findings for Ireland in isolation. Female MPs are significantly more feminist as measured by support for gender quotas, although this is not statistically evident in Ireland. The finding of conservative anti-feminism among MPs puts Ireland in line with international trends.

The results of this chapter show demonstrate significant support for the theory of the politics of presence. That is, intra-party attitudinal variation can be attributed to socio-demographic characteristics of political elites. However, further predictive tests demonstrated that a proportional alignment of demographics between parties and the electorate would not have a seismic impact on the average position of the parties.

CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDINAL CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND ELITES

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between voter and elite attitudes. Such an investigation is important in order to understand the process of converting the preferences of the masses into political outcomes. This relationship can be conceived of as systemic, by looking at the overall level of agreement between voters and elites, or individually by examining the average level of distance between representatives and voters. If the under-representation of descriptive groups causes systemic incongruence between citizens and elites, it should be evident that there is less attitudinal distance between members of under-represented groups and the electorate. The general implication of the findings is that female representatives and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds are attitudinally further from voters than men and those from higher socio-economic backgrounds respectively. Young politicians tended to be closer to voters than their older counterparts.

CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDINAL CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND ELITES

Section 1: Introduction

In the previous chapter we applied the theoretical model of social background to the intra-party attitudinal variation at the elite level. The implications for the theory of the politics of presence were drawn from observed differences between elite politicians who embody various social background characteristics. This chapter examines how elite attitudes relate to the attitudes of voters with the goal of assessing whether congruence with observed voter attitudes would be higher if the parties were descriptively representative of the population. Pluralist theories of democracy hold that the distribution of attitudes in parliament should broadly reflect the distribution of attitudes among the electorate (Marsh 1980, 59: O'Sullivan 2002, 8). The purpose of this normative goal is to provide an unbiased representation of opinion as an unbiased starting point for legislative deliberations.

This chapter examines how voter and elite attitudes are related at the macro, meso and micro levels. That is, firstly, how well aligned the distributions of opinion are between voters and elites. Secondly the consistency of attitudes within the four major parties, between TDs, defeated candidates, party identifiers and non-identifying voters and, finally, the average distance of individual politicians from voters nationally and their own party voters. At this individual level it is expected that politicians who exhibit the socio-demographic characteristics of under-represented groups will be closer to voters than their colleagues.

The chapter proceeds as follows - Section 2 outlines the theoretical focus of the chapter and states the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 discusses the data sources, measurements of congruence and the analytical methods employed by the chapter. It also examines the issues on which we could expect congruence to exist and vary, by outlining the issues voters felt were important to them. The analysis begins in section 4 with a relatively simple

discussion of the overall distributions of citizens and representative preferences. This continues in section 5 with an examination of the intra-party consistency of attitudes throughout the hierarchy of the four largest parties. Section 6 examines the relationship between voters and elites on two conceptual bases with sophisticated statistical modelling. Section 7 concludes the chapter.

The main findings of this chapter are that congruence tends to be higher on higher salience issues but this is not particularly deterministic. Consistent with Ezrow *et al* (2011, 288), the mainstream parties are closer to the national voter (which correlates with their party voters), while congruence is maximised for the small parties in the partisan constituency model. Members of the Dáil (TDs) are broadly closer to voters than losing candidates though there is no evidence to support May's Law (1973). Contrary to expectation, were the Irish parties to be representative in terms of gender and people from lower class clerical/manual occupations, they would actually be less congruent with voters. On the other hand, greater representation in terms of age would have a positive effect on congruence.

Section 2 – Theories of congruence

This chapter is theoretically concerned with the question of whether policy deliberations in parliament are likely to begin with a representative sample of attitudes in society (Marsh 1980, 59: O'Sullivan 2002, 8). This is important because, in a normative sense, all reasonably significant points of view must be represented as a starting point for policy formulation. If this is not the case, political representation could be suffering from a democratic deficit. However, Pitkin (1967, 209) argues that in order for a political system to be democratic, politicians must merely be 'responsive' to voters. The spectrum of responsiveness is discussed in this section.

The question then arises 'to which voters must they respond?' Given the institutional structure of the political system, where voters select candidates to represent their constituency, it might be expected that TDs represent the views of their constituents or an average constituency view. However this

'delegate' model (Converse and Pierce 1986, 493) is unlikely to have any practical implications particularly in the Irish case. As McCrone and Kuklinski (1979, 298) argue, in order for the theory to hold, representatives must think of themselves as delegates and the constituency must organise to express their opinion. It could be argued that periodic elections represent 'the organisation of constituency opinion' but this is only on the issue of selecting a representative, rather than individual issues. Moreover, the fact that Ireland employs multi-member constituencies means that being distant from the median constituent may simply mean that one is faithfully representing a minority voice.

An alternative method of responsiveness is for a representative to be attentive to voters' preferences but ultimately act according to their own best judgment. This is the 'trustee' or 'Burkean' model of representation (Conniff 1977, 333). While we could infer that that any observed attitudinal distance between voters and elites is due to elite responsiveness to the 'best interests' of voters over their sincere preferences, it could also be the case that they are completely unresponsive.

There is no specific representational role outlined for MPs in the Irish constitution. Although the Irish term for "member of parliament", *Teachta Dála* (TD), has a delegatory tone, as it literally translates into 'messenger of the people' (O'Sullivan 2002) or 'delegate to the assembly' (MacCarthaigh and Manning 2011, 19), this role is not binding on TDs. Indeed most TDs subjectively view their role as one of national legislators rather than constituency delegates, or party policy promoters (O'Sullivan 2002, 251). The aim of this chapter is to test which is more objectively likely.

It is more reasonable to assume that representation in Ireland operates on the basis of the responsible party model (Converse and Pierce 1986, 500). Here, parties are elected to deliver a legislative programme. Electoral systems based on proportional representation are said to have a centrifugal effect on party competition. This allows parties to spread their proposed governing programmes across the ideological spectrum rather than minimising their

policy differences in order to maximise their appeal (Downs 1957, 144; Miller and Stokes 1963, 45; Thomassen 1994, 252; Andrews and Money 2009, 815; Ezrow *et al* 2011, 288). However, the employment of the single transferable vote incentivises parties to appeal to all voters, thus mitigating the centrifugal effects of the proportional element of the system (Mitchell 2003, 83). Furthermore, Ezrow *et al* (2011, 288) claim that larger parties in proportional systems are closer to the mean voter among the general electorate, while niche parties are closer to the mean position of their own supporters. Therefore, I will measure the distance between individual politician's preferences with the electorate as whole and in relation to their own party voters. The measures of these theoretical relationships will be outlined in the next section.

I also examine the level of attitudinal agreement within the four major parties according to four 'echelons of co-partisans' (May 1973) with an emphasis on "party identifiers". This group is more likely to hold more stable attitudes and remain loyal voters for the representatives' party over time (Campbell et al 1960, 120; May 1973; Kitschelt 1989; Norris 1995; Marsh et al 2008, 63). May's Law (1973, pp135-168) hypothesises that intra-party attitudes vary according to each individuals position within the hierarchy, be they 'top-level leaders', 'mid-level leaders' and 'non-leaders' (Kitschelt 1989, 409: Norris 1995, 43). The mid-level leaders, usually party members and strong party identifiers are hypothesised to be ideological extremists given their strong commitment to the party and their lack of electoral incentives to modify their attitudes (at least publicly) to appeal to moderate voters. As data on party membership is not available I will consider those who feel a reasonable level of closeness to one party or another as a proxy for membership, replicating the approach taken in the study of Portugese parties by Belchior and Freire (2011, 55).

The evidence for the existence of May's law in practice is mixed. As outlined in Chapter 2, Kitschelt (1989, 400) found that it only applied to one of the two green parties in the Belgian case while Norris (1995, 29) found that the mid-levels leaders tended to be the most attitudinally moderate, with

elites positioned equidistant between members and voters. In the absence of data on party members, strong party identification has also been used as a proxy for party membership to test for the existence of May's Law in the case of two Portuguese parties – the Partido Socialista and the Social Democratic Party. Belchior and Freire (2011, 56) found that May's Law generally applicable to the two largest Portuguese parties. Gallagher and Marsh (2002, 174) found that May's law is unlikely to apply in the case of Fine Gael.

Before discussing the data and methodological approach of this chapter, it must be understood why we would expect attitudinal congruence between citizens and elites to vary across issues. This is attributable to issue 'salience' (Jones and Baumgartner 2003, 5). Elections are hardly efficient mechanisms for voters to communicate their opinions on a wide range of policy issues. High salience issues are likely to be heavily debated in public and voters will have a clearer idea of their potential representative's attitude to these issues than 'low salience' issues which are likely to receive less attention. Assuming that voters pick a representative closest to them on the highest salience issues, they may unknowingly choose a representative who is furthest from them on the other issues. However, voters may not be blind to this and consider it as simply a trade-off based on the available candidates and the importance of the issue. Recall from chapter 2 how Mansbridge (1999, 645) argued that if voters pick representatives that are descriptively similar to them, incongruence will be minimised on issues where preferences have not been explicitly communicated. This provides a further basis for considering salience in tandem with the descriptive-substantive representation link.

Bringing all of these theoretical strands together, I will outline the expected results of the analysis.

H_{0a} Congruence does not vary across issues.

H_1 The distributions of voter and elite preferences are perfectly congruent.

Where incongruence exists

H_{0b} Any variance in congruence is random.

H_2 Congruence is maximised on high salience issues

H_3 Losing candidates and/or party identifier voters are ideological outliers within each party.

H_4 Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil are closer to the national median voter, while the smaller parties are closer to their own supporters.

H_5 Politicians from under-represented groups such as women, the less educated, and socio-economic classes outside of the AB group demonstrate higher levels of congruence with voters.

Section 3 Data and method

This section outlines the data and variable used in this chapter's analysis. The data is broadly based on the CCS survey data analysed in the previous chapter. However, it also uses voter data to construct a new 'congruence variable'. The chapter focuses on four political attitude areas that range in salience – Economic policy, immigration, the environment, and European Union integration. The selection of these empirical dependent variables is justified later in this section. I test congruence between citizens and elites based firstly on the overall distribution of preferences between voters, defeated candidates and TDs. I then examine the level of issue agreement within the four major parties. Finally I measure the distance of each candidate and TD from voters nationally and party voters to construct two empirical dependent variables to which the theoretical model of descriptive representation is applied. The remainder of this section explains the analytical approach taken by the chapter.

I first test congruence in relation to the overall distribution of citizen and elite preferences. Here I follow Golder and Stramski's (2010, 96) development of 'many-to-many' congruence. This compares the distribution of voter preferences with the distribution of TDs', the formula for which is

$$\sum X \left| F_1(x) - F_2(x) \right|$$

Where $F_1(x)$ and $F_2(x)$ are the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for the citizen and representative preferences. This measure captures the area between the CDFs for the citizens and the representatives. When the distribution of preferences of the citizens and representatives are identically distributed, on the issue dimension, then the area between their CDFs will be zero (Golder and Stramski 2010, 96). I construct a CDF for voters, defeated candidates and winning candidates (TDs) and perform bivariate comparisons using a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for differences of probability distributions. Note that I will not test various models of representation on the basis of many-to-many congruence. From this test I will simply state whether it can be inferred that the Dáil is, on the whole, representative of the distribution of opinions in society. H_{0a} will be rejected and H_1 confirmed if the KS test between voters and TDs is insignificant. The results of these tests are presented in section 4.

A further method of comparing voters and elites is to examine whether social groups at the voter and elite levels are broadly congruent. Section 6 below examines whether social background variables are associated with attitudinal congruence with the parties. Here we will examine the extent of congruence between social groups across the electoral divide to determine whether the attitudes of some social groups achieve 'better', or 'worse', representation in the Dáil on account of, or due to the lack of, their descriptive representation.

Broadly following Ågren *et al* (2005, 137) this chapter compares voters and elites according to their social characteristics. That is, are female politicians closer to women voters than male politicians to male voters? As Converse and Pierce argue, are highly educated politicians closer to highly educated voters and so on through the socio-demographic variables? An attempt at a similar analysis was also conducted by Narud and Valen (2000, pp. 100-101). However, their approach was quite inefficient and limited them to only examining the differences between voters and elites with respect to gender. They did find that the attitudes of male MPs were consistently

closer to those of male voters, though the results for females are inconsistent.

This stage of the analysis conducts comparisons between voters and elites with regard to all of the background variables referred to throughout this thesis. This specific test is also conducted on the survey items referred to in this chapter. The method involves compiling the INES and CSS items into one dataset and adding a dummy variable coded '0' if the respondent is a voter and '1' if the respondent is a TD. In order to make a clear inference about representation, losing candidates are set aside for the purpose of this stage of the analysis.

After combining the INES and CCS items into a single dataset, it is then split according to the divisions within each social background variable. Differences in attitudes are then tested separately between female voters and female politicians, male voters and male politicians and so on. Most of the background variables are dummies with exception of class, which has four components. Age is converted into a dummy where '0' is under 40 and '1' is over 40. The total number of tests across 12 social background sub-categories and 10 items is thus 120. What we are interested here is simply the size and the significance of the coefficient coefficient for 'Politician' in each model. All other coefficients are simply controls for the purpose of this analysis. Congruence is achieved when the coefficient for 'TD' in the model is insignificant. The congruence hits across the ten items are then counted for each sub-category to make an inference about social representation.

To test the consistency of intra-party attitudes I broadly follow the approach of Belchior and Freire (2011, 56) by constructing a table of intra-party attitude agreement. This table presents a percentage difference index (PDI) for each level of each party on each issue. The values are a ratio of respondents supporting one side of an issue over the other and are delineated by four intra-party levels; TDs, defeated candidates, party identifiers and non-identifying voters for Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, Labour and Sinn Féin.

I identify and analyse the positions of echelons of co-partisans (May 1973, 135) for each of the four largest parties on the salient issues. The elites surveyed in the CCS are parsed into separate groups for TDs and candidates. The former are simply the 'top-level leaders'. The latter are assumed to be 'mid-level leaders' and thus ideologically more extreme than the former. However, their candidacy for election places similar incentives to reflect the electorate's attitudes as TDs, so it may be inappropriate to bundle them into one 'mid-level' group with the party identifiers from the voter survey.

The voters surveyed in the INES are delineated by the extent of their "closeness" to the party. I operationalise the 'party identifier' voter following Marsh et al's (2008, 62) criterion and measurement. In the INES, voters were initially asked whether they "feel close" to any political party. Those who responded 'yes', and stated one of the four major parties, are included as "Party ID" voters for the party they stated. If the respondent answered 'no' to this question, they were then asked "Do you feel closer to one party over others". If they answered 'yes' here and stated a party, they were also included as "Party ID" respondents (N = 642). Those who answered "no" to this prompt were considered non-identifiers for the party they voted for. Independent voters and those who voted for one of the smaller parties were excluded from this stage of the analysis.

An individual-level measure is used to compare each candidate and TD's congruence with various interpretations of their relationship with voters as outlined in section 2. I measure the distance between citizens and representatives, on various theoretical bases, using Golder and Stramski's "absolute congruence measure". This is calculated as

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} |Ci - R|$$

The measure captures the absolute distance of representatives from the citizens' most preferred point (C); the lower the score, the better the

congruence between citizens and their representatives. Finally, politicians may be more confident in their opinions and thus are more likely to report more extreme attitude positions than voters (or they may truly be more extreme but in the same direction as voters). Therefore they might be *relatively* congruent if not absolutely congruent with voters. This measure of absolute congruence ranges from 0 to 1. C_i is the ideal point of the *i*th citizen and R is the position of the individual representative.

$$= 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} |Ci - MC|}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} |Ci - R|}$$

The equation above calculates the relative congruence measure. If the ideological location of the representative (R) is at the position that minimises the sum of absolute distances between all the citizens (C_i) and the representative *relative* to the sum of distances between all citizens and the median citizen (MC), then congruence (distance) will be 0. The further the representative is away from MC, the closer the relative congruence measure will be to 1 (Golder and Stramski 2010, 96).

I formally test individual-level congruence between voters, losing candidates and TDs on the two assumptions of representation outlined by (Ezrow et al 2011, 276); the *general electorate* and *partisan constituency* models. The *general electorate* model assumes that TDs are elected to represent all voters nationally. Here the absolute congruence measure outlined above is calculated for each TD and candidate with respect to all voters in the INES dataset. The *partisan constituency model* of representation means the winning party implement their preferred policy and each party voter's position is subtracted from each candidate and TD for that party (Miller and Stokes 1963, 45; Thomassen 1994, 252). The result is four theoretical dependent variables; one of each individual's absolute and relative distance from all voters and from party voters.

As outlined in chapter 3, I use OLS or multilevel regression models in the analysis of the absolute congruence measure to test the effects of the

independent variables. An ANOVA test indicates whether there is clustering on the dependent variable by party affiliation or social background characteristics. Where clustering is evident, a multilevel model is applied with party affiliation added as a random intercept term, or the basis of a random slope. As the measure of relative congruence is bounded between 0 and 1 a more flexible variation structure, beyond Gaussian assumptions is required in the statistical model (Cribari-Neto and Zeiles 2010, 2). This has been extended to beta regression in multilevel structures by Grün et al (2010). These results are presented in section 6.

It also necessary here to assess which public policy issues are 'salient' (Jones and Baumgartner 2003, 5). Salience may vary across issues but also between voters and candidates for elected office. Therefore the salience of issues among voters, candidates and TDs will be compared below. Although there are other inferential methods of assessing the salience of issues such as the "lowest percentage of 'don't know' responses" (Page and Shapiro 1983, 181) the INES and CCS data takes a more direct approach[1] (Marsh et al 2008, 89). The INES survey asked voters the question;

> "What has been the issue most (and second most) important to you personally in this election?"

While the CCS asked

> "In your opinion, what are the three most important political problems facing Ireland today?

The results are summarised in Table 5.1 below in order of voter priority. The table lists the issues in order of their percentage of total mentions across the first and second most important issues personally important to voters, candidates and TDs. The third option in the CCS is excluded. Responses such as "crime/law and order/vandalism" were also omitted as there was no attitude question in either the INES or the CCS which tapped attitudes to policy options for this issue.

[1] Inferring salience from an open-ended item like 'most important problem' is heavily criticised by Wleizen (2005, 555-579), who suggests that a list of issues should be put to voters on which they are asked to rank their relative importance. Nevertheless, it is appropriate for this study to follow the approach taken by Irish political scientists in the INES.

The most important issue for voters is job creation, with 784 mentions across the first and second preferences. This is excluded from any further analysis as it is arguably a valence issue (Stokes 1963, 372), but also, no questions were included in the surveys from which left and right positions on job creation can be inferred. The valence status of this item is assumed because nobody disagrees that unemployment was a massive economic and social problem in Ireland in 2011. Political divisions occur on potential solutions to deal with the problem.

Table 5.1- Issue Salience Among Voters, Candidates and TDs

Issue	*% Mentions*		
	Voters	*Candidates*	*TDs*
Job creation	25	18	33
Economic Management	16	18	18
Problems with the banks/Banking crisis	10	6	8
Anger with the government	10	-	-
Health services	9	2	5
Deficit in the public finances	7	12	13
IMF/EU bailout	6	2	4
Social spending cuts	4	-	-
Taxation	3	1	
Education/Local Schools	3	1	1
Stable government	2	-	-
Political Reform	2	3	6
Universal social charge	1	-	-
Negative Equity	1	-	-
Immigration	1	-	-
The environment	0	3	1
Corruption		9	-
Inequality		6	3
Trust in public representatives		4	2
N	**1650**	**174**	**75**

The first issue which can be linked to substantive survey questions and political divisions is "economic management". There are several questions in both the INES and CCS tapping left/right attitudes to economic management policy options. These include dichotomously posed questions with an 11-point response mechanism tapping preferences for, firstly, more or less state regulation of industry. Secondly, more or less state ownership of industry, and thirdly, cutting taxes and spending less on social services versus increasing taxes and spending more on social services (Appendix A).

Continuing through the list, it could be supposed that seven of the 16 issues mentioned by voters could be tapped using just the survey question about taxes and spending (Appendix A). Issues arising such as the state of the health service, taxation, social welfare spending, education etc. could all be considered subsidiaries of the core policy decision of whether increase or decrease taxes and spending. The remaining issues mentioned which are unrelated to *general* economic management were: the banking and economic crisis, anger with the (Fianna Fáil-led) government, political reform, immigration and the environment. Note that the final two issues received less than 1% of mentions, making them quite low salience issues.

After the economy and general anger at the political establishment, political reform is a distant third on the list of issues important to voters (1.6%). Given that it is third nonetheless may indicate that the economic crisis was viewed as a systemic failure of governance. However, there is no indication in this element of the survey as to which areas of governance are in most urgent need of reform. For this we look to the battery of questions on political reform.

There are alternative ways to infer the salience of different issues here. The political reform statements are ranked in table 5.2 below according to the percentage of voters *strongly* agreeing with the proposed change in question. Isolating the "strongly agree" attitude response is arguably preferable to simply summing the three "agree" categories, as attitude theory indicates that strong attitudes are more stable (Miller and Peterson 2004, 847) and thus a better measure of salience. Moreover, inferring salience from highly stable attitudes toward a closed list of items is reasonably consistent with Wleizen's (2005, 578) criterion discussed in footnote 1 above. These responses are then compared across the strata of electoral participants from losing candidates to elected TDs.

The highest salience political reform issues for voters is that the number of TDs should be reduced, that technocratic ministers be included in cabinet

and that the Seanad be abolished. Medium salience issues are that local government should be given the power to raise and manage their own finances and cabinet ministers should step down as TDs. Low salience issues are quotas for female candidates and replacing the electoral system. Thus when voters speak of "political reform" it is apparent that they think there is too much fusion of power in the Irish political system. They think there is too much dependence between the parliament and the executive, and too much national dominance over local government. They also seem to think that the parliament itself is not fit for purpose given the extent to which they want to redistribute power away from it.

Table 5.2 - Salience of political reform items among voters, candidates and TDs

Political reform issues	*Voters*	*Candidates*	*TDs*
The number of TDs should be significantly reduced	33	18	6
Some experts who are not TDs should be brought into the cabinet	28	21	3
The Seanad should be abolished	25	13	24
Cabinet ministers should step down as TDs to concentrate on running their ministries and be replaced by someone else from the same party	17	13	8
Local government should be given power to raise and to manage their own finances	16	53	40
Our PR-STV electoral system should be replaced	16	13	3
Parties should be forced to nominate more women as candidates	6	28	16

Values indicate the percentage of respondents strongly agreeing in each group.

There is some unsurprising attitude incongruence here between voters, candidates and TDs. TDs are completely opposed to voters on almost every measure except the abolition of the Seanad. After this, TDs particularly favour giving more power to local government and forcing parties to select more female candidates. Losing candidates are closer to voters than TDs on four of the items.

It would be reasonable to expect that candidates who are closer to voters on salient issues would actually win election (Converse and Pierce 1986, 595). However, it could be argued that because political reform was a relatively salient issue (third highest distinct issue) rather an absolutely salient issue (1.6% of mentions) perhaps expectations of significant congruence are too demanding? Moreover, self-interest is apparent here on the part of TDs,

with only 6% strongly agreeing with a reduction in the number of TDs, compared to 33% of voters and 18% of candidates.

For the analysis stage, congruence tests will be performed on the highest and lowest salience political reform measures, reducing the number of TDs and the introduction of gender quotas for political parties. This level of salience is interacted with the overall level of salience of political reform generally to generate an expected level of congruence. Therefore a moderate level of congruence is expected on reducing the number of TDs and low levels of congruence are expected on the issue of gender quotas. However the descriptive statistics for each group outlined already demonstrate that there is very little overall congruence on the issue of reducing the number of TDs. The inclusion of gender quotas is also interesting on the basis of its implications for the broader theoretical framework of descriptive representation. We would expect women to support gender quotas to a greater extent than men, thus TDs should hold less positive attitudes towards quotas, given the low numbers of women in this group.

Ireland's relationship with Europe was no doubt an issue for voters in the 2011 election as 6% of voters mentioned the EU/IMF bailout as an issue personally important to them (table 5.1 above). But it seems that how the EU develops in general, which may have major consequences for politics in Ireland, does not motivate voters to the same extent at all. This may be a function of the fact that Irish voters get to decide on whether to ratify treaties in separate referendums. This allows more space in the context of general elections to send clearer signals to policy makers on other substantive issues. Moreover, voters attribute relatively little blame to the European Union for causing the crisis. Table 5.3 below reports the proportion of INES respondents answering "extremely" or "very" responsible to a list of potential instigators of the crisis. Here, the European Union and membership of the Euro are listed after domestic institutions and the wider economic situation. This indicates that there is not simply a linear outlook, based on closeness to home, when it comes to blame for the crisis.

Low salience issues such as European Union integration may be of great importance to this study as much as high salience issues as it can be investigated whether TDs' congruence with voter preferences remains consistent regardless of salience, if at all. If congruence is not consistent across issues, it would be expected to be lower on low salience issues (Holmberg 2000, 163). The EU integration question is thus considered to be of very low salience and is included in the test so as to cover the full range

Table 5.3 – Voters' perception of institutional responsibility for the economic crisis

Potential instigators	*Proportion Answering "Extremely" or "Very" Responsible*
Bankers	0.92
Department of Finance/ Irish Central Bank	0.84
The Irish Government	0.79
International economic situation	0.55
The European Union	0.41
Membership of the euro	0.32

of issue saliency. Appropriate questions were included in the INES and CCS to examine congruence between citizens and elites on these issues. The approximate question wordings and the salience/predicted congruence levels are outlined in table 5.4 below.

Table 5.4 - Predicted congruence levels across survey items

Survey Question	*Salience/Predicted Congruence*
Left-Right	High
Taxation	High
Mortgage write downs	High
Privatisation	High
Regulation	High
PR-STV (Single Transferable Vote) should be replaced.	Moderate
Gender Quotas	Moderate
Limits on immigration	Low
Prioritising the environment over the economy	Low
European unification	Very Low

The question then follows; to what extent do voters expect representatives to reflect their views? This will be important when interpreting the core findings of the analysis and the implications for democracy in Ireland. The INES asked voters whether or not they agree with various interpretations of a TD's role. The response mechanism was simply to indicate whether or not the respondent supported each of the interpretations. The responses are reported in table 5.5 below.

Table 5.5 – Percentages of voters favouring popular interpretations of a TD's role

Representational role	*Support*
Speak up for the area they represent	72
Speak their own mind	62
Help individual voters sort out their problems	41
Be loyal to the party they represent	30

Voters are very much supportive of TDs "speaking up for the area they represent" with 72% supporting this interpretation. Therefore, when it comes to examining the dynamics of congruence, we would expect overall congruence to be highest between TDs and their geographic constituents. However, as outlined in earlier, constituencies are attitudinally diverse entities that do not speak with one voice, particularly in a multimember setting. Moreover, they have the opportunity to elect multiple representatives, so testing congruence between representatives and the median constituent is redundant. It is more likely that what is meant by 'speaking up for the area they represent' has more to do with service allocation responsiveness (O'Sullivan 2002, 291) than attitudinal representation.

This section has demonstrated which issues were important to voters in the 2011 general election. If congruence across issues varies at all, it be would expected to be highest for those issues of highest salience among voters, economic management crisis policies and political reform. Congruence would be expected to be lower, if it exists at all, on lower salience issues such as immigration, the environment and European Union Integration. The

next section performs some simple tests as whether the distribution of TDs preferences differ significantly from voters and losing candidates.

Section 4: Many-to-many congruence

This section presents the results of testing the difference of distributions between voters, candidates and TDs on the policy areas discussed in section 3. The results are presented in Table 5.6. All voters are pooled with no distinct distributions for party identifiers. The test statistic is the Komolgorov-Smirnoff test (D) for distribution differences. The table reports the D statistic for this test implemented in *R*. Lower values indicate greater congruence between two distributions.

Table 5.6 - Many-to-Many Congruence between voters, candidates and TDs.

Topic	*Voters/TDs*	*Voters/ Candidates*	*Candidates/TDs*
Left Right	0.41***	0.37***	0.09
Cut Taxes	0.24***	0.24***	0.09
Regulation	0.29***	0.09	0.26**
Mortgage Relief	0.09	0.11*	0.14
Less TDs	0.3***	0.44*	0.19*
Immigration	0.52***	0.47***	0.16
Environment	0.14	0.22***	0.17
EU	0.28***	0.9	0.22*
Gender Quotas	0.1	0.13***	0.1

Values are D statistics from Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests for distribution differences. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$

The table presents the results of testing three relationships, those between voters and TDs, voters and losing candidates, and TDs and candidates. The issue areas are presented in order of issue salience as previously discussed in section 3. However, I include self-placement on the left-right scale initially also. I also present two graphs for the highest and lowest issue agreement areas in figures 5.1 -5.4 below. The first of each set of graphs displays the probability distribution functions (PDF) for voters, candidates and TDs for the mortgage relief and immigration policies, as they are the

issues that demonstrate the highest and lowest levels of congruence respectively. The second compares their respective cumulative distribution functions (CDF), with the difference between TDs and voters represented by the shaded area.

Figure 5.1 - Probability Density Functions for TDs, Candidates and Voters on attitudes to mortgage write-downs for heavily-indebted homeowners.



Figure 5.2 – Cumulative distribution Functions for TDs, candidates and Voters on attitudes to mortgage write-downs for heavily-indebted homeowners.



Figure 5.3 - Probability density Functions for voters, candidates and TDs on attitudes to placing restrictions on immigration.



Figure 5.4 - Cumulative distribution functions for voters, candidates and TDs on attitudes to placing restrictions on immigration.



There are several striking findings in table 5.6. The first is that there is significant incongruence between the distributions of voters' and TDs' attitudes on most policy areas. Congruence is maximised on the high salience 'mortgage bailout' item. Congruence is lowest on one of the lowest salience issues, immigration. In addition to mortgage relief, voters and TDs are congruent on the issues of the environment and gender quotas which are low salience issues. Significant incongruence is observed for left-right self-placement, cutting taxes/spending, regulation, reducing number of TDs and EU integration.

Despite EU integration being the lowest salience issue for which data were available, the *KS* statistic is quite high. This might be explained by the fact that the focus on Europe as part of the crisis ensured that TDs were more

congruent with voters than salience, as operationalised here, would predict. EU integration was the only issue, other than economic regulation, on which the distributions of voters and losing candidates do not differ while those of candidates and TDs do. There is also an un-intuitive significant difference between voters and TDs on the self placement left-right scale. This could be explained by the fact that abstract notions of left and right are not generally discussed in Irish public discourse. Substantive policy areas are a far more robust basis for analysing congruence in the Irish context. Overall, there is little support for the hypothesis that congruence is correlated with salience (H_2)

The question of whether voters choose candidates that are on average closer to their own position can be answered by looking at the *KS* statistics for the voter/candidate and voter/TD relationsips. The *KS* statistic is lower for the voter/candidate relationship compared to the voter/TD relationship on three of the eight policy areas; left-right, regulation and EU integration. Of these, regulation and EU integration demonstrate significant differences between candidates and TDs. Overall, it can be concluded that, although TDs' issue positions are significantly incongruent with voters, on average, their preferences are closer to voters' than losing candidates' preferences, supporting H_3.

Next we compare voters and TDs of similar demographic characteristics to determine whether some groups' attitudes are better represented among TDs than others. The procedure for conducting these tests is outlined in section three. Here, I present a summary table of the 120 tests. Table 5.7 below presents the number of items where congruence between voters and TDs of each social background sub-category was achieved. The table presents the count of the beta coefficients in each model which were insignificant, indicating that there was no difference between voters and elites within a sub-category of social background for that item. The results demonstrate some striking patterns.

Table 5.7 - Attitudinal Congruence between Voters and TDs of Similar Social Background Sub-Categories

Category	*No difference*	*Closer than comparator*	*Total*
Class: Farmer	9	0	9
Age: Under 40	8	1	9
Area Type: Urban	7	0	7
Education: Third Level	6	1	7
Education: No Third Level	5	1	6
Class: AB	5	1	6
Class: C1	5	1	6
Area Type: Rural	5	0	5
Gender: Female	4	3	7
Class: C2D	4	1	5
Gender: Male	4	0	4
Age: Over 40	4	0	4

Voters and TDs of a farming background achieve attitudinal congruence, with other background variables controlled for, on nine of ten items. The under 40s and urban people also achieve relatively high levels of congruence. Other sub-categories do not score particularly noteworthy though is it worth mentioning that both men and women score quite low in the congruence rankings, making gender a weak basis of comparison. Relative congruence can also be taken into account here. Of the items where significant differences exist between voters and TDs for both sub-categories of a variable, we can assign an additional congruence score where one sub-category of TDs is closer to voters than the comparator sub-category. We can set the cut-off as being one standard deviation less distant from voters, so as not to over-emphasis statistically insignificant differences. The effect on women's representation is the only notable change, with the number of relative congruence items being three, bringing the overall total number of congruent items among women to 7. As women and people under 40 are under-represented in the political system, we can then say that if the proportion of women and young people among TDs increased, the political attitudes of these groups would be better represented in the Dáil.

Section 5: Intra-Party Congruence

I now examine the internal consistency of party preferences, from voters, through party identifiers and losing candidates, to elected TDs. Figure 5.5 below illustrates this approach. The Y axis is the placement of the respondent within the party hierarchy and the X axis is the average individual's self-placement on the left-right scale, at each level of each party's hierarchy. The graph demonstrates some significant incongruence between those running for office in the CCS data and those not doing so in the INES. There appears to be at least one point between voters and representatives of each party, with left-wing representatives placing themselves at a particularly extreme distance from their voters. There is little difference between the self-placements of TDs and losing candidates', and similarly between party identifiers and non-identifiers. It would seem that if left and right congruence were the basis for voter choice, those who voted for FG, FF and Labour should all have voted for FG TDs, and SF voters should have voted for FF TDs.

Figure 5.5 – Stratified intra-party agreement for self-placement on the left-right scale.



To test the consistency of intra-party attitudes, I created a cross-table of support on each issue for each party. The PDI at each level of the party, is reported in the table 5.8 below. Of interest here is whether we can conclude

that there is intra-party directional consistency or whether one or other levels of the party are in significant disagreement with the other levels.

Table 5.8 - Intra-Party Percentage Difference Indices

	Left-Right	*Regula-tion*	*Priva-tisation*	*Taxes*	*Mortgage Bailout*	*EU*	*Environ-ment*	*Immi-gration*	*Reduce TDs*
	Fianna Fail								
TDs	-0.18	-0.09	0.91	-0.55	-0.55	0.10	0.00	0.27	0.27
Candidates	0.07	-0.09	0.68	-0.55	-0.22	-0.22	-0.03	0.66	0.25
Identifiers	0.68	0.12	0.45	-0.14	-0.38	-0.15	-0.05	0.57	-0.45
Voters	0.60	0.01	0.41	-0.12	-0.71	-0.27	-0.05	0.57	-0.60
	Fine Gael								
TDs	0.00	0.00	0.78	-0.26	-0.10	0.54	-0.07	0.33	-0.10
Candidates	0.00	0.09	0.73	-0.36	0.27	0.09	0.00	0.55	-0.36
Identifiers	0.63	0.08	0.38	-0.19	-0.28	-0.08	-0.04	0.57	-0.71
Voters	0.60	0.02	0.32	-0.16	-0.69	-0.22	0.00	0.49	-0.71
	Labour								
TDs	-1.00	-0.74	0.37	-0.67	-0.35	0.32	-0.42	0.25	0.30
Candidates	-1.00	-0.75	0.25	-1.00	-1.00	0.38	-0.25	-0.25	0.56
Identifiers	0.06	-0.12	0.29	-0.31	-0.18	-0.22	-0.20	0.42	-0.78
Voters	0.26	-0.15	0.29	-0.19	-0.68	-0.27	-0.13	0.44	-0.61
	Sinn Fein								
TDs	-1.00	-1.00	0.00	-1.00	-0.33	-1.00	-1.00	-0.33	0.50
Candidates	-1.00	-0.82	-0.64	-1.00	-0.58	-0.73	-0.82	-0.75	0.08
Identifiers	-0.10	-0.13	0.21	-0.05	-0.44	-0.12	0.01	0.73	-0.73
Voters	-0.10	-0.13	0.30	0.01	-0.79	-0.20	0.12	0.66	-0.68

There is directional consistency within Fianna Fáil on six of the 11 items. The party favours; raising taxes and spending, privatisation of industry, implements in a mortgage bailout scheme, restricting immigration and introducing gender quotas for political parties (though candidates are neutral on this issue), and is centrist on balancing the economy and the environment. In opposition to other levels of the party TDs lean left on the self-placement scale while supporting greater regulation of business and industry and further EU integration. TDs and candidates oppose reducing the number of TDs and support greater regulation, a mortgage bailout and prioritising the environment over the economy in opposition to other levels of the party. TDs and candidates are slightly opposed to further EU integration and oppose a reduction in the number of TDs. Identifiers and voters tend to cluster together and are not opposed to each other on any issue. There is no clear tendency for any group within Fianna Fáil to be the most ideologically extreme. Thus, there is no support for May's Law here.

Fine Gael demonstrates greater internal consistency with directional agreement on seven items. On the whole, the party supports privatisation of industry, raising taxes and spending, restricting immigration, gender quotas and, like Fianna Fáil, is centrist on the environment. TDs are the extreme group on supporting privatisation and further EU integration. Candidates are the most extreme on three items. They are most likely to support regulation, raising taxes, and oppose a mortgage bailout. Identifiers and voters are more right-wing than TDs and candidates, and more likely to support the political reform measures. Consistent with Gallagher and Marsh (2002, 174), there is little evidence of May's Law working within Fine Gael.

Despite the observed incongruence in attitude strength on the left-right scale observed in figure 5.5 above, Labour are ideologically consistent across levels on six of the items. But the pattern is that the TDs tend to be ideological extremists as often as candidates. The party supports regulation, privatisation, raising taxes, gender quotas, mortgage bailouts, and prioritising the economy over the environment. Candidates are the outliers only in their opposition to restricting immigration while TDs and candidates lean left wing, support further EU integration and oppose reducing the number of TDs, in opposition to the attitudes of identifiers and voters. There is no evidence of significant mid-level extremism here.

Sinn Féin demonstrates complete directional congruence on four of the items. The party is left-wing, favours regulation, higher taxes and mortgage relief and opposes further EU integration. TDs are isolated in their disagreement with restricting immigration and opposition to gender quotas. Candidates oppose privatisation while the rest of the party supports it. Candidates and TDs are slightly opposed to identifiers and voters on the environment and immigration, with the electoral level prioritising the economy over the environment and opposing restrictions on immigration. while the voter groups lean in favour of the environment. Numerically, voters are the only group with a positive PDI for taxation, technically

indicating their preference for lowering taxes, but the difference from identifiers barely lies on the opposite side of zero.

To confirm May's Law here we would at least have to see the extreme values for each item in each party arising for either the candidate or identifier groups. Admittedly, this is a low hurdle for the theory to clear. Despite this low hurdle, there is no evidence of mid-level extremism within any of the Irish parties.

Section 6: Many-to-One Congruence

This section tests theories of representation by examining the average legislator's relationship with the general electorate and their partisan constituency, under absolute and relative congruence. For efficiency, the analysis focuses firstly on absolute congruence. If there is no evidence of an absolute congruence effect the relative congruence result will be reported. If both methods do not show a statistically significant finding, the hypothesis being tested is rejected. This section will also take a wider view of the electorate than that in section 5 above, to include voters beyond those who voted for the major parties. The discussion of congruence is organised by issue area. The analysis is also sensitive to party clustering. That is, where it is found that significant clustering of representatives exist, and observations cannot be assumed to be independent, a multilevel model is used. TDs and candidates are analysed together (N = 249) with a control variable to indicate 1 where the candidate won election (and thus is a TD) and 0 otherwise and there is no distinction between non-aligned and party ID voters.

The first stage of the analysis is to justify the model type by demonstrating the significance of group-level variance in each model according to ANOVA testing. If party is found to show significant clustering, a multilevel model is used. If any of the background effects are additionally found to cause significant clustering, they are included as random slope in the model. If there is no intra-group clustering on any of the variables, an OLS model of background variables is used. The results of testing absolute

congruence with all voters nationally are presented here while absolute congruence with party voters and relative congruence tests are presented in Appendix B. Significant coefficients from the relative congruence tables are reported in the text.

For further efficiency, the reporting of these results across attitude items is organised by variable. This enables a clearer overview of significant findings without repeatedly having to declare the null findings for each variable. Firstly, the ANOVA tests are discussed and the decisions to apply multilevel models with random intercepts for party to the data, with or without random slopes/interactions for the individual-level variables, are justified. Secondly, average congruence is assessed. This is similar to the many-to-many congruence discussed above, but differs in that congruence is calculated at the individual level and averaged. The amount of inter-party variance is also assessed here. The importance of this is to understand how much variance remains to be explained with individual-level predictors, although this is less important when one is using a multilevel model. Following this, the relationship between social background and intra-party across issues and the two types of congruence discussed.

There is significant party-level variance in congruence on many of the issues examined here. Party differences are highest in the absolute national voter relationship for the left-right scale ($F = 28.37$, $p < 0.001$) and privatisation ($F = 17.75$, $p < 0.001$). Immigration ($F = 8.35$, $p < 0.001$), regulation of industry ($F = 5.22$, $p < 0.001$), the environment ($F = 5.05$, $p < 0.001$), taxation ($F = 4.36$, $p < 0.001$) and reducing the number of TDs ($F = 2.95$, $p < 0.01$) demonstrate medium levels of party variance, while the EU, mortgage relief and gender quotas have no significant party variance. Congruence with party voters is relatively similar but the F values are lower. The intra-class correlations range from 0 to 0.57 at the national level, meaning the there is considerable residual variance at the individual level and thus, within parties. The patterns for the relative congruence models are similar to those in the absolute congruence models. However, variance between parties does not exceed 0.2 in any of these models, so there is

considerably more intra-party variance to be explained by background variables under relative congruence than absolute congruence.

The ANOVA tests report a significant intra-party effect (random slope) of age on taxation attitudes in the national ($F = 11.07$, $p < 0.001$) and party ($F = 10.71$, $p < 0.01$) models. It is also evident on the regulation scale for absolute congruence with voters nationally ($F = 5.11$, $p < 0.05$) and relative congruence with party voters ($F = 3.9$, $p < 0.05$). Education is significant on the immigration scale for absolute party congruence ($F = 4.15$, $p < 0.05$, $N = 238$). However, when these random slopes were fitted to the multilevel models, they were found to correlate with the random intercepts, thus indicating an inappropriate fit. The random slopes were dropped and only varying intercept models are reported. The multilevel models results for absolute congruence with party voters are outlined in tables 5.9 - 5.12 below.

The average level of congruence on each issue can be inferred by calculating the mean and the 95% confidence interval for each survey item, regardless of party and other independent variables. The significant finding is that the cadre of political elites are incongruent with voters' preferences on every issue and under almost each conception of congruence. This is evident from the fact that most of the confidence intervals do not intersect with zero and thus significant distance exists. Table 5.8 below presents these statistics. Congruence is marginally higher for the relationship with party voters and higher salience items, though the environment is not consistent with this general pattern.

The results in table 5.9 mirror those from the discussion of overall distribution differences discussed in section 4 above. The distance between voter and elite preferences is minimised on the highly salient taxation and spending item (hereafter 'taxation') and maximised on the immigration and 'reduce TDs' items.

Table 5.9 - Average Absolute Congruence with National and Party Voters

	National Voters			*Party Voters*		
	mean	lower	upper	mean	lower	upper
Left-Right	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.6
Regulation	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.0	2.9	3.1
Privatisation	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.2
Taxation	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.7
Mortgage Bailout	3.4	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.4
EU Integration	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.1
Immigration	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.9
Environment	2.8	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.8
Gender Quotas	3.6	3.4	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.7
Reduce TDs	3.8	3.6	4.1	3.7	3.5	4.0

Values represent the average amount distance between individual representatives and either all voters or party voters. Lower values indicate higher congruence.

Although statistically significant absolute incongruence exists, the average distance between politicians and voters on taxation is only 2.7 points on an 11-point scale. Congruence is maximised within this item for the relationship with party voters, but for the average politician this is closely related to the national voter concept. Attitudinal congruence is minimised for attitudes towards reducing the number TDs. There are 4 to 5 (rescaled) points here, putting voters and elites firmly on opposite sides of the debate. On the rest of the items, the average TD is about 2-3 points incongruent with voters. The relative congruence patterns were also tested (see Appendix B) and no differences between model specifications were detected that would affect these inferences as just outlined.

Variation in congruence at the party level can be examined by fitting empty multilevel models and reporting the party intercept terms. Table 5.10 and 5.10 below present these results for economic and non-economic items respectively.

Table 5.10 - Estimation Results of Party Intercepts in Empty Multilevel Models on Absolute Congruence of Economic Attitudes Between CCS participants and all INES participants.

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Mortgage Bailout*
Constant	3.30***	3.33***	3.49***	2.67***	3.31***
	(0.50)	(0.21)	(0.44)	(0.16)	(0.11)
Fianna Fáil	2.13*	3.12	3.00*	2.37*	3.22
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Fine Gael	2.05*	2.97*	3.11*	2.17*	3.35
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Labour	3.58	3.38	2.72*	2.93	3.26
	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Sinn Féin	4.27*	3.26	3.37	2.98	3.21
	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.15)
ULA	5.60*	4.38*	6.01*	2.95	3.33
	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.16)
Greens	2.95	3.02	2.93*	2.68	3.30
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Independents	2.50*	3.21	3.27*	2.62	3.53*
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Party-Level Variance	1.72***	0.26**	1.32**	0.13	0.03
	(1.31)	(0.51)	(1.15)	(0.36)	(0.18)
Individual-Level Variance	0.91	0.81	0.87	1.04	1.43
	(0.95)	(0.90)	(0.93)	(1.02)	(1.20)
Log-likelihood	-289.25	-311.51	-324.11	-335.17	-385.92
N	202	231	231	229	240

Table 5.11 - Estimation Results of Party Intercepts in Empty Multilevel Models of Congruence with All INES Participants for Non-economic Items.

	EU Integration	*Immigration*	*Environment*	*Quotas*	*Reduce TDs*
Constant	3.01***	4.07***	2.88***	3.58***	3.84***
	(0.08)	(0.36)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.24)
Fianna Fáil	2.97	3.19*	2.55*	3.58	4.33
	(0.10)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.00)	(0.26)
Fine Gael	2.95	3.24*	2.50*	3.58	3.62
	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.00)	(0.26)
Labour	2.91	3.67	2.61	3.58	4.33
	(0.10)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.00)	(0.30)
Sinn Féin	3.02	4.59	2.83	3.58	3.96
	(0.11)	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.00)	(0.37)
ULA	3.05	5.52*	3.45*	3.58	3.81
	(0.12)	(0.43)	(0.27)	(0.00)	(0.40)
Greens	3.05	4.56	3.39*	3.58	3.23
	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.00)	(0.32)
Independents	3.12	3.76*	2.80	3.58	3.60
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.20)
Party-Level Variance	0.02	0.81	0.19	0.00	0.26
	(0.13)	(0.90)	(0.43)	(0.00)	(0.51)
Individual-Level Variance	0.93	1.93	0.98	1.44	3.98
	(0.97)	(1.39)	(0.99)	(1.20)	(2.00)
Log-likelihood	-322.47	-424.25	-331.84	-388.97	-520.82
N	231	238	231	242	245

On three of the five items where Fianna Fáil politicians differ from the average level of congruence across the parties, they are more congruent with voters than the average party as indicated by the party intercept term being less the constant term. These items are the left-right scale, taxation, and the environment. Comparing the results of these models to the models where the dependent variable is congruence with their own party voters (Appendix B), FF politicians are closer to voters nationally on taxation. They are equidistant from the two bases of support on regulation, privatisation and immigration and are closer to party voters on the idea of reducing the number of TDs (Table B.9, $\alpha_{\text{Fianna Fáil}} = 4.16$). The remaining items demonstrated no inter-party variance thus OLS models with only individual-level predictors were used.

Fine Gael, like FF, tend to be closer to voters than the average party. This is evident on left-right, regulation, taxation and immigration. FG's candidates

and TDs are more congruent with national voters than party voters on the left-right scale, regulation and reducing the number of TDs. Like FF, they are equidistant on taxation and immigration. Labour politicians have more of a tendency to be around the average level of distance from voters. They are also more congruent with their own party supporters on the left-right scale (Table B.9, $\alpha_{Labour} = 3.02$) and marginally so on regulation (Table B.8 $\alpha_{Labour} = 3.18$), privatisation ($\alpha_{Labour} = 2.82$), taxation ($\alpha_{Labour} = 2.81$) and the environment (Table B.9 $\alpha_{Labour} = 2.50$). Similarly, Sinn Féin are less congruent than the average party on most issues, and are closer to their own party voters on the left-right scale (Table B.8 $\alpha_{SinnFein} = 3.05$) and marginally closer on taxation. They are also slightly further from national voters on the environment (Table B.9 $\alpha_{SinnFein} = 3.14$). The ULA are also further from voters than the average party but one point closer to their own party supporters on the left-right scale (Table B.8 $\alpha_{ULA} = 4.07$). They are closer to the voters nationally on regulation, privatisation, immigration and reducing the number of TDs. Independents tend to be closer to voters than the average politician but closer to voters nationally than independent voters. However, they are closer to independent voters on the left-right scale ($\alpha_{independent} = 2.24$) and privatisation ($\alpha_{independent} = 2.99$).

Overall, there is a tendency for the mainstream parties, FF and FG, to be closer to voters nationally, while the smaller opposition parties, SF and ULA are more closer to their own voters. This is particularly supported by the findings for the left right scale, where there is a two point increase in absolute congruence between the national voter and party voter models. This is generally supportive of Ezrow *et al*'s finding (2011, 288) that in PR systems, mainstream parties are closer to the national voter while small parties are closer to their own supporters, though further support is provided below when TDs and losing candidates are compared. Although Mitchell (2003, 81) emphasised the centripetal effects of the electoral system, in that the parties are unlikely to differentiate themselves across the left-right spectrum, he did so in a time of normality in Irish party competition based on historical trends. The rise in the left-wing parties in 2011 provides

evidence of party competition more consistent with patterns found in other PR systems.

Table 5.12 - Estimation results of Social Background Effects on Absolute Congruence of Economic Attitudes between CCS Participants and All INES Participants.

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation (R)*	*Taxes/ Spending*	*Mortgage Relief*
Constant	3.09***	2.96***	-1.49**	1.82***	3.61***
	(0.57)	(0.38)	(0.51)	(0.38)	(0.41)
TD	0.32	-0.18	-0.47*	-0.14	-0.42*
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Female	0.19	0.08	0.34	0.30	-0.12
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Age	0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.02***	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.23	-0.11	-0.25	0.01	-0.12
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Class - C1	0.06	-0.26	0.06	-0.29	-0.31
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Class C2D	0.44*	-0.12	-0.19	-0.08	0.10
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Class - Farmer	-0.23	0.09	0.21	0.17	0.20
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.32)
Rural	-0.25	-0.04	-0.12	-0.08	0.18
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Party-Level Variance	1.40***	0.30***	2.03***	0.15**	-
	(1.18)	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.39)	
Individual-Level Variance	0.88	0.80	1.57	1.00	
	(0.94)	(0.89)	(0.09)	(1.00)	-
R^2m	0.03	0.02		0.06	
R^2c	0.63	0.28		0.19	
Adj. R^2					0.03
Log-likelihood	-291.23	-316.68	-146.71	-336.79	-377.26
N	202	231	231	229	240

The dependent variable is the absolute congruence measure except where (R) indicates a relative congruence dependent variable, specified as a multilevel beta regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.

Table 5.13 - Estimation results of the Party and Social Background Effects on Absolute Congruence of Non-economic Attitudes Between CCS Participants and All INES Participants.

	EU Integration (R)	*Restrict Immigration*	*Environment/ Economy*	*Gender Quotas*	*Reduce No. of TDs*
Constant	-1.05**	3.70***	3.21***	-0.54	4.60***
	(0.36)	(0.58)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.70)
TD	-0.06	-0.16	-0.37*	-0.49*	0.53
	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.33)
Female	-0.19	-0.04	0.14	0.27	-0.07
	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Age	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.30*	0.32	-0.02	0.01	-0.42
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Class - C1	-0.24	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10	-0.17
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.31)
Class C2D	0.43*	0.28	0.48*	0.45	-0.32
	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.41)
Class - Farmer	-0.31	-0.07	-0.31	-0.54	0.46
	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.53)
Rural	-0.26	-0.17	-0.08	-0.12	-0.15
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Party Level		0.70***	0.07*	-4.33	0.21*
		(0.83)	(0.26)	(0.85)	(0.46)
Individual Level	1.96	0.97	-1.3	4.00	
		(1.40)	(0.98)	(0.09)	(2.00)
R^2m	0.02	0.08			
R^2c	0.28	0.15			
Adj. R^2	.07				
Log-likelihood	160	-428.85	-334.59		-521.68
N	231	238	231	231	245

*The dependent variable is the absolute congruence measure except where (R) indicates a relative congruence dependent variable, specified as a beta regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

The primary individual-level variable is whether the respondent is a TD or losing candidate. This is significant on four items across tables 5.12 and 5.13 above. The striking, but in some ways unsurprising, finding here is that anywhere a difference between TDs and candidates exists, TDs are more congruent with voters or party supporters. Consistent with the finding for the average politician above, TDs also tend to be more congruent on a relative rather than absolute basis (see Appendix B), although in some cases the finding is robust across both measures. Thus, it can be inferred that

voters choose candidates who are closest to their own position, given the range of options available. TDs are more congruent with voters than candidates on issues that span the spectrum of salience. They are only more relatively congruent with national and party voters on privatisation but more absolutely congruent on taxation, quotas, and the environment. They are more congruent with national voters on mortgage bailouts. In addition to the analysis of many-to-many congruence in section 4 above, this provides further support for the notion that voters select candidates who are closest to their own attitudinal position on a range of issues.

The only gender difference in congruence on any of the alternative tests is for relative congruence with party on the gender quotas item. Female politicians are *less* congruent with voters on this issue than male politicians (B.17, $\beta = 0.01$, $p > 0.05$). Age is significant on two items. Older politicians are less congruent with voters nationally on the issues of regulation and taxation. The regulation finding only applies to the national voter model (Party voter model, table B.12, $\beta = 0.01$, $p > 0.05$) while it is robust across the both models for taxation. As the distribution of age is skewed upward in the Dáil, better age representation would lead to better citizen /elite congruence on taxation and regulation. Education has only a minimal effect on congruence for the survey items analysed here. Those with a university degree are more relatively congruent with party voters on EU integration than those without ($\beta = 0.30$, $p < 0.05$).

In all, significant class fixed effects are detectable on six items; left-right, taxation, regulation, privatisation, EU integration, mortgage bailouts, and the environment. The dominant sub categories here are lower professionals (C1), and clerical/manual workers (C2D). C1s are slightly more congruent with all voters than the AB group on the mortgage bailout item. C2Ds are less congruent with all voters in the left-right scale, EU integration and the environment. The EU integration effect is only evident in the national voter model (Party voter model: $\beta = 0.41$, $p > 0.05$). The finding here contradicts H_5. If the parties were more representative of their voters in terms of class they would probably be less congruent with voters as, outlined in Chapter 2,

C2Ds are considerably under-represented while C1s are proportionately represented. The net effect of correcting this imbalance would be to move the parties away from voters' positions. There is no statistically significant difference between the AB group and those from a farming background nor are their differences between urban and rural politicians.

Section 7: Conclusion

In this chapter I tested the extent to which the attitudes of TDs are an unbiased representation of the diversity of views in Irish society. The purpose of the analysis was to examine theories of voter-elite congruence to discover the conditions under which is congruence maximised. Moreover, the chapter investigated whether it was likely that better representation of under-represented social groups would have a positive effect on levels of congruence.

Overall, it is true that the distribution of opinion on most issues among TDs is not an unbiased representation of the electorate's attitudes. There was only mild support for the assumption that congruence tended to be highest on higher salience issues particularly in relation to all voters nationally, and lower on less salient issues. The high congruence/salience issues were taxation and the mortgage relief policy response to the crisis. Congruence was lower for lower salience issues such as reducing the number of TDs and restricting immigration. Some issues, however, did violate the theoretical assumptions. Between parties, there is only mild evidence that the mainstream parties are closer to the national voter while niche parties are closer their own supporters. The mainstream parties appear to be congruence-maximisers, although in some instances, absolute congruence does increase for the niche parties' relationship with their own voters.

In terms of the intra-party attitudinal consistency, losing candidates were regularly found to be the ideological outliers. Between TDs and losing candidates it is logical that losing candidates would be further from voters' if any distance exists. Voters do tend to select TDs who are closer to their position and this is true across the issue-saliency spectrum. However, when

investigated further, there was no consistent finding of attitudinal extremism among mid-level leaders, thus rejecting the application of May's law to the Irish parties.

In terms of social background characteristics, the strongest effects were evident for age, gender and occupational class. By a straight comparison of social characteristics, farmers, young people and women are broadly congruent. However, correcting the descriptive imbalance between voters and elites based on these characteristics within the parties would have varying effects. Nonetheless, younger politicians tended to be closer to voter preferences. Thus, the election of more young politicians would bring the distribution of opinion within the Irish parties closer to being a representative reflection of voters' attitudes. Conversely, increasing the representation of C2D would have a negative effect on intra-party congruence. This does not fundamentally violate the theory of the politics of presence, the bar for which is set at an increase in the diversity of attitude expressed in a representative assembly. However, it does contradict the expectations for theory as modified for application in this chapter.

CHAPTER 6: INTRA-PARTY ATTITUDES & PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

Abstract

This chapter advances the measurement of intra-party attitudes into the public realm. The chapter begins by outlining the theoretical debate surrounding the classification of speeches as measures of public representatives' attitudes. This debate considers the extent to which speeches made in parliamentary debates can be considered measures of attitudes or behaviour. Much of the literature on speech-making in parliaments assumes that speeches are an independent statement of representatives' attitudes. While the chapter proceeds with this assumption for the purpose of analysis, it highlights some considerable issues with the assumption. The analysis is based on the evolving quantitative text analysis technique, in this instance implemented through the popular *Wordscores* program. The discussion demonstrates that the various attitude measurements are correlated with the potential behavioural consequences.

From this discussion it is theorised that the amount of intra-party variance attributable to the individual level is lower than that observed in the survey and interview data. This is a consequence of selection bias in the allocation of debate time, the strategic decision by individual representatives not to participate if their position deviates too far from the position of their party and the strategic moderation of public declarations of attitudes. Four major Oireachtas debates are used to test the chapter-specific and general thesis hypotheses. The analysis finds that intra-party variance is considerably lower in Oireachtas speeches compared to surveys. It is also found that survey responses are significant predictors of speech positions. While there is only some minimal support for theories of descriptive representation in the variance of speech positions, there is significant support for these theories in the decision to participate or not. The most significant of these is the finding that women are more likely to speak about female-specific issues than men.

CHAPTER 6: INTRA-PARTY ATTITUDES & PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

Section 1: Introduction

Attitudes are a fundamental part of human cognitive processes as they are the primary consideration for individuals when they are making a decision about how to act. Thus far, this thesis has drawn on established methods of attitude measurement in the form of surveys and interviews associated with cognitive assessments of political issues. In such a project, it is fulfilling to make some attempt at establishing the link between attitudes and behaviour. As speeches, the measurement of attitudes employed in this chapter, come into close proximity with behaviour, particularly public behaviour, observed attitudes are less likely to be influenced by socialisation experiences and more by the consequences of acting in accordance with private preferences.

To this end, this chapter examines parliamentary speeches as a measure of individual attitudes on conceptually and politically important topics. Public speeches introduce this potential for highly strategic modification of attitudes which is not as much a concern in the analysis of confidential survey and interview data. In the latter data sources, the anonymous nature of the collection process and lack of consequences for the participant of participating provide no incentive to act strategically. Public speeches, however, can have consequences for a politician for their relationship with voters or their party or both. The core question being asked by this chapter is whether the distribution of attitudes at the party and individual level are consistent when we move shift the empirical dependent variable into the public arena.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical relationship between attitudes and behaviour in order to hypothesise which of these two concepts speeches are closer to. Section 3 discusses the methodological approach of the chapter. Here, the assumptions and shortcomings are outlined and the data analysis procedure is justified with reference to previous work in this area. The method of quantifying speech positions through the *Wordscores* program is then explained. Section 4

provides the political context of the debates. Section 5 presents the results of predicting participation in these Dáil debates and the statistical analysis of dependent variable generated by *Wordscores*. Section 6 concludes the chapter.

Section 2: Attitudes and Behaviour: Theorising Speech-making in the Political Context

Previous chapters have directly explored the attitudes of Irish politicians in a low-consequence environment. The purpose was to capture their pre-strategised attitudes, to the extent that such an endeavour is possible when dealing with professional politicians. Participation in surveys and interviews on the condition of anonymity constitute a low-consequence environment for politicians to express their views. How these attitudes translate into behavioural outcomes is the focus of this chapter. However, the measure of behaviour is only mildly beyond the approach of the previous chapters in that survey and interview responses are being replaced with public speeches. The measure is consistent with the approach of previous chapters in that the data is at the individual level[1]. This analysis does not seek to explain legislative outcomes, but merely the extent to which TDs and Senators were willing (or allowed) to participate in parliamentary debates and the positions they take on those issues. This section discusses the theoretical distinction between and attitudes and behaviour. It then considers the potential barriers prohibiting a deterministic relationship between private and public measures of attitudes.

Chapter 1 of this thesis discussed the general attitudinal model in terms of the hypothesised link between socialisation experiences and attitude formation. Attitudes are important because they are by definition a predisposition to respond to an object in a consistently favourable or unfavourable manner (Fishbein 1975, 336). This does not mean that an individual will act absent further consideration of the consequences of their

[1] Rather than an aggregate party measure like the party manifestos.

actions. Indeed, classic studies have discovered minimal links between attitudes and behaviour (Wicker 1969, 75). This is primarily because attitudes themselves are a multi-dimensional concept. These components are affection, cognition and conation. Affection is an individual's initial feeling or pre-disposition to an attitude object. The cognitive dimension is a person's considered evaluation of that object and conation is their intended action in relation to it (Fishbein 1975, 342).

This framework could be applied to an example from this thesis, in that an individual could have a positive affective attitude towards the goal of getting more women into politics. However they could have a negative cognitive evaluation towards the idea of imposing gender quotas on political parties, perhaps because they have a stronger affective attitude towards intra-party democracy in candidate selection procedures than they do about affirmative action policies for women. Nonetheless the 'conative' component of their attitude is whether they will vote for gender quotas legislation in parliament, as they may value remaining within their parliamentary party more than reflecting their cognitive attitude in a symbolic vote. It would be consistent with this framework that they then outline their personal objection to the legislation in a parliamentary speech, and subsequently vote for the legislation. The key element here is that their speech reflects their cognitive evaluation and not their conative intentions.

The disconnect between the cognitive and conative elements arises in the Irish case, and parliamentary systems generally, because parliamentary groups in these systems operate a strong whip system. The consequences of voting against the wishes of the party leadership are severe. The ability to impose penalties on rebel legislators is derived from the fusion of government and parliament. Individual MPs are thus incentivised to maximise influence and the potential for promotion by supporting the party leadership's position in legislative voting (Benedetto and Hix 2007, 757, Spirling 2007, 85). Even those who publicly speak out against the leadership position will have less favour with the leadership behind closed doors (Gallagher *et al* 2010, 68). Ultimately, there are no formal sanctions for

speaking against the leadership position in the Dáil, provided an individual is given speaking time at all. Some research suggests that the party whip will favour those within the party whom they know to support the party line on the issue (Gallagher 2010, 150; Slapin and Proksch 2012, 523). Thus we might not expect the distribution of attitudes demonstrated in parliamentary speeches to reflect the full range of cognitive attitudes within parties, but neither would we expect them to be as homogenous as parliamentary voting behaviour. The next section reviews the literature on quantitative text analysis to establish the type of inferences that can be made from analysing parliamentary speeches.

Section 3: Quantitative Text Analysis

There are two objectives in political text analysis. The first is to estimate party positions and the second is to estimate the positions of individual legislators. As quantitative text analysis is a relatively new method in political science, much of the literature has focused on estimating party positions, though developments at the individual level are emerging. The traditional means of achieving these goals are resource-heavy. Estimating party positions is usually associated with the Comparative Manifestos Project (Laver and Garry 2000, 620). The method here involves hand-coding of party manifestos by research teams. Though there has been much effort invested in this technique over the past 30 years, the increasing potential for computer-assisted analysis is too large to ignore. At the very least, it can provide a complementary, if not competing, measurement of ideological positions. Expert surveys have also been a popular method of measuring party positions (Castles & Mair 1984, 148; Benoit & Laver 2006, 2).

Attitudinal variance of individual politicians is typically measured through the use of surveys and interviews. These are also resource heavy. Moreover, in most political contexts where the number of representatives at the national level is high, like that of the UK and US, only professional researchers have any likelihood of completing a comprehensive study. Incidentally, parliamentary debates are increasingly available online and

require no intrusive effort by researchers wishing to analyse political phenomenon at the individual level. The test for text analysis then becomes whether any shortcomings of the procedure are worth the increased accessibility and speed it provides compared to established measures. I will discuss the developments in this field first with respect to its findings at the party level and second what little has be done to make inferences at the individual level.

The initial attempts at quantitative analysis of political texts were very promising. Laver and Garry (2000, 619-634) attempted to bridge the divide between the established resource-heavy methods of the manifesto coding and expert surveys on the one hand, and the new age of computer-assisted content analysis on the other. These authors split the party manifestos of the British and Irish parties for the 1992 and 1997 general elections in both countries into economic and social policy areas and scored each text based on their composite word frequencies. They then compared the relative scores for each party on each dimension across the four coding sources. They found the correspondence across methods for the British parties to be very high and the relative position of the Irish parties at the 1992 and 1997 general elections generally aligned with the results of the qualitative techniques (Laver and Garry 2000, 630). They did find some deviations in placement for FF in 1992 and FG in 1997 on economic policy and the PDs in 1997 on social policy. The misplacement of the two largest parties would hardly be problematic as they are on average very centrist parties. It is also likely that the PDs emphasised economic policy to a much greater extent than social policy, causing greater potential for error. Indeed, both of the other two measures report different relative results for the PDs. The revised experts put them to the left of FG on social policy while the expert survey puts them to the left of both FF and FG. However, the discovery of *any* error whatsoever is not sufficient justification for abandoning the technique.

Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003, 311-331) repeated this exercise with the more sophisticated text analysis program, *Wordscores*, which they developed. This program scores each document based on their similarity of

word frequencies to a set of reference texts They also find high agreement between expert surveys and computerised text-analysis. Moreover, they also find that FF is a problematic case for 1997. They even claim that this error is more likely the result of contextual judgments by experts in their placement of FF rather than the computer analysis.

Slapin and Proksch (2008, 705-722) set themselves the task of expanding the applicability of quantitative text to a time-series analyses of German party manifestos from 1990 to 2005. They criticise *Wordscores* for assuming that the political meaning of words does not change over time, as the exercise of comparing documents in Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003, 325) above is based on predicting the positions of parties in 1997 based on word frequencies in 1992. Slapin and Proksch address this issue by using words from all documents to estimate the position of each party. Although they also assume words have a fixed meaning over time their approach is more sensitive to changes in the political lexicon because it recognises new words entering political dialogue at each time period. Scoring texts over time based on texts at time *t* would not achieve this. These authors also find a high correlation between their technique and the previous CMP, expert coding and *Wordscores* approaches (Slapin and Proksch 2008, 716).

Slapin and Proksch (2010, 587-611) also apply their *Wordfish* estimation procedure to the analysis of legislative speeches in the European parliament. Although the sources for their data is at the individual level (a single MEP's speech), they create party level data by aggregating the speeches of all individuals who are members of the same national party in their home countries (note, not by aggregating by EP group). Their alternative hypotheses were that the principal latent dimension of spoken conflict was related to the left-right dimension, attitudes to EU integration, or to national-level politics. They found that these latter two, particularly the EU dimension was most strongly related with the position of parties.

Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003, 311-331) develop political text analysis beyond the analysis of aggregate party texts by explicitly focusing on

parliamentary speeches as the unit of analysis. Slapin and Procksh (2010) concatenated all of the individual speeches into an aggregate party text. However, Laver *et al* score all of the individual speeches and infer the party positions from the average score of that party's TDs. Laver *et al* (2003, 327) do point out that greater care needs to taken in making inferences from parliamentary speeches, because manifestos are comprehensive documents while speeches are much more restricted in focus. The significant difference here is the use of individual-level observations. Previously, the focus was on highly structured party manifestos. Parliamentary speeches are significantly less disciplined in their presentation.

Laver *et al* (2003, 327) scaled the membership of the Dáil based on the contributions of individual legislators in the debate on a confidence motion and set themselves a humble benchmark for success; measuring each individual's level of support for the government. Their assumption was that that this could be inferred from the extent to which the word frequencies of each legislator's speech matched a set of reference text on which the level of support for the government is known. It might seem trivial to find that members of the government strongly support the government, backbench members of the government less so and members of the opposition are strongly against the government. However, it must be appreciated that the computer program they introduced in this paper, *Wordscores*, is given no other information about the individual legislator than the frequency of words in their speech. Under these circumstances, the results of this paper are a considerable achievement. However, they make no systematic attempt to explain the intra-party variation using background variables, except to say that the leader of the junior coalition partner was less staunchly pro-government than his senior party colleagues. (Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003, 328).

Another approach to scaling legislative speeches is to scale each individual speech *from* the aggregate party text. Beauchamp (2010) applies this to an analysis of attitudes in the US Senate and the British House of Commons. In the US case all of the Democrats' speeches are compiled into one document,

all of the Republicans' into another. Then all of the individual speeches are scored based on their closeness to either one of the aggregate texts. The problem here is that there is dependency in the estimation process; a perfect match for the word frequencies of each individual speech is contained within one or other of the reference documents. However, if the speech truly reflects a position which is distant from their own party, the opposing aggregate document which does not contain their speech may overwhelm the magnetic pull of their own party's aggregate document. So we may not be measuring the true position of the legislator but the relative position within their party. In the case of the US Congress, the results can and are validated by a comparison with roll-call voting analyses. This cannot be done in the case of the House of Commons. However, Beauchamp (2010, 18) is satisfied that the estimated positions, on average reflect the true positions of the British parties. Although he has individual-level variation in his data, he again stops short of conducting an analysis with individual-level predictors. That is, he does not try to explain intra-party variation with socio-economic or even institutional variables such as seniority.

Gianetti and Laver (2005, 91-120) more intently set out to make inferences at the individual level from parliamentary speeches. Specifically, they sought to test whether the policy positions of government and junior ministers in Italy can be inferred from their parliamentary speeches. They found that a minister's position on the left-right scale is strongly related to the level of spending by their department. Right-wing ministers tend to preside over lower spending departments. They also considered the effect of junior ministers on the department spending but this was found to have no effect.

The sub-field of political text analysis has been very cautious about extending its scope to answering classic questions of representation, such as differences between legislators based on their social background characteristics. Schwarz *et al* (2013, 1) attempt to address this gap in the literature. They maximise the potential for individual-level variance (for parliamentary systems, at least) by conducting their analysis in the case of

Switzerland, where party-discipline in relation to legislative speeches is relatively low. They are particularly interested in the effect of constituency opinion on the position of individual legislators but also include the demographic variables age and gender in their models. They use debates on environmental policy as the context for their analysis. Consistent with most political science analyses, Swiss MPs are significantly clustered according to party affiliation (Schwarz *et al* 2013, 33). Nevertheless, there is considerable intra-party variation detectable here, much more so than is evident from parliamentary voting records. However, they do not find any effect of age or gender on legislators' positions but do find a strong positive link between the constituency support[2] for environmental policies and the stated positions of the legislator, despite the fact that the legislator may have voted with their party and against their stated position.

There lies another indicator of personal attitudes between estimated survey responses and estimated speech positions. The decision of whether or not to participate in a parliamentary debate may in itself convey some sort of information about a legislator's attitude to that issue. It is likely that legislators do not randomly speak on various topics and, once they are not actively prevented from speaking by the party leadership, they will prioritise the issues based on either the importance of the issue to themselves personally, to themselves strategically (in terms of demonstrating loyalty to the leadership and being considered for promotion to ministerial level) or their constituents. It would be hard to distinguish between the first two. Moreover we cannot assume that a national election study is representative at the constituency level. These limitations mean it can only be assumed that a legislator chooses to speak because the issue is of importance to them.

The first formal model of intra-party politics which incorporates the organization of parliamentary debates is provided by Slapin and Proksch (2012, 535). They theorise that when party leaders have a strong incentive

[2] Constituency support is measured as the majority supporting a proposal in a referendum. The fact that it is based on an actual outcome rather than a survey which may not be representative at the constituency level makes the analysis all the more robust, but not easily replicable.

to protect the party label, the cohesion of legislative speeches is unlikely a reflection of true party cohesion because party leaders prevent potentially dissident backbenchers from taking the floor. This is consistent with the findings of Gallagher (2010, 68) above in the Irish case. The party label is more valuable in proportional systems than majoritarian systems. Thus, UK backbenchers are provided greater opportunities to speak against the party line. Slapin and Proksch (2012, 535) refrain, however, from any individual-level analyses. Schwarz *et al* (2013, 20) consider background variables in the selection of Swiss speakers in their analysis of energy debates. In addition to important findings regarding institutional position, they also found a significant gender effect. The average female Swiss MP was 65% less likely to speak in the energy debates as the average male MP.

This review has demonstrated the potential for political science of the incorporation of utilisation of quantitative text analysis. Moreover, it has demonstrated that the literature on text analysis has not made much attempt to apply a socio-demographic theoretical model to the intra-party variation in the speech positions or speaker selection, leaving a significant opportunity for this thesis to address a gap in the literature that fits neatly with the overall conceptual framework of attitudes outlined in earlier chapters. The next section outlines the data employed by the chapter and the mechanics of quantitative text analysis.

Section 4: Data and method

A major problem with relying solely on parliamentary speeches as a source of data, were one so inclined, is that one is restricted to issues that are so highly salient as to warrant a topical debate of legislative action. The particular issues that may be of interest to a researcher may not be on the agenda of politicians. Where a researcher could interview or survey politicians regarding their attitudes to less salient issues, relying solely on the record of the Houses of the Oireachtas for this information could quickly prove to be unrewarding. Obviously, this thesis has made no such reliance. But, in comparing the structure of attitudes within political parties, as

evidenced by survey and interview techniques, with those of public statements, it would be scientific to hold the issues constant.

In Chapter 3 I justified my reasons for using attitudes to gay marriage equality as a manifestation of the liberal-authoritarian ideological dimension. However, no significant legislative measures have been taken on this issue despite much public commentary on the issue around the time of my conducting this research. However, between the stages of collecting interviews and surveys on the one hand, and collating speeches from the parliamentary record on the other, the issue of abortion became politically salient and debates took place on the issue in the Oireachtas. This issue also reflects an assumed manifestation of the liberal-conservative dimension. Further demands of the analysis are that, where possible, all of the speeches are made in the same debate, that there is a relatively high number of participants so as to have a representative sample, and that each speech is of a considerable length, usually about 500 words (Slapin and Proksch 2008, 326). Therefore I incorporated the abortion debates into this analysis in the absence of significant debates on gay equality.

Four parliamentary debates are analysed in this chapter that reflect underlying left-right, liberal-authoritarian, feminism, and nationalist-internationalist attitudes. Respectively, these debates are on the *Finance Bill No. Bill 2011* (Left-right) ; *Medical Treatment (Termination of Pregnancy in Case of Risk to Life of Pregnant Woman) Bill 2012* and *Report on the Expert Group on the Judgment in the A, B and C v. Ireland Case* (Abortion), *Electoral Amendment (Political Funding) Bill 2011* (Gender quotas); and the *Thirtieth Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2012* (EU Integration) which incorporated the EU Fiscal Stability Treaty into Irish constitutional law and subsequently endorsed in a referendum. The abortion debates were made across 2012 with the introduction in the spring, and re-introduction in the autumn, of an opposition bill which aimed to liberalise Ireland's abortion legislation, and statements surrounding the death of a pregnant woman who, according to the media, died of lack of availability of a life-

saving termination of her pregnancy. The general context of each debate is outlined in the relevant sections below.

The average level of participation across the Dáil and Seanad on these debates is 78 but when speeches totalling less than 500 words are removed the average falls to 68. The excluded speeches were assigned a hand-coded value. This may appear to violate the general 'hands-off' principle of quantitative text analysis. However, part of the *Wordscores* estimation procedure requires hand-coding of reference texts. The only difference here is that the short speeches are not included as reference texts.

To analyse the parliamentary speeches I used the relatively new method of quantitative text analysis. Here, the attitude positions of parties or individuals are inferred from word frequencies in manifestos of speeches. Popular ways of conducting text analysis are through the computer programs *Wordscores* (Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003) and *Wordfish* (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). Generating a dependent variable from parliamentary speeches and questions is essentially the result of a sophisticated word counting exercise (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003). Parliamentary speeches are assumed to reflect the ideological emphasis of individual legislators' attitudes. The frequency with which they utter ideologically meaningful words is considered an indication of attitude strength. This is measured and a score for the ideological extremity of their speech relative to a set of reference texts (*Wordscores*) or all other legislators' speeches (*Wordfish*) is returned. The dimension reflects a classic left-right ideological scale with "left" leaning legislators assigned a negative score and a positive score assigned to the "right".

The *Wordscores* program scores each speech relative to some defined reference speeches. The more a speech replicates the word frequencies of a reference speech the closer its score will be to that reference speech. This is known as the supervised approach (Beauchamp 2010, 2). *Wordfish* on the other hand utilises an unsupervised approach. Speeches are scaled simply according to relative word frequencies, with the dimensions being set in a

purely theoretical sense. I ran tests using both programs and I have more confidence that *Wordscores* captures the true positions of TDs. *Wordfish* seems to be easily biased by partisan language (Hirst *et al* 2010, 5) and specific exchanges between individuals. Therefore the analysis presented in this chapter is based on *Wordscores* estimations only.

A concerning source of systematic error using this method is the presence of rebuttal speech. As highlighted by (Hirst *et al* 2010, 5), two ideologically opposed individuals may use similar words with similar frequency. Some speeches are rebuttals of previous speeches rather than positively posed statements of the speakers' attitude. The programs cannot distinguish between these two types of speeches and score them similarly, when they are in fact opposed. One solution is to choose debates with longer speeches but in the modern Dáil, speeches, particularly by backbenchers, are considerably shorter on average than they were in previous eras (Higgins 2010, 416). I also processed the documents using the TM text mining package in *R*. The steps taken reflect best practice for efficiently scoring documents in this way (Slapin and Proksch, 2009, 332). I reduced words to their stems and removed stop-words, which have little ideological weight. The rescaled versions of document scores are employed as the dependent variable in the analysis. Rescaling is necessary to make the scores more directly interpretable (Lowe 2008, 356).

Section 5: Background to the debates and preparation for analysis

Finance Bill

Statements in response to the Minister's outline of the financial estimates for the coming year are typically used to measure representatives' positions on an underlying left-right economic scale in the quantitative text analysis literature (Herzog and Benoit 2013). However, from 2012 the format of the delivery of the Irish budget was changed. Speeches under the heading of Budget 2013 were limited to the Ministers for Finance and Public Sector Reform, 2 nominated spokespeople of the opposition parties Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin and several independent members of the Technical group. 16 speeches were made in total. This limited participation is not conducive to

making inferences about the effect of background variables on ideological positions, particularly within parties. The alternative is to use statements on the *Finance (No. 2) Bill 2012*, which gave specific effect to the broad budgetary measures. There is much wider participation here with 64 statements being made. Two speeches totalled less than 500 words and were not included in the *Wordscores* estimation. A hand-code was applied to these short statements for the purposes of constructing the dependent variable for analysis.

Although it would be convenient to assume that the distribution of word frequencies in the finance bill debate reflected a simple underlying left-right dimension, there are some problems with this approach. These problems have implications for how best to generate a score for individual documents, if using individual speeches is not appropriate. The first issue is that the *Finance (No. 2) Bill* is multi-faceted. The initial assumption would be that members who support tax increase measures (or criticise spending cuts) are left-wing and those that support measures to cut spending (or criticise tax increases) are right-wing. However, the use of speech in the Finance Bill does not conform easily to a two-dimensional model. Speakers have a choice of budgetary measures to address and time restraints limit them from outlining their position of every aspect of the bill. Individuals who are equally left-wing may display no similarity in word frequency if they address different aspects of the bill. Thus, using individual speeches as a basis for scoring the remaining speeches may not be appropriate.

An acceptable alternative is to use aggregate party texts (Beauchamp 2010, 2). This simply involves combining all of the speeches made by each party's members. The individual speeches are then scored off these party texts. The problem of dependency that arises with the use of aggregate texts as a basis for predicting the positions of most legislators was outlined in section 3 above. However, I found it to be the most appropriate in this context. Based on the patterns of the parties' left-right ideological dispersion discovered in figure 4.1 of chapter 4, the reference texts for each party were coded from -2 to +2 in the following order; ULA (-2), SF (-1), Labour (0), FF (+1), FG

(+2). Note that Independents' speeches are not included in aggregate party texts and are assigned a score indicating their closeness to one or other of the party texts.

Fiscal Stability Treaty

The data collection for this project was conducted with yet another referendum on Ireland's relationship with Europe imminent. The referendum on the Fiscal Stability Treaty was held on 31th May 2012 and firmly succeeded. This treaty basically re-stated Ireland's commitment to budgetary discipline under the Stability and Growth provision of the Maastricht treaty. The assumption underlying the analysis in this debate is that the dynamics of support or opposition to the passing of the Fiscal Stability Treaty are indicative of each individual's level of support for further EU integration in general and, ultimately, an indication of nationalist sentiment between and within parties. In total, 71 TDs and 11 Senators spoke in the debates on the legislation to put the Fiscal Stability Treaty to a referendum. I follow Benoit's (2009, 454) placement of the Irish parties on the pro-anti EU integration dimension. Although he places the Fine Gael and Labour at equivalent points on this scale, Chapter 4 demonstrated that that Fine Gael are marginally more pro-EU integration. Therefore, I assign Enda Kenny's speech the most pro-EU code of 2 followed by a 1 for Labour, 0 for Fianna Fáil and -1 for Sinn Féin. The ULA were not part of Benoit's study as they had no Dáil representation at the time. However, from a cursory reading it is evident that Joe Higgins' speech is one of the most extreme in its anti-EU integration tone, and is thus assigned a value of -2.

Gender Quotas

Soon after taking office, the Irish government announced their intention to introduce a legislative measure to boost women's participation in Irish politics. This resulted in the *Electoral Amendment (Political Funding) Bill 2011*. The bill had two major components. The first was to increase the transparency of funding mechanisms for political parties. The second was to penalise parties who failed to meet a 30% quota of female candidates at the

next election, which is projected to occur in 2016 should the government run its full term. The bill was introduced in the Seanad by Senator Ivana Bacik, who has long campaigned for some form of quota system for women in politics to be established. The bill also addressed issues of corporate donations to political parties, but this analysis focuses on speeches or sub-sections of speeches addressing the gender quotas aspect of the bill alone. The purpose of analysing this measure is to examine whether women are more 'feminist' in that they support of affirmative action measures for women. If this was the case we could conclude that more women in politics will lead to more political attention and action paid to gender-specific issues.

To estimate the *Wordscores* model, five speeches of those who represented significant ideological positions on the spectrum of pro and anti quota preferences were scored from -2 to 2, where -2 represented full support for the measure and 2 represented complete opposition. The reference speeches used were, in order of support to opposition, Ivana Bacik (-2); Minister Phil Hogan (-1); Bernard Durkan (0); Joanna Tuffy (1) and Ronan Mullen (2). It must be noted that there is a correlated dimension here. While very few people would deny increasing women's participation in politics is a desirable goal, the division arises over how this should be achieved (see Chapter 7). Those opposed to the measure in the parliamentary debates interpreted quotas as being undemocratic because they take power away from party members to select whom they feel to be the best candidates, who may or may not be women. Those supporting the measure felt that it was undemocratic that a society which is 51% women could be represented by a legislature with only 15% female membership.

Abortion

Individuals' attitude to the availability of abortion services is a typical indicator of their position on the liberal-conservative scale. However, including a question about abortion attitudes in a study of the Irish political elite has the effect of making participants less responsive. They may not return surveys with such questions included, and become more closed

during interviews. A private members' motion on liberalising the abortion regime had recently been debated at the time of the interviews for this study (April 2012). The bill itself was defeated by the government, but on the promise from the Minister for Health, James Reilly, that the government would bring forward legislation following the anticipated report of a working group into the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the *A,B and C v. Ireland* (2010) case. The judgment required Ireland to clarify the legal position in relation to abortion. Despite these ongoing political events, I left any mention of abortion out of my research discussions and relied on questions tapping attitudes to same-sex marriage as the primary measure of the respondents' position on the conservatism-liberalism scale.

However, the debate on the provision of abortion was re-ignited seven months after the private members motion was defeated. This was a result of the death of a woman, Savita Halappanavar, in Galway University hospital following a miscarriage. The Irish Times led with a story some weeks later claiming that Ms. Halappanavar's life may have been saved if her pregnancy had been terminated soon after the doctors realised she was miscarrying (*The Irish Times* 14/11/2012). The newspaper also reported that the woman and her husband had requested a termination and had been denied as some hospital staff indicated that, under Irish law, the presence of a foetal heartbeat prevented a legal termination from being possible. The couple were reportedly told by staff that "this was Catholic Country" and thus a termination was not possible.

The facts of the events were subsequently explored in the coroner's court. Nonetheless, there was significant public reaction and political pressure was placed on the government to bring forward legislation that explicitly legalises abortion in Ireland where there is a risk to the life of the mother, the principle of which was outlined in a the 1992 Irish Supreme Court case *Attorney General v. X* (1992). Following this incident, the private members' motion was re-introduced in the Dáil. Moreover, the aforementioned report on the implementation of the ECHR *A, B and C v. Ireland* (2010) judgment co-incidentally landed on the Health Minister's desk on the same morning

which the story about Ms. Halapanavaar appeared on the front page of the Irish Times.

The significance of these events is that they focused attention on the issue of abortion, which governments, and particularly those led by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, would rather leave dormant. This attention manifested itself in several Oireachtas debates on the issue which are appropriate for quantitative text analysis. Three similar debates are used for the purpose of measuring representatives' positions on abortion in particular and the liberal-conservative scale in general: The second stage debates on the private members' *'Medical Treatment (Termination of Pregnancy in Case of Risk to Life of Pregnant Woman) Bill 2012'* (*Dáil Debates* 18-19/4/2012), *'Medical Treatment (Termination of Pregnancy in Case of Risk to Life of Pregnant Woman) Bill 2012'* (*Dáil Debates* 28/112012) and on *Statements on the Report of the Expert Group on the Judgment in the A, B and C v. Ireland Case* (*Dáil/Seanad Debates* 04,06,07,17/04/2012). The Medical Treatment bill was not discussed in the Seanad in April or November as it was defeated in the Dáil. However, both Houses discussed the *ABC* report.

Across the three abortion debates and the two Houses, 92 members (40%) contributed their views on legislating for abortion services. A subset of these were hand-coded; the 29 members who made speeches of less than 500 words and the 5 texts employed as virgin texts on which to base predictions for the remaining 58 speakers. The average speech length of these 58 for scoring was 957 words. The virgin texts were all drawn from the April debates. The purpose of this was to focus the scores on the principle of legislating for abortions and to exclude references to the incident in Galway. If a November debate had been included as a virgin text, references to Ms. Halappanavar and the circumstances of her death, would have created a linguistic division between those who spoke in April and November, thus taking the emphasis off the ideological division on the principle of abortion.

The following speeches were used as a basis for predicting the remaining positions. Clare Daly (ULA) was coded -2 for the most pro-legislation position as she is the deputy who introduced the 'Medical Treatments' private members' bill in April and November 2012. Mary-Lou McDonald (SF) was coded -1. She represented her party position which is pro-legislation, though being strongly associated with Catholicism in Northern Ireland, some members would not support any further liberalisation. The Dublin-based McDonald is personally more pro-abortion than her party colleagues. Charlie Flanagan (FG) (coded 0) is the only government member among the virgin texts and clearly represents a pragmatic pro-legislation position. Although FF ultimately supported the bill, they did so on the basis that their interpretation of the legislation was that it made abortion more restrictive (which they favour) than not legislating for the *X* case judgment and leaving too much legal leeway to doctors to perform abortions. The speech of their party's health spokesperson represented this position and was coded 1[3]. Mattie McGrath (Independent and former Fianna Fáil TD) represents the extreme pro-life end of the spectrum and was assigned a code of 2. The next section discusses the results of applying the scored speech positions to the statistical models. The analysis begins in the next section.

Section 6: Results

Participation in debates

Before discussing the analysis of representatives' positions based on *Wordscores* estimation, I will first consider the likelihood that any individual will participate in the four debates being analysed here. A logit model is applied to a binary dependent variable indicating '0' where the TD or senator 'did not participate' and '1' indicates that they participated. Institutional and socio-demographic predictors are included in the model. The institutional predictors are the level of hierarchy in the party, be they a backbencher, junior minister or opposition equivalent, or senior minister or opposition equivalent. A control variable for senators is also included. Three

[3] In April 2013, Fianna Fáil's party conference passed a motion 're-affirming Fianna Fáil's status as a pro-life party'.

individuals were dropped from this model. Brian Lenihan died in June 2011 so could not possibly have participated in this debate or any other debate included in this analysis. Also, the Ceann Comhairle and the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad do not make political contributions to Oireachtas debates but merely procedural statements. Nonetheless, their personal attitudes can be predicted in the post-estimation of the fitted models, so they are only excluded from the participation models and the *Wordscores* estimations.

The variation in debate participation generally does not have a multilevel structure. There is no significant party-level variance for three of the four participation variables; the Finance ($F = 1.85$, $p = 0.11$), Stability Treaty ($F = 1.04$, $p = 0.39$) and Gender Quotas ($F = 0.65$, $p = 0.66$). Thus, being a member of a particular party did not increase the likelihood that a parliamentarian would speak in any of these debates. Inter-party variance in participation was significant for the abortion debates ($F = 3.41$, $p > 0.01$). However, when the model was fitted with individual predictors this variance reduces to zero. The reported model is a simple logit with individual-level predictors. Moreover, there is significant clustering by age ($F = 5.09$, $p > 0.05$) on participation in the finance debate and by gender ($F = 1.87$, $p > 0.05$) on the quotas debate. I also do not report a multilevel model with random slopes as the age slope is correlated with the random intercept and the gender slope reduces to zero in the fitted model. Therefore all of the reported models are simple logits expressed with exponentiated coefficients enabling the discussion to talk in terms of percentage likelihoods.

The results are presented in table 6.1 below and show some interesting trends. In an odds ratio model, the intercept reports the likelihood of a parliamentarian speaking in the debate with all of the other variables held constant. The distribution of participation means that when parliamentarians are taken as a group, any randomly drawn individual has an equal likelihood of participating in these debates. The debate on gender quotas demonstrates that the average member has only 12% likelihood of speaking. Senators also have a generally lower likelihood of speaking on the finance, treaty and abortion debates.

Table 6.1 - Estimation results of social background effects on participation in parliamentary debates.

	Finance Bill	*Stability Treaty*	*Gender Quotas*	*Abortion*
Constant	1.21	0.50	0.12*	1.27
	(1.00)	(0.96)	(1.00)	(0.98)
Seniority: Junior Minister	0.41	0.50	0.40	0.39
	(0.60)	(0.50)	(0.55)	(0.49)
Seniority: Cabinet Minister	0.67	0.70	0.43	0.20***
	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.51)	(0.48)
Senator	0.31**	0.38*	0.77	0.22***
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Female	1.82	1.53	4.52***	2.55*
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Age	0.97	1.00	0.99	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	0.95	0.54	0.99	1.02
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.34)
Class - C1	1.39	1.26	0.71	0.81
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.36)
Class - C2D	0.45	0.84	0.64	0.54
	(0.70)	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.58)
Class - Farmer	1.68	1.64	2.05	1.22
	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.54)
Rural	0.79	0.78	0.98	0.37*
	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.39)
R^2	0.09	0.07	0.10	0.15
N	224	224	224	224

Coefficients are odds ratios. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$

Compared to TDs, senators are on average 30% less likely to participate. Senior party politicians were also 80% less likely to speak than their backbench colleagues in the abortion debates. No social background variables were significant determinants of participation in the finance and treaty debates. This is despite the ANOVA finding for a significant effect of age on the finance debate. Nonetheless, the coefficient reports that older members are slightly less likely to speak on the finance bill than younger members.

Gender has a very significant effect on participation in the two debates which one would consider 'feminist' (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 218). Female parliamentarians were four times as likely as men to speak on the

issue of gender quotas and two and a half times more likely to do so on the abortion issue. This provides strong evidence for 'party feminism' theory outlined Chapter 2. The implication is that as parties elect more women, they will be more likely to speak on issues which tend to be of greater importance to women. There is also a geographical bias evident in participation patterns on the abortion debate. Rural politicians were 43% less likely than their urban counterparts to participate. These models explain 6% to 14% of the variance in participation rates among TDs and Senators.

Text Analysis

This section reports and discusses the results of employing the predicted *Wordscores* document scores as the dependent variable in statistical models. First though, it demonstrates that the distribution of *Wordscores* is based on the underlying dimension of interest. This is done by outlining how key ideological words in each debate are associated with either side of the debate. Following this, there is an assessment of the level of clustering of the independent variables in order to justify the model types. This is compared with the levels of clustering in similar questions from the survey and interview items. The results of the full statistical tests are outlined. Where background variables are found to be significant, the results of fitting the coefficients for the full parliament and a representative parliament are discussed. This is rounded off with a comparison of the fitted values from the survey analysis with the fitted values from the *Wordscores* analysis.

It is clear from examining the word weights of the finance debates that the linguistic divisions reflect the assumed left-right dimension. Words representing the left included 'austerity', 'injustice', 'wealth' , 'poor' and 'hardship'. Those on the right used words that emphasised the need to get Ireland's spending back in line with its income such as 'stability', 'efficiency', 'prioritisation', 'cashflow', 'entrepreneur', 'unsustainable'.

The type of words that most strongly discriminate between positions in the stability treaty debates were words such as "unelected", "bondholders", "blackmail", "austerity" and "unemployment" which are among the heavily

anti-EU words. These reflect a negative interpretation of the EU's impact on the economy. On the pro-EU side, the words seem to emphasise the benefits of further integration, particularly in the economic sense; "investor", "multinational", "reckless", "sensible". Put simply, support or opposition to EU integration depends on the individual's interpretation of the effect of integration on the domestic economy.

Examining the scored words illustrates how opposition or support for quotas was represented at the extremes. On the pro quota side words like 'cash', 'child', 'confidence' 'Buckley', 'campaign', 'enhance' were used to support the measure. The first three words are a reference to some proposed explanations for the lack of women in politics (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 7). 'Buckley' is a reference to a campaigner for gender quotas, Fiona Buckley and 'enhance' refers to the effect on politics of more women in politics. The anti- quota side is represented with words like 'evil', 'feminist' (in a pejorative context), 'dictatorship', 'discrimination' and 'freedom'. The linguistic dimension of the quotas debate reflects a trade-off between supporting the principle of descriptive representation or the principle of democracy in the process of candidate selection.

In reference to legislating for abortion, the pro-legislation side used words like 'woman', 'overdue', 'danger', 'decades', 'die', 'babies', and 'rape'. These words clearly show that the emphasis of pro-legislation (or pro-choice) representatives was on the dangers that women can face in pregnancy, how abortion is an issue that has been neglected for decades, and outlining conditions such as pregnancy as a result of rape, where abortion should be an option regardless of physical danger. On the anti-legislation side, words like 'evidence', 'unborn', 'psychiatrist', 'activist', and 'pro-life'. These words highlight an emphasis on the flaws of the Supreme Court judgment (which, it was argued by self-identifying pro-life members, is not supported by psychiatric evidence) and increased activism of pro-life civil society campaigners as the abortion issue began to appear on the legislative agenda.

The ANOVA tests indicate the level of clustering on the dependent variable attributable to group-level and individual level predictors. Three of the four *Wordscores* dependent variables demonstrate significant clustering between the party and individual levels. These are the Finance Bill ($F = 90.26$, $p < 0.001$, $N = 64$), Stability treaty ($F = 23.93$, $p < 0.001$, $N = 76$) and abortion ($F = 6.25$, $p < 0.001$, $N = 92$) debates. Attitudes are not clustered by party in the gender quotas debate ($F = 0.55$, $p > 0.05$, $N = 66$). The tests also indicate that there is some clustering on the individual-level variables. There is significant clustering by age on the Finance Bill and by gender for the gender quotas debate, justifying the inclusion of a random slope in these models. However, when fitted initially, the random slope for age is correlated with the random intercept term and the random slope for gender reduces to zero. Both of these outcomes warrant a reduction of model complexity to a random intercept, fixed effects model for Finance and to OLS for Quotas.

It was hypothesised that the incentives for strategic behaviour in parliamentary debates would cause greater clustering by party than was evident in anonymous surveys. In some ways this could be interpreted as being the case. Table 6.2 compares the party-level variance at each environment of strategic incentives. Among voters, reporting attitudes is assumed to be extremely low consequence and thus the level of party variance is also assumed to be low. Party clustering is assumed to increase as we move up through the party hierarchy to candidates and TDs and the range of behaviours from reporting attitudes in surveys, also assumed to be low consequence, to speeches, assumed to be higher consequence, and finally roll-call voting in the parliament. 0 indicates no party clustering and 1 indicates complete party clustering.

Table 6.2 – Intra-class correlations across items by behavioural consequences of measurement

	Left Right	*Cut Taxes*	*EU*	*Quotas*	*Abortion*
Voters	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Candidates	0.36	0.12	0.11	0.11	NA
PPGs (surveys)	0.54	0.15	0.34	0.11	NA
PPGs (speeches)	0.90	0.9	0.66	0.00	0.28
Roll Call Voting	1	1	1	1	1

The hypothesis is confirmed in the cases of the left-right scale, taxation preferences and EU integration. The higher up the chain of behaviour attitudes are measured the greater the level of party clustering. Clustering is lowest among voters, though still a high 0.2 on the left-right item, and highest (1) for the voting on legislative measures[4]. Note that the Finance Bill speeches and voting record are included in both the left-right and taxation columns. Party-level variance is relatively lower on the taxation item up to the TD survey level compared to the left-right survey item. However, 90% of the variation in *Wordscores* positions on the Finance Bill is at the party level, leaving little to be explained by individual-level predictors. Gender quotas demonstrate an unclear pattern of clustering, although it is higher among politicians than voters and higher again on roll-call voting. Clustering on abortion speeches is only marginally higher than the clustering among voters. 0.2 is a high level of clustering among voters but 0.28 a relatively low level of clustering among TDs and Senators. Overall, the hypothesis concerning the link between behavioural consequences and party clustering is supported.

Table 6.3 reports the results of running the statistical models on the *Wordscores* dependent variables. The overall intercept terms are insignificant, indicating that the average member does not lean either way on any issue. In the Finance Bill model, each of the party-level intercepts differs from the overall intercept at the 95% confidence level. This is hardly surprising given that the individual scores were predicted based on closeness to aggregate party texts, which, with the exception of the

[4] The votes to reject the 'Medical Treatments' private members motions were used as the behavioural measure on the abortion item. Survey information on TDs and candidates abortion attitudes were not available.

independent group, were given pre-assigned codes in the *Wordscores* model.

Table 6.3 - Estimation results of party intercepts in empty multilevel models for *Wordscores*.

	Finance	*Treaty*	*Abortion*
Constant	-0.65	-0.61	-0.25
	(0.85)	(0.64)	(0.42)
Fianna Fáil	0.80*	0.13*	0.74*
	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.44)
Fine Gael	1.18*	1.08*	0.63*
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Labour	0.07*	0.78*	-0.50
	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Sinn Féin	-1.50*	-1.77*	-0.72
	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.50)
ULA	-4.40*	-2.57*	-1.49*
	(0.29)	(0.55)	(0.50)
Independents	-0.02*	-1.31*	-0.16
	(0.19)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Party-Level Variance	4.28***	2.33***	0.87***
	(2.07)	(1.53)	(0.94)
Individual-Level Variance	0.33	1.05	1.78
	(0.58)	(1.03)	(1.33)
Log-likelihood	-66.81	-116.76	-162.24
N	62	75	92

In the Finance Bill model, the coefficients indicate that on average, members of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil and Labour are significantly to the right of the average member, though in absolute terms, the coefficient for Labour puts their members firmly in the centre. Independents, Sinn Féin and ULA members are, in that order, significantly to the left. The Labour party aggregate text was assigned a centre code of 0. This division of parties by the centre point is also evident on EU integration, though FF are the least enthusiastic of those who supported the stability treaty. The left-wing groups are explicitly opposed to the further integration in the form of the Stability treaty. The party variable is excluded from the gender quotas model after the ANOVA test indicated that there was no party clustering on this item. FF and FG are opposed to the introduction of abortion, while Labour, SF and the Independents are centrist on the issue. Only the ULA are, on average, supportive of introducing this legislative measure.

The result for Labour deputies is particularly interesting here considering the theoretical distinction between measures of attitudes and behaviour outlined in section 2, and the doubt over the placement of parliamentary speeches on this continuum. Labour deputies, who ultimately voted for the budget and the Stability Treaty legislation, had no reservations about making statement opposing these measures on the floor of the House.

There are only sparse effects of individual-level variables on these issues and they are presented in table 6.4. Age and coming from a lower professional occupational background were significant predictors of attitudes on the finance scores. Older members within parties tended to be more right-wing. However, having a C1 occupational background had a left-wing effect on the distribution of intra-party attitudes. There was a differentiation between TDs and Senators in the gender quotas debate. Senators were considerably more supportive of the

Table 6.4 - Estimation of Results of Social Background on *Wordscores*

	Finance Bill	*Stability Treaty*	*Gender Quotas*	*Abortion*
Constant	-0.91	-1.43	-0.50	-1.16
	(0.90)	(0.96)	(1.32)	(0.91)
Senator	-0.13	0.25	-1.30**	0.37
	(0.20)	(0.35)	(0.47)	(0.43)
Female	-0.11	0.13	0.51	0.64
	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.46)	(0.35)
Age	0.02**	0.02	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
University Education	0.06	-0.27	0.57	0.39
	(0.16)	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.33)
Class: C1	-0.52**	0.02	-0.84	-0.14
	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.53)	(0.37)
Class: C2D	-0.37	-0.79	-0.67	-0.72
	(0.36)	(0.56)	(0.83)	(0.58)
Class: Farmer	-0.28	0.13	0.18	0.38
	(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.65)	(0.56)
Rural	-0.16	-0.04	0.02	0.36
	(0.18)	(0.34)	(0.54)	(0.37)
Party Level Variance	3.92***	2.05**	0.00	0.52*
	(1.98)	(1.43)	(0.00)	(0.72)
Individual Level Variance	0.27	1.06	2.36	1.80
	(0.52)	(1.03)	(1.53)	(1.34)
Adj. R^2			0.09	
R^2m	0.02	0.04		0.18
R^2c	0.93	0.66		0.8
Log-likelihood	-67.74	-118.49	-119.48	-161.27
N	64	76	66	92

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

legislation than their counterparts in the Dáil. It is interesting that there are no effects of gender in the quotas and abortion debates despite this variable having an effect on the decision to participate in the debates. The individual-level variables explain about 15% of the variance in the finance model and 6% of the variance in the quotas model.

As with the survey analysis in Chapter 4, predicted party positions in a representative parliament can be computed. These predictions can only be performed for the Finance Bill as it was the only item to demonstrate significant socio-demographic variation. The distribution of party support for quotas will be correlated simply with the proportion of senators it has, so no further action is required here. Table 6.5 below reports the average predicted value for each party and the associated position on the finance bill. The striking finding is that all of the parties are significantly against the austerity budget, favouring raising taxes and maintaining spending rather than cutting taxes and spending. This is also a believable finding if we consider that the link between attitudes and behaviour is not deterministic, but probabilistic.

Table 6.5 – Fitted and Predicted Positions of the parties towards the austerity Finance Bill 2012

Party	*Fitted Score*	*Predicted Position*	*Predicted Representative Score*	*Predicted Position*
Fianna Fáil	-3.44	Anti-budget	-3.68	Anti-budget
Fine Gael	-2.67	Anti-budget	-2.91	Anti-budget
Labour	-4.22	Anti-budget	-3.4	Anti-budget
Sinn Féin	-4.65	Anti-budget	-4.73	Anti-budget
ULA	-7.64	Anti-budget	-4.65	Anti-budget
Independents	-3.05	Anti-budget	-3.72	Anti-budget

Finally, I correlated the *Wordscores* positions of individual TDs and senators with their anonymous survey responses to further estimate the reliability of *Wordscores* as a measure of attitudes. The caveat here is that there was only overlap of 24-29 individuals between the two datasets. Table 6.6 below reports the coefficients of an OLS regression on the relationship between comparable survey and interview scores. The finance bill scores correlate very significantly and positively with the individuals' self-

placement on the left right-scale. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.1 below. The relationship is weaker when compared with the substantive item on taxation. There is also a significant relationship between the scores on the treaty positions and the preferences expressed towards further EU integration in the survey item. There is no relationship between the gender quotas scores and attitudes to quotas as reported in the survey Despite the low number of observations on which a comparison can be made, the fact that two of the three items correlate with their survey counterparts at the individual level provide reasonable evidence that they are measuring similar underlying dimensions.

Table 6.6 - Relationship between survey responses and *Wordscores*.

Survey Dependent Variable	*Left-Right Placement*	*Cut/Raise Taxes*	*EU Integration*	*Gender Quotas*
Wordscores Independent Variable	*Finance Bill*	*Finance Bill*	*Stability treaty*	*Gender Quotas*
Constant	0.04	1.09	0.91	3.23***
	(0.47)	(0.67)	(0.58)	(0.82)
Wordscores	0.54***	0.29*	0.23*	-0.17
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Adj. R2	0.54	0.12	0.12	0.01
N	24	25	25	29

Models are specified as Ordinary Least Squares. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$

Figure 6.1 Correlation of Survey Positions on the Left-Right Scale with Wordscores on the Finance Bill.



Section 7: Conclusion

This chapter has made a substantial effort to contribute to the conceptual and methodological study of attitudes in political science. By drawing on psychological theory, the discussion outlined the expected dynamics of speech-making and how these dynamics relate to anonymous surveys. While speech-making has a considerable behavioural component, it was expected that there should be more individual-level variation in speech positions than is observed in parliamentary roll-call votes on which individual variation is typically zero.

The literature on quantitative analysis of political text has so far focused primarily on party positions. Individual-level variation has not received as much attention. Moreover analyses attempting to explain individual-level social background variables are even less abundant. This chapter has treated the variation in political positions, inferred from word frequencies in parliamentary speeches, as a dependent variable akin to survey responses and applied the statistical model from the survey analysis in Chapter 4 to these four dependent variables. *Wordscores* positions were estimated for TDs and Senators speeches on the Finance Bill, Stability Treaty, Gender Quotas and Abortion.

The results of the chapter support the prior assumption concerning the dynamics of speech-making. The public, and thus strategic, element of speech-making in parliament is associated with a higher level of attitudinal clustering than is usually evident among the survey items. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil were usually the most right-wing parties, being more likely to support the austerity budget. They also tended to be more supportive of further EU integration. Although all parties supported liberalisation of abortion, FG and FF were the least likely to do so, while the socialists were most supportive. It was also found that attitudes as measured by *Wordscores* positions in two of the debates correlated significantly with two comparable survey items. This gives us greater confidence that the assumed dimensions are being measured by *Wordscores.*

The findings regarding a link between descriptive and substantive representation are not overwhelming here. However, some important results are presented. Firstly, female politicians were much more likely than men to speak on the issue of gender quotas and abortion. This supports the hypothesis that electing more women to parliament will result in women's issues receiving greater attention in the legislative process. Also, the under-representation of young people means there is greater support for austerity than would be the case in a descriptively representative parliament. Electing more women and young people would have a significant effect on the range of attitudes and issues discussed in the Houses of the Oirechtas.

CHAPTER 7: ISSUE INTERPRETATION AND MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY

Abstract

This chapter examines the range of qualitative responses to the attitude items posed to respondents in elite interviews. Political scientists often pose questions to politicians in a way that demands a two-dimensional response. However, political issues can often be more complex. The interpretation of political issues has implications for how these issues ultimately addressed and are thus an important component of a study of intra-party attitudes. The analysis explores the diversity of attitudes to left and right, economic policy, women in politics and various measures of the GAL/TAN index, operationalised here as attitudes to same-sex marriage equality, the environment, immigration and EU integration. The chapter finds considerable variation in politicians' interpretations of left and right. It also finds that gender is the basis of intra-party divisions on economic policy and same-sex equality. It finds generational and class differences on attitudes to the EU, some of which were not evident in the statistical analysis conducted in chapter 4, thus further supporting the link between descriptive representation and substantive attitudes.

CHAPTER 7: ISSUE INTERPRETATION AND MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY

Section 1: Introduction

The previous chapters used a range of quantitative measures to test the link between descriptive representation and substantive intra-party attitudes. Survey responses, question coding and word counts of parliamentary speeches typically measure a two-dimensional opinion structure. This chapter takes a qualitative approach to the interview data. It uses the discussions from the interviews to answer two questions. First, how do politicians interpret the major political issues? This can reveal the extent to which issues assumed to be two-dimensional are, in fact, multi-dimensional. Second, what are the major qualitative divisions around which the issues revolve? Why are TDs more or less pro-Europe?; why do they favour greater less state intervention in the economy?; or why do they oppose gender quotas for political parties? This chapter adds further value as it is sensitive to distinctive responses which may not have been numerous.

The chapter examines the patterns of responses to the major questions posed in the interviews undertaken for this research project. Section 2 discusses the theoretical expectations for the interpretation of political dimensions. Section 3 discusses politicians' interpretations of political left and right. Section 4 explores the substantive interpretation of left-right in terms of economic policy. Section 5 outlines politicians' attitudes to the under-representation of women in politics. Section 6 discusses items related to the GAL/TAN dimension (Hooghe *et al* 2002, 965). In particular, these are levels of agreement with marriage and adoption equality for same-sex couples, environmental policy, and immigration and EU integration. The latter is included here as it broadly corresponds with the GAL/TAN dimension, as evidenced by Hooghe *et al* (2002 986) and Chapter 4 of this analysis.

Section 2: Theoretical expectations of issue interpretation

Irish politics does not have a tradition of being conducted through the rhetoric of left and right. Such a dynamic has been mitigated by a party

system dominated by two centre-right parties since independence (Sinnott 1986, 237: Weeks 2010, 140). As Mair (1987, pp. 203-204) explains, the affective loyalties to these parties were sustained on the basis of traditional nationalist divisions, between those who favoured radical solutions to the Northern Ireland problem and those who preferred a more cautious approach. But these divisions could not provide the basis for strategic competition. The importance of the government's role in the economy was too great for citizens not to evaluate the parties in terms of what they have done, or will do, when it came to economic policy. One solution to this puzzle is that neither of the main parties hitched themselves to either left or right, leaving them free to form policies based on either approach in a competitive strategy that has more to do with proving managerial worth than ideological purity.

Nonetheless, left and right are almost universally understood concepts that define the spatial language of political competition, but the substantive interpretations of left and right vary across political contexts. In some countries, the terms are associated with economic policy, in others, with social liberalism and conservatism (Benoit and Laver 2006, 129-131). Studying the meaning of left and right in this context is important because the terms generate insights into the dynamics of party competition. For those who depict either of the terms negatively, it would be difficult for them to switch to a positive identification of that term if it became politically advantageous to do so (Wall and Sudulich 2010, 96). Finally, understanding the interpretation of political labels, particularly those that are as widespread as left and right is important because if political actors, such as voters and elites, have different interpretations of the term, the effectiveness of these terms as ideological shortcuts are reduced. Voters may perhaps not get the substantive policies they thought they were voting for based on left/right labels. At the elite level, divergent interpretations may shatter what appears to be intra-party ideological unity.

In terms of the most recent research of elite interpretations of left and right in Ireland, Wall and Sudulich (2010, 104) found that while many Irish

electoral candidates easily identified as being left-wing, the remainder mostly identified as neutral, rather than right-leaning. Due to the neutral grouping of the two historically dominant parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, the system as a whole is not ideologically driven. But Wall and Sudulich's research was conducted in 2007, four years before Ireland's "earthquake election" (Gallagher 2011, 139). How does this finding apply when FF are no longer one of the two largest parties in the Dáil and Sinn Féin are a considerable electoral force? We might expect that with such a strong left-wing presence, those on the right may finally be more comfortable identifying as such in order to differentiate them from Sinn Féin. In addition to adopting Wall and Sudulich's coding mechanism for affective terms of left and right, I found two other distinct categories of interpretation. One which rejects the notion of left and right altogether and another where they are negatively associated with opposing parties' positions, such as "the left just oppose everything".

Where left and right are interpreted substantively we would expect them to reflect their most common usage, that of economic policy (Benoit and Laver 2006, 50). People who would refer to themselves as being on the left would typically favour greater state intervention in the economy, particularly state-run enterprise. Those on the right prefer an economy driven by the private sector and state-run businesses only where necessary, if at all. Somewhat correlated with these preferences are attitudes to non-economic issues. Those on the left would typically favour less state regulation of citizens' private lives, while those on the right would be in greater favour of legislating morality. It is not difficult to find exceptions to these broad definitions but, on the whole, these are the dynamics of left and right in political terms.

The exploration of left-right interpretations is followed by discussion around the responses to explicit questions on the government's role in the management of the economy. This is one of the two most commonly used substantive interpretations of left and right (Benoit and Laver 2006, 132), the other being the social dimension however operationalised. However, the

economic dimension is arguably more important, particularly in Ireland, as questions of morality and social policy are somewhat less frequently debated than the routine actions of government in managing the economy.

I then focus on attitudes towards addressing the gender imbalance in Irish electoral politics. Roughly 85% of candidates at, and ultimately TDs after, the 2011 general election were men. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 17) treat the feminism dimension as distinct from the social liberalism-conservatism dimension. The importance of this dimension is that if there are significant gender divisions on issues that in reality affect women more than men, given men make up the overwhelmingly majority of public policy makers, public policy may be skewed against the interests of women. Norris and Lovenduski include five issues in this scale; equal opportunities for women, the right to an abortion on the NHS, the right to an abortion within the first trimester, punishments for domestic violence and the issue of criminalising rape in marriage. They found that within each party, women were more feminist than men. That is, women were more likely to agree with policy proposals based on these items.

In the analysis that follows, I focus on attitudes towards equal opportunities for women in the context of electoral politics. The new government of 2011 committed to establishing gender quotas for political parties in the form of reduced state funding for parties that did not meet a 30% quota for female candidates at the next general election (expected in 2016). This is slightly complicated by the fact that I only interviewed people who had been elected without a party quota. They may have greater support for the 'meritocratic' model of candidate selection, with that having been their route to elected office. In this way gender quotas actually may be an exception in that positive attitudes towards government creating equal opportunities for women in society may stop at government doing so within political parties. Nonetheless, it is expected that female politicians will hold more favourable attitudes to gender quotas than men.

In the realm of social policy, I broadly incorporate Hooghe *et al*'s (2002, 966) GAL/TAN index as manifested in the interview schedule. I include discussion here of attitudes to the environment, same-sex equality, immigration and EU integration. Gay rights and abortion have long been manifestations of latent attitudes on the social-liberalism scale. Previous studies assumed attitudes to homosexuality sat on the liberal-conservative dimension (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 215) though the question wordings are now far too outdated according to modern understanding of homosexuality[5]. Same-sex marriage rights were a relatively salient issue at the time of this study, with the *Civil Unions Bill 2010* being passed by the Dáil in the year prior to these interviews. However, gay rights advocacy groups felt that a civil union is not on par with marriage in terms of the level of state recognition of the relationship and were pushing for full marriage rights[6]. Social conservatives generally oppose granting full marriage rights for same-sex couples because they feel it undermines the traditional basis of of marriage as being a heterosexual couple with the potential to start their own natural family. The question I put to respondents was simply,

> *"Should same sex couples be allowed the same marriage rights as heterosexual couples above and beyond what is in the Civil Partnership Bill?"*

The issue of adoption by same-sex couples is the next logical step, though some argue marriage and adoption rights are one and the same. If same-sex couples are to be given full marriage rights with heterosexual couples, this would include the right to be considered as adoptive parents. It may be that supporting same-sex marriage is a relatively easier item to agree with than same-sex adoption. Also, this latter issue is complicated because one or both same-sex partners could come to the relationship with their own biological children. Therefore I worded the question on this attitude item as

> *"Should same sex couples be allowed the same rights as others to adopt children from third parties?"*

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[5] Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 268) worded this item as "Do you agree/disagree that homosexual relations are always wrong?" Modern understanding eschews normative judgments by acknowledging homosexuality's biological essence, rather than it being a lifestyle choice, thus rendering this wording moot.

[6] Marriage Equality (2011,6) found 169 statutory differences between the legal statuses of civil partnership an civil marriage.

The analysis begins in the next section with an exploration of intra-party interpretations of 'left' and 'right'.

Section 3: Left and Right

Four dynamics of response patterns were evident in response to the question "what do left and right mean in Irish politics today". The first type of response emphasised that the terms mean nothing. The second defined them in party political terms. The third did so in a positive or negative affective way. The final type of interpretation was academically clear while remaining personally neutral.

Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil politicians were the most likely to indicate, with hostility, that the terms 'left' and 'right' mean nothing in Irish politics. A FG minister's explanation typified this response:

> "I think (the question is) academic. It's meaningless, all we're trying to do is represent people, irrespective of what strands of life they're from or what socio-economic backgrounds they have."

This is completely consistent with findings regarding the Irish political system. The major parties have never competed on grand ideological platforms. The party positions are an aggregation of individual-level competitions between candidates at the constituency level. The above minister's party colleague on the backbenches explained this more emotively:

> "I don't like the terms… If you're 'left' you're supposed to be warm and fuzzy, and if you're 'right' you're supposed to be mean and sadistic. I would probably be centre- right. But that doesn't make me a bad person and that certainly doesn't mean that I'm not compassionate, considerate, helpful, kind, you know, all of the other things that you would associate with people who are concerned with human dignity; human rights, basic living conditions, the establishment of equal opportunities for people, all of those good things that we foster. You automatically assume a label for a person because of the position of their party and, actually, I think that's somewhat redundant."

A senior FF TD echoed these sentiments but recognised that this lack of left-right rhetoric may not be an eternal feature of the system, given the surge of left-wing TDs elected in 2011.

> "They don't mean anything really, to be honest. I suspect in 10 years time, they might mean a lot. I think we're probably moving towards the left vs. right dynamic."

This lack of importance for left and right was the exception rather than the rule among Labour, Sinn Féin and the Independents. However, there was a presumption among some Labour TDs that left-right ideologies have existed up to this point but they are not useful in the political and economic climate of Ireland in 2011. One veteran Labour TD outlined:

> "*At the moment* [emphasis added] it means nothing, in my opinion, because we're in the elements of disaster".

His younger colleague was similarly dismissive of ideological attachments:

> "I'm not ashamed to say that ideology, sometimes, has to be suspended".

Conversely, SF politicians claimed left and right mean nothing because the Irish party system has never been based on left and right:

> "the 3 bigger parties Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour, for me, are essentially the same, they're cut from the same cloth. Obviously, Labour would see themselves as being left of centre but if you look at any of their policies which they are now delivering, they have never tried to establish the left alternative."

Independents who were hostile to the terms did so broadly in line with the FG and FF interpretations with one saying:

> "Labels, in the like of socialism and that have become largely discredited, though I would probably call myself a social democrat."

Between the parties, a correlated response mechanism emerged as a definition of left and right in party political terms. A FF TD summed up this point. He also uses this party political interpretation to emphasise the redundancy of the labels in Irish politics:

> "Left and right mean nothing. Left in Irish politics means we're against everything. Left-wing politics the world over would favour a

property tax but the left here have come simply to say 'no' to everything. So, they're not left. It would be the same if Fianna Fáil decided they really wanted to bring the Queen back. They (the opposition) are as naive and as ridiculous as that."

A FG senator continued the theme and recognised the usefulness of a purer left-wing ideology:

"All I can see coming from the left now is no, no, no. We want, we want and we want. Oppose anything and don't put forward realistic solutions to everything or to anything. Whereas, the theory of Marx, would be a reasonable 'left'. There's none of that coming through now."

His senate and party colleague took a more negative view of being left-wing in party terms:

"Well, left - how extreme left do you want to go? I think you look at the likes of Sinn Féin, they want everybody to be poor. They want us all to be poor together."

Labour tended to hedge their opinion a little here. One Labour TD diplomatically defined the terms:

"You've the broad social democratic left of centre and you've the right of centre. I suppose, Fine Gael and Labour represent those poles rather well in terms of Irish party competition. They may not measure up to mainland European politics but I think everyone knows that the Labour party is a bit different than Fine Gael and not far enough apart to prevent a joining coalition."

Consistent with Wall and Sudulich (2010, 104) some in Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael were averse to defining "right" in positive terms, instead criticising the 'left' in party political terms. TDs on the Left thought the picture was much clearer on this dimension. An independent who defined himself as left-wing put it starkly:

"Well, if you look at the present make up of the Dáil, I think it's clear who are the left and who are the right. On the right you'd find Fine Gael, Labour and Fianna Fáil."

Similar to the Labour TDs mentioned above, a ULA TD recognised that there may previously have been a right-left dynamic in Irish politics, with the left being represented by Labour. Where the Labour TDs above espoused the necessity of suspending ideology, the ULA TD thought ideology to be more necessary than ever:

> "I suppose we have a big vacuum in Irish politics because the Labour party would have been viewed as the biggest representatives of the left or ordinary people, working-class voters, and they've completely gone over to the establishment now."

The third dynamic of responses was to define left and right more substantively with a positive or negative affective attitude depending on the respondent's self-identification with either term. Left-wing identifiers had a high tendency to substantively define left with complimentary language and, if they did so at all, mostly defined the 'right' pejoratively. Positive interpretations of left were concentrated in Labour while negative interpretations of left were most likely evident within FG. Moreover, left-wing TDs had a greater tendency to define their side positively than right-wing TDs did with their own ideology. Not one Labour TD defined left in a negative sense. This statement from a Labour backbencher encapsulated the party's view:

> "I think left, for me anyway, means that the state has an important role in the economy. I regard the state as a progressive force in public life but also in the economy, in economic development. I think division over what the appropriate role of the state in the economy has represented the fault line between left and right for a long time."

SF also took a positive view of the left and acknowledged this reluctance to define the right:

> "To me, being on the left would be looking after those who are the poorest in society, the most vulnerable in society, those on the margins, and trying to create a more equal society from the bottom up. I'm not going to say anything about the right but I suppose, those

on the right, it's more capitalist driven. Well, it's big business. That kind of thing."

A FG senator was the only member of his party to define both left and right in positive terms by saying:

"Left means somebody who is socially-minded and right means somebody who is civic-minded"

A more typical interpretation of the left came from another FG senator who declared classic left-wing ideology to be redundant:

"The left-wing experiment is over because the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and parts of South America were the experiment and they failed. I mean you can't call Chinese communism 'left'. The Chinese Communist party blatantly operate a dictatorial system of capitalism."

The same senator was one of the few to positively identify with being right-wing. He also spoke for his party colleagues by saying:

"Everyone in Fine Gael believes in equality of opportunity. We must create jobs and growth. Not tax people out of existence".

Another FG Senator attached a negative connotation to being right-wing, but prefaced it by saying he was talking about the extreme right.

"I was coming up on the train the other day and I was talking to a guy who said he would cut social welfare by 50%. To me that is extreme right"

A FF TD also defined the right in ultimately negative terms. This is less surprising for FF as they had a greater tendency to identify as left-wing.

"There's a hell of a lot in between and the right would be more towards individual rights versus the state, more positively disposed towards entrepreneurship. Go right through to liberal economics, right through to fascism."

An independent senator took a marginally less reductionist view of being right wing:

"Right is far too much on open market, free trade, allowing the markets to decide, libertarian nearly."

Other respondents provided definitions of left and right absent any pejorative tones on either side. This tendency, while not any more widespread than the other dynamics outlined here, was more likely to occur within parties than between them. A FF TD had a clear interpretation:

> "Left is, predominantly, economic, more government intervention, more welfare support, generally a higher tax model. Right is a less government intervention, market-driven economy, less personal tax model."

His opponent in FG similarly defined the terms:

> "Traditionally, left is obviously high tax, high spend, while right is low tax, low spend".

A SF TD echoed these sentiments with surprising accuracy as many other SF and ULA TDs reacted very subjectively and negatively to the term "right-wing":

> "Well, I suppose, right wing economics are, usually, less state intervention, small government. Left wing economics, usually, means that the state provides for equal services and equal opportunity. Equal services, primarily, in social welfare, education and in health".

Another SF TD attempted to be equally neutral:

> "I think if you asked somebody on the street, an ordinary 'Joe', to define what left-wing is they would say somebody who represents the working class background and right-wing would be somebody who represents business."

A left-identifying independent TD was also prone to an apolitical interpretation:

> "I suppose, someone being perceived as right is conservative, very pro-private sector. Left, you're probably more socialist but you're probably more interested in developing the public sector as a part of the strategy."

No member of Labour attempted to define left and right in a purely academic sense. They either defined left in a positive sense and right in a negative sense, or simply focused on talking about the left in a positive sense.

Finally, two respondents mentioned the multi-dimensional difficulties of defining left and right. A Labour senator stated:

> "Personally, I think the idea of a left/right divide in Irish politics is just lazy because where would you put climate change on the left/right divide for instance? You could say only left wing people believe in climate change. Where do you fit the EU in the left/right divide? In fact, are there any real policy differences between the 3 main parties in this country, even though we claim to be all at different points on the spectrum? We're not really, we're all really centralist."

A FF senator mentioned how he saw an economic dimension and a social dimension. He described himself as left on the economic dimension but right on the social dimension:

> "I'd see myself being on the left on economic issues, making sure we look after the under privileged and those who are in need but also be aggressive in our business development, encouraging employment, encouraging employers, putting in incentives because everybody gains if the pots bigger and we create more wealth. On the social issues, I wouldn't be on the left where many people would be. I mean, some of the suggestions they're making on schools, for example, with a Catholic school or a Muslim school, you have to have symbols of all other religions. I don't think that's sensible or realistic, to be quite honest."

This senator was referring to how he would not be a social liberal in terms of tolerating multiculturalism in Catholic schools. His party colleague in the senate also made this distinction between the two dimensions but in the opposite direction:

> "I suppose I would be slightly to the right on the economy, maybe a 6 on the (11 - point scale), but to the left on social issues. About a 4."

Irish politicians interpret left and right as applied to Irish politics in a multitude of ways. These have been identified here as rejecting the existence of these divisions, a centrist/opportunistic party political dimension, subjective perceptions of one or both terms, and an academic interpretation of both terms. Where these interpretations were substantive, they were usually associated with divisions on economic policy, particularly state involvement in the economy, but a small minority recognised the incongruence of left and right as applied to social and economic issues. There were no apparent divisions in the interpretation of left and right based on the social background characteristics of respondents.

Section 4: Economic policy

As a graduate student, I found it difficult to prioritise question wordings for the interviews. I used several survey datasets throughout this project and there were many questions potentially tapping left-right economic attitudes. While the INES and CCS datasets worded substantive left/right questions according to cutting and raising taxes and spending, state regulation/ownership of industry and wealth distribution, the PartiRep dataset used in Chapter 4 for international comparisons inquires whether the respondent thinks "government should have a smaller role in the management of the economy". As I already had a link between TDs and Irish voters through the comparable survey questions, it occurred to me to use the PartiRep wording for the interviews to provide some link to the international context. Moreover, the dichotomous wording of the questions in the INES and CCS did not seem conducive to an interview setting. I tested them in initial interviews and respondents found them difficult to elaborate on. Furthermore, in my initial interviews with Senators I asked about what the respondent thinks is the "appropriate relationship between the state and market". This was not ideal, as it was not derived from questions used in any previous studies.

In hindsight, as it will be demonstrated, the PartiRep questions seemed to display considerable item response difficulty, with responses skewed in a 'disagree' direction. However, in Chapter 3, I demonstrated that the

binomial distribution of responses between the 'agree' and 'disagree' categories for the CCS item on regulation and the PartiRep question on 'government management' from the coded interviews are equivalent. In many cases I also asked several follow-up questions to clarify their response, but due to time constraints these follow-ups were not always feasible. Asking the CCS question about whether respondents favour more or less taxes and spending would have been more substantively interesting but, on the whole, I feel I measured left-right economic attitudes reasonably well.

In the context of the great recession from 2008 to 2012 and beyond, it was very difficult for many interviewees to agree that government should have a smaller role in the economy. The item tapped an unintended latent attitude which could be described as "left" or *prima facie* "statist" attitudes of many in Fine Gael, as one of their backbench TDs responded:

> "A smaller role? Well, I think they played a smaller role in the Celtic Tiger and forgot about the management of the economy. I think the government should have more power in the running of financial institutions, definitely."

His party colleague on the back benches took a similar view:

> "It depends on how you interpret that. I mean, the mess we're in is because they didn't play any role and allowed it to get out of control. So, no, I think that the overall environment and structures have to be put in place by the government of the day. "

The extent of variation within FG is highlighted by the fact that one of their government Ministers took the question out of the context of the recession, declaring without hesitation:

> "Yes. This (smaller government) has always been a part of the Fine Gael philosophy. That businesses create jobs, government doesn't! Businesses create economic activity, government doesn't! But government will create the conditions for it followed by

entrepreneurship and economic activity. That would be the basic philosophy."

These statements were indicative of the wider response patterns to the question. Smaller government in general was associated with the lack of regulation and ultimate destruction of the Irish economy, though a minority addressed the question in principle. Follow-up questions adequately parsed these attitudes. This is also a clear example of divisions on the intra-party interpretation of issues having major implications for how members envision government will ultimately address these issues.

Although the responses were skewed to the left in terms of disagreeing with a smaller role for government in the economy, Fine Gael were the most likely to agree. Fianna Fáil also were relatively likely to agree with a smaller role with one of their TDs efficiently responding

> "At the moment, (a smaller role for government) is impossible. But generally, yes"

A FF senator responded to an alternatively worded question regarding the "appropriate relationship between the state and the market" by saying

> "The state should regulate it in a very hard way. But it shouldn't run the economy. But they should be regulating it and making sure it's operating fairly and properly."

This response is ideally the type I would have expected from the "smaller government" question and perhaps I should have continued to use it throughout my interviews. However, it is better practice to normalise question wordings across sources so I used the PartiRep wording for consistency.

Agreement with the proposition was very much the minority view within Labour. One TD spoke almost like a typical member of Fine Gael.

> "I think the government actually needs to (play a smaller role in the management of the economy). It's not the government's job to actually be creating jobs. But it is the government's job to create the environment in which jobs can actually grow".

His party colleague responded immediately with a 'yes'. But he meant not that the management of the economy should be left to market forces, but that government should bring more independent advice into the process of government managing the economy:

> "Government itself needs to look at the committees and expertises outside to formulate opinions and ideas and they (government), ultimately, have to bring it together."

On average though, Labour party politicians were more likely to disagree strongly when this item was put to them. A Labour TD stated aghast:

> "No. Oh no, no. Government needs to be there to intervene so that services will go to people based on social justice, rather than on numbers or rather than people who disproportionately powerful. I think government needs to stand apart from that and deliver where it's needed most."

No Sinn Féin or ULA politician agreed with the statement and only one independent did so.

The analysis thus far has examined how the question on a smaller role for the government in the economy prompted a variety of responses from within the Fine Gael party. Ultimately, it is evident that the party sees a greater role for the private sector in the economy, but the word "management" forced what might be interpreted as statist or left-leaning attitude. The follow-up questions provided an appropriate opportunity for them to clarify their opinions.

When asked whether the privatisation of state assets will be in the public interest one FG TD outlined a view that would lead to the opposite inference as to his underlying left-right position:

> "Without a shadow of a doubt, ESB and CIE, letting a private partnership coming in with them, I think will only benefit the consumer. We have failed miserably in a lot of these companies. I think it would be a huge benefit and it will bring competition in to the market."

This TD, by any traditional definition, is clearly on the right-wing end of spectrum and favours less government involvement in the economy. Given the crisis conditions of the economy, his party colleague leaned towards state retention of assets:

> "Well, I would be one of the ones, actually, I think we should be careful in selling off our state assets because once you're doing that you're burning your bridges for good."

Even the question of selling state assets was coloured by the experience of privatising the national telephone network in 2002, where many citizens had bought shares and ultimately lost a lot of money. Thus, agreeing with the further privatisation of large infrastructure was relatively difficult, although, not as difficult as agreeing with a smaller role for government in the management of the economy. As another Fine Gael backbencher put it:

> "We, as a nation, inherently have a problem with selling our state assets because of the bad deal we got with Eircom. It doesn't sit well."

Therefore I also followed up with what I thought would be an "easy" privatisation question. The Irish government, at the time of the interviews, held a strategic 25% stake in the former national airline Aer Lingus. It had been speculated at the time that these shares would be sold to raise cash for the government. For those considered to be on the right of the spectrum, this was not at all difficult, as the Fine Gael member just mentioned went on to comprehensively say:

> "No, there's critical infrastructure and there are assets that we can sell off and it wouldn't make a blind bit of difference. You could probably say that about Coillte, Bord Gais, CIE, and Aer Lingus shares. I mean, would anybody die tomorrow if we didn't own 25% of Aer Lingus?"

A final question on substantive left-right attitudes demonstrated some more significant intra-party variation. Respondents were asked whether "Do you agree or disagree that larger income differences are necessary to incentivise individual effort?", though this item tended to elicit only brief responses. One FG TD explicitly supported the idea by saying

"Yes, you see my background is in human resources management for 20 years before I got into politics. So I'm aware of the whole area of motivation, incentivisation and attracting new thinking into all areas of management and that people do respond to reward."

His party colleague took a more philosophical angle:

"Well, at the end of the day, the counter argument to that is communism. Where everybody earns the same and everybody is miserable together."

However, the entire range of attitudes to this item was evident within FG. The analysis in Chapter 4 highlighted statistical gender divisions on this item. A female FG TD reacted with an egalitarian response:

"I think there's a great polarisation in society if you have these gigantic income differences versus much lower. I don't think that's healthy for society to have huge gaps of very obviously rich and very obviously poor."

A male FG TD took a more analytical view of incentives and income distribution in his disagreement with the item:

"I think that's too simplistic. You've heard of the Gini coefficient?, which is all about income distribution and i think there's got to be a fair amount of taxation taken in and we don't want such a disparity between the top and the bottom that it creates even further inequality."

FF politicians also tended towards agreement with the proposal. A typical FF response was as one TD said "I think you've got to reward initiative". However, his party colleague felt that:

"No, I think a fair wage for fair day's work. I think some incomes are too excessive"

While Labour and Sinn Féin politicians overwhelmingly disagreed with the sentiment, there were some notable exceptions. A Labour TD agreed with the statement by saying

"Of course (larger income differences are necessary). I don't hear anybody, anywhere, arguing that everybody should be paid the same. You should be rewarded on account of what you produce and your value."

A Sinn Féin TD parsed the statement more carefully:

> "Income differences are a necessity for an incentive to effort. I think larger ones? No. I think incentive would still be there with lower income differences. I think, for example, in the public service, the head chief earns 7 times the lower earner while in Norway that would be about 4 times, and I don't see this difference having any result of further incentivising 'effort' here than they have in Norway etc."

An explicitly committed left-wing TD also did not react in ideological disgust to the idea of some level of income inequality.

> "I never had a problem with people making money. I've no problem with millionaires. Actually, one or two of my friends are millionaires. My problem has always been making money exploiting other people. I have to recognize that there are people who have set up businesses, run businesses, who work extremely hard and have a right to take a profit out of that business. And if it means hundreds of thousands, so be it. I've no problem with that. My problem has always been doing it by exploiting other people, forcing people to do slave labour or on wages that are lower than minimum wage or unsustainable. So if you're asking me if I have a problem with being rich, I do not."

On average, the Labour party, Sinn Féin, the ULA and the Independents responded negatively to the idea of a smaller role for government in the management of the economy, but also averaged a left-wing position when the prompt questions regarding state assets and privatising Aer Lingus were taken into account. There also seemed to be more hostility to the idea of larger income differences being a necessary incentive to individual effort among women within the parties. Women were also more likely than men to disagree with the item on income equality, thus demonstrating more left leaning attitudes.

Section 5: Women in Politics

Ireland's low ranking in terms of female participation in politics was increasingly salient in leading up to the general election in 2011 and beyond. This may not have been the case among voters generally, but a vocal minority in academia and media frequently raised the issue. As a result, Fine Gael and Labour committed themselves to introducing measures to ensure more women were selected as candidates for the next general election, presumably to take place in 2016. This commitment manifested itself in the *Electoral Amendment (Political Funding) Bill 2012* which contained a provision for the state to cut 50% of state funding to political parties if they did not run at least 30% female candidates from the 2016 general election onwards. I asked interview respondents; from their experience, why they thought there was so few women in politics; would things improve if more women were elected and whether or not they agreed with candidate quotas for political parties. These 'equal opportunity' questions were assumed to tap a latent 'feminist' ideological dimension consistent with Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 217). Moreover, the questions reflect varying dimensions of attitudes outlined in Chapter 1 between affective and cognitive components.

There were gender-based division of responses to the question of why so few women participate in politics at an electoral level. The overwhelming response was that politics takes time that women don't have, given that they usually having greater responsibility for rearing children. This was correlated with an explanation that a male-oriented perception of politics exists and discourages women from being involved. These explanations were concentrated among male respondents. A male Fine Gael TD put it bluntly:

> "The work is shit. Really it's terrible. The endless meetings."

This TD implied that women are less attracted to the day-to-day drudgery of politics. However, it is also curious why the TD would even do the job himself if it is so bad. This view, in not so crude terms, was represented amongst the majority of male politicians. Several female TDs across parties

made comparable comments, but with an empowering spin, indicating that women were "more rational" than men. A female Independent TD stated:

> "women don't what to waste their time going around in circles in a system that is designed to make it as difficult as possible to make a bloody decision."

Given the nature of the proposed measure to promote more women in politics, very rarely did the candidate selection procedure for political parties come up as a factor. Only one female respondent mentioned a systematic bias against female candidates within her party:

> "Good (female) people in politics get suppressed because sitting TDs look at them and think 'Oh God, she's talking a bit too much, she might try and take me out'."

What can be inferred here is that male politicians are much less likely to offer diverse opinions as to the reasons for women's under-representation in politics. Moreover, if other life priorities are the reason there are so few women in politics, rather than biased candidate selection procedures, quotas for selecting more female candidates are unlikely to address the issue.

There was no straight correlation between a positive response to the question asking whether the respondent thinks things will improve if there were more women in politics and whether or not they support gender quotas. The former of these was considerably easier to agree with than the latter. Most respondents agreed to some extent that things would improve if there were more women in politics. These positive sentiments can be categorised as symbolic and substantive. Some felt it is important that the membership of the Houses of the Oireachtas approximates society as whole in terms of social background characteristics with the gender imbalance being strikingly obvious. The importance of symbolism is clearly divorced from any measurable substantive changes. A female Fine Gael TD explained:

> "My original view is that I wouldn't have necessarily agreed with quotas. But, having done a lot of research, I think we have no choice because it forces the agenda. It's not that the women are going to

change things but we have 50/50 gender breakdown in society so we should have 50/50 representation."

A male Fianna Fáil TD echoed this sentiment with some further justification:

"50 percent of society is female. The more reflective you can be of society, the better system you will have. Where we do that in terms of geography, we haven't been able to do that in relation to gender."

So here he compares it to how geographic representation is guaranteed by the electoral system, but not gender representation. The implication is that potential variation in political preferences is equally important across genders as it is across constituencies.

More substantively, and legislative outcomes aside, a female Labour Senator explained how women bring a different style to politics in that they are less interested in talking for the sake of it and more interested in making decisions:

"I notice, even from the meetings very often we (women) are trying to push things on, trying to find conclusions. We often bring a greater clarity to the situation and ironically, talk less at meetings and try and get it to order. Men will very often be the endless talkers."

A male Fine Gael TD made a similar statement:

"Perhaps the workings of the chamber, for example, in the Dáil might be different, in terms of the interaction that goes on at the minute. The heckling and the un-gentlemanly behaviour, shall we say. So, perhaps on that basis that politics would change."

In terms of the type of issues raised and how they are dealt with many felt that social issues with gender-biased implications would be more adequately addressed if there were more women in politics. A male Independent TD highlighted:

"issues involving woman like abortion, for instance, contraception, rape and domestic violence, which are primarily directed against women. We need to have all this debate in the Dáil and I think it would be best if women were more involved. They would bring a lot

more to that debate. That would fundamentally be the reason I would think we would need to have more women."

Nor were women being pigeon-holed into these particular issues. A male Fianna Fáil TD explained:

> "(Things would improve) every way. (Women) have a far more practical perspective on issues. They don't get as hung up on ideologies as men do."

Conversely, a male Sinn Féin Senator assigned a left-leaning ideology to women in general.

> "Women would put much more emphasis on the community. They'd be less amenable to cutting money from the community and voluntary sector, and more likely to put in place policies that (positively) impact working families or people who are on low levels of income."

The minority who disagreed with the statement that things would improve if more women were elected was populated by men with one exception. A female ULA TD explained that she doesn't think:

> "..women have any greater knowledge than men. The men I work with of a similar ideological view point to me have far more to offer women in Ireland than a lot of the women in Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil as far as I'm concerned. Just 'cause you're a woman, like Margaret Thatcher and Mary Harney, doesn't mean anything for women."

A male Labour TD took a similar view with a more positive and egalitarian tone:

> "If Joan Burton was minister for education and Ruiarí Quinn was minister for social welfare, what would be done differently? Very little, I think. I have a lot of time for (Minister for Children) Frances Fitzgerald and Joan Burton but I don't see them as women, *per se*, I see them as cabinet ministers."

While a male Fine Gael TD gave a more informal response:

> "No, I don't think (things would improve). I think men represent the women as much as the women would represent men. I just think that (presumption) is a myth, really."

Thus the "things that would improve" if more women were elected were not limited to legislative outcomes. First, many felt that gender balance in political representation is important in its own right. Second they felt it was would at least change how politics is done and third, some felt women would bring different issues and perspectives to the legislative process and possibly even a greater emphasis on left-wing ideology.

Responses in support of gender quotas for political parties quotas were fairly succinct, mostly eliciting a "yes" or "I agree". A female Labour TD justified her position by emphasising the knock-on effect of introducing quotas:

> "I believe in quotas because I think if you can do something dramatic, to get more women in, then that will encourage yet more women to get in."

So to her mind, the introduction of quotas will have the effect of increasing women's representation above and beyond the 30% target set out in the legislation. Others supported the measure more reluctantly:

> "I'm not a big believer in quotas but we have to be open to it. If it works, great. If not, we'll have to come up with something else".

Despite the great support, in one way or another, for the notion that things would improve if more women were elected, the methods of getting more women elected were much more divisive. Some felt that quotas are not the solution. Among Independent TDs, where party selection procedures are not a barrier to putting one's name forward for election, the reluctance of women to come forward was identified. One TD explained he was:

> "not into the whole quota thing and I've thought about it and I've examined it. But I was amazed when I put it to my own (female) election workers that I wanted them to go on the city council to plan the future when I step down, some of them didn't have the confidence to go forward. I think the privacy issue is a big issue. They just don't like seeing their mug on a poster."

Here, active election workers in a successful Independent TD's organisation were unwilling to go forward for election even with an almost unimpeded path to success. If situations like this are occurring within the political

parties, it will be particularly difficult for Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael to meet the quota.

While there was considerable intra-party division on the issue of quotas, the Sinn Féin party were almost united in their opposition to them. A statement from one of their female members is indicative of the wider party attitude:

> "I'm personally against quotas. I think it should be the best person for the job. I think jumping straight into 50/50 (gender representation) is not going to get the best representatives and it's probably going to damage politics further down the line"

She went on to say that her party might have a problem in this regard also:

> "If you told some people in our local cumann (constituency branch) 'If you're putting up two candidates, you have to have 50/50 gender balance', sure there are nearly no women in some cumann. So, I think it (an affirmative action measure) needs to look at a lot more participation and how you do that."

A considerable degree of opposition came from the Labour party. A male Labour TD stated

> "Those gender quotas drive me daft. I think they're ridiculous. I think they're quite demeaning to women. We (Labour) have had one of the most outstanding female TDs (Joan Burton) that we (Ireland) have ever had in this country and she wasn't elected because of a quota".

Politicians' concerns thus revolved around tokenism: that female candidates put on the ticket would not be taken as seriously as men. Regardless of the impression it gives about the candidate themselves a Fine Gael TD said he was:

> "totally opposed to quotas. Absolutely. 100%. It's an affront to democracy".

This view is based on the idea that parties should be free to choose which candidates they like without interference from the state.

Opposition to quotas on 'democratic' grounds was not confined to Fine Gael as a male Labour TD explained:

> "I would hate to see somebody being taken off the ticket because of the gender quota. If there are two males in a place, that are equally excellent and they can potentially be elected, it is doing democracy a disservice if one of them has to be taken off for the sole purpose of putting on a female just to get some kind of a gender balance Likewise, if there were two women on a ticket that are equally talented and if a male has to go on to it, well then you're not doing anyone any favours."

In terms of gender the majority of female TDs supported quotas at least in a limited capacity, with perhaps a ten-year time limit on the legislative measure after which it would be reviewed. No party on the whole seemed to lean one way or another. Labour women also seemed to lean against quotas as their party has the best record in electing women without affirmative action measures. The dimension tapped by gender quotas is not strictly a 'feminist' ideology. Concerns about the quality of democracy and the efficacy of the proposal were raised by politicians of both genders.

Section 6: GAL/TAN Attitudes

Same-sex equality

The first thing that characterised responses to items on same-sex equality was the lack of elaboration compared to other questions. Many responses consisted of a simple "yes" or "no". Second, the dynamics of the responses across the two questions looked similar to those across the two questions regarding women in politics in section 5 above. On the 'easier' question of full marriage rights for same-sex couples the distribution of responses is overwhelmingly in favour of legislating for this beyond the *Civil Partnership Bill 2010.* However, same-sex adoption is a much more difficult item for some to agree with and brings to the fore the assumed latent conservatism.

On average, all parties favoured the extension of full marriage rights to same-sex couples. Many who supported it used terms like "Absolutely" or "Yes, definitely" to indicate strong agreement with the measure without

elaboration. Fianna Fáil TDs were generally in favour of same-sex marriage, though many mentioned they would have traditionally been against it and have changed their mind in recent times. One FF deputy explained

> "I would have said no two years ago. I would say that the civil union bill represented an incremental approach. It's inevitable that we will give same-sex couples practically the same rights as heterosexual couples."

Opposition to the proposal came primarily from men within Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Moreover, most FF senators were definitively against this proposal. They clearly distinguished civil marriage from the measures in the civil partnership bill:

> "I don't think it's for the benefit of the wider society. I gladly supported the civil partnership but I do not believe that they should be equated with marriage. I don't feel like I'm in any way discriminating against somebody, that's just my belief."

This view was echoed by Fine Gael members opposed to the measure, if they elaborated on it at all. One deputy said:

> "I was a supporter of the civil partnership. I would have been an opponent of gay marriage. It's one of those questions that should be put to the people."

A dissenting Labour TD recognised that he might be coming from an old-fashioned view:

> "Marriage is about men and women and children and I know that's old fashioned but I believe that. If people from the same gender, obviously, wanted to form close liaisons, of course, that should be accepted. But marriage means something (more). I don't see why same-sex couples need marriage."

Labour, with two exceptions, Sinn Féin and the technical group were in favour of same-sex marriage and most did not elaborate on the issue.

Where some deputies were firmly in favour of marriage, they clearly made a distinction between this and adoption, ultimately opposing the latter. A male FG TD clearly came down against the proposal on a personal basis:

"I'll accept (same-sex adoption) but I don't think it's the best practice for a child. There is the natural thing of the mother and father, and I think it could create more problems in the long term."

However, his female party colleague, who would also identify herself as a religious conservative, actually supported the proposal:

"It's very hard to just point to a model of a family. We have single parents, we have married parents who have probably destroyed their kids. Psychological research etc., would show that children (adopted by same-sex couples) are not harmed."

Fianna Fáil members also cited "research" to bolster their argument in opposition to same-sex adoption:

"I (disagree with same-sex adoption) because surveys and statistics and everything has proven that the natural environment for children to be nourished is in a heterosexual marriage."

But FF were not immune from intra-party division on the issue, although another member's support for the proposal was more nuanced:

"It should be what's right for the child. Nobody has the right to adopt a child but nobody should be denied the opportunity to apply purely on the basis of their sexuality."

Having stated his support for same-sex marriage one Labour member felt that:

"Adopting children is, obviously, a question mark. I just couldn't bring my mind to accept that."

A Sinn Féin TD also switched his position with a firm response to the wording of the question:

"I wouldn't agree with adoption from third parties".

Overall, the issue seems to sit comfortably on the GAL/TAN dimension. It is also seems to be the case that women were very unlikely to oppose full same-sex marriage. Although the average TD supports extending marriage and adoption rights to same sex couples, male and rural TDs within all parties seemed more likely to oppose the measures. This is an important finding in terms of descriptive representation as it does seem that women are more liberal on social issues. Thus, the under-representation of women

is systematically affecting the distribution of opinion within Irish political parties.

(ii) European Integration

On the whole, Fine Gael, were very supportive of further European integration. To the question of whether European integration has gone too far or should be pushed further, a FG TD gave a reply that was typical of his party's position:

> "I think we should further European cooperation and we should deepen our relationships with our partners in Europe, in order to ensure that we have a strong, economic zone. Ireland, as a small English-speaking peripheral nation, on a gateway to an entity of 500 million people has a lot to gain, as an open, outward looking people."

However, there was some significant intra-party dissent with one FG TD recognising the multi-dimensionality of the issue. He questioned the notion that economic integration can continue at the same pace across every country, saying:

> "I don't know how much further you can continue with the Euro or integrate the European countries fiscally. The south of Italy is never going to run at the speed of Germany. Neither is Spain or Portugal. I don't think a fiscal union can force them to."

However, he emphasised the socially progressive benefits in terms of "equal pay for women and things like that" and supported extending membership of the union to Turkey. He also happened to reference Eurosceptics in the third person, indicating that he did not identify with them and to infer he is a Eurosceptic would be inaccurate.

Young FG TDs were clearly much less enthusiastic about EU integration:

> "The Euro and low interest rates that we had here for the last decade was, in hindsight, part of the fuel to the fire of the Ireland's current problems, though we've had benefits from being in the Euro as

well. I think we have gone as far as I would like to go, in terms of Europe."

Labour were also, on the whole, supportive of further European integration and this divide between younger and older TDs was evident. One party elder derived his support for European integration from first principles:

> "What has happened in Europe (development of the union) is a replacement for war and that is very hard to get across to people. In the last century, in the last war, I was alive, they killed 60 million people in Europe and that was so unbelievable. They destroyed beautiful cities and everything else. The Second World War was about money and trade, and this (the European Union) is a system to guarantee that (war) never happens again."

Furthermore, a Labour senator clearly indicated his position with the statement:

> "Well, I'd be very much in favour of a federal Europe based along the lines of America".

A young Labour party TD opposed further integration of the EU in its current form on the grounds that it is undemocratic and a tool for pursuing a neo-liberal economic agenda. He was also concerned about the Union's capacity for war against external forces:

> "One of the measures in the Lisbon treaty was a common foreign and security policy. Now I wouldn't like to see Ireland participate in something like that where other countries have a nuclear capacity, which I would be totally opposed to."

Fianna Fáil were generally pro-Europe in a pragmatic sense. One FF TD challenged the publicly perceived implications of the Fiscal Stability treaty, on which the country was due to have a referendum shortly after the interview was conducted, equating more integration with a loss of fiscal sovereignty:

> "No. This is another myth that people have. The only constraint (in the Fiscal Treaty) at the moment is that you must try and balance your budget. Ireland can decide to be a high tax, high spending economy, if we want, once our deficit is right. Or we can decide to

be a low tax, low spending economy, Europe is actually neutral as to whether we're high tax, high spend or low tax, low spend."

A Fianna Fáil senator also emphasised a pragmatic interpretation of further integration measures. In response to the dichotomously posed question of whether European Union integration has gone too far or should be pushed further, the senator responded:

> "I wouldn't agree with either one of those arguments. I would agree it needs to be looked at sensibly on a case-by-case basis. European integration has so many different areas, you've the economic, you've the political and you've things like preparation on justice issues, on environmental issues that a country can't do on its own so I think it's a complicated project."

That is not to say that the Fianna Fáil party was completely homogenous in their view. One senator was unequivocal in his opposition to further integration, stating:

> "It's gone too far. If there is a referendum (on the Fiscal Treaty), I will be voting and campaigning against it."

A Sinn Féin TD directly responded to the question with "I would row back on European integration". This broadly represented his party's position. Some independents were also not slow to declare their opposition to European integration, with one immediately pre-facing her remarks with:

> "I'm a Eurosceptic. We're a small fish in a big pond. We're giving away so much of our identity, our sovereignty and our own finances."

A Marxist view of the integration process came from a Socialist TD who clearly opposed the EU institutions in their current forming favouring instead:

> "(I support) European integration, if you like, on a community level or a cross-national level. People who work in the same factories for the same employers across different national boundaries are being screwed by the same people and there should be a much greater coming together, at that level, most definitely to take them (big

business) on because the interest of all people are largely the same. But we're being divided and exploited for a small number at the top."

This interpretation of European Integration was common among the few members of the C2D occupational group present in the Oireachtas. These individuals are concentrated in Sinn Féin though not entirely. Thus, the under-representation of C2Ds within political parties, particularly those in government may place an over-emphasis on support for European integration than would be the case if parties were occupationally representative of voters.

This exploration of the qualitative data might suggest that survey questions such as those asked by the INES and CCS do not capture the multi-dimensionality of an issue as complex as European integration. However, the structures of the EU are unlikely to be radically overhauled in the near future in a way that would satisfy Eurosceptic TDs. The EU will proceed on its current path or it will not, so statements that imply support "if the EU was not pursuing a neo-liberal agenda" or "if it is based on inter-country class solidarity" do not matter in terms of objective outcomes. The qualitative discussion captured inter and intra party differences as reported by the statistical analysis in Chapter 4. Fine Gael and Labour are relatively pro-Europe, Fianna Fáil are hesitantly pro-Europe, while the remaining parties are opposed to further integration, and in some instances even think some elements of European integration should be rolled back. In demographic terms, younger politicians within parties tend to be less enthusiastic about, or outright opposed to, further EU integration.

(iii) The Environment

This section and the next examine attitudes to issues typically categorised as 'new politics' and are incorporated into the GAL/TAN index; the environment and immigration. I put two CCS questions to TDs and Senators on the issue of the environment. The first was simply "to what extent are you personally concerned about the environment?" This is an easy question and the responses were mostly fairly concerned or very concerned. As

legislators they felt a duty to be somewhat informed about the issue, though some confessed to being not really concerned. The second question was worded as "To what extent do you think claims about environmental threats are exaggerated?" This item was intended to tap radical environmental attitudes. This question captured more variation in environmental attitudes than the first question

A quote from a Labour TD represents the overall fatalistic tone of responses to these questions on environmental protection:

> "I'd be very concerned (about environmental issues). Although on a global level if you soaked Ireland in oil and set it on fire for 100 years, it wouldn't do as much damage as China does in one day. So, I sort of feel that we do go over the top on things."

While not trying to deny the importance of environmental issues, this TD was essentially wondering why Ireland should be a global leader in environmental policy when any steps we take, in isolation, will have no effect the environmental condition of the Earth. On a party basis the second question highlighted a distinct pattern of environmentalism that was correlated with overall left-right positions. While on average FG and FF leaned in agreement with the notion that environmental issues are exaggerated, the variance within FG was much greater. Labour, Sinn Féin and the Independents were much less likely to think environmental threats are exaggerated. Sinn Féin firmly disagreed with the question with one Senator arguing that Ireland can make a difference to the global problem:

> "Regardless of bigger countries' action, there's a moral responsibility on every country to do exactly what they should be doing."

In terms of intra-party variation, some individuals within FG clearly said that environmental issues are greatly exaggerated while others said they are not exaggerated but there is little Ireland can do to change the macro situation. A common theme was that exaggerations are a feature of politics generally as the previous TD's party colleague explained:

> "I don't believe environmental threats are exaggerated. There are always people on the extremes of every argument but do I believe that climate change is happening as an objective reality? I do."

The most reserved responses came from FG Senators:

> "We need to get a balance. I think the problem I have is with our local development where we've gone overboard in terms of restricting urban development on environmental grounds."

A FF TD also mentioned how global threats can be exaggerated although he mentioned also that he was very concerned about the environment:

> "We can only do what we can in our affairs by protecting the environmental heritage and natural amenities, and proper planning. But, I'm just not sure. Do you remember the Millennium Bug we were to have? That didn't happen."

On average, the Labour party did not think environmental threats were exaggerated. One of their Senators justified his position with observations from the weather, though he felt he didn't have enough information to be any more specific:

> "Certainly climate change is happening. We're in the middle of November here and you walk to work in a suit without a coat on."

A Labour TD made the distinction between exaggerations about environmental change at the local and global level:

> "I don't think they're exaggerated on the global level. People exaggerate individual threats, like those (supposedly) around the Dun Laoghaire harbour and those kinds of ones. But damaging the ozone is a major issue."

There were no demographic differences between politicians' interpretations of environmental issues.

(iv) Immigration

Ireland has only a short history of significant immigration and only one instance of significant politicisation of the issue, in the referendum on the

27th amendment to the constitution[7]. Ireland has been a broadly welcoming country for immigrants for two reasons. The majority of the immigration occurred when the economy was growing rapidly. Thus, immigrant labour was not being used as a substitute for domestic labour, a factor usually associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. I put three questions to respondents on this topic. First, I asked what effect they thought immigration has had on Ireland. Next, I asked them to what extent do they think immigrants should be made to "adapt to the customs of Ireland". Agreement with this item is assumed to reflect authoritarian attitudes in the GAL/TAN framework. In order to accurately place their response in substantive terms, I asked to what extent they agreed with banning the Muslim Burqa in public spaces.

The first observation here is that only Sinn Féin displayed a high level of intra-party consistency in a pro-immigrant direction on this item, as previously found by O'Malley (2008, 960). On a personal basis, all of the SF respondents took a liberal stance on this issue, opposing the ideas that immigrants should be made to adapt to Irish customs and banning the Burqa. However, they were mixed in their attitudes on the open question about how immigration has affected Ireland. Two SF respondents said that immigration has had positive effect. But three respondents thought that the immigration experience had been badly managed. One SF TD explains that regardless of the facts, Irish people perceive that they are losing out to immigrants in terms of redistributed resources.

> "The effect (of immigration) has been to increase racism. A lot of people in areas that are very, very bitter have turned on immigrants, blaming them because that 'my son can't get a job' or 'my daughter can't get a house' and it's the wrong people to blame. Most of it is rubbish. But, the point is it has added to that whole mind set because we allowed huge amounts of people to come in and, in my opinion,

[7] This referendum removed the *jus soli* basis for citizenship from the constitution on the anecdotal evidence that migrants were using the provision to claim Irish citizenship for their newborn children after landing in Britain, then travelling to Northern Ireland to give birth.

> we should have the quota system. Now, that wouldn't be the Sinn Féin position, necessarily, I'm making that very clear."

This view was evident from respondents across all parties. However, this did not preclude some from saying that immigration had a very positive effect. The 'badly managed' view was most likely to come from FG politicians. One TD realised the eventual affect on Irish culture by somewhat jokingly responding "We'll have better athletes". But despite this, they still acknowledged that immigration has not been received positively by all and that there is a negative and wrong perception that immigrants take more than they give to Irish society and the economy. Overall, though, politicians thought that the effect of immigration was positive.

The closed items on this topic demonstrated more variation in attitude position and interpretations of the issue. There was a mix of responses within all parties except Sinn Féin. However where some in Fianna Fáil agreed that immigrants should be made to adapt to the customs of Ireland, these same individuals were more likely to disagree with banning the Burqa while FG were more likely to remain consistent on both items.

Irish politicians felt that the Irish reaction to immigration was tempered by the fact that the Irish have a long history of being immigrants themselves and successfully integrating into other societies, and thus culturally, we understand the immigration experience. One Labour TD represented the broad disagreement with forcing immigrants to adapt:

> "I don't think they should be required to adapt to customs to be quite honest with you. I think when we go abroad we brought the Irish pub around the world. They should integrate into society but I think people should preserve their own customs. I don't think they should be asked to drop their customs because they've moved from one country to another."

Those who supported the statement referred mostly to striving for a balance, but without allowing separate legal systems like Sharia law to operate within the state. So in the opinion of Irish politicians, immigrants should be

allowed to preserve their culture up to the point that they conflict with the law.

There was some interesting intra-party disagreement over whether the Burqa should be banned or not. Some members of the socially liberal Labour party were opposed to the Burqa on equality grounds. One TD declared:

> "Yes, I would ban it. I mean, that's not insisted on by Islam, that is a custom rather than a requirement, from my own understanding of it. I, personally, find it offensive. It is a subjugation tool against women".

A Fine Gael TD took a similar view emphasising the difficulty of Catholicism and extreme Islam existing side-by-side:

> "I don't understand the Burqa. It's not in the Koran. It isn't a requirement in the Islamic tradition. So, why would you bring a custom that is largely out dated even in the Muslim community to a country which claims to be Catholic?"

Other people who identified as Catholic indicated that they would not want to see the Burqa banned, because attacking the freedom of any religion could result in an attack on their own religion. Another FG TD recognised the threat posed to freedom by allowing a culture of banning to proliferate:

> "No, and I think we've gone way too far in some instances, for instance, where the hospitals don't allow a Christmas tree. I'd be appalled by that. If the Muslim religion wanted to wear the Burqa, I would totally be respectful of that and I think that view is defendable anywhere".

For the most part though, there was reluctance among TDs to say they would be in favour of banning the Burqa.

These items did not seem to map easily onto the GAL/TAN index. The most nationalist TDs (Sinn Féin) were those most favourable to immigrants. Moreover, those who might be considered traditional in terms of identifying as Catholics recognised the hypocrisy of forcing others to give up their own traditions in the form of the Burqa and were reluctant to go down that route. However, liberals were in favour of banning the Burqa due to their differing

interpretation of its meaning. There were no demographic differences in interpretation or substantive attitudes to immigration items.

Section 7: Conclusion

This chapter conducted a qualitative exploration of intra-party attitudes in the pursuit of two goals. The first was to discover why politicians support or oppose certain policy measures and the second was to ensure that they were interpreting the questions in a consistent fashion. If policies are interpreted in inconsistent ways, any *prima facie* finding of intra-party unity may be diluted. Attitudes to left and right, in abstract and substantive terms, and various indicators of social attitudes on the GAL/TAN dimension were discussed.

In terms of supporting or opposing certain policies, intra-party agreement was highest on the left-right item. However, this was accompanied by a high level of disagreement about what left and right actually mean. Some TDs denied the existence of left and right in the Irish context. Some saw left and right in party political terms with further substantive definition. Others attached positive connotations to whichever term they identified with, but this was more likely to occur for those on the right, who were more likely to identify to see themselves as centrist, rather than right. Finally, a small minority provided politically neutral and academic definitions of the terms. Even the interpretation of the substantive item of whether the government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy displayed a high level of interpretive variation, particularly within Fine Gael.

Social and non-economic issues demonstrated more variation within parties than between them. The chapter examined attitudes to gender quotas, same-sex equality, European Union integration, the environment and immigration. A considerable degree of multi-dimensionality was evident in response to these items, particularly on European integration and integrating immigrants. Moreover these latter items do not particularly map on to their assumed position on the GAL/TAN scale. Nationalism was correlated with left-wing economic tendencies while placing legal requirements on immigrants was supported and rejected with similar bases of reasoning.

The chapter demonstrated some clear support for descriptive representation and the politics of presence. Female TDs tended to hold left-wing affections in their opposition to large income differences and to be socially liberal in terms of supporting same-sex marriage equality and adoption. However, they seemed divided on the feminist issue of gender quotas, although they did demonstrate more variation in their reasoning for the lack of women in politics than male politicians did. Younger TDs often differed in their interpretation of political issues from the management of the economy to European integration. Moreover, the dynamics discovered by this qualitative analysis were taken into account when coding the statements for quantitative evaluation in chapter 4. Politicians from lower socio-economic occupations tended to oppose further European integration on the basis that they saw it as an engine of neo-liberal economics. This chapter thus supported the theory of the politics of presence. The inclusion of people from diverse social background would expand the variance of attitudes at the elite level on a range of topics.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Abstract

This chapter presents the main findings of the thesis and the specific findings of each of the previous chapters. It discusses the multitude of research avenues available from this point forward for studies of the relationship between descriptive and substantive attitude representation in general and in the Irish case in particular. The immediate research agendas lie in a complete analysis of policy priorities, a time-series analysis of intra-party attitudes, a broader examination of parliamentary activity, and a study of the interaction between interest groups and the Dáil as vehicle for the substantive representation of descriptive groups. To conclude, the wider implications of the study for political science are discussed.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Section 1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of this thesis and their implications for the study of the link between descriptive and substantive representation, intra-party politics, and our understanding of the case of Irish political parties in particular. The major advantage of this study is that it has treated social background and party affiliation as hierarchical explanations of attitude variation. Party affiliation is group-level explanation which mediates the effect of social background at the intra-party level. A robust theoretical framework was drawn from political science and psychology to guide the study.

The thesis emphasised the importance of accepting the reality of party affiliation as the major grouping influence on attitudes within a representative assembly. It proposed that the most effective way to study the origins and effects of political attitudes is to apply social background as an explanation of intra-party attitudes, rather than pitting party and social background against each other as competing explanations for the attitude variation within an assembly.

The analysis demonstrated that party has a major grouping influence on attitudes within Irish political parties, but at the same time showed that there remains more variation within parties than between them. I showed that there was considerable intra-party attitude divisions attributable to gender and age in particular. I then examined the extent of attitudinal congruence between the voters and political elite in Ireland from a variety of perspectives. Ultimately, better representation within parties of the age distribution in society would bring the parties closer to the position of voters, while the better representation of gender class would move the parties away from voters' positions. The theory of the *politics of presence* only demands that the descriptive representation of social groups increase the attitudinal variance within a political system. Thus, by this standard, the theory is supported. Moreover, what could be described as a cautious bridging of the attitude-behaviour link showed that descriptive groups,

particularly women, are more likely to speak in parliament on the issues that are *a priori* assumed to be important to that group. There was only mild evidence of an intra-party demographic effect on attitudes as measured by word frequencies in text, but this line of inquiry is still young.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the findings of each chapter. Section 3 takes a broader look at theoretical frameworks of descriptive representation and attitude theory to motivate contiguous future research.

Section 2: Chapter Contributions

Chapter 1 outlined the broad importance of the thesis. It began by establishing the importance of understanding attitude variation within political parties. The case of Irish political parties was proposed due to the common finding that there is little ideological distinction between the parties, thus divisions are more likely to exist within parties. Moreover, certain cues were taken from recent theoretical developments in the causes and consequences of intra-party phenomena. The theoretical framework incorporated not only political representation literature, but also a flavour of psychology, in order to capture the causal mechanism underlying the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Subsequently, it outlined the data and chapter structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 provided a synopsis of the literature on intra-party attitude structures. This discussion took the arguments of pluralist democrats as its departure point, namely, that all of the significant political opinions in society should be represented in the legislature. It is persistently assumed that the political dominance of particular social groups contributes to a democratic deficit in this regard. This led to a discussion of the necessities of descriptively representative parties, as it is through parties that citizens interact with the state. Pluralist theorists argue that where elite members of political parties do not proportionately share the socialisation of experiences of considerable sections of society, particularly in terms of gender, age and social class, they will not sufficiently reflect the attitudes of the population.

Thus, the parliament, as deliberative assembly, will consider political issues from a standpoint that does not appreciate all of the opinions within society.

One of the shortcomings of previous research is that 'party affiliation' is assumed to be an alternative to socialisation as a manufacturer of political attitudes, whereas it is more appropriate to treat it as a mediating factor. Further theorists argued that this descriptive representation can be of benefit to social groups, not only in the representation of salient preferences, but also to minimise the attitudinal distance on new issues as they arise.

The chapter then considered minimalist theories of representation based on the formal relationship between citizens and political parties. The purpose of this was primarily to demonstrate how these theories would not advance our understanding of variation in the dependent variable. If one assumed intra-party variation was associated with variation in geographical constituency opinion, this would beg the question whether such a coherent constituency opinion exists in a proportional representation electoral system. Individual MPs are here afforded the opportunity to represent the variance in their constituents' opinion, so measuring distance from the median voter is moot. Neither are representatives pure trustees of the public good. It was established that the responsible party model is most likely to apply in the Irish case, but a single party position cannot 'explain' variation in attitudes within a party. The hierarchical structure of the wider party was then considered to put elite attitudes in context through the theoretical framework of May's Law (1973, 135). Ultimately, the theoretical framework outlined here hypothesised that elite intra-party attitudes were either random or varied in accordance with the descriptive characteristics of party representatives.

Chapter 3 described the data and methodological approach of the thesis. The considerations for data analysis were given a solid basis in attitude theory and previous approaches to political attitudes. However, it also attempted to utilise and contribute to advancements in political science methodology. The quality of the data was enhanced by the commissioning of a

professional survey ideally suited to the research agenda of this project. Based on the causal arch of attitude theory, the data tapped theoretical conceptions of the dependent variable. First, it probed politicians' affective understandings of political concepts and issues through qualitative interviews. Second, it parsed their cognitive understanding and support for manifest measures of political ideologies through a quantitative evaluation of surveys and interview responses. Finally it tapped their attitudes immediately prior to consequential behaviour by examining their decision to participate in parliamentary debates and the word frequencies of their speeches as a proxy for attitude strength.

The qualitative data was based on interviews with the members of the Irish parliamentary parties and groups. The primary quantitative data was drawn from the Comparative Candidate Study 2011 (Ireland) and coded interview responses. Moreover, the Irish National Election study was used as a basis for making comparisons with voters and the PartiRep survey put the Irish data in an international context. Quasi-behavioural data was drawn from a selection of parliamentary speeches which were assumed to tap latent ideological dimensions of interest.

The extent to which the Dáil is not a descriptive microcosm of society was also outlined here, with a breakdown of these characteristics across voters and losing candidates, and across the data sources on TDs, senators and elites comparatively. The illustration of the latter showed that although the Irish political elite are not socially representative of voters, this is consistent with international norms.

The chapter then explained how these data were processed, if necessary, to construct new dependent variables such as measures of citizen elite congruence and relative word frequency scores for individual parliamentary speeches. It also justified and explained the statistical approach applied to the quantitative dependent variables through the use of multilevel modelling. This had particular implications for how 'intra-party' inferences could be drawn from the results.

The analysis began in Chapter 4 with the empirical application of the theoretical framework of the relationship between social background and intra-party attitudes. The variation observed in political attitudes was hypothesised to be related to the variation in social characteristics among members of the elite. The chapter discussed how, despite the persistence of the question of whether a link between descriptive and substantive representation exists, that the evidence is mixed and seems to vary across contexts. However, a robust review of the literature drew out the most consistent, if only weak, findings. The 'elite' here included defeated candidates, TDs and Senators. The tests divided into ideological headings consistent with previous research, namely economic, feminist and GAL/TAN attitudes. In addition to making inferences from survey questions, variables based on these underlying ideologies were constructed to ensure the patterns observed were consistent with the individual survey questions.

The chapter demonstrated initially, by way of intra-class correlation tests, that there is indeed more variation within the Irish parties than between them. Intra-party variance tended to be lowest on economic left-right issues and highest on non-economic items like feminist environmental attitudes, and rarely was intra-party variance less than fifty percent. Most of the items in the survey data demonstrated significant levels of inter-party variance, but this is much less evident in the interview data. The position of the parties tended to conform to left-right divisions, with, in most senses of the terms, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael being to the right and the others parties being centrist, left of centre or extremely left.

On an individual basis, it was found that female politicians within parties are more feminist and socially liberal than men. Females also tended to hold more affective notions of economic egalitarianism, but this does not translate into cognitive support for substantive economic policies. They strongly favour gay marriage and adoption, and are more 'feminist' on the feminism index than men. Age is also an important variable in terms of

intra-party variance here. Although younger politicians tended to be more right-wing economically, they also tended to be more socially liberal. It is evident from the results that the descriptive under-representation of these women and young people contributes to a socially conservative and anti-feminist bias throughout the Dáil. Correcting the imbalances of gender and age representation may cancel out any effect on the distribution of left-right economic attitudes within parties. However, the gender effect may be marginally stronger and thus parties may at least hold more affective left-wing notions if they were descriptively representative of women. The class effects were not extensive, although they were evident on particularly important items such as taxation, with lower class politicians favouring higher taxes, and demonstrating greater social liberalism. This is addressed further in the section 3 below. However, all of these independent effects explained very little of the overall variance and post-estimation predictions showed that socially representative party positions would shift very little from their current position.

From a comparative standpoint, it was shown that Ireland is significantly at the low end of inter-party competition, with the average amount of inter-party variance in other countries being about 30%, while Ireland only achieved 15%. The findings for the link between social background and attitudes across European countries and parties, particularly gender and age, were consistent with previous international research.

Chapter 5 took a wider look at intra-party attitudes and representation by considering the relationship between voter and elite attitudes. Congruence was tested on three bases. First, all things being equal, that the distribution of attitudes among elites corresponded to the distribution of opinion among citizens. These distributions were found to significantly divergent on average, though elected TDs tended to be closer to citizens than losing candidates. Women, young people, and farmers broadly achieved a high level of congruence across the electoral divide. The chapter then tested the level of intra-party consistency between, in May's (1973, 185) words, 'echelons of co-partisans'. These echelons were categorised as the elected

TDs, losing candidates, party identifiers and voters. The middle two categories were hypothesised to be the most attitudinally extreme but there was no evidence of this. Then TDs and candidates' relationship with the general electorate and party was tested. On average, larger parties tended to be closer to the general electorate although there was little difference between the concept of the general electorate and party voters for these parties. Niche parties were slightly closer to their own supporters. In demographic terms, younger politicians within parties tend to be closer to voters than older politicians, though those from lower socio-economic backgrounds tended to be, curiously, further away.

In Chapter 6 the analysis moved into the public realm. Inferences about intra-party attitude structure were based on observable public actions of politicians that were not initiated by this studied. On the large assumption that politicians may participate in any parliamentary debate that they wish, the chapter considered the decision to participate and the frequency of words in their speeches as measure of policy priority and attitude strength respectively. Four debates were included here for their theoretical suitability and levels of participation. The first part of the analysis placed the frequency of words in text on the psychological continuum between social background, attitudes and behaviour. The lower level of intra-party variation in *Wordscores* compared to survey responses supported the hypothesis that this measure was somewhere between surveys and roll call voting, where party unity is completely cohesive, on the attitude-behaviour spectrum.

In terms of socio-demographic effects, it was found that female politicians were much more likely than men to speak on feminist issues such as abortion and gender quotas. However, there was little structural in variation in ideological positions as measured by word frequencies. Older politicians tended to be more 'right-wing', which conflicts with the finding of the previous chapter, while the proportionately represented lower professionals were more left-wing.

The purpose of Chapter 7 was to obtain an appreciation of the qualitative intra-party interpretations of political issues. Particular attention was given to how politicians interpret left and right, and to important of manifestations of these abstract concepts such the extent of government intervention in the economy. The chapter found that left and right were interpreted in four clearly differentiated ways that had implications for the levels of partisanship and pragmatism among politicians. There was an aversion to politicians self-identifying as 'right-wing' but no hesitation about pejoratively defining those in opposition. None of these differentiations in the interpretation of left and right could have been said to be related to descriptive representation. However, it also explored attitudes in terms of substantive economic policy, egalitarian affections, social policies, and second dimension issues, which held more promise in this regard. There was a considerable degree of egalitarian left and feminist attitudes among women within parties. Moreover, divisions on further European integration appeared to break down along age and class lines.

The evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 suggests that when party affiliation is taken as a given, we can better understand the distribution of attitudes within a representative assembly by examining intra-party dynamics. These chapters found that attitudes vary to some extent according to the social characteristics of the individual members. Thus, intra-party variation is not completely random. The most important variables in this regard are gender and age. Both women and younger politicians tend to be more socially liberal than their older, male colleagues. Moreover, women tend to be more economically egalitarian while younger politicians are simply slightly more right-wing. The implication is that the election of more women and young people would increase the intra-party attitudinal variance, though the average party positions would not be radically altered.

The politics of presence has often been an elusive theory to prove despite the glaring demographic imbalances between citizens and elites. Politics is almost structured to the extent that it does not matter which demographics of citizens are better represented among the political elite. The theory does

not claim that the election of more individuals from under-represented backgrounds would lead to the distinctly differentiated policy advocacy, but increased perspectives being added to the deliberative mix to take account of sub-group differences. By this lower standard the theory has borne out in this analysis, but to some extent at the higher standard also.

Section 3: General Discussion

This section takes a broad view of the findings of thesis in terms of the major frameworks of attitudes and representation. The project established itself as part of a natural progression of political science research, which in the first instance is concerned with descriptive representation and is ultimately concerned with the government policy outputs. This thesis has found some evidence of social background effects on political attitudes when party is accounted for appropriately, and even when strategic behaviour and historical culture, such as anti-feminism, might incentivise politicians not to be overly guided by their life experiences to overt displays of social group affections.

Taking the findings of the thesis as a whole, it appears to matter for substantive reasons whether more women, young people and, to a lesser extent, lower socio-economic classes are descriptively represented in Irish political parties and the Dáil. On the latter group, the inferences here must be taken with a considerable degree of caution because so few politicians descriptively represent them. Those that are 'present', are not evenly distributed throughout the parties, but primarily elected as Sinn Féin TDs, so the party and the demographic, even with appropriate statistical treatment, may not be wholly independent. There is considerable social class homogeneity among members of the Dáil so it would unwise to state with declarative authority that class does not matter.

The immediate research agenda emanating from this study is a time series analysis of Irish elite attitudes with a similar theoretical framework. Although only one comprehensive and comparable survey of these elite exists, the contextual differences between 2007 and 2011 could not be

starker. The Irish economy suffered its most sudden and steepest decline from 2008 onwards. This would have been certain to challenge many individuals' political philosophy. The extent of resilience and consistency in the attitudinal patterns over time is the next logical course of study in Irish political science. It may be the case also that inter-party ideological competition has, on average, increased when we consider strong support for Labour, Sinn Féin and left-wing independents in the 2011 general election. The alternative view would be that these developments are simply economic voting at its most fierce and the historical patterns of party voting will return at the next election, which is due to occur in 2016. Most pertinently, as the maiden speech of Sandra McLellan TD quoted in Chapter 1 and supported by the debate participation analysis in Chapter 6 showed, 2011 may have represented a turning point for the substantive representation of descriptive groups by descriptive groups. If this turns out to be a permanent development and, taken in conjunction with the promise of 30% female candidates by all parties at the next election, intra-party attitude variation will likely increase. This will provide rewarding research opportunities for anyone so inclined.

A major theme of this study was the substantive representation of significant group opinions. The assumption was that the significant interest of social groups may be excluded from parliamentary deliberations if the groups are not descriptively represented in the legislature by their own members. This ignores the influence of a major cog in the democratic process, that of interest group activity. It may be more effective for under-represented groups to lobby politicians to have their needs addressed than to suffer the indeterminate process of electing individuals through either the party machinery or through the wilderness of independent candidacy. Thus, another immediate research agenda lies in the interaction of cause-centred lobby groups and the political system to achieve substantive outcomes for descriptive groups. Indeed, many major political achievements for women, up to and including the recent gender quota legislation, have been the product of interest group activity more so than descriptive representation in parties and parliament.

For those committed to the study of the formal electoral linkages and descriptive representation there is much to be studied. The psychological framework alluded to in this study, in terms of investigating the extent of social background effects in politics, demand further investigation towards the behavioural end of the spectrum. A research project could seek to understand the link between descriptive representation and the variation in policy priorities. Much residual data remains from this project that could have been focused on addressing this phenomenon. Moreover this thesis introduced the measuring of priorities by the decision to speak in parliamentary debates in the Irish context and a more holistic effort is required beyond the preliminary analysis offered here.

Finally, the quantitative text analysis of parliamentary speeches in contemporary and historical parliamentary contexts is nothing short of exciting. The plethora of speech data that is added to on a daily basis, and its ease of access, means this line of inquiry requires further attention. One element that was omitted from this analysis was committee speeches. Where this analysis used identifiable ideological speeches and aggregate party texts as the basis for scoring the remainder of the party, perhaps the speeches of party representatives on legislative committees are the more appropriate basis from which to scale the TDs' positions.

Focusing on intra-party competition is as important in contemporary political science as inter-party competition. The implications of this case study for the international community of political scientists can be assessed using the reference points outlined chapter 3. Here, it was outlined that in previous international studies, a strong effect of social background represented about a 2 point difference on a ten-point scale and the social background component of the model explained 20% or less of the variance in attitudes. Tables 4.10 - 4.14 are the key analyses in this study and assessing these in the wider context will bring into focus the implications of the study for the benefit of the international political science community.

While interesting dynamics between the interaction of social background and party affiliation were revealed throughout this study, it is puzzling that stronger social background effects were not observed. The Irish case maximises the opportunity to detect these effects, as inter-party competition is almost non-ideological. Using our reference points, determined in chapter 3, the analysis in chapter 4 rarely revealed bigger effects of social background than a 2 point difference on a ten-point attitude scale. Moreover, the explained variance attributable to social background rarely breached 20%.

On its face then, this study has not struck hidden treasure. But perhaps we are being too harsh on the results. Many of these models were multilevel, meaning the coefficients report the relative effects of social background within parties. Thus, comparing the results of studies conducted employing Ordinary Least Square models with one conducted using multilevel techniques is not entirely appropriate. Moreover, some effects of social background were strikingly large, such as the differences between men and women (β_{female} = -3.22), and between the AB and C2D social classes (β_{C2D} = -6.28) on attitudes to income differences in society. This item also demonstrated a high level of explained variance purely attributable to social background of 31%. Thus, the case study and the statistical tests maximised the opportunity to test the politics of presence theory. In this instance at least, the research design has been fruitful where others may not have been.

Overall, it is surprising that the effects detected were not consistently large. But Galligan (2000, 56) noted how some female TDs were previously hostile to the idea of being portrayed as advocates for their descriptive group. The results presented in this thesis suggest that this may be changing as these minority groups gain a consistent, although not rapidly increasing, place and confidence within Irish political parties. With the troubles of Ireland's history fading, the idiosyncrasies of her political culture may be normalising to allow the full range of possibilities under her inclusive institutional design reach their full potential. For political science generally, the Irish case is merely beginning to get interesting.

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APPENDIX A: ATTITUDE QUESTIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Comparative Candidate Survey questions referred to in this thesis

Political Reform Items

Please circle one response per line	Strongly disagree	Disagree	e slightly	nor disagree	Slightly agree	Agree	Strongly agree	VALID	MISSING
The Seanad should be abolished	23.65%	19.5%	12.45%	9.96%	7.05%	11.20%	16.18%	241	6
It should be possible for a certain number of citizens to initiate a referendum on any issue they want.	10.83%	10.83%	10%	10.83%	13.75%	24.58%	19.17%	240	7
Cabinet ministers should step down as TDs to concentrate on running their ministries and be replaced by someone else from the same party	15.97%	17.23%	15.55%	13.03%	9.66%	18.49%	10.08%	238	9
Some experts who are not TDs should be brought into the cabinet	21.76%	9.21%	10.88%	9.62%	8.37%	25.10%	15.06%	239	8
The number of TDs should be significantly reduced	11.57%	12.40%	15.29%	11.98%	11.98%	20.66%	16.12%	242	5
Local government should be given power to raise and to manage their own finances	6.20%	1.24%	3.31%	4.96%	6.61%	32.64%	45.04%	242	5
Our PR-STV (Single Transferable Vote) electoral system should be replaced	33.61%	13.69%	13.28%	12.45%	6.22%	10.78	9.96%	241	6
Parties should be made to nominate more women as candidates	15.9%	8.79%	7.11%	21.76%	7.11%	18.83%	20.50%	239	8

Women in politics items							
	strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree	Valid	Missing
Not enough women come forward to be considered as candidates	**36.02%**	**42.37%**	**13.56%**	**6.78%**	**1.27%**	236	11
Most Voters prefer Male candidates	**1.68%**	**26%**	**25.21%**	**39.92%**	**22.27%**	238	9
Women are not given fair opportunities by parties	**9.32%**	**23.73%**	**23.31%**	**32.20%**	**11.02%**	236	11
Women put their families above a career in the Dail	**18.14%**	**45.99%**	**26.16%**	**8.02%**	**1.69%**	236	11
Confrontational nature of politics does not suit women	**7.92%**	**31.25%**	**27.08%**	**25.42%**	**8.33%**	240	7
Women don't have the confidence to stand	**4.18%**	**14.64%**	**17.99%**	**34.73%**	**28.45%**	**239**	**8**
Women are less interested in politics	**5.02%**	**17.15%**	**24.27%**	**28.87%**	**24.69%**	**239**	**8**
Its just as easy for a woman to be elected to public office as a man	**15.25%**	**32.63%**	**10.59%**	**29.66%**	**11.86%**	**236**	**11**
Most men are better suited emotionally for political life than are most women	**4.60%**	**8.37%**	**19.67%**	**29.71%**	**37.66%**	**239**	**8**

In politics, people sometimes talk about the 'left' and the 'right'. Where would you place your own views on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the most left and 10 means the most right? *(Tick just one box.)*

	Mean	SD	Valid	Missing
Self	**4.1**	**2.11**	200	47

Below are a number of opposing statements are listed. People who agree fully with the statement on the left would give a score of '0'. People who agree fully with the statement on the right would give a score of '10'. Other people would place themselves somewhere in between these two views. Where would you place yourself on these scales?

	Mean	SD	Valid	Missing
Business and industry should be (completely regulated/free from regulation) by the state	**4.07**	**2.62**	228	19
Business and industry should be in complete (state/private) ownership	**6.17**	**2.88**	228	19
European Integration has (gone too far/should be pushed further)	**4.55**	**2.73**	228	19
God (does/does not) exist	**3.56**	**3.56**	227	20
We should (protect the environment/promote economic growth) even if this damages (economic growth/the environment)	**3.9**	**2.33**	228	19
(Raise/cut) taxes and spend (less/more) on social services	**6.46**	**2.17**	226	21

↓	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Disagree slightly	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Valid	Missing
I would be willing to accept a cut in my standard of living in order to protect the environment	**6.72%**	**7.14%**	**5.88%**	**12.61%**	**18.91%**	**34.87%**	**13.45%**	240	7
Ordinary working people should get their fair share of the nation's wealth	**1.69%**	**1.69%**	**4.22**	**4.64%**	**12.24%**	**36.29%**	**39.24%**	237	20
In general things would improve if there were more women in politics	**4.18%**	**6.28%**	**5.86%**	**30.54%**	**14.23%**	**25.94**	**12.97%**	239	8
There is nothing wrong with some people being a lot richer than others	**13.39 %**	**17.57%**	**9.62%**	**15.06%**	**14.64%**	**23.43%**	**5.86%**	239	8

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree slightly	Neither agree nor disagree	Slightly agree	Strongly agree	Valid	Missing
The people need a NAMA for their own mortgage and property debts, just as much as the banks do	**10.46%**	**16.74%**	**39.42%**	**36.40%**	**19.67%**	239	8

Interview Questions referred to in the thesis

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
the government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy.	27%	46%	0%	1%	1%	16%	9%
Aside from the fact that Ireland has made commitments to international institutions to privatise some state assets, to what extent do you think these privatisations will be in the public interest?	15%	12%	26%	2%	6%	34%	4%
The government should sell its 25% stake in Aer Lingus	3%	24%	3%	3%	9%	53%	6%
Larger income differences are necessary to incentivise individual effort	15%	24%	2%	0%	9%	49%	2%
Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Ireland ?	2%	41%	5%	7%	14%	29%	3%
The Muslim Burqa should banned in public spaces?	11%	42%	11%	9%	11%	14%	3%
Same-sex couples should be allowed the same marriage rights as heterosexual couples, above and beyond the provisions of the civil partnership bill 2010?	18%	52%	10%	0%	5%	12%	3%
Same-sex couples be allowed the same rights to adopt children as heterosexual couples?	10%	42%	11%	8%	9%	18%	2%
Things would improve if their were more women in politics	34%	39%	4%	6%	3%	13%	0%
Parties should be made to nominate more women as candidates	7%	26%	16%	5%	9%	21%	16%
Environmental threats are exaggerated	30%	32%	6%	2%	25%	2%	3%

	not at all concerned	not very concerned	somewhat concerned	very concerned
To what extent are you personally concerned about environmental threats	9%	32%	4%	55%

	Gone way too far	Gone too far	Gone Far Enough	Should be pushed further	Should be pushed a lot further
Some say European Integration has gone too far while others say it should be pushed further. What is your own view	7%	11%	26%	32%	23%

Questions put for qualitative purposes only and responses not quantified

Would you agree or disagree that Europe should have a veto over member states national budgets?

How do you think immigration has affected Ireland?

In your opinion, why have there been relatively few women in Irish politics?

PartiRep questions referred to in the thesis

	Mean	SD
In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Using the following scale, where 0 means left and 10 means right where would you place your own views?	4.6	2.4
Some say European integration should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. Where would you place your own views? (0 is gone too far, 10 is pushed further)	6.1	2.6

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Larger income differences are needed as incentives for individual effort.	26%	27%	18%	25%	4%
Government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy.	24%	29%	13%	27%	6%
Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of our country.	7%	19%	23%	38%	14%
Affirmative action is a legitimate measure to address the under-representation of women in politics.	14%	41%	18%	19%	9%

APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS – RESULTS

Tables in this appendix:

Table B.1 Intra-class correlation and mean values with confidence intervals across attitude items with non-party respondents excluded from CCS data

	mean	*lower*	*upper*
Left-right self-placement	-1.13	-1.48	-0.77
Privatisation of industry	1.03	0.58	1.48
Regulation of Industry	-1.15	-1.55	-0.75
British should withdraw from Northern Ireland	-0.61	-1.09	-0.13
European Union Integration	-0.06	-0.46	0.34
Nothing wrong with some people being rich	-0.22	-0.74	0.30
Prioritise the environment over economic growth	-1.12	-1.48	-0.75
Limits on immigration	0.13	-0.35	0.61
People should get a 'fair share' of nation's wealth	-3.13	-3.49	-2.78
Accept cut in living standards to protect the environment	-1.79	-2.23	-1.36
Feminist index	0.20	-0.08	0.48
Things would improve with more women in politics	-1.46	-1.89	-1.03
Cut/raise taxes and spending	-1.69	-2.01	-1.37
Working mothers have as good a relationship with their children as stay-at-home mothers.	-1.94	-2.41	-1.48
Gender Quotas	-1.14	-1.67	-0.60

Table B.2 - Estimation results of social background effects on attitudes to economic items from the CCS data with non-party respondents removed.

	Left - Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Fair Share*	*Lot Richer*
Constant	-0.67	0.66	1.62	-0.35	-1.02	-0.61
	(1.36)	(1.39)	(1.51)	(1.26)	(0.76)	(1.23)
TD	-0.30	-0.12	0.37	0.58	0.31	-0.59
	(0.32)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.35)
Female	0.04	0.40	-1.12*	-0.85*	0.04	-0.25
	(0.34)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.38)	(0.24)	(0.36)
Age	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04**	-0.03***	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University Education	-0.32	-1.43***	0.07	0.08	-0.29	-0.06
	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Class: C1	0.24	-0.22	-0.11	-0.06	0.27	0.07
	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.36)
Class: C2D	-0.30	-0.30	0.31	-1.07*	0.58	-0.02
	(0.50)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.53)	(0.36)	(0.53)
Class: Farmer	0.71	-0.57	0.98	0.22	0.72	-0.75
	(0.54)	(0.72)	(0.75)	(0.61)	(0.40)	(0.59)
Rural	-0.32	-0.83	0.43	0.12	-0.27	0.47
	(0.35)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Party Level Variance	3.78	4.21	6.29	0.26	0.73	1.51
	(1.94)	(2.05)	(2.51)	(0.51)	(0.86)	(1.23)
Individual Level Variance	2.28	4.46	4.72	3.21	1.43	3.14
	(1.51)	(2.11)	(2.17)	(1.79)	(1.20)	(1.77)
R^2m	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.10	0.04	0
R^2c	0.62	0.43	0.59	0.20	0.28	0.24
Log-likelihood	-257.11	-340.30	-345.67	-307.09	-264.94	-323.06
N	135	154	154	152	159	159

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table B.3 - Estimation results of the social background effects on attitudes to non-economic items from the CCS data with non-party respondents removed.

	Environment/ Economy	Environment/ Living Standards	Restrict Immigration	United Ireland	EU Integration	Things Improve	Gender Quotas	Working Women
Constant	-1.53	2.64***	-4.22***	2.15*	-0.87	3.82***	2.81**	1.72*
	(1.05)	(0.74)	(0.83)	(0.86)	(1.16)	(0.69)	(0.90)	(0.74)
TD	-0.12	-0.12	0.02	0.16	0.24	-0.11	-0.14	-0.38
	(0.40)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.28)
Female	-0.08	-0.24	0.00	-0.02	0.04	-1.37***	-0.87*	-1.19***
	(0.42)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.34)
Age	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.55	-0.49	-0.29	0.55	0.76	-0.75**	-0.35	-0.02
	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.31)
Class: C1	0.08	0.05	-0.31	0.36	-0.29	0.51	-0.17	0.20
	(0.41)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.33)
Class: C2D	-0.06	-0.01	-0.58	0.50	-0.60	0.29	0.44	-0.02
	(0.62)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.69)	(0.43)	(0.56)	(0.45)
Class: Farmer	0.22	0.49	0.14	0.19	-0.35	0.00	0.08	0.14
	(0.69)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.53)	(0.76)	(0.48)	(0.65)	(0.56)
Rural	0.22	-0.21	-0.00	-0.18	0.26	-0.22	0.21	0.51
	(0.40)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.31)
Party-level variance	1.71	0.34	1.13	1.56	2.09	0.37	0.35	0.00
	(1.31)	(0.58)	(1.06)	(1.25)	(1.45)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.00)
Individual-level variance	4.06	2.51	2.53	2.36	4.93	2.11	3.92	2.84
	(2.02)	(1.58)	(1.59)	(1.54)	(2.22)	(1.45)	(1.98)	(1.69)
Log-likelihood	-329.04	-303.66	-300.73	-296.70	-340.76	-292.79	-338.57	-303.88
N	153	159	156	156	152	160	160	156

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.

Table B.4 - Estimation results of the social background effects on latent attitudes from the CCS data with non-party respondents removed.

	Economic index	GAL/TAN index	Feminist Index
Constant	0.78	-0.34	1.20
	(0.77)	(0.44)	(0.73)
TD	-0.07	0.05	0.09
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.29)
Female	-0.28	0.04	-1.73***
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.31)
Age	-0.03***	0.00	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.34	0.22	-0.59*
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.29)
Class: C1	0.08	0.04	0.31
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.30)
Class: C2D	0.06	0.01	0.35
	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.44)
Class: Farmer	0.21	-0.02	0.40
	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.51)
Rural	-0.09	0.07	0.16
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.29)
Party-level variance	2.52	0.46	0.40
	(1.59)	(0.68)	(0.63)
Individual-level variance	0.93	0.60	2.43
	(0.97)	(0.78)	(1.56)
Log-likelihood	-243.18	-206.00	-311.12
N	164	164	164

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.

Table B.5 - Estimation results of the party intercepts in empty multilevel models on the left-right self-placement scale from pooled CCS and interview data.

	Left-Right
Constant	-1.57*
	(0.68)
Fianna Fáil	-0.19*
	(0.23)
Fine Gael	0.47*
	(0.22)
Labour	-2.10
	(0.27)
Sinn Féin	-2.99*
	(0.39)
ULA	-4.45*
	(0.54)
Greens	-1.26
	(0.35)
Independents	-0.46*
	(0.19)
Party-Level Variance	3.11
	(1.76)
Individual-Level Variance	2.61
	(1.62)
Log-likelihood	-486.31
N	250

Table B.6 - Estimation results of social background effects on the left-right self-placement scale from pooled CCS and interview data		
Constant	-1.12	-0.90
	(0.75)	(0.89)
Senator	-0.27	-0.22
	(0.40)	(0.38)
TD	-0.42	-0.15
	(0.28)	(0.28)
Female	-0.00	0.15
	(0.29)	(0.29)
Age	-0.01	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	0.09	-0.20
	(0.24)	(0.25)
Class: C1	-0.26	0.27
	(0.24)	(0.26)
Class: C2D	-0.65	-0.54
	(0.37)	(0.44)
Class: Farmer	0.49	0.43
	(0.41)	(0.41)
Rural	0.05	-0.09
	(0.24)	(0.26)
Party Level Variance	2.71***	3.53***
	(1.65)	(1.88)
Individual Level Variance	2.63	2.06
	(1.62)	(1.44)
R^2m	0.02	0.02
R^2c	0.52	0.64
Log-likelihood	-488.26	-333.93
N	292	206

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.*

Table B.7 - Estimation results of university education effect on attitudes to restricting immigration from CCS and interview data	
	Restrict Immigration
Constant	0.04
	(0.44)
University Education	-0.55*
	(0.24)
Party Level Variance	1.09***
	(1.04)
Individual Level Variance	3.05
	(1.75)
R^2m	0.02
R^2c	0.28
Log-likelihood	-478.39
N	238

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = p < 0.001, ** = p <0.01, * = p <0.05*

Table B.8 Estimation results of multilevel elite and social background effects among female voters and TDs on the Left-Right scale.	
(Intercept)	-0.02
	(0.42)
TD	-3.30***
	(0.49)
Age	0.01***
	(0.00)
Education	-0.09
	(0.15)
Class: C1	-0.00
	(0.20)
Class: C2D	-0.25
	(0.20)
Class: Farmer	-0.14
	(0.35)
Rural	0.32*
	(0.14)
Party-Level Variance	0.53***
Individual-Level Variance	2.93
Log-likelihood	-1446.01
N	732

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = p < 0.001, ** = p <0.01, * = p <0.05*

Table B.9 - Beta cofficients from models of attitudinal congruence between voters and TDs of similar social background sub-categories.

	Left-Right	Regula-tion	Privati-sation	Taxation	Mortgage Bailout	EU Integration	Immi-gration	Environ-ment	Gender Quota	Reduce TDs
Gender: Female	-3.30***	-1.30*	-1.76*	-1.33*	-0.32	-0.02	-1.62*	-0.96	-0.79	2.65***
Gender: Male	-2.31***	-1.63***	0.03	-0.86**	0.16	0.71	-1.46***	-0.77*	-0.01	3.83***
Age: Under 40	-1.55*	-0.86	1.30	0.51	1.38	1.45	-0.79	-0.71	-0.75	4.02***
Age: Over 40	-2.48***	-1.52***	-0.24	-0.91**	0.06	0.61	-1.47***	-0.77*	-0.24	3.42***
Education: No Third Level	-3.28***	-1.74**	-0.63	-1.12*	0.07	0.26	-2.37***	-0.96	-0.01	3.61***
Education: Third Level	-2.24***	-1.44*	-0.54	-1.35**	-0.67	0.69	-0.95	-0.61	-1.02	3.11***
Area Type: Rural	-2.70***	-1.77***	-0.08	-0.22	-0.43	0.65	-1.62***	-1.01*	-0.21	3.54***
Area Type: Urban	-2.26***	-1.22	-0.60	-2.33***	-0.86	-0.74	-0.99	-0.61	-0.28	3.17***
Class: AB	-2.49***	-1.41**	0.11	-0.59	0.49	-1.41**	-0.80	-0.39	-1.18*	3.66***
Class: C1	-2.69***	-1.61*	-1.13	-1.04	-0.86	-0.23	-2.48***	-1.37*	-0.30	3.00***
Class: C2D	-3.49***	-3.97***	-1.27	-3.20***	-0.39	-1.92	-2.70*	-2.07*	2.19	2.56*
Class: Farmer	-1.48	-0.65	0.12	-0.05	0.80	-0.46	-0.42	-0.71	2.33	4.49***

Table B.10 - Estimation results of party intercepts in empty multilevel models on absolute congruence of economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Mortgage Bailout*
Constant	2.73***	3.11***	3.40***	2.59***	3.15***
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.48)	(0.18)	(0.13)
Fianna Fáil	2.38*	3.00	2.80*	2.45	3.10
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Fine Gael	2.22*	3.08	3.23	2.12*	3.30
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Labour	3.02	3.18	2.82*	2.81	3.15
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Sinn Féin	3.05	3.06	2.92	3.14*	2.97
	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.20)
ULA	4.04*	4.31*	6.17*	2.86	3.04
	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.22)
Greens	2.16*	2.16*	2.86*	2.12*	3.00
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Independents	2.24*	3.01	2.99*	2.61	3.52*
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Party-Level Variance	0.52*	0.43*	1.56**	0.18	0.07
	(0.72)	(0.66)	(1.25)	(0.43)	(0.26)
Individual-Level Variance	1.01	0.92	1.00	1.03	1.48
	(1.00)	(0.96)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(1.22)
Log-likelihood	-296.36	-327.27	-339.92	-334.85	-391.29
N	202	231	231	229	240

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by
**** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table B.11 - Estimation results of party intercepts in empty multilevel models on absolute congruence of non-economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters

	EU Integration	*Immigration*	*Environment*	*Quotas*	*Reduce TDs*
Constant	2.98***	4.03***	2.69***	3.57***	3.75***
	(0.06)	(0.43)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.23)
Fianna Fáil	2.98	3.09*	2.59	3.57	4.16
	(0.00)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.00)	(0.25)
Fine Gael	2.98	3.26*	2.55	3.57	3.61
	(0.00)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.00)	(0.25)
Labour	2.98	3.65	2.50	3.57	4.14
	(0.00)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.00)	(0.29)
Sinn Féin	2.98	4.90*	2.78	3.57	3.88
	(0.00)	(0.33)	(0.15)	(0.00)	(0.35)
ULA	2.98	6.08*	2.77	3.57	3.70
	(0.00)	(0.44)	(0.17)	(0.00)	(0.38)
Greens	2.98	3.53	2.79	3.57	3.14*
	(0.00)	(0.27)	(0.14)	(0.00)	(0.30)
Independents	2.98	3.74*	2.84	3.57	3.61
	(0.00)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.00)	(0.19)
Party-Level Variance	0.00	1.23	0.04	0.00	0.21
	(0.00)	(1.11)	(0.19)	(0.00)	(0.46)
Individual-Level Variance	0.92	1.80	0.93	1.45	3.88
	(0.96)	(1.34)	(0.96)	(1.20)	(1.97)
Log-likelihood	-319.20	-417.33	-322.51	-389.25	-517.20
N	231	238	231	242	245

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by
**** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table B.12 - Estimation results of party intercepts in empty multilevel models on relative congruence between CCS participants and all INES participants

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Immigration*	*Environment*	*Reduce TDs*
Constant	-0.29	-1.19***	-1.36***	-0.86***	-0.72*	-0.94**	-0.41***
	(0.35	(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.15)
Fianna Fáil	0.28	0.45*	0.42	0.42	0.33	0.41	0.56*
	(0.39)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Fine Gael	0.28	0.41	0.46	0.36	0.36	0.42	0.46*
	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.3)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Labour	0.63	0.53*	0.33	0.59*	0.46	0.43	0.59*
	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.39)	(0.24)	(0.3)	(0.25)	(0.21)
Sinn Féin	0.69	0.52	0.55	0.59*	0.62	0.53	0.52*
	(0.43)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.26)
ULA	0.75	0.67*	0.84*	0.54	0.69	0.60	0.52*
	(0.46)	(0.29)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.26)
Greens	0.49	0.44	0.39*	0.53*	0.60*	0.64*	0.40*
	(0.39)	(0.25)	(0.38)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Independents	0.38	0.47*	0.51*	0.47*	0.46	0.48*	0.45*
	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.18)
Party-Level Variance	-1.7***	-3.21***	-1.9**	-3.23***	-2.41**	-3.10***	-3.64***
	(0.60)	(0.67)	(0.60)	(0.68)	(0.62)	(0.66)	(0.73)
Individual-Level Variance	-1.5	-1.44	-1.55	-1.23	-1.34	-1.30	-1.03
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
N	202	231	231	229	238	231	245

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by
**** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table B.13 - Estimation results of the party intercepts in empty multilevel models on relative congruence between CCS participants and INES party voters

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Immigration*	*Environment*	*Reduce TDs*
Constant	-0.18	-1.16***	-1.34***	-0.92***	-0.79*	-1.09***	-0.42*
	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Fianna Fáil	0.34	0.47	0.42	0.38	0.36	0.44*	0.54*
	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.27)	(0.41)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Fine Gael	0.31	0.36	0.42	0.36	0.36	0.46*	0.46*
	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.28)	(0.41)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Labour	0.57	0.44	0.30	0.64*	0.42	0.47*	0.57*
	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.19)	(0.24)
Sinn Féin	0.57	0.51	0.56	0.63*	0.72	0.58*	0.51
	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.44)	(0.21)	(0.28)
ULA	0.78	0.80*	0.86*	0.55	0.84	0.55*	0.60
	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.35)	(0.51)	(0.23)	(0.31)
Greens	0.58	0.38	0.41*	0.44	0.31	0.51*	0.35
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Independents	0.36	0.54	0.53*	0.50*	0.48	0.49*	0.46*
	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.24)	(0.39)	(0.16)	(0.21)
Party-Level Variance	-1.3***	-2.16**	-1.7*	-2.72***	-1.57**	-4.02***	-3.16***
	(0.10)	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.76)	(0.68)
Individual-Level Variance	-1.3	-1.49	-1.57	-1.26	-1.38	-1.36	-0.98
	(0.60)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
N	202	231	231	229	238	231	245

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by
**** = p < 0.001, ** = p <0.01, * = p <0.05*

Table B.14 - Estimation results of social background effects on absolute congruence of economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters.

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxes/ Spending*	*Mortgage Bailout*
Constant	2.38***	2.84***	3.11***	1.78***	3.61***
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.58)	(0.39)	(0.41)
TD	0.32	-0.13	-0.27	-0.11	-0.42*
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Female	0.17	0.03	0.22	0.23	-0.12
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02**	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.21	-0.16	-0.12	-0.03	-0.12
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Class - C1	-0.00	-0.25	0.18	-0.31	-0.31
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Class C2D	0.47*	-0.13	-0.04	-0.12	0.10
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Class - Farmer	-0.29	0.05	0.09	0.17	0.20
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.32)
Rural	-0.28	-0.04	-0.05	-0.08	0.18
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Party-Level Variance	0.33***	0.45***	1.47***	0.20***	
	(0.57)	(0.67)	(1.21)	(0.45)	
Individaul-Level Variance	0.98	0.92	1.00	0.99	
	(0.99)	(0.96)	(1.00)	(1.00)	
R^2m	0.07	0	0.03	0.06	
R^2c	0.3	0.32	0.38	0.22	
Adj. R^2					0.03
Log-likelihood	-297.42	-333.17	-345.43	-336.60	-377.26
N	202	231	231	229	240

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table B.15 - Estimation results of social background on absolute congruence of non-economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters.

	EU Integration	*Restrict Immigration*	*Environment/ Economy*	*Gender Quotas*	*Reduce No. of TDs*
Constant	2.83***	3.75***	3.05***	3.69***	4.39***
	(0.33)	(0.62)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.67)
TD	-0.07	-0.11	-0.40**	-0.41*	0.55
	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.29)
Female	-0.28	-0.05	0.09	0.33	0.00
	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.35)
Age	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.04	0.35	-0.05	-0.09	-0.49
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.29)
Class - C1	-0.18	-0.09	-0.07	-0.20	-0.26
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.31)
Class C2D	0.38	0.12	0.49*	0.36	-0.42
	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.40)
Class - Farmer	-0.14	-0.02	-0.27	-0.11	0.41
	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.52)
Rural	-0.09	-0.19	-0.03	-0.12	-0.17
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.29)
Party-Level Variance		1.21***			
		(1.10)			
Individaul-Level Variance		1.82			
		(1.35)			
R^2m		0.01			
R^2c		0.41			
Adj. R^2	0.04		0.06	0.03	0.01
Log-likelihood	-312.71	-422.15	-311.22	-380.01	-512.82
N	231	238	231	242	245

*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$*

Table B.16 - Estimation results of social background on absolute congruence of economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters.

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Mortgage Bailout*
Constant	-0.43***	-1.7***	-1.49**	-1.82***	-1.15**
	(0.5)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.38)
TD	0.17	-0.17	-0.47*	-0.1	-0.38*
	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Female	0.22	0.15	0.34	0.39	-0.10
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)
Age	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.19	-0.14	-0.25	0.05	-0.13
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Class: C1	-0.04	-0.31	0.06	-0.38	-0.15
	(0.18)	(0.2)	(0.19)	(0.2)	(0.17)
Class: C2D	0.48*	-0.2	-0.19	-0.06	0.23
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Class: Farmer	-0.25	0.05	0.21	0.07	0.31
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.30)
Rural	-0.27	-0.14	-0.12	-0.13	0.17
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)
Party Level	-2.01***	-3.05	-2.03**	-3.07*	
	(0.61)	(0.67)	(0.61)	(0.67)	
Individaul-Level	-1.49	-1.45	-1.57	-1.26	
	(0.10)	(0.1)	(0.09)	(0.09)	
R^2m	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.06	
R^2c	0.46	0.21	0.47	0.19	
Adj. R^2					0.04
Log-likelihood	6.91		-146.71		300.37
N	202	231	231	229	240

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$

Table B.17 - Estimation results of social background on relative congruence of non-economic attitudes between CCS participants and all INES participants.

	EU Integration	*Restrict Immigration*	*Environment/ Economy*	*Gender Quotas*	*Reduce No. of TDs*
Constant	-1.05**	-1.22**	-0.54	-1.26***	0.07
	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.45)
TD	-0.06	-0.09	-0.49*	-0.24	0.31
	(0.16)	(0.46)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.21)
Female	-0.19	-0.10	0.27	0.34	-0.04
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)
Age	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.30*	0.23	0.01	0.13	-0.29
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Class: C1	-0.24	0.06	-0.10	-0.12	-0.05
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.2)
Class: C2D	0.43*	0.24	0.45	0.26	-0.13
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Class: Farmer	-0.31	-0.14	-0.54	0.03	0.19
	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.33)
Rural	-0.26	-0.07	-0.12	-0.27	-0.04
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Party Level		-2.51***	-4.33***		-0.97***
		(0.63)	(0.85)		(0.09)
Individaul-Level		-1.33	-1.3		-3.83
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.78)
R^2m		0.02			0.08
R^2c		0.29			0.32
Adj. R^2	0.07		0.04	0.04	
Log-likelihood	160		-243.58		77.63
N	231	238	231	242	245

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$

Table B.18 - Estimation results of social background on relative congruence of economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters.

	Left Right	*Regulation*	*Privatisation*	*Taxation*	*Mortgage Bailout*
Constant	-0.41***	-1.52	-1.56*	-1.9***	-0.83*
	(0.10)	(0.49)	(0.09)	(0.46)	(0.38)
TD	0.17	-0.17	-0.51*	-0.01	-0.47**
	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Female	0.19	0.06	0.3	0.35	-0.11
	(0.22)	(0.2)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.19	-0.17	-0.22	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Class: C1	-0.03	-0.28	0.14	-0.42	-0.09
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.2)	(0.17)
Class: C2D	0.53*	-0.15	-0.12	-0.1	0.38
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Class: Farmer	-0.15	0.05	0.19	0.03	0.32
	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.30)
Rural	-0.26	-0.11	-0.08	-0.12	0.00
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Party Level	-2.2***	-2.15***	-1.8***	-2.61***	
	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.64)	
Individaul-Level	-1.32	-1.5	-1.59	-1.29	
	(0.10)	(0.1)	(0.09)	(0.1)	
R^2m	0.05	0	0.02	0.06	
R^2c	0.38	0.23	0.47	0.22	
Adj. R^2					0.06
Log-likelihood					248.61
N	202	231	231	229	240

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.0$

Table B.19 - Estimation results of social background on relative congruence of non-economic attitudes between CCS participants and INES party voters.

	EU Integration	*Restrict Immigration*	*Environment/ Economy*	*Gender Quotas*	*Reduce No. of TDs*
Constant	-1.10**	-1.17*	0.33***	-0.98**	-0.29
	(0.36)	(0.56)	(0.07)	(0.37)	(0.39)
TD	0.00	-0.06	-0.47**	-0.12	0.30
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Female	-0.25	-0.17	0.23	0.45*	0.05
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Age	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
University	-0.37*	0.23	0.06	0.14	-0.27
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Class: C1	-0.25	0.01	-0.17	-0.03	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Class: C2D	0.41	0.04	0.64**	0.37	0.08
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Class: Farmer	-0.34	-0.14	-0.29	0.24	0.03
	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Rural	-0.25	-0.1	-0.18	-0.34*	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Party Level		-1.5***			
		(0.6)			
Individaul-Level		-1.36			
		(0.6)			
R^2m		0.01			
R^2c		0.53			
Adj. R^2	0.10		0.07	0.05	0.02
Log-likelihood	139		47.04	-166.88	77.63
N	231	238	231	242	245

Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** = $p < 0.001$, ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$