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
**The Responsible Party Model and  
European Integration in Ireland**

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*Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science*

*Trinity College, Dublin*

*2001*



THESIS  
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## Summary.

The history of European integration is undeniably élitist. This study nevertheless holds that the body of research that has documented the failure of political élites (e.g., parties) and citizens are out of tune with each other on Europe as an issue in domestic politics relies on an overly narrow operational approach. This, in turn, seems to have generated unduly negative results about the Responsible Party Model and European integration. Typically, two or three survey questions are put to the public and to members of parliament. What are seen as unsatisfactorily large differences between public and party opinions are offered as evidence of the Responsible Party Model's failure.

This study set out to test a new approach, to see whether a broader conceptualisation of Europe and a correspondingly broad operationalisation would motivate a reappraisal of the Responsible Party Model and European integration. At the core of the new approach are four ideal types of attitudes European integration, labelled Europeanism, Nationalism, Pragmatism and Uninterest. Each ideal type consists of an a priori defined combination of attitudes toward national and European policy-making; attitudes toward values and identity feelings associated with the nation and with Europe, respectively; and perceptions of material interest – the national interest as well as any conception that may exist of a wider, shared European interest. The test of the Responsible Party Model in this study, then, is whether a party and its partisans have the same ideal type profile.

This study is a case study of Ireland, with three measurement points in time, namely the times of Ireland's three post-accession European-related referendums (1987, 1992 and 1998). I used three Eurobarometer surveys taken at relevant points in time to acquire measurements of public opinion, and I created quantitative data sets estimating party positions out of documents selected from *Oireachtas Eireann Official Report* (Irish parliamentary records). On this basis, using oneway analysis of variance and associated tests, I acquired measurements allowing me to profile both levels of each party-partisan dyad against the backdrop of the four ideal types.

The main results can be summarised as follows. First, at the most generic level, I found that the Model works rather better than the existing literature would

suggest, inasmuch as there was considerable ideal type overlap between each party and its partisans. Second, all dyads were rather similar to one another (parties mixed Europeanism and pro-European Pragmatism, and partisan groups mixed Uninterest with pro-European Pragmatism).

While the first finding augments a reappraisal of the Responsible Party Model, the second finding suggests that as a test case of this Model this study would have provided more convincing results had the dyads spanned a greater range of attitudes toward European integration. If parties and voters managed to “find” each other despite a wide(r) range of attitudes in society (between parties, and at the level of the public) then it would be possible to point convincingly to some process of political communication between parties and voters. As it stands, no such process is evident though it may of course be behind the observed ideal type profile overlaps. In conclusion, this study suggests that the Model deserves reappraisal on the basis of broader conceptualisations of Europe and more broadly based measurements.

## Chapter 1:

### The Responsible Party Model and European Integration

#### 1. 1 Introduction

This thesis rests on the basis of three observations. The first is that representation is essential in democratic politics. Different democratic theories and practices define meaningful representation in ways that are not always complementary, but they share the common denominator that they see representation as some link between a defined public and its elected political leadership. Representation through public – élite linkage is a *sine qua non* of democracy, within but not, until recently, between nation-states. Representation in a European nation-state is typically expected to occur as expressed in the Responsible Party Model, a well known political science device describing a process of democratic representation whereby like-minded members of the public and political parties seek out each other in the electoral process. Representation, then, is about differences and similarities in party positions and partisan attitudes. The concept of attitude congruence summarises this form of representation, attitudinal representation.

The second observation is that the European Union has reached a point of widening and deepening where it has assumed key state functions and is producing increasing amounts of state-like output, although it is not in itself a state. In particular, whether, how and to what extent democracy should and/or could be exercised within and in relation to the European Union as a non-state entity with core state functions have become increasingly urgent questions. In the member states the growing importance and impact of the European Union in virtually every aspect of society - politics, economics, culture and military-security matters – is becoming so pervasive that these states are now part of an intricate structure of European *governance*. In a simultaneous move the European Union has also acted

as the irresistible force behind the emergence of sub- and cross-national regions, challenging the nation-state from below.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the European Union has not developed into a nation-state writ large, with a fully-fledged polity replete with a European party system and a pervasive feeling of community. Whether this is a democratic deficiency or not depends on one's understanding of what European integration is all about, and of what sort of entity the European Union is becoming or should become. The apparent, and widely noted, absence of a European polity, and the absence of proper democratic structures between European citizens and European institutions, make the effectiveness of representation *on issues related to European integration* at the national level crucial in giving the European Union democratic legitimacy. However, and this is the third observation, there is consistent evidence from political science research carried out over a number of decades that national-level representation is not effective on issues pertaining to European integration. Put differently, the Responsible Party Model does not work in this area of policy.

This study is grounded in the collective theoretical and empirical importance of these three observations. The remainder of this chapter explores the issues of integration, representation and legitimacy as they apply to these three observations. Section 1.2 explores the contemporary debate around these issues, in the context of European integration. Contributors to this debate may not agree on much, but they do agree that political élites in Europe have not effectively communicated Europe to members of the public. In general terms (e.g., not restricted to European issues), the occurrence or not of attitude congruence is influenced by certain aspects of the political system and of political issues, which set the conditions for effective representation. A question that is steadily gaining importance in this context is: what are the significant features of Europe as a political system, and as a political issue? As a political system it is sometimes described as a policy space in which policy-making and opinion formation occurs. The literature highlights two features of the European policy space: a left-right dimension that mirrors the dominant

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<sup>1</sup>A consequence of this is that it no longer makes sense to study European integration and comparative European politics as separate topics, in universities or elsewhere.

dimension in domestic politics in most member states, and a more-less integration dimension which has no national counterpart. The main question about Europe as a political issue is whether people are able to use their political skills to make sense of Europe. Section 1.3 reviews the empirically based literature that addresses this question, and arrives at the conclusion that citizens by and large do not appear to be able to do so. However, this section also draws the conclusion that the narrow operational approach of this literature may be ineffective, and section 1.4 makes the case for a new approach with more broadly based measurements. This section also introduces Ireland, 1987-1998, as a suitable case study for the new approach. Section 1.5 summarises and concludes.

## **1.2 Representation and Integration**

### **1.2.1 Representation: Meaning and Process**

Representation is an essential part of the democratic process. One consequence of this is that Western European societies operate by a political division of labour between elected representatives, the élite, who are the practitioners of democracy, and the public, the represented, whose direct involvement in politics is generally limited to election day. The *Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science* defines representation as “the making present again, in some non-literal sense, of some entity, whether personal or abstract” (Bogdanor 1987:529). There is a range of alternative interpretations of what, on this basis, defines meaningful representation. A range of theories of representation can be called upon: trusteeship, delegated representation and mandate representation. The philosopher Edmund Burke, whose work is associated with the trusteeship theory, marks out one extreme. In his *Speech to the Electors of Bristol* (1774; cited in Bogdanor 1987:64-65) he made a strong case for representatives acting as would-be trustees, using independent judgement without any perceived obligation to consult the constituency ostensibly represented to account for the actions taken on its behalf. The central element of trusteeship is that the preferences and attitudes of the represented are inconsequential to the trustee’s decision-making. Whether any

representation occurs, in the sense of “making present” the public’s aggregated policy preferences at the level of policy-making, is questionable.

Delegated representation marks out the opposite extreme of the theoretical range. It requires direct and close ties between representatives, who are delegated to act, and the represented. This is undeniably more palatable than the Burkean view, from a democratic perspective. It is not entirely realistic, however, because representation implies a division of labour which the direct and close contact between a delegate and the delegating agent (the public) does not fully take into account. That is, this theory of representation is perhaps too close a reflection of direct democracy to capture the essence of representative democracy in Western Europe.

In between these two extremes, there is the so-called mandate approach to representation according to which representatives enjoy a mandate to implement specified political objectives agreed by the public and its representatives. In modern democratic politics this typically translates as parties or candidates presenting manifestos at election time, on the basis of which they are elected to be representatives with a commitment to implementing their manifesto policy package (Bogdanor 1987:64-65, 529-31; Rourke, Hiskes and Zirakzadeh 1992:11-31; Heywood 1997:206-211; Bowler and Donovan 1998:1-42). Mandate representation, then, is something quite different from both direct democracy, which requires all citizens to participate in the day-to-day affairs of state, and from trusteeship, which assumes that it is right to prevent citizens from participating.

The Responsible Party Model is a theoretical model that describes the mechanisms of mandate-based representation. It has been widely used in political science to describe how like-minded political élites (parties and candidates) and voters seek out each other in the political process. The essence of representation in the Responsible Party Model is the occurrence of attitude congruence between the political élites and voters (primarily expected to occur through the élites’ opinion leadership, a point I will elaborate below). At various times, and with different societies in mind, scholars have applied specific version of the Model to imply attitude congruence between different sets of élites and voters. For instance, the



dyads, these scholars have focused on party-partisan dyads, on the rationale that in Western European societies parties are typically the most important vehicles of representation in the electoral process. The central role parties play is due to factors such as these political systems' strong party discipline and the fact that voters typically vote for parties rather than candidates (though this may depend on the existence of a list-based electoral system and whether the list is open or closed). As will become clear later in this chapter and throughout, this study examines the Responsible Party Model from the perspective of party-partisan dyads.

The process of representation encapsulated in the Responsible Party Model is typically expected to be *élite*-driven insofar as *élites* define the range of political alternatives available to the public at any particular point in time (Rose 1984:10-14; Dalton 1996:246-254; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996:3-4; Pierce 1999:9; Thomassen 1999:34). Basic intuitions about democracy might suggest that this *élitist* form of representation - representation from above - is not quite ideal, but it nevertheless describes how democratic politics is generally conducted. There is plenty of evidence that *élites* shape public opinion rather than the reverse. For instance, in a major survey of five decades of US public opinion polling, Page and Shapiro (1992) find *élites* to be causally dominant in the interactive process between political *élites* and the public, although by no means able to mould public opinion as they please in every instance. They suggest that democratic representation is top-heavy but not top-determined.<sup>2</sup> But how do political *élites* shape public opinion? There is a number of theories that combine a partisanship effect with some notion of *élites* cues by which voters can navigate the political world.<sup>3</sup> Popkin (1991) refers to a process whereby *élites* provide "cognitive shortcuts" to a public that is not terribly interested in politics. By these shortcuts, ordinary people are able to work out not only their own opinions but also those of the *élites*. Similarly, Lupia and

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<sup>2</sup> In an earlier study these two authors are less equivocal about the force of public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1983). They freely admit that that analysis suffered from the limitation of not incorporating whether public opinion changed as a result of prior changes in *élite* discourse, or what Zaller (1992) would call the flow of *élite* information.

<sup>3</sup> There is also at least one study that highlights the difficulties of political communication, even on the basis of the simplest, most generic political concepts such as left and right (Herrera 1999). This would seem to explain at least in part why the Responsible Party Model does not always receive the empirical support one might wish it to, from the perspective of representation.

McCubbins (1998) argue that élites act as effective substitutes for “encyclopaedic information” (1998:37) to otherwise uninformed members of the public. Zaller (1992) moreover argues that subject to certain personal characteristics (political values, awareness and knowledge, and cognitive mobilisation), the flow of élite opinion shapes public opinion. Broadly speaking, an élite consensus in favour of a political issue is expected to generate a public consensus in favour of it, too, and vice versa if there is an élite consensus against the issue. Partisanship among the voters is not expected to have any effect on the formation of public opinion under élite consensus conditions. However, if there is an élite dissensus on the issue, then Zaller shows that public opinion splits on the issue, in proportion to the amount of élite information in favour and against the issue. Partisanship comes into effect in opinion formation because people attend to the information supplied by the party they favour. In a sense, Zaller’s theory can be viewed as a detailed restatement of the Responsible Party Model, in that it details the process through which representation (as envisioned in the Responsible Party Model) occurs.<sup>4</sup> Of course, these theories of how attitude congruence occurs do not rule out the possibility that voters also have the power to influence parties – parties may be dominant but they can not write public opinion to suit them in every instance. Either way, the legitimacy of the political process derives from its representative function and nature, so a breakdown in representative structures has obvious and severe consequences for the health of democracy. Attitude congruence is a term that describes a state of the world where élite and public attitudes correspond on some issue.<sup>5</sup>

Given these models about how attitude congruence occurs, there are also aspects of a country’s political system which are likely to influence the occurrence

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, numerous studies on attitude congruence in Sweden have found an increase in attitude congruence over time, which the researchers attributed mainly to Swedish parties’ increased ability to shape public opinion (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Granberg and Holmberg 1996; Holmberg 1989, 1997).

<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991) have identified a “likeability heuristic” whereby members of the public navigate the political world by assuming that parties they like share their personal preferences about politics. The reasoning goes along the lines of “I like proposal A; I like party X; Party X likes proposal A.” However, this is strictly speaking not a model of how attitude congruence occurs, but a model of how voters come to think (rightly or not) that they comprehend a party’s position of a given policy. This need not involve any attitude congruence at all.

or not of attitude congruence. For instance, attitude congruence has been observed to be affected by whether parties have clear issue positions, and whether or not voters are able to interpret issues as left-right issues (Dalton 1985, 1996; Thomassen 1999). More specifically, the clearer the party position on a given issue, the better able the voters become to assess the party's position; and the clearer the issue's left-right relevance, the better able the voters are to formulate an attitude about it. Clear, coherent party positions enable people to find out parties' positions, which requires a certain degree of party centralisation. Furthermore, economic issues have clear left-right interpretation and are more likely to be salient in people's everyday lives. It is plausible that ordinary people attend more closely to political communication about these so-called pocketbook or bread-and-butter issues, than "new politics" and foreign policy. Not only are parties likely to have clearer positions on economic issues than on new politics and foreign policy, but economic issues are also more easily interpreted in left-right terms. Ordinary people are thus probably better able to seek out the party most "like them" on economic issues than on the other types of issues.<sup>6</sup>

Other systematic factors influencing the workings of the Responsible Party Model are the nature of electoral and party systems, as well as the nature of the political parties themselves. The hypothesis about electoral systems is that those translating votes into seats with a high degree of proportionality increase attitude congruence (Wessels 1999). Electoral systems in which gaining 20 per cent of the vote means gaining very close to 20 per cent of seats in parliament clearly generate more appropriate representation of attitudes than those in which 20 per cent of votes translates into 10 or 40 per cent of seats in parliament.<sup>7</sup>

The hypothesis about the proportionality of electoral systems is at least superficially related to the hypothesis about party systems, that multiparty systems generate more attitude congruence than two-party systems. Multiparty systems

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<sup>6</sup> Pierce (1999) nevertheless notes in a study of five countries that the empirical evidence is inconsistent even with respect to some economic policy issues that ostensibly have a clear left-right interpretation, although in terms of overall left-right ideological positions the degree of congruence increased and was more consistent across countries.

offer a wider menu for choice for the voters, which increases their chances of finding a policy package that corresponds with their preferences. This, in turn, enhances attitude congruence. (On the other hand, it is possible that in the interactive process between party positions and public opinion an absence of choice will generate attitude congruence, because all political communication would point in the same direction. This would seem to be one implication of Zaller's theory, as presented above). Moreover, the left-right structure of most Western European party systems gives ready reference for people who are used to responding to left-right cues in politics.<sup>8</sup>

At the level of the nation-state in Europe there is no question about representation and its crucial, legitimising function in the democratic process. Though the detailed features of the institutions by which this occurs differ between countries there is no question about whether and how these terms apply in the national context. It is simply generally accepted and acknowledged that nation-states are and should be functioning representative democracies. As I will now turn to demonstrate, however, there is no similar acceptance or acknowledgement of what democracy at the European Union level is, or of what it can be.

### *1.2.2 The European Context*

The origins of post-war European integration are distinctly élitist in that the member state publics have not generally been invited to play a legitimising role in the European project. Creating and maintaining horizontal (between the European institutions) and vertical (between the European and national level of decision-making) political structures has always been, and remains, an élite domain. This is not a recent observation. The term permissive consensus, coined by V.O. Key in 1961 but introduced into opinion – integration studies by Lindberg and Sheingold in 1970, has become probably the most well-known and widely used summary of how élites have built an “ever closer union” as Burke might have: without referring back

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<sup>7</sup> Though it has been noted that empirical evidence does not always support this hypothesis – on the contrary, attitude congruence has been found to be higher in political systems with fewer parties (Holmberg 1999; Pierce 1999).

to those who are ostensibly represented. In this vein, Lindberg and Scheingold created a two-dimensional typology of support for European integration that relied extensively on the work of David Easton (1965, 1975). The first dimension distinguished between utilitarian and affective support. Utilitarian support derived from material considerations of interest, specifically some “perceived and relatively concrete interest” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970:40). Affective support indicated “a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity” (1970:40). On the second dimension, systemic support referred to attitudes toward “Europe” as a political system whereas identitive support was about attitudes toward the other member state publics (“we-feelings” etc.). Lindberg and Scheingold's analysis lead them to conclude that there was a basic level of affective support for Europe, constituting a policy-making environment where élites could operate relatively freely within broadly set parameters of public approval (1970:121). In a definitional sense a permissive consensus was a state of affairs where élites (e.g. the government of the day) could:

probably move in an integrative direction without significant opposition, since this permissive consensus would tend to reduce chances that opposing elites could mount an effective counterattack. Conversely, significant opposition and persistent social cleavage [between member state populations] do not necessarily mean that integrative steps can not be taken, but rather that the opportunities for blocking them are greater [for élites competing with the government of the day]. (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970:41).

In the terminology of theories of representation Lindberg and Scheingold's analysis creates an image of Europe as, at best, a case of trusteeship. Numerous studies from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s concur with the view of the European project as essentially élitist. Deutsch observed in 1966 that the “spectacular development of formal European treaties and institutions since the mid-1950s has not been matched by any corresponding deeper integration of behaviour” (Deutsch 1966:355). The emergence of a European consciousness and the establishment of a federal European state were “even beyond conjecture” (Lindberg and Scheingold

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<sup>8</sup> If a party system is not based on a left-right spectrum, the presumably people are less used to think of politics in left-right terms, and will respond to political communication on some other basis.

1970:310) because support was not thought to be generally based in any ideals of European unity. The European institutions appeared to have failed in generating affective support (Shepherd 1975), and some writers identified a politics of rejection of the Community by political élites and mass publics (Feld and Wildgen 1976). In the early 1980s the European project was found to be “unable to employ efforts to counteract a slow haemorrhaging of support” (Handley 1981:361) – which at least suggests that it had at some point in time had public support. It was also said to elicit only apathy and irritation from the mass public (Slater 1983). Europeans had “more urgent things on their minds than the rather stale and remote issues of European unity” (Putnam 1983:87). There was “no strong tendency to eschew national pride or shift from national to supra-national identities” (Hewstone 1986:200). The only relief from the general pessimism came from hypotheses generated by Inglehart’s post-materialist theory and research (Inglehart 1967, 1970, 1971, 1977). In essence, Inglehart found empirical support for the hypothesis that an intergenerational process of changing value orientations from materialist to post-materialist values brought about an increasing sense of European identity. More recently, as explored in detail in chapter 4, there has been a renewed interest in opinion – integration studies, probably in response to the post-Cold War upsurge in the integration process as well as the Danish and French Maastricht referendums in the early 1990s. The lasting effect of the two referendums may be questionable, since the Danish result was eventually reversed and the French was only a near-miss. However, they were the first signs that were in any way taken seriously by political leaders (national and European), that European integration needed a solid basis of public support. They were reminded of this also by the 2000 Danish referendum on the single currency (which the Danish people rejected) and in Britain the Blair administration’s fear of joining the single currency without holding a referendum, and their equal fear of holding such a referendum. Difficult questions about democratic representation and legitimacy became permanent on the European agenda, including questions of whether it mattered that there was no European nation and thus no basis for correspondence between nation-state democracy and European democracy. Quite simply, until the 1990s:

the European Union could rest on the 'shadow of the past' and the instrumental benefits it afforded the member states and their peoples, [but] this appears insufficient as the Union begins to go beyond regulation and market creation into core attributes of statehood, money, borders and security. (Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith 1999:201-202).

Clearly the provision of instrumental benefits to the member states is at the core of European integration, even partly its *raison d'être*, but increasingly this occurs through supranational structures which raises democratic legitimacy questions (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:9). For as long as the European Union has been able to deliver instrumental benefits it has acquired a type of legitimacy based in performance, or, as Scharpf puts it, output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). While output legitimacy can arguably not be considered as stable and secure as legitimacy based in a shared identity and belief that a political structure is the natural expression of a community of people (input legitimacy), it is nevertheless a necessary part of the social contract between taxpayers and decision-makers in capitalist democracies according to Scharpf.<sup>9</sup> The intention of national governments is presumably that the decrease in the nation-state's ability to deliver goods (broadly defined) to its citizens is redressed at the European level, but virtually none of the nation-state's popular, democratic legitimacy has shifted in a corresponding manner to the European level. (Presumably this is at least to some extent because nation-state governments have little interest in such a transfer, or are at least ambiguous about it). Those who build Europe have never taken seriously either the possibility or the necessity of building a European polity. It is not unknown for states to create their nations: Germany is but one precedent of nation-building. Less ambitiously, people's identities tend to have several layers (the national identity being one, and typically the dominant layer), and the promotion of a civic, European layer might have been one possible way of generating input legitimacy for the European Union. However, signs of a

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<sup>9</sup> Thomassen and Schmitt (1999:12-13), too, discuss the European Union as a political system consisting not only of institutions and processes legitimised by (Eastonian) diffuse support. The difference between these authors and Scharpf is that the latter dismissed the notion of Europe as a political system of that kind, which sets a very definite limit to the potential scope of European integration.

collective European identity are hard to find, as are signs of a European policy discourse or institutional infrastructure that might make democratic accountability a reality. The latter problem might seem smaller than the former, but the problem of democratic accountability can not be resolved simply with a blueprint for institutional reform. It can not be resolved without also resolving the thornier and more diffuse questions of what European democracy is, whether it can or ought to be compared to nation-state democracy, or whether in the absence of a European community it must be something else. There is a problem of translation that makes any discussion of European democracy or legitimacy almost by definition confused:

The very language of modern democracy, its grammar, syntax and vocabulary, revolve around the state, the nation and its people – its *demos*. The Union, it is generally accepted, is not a state. The result is a description of oranges with a botanical vocabulary developed for apples. (Weiler 1999:268).

The European Union region is an institutionalised part of the much larger phenomenon of internationalisation (though, as Anderson (2000:51) points out, the precise relationship between integration and internationalisation is not clear), which raises important questions about whether and how democracy as we know it can continue to operate. The questions this raises and more specifically their answers have implications for the future of national politics as well as for the final destination of European integration – and the European Union explicitly does not have a *finalité politique*.

The point about Europe not being or having a community has been made in terms of the European-level absence of a culture of consent. In contrast to the individual member states' national political cultures, Europeans (whether members of the public or of the political class) do not feel sufficient mutual trust to accept majority decisions as readily as they would at the level of national politics (Siedentop 2000). Siedentop identifies the language of economism that dominates European integration as one – perhaps the major – reason why such a culture has failed to develop. A consequence of economism, whereby the language of economics has subverted and replaced political discourse in the post-war period, has been the almost complete neglect of constitutional concerns and political culture in



the development of the European Union. People have come to matter as consumers rather than as citizens, the concern for the conditions for human flourishing being lost along the way (Siedentop 2000:33-34). It is possible that the complex, inter-related questions of European community, democracy, legitimacy and representation may be resolved by the emergence of a European community, a culture of consent, a European democracy that may or may not resemble nation-state democracy (e.g., have a basis in a demos). It is also possible that their resolution will be in favour of the nation-state or a sub-national level.

In the meantime, even decision-making powers that have traditionally been seen as inalienable symbols of statehood have been handed over to European institutions that are not especially, if at all, accountable to European citizens or even to European governments. Consequently, electing a new national government with a distinct policy package to tinker at the edges of policy-making will not change or modify public policy to reflect public opinion. European policy-making has the potential to make the Responsible Party Model irrelevant unless a comparable type of politics emerges at the European level. (Alternatively, the European project requires a new and different form of democracy, deriving legitimacy in a way hitherto unknown.) In addition, the once-neat correspondence between the constituency electing a government with a policy package, and the constituency eventually affected by policy-making, is lost. Integration, and more broadly internationalisation, means that policy decisions in one country increasingly impact beyond its borders, where those whose lives are affected find themselves outside the appropriate electoral process through which they might have usefully voiced their concerns. Moreover, the first victim of European policy-making (whether intergovernmentally or through the Community method) tends to be transparency. Without transparent policy-making the public can not hold policy-makers accountable or indeed discern what their policies are about (Goldmann 2001). It is clear that democracy requires that those affected by decision-making must identify with and have access to the decision-making procedures and institutions, and that they must have a sense of community in order to accept the legitimacy of majority decisions with which they do not agree. It is not clear that such collectives must be

nations: they could in theory be any kind of community. The fact that most democracies are not “pure” nation-states is indicative of this. Nevertheless, does the lack of a European nation (and the apparently bleak prospects for one) mean that the European Union will always suffer from a democratic deficit? A more interesting and fruitful question than the existence now or ever of a European identity is perhaps the question of whether European democracy depends on a European nation. In theory the answer is clearly no: any community that perceives the institutions that make collectively binding decisions to be legitimate will do. In practice, however, it may be that only institutions that “belong” to nations will be perceived to be legitimate.


Democracy within contemporary European nation-states is categorically different from what it presently is, and maybe different from what it ever can be, in the European Union context. Siedentop and Scharpf foresee subtly different final destinations for the European project, but their two visions share a crucial implication for this study. It is that national political élites’ persistent failure to communicate Europe to their national audiences, and the audiences’ apparent lack of interest, are the single most crucial and potentially debilitating weaknesses in the European project. That is, the single most important determinant of what Europe may become in the future is how national political leaders now engage those they represent in the question of Europe. Siedentop’s position is that the European Union must develop into a fully-fledged United States of Europe, whose federal structures will protect local, regional and national interests, rights and identities. Siedentop acknowledges that “Europe is not yet ready for federalism” (2000:231), not least because the political élites of the prospective units in a European federation – the member states and regions – have only fulfilled one of their two democratic duties: they have given a lead, but have not carried the general public with them. The upshot, if integration is too vigorously pursued, is that “the causes championed by élites – even if constructive and admirable – are likely to be discredited” (2000:219). Scharpf’s rationale for the European level of governance is similar to Siedentop’s rationale for federalism (a way of protecting established polities), in that he argues that European institutions and law are there to assist and support the

democratic legitimacy of national policy-making arena. The latter, Scharpf contends, will and must remain primary even under the pressures of competition among regulatory welfare states. The main substantive difference between the two visions of Europe is that Scharpf's does not attach any intrinsic value to the European level of governance, while Siedentop develops a rationale for a common European identity that may in time come to underpin the federalist structure. Siedentop believes Europe needs such an identity. These are two qualitatively different accounts of what the European project is and should be, but the question of the relationship between national policy-making and national public opinion is central to both. Both agree that national publics appear unable to incorporate Europe into their political landscapes because political élites have not given them the necessary help to do so.

European integration is both a response to, and a cause of, the increasing disparity between the functional, territorial and affiliational dimensions of politics and democracy that have generated and necessitated difficult debates about representation (among other things). Although there is arguably no European polity, there is increasingly a European policy space where political élites play European politics. National political élites have been largely unconstrained by their respective national publics in this. Nevertheless, a European policy space is taking shape, its structure a matter for some debate (Figure 1.1).

The simplest model, which features in virtually all theories of European integration, is a one-dimensional independence-integration model, where political actors assume positions that are "more" or "less" integrationist (the vertical axis of Figure 1.1 reflects this one-dimensional model). A number of more complex models take their conceptual point of departure in this simple independence-integration model. They seek to advance on it by introducing a left-right dimension and asking what its relationship is to the independence-integration dimension (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Scharpf 2000; Marks and Wilson 2000, Hooghe and Marks 1998; Hix 1999a, 1999b; Gabel and Hix no date). Arguably, as Hix points out, "the European Union is now more a 'political system' than an international organisation" (Hix 1999a:69). It is clear that the European Union presents political

actors with opportunities that national politics no longer do, or can do, and a powerful sign of this is that political parties pursue at the European level goals they have traditionally pursued in the national political arena. Although there is no truly



*Figure 1.1 European Policy Space*

European party system, European parties are clearly aware of Europe as part of their strategic environment. The left-right cleavage that defines most national party systems acts as a prism through which parties approach Europe with the aim of advancing the party's goals. This is not to say that party goals are immune from interaction at the European level, say, within the European Parliament party groups. Subtle redefinition of parties' perceptions of the national interest to include some notion of a common European interest - *engrenage* - may well occur.

Scharpf (2000) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) advance one-dimensional left-right models (e.g., the horizontal axis of Figure 1.1), arguing that European integration is essentially domestic politics by other means. Accordingly, parties and governments support European regulation to the extent that it is perceived to advance their left- or right-inspired objectives. In a similar vein, Marks and Wilson (2000) have applied traditional cleavage theory to explain party positions toward European integration, and found that cross-national party families were more similar to each other than parties from the same country belonging to different party families. In more detail, they found that “as regulated capitalism at the European level became a feasible goal, and as social democratic parties came to the realisation that they could not exit the single market, they sought to deepen the European Union” (Marks and Wilson 2000:447). There were also ideological factors that were found to influence cross-national liberal, Christian democrat and conservative parties in systematic ways. The European Union’s broad interpretation of democracy and rights, economic liberty as well as state intervention and social security appeal in various measure to liberal parties of different hues (liberal-radical, liberal-conservative and, less comfortably, agrarian parties). These parties’ impatience with bureaucratisation and the European Union’s unresolved democratic issues are sources of discontent, but on balance liberal parties are supportive of integration because it addresses and advances - imperfectly - issues that liberal parties wish to advance. Christian democrat parties are more closely associated with the foundation of the European project than any other party group. This does not seem like a coincidence in light of the fact that Christian democrat party origins are in the universal Catholic Church, whose structures are distinctly supranational (to be contrasted to the national orientation of Protestant religions). Of course, not every Christian democrat party is Catholic. For instance the Finnish and Swedish parties which are part of the Christian democrat group in the European Parliament are Protestant. Tellingly, though, these Protestant countries did not join until 1995. Christian democrat parties tend to support European integration to manage the potential tension between prosperity through international trade and the provision of social welfare at home. Conservative parties’ perceived optimal point of European

integration is between fully regulated economies at the national level (e.g., no integration) and a fully regulated European economy (e.g., too much integration, not allowing competition).

There are also models that combine the independence-integration and the left-right dimensions. The Hooghe-Marks (1998) model deduces from the left-right and independence-integration dimensions two positions: “regulated capitalism” (left-integration) and “neo-liberalism” (right-independence). This model effectively collapses the two dimensions into a brand new one whose spectrum ranges from regulated capitalism to neo-liberalism. Meanwhile, an elaborated version of the two-dimensional model allows for the possibility that leftist parties may oppose integration and parties to the right of the political spectrum may support it (Gabel and Hix no date; Hix 1999a). The claim this model makes is that the two dimensions are not collapsible into each other, that left-right position does not determine independence-integration position, and furthermore, that there are national variations in this respect.

There are many unresolved issues about democracy, legitimacy and representation in Europe; some of the most pressing have been reviewed in this section. Most of them were resolved in the shape of the nation-state for several hundred years. Although “pure” nation-states have been rare, most if not all have enjoyed a culture of consent (to use, again, Siedentop’s phrase). More recently, however, European integration as well as internationalisation more generally have raised new questions about national as well as European democracy, legitimacy and representation and also about the relationship between the nation-state and Europe in this respect.

### **1.3 Attitude Congruence and Europe: Evidence and Measurements**

The general theories of how attitude congruence occurs specify that élites’ ability to shape public opinion (and to some extent vice versa), subject to certain aspects of a country’s political system, strongly influence whether and how attitude congruence occurs. In contrast to the empirical evidence that the Responsible Party Model functions vis-à-vis left-right issues such as economic policies, scholars

investigating attitude congruence on European integration (as a political issue in domestic politics) have found a lack of attitude congruence. (The most damning verdict on (national and European-level) political élites' failure to communicate Europe is perhaps that most people do not view European integration as a left-right issue in politics, or are at least that the European Union significantly shapes left-right policies). As I will show here, this conclusion has held with respect to both national representatives and their (nationally elected) counterparts in the European Parliament. The standard operational approach to research in this area is rather narrow, however, and there is evidence that more broadly based measurements repeated at several points in time can generate a different picture of attitude congruence and European integration.

A standard type of operationalisation of the concept of attitude congruence has developed among the research community investigating attitude congruence *vis-à-vis* European integration. It consists of putting the same three or so survey questions on salient aspects of European integration to an élite sample and a sample of the public, and then comparing the answers of parties and their respective partisans. Survey questions that have been used in this area of research have asked about the removal of internal European Union borders, the introduction of a single currency, satisfaction with democracy in the European Union and in one's country, and questions probing general preferences about European integration. The appeal of using identical measurements at the levels of public opinion and élites is obvious: comparisons are straightforward and easily justified.<sup>10</sup> The literature on European integration and attitude congruence that the identical measurements approach has generated makes use of a number of statistical tools and concepts for estimating the attitudinal distances between parties and their voters.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> "When asked the same question, party X say this and people who vote for party X say that, which represents a gap between them of Y units."

<sup>11</sup> **Means Difference:** Measures the average élite – public response differences on policy preferences. **Percentage Difference:** Indicates the average élite – public difference in responses to dichotomised survey items. **Proportion of Issues Displaying Different Majority Positions:** Using dichotomised survey items, this measure identifies the proportion of issues where élite and public majority opinion differs. **Duncan's Index of Dissimilarity:** Combines the mean measure with a measure of differentiation, yielding a 0-100 range where 0 is complete agreement and 100 complete disagreement.

The picture painted of attitude congruence and European integration, on the basis of the narrow, identical measurements approach, is disheartening. For instance, Marsh and Wessels (1997) found that in the 1994 European Parliament elections, successful candidates were much more in favour of integrative measures (European unification, a common currency and the removal of internal borders) than the European publics they ostensibly represent. This occurred to varying degrees in different countries. The authors suggest that party systems and electoral systems affect attitude congruence, but overall the authors conclude that “political representation on the European level shows strong deficiencies...The distortions in representation result in élites who are unduly favourable to European integration” (1997:231).<sup>12</sup> Additional research moreover shows that this is not a case of Members of the European Parliament being “naturally” more pro-European than their national-level counterparts. Attitude congruence research into the opinions of Members of National Parliaments vis-à-vis public opinion undermines that possibility. The problem is not about a “Eurocracy out of contact with the mood of the European people. Rather, the political élite quite generally seems to be marching ahead of the people” (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:202). Moreover, a study that combined Members of the European Parliament and Members of National Parliaments found both types of political representatives to reflect their voters’ opinions on “basic political dividing lines that have nothing to do with the European project” (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:199). That is, the finding was substantiated that the Responsible Party Model functions on issues that have straightforward, traditional left – right interpretation – but on European Union-related issues, which have not (yet?) acquired such connotations, the attitude congruence disappeared. In another study, the same authors wrote that voters have preferences and do recognise where parties stand on the European Union in general terms (some basic prerequisites for the Responsible Party Model to work), that is, as expressed in

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<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, successful election candidates were found to be less representative of public opinion than unsuccessful candidates, leading to the counter-intuitive conclusion that voters choose candidates who do not reflect their own opinions. Marsh and Wessels suggest that parties may have a tendency to promote strongly pro-European candidates over lukewarm ones, thus subtly tipping the electoral scales. But this does not answer the questions of why parties might be keen to promote



terms of left and right. They argue that as a consequence “political representation in the European Union works pretty well as far as general policy views are concerned; if it comes to the specifics of European policy making, the congruence between voters and their representatives is remarkably poor” (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000:2). In a further study with a very broad definition of “élite” the élites and the public were not found to be tuned to each other on European issues (Hix 1999).<sup>13</sup> On average élites were a staggering 43 per cent more favourably inclined towards European integration than the national publics, ranging from 58 percentage points in Germany to 19 percentage points in Ireland.<sup>14</sup>

Do these studies indicate that the situation has deteriorated from a permissive consensus in the 1970s and 1980s, into outright opposition in the 1990s and the new millennium? Claims about an alleged erosion of the permissive consensus were commonplace in the aftermath of the Danish (1992) and French (1993) referendums on the Treaty on European Union/Maastricht Treaty. Their outcomes have been interpreted literally as evidence that European publics had become mobilised and critical, the opposite of disengaged and pliant. Danish and French political parties favouring the Treaty failed to bring their partisans with them. The problems associated with Maastricht’s ratification were interpreted as “an indication of a

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
candidates who reflect public opinion less well than other candidates, and why members of the public do not notice this and translate it into their electoral behaviour?

<sup>13</sup> This study used the Top-Decision Maker survey, incorporating political élites as well as trade unionists, civil servants, media editors and owners, academics and other prominent members of civil society. This study used three public opinion survey questions that were also in the Top-Decision Maker survey.

<sup>14</sup> In addition to Schmitt and Thomassen’s qualified claim to attitude congruence (e.g., the distinction between grand political goals and specific policies) I am aware of three studies that argue that the Responsible Party Model does work with respect to European integration (Carrubba, n.d.; Evans 2000; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1991). (None of them gets fully to grips with the difficult question of whether the political élites or the public take the lead in the process of attitude congruence that they claim to have identified). None of them is especially reassuring, as the legitimacy of European integration is concerned. In one study, Carrubba argued that political élites, while respecting public opinion, use the room for manoeuvre caused by the widespread lack of citizen interest in European integration to push the integration process forward (n.d.:16). Whether this can actually be called representation in any meaningful sense of the word is questionable. In the other study, Evans found that French anti-European voters and parties successfully sought out each other (this study focused only on anti-European voters and parties). The anti-European attitudes of these voters and parties do nevertheless not render the European Union more democratically legitimate; it undermines it further. Van der Eijk and Franklin’s study (1991) concludes that attitude congruence on European integration exists, but this study is flawed because it measures only voters’ perceptions of party positions rather than party positions. Clearly, voter perceptions need not bear any close resemblance to reality.

disillusionment which extends far deeper than any objection to the specific content of the Treaty itself" (Weiler 1999:238), and as a demonstration that "European citizens were neither 'permissive' nor 'consensual' in their appraisal of the dramatic relaunching of European integration" (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998:251). However, since the French referendum was carried, albeit by the slimmest of margins, and the Danish "no" was overturned a year later, these two events may be less conclusive evidence of the end of the permissive consensus than some would have us believe. If it really were the end, it would need to have lasting effects not only in France and Denmark but also in the other member states (and, as Wessels reminds us, "public opinion is not homogenous; indeed, considerable variations in mass attitudes toward European integration is found between member countries" (1995a:105)). There is no immediate evidence that an era has ended in this respect. In addition, the referendum outcomes of 1992 and 1993 have been explained not so much as evidence of attitudes toward the current model of European integration, as evidence of anti-government feeling (Franklin, Marsh and Wleizen 1994; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 1995). These authors cite Danish and French public opinion data from 1992-1993, which indicates solid support for integration, and suggest that the results of these referendums reflected government unpopularity rather attitudes toward European integration. In contrast, in Ireland (where public support for Europe was also solid) the Maastricht referendum in 1992 passed with ease and the Irish government of the day was vastly more popular than were the French and Danish ones.

There is also at least one claim to the effect that there was never a permissive consensus in the first place (Gabel 1998:32-35). Eurobarometer time-series cross-national data shows that in the 1985-1991 period the proportion of respondents who reported that they "often think of themselves as European" never exceeded 20 per cent, and on this basis Gabel dismissed the permissive consensus. The main value of this contribution is that it highlights the imprecision of the concept of permissive consensus, despite its frequent use. As a form of "soft attitude congruence" is can be spatially located between two opposite poles of attitude congruence and incongruence (Figure 1.2).



*Figure 1.2 Attitude Congruence*

In accordance with the Responsible Party Model modern democracies should be located closest to the attitude congruence pole, to the left. The literature on permissive consensus suggests that on the particular issue of European integration, modern democracies are in fact located in the middle zone. The recent claims about the erosion or non-existence of the permissive consensus place them to the right of the Figure, close to the attitude incongruence where the Responsible Party Model does not function.

But does every instance of attitude incongruence cause concern? Not necessarily, according to Esaiason and Holmberg (1996). Since neither politics nor attitudes are static, “the public and their chosen leaders must march in rhythm, even if that takes time” (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996:82). It may be unavoidable that the political division of labour that occurs in representative politics between élites and the public might generate temporary instances of incongruence. But more than three decades of research have found and reaffirmed, at best, permissive consensus. Three decades is hardly a “temporary instance.” Could it be, though, as the opening paragraph of this section suggests, that the substantive result of the empirical research in this area reflects poor operationalisation of the Responsible Party Model rather than poor representation? The standard operationalisation of attitude congruence, to compare the two halves of party-partisan dyads by asking them the same two or three survey questions, has certain strengths that have already been acknowledged. Whether it is the result of poor funding for the social sciences, a lack of imagination on the part of the researchers, or something else, there is arguably a research economism that unfortunately but rather neatly parallels the

economism of thinking about the European Union itself. Just as the European Union itself has developed without any searching debate on its nature, research in this area has been pursued with a very narrow research operationalisation of attitude congruence. To measure party-partisan congruence using two or three survey questions emphasises, correctly, a high degree of comparability is assessing the degree of attitude congruence. It is unavoidable that the operationalisation will be based on a small number of survey questions if one is very concerned about identical measurements, because it is simply the case that not enough such data exists for more extensive research in this vein. If one's research objective is to establish attitudes on a particular policy at different levels of society, then this may be sufficient. However, to infer that the Responsible Party Model does not work from findings based on less than a handful of discrete policy areas is to infer rather a lot on the basis of not very much.

There is at least some evidence that a more comprehensive approach to researching attitude congruence can result in findings that fundamentally challenge the received wisdom about Europe and the Responsible Party Model. This evidence derives from a study based on more broadly based measurements of public opinion and party positions than the conventional and narrow identical measurements approach. Wessels (1995) employs party manifestos to estimate party positions and found that the contents of party manifestos were well reflected in the attitudes of partisan voters. This study applied the so-called cascade model developed by Deutsch (1968), and it showed that across Europe élites do act as opinion leaders, acquiring opinions that subsequently cascade down through five conceptual levels of society (and occasionally in the reverse direction). In the cascade model, the uppermost level of society comprises the top two to three per cent of the population (in terms of property, income and socio-economic status). This group is not monolithic but is nonetheless connected through multiple socialising links that generate patterns of behaviour and preferences. The second level consists of the political and governmental élites who also function as a self-contained communication and decision system. Neither Deutsch nor Wessels specify what proportion of society as a whole this group constitutes. The size of the next level,

the mass media (newspapers, magazines, television, radio, etc.), is not specified either. The mass media level is understood as a system with its own intake, output and decision-making capabilities and memories. Below the mass media is a level of opinion leaders, the estimated 5 or 10 per cent of the population who pay consistent attention to the media. We can think of this group as an issue public with particular interest in foreign affairs, which Deutsch mentions as a particular interest (probably because the book where he develops the cascade model was *The Analysis of International Relations* (1968)). Finally, there is the part of the public that takes an interest in politics. Between 60 and 90 per cent of the adult population is reckoned to be politically effective, that is, they vote (Deutsch 1968:103-104). His analysis suggests that opinions do cascade down through societies involved in European integration, as the attitudes of the politically relevant members of the public (e.g., people who vote) are affected by élite opinion to a greater extent than for people who do not vote. To a lesser extent partisans were also able to influence the platforms' contents.<sup>15</sup> It would be foolish to claim that the European Union has developed on the basis of an involved citizenry that regularly engages with important issues, but Wessels' application of the cascade model with broadly based measurements nevertheless shows that reality may not warrant the very negative picture research in this area tends to paint.

#### **1.4 From the Conventional Approach to the Ideal Type Approach**

##### 1.4.1 Why a New Approach?

The narrow operational approach that has become conventional is to survey samples of the public and the political élites on two or three policies (e.g. the single currency, the removal of internal borders, etc.) and then compare rates of approval among the two parts of a party-partisan dyad. The strong appeal of this approach is that it is based in identical measures of public and party attitudes, but the

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<sup>15</sup> Wessels qualifies this conclusion with the observation that in about two thirds of cases there is a discrepancy between parties and partisans on the matter of European integration. Apparently, most people at the lowest level of the cascade carry on regardless of the élite opinions splashing down over their heads (literally and figuratively). Nor, understandably if they have no interest in politics, are they successful in reversing the downward flow of opinion-formation by influencing party platforms.

narrowness of this approach also has serious flaws. There are at least four reasons to take a new look at how to operationalise research in this area. Some of these reasons are interrelated, or reinforce each other in terms of what a new approach to research in this area might look like.

First, some of the literature reviewed above suggests that to some extent members of the public can make sense of parties' general policy positions but not necessarily their views on detailed policies. Consequently, it would be worthwhile to work with broad conceptualisations of Europe instead of small numbers of policy areas, and in this vein this study has at its core a set of four broad ideal type conceptualisations of Europe, which are introduced in detail in chapter 2.

The second reason is about measurements, and is related to the first, conceptual reason. Broad conceptualisations obviously require broadly based measurements. The approach taken in this study requires significantly larger amounts of data than the limited availability of identical measurements can facilitate.

The third reason to take a new approach refers to a point raised earlier in this chapter, whether it is meaningful to measure attitude congruence at a single point in time. Typically there is not sufficient data to create identical measurements that track party and public opinion over time. Faced with the constraints of data and the desire to take a cross-temporal perspective, most research has prioritised the identical measurements over cross-temporal analyses. It should not be denied that there is at least one good reason to make that choice (e.g., the value of having identical measurements), but the ensuing neglect of the cross-temporal perspective may lead to a failure to detect trends of increasing or decreasing attitude congruence. As will become clear below, this study takes a cross-temporal perspective with the aim of detecting cross-temporal trends.

The fourth and final reason refers to replication and its role in political science (and the social sciences generally). There is disagreement within political science over what is appropriate and useful replication. To replicate someone else's research with their samples and following every step of their methodology arguably

does not contribute much to a research community.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, to apply a different methodology to the same data, or to acquire new data with which to investigate the same research question can be very useful contributions. This study takes a new approach to the old research question of whether the Responsible Party Model works with respect to European integration. If the results reached through the conventional approach to research are robust, then they should be replicated in a new and different approach to research. Chapter 2 is dedicated to outlining and explaining this approach, whose objective is to widen the focus of attitude congruence research from the narrow focus on two or three survey questions to the broader question of policy space. As will become clear, the question shifts from “do parties and partisans agree about this or that European policy?” to “how closely do parties’ and partisans’ ideal type profiles correspond?”

#### 1.4.2 Case Study: Ireland

It has already been hinted that the ideal type approach is highly demanding in terms of empirical data, and therefore most usefully framed as a case study. A “case” must at a minimum be an integrated system of some kind (Stake 1994:236). In this type of research a country as a political system based on representation can be considered a case: it is a system where political élites and the public ostensibly refer to each other in the nationally integrated political process. Any of the European Union’s 15 member states could be selected as a case on this basis. Why select Ireland, and how representative is it, as a case, of the other 14 member states? In undertaking a case study it is worth considering to what extent the findings about the case selected for study allows one to make inferences to other geographic or temporal settings (from the outset, along with Coakley and Gallagher, I do not agree with “the venerable generalisation that ‘Ireland is different’, so there is no need to make the effort to compare its politics with those of other countries” (Coakley and Gallagher 1999:xvi)). The place and role of case studies in comparative research sometimes seems uncertain, but case studies can and should be considered in the context of a wider research agenda if they use the concepts, theories, measurements

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<sup>16</sup> It also lacks the element of originality that is required in doctoral work.

or models that are central to that research agenda - possibly in other case studies, or in explicitly comparative research. Accordingly, this case study which shares the Responsible Party Model and concepts such as attitude congruence with a whole body of research and its attendant literature, can be seen as implicitly comparative. In fact, it is what Lijphart (1971) has referred to as a theory-confirming case study, or a theory-infirming case study, depending on whether or not the findings will confirm or infirm the currently prevailing view that the Responsible Party Model does not function well with respect to European integration. (Though Lijphart correctly points out (1971:692) that one single case will never constitute a very strong basis for arguing that a theory has been confirmed or infirmed by one's analysis).

So what can one learn about other European Union member states with respect to the Responsible Party Model and European integration, from studying Ireland? I did not select Ireland as a case randomly, but neither I did select it because I somehow knew it to be representative of the other 14 member states. Since random selection is not generally suitable in small-n research such as this (see for instance King, Keohane and Verba 1994:124-128), one must select on the basis of theoretically driven, explicit reasons. Taken together, these reasons (which are set out directly below) strongly suggest that Ireland is a lenient test of the Responsible Party Model. It follows that if, for instance, the Model turns out not to work in Ireland, then one can say quite conclusively that it is unlikely to work elsewhere. In this scenario, which would be theory-confirming, Ireland would quite clearly be representative of other member states. If, on the other hand, the Model turns out to work well in Ireland, then it is an open question whether it works elsewhere. In this theory-infirming scenario it would not be clear whether Ireland is a representative case or not: to find out one would have to undertake another study. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this study to deal in detail with other countries (cases), except to conclude, after the analysis, whether it would be worthwhile to pursue this line of research on new case studies, and if so, which cases might be the most promising or interesting.



What, then, makes Ireland a lenient text, an easy case? The previous sections of this chapter have shown that certain factors appear to systematically effect the presence or absence of attitude congruence, or differently put, whether the Responsible Party Model functions. They can be roughly divided into issue factors and system factors. The issue factors pertain to the nature of a given political issue, specifically its salience and left-right connotations. The system factors refer to the electoral and party systems, and the centrality of political parties.

With respect to the first point, an issue's salience, the permissive consensus literature has shown that the low salience of European issues is a cross-national phenomenon. In Ireland it can nevertheless be expected that the levels of political communication on European issues are comparatively high due to the requirement of holding referendums on amendments to the European Treaties. Only in Ireland and Denmark are European-related referendums held with any degree of regularity (though in contrast to Ireland, Denmark has a history of divisions between and within parties over Europe). Referendums have been a defining aspect of Ireland's European Union membership, and it might be said informally that they are times when "everyone" talks about the same thing(s) at the same time. Referendums are not the only source of political communication, nor necessarily in theory the most productive, but like other types of electoral contests referendums are about élites presenting the public with different alternatives (a binary choice in referendums) and trying to persuade the public around to a particular position. To gain public approval, however, the party must define its position with careful consideration of public opinion. This is exactly how the Responsible Party Model envisions representation to occur. The resulting political communication, ostensibly European-related inasmuch as the referendums are about European Treaty reforms, are precisely what commentators have spent much time and effort arguing is not present in European societies. The absence of political communication is widely blamed for the failure of the Responsible Party Model, as reported in previous sections of this chapter. The implication of this point is that when there is political communication the Responsible Party Model can be expected to work (or at least to work better).

The occurrence of European-related referendums in Ireland as the place and time(s) of measurement in a test of the Responsible Party Model on European integration requires some further comment on these referendums. Four European-related referendums have taken place in Ireland between 1972 and 1998 (Table 1.1). The first paved the way for Ireland's accession on 1 January, 1973, together with Denmark and the United Kingdom. European integration had been on the Irish political agenda since the very early 1960s, and until 1973 it moved up and

**Table 1.1 European-Related Referendums in Ireland 1972-1998**

| <i>Referendum</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Turnout</i> | <i>Y %</i> | <i>N %</i> | <i>Spoil %</i> | <i>Gov't</i> |
|-------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|------------|----------------|--------------|
| <b>Accession</b>  | 10/5/1972   | 70.9           | 83.1       | 16.9       | .8             | FF           |
| <b>SEA</b>        | 26/5/1987   | 44.1           | 69.9       | 30.1       | .5             | FF           |
| <b>Maastricht</b> | 18/6/1992   | 57.3           | 69.1       | 30.9       | .5             | FF-PD        |
| <b>Amsterdam</b>  | 22/5/1998   | 56.2           | 61.7       | 38.3       | .02            | FF-PD        |

down that agenda depending on the status of the British application (which was vetoed by France's President De Gaulle in 1963). Ireland's dependence on the British economy made Irish governments loath to seek a relationship with the European Economic Communities that differed from the relationship between the UK and the European Economic Communities, hence the delay until 1973 (Maher 1986).<sup>17</sup> Over 80 per cent of votes cast in 1972 favoured accession, and the high turnout further strengthened the case for accession. 1972 was before the time of opinion polling in Ireland and due to the lack of data on public opinion this study does not cover the early part of Ireland's membership.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Although the Irish economy's dependence on Britain has decreased since 1973 (Gillespie 1996, 2000) matters continue to arise in Ireland in the 1990s as a consequence of Britain's uneasy relationship with European (Schengen and EMU are late-1990s examples).

<sup>18</sup> I have come across two oblique references to an opinion survey allegedly carried out by Irish Marketing Surveys for Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs prior to the 1972 accession referendum. First, a Canadian government publication held that "attitude surveys were conducted to discover the issues which worried the people [with regard to joining the then EEC]" (Canada 1978). Second, *Leargas – Public Affairs* wrote in April 1972 that supplementary estimates for the Department of Foreign Affairs included a £40 000 item for "Information," part or all of which was alleged to be used for a survey to aid the government in its campaign. The brief article continued "Circulation of the results is extremely limited" ("Survey of Attitudes to EEC" *Leargas – Public Affairs* No.8, Vol. 4, 1972). I wrote to politicians, civil servants, polling agencies and journalists who were active at the time to find out more. Most never replied, and when I pursued them they denied any knowledge of the survey.

The period covered in this study starts in 1987, the time of the Single European Act referendum. The Single European Act re-launched the European project after many years of Euro-sclerosis. There was no intention on the part of the Fianna Fail government of the day to hold a referendum on the Single European Act. A successful Supreme Court challenge by Mr. Raymond Crotty forced the government to hold a referendum over Title III of the Act (which put European Political Co-operation under the auspices of the Treaties). However, the implications of the Supreme Court judgement were ambiguous insofar as it brought into question Ireland's membership of the United Nations and Ireland's status as signatory to other international treaties. These had not been ratified by referendum; were they suddenly invalid? Could an Irish government no longer make executive decisions without referring to the judiciary and, ultimately, to the people? In the course of events the Fianna Fail government decided to submit to the people the question of ratifying the Single European Act, rather than simply Title III of the Act. There were also calls for a broader amendment, dealing with the making of Irish foreign policy instead of or in addition to the Single European Act *per se*. The question of whether to agree with the narrow amendment to ratify the Single European Act as proposed by the government, or a wider amendment that would settle Ireland's standing *vis-à-vis* international organisation etc. thus became a matter for extensive debate (Gallagher 1988). In any event the electorate passed the referendum by about 70 per cent in favour to 30 per cent against, a decrease on 1972 in terms of support as well as turnout.

The Supreme Court judgement on the Irish ratification of the Single European Act meant that all subsequent amendments to the European Treaties had to be by referendum in Ireland. The referendum on the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty as it immediately became known, took place in 1992. It took steps toward the completion of the single market and responded to the changes deriving from the end of the Cold War, in particular the reunification of the then East and West Germany. This course of events caused anxiety amongst Germany's Community partners who were adamant that the new Germany must be entirely tied into the Community (and Nato) framework. Hence the Treaty changes agreed at the

Maastricht Council. 69.1 per cent of votes cast in the Irish referendum favoured ratification, which was not a substantial change from 1987 though turnout in 1992 was rather higher than in 1987.

The fourth European-related referendum in Ireland concerned the Amsterdam Treaty, which was the outcome of the 1996-97 intergovernmental conference and aimed to prepare the European Union for eastward enlargement, bringing the European Union closer to the citizen and strengthening the European Union's external role and capabilities. In the Irish referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty just over 60 per cent of votes cast favoured the ratification of the Treaty, a substantial drop from 1992 though turnout was virtually unchanged. The 1998 referendum took place under a new regime of rules. The Referendum Act (1998) led to the establishment of a Referendum Commission charged with preparing and disseminating information on the subject matter of the referendum. The removal of referendum campaigning from the political parties to a non-politically motivated agency presenting a wide range of pro and con arguments did not occur without criticism. In particular it did not appear to succeed in enabling citizens to make informed choices (chapter 6 contains extensive analysis of this aspect of the Referendum Commission).

The second point pertaining to the likelihood of attitude congruence on a given political issue is the extent to which the issue has a clear left-right interpretation. The assumption is that people orient themselves in the political world using left-right cues provided by political parties, which inform them about the issues affecting them and their pocketbooks. European issues have been cast neither as left-right issues, nor as pocket-book issues, which contributes to the problem that people do not engage with European issues. However, Irish people are probably less used to left-right cues than virtually any other political community in Europe (and due to Ireland's sizeable benefits from Europe they may also be more inclined to view it in pocket-book terms). As a consequence, it would not be expected that they would be "thrown" by issues that had no immediate, obvious left-right interpretation. Perhaps as a consequence they would be better equipped to acquire and process information about European issues. The unusual nature of Irish

politics derives from the weakness of the left and of the right, and this anomaly derives from the two dominant parties that give the party system its structure, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. They evolved as political bodies with competing visions of Irish nationalism and independence in the civil war following the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921). The Anglo-Irish Treaty contained a formulation of Irish independence from Britain that was not universally acceptable among the political forces in Ireland and it set off a series of splits in the nationalist movement that has continued into the 1990s, with ripples in the political party system.<sup>19</sup> The victorious pro-Treaty forces of the early 1920s were encapsulated in the Fine Gael party. Fianna Fail, the political party evolving from the losing anti-Treaty side, is nevertheless the largest and historically the most influential party in Irish politics. Fianna Fail and Fine Gael took over 70 per cent of the total vote in all elections between 1961 and 1989, occasionally exceeding 80 per cent (Holmes 1996:192). Little other than Northern Ireland policy has differentiated these centrist, catch-all parties, and certainly not European integration.<sup>20</sup>

Since 1989, other parties and independent representatives have played pivotal roles as government makers and breakers. The Labour Party is the oldest party in Ireland, but it has always played third fiddle to the “civil war” parties. The merger in 1998 between Labour and Democratic Left, a small party that emerged on the Irish political scene in 1992 after a series of splits within the radical Republican tradition, may strengthen the peculiarly weak Irish left in due course. The Progressive Democrats, a 1985 offshoot of Fianna Fail, is often thought to be the most conservative Irish party, irrespective of its comparatively liberal, progressive social agenda. The Green Party and Sinn Fein are two additional, small parties with parliamentary representation that are not easily located on a left – right spectrum although both profess leftist values. This is the case of European Green parties generally, while Sinn Fein is primarily thought of in terms of its involvement in the

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<sup>19</sup> The IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, split into Official IRA and Official Sinn Fein in 1969-1970; Official Sinn Fein changed its name to Sinn Fein the Workers’ Party in 1977 and to the Workers’ Party in 1982. In 1992 Democratic Left split from the Workers’ Party and emerged as a new party in Irish politics (Sinnott 1995:59).

wider Irish Republican family. Finally, there is a small but occasionally pivotal category of “Others and Independents” whose power depends upon the distribution of seats between the government and the opposition parties at any given point in time.

The civil war, rather than left-right, axis of the Irish party system is commonly considered not to fit into the analytical categories that are often used to compare party systems. Accordingly, many Irish parties do not easily fit into Western European party families, and nor is the particular electoral weakness of the Irish left easy to reconcile with the strength of comparable parties in other European countries. (Incidentally, Labour is one of few Irish parties that fits comfortably into a European party family). Nevertheless, some Irish parties are clearly “more” or “less” left or right than certain other ones and typical left-right issues are as important in Irish politics as in any other country. As a consequence, Irish people must use some other cues to make sense of the political world, which may be more suitable to making sense of European-related issues that are not obviously left-right issues? If this is true, then the Responsible Party Model might work well in Ireland.

The system factors also suggest Ireland is an easy case. To begin with, electoral systems that turn votes into seats with high degrees of proportionality are expected to promote attitude congruence. Accordingly, the Responsible Party Model would be expected to work well in Ireland. The Irish electoral system, Proportional Representation by a Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV) translates votes into seats with a very high degree of proportionality. Precise estimates of just how proportional it is depend on voting behaviour in any given election, though typically large parties benefit somewhat simply from being large (Sinnott 1999:113-115). The current significance of PR-STV’s proportional nature is that different flavours of public opinion in Ireland ought to be proportionally represented at the level of policy-making, thus enhancing attitude congruence between parties and public opinion.

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<sup>20</sup> The peace process that took off in the middle of the 1990s may or may not transform these two parties, and thereby the Irish party system (in the main the peace process has nevertheless seemed in poorer shape than the Irish party system).

Furthermore, the nature of the party system is expected to make a difference inasmuch as multi-party systems are expected to enhance attitude congruence. The assumption is that multiparty systems present more policy packages to the public than two-party (or single-party) systems, thus creating a greater likelihood that there will be “something for everyone” among the public. The Irish party system is a multiparty system, though two of the parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, have dominated Irish politics since the foundation of the state in 1922. The party system has responded to changes in society and moved from a two-and-a-half party system (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour) to a more conventional, fragmented multiparty system. In this evolved party system coalitions between large and small parties have become the norm and consequently small parties’ policy packages have a realistic possibility of being implemented as policy (Farrell 1999; Mair 1999). As a consequence of the emergence of new parties and pivotal parliamentary independents the Irish people have a larger set of policy packages to choose between, at least in theory. Accordingly, their attitudes are more likely to find reflection at the level of political parties than they were previously.

The third and final system factor refers to the centralism of political parties. Centralised parties are presumed to have clear, coherent positions that facilitate attitude congruence. The presumed effect of clear, coherent party positions is that members of the general public are able to make sense of party positions and decide whether they agree with one or more parties. It has been noted that “in many respects Irish parties are quite decentralised, with local organisations retaining a high degree of autonomy” (Laver and Marsh 1999:153). This includes the selection of party candidates, where local party branches are influential, and at the national party conferences where branches are well represented. However, policy-making per se takes place within the executive of each party and in the Oireachtas the party whip is not taken lightly. There is not much research into this aspect of Irish politics, but “all around Europe, deputies follow the party line in votes in parliament, and if anything parliamentary party cohesion is even higher in Ireland than the average” (Gallagher 1999:179). Accordingly, for the purposes of this

study, Irish parties are centralised in the relevant respect (candidates, no matter how or by whom they are selected, conform to the party whip).

Two further points are worth addressing in the context of selecting Ireland as a case study, because they might seem to decrease Ireland's usefulness as a case. The first is whether the holding of European-related referendums make party-partisan congruence irrelevant in Ireland. After all, in these referendums ordinary people get to have their say on the major developments of the European project, so what else could one ask for in terms of legitimising it – especially considering that the Irish people have generally endorsed what was proposed in each referendum? The answer to this question is that it is not as simple as all that to say that referendums legitimise European integration, removing the need for broad attitudinal agreement between parties and voters. The reason is that in referendums voters are asked to pass judgement on incredibly complex legal texts that most of them have never had the opportunity to read, and whose political outcomes are far from obvious even to specialists.<sup>21</sup> But apart from the inaccessibility of Treaties, party-partisan agreement matters despite referendums because in their role of Irish government parties represent Ireland at the European Councils where Treaty amendments are negotiated. While governments never represent the full range of opinion in a country,<sup>22</sup> they can not be said to represent Ireland in any meaningful way unless their basic attitude toward European issues is in line with at least their own supporters among the general public. Therefore, referendums alone do not suffice in legitimising the way in which European integration proceeds.

The second point about Ireland as a case study is whether the Responsible Party Model can be expected to work on any policy issue in Ireland, considering the non-left-right nature of the party system. This point requires one to distinguish between the model of representative democracy embodied in the Responsible Party Model on the one hand, and the fact that Western European politics tend to operate along a left-right axis on the other hand. From the perspective of democratic

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<sup>21</sup> An Irish participant in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference wrote that after the June 1997 Amsterdam Council “establishing what had ‘happened’ at Amsterdam did not always prove to be an exact and objective science” (McDonagh 1998:195) due to the overload of information, activity, languages and delegations at the Council itself.



legitimacy, what matters is not that parties and partisans agree in left-right terms, but that they agree in whatever terms happen to be salient in a particular system. Therefore, while the Responsible Party Model may not operate in left-right terms in Ireland there is in principle no reason to assume it does not work along any axis at all there. In addition, there is the possibility that because Irish voters may not usually rely of left-right cues, they may more easily adapt their cues to incorporate new, non-left-right issues such as European issues.<sup>23</sup>

### 1.5 Conclusion

The member states of the European Union are engaged in a multi-level governance project that has no pre-ordained destination, no *finalité politique*, and which arguably should not have one. However, it should be surrounded by, even proceed on the basis of, on-going debates between the European publics and their elected policy-makers. The significance of European governance in the lives of European citizens is often as important as or more important than national policy-making, which makes the present state of affairs a disturbing political problem. It also poses at least one puzzle to political science: is the central message emerging from empirical research, and current theorising about representation and integration, correct? May it be the case that the conventional way of researching attitude congruence in part paints a more pessimistic picture than reality would warrant, by relying on an overly narrow operational approach?

In the chapters that follow this narrow, conventional approach is abandoned in favour of a broader approach. It is based on broad conceptualisations of Europe, a different set of priorities regarding the selection and use of data, and ultimately leads to a different way of assessing the Responsible Party Model. If this generates the same conclusions as the narrow operational approach, then they will gain in persuasiveness. If it generates new, unexpected insights into attitude congruence between parties and partisans over Europe, then a new direction in attitude

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<sup>22</sup> This follows necessarily from accepting the principle of majority rule.

<sup>23</sup> I wish to stress that I see the European Union as having a significant impact on left-right policies in domestic settings; the point I am making here, however, is that voters do not seem to have incorporated the European Union into their left-right system of political cues.

congruence research might be warranted. It would take its departure in the notion that the problem might be at least partly in the social science measurement instruments, not in the democratic legitimacy of the European Union.

## Chapter 2:

### The Ideal Type Approach

#### 2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter spelled out the reasons why it matters that representation works with respect to European integration at the national level: because this is the most promising place to start the search for a future solution to the legitimacy problems that the European project faces. This chapter builds on and extends the narrow approach to researching the Responsible Party Model and European integration, which was presented in chapter 1. The new approach draws heavily on contemporary thinking about an emerging European policy space. The reason for modifying the models of a European policy space that have been developed in this literature is to be able to use the thinking underpinning them to research attitude congruence vis-à-vis European integration in a way that moves beyond the narrow focus that such research tends to have. Such narrow research tends to score high on reliability, but arguably not very high on validity inasmuch as it conceptualises European integration too narrowly. Section 2.2 outlines how this study draws on and fits in with competing models of the European Union as a political space (usually these models are referred to as models of policy space). Section 2.3 subsequently introduces the conceptual framework that is at the core of this study, namely a set of four ideal type orientations toward European integration. In later chapters all Irish parties and partisan groups will be characterised on the basis of the ideal types, so in anticipation of this I elaborate on what sort of evidence would lead me to accept or reject the Responsible Party Model on the basis of the ideal types. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.

#### 2.2 Models of Policy Space

Chapter 1 introduced the conventional approach to research, that is, comparing élite and public attitudes on two or three specific policy issues such as the single currency and the removal of borders. The advantage of this approach is its identical measurements. The dependence on the availability of identical élite and public opinion data restricts the scope of this research, and


leads to its main limitation, the inability to conceptualise Europe as anything other than a small number of policy areas. This arguably misses the broader, more complex and hugely more interesting question of prevailing conceptions of what Europe is, among political actors and the general public.

Chapter 1 presented competing models of the European policy space, represented by the two axis of Figure 1.1. The competing models aim to locate political actors spatially vis-à-vis ideological and other factors that cause members of cross-national party families to take fairly coherent positions on Europe. These models, unmodified, are inspirational but of limited practical use in the present context because they do not accommodate permissive consensus (or some similar concept) as a spatial location. Keeping in mind that permissive consensus would be the most likely location of partisans according to the bulk of research into public opinion and European integration, this is a serious shortcoming. To overcome this problem and to create a model as suitable as possible to attitude congruence research, certain amendments to existing models were necessary.

To recapitulate, the element of competition between the models refers to whether this policy space has one or two dimensions. The first of these is an independence-integration dimension, and the second a left-right dimension. A model consisting of merely an independence-integration dimension in effect reflects the traditional view of European integration inspired by Realist International Relations theory: as providing an arena where sovereign, national governments advance their national interests. A model consisting of merely a left-right dimension would represent a radical, European federalist view. Here, the integration-independence dimension would be seen as played out and void of significance. Chapter 1 also referred to two-dimensional models, combining the independence-integration and left-right dimensions. A two-dimensional model represents contemporary Western Europe most accurately, because the independence-integration dimension is still significant and the left-right dimension appears to be becoming more and more so. National resistance to European policy-making continues to determine the scope of the European project, and will do so for the foreseeable future, and yet the European project has moved far beyond mere international co-operation. The left-right dimension is relevant as an arena where national political actors seek to advance their

objectives and co-operate across national divides to a degree that the independence-integration dimension can not adequately reflect.

The modification of existing models is illustrated in Figure 2.1. While still drawing on the spatial idea, and also drawing on attitude theory (Triandis 1971; Back *et.al.* 1977; Hollander 1981; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Baron and Byrne 1991; Eagly and Chaiken 1993), the independence-integration dimension has been reconceptualised as a directional dimension in Figure 2.1. Direction refers to an attitude's positive, neutral or negative content. The attitude object that may be liked, ignored or disliked in this study is of course Europe. The second dimension in the respecified model is a salience dimension, included instead of a left-right dimension specifically to be able to address the permissive consensus-related arguments about European integration. Salience refers to whether an agent considers the attitude object to be important, irrespective of the direction of the attitude. The removal of the left-right dimension is not intended to suggest that left and right do not matter, per se. However, since the objective here is not to assess self-placement in terms of left and right such a dimension is less relevant than direction and salience.



*Figure 2.1 Revised Two-Dimensional Model of European Policy Space*

## 2.3 The Ideal Types

### 2.3.1 Features

An ideal type is a heuristic tool closely associated with Max Weber, as developed especially in “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy” (1949), and applied in other works (such as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1976)). Weber developed ideal types as a critique of both the positivist and subjectivist branches of social science research. According to Weber the tool’s function was to enable our getting to grips with the social world without either seeking to establish covering-laws or having to resort to simply “intuit” the meanings of social action. In this vein, Weber defined an ideal type as a:

one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. (Weber 1949:90).

An ideal type, it follows from this definition, is a purely intellectual exercise where the social scientist distils out a phenomenon’s essential features; the result is a construct that in itself is not expected ever to exist in its pure form in the real world. It is, however, hypothesised to characterise to some extent the phenomenon to which it refers. The point of ideal types, then, is that they can aid social scientists in their efforts by functioning as yardstick measurements against which to compare empirical cases, as “analytical instruments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data” (Weber 1949:106). Naturally, one would like to know whether the yardstick is any good, but according to Weber an ideal type’s merit depends on the research circumstances because they determine which elements of some phenomenon should be accentuated. Moreover, ideal types are “utopia” (1949:90) so it would be misguided to reject them as one would hypotheses on the basis of empirical falsification.

In this thesis I draw upon Weber’s development of ideal types as heuristic tools for making sense of empirical data, by developing four stylised or even exaggerated constructs (ideal types), each depicting a generalised, internally coherent, attitude toward European integration. These four ideal types

are developed below, and used (in chapter 5) to “master” the empirical cases (e.g., the parties and partisan groups) in the sense of profiling each party and each partisan group, subsequently to be used to test the Responsible Party Model. It follows from taking this approach that the research does not depend on the empirical cases being perfect fits to any given ideal type; rather, what matters is that the ideal types specify what to look for (perhaps even what to expect) when examining the empirical cases.

The four ideal type attitudes toward Europe can be located in the revised, direction-salience spatial model (Figure 2.1). The internal structure of the ideal types mirrors the major aspects of the European project, thereby allowing the ideal types to encapsulate that which it describes as fully as possible.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, a core part of the ideal types is European institutions and policies. The origins of European integration were, of course, about creating institutions and policies whereby peaceful relations could be established and maintained and whereby war-ravaged continental economies could begin to help themselves. All major theoretical accounts of European integration maintain a strong focus on institutions and policies, in reflection of this reality (O’Neill 1996). Federal accounts of European integration place institutions and institution-building at the very heart of what integration is all about, and consequently also the policies that are made in those institutions. Neo-functional accounts of integration place sectoral policies and the institutions in which they are managed at the core Europe. Jean Monnet, the French civil servant and “father of Europe” is sometimes seen as a federalist and sometimes as a neo-functionalist. In this passage he could be either, or both – the point is, European institutions and policies are what Europe is all about: “European unity is the most important event in Europe since the war, not because it is a new great power, but because the new institutional method it introduces is permanently modifying relations between nations and men” (Monnet 1962; reprinted 1994). Intergovernmental accounts of integration also focus on institutions and policies, though

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<sup>1</sup> Niedermayer and Westle’s (1995) impressive typology of orientations toward international organisations is very detailed and the authors suggest it has application to the European Union as well as to other regional bodies. My thinking in developing the ideal types was certainly influenced by this typology in terms of the ideal types’ dimensions, but I wanted to develop a conceptual framework that applied specifically to European integration, and which was simpler than Niedermayer and Westle’s. (As will become clear in the chapters that follow, applying the ideal types to the empirical data was quite complicated despite their relative simplicity).

downplaying their supranational elements in favour of the national governments, who are the most important actors from this perspective.

This brings to the fore the necessity of also looking at national institutions and policies, in particular their relationship with European institutions and policies. Federal and neo-functional accounts of integration naturally play down their significance; at least in due course it is presumed that they will be superseded by their European equivalents. From the intergovernmental perspective, however, no such shift is expected to occur since national governments, the gatekeepers of integration, are not expected to let that happen. Nevertheless, a number of attitude combinations are thinkable with respect to national and European institutions and policies, such as pro-national/pro-European; pro-national/anti-European, etc. As will become clear, the ideal types reflect some plausible combinations, and also takes into account the importance of institutions and policies to parties and to voters.

Values and identity-perceptions are much less prominent than institutions and policies in the reality of European integration, as well as in theories about it. This is the source of some of the concerns about the legitimacy of the European project (chapter 1 explored these issues). Moreover, values and identity-perceptions are at best implicit or secondary features of federal and neo-functional theories of integration. For instance, the federalist's Europe would presumably culminate in a European-wide sense of collective identity and neo-functionalists assume that citizens will shift their identity affiliation to the new, European institutions once they take over from national institutions. Among intergovernmentalists shared values and identities are not assumed to evolve and nor are they considered in any way necessary, not to say desirable. Intergovernmentalists view these issues as irrelevant to the integration process, though in a general sense their focus is entirely on national values and national identity. They would not recognise or wish to feel part of any notion of European values or community feelings.

As with institutions and policies, there is a national – European duality here. Although theories of integration do not focus much on these matters, assuming that neither do people nor the practitioners of integration, in this study they are treated as equally important as institutions and policies because of the role they play in any eventual resolution of Europe's democracy issues. It is



clearly possible to imagine several configurations of national and European values and identity-perceptions, for instance one might associate Europe with negative values (undemocratic, unjust, etc.) and one's nation with positive ones (e.g., fundamentally democratic and just) and vice versa. Alternatively, one might associate both Europe and the nation with positive, or with negative values. The ideal types incorporate several combinations of attitudes toward national and European values and identity-perceptions, including the importance of these matters to parties and to voters.

Finally, the ideal types also encapsulate attitudes toward the material consequences, or output, of integration. From different theoretical perspectives, the question of "whose interests does Europe serve, and whose interests should Europe serve?" has a different answer. To federalists, and to a somewhat lesser extent neo-functionalists, the answer is "Europe's interest" though these perspectives do not rule out a parallel concern with the national interest, the conventional focus of inter-state relations. The greater European good would nevertheless take precedence here inasmuch as what was in Europe's interest would ultimately also be considered to be in the national interest. Intergovernmentalists would, in contrast, maintain a focus on the only interest they recognised: the national one.

As before, it is possible to imagine a number of configurations of attitudes toward Europe's influence on the national interest as well as a shared European interest. For instance, one might feel that integration does nobody any good, or alternatively one might agree with federalists and neo-functionalists that it advances the national interest as well as Europe's. The ideal types reflect a number of possible positions in this regard, as well as incorporating an estimate of how salient the material consequences of integration are to parties and voters.

Keeping this ideal type background in mind, it should come as no surprise that the six dimensions that are the structure of all ideal types are National and European Institutions/Policies, National and European Values/Community, and National and European Output. With respect to the first set of attitudes, the aim is to establish preferences for national or European policy-making. The question is about governance, about how national and European institutions and policies are perceived. What are the public and party

preferences in this regard, and do they correspond? With respect to attitudes towards values and community issues, the focus turns from governance to polity. Are prevailing “we-feelings” purely national, that is, national identities, or do identity constructions also have European layers? If so, what is the order of salience of those identity layers? In a similar vein, are any values associated with either the nation or with Europe, and are those values perceived positively, neutrally or negatively? Finally, on attitudes toward material benefits: is participation in European integration seen to advance or damage a narrow, traditional sense of national interest, and/or some broader sense of common European interest?<sup>2</sup> In principle, there is nothing that requires one to conceptualise attitudes toward, say, national and European policy-making in zero-sum terms. To support European policy-making does not mean that one has to oppose national policy-making or vice versa. Nor do specific values or indeed self-perceptions have to be associated with either the nation and the state or Europe. For instance justice or equality might be seen as values defining a nation as well as being inherently European. Likewise, identities can have several layers that are perfectly compatible in the experience of the identity holder. Nor is there any reason why a sense of national interest might not exist alongside a sense of wider European interest.

The ideal types have labels that summarise their substantive content: Europeanism, Nationalism, Pragmatism and Uninterested. In a technical sense, each can be seen as a configuration of attitudes toward some or all of the six dimensions outlined directly above, in terms of the direction of the attitude (which can range from very positive to very negative) and its salience (range: very high to very low). As will become clear, not all six dimensions necessarily define a given ideal type; for instance, any National Institutions/Policies score is compatible with the Europeanist ideal type.

The Europeanist ideal type represents a radically pro-European position, and parties or partisan groups whose profile is Europeanist openly advocate a

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<sup>2</sup> While this is probably the most common way of thinking about output, partaking in European integration can also have more subtle kinds of output, such as the psychological comfort of ‘belonging in Europe,’ or EU membership as a recognition of independent statehood. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish empirically between material and psychological output insofar as ‘belonging in Europe’ may in itself be valued due to the material benefits deriving from the very fact of belonging. If so, then ‘belonging in Europe’ is a material output, but if not, then it

federal Europe. Europeanists see the nation and state as important parts of a European whole, which in turn is seen as the natural extension and context of the nation and state. Europeanists parties and partisans have, as far as they are concerned, resolved the difficult questions about the territorial, functional and affiliational dimensions of democracy at the European level. They have done so by developing a view of Europe as a nation-state writ-large, where the triangle of territory, function and affiliation can be connected at the vital points into a working whole. To Europeanists there is a Europe-wide political culture based on mutual trust that makes majority decision-making possible. They attribute Europe with both input and output legitimacy, and view it as a value-based and institutionalised community that also, like post-war welfare states, produces public goods. To Europeanists, Europe is a community of shared communication, memory and experience with its own institutions and interests (Goldmann 2001). With respect to material interests Europeanists' perceptions of national and European interests are closely intertwined ("what is good for Europe is good for the nation/national interest"), a phenomenon known as *engrenage*. In the terminology of the spatial model developed above, Europeanists are very positive about European Institutions/Policies, European Values/Community and European Output. This reflects their support for European policy-making, the admiration for values and identity perceptions they associate with Europe and the view that Europe as a whole benefits from integration. These three dimensions are also very salient to Europeanists. Moreover, Europeanists are convinced about the national benefits of integration, and are therefore expected to have very positive and salient National Output scores. These dimensions define the Europeanist ideal type (they may take any position on the two national dimensions (Table 2.1).

The second ideal type is Nationalism. Its point of departure is a traditional and principled (some might say sterile) approach to national sovereignty and the pursuit of the national interest. Nationalists are principled opponents to European policy-making because they feel it undermines the national political system. The notion of pursuing the national interest at the European level is a contradiction in terms to Nationalists. There is certainly no

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is instead be part of the Values/Community dimension. The output theme measures attitudes to material output deriving from European integration

**Table 2.1 Ideal Types**

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative.

**Saliency:** 'VH' Very High; 'H' High; 'M' Medium; 'L' Low; 'VL' Very Low.

'--': Any value compatible with the ideal type.

| <i>Ideal Type Dimensions</i> |                  | <i>Europeanism</i> | <i>Nationalism</i> | <i>Pragmatism</i> <sup>3</sup> | <i>Uninterested</i> |
|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|
| <i>European</i>              | <i>Direction</i> | VP                 | VN                 | *                              | --                  |
| <i>Institutions/Policies</i> | <i>Saliency</i>  | H, VH              | M                  | M, H, VH                       | L, VL               |
| <i>European</i>              | <i>Direction</i> | VP                 | VN                 | N                              | --                  |
| <i>Values/Community</i>      | <i>Saliency</i>  | H, VH              | M                  | VL                             | L, VL               |
| <i>European</i>              | <i>Direction</i> | VP                 | VN                 | --                             | --                  |
| <i>Output</i>                | <i>Saliency</i>  | H, VH              | M                  | --                             | L, VL               |
| <i>National</i>              | <i>Direction</i> | --                 | VP                 | --                             | --                  |
| <i>Institutions/Policies</i> | <i>Saliency</i>  | --                 | M                  | --                             | L, VL               |
| <i>National</i>              | <i>Direction</i> | --                 | VP                 | VP                             | --                  |
| <i>Values/Community</i>      | <i>Saliency</i>  | --                 | M                  | VL                             | L, VL               |
| <i>National</i>              | <i>Direction</i> | VP                 | VN                 | *                              | --                  |
| <i>Output</i>                | <i>Saliency</i>  | H, VH              | M                  | M, H, VH                       | L, VL               |

sense of a greater European community or of positive European values. Nor do Nationalists recognise a shared European interest. Table 2.1 summarises the Nationalist ideal type as inclined towards national policy-making and national values and identity. In contrast, Nationalists have a negative view of European policy-making, European values and community (e.g., neither their national interest nor indeed Europe as a whole is perceived to benefit from integration). All dimensions are expected to be of medium saliency.

The third ideal type, Pragmatism, is more complex because it can not be stated a priori whether Pragmatists will favour European integration or not. This ideal type is inspired by the argument made most cogently by the historian Alan Milward in *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (1992). Milward argues at length that European integration is not undermining the nation-state in Europe but to the contrary, it is rescuing the nation-state from the pressures of internationalisation. The Pragmatic ideal type originates from what might be called "enlightened self-interest" or less flatteringly just plain cynicism. Pragmatists' goal is to advance the national interest, which may be pursued as the circumstances require. The consequence is an instrumental view of Europe, perceived as a complex means that can serve or damage the national interest; as

a means to an end European integration is filled with ambiguity. The Pragmatic image of Europe is neither that of a natural extension of the nation-state, nor necessarily a threat. European policy-making is evaluated on the basis of the national interest, however defined. This utilitarian understanding of Europe means that Europe's legitimacy is performance-based, the implication being that it is not important whether or not there is a European polity or European values. Differently put, the way that the territorial, functional and affiliational dimensions of national democratic politics are increasingly prised apart may cause Pragmatists concern, but European-level democracy with all that it entails is not a solution Pragmatists would welcome. They are in Europe for what they can get out of it, not for what they can put into it. Table 2.1 summarises what defines this ideal type, and it shows that neither European nor national values and identity feelings are salient in the context of European integration. National Values/Community are positively viewed but not salient in the context of European integration, whereas European Values/Community is a non-issue (e.g., neutral direction, low to very low salience). Pragmatists are interested in how European Institutions/Policies impact on the national interest, and their attitude toward European Institutions/Policies is determined by how they perceive it to impact on the national interest. This might be on balance in favour of integration, or it might lead to a neutral or negative attitude. Either way, the expectation is that for Pragmatists the location of the ideal type dimensions European Institutions/Policies and National Output will be broadly similar, since this ideal type evaluates the former on the basis of the latter. The balance of advantage in favour or not in favour of European policy-making will be reflected on the model's directional dimension. European Institutions/Policies and National Output are expected to be salient.<sup>4</sup>

The ideal type Uninterested resembles the permissive consensus insofar as the single, pronounced feature of this ideal type is a lack of interest in any aspect of European integration and in politics generally. All dimensions of this ideal type are located in the low salience part of the model. There is no

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
<sup>3</sup> \*\*, indicates that the directional scores can vary, but that European Institutions/Policies and National Output should be broadly similar.

<sup>4</sup> In principle the same could be said about National Institutions/Policies and National Output, but since this research's primary concern is attitudes toward European integration, not national

particular expectation about the direction of attitudes here, since attitudinal direction is a distinct attitudinal feature from attitudinal salience, which is the essence of this ideal type.

### 2.3.2 Testing the Responsible Party Model

The “test” of whether the Responsible Party Model works is whether there is attitude congruence. Specifically, the test is whether political parties and their respective groups of partisans have the same ideal type profile. If they do, then the Responsible Party Model functions. They may disagree about particular policies, and yet belong to the same ideal type - which is the ideal type approach’s strength over the conventional approach to research. Conversely, discrepancies in ideal type profiles between the two halves in a party-partisan dyad are evidence that the Model does not work: the operational definition of attitude congruence in this study is that a party and its partisans can be characterised as belonging to the same ideal type. Recalling that it is inherent in




**Figure 2.2 Ideal Type Model**

‘EIP’ European Institutions/Policies; ‘NIP’ National Institutions/Policies; ‘EVC’ European Values/ Community; ‘NVC’ National Values/Community; ‘EO’ European Output; ‘NO’ National Output.

policy-making, the relationship between European Institutions/Policies and National Output is

the definition of the concept of ideal types that they may not accurately reflect every aspect of the part of the social world they address, no party or partisan group may be a flawless exemplar of any ideal type. If so, the next question becomes how closely a party or its partisan group resembles a given ideal type, and whether they may constitute mixtures of more than one ideal type.

Before turning to the empirical analysis in the chapters that follow it is worth considering what sort of empirical evidence would lead me to accept the Responsible Party Model, and vice versa what sort of evidence would lead me to reject it. It is also worth considering at this early point what the substantive implications for the Model would be of evidence either confirming or not confirming it.



**Figure 2.3 Dyad: The Responsible Party Model Works**  
**Horizontal Axis:** Partisan positions; **Vertical Axis:** Party positions;  
**Dashed Line:** Perfect attitude congruence (directional scores); '**NIP**'  
 National Institutions/Policies; '**EIP**' European Institutions/Policies;  
 '**NVC**' National Values/Community; '**EVC**' European Values/  
 Community; '**NO**' National Output; '**EO**' European Output.


I have already stated that in a general sense the test of the Responsible Party Model is whether and to what extent a party and its partisans share the same ideal type profile as follows. The more closely the profiles of two dyad halves correspond in this respect, the more strongly the data supports the Model. Vice versa, the less the two dyad halves' profiles correspond, the less the data supports the Model. More formally, this can be illustrated in terms of the

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much more interesting.

location of data points in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. In these Figures two aspects of each data point's location are important: its proximity to the dashed line, and in which quarter of a Figure it is located. The dashed line represents perfect attitude congruence between a party and its partisan. If the Responsible Party Model works then data points would be expected to be on or at least in the same quarter as the dashed line (e.g., either the top right hand quarter or the bottom left hand quarter).

Furthermore, it matters greatly from the point of view of identifying and comparing ideal type profiles in which quarter the data points are. To begin with (and as already indicated) there are two congruence and two non-congruence quarters. The top right hand quarter is where data points will be when a party and its partisans are united in support of some dimension, say, European Institutions/Policies. The bottom right hand corner is where data points will be when a party is opposed and the partisans favour some dimension. If the data points are in the bottom left hand corner, then the party and the partisans alike are opposed, and finally if data points are in the top left corner then the party is supportive but the partisans opposed to a given dimension.



**Figure 2.4 Dyad: The Responsible Party Model Not Working**  
*Horizontal Axis:* Partisan positions; *Vertical Axis:* Party positions;  
*Dashed Line:* Perfect attitude congruence (directional scores); '*NIP*'  
 National Institutions/Policies; '*EIP*' European Institutions/Policies;  
 '*NVC*' National Values/ Community; '*EVC*' European Values/  
 Community; '*NO*' National Output; '*EO*' European Output.



Figure 2.3 shows the directional scores of an imaginary party-partisan dyad that, if it existed in reality, would suggest that contrary to the literature cited in chapter 1, the Responsible Party Model does work with respect to European integration. In this imaginary dyad parties and partisans approve of both national and European policy-making (e.g., the NIP and EIP data points are in the top right hand corner). The location of the NO and EO data points moreover show that there is party-partisan agreement that both their country as well as Europe benefit from integration.

The Figure also shows that the party and the partisans have positive views of their national identity and their sense of national community and the values they associate with it. However, both parts of the dyad perceive European values etc. negatively. In contrast, Figure 2.4 shows what evidence against the Responsible Party Model might look like. Here, the imaginary party reckons that its country does benefit somewhat from integration, but supports national policy-making a considerable deal more than European policy-making (which it in fact opposes). The partisans, however, are much more favourably inclined towards all aspects of European integration than the party, and than they are toward the three national dimensions. The Figure shows that the party and the partisans are quite agreed on the national benefits of Europe (mildly positive), which is an isolated element of congruence in a wider context of non-congruence.

Having considered these general illustrations which were made up to reflect situations in which the Responsible Party Model would be confirmed and rejected, respectively, on the basis of empirical data, where would data points be located for a dyad to be considered Europeanist, Nationalist, Pragmatic and Uninterested? To answer this question I refer to Table 2.2, which sets out the expected scores for each ideal type. Accordingly, in a Europeanist dyad the European Institutions/Policies, European Values/Community, European Output and National Output data points would be located in the top right hand quarter (any location is compatible with Europeanism on the two other dimensions). In a Nationalist dyad National Institutions/Policies and National Values/Community are located in the top right hand corner and all other dimensions are in the bottom left hand quarter. In a Pragmatic dyad European Institutions/Policies and National Output can be anywhere in a “dashed line”

quarter (depending on whether the dyad is pro, neutral or anti-European). National Values/Community will be in the top right hand corner (since both the party and the partisans are positive about that) and European Values/Community in the bottom left hand corner (since they are not keen on that). National Institutions/Policies and European Output can be located anywhere. Finally, any directional score is compatible with the Uninterested ideal type, which points up what is lacking from Figures 2.3 and 2.4: they do not incorporate salience. Nevertheless, salience can be taken into account when finally deciding the profile of a dyad or its two constituent parts (which, as chapter 5 will show, I do).

It is possible that within a political system some dyads have a higher or lower degree of congruence than other dyads – one dyad might resemble Figure 2.3 whereas another is more like Figure 2.4, and the rest might be somewhere in between. Even if the Model works for some dyads, then, it need not work at the level of a political system. But even if it does (e.g., all dyads are effectively like Figure 2.3), the evidence in the Model's favour is not as strong as could be, because it does not show whether the ostensible attitude congruence occurred through a process of party-partisan communication or merely "by coincidence." This study can not distinguish entirely between coincidence and communication although the fact that it assesses party and partisan attitudes at three different points in time gives some insight into attitudinal trends which sheds more light on this question than would measurements from a single point in time. The primary consequence of this is that it is insufficient only to consider the two obvious outcomes of this research – "the evidence conclusively supports the Model" and "the evidence refutes the Model." Due to the difficulty in distinguishing between communication and coincidence it may only be possible to draw the conclusion that "the evidence does not contradict the Model." Stronger evidence (specifically, evidence that distinguishes communication from coincidence) than what can be provided here would be required to argue that "the evidence conclusively supports the Model," though conversely, of course, it is possible that the evidence will conclusively refute it.

## **2.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has presented a new approach to the study of national-level attitudinal representation on European integration as a multi-dimensional issue in domestic politics. It has also spelt out the contribution this approach can make to this area of study, which is arguably key to resolving the complex democracy, legitimacy and representation issues that surround European integration and the countries that partake in it. The remaining chapters of this study present the process of operationalising this conceptual framework, the results derived from it and, finally, interprets the results vis-à-vis the substantive question of the Responsible Party Model and European integration.

## Chapter 3

### Estimating Party Positions

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the party halves of Irish party-partisan dyads, thus providing one part of the analysis necessary to examine how well the Responsible Party Model works with respect to European integration. In this context it was obvious to define political élites in terms of political parties, since they are the vehicles of representation according to the Responsible Party Model as it typically applies in Western Europe (though in other contexts it may be appropriate to define political élites quite differently).

The party analysis was carried out with a data set created specifically for this study from the *Oireachtas Eireann Official Reports*.<sup>1</sup> The analysis aimed to answer four questions about Irish political élites and European integration: first, what were the party positions on the six ideal type dimensions (set out in chapter 2), at each point in time of measurement? Second, did these positions change significantly over time, and if so, how? Third, was there evidence of internal party cohesion on European issues? Fourth, were the parties significantly different from each other, and specifically, were there any identifiable trends of parties becoming increasingly similar or different? The answers to these four questions were subsequently used to answer a fifth question (in chapter 5), namely: to what extent did each party's profile resemble any of the ideal types?

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 addresses some central issues in documentary analysis, and in section 3.3 I highlight certain aspects of, and issues pertaining to, the three documents used in this study. Section 3.4 subsequently presents the methodology applied to analyse the documents. The results pertaining to Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour are presented in sections 3.5-3.7, respectively. Because of the small number of observations of small, additional parties whose Oireachtas members made contributions to the Oireachtas debates analysed here, I combined these parties and independents into an Other Party category, whose results are presented in section 3.8. In

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<sup>1</sup> The official records of the Irish Houses of Parliament.

section 3.9 the results presented in the four preceding sections are synthesised, and I consider whether Irish parties presented different policy packages on Europe. Section 3.10 brings the chapter to its conclusion. The results presented in this chapter are summarised in tables and illustrated in figures throughout, as well as in the appendix to this chapter.

### **3.2 Analysing Political Documents**

Documents can either be approached as more or less neutral records of some aspect of the social world, or they can be conceptualised in a more interpretative sense, as actively reconstituting the particular social order that produced them. This incorporates a critical awareness that documents are located within a social and political context and, at least potentially, define that context by imposing certain meanings or interpretations of reality over alternative ways of understanding it. The existence of one document (with content X) instead of another (with content Y) naturally reflects social relations and social power, albeit not necessarily in a sinister way. It is helpful, therefore, to think of documents as attempts at persuasion (Sparks 1992). The documents analysed here can be seen as elites' attempts to persuade the public, and perhaps each other, to arrive at particular meanings or understandings of Europe. But the questions about documents' place and role in the constitution and reconstitution of the social world also raises the question of whether they, or any other documents by, about or reflecting political actors in fact reveals some "true" or "real" attitudes. Such a thing as a "real" policy position of a political actor is a fundamentally elusive, even metaphysical, notion. All we can do in practise is use evidence about policy positions in particular political contexts and make context-specific inferences from this" (Laver and Garry 1999:2).

There is no single, generally accepted method for analysing documentary data, but the use of documents or texts as data sources has nevertheless been defined as "an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their relevance, significance and meaning" (Altheide 1995:2). Less reassuringly, it has also been characterised as "not a clear-cut and well-recognised category [of social scientific enterprise]...It can hardly be held to constitute a method, since to say that one will use documents is to say nothing of *how* one will use them"

(Platt 1981:31).<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, documents are now included among the top five sources of data in social science, along with surveys, government statistics, field observation and experiments (Hodson 1999:73).

The quality of a document *qua* source of data depends on its authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott 1990:6-8). Authenticity refers to whether documents are genuine and of unquestionable origin. Similarly, credibility is about whether documents are free from error, or more maliciously, distortion. Representativeness refers to whether selected documents (the sample) are representative of the totality of possible evidence. The meaning of the contents of a document needs to be clear and historical and cross-cultural studies may have particular difficulty in this regard, inasmuch as knowing the social and political context that produced a particular document is almost certainly instrumental in understanding the document in question. Taken together, these four criteria give a measure of the basic level of confidence we may have in the analysis of any document without prejudice to the question of whether the results of documentary analysis corresponds with the results of analysing the “same thing” with other kinds of data. Documents that are thought to meet these four criteria in the context of a given research objective are typically content analysed. There are many different ways of proceeding with content analysis, whose aim is sometimes seen as making replicable and valid inferences (Krippendorff 1980:21; Weber 1990:9), and sometimes as a non-inferential procedure for acquiring understanding (Ericson et.al. in May 1997:171; Marshall and Rossman 1999:117). It has moreover been widely noted that documentary research is pursued both qualitatively and quantitatively (Andersson 1974; Tesch 1990; Weber 1990; Altheide 1995; May 1997; Fielding and Lee 1998). Documents of different types but primarily party manifestos have been used in previous research to generate measurements of party political positions successfully. The most well known and widely cited body of research in this vein comes from the Comparative Manifesto Group, formerly the Manifesto Research Group, who have devised a 56-category coding scheme and coded post-war party election manifestos of democratic countries. The amount of literature that the manifestos project has generated (see for instance Budge

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<sup>2</sup> This criticism can of course be levied at any kind of data.

and Farlie 1983; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Laver and Budge 1992; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994) bears testimony to the usefulness of documents in political analysis.<sup>3</sup> However, the coding scheme has not been without its critics: over time certain coding scheme categories have become obsolete or have turned out to overlap, and the inclusion of new categories has become increasingly urgent. Any changes to the basic coding scheme have to be weighed against the diminishing comparability of measurements that would follow from any changes. The problem of overlapping categories has been resolved by collapsing the 56 categories into 20 broad policy dimensions (Laver and Budge 1992), but that does not solve the problem of missing categories (presumably ones that did not feature in political life when the coding scheme was originally devised). In addition, the coding scheme has prioritised policy issues' comparative salience over direction (e.g., positive, neutral, negative). There is no inherent tension or trade-off or choice in salience and directional analysis: coding schemes can be devised to gauge salience as well as direction (Laver and Garry 1999; Gabel and Huber 2000). The success of the Comparative Manifesto Group is an indicator of the value of documentary analysis in estimating the positions of political actors, shortcomings notwithstanding. Elsewhere, it has been noted that it is not unusual for documentary analysis to generate quite different results than, say, survey research or government data and official statistics (Hodson 1999:63-64; Gabel and Huber 2000), which reveals as much about survey research and government data as it does about documentary analysis. On a different level it also reveals something fundamental about the study of politics, namely that replication as a mark of research quality may be difficult to disagree with in principle, but can be difficult to undertake in practise.<sup>4</sup>

### **3.3 The Data**

This documentary analysis will use parliamentary records rather than party manifestos, which are a more common source of data in this type of

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<sup>3</sup> There are very few documentary analyses of Irish parties. One such recent analysis (Garry and Mansergh 1999) focuses on party manifestos and takes a much broader policy approach than this study, which focuses solely on Europe as a domestic political issue.

<sup>4</sup> An on-going debate amongst practitioners in the profession was aired in Hauck, R. et.al. "Verification, Replication" *PS: Political Science and Politics*, September 1995.

analysis. The reasons for using parliamentary records instead, and specifically the reasons for selecting the particular parliamentary records that have been used here, are set out in this section. Oireachtas reports are publicly available, verbatim transcripts of the proceedings of the Irish Houses of Parliament (the Oireachtas, consisting of the Dail and the Seanad).<sup>5</sup> The distribution of Dail and Seanad seats between parties and independents at the time of each debate can be found in the appendix to this chapter. The three particular Oireachtas debates that have been used here concerned constitutional amendment bills that were directly related to the process of European integration. The origins of the three debates were the amendments to the European Treaties contained in the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, respectively. Each set of amendments to the European Treaties required amendments to the Irish constitution, *Bunreacht na hEireann* (1937). The debates, *qua* documents, contain a greater amount of information about party positions toward European integration than party manifestos, which makes the Oireachtas report an obvious choice over party manifestos. What makes the constitutional amendment bills preferable to other Oireachtas report documents (e.g., parliamentary questions, etc.) is primarily the standing orders that pertain to constitutional amendment bills. The standing orders provide an opportunity for all parties and independents to participate in the debate. As a consequence there is at least a theoretical possibility that the documents will contain information about all parties' and independents' positions (though note also that the standing orders allocate time unevenly to government and opposition speakers, which impacts on the salience estimates – an issue I return to in chapter 5). The standing orders are frequently amended, but the basic procedure has remained the same for the period under study here, although marginal changes were made to the rules regulating the allocation of speaking time.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In the Irish language terminology that is used for these institutions, the Irish Parliament is referred to as the Oireachtas, consisting of the lower House Dail Eireann, and the upper House Seanad Eireann. The 166-member Dail is more powerful by far than the 60-member Seanad, but the government, in turn, dominates the Dail quite effectively. This is not least due to the parliamentary system, whereby the executive branch – the government – must enjoy the support of at least half the legislative branch (e.g. the Dail). Though unequal in weight, the Dail and Seanad are nevertheless equally valid in terms of establishing party attitudes toward issues that are debated in the Oireachtas.

<sup>6</sup> The passing of a Bill has five stages in the Dail and five corresponding stages in the Seanad. In the correct order they are as follows: initiation, second reading, committee stage, report stage,



The format in which the debates have been used here is that each is treated as one long document. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (referring to the Single European Act) passed through the Oireachtas on 22-25 April, 1987. The debate dealing with the Act was 2626 paragraphs long.<sup>7</sup> The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill (referring to the Maastricht Treaty) passed through the Oireachtas on 5-15 May, 1992. This debate consisted of 2528 paragraphs. The Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (referring to the Amsterdam Treaty) passed through the Oireachtas between 3 March – 1 April, 1998. This debate amounted to 1226 paragraphs. The reason why this debate was so much shorter than the previous two was that fewer parliamentarians contributed to the debate in relation to the Eighteenth Amendment Bill, and fewer amendments to the government's proposed constitutional amendment were lodged in 1998 than in 1987 and 1992. The Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty were possibly more important steps in the integration process, thus generating more debate. An additional contributing factor may be that the Eighteenth Amendment Bill referendum coincided with the referendum on the Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill which proposed changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution in connection with the implementation of the so-called Belfast Agreement. This was largely presented as a historic opportunity for peace in Ireland and may have overshadowed the Amsterdam Treaty.

Oireachtas records are true representations of what was said at some point in time by a particular person speaking for a given party. They are

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and motion for passage of the Bill. At the initiation stage the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker of the Dail) examines the Bill for compliance with standing orders. The second reading confines debate to the general principle of Bills introduced, and restricts the length of time Dail deputies and senators have at their disposal. The member of government or minister of state proposing the motion makes the first speech, and is followed by the relevant spokespersons of the other parties. At that point the member of government or minister of state proposing the motion is entitled to a speech to reply. In the third stage the Bill is referred to a committee that considers the Bill in detail. The committee can propose amendments to the Bill, and the Dail considers any such proposed amendments in the fourth stage. Bills can be recommitted in parts or in full at this stage, and when all proposed amendments have been disposed of the Bill passes to the fifth and final stage where it is moved "That the Bill do now pass." (If no amendments were offered to a Bill at committee stage the fourth stage does not take place; the Bill goes directly to the fifth and final stage). The Bill is then sent to the Seanad, a procedure that is deemed to constitute the first stage of the Bill's passing through the Seanad. The subsequent stages in the Seanad mirror the stages of passing a Bill in the Dail.

<sup>7</sup> The reason for reporting document length in paragraphs is that this is the relevant unit of measurement for the computer software that supported the analysis reported in this chapter.

therefore very useful sources of data, but not without their potential limitations. The previous section set out four criteria for assessing the quality of documents as data sources, authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. The selected documents are clearly authentic; there can be no doubt about their origin. Oireachtas reports are edited by a team of civil servants who specialise in preparing and transcribing what has been said in the Dail and the Seanad. It can not be ruled out that some errors may occur in the recording process. Whether these documents are representative depends of course on the question of to what they are compared. They are comparable to other Oireachtas documents about European integration in format but to find out if they are comparable in content would require another piece of research. The comparability of these documents to other documents such as party manifestos is considered in the appendix to this chapter. Also, do the Oireachtas documents contain meanings that this researcher does not, for any reason, share or comprehend? The social and political context that produced these documents is well known (the requirement of amending the Irish constitution in order to ratify amendments to the European Treaties) so from that perspective the meaning of these documents is not in question. Moreover, since the substantive contents of the Treaties debated in the documents are also known, the wider meaning of the documents is not in question either.

Satisfying these criteria does not satisfy an additional question that may arise, namely whether the three documents generate comparable measurements of party positions. The Tenth Amendment Bill's point of reference is the Single European Act; the Eleventh Amendment Bill's point of reference is the Maastricht Treaty, and the Eighteenth Bill's point of reference is the Amsterdam Treaty. Ideally, it might be argued, from a research perspective, the Oireachtas should have debated the Single European Act in 1992 and 1998, too, in order to generate identical measurements of party positions at different points in time. On the other hand, the European Union is a moving target and the Treaties naturally reflect this since in large measure they are what move it forward. Empirical measurements generated from two re-debates about the Single European Act would arguably be substantively irrelevant if in a narrow, technical way preferable. The measurements that have been generated in this study make it possible to compare how any given party's position on European

integration has developed over time, taking into account the fact that European integration changes over time.

There is, however, a missing data problem if not all parties and independents talk about all the relevant issues. There is no guarantee of a full set of empirical measurements despite the theoretical possibility under the standing orders to acquire information about all parliamentary actors from constitutional amendment bills. In this study the important thing is that all parliamentary actors have the opportunity to contribute to the debate: not doing so is a very strong sign that the party or independent in question is an example of the Uninterested ideal type. An additional issue that presents a potential problem is that the documents may contain built-in biases. Although parties are supposed to be coherent under the party whip they can often be “broad church” in the range of opinions found within them on any given issue. Public representatives who partake in the debate may therefore express views that (i) do not correspond with the official party view, or (ii) do not represent the full range of views existing within a party. However, there is no serious risk of either in the selected documents. It was noted in chapter 1 that party discipline in the Oireachtas is not a well-researched subject. It has nevertheless been commented that “all around Europe, deputies follow the party line in votes in parliament, and if anything parliamentary party cohesion is even higher in Ireland than the average” (Gallagher 1999:179). It is fair to assume, therefore, that unless a party is fundamentally and publicly split on an issue the range of opinions within Irish parliamentary parties is subjugated to the official party line. The range of opinion that occurs naturally when several people group together, here in a political party, is not usually salient in Irish politics. Parliamentary party members present their party’s official lines in the Oireachtas and elsewhere: these lines are what matter to voters, and therefore also to attitude congruence research. General knowledge of the wider political situation at the time of each of the three bills moreover makes it possible to determine if any of the bills may have been effected by internal party splits.

Finally, documents are not the only thinkable source of data for the assessment of political actors’ position on issues. The two main alternatives are survey-based research (either expert surveys or surveys of politicians) or data collected through interviews. Élite survey research is less common than public

opinion survey research and shares the latter's strengths and weaknesses (see chapter 4). As a source of data interviews are rather similar to documents insofar as it involves transcribing the interviews and thus the interviews become documents that must be analysed in accordance with some methodological procedure.<sup>8</sup> Survey-based and interview-based research suffers one drawback of crippling dimensions, namely that researchers' generally limited ability to travel in time requires more faith than is prudent in people's ability to recall events of interest that took place a decade or so ago. This problem does not arise with documents dating to the relevant time, which was the reason for selecting documents over other sources of data. An additional reason why parliamentary documents are preferable in research such as this, where party views matter rather than the views of individual members of the parliamentary parties, is that in parliamentary debates the speakers may well be expected to tow the party line to retain the party whip. They may do so to a much lesser extent in one-to-one interviews or when filling in a survey in the privacy of their offices. (In turn, of course, if one aims to investigate the personal views of individual parliamentary party members, then parliamentary records may be a less attractive data source).

### **3.4 The Methodology**

#### **3.4.1 The Coding Procedure**

To undertake content analysis is to assign, or code, pieces of text ("text units") to research-relevant conceptual categories. Five operational rules defined and guided the coding procedure in this study. The first defined the text unit, the smallest codeable segment of text, to be a paragraph of text. Since line or sentence text units are so small they make the coding of very lengthy documents unpractical if the analysis also includes manual double-checks on the coding (which is very important in maintaining the highest possible standards of validity and reliability). Moreover, paragraphs typically correspond with the substantive message communicated in text, although they are often too short for speakers to deal with an issue from beginning to end. However, the next step up in text unit size, a page, is unworkable insofar as the stated research objective

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<sup>8</sup> However, elite survey data and parliamentary documents are quite different in that in the former parliamentary party members are considerably more able to express their personal, as distinct from the party, view.

requires all text units to be identified by party label. Several speakers of different parties and independents may speak over the course of a single page, making page text units unworkable from the perspective of the research objective. Note that I did not divide the text contained in the Oireachtas debates into paragraphs; this was done by the team of civil servants whose task it is to record and publish the proceedings of the Oireachtas.

The second operational rule refers to the coding scheme (sometimes referred to as the coding frame). The coding scheme is where data and theory meet: it is where text units are coded to theoretically relevant coding categories, together comprising of the coding scheme. The coding scheme created for this study has a hierarchical structure that mirrors the ideal type structure. It is reprinted in full in the appendix, but deserves some further comment here. Casedata, Institutions/Policies, Values/Community and Output are the four categories at the top level of the hierarchy. At the next level, underneath each of the four overarching categories, are further, related categories. At the bottom level of the hierarchy are categories for recording whether what was said was positive, negative or neutral.

The categories under Casedata record speakers' party labels, their names and the year they spoke. Under Institutions/Policies there are categories for measuring European and National Institutions/Policies. European Institutions/Policies is measured on 19 coding categories, aiming to identify the direction and salience of parties' attitudes toward European institutions and policies. Attitudes toward National Institutions/Policies are estimated on 14 coding categories, which basically reflect the 19 coding categories that measure attitudes toward European Institutions/Policies. The difference in the number of categories arises from the fact that not all institutions and policies have an equivalent (there is for example no national equivalent to EC/EU enlargement). The part of the coding scheme that measures National and European Values/Community codes exclusively text units that refer explicitly to values and feelings of belonging associated with either one's country or with Europe or both. The question is whether values and feelings of community are associated with the nation and state, with Europe, or some mixture of both? The seven pairs of Values/Community coding categories include for instance democracy, justice, identity and peace. Only text units referring to these *qua values* were

coded in the Values/Community part of the coding scheme. Text units referring to, for instance, the need for more transparency in EU policy-making or the weakness of the European Parliament vis-à-vis other institutions were coded under the appropriate Institutions/Policies categories. The ideal types' National and European Output dimensions were operationalised in the coding scheme on a single substantive issue, which records whether political actors' have a primarily narrow, traditional sense of national interest (National Output) or whether there is also a broader sense of European common good (European Output)?

This leads to the third rule that guided the coding process, that the coding scheme facilitates both salience and directional coding across all the various coding categories referred to above. Salience coding proceeds on the assumption that the greater the proportion of text allocated to an issue by an actor in text or speech, the greater the significance of that issue to the actor in question. The coding scheme is designed for salience coding insofar as it is possible to establish the total number of observations or "mentions" each political actor makes of each institution, policy, etc. Directional coding aims to establish the positive, negative or neutral direction of an attitude. Text units coded as pro, or positive, express a favourable attitude, including a desire to improve, strengthen, further, advance, make more prominent or important, empower, etc., the object in question. This coding practise is not entirely self-evident. A demand for improvement etc. may also be interpreted as criticism, that is, a negative attitude which should be coded under a con sub-category rather than a pro. However, there is a qualitative difference between the kind of criticism which is ultimately aimed to promote the object in question, and criticism that is aimed to remove, dismantle, do away with or dissolve the object in question. Text units expressing the latter kind of negative attitude has been coded as con, or negative, observations. Text units coded as neutral refer to the relevant object in a descriptive, factual or peripheral manner without expressing a directional (pro or con) view. Neutral mentions are not always easy to distinguish from statements that express a positive or negative attitude, because virtually all text units contain description, but far from all convey a direction. Note that text units that express a directional attitude were not coded as neutral as well as pro or con, even if they had descriptive content as well as an

expression of positive or negative perception. The use of or lack of adjectives has been used to determine whether mentions were directional or neutral.

There is no denying that face validity, whether a text unit may “on the face of it” be thought to measure some unobservable object, is a difficult issue in the coding process. Face validity is easily lost or compromised by inferring meaning into the text by reading between the lines, as it were. Yet not reading between the lines means that much potentially interesting information is missed (Weber 1990:76; King, Keohane and Verba 1994:25). The coder is between something of a rock and a hard place in deciding to proceed in one way or another. On the one hand what is explicitly stated is in the public domain in a tangible way, on the other hand it can be hugely misrepresented if it is not viewed in the context of unspoken “givens.” There is no wholly satisfactory solution to this trade-off between consistency and context, but this analysis proceeded on the basis of explicit statements, not intuitive text interpretations of what may be between the lines of a document. This is the coding procedure’s fourth rule. Yet, it is inevitable that documents *qua* sources of data have the potential to tell many stories, depending on what questions are asked of them. This, a natural consequence of the depth and richness of most texts, carries an inescapable potential for inconsistent interpretations of the text, especially since coding is a long and slow process and the coder’s understanding of how to code may evolve in the process. (These issues are further considered in the appendix to this chapter).

Moreover, the coding process was computer supported with software that could be used in a variety of ways to manage the documentary data, and also as a gateway into applying quantitative techniques.<sup>9</sup> I used key word search facilities to identify and pull together text units and, on the basis of the searches, to assign (e.g., code) text units to the appropriate location in the coding scheme. The results were double-checked manually. The fifth operational rule of the coding procedure set out a dictionary of key search words for each coding category (reprinted in the appendix). The dictionary was slightly modified for each of the three documents on account of certain words, expressions, acronyms and names not being in the political vocabulary of European integration at all three points in

time. An example of this is the Common Foreign and Security Policy, established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The name of this policy and its standard abbreviation CFSP meant nothing in 1987 but were effective search words in the 1992 and 1998 documents.

### 3.4.2 Statistical Analysis of the Coding Results

The results of the salience and directional coding were used in quantitative analysis, so that ultimately each document had generated one qualitative and one quantitative data set (for 1987, 1992 and 1998, respectively).<sup>10</sup> The qualitative data sets were used to locate appropriate citations, which were inserted into this chapter to illustrate the results of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative data sets were manipulated in a variety of ways (for details, see below) to allow me to address the four questions set out in section 3.1. Each quantitative data set was structured around the variable **attitude** which could take on the values 1, 0 and -1 depending on whether the observation contained a positive, neutral or negative attitude. Two other variables recorded what each observation was about (e.g., the European Parliament, national identity, etc.) and to which ideal type dimension that object referred (e.g., European Institutions/Policies, National Values/Community, etc.). Dichotomous party variables (one such variable per party per year, e.g. **ff87**, **fg87**, **lab87**, **other87**, and so on for the 1992 and 1998 data sets) showed whose attitude each observation measured. Because the smaller parties and independents tended to have few observations they were counted as a combined variable (**other87**, **other92**, **other98**). As a consequence of the Oireachtas' shifting composition, the **other** variables do not consist of the same parties from one year to the next. **Other87** consists of the Progressive Democrats, the Workers' Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and independents. **Other92** combined the Progressive Democrats, Democratic Left, the Green Party, the Workers' Party

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<sup>9</sup> I used NUD\*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising) version 4.

<sup>10</sup> I used Stata Intercooled release 6.0 (software for statistical analysis) to undertake all procedures described here.



and independents, and **other98** Democratic Left, the Green party, Sinn Fein, the Socialist Party and independents.<sup>11</sup>

The first of the four questions was “what were the party positions on the six ideal type dimensions at each point in time of measurement?” To answer this question I kept the data in three separate sets (by year, so there was one set for 1987, one for 1992 and one for 1998), and submitted the data to oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni pair-wise multiple comparison tests.<sup>12</sup> In this way I obtained estimates of directional scores, that is, party means on all six ideal type dimensions for each year, as well as estimates of significance. To obtain salience scores for each dimension I calculated a party’s observations on a given dimension as a proportion of the party’s total observations in that year. The results are illustrated in Figures 3.1-3.4 (below).

The second question referred to changes in party position over time. To address this question I restructured the data sets so that I had one 1987-1998 set for each party. I then repeated the oneway analysis of variance and bonferroni tests to identify instances of continuity and change on each ideal type dimension. The results are presented in Tables 3.1a, 3.2a, 3.3a and 3.4a (below).

The third question pertained to internal party cohesiveness. Addressing this question required me to “unpack” the party variables and create dichotomous speaker variables, so that individual speakers belonging to the same party could be compared to each other. Again, I used oneway analysis of variance and bonferroni tests to find out how many pairs of speakers within each party were significantly different from each other, and how many pairs were “on message,” on each ideal type dimension. The results are presented in Tables 3.1b, 3.2b, 3.3b and 3.4b (below).

The fourth question was whether the parties were significantly different from each other, and whether any trends could be discerned. To give an

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<sup>11</sup> The Progressive Democrats had Oireachtas representation in 1998 but did not speak on the Bill and thus can not be included here, except insofar it can be inferred this party shared the views of its senior government coalition partner of the time, Fianna Fail.

<sup>12</sup> In oneway analyses of variance the F statistic measures the model’s explanatory power (e.g., its goodness of fit). Bonferroni tests elaborate on the information in the oneway analysis of variance model, by testing all the model’s means in pair-wise order, and provides a level of significance for each pair of means. Each oneway analysis yielded a statistic relating to the overall model (the F statistic), which I interpreted at the conventional 0.05 level of significance. Sometimes the F statistics’ significance did not carry through to the bonferroni tests, making it

overview of each party's attitudes over time Table 3.5 summarises all directional and salience scores. For the purposes of answering the question of inter-party differences I reverted to the original three all-party data sets (1987, 1992, 1998) and carried out a further set of oneway analyses and bonferroni tests for each year, in which I compared party positions on each ideal type dimension. The results are presented (by year) in Tables 3.6a-c (below).

### **3.5 Fianna Fail 1987 – 1998**

#### **3.5.1 Mean Positions**

Figure 3.1 displays Fianna Fail's mean positions in the 11-year period under study. The figure's most striking feature is the cluster of observations in the top left hand corner, the "highly positive but not salient" corner. In addition, there is a trickle of observations fanning out from the top left hand corner, reaching toward the high end of the salience axis and the neutral mid-point of the direction axis. The fan of observations never reaches past the 0.70 point on the salience axis, and never dips below 0.1 on the direction axis.


These general comments nevertheless hide some apparent movement in both the direction and the salience of the party's position on the various dimensions. Beginning with National and European Institutions/Policies, Figure 3.1 shows them to be generally of higher salience than any of the other dimensions. National and European Institutions/Policies behaved as each other's mirror opposites for Fianna Fail. In 1987 they were approximately equally salient: 0.37 (National Institutions/Policies) and 0.42 (European Institutions/Policies), respectively. As European Institutions/Policies grew more salient National Institutions/Policies lost in salience in almost equal measure by 1992. In similar but less dramatic symmetry they moved towards each other in 1998. Nevertheless, at the end of the 11-year period a marked shift had occurred in Fianna Fail's discourse, away from Ireland and onto matters European. It is notable also that the fairly large swings in salience were to some extent accompanied by corresponding, but smaller, shifts in direction.

In each year covered here the references to European Institutions/Policies were more positive than those to its national counterpart, but the directional

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impossible to be any more precise about means differences than acknowledging them without

trend for both is such that a time seems imminent when they will cross over and the National become the more positive of the two. Specifically, in the time



|   |  |
|---|--|
| 1 European Institutions/Policies 1987 (.58, .42, 342) | 10 National Institutions/Policies 1987 (.21, .37, 306) |
| 2 European Institutions/Policies 1992 (.50, .67, 844) | 11 National Institutions/Policies 1992 (.23, .09, 107) |
| 3 European Institutions/Policies 1998 (.44, .62, 309) | 12 National Institutions/Policies 1998 (.36, .14, 69)  |
| 4 European Output 1987 (.87, .02, 15)                 | 13 National Output 1987 (.97, .11, 89)                 |
| 5 European Output 1992 (.92, .01, 12)                 | 14 National Output 1992 (.98, .12, 154)                |
| 6 European Output 1998 (1.0, .02, 12)                 | 15 National Output 1998 (1.0, .08, 38)                 |
| 7 European Values/Community 1987 (.80, .04, 30)       | 16 National Values/Community 1987 (.90, .05, 40)       |
| 8 European Values/Community 1992 (.81, .07, 88)       | 17 National Values/Community 1992 (.75, .04, 48)       |
| 9 European Values/Community 1998 (.82, .12, 60)       | 18 National Values/Community 1998 (.58, .02, 12)       |
| (direction, salience, n)                              |  |

**Figure 3.1 Fianna Fail Positions 1987-1998**

**Direction:** Attitudinal direction on a given ideal type, where -1 is the strongest possible disapproval and 1 is the strongest possible support.

**Salience:** The comparative salience of dimensions, adding to 1 over six dimensions in a given year.

period as a whole (1987-1998), European Institutions/Policies went from a high of 0.58 to a low of 0.44, and National Institutions/Policies started out at a low of 0.21 and reached a high of 0.36. However, the apparent focus on the European level is not necessarily indicative of any decrease in the importance of the nation and state; as this text unit from the debate on the Maastricht Treaty reveals,

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specifying between which particular parties they occurred.

aspects of Europe are easily and probably often considered from a national rather than a Europe-wide perspective:

Irish firms are already successfully meeting the challenge of the Single Market. This is of much greater importance for us than most member states. Our EC partners take over 75 per cent of our exports, which represent 42 per cent of our national output, three times the Community average, and we have a £2 Billion surplus with them. Our exports last year were valued at £15 Billion, a 5 per cent increase on the 1990 figures, with the rate of growth of indigenous exports once again out-performing total export growth. This was a remarkable performance, given very difficult economic conditions. All the indications are of increased export buoyancy so far this year, with a £500 million trade surplus in the first two months. These figures demonstrate the benefits of our participation in the Community, quite apart from the direct impact of Structural Funds. (The Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 17).

If the Institutions/Policies dimensions are broken down into their constituent coding categories, it notable also that the same institutions and policies tended to be salient to Fianna Fail throughout. In 1987 the national constitution, national foreign security and defence policy, European foreign security and defence policy, the national court and structural instruments were the most salient. In 1992 the most salient were structural instruments, the single market, the single currency, European social and employment policy, and European foreign security and defence policy. (National foreign, security and defence policy was unexpectedly low key this year). In 1998 European foreign security and defence policy was the most salient category, followed by European social and employment policy, the European Council, enlargement, national foreign security and defence policy and the European Commission. This mirrors the social context and reality of the time at which each referendum took place fairly well. For instance, the prevalence of the national courts and constitutions in 1987 reflect the unusual circumstances surrounding the 1987 referendum, and the evolving European agenda is reflected in all three years. However, it might be curious that national foreign security and defence policy was of such relatively low salience in the context of the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. This may have been an explicit attempt on the part of

Fianna Fail to avoid getting into trouble over Irish neutrality with other parties and by implication with the general public – a sort of “don’t mention the war” approach to the Oireachtas debate.

Fianna Fail’s positions on the Values/Community dimensions were more extreme than they were on Institutions/Policies: the direction very positive, and the salience extremely low. It is not surprising that values etc. associated with the nation and state are experienced in very positive ways, especially by a party that, like Fianna Fail, has rarely found itself out of government. This is not to say anything of the existence of any ideas around which the party might unite – ideas of what constitutes Irishness and Europeanness. One view within Fianna Fail was nevertheless that Ireland had made a supposedly unique religious contribution to European history:

Ireland has a long and proud history as a European country despite what was said earlier about our historical links with Europe being tenuous to say the least, or that we were a pawn in European affairs. During what were known as the Dark Ages our missionaries brought the light of Christian civilisation to the heathen hordes of the European mainland. We, a small island on the periphery of Europe, with limited material resources, became the island of saints and scholars. We led Europe in helping to provide civilised standards of behaviour on the Christian model. As a modern Irish Christian I am prepared to take that same message to Europe, to the modern-day Europeans, who seem to have lost their sense of Christian morality. I am sufficiently confident in my beliefs, strong in my Christian faith, to face our European [158] neighbours with the reality of Christian thinking and morality without being afraid that they are going to change me or my country. Rather it is I and my country who will change them. (Senator Paschal Mooney, Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 2036).

Values and we-feelings associated with Europe were viewed in a very positive light - in 1992 and 1998 they were held in higher regard than National Values/Community - in light of the commonplace claims that Europe is undemocratic, etc. Yet, this may not matter very much since European Values/Community was of such spectacularly low salience, albeit trebling over the 1987-1998 time period. The European Values/Community observations were not evenly spread over the coding categories. National and European identity were more salient than other categories in 1987. European identity remained the

most salient in 1992, but this year it was followed by the category for European peace and security. By 1998 European values other had become the most salient (“other values” referred especially to such things as human rights and the general principle of the rule of law), followed by equality as a European value.

The major surprise of this part of the study was without a doubt the low salience of the Output dimensions – the expectation was that National Output would be a major part of party discourse. It was certainly more salient than European Output, which was referred to virtually only in the context of National Output: in 1987 12 of the 15 text units that referred to European Output also referred to National Output. The 1992 and 1998 figures were 12 of 12, and 8 of 12, respectively. This text unit from the Eighteenth Amendment Bill is one example of this:

The Amsterdam Treaty is a good deal for Ireland, for Europe and for European citizens. It addresses the core issues which affect daily life throughout Europe: employment, the environment, social policy, public health, consumer rights and combating discrimination. It establishes fundamental rights on a treaty basis for the Union and creates a framework in which freedom of movement can be progressively realised to the maximum extent possible. It couples this with flanking measures in areas such as external border controls and fighting international crime. (Mr. Ned O’Keeffe, Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 339).

However, talk about National Output was not restricted to the context of European Output, so the obverse relationship did not hold true. National Output was more salient than the Values/Community dimensions (as had been expected), but it was rarely close to the Institutions/Policies dimensions, and the size of salience the difference between National Output and Institutions/Policies was unexpectedly large. If countries partake in European integration to advance their national interest, it might reasonably be expected that the latter features prominently in their political discourse on Europe. Do views of material costs and benefits not enter into considerations of governance, or is it a mistake to

expect parties to articulate their views on this every time they talk about some policy or institution?<sup>13</sup>

### 3.5.2 Continuity and Cohesiveness

Figure 3.1 paints a picture of relative stability over the 11-year period from 1987 to 1998, and this impression was sustained in statistical analyses (Table 3.1a).<sup>14</sup> The F value here is a test of the hypothesis that the party position did not change. The bonferroni tests were used to establish between what years change (if any) occurred. Statistically significant change occurred in a negative direction on European Institutions/Policies in the 1987-1998 period (though not in the two shorter time periods, 1987-1992 and 1992-1998). However, even at its most negative Fianna Fail remained unambiguously positive about European Institutions/Policies.

**Table 3.1a Continuity - Fianna Fail 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of Fianna Fail's position on each ideal type dimension. The analysis compares the party position in 1987-1992, 1987-1998 and 1992-1998.

'--': Difference not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference significant at the 0.05 level.

|                    | <i>Eur'n</i>    | <i>Nat'l</i>    | <i>Eur'n</i>    | <i>Nat'l</i>   | <i>Eur'n</i>  | <i>Nat'l</i>  |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| <i>Continuity</i>  | <i>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Val/Com</i> | <i>Output</i> | <i>Output</i> |
| <i>1987-1992</i>   | --              | --              | --              | --             | --            | --            |
| <i>1987-1998</i>   | X               | X               | --              | --             | --            | --            |
| <i>1992-1998</i>   | --              | --              | --              | --             | --            | --            |
| <i>F</i>           | 5.60            | 3.47            | .02             | 2.42           | .81           | .75           |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .0038           | .0319           | .9844           | .0943          | .4529         | .4740         |

Whereas the position on European Institutions/Policies became less positive, the position on National Institutions/Policies grew more positive. The trend points towards a possible cross-over in the not too distant future. In summary, future Fianna Fail governments' willingness to pursue integration may diminish, if support for European Institutions/Policies continues to diminish (augmented by a continued absence of a strong sense of European values or

<sup>13</sup> Since there was only one coding category on European and National Output, respectively, there are no comments on what coding categories were the most relevant at various points in time.

<sup>14</sup> Continuity effectively means failure to reject null hypotheses of no change in the oneway analyses of variance and bonferroni tests. Where the null hypothesis could be rejected at the 0.05 level I accepted that change had occurred over time in the direction indicated in the data. The same procedure was repeated for all parties.

community). On the other hand, the trend detected here may not be sustained after 1998.

“Cohesiveness” refers to how “on message” the Fianna Fail parliamentarians were in their contributions to the three parliamentary debates. Did estimated party positions result from speakers wearing the Fianna Fail party label saying the same things, or were the estimated positions a haphazard result of divided Fianna Fail speakers?<sup>15</sup>

**Table 3.1b Cohesiveness – Fianna Fail 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of inter-party cohesiveness, by ideal type dimension for 1987, 1992 and 1998. The analyses identifies how many Fianna Fail speakers differed from each other (‘Significant Pairs’) in their Oireachtas speeches, as a proportion of how many pairs of Fianna Fail speakers there were (‘Total Pairs’) in each year.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Ideal Type Dimension</i>    | <i>F Statistic</i>          | <i>Prob. &gt; F</i> | <i>Significant Pairs</i> | <i>Total Pairs</i> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1987        | European Institutions/Policies | 2.97                        | 0.0003              | 1                        | 105                |
| 1987        | European Values/Community      | 1.14                        | 0.3787              | --                       | 36                 |
| 1987        | European Output                | 2.13                        | 0.1586              | --                       | 21                 |
| 1987        | National Institutions/Policies | 3.31                        | 0.0001              | 1                        | 105                |
| 1987        | National Values/Community      | 1.75                        | 0.1272              | --                       | 36                 |
| 1987        | National Output                | 0.83                        | 0.6313              | --                       | 91                 |
| 1992        | European Institutions/Policies | 3.93                        | 0.0000              | 19                       | 406                |
| 1992        | European Values/Community      | 0.84                        | 0.6744              | --                       | 300                |
| 1992        | European Output                | 1.00                        | 0.4894              | --                       | 15                 |
| 1992        | National Institutions/Policies | 2.86                        | 0.0003              | 2                        | 253                |
| 1992        | National Values/Community      | 0.77                        | 0.7184              | --                       | 190                |
| 1992        | National Output                | 0.50                        | 0.9783              | --                       | 351                |
| 1998        | European Institutions/Policies | 6.28                        | 0.0000              | 9                        | 55                 |
| 1998        | European Values/Community      | 2.01                        | 0.0641              | --                       | 36                 |
| 1998        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed</i> |                     | --                       | 6                  |
| 1998        | National Institutions/Policies | 2.55                        | 0.0150              | 0                        | 45                 |
| 1998        | National Values/Community      | 1.38                        | 0.3327              | --                       | 10                 |
| 1998        | National Output                | <i>No variance observed</i> |                     | --                       | 45                 |

Again, this is examined by looking for significant differences in the content of speeches by Fianna Fail speakers. The F value here is a test of the hypothesis that all speakers said the same thing. Bonferroni tests were used to establish how many pairs of speakers took significantly different positions.

<sup>15</sup> This analysis followed exactly the procedures described for the inter-year comparisons (directly above, and section 3.4). The only two differences were, first, individual Fianna Fail speakers rather than **ff87**, **ff92** and **ff98** were the variables whose means were compared. Second, the six oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests were repeated for each year, yielding a total of 18 analyses of Fianna Fail’s internal cohesiveness.



Table 3.1b summarises the result: internal consistency with minor exceptions. The exceptions are not substantively important, as there is nothing in this analysis to suggest that Fianna Fail was a divided party; even though there are some pairs of significantly different speakers (“Significant Pairs”), they constitute a very small proportion of “Total Pairs.” In 1987 there were differences between Fianna Fail speakers only with respect to European and National Institutions/Policies. In 1992 most inter-speaker differences occurred on European Institutions/Policies (the null hypothesis of no difference was rejected for 19 pairs of speakers), and - to a much lesser extent - National Institutions/Policies (two rejections). Again, the four Values/Community and Output dimensions passed through this analysis without registering any significant differences. The commentary of 1992 can be applied virtually unaltered to 1998; significant differences occurred with respect to the same ideal type dimensions, but the number of significant bonferroni tests were not the same in the two years (nor were the numbers of Fianna Fail speakers in 1992 and 1998). The only notable difference between 1992 and 1998 is that in 1998 no pairs of speakers could be identified as different from each other on National Institutions/Policies (although the F statistic was significant in the associated oneway analysis). In summary, the picture is one of continuity over time and internal cohesiveness, albeit with instances of change and pockets of idiosyncratic attitudes.


### **3.6 Fine Gael 1987-1998**

#### **3.6.1 Mean Positions**

Fine Gael’s profile is displayed in Figure 3.2. In some ways it is not unlike Fianna Fail’s, specifically the clustering in the top left hand corner and the tail of observations fanning out from that corner. An additional similarity is that the tail consists of the same dimensions, the European and National Institutions/Policies dimensions for 1987, 1992 and 1998. The Values/Community and Output dimensions are huddled together in the corner for things that are held in high but irrelevant regard.

Fine Gael displayed solid support for European Institutions/Policies in all the three years – the direction was virtually the same in 1987 and 1998 (0.42 and 0.41, respectively), with a peak of 0.54 in 1992. Compared to their position on

National Institutions/Policies, attitudes toward European Institutions/Policies seem very positive. In contrast, support for National Institutions/Policies hovered around zero every year. This may be the sign of a party that is genuinely not interested in “the national” in the context of “the European,” but if so, then National Institutions/Policies ought not to be one of the most salient dimensions and certainly not more salient than any European dimension. National Institutions/Policies lost in salience between 1987 and 1992, only to increase again in 1998 (but never to reach the heights of 1987). The neutral



**Figure 3.2 Fine Gael Positions 1987-1998**

**Direction:** Attitudinal direction on a given ideal type, where -1 is the strongest possible disapproval and 1 is the strongest possible support.

**Salience:** The comparative salience of dimensions, adding to 1 over six dimensions in a given year.

position is more likely a consequence of domestic electoral politics, whereby it might be anathema to Fine Gael in opposition to praise the domestic policies of

its main political rival (Fianna Fail) in government. Rivalries aside, the two parties (and on occasion other parties, too) are able to join forces to promote European integration.

Certain institutions, policies etc. were far more salient than others to Fine Gael. The focus was quite strongly on European and national foreign, security and defence policy in all three years (they were among the five most salient coding categories at all times except national foreign, security and defence in 1992).<sup>16</sup> National foreign, security and defence policy was the most salient category in 1987. The circumstances surrounding the Single European Act referendum are also reflected in the coding results; the national constitution and the national court were very prominent in Fine Gael speeches, in the manner of the below citation:

The European Communities (Amendment) Act which gives force of law in this country to these amendments is not, according to the Supreme Court decision, unconstitutional. It is important that we recognise this because all the references to the possible unconstitutionality of the Single European Act made by Members of the Dáil and Seanad in December last were to the Act that was passed by the Oireachtas and not to Title III which the Supreme Court found did not conform with the Constitution. The Court has found, as the Government of the day said, that the Act was constitutional. (Mr. Peter Barry TD, Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 66).

In 1992 structural instruments, the single market, the single currency and European foreign, security and defence policy were the most salient categories. The three former were much more salient than European foreign, security and defence policy which is notable in light of the fact that this was the Treaty that established the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Fine Gael leader Mr John Bruton TD set out his party's position:

How could a Single Market without customs posts, tariffs and subsidies last if individual countries were able, for example, to competitively devalue their currencies, which they will be able to do if the Maastricht Treaty is not approved, print money to pay their Bills, which they will be able to do if the Maastricht Treaty is not approved, give unfair subsidies to their local authorities,

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<sup>16</sup> This was also the case for Fianna Fail in 1992 – were the two main parties in cahoots over the “don't mention the war” approach to the Eleventh Amendment?

which they will be able to do if the Maastricht Treaty is not approved, or pursue conflicting defence and security policies? Without the Maastricht Treaty the Single Market would not survive more than a year or two. It does not take much imagination to see that without the Maastricht Treaty the Single Market would quickly revert to a series of competing national economic blocs. The Single Market, the Cohesion Fund and the single European currency are a huge opportunity for Ireland, an [339] opportunity to solve our employment crisis. However, it is only an opportunity; it is not a guarantee. We can fail to grasp that opportunity. (Mr. John Bruton TD, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 471).

In 1998 European foreign, security and defence policy was the most salient policy or institution, followed by the national constitution, national foreign security and defence policy and, emulating the European agenda of the time, enlargement. This text unit from the Eighteenth Amendment Bill debate reflects Fine Gael's position on some of these policies:

The common foreign and security policy is concerned with facing up to those responsibilities and it does so without compromising our military neutrality. In the past we have operated under UN auspices in peacekeeping and, in Somalia, in peacekeeping. As I understand the Amsterdam Treaty, under the general guidelines and principles of our United Nations membership we are extending those areas of activity to be carried out by the European Union. That is the least we should be obliged to do and I fail to see how that conflicts with our neutrality or goes against the wishes of the vast majority of Irish people. Any recollection of the shame and powerlessness we felt as a nation in light of some of the major international crises that have arisen would clearly bring that home to us. We are virtually powerless in regard to areas like the Middle East. In addition, there is an increasing reluctance on the part of the United States to repeatedly step into the trouble spots of the world. There is a danger that if we do not face up to our responsibilities that vacuum will be filled by increased bloodshed and attacks on human rights in these trouble spots because there will not be an international police watchdog to carry out these duties. (Mr. Michael Creed TD, Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 484).

Figure 3.2 shows the three co-ordinates for European Values/Community clustered in the top left hand corner. While there was some variation (otherwise the three positions would have been represented on top of each other in Figure 3.2) the range of the salience was only 0.05 (0.03 – 0.08) and the direction of the

attitude was consistently high, between 0.73 and 0.87. Fine Gael's mean position on European Values/Community was always more positive in direction and of stronger salience than the mean position on National Values/Community in the same year, except for in 1987 when the salience of the latter was marginally higher. By and large, however, the content of Fine Gael's discourse on Europe did not focus on values, etc. Even so, on the Values/Community dimensions European and national identity tended to attract most of the attention in 1987 and 1992, but lost salience in 1998. This text unit from 1987 reveals a complementary view of nationality and Europeanness within Fine Gael:

The question to be put to the people on polling day, 26 May, is simple and straightforward. The question is: are we as a people willing to join with our EC partners in furthering the ideal of a united Europe by ratifying the Single European Act? A referendum is, in a way, a sacred political exercise and it allows the people of Ireland once again to consider the question of membership of the European Community, which they also did in 1972. At that time - and I certainly am one of those in the House who remember it quite clearly - there was prolonged and sustained debate but we, the people, voted overwhelmingly and unambiguously to join the Community. In many ways it is a useful exercise to engage in this debate once more, some 15 years down the road, because it presents us all with an opportunity to take stock of ourselves as a nation and more particularly as Europeans and to assess our enthusiasm for the EC in the year 1987. (Senator Catherine Bulbulia, Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 1840).

Fine Gael's position on European Output in 1987 and 1992 combines the most positive possible attitude with the lowest possible salience. This changes somewhat in 1998 due to a drop in direction (still very positive, just not as extremely positive as in the previous years). The points raised about the importance of material considerations to a party's general position on European integration in the previous section are relevant here, too: did Fine Gael really not care more about National Output than what Figure 3.2 suggests?

In summary, Fine Gael took an essentially positive view of European integration in its various manifestations. There was a certain amount of change, sometimes in direction and sometimes in salience, but Fine Gael's essentially pro-European profile remained throughout the period under study.

### 3.6.2 Continuity and Cohesiveness

Having looked at Fine Gael's positions in each year and over time, it is time to test the apparent changes as well as the party's internal cohesiveness more formally. As Table 3.2a shows, Fine Gael's position barely changed at all in the time period covered here. (Again, the F value is a test of the hypothesis that the party position did not change. The bonferroni tests were used to establish between what years change (if any) occurred.) The only ideal type dimension registering statistically significant change in the direction Fine Gael's position over time was European Institutions/Policies, and this change occurred between 1987 and 1992. Turning to cohesiveness, Table 3.2b summarises the results of the intra-party speaker analysis. In 1987 there were intra-party differences on the European and National Institutions/Policies dimensions as well as National Output. Only on the latter was it possible to identify the relevant individuals (e.g., there were significant bonferroni tests). Then party leader Garret FitzGerald was involved in each of the four cases of significant National Output differences. In each case his attitude was less positive than his colleagues' attitudes.

**Table 3.2a Continuity – Fine Gael 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of Fine Gael's position on each ideal type dimension. The analysis compares the party position in 1987-1992, 1987-1998 and 1992-1998.

'--': Difference not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference significant at the 0.05 level.

|                    | <i>Eur'n</i>    | <i>Nat'l</i>    | <i>Eur'n</i>    | <i>Nat'l</i>    | <i>Eur'n</i>  | <i>Nat'l</i>  |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| <i>Continuity</i>  | <i>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Output</i> | <i>Output</i> |
| <i>1987-1992</i>   | X               | --              | --              | --              | --            | --            |
| <i>1987-1998</i>   | --              | --              | --              | --              | --            | --            |
| <i>1992-1998</i>   | --              | --              | --              | --              | --            | --            |
| <i>F</i>           | 4.49            | .42             | .75             | 3.05            | 2.43          | 1.17          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .0116           | .6549           | .4748           | .0535           | .1165         | .3134         |

In 1992 there were again differences over the two Institutions/Policies dimensions, European Values/Community and European Output. In each instance there were some significant bonferroni tests, for instance Michael Noonan-John Bruton on European Institutions/Policies. In 1998 the only ideal type dimension where significance was attained for the F statistic was National Institutions/Policies and there were two pairs of Fine Gael representatives who

were significantly different from each other. Mr. Bernard Durkan was part of both pairs.

In an ideal world (as envisaged in the Responsible Party Model) there would be no differences between members of the same party (inasmuch as a party is expected to present a clear policy on a given issue). As in the analysis of Fianna Fail speakers, the F value here is a test of the hypothesis that all speakers said the same thing. Bonferroni tests were used to establish how many pairs of speakers took significantly different positions. This analysis found that not all Fine Gael members were saying exactly the same thing, but nothing in this analysis suggests that Fine Gael was divided on Europe. Comparing “Significant Pairs” to “Total Pairs” party colleagues were distinguishable on certain issues within an overall context of a cohesive, pro-European party line that remained largely constant throughout the 1987-1998 period.

**Table 3.2b Cohesiveness – Fine Gael 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of inter-party cohesiveness, by ideal type dimension for 1987, 1992 and 1998. The analyses identifies how many Fine Gael speakers differed from each other (‘Significant Pairs’) in their Oireachtas speeches, as a proportion of how many pairs of Fine Gael speakers there were (‘Total Pairs’) in each year.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Ideal Type Dimension</i>    | <i>F Statistic</i>          | <i>Prob. &gt; F</i> | <i>Significant Pairs</i> | <i>Total Pairs</i> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1987        | European Institutions/Policies | 2.82                        | 0.0020              | 0                        | 66                 |
| 1987        | European Values/Community      | 1.10                        | 0.4084              | --                       | 28                 |
| 1987        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed</i> |                     | --                       | 1                  |
| 1987        | National Institutions/Policies | 1.92                        | 0.0297              | 0                        | 78                 |
| 1987        | National Values/Community      | 1.65                        | 0.1387              | --                       | 66                 |
| 1987        | National Output                | 5.68                        | 0.0003              | 4                        | 66                 |
| 1992        | European Institutions/Policies | 2.20                        | 0.0014              | 3                        | 276                |
| 1992        | European Values/Community      | 2.03                        | 0.0391              | 2                        | 171                |
| 1992        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed</i> |                     | --                       | 45                 |
| 1992        | National Institutions/Policies | 4.12                        | 0.0001              | 5                        | 136                |
| 1992        | National Values/Community      | 2.16                        | 0.0778              | --                       | 91                 |
| 1992        | National Output                | 6.58                        | 0.0000              | 19                       | 190                |
| 1998        | European Institutions/Policies | 1.04                        | 0.4090              | --                       | 36                 |
| 1998        | European Values/Community      | 1.56                        | 0.2646              | --                       | 15                 |
| 1998        | European Output                | 0.25                        | 0.8165              | --                       | 3                  |
| 1998        | National Institutions/Policies | 3.16                        | 0.0045              | 2                        | 36                 |
| 1998        | National Values/Community      |                             |                     | --                       | 10                 |
| 1998        | National Output                | 0.76                        | 0.5652              | --                       | 10                 |

### **3.7 The Labour Party 1987 - 1998**

#### **3.7.1 Mean Positions**

Figure 3.3 describes Labour’s position on the six ideal type dimensions in 1987, 1992 and 1998. In a pattern that is becoming familiar, the

Institutions/Policies dimensions are located further up the salience axis and somewhat closer to the neutral point of the direction axis than the cluster of Values/Community and Output dimensions in the top left hand corner. However, the shape of the co-ordinates in Figure 3.3 is a less tightly knit cluster along the upper half of the direction axis, compared to Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. Labour's position on European Institutions/Policies was fairly positive at the point in time when this study started and at the point it left off (with a dip to 0.24 in 1992).


At first glance the fact that the position in 1987 appears more positive than the position in 1992 on does not correspond well with the fact that the Maastricht Treaty enjoyed Labour's support whereas the party was known at the time to be less convinced about the Single European Act. Specifically, Labour's historical difficulty with reconciling EC membership with the Irish brand of neutrality (military neutrality) has been widely documented, and had not been fully resolved by 1987 (Keatinge 1984; Gallagher 1988; Salmon 1989; Keogh 1990; Holmes 1993). This is not reflected in the current analysis. If anything, the European Institutions/Policies direction in 1987 and 1992 might have been expected to be the reverse of what Figure 3.3 shows.

The salience of the National Institutions/Policies dimension in 1987 was higher than the salience of European Institutions/Policies. Curiously, for a party that was sometimes seen as somewhat Eurosceptic at the time, the direction of National Institutions/Policies indicated a much more critical attitude towards National than toward European Institutions/Policies. This remained the case throughout and may be tentatively explained as a disinclination to appear to validate Fianna Fail in government. Labour's stance on National Institutions/Policies did become more positive in the two subsequent years, in 1992 more or less on a par with European Institutions/Policies in terms of direction. The difference in salience between National and European Institutions/Policies was substantial. The initial focus on National Institutions/Policies gave way to a focus on the European dimension in the two later years.

The most salient Institutions/Policies coding categories in 1987 were national foreign, security and defence policy, the national constitution, European



foreign, security and defence policy and the national courts. Labour maintained the focus on European foreign, security and defence policy in 1992, but the main



**Figure 3.3 Labour Positions 1987-1998**

**Direction:** Attitudinal direction on a given ideal type, where -1 is the strongest possible disapproval and 1 is the strongest possible support.

**Salience:** The comparative salience of dimensions, adding to 1 over six dimensions in a given year.

focus this year was on European social and employment policy and the structural instruments. The single currency was also salient in this year. In 1998 European foreign, security and defence policy was again the most salient institution or policy, followed by the European Council, European social and employment policy and national foreign, security and defence policy. On foreign, security and defence policy Labour Senator Jack Harte said in 1987 that:

It is my view that as time goes on we are likely to get more dragged into giving away a little more. When we joined the Community we gave away some of our sovereignty and through time we will give more of it away. While I do not think there will be another world war in my life time nobody can say that a war of massive proportions will not take place. The danger exists and there is a possibility of our being sucked into a military alliance, rather than dragged, as a result of the benefits we get from the Community. We are moving one step nearer a military alliance and the Labour Party are concerned about that. (Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 2103).

By 1992 the party line was nevertheless that:

In the period up to 1996 Ireland must argue and work, in close co-operation with like-minded member states and notably with new arrivals such as [196] Sweden, Austria and Finland, for acceptable and progressive common policies capable of providing the whole of Europe with genuine security, disarmament and development and reducing defence policy and provisions to the minimum levels necessary to ensure peace and justice. In doing so, we will have the support of every social democratic party in Europe. (Mr. Dick Spring TD, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 161).

In 1998, finally, integration was perceived to “enhance” neutrality rather than, as had been claimed in 1987, to “drag Ireland nearer a military alliance”:

I genuinely believe this amendment is not necessary because the legal position is as outlined by Deputy Mitchell. I subscribe to that legal position in relation to the Amsterdam Treaty and in relation to our neutrality. The position is enhanced rather than weakened by virtue of the amendment which will be put before the people on 22 May. (Mr. Dick Spring, Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 627).<sup>17</sup>

Labour’s view of European Values/Community improved little by little, and this seems also to have been the case with National Values/Community. It is worth keeping in mind here that very few observations are the basis for this analysis and associated commentary in these pages. It is implicit in this warning that these dimensions were consistently of very low salience. Nevertheless, this

data tells us that the view of European Values/Community improved from 0.64 to 0.80 between 1987 and 1992, and reached 1.0 in 1998. Meanwhile, the view of National Values/Community was perfectly neutral in 1987, and grew more positive, but not consistently so, in the subsequent years. The kinds of things measured by the two Values/Community dimensions were arguably not important to Labour, on the assumption that salience reflects importance. No Values/Community category was consistently salient. A sense that the promotion of international peace and security is a specifically Irish value was the most salient (or least non-salient) in 1987. By 1992 European identity had become the most salient category, followed by European democracy and national peace and security. European identity was once again the most salient in 1998:

The loss of life in the Second World War led to a series of stepping stones towards what the Treaty of Rome described as the ever closer union of European people. The ambiguity of that phrase was deliberately chosen to ensure that while the objective was constantly in front of people, the precise description was never put in place so that it could not become a source of dispute. However, we have been inexorably moving towards that ever closer union. (Mr. Ruairi Quinn TD, Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 101).

On the assumption that the relationship between an issue's importance is reflected by the time and/or space allocated to it, neither European nor National Output seem important to Labour. This has been a puzzling finding about National Output especially, throughout the analysis. Is the salience-importance assumption flawed, or have the documents been analysed in a way that does not accurately reflect salience? This question seems critical, and answering it is very hard. Labour's attitude toward European Output combines the very lowest salience with the very highest esteem – clearly Europe as an entity is perceived to benefit from integration but whether or not it does is not of great concern to Labour. Nor, by the same token, is the degree to which Ireland as a part of the European entity benefits from integration although the salience of National Output is marginally higher than that of National Output. While the salience of

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<sup>17</sup> The "legal position outlined by Mr. Mitchell" referred to by Mr. Spring is that the Amsterdam Treaty would in effect (albeit unintentionally on the part of the drafters of the Treaty) give Irish

National Output did not change much over the years, Labour appears to have developed a much more positive view of how Ireland fares in Europe in the 1992-1998 period. Until 1998 however, this was not a party that accepted any claims about the benefits of integration uncritically:

As one who campaigned personally and vigorously against our entry into the EC in 1972 and whose party led that campaign against acceptance of a very limited Treaty of Rome, I have witnessed the realisation of the worst predictions of our party at that time. There have been short term benefits for Irish farmers arising from our membership. Native Irish industry has been decimated. We have record breaking rates of unemployment and the services we can provide in health, education and welfare are seriously reduced and in some instances are being dismantled. Our food prices are artificially inflated to give producers prices for goods that are not needed. The surplus is stored at enormous expense while many in our society go without, and millions in the exploited Third World - the exploitation in the first instance being by our European partners as colonisers and imperialists and later and at present as long distance economic exploiters - starve to death while we build stores in which lifesaving, lifegiving food, beef, grain and butter, lie wasting. There are new examples of this massive scandal at present under construction in my constituency. This is very far from the near Utopia promised by advocates of our membership of the EC in 1972. (Mr. Emmet Stagg TD, Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 964).

A more favourable but by no means uncritical assessment by a member (and later leader) of Labour:

It has to be stressed that there are cogent arguments both ways. But in the end a judgement has to be made on where this country's best interests lie and also how the Labour Party's aspirations can be best advanced. The conclusion is that the Labour Party should support the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. (Mr. Ruairi Quinn TD, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 727).

This data does not suggest that a sense of common European good – if there is such a sense – matters greatly to Labour; here is nevertheless one rare example:

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neutrality constitutional status.

The Maastricht process can lead to a more prosperous Europe - but much remains to be done if that prosperity is to be spread fairly throughout the regions of Europe. Maastricht must not be allowed to enrich the few at the expense of the many. In that context it must be recognised that there are many instruments in the Maastricht Treaty that will enable wealth creation. The continuing process must add instruments to enable the fair distribution of that extra wealth so that citizens and workers benefit. (Mr. Dick Spring TD, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 126).

### 3.7.2 Continuity and Cohesiveness

Table 3.3a shows that the change in Labour's position on European Institutions/Policies in the 1987-1992 period turned out to be statistically significant. However, the return in 1998 to the high level of support in 1987 does not quite come out as significant at the 0.05 level (0.055). On the National dimensions there were changes only on Institutions/Policies. They were from marginally negative in 1987 to nominally positive in 1992 and 1998. The failure to reject the null hypothesis of no change in most instances means that Labour's position was characterised by continuity rather than change, in the 1987-1998 time period as a whole as well as in the two shorter time periods, 1987-1992 and 1992-1998. This is beginning to be a familiar conclusion, since it more or less replicates what was found in the corresponding analyses of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael.

**Table 3.3a Continuity - Labour 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of Labour's position on each ideal type dimension. The analysis compares the party position in 1987-1992, 1987-1998 and 1992-1998.

'--': Difference not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference significant at the 0.05 level.

'\*': No variance observed, therefore no F statistic and no Prob > F can be reported.

|                    | <i>Eur'n</i>    | <i>Nat'l</i>    | <i>Eur'n</i>    | <i>Nat'l</i>    | <i>Eur'n</i>   | <i>Nat'l</i>  |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|
| <i>Continuity</i>  | <i>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Output*</i> | <i>Output</i> |
| <i>1987-1992</i>   | X               | X               | --              | --              | --             | --            |
| <i>1987-1998</i>   | --              | X               | --              | --              | --             | --            |
| <i>1992-1998</i>   | --              | --              | --              | --              | --             | --            |
| <i>F</i>           | 6.22            | 6.21            | 2.40            | 1.41            | --             | 1.40          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .0022           | .0024           | .0975           | .2587           | --             | .2608         |

Table 3.3b summarises the results of the analysis of Labour's internal cohesiveness. Party speakers were in the main united around the same position; instances of pair-wise differences often involved a single speaker who differed from many colleagues. The only significant F statistics in 1987 were for European and National Institutions/Policies (though on the European this did not carry through to the bonferroni tests so no "Significant Pairs" could be identified). On the National, Mr. Jack Harte was involved in all four instances of pair-wise differences.

**Table 3.3b Cohesiveness – Labour 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of inter-party cohesiveness, by ideal type dimension for 1987, 1992 and 1998. The analyses identifies how many Labour speakers differed from each other ('Significant Pairs') in their Oireachtas speeches, as a proportion of how many pairs of Labour speakers there were ('Total Pairs') in each year.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Ideal Type Dimension</i>    | <i>F Statistic</i>                      | <i>Prob. &gt; F</i> | <i>Significant Pairs</i> | <i>Total Pairs</i> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|---|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1987        | European Institutions/Policies | 3.49                                    | 0.0060              | 0                        | 15                 |
| 1987        | European Values/Community      | 1.42                                    | 0.2643              | --                       | 10                 |
| 1987        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed (1 speaker)</i> |                     |                          |                    |
| 1987        | National Institutions/Policies | 6.19                                    | 0.0000              | 4                        | 15                 |
| 1987        | National Values/Community      | 0.20                                    | 0.8960              | --                       | 6                  |
| 1987        | National Output                | 5.83                                    | 0.0206              | --                       | 6                  |
| 1992        | European Institutions/Policies | 4.89                                    | 0.0000              | 2                        | 28                 |
| 1992        | European Values/Community      | 1.56                                    | 0.1860              | --                       | 21                 |
| 1992        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed (1 speaker)</i> |                     |                          |                    |
| 1992        | National Institutions/Policies | 0.89                                    | 0.4894              | --                       | 10                 |
| 1992        | National Values/Community      | 1.01                                    | 0.4439              | --                       | 15                 |
| 1992        | National Output                | 29.00                                   | 0.0000              | 7                        | 15                 |
| 1998        | European Institutions/Policies | 0.41                                    | 0.6680              | --                       | 3                  |
| 1998        | European Values/Community      | <i>No variance observed</i>             |                     |                          |                    |
| 1998        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed</i>             |                     |                          |                    |
| 1998        | National Institutions/Policies | 6.79                                    | 0.0051              | 1                        | 3                  |
| 1998        | National Values/Community      | <i>No variance observed</i>             |                     |                          |                    |
| 1998        | National Output                | 2.34                                    | 0.1914              | --                       | 3                  |


In 1992 the two ideal type dimensions where there were differences between party members were European Institutions/Policies and National Output. On the former Dr. Pat Upton was involved in each of the two pair-wise differences. He was less conspicuous in terms of National Output, involved in only two of seven pair-wise differences. Mr. Joe Costello stands out here: his mean position of -1 was at least a distance of 1.0 away from any other Labour speaker. In 1998 there was only one significant F statistic, for National Institutions/Policies, and one significant bonferroni test. Here, Mr. Pat

Gallagher was quite off message vis-à-vis party leader Ruairi Quinn. On the whole, however, while these comments have highlighted speakers who are different in some way, Labour emerges as a party whose position is agreed, not as a party whose position is contested by Labour members.

### **3.8 Other Parties 1987-1998**

#### **3.8.1 Mean Positions**

Somewhat different expectations might apply to the Other Party group than to Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, since the latter three are discrete parties and



**Figure 3.4 Other Party Positions 1987-1998**

**Direction:** Attitudinal direction on a given ideal type, where -1 is the strongest possible disapproval and 1 is the strongest possible support.

**Salience:** The comparative salience of dimensions, adding to 1 over six dimensions in a given year.

the Other Party group is not. Nevertheless, the broad pattern of observations in Figure 3.4 is familiar from Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. For Other Parties data points form a reasonably tidy L-shape along the upper half of the direction axis and three-quarters of the salience axis.<sup>18</sup>

European and National Institutions/Policies were equally salient in 1987 but as the former's salience grew in subsequent years, the latter's declined. The direction of each dimension was stable: European Institutions/Policies never really left the neutral 0 point, whereas National Institutions/Policies hovered in a similar manner around the 0.20 mark. The salience of European Institutions/Policies here was not unlike what was observed of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour in this regard, but very unlike the three main parties in terms of direction. Moreover, Labour and the Other group were not dissimilar in attitude toward National Institutions/Policies, in direction and salience.

What policies and institutions interested the Other group? In 1987 their discourse(s) centred on national courts, national foreign, security and defence policy, the national constitution, and European foreign, security and defence policy. In 1992 it was European foreign, security and defence policy, the national constitution, structural instruments, the single market, the single currency and European social and employment policy. In 1998, it was European foreign, security and defence policy, national foreign, security and defence policy, the European Council, European social and employment policy and the European Parliament. With regard to foreign, security and defence policy the independent TD Neil Blaney held that the Single European Act had negative implications for Irish neutrality:

What frightens me most is the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of all people, coming into the House a short while ago - in response to what may have been said by speakers yesterday and earlier this morning - and talking about our right of military neutrality never having been called into question. Of course it has not been for the simple reason that to date nobody had any right to call it into question. This is a great way of assuring people that it will not be called into question in the future. When the Spinelli and Dooge

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<sup>18</sup> The shifting composition of the Other group means that comparing **other87**, **other92** and **other98** is not to compare like with like in the sense that comparing, say, **fg87**, **fg92** and **fg98** is (though the configuration of Fine Gael members speaking on each bill changed, too). To alleviate the gravity of these concerns particular attention will be paid to the cohesiveness analysis (below).



reports were going through the European Parliament I said, and am on record, that it was the beginning of the dragging of this country into NATO by the back door. The recommendations of those two reports have now been incorporated in the Single European Act in a much more dangerous form. There is no point in any Minister or any other speaker attempting to tell us that because our military neutrality was not called into question in the past that constitutes an assurance under the new order of things if the Single European Act is ratified. It cannot be contended that our military neutrality will not then be called into question because we will have no defence in any such calling into question as we have at present. (Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 1192).

Another independent member of the Oireachtas took the opposite view:

I believe then that Title III of the Single Act poses no difficulties for Ireland's ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. (Senator Mary Robinson, Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Single European Act), text unit 1754).

The Other group is clearly distinct from the three larger parties in terms of Values/Community. The top left hand corner of Figures 3.1-3.3 were the habitual location for Values/Community, but that is not where they are all the time in Figure 3.4. Values/Community is not especially more salient to the Other Party group than to Fianna Fail et.al., just less positive. The direction indicates less conviction about the value basis of the European project, and a consistently higher appreciation of values associated with the nation and state than values associated with Europe in each year. However, the position on National Values/Community 1998 is less positive than that on European Values/Community 1987, so in the 11-year period of study there was some overlap between European and National Values/Community. Figure 3.4 moreover indicates increasing dislike of European and National Values/Community, especially between 1992 and 1998. The identity categories were among the most salient Values/Community categories in the coding scheme for Others in all years (except European identity in 1992). Some, like this Progressive Democrat, felt that national and European identities were complementary and even mutually supportive:

Our membership of the European Community over the past 20 years has done a great deal to improve our own self-confidence,

our view of what we stand for in the world. It has reinforced the values we hold dear and, perhaps, which were submerged as we came out of a colonial past. I believe our confidence has grown enormously. I also believe we can bring to the European table many of the values which we hold to be important to enhance that desire for peace, to enhance that desire for conciliation [1000] and to enhance that desire for a common heritage and a common citizenship which the Treaty will bring to us. I think it was Sir Kenneth Clarke, in the series of programmes he did on the BBC some years ago on "Civilisation", who suggested that the restoration of civilisation to Europe began from places like the Skelligs Rock on the west coast of Ireland and from the monastic settlements. When you consider that we had no European union then and we had no communication, the fact that Ireland could have had such a profound impact on European civilisation is one we might remember and one that might give us some confidence when we bring our values to the negotiating table in Europe. (Senator John Dardis, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 1772).

Not everyone shared this view. In 1998 European democracy and European values other were the most salient Values/Community coding scheme categories. Human rights was one such "other value", and other values such as democracy, justice and equality were also found in this category. Not everyone agreed that the recent developments in integration were enough to salvage the European Union's legitimacy. For instance, the Green Party TD John Gormley said that:

Despite some advances, therefore, the Amsterdam Treaty has failed to remedy the anti-democratic nature of the European Union and has failed to make substantial gains for those living in the EU. This lack of democracy and accountability in the EU will be a point of criticism by the Green Party when considering a number of other areas of the Amsterdam Treaty. (Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 183).

Even as the perception of European Values/Community worsened severely in the 1992 – 1998 period, the perception that Ireland nonetheless benefits materially from integration improved quite drastically. Of course, this is subject to the qualification made above: year-on-year comparisons of the Other Party group are complicated because apparent changes may be due to new groups entering or leaving the Other group rather than any given group changing

its position. However, the analysis also reveals a sense that Europe rather than Ireland benefited from integration in 1987 and 1992, while they were felt to benefit equally – and a lot – in 1998. The view that Ireland does benefit - considerably - from Europe seems to have gained acceptance just at the time when was becoming clear that Ireland would become a net contributor to the European budget within a decade. According to the relevant criteria Ireland had started to catch up with average European standards of living and with average European performance on standard economic indicators. Hence, Ireland would not qualify for large-scale pay-outs for much longer. Not that Output seems to have mattered much to the Other group, but again, this is a question of whether the salience assumption, the sample or the analysis (or more than one of these) is flawed. The single National Output observation in 1998 was spoken by Democratic Left TD Proinsias De Rossa, and it refers also to European Output:

Sharing sovereignty inevitably will lead to sharing defence. This will mean common defence because as long as Ireland remains a member of the EU it will become involved in common security and defence at some point and the Irish people have accepted this time after time since taking up membership. Ireland has one of the smallest populations in Europe and when we enter negotiations we must make sure we argue for the best possible deal whatever evolves in economics, commerce, defence and security not just for the people of Ireland but for those of Europe and the world generally because the EU is about to become not only one of the most powerful trading blocs but political entities in the world. We cannot continue to narrow the debate on Europe to the issue of whether we should hang on to traditional neutrality. (Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 462).

### 3.8.2 Continuity and Cohesiveness

The reason for combining very small parties and parliamentary independents into a group (“Other”) was a solution to a small-n problem. As a solution it undoubtedly introduces some new problems.<sup>1</sup> Despite the shifting composition of the membership of this group there was not a single instance of statistically significant change, as reflected in Table 3.4a. Figure 3.4 (which is

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<sup>1</sup> Is it interesting or relevant to examine a mean position calculated on the basis of such varied parties and independent parliamentarians? The standard deviation associated with such a mean

based on the same data as the analyses summarised in Table 3.4a) does not generate expectations of change with regard to European and National Institutions/Policies, because, as the Figure shows, the estimated inter-year differences are so small. However, the Figure gives the impression that the mean positions on the four Values/Community and Output dimensions did undergo quite dramatic change.

Table 3.4a shows that these observed changes were not confirmed at the 0.05 level of significance, but these remarks must be understood in the context of the small-n problem: if there had been more observations it is quite possible that the observed changes would have become statistically significant. Even at that, the Other group is a somewhat different entity than Fianna Fail, Fine Gael or Labour, which may make it a difficult entity to get to grips with in the analysis. This begs the question: what was the substantive position of the Other group, for instance on European Values/Community?

**Table 3.4a Continuity – Other Parties 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of Other Parties' position on each ideal type dimension. The analysis compares the party position in 1987-1992, 1987-1998 and 1992-1998.

'--': Difference not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference significant at the 0.05 level.

| <i>Continuity</i>  | <i>Eur'n<br/>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Nat'<br/>Inst/Pol</i> | <i>Eur'n<br/>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Nat'l<br/>Val/Comm</i> | <i>Eur'n<br/>Output</i> | <i>Nat'l<br/>Output</i> |
|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>1987-1992</i>   | --                        | --                       | --                        | --                        | --                      | --                      |
| <i>1987-1998</i>   | --                        | --                       | --                        | --                        | --                      | --                      |
| <i>1992-1998</i>   | --                        | --                       | --                        | --                        | --                      | --                      |
| <i>F</i>           | .62                       | .51                      | 2.05                      | 2.04                      | .86                     | 2.16                    |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .5397                     | .5991                    | .1341                     | .1394                     | .4900                   | .1244                   |

If the observed mean direction of 0.39 in 1987 is no different from what was observed in 1998 (e.g., -0.02), then was the Other group “fairly positive” (0.39) or “essentially neutral” towards European Values/Community? Similar questions apply to National Values/Community and the two Output dimensions. The statistical tests were applied with a health warning. Interpreting the results

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is bound to be substantial, thus making the mean an imprecise and uninformative measure of central tendency.

with this warning in mind means that the bottom line is that not much can be said one way or another about the Other group.<sup>2</sup>

The Other group requires some particular attention in the cohesiveness analysis, to see if speakers belonging to the same party within the Other group behave differently than speakers not belonging to the same party. Table 3.4b summarises the data analysis results. Compared to Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour the frequency with which the null hypothesis of no difference could be rejected for the Other group is relatively high. The small parties within the Other group were generally internally cohesive. To begin with the Progressive Democrats, at no point was there ever any difference between the four Progressive Democrat speakers (Mr. Desmond O'Malley, Mr. Martin Cullen, Mr. Michael McDowell, Miss Geraldine Kennedy) in 1987 or between the two Progressive Democrat speakers in 1992 (Mr. John Dardis, Mr. Robert Molloy).

**Table 3.4b Cohesiveness – Other Party 1987-1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests of inter-party cohesiveness, by ideal type dimension for 1987, 1992 and 1998. The analyses identifies how many Other Party speakers differed from each other ('Significant Pairs') in their Oireachtas speeches, as a proportion of how many pairs of Other Party speakers there were ('Total Pairs') in each year.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Ideal Type Dimension</i>    | <i>F Statistic</i>                      | <i>Prob. &gt; F</i> | <i>Significant Pairs</i> | <i>Total Pairs</i> |    |
|-------------|--------------------------------|---|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|----|
| 1987        | European Institutions/Policies | 4.57                                    | 0.0000              | 13                       | 105                |    |
| 1987        | European Values/Community      | 1.39                                    | 0.2646              | --                       | 36                 |    |
| 1987        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed</i>             |                     |                          | --                 | 10 |
| 1987        | National Institutions/Policies | 5.42                                    | 0.0000              | 12                       | 105                |    |
| 1987        | National Values/Community      | 0.63                                    | 0.7596              | --                       | 45                 |    |
| 1987        | National Output                | 2.39                                    | 0.0686              | --                       | 21                 |    |
| 1992        | European Institutions/Policies | 12.99                                   | 0.0000              | 13                       | 36                 |    |
| 1992        | European Values/Community      | 6.97                                    | 0.0002              | 2                        | 28                 |    |
| 1992        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed (1 speaker)</i> |                     |                          |                    |    |
| 1992        | National Institutions/Policies | 2.40                                    | 0.0239              | 0                        | 36                 |    |
| 1992        | National Values/Community      | 1.61                                    | 0.2105              | --                       | 45                 |    |
| 1992        | National Output                | 8.89                                    | 0.0000              | 6                        | 36                 |    |
| 1998        | European Institutions/Policies | 7.91                                    | 0.0000              | 8                        | 21                 |    |
| 1998        | European Values/Community      | 4.78                                    | 0.0011              | 2                        | 21                 |    |
| 1998        | European Output                | <i>No variance observed (1 speaker)</i> |                     |                          |                    |    |
| 1998        | National Institutions/Policies | 3.10                                    | 0.0091              | 1                        | 21                 |    |
| 1998        | National Values/Community      | 4.33                                    | 0.0923              | --                       | 10                 |    |
| 1998        | National Output                | <i>No variance observed</i>             |                     |                          | --                 | 1  |

<sup>2</sup> The statistical tests were nevertheless applied rather than just relying on descriptives (such as frequency tables) because relying on descriptives only does not solve the underlying problem of small-n.

There were no Progressive Democrat speakers in 1998 (the party was the junior coalition partner and its senior partner in government, Fianna Fail, did all the talking on behalf of the government). On the current evidence, therefore, the Progressive Democrats were a perfectly cohesive party. The same was not true of the Workers' Party, another small party in the Other group. Its two speakers in 1987 (Mr. Proinsias De Rossa, Mr. Thomas Mac Giolla) took different positions on European and National Institutions/Policies in 1987, and interestingly, Mr. Proinsias De Rossa had left that party by 1992 and formed Democratic Left. Mr. Thomas Mac Giolla was the only Workers' Party speaker in 1992 and the party took no part in the 1998 debate, so no further inter-speaker comparisons were possible. Mr. Proinsias De Rossa and his Democratic Left colleague Mr. Éamon Gilmore were perfectly cohesive in 1992 and 1998. No other parties had more than one speaker, so no further comment about party cohesiveness can be made about them (such as the Green Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and Sinn Féin).

While the small parties included in the Other Party group were internally coherent as far as this analysis can tell, they were also compatible across party lines. There was a strong tendency for speakers belonging to the same party to be "alike," and there was also a strong tendency for speakers of different Other parties or indeed independents to be "alike," too. Many independent TDs and Senators were indistinguishable from each other and also indistinguishable from the small parties in the Other group. So, party colleagues tended to agree with each other, and with colleagues from other parties or independent colleagues, insofar as the statistical analysis did not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference between them (at the 0.05 level). This indicates space for coalition building among members of the Oireachtas who may too easily be considered peripheral or marginal in the Oireachtas for not belonging to a major party (e.g., Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Labour). If these political actors organised themselves with respect to European integration as an issue in Irish domestic politics, they would possibly be quite effective or at least have more than a marginal effect on policy-making in this area. Provided, that is, that their preferences differ from those of the major parties.

### 3.9 Irish Parties – Distinct Policy Packages?

At this point I have located the parties spatially according to estimates of directions and salience, analysed the (lack of) evolution in these positions over time, and estimated internal party cohesion (which was generally very high). It remains to take a comparative, inter-party perspective, by bringing together the results for each party to see if the parties resembled one another or demonstrated clear differences. In this section I continue the analysis in the same methodological vein as previously (e.g., analyses of variance and associated bonferroni tests), on the basis of the same data used in those sections, as outlined in Table 3.5. In this context it is important to distinguish between statistically significant differences, which were frequent, and substantively significant differences, which were far less frequent.

**Table 3.5 Party Positions**

Summary of data presented in Figures 3.1-3.4.

*Dir:* Attitudinal direction on a given ideal type, where -1 is the strongest possible disapproval and 1 is the strongest possible support.

*Sal:* The comparative salience of dimensions, adding to 1 over six dimensions in a given year.

| Ideal Type Dimensions |            | FF 87 | FF 92 | FF 98 | FG 87 | FG 92 | FG 98 | L 87 | L 92 | L 98 | O 87 | O 92 | O 98 |
|-----------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <i>Eur'n</i>          | <i>Dir</i> | .58   | .50   | .44   | .42   | .54   | .41   | .44  | .24  | .49  | -.03 | .02  | -.02 |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>       | <i>Sal</i> | .42   | .67   | .62   | .25   | .59   | .54   | .34  | .65  | .62  | .44  | .62  | .65  |
| <i>Eur'n</i>          | <i>Dir</i> | .80   | .81   | .82   | .83   | .73   | .87   | .64  | .80  | 1.0  | .39  | .26  | -.02 |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>       | <i>Sal</i> | .04   | .07   | .12   | .03   | .08   | .06   | .08  | .14  | .10  | .03  | .07  | .11  |
| <i>Eur'n</i>          | <i>Dir</i> | .87   | .92   | 1.0   | 1.0   | 1.0   | .75   | 1.0  | 1.0  | 1.0  | .40  | 1.0  | 1.0  |
| <i>Output</i>         | <i>Sal</i> | .02   | .01   | .02   | .01   | .02   | .02   | .01  | 0.0  | .02  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| <i>Nat'l</i>          | <i>Dir</i> | .21   | .23   | .36   | .04   | -.02  | .01   | -.05 | .19  | .16  | .18  | .20  | .23  |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>       | <i>Sal</i> | .37   | .09   | .14   | .61   | .11   | .28   | .50  | .08  | .20  | .45  | .18  | .21  |
| <i>Nat'l</i>          | <i>Dir</i> | .90   | .75   | .75   | .63   | .28   | .67   | 0.0  | .45  | .33  | .74  | .65  | .33  |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>       | <i>Sal</i> | .05   | .04   | .03   | .05   | .05   | .02   | .03  | .07  | .02  | .03  | .05  | .02  |
| <i>Nat'l</i>          | <i>Dir</i> | .97   | .98   | 1.0   | .76   | .88   | .95   | .25  | .13  | .63  | -.04 | .03  | 1.0  |
| <i>Output</i>         | <i>Sal</i> | .11   | .12   | .08   | .04   | .14   | .08   | .04  | .05  | .06  | .03  | .07  | 0.1  |

In 1987 there were many party differences but as Table 3.6a shows no particular pattern of differences emerged (such as particular parties being consistently different, or always essentially the same, across ideal type dimensions). It may be noted, however, that Other Parties figured in nine of the 16 significant inter-party differences. With the exception of European Output there were party differences on each ideal type dimension, but Tables 3.5 and

3.6a-c inform us that while the statistically significant differences were frequent, often the differences were substantively not as great as the statistical tests might lead one to expect. Nevertheless, there is a pattern here: Other Parties were substantively less positive about all things European (except European Output) than mainstream Irish parties. Fine Gael were moreover somewhat less positive about European policy-making than the government party Fianna Fail, although both parties clearly favoured it. Overall, the cross-party analysis nevertheless confirms what was already clear from previous sections of this chapter: that Irish parties collectively occupy a small part of the entire -1 to 1 range that is the basis for these estimates.

**Table 3.6a Party Differences 1987**

Oneway analyses of variance and bonferroni tests estimating differences in party positions on the six ideal type dimensions in 1987. Based on the data presented in Table 3.5.

'--': Difference not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference significant at the 0.05 level.

| <i>Eur'n</i>       |           |           |          | <i>Eur'n Val/</i>  |           |           |          | <i>Eur'n</i>       |           |           |          |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>    | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Comm</i>        | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Output</i>      | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> |
| <i>FG</i>          | X         |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          |
| <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          |
| <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | X        | <i>O</i>           | --        | X         | --       | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | --       |
| <i>F Stat.</i>     |           | 93.92     |          | <i>F Stat.</i>     |           | 3.29      |          | <i>F Stat.</i>     |           | 2.98      |          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0236     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0523     |          |
| <i>Nat'l</i>       |           |           |          | <i>Nat'l Val/</i>  |           |           |          | <i>Nat'l</i>       |           |           |          |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>    | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Comm</i>        | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Output</i>      | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> |
| <i>FG</i>          | X         |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          |
| <i>L</i>           | X         | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | X         | X         |          | <i>L</i>           | X         | X         |          |
| <i>O</i>           | --        | X         | X        | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | X        | <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | --       |
| <i>F Stat.</i>     |           | 20.18     |          | <i>F Stat.</i>     |           | 9.82      |          | <i>F Stat.</i>     |           | 37.21     |          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          |

There were no clear patterns of party differences or similarities in 1992, though as in 1987 Other Parties were part of many instances of significant inter-party differences (nine out of 15). Another similarity with 1987 was the absence of party differences on European Output: all parties were equally positive about the impact of integration on the European region. In addition, in 1992 all parties were agreed about National Values/Community – they were perhaps not as strongly positive about it as one might have expected. In 1992, moreover, Fianna Fail's and Fine Gael's attitudes on European policy-making had become more similar – in 1992 they “met” somewhere roughly in between their respective 1987 positions. (Note that in contrast to 1987, in 1992 Fine Gael



were the more positive of these two parties). Labour were somewhat less enthusiastic about European policy-making than either of these two parties, but all the same clearly positive about it. The qualitatively most important distinction is between Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour on the one hand, and Other Parties on the other hand, since the latter were neutral rather than positive about European policy-making. This division is repeated on European Values/Community, where Fianna Fail and Fine Gael are once again the most positive parties, followed by the more moderately positive Labour and the neutral Other Parties. There is a tendency for this pattern to be repeated a third time on National Output, though it is not entirely clear whether Labour is belongs with Fianna Fail - Fine Gael or with Other Parties here.

**Table 3.6b Party Differences 1992**

Oneway analyses of variance and bonferroni tests estimating differences in party positions on the six ideal type dimensions in 1992. Based on the data presented in Table 3.5.

'--': Difference not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference significant at the 0.05 level.

| <i>Eur'n</i>       |           |           |          | <i>Eur'n Val/</i>  |           |           |          | <i>Eur'n</i>       |           |           |          |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>    | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Comm</i>        | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Output</i>      | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> |
| <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          |
| <i>L</i>           | X         | X         |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          |
| <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | X        | <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | X        | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | --       |
| <i>F Statistic</i> |           | 68.59     |          | <i>F Statistic</i> |           | 9.20      |          | <i>F Statistic</i> |           | 0.36      |          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .7832     |          |
| <i>Nat'l</i>       |           |           |          | <i>Nat'l Val/</i>  |           |           |          | <i>Nat'l</i>       |           |           |          |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>    | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Comm</i>        | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Output</i>      | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> |
| <i>FG</i>          | X         |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | X         |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          |
| <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | X         | X         |          |
| <i>O</i>           | --        | X         | --       | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | --       | <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | --       |
| <i>F Statistic</i> |           | 4.23      |          | <i>F Statistic</i> |           | 4.28      |          | <i>F Statistic</i> |           | 67.89     |          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0060     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0066     |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> |           | .0000     |          |

In addition to the continued absence of party differences on European Output and National Values/Community, the tendency that emerged in 1992 for a dividing line between on the one hand all "mainstream" parties and on the other hand Other Parties became stronger in 1998. The number of significant differences between Other Parties and the rest, as well as the simultaneous decrease in significant differences between Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, signal two simultaneous and contradictory trends. The first is a trend of attitudinal assimilation, between Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour. Fianna Fail disagreed with Fine Gael about National Institutions/Policies and with Labour about National Output (in both instances Fianna Fail were more positive than the

other party), and these were the only statistically significant differences between these three. The second trend is one of attitudinal distinctiveness, between Other Parties and everybody else. What appears to be happening here is that Other Parties are following a less pro-European trajectory in attitudinal development than Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour. Differences between parties were not generally sustainable with respect to national policy-making, national values etc. or the national interest, so it is not an all-pervasive trend.

Over time Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour appear to have become more alike in their pro-European attitudes, while Other Parties were predominantly neutral. Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour were alike throughout with respect to European Values/Community, but became more alike over time in other respects, too. At all times Other Parties were less positive about European Values/Community, as well as European policy-making.

The pattern of differences on National Values/Community is rather different. In 1987 Labour took a unique, neutral approach, while Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Other group were very positive indeed about the values etc. that they associated with Ireland. In 1992 the only significant inter-party difference concerned Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, the latter being the less enthusiastic about the relevant subject matter. However, in the end, in 1998 all parties were agreed about national values. The respective party means do look quite distinct but there were probably not sufficient observations to obtain significance.

**Table 3.6c Party Differences 1998**

Oneway analyses of variance and bonferroni tests estimating differences in party positions on the six ideal type dimensions in 1998. Based on the data presented in Table 3.5.

'--': Difference in pairwise means comparison not significant at the 0.05 level.

'X': Difference in pairwise means comparison significant at the 0.05 level.

| <i>Eur'n</i>       |           |           |          | <i>Eur'n Val/</i>  |           |           |          | <i>Eur'n</i>       |           |           |          |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>    | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Comm</i>        | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Output</i>      | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> |
| <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          |
| <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          |
| <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | X        | <i>O</i>           | X         | X         | X        | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | --       |
| <i>F Statistic</i> | 27.73     |           |          | <i>F Statistic</i> | 15.78     |           |          | <i>F Statistic</i> | 1.32      |           |          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | 0.0000    |           |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | 0.0000    |           |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | 0.3061    |           |          |
| <i>Nat'l</i>       |           |           |          | <i>Nat'l Val/</i>  |           |           |          | <i>Nat'l</i>       |           |           |          |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>    | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Comm</i>        | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>Output</i>      | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> |
| <i>FG</i>          | X         |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          | <i>FG</i>          | --        |           |          |
| <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | --        | --        |          | <i>L</i>           | X         | --        |          |
| <i>O</i>           | --        | X         | --       | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | --       | <i>O</i>           | --        | --        | --       |
| <i>F Statistic</i> | 6.49      |           |          | <i>F Statistic</i> | 0.39      |           |          | <i>F Statistic</i> | 2.74      |           |          |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | 0.0003    |           |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | 0.7602    |           |          | <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | 0.0500    |           |          |

There was some surprise in discovering that National Output was not more prominent in the political debate. Fianna Fail and Fine Gael have been similarly positive about National Output – quite unequivocally so – throughout the entire time period, the Labour party and the Other group on their part were substantially less convinced about this. In 1987 and 1992 there was a perfect National Output fault line between these two pairs of parties, which broke down in 1998 when Labour was the least positive about the effect of integration on Ireland. (This contradicts the trend of Fianna Fail-Fine Gael-Labour similarity and dissimilarity from Other Parties).

Three general observations can be made. First, the trend over the 11-year period is that Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour have become more similar to each other in terms of attitudinal direction, in some very important respects even indistinguishable. These three parties comprise the mainstream of Irish politics. Second, the smaller parties and independents in Irish politics do not offer any radical alternative to the mainstream, simply a watered down version of the same.<sup>3</sup> Together, these two points augment the third: that collectively, Irish parties inhabit a very limited part of the -1 to 1 range of possible attitudes toward each ideal type dimension. To anticipate chapter 5, therefore, one would not expect dramatic differences in the parties' ideal type profiles. As I will highlight further in later chapters, this has implications for Ireland's suitability as a test of the Responsible Party Model.

A final remark pertains to National Institutions/Policies. The most (perhaps only) interesting things that has emerged about it are the continuous differences between Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. Since they are commonly said not to be notably different from each other this finding is a challenge to received wisdom about Irish political parties.

### **3.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed Irish party attitudes toward Europe, covering a decade that saw major developments in the scope of European integration. Four questions that are relevant to the overall research objective of this study were set

out in the introduction. All four questions have been answered by analysing three sets of parliamentary documents. The answers that have been found were not always unambiguous. Nevertheless, with respect to the first question the analysis revealed each party's position in 1987, 1992 and 1998 vis-à-vis the ideal type dimensions. Irish parties emphasise institutions and policies over values etc. and over discussions of material benefits. With respect to the second question the analysis showed that there were changes in each party's position, but in the main party positions were stable. The analysis also revealed that each party was internally cohesive, that is, that speakers wearing the same party label conveyed the same message in the Oireachtas. The fourth question was whether there were any inter-party differences, and if so, how they developed over time. To the question the analysis answered that there is a trend toward increasing attitudinal assimilation between the three largest parties in Irish politics, the pro-European Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour. Simultaneously, there is a growing "fault line" between them and the Other Parties who are more neutral about European integration. It remains to see, in chapter 5, whether and how this analysis allows the parties to be profiled vis-à-vis the ideal types – and more crucially, whether and, more crucially, how the parties and their respective groups of partisans have the same ideal type profiles. Therefore, the next chapter presents an analysis of Irish public opinion towards European integration.

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<sup>3</sup> On certain dimensions Other Parties have a distinguishable profile but even in those instances Other Parties were neutral (compared to Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour who were positive) rather than outright opposed to, say, European Institutions/Policies.

## Chapter 4:

### Estimating Public Opinion

#### 4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter estimated the attitudes of Irish political parties towards European integration, thus paving the way for assessing each party's ideal type profile. This chapter extends the analysis to the level of Irish public opinion, with the objective of assessing the ideal type profile of groups of people among the Irish public, specifically partisan groups. They are the most important groups in this study because in the Western European setting the Responsible Party Model assumes that likeminded parties and partisans form dyads of representation.

Chapter 1 showed that early empirical studies of public opinion and European integration reached overwhelmingly negative conclusions: these studies found European publics to be essentially disconnected from integration. In contrast, it is commonplace among academic and journalistic commentators alike to assume that the Irish are "good Europeans" in the sense of always appearing at the top of opinion poll tables that compare public support for European integration in the member states. This chapter examines Irish public opinion towards European integration with the ultimate objective (in chapter 5) of comparing Irish political parties and their respective partisan groups to each other against the backdrop of these ideal types.

What can reasonably be expected of the public as a political actor? Representative democracy makes the represented – the public – political actors at one remove. As political actors members of the public are often portrayed as unsophisticated operators whose lack of interest in politics weakens the political linkage that is at the core of democratic representation. Knowledge about the public as a political actor is generated primarily through public opinion survey research, a central social science research tradition that is not without its critics. Central debates pertaining to public opinion research, as well as a specific body of existing theory and research into public opinion toward European integration, are reviewed in section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the survey data I used to

analyse Irish public opinion toward European integration 1987-1998, including details of how I selected and recoded the data to make it as suitable as possible to my objectives. Section 4.4 accounts for the methodology employed to analyse the data. Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 present the results for 1987, 1992 and 1998, respectively. As will become clear throughout the chapter, there are very good reasons to be restrained in drawing cross-temporal comparisons in this analysis, but section 4.8 nevertheless assesses the evolution of public opinion. It should be stressed from the outset, however, that cross-temporal comparisons in any section of this chapter are intended as tentative. Finally, section 4.9 concludes by summarising the results in brief.

## **4.2 Public Opinion Research**

### **4.2.1 Political Attitudes: Theory and Research**

Among survey researchers, whose main concern is to understand the substance and nature of public opinion, there is widespread suspicion that ordinary people – the public - do not commonly possess the well thought-out, consistent attitudes on political issues that effective participation in the democratic process is generally held to require. At least since Converse's "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964; also Converse 1970, 1974) what might be called the non-attitude thesis has been advocated – and criticised - with vigour. The essence of the non-attitude thesis, that except for people who take a special interest in some issue (so-called issue publics) ordinary people do not have political attitudes, is the most famous formulation of so-called minimalism in public opinion research. Minimalism comprises of four claims: that the public pays minimal levels of attention to politics, that the public is minimally capable of making sense of political concepts like liberalism and conservatism, that there is minimal stability in political preferences, and that there is minimal attitudinal constraint among the public vis-à-vis politics (Sniderman 1993:219).

There is also research that questions this view of public opinion. Critics have pointed to the social science instruments for gauging public opinion - surveys – and argued that they inflict systematic and random measurement error on the data, giving a false impression of non-attitudes (Lane 1962, 1973; Pierce and Rose 1974; Achen 1975; Ericson 1979; Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1979).

More recent evaluations tend to synthesise the non-attitude thesis and the measurement error thesis: both have elements of truth. Fluctuations in the data derive from “fuzzy measurements and fuzzy citizens” (Kinder and Sears 1985:668; Feldman 1989, 1995; see also Smith 1984). To be sure, in the on-street, home or telephone interview situation, respondents may make up “attitudes” on the spot to satisfy the interviewer. If so, an “attitude” may change at the slightest incentive. A survey’s design, its subject matter and the skill of the interviewer are such incentives. Wentland and Smith (1993:43) identify no less than 17 factors in the interview situation that influence response rates. Among the most important are the salience of an issue or behaviour to the respondent, social desirability factors, the interviewer’s characteristics and the method of interviewing, response anonymity and how far back into memory the respondent has to recall in order to provide a response. One group of researchers explain the apparent inconsistencies in people’s political attitudes that emerge in survey research with reference to the mechanisms and capacity of human memory. They argue that responses are the result of an on-line memory tally of acquired information about a given issue (Conover and Feldman 1984, 1989, 1991; Hamill, Lodge and Blake 1985; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 1989; Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland 1991; Lodge and McGraw 1991, 1995; Miller 1991; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Feldman 1995; Lodge 1995; Stroh 1995).

Elsewhere, the effects of a survey’s question order and question-wording are identified as major sources of random and systematic error: the question order effect is estimated at 10-15 per cent and the question-wording may “produce much larger effects” (Zaller 1992:33) – how large exactly remains unsaid. At the core of Zaller’s work is a proposed solution to the non-attitude - measurement error controversy, which is similar to the on-line model in that its explanatory power derives from a notion of human memory. However, Zaller’s model does not rely on an on-line tally. In its place Zaller proposes a model of how elements of the interview situation invoke particular aspects of respondents’ memories, thereby conditioning their answers in a way that may make respondents look inconsistent over a set of questions. However, it is not concluded on this basis that respondents have no attitudes. Nor (as already indicated) does Zaller argue that the measurement instruments are ideal. Instead,

his argument is that people have real attitudes, true at the moment they are given expression but alterable as the circumstances alter. And why not? Ask a different question and you will get a different answer – is that such an unreasonable claim? Nevertheless, the sensitivity of public opinion data to the vagaries of the interview situation, including the design of the questionnaire and the wording of the questions asked, presents some very real problems for public opinion research.<sup>1</sup> This study is no exception, as will become clear.

#### 4.2.2 Eurobarometer Research to Date

There is now an identifiable body of Eurobarometer research into public opinion and European integration, whose central message about public opinion and European integration is contained in the notion of permissive consensus (the Eurobarometer is further described in section 4.3). There is a strong tendency in this body of literature to take a cross-national research focus, to direct itself to explaining the differences in aggregate levels of support for European integration across member states.

Public opinion has never been a dominant mode of inquiry to the study of European integration, probably because as a factor public opinion has generally been seen to be irrelevant to that which scholars have sought to explain (what drives and limits the integration process). Most theory and research into European integration has tended to emphasise some mixture of legal, political, institutional, and economic-structural transformations. Intergovernmental theory is particularly dismissive of public opinion as a factor, whereas federal and neo-functional theories refer more extensively to the role of public opinion in European integration (Moravcsik 1993; Monnet 1962; Haas 1958; Mitrany 1975; Pentland 1973; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). The political developments of

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<sup>1</sup> It is possible to make distinctions between survey research and opinion polls, on the grounds of their sponsorship and goals (Sinnott 1995:22). Survey research is ostensibly an academic pursuit aimed at understanding or explaining human behaviours or attitudes, guided by theory and based on rigorous, full-scale probability sampling. Like any research process, it is slow and incremental. Opinion polls, in contrast, tend to be commissioned by newspapers and other media agents, political parties and so on – clients who pay polling organisations for fast answers to the questions that concern them. Opinion polls are therefore often based on quota sampling, a less demanding and quicker method than probability sampling, and the questions asked may not have undergone the process of testing and modification that survey researchers are likely to put their survey questions through. However, these distinctions are not watertight categories and even if they were it would not make survey research irrelevant to the world outside academia and nor would it make opinion polls uninteresting to theory-guided academics.



the 1990s, such as the completion of the Single Market and developments associated with it, as well as the emergence of an external European presence and identity, have generated a renewed interest in opinion – integration research. Lindberg’s and Scheingold’s typology (see chapter 1) is prominent in this new burst of research, especially the utilitarian-affective distinction which scholars have operationalised with Eurobarometer data. The identitive – systemic dimension appears largely forgotten. The new literature contains a standard set of hypotheses about integration and public opinion, but there are many alternative operationalisations of most hypotheses which has some important research implications since they do not tend to generate the same substantive results.<sup>2</sup>

Existent Eurobarometer research offers insights into the Eurobarometer as a source of data.<sup>3</sup> A “standard practise” has become established in the opinion - integration literature, whereby four Eurobarometer variables are used as indicators of support for European integration. They are:

**Unification:** *“In general, are you for or against efforts to unify Western Europe?” Very much for, for to some extent, against to some extent, very much against;*

**Membership:** *“Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” Good thing, bad thing, neither good nor bad;*

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<sup>2</sup>A hypothesis (e.g. “Post-materialists are more likely than materialists to have a sense of European identity”) measured in different ways in different studies tends to receive empirical confirmation some but not all of the time, so theories about attitudes towards Europe are developing on shifting sands. This may be a reflection of flawed data, less than rigorous research methods or poorly developed attitudes among the public, or all of the above.

<sup>3</sup> Eurobarometer research tends to be cross-national and it tends to address many hypotheses about support for integration beyond partisanship. In fact, it does not tend to address issues pertaining to attitude congruence at all, and does not typically include any measure of party positions (e.g., the equivalent of chapter 3 in this study). Nevertheless, existent Eurobarometer research occasionally concludes that “partisanship matters,” but without measurements of party positions the analysis become rather limited. For instance, it becomes impossible to conclude whether the effect of partisanship is that parties and their partisans align themselves attitudinally so that attitude congruence occurs, or whether partisanship matters in some other way that does not generate attitude congruence.

**Benefit:** "Taking everything into consideration, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community?" Benefited, not benefited;

**Regret:** "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent, or relieved?"

There is a certain amount of ambiguity as to which of these four variables measures what kind of support (utilitarian or affective), and whether they in fact measure the same or different underlying objects.<sup>4</sup> Statistical analyses have shown that they are different, yet closely related (Janssen 1991; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Dalton and Eichenberg 1994; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Niedermayer 1995a; Anderson and Kaltenhalter 1996; Deflem and Pampel 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a; Eichenberg 1998; Palmer and

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<sup>4</sup> These four measurements form the core of Eurobarometer research. There are divergent views on what kind of support for integration they measure they have considerable appeal due to the fact that they have been asked regularly in many countries, thus providing a solid foundation for both cross-national and longitudinal studies. These and other variables (from the Eurobarometer and other sources, such as official statistics and standard economic indicators) various hypotheses have been developed and tested. A brief review of these categories of hypotheses serves as a reminder that apart from or in addition to partisanship, many other factors can shape public opinion toward European integration. The most common type of hypotheses refers to economic (that is, utilitarian) considerations. That people evaluate Europe on the basis of its perceived performance is a straight forward hypothesis in itself, but more refined hypotheses also distinguish between sociotropic and individualistic evaluations, as well as retrospective and forward-looking ones. The record is not consistent with respect to the highly specified hypotheses, though the economic hypotheses as a category have received strong empirical support (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991; Dalton and Eichenberg 1994; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Bosch and Newton 1995; Anderson 1995; Anderson and Kaltenhalter 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Gabel 1998; Eichenberg 1998; Palmer and Gabel no date; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Another set of hypotheses pertains to Europe's historical and present role in ensuring regional peace and security (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Palmer and Gabel no date). There tends to be reasonable support for peace and security hypotheses, too. Socialisation effects and hypotheses about perceptions of identity are a third category, but less successful than the previous two (Janssen 1991; Deflem and Pampel 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a; Anderson and Kaltenhalter 1996; Marsh 1999; Flickinger 1995; Palmer and Gabel no date, Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Niedermayer 1995b). Virtually all research includes some constellation of a wide range of socio-demographic factors. Among the most common are age, gender, occupation, levels of income and education, living in a border region, urban/rural residence, party political allegiance/ideology/political values, and cognitive mobilisation. There is no consistent record of which socio-demographic factors matter and which do not (this seems to depend on what other variables are included in a given analysis). A final, identifiable type of hypotheses is "special events" that supposedly heighten public awareness and thereby rally support for Europe (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Eichenberg 1998). Referendums are one such special event. There is no consistent record of what sort of special events matter, or any theoretical account of why they matter (salience, surely, can generate dislike as well as support?)

Gabel no date). The assumption that questions referring to respondents' country, the EU itself, and material or other kinds of goods invoke a particular image of Europe in the mind of the respondent and thereby effect his or her answer has generated a belief that **Benefit** and **Membership** measure utilitarian support. **Unification** makes no such references and is therefore generally believed to measure affective support (**Regret** has not been as widely analysed). In contrast, Eichenberg (1998) has suggested that **Unification** and **Membership** are the most closely related (correlation coefficient .78) and **Unification** and **Benefit** the least (correlation coefficient .34). Gabel (1998) has argued that **Unification** taps into both affective and utilitarian support. With a variety of co-authors he has developed a combined **Unification** and **Membership** index variable (a small cumulative scale), which ostensibly taps both utilitarian and affective support (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Palmer and Gabel no date; Gabel 1998a).

An interesting observation about the "Eurobarometer literature" is that it assumes (implicitly) that ordinary people have attitudes about Europe, which is something qualitatively different from permissive consensus. What this literature moreover reveals, which is of immediate significance to this study, is that partisanship is clearly not the only factor with potential to influence people's attitudes toward European integration, though with respect to the political legitimacy of European integration it is by far the most significant. While assuming that people have opinions, however, this literature does address what broad conceptualisations of Europe there are among the public, which is ultimately what this chapter will establish.

### **4.3 The Data**

#### **4.3.1 The Eurobarometer**

The Eurobarometer is a valuable source of data here because of its large number of different questions about various aspects of European integration. The Eurobarometer began in the early 1970s as a traditional opinion poll taken in all member states of the time, as a means of assessing public attitudes toward

the Community and its activities.<sup>5</sup> Today it has elements of a commercial poll as well as a theoretically driven survey. The Eurobarometer polls a representative sample of the population (over 15 years of age) in each member state, by multi-stage random probability sampling. The only cross-national survey differences are those pertaining to translation, and occasionally specific questions of relevance to one specific country are included in that country's questionnaire, too, but this is a minor feature of the Eurobarometer. The backbone of the Eurobarometer is a set of so-called trend questions, presumably referred to as "trend" because they feature in virtually every survey and thus track trends in public opinion. Over time the trend questions have generated an impressive cross-sectional time-series, complemented by one-off or less frequently asked questions about some theme or topic that may or may not be explicitly related to European integration. Cancer, consumer safety, trade issues and perceptions of the third world are examples of such themes and topics, only implicitly related to European integration inasmuch as one or more European policies may relate to them. Attitudes toward European Parliament elections and toward the European Court of Justice are examples of topics that have been specially featured in the Eurobarometer, and which are explicitly related to the integration project.

#### *4.3.2 Data Selection*

The Eurobarometer does not take into account the Irish political calendar, and as a consequence Eurobarometer surveys bear no relation to the timing of Irish European-related referendums, except accidentally. The Eurobarometer that has been used here to estimate public opinion in 1987 was polled in the month of April of that year (after the signing of the Act in February 1986, but before the referendum campaign had started). The Single European Act

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<sup>5</sup> Sponsored by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Information, Communication, Culture and Audiovisual Policy (DGX), it is taken at least twice every year (Spring and Autumn) in all member states. Other countries that seek membership are also polled from time to time. The results of each Eurobarometer are published in detailed reports that include a brief introduction of the findings, followed by frequency tables that present response rates by country and by demographics. Until the spring of 1989 (Eurobarometer 31) the polls were carried out by national polling organisations belonging to the European Omnibus Surveys (in Ireland, Irish Marketing Surveys). The European Commission's Surveys, Research, Analyses unit and the *Faits et Opinions* Institute, Paris, were responsible for the questionnaires at that time. From autumn 1989 (Eurobarometer 32) national polling organisations associated with INRA, the European Network of Market and Public Opinion Research have been responsible for these tasks (in Ireland, Lansdowne Market Research).

referendum took place on 26 May, 1987. The field work of the 1992 Eurobarometer survey was carried out in March and April, 1992, whereas the Maastricht Treaty referendum took place on 18 June, 1992 (again, after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992 but before the referendum campaign started). The Amsterdam referendum took place on 22 May, 1998, and the 1998 Eurobarometer used here was polled in April and May of that year, so here, too, the poll was taken just before the referendum. To estimate public opinion exactly at the times of European-related referendums with the Eurobarometer is not possible. Nor is it possible with Irish opinion polls, although they tend to contain European-related questions at “salient times” like the run-up to referendums. They do not contain enough questions to provide a basis for an extensive analysis like the present and the relevant questions they do contain typically have equivalents in the Eurobarometer (e.g., fairly basic questions about support for salient policies).

There are two broad approaches to data selection. The first is narrow and prioritises comparability over time. It consists of selecting only variables that meet the criterion of having been repeated in verbatim at all three times of measurement. This criterion rules out all but the Eurobarometer trend variables (and some trend variables would not pass the criterion either, since they may have become trend variables in, say, 1990, but were not asked in 1987). This approach does not create a rich image of public opinion because there is not a large number of variables that meet the criterion for selection. The second approach relaxes the criterion for selection and by implication also the comparative aspect. The criterion of selection here is simply to include all relevant variables at each point of measurement, whether or not they were asked at any other relevant point in time. This approach has the potential to create a much richer image of public opinion, since more data becomes available for selection. I took the second approach, for two reasons. First, not many variables featured in all three Eurobarometers, so the narrow approach to data selection was not a realistic option. Second, the more relaxed approach to data selection corresponds with the measurement of party positions in chapter 3. In that chapter I used whatever data was available (provided by the parties themselves though their parliamentary speeches) to create estimates of party positions. In this chapter I use survey data in the same, inclusive manner. The appendix to

this chapter lists all the Eurobarometer variables that I used, including question wordings, response categories, the year each question was asked, the details of how each individual variable was recoded for this study and the number of observations on each variable.<sup>6</sup>

#### 4.3.3 Data Preparation and Operationalisation

I recoded the variables selected into a range from -1 to 1. The substantive meaning of -1 was opposition to Europe (European policy-making, European values etc., or the view that Europe is contrary to the national interest). The substantive meaning of 1 was support of Europe (European policy-making, values etc. associated with Europe, or the view that the national interest is served by Europe). Having set the range (which corresponds with the range in which party positions were estimated, see chapter 3), the negative impact of missing data was alleviated by imputing the missing values. All survey respondents with any missing values would otherwise have been deleted from the analysis, which would have depleted the data set and consequently devastated the analysis. To impute is to predict missing values on the basis of the values that are not missing.<sup>7</sup> This is not a problem-free solution, since it can for instance introduce biases in the imputed values. Nevertheless, this is a smaller problem than the problem of deleting all cases with missing values.<sup>8</sup> The only missing values that were not imputed were data on partisanship, so respondents on whom there was no such information were eliminated from the analysis. Furthermore, to avoid the worst small-n problems, partisan groups that contained less than 30 partisans were integrated into the Other Partisan group. Similarly, in some years the original coding of **Partisan** distinguished between people who would not vote, would vote blank, etc. Since they are to all intents and purposes not partisan on the present operationalisation I combined them into a Non-Partisan category.

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<sup>6</sup> Dr. Meinhard Moschner of the Zentralarchiv was in charge of compiling two CD-ROMs containing all Eurobarometers 1970-1998. The data was acquired from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZA, Central Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne, Germany).

<sup>7</sup> Stata imputes missing values by conducting linear missing value regressions.

<sup>8</sup> The appendix to this chapter specifies how many missing values there was for each variable (e.g., it can be gleaned how many values had to be imputed). Imputation models, as distinct from the estimation models I used for the analysis proper, contained all the variables of the estimation models and additional, relevant variables from the same data set. Stata allows an imputation model to contain a total of 31 variables.

Although the ideal types consist of six dimensions (e.g., three pairs of European and National Institutions/Policies, Values/Community and Output dimensions), the availability of data set limitations to which dimensions I could operationalise, and how. I used the selected Eurobarometer variables to generate cumulative scales, as measurements of the ideal type dimensions. The appendix shows what Eurobarometer survey questions went into generating each scale. Summated rating scales are widely used in survey research to estimate unobservable phenomena of interest (attitudes, emotional states, personality types, etc.), and are useful because they generate more precise estimates than measurements based on a single survey question/variable.<sup>9</sup> Scaling has nevertheless not been widely used in Eurobarometer research into attitudes toward European integration, but is suitable to the present objective to obtain generalised measurements of attitudes based on a large number of variables. The scales generated were as follows:

**Institutions/Policies.** **IP** scale, measuring mean partisan attitudes to European and national policy-making. 1=strongest possible support for European policy-making, -1=strongest possible support for national policy-making & strongest possible opposition to European policy-making. 1987, 1992, 1998.

**Values/Community.** **VC** scale, measuring attitudes to European and national values, etc. 1= strongest possible support for European Values/Community, -1=strongest possible support for National Values/Community. 1987, 1992, 1998.

**National Output.** **NO** scale, measuring attitudes to how Europe serves the national interest. 1=strongest possible view that it does, -1=strongest possible view that it does not. 1987, 1992, 1998.

**European Output (1992 only).** **EO** scale, measuring attitudes to how Europe serves a wider, European interest. 1=strongest possible view that it does, -1=strongest possible view that it does not. 1992.

**Saliency Politics.** **SP** scale, measuring the saliency of politics in general among partisan groups. 1=the strongest possible interest in politics, -1=the least possible interest in politics. 1987, 1992, 1998.

**Saliency Europe.** **SE** scale, measuring the saliency of Europe among partisan groups (subjective and objective). 1=the strongest possible interest in European integration/issues, -1=the least possible interest in European integration/issues. 1987, 1992, 1998.

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<sup>9</sup> As will become clear, however, the sometime limited availability of data made it necessary to operationalise an ideal type dimension on the basis of a single Eurobarometer variable.

An unfortunate limitation of this analysis is that the original variables from which I generated **IP** scales meant that while 1 means the strongest possible support for European policy-making, -1 is a mixture of the strongest possible support for national policy-making and the strongest possible opposition to European policy-making. In theory at least these are not necessarily the same. The nature of the original survey questions meant there was nothing I could do to avoid the source of ambiguity except eliminate several survey questions, which seemed counter-productive since the main interest is in attitudes toward European policy-making anyway and the European end of the scale is unambiguous. The European and National Output dimensions were operationalised separately from each other (though the former was only estimated in 1992 due to data availability), since the variables from which National Output and European Output were created do not juxtapose the national and the European.

There were two specific concerns with respect to using these scales: their internal reliability, and the comparability of scales of the same underlying dimension derived with different sets of Eurobarometer variables. First, the scales' internal reliability (the extent to which items in a scale correlate) was gauged with Cronbach's alpha. Minor modifications were made to ensure the internal reliability of the scales used in the analysis, but usually no modifications were necessary (Cronbach's Alpha for all scales is reported in the appendix to this chapter). Second, the comparability of 1987, 1992 and 1998 scales measuring a given ideal type dimension (say, Institutions/Policies) is an issue as a consequence of the different items that went into the Institutions/Policies scale for each of the three years. In addition to the trend questions, Eurobarometer surveys tend to ask questions about issues that are topical at the time of the poll. It follows that questions that were asked for instance in 1998 can be expected to refer to events, policies, etc. that had not happened, did not exist or were not topical in 1987 or 1992. As a consequence it is impossible to distinguish "real" attitudinal change from change incurred by changes in the measurement on, say, European Institutions/Policies. Yet, it is an advantage that the Eurobarometer mirrors the evolution of the European integration process, because the European Union of 1998 was not the same as the European Community of 1987. The



alternative is that the Eurobarometer would not ask questions about anything that has happened in the integration process since the early 1970s, when the survey began. Such measures would fail to address most aspects of European integration since many significant steps have been taken since that time. Apart from the creation of the Community in the first place, in 1957, arguably all significant steps have been taken later than 1970 and most of them in 1987 or later. The structural instruments and the Cohesion Fund, the single currency, European citizenship, Common Foreign and Security Policy, justice and home affairs co-operation, subsidiarity, incremental institutional reform and successive enlargements are some of the most significant post-1987 developments that surely influence what Europe is and how people think about it. Some of these could not even be imagined in the 1970s, or even in 1987, before the Cold War ended, Germany reunited, the Balkan wars started and the single market finally came into being. To study European integration from any perspective is to study a moving target, and the public opinion perspective is no different in this respect. Quite simply, however, the choice is simple between keeping the aim trained on the target or where the target used to be, though as acknowledged here this choice entails problematic implications for analysing changes over time.

#### **4.4 The Methodology**

The aim of generating scales was to estimate mean partisan group positions, in the form of mean partisan group positions on the scales created from Eurobarometer variables. As in chapter 3, I used oneway analysis of variance and the associated bonferroni tests to obtain partisan group means for each scale, as well as estimates of how probable it was that the observed means were different.<sup>10</sup> In addition to statistical significance, there is substantive significance for which there is no test except critical reflection of the data analysis results vis-à-vis its theoretical context. Some statistically significant differences are very small substantively, however, and nor are statistically significant differences always substantively important. (These points became very important in comparing partisan groups to each other and to the ideal types).

The oneway analyses and associated significance tests generated information about partisan groups in a given year, on a given scale. All mean scores and significant means differences referred to in this chapter are presented in tables throughout, and further relevant information about the oneway analyses of the scales, and about the scales themselves, is in the appendix to this chapter.<sup>11</sup> The next step in the analysis was to consider these results vis-à-vis the ideal types. A central aspect of this was to consider if and how partisan group positions developed over time. I used two-sample t-tests (of which ANOVA is simply an extension for comparisons of more than two means) to test the significance of partisan group differences over time (only partisan groups that featured in more than one year), at the 0.05 level of significance. As a consequence apparent shifts in partisan positions could be given an estimate of (un-)certainty.

#### **4.5 Irish Public Opinion 1987**

##### **4.5.1 Partisanship**

Of the 1005 Irish survey respondents 924 identified a party for which they would vote in a hypothetical election, or identified themselves in a way that allowed me to classify them as Non-Partisan. Partisan groups containing less than 30 observations were incorporated into the Other Party category, which originally contained 13 observations. I added partisans of the Workers' Party (29 observations) and the Greens (5) to the Other Party partisan group (47 observations). I also combined the undecided, those who refused and those who would not vote into a Non Partisan category (159 observations). The other partisanship categories were not recoded or changed in any way. There were 51 Labour observations, 85 Progressive Democrat observations, 199 Fine Gael and 383 Fianna Fail respondents. Table 4.1 contains all scores pertaining to Irish public opinion in 1987.

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<sup>10</sup> I accepted the 0.05 level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference between groups.

<sup>11</sup> The appendix to this chapter reports each oneway analysis' F statistic and Prob > F, in addition to each scale's Cronbach's Alpha and number of items.

**Table 4.1 Mean Partisan Positions 1987**

*Columns:* Partisan groups. ‘Differences’ lists partisan groups that were significantly different at the 0.05 level. The group in front of the hyphen was significantly different from all partisan groups listed before the nearest semicolon.

*Rows:* Ideal type dimensions.

|                              | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>Lab</i> | <i>Other</i> | <i>NP</i> | <i>PD</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>Differences</i>             |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------------------------------|
| <i>Institutions/Policies</i> | .29       | .36       | .22        | .33          | .18       | .33       | .29          | NP-FG PD.                      |
| <i>Values/Community</i>      | -.60      | -.47      | -.58       | -.42         | -.56      | -.38      | -.54         | FF-PD.                         |
| <i>National Output</i>       | .48       | .55       | .35        | .44          | .32       | .65       | .48          | NP-FG PD.                      |
| <i>Salience Politics</i>     | -.23      | -.04      | -.25       | .10          | -.26      | -.03      | -.16         | FG-FF PD NP;<br>O-L NP; PD-NP. |
| <i>Salience Europe</i>       | -.29      | -.02      | -.33       | .17          | -.36      | .02       | -.20         | FF-FG O PD; NP-<br>FG PD; L-O. |

#### 4.5.2 Institutions/Policies

This scale estimates mean partisan group attitudes toward Institutions/Policies. As the appendix to this chapter shows, all available Eurobarometer variables that were suitable to create this scale refer singularly to European Institutions/Policies, not National Institutions/Policies. Therefore, there is no ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the “negative” end of this scale: it means “the strongest possible opposition to European policy-making.”<sup>12</sup>

In the context of the scale’s 1 to –1 range, the overall Institutions/Policies mean of 0.29 shows the Irish public to be generally supportive of European Institutions/Policies in this year. Moreover, in the main partisan group differences were neither substantively important nor statistically significant. The Fianna Fail mean was exactly the same as the overall mean, while the Fine Gael, Progressive Democrat and Other Party partisans were observed to be somewhat more supportive. Labour partisans and Non-Partisans were somewhat below the overall mean. However, as the right hand column (“Differences”) of Table 4.1 shows, the differences between Irish partisan groups were not pronounced. The Non-Partisan group was different from Fine Gael and from Progressive Democrat partisans but no other observed means differences were significant.

This analysis shows that all partisan groups were “fairly supportive” of European policy-making. No group opposed it, but nor was any group very

supportive. Even the Non-Partisans, the least supportive, were not opposed but merely somewhat less positively inclined toward European policy-making. Partisan differences were small and neither substantively nor, in the main, statistically significant.

#### 4.5.3 Values/Community

This scale inquires about people's self-perceptions. It assumes that people think of themselves in terms of their national identity and asks whether they never, sometimes or often also think of themselves as European. Means close to the negative end of the -1 to 1 range indicate that respondents tend never to think of themselves as European, while means close to 1 suggest that people commonly think of themselves as European as well as Irish.

One unequivocal point about Irish people's self-perceptions emerges from Table 4.1: that they hardly ever think of themselves as Europeans, but simply as being Irish. Though the observed means are somewhat different from each other, the analysis only sustained statistically significant differences between Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats, the former being the most adamantly Irish-only. However, even supporters of the Progressive Democrats were quite clear that Irishness was the primary element of their self-perception.

#### 4.5.4 National Output

This scale (which was developed from two of the most commonly used Eurobarometer variables, **Benefit** and **Membership** in all three years of analysis) measures partisans' evaluation of Europe on the basis of how it advances the Irish national interest. In the context of the -1 to 1 range where 1 represents the strongest possible view that the national interest is advanced by European integration, and -1 the strongest possible view that it is damaged by European integration, Irish people were generally quite convinced about the material benefits of Europe. The observed means differences range from 0.32 to 0.65, the Non-Partisans being the least convinced and the Progressive Democrat supporters the most convinced in this regard. As Table 4.1 shows, the statistical analysis only showed differences between the most extreme mean scores (in

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<sup>12</sup> The appendix also shows that this scale was based on seven original variables, and its

fact, the same partisan groups whose Institutions/Policies means were different). Therefore, in line with what the analysis discovered about Institutions/Policies and Values/Community, partisan differences were few and substantively not especially remarkable: all partisan groups had a positive view about the Irish national interest and Europe, though some were more positive than were others.

#### 4.5.5 Saliency Politics and Saliency Europe

Certain survey questions addressed respondents' general interest in politics whereas other survey questions referred specifically to their interest in European integration. These two types of questions formed the basis for two scales, Saliency Politics and Saliency Europe. Both scales have the familiar -1 to 1 range, where -1 represented the least possible level of interest and 1 the highest possible level of interest.

Table 4.1 shows that Irish people were neither interested in politics generally nor in Europe. The overall Saliency Politics mean of -0.16 suggests a limited interest in politics, which was nevertheless somewhat higher than the overall interest in Europe (-0.20). Though there were some variations between partisan groups, no group revealed itself to be positively interested in politics or in Europe. On the other hand, nor had any partisan group an extremely low level of interest. The Non-Partisans, Labour supporters and Fianna Fail supporters were the least interested (firmly in the negative on both Saliency scales), while Fine Gael and Progressive Democrats were very close to the scales' neutral points. The "Differences" column of Table 4.1 reveals that more instances of partisan differences occurred on the two Saliency scales than on any of the three other scales. This point notwithstanding, no partisan group turned out to have a very strong interest in either politics or in Europe, but nor did any group turn out to be extremely detached from it. However, a critical detachment was observed on the part of many partisan groups, making partisan groups that were blasé about it appear involved and engaged, by comparison.

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Cronbach's alpha was 0.72.

#### 4.5.6 Summary of Irish Public Opinion 1987

The analysis aimed to identify differences between partisan groups on each of the five scales, but very few were found. Moreover, where the statistical analysis sustained observed differences they were substantively moderate. Across partisan groups the Irish public was fairly supportive of European policy-making though they did not associate with Europe in terms of self-perceptions – people were quite clear that their primary identity was Irishness. However, the analysis shows that the lack of a European identity did not prevent people from recognising the benefits their country derived from Europe despite a pervasive lack of interest in it.

### 4.6 Irish Public Opinion 1992

#### 4.6.1 Partisanship

765 Irish survey respondents answered the hypothetical vote intention question. All partisan groups with 30 or more observations were retained, the rest were included in the Other Party group. A small number of respondents reported they would vote for New Agenda (9), Sinn Fein (13) and Other Party (17). Added to the 17 respondents who were in the original Other Party category, this meant there were 39 respondents in the Other Party group in the analysis. Additional partisan groups in 1992 were Fianna Fail (359 respondents), Fine Gael (130), Labour (90), the Progressive Democrats (34), the Greens (33) and the Workers' Party (31). Respondents who claimed they would not vote (47), or would cast a blank vote (2), were combined into a Non-Partisan category (49 respondents).

#### 4.6.2 Institutions/Policies

As ever, the data used to create the Institutions/Policies scale, and the details of the oneway analysis of variance, are in the appendix to this chapter.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The 1992 Institutions/Policies scale was constructed from 40 original Eurobarometer variables, 27 of which were combined into two scalar variables (consisting of 18 and 9 original variables, respectively) which were subsequently included in Institutions/Policies along with 13 other, original Eurobarometer variables. The reason for this is that a maximum of 31 variables can be used for imputing missing values in Stata. To get around this limit, sub-sets of very similar variables deriving from the same survey question were combined into scales. The very good Cronbach's alphas of the scales justify this procedure (see the appendix to this chapter), and made it possible to use an imputation model that included all variables which were subsequently used in a scale analysed in the oneway analysis of variance.

Table 4.2 shows that there are two main points to be made about attitudes towards Institutions/Policies. The first is that there were no partisan differences. The second is that Irish people across partisan groups were solidly supportive of European policy-making in 1992. Table 4.2 shows that mean scores tended to be in the 0.40-0.50 region (overall mean: 0.46). In the context of the full -1 to 1 range these sorts of scores are solidly positive.

**Table 4.2 Mean Partisan Positions 1992**

*Columns:* Partisan groups. ‘Differences’ lists partisan groups that were significantly different at the 0.05 level. The group in front of the hyphen was significantly different from all partisan groups listed before the nearest semicolon.

*Rows:* Ideal Type Dimensions.

|                     | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>O</i> | <i>NP</i> | <i>GP</i> | <i>PD</i> | <i>WP</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>Differences</i> |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>     | .51       | .45       | .41      | .34      | .39       | .44       | .44       | .41       | .46          |                    |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>     | -.48      | -.47      | -.54     | -.46     | -.55      | -.51      | -.44      | -.55      | -.49         |                    |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i> | .76       | .67       | .76      | .61      | .61       | .76       | .74       | .66       | .72          |                    |
| <i>Eur'n Output</i> | .85       | .77       | .71      | .57      | .72       | .83       | .72       | .87       | .79          |                    |
| <i>Sal Politics</i> | -.13      | -.12      | -.09     | -.14     | -.10      | .08       | -.13      | -.04      | -.11         |                    |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>   | .20       | .28       | -.09     | .15      | .10       | .48       | .51       | .10       | .21          | L-PD GP.           |

#### 4.6.3 Values/Community

The substantive meaning of this scale's -1 to 1 range is from the strongest possible association with Irishness (-1) to the strongest possible association with Europeanness (1).<sup>14</sup> The overall mean (-0.49) reflects Irish people's Irishness rather than any sense of being Europeans. Individual partisan groups did not deviate substantively from the overall mean, and nor were they either substantively or significantly different from each other. Irrespective of partisanship Irish people saw themselves as Irish, not European.

#### 4.6.4 National Output and European Output

Irish people across partisan groups were very convinced that the Irish national interest was well served indeed by Europe (overall National Output

<sup>14</sup> This scale was based on two original Eurobarometer variables which were the result of asking split samples two very similar versions of the same question. I generated one variable out of the two split sample variables, and therefore, effectively, Values/Community is based on one Eurobarometer variable. Since respondents in one sample were registered as "missing" on the

mean: 0.72). The individual partisan group means varied from 0.61 to 0.76, though no observed differences were sustained in the statistical analysis. The Irish public was once again homogenous and pro-European.

In 1992 it was possible to operationalise European Output. In the -1 to 1 range the scores show that no partisan group doubted that Europe as an entity benefited from integration. In fact, on average Europe was even seen to benefit more than Ireland. Workers' Party and Fianna Fail supporters had exceptionally high means, 0.85 or more. Other partisan groups were also strongly of the view that integration is good for Europe as a whole. All observed partisan means expressed very strong agreement that integration is good for Europe as an entity.

#### 4.6.5 Saliency Politics and Saliency Europe

Irish people were neither very interested, nor extremely uninterested in politics generally. Means were mainly mildly negative, the only exception being Progressive Democrat supporters whose mean was mildly positive (0.08). The word that sums up all partisan groups' interest in politics is "blasé." Though observed scores varied somewhat, they did not vary substantively and the statistical analysis did not sustain the observed differences.

Curiously, inasmuch as European issues are political issues, the interest in Europe was much higher than the interest in politics generally. The overall mean of 0.21 is quite striking in contrast with the overall mean interest in politics generally. Several partisan groups were comparatively strongly interested in Europe, for instance Green supporters and Progressive Democrat partisans. Fine Gael and Fianna Fail supporters were also quite interested, while Other Partisans, Non-Partisans and Workers' Party supporters were somewhat less so. Labour supporters were the only ones whose mean was in the negative (-0.09). Labour partisans were statistically significantly different from Green and Progressive Democrat partisans, and might have been expected to be different from even more groups, reflecting the different signs (positive and negative) of their scores.

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variable containing the other sample it was pointless to calculate Cronbach's alpha for the two



#### 4.6.6 Summary of Irish Public Opinion 1992

In 1992 it was virtually impossible to distinguish partisan groups on the basis of their attitudes toward European integration. The Irish public was very homogenous and solidly supportive of European policy-making though not feeling in any way European. Simultaneously, across partisan groups Irish people rated the benefits of integration for Ireland and for Europe very highly indeed. For some partisan groups, however, these attitudes were shrouded in a lack of interest in politics generally and European issues, too. Other groups, particularly supporters of small parties like the Greens and the Progressive Democrats displayed unusually high levels of interest in Europe.

### 4.7 Irish Public Opinion 1998

#### 4.7.1 Partisanship

736 respondents answered the hypothetical vote intention question in a way that was classifiable as partisan of an Irish party or independent parliamentarian, or not partisan (e.g., people who would not vote). Only partisan groups containing 30 or more observations were retained, those that had less than 30 observations were included in the Other Partisan group. In effect, the recoded variable **Partisan** has six categories: Fianna Fail (366), Fine Gael (153), Labour (82), Independents (34), Other Partisans (68), and Non-Partisan (33). The appendix shows that there were two original observations in the Other Party group. It increased to 68 subsequent to the recoding of respondents reporting an intention to vote for the Workers' Party (9 observations), the Greens (22 observations), the Progressive Democrats (15), Sinn Fein (16) and Democratic Left (4) to the Other Party category. Note also that for the first time the original coding distinguished supporters of parliamentary independents from Other Partisans.

#### 4.7.2 Institutions/Policies

This scale ranged, as in previous years, from -1 to 1, and the meanings of these values should be familiar by now.<sup>15</sup> Table 4.3 shows that all partisan

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split sample variables.

<sup>15</sup> As previously, there were good reasons to reduce the number of variables used to generate Institutions/Policies (see Section 4.6.2). As a result, although 49 original Eurobarometer

groups were reasonably supportive of European Institutions/Policies (overall mean: 0.29). What emerges most strongly is the cross-partisan similarity in positive attitude towards European policy-making, with the exception of the Non-Partisans. Their neutral attitude sets them apart in this instance, as reflected not only in the observed means but also in the statistical analysis. The differences in attitude among larger parties' supporters, such as Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, could virtually not be any smaller. Moreover, Other Partisans were very similar to partisans of the three larger parties though supporters of parliamentary independents somewhat less so. The real fault line, however, runs between the Non-Partisans on the other hand and virtually everyone else on the other hand.

**Table 4.3 Mean Partisan Positions 1998**

*Columns:* Partisan groups. 'Differences' lists partisan groups that were significantly different at the 0.05 level. The group in front of the hyphen was significantly different from all partisan groups listed before the nearest semicolon.

*Rows:* Ideal type dimensions.

|                     | <i>FF</i> | <i>FG</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>O</i> | <i>NP</i> | <i>Ind.</i> | <i>Tot.al</i> | <i>Differences</i> |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>     | .32       | .31       | .31      | .27      | .07       | .20         | .29           | NP-FF FG L O.      |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>     | -.63      | -.59      | -.63     | -.71     | -.78      | -.69        | -.64          |                    |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i> | .84       | .86       | .91      | .88      | .70       | .81         | .85           |                    |
| <i>Sal Politics</i> | -.17      | -.12      | -.13     | -.16     | -.38      | -.07        | -.16          | NP-FF FG L O I.    |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>   | -.09      | -.10      | -.05     | -.16     | -.36      | -.01        | -.10          |                    |

#### 4.7.3 Values/Community

At -0.64 the overall Values/Community mean leaves no room for doubt that Irish people felt associated with Ireland and their Irishness, not with Europe or any notion of Europeanness. Although the analysis did not sustain any cross-partisan differences, the observed scores suggest that Non-Partisans and Other Partisans were particularly strongly inclined toward Irishness. In contrast, Fine Gael partisans were the least inclined towards that end of the range (-0.59), but even the observed Fine Gael mean leaves no room for supposing that Fine Gael voters had begun to see themselves as Europeans in 1998.

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variables eventually became part of Institutions/Policies 1998, 19 variables were used in the final

#### 4.7.4 National Output

In 1998 all partisan groups were strongly in agreement that Europe was hugely beneficial to Ireland's national interest. The overall mean was 0.85, which is very close indeed to the positive end of the range (e.g., the end of the range that signifies the strongest possible agreement that Ireland's national interest benefits from Europe). No observed differences were sustained in the statistical analysis – homogenous, unequivocal support sums up the situation.

#### 4.7.5 Salience Politics and Salience Europe

The general interest in politics was neutral with a tendency to be low in 1998 (overall mean: -0.16). On the basis of the statistical analysis this scale shows a perfect fault line between respondents who were partisans of any kind, and respondents who were not. With the exception of the Non-Partisans, who were much less interested than anyone else, all partisan groups were rather similar to each other and to the overall mean. The observed scores of supporters of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Labour and the Other Party were very similar indeed, while those who supported parliamentary Independents were marginally closer to the scale's neutral point.

Public interest in Europe was generally marginally higher (overall mean: -0.10). The observed means suggest that the Non-Partisans were once again different from the other groups, but in this instance the significance tests did not confirm the observed differences. Supporters of independents and of the Labour party were rather close to the neutral point whereas, as Table 4.3 shows, the other partisans displayed lower levels of interest in Europe.

#### 4.7.6 Summary of Irish Public Opinion 1998

The Irish public was strikingly homogenous in their attitudes toward European integration, with one (equally striking) exception: where any partisan differences have been identified, Non-Partisans have been distinct from virtually everyone else. Among the other groups, partisanship did not predict attitudes toward the aspects of Europe analysed here. Irish people who supported any party were indistinguishable. The Irish public as a whole was fairly supportive of European policy-making in 1998, and were moreover exceptionally in

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model that derived Institutions/Policies (Cronbach's alpha: 0.74).

agreement that Ireland benefits from Europe. Yet, these attitudes were not underpinned by any sense of feeling European, and nor did the recognition of European bounty manage to generate anything more than very moderate levels of interest.

#### **4.8 Continuity and Cohesiveness Among Partisan Groups**

##### 4.8.1 Measurement Continuity

Apparent attitudinal shifts over time should be interpreted with care, since they are based on different sets of Eurobarometer variables. The reason for this (set out earlier in this chapter) is that the Eurobarometer changes to reflect the new developments of the European project. As a consequence the measurements change, too, with the complication that it becomes impossible to distinguish observed “real” attitudinal shifts from observed shifts that derive from changes in the measurement instrument, the scale. The problem is more severe the more changes there are in the scale between years. Accordingly, it is particularly severe for Institutions/Policies, less so for Values/Community and not a problem at all for National Output. Moreover, the problem is graver for Salience Europe than for Salience Politics.

##### 4.8.2 Attitudinal Continuity and Partisan Group Cohesiveness

Keeping in mind these warnings about observationally indistinguishable sources of attitudinal change, t-tests confirmed observed attitudinal change as well as instances of stability. In the main the cases of stability and change did not form clear patterns. The remainder of this section sketches each partisan group’s attitudinal change in turn. In addition to a set of Tables that present the results of t-tests for significant differences between years, Figures 4.1a-f illustrate the partisans’ observed attitudinal development.

Table 4.4a presents the results of significance tests of the observed changes in Fianna Fail partisans’ attitudes, and Figure 4.1a graphs the observed attitudes year by year. The Table shows that in some respect Fianna Fail supporters’ attitudes changed over time, but the Figure puts this in context: no changes were particularly dramatic. With respect to the complex Institutions/Policies Table 4.4a shows attitudinal change in the 1987-1992 and in the 1992-1998 periods, but it was not strong enough to be significant in the

entire 11-year period (1987-1998). The same pattern emerged from the significance tests of change on Values/Community. Since this dimension is much less problematic one can have more confidence that the 1987-1992 and 1992-1998 changes indeed reflect real attitudinal change, but it was marginal in the context of the -1 to 1 range, and temporary given the Values/Community score for 1998. All observed changes in attitude toward National Output were significant (since it was measured the same way in all years there is no ambiguity about the source of the observed shifts). Fianna Fail supporters became increasingly convinced that Ireland's national interest was well served in Europe in the time period under study. No observed Salience Politics changes were significant, while in contrast they were on Salience Europe in 1987-1998 and 1992-1998, respectively. However, interpreting change on Salience Europe is fraught with ambiguity since the source of change can not be determined.


**Table 4.4a Fianna Fail Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

T-tests of Fianna Fail partisans' scores 1987-1998.

'x': Change significant at 0.05 level; '--': Change not significant at 0.05 level.

N 1987: 383; N 1992: 359; N1998: 366.

| <i>Inst/<br/>Pol</i>    | 1987 | 1992 | <i>Val/<br/>Comm</i>  | 1987 | 1992 | <i>Nat'l<br/>Output</i> | 1987 | 1992 |
|-------------------------|------|------|-----------------------|------|------|-------------------------|------|------|
| 1992                    | x    |      | 1992                  | x    |      | 1992                    | x    |      |
| 1998                    | --   | x    | 1998                  | --   | x    | 1998                    | x    | x    |
| <i>Sal<br/>Politics</i> | 1987 | 1992 | <i>Sal<br/>Europe</i> | 1987 | 1992 |                         |      |      |
| 1992                    | --   |      | 1992                  | --   |      |                         |      |      |
| 1998                    | --   | --   | 1998                  | x    | x    |                         |      |      |



**Figure 4.1a Fianna Fail Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

In summary, Fianna Fail partisans were rather stable in their attitudes toward Europe: the trends observed were not of a nature that would lead to

radical reassessment of Fianna Fail supporters from one year to the next in the time period covered by this study.

Attitudinal change among Fine Gael supporters reveal that on Institutions/Policies Fine Gael and Fianna Fail supporters have very similar trajectories, and exactly the same pattern of significant t-tests (e.g., change was significant in the 1987-1992 and 1992-1998 periods but not in the 1987-1998 period inclusive). The substantive story behind these t-test results is a fairly positive attitude toward European policy-making in 1987 and 1998, interspersed with a temporary peak in approval in 1992 (the usual reservation applies to this


**Table 4.4b Fine Gael Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

T-tests of Fine Gael partisans' scores 1987-1998.

'x': Change significant at 0.05 level; '--': Change not significant at 0.05 level.

N 1987: 199; N 1992: 130; N1998: 153.

| <i>Inst/<br/>Pol</i>    | <i>FG87</i> | <i>FG92</i> | <i>Val/<br/>Comm</i>  | <i>FG87</i> | <i>FG92</i> | <i>Nat'l<br/>Output</i> | <i>FG87</i> | <i>FG92</i> |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>FG92</i>             | x           |             | <i>FG92</i>           | --          |             | <i>FG92</i>             | x           |             |
| <i>FG98</i>             | --          | x           | <i>FG98</i>           | x           | --          | <i>FG98</i>             | x           | x           |
| <i>Sal<br/>Politics</i> |             |             | <i>Sal<br/>Europe</i> |             |             |                         |             |             |
| <i>FG92</i>             | --          |             | <i>FG92</i>           | x           |             |                         |             |             |
| <i>FG98</i>             | --          | --          | <i>FG98</i>           | --          | x           |                         |             |             |



**Figure 4.1b Fine Gael Partisans' Attitudinal Developments**

analysis). The observed change in Values/Community for this section of the Irish public was significant in the 1987-1998 period inclusive, but not for its two constituent parts, 1987-1992 and 1992-1998.<sup>16</sup> All observed changes on National Output, the measurement that withstands comparisons the best, were significant. Fine Gaelers became progressively more convinced about Ireland's gains from

<sup>16</sup> They were very nearly significant in 1992-1998 ( $P > t: 0.0569$ ).

Europe. No observed Saliency Politics changes were significant, while observed Saliency Europe changes were (1987-1992, 1992-1998) but comparisons on this scale are difficult.

Labour partisans' attitudinal development on Institutions/Policies was significant in the 1987-1992 period and in the 1987-1998 period but the change was not pronounced enough for the significance test to register in the shorter 1987-1992 period (Table 4.4c). The trend is that Labour partisans became increasingly positive about European policy-making (with the possibility that rather than attitudinal development this apparent trend was a consequence of the measurement instrument). Labourites' self-perceptions were stable throughout the time period (not only did the significance tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference, but also the measurement was reasonably stable).


**Table 4.4c Labour Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

T-tests of Labour partisans' scores 1987-1998.

'x': Change significant at 0.05 level; '--': Change not significant at 0.05 level.

N 1987: 51; N 1992: 90; N1998: 82.

| <i>Inst/</i>    |            |            | <i>Val/</i>   |            |            | <i>Nat'l</i>  |            |            |
|-----------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|
| <i>Pol</i>      | <i>L87</i> | <i>L92</i> | <i>Comm</i>   | <i>L87</i> | <i>L92</i> | <i>Output</i> | <i>L87</i> | <i>L92</i> |
| <i>L92</i>      | X          |            | <i>L92</i>    | --         |            | <i>L92</i>    | x          |            |
| <i>L98</i>      | --         | x          | <i>L98</i>    | --         | --         | <i>L98</i>    | x          | --         |
| <i>Sal</i>      |            |            | <i>Sal</i>    |            |            |               |            |            |
| <i>Politics</i> | <i>L87</i> | <i>L92</i> | <i>Europe</i> | <i>L87</i> | <i>L92</i> |               |            |            |
| <i>L92</i>      | --         |            | <i>L92</i>    | x          |            |               |            |            |
| <i>L98</i>      | --         | --         | <i>L98</i>    | x          | --         |               |            |            |



**Figure 4.1c Labour Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

The National Output measurement did not change at all over time, but Labour supporters attitudes did, in the 1987-1992 and in the 1987-1998 periods. This development was not strong enough to register in the 1992-1998 period. This

group's interest in politics generally neither increased nor decreased over time, according to the t-tests, but Saliency Europe signalled a decreasing interest in European issues. Whether this reflects real attitudinal Saliency Europe change or simply change in the measurement (or just randomness) is impossible to discern.

Table 4.4d shows that among Irish people belonging to Other Partisans no Institutions/Policies changes registered as significant (despite the changes in the Institutions/Policies measurement over time, fluctuations in Other Partisans' scores were rather small). With respect to Values/Community change appears to have occurred primarily in the 1992-1998 period: these people identified less and less with Europe over time (though the 1987 "starting point" signalled a virtual absence of European identity in the first place). Table 4.4d shows that on


**Table 4.4d Other Party Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

T-tests of Other Party Partisans' scores 1987-1998.

'x': Change significant at 0.05 level; '--': Change not significant at 0.05 level.

N 1987: 47; N 1992: 39; N1998: 68.

| <i>Inst/<br/>Pol</i>    | <i>OP87</i> | <i>OP92</i> | <i>Val/<br/>Comm</i>  | <i>OP87</i> | <i>OP92</i> | <i>Nat'l<br/>Output</i> | <i>OP87</i> | <i>OP92</i> |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>OP92</i>             | --          |             | <i>OP92</i>           | --          |             | <i>OP92</i>             | x           |             |
| <i>OP98</i>             | --          | --          | <i>OP98</i>           | x           | x           | <i>OP98</i>             | x           | x           |
| <i>Sal<br/>Politics</i> | <i>OP87</i> | <i>OP92</i> | <i>Sal<br/>Europe</i> | <i>OP87</i> | <i>OP92</i> |                         |             |             |
| <i>OP92</i>             | --          |             | <i>OP92</i>           | --          |             |                         |             |             |
| <i>OP98</i>             | x           | --          | <i>OP98</i>           | x           | x           |                         |             |             |



**Figure 4.1d Other Party Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

National Output change occurred throughout the 1987-1998 period, and we know from earlier sections of this chapter that the trend is one of increasing appreciation of Europe's effect on the Irish national interest. With respect to the two salience dimensions there were no clear patterns of attitudinal development.



The t-tests confirmed the observed trend that in the entire 1987-1998 period interest in politics generally decreased among this group. The levels of interest in European issues varied between years but the Saliency Europe measurement makes it hard to draw strong conclusions about this change.

T-tests confirmed the observed Non-Partisans' attitudinal changes on Institutions/Policies (Table 4.4e). The development, as we know from previous sections, was not consistently in one direction. Between 1987 and 1992 attitudes improved with respect to European policy-making, only to reverse between 1992 and 1998, to a level in 1998 that was much lower than it was in 1987. At no point in the 11-year period covered here did Non-Partisans identify with Europe, but the t-tests confirm the observed turn toward national identity especially between 1992 and 1998. In contrast, attitudes toward National Output changed


**Table 4.4e Non-Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

T-tests of Non-Partisans' scores 1987-1998.

'x': Change significant at 0.05 level; '--': Change not significant at 0.05 level.

N 1987: 159; N 1992: 49; N1998: 33.

| <i>Inst/</i>    |             |             | <i>Val/</i>   |             |             | <i>Nat'l</i>  |             |             |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Pol</i>      | <i>NP87</i> | <i>NP92</i> | <i>Comm</i>   | <i>NP87</i> | <i>NP92</i> | <i>Output</i> | <i>NP87</i> | <i>NP92</i> |
| <i>NP92</i>     | x           |             | <i>NP92</i>   | --          |             | <i>NP92</i>   | x           |             |
| <i>NP98</i>     | x           | x           | <i>NP98</i>   | x           | x           | <i>NP98</i>   | x           | --          |
| <br>            |             |             |               |             |             |               |             |             |
| <i>Sal</i>      |             |             | <i>Sal</i>    |             |             |               |             |             |
| <i>Politics</i> | <i>NP87</i> | <i>NP92</i> | <i>Europe</i> | <i>NP87</i> | <i>NP92</i> |               |             |             |
| <i>NP92</i>     | --          |             | <i>NP92</i>   | x           |             |               |             |             |
| <i>NP98</i>     | x           | x           | <i>NP98</i>   | --          | x           |               |             |             |



**Figure 4.1e Non-Partisans' Attitudinal Development**

in the 1987-1992 period; there was an upswing in perceptions of Europe's impact on the Irish national interest. No clear pattern emerged from the t-tests about the two salience scales. The general interest in politics was rather low in

all years, as one might expect from Non-Partisans, but fluctuated somewhat from one year to the next. Interest in European issues was also rather low, but “peaked” at 0.10 in 1992 which is reflected in Table 4.4e.

Progressive Democrat partisans’ attitudinal development can be tracked between 1987 and 1992 (Table 4.4f). The observed attitudinal changes on Institutions/Policies, National Output and Saliency Europe among this group were confirmed through t-tests. Progressive Democrat supporters warmed to European policy-making and their appreciation of the Irish national interest in Europe grew in this time period, and so did their interest in European integration (in fact, their Saliency Europe score of 0.51 was the highest saliency score observed in the entire study). However, only in relation to National Output can it be said with certainty that these figures reflect attitudinal change, not measurement change. With respect to Values/Community and Saliency/Politics observed changes were not confirmed in the t-tests, which leads to the conclusion that Progressive Democrat partisans felt consistently Irish and were blasé about politics.

**Table 4.4e Progressive Democrat Partisans’ Attitudinal Development**


T-tests of Progressive Democrat Partisans’ scores 1987-1998.

‘x’: Observed change significant at the 0.05 level.

‘--’: Observed change not significant at the 0.05 level.

N 1987: 85; N 1992: 34.

|             |             |             |             |             |             |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>IP</i>   | <i>PD87</i> | <i>VC</i>   | <i>PD87</i> | <i>NO</i>   | <i>PD87</i> |
| <i>PD92</i> | x           | <i>PD92</i> | --          | <i>PD92</i> | x           |
| <i>SP</i>   | <i>PD87</i> | <i>SE</i>   | <i>PD87</i> |             |             |
| <i>PD92</i> | --          | <i>PD92</i> | x           |             |             |



**Figure 4.1f Progressive Democrat Partisans’ Attitudinal Development**

This section shows that while there were instances of stability and change there were no clear or certain patterns except that where there was change in attitudes toward National Output it signalled growing appreciation of how Europe advances the Irish national interest. For Institutions/Policies and Salience Europe it was particularly complex to assess whether observed change was attitude or measurement change. At least in the case of Institutions/Policies scores did not change dramatically or suspiciously (e.g., drop from around 0.30 to -0.30 between years).

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

Several strong messages have emerged about the Irish public and Europe. Across partisan groups the Irish public is generally blasé about European integration (and politics generally), though European policy-making receives reasonable levels of public support despite people's Irish rather than European self-perceptions. Irish people feel Irish, not European. Any sense of Europeanness was clearly secondary to the fact of being and feeling Irish, at all times. Nevertheless, not seeing themselves as Europeans did not prevent Irish people from recognising and appreciating the benefits of Europe for Ireland, and for Europe more broadly. There were also attitudinal changes over time, especially with regard to Ireland's benefits from Europe which was something that Irish people came to appreciate more and more.

The analysis did identify certain differences between partisan groups, but there was considerably more that united partisans groups than what distinguished them - one might say that partisanship was generally a poor predictor of attitude. It is difficult to draw strong cross-temporal conclusions due to the changes in measurement but Figures 4.1a-f illustrated that irrespective of whether observed changes were statistically significant, they were typically substantively quite small (with the primary exception of National Output. There was no change in this measurement, and partisan scores generally grew closer to 1 over time).

In other words, there is plenty of support for something people do not associate with and in which they have virtually no interest. No evidence has emerged that since 1973 the Irish public has taken ownership of the European project. Between the Single European Act and the Amsterdam Treaty the

European project has turned into a different animal, existing in a different external environment. However, public opinion has not evolved to ground it in popular legitimacy, which becomes more urgent the more competencies the European Union acquires. From this perspective one can ask how much public interest, knowledge and support is “enough” or “reasonable.” One yardstick is the level of interest, knowledge and support for the national political system.<sup>17</sup> If Salience Politics, which measures general interest in politics, is assumed to mean national politics, then interest in Europe suddenly looks more impressive. Alternatively, interest in national politics just looks plain poor, like interest in European affairs. Elsewhere a link has been found between low salience and opposition to European integration, so that “the main effect of low levels of knowledge is to increase levels of indecision and ambivalence” (Sinnott 1995a:14). However, this analysis has found the Irish to be simultaneously supportive of, and happily ignorant about, Europe. The lack of a sense of European identity may nevertheless mean that under the “right” circumstances this sort of support may evaporate.

Chapter 3 and this chapter together equips the analysis with information about Irish parties and public opinion that makes it possible to proceed and consider how well the Responsible Party Model functioned in Ireland 1987-1998 with respect to European integration. It is to this that the next chapter now turns.

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<sup>17</sup> Elsewhere it has been reported that of all European Union member publics Ireland has the highest proportion (26 per cent) of members of the public falling into the category of “very high levels of knowledge of the national political system” (Sinnott 1995a:6).

## Chapter 5:

### Comparing Dyads: Parties, Partisans and Ideal Types

#### 5.1 Introduction

At the core of this study is a set of four theoretical constructs – ideal types – which form a backdrop for comparing the attitudes of Irish political parties and their partisans towards European integration. To this end, this chapter builds on and synthesises the analyses presented in chapters 3 and 4, on the basis of which it is possible to identify parties' and partisans' ideal type profiles, and subsequently to assess whether and to what extent the two halves of each party-partisan dyad have the same profile. Section 5.2 draws on chapter 3 to develop ideal type profiles for each Irish party. Section 5.3 similarly draws on chapter 4 to create ideal type profiles for the partisan groups. Some general issues pertaining to the comparisons of party-partisan positions are addressed in section 5.4, while 5.5 summarises and concludes the chapter.

#### 5.2 Irish Parties and the Ideal Types

##### 5.2.1 Setting the Scene

Chapter 3 located party positions on the several ideal type dimensions, and tested for cross-temporal, cross-party and within-party similarities and differences. It remains here to use these insights to establish the parties' ideal type profiles. Some general comments will preface the party-specific analyses. First of all, to recapitulate from chapter 2, the basic features of the ideal types are as follows. Europeanist parties take a very positive view of the three European dimensions and National Output, all of which are expected to be salient. The two other National dimensions are not pivotal in defining Europeanists. Nationalist parties take a negative view of the three European dimensions as well as National Output (since this type of party does not recognise any beneficial impact of European integration), while the view of National Institutions/Policies and National Values/Community is positive. No dimension is expected to have extremely high or low salience.

Pragmatic parties are harder to pinpoint. The Values/Community dimensions are expected to be non-salient and neutral, along with European Output. The Institutions/Policies dimensions are expected to be highly salient, but their direction depends on how they are perceived to effect National Output. Since the objective is to establish party views of European integration, the relationship between European Institutions/Policies and National Output is the defining feature of a Pragmatic party (along with the already specified positions on National and European Values/Community and European Output). Specifically, attitudes toward European Institutions/Policies are expected to be broadly the same as attitudes toward National Output, in reflection of an inclination to evaluate the former on the basis of how it is seen to affect the latter. The Uninterested ideal type expects party positions to lack salience. Moreover, ideal types do occasionally share features, so that for instance a neutral, low-salience European Values/Community score may signal either Uninterest or Pragmatism. What matters in assessing parties' ideal type profiles is the overall combination of scores for a given party, so that on the basis of its overall profile one can determine whether, in the above example, the neutral, low-salience score is indicative of Uninterest or Pragmatism.

How were the party scores interpreted to identify each party's ideal type profile? The following rules of thumb were applied for interpreting directional scores: scores between  $-1$  and  $-0.60$  were interpreted as showing a "very negative" position, and scores between  $-0.59$  and  $-0.10$  were interpreted as "negative." Furthermore, scores between  $-0.09$  and  $0.09$  were counted as essentially neutral, and scores between  $0.10$  and  $0.59$  as "positive." Finally, scores exceeding  $0.60$  were interpreted as reflecting a "very positive" position.

With respect to salience, I attempted to combine the calculation of comparative, inter-dimensional salience with some criteria for estimating the salience of Europe (as compared to other political issues). This made it more complex to interpret salience scores than directional scores. First, I calculated comparative, inter-dimensional salience as the observations on a dimension as proportion of a party's overall observations in a given year. Second, I calculated salience in terms of  $N$ , that is, I looked at how many observations there were on

each dimension, and used  $N=10$  and  $N=50$  as two cut off points for high and low salience which I combined with the proportional salience scores follows:

| <u><i>If Proportional Salience Is:</i></u> | <u><i>And N=</i></u> | <u><i>Then Ideal Type Salience Is:</i></u> |
|--|----------------------|--|
| 0.09 or below                              | 10 or below          | Very Low                                   |
| 0.09 or below                              | Above 10             | Low  |
| Above 0.09                                 | 10 or below          | Low  |
| 0.33 or above                              | 50 or more           | Very High                                  |
| 0.33 or above                              | Below 50             | High                                       |
| Below 0.33                                 | 50 or more           | High                                       |

In this way it was possible to take into account not only the comparative salience of the various dimensions, but also to gauge the overall level of salience that a party attached to Europe. It follows, for instance, that if there is a small number of observations for a given party, this will be reflected in the salience scores for that party. Vice versa, Europe's high salience will be registered in the salience scores of parties with large numbers of observations. In addition to these rules of thumb for assessing the "extremes" of salience, 0.21 (halfway between 0.09 and 0.33) represents medium proportional salience, and 30 observations (halfway between 10 and 50) represents medium N-salience. These two pieces of information guide the interpretation of salience scores that fall in the middle of the range (though as will become clear this was unusual).

Tables 5.1a-d contain the scores and their interpretations according to these rules of thumb as well as what are the characteristic scores of each ideal type (as set out in chapter 2). Even at this early point two ideal types can be ruled out: Uninterest and Nationalism. There was no Uninterested party, though there were certain ideal type dimensions whose salience was very low. However, parties' total numbers of observations were too high for any party to be characterised as overall Uninterested. Moreover, at no time did any party display the Nationalist combination of support for national policy-making and national values and community, and opposition to European policy-making, values etc., and Ireland's and Europe's material interests. (Accordingly, the bottom halves of Figures 3.1-3.4 in chapter 3 were virtually empty and by the same token the possibility can also be

ruled out that there were anti-European Pragmatic parties, in which case National Output and European Institutions/Policies scores would have been in the Figures' bottom halves).

### 5.2.2 *Fianna Fail*

Fianna Fail's ideal type profile was not a perfect reflection of any ideal type; rather, throughout the 1987-1998 period it consisted of a mix of pro-European Pragmatism and Europeanism. From left to right, Table 5.1a sets out the ideal type dimensions; presents Fianna Fail's scores in 1987, 1992 and 1998; interprets the scores in terms of ideal type profiles; and gives the characteristic interpretations for Europeanism, Nationalism, Pragmatism and Uninterest. The evidence is as follows.

**Table 5.1a Ideal Type Classification of Fianna Fail Scores**

This Table classifies the party's scores in accordance with the ideal type definitions (Table 2.1, ch. 2) and rules of thumb for this purpose (see Section 5.2).

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Salience:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

| Ideal Type Dim's |               | 1987    | 1992    | 1998    | Profile      | Eur'm | Nat'm | Prag'm <sup>1</sup> | Unt'd |
|------------------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| <i>Eur'n</i>     | <i>Dir.</i>   | .58     | .50     | .44     | <b>P</b>     | VP    | VN    | *                   |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>  | <i>Sal./N</i> | .42/342 | .67/844 | .62/309 | <b>VH</b>    | VH    | M     | M, H, VH            | L, VL |
| <i>Eur'n</i>     | <i>Dir.</i>   | .80     | .81     | .82     | <b>VP</b>    | VP    | VN    | N                   |       |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>  | <i>Sal./N</i> | .04/30  | .07/88  | .12/60  | <b>L</b>     | VH    | M     | VL                  | L, VL |
| <i>Eur'n</i>     | <i>Dir.</i>   | .87     | .92     | 1.0     | <b>VP</b>    | VP    | VN    | N                   |       |
| <i>Output</i>    | <i>Sal./N</i> | .02/15  | .01/12  | .02/12  | <b>L</b>     | VH    | M     | VL                  | L, VL |
| <i>Nat'l</i>     | <i>Dir.</i>   | .21     | .23     | .36     | <b>P</b>     |       | VP    |                     |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>  | <i>Sal./N</i> | .37/306 | .09/107 | .14/69  | <b>H, VH</b> |       | M     |                     | L, VL |
| <i>Nat'l</i>     | <i>Dir.</i>   | .90     | .75     | .75     | <b>VP</b>    |       | VP    | VP                  |       |
| <i>Vals/Comm</i> | <i>Sal./N</i> | .05/40  | .04/48  | .03/12  | <b>L</b>     |       | M     | VL                  | L, VL |
| <i>Nat'l</i>     | <i>Dir.</i>   | .97     | .98     | 1.0     | <b>VP</b>    | VP    | VN    | *                   |       |
| <i>Output</i>    | <i>Sal./N</i> | .11/89  | .12/154 | .08/38  | <b>L, M</b>  | VH    | M     | M, H, VH            | L, VL |

Fianna Fail's consistently positive directional scores for European Values/Community and European Output conform to the Europeanist ideal type,



though the salience scores are cause for reservation – they are only “low” whereas to Europeanists they are expected to be “very high.”

Moreover, the European Institutions/Policies scores fit the Europeanist ideal type fairly well, though ideally Europeanists would be expected to have a more positive view than Fianna Fail did. The appreciation of benefits flowing to Ireland from Europe also contributes to Fianna Fail’s Europeanist profile, but once again the salience score does not fit the Europeanist profile.

Some pro-European Pragmatic features were also present in Fianna Fail’s ideal type profile. The directional scores of European Institutions/Policies and National Output are broadly the same although the high appreciation of Irish benefits from Europe exceeds the support for European policy-making by quite a margin. This is not consistent with the expectations of a Pragmatic party, which should moreover ideally have a far higher salience score for National Output. Pragmatics are in Europe because of the benefits, and this is expected to show in their priorities. On the other hand, the low salience of all Values/Community (both dimensions) and European Output is in line with a Pragmatic ideal type profile (though low, Fianna Fail’s scores might have been somewhat lower yet for this).

### 5.2.3 Fine Gael

Fine Gael constitutes a mixture of pro-European Pragmatism and Europeanism (Table 5.1b). Values etc. associated with Europe were very positively viewed but were of rather low salience for a Europeanist party, and the same goes for European Output: Fine Gael viewed the material consequences of integration for Europe as greatly beneficial, but did not attach much importance to that. In contrast, European policy-making was highly to very highly salient, but here the directional score was not quite positive enough for a Europeanist party although the discrepancy was not large. Nevertheless, the Europeanist profile would have been sharper had the position on European Institutions/Policies been a bit more positive,

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<sup>1</sup> ‘\*’ indicates that the directional scores can vary, but that European Institutions/Policies and National Output should be broadly similar.

and had the salience of European Values/Community and European Output been higher.

Keeping in mind Fine Gael's high appreciation of Ireland's European benefits, the European Institutions/Policies scores were also somewhat low, but these two directional scores nevertheless broadly correspond which is what one would expect of a Pragmatic party. The Pragmatic profile would have been sharper had the National Output and European Institutions/Policies scores matched each other more closely. All the same, the low salience of the Values/Community and European Output dimensions, already highlighted above, conform virtually exactly with Pragmatic expectations.

**Table 5.1b Ideal Type Classification of Fine Gael Scores**

This Table classifies the party's scores in accordance with the ideal type definitions (Table 2.1, ch. 2) and rules of thumb for this purpose (see Section 5.2).

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Salience:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

| <i>Ideal Type Dim's</i> |               | <i>1987</i> | <i>1992</i> | <i>1998</i> | <i>Profile</i> | <i>Eur'm</i> | <i>Nat'm</i> | <i>Prag'm<sup>2</sup></i> | <i>Unt'd</i> |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .42         | .54         | .41         | <b>P</b>       | VP           | VN           | *                         |              |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .25/197     | .59/341     | .54/136     | <b>H, VH</b>   | VH           | M            | M, H, VH                  | L, VL        |
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .83         | .73         | .87         | <b>VP</b>      | VP           | VN           | N                         |              |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .03/24      | .08/51      | .06/15      | <b>L</b>       | VH           | M            | VL                        | L, VL        |
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | 1.0         | 1.0         | .75         | <b>VP</b>      | VP           | VN           | N                         |              |
| <i>Output</i>           | <i>Sal./N</i> | .01/5       | .02/12      | .02/4       | <b>L, VL</b>   | VH           | M            | VL                        | L, VL        |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .04         | -.02        | .01         | <b>N</b>       |              | VP           |                           |              |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .61/475     | .11/65      | .28/71      | <b>H, VH</b>   |              | M            |                           | L, VL        |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .63         | .28         | .67         | <b>P, VP</b>   |              | VP           | VP                        |              |
| <i>Vals/Comm</i>        | <i>Sal./N</i> | .05/40      | .05/29      | .02/6       | <b>L, VL</b>   |              | M            | VL                        | L, VL        |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .76         | .88         | .95         | <b>VP</b>      | VP           | VN           | *                         |              |
| <i>Output</i>           | <i>Sal./N</i> | .04/33      | .14/81      | .08/21      | <b>L</b>       | VH           | M            | M, H, VH                  | L, VL        |

#### 5.2.4 Labour

Labour's ideal type profile was broadly the same as Fianna Fail's and Fine Gael's, that is, a combination of Pragmatism and Europeanism (Table 5.1c).

However, some aspects of Labour's profile nevertheless distinguished it from the other two parties. Labour's profile is complex in that it combines Europeanism (complete ease with European values and recognition of a wider, European interest, neither of which was salient) with a comparatively neutral flavour of Pragmatism.

Beginning with Labour's Europeanist credentials, with respect to European Values/Community and European Output no real distinction is possible between Labour and the other two parties. Labour, too, held the values it associated with Europe in high esteem and held no doubts about the benefits of integration for

**Table 5.1c Ideal Type Classification of Labour Scores**

This Table classifies the party's scores in accordance with the ideal type definitions (Table 2.1, ch. 2) and rules of thumb for this purpose (see Section 5.2).

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Salience:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

| <i>Ideal Type Dim's</i> |               | 1987    | 1992    | 1998   | Profile      | Eur'm | Nat'm | Prag'm <sup>3</sup> | Unt'd |
|-------------------------|---------------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .44     | .24     | .49    | <b>P</b>     | VP    | VN    | *                   |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .34/106 | .65/200 | .62/76 | <b>VH</b>    | VH    | M     | M, H, VH            | L, VL |
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .64     | .80     | 1.0    | <b>VP</b>    | VP    | VN    | N                   |       |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .08/25  | .14/45  | .10/13 | <b>L</b>     | VH    | M     | VL                  | L, VL |
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | 1.0     | 1.0     | 1.0    | <b>VP</b>    | VP    | VN    | N                   |       |
| <i>Output</i>           | <i>Sal./N</i> | .01/2   | 0/1     | .02/2  | <b>VL</b>    | VH    | M     | VL                  | L, VL |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | -.05    | .19     | .16    | <b>N, P</b>  |       | VP    |                     |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .50/156 | .08/26  | .20/25 | <b>L, VH</b> |       | M     |                     | L, VL |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | 0       | .45     | .33    | <b>N, P</b>  |       | VP    | VP                  |       |
| <i>Vals/Comm</i>        | <i>Sal./N</i> | .03/10  | .07/22  | .02/3  | <b>VL</b>    |       | M     | VL                  | L, VL |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .25     | .13     | .63    | <b>P, VP</b> | VP    | VN    | *                   |       |
| <i>Output</i>           | <i>Sal./N</i> | .04/12  | .05/16  | .06/8  | <b>VL</b>    | VH    | M     | M, H, VH            | L, VL |

Europe as an entity.<sup>4</sup> On European Institutions/Policies Labour was less supportive than the Europeanist ideal type (as familiar observation from Fianna Fail and Fine

<sup>2</sup> '\*' indicates that the directional scores can vary, but that European Institutions/Policies and National Output should be broadly similar.

<sup>3</sup> '\*' indicates that the directional scores can vary, but that European Institutions/Policies and National Output should be broadly similar.

Gael). The party attitude grew increasingly positive on National Output; on this dimension, too, Labour does not live up to the Europeanist ideal type at least in 1987 and 1992.

Just as Labour's Europeanist profile is somewhat weaker than those of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael (as described above), Labour's Pragmatic profile lacks the distinctly pro-European quality of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. Comparatively speaking, Labour's calculation of the balance of Ireland's advantage was less pro-European than those of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael (e.g., Labour's European Institutions/Policies and National Output scores were less positive). For Labour, too, the difference in support for European policy-making and appreciation of benefits from Europe could certainly have been smaller.<sup>5</sup> However, the 1992 decrease in support for European policy-making coincided with a decrease in appreciation of European benefits, and vice versa between 1992 and 1998 when the support of both increased again. The coinciding shifts on the two dimensions signal Pragmatism. The familiar observation that European Values/Community and European Output were particularly non-salient adds to Labour's Pragmatic profile: values associated with Europe and the greater European good did not matter much to Labour.<sup>6</sup>

#### 5.2.5 Other Parties

Other Parties' closest fit to the ideal types is neutral Pragmatic, as evidenced in the directional European Institutions/Policies and National Output scores in 1987 and 1992 (Table 5.1d). (1998 is more complex, though as noted in chapter 3 Other Party scores should be interpreted with extra care).<sup>7</sup> The low salience of European Values/Community and European Output are additional Pragmatic elements.

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<sup>4</sup> Labour's growing approval of European Values/Community is notable but was not statistically significant, but even at its lowest in 1987 the mean European Values/Community direction score was clearly positive.

<sup>5</sup> The difference was smaller than it was for either Fianna Fail or Fine Gael.

<sup>6</sup> The less pro-European Pragmatism does not, however, appear to effect Labour's views of European values etc., or its view of how integration impacts on Europe as a whole, as shown in the directional scores on European Values/Community and European Output.

<sup>7</sup> The small number of observations here prevents any strong conclusions about whether and how this attitude actually changed over time. This applied particularly to National Output, regarding which Other Parties' view improved from 0.3 to 1.0 between 1992 and 1998. This did not register

In light of the neutral Pragmatism the lack of Europeanist features is quite natural: Other Parties did not have the many pronounced Europeanist features that have been identified in the larger parties' ideal type profiles, having only one, barely existent Europeanist feature: the utterly non-salient view that integration benefited Europe. Though the view of European values etc. was not negative, Other Parties were rather less enthusiastic about this aspect of integration than Europeanists are expected to be, especially in 1998.

**Table 5.1d Ideal Type Classification of Other Party Scores**

This Table classifies the party's scores in accordance with the ideal type definitions (see Table 2.1, ch. 2) and rules of thumb for this purpose (see Section 5.2).

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Salience:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

| <i>Ideal Type Dim's</i> |               | 1987    | 1992    | 1998    | <i>Profile</i> | <i>Eur'm</i> | <i>Nat'm</i> | <i>Prag'm</i> <sup>8</sup> | <i>Unt'd</i> |
|-------------------------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|----------------|--------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | -.03    | .02     | -.02    | <b>N</b>       | VP           | VN           | *                          |              |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .44/369 | .62/278 | .65/253 | <b>VH</b>      | VH           | M            | M, H, VH                   | L, VL        |
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .39     | .26     | -.02    | <b>N, P</b>    | VP           | VN           | N                          |              |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .03/28  | .07/31  | .11/44  | <b>L</b>       | VH           | M            | VL                         | L, VL        |
| <i>Eur'n</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .40     | 1.0     | 1.0     | <b>P, VP</b>   | VP           | VN           | N                          |              |
| <i>Output</i>           | <i>Sal./N</i> | 0/5     | 0/1     | 0/1     | <b>VL</b>      | VH           | M            | VL                         | L, VL        |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .18     | .20     | .23     | <b>P</b>       |              | VP           |                            |              |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>         | <i>Sal./N</i> | .45/374 | .18/80  | .21/81  | <b>H, VH</b>   |              | M            |                            | L, VL        |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | .74     | .65     | .33     | <b>P, VP</b>   |              | VP           | VP                         |              |
| <i>Vals/Comm</i>        | <i>Sal./N</i> | .03/31  | .05/23  | .02/9   | <b>L, VL</b>   |              | M            | VL                         | L, VL        |
| <i>Nat'l</i>            | <i>Dir.</i>   | -.04    | .03     | 1.0     | <b>N, VP</b>   | VP           | VN           | *                          |              |
| <i>Output</i>           | <i>Sal./N</i> | .03/26  | .07/33  | .01/3   | <b>L, VL</b>   | VH           | M            | M, H, VH                   | L, VL        |

#### 5.2.6 Irish Parties and Europe: Shades of Europeanist Pragmatism

Irish parties generally did not tend to resemble a single ideal type, but represented combinations of ideal types (Other Parties were somewhat of an exception). The main Irish parties, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour combined a

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significant in the statistical analysis in chapter 3, which seems unsatisfactory from the point of view of drawing clear and unambiguous conclusions. Observed changes about Other Parties may be more appropriately seen as possible trajectories but nothing more.

<sup>8</sup> '\*' indicates that the directional scores can vary, but that European Institutions/Policies and National Output should be broadly similar.

weakly rooted devotion to European values and Europeanness (that is, Europeanism) with brands of Pragmatism that favoured integration. Labour was somewhat less in favour than the other two. The Other Parties did not represent a radically different alternative position. That they are nevertheless the cutting edge of Irish Euro-scepticism says something about the homogeneity of the political establishment on European issues.

### ***5.3 The Irish Public and the Ideal Types***

#### ***5.3.1 Setting the Scene***

This section looks at each partisan group in turn, and examines whether and how they corresponded with the ideal types. Certain rules of thumb were applied for interpreting the partisan scores, in a manner similar to the interpretation of party scores (above). Table 5.2 shows how scales were interpreted vis-à-vis the ideal types.

In what follows, each partisan groups' scores have been considered vis-à-vis these ideal type expectations. Accordingly, Partisans are Europeanists if their Institutions/Policies, Values/Community, National Output and European Output scores are very positive (e.g., 0.60 or higher). Europeanists' Saliency Europe score should moreover be very high (e.g., 0.60 or higher) and their Saliency Politics score at least medium (-0.09). Similar "formulae" are possible to work out for the other ideal types, on the basis of Table 5.2. For instance, Nationalist partisans are expected to have very negative Institutions/Policies, Values/Community, National and European Output scores (-0.60 or below) and medium saliency. Pragmatic partisans are expected to have broadly similar Institutions/Policies and National Output scores (in whatever direction), and to have very negative Values/Community scores (e.g., -0.60 or below). Saliency is expected to be medium. Uninterested partisans are void of direction (that is, neutral) and have consistently low saliency.

It is possible to apply these rules of thumb to partisan groups as well as to individual partisans belonging to a given group. Because the Responsible Party Model is about the relationship between parties and individual voters, at this stage

of the analysis I add an individual level focus to see whether the ideal type profile ascribed to the group also can be ascribed to individual partisans.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 5.2 Ideal Types at Partisan Level**

This Table specifies how partisan scores are interpreted to establish ideal type profiles at the level of partisan groups as well as at the level of individuals. **Direction:** ‘VP’ Very Positive; ‘P’ Positive; ‘Neu’ Neutral; ‘N’ Negative; ‘VN’ Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type. **Saliency:** ‘VL’ Very Low; ‘L’ Low; ‘M’ Medium; ‘H’ High; ‘VH’ Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

|                     | <i>Eur'm</i>     | <i>Nat'm</i> | <i>Prag'm</i> <sup>10</sup> | <i>Unt'd</i> |
|---------------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|--------------|
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>     | VP (>.59)        | VN (<-.59)   | *                           |              |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>     | VP (>.59)        | VN (<-.59)   | VN (-0.60)                  |              |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i> | VP (>.59)        | VN (<-.59)   | *                           |              |
| <i>Eur'n Output</i> | VP (>.59)        | VN (<-.59)   | N (-.09-.09)                |              |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>   | VH (>.59)        | M (-.09-.09) | M (-.09-.09)                | L (<-.09)    |
| <i>Sal Politics</i> | M, H, VH (>-.09) | M (-.09-.09) | M (-.09-.09)                | L (<-.09)    |

### 5.3.2 Fianna Fail Partisans

The group-level analysis and the analysis of individual Fianna Fail partisans pointed toward two ideal types which existed at both levels: Uninterest and pro-European Pragmatism. Accordingly, Table 5.3a suggests that the level of interest in Europe was low in 1987 and 1998 but that it rose to 0.20 in 1992; however, there are reasons to be suspicious of this hike.<sup>11</sup> Low levels of interest in Europe are

<sup>9</sup> It can not be easily inferred from the fact that the group displays certain features (say, a “very positive” Institutions/Policies score and a “very negative” Values/Community score) that the group’s members also display the same features. To identify the number of individual partisans having a particular ideal type I undertook an analysis in which I specified “ideal type variables” which selected cases (e.g., individual survey respondents) on the basis of the rules of thumb set forth in Table 5.2. The results, that is, the number of partisans fitting perfectly into a given idea type, are reported in Tables 5.5a-e below.

<sup>10</sup> To calculate whether Institutions/Policies and National Output scores were “broadly similar” I created two new variables on the basis of Institutions/Policies (“IPmean+IPstandard deviation”; “IPmean-IPstandard deviation”), and two new variables on the basis of National Output (“NOMean+NOstandard deviation”; “NOMean-NOstandard deviation”). I then counted Institutions/Policies and National Output scores as being “broadly similar” if one of these two conditions held: 1. If the Institutions/Policies score was lower than the National Output score, the “IPmean+IPstandard deviation” score exceeded the “NOMean-NOstandard deviation” score; 2. If the National Output score was lower than the Institutions/Policies score, the “NOMean+NOstandard deviation” score exceeded the “IPmean-IPstandard deviation” score.

<sup>11</sup> The 1992 Saliency Europe scores were comparatively high for most partisan groups but not accompanied by Saliency Politics scores of corresponding magnitude. Viewed in the context of how

naturally key to the Uninterested ideal type. Given that in two of the three years interest levels were low, and that in 1992 there are reasons to suspect that the observed fluctuation was due to a change in measurement rather than attitude, I conclude that Uninterest was a defining feature of this partisan group.

Table 5.3a also shows a correlation between attitudes toward Institutions/Policies and National Output, in a reasonably positive direction (that is, the Institutions/Policies and National Output scores were positive or very positive at all times), which is indicative of pro-European Pragmatism.<sup>12</sup> The Values/Community scores support this interpretation of the data, inasmuch as the Values/Community scores show a strong tendency to feel Irish and identify with that rather than with Europeanness.

Two final comments about the Fianna Fail partisans as a group concerns, first, the possibility that the European Output score (only available for 1992) suggests Europeanism. Since the Values/Community scores completely negate any possibility of Europeanism, and since a sense of Europeanness is key to Europeanism, I can not conclude that Europeanism was a prominent or in any way defining feature of Fianna Fail partisans. The second comment refers to the possibility that the Values/Community scores suggest Nationalism. True, these scores are compatible with Nationalism, but in the wider context of the other scores (in particular Institutions/Policies and National Output) I argue that it is more appropriate to interpret the Values/Community scores as signs of Pragmatism rather than Nationalism.

Moreover, at the level of individual Fianna Fail partisans a large proportion of partisans also conformed to an ideal type. The bulk of partisans who did so were

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these scales behaved in the two other years, there is at least one good reason not to attach too much weight to the apparent hike in interest in Europe in 1992. The reason is that it would be reasonable to expect a real (e.g., attitudinal, not measurement-induced) hike in Europe's salience to be reflected in a similar hike in Salience Politics. If Europe is a political issue, and people have only the mildest interest in politics, it would not follow that they were quite tuned into European affairs. Since no group pays much attention to politics in general (e.g., Salience Politics means are negative-to-neutral) arguably Salience Europe in 1992 inflated the observed levels of interest.

<sup>12</sup> The correlation became weaker in each year for Fianna Fail partisans, and this became a pattern for most partisan groups. It is due to the increasing skewness and lack of variance in the National Output scale (e.g., over time attitudes toward National Output became increasingly positive, which pushed the National Output mean closer and closer to the positive end of the -1 to 1 scale).



either Pragmatic or Uninterested, which adds weight to the group level analysis.<sup>13</sup> It is notable that over the 1987-1998 period, a dynamic integration period, there was

**Table 5.3a Ideal Type Classification of Fianna Fail Partisans' Scores**

Partisan scores (from ch. 4) and the rules of thumb for interpreting scores vis-à-vis the ideal types.

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; empty cells any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Saliency:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; empty cells any position is compatible with ideal type.

|  | 1987 | 1992 | 1998                | Profile | Eur'm    | Nat'm | Prag'm | Unt'd |
|--|------|------|---------------------|---------|----------|-------|--------|-------|
| <b>Group Level</b>                               |      |      |                     |         |          |       |        |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>                                  | .29  | .51  | .32                 | P       | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>                                  | -.60 | -.48 | -.63                | N, VN   | VP       | VN    | VN     |       |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i>                              | .48  | .76  | .84                 | P, VP   | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Eur'n Output</i>                              | --   | .85  | --                  | VP      | VP       | VN    | N      |       |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>                                | -.29 | .20  | -.09                | L       | VH       | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Sal Politics</i>                              | -.23 | -.13 | -.17                | L, M, H | M, H, VH | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Correlation IP/NO<sup>14</sup></i>            | .66* | .45* | .25*                |         |          |       |        |       |
| <b>Individual Level</b>                          |      |      |                     |         |          |       |        |       |
| <i>No. Partisans Fitting Ideal Type Profiles</i> |      |      | 1987 (Total N: 383) |         | 7        | 2     | 158    | 214   |
|  |      |      | 1992 (Total N: 359) |         | 9        | 0     | 127    | 132   |
|  |      |      | 1998 (Total N: 366) |         | 1        | 0     | 77     | 225   |

no notable increase in the numbers of Europeanists (on the contrary, numbers dropped after 1992). Nor does there appear to have been a backlash against the integration process inasmuch as there was no increase in Nationalists either (and nor did the Pragmatists become anti-European). The proportion of Uninterested and Pragmatic individuals shifted from one year to the next but together they account for the bulk of individual Fianna Fail partisans.

<sup>13</sup> It does so because it shows that, say, the Institutions/Policies scores are not the average of individuals who are polarised at the -1 and the 1 ends of the scale, which would suggest a mixture of Nationalist and Europeanist individuals in this group.

<sup>14</sup> "\*\*\*" indicates that the correlation was statistically significant at the 0.05 level in Tables 5.5a-e.

### 5.3.3 Fine Gael Partisans

At the group level as well as at the level of individual Fine Gael partisans the two prevailing ideal types were pro-European Pragmatism and also Uninterest. Beginning at the group level, Table 5.3b shows a correlation between Institutions/Policies and National Output (both of which were positive at all times) in 1987 and 1992. Ideally the correlation should have held in 1998, too, but it disappears for known reasons.<sup>15</sup> The negative Values/Community scores moreover supported the Pragmatic interpretation in every year. The Fine Gael partisan group was less Uninterested than Fianna Fail inasmuch as Fine Gael's Saliency Europe scores were typically somewhat higher. For instance, in 1987 Saliency Europe was -0.02 which is a medium saliency score. In 1992 it rose to 0.28; for reasons that have already been discussed, the 1992 scale is believed to inflate scores but nevertheless, it can not be ruled out that some part of the observed increase reflects an actual increase in interest. In 1998 Saliency Europe was at its lowest, -0.10, which counts as low saliency. Considering the uncertainty surrounding the 1992 Saliency Europe score it is hard to determine how well this group fit the Uninterested ideal type, but the group is at least borderline Uninterested.

The possible arguments that the European Output score (only available for 1992) indicates Europeanism, and that the Values/Community scores suggest Nationalism, can be rejected here for the same reasons as they were rejected with respect to Fianna Fail partisans. With respect to the first argument the Values/Community scores completely negate any possibility of Europeanism, and with respect to the second argument it is more appropriate to interpret the Values/Community scores as signs of Pragmatism than Nationalism, in the wider context of the other scores.

At the level of individual Fine Gael partisans the Uninterested and pro-European Pragmatic ideal type dominated, too: there are virtually no Europeanists or Nationalists. This strengthens the picture already painted of the group, insofar as it confirms that the scores are appropriate reflections of the individuals that

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<sup>15</sup> The correlation disappears in 1992 due to the increasing skewness and lack of variance in National Output.

constitute the group. The individual level analysis moreover confirms the existence of Uninterest here, which did not always come through quite so clearly at the group level.

**Table 5.3b Ideal Type Classification of Fine Gael Partisans' Scores**

Partisan scores (from ch. 4) and the rules of thumb for interpreting scores vis-à-vis the ideal types.  
**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.  
**Saliency:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

|   | 1987 | 1992 | 1998                | Profile        | Eur'm    | Nat'm | Prag'm | Unt'd |
|---|------|------|---------------------|----------------|----------|-------|--------|-------|
| <b><u>Group Level</u></b>                       |      |      |                     |                |          |       |        |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>                                 | .36  | .45  | .31                 | <b>P</b>       | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>                                 | -.47 | -.47 | -.59                | <b>N</b>       | VP       | VN    | VN     |       |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i>                             | .55  | .67  | .86                 | <b>P, VP</b>   | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Eur'n Output</i>                             | --   | .77  | --                  | <b>VP</b>      | VP       | VN    | N      |       |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>                               | -.02 | .28  | -.10                | <b>L, M, H</b> | VH       | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Sal Politics</i>                             | -.04 | -.12 | -.12                | <b>L, M, H</b> | M, H, VH | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Correlation IP/NO</i>                        | .64* | .62* | .16                 |                |          |       |        |       |
| <b><u>Individual Level</u></b>                  |      |      |                     |                |          |       |        |       |
| <i>No Partisans Fitting Ideal Type Profiles</i> |      |      | 1987 (Total N: 199) |                | 6        | 0     | 57     | 84    |
|   |      |      | 1992 (Total N: 130) |                | 3        | 1     | 60     | 41    |
|   |      |      | 1998 (Total N: 153) |                | 0        | 0     | 30     | 95    |

#### 5.3.4 Labour Partisans

At the group level Labour partisans were Uninterested, pro-European Pragmatics, and this characterisation holds true at the level of individual Labour partisans, too (Table 5.3c). At the group level the correlation between Institutions/Policies and National Output is a (disappearing) sign of Pragmatism, as are the Values/Community scores which indicate a strong sense of Irishness and identification with Ireland rather than Europe.

With respect to Uninterest, the Saliency Europe score was only unambiguously low in 1987, and towards the low end of medium in 1992 and 1998. At the group level the ideal type profile is borderline Uninterested, but the

individual level analysis confirms that many of these partisans were indeed Uninterested. A significant proportion of Labour partisans moreover fitted the Pragmatic ideal type; there is a Fianna Fail-Fine Gael-Labour pattern of virtually no Europeanists or Nationalists among their partisans.

**Table 5.3c Ideal Type Classification of Labour Partisans' Scores**

Partisan scores (from ch. 4) and the rules of thumb for interpreting scores vis-à-vis the ideal types.  
**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.  
**Saliency:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

|   | 1987 | 1992 | 1998                      | Profile      | Eur'm    | Nat'm | Prag'm | Unt'd |
|---|------|------|---------------------------|--------------|----------|-------|--------|-------|
| <b>Group Level</b>                                  |      |      |                           |              |          |       |        |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>                                     | .22  | .41  | .31                       | <b>P</b>     | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>                                     | -.58 | -.54 | -.63                      | <b>N, VN</b> | VP       | VN    | VN     |       |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i>                                 | .35  | .76  | .91                       | <b>P, VP</b> | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Eur'n Output</i>                                 | --   | .71  | --                        | <b>VP</b>    | VP       | VN    | N      |       |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>                                   | -.33 | -.09 | -.05                      | <b>L, M</b>  | VH       | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Sal Politics</i>                                 | -.25 | -.09 | -.13                      | <b>L, M</b>  | M, H, VH | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Correlation<br/>IP/NO</i>                        | .73* | .45* | .15                       |              |          |       |        |       |
| <b>Individual Level</b>                             |      |      |                           |              |          |       |        |       |
| <i>No Partisans Fitting<br/>Ideal Type Profiles</i> |      |      |                           |              |          |       |        |       |
|   |      |      | <i>1987 (Total N: 51)</i> | 1            | 0        | 14    | 30     |       |
|   |      |      | <i>1992 (Total N: 90)</i> | 2            | 0        | 28    | 42     |       |
|   |      |      | <i>1998 (Total N: 82)</i> | 0            | 0        | 30    | 48     |       |

The final remarks about Labour partisans have been stated above in connection with Fianna Fail and Fine Gael; namely that while Labour's Values/Community scores may hint at Nationalism, and that its European Output score may suggest Europeanism. As previously argued, this is only the case if these scores are seen in isolation from all other scores (and also in isolation from each other, since they suggest ideal types that are each other's opposite).

### 5.3.5 Other Party Partisans

Other Partisans were pro-European Pragmatics, sometimes with a tendency towards Uninterest but at the group level less so than the partisan groups considered

above. At the level of individual partisans, however, there is a significant proportion of Uninterested individuals also in the Other Partisan group. To begin at the group level, however, Table 5.3d shows an Institutions/Policies - National Output correlation and moreover that these dimensions' scores were positive or very positive throughout.

**Table 5.3d Ideal Type Classification of Other Partisans' Scores**

Partisan scores (from ch. 4) and the rules of thumb for interpreting scores vis-à-vis the ideal types.

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Saliency:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

|   | 1987 | 1992 | 1998                      | Profile      | Eur'm    | Nat'm | Prag'm | Unt'd |
|---|------|------|---------------------------|--------------|----------|-------|--------|-------|
| <b>Group Level</b>                              |      |      |                           |              |          |       |        |       |
| <i>Inst/Pol</i>                                 | .33  | .34  | .27                       | <b>P</b>     | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Val/Comm</i>                                 | -.42 | -.46 | -.71                      | <b>N, VN</b> | VP       | VN    | VN     |       |
| <i>Nat'l Output</i>                             | .44  | .61  | .88                       | <b>P, VP</b> | VP       | VN    | *      |       |
| <i>Eur'n Output</i>                             | --   | .57  | --                        | <b>P</b>     | VP       | VN    | N      |       |
| <i>Sal Europe</i>                               | .17  | .15  | -.16                      | <b>L, H</b>  | VH       | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Sal Politics</i>                             | .10  | -.14 | -.16                      | <b>L, H</b>  | M, H, VH | M     | M      | L, VL |
| <i>Correlation IP/NO</i>                        | .54* | .46* | .29*                      |              |          |       |        |       |
| <b>Individual Level</b>                         |      |      |                           |              |          |       |        |       |
| <i>No Partisans Fitting Ideal Type Profiles</i> |      |      | <i>1987 (Total N: 47)</i> |              | 2        | 1     | 11     | 16    |
|   |      |      | <i>1992 (Total N: 39)</i> |              | 0        | 0     | 12     | 15    |
|   |      |      | <i>1998 (Total N: 68)</i> |              | 0        | 0     | 11     | 43    |

The Values/Community scores also suggest Pragmatism throughout. However, it is notable that the Saliency Europe scores are relatively high in 1987 and 1992, compared to the other partisan groups. At group level in 1987 and 1992 this was not Uninterest (though there is no evidence of strong interest either), though the individual level tells a somewhat different story: between 34 and 38 per cent of Other partisans were Uninterested individuals. In 1998 there is no doubt however that Other partisans were Uninterested (at both levels of analysis). Furthermore, at the individual level of analysis, it is plain that if there are

Europeanists and Nationalists in Ireland, they are not among the Other Party partisans. Rather, these individuals perpetuate the trend of Pragmatism and Uninterest that has already been noted above.

It is moreover also appropriate to apply the same final remarks to Other Party partisans as I applied to Labour partisans, that is, that the Values/Community scores should not be interpreted as Nationalism, and that the European Output score should not be interpreted as Europeanism. In both cases, the reasons are that in the wider context of all the group's marks those interpretations do not make sense.

### 5.3.6 The Rest

These groups of partisans generally shared the Uninterested, pro-European Pragmatic profile that has become so familiar by now, at the group level as well as at the individual level. As Table 5.3e shows, there were barely any Europeanists or Nationalists at the individual level (of those that were identified, most were Progressive Democrats). In contrast, there were plenty of Uninterested and Pragmatic individuals among all partisan groups as well as among the Non-Partisans. At group level, the Pragmatism was, as elsewhere, mainly pro-European (a partial exception to this tendency were the Non-Partisans in 1998, who were on the positive edge of neutral with respect to Institutions/Policies). The signs of Pragmatism, familiar by now, are the negative (occasionally very negative) Values/Community scores and the Institutions/Policies correlations. While the former sign applied to all partisan groups discussed here, the second sign did not (e.g., Non-Partisans, Green partisans and Workers' Party partisans, all 1992). In each case the individual level analysis nevertheless strongly suggests that the Pragmatic ideal type does apply: in each case a significant proportion of individual partisans were Pragmatics. There were some variations between these partisan groups with respect to Uninterest. The Greens and Progressive Democrats in 1992 displayed unusually high levels of interest in Europe – placing themselves far beyond Uninterest as a group (though at the individual level there were still 15 Uninterested Progressive Democrats and 16 Uninterested Greens).

**Table 5.3e Ideal Type Classification of the Rest of Partisans' Scores**

This Table classifies the party's scores in accordance with the ideal type definitions (Table 2.1, ch. 2) and rules of thumb for this purpose (see Section 5.2).

**Direction:** 'VP' Very Positive; 'P' Positive; 'Neu' Neutral; 'N' Negative; 'VN' Very Negative; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

**Salience:** 'VL' Very Low; 'L' Low; 'M' Medium; 'H' High; 'VH' Very High; **empty cells** any position is compatible with ideal type.

'NP' Non-Partisans; 'GP' Green Party; 'PD' Progressive Democrats; 'WP' Workers' Party; 'Ind' Independents.

|                              | <i>NP</i> | <i>NP</i> | <i>NP</i> | <i>Profile</i> | <i>GP</i> | <i>Profile</i> | <i>PD</i> | <i>PD</i> | <i>Profile</i> | <i>WP</i> | <i>Profile</i> | <i>Ind</i> | <i>Profile</i> |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|----------------|------------|----------------|
|                              | 1987      | 1992      | 1998      | <i>NP</i>      | 1992      | <i>GP</i>      | 1987      | 1992      | <i>PD</i>      | 1992      | <i>WP</i>      | 1998       | <i>Ind</i>     |
| <b>Group Level</b>           |           |           |           |                |           |                |           |           |                |           |                |            |                |
| <i>Institutions/Policies</i> | .18       | .39       | .07       | Neu, P         | .44       | P              | .33       | .44       | P              | .41       | P              | .20        | P              |
| <i>Values/Community</i>      | -.56      | -.55      | -.78      | N, VN          | -.51      | N              | -.38      | -.44      | N              | -.55      | N              | -.69       | VN             |
| <i>National Output</i>       | .32       | .61       | .88       | P, VP          | .76       | VP             | .65       | .74       | VP             | .66       | P              | .81        | VP             |
| <i>European Output</i>       | --        | .57       | --        | P              | .83       | VP             | --        | .72       | VP             | .87       | VP             | --         |                |
| <i>Salience Europe</i>       | -.36      | .10       | -.36      | L, H           | .48       | H              | .02       | .51       | M, H           | .10       | H              | -.01       | M              |
| <i>Salience Politics</i>     | .10       | -.14      | -.16      | L, H           | .08       | M              | -.03      | -.13      | L              | -.04      | M              | -.07       | M              |
| <i>Correlation IP/NO</i>     | .63*      | .28       | .69*      |                | .33       |                | .70*      | .42*      |                | .29       |                | .43*       |                |
| <b>Individual Level</b>      |           |           |           |                |           |                |           |           |                |           |                |            |                |
| <i>Total N:</i>              | 159       | 49        | 33        |                | 33        |                | 85        | 34        |                | 31        |                | 34         |                |
| <b>No. Partisans:</b>        |           |           |           |                |           |                |           |           |                |           |                |            |                |
| <i>Europeanist</i>           | 0         | 0         | 0         |                | 0         |                | 5         | 1         |                | 0         |                | 0          |                |
| <i>Nationalist</i>           | 2         | 0         | 0         |                | 0         |                | 1         | 0         |                | 0         |                | 0          |                |
| <i>Pragmatic</i>             | 25        | 18        | 2         |                | 16        |                | 24        | 15        |                | 13        |                | 8          |                |
| <i>Uninterested</i>          | 93        | 19        | 25        |                | 6         |                | 33        | 4         |                | 12        |                | 18         |                |

In contrast, Non-Partisans were distinctly Uninterested in 1987 and 1998 (1992 was rather different, and so, as already commented, was the 1992 Salience Europe measurement, which has obvious implications for the high scores for the Greens and Progressive Democrats in that year, too).

### 5.3.7 The Irish Public and Europe: Shades of Uninterested, pro-European Pragmatism

Chapter 4 identified a remarkable homogeneity in public opinion, which has been reflected here in a similar homogeneity in partisans' ideal type profiles. The fact that two ideal types (Europeanism and Nationalism) were never serious prospects is a sign of this homogeneity, as is the fact that all partisan groups (at the group level and at the individual level) constituted a combination of the other two ideal types, Uninterest and pro-European Pragmatism. Some partisan groups were particularly clear-cut Pragmatic, whereas for others the correlation between Institutions/Policies and National Output did not hold at the group level, though without exception the individual level analysis showed that Pragmatism was definitely part of the ideal type profiles. A further strong sign of Pragmatism among all partisans was the strong association with national identity, rather than any sense of Europeanness. Furthermore, Uninterest was evident at the individual level of analysis among all partisan groups as well as at the group level of a great majority of groups.

## 5.4 Party-Partisan Comparisons

### 5.4.1 Setting the Scene

At this point it is possible to compare the two halves of each party-partisan dyad, for each year of measurement as well as the trajectory of increasing or decreasing similarity over time. Ideally, as an indication of a functioning representative process, the two halves of each dyad should have the same ideal type profile.

The differences in the nature of available data for measuring party and partisan attitudes have been spelt out in earlier parts of this study and need not be



rehearsed again. Two main implications flow from the data differences when comparing party and partisan attitudes. The first pertains to comparing salience. The salience a party attached to Europe was necessarily measured in quite a different way than the salience that partisans attached to Europe. One aspect of this difficulty is that among parties salience was measured for each independent dimension, whereas at partisan level it was measured as an undifferentiated whole. Another aspect is that the measures of party salience just compare the relative salience of the dimensions (always adding up to the value of 1), the partisan measures are absolute. In earlier sections of this chapter steps have nevertheless been taken to facilitate party-partisan salience comparisons (e.g., the rules of thumb designed to enable comparable interpretations of party and partisan salience scores).

The second implication pertains to the directional scores. Chapter 3 as well as an earlier section of this chapter have made clear that party attitudes toward Institutions/Policies, Values/Community and Output were measured on two distinct dimensions, respectively, in line with the assumption that supporting European policy-making or values need not imply that one is opposed toward national policy-making or values, and vice versa. However, as chapter 4 and an earlier section of this chapter made clear, it was only possible to measure public opinion on a single Institutions/Policies dimension and a single Values/Community dimension. Clearly this complicates party-partisan comparisons, but the following steps were taken to create the best possible conditions for comparisons of Institutions/Policies and Values/Community scores.<sup>1</sup> The partisan scores were left entirely as they were, whereas the each party's European and National Institutions/Policies scores were "merged" into a single score reflecting the margin of preference for either the national or the European level. The same process was repeated for the European and National Values/Community scores.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This problem did not occur with respect to National Output (or, in 1992, European Output), due to the availability of public opinion data.

<sup>2</sup> The recalculation of party scores was carried out as follows. Taking a party's European and National Institutions/Policies (or Values/Community) scores for a given year, I subtracted the score that was closest to zero from the score that was closest to either of the scales' extremes (e.g., closest to either -1 or 1). The "new" score represented the size of the margin in favour of either European or National Institutions/Policies: scores below zero implies a preference for national policy-making, zero represents no preference either way, and positive scores represent a preference for European

A further issue in the comparisons refers to cross-temporal comparisons, which are important inasmuch as I would like to know whether, over a reasonably substantial period of time, attitude congruence existed, developed or disappeared. Previous chapters have already dealt with the complex issues pertaining to significant (as distinct from observed) attitudinal change, primarily that at party level different Treaties were debated in the Oireachtas in each year, and that a public opinion level some measurements changed from one year to the next. Discerning attitudinal change from measurement change is difficult under these circumstances, but the argument has been set forth repeatedly that using identical measurements over time would not be a problem-free option either when one's research object is a moving target. It follows that such measurements, at party and partisan level, would not be effective measurements of ongoing European developments.

#### 5.4.2 The Fianna Fail Dyad


The sections of this chapter that assessed Fianna Fail's and the Fianna Fail partisans' respective ideal type profiles put it beyond doubt that with respect to Europe's salience there is quite significant distance between the party and the partisans. Of course, Fianna Fail was in government at each point in time and as such the responsibility was theirs to pilot the bills through the Oireachtas – clearly, then, an Uninterested approach was not likely on their part. Among the partisans I have nevertheless observed rather widespread Uninterest, both at group level and among individual Fianna Fail supporters. This aspect of the partisans' ideal type profile, then, is considerably at odds with the profile of the party.

In contrast, and turning from salience scores to directional scores, elements of Europeanism were discovered at party level, for instance the espousal of values seen as specifically European values and a sense of Europeanness (albeit these matters were not particularly salient). This and other elements of Europeanism were not reflected at the partisan level, either at the group level or the individual level. Figure 5.1a (based on the party scores reflecting margin of preference) reflects this

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policy-making. The same applies to Values/Community. Figures 5.1a-d (below) are based on the "new" party scores that reflect margin of preference.

in that the Values/Community data points are located in or just outside a quarter of the Figure that symbolises attitude incongruence. Specifically, and as would be expected on the basis of what has been observed about this party and its partisans, the data points are located in the “attitude incongruence: party pro-European, partisans anti-European” quarter. The year 1987 was an exception: both parts of the dyad were less keen on European than national values etc. in that year, thus the data point is in the “anti-European attitude congruence” quarter. However, even here the dyad was not closely aligned as the data point is rather far from the dashed line that represents perfect attitude congruence.



**Figure 5.1a The Fianna Fail Dyad**

**Horizontal Axis:** Partisan positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Vertical Axis:** Party positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Dashed Line:** Perfect attitude congruence (directional scores); **‘IP’** Institutions/Policies; **‘VC’** Values/Community; **‘NO’** National Output; **‘EO’** European Output.

Having established the aspects of Fianna Fail’s and the Fianna Fail partisans’ ideal type profiles which did not match, Figure 5.1a reinforces the conclusion one might have drawn already: that there were also significant aspects of the party-partisans’ respective ideal type profiles which did correspond. Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2 established that pro-European Pragmatism was part of the make-up of both parts of the dyad. Fianna Fail’s Pragmatism (and, incidentally, its

Europeanism) is illustrated in this excerpt from the 1992 Oireachtas debate, which refers to a materialistic conception of Europe:

The Maastricht Treaty is an important practical step in making the European Community more relevant to its people and in promoting a sense of shared European identity. Ireland's interests and our people's welfare are best served by wholehearted and active participation in the move forward towards European Union. What the National Economic and Social Council pointed out in 1974 is equally true today - "it is not possible to stop the world and let Ireland off". [Mrs. M. Geoghean-Quinn, Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 308].

Though there are no documents to cite to get a flavour of the partisans' position, I have already demonstrated the partisans' similarly Pragmatic attitude. Accordingly, Figure 5.1a suggests a close attitudinal alignment between the two parts of this dyad through the data points' proximity to the dashed line in the "pro-European attitude congruence" quarter.

Neither part of this dyad had a clear-cut fit to any single ideal type. For instance, as I have pointed out already, at party level the support for European Institutions/Policies should ideally have been higher from the perspective of the Europeanist ideal type (though the positive views of European Values/Community and European Output left nothing to be desired in this regard). Moreover, the low salience of National Output, which should be at the forefront of a Pragmatics' mind, and the gap between it and European Institutions/Policies diminished Fianna Fail's Pragmatic profile. The partisans, meanwhile, clearly supported European policy-making and enjoyed the benefits of Ireland's membership, but the Pragmatic profile was occasionally somewhat fuzzy. However, the ideal types have been useful instruments for identifying similarities and differences between the two parts of this dyad. In the context of what existing research leads one to expect, the attitude congruence in the Fianna Fail dyad is rather strong in some respects, while at the same time there are no grounds for dismissing the traditional permissive consensus thesis and indeed, the question arises: does attitude congruence matter when it exists on the basis of partisan Uninterest?

### 5.4.3 The Fine Gael Dyad

The question about attitude congruence on the basis of partisan Uninterest arises also with respect to the Fine Gael dyad. At partisan level Europe's salience varied over time and peaked at 0.28 in 1992 (though I have reservations about that Salience Europe measurement since it seems to unduly inflate scores) for the group. Moreover, very considerable proportions of individual Fine Gael supporters fit the Uninterested ideal type in 1992 as well as in the other two years. Meanwhile, Fine Gael was not an Uninterested party though the distribution of salience between ideal type dimensions was quite skewed (of course, the latter point applies to all parties).


Moreover, Fine Gael had an element of Europeanism in their ideal type profile, evidenced for example in their positive view of European Values/Community and in the party's sense of a greater European good. In this citation that greater good did not even stop at the borders of the European Union:

I support the Amsterdam Treaty and the process of European integration. It is a welcome development and Ireland and western Europe should not stop reminding themselves of the benefits they have derived from membership of the European Union. We must set about sharing those benefits with our neighbours and planning the future evolution of an integrated Europe to ensure that it continues to play its role in an increasingly regionalised world. [Mr. G. Mitchell TD, Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 95].

It was quite clear that when (in 1992) the partisans were afforded the opportunity to express themselves about a common European good, they were strongly of the view that integration serves that common good – a view that corresponded with the party position. However, the virtually complete absence of a sense of Europeanness at group level as well as at individual level makes it impossible to infer partisan Europeanism despite the European Output score; seeing oneself as a European is the lynchpin of what Europeanism is about.

There were also very considerable instances of attitude congruence in this dyad. Figure 5.1b illustrates that with respect to Institutions/Policies and National Output (and, in 1992, European Output) Fine Gael and its partisans were nearly as

closely attitudinally aligned to each other as was possible. Since all data points in the Figure’s “pro-European attitude congruence” quarter are a small distance above the dashed line, one can nevertheless conclude that the party was at all times somewhat more strongly in favour of the various aspects of integration than its partisans. The three Values/Community data points in the “attitude incongruence:



**Figure 5.1b The Fine Gael Dyad**

**Horizontal Axis:** Partisan positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Vertical Axis:** Party positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Dashed Line:** Perfect attitude congruence (directional scores); **‘IP’** Institutions/Policies; **‘VC’** Values/Community; **‘NO’** National Output; **‘EO’** European Output.

pro-European party, anti-European partisans” quarter show that here, too, the party was more favourably inclined toward Europe – the difference is that the partisans were not favourably inclined at all, but displayed a distinct national preference. What is more, the previous sections of this chapter established that the pro-European attitudes identified at both levels of the Fine Gael dyad were not simply pro-European, but conformed with the Pragmatic ideal type in a variety of ways.

Fine Gael is strikingly closely aligned to its partisans in a number of ways. Yet, the contrasts in their ideal type profiles (partly Uninterested partisans represented by a partly Europeanist party) and the deeper question of the

meaningfulness of attitude congruence on the basis of Uninterest are reminders of the limits to attitude congruence in this dyad.

#### 5.4.4 The Labour Dyad


The attitudinal relationship between Labour and its partisans was less close than the corresponding relationships in the Fianna Fail and Fine Gael dyads; in Figure 5.1c the data points cluster less closely around the dashed line than they did in Figures 5.1a-b. Nevertheless, all data points in Figure 5.1c are located in the same Figure quarters as they were in the Fianna Fail and Fine Gael Figures, so the difference should not be overstated.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, Figure 5.1c shows that with the exception of Values/Community Labour and the Labour partisans were broadly in agreement with each other on the policy-making and output aspects of European integration. At various points the party was more supportive (e.g., Institutions/Policies 1992 and European Output 1992) but at other times the reverse held true. That is, the partisans were more strongly of the opinion that Ireland's benefited from integration than the party in each year, and in 1992 the partisans were more supportive of European policy-making than the party. While the data points are not neatly lined up along the dashed line they are in the "pro-European attitude congruence" quarter which signals broad agreement. In 1987 and 1992 there was strong evidence that at group level Labour partisans were clearly Pragmatic, but for reasons already stated the correlation dissolved in 1998. However, the large proportion of individual Pragmatics among this group nevertheless augments the judgement that Pragmatism characterised this group's ideal type profile throughout, so in this respect the attitude congruence in this dyad is reasonable. The location of the Values/Community data points nevertheless shows a similarity between Labour and the two larger party dyads: that Labour's ideal type profile had a Europeanist element not shared by its partisans at group or individual level. Again, the partisans' view on European Output may be seen to contradict this judgement, but as already stated the lack of commitment to a sense of

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<sup>3</sup> With the exception of Fianna Fail's Values/Community 1987, which was in the "attitude incongruence: pro-European party, anti-European partisans" quarter.

European identity makes it impossible to argue that the partisans were in any way Europeanist.

Turning to the salience aspect of attitude congruence (which is not represented in Figure 5.1c), Labour partisans were as Uninterested in Europe as any other partisans. At group level their Salience Europe scores varied somewhat – it was clearly lowest in 1987 and from then on towards the low end of medium salience (-0.09 to 0.09; it is notable that the 1992 measurement did not have the effect of pushing the score well about zero for Labour partisans, as it did for Fianna



**Figure 5.1c The Labour Dyad**

**Horizontal Axis:** Partisan positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Vertical Axis:** Party positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Dashed Line:** Perfect attitude congruence (directional scores); **'IP'** Institutions/Policies; **'VC'** Values/Community; **'NO'** National Output; **'EO'** European Output.

Fail and Fine Gael partisans). At the individual level the Uninterested ideal type accounted for the majority or plurality of partisans in each year. Meanwhile Labour was not an Uninterested party, though due to its smaller parliamentary size it always had fewer potential speakers and “suffered” in ways that are hard to measure under the Oireachtas standing orders from its relative size. The knock-on effect for this research is that there are fewer Labour observations than Fianna Fail or Fine Gael



observations (of course, Fine Gael similarly “suffered” vis-à-vis Fianna Fail due to relative size).

While the Labour dyad was not an exact replica of the Fianna Fail and Fine Gael dyads, a pattern has emerged in Figures 5.1a-c whereby in terms of directional attitude scores the dyads display reasonable or better attitude congruence. In the case of Labour congruence was reasonable inasmuch as data points were in the “pro-European attitude congruence” quarter but typically not all that close to the dashed line. The exception to this (but every bit as much part of the three-party pattern) is the party-level Europeanism that the partisans, Labour partisans included, simply do not possess. With respect to salience additional incongruence is evident: though Labour partisans were able to express attitudes in a survey interview, they did not take an active interest in European issues, so on this point, too, the general three-party pattern persists.

#### 5.4.5 The Other Party Dyad<sup>4</sup>


Significant aspects of the pattern identified above did not extend to the Other Party dyad, for here many of the party-partisan characteristics that have become familiar are different. Both parts of this dyad had Pragmatic features, but the partisans were more pro-European than Other Parties whose Pragmatism was rather neutral. In contrast to the larger parties, Other Parties’ ideal type profile lacked a Europeanist element, whereas the prevailing Uninterest found among Other partisans was fully in line with that of the partisan groups of the dyads examined above.

To begin with the directional scores, Figure 5.1d shows that several data points are located in an “attitude incongruence” quarter – to boot, it is the “party anti-European, partisans pro-European” attitude incongruence quarter, where

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<sup>4</sup> Note that this dyad compares Other Parties to Other Partisans *including* partisan groups that have been analysed as individual groups until this point (1987: Other Partisans including the Progressive Democrats; 1992: Other Partisans including the Workers’ Party, Progressive Democrats and Greens; 1998: Other Partisans including independents). To compare the impact of combining all small partisan groups into Other Partisans I also created a Figure of Other Parties-Other Partisans without the additional small partisan groups (not included here). It was completely indistinguishable from Figure 5.1d except that “EO92” was somewhat further from the dashed line in the Figure not included here.

previously not a single data point has been located. Clearly, the partisans were more supportive of European policy-making than the Other Parties, since all Institutions/Policies data points are located there, along with National Output 1987. Where Other Parties were neutral Pragmatics their partisans calculated Ireland's interest to be on balance inside Europe.



**Figure 5.1d The Other Party Dyad**

**Horizontal Axis:** Partisan positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Vertical Axis:** Party positions, ranging from -1 (anti-European) to 1 (pro-European); **Dashed Line:** Perfect attitude congruence (directional scores); **'IP'** Institutions/Policies; **'VC'** Values/Community; **'NO'** National Output; **'EO'** European Output.

Furthermore, the Values/Community scores which were in the opposite attitude incongruence quarter (“party pro-European, partisans anti-European”) in the Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour dyads are in an attitude congruence quarter here – but not in the one where attitude congruence has been identified hitherto. Rather, this is a case of anti-European congruence which of course signals a healthy Responsible Party Model but which at the same time does nothing for the legitimacy of European integration.

On the contrary, this is a direct challenge to Europe. In this citation from the 1992, Independent Senator John A. Murphy distances himself from the notion of

Europeanness in a way that it is hard to imagine a member of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael or Labour would have done in any of the debates:

Culturally, even though I admire our European partners in many respects, apart from their imperialist ventures, I do not want to share citizenship with them. I do not want to be a citizen of Europe. I do not want to be a citizen of a multinational super-state where enormous cultural differences exist between component parts. In my view a united states of Europe is a nonsense, a new Tower of Babel. [Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Maastricht Treaty), text unit 1991].

On the other hand there were also expressions of admiration and support for Europe as a value-based community:

The Amsterdam Treaty has begun that process. It has begun to take the rough free market edge off Maastricht. First, it makes clear the European Union was founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. It defines the human rights standard as that of the European Convention. It provides for enforcement of these principles through making them a condition of membership, through sanctions and through the European Court. The inclusion of these principles in the treaty is our guarantee that the European Union in which our children and grandchildren will live will be democratic and will respect human rights. [Mr. Éamon Gilmore TD, Democratic Left, Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (Amsterdam Treaty), text unit 141].

On balance, however, as Figure 5.1d illustrates, the critical view prevailed. Meanwhile, with respect to the Output dimensions (National Output 1987 excepted) the two parts of this dyad are quite agreed that Ireland as well as Europe benefits from integration. There are elements of congruence here, but they are not generally pro-European (and outright anti-European with respect to Values/Community) except with respect to Output and with respect to Institutions/Policies Other Parties lag behind their partisans.

Turning to Europe's salience, Other partisans as a group were relatively interested in European issues in 1987 (though this did not hold at the individual level) but this interest seemingly evaporated by 1992 and did not return in 1998. Other Parties were in contrast not Uninterested as manifested by the amount of


observations they generated in each year though as already commented in relation to the larger parties there was a skewed distribution of observations across ideal type dimensions.

There is attitude congruence in this dyad, too, but it is a somewhat different brand of attitude congruence than what has gone before and moreover some aspects of this attitude congruence (Values/Community) problematises rather than legitimises European integration. Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that this dyad is an exception to the commonplace assumption that Europe is élite-driven: here, the partisans are taking the lead in support for European policy-making. At the bottom of all this, though, is the persistent question of what weight should be attached to attitude congruence when it exists on the basis of partisan Uninterest?

#### *5.4.6 Irish Public Opinion and Political Opinion Leadership*

There was a three-party pattern (or, to be precise, a three-dyad pattern – but since I label the dyads after the party names it makes sense to talk of a three-party pattern) to which the fourth dyad conformed in part (Figure 5.2). With respect to Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour the party parts of each dyad constituted a mix of pro-European Pragmatism and Europeanism, while the partisans combined aspects of pro-European Pragmatism with Uninterest. Within this generalisation it was clear that the dyads were not equally tightly knit. The Fine Gael dyad was particularly impressive in this respect whereas in the Labour dyad partisan and party opinions were less closely aligned. Meanwhile, the Other Party dyad consisted to a very large extent of attitude incongruence and anti-European attitude congruence. Nevertheless, the very considerable amount of Uninterest among all partisans (most clearly observed at the individual level, but also frequently at group level) undermines the significance of attitude congruence in that it raises questions about its meaningfulness. This is not to suggest that attitude congruence does not matter – that since Uninterest is so widespread it would have made no difference to find attitude incongruence everywhere. However, it lends urgency to the possibility that attitude congruence does little to legitimise the European project if it is a functional equivalent of “blissful ignorance” among partisans.

The three-party pattern is a useful summary of the findings, and it suggests that the Responsible Party Model may work rather better than the literature cited in chapter 1 would lead one to expect it to. In chapter 2 I set forth an imaginary example of virtually perfect attitude congruence (Figure 2.3) and an imaginary example of very poor attitude congruence (Figure 2.4). The similar Figures of Irish dyads presented in this chapter are clearly closer to Figure 2.3 than to Figure 2.4, insofar as data points were mainly in a “dashed line” quarter (as it happened, mainly in the pro-European “dashed line” quarter of the Figures presented in this chapter).



**Figure 5.2 Three-Party Pattern**

**Grey dotted area:** The Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour parties’ ideal type profiles;

**Grey dashed area:** The Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour partisans’ ideal type profiles.

This shows that attitude congruence exists with respect to at least some aspects of European integration. Specifically, because the Institutions/Policies and Output data points were overwhelmingly in a pro-European “dashed line” quarter it appears that when it comes to policy-making and to the material consequences of integration parties indeed represent the views of their supporters. This did not generally extend to feelings of identity and values, etc., since Values/Community data points were in the main not in a “dashed line” quarter – though in the Other Parties dyad they were, in the anti-European “dashed line” quarter.

While this study supports the Responsible Party Model to a greater extent than does the existing literature, the present study’s defence of the Model is not altogether convincing. The reason is that three of the four dyads conform to the same general pattern and the fourth dyad, too, shares many of the features of that pattern, which means that as I have pointed out in various places already, there was

remarkable attitudinal homogeneity in Ireland. If attitudes had been more polarised, at party and at public level, and it was found that parties reflected the attitudes of their respective partisans, then the Responsible Party Model would have been more convincingly vindicated. In such a scenario likeminded parties and partisans will only “find” each other through political communication (the nature of which has been beyond this study) rather than simply happening to correspond.

### **5.5 Conclusion**

What matters in resolving Europe’s democracy and legitimacy questions in contemporary Europe are peoples’ and parties’ basic understandings of what Europe is, and by implication what it may be in the future. The ideal types represent four plausible alternatives in this regard, and they have been useful tools in comparing and contrasting Irish peoples’ and parties’ understandings of Europe over an 11-year period in which integration accelerated at an unprecedented rate. Four main concluding points flow from this analysis. The first is that at one level representation appears to function to a greater degree than the existing literature suggests. Specifically, significant elements of the same ideal type have been observed within the dyads. (In one dyad some correspondence was however anti-European rather than pro-European). The second point, however, is that there were also significant elements of non-correspondence within the dyads. Three parties had considerable Europeanist elements whereas their partisans were instead Uninterested. An third, additional important point flows from the pervasive Uninterest among the Irish public. It is that a happily oblivious public may ultimately not even care whether their opinions are appropriately represented in policy-making – it may put to nought the elements of attitude congruence that were after all found in this analysis. This, of course, does not in any way reduce the need for public ownership of the European project. On the contrary, it makes it all the more urgent. The fourth concluding point is related to the third, and it is that while it is encouraging (from the perspective of the Responsible Party Model) to find party-partisan correspondence, the fact that the correspondence was Pragmatic has ambiguous implications for the future of European integration. Attitudes based on

narrowly construed performance-based considerations of costs and benefits are likely to mean that at times of difficulty when Europe needs support the most, it would be least likely to be forthcoming. In the years to come Ireland will lose many of the benefits it has hitherto drawn from Europe, so it would follow that Europe in turn will lose much of the support it has drawn from Ireland. The next chapter elaborates on these implications, in order to spell out more broadly the implications of this study, and asks: what are the possibilities for representative democracy in contemporary and future Europe? What are the implications for Ireland's future as a member of the European Union? What is, ultimately, the contribution of this study to this area of research?

## Chapter 6:

### Conclusions: The Responsible Party Model and Europe's Finalité Politique

#### 6.1 Introduction

This study is based on three observations. The first one is that representation is at the core of democratic legitimacy. Representative democracy as Western Europe knows it is nation-state democracy, where political parties offer the public a set of policy packages from which the public select one which is subsequently implemented because it is deemed legitimate as a consequence of reflecting public preferences. This model of representative democracy is encapsulated in the Responsible Party Model, which posits that meaningful, legitimate representation occurs when public opinion is reflected at the level of policy-making.

The second observation at the basis of this study is that the incremental Europeanisation of policy-making challenges the reality as well as the idea of representative democracy as nation-state democracy. This point goes beyond the question of whether European governance in the final analysis enhances or undermines the viability of nation-states, and it goes beyond competing visions of Europe's *finalité politique*. Whatever one's views, it is an indisputable fact that European governance is affecting nation-state democracy because political parties are able to make national policy in fewer and fewer policy areas, thus hollowing out the notion of representative democracy as a process whereby parties commit themselves to implementing policy packages.

The third observation that formed this study's point of departure is the widely documented breakdown of national representative structures vis-à-vis European integration as an issue in domestic politics. For a considerable period of time research into the attitudes toward integration among policy-makers and the publics for which they make policy was dominated by the notion of permissive consensus, which held (quite correctly) that the European project was essentially élitist. Ordinary members of the general public in each member state were rather



absent-mindedly supportive of it. In the early 1990s the changes in the international environment injected the European project with energy. Research into public opinion toward European integration surged, too, and proclaimed that the permissive consensus had broken down, which European-related referendums in Denmark and France seemed to confirm.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, this makes the “era of permissive consensus” pre-1992 seem perhaps not quite like a golden age, but arguably the alleged new era is not much of an improvement.

This study was motivated by these three observations, and Ireland selected as the venue for operationalising a new approach to attitude congruence research on European integration. In contrast to the existing literature, this study has found some fairly positive results vis-à-vis the Responsible Party Model and European integration. It remains to consider the wider implications of the results, for the Responsible Party Model as well as for further research into it and for the future of democratic representation in Europe. Section 6.2 considers in a set of sub-sections a range of contributions this study makes to its particular area of research. The focus of the first sub-section is what the findings imply about the Responsible Party Model, and in the remaining three I elaborate on key aspects, both conceptual and empirical, of the approach to research taken in this study. In turn, I focus on the ideal types, which were the conceptual core of the study; issues pertaining to the bringing together of different kinds of data in the same research project; and issues pertaining to computer supported as opposed to manual document analysis. Subsequently, section 6.3 looks at the implications of this study’s results for European integration, and asks in particular what the possibilities are for representative democracy in contemporary and future Europe. Policy-makers in governments and other European institutions have not been blind to the difficult issues that are at the core of this study. For example, the Amsterdam Treaty (1998) was dubbed “the people’s treaty” due to the conscious steps it took towards making the European Union relevant to its citizens without explicitly challenging prevailing notions of identity. A key question in this section is what the results of this study

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<sup>1</sup> Though chapter 1 refers to arguments that the outcomes of these referendums were a reflection of government popularity, not attitudes toward European integration.

reveal about the permissive consensus: are there grounds to believe that it still defines the relationship between Europe, its policy-makers and its citizens? If we are in a new era of building Europe, what defines the new era? The specific implications of this research for Ireland are considered in section 6.4. A complex set of factors, some internal to Ireland and some external, had brought considerable social, economic and political change to Ireland by the final year covered in this study, 1998. The factors behind these changes were wide-ranging and often inter-related, and continued to change not only Ireland itself but also the role that Ireland could hope to play as a member of the European Union. Finally, section 6.5 summarises and concludes.

## **6.2 The Ideal Type Approach**

### **6.2.1 The Responsible Party Model: The Evidence**

Ireland was chosen as the case for this study because several factors suggested Ireland would be an easy test of the Responsible Party Model. Bearing this in mind, the results of this study are quite positive inasmuch as parties and their partisans were found to be in broad agreement in many significant respects. Specifically, there was attitude congruence with respect to policy-making and Europe's material consequences, but not generally with respect to identity and value issues or salience. Accordingly, the test applied to the Responsible Party Model, whether the two parts of a dyad have the same ideal type profile, showed mixed results.

On the positive side, in each dyad parties and partisans displayed Pragmatism, though the direction of the Pragmatism varied between, and occasionally within, dyads. The Fine Gael dyad was overall most pro-European, followed by the Fianna Fail dyad which was marginally less so. The Labour shade of Pragmatism was somewhat less pro-European again, but as I have already indicated by referring to a three-party pattern (incorporating Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour) these differences are far less dramatic than they could have been. The main difference is between these three and the Other Party dyad, where (as chapter 5 pointed out) the partisans' attitudes were rather like those of any other partisan

group but Other Party was more critical of European policy-making, values etc. and material consequences than were their partisans.

On the negative side, all partisan profiles had strong elements of Uninterest, due to the low salience attached to Europe, and this was not reflected at party level (though some dimensions were particularly non-salient, overall it was not possible to conclude that any party was Uninterested). In contrast, in three dyads - Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour - the party halves showed Europeanism not found in the partisan halves. (In the Other Party dyad neither the party nor the partisan profile was Europeanist so on this point this dyad reflects a higher degree of attitude congruence, though of course as chapter 5 showed in other respects it reflects much less attitude congruence than the other dyads).

“Partial dyadic ideal type correspondence” summarises this study’s results, the qualifier “partial” indicating that the Responsible Party Model has been supported to a point. I have already indicated that although the results of this test of the Responsible Party Model are encouraging (compared to other research in this area of study), their persuasiveness is somewhat limited. The problem is that I have not been able to establish that party-partisan ideal type correspondence occurs through political communication (as any notion of meaningful representation would require) rather than through coincidence. The crux here is determining whether Irish parties are trustees who happen to share their partisans’ views, or whether they are delegates actively seeking their partisans’ views.

Operationalising the distinction between communication and coincidence is hard, and the similarity of the four Irish dyads (even the Other Party dyad is not all that different from the other three, in the greater scheme of things) compounds this problem. In contrast, if attitudes toward Europe were polarised, then party-partisan correspondence would be extremely unlikely to be coincidental. While the results of this study augments further research pursued in the vein of the ideal type approach, doing so in a European Union member state where attitudes are known to be polarised may produce more decisive results. Accordingly, Denmark, Sweden or the United Kingdom would be possible venues for further research. In Denmark (which, like Ireland, holds referendums on European Treaty amendments) there is a

history of divisions between as well as within parties on European issues, and the Danish public is polarised in this regard, too (Branner 1992; Nielsen 1992; Schou 1992; von Dosenrode 1998). In Sweden, which has only been a member since 1995, the situation is broadly similar inasmuch as there are strong disagreements between parties (as well as within the largest party, the Social Democrats) and public opinion (Luif 1995; Ekengren and Sundelius 1998; Ekholm, Sjoden and Ulram 1999). The United Kingdom, Ireland's closest neighbour and fellow member since 1973, has a similar experience to Denmark and Sweden, because European issues have cross-cut British politics and divided parties internally as well as causing intense party competition, as accounted for by Gillespie and colleagues (1996, 2000). If one were to apply the ideal type approach to one of these countries and find dyadic correspondence, then it would be possible to conclude "the Model works" rather than, as I do here, that the failure to reject the Model does not automatically mean that it should be accepted. The present results are encouraging but not conclusive.

### 6.2.2 The Conceptual Core: The Ideal Types

The ideal types were the conceptual core of this study, and they were developed as broad, potential attitudes toward European integration. Because Europe is well under way to becoming a political system rather than an international organisation, I argue, it is more relevant to focus on broad conceptualisations of Europe rather than on a small number of survey questions. The ideal type approach represented an attempt to explore peoples' and parties' attitudes toward Europe as a system, not just toward certain of its activities. The European layer of governance affects virtually every area of policy-making, even ones that are ostensibly national or sub-national. The precedence of Community law has manifold effects and the more competencies the Union acquires, the more wide-ranging the effects of legal federation. As a consequence, nationally based interest and lobby groups as well as governments achieve their goals at the European level as well as at the national level now, as demonstrated effectively by Goetz and Hix with colleagues (2000). Since the European Union has long been a coherent political system and its competencies

are increasing, it is and will continue to be important to research it in ways that recognises it for what it is, rather than as a small number of disparate policy areas. At this point I will consider how well the ideal type approach as implemented here captured attitudes toward Europe as a system.

To be plausible the ideal types naturally drew on insights from previous research and decades of theorising about European integration. Europeanism was heavily influenced by federal and neo-functional thought, and Nationalism was its mirror opposite. The Pragmatic ideal type benefited from the scholarship of Alan Milward (1992) and the numerous opinion-integration studies that emerged in the 1990s (cited in chapter 4). Uninterest drew on the original, as yet not convincingly refuted, permissive consensus thesis and the literature that emerged in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

Since the ideal types extrapolated and benefited from insights made in previous research it was reasonable to assume that they would capture the attitudes of people and parties, attitudes that were relevant to the present research objective. The ideal types worked rather well, inasmuch as they generated substantive results about the parties and the partisans. However, a conceptual refinement of the ideal types may be in order since no party or group of partisans was a perfect, obvious fit to any ideal type.

There are three points to consider here. The first is that it may not be the conceptualisations (e.g., the ideal types) but the availability of data that make the ideal types appear not to encapsulate political attitudes as closely as might have been desirable. The availability of data is discussed further below, but it is relevant to note here that if lack of data makes the ideal types appear poor, then modifying the ideal types would not seem to be a fruitful way of proceeding. Rather, the solution would be to develop sources of data.

Secondly, according to Weber's original usage of the concept of ideal types they do permit inconsistencies between themselves and the objects they seek to encapsulate. Finding that no political actor or group fits an ideal type perfectly does not automatically mean that the ideal type is useless or wrong or should be modified. There has not emerged any indication from this research that a new,

previously unconsidered ideal type would complete the set of ideal types. Nor has this study unearthed any reason to drop one or more of the four used in this study, despite the failure to find substantial evidence of some of them. They may well have more empirical application in other countries.

The third point is whether conceptualisations travel from one empirical setting to the next; this study of Ireland was after all a case study, a venue for testing a new operational approach whose ultimate value is its (as yet untested) wider empirical applicability. The danger in comparative analysis is, as Peters put it, that “words that we use to describe political life in one country, or that have theoretical meaning in one context, may elsewhere have a very different meaning, or indeed be meaningless” (Peters 1998:80). There is no reason to believe that the conceptualisations of attitudes toward Europe encapsulated in the ideal types do not travel well to other European settings, since all member states face similar questions about what Europe is and what it should be. Nevertheless, some aspects may travel less easily than others may. Prevailing identities may be not national (or European) but regional or federal in Belgium, Holland, Austria, and Germany. Scandinavian member states may associate more with a sense of Nordic identity (encompassing also non-European Union members Norway and Iceland as well as the three Baltic states). Moreover, in these and other member states Europe might be understood at party level and among the public in a broader geographical, cultural, historical sense rather than as the European Union.

Although it is possible that the ideal types’ applicability may vary in different European Union member states, no strong reasons arose out of this study to modify the ideal types. They helped to make sense of and to interpret party and partisan attitudes. The failure of any party or partisan group to conform fully to the ideal types was a partially expected and unavoidable consequence of the fact that the political world is never as tidy as ideal types would have them. The ideal types were nevertheless a useful road map to making sense of its snarls and puzzles.

### 6.2.3 Bringing Together Different Kinds of Data

This study relied on already existing data sources, the availability of which limited as well as facilitated the research. It is not unusual that research draws on different sources of data, but this study has probably gone quite far in this respect, in two ways. First, party-partisan comparisons in any given year relied on measurements from very different sources. The key insight from this is that while it worked reasonably well identical public and party data would be preferable because it would allow conclusions to be based on identical measurements. All else being equal, however one sees the “limits and possibilities of comparison” (Mair 1996:310), identical measurements are superior (in this vein, the comparability of measurements has been identified as the most significant limit to good comparative research; Peters 1998:80). Nevertheless, two valid measurements of a given object (e.g., attitude toward, say, European policy-making) should be comparable to each other or else at least one of them is not really valid. This study encourages further research that brings together qualitatively different data, because it shows that this is possible and that therefore researchers are not as limited by data availability as they may seem to be, if they only look for identical party-partisan data.

Second, the attitudinal developments over time of a given party or partisan groups were frequently examined with measurements that differed from one point in time to the next. The potential pitfall of this was aired in previous chapters, and there is no doubt that using non-identical measurements makes it impossible to know whether observed changes reflects real attitudinal change or is induced by the change in measurement. The view is commonplace that “to speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost” (Key 1961: 8), and the same point may well apply to parties. Clearly, then, these are not robust phenomena and measurement changes can have significant impact on them. However, as I have argued throughout, while in one way it would be priceless to have identical data for all parties and partisans on all ideal type dimensions in the 1987-1998 period, this would mean having to forgo any reference to post-1987 developments in European integration. That would be a very significant limitation since the post-1987 period has been the most dynamic period since the integration

process began. In a sense the non-identical measurements are a reasonable consequence of the fact that to study the European Union is to study a moving target. To limit measurements to the extent that would be necessary in order to make the measurements identical (were such data available in the first place) would be to disregard some of the most important and high profile aspects of the European Union. It is questionable if greater certainty in cross-temporal analyses would be worth a price as high as that.

#### 6.2.4 Analysing Documents: Manual or Computer-Supported?

Computer-supported content analysis acted as the gateway to quantification of the party data, and the experience of this study is that quantification was the only way of managing large amounts of data systematically, and therefore the only way of getting a grasp of the rich detail of the text.<sup>2</sup> Quite simply, without quantification it would not have been possible to use the documents in a rigorous way.

Fielding and Lee (1998) have summarised the main points of criticism and support for computer-based documentary analysis, which reflect the more general debate on the “true” aim of social science (understanding subjective meanings, or explaining the factors that systematically bring about particular political outcomes). To begin with three commonplace criticisms of computer supported documentary analysis, the first is that using computers creates a detrimental distance between the data and the researcher. This criticism is based on the assumption that being able to leaf through and physically handle documents is an essential part of being able to analyse them properly, and that the ability to do so in a meaningful sense constitutes “closeness” to the data. My experience is that on the contrary, having to leaf through reams of pages would have made it impossible to get a systematic overview of the contents.

The second common criticism refers to the so-called fragmentation effect that computers are alleged to have on documentary analysis, by dividing the text into text units. The complaint is that working with text units prevents the researcher

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<sup>2</sup> There is a range of different computer software products that may be split into broad categories: text base managers, code and retrieve programmes and theory builders (Popping 2000), but these distinctions do not matter in this context.



from connecting analytically what is written in different parts of the document. Agreed, it is difficult to base one's work on text units while not letting them fragment the document. However, I coded strictly at the level of the text unit even when this had a fragmenting effect, in order not to slide down the slippery slope of reading between the lines in each text unit. Fragmentation did occur to some extent (politicians talked descriptively at length about some aspect of a Treaty, only to summarise at the end with "my party and I support these developments" – as a consequence only the final text unit could be coded "pro" and the other ones "neutral"). It would have occurred with or without computer support if the coder adhered to the coding procedure of coding at the level of the text unit. This problem, in other words, is not about computer support but about text units.<sup>3</sup>

The third common criticism is that computer support leads documentary analysis to imitate (not to say ape) statistical research such as survey research. Documentary analysis should not make large-n broad sweeps at the research question, according to this criticism. In contrast, this documentary analysis went for fully-fledged quantitative analysis, while also supplying excerpts of text from the documents to give a flavour of them. The entire process of coding the text was naturally subjective, but it was based on an explicit coding framework and it is traceable and reproducible. Arguably the potential for manipulating documents' contents is at least as real (and possibly greater) in analyses that simply rely on the researchers' decisions about how to represent documents, unless they also supply the full text of the documents so that readers can recode it all themselves to satisfy their curiosity. Supplying, for instance, indicators of statistical significance gives estimates of the confidence that may be attached to research findings but there is no equivalent way of providing information of segments of text chosen by the researcher. On this basis I reject this criticism.

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<sup>3</sup> Getting around this problem by treating a document as a single text unit would probably not work unless the document was very short, because most people's ability to manage and organise information in memory would require one to mentally fragment the document's contents anyway. Moreover, trying to overcome the fragmentation problem by not coding neutral text units as neutral, but with reference to the text unit expressing direction, would open up an abyss of potentially inconsistent interpretations, which presents validity and reliability problems.

The arguments in favour of computer-based documentary analysis are partly about the practicalities and partly about the substantive aspects of research. (Arguably, improving the practicalities of the research has the potential to improve the substantive quality of it, too). The main supportive argument is that software have organisational and search facilities that speed up otherwise tedious and time-consuming tasks such as coding, inspections of the work and corrections. This makes it possible to manage large amounts of data. I agree that software does have a positive impact in this respect, though the process is time-consuming irrespective of the computer support. An additional, alleged knock-on effect of computer support is that if less time and effort is spent on data management, more time and effort can be spent on the substantive analysis itself. This would certainly seem to be true. Using computer support is also said to require great explicitness about the research process since it is only possible to use the software if one has thought through what one wants to do with it. I agree with this point, but would presume that manual coding also requires explicitness about one's procedures, so it is in fact not a quality unique to computer supported analysis although it may well enhance explicitness. To these advantages I add its usefulness as a gateway to statistical analysis, which makes it possible to analyse, summarise and present amounts of information that are too large to be satisfactorily dealt with in any other way. In this particular study quantification allowed me to make the documentary data as similar as possible to survey data, but the point has general application.

### **6.3 Implications I: The Responsible Party Model and European Integration**

#### **6.3.1 The Model Revisited**

The results suggest that the Responsible Party Model may function a great deal better than what is usually assumed to be the case, and therefore they motivate a revised, tentative opinion about the Model. The results may not be convincing enough to reject conclusively the existing literature's central message about the Model, and the public's abiding lack of engagement with European issues continues to pose a challenge to meaningful representation - and therefore also to any claim

that the Model functions well. Nevertheless, the simple fact remains that the parties and their partisans were frequently closely attitudinally aligned to each other.

Contemporary research into the Responsible Party Model and Europe typically augments a wholesale rejection of the Model. As chapter 1 showed, common sentiments are that “the distortions in representation result in élites who are unduly favourable to European integration” (Marsh and Wessels 1997:231) and that “the political élite quite generally seems to be marching ahead of the people” (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:202). In contrast, this study has not found grounds for a wholesale rejection, but suggests some ways in which the conventional view can be refined. On European policy-making in general (remember, the measurements covered a broad range of policy areas) and the material consequences of integration parties do by and large represent the views of their partisans. Figures 5.1a-d showed no consistent pattern in terms of whether parties or partisans were “marching ahead.” In the Fianna Fail, Labour and Other Party dyads this varied seemingly randomly, whereas in the Fine Gael dyad the party was consistently ahead of its partisans (though only marginally, with the exception of Values/Community). These findings motivate a statement about the Model that is rather different from the citations directly above. Figures 5.1a-d look by and large as would be expected when the Model functions effectively (again, with the obvious exception of Values/Community). The situation is generally quite different with respect to Values/Community, where parties and partisans were frequently found not to be in agreement with each other, so different rationales may underpin the parties’ Pragmatism and the partisans’ Pragmatism. Among partisans the source of consent to European policy-making and its material consequences seems entirely performance-related, whereas among parties it seems also to derive partly from a sense of Europeanness. This opens up the possibility that if performance perceptions worsen among parties and partisans, they may not adjust their attitudes toward European policy-making in similar ways, since the parties’ sense of Europeanness may lead them to remain supportive whereas the partisans would not. However, this risk that the Model would malfunction if or when perceptions of

Europe's performance worsen should not be overstated, since the parties' European identity, sense of European values etc. was comparatively weak.

Additionally, nothing in this study dispels the permissive consensus, defined as nothing more than an environment in which policy-makers can act relatively unconstrained by public opinion – since all sections of the public are simultaneously Uninterested and in any case in favour of European integration. It is quite surprising that attitudinal alignment to the degree found here can occur amidst pervasive partisan Uninterest, assuming that some form of communication is required for the alignment to occur and that Uninterested people do not tune in to parties' attempts to communicate. (However, I have flagged concern that this may have occurred coincidentally rather than through political communication.) Partisan Uninterest is possibly the strongest argument against a revised opinion on whether the Model works better than recent and contemporary opinion suggests. Even if it does work better, this seems rather unimportant if those whose opinions are represented do not care much about the issues in question (here, European issues). Consequently, instead of abandoning the view that the Model does not work in favour of the view that it does, which would be a positive development for anyone concerned with democratic legitimacy, Uninterest leaves us with “the Model works; so what?” This is hardly an improvement on the original view that the Model functioned poorly or not at all.

In all, then, there are some grounds for revisiting the Responsible Party Model with a view to possibly revising prevailing opinion about it, primarily on the basis of the partially overlapping ideal type profiles found in this case study. At the same time, however, there are also signs that opinion about the Model should only be partially revised, since I have not established that this overlap occurred through party-partisan communication; since within each dyad there were elements of ideal type profiles that did not overlap; and because of the general Uninterest among partisans.

### 6.3.2 The Possibilities and Limits to the European Project

The reason why it matters if the Responsible Party Model functions with respect to European integration or any other issue or policy is that if it does, then the issue is imbued with popular legitimacy because elected representatives reflect the opinions of those they represent. Moreover, the European Union quite explicitly does not have a *finalité politique*, that is, a predetermined final goal or destination – in theory it could widen and deepen virtually endlessly. In practise, however, there are many factors that do and will continue to act as brakes on the integration process. The Union's relationship with its citizens (mainly channelled through citizens' relationship with their own political system and representatives) is one of many significant factors that can act as a facilitator and as a brake on integration. This study highlights this ambiguity. On the one hand, the results were rather more positive than what is usually the case, inasmuch as the two halves of each dyad overlapped considerably with each other's ideal type profile in a pro-European direction. This is a source of legitimacy for the European Union, which not only provides a (more) solid foundation for policies and institutions already in existence but which also extends the possibilities and scope of what the Union can become in the future. On the other hand, the fact that the overlap was Pragmatic implies that this source of legitimacy may dry up rather suddenly, and the widespread public Uninterest adds to the hesitation about this source of legitimacy. European Union governments are aware of the difficulties they face if they do not manage to resolve the tension between the European Union's weak societal foundation and its wide-ranging competencies, a tension which becomes ever more difficult to manage as the European project moves forward.

The implication of Pragmatism for the possibilities and limits to European integration are, first, that consent to European-level policy-making – that is, de-regulation and re-regulation through the Union's policy-making mechanisms - is conditional on its perceived performance. Opposition may therefore relatively quickly turn into support, and vice versa. Whether or not Pragmatism is pro-, neutral or anti-European, it provides flimsy foundation for major projects that are difficult or impossible to revoke, such as the single currency. If Europeanism had

been the prevalent ideal type then there would have been a much more solid foundation, so that the Union or let's say its single currency could withstand more "bad times" without governments and voters losing faith in it. The weak Europeanism among parties would presumably have some effect in this regard, but the public would not be expected to have much patience with it. If Nationalism was the prevailing ideal type, then opposition to a single currency or any other development would be irrespective of the currency's performance (of course, if Nationalism or Uninterest prevailed across Europe there would probably not be a single currency or indeed a European Union). Pragmatism, then, is neither the best nor the worst case scenario with respect to the limits and possibilities of integration – pro-European Pragmatism obviously offers greater possibilities but not as a source of legitimacy it is not stable or dependable. A sense of identity or value-based orientation toward Europe as envisaged in federal and neo-functional theories of European integration (O'Neill 1996) clearly has not occurred despite political leaders' generally assumed ability to control and manipulate identity carriers (Bloom 1990:51; Hylland Eriksen 1993:194; Dunphy and O'Neill 2000:297). It follows that political leaders have not tried, or have been unsuccessful, in manipulating a European identity.

Nevertheless, all Treaty reforms since the Maastricht Treaty contain some effort to ground the Union among its citizens to avoid "erosion of support for the core [European] institutions" (Norris 1999:88). Norris argues that while this would have serious consequences for the future stability of the European Union, public opposition to integration may ultimately strengthen Europe if it reflects public demands for democratisation. The problem with democratising the European Union, however, is that nobody really knows what European democracy is, as distinct from democracy in European nation-states. It seems quite clear that European governments are not sure what European democracy means. Does it mean nation-state democracy writ large, based on the notion that a group of people who feel they belong together (a nation, to be precise) have the right to rule themselves though a parliament and other institutions? The drive to strengthen the European Parliament little by little can be seen as a series of steps in this direction.

On the other hand, this study has failed to find anything to suggest that there is a demand for the sort of democracy that exists in Western European countries at the European level. There is only a weak sense of community at party level and none whatever at the level of the public, so realistically European democracy must mean something different from nation-state democracy, at least for the foreseeable future. Some see 1957 and the Treaty of Rome as the end of the nation-state epoch (Hettne, Sorlin and Ostergard 1998:21), which seems true with respect to nation-states' diminishing functional capability but not with respect to the idea of the nation. In the absence of a widespread sense of Europeanness it is far from obvious that supranational moves to resolve the democratic deficit will in fact do so; they may even worsen the situation.

In parallel with the supposedly democratising institutional reforms several significant political and legal steps have been taken since the early 1990s to ground the Union among ordinary people. The establishment of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was a very overt step. The Treaty says that "every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union" (Art. 8.1). Citizens' legal rights include the right to move and reside freely within the Union, to vote and stand for office in local and European elections, and to diplomatic protection by other European Union countries in third countries (Art. 8).<sup>4</sup>

European citizenship purports to fulfil two simultaneous roles (which, incidentally, nation-state citizenship also fulfils): providing a social basis for institutions, and defining a social space encompassed by the citizenship. The uniqueness of European citizenship is that it provides a social basis for supranational and transnational institutions rather than national ones, and that its referent social space is, accordingly, also supranational and transnational instead of national (Giesen and Eder 2001:2). Scholars have taken widely different views of European citizenship (Meehan (1993) and Karlsson (1999) are very positive about it, while Keane (1995) comes across as entirely dismissive). Nevertheless, the Union now has a legal basis for a European community that does not yet exist

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<sup>4</sup> National (e.g., general) elections were not among the elections where European citizens were granted equal status in a given member state – clearly another sign of lack of trust between Europeans as distinct from trust between nationals.

except in name. In 1998 the Amsterdam Treaty in fact limited the formulation of European citizenship by adding to the 1992 formulation that “citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship” (Art. 8.1). However, perhaps this is best viewed not as recognition that Maastricht overstepped the limits of the desirable, but as recognition that the way to make European citizenship more than a legal formality may lie in assuming subtler tactics. Therefore, the Amsterdam formulation is best understood as subtly framing national and European citizenship as co-terminus and focusing instead on developing the European Union in areas where it would be relevant to ordinary people’s everyday lives, thereby developing over time a non-performance based sense of allegiance. Consumer rights and protection, public health and environmental protection were such areas.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, member state governments continue their deliberations about the Union’s future between Pragmatism and Uninterest. In the Declaration on the Future of the Union (annexed to the Treaty of Nice (2000))<sup>6</sup> they called for a debate on issues that might be called constitutional, including legitimacy and representation issues. The Declaration foresees that the Presidencies of 2001 (Sweden and Belgium) in co-operation with the European Commission and the European Parliament will encourage wide-ranging discussions with interested parties such as representatives of national parliaments and other “opinion leaders” in political, economic and university circles, and representatives of civil society. The Göteborg Council of June 2001 and the Laeken Council of December 2001 have been assigned the tasks of agreeing on a declaration containing appropriate initiatives for grounding the Union among its citizenry. In this vein, the Nice Council agreed specific questions to be addressed with a view to improving the Union’s democratic legitimacy and transparency:

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<sup>5</sup> Several more radical proposals for European citizenship rights were turned down at Amsterdam. These included the right to trade union association, a Treaty article on European political parties, a right to popular petition to the European Commission and the right to learn a second language as part of one’s education (Tonra 1997:89). Some of these, for instance the promotion of second (European) languages and possibly an article about the role of European political parties, may have had “community-creating” effects.

<sup>6</sup> The Treaty of Nice (2000) sought to prepare the Union’s institutions for enlargement, estimated to create at least 103.5 million new European citizens (the figure includes Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovenia (European Commission 1997:138).



- How to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of competencies between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity;
- The status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in Cologne;
- A simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better understood without changing their meaning;
- The role of national parliaments in the European architecture.

The first of these four points identifies subsidiarity as the basic touchstone of European democracy, the blueprint for assigning competencies between alternative levels of governance. In other words, subsidiarity, whereby decision-making shall take place as closely to the citizens as effectively possible (European, national or sub-national level), will determine future configurations of territory, functionality and affiliations. The second point, referring to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is crucially important to the conscious evolution of a European identity. The Charter's 54 articles are divided over six chapters entitled Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights and General Provisions. These chapter titles signal a strong commitment to a civic notion of Europeanness, an assumption that is strengthened in the Charter's Preamble:

The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values. Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based in the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. (Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000).

The European Union clearly does not live up to these aspirations, in fact the status of the Charter was not even decided at Nice, but put off to the 2004 intergovernmental conference. Considering the dedication that drove other projects, the Union is certainly proceeding with caution and taking its time with the Charter.

The third point, about simplifying the Treaties, is extremely important because it is unfair and unreasonable to ask for people's support without making it possible for them to approach the Treaties and make their own minds up on the basis of the text. The more the European Treaties are becoming the constitution the European Union does not have, the more indefensible and undemocratic it is that the Treaties are unreadable. The fourth point is interesting in that it seeks to marry the national and European levels of government, as suggested in phrases such as joined-up or seamless government/governance. As an institutional development, it moreover mirrors the conscious but sometimes implicit community building in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in that it seeks to bring together rather than juxtapose institutions at different political levels.

It is in the nature of European integration that the process has no defined limits – the possibilities are therefore by definition endless (as in the phrase “ever closer Union”). This section has sought to demonstrate against the background of the results of this study the growing awareness that the possibilities are nevertheless limited unless Europe brings its citizens along.

## **6.4 Implications II: Ireland**

### **6.4.1 The Past: A “Good European”?**

From 1973 until the present Irish governments have been very clever at advancing Irish national interests with arguments to the effect that it is in the Union's collective interest that Ireland's interests are satisfied. This has been possible mainly through the incremental development of a level playing field in the single market whereby Ireland's catching up process benefited not only Ireland but also every other actor with an interest in the single market's success. But the single market has meant more than economic gain: a radical but widespread view is that until 1973 Ireland's independence was vacuous due to the continued economic dependence on Britain. Accordingly, the argument goes, both countries' accession to the Treaty of Rome (1957) in 1973 rather than the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921)

made Ireland independent (Halligan 2000).<sup>7</sup> An examination of attitudes in various sectors of Irish society (the media, universities, voluntary and rural organisations, trade unions and business, the civil service) one decade after accession concluded that even opinion leaders in Irish society who were critical of integration were in fact in favour of it. They viewed integration much as they did “democracy, peace, economic progress and happy family life – all were in favour in principle, only on matters of practice were there strong differences” (Hederman 1983: 183-184). This study has observed only marginal party differences and nuances in public opinion, which seems to confirm Hederman’s point.

This study refutes the claim that “the intensification of constitution-building in the EU since the mid-1980s politicised the European project in Ireland” (Laffan and Tannam 1998:71). The European project is not politicised in Ireland, if politicisation is understood as a process whereby some issue is becoming controversial, salient and perhaps politically sensitive. On the contrary, the relationship between Irish political parties and their partisan suggests that European policy is made with plenty of latitude vis-à-vis public opinion - public Uninterest does not conjure up images of constrained parties. In describing the parties as pro-European Pragmatics with an element of Europeanism, I am describing them in terms that correspond with how others have described them, too. Consecutive Irish governments have had a stated *communautaire* commitment to Europe since 1973, viewing integration as a win-win situation in which even national concessions could be viewed as long-term gains inasmuch as they advanced collective interests which happened to correspond with narrower Irish interests. The incremental development of the Union’s structural instruments to create a level playing field in the single market allowed Irish governments to wrap the national interest in arguments about European solidarity and redistribution. Irish governments thereby managed to make Ireland appear as “a good European” through its commitment to major European

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<sup>7</sup> In contrast, this excerpt of a document written before 1973 puts across the view that membership would make the struggle for, and eventual achievement of, independence from Britain pointless: “If the Irish decide now that the nation-state (for which “all that blood was shed”) is not worth having, it is, as I have said, a pity that we didn’t make up our minds on this point at an earlier date – even if it would have meant our having to settle for a few Robert Emmets less” (Dowdall no date:30). This view is unusual in Ireland; as we have seen, the Nationalist ideal type was virtually non-existent here.

projects, while at the same time acquiring very considerable benefits from Europe. Simultaneously, however, consecutive Irish governments' actual hesitation to take *communautaire* positions on key developments such as Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Schengen Agreement (the removal of internal borders) qualifies Ireland's *communautaire* track record. Scott captures this with the term conditionally integrationist, which implies "support for progressively closer integration, including political integration, provided the economic benefits will be fairly shared" (1994: 8). This characterisation of Irish governments' policy toward European integration has a very comfortable fit with the pro-European Pragmatic-Europeanist ideal type combination that I have argued characterise most Irish parties.

While Irish parties may have enjoyed the considerable latitude in policy-making, political management of public opinion has assumed more importance. Two extensive documents in the early-to-mid 1990s spelt out a previously unfelt need for this. The first document was *Communicating Europe* (Ireland 1995), the report of a task force by the same name.<sup>8</sup> The task force's point of departure was that:

Apart altogether from understanding why the EU was founded, what it hopes to achieve and how it impinges on the major issues of national concern, the people have a right to know what membership of the Union means to them as individuals in their everyday life. (Ireland 1995: 1).

The major conclusion drawn about Irish public opinion (based on a commissioned analysis thereof) was that the favourable attitudes that were observed could easily turn into ambiguity and opposition to European integration, due to the low levels of information and awareness. The report assumed that information and awareness generates support (an assumption that does not seem entirely justified or

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<sup>8</sup> The *Communicating Europe* task force was announced by the then Minister for Finance Bertie Ahern TD in his January 1994 budget speech to the Oireachtas. The budget allocated £100 000 to the task force, which was officially launched by Tom Kitt TD on 18 February, 1994. The task force's specific task was to draft a report that would analyse the awareness of European issues among the Irish public and propose measures for raising awareness. As indicated above, the task force reported in 1995.

unquestionable), and made numerous recommendations designed to prevent such a scenario from becoming a reality. They included establishing a centrally located “first stop shop” for European-related queries, an Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs, widely available user-friendly publications, using the public service broadcaster (RTÉ) to convey information, and specific information drives targeting youth issues, women’s issues etc. To increase general levels of awareness of how wide-ranging the impact of the European Union is in people’s lives the task force recommended that all projects (however large or small) that had a European dimension should carry prominent information about this.

The second document of relevance is *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: White Paper on Foreign Policy* (Ireland 1996), the state’s first ever White Paper on foreign policy and the most comprehensive statement on foreign policy in the history of the Irish state. It was borne out of a commitment to “encourage debate about all aspects of policy, more transparency in the conduct of policy, and the maximum degree of ownership of policy by the people” (Ireland 1996:1). The decision to publish the White Paper was moreover influenced “by the rapid growth over the last few years of public interest in the formulation of foreign policy, and a desire to open this policy to greater public scrutiny” (Ireland 1996:2). A series of public seminars held in various geographical locations in Ireland and written submissions were also part of the process of creating the White Paper. While one can question the claimed “public interest in the formulation of foreign policy” at least as it applies to the making of European policy, the document reflects a clearly perceived need on the part of political élites to create public ownership of policy, at least in principle. Real public involvement in, not to mention ownership of, European policy, is questionable inasmuch as this study has shown that the majority of people have no interest in it. Notably, this is as true of public opinion after the publication of these two documents in the mid-1990s as it was in 1987 or in 1992. The support for European integration shown by the Irish people in opinion surveys (as well as in referendums and elections to the European Parliament) has been called “a gauge of the effectiveness of successive Irish governments in providing convincing leadership of European issues” (Scott 1994:29). The same author has

also identified politicians' collective, consistent failure to educate public opinion about European integration as a challenge unmet:

For want of information, public opinion has not understood the EU, and has not therefore taken the EU to its heart, having a somewhat semidetached attitude, willing to go along but having little knowledge or conviction about the goals of integration, little vision of what a European Union might become. (Scott 1994:34).

This study confirms the veracity of this point absolutely, which in turn means that *Communicating Europe* and *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad* have failed in their objectives. Additional milestones have added to the need to manage public opinion vis-à-vis Europe. The first was the Referendum Act (1998),<sup>9</sup> which led to the establishment of the Referendum Commission, whose task it became to:

explain the subject matter of the referendum to the public at large, as simply and effectively as possible, while ensuring that the arguments of those against the proposed amendment to the Constitution and those in favour are put forward in a manner that is fair to all interests involved. (Referendum Commission 1998:4).

This applied to all referendums, not only to European-related ones, however, the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty referendum and the simultaneously held referendum in relation to the Good Friday Agreement were the first referendums that took place subsequent to the establishment of the Referendum Commission. It engaged a firm of media consultants, published and disseminated information booklets, ran press and broadcast “info-mercials.” They were used in a three-phase strategy to firstly give out basic information about the Amsterdam Treaty, secondly provide more detailed information about the Treaty’s provisions, and thirdly to elaborate on the various arguments for and against the Treaty. The Referendum Commission also undertook a media analysis. It revealed that two weeks before the vote there was an approximately equal number of pro- and anti-Amsterdam articles in the press. In

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<sup>9</sup> The Referendum Act (1998) came about as a consequence of the so-called McKenna judgement (McKenna v. An Taoiseach (1995) 2 IR 10). Patricia McKenna was a Green Party Member of the European Parliament. The Referendum Act (1998) set out that public funds might not be used to promote one side over the other in a referendum campaign.

the broadcast media (especially local radio) there was a greater number of pro-Amsterdam reports in the early part of the campaign, but this evened out as the campaign drew to an end. Overall, the media coverage imbalances evened themselves out according to the Referendum Commission's analysis (Referendum Commission 1998).

Irrespective of the basic soundness of the rationale underpinning the Referendum Commission (that people are in no position to make their minds up if they only have access to one-sided information) the Commission was ultimately pointless: "didn't have enough information" was cited as the most common reason to vote against the Treaty in the referendum exit poll. In fact, more people voted no out of a perceived lack of information (36 per cent of no-voters) than people who cited fears for Irish neutrality (34 per cent of no-voters), or Irish sovereignty (26 per cent of no-voters; Gilland 1999, Mansergh 1999). Clearly, it was not the Commission's task to make people vote yes, but it was the Commission's task to facilitate informed choice, whether the choice was to favour or not to favour the Amsterdam Treaty. This rather seems to confirm the general conclusions in this study about Irish public opinion and Uninterest vis-à-vis Europe.

In summary, Ireland's experience to date as a member of the European Union has not caused divisions between or within parties, or polarised public opinion, or given rise to difficult arguments about Irish independence or indeed demanded painful social, economic or political concessions. Consecutive Irish governments have constructed arguments about Europe and Irish interests that have pleased both the Irish public and the European partners. However, the formula of weaving European solidarity around narrow Irish interests is not timeless, and when its time runs out party as well as public opinion may well change.

#### 6.4.2 Future Perspectives

Pragmatism is not a stable source of support for Europe. Furthermore, the parties' Europeanist elements were rather weak, and Uninterest, prevalent among the Irish public, is a weak source of support at any time. Therefore, the ideal type profiles that I have identified for Irish parties and partisans are not necessarily likely

to withstand the changes that Ireland is facing as a member of the European Union. Whether or not this will make party-partisan dyads more or less congruent is difficult to foresee, but this section will outline some of the most important reasons why changes are likely to occur, and some Irish party reactions to date to these changes.

Complex and frequently interrelated processes of social, economic and political change within Ireland itself, and in Europe generally, will make it more difficult for Irish governments to maintain the balance that has hitherto been so successfully struck between narrow Irish interests and wider Community interests. The correspondence of Irish and Community interests has allowed Irish governments since 1973 to sell Europe at home on the basis of what Ireland can get out of Europe, and to justify this in Europe on the basis that by helping Ireland Europe is ultimately helping itself. However, the triumphant Irish economy of the 1990s, the result of a combination of domestic policy and membership of the European Union, has brought Ireland close to disqualifying itself from the large European transfers that have become part of Ireland's European experience.<sup>10</sup> According to Eurostat, the European Commission's agency for statistics, in 1997 Ireland's GDP per capita was 102 per cent of the Community average. Regionally within Ireland the border, midlands and western (BMW) region had 75 per cent per capita of Community GDP and the Southern and Eastern region 112 per cent per capita (Eurostat 2000). Already, Ireland has surpassed the criteria for the structural instruments, so it is not surprising to find suggestions in the Irish media that Ireland will become a net contributor to the Community budget in the Community financial perspective that begins in 2007.<sup>11</sup>

The economic performance has made Ireland a source of inspiration to Central and Eastern European applicants to the European Union who wish to emulate the Irish experience. These countries' applications followed the end of the

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<sup>10</sup> Structural Funds eligibility criterion: Regional per capita GDP below 75 per cent of Community average (introduced in *Single European Act*). Cohesion Fund eligibility criterion: Member state per capita GDP below 90 per cent of Community average, and which are part of the third phase of EMU (introduced in *Maastricht Treaty*).



Cold War and despite the sometime complacency of current member states and institutions in getting the Union ready for enlargement there is now no doubt but that many of these applicants will join before or around 2005. One immediate effect of this will be that the Community average per capita GDP will be pulled down, which in turn will push Ireland well above the eligibility criteria for most European regional redistribution. Quite apart from the success of the Irish economy in catching up with the Community average, enlargement will strengthen the rationale for discontinuing transfers to Ireland as part of creating a level playing field in the single market.

In addition, the economies of the current Central and Eastern European applicants tend to be agriculture-based to a greater extent than any current European Union member economy. The prospect of the costs involved in extending the Common Agricultural Policy to these poor, agriculturally dependent countries generated a momentum in favour of reforming the Common Agricultural Policy towards the end of the 1990s. This momentum received additional force from international trade negotiations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), where the protection of Community agricultural produce in intra-EU trade received much criticism and became increasingly unsustainable. The Common Agricultural Policy is not a regional policy but has strong redistributive consequences and it has impacted more on Ireland's GDP (4.2 per cent) than any other member state's GDP (NESC 1997:360). Accordingly, the proposal to increasingly re-nationalise agricultural policy, that is, to let national governments rather than the Community budget pay for agriculture, would impact more negatively on Ireland than on any of its European partners.

One of the aspects of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe that existing member state governments have been slow to resolve is to reform the European institutions and decision-making procedures. As a small member state Ireland has everything to gain from an international framework that restricts the sovereignty of larger, more powerful states. Ireland has benefited particularly from

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<sup>11</sup> Mr. Peter Brennan, Director of the Irish Business Bureau, the Brussels office of the Irish Business Employers' Confederation (IBEC), "Funding from EU could be down by half by 2006", *Irish Times*, 19 March, 1998

Britain's being tied into the European framework, and in general European Union institutions have protected small member states from larger ones while also protecting large states (e.g., France and Germany) from each other. The European Union will only continue to have this effect if it operates effectively, which means its institutions and decision-making processes must be reformed in order to absorb the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The issues here are the size of the European Commission (that is, each member state's right to have a Commissioner), the weighting of votes and use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, and the size and member state distribution of seats in the European Parliament. The Treaty of Nice (2000) began to resolve some of these issues without immediate negative effects for Ireland.<sup>12</sup> At this juncture perhaps the biggest challenge Ireland faces in the European context is to balance the need for institutional reform as well as the attractions of flexibility (enhanced co-operation) with the risk that a large state *directoire* would become established. A *directoire* of the large member states would effectively revoke one of the most valuable functions that integration plays for small members: restraining larger member states that, all else being equal, would

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<sup>12</sup> The following institutional reforms were agreed in the Treaty of Nice (2000; all details from Ireland 2001). *European Commission*: A two-step reform based on the speed and scope of enlargement. First, from 2005 each member state (including any member that may have joined between the present and 2005) will have the right to nominate one Commissioner. This means that the member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom) that currently nominate two will lose one, but the Treaty implies no change for Ireland in this respect. Second, when the European Union consists of 27 member states they will nominate Commissioners on a strictly equal basis (the size of the Commission at that future point in time is yet to be decided, but will be smaller than 27). *Council of Ministers*: Regardless of any future enlargement all member state governments will continue to be represented in the Council, which is nevertheless increasingly relying on qualified majority voting. The Treaty of Nice extended qualified majority voting to more than thirty new policies, and also set out a new vote re-weighting model that takes into account enlargement. Presently Ireland has 3 of 87, or 3.4 per cent, of the Council votes (Council decisions currently require 62 out of 87, or 71.3 per cent, of votes). The Treaty of Nice sets out that from 2005, in a European Union of 15, Council decisions will require 169 votes out of 237 (71.3 per cent) comprising two thirds of member states. Ireland will have 7, or 2.95 per cent, of the votes, which are distributed on the basis of population size. In an enlarged future Union of 27 member states a Council decision will require 255 votes out of 345 (73.9 per cent) and as the Union moves from 15 to 26 member states these formulae will be adjusted appropriately. Ireland's vote weight in a Union of 27 is estimated to be 2.03 per cent, or 7 votes. *European Parliament*: The European Parliament currently has 626 seats of which 15 are Irish. The current Parliament session (1999-2004) will be unaffected by the Treaty of Nice, which caps the size of the European Parliament in a European Union of 27 at 72 seats, of which Ireland will have 12 (a decrease from 2.4 to 1.6 per cent). There are additional interim arrangements that will come into effect in the 2004-2009 Parliament session, whereby any new members will participate in the 2004 elections according to the revised distribution of seats.

not need to take small state concerns into account. That was effectively the situation between Ireland and the UK between 1922 and 1973. To lose the real importance as well as the symbolism of not being at the table where decisions are made would be a serious blow to the rationale for Irish membership. The effect would be especially poignant if it coincided with Ireland's becoming a net contributor to the Community budget (regardless of the continued advantages of having access to the single market). In this type of scenario one or more Irish parties might rate electoral success above weak Europeanist instincts and gamble that public opinion contains untapped Euroscepticism. If the sort of scenario painted here were to become a reality, then the Responsible Party Model would have been shown to function inasmuch as a party and a partisan change of heart would coincide. It would not, however, imbue the European Union with any more legitimacy than it has had to date, since the attitude congruence would be against rather than in favour of Europe.

Since the Amsterdam Treaty, prominent politicians whose parties have pristinely pro-European profiles have made mildly questioning speeches on Europe and the Irish media were by and large only too happy to exaggerate the degree of Euroscepticism expressed in these speeches, which was mild. (In contrast, at around the same time, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern TD made a wholly conventional (in the Irish context) speech about Europe with the explicit aspiration of starting a public debate in Ireland (Ahern 2000a). Nothing happened). The first to cause controversy was the Tanaiste and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, the Progressive Democrat leader Mary Harney. The central message of her mildly critical speech was that apart from the benefits Ireland has derived from its European partners and Ireland's geographical connection with Europe, spiritually Ireland is much closer to the United States. In particular she admired the United States' economic model, based in the "rugged individualism of the original frontiersmen, an economic model that is heavily based on enterprise and incentive on individual effort and with limited government intervention" (Harney 2000:1). The European model, meanwhile, was characterised in the speech as based in strong concern for social harmony and inclusion to be achieved through high levels of

taxation and regulation. The Tanaiste did not deny that Ireland's membership of the European Union was a crucial part in Ireland's economic success, but highlighted the importance of being able to take key economic decisions nationally. On this basis she argued (unusually in the Irish context) that a more centralised or a federal Europe would not be in Ireland's interests, and continued to say that:

The fact is that Europe is not America and never will be. The people of Europe are not united by common language, common history and common tradition the way that Americans are. During the next five years, for instance, the process of enlargement is likely to add a further half-a-dozen working languages to the European Union...I believe in a Europe of independent states, not a United States of Europe. (Harney 2000:2).

The Tanaiste clearly had not grasped that in order to enlarge – her speech was very supportive of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe - without imploding in the process the Union must integrate further than what is currently the case. It was never a question of “widen or deepen” but “deepen in order to widen.” More importantly in the current context, it is clear that Europeanist arguments cut no ice with her.

On 18 September the same year, the Minister for Arts, Heritage, the Gaeltacht and the Islands, Fianna Fail's Sile De Valera, followed suit in a speech delivered at the Boston College, Massachusetts. In fact, the speech was not in any way anti-European. It is a measure of how ingrained the acceptance of pro-European statements had become that a speech stating that the European Union “is not the cornerstone of what our nation is and should be” (De Valera 2000:1) nevertheless was treated as anti-European ranting. The Minister can not be faulted for advocating a “future in which Ireland will exercise a more vigilant, a more questioning attitude to the European Union” (De Valera 2000:2) if at least that would dispel some of the public Uninterest. She continued to remark that in embracing Europe Ireland seemed at times to forget its very close ties with the United States. Strikingly, these two prominent Irish Ministers started to spell out apparent tensions between the European Union and ties with the United States at

precisely the time that the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, started to reframe his country's relationship with Europe and with the United States. In Ireland no contradiction has traditionally been perceived. The British perception, in contrast, has been that of a choice between Britain's elusive (not to say imaginary) special relationship with the United States and being in Europe. Tony Blair's message has been, however, that his country should be the bridge between Europe and the United States, that the United Kingdom is a more valuable ally to the United States if it is at the heart of Europe.

Meanwhile on the Irish political scene, fellow politicians from other parties responded publicly to the Tanaiste's and the Minister for Arts, Heritage, the Gaeltacht and the Islands' speeches in the Irish print media. Fine Gael's Gay Mitchell TD, a former Junior Minister for European Affairs, wrote in the *Irish Times* that through Europe Irish men and women "have choices that are unprecedented in Irish history" ("Wandering Ministers' Solo Runs on EU a Liability" *Irish Times* 23/9/2000). In contrast, in the "good old days" Ireland had no say in decisions made by for instance the UK and Germany but Ireland suffered the consequences all the same – in fact suffered them more, because a place at the European table means Ireland has influenced their decisions since 1973. Moreover, Mr Mitchell TD pointed out that in his view integration is quite distinct from assimilation, which requires peoples to become uniform and indistinguishable. To him integration was about "different traditions, religions, and cultures living side by side by agreement and with mutual respect...based on the reality that in our increasingly complex world we can tackle certain issues only by working more closely together" (ibid.). The same paper carried an article by the President of the Labour party and Member of European Parliament for Labour, Proinsias De Rossa TD ("Government Detached from European Ideas" *Irish Times*, 23/9/2000). He agreed with Minister De Valera that more vigilance in Ireland regarding developments in Europe would be positive, but ruled out any distancing from Europe on Ireland's part:

As Europe evolves and as Ireland's role within it changes, we need to be much more thoughtful and proactive about how best our interests are articulated and advanced. For Sile De Valera (and Mary Harney) to string together a set of simplistic clichés about a “United States of Europe” and EU regulations impinging of Ireland's identity shows the extent to which this government is detached from European thinking and cannot be relied upon to represent Ireland's interests in Europe. (“Government Detached from European Ideas.” *Irish Times*, 23/9/2000).

Clearly the two responses to the two speeches were made with at least half a mind on party-political point scoring but this in itself is an interesting observation. Apart from spats in the Oireachtas and in the media over Irish neutrality in the context of European integration, parties in general and Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats in particular have not tended to politicise Europe in this way. Once the Harney and De Valera speeches were no longer in the media headlines or opinion columns Taoiseach Ahern delivered another major speech on the European Union. It briefly referred to the controversy over his government partners' speeches, but reverted to form by praising all aspects of Ireland's European experience since 1973. Interestingly (with hindsight) he remarked that “as a small state, Ireland values the key role of the Commission, as holder of the right of initiative and as guardian of the Treaties and of the common interest” (Ahern 2000b:9). A matter of months later the European Commission's criticism and ultimate reprimand of the Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat government's December 2000 budget flagged what may be a new beginning in Ireland's relationship with Europe in general and with the European Commission in particular. The European Commission has been widely viewed in Ireland as a small state's best friend. In February 2000 the Commissioner who admonished Ireland later in the year, Mr Pedro Solbes, spoke in Dublin about the Commission's two roles in managing economic and monetary union (Solbes 2000). The first role is to safeguard the provisions of the Treaties and the second role is multilateral surveillance of the member state economies. With respect to the second role, he commented that “what is needed is a continuation of stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and energetic economic reforms to boost the dynamism of

Europe's economy" (ibid:7). As if prescient of what was to follow less than a year later, he added: "The European Commission is determined to play its role" (ibid:7). In January 2001 he advised the Fianna Fail Minister for Finance, Charles McCreevy TD, to rewrite his budget in such a way as to take money out of the Irish economy. The Irish response was curt. The Commission should mind the limits of its competencies. Rather than reprimanding Ireland, the Commission might instruct other member states to follow the Irish example for outstanding economic performance ("McCreevy Says EU Critics are Jealous." *Irish Times*, 26/1/2001; "Mild-Mannered Pedro is Not for Turning." *Irish Independent*, 27/1/2001; "EU Censure Beggars Belief." *Sunday Business Post*, 28/1/2001; "Last Thing We Want is a Slagging Match with EU." *Irish Independent*, 2/2/2001). The *Irish Times* reported an opinion poll taken after the Commission storm had started to blow, to the effect that 71 per cent of the Irish people thought the budget was "good for the country" ("Coalition would Win Election, According to Poll." *Irish Times* 26/1/2001). Many of these media reports also referred to a widely held suspicion that the real source of the European Commission's annoyance was Ireland's low corporate taxation rates, whereby Ireland attracted foreign direct investment in a manner considered unfair among its European partners. Former Fine Gael Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald warned against unnecessarily aggravating the Europeans in the pursuit of the Irish interest, since goodwill is essentially what Ireland has traded on since 1973 ("Cock-a-Snook Stance Means Less EU Goodwill for Us." *Irish Times*, 27/1/2001).

In each of the three years prior to the budget row the Irish government had signed up to broad economic guidelines which they subsequently ignored in the national budgets. While the European Commission may have been correct to respond as it did to the Irish budget from the point of view of managing the performance of the single currency (if nothing else, as a warning to other member states), its action did not show political prudence. The European Commission needs the Irish government to ratify the Treaty of Nice, and since the Irish ratification process is through referendum an "us versus them" mentality among the public would not be helpful a few months before the referendum. This is especially true at

a time when the material reasons for pro-European Irish Pragmatism vis-à-vis Europe are increasingly disappearing and Ireland's status in Europe is changing from net recipient to net contributor. Tanaiste Mary Harney pointed out the link between the budget reprimand and the Irish Nice referendum in an article in the *Financial Times*, which presumably has a larger circulation across European capitals than Irish newspapers ("Ireland's Misunderstood Budget." *Financial Times* 5/2/2001). This did not endear the Irish position to anyone else, and on the eve of the Economic and Finance Council in Brussels on 12 February, 2001, when the Commission's recommendation to reprimand Ireland would be agreed, the *Financial Times* reported that:

Ironically, there is among finance officials some sympathy for the Irish position that a small, successful, open economy should not be judged by the same standards as a large member of the euro-zone where an expansionary budget would have obvious spill-over effects. But Mr McCreevy's uncompromising refusal to change his budget stance since first warned by the Commission last month appears to have persuaded his fellow finance ministers that failure to act would set a dangerous precedent. ("EU to Order Ireland to Change Budget." *Financial Times* 11/2/2001).

Had the Irish government's stance been more conciliatory in tone (if not in content) it may have had an easier time pleasing its various domestic constituencies as well as its European partners. As the media reported growing annoyance in Dublin and in Brussels, the various Irish contributors to the debate more or less forced the Commission to view its position as a matter of principle, despite the limited impact the Irish budget would have on the Euro-zone. In the event, the Economic and Finance Council did act on the Commission's recommendation to reprimand Ireland for the allegedly expansionist and pro-cyclical budget which was thought to be inconsistent with the European Union's broad economic policy guidelines. The Irish Minister present at the Council (Charles McCreevy) disputed the Commission's and Council's interpretation of the Irish budget throughout.

The Irish government was technically within its rights to make decisions about its national budget, though the budget did not happen to be in the spirit of the country's commitment to maintaining stability in the single currency area. In the



larger scheme of things the significance of the whole affair may turn out to be a signal of Irish ambivalence. The ambivalence is that while Irish governments have rarely missed an opportunity to remind its partners of their responsibility vis-à-vis regional development, within Ireland the notion that Ireland has any duty vis-à-vis Europe is anathema. Furthermore and in the same vein, the row politicised Europe in Ireland in a highly unusual manner, for Ireland. In the hours after the Council meeting the Irish national broadcast media reported prominent Fine Gael and Labour members' statements to the effect that the government in general and Minister McCreevy in particular had unnecessarily embarrassed Ireland, depleting Ireland's goodwill and credit in Europe.<sup>13</sup>

The question is whether this signals a brave new world for Ireland in the European Union, and particularly for Irish attitudes towards it, or whether it will turn out to be just so much blustering on the part of prominent cabinet ministers. In a timely speech on the theme of Irish constitutionalism and European Union the Attorney General, former Progressive Democrat TD Michael McDowell, set out what he saw as the two options before Ireland – crucially, neither included any element of antagonism. The first option was to take a “passive and reactive approach that surrenders to others the role of making proposals while we pass judgement on them” (McDowell 2001:5). This is essentially the Irish approach to date. The second option was to “develop our own concept of the future of the European Union which is consistent with the wishes of the Irish people and to actively advocate that model among the other member states and candidate countries” (*ibid*:5). On the basis of this research it is hard to imagine anything as deliberate as an Irish model of Europe, especially if it is to be consistent with Irish public opinion. After all, Irish public opinion, while generally positively inclined, is shrouded in Uninterest.

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<sup>13</sup>Labour MEP Proinsias De Rossa and Fine Gael TD Alan Dukes made these statements to RTÉ, reported on 12 February, 2001.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

This case study of Ireland, using the ideal type approach to examining the Responsible Party Model and European integration, has revealed evidence in favour of the Model. The nature of this evidence, specifically the fact that party-partisan correspondence was Pragmatic, that the Europeanism among parties was quite weakly rooted, and that partisans were Uninterested, has the implication that European integration lacks support deriving from a stable source. As a consequence support is likely to evaporate in times of difficulty – when the Union is likely to need support more than at any other time.

Meanwhile, Ireland's status in the European Union is certain to undergo very significant changes in the near- to medium-term future, which may change parties' and partisans' ideal type profiles. Whether this will enhance or diminish the attitude congruence observed for each dyad is hard not to say impossible to predict – but the early signs are that for the first time there is political currency in Euroscepticism in Ireland.

Whatever the future may hold for Ireland in the European Union (probably not Europeanism, but possibly anti-European Pragmatism or even Nationalism, and continued Uninterest), this study has not found the Responsible Party Model to be malfunctioning as badly as the existing literature contends. However, this case study of Ireland 1987-1998 gives limited comfort against claims that the European project is élitist and fundamentally lacking in legitimacy inasmuch as ordinary people have no sense of ownership of it. There is nothing in this research to suggest that they do – was Fianna Fail Taoiseach Bertie Ahern aware of the magnitude of the challenge he set himself and the Irish political establishment when making the following comment in March 2000:

The challenge for me as Leader and for other political leaders and opinion formers in society in Ireland is to maintain momentum behind the European project and to ensure that the Union's development is relevant to the interests and aspirations of our citizens. (Ahern 2000a:10).

Appendix Chapter 3. Estimating Party Positions

- i) *Distribution of Oireachtas Seats at the Times of the 1987, 1992 and 1998 Amendment of the Constituion Bills (Tenth, Eleventh, Eighteenth).*
- ii) *Coding Scheme Categories and Computer Search Words*
- iii) *Coding Illustrations*
- iv) *Validity and Reliability*

**i) *Distribution of Oireachtas Seats 1987, 1992, 1998***

| <b>Party</b>                 | <b>1987<sup>1</sup></b> |               | <b>1992</b> |               | <b>1998</b> |               |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
|                              | <i>Dail</i>             | <i>Seanad</i> | <i>Dail</i> | <i>Seanad</i> | <i>Dail</i> | <i>Seanad</i> |
| <i>Fianna Fail</i>           | 81                      | 30            | 77          | 32            | 77          | 29            |
| <i>Fine Gael</i>             | 51                      | 16            | 55          | 14            | 54          | 16            |
| <i>Labour</i>                | 12                      | 3             | 15          | 4             | 17          | 4             |
| <i>Democratic Left</i>       | --                      | --            | --          | --            | 4           | --            |
| <i>Progressive Democrats</i> | 14                      | --            | 6           | 3             | 4           | 4             |
| <i>Green Party</i>           | --                      | --            | 1           | --            | 2           | --            |
| <i>Sinn Fein</i>             | --                      | --            | --          | --            | 1           | --            |
| <i>Workers' Party</i>        | 4                       | --            | 7           | --            | 1           | --            |
| <i>Independents</i>          | 4                       | 11            | 4           | 7             | 6           | --            |
| <i>Dem. Socialist Party</i>  | 1                       | --            | 1           | --            | --          | --            |
| <i>Others</i>                |                         |               |             |               |             |               |
| <b>Total</b>                 | 166                     | 60            | 166         | 60            | 166         | 60            |

(Sources: Coakley 1990; Gallagher and Laver 1993; Nealon 1997; Coakley and Gallagher 1999)

<sup>1</sup> These figures show the composition of the 24<sup>th</sup> Dail, subsequent to the 10 March 1987 election. Elections to the Seanad must take place within 90 days of the dissolution of the Dail, but they had not yet taken place when the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution Act passed through the Oireachtas so these figures show the composition of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Seanad.

ii) **Coding Scheme Categories and Computer Search Words**

“\*” = search for word stem, with any or no ending.

| <u>Categories</u>                       | <u>Computer Search Words</u> |
|---|------------------------------|
| <b><u>Casedata</u></b>                  |                              |
| <b><u>Year</u></b>                      |                              |
| 1987                                    |                              |
| 1992                                    |                              |
| 1998                                    |                              |
| <b><u>Party</u></b>                     |                              |
| Fianna Fail                             |                              |
| Fianna Fail Speakers (FF1-FF64)         |                              |
| Fine Gael                               |                              |
| Fine Gael Speakers (FG1-FG52)           |                              |
| Labour                                  |                              |
| Labour Speakers (L1-L20)                |                              |
| Other                                   |                              |
| Other Party Speakers (O1-O34)           |                              |
| <b><u>Institutions/Policies</u></b>     |                              |
| <b><u>European Commission</u></b>       |                              |
| Pro                                     | Commission*                  |
| Con                                     |                              |
| Neutral                                 |                              |
| <b><u>European Council</u></b>          |                              |
| Pro                                     | Council*                     |
| Con                                     |                              |
| Neutral                                 |                              |
| <b><u>European Parliament</u></b>       |                              |
| Pro                                     | Parliament*                  |
| Con                                     |                              |
| Neutral                                 |                              |
| <b><u>Court</u></b>                     |                              |
| <b><u>European Court of Justice</u></b> |                              |
| Pro                                     | Court*                       |
| Con                                     |                              |
| Neutral                                 |                              |
| <b><u>National Court</u></b>            |                              |
| Pro                                     |                              |
| Con                                     |                              |
| Neutral                                 |                              |
| <b><u>Bank</u></b>                      |                              |
| <b><u>European Central Bank</u></b>     |                              |
| Pro                                     | Bank* ECB*                   |
| Con                                     |                              |

| <b>Categories</b>                            | <b>Computer Search Words</b>            |
|--|---|
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b>National Central Bank</b>                 |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b><u>National Parliament</u></b>            | Parliament*                             |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b><u>Immigration/Asylum</u></b>             | Immigration* Asylum* Refugee*           |
| <b>European Immigration/Asylum</b>           |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b>National Immigration/Asylum</b>           |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b><u>Justice and Home Affairs</u></b>       | Judicia* Third                          |
| <b>European Justice and Home Affairs</b>     |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b>National Justice and Home Affairs</b>     |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b><u>Market</u></b>                         | Single Common Internal Market*<br>Trad* |
| <b>Single Market</b>                         |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b>National Market</b>                       |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b><u>Social and Employment Policy</u></b>   | Social Employ*                          |
| <b>European Social and Employment Policy</b> |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Con</i>                                   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>                               |   |
| <b>National Social and Employment Policy</b> |   |
| <i>Pro</i>                                   |   |

| <b>Categories</b>  | <b>Computer Search Word</b>   |
|--|---|
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Currency</u></b>                                     | EMU* Currenc*   |
| <b><i>Single Currency</i></b>                              |   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><i>National Currency</i></b>                            |   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Agricultural and Fisheries Policies</u></b>          | CAP* Agricult* Fish*  |
| <b><i>Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies</i></b>   |   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><i>National Agricultural and Fisheries Policies</i></b> |   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Structural Instruments</u></b>                       | Fund* FEOGA   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Community Budget</u></b>                             | Budget* Ceiling* Contribut* Receiv*<br>Recipient* Agenda*   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Enlargement</u></b>                                  | Enlarg* Expand* East* Polish Poland<br>Hungar* Czezh<br>Slovak* Sloven* Malt* Turk* Roman*<br>Bulgar* Latvia* Lithu* Eston* |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Environmental Policy</u></b>                         | Environment* Pollut* Sustainable<br>Indust* Ecolo*  |
| <b><i>European Environmental Policy</i></b>                |   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><i>National Environmental Policy</i></b>                |   |
| <i>Pro</i>   |   |
| <i>Con</i>   |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>   |   |
| <b><u>Consumer Policy</u></b>                              | Consum*   |
| <b><i>European Consumer Policy</i></b>                     |   |

| <b>Categories</b>   | <b>Computer Search Word</b>   |
|---|---|
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b>National Consumer Policy</b>                             |   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><u>Foreign, Security and Defence Policy</u></b>          | Foreign Security Defence Neutral*                                       |
| <b><i>European FSD Policy</i></b>                           | Art* CFSP Peace* United UN Western<br>WEU Nato* Nuclear Troop* Militar* |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><i>National Foreign, Security and Defence Policy</i></b> |   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><u>Borders</u></b>                                       | Schengen Border* Travel*  |
| <b><i>European Borders</i></b>                              |   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><i>National Borders</i></b>                              |   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><u>Constitution</u></b>                                  | Constitutio* Federal*   |
| <b><i>European Constitution</i></b>                         |   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><i>National Constitution</i></b>                         |   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><u>Values/Community</u></b>                              |   |
| <b><u>Identity</u></b>                                      | Communit* People* Feel* Partner*  |
| <b><i>European Identity</i></b>                             | Identit* Citizen*   |
| <i>Pro</i>  |   |
| <i>Con</i>  |   |
| <i>Neutral</i>  |   |
| <b><i>National Identity</i></b>                             |   |
| <b><i>Pro</i></b>   |   |

| <b>Categories</b>             | <b>Computer Search Words</b>  |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b><u>Liberty/Freedom</u></b> | Libert* Freedom*              |
| <b>European</b>               |                               |
| <b>Liberty/Freedom</b>        |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b>National</b>               |                               |
| <b>Liberty/Freedom</b>        |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b><u>Justice</u></b>         | Just*                         |
| <b>European Justice</b>       |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b>National Justice</b>       |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b><u>Democracy</u></b>       | Democra*                      |
| <b>European Democracy</b>     |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b>National Democracy</b>     |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b><u>Equality</u></b>        | Equal*                        |
| <b>European Equality</b>      |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b>National Equality</b>      |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |
| <b><u>Values Other</u></b>    | Fundamental Value* Principle* |
| <b>European Values Other</b>  |                               |
| <i>Pro</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Con</i>                    |                               |
| <i>Neutral</i>                |                               |



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**Categories****Computer Search Words****National Values Other***Pro**Con**Neutral***Peace**

Peace\*

**European Peace***Pro**Con**Neutral***National Peace***Pro**Con**Neutral***Output****Benefit**

Interest\* Good\* Benefit\* Gain\*

Impro\*

**European Benefit***Pro**Con**Neutral***National Benefit***Pro**Con**Neutral*

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Searches were not case sensitive. Asterisks ("\*") indicate that all occurrences of a word stem were found in the search, irrespective of the ending of the word.

### **iii) Coding Illustrations**

#### **Illustration 1.**

##### **Text Unit:**

Ireland is already playing an outstanding role in peace-keeping in some of the world's most notorious trouble spots, like Lebanon and Yugoslavia. We believe, therefore, that it is essential that Ireland be willing to play its part, in time, in the formulation of and any eventual common security and defence arrangements for the new Europe of 1993 and thereafter. But those developments are a long way off, if they happen at all.

##### **Codings:**

*/casedata/year/1992:* The text unit is from 1992.

*/casedata/party/other/o22:* The speaker is in the Other Party group, and is Mr. B. Molloy (Progressive Democrats).

*/institutions\_policies/fsd\_policy/national/pro:* Supportive of national foreign, security and defence policy.

*/institutions\_policies/fsd\_policy/european/pro:* Supportive of European foreign, security and defence policy.

#### **Illustration 2.**

##### **Text Unit:**

The social provisions of the EC Treaty will also be strengthened. In particular I wish to draw the attention of the House to the new treaty provisions on social exclusion. The inclusion of these provisions, which reflects a proposal by the Irish delegation, will allow the Union undertake actions of particular value, such as incentive measures and pilot projects in relation to social exclusion.

##### **Codings:**

*/casedata/year/1992:* The text unit is from 1992.

*/casedata/party/ff/ff54:* The speaker is a Fianna Fail member, and is Mr. D. Andrews.

*/institutions\_policies/social\_employment\_policy/european/pro:* Supportive of European social and employment policy.

#### **Illustration 3.**

##### **Text Unit:**

Despite some advances, therefore, the Amsterdam Treaty has failed to remedy the anti-democratic nature of the European Union and has failed to make substantial gains for those living in the EU. This lack of democracy and accountability in the EU will be a point of criticism by the Green Party when considering a number of other areas of the Amsterdam Treaty.

##### **Codings:**

*/casedata/year/1998:* The text unit is from 1998.

*/casedata/party/other/o29:* The speaker is in the Other Party group, and is Mr. J. Gormley (Green Party).

*/values\_community/democracy/european/con:* Critical about the un-democratic nature of the European Union.

#### **Illustration 4.**

##### **Text Unit:**

We are fully conscious of the benefits that can flow to Europe as a whole from the realisation of an internal market of 320 million people - one of the richest and largest in the world - and from the capacity to narrow the technological gap between the Community and its major international competitors, namely, the US and Japan. However, we must make every effort to ensure that these benefits are spread right across the member states and do not accrue disproportionately to the more central regions of the Community.

##### **Codings:**

*/casedata/year/1987:* The text unit is from 1987

*/casedata/party/ff/ff1:* The speaker is a Fianna Fail member, and is Mr. C. Haughey.

*/institutions\_policies/market/european/pro:* Supportive of the single market.

*/institutions\_policies/structural\_instruments/european/pro:* Supportive of European redistribution.

*/output/benefit/national/pro*: Supportive of European integration to reap national benefits.  
*/output/benefit/european/pro*: Supportive of European integration to reap regional, European benefits.

iv) *Validity and Reliability*

There are various aspects of validity and reliability in social research, or, differently put, different forms of validity and reliability, some of which were considered in a general sense in earlier sections of this chapter (e.g., the use of political documents to estimate party positions in Political Science). The analysis presented in this chapter proceeded on the basis of the claim that documentary content analysis can give empirical estimates that meet reasonable demands of validity and reliability. The high degree of cohesiveness between speakers belonging to the same party goes some way towards validating these measurements, too, given the view that parties are not internally divided on European issues.

Face validity was broached in an earlier section of this chapter. I addressed the inherent face validity problems by coding only explicit statements. That this solution to face validity is not problem free has already been acknowledged, but it gives credential to the claim that the measurements do indeed measure that which they are expected to measure. Arguably the current analysis has content validity;<sup>2</sup> in fact the research design faulted on the side of caution in that many coding scheme categories were hardly mentioned at all in the Oireachtas documents. It can be particularly difficult for documentary research results to obtain construct validity.<sup>3</sup> It has been noted elsewhere that “documentary accounts sometimes produce different answers to important questions than surveys or government data” (Hodson 1999:63). There are some other measurements against which the results of this study may be compared. Nevertheless, available external constructs of Irish party attitudes toward European integration (which are the best standard to which I can appeal here) do not suggest that the present measurements have poor validity. First, two expert surveys measuring Irish party positions, as perceived by academics whose interest was in Irish politics, carried out in 1992 and 1997, do not contradict the findings of the present study.<sup>4</sup> These surveys were based on direction and

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<sup>2</sup> Content validity refers to whether measurements cover all relevant aspects of the concept/object that is being studied.

<sup>3</sup> Construct validity refers to whether measurements compare against other, known measurements of the same thing.

<sup>4</sup> The expert survey was carried out by Laver (1994), and is based on 31 postal surveys to academics active in the study of Irish politics at the time.

salience measurements of Irish parties' attitudes towards European integration (and other policy areas). On a scale from 1 to 20, where 1 = "oppose close relationship with European Community" and 20 = "Promote close relationship with European Community" mean expert responses were reported as follows. Fine Gael, Fianna Fail and Labour were perceived as pro-European, as were the Progressive Democrats which were included in the Other group in this study. Additional parties that were included in the 1992 expert survey were closer to the "oppose" end of the scale: Sinn Fein, the Workers' Party, the Greens and Democratic Left (all of which were part of Other Parties in this study). Broadly, this confirms the present findings from 1992. In the 1997 expert survey Sinn Fein, Democratic Left and the Greens were again less favourably inclined toward Europe than the three major parties, whereas the Progressive Democrats were as supportive of Europe as any of the major parties. This broadly supports the present findings of party positions in 1998, too.

In another expert survey experts placed Irish and other European parties on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = "strongly opposed" and 7 = "strongly in favour" (Ray 1999). The Progressive Democrats were highly in favour every year (between 6.20 and 6.50), as were Fine Gael (between 6.29 and 6.57) and Fianna Fail (between 5.00 and 5.71). Labour (between 4.00 and 4.88) was between these parties and the small parties that have been called Other parties in this study. Ray's expert survey also asked about the salience of European integration and internal party dissent over it. These scales ranged from 1 to 5. Europe was most important to the Progressive Democrats (between 3.57 and 3.83) and Labour (between 2.83 and 3.43). There is continuity and change between this survey and the one referred to directly above with respect to salience (though probably the same academics responded to both). Internal dissent was deemed highest by the experts in Labour and the Greens, but in all cases was deemed low by the original researcher.

In terms of direction and internal cohesion these external measurements do seem to give the present analysis construct validity, broadly speaking. Salience is trickier to determine. Laver and Ray, in their respective studies, found that there was little difference between most parties in this regard, whereas the present study

found some parties to produce more text units than others, by substantive margins. To an extent this has to do with the Oireachtas standing orders, which restrict speaking time. The expert survey respondents' judgements were not subject to any comparable restrictions. Perhaps it would be to ask too much of the data to generate comparable results under such different conditions.<sup>5</sup>

A validity issue that arises when assessing the evolution of party positions over time is that the measurements derive from parliamentary debates on different Treaties (rather than three debates on the same Treaty). The ability to compare what, say, Fianna Fail thought about European Institutions/Policies in 1987 and 1992 is to some extent complicated by the fact that strictly speaking, the Oireachtas debated three different Treaties. Accordingly, the validity of comparisons derived from these measurements is not straightforward. However, it would be facile to assume that comparing three measurements derived from three Oireachtas debates on one and the same Treaty at three points in time would be any more straightforward. The reason for this, which most chapters of this study stress, is that European integration is a moving target and that therefore, *necessarily*, so are attitudes toward it. To develop attitudinal measurements derived from three debates on the earliest Treaty, the Single European Act, would miss out on all the new developments introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty. Many of these were completely unforeseen in 1987, and many that were not were nevertheless not part of the Single European Act. For instance, examples of developments that make the European Union of 1998 qualitatively different from the European Community of 1987 include concluded and pending enlargements, the reunification of Germany, the single currency, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Europe's external identity and capabilities, Justice and Home Affairs co-operation, the distribution of powers between European institutions - and between European and national institutions, and European citizenship. If the three measurements of say, European Institutions/Policies only measured that aspect of Europe such as it was in 1987 then its validity in 1992 and 1998 would be highly

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<sup>5</sup> Criterion validity, whereby measurements are expected to correspond to some known, objective standard or criterion can not be explored here due to the lack of any known, objective standard or criterion.

questionable indeed because Europe itself is a moving target. Of course, this argument in defence of the measurements used here does not make it any easier to compare the evolution of party positions, it merely points out the impossibility of taking any other approach.<sup>6</sup>

A difficult issue that nevertheless pertains to the validity of salience measurements was broached earlier in this chapter, namely whether the assumption holds that authors/speakers allocate more space to that which is important to them. If an issue is highly important but too sensitive to bring up, then its importance would not be accurately reflected in salience coding. Alternatively, an issue might be crucial but so obvious and uncontroversial that it literally goes without saying. The outcome is that this issue, too, would be given an inappropriately low salience score. In both types of situation the validity of the measurement would be negatively affected. The decision to code only explicit mentions may exacerbate the possibility that under certain conditions measurements underestimate salience, but, as already resolved above, on balance the problems involved in reading between the lines have been deemed to be greater than the problems involved in not doing so. The doubt about the assumption that space allocation reflects salience arose especially in relation to National Output. If states participate in European integration because of expected material outcomes, then surely National Output would have turned out to be a great deal more salient than it did? Certainly, there was nothing in this research to suggest that states participate because they feel European or out of a sense of European good; European Values/Community and European Output were not salient dimensions either. If the “real” salience of National Output is higher than what has been observed here, then the correspondence between it and European Institutions/Policies and would be much improved, giving all parties a sharper Pragmatic profile. The data does not make it possible to do more than suggest the possibility that National Output in particular and possibly other ideal type dimensions were underestimated in terms of salience.

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<sup>6</sup> It is impossible for pragmatic as well as conceptual reasons. Pragmatically, it would not have been possible to take any other approach, since the Oireachtas did not debate the same Treaty three times. Conceptually, as pointed out above, measurements of “Europe” derived from three debates of the same Treaty would not capture what Europe was at each point in time.

The main reliability issue in this research is same-coder reliability (consistency in the coding procedure), and this aspect of the research benefited considerably from the decisions to code explicit mentions, and to undertake computer-supported coding. The combined effect was that it was possible to pull together all text units containing specified search words with much higher consistency than the human factor would otherwise have allowed (though searches were followed by manual checks for words with double meanings, etc.). This improved reliability by ensuring that all intended but no other text units were in each coding category. This was invaluable especially considering the length of the coding process. It is fair to say that as the coding process evolves informal coding habits develop, which may or may not enhance reliability. The ability to go back to coding categories and browse their contents acted as a self-regulatory constraint on a process that could take on a life of its own.



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***Appendix Chapter 4. Estimating Public Opinion***

***i) Eurobarometer Data.***

“X”: Identifies what scale(s) variables were part of; “(n)”: Number of observations (e.g. non-missing) before imputation.

“(1, 0, -1) etc.”: Values of recoded response categories.

“\*”: Included in Other Party category in the analysis, due to low number of observations.

“~”: Included in Not Partisan in the analysis.

| Survey Question  | Response Categories   | 1987(n) | 1992(n) | 1998(n) |
|--|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|
|  | Total:                | N=924   | N=765   | N=736   |
| <b><i>Partisanship</i></b>   |                       |         |         |         |
| If there were a general election tomorrow (say if contact is under 18 years: and if you had a vote), which party would you vote for? | Fianna Fail           | X(383)  | X(359)  | X(366)  |
|  | Fine Gael             | X(199)  | X(130)  | X(153)  |
|  | Labour                | X(51)   | X(90)   | X(82)   |
|  | Progressive Democrats | X(85)   | X(34)   | X(15)*  |
|  | Democratic Left       |         |         | X(4)*   |
|  | Greens                | X(5)*   | X(33)   | X(22)*  |
|  | Sinn Fein             |         | X(13)*  | X(16)*  |
|  | Workers’ Party        | X(29)*  | X(31)   | X(9)*   |
|  | New Agenda            |         | X(9)*   |         |
|  | Independent           |         |         | X(34)   |
|  | Other Party           | X(13)*  | X(17)*  | X(2)*   |
|  | Other Party (recoded) | X(47)   | X(39)   | X(68)   |
|  | Would vote blank      |         | X(2)~   |         |
|  | Would not vote        | X(31)~  | X(47)~  | X(33)~  |
|  | Undecided             | X(20)~  |         |         |
|  | Refused               | X(108)~ |         |         |
|  | Not Partisan          | X(159)  | X(49)   | X(33)   |
|  | Total                 | 924     | 765     | 736     |

| Survey Question  | Response Categories  | 1987(n) | 1992(n) | 1998(n) |
|--|--|---------|---------|---------|
| <b><u>Scale: Institutions/Policies</u></b>   |  |         |         |         |
| Has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Parliament?   | Generally favourable impression (1)<br>Neither favourable nor unfavourable (0)<br>Generally unfavourable impression (-1) | X(340)  | X(412)  |         |
| If there were tomorrow an election for the European Parliament, would you certainly go and vote, probably go and vote, probably would not go, or certainly would not go?   | Would certainly (1)<br>Would probably (.33)<br>Would probably not (-.33)<br>Would certainly not (-1)                     | X(940)  |         |         |
| How important would you say, is the European Parliament in the life of the European Community?   | Very important (1)<br>Important (.33)<br>Not very important (-.33)<br>Not important at all (-1)                          | X(831)  |         | X(728)  |
| When you hear about the European Community, what does that bring to your mind? Please tell me all the things that come to mind.  | European policy positive (1)<br>European policy negative (-1)  | X(1005) |         |         |
| One can imagine different developments happening in the European Community in the course of the next ten or fifteen years. Among the following ones (SHOW CARD), which development appears to you, personally, to be the most desirable? | One single country (1)<br>Federation (1)<br>Denser exchanges (1)<br>Continues as now (0)<br>Scrapped (-1)                | X(976)  |         |         |
| Would you personally prefer that the European Parliament played a more or a less important part than it does now?  | More important (1)<br>About the same (0)<br>Less Important (-1)  | X(706)  | X(754)  | X(704)  |

| Survey Question  | Response Categories  | 1987(n) | 1992(n) | 1998(n) |
|--|--|---------|---------|---------|
| Has this given you a good or bad impression of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community?   | Good impression (1)<br>Neither good nor bad (0)<br>Bad impression (-1)                             | X(317)  |         |         |
| In your opinion, how is the European Community, the European Unification advancing nowadays? Please look at these people (SHOW CARD). No. 1 is standing still, No. 7 is running as fast as possible. Which corresponds with best to what you would like?   | No.7 (1)<br>No. 6 (.66)<br>No. 5 (.33)<br>No. 4 (0)<br>No. 3 (-.33)<br>No.2 (-.66)<br>No. 1 (-1)   |         | X(782)  |         |
| Has what you have seen or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Commission?  | Generally favourable (1)<br>Neither favourable nor unfavourable (0)<br>Generally unfavourable (-1) |         | X(439)  |         |
| <sup>1</sup> Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the Irish government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the Irish government, and which do you think should be decided jointly within the European Community? | Jointly within the EC/EU (1)<br>National policy-making (-1)  |         | X(691)  | X(680)  |
| Security and defence   |  |         | X       |         |
| Protection of the environment  |  |         | X       | X       |
| Currency   |  |         | X       | X       |
| Co-operation with developing countries, the third world  |  |         | X       | X       |
| Health and social welfare  |  |         | X       | X       |
| Education  |  |         | X       | X       |
| Basic rules for broadcasting and press   |  |         | X       | X       |

<sup>1</sup> The specific policy areas were individual variables in the original data. Since a maximum of 31 variables can be used in a model for imputing missing values in Stata Intercooled 6.0, it was convenient to combine the policy areas into a single variable (**Policy**). Cronbach's alpha for the original **Policy** variables suggests this solution was reasonable. Cronbach's alpha 1992: .85. Cronbach's alpha 1998: .86.

| Survey Question  | Response Categories  | 1987 | 1992   | 1998 |
|--|--|------|--------|------|
| Scientific and technological research  |  |      | X      | X    |
| Rates of VAT   |  |      | X      | X    |
| Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community  |  |      | X      | X    |
| Participation of workers' representatives on company boards of directors   |  |      | X      |      |
| Protection of computer based information on individuals  |  |      | X      | X    |
| Industrial policy  |  |      | X      | X    |
| Cultural policy  |  |      | X      |      |
| Immigration policy   |  |      | X      |      |
| Rules for political asylum   |  |      | X      |      |
| Health and safety of workers   |  |      | X      |      |
| Dealing with unemployment  |  |      | X      | X    |
| Defence  |  |      |        | X    |
| Workers' rights vis-à-vis their employers  |  |      |        | X    |
| Agriculture and fishing policies   |  |      |        | X    |
| Supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties  |  |      |        | X    |
| Fight against drugs  |  |      |        | X    |
| Personally, would you say that the Single Market which will come about by the end of 1992, the beginning of 1993, makes you feel...  | Very hopeful (1)<br>Rather hopeful (0.33)<br>Rather fearful (-0.33)<br>Very fearful (-1) |      | X(811) |      |
| Overall, do you think that the completion of the Single European Market in the end of 1992, the beginning of 1993 will be – for people like you -a...  | Good thing (1)<br>Neither good nor bad (0)<br>Bad thing (-1)                             |      | X(828) |      |
| The European Community is committed to complementing the Single Market with a social dimension. This consists of a basic set of rules, for example, concerning the rights and duties of workers and employers in all the member countries. In your opinion, is such a European social dimension a good thing or a bad thing? | Good thing (1)<br>Neither good nor bad (0)<br>Bad thing (-1)                             |      | X(820) |      |
| Are you for or against the formation of a European Union with a European government  | For (1)  |      | X(658) |      |

| Survey Question  | Response Categories | 1987 | 1992   | 1998   |
|--|---------------------|------|--------|--------|
| responsible to the European Parliament?  | Against (-1)        |      |        |        |
| Following the meeting in Maastricht, the debate on European union continues. Could you please tell me whether you are in favour or not, of...  | In favour (1)       |      |        |        |
| As an Economic and Monetary Union, the European Community having a common European Central Bank, with the heads of national central banks on its board of directors                          | Not in favour (-1)  |      | X(736) |        |
| Within this European Economic and Monetary Union, a single currency replacing the different currencies of the Member States in five or six years time  |                     |      | X(792) |        |
| As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC   |                     |      | X(714) |        |
| As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence  |                     |      | X(748) |        |
| The European Parliament having the right to decide together with the Council of Ministers representing the national governments, on the legislation of the European Community                |                     |      | X(677) |        |
| <sup>2</sup> 1992: For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of them becoming part of the European Community, in the near future?  | In favour (1)       |      | X(647) | X(571) |
| 1998: Several countries have applied to become members of the European Union. For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it becoming part of the European Union? | Not in favour (-1)  |      |        |        |
| Austria  |                     |      | X      |        |
| Sweden   |                     |      | X      |        |
| Finland  |                     |      | X      |        |
| Norway   |                     |      | X      |        |
| Iceland  |                     |      | X      |        |
| Switzerland  |                     |      | X      |        |
| Malta  |                     |      | X      |        |
| Cyprus   |                     |      | X      |        |

<sup>2</sup> The specific applicant countries were individual variables in the original data. Since a maximum of 31 variables can be used in a model for imputing missing values in Stata Intercooled 6.0, it was convenient to combine them into a single variable (**Enlarg**). Cronbach's alpha for the original **Enlarg** variables suggests this solution was reasonable. Cronbach's alpha 1992: .91. Cronbach's alpha 1998: .98.

| Survey Question  | Response Categories  | 1987 | 1992 | 1998   |
|--|--|------|------|--------|
| Russia   |  |      | X    |        |
| Czech Republic   |  |      |      | X      |
| Slovakia   |  |      |      | X      |
| Poland   |  |      |      | X      |
| Hungary  |  |      |      | X      |
| Romania  |  |      |      | X      |
| Slovenia   |  |      |      | X      |
| Estonia  |  |      |      | X      |
| Latvia   |  |      |      | X      |
| Lithuania  |  |      |      | X      |
| Bulgaria   |  |      |      | X      |
| Cyprus   |  |      |      | X      |
| On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Ireland?  | Very satisfied (-1)<br>Fairly satisfied (-0.33)<br>Not very satisfied (0.33)<br>Not at all satisfied (1) |      |      | X(925) |
| And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?   | Very satisfied (1)<br>Fairly satisfied (0.33)<br>Not very satisfied (-0.33)<br>Not at all satisfied (-1) |      |      | X(756) |
| What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it             | For (1)<br>Against (-1)  |      |      |        |
| There has to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the Irish pound and all other currencies of the member states of the European Union |  |      |      | X(829) |
| With the European currency, the euro, there has to be a European Central Bank which is independent of the member states                      |  |      |      | X(750) |
| The member states of the European Union should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union                   |  |      |      | X(697) |
| The European Union member states should have a common defence and security policy  |  |      |      | X(715) |



| Survey Question   | Response Categories  | 1987   | 1992   | 1998   |
|---|--|--------|--------|--------|
| Thinking about the enlargement of the European union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements? | Agree (1)<br>Disagree (-1)   |        |        |        |
| After the enlargement to new countries, Ireland will become less important in Europe  |  |        |        | X(808) |
| The more member countries there are, the more unemployment there will be in Ireland   |  |        |        | X(713) |
| From now on, future member states should start to receive financial aid from the European Union to help them prepare to join  |  |        |        | X(728) |
| Once new countries have joined the European Union, Ireland will receive less financial aid from it  |  |        |        | X(810) |
| The more member countries within the European Union, the more important it will be in the world   |  |        |        | X(812) |
| With more member countries, Europe will be culturally richer  |  |        |        | X(790) |
| The next elections tot the European Parliament will take place in June 1999 in each member state.   | Yes (1)<br>Could not vote then (0)   |        |        |        |
| a) Did you vote in the last elections to the European parliament in June 1994?  | No(-1)   |        |        | X(935) |
| b) Do you intend to vote in the next European parliament elections in June 1999?  |  |        |        | X(845) |
| As a European citizen, do you think that the European Parliament protects your interests?   | Very well (1)<br>Fairly well (0.33)<br>Fairly badly (-0.33)<br>Very badly (-1) |        |        | X(724) |
| <b><u>Scale: Values/Community</u></b>   |  |        |        |        |
| <sup>3</sup> 1987, 1992: Does the though ever occur to you that you are not only Irish, but also a European? Does this happen...  | Often (1)<br>Sometimes (0)<br>Never (-1)                                       | X(984) | X(989) |        |
| 1992:Do you ever think of yourself as not only an Irish citizen, but also a citizen of Europe?  |  |        |        |        |
| In the near future, do you think of yourself as...  | Irish only (1)<br>Irish and European (0.33)                                    |        |        | X(968) |

<sup>3</sup> The 1992 survey asked two split samples these two very similar questions. For the present purposes the two split sample variables were combined into a single sample.

| Survey Question | Response Categories                              | 1987 | 1992 | 1998 |
|-----------------|--|------|------|------|
|                 | European and Irish (-0.33)<br>European only (-1) |      |      |      |

**Scale: National Output**

|   |  |        |        |        |
|---|--|--------|--------|--------|
| Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Ireland has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)? | Has benefited (1)<br>Has not benefited (-1)                  | X(906) | X(924) | X(909) |
| Generally speaking, do you think Ireland's membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a...   | Good thing (1)<br>Neither good nor bad (0)<br>Bad thing (-1) | X(846) | X(961) | X(938) |

**Scale: European Output**

|   |  |  |        |  |
|---|--|--|--------|--|
| Do you think that the Single European Market will have a positive effect, a negative effect or no effect at all on the countries of the European Community? | Positive effect (1)<br>No effect (0)<br>Negative effect (-1) |  | X(776) |  |
|---|--|--|--------|--|

**Scale: Salience Europe**

|   |                            |        |        |        |
|---|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio or TV, anything about the European Parliament? That is the parliamentary assembly of the European Community/Union  | Heard (1)<br>Not heard (0) | X(925) | X(922) | X(934) |
| In agricultural policy the European Community has for several years engaged in a policy known as the Common Agricultural Policy. Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on the radio or television something about the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community? | Heard (1)<br>Not heard (0) | X(875) |        |        |

| <b>Survey Question</b>   | <b>Response Categories</b>   | <b>1987</b> | <b>1992</b> | <b>1998</b> |
|--|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Have you recently heard or read something about the European Community (the EC) or the European Economic Community (EEC) or not?   | Heard (1)<br>Not heard (-1)  |             | X(976)      |             |
| Have you recently seen or heard, in the papers, on the radio or on the television, anything about the European Commission in Brussels, that is the Commission of the European Communities                                | Heard (1)<br>Not heard (0)   |             | X(953)      |             |
| Have you read in the papers, seen on television or heard anything about the Single European Market of 1992   | Heard (1)<br>Not heard (0)   |             | X(970)      |             |
| Do you know the name of the future European single currency?   | Correct (1)<br>Wrong (0)   |             |             | X(723)      |
| How well informed do you feel about the European currency, that is the Euro. Do you feel you are...  | Very well informed (1)<br>Well informed (.33)<br>Not very well informed (-.33)<br>Not at all informed (-1) |             |             | X(934)      |
| Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in European Community matters, do you feel that these are very important, important or not at all important for the future of Ireland and the Irish people? | Very important (1)<br>Important (0.33)<br>Not very important (-0.33)<br>Not at all important (-1)          |             | X(954)      |             |
| <b><i>Scale: Salience Politics</i></b>   |  |             |             |             |
| When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...  | From time to time (1)<br>Rarely (0)<br>Never (-1)  | X(997)      | X(995)      | X(991)      |
| When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?   | Frequently (1)<br>Occasionally (0)<br>Never (-1)   | X(994)      | X(989)      | X(987)      |

| Survey Question   | Response Categories  | 1987 | 1992 | 1998   |
|---|--|------|------|--------|
| <sup>4</sup> To what extent are you interested in politics these days? (SHOW CARD)  | A great deal (1)<br>To some extent (.33)<br>Not much (-.33)<br>Not at all (-1)                             |      |      | X(289) |
| How well informed do you feel about politics? (SHOW CARD)   | Very well informed (1)<br>Well informed (.33)<br>Not very well informed (-.33)<br>Not informed at all (-1) |      |      | X      |
| How much do you know about politics or political issues? Would you say you know..? (SHOW CARD)                              | Very much (1)<br>Much (.5)<br>Fairly much (0)<br>Rather less (-.5)<br>Nothing at all (-1)                  |      |      | X      |
| How much is your life influenced by politics? Would you say that the influence of politics on your life is..? (SHOW CARD)   | Very strong (1)<br>Fairly strong (.33)<br>Not strong at all (-.33)<br>Non-existent (-1)                    |      |      | X      |
| Do you think you should be more interested in politics than you are now, less interested, or is it just right as it is now? | More interested (1)<br>Just right (0)<br>Less interested (-1)  |      |      | X      |
| How important is each of the following to you personally? (SHOW CARD) Work, family, friends, leisure, politics, religion:   | Very important (1)<br>Quite important (.33)<br>Not very important (-.33)<br>Not at all important (-1)      |      |      | X      |

<sup>4</sup> These six variables were combined into a single variable to meet Stata's requirement that a maximum of 31 variables can be used in a model for imputing missing values. Cronbach's alpha for the original variables suggests this solution was reasonable. Cronbach's alpha: .69.

ii) *Scale Construction and Analysis*

As described in chapter 4, the Eurobarometer variables listed in this appendix (above) were used to develop scales estimating partisan group positions through analysis of variance. This part of the appendix contains further details about the scales and the analyses of variance not reported in chapter 4.

*F*: Oneway analysis of variance F statistic.

*Prob > F*: Level of significance of the F statistic.

*Alpha*: Cronbach's Alpha, test of scales' internal reliability.

*Items*: Number of Eurobarometer variables in scale.

|                    | <i>Institutions/<br/>Policies</i> | <i>Values/<br/>Community</i> | <i>National<br/>Output</i> | <i>European<br/>Output</i> | <i>Salience<br/>Politics</i> | <i>Salience<br/>Europe</i> |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <u>1987</u>        |                                   |                              |                            |                            |                              |                            |
| <i>F</i>           | 4.95                              | 2.86                         | 3.47                       |                            | 7.23                         | 7.64                       |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .0002                             | .0143                        | .0041                      |                            | .0000                        | .0000                      |
| <i>Alpha</i>       | .72                               |                              | .69                        |                            | .50                          | .48                        |
| <i>Items</i>       | 7                                 | 1                            | 2                          |                            | 2                            | 2                          |
| <u>1992</u>        |                                   |                              |                            |                            |                              |                            |
| <i>F</i>           | 2.77                              | .21                          | 1.17                       | 3.13                       | .77                          | 3.49                       |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .0075                             | .9841                        | .3184                      | .0029                      | .6131                        | .0011                      |
| <i>Alpha</i>       | .83                               |                              | .69                        |                            | .39                          | .66                        |
| <i>Items</i>       | 15                                | 1                            | 2                          | 1                          | 2                            | 5                          |
| <u>1998</u>        |                                   |                              |                            |                            |                              |                            |
| <i>F</i>           | 8.08                              | 1.36                         | 1.60                       |                            | 3.63                         | 2.23                       |
| <i>Prob &gt; F</i> | .0000                             | .2378                        | .1584                      |                            | .0030                        | .0501                      |
| <i>Alpha</i>       | .74                               |                              | .72                        |                            | .71                          | .43                        |
| <i>Items</i>       | 19                                | 1                            | 2                          |                            | 3                            | 3                          |

iii). *Mean Partisan Positions 1987-1998*

| <i>Party &amp; Year</i> | <i>Institutions/<br/>Policies</i> | <i>Values/<br/>Community</i> | <i>National<br/>Output</i> | <i>European<br/>Output</i> | <i>Salience<br/>Politics</i> | <i>Salience<br/>Europe</i> |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Total87</i>          | .29                               | -.54                         | .48                        | --                         | -.16                         | -.20                       |
| <i>Total92</i>          | .46                               | -.49                         | .72                        | .79                        | -.11                         | .21                        |
| <i>Total98</i>          | .29                               | -.64                         | .85                        | --                         | -.16                         | -.10                       |
| <i>FF87</i>             | .29                               | -.60                         | .48                        | --                         | -.23                         | -.29                       |
| <i>FF92</i>             | .51                               | -.48                         | .76                        | .85                        | -.13                         | .20                        |
| <i>FF98</i>             | .32                               | -.63                         | .84                        | --                         | -.17                         | -.09                       |
| <i>FG87</i>             | .36                               | -.47                         | .55                        | --                         | -.04                         | -.02                       |
| <i>FG92</i>             | .45                               | -.47                         | .67                        | .77                        | -.12                         | .28                        |
| <i>FG98</i>             | .31                               | -.59                         | .86                        | --                         | -.12                         | -.10                       |
| <i>L87</i>              | .22                               | -.58                         | .35                        | --                         | -.25                         | -.33                       |
| <i>L92</i>              | .41                               | -.54                         | .76                        | .71                        | -.09                         | -.09                       |
| <i>L98</i>              | .31                               | -.63                         | .91                        | --                         | -.13                         | -.05                       |
| <i>O87</i>              | .33                               | -.42                         | .44                        | --                         | .10                          | .17                        |
| <i>O92</i>              | .34                               | -.46                         | .61                        | .57                        | -.14                         | .15                        |
| <i>O98</i>              | .27                               | -.71                         | .88                        | --                         | -.16                         | -.16                       |
| <i>NP87</i>             | .18                               | -.56                         | .32                        | --                         | -.26                         | -.36                       |
| <i>NP92</i>             | .39                               | -.55                         | .61                        | .72                        | -.10                         | .10                        |
| <i>NP98</i>             | .07                               | -.78                         | .70                        | --                         | -.38                         | -.36                       |
| <i>PD87</i>             | .33                               | -.38                         | .65                        | --                         | -.03                         | .02                        |
| <i>PD92</i>             | .44                               | -.44                         | .74                        | .72                        | -.13                         | .51                        |
| <i>Green92</i>          | .44                               | -.51                         | .76                        | .83                        | .08                          | .48                        |
| <i>WP92</i>             | .41                               | -.55                         | .66                        | .87                        | -.04                         | .10                        |
| <i>Ind98</i>            | .20                               | -.69                         | .81                        | --                         | -.07                         | -.01                       |