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AN EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CONSOCIATIONALISM AND STABILITY
IN PLURAL SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

Dissertation

PhD in Political Science

Submitted on April 24, 2007

By Brighid Brooks Kelly
Declaration

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Summary

This project includes the most carefully constructed, large scale statistical analysis of the influence of the components of consociational government on stability. The variables and cases used in this analysis conform as closely as possible to the concepts of consociationalism, stability, and plural societies, as they are described by Lijphart in his extensive body of work regarding consociationalism. Accurate quantitative representation of his theory and recognition of the value of its analysis are facilitated by the discussions presented in Chapters 2 and 3. These chapters confirm the precise components of the theory, discuss criticisms that have been made concerning it, and describe another quantitative treatment of the performance of one of consociationalism’s components. This project’s quantitative analysis comprises multiple regression tests involving two sets of cases, which correspond to plural societies and plural societies which are also democratic. The latter set of cases and an independent controlling variable corresponding to democracy are used to ascertain whether consociationalism produces the stability which characterizes democracies, in contrast to the lack of upheaval, rebellion, and protest that results from severe oppression under undemocratic regimes. After the definition of plural societies to be used to choose cases is identified in Chapter 4, the independent variables and data representing them are identified and justified in Chapter 5. The independent variables correspond to each consociational component and six phenomena to be controlled for, including democracy and five of the conditions identified by Lijphart as conducive to the successful promotion of stability by consociationalism. This project enables separate analysis of Lijphart’s four components of consociationalism, which correspond to “grand” coalition executives including potentially antagonistic groups, segmental autonomy granting groups’ control over cultural issues, proportional empowerment of groups, and potential veto power for minorities. Although some of these components cannot be quantitatively represented in a form which perfectly corresponds to Lijphart’s portrayal of them, the variables and data corresponding to them in this analysis do represent them more faithfully than any other large-scale, quantitative exploration of consociationalism.

Chapter 6 contains a description and justification of the manner in which stability is represented in the dependent variable, an identification of which plural states have used consociationalism most extensively, and the results of the quantitative analyses which indicate whether consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. Although Lijphart describes stability as comprising four elements, only two of them can be represented through the dependent variable and one more can be partially controlled for.

The quantitative analyses of both sets of cases suggest that highly inclusive coalitions deter violent and nonviolent instability but that potential minority veto power and PR
electoral systems actually exacerbate it. The consociational component of segmental autonomy was not found to exert a statistically significant influence on stability. Of all of the independent variables representing consociational components and other phenomena, those corresponding to somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions, potential minority veto power, PR, and democracy were found to influence stability to an extent that was statistically significant. The collective influence of the consociational components shown in these tests challenges the theory that consociational components can be consistently relied upon to promote stability in plural societies.

Comparison of the results of these quantitative analyses with qualitative assessments of individual countries' experiences is presented in chapters 7 and 8. This qualitative treatment of seven places that have experienced consociationalism also facilitates comprehension of the role of this governance system because many of them are considered to have used the system successfully but most of them could not be quantitatively examined for diverse methodological reasons. These seven places include Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. The case studies examining their experiences indicate that the performance of consociationalism is influenced by a number of factors in addition to the consociational components, some of which it is difficult to represent quantitatively. Some of these factors include overarching loyalty and patriotism by antagonistic groups toward their state, cross-cutting cleavages which tend to make a society less clearly polarized, and incentives for intergroup compromise and moderation of political appeals. These countries' experiences also illustrate that such incentives need not be introduced through mechanisms which could permanently exclude potentially antagonistic groups from power. In these places, the segmental autonomy and empowerment provided by consociationalism seems most conducive to long-term stability when it is tempered by conditions and mechanisms which encourage groups' to coexist and consider one another's perspectives. The insights suggested by these case studies can be used to formulate hypotheses concerning the operation of consociationalism examined in the quantitative tests. However, the idiosyncratic nature of each place's experiences means that they cannot be relied upon as accurate indications of universal trends.

The general conclusions supported by the statistical tests and also suggested by the qualitative case studies performed for this project are that consociational autonomy and empowerment for potentially antagonistic groups are most conducive to long-term stability in plural societies when they are combined with conditions and mechanisms which motivate mutual understanding of each other's perspectives.
Dedication

This Work Is Dedicated To
My Grandfather,

Patrick F. Dougherty,

Who Inspired My Interest
In Helping Divided Societies
Acknowledgements

After learning of Arend Lijphart’s work involving plural societies and his theory of consociationalism, my first impressions were of the extent to which he has worked to benefit divided peoples across the globe and stimulated academic interest in the conflicts which afflict them, long before it was fashionable to study “ethnic conflict.” Like so many others throughout the world, I will always feel indebted to him and inspired by his thought provoking theory of consociationalism.

I would like to acknowledge the help and advice given to me concerning this thesis. More than anyone else, Michael Gallagher and Ken Benoit have assisted and encouraged my quantitative and qualitative analysis of consociationalism. Lengthy discussions with Donald Horowitz, Brendan O’Leary, and Rupert Taylor also facilitated my construction of the examination of issues related to the resolution of conflict in plural societies which is contained in this dissertation. Allahan Lee, who is my best friend and also a legislative researcher for a Canadian Member of Parliament, provided me with materials and information that helped me develop Part 1 of Chapter 7, which focuses on Canada. Without my family’s emotional support and help with nonacademic commitments, I would never have been able to finish this thesis and I also would like to thank my husband, Raymond, my son, my parents, and my brothers. Raymond encouraged me every day that I worked on this project.
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Section 1: Introducing Consociationalism

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Violent clashes between groups who claim to be culturally incompatible with one another command tremendous media attention because the international community finds it difficult to understand what motivates them and how their antagonisms can be resolved. Journalists everywhere respond to the fact that, thousands of miles away from these clashes, people from all walks of life seem more intrigued by them than by numerous, daily murders much closer to their homes. News reports commonly contain very limited information concerning the historical relationships between these antagonistic groups and give the impression that either the groups have no comprehensible motive for fighting and/or ancient hatreds exist between them which cannot be quelled. These observations seem to intrigue the public even more, since it is difficult to understand why people continue to fight if they are not doing so for any rational reasons and thus seem unlikely to gain anything beneficial from their feud. Unfortunately, a scholarly consensus concerning the source and means of resolving these conflicts has not yet been reached. If some theory explaining these phenomena was agreed upon by a large proportion of experts studying such conflicts and its validity was demonstrated through reference to international trends, a clear-cut, succinct version of it could be disseminated and the world’s population might begin to decide that these antagonisms can be resolved and that it makes sense to support efforts to promote reconciliation. For more than three decades, Arend Lijphart has been attempting to achieve this goal. He has developed, analyzed, and prescribed a system that he calls consociational democracy, which aims to promote stability in plural, deeply divided societies.

Most people who have ever encountered the term, consociationalism, recognize it to be the less aesthetically pleasing version of the word, power-sharing. Lijphart has encouraged widespread equation of these two terms by using them interchangeably himself. It seems obvious that, in deeply divided societies of any type, justice and long-term stability will not be achieved if one antagonistic group controls its opponents, instead of sharing power with them. However, consociationalism is not the only conceivable type of power-sharing. In reality, policymakers choosing new political systems do not need to choose between consociationalism and majoritarian systems that allow one group to oppressively control its rivals. This study will attempt to ascertain whether Lijphart’s system of consociationalism is the optimal form of political power-sharing for deeply divided, plural societies. It constitutes the first comparative, empirical analysis in which all four elements of Lijphart’s consociationalism are portrayed realistically and his exact claim for the system is evaluated.
If it can demonstrate whether or not consociationalism promotes stability in these troubled regions, this study will assist in the identification of optimal strategies for policymakers, facilitate international comprehension of severe inter-group conflict, and make a substantial contribution to the cultivation of long-term peace in persistently antagonistic societies.

The Proposition To Be Tested Here

This study will evaluate Lijphart’s (1977, p.1) main proposition concerning the consociational system, that it makes it possible "to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society." Statistical analysis will be used to evaluate this proposition because it is conducive to objective empirical examination of the effects of political institutions. The precise definition of consociationalism to be tested in this study necessitates substantial justification because so many slight variations of it have been published by Lijphart, reflecting his refinement of the concept. Valid, empirical examination of the proposition that this system promotes stability in plural societies also requires a testable, and thus unique, definition of consociationalism. For the purposes of this study, consociationalism will be recognized as the operation of all, or some, of those elements comprising this system that are identified consistently by Lijphart and can be scientifically tested. These include the presence within individual states of a somewhat or highly inclusive governing coalition, segmental autonomy, proportional representation electoral systems, and allocation of veto power to politically significant minority groups. This definition also recognizes consociationalism as a phenomenon which can characterize existing systems to differing degrees, depending on the number of its components that are utilized, and the similarity between them and Lijphart’s specific prescriptions concerning their optimal composition. The components of this definition of consociationalism will be described in detail in Chapter 2, “Defining Consociationalism” and Chapter 5, “Empirically Depicting Consociationalism and Factors Likely To Affect Its Operation.”

The theoretical coherence and validity of Lijphart’s consociationalism have been extensively analyzed by many academics, ever since its introduction in 1968. Although some criticisms of consociationalism arguably have not been effectively discredited, the system is widely believed to be the only feasible alternative to oppressive forms of majoritarianism and violence in deeply divided, plural societies. Recent consideration of proposals resembling Lijphart’s consociational model, by constitutional drafters in South

Africa, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia, suggests that many policymakers and academics believe the system is capable of resolving many of the most intense intergroup conflicts. Adoption of one or more institutional elements which arguably resemble Lijphart's consociational components has occurred at some stage in societies as diverse as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Nigeria, South Africa and Switzerland (Lijphart, 1977; Reilly, 2001, p.104-5; Evans and O'Leary, 2000; Jung and Shapiro, 1995). Virtually all of consociationalism's critics have failed, and rarely even explicitly attempted, to challenge the assumption that the system actually promotes conflict resolution. Analysts of individual countries' experiences with consociationalism have made some negative observations concerning its value. However, international constitutional designers' lack of interest in those observations seems justifiable because apparent shortcomings of the system in individual states can be persuasively attributed to situation-specific factors, such as international intervention in their domestic affairs.

Since Lijphart is the recognized definer of the modern concept of consociationalism, evaluation of the system's effectiveness requires thorough specification of the functions that he believes that it performs. He has produced the most extensive, persuasive arguments in favor of consociationalism and his descriptions of it are used to justify the proposition tested here. This will enable examination of the most widely accepted definition of the concept and, therefore, the one most impervious to criticism. This proposition incorporates the description of consociationalism least likely to be proven false because it was identified through close reference to Lijphart's entire body of work involving the system, which reflects his revision of the concept (Lijphart, 1998, p.149).

Lijphart's general descriptions of consociationalism's function performs have remained consistent in his writings since 1968. His later discussions have not strayed far from this definition he gave in 1969: "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (Lijphart, 1969, p.216). He still insists on the pivotal role of elites in establishing and maintaining the system but has become less inclined to use the term, "elite cartel." He has always described consociationalism as democratic but, when he began to consider prescribing it for unstable societies, he decided that it could be introduced in initially undemocratic countries.

In his early works on consociationalism, Lijphart (1989, p.39) used Gabriel Almond's term, "culturally fragmented," to describe the countries that would benefit from his system. He has used other terms to describe these societies, which must be considered to produce a justifiable distillation of his theory for analysis here. In addition to "culturally fragmented" and "fragmented," he has referred to these societies as composed of "subcultures" and "ethnic pluralism," and as "plural," "plural societies," "severely divided societies," "multiethnic societies," "divided societies," "divided countries," and societies containing "deep societal divisions," "ethnic divisions," and "plural..."
divisions.” However, the terms he has usually used since 1970 are “plural” and “plural societies.”

This survey of the terms Lijphart has adopted to describe these societies indicates that my proposition should identify them as “plural,” rather than “ethnic” or “divided.” My specification of cases and variables also takes into account Lijphart’s overall conception of what constitutes these societies, which includes his references to the other terms listed above. These additional terms facilitate recognition of Lijphart’s exact understanding of what constitutes “plural.” Examination of the contexts in which he uses this term, as well as the other concepts included in his main hypothesis, assists the determination of optimal cases and variables for this project.

Lijphart consistently describes consociationalism as a type of democracy and a means of successfully introducing and maintaining “stability” and “democracy.” Other goals of the system that he mentions are “transcend[ing] cleavages,” “improvement of cohesion,” “internal unity and cooperation,” “peaceful democratic change,” “a stable power-sharing equilibrium,” government “effective[ness],” “efficien[cy],” and “durability,” and avoidance of “immobilism,” “breakdown,” and “strain and hostility.” Lijphart (1977, p.2, 1; 1969, p.217) explains that consociationalism “forg[es] establish[es],” or “achieve[s],” the components of its system and then “maintains” them. He also identifies “establishment or maintenance of cooperation among elites” as an aim of consociationalism, but this achievement facilitates, rather than constitutes, the end goals of “stability” and “democracy” (Lijphart, 1969, p.217). Democracy will be formally included in this analysis and my conclusions should suggest valuable insights concerning its relationship to stability in consociational societies. However, examination of Lijphart’s discussions of consociationalism indicates that his most consistent claim for consociationalism is that it engenders “stability in plural societies” so this project will focus on assessing the influence of consociationalism on “stability” in societies which conform to his definition of “plural.” The meanings of these terms, which should be represented accurately in this project’s quantitative analysis, cannot be quickly assumed and defensible descriptions of them will be arrived at and justified in chapters 4 and 6.

Lijphart’s understanding of what constitutes “political stability” can be partially discerned from a survey of those works which inspired the introduction of his theory involving consociationalism. Lijphart initially formulated his theory because he recognized highly significant pivotal exceptions to the contemporary academic consensus that political stability was less likely in multi-party systems, and almost impossible in “plural” and “fragmented” societies. Throughout his

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extensive work on democracy, he seems to have remained committed to the conception of “stability” used by his PhD advisor, Gabriel Almond, who was a leading articulator of the consensus Lijphart challenged. Almond asserted that the “Anglo-American type” of political system, “with its homogeneous political culture and its autonomous parties, interest groups, and communication media, is associated with stability, and the Continental European type, with its fragmented culture and mutual dependence of parties and groups, with instability” (Lijphart, 1968, p.9-10). Almond thought that the Continental European type was much more prone to “immobility” and “dictatorial rule” (Lijphart, 1968, p. 10). He believed that, in Anglo-American democracies, superior stability is engendered by more “effective aggregation” of political views, “proper boundary maintenance” between political forces, and a more pervasive, democratic political culture (Lijphart, 1968, p. 13, 12).

When Lijphart first conceived his theory of consociationalism, other very well respected specialists concurred with Almond’s judgments concerning these types of democracy. Downs similarly believed that multiparty systems were less conducive to “effective action” by governments because they made it more difficult for voters to attribute policies to individual political parties (Lijphart, 1968, p.9). Neumann agreed that, in multiparty systems, “political responsibility is less clearly focused” and they do not produce a “‘unifying and centralizing order’ or ‘great promise of effective policy formation’” (Lijphart, 1968, p.9). Duverger also believed that multi-party systems are less “moderate,” more “intensely politically divided,” and thus less stable (Lijphart, 1977, p.12-13). Very similar generalizations were also made by Bluhm (Lijphart, 1977, p.7-8). It was widely accepted by political scientists that “cross-cutting cleavages” and “overlapping memberships” among social groups are characteristic of “homogeneous” cultures and are also conducive to political stability (Lijphart, 1977, p.10, 11). Lipset, the chief articulator of this theory, persuasively argued that, “when a society is riven with sharp cleavages and when memberships and loyalties do not overlap but are concentrated exclusively within each separate segment of society, the cross-pressures that are vital to political moderation and stability will be absent” (Lijphart, 1977, p.10).

Surrounded by almost universal acceptance of these theories concerning political stability, Lijphart realized that an impressive amount of stability existed in the Netherlands’ socially fragmented and multi-party system. He adopted the concept of stability popularized by these other academics and proved that their theories were falsifiable, and that stability did exist in places where it had been considered virtually impossible. One factor enhancing the persuasiveness of Lijphart’s body of work on consociationalism is his consistent and faithful comparison of real situations with this definition of stability first articulated by those whose theory he challenged. Their definition of stability, which inspired Lijphart, focused on system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. This specific conception of stability will be specified in more detail when its quantitative representation for this project is discussed in Chapter 6.

Thorough comprehension of Lijphart’s expectations for consociational systems is facilitated through recognition of his premise that, in deeply divided societies, social and institutional separation
of potentially antagonistic population segments most effectively promotes peace in the states they share. Lijphart (1969, p.208) explains that the “theoretical basis” of Almond’s claim regarding the likely stability of heterogeneous societies “is the ‘overlapping memberships’ proposition formulated by … Arthur F. Bentley and David B. Truman and the very similar ‘crosscutting cleavages’ proposition of Seymour Martin Lipset.” This influential theory claims that, in Lipset’s (1960, p. 88-89) words, “the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations.” Almond considered the countries constituting his “Continental European” category of democracies to be very susceptible to breakdown but Lijphart (1969, p. 211) responded by observing that they are “fragmented but stable.” Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism represents his attempt to understand these states’ seemingly impossible combination of division and stability. His answer to this puzzle is:

Such distinct lines of cleavage appear to be conducive to consociational democracy and political stability. The explanation is that subcultures with widely divergent outlooks and interests may coexist without necessarily being in conflict; conflict arises only when they are in contact with each other (Lijphart, 1969, p.219).

Lijphart (1969, p.219) points out that Quincy Wright, David Easton, Sidney Verba, and Walker Connor agree that inter-group contact often heightens conflict and “good social fences may make good political neighbors.” He explains that social divisions do not necessarily produce secession or partition and the violence which often accompanies them because, in consociational systems, elites representing the potentially antagonistic segments work together to manage their shared state’s affairs and maintain stability (Lijphart, 1969, p.219-20). Lijphart (1969, p.220) also distinguishes between “essentially homogeneous political cultures, where contacts are likely to lead to an increase in mutual understanding and further homogenization, and essentially heterogeneous cultures, where close contacts are likely to lead to strain and hostility.” He argues that “to safeguard political stability, the volume and intensity of contacts must not exceed the commensurate degree of homogeneity” and “it may be desirable to keep transactions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society… to a minimum” (Lijphart, 1969, p.220-1). In the following excerpt published eight years later, Lijphart (1977, p.88) restates this notion that “clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility.” His assumption that contact in such societies is conducive to instability is also shown in his discussions of individual countries’ experiences. In response to Brian Barry, who argues that consociationalism is less appropriate for ethnically divided societies, Lijphart (1977, p.233) argues that the “highly visible differences” often existing between ethnic groups “may also serve the positive function of clearly demarcating segmental boundaries-thereby limiting intersegmental contacts and minimizing opportunities for intersegmental conflict.” Many specialists focusing on the Northern Ireland conflict believe that the region’s tight congruence of multiple cleavages and the confrontational behavior of its elites are the two main factors that have
prevented stability there. In contrast to this common view, Lijphart (1977, p. 140) believes that, in Northern Ireland, the “segmental isolation” that results from coincidence of cleavages is beneficial and “does appear to have the function of the good fences that make good neighbors.” Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism prescribes a system with “segmental autonomy” as one of its four core elements and identifies “segmental isolation” as a condition favorable to establishment of the system. Throughout his body of work concerning consociationalism, he explicitly and implicitly expresses his consistent, general belief that strict segmental borders and encouragement of their formation are conducive to the promotion of stability in plural societies. If the effects of consociationalism are to be tested in a scientifically sound manner, it must be kept in mind that Lijphart’s view of how conflicts are resolved fundamentally differs from those who do not view cross-group contact in plural societies as detrimental for long-term stability. However, Lijphart also identifies the presence of cross-cutting cleavages as a condition that is favorable to consociationalism’s successful promotion of stability in those more heterogeneous and divided societies which he describes as plural. Many cross-cutting cleavages prevent the segmental isolation which characterizes the societies for which he prescribes consociationalism and can eventually lead to very destabilizing events such as secession and civil war. They also help elites to maintain electoral support when they go into government with elites representing those groups who their constituents have traditionally opposed. Lijphart believes that consociationalism and group separateness are necessary for the more heterogeneous countries but also seems to consider cross-cutting cleavages as beneficial for such countries because they make it easier for elites of different groups to hold their shared countries together.

Lijphart’s general approach to conflict resolution and the terms that he uses in his descriptions of consociationalism suggest that the claim that should be tested in this analysis is: Consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. Lijphart’s identification of individual core components of the system in countries which do not possess all of them suggests that his precise claim, and the proposition to be tested here, is actually that, the more consociational a plural society is, the better are its chances to achieve long-term stability. Some critics of his theory have assumed that consociationalism should be considered a necessary, or sufficient, condition for achievement of stability in these situations. Claims positing this relationship are more easily challenged than those asserting only a positive relationship between the extent of a society’s consociationalism and its stability. However, statistical analysis enables empirically sound calculation of the overall effects of consociational influences internationally because it does not require independent analysis of individual cases and combination of its impressionistically reached conclusions. Statistical analysis allows objective, identical treatment of all cases and discernment of even slight relationships between variables so it will enable the proposition chosen above to be objectively evaluated. It is important to distinguish between the entire body of Lijphart’s work on consociationalism, generally recognized to constitute his theory involving the topic, and the core components that make up the consociational
governmental structure. The theory concerning the effects of the system will be quantitatively and qualitatively assessed in this project, through analysis of a very large set of countries' experiences.

The Model Used For This Study

A statistical model analyzing the long-term relationship between consociationalism, stability, and plural societies will enable valid testing and examination of the theory that consociationalism promotes stability. To ascertain the effects of consociationalism on stability in plural societies through statistical analysis, plural societies' years of experience must constitute cases, or units of observation. Through reference to Lijphart's definition of plural societies, it would be possible to impressionistically differentiate between past and present societies that are, or were, plural or not plural. However, this procedure would undoubtedly introduce significant bias to this analysis because it would be nearly impossible to prevent oneself from choosing cases based on unproven beliefs concerning the nature of specific conflicts and groups. For this reason, cases for this analysis will be chosen by adopting a threshold, according to which societies can be categorized as plural, which was designed by another scholar who was not particularly interested in the proposition to be tested here. Although this approach is likely to introduce some bias from this scholar, complete impartiality in choosing societies seems unattainable and this bias is not likely to be directly related to consociationalism. In Chapter 4, it is demonstrated that the optimal threshold is one that is evident in Ted Robert Gurr's (1993) dataset, *Minorities at Risk*. This dataset contains all of the minorities in the world which Gurr has found to conform to his definition of "minorities at risk." His criteria used for identifying these groups are very similar to Lijphart’s description of which groups are required in a society for it to be considered plural. Gurr’s guidelines are consistent with Lijphart’s most commonly used definition of plural societies, those which are clearly divided into groups whose members’ collective actions reflect the obvious existence of cleavages corresponding to religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and/or race. The similarity between these two scholars’ categories suggests that the most prudent, least biased means of choosing cases for this analysis is inclusion of each country whose population contains a significant proportion of people in Gurr’s *Minorities at Risk*. It is well known that the effects of constitutional systems emerge very gradually so the accuracy of this study findings is maximized by inclusion of the longest time period possible, which is from 1975 to 1995.

Accurate measurement of the influence of consociationalism on stability in these societies, during this period, requires variables representing consociationalism, stability, and phenomena other than consociationalism, the exclusion of which could lead to incorrect results. Lijphart maintains that consociational systems are made up of four components, grand coalitions, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and groups’ mutual veto power. The independent variables and data representing consociationalism and other phenomena will be described and justified in Chapter 5. Since this study is designed to ascertain effects on stability, Lijphart’s most commonly used definition of stability ha
been used to construct the dependent variables. The four elements which he usually describes as constituting stability are system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Analysis of the methodological and theoretical ramifications of including all four elements in an index variable representing stability suggests that only civil order and legitimacy can be thus operationalized, without causing serious methodological problems. However, the effects of consociationalism on system maintenance will be controlled for to some extent by conducting quantitative analyses on a subset of cases that are both plural and democratic. The possibility of representing all four components of stability in this quantitative analysis is explored in Chapter 6, which also includes a description of the analysis itself and its results.

A few additional, independent variables should be included in this study to facilitate confirmation of my findings. In any statistical analysis examining whether factor A is associated with factor B, apparent relationships between these factors may actually be caused by phenomena which are not constitutive of factor A but are systematically related to it. To explain the nature of consociational systems, predict their effects, and judge the likelihood of their successful implementation and maintenance, Lijphart created a theory which attempts to achieve all of these aims. He argues that, if certain conditions do not exist in a society, it is unlikely that consociational systems will be introduced or successfully used there. He particularly emphasizes that the system will definitely not work unless elites are motivated to make this happen. A few of his other conditions include geographical concentration of population segments, cross-cutting cleavages, small population size, external threats, and overarching loyalties. Lijphart’s contention that these conditions facilitate the system has been criticized, in part because some of them, such as overarching loyalties and elite accommodation, are arguably products, rather than stimulants, of conflict resolution. However, this study will include variables corresponding to the conditions whose inclusion will not cause methodological problems, because these conditions arguably account for some stability in plural societies. Identification of all of the control variables is included in Chapter 5.

The quantitative analysis performed for this project will examine eighty-eight plural societies’ experiences between 1975 and 1995, through employment of variables corresponding to consociationalism’s components, stability, and several factors which may account for some trends in stability that only appear to result from consociationalism. The statistical examination will show concrete, international, long-term evidence of the general relationship between consociationalism and stability. However, its use of individual variables for the consociational components will also yield insights concerning this general relationship, some of which may never have even been considered by other scholars. Not only does this project examine the basic relationship between consociationalism and stability more carefully and objectively than ever before, it elucidates smaller effects of different levels, such as the connection between segmental autonomy and stability. Horowitz (2002, p.21) emphasizes the potential value of analyzing the connection between consociationalism and stability at such sub-levels, through his persuasive argument that “it is not amiss to refer to consociational
elements or consociational practices, but consociational regimes in the developing world are... few and far between.”

Particularly among ethnic conflict specialists, comparative analysis inspires extensive criticism because it is inherently incapable of accounting for all of the idiosyncratic aspects of each situation. Every, even minuscule fact about anything is indispensable for some conceivable study. Many insights regarding consociationalism's value as a conflict resolution device can be gleaned by demonstrating that pivotal similarities exist among systems that, at first glance, seem to have nothing in common except consociationalism itself. The quantitative analysis performed for this project will provide objective measures of trends common to all countries that have experienced variants of consociationalism. The prudence of attempting to statistically examine the behavior of antagonistic groups in plural societies has been challenged on the grounds that it is very difficult to obtain the data necessary to analyze the topic validly and that required variables are often mutually interdependent. Forbes, in relation to his theory concerning the effects of interpersonal and inter-group contact on conflict, argues that academics interested in this area should focus more on constructing intuitively plausible and coherent models, than on testing their validity empirically. Similarly to Fukuyama’s The End of History, Forbes’s “main purpose was ... to crystallize a way of thinking” and construct a very persuasive, plausible explanation for previously unexplained phenomena (1997, p.226). He believes that social scientists insist on testing hypotheses because they don’t seem to “know the charm of a mathematical model” (Forbes, 1997, p.226). However, even the most aesthetically pleasing mathematical models have only been accepted after being proven through demonstration of the validity of their components. The real difference between purely mathematical and empirical models seems to be that, while the former can be proven through reference to previously proven propositions, the latter require analysis of information that is much less consistently self-evident. However, if adequate data can be gathered to test intuitively coherent models and, if statistical methods are used to identify interdependent variables, statistical testing can turn a plausible model that might attract policymakers’ attention into a model that explains phenomena most accurately and thus demands attention. Horowitz believes that some policymakers “prefer” consociationalism to other forms of government “because its requirements are formal, easy to fathom, and [supposedly] predictable in their consequences” (Horowitz, 1999a). Statistical evaluation of this system will produce formal, easily understood, more reliable indications of whether consociationalism promotes resolution of conflicts in plural, divided societies. In Chapters 7 and 8, the results of this project's quantitative analysis will be further explored through a qualitative discussion of those countries' experiences which are commonly identified as providing the best evidence of consociationalism's value for plural societies.

Lijphart discusses consociationalism in a large body of work spanning about three decades and his concept of exactly what constitutes this system has evolved over time. Examination of his
proposition is preceded by justification of an operationalizable definition of consociationalism, in
Chapter 2. Lijphart's academic contributions involving consociationalism have inspired an extensive
literature, which will be explored in Chapter 3. Recognition of existing works concerning
consociationalism will ensure that the system to be tested here is the version of consociationalism
which is least worthy of criticism and most likely to promote stability in plural societies. Statistical
analysis of our proposition requires careful identification of cases of plural societies and independent
variables, which will be accomplished in Chapters 4 and 5. Following the description of the
dependent variable and presentation of the quantitative results in Chapter 6, a qualitative exploration
of those cases which apparently have gained the most from consociationalism will be performed to
further examine the relationship between the system and the stability that it is said to promote.
CHAPTER 2: DEFINING CONSOCIATIONALISM

Consociationalism is now most commonly identified with Lijphart’s description and prescription of the system of government which he believes is most capable of bringing true democracy and intercultural harmony to states plagued by “ethnic” conflict. Consociationalism is recognized as constituting both this system and the theory concerning its adoption and operation. Lijphart defines the consociational system as a governance structure composed of four core components, which is required to achieve stability in deeply divided societies and is the only form of democracy which can operate in such places. Its components are government by all-inclusive grand coalition, proportional representation, provision of minority veto power, and cultural autonomy for subcultures. The combination of these four elements prevents groups of any size from being consistently deprived of influence over decision-making. Groups’ continual, political disempowerment often provoke conflict and, by guaranteeing groups’ abilities to affect policy, consociationalism is designed to eliminate this grievance. This project aims to ascertain the validity of Lijphart’s theory that his consociational system does promote “stability in plural societies,” by discouraging such conflict.

The premise underlying Lijphart’s theory is that potentially antagonistic population segments can peacefully coexist if they are governed by a system which preserves cultural diversity and political influence, through groups’ separate but equal representation. He encourages policymakers instituting consociational systems to “let ... groups define themselves” through citizens’ evolving patterns of interaction, instead of imposing a set of divisions that may not perfectly correspond to actual cleavages (Lijphart, 1998, p. 144). Lijphart’s construction and evolution of his system and theory of consociationalism were motivated to reflect the qualitative nature of diverse political phenomena and assist the troubled inhabitants of deeply divided societies, with much less concern for how these concepts could be quantitatively operationalized. The task of identifying the definition of consociationalism which best facilitates quantitative assessment of the system and theory is thus made more difficult because of the complexity of Lijphart’s findings and conjectures concerning the concept. For instance, when prescribing consociational systems, Lijphart encourages adoption of specific political institutions but, when identifying the operation of consociationalism internationally, he considers any democratic arrangement generating the anticipated effects of these four components as consociational.

Arguably because of the complexity and evolution of Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism, several critics have concluded that political developments and explorations of its theoretical integrity suggest that it is not adequately falsifiable to enable its scientific
evaluation. This project demonstrates that a carefully constructed definition of consociationalism can be used to quantitatively analyze Lijphart's system and theory, with a replicable and scientifically valid methodology. Lijphart's definition of consociationalism is almost unanimously regarded as the definition of the concept. Perhaps for this reason, it seems inadequately appreciated that the complex and arguably contradictory elements in his many years of evolving thought on the subject can be distinguished from his consistent, central claim concerning the system and a solid, lasting concept of consociationalism, which can be observed in his and others' works from as early as the 17th century. Distillation of a precise definition of consociationalism appropriate for use in this study can only accomplished by identifying consistent elements throughout Lijphart's portrayal of the system and examining concepts of "consociationalism" offered by other writers, which seem to have influenced Lijphart's work. This approach promotes identification and verification of operationalizable versions the consistent, core components of Lijphart's consociational system, which are necessary for valid scientific examination of his theory regarding the system.

**Versions of Consociationalism Introduced Prior to Lijphart's Theory**

Although Barry (1975a, p.478) is correct in saying that consociation has always been a "much rarer word than 'accommodation,'" it has been used occasionally since the fifteenth century. Some, but not all, of the meanings it has acquired over the past centuries have been political. Until at least 1960, ecologists used it to identify a subdivision of an "association" that is dominated by a single species of plant life ("Consociation", 1989). The Oxford English Dictionary categorizes early appearances of the term as generally meaning, "associated together; united in fellowship or companionship" ("Consociate", 1989). The extent to which it was considered a synonym of association is revealed in this 1889 quote, where "consociate" is used as we use "associate": "It was not anything consociated with either frost or snow" ("Consociate", 1889). This apparent supposition of terminological interchangeability seems consistent with Lijphart's concept because his consociations of ethnic groups plausibly could also be described as associations. His theory seemingly aspires to engender a relationship between associates, in this case consisting of elites representing ethnic groups.

The Oxford English Dictionary's first reference to the political sense of "consociate" dates from 1638, when it was used to describe "formal co-operative arrangements" among churches of the same denomination (Barry, 1975a, p.478; "Consociate", 1989). Until at least the beginning of the nineteenth century, unions of Presbyterian and Congregational churches in the New England region of the United States often called themselves "consociations".
Oxford English Dictionary ("Consociation", 1989) describes these relationships as "confederations or unions" and Barry (1975a, p.478) has also referred to their "confederal ties." However, primary source research seems to suggest that these consociations were often more centralized than what are now commonly known as "confederations." Ivo Duchacek (1982, p.146) has described "confederation" as a form of government in which there is no emotional or institutional commitment to building a supranational community, a new nation. In a confederal system, the component communities, preserving their sovereignty and independence, combine into a cooperative (perpetual or temporary) association only for the purpose of executing some specific tasks in common. No nation-building is contemplated.

These religious consociations in New England were apparently formed to discipline any sort of church activity that they found fault with. For instance, in Massachusetts, it became the established custom to identify those to be disciplined by requiring that the consociation leaders be present at the "covenancing of new organizations, ... the election of all officers, ... the deposition of erring ones, and ... the arbitration of all parish quarrels" (Miller, 1965, pp. 189-190). These normally only used extreme social pressure to bring about change but their discipline was seemingly as effective as any legal action would have been. Tales of ministers publicly humiliated to the extent that they were "separated completely" from their churches substantiate one description of such consociations as "autocr[a][tic]" (Miller, 1965, p.190; Winslow, 1952, p.258). To "perfect the device of consociation" in this context was "to dominate a community" (Miller, 1965, p.191). The substantive extent of these organizations' effective jurisdiction seems inconsistent with their description as confederations. However, the extent of their influence also further justifies their comparison to Lijphart's ideal consociational states, which are occasionally federal but whose central governments seem to have the overriding power. Duchacek actually presents confederations as equivalent to consociational governments but this unusual view seems to be presented in order to argue that confederations can use consociational, non-majoritarian decision-making procedures (Duchacek, 1982, 146).

The apparently typical church consociations' charter documents also indicate that each parish supplied two delegates to its consociation and plans outlined in these documents required these members' unanimous agreement (Consociation of..., 1797, p.5; Associated Ministers..., 1800, p.14). Like Lijphart's ideal consociational government, these consociations were contracted unanimously but, unlike his ideal, their decisions were arrived at in majoritarian fashion. Like those elements of consociationalism designed to enhance all groups' power over central decision-making, these church consociations gave parishes with smaller populations equal influence, through the provision of an "equal vote" for each representative (Consociation of..., 1797, p.5; Heimert, 1966, p.206). However, in contrast to
the core consociational component of minority veto power, this provision did not give any groups veto power.

When Lijphart (1969, p.211) first used the term, "consociationalism," he attributed it to Johannes Althusius, who developed a concept similar to Lijphart's in a work that was originally published in 1603 (Elazar, 1995, p.xxxv). Lijphart (1977, p.1) described his notion as having been "derived" from Althusius's. Like Lijphart but unlike those conceptions of "consociation" described above, Althusius encouraged the institutionalized separation of existing population groups, within states. He was inspired by the emphasis in natural law on individualism and he believed that groups of all kinds, including families and private associations, should be granted substantial control over their own affairs. He believed that such groups should "surrender to the State ... only such part of their rights as is definitely required for the purposes of the higher community" (Gierke, 1958, pp.71-72). The groups were to be "on a level of full equality with the State," particularly because they were only to enter its jurisdiction under a social contract, which could be abandoned if the state did not maintain "defence and protection" (Gierke, 1958, p.74). Althusius's theory was revolutionary when published because it argued that political associations should be based on their members' consent, rather than a "reified state imposed by a ruler or an elite" (Elazar, 1995, p.xxxv). This element of Althusius's thought closely corresponds to Lijphart's implicit assumption that his form of consociation will not endure and promote stability if it is forcibly imposed by elites.

Althusius's law governing this system of "symbiotic" individuals included two aspects, "one functioning to direct and govern social life" and "the other prescribing a plan and manner for communicating things and services among the symbiotes" (Althusius, 1995, p.19). Althusius advocated the political institutionalization of what he recognized to be the natural existence of individualism and voluntary inter-group boundaries. In this way, Althusius and Lijphart saw their theories as both descriptive and prescriptive. Like Lijphart's inspiration through analysis of the Dutch style of governance, Althusius was impressed by the political experience of some groups within the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the "biblical grand design for humankind" outlined in the Hebrew Scriptures and Old Testament (Elazar, 1995, pp.xxxv-xxxvi). Both thinkers hoped that their exposition of an ideal governance system would encourage its emulation and Lijphart went a step further than Althusius by outlining conditions likely to be conducive to its introduction.

Not surprisingly, Althusius and the New England religious groups, favoring what they both termed, "consociationalism," may have both been partially inspired by the Bible and previous religious organizations. Elazar (1995, p.xxxv) surmises that Althusius "synthesized the political experience of the Holy Roman Empire with the political ideas of the covenant theology of Reformed Protestantism." Althusius's (1995, p.55) depiction of religion bears a
strong resemblance to Presbyterianism and he states that each province of a state should have a "presbytery." Apparently not coincidentally, the notion of consociationalism adopted by Congregationalists in New England bore such close resemblance to similar organizations used by Presbyterians that presbyteries were occasionally referred to as consociations. As time went on, Congregationalist consociations functioned so similarly to presbyteries that congregationalism in some states eventually "developed a stronger feeling of kinship for the Presbyterianism of the Middle Colonies than for the purer Congregationalism of Massachusetts" (Sweet, 1951, p.114). These religious uses of the term further corroborate the conceptual, historical integrity of Lijphart's notion of consociationalism. Democracy in the Netherlands stimulated Lijphart's imagination and perhaps even he was indirectly influenced by Protestant religious organization, considering the religious makeup of the Netherlands. The similarity between Lijphart's and Althusius's notions of segmental autonomy and voluntary union is not surprising, considering that both can be traced to early uses of the term, "consociationalism," and Lijphart was aware of Althusius's work.

In addition to Althusius, Lijphart explains that he was influenced also by David Apter's introduction of the term to modern political science. To Apter (1961, p.5), consociation was one of three "dynamic political arrangement[s]" being adopted in post-colonial African states, as of 1961. He defines it as "a joining together of constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of union" (Apter, 1961, p.24). He agrees with Duchacek that it can be used to govern interaction within confederations and believes that its maximum level of centralization is achieved in federation (Apter, 1961, p.24-25). While Lijphart envisions his system as appropriate in both unitary and federal states, Apter (1961, p.24) sees consociationalism as a system which "does not require a total commitment on the part of its members." Apter (1961, p.24) observes that negotiation within such systems requires constant argument, which renders them susceptible to "crisis, fission," and "recombination" of the groups to be included in their governance organizations. Lijphart's judgments concerning the likely permanence of consociation are more optimistic. However, like Lijphart, Apter (1961, p.24, p.474) believes that it is a system marked by compromise, accommodation, and coalitions of durable groups. They agree that consociation is entered into voluntarily, its members hold multiple loyalties, and power is "shared between the constituent units and a central agency" (Apter, 1961, p.24-25). In contrast to Lijphart's, Apter's (1961, p.24, 474) notion of consociation is a majoritarian one, in which decisions require what he alternatively calls "recurrent pluralities" and "recurrent majorities." Apter and Lijphart also seem to disagree about the reason masses would support elites who cooperated with one another. Apter identifies one of the five most distinctive characteristics of consociation as the possession by the groups comprising the masses of an ideologically related motivation to unite with each other to some extent. He sees ideology as "extremely
important, providing meaning and coherence both to political roles and structural alliances among constituent parts, and making political marriages deeper than mere convenience” (Apter, 1961, p.25). While Lijphart believes that overarching loyalty can promote consociational union of groups, he also envisions people consenting to political union solely for practical reasons, such as peace maintenance, and forming some sort of allegiance to the union through habitual cooperation and pride in the consociational system. In fact, Deschouwer interprets Lijphart's model as precluding strong ideological attachment among the masses. He argues that ideological passion among the masses would endanger the consociational system by causing the "party leadership” to “forfeit its strategic freedom” (Deschouwer, 1994, p. 81). Lijphart and Apter disagree concerning consociationalism's applicability to unitary states, its likely stability, the manner in which individual decisions are to be arrived at, and probable motives among the masses for association. However, in general, it is obvious that Lijphart's and Apter's models are two interpretations of the same sort of phenomenon.

Lijphart's conception of consociationalism may also have been influenced by M.G. Smith's 1969 use of the term, which was published the same year as Lijphart's introduction of his theory (Smith, 1969, p.94; Smith, 1969a, p.434; Lijphart, 1969, p.207). In a 1977 publication, Lijphart (1977, p.168) explains that Smith's "definition is quite similar" to his but "the fact that the same term is used is a coincidence." Like Lijphart, Smith (1969, p. 94) portrays consociations as "associations of separately constituted corporate collectivities as equal and internally autonomous partners in a common society" that also "surpass alliance[s] in ... scope, content, and intensity" and maintain their “internal distinctness.” However, Smith appears not to share Lijphart’s consistently articulated belief that institutionalization of segmental borders encourages stability in plural societies. Smith (1969a, p.434) believes that consociationalism's greatest value is its "tendenc[y] toward increasing cohesion" between groups, manifested through "increases in the scope for social mobility, assimilation, and wider allegiances." Like Apter but unlike Lijphart, Smith is also not entirely optimistic about individual consociational systems' likely permanence. He believes that they "provide an imperfect and conditional basis for union, since they presuppose... internal autonomy and mutual exclusiveness of the segments" (Smith, 1969a, p. 435). Nevertheless, Lijphart and Smith seem to disagree about the ramifications, rather than the definition, of consociationalism. Since Lijphart’s central claim for the system is very consistent, it is the definition of the system itself which must be specified and confirmed for this project, partly through reference to the works of others such as Smith. Unless Smith adopted Lijphart's description of what constitutes consociationalism, like so many later analysts of Lijphart's work, Smith's use of the term represents one more similar, but independently conceived, usage of it.
The versions of consociationalism, given in the Oxford English Dictionary, by Protestant groups, by Althusius, by Apter, and by Smith, agree on a general definition of the term. They agree that a "consociation" is an at least semi-permanent group of individual segments, in which each has autonomy over at least some of its affairs. Although some Protestant churches used consociations to discipline individual people, none of these pre-Lijphart conceptions or Lijphart's own suggest that forced management of inter-group differences is consistent with consociationalism. Pre-Lijphart versions of consociational systems do vary concerning the extent of their centralization, decision-making mechanisms, association motives, and predictions of their likely stability. However, they do constitute historical precedents supporting Lijphart's portrayal of the consociational system as a set of mechanisms which provide diverse forms of political empowerment and autonomy concerning at least some spheres of life, for potentially antagonistic groups that are attempting to coexist.

These uses of the concept of consociationalism, including Lijphart's, all refer to a very similar form of governance. However, it seems possible to distinguish between two schools of thought among them, deriving from their intellectual inspirations. Perhaps it is only coincidental, or perhaps employment of consociationalism in Africa was inspired by European, Althusian thought, but the forms of government observed by Apter and Smith in Africa seem more similar to each other than to the churches', Althusius' and Lijphart's conceptions. The Protestant, New England churches, Althusius, who was inspired by the Bible, and Lijphart, whose theory was derived from the largely Protestant Netherlands, all envisioned a more centralized and permanent version of consociationalism than those described by Smith and Apter. If this description is valid, the historical precedents for the more centralized and permanent aspects of Lijphart's definition of consociationalism appear to be particularly strong, since it is seemingly emblematic of the Western Christian, rather than African, schools of consociational thought.

Theories Similar to Lijphart's Version of Consociationalism Which Were Either Definitely or Apparently Developed Without Reference to His Theory

While retaining his theory's distinctiveness, Lijphart has likened certain aspects of it to other academics' contributions that they had not identified as consociational. Lijphart's reference to them in his initial exposition of consociationalism, and the wording he used to depict them, suggest that his concept may have been influenced by theirs. If this is true, his description of consociationalism, not surprisingly, was affected by others' ideas that were not described in the last section regarding pre-Lijphart uses of the term.
When Lijphart (1977, p.43) recommended nonterritorial cultural autonomy for groups that are not geographically concentrated, he acknowledged that Karl Renner and Otto Bauer prescribed such a system, earlier in the twentieth century, when attempting to resolve "the nationalities problem" of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Renner and Bauer actually advocated nonterritorial group autonomy in Austria separately, in 1902 and the 1920's (Hanf, 1991, p.35-36). They were both inspired by a tradition of similar thought, that was apparently first articulated in the Treaty of Westphalia, during the seventeenth century (Hanf, 1991, p.37). This treaty applied nonterritorial autonomy to religious groups and, in 1866, Fischhof seems to have been the first to advocate its regulation of "coexistence between linguistically defined nations" (Hanf, 1991, p.37, 35). Fischhof recommended equality between linguistic groups of all sizes, legal guarantees against "any encroachment by the majority," and a requirement of consent by majorities of each group for acceptance of legislation relating to "national interest" (Hanf, 1991, p.37, 38).

The system that was subsequently espoused by Renner gives groups greater autonomy than is provided by veto power in the area of "national interest" (Hanf, 1991, p.38). Renner recommended autonomy approximating "sovereignty" in the "broadly defined... cultural sphere" (Hanf, 1991, p.38). He thought that nations had to be legally regarded as associations of persons, rather than geographically defined groups, and he thought each nation should be given complete control over its cultural matters, such as education, art, and literature (Hanf, 1991, p.37, 38). Renner believed these nations should be given veto power over cultural matters at every level of central government and provided with their own "cultural parliament[s]" at the level of the "supreme state" (Hanf, 1991, p.39). He seemed to envision these "nations" as performing functions similar to Lijphart's segmentally delineated political parties. Similarly to Lijphart's current approach and Lorwin's related concept of "segmented pluralism," Renner believed that, if individuals wish to form or join segmentally delineated political groups, they should voluntarily indicate their intention to do so. He stated that: "Membership of a nation is determined solely by an individual's declaration of nationality to the competent authorities" (Hanf, 1991, p.38). One intriguing difference between Renner and Lijphart is that Renner was also a socialist politician, who proposed this system in an attempt to "depoliticize national cleavages," seemingly in order to remove the Austrian masses' main distraction from class based politics (Hanf, 1991, p.40). Although Lijphart advocates territorial, as opposed to nonterritorial, federalism where geographical boundaries do correspond to segmental ones, his notion of consociationalism seems to closely reflect the intellectual tradition popularized by Renner and Bauer. This is not surprising, considering that Lijphart did derive his notion of consociationalism partially from the Austrian historical experience, which also inspired Renner and Bauer.
In an early publication, Lijphart (1977, p.164) also identifies a "close correspondence" between his model of consociationalism and W. Arthur Lewis's recommendations for facilitating democratization in West Africa. Lijphart (1977, p.143) believes that, of all the proposals similar to his concept of consociationalism, Lewis's is the "most interesting, specific, and detailed." Lewis and Lijphart studied different countries but, like Lijphart, Lewis (1965, p.5-6 & 11-14) urged development of multiple political parties governing through large coalitions, proportional representation, and federalism. Lewis and Lijphart agreed that majoritarianism was antithetical to democracy in plural societies. Lijphart (1977, p.146) actually observed that the "only difference between Lewis's scheme and the normative rules of consociationalism is that Lewis tends to be rather more specific than the latter would require." Lewis believed that plural societies required federalism, while Lijphart (1977, p.146) thought that this was only one of a few mechanisms available for introducing high levels of cultural autonomy. In contrast to Lijphart (1977, p.146), Lewis recommended a specific electoral threshold for coalition incorporation and argued in favor of a specific proportional representation vote allocation rule. Disagreement between the two scholars did exist concerning specific, optimal governance mechanisms. In addition to suggesting an electoral threshold for coalitions, Lewis (1965, p.81) differed from Lijphart in believing that having "a small party in opposition is good." Lijphart, on the other hand, advocated "grand" coalitions composed of all parties, which would render any electoral thresholds inappropriate. Even in his earlier works, Lijphart (1977, p.146-147) addressed and criticized specific proportional representation vote allocation rules, including Lewis's suggested one of the Single Transferable Vote. While Lijphart (1977, p.170) maintains that consociationalism "will have to be introduced by elites," he interprets Lewis as implying that Lewis's proposed system can "originate at the mass level." Also in contrast to Lijphart, Lewis (1965, p.83-84) explicitly argues that elites' replacement of institutions cannot independently introduce the preferred system and must be accompanied by mass-level political culture modification. Lijphart (1977, p.146) points out that Lewis's recommendations are "products of his creative imagination" that were inspired by cases completely different from those which provoked Lijphart's study of consociationalism. Lewis's idea was also published a few years before any mention by Lijphart of consociationalism. Therefore, it seems possible that, when he began to consider the topic, Lijphart may have been partially influenced by his agreement with Lewis's general idea and disagreement with his description of ideal coalition arrangements and vote allocation formulas.

Lijphart's distinction between Lewis's general concept and recommendations which he believes Lewis should have omitted, draws attention to his belief that consociationalism can be defined according to its political requirements, such as grand coalition, or the general effects produced by them, such as preservation of cultural autonomy. Although he
distinguishes his concept from Lorwin’s notion of "segmented pluralism" and Lehmbruch’s of "concordant democracy," Lijphart (1977, p.5) implies that the effects of his consociationalism reflect these concepts' core meanings. Lijphart (1977, p.5) explains that “concordant democracy... is the second feature of consociational government” and that his consociationalism means "segmented pluralism, if it is broadened to include all possible segmental cleavages in a plural society, and combined with concordant democracy." He thus acknowledges that his theory closely resembles Lorwin’s and Lehmbruch’s (Lijphart, 1977, p.5). Information regarding the direction of influence, or existence of any influence, between the intellectual contributions of Lijphart, Lorwin, and Lehmbruch is not readily available. Publication dates of their articles suggest that these scholars presented their similar ideas within only a few years of one another. Lorwin and Lehmbruch may have influenced Lijphart's system and theory as they were represented initially or within his decades-long evolution of their details. Therefore, analysis of their contributions may facilitate precise and accurate definition of the components of Lijphart’s consociational system.

Lorwin (1971, p.33) defines "segmented pluralism" as the institutionalization of associations, that correspond to diverse societal affiliations. Lorwin (1971, p.35) agrees with Lijphart's later recommendation that such segments must voluntarily form. Also like Lijphart, he includes in his theory conditions favorable to this system. He similarly believes that smallness of states, external international relations, and prior traditions of elite accommodation influence states' abilities to introduce segmental institutionalization (Lorwin, 1971, p.40-44). Lijphart and Lorwin (1971, p.44) agree that such institutionalization is sometimes manifested through federalism but that federalism is sometimes inappropriate for dividing geographically dispersed groups. Both scholars also believe that proportional representation and coalitions are conducive to segmental institutionalization. However, Lorwin (1971, p.44) argues that, if there are more than two major segmental parties, shifting coalitions can be an alternative to Lijphart’s (1977, p.30) prescribed, all-inclusive grand coalition. Lorwin succinctly describes the two academics' shared general premise, reflected in their theories: "If meaningful personal contacts with people of other subcultures are few, so are the occasions for personal hostility" (Lijphart, 1977, p.88). However, Lorwin (1971, p.36) interestingly appears to somewhat disagree with Lijphart concerning the optimum level of such segregation, since he believes that "complete... segmentation" can potentially cause "interest-group and political life" to “become too stifling, and perhaps even explosive.” While Lijphart and Lorwin appear to agree on most of the core issues involving institutionalized "segmental cleavages," analysis of the similarities and disagreements between their contributions emphasizes the distinctive elements of prototypical consociational systems and which of those may prove less conducive to the achievement of stability in plural societies. Their areas of disagreement involve the optimal level of segmental segregation and
alternatives to Lijphart's notion of grand coalition, which is also somewhat inconsistent with Lewis' descriptions of advisable electoral thresholds and oppositions.

Although he differentiates between his theory and Lehmbuch's "concordant democracy," Lijphart also claims that consociational democracy is basically equivalent to concordant democracy, when the latter is combined with a form of segmented pluralism. Lehmbuch (1974, p.92) believes that negotiation between segments in heterogeneous societies necessitates either division of political systems into largely autonomous, segment-specific spheres of interest, or agreement on "large-scale barter similar to package deals." Lehmbuch's (1974, p.93, 96) presentation of factors conducive to the system he describes, such as historical traditions, international influences, and state size, also parallels Lijphart's and Lorwin's inclusion of similar factors in their theories. In contrast to Lijphart and Lorwin, Lehmbuch (1974, p.95-96) believes that, if "several independent centers of political power" exist in a society, "these can use the majority principle not as the fundamental device of conflict management and the ultimate source of legitimacy, but as an auxiliary expedient to avoid deadlock." Like the others, he believes that the majority principle in societies with only two such groups should simply be considered "inapplicable" (Lehmbuch, 1974, p.96).

Lehmbuch's belief that limited majoritarianism is compatible with democracy and Lijphart's presentation of Lehmbuch's theory as approximating consociationalism suggest that it may not be impossible to beneficially combine some elements of consociationalism with constrained majoritarianism, even though Lijphart and most consociational scholars consider these mechanisms to be inimical to each other. Lewis, Lorwin, Lehmbuch, and the intellectual tradition exemplified by Renner all agree with Lijphart that cultural autonomy and provision for all groups' political empowerment is required for peace in multicultural states. Lijphart acknowledges this similarity and thus suggests that his formulation of consociationalism may have been influenced by what he judged to be their merits and mistakes.

While likening his theory to Lehmbuch's, Lijphart interestingly omits any discussion of Lehmbuch's belief that, under some circumstances, an element of majoritarianism may actually enhance relations between diverse groups. Lijphart now argues that there is a direct, positive relationship between the extent of political and administrative proportionality in a society and its constituent groups' abilities to coexist peacefully. In contrast, Lehmbuch prescribes limited majoritarianism in certain societies to eliminate decision-making deadlock. Horowitz similarly prescribes electoral formulae that maximize both proportionality and incentives for negotiation, for achievement of stability in divided societies. Lorwin argues that complete segregation of segments is not conducive to peace maintenance and that such segregation is also strengthened through prioritization of proportionality over negotiation promotion, when choosing electoral rules. Lorwin's and Lehmbuch's implicit warnings about
excessive proportionality and consequent segment segregation emphasizes the importance of discerning the effects of consociational proportionality and group separation on stability in plural societies. Lewis's and Lorwin's statements concerning optimal coalition behavior similarly challenged Lijphart's recommendation that all population segments be included in consociational "grand coalitions." Apparently to avoid the oligarchical potential of such "grand coalitions," Lewis suggests that small oppositions are beneficial and Lorwin recommends shifting coalitions for consociational-like systems.

Analysis of contributions by Renner, Lewis, Lorwin, and Lehmbruch suggest that Lijphart's core concept is one that makes intuitive sense to many people, who came to agree with it from varied international perspectives. It emphasizes that many of the core components of Lijphart's system have been consistently associated with one another, not just by Lijphart, but by a number of other scholars who appear to have worked independently of Lijphart. Their theories and observations illustrate the importance of testing the effects of those elements more particular to Lijphart's theory, such as extreme proportionality, complete absence of majoritarianism, and all-inclusive coalitions. However, more importantly, their fundamental similarities with one another and Lijphart's work powerfully challenge the claim that Lijphart's evolution of this system precludes replicable identification of its components in a manner conducive to valid scientific analysis.

Lijphart's Model of Consociationalism

Lijphart's version of consociationalism dominates academic treatment of ethnic conflict today. However, Lijphart and analysts of his work have interpreted his system and theory differently and suggested many modifications of it. The system's consistent core components are more accurately identified when distinguished from their portrayal in the many assessments regarding its international applicability that have been contributed by other scholars.

Analysis of Lijphart's notion of consociationalism is complicated by his presentation of it as both descriptive and prescriptive. In a 1968 publication, Lijphart identified consociation inductively through analysis of Dutch political patterns (Bogaards, 1998, p.499). However, he only began to prescribe its introduction after recognizing similar systems in other states. His derivation of conditions conducive to establishment of consociation resulted in almost unanimous interpretation of the theory's descriptive and normative aspects as inextricably linked. Lijphart (1991, p.499) explains that "a distinction must be made between [it] as an empirical theory and as a normative or prescriptive theory." Overall, Lijphart appears more dedicated to the latter approach to consociationalism, since he is evidently more
concerned with prescribing it to resolve conflict than with empirically proving his
publication, he explains that he:

deliberately opted for a definition of consociationalism in broad and inclusive terms. The
obvious disadvantage is that these terms do not lend themselves to manageable
operational definitions and precise measurements. Therefore their utility for measuring
differences between democracies and changes within democracies is rather limited
(Lijphart, 1989a, p.142).

This attitude obviously frustrates those more concerned with the scientific validity of
Lijphart's theory. They see the "central task for consociationalism [as] revolv[ing] around
trying to actually establish valid causal relationships" (Taylor, 1994, p.167). Lijphart (1985,
p. 115) argues that "virtually all social scientific knowledge is probabilistic in nature" but
some scholars, such as Barry (1975a, p. 489), do argue that Lijphart’s theory could be
disproven by country specific evidence. As it has evolved thus far, Lijphart's
consociationalism aspires to describe a governmental system conducive to ethnic harmony
and prescribe this system for use elsewhere. He has not aimed to prove the validity of many
of its generalizations empirically. Inconsistencies within Lijphart’s body of descriptions of
consociationalism complicates valid empirical testing of his theory but distillation of a
consistent specification of his system will allow achievement of this goal. His central claim
that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies is falsifiable.

Examination of existing analyses of consociationalism suggests that Lijphart believes
that accurate descriptions and maximization of stability in plural societies are much more
important than refraining from revision of his work to facilitate its empirical assessment. He
argues that detection of inconsistencies throughout his body of work on consociationalism is
not "fair" because his recent work incorporates "the many refinements and improvements that
[he has] been steadily trying to achieve" (Lijphart, 1998, p.149). To distill a valid definition
of consociationalism appropriate for future studies, it seems necessary to identify those
elements that have survived unchanged in his work. In addition, comparison between his
portrayal of these elements and discussion of them by other academics should illustrate how
consociationalism is now generally interpreted. It should be noted that, although he sees the
details of its components as subject to revision, Lijphart (1985, p.503) "emphasize[s] the
'inseparability'" of its four core components and maintains that consociational power-sharing
"cannot work well- and certainly not optimally- if one or more are missing."

Although Lijphart has revised many elements of his definition of consociationalism
over the past thirty years, a general description of the phenomenon undeniably has survived in
his work. His general definition of consociational democracy has remained a system in which
"the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative
attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population" (Lijphart,
1977, p.1). Boulle explains that academics have approached consociationalism from three different perspectives. None of these contradict Lijphart's fundamental portrayal of the concept. The perspectives he identifies are:

first, as a pattern of social structure which emphasizes the degree of ... segmentation in a society; secondly, as a pattern of élite behavior, emphasizing the process of decision-making and conflict regulation; and thirdly, ... as an underlying characteristic of the political culture arising from historical circumstances (Boulle, 1984, p.45).

These perspectives also emphasize the centrality and consistency of the components of Lijphart's system corresponding to segmental autonomy and grand, intergroup coalitions. Aspects of Lijphart's general definition of his consociational system must be examined in depth to ensure that the precise version to be used will enable accurate and scientifically valid assessment of his theory.

Lijphart (1977, p.25) has always defined consociationalism in terms of the maintenance of four core, political functions: grand coalitions, segmental isolation, proportionality, and mutual veto power. In one of his earliest relevant publications, Lijphart (1977, p.25, 31) explains that the "grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society" is the "prototypical" consociational device. However, he explains that the essential characteristic of this element is, not its institutional incarnation but, its inclusion of "all significant segments in governing a plural society" (Lijphart, 1977, p.31). According to a 1996 publication by Lijphart (1996a, p.259-260), consociational "grand coalitions" can consist of cabinet coalitions of political parties, coalitions "in sites other than the cabinet," cabinet coalitions defined in group rather than party terms, proportional allocation of top governmental offices, or even one party government by very socially inclusive parties. Lijphart (1989a, p.141) even considers "informal grand coalition[s] to resolve a sudden crisis" as consociational. Juan Linz (1992, p.124) suggests that such informal coalitions are the sole form of consociationalism compatible with presidentialism. Lijphart (1992, p.217) contends that the "concentration of executive power in ... one person is inimical to the basic idea of shared power" but agrees with Linz that it is "not completely impossible" for consociational elements to appear in such systems. However, Lijphart (1991, p.494) believes this can also be achieved through "distribution" of the "presidency and other high offices among the different groups." Ronald Kieve (1981, p.315) interestingly contends that "presidential councils" can also perform the function of consociational grand coalitions. Kieve's observation and those of Lijphart and other analysts seem to agree that, to be consociational, something organizationally approximating a "grand coalition" must include representatives from all major social groups and must significantly influence political decisions made in their state. To examine the influence of both consociationalism and its individual components on stability in plural societies, this study will require quantitative
representation of the existence of phenomena constituting “grand coalitions.” This and the other independent, potentially causal variables are described in Chapter 5 and Appendix D. Lijphart advocates allocation of substantial power to each potentially antagonistic segment. For this reason, the variables corresponding to this consociational component were designed to identify those years of states' histories when the presence of this power could be verified through confirmation that such groups were represented in governing executives.

Lijphart (1977, p.36) describes the three remaining elements of consociationalism as "secondary" to "grand coalition." However, Colin Knox (1995, p.4) understandably interprets Lijphart's emphasis on the inclusion of culturally distinct groups as indicative of a greater prioritization of one of these three, “segmental autonomy.” Soon after Lijphart first introduced his notion of consociationalism, Val Lorwin argued that it was itself a "function of the structure of the social cleavage" (McRae, 1974a, p.5). Lijphart (1977, p.41) describes this concept of "segmental autonomy" as consisting of "rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern." "Segmental autonomy" thereby "ramifies subcultural divisions and legitimises subcultural encapsulation" (Halpern, 1986, p.191). It can manifest itself as "a formal territorial federal system, a non-territorial federation, or a system in which decision-making is delegated to private segmental organisations" (Lijphart, 1989a, p.141).

Lijphart believes that peace can be maintained in societies suffering from ethnic conflict through institutional segregation of the main subcultures. Matthew Gabel (1998, p.463) actually interprets Lijphart's segments as sufficiently segregated to justify their analogy to member states of the European Union. Jurg Steiner observes that Lijphart and other academics have not yet conclusively identified the optimal extent of segregation for consociation. However, Steiner (1981, p.1241) has identified minimum indicators of autonomy necessary for a system to be identified as consociational. He observes that the presence of "segmental autonomy" requires that cultural groups are clearly distinguishable and have their own identities, that these groups have "political relevance," and that intergroup mobility and marriage are rare (Steiner, 1981, p.1242). Similarly, Halpern (1986, p.192) identifies as assumptions of "segmental autonomy" that:

The subcultures must be politically organised... they must be unified and responsive to this internal authority:... there are areas of interest which separate the goals of the subcultures from one another and the state; and, of course,... each subculture, its leaders and its goals must be recognised and deemed legitimate by the state.

Lijphart's descriptions of subcultural autonomy are consistent with these portrayals of his consociational component corresponding to the phenomenon.

Lijphart initially advocated elites' semi-intuitive identification of those subcultures worthy of sub-state autonomy. However, he has now come to believe that such empowerment scenarios can more accurately reflect intergroup relations, be designed in a neutral fashion,
and be responsive to social change if they naturally evolve through citizens' interaction with a "proportional representation" electoral system, "multiparty coalition government, and cultural councils" (Lijphart, 1991, p.499). For instance, in reference to South Africa, Lijphart (1998, p.144) explains that, "instead of positing that ethnic divisions are rigid and immutable, I have argued that their frequent fluidity makes it advisable not to pre-determine any ethnic or other groups in consociational systems and instead to let these groups define themselves." Lijphart (1995, p.281) specifies that this procedure is best introduced through elections according to a "relatively pure form of PR" which will encourage representation of "even very small parties." He points out that his definition of plural societies "implies" that one indication that a society is "genuinely plural" is that its parties are "organized along segmental lines" (Lijphart, 1995, p.281). These PR elections enhance the extent to which a society is plural according to this definition and facilitate groups' appropriate political empowerment, by promoting the development of parties representing all politically significant, potentially antagonistic groups. In this way, PR "allow[s] the segments to manifest themselves in the form of political parties" and so "electoral success" can be recognized as one type of "proof of segmental autonomy" (Lijphart, 1995, p.281). Lijphart (1995, p.281) points out that this situation will also enable distinction between plural and non-plural societies, since the successful parties in plural societies will most closely correspond to ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, or racial groups, while those in non-plural ones will be "non-segmental policy-oriented parties." He also describes how these electorally self-determined groups should be granted political power. Lijphart (1995, p.282) recommends that each of the group-oriented parties which will naturally dominate plural societies should be granted representation in the cabinet, if they achieve "a specified minimum size in parliament." Posts and/or opportunities to be given in proportion to group size, as well as veto power and segmental autonomy rights, should also be allocated to each party which achieves this minimum amount of electoral influence (Lijphart, 1995, p.282). Lijphart (1995, p.282) points out that segregation resulting from segmental autonomy would be voluntary under this system, because groups will only be granted segmental autonomy powers if their members vote in a manner that illustrates their desire for them. This refinement of consociationalism allows groups’ identities and relative strengths to be “naturally and continually self-adjusting,” according to the results of subsequent elections. This avoids conflict inspired by resentment concerning demographic changes that render groups’ population and political strengths incommensurate, like those which arguably caused the collapse of Lebanon’s first consociational system in the 1970’s. Lijphart’s revision of his position concerning the optimal means for identifying groups to be granted segmental autonomy illustrates that his modifications of consociational theory were motivated by a desire to assist divided societies.
and emphasizes the inadvisability of dismissing it as falsifiable because of inconsistencies in his body of work that were created by this revision.

The remaining two elements required for Lijphart's (1977, p.25) consociationalism involve proportionality and a mutual veto, or "concurrent majority," rule. The proportionality element in these systems is "the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds" (Lijphart, 1977, p.25). This proportionality is reflected in the makeup of grand coalitions and it should also determine the constitution of the assembly cabinet and committees, "broadly in proportion to party strengths" (Lijphart, 1996, p.271; Lijphart, 1994, p.225). In order for subcultures to be represented in proportion to their sizes, these political parties must coincide with subcultural boundaries and Lijphart seems to recently have improved his prescribed means for achieving this, by recommending subcultures' self-identification of political categories. Lijphart (1996a, p.261) explains that the "normal" and preferable method of reflecting proportionality in elections is the use of a proportional representation system of vote allocation. Lijphart (1989a, p.141) discerns that proportionality in election results can also be achieved through other electoral systems, such as "a plurality single-member district system when the segments are geographically concentrated." He argues that, although India does not have a proportional representation electoral system, it is consociational. He believes that sufficient institutional and policy proportionality is engendered by the Indian plurality system, among geographically concentrated "minorities," and by the predominant Congress Party's repeated, manufactured, largely inclusive majorities, which have "been deliberately protective of the various religious and linguistic minorities (Lijphart, 1996a, 261). He is impressed by institutional and policy results of the Indian electoral system and he believes that other systems producing similar results also qualify as consociations. Lijphart (1991, p.507) similarly identifies the Malaysian and Canadian systems as consociational and generally implies that his consociational requirement of proportionality refers to political results, rather than specific electoral formulas. In two articles involving Horowitz's advocacy of the Alternative Vote (AV) electoral system for deeply divided societies, Lijphart (1991, p. 93; 1997, p.9) focuses on arguing that the relationship between seats and votes produced by AV is very unproportional and that AV does not yield levels of moderation, representativeness, and responsiveness that facilitate stability. Lijphart's overriding concern with the results, rather than the specific configurations, of systems is also emphasized through other academics' responses to his claims. The extent to which electoral systems allocate seats proportionally can be represented in this analysis through variables indicating the presence of different systems. Lijphart's focus on results as indicators of consociationalism illustrates the justifiability of quantitatively

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6 Halpern (1986, p.191) pointed out that subcultures would not be represented proportionally, unless political parties perfectly corresponded to subcultures' boundaries.
representing the system through data corresponding to both laws mandating the existence of its components, as well as manifestations of their actual use.

The fourth, and final, element necessary for achievement of Lijphart's consociationalism is mutual veto power that can be exercised by subcultures. Mutual veto power, which he also describes as "negative minority rule" and "concurrent majority" power, is employed in consociations to protect minorities against political defeats judged to jeopardize their "vital interests" (Lijphart, 1977, p.36-37). To detect consociationalism in a replicable fashion, some defensible definition of these "vital interests" must be ascertained. Analysts of Lijphart's work provide slightly different descriptions of them, which may facilitate their delineation. Kotze (2001) portrays the mutual veto as a guarantee of "sovereignty in matters important to" segments, while Gabel (1998, p.465) describes it as "the power to block any attempt to eliminate or reduce their autonomy." Perhaps international classification of exactly which policy matters are covered by this throughout the world is unnecessary for valid definition of consociationalism, since what is relevant is its interpretation by each population. The only point about mutual vetoes' potential subject matter relevant to international study of consociationalism is whether there is unanimous identification of potential claims and consistent political treatment of them, in individual consociational states. Assuming that all groups have this mutual veto power and consider consequent policy jurisdictions as legitimate, Lijphart argues that mutual veto power is unlikely to cause minority tyranny. He believes this is so because all minorities will have the power and thus each will be aware of the potential for reprisals, deadlock, and general insecurity, should it be used in a manner that seems improper (Lijphart, 1977, p.37). Apparently, Lijphart's (1991, p.495) only advice to the individual groups is that this power "works best when it is not used too often and only with regard to issues of fundamental importance." He explains that this mutual veto power can be manifested in either formal, legal form or as an "informal and unwritten understanding" (Lijphart, 1977, p.38). A type of consistently operational mutual veto power can be instituted through a requirement for consensus or some proportion of representatives' agreement, in the decision-making process (Lijphart, 1996, p.271; Lijphart, 1994, p.223).

However, the successful performance of the mutual veto provision depends on the popular legitimacy of its policy jurisdiction, its application, and the identity of those groups given the power to veto. Analysts of Lijphart's consociationalism seem to slightly disagree concerning what is required of a group, for it to be given such veto power. MacDonald (1992, p.713) believes that such vetoes can be "wielded by any group or party," while Adam (1994, p.32) sees this power as only being held by "[e]ach significant subgroup." Hudson emphasizes the necessity for agreement throughout the population about which groups are to be considered deserving of mutual veto power. In his discussion of Lebanese
"consociationalism," he points out that, from the perspective of Shi'ites and Druze, this veto power was not legitimate because it was not held by their groups (Hudson, 1988, p.227). One could argue that, if identification of empowered groups is seen as illegitimate in a specific state, true consociationalism has not been attained there. Of course, if no "consociational" state has ever enjoyed this sort of legitimacy, this might suggest that widespread acceptance of designated groups cannot be achieved in consociational systems. Even if groups are allowed to identify themselves as subcultures deserving such empowerment, mutual veto mechanisms may become unsustainable. The more groups that are involved, the greater the likelihood that every legislative proposal will be vetoed. Perhaps we cannot include a specification involving number of subcultures in a definition that is designed to be applied to existing states in a replicable manner. The diversity of country specific perspectives and practices concerning the identification of groups that should be granted this power illustrates the inadvisability of employing one equation to ascertain how many, or which, groups must be empowered in each country, if it is using the minority veto consociational component. To avoid using such an equation, but to simultaneously ensure objective, international identification of this power, a list of "Minorities at Risk" compiled for a separate project and information taken from each country's constitution will be analyzed to make the data used in this study to represent minority veto power.

Identification of consociational government internationally also requires definition of these four core components so that they are theoretically compatible with each other, when they exist in their purest forms. Grand coalitions and segmental autonomy can exist in their purest manifestations with each other and with proportionality or mutual veto. However, one statement by Lijphart suggests that his notions of proportionality and groups' veto power may not be completely compatible. He explains that, as far as political representation is concerned, two extensions of proportionality entail even greater deviations from majority rule and give special protection to small minorities: the overrepresentation of small minorities and parity of representation. They are particularly useful alternatives to proportionality ...(Lijphart, 1979, p.501).^7

Overrepresentation is not representation according to strength of segments, no matter how this strength is measured. It actually constitutes a form of veto power for minorities. Overrepresentation is thus compatible with the veto requirement but not with that of proportionality. Lijphart is the only theorist of consociationalism who has contributed a list of its core elements and they are internationally recognized as the components of consociationalism. Therefore, it seems reasonable to interpret exactly what he means by this prescription of overrepresentation and to attempt to incorporate it into the definition to be quantitatively represented in this study. Lijphart apparently means that each segment in a

^7 The italics shown here did not exist in the original text.
consociational system should be represented as if it is approximately equally strong, so that segments will treat each others' demands seriously. After these strengths are determined, he implicitly prescribes that they be fixed at least in the short term, to engender segments' feelings of security. By proportionality, he means that these groups should be granted policy-making influence in proportion to their designated overall strengths. He does not recommend a precise means of deducing the prudent strength to be allocated to each segment. This implicitly suggested modification of what is normally termed "proportionality" has been adopted by international policy makers. In South Africa and Northern Ireland, it is obvious that they have interpreted consociationalism as a means of legitimizing the promise of permanent substantial power, regardless of actual numbers of White South Africans and members of both Northern Irish segments. Although they are both designed to enhance the political power of minorities, it must be kept in mind that Lijphart’s consociational components of proportionality and minority veto power have different specific aims and functions. While proportionality is designed to allocate positions in representative bodies in an egalitarian manner, minority veto is the requirement that certain group, irrespective to their relative sizes, have an equal ability to actually affect government policy. Since they focus on different things, representation and decision-making capability, they are not actually theoretically antithetical to one another or incompatible but their coexistence as consociational components emphasizes the theory’s simultaneous dual approach regarding group size.

Lijphart has not modified his recommendations for proportionality and minority veto, throughout the body of his work. However, he has extensively revised other elements of his theory, and particularly the conditions that he believes are favorable to its institutionalization. If his theory is judged only in terms of its descriptive potential, as a means of governance, these conditions are not very significant because they concern the introduction, rather than the function, of consociationalism. If, on the other hand, the object is to study his theory's prescriptive value, some distilled version of these conditions must be derived. Because this study’s primary aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of consociationalism as an ethnic conflict resolution device, interpretation of these conditions is unnecessary. However, when feasible, they will be included in this study to ensure that they are not themselves responsible for effects which are usually attributed to consociationalism. For instance, one of these conditions, concerning small population size, may conceivably encourage introduction of consociationalism and the effects that it appears to produce. The variables used to represent these conditions in this analysis will be identified in Chapter 5.

Although Lijphart has consistently revised his theory and optimal consociational system over the past few decades, his unwavering espousal of the system's four core elements illustrates that it is methodologically appropriate to define it as comprising these components,
to facilitate its quantitative assessment. Other scholars’ work concerning systems similar to consociationalism that was developed independently of Lijphart also will be examined, to ascertain how consistently these core elements were associated with their systems and the extent to which this project’s conclusions will thus be relevant to their work, as well as Lijphart’s.

Conclusion

Analysis of the varied, historical uses of the term, consociationalism, emphasizes that a theoretically sound, empirically testable definition of Lijphart’s system of governance can be analyzed. Versions of consociationalism constructed independently of Lijphart are compatible with, and share some element of, his general definition of the concept. Lijphart’s theory reflects the term’s historical meaning and this enhances its credibility as representative of a body of thought that is centuries old. For the purposes of this project designed to evaluate Lijphart’s claims for consociational systems, they are defined as those which consistently experience all or some of the components, grand coalitions, segmental autonomy, policy influence proportional to designated segmental strength, and provision for mutual veto. Representation of these components in this analysis will enable their repercussions to be individually identified and assessed.
CHAPTER 3:
RESPONSES TO LIJPHART’S WORK INVOLVING CONSOCIATIONALISM

Apparently because it challenges previous assumptions concerning sources of stability and suggests a means of resolving severe inter-group conflicts, Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism has inspired extensive commentary. Most discussions of consociationalism involve the theory’s scientific credibility and the experience of the system in various countries. While one set of scholars has persuasively criticized both the theory and system which it prescribes, another has embraced Lijphart’s work and recognized the existence of consociationalism in entities as diverse as the European Union and Surinam. Policymakers in at least three deeply divided societies, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and South Africa, have expressed their respect for Lijphart’s consociationalism by institutionalizing some of its components (Reilly, 1999, p.45, 47; Reilly & Reynolds, 1997, p.10). Examination of existing works involving consociationalism will emphasize the importance of ascertaining whether consociationalism does encourage stability in plural societies. Recognition of the objections put forth by the academic community will also confirm that the version of Lijphart’s system to be tested in this study is optimal for quantitative analysis. In addition, a review of this literature will suggest some factors which may be found to influence consociationalism’s ability to promote conflict resolution.

Lijphart has also inspired multiple explorations of the question of where elements of consociationalism should, and can, be institutionalized and successfully in promote stability. Other scholars have extensively discussed the existence and potential for consociationalism in a wide range of societies, including Austria, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the European Union, Fiji, the Former Yugoslavia, Gambia, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Surinam, and Switzerland. Examinations of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have primarily focused on testing Lijphart’s claims that these countries have exhibited extensive

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8 The following is a list of a selection of sources corresponding to all of the societies in this list except for Belgium and Switzerland, for which publications are indicated in later footnotes in this chapter:

evidence of consociationalism. Substantial debate has emerged concerning the advisability and/or possibility of promoting consociationalism in the Former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and particularly South Africa. Most publications discussing consociationalism and these four societies have focused on this question. In contrast, the majority of academic contributions regarding the remaining countries in this list, such as Canada, Colombia, and the European Union, have examined the role or arguable presence of consociationalism or used the theory to explain developments in these cases. For instance, Noel (1971, p.18) explores consociational theory because “it offers a way of viewing the Canadian political process” and McRae (1974, p.238) does so to ascertain “how closely the Canadian experience has approached the consociational model… and… consider whether the… model suggests possible reforms for the existing Canadian system.” Dix (1980) and Springer (1997) similarly evaluate the extent to which Colombia has experienced consociationalism. In his discussion of the stability of the European Union’s supranational authority, Gabel (1998) also approaches consociationalism uncritically, using consociational theory as “an empirically verified explanation of the stability of governing institutions whose authority depends on voluntary compliance.” A survey of all society-specific commentaries concerning consociationalism illustrates the influence of the theory and system, as topics of controversy, a seriously considered policy recommendation, and means of understanding individual countries’ political situations.

Part 1:
Is Lijphart’s Body of Work Concerning Consociationalism Scientifically Falsifiable?

Lijphart’s body of work concerning consociationalism arguably includes numerous invalid observations, assumptions, and conclusions. Lustick (1997, p.90) believes that most of the theory’s scientific defects crept into Lijphart’s work as he revised his approach in response to criticisms and a “changing evidentiary base.” Lijphart (1998, p.149) responds to this claim by arguing that his constant improvement of consociational theory means that it is not “fair” of Lustick to “detect all kinds of ‘inconsistencies’” within his body of work on the subject. In an article published fifteen years before, Lijphart (1984a, p.15) also points out that revisions he had introduced were “most[ly] … small,” and “do not affect the fundamental propositions of consociational theory.” He asserts: “I believe that the theory has stood the test of time and continues to be of value both empirically and prescriptively” (Lijphart, 1984a, p.15). The fact that a core definition of consociationalism, comprising the consistent aim and four core components of the system, has remained intact throughout his work, indicates that its basic elements have not been substantially changed by his revisions of the theory.
Lustick (1997) argues that Lijphart’s elaboration of the theory, to remedy problems identified by other scholars, renders his body of work unfalsifiable. Lijphart (2000, p.425; 1998, p.149) repeatedly maintains that, within his body of work concerning consociationalism, “many seemingly contradictory statements are not true contradictions but attempts to improve and refine earlier formulations.” Lustick (1997) contends out that this evolution has become problematic because such a broad range of phenomena can be portrayed as consistent with some version of Lijphart’s theory. For instance, through reference to his evolving theory, but also undoubtedly in response to political and social change, Lijphart (1975a, 1996) changed his mind concerning Northern Ireland’s likely ability to adopt, and achieve stability with, a consociational system. Lustick (1997, p.113-117) also criticizes Lijphart’s portrayal of India as thoroughly consociational even though other scholars believe it exhibits substantial elements of majoritarianism. If it is true that Lijphart’s theory allows him to claim that any society is consociational to some extent, then his writings on this subject would seem to be collectively unfalsifiable. While this would not preclude distillation of a version of consociationalism to be tested in a scientifically sound manner, it would suggest that analysis of the body of work as a whole was problematic. Lijphart (1985, p.117) concedes that critiques of his explorations “may detract slightly from the empirical validity of consociationalism” but still contends that they “have minimal relevance to its value as a policy recommendation.” Van Schendelen (1984, p.44) interprets this attitude as indicating that Lijphart “seems to attach more value to the theory’s potential for engineering societies than to any other criterion of science.” Lustick (1997, p.111) similarly argues that “Lijphart’s struggle over time thus emerges as mainly political, to affirm consociationalism as valid (almost) regardless of its scientific status, because it serves the ends he values.”

However, Lijphart is correct in contending that the fundamental elements of consociationalism have remained unchanged in his work. Lijphart’s requirement of the same four core components to justify identification of a case as consociational suggests that, regardless of how he has changed other details of his theory, these components can be considered to collectively define consociational systems and can thus enable empirical testing of the effects of these systems.

He has occasionally evaluated their presence in specific societies through reference to the effects of institutions rather than the actual structure of institutions. For instance, in his 1996 discussion of India, he identified the presence of grand coalition through reference to the group membership of the Congress Party at some points in its history, rather than the presence of a coalition of parties, or requirement or convention for use of such a body. He has recently claimed that such effects of grand coalition, minority veto, segmental autonomy, and proportionality can be considered sufficient to constitute consociationalism, rather than existence of their institutional manifestations. However, in contrast to some of his works
which focus on claiming that individual societies are consociational, my project’s aim is to evaluate the role of this system in plural societies. The possibility of analyzing Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism in a scientifically valid manner will be explored through analysis of criticisms that question its falsifiability. These criticisms have involved Lijphart’s terminology, methodology for detecting consociationalism in practice, the relationship between cleavages and consociationalism, and the conditions which he believes are favorable to consociationalism.

“Imprecision” Of Lijphart’s Terminology

Lustick (1997, p.99) observes that the “imprecision” of Lijphart’s terms has been repeatedly criticized and claims that, without well-specified concepts, the validity of consociational theory cannot be empirically tested in a replicable manner because data must be chosen subjectively. In 1972, a few years after Lijphart first articulated this theory, Eric Nordlinger criticized “the imprecision of his terms, the awkwardness of his typology, and his mischaracterization of key cases” (Lustick, 1997, p.100). Lustick (1997, p.105) observes that Lijphart only defined key terms like “plural” and “stable” in publications following Nordlinger’s criticisms and that these characterizations were “explicit” but “far from precise.” The substantial efforts required for specification of these concepts for the purposes of their empirical examination in this study illustrate the vagueness of Lijphart’s central terms. Butenschön’s (1985, p.99) discussion of the “validity of consociational theory” exemplifies the widespread opinion that an “...important problem at the conceptual level when applying the model” is identifying the “exact meaning of the key concepts ‘plurality’, ‘stability’, [and] ‘coalescent behaviour...” M.P.C.M. Van Schendelen (1984, p.31) points out that Lijphart “considers a society as plural if it is divided by segmental cleavages” but does not explain when a “division” constitutes a “cleavage” and when a “cleavage” is “segmental.” Halpern (1986, p.194) argues that Lijphart’s apparent supposition that the terms, “plural” and “fragmented,” can be used interchangeably is false because he claims to have adopted Almond’s definition of “fragmented,” who describes it as referring to societies in which “‘all of the cultural variations have common roots and share a common heritage.’” Halpern (1986, p.194) believes that this conflation of concepts is problematic because Lijphart implies that “plural” societies are “subculturally divisive or conflictual” and their equation with “fragmented” societies has led him to “overstate the extent of divisions” in some country cases and “claim success for the model... in cases where stability preceded adoption of consociational practices.” Jürg Steiner (1981a, p.341) similarly claims that measurement of phenomena central to consociationalism is severely hampered because Lijphart “does not clearly distinguish between cultural diversity and subcultural segmentation.” Steiner (1981a,
p.341) observes that Lijphart is clearly not very interested in cultural diversity but that “much of the data” that he does use to examine cases are relevant to diversity measurement and not more significant segmentation. For instance, Lijphart uses the Index of Fragmentation designed by Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, which “merely looks at the question of how cultural attributes are distributed in a society,” instead of their potential, or actual, conflicts (Steiner, 1981a, p.341). The vagueness of Lijphart’s portrayals of “stability” has also inspired criticism, such as Van Schendelen’s (1984, p.32) observation that Lijphart defines it differently in separate publications and argues that there is “neither a logical nor a close empirical relationship between” elements of these definitions, such as “effective problem-solving” and revolution. Regardless of whether one agrees with all of these criticisms, they do illustrate that Lijphart has not defined and examined his central terms precisely enough to render them conducive to empirical analysis. Lustick (1997, p.105) asserts that Lijphart’s “imprecision in the definition of key concepts … precludes empirical testing.” However, in Chapter 2, it is shown that the key components of Lijphart’s consociationalism remain clear throughout his body of work. Their ability to promote stability can, in fact, be tested.

Lijphart responds to these criticisms concerning his apparent neglect of definitional issues. He explains that his consideration and production of increasingly precise definitions of “plural” societies has not yet yielded criteria that are “exactly measurable” and do not require “‘impressionistic’ estimation” (Lijphart, 1985, p.87). He agrees that it is unfortunate that no means of precise measurement has been invented yet (Lijphart, 1985, p.87). So far, most academic attention has focused on specifying and measuring the “plural” element of his theory to be tested here, that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. In response to critiques focusing on whether or not individual countries should be categorized as “plural” or not plural, Lijphart (1981, p.355) agrees with Steiner’s proposal that it is more accurate to “think in terms of varying degrees of pluralism” rather than “a sharp dichotomous distinction” between plural and “homogeneous” (non-plural) societies. Steiner’s (1981a, p.343-4) discussion of potential means for creating an index through which to identify these degrees illustrates that Lijphart has not been able to come up with a means of quantitatively measuring pluralism in a replicable fashion. Steiner (1981a, p.343-4) explains that factors hindering the formulation of such an index include the relative importance of cleavages in different spheres of life (such as “interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations”) and of different types of cleavages, such as those which are linguistically, ethnically, racially, and ideologically based. He also points out that manifestations of cleavages within all organizations, and particularly those which apparently contain one, particular segment, would also have to be measured and weighed in a fashion generally agreed upon by the academic community, in order to create an acceptable index (Steiner, 1981a, p.344). Steiner (1981a, p.343) persuasively argues that the possibility of
developing such an index designed to identify segmentation levels is remote and emphasizes that any index incorporating variables related to segmentation cannot be expected to provide the precise, appropriate cut-off value to distinguish plural from non-plural societies. Like Steiner, Lijphart (1981, p.357) recognizes that the index designed by Rae and Taylor which he uses measures diversity, rather than antagonism, but he convincingly argues that it should be used to aid identification of “pluralism” because a more appropriate index does not exist and, while not all diverse societies are plural, pluralism does require diversity. Lijphart (1981, p.357) observes that “it has not been possible so far to devise quantitative indices” for pluralism but argues that “it is better to make well-informed impressionistic judgments based largely on qualitative data than to make no judgment at all.”

Fortunately, Gurr’s Minorities at Risk team uses criteria unrelated to consociationalism to identify which countries are divided into culturally distinct, potentially or actually antagonistic groups that seem very akin to those groups whose presence Lijphart’s portrays as the hallmark of his “plural” societies. The Minorities at Risk project provides an independently identified, empirically replicable threshold which can justifiably be used to distinguish plural societies which should be examined in an evaluation of Lijphart’s consociational theory. This means of quantifying the concept in this theory that has been most criticized as imprecise emphasizes that ambiguities in Lijphart’s descriptions of such phenomena do not necessarily preclude their scientific evaluation. The two least precise concepts that must be specified to enable analysis of this theory are “plural societies” and “stability.” Lijphart’s descriptions of them are clear enough to enable the quantitative representation of both with data collected by other scholars for projects unrelated to consociationalism.

Disagreement Concerning Where Consociationalism Has Existed

Lijphart supports his theory through reference to his impressionistic judgments concerning countries which he identifies as having experienced consociationalism. He persuades policymakers in other countries to adopt the system by referring to its apparent successes. Several critics argue that he cannot prove that the cases he refers to as consociational actually have employed the system. Since Lijphart concedes that he cannot demonstrate which societies are plural in a replicable, empirically unassailable fashion, this makes it possible to challenge his identification of cases that he offers to exemplify the validity of his theory that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. In the absence of any agreed upon indexes through which levels of pluralism could be empirically measured, Lijphart and his critics focused on analysis of individual cases to debate consociationalism’s performance. Lustick (1997, p.101-104) summarizes the most persuasive
arguments designed to demonstrate the inaccuracies contained in Lijphart’s portrayal of the cases which he presents as most closely conforming to his consociational model.

For instance, in his most comprehensive discussion of consociationalism, Lijphart (1977, p.2) identified Switzerland as providing one of the four best “concrete examples” of how consociationalism can “be a stable and effective system of government in plural societies.” Although he originally developed his consociational theory after discerning the system’s presence in the Netherlands, Lijphart (1977, p.185) revealed the importance of the Swiss case when he explained that “the concrete Belgian and Dutch cases are only imperfect instances of consociational democracy and approximate the ideal type of consociational decision-making less closely than Austria and Switzerland.” Lijphart’s portrayal of Switzerland has inspired substantial analysis by numerous specialists but Brian Barry (1975a, p. 481-490) provides the most convincing argument that the country’s experience does not support Lijphart’s theory. Lustick (1997, p.101) succinctly explains that:

Citing the mildness of ethnic conflict in Switzerland, the use of majoritarian techniques such as binding referenda, and successful challenges to elite decisions, Barry observes that Switzerland is neither deeply divided, nor conflictual, nor consociational in design, nor stable because of undersigned consociational practices.

In his response to these charges by Barry, Lijphart (1985, p.90-91) explains why he disagrees with him, points out that others who specialize in Swiss politics have also identified the existence of consociationalism and its positive effects in the country, and remains certain that it is “clearly both consociational and spectacularly successful in maintaining peace and democracy.”

Barry, Lijphart, and other scholars have also debated the extent to which consociationalism promoted stability in Lijphart’s other most “ideal” case, Austria. Barry (1975a, p.490-1, 501) accepts that Austrian consociationalism did coincide with an introduction of greater political stability in the decades after WW2. However, he argues that consociationalism was not a “necessary condition” for this stabilization, since economic and international factors also facilitated this development and that there was little inter-segmental hostility among the Austrian masses (Barry, 1975a, p.495, 493, 499). Lijphart (1985, p.94) addresses only the economic component of Barry’s argument, contending that high increases in prosperity do not necessarily promote political stability and demonstrating this through reference to trends in Belgium, Canada, and generally within Western Europe. Van Schendelen also “raises serious questions about Lijphart’s characterization of the Netherlands as a culturally fragmented society saved from democratic instability only by consociationalism” (Lustick, 1997, p.103). Van Schendelen (1984, p.36) points out that

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specialists in Dutch politics do not all agree with Lijphart that there was any period in which there was serious inter-group antagonism and polarization along all significant “cleavages” of political debate. Lijphart (1984a, p.11) maintains that the evidence shows that Dutch society was originally very divided and consociationalism ameliorated a potentially explosive situation.

Although Lijphart’s core cases of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium seem to have attracted the most scrutiny by other scholars, his portrayals of other countries as consociational have also inspired substantial commentary.10 Halpern (1986, p.181) observes that this body of literature contains extensive “[c]ontroversy” concerning the identification of which cases are accurately described as consociational. She believes that “virtually every case that can be located within the universe can also be argued out of it” and argues that this predicament persists because Lijphart’s theory is based on “faulty and imprecise concepts” (Halpern, 1986, p.181). Halpern discusses common reasons why cases identified as consociational arguably have not experienced the system. She argues that, if consociationalism truly is a system designed to bring stability to “plural societies,” cases exhibiting a “historic lack of subcultural conflict” and the “presence of cross-cutting cleavages” cannot be considered examples of the system (Halpern, 1986, p.185). Halpern (1986, p.185-7) cites Switzerland and the Netherlands as cases which have not experienced significant conflict and points out that Lijphart has observed cross-cutting cleavages in all four of his core cases, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium. Of course, it must be recognized that Lijphart does not require an absence of cross-cutting cleavages for a society to be considered plural or consociational. On the contrary, he believes that the system will operate best in those countries which contain some cross-cutting cleavages and which he also considers to be plural. His concept of plural is somewhat vague but seems to involve significant intergroup divisions but not necessarily a complete absence of all cross-cutting cleavages.

Another set of criticisms involves the presence of a “grand” government coalition which Lijphart considers to be the most crucial element of consociationalism. Halpern (1986, p.187-8) argues that this component actually has been absent in systems which Lijphart has described as consociational. She points out that even apparently ideal grand coalitions, such as that in Switzerland, do not necessarily conform to Lijphart’s vision of how such bodies operate. Halpern (1986, p.188) explains that “Members of the [Swiss] Federal Council do not sit as sectarian elites poised to represent and defend the interests of their group” because

10 Discussions and criticisms concerning the experience of consociationalism in Belgium have not been examined here because this chapter is designed to only give an overview of the types of literature that have been produced in response to Lijphart’s theory. Some works which have discussed Belgium in relation to consociational theory are: Covell (1981), Deshouwer (1994), Dierickx (1978), Dunn (1972), Hooghe (1993), and Pijnenburg (1984).
“each member serves as an unaffiliated individual.” She quotes Dunn (1972, p.18), who tells us that each Swiss member “is expected to be able to rise above partisan politics and seek the common good according to the dictates of his conscience” and “does not take orders from the party that he previously belonged to.” However, Lijphart also believes that consociationalism can actually render itself obsolete in the long term by creating and strengthening widespread feelings of security, which in turn facilitate the change of a society’s political focus from defence of group interests to issues that transcend the old intergroup divide. If Swiss politicians no longer focus on defending their groups, this is arguably the result of many years of successful experience with a consociational system that is becoming obsolete. However, it is true that a great deal of analysis by those with extensive country specific knowledge has challenged Lijphart’s observations concerning the presence of consociational components in specific societies.

Substantial debate has arisen over many of the cases which Lijphart identifies as consociational. The first countries he discussed, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria, have attracted the most attention but even cases such as India, which he only identified as consociational in 1996, have also inspired significant discussion. In 1991, Brass (p.342) criticized all scholars analyzing consociationalism for “consistently ignor[ing] the experience of India, the largest, most culturally diverse society in the world that has, except for a period of two years, functioned with a highly competitive and distinctly adversarial system of politics.” His depiction of the Indian political system is not clear-cut: “it is not a consociational democracy at all, though it has adopted many consociational devices, some permanently, some temporarily” (Brass, 1991, p.343). G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (1979, p.296) similarly observed that Lijphart’s neglect of India and some other countries was “troubling” because they were also plural societies that have been successful in establishing democratic stability. Perhaps in response to Brass and Bingham Powell’s comments, in 1996, Lijphart (p. 258) published an extensive argument claiming that India constitutes an “impressive confirming” case of consociationalism. Barry (1975, p. 396) presents another country-specific sort of criticism when he argues that, in Canada and Northern Ireland, it is “probabl[e]” that introduction of consociationalism would “exacerbate” conflicts experienced there. The relationship between consociationalism and many individual countries has been both criticized and neutrally discussed.

Lijphart’s consociational theory has also prompted other criticisms related to the entire body of cases he presents as exemplifying the system. Bingham Powell (1979, p.296) is disappointed by Lijphart’s failure to discuss countries comprising plural societies that have achieved stable democracy without consociationalism and consociational practices used in “less ‘plural’ cases, such as Venezuela.” The plural societies which Bingham Powell (1979, p.296) identifies as plural, stable, but not consociational, are India, Ceylon, the Philippines,
and Trinidad. In response to this criticism, Lijphart (1985, p.103) argues that Ceylon and Trinidad are only superficially democracies because they allowed coercive “control” of minorities and that, in the Filipino system in place until 1972, the “Moslem minority was excluded” from power. Later, Lijphart argues that India is consociational but he does not discuss cases which Bingham Powell identifies as not plural but consociational. Perhaps Lijphart does not discuss this category because he defines consociationalism as a system existing in plural societies and, according to that description, apparently consociational but non-plural countries cannot actually be consociational. On the other hand, a number of other publications have criticized Lijphart for identifying countries as consociational which are arguably not plural, or were not plural when they were supposedly consociational. Halpern (1986, p. 194) believes that insufficiently precise specification of Lijphart’s concept of “plural” results in fundamental flaws in his theory:

…the universe of consociational democracy is riddled with cases which, while subculturally segmented, are not subculturally divisive or conflictual. Fragmented political cultures are not necessarily co-extensive with plural societies. The confusion of these two very different concepts leads Lijphart to overstate the extent of the division in many of the societies from which he derives the model and to claim success for the model as a conflict-regulating device in cases where stability preceded the adoption of consociational practices.

Lijphart has been criticized in a number of publications for identifying periods of countries’ experiences as consociational even though, during them and the periods immediately preceding them, their societies were not plural. For instance, Nordlinger (1972, p.15) argues that the Netherlands was not experiencing intense conflict during the period initially referred to by Lijphart. Barry (1975a, p.501) claims that Switzerland also did not exhibit “deep divisions” during supposedly consociational periods. Regardless of whether their claims are correct, criticisms such as Nordlinger’s and Barry’s show that some confusion exists among academics concerning Lijphart’s methodology for identifying the existence of plural societies. Fortunately, a list of plural societies to be analysed for this project can be compiled in an objective and scientifically sound manner, through reference to Gurr’s Minorities at Risk dataset. Whether or not it is true that Lijphart has portrayed some unplural societies as consociational, it is still very appropriate to examine his central theory that consociationalism encourages stability in plural societies.

Debate Concerning The Relationship Between Cleavages And Consociationalism

Some criticisms of consociationalism examine Lijphart’s treatment of cleavages, as well as levels of pluralism. Lijphart’s sharp departure from the initially widespread view that “cross-cutting” inter-group divisions promote peace has understandably stimulated
comparison of it with consociationalism. Barry (1975a, p.487) believes that the notion that “cross-cutting between political parties and socio-cultural cleavage lines moderates conflict seems… much more plausible and better supported.” He observes that, in reality, this causal relationship may be reversed and cross-cutting may just be produced by conflict moderation but, even if this is true, it does not disprove the close relationship between these two phenomena (Barry, 1975a, p.487). Barry (1975a, p.487) also points out that Steiner found evidence to suggest that the demands of Swiss political parties are often compatible and “coincide… partly because the party cleavages crosscut other important cleavages.” It appears that evidence exists to support both the consociational and cross-cutting theories and that many scholars are intuitively more inclined to believe that either more or less thorough division facilitates peaceful coexistence. Lijphart (1977, p.81) consistently argues that consociational, autonomous freedom for segments, rather than cross-cutting allegiances, produces stability but he also believes that certain types of cross-cutting of cleavages helps actively antagonistic groups to decide to retain their shared state and decide upon a consociational system of government.

His discussion of these cleavages as a condition favoring introduction of consociationalism has also inspired criticism. Lijphart (1977, p.73, 75) does mention some potential forms of cleavage, such as those related to religion, social class, and language. However, Graziano (1980, p.349) correctly points out that Lijphart’s discussion of consociationalism “does not provide any systematic classification of the cleavages.” Graziano (1980, p.349) observes that Lijphart does not mention which cleavages consociationalism can more “effectively mediate.” Barry’s discussion concerning the applicability of consociationalism in ethnically divided societies also highlights the possibility that the system is more conducive to promoting stability in situations with certain cleavages, rather than others. Bingham Powell (1979, p.296) points out that “Lijphart never really resolves the rather ambiguous position of intense class differences as a form of ‘segmentation.’” Nolutshungu (1982, p.26-7) similarly claims that Lijphart is “silent about class conflict and even about economic inequality in general.” Kieve (1981) discusses issues involving class and consociationalism that Lijphart has not explored in detail. The following quote, concerning Dutch experience, illustrates the extent to which Kieve (1981, p.332) believes that social cleavages influence developments involving consociationalism:

the accommodationist arrangements were themselves determined by shifts in the balance of class forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For that very reason it is not wholly surprising that these arrangements should start breaking down with the intensification of class conflict, that is, precisely during those periods of social and political unrest when they are supposed to be most effective.

Lijphart (1985, p.98) responds to allegations that he has neglected class issues by pointing out his introduction of a favorable condition of socioeconomic equality. He also argues that the
most divisive cleavages in plural societies “usually do not coincide with class divisions” and their dominance in these situations means that “class interests will have little chance to be articulated and promoted” (Lijphart, 1985, p.98). Lijphart (1985, p.98) explains that consociational states have not proven less successful than nonconsociational ones “with regard to the solution of socioeconomic problems and the reduction of inequality.” He interprets Kieve’s critique as consisting of the view that cleavages not based on class are intentionally promoted by elites to “disguise class antagonism and suppress the class struggle” (Lijphart, 1985, p.107). Lijphart (1985, p.107) then argues that scholars adopting this approach “cannot explain” why “it is so easy” for leaders to manipulate situations in this way. Lijphart does not address other aspects of the relationship between socioeconomic influences and consociationalism, in practice and in theory. He does not discuss Kieve’s argument concerning the potency, as distinct from the suppression, of “class forces.” Lijphart also does not choose to extensively examine the relationship between class and other cleavages, in situations where they are congruent or both quite powerful. In general, Lijphart’s discussion of cleavages emphasizes the validity of Daalder’s (1974, p.612-3) distinction between “mechanistic” and “qualitative” approaches to this subject. Daalder (1974, p.612-3) observes that most analysis concerning cleavages focuses on counting and identifying them, and measuring their relative strengths. He advocates more attention to the “qualitative differences of specific cleavages” and their relationships to levels of accommodation (Daalder, 1974, p.613). Lijphart has not prioritized qualitative analysis of the specific roles played by cleavages of different types in plural societies. Greater comprehension of these roles would promote understanding of their interaction and prediction of each unique society’s potential for achieving stability with consociationalism. Predictions concerning the operation and success of such individual systems of consociationalism could be facilitated by comparison of this information regarding cleavages and the conditions which Lijphart believes are conducive to this success.

Criticisms Focused On Lijphart’s Other Favorable Conditions

Rough socioeconomic equality is only one of the conditions which Lijphart believes are favorable to the introduction and operation of consociationalism. Most of these conditions have inspired debate. One set of criticisms argues that their presence has been identified in an inconsistent manner, by Lijphart and other scholars. Lijphart first described conditions conducive to consociationalism in a 1968 publication. Due to his dedicated evolution of his thoughts concerning consociationalism, only a few of the conditions he portrayed then were presented in the same terms in a 1985 publication. Bogaards (1998, p.478) provides a systematic examination of this evolving list. He detects “four different sets of favourable
factors,” exemplified by works published in 1968, 1969, 1977, and 1985 (Bogaards, 1998, p.480). The conditions appearing in these lists include:

- Distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures
- A multiple balance of power among the subcultures
- External threats
- A relatively low load on the system
- Moderate nationalism
- Popular attitudes favourable to government by grand coalition
- Widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel
- The length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation
- Internal political cohesion of the subcultures
- Adequate articulation of the subcultural interests
- Segmental isolation and federalism
- Small country size
- Overarching loyalties
- Moderate multiparty system
- Representative party system
- Crosscutting cleavages (in some instances)
- Tradition of elite accommodation
- Geographical concentration of segments
- No majority segment plus segments of equal size
- Small population size
- Small number of segments

Bogaards (1998, p.480) observes that most academics who discuss Lijphart’s conditions either refer to the conditions endorsed in Lijphart’s most recent publication or they pick and choose which ones they wish to refer to. He asserts that: “Lijphart’s fickleness in his composition of the lists of favourable factors is equaled by the liberty other authors take in selecting their custom-made set of favourable factors for the purpose of a country-study or theoretical exercise” (Bogaards, 1998, p.480). Of course, Lijphart’s list was highly unlikely to remain unchanged, following his tireless revision of the theory designed to enhance the ability of consociationalism to benefit divided societies.

Another set of criticisms is best represented by Pappalardo’s (1981, p.363) analysis of whether each condition is “unambiguously favourable to consociational cooperation.” He finds that only two fit this description: “inter-subcultural stability and elite predominance over a politically deferential and organizationally encapsulated following” (Pappalardo, 1981, p.364). Van Schendelen (1984, p.41) also describes evidence, collected by himself and other scholars, showing that relationships between individual conditions and consociationalism are either unclear or arguably not as Lijphart believes them to be. Related to these points is the third set of criticisms involving Lijphart’s conditions, which claim that they are insufficiently useful. Van Schendelen (1984, p.34) describes the conditions as “empty” because their influence cannot be measured in a replicable fashion. He claims that this is because “Lijphart’s single items are empty: the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all” (Van Schendelen (1984, p.34).

Lustick (1997, p.107) summarized Van Schendelen’s comments as suggesting that none of the conditions “can be tested in any practical way.” However, consideration of Lijphart’s (1985, p.114-116) response to the latter two sets of criticisms involving his conditions suggests that his approach does not preclude valid empirical analysis of them. Lijphart (1985, p.116) explains that he intends these conditions to be “merely probabilistic instead of decisive” and that, “even if most or all of the favorable factors are missing, it is still possible to have a successful consociation.” Even prior to the contribution of the above criticisms, in a
1977 publication, Lijphart (p. 54) describes these conditions as “helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient” for conflict resolution. Van Schendelen (1984, p.34) acknowledges this statement by Lijphart but interprets it as precluding valid measurement of the conditions’ effects. However, particularly through mechanisms such as statistical analysis, even slight causal relationships that may not exist in every case can be detected in a scientifically sound manner. Lijphart’s clear specification that these conditions do not necessarily always promote consociationalism also indicates that it is invalid to argue that Pappalardo’s evaluation of whether conditions are “unambiguously favorable” may possibly falsify Lijphart’s theory. Perhaps the most persuasive criticism involving these conditions is that they may only promote consociationalism when the most crucial one is present, elites’ intentions to promote accommodation. In reference to the role of Austrian elites, Barry (1975a, p.500) goes so far as to say that “what mattered was the attitude manifested in the offer and acceptance of a ‘grand coalition’ and that the same attitude without any consociational institutions could also have produced a stable democratic system.” Even if this is true, Lijphart’s conditions should still have explanatory value because it does not challenge the thesis that factors like elites’ positive attitudes exert some potential influence over consociational systems’ likelihood of success. Bogaards (1998, p.483) anticipates that academics are likely to repeatedly disagree about ratings indicating the existence of conditions in individual countries and about whether the conditions should be quantitatively treated as if they are equally important. The existence and influence of some of Lijphart’s favorable conditions can be assessed in the statistical analysis performed for this project. Most of the conditions would be quantifiable if adequate information was available regarding the large set of phenomena which they collectively represent. Data for six of the conditions was easily accessible when the dataset for this project was compiled so their influences will be quantitatively examined here. The variables corresponding to them will be described in more detail in Part 2 of Chapter 5. The conditions to be represented are: External Threats, Segmental isolation and federalism, Moderate multiparty system, Geographical concentration of segments, Small population size, and Socioeconomic equality. The most persuasive criticisms concerning Lijphart’s favorable conditions assert that their influences cannot be ascertained or compared in a scientifically valid manner. The analysis of several conditions in this quantitative analysis highlights the fact that many of Lijphart’s propositions relating to consociationalism are truly falsifiable.

If the existence of consociational components can be impartially detected and it can be ascertained whether the favorable conditions are more conducive to stable consociationalism, Lijphart’s claims about the roles performed by these phenomena are subject to falsification. It is important to recognize that Lijphart has contributed both a
theory, containing all of his claims concerning consociationalism, and a description of the structure of this form of governance, which can be considered separately from the theory. While some criticisms attempt to falsify the entire theory by discrediting elements that are not crucial to the central proposition that consociational elements promote stability in plural societies, others focus on attacking the proposition by examining whether the core elements of the government structure function as Lijphart claims they do. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, p.7-9) remind us that “scientific research” is based on inferences involving empirical information, is conducted according to “public” procedures, is falsifiable, and “adheres to a set of rules of inference on which its validity depends.” Criticisms involving the scientific credibility of consociationalism can be evaluated through reference to these requirements. If they are found to have merit, it can be ascertained whether they are damaging to Lijphart’s theory in a way that does, or does not, challenge the fundamental claim regarding this government structure, that it promotes stability in plural societies. Objections to the imprecision of definitions offered by Lijphart for some terms involve the requirements of falsifiability and for research according to public procedures. The specific problems with these definitions have already been discussed but it should be recognized that, even if it is true that all of Lijphart’s descriptions of concepts considered as a unit are not falsifiable, versions of them can be adopted in a way which will enable scientifically sound analysis of the central proposition involving consociationalism’s role. A more serious potential problem for this project is that the phenomena central to Lijphart’s theory and government structure may not be measurable, in any replicable, empirical way. For instance, “segmental autonomy” is one of the four core elements of the consociationalism governance system but, if means of measuring its existence cannot be decided upon and effectively implemented, this would render unfalsifiable the entire theory and his claims involving only the system. Lustick (1997, p.112) argues that Lijphart’s alternative impressionistic and precise judgments make the theory unfalsifiable:

Employing precise use of evidence and analysis to defeat alternatives to his position, he delegitimates this technique as a basis for criticizing consociationalism and makes every possible allowance for the ‘impressionistic’ nature of social science where evidence or logic is inconvenient.

Lijphart (1985, p.88) argues that, occasionally, searching for “exact” measurements is a “futile” exercise that distracts attention away from more productive efforts. However, regardless of Lijphart’s specificity of definitions and measurements, the versions of them represented in this analysis are precise enough to be tested and they collectively comprise a version of his theory which is falsifiable.

It seems that it is Lijphart’s presentation of consociationalism that is arguably, scientifically problematic rather than his theory that adoption of the consociational elements
promotes stability in plural societies. This project will demonstrate that it is possible to construct a version of the system that can be examined in a scientifically valid and rigorous manner.

Part 2: Does Consociationalism Promote Stability in Plural Societies?

For the purposes of this analysis, the most relevant criticisms of consociationalism are those which challenge the system’s ability to promote stability in plural societies. For instance, it has been argued that stability achieved in consociational systems has actually been caused by other phenomena. One example of these alternative potential explanations is Barry’s (1975a, p.129) contention that elites can achieve stability without consociationalism. Lustick (1979, p.330) argues that stability can also be maintained in plural societies through systems of “control,” which he describes as “sustained manipulation of subordinate segment(s) by a superordinate segment.” Control is probably less capable of maintaining stability in the long term so Lijphart may have not responded to Lustick’s point because he believes that short-term stability does not constitute true stability. However, Lustick’s and Barry’s contributions do illustrate that Lijphart’s overall theoretical presentation of consociationalism is falsifiable, because he does not extensively explore other phenomena which may be conducive to stability in plural societies.

Another set of criticisms involving the direction of the causal relationship between consociationalism and stability also illustrates that the central proposition to be empirically tested in this study is falsifiable. Daalder (1974, p.615-18) argues that Dutch and Swiss experiences suggest that “rather than seeing accommodationist practices as an elite response to threatening political divisions, one might argue that earlier consociational practices facilitate the accommodation of new emerging cleavages.” This point is similar to Barry’s (1975a, p.487) observation regarding the theory of cross-cutting cleavages, that overlapping divisions might be an effect, rather than a cause, of conflict moderation. Boynton and Kwon’s (1978) quantitative examination of consociationalism also challenges Lijphart’s claims concerning causal direction. They focus on the performance of Lijphart’s version of consociationalism in the Netherlands, before 1978. They “perform a formal analytical assessment” of Lijphart’s argument, represented through a set of differential equations “parallel to the structure of [his consociational] relationships” (Boynton & Kwon, 1978, p.11, 24). Although their study involves only one country, their overall conclusions suggest that his claims for the system are tautological and that it does not necessarily resolve conflicts in deeply divided societies. They conclude that, “[i]nstead of consociational democracy
producing stability[,]... a stable democracy will produce accommodation” and that “more is required to guarantee democratic stability than the structure Lijphart proposed” (Boynton & Kwon, 1978, p.21, 25). However, they also find that “democratic stability would be guaranteed if the system were structured as Lijphart suggested and elites were willing to discount their own views of what should be done about political problems” (Boynton & Kwon, 1978, p.25). Boynton and Kwon suggest that the direction of the causal relationship between consociationalism and stability is unclear and that achievement of stability through consociationalism requires certain types of elite behavior. However, Lijphart also emphasizes the importance of elite behavior and Boynton and Kwon do not attempt to test the accuracy of their results through analysis of concrete evidence involving real situations. My study will enable further exploration of the issues they examine because statistical analysis can discriminate between causal directions and suggest whether another variable such as elite behavior may be crucial.

Consociationalism has been criticized for not promoting desirable effects. Lijphart argues that it enables stability by allowing for substantial inter-group contact only among segments’ elites, who represent the interests of their fellow group members. In his consociational system, Lijphart also explains that elites must make sure that their groups do not successfully challenge their accommodative efforts and that segments must be allocated proportions of power corresponding to their sizes prior to elections. He thus implies that the only function of elections is for the masses to choose who in their groups will represent them, rather than affecting the overall configuration of state power. A number of scholars have examined the degree to which this system is democratic. For instance, Barry (1975a, p.500) argues that “[r]ival politicians may get together to suppress dissent and we may if we wish call the result 'consociation', but if it is to be consociational democracy they must carry their supporters with them voluntarily.” For slightly different reasons, Van Schendelen (1984, p.32) comes to a similar conclusion: “In a polyarchy competition between the elites is, more than anything else, essential; in a consociation basically the opposite, namely intense collaboration, is crucial.” The literature discussing the extent to which consociationalism is democratic suggests that, if the system is found to not promote stability in plural societies, one potential explanation for this failure may be because its insufficient democracy precludes long-term legitimacy, and hence stability. Lijphart’s (2002, p.41) response to such criticism is that consociationalism should not evaluated through reference to the view, almost universally held by academics, that opposition to, and turnover of, governing regimes is necessary for stable democracy. He contends that these criteria “are narrowly based on one conception of democracy, the majoritarian conception, which does not exhaust the range of democratic possibilities” (2002, p.41). He also points out that, while the List Proportional Representation electoral system he favors gives party leaders great influence over which
candidates are elected, party leaders also are “usually able to reserve safe seats” in Britain’s majoritarian system and “[e]lite domination does not vary a great deal among democracies” (Lijphart, 2002, p.41). In his discussions of criticisms involving insufficient democracy, Lijphart does not extensively explore the argument that lack of opposition and turnover produce instability and system illegitimacy. He contends that consociationalism does not require opposition and turnover, which are commonly considered to be indispensable for any type of democracy, but he does not elaborate on why his system does not require them to be successful. To gain some insights on the role of democracy in plural societies and its relationship to consociationalism, a controlling, independent variable corresponding to democracy will be analysed in this project.

Barry (1975, p.396) and Butenschön (1985, p.99), among others, have also discussed the possibility that consociational systems may “exacerbate” conflicts or “create instability” by “freezing” the cleavages which divide groups. Lijphart’s core consociational idea, that minimizing contact between people of different groups promotes stability, is arguably also conducive to instability because it could theoretically result in “frozen,” completely impermeable lines of cleavage. Lijphart does not prescribe intentional introduction of incentives to encourage negotiation or cooperation of any kind across these cleavages. Lijphart (2002, p.44) argues that incentives for inter-group cooperation and negotiation do not need to be intentionally adopted for consociationalism to work, because he believes that politicians and parties want power and they have to enter into coalitions to acquire and maintain it. Particularly because this project will yield insights about the specific role of segmental autonomy on stability, it will facilitate greater understanding of the hypothesis that Lijphart’s consociationalism inherently leads to frozen cleavages and instability. However, optimal consociational systems, as described by Lijphart, have also seemed conducive to instability because he initially recommended that elites and academic advisors identify potentially antagonistic groups and set up systems to grant them autonomy, encourage their isolation, and provide smaller groups with power sufficient to veto decisions. In Chapter 2, the evolution of Lijphart’s thought regarding this issue is described. He believes that his recent revisions of the optimal consociational system ensure that populations themselves will determine which cleavages are necessary to isolate potentially antagonistic groups and the makeup of such groups, and that the group boundaries and power granted to groups can evolve according to demographic changes. This project tests whether states possessing the consociational components enjoy increased stability so, although it would be interesting to examine, it does not require data indicating the means by which groups were chosen and allocated power in individual states. By showing the influence of consociationalism on stability, the project will provide some hints concerning the validity of the hypothesis that
Lijphart's system destabilizes countries in the long term through excessive “freezing” of cleavages.

Some scholars have also argued that consociationalism contains inadequate incentives for inter-group cooperation, and thus long-term stability. Lijphart (1977, p.53, 170, 165; 2002, p.44) believes that his system contains sufficient incentives because elites can control their constituents and will form all-inclusive coalitions because they realize that these are necessary for maintenance of stability and their own power. In Lijphart’s (1977, p.165) words,

consociational democracy… assumes that political elites enjoy a high degree of freedom of choice, and that they may resort to consociational methods of decision-making as a result of a rational recognition of the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies and a deliberate effort to counteract these dangers.

Horowitz (1985, p.573) disagrees with Lijphart and believes that elites in “severely divided societies” usually do not possess this amount of “freedom.” He argues that all-inclusive, grand coalitions are unlikely in democratic systems with such divided populations because the formation of such coalitions substantially heightens “intraethnic competition” and thus jeopardizes the cohesiveness required for collective articulation of interests (Horowitz, 1985, p.575). Horowitz (1991, p.171) also believes that, “[u]nless there is an incentive to compromise over ethnic issues, the mere need to form [any type of] coalition will not produce compromise.” He thinks that party proliferation sufficient to prevent any one party from monopolizing power must exist “to require a coalition” and that Lijphart’s prescribed electoral system, List PR, cannot be relied on to produce this level of proliferation (Horowitz, 1991, p.175). Horowitz (1991, p.175) observes that, whenever possible, politicians “prefer to govern alone.” However, Lijphart (2002, p.43-4) points out that most coalition theorists believe that, “in multiparty systems, parties will want to enter and remain in coalition cabinets.” He explains that, recently, Kaare Strom and other coalition theorists have found that, under “special” conditions, parties may be motivated to not be in “coalitions” but that these situations are “the exceptions, and the more usual inclination of parties is to want to be included in cabinets” (Lijphart, 2002, p.43-44). Lijphart (2002, p.44) argues that this is true “[b]ecause” politicians want power and they must be in cabinet to gain power.

Regardless of whether it is true that parties and politicians almost always want to be in coalitions and cabinets in normal democracies, it needs to be kept in mind that political competition is fundamentally different in divided societies. Reilly (2001, p.9) explains that most models of political competition assume that societies are not polarized so “both voters and parties can be expected to converge on a middle ground” concerning desired policy. When this is true, parties profit most by attracting the “median voter,” who favors moderate policy. Reilly (2001, p.10) points out that divided societies naturally yield parties that are
almost exclusively focused on representing individual groups and that voters in these states are usually “ethnic voters,” who are much more inclined to support parties tailored to their groups, rather than any other type of party. Following Sartori’s (1976) example, Reilly (2001, p.10) refers to this situation as one of “polarised pluralism,” in which “the logic of elections changes from one of convergence on policy positions to one of extreme divergence.” The virtual absence of median voters in this scenario means that political competition occurs “at the extremes” rather than the policy center (Reilly, 2001, p.10). This results in “an increasingly polarised political process, in which strategic incentives for office-seeking politicians often push them in the direction of encouraging ethnic hostilities and perceptions of group insecurity” (Reilly, 2001, p.10). Under these conditions, politicians can gain more power by gravitating toward policy extremes and parties may prefer not to enter into coalitions because doing so will indicate that they are negotiating concerning their policy preferences. The policies they advocate are also often motivated by the belief that the government system under which they operate is fundamentally unfair and illegitimate so joining coalitions under these circumstances could also be interpreted as “selling out” for power. Perhaps because of his general interest in all types of political systems, Lijphart focuses less than Horowitz and Reilly on differentiating between politicians’ motivations in more and less divided societies. This project will facilitate greater recognition of the incentives required for stability in divided societies, by analyzing the effects of highly inclusive coalitions, potential veto power for segmental groups, and moderate multiparty systems.

Horowitz suggests means by which politicians and the masses could be motivated to provide greater support inter-group political systems. He argues that electoral systems which require each voter to provide a list of his/her preferred candidates, chosen from a list containing fewer candidates from his/her group than the number of required preferences, would motivate politicians to appeal for votes from outside their groups and thus encourage their pursuit of moderate policies (Horowitz, 1991, p.175). If politicians do not have to appeal outside of their groups, Horowitz believes that they will eventually become more antagonistic. He asserts that they will wish to make it appear that they are more dedicated than their competitors to improving conditions for their groups relative to other groups and representing the more extreme factions of their groups. Horowitz (1985, p.619) also argues that appropriately tailored federalism can be used “to foster interethnic cooperation” by delineating electoral district boundaries in a way that further motivates politicians to appeal to multiple groups. Reilly (2001, p.177-8) observes that it does not seem reasonable to assume that elites have good intentions, since there is a “clear pattern in many deeply divided societies of party leaders themselves being the ones who initiate and fuel inter-ethnic conflicts.”
Since electoral systems exert substantial influence on politicians’ and voters’ incentives, a great deal of debate concerning such incentives in divided societies has focused on electoral systems. Horowitz prescribes the Alternative Vote (AV) majoritarian electoral system as optimal for deeply divided societies. This system is normally used in single-member districts and it allocates each district’s single seat to the candidate who wins a majority of votes. Voters can rank-order candidates and, if not candidate receives more than 50% of votes during the first count, voters’ subordinate candidate choices are analyzed to determine the winner of the seat. The potential role of these rank-orderings may motivate voters to consider candidates from groups other than their own but election to the seat still only requires 50% of the votes and so the system can also result in a lack of representation for almost 50% of voters. The possible alienation of almost 50% of voters who may conceivably belong to a group that is always excluded from power is unavoidable with AV. However, Reilly (2001, p.167-171) provides significant evidence suggesting that the AV system, if it is designed carefully, need not produce excessively disproportional, exclusionary results and that it and other systems allowing for rank-ordering of candidates, including the non-majoritarian Single Transferable Vote (STV) procedure, have succeeded in promoting resolution of inter-group conflicts in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Northern Ireland. It should be recognized that STV differs very much from AV because it is used in multimember districts and the rank-ordering it allows for voters thus translate into seats for representatives of multiple groups in districts where multiple groups coexist in substantial numbers. For this reason, STV is much less likely to engender resentment caused by constant unempowerment of significant groups. Lijphart’s preferred system, List PR, allows for greater proportionality of power allocation but does not allow voters to give support for multiple parties, some of which may focus on representing groups other than their own. The approaches of Horowitz and Reilly also differ from that of Lijphart because they believe that cross-group interaction is advisable (in particular between politicians and groups other than their own). This leads them to favor heterogeneous districts in which cross-group political appeals would help candidates more, while Lijphart favors autonomy and the voluntary separateness of potentially antagonistic groups. Inclusion in this project of variables representing PR, segmental autonomy and federalism, and geographical concentration of segments will shed some light on the hypothesis that consociationalism contains inadequate incentives to promote long-term stability.

Consociationalism then, according to its critics, does not facilitate stability in plural societies because this aim is achieved by other phenomena, that stability actually causes the introduction of consociationalism, that consociationalism cannot maintain legitimacy in the long-term because it freezes segmental cleavages, that it contains inadequate incentives for
inter-group cooperation, and that it is not sufficiently democratic. This project will ascertain whether these criticisms are valid.

Part 3:
Existing Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Consociationalism and Stability in Plural Societies

Pippa Norris (2002) provides an empirical test of one element of the claim that consociationalism promotes conflict resolution in plural societies. She examines whether proportional representation systems, such as the specific one Lijphart prescribes as a consociational component, encourage ethnic minorities’ support for their political systems. To perform her statistical analyses, Norris (2002, p.207-8) uses national election survey data from twelve states, provided in the 1996-8 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. These twelve states enjoy different amounts of democratic and socioeconomic development and include three using majoritarian electoral systems, three using “mixed” systems, and six using proportional representation (Norris, 2002, p.208). She appears not to have compared the experiences of consociational and nonconsociational countries which have used PR. Norris (2002, p.218) keeps constant differences that occur cross-nationally by comparing states’ comparative gaps in majority-minority support for their political systems, rather than simply their minorities’ opinions. Her two specific hypotheses are that, “within each country, ethnic majorities will express greater support than minorities for the political system” and that “relative majority-minority differences would be smaller in countries with PR rather than majoritarian electoral rules. (Norris, 2002, p.218). In most of the states, Norris (2002, p.229) finds that minorities are less satisfied with their political systems. However, she finds that “the idea that more proportional electoral systems directly generate greater support for the political system among ethnic minority groups, as consociational theory claims, is not borne out by [her] results” (Norris, 2002, p.237). Norris (2002, p.230) finds that her evidence involving twelve states over a short period of time indicates that there is “no simple and clear-cut” or statistically significant relationship between types of electoral system and “differences in majority-minority political support.” Norris does describe four reasons why the connection between these phenomena may be “conditional and indirect.” These other potential variables involve the territorial distribution of minorities within states, the extent to which minorities are antagonistic, special arrangements for minority representation employed by some majoritarian states, and the other three consociational components (Norris, 2002, p.233-6). Norris’s study constitutes one of the first empirical examinations of the effects of consociational components and suggests that there may be no relationship between consociational components and conflict resolution in plural societies.
The validity of my results will be strengthened if I can take into account the four variables suggested by Norris for use in future studies. The demographic content of federal units will be included as a variable concerning segmental autonomy in my analysis, because the extent to which groups intermingle very significantly affects their incentives to cooperate and coexist. The methodology used in my analysis for identifying cases will ensure that only divided societies will be examined and, therefore, trends in divided and diverse, but undivided, states will not be treated as equivalent. Norris (2002, p.234) and Lijphart (1999, p.58) agree that “it is misleading to treat demographic classifications as equivalent to political divisions.” This practice is misleading because groups can live harmoniously with one another and inter-group antagonism is caused by perceptions and disagreements, rather than demographic attributes. My cases will be those states inhabited by at least one of Gurr’s (1993, p.6-7) Minorities at Risk, which are by definition those which “suffer, or benefit from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state” and were “the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of [their] self-defined interests.” Norris (2002, p.235) also emphasizes the importance of recognizing that some majoritarian systems do contain devices designed to safeguard minorities’ political influence. However, my study focuses on the effects of consociationalism so this issue will be relevant to explaining my results, instead of designing the analysis. This project’s greatest achievement is the examination of the effects of all four consociational components in a wide range of states and over a long time period. If the influence of proportional representation electoral systems on antagonism and resentment is again found to be insignificant here, it can be ascertained whether the effects of other consociational components and demographic factors explain the relationship Lijphart observes between proportional representation and inter-group harmony.

In a recent publication, Lijphart (2002, p.37-9) implies that he believes that the conclusions Gurr has made in relation to his Minorities at Risk project provide further, empirically based confirmation that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. In the beginning of the chapter, Lijphart (2002, p.37) explains that he “still believe[s]…that consociational democracy is not only the optimal form of democracy for deeply divided societies but also, for the most deeply divided societies, the only feasible solution.” He goes on identify the “two ‘primary characteristics’ of consociational democracy” as “the sharing of executive power and group autonomy” (Lijphart, 2002, p.38-9). The definitions of the two characteristics, as he provides them here, are:

Power-sharing means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture (Lijphart, 2002, p.39).
These phenomena closely resemble his consociational components of grand coalition and segmental autonomy. Lijphart’s descriptions of “power-sharing and “autonomy” first appear different from his earlier depictions of “grand coalition” and “segmental autonomy” because the former two mechanisms seem to require less formal institutionalization. However, in the same chapter, Lijphart (2002, p.46-47) emphasizes and defends his tendency to recognize informal practices as constituting his core consociational components:

The substantive problem is that the basic characteristics of consociational democracy are inherently stretchable: they can assume a large number of different institutional forms. … [One] possibility is a grand coalition in cabinets, defined not in partisan terms but more broadly in terms of the representation of linguistic or other groups in a pre-determined ratio, such as the equal representation of Dutch-speakers and French-speakers in Belgian cabinets. … The above examples are all parliamentary systems, but grand coalitions can also occur in non-parliamentary systems. … Can all of these formal and informal rules and practices be subsumed under the one concept of executive power-sharing? My feeling is that they have enough of a common core to justify it.

Lijphart (2002, p.39) “distinguishes the more general recommendation of power-sharing and autonomy… from the consociational model.” However, his depiction of the “stretchability” of consociational components in the same publication as his description of these two practices, “power-sharing” and “autonomy,” suggests that these are virtually equivalent. Therefore, it seems reasonable to recognize these two characteristics as at least roughly corresponding to these two consociational components. Lijphart (2002, p.39) next argues that Gurr’s “relentless inductive strategy which is so full of detailed operational definitions” produces “overall evidence” which shows (1) that such conflicts are by no means intractable; [and] (2) that they can usually be accommodated by ‘some combination of the policies and institutions of autonomy and power-sharing.’

Lijphart does not explicitly claim that Gurr’s widely respected, empirical Minorities at Risk proves that consociationalism works but he implies that this is true. Gurr’s (1993, p.292) statement about power-sharing was an assumption, rather than a finding, and it was apparently expressed only in relation to the option of majority control in divided societies:

Control is the revolutionary aim of a minority or subordinate majority to establish the group’s political and economic hegemony over others. We assume that this objective can be accommodated, if at all, by some combination of the policies and institutions of autonomy and power sharing.

Lijphart’s description of Gurr’s findings suggested that Gurr may have gained valuable insights into the relationship between consociationalism and stability. However, it seems that this is not the case and that the statistical analysis to be executed for this project will be largely unprecedented.
A survey of relevant empirical analyses confirms that the effects of all four components of Lijphart’s consociational system on stability in plural societies has not yet been ascertained in a scientifically sound manner.

**Conclusion**

The existing literature concerning consociationalism suggests many considerations relevant to empirical analysis of the proposition that the system’s elements promote stability in plural societies. Criticisms concerning the scientific credibility of Lijphart’s work emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the components of the consociational system of governance and the entire body of his writings concerning it. Objections involving the imprecision of Lijphart’s terms, means of measurement, and identification of cases similarly illustrate that choosing these carefully is absolutely essential. Discussions of the probable effects of consociationalism in societies containing different cleavage structures, the system’s arguably undemocratic aspects, and the flaws of existing works attempting to test this proposition all emphasize the importance of the project to be undertaken here.
Section 2: Testing Consociationalism

CHAPTER 4:
THE CASES: PLURAL SOCIETIES

Lijphart’s specific proposition that will be tested in this project is that “consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies.” Statistical analysis of this theory requires that cases must be identified which represent each society that should be examined. The specific wording of the proposition signifies that the aim is to explore consociationalism’s role in plural states, rather than in all existing states, all states experiencing violence, or all states that have experienced consociationalism. Therefore, this project requires identification of all plural states through a replicable means for recognizing them. Since Lijphart is recognized to be the source of the modern theory of consociationalism, if the cases are chosen according to his understanding of the term, “plural,” the potential value of this project’s results will be optimized. The following discussion will demonstrate that this course of action is possible and will argue in favor of the specific definition to be used for the purposes of this study. This chapter concludes with a justification for, and description of, the methodology which will be used to choose the cases of plural countries to be studied for this project. Those cases will be the countries which Gurr’s Minorities at Risk project identifies as containing substantial populations of such minorities. Selection of cases through reference to this source is advisable because Gurr’s definition of Minorities at Risk closely corresponds to Lijphart’s definition of plural societies. In addition, Gurr’s list was not compiled for a study of consociationalism so it should not be contaminated by any biases involving the proposition to be tested here. Chapter 4 thus contains the justification, identification, and preliminary qualitative analysis of the plural societies whose experiences with consociationalism are the subject of this project.

A brief analysis of the relationship between this concept of plural societies and widely recognized notions of what constitutes “ethnic conflict” will assist the refinement of the specific definition of plural societies to be used for this project. It also illustrates that, although many different definitions of ethnicity exist, careful comparison of them suggests that it is reasonable to argue that the attributes of societies which make them “plural” or troubled by “ethnic conflict” are virtually the same. This similarly shows that this study’s conclusions will be applicable to both plural societies and those experiencing “ethnic conflict.”

Part 1:
The Definition of Plural Societies to be Used for Choosing Cases

Lijphart has defined the term, "plural," a few times so analysis of these definitions and the use of the term by him and other scholars facilitates the identification of the concept which should be used to choose cases for this project. It will become clear that these plural societies are those which are clearly divided into groups whose members' collective actions reflect the obvious existence of cleavages corresponding to religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and/or race.

Lijphart’s Concept Of “Plural Societies”

Lijphart seems to have first discussed the definition of this term to illustrate how his understanding of it does not completely correspond to those articulated by other academics. In a 1977 publication, Lijphart (p.18) first directly addressed this issue, when he described M.G. Smith’s definition of a “plural society”:

Domination of one of the segments is part of his definition of a plural society. But it is not merely a matter of definition. According to Smith, pluralism necessarily entails the maintenance of political order by domination and force: ‘Cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes the structural necessity for domination by one of the cultural sections. It... necessitates nondemocratic regulation of group relationships.’

Lijphart (1977, p.19) observes that Smith’s definition of “plural society” implies that “homogeneity is a prerequisite for democratic government.” In contrast, the rationale behind Lijphart’s work involving democracy is predicated on his belief that a society’s propensity for stable democracy is not necessarily dependent on its level of pluralism. In fact, a fundamental assumption of his theory of consociationalism is that stable democracy can be promoted “by making [societies] more plural” through enhancement of “the organizational strength of the segments” (Lijphart, 1984a, p.11).

Lijphart’s (1981, p. 356) first, explicit definition of “plural societies” was published in 1981:

...four criteria may be used to determine whether a society is completely plural or deviates from perfect pluralism to a greater or lesser extent on one or more of the four dimensions:

1. In a completely plural society, it must be possible to identify exactly the segments into which the society is divided.
2. It must also be possible to state exactly what the size of each segment is, that is, how many people belong to each of the segments.
3. In a completely plural society, there must be perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the political, social, and economic organizations.
4. Political parties are one type of organization covered by the third criterion. The final test of a completely plural society is that, since party and segmental loyalties should coincide, there should be little or no change in the voting support of the different parties from election to election: in a perfectly plural society, an election is a segmental census.

I do not know any empirical example of a society that can be regarded as perfectly plural according to the above four criteria.

He also reiterated some of these criteria later: “the basic traits of a plural society are that it is divided into clearly identifiable and measurable segments which have their own social and political
organizations" (Lijphart, 1984a, p.11). Subsequently, he also defined a “fragmented or plural society” as one “that is sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of communication” (Lijphart, 1989, p.39). In other statements with implications related to this definition, he has suggested that plural societies contain “clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments,” that they are “divided along several lines of cleavage,” and that this “multiplicity of cleavages is reflected in the multidimensional character of their party systems” (Lijphart, 1977, p.28; 1999, p.36). He seems to not equate the number of segments with the intensity of pluralism, since he distinguishes between “the degree of pluralism and the number of groups into which a society is divided” (Lijphart, 1999, p.168). His statistical analysis of democracies published in 1999 suggested that, in all but one of the countries he then identified as plural, in “most... cultural-ethnic issues have high salience” and, in two of them, “religious” issues do (Lijphart, 1999, p.83). Particularly in the past ten years, Lijphart has discussed degrees of pluralism, suggesting that clear delineation of plural and non-plural societies may not be possible (for example: 1999, p.252). His means of identifying plural societies is suggested by his implication that the United States is not a plural society and his argument that the European Union is plural because it comprises “‘[d]eep seated and long-standing national differences’” that are unlikely to disappear (Lijphart, 1999, p.195, 46). This observation emphasizes that Lijphart’s concept of “plural” implies much more than simply diversity of ancestral backgrounds or cultural and ideological traditions.

Lijphart’s explicit and implicit expositions of his concept of “plural society” collectively suggest that even ideological divisions can render societies “plural” but that, to be “plural,” a society must contain extensive coincidence of cleavages, separating virtual subsocieties that have their own political and social organizations. These divisions must be “clear” and they must remain evident, when subjected to replicable, systematic means of measurement. The more clear and evident they are in a society, the more intense is its level of pluralness. Lijphart’s criteria for identifying plural societies are that (1) they are divided into groups clearly enough to enable easy calculation of their groups’ sizes, (2) the cleavages separating the groups are maintained by their collective actions, and (3) these cleavages are obvious but may correspond to a wide variety of phenomena, such as religion, language, culture, ethnicity, race, or even perhaps ideology.

Definitions Of “Plural Society” Offered By Other Scholars

The choice of the exact version of Lijphart’s definition of plural society to be used in this project will be confirmed and analyzed through examination of alternative definitions offered by other scholars. This analysis will ensure that the definition chosen here will seem legitimate to most of the academic community and thus render this project’s findings more relevant to other research.
The term, "plural society," has been defined in a wide range of ways by writers other than Lijphart. Fumivall is generally considered to be the "formulator of the concept" of "plural society" (Haug, 1967, p.294). Fumivall defines it as a society "comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit" (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.10). He also suggests that plural societies lack "common social demand" and Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, p.11) interpret this as meaning an absence of "consensus." Fumivall’s work seems to agree with Lijphart’s references to the capability of ideological differences to produce plural societies. He explained that, in these societies, “social demands” generate policies that treat communities separately and thus often benefit one more than the others (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.11). These differential benefits, and the individual communities’ policies that motivate them, could produce ideological divisions which seem to mirror the cleavages which the groups originally organize around. Fumivall believes that these separate demands constitute the characteristic which distinguishes plural societies from homogeneous ones (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.11). In Rabushka and Shepsle’s (1972, p.11) words, Fumivall surmised that, in this concept of plural society, “the only common meeting ground available to the various cultures is the marketplace.” In this situation, “economic competition” remains the groups’ “only feasible mutual activity” because their other activities “are determined by” their “specific cultural values” (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.11). Fumivall observed that economic interests were also often congruent with these intergroup divisions (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.11). He implied that economic interests were thus incapable of holding groups together and this could only be achieved if their shared political entity faced an external threat (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.11). Unlike Lijphart, Furnivall does not explicitly argue that group divisions must be reflected in state political structure to maintain stability but he does seem to imply that this stability would be more likely if this sort of representation did exist. Lijphart does not specify which policy areas he believes groups can interact with one another in, without reference to their group values. However, his statements concerning the extent to which such groups are separate seems compatible with Furnivall’s belief that all policy is affected by group identity in plural societies. Furnivall’s theory of plural societies was inspired by colonial dynamics but he seems not to believe that only certain types of groups are capable of engendering plural societies. His theory seems to suggest that it is the behavior of the group, rather than its means of identifying itself, that marks plural societies. Both he and Lijphart seem to agree that plural societies are those which are clearly divided into groups whose members’ collective actions reflect the obvious existence of cleavages and that particular types of group identification are not what characterize these societies as plural.

M.G. Smith also provides a definition of plural societies. He disagrees with Furnivall’s distinction between plural and homogeneous societies, pointing out that heterogeneity can exist without provoking group isolation (Haug, 1967, p.294). Smith believes that plural societies are marked by cultural groups who have their own institutions, which may involve “kinship, education, religion, property and economy, recreation and certain sodalities” (Haug, 1967, p.294). Smith’s
observation that these group differences are institutionalized in plural societies is consistent with Lijphart’s belief that, in plural societies, this diversity is reflected in political structure. According to Haug, (1967, p.294) Smith believes that “such differences should produce incompatibility, with the society held together only by power concentrated in the hands of one cultural section.” Smith’s point that heterogeneous societies are not intrinsically plural is compatible with Lijphart’s belief that pluralness involves collectively created division rather than uninstitutionalized, unantagonistic diversity. It is consistent with Lijphart’s recommendation that only groups that identify themselves through the electoral process should be granted segmental autonomy. Identifying the extent to which heterogeneity is antagonistic is considerably more difficult than simply measuring heterogeneity so that probably explains why Lijphart suggests identification through the electoral process. Lijphart’s beliefs about the definition of “plural society” seem consistent with Smith’s so they do not offer contradictory recommendations concerning the optimal means of collecting data for this project. Smith’s view concerning economic interactions between groups contradicts Furnivall’s but it is unclear whose theory is more compatible with Lijphart’s. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, p.15-16) explain that, according to Smith, economic relationships can be “irrelevant” to group identities and “it is erroneous to equate cultural pluralism with ‘class stratification,’ since one can vary independently of the other.” Compared to Furnivall, Smith appears to believe that ideological divisions are less conducive to the generation of plural societies, than are other types of divisions. Smith’s work emphasizes the fact that most definitions of plural society unequivocally agree with all of the types of divisions that Lijphart lists, except “ideological.”

Rabushka and Shepsle also provide a definition of plural societies. They do not believe that “the existence of well-defined ethnic groups with generally incompatible values constitutes a necessary condition of the plural society” (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.20). They think that the distinctive attribute of plural societies, compared to simply heterogeneous ones, is “the practice of politics almost exclusively along ethnic lines” (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.20). Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, p.20) observe that these places are characterized by the interpretation of the “preponderance of political conflicts… in ethnic terms” and “cohesive” action by “ethnic” groups “on nearly all political issues.” They elaborate that:

Politically organized cultural sections, communally based political parties, the partitioning of major social groups (e.g., labor unions) into culturally homogeneous subgroups, and political appeals emphasizing primordial sentiments serve as unambiguous indicators of a plural society (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972, p.21).

While Lijphart believes that, in a plural society, the groups are reflected in the political structure, Rabushka and Shepsle contend that virtually all political activity is based on the inter-group divisions. They imply that all political attitudes and ideologies are significantly influenced by group identity. Although Rabushka and Shepsle describe these groups as “ethnic,” their contention that they are divided on virtually every issue implies that their antagonism can involve all of the group attributes
listed by Lijphart (1989, p.39), “religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, [and] racial.” However, like Lijphart and Furnivall, Rabushka and Shepsle do not explain whether ideological cleavages, on their own, can make societies permanently deeply divided. Lijphart (1989, p.39) himself seems to only mention ideological differences as a possible manifestation of pluralness once in his publications, throughout his more than thirty years of discussing consociationalism. Precise determination of which states are plural requires that the question of whether those divided over ideological issues constitute plural societies be answered.

Analysis of Lijphart’s discussions of plural societies suggest that these societies should be represented in this project as being diverse with regard to religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and race, but not ideology. The prudence of this course of action is emphasized by the fact that, of these types of identities that he mentions, it is only considered ethically correct to attempt to change someone else’s ideological identity. At least in the modern society in which we live, it is considered unacceptable to attempt to compel someone to change their religion, language, culture, ethnicity, or race. However, all ideological positions, regardless of how strongly they are held, are considered open to debate. For this reason, even though Lijphart mentioned ideology once as a potential “line” of division in plural societies, it seems legitimate to measure levels of pluralism based on all of the attributes he mentioned except ideology. This significant decision is further justified by Lijphart’s description of the optimal procedure for allowing groups to delineate themselves politically, prior to being granted segmental autonomy. He explains that voters’ formation of political parties through a Proportional Representation electoral system allows policymakers to ascertain whether their societies are plural or not plural. He explains that, if a society is plural, “the successful parties will be mainly segmental (and presumably ethnic) parties; if it is not... plural..., the parties that will emerge will be non-segmental, policy-oriented parties” (Lijphart, 1995, p.281). Non-segmental, policy-oriented parties are held together solely by belief systems concerning policy, otherwise known as ideologies. Therefore, Lijphart’s identification of them as emblematic of non-plural societies justifies this study’s exclusion of “ideological” as a form of division characterizing plural societies.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) provides information concerning the use of the term, plural societies, by the general public so the validity of academics’ definitions of this concept can be confirmed through reference to this reference source. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, vol. 11, p.1088) defines “plural society” as “a society composed of different ethnic groups or cultural traditions; a society in which ethnic differences, etc., are reflected in the political structure.” The remainder of the dictionary entry concerning this concept does not clarify what the “etc.” in this quote refers to. The meaning provided by the OED does not agree with Lijphart’s (1989, p.39) requirement of “virtually separate subsocieties.” However, the OED’s reference to “reflect[ion] in the political structure” suggests that its definition may be consistent with Lijphart’s (1984a, p.11; 1989, p.39) requirement for “clearly identifiable and measurable segments” and “sharp” divisions. While Lijphart (1989, p.39) states that these segments can be divided
according to “religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines,” the OED quote refers explicitly to only cultural and ethnic differences. However, with the probable exception of “ideological,” Lijphart’s other types of divisions are arguably encompassed by the “cultural” and “ethnic” categories.

Definitions of plural societies offered by the OED, Furnivall, Smith, and Rabushka and Shepsle collectively support the conclusion that ideological divisions should not be regarded as contributing to the extent to which they are plural. Of the four concepts of plural societies offered by these sources, only Furnivall’s suggests that ideological cleavages can themselves make societies plural. Even he seems to believe that it is groups’ collective support of separate demands, rather than the nature of these demands, that constitutes pluralism. Comparison of the depictions of plural societies offered by Lijphart and the other scholars facilitates confirmation of the optimal definition that should be reflected in quantitative analyses, if his theory concerning consociationalism is to be tested most accurately. By this definition, plural societies are diverse with respect to religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and/or race, and are also sharply divided because of the collective actions of the people who identify themselves through reference to the groups comprising this diversity.

**Part 2:**

**Comparison of Ethnic Conflict and Plural Societies**

The concept of plural societies used by Lijphart and other scholars is better understood through comparison of these societies with those which are widely regarded to be ethnically divided. Examination of the relationship between these two sets of societies also provides an indication of the extent to which this project’s conclusions concerning consociationalism in plural societies can be considered applicable to countries diagnosed as experiencing “ethnic conflict.” Particularly since consociationalism is widely believed to hinder ethnic conflict, recognition of the close relationship between plural societies and ethnic conflict is important because it indicates that it is valid to infer conclusions regarding ethnic conflict from the findings of this project involving plural societies. Part 2 of this chapter will explore the relationship between these two phenomena and discuss the relevancy of this project’s findings to ethnic conflict.

**The Similarities Between Commonly Employed Definitions Of Ethnic Conflict And Plural Societies**

The appropriateness of the precise definition of plural societies to be analyzed in this project is further illustrated through the examination of the relationship between ethnic conflict and the divisions which render societies plural. This exercise also yields an initial indication of the extent to which findings concerning one type of division can be considered applicable to the other.
The most potentially controversial decision made for this project involving its definition of plural societies is the exclusion of ideological cleavages as an indicator of pluralness. Widely held assumptions concerning the relationship between ethnicity and plural societies emphasize the prudence of this decision. Although Lijphart identifies “ethnic” as but one form of cleavage conducive to the development of plural societies, many academic treatments of consociationalism seem to assume that, when Lijphart mentions tensions in “plural societies,” he is referring to “ethnic” conflict. There is also a widespread belief that religion, language, culture, and race are arguably components of ethnicity. If this relationship does exist, it supports the argument that excluding ideology from our definition of plural will actually improve the usefulness of this study’s conclusions for the majority of those who analyze the effects of consociationalism.

Some academics agree with Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, p.10) that “ethnic divisions” can “be... racial, religious, linguistic, or tribal.” Norris (2002, p.206) defines

ethnic identities... as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on national, cultural-linguistic, racial, or religious backgrounds. They provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their meaning for the actors, representing ties of blood, soil, faith, and community.

Bulmer (1986, p.54) similarly defines ethnicity as encompassing religious, linguistic, and other forms of identity:

An ‘ethnic group’ is a collectivity within a larger society, having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group’s identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to the group.

The inclusive nature of these definitions, which are provided by political scientists, seem particularly likely to represent reality because they are largely consistent with each other and other usages of the term outside academia. For instance, the Oxford English Dictionary explains that, the word, “ethnic,” was originally used to identify those people who were not Christians or Jews, and were thus categorized as “heathen” and “pagan” (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, vol. 5, p.423). Uses of the term as late as 1964 in the United States referred to Jews as comprising an ethnic group so, even if they did so inadvertently, they described a religious group as constituting an ethnicity (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, vol. 5, p.424). Other definitions of “ethnic” recorded by the OED describe it as a term representing “minorit[ies],” and “pertaining to or having common racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics” (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, vol. 5, p.424). In his study of “ethno-religious conflict,” Fox (1999, p.444) observes that “[m]ost agree that religion is an aspect of ethnicity.” However, he interprets Gurr’s work as implying that “religion is salient to ethnicity if it is a defining trait that sets a group apart in its own eyes and/or in the eyes of others” (Fox, 1999, p.444). After reviewing others’ opinions on the topic, Fox (1999, p.444) concludes that “religion is an aspect of ethnicity” but it is also “a distinct and independent factor that can contribute to ethnic identity.” Fox exemplifies a widely expressed opinion concerning the relationship between attributes like religion and language,
and ethnicity. He seems to see religion as an aspect of ethnicity because it is a marker for it, that simultaneously reflects and "contributes" to it. This arguably contradictory idea posits that these phenomena can be both constitutive of ethnicity and something separate that influences it. This issue must be explored because, if ethnic conflicts can be defined as including religion and other types of identity, they will be almost equivalent to Lijphart’s concept of antagonism in plural societies. If this is true, it will be appropriate for findings concerning consociationalism to be applied to future analyses concerning "ethnic conflict."

Work by many academics exemplifies the confusion concerning the relationship between ethnicity and other factors that Lijphart sees as forming the basis for divisions in plural societies. In a quantitative analysis of partition, Sambanis (2000, p.447) categorizes civil wars as either "ethnic/religious" or "ideology/other." This approach interestingly implies that ethnicity and religion are two separate things but also that these two are more similar to each other than to ideology. Another quantitative analysis by Silver and Dowley (2000) suggests that some apparent decisions concerning the definition of ethnicity may be heavily influenced by what data is available. They explain: "If we count as ethnic any of several variables in the... data sets- ethnicity/race... racial/ethnic background... religious denomination... language... region... then it is possible to obtain information on ethnic/racial characteristics of individual respondents for 16 countries" (Silver & Dowley, 2000, p.521). In another excerpt from the same study, Silver and Dowley (2000, p.519) seem to reveal their own predisposition to consider ethnicity and religion to be separate phenomena: "... groups are distinguished by language, race, ethnic self-identification, or religion." Banton (2000, p.482) suggests that ethnicity and other attributes, such as religion, are separate but often accompany each other:

Ethnic groups... are currently distinguished from national, religious, and racial groups by cultural distinctiveness associated with a belief in distinctive origin, though any particular group may be both ethnic and national, ethnic and religious, ethnic and racial, or distinctive on multiple dimensions.

However, his observation seems problematic because national, religious, and racial groups very often also possess "cultural distinctiveness associated with a belief in distinctive origin.” Banton (2000, p.482) admits that groups can feel “distinctive on multiple dimensions” but he avoids discussing the fact that groups of people often share these multiple loyalties and ethnicity is therefore inextricably linked with attributes that are associated with it. Fox (1997) emphasizes the problem with assuming that religious and ethnic conflicts are intrinsically separate phenomena. After performing a quantitative analysis designed to discern the relationship between religious and ethnic conflicts, Fox (1997, p.16) finds that, even when "ethnic conflicts" are “between groups of different religions,” religious issues are often not “important” to the conflicts.

Tilley (1997, p.498) seems to provide one reason why the interaction between ethnicity and factors like religion has never been agreed upon. She emphasizes that the academic community does
not share a single definition of “ethnicity.” She explains that “‘[e]thnicity’ has always comprised a
kind of catch-all term for social features such as language, religion, customs or food or dress, folklore
and/or general groupings by country or regional heritage (Tilley, 1997, p.498). According to Tilley
(1997, p.498), Glazer and Moynihan describe “ethnicity as being comprised of culture, religion,
language, customs and political affiliation.” Their definition of ethnicity sounds surprisingly akin to
Lijphart’s definition of “plural,” even down to their reference to apparently ideological, political
affiliation. Tilley (1997, p.498) actually claims that “ethnicity... has become a way to signal virtually
any category of group identity, even gender” and that it is used more and more “as a euphemism for
‘culture.’”

Academic treatments of ethnicity and its relationship to religion, culture, language, and race
suggest that it is plausible to argue that, depending on the context, these four phenomena can merge
with other elements of ethnicity, to such an extent that they become indistinguishable. For example, if
the United States’ Roman Catholic community favored state funding of religious schools, the conflict
inspired by this demand would not be ethnic if the only common bond holding this community
together was religion. However, when Catholics in Northern Ireland discuss state funding of their
separate schools, their actions involve ethnic conflict because their group distinguishes itself from the
remainder of the Northern Irish population religiously, culturally, historically, and arguably even
linguistically, racially, and ideologically. The thing that groups in plural societies described by
Lijphart, and those in ethnic conflicts described by other academics, seem to have in common is that
they find it necessary to emphasize their group identities and justify them by referring to what they
have in common, which may conceivably pertain to almost anything but usually involves factors like
religion, language, and history. Although primordialists contend that such identities are inescapably
inherited and instrumentalists argue that they can be cultivated, the debate between these schools of
thought does not challenge the fact that ethnic conflicts and conflicts in plural societies involve groups
who consciously, or subconsciously, emphasize their identities. Vanhanen (1999, p.59) points out
that “[o]ld religious cleavages have... produced ethnic groups because religious communities are
usually endogamous.” This is because group members consistently marry within their groups, thus
preserving the integrity of their often multifaceted group identities. Basch (1998, p.232) similarly
observes that languages that define population segments are “used in the political arena to direct the
state’s attention to certain groups.” Barth (1969, p.14) argued that “the [cultural] features that are
taken into account” as elements of group identity “are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only
those which the actors themselves regard as significant.” Gil-White (1999, p.792) observes that
Barth’s idea that “ethnies are in the first instance collections of individuals sharing a common self-
ascription” has become “accepted by all” who study these areas.

The extent to which ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are widely considered to be very closely
related to the other forms of diversity included in Lijphart’s notion of plural societies indicates that it
is appropriate to consider conclusions regarding plural societies to be relevant to societies
experiencing ethnic conflict. The lack of focus in definitions of ethnicity on ideological differences, compared to those involving ethnicity, race, language, religion, and culture, provides further confirmation that it is justifiable to omit ideological differences from the concept of plural societies to be quantitatively treated in this project.

Confirming The Extent To Which This Project's Conclusions Will Be Applicable To Ethnic Conflict

Comparison of the concepts of ethnic divisiveness and plural societies indicates that they reflect very similar conditions involving forms of group identity which are generally regarded to be virtually unchangeable and their contribution to intergroup alienation. The strong resemblance between these concepts suggests that conclusions arrived at concerning one of them should be applicable to both. Research concerning communal identity confirms the appropriateness of treating conclusions regarding plural societies as also relevant to those experiencing ethnic conflict.

The comparability of conditions in these societies is emphasized by academics' use of the term, "communal group." For instance, Nordlinger presents "communal divisions" as something very akin to the definitions of plural societies and ethnicity described above. He explains that communal divisions "refer to ascriptive criteria, including racial tribal, religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences" (Nordlinger, 1972, p.6). Le Vine (1997, p.51) observes that "most visible ethnic groups are also communal groups" because the "principal structural characteristic" of community is "the maintenance of a volume of social transactions sufficient to maintain and reinforce the elements of individual and collective identity." Fox's (1999, p.444) terminological choices imply that "communal" and "ethnicity" are the same and Gurr (1993, p.3) explains that, in his landmark study, "[c]ommunal groups... are also referred to as ethnic groups, minorities, and peoples." Väyrynen (1998, p.65) believes that ethnicity is "nothing but a form of communality, ethnic communality, which is based on certain features (e.g. language, religion, common history, race, ancestors)..." The attributes which define ethnic groups and Lijphart's segments in plural societies are almost indistinguishable from those which mainstream political science uses to identify communal groups.

Comparison of Lijphart's and others' discussions of plural societies and those divided by ethnic and communal conflicts further demonstrates the advisability of considering findings concerning these situations to be highly relevant to each other. However, it must also be kept in mind that the cases for this project were chosen through careful consideration of the precise definition of plural societies that has been identified through close analysis of Lijphart's work and only confirmed through reference to other sources.

Exploration of the relationship between plural societies and ethnic and communal conflicts emphasizes their similarity to one another and further emphasizes the appropriateness of the definition
of plural societies to be used to quantitatively examine his theory concerning consociationalism. The phenomenon described in this definition constitutes the most accurate representation of the sort of societies for which Lijphart prescribes consociationalism as a means of promoting stability. The statistical cases to be analyzed will thus correspond to those societies which are clearly divided into groups whose members’ collective actions reflect the obvious existence of cleavages corresponding to religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and/or race. While this project focuses on studying the role of consociationalism in plural societies, the close resemblance between plural societies and those divided by ethnic conflict suggests that its findings should be considered relevant to both.

Part 3: Cases of Plural Societies

A number of scholars have designed means of identifying cases that constitute something akin to the notion of plural societies which has been chosen for use in this project. A straightforward means of identifying states that are sufficiently plural to be considered in this analysis would be to include those which contain a group that Gurr (1993) identifies as a “minority at risk.” If his concept of a “minority at risk” is sufficiently similar to the groups which exist in states which are plural according to the definition of plural societies chosen for this study, this procedure for choosing cases would be appropriate. Gurr (1993, p.6-7) describes these “minorities at risk” as “politicized communal groups.” He considers them to be politically salient if they fulfill either one or both of two criteria:

1. The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state.
2. The group was the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests at some time between 1945 and 1989 (Gurr, 1993, p.6-7).

Research conducted since this excerpt was published in 1993 is constantly expanding the time period covered by the dataset. Gurr’s (1993, p.38) approach to studying “minorities at risk” recognizes that “political and economic inequalities” tend to arise between them when they share a state but that these constitute effects of the groups’ interactions, rather than intrinsic elements of their identities. All of Gurr’s (1993, p.18) categories of “minorities at risk” are described as either “culturally,” “ethnically,” or “religiously” “distinct.” The fact that these groups are distinct, experience discriminatory treatment, and act collectively signifies that Gurr’s methodology for identifying them is consistent
with the definition of plural societies chosen for this project. Gurr’s “minorities at risk” also constitute groups that are religiously, linguistically, culturally, ethnically, and racially identifiable. The societies in which they live are also sharply divided by discrimination and group mobilization and these activities logically facilitate calculation of the groups’ relative sizes. The striking similarities between Gurr’s criteria for “minorities at risk” and the definition of plural societies to be used in this project, which consists of diversity plus groups’ collective, divisive behavior, suggests that its cases should consist of the set of countries in which at least one of Gurr’s groups lives.

One other benefit of identifying cases according to Lijphart’s definition of plural societies and Gurr’s list of Minorities at Risk (MARS) is that both categories contain a wide variety of states. Norris (2002, p.208, 212) emphasizes the importance of examining established, consolidated, and new democracies, as well as states enjoying different socioeconomic levels. She believes that it may not be coincidental that established democracies such as the Netherlands and Belgium appear to have gained more through consociationalism than developing societies like Lebanon and Malaysia (Norris, 2002, p.212). Norris (2002, p.212) observes that

[m]uch existing research on consociational democracies is based on the experience of Western political systems that, by virtue of their very persistence, have come to a consensus about many of the basic constitutional rules of the game and a democratic culture.

It also seems logical that socioeconomically troubled states also enjoy less political stability so it could be argued that leaving them out of this analysis would introduce significant bias. The cases to be used here are chosen only on the basis of Gurr’s criteria for MARS and this procedure will prevent bias involving consociationalism and thus strengthen the validity of this project’s results. Inclusion of this wide variety of states in the statistical analysis will be accompanied by the use of independent variables designed to control for several factors such as democracy and states’ differing socioeconomic conditions, to ensure that the true effects of consociationalism are distinguished from these other phenomena.

To maximize the validity of this project’s findings, a few categories of countries containing Gurr’s MARS have been excluded from the list of cases. Two lists of his minorities have been consulted to identify all potential country cases and to eliminate some that not appropriate for this analysis. These publications classify the groups by the countries in which they reside and provide estimates of their population sizes in these countries as of 1990 and 1998 (Gurr, 1993, p.326-338; 2000, p.321-336). Optimally, the lists of cases for this project would have been compiled through reference to lists reflecting conditions throughout the period to be covered, 1975 to 1995. However, the 1990 list appears to be the earliest of its kind available from Gurr’s team. The criteria quoted above for inclusion of a group in their study, involving historic, as well as current, collective suffering or benefit, and political mobilization, emphasize that Gurr’s means of categorization takes into account developments since 1945. Groups must meet some additional criteria to be identified as MARS. The groups must reside in countries with populations of at least one million and each group in
each country must contain at least one hundred thousand people or one percent of the country's population (Gurr, 1993, p.8). Gurr's (1993, p.8-9) study also includes advantaged and dominant minorities, if they mobilize collectively or are the object of discrimination, and occasionally aggregations of small groups if they are usually treated by their country's rump population as if they constitute a single group (e.g. "native peoples" in the United States). If only a very small proportion of a country's population is comprised of members of groups fitting Gurr's definition of MARs, it seems inappropriate to label their entire country a "plural society." For instance, the tiny Korean community in Japan is identified as the country's only MAR presumably because, even though they constitute only .6% of the overall population (as of both 1990 and 1998), they must number more than one hundred thousand people (Gurr, 1993, p.327; 2000, p.323). Inclusion of a country in the project undertaken here implies that its entire "society" is "plural" and this cannot be reasonably claimed unless some substantial percentage of its population has the characteristics of Gurr's MARs. For this reason, a threshold was chosen, without reference to the data, which will enable elimination of insufficiently plural countries. If a country's MARs do not collectively constitute ten percent of its overall population, according to the 1990 or 1998 statistics provided by Gurr, it is excluded from the project. If either set of statistics estimates this percentage to be higher than ten percent for a country, that country is included. This measure eliminates a diverse set of countries from around the globe, some of which are Australia, China, Croatia, Eritrea, Papua New Guinea, and Russia.

Examination of this sample of countries containing MARs to be excluded, as well as the assignment of MAR status to certain countries by Gurr, emphasizes that some of the decisions the MAR dataset reflects concerning individual countries would be criticized by comparativist political scientists and/or country specialists. In a 1993 publication, Gurr (p.9) acknowledges that his list of MARs "excludes groups that some regional specialists think should be included," such as the Scots in the United Kingdom, the French speakers in Belgium, and Greeks in Albania. He then states that "[a]ll these groups should be added the next time we revise the list" but the version provided in the revision published in 2000 includes some, but not all, of these (Gurr, 1993, p.10; 2000, p.322-325). No Belgian groups were inserted in this updated list and this is significant because Belgium is one of four countries which Lijphart has consistently identified as having had a very successful experience with consociationalism. Gurr's choice of specific MARs for individual countries has also led to their exclusion from this project, according to the ten percent population threshold described above, even though they are often portrayed in scholarly works as fitting the definition of plural societies to be operationalized. For example, in a chapter-length case study of Papua New Guinea, Reilly (2001, p.60-61) describes the country in a way that makes it sound like it should definitely be categorized as a "plural society" and references these passages by other experts, Premdas and Griffin:

... Papua New Guinea is almost certainly the world's most ethnically fragmented state in terms of the sheer numbers of independent ethno-linguistic groups. Observers of Papua New Guinea politics have long argued that its ethnic fragmentation represents a 'formidable and intractable' impediment to nation-building (Premdas 1989, p.246) and that Papua New Guinea's '10,000
micro-societies' and hundreds of language groups, the largest of which numbers only 150,000 people, presents an almost insurmountable barrier to stable democracy (Griffin 1974, p. 142-3).

Presumably because they are either insufficiently, collectively threatened or mobilized, or they do not meet his threshold requiring a group to constitute one percent of its country's population or contain one hundred thousand people, most of these groups in Papua New Guinea were not identified as MARs. The only MAR identified in Papua New Guinea is the Bougainvilleans, who constituted approximately 4.6% of the population as of 1990 and 3% as of 1998 (Gurr, 1993, p. 331; 2000, p. 329).

Perhaps it is unfortunate that a country as widely regarded to be plural as Papua New Guinea is not to be included in this project because its MARs do not total ten percent. However, by not including cases chosen according to subjective assessments by its author, this statistical analysis avoids a pitfall more threatening than the exclusion of a few, potentially interesting cases. The choice of cases for this project cannot be criticized for containing any bias introduced through considerations involving the subject or outcome of this analysis of consociationalism. The cases will be chosen through reference only to choices made by Gurr and his research team, a ten percent threshold that was chosen without consideration of individual countries, and exclusion of the regions inhabited by a few MARs that do not constitute independent countries. Since Gurr's definition of a MAR, reflecting its collective treatment and activities, closely corresponds to the definition of plural societies which this project aims to accurately analyze, the identification of cases according to his definition does not introduce any undesired effects. However, the significance of his policies of restricting MAR status only to groups and countries of a certain size and identifying advantaged, often dominant, groups as MARs will be acknowledged when the statistical results obtained by this project are examined. It must also be recognized that the arbitrary ten percent threshold for excluding cases does not take into account the strength of problems and collective action experienced, and exhibited, by groups. Biases within the list of cases that are not connected to consociationalism and not subjectively introduced by this project's author include a lack of adequate consideration of regions not constituting individual countries, countries with small overall or MAR populations, countries with greater numbers of advantaged MARs, and countries with small numbers of MAR inhabitants whose activities and conditions are more intense.

Three categories of countries containing at least one MAR have been excluded from this analysis. They include those whose MARs collectively do not constitute ten percent of their overall populations, those which are not truly independent countries containing the MARs listed for them, and those for which appropriate data was not available for the dependent variable representing stability. These are countries which were included in Gurr's dataset but have been excluded from the dataset used for this project for methodological reasons. Of the 117 places identified as containing MARs according to either 1990 or 1998 population data, 30 were eliminated because the population figures provided by the MAR research team indicated that the MARs within them did not collectively
meet the arbitrary threshold of ten percent. The countries that were eliminated because they are not independent countries containing the MARs identified with them are, in Gurr's exact terminology: Eurocommunity, Nordic Countries, Taiwan, Cyprus, and Yugoslavia (1992-1995). Taiwan is not included because it is arguably not very independent from China. Cyprus is excluded because the MAR identified for it, Turkish Cypriots, is recognized by many in the international community as inhabiting another country, Turkish Cyprus. Yugoslavia is not included for the years, 1992-1995, because it was effectively a different country from 1992 and the only population data I have for it is from 1998, which may drastically differ from the actual makeup of the population from 1992 to 1995. The "Former Yugoslavia," identified as "Yugoslavia" in the 1993 publication, is included in this project for 1975-1991, using the 1990 population data provided in that publication. Burma is listed with its alternative name, Myanmar, in the dataset only because it was identified that way in another dataset used for this analysis. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union had to be eliminated from this project because the dependent variable and data used in this project was constructed through data available in Gurr's Minorities at Risk dataset, which was not available for the Soviet Union. The one category of countries that is included in the dataset for this project even though they were not identified as containing MARs were three of Lijphart's cases of apparently very successful consociationalism, which he specified in addition to Switzerland (which is a case for this project). Unfortunately, the data required for making dependent variable data representing stability for these countries, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, were also not available in the Minorities at Risk dataset so data for the independent variables is available in this project's dataset but the influence of consociationalism on stability in these countries cannot be quantitatively analyzed here. While similar data could conceivably be made to take the place of this data derived from Gurr's dataset, its separate construction would inevitably provoke criticism regarding subjective, potentially biased decision-making and its comparability with other countries' values for the dependent variable would be inferior. These countries' experiences will be analyzed quantitatively in Chapter 7. Switzerland is included in the statistical analysis because more than ten percent of its population is comprised of MARs. It is also a special case because these MARs, Jurassiens and Foreign Workers, do not correspond to the cleavage identified by Lijphart in connection with consociationalism. For this reason, the data which were constructed through reference to attributes of MARs for the rest of the countries were made instead according to the cleavage identified by Lijphart for Switzerland.

The lack of some other data for additional countries has not required their elimination from this study but it should be recognized that conclusions concerning certain independent variables will not necessarily reflect the experiences of every country. Some other scholars' datasets were used to make and collect data for this project and they were occasionally missing data for some years of countries' experiences. Therefore, these resulting shortcomings were then also introduced into the dataset to be used here. This problem normally affected only some years for each of these individual countries. However, no data for the Minority Veto Power variable (MV) was created for some
countries because it was constructed through analysis of operational, codified, single constitutional
documents and some countries either did not use such documents between 1975 and 1995 or such
documents could not be accessed during the data construction process. For example, no MV data
exists for Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Bhutan. However, the absence of MV data
for these countries affects their representation in the dataset but does not require their elimination
from the project. The representation of one other intriguing place will also necessarily be suboptimal.
Since the cases are independent countries and inclusion of other entities would hinder valid
comparison of cases, Northern Ireland's experience of consociational components (which were not
used throughout the United Kingdom) cannot be adequately assessed in this statistical analysis. The
data representing the United Kingdom will take Northern Ireland into account but examination of this
region on its own must be restricted to a qualitative treatment in Chapter 7. Of course, the findings of
the statistical analysis should greatly assist comprehension of the role, and history, of consociational
components in that troubled region.

To maximize the validity of this project's findings, two sets of countries containing Gurr's
MARs will be separately statistically analysed. These two sets of cases correspond to those countries
which are identified as plural, and those which are both plural and democratic. The theory of
Lijphart's to be tested is that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. For this reason,
the first set of cases is designed to include all plural countries in the world. However, the specific
type of stability envisioned by Lijphart as occurring due to consociationalism is democratic and he
also consistently describes consociationalism as a type of democracy. Due to methodological
considerations detailed in Chapter 6, the optimal means of statistically representing the theory that
consociational democracy promotes a democratic form of stability in plural societies is to test this
system's operation among countries which are both plural and democratic. Those countries identified
as plural, through reference to the MAR data in the manner described above, were evaluated for
potential inclusion in the subset of plural and democratic countries through analysis of another dataset
provided by the Freedom House human rights organization. The data provided by Freedom House
which was used here was collected and calculated annually for the organization's "Freedom in the
World Project," for 192 countries since 1972 ("Freedom"). The dataset is described as comprising
rankings derived from "an annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights and civil
liberties" and the methodology for calculating these rankings is provided on the Freedom House
website ("Freedom"; "Methodology"). Each year of each country's experience is first allocated two
numerical rankings indicating levels of political rights and civil liberties ("Methodology"). The sum
of these rankings for each year is evaluated to determine whether the country was, in each year,
"free," "partly free," or "not free" ("Methodology"). The subset of plural and democratic cases
Corresponding to countries' years of experience, which was created for this project, contains those
deemed to be plural following analysis of the MAR dataset and identified as either "free" or "partly
free," in Freedom House's "Freedom in the World Project" dataset. A variety of different data

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sources providing information about democracy could have been used to assess the extent to which the cases used for this project were democratic. This “Freedom in the World” data was chosen because it indicates whether institutions and regimes are producing democratic freedom of expression. In contrast to that provided by Freedom House, most other data indicating democracy levels rely on information regarding institutions. However, even seemingly democratic institutions can be manipulated in such a way as to deprive countries’ inhabitants of democratic rights of political participation and expression. For instance, Lijphart has emphasized to the world community that majoritarian democracies, which have commonly been recognized as fully democratic, are not truly democratic if they permanently exclude from power segments of their populations. The Freedom House data was used to facilitate construction of this project’s set of plural and democratic countries because they indicate whether democratic conditions actually exist in all of the countries and years covered by the project.

Three lists of countries are provided in Appendices A, B, and C. Appendix A lists the Minorities at Risk identified as existing in each country included in this project, which were examined to determine whether each country should be considered plural and, therefore, whether it should be analyzed here. Appendix B comprises a list of those plural countries, categorized by continent. Appendix C is also categorized by continent and it provides the list of countries’ years of experience deemed to constitute examples of plural and democratic societies, which was compiled through reference to the Freedom House data described above. This project examining the role of consociationalism in plural societies uses cases that represent each independent country containing one or more of Gurr’s MARs that collectively constitute more than ten percent of its population. These cases comprise eighty-eight countries throughout the world. In addition, a second set of cases was compiled for the project which includes only those years of these eighty-eight countries’ experiences which can be considered democratic. This second set of cases must be analyzed in this project in facilitate understanding of the extent to which consociationalism produces the sort of democratic, long-term stability which Lijphart seeks to encourage internationally. When the findings of this project’s quantitative analyses are considered, it should also be remembered that consociationalism is prescribed for those countries whose populations are not only diverse but also whose segments are at least potentially antagonistic. The theory to be tested here is that consociationalism produces stability in plural societies so these societies must comprise the cases for the quantitative analyses. However, instability is inherently more likely in these cases and it should be considered that consociational components may actually be more conducive to stability in non-plural societies.

Conclusion
Lijphart’s and others’ discussions of plural societies and ethnic and communal conflicts together illustrate which definition of plural societies should be used in this study, in order to ascertain whether the elements of his consociational system do encourage stability in plural societies. Plural societies will be defined as those which are clearly divided into groups whose members’ collective actions reflect the obvious existence of cleavages corresponding to religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and/or race. Since Gurr’s methodology for choosing cases for his dataset, *Minorities at Risk*, is very similar to this definition, most states including one of the groups constituting his cases, will be adopted as cases for this project. A few of these states will not be used in this analysis for the reasons described above to maximize the accuracy of the statistical findings. Their exclusion will not introduce any biases connected to the proposition to be tested. A second set of cases restricted to these plural countries’ democratic years of experience has also been compiled through examination of a dataset provided by Freedom House. It will be analyzed to promote more accurate assessment of Lijphart’s theory that, in plural societies, consociationalism promotes the sort of long-term stability associated with democracy.
CHAPTER 5:
EMPIRICALLY DEPICTING CONSOCIATIONALISM
AND FACTORS LIKELY TO AFFECT ITS OPERATION

Statistical assessment of the claim that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies requires identification of appropriate variables and data to represent this proposition. Variables must be chosen which reflect consociationalism and stability as accurately as possible, in a manner which prevents methodological problems which could invalidate this study’s conclusions. For instance, the results would be inaccurate if phenomena other than consociationalism, instead of this political system itself, were not included in the analysis but actually explained trends in stability which only appeared to be produced by consociationalism. False conclusions generated in this scenario can be avoided through inclusion of “controlling” variables representing factors which may account for consociationalism’s apparent successes and failures. Data representing all of the independent variables was assembled through determination of optimal types of information and subsequent collection and creation of data which resemble these ideal types as closely as possible.

Part 1:
Independent Variables Representing Consociationalism

Statistical analysis of the effects of consociationalism requires independent variables representing this political system, as well as independent, controlling variables which are also thought to significantly influence stability in plural societies. The consociational variables correspond to the four components of this system, grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportional representation, and minority veto power. The controlling, independent variables chosen for inclusion in this study involve external threats, moderate multiparty systems, geographical concentration of segments, population size, socioeconomic equality, and democracy. Data for the controlling variables and proportional representation is borrowed from other datasets, while newly created data represents minority veto power and new data incorporating information from some other datasets represents grand coalition and segmental autonomy.

Grand Coalition

Grand coalitions including representatives from all potentially antagonistic population segments are presented by Lijphart as the most crucial institutional element of consociationalism. The variables designed to measure the presence of grand coalitions could either indicate the proportion of voters represented by politicians in coalitions, or simply whether or not all-inclusive coalitions exist. The latter option is the optimal means of constructing these variables because it must correspond to an
element of the consociational system, instead of an effect of consociationalism. Lijphart arguably does not adequately distinguish between components and ramifications of consociationalism. Unintentional testing of the connection between different ramifications of the system would inescapably suggest a positive relationship that is not necessarily connected to consociationalism itself. For instance, inter-group elite negotiation is obviously conducive to decreased communal violence but identification of this relationship implies nothing about consociationalism. Government by all-inclusive coalition, especially when it is permanent, might very possibly become illegitimate in the eyes of voters because it would virtually preclude cabinet turnover following elections and effective opposition to cabinet decisions. Therefore, all-inclusive coalitions are not unarguable manifestations of long-term stability. In contrast, coalitions which do not include all politically significant groups in society do not preclude government turnover or opposition. For these reasons, the presence of all-inclusive, but not semi-inclusive, coalitions ideally should be represented in this independent variable corresponding to grand coalition. However, examination of the actual experiences of the countries to be represented in this project, and indeed all countries in the world, indicates that such all-inclusive coalitions are extremely rare. Many coalitions identified by Lijphart as being all-inclusive actually do not contain all political parties in their societies. Representation of this consociational component through data with very little variation, resulting from the extreme rarity of grand, all-inclusive coalition in its ideal form, would render this variable methodologically problematic. For this reason, coalitions including one or more, but not all, MARs will be coded positively for the first “grand coalition” variable used here, “somewhat inclusive grand coalition,” indicating that they at least somewhat resemble Lijphart’s grand coalitions. Coalitions including members of all of a country’s MARs will be allocated positive scores for the second “grand coalition” variable, “highly inclusive grand coalition.” When countries only contain one MAR and a member of it is included in executives, they are allocated positive scores for this second variable. Particularly when the MARs are included in coalitions specifically to promote the mitigation of antagonism, the spirit of true, grand, all-inclusive coalitions is present and they thus constitute some degree of consociationalism. Identification of a coalition as inclusive because of its representation of only one group is more appropriate than it may first appear because this group has been identified by Gurr’s team as a “minority” and “at risk,” both of which are attributes which makes a group much less likely to possess supreme political power. Unfortunately, due to their extreme rarity, Lijphart’s consociational component of grand coalitions cannot be represented statistically in its purest form in this project. The absence of the pure form of grand coalition in this project’s statistical model should be kept in mind as a significant, but unavoidable, deficiency that is only partially mitigated by inclusion of the variables indicating the presence of coalitions which are more inclusive with regard to MAR members. Completely inclusive executive coalitions, with their inherently very limited, accompanying potential for opposition, also have a much less obvious relationship with stability than do executives which simply contain one or more MARs. For this reason, relationships found in this
dataset between the inclusive coalition variables and stability will be less valuable and interesting than those involving the other consociational components, whose variables are less clearly associated with stability.

The variables corresponding to the presence of such grand coalitions are represented through data made for this analysis through reference to the World Bank Database of Political Institutions, which is compiled by Philip Keefer (2002), and a wide range of internet sites found through extensive Google searches. For each country, a substantial attempt is made to ascertain whether its MARs have been in executive coalitions during the years from 1975 until 1995. Separate pieces of data are made for each year of each country's experience during this period. The list of MARs to be investigated for each country corresponds to the group identified in the Appendix of the 1993 *Minorities at Risk* publication, unless a new country was not listed in that publication (Gurr, p.326-338). In that case, the MARs residing in it are found in Appendix D of the 2000 version of that publication (Gurr, p.321-336). For each year between 1975 and 1995, Keefer's data for individual countries and a number of variables are consulted to ascertain whether any MARs were in coalition governments. This data indicates whether the chief executive was from a political party (rather than a military, royalty, etc.), how many coalition parties existed and the identities of the three biggest ones, if a "primary component" of those parties' platforms was "nationalist," "regional," or "religious," and the number of opposition and government seats existing each year (Keefer, 2002, p.9). If examined collectively, this information often indicates whether parties focusing on representing MARs were in the executive. When it is not adequate to enable determination of this question, terms relevant to the situation in each country are used in internet searches that usually facilitate accurate discovery of the data required to represent the grand coalition variable. If complete information regarding a country's coalition partners cannot be found through these two avenues, it is concluded that no evidence of coalitions including MARs can be found. A case corresponding to a year of a country's experience is allocated a "0" for this variable in any one of these scenarios: (1) if no evidence can be found of such a coalition, (2) if it is confirmed that no such coalition existed, or (3) if one of the MARs identified as "advantaged" by the Minorities at Risk team dominates power. A case is allocated a "1" if one MAR is in the executive and a "2" if all of a country's MARs (which may be only one), hold executive power. It should be pointed out that these variables do not indicate whether or not a country is democratic. Grand coalitions, or any executive power holders for that matter, do not necessarily hold any democratic mandate to rule. The relationship between democracy, consociationalism, and stability will be examined in this project with a subset of country cases and a control variable representing democracy.
The second consociational component is segmental autonomy, which Lijphart (1977, p.41) describes as “rule by the minority [or other group] over itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern.” Lijphart (1986, p.191) prescribes segmental autonomy in plural societies because it reassures groups that their cultures and other collective behaviors are respected and will not be impinged upon. This component thereby encourages extensive separation of groups and arguably diminishes inter-group contact to an extent that facilitates prejudice, scapegoating, and secession. The inclusion of a separate variable representing segmental autonomy in this analysis will enable discrimination between the effects of forms of separateness and other elements of consociationalism, such as minority veto power. Since segmental autonomy is arguably not beneficial, it cannot be assumed that it is a manifestation of stability, so it can be represented without modification in this analysis and without causing methodological problems.

The variable representing this phenomenon is arguably the most exciting component of the project because Lijphart’s concept of segmental autonomy is truly the heart of consociationalism. His thesis is that there is a strong, positive relationship between stability and the separation of groups at all but the most elite leadership levels (Lijphart, 1969, p.216-221; 1977, p.1, 88-89). Lijphart (1977, p.1, 88) explains that inter-group “[e]lite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy” and that “clear boundaries between the [nonelite members of] segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility.” He argues that

A distinction has to be made between essentially homogeneous political cultures, where increased contacts are likely to lead to an increase in mutual understanding and further homogenization, and essentially heterogeneous cultures, where close contacts are likely to lead to strain and hostility. ... This proposition can be refined further by stating both the degree of homogeneity and the extent of mutual contacts in terms of continua rather than dichotomies. In order to safeguard political stability, the volume and intensity of contact must not exceed the commensurate degree of homogeneity. ... Hence, it may be desirable to keep transactions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society- or, similarly, among different nationalities in a multinational state- to a minimum (Lijphart, 1969, p.220-221).

Lijphart’s other three core consociational components are really subsidiary ones to this more fundamental element requiring group autonomy and separation. Grand coalition is the necessary cooperation among elites, minority veto power is one manifestation of groups’ autonomy, and proportional representation is another means of maximizing groups’ power over their own affairs. The performance of the segmental autonomy variable in this analysis will give some indication of whether Lijphart’s entire notion of consociationalism promotes inter-group harmony.

The accuracy of any statistical representation of Lijphart’s notion of segmental autonomy can be maximized through analysis of his descriptions of this component. In his 1996 article, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” he provides a very clear description of it that seems to lend itself to quantifiability:
Cultural autonomy for religious and linguistic groups has taken three main forms in power-sharing democracies:
(1) federal arrangements in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide, thus providing a high degree of linguistic autonomy, as in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czecho-Slovakia;
(2) the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer their own autonomous schools, fully supported by public funds, as in Belgium and the Netherlands; and
(3) separate 'personal laws' - concerning marriage, divorce, custody, and adoption of children, and inheritance - for religious minorities, as in Lebanon and Cyprus.
Indian democracy has had all these three forms, the last two from the very beginning and linguistic federalism since the 1950s (Lijphart, p.260).

This excerpt suggests that segmental ("cultural") autonomy should be represented through data indicating the presence of federalism, the extent to which federal boundaries coincide with group boundaries, the right of groups to establish their own publicly funded schools, and the existence of separate "personal laws" for groups. This list emphasizes the fact that segmental autonomy does not require the existence of federalism, separate schools, or separate personal laws. These are indicators of, rather than requirements for, groups' autonomy. Lijphart's consistent use of the term, "autonomy," and his choice of the word, "right," in reference to schools, highlights that segmental autonomy is about groups' power to do things separately, rather than their actual separateness. Lijphart seems to never explicitly make this distinction but analysis of his body of work on consociationalism indicates that it is a valid interpretation of his point of view. Alternatively, some scholars understand Lijphart as advocating separation, and/or imposed "segregation," of groups. Even if this was an equally reasonable interpretation of his work, its translation into data would probably produce a representation of consociationalism that would be less likely to be associated with long-term intergroup stability. When potentially valid interpretations of consociationalism exist which are likely to yield statistical results favoring or condemning it, those which are likely to present it in its most positive light are chosen for this analysis, to give the theory its best chance of being proven to be true. The data for this project's segmental autonomy variable is thus made to represent groups' empowerment, rather than the dominance implied by the term, "segregation," and the situations which have historically been labeled "segregation." For instance, although Lijphart implies that separate schools are evidence of segmental autonomy but they are not represented in the segmental autonomy variable because the data for this project is designed to represent the existence, rather than the effects, of empowerment. Of course, power over one's own affairs is inevitably a result of one's empowerment but this project aims to identify devices used to exert power more than the results obtained through those mechanisms. This methodological choice also simplifies analysis of consociationalism because, while it cannot be assumed that all MARs want their own schools, legal systems, transportation systems, and other services, it is reasonable to conclude they all desire more control over their cultural affairs, particularly since they are "at risk." Therefore, segmental autonomy according to this definition is something that all MARs would prefer and thus would use in some fashion, if it was provided. Lijphart differentiates two categories of segmental autonomy which
are fundamental types of empowerment that can be translated into data for this project, territorially based and non-territorially based federalism and autonomy.

This project's segmental autonomy variable constitutes the first quantitative representation of the concept that incorporates both its territorial and non-territorial forms. Lijphart (1989a, p. 141) explains that consociationalism can manifest itself as "a formal territorial federal system, a non-territorial federation, or a system in which decision-making is delegated to private segmental organisations." The variable will indicate whether or not any of these situations exist. Lijphart also believes that, to bring stability to plural societies, the substate divisions separating the units which comprise territorially based federations and other autonomy structures ideally should coincide with the cleavages separating potentially antagonistic groups. For this reason, countries with territorially delineated federalism and/or autonomy will only be recognized as containing segmental autonomy if their substate governance units contain populations that are relatively culturally homogeneous (in terms of MAR groups). Lijphart's advocacy of the unit homogeneity promoted by such systems is in fundamental disagreement with many other scholars' recommendations for antagonistic, plural societies. For instance, Horowitz (1985, p. 619-620) and Reilly (2001, p. 185-192) stress that demographic conditions can very significantly affect the operation of federalism and electoral systems and recommend avoidance of coinciding governance and group intrastate boundaries. Unlike any previous quantitative treatment of consociationalism, this project recognizes that Lijphart's segmental autonomy is manifested through separation of the potentially antagonistic groups which make up a plural society. If federal and territorial autonomy systems are made with units that integrate these groups more than separating them, their presence is actually inimical to the theory and spirit of consociationalism.

Non-territorially based systems for separating groups and maintaining their autonomy will also be reflected in the data used to represent segmental autonomy in this analysis. Groups' control over their own cultural affairs can be manifested through a huge variety of practices so it is a difficult phenomenon to accurately quantify. Countries will be identified as containing segmental autonomy if their MARs' cultural organizations' activities are not substantially restricted, and if they have one of these three provisions: (1) territorial autonomy with relatively homogeneous governance units, (2) at least one MAR's language as a state official language, or (3) MARs are permitted to govern themselves to some extent through their own laws or justice systems. The only requirement of these four which must be in place for segmental autonomy to be coded as existent is that involving cultural organizations. While it can be assumed that MARs do not want their cultural organizations to be restricted in their activities, they may not all want territorial (as opposed to non-territorial) autonomy, official language status, or their own laws. The existence of one of these latter three conditions seems to indicate the presence of empowerment in a society that is segmented. Although official language status does not itself provide any power to groups, if a MAR's language is made official, it is implied that the MAR is as powerful as any other group inhabiting the country. While these conditions
obviously do not comprise all of the seemingly unlimited, potential types of segmental autonomy, they are unarguably manifestations of this phenomenon and they collectively cover a diversity of experiences and feelings of empowerment. They represent groups' abilities to control more of their affairs than is possible through schools and the specific activities conducted by cultural organizations. Unfortunately, in the absence of data covering all existing forms of group empowerment in segmented societies, some countries containing segmental autonomy may accidentally not be coded as such for this project. However, the variable corresponding to this consociational component will indicate whether segmental autonomy can be identified in a country, following a search for these manifestations of it. Optimally, the presence of these manifestations would also have been separately tested for each year during the 1975-1995 period, for each country. Since most of these factors are unlikely to change often in each society, and due to the unfeasibly large undertaking that would be required to calculate separate, annual data, only one piece of information was made for each country, corresponding to each manifestation and to segmental autonomy as a whole.

The data for segmental autonomy was made through reference to information involving these manifestations, found through the Minorities at Risk dataset, Ann L. Griffith's Handbook of Federal Countries: 2002, Keefer's World Bank Database of Political Institutions, the 1988, 1989, and 2004 editions of the CIA World Factbook, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Islamic Family Law project, Herbert Kritzer's encyclopedia of Legal Systems of the World, and the results of numerous internet searches. First, data was collected for each of the forms of segmental autonomy to be analyzed: restrictions on cultural organizations, territorial autonomy with relatively homogeneous units, state language status, and groups' control of their own legal affairs. The first of these regarding organizations corresponds perfectly to a variable in the Minorities at Risk dataset that is entitled “Restrictions on Cultural Organizations.” Unfortunately, this variable is not available for many years in the 1975-1995 period but it is calculated for 1990. The 1990 mean values for each country are used as the data for this component of segmental autonomy. In the Minorities at Risk dataset, there are four potential values for it: 0: “no restrictions,” 1: “activity informally restricted,” 2: “activity somewhat restricted,” 3: “activity sharply restricted” (Gurr et.al., 2002, p.88-89). These data were used to decide whether each country had such restrictions or did not. At first, only countries with a “0” were coded as not having restrictions. However, this method eliminated many countries which are commonly believed to have segmental autonomy, such as Bosnia. For this reason, countries with a “0” or “1” are recorded as unrestricted, while the others are labeled as positive for this factor.

The second phenomenon to be identified through data is territorial autonomy with relatively homogeneous units. This information was made through two steps: identification of all countries with federalism or other forms of territorial autonomy, and determination of which countries seemed to have substantial geographical concentration of MARs in the resulting substate units. The list of countries containing some form of territorial autonomy includes all those identified as federal in
Griffith’s *Handbook of Federal Countries: 2002*, and those which were allocated positive values for two variables in Keefer’s database corresponding to the existence of autonomous regions and devolution of powers often delegated to regions in federal systems. Separate values were calculated for these two variables for each year of countries’ experiences between 1975 to 1995. If a country received positive values for either of them at any time during that period, it was coded for this project as having contained territorial autonomy. Like the information compiled for restrictions on cultural associations, one piece of data was made for each country indicating whether it had territorial autonomy at any time during the 1975-1995 period. Next, the data provided for six variables in the *Minorities at Risk* dataset were analyzed to ascertain the likelihood that the countries with territorial autonomy had subnational units which were relatively homogeneous with regard to MARs. Unfortunately, no data exists that specifically indicates the percentages of groups akin to MARs in subnational governing units. However, this data from the *Minorities at Risk* dataset does show to what extent MARs were geographically concentrated and what proportions of them were living inside and outside of their respective “regional base[s].” This is the best data available that provides an indication of the extent to which such groups are concentrated in subnational governance units so it was examined for each country with territorial autonomy and a determination was made that, during the 1975-1995 period, either territorial autonomy with relatively homogeneous units existed or it did not. The methodology for making these judgments did ensure perfectly accurate results so the data really indicates whether or evidence of this phenomenon could be found in each place.

The third manifestation of segmental autonomy analyzed to make data for this core component of consociationalism is the provision in some countries for MARs’ distinctive languages to be granted official status. Such a designation seems quite significant because it implies that MARs should have a right (but not any obligation) to have the separate treatment in educational and other social spheres that would be required for constant use of their language. For a country to receive a positive score for this factor, a MAR that constitutes less than half of the overall population must have a distinctive language which is formally recognized as having status equal to that of the more dominant, majority language. Such a MAR can be historically dominant, such as the Whites in South Africa, if it comprises less than half of the country’s population. This language need not actually be called an “official” language. If a country uses a different term for this status, such as “national language,” that is acceptable. However, designation as a “national” or “official” language is not sufficient if another language has a more prestigious designation. For instance, Sri Lanka is not given a positive score for this factor because, although Tamil is a “national” language, Sinhala is given supreme status as both a “national” and the “official” language. If a language is given the supreme designation for the MAR rather than its entire country, that country also receives a positive score for this factor because that seems to imply that the group would be empowered to create its own publicly funded institutions. Since only one value is provided for segmental autonomy for each country’s experience during the entire 1975-1995 period, if a MAR gained such status for its language
sometime during this period, the entire period was given a positive value. For instance, Maori was
declared an official language in New Zealand in August, 1987 so that country is given a positive value
for this factor covering the entire period. The entries listing each countries’ languages in the 1988,
1989, and 2004 editions of the CIA World Factbook were compared to the list of MARs, to determine
values for this manifestation of segmental autonomy. In the rare cases for which the CIA World
Factbook did not contain information regarding official language status, internet searches yielded the
information required for making this data. The list of countries was simply divided into those
containing such a provision, and those which do not. Some drawbacks of the information compiled
for this factor illustrate the importance of making the segmental autonomy data through reference to
four of its manifestations. Countries whose MARs share the languages of the dominant group in their
societies would automatically receive a negative score for this factor, even though they may possess
very significant segmental autonomy. In addition, sometimes official language status does not seem
to correlate very strongly with positive treatment of MARs. For instance, Kurdish was an official
language for the Kurdish Regions of Iraq during this period but that did not seem to translate into their
fair treatment.

The fourth, and final, component of segmental autonomy that was examined to make data for
this consociational component is MARs’ ability to control their own culturally related legal affairs.
The most common cases of this provision are for Muslim groups within largely non-Muslim
countries, which are often recognized as preferring to operate according to distinctive customary laws.
Like the segmental autonomy factor involving official language status, this phenomenon is also not
something that would be desired by a lot of MARs that are not interested in ruling themselves
according to a distinctive set of rules. For instance, African-Americans in the United States and
“Catholics” in Northern Ireland desire equal treatment according to laws shared with their rump
populations, rather than a separate set of laws for themselves. However, the presence of such legal
autonomy is a definite indication of the presence of segmental autonomy. Provisions allowing for
measures of such legal autonomy for MARs were searched for, through reference to three sources:
“core documents” for individual countries available through the website for the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the website for the Islamic Family Law Project at
Emory University, and a set of encyclopedias edited by Herbert Kritzer, entitled Legal Systems of the
World. These sources were identified as the most useful for collection of this information, following
consultation with a number of international legal experts. Countries were coded as either possessing,
or not possessing, separate legal treatment for one or more of their MARs, manifested through
separate laws or courts. If a territorially autonomous substate possesses a separate legal system that is
applied to everyone in that substate, it is not recognized as evidence of this type of legal autonomy.
While this determination does not take into account the fact that some of these substates may be
culturally homogeneous, it is not problematic because homogeneity of such units will produce
positive segmental autonomy scores for their countries, through reference to data made for the factor
described above that indicates territorial autonomy. However, if a country possesses multiple MARs but not all of these are granted this legal autonomy, and if this right is allocated to them as a group rather than as a territorial unit, the country is positively coded for this factor. The group in question may be the only one who would desire, or benefit from, such a provision.

The data to be used in the statistical analysis, corresponding to the presence of segmental autonomy, were made especially for this project through reference to the information collected for the four manifestations of this consociational component that are described above. For a country to be coded as possessing segmental autonomy during the 1975-1995 period, it must have received a positive score indicating little repression of MARs’ cultural organizations, as well as a positive value indicating possession of either territorial autonomy with likely coincidence of substate and MAR boundaries, formal official status for at least one MAR’s distinctive language, or MARs’ ability to control their own culturally related legal affairs. When evidence of the components of segmental autonomy was found in legal and constitutional sources, the extent to which these sources reflect the reality of life could usually not be verified. Fortunately, even if a country was inaccurately coded as possessing some manifestations of segmental autonomy, the data indicating restrictions on cultural organizations was derived from observation of reality rather than legal documents and any country which was found to have significant restrictions of this type was coded negatively for segmental autonomy, regardless of its values for other manifestations of segmental autonomy. A survey of the resulting data for this variable illustrates that a positive value for segmental autonomy is not necessarily indicative of democracy. For example, Iraq gets positive scores for four of the manifestations of segmental autonomy and a positive overall score for the variable during this period, when Saddam Hussein brutally mistreated the group he officially gave the most autonomy to, the Kurds.

Proportionality

Proportionality of electoral results and other opportunities comprises the third component of Lijphart’s consociational system. The availability of occupational and other opportunities in approximate proportion to groups’ sizes should naturally evolve when people receive equal treatment and groups peacefully coexist. For this reason, proportional allocation of opportunities is arguably an effect, rather than a cause, of stability. Therefore, representation of it in an independent variable within this analysis would introduce methodological problems. The variable assigned to proportionality in this project must be restricted to proportionality of electoral results. Electoral rules which engender a close correspondence between votes and awarded political seats naturally encourage groups’ fair representation in government. Proportional Representation (PR) is not necessarily associated with, or an effect of, stability so its presence can be indicated through an independent variable. If it is found to be conducive to stability, an additional independent variable can be
introduced that corresponds to the specific PR system advocated by Lijphart, List PR. Its presence in the analysis would also be methodologically unproblematic because it also is not necessarily associated with stability. Horowitz (1985, p.639-41) and Reilly (2001) argue that List PR does not contain adequate incentives for inter-group, elite and mass level, negotiation and, therefore, is potentially destabilizing. If PR is not found to have a stabilizing influence, the only variable regarding proportionality in this analysis will be represented by data indicating whether PR has operated in each state for each year during the 1975-1995 period. The data for this variable will be taken directly from Keefer's World Bank Database of Political Institutions. It contains a variable identical to the one used here that indicates whether, if multiple political parties are legal, a country uses PR or does not use PR. Unfortunately, Keefer’s dataset had missing values for a substantial number of years of countries’ experiences and data could not be made to replace these missing values, with the exception of a few which were allocated to Czechoslovakia. Only cases which Keefer’s dataset indicated as using PR were coded for this project as positive for PR. The consequent translation of Keefer’s missing values as negative for PR constitutes a deficiency of this project’s dataset because it cannot be assumed that missing values indicate an absence of PR.

Minority Veto Power

The final component of consociationalism is each politically significant group’s power to veto legislation. Since extensively granted veto powers can, at least under some conditions, cause deadlock and consequent instability, this component cannot be considered a manifestation of stability so it can be directly represented in this statistical analysis. The independent variable corresponding to veto power will indicate whether all politically significant groups, only some, or none, possess this instrument. This variable’s identification of situations in which some, but not all, groups can veto legislation will significantly increase the ability of this analysis to explain stability in plural societies. If states allocating veto power to some or no groups were identified as belonging to the same category within this variable, the analysis would be biased toward the conclusion that consociationalism promotes stability. Situations in which only some politically salient groups are given this right would obviously be conducive to tremendous resentment and instability, whereas allocation of veto power to no groups may promote stability through deterrence of stalemate.

The first data indicating the presence of minority groups’ veto power (MVP) in a large set of countries were made for this project. They were calculated through reference to demographic statistics and the contents of all constitutions and constitutional amendments that could be found which governed each country’s entire populations. The unfeasibility of finding out whether groups veto policies in practice meant that the MVP variable is confined to indicating whether, if groups were represented in legislative bodies in proportion to their sizes, they could exert a veto resulting in a changed policy decision. This criterion contains a highly significant and unfortunately necessary
assumption. However, if the MVP and PR variables are used in conjunction with each other in the statistical analysis, inability of groups to gain such representation at least will be partly controlled for.

With two sets of exceptions, this data was made for all countries including a MAR, identified in Gurr’s 1993 and 2000 lists of MARs, as well as Lijphart’s four country cases of successful consociationalism. The first category contains a very small set of countries for which access to constitutional documents could not be obtained. The second group includes countries which have not had operational, codified, single constitution documents, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Bhutan. Although some of these countries have systems of government which use groups of documents that are internationally, collectively recognized to be analogous to constitutions, these groups of documents seem to cover significantly more subjects than normal, codified constitutions. Since they contain more material, it is likely that these countries’ “constitutions” would generally tend to have more mentions of potential MVP so their inclusion in my MVP dataset would introduce a systematic bias in favor of identifying these countries as containing MVP. Some countries like Bhutan simply did not use anything like a constitution during the 1975-1995 period so they also cannot be represented by this MVP data. These two categories of exclusions together comprise 15 countries for which no MVP data is supplied.

With the exception of “schedules” used to provide details and attached to some constitutions, every word of each constitutional document used between 1975 and 1995 and found for use in this project was read in search of provisions that could result in MVP. An inventory was made that lists all documents found for each state, the few that were not found, and the periods of time they were used. Individual pieces of data were made for each year of a country’s experience, which are particularly important because some countries only used constitutions for a few years of this period. Data could only be made for years when such documents were in force. Notes made for each document were compared to the percentages of each country’s population made up of individual MARs and all of its MARs collectively. If MARs and countries were listed in Gurr’s 1993 publication, the 1990 population figures used in it were provided for this purpose. If they were included in his 2000 publication but not the 1993 one, the 1998 figures provided in the 2000 publication were referred to. The Netherlands is the only one of Lijphart’s core country examples of consociationalism for which MVP data could not be made and it was not included in Gurr’s study. The population figures used to make MVP data for the Netherlands were taken from the 2004 edition of the CIA World Factbook. If it is found that one MAR in a country could potentially exert a veto resulting in a changed policy decision, if it was proportionally represented in legislative bodies, each year when that was true is allocated a “1” for this variable. If this feat could be accomplished by all of a country’s MARs working in concert, that case is given a “.5.” If neither of these scenarios was possible in a year of a country’s experience, it was allocated a “0.”

This project contains the first data designed to represent the ability of minority groups to veto their governments’ policy decisions, in a large set of countries. However, the absence of earlier
comparative, and particularly quantitative, work in this area severely limited the existing sources that could be used to make this data. Therefore, there are a number of drawbacks related to the applicability of the data which need to be recognized. The detection of rules potentially allowing this veto power had to be restricted to analysis of constitutions because information concerning its actual use was unavailable. Representation of actual use also was not feasible, given the resources available for construction of this project. In a couple cases when I knew that information contained in constitutions did not reflect the reality in a specific country, I did a little more research through internet searches to confirm my impression and made the data reflect reality. For example, one of the MARs for South Africa, from as early as 1993, is “Europeans.” If one MAR could possess potential veto power, its country was usually given the highest “1” score. However, its constitutional documents prior to 1993 indicated that all legislative decision-makers had to be “white” so they were the only people capable of exerting this veto and I knew that they dominated all policy there. For this reason, although Europeans had lots of veto power, South Africa is coded “0” until the very end of the 1975-1995 period because this “minority at risk” was at risk regarding some matters but completely dominant in terms of political power.

Unfortunately, the data is also adversely affected by the fact that data showing the exact proportions of legislative seats held by members of different cultural groups is also unavailable. Keefer’s World Bank Database of Political Institutions contains information showing whether any of the three largest government parties during each year of country’s experience were “nationalist” or “religious” but this information only covers members whose parties are in government. These individuals also cannot be relied upon even to be representatives of “nationalist” or “religious” types of political parties. Rather than representing the existence of veto power over policy initiatives by MARs, the data for this variable actually corresponds to the existence of MVP in countries with operational, single, written constitutions that reflect real conditions and relatively proportional representation of MARs in decision-making bodies. Another drawback of this data is that it inadequately represents the domination of some majority groups by minority ones. “Minorities at Risk” that are actually numerical majorities are very rare within Gurr’s dataset but they do exist in a few countries. The method for constructing this data treats all MARs the same so, if one of a country’s MARs had a numerical majority of the population and was judged to have potential veto power, the country was given a positive “1” score. However, examination of Gurr’s cases indicates that the countries with a majority MAR either had potential veto power for other MARs as well or the majority MAR was labeled an MAR because it was dominated by a smaller group. The first category resulted in no introduction of inaccuracy. For countries in the second category, constitutional provisions indicating potential veto power for the majority MAR did constitute promises of empowerment for groups that traditionally were politically dominated. However, this second category of countries, consisting of South Africa, Burundi, and Iraq, often did not operate in practice in a manner reflecting this power portrayed in their constitutional documents. That is a problem
related to the drawbacks of using constitutions to make this data, rather than treating all MARs the same way. Yet another regrettable aspect of this data is that, since countries are given a positive "5" score if all of their MARs can apparently exert a veto if they act together, countries whose populations contain large proportions of MARs are actually more likely to be coded as if they have more MVP. Introduction of an additional independent variable corresponding to size of population comprised of all MARs could control for this effect but such a variable would have a systemic, directly proportional, and unfalsifiable relationship with the dependent variable, stability. More people at risk in a society obviously makes it more likely to be unstable. It should also be pointed out that one piece of data exists for each year that each country was using a constitution, unless a copy of that document could not be collected. Since most constitutions covered several years of individual countries’ experiences, a country is often allocated the same value for all years between 1975 and 1995. Values of "0" were not allocated to years for which data was unavailable because that would introduce a problematic bias, since countries with constitutions that were difficult to find or unformalized constitutions would be penalized. Notwithstanding all of the small drawbacks associated with this data, it is the first designed to represent minority veto power and it will provide great insight into the operation of this core component of consociationalism.

Consociationalism will be represented in this project through four variables corresponding to Lijphart’s core components of consociationalism: the presence of inclusive coalitions, segmental autonomy, proportional representation, and minority veto power. Particularly since many states have adopted elements of consociationalism, rather than the complete system, separate representation of the elements through these variables is optimal for this analysis. In addition to ascertaining the effects of consociationalism, in general, individual representation of these elements will enable identification of their independent effects on stability in plural societies. Table 5.1, which is provided below, facilitates comparison of the consociational components, the variables representing them, and the drawbacks of those data.
<table>
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<th>Consociational Components</th>
<th>What Do Their Variables Indicate?</th>
<th>Sources of Data</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
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</table>
| **Grand Coalition**       | Can I find evidence that any non-advantaged Minorities at Risk (MARs) are represented in the governing executive? (Actually indicates the presence of highly inclusive executive coalitions) | • Gurr’s MAR dataset  
• Keefer’s World Database of Political Institutions  
• Wide ranging internet searches | • Data indicates presence of highly inclusive, rather than all inclusive coalitions.*  
• Data may not represent some highly inclusive coalitions, for which no evidence could be found.** |
| **Segmental Autonomy**    | Can I find evidence that MAR groups had the power to govern some aspects of their lives autonomously?  
• (Segmental autonomy identified when low levels of repression of cultural organizations are combined with either (1) territorial autonomy for fairly homogeneous regions, (2) formal official status of one MAR’s distinctive language, or (3) a MAR’s ability to control its own cultural legal affairs) | • Gurr’s MAR dataset  
• Griffith’s *Handbook of Federal Countries: 2002*  
• Keefer’s *World Database of Political Institutions*  
• 1988, 1989, & 2004 editions of the CIA *World Factbook*  
• “Core documents” for individual countries available on website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  
• Website for the Islamic Family Law Project at Emory University  
• Kritzer’s *Legal Systems of the World*  
• Wide ranging internet searches | • Data may not represent some segmental autonomy, for which no evidence could be found.** |
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<tr>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>If there is electoral competitiveness, is a Proportional Representation (PR) system used?</td>
<td>• Keefer’s World Database of Political Institutions</td>
<td>• Almost no missing values for Keefer’s PR variable could be investigated. Needed to assume that missing values indicate absence of PR.**</td>
</tr>
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| Minority Veto Power (MVP) | If it is assumed that MAR groups can gain representation in legislative bodies in proportion to their sizes, does their country’s constitution indicate that they could possibly exert a veto resulting in a changed policy decision? | • Constitutions  
• Gurr’s MAR dataset  
• 2004 edition of the CIA World Factbook | • Needed to rely on constitutions for evidence of potential MVP, so data may not always reflect reality.**  
• Countries whose populations contain large proportions of MARs are more likely to be coded as if they have MVP.** |

* Drawbacks that could not be eliminated, if the methodological validity of the quantitative analysis was to be preserved.  
** Drawbacks that could have been eliminated, if more information had been available.  
*** More details about the construction of these variables are available in Appendix D.
Accurate identification of any causal relationship requires confirmation that apparent effects are in fact resulting from the variables which are assumed to be decisive. Although components of Lijphart's consociational system are designed to engender stability in plural societies, other factors may also be performing this function. If they are not included in this analysis, its results will attribute an incorrect level of influence to consociationalism. For instance, if Lijphart is correct in saying that certain conditions facilitate the introduction and successful function of consociationalism, variables representing these conditions should logically, significantly influence the system's performance and effectiveness. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include all of these conditions for methodological reasons but six can be examined, at least to some degree. These are: external threats, segmental isolation and federalism, moderate multiparty system, geographical concentration of segments, small population size, and socioeconomic equality. Although Lijphart consistently identifies external threats as a favorable condition for consociationalism, some instances in which this system arguably created instability have instead been attributed to external threats and interventions. The relationship between at least one category of external threats and stability in plural societies will be analyzed with a controlling variable indicating the extent to which ethnopolitical rebellion spreads in each country's surrounding region. Another of Lijphart's favorable conditions, segmental isolation and federalism, will be examined through one of the primary independent variables corresponding to the segmental autonomy component of consociationalism. The effects of moderate multiparty systems, small population size, and socioeconomic equality will be tested with data borrowed from other databases. Another variable representing one of Lijphart's favorable conditions is designed to represent geographical concentration of segments. Its data indicate the presence of federal or autonomous regions in which MARs are concentrated. This variable is also important because it enables examination of Lijphart's claim that stability is best achieved through the consociational situation in which the boundaries separating countries' regions correspond as closely as possible with the boundaries separating potentially antagonistic groups. He explains that "federalism can be used as a consociational method when the plural society is a 'federal society': a society in which each segment is territorially concentrated and separated from the other segments, or, to put it differently, a society in which the segmented cleavages coincide with regional cleavages" (Lijphart, 1977, p.42). Federal and other forms of autonomy for relatively homogeneous units were also considered during the process of constructing data to represent the SA variable. However, the other conditions that influence a
country’s value for SA all reflected the ability of groups to have autonomy in various spheres of life, rather than the actual presence of that autonomy. Since the actual presence of autonomy might be expected to play a different role than the ability of groups to acquire such power, the geographical concentration of groups in autonomous and semi-autonomous regions will also be analyzed separately through a controlling, independent variable. The only control variable included which is not related to Lijphart’s favorable conditions will represent democracy. The role of democracy is also studied in this project through analysis of a subset of cases that are both democratic and plural. Democracy is included as a control variable because varied levels of democratic decision-making are widely believed to have substantial effects on countries’ levels of stability and these effects may be independent of the influences exerted by consociational components.

Conditions Which Lijphart Believes Are Favorable To Consociationalism

Lijphart’s work on consociationalism aspires to be empirical, normative, and predictive. He presents it as capable of explaining stability in plural societies, constituting a set of policy recommendations, and predicting where it will be adopted. Lijphart claims that certain “favorable conditions” are conducive to the introduction and successful operation of consociationalism. If this is true, for any given society, the extent to which they are present enables prediction concerning prospects for consociationalism and, if it is introduced, analysis of whether they do indeed promote the system’s stable use and conflict resolution. Lijphart (1977, p.54) does emphasize that these conditions are “helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient... to account for the success of consociational democracy.” However, he also consistently claims that “they are conditions that are helpful not only in establishing consociational democracy in a plural society but also, once it is established, in maintaining and strengthening it” (Lijphart, 1977, p.54). Lijphart claims that they can significantly affect the ability of consociational elements to bring stability to plural societies. If these favorable conditions were represented in this project through controlling, independent variables, it would provide great insights into both the role of consociationalism and the plausibility of Lijphart’s claim that the conditions heavily influence the potential for its institutionalization. Following identification of these favorable conditions, the advisability of representing them in the analysis and potential means of doing so will be examined.

The different lists of conditions presented by Lijphart in various publications over the past three decades have inspired considerable analysis by other academics. Lijphart claims that discrepancies between these lists result from his continual refinement of consociational theory. His most recent, furthest evolved set of conditions includes: “External threats,... Geographical concentration of [population] segments,... No majority segment plus segments of equal size,... Small population size,...Overarching loyalties,... Small number of segments,... Tradition of elite
accommodation," and "Socioeconomic equality" (Bogaards, 1998, p.478). Lijphart's careful revision of this list suggests that these are the conditions which ideally would be represented in this analysis. Five of them can be included, as well as another from an earlier list, corresponding to "moderate multiparty system[s]" (Bogaards, 1998, p.478). As was explained in Chapter 3, Bogaards (1998, p.483) observes that it is likely that academics will repeatedly disagree concerning the means of rating the presence of conditions and the relative importance of individual conditions. He discusses existing efforts to "quantify" the conditions (Bogaards, 1998, p.483). In Lijphart's (1985) most extensive analysis of South Africa, he created a five-point scale to classify the existence of conditions in countries as either very favourable (+2), favourable (+1), neutral (0), unfavourable (-1) or very unfavourable (-2). His methodology for allocating these ratings seems fairly impressionistic. He judged countries' fulfillment of them based on qualitative sources but Bogaards describes evidence suggesting that Lijphart's ratings are not replicable. Bogaards (1998, p. 484) explains that:

John McGarry and S.J.R. Noel (1989), and many with them, predicted a (black) majority segment in a democratic South Africa where Lijphart judged minority parties of more or less equal size the most likely outcome of the first free elections. This makes a difference of seven points [in South Africa's total rating] and South Africa would in this alternative interpretation end well below zero with a score of -6, a score nearly equaling the ill-fated consociational democracy of Cyprus. In addition McGarry and Noel assign more unfavourable weight to socio-economic inequality [in South Africa].

Lijphart's rating system and similar ones, such as that used by McGarry and Noel, apparently constitute the only attempts to quantitatively express the existence of these conditions. It seems that attempts to replicate their methodologies would be controversial so data from other sources will be used to test these conditions in this statistical analysis.

Six favorable conditions can be examined in this analysis because data is available with which to represent them and their inclusion will not cause any significant methodological problems. These are external threats, segmental isolation and federalism, moderate multiparty systems, geographical concentration of population segments, population size, and socioeconomic equality. Segmental Isolation and federalism is represented by the primary independent variable corresponding to segmental isolation but the remaining phenomena will be allocated controlling, independent variables. The other conditions in Lijphart's most recently revised list cannot be included because no data is available for them and, even if it was, their representation in the analysis would weaken the explanatory integrity of the analysis. If assigned to variables, three of these conditions would create endogeneity problems, which occur when "the values our explanatory [independent] variables take on are... a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable" (King et al., 1994, p.185). For example, if one wanted to test whether eating more made people gain more weight, one would not want to use gaining weight as an independent variable and eating as a dependent one because an analysis of them would indicate that gaining weight makes one eat more. Lijphart argues that "overarching loyalties" and "traditions of elite accommodation" promote consociationalism's ability
to bring stability to plural societies. However, these phenomena are also unarguably symptoms (and effects) of stability, even though it seems quite plausible that they are also some of its causes. He also argues that the absence of a majority group segment and the rough equality of such segments are conducive to consociationalism’s success. Unfortunately, variables representing these conditions would also be methodologically problematic because the observations for them would not contain enough variation to avoid systematic biases. Such variables will not be used because the segments in this project correspond to MARs and only a tiny proportion of the countries being studied contain either a majority MAR or roughly equal size MARs. For the same reason, another condition, a “small number of segments,” must also be excluded. The very small sample of countries with more than a few MARs means that inclusion of a variable corresponding to this factor would also be likely to introduce systematic bias.

External Threats

Lijphart identifies international threats as a condition favorable to consociationalism but also argues that international intervention heavily contributed to the breakdown of consociational systems in Lebanon and Cyprus. This phenomenon must be represented in this analysis because he believes that it substantially influences both the adoption and the success of consociational systems, and can sometimes transform a peaceful consociational society into a disaster area. Lijphart has consistently, convincingly argued that at least some external threats are felt by all inhabitants of a country and thus motivate them to feel more loyalty to their country and temporarily forget their inter-segmental disagreements to some extent. For example, if a country was made up of only A’s and B’s, an attack by C’s would constitute this sort of external threat but a secessionist movement by B’s in a bordering country would not. Unfortunately, Lijphart has not specifically described which categories of external threats result in greater inter-group feelings of comradeship and which actually precipitate instability. However, these phenomena are obviously very situation-specific and it would seem almost impossible to create data to represent them, especially for a large sample of countries and time periods.

Lijphart does provide numerous, compelling examples of how threats with origins external to countries promote both patriotism and conflict. For instance, Lijphart (1977, p.154) claims that “it is primarily to Lebanon’s increasingly unfavorable international environment- combined with the internal flaw of consociational rigidity- that the 1975 breakdown of the democratic regime must be attributed.” He does explain that Lebanese consociationalism was not “blameless” for its system’s breakdown and that “Cyprus… is admittedly a case of consociational failure” (Lijphart, 1985, p.92). Lijphart also blames the Cypriot system failure less on international events than that which occurred in Lebanon. However, he emphasizes that “[e]xternal threats and interventions emanating mainly from Turkey and Greece… hurt… internal unity,” in a situation in which there was no
"overarching" Cypriot loyalty "to counteract the divergent Greek and Turkish nationalisms dividing the islanders" (Lijphart, 1977, p.161). Lijphart’s discussion of Cypriot developments suggests that Greek and Turkish involvement encouraged the eventual civil war which ended consociational government. His claim that international intervention significantly influenced the stability of consociational systems in Lebanon and Cyprus indicates his belief that such involvement can explain substantial variation in the effects of his system in plural societies. To ensure that apparent ramifications of consociationalism in plural societies are not the result of international intervention, the latter phenomenon must also be represented in this analysis.

Identification of the optimal variables for representation of international intervention in this study can be facilitated through reference to discussions of the different manifestations of this phenomenon. One example of a list of intervention types is provided by Le Vine (1997, p.75), who describes a list of conflict resolution intervention “strategies” and groups them according to the stage of conflict when they are most likely to be used. The intervention strategies he describes are those designed to resolve conflict and engender peaceful coexistence between groups so that they can continue to share a state. In fact, most intervention types identified in academic contributions seem to be positive ones, initiated by other countries and designed to increase stability. Most examinations of the causes of communal conflict, such as the well-respected and fairly comprehensive ones contributed by Bingham Powell (1982) and Hibbs (1973), do not even explore international effects. The positive intervention examined by those interested in democratization seems to be another influence on the introduction of consociationalism, more than its subsequent stability. The international intervention which must be analyzed to understand the role of the favorable condition of external threats, as well as Lijphart’s theory about how manifestations of it may cause instability, involves belligerence. Fortunately, although this phenomenon has not received extensive academic treatment, data representing it to some degree is available in the Minorities at Risk dataset. Khosla (1999) used this data to analyze the influence on regional and international security of third world countries’ interventions in each others’ domestic politics.

Two types of data related to destabilizing international intervention are available in the Minorities at Risk dataset, corresponding to the “spread of ethnopolitical protest and rebellion through [the] region” surrounding each country (Gurr et.al., 2002, p.217). The two variables are indexes of “international contagion” corresponding to protest and rebellion. This data is the best available for representation of destabilizing international intervention in a large number of countries but it should be recognized that it does include both the intentional and unintentional influence implied in the term, “contagion.” Another drawback of the data is that it does not reflect the rare cases when an outside entity that does not border a country exerts such a destabilizing influence. The variable for rebellion will be used for this project.
because it is the strongest, and so likely the most influential, form of this contagion represented in the Minorities at Risk dataset. However, it must be kept in mind that such rebellion is, by no means, the only form of external threat which can influence a country’s level of stability. For instance, political, non-violent intervention by other countries’ governments could be as influential as rebellion but, unfortunately, it cannot be analyzed here due to the unavailability of relevant data. Separate pieces of rebellion-related data are provided for each decade of a country’s experience in the Minorities at Risk dataset so some of the years of each country’s experience covered in this project are allocated different values. The higher the value for this variable, the more contagion and intervention was being exerted. Inclusion of this variable is also methodologically unproblematic. Fortunately, intervention intended to cause instability and rebellion in bordering countries can occasionally motivate a greater sense of patriotism in response to such external threats. This possibility ensures that the effects of this variable on the dependent one corresponding to stability can be expected to contain variation adequate to produce valid statistical results. It also allows us to test one of Lijphart’s favorable conditions and one of his theories about consociational failures with one controlling variable.

Moderate Multiparty Systems

Another control variable to be included in this analysis will facilitate assessment of Lijphart’s belief that “moderate multiparty system[s]” are more conducive to the success of consociationalism (Bogaards, 1998, p.478). Unfortunately, data indicating the polarization represented by all of the parties operating in each country is unavailable. Philip Keefer’s World Bank Database of Political Institutions does provide information for all of the countries and years covered by this project, indicating the maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principal parties of the legislature. Situations in which elections are noncompetitive and/or the Chief Executive’s party has an absolute majority in the legislature, are given “0” values in Keefer’s database. The codebook for this database does not specify a maximum value that can be attained for this variable. It provides a separate value that was calculated for each year of each country’s experience and this data from his dataset will be used to represent the variable corresponding to “moderate multiparty systems” in this project. Analysis of this variable will indicate the extent to which party system polarization accounts for instability. As with the other variables corresponding to conditions that seem favorable to consociationalism, a lack of polarization may facilitate the progress of the system but it might also be responsible for stability that initially appears to be caused by consociationalism or some other prescribed remedy for deeply divided societies.

Geographical Concentration of Population Segments
Inclusion of a variable controlling for the influence of geographical concentration of population segments enables assessment of one of the conditions considered by Lijphart to be favorable for consociationalism, but also of the most intense debate surrounding conflict management in divided societies. A heated disagreement has persisted between proponents of seemingly incompatible recommendations for Lijphart’s consociational separation of groups and Horowitz’s institutionalized incentives for intergroup compromise. The most influential manifestations of the initiatives favored by these two highly influential academics involve the relationship between geographical boundaries corresponding to federalism and regional autonomy, and those areas inhabited by potentially antagonistic groups. The coincidence of these two sets of boundaries is reflected, to some extent, in data made for the Segmental Autonomy (SA) variable in this project. However, unlike the other factors incorporated in that data, this boundary coincidence is a form of autonomy, rather than simply a provision allowing groups to get autonomy. Since the phenomenon reflected in this boundary coincidence variable is also reflected in the SA variable, the two variables cannot be used together if methodological soundness is to be preserved. If they were analyzed in conjunction with one another, this would cause multicollinearity, which is a problem that occurs when “we can perfectly predict one explanatory [independent] variable from one or more of the remaining explanatory variables” (King et al., 1994, p.122). The relationship between the variables, corresponding to segmental autonomy and geographical concentration of segments, is close enough that, if information was known about cultural restrictions, values for the boundary coincidence variable could be used to predict a substantial number of values for SA. If multicollinearity exists between independent variables, their causal effects simply cannot be accurately distinguished from one another. For this reason, these two variables will not be used in the same analysis. By alternately trying both of them, some valuable insights will be reached concerning the possibly different roles of autonomy and its availability and the comparative validity of Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s claims concerning the advisability of specific government structures for promotion of stability. Inclusion of the boundary coincidence variable on its own creates no methodological problems involving variable effects on the dependent variable because two, highly respected theories contend that it produces completely opposite effects on countries’ stability.

Like the boundary coincidence information that was considered during the process of constructing data for SA, the data for this variable indicates whether countries with federal systems and/or autonomous regions have high or low concentrations of MAR groups in those subcountry territories. This data was made through comparison of a list of these countries and data from the Minorities at Risk dataset, indicating the extent to which MARs are geographically concentrated. The list of countries with both autonomy provisions and this
geographical concentration was also examined according to Horowitz’s and Reilly’s observations about which countries contained this coincidence of autonomy and group boundaries. When the data for this variable differed from their descriptions, it was modified to agree with them. For this reason, the data for three countries was changed: Fiji, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. Fiji was originally coded as not containing boundary coincidence but Reilly’s (2001, p.98-100) discussion of the country’s experiences indicates that, while geographic and group boundaries have not coincided between 1975 and 1995, the electoral system operated to produce the same sort of results to be expected from such coincidence between 1987 and 1995. In a situation with perfect correspondence between geographic and group boundaries, a voter would only have an opportunity to vote for regional representatives from his/her own group. Horowitz and Reilly espouse avoidance of this boundary coincidence to advocate availability of incentives for people to vote for candidates from outside of their groups.

Between 1987 and 1995, in elections to all decision-making posts in the country, voters in Fiji were only permitted to vote for candidates of their own groups, two of which are MARs (Reilly, 2001, p.100). Reilly (2001, p.100) observes that this situation, with electoral and group coincidence performing the same function that geographic and group coincidence would, “ensured that true interethnic political competition was virtually impossible.” Since this did not constitute geographic and group coincidence, Fiji might arguably be coded with negative values for this variable, for 1987 to 1995. However, positive or negative values must be chosen and, while it may not perfectly fit the positive definition, this situation certainly does not fit the negative one implying the dispersal of individuals’ power across communal lines. Prior to 1987, all voters in Fiji voted for candidates to fill a substantial number of “national” seats so negative values, indicating an absence of boundary coincidence, were allocated to the years 1975-1986 of the country’s experience. Lijphart does not seem to examine Fiji at any length so his perspective on the group and power boundaries in Fiji cannot be compared to that of Reilly.

The relationship between boundaries corresponding to power and groups has been discussed at length by Horowitz and more briefly by Lijphart. Examination of the Minorities at Risk dataset and the list of countries containing federalism and/or autonomy arrangements initially indicated that Malaysia did contain a coincidence of these boundaries during the 1975-1995 period. However, the inaccuracy of this preliminary conclusion is emphasized by the agreement between Horowitz and Lijphart that the potentially antagonistic groups in Malaysia are more divided, than concentrated, between the country’s federal units. Horowitz (1985, p.617) identifies Malaysia as containing “heterogeneous states” and Lijphart (1977, p.156) confirms that the communal groups (identified as MARs in Gurr’s project) experience “mutual isolation” that is “only social and not territorial,” because the country’s fragmentation pervades the substates. These conditions appear to have existed throughout the
1975-1995 period so each of those years of Malaysia's history was allocated a negative value for this boundary coincidence variable.

The third country for which values were changed following reference to academics' descriptions is Sri Lanka. The information originally consulted to make data for Sri Lanka regarding this variable indicated that it should receive a negative value, indicating an absence of boundary coincidence. This value resulted from the fact that Sri Lanka is not a federal country and it does not contain autonomous units. However, Horowitz (1985, p.616-617) depicts its subnational governance units, which apparently do not have sufficient autonomy to justify its identification as federal, as "homogeneous" with regard to group composition. Lijphart does not discuss conditions in Sri Lanka so his perspective on the nature of these subcountry governance units cannot be consulted, to ascertain whether he agrees with Horowitz regarding the country's demographic situation. Since Sri Lanka's subnational governance units appear to have been homogeneous throughout the 1975-1995 period, the country receives positive values for each year contained in this analysis.

The process by which data was made corresponding to this variable for these three countries is described in detail because the decisions it required seemed more contentious than those regarding other countries. However, it should be remembered that every piece of data for this variable necessitated a somewhat impressionistic judgment concerning whether or not governance systems separated potentially antagonistic groups and restricted their members to voting only within their groups.

**Small Population Size**

The data corresponding to "small population size" in this analysis is taken directly from the Minorities at Risk dataset. It is the estimated population size for each country and it is provided for two years, 1990 and 1995. This data is particularly appropriate because it was used by Minorities at Risk staff to calculate the percentages constituted by each MAR in individual countries, and these figures were used to identify cases for this project. Since 1990 is within the period to be covered, each case representing one year of a country's experience is allocated the 1990 population estimate for that country. Only one figure is thus given for each country but, since this project contains a large number of countries, that information will be adequate to identify statistically significant relationships between population size and stability. For countries that did not exist as of 1990, the 1995 data was used for the analysis. The influence of this variable is unpredictable enough to ensure that its effects on the dependent variable, stability, will contain some variation. Although Lijphart believes that smaller populations are more conducive to stability, the greater diversity likely in larger populations could plausibly result in less corruption, competition, and other forms of antagonism among groups and individuals.
Socioeconomic Equality

The final favorable condition to be examined, "socioeconomic equality," also will be represented through inclusion of a variable from the Minorities at Risk dataset. This variable is an "economic differentials index" that reflects the situation of MARs regarding income, land and property, higher education, and presence in commerce, professions, and official positions, compared to the rest of their countries' inhabitants. The higher a value given for this index, the greater the extent to which a country's MARs are disadvantaged. The codebook explains that only one piece of data for this variable was made for each country, that corresponds to the period immediately preceding the year that it was included in the database. The Minorities at Risk project was initiated in 1986 so the period analyzed to make the data for most countries was the early 1980's. In contrast to the description of this variable in the Minorities at Risk codebook, the data for this variable provided for each country in the MAR dataset is not the same for all years within the 1975-1995 period covered by this project. Very few countries were represented in this way. For those, the value which most often occurred, which was usually, roughly an average of the figures provided, was used for all of the years of its experience to be covered. Like the data corresponding to population size, the data used for this variable in this project was also the same for every year of a country's experience but the large number of countries included precludes methodological problems. For both of these variables, international differences are much more significant than any intra-country differences that may have occurred during the 1975-1995 period. The influence of socioeconomic equality on stability will also vary enough to ensure that this variable will not jeopardize the methodological integrity of this analysis. While socioeconomic equality is often believed to result in greater stability, some countries containing tremendous disparities of wealth, such as Singapore and Venezuela, have maintained impressive levels of stability.

Democracy

The influence of democracy should be controlled for in this analysis for two reasons. Firstly, it is widely believed to exert a strong independent effect on stability which could be confused with the role of consociational components, if a variable corresponding to it was not included. Secondly, although Lijphart implies that only democratic arrangements can be considered consociational, his description of the grand coalition component places great stress on the superiority of governments including all potentially antagonistic groups and elite predominance, which arguably could constitute an elite cartel government. His notion of grand coalition has been interpreted by some critics as implying a system with no effective opposition and very little turnover of government members, in which the general population
is provided with very little information concerning the government and its decisions. Lijphart has identified several countries as possessing grand coalitions which do not fit this description. For instance, he claims that the Indian Congress Party was adequately representative of its country to justify its identification as a grand coalition, even when it was alone in government. Comparison of his theoretical treatments of consociationalism and descriptions of real governments that he believes constitute grand coalitions implies that consociational governments could be either democratic or relatively undemocratic. Inclusion of a controlling variable corresponding to democracy will enable discrimination between the effects on stability of more, and less, democratic consociational systems. A variable contained in the Polity IV dataset, which was also included in the Minorities at Risk project, can be used to represent democracy in this variable. The higher its value for this variable, the more democratic a country is, and negative values indicate various levels of autocracy. Separate values are provided for each year of a country’s experience and they represent democracy in the first project to examine its influence on stability and its operation when combined with consociationalism, in a large number of cases throughout the world. This variable is methodologically unproblematic because, while democracy is commonly associated with stability, it also allows exertion of more dissent which could produce substantial disruption and regime change. Therefore, the effects of democracy on stability can be expected contain substantial variation. However, to preserve the methodological integrity of this project’s analyses, this variable cannot be used in examinations of the subset of cases confined to democratic plural countries because democracy will already be controlled for in the models using this subset of cases.

Conclusion

In a chapter published four years ago, Lijphart (2002, p.46) explains that, with regard to consociationalism

[a]n especially valid and serious criticism is that its key concepts have been very hard to define and measure precisely. I have come to the conclusion, however, that this is an insoluble problem and that we shall simply have to live with concepts that have very important theoretical and policy significance but cannot be measured precisely.

The analysis performed in later chapters of this project will provide valuable insights into the effects of consociationalism, regardless of whether it indicates that the system has a positive, negative, or insignificant influence on stability in plural societies. However, Lijphart’s beliefs concerning this system emphasize that identification of a testable version of consociationalism and its representation through methodologically sound variables and data is an achievement itself. The independent
variables and data specified in this chapter will allow statistical investigation of the proposition that consociationalism promoted stability in plural societies, between 1975 and 1995.

The role of consociational components will be verified and further explored through their analysis in conjunction with six variables designed to control for phenomena that are likely to affect their operation. Lijphart identifies a number of factors that are likely to facilitate the success of consociationalism and five of these can be represented in this project without jeopardizing the scientific validity of its results. Variables representing geographical concentration of segments and democracy will also facilitate assessment of the validity of some criticisms of consociationalism.
CHAPTER 6:
CONSTRUCTING AND ANALYZING DATA
CORRESPONDING TO STABILITY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES

Lijphart prescribes consociationalism as a means of fostering stability that may work in plural societies which are divided into groups whose conflict with one another has not been resolved through the application of alternative prescriptions for conflict resolution. Representation of "stability" in a methodologically sound, empirical manner requires the term’s precise definition through reference to the contexts in which it is used by Lijphart. The conception of stability to be operationalized will be that which seems to best reflect its qualitative portrayal by Lijphart and can be represented through available quantitative data. The resulting dependent variable and data corresponding to stability in plural societies will then be used to examine its relationship to consociationalism and the related phenomena embodied in the controlling, independent variables. The likelihood of successful conflict resolution through consociationalism will then be assessed, through reference to insights gained through this empirical exploration.

Part 1:
Defining “Stability” For This Analysis

The goal of this quantitative analysis is to represent and analyze Lijphart’s claims concerning consociationalism as accurately as possible. Identification of the optimal means of representing “stability” in this project thus is facilitated through examination of Lijphart’s depiction of this phenomenon. In a 1977 publication focusing on consociationalism, he gave his most detailed definition of stability:

Political stability is a... difficult and ambiguous term. It will be used in this study as a multidimensional concept, combining ideas that are frequently encountered in the comparative politics literature: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. The foremost characteristics of a stable democratic regime are that it has a high probability of remaining democratic and that it has a low level of actual and potential civil violence. These two dimensions are closely related; the latter can also be viewed as a prerequisite for, and as an indicator of, the former. Similarly, the degree of legitimacy that the regime enjoys and its decisional effectiveness are related both to each other and to the first two factors. Jointly and interdependently, these four dimensions characterize democratic stability (Lijphart, p.4).

This definition indicates that he views the concept as comprised of four elements: “system maintenance,” “civil order,” “legitimacy,” and “effectiveness” (Lijphart, 1977, p.4). Lijphart (1977, p.4) also believes that stability commonly coexists with low levels of “actual and potential civil
violence” and that stable democratic regimes tend to remain democratic. Perfect replication of his notion of stability in this analysis requires depiction of stability through a dependent variable incorporating data corresponding to system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. The variable should also reflect the existence of actual or potential civil violence as an indicator of instability and the overall statistical model should be constructed in a manner which enables assessment of the influence of consociationalism in democratic countries. A number of qualitative issues regarding the optimal means of depicting these phenomena must be considered prior to the identification of appropriate data for representation of stability.

The definition quoted above illustrates Lijphart’s belief that stability and democracy very often coexist. However, it should also be noted that he does not identify democracy as one of the four core elements of stability. Lijphart commonly describes consociationalism as “consociational democracy,” thus implying that consociationalism and democracy are closely related. Although the relationship between consociationalism and democracy has been intensely debated by other academics, Lijphart’s belief concerning the connection between them suggests that he assumes that consociationalism is designed to encourage and maintain democracy. Considering both his perspective on this issue and the arguments by many critics that consociationalism is intrinsically, inadequately democratic, it seems most prudent to quantitatively analyze the system’s operation in two sets of countries, those which are plural and those which are both plural and democratic. Separate treatment of these two sets of cases will enable differentiation between the ability of the system to promote stability in democratic, plural countries and plural countries in general. When the role of consociationalism in a set of democracies is studied, undemocratic systems containing elements resembling the consociational core components are excluded from analysis. This enables analysis that is consistent with Lijphart’s belief that consociationalism without democracy is not true consociationalism. An additional set of tests performed with a dataset including both democratic and undemocratic plural countries will enable the examination of other scholars’ contentions that consociational components are not as closely, or positively, related to democracy as is asserted by Lijphart. The employment of a causal, independent variable corresponding to democracy in analyses using this larger set of cases will allow comparison of the effects of consociationalism and democracy on stability. Quantitative models using the two sets of cases and the additional democracy variable will enable testing of Lijphart’s claims concerning the relationship between consociationalism, stability, and democracy, as well as the claims of some critics that these phenomena are not very closely or positively related to one another.

Identification of the specific, most justifiable measure of stability for this analysis is facilitated by qualitative analysis of exactly which sorts of situations that Lijphart considers to be stable and unstable. Lijphart’s discussions of individual countries’ experiences suggests that he believes that a loss of stability consists of the suspension of the main government institutions, the accession to power of individuals or groups opposed to peaceful coexistence of segments, and/or the
eruption of violence and "civil disorder" (Lijphart, 1977, p.152-3, 159). However, Lijphart does not consider the end of consociational government to constitute a loss of stability, if it does not result in these problematic developments. He portrays consociationalism as a form of government that can restore normal political relations and encourage a sense of national loyalty, but that can also eventually be replaced with more competitive democracy without engendering instability (Lijphart, 1977, p.50-2). He persuasively argues that more competitive democracy cannot perform these roles as effectively as consociationalism. Lijphart (1989a, p.141) also believes that institutional inertia and other factors mean that consociationalism should not be expected to "vanish" when a society "becomes less plural." He has constructed consociationalism to allow it to "provide for its own abolition," when a society becomes able to support increased political competitiveness (Lijphart, 1975, p.219). Lijphart (1977, p.2, 228-9) argues that the Austrian experience demonstrates that consociationalism, "by its very success," can "make itself superfluous."

Lijphart also identifies measures of political and democratic stability that he judges to be inadequate. He rejects the contention that a system’s stability is related to the number of political parties operating in it (Lijphart, 1968, p.35). Although consociationalism consists of a grand coalition government, encompassing all political parties, parties are important for its success because they represent population segments. Lijphart (1999, p.261) also disapproves of the use of “executive durability” as a measure of “government stability” because he believes that it is only an indication of the executive’s power vis-à-vis the legislature, rather than of the effectiveness of its policymaking. He agrees with Mattei Dogan, that cabinet stability is not equivalent to regime stability (Lijphart, 1999, p.130). Lijphart (1999, p.12) explains that these two factors are sometimes thought to be related because cabinet longevity is associated with consistent, effective policies. However, Dogan argues that, “in most systems with seemingly unstable cabinets, there is a high stable ‘core’ of ministerial personnel” (Lijphart, 1999, p.130). Lijphart’s (1999, p.7) conception of democracy as a means of representing groups, more than as a system of alternation in government, is emphasized by his rejection of “turnover test[s],” which imply that turnover of government parties is equivalent to stability. Above all, Lijphart equates stability in consociational systems with the peaceful coexistence of subcultures. Lijphart’s (1977, p.4) focus on the representation of these subcultures seems to lead him to assess stability levels through reference to “system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness,” more than phenomena which have less to do with intergroup stable relations, such as government alternation and specific numbers of political parties.

The most fundamental element of consociationalism is “grand coalition” government, which Lijphart defines as constant, joint governance by representatives of all potentially antagonistic population segments. The central benefit of this component of consociationalism is precisely that it guarantees political power for minority groups, regardless of their electoral strengths. The intrinsic nature of this system explains Lijphart’s contention that its stability will not be accurately measured according to frequency of party turnover in government, executive durability, and cabinet stability.
Although these variables are widely used to gauge stability, they will not be included in this study because its aim is to determine whether consociationalism performs the role ascribed to it by Lijphart. Examination of Lijphart’s body of work suggests that the ideal variable for representing stability for this project would constitute an index incorporating measures of the four components that he identifies as comprising the phenomenon: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. In addition, the data used to represent these components should include measures of actual or potential civil violence. The analyses conducted for this project also should be performed on two sets of countries and with a democracy variable, to enable exploration of Lijphart’s beliefs concerning the relationship between democracy, stability, and consociationalism.

Part 2:

Representation of Lijphart’s Four Elements of Stability

Examination of Lijphart’s body of work illustrates that he views stability as comprising four components, system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Since this project aims to quantitatively assess his claims concerning the effects of consociationalism, the variable corresponding to stability should incorporate information concerning the operation of all four components in the many years and countries to be analyzed. However, two of these components cannot be incorporated as elements of this dependent variable because their inclusion would jeopardize the methodological soundness of the analysis.

System Maintenance

The first component, system maintenance, should not be used for two reasons. In his later writings, Lijphart describes consociationalism as a system which, in the best case scenario, will evolve into a slightly more competitive system and basically render conflict mitigation techniques of all kinds obsolete. Therefore, by definition, consociationalism is a governance system in which available measures of system maintenance are not indicative of stability. Examination of the body of his work involving consociationalism suggests that Lijphart would consider a system as remaining consociational, even if the rules generally recognized as constituting a political system were drastically changed. For instance, he believes that a very widely representative Congress Party in India is capable of making the country consociational, no matter how it came to power and whether or not it rules alone (Lijphart, 1996a, p.260). Lijphart (1996a, p.260) explains that:

…the Congress Party has served as the foundation for a consociational grand coalition. Despite never winning a majority of the popular vote in parliamentary elections,… [t]he combination of the Congress Party’s inclusive nature and political dominance has
generated grand coalition cabinets with ministers belonging to all the main religious, linguistic, and regional groups.

He implies that it is the presence of representativeness, rather than the actual institutionalized mechanisms for making decisions and choosing representatives, which really make a society consociational. If India went from a majoritarian means of making decisions and choosing politicians, to a purely consensual one, and the government remained equally representative, Lijphart would consider the system to have remained consociational. This perspective is in direct contradiction to the general notion of "system maintenance" and the data available to represent it, which focus on the type of institutions rather than their political effects. For this reason, a variable corresponding to "system maintenance" would simply mirror changes in the institution-related independent variables, rather than the sort of political effects implied by Lijphart as constituting stability in plural societies. By definition, Lijphart’s consociational system and the notion of institution-related system maintenance as an indicator of stability are fundamentally at odds with one another so the latter will not be employed for this project.

The institution-related data available for representation of system maintenance should also not be reflected in the dependent variable because it is too closely related to indispensable independent variables concerning institutional mechanisms. Three of the necessary, independent variables corresponding to the consociational components of proportional representation electoral systems, minority veto power, and “grand coalitions” reflect institutionalized aspects of governance systems. If institution-related data indicating system maintenance were incorporated in the dependent variable, analyses of the effects of consociationalism would be testing whether the existence of certain institutions led to their existence. Inclusion of this phenomenon in the dependent variable would thus introduce a methodologically troublesome, systematic relationship between independent and dependent variables. Incidentally, this same problem would arise if democracy was represented in an independent variable because it also would constitute an indicator of whether certain institutions existed.

However, Lijphart’s identification of system maintenance as a fundamental component of stability emphasizes that his concept of this phenomenon must be included in statistical models designed to test his theory of consociationalism. He appears to estimate levels of system maintenance in countries that have used consociationalism by evaluating whether their governments have remained representative, rather than whether their specific institutional forms have remained permanent. This is consistent with his beliefs that consociational systems can evolve into substantially more competitive systems and that consociationalism without democracy is not true consociationalism. Lijphart seems to imply that the manifestations of stability in countries with consociational experience are continued representativeness of potentially antagonistic population segments and continued democracy.
No data covering the cases and dates of this project’s dataset is available to indicate the notion of representation for these certain, country-specific groups. The data corresponding to system maintenance that is available documents the persistence of institutions and most of it actually focuses on indicating the presence of democracy. Lijphart’s notion of system maintenance as the permanence of a specially representative form of democracy is actually indicated most perfectly by the four core independent variables corresponding to his four components of consociationalism. These components include proportional representation as well as three phenomena whose existence is more important than their rigid institutionalization, according to Lijphart’s theory: minority veto power, grand coalition, and segmental autonomy. If the persistence of such factors which create his special form of representative democracy were reflected in both the independent and dependent variables, the resulting statistical model would have very little explanatory power and it would be fundamentally, methodologically flawed. However, some of these four consociational components could logically exist in undemocratic systems, which Lijphart would consider to be unstable and unconsociational due to their lack of democracy.

Analysis of a set of cases confined to plural democracies will enable examination of the performance of consociationalism within only countries which remain stable, according to Lijphart’s requirement of democracy for stability. This course of action will not indicate whether consociational components produce Lijphart’s other apparent requirement for stability, continued representation of potentially antagonistic groups. However, that relationship cannot be statistically evaluated because such a test would be methodologically invalid and, in any case, it would be completely unhelpful because it would basically measure the effects of consociational components on themselves. Fortunately, effects of such permanent representativeness like the absence of protest will be included in the dependent variable, as evidence of other elements of stability such as civil order. Lijphart’s element of stability corresponding to system maintenance cannot be represented as a component of the dependent, stability variable. However, analysis of a set of democratic, plural countries will enable examination of his particular notion of system maintenance in the most ideal manner possible in a statistical analysis of his theory of consociationalism. Analysis of a set of countries including undemocratic systems will be performed to assess criticisms concerning the relationships between democracy, consociational components, and democracy. However, it cannot examine democracy as an effect of consociationalism and it will indicate the presence of consociationalism in some undemocratic countries employing some of Lijphart’s consociational components. However, it will also provide further insights into the relationship between democracy and the other components of Lijphart’s notion of stability, which will be incorporated in the dependent variable used to study both sets of cases. While Lijphart’s notion of system maintenance cannot be included as an element of the dependent
variable, the representative component of it cannot be for methodological reasons and the democracy component of it will be adequately considered through the application of the statistical model to two different sets of countries.

**Effectiveness**

Lijphart’s four components of stability (system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness) can be divided into two categories: those involving the operation of the political system and its effects on society. "System maintenance" and "effectiveness" both focus on the operation of the political system. Like “system maintenance,” Lijphart’s “effectiveness” element of stability must be excluded from the dependent variable because the data available to represent it seems incapable of representing the sort of effectiveness that Lijphart believes that consociational systems should seek. Examination of Lijphart’s (1977, p.108; 1999, p.8, 258) multiple depictions of “effectiveness” indicates that, like many other scholars, he views it to be efficiency of policymaking and greater decisiveness. Available data accordingly allocates the highest effectiveness scores to countries in which policymaking is performed most efficiently and decisively. However, the most efficient and decisive policymaking is obviously achieved by those governments which provide the least power to challenge or veto majority decisions. Lijphart’s four components of consociationalism, which include minority veto power and executive representation, were designed precisely to guarantee the consideration of minority opinions during the policymaking process. Therefore, by definition, consociationalism is designed to be less effective, with less efficient and decisive policymaking, than other forms of democracy such as majoritarianism. Lijphart’s claim that consociationalism promotes “stability,” and his identification of effectiveness as a central element of stability, together suggest that the sort of effectiveness to be ideally achieved in consociational systems differs from that which is reflected in available data, which gives highest marks to the most decisive systems. Lijphart’s claim for consociationalism is not that it achieves a type of stability marked by high levels of policymaking decisiveness and efficiency. For this reason, existing effectiveness data, which grants the most decisive systems the greatest esteem, is not appropriate for incorporation in the dependent variable. If Lijphart’s theory concerning consociationalism is to be accurately tested by this project’s statistical analysis, the particular type of stability that he claims that it promotes must be reflected as precisely as possible in this dependent variable.

However, interpretation of Lijphart’s claims for the system and description of stability suggests that he does believe that consociationalism promotes a specific form of effectiveness that contributes to the stability of those countries in which it is used. It seems reasonable to interpret his works involving these issues as implying that consociational
systems, which he sees as producing democracy, promote their continued operation and that this operation constitutes effectiveness. While the continued operation of democratic governance in undivided, long-term democracies may not seem indicative of an exciting level of effectiveness, such effectiveness is a terrific achievement in the deeply divided, plural societies for which consociationalism is commonly prescribed. It would appear that Lijphart's claim regarding effectiveness, and the system he calls consociational democracy, is that it promotes a situation in which democratic governance continues in the long-term. This interpretation is consistent with his definition of stability quoted above, which explains that one of the two “foremost characteristics of a stable democratic regime [is] that it has a high probability of remaining democratic” (Lijphart, 1977, p.4).

Such continuation of democracy intrinsically requires that a country’s government can make policies and, therefore, exhibit some level of the type of effectiveness that is reflected in available data. This situation inspires consideration of a means of data manipulation to create appropriate effectiveness information for incorporation in the dependent, stability variable. Data could conceivably be created which would indicate continued policymaking abilities but would not grant higher values of effectiveness to extremely decisive and efficient policymaking countries. This data would perhaps allocate the same value to all systems achieving some level of effectiveness indicating continued, rather than very decisive, policymaking activity. However, a theoretical difficulty would be incurred by this course of action that would not arise if the stability element of effectiveness is incorporated in a component of this statistical model that is not part of the dependent variable. This difficulty is caused by the fact that Lijphart’s concept of effectiveness stability in consociational countries is of the continued operation of democratic policymaking mechanisms, rather than policymaking mechanisms in any sort of country. Policymaking is obviously performed very decisively and efficiently by dictators and other leaders of undemocratic countries. Data focusing only on policymaking does not represent accurately Lijphart’s concept of the effectiveness component of stability in consociational societies.

Fortunately, Lijphart’s concept of effectiveness can be included in this project’s statistical analyses without relying on such problematic, policymaking-focused data. For instance, the possibility should be considered that data combining information regarding the presence of democracy and policymaking could be used to represent the continued democratic policymaking that Lijphart seems to consider to be the manifestation of effectiveness in consociational states. However, like the possibility of using some modified democracy data to represent the system maintenance element of the dependent stability variable, this course of action is not methodologically sound. If democracy were included as an element of the dependent variable in this dataset in which a number of the core independent variables indicate the presence of institutions and practices closely related to democracy, the
relationships between these components of the model would contain inadequate variation and would thus be methodologically invalid. The inadvisability of including democracy in the dependent variable becomes more obvious when one considers that Lijphart views consociationalism as a form of democracy that comprises four main components, which must be represented by independent variables if his theory concerning consociationalism is to be empirically tested. It is illogical and unproductive to study the effects of four components of a type of democracy, on democracy. Like Lijphart's system maintenance element of stability, the effectiveness element also cannot be represented in the stability dependent variable.

However, both of these elements of Lijphart's definition of stability in consociational countries can be adequately represented in statistical analyses by employment of a dataset that includes only those plural countries which are also democratic. Lijphart seems to believe that effectiveness in consociational societies is manifested by continued democratic policymaking. Therefore, a set of cases that excludes undemocratic countries also excludes all cases that are not effective, according to this definition of effectiveness. Although system maintenance and effectiveness cannot be represented in the stability dependent variable, a set of cases will be analyzed which includes only those countries which are stable according to these two criteria.

It should be recognized that, to enable assessment of the relationship between consociationalism and democracy, an alternate set of cases including plural countries irrespective of their political systems also will be analyzed, in conjunction with a controlling, independent variable corresponding to democracy. Unfortunately, since effectiveness and system maintenance cannot be reflected through this set of cases or represented within the dependent variable, the analyses of this more inclusive set of cases are confined to investigating the effects of consociationalism on Lijphart's remaining two elements of stability, "civil order" and "legitimacy." However, since both system maintenance and effectiveness are closely related to democracy, analyses of this larger set of cases may actually shed additional light on the relationship between consociationalism and these two elements. These elements represent the continued operation of democracy and the necessity to omit them from the dependent variable will not hamper this project's exploration of the relationship between consociationalism, stability, and democracy.

Civil Order & Legitimacy

In a 1977 publication focusing on consociationalism, Lijphart (p.4) describes stability as a "multidimensional" concept consisting of four elements, system maintenance, effectiveness, civil order, and legitimacy. This project's statistical model is designed to ascertain whether consociationalism promotes "stability in plural societies." For this reason, it requires a dependent variable corresponding as closely as possible to the concept of stability.
presented by Lijphart as appropriate for evaluating conditions in plural societies using consociationalism. The two elements of stability involving system maintenance and effectiveness cannot be included in the dependent variable. This is because both they and the main independent variables indicate the operation of very closely related aspects of an arguably identical political system. Those independent variables specify whether the components of the system described by Lijphart as consociational democracy are working, while system maintenance and effectiveness refer to whether a specially representative form of democracy (like consociationalism) and democratic policymaking exist. Inclusion of system maintenance and effectiveness in the dependent stability variable would thus create a model which asks, “does consociational democracy lead to itself?” However, the employment of a set of cases including only democracies allows analysis of the question, “in the democratic and plural countries of the world, does consociationalism promote manifestations of stability in addition to the countries’ operation of democracy?” The other manifestations of stability to be analyzed as the components of the dependent variable correspond to Lijphart’s remaining two elements of stability, civil order and legitimacy. In contrast to the core independent variables and the system maintenance and effectiveness elements of stability, civil order and legitimacy are criteria for the measurement of governance mechanisms’ effects on society, rather than indications of whether these governance mechanisms are operational.

The “civil order” and “legitimacy” elements of stability respectively represent violent and nonviolent forms of opposition to the status quo. It should be recognized that the dependent variable, which corresponds to stability, is necessarily confined to reflecting only these two elements that focus on opposition. When it is analyzed with a set of only democratic countries, it is reasonable to assume that all of the cases are stable with regard to the system maintenance and effectiveness elements of stability. However, in those statistical models designed to ascertain the relationship between consociational and democracy through application of a set of cases including both democratic and undemocratic countries, this dependent variable must also be used and the results of such analyses cannot be assumed to indicate anything about the system maintenance and effectiveness elements of stability. Another point must be made about the interpretation of results for those analyses conducted with the larger set of cases.

The absence or low incidence of the violent and nonviolent forms of opposition, which indicate levels of civil order and legitimacy, cannot be relied upon to indicate true legitimacy and consequent prospects for long-term stability when undemocratic regimes exert substantial repression of opposition. Lustick (1979) has emphasized that the absence of violence cannot be assumed to signify stability because “control” systems repress grievances, unlike democratic systems, such as consociationalism, which aim to promote consideration of them. Conclusions concerning stability
that are made in reference to analyses involving both democratic and undemocratic countries will not be as reliable as those made in relation to the smaller set of cases confined to democracies. In undemocratic countries, apparent stability, as manifested by violent and nonviolent forms of opposition, could just mask severe oppression. Thankfully, the larger set of cases will be analyzed with a democracy control variable that will suggest the extent to which levels of democracy are yielding levels of stability, in the forms of violent and nonviolent opposition. In these models using the larger set of cases, if this democracy variable explains stability better than the other independent variable, it will become obvious that stability levels in undemocratic countries are being influenced much more by levels of democracy than the phenomena represented by the other independent variables. A plausible means of creating a dependent variable that is more independent of democracy levels would be to represent the legitimacy component of the variable through data indicating the attitudes of, rather than the actions of, the inhabitants of each country. Although their results may also be warped by respondents’ fears of oppression, survey data indicating levels of legitimacy could probably be relied upon to be more indicative of legitimacy levels than active protest, in undemocratic societies. However, the unavailability of this sort of survey data for most of the countries and years included in this study prevents its use as a component of the dependent variable. It should be recognized that research by some scholars suggests that the relationship between repression and opposition may not be as strong as is sometimes assumed. In quantitative studies focusing on resource mobilization, Muller (1985) and Muller and Seligson (1987) have shown that violence is not simply positively correlated with repression, since it is most common in situations of moderate levels of repression and resources. While it should be considered that democracy levels may have a strong effect on violent and nonviolent opposition, it also cannot be assumed that a very strong relationship generally exists between these phenomena.

The occurrence in democratic societies of large scale, nonviolent forms of opposition, such as protests, is also arguably an indication of well-developed, stable democracy. Some scholars may argue that nonviolent forms of opposition should not incorporated into the dependent variable, as manifestations of instability. However, this statistical model is designed to test Lijphart’s argument that, in plural societies, consociationalism promotes stability and this stability is composed of four elements, one of which is legitimacy. The term opposition suggests activity that is not provided for in states’ formal or informal constitutions and formal governance structures. Regardless of whether it is violent or nonviolent, active opposition by a state’s inhabitants against their state or its policies indicates that its participants consider the channels of participation outlined in their formal or informal constitutions to be inadequately effective means of influencing their state that are thus lacking in legitimacy. While active opposition to state policies may be regarded to be an almost official channel for participation in a relatively small number of countries, such opposition to one’s state inherently constitutes an assertion that that state is illegitimate. Even violent opposition could theoretically be condoned by the leaders of a state as a normal means of political participation. Ideally, those
situations in which opposition is not as motivated by legitimacy related grievances could be distinguished from those in which participation is inspired by such grievances. However, such a distinction would require extensive survey data, indicating protestors' opinions concerning the legitimacy of their governing mechanisms and leaders. Sufficient amounts of such data are unavailable for the cases covered by this project and, therefore, distinctions involving legitimacy feelings associated with opposition cannot be incorporated into this dataset. Creation of a dependent variable which approximates Lijphart's concept of stability as closely as possible requires data reflecting legitimacy. Since data reflecting nonviolent forms of opposition is the best information available for representation of this component of stability, the dependent variable corresponding to stability will combine this data with that corresponding to the civil order element of violent opposition.

Perhaps it is also reasonable to argue that both violent and nonviolent opposition are more strongly associated with illegitimacy in plural societies than in non-plural societies, precisely because opposition in plural societies is much more likely to occur along inter-segmental lines and thus intensify the sort of antagonism that is most likely to destabilize those societies. Consociationalism is designed to involve all potentially antagonistic groups in decision-making because opposition in plural societies is highly likely to result in permanent disempowerment of such groups and consequent instability. Debates concerning the relationship between opposition and stability in democracies may be less relevant to this project's findings because it focuses on these plural societies.

Observations by scholars who specialize in inter-group conflict support the assumption that, under certain conditions, nonviolent antagonism is as strongly associated with loss of legitimacy as violent actions. An additional argument for considering non-violent opposition in this study is the fact that governments can control people, to the extent that they will not express themselves violently, and this phenomenon inevitably weakens states' long-term stability. Discussions of "conflict intensity" also suggest the crucial role of non-violent manifestations of antagonism. For instance, Cohen (1997, p.618) distinguishes between "high" and "low" levels of "conflict" and explains that the latter "is indicated by... nonviolent protest." He introduces "nonviolent protest" as "the most frequent but least severe form of conflict" (Cohen, 1997, p.618). Horowitz's (1985, p.5, 113, 229) extensive analysis of many manifestations of "ethnic conflict" throughout the world emphasizes its "ubiquitous character," which includes developments as diverse as "business rivalries" and nonviolent secessions. Gurr, whose dataset is arguably the most respected one focusing on divided societies, similarly defines conflict as comprising "nonviolent protest, violent protest, and rebellion" (Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000, p.565). While the relationship between conflict and stability is debatable, contributions by multiple scholars emphasize the reasonableness of treating nonviolent opposition as a manifestation of illegitimacy.

The Minorities at Risk project provides data that can be used to represent the legitimacy and civil order elements of the dependent variable corresponding to stability. A
dependent index variable has been constructed to represent stability by combining data concerning these elements. This data includes information on group protest and intercommunal rebellion, which will be used as indications of legitimacy and civil order in these plural societies whose most dangerous source of instability is group organized antagonism. The Minorities at Risk codebook confirms that the rebellion and protest data together represent violent and nonviolent activity so they are combined in the dependent variable (Gurr et al., 2002, p.152-181). Phenomena recorded in this data cover a wide range of activities, including verbal protest, petitions, massive nonviolent demonstrations, riots, strikes, rebellions, and civil war (Gurr et al., 2002, p.152-181). For each of the protest and rebellion variables in the Minorities at Risk dataset, higher values indicate greater amounts and intensity of violent and nonviolent conflict. There are four such variables: a protest index with values corresponding to five-year periods in each country’s history from 1945 to 1999, another protest index for which annual values are available for the period 1985-2000, and two indexes covering rebellion with values available for the same periods and years as the two protest indexes. Data for the dependent, index variable made for this project, which incorporates both protest and rebellion, was made by adding each country’s quinquennial data for protest and rebellion for each year before 1985 and adding the corresponding annual data to construct values for each year of countries’ experiences from 1985 until 1995. A detailed description of the construction of this variable is provided in Appendix E. This dependent index variable combines data corresponding to Lijphart’s legitimacy and civil order elements of stability. When analyzed in conjunction with the set of cases restricted to democracies, it enables very close, quantitative representation of his notion of stability in plural societies.

In reference to plural societies and consociationalism, Lijphart provides his most detailed definition of stability. He explains that it comprises four elements: system maintenance, effectiveness, legitimacy, and civil order (Lijphart, 1977, p.4). Analysis of his portrayal of these elements suggests that he understands them to correspond to the persistence of a consociational-like, specially representative form of democracy, continued democratic policymaking, and nonviolent and violent forms of opposition. The former two factors relating to government structure cannot be represented in the dependent variable and, therefore, must be included in the statistical model by employment of a restricted set of cases including only those plural countries which are also democratic. Fortunately, it is possible and methodologically sound to create an index, dependent variable that combines data corresponding to the legitimacy and civil order elements of stability. This variable can be used to analyze countries governed by any system of government and an independent variable corresponding to democracy can be applied when examining the set of cases including nondemocratic regimes, in part to judge the extent to which the opposition embodied in the dependent variable is influenced by democracy levels. In his detailed definition of stability, Lijphart (1977, p.4)
also expresses his belief that it commonly coexists with low levels of “actual and potential civil violence” and that stable democratic regimes tend to remain democratic. These two aspects of his notion of stability are reflected in this model by the measurement of stability in part through data involving civil violence and the consideration of his thoughts concerning democracy and consociationalism, during the variable and data construction process. The importance of all four of Lijphart’s (1977, p.4) elements of stability is emphasized by his statement that “[j]ointly and independently, these four … characterize democratic stability.”

Part 3: Where In The World Has Consociationalism Existed?

The relationships between data representing consociationalism and stability are the most interesting element of this study because of their implications concerning the nature of optimal governance systems for divided societies. However, some of the most intensely debated issues concerning consociationalism can be explored with unprecedented accuracy through a survey of this data, prior to its statistical analysis. The extent to which any country has ever contained all four consociational elements has never been quantified as objectively as the information provided for a huge range of countries for this project. This data suggests that some countries have been less consociational than was previously assumed and identifies others, which have never been examined in reference to consociationalism but have contained substantial levels of consociational components.

Description of the data representing each consociational component, and situations in which they have been used in combination with one another, will illustrate the system’s influence throughout the large percentage of the world’s population covered by this study, during the period of 1975 to 1995. Grand coalition is often presented as the most critical element of consociationalism but definitions of it provided by Lijphart and others vary greatly regarding the extent of groups’ and parties’ inclusion necessary to constitute one of these executive governing bodies. Unfortunately, so few examples exist of completely inclusive coalitions that a variable indicating their existence would contain too little variation and would not be useful in any statistical analysis. Unfortunately, the only means of creating data for this phenomenon, which contains enough variation to maintain methodological integrity, is the definition of this type of coalition as a government executive that includes representatives of one or all of each country’s Minorities at Risk (MAR) groups. This data is useful because it indicates the extent to which a government resembles a “grand coalition” but, since the criterion for a top score of highest inclusiveness does not indicate perfectly inclusive coalitions, it cannot be assumed to correspond exactly to this consociational component. Although high values for one of the variables indicating more inclusive coalitions are allocated for executives including all MAR groups listed in Gurr’s study as existing in each country, this list cannot be relied upon to include all potentially antagonistic population segments. In addition, the inclusion of one
representative politician from each such segment does not guarantee his/her equal power within the executive, which is another facet of Lijphart’s stricter descriptions of grand coalition. The extent to which countries have executives similar to grand coalitions is represented through two variables. The first of these is labeled, “somewhat inclusive grand coalitions,” and it indicates whether one or more MAR groups, which do not comprise all of their country’s MAR groups and are not identified as “advantaged” in Gurr’s dataset, are represented in the governing executive. This is a dummy variable, indicating either the absence of this condition (“0”) or the representation of one or more (but not all) groups (“1”). The second variable corresponding to this consociational component shows the presence of “highly inclusive grand coalitions” and its data indicate whether all of a country’s MAR groups, which may be only one and are not identified as “advantaged” in Gurr’s dataset, are represented in the governing executive. For this dummy variable, the representation of all such groups is indicated with a “1” and the lack of representation for all of them with a “0.” Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of somewhat and highly inclusive executives, in the continents where the cases are located. Of all of the years of countries’ experiences examined for this project, 87% had no inclusion of MAR groups in executives. Of the remaining 13% of cases, 6% received contained somewhat inclusive coalitions and 7% had highly inclusive executives containing people from all MAR groups.11 Countries which which experienced executive representation for all MAR groups between 1975 and 1995 included:

- Belgium (1978-1995)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)
- Czechoslovakia (1989-1992)
- Madagascar (1975-1995)
- Malaysia (1975-1995)
- Netherlands (1975-1977)
- South Africa (1995)
- Switzerland (1975-1995)

The extent to which this data accurately represents the existence of such coalitions is emphasized by the fact a number of the countries identified as consociational by numerous scholars are included in this list. Madagascar’s experience with this consociational component, as well as for segmental autonomy and minority veto, illustrates that analysis of a long period of its experience would likely produce interesting insights into the use of Lijphart’s system in an additional non-western location. Identification of Malaysia and Nigeria as possessing executives similar to grand coalitions illustrates the fact that the data for this variable does not represent the component of consociationalism in an ideal fashion. The distinction between highly and completely inclusive coalitions is very significant because, while the former indicates a willingness to allocate power to all potentially antagonistic groups, the latter renders government opposition at least powerless and potentially, just completely nonexistent. The data used to represent grand coalition for this project shows the existence of highly

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11 All of the proportions described in this section, “Surveying the Body of Data,” are rounded to the nearest whole number.
inclusive, rather than totally inclusive, executives and even they have not ever occurred in most countries.
Figure 6.1

Percentage of Each Continent's Cases With Somewhat Or Highly Inclusive Executives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% with these Inclusive Executives</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Continent's Cases with One of Their Multiple &quot;Minorities at Risk&quot; (MARs) Represented in Executive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Continent's Cases with All MARs in Executive</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Continent's Cases with At Least One MAR in Executive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The question corresponding to independent variable #1, which indicates the presence of Somewhat Inclusive Executives, is:
  **Can I find evidence that one or more MAR groups, which do not comprise all of their country's MAR groups and are not identified as "advantaged" in Gurr's dataset, are represented in the governing executive?**

* The question corresponding to independent variable #2, which indicates the presence of Highly Inclusive Executives, is:
  **Can I find evidence that all of a country's MAR groups, which may be only one and are not identified as "advantaged" in Gurr's dataset, are represented in the governing executive?**

* Each case corresponds to one year of a country's experience.
The second consociational component, segmental autonomy, is examined through a variable indicating whether any evidence was found for this project that suggests that MAR groups had the power to govern some aspects of their lives autonomously. This phenomenon was measured through reference to information regarding restrictions on cultural organizations, provisions for official language status and legal autonomy for MARs, and the existence of homogeneous, geographically defined governance units. These criteria certainly do not constitute an exhaustive list of those which would ideally be examined for production of perfect data to represent segmental autonomy. However, they do indicate a wide range of social, political, and legal manifestations of segmental autonomy that are not connected to other variables in a manner which would jeopardize the methodological soundness of this project. For each country, it was determined that segmental autonomy either did, or did not, exist and then the appropriate value was allocated to every year of its experience. The only exception to this methodology was made in relation to Fiji because information was found that indicated the presence of segmental autonomy involving the country’s demographic situation, beginning in 1987. The methodology for creating this data indicated that 60% of the years of countries’ experiences included segmental autonomy. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the evidence of segmental autonomy that was found, according to the continents where the cases are located. Of the countries listed above as possessing highly inclusive coalitions, only Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands were identified as not employing segmental autonomy. Three countries which have been identified by Lijphart as using consociationalism at some stage but did not use these coalitions, Austria, Canada, and India, have experienced segmental autonomy as it is defined for this study. Due to the complications involved in weighing certain types of autonomy as more significant, only positive and negative values were calculated for this variable. However, the manifestations of autonomy that were examined seem to represent the concept of, and spirit behind, Lijphart’s consociational component of segmental autonomy.
Figure 6.2

**Percentage of Each Continent’s Cases With Evidence of Segmental Autonomy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>% with Segmental Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The question corresponding to the Segmental Autonomy variable is:

*Can I find evidence that MAR groups had the power to govern some aspects of their lives autonomously?*

*Each case corresponds to one year of a country's experience.*
The variable for minority veto power indicates whether countries’ constitutions indicate that MAR groups could possibly exert a veto resulting in a changed policy decision, if it is assumed that they can gain representation in legislative bodies in proportion to their relative population sizes. A separate piece of data was constructed for each year of countries’ experiences, indicating that either: one MAR could theoretically exert such vetoes alone, all of a country’s MAR groups could do it collectively, or none could do it independently or together. For methodological reasons primarily concerning the comparability of constitutions, data for this variable could not be created for certain countries and time periods. Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of potential minority veto power, according to the continents where the cases are located. During the 72% of countries’ years of experience for which this data was made, 43% had the theoretical possibility that a MAR group could exert this veto power itself. This is a surprisingly high proportion of countries’ years of experience which indicates only the possibility of veto power and thus illustrates the manner in which the data representing consociationalism was designed to account for any arguable manifestations of this system. With the sole exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of the countries that used highly inclusive executive coalitions at some stage between 1975 and 1995, also exhibited this potential veto power for an independent MAR for at least one year of this period. Two of the three countries identified by Lijphart as consociational that did not use highly inclusive coalitions, Austria and Canada, did not exhibit this potential veto power at any time during this period. The third, India, possessed this facet of consociationalism for only one year, 1975.
The Percentage of Each Continent's Cases with Potential Minority Veto Power (MV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Potential Minority Veto Power (MV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The question corresponding to the MV variable is:

If it is assumed that “Minorities at Risk” groups can gain representation in legislative bodies in proportion to their sizes, does their country’s constitution indicate that they could possibly exert a veto resulting in a changed policy decision?

* Each case corresponds to one year of a country’s experience.
Examination of the data used to represent the final consociational component, proportional representation, will further illuminate the extent to which some countries have exhibited all of the aspects of Lijphart’s conflict reduction governance structure. According to Philip Keefer’s World Bank Database of Political Institutions, some sort of proportional representation electoral system was used during 29% of the years of countries’ experiences examined for this project. Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of proportional representation electoral systems, according to the continents where the cases are located. Some countries which have experienced other consociational components, as they are represented in these variables, but not proportional representation electoral systems include Canada, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Malaysia. Although Lijphart identifies proportional allocation of some opportunities as an element of this consociational component, its role in the promotion of stability cannot be tested in this project. Such allocation of posts is arguably an effect, rather than a cause, of stability so its inclusion in this statistical analysis would have caused methodological problems.
Figure 6.4

The Percentage of Each Continent's Cases with Proportional Representation Electoral Systems (PR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>% with PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The question corresponding to the PR variable is:
  *If there is electoral competitiveness, is there PR?*

* Each case corresponds to one year of a country’s experience.
The extent to which a year of a country's experience is consociational can be approximated by adding the values allocated to it for each of the four variables corresponding to the components of the system. For instance, if a country exhibits the maximum amounts of grand coalition, segmental autonomy, minority veto, and proportional representation represented through the variables used for this project, it could be allocated 5 points. These points include 2 that a case may achieve through inclusiveness of MARs in executives, 1 for segmental autonomy, 1 for potential minority veto power for independent MAR groups, and 1 for the use of a proportional representation electoral system. If a case is found to have a "highly" inclusive executive coalition, it is assigned two points and, if it is found to have a "somewhat" inclusive coalition that includes some but not all non-advantaged MARs, it is given one point toward this overall score indicating consociational activity. Table 6.1 lists the consociational situations whose existence is confirmed by this dataset. Only 3% of countries' years of experience can be allocated all five points. These situations include: Belgium (1978-1995), Madagascar (1993-1995), Nigeria (1980-1983), South Africa (1995), and Switzerland (1975-1995). Therefore, this project indicates that, even if consociationalism is defined in the very broad terms represented by these variables, the combination of all four components judged to collectively constitute this system has operated extremely infrequently throughout the world between 1975 and 1995. Of course, it should be kept in mind that a combination of these elements which does not include all four is very often described by scholars as constituting some level of consociationalism. However, even the countries' years of experience warranting an overall consociational score of four constitutes a very small proportion of governance systems operating during this period. These additional cases are: Afghanistan (1989-1991), Belgium (1975-1977), Ethiopia (1992-1995), India (1975), Lebanon (1991-1995), Madagascar (1976-1992), Malaysia (1975-1995), and the Netherlands (1975-1977). These cases constitute just 4% of all of the years of countries' experiences covered for this project so, if cases achieving 4 or 5 points are considered to be at least somewhat consociational, this category makes up 7% of all of these cases. It should be remembered that this is not 7% of the world's experience between 1975-1995, but only of those eighty-eight countries which contained large enough populations of MAR groups to be considered plural and did not have any attributes that rendered them methodologically inappropriate for this analysis. The extent to which the countries comprising this 7% of cases have multiple manifestations of consociationalism suggests the accuracy of Lijphart's belief that the components of this system often exist and complement one another. Unfortunately, the data from the Minorities at Risk project that was used to make data representing stability for this analysis is not available for Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia. The relationship between stability and their experiences with consociational components cannot be statistically tested here. Since they are generally considered to constitute some of the most perfect examples of consociationalism, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands will be qualitatively analyzed in depth, in Chapter 7.
Consociational Situations Whose Existence Is Confirmed By This Dataset:

Identification of the presence of consociationalism has been performed through allocation of a maximum of five points for each case. Each case’s point allocation corresponds to the sum of its values for the variables representing consociationalism’s four components.

Cases deserving all five points comprised only 3% of the countries’ years of experience represented in this dataset and they were confined to two continents, Africa and Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (1995)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some additional cases deserved four points and thus exhibit several elements of consociationalism. They are listed below and include countries from all of the continents except the Americas and Oceania. The situations allocated four and five points collectively constitute 7% of the years of experience examined here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia (1975-1995)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (1975-1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (1975-1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some caveats should be kept in mind regarding the representation of consociationalism by the data used for this project. For instance, a country could theoretically have a proportional representation electoral system that never translates into executive representation for a permanently excluded group and minority veto power that only appears to exist in constitutions but cannot actually be exerted. If a permanently excluded group was somehow overlooked by the Minorities at Risk project or if only an unrepresentative element of it is included in a coalition, its country’s achievement of a positive score indicating inclusive coalitions might not constitute any type of grand coalition. Even the inclusion of some element of such a group in a coalition also does not render this body of all potentially antagonistic elements. Therefore, this situation would not fulfill Lijphart’s strictest definition of grand coalition, which is the one that is most likely to be insufficiently democratic to promote stability. Fortunately, for the purposes of this study, it was possible to construct data for segmental autonomy which avoid identification of repressive segregation. The ability to voluntarily restrict one’s contact to only members of one’s group is thus counted as segmental autonomy, while involuntary restrictions of this sort are not. This was accomplished by coding each year of a country’s experience with moderate to high restrictions on cultural organizations as indicative of an absence of segmental autonomy.

If a case receives a cumulative score of “4” or “5” for the variables corresponding to consociational components, it seems reasonable to assume that it does constitute an example of something approximating consociationalism. However, even a score of “5” should not be assumed to perfectly correspond to a strictly defined consociational situation. It is unfortunate that consociationalism cannot be represented more accurately in this quantitative analysis and this drawback of the statistical tests conducted here must be kept in mind. Nevertheless, the data available for use in this project provide a completely unprecedented amount of knowledge concerning the use of consociationalism around the globe and its capacity for facilitating stability in plural societies. Examination of these data prior to the statistical analyses illustrates that 7% of the years of plural countries’ experiences between 1975 and 1995 can be described as somewhat reflective of consociationalism.

Part 4:
Testing Consociationalism

Exploration of the relationship between consociationalism and stability and empirical examination of several claims that have been made by various scholars about the system will be performed with the Beck-Katz cross-sectional time-series model, using fixed-effect country dummies. The data collected for representation of all of the variables in this project are known as cross-sectional time-series data. This means that they are data where multiple cases like countries or people are
observed at more than two time periods. The cross-sectional cases in this project are the countries, while the time periods are every year between 1975 and 1995. When the set of cases is used which includes plural countries regardless of whether they are democratic, there are 88 cross-sectional cases that each correspond to one country. When the smaller set of democratic plural countries is analyzed, there are 77 such cross-sectional cases.

If an analysis of this sort of data is not performed in a way which “controls” for its cross-sectional time series nature, the accuracy of the conclusions will not be optimized. In any statistical model, if phenomena that could affect the dependent variable (ie. stability) are not represented through independent variables, their role may be misinterpreted as pertaining to the factors that are being analyzed. This “omitted variable bias” is quite common in studies using cross-sectional time series data but its detrimental influence on statistical results can be controlled. The precision of statistical models with this sort of data is heightened through this mechanism for controlling for omitted variables that vary between cases but not over time, as well as those which differ over time but are constant between cases. Three types of cross-sectional time series analysis exist, which control for “fixed effects” for omitted variables that are constant over time, “between effects” for those which are constant between cases, and “random effects” for those models in which some omitted variables vary across time and others between cases. The best variant to use on one’s data can be ascertained through a Hausman Test, that examines which means of analysis will produce the most efficient, explanatory model with consistent, optimally reliable results (“Panel”). The Hausman Test for this database indicates that the fixed effects cross-sectional time series variant of multiple regression analysis must be used, to achieve the most accurate results. The results of the fixed effects regression tests which were carried out with this dataset are listed on the following two pages and then subsequently described and analyzed. All models were of independent variables corresponding to consociational components and controlling independent variables, regressed on the dependent variable corresponding to stability. It should be remembered that, although the dependent variable is being analyzed in order to find out which factors contribute to stability, higher values for this variable actually correspond to higher levels of instability, as it is manifested by protests and rebellions. Appendix D lists all variables and the means by which their data were collected. To facilitate explanation of the following results, the set of country cases including only democracies will hence be described as the “democracies set” and the set of cases including all plural countries analyzed for this project will be referred to as the “complete set.” The democracies set comprises 77 countries and 1001 years of their experiences, while the complete set includes 88 countries and 1593 years of their experiences.
### Table 6.2:
Statistical Tests Conducted Using The Set Of Cases That Includes Countries Which Are Both Plural and Democratic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Test 1</th>
<th>Test 2</th>
<th>Test 3</th>
<th>Test 4</th>
<th>Test 5</th>
<th>Test 6</th>
<th>Test 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Inclusive</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.520*</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>(.260)</td>
<td>(.260)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Inclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Veto</td>
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<td>1.2**</td>
<td>1.356**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(.394)</td>
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<td>Segmental Autonomy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.520)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>.543*</td>
<td>.818**</td>
<td>.532</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.263)</td>
<td>(.316)</td>
<td>(.470)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>External Threats</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.314)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate Multiparty System</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.091)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall R-Squared</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma_u</td>
<td>1.611</td>
<td>1.752</td>
<td>1.617</td>
<td>1.628</td>
<td>1.719</td>
<td>1.782</td>
<td>1.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma_e</td>
<td>1.156</td>
<td>1.189</td>
<td>1.156</td>
<td>.902</td>
<td>.900</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>1.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
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<td>.685</td>
<td>.662</td>
<td>.765</td>
<td>.785</td>
<td>.802</td>
<td>.658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In Tables 6.2. and 6.3.,
The dependent variable is allocated higher values for higher levels of instability, as manifested by protest and rebellion. Entries are coefficients and numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The coefficients of those variables with P-values .05 or lower are allocated one asterisk and those with P-values .01 or lower are allocated two asterisks. All figures are rounded to three decimal places.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Test 8</th>
<th>Test 9</th>
<th>Test 10</th>
<th>Test 11</th>
<th>Test 12</th>
<th>Test 13</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Inclusive</td>
<td>Test 11</td>
<td>.028</td>
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<td>.260</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
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<td>(.250)</td>
<td>(.298)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-4.452**</td>
<td>-2.099*</td>
<td>-1.737**</td>
<td>-4.452**</td>
<td>-2.100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>(.415)</td>
<td>(.698)</td>
<td>(.994)</td>
<td>(.415)</td>
<td>(.696)</td>
<td>(.944)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.981**</td>
<td>1.714**</td>
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</tr>
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<td>dropped</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>dropped</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>.935**</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>.818**</td>
<td>.535</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PR)</td>
<td>(.501)</td>
<td>(.299)</td>
<td>(.467)</td>
<td>(.467)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
<td>External Threats</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>-.310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentration of</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.312)</td>
<td>(.312)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segments</td>
<td>Moderate Multiparty</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
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<td>(.091)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
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<td>dropped</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Equality</td>
<td>dropped</td>
<td>dropped</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall R-Squared</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma_u</td>
<td>1.618</td>
<td>1.883</td>
<td>1.784</td>
<td>1.618</td>
<td>1.879</td>
<td>1.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma_e</td>
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<td>.867</td>
<td>.880</td>
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<td>.864</td>
<td>.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>.804</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>.800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.3:
Statistical Tests Conducted Using The Set of Cases That Includes Plural Countries, Regardless Of The Extent To Which They Are Democratic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Test 14</th>
<th>Test 15</th>
<th>Test 16</th>
<th>Test 17</th>
<th>Test 18</th>
<th>Test 19</th>
<th>Test 20</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Inclusive</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.520*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>(.308)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.264)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Inclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Veto</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td></td>
<td>.543*</td>
<td>1.174**</td>
<td>.818**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.338)</td>
<td>(.605)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.277)</td>
<td>(.403)</td>
<td>(.527)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Segmental Autonomy</td>
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<td>.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.527)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.543*</td>
<td>.818**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.277)</td>
<td>(.321)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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**Note:** The table shows statistical tests conducted using the set of cases that includes plural countries, regardless of the extent to which they are democratic. The table includes independent variables such as Somewhat Inclusive, Grand Coalition, Minority Veto, Segmental Autonomy, PR, Geographical Concentration of Segments, External Threats, Moderate Multiparty System, Population Size, Socioeconomic Equality, and Democracy. The table also shows the test results for each variable, including the overall R-Squared, N, Sigma_u, Sigma_e, and Rho.
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| Overall R-Squared             | 0.042   | 0.024   | 0.064   | 0.022   |
| N                             | 566     | 1425    | 554     | 362     |
| Sigma_u                       | 1.883   | 1.542   | 1.740   | 1.732   |
| Sigma_e                       | .859    | 1.339   | .850    | .864    |
| Rho                           | .828    | .570    | .807    | .801    |

Table 6.3: Continued
The role that each consociational component plays independently should be explored because the components often operate on their own and understanding each one's function will facilitate greater comprehension of which institutions and practices are more conducive to stability in plural societies. In analyses using both the democratic set and complete set of countries, the somewhat inclusive grand coalition variable (SGC) is not significant when the dependent variable is regressed on it, in models with it as the only independent variable. In these scenarios, the variable has a negative coefficient suggesting a stabilizing influence but its statistical insignificance means that the coefficient is of little interest. When the highly inclusive grand coalition variable (HGC) is tested alone with the dependent variable and with both sets of cases, its coefficient is negative and thus indicative of a stabilizing influence but it is also statistically significant. If the SGC and HGC variables are the only two independent variables used in models employing both sets of cases, the coefficients of both are negative, indicating a beneficial effect on stability. However, only the HGC variable is statistically significant in such tests. The results obtained using these models corroborate Lijphart's belief that, the more inclusive coalitions are in plural societies, the more clear it is that they will promote stabilization. In two models using the two sets of countries and minority veto (MV) as the only independent variable, the coefficients for the variable are both positive and this indicates that increased, potential minority veto power is actually associated with greater instability. However, in the test performed with the democracies set, this effect was statistically significant, while this relationship was not statistically significant in the model performed with the complete set. This suggests that potential minority veto power may have a worse effect on stability in democracies. In the analyses using both the democracies and complete sets of countries, as well as a variety of other independent variables, the segmental autonomy variable (SA) is never statistically significant and is sometimes dropped as completely lacking in explanatory value. However, when it is allocated a coefficient, this figure is always positive, which would indicate detrimental effects on stability if they were significant and does confirm that this factor does not make any significant contribution toward stability. When regressed alone on stability with the democracies and complete set of countries, the PR variable is often statistically significant and the positive coefficients it always produces indicate that the use of PR increases the likelihood of instability. This set of models, which examine the roles of consociational components on their own, indicate that HGC and MV have the most consistently, statistically significant effect on stability and that this occurs when it is analyzed in relation to the democracies set of cases. The models involving MV and PR indicate that both are detrimental to stability but HGC is found to be conducive to stability when analyzed in relation to both sets of countries.

R-squared statistics also can be evaluated, to better understand the relationships between the independent variables and stability. They indicate the percentage of change in the dependent variable that is caused by the combination of independent variables used in each model. The r-squared statistics
produced by the models tested here are provided in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Although the models tested for this project provide substantial evidence confirming that elements of consociationalism influence stability levels, they also produced low r-squared statistics that indicate that the independent variables tested account for only a very small percentage of change in these stability levels. This project focuses on ascertaining whether its independent variables influence stability and confirms that a number of them do. Although r-squared statistics are of lesser importance to such a quantitative exploration, those produced by the models tested here provide more evidence of the significance of potential minority veto's influence on stability.

Employment of the democracies set of country cases ensures that detected trends in stability cannot be attributed to the actions of undemocratic governments that repress the nonviolent and violent oppression represented in the dependent variable. Since no undemocratic countries are contained in this set of cases, any relationships that are found when this set is used are not caused by the inadequate democracy that is evidence of system maintenance and effectiveness deficits which Lijphart identifies as elements of instability. When the variables corresponding to the four consociational components are regressed on the dependent stability variable with this set of cases, all of them except SA are found to be significant in at least some models, HGC is found to exert a stabilizing effect, and MV and PR are found to each exert destabilizing effects. Interestingly, in some models in which SGC is tested along with other variables indicating consociational components, it is found to have a statistically significant, destabilizing influence. With both sets of cases, SGC never has a statistically significant beneficial effect but occasionally has a statistically significant detrimental effect. Apparently, there is a causal connection between executives including some, but not all, MAR groups and instability in plural societies. When the five controlling variables are examined in addition to these four consociational components, MV and HGC are the only ones whose relationships to stability remain significant and only these in addition to SGC, PR, External Threats (ET), and Moderate Multiparty Systems (MMS) are not dropped from the analysis. Although they PR is no longer significant when analyzed with these additional variables, the relationships involving SGC, HGC, MV, and PR were allocated coefficients which indicated that they exerted the same types of effects (positive or negative) in all of the models using the democracies set of cases. Overall, among democratic plural countries, the consociational components of somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions, potential minority veto power, and PR are found to be the only independent variables which exert statistically significant effects on the dependent stability variable. The segmental autonomy consociational component, as well as control variables corresponding to groups’ geographical concentration, external threats, moderate multiparty systems, population size, and socioeconomic equality, were found to have no significant effect on stability. The models using this democracies set of cases indicate that potential minority veto power and PR are both associated with greater instability, while
highly inclusive coalitions are associated with stability but their less inclusive counterparts actually seem conducive to instability.

The complete set of cases, including both democratic and undemocratic countries, is capable of providing insights concerning the influence of democracy on the elements of stability represented by the dependent variable, nonviolent and violent opposition. While it does not make sense to use an independent variable corresponding to democracy with the set of cases comprising only democracies, employment of this variable in analyses of the complete set of cases can promote understanding of democracy's influence on stability as well as its interaction with the consociational components. Models with this set of countries confirm the relationships detected through examination of the democracies set, as well as the role of democracy. In very similar fashion to the models involving the democracies set, these analyses show that segmental autonomy and the controlling, independent variables other than democracy do not exert statistically significant effects on the dependent stability variable. Greater democracy is found to exert a significant destabilizing effect on stability. Therefore, this statistical model provides evidence confirming the theory that democracy is associated with greater amounts of nonviolent and violent opposition because undemocratic countries repress their inhabitants' abilities to express their discontent. Thankfully, the relationships between consociational components and stability, as manifested by nonviolent and violent opposition, can be tested in this project also through analysis of the set of countries that includes only democracies. However, the models using the complete set of cases including undemocratic countries corroborate those conclusions suggested by models using the democracies set of cases. Analysis of variable coefficients and tests for statistical significance yielded through these models indicates that they provide further evidence that somewhat inclusive coalitions (SGC), minority veto power, and PR tend to be destabilizing in plural societies, while highly inclusive coalitions (HGC) seem to contribute to greater stability.

Models of the relationships between consociationalism and the dependent, stability variable indicate the same findings, regardless of whether they are conducted with a set of cases corresponding to plural countries employing various political systems or those using democracy. Three of the four components of consociationalism (represented by four variables), somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions, potential minority veto power, and proportional representation electoral systems, are the only variables other than democracy which are shown to exert statistically significant effects on stability. Executive coalitions appear to benefit stability in plural societies when they contain representatives of all MAR groups but seem to yield detrimental effects when they include some, but not all, of these groups. Examination of the variable corresponding to somewhat inclusive coalitions actually suggests that coalitions which do not contain representatives from a country's MARs are more conducive to stability than those including members of some, rather than all, such groups. This phenomenon might conceivably
result from some, potentially destabilizing groups’ belief that they may be permanently excluded from such somewhat inclusive coalitions. The statistical analyses using both sets of cases also illustrate that potential minority veto power and PR exert a detrimental effect on stability levels in plural societies.

Part 5:
What Role Is Performed By Consociationalism In Plural Societies?

The body of cross-sectional time series regression analyses used to test the relationships between the independent variables in this project and stability indicates that a number of factors influence the role of consociationalism in plural societies. These factors include potential minority veto power, proportional representation electoral systems, somewhat and highly inclusive executive coalitions, and democracy. It is certainly possible that other phenomena could better explain stability in plural societies but this dataset does include additional variables representing more factors which are capable of being examined statistically and are commonly believed to strongly influence the operation of consociationalism. The two prescriptions for lasting peace in divided societies which have so far commanded the most respect from both academics and policymakers are Lijphart’s system of consociationalism, which is based on the belief that inter-group cooperation is necessary only at the elite level, and Horowitz’s suggested mechanisms for promoting incentives for inter-group cooperation among both leaders and their constituents. The quantitative analysis performed for this project provides insights into the benefits and drawbacks of both of these academics’ preferred sets of institutions and practices. At first glance, it may seem that only the control variable of geographical concentration of segments involves Horowitz’s suggestions to leaders of troubled, plural societies. This variable was found to not have a statistically significant effect on stability in plural societies, when it was tested with both sets of cases. Horowitz believes that electoral constituencies containing substantial amounts of people from different antagonistic groups and electoral systems requiring voters to choose more than one candidate for each office will promote moderation of campaign promises, policies, and consequent polarization and conflict. However, this idea that incentives for moderation should be promoted through mass-level intergroup contact is completely at odds with Lijphart’s belief that, by keeping the non-elite memberships of groups separate from one another, permanent peace can be achieved in states that they will still share. Since Lijphart’s consociational components and theory derive from this general premise, if it was proven that they do facilitate stability, Horowitz’s conception of human nature in plural societies and the prescriptions designed according to it would be wrong.
The variables used for this project do not perfectly represent consociationalism and the factors thought to influence its operation. Although findings concerning consociationalism suggest hypotheses concerning Horowitz’s suggestions for quelling communal conflicts, it must also be recognized that this project was not designed to evaluate Horowitz’s work. The arguable drawbacks of consociationalism would have been more effectively assessed if the variable or variables corresponding to the grand coalition component of consociationalism had represented the presence of executives commanding the allegiance of all potentially antagonistic groups in each country. However, to create enough variation in the data for this factor, the variables corresponding to this phenomenon had to instead reflect whether or not MAR groups were included in executives. The analyses of these variables for this project indicate that coalitions containing representatives of all MARs are conducive to stability, while those containing some but not all such groups seem to have a detrimental effect. Horowitz claims that no real grand coalitions have ever existed but he defines these bodies as they would ideally have been represented with such variables, but could not be for methodological reasons. The contrary influences of highly, and somewhat, inclusive coalitions suggested by these analyses do not prove or disprove Lijphart’s contention that the absence of opposition in a governance system is conducive to instability. However, they are also consistent with Lijphart’s belief that, the more a coalition represents all potentially antagonistic groups, the more stable their plural society will become.

Proportional representation is required for consociational systems. Lijphart believes that stability is maximized in plural societies when power is allocated to potentially antagonistic groups as proportionally as possible and in a manner which helps them achieve autonomy over their cultural affairs. To this end, he prescribes List Proportional Representation as the optimal electoral system in these countries because it results in very proportional legislative seat allocation and includes no element designed to motivate mass-level cross-group negotiation. The Single Transferable Vote electoral system is the only proportional representation system which does inspire such negotiation because it allows voters to list several preferences for individual candidates that are competing for the same position. However, it accounts for only a tiny percentage of proportional representation systems being used throughout the world. The data corresponding to the consociational component of proportional representation in this project does not differentiate between the numerous variants in this category. Thankfully, they all result in allocations of seats that are much more proportional than those produced by majoritarian and undemocratic systems and only one rare type promotes intergroup negotiation so this variable can be relied upon to reflect Lijphart’s general recommendation that proportionality and autonomy be engendered by plural societies’ electoral systems. Since the Single Transferable Vote system and the majoritarian Alternative Vote system are those which seem to foster the sort of intergroup negotiation and cooperation favored by Horowitz, their inclusion in separate variables would have
optimized the explanatory potential of this project. However, the scarcity of both systems internationally
would render such variables methodologically problematic because their data would contain too little
variation. The role of proportional representation suggested by analyses of the variable corresponding to
it in this dataset corroborate Norris' (2002, p.237) finding that it does not appear to be true that “more
proportional electoral systems directly generate greater support for the political system among ethnic
minority groups.” Among the many plural countries covered in this project, proportional representation
electoral systems promoted instability, as manifested by rebellion and protest. Analysis of the
independent variables corresponding to proportional representation and democracy together confirms that,
even after taking into consideration the role of democratic freedoms to protest that may conceivably result
in rebellion, intrinsically democratic proportional representation is still conducive to instability in plural
societies. This category of electoral systems may conceivably promote stability in societies that are not
prone to the sort of divisions likely to occur in plural societies. This project suggests that international
trends do not support the claim that proportional representation, and the lack of incentives for mass-level
inter-group cooperation provided by virtually all of its variations, promote stability in plural countries.

The variable corresponding to the consociational component of segmental autonomy may at first
glance seem to yield no valuable insights concerning the regulation of intergroup conflict because it is not
statistically significant in any of the models carried out for this project. However, this is a variable which
simultaneously indicates whether cultural organizations are repressed, MAR groups have legal autonomy
over cultural affairs, their languages have official status, and they live in regions with relative
homogeneity of group populations. The fact that this variable representing various manifestations of
group separateness does not influence stability is quite notable. Lijphart believes that groups’ power over
their cultural affairs is greatly conducive to stability in the countries that they share. These statistical
analyses suggest that he has overestimated the impact of at least these manifestations of cultural
autonomy.

The consociational component of minority veto power is analyzed with a variable corresponding
to its potential availability to MAR groups in situations where they can gain legislative representation in
rough proportion to their numbers. This condition certainly cannot be relied upon in plural societies but
data indicating the actual exertion of minority veto power does not exist and would be extremely difficult
to produce, particularly for a large set of countries and years. The data representing this factor is the first
of its kind and was created through reference to all of the constitutions that operated in eighty-eight
countries between 1975 and 1995. It provides the first indication of the role of potential, if not actual,
minority veto power in plural societies and its examination in conjunction with the other variables in this
project indicates that it exerts a detrimental effect on stability, as manifested by nonviolent and violent
opposition, in countries with democratic and other types of political systems.

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If autonomy for potentially antagonistic, communal groups does inspire them to live in harmony with one another in shared states for prolonged time periods, minority veto power definitely would be conducive to stability. Apparently, Horowitz may be correct in his belief that majority requirements, both in elections and for other activities such as legislating, facilitates long term, intergroup harmony and coexistence more than empowering them in their battles against one another. However, the relationships between stability and somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions which were also detected indicate that these majority requirements are likely to have the reverse effect if MAR groups are permanently excluded from possessing real political power.

The results of this analysis suggest that the international community of constitutional drafters and academics needs to recognize a crucial distinction involving the effects of majoritarianism and plurality decisions in divided societies. Particularly in countries with certain constellations of potentially antagonistic groups, simple majority decision-making in the electoral or legislative arenas can permanently disempower them and result in terrible injustice and violence. However, not all majoritarianism and plurality decision making is of this type. If a country is divided into regions or constituencies with sufficient heterogeneity of such groups, requirements for assent by relatively large proportions of electors or representatives in elections and for other decisions may actually motivate them to work together, without forcing them to assimilate or surrender their distinctive identities. For example, if majoritarianism unavoidably compelled the assimilation of potentially antagonistic groups, the United States would either have soon disintegrated following a war even more bloody than the civil war that did take place or it would be the most ethnically homogeneous immigrant society imaginable, after its two centuries of existence. The analyses performed for this project suggest that elements of Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s premises and prescriptions are both correct and perhaps even compatible. The effects exhibited by the variables corresponding to consociational components indicate that stability is maximized when minorities at risk feel that they can gain representation in their countries’ executives but also feel motivated to work with members of other groups to achieve their common and separate cultural goals. The contrasting influences of somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions on stability which were detected here emphasize that the widespread belief among the members of one “minority at risk” that they cannot achieve effective representation can be enough to engender substantial instability in their plural societies.

**Conclusion**

Analysis of the two sets of cases and numerous variables used for this project indicates that highly inclusive coalitions deter violent and nonviolent instability, while somewhat inclusive coalitions,
potential minority veto power, and PR electoral systems actually exacerbate it. In tests involving plural
countries in general and only those which were democratic, the same effects of these variables reflecting
components of consociationalism were confirmed and found to be statistically significant. While this
project’s findings concerning potential minority veto power and PR suggest that the system is much less
conducive to stability than is often assumed, the positive role of highly inclusive coalitions also indicates
that it is important for members of minorities at risk to feel as if their representatives could attain some
measure of executive power. The negative effects of somewhat inclusive coalitions illustrate that
exclusion from executive power of only some of a country’s MARs is sufficient to destabilize a plural
society. The fact that somewhat inclusive coalitions in countries containing MARs appear to be more
detrimental than coalitions that do not include members of their MAR groups suggests that such groups’
members may feel even more angry about exclusion from power if other such groups have attained
executive representation.

Rebellion and protest constitute two of the most common manifestations of the sort of violent and
nonviolent instability which Lijphart believes are substantially deterred and often prevented by
consociationalism. This project analyzes the influence on these manifestations of instability by
consociationalism, its separate components, and many of the factors which are thought to most
significantly impact its operation. Their effects are tested through analysis of two sets of cases,
corresponding to plural countries which are also democratic and plural countries irrespective of their
governance system type. This approach was also designed to enable analysis of the argument that such
effects are simply ramifications of the phenomenon by which democratic countries allow their inhabitants
more freedom to express opposition and thus the elements of their governance systems seem more
conducive to instability. The possible influence of this phenomenon on the operation of consociational
components was tested through analysis of the variables corresponding to them with a dataset only
containing democratic countries, as well as a democracy control variable with a larger set of plural
countries with various governance systems. The confirmation of the same effects exerted by potential
minority veto power, PR, and somewhat and highly inclusive coalitions in analyses using both sets of
cases and a democracy control variable emphasize the value of this project’s findings.
Section 3:
Understanding The Effects Of Consociationalism In Plural Societies:
A New Approach To Explaining Stability In Plural Societies

CHAPTER 7:
EXAMINATION OF TWO COUNTRIES IN WHICH CONSOCIATIONALISM IS OFTEN RECOGNIZED AS SUCCESSFUL BUT WHERE IT ARGUABLY HAS NOT PRODUCED IMPRESSIVE LEVELS OF STABILITY

Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism was derived inductively through reference to the system of governance which existed in his home country during his youth. His first works on the subject were inspired by his observation that the Netherlands was a highly stable yet plural society and thus constituted a significant contradiction of the then conventional wisdom among political scientists that these attributes are inherently incompatible in the long term. After demonstrating that consociationalism was responsible for stability in the Netherlands, Lijphart began to notice elements of this system in other countries that seemed both plural and stable. Some of the places he has since identified as having experienced the successful operation of consociationalism include Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland. He also has observed that consociational components recently were adopted in Northern Ireland and South Africa. Unfortunately, stability in the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium could not be quantitatively analyzed in this project because these countries were not included in the sources of data used to represent stability for all of the other countries in the dependent variable. Some other sources of data used for this analysis were available only for a period ending in 1995 and, by necessity, the project was confined to the period, 1975-1995. Unfortunately, most of the experience of consociationalism in Northern Ireland and South Africa has occurred since then so it cannot be examined here with statistical methods. Many scholars agree with Lijphart’s consistent position that the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland are the “core cases” that best exemplify the potential benefits of consociationalism. The history of Canada is also commonly recognized to be a consociational success story. While some components of the system to be introduced in Northern Ireland have not yet become reliably operational, they are believed by many to be the best and perhaps only means of achieving stability there. Consociationalism is also often credited with engendering intergroup harmony in South Africa, since apartheid was abolished. The experiences of these countries are cited as the strongest evidence that consociationalism promotes
stability in plural societies. With the exceptions of Switzerland, Canada, and South Africa prior to 1995, the operation of these countries’ consociational elements could not be statistically analyzed, due to a lack of appropriate data for the dependent variable. The effects of governance mechanisms in Northern Ireland could not be statistically analyzed with any precision even during the 1975 to 1995 period because this project’s cases are country specific. The United Kingdom is examined but separate inclusion of a region would substantially diminish the comparability of cases and overrepresent its experience by including Northern Ireland as a portion of one country and also an independent case. The conclusions drawn from the quantitative analysis of consociationalism do not reflect the supposed successes of those places which could not be adequately represented in the dataset. Careful assessment of the effects of consociationalism in each of these commonly cited cases will elucidate the extent to which exclusion of some of them biased the conclusions derived from the quantitative analysis. It will also promote greater understanding of the conditions which promote stability in plural societies and determine how the quantitative analysis could have suggested that consociationalism is not strongly conducive to stability, if it appeared to perform this function in these countries. The effects of consociationalism in plural societies will be qualitatively explored in Section 3, which includes case study analysis of some countries which seem to have benefited less than expected, in Chapter 7, and attempts to pinpoint the exact causes of apparent consociational “success stories,” in Chapter 8. Chapter 7 focuses on the experience of Canada and Belgium but initial consideration of all the case studies analyzed in Section 3 will maximize the depth of insights reached through comparison of both Chapter 7 and 8’s case studies.

The unavailability of dependent variable data representing stability in the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium and the consequent lack of quantitative analysis of consociationalism’s effects on stability in these countries is most unfortunate, since these countries’ experiences are cited as some of the best evidence illustrating consociationalism’s value in plural societies. Due to the great significance of the absence of statistical examination of their stability levels, the methodological necessity for this regrettable situation must be more justified in detail. Using data from a different source to represent the existence of stability in these three cases would have jeopardized the project’s methodological integrity since it would not be perfectly comparable to the data corresponding to the other countries. Incidentally, the source of the stability data was the Minorities at Risk project and these three cases, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium, were excluded from it because none of the groups inhabiting the countries were judged to be such minorities. This lack of MAR groups in Belgium constitutes a serious drawback of Gurr’s dataset as a means of identifying plural societies for analysis. Even if no groups in Belgium are
considered to be “at risk,” the country is deeply divided to a degree that obviously renders it plural, according to its consistent definition by Lijphart. The absence of Belgium from the Minorities at Risk project suggests that some other plural countries may have been inadvertently left out of this analysis because they were not identified by Gurr’s team as containing one of these special minority groups. Fortunately, the relationship between consociationalism and stability in the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium can be qualitatively assessed and compared to the statistically derived finding that elements of this system of governance do not seem very conducive to stability throughout the world. If this qualitative analysis suggests that consociationalism has very substantially contributed to stability in these countries over the many decades of its operation in them, the findings yielded by quantitative analysis must be reconsidered.

Although the unavailability of dependent stability data precludes quantitative analysis of the influence of consociationalism and control variables on stability in the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium, independent variable data corresponding to the existence of the system’s core components was nevertheless collected. The only core component information that could not be collected for these countries was Austria’s information regarding potential minority veto power. The data indicates that, of these three countries for which no dependent variable data is available, Belgium (from 1975-1995) and the Netherlands (from 1975 to 1977) used three or more of the four consociational components. When these countries are taken into consideration, only 7% of the years of countries’ experiences represented in the database were judged to have included the use of three or more of the four consociational components. Particularly because this 7% reflects conditions in these three countries, it seems that consociational components are not very common in the plural societies represented in this dataset. The apparent rarity of these mechanisms increases the influence that these countries’ experiences would have exerted in analyses of this dataset, if their stability levels could have been quantitatively examined. If consociationalism is the driver of long lasting stability in these countries, perhaps the system promotes intergroup harmony to a much greater degree than is indicated by this study’s preliminary conclusions.

Lijphart’s claims for consociationalism have been disputed repeatedly with evidence suggesting that these countries where it was apparently successful actually never really used consociationalism or their periods of consociationalism and stability were not contemporaneous (for instance: Barry, 1975a, p.482-493; Horowitz, 1985, p.575-576). Data was collected indicating the presence of consociationalism for all of the eighty-eight countries included in the quantitative analysis. It constitutes the first inventory of the system’s components that was not compiled through more subjective analysis of individual countries’ historical experiences.
Although some of the variables would ideally represent consociational components more perfectly, they are the most objective measurements of the practice of consociational components ever to be assembled and analysis of such a wide range of countries is completely unprecedented. The data is a valuable contribution to the lively debate over whether consociationalism exists in individual countries. When the scores for all four consociational components corresponding to each year of individual countries' experiences are totaled, it appears that Canada did not use many consociational elements between 1975 and 1995 but the South African governance system, as of 1995, strongly resembled Lijphart’s system. If it is assumed that consociationalism definitely occurred to some extent in countries that seemed to possess three or more of its components, as represented by these variables, it cannot be confirmed that Austria was consociational at any time between 1975 and 1995. The Netherlands fit this definition only from 1975 to 1977 and Belgium and Switzerland were the only countries common recognized as “core cases” which were definitely consociational throughout the twenty year period. However, Lijphart himself does not believe that all of these countries were consociational throughout this period and the evidence of the system throughout their histories has been explored extensively by many scholars. For instance, as of 1977, Lijphart (p.1-2) explained that Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were “retreating from their high point of consociational development” and “reached their apogee of sharp plural divisions and close elite cooperation in the late 1950s and have been declining since then.” At that stage in the development of his theory, Lijphart (1977, p.2) believed that consociationalism’s dissipation in all four countries was caused because the system “by its very success ha[d] begun to make itself superfluous.” Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, as well as Northern Ireland to some extent, are widely regarded to be the cases which provide the most support for Lijphart’s theory that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. Meticulous comparisons of time periods during which consociational components operated and stability prevailed could potentially establish whether the system engendered the desired effect in some of these places. Careful historical analysis might also be used to demonstrate that individual countries were not plural at any point or when consociationalism appeared to create stability in them. However, the most powerful argument that consociationalism does not result in substantial increases in stability would be created if it was assumed that all of these places used this system and if their experiences, particularly when analyzed collectively, did not confirm Lijphart’s theory. It is possible to argue that impressive levels of stability during and after the consociational periods in these countries either did not exist or are better explained by a theory that differs from Lijphart’s. Even if one country appears to fit Lijphart’s theory perfectly, its experience will provide valuable
insights into means by which stability can be cultivated but it will not prove a general, universal
trend that contradicts the findings of this project’s quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis
did indicate that the system does not have a large, positive effect on stability but also that highly
inclusive coalitions were found to increase intergroup harmony and segmental autonomy had no
effect on its existence. Qualitative examination of the experiences of Canada and Belgium will
facilitate greater understanding of the ways in which consociational components influence
individual societies.

Canada and Belgium are cited by Lijphart and other proponents of consociationalism as
some of the best examples of the great potential of the system to promote stability in plural
societies. Lijphart (1977, p.119) believes that Belgium is one of the countries that best
demonstrate the positive role of consociational methods and that the elements of the system used
in Canada are responsible for maintaining the country’s existence and stability. However, some
experts on trends within these countries currently believe that, after many years of arguably using
consociationalism quite successfully, they are now more likely than ever to split and thus incur
considerable instability.

Part 1:
Canada

Consociational mechanisms have been used in Canada for more than 150 years and the
historical antagonism dividing English and French speakers has remained intense and apparently
still threatens to culminate in the secession of Quebec. It is not clear that consociationalism has
lessened this most problematic, Canadian intergroup antagonism. The system’s relatively
unimpressive performance there may be partly due to an inadequate amount of the “overarching
loyalty” to the groups’ shared state, which is identified by Lijphart as one of the “favorable
conditions” for the implementation and success of consociationalism. Another possible cause of
the continued divide between French and English speakers is an inadequate amount of incentives
for cross-cleavage cooperation. Consociational autonomy and the desire among some
Quebeckers to continue to receive financial benefits from the Canadian government are arguably
the factors which have thus far prevented Quebec’s secession. The importance of this autonomy
is illustrated by the rise in Francophones’ desire for secession, following their group’s substantial
decrease in veto power resulting from the 1982 constitution. However, it remains plausible to
speculate that lack of sufficient “overarching loyalty” and incentives for intergroup harmony
could still result in the intense destabilization of the state which would accompany secession,
particularly if Quebeckers no longer possessed strong economic motives to remain in the Canadian state. Qualitative analysis of Canada’s experience with consociationalism promotes greater comprehension of the extent to which the system’s components have influenced the level of stability there, as evidenced by the likelihood of secession.

It must be remembered that Lijphart (1977, p. 119) does regard Canada as only “semiconsociational.” However, he believes that, although Canada does not use proportional representation electoral mechanisms and its executives are not “grand coalitions,” other important decisionmaking bodies do resemble these special coalitions and groups are represented in government in largely proportional fashion without electoral systems specifically designed to produce this result (Lijphart, 1977, p. 126, 125). Lijphart (1977, p. 125) explains that the potentially problematic Francophone segment is heavily geographically concentrated and “proportional representation as an electoral method is not a crucial ingredient of consociational democracy when the segments are geographically concentrated.” In a 1977 publication, he argued that

[t]he future of the Canadian political system will depend to a large extent on whether it moves in the direction of greater consociationalism and, as a result, greater stability and unity, or in the direction of a more centrifugal regime with a partition of the country as its most likely outcome (Lijphart, p. 129).

Not only have consociational mechanisms operated for more than one hundred and fifty years in Canada, Lijphart (1977, p. 127) observes that, during the period of the United Province of Canada which ended when the Confederation was established in 1867, the country was even “more strongly consociational.” Over this lengthy period of time, the system has not proven capable of engendering enough stability to prevent the secession of Quebec. However, the positive influence of the minority veto consociational components was seemingly evidenced when the termination of minority veto power over constitutional amendments in 1982 arguably produced a small increase in instability and desire for Quebec’s secession (Marshall, 1998, p. 162).12

Canada has historically been a binational state. Compared to its English counterpart, its French segment constitutes a much smaller proportion of the country’s population, has historically been socioeconomically less successful, and is the group whose discontent still

12 In his 1977 publication, Lijphart (p. 125) argues that “the province of Quebec… can still be said to have a largely effective informal veto over decisions that concern its vital interests.” Quebec apparently has retained most of the veto power identified by Lijphart but, when the new Canadian constitution was enacted in 1982, the province “continued to resist the constitutional settlement and engaged unsuccessfully in further court action to establish the right to veto” (Marshall, 1998, p. 158). Marshall (1998, p. 162) points out that this constitution decreased Quebec’s linguistic and educational autonomy and that its power to veto constitutional amendments ceased to exist in 1982. This obviously diminished the extent to which minority veto and consociationalism are reflected in the Canadian system.
threatens to break up and thus destabilize Canada. The strength of the cleavage separating those of French and English ancestry appears to have changed little throughout Canadian history. All of these years of consociational experience have preceded the current situation, in which almost 50% of the population of the French region of Quebec wish to secede. In 1980, before the 1982 constitution which decreased Francophones’ veto power, the Premier of Quebec called a referendum “on the issue of a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association between Quebec and the rest of Canada” (Dunsmuir, 1995, p.3). The voters of Quebec rejected this proposal for a form of secession but only by approximately 60%-40% (Dunsmuir, 1995, p.3). As of 1993, “[s]urveys also showed that roughly 40 percent of the population [of Quebec] was either very or somewhat in favour of sovereignty” (Crête et al., 2000, p.298). These two measurements of Quebec opinion produced the same result, even though they occurred before and well after the elimination of minority veto power over constitutional amendments in 1982. Thirteen years after the slight decrease in consociationalism resulting from this change, a 1995 referendum showed that 49.4% of Quebec voters wanted to secede (Cameron, 2002, p.112). The database for this project also shows that instability, as manifested by protest and rebellion, rose slightly in 1985, continued to rise until 1990, and then began falling but, as of 1995, had not returned to pre-1985 levels. The 1982 constitutional change obviously had some impact on the extent to which Quebeckers possessed patriotic feelings toward Canada. However, its resulting decrease in consociationalism does not explain all of the variation in stability and support for secession since 1982. Desire for secession seemed to remain steady until at least eleven years after 1982. In addition, Canada is “highly decentralized” and Quebec’s power over many policies affecting its population, when combined with the extent to which the French population is concentrated there, means that the province retained a huge amount of power over its own affairs even after 1982 (Cameron, 2002, p.108). The loss of the ability to veto constitutional amendments obviously angered many in Quebec and probably affected the secessionist movement and stability levels to some extent. However, the more striking thing about consociationalism in Canada is that it has operated there since the United Province of Canada was formed in 1840 and almost fifty percent of Quebec voters wanted their province in secede in 1995 (“Province”).

Canada’s prospects for maintaining long term stability as a political entity do not seem to have increased much since the country’s birth. Proponents of consociationalism perhaps would argue that the continuing, widespread desire of Quebec residents to secede is evidence that the system they favor has not been used extensively enough in Canada. Particularly since the confederation of Canada in 1867, an absence of grand coalition executives arguably renders the country inadequately consociational. Presumably such all-inclusive executives would have
legitimized the state in the eyes of potentially embittered Francophones by providing them more access to representation at the highest levels of government. If Lijphart is correct in asserting that proportional representation electoral systems are not required to produce sufficiently proportional results and that segmental autonomy and minority veto exist in Canada to a degree that constitutes consociationalism, the absence of grand coalition would constitute the Achilles Heel threatening to intensely destabilize the country. However, the apparent possibility that Quebec might secede in recent decades has coincided with the country's leadership by a number of Prime Ministers whose electoral constituencies were in Quebec and who are judged by the majority of Canadians as in fact either being French Canadians from Quebec or being very closely associated with them (Lee, 2005). A survey of recent Prime Ministers indicates that Canada has been led by such politicians every year between 1968 and 2005, except for 1993, 1984, and nine months beginning in 1979 ("Prime Ministers;" "Pierre"). These Prime Ministers include Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chretien, and Paul Martin. They were not representatives of the Quebec separatist movement but they were considered by at least a majority of Canadians to be members of, or at least very closely connected to, the French segment of the population (Lee, 2005). Even Pierre Trudeau, who "went into politics to fight Quebec separatism," seemed motivated by his connections to this province when he worked to achieve complete independence for Canada from Britain and "became the father of official bilingualism" (Bliss; "Pierre"). Representatives of at least some portion of French Quebec opinion have led all of Canada for most of the past forty years. The fact that they did not try to advance the French separatist agenda and managed to maintain the favor of a majority of Canadians, most of whom were not French, illustrates their individual abilities to represent both English and French national traditions. The existence of such leadership suggests that the continuing popularity of French separatism among Quebeckers is not due to an absence of the simultaneous representation of both French and English perspectives at the executive level. Especially considering the fact that Quebec seems destined for economic failure if it does secede, the support for independence by almost 50% of the province's population is striking. Without consociationalism, Quebec may have seceded from Canada many years ago. On the other hand, 165 years with most elements of the system have not succeeded in substantially enhancing stability to the degree necessary for preventing secession. It may be time to reassess whether consociationalism represents the country's best chance for unity and stability.

The concentration of most of the French and secessionist population in Quebec does translate into allocation of a roughly proportionate number of federal elected posts to its representatives. However, this situation also almost precludes the success of systems like those
prescribed by Horowitz, which engender incentives for cross-group cooperation through majoritarian or plurality elections used to elect officials in constituencies which are heterogeneous (regarding the populations of potentially antagonistic segments). The French population is located in Quebec because of original immigration patterns and its forced dispersal to create such heterogeneous regions at any time in the settlement's history would undoubtedly have caused much more instability that it could have prevented. Therefore, Canada is not experiencing this threat of secession and potential constitutional crisis because it should have created such multiple, heterogeneous constituencies. However, the fact that Prime Ministers with French backgrounds are often elected indicates that this nationwide heterogeneous constituency does promote the sort of voting for members of other segments that is hailed by Lijphart's critic, Horowitz, as an effective alternative to consociationalism for mitigating conflict in divided societies. The same Prime Ministerial office that seems to often contain a leader who is seen to represent all segments in an arguably consociational fashion also appears to be filled in a process in which people vote for members of the "other" group. The plurality election in the Canadian, nationwide, heterogeneous constituency appears conducive to patriotism toward the state among both population segments. Perhaps the cultivation of more federal level, single elected positions to be filled through nationwide elections would encourage French separatists to feel more allegiant to Canada. This country's experience suggests the possibility that, if elections are designed to fill single posts and are held in heterogeneous constituencies, the leaders who prevail in these contests are highly likely to be people who seriously consider the interests of all segments whose members elected them. These individuals may actually then represent all of these segments' points of view, while making decisions on their own and thus avoiding some potential government deadlock. Perhaps the benefits of Lijphart's autonomy-based, and Horowitz's incentives-based, prescriptions for stabilizing plural societies are much more compatible than has been previously recognized.

The "immigrant societies" of Canada and the United States are often grouped together for the purposes of comparative analysis of political systems. They are believed to avoid many conflicts motivated by nationalist sentiments because they include representatives of so many ancestral lands who, for the most part, voluntarily left those places to form new societies together. One would expect their experiences involving intergroup harmony and consequent stability to be fairly similar, considering this common provenance. However, comparison of their histories suggests that a number of factors have contributed to the fact that, as late as the twenty-first century, Canada has a region like Quebec that may very possibly secede and the United States does not. The United States unquestionably contains many self-segregating, angst-ridden groups
who feel inadequately represented by current political elites. However, it seems highly unlikely that the country’s multiple problematic intergroup relationships will ever culminate in the collapse of the federal government or secession of territory. If avoidance of these scenarios is ensured through election of representatives with the heterogeneous constituencies that predominate in the United States, it is evidence favoring Horowitz’s assertion that the cross-group electoral incentives resulting from such a system promote stability. However, this explanation does not suffice to explain the differences involving intergroup dynamics in these two countries. The French in Quebec have never seemed to migrate across their state to an extent even resembling the proclivity among people of embittered groups in the United States to permanently relocate, sometimes repeatedly, to new locations thousands of miles from the places where they and their ancestors originally settled. The theories offered by Lijphart and his critic, Horowitz, do not explain why these sorts of groups voluntarily disperse in great numbers in the United States but stay huddled together in Quebec. The determination of French Quebeckers to maintain the extent of their language’s usage undoubtedly contributes to their continued regional concentration but most inhabitants of the United States and their ancestors, including those from France, also spoke different languages when they immigrated but most have not felt compelled to live in homogeneous communities and perpetuate their use.

One plausible explanation for this difference between the two countries also facilitates comprehension of the scenarios which perpetuate stability in Switzerland and the Netherlands. The two types of patriotism which promote domestic stability across the world correspond to the emotional driven motivations for wanting to live with other people under a common government. All of the states that have achieved long term stability apparently have done so because their inhabitants either feel some common, uniting bond with each other, or they feel that they need to live and be governed together. Throughout history, sentimental attachment to the culture seemingly shared by one’s ancestors has been the dominant motivation for patriotism towards one’s state. However, the presence of some stable, democratic multinational states has inspired some scholars to recognize a different type of allegiance that is capable of supporting state solidarity. Loyalty arguably as strong as communal related nationalism sometimes evolves in such countries when their inhabitants feel united by common, apparently distinctive modes of governance or guiding principles that seem at least largely unbiased with regard to substate groups. The United States is often cited as the prime example of the type of country united by this sort of “constitutional patriotism.” Perhaps the United States does not have a Quebec type of problem because its people are emotionally united through patriotism to their constitution and civic traditions. The strength of this patriotism is evidenced by the fact that most United States
citizens view their country as a “nation” and do not detect any real difference between the notions of nation and state. If French Canadians felt either constitutional or nationalist loyalty to their state, 40% of them would never favor their province’s secession and they may even see themselves as members of a Canadian “nation.”

The dominance of the English traditions, vis-à-vis their French counterparts, and the continued connection to England evident in Canada is not adequately considered when Canada and the United States are categorized together as “immigrant societies.” The United States certainly inherited many customs from England but these seem to have been adopted over time by most Americans without English ancestors as their own. While the United States has been an independent country since 1776, Canada had de facto independence from the mid-nineteenth century but only gained complete, formal independence from Britain in 1982 (“Pierre”). Perhaps not coincidentally, the Canadian Prime Minister who pushed to achieve this sovereignty was Pierre Trudeau, who was a Quebecker and regarded by most Canadians to be culturally French.

Marshall (1998, p.167) explains that the “process of dividing imperial sovereignty began with the Statute of Westminster in 1931.” However, “[u]nder this Statute the Dominions in theory retained a legal, umbilical cord to the Imperial Parliament, which could legislate for them at their request and consent” (Marshall, 1998, p.167). While the situation between 1931 and 1982 was not one of British domination, the French population whose ancestors had been defeated by the British in the competition to control Canada remained under a very limited form of official British influence until 1982 (Strayer, 1989, p.160-163). Even now, the Canadian head of state remains the British monarch (Marshall, 1998, p.168). While it seems rational to surmise that Canada’s connection to Britain has not substantially influenced French Quebeckers’ lives for a very long time, historical intergroup antagonisms throughout the world are heavily influenced by symbols as arguably unimportant as flags, pictures on currency, and national anthem songs. In a state inhabited by multiple groups, the representation of only one on the symbols of the state is a manifestation of that group’s dominance, which will naturally be more resented if it is viewed as only one of several such manifestations.

Canada’s strong ties to Britain have undoubtedly exacerbated the French speakers’ feelings of alienation from the Canadian state. The potentially insufficient strength of loyalty to the Canadian state is evidenced by belief of “a significant group of knowledgeable people” in Canada that the country “will not hang together as a single country when Quebec leaves” (Cairns, 1996, p.1, 4). Apparently, pan-Canadian patriotism is not strong enough even among groups other than the Francophones to convince these “knowledgeable people” that the remainder of the country would stay intact after secession by Quebec. The 45% of Canadians who “can trace their
origins to the British Isles” feel a much greater sense of loyalty to their state than do the 28% whose ancestors were from France (Strayer, 1989, p.158). Considering that Canada has been much more heavily influenced by English culture for so long, the state probably enjoys some nationalistic patriotism among those descended from British immigrants. However, the level of constitutional patriotism that exists has apparently never become strong enough to inspire the French population to feel more like Canadians than Quebeckers. The operation of consociational components, when combined with efforts to assimilate the French which were not prevented by these components, seems to have motivated the French to gain as much autonomy as possible and think of the Canadian state more as a source of money than anything else.

However, Canada has remained united since 1840 and presumably the majority of French Quebec has not voted to secede for primarily pragmatic reasons. Recognition of the real possibility of such an event in the near future is evidenced by extensive discussions by academics and policymakers concerning its likely economic and political ramifications for both the region and the resulting Canadian rump state. For instance, articles by Stewart (1997) and Neufeld (1995) explore the negative financial effects for Quebec that would follow its independence and, as recently as October, 2005, Prime Minister Martin “warned” that “a sovereign Quebec wouldn’t be able to survive” (Thompson, 2005, p.C10). Neufeld (1995, p.1) believes that Quebec’s independence could result in a “financial crisis” brought on by the enormous fiscal deficits it would then have to face on its own. According to Stewart (1997, p.32), a huge factor discouraging Quebeckers from pursuing independence ironically also provides an incentive to threaten to secede. One aspect of Canadian federal governance is the policy of provincial transfers of money, from more wealthy provinces to those who are in more need. Stewart (1997, p.32) provides details of the net transfers which occurred in the fiscal year covering 1991/1992. Although its per capita gains were much lower than those of some less populated provinces like Newfoundland that year, Quebec’s total gain was 2,984 million dollars, which is more than twice as much as any other province (Stewart, 1997, p.32). Stewart (1997, p.32-33) implies that a lot of Quebeckers elect secessionists to engage in “brinkmanship” designed to put forward the threat of secession, to compel the transfer of more funds to their province. If this is true, the combination of the extent to which Quebec relies on Canada financially and many Quebeckers’ notion of the state as a source of great funding suggest that perhaps the province has not seceded over the past 165 years because it enjoys considerable autonomy in a state often ruled by people sympathetic to its interests, which simultaneously gives it a huge financial support. Connor (1984) points out that economic motivations cannot be relied upon as explanations for secessionist activity but,
when the potential seceders control their own province with a highly decentralized state and most of them choose to live there, the influence of financial incentives surely increases.

It seems that the best explanation for Canada’s continued unity may be Quebeckers’ considerable autonomy throughout Canadian history, when combined with financial incentives. The traditional British orientation of the state seems to inspire loyalty among some groups but feelings of alienation among Francophones. Consociationalism has provided the autonomy which seems to have discouraged instability in the past. However, uncertainty concerning Canada’s ability to maintain unity following secession by Quebec may be evidence that consociationalism has kept the provinces too separate and deterred the evolution of constitutional patriotism, which may have encouraged Quebeckers to feel more Canadian than French. Canada’s experience of consociationalism seems to suggest that it can maintain peaceful coexistence of groups but perhaps not long term stability. States appear to remain intact and stable in the long term when they inspire shared loyalty of a nationalistic or constitutional nature or when they offer many more crucial benefits than does secession and/or rebellion. Consociationalism constitutes one means of influencing individuals’ and groups’ emotions and decisions about membership in existing states. If people who feel no patriotism toward their states also believe that they need to stay within them, consociationalism seems conducive to the continued function of the states, which is a manifestation of stability. However, since it is designed to create stability by keeping groups separate, if the members of these groups do not begin to feel a pride in their system intense enough to become constitutional loyalty, they cannot be expected to stay together permanently and their secession would certainly constitutes perhaps temporary but quite severe instability. The relationship between different manifestations of stability and consociationalism will be more thoroughly examined following qualitative analysis of the case studies in Chapters 7 and 8.

Part 2:
Belgium

The database constructed for this project indicates that, from 1975 to 1995, Belgium and Switzerland have been the two most intensely and consistently consociational countries in the world. Lijphart has recognized their status as prime examples of his system for more than three decades and the intensity of their consociationalism appears not to have waned since then. However, while Switzerland has consistently enjoyed stable intergroup relations, Belgium remains antagonistic and is arguably on the brink of partition (O’Neill, 2000, p.114). Comparison
of these two countries suggests that Belgium’s unity may be in jeopardy because the country has never inspired sufficient feelings of patriotism and its dominant groups are increasingly gaining the impression that their relative geographic concentration and regional conditions such as the development of the European Union mean that they could now form independent, viable states. One conceivable type of patriotism that seems possible under consociationalism in plural societies is a loyalty to the system itself. Such pride in consociationalism seems to be partially responsible for long-term stability in Switzerland and the Netherlands. Belgian patriotism was encouraged as a mechanism for promoting the assimilation to French culture so it inevitably became associated with domination, rather than any set of values which might inspire some feelings of unity shared by the Fleming and Walloon segments. Widespread belief that these groups needed to coexist in Belgium, rather than the operation of consociationalism, seems to better explain why Belgium has lasted as a unitary state since 1830 and why the decentralization that began in the 1970’s resulted in federalization and may culminate in partition (Lecours, 2002, p.59, 61). The Belgian experience of consociationalism seems to suggest that the system promotes stability when either nationalistic or constitutional patriotism unites the members of potentially problematic segments or when they believe that partition of their shared state is not desirable or possible. Growing separation of segments and its potential for creating great instability has occurred in Belgium, despite the use of consociationalism in a more pure form than has existed in Canada.

Belgium does not contain any of Gurr’s “minorities at risk” but it contains two population segments which have been at odds with one another since before the state was established so it is clear why Lijphart identifies it as a plural society. Perhaps Gurr’s project did not include Belgium because these two main segments, the Flemings and Walloons, have both come to possess substantial, if not equal, amounts of political, economic, and social power. Vanderlinden (1989, p.112) explains that “[t]hree cultures coexist within Belgium: the Dutch, the French, and the German.” These groups each have their “own communit[ies]” and languages but the German-speaking community constitutes less than one percent of the state’s population (Vanderlinden, 1989, p.112). The historically antagonistic Fleming and Walloon segments are divided by language, religious and ideological orientations, and geography (Vanderlinden, 1989, p.113; De Bandt, 1989, p.140). The northern half of Belgium is called Flanders and it is inhabited by most of the country’s Dutch speakers, while most French speakers live in the southern Wallonia region, and the very small group of German speakers is mainly concentrated in the southeast (Lecours, 2002, p.59). The capital city of Brussels is located in the northern, largely Dutch speaking region, it is quite heterogeneous and “cosmopolitan,” and is also “predominantly French”
(O'Neill, 2000, p.129; Lecours, 2002, p.59). These territorial divisions were formalized during the federalization of Belgium that “occurred step by step” between 1970 and 1993 (Lecours, 2002, p.61). Lecours (2002, p.61) points out that federalization did not progress faster because the two groups preferred different federal models and that “crises in relations” between them “were crucial in jumpstarting the federalization process when it appeared to be stalled.” In 1988, a compromise was attained concerning the status of Brussels and it became the only largely heterogeneous region in the new federal system which devolved great amounts of autonomy to its other two regions, Flanders and Walloonia (Lecours, 2002, p.61). De Bandt (1989, p.140) observes that “[c]leavages other than language tend to reinforce the [linguistic] division.” For instance, “Flemings are traditionally Catholic, while a majority of Walloons are not” and “Flanders has traditionally been more conservative.. while Wallonia is traditionally more socialist” (De Bandt, 1989, p.140). The Belgian state was established in 1830 by a coalition of groups representing these divergent points of view and, when this coalition broke down shortly after independence, “[n]ation-wide political parties were formed along the conservative (or, more precisely, Catholic)- liberal cleavage” (Hooghe, 1993, p.45). Hooghe (1993, p.45) explains that the Flemish movement began in the early nineteenth century in reaction to cultural deprivation and Walloon nationalism emerged after 1945 in response to “divergent economic developments between north and south.” Even though socioeconomic, religious, linguistic, and ethnic cleavages seem to have solidified at different points in Belgian history, they seem to have evolved to be largely congruent with each other and to intensify the country’s most potentially destabilizing division, between Flemings and Walloons. As of 1977, Lijphart (p.78) argued that substantial cross-cutting existed in Belgian among these cleavages. He explained that a significant portion of the country used, in Lorwin’s words, “‘French in the parlor; Flemish in the kitchen’” and that levels of religiosity do differ between Flemish and Walloons but also between the rural and urban members of each group (Lijphart, 1977, p.79). Pijnenburg (1984, p.59) points out that, as of 1963, Van Den Brande similarly believed that “the philosophical-religious, socio-economical, and ethno-linguistic cleavages in Belgium tend to impair one another’s potential for conflict and centrifugal effect through a process of crosscutting.” Lijphart (1977, p.81) believes that such cross-cutting can facilitate the operation of consociationalism because sometimes it transforms a bipolar constellation of groups into one with many segments (1977, p.81). From Lijphart’s (1977, p.81) perspective, “[i]f [cross-cutting] means an all-minority situation with not too many segments rather than a bipolar situation, it is a favorable effect; if it means a highly fractionalized society, this is not a favorable result.” Consociational means of governance have operated to varying degrees since the country’s first coalition government achieved independence.
in 1830. While Belgian cleavages appeared to have cross-cut each other to a considerable extent a few decades ago, politics in the country now appear to have become predominantly bipolar. Consociationalism’s promotion of the separation of dominant segments has arguably brought about this transformation of the cleavage system and facilitated the development of a federal system providing great autonomy for its mainly homogeneous regions. These developments have arguably inspired many Belgians to consider partition.

When Belgium is analyzed, it should be remembered again that, as of 1977, Lijphart (p.1-2) believed that consociationalism was making itself “superfluous” and, consequently, the country was becoming less consociational, less plural, and less marked by “close elite cooperation.” As of 2002, Lijphart’s (p.41) revised assessment of trends in Belgium was that the “clear case” of consociationalism “work[ing] successfully in ethnically divided” conditions there actually corresponded to the period “since 1970.” Lijphart’s body of work concerning Belgium implies that consociational components have been used extensively for many decades in Belgium but they have not promoted sufficient stability to render themselves superfluous. Deschouwer (2002, p.71-73) believes that the Belgian system rarely has been completely consociational but it seemed to “c[o]me in waves, pacifying only one problem at a time, and leaving room for competition on the others.” In a discussion of the effects of institutional changes introduced since the 1970s, Deshouwer (2002, p.83) argues that “[t]he very special kind of territorial and federal consociationalism that has been built in Belgium, and that has to be managed by parties that are completely divided along the territorial divide, offers little hope for an enduring stability of the system.” The segmental autonomy component of consociationalism was strengthened through federalization and coalitions have been used at the federal and regional levels to “contain the tensions” between the Flemish and Walloons (Deshouwer, 2002, p.82). However, at the same time, the dominant, ideologically identified parties find it difficult to operate cohesively because they are increasingly divided between Flemish and Walloons and the intensity of antagonism between these groups is evidenced by the fact that “the pillars in Belgium have survived the decline of their ideological relevance” (Deshouwer, 2002, p.76). Deshouwer (2002, p.78) believes that Belgium is “still [a] deeply divided society” and that “most governments since the 1960s collapsed because of the linguistic divide.” Deshouwer’s concern about Belgium’s prospects for stability is shared by several other analysts, such as De Bandt (1989, p.135), who believes that “the schism [between Flemish and Walloons] threatens the very existence of the country.” O’Neill (2000, p.114) also argues that the “issue of political identity based on language has become so entrenched in Belgian politics that it threatens the break-up of the state.” In the same year that the federalization process formally ended, 1993, Hooghe (1993, p.65) articulated
the fear that allocation of more and more previously federal power to the regions between 1970 and 1993 seemed to indicate the possibility of “[i]nfinite devolution of competences” with “a clear ultimate end: secession.” The intensification of both consociationalism and antagonism between Flemish and Walloons since federalization began suggests that there may be a strong relationship linking these two phenomena. O’Neill (2000, p.119) points out the possibility that federalism is “a testament to the commitment of most of the political class to calm communal tensions.” The cooperation by elite members of potentially antagonistic groups to facilitate stability is one of the most central elements of consociationalism so, if they are preventing conflict and secession in Belgium, it would appear that Lijphart’s system is succeeding there. However, consociationalism has operated to some extent in Belgium since long before 1970, and the potential for instability and conflict has nevertheless seemed to substantially increase over the past hundred years.

Lijphart believes that geographical concentration of potentially antagonistic segments facilitates the promotion of stability by consociationalism by enabling easier distribution of autonomy to them and enhancing their abilities to live separately from one another. However, the Belgian and Canadian experiences with consociationalism and this project’s quantitatively derived findings both suggest that no positive relationship exists between these groups’ geographical concentration and the stability that results if consociationalism is successful. Geographical concentration of groups is inherently conducive to both Lijphart’s consociational component of segmental autonomy and secession, which inevitably increases many manifestations of instability. Lijphart (1977, p.44-47) agrees with many other political scientists that secession and partition are sometimes preferable courses of action but consociationalism is designed to enable groups to coexist within shared states and the disintegration of countries is obviously indicative of, and conducive to, at the very least very, short-term instability. When segments exist in virtually homogeneous regions, potential negative repercussions of secession are relatively small so these groups have less need to continue sharing their state. In the absence of other compelling reasons to stay together or feelings of patriotism to their shared state, segments will naturally favor secession when they are geographically concentrated. Of course, it should be remembered that even almost complete homogeneity of a region does not make its secession largely unproblematic because minorities trapped in such regions throughout the world have produced intense violent and nonviolent instability for very long periods of time.

Of Lijphart’s four core cases of consociationalism, only the Belgian and Swiss systems delegate substantial amounts of power to their regions and also possess relative coincidence of group and regional boundaries (Deschouwer, 2002, p.81). The coexistence of potentially
antagonistic segments has caused much less instability in Switzerland than in Belgium and Canada. Church (2000, p.98) observes that “Swiss society has been stable, harmonious and in little need of a wise elite to save it from itself.” Deschouwer (2002, p.81) attributes this difference to the fact that, in Switzerland, “the consociational (or consensus) element at the federal level is not an accommodation between the territorial sub-units, because the federal parties are not, as in Belgium, at the same time only regional parties.” However, the fact that Belgium’s originally statewide parties have become regional seems to constitute a symptom of the country’s growing instability and polarization, rather than its cause.

In a 1977 publication, Lijphart (p.82) mentions Lorwin’s belief that “[n]ational sentiment in Belgium is weaker... than in any other European country.” In contrast, the Swiss “are strongly committed not merely to [their] national independence but also to the maintenance of those things which hold the country together, its pluralism and its political system” (Church, 2000, p.99). The Swiss seem to be motivated to maintain their state by constitutional patriotism that does not appear to be strong in Belgium. The comparative lack of patriotism exhibited by Belgians and Francophone Canadians to their states helps to explain why their decision concerning whether to try to secede seems to be heavily influenced by the extent to which they feel that they need these states. Geographical concentration of segments in federal systems is highly unlikely to motivate secession when all groups feel loyalty to their state but, in the absence of such patriotism or the need for membership in the federal system, such groups will inevitably want to create independent states to which they can feel a nationalistic form of loyalty. By delegating considerable power to geographically concentrated segments without engendering incentives for their representatives to cooperate, consociationalism seems conducive to secession and consequent instability in states that do not command shared loyalty among these groups and are not considered to be indispensable.

Although Lijphart believes that certain types of crosscutting cleavages facilitate the success of consociationalism, his system appears to promote polarization because it focuses on consistent allocation of autonomy and veto power to dominant groups, rather than encouraging moderation of their leaders’ demands. It is assumed that elites will moderate their demands in order to maintain the unity and consequent stability of their shared state but institutionalized mechanisms for promoting such moderation are not included in the consociational system. Enhancement of Belgian consociationalism through federalization and the antagonistic polarization coinciding with this development suggest that allocation of greater autonomy to groups corresponding to the most salient cleavages does not always promote stability. Belgium apparently contained substantial cross-cutting cleavages prior to federalization. However, Heisler
(1991, p.179) points out that the "'linguistic question'—a euphemism for cultural and regional contention, as well as the most obvious marker of ethnic difference—has dominated most aspects of political life since the early 1960s." The motivation of political activity by cross-cutting cleavages arguably explains Switzerland’s ability to maintain stability and inspire state-wide loyalty, even though it is federal and its most salient groups appear to be geographically concentrated. De Bandt (1989, p.139-140) argues that Belgian and Canadian cleavages are now largely coinciding but Switzerland contains “four lines of cleavage… cut across each other so that separate coalitions come to be formed on different issues.” Although Switzerland’s segments seem to be geographically concentrated, the cantonal divisions do not appear to coincide as closely with group boundaries as regional governance units do in Belgium and Canada. Belgian experience suggests that, when natural or historic territorial divisions are largely congruent with some power cleavage existing in a system initially marked by cross-cutting cleavages, consociationalism’s allocation of autonomy to regions encourages increasing coincidence of cleavages and polarization. Polarization facilitates the use of consociational components by clarifying which groups should be represented in executives and provided with autonomy and veto power. Lijphart points out that the fractionalization yielded by some constellations of cross-cutting cleavages does not promote consociationalism’s success. Representation of even a few groups in grand coalitions can render systems highly susceptible to deadlock so the inclusion of many segments corresponding to different points in a web of cross-cutting cleavages would frustrate policymaking even further. Allocation of autonomy and veto power to the myriad of resultant groups would also risk the introduction of instability in the form of deadlock, that might seem almost impossible to overcome. Consociationalism operates most effectively when the most influential groups are identifiable and allocated power which, in turn, increases the likelihood that they will dominate political life. Belgian experience shows that reorganizing this power distribution through different institutions seems to sometimes yield new but equally distinct constellations of cleavages. However, the inertia engendered by the initial consociational allocation of power frustrates the system’s adaptation to the new constellation of cleavages. Deschouwer (2002, p.75-77) explains that the increasing dominance of the cleavage separating Flemish and Walloons has divided the old ideologically identified parties into wings and effectively created “two electoral party systems in a country that attempts to have one governmental party system.” Instead of yielding more segments through cross-cutting cleavages created by strengthening the Flemish-Walloon division in a party system dominated by ideological parties, the new consociationalism introduced through federalization has replaced the first means of consociational power allocation with another corresponding to a new polarized
constellation. Consociationalism appears to naturally promote the development of permanent, clearly defined cleavages that facilitate its allocation of power and separation of potentially antagonistic groups. When this tendency operates in a state like Belgium in which these groups are geographically concentrated and one or more of them feels no desire or need to continue to coexist in the state, it seems highly possible that secession and consequent instability will result.

Consociationalism’s apparent inability to bring lasting stability to Belgium also seems partly due to the system’s allocation of great power to elites who are not provided with institutionalized incentives to moderate their political views. Hooghe (1993, p.64) explains that the Dutch and French speaking elites have become more “exclusive[ly] dependen[t]” on their own linguistic groups for support since 1970 and this has resulted in their “creeping ‘de-Belgianization’ or regionalization” that is evidenced by the splits in the traditional ideological parties. Cartrite (2002, p.43) identifies five factors that suggest that the “prospects for overcoming the weaknesses of both the Belgian state and contemporary Belgian identity appear bleak.” Two of these relate to consociationalism’s lack of incentives for elite moderation: “the gap between a radicalized elite and a moderate electorate” and “the lack of Belgian (as opposed to Flemish and Francophone) representation at the negotiating table” (Cartrite, 2002, p.43). Lijphart believes that elites are the glue that holds the autonomous and separate segments together in a united state. They are expected to cooperate with each other when their constituents could not and negotiate settlements that ensure their states’ stability. In Belgium, consociationalism appears to have actually produced elites who are more polarized and antagonistic than their constituents. Lijphart (1975, p.209) explains that consociationalism occurs when “coalescent elite behavior” is applied in “fragmented political culture[s]” and that centrifugal democracy emerges when elites in these societies act “competitive[ly].” Centrifugal democracy is the type of regime which is most conducive to instability because, if their leaders do not make consensual decisions, the groups comprising fragmented systems are likely to descend into conflict.

However, Deschouwer (2002, p.79) points out that consociational governance mechanisms have actually resulted in “very centrifugal competition, because there is simply nobody to defend the centre.” Newman (1995, p.67) explains that plenty of ordinary Belgians have centrist views but their governance system has produced a polarized elite that does not adequately represent their views. In this passage, he describes how these conditions resulted in greater separation of groups than the population actually seemed to favor:

The fact that only a minority of the population endorsed federalism meant little. In order to maintain the consociational process, federalism needed to move along to satisfy the interests of the party actors. During the consociational process, elite interaction intensified splits within the ethnoregional parties and drew RW leaders toward the Walloon Socialists and FDF
leaders toward the Brussels Liberals, Catholics and Socialists. At one and the same time the 
logic of consociationalism undermined the unity of ethnoregional party elites and took the 
decision-making out of the hands of voters, driving the state toward federalism at a pace that 
may have been more rapid than the electorate might have endorsed (Newman, 1995, p.67).

Horowitz argues that, particularly when regional governance units are fairly homogeneous in 
terms of potentially antagonistic groups as they are in Belgium and Canada, consociationalism 
and its lack of focus on incentives for elite moderation and cooperation will encourage instability. 
Belgian experience indicates that, if Lijphart’s system is to engender stability when it is used with 
such homogeneous units, intense loyalty to the state among all groups or widespread belief that 
they need state membership must mitigate the disintegrative, polarizing trends predicted by 
Horowitz and evident among Belgian elites.

If consociationalism combined with geographical concentration of potentially 
antagonistic groups was going to result in either partition of Belgium or its long term stability, the 
system certainly would have done so after being used to varying extents since 1830. O’Neill 
(2000, p.133) observes that the “problématique belge remains an enigma, continuing to defy those 
who predict national collapse.” However, the state’s survival can be comprehended when its 
segments’ incentives for unity and the loyalty to the state among some people are considered. 
The formation of Belgium apparently constituted a “marriage of convenience” motivated because 
the French and Dutch speakers wanted to avoid absorption into France and the Netherlands and 
believed that their union would decrease their “vulnerability in relation to more powerful 
neighbours” (O’Neill, 1998, p.244). Recently, European Union elites and “[l]eaders of large-

scale business” have encouraged Belgian leaders to “settle their differences some way short of 
“pivotal role in the European Union” and the fact that “competitive global forces.. reward large, 
coherent markets” are strong incentives for continued unity. Such motivations have helped to 
prevent secession and violent inter-ethnic conflict in Belgium, even as the country has become 
very decentralized and more polarized.

Loyalty to the Belgian state has not been strong enough to discourage potentially 
destabilizing polarization of the elite. Particularly as the country’s security and financial 
wellbeing have become more dependent on the European Union, if Belgians possessed virtually 
no state directed patriotism, the devolution of power to mainly homogeneous regions would 
presumably have resulted in partition some time in the past decade. Loyalty to the united 
Belgium state does appear to exist among its population, which elites have not been motivated to 
represent. In a discussion with other scholars published in 1989, Linz observed that “Belgians 
agree basically on being Belgians” and “they do not want to be Dutch, they do not want to be
German, and they do not want to be French” ("Discussion," p.151). Of course, the desire to be Belgian or to join the Netherlands, Germany, or France are not the only two options theoretically available to the Flemish and Walloons. However, O’Neill (2000, p.132) believes that, “for many of the political class, and even for a ‘silent majority’ of citizens, including those in the minority German speaking community and in bilingual Brussels, a residual Belgian patriotism continues to exist alongside assertive national identities.” Both O’Neill (2000, p.132) and Fitzmaurice (1996, p.267) differentiate between the potential for loyalty toward a unitary and devolved state. Fitzmaurice (1996, p.267) points out that the debate concerning the Accord de la St. Michel and “the outpouring of national sentiment caused by the death of King Baudouin” in 1993 revealed a “groundswell of support for the maintenance of the unity of the Belgian state- which... is not identical to a desire to return to the old centralized unitary state.” Van den Abbeele (2001, p.516-517) explains that elites are much more polarized than the people they supposedly represent and points out that those considered to be “recent immigrants” to Belgium constitute approximately twenty-five percent of the country’s population and are arguably the “most eager to see [its] survival.” Although Belgium was established in 1830 “for the very purpose of nationbuilding under francophone domination” and most analysts agree that the majority of the state’s inhabitants identify more now with the Flemish or Walloon groups than Belgium as a whole, significant evidence of state directed loyalty still exists and helps to explain how partition and violent conflict have been avoided.

Belgium is one of Lijphart’s “core cases” of consociationalism because it has used components of the system extensively, although not exclusively, for a very long time. The country would arguably have descended into chaos long ago without consociationalism. However, the system never rendered itself obsolete in Belgium and its extension through federalization providing extensive segmental autonomy has actually accompanied greater antagonism and potential for instability. Like the quantitative analysis for this project, Belgium’s experience does not suggest that consociationalism has performed any strong stabilizing role there. However, its ability to promote stability is affected by factors other than its constitutive components. Lijphart believes that “overarching loyalties” facilitate the successful use of consociationalism. Belgium’s comparative, but not absolute, lack of state directed patriotism seems to explain some of the country’s polarization but also its continued unity. This loyalty combined with the belief among some that the Flemish and Walloons need to remain in Belgium seems to inspire adequate support for the maintenance of the state’s boundaries and its governance system. The polarization spearheaded by unmoderate elites suggests that consociationalism is not sufficiently conducive to stability when regions are allocated substantial
political power and are largely homogeneous with regard to potentially antagonistic groups. The separateness fostered by consociationalism is not adequately tempered by incentives for intergroup negotiation that are often produced by heterogeneous electoral constituencies. However, sufficient levels of state directed loyalty and/or belief that existing states are needed seems also capable of going some way toward maintaining stability, regardless of which specific governance mechanisms are employed.

Conclusion

It is impossible to ascertain whether consociationalism or a more incentives oriented system would have introduced greater stability to Canada and Belgium, since the two states were founded in the nineteenth century. Every country is unique and there is no way to definitively assess whether consociationalism was the only system that could maintain any reasonable level of stability in these places. Lijphart identifies Canada and Belgium as two states that this system of governance has helped enormously. However, more than one hundred and fifty years of varying levels of consociationalism in these countries has culminated in situations in which extensive future instability is predicted by many and secession is being contemplated by the groups that consociationalism was designed to satisfy. In his 1977 publication, Lijphart (p. 44-5) argues that “[t]here are three types of solutions to deal with the political problems of a plural society while maintaining its democratic nature,” “assimilation,” “consociation,” or “dividing the state.” Both Canada and Belgium first attempted to assimilate their now problematic minorities, have used consociationalism for many years, and could eventually be divided to accommodate these groups. Historical attempts to assimilate French speakers in Canada and non-French speakers in Belgium seem to have played a significant role in discouraging the evolution of state directed loyalty among all groups in these countries, which perhaps could have prevented even the contemplation of secession and partition today. Canada and Belgium are arguably still intact because large enough proportions of the members of their potentially secessionist groups feel some state directed patriotism and believe that the financial and diplomatic benefits they derive from state membership are of higher priority than their grievances. Their discontent has undoubtedly been decreased by the devolution of a great amount of segmental autonomy to the regions which they dominate but, at the same time, increasing autonomy seems to inspire a keen desire for more and greater consideration of the possibility of secession.

However, it seems possible to combine autonomy and its positive influence with incentives which engender a situation in which groups are content with the manner in which they
are treated and are more motivated to maintain the stability of their shared state. When Lijphart argued that there are three means of promoting stability in democratic plural societies, Horowitz had not yet prescribed his mechanisms for institutionalizing incentives for intergroup negotiation and peaceful coexistence. Lijphart believes that democracy in plural societies is facilitated by homogeneity of sub-state governance units conducive to segmental autonomy and that proper, and thus legitimate, empowerment of these segments requires the greatest possible proportional representation of groups in leadership bodies. In essence, Lijphart aims to maximize autonomy and proportionality in shared states. The means of encouraging intergroup moderation and cooperation that Horowitz prescribes are designed to temper that autonomy with motivations for groups to get along with one another. Horowitz recommends federal systems with heterogeneous constituencies and the Alternative Vote (AV), which is a majoritarian electoral system that encourages constituents to rank candidates and thus vote for members outside their segments to encourage candidates to appeal across group lines. However, a proportional system called the Single Transferable Vote (STV) is less proportional than is favored as ideal by Lijphart but, like AV, it encouraged ranking of candidates and consequent cross-group electoral appeals. Horowitz believes that a system with such incentives would produce leaders whose livelihoods depended on keeping the members of multiple groups happy and discouraging destabilizing intergroup divisiveness. Even though they are designed to produce leaders who aim to represent multiple groups, a group could theoretically be excluded from power in an electoral system like that prescribed by Horowitz. Confirmation that such incentives should be introduced would require another quantitative test like the one performed in this project, designed to test Horowitz’s prescribed mechanisms. However, while this project does not test the validity of Horowitz’s beliefs, its quantitative results suggest that consociationalism may perform better as a facilitator of stability if its autonomy and proportionality are tempered by some mechanisms requiring candidates’ cross-group appeals. Permanent representation of all segments in consociational grand coalition executives perversely seems to further decrease candidates’ motivation to moderate their views and cooperate across segmental boundaries. In contrast, the Canada-wide elections for the country’s highest office have produced leaders who are widely recognized as representing both English and French speakers. Analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of segmental autonomy in Canada and Belgium suggests that stability could be optimized by providing such autonomy in an institutional structure which simultaneously encouraged moderation and thus facilitated a more consensual atmosphere among both elites and their constituents. Perhaps another option for plural societies exists that could empower segments while also promoting the belief that they can coexist contentedly. The permanent exclusion of
groups that can occur in some countries when majoritarian electoral formulas, such as AV, are used may be avoided through adoption of the STV system, and this mechanism's cultivation of intergroup harmony may temper the secessionist, destabilizing tendencies introduced by segmental autonomy under some circumstances. Because of the number of representatives per constituency in the AV and STV systems, AV encourages more intense cross-group voting appeals but STV does combine the encouragement of such appeals to some extent with proportional representation that is less likely to result in the permanent exclusion of minorities.
CHAPTER 8:
UNDERSTANDING SOME OF CONSCIATIONALISM’S
MOST IMPRESSIVE RESULTS

Analysis of the countries in which consociationalism seems to have promoted great stability facilitates comprehension of the system’s strengths and assessment of the extent to which the results of this project’s quantitative tests are accurate. Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria have been cited by Lijphart as three of the four best examples of consociational success, since he began his extensive treatment of consociationalism decades ago. When South Africa and Northern Ireland appeared to gain substantial stability in the 1990’s following adoption of consociational components, their experiences were also hailed by many in the academic community as evidence of consociationalism’s merits. The Swiss, Dutch, and Austrian experiences of consociationalism suggest that these countries’ impressive levels of stability may be partially due to a tempering of autonomy by incentives for moderation caused by cross-cutting cleavages and geographical heterogeneity of groups which makes cross-group political appeals more likely. Lijphart (1977, p.88) believes that “clear boundaries between the segments... limit the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility.” For this reason, he prioritizes autonomy for segments. The experiences of these three core cases of consociationalism illustrate the benefits of such autonomy but also the great influence of the cross-cutting cleavages which logically make such boundaries less clear but which Lijphart identifies as a favorable condition for the implementation and success of consociationalism. The disincentives for complete group separation and political extremism that were produced by cross-cutting cleavages, geographical heterogeneity, and Swiss majoritarian referendums, seem to be at least somewhat responsible for the success of the elements of Lijphart’s system used in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria. Austria arguably does not provide support for the theory that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies because it has arguably not operated in a plural environment there. However, the overarching loyalty to one’s state identified by Lijphart as another favorable condition that is also more possible in the absence of extensive pluralness, seems to have facilitated the progress of consociationalism in Austria, as well as Switzerland and the Netherlands. The hypothesis that incentives for intergroup moderation facilitate the progress of consociational autonomy could not be quantitatively assessed in this project. On the other hand, the quantitative results do not indicate that the consociational components, with the exception of highly inclusive executives, perform well regardless of whether they are combined with factors like cross-cutting cleavages, overarching loyalty, and
other incentives for moderation. The experiences of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, and South Africa also emphasize the importance of practical motivations to gain stability for shared states, such as perceptions that partition and continued dominance by one segment are not viable options. The qualitatively derived insights described in Chapters 7 and 8 cannot be tested quantitatively in this project but their compatibility with the quantitative findings suggests that consociational components yield optimal results when combined with a number of conditions and mechanisms that are capable of tempering complete separation of segments and extremism of political orientations.

Part 1:
Consociational, Plural Countries That Have Achieved Long-Term Stability

Switzerland and the Netherlands are two of Lijphart’s four “core cases” of consociationalism, which have used this system extensively for a long period of time and maintained so much stability among their population segments that it is difficult to imagine that these groups were ever in conflict with each other. Unlike Canada and Belgium, these countries have not allocated great amounts of power to regional governance units whose boundaries closely coincide with those intergroup divisions which were historically most likely to produce conflict. Although Switzerland and the Netherlands are plural, their stability is undoubtedly facilitated by their populations’ enduring pride in, and respect for, the specific consensual nature of their societies and governance systems. The most potentially antagonistic groups in these states do share these feelings of state directed patriotism and they are not concentrated in regions that could secede with relative ease. These factors predispose all groups inhabiting Switzerland and the Netherlands to favor these countries’ continued unity and stability. Analysis of their individual experiences should facilitate assessment of the extent to which consociationalism has created stability in these countries. However, if consociationalism has proven to be much more successful in Switzerland and the Netherlands than in Canada and Belgium, this discrepancy would suggest that some factor other than Lijphart’s system heavily influences its effects on plural societies.

Switzerland

The database used in this project’s quantitative analysis indicates that Switzerland is one of only two of the eighty-eight countries analyzed which has used the maximum amount of
consociationalism that can be represented through the variables, between the years of 1975 and 1995. Since Switzerland was identified by in Gurr’s dataset as containing two minorities at risk during this period, it was used to make data representing stability. These two groups, the Jurassians and Foreign Workers, are not discussed in Lijphart’s analyses of Switzerland but independent variable data was made for Switzerland through reference to the cleavages which Lijphart believed were most divisive, that separate the German, French, and Italian speakers. Therefore, unlike Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, an objective measurement of this country’s stability levels over these twenty years is available for analysis here. This data indicates that similar levels of stability have been experienced in Switzerland and Canada but that Switzerland was more stable in the second half of the period covered, while Canada grew slightly less stable. The data available for Canada and Switzerland in Gurr’s Minorities at Risk dataset indicates that these two countries enjoyed the greatest amount of democracy that could be represented by this variable. While the potentially antagonistic groups in Switzerland seem quite content to permanently act within their democratic system, almost fifty percent of Canadian Quebeckers wish to secede from their highly democratic state that devolves substantial autonomy to them. Between 1975 and 1995, Switzerland has been more consociational than Canada but this project’s dataset also suggests that Switzerland and Belgium have been equally consociational. It appears that contrasting levels of stability in Switzerland and Belgium may be due to differential levels of state-directed patriotism and coincidence between group and regional governance boundaries, rather than consociationalism.

The cleavages separating population segments in Switzerland are numerous and have historically not coincided with each other. Steinberg (1996, p.14) explains that the Swiss have experienced religious and ethnic tensions for centuries and class conflict entered this mix in the twentieth century, most vividly exemplified by the General Strike in 1918 that seemingly “threatened the unity of the state and of society.” Political party allegiances partly related to this class conflict motivated an additional firmly entrenched division which resulted in similar electoral shares for the main parties for most of the twentieth century (Steinberg, 1996, p.83, 73). Lehmbruch (1993, p.45) explains that “most of the cantons were religiously homogeneous from the beginning of modern Switzerland” and discusses the relationship between these multiple cleavages:

The Swiss case is peculiar insofar as the segmented organizational networks of the minority groups (Catholics and Socialists) were in turn horizontally fragmented by regional and linguistic cleavages that are institutionally entrenched in the cantonal organization of the Swiss federal system.
The linguistic, or ethnic, cleavage has existed since the foundation of the state in 1291 but it seems to be eclipsing the division corresponding to political party allegiance (Steinberg, 1996, p.127, 83). The three main linguistic groups identify with German (63.7%), French (20.4%), and Italian (6.5%) (“Switzerland”). Referendums in the 1990s showed that the German and French groups are becoming polarized with regard to initiatives related to European Union membership (Steinberg, 1996, p.108, 109, 127). In a 1993 publication, Lehmanbruch (p.58) explains that, “[i]n the last decades, …the ‘trench’ between German- and French-speaking Switzerland apparently has become deeper- at least in the perception of many … French-speakers.” Steiner (2002, p.104) observes that the religiously motivated antagonism has “almost completely vanished” now but the “language issue… has gained salience.” He believes that the language division has intensified because members of the French and German groups now are inclined to “see the identity of Switzerland in a different light” (Steiner, 2002, p.104). Even though consociationalism is being more carefully applied now, Steiner (2002, p.104, 116) believes that the system is less able to deal with this language cleavage because it has much less to do with any issues regarding language than with the fact that the German group “see[s] Europe as a danger” and its French counterpart favors greater integration into Europe. Apparently, “[m]any German speakers fear that the French speakers have never fully understood the idea of Switzerland and that they are therefore willing to abandon it recklessly” (Steiner, 2002, p.114). Language appears to have become the most powerful cleavage in Switzerland. It may begin to dominate the other divisions which cross-cut it and polarize the country in a manner conducive to destabilization. However, to the extent that this cleavage involves language issues, rather than language as an identity marker representing political views, this phenomenon will not divide the Swiss into very homogeneous, impermeable segments. Extensive use of dialects and widespread multilingualism, as well as differences in political opinion concerning other issues, religion, and class, still seem to prevent the sort of airtight division of the Swiss population that has polarized societies such as Belgium and Northern Ireland. Perhaps the most powerful deterrent to this polarization is the federal organization of the country into communes and federal governance units called cantons which, unlike the Belgian system, do not separate the population into a few largely homogeneous units corresponding to a historically dominant cleavage that has the potential to inspire partition or secession. Steinberg (1996, p.78) explains that communes have historically been the “basic unit of Swiss politics” and they “enjoy the same sort of semi-sovereignty within the canton that the canton enjoys within the federation.” Even though many of these communes and cantons are religiously and linguistically homogeneous, the cross-cutting cleavages dividing Swiss society also divide the constellation of governance units. Even though the communes and cantons
containing them are "mainly homogeneous," the overall constellation of these "powerful" regions with substantial autonomy is cross-cut by many cleavages (Horowitz, 1985, p.614). Traditional feelings of identification with cantons and communes, which existed long before they were joined through Swiss statehood, divide the population in one more way and thus add to the web of many cleavages that has discouraged potentially destabilizing polarization. Lijphart identifies such cross-cutting cleavages as a condition that is favorable to consociationalism's successful promotion of stability in plural societies. His recognition of this phenomenon's positive role in the context of a theory which claims that stability is best achieved when potentially antagonistic groups are separate from one another emphasizes his belief that separation of a few, completely polarized segments is not optimal. It seems to not be coincidental that Switzerland is both one of the most stable consociational states and has also contained many cross-cutting cleavages for centuries. Like heterogeneous electoral constituencies, states containing such constellations of diverse cleavages inevitably promote wider consideration of other groups' positions and consequent moderation of political views. While segmental autonomy organized through federalism with relatively homogeneous substate units obviously promotes potentially antagonistic groups' contentment with their states, incentives for moderation and cooperation encouraged by extensive cross-cutting of cleavages in Switzerland may explain why its consociationalism has produced so much more than Belgium's.

An obvious manifestation of stability in Switzerland is the persistence of a constellation of power that has been reflected in highly inclusive executive cabinets. In a 1996 publication, Steinberg (p.73) explains that "Swiss voting habits ... have held the four main parties in very nearly perfect equilibrium since 1919." As of 1993, Lehmbruch (1993, p.51) points out that, "[f]or more than three decades," four of the main parties have held the same number of seats in the executive cabinet. The executive is not equivalent to a grand coalition because supreme executive power is held by the Swiss president and the representation of all of these parties in the cabinet "is not necessarily tantamount to equality in the administration" (Lehmbruch, 1993, p.51). This source of stability is obviously related to the consociational requirement for representation of potentially antagonistic segments in executive leadership positions. However, it is apparently motivated by a phenomenon which challenges the assumption that such collective executive bodies can only exist in the long term if the elites comprising them rise above, and arguably ignore, the extreme positions held by their constituents. Switzerland's extensive use of direct democracy, manifested through frequent referendums, contrasts with Lijphart's belief that stability in plural societies requires elite domination of decision-making. Church (2000, p.100) points out that "Swiss governance is greatly marked by the extensive processes of consultation...
which precedes all Swiss legislation.” The ideal type, consociational system described by Lijphart does require such intensive consultation, but only among political, economic, and other elites. The Swiss political system is guided by a tradition of considering both elite and mass opinion, in order to “rally as many people as possible behind... proposals” and thus avoid the “referendum challenges” that could prevent their passage (Church, 2000, p.100). Steiner (1991, p.114) argues that consociationalism “must be institutionally combined with a strongly developed referendum so that rule by an elite cartel can be prevented.” Since the “major parties continue to form the executive cabinet” or other executive body in consociations and this greatly diminishes voters’ abilities to influence the makeup and policies of their executives, Steiner (1991, p.114) believes that “it is essential that the referendum give some power to the people.” He suggests that the absence of frequent referendums in some consociational systems has made them less successful, presumably because referendums enhance democracy, which in turn boosts legitimacy among all potentially antagonistic groups (Steiner, 1991, p.114). Steiner (1991, p.114) identifies Austria and the Netherlands during the 1950s and 1960s as two examples of consociational systems which were made more “problematic” by a “lack of... referendum[s].” Interestingly, referendums culminate in one state-wide decision concerning a specific issue, just as the electoral system most preferred by Horowitz, the majoritarian alternative vote, creates one state-wide decision when it is used for an election using an entire country as a single constituency.

Referendums seem likely to inspire moderation of elites’ views because these group representatives must work together to rally a majority of their state’s population behind individual initiatives. Perhaps Horowitz’s prescription for incentives designed to encourage elites’ moderation and intergroup negotiation is actually manifested in the Swiss system by the use of frequent referendums. While state-wide referendums would be necessary to achieve this result in countries containing groups that are highly concentrated in homogeneous geographic areas, in other places like Switzerland where many cross-cutting cleavages interact, even referendums confined to regions would seem likely to inspire moderation of political rhetoric. The Swiss example illustrates that political systems can be constructed in which potentially antagonistic groups feel adequately represented by government elites, feel that their views are consulted in a democratic manner, and simultaneously are encouraged to consider political issues from a moderate, rather than xenophobic, point of view.

The majoritarian Alternative Vote (AV) system in a state-wide election would yield only one successful candidate so it would be inappropriate for election of multi-person executives. However, perhaps a new sort of electoral system could combine the benefits of both the AV system and highly inclusive coalitions that provide for at least some proportional representation.
If entire state electorates were required to vote in multiple, alternative vote races to choose an executive level representative of each, necessarily already identified, segment, the candidates for these positions would be compelled to appeal to all of these potentially antagonistic groups comprising their states’ populations. When referendums or the conventional AV system are used in state-wide elections, they cannot promote moderation in states containing very little cross-cutting of cleavages and one group which votes as a block and constitutes more than fifty percent of their populations. The AV system is majoritarian and thus likely to permanently exclude some groups from power, under certain demographic conditions. If these states’ groups are not geographically concentrated, referendums or other majoritarian devices could promote moderation in races confined to individual regions or constituencies. However, under any circumstances involving the proportions of groups state-wide or in regions, the use of multiple Alternative Vote elections each confined to the election of only one group’s representative would promote moderation and more intersegmental mutual understanding. The use of AV would thus not affect the representation of groups, only the election of particular elites from these groups. The Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, which combines proportional representation with the incentives encouraged by the Alternative Vote variant, would also promote moderation of political views in most situations because it allows voters to choose multiple candidates from lists including political parties representing groups other than their own. The conventional and modified Alternative Vote systems, the Single Transferable Vote system, and referendums are three means of encouraging intergroup consideration and political moderation that could be chosen through reference to the demographic conditions in individual states. These electoral systems will necessarily weaken the extent to which groups are perfectly represented according to their proportions of states’ populations. However, the conventional Alternative Vote system need not be applied in situations in which it would permanently exclude a minority from power. Other means of promoting elite moderation are available that can enhance stability and democratic legitimacy in any setting. The Swiss example, and Steiner’s analysis of it, suggests that the sort of proportional representation favored by Lijphart creates the most stability in plural societies when it is combined with some opportunities for plurality, or even majoritarian, decision-making by electorates.

Extensive employment of referendums in Switzerland seems to have been inspired by a culture that is shared by its myriad of groups and constitutes one source of state-directed patriotism. The influence of this patriotism in Switzerland suggests that it encourages groups to accept their coexistence, adopt political systems designed to maximize their representation and optimize their collective experience, and avoid conflict and separatism. Steiner (1991, p.110-
Ill) explains that the culture favoring peaceful intergroup relations and power sharing in Switzerland only began to dominate there after its people learned the benefits of these conditions through experiences of great "hatred" and "hostility." He describes the evolution of this culture:

Looking at Switzerland today, one may come to the conclusion that its people are by nature particularly peaceful, but there is no evidence at all for such a conclusion. There is nothing special about the genes of the Swiss that predisposes them to practice power-sharing. Rather, the current pattern of decision making is the result of a long learning process. The Swiss learned that if power is shared among the various groups, their country is more stable and prosperous (Steiner, 1991, p.111).

The specific form of power sharing that evolved in Switzerland, in which referendums play a prominent role, seems to have been inspired by notions concerning legitimate means of decision making that have historically predominated in "certain parts" of the country (Steinberg, 1996, p.78). Steinberg (1996, p.78) explains that, in these regions, "the community of citizens has always been understood to be 'sovereign' and in Swiss political parlance today, the citizenry as a whole... is still 'the sovereign.'" The Swiss were probably predisposed to think this way because their ancestors in the Middle Ages were "free of feudal servitudes and, as a sign of their liberty, these mountain peasants bore arms and demanded 'honour' even from nobles" (Steinberg, 1996, p.17). Steinberg (1996, p.17) points out that the other distinctive thing about early Swiss society was "its communalism, ... which regulated economic activity and social life." These two factors seemingly combined to engender a highly democratic culture that encouraged cooperation. Even though the religious and linguistic groups struggled against each other intensely during different periods of Swiss history, the type of power sharing that evolved among this population understandably stressed direct democracy and communalism (Steiner, 1991, p.110-111).

Steinberg (1996, p.75) stresses that Swiss "institutions reflect their desire for what they call 'concordance' and their dislike of conflict." They generally prefer to "protect the losers," rather than "generate... powerful majority[ies]" (Steinberg, 1996, p.75). Apparently, the Swiss constitution is changed so often and is "pedestrian, practical and detailed" because it is viewed as the means by which the populace exerts its "sovereignty" (Steinberg, 1996, p.98). The mechanism for consenting to constitutional revisions via referendums takes into consideration the opinions of both the entire population and their cantons, in a manner which presumably also strengthens and reflects loyalty to cantons. Steinberg (1996, p.101) explains that the "equality of cantons (the federal principle) demands that revisions be approved by a majority of cantons as well as a majority of individual votes cast." The traditions which predisposed the Swiss to adopt their particular form of consociationalism undoubtedly also have promoted this system's ability to
engender stability in their state. Steinberg (1996, p.75) argues that these beliefs they share about proper forms of governance “come close to being a surrogate for conventional national identity.” He relates Church’s similar belief that “‘the Swiss have- rather like the Americans- been bound together by their political process’” (Steinberg, 1996, p.75). This loyalty to a distinctively Swiss way of doing things has apparently produced a strong desire among all the groups which comprise this country to retain its unity and stability. The Swiss experience emphasizes the importance of Lijphart’s favorable condition of overarching loyalty to the state, which intrinsically mitigates the potentially divisive influence of segmental autonomy.

A Swiss belief that the continuance of their state is needed appears to have also promoted the success of its consociational system. The Swiss may not have “learned” that such power sharing was most conducive to their individual wellbeing, had they felt that the country’s disintegration was a real option. The belief that the numerous communal societies needed to join together to become a modern state secured its development and has also contributed to patriotism directed toward this state. The Swiss Confederation began in 1291, when the representatives of three “mountain republics... sign[ed] a pact of mutual assistance” (Elazar, 1993a, p.3). This contract represented their attempt to “resist the Austrian efforts to subordinate them to imperial control” and thus introduced the notion of the Swiss state as a fortress to protect its members from external threats (Elazar, 1993, p.5). After this regime “broke down” when troops of the French Revolution invaded Switzerland, a loose confederation of 25 Swiss cantons that at that time “considered themselves sovereign states” signed another “‘eternal’ treaty guarantee[ing] collective security by mutual assistance” (Linder, 1998, p.5). They decided to reunite in this way even though the old confederation had “suffered four internal religious wars” between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries (Linder, 1998, p.6). Steiner (2002, p. 114) explains that the continuing Swiss determination to remain neutral and opposition to integration into the European Union are both motivated by the widespread perception that the country’s “very existence [i]s constantly endangered and that it must continue to be vigilant against potential threats to its neutrality and independence, and vigilant in the defence of its special way of practicing direct democracy.” The traditional Swiss view concerning its international affairs is that it must remain neutral if it is to maintain its independence (Steiner, 2002, p.114). Steiner (1991, p.113) suggests that neutrality seems to discourage the collapse of states such as Switzerland because, in a “culturally diverse society, there is always the risk of severe splits over foreign affairs. He points out that Switzerland presumably would not have survived World War One intact if it had not been for its neutrality, since most German speakers supported Germany and most French speakers supported France as it raged on (Steiner, 1991, p.114). Perhaps because they historically have
lived rather independent lives in the mountainous region comprising Switzerland, the country’s
diverse inhabitants have consistently worked to maximize their control over their own lives and
decided many centuries ago that this goal was best achieved through a confederation maintaining
international neutrality, governed by a variant of democracy that is much more direct than that
available elsewhere. To maximize the independence of themselves and their groups, the Swiss
needed to remain united and develop a governance system amenable to all.

To maximize stability and the democracy and legitimacy which engender it in the long
term, governance systems must be carefully tailored to suit the unique characteristics and
dynamics existing within individual states and their component groups. Elazar (1993, p.1)
explains that the Swiss “believe[e] that outsiders seek to learn about Switzerland in order to imitate
it, but that the Swiss way cannot be copied or imitated, or to try to fit it into models that they
understand, thereby distorting the Swiss experience.” However, the Swiss system does not have
to be replicated to achieve stability in other plural societies. Recognition of the reasons it does
not fit into existing models promotes consideration of the possibility that combinations of
elements commonly associated with separate models are optimal for some states. Swiss culture
and history have engendered the specific governance structure and patriotism supporting it and
such things certainly cannot be imitated. However, analysis of Swiss experience indicates that
such non-ethnic based, state directed loyalties can enable and facilitate the establishment of
lasting accommodation and stability. Qualitative analysis of its experience suggests that
Switzerland appears to benefit from consociational elements empowering groups through
segmental autonomy and political representation, in conjunction with incentives for compromise
and tolerance that are engendered through cross-cutting cleavages and referendums. The extent
to which this country has achieved long term stability illustrates that some forms of
majoritarianism, under certain country-specific demographic conditions, are conducive to, rather
than antithetical to, the peaceful coexistence of potentially antagonistic groups in plural societies.
However, Switzerland would not exist now if its inhabitants and their ancestors had not felt that
they both needed the country and desired its continued unity.

The Netherlands

Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are widely regarded as the “classic
cases” of consociationalism (Andeweg, 2000, p.697). However, the Netherlands is thought to
have experienced the purest and most successful use of consociationalism. Some scholars, such
as Horowitz, argue that consociationalism has never been implemented in a form which
completely corresponds to the consistent elements of Lijphart’s prescription. Those who believe that consociationalism has existed in its pure form seem to agree that the Netherlands “represents the prototypic case of a consociational democracy” and that Dutch society “has provided the ‘ideal type’” example of “pillarisation,” which is a term that is widely assumed to represent the segmental autonomy element of Lijphart’s system (Aarts et al., 1999, p.63; Thung et al., 1982, p.127). Such identification of the Netherlands as having possessed the most perfect consociational system is not surprising, considering that Lijphart (1975, p.14-15) derived his theory concerning this system inductively through analysis of this country, which was his original home. The impressive performance of consociationalism in the Netherlands appears to have been facilitated by the existence of several conditions which Lijphart has identified as being conducive to its success. These include cross-cutting cleavages that do not produce excessive fractionalization, “Moderate nationalism,... Popular attitudes favourable to government by grand coalition,... Widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel,... Overarching loyalties,... [and a] Tradition of elite accommodation” (Bogaards, 1998, p.478). These factors seem to have interacted with one another extensively in the Netherlands. Long-term contentment with the nature of consociational decisionmaking and its effects seems to have made the system a source of great pride, as well as motivation for state-directed patriotism that is shared by the potentially antagonistic groups. In fact, some “favorable conditions” are arguably the driving force behind the successful operation of consociationalism, its increasing obsolescence, and the stability that has been engendered in the Netherlands. The conditions which initially discouraged secession and/or partition of antagonistic groups seem to have inspired the development of consociationalism there. Particularly because of the specific constellation of power existing in the Netherlands when consociationalism was gradually introduced, the system did promote stability through these groups’ separation and eventually appears to have cultivated sufficient goodwill among all population segments to encourage their voluntary political and social integration. Extensive cross-cutting of cleavages and the relative lack of segments’ geographical separation and concentration arguably allowed all of these developments to occur and it should be recognized that these factors discourage excessive group polarization, which is not prevented through autonomy and proportionality on their own. Separation and empowerment of Dutch groups has been complemented by conditions which encouraged these groups to peacefully coexist rather than demand greater separation culminating in secession or partition.

Like Switzerland, the Netherlands appears to have achieved long-term stability through the combination of consociationalism’s separate representation and segmental autonomy with incentives for intergroup political moderation. Recommendations for institutional precipitants of
such incentives, such as those made by Horowitz, are commonly regarded as antithetical to Lijphart’s prescription for consociationalism. However, the experiences of both of these countries suggest that consociational systems may achieve stability most effectively when their constituent groups and elites are motivated to avoid extremism. Swiss and Dutch history suggest that the sort of cross-cutting cleavages identified by Lijphart as a condition favorable to consociationalism perhaps perform this function because they constitute a source of these incentives. In his critiques of Horowitz’s recommendations for plural societies, Lijphart (2002, p.48; 1991, p.99; 1997, p.9) focuses on the negative repercussions of the Alternative Vote electoral system that Horowitz favors most. Lijphart (2002, p.44) believes that the necessity for elite cooperation in coalitions including representatives from multiple groups constitutes adequate motivation for intergroup moderation and negotiation. He presumably does not devote much analysis to other means of engendering additional incentives for such moderation because he believes they are unnecessary. Horowitz’s recommendations could not be examined here as Lijphart’s have been. However, he advocates federal devolution of power to heterogeneous regions and electoral systems designed to encourage cross-community appeals for support by politicians because, depending on the unique attributes of each state, these mechanisms both seem conducive to negotiation and consequent stability in plural societies. He recommends devolution of this sort to maximize the chances that cross-cutting cleavages can be allowed to have greater influence, as voters are encouraged to vote for candidates outside their groups with views similar to their own regarding issues other than intergroup relations. Lijphart and Horowitz have some fundamental disagreements concerning the means by which cross-cutting cleavages should be handled but they and many other experts appear to agree that those which have arisen in some countries, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, have encouraged stability.

The positive role of cross-cutting cleavages in systems containing consociational components, and their promotion of the sort of incentives favored by Horowitz, has not been explored much by academics. Perhaps Lijphart has not focused on this phenomenon because of its relationship to the pluralist theory of stability that his consociational theory was designed to challenge. He explains that one of the three main propositions of this pluralist theory is that “mutually reinforcing cleavages are identified with political instability” (Lijphart, 1975, p.10). Although Lijphart (1975, p.14, 15) believes that this third proposition of pluralist theory “retains much of its validity” even after being compared to the Dutch experiences which contradict the theory as a whole, he argues that the “Dutch case is prima facie contrary to the crosscutting cleavages proposition.” The Dutch constellation of power which justified these seemingly contrasting claims comprised four, largely mutually exclusive “blocs” that included two whose
identities involved religion and two which were motivated by socioeconomic, class concerns (Lijphart, 1975, p.23). Lijphart (1975, p.23) describes these groups as the "Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists, and Liberals." Each of these blocs had "its own political party" and, particularly until the 1960s, their closed nature had allowed these parties’ “relative strengths” to “remain remarkably constant since the first elections under universal manhood suffrage in 1918” (Lijphart, 1975, p.23, 25, 203). The Netherlands did include blocs divided by two types of cleavage, religion and class, which often cross-cut each other in other societies. However, most people in the society were not sufficiently, politically motivated by the cleavage that did not correspond to their bloc, to produce cross-cutting of potentially powerful cleavages. Following an analysis of voting behavior, Lijphart (1975, p.33) finds that “parties are the virtually exclusive representatives of relatively small class and religious segments of the population and receive very little backing from any other segments.” It was true that the class and religious cleavages did “cut across each other at an almost perfectly straight angle” because the religious blocs were “true cross sections of the Dutch people, resembling the class composition of the population as a whole very closely” (Lijphart, 1975, p.189). However, these two cleavages did not influence the majority of people enough to divide their loyalties and encourage them to sometimes vote for a religious party and sometimes for a class-based one. For example, Lijphart (1975, p.189) points out that, in the Catholic and Calvinist blocs, “religious commitment is sufficiently strong to override class differences to a large extent.” Some scholars, such as Bryant (1981, p.56) believe that Dutch society at this time was arguably divided into three, rather than four, blocs. However, even he believes that the Catholic and Calvinist blocs were separate from their secular counterpart, which was “sometimes further divided into bourgeois liberal/conservative and socialist constituents” (Bryant, 1981, p.56). The lack of dynamic interaction between the religion and class cleavages characterized the “most developed form” of pillarization, or segmental autonomy, which occurred “between the late 1910s and the mid 1960s” (Bryant, 1981, p.56). Since the 1960s, the cleavages separating these blocks have “lost their sharpness as well as much of their political salience” and Lijphart (1975, p.197; 1977, p.2) believes this occurred “because consociationalism by its very success... beg[an] to make itself superfluous.” However, he also thinks that the fact that these cleavages “cut across each other at an almost perfectly straight angle... predispose” the blocs’ elites to “moderation” because their supporters and fellow leaders are diverse with regard to cleavages represented by other available political parties (Lijphart, 1975, p.189). Lijphart does believe that such incentives for moderation can promote stability in plural societies. His identification of cross-cutting cleavages as a condition favorable to consociationalism, soon after developing this theory through reference to the Netherlands,
suggests that he believed the incentives it produced contributed substantially to that country’s achievements. Interestingly, the Dutch blocs were also geographically dispersed in the manner which Horowitz believes is conducive to motivations for moderation and consequent stability. Lijphart (1975, p.18) explains that, while “[e]ach group has its traditional geographical stronghold,… [t]hey are not geographically isolated from each other.” For instance, the Catholic bloc is the most geographically concentrated bloc but it is also “well represented throughout the country” (Lijphart, 1975, p.18). Therefore, the motivations for political moderation resulting from these blocs cutting “across” each other would not have been weakened by strict geographic separation of these groups. Extensive segmental autonomy allowed the blocs to “live side by side as distinctly separate subcultural communities, each with its own political and social institutions and with interaction and communication across bloc boundaries kept to a minimum” (Lijphart, 1975, p.58). However, while their effects could not be analyzed in this project’s quantitative analysis, motivations for moderation similar to those sought by Horowitz seemed to have provided some of the glue that kept these separate communities together in the united country of the Netherlands.

Apparently because consociationalism seems to have engendered stability more effectively in the Netherlands than anywhere else, the country’s culture has been examined by several academics seeking to identify social factors that are conducive to system’s success. These beneficial historical elements of Dutch culture include tolerance of other groups and their autonomy, acceptance of the need for intergroup compromise, and an attitude toward elites that is sometimes portrayed as passive and deferential but can also be interpreted as contentment with their limited ability to influence policy through subtle means. Wintle (2000, p.144-145) describes the nature of this Dutch form of tolerance:

Dutch tolerance has now been shown to be pragmatic rather than principled, and negative rather than generous: it has on the whole been a rather grudging acceptance that, although many people are wrong-headed, they are unlikely to go away, and therefore should be incorporated and confined in the socio-political system as an exercise in damage limitation. … The safest way to deal with new threats to stability was to recognize them, incorporate them into the existing pecking order, and give them a proportional voice.

Wintle (2000, p.145) points out that, even as segmental autonomy and consociationalism became less evident in the 1960s and 1970s, “the toleration manifested in Dutch society… was still of a rather negative or even disowning kind.” This tolerance seems to have been inspired by historical events involving the blocs described by Lijphart, which also appear to have persuaded the Dutch that intergroup compromise and a relatively small political role for nonelites are necessary. Thung et al. (1982, p.128) suggest one reason why the Dutch may be inclined to accommodate
these “wrong-headed” people, rather than attempt to convert or assimilate them like many other states have done with seemingly incompatible groups (Wintle, 2000, p.144). They explain that “it was among the orthodox Calvinists that pillarisation started” (Thung et al., 1982, p.127-128). In the nineteenth century, these Calvinists adopted a “strategy... to develop an almost complete social isolation from the ‘hostile’ outside world” and this “unyielding striving for isolation directly produced a great variety of social organizations based on Calvinists principles” (Thung et al., 1982, p.128). Their yearning for isolation seems to have encouraged segmental autonomy throughout Dutch society, particularly because other groups must have been inclined to also sequester themselves because the Calvinists obviously did not want to integrate with them. Daalder identifies some factors which motivated the cooperation between representatives of these groups that was indispensable for governance of their shared state. He believes that one highly influential example of such collaboration was the “institutionaliz[ation] some thousand years ago” of “water control boards [which] still exist” and enable farmers to collectively protect lands reclaimed from bodies of water from once again disappearing (Andeweg, 2000, p.698). Andeweg (2000, p.698) argues that such examples cannot explain how these Dutch cultural attributes involving tolerance and intergroup cooperation have persisted for so long. He believes that the Dutch approach to handling diversity has evolved and remained in place because the Netherlands “has always been a country of minorities: geographical or provincial minorities first, social and political minorities later” (Andeweg, 2000, p.698). Andeweg (2000, p.698) points out that the leaders of these minorities needed to cooperate if they wanted to avoid the “political marginalisation” that would be incurred through “continued cooperation.” Daalder agrees that the “religious, social, and political constellation, whose features included pluriformity and the absence of a single predominant power centre, ... resulted in a strong tendency to compromises of all kinds” (Blom, 2000, p.155). It seems that, if the Dutch wanted segmental autonomy for their groups but also wanted to enjoy the benefits of retaining their shared state, they needed to give each group some power in proportion to its size and their leaders needed to cooperate if they were to influence the policies of this state. The inherent incompatibility between their desire for segmental isolation and need for intergroup negotiation seems to have persuaded the Dutch that their elites needed to dominate the groups’ interactions with one another. Their appropriation of political power in intergroup dealings is sometimes interpreted as apathy and passivity but analysis of the factors enabling the long-term perpetuation of these attitudes provides greater insight into the workings of Dutch consociationalism. Lijphart (1975, p.137, 138) explains that “popular apathy and disinterest in politics” had a “positive value” in the Netherlands because they facilitated the “elite’s conscious and deliberate attempts to cope with the system’s fragility,”
which resulted from the “potentially divisive issues and disintegrative tendencies” caused by the cleavages. However, he attributes ordinary people’s satisfaction with this system to a combination of cultural and instrumental factors. He stresses that the “subjective minimum requirements” for successful consociationalism are “not unusually difficult demands” but he also provides this description of Dutch culture and its relationship to the legitimacy of their governance system:

The acquiescence by the rank and file in their leaders’ oligarchical power requires a highly deferential attitude. ... The commitment to system maintenance and prudent leadership complemented by deference, are crucial... [the] vital subjective orientations have a long history and antedate the rise of democracy by many centuries. The will to preserve the system is closely related to Dutch nationalism and national symbols; deference and obedience are emphasized both in Calvinist and Roman Catholic doctrine; and the habits of pragmatism and prudence in politics... can be traced back to Holland’s history as a merchant nation (Lijphart, 1975, p.191).

The instrumental source of government legitimacy is the set of mechanisms that the masses have been able to use in order to influence policy. Lijphart (1975, p.190) explains that “potential pressures” from “below” operated which put “limits on the elite’s freedom of action” without being “constrictive.” From 1925 until 1967 the parties corresponding to the blocs never received less than the support of seventy-five percent of eligible voters but Lijphart (1975, p.167, 169) argues that the additional “splinter parties” provide “outlets” for the “dissatisfaction” among the masses and constitute “the safety valves of the system.” The electoral system used in the Netherlands allowed these extra parties to gain legislative seats but they were “ignored in the formation of new cabinets” (Lijphart, 1975, p.169). The electoral support they attract serves as a “valuable indicator of political dissatisfaction” for the bloc elites and, “[a]s long as they remain small, their nuisance potential is low” (Lijphart, 1975, p.169). Lijphart (1975, p.151, 158) observes that the Dutch “seem to prefer... to cast a protest vote in the secrecy and anonymity of the voting booth” and this is probably connected to their predisposition to view elected officials as leaders more than representatives and “shy away from direct contact” with them. While this orientation may seem repugnant to the electorates of many democracies, Eurobarometer surveys in the 1990s have confirmed that the Dutch are “relatively contented with consensus government” and indicate that the Netherlands is consistently one of the top three European states “in the proportion of people who profess to be very or fairly satisfied with the way their democracy works” (Andeweg, 2000, p. 706). Lijphart (1975, p.192) argues that consociationalism requires “the commitment to maintain the system, reinforced by habits of prudence and deference.” The desire to retain a specific governance system such as consociationalism arises when the population of a state desires its continued unity and believes that the system will prove to be the
most beneficial means of organizing its activities. If the requirements for maintaining this system do not exceed the benefits derived from it, compared to an alternative governance structure, the groups comprising this population will fulfill these requirements, even if they necessitate deference that other peoples would find undesirable. A culture including a unique combination of tolerance, elite cooperation, and deference has evolved in the Netherlands because generations of the country’s inhabitants found that these attributes contributed to their wellbeing. The culture shared by the Calvinist, Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal segments developed perfectly to support consociationalism. The strength of these statewide cultural beliefs also heightened, and perhaps partially derived from, the population’s centuries-old determination to maintain a united Dutch state. Their desire for this sovereignty seemingly constitutes the fundamental cause of the cultural attributes which encouraged consociationalism and their ability to combine stable coexistence with segmental autonomy and isolation.

When a shared culture or other phenomenon creates a desire for state unity that is more powerful than the divisions which threaten its stability, the individuals constituting groups that had been potentially, or actually, antagonistic may begin to develop a greater sense of loyalty toward their state than their groups. As of 1977, Lijphart (p.2) believed that the “sharp plural divisions and close elite cooperation” which characterize consociationalism began “declining” after the 1950s in all of the countries comprising his four core examples of the system, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. He argues that consociationalism made itself “superfluous” in these cases and this does seem to have occurred in the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1977, p.2). Lijphart (1975, p.197) points out that, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the “social cleavages between the blocs… lost their sharpness as well as much of their political salience.” This trend was evidenced by greater interaction and cooperation between the blocs’ parties and supporters, “declining allegiance given to bloc organizations,” decreasing “deference and indifference,” lower levels of cabinet stability, and more “frequent resort to civil disobedience” by ordinary citizens (Lijphart, 1975, p.197-201). Both the relative strengths of the bloc parties, as well as the amount of electoral support they enjoyed collectively, had substantially declined by 1975 (Lijphart, 1975, p.202). Toonen (2000, p.167) observes that “everyone seems to agree things have been changing within the institutional order of Dutch society- conveniently labeled ‘depillarisation’- since the end of the 1960s.” Thung et al. (1982, p.131-132) cite figures collected by Van den Berg and Molleman that indicate a massive decrease in the “political orthodoxy… index” among Catholics, a substantial drop within the Neo-Calvinist segment, and also a “slight” decline among the Dutch Reformed religious group. This decrease in “political orthodoxy” could not be completely explained by the decline in church-going by these groups and
Van den Berg and Molleman concluded that “[i]t is no longer self-evident...for a member of one denomination to vote for the party traditionally associated with that denomination” (Thung et al., 1982, p.132). The loyalty between organizations representing the same confessional group also decreased during this period and the religious blocs had “lost cohesion while the ideological basis of the constituent organisations was gradually changing or even disappearing” (Thung et al., 1982, p.132). Miller and Stouthard (p.253) conducted quantitative analysis for a 1975 publication which suggested a “drop of almost 40% in the confessional vote” since the end of World War 2 and a widespread “rejection of institutionalized religion.”

The waning influence of the cleavages which divided Dutch society for many years has been attributed to a myriad of social and political factors. Bryant (1981, p.71) argues that the Dutch began to demand “democratization” because they became “increasingly unwilling to accept unquestioningly” the elites corresponding to the traditional blocs. In his doctoral dissertation which was finished in 1988, Bax argued that the three primary causes of the erosion of Dutch consociationalism were the emergence of the welfare state following World War Two, secularization, and something he calls “progressive enlargement of scale” (Dekker & Ester, 1990, p.171). The latter cause refers to the decreased isolation of blocs and widespread “confrontation with other systems of meaning” that resulted from “[e]conomic growth, technological change, rationalization, urbanization, and increased mobility” (Dekker & Ester, 1990, p.171). Many of these phenomena that are identified as causes are actually arguably symptoms and intermediate causes of the decline of consociationalism. They do not explain why the Dutch began to demand “democratization,” why the welfare state was not constructed to allow for the segmental autonomy reflected in virtually all Dutch associations, why the religious groups which meticulously segregated themselves did follow the secularization trend appearing in other countries, and why they now responded to economic and technological trends by integrating with members of other blocs. Lijphart’s (1975, p.210-215) discussion of the causes of phenomena related to the decrease in consociationalism focuses on explaining why instability accompanied the country’s evolution from consociationalism to his “depoliticized” category of democracies. Wintle (2000, p.143) discusses the explanation of consociational segmental isolation involving “emancipation,” which suggests that self-segregation was a “rite of passage” in the development of Dutch society. Apparently, variations of this explanation were put forth by a “generation” of historical sociologists in the 1970s, who believed that “each group... on its way to emancipation needed to turn inward and consolidate the legislative gains earned by the pillars in the political settlement from 1917 to 1919 (including universal suffrage, PR, and the settlement of the Schools Question)” (Wintle, 2000, p.143). This sort of emancipation theoretically could have produced
increased desire for more political involvement by the masses, susceptibility to secularization, and willingness to increase contact with members of other blocs, in response to trends such as economic growth and technological change.

Perhaps consociationalism becomes, in Lijphart’s (1977, p.2) terminology, “superfluous,” when consociational components are used by the potentially antagonistic groups which comprise plural societies to consolidate the characteristics of, and state-wide respect for, the aspects of their identities which they wish to permanently retain and celebrate. If groups are persuaded that their identities will be preserved indefinitely, their members will naturally feel more patriotic toward the state that has thus supported their right to maintain their group identities. Human beings seemingly exert power through the groups to which they belong when they feel that the interpersonal cooperation necessitated by this behavior is necessary if their goals are to be attained. When their aim of achieving protection for their identities and preferred ways of life is attained through consociationalism or some other phenomena capable of inspiring this contentment, they will tend to act more independently because group protection no longer seems necessary. After achieving the right to segmental autonomy, people naturally will seek personal autonomy because, while they share many attributes with their group members, they each obviously possess many unique preferences and opinions which they naturally would hope to express. While feeling kinship with both their group and the state that allows it freedom, people under these conditions will begin to adopt as a first priority the advocacy of their own individual point of view. Because of the huge diversity of political forces created when individuals, rather than their groups, become the primary actors in a governance system, majoritarianism can be used without jeopardizing the permanent exclusion of categories of people who individually feel solidarity with one another.

Lijphart (1975, p.209) implies this change of individuals’ perspectives when he observes that the Netherlands evolved from a consociational system with a “fragmented” political culture to a depoliticized one with a “homogeneous” culture. Lijphart’s (1975, p.209) classification of political systems indicates that depoliticized systems are characterized by “coalescent” elite behavior. However, the Netherlands arguably tended toward the centripetal variant, combining homogeneous cultures with competitive elite behavior, because Lijphart (1975, 209; 1989a, p.151) and others agree that it became more majoritarian when consociationalism decreased. Lijphart (1989a, p.151) observes that an “admittedly significant movement toward majoritarianism” did occur but he points out that, as of 1989, the Netherlands had not made a complete transition from one system to another:
The Netherlands has merely moved from the politics of accommodation to the politics of relatively less accommodation and relatively more adversarial relations- and it clearly does not qualify yet to be a member of the family of adversarial and majoritarian democracies.

Bryant (1981, p.67) disagrees with Lijphart’s contention that the Netherlands has moved toward a depoliticized system and argues that, “on the contrary, Dutch politics are more politicized… than at any time since the Pacification of 1917” and that Dutch politics have been “livelier, and political clashes sharper.” Qualitative analysis of Dutch experience suggests that consociationalism is a mechanism which enables the inhabitants of antagonistic, plural societies to gain protection for their group identities and society-wide patriotism supporting their state’s unity. These factors engender more individualistic thinking, more contentment with majoritarian decision-making methods which create more incentives for cooperation, and long-term democratic stability in systems not dominated by elites.

Consociational isolation of potentially antagonistic groups has substantially decreased in both the Netherlands and Switzerland. While the previously, self-segregated blocs are interacting more in these states, some aspects of Lijphart’s system survive and now exist alongside more majoritarianism and more fluid interpersonal relations. Like those which dominated Dutch politics, the Swiss “ancient identities have begun to crumble” and the “old communalism has become a fiction” (Steinberg, 1996, p.82, 85). The increasing lack of strong attachment to Swiss communal groups prompted Steinberg (1996, p.154) to argue that the country has actually “become in a deep sense less Swiss,” since “[t]o be Swiss was to be part of a specific community.” Like the more individualistic perspective which has seemingly allowed some majoritarian elements to enter the Dutch political system, Frenkel (1993, p.61) argues that “the Swiss notion of liberty has evolved from communal liberty into one that is oriented toward individual rights.” However, in the Netherlands and Switzerland, the persistence and strengthening of fewer cleavages has been cited as evidence that cleavage isolation has not dissipated extensively. Bryant (1981, p.67) observes that, as religion became less influential politically in the Netherlands, “class and other sectional cleavages [became] more visible and … [were] increasingly the basis of political and industrial action.” The class cleavage he describes seems to be less divisive than the previous division of Dutch society into isolated blocs. Bryant (1981, p.71) discusses the “fragmentary character of the Dutch class structure” and points out that this structure enables unions to “reinforce differences within classes as well as between them.” He points out that, instead of the four blocs identified by Lijphart as operating in the Netherlands during its period of most intense consociationalism, the population was arguably divided into three blocs and one of these included both economically liberal and conservative elements of the
secular group (Bryant, 1981, p.56). The Netherlands, like virtually every other country on earth, has not reached a point in which no cleavages divide the electorate. However, the socioeconomic cleavage which is now most influential in the Netherlands divides the population in a fragmentary manner, into groups that actually collaborated as secularists for a long period of time. The Netherlands appears to no longer contain the sort of blocs which characterized the height of consociationalism there, which attempt to isolate themselves and whose members use an almost entirely separate set of institutions and associations. The isolation of Swiss pillars and that country’s intensity of consociationalism are also widely believed to have decreased at approximately the same time that this was happening in the Netherlands. The continued strength of the Swiss linguistic cleavage arguably suggests that this “depillarization” has not really occurred there. The results of referendums concerning integration into the European Union in 1992 and 1999 illustrated a “very clear division” between the biggest language groups, the French and Germans, involving this institution (Church, 2000, p.97, 98; Lehmburch, 1993, p.43, 58). Steinberg (1996, p.126, 127) points out that the “division in attitudes to foreign workers corresponds exactly to the divisions on European integration, on Swiss participation in UN ‘blue beret’ operations and on liberalisation of land sales.” The issue involving land sales apparently involves the purchase of property by people who are not citizens of Switzerland. Church (2000, p.102) suggests that the “tools” which allowed the Swiss to “solve their problems” involving the original cleavages, including neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy, became “values” and objects of loyalty. The strongly held, opposing positions common among French and German speakers involving the European Union and these other issues seemingly derive from their differing feelings about whether international cooperation should be embraced even if it would jeopardize these three values. The common attitudes expressed by members of the French and German groups suggest that these groups generally hold different views about the sacrifices that should be made to protect neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy. However, in contrast to the role of isolated groups in “pillarized” consociational systems, the French and German voters in these referendums voted as they did because of their feelings involving these issues, rather than because they were French or German. Perhaps the decades of strong consociationalism inevitably yielded a situation in which different attitudes became more prevalent among the self-segregating segments and these attitudes continue to exist, even after the Swiss have begun to voluntarily interact more with members of groups other than their own. Disagreement across a cleavage seems to be fundamentally different from the self-enforced isolation of the groups on either side of a cleavage, which is what distinguishes consociationalism from other, more competitive governance systems. Such disagreement may require more consociationalism to
maintain stability if it intensifies but it is not itself evidence of the previously dominant consociational system. The constellation of Swiss groups was significantly changed “with the vanishing of the religious cleavage” so the previously stable consociational pillarization no longer exists but this system also appears not to have calmed the potentially antagonistic nature of the linguistic cleavage (Steiner, 2002, p.113). In a 1993 publication, Lehmbruch (p.57) expressed his belief that the Swiss system had changed enough to suggest that “the emphasis is now much more on individual autonomy and, hence, the shaking off of those residual community-type bonds.”

Both Switzerland and the Netherlands continue to use consociational devices to some degree but the protection given to their population segments by Lijphart’s system has arguably provided the protection for group identities that encourages people to take a more active role politically as individuals, rather than relying on segmental elites for leadership. The main Swiss language segments and Dutch socioeconomic groups still largely disagree with one another but no longer appear to feel compelled to isolate themselves socially and focus on exerting and strengthening their segmental autonomy. Lijphart (1989a, p.151) points out that “[n]o ‘revolution’ ever happened” in the Netherlands involving its consociational system and Steiner (2002, p.104) observes that elements of it are being used in Switzerland “more carefully than ever.” Nevertheless, the segmental isolation which is central to consociationalism appears to have very substantially dissipated in both countries and given way to more individualistic political action and majoritarian decisionmaking.

The Dutch experience with consociationalism has arguably been more successful than that of any other country. Perhaps because the Netherlands inspired Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism, the system there has also seemingly reflected his prescriptions most perfectly. However, even the Dutch seem to have benefited from a combination of consociationalism and some motivations for elite political moderation and cooperation, introduced by cleavages which cut “across,” rather than through, one another, as well as geographical heterogeneity of groups (Lijphart, 1975, p.189). Although Lijphart identifies cross-cutting cleavages as a factor conducive to the introduction and success of consociationalism, his components of this system are segmental autonomy and empowerment of these segments, which encourage separation of groups and consolidation of their boundaries rather than the cross-cutting that he seems to agree make such separation more conducive to stability. Lijphart (1977, p.42) explains that consociationalism can be engendered through homogeneous substate governance units, rather than heterogeneous ones:

...federalism can be used as a consociational method when the plural society is a ‘federal society’: a society in which each segment is territorially concentrated and separated from the
other segments, or, to put it differently, a society in which the segmental cleavages coincide with regional cleavages.

Consociationalism completed by these factors which Lijphart’s system does not include seems to have helped the Netherlands. In addition, Dutch nationalism, the evolution of a culture supporting consociationalism, and pride in this system constituting another form of patriotism, ensured that the members of the isolated blocs continued to desire their state’s unity and assume whatever roles were necessary to achieve this goal. As Lijphart explained when identifying overarching loyalty as a favorable condition, these sources of state-directed loyalty appear to have promoted the use of consociationalism. Therefore, they also indirectly led to the “depillarization” and dissipation of bloc divisions, which seem to have secured permanent stability in the Netherlands.

Of Lijphart’s four core cases of consociationalism, Switzerland and the Netherlands have both used consociationalism with autonomy that was tempered by elite motivations for moderation, to achieve long-term stability among their plural populations. The heterogeneity of geographic segments, along with practical needs for their states’ survival, seems to have motivated the Swiss and Dutch to adopt consociational mechanisms. In turn, Lijphart’s system inspired state-directed patriotism based on pride in these countries’ governance systems, which augmented existing Dutch nationalist state-directed loyalty in the Netherlands. By providing extensive segmental autonomy and accommodating segments’ desire for isolation, consociationalism and the motivations for adopting it seem to have shown the ordinary Dutch and Swiss citizens that their distinctive identities will remain unthreatened and they can act more competitively in the political sphere without fearing assimilationist pressures.

Part 2:

Austria:

The “Core Case” of Consociationalism

Which Arguably Did Not Occur in a Plural Country

Austria is cited as one of the clearest examples of a country which was stabilized by consociational government. Barry (1975, p.493) argues that Austria is the case of consociationalism which best illustrates the benefits of the governance system, but that
consociationalism was not the true cause of stability in this country when it was used after World War 2. He explains that

Austria is the jewel in the ‘consociational’ crown because it ‘presents virtually the only example of a European state in which an initially unsuccessful parliamentary system turned into a successful one, and in which constitutional and party-structural factors can be held constant over half a century (1919-1969) (Barry, 1975, p. 493).

Interestingly, this description of Austria’s great achievement does not include any mention of the sort of population segments or divisive cleavages which constitute plural societies, as they are consistently described by Lijphart. Assuming that stability during this period was attributable to consociationalism, the system’s performance in Austria arguably does not provide convincing evidence for Lijphart’s theory that consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. If Austria should not be considered plural before and during its experience with consociationalism, its accomplishments do not provide insights concerning the management of the very divisive cleavages which characterize plural societies.

The extent to which Austria has been plural will be examined through reference to Lijphart’s descriptions of what constitutes a plural society, which are quoted and discussed in the beginning of Chapter 4, Part I. The five aspects of his definitions can be summarized and compared to the Austrian experience. Lijphart (1981, p.356) explains that, in "completely plural societies," it is possible to "identify exactly the segments" into which they are divided and "state exactly what the size" of each segment is, in terms of the number of people it includes. A society is also regarded to be "completely" plural when there is "perfect correspondence" between segmental boundaries and the boundaries separating the segments' organizations, to the extent that the segments constitute "virtually separate subsocieties" (Lijphart, 1981, p.356; 1989, p.39). According to Lijphart (1989, p.39), plural societies occur when these boundaries are "sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines." An argument is made in Chapter 4 that it is inappropriate to consider ideological cleavages as evidence of such pluralness, considering several qualitative issues including the extreme rarity of Lijphart’s mentions of a relationship between these two phenomena. The "final test of a completely plural society" identified by Lijphart (1981, p.356) is that, "since party and segmental loyalties should coincide, there should be little or no change in the voting support of the different parties from election to election: in a perfectly plural society, an election is a segmental census." Historical accounts suggest that Austria fit some of these criteria for plural societies before and after World War 2 but also that the set of criteria does not describe the country's experience to an extent which definitely justifies its portrayal as that of a plural society. While it was possible to identify the segments into which the country was divided, calculation of the exact sizes of these segments
is frustrated by the fact that they included members of some of the same groups, such as the "workers," a sizeable number of whom supported the party which opposed the Socialist segment (Jelavich, 1987, p.248). Although it was not true of the other segments, the extent to which workers in the Socialist segment could "live in a world organized by [their] party," from before World War 2 suggests that the boundaries separating segments and their organizations were relatively congruent and conducive to separate subsocieties (Jelavich, 1987, p.180, 181).

However, with the exception of religious devotion, rather than religious denomination, the divisions separating Austrian society did not correspond to the cleavages identified with plural societies involving language, culture, ethnicity, and race. The Socialist party's appeal for support from other segments through espousal of a moderate version of traditional leftist goals from the 1920's, including its decision to "not oppose Catholicism," suggests that they expected change in their electoral support from election to election and that Austrian elections were not simply "segmental census[es]" (Jelavich, p.1987, p.178-179; Lijphart, 1981, p.356). Considered together, the extent to which Lijphart's criteria for pluralness existed in Austria suggests that it is by no means clear that Austria was plural during its periods of segmental antagonism and consociationalism in the twentieth century.

Lijphart (1977, p.15) explains that Austria was clearly divided into three groups, which he calls the "Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal-National Lager (camps)." He also points out that the country is "almost completely homogeneous as far as language is concerned" (Lijphart, 1977, p.73). Other analysts of Austrian history describe these groups differently but also agree that it was possible to identify the segments into which the country was divided. For instance, Jelavich (1987, p.146-147) calls these groups the Christian Socials, Social Democrats, and more "German-based parties" which were particularly drawn to Nazism during the World War 2 period. Lijphart (1977, p.15) points out that, although there were these three segments, they worked within a "two-party" system dominated by the Christian Socials and Social Democrats. Jelavich (1987, p.191, 170) explains that, prior to World War 2 and the major changes it affected in Austrians' political goals, the Christian Socials "would have preferred a conservative constitutional monarchy with a strong Catholic orientation," while the Social Democrats saw "the republic...[as] only a brief stopping point on the road" to a "future socialist society" and the "German-national groups" wanted "union with Germany." She points out that, at this stage, "the Austrian state was a second choice for all concerned" (Jelavich, 1987, p.171). The commonality holding the Social Democrats together seems to have been an ideological one in favor of socialism, while the Christian Socials "never ha[d] the cohesion in interest and ideology of their Socialist opponent" because of the great social and economic diversity of its members (Jelavich, 1987, p.180-181).
The Christian Socials were united in their fear that the Social Democrats were essentially "Bolsheviks" in pursuit of revolution and, "most importantly," in the "strong Catholic tie that all [Christian Socials] shared" (Jelavich, 1987, p.166, 181). The cleavages dividing this country prior to World War 2, whose antagonism towards one another is thought to have been calmed by consociationalism, seem to have been an ideological one regarding the nature of the government and one involving the extent to which Austrians believed that their shared Catholic religion should dominate their lives.

If it is accepted that ideological cleavages do not render societies plural, regardless of the extent of animosity provoked by ideological differences in Austria, the country cannot be considered plural in the absence of very firm divisions on the basis of a religious, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial cleavage. Lijphart (1977, p.73) explains that, if denominations are used to calculate indices of religious fragmentation, Austria is "nearly homogeneous" with regard to religion. However, he contends that this religious homogeneity "is more apparent than real" because the country contained "sharp religious cleavages between practicing and nonpracticing Catholics" (Lijphart, 1977, p.74). He estimates that "Belgium and Switzerland should indeed be rated higher than Austria and the Netherlands on an overall index of pluralism" (Lijphart, 1977, p.74). However, the Dutch religious cleavage is arguably quite different from that which Lijphart identifies in Austria. The Dutch people were firmly divided along both denominational and secular/religious lines of cleavage. Lijphart (1977, p.74) explains that Haug incorrectly assessed the extent to which Austria was plural because she assumed that intensity of Catholicism did not constitute the sort of cleavage that characterizes plural societies. To construct her index of pluralism, she used five variables involving "language, religion, race, sectionalism, and interest articulation by nonassociational groups" (Lijphart, 1977, p.74). Presumably because Austria’s only intense divisions corresponded to religiosity and economic conservatism, Haug determined that Austria deserved the "lowest possible overall rating and ... included [it] in the category of 'negligible pluralism'" (Lijphart, 1977, p.74). If such divisions are judged to not render societies plural, her assessment would be correct and Austrian consociationalism’s promotion of stability would not provide insights into the systems’ operation in plural societies. In fact, Jelavich’s (1987, p.179) account of modern Austrian history challenges the notion that there was the sort of very clear division that characterizes Lijphart’s plural societies, separating Christian Socials and Social Democrats with regard to religiosity. She points out that, even in the 1920’s when the antagonism between the two groups was at its height, in the Social Democratic party,

[i]n the question of religion... adjustments were made [to conventional Socialist and Communist stances], owing to the fact that most peasants and many workers were sincere, believing Catholics. In opposition to the Communist and Socialist line of thought that
regarded religion as an 'opium of the people' and called for a campaign against it, the Austrian Socialist party emphasized that religion was a private matter. Thus it did not oppose Catholicism as such, but only the church organizations and societies that did not support the interests of the workers (Jelavich, 1987, p.179, 182-184).

Although the Social Democratic party opposed its Christian Social rival regarding the separation of church and state and religious control of the educational system, both parties contained many "sincere, believing," presumably practicing Catholics (Jelavich, 1987, p.179). Therefore, even if cleavages corresponding to religiosity are considered capable of rendering societies plural, the assertion that a cleavage corresponding to religiosity firmly divided the population into the sort of impermeable units characterizing plural societies seems quite debatable.

In his extensive exploration of Austrian national identity, Bruckmüller (1996) emphasizes that the country's problematic divisions did not involve linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial cleavages. He also suggests that a fundamental disagreement concerning the proper status of Austria motivated the country's cleavages involving religiosity and ideology. When Germany gained independence following its inclusion in the Hapsburg Empire, a substantial proportion of people left in the rump portion of this empire, Austria, wanted their territory to be included in Germany. This was apparently not because those favoring German inclusion were any more ethnically German than most of those in Austria who did not prefer this option. It is true that, "[i]n the older Austria images the mythology of origins appears in two different and completely contrary formulations- in a ‘Germanic’ one and one that views the Austrians as people of predominantly or partially ‘mixed’ origins" (Bruckmüller, 1996, p.126). Austria was apparently viewed in this way because it had been the center of a very diverse empire including Slavs, Hungarians, and Italians. However, by the time consociational components were adopted after World War II, these groups had gained independence from the empire and the territory recognized as Austria was inhabited by a population of relatively homogeneous ethnicity (Bruckmüller, 1996, p.374). The absence of a cleavage involving ethnicity, or “Germanness,” is confirmed by Lijphart’s identification of only religiosity and ideological divisions, during the country’s period of consociationalism. A myriad of factors seems to have motivated some people to desire inclusion in Germany, one of which was simply dislike for the monarchy whose center of dominance had been Austria. Religiosity levels and opinions concerning socialism and class differed strikingly between the segment favoring German inclusion and those preferring Austrian independence. Catholicism and economic conservativism were identified as attributes of the Hapsburg Empire and those who advocated the preservation of its rump state, Austria.

Bruckmüller (1996, p.132) extensively describes the
A black legend about the Catholic, Hapsburg Austria as a refuge of intolerance and indolence, servility and stupidity, which was invoked again and again by Protestants, liberals, and German nationalists, by socialists and National Socialists.

In a 1977 publication, Lijphart (p. 74) explains that Austria is 89.4% Catholic. The small number of Protestants described in relation to this legend presumably collaborated with the Catholics desiring separation between church and state, who are identified by Lijphart as maintaining a cleavage between themselves and other Catholics. However, the motivations of this coalition against Austrian independence are better comprehended if the trends in their desire for inclusion in Germany are analyzed. In the mid-nineteenth century, while the Hapsburg empire was still intact, the “German Austrians saw themselves as the supporting nation of the monarchy, as the ‘best Austrians’” (Bruckmüller, 1996, p. 293). Bruckmüller (1996, p. 293-294) explains that, at this time, “[f]or many German Austrians a definite Austrian patriotism and a similarly definite adherence to their own Austrian state accompanied [their] feeling of belonging to ‘Germany.’” In 1918, the year the empire came to an end, “the Republic of Austria constituted itself... as part of the German Republic” but the victorious powers in World War One would not accept this inclusion of Austria in Germany, known as Anschluss (Bruckmüller, 1996, p. 304). After Anschluss was thus “prohibit[ed],” enthusiasm for it was most common among German nationalists and Christian Socialists but Bruckmüller (1996, p. 304) explains that the “actual social breadth of the desire” for it remains “unknown.” Another “wave” of enthusiasm for Anschluss in 1921 was “supported more by the ‘right,’” who included the party containing those who opposed separation of church and state, and Anschluss apparently became increasingly popular partly for economic reasons (Bruckmüller, 1996, p. 305, 307). It seemed to many in Austria that Germany was, and would become, much more economically successful than their state. Bruckmüller (1996, p. 307) explains that, in the early twentieth century, “with few exceptions the famous debate about the viability of Austria seemed to conclude again and again that the small republic could not exist financially.” He provides substantial evidence supporting Friedrich Heer’s belief that

After so many defeats and humiliations the engrossment in ‘Germanness’ and logically then also in ‘Germany’ as the redeeming power state of the Germans was plainly and simply a flight from the situation in Austria that was increasingly perceived as unbearable. This self-image stood in very strong contrast at least from the Austrian standpoint to that of the German Reich, brimming with self-confidence, with its powerful army and its impressive economic data. It always stood in the background as an alternative model.... (Bruckmüller, 1996, p. 303-304).

The eventual decrease in support for Austria’s inclusion in the German state was apparently not motivated by trends in religiosity, reconciliation between socialists and conservatives, or the
Austrian resistance (Bruckmüller, 1996, p.312). By 1943, enthusiasm for Anschluss had dramatically declined because Hitler “pushed… aside… the loyal nationalists” rather than granting them any power, which along with other factors “very quickly created a legitimacy deficit in Vienna” (Bruckmüller, 1996, p.312). Bruckmüller (1943, p.312) explains that, the “Pan-German idea had probably played itself out” in Vienna by 1943 and the “beginning of air raids by the Allies probably took care of the rest” of enthusiasm for Anschluss. He observes that the German military defeat in World War Two “brought to pass the very thing that would have hardly been considered possible in 1938: namely the urgent wish of the Austrians not to belong to the Germans in any way” (Bruckmüller, 1996, p.371). The remnants of a cleavage motivated by disagreement concerning the desirability of Anschluss seem to have remained in Austria when consociationalism was introduced immediately after the war through a grand coalition of the two major parties in 1945 (Barry, 1975a, p.493).

To the extent that this cleavage separating the originally pro- and anti- Anschluss groups as Austria was annexed by the Nazis involved religiosity of Catholics and ideology, these factors do not account for trends in the antagonism surrounding this cleavage. If the intensity of support for connections between church and state or advocacy of socialism motivated support for Austrian independence, one would expect that the Austrian resistance movement against Nazism would have been primarily composed of devout Catholics and economic conservatives. Years before the majority of Austrian opinion turned against Anschluss, “Catholic legitimists of the Winter school and some communists… began to form resistance groups” (Bruckmüller, 1996, p.350, 351). If socialism motivated support for the Anschluss, the first groups in the resistance movement would not have included communists. The diversity of the Austrian resistance movement throughout the German occupation suggests that no clear cleavages involving Catholic religiosity and economic liberal views was reflected in the divide between those supporting and opposing Anschluss. Bruckmüller (1996, p.350) explains that the Austrian resistance had to struggle against its enormous ideological and party fragmentation. It was not only on the right that agreement was not very simple between Catholic-monarchist, more likely Christian Social, and more likely aristocratically oriented groups. On the left the agreement difficulties between communists, revolutionary socialists, and more traditional Social Democrats were also great.

This situation existed in the period immediately preceding adoption of consociationalism in Austria but the fractionalization suggested by these observations does not coincide with Lijphart’s portrayal of the society as divided between the three Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal-National camps. The extent to which the cleavages that dominated Austria before consociationalism was implemented following World War 2 were not dominated by these three groups is emphasized by
historical discussions of "Austrian National Identity," such as Johnson's (1994, p.78-80), which
discusses this period but not the division between Christian Socialists and Social Democrats.
Pelinka (2002, p.147) also confirms that these three groups, which he calls the "Christian-
Conservative," "Social Democrat," and "pan-German," were no longer "closed camps" by the
1930s, as the Austrian Nazi party attracted voters "in numbers far beyond the strength of the
traditional pan-German camp." It seems plausible to argue that this country was not organized
into the sort of self-isolating, antagonistic segments considered to characterize plural societies as
of 1945, when consociational elements were first adopted and Austrians of all groups had
apparently come to agree that independence for Austria was preferable. It almost seems as if
their decision to remain a united nation, as well as state, encouraged them to embrace a grand
coalition executive system in 1945 and interact in a stable fashion since then.

A strong argument can be made that Austria was not a plural society when consociational
elements were introduced there in 1945. The possibility that it did not constitute such a society at
that time means that analysis of consociationalism's effects there cannot be assumed to be
characteristic of those achieved by the system. Incidentally, if religiosity and economic
liberalism are assumed to have been cleavages in Austria when consociationalism was
introduced, cross-cutting cleavages and heterogeneity of regions would have also existed and
seemingly tempered segmental autonomy with greater incentives for political moderation and
intergroup negotiation. Lijphart (1977, p.78) explains that the Austrian "religious and class
cleavages came close to cutting across each other at right angles." He also suggests that the
religious and ideological groups that would be divided by such a cleavage were not heavily
concentrated geographically (Lijphart, 1977, p.98, 99). Austria has been a federal state
throughout its experience with consociationalism and, although it is "not a highly decentralized"
one, any delegation of power to regions would have increased the moderating role of this
geographical heterogeneity (Lijphart, 1977, p.98). Consociationalism may well have brought a
degree of stability to Austrian society that would not have occurred only as a result of the change
in popular opinion following World War Two. However, a persuasive argument can be made that
Austria was not a plural society when consociationalism was introduced and, therefore, this
country's experience of the system does not provide much insight into its role in divided, plural
societies.
Part 3: Comparing The Experiences Of Consociationalism In Northern Ireland and South Africa

Many components of consociationalism were introduced in South Africa and Northern Ireland during the past decade because domestic and international political actors believed that employment of the system would maximize these societies’ prospects for lasting peace, justice, and consequent stability. Unfortunately, the consociational mechanisms for governance in these societies are not adequately analyzed by the quantitative analysis conducted for this project. The dataset used years of countries’ experiences as cases so Northern Ireland could not be statistically analyzed independently of the majoritarian British system. Northern Ireland’s experiences with consociationalism in 1974 and after 1999 also are completely absent from the dataset because the time period it covers is from 1975 to 1995. South Africa began implementing consociational mechanisms of governance when an interim constitution came into effect following elections in April, 1994 (“Background”). Its adoption of consociational components and information concerning stability in 1994 and 1995 are represented in the dataset constructed for this project. However, its lack of information regarding the years after 1995 virtually precludes quantitative analysis of consociationalism’s effects there, with this dataset. South Africa did have one other arguably consociational experience, when a constitution was adopted in 1983 that its government argued was consociational. Considering that it continued the political exclusion of the Black majority population, it should not be considered consociational because Lijphart’s system is predicated on the notion of empowering potentially antagonistic groups and this constitution did just the opposite. The periods of Northern Ireland’s history in the first half of 1974 and from 1999 until 2002, as well as South Africa’s experiences since 1994, will all be considered to be examples of consociationalism. None of these situations perfectly fitted Lijphart’s description of ideal consociational practices and institutions but it can be argued that no countries have ever fit this definition so the system’s performance must be assessed through analysis of all countries in which elements of it have operated. Regardless of whether consociationalism’s components have all been used according to Lijphart’s suggestions in South Africa and Northern Ireland, their implementation of it in any form is of great interest to policymakers and academics because they are two of the most divided societies in which the system has ever been introduced. Analysis of their experiences with consociationalism will enable much greater comprehension of the system’s effects in the sort of places for which it arguably constitutes the only means of achieving lasting stability.
The *Minorities at Risk* dataset can be used to construct additional data corresponding to stability levels in South Africa for the years 1996 to 2003. This information suggests that stability has increased since the interim constitution, containing many consociational elements, came into force in April, 1994. This data representing stability, like that which was calculated for the eighty-eight countries in this project’s dataset for the years 1975 to 1995, takes into account levels of “rebellion” and “protest.” According to these indicators, instability since 1975 peaked between 1980 and 1984, declined strikingly between 1985 and 1989, then rose again peaking in 1994, and has been decreasing since then. The low levels of instability in the late eighties draw attention to the fact that stability, as manifested by protest and rebellion, can decrease when potentially rebellious groups are severely oppressed. It is for this reason that democracy is controlled for in many of the quantitative analyses performed for this project, which are described in Chapter 6. The low levels of instability following 1994 are obviously not caused by such oppression. By 1997, the level of instability in South Africa had dropped to a level that had not been experienced since the late eighties. Since then, it has declined further, even reaching zero in 1999. The *Minorities at Risk* dataset indicates that no “rebellion” has taken place there since 1997 but the levels of protest have bounced up and down a bit since they fell to zero in 1999. Details concerning the construction of the dependent, stability variable for this project and the protest and rebellion variables from the *Minorities at Risk* dataset which were used to create it are provided in Appendix E. It should be remembered here that the levels of protest recorded for the *Minorities at Risk* project correspond to the “highest observed level of protest” in each year and protest is considered to constitute “actions initiated by members of [a Minority at Risk] group on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those who claim to exercise authority over the group” (Davenport, 2004, p.87). The figure corresponding to levels of protest in South Africa during the years 1994 to 2003, is the average of the highest levels of protest performed by the minority groups which were then identified as inhabiting the country. The figure provided for the years 1995 and 1996 indicates that the average of the highest levels of protest exhibited by these groups corresponded to “symbolic resistance,” manifested through activities which did not involve harming other human beings, such as sit-ins and “symbolic destruction of property,” or “political organizing activity on a substantial scale” (Davenport, 2004, p.88-89). No rebellion occurred during those years so these occurrences were the sole form of instability, as manifested by rebellion and protest, that was recorded in the *Minorities at Risk* dataset. From 1997 to 2003, no rebellion happened and the average of the highest levels of protest exhibited by the groups fell between the “symbolic resistance” more common in 1995 and 1996, and “verbal opposition,” which includes “[p]ublic letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc” (Davenport, 2004,
These figures have varied since 1997 but not in a direction which could be interpreted as indicative of increased instability. For instance, the figure corresponding to the last year for which data is currently available, 2003, is the second lowest in South Africa since 1975. Interestingly, the heightening stability in South Africa is also suggested by the list of minority groups at risk identified by Gurr’s project. Before consociational elements were introduced in 1993, all “Black Africans” were judged to be “at risk” in South Africa but, by 2000, only Xhosa and Zulu blacks were considered appropriate for this category (Gurr, 1993, p.335; 2000, p.334). This assessment of South African groups confirms that many of the “Black Africans” who were obviously the group at greatest risk prior to 1994 have benefited tremendously from the new governance system. Of course, prior to ascribing all of this positive influence to consociationalism, it should be considered the “Black Africans” in South Africa had not even been allowed to vote before 1994 and the end of the apartheid system coincided with the adoption of some elements of consociationalism.

Consociationalism arguably does not completely explain the increase of stability in South Africa for a few reasons. One of the most crucial elements of consociational systems is governance by executive coalitions containing representatives of all of the potentially antagonistic groups that make a society plural. From 1994 until 1996, this sort of coalition existed in South Africa (“South”). This coalition included the African National Congress (ANC), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the National Party (NP), which respectively focus on representing “Black Africans,” the Zulu group, and the descendants of European settlers (“South”). “Black Africans” now constitute approximately 79% of the population, the Zulu portion of this group includes about 14% of South Africans, those of European descent make up 9.6%, “Coloreds” have 8.9%, and the “Asians,” who are mainly of Indian descent, include about 2.5% of the country’s inhabitants (“Background”; Gurr, 2000, p.334). In June, 1996, the white representative of the NP, De Klerk, “voluntarily gave up his position” as Executive Deputy President “and distanced himself from the programs of the ANC” (“South”). Guelke (1999, p.183) explains that one reason given by the NP’s leaders for this withdrawal was “the party’s lack of influence on government policy” during the two years in which it had ministerial office. While the interim constitution contained some consociational components, such as mandated coalition government, the “absence of any provision” in it for “the exercise of a minority veto” allowed the ANC to “dominate the decision-making process,” even before other forms of power-sharing were excluded from the final constitution (Guelke, 1999, p.183). Glaser (2001, p.225) explains that the final constitution, which was created in 1996 and became operational in 1997, “scrapped enforced coalition government” and Guelke (1999, p.197) argues that it also “discarded
any vestige of power sharing.” The closed-list PR electoral system that has been used in South Africa since 1994 “may well be the most proportional electoral system in use in any democracy” but the ANC has won very high majorities in all of the national elections and is expected to be “dominant in the foreseeable future” (Gouws & Mitchell, 2006, p.361, 365). The ANC has not held executive office in coalition with a party focusing on the representation of “coloreds,” Asians, or “whites” since 1996. Therefore, if consociational grand coalition executives are defined as those including parties representing potentially antagonistic groups, since 1996 no such coalition has existed in South Africa, while stability has substantially increased.

However, particularly in reference to the Indian Congress Party, Lijphart (1996a, p.260) has argued that an executive also should be considered consociational if its “cabinets are produced by the broadly representative and inclusive nature of a single, dominant party.” For executives to be considered consociational according to this criterion, they logically would need to contain members of potentially antagonistic groups but these members would also have to be representative of their groups. South African history and demographic conditions indicate that the “white” population would need to be represented in the ANC, for it to be considered a party which itself constitutes a consociational executive. “White” people have been included in South African cabinets since 1996 and, in August 2004, the predominantly “white” New National Party (NNP) announced that “most of its leaders would join the ANC” (Venter, 2001,p.64; Molwedi et.al., 2004; Gouws & Mitchell, 2006, p.365n). However, there is substantial evidence suggesting that the “whites” contained in South African executives since 1996 are not widely viewed as representatives of the “white” group. Amichand Rajbansi, who was the leader of the Minority Front in KwaZulu-Natal as of 2004, illustrated a belief that NNP leaders joining the ANC would not be bringing their constituents’ support to the ANC when he said that “the NNP would not be an asset to the ANC and could ‘hardly be expected to make a significant contribution to the organization’” (Molwedi et.al., 2004, p.3). Similarly, Helen Zille, the spokesperson for the Democratic Alliance party in 2004, said that the NNP leader’s decision to join the ANC constituted “the last betrayal of [his party’s] voters” and predicted that the “NNP voters will not follow him” (Molwedi et.al., 2004, p.3). Confirmation of the extent to which white members of ANC executives since 1996 have truly represented the “white” group could be performed only through reference to survey evidence of “whites’” feelings concerning these politicians, which seemingly does not exist. On the other hand, substantial circumstantial evidence supports the notion that the ANC executives have not represented the “white” population to an extent that would justify their identification as consociational governments.
The nature of the electoral competitive field in South Africa also suggests that the ANC executives are not representative of “white” interests. The country appears to remain electorally polarized with regard to race and the electoral system does not require the ANC to appeal to “white” voters. The cleavage separating “whites” and “blacks” appears to have remained quite intense. In a 1999 publication, Guelke (p.186) points out that “political discourse... continued to be dominated by race” and that data concerning elections in 1994, 1995, and 1996 confirm that “the country has remained electorally polarized on racial lines... between whites and Africans.” In another 1999 publication, Uys (p.21) observes that “[m]uch of the reconciliation achieved in 1994 has been overtaken by indifference among blacks and alienation among whites.” Observations by Friedman and Piombo that were published in 2005 confirm the continued strength of this “black”-“white” cleavage in South African society and politics. Friedman (2005, p.9) explains that “political conflict has been far less intense that it might have been since 1994 because parties’ control of identity segments has often been uncontested (a notable exception being the ‘coloured’ and Indian vote).” Similarly, Piombo (2005, p.276) points out that the ANC, whose leaders control the executive, “has frequently contributed to a political discourse that demonizes the opposition as racist and reinforces the social cleavage between blacks and whites.” The ANC’s electoral dominance, combined with a closed-list PR system in which “the expectation [is] that accountability is primarily to parties [and] not to voters,” also contributes to a situation in which the ANC does not need to attract “white” votes to dominate executive power and the “white” and “black” voters are electorally polarized (Gouws & Mitchell, 2006, p.366). Regardless of opinion concerning the benefits and drawbacks of this situation, such electoral polarization and incentives, combined with the persistence of a strong cleavage dividing the potentially antagonistic “black” and “white” populations, seems highly incompatible with the notion that ANC executives since 1996 should be considered consociational. During the period after 1996, when stability levels have been so impressive in South Africa, the country seems not to have had governments resembling consociational grand coalitions. The one consociational component which unarguably has existed since 1994 is the very proportional representation electoral system. An argument perhaps also could be made that segmental autonomy has characterized the post-apartheid society. However, minority veto power has never been used in the post-apartheid system and, when the trend toward less power-sharing formalized in the final constitution is considered, it becomes clear that stability has increased in the country while the extent to which consociationalism has been used has markedly decreased. The logical implication of these trends is that some factor other than consociationalism is contributing to South Africa’s stability.
In contrast to South Africa, consociational elements have not been used as extensively in Northern Ireland, not because they were gradually exchanged for mechanisms less conducive to powersharing, but because the will to permanently implement them has proven to be elusive. South Africa and Northern Ireland obviously constitute unique societies and their experiences are not directly comparable. However, their constituent groups' recognition of the need for means of governance designed to promote resolution of their differences is arguably responsible for the persistence of consociational elements and the political system in South Africa but not in Northern Ireland. In 1998, elections were held according to an agreement with many consociational elements in Northern Ireland but “because of unresolved disputes among existing parties,” power over the region was only transferred from London at the end of 1999 (“United Kingdom”). Since then, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended four times and, since October 2002, the assembly and executive have not operated (“United Kingdom”). An earlier governance system resembling Lijphart’s consociational system also operated there for a short time during the first half of 1974. Northern Ireland is now governed directly from London but representatives were nevertheless elected for an assembly after its 2002 suspension and are still waiting for the opportunity to take up political office (McAdam, 2005). In a recent newspaper article, McAdam (2005) explained that the British Government has “threatened to scrap the Assembly” if a deal enabling the resumption of activity by the assembly and executive is not achieved prior to the next elections which are scheduled to occur in 2007. Discussion of this decision in another article published the next day emphasizes the fact that this deadlock is occurring despite attempts by the most high profile paramilitary group to end it. It is expected that “[f]inding an accommodation between the DUP and Sinn Fein will be as hard as ever- even in view of the IRA’s July statement, its decommissioning and, presumably, another favourable report from the International Monitoring Commission” (“Viewpoint”). The DUP, or Democratic Unionist Party, and Sinn Fein are the most influential parties representing the more polarized wings of the two groups at conflict in Northern Ireland, the Unionists and Nationalists. The IRA is the paramilitary wing of Sinn Fein and the violent organization that has had the highest profile in the region historically. The brief periods of time in which consociationalism has been operational in Northern Ireland frustrate any attempt to ascertain the system’s likely long-term effects there. However, some factor other than consociationalism has presumably made its adoption so much harder in Northern Ireland than in South Africa.

One difference between the antagonisms in Northern Ireland and South Africa involves the strong connection of the former society with sovereign states, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Unlike South Africans, the inhabitants of Northern Ireland know that, if they
cannot agree to accept a governance system operated by themselves, their region will not be without a government to organize its public affairs. Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom so, when its people cannot govern themselves, they are managed by the British government headquartered in London. On the other hand, if the inhabitants of South Africa had not agreed upon a system of governance for their state when apartheid ended, they could not have relied on any other entity to manage their public affairs and they would have faced the prospect of utter chaos. Schwartzman and Taylor (1999) analyze the reasons why the white South African population felt that it needed to abolish the system which allowed them to dominate the country. They concluded that this group was compelled to opt for constitutional change by "constraints on the domestic labor market and international financial boycotts" (Schwartzman & Taylor, 1999, p.109). In contrast, the groups involved in the prolonged conflict in Northern Ireland do not have economic motivations for achieving a stable, regional governance system and one of them seeks to remain as connected to Britain as possible. Even if some Unionists may most prefer to dominate a Northern Ireland assembly, they may actually prefer rule from London than the power-sharing system that has been chosen for the region. These people seemingly consider governance by Britain to be a viable, long-term option. If they prefer it to power-sharing within Northern Ireland, they have little motivation to find an accommodation with the other group, the Nationalists, which would enable consociational government to continue. Intransigence by both Unionists and Nationalists has frustrated the operation of the consociational system initially agreed upon and both groups know that a government will manage their region's affairs, whether they come to an agreement or not.

Perhaps the new governance system in South Africa was successfully introduced and has survived because the country's inhabitants feel that they need it, more than the population of Northern Ireland feels that they need one. The South Africans have been able to achieve impressive levels of stability even though powersharing has markedly decreased. Perhaps the elements of consociationalism that remain there account for this stability but it also seems reasonable to argue that one motivation for this stability and the continuation of their political system is their need for some sort of mutually agreed upon means of governance. During the negotiations which produced their 1994 interim constitution, White South African leaders apparently indicated their acceptance that they might have to be permanently excluded from government in return for stability. The Director of the South African Institute for Race Relations, John Kane-Berman, argues that... mid-way through the negotiation process, when as a result of its capitulating to ANC allegations of government involvement in the Boipatong massacre (of 50 ANC supporters) in June 1992, the NP abandoned its demands for an entrenchment of power-
sharing and ultimately settled for a constitution which ‘regards minority rights as catered for in the protection of individual rights, and allows for Westminster-type majority rule’ (Southall, 2000, p.161).

The lesser extent to which Northern Irish group leaders feel compelled to adopt a mutually agreeable governance system is arguably the fundamental cause of the difference between the operation of consociational mechanisms there and in South Africa. The contrast between consociational experiences in South Africa and Northern Ireland arguably also provides additional evidence illustrating the validity of Lijphart’s belief that overarching loyalties do promote stability in consociational situations. While many members of all groups in South Africa share a loyalty to their state, loyalty to Northern Ireland (rather than the Republic of Ireland or Britain) is much more rare in that troubled region. Consociationalism is a system that is adopted in order to achieve long-term stability in plural societies but it and its alternatives are only employed when the populations to be governed by them either desire unity or need to both inhabit the same territory and agree upon a means of managing it.

Conclusion

The experiences of Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria are commonly cited as some of the best examples of the potential benefits to be achieved with elements of Lijphart’s consociational system. The composition of Austria’s population and political divisions when consociationalism was adopted there in 1945 arguably do not justify its depiction as a plural society. Therefore, although its success with a combination of segmental autonomy and cross-cutting cleavages does not appear to contradict the general conclusions suggested by qualitative comparison of the countries, it cannot be assumed to exemplify the effects of consociationalism in plural societies so it is not extensively evaluated here. Assessment of the relationship between stability and consociationalism in the other four countries suggests that elements of consociationalism are more conducive to stability when they are combined with incentives for intergroup compromise and moderation of political appeals. Segmental autonomy seems to have maintained stability in, and the unity of, all four of these countries at some point in their history. However, the countries in this group which are still in jeopardy of partition or secession after more than one hundred years, Canada and Belgium, are also those in which relative homogeneity of federal governance regions has meant that consociationalism’s separate autonomy for segments has not been tempered by factors promoting intergroup moderation and compromise. The two countries in which consociationalism seems to have promoted stability
best in plural societies, Switzerland and Netherlands, have had systems combining segmental
autonomy with incentives for moderation. In Switzerland, crosscutting cleavages and
majoritarian referendums have maintained such incentives and this role has been performed by
cleavages that cut across each other in the Netherlands. The other crucial difference between
these two sets of countries seems to be the much stronger influence of state-directed patriotism in
Switzerland and the Netherlands. In Canada, loyalty toward Britain seems to have been strong
historically and, while this has undoubtedly promoted patriotism among the English speaking
population, a more Canadian focused orientation perhaps would have engendered the sort of
nonnational specific patriotism which has helped Switzerland to remain united. State-directed
loyalty is also less common in Belgium than in Switzerland and the Netherlands and this may be
contributing to its comparative instability. The Swiss and Dutch both share a powerful, patriotic
pride in the governance systems which have facilitated their unity, and loyalty to the Netherlands
also seems to benefit from an intense nationalistic loyalty inspired by a shared sense of Dutch
ethnicity. The belief that they need to remain united seems to have assisted the continued unity of
all four of these states but secessionist movements in Canada and Belgium seem to have been
motivated in part because their supporters believe that their membership in the states is no longer
absolutely necessary. While the unity of Canada and Belgium has required the belief that it was
necessary, that of Switzerland and the Netherlands has probably been supported by such beliefs in
its necessity but ultimately ensured by the constitutional and nationalistic patriotism that they
have inspired. A contrast of the experiences of consociationalism in Northern Ireland and South
Africa emphasizes that a strong desire, or a belief in the absolute necessity, for a mutually agreed
upon governance system determines where mechanisms such as consociational components can
be institutionalized. Intergroup accommodation can apparently be maintained when it is deemed
necessary by all potentially destabilizing entities. The experiences of Switzerland and the
Netherlands suggest that harmony can complement stability when state-directed patriotism is
widespread and can be maximized when individual voters begin to view themselves as the most
appropriate political actors.
CHAPTER 9:  
CONCLUSIONS:  
HOW CAN STABILITY BE ACHIEVED MOST EFFICIENTLY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES?

The optimal means of assessing the value of any governance system is qualitative analysis of its operation throughout time and the globe. The prohibitive nature of such an undertaking means that examination of some situations must be carried out through quantitative tests, if insights are to be gained through comparison of a large number of countries over a substantial period of time. This project attempts to ascertain whether consociational promotes stability in plural societies, through quantitative analysis of eighty-eight plural countries between the years, 1975 to 1995. To assist comprehension of the trends illuminated through quantitative analysis and to enable examination of important cases that could not be represented by the dataset, several countries' experiences were then assessed qualitatively.

Summary Of The Project

This project includes the most carefully constructed, large scale statistical analysis of the influence of the components of consociational government on stability. The variables and cases used in this analysis conform as closely as possible to the concepts of consociationalism, stability, and plural societies, as they are described by Lijphart in his extensive body of work regarding consociationalism. Accurate quantitative representation of his theory and recognition of the value of its analysis are facilitated by the discussions presented in Chapters 2 and 3. These chapters confirm the precise components of the theory, discuss criticisms that have been made concerning it, and describe another quantitative treatment of the performance of one of consociationalism's components. This project's quantitative analysis comprises multiple regression tests involving two sets of cases, which correspond to plural societies and plural societies which are also democratic. The latter set of cases and an independent controlling variable corresponding to democracy are used to ascertain whether consociationalism produces the stability which characterizes democracies, in contrast to the lack of upheaval, rebellion, and protest that results from severe oppression under undemocratic regimes. After the definition of plural societies to be used to choose cases is identified in Chapter 4, the independent variables and data representing them are identified and justified in Chapter 5. The independent variables correspond to each consociational component and six phenomena to be controlled for, including democracy and five of the conditions identified by Lijphart as conducive to the successful promotion of stability by
consociationalism. This project enables separate analysis of Lijphart’s four components of consociationalism, which correspond to “grand” coalition executives including potentially antagonistic groups, segmental autonomy granting groups’ control over cultural issues, proportional empowerment of groups, and potential veto power for minorities. The variables corresponding to Lijphart’s consociational component of grand coalition could not be designed to perfectly correspond to the presence of only the all-inclusive executives identified by him as comprising this component because of difficulties in detecting true incidences of such executives and their extreme rarity. The variable corresponding to highly inclusive executive coalitions does identify situations in which members of all MARs are in executives but it cannot be relied upon as an indicator of all-inclusive executives because it is not clear if these individual members are very representative of their groups and Gurr’s dataset arguably does not include as MARs all of the sort of potentially antagonistic groups which Lijphart believes make a society plural. The variable indicating potential veto power for minorities would ideally have corresponded to actual veto power but data indicating such actual power could not be collected. Although some of these components cannot be quantitatively represented in a form which perfectly corresponds to Lijphart’s portrayal of them, the variables and data portraying them in this analysis do represent them more faithfully than any other large-scale, quantitative exploration of consociationalism.

Chapter 6 contains a description and justification of the manner in which stability is represented in the dependent variable, an identification of which plural states have used consociationalism most extensively, and the results of the quantitative analyses which indicate whether consociationalism promotes stability in plural societies. Although Lijphart describes stability as comprising four elements, only two of them can be represented through the dependent variable and one more can be partially controlled for. An independent variable and separate set of cases controlling for democracy will promote some insight into the role of consociationalism on system maintenance, while the elements of civil order and legitimacy will be represented in the dependent variable with data indicating levels of rebellion and protest. Lijphart’s element of stability corresponding to effectiveness must be excluded from the quantitative analysis to preserve its methodological integrity.

The quantitative analyses of both sets of cases suggest that highly inclusive coalitions deter violent and nonviolent instability but that potential minority veto power, PR electoral systems, and somewhat inclusive coalitions actually exacerbate it. The consociational component of segmental autonomy was not found to exert a statistically significant influence on stability. Of all of the independent variables representing consociational components and other phenomena, those corresponding to highly and somewhat inclusive coalitions, potential minority veto power,
PR, and democracy were found to influence stability in a statistically significant manner. Particularly since the highly inclusive coalitions analysed in the tests probably did not include all potentially antagonistic groups, the collective influence of the consociational components shown in these tests challenges the theory that consociational components can be consistently relied upon to promote stability in plural societies.

Comparison of the results of these quantitative analyses with qualitative assessments of individual countries’ experiences is presented in chapters 7 and 8. This qualitative treatment of seven places that have experienced consociationalism also facilitates comprehension of the role of this governance system because many of them are considered to have used the system successfully but most of them could not be quantitatively examined for diverse methodological reasons. These seven places include Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. The case studies examining their experiences indicate that the performance of consociationalism is influenced by a number of factors in addition to the consociational components, some of which it is difficult to represent quantitatively. Some of these factors include overarching loyalty and patriotism by antagonistic groups toward their state, cross-cutting cleavages which tend to make a society less clearly polarized, and incentives for intergroup compromise and moderation of political appeals. These countries’ experiences also illustrate that such incentives need not be introduced through mechanisms which could permanently exclude potentially antagonistic groups from power. The extent to which consociationalism has been used successfully in all seven of these places also seems to have been dependent on how much the members of potentially antagonistic groups feel that their coexistence in a state is necessary for protection of their interests and achievement of their goals. In these places, the segmental autonomy and empowerment provided by consociationalism seems most conducive to long-term stability when it is tempered by conditions and mechanisms which encourage groups’ to coexist and consider one another’s perspectives. The insights suggested by these case studies can be used to formulate hypotheses concerning the operation of consociationalism examined in the quantitative tests. However, the idiosyncratic nature of each place’s experiences means that they cannot be relied upon as accurate indications of universal trends.

The general conclusions supported by the statistical tests and also suggested by the qualitative case studies performed for this project are that consociational autonomy and empowerment for potentially antagonistic groups are most conducive to long-term stability in plural societies when they are combined with conditions and mechanisms which motivate mutual understanding of each other’s perspectives.
The Implications Of This Project’s Quantitative And Qualitative Findings

When considered together, the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that consociationalism promotes stability best when it is combined with phenomena that promote intergroup moderation and cooperation. When the potentially antagonistic groups comprising plural societies are given autonomy over their cultural affairs and satisfied with their levels of political representation, they seem most likely to remain united in the long-term if they are also given incentives to get along with one another. Consociationalism without such incentives is presented as the only alternative to the oppression of permanent political minorities and/or their assimilation. This project’s findings suggest that these are not the only, or the best, possibilities available for divided plural societies. The quantitative analysis indicates that segmental autonomy is not necessarily beneficial or detrimental to societies’ stability. However, incentives for moderation could only be roughly represented in the dataset through a variable estimating the extent to which regional governance units contain populations that are homogeneous with regard to potentially antagonistic groups. Even when segmental autonomy was analyzed in conjunction with this variable, it seemed to exert no effect on stability. It is hard to believe that segmental autonomy has no effect on the long-term stability of plural societies but this quantitative analysis provided no evidence of a positive or negative impact of this consociational component. In contrast, qualitative analysis of the experiences of Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands indicated that segmental autonomy was arguably necessary for these countries’ stability and became an inspiration for Swiss and Dutch state loyalty. “Grand” coalitions that include members of all potentially antagonistic segments are believed by Lijphart to constitute one of the most important consociational components. However, they arguably, only very rarely exist in their ideal form. Highly inclusive coalitions, including members from all of a country’s MAR groups, were found to be positively associated with stability in both the quantitative and qualitative explorations of their effects. The fact that somewhat inclusive coalitions, containing members of some but not all of a country’s MARs, were found to be detrimental to stability in the statistical analyses, indicates the importance of a very high and quite rare level of inclusiveness in executives, if stability is to be achieved. Completely and highly inclusive coalitions and segmental autonomy seem to condition the members of potentially antagonistic groups to feel that their cultural identities will be respected and their segments will share political power.

Although the role of such incentives could not be demonstrated in this project, its findings suggest that it may be true that segmental autonomy and highly inclusive coalitions
achieve higher levels of stability when they are combined with incentives for moderation and intergroup compromise. Unfortunately, the dataset could not be designed to include variables corresponding to two of the factors found to introduce these incentives during the qualitative analysis. Examination of Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria suggested that cross-cutting cleavages or, in the Dutch case, those which went “across” one another without intersecting, encourage politicians to appeal to constituents outside their own groups and thus promote intergroup understanding. The majoritarian influence of the frequent Swiss referendums was also found to discourage extremism by providing similar incentives to politicians. The contrasting levels of stability in Canada and Belgium, on one hand, and Switzerland and the Netherlands, on the other, suggested that the relatively homogeneity of regional governance units in the first two countries may be contributing to intergroup tensions by making it easier for politicians to refrain from appealing across cleavage lines. Cross-cutting cleavages and the Swiss referendum system could not be examined in the quantitative analysis because they could not be adequately represented in the dataset. However, the relative homogeneity of governance units was included through a controlling, independent variable and its analysis indicated that it may have a slightly negative influence on stability. However, this effect was found to be not statistically significant so its existence could not be confirmed. The consociational components of minority veto power and proportional representation were examined through variables corresponding to the potential for this power and electoral systems allocating political representation proportionally. Incentives for political power are not introduced by minority veto power or all but one of the proportional representation electoral systems. The relative permanence of most electoral systems and provisions for potential minority veto power meant that qualitative analysis could not enable comparison of individual countries’ experiences with those including such incentives and those that do not. However, quantitative examination of these factors, alone and in conjunction with the other consociational components and controlling variables, indicated that both potential veto power and proportional representation electoral systems are conducive to instability. The quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted for this project suggest that those mechanisms which engender incentives for intergroup moderation and negotiation may themselves promote stability and they also support the positive role played by highly inclusive coalitions and segmental autonomy.

A New Theory Designed To Facilitate Greater Understanding Of How Stability Can Be Achieved In Plural Societies
The experiences of those countries studied in more depth suggest that the success of systems such as consociationalism, which are introduced to try to bring stability to plural societies, is dependent on more than their respective elements. Even before they can be agreed upon or operate for any significant length of time, the fate of these new governance systems seems determined by the extent to which the populations of these plural societies believe that they need to retain state unity, need to adopt such a system, and want to live together under stable conditions. This may seem obvious but it constitutes a new framework for predicting the likelihood that these systems will be adopted and possibly a new approach to cultivating situations conducive to their development. Horowitz and others have discussed factors which have motivated the institutionalization of governance systems designed to promote peace in specific divided societies. However, they have not contributed a general tool for assessing the likelihood of this activity comparable to Lijphart’s list of conditions that he believes to be favorable to the success of consociationalism. All of these are either phenomena which are likely to influence popular attitudes toward consociationalism or opinions concerning the advisability of specific elements of the system. The alternative approach suggested here does not indicate whether a specific system, such as consociationalism, is likely to be adopted or be successful. However, it does provide a simple means of evaluating whether systems that are mutually acceptable to potentially antagonistic groups are likely to be motivated by their members’ rational calculation of the costs and benefits to be incurred by themselves and their groups, if such means of governance were adopted.

This new theory posits that such a system will be adopted and maintained in a state if the potentially destabilizing groups within it believe that the system is either necessary or desirable. If they are motivated by feelings of state-directed patriotism that they share with the other such groups in their state, the system will be more likely to achieve stability. If their sentiments are not widely shared or if they advocate state unity or the specific system because they believe it is indispensable for their wellbeing, they may conceivably decide later that they do not require these things and subsequently exert destabilizing force. Two forms of state-directed loyalty can conceivably motivate desire for state unity and they are inspired by love of one’s ethnic or communal group and by love of one’s political system or philosophy for governance. Unless societies are simultaneously plural with regard to one form of communal identity and relatively homogeneous with regard to another, the variant inspired by one’s ethnic or communal group will not develop. The Netherlands is an example of a state that was plural because of its deep divisions involving religion and ideology but enjoyed patriotism motivated by the common Dutch ethnic identity possessed by most of its citizens. The unity and stability of the Netherlands and
Switzerland have also been bolstered by widespread patriotic feelings inspired by pride in the
countries’ political systems. Belgium and Canada do inspire some level of state-directed
patriotism by their potentially secessionist groups but apparently less than that exhibited by the
Dutch and Swiss groups which have rendered their states plural.

The primary force discouraging separatism and/or partition forced by resentful groups in
Belgium and Canada seems to have been their belief that the benefits they derived from
membership in these states so far outweighed its drawbacks so much that the status quo seemed
necessary for their wellbeing. In these countries, segmental autonomy, representation in
government, and political moderation were some of the factors which seemed to mitigate the
influence of their grievances. In contrast to Lijphart’s list of conditions favorable to
consociationalism’s success, this theory argues that the rational calculations which motivate the
maintenance of accommodative government are sometimes influenced by consociational
components, as well as in turn affecting the extent to which they might be used in the future. In
reference to Canada’s experience, it was observed that stability and intergroup harmony do not
always coexist but it is obvious that stability is a precondition for such harmony. Lijphart (1977,
p.2) argues that, in some states, “consociationalism by its very success... make[s] itself
superfluous.” When he published this statement in 1977, he believed this evolution was starting
to occur in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It has arguably only happened in
the Netherlands but analysis of that country’s experience provides some insights concerning how
this might occur. Strong ethnically motivated patriotism seems to have provoked creation of a
highly consociational governance system which, in turn, inspired additional, widespread state-
directed loyalty concerning the system itself. Popular satisfaction with the security of group
identities, secured through segmental autonomy and highly inclusive executives, was apparently
complemented by the incentives for moderation and cooperation provided by cleavages that cut
across each other and relative heterogeneity of regions. Over time, the members of these groups
seem to have become convinced that they no longer need to sacrifice some of their individual
political power to strengthen the potential power of their elite leaders. These ordinary people
apparently began to feel like they did not need the level of protection for their identities that this
delegation of political power enabled and (probably subconsciously) started to assume more
active roles themselves. Now that they felt that their identities no longer had to be defended in
the political arena, the Dutch people apparently began to feel aligned with more and more
divisions in their society, corresponding to a multitude of issues about which they possessed
strong opinions. At this stage, their perspectives as independent actors, rather than members of
embattled and potentially, political excluded groups, seemingly makes them more accepting of
the sort of increase in majoritarian decisionmaking that has occurred in the Netherlands.

Dutch experience suggests that, if stability evolves sufficiently to produce popular belief
in the security of group identities, intergroup harmony can result that could eventually produce
more individualistic popular perspectives concerning politics and acceptance of majoritarian
means of decisionmaking. Under those circumstances, majoritarianism would promote further
stability rather than permanent exclusion of potentially antagonistic groups. However, this chain
of events is unlikely to occur without state-directed patriotism or sufficient need for cohabitation
of states that, combined with optimal systems for promoting intergroup accommodation, may
eventually cultivate such patriotism. If this theory concerning motivations and political behavior
in plural societies is correct, the most effective, initial approach for bringing stability to plural
societies may be to encourage the belief that the mechanisms for achieving it are absolutely
necessary. If governance systems encouraging intergroup moderation and negotiation can be
implemented, these incentives can reinforce the already widespread feeling that the societies’
potentially antagonistic groups can, and need, to get along.

However, systems with such incentives are often less appealing to the leaders of such
groups who decide how their societies will be governed. Horowitz observes that some of these
elites “prefer” consociationalism to other forms of government “because its requirements are
formal, easy to fathom, and [supposedly] predictable in their consequences” (Horowitz, 1999a).
Leaders could be encouraged to adopt a relatively pure form of consociationalism which could
naturally mutate into a form of government including segmental autonomy, highly inclusive
coalitions, and phenomena that promote intergroup moderation. The first consociational
component, “grand coalition,” is commonly interpreted as requiring executive inclusion of all
potentially antagonistic groups. However, virtually every executive identified as consociational
has merely included some representatives of each major ethnic group. The Northern Irish power
sharing system was judged to be consociational but the exit of individual parties from its
executive did not legally mandate system dissolution. The system envisioned by Horowitz also
produces large, but not all inclusive, coalitions. Both types of coalitions respond to flanking
opposition parties and benefit from cross-community electoral appeals. Politicians’ need to
appeal across community divides also logically mitigates the negative influence of somewhat
inclusive coalitions, which could permanently exclude groups in the absence of such incentives
and consequently motivate them to destabilize their societies. The second consociational
component, proportional representation, is primarily introduced through electoral systems.
Lijphart prefers List PR but, because it is also a form of proportional representation, STV is also
considered compatible with consociationalism. STV is considered suboptimal by both Lijphart and his critics who stress the need for moderation incentives because its results are not as proportional as those of List PR and its incentives for moderation are not as intense as those of majoritarian AV, which can permanently exclude groups from power. However, it may be perfect for plural societies precisely because it combines proportional representation with incentives for moderation. If STV was introduced consistently, as in Northern Ireland, and accompanied by federalism in homogeneous units containing subdivisions, it may introduce proportional political empowerment and even greater incentives for moderation than would be achieved by STV on its own. Eventually, perhaps gridlock and party proliferation likely with STV in divided societies could inspire them to decrease the number of constituency members and thus make STV systems encourage cross-group electoral appeals even more. This reform could be facilitated through a constitutional provision for constitutional amendment through referendum. The percentages of states' populations needed to condone constitutional amendments could be modified to ensure consideration of all significant ethnic groups. The third consociational component, minority veto power, could be manifested through high vote percentage requirements for passage of culturally related legislation, thus necessitating additional cross-community appeals. If strictly restricted to cultural issues, the fourth component, segmental autonomy, would maintain groups' security but not engender excessive polarization.

Severely divided societies throughout the world are most likely to achieve long-term stability when the optimal means of doing so is identified through reference to their unique demographic and historical attributes, in addition to dominant sentiments expressed by their potentially antagonistic groups. The quantitative analysis conducted for this project sheds new light on the advisability of institutional and demographic factors which are most conducive to lasting peace in plural societies. The qualitative analysis supports and augments those findings and suggests that potentially destabilizing groups must either feel that they need or want state unity and mutually acceptable forms of government, before such systems can operate successfully. Unfortunately, the implication of this observation is that the need or desire for such systems could only conceivably be engineered by policymakers and academics by engendering conditions and mechanisms which seem to promote the dependence of such groups' leaders on the cultivation of stability in their shared states. Some such conditions and mechanisms seem to be cross-cutting cleavages, encouragement of overarching loyalty, limited majoritarian devices such as referendums, electoral systems like STV, and specially tailored federalism.
When such groups do feel that they need or desire state unity and a mutually acceptable form of government, their leaders of such groups tend to favor purely consociational systems and this project has found that the consociational components of grand coalition and segmental autonomy should optimally be combined with mechanisms promoting intergroup moderation and negotiation. However, when the motivations of these elites and their constituents are taken into consideration, specific consociational systems can be prescribed for them which they can potentially evolve into forms of governance that may benefit them more in the long term, without destabilizing their countries and when they feel as though they no longer have to fear disempowerment.
### Appendix A: The Cases: Who Are Their “Minorities At Risk”?1314

**Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Minorities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Berbers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Bakongo, Cabinda, Ovimbundu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Hutus, Tutsis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Northerners, Southerners</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Afars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Afars, Amhara, Eritreans, Nilo-Saharans, Oromo, Somali, Tigreans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Ashanti, Ewe, Mossi-Dagomba</td>
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13 The information in this table is taken from lists provided in these sources: Gurr, 1993, p.326-338; Gurr, 2000, p.321-336.

14 It should be noted that these Minorities at Risk are those identified in the 1993 and 2000 books by Gurr, which are cited above in footnote 1. For each country, only the groups identified in either 1993 or 2000 were used to create data. The 1993 list was used for this purpose, unless the country in question was only represented in the 2000 list. The only exception to this involves Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, for which the main groups identified by Lijphart were referred to during the data-making process. In some cases, it appears that the same group was referred to using slightly different terminology, in the 1993 and 2000 books. When it seemed obvious that two different terms referred to the same group, that group was listed once for its country. When this did not seem obvious, both terms were listed even though they may actually refer to the same group. For some countries, such as South Africa, political and social conditions profoundly changed between 1993 and 2000 but all groups listed in both publications were also listed above.
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### Appendix B:
The Plural Cases:
Comprising 88 Countries And Years Of Experience

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# Appendix C:
The Democratic And Plural Cases:
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Appendix D:

The Variables
And
The Data Collected To Represent Them

Independent Variables:

1. Somewhat Inclusive Grand Coalition
   - Can I find evidence that one or more MAR groups, which do not comprise all of their country’s MAR groups and are not identified as “advantaged” in Gurr’s dataset, are represented in the governing executive?
   - “0” = no; “1” = yes.
   - Separate values were made for each year, for each country, but many years for the same country have the same value.

2. Highly Inclusive Grand Coalition (not necessarily, fully inclusive)
   - Can I find evidence that all of a country’s MAR groups, which may be only one and are not identified as “advantaged” in Gurr’s dataset, are represented in the governing executive?
   - “0” = no; “1” = yes.
   - Separate values were made for each year, for each country, but many years for the same country have the same value.

3. Segmental Autonomy
   - Can I find evidence that MAR groups had the power to govern some aspects of their lives autonomously?
   - Incorporates information regarding restrictions on cultural organizations, official language status, legal autonomy, and homogeneous, geographically defined governance units. Data was first collected or made for these four components and then a positive value was given to any country that had low levels, or no, restrictions on cultural organizations, as well as positive values for one of the other three components.
There is one piece of data for each country that has been copied into cells corresponding to each year of that country’s experience. Each piece of data is either positive (“1”) or negative (“0”).

4. Minority Veto

- If it is assumed that MAR groups can gain representation in legislative bodies in proportion to their sizes, does their country’s constitution indicate that they could possibly exert a veto resulting in a changed policy decision?
- A separate piece of data was made for each year of each country’s experience.
- “1” if an MAR could do it alone, “.5” if a country’s MARs could do it collectively, “0” if none of these scenarios was possible. (so some values are not integers)

5. PR

- If there is electoral competitiveness, is a Proportional Representation system used?
- Taken from Philip Keefer’s World Bank Database of Political Institutions
- “1” if yes, “0” if no or if missing values are allocated to cases in Keefer’s database.
- Each year of each country’s experience is coded individually.

6. External Threats

- How big is the spread of ethnopolitical rebellion throughout the region surrounding each country?
- Taken from the Minorities at Risk database
- This is an index that was calculated for each decade so only one value is available for each decade and that was allocated in my database to each year in that decade.
- The Minorities at Risk codebook does not specify the possible values of this variable but the values of it used for this project are all positive numbers, including up to three decimal points, and no values are above 3.

7. Moderate Multiparty System

- If elections are competitive and if more than one party is represented in the legislature, what is the maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature?
- Taken from Philip Keefer’s World Bank Database of Political Institutions
• The codebook for this database provides no maximum score for this variable. If the Chief Executive’s party has an absolute majority in the legislature, the country receives a “0” for this variable.
• The values are calculated separately for each year of a country’s experience.

8. Geographical Concentration of Segments
• *Do Lijphart’s relatively homogeneous governance units, or Horowitz’s cross-cutting sub-country units, most characterize each country’s political system?*
• Every country except Fiji received one value for this variable that was then allocated to each year of its experience. Fiji was given separate values for two time periods because I knew it should be represented that way.
• Possible values are “0” = relatively heterogeneous, or “1” = relatively homogeneous

9. Population Size
• *What was the estimated population in thousands of the country as of 1990 or, if it was not independent then, as of 1995?*
• Taken from the *Minorities at Risk* database
• Values for the variable are provided for two years, 1990 and 1995. Since 1990 is within the period to be covered, each case representing one year of a country’s experience is allocated the country’s 1990 estimate. If the country did not exist at that time, the later estimate is used.
• Some of the values are not integers.

10. Socioeconomic Equality
• *How great are the objective, economic differences between the groups in each country?*
• Taken from the *Minorities at Risk* database
• Each country was given one mean value of this variable, corresponding to the period immediately before the country was included in the *Minorities at Risk* database. This value has been allocated to each year of the country’s experience in the database for my project.
• The variable is an economic differentials index with a seven-category scale and values ranging from -2 to +4. The more positive the value, the more inequality is present. The values are integers.
11. **Democracy**

- *How democratic is the country?*
- Taken from the Polity IV database
- Possible scores are integers between -10 and 10. The higher a country’s score, the more democratic it is. Negative scores indicate levels of autocracy.
- Separate values are provided for each year of each country’s experience.

**Dependent Variable**

12. **Stability**

- *Is the country stable?*
- * Higher values of this variable indicate higher levels of instability.*
- Data is calculated through addition of data provided for four variables in the Minorities at Risk dataset.
- Each year of each country’s experience is given a separately calculated value that is its protest score plus its rebellion score. However, these values differ annually only between 1985 and 1995. Different scores also exist for the periods, 1975-1979 and 1980-1984.
- The Minorities at Risk codebook explained that the protest scores are the highest observed level of protest in a time period, and are not cumulative scores. This is protest involving members of MAR groups. The scores for rebellion similarly correspond to the highest observed level in a time period and are also not cumulative. They indicate intensity of anti-regime rebellion by members of the MAR groups. There are two protest variables (PROT- which is supposed to be for each 5-year period from 1945-1999 & PROTI- which is supposed to be an annual score for 1985-2000). There are two rebellion variables (REBEL- which is supposed to be for each 5-year period from 1945-1999 & REB- which is supposed to be an annual score for 1985-2000).
- However, in the MAR database, scores for PROTI and REBEL are only available for the years 1975-1984 of my time period. PROT and REB do not have any scores for this time period. The PROTI and REBEL scores that are available for this period only differ between the two 5-year periods they cover. The score for each country’s experience, if the country existed from 1975, is the same for 1975-1979 and another identical one is given for each year between 1980 and 1984. The only scores available for PROT and REB are provided for 1985-1995 of my time period. They differ year by year.
• Between the variables PROTI, PROT, REBEL, and REB, I had data for each phenomena to use for each year but the values only changed annually from 1985-1995. For each year of each country’s experience, I added the two scores available. So, for each year between 1975 and 1984, I added PROTI and REBEL. For 1985-1995, I once again added what was available- scores for PROT and REB.

• The protest variables include scores corresponding to non-violent protest.

• No negative scores are provided for the dependent variable in my dataset, nor for the variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset that I used to compile this data. The higher the score, the more intense the destabilizing phenomena.

• Many of the scores are not integers and contain several decimal points.
Appendix E:
The Construction Of The Dependent, Stability Variable

The dependent, index variable used for this project represents stability. However, it should be noted that higher values for the variable actually correspond to greater instability. The data for this variable was the summed data taken directly from four variables in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. These variables involve protest and rebellion. The data for each year used for this project’s dependent variable were made by adding each country’s quinquennial MAR data for protest and rebellion for each year before 1985 and adding the corresponding annual MAR data to construct values for each year of countries’ experiences from 1985 until 1995.

The following passages in this appendix are quotes from the 2002 Minorities at Risk Dataset Users Manual, which was produced by Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Christian Davenport. These passages are the descriptions given by the Minorities at Risk project, to describe how the data used for this variable were made.

Values for the protest scores were made according to these criteria:

“The values coded are based on the highest observed level of protest in the given period and are not cumulative. These are recorded for 5-year periods from 1945 to 1999, and for annual periods from 1985 to 2000. Indicators are coded based on actions initiated by members of the group on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those who claim to exercise authority over the group” (Gurr et.al., 2002, p.168)

“Protest Index:
Missing Values: 99
Value     Label
0        None reported
1        Verbal Opposition
         (Public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.) Code requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence here.
2        Symbolic Resistance
Scattered acts of symbolic resistance (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property) or political organizing activity on a substantial scale. Code mobilization for autonomy/secession by a minority-controlled regional government here.

3 Small Demonstrations
A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation of less than 10,000.

4 Medium Demonstrations
Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation of less than 100,000.

5 Large Demonstrations
Mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation greater than 100,000.

99 No basis for judgment” (Gurr et.al., 2002, p.169).

Values for the rebellion scores were made according to these criteria (The specific type of rebellion reflected in this MAR data is “anti-regime rebellion”):

“The values coded here are based on the highest observed level of rebellion in the given period and are not cumulative. These values are recorded both for 5-year periods from 1945 to 1999 and annual periods from 1985 to 2000. These indicators are coded based on actions initiated by members of the group on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those who claim to exercise authority over the group” (Gurr et.al., 2002, p.174).

“Only the most serious manifestation of rebellion is coded for each of the... periods” (Gurr, 2002, p.175).

“Rebellion Index:
Missing Values: 99
Value Label
0 None reported
1 Political banditry, sporadic terrorism
2 Campaigns of terrorism
3 Local rebellions
   Armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they prove to be the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerilla or civil war during the year being coded, code the latter rather than local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority-controlled government here.
4 Small-scale guerrilla activity

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All of the following must exist:
1) fewer than 1000 armed fighters;
2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year); and
3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales

5 Intermediate guerrilla activity
Has one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity.

6 Large-scale guerrilla activity
All of the following must exist:
1) more than 1000 armed fighters;
2) frequent armed attacks (more than 6 per year); and
3) attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group.

7 Protracted civil war
Fought by rebel military units with base areas.

8 No basis for judgment

* All of the data available for protest or rebellion for each year between 1975 and 1995 through the variables described above was simply summed to create a value for each year. Higher values of this project's dependent variable indicate higher levels of instability, as manifested by protest and rebellion.
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