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
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**Presidential Institutions and
Democracy:
The Political Economy
of Succession and Term Limits**


Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science,
University of Dublin, Trinity College

2007

Alexander Baturó

Declaration

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at this or any other university and that it is entirely my own work. Parts of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have been presented previously at the at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, April 7-10, 2005; at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005; and at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, April 20-23, 2006. I agree that the Library may lend or copy the thesis upon request.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'A. Baturu', written over a horizontal line.

Alexander Baturu

Summary

This thesis focuses on the logic of succession and term limits in all presidential regimes (1975-2005). The aim is to describe presidential tenure institutions and succession strategies and outcomes, to explain these outcomes, and analyze their implications on democracy. The question of limited tenure is one of the oldest questions in political science, dating back to Hamilton and Jefferson. I evaluate their normative arguments by examining presidential succession, term limits and the observance using original data collected on 373 presidents from 1975-2005. I find that limited tenure is fundamentally important for the health of democracy because it prevents dictatorial takeover.

There is a strong association between limited tenure and democracy: democrats have limited tenure and step down when required, dictators have unlimited tenure and attempt to remain in office as long as possible. During the third wave of democratization many nations imposed tenure restrictions in a genuine attempt to build democratic institutions or to maintain the facade of democratic legitimacy. In advanced or consolidating democracies rulers are constitutionally prohibited from seeking more terms and they step down. In many transitional and developing nations, however, many rulers attempt to scrap limits and remain in office. Why are the latter more reluctant to leave office than those in the West, and what implications does it have for the health or survival of democracy?

In order to address these questions, I argue that rulers in different polities have different stakes of losing office and behave differently during succession. The high probability of ex post asset redistribution, lack of immunity and dire economic conditions make the stakes of losing office very high in many developing countries. To investigate how the value of political office affects the behavior of politicians, I focus on the most logical and direct manifestation of this value: presidential succession. When rulers value their office highly enough and face low executive constraints, they prolong the rule, when the costs of stepping down are low and they face high con-

straints, they step down. I also test for the influence of reputation and diffusion (emulation) effects. Using originally collected data on all presidential regimes in the world (1975-2005), I find that the impact of these costs and constraints on succession behaviour is roughly equal in substantive terms. In turn, presidential succession has consequences for democratic transitions, as successors are more likely to lose office than the long-standing incumbents. In this thesis I also examine survival in office and the determinants thereof, re-election and incumbency advantage, and implications of rulers' succession behavior on stability and breakdown of democracy and dictatorship.

In this dissertation I combine statistical and game theoretical methods, as well as an analytic narrative about presidential succession and survival in office. This dissertation contributes to the literatures on presidentialism, democracy and development, and on transitions to democracy. The broader implication of this thesis is that democracy practitioners should focus their attention not only on free and fair elections, but also on the executive tenure restrictions and the observance thereof.

Dedication

To my parents, Anna and Anton

Oh, President, shall I tell you the truth, the nitty-gritty? Public opinion's worth damn all. The notion that X is a viable successor because he is tremendously popular only works against the incumbent. It's conceivable that, once in office, without debts to anyone but the voters, the popular president will cut off all his obligations to the outgoing president. What you want and hope for is Y because he has your support and no one else's, because he is trailing in all the polls, because when he succeeds you he'll be indebted to you. Because, as a result, he'll be the most loyal of the lot.

Oh, President. A big mistake. If you select the man who owes you the most, you can be certain that he'll betray you in order to prove that he doesn't depend on you. In other words: he who owes you the most will feel under the strongest obligation to exercise his independence, or, to put it bluntly, his disloyalty. . .

Regardless of who wins the elections, the ex-President will always be, lethally, the ex-President. And every ex-President, it turns out, has skeletons in his cupboard. Crooked brothers, insatiable lovers, incorrigible sisters, deviant children, false proxies for his business interests, lifelong friends that cannot be condemned to death, who knows what else. . .

Carlos Fuentes. 2006. *The Eagle's Throne*.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation began as a puzzle that I had more than six years ago when I worked in the fields of international development and democracy promotion. I tried to understand why the process of democratic consolidation proceeded successfully in some nations, while it stalled or even reversed in many others. The discussions I had with my colleagues in the Freedom House and with other practitioners in the field of international development helped me to focus on the motivation of rulers in transitional and developing countries, what was at stake for them and what implications their behavior had for democracy. Ultimately, this and related puzzles led me to resume my academic career and resulted in this thesis. I am indebted to my former colleagues for their encouragement and enthusiasm.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Kenneth Benoit. It is hard to overstate how much he and his guidance changed the direction of this dissertation and my graduate school career. From him I learnt how to think big and engage in a large-n cross-national research, to see patterns and similarities and to ask interesting questions. Most importantly, his subtle sense of humor and his encouragement helped me enormously during all this time, especially at the initial stage of this project when nothing seemed to make sense or nothing appeared doable.

I have also been fortunate to interact and discuss my work with faculty members who have each contributed greatly to my research and education. I would like to thank Michael Laver, Gail McElroy, James Hyland, Ronald Hill, Michael Marsh, Michael Gallagher, Yee-Kuang Heng, Raj Chari, Robert Thomson and Jac Hayden for their thoughtful comments and suggestions, especially during the departmental seminars. It is not possible to overemphasize how much I learned from their classes and discussions in terms of methodology and substance. It was also my fortune that my teaching assistant assignment during my first and second years at school was for Gail McElroy who taught me how to think about politics scientifically and how to craft a good research design.

In addition to these faculty members, I would like to thank my graduate student colleagues and friends. I indebted to Jos Elkink, Slava Mikhailov, Alex Perez, Ecaterina McDonagh, Ken McDonagh, Shane MacGiollabhui, Matthew Wall and many others for their help in developing, refining, and advancing the arguments and empirical analysis of my papers, proof-reading and commenting on them. My largest debt must go to my friend and co-author Julia Gray who gave me support and feedback all these years, and provided comments on and proof-read many drafts of my papers.

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Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Natalie. She has witnessed and endured with me my entire graduate career, tolerating my psychotic episodes at its early stages and understanding my absence and absent-mindedness during the final, writing stage. She also proved that AutoCAD can be used not only in the interior architecture and design but also in political science, as can be seen from Figures 1.3, 2.1 and 4.2. For this, and everything else, I am grateful. To all those mentioned herein and those I unintentionally failed to include, I am indebted.

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Introduction

In this dissertation I provide a theory of presidential succession and term limits the world over. I investigate what presidents do when faced with the prospect of stepping down due to term limits, how the state of economic development and executive constraints affect presidential succession and outcomes thereof. I study the implications of succession on persistence and change of political institutions (endogenous institutions) and on the probability of democratic transitions. I examine the behavior of rulers with and without limited tenure, their re-election rates, incumbency advantage and implications thereof. I address the question of why rulers in the developing world are more reluctant to leave office than those in the West. I study democracy and dictatorship as the outcomes of individual strategies in pursuit of survival in office, and what determines these strategies. In order to answer these questions, I examine all presidential regimes in the world (1975-2004) through a mixture of statistical and game theoretical methods, as well as analytic narratives.

The scheduled 2008 Russian presidential succession and its saliency during President Putin's second and last term help to illustrate some of the arguments advanced in this thesis. Vladimir Putin is currently serving his last term, according to the Russian Constitution, and he is supposed to step down in spring of 2008. He has a choice between honouring the constitution, if he decides to step down, and amending it, if he decides to remain in office. The "2008 problem", has become the most salient issue in Russian politics since Putin's re-election in 2004, and is seen as decisive for the future of Russian democracy.¹

The majority of presidential regimes subject their chief executives to the legal requirement of stepping down after one or two terms in office. In 2005, 67 out of 93 (or 72 per cent) countries had limits on the number of terms their presidents could serve. Bans or restrictions on re-election are typically perceived as a safeguard against an executive's self-perpetuation in office (Shugart and Carey 1992).

¹*New York Times*. 2005, August 13. "Russia Moves on "2008 Problem," (by Steven Lee Myers).

The arguments on presidential tenure restrictions can be traced back to Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson in *The Federalist* (2004 [1787]). In a nutshell, the issue of term limits is at the heart of a dilemma about sufficient insulation of leaders for policy performance and the possibility of dictatorial takeover. The opponents of term limits follow Hamilton and argue against restricting voters' choice at elections, and emphasize the virtues of strong leadership and policy continuity. The proponents agree with Jefferson and warn that the possibility of a dictatorial takeover is too large a threat to ignore. Likewise, in Russia, those who want to amend the constitution argue that President Putin is too popular to discard and he has still to finish reforms he started, while others warn that a third term would signal the end of democracy in Russia.²

What can the Russian President do, if he decides to step down? He can abide by the Constitution and step down, come what may, or he can designate his successor in advance and make sure that the latter is well positioned to win elections and become the next president. In this case, can Vladimir Putin be sure that the next ruler will preserve his legacy and ensure his post tenure fate? In 2000 Putin himself was elected as his predecessor's designated successor. In 1999 he became Prime Minister, and the President of that time, Boris Yeltsin stepped down three months prior to the 2000 elections. As a result, his successor Vladimir Putin became a de facto President in the crucial pre-election period and consolidated his incumbency advantage. The succession was accompanied by a careful elite contracting and a pledge not to redistribute economic assets, acquired previously during the transitional decade of 1990s, ex post. Yet the consequent "redistribution" of the oligarchs that became rich under the previous president promptly ensued, once Putin was able to use his office to consolidate his executive power. At the moment President Putin and his winning coalition face a similar dilemma for 2008: to prolong rule or step down? In the latter case, the problem is how to ensure the ex post compliance in the absence of the rule of law and secure property rights (Shevtsova 2006a). Indeed, the rulers that are willing to step down have to be able to make a binding contract with their successors in order to avoid the redistribution of their assets and to ensure their immunity. "Russian political roulette may become perilous for the current political team and its economic interests should a new ruler seek legitimacy through a gradual rejection of the previous regime" (Shevtsova 2006b).

What can President do, if he decides to prolong his tenure? The menu of choice

²*The Guardian*. 2005, July 6. "Meet the Chief Exec of Kremlin Inc." *The Times*. 2006, December 16. "Kasparov Plays a Dangerous Game with Battle to Keep Putin in Check"

during presidential succession depends on a country's constitutional and political history, but there is an ample room for constitutional imagination as well. In the case of Russia and President Putin in 2008, the latter can simply amend the constitution and allow an additional third term ad hoc, like President of Namibia Nujoma did in 1998, or drop term limits altogether, as President Lukashenko in the neighbouring Belarus did in 2004. Alternatively, Vladimir Putin can reconfigure the political regime and empower Prime Ministerial office at the expense of the presidency and then become this Prime Minister, or he can pursue a further integration with one of the former Soviet states and become the head of a new state. There are still other, more ingenious designs. The President can step down but in fact remain in power, and rule by proxy. In his fascinating account of life under regime of General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Vargas Llosa (2000) described how the latter "appointed" his lieutenant Balaguer as the figurehead President of the Republic, while himself remaining the de facto ruler of a country. Finally, there is always an option of appointing oneself for life and abolishing elections – admittedly, very unlikely in Russia.³

What will President Putin do? Due to the abysmal record of predictions in social sciences, I have to follow Yogi Berra's maxim: never predict anything, especially the future. Indeed, there are still 1.5 years to go before 2008 elections in Russia, as of this writing. Putin himself seems to have given all the indications that he intends to step down.⁴ In fact, the president himself, quiet likely, is not one hundred per cent sure about the final outcome: there are many parameters that can still change and influence his decision-making about succession.

What we can do, however, and what this dissertation will attempt to accomplish, is to describe and analyze what other presidents the world over do when they face term limits and have to step down, what determines their choice, how confident we can be about our predictions, and examine the implications of choices that presi-

³In the neighbouring Kazakhstan, however, Rakhat Aliev, deputy foreign minister and son-in-law of President Nazarbaev, recently suggested: "The republican form of governance does not protect nations from dictatorship or from putsches or corruption. If we look at which political system has achieved obvious success in setting up a stable democratic society, strange as it may seem, the first on the list will be the monarchy. ... A sultanate would provide for greater stability than elections and better reflect a centuries-old tradition of government in which power belongs to a limited number of clans." (*RFE/RL*. 2006, September 5. "Kazakh's President Son-in-Law Calls for Monarchy." *RFE/RL Newsline*. Volume 10 Number 163).

⁴"I don't consider it appropriate to introduce any changes in the constitution," said Putin, 52, whose future is the subject of constant speculation. When pressed afterward by reporters about what post-presidential role he might seek, he said, "Let's maintain the suspense". *The Washington Post*. 2005, September 28. "Putin Says He Won't Seek 3rd Term: On Call-In Show, President Hints at Continuing Political Role in Russia", A14).

dents make during succession – on democracy, institutional change and stability, and policy-making.⁵ We can also compare across similar cases to uncover patterns and similarities in order to understand the range of possible outcomes. During Putin’s tenure, Russia regressed on its measures of democracy, as indicated by Freedom House combined index of civil liberties and political rights, – from 4.5 in 1999 to 5.5 in 2006, where 7 is the worst score. This leads many to predict that Putin is more likely to stay in power, as non-democratic regimes are associated with unlimited tenure for their chief executives. Indeed, such countries as Egypt, Syria or Tajikistan are among the most oppressive regimes in the world, and they don’t limit their executives.

At the same time, many non- and partly-democratic regimes impose limits on their rulers and the latter step down, when required. Indeed, many Latin American countries throughout XIXth and XXth centuries set up competitive presidential systems in which the incumbent presidents, when term limits approached, would decide on their successors, assure the latter’s victory during elections, and step down, when required (Przeworski and Curvale 2005, 24). Mexico provides such an example of a non-democratic regime that has arranged an orderly succession and enforced 6-year long single presidential terms for its powerful executives ever since 1934 (Castaneda 2000). Argentina had imposed a single six-year term between 1853 and 1949, until President Juan Peron became “indispensable”: “the fortune of this Argentine enterprise depends on the constitutional possibility that General Peron is reelected president of the republic by the free vote of its citizens, then we should remove the constitutional impediment that is consistent with neither political wisdom nor the historical circumstance in which the country finds itself.” (Sampay 1949, 289, quoted in Carey 2003, 124). Even dictator Anastasio Somoza Debalyle (1967-79) of Nicaragua chose to step down and to rule by military junta’s proxy between his terms, formally prohibited from immediate re-election. Apparently, to map the likely outcome of succession, whether a ruler prolongs or steps down, from a country’s levels of democracy alone is not obvious.

I find that out of 117 term-bounded presidents that reached term limits in 1975-2004, 79 per cent obeyed term limits and stepped down when required, and 21 per cent extended their terms. Term limits can be observed because of a very powerful precedent and agreement among elites, as the example of single six-year terms in Mexico illustrates. Also, rulers could introduce and obey term limits in the process

⁵The statistical model which I employ to predict succession outcomes in Chapter 4 predicts that the probability of tenure change for Putin is 0.83, with the standard error of 0.25.

of self-imposed liberalization to signal their democratic “type” to the international community. When a popular military junta that in 2005 overthrew the long-serving ruler Taya of Mauritania, promised political liberalization and return to a civilian rule, one of the first steps was to hold a referendum to restrict presidential tenure to two terms of five years’ length in June 2006.

Indeed, during the third wave of democratization many nations imposed elections and tenure restrictions in a genuine attempt to build democratic institutions or to maintain a façade of democratic legitimacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the proliferation of democratic regimes, many Western donors began conditioning the levels of foreign aid or investments on adherence to democratic procedures by the receiving countries. Many partly- and non-democratic regimes have learnt to use elections, however unfree and not fair, for their own advantage in order to appear legitimate (see Levitsky and Way 2002; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2002). Like elections, the executive term limits seem to have become a norm of modern presidential democracy. Unlike elections that can be manipulated, however, tenure restrictions cannot be manipulated: a given ruler either steps down when term limits approach or he does not. When presidents scrap their tenure restrictions as the time for scheduled departures approaches, so do they scrap what remains of their democratic legitimacy.

As a result, tenure changes can incur the withdrawal of foreign aid and various sanctions imposed on rulers and their regimes, not unlike sanctions imposed for electoral violations. Perhaps inadvertently, by imposing tenure restrictions at the onset of democratization, whether genuine or not, many presidents created very powerful focal points for societal, elite and international coordination against dictatorial takeover.

In Russia, if President Putin does step down when required despite his enormous power and declining regime openness, the crucial parameter that drives this choice is probably Putin’s commitment to preserve the prestige of Russia as a superpower, as well as his post tenure reputational costs: “Putin seems to understand what it would mean for him to stay beyond his constitutional term: He would [...] lose both the legitimacy of power and the respect of the world leaders’ club whose membership he so cherishes” (Shevtsova 2006b). He also seems to be confident in the affinity with a next ruler. The latter factor could also lower the stakes of stepping down. In the next section that describes the theory, I will discuss the major parameters that influence presidential succession.

What do Presidents do when they have to step down due to tenure restrictions and what determines the outcome of succession? While we expect the chief executives in advanced industrial democracies to honor their constitutions and to step down if required, the answer is not that obvious for many rulers of transitional and developing countries where constitutions are often changed. In 2004, the succession of President Kuchma of Ukraine proved that this process is by no means certain, as his successor lost to the pro-democratic candidate. When asked why did not he run for a third term himself, Mr. Kuchma replied that unlike Belarus, in which his fellow ruler Lukashenka dropped term limits, Ukraine could not afford international isolation, as 70 per cent of its exports went to the West.⁶ Unlike President Kuchma, Azerbaijani outgoing president Heidar Aliyev has been more successful: in 2003 his son Ilham Aliyev became successor and was duly elected in the first round. In contrast, many other post-Soviet presidents adopted a variety of institutional arrangements to prolong their rule. Some of them dropped term limits, others extended term lengths; some did so in the beginning of their rule, while others in the end. In Africa, quite recently, the presidents of Uganda (2005), Togo (2002) and Namibia (1998) extended their terms, while rulers of Nigeria (2006), Zambia (2001) and Malawi (2003) failed in their bids to extend their rule and had or will have to step down. In contrast, not unlike in the 2004 Ukrainian succession, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya's designated successor lost the race in 2002. Clearly, there is a variation in the outcomes of succession, and this needs to be explained. The aim of this dissertation is to describe the pattern of succession and prolongation strategies and outcomes, and to explain this pattern.

The Argument of This Thesis

Why are rulers in the developing world more reluctant to leave office than in the West? In order to answer this question and to explain ruler's behaviour during succession and the implications of the latter on democracy, I focus on how the state of economic development affects the incentives of politicians. Poor economic conditions in many developing countries render the costs (the stakes) of losing office very high indeed where the state provides "the fountain of privilege" (Bates 2001, Easterly 2001).⁷ This is especially true where the prospects of economic success

⁶*RFE/RL*. 2003, June 17. "Kuchma's Illusive 2004 Candidate". In *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, Volume 5, Number 2.

⁷Throughout this thesis I use stakes (also costs and risks) of losing office, the value of holding office interchangeably to denote the same concept: how valuable the political office for a ruler is

outside of political office are grim and there is a high probability of ex post asset redistribution and low probability of immunity. “High stakes imply that those in power are far less likely to give up power. The reason is that they have too much to lose from policy changes that would occur if they gave up power” (North et al. 2000, 28). The power-holders could lose their personal assets or face prosecution after they depart from power. Rulers evaluate their likely fate should they exit or remain in office, and act accordingly. In Africa, out of 93 presidents that exited from power in 1975-2000 period, 50 (54 per cent) died, were imprisoned or went into exile in the period of up to one year after they lost power. There is no surprise that this region, together with the Middle East and North Africa, witnessed the highest proportion of rulers extending their rule or having unlimited tenure.

Rulers that face high costs of stepping down “select” to stay in office as their best strategy and strive to prolong their rule, while those with low costs step down. In turn, long-serving rulers make their regimes persistent and thus render the prospects of democracy more slight. Leaders become more authoritarian the longer they stay in power, political decision-making ossifies (Bunce 1981). Some rulers, when faced with the prospect of stepping down due to term limits, deem the stakes of losing office low enough to step down and obey the constitution, while others value office highly enough to attempt to prolong their rule. Another parameter, executive constraints, determines how easy it is to remain in office, should a ruler decide to stay due to the high value of political office.

In a narrow sense, this thesis is about presidential succession and term limits. More ambitiously, however, this thesis is also about the motivation of a politician, why so many rulers strive to remain in power, and how their survival strategies influence the stability and breakdown of democracies and dictatorships. Rather than treating dictatorship as a black box, I argue that during succession leaders in developing world face the same decision problem as their counterparts in the West, but the stakes of losing office are sometimes perilously high for the former.

At its heart, the argument of this dissertation is very simple: when rulers face high stakes and low constraints, they prolong their rule; when faced with low stakes and high constraints, they step down. In an effort to build a generalizable theory of *The Political Economy of Succession and Term Limits* in all presidential regimes, I abstract from many details as well as potentially important variables.⁸ The primary

and what are the costs of stepping down.

⁸The term of Political Economy is used in a broad sense, as the general examination of the interaction between the state of economic development, political institutions and the incentives of

focus of this thesis is on the single actor: ruler, his or her motivation while he or she is in office, the evaluation of the likely post tenure fate and of the probability of remaining in office, constraints and his or her interaction with other actors. While the title of this thesis is *Presidential Institutions and Democracy*, I mainly focus on the institutions that regulate presidential tenure and abstract away from such important institutions as presidential legislative powers, electoral rules, and powers of appointment. However, as I will show throughout this thesis, using this simple actor-centered approach and focusing on *The Political Economy of Succession and Term Limits*, I am able to explain the important and not obvious outcomes of interest: endogenous institutions, survival in office, and transitions to democracy.

I find that long-standing incumbents are less likely to lose elections than their successors, that democratic transitions occur more often when incumbents step down and successors run in elections, and that many incumbents step down because of term limits. In this sense, the focus on presidential succession allows us to study not only democracy and dictatorship as the outcomes of rulers' pursuits of their survival in office, but also transitions to democracy.

Political Economy of Executive Tenure

The question of limited tenure is one of the oldest questions in political science, and the questions of political survival and succession are even older. In a nutshell, term limits are at the heart of a dilemma about sufficient insulation of leaders for policy performance and the possibility of dictatorial takeover. Long tenures and no restrictions on the number of terms entrench incumbency advantage and render the survival of democracy more difficult. The shorter the tenure, the fewer opportunities for a ruler to take over a regime (Barzel 2002, 261).

As stated previously, Hamilton and Jefferson were the first to argue systematically about presidential tenure restrictions in *The Federalist* (2004 [1787]). To summarize their theoretical discussion, the most serious argument against term limits seems to be that in a system with checks and balances, the abuse of power is already checked and term limits deprive voters of capable leaders; in the system without checks and balances, limits are meaningless as they can be easily scrapped. However, this argument does not take into account that the system of checks and balances does not exist in a vacuum and needs to be carefully maintained. In the

rulers during presidential succession.

absence of term limits, the ambitious executives can build up their incumbency advantage. Presidents can accumulate resources for the continuous re-election; as heads of the executive branches they establish and maintain networks of loyal clients, possess unique information advantages over their opponents, they are familiar to the voting public and enjoy the name recognition.

Elections are not sufficient to ensure that mandates are limited, as most incumbents lose office due to limits rather than elections (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). Checks and balances are not sufficient to prevent dictatorial takeover because of an inherent logic of self-perpetuation in power of multiple-term presidents. It is not only the lack of constraints that allows executives to stay in office “forever”, but also the other way around: the longer tenures are, the more opportunities are to consolidate power and decrease the constraints.

Democracy is associated with limited tenure, and dictatorship with unlimited tenure the world over. There is good fit not only between the number of terms and democracy, but also between a particular tenure arrangement and democracy: ranging from Freedom House average score of 2.8 for leader-years under a single four-year term arrangement (“electoral democracy”) to 5.8 for the one that prescribes the unlimited number of seven-year terms (“non-democracy”). The pattern is unambiguous: the longer executives are allowed to stay in office, the more repressive their regimes are.

Why are rulers in the developing world more reluctant to leave office than in the West, and why do we observe more presidencies with unlimited tenure in developing countries? The simple explanation is that there are more dictators in developing areas and there are democrats in industrial ones, so that dictators remain in office and democrats step down. However, this circular explanation does not address what makes dictators become dictators, and democrats remain democrats. There is a clear possibility of the selection bias. It would be easy to assume that rulers desired re-election and political immortality whenever they extended their tenure and they did not whenever they stepped down.

In order to begin addressing questions about stability and breakdown of democracy and dictatorship, I propose to focus on how presidents behave during succession and what influences the outcomes thereof. Rulers evaluate their future and decide on their succession strategy on the basis of their institutional and economic environment, the stakes of holding office and losing elections, and the constraints they face. Choices they make influence the type of political regimes their countries have:

democracies and dictatorships. It is the low risks (stakes) of losing elections that demarcates democracy from dictatorship, rather than that democracies have more democratic leaders and dictatorships are populated by the power-hungry autocrats: the mapping of political regimes from the identity and the attributes of their rulers is rather a more nuanced endeavor.

The continuum of costs of stepping down (value of political office) from low costs to high costs defines the very logic of political economy of executive tenure in dictatorship and democracy. While I focus on presidential regimes, term limits and succession as a particular and observable phenomenon of the logic of executive tenure, this explanation can be generalizable as a broader phenomenon of the value of political office in democracy and dictatorship, whether in the environment of elections or not.

Indeed, the question as to why rulers in developing world are more reluctant to leave office and what do they do to perpetuate themselves in power is very broad and could lead to the coverage of more cases and phenomena beyond succession strategies and outcomes in term-bound presidencies. Indeed, if the poor state of economic development, the lack of other options outside of office, the high costs of stepping down influence rulers' decision-making, they can perpetuate themselves in power by other means, such as through corrupt elections or by shutting down the parliaments. In this thesis I only look at one of the instances as to why some term-bound presidents are reluctant to leave office and what can explain their behavior.

I contribute to the literature on democracy and development by examining a link between how the macro-politico-economic variables, such as income levels, ethnic heterogeneity, black market exchange premiums and corruption, affect the incentives of rulers by rendering the stakes of losing political office high or low and, in turn, by mapping a link between these micro-foundations – rulers' incentives, to the observable macro-outcomes: endogenous institutions that regulate rulers' tenure, and, most importantly, development and consolidation of democratic and dictatorial regimes.

Origins of Tenure Institutions

Tenure institutions vary across the presidencies of the world: they range from such institutions as one single 4-year term only, as in Ecuador, — to the generously endowed, “king-like” institution of an unlimited number of 7-year terms, as in Syria.

The type of tenure institution, the number of terms and the length of each term affect the time horizons of rulers and their policy making, their survival strategies and succession. The presidents bounded by a single 4-year term with no prospect of re-election behave differently from those serving two terms of five years each with a high probability of re-election: longer horizons in office affect horizons in policy decision-making (Franzese 2002).

Earlier I outlined the logic of succession and term limits for the chief executives: facing restrictions, rulers choose between stepping down and prolonging their rule. I select the sample of all presidential regimes in the world during the third wave of democratization, 1975-2004. In 2005 there are 93 presidential regimes and this number is lower in earlier periods.

In order to address the questions I pose in this thesis, I need to know what tenure institutions presidents of the world have, whether they have limits and have to step down, or they don't, and how many terms they have. The available data that I found was either limited to a particular period and region, as in Carey (1997) regarding Latin America; or with errors and omissions, as in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001); or focused on particular regions and certain parameters, such as the Archigos dataset (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006). Instead, in the beginning of 2005, I collected data on presidential tenure arrangements throughout the world for 1975-2004 period, and included such parameters as the number and length of terms, year of a constitutional amendment, whether terms are consecutive or not, and I matched particular arrangements with presidents at the time.

This data also allows us to observe changes in tenure institutions. If presidents change their terms, how often do they do so? If the rulers enter office without limits in the first place, there is no need to extend their rule. Likewise, if there are limits on the executive tenure, the ambitious rulers have to go through a different decision-making than they do if there are no restrictions. In other words, institutions of term limits have their origins, and I test whether it is possible to explain the patterns of tenure institutions nowadays on the basis of countries' colonial or legal origins of political institutions, as well as by regional clustering or the tenure institutions in the past. It is conceivable that countries simply "inherit" their tenure institutions from the time of the latter's adoption after independence, and terms do not change ever since. Using a series of multinomial logit regressions, I find some evidence for regional or group clustering, such as the tendency for most countries with the

Spanish colonial origins to have a single presidential term, or for countries that had 7-year length in 1975 to have the same length 30 years later, and the like. Yet, due to the small sample size, the evidence is not conclusive. Most importantly, the data indicates that a great number of presidents change their tenure arrangements, some of them even several times, and we should turn to the leader-level for an explanation instead.

Survival in Office, Incumbency Advantage and Term Limits

What determines survival in office in democratic presidencies and how relevant are tenure restrictions for political survival? The existing literature on political survival subscribes to the view that term limits are not important for survival in office. Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) argue that term limits have little effect on longevity, as they can be easily scrapped.

I try to assess whether term institutions matter for survival. In contrast to Cheibub and Przeworski's (1999) study that examined 86 democratic presidents, 1950-1990, and found that survival in office was independent of economic performance, I look at 373 presidential regimes the world over, 1975-2005, be they democratic or dictatorial. I find that barring term limits and all things being equal, the probability of re-election in presidential regimes is close to 1 throughout the world. When sitting presidents present themselves for re-election, the odds of winning elections are 5 to 1 in their favor, on average.

But does this ability to present oneself for re-election and, consequently, win stem from the absence of term limits which allows this continuing re-election, or from the overall degree of authoritarianism, so that more authoritarian leaders can run as many times as they please? In other words, do tenure institutions have separate effects on survival or does the degree of authoritarianism alone explain political survival?

To address this question, using an additional tenure institution parameter, I re-examine two models of political survival, well known in the literature. I focus on term limits at entry into office. If the former determine survival in office, and the expected entry horizons — for example, in a presidency with two constitutionally allowed terms of four years each, the entry horizon is eight years, — match presidential tenure lengths actually served, it indicates that terms are not easy to change. If they are easy to change, then tenure institutions should not influence tenure length,

the degree of authoritarianism should. I find that it is not only the lack of constraints that allows the executives to stay in office “forever”, but also the other way around: the longer tenures, the more opportunities to consolidate power and lower these constraints. In other words, the self-perpetuating executive power can undermine the system of checks and balances.

I find that tenure institutions at entry into office have statistically significant effects both on the hazard rate and on how this hazard rate changes over time, independent of the overall degree of democracy and of other regime parameters. This separate effect can be attributed to the fact that tenure institutions can be costly to change, as they provide important focal points against dictatorial takeover for the elites, mass public and the international community. Many regimes that imposed limits on their chief executives during the third wave of democracy and that often manipulated elections, found it too costly to drop restrictions on presidential tenure once the time for their presidents to depart approached, as I demonstrate later on in this thesis. To understand the costs of tenure changes, I turn to explore why do some presidents step down while others prolong their rule, that is, what makes certain incumbents remain incumbents.

The Value of Political Office, Term Limits and Succession

The state of economic development determines the stakes of losing office in presidential regimes and thereby development affects rulers’ succession behaviour. And since, as I will argue below, the outcomes of succession affect the probability of democratic transition, development indirectly influences democracy by structuring rulers’ incentives through shaping the balance of costs and benefits.

Economic development affects the stakes of losing office in two ways. Firstly, if access to the State is very important for economic success, rulers are concerned whether they will remain well-off after their exit from office. Very often, continuing access to State in many developing countries, and financial and economic success crucially depends on concessions and public work contracts that are secured from the state, and through rent-seeking (Easterley 2001; Bates 1999).

Secondly, low incomes, inequality and poor protection of property rights make certain actions in office, certain policies, more likely than others: politicians are more corrupt in developing countries not because they are vile, but because they can get away with it. Hence their behavior while in office also often affects their

likely post-tenure fate. The manner of the asset acquisition renders the prospect of the ex post asset legitimating and immunity problematic. Likewise, in multiethnic developing countries, succession could usher in a different ethnic group, that could make the exclusion from office permanent for a ruler and his winning coalition.

Rulers that are willing to step down have to be able to make a binding contract with their successors in order to avoid the redistribution of their assets and to ensure their immunity. They select their successors on the basis of affinity with the latter. Another parameter, executive constraints, determines how easy it is to remain in office, should a ruler decide to stay due to the high value of political office.

In order to understand the process better, in this thesis I examine the decision problem that every president faces during succession. His choice over prolonging his rule and stepping down depend on the expected probability of a successful tenure change, the values of office and of life “outside-of-office” and the ruler’s ideology (how committed the ruler is to democracy vis-a-vis his commitment to office per se, and how much he values his reputation so as to risk the tenure extension). It also depends on the executive constraints and the tenure prolongation experience of other rulers in a “peer” group (“demonstration”). I stipulate that the utility of staying in office increases as the value of office vis-a-vis life outside of office increases, when the ruler does not value democracy as his ideology or discards his reputational costs, when the experience of other rulers ex post is unenviable, when the expected affinity with the next ruler is low, and when the constraints are low.

For analytical purposes, I count three possible outcomes in presidential succession. Firstly, rulers can prolong their tenure by whatever means at their disposal and remain in power (no succession). Secondly, they can step down (by appointing a successor and making sure that the latter wins with some non-negative probability). Thirdly, they can attempt to prolong their rule, fail, and step down as a result. If stakes are low, constraints are high, the ruler is deterred and steps down. The example of such outcomes can be found in most industrial democracies. If stakes are high and constraints are low, ruler prolongs (save some idiosyncratic reasons, such as poor health or a binding pledge of immunity). All five Central Asian republics represent this outcome: presidents extended their terms in 1990s, facing very limited opposition. If stakes are high, and constraints are high (or their strength is uncertain), the ruler chooses to prolong, and succeeds or fails with a certain probability. While the first two outcomes can be predicted, as demonstrated by a series of statistical models employed throughout this thesis, the third outcome is hardly

predictable by statistical analyses. The latter depends on the skills of the opposing players, “the human factor” and errors that the actors make.

Then I operationalize the stakes of losing office, constraints, regional diffusion effects, entry horizons and reputational concerns and estimate tenure changes empirically, using a sample that includes all presidents that entered office with term limits. The costs of stepping down are a function of the income in the country, ethnic polarization, the probability of immunity after the exit from office, the black market exchange premium, levels of corruption and events during leader’s tenure that are likely to affect his post tenure fate. Alongside “stakes,” regional demonstration effects and the length of time horizons at entry into office, I also propose the hypothesis that the executive constraints make it more difficult to extend the terms. The strength of constraints on the executives will also serve as an alternative hypothesis: levels of authoritarianism, constraints on the executives alone can explain whether presidents extend their tenures or not. In other words, democrats step down, dictators extend their rule.

The sample includes all presidents that entered office *with* term limits in presidential regimes: 276 presidents (full sample). There are 190 presidents that either prolonged their terms or stepped down “regularly” prior to 2004 and I conduct the majority of estimations using this smaller sample, as it excludes those rulers that are still in power and therefore still can extend their rule and those that simply could not because they were ousted. The unit of observation is a leader and the dependent variable is whether ruler steps down or extends his rule. Most of the predictors are averages calculated for the last three years before exit from office or before extension, or averages per leader’s tenure. I find that higher stakes at elections, lower constraints, previous successful term changes in the region and longer horizons increase the probability of tenure change. I also find some evidence for the reputation’s concerns. Finally, I discuss the substantive impact of each predictor in light of the expectations from the preceding theoretical section. Additionally I specify a duration dependent logit (restricted transition) model on the binary time-series cross-section data and obtain similar results.

Presidential Succession and Democratic Transitions

Earlier I stated that the probability of incumbent re-election is very close to 1, barring term limits. In the previous section I described how rulers facing different

stakes of losing office prolong their rule or step down. When they decide to leave office, their successors run instead. Does presidential succession render the probability of democratic transition more likely and why? Transitions to democracy almost always result from splits within authoritarian regimes (Di Palma 1990; Karl 1990; Przeworski 1991; Stepan 1986). Since the process of presidential succession introduces uncertainty about the distribution of power in society and likely outcomes, not unlike in the event of the incapacity or death of the personalist ruler (Geddes 1999, Huntington 1991), I investigate whether democratic transitions are more likely during presidential succession than when the incumbent presents himself for re-election.

I find that presidential successors are more likely to lose elections than long-standing incumbents, as the process of presidential succession often triggers elite splits and uncertainty and successors have yet to consolidate their incumbency advantage. When incumbents run, the liberalizing electoral outcomes occur in only 6.8 per cent of elections, when successors run, they occur in 60 per cent of elections in presidential regimes (1990-2004). In turn, since the latter lose to the pro-democratic opposition, incumbency influences the probability of successful democratic breakthrough. Finally, I find that in 60 per cent of elections in this sample the incumbents do not run because of term limits, while in the remaining cases they do not run because they die or exit “irregularly”. This suggests that term limits are a very important obstacle which prevent incumbent executives from standing for re-election.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation develops the arguments outlined in this introduction and is organized as follows. Chapters 1 and 2 chart the relationship between democracy and limited tenure, the effects of incumbency and term limits on democracy and dictatorship. Chapter 2 also charts the patterns of tenure institutions throughout the world. Chapter 1 develops the theory, and also reviews the literature. I also review the literature wherever relevant in empirical chapters to follow. Chapter 2 is the data section in this thesis, but it also tests hypotheses. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the individual level of rulers and investigate statistically political survival, incumbency and term limits (3) and the value of political office, term limits and democracy (4). Chapter 5 is a case study that examines the internal workings of the theory. Chapters 4 and 5 employ elements of game theory. Finally, Chapter 6

investigates statistically presidential succession and transitions to democracy.

Chapter 1 provides theoretical blueprint for the empirical chapters to follow. I analyze what arguments political scientists and political theorists used for and against restricted tenure. I discuss limited tenure, ruler's motivation, the stakes of losing office in different polities and constraints rulers face, implications of incumbency advantage for democracy and democratic transitions. Chapter 1 also serves as literature review. I explain the foundations and assumptions that this thesis is built upon and how it contributes to several literatures: comparative presidentialism (e.g., Shugart and Carey 1997; Cheibub 2006) survival in office (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bienen and Van der Walle 1991); democracy and development (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000); transitions to democracy (e.g., Geddes 1999; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986) and democracy and dictatorship (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Olson 1993).


In Chapter 2 I aim to “get the data right” and describe cross-country patterns of presidential tenure arrangements and changes thereof, as well as the empirical relationship between democracy and limited tenure. I explain the sample selection and describe the originally collected data on term limits in world presidencies. I also attempt to predict the tenure institutions in 2005 on the basis of historical characteristics, such as colonial or legal origins.

In Chapter 3 I explore the impact of tenure institutions and degree of democracy on presidential incumbency advantage and survival in office. Using an additional tenure institution parameter, I re-examine two models of political survival, known in the literature. I also examine re-election rates and the incumbency advantage, as explained earlier in the introduction.

Chapter 4 is “the core” chapter of the dissertation. I build upon the theory developed in Chapter 1 of how the state of economic development influences the stakes of losing office, which in turn, affect rulers' succession behaviour. I present presidential succession as ruler's decision-problem; and I also present elite interaction over succession in extensive form. I operationalize “stakes” and “constraints”. Finally, using a battery of statistical techniques, I estimate the probability of tenure change in presidential regimes with term limits at entry into office, and evaluate the results through a series of post-estimation techniques.

In Chapters 2 to 4 I employ various statistical methods to estimate tenure changes, incumbency and survival in office. It is extremely difficult to predict the

Figure 1: Dissertation Roadmap



outcome of a succession scenario when both the stakes and constraints are high, however. In Chapter 5 I employ the analytic narratives with elements of game theory in order to examine the internal workings of a theory, as described in Chapter 1. I focus on the presidential succession in Ukraine in 2004 as the case, in which the main regime and country parameters of interest represented the regional average, and in which a number of strategies resulting in diverse outcomes were possible. I argue that a number of puzzles during the Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine can be explained if we focus on how the president interacted with other players over succession. This case also illustrates the importance of the elite interactions during succession for transitions to democracy.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I examine the effects of incumbency advantage and, indirectly, term limits – on the probability of democratic transition. I use data on liberalizing electoral outcomes (1990-2002) (Howard and Roessler 2006) and update it to include all elections held in presidential semi- and non-democratic regimes in 2002-04 period to construct a largely modified dataset. I estimate four logit regression models and an OLS regression and discuss the impact of incumbency on the probability of democratic change. I also examine all outlier cases in which incumbents ran and lost or successors ran and won, as well as the reasons for the absence of incumbents in some elections in order to illuminate the causal mechanism and see whether theory holds under adverse conditions.

Chapter 1

The Political Economy of Executive Tenure

1.1 Introduction

On May 18, 2006 Nigerian Senate rejected the proposed constitutional amendment to allow President Obasanjo to stand for a third term in elections scheduled for 2007, thereby halting the tenure prolongation controversy that had been the most salient and divisive political issue in this African nation for more than a year.¹ The president's bid was backed by a group of regional governors that strived to extend their own tenures on the same basis, by the supporters that wanted him to complete his economic reforms and, allegedly, by a group of businessmen with close links to the president.² Mr. Obasanjo himself had never said in public that he wanted to stay, thus heating the controversy even more. One of his supporters was quoted as saying in the local press: "Nigeria at this point needs a ruler in the mould of Obasanjo, we need a ruler with elements of dictatorship. This is how we can move forward. I think he should be given more years to complete the good work he started".³ The opposition to a third term was just as vocal, and ranged from the civil society groups and many Western governments to Obasanjo's own Vice-President. Why did so many political actors, both on the elite and mass level, oppose a third term for

¹After gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria went through a series of military coups and political instability. The latest coup was launched by General Abacha in 1993. In 1999 the military relinquished power to a civilian authority and Olusegun Obasanjo, himself a former general and a leader of 1976 coup, won 1999 presidential elections and in 2003 was re-elected for a second term.

²*Economist*. 2006, May 18. "A President Frustrated."

³*Reuters*. 2005, July 26. "Analysis-Could Nigeria's Obasanjo Serve a Third Term?"

the Nigerian President? What could be the purpose of restricting voters' choice by eliminating one contender for the highest office?

The opponents to a third term hailed the failed bid as a victory for Nigeria's democracy. Indeed, limited mandate and limited tenure are essential for democracy. Term limits, by restricting tenure, limit the mandate of elected officials. Limited mandate, as well as a robust system of checks and balances are indispensable for democracy to survive (*The Federalist no. 51* 2004 [1788]). But if checks and balances worked in Nigeria, as manifested by the successful opposition to a third term for the president, then restricting tenure could also be seen as a redundant and, perhaps, undemocratic measure, since the president was already constrained by the existing checks and balances. Surely, should a president have decided to transgress his constitutional boundaries in the future, these checks and balances could have prevented him from doing so, or the voters would have defeated him in elections?

In another African country, Uganda, the incumbent president Yoweri Museveni reneged on his previous promise made in 2001 that his second term would be his last and, despite a battery of criticism both from the international donors and domestic opposition, proceeded with a referendum in July 2005 that lifted the restrictions. Following this constitutional change, Museveni stood for as the candidate of the ruling party and in February 23, 2006 comfortably won elections in a first round. A former U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, Carlson, warned that:

We may be looking at another Mugabe and Zimbabwe in the making. Many observers see Museveni's efforts to amend the constitution as a re-run of a common problem that afflicts many African leaders – an unwillingness to follow constitutional norms and give up power (*Boston Globe* 2005, May 1).

The comparison with Mugabe is indeed alarming. The latter has ruled Zimbabwe since 1979, first as a Prime Minister, then, after creating a very powerful presidency in 1987, as a president without tenure restrictions. Under his tenure, Zimbabwe became one of the most repressive and mismanaged regimes in the world today. Indeed, in the last 10 years Zimbabwe has enjoyed the dubious privilege of a country with the top inflation. Thus, the projected inflation rate for 2007 is 5,200 per cent.⁴ After claiming victory in a fraudulent poll in 2005, Mugabe pledged to

⁴*Financial Times*. 2007, March 17. "Zimbabwe Teachers Find Earnings Add Up to 4.5 bananas a day." P.7.

remain in power until he is 100 years old.⁵ Given that he was 81 at that time and assuming that his health indeed allows him to do so, the absence of tenure restrictions theoretically allows for the possibility of remaining in office till 2024.

The question of limited tenure is one of the oldest questions in political science, and the questions of political survival and succession are even older. In fact, the questions posed regarding a third term for Nigerian President are the very questions posed by Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson more than 200 years ago regarding the U.S. presidents. This thesis addresses many of these and related questions using empirical and game theoretic tools of contemporary political science. In this chapter I provide the theoretical arguments as to how limited tenure demarcates democracy from dictatorship and why term limits are necessary to ensure limited mandate.

In the first section, I discuss the importance of limited tenure and presidential term limits, and what arguments political scientists and theorists used for and against restricted tenure. Term limits restrict the time that rulers can serve in office, irrespective of their performance and of citizens' desires to vote for them. Long tenures and no restrictions on the number of terms entrench incumbency advantage and render the survival of democracy more difficult. Leaders become more authoritarian the longer they stay in power, as I will demonstrate later in this thesis. Elections are not sufficient to ensure that the mandate is limited, as most incumbent presidents lose office due to limits rather than elections, as I will discuss below. Checks and balances are not enough to prevent the dictatorial takeover because of an inherent logic of self-perpetuation for multiple-term presidents.

The United States democratic system has survived until 1951 despite the institution of presidency without term limits and dictatorial takeover never happened.⁶ The question arises as to why we should be so concerned about dictatorial takeover and why we don't expect all politicians to step down when required? In order to answer this question, in the second section I discuss what we know about the motivation of politicians and the stakes of losing office in different polities. The state of economic development has an indirect effect on democracy, as poor economic conditions in many developing countries render the stakes of losing office very high, and the prospects of economic success outside of political office are grim and there is a

⁵*Observer*. 2005, April 3. "Mugabe claims poll landslide has sent a message to Blair" (by Andrew Meldrum).

⁶Putting aside the powerful precedent not to stand for a third term, in legal terms until 1951, when 22nd Amendment has been ratified that limited presidential tenure to two terms, the United States had had no restrictions on a number of terms their presidents could serve.

high probability of ex post asset redistribution and low probability of the immunity for acts committed while in office, such as for corruption or human rights' abuses. As a result, rulers that face the high costs of stepping down “select” to stay in office as their best strategy and strive to prolong the rule, while those with the low stakes step down.

From the continuum of these costs of stepping down (stakes of losing office), I map democratic, partly-democratic and non-democratic presidential regimes and succession behavior of their rulers. In fact, this continuum defines the very logic of dictatorship and democracy, as well as the motivation of rulers in these two types of regimes, and I focus on presidential regimes, term limits and succession as a particular and observable case that represents a broader phenomenon of the value of political office in democracy and dictatorship.

I address a number of possible reasons for why some presidents extend their tenures but not others. Apart from the stakes of losing office, executive constraints affect the succession behavior of rulers. Indeed, strong executive constraints make it very difficult for presidents to remain in office even if the stakes of losing office can be very high. I discuss executive constraints, stakes of losing office, the prospect of redistribution of assets and ex post immunity, the strength of the opposition, the possibility of elite cooperation and political institutions as possible independent variables influencing the dependent variable — rulers' succession strategies and the success thereof.

1.2 Limited Tenure, Historical Debate

A limited mandate for elected officials is a central concept in the theory of representative democracy. A robust system of checks and balances is indispensable for democracy to survive, as “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” (*The Federalist no. 51* 2004 [1788]). It is axiomatic in the theory of constitutionalism that state power should be limited and checked in order to avoid the possible danger of dictatorship. On the other hand, checks and balances must be set in a way so as not to hinder policymaking and the responsiveness of the government. There is a trade-off between the sufficient degree of insulation of leaders for the adequate policy performance and the possibility of dictatorial takeover (Alesina et al. 2004). Different polities address this trade-off differently by having diverse institutional designs. In the discussion of the tenure restrictions that follows, I will rely on the

historical arguments that were used for and against presidential term limits in the United States and Latin America, and show that these arguments are still relevant for contemporary presidential regimes.

Contemporary political science literature that investigates term limits gravitates towards two strands: the positive political theory (public choice), and empirical literature that conducts an investigation of the various effects of term limits. The public choice reiterates the arguments of the Founding Fathers, utilizing the tools and rigidity of formal analysis. The empirical literature investigates the effects of the term limits for the US or state legislators on various measures of their performance.

When we discuss tenure restrictions, that is, restrictions that do not allow one to serve longer than the specified length of time, we discuss limits on the mandates of politicians. The mandate of elected officials is limited in time, by the requirements to subject the power holders to elections at regular intervals, typically between 4 to 7 years. In the words of Hamilton:

Between the commencement and termination of such a period, there would always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of annihilation would be sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man endued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that there would be time enough before it arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue (2004 [1787]).

The regular elections are meant to provide regular checks on the performance of the elected officials, make them accountable to the citizens and provide the opportunity to reflect the changing values and ideas of society at large by debating these ideas during elections and by rotating public representatives. In other words, regular elections assist in maintaining the principal-agent relationship between the public, the principal, and the elected representative, its agent. Since the public does not possess perfect information about the services of its agent most of the time, elections provide the venue to debate and assess the quality of services provided by its agent. In 1787, during the birth of the American Republic, some delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional convention discussed limiting the future chief executives to a single six- or seven-year term (Madison 1787 [1966], 356-61). One of the leading authors of the American Constitution, who also wrote a lot about term limits, Alexander Hamilton, recommended intervals of four years and in *The Federalist Paper n. 71* (2004 [1787]) wrote that,

It may be asked also whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious design would be too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired fairness and independence of the magistrate.

Limited mandate in parliamentary democracies is ensured by electoral cycles. In addition to the regular elections, most presidential regimes subject their chief executives to the legal requirement to step down after one or two terms in office. The logic behind the institution of term limits is that the power of the chief executives and the temptation of office are so high, that the citizenry needs extra safeguards in addition to regular elections and the system of checks and balances. While many leaders in parliamentary systems can serve 2, 3 or even 4 terms, in a *democratic* presidential regime it is hardly possible for a leader to serve more than 2 terms.⁷ The majority of presidential regimes subject their chief executives to the legal requirement of stepping down after one or two terms in office. The bans or restrictions on re-election are typically perceived as a check on presidential power, or, more specifically, as a safeguard against an executive's self-perpetuation in office (Shugart and Carey 1992, 88).

1.2.1 Arguments Against Limited Tenure

The debate about presidential tenure and the possibility of dictatorial takeover is as old as presidentialism itself. Indeed, these concerns originated among the founders of America's many republics who faced the problem of how to maintain political stability in the absence of monarchy (Carey 2003, 120).

Most of the contemporary arguments regarding the executive tenure and term limits can be traced back to Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist papers* No. 71 and 72 (2004 [1788]). Hamilton was against term limits on the basis that the latter would hinder the policy continuity and institutional memory:

To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert. . .

⁷For example, Felipe Gonzáles of Spain (1982-96) served 4 terms, same as Helmut Kohl of Germany (1982-1998). Margaret Thatcher of UK (1979-90) won 3 elections before she was ousted by her own party. Currently serving John Howard of Australia (1996-) won 4 consecutive re-elections.

also, limits do not create the adequate incentives to perform:

One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period.

and, therefore, induce kleptocratic behavior:

An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory.

In the related discussion, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 313-319) argue that as the end of their legal term approaches, leaders know that they will be removed regardless of their policy performance and this fact undermines their incentive to perform. However, the authors do not test this hypothesis empirically. Besley and Case (1995) analyze the difference between first and second terms among the term-bound U.S. states' governors and find that a variety of policy measures, such as state taxes and spending are higher in the second term when term limits induce office-holders to feel less pressure to please the voters. Likewise, List and Sturm (2006) found that politicians are more sincere in their last term in office, on the state level. Other studies find no significant changes in voting patterns in a representatives' last term in office (Lott and Bronars 1993).

Hamilton further argues that limits could induce dictatorial takeover (rather counter-intuitively):

An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on the summit of his country's honors, when he looked forward to the time at which he must descend from the exalted eminence for ever, and reflected that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse; such a man, in such a situation, would be much more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power.

term limits are also not desirable because they restrict voters' choice and deprive the latter of the experienced representatives:

What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban of the Constitution, and to declare that the moment it is acquired, its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it was acquired, and to which it is adapted?

Likewise, Squire (1988) argues that the institutional constraints might squander quality leadership by forcing elected officials out of office earlier than they might do otherwise, thus reducing the utility of the voters. Also, Linz (1994) warns that one of the main flaws of the presidentialism is that the rule of no reelection could prevent a competent and popular chief executive from remaining in power.

Hamilton also argues that restrictions endanger the nation at the time of war:

Without supposing the personal essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental to the community.

Indeed, this very argument has been used to justify the continuing nomination of President F.D. Roosevelt for presidential elections during the World War II (Stein 1943). Hamilton dismissed the arguments for term limits as not very compelling. In his view, term limits could not promote the independence of a ruler as the latter would be concerned with how his choices in office affect his post tenure fate:

while it was conceivable that security of the people would be promoted by restricted tenure under certain circumstances, it could be just as much endangered by forcing ambitious rulers facing limits to extend their tenure via usurpation.

Following independence of former Spanish Colonies, some newly sovereign Latin American nations briefly experimented with parliamentary and plural executive systems, such as the multiple-executive junta in Peru (1822-23), but these arrangements proved very unstable and short-lived. Likewise, due to the legacy of heavy-handed

Spanish colonial rule, monarchical experiments in Latin America also proved to be short-lived and many rulers who harbored monarchical ambitions suffered an “irregular” fate (Sondrol 2005, 518-19).⁸ Instead, all Latin American nations adopted presidential form of government. Initially, the new presidential regimes did not have term limits or the provisions pertaining to executive tenure were not explicitly spelt out.

The Great Liberator, Simon Bolivar, in 1828 advocated for the Constitution of Gran Colombia⁹ to include the lifetime presidency with the president’s ability to select a successor. Bolivar argued for the institution of a life-long presidency as a supreme arbiter of the nation, whose powers will be strongly curtailed by checks and balances and, therefore, weak:

In 1826, The President of the Republic, in our Constitution, becomes the sun which, fixed in its orbit, imparts life to the universe. This supreme authority must be perpetual, for in non-hierarchical systems, more than in others, a fixed point is needed about which leaders and citizens, men and affairs can revolve. . . . For Bolivia, this point is the lifetime presidency [*presidencia vitalicial*].¹⁰

These two-hundred-year-old arguments about presidential tenure are still relevant and being debated in contemporary presidential regimes. The ruling elites and citizens at large discuss and weigh the benefits of policy continuity and the ability to elect whomever they prefer, against the possibility of stagnation and corruption in power. In the introduction to this thesis, I used the example of presidential succession in Russia in 2008, and the ongoing debate about the third term for President Putin.

This debate, which is strikingly similar to the one in Nigeria in 2005 that I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, reflects the very arguments made the founders of the American republics. Indeed, the proponents of a third term argued that Russia lacked capable national leaders of such standing (compare with Hamilton’s “Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban of the Constitution. . . .”); that a country was going through a period of transition and

⁸For example, Mexican emperors Augustin II (1822-1823) and Maximilian (1864-1867), as well as Haitian Emperor Jacques I (1804-1806) proved to be widely unpopular and were executed.

⁹The territory of Gran Colombia consisted of today’s Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama. Gran Colombia soon disintegrated after Bolivar’s death in 1830.

¹⁰Quoted in Carey 2003, 121, originally quoted in Bierck 1951, 598.

was under threat from the international terrorism (. . . “a change of the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental to the community. . .”) and that the president has not finished his programme of economic and societal reforms yet (“To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor. . .”).¹¹ The champion of the third term for the Russian presidency, the Speaker of the Upper Chamber, Mironov, argued that “12-15 years is the optimum tenure for somebody in power.” Later he, however, acknowledged that, “after that [initial period of 12-15 years], a period of ‘stability’, ‘stagnation’, and finally, of ‘marasmus’ will follow.”¹²

1.2.2 Arguments For Limited Tenure

Hamilton’s and Bolivar’s arguments that unrestricted tenures are safe since the executives will be counter-balanced by the existing checks and balances, do not entertain the possibility that long-serving presidents would be very likely to seek and expand executive power and thus undermine checks and balances that are supposed to keep them in check. Thomas Jefferson, who was a strong supporter of tenure limitation as a insurance against self-perpetuated personal rule, wrote that:

. . . greatly dislike, is the abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President” (Jefferson 1975 [1788]). “If some termination to the services of the Chief Magistrate be not fixed by the Constitution or supplied by practice, his office, nominally four years, will in fact, become for life; and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance.”¹³

Many of Hamilton’s arguments could be turned around (the possibility of usurpation, the danger of bureaucracy growing loyal to a specific person, etc) and used to make the opposite case, and in fact such arguments were used during debates on the 22nd Amendment in the US in 1951 and prior to it.¹⁴ It should be noted that Hamilton was above all concerned with the power of Assembly and the need to

¹¹ *RIA Novosti*. 2005, August 21. “Putin’s Third Term Remains at the Center of Political Debate.”

¹² *Kommersant*. 2007, March 31. “Sergey Mironov Focused on the Main Issue.”

¹³ Letter to Vermont State Legislature, December 10, 1807, quoted in Stein 1943, 38.

¹⁴ Beginning with George Washington, who himself stepped down voluntarily after serving two terms in office and after all other successor presidents followed his suit, a two-term rule became some sort of a precedent.

counter this power, hence his support for a strong executive. On the contrary, after four terms of President F. D. Roosevelt, the concern centered on the powerful executive that dominated other branches of power, as well as on its detrimental effects for the separation of powers system, rather than with the legislature. Apart from the concerns about the executive's self-perpetuation in office, the second issue was connected with the fact that the executive branch grew uniquely responsive to a multiple-term president (Kallenbach 1952).

In the XXth century it was not the legislature that became the most powerful branch in a representative democracy, but the executive. The increasing complexity of decision-making in the modern economy, and the consequent need for swift decisions rendered the prolonged discussions of legislation in parliaments very difficult. The growth of incumbency advantage has also made term limits more necessary, in addition to the checks and balances and regular elections: all things being equal, incumbents are more difficult to defeat at elections than other candidates. And it is the high stakes of holding the highest executive office that make term limits more important for presidents than for the other public representatives — members of the parliaments or the governors.

In Latin America, all nations adopted term limits, with the majority of them doing so in the early and mid-XIXth century, following the period of instability, coups and the rule by the strongmen (*caudillos*). Even Simon Bolivar himself acknowledged the danger of dictatorship arising from the prolonged rule by a powerful president:

Nothing is more perilous than to permit one citizen to retain power for an extended period. The people become accustomed to obeying him, and he forms the habit of commanding them; herein lie the origins of usurpation and tyranny. . . . Our citizens must with good reason learn to fear lest the magistrate who has governed them long will govern them forever.¹⁵

The implementation of term limits in Latin America were driven by both the disastrous experience with the long-serving strongmen, but also by normative arguments against term limits. Following independence, Latin American intellectuals set to work devising various forms of institutional arrangements patterned on the US version (Sondrol 2005, 518).¹⁶ Following the long rule by President Juan Manuel

¹⁵Quoted in Carey 2003, 121, originally quoted in Bierck 1951, 175.

¹⁶When Doctor Nicolas A. Calvo published the Spanish version of Story's Commentary on the Constitution of the United States in 1860, he stated that his translation was to serve so that his

de Rosas of Argentina (1829-1852), and drawing ideas from Jean Jacques Rousseau, Echeverria, and the Constitution of the United States, “the Father of the Argentine Constitution of 1853”, Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884), advocated for the single six-year term for the Argentine President (Sondrol 1990). Alberdi wrote in his “Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic”:

To allow reelection is to extend to twelve years the presidential term. The president always has the means to secure his own reelection, and only rarely would refrain from doing so. Any reelection sows controversy, because it will be fought based upon actions taken in the first period in preparation for the effort.¹⁷

In Argentina, this rule of a single six-year term has remained intact from 1853 until 1949, when President Peron scrapped limits altogether, only to be restored in 1957, after Peron’s departure from power. Similarly to Argentina and many other Latin American nations, Mexico adopted term limits after experiencing long-term dictatorship of an unconstrained president, Porfirio Diaz (1867-1910). I will elaborate on the history of tenure restriction in Mexico later on in this chapter.

1.2.3 Limited Tenure: Discussion

We can extend the same arguments that were advanced in the US context by Hamilton and Jefferson, as well as by Latin American constitutional designers, to developing countries today. If a government in a developing country is insecure, or for any other reason has a short time horizon, it no longer has an incentive to encourage the long-run investment that will increase the output of the domain in the long run (Olson 1991). A ruler with long horizons, however, has an incentive to maintain law and order and to encourage creativity and production in his domain. The rapid executive turnover makes it difficult to implement policies for structural change (Bienen and Van der Walle 1991).

However, long tenure has its pitfalls, as it could lead to dictatorial takeover. In the words of Simon Bolivar, “we elect monarchs whom we call presidents” (quoted

compatriots “might become aware of the value of the Argentine federal Constitution, which has been copied from the United States Constitution; and which has no defects except precisely in those points in which it ceases to be a copy.” (Quintana 1949, originally quoted in Calvo, John. 1888. *Comentario Sobre La Constitucion Federal De Los Estados Unidos*, 2.)

¹⁷Quoted in Carey 2003, 122, originally quoted in Alberdi 1915, 276.

in Przeworski et al. 1996, 234). Overly long tenure could transform presidents into monarchs, and term limits are supposed to hinder this transformation. The strength of a political regime in weakly institutionalized settings is based on the strength of an incumbent ruler in the absence of strong institutions. In fact, many institutions are endogenous to the ruler, as they emerge and develop in response to their continuing struggle for political survival. While short time horizons can indeed lead to corruption and opportunistic rent seeking, long horizons just as easily lead to executive consolidation and dictatorial takeover. The central difficulty of political power in any form is that it gives rise to increasing returns to scale (Lane 1979): on the one hand, incumbency can be used directly to prevent others from contesting office; on the other hand, economic power translates into political power. Political power can be used to enhance economic power, and so on (Przeworski 1991, 25). In brief, the shorter the tenure, the fewer opportunities there are for a ruler to take over a regime (Barzel 2002, 261).

The public choice literature addresses the question of whether term limits are good for democracy, accountability and policy performance (Dick 1993; Gilmour 1994; Glazer 1996), yet the findings are not conclusive. Some authors find that term limits can improve the welfare of voters as the former make it less costly to punish “bad” incumbents (Dick 1993). The others argue that a politician won’t be able to use the private information acquired during the first term to his advantage again if there are term limits in place (Konrad and Torsvik 1997).

The empirical literature that investigates incumbency advantage is primarily concerned with the impact of term limits for the members of the American Congress or the state assemblies (Carey et al. 2000; Carey 1998; Franklin 1998; Gilmour 1994, Besley and Case 1995; Alford and Brady 1988). The findings are overwhelming and conclusive: in the absence of term limits, incumbents are almost impossible to unseat, and incumbency advantage grows with time. This could reflect the spending power of the incumbents, voters’ familiarity, the poor quality of challengers that are aware of the advantage and self-select to run in “open” constituencies only, etc. (King and Gelman 1990, Alford and Brady 1988, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Erikson 1977). Outside of the literature on Congress, only a few papers address the question of term limits in world presidencies (Carey 2003, 1997; Lopez 2003).

While theoretically and empirically robust, the applicability of the vast bulk of literature on term limits in the U.S. Congress is of limited relevance for the questions pursued in this thesis. The stakes of losing office in democratic sub-national or

legislative elections are miniscule in comparison with those facing the holder of a national executive office of a developing country. Besides, most of this literature investigates term limits as exogenous variables, while I treat them as endogenous to the rulers' survival strategies.

Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) investigated re-election and accountability in democratic presidencies across the world and some of their findings are relevant for this discussion of limited mandates. Limited mandates enable citizens to have a chance to evaluate the actions of their agents at periodic intervals. Accountability is a retrospective mechanism, in the sense that the actions of rulers are judged *ex post* by their effects on the citizens. The rulers are accountable if the probability that they survive in office is sensitive to government performance; otherwise they are not accountable (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 225). They find that survival of heads of governments in the global sample for 1950-1990 is independent of the set of economic conditions, even controlling for the 'clarity of responsibility' variables: none of the economic indicators mattered for the presidential survival.¹⁸

In their sample of 86 democratic presidents (1950-90), Cheibub and Przeworski found that among presidents who faced elections without impending term limits only 27 per cent were defeated, and the rest either won them or did not run.¹⁹ In fact, 80 per cent of the presidents departed because of term limits, not because of the electoral defeat. In the entire history of Latin America only one incumbent president who presented himself for re-election, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 1990, ever lost (Przeworski and Curvale 2005, 26).

The issue of accountability is not the subject of this chapter, yet these findings suggest that incumbents rarely lose no matter what their performance is and that most presidents depart not because they lose at the elections but because they have to step down due to term limits. In this sense, term limits undermine the incumbency advantage by restricting the length of time for which leaders can credibly promise benefits to their supporting coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 314). I will

¹⁸The growth of per capita income, growth in per capita consumption, the share of government consumption expenditures and inflation do not have any effect. "Clarity of responsibility" is the set of institutional and electoral parameters. (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 227-228). Other studies find, however, that in some countries different economic indicators sometimes matter for survival (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck 1988, Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1993; Remmer 1993), but the overall effect remains elusive. Since my interest is in presidential, personalist regimes, I refer to Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) cross-national study as the closest to the under study and forsake any further discussion.

¹⁹Among 22 of such presidents, 6 were defeated, 8 did not run themselves. Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 234-235.

address the possible reasons why could they honor them and step down later on in this chapter.

To summarize this theoretical discussion, the most serious argument against term limits seems to be that in a system with checks and balances, abuse of power is checked and term limits deprive voters of capable leaders; in a system without checks and balances, limits are meaningless as they can be easily scrapped. However, this argument does not take into account that the system of checks and balances does not exist in a vacuum and needs to be carefully maintained. In the absence of term limits, the ambitious executives can build up their incumbency advantage. Presidents can accumulate resources for continuous re-election; as heads of executive branch establish and maintain network of the loyal clients, possess unique information advantage, etc. It is not only the lack of constraints that allows the executives to stay in office “forever”, but also the other way around: the longer the tenure, the more opportunities exist to consolidate power and to lower these constraints. In other words, self-perpetuating executive power can undermine the system of checks and balances.

As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, the longer rulers remain in power, the more repressive their regimes are. Since long-standing rulers become very difficult to unseat, as I demonstrate in later chapters, and since without limits they can be re-elected forever, the only feasible strategies for the alternation of power are insiders’ coups and mass revolutions. Rulers realize this and respond by making their regimes even more repressive in order to prevent this alternation. Wintrobe (1998, 20-25) elaborates on the so-called “dictator’s dilemma”: the more power a dictator has, the more difficult it becomes to receive information about the true state of the world, as dictator’s subjects become more afraid and reluctant to reveal their true preferences. Without the adequate information, it becomes more dangerous for dictator to remain in office. As a result, dictator responds by making his regime even more repressive. The logic of a presidency without restrictions is similar: because these rulers can only be unseated by “irregular” means, rulers respond by making their regimes more repressive in order to be safe. As a result, they commit various human rights abuses for which they can become liable should they depart from power later on. In turn, the costs of stepping down become very high indeed.

When presidents step down due to term limits, the process of presidential succession begins. When they don’t step down and attempt to remain in office, one can analyze their behavior through the lenses of political survival literature. In fact,

since I approach term limits as the endogenous political institution, the discussion of term limits is nested within and should be addressed by larger strands of literatures on succession (Egorov and Sonin 2005, Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Wintrobe 1998; Tullock 1987; Bunce 1981; Burling 1974) and survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 1999; Bienen and Van der Walle 1991; Machiavelli 1999 [1515]). I discuss these literatures as this thesis progresses.

To reiterate, while short tenures and term limits could undermine the incentives for policy performance, deprive citizens of capable leaders or promote rent-seeking behavior, long tenures and no restrictions on the number of terms entrench incumbency advantage and render the survival of democracy, especially in developing countries, more difficult. As I elaborated above, the literature is not conclusive whether regular elections provide the adequate venue for incumbent's performance evaluation. The incumbency advantage grows with time both in advanced industrial democracies and in the developing world. Limited mandate and limited tenure are important for democracy, as elections alone are not enough to ensure that mandate is limited. In other words, contemporary experience indicates that it was Thomas Jefferson who was proved to be correct and later on I intend to demonstrate why.

Term limits seem to have become one of the textbook norms in modern presidential democracy, so that the mere possibility of a tenure extension invariably triggers questions about the overall state of democracy. As discussed above, the controversy over a third term for President Obasanjo was the most divisive political issue in Nigeria for more than a year. Political actors that clashed over a third term in Nigeria, perhaps without realizing, used all the arguments pro and against restricted tenure that were made by Hamilton and Jefferson two centuries ago.

As mentioned earlier in this section, the majority of legislators or governors in the U.S., as well other representatives in similar offices across the world do not face term limits despite their growing incumbency advantage in office. Most of the world presidencies, however, have some form of a tenure restriction. In the words of Bolivar, it is because presidents are, as the chiefs of executive branch, elected monarchs, and the threat of usurpation and self-perpetuation in office is much greater for the chief executives than for any other representatives.

However, why should we be so concerned about the dictatorial takeover rather than policy performance and why don't we expect all politicians to step down when needed? Indeed, in the United States democracy has survived for almost two centuries prior to the 22nd Amendment in 1951. The dictatorial takeover never hap-

pened despite the absence of the constitutional limits on presidential tenure. In order to answer this question, I turn to discuss what we know about the motivation of politicians and the stakes of losing office in different polities.

1.3 The Stakes of Losing Office and Succession

In April of 2003, the Boston University African Presidential Archives and Research Center for the first time in history held a roundtable of former African presidents. Six ex-Presidents attended the gathering.²⁰ The roundtable became possible only in 2003 because, to put it bluntly, there were not enough *former* African Presidents around to man a roundtable in the past. The Presidents were either still in power, many died during their time in office and a small number of former rulers went into exile. Out of 93 presidents that exited from power in 1975-2000 period in Africa, 50 (54 per cent) died, were imprisoned or went into exile in the period of up to one year after they lost power.

In contrast, at the time of this meeting in 2003, the host country, the United States, had five former presidents alive and some of them were still active in public life. This one country alone could field almost the same number of former heads of state as the whole continent of Africa.²¹

Why has Africa had so few former presidents up until recently, and the US had so many? In other words, why are the rulers in the developing world more reluctant to leave office than in the West? Could it be the case that there are more dictators in developing areas and there are democrats in industrial ones, so that dictators remain in office and democrats step down? The developing world is less democratic indeed, as indicated by all the empirical measures of democracy, such as Freedom House or Polity indices.

²⁰The participants of this roundtable were Nicephore Sogolo of Benin; Ketumile Masire of Botswana; Jerry Rawlings of Ghana; Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania; Dr. Navichandra Ramgoolam of Mauritius; and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (Boston University News Release. 2003. Six African Former Heads of State to Hold Summit, News Conference at Boston University. April 10, 2003).

²¹Hamilton wondered more than 200 years ago: 'Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability of the government to have half a dozen men who had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to possess?' (2004 [1788]) As it turned out, it did, as the former presidents chose not to undermine the consecutive governments (at least, not actively) and engaged in other pursuits instead.

To answer this question, I will focus on the different stakes of losing office in poorer and more affluent countries, and how these stakes (or the value of holding office) affect presidential behavior during succession. In short, the argument advanced in this thesis is that the value of political office in poor countries is much higher than in the rich ones, so that rulers attempt to remain in office as long as possible because the pay-offs from staying in office outweigh the ones from stepping down. Behavior during succession is the most direct manifestation of the value of office: when rulers have to step down due to restrictions, but value their office highly enough and face the high stakes to simply step down, they would attempt to avoid the ban on re-election.

In the next section I discuss the motivation of an average office holder and why office-seeking is the most plausible assumption of what motivates politicians. Secondly, I discuss the costs of losing and the value of holding office and how it affects our discussion about political survival.

1.3.1 Motivation of a Politician: to Stay or Step Down?

The office-seeking motivation of a politician is one of the most axiomatic assumptions in the rational choice literature, and political science in general.

It is easier and more plausible to assume the same self-interested behavior by all rulers in all countries: politicians are office-seekers and use all possible means to get re-elected. Indeed, the assumption of self-interest is much more realistic than any other of comparative simplicity and impartiality (Olson 1991).

An office-seeking politician, uninhibited by term limits and save for the actuarial reasons (mortality, incapacity), is expected to run in the multiple consecutive elections. In turn, the accumulated incumbency advantage renders the probability of his winning repeatedly to be very high indeed.²²

The struggle to extend tenure is one of the primary driving forces in politics, both in democracies and non-democracies. The 22nd Amendment prevents U.S. Presidents to serve more than two terms. While the only American President who managed to

²²In this chapter I discuss presidents that enter office *with* limits only, as the question of prolongation is pertinent for them only. In the following chapters, I also discuss rulers *without* limits at entry.

stay for a third (and a fourth) term was F.D.Roosevelt (1932-45), plenty of presidents made attempts at a third term that were hampered more by sickness, bad luck, party divisions, and personal disinclinations at the last moment, rather than the lack of motivation (Thornton 1939). The means and the constraints available to rulers are different in democracies and dictatorships, but the motivation to retain office is central for a politician (Downs 1957; Wintrobe 1998).

The political history of many Western democracies suggests that not all Presidents seek re-election, as many engage in other pursuits after they leave office, and many do not run even if they are constitutionally allowed to. Despite the office-seeking assumption, politicians do step down. There are rulers that do not pursue pure office seeking. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson did not run in 1968 despite the fact that he could.²³ Yet the majority of examples of such behavior come from advanced industrialized countries, where the costs of stepping down are much lower and the control of the state is not paramount for economic success. The rulers in developing world, by contrast, want to stay in office not only because they are inherent office-seeking political animals, but also because the stakes at elections are so high that they, as rational actors, don't have much choice but to cling to the political office for as long as possible. The few rulers in the developing world that step down when they can prolong their tenure represent idiosyncratic cases.

In a related discussion on presidentialism and parliamentarianism, the argument is that presidentialism encourages zero-sum, all-or-nothing behavior, so that incumbents use all means possible to hold on to political power (Linz 1990). Likewise, Przeworski (1991) stipulates that the value of winning under presidentialism is higher and of losing – lower, than under parliamentarism (1991, 30).²⁴ Przeworski et al. (2006, 45) estimate that “...democracy’s life expectancy under presidentialism is less than 20 years, while under parliamentarism it is 71 years”.

What goes on in the head of a president who faces the prospect of stepping down? What is at stake? Undoubtedly, politicians value office for its intrinsic benefits (Downs 1957). But they also, like all individuals, think about the future and how their actions at time t affect their fate at time t_{+1} (Laibson 2003, Price 1993). They also evaluate and compare their well-being while they are in office, and their likely status once they are outside of office. It is very plausible to assume

²³Properly speaking, he entered the race for the Primary nomination, but then withdrew as the internal party polling indicated that he was rather weak.

²⁴In this thesis I do not compare presidential and parliamentary systems. However, this and the related discussion of the virtue of democracy as being designed to lower the stakes of losing has very similar intuition to the arguments advanced here.

that rulers contemplate their likely post tenure fate — whether they will be all right and be able to live a high-status life that they got used to during their tenures, or could end up in prison, in exile, or even worse. It is also very plausible that such contemplation will affect their succession behavior.

To illustrate what is at stake for a ruler facing the prospect of stepping down, I examine the post tenure fate and their record in office of a dozen of recent former presidents from all regions of the world, from wealthy and poor countries, democracies and non-democracies. To assess their record in office I use the average combined Freedom House index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (henceforth, *FH*) per tenure, on [1, 7] scale, where 7 is the worst score, as well changes in Freedom House index during leader's tenure, with the negative values standing for democratization. I also look at their post tenure fate.

The stakes of losing office for a president in a developing country are higher than for a president in an industrialized democracy. The former could face exile or imprisonment once they step down, while the latter can look forward to lucrative writing contracts and lecturing tours. After Bill Clinton (1992-2000) of the United States stepped down after serving with the average *FH* index of 1 and no change in democracy scores during his tenure, he began an interesting and also lucrative post-presidential career. The publishing company Alfred A. Knopf paid an advance of \$10 million for his book, and many institutions were willing to spring \$250,000 for a lecture.²⁵ In his first year after office, Clinton gave 59 speeches and made \$9.2 million.²⁶ Likewise, after Mary Robinson stepped down from her post of the President of Ireland (albeit very weak post in Irish politics) in September of 1997 and she has had an opportunity to pursue a remarkable career ever since: she served as the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner and, following tenure in the UN, president of the Ethnic Globalization Initiative, the advocacy group.

The ex-president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) enjoys a post tenure life that is not unlike Bill Clinton's, a president of a more developed country. During Zedillo's 6 years in power, while being at the same *FH*'s average level of 3.5 as belowmentioned Muluzi's Malawi, Mexico progressed by 1.5 points on *FH* scale, culminating in the first-ever transfer of presidency to another party in 2000. After his exit from office, Zedillo returned to his professorship in the United States.

²⁵*New Yorker*. 2006, September 18. "Clinton: the Second Act." (by David Remnick).

²⁶Of course, the success of ex-rulers can be attributed to the fact that they served in this office, and thus they still derive value from their office even in political "afterlife".

During President Cardoso's tenure (1995-2002), Brazil improved her democracy rating by 0.5, with the average score being 3. After leaving office Cardoso established "Fernando Henrique Cardoso" Institute, published two books and has enjoyed high public profile ever since. Likewise, Lech Walesa (1990-95) of Poland, under whose presidency Poland transitioned to and began consolidation of its democracy, established "Lech Walesa Institute" Foundation, became honorary doctor of dozens of universities and appeared in hundreds of honorary meetings and conferences throughout the world. Clearly, the post tenure fate of these rulers leaves little else to be desired.

Some former presidents could end up in exile, however. President Akayev (1990-2005) of Kyrgyzstan (average *FH* of 3.7 and regression by 2.5), who lost power after a series of street protests in 2005, had to leave the country and became the Maths professor in Moscow, Russia. Likewise, President Fujimori (1990-2000) of Peru (average score of 4.4 and regression by 1) left for exile in Japan after being ousted in 2000, yet had the misfortune to return to Latin America and was arrested in Chile in 2005, awaiting extradition to Peru.

Even if a president hand-picks his own successor, he cannot be sure of his immunity in the future: for example, the ex-President of Malawi Muluzi (1994-2004) reportedly said that he became disappointed in his successor Mutharika after the former lost influence over the new President and got intimidated by the new anti-corruption campaign.²⁷ In 2005 the former president was even briefly arrested and released, yet the investigation was still ongoing at the time of this writing. It is worth noting, that the average *FH* score during the latter's tenure was 3.5, but it worsened by 1.5 points during his 10 years in power. Likewise, president Chiluba (1991-2001) of Zambia (the average *FH* score of 3.6 and regression by 1.5 during tenure) was also charged with corruption, his assets were seized and wife arrested.

Many a fellow ruler in the developing world, who has to decide whether to remain in office, faces a life that can be "nasty, brutal and short" outside of office, and the stakes of losing office are much higher, as Slobodan Milošević of Serbia undoubtedly discovered after his departure from power in 2000, when he was sent to the Hague and subjected to trial by the international tribunal for war crimes. During the latter's tenure Serbia worsened her democracy rating by 0.5 and maintained the average score of 6. Likewise, Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) of Iraq, who maintained Iraqi democracy score at 6.9 points with an iron grip (where the score of 7 is the least democratic category) during his 25 years in power and even worsened the score

²⁷ *Chronicle*. 2005, January 18. "Malawi's ex-President Muluzi "Should Be Arrested."

by 0.5, was sentenced to death for crimes against Iraqi citizens and was promptly executed.

The answer as to why politicians in developing world are much more reluctant to leave office than politicians in the West can be found if we understand that the former estimate their likely post tenure fate and act accordingly. In their study of the determinants of survival in office, Bienen and van de Walle (1991) find that 42 per cent of rulers in developed countries enter office more than once (multiple entries), while in developing countries only 17 per cent do so – clearly, rulers in poorer settings have only one shot, and it is rational for them to stay by whatever means necessary, as they will not have another chance.

Economic development affects the stakes of losing office in two ways. Firstly, if the access to state is very important for economic success, rulers are concerned whether they will continue to be well-off after their exit from office. Very often, continuing access to state represents a remarkable economic opportunity in many developing countries, and financial and economic success crucially depends not on entrepreneurial skills, but on the concessions and public work contracts that are secured from the politicians, and through the rent-seeking.

Likewise, an anti-constitutional coup is twenty times more likely in a poor country: lower income renders stakes higher (Londregan and Poole 1990). Many politicians in developing countries pursue a rational strategy of enriching themselves while in office, as they realize that opportunities out of office are scarce. To return to Obasanjo's example, the president received the strongest backing for his third-term bid from a group of tycoons connected with his office, whose financial dealings depended on the continuing access to the presidential office.²⁸

Secondly, the behavior of politicians while in office should also affect their likely post tenure fate. Depending on their actions during their tenure in office, some former rulers can be assured of their immunity and the high status, while others entertain the possibility of a more "irregular" fate, such as the investigation into corruption or the human rights' abuses and the consequent possibility of exile, a term in prison or worse. Numerous studies into corruption conducted by the World Bank or the Transparency International indicate that the developing countries are more corrupt than the wealthy nations. However, politicians are more corrupt in developing countries not because they are vile, but because they can get away with it, as the widespread poverty, inequality, and poor protection of property rights make

²⁸*Economist*. 2006, May 18. "A President Frustrated."

certain actions in office and certain policies more likely than others. Likewise, up until very recently, the majority of developing nations attempted to build the statist economies with very large public sectors and therefore “tempted” the executives, who acquired the power of life and death over their nascent economies (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002).

During Malawian President Muluzi’s tenure a controversial sale of foodstuffs to other countries occurred, followed by a drought and a famine in Malawi itself. More than \$42 million from this sale allegedly ended up in the accounts of Muluzi and his cronies. Muluzi fiercely tried to prolong his rule in 2002-03, but failed. His successor Mutharika swiftly initiated a corruption investigation against his predecessor.²⁹ As this Malawian example illustrates, the manner of the asset acquisition renders the prospect of the asset legitimating and immunity problematic after the ruler leaves presidential office.

In countries with weakly developed property rights and the absence of the rule of law, the prospect of redistribution of assets after every elite rotation is very strong indeed, and elections could bring this rotation. Also, in developing countries with high ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity, succession could usher in a different ethnic group, that could make the exclusion from office permanent (e.g., the Shiites and Kurds in Iraq under Saddam Hussein), making it even more compelling for a ruling group to stay in power under the same ruler (Acemoglu et al. 2003).³⁰

The causality can go in the opposite direction, with the rulers and their winning coalitions consciously pursuing profits and committing crimes while in office, so the stakes are raised because of their behavior rather than politico-economic conditions as such. While this is certainly a plausible assumption, the behavior is still endogenous to the politico-economic conditions because, firstly, even if they themselves raise the stakes, it is the politico-economic environment that conditions such behavior and “selects” this type of rulers. Murphy et al. (1991) find how the distinct career paths in private and public sectors of ambitious individuals (allocation of talent) in developed and developing countries affect growth: in developing countries ambitious individuals choose to pursue careers in the state sector, while in developed world they do so in the private sector, since these sectors bring different rewards in different societies. Also, while many rulers in industrial democracies engage in corruption, the overall politico-economic environment still renders stakes low and the

²⁹*Independent (Zambia)*. 2006, July 27. “Former President Held for Corruption Charges.”

³⁰In Nigerian case, two strongest contenders for presidency as in the summer of 2006 came from the Muslim North. Mr. Obasanjo is from Christian South.

executive constraints high regardless.

Rulers that are willing to step down have to be able to make a binding contract with their successors in order to avoid the redistribution of their assets and to ensure their immunity. Hereditary monarchy seems to be able to solve the succession problem. It is not surprising that many long-term presidents (Mubarak in Egypt, Aliiev in Azerbaijan, etc) prepared their offspring for the highest post for life after they depart. Family ties provide the necessary affinity to ease the contracting costs in the absence of strong institutions. In Chapter 6 I show that the designated successors who are direct relatives of the incumbent presidents are rather successful during the executive turnover and their initial period in office. In Syria, despite the fact that the son of the incumbent President Hafiz al-Asad, Bashir, lacked knowledge, experience, the image of the charismatic and capable leader fit to succeed his father, for six years he has been carefully groomed and positioned to become a successor, and faced very little resistance to actually become one in 2000, when Hafiz al-Asad died (Zisser 2007, 19-46).


In Chapter 5 I illustrate the logic behind presidential succession and presidential choices over survival, as well as their influence on the democratic transition, using the case of the Ukrainian President Kuchma (1994-04). Kuchma left office in 2004 but his prior succession strategies affected the democratic breakthrough that followed (“Orange revolution”).³¹ Having failed in his third term bid, Nigerian President Obasanjo selected an obscure state governor, Mr Umaru Yar’Adua as his successor, a figure widely regarded as weak and open to manipulation by the current president after the latter departs.³²

In many presidential regimes in the developing world it is the president who does the arbitrage over the intra elite conflicts and who orchestrates the redistribution of assets. With the change of the identity of a president, the system of “checks and balances” between the conflicting elite groups can spin out of control. Even if the outgoing president selects the successor and installs him in office, it only decreases the stakes of stepping down, it does not eliminate the problem altogether. As I elaborated in the introduction, a recent example of such a conundrum is the ongoing succession in Russia, with Vladimir Putin facing a dilemma in 2008, when

³¹I will also demonstrate that the questions of redistribution and the ex post immunity were important factors that affected the stakes during succession.

³²Mr Yar’Adua has old ties to the President: his elder brother was Obasanjo’s deputy during his military rule in 1970s. Many think that Yar’Adua’s usefulness to his patron will be to protect his immunity after he leaves office (*Economist*. 2006, December 23. “The Next President, Perhaps?” December 23 2006-January 5 2007. p. 69)

Figure 1.1: The Stakes of Losing Office



Putin's second and last term expires — to prolong rule or step down?³³ If he steps down, it is not clear how to ensure the ex post compliance in the absence of the rule of law (Shevtsova 2006).

1.3.2 The Value of Political Office and Executive Tenure

To summarize, the crucial parameter that influences decision-making on succession is the stakes of stepping down, that is, how important it is for a ruler to remain in office, the value of office vis-à-vis out of office. It is possible to imagine a continuous scale of stakes of losing office for the presidents of the world, with the pole on the left denoting low stakes, and on the right high stakes. The stakes stand for the probability of the asset redistribution, prosecution, immunity and the possibility of leading a high-status life after leaving office. By making a continuous scale of stakes of losing office, we can focus on political survival and succession for democracies and dictatorships in one analysis. The stakes are reduced if political institutions or a powerful precedent (e.g., Mexico, see below) can enable long-term elite contracting. As expected, rulers in democracies gravitate towards the low point and those in dictatorships do towards the high one on this scale.

From the continuum of these costs of stepping down (stakes of losing office), we can map democratic, partly-democratic and non-democratic presidential regimes and succession behavior of their rulers. In fact, this continuum defines the very logic of political economy of executive tenure in dictatorship and democracy. While I focus on presidential regimes, term limits and succession as a particular and observable case, this explanation can be generalizable as a broader phenomenon of the value of political office in democracy and dictatorship, whether in the environment of elections or not. For example, the theory is well positioned to explain such bizarre

³³Novaya Gazeta, an investigating newspaper, reports that altogether seven Kremlin top officials and the president himself control the assets of the major and most profitable companies, which assets are equal to 3 Russian budgets. *Novaya Gazeta*, 2005, February 3.

instances as when the “communist” rulers resort to hereditary succession (such as in North Korea), which is totally at ideological odds with Marxism (on the tenets of which the North Korean state was built initially), but it is in line with this intuitive explanation of the risks of stepping down and the determinants of succession, as advanced in this thesis.

In democracies, because of the very low stakes of losing office and the smooth long-term contracting, enabled by the consolidated institutions, the rulers can’t and don’t have to prolong their tenure. In contrast, in developing countries, because of the very high stakes of losing office and the weak institutions, many rulers can, but also have to prolong their tenure. The longer they are in power, the more difficult they are to unseat, the logic of self-perpetuation of power undermines all possible checks and balances, and the stakes of losing office become even higher.

Indeed, the presidents, like all individuals, live in “the shadow of the future” and discount it differently (Axelrod 1984, 15). Term limits and the lack thereof should affect how much rulers can discount the future: those rulers that face limits and, therefore, have short time horizons, cannot discount their future heavily and should be concerned with their post tenure fate. Those rulers that do not face limits and have the prospect of a self-perpetuating rule, can discount their future heavily. In this sense, term limits and the prospect of stepping down should have the moderating effect on the behavior of presidents while in office, since they have to take into account how their actions in office will affect their chances for immunity in several years time.

If presidents extend their tenures, by scrapping term limits, for example, they also increase the discount factor, as they postpone the prospects of stepping down, and, for many, retribution, often indefinitely. Tenure changes indicate declines in democracy, but they also accelerate the further deterioration in democracy levels. Firstly, tenure extensions signal declines in democracy that make these tenure extensions possible in the first place. Indeed, President Obasanjo faced a very powerful opposition both at the level of institutions: in the Senate and the courts, and at the mass level of civil society. This indicates that while the state of Nigerian democracy left much to be desired in 2006, it did not decline to an extent that the incumbent would have no executive constraints at all. At the same time, once constraints are lifted, it makes it easier for democracy to decline even further, as the logic of self-perpetuating power kicks in. The logic of a long-term rule interplays with a

conscious desire for personal power that many politicians possess.³⁴

For instance, it is inconceivable for President Mubarak of Egypt to depart. Likewise, given the value of presidential office in a poor country such as Uzbekistan, but also the recent massacre of civilians in May of 2005 by the governmental forces in Andijan, Uzbekistan (Human Rights Watch 2005), exit from office is not a realistic option for President Karimov, it seems. In contrast, George W. Bush in all likelihood is looking forward to his retirement on his ranch in Crawford, Texas.

Given that the primary motivation of rulers to remain in office and the malleable institutions in many developing countries, the question is then not why do rulers extend their tenure, but why do only some do so? In Chapter 3, matching originally collected data on tenure arrangements and data on political leaders (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006) in the period of 1975-2004, I estimate how many presidents step down when required, how many get re-elected and how many extend their terms. Out of 265 presidents that entered single- and two-term offices; 56 (21 per cent) were still in power on December 31, 2004 (the sample includes all presidents, 1974-2004); 40 (15 per cent) were the interim non-elected presidents, staying in office for one or two years; 32 (12 per cent) died or were deposed while in office; 10 (4 per cent) lost elections; 10 (4 per cent) did not run even though they were not precluded by term limits; 92 (35 per cent) obeyed term limits and step down and 25 (10 per cent) extended their tenure.

Out of 117 term-bounded presidents that reached term limits in 1975-2004, 92, or 79 per cent, obeyed term limits and stepped down when required and 25, or 21 per cent, extended their terms.³⁵

³⁴While I don't want to question the integrity of many democratic politicians that honestly pursue public interest, my point is rather that different institutional environment would produce drastically different outcomes for the same office-seeking politician. In the context of this discussion, I argue that it is rational to consolidate power and prolong rule in many developing countries, and likewise, it is rational to comply with the checks and balances and step down when required in western democracies. I am not prepared to venture into a more philosophical discussion on what causes what, however.

³⁵Using various statistical analyses, I show later in this thesis that this proportion cannot be accounted by chance: a set of independent variables that operationalize the stakes of losing office, diffusion, institutional constraints and the reputational concerns, explains the variation rather well.

1.3.3 Why Do They Step Down? Executive Constraints and Low Stakes

If we assume that all rulers desire re-election but do not observe all of them extending their rule, we have to assume that there are factors that deter rulers from doing this. Also, if we assume that leaders are concerned with ex post redistribution and immunity, and, again, do not observe all of them extending the rule in order to avoid the succession problem, there must be some mechanism that allows rulers to make binding contracts during succession.

Presidents can step down for actuarial reasons,³⁶ because they are committed to democracy;³⁷ because stakes of losing office are low and they can actually be better off outside of office; because institutions are not that malleable and do constrain the executives; because rulers value their reputation, the international standing and legacy; or all of the above.

The degree of democracy and the strength of checks and balances facilitate the smooth transitions in power. Indeed, democracy is the only form of government that is designed to arrange for an orderly succession of leaders. The democratic form of government is associated with the lower stakes of holding to office. A dictator cannot appoint his successor in advance, as he would undermine his own authority thereby. The example of president Mugabe and his current anxiety over succession illustrates this problem. The eighty-three year old president of Zimbabwe Mugabe, who is not constrained by limits and pledged to go on until he is hundred years old, however feels threatened by regime insiders who began to position themselves for succession and who are posed to lose their rent-seeking opportunities should they miscalculate and have their lucrative offices lost when Mugabe departs. “Explaining that those next in line to assume his post were “deficient” in terms of honesty, President Mugabe, displaying an apparent growing distrust of those touted as frontrunners in the race to succeed him, said: “What it has done (succession), goodness me, is to let out, I don’t know what to call them, people, ambitious people going in this direction. Each and every individual in the upper echelons is now looking at himself wondering how to position themselves, asking themselves what do I do, what do I do?”³⁸ Given

³⁶They can be too old when they assume office and even older for possible re-election. However, in Chapter 2 I find that the average age of presidents in (1975-2004) sample is 52 years old.

³⁷This, however, is difficult to measure and can only be known ex post and hence an ad hoc explanation. I focus on the observable politico-economic data instead.

³⁸*Financial Gazette (Harare)*. 2007, February 12. “Zimbabwe: Diamonds, Succession - Mugabe’s Lament”.

the extent of corruption, as well as widespread human rights abuses during his 27-year long tenure, as well as the temptation for whoever comes next to use him as a scapegoat, the chances for post tenure immunity remain slim for Mugabe. It is not surprising that the president chose to remain in office for as long as possible (“till he is hundred years old”), facing very high stakes and few constraints.

There should not be an unambiguous second position. If there were, many would rally around the second position and then the first position would be endangered (Burling 1974). When dictator dies, “war of all against all” follows and the strongest contender emerges as a new dictator. It has been found that the succession problem is the most severe problem for dictatorships throughout recorded history and the hereditary succession is the most stable form of succession for dictatorships (Egorov and Sonin 2005, Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Tullock 1987). Throughout this thesis, I control for the degree of democracy using various measures. On the other hand, it is the low stakes at elections that make electoral losers prefer defeats under democracy to any other outcomes under alternative arrangements (Przeworski 2005): democracy (levels of) can be endogenous to the stakes!

Under what circumstances are term limits enforceable, that is, when do the office-seeking rulers step down at elections? There are several plausible reasons to investigate. Firstly, it is conceivable that the stakes of stepping down are actually lower for some rulers or in some polities, and I intend to investigate the determinants that lower the risks of stepping down; secondly, and in relation to the first conjecture, institutions can be enduring, constraining and be able to ensure inter-temporal contracting that lowers the probability of redistribution even in poorer countries; thirdly, the rulers could be deterred or fail because of the strong opposition to their permanent rule, either domestic, international or both. These three factors could be interrelated. Finally, rulers can be deterred because they value their reputation and tenure changes could endanger their international standing or business interests in the increasingly globalized world.

Similarly to regular elections, term limits seem to have become a norm of modern democracy, so that even rulers that used a democratic façade to gain legitimacy imposed executive limits. Once these limits approached, many presidents found it too difficult to scrap as tenure institutions became the focal points for societal coordination and international criticism. For example, in 1992 President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana (1981-2001) introduced term limits, together with the multiparty elections. It has not been clear until very late in Rawlings’ second term whether he would

step down when required, in 2000. However, facing an enormous pressure to honor self-imposed restrictions and with his international reputation at stake, President Rawlings decided to step down and appointed one of his lieutenants to run in his stead.

Under certain circumstances the ruling elites should be able to lower the costs of stepping down (or to increase the costs of prolongation) for the incumbents and to guarantee the immunity and security of their assets. So, despite the flexible institutions and the office-seeking motivation, the stakes are still low. Indeed, many Latin American countries throughout XIXth and XXth centuries set up stable competitive systems in which the incumbent presidents, faithfully obeying term limits, would choose their successors and through various devices assure the latter's victory at the polls (Przeworski and Curvale 2005, 24). Przeworski and Curvale highlighted the similar puzzle as the one posed in this thesis: "Term limits were ubiquitous, and, surprisingly, whenever in place were almost always obeyed" (ibid, 24). Mexico provides such an example of a non-democratic regime that has been able to arrange an orderly succession and enforced a 6-year long single presidential term between 1934 and 2000. The ruling party, PRI had served as a contracting mechanism that mitigated the intra-elite conflicts and smoothed leaders' transitions. Russia might be posed to repeat the example of many Latin American oligarchies in 2008, by establishing a stable dominant party regime with the term-bound presidents. Likewise, at the time of this writing Botswana's President Festus Mogae is in the middle of a power transition to his successor, a process mitigated by their ruling party — BDP (Good 2005).

Term limits can be observed because of a very powerful precedent and the agreement between the elites. The history of a Mexican tenure arrangement testifies to this logic. The Mexican revolution of 1910 began when the opposition candidate Madero "lost" the election to the official candidate and then president Porfirio Diaz, who was running for his 8th term. The ensuing revolution began with the pretext that the election had been rigged and that Madero was the actual winner. It was fought under the slogan "*suffragio efectivo, no re-election*" ("no re-election and the right to have votes effectively counted") against the long-standing president. The revolution itself took only 6 months and the incumbent Porfirio Diaz went into exile. However, a civil war ensued a year later after President Madero was killed in a coup and it lasted 4 years. In 1917 a new constitution was enacted. Chapter 3, article 83 of the constitution says that under no circumstances a citizen can serve as a president twice (Krauze 1997).

When president Alvaro Obregon (1920-24) avoided this ban, winning a second term, he was subsequently assassinated in 1928. Following this, the Mexican elites established a new umbrella party, PRI, as a collective agreement to prevent one single individual from becoming dictator (Hall 1990). The assassination of Obregon created a powerful focal point for coordination against possible re-election attempts in the future (Magaloni 2006, 8). Ever since, no president in Mexico has dared to break this rule and extend his tenure. The all-powerful party, combined with the specific institutional agreement, placed insurmountable constraints on the executive should the latter decide to prolong his rule, and lowered the stakes of losing office. The incumbent could elect his successor on his own on the basis of the affinity with the latter, and the hegemonic party, PRI, with its long horizon and strength guaranteed the post election fate of the president.

Political institutions can be very strong even in non-democracies. Recent literature finds that institutions matter in dictatorships (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Brownlee 2004; Geddes 1999): they can provide guarantees to the groups whose support is often necessary for a ruler to stay in power, serve as a contract between members of the winning coalition, and coopt potential challengers. Rulers are situated in the institutional environment, even if it is of their own making, and they can be constrained by this environment (Barros 2002). Barros (2002) unveiled how, behind the façade of the monolithic authoritarian regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-89), different branches of the military agreed to balance and constrain each other and abide by their agreement, so that this military regime had its checks and balances in its inner workings.

As argued in the introduction, during the third wave of democratization that began with the transitions in Southern Europe in mid-1970s and arguably continues today, many presidential regimes imposed tenure restrictions in a genuine attempt to build democratic institutions or to maintain the façade of democratic legitimacy. As a result, many partly- and non-democratic regimes have learnt to use elections, however unfree and not fair, for their own advantage in order to appear legitimate (see Levitsky and Way 2002; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2002). Like elections, executive term limits seem to have become a norm of modern democracy. Unlike elections, however, tenure restrictions cannot be manipulated: a given ruler is either restricted in his tenure or he is not. When presidents scrap their tenure restrictions as the time for scheduled departures approach, so do they scrap what remains of their democratic legitimacy, with all the potential consequences, such as withdrawal of foreign aid or various sanctions, to follow.

Term limits are institutions. As I show later on in this dissertation, even controlling for the degree of authoritarianism, rulers that enter office without term limits survive longer than those with limits (Chapter 3). It means that the tenure institutions influence longevity in office, that is, they are not easily scrapped. The institutional change is costly, as institutions can provide focal points to coordinate collective action strategies (Barzel 2002). The rulers that enter office without restrictions, as argued earlier, can discount their future heavily. They are also able to consolidate their incumbency advantage more quickly by signalling credible commitments of private goods and rent-seeking to the coalition whose support is necessary for them to remain in power.

Also, rulers can fail or be deterred by a powerful opposition, determined to oppose the prolongation, as in the Nigerian example illustrated earlier. The ensuring crisis could increase the costs of prolongation so that the stakes of stepping down under certain circumstances are lower than the stakes of holding office. In today's world of financial interconnectedness, many rulers keep their assets abroad, and/or depend on the international backers, and the prospect of permanent rule could, to the contrary, threaten their assets and their immunity. President Kuchma of Ukraine, who decided against the third term for himself in 2004 and instead backed Prime Minister Yanukovich as his successor, represented various business interests and oligarchic clans, and the latter profited enormously under Leonid Kuchma's ten years of rule. One of the most prominent and wealthiest members of Kuchma's coalition, his son-in-law, Pinchuk, began expanding his business interests globally in 2000s, so that the 2004 presidential succession, the possibility of losing access to the State, as well as the threat of sanctions against the interests of President's Kuchma's coalition unveiled by the U.S. State Department shortly before elections, crucially affected Pinchuk's business interests and Kuchma's decision-making during succession. Taras Chornovil, Yanukovich's campaign director, recalled that,

Pinchuk always influenced Kuchma, and Pinchuk himself was influenced by America. Recall the State Department decision to make a list of those who will be banned from entering the US should elections fail to "proceed according to the American scenario"? America also threatened to freeze ministers' and MP's bank accounts. Pinchuk always gravitated to America rather than Russia. And it would be an absolute disaster for him. . . ³⁹

Rulers can also step down because they can anticipate that they will lose. It is


³⁹ROSALT. 2005, July 21. "We believed that Russia played a role in Ukraine (interview with Taras Chornovil).

very plausible but difficult to account for empirically. Indeed, how can one know whether a president steps down because of the anticipation that he would lose his bid to remain in office, or because the existing checks and balances constrain him, and the stakes of stepping down are low, as the theory of presidential succession, elaborated in this thesis, predicts? It seems that it is impossible to estimate empirically whether the deterrence arises from the anticipation of losing or whether it arises from the strength of executive constraints. Certainly, rulers could expect to lose if the existing checks and balances constrain their reliance on the state institutions and resources to achieve their objectives. In this regard, anticipation of losing is tantamount to string executive constraints.

It is very plausible that leaders' motivations are more complicated than just reflecting the perks of office and the fear of retribution once out of office. Rulers could value their reputation, the international standing highly enough to risk any tenure prolongation. If the latter is increasingly seen as unacceptable practice in modern democracies, some rulers could step down even if they could attempt to remain in office. President Vladimir Putin of Russia, if he steps down in 2008 could provide such a counter-example as, despite very high stakes of stepping down, his motivation to maintain the prestige of Russia as a superpower and to preserve his legacy could still prevail. It is quite likely that some rulers value their reputation, their international status highly enough to discard the high costs of stepping down. As argued in the introduction to this thesis, "Putin seems to understand what it would mean for him to stay beyond his constitutional term: He would [...] lose both the legitimacy of power and the respect of the world leaders club whose membership he so cherishes" (Shevtsova 2006b). Later in the empirical section, I will attempt to control for potential reputational costs by including parameters that measure nations' membership in important international organizations and trade blocks that could sanction rulers' behavior and affect their reputation, as well as economic openness.

When we attempt to understand the outcomes of presidential succession, we should address both the costs of stepping down and the constraints that rulers face. Acemoglu and Robinson (1999, 2006) examine how conflicts over redistribution determine the prospects for democratization. The authors argue that democratization results when the ruling elites estimate that the expected costs of repressing democratic transition would exceed the expected loss of income arising from democratization. Likewise, in presidential regimes throughout the world, rulers step down if the costs of doing so are lower than attempts to remain in office.

Figure 1.2: The Stakes of Losing Office, Two-by-Two Matrix



All in all, there are three possible outcomes during presidential succession the world over. Firstly, rulers can prolong their tenure by whatever means at their disposal⁴⁰, secondly, they can step down (by appointing a successor – ensuring that the latter wins with some non-negative probability, or not), or thirdly, they can attempt to prolong and fail. Figure 1.2 illustrates plots these outcomes as the function of constraints (high or low) and stakes (high or low).

As discussed previously in the introduction, if stakes are low and constraints are high, the ruler is deterred. In the consolidated democracies with an established democratic tradition rulers can be seen as permanently deterred: the possibility of a tenure change is almost impossible. Example of such outcomes can be found during presidential succession in mature and wealthy democracies. If stakes are high and constraints are low, the ruler prolongs (save some idiosyncratic reasons). Many presidential regimes in developing countries will provide examples of this outcome and I will discuss a number of cases as the thesis progresses. If stakes are high, and constraints are high (or their strength is uncertain), the ruler chooses to prolong, and succeeds with the probability p , or fails with probability $(1 - p)$. The latter outcome is difficult to predict by statistical analyses, as it depends on “the human factor” and uncertainty of succession — this outcome is less interpretable by structural,

⁴⁰In Chapter 4 I discuss the menu of possible strategies the world over.

macro-societal explanations. Indeed, while rulers in Zambia in 2001 or Nigeria in 2006 failed in their attempts to remain in power, given a slight change in parameters, they could have just as well succeeded, like Namibian president did in 1998. Finally, the combination of low stakes and low constraints produces an empty set, as the low executive constraints necessarily render the stakes of losing office high, since a next unconstrained ruler cannot guarantee the ex post immunity for a current ruler. To some extent, the latter quadrant can be illustrated by the succession of a powerful Prime-Minister in a wealthy parliamentary democracy, such as of Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, yet the analysis of succession of the non-presidential regimes falls outside the remit of this thesis.

1.4 In Conclusion: Economic Development, the Value of Political Office and Democracy

For decades, political scientists have puzzled over the origins and stability of democracy and dictatorship (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Olson 1993, Moore 1966). A deep, but perhaps idiosyncratic, examination of what makes individual dictators become dictators, and democrats democrats, would involve inferences drawn from the fields of social and individual psychology and the examination of rulers' personalities.⁴¹ However, I focus on the observable politico-economic data and, as far as the psychology of rulers is concerned, assume that the primary motivation is to remain in office, as discussed above.

Earlier in this chapter, I posed the question why are the rulers in the developing world more reluctant to leave office than in the West? The simple explanation is that there are more dictators in developing areas and there are democrats in industrial ones, so that dictators remain in office and democrats step down. However, this circular explanation does not address what makes dictators become dictators, and democrats remain democrats. There is a clear possibility of selection bias. It would

⁴¹See, for example, the classical study by Adorno et al. (1950) on authoritarian personality, followed by Hines (1956), Larsen, Coleman, Forbes and Johnson (1972), inter alia; or the studies of Hitler, such as Brink (1974). The prominent scholar of political economy Adam Przeworski is quoted in Munck (2007 forthcoming) as saying recently, "In the work I'm currently doing on development, I am back to reading biographies of dictators and novels about dictators, which are very informative. I would like to get into Park's shoes and Mobutu's shoes and see why one of them was a developmental leader and the other was a thief. My current hunch is that developmentalist dictators are those who loved their mothers: obviously this is not something you will learn or be able to test with statistics, but when you read novels and biographies, the pattern becomes uncanny."

be easy to assume that rulers desired re-election and political immortality whenever they extended their tenure and they did not whenever they stepped down. As I demonstrate by a series of examples in this thesis (e.g., Obasanjo in this chapter), many rulers desire re-election, but fail. We can just as well assume that many desire, but do not try and we do not observe it. In other words, some rulers extend their rule, others try and fail, and yet others are deterred from trying.

In order to begin addressing questions about stability and breakdown of democracy and dictatorship, I propose to focus on how presidents behave during succession and what influences the outcomes thereof. Rulers evaluate their future and decide on their succession strategy on the basis of their institutional and economic environment, the stakes of holding office and losing elections, constraints they face. Choices they make influence their political regimes their countries have: democracies and dictatorships.

The relationship between development and democracy has long been a focus of attention in social sciences (Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959, Deutsch 1961, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, Diamond 1993, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, Muller 1995, Przeworski et al. 2000). Vibrant, ongoing debate continues today between the proponents of the modernization hypothesis (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006) and those authors that question the systematic relationship between modernization and democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). There is also a related strand of literature that analyzes the origins of regimes and democratic transitions as a problem of economic redistribution and inequality, rather than income as such (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 1999, 2005, Perotti 1996, Muller 1995, Bollen and Jackman 1995, 1985, Bates and Lien 1985).

Przeworski et al. (1996, 49) argue for the central “importance of economic factors in sustaining democracies. . . . once established in a wealthy country, democracy is more likely to endure.” I contribute to this literature by arguing that economic development has an indirect effect on democracy by affecting rulers’ incentives while in office. As I argued earlier, poor economic conditions in many developing countries render the stakes of losing office very high indeed where the state represents the major source of income. This is especially true where the prospects of economic success outside of political office are grim and there is a high probability of ex post asset redistribution and low probability of immunity.

In the words of Douglass North and his co-authors:


High stakes imply that those in power are far less likely to give up power. The reason is that they have too much to lose from policy changes that would occur if they gave up power (North et al. 2000, 28). Higher political stakes imply greater levels of rent-seeking. The greater the stakes, the more resources are devoted to capturing and defending valuable rights (ibid, 29).

As a result, rulers that face high stakes “select” to stay in office as their best strategy and strive to prolong the rule, while those with the low stakes step down. In turn, long-serving rulers makes their regimes persistent and thus render the prospects of democracy more slight. To investigate how the value of political office affects the behavior of politicians, I focus on the most logical and direct manifestation of this value: presidential behavior during succession. Some rulers, when faced with the prospect of stepping down due to term limits, deem the stakes of losing office low enough to step down and obey the constitution, while others value office high enough to attempt to prolong the rule. It is the low stakes of losing elections that demarcates democracy from dictatorship. It is not that democracies have democratic leaders and dictatorships have only power-hungry autocrats. It is rather a more nuanced process.

We can unite rulers’ motivation, the stakes of losing office, and democracy and dictatorship together into one framework. Figure 1.3 charts the essence of the argument advanced in this thesis. Rulers enter office with or without limits. When rulers face term limits, they have to evaluate the stakes of losing office in terms of their likely post tenure date. The state of economic development affects the stakes by influencing the value of office vis-à-vis outside of office, and by affecting behavior while in office. In poorer countries rulers tend to be more corrupted and tend to pursue policies for which they are likely to become liable in the future, should they depart from power. Rulers evaluate the stakes and constraints and either step down or prolong their rule. If the stakes are low enough, they step down. In turn, their post tenure fate affects the decision-making of other rulers in office who decide on their succession strategy. If the costs are too high, the rulers prolong the rule, with a certain probability they get reelected, and we observe the endogenous institutional change: a new tenure institution. Even though many rulers in democracies desire re-election as the rational office-seeking actors, because of the very low stakes of losing office and the smooth long-term contracting, enabled by the consolidated institutions, they don’t have to prolong their tenure, and they can’t, barring extraordinary circumstances. They can be seen as deterred from doing so.

The aforementioned literature on democracy and development made a large con-

Figure 1.3: Term Limits, the Stakes of Losing Office, and Democracy



tribution as to how the state of economy, income per capita and growth affect democracy. However, this approach is focused on macro-level aggregates. We should not neglect the human factor and how these macro-outcomes are translated at the micro-level. I contribute to this literature on development by examining a link between how the macro-politico-economic aggregates affect the incentives of rulers by rendering the stakes of losing political office to be high or low, and, in turn, by mapping a link between these micro-foundations (rulers' incentives) to the observable macro-outcomes: endogenous institutions that regulate rulers' tenure, and, most importantly, development and consolidation of democratic and dictatorial regimes. This thesis will contribute to this examination of wealth and democracy by mapping the impact of wealth on rulers' motivation and behavior and then translating the motivation of rulers into the outcomes of interests.

In this chapter I provided a theoretical blueprint for the empirical chapters to follow. I reflected on the relevance of limited tenure, ruler's motivation, the stakes of losing office in different polities and constraints rulers face, implications of incumbency advantage for democracy and democratic transitions.

This dissertation is built upon and contributes to several literatures. First of all, by assembling the data on tenure institutions in all world presidencies and analyzing term limits, re-election, incumbency advantage and survival in office, it contributes to the literature on comparative presidentialism (e.g., Shugart and Carey 1997; Cheibub 2006) and survival in office (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bienen and Van der Walle 1991, Machiavelli 1999 [1515]), in presidential regimes.

By analyzing how the state of economic development influences the stakes of losing and holding office, as well as rulers' behavior in office, and how, in turn, these stakes affect succession behavior and the outcomes thereof, it contributes to the literature on democracy and development (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000).

The literature on transitions has made serious advances in our understanding of what matters for the regime stability and transitions and when the latter occur (Geddes 1999; Przeworski 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Transitions to democracy almost always result from splits within authoritarian regimes (Karl 1990; Przeworski 1991; Stepan 1986; Di Palma 1990). Geddes (1999) analyzed stability and breakdown of authoritarian regimes as functions of elite splitting and unity: when elites split, transitions are more likely.

Since elite splits often precipitate transitions to democracy, the absence of an incumbent at elections and the presence of a successor, who does not have the incumbency advantage, should increase the probability of transition. Since the process of presidential succession creates uncertainty about the distribution of power in society and elite splits, since elite splits often precipitate transitions to democracy, and since incumbents are more likely to win elections, I expect that when incumbents step down due to term limits, this increases the chances of democratic breakthrough. In this sense, the focus on presidential succession allows us to study not only democracy and dictatorship as the outcomes of rulers pursuits of their survival in office, but also transitions to democracy.

All together, the study of democracy and dictatorship as the outcomes of individual strategies in pursuit of their survival in office, which in turn are determined by the state of economic development and their own actions in office, contributes to the literature on stability and breakdown of democracy and dictatorship in general (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Olson 1993). The examination of presidential behavior during succession and of term limits, because it captures how high rulers value their office directly, allows to address these profound questions in one integrated framework.

In the next chapter I begin from the basics and describe the patterns of presidential succession and term limits the world over. In the chapters to follow, I will analyze these patterns.

Chapter 2

Tenure Institutions in Presidential Regimes

2.1 Introduction

Tenure institutions vary across the presidencies of the world: they range from such institutions as one single 4-year term only, as in Ecuador, to the generously endowed, “king-like” institution of an unlimited number of 7-year terms, as in Syria. The type of tenure institution, the number of terms and the length of each term affect the time horizons of rulers and their policy making, their survival strategies and succession. The presidents bound by a single 4-year term with no prospect of re-election behave differently from those serving two terms of five years each with a high probability of re-election: longer horizons in office affect horizons in policy decision-making (Franzese 2002). The length of term also matters as it determines the length of the political economic cycle (Tufté 1978, Alesina 1997).

Big projects are bedeviled in Mexico by the ‘sexenio mentality’, the rush to get things done during the six-year presidential term. This is caused by the politicization of many governmental activities, which encourages six-year, but not long-term, planning.¹

President Putin of Russia, whose second four-year term will expire in 2008, while reiterating his commitment to the term limits, noted on the appropriate length of

¹*Economist*. 2006, July 1. “Six Years of Refried Beans, and Little Confidence of Better to Come - Mexico”s Election.”

presidential term:

I believe that limitation by the number of terms is justified. . . . In modern Russia, five, six or seven years is quite acceptable. I was acting prime minister before becoming president so I knew what was going on and what was involved in the decision-making process. But if, for example, a governor is elected [president], it will take him at least two years to understand national and international problems, but by then a new election campaign will have to be launched.²

In order to begin addressing the questions posed in Chapter 1 and the introduction, and to explain the logic of presidential tenure prolongation and succession and its impact on democracy, in this chapter I intend to describe the pattern of tenure arrangements and changes thereof currently, and historically (1975-2004) — in other words, to “get the data right”.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explain the sample selection. Since I focus on term limits, succession, and the incentives of the top executives, I focus on the sample of elected presidencies and elaborate on the criteria for the inclusion of specific cases. Next, I describe the institutions of presidential terms throughout the world in 2005 and compare them with the ones in 1975. I also discuss the shortcomings of the existing data on term limits and describe my original dataset of tenure institutions. As expected, long or unlimited tenure is strongly associated with low levels of democracy and of executive competitiveness, yet I also find that many partly or non-democratic regimes impose limited tenure on their chief executives.

The origins of institutions matter, and in the third section I turn to test whether it is possible to explain the contemporary patterns of tenure institutions on the basis of countries’ historical macro-characteristics, such as colonial or legal origins, as well as by regional clustering or tenure institutions they had in the past (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Alesina et al. 2004). The null hypothesis is that countries simply “inherit” their tenure institutions, so that in the 2000s’ decade countries have the same presidential tenure arrangements today as they had long ago. Using a series of multinomial logit regressions, I find some evidence for regional or group clustering, such as the tendency for most countries with Spanish colonial origins to have a single presidential term, or for countries that had 7-year length in 1975 to have the same length 30 years later. Yet, due to the small sample size, the evidence is

²*RIA Novosti*. 2007, June 4. “Putin Says Presidential Term May Be Extended To 7 Years.”

not conclusive. Most importantly, a mere glance suggests that a great number of presidents change their tenure arrangements, and some of them even several times, and we should turn to the leader-level for an explanation instead, which I do in the consequent chapters.

2.2 Presidential Regimes in the Third Wave

This thesis focuses on all presidential regimes of the world. There are different classifications of presidential regimes in the literature and what constitutes presidential regime is open to some interpretation. There are directly elected presidencies, indirectly elected but powerful presidencies. Some regimes could be classified as either presidential or parliamentary depending on the criteria; and the predominant majority of studies focus on democratic presidential regimes only (see Shugart and Carey 1992 for an overview, also Cheibub et al. 2006).

In this thesis, I define as presidential those regimes in which the effective head of government, the president, is elected for a fixed term either directly or indirectly. A president is effective in the sense that he is not dominated by a single ruling party or a military junta, and that he cannot be discharged by a legislative no-confidence vote, like the heads of cabinets can be (Riggs 1998).³ As I explain below, such a classification will include presidents with different powers and different electoral legitimacy, and the sample will consist of directly elected presidents, presidents competing with Prime-Ministers in semi-presidential systems, and the hyper-presidential autocrats. Because I focus on the electoral succession of the top executives (presidents) and its implications for democracy, I include presidents in democratic, partly-democratic and non-democratic regimes and keep the sample size large, perhaps at the expense of precision. However, the predominant majority of included rulers are directly-elected presidents. In this section I explain how I construct the sample of presidential regimes (1975-2004), using a number of well-known datasets.

I concentrate on regimes headed by elected single chief executives. The period

³In contrast, Sartori classifies as presidential those regimes in which the head of state is directly elected, cannot be removed by a parliamentary vote during his fixed term and is both head of government and of state (Sartori 1990, 1). Such classification effectively eliminates all semi-presidential systems and/or indirect presidential systems. Also, sometimes “directly-elected” presidents can be elected indirectly, such as in Bolivia or Chile (for example, Allende in 1970). Properly speaking, US presidents are also elected indirectly, by the electoral college.

under investigation is 1975-2004, which closely matches the third wave of democratization that began in 1974, or specifically, at twenty-five minutes past midnight on April 25, 1974, in Lisbon, Portugal, according to Huntington (1991, 3). It is also not coincidental that the specific lower cut point of 1975 matches the available data from a series of well-known datasets that I use in the estimations to follow.

In Chapter 1 I outlined the logic of succession and term limits for chief executives: facing restrictions, rulers choose between stepping down and prolonging their rule. I select those political regimes with a single identifiable decision-maker at the top, whether democratic, partly-democratic or non-democratic, in which the logic of an individual ruler deciding on his or her survival strategy applies. Single-party states, pure or predominantly parliamentary regimes, military juntas, the interim regimes or monarchies are therefore not the subject of this study: term limits, their absence or changes thereof do not apply in these regimes, and rulers do not legitimate their succession via elections.

Depending on the survival strategies chosen by rulers and the outcomes thereof, regimes that enter the sample as non-democracies can gravitate to and become democracies, and vice versa. Therefore, I select all presidential regimes, whether democratic, partly democratic, electoral authoritarian or non-democratic, as long as there are single chief executives at the helm, and they are elected. Including electoral autocracies alone would select on the dependent variable, as many electoral democracies could have become autocracies, but managed to consolidate instead. It could be due to the fact that their rulers failed to consolidate their powers and to remain in office, or were deterred from the elimination of term limits and had to step down.

This research is related to the emerging research program on electoral autocracies (Howard and Roessler 2006; Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, Ottaway 2002). These authors examine only those authoritarian regimes that allow semi-competitive elections and they omit both democratic and “closed” authoritarian regimes.⁴ In contrast, this thesis is more inclusive, “democratic” in its selection criteria and admits democrats, dictators and everyone in between: I focus on all presidential regimes in the spectrum between 1 and 7 on the Freedom House index of Civil Liberties and Political Rights, as long as they are presidential and hold elections.

⁴E.g., in a recent paper on liberalizing electoral outcomes in semi-authoritarian regimes, Howard and Roessler excluded those countries that received *FH*'s score of 2 or lower (democracies) on the one hand, and those with the worst score of 7 (the “closed” autocracies), as well as those where the winning party or candidate received over 70 per cent of the popular vote (Howard and Roessler 2006, 368). That is, the authors focused on hybrid regimes only.

I use several well-known datasets in order to select presidential regimes, 1975-2004. Table 2.3 (in the Appendix) lists all major variables that I use in this and the following Chapters, their abbreviations, and where they came from.

The Database of Political Institutions (henceforth *DPI*), compiled by a team of the World Bank economists, is a large cross-country database of political characteristics of all countries in the world, 1975-2004 (Beck et al. 2001, 2004). One of the variables included in it, *System*, defines whether a country has a parliamentary, assembly-elected presidential, or presidential system of governance. For illustrative purposes, I explain how I used the *DPI* data to select presidential regimes in 2004. The selection of presidential regimes in the whole sample, 1975-2004, is based on the same criteria.


According to the *DPI*, in 2004, there are 99 presidential, 16 indirect presidential and 58 parliamentary regimes, 173 in total. On average in the period of 1975-2004 the *FH* index is 4.9 for presidential regimes, 5.5 for indirect presidential regimes and 1.9 for parliamentary regimes. Apparently, the majority of presidential and indirect president regimes are partly- or non-democratic, as indicated by their high *FH* scores, while parliamentary regimes are, predominantly, democracies. There is a large literature in comparative politics that investigates democracy in presidential and parliamentary regimes (Cheibub et al. 2006; Cheibub 2002; Linz 1994, 1990a 1990b; Mainwaring 1993; Schugart and Carey 1992; Przeworski et al. 2000; Stepan and Skach 1993). In a seminal paper, Linz (1990) argued that presidencies tend to be more authoritarian than parliamentary regimes because of their winner-take-all logic.⁵

Figure 2.1 illustrates the selection process. As can be seen, all three categories of presidential, indirect presidential and parliamentary systems contribute to the sample, with the predominant majority of cases selected from the presidential sub-sample. The numbers represent frequencies: the numbers without brackets represent the contribution of each category to the sample; the numbers in brackets represent the total number of observations in these three sub-samples.

First I turn to the regimes coded as presidential. There are 99 of those. However, this group also contains military juntas, monarchies and one-party states. In order

⁵There is a contrasting perspective on presidentialism and democracy that holds that countries, which adopt presidential systems, might be different from those that adopt parliamentarianism. Therefore, democratic “under-achievement” of presidential regimes has more to do with the economic backwardness or with the legacy of military involvement in politics, rather than presidential institutions. See Cheibub et al. 2006.

Figure 2.1: Sample Selection



to discard these non-presidential regimes, I use the Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (*EIEC*, also from the *DPI*). There are 19 countries with the value of *EIEC* that equals “No executive” or “Unelected executive”. Using the dataset of political constraints, (henceforth *POLCON* (Henisz 2002)), I make sure that these 19 cases are not presidential regimes. The *POLCON* includes a number of regime-related variables. If the executive party variable in *POLCON* is coded as a monarchy, I exclude such cases. Altogether, there are 11 monarchies, coded as “presidential” in the *DPI*.⁶ Of the remaining 8, Myanmar is a military junta, Libya has not held a single election under Gaddafi since 1969 and the Democratic Republic of Congo is recovering from a state of anarchy.

Therefore, out of these 19, I exclude 11 monarchies and 3 abovementioned countries. I retain remaining 5: Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central African Republic, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau. I include Afghanistan, as it recently had presidential elections (Afghanistan will have observations for 2004 only and no observations for 1975-2003). I also include Pakistan, as in 2002 President Musharraf held a confirmatory plebiscite on his term not unlike the regular plebiscites in the Egyptian presidency prior to the recent adoption of direct presidential elections in 2005 in the latter, and, hence, comparable to the included presidencies of Egypt and Syria. Finally, I include the Central African Republic, as it held presidential elections in spring of 2005, and two African presidential non-democracies: Burundi and Guinea-Bissau.

Of the remaining 80 presidential regimes, I include all but 5.⁷ Combining the remaining 75 cases (80 - 5) with the above selected 5 (19 - 14), there are 80 presidential regimes in 2004 altogether.

Next I turn to the sample of the indirectly elected presidencies. Out of 16 indirectly elected presidencies included in the *DPI* dataset, I exclude 6 one-party states (China, Vietnam, Cuba, Eritrea, Laos, North Korea). These 6 are all coded as one-party dictatorships in Geddes’s (1999) dataset. Of the remaining 10, I retain 6 for further analyses: Togo, Egypt, South Africa, Yemen, Lebanon and Indonesia, as they all have strong presidents.⁸ All in all, I add 6 indirect presidential regimes

⁶Bahrain, Bhutan, Jordan, Kuwait, Monaco, Morocco, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates

⁷These are Timor Leste, Turk Cyprus, Cyprus, Comoro Islands and Israel. I lack the data for the first 4 cases that is necessary for the analyses to follow, and I drop Israel as it is not presidential, but a parliamentary regime with a directly elected Prime Minister.

⁸I drop the remaining 4 as I either lack data for the analyses to follow (Guyana and Moldova), or for other reasons: Liberia has been in the state of anarchy up until the time of this writing, and Estonia is a parliamentary regime, miscoded as indirect presidentialism.

to the previously selected 80, thus enlarging the sample to 86 cases.

Finally, I browse through countries coded as parliamentary regimes in the *DPI*. This category contains several countries with directly elected presidents. The authors of *DPI* exercised certain discretion in ambiguous cases, coding some regimes as parliamentary where they could have been coded as presidential, and vice versa.⁹ Out of 58 countries coded as parliamentary, I select 6 to include in the sample of presidencies: Romania, Suriname, Finland, France, Botswana and Zimbabwe. I select Finland and France because these countries had strong presidents in the past and because they changed their presidential tenure arrangements recently; Zimbabwe, for it has switched to direct presidential elections; Botswana, for it has a powerful president not unlike in the other indirectly elected presidencies and an interesting succession process underway at the time of this writing; and Romania because its presidential powers are similar to those of the included in the sample Poland and Lithuania. It adds 6 more cases to the previously selected 86.

In sum, there are 92 presidential regimes altogether included in the sample in 2004. Inevitably, there are several hybrid cases, such as Botswana or Zimbabwe, that can be also classified as parliamentary regimes. I chose to increase the sample size, perhaps, at the expense of precision. For comparison, in 1975 there were 63 regimes that satisfied the abovementioned criteria. Indeed, a lot of Latin American presidential regimes were military juntas in 1970s, and a dozen of the post-Soviet presidents had not entered the scene yet, so the number of presidential regimes in 1975 is much lower than in 2005.

2.3 Tenure Arrangements Throughout the World

The majority of presidential regimes subject their chief executives to the legal requirement to step down after one or two terms in office, yet many presidents do not face term limits at all and can be re-elected as many times as they please. As discussed in some detail in Chapter 1, the arguments on presidential tenure restrictions can be traced back to Hamilton and Jefferson in *The Federalist* (2004 [1787]). Properly speaking, the discussion on term limits did not originate with the Founding Fathers but dates back to the ancient Greeks, who imposed two terms' rule

⁹One of the criteria for selection was "Mentioning in sources: if the sources mention the president more often than the PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential" (Beck et al. 2005, 6).

for citizens serving in their council of citizens and one term for those chosen as heads of councils (Rhodes 1985). However, we will not go as far back as the Athens city-state and instead examine whether current tenure arrangements and the record of presidents under these arrangements support Hamilton's arguments or whether Jefferson's caution was justified.

2.3.1 Data on Tenure Institutions

There are a rich variety of different institutional arrangements regulating executive tenure throughout the world. The most relevant provisions regulate the length of one term, and the number of terms allowed. The available data that I found was either limited to a particular period and region, as in Carey (2003, 1997) regarding Latin America; or with errors and omissions, as in the *DPI*; or focused on particular regions and certain parameters, as in the *Archigos* dataset (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006).

The *DPI* dataset (Beck et al. 2001) includes 2 variables of interest: whether there are term limits, and whether a second term is allowed, and covers all countries in the world, 1975-2005.¹⁰ However, a cursory glance at the term arrangements in 2005 reveals certain disparities between the *DPI* data and the actual arrangements. Thus, the *DPI* reports term limits in presidencies without limits, and reports the absence of limits when they are in existence. In fact, the *DPI* reports only 6 cases without term limits in 2004, while I count 24!¹¹

To see how much my dataset, which I describe below, corresponds to the *DPI*, I

¹⁰*FINITTRM*: Is there a finite term in office? (1 if yes, 0 if no) and *MULTPL*: If there are formal restraints on an executive's term (NA if not), can s/he serve additional term(s) following the current one? Only limits on immediate re-election count (If *FINITTRM*=0, then *MULTPL*=NA). In other words, using *DPI*, it is possible to deduce whether a president has one term (*MULTPL*=0), two terms (*MULTPL*=1), or no term limits (*FINITTRM*=0).

¹¹For example, according to the *DPI*, the Egyptian chief executive has term limits, as well as the French, Syrian and Mauritanian presidents (they don't!). Likewise, the *DPI* reports all Central Asian presidencies but Turkmenistan having limits, while in fact only Kyrgyzstan does (and even there President Akayev discarded his first term and began a new countdown after a new Constitution was promulgated, thus effectively extending his term). In other Central Asian presidencies terms have been scrapped or extended and ambiguous arrangements were promulgated instead. The *DPI* data also reports that some parliamentary systems have term limits (e.g., Germany, UK), which is impossible by definition. Besides, there are many missing values. I counted 41 tenure arrangements that were miscoded in 2004-5 only. I cannot explain this disparity, but it appears that the *DPI* encountered problems during the process of data collection, as I can account for all observations in my dataset. Other political scientists confirmed having similar problems regarding the *DPI* in their own research, e.g., Alberto Simpser of the University of Chicago (personal communication).

test for correlation between *DPI* and my data for the whole period of 1975-2004.¹² The correlation is only 0.57 ($n = 2,023$), while being highly significant for the obvious reasons, it is far from 1. I also cross checked with the data on terms collected under the auspices of the existing *ARCHIGOS* project by Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza (2006).¹³

Instead, in the beginning of 2005, I collected data on presidential tenure arrangements throughout the world for 1975-2004 period, and since then updated it.¹⁴ Table 2.2 in the Appendix defines and describes the major variables included in this dataset: *Terms* is the number of consecutive terms allowed: 1, 2 or N, with N standing for an unlimited number of terms; *Length* denotes the length of one term; *Year* denotes the year in which the constitutional provision pertaining to term limits was promulgated. There are also a number of other variables that I discuss throughout this thesis. Henceforth, I use the *Nxn* code to denote particular arrangements: number of terms x term length (e.g., 1x5, 2x4 or Nx7).

Figure 2.2 reports the tenure institutions for all presidential regimes in the world in 2005. Table 2.4 in the appendix details tenure arrangements for every country. There are countries that impose only one single term for their chief executives, as well as countries that allow one reelection. Sometimes there are more elaborate provisions which stipulate, for example, that the terms cannot be consecutive, or that the terms must be separated by at least two interim terms. Some countries have no term limits at all. The length of a term also ranges between four and seven years. The median tenure arrangement in the world is 2 terms of 5 years each: 35 presidential regimes (39 per cent) have this arrangement. The median number of terms is also 2. The median length is 5, which is not far off the mark suggested by Hamilton, who suggested the duration of four years:

¹²I first recode *FINITTRM* and *MULTPL* to match with my coding single-terms as (1), two-terms (2) and no limits (3)

¹³This dataset has not been released (as in August 2006), yet Hein Goemans generously shared a pre-release version with me in the summer of 2005, and I would like to thank him and other authors. Their data included the historic term limits arrangements for Latin America and the contemporary data for most of the Sub-Saharan Africa, but did not include Europe and the post-Soviet states, as well as most of the Middle East (in the version shared with me at the time). I used this data to cross check my dataset (collected in the beginning of 2005). Gleditsch et al. 2006 were not necessarily interested in the same questions as I was. Thus, they did not collect data on how many terms rulers could serve; whether rulers extended their tenures, etc. They also focused on particular regions, etc.

¹⁴The major sources: constitutions of the world (FindLaw, State Department country profiles, CIA country information, BBC country timeline, Central European Constitutional Review, the *Archigos* dataset, etc.

Figure 2.2: Presidential Tenure Arrangements in the World, 2005




Figure 2.3: Presidential Tenure Arrangements in the World, 1975





Figure 2.4: Entry Tenure Institutions in 373 Presidencies, 1975-2004



“As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty” *The Federalist Paper n. 71* (2004 [1787]).

In 2005 67 presidential regimes have term limits, and 24 countries do not limit their executive tenure. It seems that the majority of nations decided to err on the side of caution and limit the possibilities of dictatorial takeover, thus agreeing with the opinion of Thomas Jefferson. Most of those that “disagree” with Thomas Jefferson are located in Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and the post-Soviet region, with France a remarkable oddity among them. Their term lengths vary between five and seven years. All Latin American presidencies have term limits.

We can also compare tenure institutions in 2005 and in 1975. As seen from Figure 2.3, the pattern in 1975 can hardly be more different. In 2005 more than two thirds of presidential regimes have limits on their executives, and the median category is two terms, five years each. In contrast, at the onset of the third wave in 1975 only one quarter of presidencies have limits, and the most numerous category is the unlimited number of five-year terms.

The mid-1970s were the dark hours for democracy. The only two free countries in Latin America in 1975 were Venezuela and Colombia, the Soviet Union appeared strong and unbreakable, and Africa was controlled by highly repressive dictatorships. Thirty years later, in 2005 the only ruler who declared himself “president for life” was president Niyazov of Turkmenistan and he was perceived as an oddity even among the most repressive presidential regimes that did not impose tenure limits. In contrast, in 1975, there were three rulers in this category: Banda of Malawi (from 1971), Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (from 1972) and Bokassa of Central African Republic (from 1972). The latter also came to be known as the Emperor Bokassa four years later in 1976. In that same year, in 1976, Idi Amin declared himself president for life, thus increasing the number of “lifers” to four.¹⁵

Likewise, Figure 2.4 is constructed in the same manner as the first two. This figure, however, plots the distribution of all presidents with particular tenure institutions at *entry* into office, whether they changed it later or not, in 1975-2004. The distribution is somewhat closer to the one in 2005, with the majority of rulers entering term-bounded offices and the 2x5 arrangement being the median one.

¹⁵Idi Amin came into power as a leader of military coup and he had never had elections, so Uganda under Amin is not counted among presidential regimes in 1975.

2.3.2 Tenure Institutions and Democracy

Thomas Jefferson, as well as Juan Bautista Alberdi, warned the authors of the American and Argentine Constitutions that without term limits the possibility of a dictatorial (“monarchical”) takeover of democracy was too large a threat to ignore. Indeed, a cursory glance at countries without term limits shows that the majority of them are non-democratic. Indeed, such countries as Egypt, Syria, Tajikistan and Gabon are among the most oppressive regimes in the world. The only “unfree” country with one term for a chief executive is Haiti, which has only recently begun recovering from a state of anarchy and civil war. The average *FH* index score for the “no limits” countries is 5.3 (s.d. = 1.3), and for countries that impose limits it is 3.3 (1.5). The difference between the single-term and two-term regimes is much smaller: 2.6 (1.4) and 3.3 (1.6), respectively.¹⁶

It is evident that there is a link between limited tenure and democracy. The only two “free” countries without limits are France and Suriname, and the latter, arguably, can also be classified as an indirectly presidential. There are four “partly free” countries without tenure restrictions, including Uganda or Gabon. There is a good fit not only between the number of terms and democracy, but also between a particular tenure arrangement and democracy: there is a positive linear relationship ranging from the *FH* score of 2.8 (1.3) for the 1x4 arrangement to *FH* score of 5.8 (0.8) for the Nx7, where the *FH*’s score of 7 is the least democratic category. The pattern is unambiguous: the longer executives are allowed to stay in office, the more repressive their regimes are.

Figure 2.5 illustrates the positive relationship between the level of democracy and limited tenure. There is a dense cluster of “unfree” countries without limits in the upper right quadrant, and “free” and “partly free” countries with single or two terms in the lower left quadrant and the center. There is another distinct group of countries in the lower right corner: “unfree” with term limits.

Table 2.5 in the appendix provides summary statistics for countries with and without term limits, as well as for various regional groups (omitting North America with 1 observation (USA), Asia with 3 and Europe with 4). As it can be seen, the differences between groups with and without limits are not that large. These

¹⁶Likewise, there is a significant correlation between various measures of executive constraints and term limits. The correlation between tenure and the *EIEC* is -0.38; between terms and political constraints, *POLCON iii* (Henisz 2002), is -0.38. These correlations are significant and have the correct sign.

two categories have similar scores on the index of ethnic diversity (*Ethnic*) and the economic growth rates (*Growth*) rates. There are more indirectly elected presidents among those rulers without limits, as indicated by the *System* variable.¹⁷ Also, fraudulent elections are more common in the “unlimited” presidencies than in the term-bounded ones. The governmental party majority premium in the legislature is larger in presidencies without limits, their legislatures are elected by plurality (rather than PR) most of the time, and the government controls both legislative houses most of the time. Indeed, rulers without limits on their tenure are more powerful.

In Chapter 3 I will discuss that on average there is a 23 percent probability that terms will be changed. I mark in grey the area on Figure 2.5 that contains unfree and partly free term-bounded presidencies, where term limits can be changed. Twelve countries eliminated term limits altogether in the 1990-2005 period alone. Five Latin American nations introduced a second term, and one, Costa Rica, imposed a period of two interim terms before a chief executive can run again. Togo displayed amazing institutional flexibility by imposing term limits just to drop them again, — all in the period of 4 years. One elected leader, President Niyazov of Turkmenistan (also known as Turkmenbashi — “the father of all Turkmen”) became president for life.

On the other side, 10 countries that did not have tenure restrictions imposed term limits on their chief executives in the same period. Out of these ten, seven imposed two terms and three imposed one. Two countries eliminated the opportunity to run after some interim period has lapsed. One, France, shortened the term from 7 to 5 years, but did not impose limits.

There are 25 “partly free” countries with limits, such as Nigeria and Sudan. In Nigeria the bid to change term limits failed when the Senate rejected it on May 18, 2006. But rulers can also succeed: during his tenure Hugo Chavez “traveled” from the very center of the bottom left quarter to its top right margin, extending his initial tenure from 5 to 13 years (2x6 plus 1 year under the old Constitution was discarded) and simultaneously “dragging” Venezuela’s democracy scores down along the way. Should he decide to prolong again, this journey could bring his presidency to the group in the upper right quadrant.

The fact that limited tenure is associated with higher levels of democracy and stronger executive constraints is not surprising at all. Indeed, the lack of the execu-

¹⁷Coded 0 if direct, 1 if indirect. I recoded a few parliamentary (2) regimes as indirectly presidential to create this dummy.

tive constraints indicates that the executives can do as they please, and surely stay in power longer, if they prefer. However, we should disentangle the precise mechanism between the limited tenure and democracy by understanding the executive decision-making on succession and staying in power, which I address throughout this thesis. As I argued in Chapter 1 and examine empirically later on, the lack of constraints that allows the executives to stay in office “forever” also works the other way around: the longer tenures, the more opportunities to consolidate power and lower these constraints. Because of the paradoxes of unlimited rule and rulers’ insecurity, unlimited tenure accelerates countries’ backsliding away from democracy, and does not only reflect it.

Unlimited tenure and tenure changes reflect the lack of executive constraints and low levels of democracy. When countries are coded on their levels of democracy (Freedom House or Polity indices, for example), tenure changes reflect badly on nations’ ratings. In this sense, there is some endogeneity in comparisons of limited mandate and democracy that I cannot eliminate completely. While democracy indicators do incorporate the status of unlimited tenure in their ratings, however, the term changes should also affect democracy levels directly, by making regimes without limits more authoritarian.

We can compare the average *FH* score for the tenure years preceding tenure change and years after this change for those 63 rulers that extend or shorten their tenure horizons in the 1975-2004 period (see Chapter 3 for more details). The difference, while rather small, is still noticeable: the score of 4.9 regresses to 5.7 on the *FH* index for those that extend their rule. Likewise, the democracy scores improve after a leader imposes limits or shortens his tenure: from 4.4 to 3.9. These differences can be attributed to the genuine improvements/lapses in democracy, or to the coders’ upgrading/downgrading of democracy scores simply because a limited mandate is so fundamental in democracy.¹⁸

If rulers enter office without limits in the first place, there is no need to extend their rule. Likewise, if there are limits on executive tenure, ambitious rulers have to go through a different decision-making process. In other words, institutions of term limits have their origins, and I briefly attend to this issue in the next section.

¹⁸The Student’s t-test indicates that the difference in average democracy scores prior to and after the change is significant for “term extenders” ($t = -5.93$) and not significant for those that impose limits ($t = 1.22$).

2.4 The Origins of Tenure Institutions

During the first, “long” wave of democratization in the XIXth century in the Old World, the monarchs gradually ceded authority to the parliaments and cabinets, but remained in control as the heads of states and often retained important veto powers. In consequence, the need for presidents as supreme national arbiters, as heads of states, did not arise in Europe, in which the majority of nations developed parliamentary forms of governance instead. When the new nations emerged elsewhere, very often they adopted the institutions of their former colonial masters. In fact, when colonial powers negotiated independence with their colonies, the former often helped to craft institutions based on their own (Sartori 1994). However, the new nations needed heads of states and chose presidents over monarchs. In the words of Simon Bolivar in 1826, “the new states of America . . . need kings with the title of President” (Sondrol 1990, 426). As discussed in Chapter 1, in Latin America, almost all nations had adopted term limits by mid-XIXth century, following the period of instability, coups and the rule by strongmen (*caudillos*).

Almost always, once a particular institutional form is adopted after independence, whether presidential or parliamentary, the nation adheres to this basic institutional form. If nations do change their institutional set-up, usually they swap parliamentarianism for presidentialism (as they did in Zimbabwe in 1987 or in Sri Lanka in 1978), rather than the other way around. Nations also often change the power-sharing arrangements between the presidents and their prime ministers, or they change the way their presidents are elected, directly or indirectly. For example, as I will discuss in Chapter 5, in 2004 the Ukrainian elites negotiated to empower the Prime-Ministerial office at the expense of the presidency. In consequence, that reform transformed presidential regime into presidential-parliamentary regime. Likewise, for the first time in 2005, Egypt held direct presidential elections, while its presidents were elected indirectly in the past. Whatever the perceived advantages of presidentialism over parliamentarianism are (see Przeworski et al. 1996; Linz 1990 on the perils of presidentialism or Cheibub et al. 2006 for the opposite view), once the basic institutional set-up is in place, only a few countries are able to change it.¹⁹ This is even true for military juntas, which often come into power and “redress” the wrongs committed by the preceding presidential regimes. Once they decide to cede power back to the civilian authority, they “appoint” a new president or hold elections to install a new president into power (Przeworski et al. 1996, 48).

¹⁹Moldova in 2000 transformed itself from a presidential to parliamentary republic, however, which was rather unusual.

If presidentialism is so “sticky” that nations, once they choose a presidential form of government at independence, adhere to it throughout their history, can we expect that the basic features that regulate presidential powers are just as “sticky”? In other words, do tenure institutions change?

Prima facie, the differences in the institutional arrangements that regulate term limits throughout the world can be attributed to the idiosyncratic reasons behind each country’s constitutional history. Yet, certain patterns are also discernable. As can be seen from Table 2.4 in the appendix, in 2005 the majority of Latin American countries have either one presidential term or the terms are separated by the interim term(s). Likewise, all Central Asian republics adopted the 2x5 arrangement in the early 1990s, only to change it to Nx7 later on.

Shugart and Carey (1992, 88) expect the variations in tenure arrangements to reflect the nature of those elites whose acceptance was necessary to put into effect the constitution. Indeed, as the brief illustration about the origins of the Mexican 6-year term in Chapter 1 suggests, this institution and its stability in the period under study in this thesis (1975-2004) can be explained by its origins in 1917 and by its stability in the longer run. Likewise, many post-colonial African nations followed the French institutional model, and, together with other institutions taken after the French metropolis, its former colonies adopted the Nx7 term institution.

During the third wave of democratization, which began with transitions in Southern Europe in mid-1970s and arguably continues today, many presidential regimes imposed tenure restrictions in a genuine attempt to build democratic institutions or to maintain the façade of democratic legitimacy. As the Soviet Union collapsed, one-party regimes seemed to have gone out of fashion. In the words of President Frederik Chiluba of Zambia, “If the owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are the Africans to continue with it?” As a result, many former presidential one-party states “transited” to presidential multi-party regimes with tenure restrictions. Some long-serving presidents that used to rule without tenure restrictions, together with other institutional innovations self-imposed limits, only to scrap them all over again when the limits approached, e.g., Deby, Nguesso, Bongo, and Eyadema. While their countries adopted some democratic norms and imposed certain constraints on their executives, the costs of losing office remained as high as they had been in the past, for rulers to depart easily.

Since I only focus on presidential succession and term limits during the third wave of democracy, which began after the majority of countries in this sample had

gained their independence, I can not map the constitutional bargaining at the time of independence to a particular tenure institution that each country adopted. In the following chapters, however, I will investigate the intra-elite bargaining over executive survival in a more recent period. Chapter 5 is explicitly written with this goal in mind.

Instead, I will address whether it is possible to explain the patterns of tenure institutions today on the basis of countries' historical characteristics, such as colonial or legal origins of their political institutions, as well as by regional clustering. If presidentialism is so "sticky" that, once adopted, it accompanies nations throughout their history, and if political institutions in the newly-independent nations were copied from institutions of their former colonial masters, can we predict the tenure institutions on the basis of country-wide parameters, such as colonial or legal origins of political institutions?

- H_1 : *Legal and colonial origins of political institutions can predict presidential tenure arrangements.*

2.4.1 Colonial and Legal Origins of Tenure Institutions

In order to measure the origins of political institutions, I deploy two variables: *Colonial origins* (British, French, Spanish or Portuguese, other, no colony) and *Legal origins* (British, French, German and socialist). I constructed *Colonial origins* myself, and borrowed *Legal origins* from La Porta et al. (1999). The measures of colonial and legal origins are highly correlated. Indeed, all former French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies have French legal origins; all but two British colonies have British legal origins; all but one nation, classified as "other colonies", have the socialist legal origins. Therefore, in the statistical analyses to follow I use the French, British, Spanish and Portuguese former colonies, and only socialist legal origins in order to avoid the overlap between colonial and legal origins.

Colonial and legal origins do not seem to determine whether a country will have limits or not in 2005. Across all four categories of legal origins, approximately 25 per cent of countries do not have term limits. Among the former French colonies there are 45 per cent of rulers with unlimited tenure, however. Indeed, 9 countries in the Francophone and Northern Africa, such as Chad or Guinea, have no restrictions in 2005. All former Spanish colonies have limited tenure in 2005.

Former Spanish colonies also seem to be the most democratic. On average, this category scores 2.4 on the *FH* index. Other “colonial” categories have lower scores. Thus, the former British colonies score 4.1, the French ones 4.5. In comparison with the other “colonial” categories, Spanish former colonies have gained the most freedom since 1975 (2 points’ improvement). Indeed, in 1975 only Colombia and Venezuela were free in Latin America. The former British colonies gained only 0.7 and the former French colonies gained 1.2 points’ difference between 1975 and 2005, on average.²⁰

Unfortunately, I don’t have data on term limits throughout countries’ independent history. However, I have data on term limits in 1975 and can compare the difference between the arrangements in 1975 and 2005. The correlation is statistically significant, and it is 0.48 between whether a country has term limits in 2005 and 1975; between a particular tenure arrangement (for example, 2x4 or 1x5) in 1975 and 2005, it is 0.67; and between the lengths of term, irrespective of the number of terms, it is 0.59. It appears that while many countries do have the same institution as the one they had at least 30 years ago, many did change it.

In order to test whether it is possible to predict a tenure institution in 2005 on the basis of colonial and legal origins of political institutions, as well as the tenure institutions in 1975, I run a series of statistical estimations (see the appendix, tables 2.6–2.8). Because of the small number of observations, we should treat these results with caution, and here I discuss these results only briefly. Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2001), Alesina, Aghion and Trebbi (2004), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) developed models that employed colonial and legal origins of political institutions in order to predict economic performance and democracy of nations. In the empirical models to follow, I adjust and use these models in order to predict presidential tenure arrangements in 2005.

In each model, I include French, British and Spanish colonial dummies, as well as a dummy for the socialist legal origins. I also include the *FH* scores to control for the degree of democracy. Finally, I include regional variables in order to check for the regional clustering effects: the Middle East and North Africa, and Africa. I omit the Latin America dummy as it correlates with the Spanish dummy, and CEE/NIS as it correlates with the socialist variable. This is very a simple, “bare-bones” model and it is specified to include only the very basic, macro-level parameters in order to

²⁰Clearly, I don’t intend to claim that colonial origins alone determine the levels of democracy, or whether they can determine particular political institutions at all. There are many omitted historical and politic-economic variables that need to be included.

account for nations' historical and geographic characteristics.

Each model is specified as a multinomial logit regression. I chose multinomial logit over ordered probit since it is not clear whether there is a logical ordering of the alternatives, such as, for example, whether nations will adopt the term length of four, five, six or seven years. Instead, I assume that the order is arbitrary and attempt to explain the existence of the various tenure arrangements on the basis of the various nation-level characteristics, and employ multinomial logit.

In model 2.6 the dependent variable is the number of terms in 2005 (1, 2 or no limits). The best predictor of whether a country will have a single-term arrangement in 2005 is whether this country is a *Spanish* or *British* former colony; and that it is not located in *the Middle East* or *Africa*. Indeed, as we already know, the majority of single-term presidencies can be found in Latin America. Likewise, democracy, *FH*, and *the number of terms in 1975*, as well as the *Spanish* colony (with negative coefficient) are the best predictors for multiple-term presidencies in 2005. This finding indicates that undemocratic countries with unlimited mandate in 1975 tend to remain in the same category 30 years on.²¹

Models 2.7 and 2.8 are specified to predict particular tenure arrangements in 2005 and in 1975, respectively. They include the same variables as in Model 2.6. The only difference is that Model 2.8 (terms in 1975) includes the measure of ethnic polarization, *Ethnic*. This variable is based on a well-known ethnic study from the 1960s by a group of Soviet academics, widely used in development economics now (first described in Mauro 1995). The higher values of this variable indicate higher polarization (See also Table 2.3). The logic behind the inclusion of this variable is that it captures the importance of holding office for a minority group, as the risk of losing office might signal permanent exclusion when the rival group captures it. The high ethnic polarization should be associated with higher insulation of executives and an unlimited mandate. There are studies that analyze how the identity of the ethnic group in power influence various outcomes of interest (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon et al. 2007). Fearon et al. (2007) find that ethnic minority leaders are more common in poorer countries, where particular ethnic groups, once in power, do their utmost to remain in power. The stakes of losing office seem to be high in ethnically polarized countries, so leaders should attempt to remain in office as long as they can.

²¹Inclusion of the number of terms in 1975 does not affect the results for the one-term category, and slightly improves for category without limits. I performed a Wald test to check for simple and composite linear hypotheses about the parameters of the model. Prob. $\chi^2 \geq 0.001$

Table 2.1: Term Length in 2005 (4, 5, 6 or 7 years), multinomial logit

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : 4 year term		
FH	0.342	(0.334)
Term length in 1975	1.803 [†]	(1.047)
Number of terms	0.260	(0.831)
British colony	18.953**	(2.832)
French colony	18.264	(2.740)
Spanish colony	21.386**	(1.628)
Middle East	-43.086	(0.000)
Intercept	-20.766	(0.000)
Equation 2 : 6 year term		
FH	0.063	(0.458)
Term length in 1975	2.607*	(1.305)
Number of terms	0.738**	(1.269)
British colony	22.396	(2.313)
French colony	18.377	(2.436)
Spanish colony	21.652**	(1.465)
Middle East	1.987	(2.627)
Intercept	-26.113	(0.000)
Equation 3 : 7 year term		
FH	10.036**	(0.347)
Term length in 1975	39.821**	(0.833)
Number of terms	34.554	(0.000)
British colony	2.239	(0.000)
French colony	27.041**	(1.452)
Spanish colony	46.256	(0.000)
Middle East	-3.572	(189.472)
Intercept	-278.324	(0.000)
N	52	
Log-likelihood	-28.106	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
5-year term is the base outcome		

The results of Models 2.7 and 2.8 are self-explanatory, and it seems that the country-level characteristics do explain certain patterns in tenure arrangements. The former Spanish colonies tend to have single-term presidencies, while the former French colonies and countries with socialist legal origins, as well as the Middle Eastern and African countries, tend to have unlimited institutions of some kind. Democracy is also a powerful predictor, but not always. Interestingly enough, ethnic polarization is a statistically significant predictor of unlimited tenure arrangements

in 1975, as can be seen in Table 2.8. It could suggest that the ethnic minority groups that captured control over the highest office at, or shortly after independence, decided to insulate their executives so that the latter could remain in office as long as possible.

Finally, Model 2.1 is specified to predict the length of term in 2005. Like in Models 2.6–2.8, I employ multinomial logit regression and assume that the order is arbitrary and there is no logical ordering of the alternatives, that is, whether nations will adopt the term length of four, five, six or seven years. The results of this model indicate that even if countries do change their tenure arrangements, most likely they change the number of terms, rather than the term length. That is, even if a country imposes limits on the number of terms its executive can serve, for example, limiting down to two terms, the length of one term will remain the same as under the unlimited tenure: 4, 5 or 7 years. The length in 1975 is statistically significant for predicting 4, 5 or 7 year-terms in 2005 and seems to be a better predictor than colonial origins or regional variables, as well as the number of terms or democracy scores.

When in 1994 in the Dominican Republic all major political parties decided to limit the tenure of their country's presidents to a single four-year term, the length of term remained the same 4 years, same as the length of term for President Balaguer that had served six 4-year terms by the time of that change. As can be seen from Figures 2.3 and 2.4, as the third wave of democratization found its way, many rulers imposed restrictions on their rule, thus transforming their institutions from $N \times 5$, prevalent in 1975, into 2×5 , common in 2005. However, they retained the same term length of 5 years. Indeed, the most numerous categories in 1975 and 2005 are these arrangements, respectively. While the number of terms changes, the length of this term does not necessarily change.

The origins of tenure institutions matter, as many rulers do not have term limits at entry and do not have to go through the decision-making problem described in this dissertation. Short of collecting data on institutions all the way down to the independence of each country under study, I can only conclude that there is some evidence that country-level characteristics can account for some patterns in tenure institutions. Due to a very small number of observations and a rather simple, "bare bones" model specification, we should treat the results of these 4 models with caution. It is more prudent to reject the hypothesis in this chapter and attempt to understand what causes the variation in tenure arrangements.

The simple test, however, indicates that the models have some explanatory power. Thus, Model 2.1 has 4 outcome categories, so if we have no expectations as to which category an observation belongs, we could just assign the probability of 0.25, and accidentally, four colonial and legal categories are also in this rough proportion. On average, the probability of observing what we observe given the model is roughly 0.58, however.²² This simple test produces similar results for other models that are included in the appendix.

2.5 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to introduce the data, select and explain the sample, and make some preliminary analyses of the patterns of tenure institutions across the world. Throughout this thesis, I use this sample and original data on term institutions (1975-2004). The majority of constitutional designers seem to agree, or perhaps, almost agree, with Alexander Hamilton who recommended four years as the most suitable length of a presidential term. Instead of the recommended four years, however, they adopt five-year terms as the most common term length. Thomas Jefferson also proved to be right: the possibility of dictatorial takeover is too large a threat to ignore and the majority of presidential regimes do impose some sort of tenure restrictions on their executives.

The findings of this chapter suggests two things. Firstly, and as expected, there is a link between limited tenure and democracy. There is a good fit not only between the number of terms and democracy, but there is a also positive linear relationship between a particular tenure arrangement and democracy. As we move across the tenure institutions from the shortest to the longest: from the 1x4 to the Nx7, so the democracy ratings improve along the continuum. Nations with shorter tenures tend to be more democratic. Yet there are many non- and partly-democratic regimes that impose limits on their executives. In the next chapters I will disentangle the precise mechanism between limited tenure and democracy by analyzing executive decision-making on succession and staying in power.

Secondly, tenure institutions do change. I investigated whether we can predict tenure arrangements in 2005 on the basis of historical, system-wide predictors, such as colonial origins, legal origins, ethnic polarization and political institutions in the

²² $exp(\frac{\log-likelihood}{n}) = exp(\frac{-28}{52}) = 0.58$. 0.58 is very different from 0.25, which suggests that the model has some explanatory power.

past. With this goal in mind, I ran a series of multinomial logit regressions with different tenure arrangements as the dependent variables. While there is a clear indication that colonial and legal origins, as well as tenure institutions in 1975, have some sway over what we observe in 2005, and that we should take into account the origins of institutions, the limited number of observations also suggests a certain degree of caution in interpreting the results. Besides, and most importantly, the predominant majority of countries in 2005 have different institutions than in 1975. There is a very strong evidence that countries do change their institutions. Only 12 countries have the same institution in 1975 and 2005 (e.g., USA, Syria, Egypt, etc), while four times as many, 51, have different institutions (e.g., Haiti, France, Venezuela). When we compare tenure institutions in 2005 and in 1975, Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we can see that in 2005 more than two thirds of presidencies impose limits on their executives, while in 1975, at the onset of the third wave, only one quarter of presidencies have limits.

While the origins of term limits are important, once rulers are on their own, the logic of succession and prolongation takes hold and terms can be changed. With this in mind, in the next chapter I match terms data with data on leaders and turn to the individual-level analysis to see whether tenure institutions' persistence and change can be explained any better. I explore the impact of these tenure institutions on presidential incumbency advantage, re-election and survival in office.

Appendix to Chapter 2

Table 2.2: Variable Definitions and Data Sources, Data on Terms

Variable	Description	In Range	Data
<i>Number of terms</i>	the number of consecutive terms 1, 2 or N, where N stands for the unlimited n of terms	[1, 2, N]	
<i>Term length</i>	the length of one term, 4, 5, 6 or 7 years	[4-7]	
<i>Ter</i>	tenure arrangement, Nxn : number of terms x term length (e.g., 1x5, 2x4 or Nx7)		
<i>Terms</i>	also <i>Term Limits</i> : term limits (1 if Yes, 0 if No)		
<i>Year</i>	year since which the most recent tenure arrangement is in force		
<i>Length type</i>	type of length: 1 if 4 years, 2 if 5, 3 if 6, 4 if 7		
<i>Entry Horizon</i>	maximum length of tenure a leader can serve, if reelected. Coded for the term-bounded presidents	[4, 14]	
<i>Years</i>	relative inverse distance to the end of tenure (allowed at entry), e.g., 2nd year in 1x4 is 0.5; 4th in 2x4 is also 0.5	[0, 1]	
<i>Changers</i>	leaders: 1 if entry and exit without limits, 2 if entry and exit with limits; 3 if entry without, exit with limits; 4 entry with, exit without		

Table 2.3: Variable Definitions and Data Sources

Variable	Description	In Range	Data
<i>Post Tenure Fate</i>	1 if Imprisonment, Exile or Death in up to 1 year after exit from office	[0, 0.19]	<i>Archigos</i>
<i>Exit</i>	0 if lost power by regular, 1 if by irregular means		<i>Archigos</i>
<i>Entry</i>	Leader reached power via regular (0) irregular (1) means; imposed directly (2)		<i>Archigos</i>

Continued on next page

Table 2.3: Variable Definitions and Data Sources (continued)

Variable	Description	In Range	Data
<i>Income</i>	GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$)	[106, 34,921]	WDI
<i>FDI</i>	Foreign Direct Investment, % of GDP	[-6.9, 44.5]	WDI
<i>Growth</i>	GDP growth per capita, %	[-10.8, 22.5]	WDI
<i>Foreign Aid</i>	Averaged aid per capita, % of GDP	[0, 129.2]	WDI
<i>FDI</i>	Foreign direct investments' inflows (% of GDP), averaged 3 years prior to change/departure,	[0, 0.37]	WDI
<i>Openness</i>	Imports + exports (% of GDP), averaged 3 years prior to change/departure	[0.11, 1.84]	WDI
<i>Vote share</i>	% of votes in the 1st/only round	[26.7, 99]	DPI
<i>System</i>	Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected Presidential (1), or Presidential (0)	[0, 1, 2]	DPI
<i>FINITTRM</i>	Is there a finite term in office? (1 if yes, 0 if no)	[0, 1]	DPI
<i>MULTPL</i>	If there are term limits (NA if not), can one serve additional term(s) following the current one? (1 if yes)	[0, 1]	DPI
<i>Government majority margin</i>	Proportion of seats in the legislature, controlled by the governmental party(ies)	[0.23, 1]	DPI
<i>Fraud</i>	1 if fraud was reported during elections	[0, 1]	DPI
<i>Allhouse</i>	Does party of executive control all relevant houses?	[0, 1]	DPI
<i>Plurality</i>	Legislature is elected by plurality? (1 if yes)	[0, 1]	DPI
<i>Events</i>	The sum of assassinations, purges, anti-governmental demonstrations, strikes per leader's tenure (from Banks 2005)	[0, 34]	Banks
<i>W</i>	Winning Coalition Size, size of the group whose support is needed to stay in power.	[0, 1]	BDM
<i>S</i>	Selectorate, size of the group that can formally select rulers, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1	[0, 1]	BDM
<i>EIEC</i>	Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness: No executive (1); Unelected (2); Elected, 1 cand. (3); 1 party, multiple candidates (4); multiple parties are legal but only one won votes (5); multiple parties win votes but the largest win	[1, 7]	DPI

Continued on next page

Table 2.3: Variable Definitions and Data Sources (continued)

Variable	Description	In Range	Data
	> 75 % (6); largest got < 75 % (7)		
<i>Executive constraints</i>	<i>polconv</i> : 1 if constraints, 0 if total discretion, includes executive, legislature, judiciary and the subfederal units	[0, 0.89]	Henisz
<i>PolconIII</i>	same as <i>polconV</i>	[0, 0.69]	Henisz
<i>XCONST</i>	excludes judiciary and subnational units Executive constraints, on scale between 1 and 7, where 1 is unlimited authority, 7 is coalition instability	[1, 7]	POLITY
<i>Colonial origins</i>	British, French, Spanish or Portuguese, other, no colony		La Porta et al. (1999)
<i>Legal origins</i>	British, French, German and socialist		La Porta et al. (1999)
<i>FH</i>	Averaged FH civil liberties and political freedoms score	[1, 7]	FH
<i>Ethnic</i>	Index of ethnic polarization, higher values stand for higher polarization	[0.02, 0.99]	Mauro (1995)
<i>Exchange Premium</i>	Black market exchange premium, %, (the official exchange rate minus black market rate)	[0, 558]	GFD, Banks
<i>TI</i>	TI Corruption Perception Index, 10 least corrupted	[1, 10]	TI
<i>International membership</i>	The number of organizations that a nation is a member of (See Ch. 4)	[0, 5]	-

Data sources: *Archigos*: Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza (2006); FH: Freedom House (2006); DPI: Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2005); WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank); TI: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (various years); GFD: Global Financial Data (GFD database); Banks: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2005).

Table 2.4: Tenure Arrangements in the World, 2005

Country	System	N	Length	Terms	Change	Region
Honduras	pres.	1	4	1x4	1982	Latin America
Guatemala	pres.	1	4	1x4	1985	Latin America
Costa Rica ¹	pres.	1	4	1x4	2003	Latin America
Haiti ²	pres.	1	4	1x4	1987	Latin America
Ecuador	pres.	1	4	1x4	1979	Latin America
Nicaragua	pres.	1	5	1x5	1987	Latin America

Continued on next page

Table 2.4: Tenure Arrangements in the World, 2005 (continued)

Country	System	N	Length	Terms	Change	Region
S. Korea	pres.	1	5	1x5	1988	Asia
Uruguay ²	pres.	1	5	1x5	1967	Latin America
Panama ²	pres.	1	5	1x5	1972	Latin America
El Salvador	pres.	1	5	1x5	1983	Latin America
Bolivia ²	pres.	1	5	1x5	1967	Latin America
Paraguay	pres.	1	5	1x5	1992	Latin America
Lebanon	pr/parl.	1	6	1x6	1947	Middle East
Mexico	pres.	1	6	1x6	1917	Latin America
Philippines	pres.	1	6	1x6	1987	Asia
Chile	pres.	1	6	1x6	1989	Latin America
United States	pres.	2	4	2x4	1951	North America
Nigeria	pres.	2	4	2x4	1999	Africa
Romania	parl.	2	4	2x4	1991	CEE/NIS
Russia	pres.	2	4	2x4	1993	CEE/NIS
Brazil	pres.	2	4	2x4	1997	Latin America
Argentina	pres.	2	4	2x4	1993	Latin America
Mongolia	pres.	2	4	2x4	1992	Asia
Dominican R.	pres.	2	4	2x4	2002	Latin America
Iran	pres.	2	4	2x4	1989	Middle East*
Taiwan	pres.	2	4	2x4	1994	Asia
Ghana	pres.	2	4	2x4	1992	Africa
Columbia	pres.	2	4	2x4	2006	Latin America
Cote d.Ivoire	pres.	2	5	2x5	2000	Africa
Botswana	parl.	2	5	2x5	1997	Africa
CAR	pres.	2	5	2x5	2004	Africa
Zambia	pres.	2	5	2x5	1996	Africa
Poland	pres.	2	5	2x5	1997	Europe
Tanzania	pres.	2	5	2x5	1998	Africa
Mozambique	pres.	2	5	2x5	1990	Africa
Niger	pres.	2	5	2x5	1999	Africa
Kyrgyzstan	pres.	2	5	2x5	1996	CEE/NIS
Madagascar	pres.	2	5	2x5	1998	Africa
Armenia	pres.	2	5	2x5	1995	CEE/NIS
Benin	pres.	2	5	2x5	1990	Africa
Algeria	pres.	2	5	2x5	2002	Middle East
Azerbaijan	pres.	2	5	2x5	1995	CEE/NIS
Kenya	pres.	2	5	2x5	1999	Africa
Burkina Faso	pres.	2	5	2x5	2000	Africa
Cape Verde	pres.	2	5	2x5	1992	Africa
Mali	pres.	2	5	2x5	1992	Africa
Namibia	pres.	2	5	2x5	1990	Africa
Afghanistan	pres.	2	5	2x5	2004	Middle East

Continued on next page

Table 2.4: Tenure Arrangements in the World, 2005 (continued)

Country	System	N	Length	Terms	Change	Region
Georgia	pres.	2	5	2x5	1995	CEE/NIS
Gambia	pres.	2	5	2x5	1996	Africa
Malawi	pres.	2	5	2x5	1994	Africa
Senegal	pres.	2	5	2x5	2001	Africa
Croatia	pres.	2	5	2x5	1990	CEE/NIS
Burundi	pres.	2	5	2x5	2005	Africa
Guinea-Bissau	pres.	3	5	2x5	1996	Africa
Sierra Leone	pres.	2	5	2x5	1991	Africa
Lithuania	pres.	2	5	2x5	1992	Europe
Ukraine	pres.	2	5	2x5	1996	CEE/NIS
Niger	pres.	2	5	2x5	1999	Africa
Serbia	pr/parl.	2	5	2x5	1997	CEE/NIS
Indonesia	pr/parl.	2	5	2x5	2002	Asia
South Africa	pr/parl.	2	5	2x5	1996	Africa
Peru	pres.	2	5	2x5	1993	Latin America
Sri Lanka	pres.	2	6	2x6	1978	Asia
Finland	parl.	2	6	2x6	1991	Europe
Venezuela	pres.	2	6	2x6	2000	Latin America
Rwanda	pres.	2	7	2x7	2003	Africa
Cameroon	pres.	2	7	2x7	1996	Africa
Mauritania	pres.	N	5	Nx5	1991	Africa
France	parl.	N	5	Nx5	2000	Europe
Belarus	pres.	N	5	Nx5	2004	CEE/NIS
Maldives	pres.	N	5	Nx5	1968	Asia
Pakistan	pres.	N	5	Nx5	2004	Asia
Uganda	pres.	N	5	Nx5	2005	Africa
Angola	pres.	N	5	Nx5	1992	Africa
Togo	pr/parl.	N	5	Nx5	2002	Africa
Chad	pres.	N	5	Nx5	2005	Africa
Sudan	pres.	N	5	Nx5	1998	Africa
Liberia	pres.	N	5	Nx5	1986	Africa
Tunisia	pres.	N	5	Nx5	2002	Middle East
Suriname	parl.	N	5	Nx5	1987	Asia
Egypt	pr/parl.	N	6	Nx6	1980	Middle East
Djibouti	pres.	N	6	Nx6	1992	Africa
Zimbabwe	parl.	N	6	Nx6	2000	Africa
Eq. Guinea	pres.	N	7	Nx7	1995	Africa
Guinea	pres.	N	7	Nx7	2001	Africa
Yemen	pr/parl.	N	7	Nx7	2000	Middle East
Kazakhstan	pres.	N	7	Nx7	1999	CEE/NIS
Tajikistan	pres.	N	7	Nx7	2003	CEE/NIS
Uzbekistan	pres.	N	7	Nx7	2002	CEE/NIS

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Table 2.4: Tenure Arrangements in the World, 2005 (continued)

Country	System	N	Length	Terms	Change	Region
Syria	pres.	N	7	Nx7	1973	Middle East
Congo, Rep. of	pres.	N	7	Nx7	2002	Africa
Gabon	pres.	N	7	Nx7	1991	Africa
Turkmenistan	pres.	N	N	for life	1999	CEE/NIS

*Middle East and North Africa. ¹Two interim terms. ²No immediate re-election. *System*: 0 presidential, 1 indirect presidential, 2 parliamentary (DPI); *N*: number of terms; *Change*: year of the most recent change. All ambiguous institutional arrangements, or cases where the initial 2xn configuration is modified for another one for the same president ad hoc, are coded as NxN.

Table 2.5: Summary Statistics, 2005, Country Level

SUBSAMPLES	FH	EIEC	system	polcon	exchprem	ethnic	growth	fraud	govt maj	plurality	allhouse
Total	3.7	6.2	.19	.27	25	.53	3.6	0.33	0.70	0.63	0.54
	1.8	1.6	.54	.21	49	.25	2.9	0.48	0.46	0.21	0.49
	1-7	1-7	0-2	0-.69	-16-312	.002-.93	-6.4-10	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	91	89	89	88	70	86	85	74	74	74	74
No term limits	5.3	5.3	.39	.12	64	.55	4.9	0.5	0.89	0.73	0.75
	1.3	1.9	.72	.18	77	.28	3.1	0.51	0.31	0.19	0.34
	1-7	2-7	0-2	0-.54	1.7-312	.002-.93	.7-10	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	24	23	23	23	21	22	20	22	19	21	20
Term limits	3.2	6.5	.12	.33	8.5	.53	3.2	0.27	0.54	0.59	0.46
	1.5	1.3	.45	.19	11	.24	2.7	0.45	0.29	0.20	0.50
	1-7	1-7	0-2	0-.69	-16-43	.095-.88	-6.4-9.7	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	67	66	66	65	49	64	65	52	55	53	54
Africa	4.2	6.1	.17	.22	41	.64	3.2	0.46	0.74	0.73	0.79
	1.6	1.6	.51	.19	71	.23	3.2	0.51	0.45	0.16	0.52
	1-7	2-7	0-2	0-.53	-16-312	.002-.87	-6.4-10	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	36	35	35	35	28	34	32	26	27	28	28
CEE/NIS	4.5	6	.17	.22	17	.46	5.6	0.58	0.91	0.52	0.3
	1.6	1.5	.58	.22	13	.21	2.6	0.51	0.30	0.41	0.48
	2-6.5	3-7	0-2	0-.54	-5.6-37	.13-.82	1.6-10	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	13	12	12	12	11	13	13	12	11	11	10
Latin America	2.6	7	0	.37	10	.42	2.7	0.17	0.5	0.5	0.28
	1.2	.22	0	.18	15	.21	2.5	0.38	0.51	0.18	0.46
	1-6.5	6-7	0	.084-.69	-12-43	.095-.74	-1.3-8.5	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	21	21	21	21	16	20	20	18	18	18	18
Middle East and North Africa	5.7	4.6	.29	.18	34	.61	4	0.33	1	0.85	1
	.64	2.2	.49	.19	47	.29	.93	0.52	0	0.13	0
	5-7	1-7	0-1	0-.46	-2-121	.18-.93	3-5.3	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7
Socialist Legal Code	4	6.2	.13	.25	16	.48	5.5	0.46	0.86	0.56	0.31
	1.8	1.4	.52	.22	13	.22	2.4	0.52	0.56	0.23	0.48
	1-6.5	3-7	0-2	0-.54	-5.6-37	.13-.88	1.6-10	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1
	16	15	15	15	12	16	16	15	14	13	13

in rows: mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, number of observations

Table 2.6: Number of Terms in 2005, multinomial logit

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : one term		
Number of terms in 1975	-0.316	(0.538)
FH	0.355	(0.411)
British colony	19.228**	(1.685)
French colony	20.484	(2.162)
Spanish colony	19.989**	(1.284)
Africa	-38.917**	(1.201)
Middle East	-39.377**	(1.994)
Intercept	-19.749	(0.000)
Equation 2 : no limits		
Number of terms in 1975	18.548**	(0.592)
FH	0.630*	(0.307)
British colony	-0.134	(1.229)
French colony	-1.122	(1.319)
Spanish colony	-36.242**	(1.456)
Africa	-1.211	(1.500)
Middle East	-0.605	(1.959)
Intercept	-56.708	(0.000)
N	53	
Log-likelihood	-30.789	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
(Two terms is the base outcome)		

Table 2.7: Tenure Arrangement in 2005, multinomial logit

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : 1x4		
FH	-1.416*	(0.696)
British colony	13.165**	(1.871)
French colony	23.505	(0.000)
Spanish colony	22.582**	(1.720)
Socialist	-19.198**	(2.755)
Africa	-41.140**	(2.392)
Middle East	-42.880**	(3.043)
Intercept	-25.036**	(2.073)
Equation 2 : 1x5		
FH	0.012	(0.634)
British colony	-33.114**	(1.630)
French colony	-33.871**	(1.855)
Spanish colony	1.251	(1.900)
Socialist	-37.894**	(1.991)

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2. Tenure Institutions in Presidential Regimes

... table 2.7 continued

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Africa	-36.541**	(1.338)
Middle East	-36.277**	(3.229)
Intercept	0.488	(1.877)
Equation 3 : 1x6		
FH	-0.222	(0.547)
British colony	24.254	(0.000)
French colony	-11.997**	(2.109)
Spanish colony	22.927**	(2.191)
Socialist	-15.809**	(2.135)
Africa	-38.771**	(2.049)
Middle East	-38.504**	(2.995)
Intercept	-21.366**	(1.952)
Equation 4 : 2x4		
FH	0.007	(0.315)
British colony	2.672 [†]	(1.433)
French colony	-33.537**	(1.521)
Spanish colony	1.143	(1.869)
Socialist	-1.545	(1.826)
Africa	-5.266**	(1.815)
Middle East	-2.978	(2.239)
Intercept	0.422	(1.625)
Equation 5 : Nx5		
FH	1.106**	(0.369)
British colony	0.075	(1.430)
French colony	0.900	(1.147)
Spanish colony	-36.851**	(1.929)
Socialist	5.865*	(2.340)
Africa	5.323**	(2.051)
Middle East	-5.841*	(2.619)
Intercept	-1.504	(1.722)
Equation 6 : Nx6		
FH	1.391*	(0.684)
British colony	21.326	(0.000)
French colony	20.469	(0.000)
Spanish colony	-8.388	(0.000)
Socialist	0.669	(3.847)
Africa	15.993	(0.000)
Middle East	16.056	(0.000)
Intercept	-45.276	(0.000)
Equation 7 : Nx7		
FH	1.577**	(0.543)
British colony	-0.484	(1.759)
French colony	0.767*	(1.143)
Spanish colony	-27.403**	(2.589)
Socialist	15.275**	(3.079)
Africa	15.011**	(2.921)

Continued on next page...

2. Tenure Institutions in Presidential Regimes

... table 2.7 continued

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Middle East	15.004**	(3.774)
Intercept	-24.235	(0.000)
N	88	
Log-likelihood	-89.659	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
 (2x5 is the base outcome,
 2x6 (n=4), 2x7 (n=1) and Nx6 (n=3) not estimated)

Table 2.8: Tenure arrangement in 1975, multinomial logit

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : 1x5		
FH in 1975	0.472	(0.622)
British colony	-22.352	(0.000)
French colony	-23.793	(0.000)
Spanish colony	24.360**	(4.054)
Middle East	-3.504	(0.000)
Ethnic	-2.802	(4.142)
Intercept	-27.545	(0.000)
Equation 2 : 1x6		
FH in 1975	-0.698**	(0.436)
British colony	19.343	(2.102)
French colony	-23.324	(0.000)
Spanish colony	21.300**	(2.628)
Middle East	0.006	(0.000)
Ethnic	-4.796	(3.101)
Intercept	-15.875	(0.000)
Equation 3 : 2x4		
FH in 1975	-0.376	(0.450)
British colony	21.408**	(3.595)
French colony	-23.456	(0.000)
Spanish colony	21.578**	(3.251)
Middle East	-0.242	(0.000)
Ethnic	-2.414	(4.156)
Intercept	-19.292	(0.000)
Equation 4 : Nx6		
FH in 1975	-77.300**	(0.397)
British colony	40.890	(0.000)
French colony	162.172**	(2.218)
Spanish colony	200.800**	(2.529)
Middle East	502.270	(0.000)
Ethnic	17.558**	(0.000)

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2. Tenure Institutions in Presidential Regimes

... table 2.8 continued

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Intercept	431.012	(0.000)
Equation 5 : Nx7		
FH in 1975	-1.730	(1.186)
British colony	-51.530	(0.000)
French colony	0.209**	(1.389)
Spanish colony	-49.534	(0.000)
Middle East	-42.798	(0.000)
Ethnic	4.562**	(3.146)
Intercept	12.156	(7.795)
N		42
Log-likelihood		-30.412

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

(Nx5 is the base outcome, 1x4 (n=2) and NxN (n=3) are omitted)

Chapter 3

Survival in Office, Term Limits, and Incumbency Advantage

3.1 Introduction

How relevant are tenure restrictions for survival in office and what determines this survival? The existing literature on political survival subscribes to the view that term limits are not important for survival in office. Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) argue that term limits have little effect on longevity as they can be easily scrapped. Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 313-314) find that autocracies never implement term limits, and if they do, those limits are not enforceable. In this chapter I intend to examine the patterns of presidential re-election rates and survival in office, and analyze these patterns. As I discuss in the next section, I find that when sitting presidents present themselves for re-election, the odds of winning are close to one in all presidential regimes, whether democratic or dictatorial. But does this ability to present oneself for re-election (and consequently, win) stem from the absence of term limits that allows this continuing re-election, or from the overall degree of authoritarianism, so that the more authoritarian leaders can run as many times as they please? In other words, I intend to estimate the effects of tenure institutions at entry into office on how long a ruler is expected to remain in office and whether we can separate these effects from the overall degree of democracy.

To address this question, using an additional parameter that measures a tenure institution at entry into office, I reexamine two well-known models of political survival. I focus on term limits at entry into office. If the expected entry horizons,

which are determined by the term limits, match the actual length of time in office, it will indicate that terms are not easy to change. If they are easy to change, then term limits at entry should not influence the length of time in office. Instead, how repressive and unaccountable regime is, or how stable it is, should determine survival in office.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, matching data on political leaders with data on terms, I investigate re-election and incumbency advantage in all presidential regimes. Next I map the survival rates of presidents, depending on tenure institutions at entry and on other relevant parameters. Then I specify and estimate the impact of tenure institutions at entry on how long rulers are expected to stay in power, controlling for the degree of authoritarianism. The main findings of this chapter are, firstly, that barring term limits and all things being equal, the probability of re-election in presidential regimes is close to one, and, secondly, that entry term limits have statistically significant effects on survival, independent of the overall degree of authoritarianism. However, I also find that in the poorest countries, where the stakes of losing office are very high, compliance with term limits is not enforceable.

3.2 Re-election, Term Limits and Political Survival

In Chapter 2 I described the patterns of tenure institutions in the world and attempted to explain them on the basis of country-level parameters. While there was some evidence that colonial and legal institutional origins had some sway over tenure institutions, I concluded that we should turn towards leader-level data in order to understand changes and persistence of these institutions.

In order to discuss the interaction between political survival, re-election, and term limits, I match data on term limits with *Archigos*, the dataset of political leaders (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006). I merge and construct the combined dataset of leaders and tenure institutions (1975-2004). In total, there are 373 leaders and 96 countries.¹ A total of 90 rulers are still in office as of December 31, 2004. On average, there are 3.2 presidents per country in this period. Some countries have had

¹The number of presidential regimes varies by year. There are 96 different countries coded as presidential one year or another. For example, there are 92 presidential regimes in 2004.

only one president since their independence, such as Kazakhstan, while others have had more. Argentina had 13 presidents in this period, even excluding military rulers. Executive turnover is highest in Latin America, and lowest in Eastern Europe, where many countries became independent only in 1989-91.

Table 3.1: Number of Leaders per Country, by Region

Region	mean	st. dev.	min	max	N
Africa	2.3	1.3	1	6	115
Asia	3	1.7	1	7	24
CEE/NIS	1.8	0.9	1	4	34
Latin America	4.5	2.9	1	13	148
Middle East and North Africa	2.8	1.8	1	7	32
West	2.8	1.5	1	6	20
Total	3.2	2.2	1	13	373

How relevant are tenure restrictions for political survival? To see whether I can obtain similar findings and predictions to the Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) sample of 86 democratic presidents (see Chapter 1) on this larger and different data, as well as to prepare for the discussion of presidential re-election in the world, I investigate re-election in 373 presidencies, whether democratic or not (1975-2004).

A total of 140 presidents entered office with a single term, 125 with 2 terms, and 108 without limits.

Out of 125 presidents that entered two-term office, 52 were reelected for the second term. Out of these 52, 14 exited regularly (complied with term limits), 22 died in office, were deposed, or were still in office as of 2004. 16 scrapped limits and prolonged their rule and 36 (52 - 16) did not. If we count only those that finished their two terms and departed from office, the count is 16 extended to 14 that did not. Out of these 16 twelve won 2, three won 3, and another one, Zine Ben Ali of Tunisia, won 4 re-elections.

Out of 73 that served less than one term (not reelected, 125 - 52), 36 were either still in power (and could still get reelected) or died in office prior to the expiration of their first term, and 17 exited by “regular” means after serving as interim presidents for 1 to 2 years only in office.² Obviously, only those that serve a full term can get

²Most of these are Latin American presidencies. For example, during the recent financial crisis

Table 3.2: Term Limits and Reelection

Total number of presidents	373
Entered single-term office	140
served 1 full term	87
extended 1 term	9
obeyed term limits	78
did not serve 1 full term	53
deposed or died	15
exited regularly (7 interim)	23
still in power	15
Entered 2-term office	125
got reelected	52
extended, won 2nd re-election or more	16
more than 2 re-elections (16 - 4)	12
did not extend (52 - 16)	36
served full 2 terms and exited	14
died or deposed	3
still in power	19
did not get reelected	73
still in power	22
deposed or died	14
interim	17
served full term	20
did not run	10
ran and lost	10
Entered multiple-term office	108
got reelected at least once	68
served 1 term	25
served 2 terms	17
served 3 terms	10
served 4 terms	10
served 5 or more terms	6
did not get reelected	40
interim	12
died or exited irregularly (40 - 12 - 8)	20

reelected in two-term presidencies, and there are only 20 of those. Out of these 20 that served one full term, 10 did not run (e.g., Martti Ahtisaari of Finland in 2000 or Mandela of South Africa in 1999) and only 10 ran and lost re-election. Out of these 10, 3 were U.S. presidents (Ford, Carter and Bush).

Likewise, 87 presidents served and 53 did not serve a full one term in single-term presidencies. Out of these 87, 9 prolonged their rule by extending terms limits or abolishing them. The most recent of these is President Uribe of Columbia, who secured a second term extension in 2005 and won re-election the following year. Altogether, there are 39 “extenders”, 16 from 2 initial terms and 9 from single terms; there are 10 leaders (e.g., Deby, Nguesso, Bongo, Conte, Eyadema, Mugabe) who entered office without term limits, then imposed limits (two-terms), and then again dropped them, and 4 who entered office without limits and became presidents for life. One, Bokassa of Central African Republic, became president for life in 1972 and in 1976 proclaimed himself a monarch — the only case of Bonapartism in the dataset.

If we exclude presidents that were still in power on December 31, 2004, those that were interim rulers for one or two years, those that died in office or were deposed, and those in two-term offices that lost their first-reelection or did not run for it, we find that out of 117 term-bounded presidents that reached term limits in 1975-2004, 92, or 79 per cent, obeyed term limits and stepped down when required, and 25, or 21 per cent, extended their terms. If we also include those 20 rulers in two-term offices that lost their first-reelection or did not run for it, then we can conclude that 67 per cent stepped down because of term limits, 7 per cent because they lost the election, 7 per cent because they stepped down even though they could have run, and 19 per cent extended their terms.

Finally, of those that enter “no limits” presidencies, 37 per cent do not survive beyond one term (half of them exit “irregularly”) and 63 per cent serve at least one term. After one term, 63 per cent of the remaining ones go beyond a second re-election; 38 per cent would at least pass a third, and 24 per cent go beyond fourth or more re-elections (those yet serving as on 2004 are also counted).

Remarkably, despite a larger and a different sample, both in terms of geography and regimes included (Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) had 86 *democratic* presidents,

Argentina alone had 4 rulers in the period of only 3 years: de la Rúa in 2001, Ramon Puerta and Adolfo Rodríguez Saa in 2002, Eduardo Duhalde in 2003. Compare with countries like Syria, which had only 2 presidents for the duration of the whole sample.

3. Survival in Office, Term Limits, and Incumbency Advantage

see Section 1.2.3), the patterns here are quite similar. The odds of re-election in two-term presidencies are 5 to 1 (52 to 10). I found a similar number of losers across the sample.³ However, because I found many more presidents getting reelected, the odds of re-election in two-term presidencies are 5 to 1 (See table 2.6). In other words, there is a 84 per cent chance of getting reelected, should a leader present himself for re-election — a very significant incumbency advantage. The probability of re-election in democratic and partly democratic regimes is almost the same as in the total sample: 80 per cent. The probability of surviving a full constitutional tenure in a presidency with term limits is 39 per cent (excluding those still in power in 2004).

Table 3.3: Odds of Survival in Office

Category	Observed numbers	Odds	Per cent
Stepping down due to term limits	92 to 25	3.7 to 1	79
Serving full term in a single-term office	53 to 87	.69 to 1	62
Serving at least 1 term in a two-term office*	72 to 36	2 to 1	67
Getting reelected in a two-term office	52 to 10	5 to 1	84
Getting reelected in a two-term office in democracy or partly democracy (FH≤5.5)	28 to 7	4 to 1	80
Surviving full constitutional tenure in single and two-term offices**	117 to 98	1.2 to 1	54
Serving at least 1 term in a multiple-term office	68 to 40	1.7 to 1	63
Serving at least 2 terms in a multiple-term office	42 to 66	.64 to 1	39
Extending the term after serving 1 full term	34 to 114	.3 to 1	23
Extending the term after serving 1 full term in 'partly' or non- democracy (FH>2.5)	31 to 88	.35 to 1	26
Extending the term after serving 2 terms	16 to 36	.44 to 1	29

*Excluding interim presidents. **Excluding those still in power in 2004.

The conclusion is clear: barring term limits and all other things being equal (provided presidents do not die, are not ousted, refuse to run for idiosyncratic reasons, etc), the probability of re-election in presidencies across the world is close to 1. In the following sections I describe the interaction between tenure institutions at entry and expected political survival rates, and then I investigate whether we can discern an impact of term limits on political survival, independent of the degree of authoritarianism and other parameters.

³10, and they found 6 (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 234-235).

3.2.1 Survival in Office and Tenure Institutions at Entry

When rulers enter presidential office, they either enter one with limits or without limits, and, once in office, they decide on the succession/prolongation strategy: they can either extend, or step down (or, on case of entering office with term limits, to self-impose limits and step down). The sample spans between 1975 and 2004, so depending on tenure institutions at entry, 1975, and exit, 2004, there are four possible outcomes for presidential regimes:


- 1. To enter without limits, to exit without limits (e.g., Egypt);
- 2. To enter with limits, exit with limits (United States);
- 3. To enter without limits, exit with limits (the Dominican Republic);
- 4. To enter with limits, exit without limits (Kazakhstan).

In the first two categories, there are no institutional changes (categories 1 and 2), and in the last two, there are changes (categories 3 and 4). The choice of countries is driven by illustrative purposes solely.⁴ I also mark the number of leaders in every category in Figure 3.1. The upper left and lower right quadrants represent the most interesting categories for analysis. In category 4 rulers decide to forsake succession for prolongation, and they prolong their tenure successfully. In Chapter 1 I elaborated on the possible reasons for doing so, such as concerns about their post tenure fate, immunity, assets, or pure office-seeking. In category 3 rulers self-impose limits on their tenure. A number of the long-serving presidents that did not have tenure restrictions, together with other institutional innovations during the democratic transitions in 1980-90s, self-imposed limits, only to scrap them all over again when the limits approached. Also, some rulers signal their type, “democrats”, by voluntarily imposing term limits after coming into power during democratic transitions or liberalizing elections, as Abduolaye Wade of Senegal did in 2001 after defeating the long-serving President Diouf in 2000. Some rulers are simply forced to agree to limits by overwhelming opposition, as President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic was in 1994.

How different are rulers in these 4 categories? On average, political life expectancy in category 2 is the shortest, with only 3.3 years on average (s.d. = 2.7). Indeed, since these rulers obey term limits and step down when required, their length

⁴Likewise, I could assign presidents instead of countries: Sadat of Egypt (1), Clinton of the U.S. (2), Balaguer of the Dominican Republic (3) and Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan (4).

Figure 3.1: Term Limits at Entry/Exit



in office must be shorter. The rulers without limits survive to a “respectable” 12.2 years on average. Note that there is a high standard deviation of 9.7 for this category. Rulers that self-impose limits on themselves have expected rate of 9.6 years and those that extend the rule stay the longest: 14.9 years.

Table 3.9 in the appendix reports summary statistics across these four categories. Leaders have very similar average age in office and entry age, and apart from category 2, which is clearly the most democratic, the other 3 categories have similar values on the economic and regime institutional variables also.⁵

These results are consistent with the literature. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) report mean of 8.06 years for small-coalition systems (autocracies) and 5.23 years for large-coalition systems (democracies) (ibid, 294-302). The differences between

⁵I also use a number of dummy variables: *System* (0 if presidential, 1 if indirect presidential (DPI); *Military* (1 if a leader is a military officer, Banks 2005); *Entry*, *Exit* and *Post tenure fate* (0 if regular, 1 if irregular) (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006). I recoded *Exit* variable as a dummy. The original exit variable has 7 categories: missing if a leader still in power; 1 if a leader lost power through regular means; 2 if a leader died of natural causes while in power; 2.1 if a leader retired due to ill health; 2.2 if a leader lost office as a result of suicide; 3 if a leader lost power through irregular means; 4 if a leader was deposed by another state. I recode *Exit* as 0 if the original value of this variable equals 1 or 2 and not missing, and 1 if it equals 3 or 4 and not missing.

presidents with and without limited tenure in this sample are even larger than those between small and large coalition systems: 3.7 years v 12.2 years.

I find it interesting that the length of tenure of those that manage to extend their rule is 2.7 years longer, on average, than those that enter office without term limits in the first place. This fact could indicate a “survival” ability of some kind. Bienen and van der Walle (1991) discuss the inherent difficulties to infer a ruler’s ability from their survival rates. Indeed, it is impossible to measure leadership skills, charisma and the ability to survive in office, as these attributes become evident only *ex post facto*.⁶ Those leaders that last long are attributed with charisma and skills, while those that exit early are described as incapable and lacking the necessary skills. Clearly, such explanations are *ad hoc* and can not provide a falsifiable theory about survival skills.

However, longer survival rates of “changers” could indicate the presence of skills needed for survival in office, or, in other words, the raw desire for power. Those that enter office with limits have to fight other political actors and consolidate their power base in order to be able to prolong their rule. If they manage to extend their tenure despite very likely and, often, strong opposition, it could signal some sort of “survival” ability. I elaborate on succession and prolongation, and what determines these outcomes, in Chapter 4.

Table 3.4: Terms at Entry and the Type of Exit

	In office	Regular exit	Died or retired	Irregular exit	Total
One term	19	100	4	17	149
Two terms	52	53	2	18	122
No term limits	20	37	11	40	108
Total	91	190	17	75	373

⁶Indeed, prior to the death of Kenyan leader Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, his vice president Daniel arap Moi was deemed an unintelligent and rather unskillful politician, yet he proved to be the opposite and remained in power until 2002. Likewise, in the Dominican Republic, dictator Trujillo’s lieutenant Balaguer, who was appointed president and the *de jure* ruler of the country in order to deflect international criticism at that time, was deemed loyal and unambitious enough to assume the figurehead role without consequences for the supreme ruler. When Trujillo was assassinated, however, Balaguer consolidated his power and proceeded to win 6 terms as the president of this country. Likewise, Bienen and van der Walle (1990) cite the experience of the deemed very intelligent and “capable” Kofi Busia of Ghana and Sylvio Olympio of Togo, who did not last very long.

Table 3.4 also reports the type of exit (based on the original Archigos's variable) across several categories. It appears that the "no limits" category is a slightly more dangerous job in comparison with the other two: 37 per cent of those that enter office without term limits exit "irregularly", in comparison with 13 per cent only of term-bound leaders. This is not surprising, as the succession in personalistic dictatorships, and many of regimes in the category of unlimited rulers are dictatorships with the average *FH* score of 5.1 (1.3), is almost always violent (Tullock 1991, Geddes 1999). Thus, when the long-serving ruler of the Dominican Republic Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by members of armed forces in May of 1961, instead of a peaceful transition to democracy the nation was plunged into prolonged civil conflict, purges, a series of military coups and the eventual return of Trujillo's regime insiders to power (Betances 1995).


3.3 Political Survival in Presidential Regimes

As I demonstrated in the beginning of this chapter, long-standing rulers become very difficult to unseat with time, and without limits they can be re-elected forever. In turn, the only feasible strategies for the alternation of power become non-electoral: regime insiders' coups, and mass revolutions and uprisings. Rulers realize this and respond by making their regimes even more repressive in order to prevent this alternation. As argued in Chapter 1, leaders become more authoritarian the longer they stay in power (Bunce 1981). In order to test this, I compare democracy ratings in the first and last halves of rulers' tenure, for each ruler. I rescale rulers' length of time in office on a scale between 0 and 1, so that I can compare shorter-serving presidents with the long-serving ones. I plot democracy scores (*FH*) against rulers' tenure progression.⁷ As we can see from Figure 3.2, on average, 147 of these rulers do become more authoritarian with time, by 0.5 on the *FH*' [1, 7] scale.

For example, when President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan assumed office in 1991, the country's *FH* score was respectable 3, very close to 2.5, which indicates the cut point between a full democracy and partial democracy, according to the Freedom House methodology. Indeed, in the 1990s Kyrgyzstan was hailed as the Central Asian democracy success story (Anderson 1999). However, as President Akayev's

⁷I use the sample of those presidents that entered "no limits" office and those that extended their rule (categories 1 and 4). I excluded the rest as the levels of democracy hardly change among those in the most populated category 2, and the relationship between time in office and democracy becomes flat, once specified for the full sample.

Figure 3.2: Democracy Levels During Leaders' Tenure



tenure progressed, his rule became more authoritarian, as the president had to clamp down on political freedoms in order to stay in power. After promulgating a new constitution, the president also discarded his first term and began a new countdown. When he was finally ousted from office in a popular uprising in 2005, the score had worsened to 5.5 from the initial 3. This change of 2.5 points shifted Kyrgyzstan into the third, non-democratic category.

Wintrobe (1998, 20-25) elaborates on the so-called “dictator’s dilemma”: the more power a dictator has, the more dangerous it becomes for him to remain in office, as his subjects become reluctant to reveal their true preferences and the dictator does not receive adequate information about the true state of the world. As a result, the dictator responds by making his regime even more repressive:

This dilemma is inherent in any dictatorship — that is, in any system in which rulers are self-appointed and in which there is no legal procedure for removing them. The problem is magnified when procedures for succession are unclear. . . . The dilemma is also a paradox: as the dictator’s power over his or her subjects increases, his or her problem appears to become larger. The more threatened they are by the ruler, the more the subjects will be afraid to speak ill of or to do anything which might conceivably displease him or her. . . . Hence the paradox: The greater the dictator’s power, the more reason he or she has to be afraid (Wintrobe 1998, 22).

The logic of a presidency without restrictions is similar: because rulers become

stronger with time and are increasingly difficult to unseat by electoral means, they can only be unseated through “irregular” means. Likewise, ambitious politicians from the regime ranks could be willing to wait their turn if they know there is a realistic chance of gaining the prize of presidential office at elections to come. If they realize that incumbents are unseatable, the challengers are very likely to gain office via non-constitutional means. In turn, rulers realize this danger and respond by making their regimes more repressive in order to remain in power. In the process they commit various human rights abuses for which they can become liable should they depart from power in the future. In turn, the costs of stepping down become very high indeed as rulers’ future immunity is at stake. The paradox of unlimited tenure is that in many ways it brings more dangers than limited tenure, for power-holders.

The president of Syria, Hafiz al-Asad (1970-2000), who won 5 re-elections under the Nx7 institution, because of he increasingly feared for his life, became very closed, cautious, wary and suspicious, reluctant to initiate any move, least of all any significant change in direction of policy. “When everyone takes care to walk between the raindrops, he prefers to stay at home and not get wet at all.” (Yosef Burg, quoted in Zisser 2007, 3).

What determines how long does a ruler stays in office? Geddes (1999) found that personalistic regimes are relatively immune to economic crises and other exogenous shocks. However, these regimes are especially vulnerable to the death or incapacity of their rulers. Likewise, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) explained the breakdown of authoritarian regimes as a result of the accumulation of random hazards and thus inherently difficult to predict. One needs to turn to actuarial science in order to predict mortality or the likelihood of the incapacity of political leaders, however. In some estimations to follow I include the age at which presidents enter into office, but results are not conclusive.

Bienen and Van de Walle (1991) find that the best explanatory variable for how long a leader remains in office is the length of time already served: it becomes increasingly difficult to unseat a sitting incumbent. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) focus on institutions that select the leader: rulers whose survival depends on large coalitions, such as in democracies, have to provide public goods to the public at large. The leaders in such systems survive shorter periods than those in smaller coalitions. Those in smaller coalitions have to provide private goods to their coalitions. As long as these rulers continue doing so, they survive in power. This happens because a

leader's incumbency advantage is derived from his ability to credibly promise future goods: a leader in a large coalition can be easily deposed by a challenger offering better public policies, while an incumbent in a small coalition is advantaged in his ability to provide future private goods to members of a small coalition that no challenger can match (ibid, 276-292). To put it simply, these authors predict that more insulated authoritarian rulers can survive longer than democratic ones.

My argument is supplemental to the one above: leaders in small-coalition systems, once they survive sufficiently long in office, do have an incumbency advantage over their challengers and face lower hazard rates as the time progresses. I also argue that tenure institutions have separate effects on tenure, independent of the size of a coalition (of the degrees of democracy). While Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) dismiss the possibility that term limits have any effects on survival as they are unenforceable (ibid, 313-4), they also argue that whenever they are enforceable, "term limits undermine incumbency advantage by restricting the length of time for which a leader can credibly promise private benefits to their coalition" (ibid, 314).

I build upon this statement above and argue that incumbency advantage takes time to accumulate. A ruler with a short expected horizon at entry into office needs to perform well enough and reward supporters sufficiently in a relatively short period of time (in case of single-term presidents, in four, five or six years) so as to be able to assemble a coalition that would not oppose tenure change for an ambitious leader. Presidents have to commit credibly that they will be able to continue rewarding their supporters in the future. Long horizons at entry, determined by the absence of limits, signal this credible commitment.

In contrast, term-bounded presidents have shorter horizons and cannot promise a long-term access to the state and private goods to their coalition. Term restrictions limit the period of time in which a ruler can provide for his winning coalition and hence lowers his incumbency advantage over challengers. The strength of the incumbency advantage also depends on the tenure institutions at entry. I argue that the absence of limits allows leaders to establish incumbency advantage faster.

As argued in Chapter 1, term limits and the lack thereof affect the degree to which rulers can discount their future. Rulers that face limits and, therefore, have shorter time horizons, cannot discount their future heavily, and they are more concerned about their post-tenure fate. These rulers will moderate their behavior in office, since they have to take into account how their actions in office will affect their chances for immunity in several years' time. Those rulers that do not face limits and have

the prospect of self-perpetuating rule, can discount their future heavily and are not constrained in their policies or actions in office, — such as the human rights abuses or the imprisonment of their political rivals, — that would allow them to survive in office irrespective of their performance.

Also, as argued in Chapter 1, term limits can be seen as a norm of modern democracy. Many rulers in electoral authoritarian regimes that use a democratic façade to gain legitimacy, impose executive limits. Once these limits approach, many of these presidents find it too difficult to remain in power, as tenure institutions become the focal points for societal coordination as well as the international criticism and sanctions.

If we turn to African presidencies, we see that many rulers recently attempted to extend their tenure and failed. These attempts provoked very strong opposition, both international and domestic, even from the ranks of the governing, and hegemonic, parties. In the summer of 2005 Uganda held a referendum to drop term limits, and the incumbent president swiftly won his re-election after that. Prior to that, terms were dropped in Togo in 2002 and another term was added ad hoc in Namibia in 1998. In contrast, Zambian (2001) Malawian (2003) and Nigerian (2006) executives failed in their bids and had to step down. The list could go on, but it is already possible to see that term limits not only can be difficult to scrap, they also can serve as brakes on the prolongation of political life in semi- and authoritarian regimes.

I stipulate that term changes are not costless during the third wave of democratization and that limits at entry can deter rulers from prolonging their tenures. They are costly to change because they provide important focal points against dictatorial takeover. Tenure restrictions at entry also have a moderating effect on the behavior of politicians, limiting the choice of policies that could enhance their political survival. If term limits are a mere formality, and if they are easy to change in a rigged-election environment, then the fact that rulers entered office with or without term limits should not have any impact on survival, controlling for the size of the winning coalition and other regime parameters, such as executive constraints. My hypothesis in this section is that:

- H_1 : *Tenure institutions at entry in office have effects on survival in office that are independent of the overall degree of authoritarianism.* Rulers that enter office without limits can establish incumbency advantage earlier, discount future heavily and survive in office longer. The change of tenure institutions impose some non-negative costs on rulers.

- H_A : The alternative hypothesis is that *tenure institutions have no impact on political survival*. Term limits are easy to scrap (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Bienen and Van de Walle 1991).

If the effects of term limits at entry into office are statistically significant, I will be able to reject the null hypothesis that these institutions have no effect on survival, and that they are a function of the degrees of democracy themselves.⁸ The main parameters to control for are the degree of democracy and the size of the winning coalition. Even if the status of term limits is already incorporated in democracy indices, if we can still show that these democracy indices do not cancel the effects of term limits at entry, and that the latter exhibit statistically significant influence on survival in office, this finding can only suggest that the impact of these institutions is probably even underestimated.


3.3.1 Model Specification, Survival and Hazard Functions

Table 3.11 and Figures 3.5 and 3.6 (see the appendix) provide details on how many presidents survive in different periods of their tenure in office, across several categories. The vertical axis shows the proportion of leaders that survive. The horizontal axis is time in office. The patterns in the total sample of presidents are very similar to those observed in the previous studies of leaders by Bienen and van der Walle (1991) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Like in their studies, the most dangerous time in office is the first few years, when the attrition rate is at its highest, and then the proportion of “exiting” leaders goes down with slowly decelerating rate of exits, until all leaders are gone.

The life table of those that enter office with limits and obey them displays similar patterns to the total sample. The only difference is that the former group is truncated by term limits. Interestingly enough, rulers without term limits exit in roughly equal proportions as the time goes by: 18 leaders exit in the period between 2 and 5 years, 14 in 5-10 years, 16 in 10-15 years, 12 in 15-20 years, etc. This indicates that with time the hazard rate in this group remains constant or even goes down. Finally, the sub sample of “extenders” is also different from the total: they hardly

⁸I expect some multicollinearity between unlimited tenure and degrees of autocracy. Indeed, when experts code democracy ratings, such as the Freedom House index, they are likely to regard unlimited tenure as an additional indicator of the regime repressiveness and hence tenure will be built into the measures of democracy. In order to counter this, in addition to *FH* scores, I also use other measures of democracy, such as the size of the Winning Coalition and of the Selectorate.

Figure 3.3: Survivor Functions, by Term Limits at Entry, Adjusted for Degrees of Democracy (FH)



exit in the first decade or so, and the most dangerous time seems to be the period between 10 and 15 years. If presidents extend their rule from the 2xn office, this most dangerous period of 10-15 will coincide with the period after they scrapped the limits. After this period, they seem to follow the patterns as in the “no limits” category, it becomes less hazardous.

A glance at the plotted survival functions supports the supposition that those that enter without restrictions possess the incumbency advantage. Figure 3.3 plots survival functions for two groups: those that enter office with tenure restrictions and those that do without.

This survival function indicates the probability that there is no exit from office prior to time t , tenure in office. The functions are adjusted for the Freedom House index scores: it means that an attempt has been made to remove the differences in the functions due to the degree of authoritarianism.⁹ The difference between survival curves for leaders that enter office with and without limits is statistically significant at the 0.000 level. This graph provides prima facie evidence that limits at

⁹The program performs the adjustment by fitting a stratified-on-group Cox regression model using FH as the covariate. The stratified, baseline survivor function is then retrieved. The survivor function is adjusted to 0 values of the covariates. Since 90 per cent of president-years have FH values of 2.5 and above in the sample, in this estimation I adjusted FH to 2.5, not to 0.

entry have independent effect on survival irrespective of how undemocratic regime is. In order to estimate what determines how long a ruler remains in office, next I turn to a specific type of statistical models — survival models.

Semi parametric survival models, such as the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model, assume that whatever the shape of hazard over time, it is the same for everyone. However, I expect the hazard to be different depending on, firstly, whether a leader serves in a democracy or a dictatorship, and secondly, whether this leader enters office with tenure restrictions or not. In order to test the proportionality assumption, I plot the smoothed hazard functions for these two tenure groups on a logged scale (see Figure 3.8 in the appendix).¹⁰ This graph indicates that the hazard functions across categories are not parallel, and, therefore, the Cox model might not be the most suitable one. Besides, the Cox model does not account for the predictors' influence on how the hazard rate changes over time, rather than their influence upon the hazard rate at any time.

Instead, I turn to the Weibull model, one of the accelerated failure time models (AFT). Weibull analysis is widely used in political science (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Diermeier and Merlo 2000, King et al. 1990). In order to test the effects of tenure institutions, I add a new variable, *entry terms*, and re-estimate two statistical models of political survival: by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Bienen and van der Walle (1991). Both of these models were estimated as Weibull parametric hazard models.

The Weibull model is specified as:

$$h(t) = pt^{p-1}\exp(X\beta)$$

where $X\beta$ produces the log relative hazard and $\exp(\beta)$ is the hazard ratio of coefficient(s); p is the ancillary parameter, also called a shape parameter, which determines how the hazard rate changes over time. The hazard rate either rises monotonically with time ($p > 1$), falls monotonically with time ($p < 1$), or it is constant. In the latter case, if $p = 1$, it is a special kind of the Weibull model known as an exponential model, specified as:

$$h(t) = h_0(t)\exp(X\beta) = \exp(\beta_0 + X\beta)$$

¹⁰If the hazards are proportional, then the plots of the estimated $\ln[H(t)]$ against t for each of the groups should have different vertical intercepts, but a common shape, moving in parallel. The common shape arises because the remaining term, the function of t , is common to both groups (Jenkins 2005, 31-32). However, the hazard functions do not seem to be parallel to justify the semi parametric model.

Since the baseline hazard $h_0(t)$ is constant, the estimation does not take it into account. I will estimate both Weibull and exponential models below.¹¹ From the ancillary parameter p we can test how the hazard rate changes over time as a linear function of selected predictors (Cleves et al. 2004, 202).

3.3.2 Survival in Office, Winning Coalition and Term Limits

I expect that as time in office progresses, it becomes increasingly easier to survive in office in presidential regimes. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) found that the hazard declined for both small-coalition and for large-coalition systems (that is, for the less and for the more democratic polities), but much more modestly for the latter. I expect to find similar effects in this smaller sample of presidencies. I also intend to estimate whether entry limits have statistically significant effects on survival and how the hazard of exit from office changes over time.

All three models are estimated with robust standard errors to adjust for intra-group (country) effects. Note that the cells contain parameter coefficients, rather than hazard rates. The estimates of the shape parameter p are reported below $X\beta$ estimates.

Model 1 is the replication of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) political-survival model, on the sample of world presidents, 1975-2004.¹² The model includes two parameters, the *Winning Coalition*, W , and the *Selectorate*, S , and the ancillary parameter, p , as function of the *Winning Coalition*. The latter parameter shows the changes in the likelihood of losing office depending on the changes of W .

In a nutshell, the *Winning Coalition* is a group whose support is necessary for a leader to stay in power, that is, the number of people whose support is necessary for a ruler to remain in power, e.g., tribal chiefs, top military officers, presidential guards, etc. The *Selectorate* is a group from which the *Winning Coalition* is drawn.¹³

¹¹Fortunately, Weibull model produces results directly comparable to those produced by the Cox regression. When estimating models (below), I also compared the results produced by the Cox model with the same predictors, and they are rather similar, which indicates that the underlying baseline hazard is parameterized correctly.

¹²Their original sample is 2,886 leaders, 1800-2000. This sample of presidents is 373 leaders, 1975-2004.

¹³The values of Winning Coalition, W and the Selectorate, S range between 0 and 1, with W in $[0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1]$ and S $[0, 0.5, 1]$, with 1 representing largest size of the coalition and the selectorate. I constructed W and S from the *Type of Regime* variable (Banks 2005); Legislative Selection (*LEGSELEC*), the competitiveness of the executive recruitment (*XRCOMP*), the openness of

Table 3.5: Term Limits, Winning Coalition and Presidential Survival

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
$X\beta$	Winning Coalition	0.020 (0.499)	-0.763 (0.561)	-0.370** (0.428)
	Entry terms	–	0.705 (0.443)	–
	Selectorate	-0.323 (0.247)	-0.296 (0.223)	–
	Intercept	-1.847** (0.329)	-2.158** (0.333)	-1.619** (0.307)
	Year	–	–	-0.508** (0.164)
	Year*Win.Coalition	–	–	0.513** (0.247)
	Year*Terms	–	–	0.406** (0.064)
	Ancillary Parameter, $\ln(p)$	Winning Coalition	0.445** (0.173)	0.456** (0.177)
	Entry terms	–	0.180* (0.107)	–
	Intercept	-0.170 (0.124)	-0.120 (0.131)	–
	N	1982	1982	2177
	Log-Likelihood	-399.405	-351.303	-421.473

*Significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level; parameter estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses).

The incentive of a member of the *Winning Coalition* to defect from the incumbent to a challenger depends on the prospects of being included in the challenger's *Winning Coalition* after replacement. The larger the *Selectorate* relative to W , the smaller the chance that a member of W will be included in a challenger's W , hence a larger S is safer for the incumbents (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 8). All democracies have large S and W ; dictatorships have small S and W , and electoral autocracies have large S but small W (Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 132-140).


The estimation of Model 1 indicates that the effects of the *Winning Coalition*, W are insignificant (due to its linear dependence with p), the effects of W on the ancillary parameter are statistically significant, but the effects of the *Selectorate* are not significant, even though the sign is correct. The positive sign of the ancillary parameter, p , indicates that an increase in the value of the *Winning Coalition* increases the hazard rate: an exit from office becomes more likely. In other words, the smaller the size of the *Winning Coalition* is, and the larger the size of the *Selectorate* is, the easier it is to stay in power.

In model 2 I include *entry term* limits (yes or no), the *Winning Coalition*, W , as well as the effects of *entry terms* and the *Winning Coalition's* size on the ancillary parameter, p . Similarly to Model 1, the effects of the determinants are statistically insignificant due to their dependence on p . To see the exact effect of change in the parameters on changes in hazard rates for the presidents, I estimate the value of the ancillary parameter depending on the value of W and the *entry term*. I find that the ancillary parameter for leaders with term limits and the large winning coalition (e.g., Poland) is 1.64, that it is 1.05 for those with limits and small coalition (e.g., Mexico pre-2000) and for those without limits and in small coalitions (e.g., Togo) it is 0.89.¹⁴ In substantive terms, these differences indicate that for those rulers that enter office with term limits the hazard rate accelerates with time, as presidents step down when required: $p > 1$, and it accelerates with slower rate for the term-bounded rulers in partly- or non-democratic regimes (smaller W), as some of these rulers extend their entry terms. Crucially, the hazard decelerates for those that enter without restrictions, $p < 1$. This finding provides additional evidence that with time it becomes increasingly difficult to unseat presidents, barring term limits. In a way, the shape parameter p could be seen as a proxy for incumbency advantage.

executive recruitment (*XROPEN*) and competitiveness of participation (*PARCOMP*), all four variables from POLITY IV dataset.

¹⁴ $Terms = 1$ if there are limits at entry and 0 otherwise, and winning coalition is 0 (small) or large (1). For example, the calculation for $p = 1.65$ is as follows: $p = \exp(-0.120 + 0.180*1 + 0.450*1) = 1.64$ and $p = \exp(-0.120 + 0.180*0 + 0.450*0) = 0.89$.

Figure 3.4: Predicted Hazards, Depending on Limits at Entry (Yes/No) and the Size of the Winning Coalition



Likewise, we can visualize the impact of the size of the winning coalition (democracy or not) and entry term limits on the hazard function: the probability that a ruler exits from office in a given moment given that he survived up until that moment.¹⁵ As can be seen from Figure 3.4, the hazard is flat (or slightly decelerates) for rulers with unlimited mandate and small coalitions, like in the regression results above. Likewise, the hazard rate only slightly accelerates for rulers in democracies without limits, such as Kekkonen (1956-81) in Finland. As expected, the hazard goes up for democratic rulers with a limited mandate. Interestingly enough, it also accelerates, but more slowly, for those that enter term-bounded office in dictatorships (such as Mexico, Lebanon or XIX-century Argentina): an indication that very powerful rulers in these non-democratic regimes obeyed limits. The rate of deceleration for democratic leaders with no limits is lower than for term-bounded non-democratic

¹⁵Survival function reports the probability of surviving beyond time t , or, in other words, the probability that there is no exit from office (failure) prior to t . In contrast, the hazard function, or instantaneous rate of failure, is the limiting probability that the exit from office would occur in a given interval, conditional that the subject having survived to the beginning of that interval, divided by the width of that interval (year): $H(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}$

Where $h(t)$ is the hazard rate (function), $S(t)$ is the survival function, and $f(t)$ is the density function. The hazard rate measures the rate at which the risk is accumulated over time, and it can increase, decrease or remain constant (Cleves et al. 2004, 7-9).

leaders. We can conclude from this visualization that rulers that enter office without restrictions survive longer, even controlling for the degrees of authoritarianism. It provides additional evidence that term limits matter.

I also rerun the estimation using an exponential model. Model 3 fixes the ancillary parameter at 1, and hence the model becomes exponential. It is the simplest of parametric models, as it assumes that the baseline hazard is constant. I include three additional regressors: *Year* is the logarithm of the number of years a president was in office plus 1 year; *Year*Terms* is its interaction with entry terms, and *Year*Winning Coalition* is an interaction with *W*. The negative coefficient on *Yr* indicates that the risk of exit declines over time; the positive signs of the coefficient of the interaction terms mean that as time in office goes by, rulers in democracies and term-bounded presidents face increasing risks. In other words, the results of the exponential model support results produced by two Weibull regressions.

In summary, the results of these three models suggest that more authoritarian presidents do survive longer in office. Political survival models tested on a global sample of leaders (Buono de Mesquita et al. 2003) are applicable to this presidential sample and results are comparable. However, the estimation results also provide evidence that we can reject the null hypothesis stipulated earlier and accept the alternative one: those rulers that enter office without limits are expected to survive longer, independent of the degrees of authoritarianism, as the estimation results of Model 2 indicate (however, at the 0.1 level of statistical significance). Finally, presidents that enter office without restrictions are increasingly difficult to unseat because we observe decelerating hazard rate, and those with limits face increasing hazards as time for a scheduled exit approaches.

3.3.3 “Individual”, “Country” Traits and Preferred Survival Models

In another well-known study of political survival, Bienen and van der Walle (1991) also employ a proportional hazards model.¹⁶ They estimate five models: duration effects only, individual traits, country traits, comprehensive and preferred models (Bienen and van der Walle 1991, 60-61). I omit duration effects and comprehensive ones, re-estimate individual and country traits on a sample of presidents, including

¹⁶Their sample is 2256 leaders, spanning from late XIX century to 1987.

the entry terms variable, and specify two of my own preferred models.¹⁷

The “individual” traits model includes the individual-level parameters: *entry terms*, *entry period* (1 if post-1991, 0 otherwise), *entry age*, whether a ruler is a *military* officer (Banks 2005) and the mode of *entry* (0 if constitutional entry, 1 otherwise). The parameters are constructed from data compiled by Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza (2006). This model is specified to capture those individual characteristics that might or might not enhance leaders’ survival prospects.

As elaborated above, rulers that enter office without limits should be able to credibly commit to provide access to the state and rents to members of their winning coalitions in the long-term and establish incumbency advantage faster. Those that enter office in a more democratic period, after 1991, should find it more difficult to remain in office for long. An older age at entry could make rulers more experienced for survival in office but their own old age could limit the time they could stay in this office.¹⁸ A non-constitutional mode of entry could make a ruler to cling to office because of the fear of retribution, but it could also make his office more dangerous and difficult to remain in. Also, military rulers should serve shorter tenures than civilians, on average (Geddes 1999).¹⁹

Like in the previous section, positive parameters indicate that they increase the hazard of exit from office, and negative decrease it. The results of this “individual” model suggest that term limits at entry, entry into office in the post-1991 period and older age at entry increase the hazards of losing office, and the effects of all these three variables are statistically significant.

Another model, the “country” traits model, includes *entry terms*, *entry period*, as well as the number of variables that are supposed to capture country-specific effects that make a particular country more or less governable and more or less easy place to survive in office. I include the *population size* (in thousands), *population density* (per square mile), *country size* (square kilometers), (all three from Banks 2005), *economic growth* (per capita, in 2000 \$USD constant prices, from WDI), *ethnic diversity* (Mauro 1995), *average tenure* in a country on a rolling basis, and

¹⁷I perform the link test on all Weibull model specifications. The coefficients on the squared linear predictors are insignificant, which indicates that specifications are correct (Cleves et al. 2004).

¹⁸“Experience is a great advantage. The problem is that when you get the experience, you’re too damned old to do anything about it” (James Scott Connors, world number one tennis player, 1974-77).

¹⁹The original individual traits model included *multiple entries*. Its *entry period* was 1 if post-1945.

three regional dummies (three regions where the majority of rulers in the sample come from).²⁰

The results indicate that *terms* at entry increase the hazard, while the higher *average tenure* decreases it; that an *entry period* after 1991 is more dangerous (both because of the “third wave” that increased the executive turnover and caused the departure of many long-serving leaders, but also because the sample is right-censored in 2004); *growth* rates decrease hazard; that more populous and large countries with lower density of the population are associated with longer tenures; and that all three regional dummies are dangerous for rulers. The last results are probably skewed by the large number of short-serving rulers in these regions.

Finally, I specify and estimate two of my own, “preferred” models. They are “preferred” because they include both “country traits” and individual variables. In model (A) I include *entry limits*, *entry period*, *growth*, mode of *entry*, the *average tenure*, as well as *democracy (FH)*. *FH* is supposed to capture the overall degree of authoritarianism in the country and serves as a proxy for both the *W* and *S* variables. I also construct a dummy for low-income, high-stakes countries in which the access to the state is very important. *Low income country* is specified as 1 if a country’s income is below the average GDP per capita in the sample on the annual basis, with the average value of \$USD 2,170 (in 2000 constant prices), 0 otherwise. I also adjust standard errors for intragroup correlation (by country). Finally, I estimate the effects of *democracy* and *low income* on the ancillary parameter. I expect these variables to capture the politico-economic and system-wide characteristics that make countries more difficult or easier to govern.

²⁰The original country traits model included *high ethnic tension* dummy (instead of a continuous *ethnic*, like in this estimation), as well as *literacy rate*. The estimated sample is much smaller than the one used in the original study and I am wary of inclusion of too many variables.

Table 3.6: Presidential Survival: “Individual”, “Country Traits” and Preferred Models, Weibull Regression

Variables	“Individual” Model		“Country Traits”		Preferred (A)		Preferred (B)	
	$X\beta$							
Entry limits	1.124***	(0.191)	0.546***	(0.179)	0.603***	(0.192)	0.316	(0.385)
Entry period	0.661***	(0.145)	0.657***	(0.177)	0.497***	(0.150)	0.520***	(0.144)
Entry age	0.018***	(0.006)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Entry	0.107	(0.167)	–	–	0.162	(0.151)	0.142	(0.150)
Military	0.390	(0.364)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Population size	–	–	0.000**	(0.000)	–	–	–	–
Population density	–	–	-0.000**	(0.000)	–	–	–	–
Country size (km^2)	–	–	0.000***	(0.000)	–	–	–	–
Average tenure	–	–	-0.057***	(0.014)	-0.064***	(0.015)	-0.065***	(0.014)
Growth (in 2000 \$USD)	–	–	-0.034***	(0.008)	-0.030***	(0.008)	-0.033***	(0.008)
Ethnic diversity	–	–	0.006	(0.214)	–	–	–	–
Latin America	–	–	0.780***	(0.118)	–	–	–	–
Middle East & NA	–	–	0.316**	(0.160)	–	–	–	–
Africa	–	–	0.240*	(0.135)	–	–	–	–
Low income country	–	–	–	–	0.828*	(0.478)	1.144***	(0.428)
Democracy (FH)	–	–	–	–	0.045	(0.113)	-0.131***	(0.046)
Intercept	-4.814***	(0.418)	-3.620***	(0.341)	-3.767***	(0.497)	-3.138***	(0.410)
	Ancillary Parameter, $\ln(p)$							
Intercept	0.350***	(0.047)	0.482***	(0.076)	0.817***	(0.105)	0.654***	(0.078)
Low income country	–	–	–	–	-0.219	(0.126)	-0.307***	(0.101)
Democracy (FH)	–	–	–	–	-0.048	(0.030)	–	–
Entry limits	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.068	(0.086)
N	2607		2028		2041		2041	
Log-likelihood	-430.135		-318.735		-319.401		-321.219	
χ^2	162.838		155.635		99.25		96.941	

*Significant at the 0.1, ** 0.05 and *** 0.001 levels; parameter estimates and robust st. errors (in parentheses)

Like in the “country traits” model, in this model *entry limits* and *entry period* after 1991 increase hazard, and *average tenure* and *growth* decrease it. Because of their linear relationship with the ancillary parameter, *democracy* and *low income* are statistically insignificant.²¹ Note that I do not estimate the effects of entry limits on how the hazard changes over time. The shape parameter p equals 1.24 for those rulers that enter non-democratic office in a poor low-income country and it is 2.13 for those that enter a democratic office in not-so-poor country (income above the average).²² In other words, the hazard, that is, the rate at which the risk of exit from office is accumulated over time, accelerates at a faster rate for democratic presidents in wealthy countries, to a large extent because all of these rulers obey limits. The hazard still accelerates, but at a much slower rate for autocratic rulers in poor settings.

Finally, I re-specify the preferred model and instead of *democracy*, include *entry limits* to see how they affect the rate of hazard’s change over time (Model (B)). All other parameters remain and they exhibit the same effects as in Model (A). Remarkably, the effects of term limits disappear once we include both *low income* and *limits* in the ancillary parameter. For rulers in the poorest countries with limits, p is 1.4, and without limits at entry it is 1.31, which is smaller but only just. The p for rulers in richer countries is even larger, at 1.9.

This finding indicates that while term limits at entry do determine how long a ruler is expected to survive in office, whether in a democratic, partly- or non-democratic office (as described in the section on the Winning Coalition, Term Limits and Democracy), in the very poor countries, where the stakes of losing office are very high, compliance with term limits ceases to be enforceable. Even if rulers enter office with restrictions in very poor countries, when the time for the scheduled departure looms large, they would simply extend their rule regardless. In other words, in the context of the very poor countries, term limits seem to be meaningless, as argued by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 313-14). In the next chapter, I will look at decision-making during succession and what determines tenure changes in world presidencies.

²¹Alternatively, we can estimate the hazard ratios instead of coefficients. Thus, the hazard ratio of *terms* is 1.8 and of the *entry period* it is 1.7. It indicates that the unit increase in these independent variables would increase the risk by 1.8 and 1.7, respectively. The hazard ratio of other variables is either lower than 1, which means that the unit increase in these variables would decrease the risk, or statistically insignificant.

²² $\exp(0.817 - 0.219*1 - 0.048*7 \text{ (Freedom House score of 7)}) = 1.24$.

3.4 Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter I explored the impact of democracy and tenure institutions at entry into office on presidential incumbency advantage and political survival. I found that barring term limits and all things being equal, the odds of winning elections are 5 to 1 in an incumbent president's favor, on average. Also, I examined and described the survival in office in all presidential regimes (1975-2004) and thus contribute to the literature on presidentialism. By and large, I find that in terms of patterns of survival in office, such as rulers' survival and hazard rates over different intervals of time, presidents of the world follow a pattern that is not very different from that of all leaders, such as prime ministers, the heads of military juntas and monarchs.

I also described and analyzed the interaction between tenure institutions at entry and the expected political survival rates. What can explain the fact that incumbent presidents throughout the world are so difficult to unseat, yet that they step down when required by term limits? I stipulated that term changes are not costless during the third wave of democratization and that limits can deter rulers from prolonging their tenures. They are costly to change because they provide important focal points against dictatorial takeover, since term limits became one of the norms of modern democracy. When they are introduced, even as a sham façade to gain democratic legitimacy, very often they can become strong and produce unexpected results. If term limits are meaningless in a rigged-election environment, then the fact that rulers entered office with or without term limits should not have any impact on survival in power, controlling for the size of the winning coalition and other regime parameters.

Using an additional tenure institution parameter, I reexamined two models of political survival, well known in the literature. I found that tenure institutions at entry into office had significant effects both on the hazard rate and on how this hazard rate changed over time. I explained model specifications and their results in detail in the main body of this text. In order to gain a more intuitive understanding of the effects of tenure institutions and democracy on survival in office, I can also run the post-estimation simulations on the preferred model (A).

The results suggest that the expected value of survival time, otherwise known as the first moment of the distribution of survival time, for those that enter office with limits is 4.4 years (standard error is 0.37); for those without limits 5.8 years (standard error is 0.53). The expected increase in survival time for a president that

enters “no limits” office instead of a 2-term office is 3.1 years (standard error is 0.54). The expected difference in survival time for a leader whose country goes from democracy ($FH = 2.5$) to a complete dictatorship ($FH = 7$) is 1.7 (standard error is 0.64), all things being equal. As can be seen, controlling for all possible country and individual characteristics, limits at entry have discernable effects on survival in office. Even though democracy indicators incorporate limited and unlimited mandates as one of their components, however, the fact that the effects of unlimited tenure are still significant and substantially larger than democracy’s effects only suggests that term limits at entry determine horizons in power for many rulers.

I also found that in the poorest countries, where the stakes of losing office are very high, compliance with term limits ceases to be enforceable. As demonstrated by Model (B)’s results, even if rulers enter office with restrictions in a very poor country, when the time for the scheduled departure approaches, they would simply extend their rule.

It appears that incumbency advantage takes time to establish, and with time hazard rates accelerate more slowly, flatten out or decelerate. Whether rulers have limits at entry or not determines how this hazard changes over time: hazard decelerates for those without limits at entry into office. As an illustration, we can look at the predicted hazards for one of the presidential regimes included in the sample: Kazakhstan (estimated from the ‘preferred’ model (A)). Shortly before Kazakhstan declared its independence, Nursultan Nazarbaev had become the ruler of this Soviet republic. In 1991 he became this country’s first president and has ruled in this capacity thereafter. The FH index remained at the level of 5.5 from 1991 to 2004. The constitution initially stipulated a 2x5 tenure arrangement. In 1995 the old constitution has changed and heralded a new “countdown” of that very 5-year term (already served by that time) all over again. Finally, in 1999 Nazarbaev swapped his 2x5 arrangement for a longer and more generous Nx7 one. He was reelected in December of 2005 for another 7-year term in elections deemed not free and fair by international observers (OSCE/ODIHR 2006).²³

Looking at the predicted hazard for the tenure years of President Nazarbaev, we can see that the hazard slightly increases over 1990s, stays constant in the end of

²³Following the vote, widespread allegations of electoral fraud during elections ensued. The regional governors responsible for rallying the voters to polling stations and ensuring required turnout, apparently competed against each other on who would be able to “deliver” the highest vote for the president. As a result, Nazarbaev gained unprecedented 91.15 per cent of vote cast. Some ‘witty’ journalist rather appropriately called him “Nursultan the Ninety-Two Percent.”

Table 3.7: Predicted Hazard Rates and Tenure Institutions, Kazakhstan

hazard	year	terms	hazard	year	terms
.054	1991	2x5	.179	1998	2x5
.097	1992	2x5	.177	1999	Nx7
.117	1993	2x5	.164	2000	Nx7
.147	1994	2x5	.170	2001	Nx7
.153	1995	2x5	.166	2002	Nx7
.140	1996	2x5	.146	2003	Nx7
.151	1997	2x5	.145	2004	Nx7

1990s, and slightly decreases ever since 1999. Incidentally, Nazarbaev scrapped his terms in 1999. These results indicate that the early period in office is the most hazardous, when a leader must establish his incumbency advantage, signal his strength in order to thwart potential challengers, perform for and satisfy his winning coalition. Once a ruler stays in office long enough, all things being equal, the hazard decreases. By the late 1990s, President Nazarbaev established his incumbency advantage and managed to prolong his rule long into the future, thereby extending the horizons of his winning coalition.

In sum, as expected, term limits do vary with degrees of democracy, yet they also have a separate impact on political survival, independent of the overall degree of democracy. This separate effect can be attributed to the fact that tenure institutions can be costly to change. In the next chapter I explore why some presidents step down while others prolong their rule, that is, — what makes certain incumbents remain incumbents. Since terms seem to be costly to change, what are these costs?

Appendix to Chapter 3

Table 3.8: Tenure Changes in the World, 2005

President	From	To	Country	Change Year	Entry terms	New terms
Chun Doo Hwan	1980	1988	S. Korea	1980	Nx6	1x7
Paz Garcia	1978	1982	Honduras	1982	1x6	1x4
Mejia Victores	1983	1986	Guatemala	1985	1x5	1x4
Sarnay	1985	1990	Brazil	1988	1x6	1x4
Benjedid	1979	1992	Algeria	1989	Nx6	2x5
Kerekou	1972	1991	Benin	1990	Nx5	2x5
Koivisto	1981	1994	Finland	1991	Nx6	2x6
Vieira	1980	1999	Guinea-Bissau	1991	Nx5	2x5
Rawlings	1981	2001	Ghana	1992	Nx4	2x4
Ratsiraka	1975	1993	Madagascar	1992	Nx7	2x5
Buyoya	1987	1993	Burundi	1992	Nx5	2x5
Rodriguez Pedotti	1989	1993	Paraguay	1992	Nx5	1x5
Balaguer	1986	1996	Dominican R.	1994	Nx4	1x4
Endara	1990	1994	Panama	1994	Nx5	1x5
Violeta Chamorro	1990	1997	Nicaragua	1995	2x5	1x5
Lee Teng-Hui	1988	2000	Taiwan	1996	Nx4	2x4
Jammeh	1994	2004	Gambia	1996	Nx5	2x5
Masire	1980	1998	Botswana	1997	Nx5	2x5
Mainassara	1996	1999	Niger	1999	Nx5	2x5
Wahid	1999	2001	Indonesia	1999	Nx5	2x5
Chirac	1995	2004	France	2000	Nx7	Nx5
Abdoulaye Wade	2000	2004	Senegal	2001	Nx7	2x5
Paul Kagame	1994	2004	Rwanda	2003	Nx5	2x5

Continued on next page

Table 3.8: Tenure Changes in the World (continued)

President	From	To	Country	Change Year	Entry terms	New terms
Mwinyi ¹	1985	1995	Tanzania		Nx5	2x5
Banda	1964	1994	Malawi	1971	Nx5	N
Macias Nguema	1968	1979	Equatorial Guinea	1972	Nx7	N
Marcos ²	1965	1986	Philippines	1972	Nx6	Nx6
Bokassa ³	1966	1979	Central African Rep.	1972	Nx7	N
Hee Park	1961	1979	S. Korea	1972	2x5	Nx6
Ben Ali Bourguiba	1957	1987	Tunisia	1975	Nx5	N
Bordaberry ⁴	1972	1976	Uruguay	1975	1x5	Nx5
Amin	1971	1979	Uganda	1976	Nx5	N
Stevens	1968	1985	Sierra Leone	1978	Nx5	Nx7
Jayewardene ⁵	1977	1989	Sri Lanka	1978	2x6	2x6
Diouf	1981	2000	Senegal	1991	Nx5	Nx7
Menem	1988	1999	Argentina	1993	1x6	2x4
Fujimori ⁶	1990	2000	Peru	1993	1x5	2x5
Niyazov	1990	2004	Turkmenistan	1994	2x5	N
Akayev ⁷	1990	2004	Kyrgyzstan	1995	2x5	Nx5
Elias Hrawi ⁸	1989	1998	Lebanon	1995	1x6	1x6
Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali	1987	2004	Tunisia	1995	2x5	Nx5
Iliescu ⁹	1989	1996	Romania	1996	2x4	2x4
Milošević ¹⁰	1989	2000	Yugoslavia	1997	2x5	2x5
Cardoso	1995	2003	Brazil	1997	1x4	2x4
Nujoma	1990	2004	Namibia	1998	2x5	Nx5
Nazarbaev	1990	2004	Kazakhstan	1999	2x5	Nx7
Campaore ¹¹	1987	2004	Burkina Faso	2000	Nx7	2x5
Hugo Chavez	1999	2004	Venezuela	2000	1x5	2x6

Continued on next page

Table 3.8: Tenure Changes in the World (continued)

President	From	To	Country	Change Year	Entry terms	New terms
Mugabe	1980	2004	Zimbabwe	2000	Nx6	Nx6
Conte	1984	2004	Guinea	2001	Nx5	1x7
Nguesso	1997	2004	Congo	2001	Nx7	Nx7
Eyadema ¹²	1967	2004	Togo	2002	Nx7	Nx5
Saleh al-Hashidi	1978	2004	Yemen Arab Republic	2002	2x5	Nx7
Karimov	1990	2004	Uzbekistan	2002	2x5	Nx7
Hipolito Mejia	2000	2004	Dominican Republic	2002	1x4	2x4
H. Aliyev ¹³	1993	2003	Azerbaijan	2003	2x5	Nx5
Bongo ¹⁴	1967	2004	Gabon	2003	2x7	Nx7
Rakhmonov	1992	2004	Tajikistan	2003	2x5	Nx7
Lukashenko	1994	2004	Belarus	2004	2x5	Nx5
Deby	1990	2004	Chad	2004	2x5	Nx5
Museveni ¹⁵	1986	2004	Uganda	2005	2x5	Nx5
Alvaro Uribe Velez	2002	2004	Colombia	2005	1x4	2x4
Anastasio Somoza ¹⁶	1967	1979	Nicaragua		1x5	Nx5

¹ Change occurred during president's second term, some time in 1990-95. ²Emergency rule and suspension of elections since 1972. ³In 1972 became president for life, in 1976 proclaimed himself monarch – the only president-cum-monarch in the dataset. ⁴Autogolpe, extended the rule. ⁵In 1978 Prime-Minister Jayewardene created a very powerful presidency. ⁶In 1993 Fujimori changed the constitution to allow for one more term and in 2000 discarded the first term served under the old constitution. ⁷President Akayev discarded his first term under the old constitution and ran for a third as for a “second”. ⁸Added 3 more years ad hoc. ⁹Ambiguous case: in 2000 ran and won despite serving for 7 years previously, arguing that his first term under the old constitution should be discarded. ¹⁰President Milošević of Serbia, having prohibited to serve more than 2 terms, in 1997 strengthened the office of the president of Yugoslavia and become the latter's president. ¹¹In 2000 changed Nx7 to 2x5, yet in 2005 ran again discarding time served before the amendment. ¹²In 1992 change from Nx7 to 2x5, in 2002 back to Nx5. ¹³President discarded his first term under the old constitution and ran for a third as for a “second” (died prior to elections). ¹⁴In 1995 limits from Nx7 to 2x7, in 2003 limits are scrapped. ¹⁵In 1995 from Nx5 to 2x5, in 2005 from 2x5 back to Nx5. ¹⁶Somoza Debayle was a de facto ruler by proxy (military junta) between two terms (only one term was permitted). NxN stands for number of terms (1, 2 or unlimited N)x term length. N stands for the presidency for life. All ambiguous institutional arrangements, or cases where the initial 2xn configuration is modified for another one for the same president ad hoc, are coded as unlimited number of terms.

Table 3.9: Sample Proportions and Means of the Covariates Across Four “Tenure” Groups

Variable	Total	1	2	3	4
<i>Continuous</i>					
Tenure length	7.1 (7.3)	12.2 (9.7)	3.7 (2.7)	9.6 (5.8)	14.9 (8.4)
Exit Age	60.1 (10.8)	61.1 (12.1)	58.7 (10)	63.1 (11.4)	64.4 (10.3)
Entry Age	51.2 (10.2)	47.3 (10.7)	52.9 (9.4)	51 (11.1)	49.1 (9.9)
Black Market Premium	.16 (.36)	.28 (.55)	.08 (.12)	.16 (.29)	.53 (.75)
Growth per capita	2.2 (5.4)	3.6 (5.4)	1.5 (1.3)	3.5 (5.6)	3.2 (1.5)
Inequality (Gini coef.)	12 (6.7)	9 (5)	12 (6.9)	13 (8.3)	16 (6)
EIEC	5.2 (2.1)	3.9 (1.9)	5.7 (2)	5.4 (1.9)	5.1 (1.7)
Executive constr. (Xconst)	4.4 (2.1)	3 (1.6)	5 (2)	4 (1.9)	3.7 (1.8)
Executive Vote Share	65 (19)	76 (20)	59 (17)	70 (17)	74 (17)
Freedom House	4.4 (1.8)	5.4 (1.5)	3.2 (1.5)	4.1 (1.8)	5.1 (1.2)
Executive const. (polcon)	.23 (.2)	.12 (.18)	.27 (.2)	.24 (.18)	.18 (.2)
Ethnic Polarization	.51 (.24)	.65 (.24)	.45 (.23)	.47 (.25)	.53 (.26)
<i>Dummies</i>					
System	.18	.34	.12	.29	.24
In power in 2004	.23	.15	.24	.17	.48
Entry	.22	.39	.12	.41	.34
Exit	.26	.46	.18	.15	.43
Post Tenure Fate	.30	.56	.21	.10	.53
Military	.27	.43	.19	.37	.3
Africa	.31	.43	.34	.09	.13
Latin America	.40	0.9	.81	.05	.05
CEE/NIS	.09	0	.74	0	.26
Middle East and North Africa	.08	.38	.47	.03	.13

1: no limits and entry and exit; 2: limits at entry and exit;

3: no limits at entry, limits at exit; 4: limits at entry, no limits at exit.

Table 3.10: Length of Tenure and Entry Tenure Institution

Tenure Inst. at Entry	Years in Office (av.)	st. dev.	min	max	N
1x4	3.1	1.6	1	8	51
1x5	3.7	2.5	1	12	59
1x6	5.1	2.2	1	11	28
2x4	3.9	2.8	1	8	30
2x5	5.7	5.2	1	26	85
2x6	5.0	1.41	4	6	2
Nx4	9.6	6.6	1	20	8
Nx5	12.7	9.6	1	35	64
Nx6	15.7	6.9	5	25	12
Nx7	13.7	11.1	1	37	30
Total	7.1	7.3	1	37	373

Table 3.11: Life Table: Leaders and Tenure Institutions

Samples	Interval (years)	Beg. Total	Exits	Survival Function
Total	1-2	373	111	0.892 (0.01)
	2-5	262	84	0.821 (0.02)
	5-10	178	88	0.425 (0.03)
	10-15	90	41	0.245 (0.02)
	15-20	49	16	0.144 (0.02)
	20-30	33	22	0.021 (0.01)
	30-40	11	11	0
1 term at entry	1-2	140	95	0.823 (0.03)
	2-5	45	39	0.721 (0.04)
	5-10	6	4	0.167 (0.03)
	10-15	2	2	0
2 terms at entry	1-2	125	38	0.688 (0.02)
	2-5	87	32	0.426 (0.01)
	5-10	55	35	0.139 (0.03)
	10-15	20	15	0.016 (0.02)
	15-20	5	4	0.008 (0.01)
	20-30	1	1	0
Multiple terms at entry	1-2	108	20	0.8148 (0.02)
	2-5	88	18	0.6481 (0.02)
	5-10	70	14	0.518 (0.03)
	10-15	56	16	0.371 (0.01)
	15-20	40	12	0.259 (0.02)
	20-30	28	21	0.064 (0.02)
	30-40	7	7	0
"Extenders"	2-5	40	2	0.909 (0.01)
	5-10	38	8	0.818 (0.02)
	10-15	30	22	0.272 (0.02)
	15-20	8	4	0.227 (0.03)
	20-30	4	2	0.091 (0.01)
	30-40	2	2	0

Standard errors in parentheses. Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions:
 $\chi^2=91.11$, $\text{Pr} \geq 0.000$

Figure 3.5: Proportion of Presidents Surviving in Office, by Tenure Institutions




Figure 3.6: Proportion of Presidents Surviving in Office, by Tenure Institutions (Continued)






Figure 3.7: Smoothed Hazard Estimates, by Limits at Entry (Yes = 1, No = 0)



3. Survival in Office, Term Limits, and Incumbency Advantage

Chapter 4

The Value of Political Office, Term Limits and Democracy

The most difficult thing to do while living in a palace is to imagine a different life — for instance, your own life, but outside of and minus the palace. Toward the end, the ruler finds people willing to help him out. Many lives, regrettably, can be lost at such moments. ... They will cry, but they won't move; they will torment their nation, but they won't budge. Thrown out one door, they sneak in through another; kicked down the stairs, they begin to crawl back up. They will excuse themselves, bow and scrape, lie and simper, provided they can stay — or provided they can return.

R. Kapuscinski. 1984. *The Emperor*

4.1 Introduction

What makes some rulers step down when required by term limits while others prolong their rule by whatever means at their disposal? Earlier in this thesis I discussed that during the third wave of democratization, many presidents adopted the institution of term limits in order to signal their commitment to democracy, whether genuine or not. I also found that term limits at entry into office exert statistically significant effects on survival in presidential office. I argued that these effects can be attributed to the fact that tenure institutions can be costly to change under certain circumstances, as they provide important focal points against dictatorial takeover on the elite, mass and the international level. In this chapter I build on previous findings and intend to explore why some presidents step down while others prolong their rule, that is, what makes certain incumbents remain incumbents. Since terms

can be costly to change, what are these costs? In other words, I endogenize tenure institutions and explain their stability and change.

This chapter builds on Chapter 1' theoretical discussion of the value of political office in developing countries and provides a more formal treatment of some of the arguments introduced earlier and tests these arguments empirically. The main question I address is what makes some presidents more reluctant to step down than others. In an effort to provide a far-reaching and generalizable analysis, I focus on the observable politico-economic data and, as far as the psychology of rulers is concerned, assume that the primary motivation of a politician is to remain in office, and analyze what costs and constraints should influence his decision-making during succession.

I argue that economic development has an indirect effect on democracy by affecting rulers' incentives.¹ Poor economic conditions in many developing countries render the stakes of losing office very high indeed. This is especially true where the prospects of economic success outside of political office are grim and there is a high probability of ex post asset redistribution and low probability of immunity. In the words of Douglass North and his co-authors: "high stakes imply that those in power are far less likely to give up power" (North et al. 2000, 28). Earlier I observed that presidents in the more affluent societies tend to serve shorter tenures, and presidents in the developing world do their utmost to remain in office and serve longer tenures. The rulers evaluate their likely fate should they exit or remain in office, and act accordingly. On average, 29 per cent of leaders throughout the world had an "irregular" fate in 1975-2000 period: they died, were imprisoned or went into exile in the period of up to one year after they lost power. In Sub-saharan Africa 54 per cent had an "irregular" fate in this period, while 41 per cent of rulers in the Middle East and North Africa were so unfortunate. In contrast, Western presidential regimes in this sample had no leaders with such a fate (estimated from data by Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006).²

As a result, the rulers that face high stakes "select" to stay in office as their best strategy and strive to prolong their rule, while those with the low stakes step down. To investigate how the value of political office affects the behavior of politicians, I focus on the most direct and observable manifestation of this value: presidential

¹On democracy and development in general, see Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Diamond 1993; Epstein et al. 2006; Deutsch 1961; Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Muller 1995; Przeworski et al. 2000; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992

²It can be argued that Richard Nixon of the United States escaped such a fate only just.

behavior during succession. I study whether rulers, when faced with the prospect of stepping down due to term limits, deem the stakes of losing office low enough to step down and obey the constitution, or whether they value office high enough to attempt to prolong the rule. To put it simply, I expect that when rulers face high stakes and low constraints, they prolong the rule; when stakes are low and constraints are high, they step down. I also include measures that account for regional observance of term limits and changes thereof in rulers' "peer groups", as well as for the time horizons at entry into office. I also account for the alternative explanations, such as reputational concerns or rulers' age.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First I elaborate on the decision problem that presidents of the world have facing term limits and how they address it differently depending on a number of plausible parameters. Then I operationalize the stakes of losing office, constraints, regional diffusion effects, entry horizons and reputational concerns and estimate tenure changes empirically, using a sample that includes all presidents that entered office with term limits. I find that higher stakes at elections, lower constraints, previous successful term changes in the region and longer horizons increase the probability of tenure change. I also find some evidence for the reputational concerns. Finally, I discuss the substantive impact of each predictor in light of the expectations from the preceding theoretical section.

4.2 An Actor-Centered Explanation for The Value of Political Office and Democracy

What goes on in the head of a president who faces the prospect of stepping down? What is at stake? Undoubtedly, politicians value office for its intrinsic benefits (Downs 1957). But they also, like all individuals, think about the future and how their actions at present time, t , affect their fate in the future, at time t_{+1} (Laibson 2003, Price 1993). They also evaluate and compare their well-being while they are in office, with their likely status once they are outside of office.

Intuitively, it is clear that the costs of stepping down from office (or the value of holding it) for a president in a poor, corrupt country are much higher than for a president in an industrialized democracy. The former could face exile or imprisonment once they step down, while the latter can look forward to lucrative writing contracts and lecturing tours. It is not surprising that Western presidents such as Bill Clinton

step down, and many a reader could probably think that it is not a puzzle at all. However, as I argue throughout this thesis we should embrace the whole continuum of presidents, whether democratic, partly democratic and non-democratic in order to understand how their succession behavior affects their nations and the prospects for democratic transitions, or, via the repeated honoring of limited mandate by the consecutive presidents, for the democratic consolidation.

As I elaborated in Chapter 1, in many developing countries the stakes of losing office are so high that leaving office is not always an option for a rational politician. Firstly, political office provides economic enrichment that is not available out of office. Secondly, the behavior in office in developing countries, the manner of the asset acquisition makes ex post office redistribution very likely and immunity problematic (Bates 2001, Mauro 1995).³ In countries where property rights are weak and the rule of law is absent, the lack of credible commitments renders the prospect of the redistribution of assets after every elite rotation very strong indeed (Austin-Smith and Wallerstein 2003, North and Weingast 1989). Elections could bring this rotation.⁴ In a related discussion on the stability of political regimes, democracies are seen to be more robust because they limit what is at stake in politics (North et al. 2000; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997).⁵

In the introduction to this thesis I discussed a recent example of such a conundrum: the 2000 election of Vladimir Putin as Boris Yeltsin's designated successor in Russia. The presidential succession was accompanied by a careful elite "contracting" and a pledge not to redistribute assets ex post. Yet the consequent "redistribution" of oligarchs that got enriched under the previous president promptly ensued, once the successor, President Putin, consolidated his power. Now Putin and his winning coalition face a similar dilemma in 2008, when Putin's second and last term expires: to prolong rule or step down? In the latter case, the problem is how to ensure ex post compliance in the absence of the rule of law and secure property rights (Shevtsova 2006a). Indeed, the rulers that are willing to step down have to be able

³See the recent strand of literature that analyzes the origins of regimes and democratic transitions as a problem of economic redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 1999, 2005; Bates and Lien 1985; Boix 2003; Bollen and Jackman 1995, 1985; Muller 1995; Perotti 1996).

⁴Likewise, in multiethnic countries presidential succession could usher in a different ethnic group, which could make the exclusion from office permanent (e.g., the Shiites and Kurds in Iraq under Saddam Hussein). That makes it even more compelling for a ruling group to stay in power under the same ruler (Acemoglu et al. 2003).

⁵"High stakes have several consequences. First, high stakes imply that those in power are far less likely to give up power. The reason is that they have too much to lose from policy changes that would occur if they gave up power" (North et al. 2000, 28). "Higher political stakes imply greater levels of rent-seeking." (ibid, 29).

to make a binding contract with their successors in order to avoid the redistribution of their assets and to ensure their immunity.

The struggle to extend tenure is one of the primary driving forces in politics, both in democracies and non-democracies (Downs 1957, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). However, despite the office-seeking assumption, some politicians do step down, not only in the developed world, but also in developing one as well. There are certain idiosyncrasies among presidents of the world that are not explained by politico-economic factors alone.⁶ One way to think about these idiosyncrasies is to analyze the politico-economic factors, such as income in the country, or the levels of corruption, as a systematic component to be predicted, and to think about human factor as an error term. Looking at dozens of rulers, the individual factors of rulers' personality loom large, but once the sample grows (to 276 presidents, in this case), certain patterns and similarities necessarily emerge. Despite rulers' idiosyncrasies, the nature of power in countries with high stakes and low executive constraints is such, that even the most civic-minded leaders are tempted. In the words of the president of Czech Republic Václav Havel (1991):

“ . . . I find myself in the world of privileges, exceptions, perks; in the world of VIPs who gradually lose track of how much butter or a streetcar ticket costs, how to make a cup of coffee, how to drive a car, and how to place a telephone call. I find myself on the very threshold of the world of the communist fat cats whom I have criticized all my life. . . . It is interesting to observe how diabolical the temptations of power are, precisely in this sphere Again, being in power makes me permanently suspicious of myself. What is more, I suddenly have a greater understanding of those who are starting to lose their battle with the temptations of power. In attempting to persuade themselves that they are still merely serving their country, they increasingly persuade themselves of nothing more than their own excellence, and begin to take their privileges for granted. You get used to things, and gradually, without being aware of it, you may lose your sense of judgment.”⁷

A ruler can pursue two strategies: to prolong his tenure (see the specification of the dependent variable below on the possible options), or to step down.⁸ While

⁶And it would be strange and boring if there were no human factor in the science of politics!

⁷From Václav Havel's acceptance speech of the Sonning Prize for his contribution to European civilization, May 28, 1991, available at: <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/vl/notes/havel.html>

⁸Another strategy is to change the constitution to prolong the rule but do not run in elections, and then step down. This strategy can be chosen if the ruler does not intend to run for whatever reasons (health, age), but signals his intent to run in order to preserve political stability and ensure

deciding whether to step down or prolong the rule, an incumbent evaluate the value of office and the likely consequences of stepping down v. remaining in office; and faces the following decision problem.⁹

$$E(U_o) = E(\alpha V_o + \beta R_o) - \gamma C + \delta D_o \quad (4.1)$$

The expected utility of staying in office is given by the expected probability of a successful tenure change, E , times the utility of presidential office (the sum of the value of office, V_o , and ruler's reputational concerns (ideology), R , minus the executive constraints, C , and the tenure prolongation experience of other rulers in a reference group of this particular ruler ("diffusion"), D_o).¹⁰ The record of successful (or unsuccessful) tenure prolongation among presidents in the same "reference group" creates windows of opportunity. If a term change has never been done before in the region, it is more difficult to implement. Thus, whether the ruler steps down or presses ahead further depends on the information from his environment, such as the experience of other rulers, $\frac{(D_o-1)}{(1-D_o)}$, and how important it for a ruler, δ . The evidence suggests that many presidents that negotiated their tenure extensions in Africa, Latin America and Soviet successor states referred to the similar experience of fellow rulers to justify changes.¹¹ In this section diffusion (emulation) effects are specified as given and static. They can also be re-parameterized as priors or as new information that allows the ruler to update his beliefs about the probability of success in changing the constitution.

The value of office represents what is at stake for a president: the rent-seeking opportunities, the intrinsic importance of political office, etc.¹² A ruler's "ideology" in this context means how committed the ruler is to democracy vis-à-vis his com-

that his chosen successor is well placed to succeed him in time of his choosing. On the danger of announcing succession too early in dictatorships, see Tullock 1987, Egorov and Sonin 2006). The succession game in Azerbaijan in 2003 approximated this scenario, in which the outgoing, terminally-ill president Aliiev cleared the constitutional obstacles to run for a third term, began the electoral campaign but then withdrew in favor of his son, designated successor. There were reports that the President Aliiev was actually dead while running for the Presidency (*Al-Ahram International Edition*. 2003, August 7-13. "Like Father, Like Son". No. 650.).

⁹For somewhat similar and extended models in different settings, see Cox (1997) and Magaloni (2006).

¹⁰There is no doubt that the rulers monitor their 'reference groups' and update their strategies on the basis of other rulers' experience. See, for example, Silitski (2006) and his discussion of the preemptive authoritarianism.

¹¹E.g., see *RFE/RL*. 2003, June 17. "Kuchma's Illusive 2004 Candidate". In *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, Volume 5, Number 2.

¹²Because of the 82 per cent re-election rate for presidents who presented themselves for re-election and 100 per cent re-election rate after the rulers extended their tenure by changing the constitution, I discard the expected probability of re-election after tenure change has been made.

mitment to office per se, and how much he values his reputation so as to risk the tenure extension. One way to think about R is to regard it as a “human factor”, e.g., when a democratically inclined politicians step down despite high stakes. In the empirical section to follow I specify reputation as a number of international commitments in important organizations and trade blocks that could affect reputation of a ruler. α and β are the weights that the incumbent attaches to the value of office and his reputation as a democratic politician. γ and δ are weights that he attaches to constraints and to the experience of other rulers.

$$E(U_s) = E(\alpha V_s + \beta \frac{1}{R_o}) + E(A) + \delta \frac{1}{D_o} \quad (4.2)$$

Likewise, the utility of stepping down is given by the expected value “out-of-office”, ruler’s ideology, the experience of political afterlife of other rulers, weighted as above, and the expected affinity of a next ruler, $E(A)$, to the current ruler. If the next ruler comes from the same party, “appointed” as a successor by the current ruler, comes from the same ethnic group, etc, affinity is high, and it is less risky for a president to step down.

The utility of a president facing term limits is thus given by:

$$E(\alpha V_o + \beta R_o) - \gamma C + \delta D_o - [E(\alpha V_s + \beta \frac{1}{R_o}) + E(A) + \delta \frac{1}{D_o}] \quad (4.3)$$


The utility of staying in office increases, as the value of office vis-à-vis life outside of office increases, when the ruler does not value democracy or discards his reputational costs, when the experience of other rulers ex post is unenviable, when the expected affinity with the next rulers is low, and the constraints are low.

The incumbent is indifferent between stepping down and prolonging the tenure when

$$\alpha E[V_o - V_s] + \beta E[\frac{(R_o - 1)}{(1 - R_o)}] = \gamma C + E(A) - \delta \frac{(D_o - 1)}{(1 - D_o)} \quad (4.4)$$

The left side of the equation stands for the utility differential between the prospect of staying in office and stepping down, where $[V_o - V_s]$ are the stakes of losing office, and $[\frac{(R_o - 1)}{(1 - R_o)}]$ is the importance of reputation, “democratic ideology”. If the reputational concerns and commitment to democracy outweigh the commitment

Figure 4.1: The Stakes of Losing Office



to office, the ruler steps down. The right side of the equation represents factors that affect presidential decision-making to step down: high constraints, high affinity with a next ruler, and the positive experience of fellow rulers in political “afterlife”. The ruler remains in office, if the expected utility differential pertaining to the value of office and to reputational concerns is larger than the constraints, the expected affinity and the positive ex post experience of other rulers.

In Chapter 1 I parameterized the stakes $[V_o - V_s]$ for the presidents of the world on a continuous scale, with the pole on the left denoting the low stakes, and on the right — high stakes. The stakes stand for the probability of ex post asset redistribution, prosecution, immunity and the possibility of leading a high-status life after leaving office.

In democracies, the stakes of losing office are very low, and consolidated institutions enable smooth long-term contracting. Thus, rulers can’t and don’t have to prolong their tenure. In contrast, in developing countries, because of the very high stakes of losing office and weak institutions, the rulers have to prolong their rule.¹³ The longer they are in power, the more difficult they are to unseat (Bienen and van de Walle 1991), the logic of self-perpetuation in power undermines checks and balances, and the stakes of losing office become even higher. It is inconceivable for President Mubarak of Egypt or Niyazov of Turkmenistan to step down because of the high stakes for them and their winning coalitions.

Another parameter, executive constraints (C), determines how easy it is to remain in office, should a ruler decide to stay due to the high value of political office.

¹³The causality can go in the opposite direction, with the rulers consciously pursuing profits and committing crimes while in office, so the stakes are raised because of their behavior rather than economic conditions as such. While this is certainly plausible, the behavior is still endogenous to the politico-economic conditions. Even if they themselves raise the stakes, it is this environment that conditions such behavior and ‘selects’ this type of rulers. While many rulers in industrial democracies engage in corruption, the overall politico-economic environment still renders stakes low and constraints high. I include an individual-level variable *events* to account for the behavior that could affect the stakes.

As demonstrated earlier, there is a positive correlation between the higher degrees of democracy, executive constraints, on the one hand, and limited tenure, on the other hand. On average, constraints are stronger in developed than in the developing countries. However, due to the diffusion of democracy in 1990s, many developing countries strengthened their executive constraints, but being poor, could not lower the stakes of losing office (“tempted” the executives). The constraints also affect the expected affinity with the next ruler, $E(A)$. Indeed, the lower number of veto players and smaller coalition also signal the low probability of ex post elite contracting, as the outgoing president will have to negotiate with and be at the mercy of her all-powerful successor.


The executive constraints could also be parameterized as a continuum $[0, 1]$, with 1 representing strong constraints, robust institutions, and 0 no constraints on the executive and malleable institutions. The U.S. would approximate the value of 1. The U.S. president is permanently deterred from pursuing a third term. The authoritarian “start-ups” in Central Asia with strong executives, one veto player, and weak opposition gravitate towards 0. The Nigerian case of a prolonged fight over a third term and the subsequent failure in 2006 represents the case of the regime in between these two extremes.

4.2.1 Strategic Interaction Over Presidential Succession

Earlier I presented presidential succession and the likely parameters that influence the outcomes of this succession as a decision problem of a ruler. Below I discuss presidential succession as the interaction between two players with the help of a decision tree. There are two players in the game: the Ruler (R) and the Opposition (O). The players engage in a game over executive survival and succession. The Ruler wishes to extend his tenure, and the Opposition opposes this move (supports term limits). I simplify by treating the Opposition as a unitary actor (Median Pivotal Opposition Actor): the population of relevant actors that oppose tenure extension for the current Ruler. It includes the challengers within his own winning coalition, opposing party(-ies); economic interests that oppose the Ruler because he could endanger their long-term interests if he consolidates his incumbency advantage; international players, such as the Organization of American states, NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Again, the Ruler has two strategies: to prolong his tenure or to step down. The

Figure 4.2: Prolong or Step Down: a Decision Tree and Outcomes



Opposition has two strategies: to oppose the Ruler or not to oppose (to acquiesce). The payoffs depend on the value of holding office and on the executive constraints (the strength of the opposition).

The game has the following sequence: the Ruler moves first by attempting to prolong his tenure or by stepping down. If the Ruler decides to step down, the game ends: the Ruler is deterred (outcome D). If the Ruler moves to prolong, the Opposition moves second: if it does not oppose the move, the Ruler is successful (outcome T^1). If Opposition opposes the Ruler, the Ruler prolongs his tenure with the probability p (outcome T^2) or fails with probability $(1 - p)$ (outcome F). Because of the 82 per cent re-election rate for presidents who presented themselves for re-election and 100 per cent re-election rate after the rulers extended their tenure by changing the constitution (Chapter 3, also see section on the dependent variable specification below), I omit the possible stage of re-election (reelected or not) after

outcomes T^1 and T^2 .¹⁴

The Ruler's strategies depend on the stakes of losing office and the degree of executive constraints. If the stakes are low and constraints are high, the Ruler steps down. If stakes are high and constraints are low, the Ruler prolongs the rule. Under complete information there are two equilibria: if constraints are too high, and the Ruler knows it, he is deterred, term limits are enforced and the outcome is D. If stakes are too high and executive constraints are sufficiently low, the Ruler decides to prolong, and the Opposition acquiesces: the outcome is T^1 . In 1997-98 President Nujoma of Namibia's launched a third term bid. The party did not split, the opposition was weak and he was the founding leader of a nation and genuinely popular (VonDoepp 2005). The Ruler went straight to (T^1).

Likewise, Malawi's President Muluzi and his supporters engaged in a fierce battle to extend tenure throughout 2000-2003. Facing numerous opposition from the civil society, courts, opposition parties and the factions within the ruling party UDF itself, Muluzi lost the crucial vote on constitutional amendment in July 2002 (VonDoepp 2005). Facing high stakes and calculating constraints to be medium to high, Muluzi pressed ahead and tried to push a bill to amend the constitution again in 2003, but failed again in the face of an organized opposition: the outcome F.

Whether ruler steps down or presses ahead depends on the number of veto players, his own strength versus his own winning coalition and the opposition, past major constitutional changes, the leverage that the international community can exert on him due to a country's membership on international organizations and successful changes in Ruler's "peer group". Many term changes occurred in a sequence in different countries (Chapter 2). The record of successful (or unsuccessful) tenure prolongation among presidents in the same "reference group" provides cues for the Ruler.

If stakes are high, and constraints are high (or their strength is uncertain), the Ruler chooses to prolong, and succeeds with the probability p , or fails with probability $(1 - p)$. The combination of low stakes and low constraints produces an empty set, as the low executive constraints necessarily render the stakes of losing office high, since a next unconstrained Ruler cannot guarantee ex postimmunity for the Ruler (see the quadrant on figure 4.2).

¹⁴The only two cases of a failed re-election after successful tenure extension I am aware of is the ouster of Milosević of Yugoslavia in 2000 after he strengthened the federal office of Yugoslavian presidency at the expense of the executive of its strongest constituent, Serbia, and ran for the former office, being precluded from running for the latter; and of Diouf of Senegal in 2000.

For the Opposition there are two best response equilibria: if constraints are low, to acquiesce, if high, to oppose. Resisting the challenge leads to a crisis, which can be a constitutional crisis if Constitution has to be amended and the opposition can mount a challenge in the Parliament or the Supreme Court; or an international crisis if the international players oppose the change and can thwart the Ruler by ostracizing him, freezing his assets in foreign banks, excluding from international organizations, or applying economic sanctions. All these actions can impose costs on the Ruler.

To reiterate, under complete information, there are two possible outcomes: D if stakes are low, constraints are high; and T^1 if stakes are high and constraints are low. Under limited information about the strength of the Opposition, the Ruler presses ahead and the Opposition fights back. As a result, a constitutional crisis follows and there are two possible outcomes: F or T^2 with the probability of p and $(1 - p)$, respectively. While the outcome of D and T^1 can be predicted, the outcomes F and T^2 are hardly predictable by statistical analyses. These outcomes depend on the skills of the opposing players, “the human factor” and errors that the actors make. Unless we are able to engage in an in-depth case-by-case research, all we observe is the majority of presidents stepping down when required (152 in the empirical sample to follow) and 38 successfully prolonging their rule in 1975-2004. Empirically, $Y = 0$ if (D, F) and $Y = 1$ if (T^1, T^2).

4.2.2 Alternative Explanations for Rulers’ Succession Behavior

In order to understand what makes some rulers more reluctant to leave office and to attempt to perpetuate themselves in power, I propose this very simple decision-making framework conditioned by the costs of stepping down (stakes) and the constraints imposed on the executive. It is very plausible that leaders’ motivations are more complicated than just reflecting the perks of office and the fear of retribution once out of office. There are a number of potential alternative explanations. For example, it is quite likely that some rulers come into office in order to implement a particular policy, and they will strive to remain in power in order to achieve their goals.¹⁵ However, short of collecting policy preferences of each ruler in the sample and mapping these preferences to the observed policies, which would require a very

¹⁵E.g., see Laver and Hunt 1992 for an overview of policy-seeking versus office-seeking assumptions of the behavior of democratic politicians.

serious and time-consuming data collection, it is very difficult to observe empirically that presidents in developing world do value policies above all things and step down if they achieve their goals.

For example, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in all likelihood wanted to achieve power in order to implement his redistribution policies and improve the lot of the poor. Yet can we expect him to step down when he achieves his goals? For example, should this ruler have all industrial sector in the country nationalized, will he deem his policies fulfilled and step down, or go on with more policies to implement? Rulers update their time horizons and their preferences as their tenure progresses. Hugo Chavez was elected for a 5-year single term and extended his tenure straight after coming into office in 1999 by changing the length from 5 to 6 years and allowing for immediate re-election. This change extended his future horizons from the initial 5 to 13 years (his first year before the constitutional change was discarded). In 2006 Chavez declared that he would seek a constitutional amendment that could extend his tenure as he hastened his country's transformation into what he called "21st-century socialism."¹⁶ While policy-seeking could be an alternative and very plausible explanation for ruler's succession behavior, I have to leave it out because it cannot be measured. Instead, I propose another explanation that can be measured, and focus on the lack of constraints and the high costs of losing office as a plausible and testable explanation.

There is another alternative explanation as to the rulers' survival strategies that can be measured. In the introduction to this thesis I discussed the succession problem that president Putin of Russia faced. Indeed, lacking any serious checks on his power and undoubtedly having very high costs of stepping down, Vladimir Putin still seems to be inclined to step down in 2008, which disproves the theoretical expectations above as to what rulers are more likely to do under such circumstances. As I will describe in the empirical section, the predicted probability of tenure change in 2004 for Putin is 0.82 with the standard error of prediction of 0.25, which again suggests that he should remain in office. However, it is quite likely that some rulers value their reputation, their international status, highly enough to discard the high costs of stepping down. If President Putin does step down when required despite his enormous power and declining regime openness, the crucial parameter that drives this choice is his commitment to preserve the prestige of Russia as a superpower, as well as his post tenure reputational costs: "Putin seems to understand what it would

¹⁶ *Washington Post*. 2007, January 12. "Chavez Would Abolish Presidential Term Limit. "We Are Going to Deepen This Revolution," Venezuelans Told at Swearing-In Ceremony". A21.

mean for him to stay beyond his constitutional term: He would [...] lose both the legitimacy of power and the respect of the world leaders' club whose membership he so cherishes" (Shevtsova 2006b). I will attempt to control for potential reputational costs by including parameters that measure nations' membership in important international organizations and trade blocks that could sanction rulers' behavior and affect their reputation, as well as economic openness.

There are other factors that can still influence succession behavior. For example, after winning three consequent elections and being able to run for a fourth one, in 1999 83-year old President Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti stepped down and let his nephew become the new president instead. Can we expect older presidents to be more likely to step down from office? President Mugabe, who is only 2 years younger than Gouled, does not seem to take his own age into account at all. Indeed, after claiming victory in a fraudulent poll in 2005, Mugabe pledged to remain in power until he is 100 years old.¹⁷ On the one hand, older presidents might have less stamina to withstand the life in palace, and step down. Younger presidents, should they step down, can hardly find a more interesting job to suit their ambitions than the supreme executive post in a country, so it is quite plausible that they are more likely to remain in office than their older colleagues. I include age in some estimations but remain agnostic as to its effects.

Finally, while I adopt an actor-centered approach and focus on elite interactions and strategies of the individual actors, and this approach should go some way toward explaining term limits, we cannot ignore the influence of mass citizenry on presidential survival and succession. Indeed, the most remarkable transition of our times, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, was driven not only by the elite pacts (e.g., Colomer 1995; Przeworski 1991), but also by sudden mass mobilization and rapid public opinion cascades that made these pacts possible (Kuran 1995). I focus on elite interaction and account for the mass attitudes and mobilization as the function of the executive constraints: in closed undemocratic regimes with a single veto player, with no executive constraints, the degree and the probability of successful opposition to the presidential decision-making pertaining to succession and prolongation is close to zero. On the other hand, in more democratic regimes with a larger number of veto players and certain executive constraints there is a room for the mass public to influence elite interactions, so I can account for the societal attitudes by including the proxies for the executive constraints and the degree of

¹⁷*Observer*. 2005, April 3. "Mugabe claims poll landslide has sent a message to Blair" (by Andrew Meldrum)

democracy.

The discussion of rulers' decision problem as well as their interaction with the opposition helps to illuminate the likely factors that should influence the probability of tenure prolongation. I put forward five hypotheses, all of which will be tested in the upcoming sections.

- H_1 : *Stakes of Losing Office: If the costs of stepping down from office are too high, the rulers will extend their tenure.*

The stakes depend on the overall economic development (income), importance of access to political office for economic advancement, the probability of asset redistribution, ex post immunity, ethnic heterogeneity, ruler's own behavior while in office. In the theoretical section I discussed the affinity with the next ruler as one of the factors that is very likely to influence ruler's decision-making. How to measure this affinity, however? I collected the measure of affinity coded as 1 if a next president comes from the same party or a direct relative of a previous president and find that among 190 presidents, 26 per cent of those that stepped down "regularly" prior to 2004 registered affinity with their successors, while 18 of those that extended their terms had this affinity.¹⁸ However, presidents can also miscalculate and step down believing that their designated successors will win, but the latter can lose and we will not observe this affinity, even though the outgoing rulers could take it into account. I do not test for affinity in here and later in Chapter 6 I discuss some of the issues about successors and affinity in more detail.

- H_2 : *Constraints: executive constraints increase the costs of prolonging the rule.*

Strong executive constraints, large number of veto players and large winning coalitions will deter or make presidents more likely to fail. In Chapter 3 I discussed the statement that that autocracies never implemented term limits, and if they did, the latter were not enforceable (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 313-314). The executive constraints' hypothesis H_2 : serves as an alternative hypothesis for the estimations to follow: levels of authoritarianism, constraints on the executives alone

¹⁸However, out of 38 changers, 20 are still in power in 2004 and nine exited "irregularly" or died in office. Among the remaining nine, four are Latin American recent "democratic extenders" (i will discuss them separately later on), and only two register any affinity with their successors: Elias Hrawi of Lebanon who in 1995 had his tenure extended by 3 years ad hoc (and it is a weak presidency in the first place) and Jayewardene of Sri Lanka who in 1978 transformed his Prime Ministerial office into a powerful presidency.

can explain whether presidents extend their tenures or not. In other words, the alternative hypothesis is that democrats step down, dictators extend their rule.

Also, in Chapter 3 I discussed how rulers with longer horizons at entry can accumulate their incumbency advantage faster and become unbeatable. We can also test whether longer horizons at entry, when a ruler enters 2x7 office instead of 1x4, for example, increase the chances that this ruler will want to stay even longer.

- *H₃: Longer entry horizons increase the probability of a further perpetuation in power.*
- *H₄: Earlier changes in the region increases the probability of tenure change for rulers in this region.* If there are rulers in the region extending their tenure, it is easier to follow their suit, to emulate them.
- *H₅: Reputation's concerns make rulers more likely to step down.*

4.3 The Data and Model Specification

Now, paraphrasing the words of Winston Churchill, — “however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results,” I turn from the theoretical predictions to empirical estimations of the hypotheses above.

The Dependent Variable

While discussing the decision problem over succession, I simplified the choice of available strategies to two: extend tenure or step down. The choice of institutional arrangements for political survival is much wider, however. The practice of current world presidents provides the menu of possible strategies for political survival under term limits. I count ten discernable actions for rulers that face restrictions. The ruler can:

1. Step down (and come what may);
2. Designate a successor and step down (Mexico 2006, Kenya 2000, Russia 2000);
3. Promulgate a new constitution during one term and start a new term countdown after re-election, in which case the second term becomes the first all over again (Peru in 2000, Kyrgyzstan 1995, Azerbaijan 1995);
4. Promulgate a new constitution and make amendments to the effect that the time served under the old constitution is discarded (Belarus 1996, Venezuela 2000);

5. Change the constitution to allow one more term *ad hoc* (Namibia 1998, Tunisia 1988);
6. Change the constitution to eliminate term limits altogether so that an incumbent can run an unlimited number of times (Chad 2004, Uganda 2005, Uzbekistan 2002);
7. Make constitutional changes to the effect that the political regime or the division of authority within the state changes. For example, it is conceivable to weaken the post of the president so that the latter becomes a mere figurehead, strengthen the Prime-Ministerial position and place oneself as a PM, without amending tenure institutions as such, or vice versa (Yugoslavia 1997). One can also strengthen the strongest subject of the federation at the expense of the center, or vice versa (Zimbabwe 2000);
8. Simply prolong the rule by referendum *ad hoc* (Pakistan 2002, Kazakhstan 1995);
9. Suspend elections for the time being (Dos Santos of Angola 1992, Marcos of the Philippines in 1972);
10. Abolish elections, appoint yourself for life (Niyazov of Turkmenistan 1999, Nguema of Equatorial Guinea in 1972).¹⁹

All of these strategies testify to the cunning ingenuity of the constitutional designers.²⁰ Some of these strategies do not preclude the other ones during one's tenure. Many rulers introduced additional term(s) before abolishing limits (Ben Ali in Tunisia), while others prolonged their terms *ad hoc* before venturing any further

¹⁹The logical extension of the last strategy is to discard the institution of presidency and introduce monarchy, but the only president in this sample who followed the steps of Napoleon Bonaparte was Bokassa who, following his own appointment as president for life in 1972 became the Emperor of the Central African Empire in 1976. Note, however, the recent suggestion from Rakhat Aliev, deputy foreign minister and son-in-law of President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan: "The republican form of governance does not protect nations from dictatorship or from putsches or corruption. If we look at which political system has achieved obvious success in setting up a stable democratic society, strange as it may seem, the first on the list will be the monarchy. ... A sultanate would provide for greater stability than elections and better reflect a centuries-old tradition of government in which power belongs to a limited number of clans." (*RFE/RL*. 2006, September 5. "Kazakh's President Son-in-Law Calls for Monarchy." *RFE/RL Newslines*. Volume 10 Number 163).

²⁰I omit from this menu more ingenious designs that are very difficult to account empirically, unless a researcher is able to examine every presidency. For example, the strategy is to step aside and rule by proxy. In the late period of his rule, president of Mexico Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) ruled through proxy (Purcell 1973). Likewise, dictator Trujillo of Dominican Republic in order to deflect the international criticism, 'appointed' his lieutenant Balaguer as a figurehead President of the Republic. General Trujillo remained *de facto* ruler of a country, so it was not a case of presidential succession. However, upon Trujillo's assassination, the institution of president assumed the life of its own and President Balaguer shortly became a *de jure* ruler (for a fascinating account of these events, see Vargas Llosa. 2000. *The Feast of the Goat*). Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967-79) of Nicaragua ruled by proxy between his terms, formally prohibited from immediate re-election.

(Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan). It is also possible to abolish presidency altogether and become Prime Minister, in which case the issue of term limits is no longer pertinent. However, due to the remarkable “stickiness” of presidentialism, there are only a few nations that transformed from a parliamentary to a presidential rule, such as Moldova in 2000. Also, directly elected president will lose his or her direct legitimacy and will have to rely on the governing party instead. In the next chapter I discuss the possibility of a parliamentary regime as one of the prolongation strategies in Ukraine in 2002-04. Chapter 3 lists all tenure changes in 1975-2005 period in its appendix.

In order to operationalize the dependent variable, I simply divide these ten strategies into two categories: 1) step down (no tenure change); 2) prolong the rule by whatever means (see below).

The Stakes of Losing Office

I elaborated on the factors that should determine the costs of stepping down from office in the theoretical section. In order to operationalize what is at stake for presidents who face the prospect of losing office, I use several variables: income in the country, previous ruler’s fate, the combination of events that are likely to affect his post tenure fate, as well as the ethnic polarization, the black market exchange premium and corruption indices. These parameters should account for the the individual-level behavior in office and the overall state of economy and the importance of political office for personal advancement.

Income denotes GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$). Lower income renders stakes higher (Londregan and Poole 1990), careers in the public sector become more important for advancement, so the value of political office should also be higher. Likewise, it is very plausible that a ruler will receive cues about his likely post tenure fate from the experience of the previous ruler in the same office and I employ the *past ruler’s fate* variable to measure this. If a country has an established tradition of honouring past presidents, the current president’s costs of stepping down should be reduced.²¹ *Ethnic* is the ethnic polarization index.²² It is very plausible that in heterogenous nations control of the highest office is especially important for a

²¹It also likely that a ruler will monitor experience of other ex-rulers, in his or her region. For example, an old opponent of general Pinochet, Fidel Castro, reacted very negatively to 1998 arrest of the former, undoubtedly worrying about his own fate. Reported by WSWS, 2005, November 5: www.wsws.org/news/1998/nov1998/cas-n05.shtml

²²The variable is based on a well-known study from 1960s by a group of Soviet academics, widely used in development economics now (first described in Mauro 1995), with the higher values of the variable indicating higher polarization.

particular ethnic group and a ruler that represents this group, and should they lose power the exclusion from office can become permanent and repercussions to follow could also be severe.²³

Exchange premium is the black market exchange premium: the difference between the official and the market exchange rate, it is widely used in the development literature to capture the overall depravity of the economy, the opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption (e.g., Saca 1997, Fischer 1993, Pinto 1989).²⁴ Indeed, in Zimbabwe, one of the most mismanaged nations in the world, where the projected inflation rate for 2007 is 5,200 per cent and the the official exchange rate is Z\$250 for \$US1 and the black market rate is Z\$12,500, “for the politically well-connected, Zimbabwe offers a lifestyle unmatched in much of Africa. They are the ones who can obtain foreign exchange at official rates to import and sell at vast profit smart Japanese vehicles in Harare’s burgeoning car dealerships.”²⁵ I also use Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, various years) (Murphy et al. 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Due to the problem of missingness, the usage of the last two parameters is limited, however.

Events is the sum of assassinations, purges, workers’ strikes, riots and anti-governmental demonstrations per leader’s tenure.²⁶ I expect this variable to capture some of the “legacy” that a leader could be hold responsible for after leaving office. The measure is far from perfect as many democratic rulers experience high number of strikes and anti-governmental demonstrations, while non-democratic rulers do not. However, if the latter experience “events”, most likely these events will be repressed heavily and hence could affect rulers’ immunity in the future.

²³E.g., Bates (1989) describes how Daniel arap Moi of Kenya used his power to extract resources from other ethnic groups to the benefit of his own.

²⁴“... A black market exchange-rate premium is indicative of a polity that supports rent-seeking opportunities, because black markets can be made more or less accessible depending on how closely tied one is to the ruling elite. Additionally, opportunities to exchange currencies at the official rate are often restricted to governmental officials and the businesses they favor” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 200-203).

²⁵*Financial Times*. 2007, March 17. “Zimbabwe Teachers Find Earnings Add Up to 4.5 bananas a day.” P.7.

²⁶Assassinations: any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician; purges: any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition; strikes: any strike of 1,000 or more workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority; riots: any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force; anti-governmental demonstrations: any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature (Banks 2005).

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of the Covariates

variable	mean	st. dev.	min	max	N
Tenure Change	0.2	–	0	1	190
Income per capita	2,676	4,559	106	34,921	190
Past ruler's fate	0.28	0.45	0	1	190
Events during tenure	5	5.8	0	49	190
Ethnic polarization	0.46	0.24	0	0.93	190
Government Majority Margin	0.65	0.19	0.23	1	180
Executive constraints	0.39	0.29	0	0.89	190
Democracy (FH)	3.6	1.6	1	7	188
Economic growth	0.1	4.0	-28	11	190
Entry horizon	7.5	2.8	4	14	190
Tenure changes in the region*	0.71	1.3	0	5	190
International membership	1.7	1.4	0	6	190
Openness (Exports + Imports)	0.60	0.3	0.11	1.67	173
Transparency Int. Corruption Index	3.5	1.7	0.7	9.8	106
Foreign Direct Investment	0.02	0.04	0	0.33	175
Black market exchange premium	80.9	218	0	1312	65

*See Table 4.2 for details on how these variables are constructed

Executive Constraints

I use political constraints parameter, *polconv*, (Henisz 2002) that classifies all political regimes based on how much political discretion their rulers have (the feasibility of policy change), where 0 is total discretion and 1 are political constraints. The measure is constructed based on the interaction between the executive, legislature, judiciary and subnational units. For example, on average those rulers that step down register 0.43 (standard deviation equals 0.28) and those that decide to remain in power 0.12 (0.18) on this index. I also use government majority size as a measure of constraints on the executive.²⁷ Should *polconv* register low values for democratic presidents (when the presidential party controls a majority in the parliament), the oversized seats' and votes' margins will signal lack of constraints. The difference between rulers that extend and step down is 0.79 (0.19) v. 0.62 (0.19) on this parameter. On the other hand, the dominance in the legislature (e.g., the presence of the hegemonic party) could ease the costs of stepping down for a ruler, so larger margins could reduce the probability of change. Lastly, I include *FH*'s measurement of democracy in some of the estimations.

²⁷*Margin of Majority*: the fraction of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats (NUMGOV) by total (government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats (DPI).

Table 4.2: Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Signs of Their Effects

Variable	Details	In Range	Hypothesized Sign
“Stakes”			
<i>Income</i>	GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$), averaged 3 years prior to change/departure (WDI)	[106, 34,921]	-
<i>Past ruler’s fate</i>	1 if a previous ruler in a country had ‘irregular’ fate (Post Tenure Fate is Imprisonment, Exile or Death, Archigos) per decade, per region (author)	[0, 1]	+
<i>Events</i>	the sum of assassinations, purges, anti-governmental demonstrations, per leader’s tenure (Banks 2005) per decade, per region	[0, 49]	+
<i>Ethnic Polarization</i>	index of ethnic polarization, higher values stand for higher polarization (Mauro 1995)	[0, 0.93]	+
<i>TI Corruption</i>	Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, averaged per tenure	[0.07, 9.8]	-
<i>Exchange premium</i>	black market exchange premium, (official - black market rate, %) (Banks 2005)	[0, 1,312]	+
Executive Constraints			
<i>Government majority margin</i>	Proportion of seats in the legislature, controlled by the governmental party(ies), most current election, DPI	[0.23, 1]	+
<i>Executive constraints</i>	<i>polconv</i> : 1 if constraints, 0 if total discretion, averaged 3 years prior to change/departure, Henisz (2002)	[0, 0.89]	-
<i>Democracy, FH</i>	FH’s combined index of Political Rights and Civil	[1, 7]	+

Continued on next page

Table 4.2: Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Signs of Their Effects (continued)

Variable	Details	In Range	Hypothesized Sign
<i>Demonstration</i>	Liberties, averaged 3 years prior to change/departure		
<i>Tenure changes in the region</i>	number of rulers that extended or dropped term limits in the region, averaged 3 years prior to change/departure	[0, 5]	+
<i>Horizon</i>			
<i>Entry Horizon</i>	Maximum tenure length that a ruler can serve, as prescribed by the constitution at entry into office, e.g., 2x4=8 and 1x5=5	[4, 14]	+/-
<i>“Reputation”</i>			
<i>International membership</i>	The number of organizations that a nation is/became a member of during ruler’s tenure, and that are likely to affects ruler’s reputation	[0, 5]	-
<i>Openness</i>	Imports + exports (% of GDP), averaged 3 years prior to change/departure, WDI	[0.11, 1.84]	-
<i>FDI</i>	foreign direct investments’ inflows (% of GDP), averaged 3 years prior to change/departure	[0, 0.37]	-

Demonstration Effects

Rulers update their beliefs about the success of their endeavors on the basis of their own experience and the experience of fellow rulers in their relevant reference groups. I use smaller groups of countries (regions) to identify the reference groups to which particular rulers belong. For example, it would be wrong to assume that the president of Cote d'Ivoire takes into account the behavior of the president of Namibia, or the president of Poland that of the neighboring president of Belarus. That is, the reference groups should be different than the whole Africa or all transitional countries, respectively. Instead, I divide rulers into 10 regional groups.²⁸ *Tenure changes* in the region is constructed as the number of successful tenure changes in the region for every president in the region in the last 3 years before his tenure extension or departure from office. The intuition is that the leaders take cues from their peer group (region) and they evaluate not only contemporaneous events, but also those in the past.

Entry Horizons

In Chapter 3 I elaborated on how rulers require some time to establish their incumbency advantage over potential challengers and that those with shorter prescribed tenures could be at the disadvantage. In other words, those that come with longer horizons can become very strong as their tenure progresses and find it easier to remain beyond limits. On the other hand, while it goes against the theory advanced earlier, those that serve longer could satisfy their appetite for power and step down, while those that enter single-term presidencies might seek additional terms to finish their policies.

Reputation

To account for the reputational concerns, I use several variables. As discussed throughout this thesis, during the third wave of democratization many nations imposed tenure restrictions in a genuine attempt to build democratic institutions or to maintain the façade of democratic legitimacy. Because restrictions are seen as the inherent component of the practice of democracy, the attempts to scrap them often lead to a very strong international opposition. If a ruler is a member of an organization that sanctions transgressions against democracy or even explicitly adheres to democratic norms (such as the Council of Europe, for example), it can affect

²⁸The West (EU and USA), West Africa, Middle Africa, South Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Middle East, CEE, NIS, Central America, South America and Asia. I did not subdivide Asia into smaller categories because there are only 3 Asian presidencies in the sample.

succession outcomes. Likewise, if the non-democratic practices are seen as political risks and can incur negative trade outflows or affect investment, ruler's succession decision-making is very likely to weigh these parameters.

Not all international organizations or trade agreements take democracy or political risks into consideration, or even if they do, they can hardly exert any influence. For example, even though the OSCE regularly monitors democratic practices of its members, the organization cannot exclude them or sanction them for noncompliance. I include a number of influential organizations and trade agreements in hope that even if some of them cannot and do not oppose what rulers do, a nation's membership in *a larger number* of them would at least signal the possibility that rulers could be concerned how their actions are perceived abroad.²⁹

I also include openness, traditionally coded as the sum of import and exports (as per cent of GDP) and the foreign direct investment (per cent of GDP), both parameters are averaged in the last three years for each ruler before stepping down or extending the terms.³⁰ I expect the economic openness to affect succession behavior in the following manner: the more open a country is, the more likely that the assets of a ruler or his or her winning coalition are invested abroad and hence the international community has leverage over succession behavior; likewise, ruler is less likely to pursue an autarkic policy and has to take into regard his or her reputation abroad in order to safeguard his or her economic assets. It is very likely that President Putin of Russia, who decided to step down in 2008, took this decision in order to safeguard his economic interests in the gas monopoly "Gazprom", inter alia. I will discuss the case of Ukrainian succession of 2004 in depth in the next chapter, but one reference is directly relevant to this discussion here. When President Kuchma was asked about the possibility of a third term during one interview, he replied that unlike Belarus, in which his fellow ruler Lukashenka dropped term limits, Ukraine could not afford international isolation, as 70 per cent of its exports went to the

²⁹*International membership* is coded as the number of organizations that a nation is/became a member of during ruler's tenure: Council of Europe (CoE), NATO, European Community (EC): for CEE members from the moment of signing of negotiation agreements; World Trade Organization (WTO), Mercosur, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), Generalized System of Trading Preferences (GSTP), South African Development Community (SADC), the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (Sparteca), Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries (PTN).

³⁰There is a likely possibility of the selection bias, as the more democratic rulers and those more concerned with their reputation will "select" themselves into more international organizations or receive more FDIs. The measures of executive constraints and of democracy should be able to control for this self-selection.

West.³¹ As I demonstrate in the next chapter, president Kuchma's reputational concerns were directly relevant to his succession strategy and its outcome.

4.3.1 Model Specification

I match my original data on tenure institutions with the data of political leaders (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006) in order to create the dependent variables, as I did in earlier chapters. The sample includes all presidents that entered office *with* term limits in presidential regimes: 276 presidents altogether in 1975-2004, whether they extended their terms or not. 38 presidents extended their terms and 238 did not.³²

In the estimations to follow, I use two samples. The “full” sample includes all presidents with limits at entry, 276 in total, whether they are in power in 2004 (truncated) or not. The smaller sample of 190 presidents includes only those leaders that extended terms whether they are in power in 2004 or not, and those that stepped down “regularly” prior to 2004, December 31. The difference between these two samples is that the smaller one excludes those in power that still have a chance to extend and those that were ousted from power or stepped down “irregularly” and hence could not extend terms, even if they wanted to. In all post-estimations and discussion to follow I use and refer to the smaller sample of rulers, unless otherwise stated. I only use the full sample to discuss the probability of term changes for the current presidents in power.

In this section I use two logit models. The first model is a simple logit regression with 190 and 276 observations, as discussed above. I predict whether a particular ruler steps down when required (or does not extend his terms as for 2004 for the full sample), with the dependent variable taking the value of 0, or prolongs his term (the dependent variable equals 1). The unit of observation is a ruler, and the majority of the independent variables are averaged either per leader's tenure, or for the last 3 years before departure from office or before extension. Details on the construction of variables is provided in Table 4.2. The logit regression is estimated with robust clustered (intra-region) errors.

³¹*RFE/RL*. 2003, June 17. “Kuchma's Illusive 2004 Candidate”. In *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, Volume 5, Number 2.

³²Those rulers that entered office without restrictions, then introduced limits (together with the multiparty elections and other democratic attributes), only to scrap them all over again when the limits approached, e.g., Deby, Nguesso, Bongo, and Eyadema, are coded as entering with limits from the time of introduction of the latter.

The second model specification is dynamic. I intend to predict a binary outcome — tenure change or not, using data that ranges spatially and temporally: time-series-cross-section with a binary dependent variable (“BTSCS”).³³ The unit of observation is leader-year, coded as 0 for all leader-years under which rulers obey their entry limits and 1 for years of extended tenure. Like in the smaller sample above, I exclude those rulers that stepped down “irregularly” or did not extend terms and are still in power in 2004. Thus, if a president enters office in 1992, then changes his tenure in 1996 and rules until 2004, 1992-95 are coded as 0’s and 1995-2004 as 1’s. There are only six rulers that extended their terms and then stepped down peacefully; the rest were either deposed, died in office or are still in power.³⁴ For the predominant majority, extension was supposed to be long-term. There are 991 leader-year observations, and among them 22 per cent (219 obs.) are 1’s.

This second model is specified as follows. Considering the effect of time on the hazard rate, $h(t)$ to be separable from the effects of the covariates, the logit model that allows for duration dependence ($h(t)$ varying with t) can be represented as:

$$f_{\tau}(x_{i,t}\beta) = f(x_{i,t}\beta + g(\tau)) \quad (5)$$

where $g(\tau)$ is some function of time. As the hazard rate changes over time, we should allow for different intercepts at each time point. $g(\tau) = k(\tau)$, so that time effects are modeled as a series of time dummies, k . Beck and Katz (2004) recommend modeling g as a cubic spline function of τ , since period dummies could be too jagged.³⁵ To test the null hypothesis for duration independence for spells of non-failure (no tenure change), I add functions of time since the first observation, and compute a three-knot cubic spline using BTSCS package for Stata to correct for temporal dependence of the dependent variable (Tucker 1999).³⁶ I also use Huber robust standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence (treating each region (see Demonstration Effects’ section) as a cluster), as adding fixed effects

³³Beck, Jackson, Katz and Tucker quite recently produced a series of chapters on the issues arising in BTSCS estimation (Tucker and Beck 1997, Beck et al. 1998, Beck and Katz 2001, Beck et. 2002). In specifying the model in this section, by and large I follow their discussion.

³⁴These presidents are Latin American “extenders” from single to two terms, Iliescu of Romania who discarded time served under the old constitution and Diouf of Senegal who lost the elections.

³⁵Splines are piecewise polynomial functions that are constrained to join at points called knots. Cubic splines are made to be smooth at the knots by forcing the first and second derivatives of the function to agree at the knots. See Keele (2006, 4 - 7).

³⁶Following Beck, Katz and Tucker (1999), three-knot cubic spline became a standard routine to account for temporal dependence in BTSCS models (e.g., Meinke et al. 2006; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006).

could be problematic for BTSCS data (Beck and Katz 2001).

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(y_{t,i} = 1 | y_{i,t-1} = 1) &= \text{logit}(x_{i,t}\beta + g(\tau) + \rho) \\ \Pr(y_{t,i} = 1 | y_{i,t-1} = 0) &= \text{logit}(x_{i,t}\beta + g(\tau))\end{aligned}\tag{6}$$

I employ duration dependent logit (restricted transition) model (6) as the main model in the analyses to follow, where the intercept shifts depending on the value of the lagged variable by ρ .³⁷ To summarize, the model includes the lagged dependent variable, lagged demonstration effects, as well as lagged income, growth and democracy variables. Other predictors are not lagged. I also include ruler's age to test whether older rulers are more likely to step down or not.

4.4 Model Estimation

How does the value of office affect leaders' succession behavior, given constraints? In this section I present the results of logit regression, with 190 succession outcomes as the dependent variable (Table 3) and the BTSCS model, 990 leader-year observations (Table 5). Table 4.3 displays the results from seven logit estimations, each specified differently. Table 4.4 reports the results of another seven models estimated on a larger sample that includes the current presidents. I do not discuss the estimation results from the full sample, but the cursory glance will reveal that these results are very similar. The differences in the number of observations between models are due to missing data. Each model also includes *economic growth* to control for rulers' performance in office.

All seven models include "stakes" (first four) and "constraints" (fifth, sixth and eighth) parameters. In all seven specifications all variables have the expected sign, except *ethnic polarization*, which can be both negative and positive, depending on the model specified. However, it is not statistically significant and I can only con-

³⁷In order to account both for the transition from a non-event to an event (tenure change) and the transition from event to event (tenure persistence), I add lagged dependent variable and use the same duration dependent logit (restricted transition model). The inclusion of lagged dependent variable does not make time variables (splines) insignificant in the models to follow. I forsake Markov transition model for the restricted transition model because of the small number of observations of 1's in the dataset that would render a separate estimation of the tenure change persistence problematic. A much more complicated alternative to lagged dependent variable is to use latent lagged dependent variable (Jackson 2001). The model with lagged realized y is much easier to estimate than model with latent lagged dependent variable, however (Beck 2005).

clude that the prior expectation about the effects of ethnic polarization on the value of office is not supported by these model specifications. Past ruler's fate and the executive constraints are always statistically significant in all specifications. In Models A and B an additional "constraints" parameter, the 3-year averaged FH's score prior to ruler's departure or change is also significant at 0.1 level. However, I exclude this measure to avoid its collinearity with political constraints and the majority margins.

Latin America is the most democratic region in developing world in 1990-2004 ($FH = 2.6$ vs. 3.7 in the world), and the tenure extensions that were initiated, e.g., by Menem of Argentina or Cardoso of Brazil, were not necessarily driven by the same logic as the institutional changes in Africa or the Newly Independent States, but rather by the strength of presidents vis-à-vis their parties and other political players (Carey 1997, Serrafiero 1997). Also, Latin American "changers" entry horizons were really short, as they all extended from the single terms and stepped down when they finished their second terms.³⁸ There is a good reason to treat these changers differently from the rest of rulers that extended their tenures and in Model B I recode these four as 0's instead. In Models C-F I follow this coding and also exclude *democracy* index and rely on *constraints* and *majority size* to measure executive constraints.

Model C includes entry horizon, which is statistically significant: longer horizons at entry make rulers want more time in office, not less. The average horizon for extenders is 10.4 (indicating 2x5 or 2x7 arrangements) and it is 6.9 for the rest of rulers. Model D additionally includes regional tenure changes, which are also statistically significant: rulers emulate successful changes in their "peer" groups.³⁹ Model D that includes stakes, constraints, demonstration effects and horizons is the base model for discussion to follow. The post estimation tests suggest that the models are correctly specified.⁴⁰

³⁸The "changers" are Menem of Argentina, 1993 that introduced 2x4 institution, Cardoso of Brazil who followed the suit in 1997, Mejia of the Dominican Republic in 2002 and Alvaro Uribe Velez of Colombia in 2005 - 2x4. I retain Fujimori and Hugo Chavez, however.

³⁹Or rulers in these groups go through the similar evolution (the so-called "Galton's problem")

⁴⁰As an example, I report the results for model D, Table 3. The linktest reports that predicted value squared is statistically insignificant. If model is properly specified, predicted value squared variable shouldn't have much predictive power except by chance ($Pr \geq 0.39$). The area under the ROC curve is 91.7 per cent (logit correctly classifies 90 per cent of outcomes). The Hosmer and Lemeshow's test also suggests that the model is correctly specified (p-value of 0.74). Finally, I don't find that multicollinearity is of a serious concern in this model: the model does not include regressors with a tolerance (an indicator of how much collinearity one can tolerate) of 0.1 or less (Berry and Feldman 1985, 46-50).

Table 4.3: Logit Regression Models, Tenure Changes, 190 Presidents

	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.
Income	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Past ruler's fate	1.785*** (0.56)	2.242*** (0.46)	2.241** (0.76)	2.100** (0.76)	1.880** (0.75)	1.823** (0.74)	1.192** (0.63)
Events	0.026 (0.04)	0.021 (0.04)	0.011 (0.03)	0.034 (0.03)	0.019 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.05)	-0.086 (0.08)
Ethnic polarization	1.087 (0.94)	1.306 (1.12)	-0.583 (0.81)	-1.033 (1.05)	-0.225 (1.38)	-0.259 (1.25)	-1.669 (1.69)
Government majority margin	-0.513 (1.61)	-0.092 (2.07)	-0.601 (2.08)	0.467 (1.88)	1.219 (1.43)	0.835 (1.52)	-0.155 (2.24)
Executive constraints	-2.277** (1.24)	-3.004** (1.66)	-5.201** (2.01)	-4.427** (2.03)	-3.927** (2.31)	-3.199* (1.91)	-2.739* (2.04)
Economic growth	0.132** (0.05)	0.121* (0.07)	0.099* (0.06)	0.116* (0.08)	0.088 (0.10)	0.126 (0.10)	0.065 (0.15)
Democracy (Freedom House)	0.476* (0.28)	0.537* (0.32)	–	–	–	–	–
Entry horizon	–	–	0.421** (0.19)	0.265* (0.24)	0.225 (2.13)	0.195* (0.16)	0.282 (0.33)
Regional tenure changes	–	–	–	0.699** (0.41)	0.626** (0.38)	0.791* (0.49)	0.719 (0.52)
International membership	–	–	–	–	–	-0.424* (0.24)	-0.600 (0.44)
Openness (imports + exports)	–	–	–	–	–	1.013 (1.12)	-0.670 (1.17)
TI Corruption Index	–	–	–	–	–	–	-0.471* (0.21)
Fraud	–	–	–	–	1.450** (0.56)	–	–
Constant	-3.732** (1.18)	-4.633** (1.80)	-4.140** (1.36)	-4.395** (1.61)	-5.440** (1.32)	-4.723** (1.98)	-2.631* (1.94)
Log-Likelihood	-59.448	-46.976	-42.015	-38.283	-35.828	-29.676	-17.722
χ^2	146.585	243.442	54.115	103.304	94.18	82.302	58.332
N	178	178	180	180	170	164	100

The DV is whether ruler steps down or extends his terms. Sample excludes rulers in power in 2004 and those that exited “irregularly.” *Significant at the 0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 levels; parameter estimates and robust st. errors (regions)

Table 4.4: Logit Regression Models, Tenure Changes (Full Sample, 276 Presidents)

	2A.	2B.	2C.	2D.	2E.	2F.	2G.
Income	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Past ruler's fate	1.575** (0.52)	1.954*** (0.47)	1.942** (0.67)	1.856** (0.72)	1.816** (0.69)	1.911** (0.77)	1.875** (0.88)
Events	0.043 (0.04)	0.041 (0.03)	0.036 (0.03)	0.050** (0.02)	0.046* (0.03)	0.025 (0.02)	0.014 (0.03)
Ethnic polarization	0.857 (0.91)	1.019 (1.11)	-0.652 (1.07)	-0.982 (1.30)	-1.156 (1.47)	-0.379 (1.48)	-1.866 (1.80)
Government majority margin	0.357 (1.64)	0.500 (2.21)	0.084 (1.93)	1.182 (1.88)	0.791 (1.56)	0.277 (1.82)	1.223 (2.11)
Executive constraints	-2.452** (1.07)	-3.236** (1.32)	-4.331*** (1.65)	-3.803** (1.76)	-4.187** (1.87)	-3.150* (1.73)	-4.525** (1.83)
Democracy (Freedom House)	0.255 (0.20)	0.327 (0.26)	–	–	–	–	–
Entry horizon	–	–	0.421** (0.19)	0.318* (0.24)	0.290* (0.21)	0.325 (0.25)	0.353 (0.38)
Regional tenure changes	–	–	–	0.397** (0.21)	0.340** (0.19)	0.371** (0.22)	0.163 (0.25)
International membership	–	–	–	–	–	-0.244 (0.23)	–
Openness (imports + exports)	–	–	–	–	–	0.823 (0.74)	–
TI Corruption Index	–	–	–	–	–	–	-0.340** (0.17)
Fraud	–	–	–	–	1.121** (0.54)	–	–
Constant	-3.769*** (0.75)	-4.556*** (1.16)	-5.408*** (1.41)	-5.858*** (1.45)	-5.592*** (1.37)	-6.016*** (2.12)	-4.807* (2.13)
Log-Likelihood	-74.452	-60.709	-54.256	-51.634	-51.182	-42.783	-28.901
χ^2	219.781	374.120	64.397	55.247	63.91	40.007	202.00
N	236	236	243	243	237	225	146

The DV is whether ruler steps down or extends his terms. Sample includes all rulers with entry limits, even those still in power in 2004 and that exited “irregularly.” *Significant at the 0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 levels; parameter estimates and robust st. errors (regions).

Model E includes a parameter that indicates whether electoral fraud was reported during elections prior to the tenure change or departure from power. As argued in the introduction to this thesis, the question as to what rulers do to perpetuate themselves in power is very broad and could lead to the coverage of more cases beyond succession outcomes in the term-bound presidencies. Rulers can perpetuate themselves in power by other means, such as through corrupt elections, for example. Also, if rulers can control electoral process to their advantage, it will be easier for them to scrap term limits, as they will be assured of their continuous re-election. In other words, the empirical models of presidential succession would benefit from an indicator of electoral fraud. The only systematic cross-national measure of electoral fraud available is *FRAUD* from the *DPI* dataset (1 if fraud is reported during election, 0 otherwise). I include this measure in the fifth model, and it is statistically significant, suggesting that the ability to defraud elections should make the incumbents more likely to scrap limits. However, due to missing values, potential data collection problems,⁴¹ we should treat this measure of electoral fraud with caution.

Finally, in Model F I include two measures that are likely to influence reputational concerns: international membership and the openness of the economy. Membership in prominent international organizations and trade blocks seems to decrease the probability of tenure change, and *openness* is not statistically significant. This results indicates that further, better operationalization of reputational concerns are required. Because of many missing values I did not include corruption indices or black market exchange premium in Models A-F. I add Transparency International Corruption Index (averaged per ruler's tenure) in Model G, and it significant, with the correct sign, but due to the large number of missing values we should treat this with caution. On average, "changers" are slightly more corrupt: 1.81 (1.1) v. 3.5 (2.9) on this index, where higher values stand for more corruption. Likewise, black market exchange premium is 158 per cent (st. dev. 357) v. 60 (146) per cent for these two categories, but due to the high number of missing values, I do not include this parameter.

Table 4.5 includes five Models specified as binary time-series cross-section. Each model includes the lagged dependent variable and is estimated after including spline corrections for temporal dependence (results omitted), with robust standard errors. Models H-L specifications follow earlier specifications of Models A-G, with first two

⁴¹I found a dozen of miscoded observations for a number of Eastern European elections in which I worked as an observer on, or studied in depth.

Table 4.5: Binary Time Series Cross-Section Models, Tenure Changes

	H.	I.	J.	K.	L.
Tenure change lag	9.264** (3.00)	9.264** (3.00)	8.750*** (2.03)	8.164*** (2.04)	7.855*** (1.79)
Income	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)
Past ruler's fate	0.300 (0.57)	0.300 (0.57)	0.367 (0.59)	0.250 (0.67)	-0.191 (0.68)
Events	0.077 (0.06)	0.077 (0.06)	0.064 (0.06)	0.085* (0.04)	0.053 (0.09)
Ethnic	-2.226 (1.41)	-2.226 (1.41)	-3.128* (1.64)	-3.085* (1.66)	-3.513* (2.06)
Government majority margin	2.345*** (0.60)	2.345*** (0.60)	1.685*** (0.70)	3.231** (1.10)	3.364*** (0.92)
Executive constraints	-0.228 (0.70)	-0.228 (0.70)	-1.223* (0.62)	-1.687* (0.90)	-2.327** (1.19)
Economic growth	0.066* (0.04)	0.066* (0.04)	0.064* (0.04)	0.037* (0.04)	0.029 (0.05)
Ruler's age	0.085** (0.03)	0.085** (0.03)	0.095*** (0.03)	0.085** (0.03)	0.089** (0.03)
Entry horizon	–	–	0.491** (0.16)	0.421** (0.18)	0.405* (0.23)
Regional tenure changes	–	–	–	0.608*** (0.17)	0.657*** (0.20)
International membership	–	–	–	–	-0.141 (0.50)
Openness	–	–	–	–	1.160 (1.14)
Constant	-12.482** (4.73)	-12.482** (4.73)	-15.981*** (3.07)	-17.087*** (3.38)	-17.634*** (3.15)
Log-likelihood	-81.650	-81.650	-74.454	-67.783	-61.392
N	640	640	640	640	606

The dependent variable is leader-year, coded as 0 for all leader-years under which rulers obey their entry limits and 1 for years of extended tenure. *Significant at the 0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 levels; parameter estimates and robust st. errors (in parentheses). Each model is estimated after including spline corrections for temporal dependence, results omitted

(H and I) including “stakes” and “constraints”, the third including demonstration in the region, the fourth with entry horizons and the last one with the reputational parameters. Also, all five models include rulers’ age. The results of BTSCS models by and large support earlier findings from simpler logit regressions’ specifications: “stakes” increase chances for tenure change, while constraints reduce them, and both demonstration and horizons at entry are statistically significant. There are some notable differences as well. *Past ruler’s fate* in this more dynamic specification does not prove to be significant. Instead, *income* is consistently statistically significant, with the expected sign. Also, instead of the *executive constraints* the major “constraints” variable in this dynamic model becomes the *margin of governmental majority*: it is statistically significant in all five specifications. Like above, the influence of ethnic polarization is inconclusive. Also, *economic growth* improves chances for tenure prolongation. Finally, in all four models older age seems to increase the probability of tenure change, rather than decrease it.

4.5 Empirical Evaluation and Discussion

The empirical models estimated above support hypotheses that were specified earlier: higher costs of stepping down (“stakes”), lower executive constraints, longer entry horizons and earlier successful changes in the region (emulation effects) increase the probability of tenure extension. While reputation concerns seem to a plausible factor that could influence ruler’s decision-making during succession, and I find some evidence of its influence, it is only statistically significant at 0.1 level. However, it is quite possible that a better operationalization of reputational costs is needed. In order to grasp the substantive impact of the regressors on the outcome probability, I compute the first differences. I use model D and simulate predicted values using Clarify package (King et al. 2000, Tomz et al. 2003). I set the independent variables at their means and estimate the probability of tenure prolongation, changing the values of interest for each regressor, in turn.

Table 4.6 reports the simulated effects. I change the value of each variable from its mean by one standard deviation, as well as by other values of interest and report changes in the dependent variable. For example, consider the impact of earlier tenure changes in the region on the probability of a given ruler in this region following the suit. The increase in the number of “extenders” from 1 to 2 will increase the chances of change by 10 per cent only, but if in the past 3 years 5 presidents

Table 4.6: Simulated Effects on the Dependent Variable

Variable	Change	Magnitude	Simulated Effects
<i>Income</i>	2,172 to 6,964	by 1 st. dev. from the mean	-0.02 (0.02)
	1,466 to 6,055	from the mean income in dictatorships to the level of Argentina, 1975 ¹	-0.02 (0.02)
<i>Events</i>	5.05 to 10.83	by 1 st.d. from the mean	0.02 (0.02)
	2 to 14	From Clinton (USA) to Milošević (Yug)	0.03 (0.2)
<i>Ethnic</i>	0.46 to 0.65	by 1 st. dev. from the mean	0.01 (0.01)
	0.11 to 0.61	Poland to Kazakhstan	0.02 (0.03)
	0.10 to 0.93	France to Uganda	0.2 (0.03)
<i>Past ruler's fate</i>	0 to 1		0.16 (0.08)
<i>Tenure changes in the region</i>	0.7 to 2	by 1 st. dev. from the mean	0.10 (0.09)
	1 to 5		0.42 (0.29)
<i>Executive constraints</i>	0.35 to 0.67	by 1 st. dev. from the mean	-0.4 (0.2)
	0 to 1		-0.23 (0.13)
<i>Government Majority</i>	0.64 to 0.84		0.03 (0.2)
	0.5 to 0.99		0.06 (0.04)
<i>Horizon</i>	7.4 to 10.2	by 1 st. dev. from the mean	0.04 (0.03)
	4 to 14		0.21 (0.17)
'Stakes' CC ²	-2.7 to 3.4	min to max	0.77 (0.25)
'Constraints' CC ³	1.05 to 15.62	min to max	-0.99 (0.05)

Parameters are simulated from logit Model D (stakes, constrains, horizon and demonstration) using Clarify package (King et al. 2000). The simulated effects represent the change in the predicted probability of the dependent variable (tenure change), given changes in particular predictors, holding others at their mean. *Past ruler's fate* is significant at 0.01 level, *events* and *constraints* are significant at 0.05 level; *demonstration* is significant at 0.1 level, and *years* and *events* are significant at 0.1 level. ¹No democracy ever fell in a country with a per capita income of 6055 USD or higher, which is the level of Argentina in 1975 (Przeworski, 2005, 4). ²'Stakes' CC is the covariate contribution of income, past ruler's fate, events and ethnic polarization — the independent variables that account for the value of political office in the model. ³'Constraints' CC is the covariate contribution of the executive constraints and government majority size — the independent variables that account for the executive constraints in the model.

extended their rule instead of 1, it will increase the expected probability by 42 per cent, which suggests strong emulation effects. The substantive impact of changes in *income*, *ethnic* polarization and *events* is pretty small (note, however, their covariate contribution below). The high stakes of losing office, manifested in cues received by a ruler from the previous ruler's fate after the latter departed from power, are significant. *Constraints* and *horizons* at entry exhibit the most substantive impact on term changes: the change in constraints from complete discretion to strong constraints decrease the chances by 23 per cent, and when a ruler enters a two-terms', seven-year each term's office instead of a single four-year term, the chances that he will become very strong and "indispensable" and stay for longer increase by 21 per cent.

We can also consider the aggregate contribution of the variables of interest ("stakes" and "constraints") rather than individual ones. In order to compare the overall effects of "stakes" versus "constraints", I generate two covariate contributions as the linear combinations of two groups of predictors (four variables for "stakes" and two for "constraints"), multiplied by their corresponding coefficients (Long and Freese 2003).⁴² Holding other variables at their means, I estimate that the overall effect of "constraints" (when the value goes from its minimum to its maximum) is slightly larger than that of "stakes": 0.99 v. 0.77. Presidents of the world attempt to prolong their political life when they *can* (low constraints), but also when they *have to*, due to the high stakes of losing office.

We can use these predictors' covariate contributions to demonstrate the substantive impact of the low and the high stakes and constraints, as explained in the theoretical section of this chapter. This time, I plot the effects of "stakes" versus the covariate contribution (CC) of all the remaining variables: "constraints", horizons and demonstration. This plot visualizes the relationship between "stakes" and the probability of change at three levels of CC: 25th, 50th and 75th centiles.⁴³ On the horizontal axis of this graph the CC ranges from 1 to 15 (the minimum and maximum CC values). The three vertical lines correspond to three CC values at 25th, 50th and 75th centiles. There is a dashed line when "stakes" are low (at -1.4)

⁴²I invert the values of income for "stakes" and executive constraints for "constraints" in order for their respective covariate contributions to influence the probability with the same sign.

⁴³Unlike in the previous example when I estimated 2 CCs separately for the two groups of variables, in this estimation I calculate the covariate contribution of all the remaining variables, except for the "stakes". Again, variables' values are inverted: higher values of CC represent lower constraints, longer horizons, more extenders in the region. Literature suggests investigating the effects of CC at either 25th, 50th and 75th centiles or at the mean and 1 standard deviation below and above it (Long and Freese 2003). Figure generated using *Viblmdb* package in Stata (Mitchell and Chen 2005).



and the knotted line is when “stakes” are moderate (at -0.45) in the upper graph, and when they are moderate and high (at 1.3) in the bottom graph.

We can see that the difference between the knotted and dashed lines (i.e. when stakes are low to moderate in the upper graph of Figure 4.3) is fairly small across various levels of CC. In the theoretical section I stipulated that when stakes are low and constraints are high (this state is represented by low CC values and the dashed line, rulers are deterred and they step down (probability is zero). The example of such outcome would be any U.S. President and his succession. Even if “stakes” increase to moderate, rulers are still most likely to step down under these circumstances. I also stipulated earlier that the set of low stakes and low constraints should be empty, as low constraints on the power of the executive will unavoidably drive up the costs of stepping down, and the probability of such outcome is indeed close to zero.

When “stakes” of losing power become high (the bottom graph of Figure 4.3), the impact of the combined contribution of constraints, emulation and longer horizons increases and it is not constant. When stakes go up, and constraints are strong, the probability goes up by 10 per cent. Likewise, the probability goes up by 38 per cent at the moderate levels of CC. The region between the first and the second vertical lines represent the second possible outcome: when stakes are high and constraints are high (or moderately high), rulers will attempt to remain in office and either fail or prolong after overcoming a strong opposition. The examples of such outcome are Obasanjo of Nigeria who tried and failed in 2006, or Nujoma of Namibia who prolonged for a third term in 1998. Finally, in the last case when the constraints are high, when many rulers extend in the region and when entry horizons are sufficiently long, the probability of extension is 68 per cent. Any Central Asian president or many a ruler in the Middle Africa will provide an example of such succession outcomes.

Earlier in this chapter I discussed the value of holding office and, as an illustration, proposed the continuous scale of this value for 5 presidents of the world, with the US president having low stakes, and Uzbek president having very high stakes, as examples. Given the value of presidential office in a poor country such as Uzbekistan, but also the recent massacre of civilians in May of 2005 by the governmental forces in Andijan, Uzbekistan (Human Rights Watch 2005), exit from office is not an option for President Karimov, it seems. For illustration, I placed 5 leaders in the following order, from low costs of stepping down to high: G. W. Bush of the USA, Vicente Fox Quesada of Mexico, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Putin of Russia and

Figure 4.3: Probability of Tenure Change as a Function of Changes in “Stakes” and the Covariate Contribution of Constraints, Regional Changes and Entry Horizons



Karimov of Uzbekistan. All five were still in office in 2004 and were yet to address their succession strategy. Since models A-E did not include presidents that were in power in 2004, for illustrative purposes I re-estimated the covariate contribution of “stakes” for Model 2D that included these rulers.

The covariate contribution of stakes has a mean of -0.22 (st. dev. 1.04) for the total sample, and 1.07 (1.19) for tenure extenders, and -0.41 (0.86) for those rulers that step down, in the range of [-2.7, 3.4]. As it turns out, the empirical model places these 5 presidents in the same order as expected theoretically: G. W. Bush (-0.88), Vicente Fox (-0.71), Obasanjo (-0.04), Putin (2.15) and Karimov (2.59).

Finally, how does the model fare in terms of forecasting and reliability? As an illustration, I select 4 cases where tenure change occurred and 4 where it did not. The model correctly predicts 3 changes and 3 instances where no change occurred.⁴⁴ It fails completely to predict tenure changes in Venezuela in 2000, and gives a very high probability for the term change in Russia, which so far has not materialized.

Table 4.7: Predicted Probabilities for Selected Countries

Country and Year	Ruler	Predicted Probability	Observed Tenure Change
Uzbekistan 2002	Karimov	0.96 (0.03)	change
Tunisia 1995	Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali	0.68 (0.16)	change
Uganda 2005 ¹	Museveni	0.67 (0.19)	change
Venezuela 2000	Hugo Chavez	0.01 (0.02)	change
Russia 2004 ²	Putin	0.83 (0.25)	no change
Nigeria 2004 ³	Obasanjo	0.16 (0.29)	no change
Mexico 2000	Zedillo	0.16 (0.09)	no change
United States 2000	Clinton	0.02 (0.02)	no change

¹Prediction for 2004. ²Scheduled to step down in 2008, last observation is 2004; ³scheduled for 2007.

The recent controversy over a third term for President Obasanjo of Nigeria where a concerted and determined opposition prevented a third term bid, and the speculations around the forthcoming succession game in Russia in 2008 testify to the uncertainty and intensity of political conflict over executive survival. The empirical model does not rate Obasanjo’s chances to be very high and treats Russia as more uncertain case. Also, high standard errors for the former case indicate high

⁴⁴78 per cent of obs. are predicted correctly overall: if $\text{Pr} > 0.5$ and y is 1, and if $\text{Pr} < 0.5$ and $y = 0$.

uncertainty, where a lot depends on decision-making and skills of the individual agents.

4.6 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter suggest several things. When focusing on the origins and stability of democracy and dictatorship, and analyzing the interplay between democracy and dictatorship on a macro-level, we should not neglect the micro-foundations: rulers' incentives and their behavior. Recent advances in international relations (Buena de Mesquita 2003, Goemans 2004) and comparative politics (Przeworski 1999) link the utility-maximization of politicians to observable political and economic outcomes. In this chapter I contribute to this literature by examining how the macro-politico-economic aggregates affect the incentives of rulers by rendering the stakes of losing political office as high or low, and, in turn, by mapping a link between the micro-foundations (incentives) back to the observable macro-outcomes: endogenous institutions that regulate rulers' tenure, and, via the persistence of long-serving rulers, on the development of democratic and dictatorial regimes.

Buena de Mesquita et al. (2003) analyzed how political institutions that regulate selection of rulers (the selectorate and winning coalition) affected the political behavior of the latter, and how different survival strategies conditioned by these institutions influenced economic development. I analyzed how the overall state of development affects the motivation of rulers and how the latter, given constraints and the value of office, conditioned by this environment, "select" institutions that enhance their survival. I find evidence that the higher costs of stepping down ("stakes"), lower executive constraints, longer entry horizons and earlier successful changes in the region (emulation effects) increase the probability of tenure extension. While reputation concerns seem to a plausible factor that could influence ruler's decision-making during succession, and I find some evidence of its influence, it is only statistically significant at 0.1 level.

While it is very plausible that leaders' motivations are more complicated than just reflecting the perks of office and the fear of retribution once out of office, and that there is a number of potential alternative explanations to explore in the future, the proposed, very simple decision-making framework and the empirical examination of "stakes" of losing office versus constraints provides intuitively plausible and simple theory of the motivations of politicians in the developing world and how the value of

office affects their behavior and their nations. While I focus on succession and term limits in this thesis, there is nothing that prevents us from extending this framework in order to understand what makes some rulers more reluctant to leave office than others, and not only in the presidential regimes, and not only in the context of term changes.

The alternative and further operationalizations of the value of political office for the power-holders could be an interesting and fruitful research program in the future. While it is correct to assume that those rulers facing stakes too high will do their best to remain in power, and that all selected variables together are the plausible proxies to account for the value of office, the measures that are independent of the tenure changes are something to explore later on elsewhere. Most importantly, an individual level data on the actual behavior of politicians in office, rather than the system-level approximation of the value of office, is necessary to evaluate the stakes of losing office. Not only the level of income, but also other economic variables, such as degree of inequality or economic growth are potential candidates in further model specification of the value of political office. Likewise, reputation concerns seem to a plausible factor that could and should influence ruler's decision-making during succession, and I find some evidence of its influence that is statistically significant, but only at 0.1 level. However, it is quite possible that a better operationalization of reputational costs is needed.

In section on the specification of the dependent variable, I collapsed possible succession strategies into two: prolong the rule or step down. Clearly, the menu is much wider and it is interesting to explore how the incumbent selects the appropriate strategy facing the possibility of leaving office. Also, in the theoretical section, I emphasized that while the outcomes of D and T^1 (stepping down and prolongation without or with little opposition) can be predicted, the outcomes F and T^2 (failed bids and successful bids after a fight with the opposition) are hardly predictable by statistical analyses. These outcomes depend on the skills of the opposing players, "human factor" and errors that the actors make. In Chapter 5 I engage in the in-depth case study, testing the robustness of the theory of presidential succession, that I elaborated in this chapter.

Finally, what difference does holding to political office make for their countries, for democracy in general? In this chapter I attempted to explain what makes incumbents incumbents and how they attempt to remain in office. Earlier, I showed that there is positive relationship between democracy and limited tenure. In chapter 6 I

will investigate how incumbency affects the probability of democratic transitions. In the predominant majority of recent elections in developing world, the elites, whether incumbents or successors, run against the pro-democratic opposition. I will investigate whether incumbents, by stepping down and appointing their successors to run in their stead, increase the probability of democratic breakthrough. I also investigate whether term limits is the important factor that prevents incumbents from standing for re-election.

Chapter 5

The 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Succession and Constitutional Reform

5.1 Introduction

In November and December of 2004 the whole world was captivated by how, despite obvious danger and winter cold, the citizens of Ukraine stood up against electoral fraud that had been perpetrated by corrupted electoral officials, and how, against all odds, they defeated the appointed successor of the outgoing president in a series of non-stop peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience. This groundbreaking event instantaneously received the name of the Orange Revolution. While attention was focused upon the street mobilization and electoral tallies, the complex strategy that the outgoing President Kuchma played was less visible. The major part of his strategy, the constitutional reform that was agreed upon in the midst of an electoral crisis, was not a spontaneous event but the result of a complex game of succession and political survival that had been underway for more than two years prior to 2004 Presidential elections.

Throughout this thesis, I ask what Presidents do when they have to step down due to tenure restrictions. The fact that the incumbent president Leonid Kuchma decided to step down does not imply that it was his only option. The experience of many post-Soviet presidents suggests that a third term should not be ruled out,

and it was not in Ukraine.¹ Leonid Kuchma could have followed in the footsteps of other post-Soviet rulers and run for a third term. The president could have also suspended the elections, prolonged his rule by an act of parliament, or weakened the presidency and ruled in another capacity, as a Prime Minister. Alternatively, he could have stepped down in a democratic fashion, like his neighbor, Alexander Kwasniewski of Poland did in 2005.

In fact, President Kuchma did pursue a number of strategies, from an attempt to open the possibility of prolonging his rule or becoming a powerful Prime Minister, to the “succession” scenario in which the president designated his heir. However, the fact that the president evaluated various strategies that could have led to different outcomes can only be understood once we study the case in depth. In the previous chapter I elaborated that, when rulers face high stakes and low constraints, they extend their rule; when they face high constraints and low stakes, they step down. However, it is extremely difficult to predict the outcome of a succession scenario when both stakes and constraints are high.

The Ukrainian succession of 2004 represents such a case and illustrates the contingency of political events and the alternative outcomes that could have come to pass under different circumstances. The presidential succession in Ukraine is an example of the modal value on the dependent variable: the outcome of presidential succession. I use this modal case to examine the internal workings of a theory: how does the value of political office affect decision-making during presidential succession? The theory predicts that both prolongation and succession are equally possible under high constraints and high stakes. The analytic narratives with elements of game theory presented in this Chapter allow us to trace the sequence of events and how the changes in the relevant parameters affected the choices over succession strategies.

In this chapter I illustrate the inherent uncertainty of presidential succession, how the outgoing president evaluates the utility of staying in office versus stepping down, selects various strategies from the menu of possible succession strategies, and how the value of political office is translated into a succession outcome. First, I sketch the logic of 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. The strategies selected by regime elites and the opposition, such as the outgoing president’s uncommitted support of his designated successor, which ultimately contributed to the victory of the Orange revolution, represents a puzzle that is difficult to explain if we analyze

¹See Table 2 in this chapter, and Chapter 4, for the menu of choices over various strategies available during presidential succession.

the events through the lens of the literature on transitions.

This puzzle cannot be explained outside of the context of a ruler's succession strategy and what was at stake for the outgoing president. I revisit the decision problem of a ruler who faces term limits, introduced in Chapter 4, and discuss what President Kuchma had to take into consideration in 2004 and how he evaluated the stakes of losing office. I present the interaction of an incumbent president with a presidential successor and his challenger as two cooperative games. I theorize that the constitutional reform that was agreed upon during the electoral crisis can be understood as a contract among elites that signalled their credible commitments to each other and lowered the stakes of presidential succession. In this sense, this chapter contributes to the literature on constitutional political economy and constitutional contracts (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Calvert 1994; North 1981). What follows is a case study of the presidential elections and their follow-up in the context of succession. I adopt an actor-centered approach and focus on the strategies of three major actors: the outgoing president, his designated successor and the pro-democratic challenger.

5.2 The Stakes of Losing Office and Presidential Succession

The constitution of Ukraine prescribes no more than 2 consecutive presidential terms of 5 years each (article 103). Therefore, when President Kuchma was re-elected in 1999 for his second and last term in office, the countdown to the 2004 departure from power began. What went on in the head of the president who faced the prospect of stepping down? What was at stake? Earlier in this thesis, I discussed how presidents evaluated how valuable their political office was and how it affected their succession behavior. Rulers think about the future and how their present actions affect their future fate. They also evaluate and compare their well-being while they are in office, and their likely status once they are outside of office. In this section I will show that the stakes of losing office were very high for President Kuchma due to a very high probability of redistribution and prosecution after the elections. The theory predicts that rulers are more likely to prolong their tenure in such cases, as they did in Belarus, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. At the same time, the president faced high constraints due to the powerful parliament and strong opposition. Also, Ukraine had very strong economic linkages with the West. The theory predicts that

rulers step down under these circumstances, and they did in Lithuania, Poland and Croatia. How should president Kuchma select his succession strategy, faced both with high costs of stepping down and high constraints?

In Chapter 4, when discussing the value of office, I parameterised a number of system-level variables, such as national income, the past ruler's fate, the degree of corruption, the black market premium, ethnic polarization, etc, in order to account for the stakes of losing office. I argued that these factors should affect a leader's individual behavior in office and during succession. The case study method allows me to focus not only on the system-level parameters, but on individual-level data as well, "events", that influenced what was at stake in 2004. I also explain how country-specific factors, such as the political history of 2000-04, and a strong and determined opposition with a base in the parliament, influenced the outcome of succession. In this section I discuss the value of office and executive constraints in Ukraine of 2004. I also sketch the available menu of succession strategies based on the experience of other rulers in the region, as well as on the constitution of Ukraine and preceding events.

In 2004 Ukraine was a very representative political regime of the post-Soviet region, since it stood right in the middle among more and less democratic regimes of this region. In 2004 the regional Freedom House index's average was 4.6, and 4.3 at the median, while Ukraine scored the value of 4 (prior to 1999 it has been 3.5). Such regimes are usually described in the literature as electoral authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002). Ukraine's neighbors were slightly more authoritarian: 4.5 in Russia and 6 in Belarus. Table 5.1 reports some of the parameters of interest for Ukraine, its neighbours Belarus and Russia, and the region as a whole.²

The high stakes of losing office in Ukraine were counter-balanced by the high executive constraints faced by the incumbent President. Again, looking at the parameters measuring executive constraints, we can see that the Ukrainian presidential regime, while having a comparable high stakes environment, constrained its president to a much larger degree than the neighboring Russia and Belarus did their executives. The veto players variable (*polconv*) in Ukraine in 2004 records the value of 0.69 (with 0 standing for complete discretion and 1 for the highest level of constraints on the executive), indicating that the executive was constrained in his policy choices not only by the parliament, but also by the judiciary (as will become clear as

²All post-Soviet presidencies, and Serbian, Croatian and Romanian presidencies. I exclude EU accession states.

Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics: Ukraine, its Neighbors and the Region, 2004

variable	Ukraine	Russia	Belarus	NIS/CEE
FH	4	4.5	6	4.6
Winning Coalition	0.75	0.75	0.5	0.6
Veto Players (polconv)	0.69	0.19	0	0.18
Executive Competitiveness	7	7	6	5.8
Incumbent Vote Share	36.5	52.9	75.6	64.6
Ethnic polarization	0.49	0.32	0.32	0.44
Income (GDP per capita)	928	2,285	1,695	1,325
Economic Growth	12.1	7.14	11	7.33
TI Index of Corruption	2.7	2.2	3.3	2.6
Foreign Direct Investment	2.84	1.84	0.96	4.07
Openness	1.13	0.60	1.34	1.01
International membership	2	1	0	0.75
Government majority margin	0.22	0.33	1	0.60
Term Changes*	-	no	yes	58 per cent

*7 out of 5 presidents in the region extended their tenure as of December 31, 2004.

the events unfold) and the regional authorities.³ Kuchma's fellow rulers — Putin and Lukashenko — had much more discretion in 2004: Russia scored 0.19 and Belarus 0, with the regional average of 0.24.

Likewise, in 2004 the size of the winning coalition was 0.75, the same as in Russia, and it was 0.5 in Belarus (the regional average was 0.6). The executive index of electoral competitiveness (*EIEC*) was 7, the same as in Russia, and 6 for Belarus (regionally it was 5.8). However, the latter measure does not capture constraints well enough: in contrast with Russia and Belarus, as well as all the Central Asian presidencies, in which elections hardly witnessed a second round since mid-90s, in Ukraine a second round has always been a feature at elections, indicating a serious degree of contestation. Thus, in the 1999 elections Kuchma gained only 36.5 per cent in his first round, in contrast with Putin's 52.9, Lukashenko's 75.6 and the regional average of 64.6 per cent share. Likewise, the governmental majority margin in the parliament was only 22 per cent in comparison with the regional 60 per cent, thus indicating an unusually strong legislature.

A series of events during the second term of President Kuchma increased the stakes of losing office for the incumbent considerably so that the ruler clearly had to worry about his post tenure fate. In November of 2000 the leader of the Socialist

³*Polconv* additionally includes judiciary and sub-federal actors as veto players, unlike *Polconiii*, which includes only executive and legislative actors. *Polconiii* is 0.09.

Party, Alexander Moroz, released audio tapes to the public that provoked a full-blown political crisis (so-called “Kuchmagate”). In these tapes President Kuchma was heard to say things that implicated him in a number of illegal activities, from the murder of a journalist, Georgy Gongadze, in 2000, to approving the sale of the “Kolchuga” aerial surveillance radar systems to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Kuzio 2005). The scandal led to mass demonstrations on the streets of Kiev, which were quashed in a police crackdown. (CEIP 2001; Harasymiw 2003). The President’s popularity was seriously undermined, but he survived. Prime-Minister Yushchenko, who was very popular at that time, became a liability for Kuchma and was sacked in the aftermath.

The president had to worry not only about his own immunity, but also about the very likely redistribution of his assets after 2004. Indeed, during his tenure a series of questionable privatization schemes had been implemented in which businessmen with the access to the state became rich. In the previous Chapter I argued that in corrupt economies the stakes are high because so much depends on access to the state. The available data indicates that Ukraine was very prone to corruption indeed: the value of the *Control of Corruption* (Kaufmann et al. 2005) was only -0.7 (with lower scores indicating higher levels of corruption and vice versa) and the value of Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, was 2.7 (on a 10-point scale, where 10 is the least and 1 is the most corrupt country). The most notorious example that generated widespread indignation was the pre-electoral privatization of the highly profitable Ukrainian metal giant “Krivorozhstal” on June 14, 2004. The tender was awarded to a business group affiliated with the president, for a meagre sum that was only slightly above the initial price.⁴

Unlike all other post-Soviet presidential regimes, Ukraine had and still has a very strong parliament (the *Verkhovna Rada*). Ukraine also had a very strong opposition headed by the former Prime Minister Yushchenko who was more popular than the president — and, up until the election day, considerably more popular than the designated presidential successor, — represented a further constraint that the incumbent president faced. If in the 1990s the major contestation was between the

⁴“Krivorozhstal” was sold for \$804 million (with an initial price of \$717 million) to the IMU company. No foreign bidder was allowed to take part. Viktor Pinchuk, the son-in-law of Leonid Kuchma, owned 43.75 percent of IMU (*Kommersant*. 2005, May 31. “They Will Pay in Whole for Krivorozhstal”). Following Kuchma’s departure and the victory of the pro-democratic opposition, the results of the privatization were annulled. On October 24, 2005, “Krivorozhstal” was sold to Mittal Steel for a record \$4.8 billion, 20 percent more than all the income Ukrainian authorities have gained in the entire privatization period (*Kommersant*. 2005, October 25. “Dividends of the Revolution”). This was 6 times the amount received in 2004.

communists and the pro-governmental “center”, the most recent 2002 Parliamentary elections signaled that profound changes were under way. While “Our Ukraine”, the pro-democratic coalition led by Viktor Yushchenko, was not able to form a majority, it won a plurality of 111 seats (23.6 per cent) of the list vote and 24.8 per cent of the total number of deputies elected. The pro-Kuchma grouping “For a United Ukraine” won far fewer of the list votes (only 11.8 per cent), but more of the single-member constituencies (29.7 per cent), and obtained 101 seats. The communists came only third with 66 seats (14.8 per cent) compared with 122 (27.1 per cent) that they obtained in 1998. Clearly, a new political realignment was emerging, with more people inclined to support the pro-change democratic forces (Birch 2003).

Although he was in the second half of his second (and constitutionally last) term, and was faced with increasing unpopularity, Kuchma was not exactly “a lame duck”. Because the possibility of tenure extension looms large in many developing countries, their rulers can hardly ever be considered “lame ducks”. In fact, the experience of fellow rulers in the region provided the Ukrainian president with a menu of possible succession scenarios. Earlier in 1999 Russian President Boris Yeltsin stepped down well in advance of presidential elections to be held in 2000, so that his successor Vladimir Putin was able to assume control over the executive branch during the crucial pre-electoral period. Another neighbour, President Lukashenko of Belarus, was clearly preparing a third term bid during his second term, and indeed he extended his rule in a constitutional referendum in the fall of 2004, one month before elections in Ukraine. Other post-Soviet presidents experimented with lengthening their terms, discarding time already served, abolishing limits or even abolishing elections altogether (see Table 5.2). On the other side, Kuchma’s Western neighbour, Alexander Kwasniewski of Poland, clearly intended to step down in 2005 when required.

President Kuchma had to decide whether to step down or to prolong his rule through some kind of tenure reform. One option for stepping down would have been to find a strong pro-Kuchma successor who would be capable of defeating an increasingly popular challenger Yushchenko and of guaranteeing immunity to Kuchma for his various misdeeds in office. Another option was to launch a constitutional reform and to have Parliament elect the president (thus rendering his unpopularity irrelevant given a majority support in the parliament), or weaken the future president, whether it were to be Yushchenko or anyone else, and transfer the bulk of executive powers into the hands of Prime Minister. Kuchma could have become Prime Minister himself, or, having secured a weaker presidency, he would have been able

to orchestrate politics from behind the scenes. Yet another option was to negotiate a pact with Yushchenko in exchange for immunity, either leaving the latter with a strong presidency or a constitutionally weakened one. Finally, he could have run himself for a third term, an option increasingly difficult due to his low popularity and high constraints.

Therefore, the menu of possible strategies for the incumbent president is as follows:

1. To abolish term limits, or introduce an additional third term ad hoc, and run for a third term in 2004;
2. To prolong the rule by referendum ad hoc, change the constitution and elect president by parliament, or become Prime Minister and transform Ukraine into a parliamentary republic;
3. To transform Ukraine into a parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential republic, weaken the future president, ensure that his designated successor is elected, and then step down;
4. To ensure that his designated successor is elected and step down;
5. To step down and take his chances in the post-Kuchma environment;

Ukraine in 2004 represents an interesting case of high stakes and high constraints, in which it is extremely difficult to abolish limits and run again, as well as to afford oneself the luxury of stepping down without taking precautions about one's post tenure fate. Even if President Kuchma harbored any ambitions of running for a third term, the combination of "Kuchmagate", an earlier failed attempt of a constitutional reform to strengthen presidency at the expense of parliament in late 1990s,⁵ as well as economic linkages with the West and the imperative of various business groups to gain legitimacy of their investment capital in the West (e.g., Kuchma's son-in-law Pinchuk was one of the richest Ukrainian businessmen with global ambitions for his ventures) rendered the first option of extending the rule a low probability and highly dangerous outcome. In 2005, after elections, Leonid Kuchma elaborated why he did not entertain the possibility of running for the third term:

I decided for myself from the very beginning: a third term was not an option. I am a realist. I did not want to make Ukraine into pariah state in the democratic world.⁶

⁵There were plans to create a second chamber in order to make parliament more cumbersome and to increase the powers of the president, but the attempt failed.

⁶*Vremya Novostej*. 2005, March 16. "Leonid Kuchma: in the Personality Contest Yushchenko had an Advantage (Interview with Leonid Kuchma)."

Likewise, to step down without taking any precautions about his future immunity, given serious accusations against President Kuchma and given a very likely expropriation of his own assets and those of his winning coalition would have been an extremely risky strategy. Indeed, as the 2005 post-electoral reprivatization campaign launched by the new government of Prime Minister Julia Timoshenko showed, such concerns were not unfounded. Likewise, new probes into the unsolved criminal cases that implicated the top officials, including the president himself, were launched almost immediately once Kuchma stepped down in 2005. Therefore, almost certainly Kuchma was supposed to take some serious precautions and to follow some kind of middle strategy between the outright extension and stepping down.

In Chapter 4 I stipulated that the utility of a president facing term limits is given by:

$$E(\alpha V_o + \beta R_o) - \gamma C + \delta D_o - E(\alpha V_s + \beta \frac{1}{R_o}) + E(A) + \delta \frac{1}{D_o}$$

The utility of staying in office increases, as the value of office vis-à-vis life outside of office increases, when a ruler does not value democracy or discards his reputational costs, when the experience of other rulers ex post gets “bad”, when the expected affinity with the next ruler is low, and when constraints are low. If the reputational concerns and commitment to democracy outweigh the commitment to office, the ruler steps down. A ruler remains in office if the expected utility differential pertaining to the value of office and to reputational concerns is larger than the constraints, the expected affinity and the positive ex post experience of other rulers.

In case of Kuchma’s presidency, the value of office is high and constraints are high. It is hard to evaluate the experience of fellow rulers in the region. For a start, there were not that many *former* rulers in the region in 2002-4. The experience among those former leaders was mixed: Eduard Shevarnadze, the ex-president of Georgia ousted in the “Rose” revolution in 2003, was granted immunity for his peaceful behavior during the revolution. The new government also left him with a mansion, yet Shevarnadze complained that while his pension was \$400, the utility bill for the mansion exceeded \$800. President Lukashenko of Belarus was less generous to his predecessor Shushkevich, who enjoyed the dubious honor of being the former head of state with the lowest pension: \$3 per month in the mid 1990s.⁷ Yeltsin of Russia was left in peace, and his and his family’s assets were left intact by President Putin. President Milosevic of Serbia, on the contrary, was prosecuted for war crimes and

⁷www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/2004-10-16

Table 5.2: Prolongation Strategies in the Post-Soviet Region

Country	Ruler	Terms	Strategy	Prev. Ruler's Fate
Armenia	Kocharyan 1998-	2x5	—	ousted in a coup, out of public life
Azerbaijan	I. Aliev 2003-	2x5	succeeded his father, G. Aliev, who discarded his 1st term, could have run, but died	died in office
Belarus	Lukashenko 1994-	Nx5	in 1996 discarded years served under the old constit., 2 extra years; in 2004 transforms 2x5 into Nx5	marginalized, ex-head of state with the lowest pension in the world
Georgia	Saakashvili 2003-	2x5	previous ruler ousted in 2003	in semi-exile
Kyrgyzstan	Bakiyev 2005-	2x5	previous ruler discarded years served under the old const., served 2 extra years	in exile
Kazakhstan	Nazarbaev 1991-	Nx7	1995 referendum extends rule to 2000 ad hoc; 1998 bill to change 2x5 into Nx7	no previous ruler
Russia	Putin 2000-	2x4	'appointed' as successor in 1999 consolidates power, gets elected	honourary pension
Tajikistan	Rakhmonov 1994-	Nx7	2003 referendum allows to stay on despite limits; transforms 2x5 into Nx7 (open to interpr.)	in exile
Turkmenistan	Niyazov 1992-06	for life	1994 referendum allows 8 more years, in 1998 allowed to stay for life	no previous ruler died in office
Ukraine	Yushchenko 2004-	2x5	in 2003 the Const. C. declares previous ruler, Kuchma's, 2 nd term is 1 st under new const. but attempts succession, fails	honourary pension
Uzbekistan	Karimov 1991-	Nx7	1995 referendum allows 5 more years; 2002 transforms 2x5 into Nx7	no previous ruler

In 2000 Moldova transformed itself from a presidential-parliamentary into a parliamentary republic. The change was initiated by the legislature to defeat its rival, President Lucinschi who was expected to win the 2000 reelection. Since this change does not constitute a succession strategy, Moldova is not included. *Eastern European Constitutional Review*. Moldova Update. 8(3), 8(4) and 9(4).

tried in The Hague. In Ukraine, the first President Kravchuk (1991-94) kept a low profile as a parliamentarian. More ominous for the president, however, were the legal proceedings against and the indictment of the ex-Prime Minister Lazarenko in the USA for corruption.⁸

With the parameters of the value of office, constraints and diffusion effects hardly changing in 2002-04, the affinity with a next ruler and reputational concerns (ruler's ideology) became crucial factors that influenced decision-making during succession in Ukraine. If Kuchma thought that he could make a contract with the future ruler that would ensure his immunity and that would protect his assets, and do so without the loss of his reputation (which in turn could endanger his immunity ex post!), the incumbent ruler could designate his successor and step down. If he was not confident in his affinity with the next ruler, the president either had to prolong his rule somehow or he had to find a way to make a binding contract with the ruler that would provide him with guarantees of his immunity in his political afterlife.⁹ In a strong presidential regime it is hard to be confident in one's affinity with the next ruler. Indeed, the latter can always be tempted to boost his popularity by punishing the previous ruler and nothing (no executive constraints that can guarantee compliance with the prior agreement) can stop him.

In order to lower the costs of stepping down, President Kuchma initiated a constitutional reform that would make Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential republic well in advance of the 2004 succession, as it gave him the leverage to try out a number of succession strategies (2, 3 and 4, as described above). If this reform had been successful, he could have become prime minister and remained the incumbent ruler, but in a different capacity of Prime Minister (2);¹⁰ or he could have weakened the next ruler and make the contracting and the affinity with the latter less important (3); if the third strategy were to become unsuccessful, he still could have designated his successor and made sure the latter would have won (4).

The constitutional reform that was agreed upon in the middle of the electoral crisis in December 2004 and that transformed Ukraine from presidential-parliamentary into parliamentary-presidential republic, as I discuss in detail below, served a num-

⁸ *Guardian*. 2004, November 26. "The Millionaire Revolutionary".

⁹In the following section I focus on the interactions between a ruler and his successor, and between ruler and the challenger and analyze how the probability of sanctions and reputational costs affected the pay-offs in these interactions.

¹⁰In 2000 the neighbouring Moldova transformed itself from a presidential into a parliamentary republic. The Moldovan president, who has real political power, is elected by the parliamentary majority. Ukrainian politicians widely discussed this transformation in the context of the pending constitutional reform in Ukraine.

ber of functions. Firstly, it diminished the powers of the future president and lowered the stakes of losing office for the outgoing ruler, as the latter was not confident that his chosen successor would credibly commit to preserve his immunity. Likewise, it lowered the stakes of losing the “appointed successorship” for the presidential successor and allowed the possibility of a parliamentary comeback in 2006 for the losers of 2004. In fact, this is precisely what happened, as his successor Yanukovich lost the contest in 2004, but in 2006 became a stronger Prime Minister and a powerful rival to his former victor. Finally, this reform lowered the possibility of a violent regime crackdown and pacified regime hardliners, which was important for the pro-democratic opposition.

In fact, this constitutional reform was a form of an elite contract that signaled their credible commitments to each other and that lowered the stakes of presidential succession. As a decision to cooperate, a constitution can be analyzed as a contract (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Calvert 1994). As we know from the public choice literature, an unconstrained ruler cannot credibly commit with his constituencies, as he can confiscate their wealth at any time (Tullock 1987, North 1981). An unconstrained ruler (successor), from the point of view of the outgoing president, cannot credibly commit to preserve the post tenure immunity of the latter.

The high stakes environment of presidential succession resembles a prisoners’ dilemma, when everyone is better off cooperating, but in the absence of third party enforcement or repeated interaction, the players cannot trust each other. Under what conditions does the presidential succession proceed in an orderly manner and when does it resemble “the war of all against all”? Under what conditions are deadlocked elites able to commit to a new contract rather than return to the prisoners’ dilemma’s war of all against all? Can redrafting the constitution help elites in solving the prisoners’ dilemma?

Below I describe how President Kuchma evaluated and pursued different strategies in 2002-2004. I will show that, up until the last moment, succession could have resulted in different outcomes, not necessarily the victory of the Orange Revolution. In the end, in 2004 the president selected the strategy of conditional support of his chosen successor, leaving room open for negotiation with another candidate. The constitutional contract lowered the stakes and in a way provided the players with an opportunity to avoid a zero-sum game.¹¹

¹¹In other words, events of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine can be described as a nested game with variable pay-offs, where the electoral game was nested within a larger, constitutional-succession game. Tsebelis (1990), who pioneered the approach of nested games in the study of

5.3 Constitutional Reform and Presidential Succession


Shortly after the 2002 Parliamentary elections, in August of 2002 President Kuchma outlined his vision of Ukraine as a parliamentary-presidential republic, signaling the start of a new political cycle. In the previous section I explained the rationale for constitutional change from the point of view of the outgoing president. In order to carry out this change, he had to assemble a majority in the parliament that would approve the bill in the first reading by at least 226 MPs out of 450 in total. The pro-Kuchma coalition commanded a majority in the parliament, so passing in the first reading proved to be easy. Then a constitutional amendment proposal had to withstand the scrutiny of the Constitutional court. During the following session it had to be endorsed by a supermajority of 2/3 of the MPs (300 out of 450). Failure to enact the reform would have meant that the same bill could not be considered in the parliament within a one-year period after the vote (Article 158 of the Constitution). Besides, the law banned constitutional amendments in a half-year period leading up to elections. Having elections in October 30, 2004 meant that the amendment had to be enacted before the end of April 2004.

Unlike a simple majority, assembling a supermajority for the constitutional amendment proved to be very difficult due to the considerable weight of the opposition both on the left and on the right. However, it was not seen as impossible either, as the incumbent at the time due to his considerable powers could have influenced the MPs. To illustrate the strength and policy positions of the major parliamentary players, Figure 5.1 plots the policy space in Ukrainian politics on two dimensions.¹² Table 5.3 reports the distribution of MPs among the parliamentary factions.

politics, describes them as games “in which the payoffs of the game in the principal arena are influenced by the prevailing conditions in another arena or the moves made by players in these arenas” (ibid, 61), so that “the game in the principal arena is nested inside a bigger game where the rules of the game themselves are variable” (ibid, 8). The advantage of the nested game approach is that it allows studying political interaction in all its complexity, neither making it realistic but intractable, nor reducing it to unrealistic simplicity. Also see Schedler (2002), Jesse, Hoe, and Doerun (2002).

¹²The survey, conducted in 2002-2003, included all major parties and blocks participating in 2002 elections. After 2002 elections, however, many deputies switched their factions and formed the new parliamentary ones, so this policy space does not include all groupings. However, it includes major players of the pro-democracy camp, in the right upper corner, of the left - in the bottom left corner, and pro-president center - in the center. Party policy positions are weighted by seats, and label sizes are proportional to vote shares, as described in Benoit and Laver 2006. I would like to thank Professor Kenneth Benoit for sharing data and R code to produce this figure.

Figure 5.1: Policy Space in Ukrainian Politics, 2004



Two opposition blocks “Our Ukraine” (NU), headed by Viktor Yushchenko, and “Yulia Tymoshenko Block” (BYT) dominated on the right. The left was represented by the communists (KPU) and fiercely anti-Kuchma socialists (SPU). The centre, like in the Russian parliament, was ill defined and elusive (Protsyk and Wilson 2003; Remington 2004; Wilson and Birch 1999), for which “centrist” slogans were used to disguise support for an unpopular government (Protsyk and Wilson 2003). The pro-presidential forces needed to assemble 2/3 majority (300 out of 450), that was required in order to pass the amendment.

The process of constitutional reform allowed the president a certain flexibility in trying several succession strategies. Thus, the first two drafts of the constitutional reform attempted to lengthen Kuchma’s term in office by postponing the 2004 elections until 2006, in order to synchronize them with parliamentary elections (strategy 2). The SPU favored this reform bill on the condition that the changes would come into effect after Presidential elections in order to prevent Kuchma from resigning and becoming a powerful Prime Minister. In the latter case the Presidential elections would automatically have turned into a secondary contest (bill N 3207-1, also failed with only 117 votes cast for it).¹³

As argued earlier, the combination of “Kuchmagate”, as well as economic linkages with the West and the imperative of various business groups to gain legitimacy of their capital in the West, rendered the possibility of extending the terms via a third term a highly unlikely and unfeasible option (first choice). Having failed to implement his second choice strategy, President Kuchma continued with the constitutional reform that could still allow him to realize his third choice: to transform Ukraine into a parliamentary republic, weakening the future president and ensuring that his successor was elected. If the pro-Kuchma forces wanted to have their bill passed, they had to co-opt the opposition on the left (the KPU and SPU) and to ensure the discipline of their own factions in order to assemble a supermajority. Alternatively, the pro-president factions could co-opt the more numerous opposition forces on the right (the NU, BYT). In the latter case, the discipline of the centrist factions would not be crucial as such a configuration would assemble well above 300 MPs.

For the reasons explained below, NU (101 deputies) and BYT (19 deputies) chose to oppose the bill. Instead, the left, the KPU (59) and SPU (20) was finally co-opted in exchange for the introduction of a fully proportional system of parliamentary

¹³RFE/RL. 2003, September 16. “Communists Came to the Rescue of Kuchma, Again.” In *Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Volume 5, Number 34.

elections that the left desired, since they thought they would fare better under proportional representation (Ukraine employed a mixed system in 2002 elections). The parliamentary blocks from the “majority” and the “independents,” that were backed up by President Kuchma and three major oligarchic clans, the largest of which (Donetsk’s clan, “The Regions of Ukraine” faction) his soon-to-be successor Yanukovich belonged, supported the reform together with the KPU and SPU.

Table 5.3: Parliamentary Factions in 2002 *Verkhovna Rada*

Abbreviation	Parliamentary Faction	N of Deputies
NU	Our Ukraine Bloc	100
BYT	Yulia Tymoshenko Block	19
SPU	Socialist Party	20
NAPU	National Agrarian Party	20
Centre	Center group	15
NDP-PPPU	People’s (Democratic Party IEP) Bloc	16
Ind.	Non-Affiliated Deputies	41
ZYU	United Ukraine	17
SDPU(o)	Social Democratic Party (united)	33
Regions	The Regions of Ukraine	61
Union	Union group	17
LU	Labor Ukraine	18
DemInit.	Democratic Initiatives group	14
KPU	Communist Party	59

As discussed earlier, 300 MPs had to support the bill in order for the constitutional reform to pass. On April 8, 2004 the crucial vote on bill N4150 (the constitutional changes) was held. To the surprise of many observers, the bill failed, as only 294 MPs, 6 short of a required 300 majority voted for the bill. Not only the opposition, the BYT and the NU, but also a number of “majoritarians” opposed it, even though the SPU, KPU and pro-Kuchma factions voted for it. Crucially, many MPs from the “elusive” center did not support the constitutional reform. The speaker Litvin proved to be a pivotal actor in this vote, orchestrating the defeat and thus hinting at the possibility of pre-election repositioning in the parliament independent of Kuchma.¹⁴

In June of 2004 rather desperate pro-Kuchma forces attempted another vote on constitutional change. In order to circumvent the provision that barred the same

¹⁴It appears that Litvin focused on the future 2006 parliamentary elections, assembling the so-called “Pro-speaker’s” part of the majority (Center Block, Demplatforma of NDP, People’s Agrarian Party). Pro-Kuchma forces could no longer take his support for granted. (*proUA.com*, December 14, 2004).

bills from reconsideration for one year following the vote, the bill was modified. The second time, for the slightly modified bill N4180 only 276 MPs were willing to cast their votes (50 from the KPU, 17 from SPU and 209 from the “majority”). A sizeable proportion of MPs from the majority was preparing strategically for the forthcoming Presidential elections, so that the Parliament would be able to negotiate with the future president, whoever that might be.¹⁵

5.3.1 Elite Interaction Over Succession and Reform: President v. Opposition

What factors led to the stalemate over reform in 2002-2004? The elite interaction over succession and reform can be represented in game theoretic terms. The outgoing president interacts with the pro-democratic challenger and with his chosen successor. First I describe the interaction of the incumbent president with the opposition. The opposition cooperates with the president if it votes for the reform that the president desires, and defects if it does not. In turn, the president cooperates if, following this vote he makes sure that the electoral contest is fair and avoids the violent crackdown on Yushchenko’s supporters. In turn, the president defects by assuring victory of his designated successor, that is, by committing fraud and suppressing post election protests if necessary. The opposition defects by not voting on the reform.

Why did Yushchenko and his pro-democratic faction oppose the constitutional reform? As the most popular politician in the country since 2001 and the top-running candidate for the forthcoming Presidential elections, supporting constitutional reform for the challenger was tantamount to weakening the Presidency that he expected to win. Indeed, in May of 2004 his popularity ratings were 27.8 percent, rising to a projected 42.3 per cent if the SPU’s Moroz’s and BYT’s Tymoshenko’s support was added.¹⁶

Also, to prevent the expected machinations after elections Yushchenko’s faction voted for a new provision in the electoral code that would eliminate the possibilities to challenge electoral results in courts once they were announced by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) — a move he would pay for dearly in November, when

¹⁵ *RFE/RL*, April 13, 2004. Indeed, the parliament would prove to be a pivotal actor during the crisis, especially if we take into consideration that at a certain stage, that is, after November 25, 2004, Ukraine “was blessed” with three presidents, each claiming equal legitimacy, and only the parliament could provide legitimate grounds for resolving the crisis.

¹⁶ *RFE/RL*. 2004, July 8. “Ukrainian Presidential Campaign Starts with All Major Contenders Joining the Race”. *RFE/RL Newsline*.

there would be no legal means to challenge the CEC's ruling in favor of his rival Yanukovich. Only if Yushchenko had not had expected to defeat Kuchma's successor in these elections would he have preferred a weaker Presidency and supported the constitutional reform.

Table 5.4: Preferences' Structure in the Game

Challenger	President
1. Winning Strong Presidency	Weak Successor
2. Winning Weaker Presidency	Weak Opponent
3. Losing to a Weaker President	Strong Successor
4. Losing to a Strong President	Strong Opponent

Table 5.4 illustrates the preferences' ordering for the pro-democratic challenger. Yushchenko would rather win a strong rather than a weak presidency. The weak presidency would entail support for the reform prior to elections. Short of these two outcomes, the challenger would rather lose elections to the appointed successor who inherits a weaker office (reformed presidency). The worst possible outcome is to lose to the powerful president to be (no reform).

In light of these considerations the opposition's block, "NU" voted against the reform in April and June of 2004, when the parliament was deciding whether this reform was to be or not. The "majority" spokesman Havrish predicted that Yushchenko would change his mind in September, when "it would become clear who was going to be President", and predicted not 300 MPs, but 400 for the constitutional amendment.¹⁷

As regards Kuchma's preference ordering, short of extending his term the outgoing president would rather see his designated successor winning a weaker reformed office (first choice), than the leader of the democratic opposition assuming power in such reformed office (second choice). Crucially, even though he prefers his designated successor to the challenger, Kuchma would rather see the challenger in a weaker office than his designated successor in an all-powerful, unreformed office, and I elaborate on the reasons for this ordering below. The worst possible outcome for Kuchma is the new pro-democratic president inheriting strong powers that the outgoing president himself enjoyed.

Unless the affinity with the next ruler is very high, the president would rather

¹⁷ *Ukrainska Pravda*. 2004, June 23. "Gavrish Predicts that Yushchenko will "Understand" after September's Opinion Polls".

have a weak opponent (challenger) than a strong successor. After the 2004 elections, Kuchma commented on his ambiguous position:

One side accused me of supporting my successor too vehemently, another side, Yanukovich, even accused me of “betrayal”. . . . I am disappointed that the reform was agreed upon so late. If it had been approved after the first attempt, the events that unfolded would never have happened. The country would not have been shaken, and elections would have been conducted in a normal way. (Interview with Kuchma, *Vremia Novostej*, 2005, March 16).

We can present the interaction of the major players more formally. U denotes actors' utilities. For Yushchenko U_c denotes the utility of obtaining a weaker presidency, after cooperating on the constitutional reform; U_n denotes the utility of stronger presidency, no reform (no cooperation), where $U_n > U_c$. For Kuchma U_c is the utility of having the reform enacted; and U_n is the utility of having no reform. As elaborated elsewhere, a weaker presidency could have allowed Kuchma to negotiate between various power holders rather than with a single one, and, hence, very powerful, person holding the powers in the post-Kuchma's Ukraine.

S are the threats of sanctions incurred in the game. For Yushchenko S_c are the sanctions associated with his cooperation strategy (running for a weaker presidency); S_n are the sanctions associated with running for a strong presidency, where $S_n > S_c$. The sanctions include the probabilities that Kuchma could become a strong Prime Minister after Yushchenko opted for reform, thus making the future Presidential contest meaningless; or that the incumbent could announce a state of emergency during elections, thus extending his rule, or could defraud the former of his victory during the vote count. For Kuchma S_c and S_n are associated with either Yanukovich (S_n) and Yushchenko (S_c) as presidents, and denote the probabilities that the next president would not implement reform after elections, prosecute the outgoing president, and grant no immunity for an outgoing president.

R represent ex post election costs. For Kuchma, R_n are the reputational costs associated with his behavior during elections, e.g., whether he would have to face prosecution and possible international sanctions, whether he would destroy his legacy should he allow an indiscriminate fraud during elections, or suppress the street protestors, or announce a state of emergency, or all of the above. R_c are the reputational costs associated with his support of Yushchenko. If Kuchma does not cooperate with the challenger and chooses n (his successor) and the latter, Yanukovich, manages to win without fraud, then $R_n \leq R_c$. If Kuchma supports Yanukovich and

allows fraud and violence, then $R_n > R_c$. If Kuchma sides with Yushchenko, then $R_n < R_c$. However, given the animosity towards Kuchma inside Yushchenko's camp, the latter could have still decided to prosecute the former even if the president had chosen to support Yushchenko, that is, the relationship between R_n and R_c is indeterminate in the latter case. For Yushchenko R_n are the costs of not cooperating on reform and running a divided country after the election, the costs associated with his reneged commitment on the constitutional reform with his allies, should he have chosen to compete for the stronger presidency regardless of the preferences in his coalition; and R_c are the costs associated with his choosing reform and thus alienating radicals inside the opposition camp. The expected utility of cooperation and non-cooperation, respectively, are:

$$EU(c) = Pr(S_c)U_c(\textit{winning}) + (1 - Pr)(S_c)U_c(\textit{losing}) - R_c$$

$$EU(n) = Pr(S_n)U_n(\textit{winning}) + (1 - Pr)(S_n)U_n(\textit{losing}) - R_n$$

The constitutional reform depends on the ordering of preferences, sanctions and ex post reputation costs, given the cooperation strategy relative to those given non-cooperation. If Yushchenko cooperates and Kuchma defects, the former receives zero utility and would incur ex post costs as a weak leader not worthy of his followers; and Kuchma obtains reform for certain. If Kuchma cooperates and Yushchenko defects, Kuchma incurs ex post costs (sanctions) and Yushchenko wins a stronger presidency for certain — an unlikely option, as Yushchenko moves first and Kuchma can always defect. There are two possible outcomes of this interaction.

a) If $Pr(S_n)U_n + R_n > Pr(S_c)U_c + R_c$, the equilibrium strategy for Yushchenko is to defect. After the 2002 parliamentary election opposition pollsters claimed that "Our Ukraine" (NU) had been cheated of approximately 1.4 per cent of the vote by mis-tabulation, and the pro-Kuchma "For a United Ukraine" had gained about 2.4 per cent by the same means.¹⁸ The challenger could have calculated that his popularity could offset any possible election fraud, taking his cue from the results from 2002. Indeed, in spring of 2004 Yushchenko's popularity was higher than the popularity of any possible challenger (by a 20 per cent margin). If we subtract the "expected" fraud ($1.4 + 2.4 \approx 3-4$ per cent) from Yushchenko's margin of 20 per cent, the opposition's champion still had a 15-16 per cent advantage. While I cannot substantiate that such calculations took place, they seem very intuitive and provide plausible reasons for Yushchenko's persistent opposition to the reform bill. As long

¹⁸RFE/RL. 2002, April 16. "Alternative Vote Count Differs from Ukraine's Official Results." RFE/RL Newline, Volume 6 Number 71.

as the probability of winning was high and the utility of conceding to a weaker presidency was low, since Yushchenko did not command a majority in the parliament to sustain a weaker presidency were the reform to be implemented, Yushchenko did not support the reform. Likewise for Kuchma, if $Pr(S_n)U_n + R_n > Pr(S_c)U_c + R_c$, Kuchma defects. To break this equilibrium, either the values of U_c, R_c, S_c must increase, or of U_n, R_n, S_n decrease.

b) On the other hand, if $Pr(S_c)U_c + R_c > Pr(S_n)U_n + R_n$, the equilibrium strategy for Yushchenko is to agree on the constitutional reform and for Kuchma to “defect” from his appointed successor and stay neutral in the contest (“cooperate” with the opposition).

For Yushchenko not cooperating on the constitutional reform and then losing to a strong President, and for Kuchma failing to enact constitutional reform in order to weaken a future President are the worst outcomes (*defect, defect*). Yushchenko has to move first, since he decides whether to cooperate or not (by supporting or not the parliamentary vote that preceded the 2004 elections) before he can observe whether another party has engaged in fraud against him, or whether Kuchma prevented the transfer of power (e.g., declaring the state of emergency during elections) or not. As he cannot commit with Kuchma, the dominant strategy for Yushchenko is to defect and oppose the constitutional reform bills, which he did.

The dominant strategy for Kuchma is to “defect” as well, as there is no point in cooperating with Yushchenko if the latter cannot guarantee him immunity after the election. There have been no reports testifying that Yushchenko tried or even signaled his willingness to strike some sort of succession deal with Kuchma in order to guarantee the president and his aides some form of immunity.¹⁹ Kuchma himself denied this:

The insinuations about some sort of agreement with Victor Andreevich Yushchenko in order to ensure his victory was nonsense. We were both politicians, and we had always had a serious political relationship. What actually happened was exactly what everyone observed. (Interview with Kuchma, *Vremia Novostej*, 2005, March 16).

There is one caveat to Kuchma’s strategy, as will be clear below. He acts through an agent, Yanukovich, who also might defect after election as the latter’s first preference is to inherit a strong presidency. Yanukovich moves second: he supports the

¹⁹ *RFE/RL*. 2003, September 16. “Ukraine Faces Changes in the Constitutional System.” In *Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Volume 5, Number 34.

reform once Kuchma has made sure his successor is elected. As some reports suggested, President Yanukovich would have had been no less a risk than Yushchenko himself for Kuchma and the Ukrainian oligarchs.²⁰ As it will be clear once we analyze the electoral game, the complicated strategy that Kuchma played simultaneously with Yushchenko and Yanukovich depended crucially on the ex post reputational costs for Kuchma, R_n , and the probability of getting the constitutional amendment through Yanukovich.

5.3.2 Elite Interaction Over Succession and Reform: President v. Successor

After the crucial vote of April 8, 2004 and with the chances for a positive vote on reform rapidly diminishing, Kuchma had no choice but to make his next move and to designate his successor (his fourth strategy). Prime Minister Yanukovich was chosen as “the united candidate” on April 14, 2004. There is no doubt that Yanukovich promised Kuchma to deliver the constitutional reform at whatever costs in exchange for the candidacy.²¹ As Yanukovich did not possess any leverage over the NU and BYT, his only option was to dismiss the speaker Litvin, who blocked the passage of the reform previously in April, from his pivotal post and convince the “pro-Litvin” forces in the Parliament to change sides. If Yanukovich had been elected, the balance of forces in the political system would have had been radically different and many in the “center” would have had bandwagoned to his side.²²

As a rational power-maximizing agent, Yanukovich would prefer winning a stronger presidency for himself. Unlike Yushchenko, Yanukovich was not in a position to choose between a stronger and weaker presidency. His faction, the “Regions of Ukraine”, as a member of the pro-Kuchma coalition had supported this reform anyway. His failure to support it would have meant that Kuchma would appoint another successor or run for a third term himself. The preference ordering for Yanukovich is the same as Yushchenko’s: 1) Winning Strong Presidency, 2) Winning Weaker Presi-

²⁰“Many Ukrainian analysts assert that pro-Kuchma oligarchs were unlikely to unite behind Yanukovich against the Yushchenko threat. According to them, they were likely to support Kuchma as a guarantor of the stability and continuity of the current political establishment in the country. For Ukrainian oligarchs Yanukovich in the post of president is allegedly no less a risk than Yushchenko himself.” *RFE/RL*. 2004, April 13. *RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report*. “Verhovna Rada Fails to Pass the Constitutional Reform Bill” Volume 6, Number 13.

²¹*Ukrainska Pravda*. 2004, August 28. “Strategic Reverse of 2004 Political Choice: Escape from Freedom” (by Viktorija Podgornaja).

²²On how the size of “centrist” factions depends on their access to the state resources, see Protsyk and Wilson 2003

gency, 3) Losing to a Weaker President, 4) Losing to a Strong President. Yanukovich remained successor as long as his faction supported constitutional change. Without this support Yanukovich would have lost the support of Kuchma. In other words, Yanukovich was not a successor in the same sense as Putin was for Yeltsin in neighbouring Russia in 1999. Rather, Yanukovich played a crucial link in a long-term 2002-06 scenario orchestrated by the ruling coalition: to “break” Yushchenko and prepare grounds for a constitutional reform that would guarantee that no single actor would be able to dominate politics after the 2004 presidential elections.

The relationship between Kuchma and Yanukovich can be understood as a contract: Kuchma backs up his agent, Yanukovich; in turn the latter wins elections and delivers the constitutional reform to his principal. Kuchma, in turn, has to secure victory for his successor, that is, to devote state resources to the electoral campaign of the latter.

In the context of the 2004 elections and a very popular challenger, the outgoing president has to make sure that his successor is in a position to defraud elections if necessary and to suppress the likely protests should the fraud be uncovered. Kuchma has to move first, however, helping his agent to win. He does not possess complete information about the type of his agent, as Yanukovich, once elected president, may renege on his earlier promise to amend the constitution and stay on as a strong president.²³ One option for Kuchma was to transfer the command over police and security forces to the Prime Minister prior to election and become a “lame duck” indeed. Another strategy was to retain the command and keep his options open. President Kuchma chose the latter option. In the words of the president,

I don't know what they mean [by accusing Kuchma of betraying his successor]. It seems what they mean is that I have not transferred my authority to Yanukovich prior to the elections. There were people who suggested I should do so. But this was not a serious proposal. I could have triggered the gravest crisis in the country. I realized this. (Interview with Kuchma, *Vremia Novostej*, 2005, March 16).

Both the president and his successor are committed to cooperation. However, there is a crucial difference between this interaction and the one between president and challenger, described earlier. This time Kuchma has to move first, as Yanukovich can cooperate only after being elected, and having assembled a supermajority after

²³It can also be argued that Kuchma selected the Russian President Putin as an external third party to guarantee that the deal after 2004 stood. (*Guardian*, October 27, 2004)

elections for reform to pass. President Kuchma is not quite sure whether Yanukovich is committed to reform and whether he is able to win these elections. There is a certain ambiguity in the fact that the chances of winning elections for Yanukovich are in probabilistic terms and Kuchma does not know the reputation costs R_n of supporting his candidate prior to elections. If Yanukovich makes a poor electoral showing, cooperation for President Kuchma incurs resorting to violence in order to ensure victory of the former. In this case the reputation costs R would escalate. Strictly speaking, the dominant strategy for Kuchma is to defect.

Instead, President Kuchma decides to “play” simultaneously with Yanukovich and Yushchenko. The president’s strategies are contingent on who wins the elections and on his own reputational costs. Kuchma cannot defect from Yanukovich as he does not want Yushchenko to win, yet he cannot fully commit with his chosen successor either. The best strategy for Kuchma is to create a situation of parity between the two candidates, remain in the game as long as possible and negotiate with the strongest candidate at the latest possible date.

All three actors enforced their positions prior to elections. Yushchenko, as the top running candidate, made sure the electoral results couldn’t be questioned in court. Yanukovich made sure the Parliament would not be able to dismiss his cabinet until the spring of 2005.²⁴ President Kuchma made sure his successor could run a state-sponsored campaign and dominate his opponent in the media, but remained in control himself. In the words of Kuchma, “I am looking into the next year [from his speech on December 19, 2003] with fear. Everybody agrees that the [2004 presidential] elections will be the scariest and dirtiest ever”.²⁵

5.4 2004 Presidential Elections and Constitutional Contract

By election time in October of 2004, the presidential successor and his challenger had reached a near parity, with Yushchenko running first in the opinion polls, but Yanukovich slowly closing the gap. The electoral campaign itself has been held in

²⁴Prime Minister endorsed the cabinet budget proposal in April of 2004. Should the constitutional reform be enacted, he could have stayed on as the Prime Minister, a stronger player than the future President.

²⁵*RFE/RL*. 2004, July 8. “Ukrainian Presidential Campaign Starts with All Major Contenders Joining the Race”. *RFE/RL Newslines*.

a highly charged atmosphere, with an overwhelming bias in favor of Yanukovich in the state media and interference in his favor by the State administration (OSCE 2004b) and culminating in a near-lethal poisoning of Yushchenko in September. The elections themselves were held on October 31. The official returns showed that the two major candidates were neck-in-neck and a second round would have to be held. Giving a boost to Yushchenko, the crucial third candidate, Moroz of the SPU, sided with him following the first round in exchange for Yushchenko's pledge to support the constitutional reform before January 1, 2005.²⁶

A week after the first round and rather unexpectedly, Yushchenko was declared winner of that round, with 39.90 per cent against 39.26 per cent for Yanukovich. The status quo remained: Yushchenko still defected on the constitutional reform, Yanukovich was committed to cooperation with President Kuchma and the latter cooperated with Yanukovich. Moroz proposed the idea of reform between two rounds, but this endeavor was doomed with both players expecting to win a stronger presidency, with Yushchenko relying on his supporters emboldened by the inability of Yanukovich to win in a first round, and Yanukovich relying on the administrative resources in the East of Ukraine.

During TV debates with Yushchenko prior to the second round Yanukovich distanced himself from Kuchma and refused to be labeled as his successor. Instead, he repositioned himself as "the brand new authority, decisive force in Ukrainian politics".²⁷ Undoubtedly a PR move, it could also have meant that Yanukovich was revealing his type. If Yanukovich believed that he could win on his own the larger prize of a strong presidency, and were he indeed to win the second round relying on his own resources at his home eastern regions, Yanukovich would have felt less obliged towards the outgoing ruler and could have abandoned his commitment to President Kuchma.

The second round was held on November 21. The OSCE observers assessed that round less favorably than the previous one held on 31 October, noting a higher incidence of serious violations, including some isolated incidents of violence and a pattern of intimidation, with suspiciously high turnout in some Eastern regions.²⁸

²⁶ *RFE/RL*. 2004, November 8. "...As Zyuganov Joins Putin in Stumping for Ukrainian Premier". In *RFE/RL Newslines*, Volume 8 Number 211.

²⁷ *RFE/RL*. 2004, December 22. "Ukraine Presidential Rivals Trade Barbs in Televised Debate." In *RFE/RL Newslines*, Volume 8 Number 239.

²⁸ For example, turnout was 96.31 per cent in Donetsk and 88.41 per cent in Lugansk in the East. A high number of voters - approximately 5 per cent - was added to voter lists on election day (OSCE 2004a)

The size of fraud is hard to estimate, but it was most probably larger than during the first round. Many Ukrainian and foreign election monitors alleged massive electoral fraud that included voter intimidation and manipulation of voter registration lists (OSCE 2004a).

Following the second round, the Central Electoral Commission (henceforth CEC) declared preliminary tallies that showed Victor Yanukovich the apparent winner, ahead by 3 per cent over Viktor Yushchenko. In contrast, the majority of exit polls showed Yushchenko ahead of Yanukovich.²⁹ Anticipating that these irregularities would not be considered by the pro-governmental CEC, Yushchenko's supporters occupied Kiev's Main Square to demand that their candidate be recognized as the legitimate winner.³⁰ Their rally ushered in a series of non-stop, day-and-night peaceful protests against electoral fraud despite the unfavorable weather conditions of winter Kiev. The Orange Revolution, named for the orange color of the campaign insignia chosen by Yushchenko's camp, led to the victory of Yushchenko and the pro-democratic opposition in the end and produced a truly tectonic shift in Ukrainian politics.

The events of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine were almost immediately compared with the similar events of the Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia (on Georgia, see Fairbanks Jr. 2004; Tsomaia 2004) and the earlier toppling of the Serbian strongman Milošević in Belgrade of 2000 (Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003; de Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001; RFE/RL, December 20, 2004; Thompson 2004a).³¹ Like these prior events, events in Ukraine represent the well-known "stunning elections" phenomenon, in which a suddenly mobilized opposition inflicts a surprising defeat on a non-democratic regime (Huntington 1991; Thompson 2004). Elections in Ukraine appear to have followed a similar chain of events as its predecessors: the incumbents attempted to cheat during elections; the opposition challenged the official results on the streets; the surprised regimes became "stunned" and, unable to crush the protestors, were defeated. Yet Ukraine also presents us with several puzzles.

The street mobilization of the Ukrainian opposition was not completely unexpected by regime insiders. The surprisingly strong post-electoral mobilization of 2000 in Serbia came as a shock to that regime, which had been able to cope previously with similar challenges in the 1996-97 series of protests. Likewise, the Georgian

²⁹ *Interfax-Ukraine*. 2004, November 21. Breaking News Newline.

³⁰ *Time*. 2004, December 06. "The Orange Revolution: Why Russia, the U.S. and Europe Care so much about Ukraine's Disputed Presidential Election".

³¹ *RFE/RL*. 2004, December 20. "Ukraine: Part Homegrown Uprising, Part Imported Production?" (by Jeremy Bransten). In *RFE/RL Daily Newsreel*.

breakthrough in the 2003 elections was the first of this kind in the former Soviet Union and hence also surprising.³² Neither the Georgian nor the Serbian regimes experimented with constitutional reform simultaneously with elections. The outgoing President Kuchma was a student of the events in Georgia and Serbia and repeatedly dismissed the prospect for electoral revolution in Ukraine as impossible.³³ The activists of the youth mobilization group “Pora” were routinely harassed and monitored by authorities in 2004, and their preparation for the Orange Revolution was common knowledge.³⁴ Thus, the 2004 elections should not have become “stunning” by any means.

Determined autocrats, if prepared well in advance, are able to thwart the challenges of elections and post-electoral protests as occurred in Belarus 2001 and 2006, in Azerbaijan 2003 or in Kazakhstan 2005. Unlike democratic regimes, in which incumbent rulers might lose elections, electoral autocracies are designed to prevent electoral defeats through fraud or intimidation of the opponents. “Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty” (Schedler 2002a, 37). Undoubtedly, Kuchma’s Ukraine belonged to the category of electoral autocracy (Levitsky and Way 2002): a regime that allowed little political competition for power, but left enough political space for political parties and civil society organizations to form, an independent press to function to some extent and for some political debate to take place (Ottaway 2003, 3-4). Even if incumbents themselves do not run, they can always appoint successors in advance in order to make sure the latter consolidate power before scheduled executive turnover (as it happened in Russia 2000, Azerbaijan 2003, Syria 2000 or Djibouti 1999).

As I argued in the previous section, President Kuchma was reluctant to transfer his enormous powers to his designated successor, Prime Minister Yanukovich. Evidently, the outgoing president did not follow the Russian succession scenario, in which the outgoing President Yeltsin had resigned and passed his powers to his Prime Minister and designated successor, Vladimir Putin well in advance of an election date, so that Putin was able to assume full control of the state apparatus (White 2000). On the contrary, Kuchma appointed Yanukovich too late in the election year, while retaining control over the administrative and security resources of the state. If

³²Besides, the Georgian regime had also been exceptionally weak (Fairbanks Jr. 2004).

³³*RFE/RL*. 2004, October 20. “Are Authorities Afraid of “Georgian Scenario” in Presidential Election?” In *Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Number 38.

³⁴The possibility of elite defections was also considered, as evidenced by the preventative dismissal of the pro-Western Defense Minister Marchuk in August of 2004 (Sherr 2004). *RFE/RL*. 2004, October 20. “Are Authorities Afraid of “Georgian Scenario” in Presidential Election?” In *Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Number 38.

Yanukovich was his chosen successor, why did the President not ensure by all available means that his Prime Minister was in a position to succeed him? Once we take into consideration the motivation of the outgoing ruler and his complex succession strategy as described earlier, we will be able to understand his reluctance to transfer his powers, his focus on the constitutional reform in the midst of a crisis, as well as changes of Yushchenko's position on the reform before and after the vote.

Two days after the vote, on November 23 Yushchenko declared himself the winner of the Presidential contest. The following day, the CEC declared Yanukovich winner, with the official results giving Yanukovich 49.46 percent against Yushchenko's 46.61 per cent. At that stage, Yushchenko's supporters were on the brink of storming governmental buildings, the city was blocked and several regional administrations declared their allegiance to Yushchenko. Oddly enough, Ukraine had three presidents — the outgoing president, the "people's" President Yushchenko, and the President-elect Yanukovich. The parity between the two candidates at this stage largely remained intact: Yanukovich was about to be officially certified as the winner, while Yushchenko commanded the streets and appeared more legitimate to the public. The interaction between Kuchma and Yushchenko (*defect-defect*) and Kuchma and Yanukovich (*cooperate-cooperate*) did not change.

However, on November 25 the situation drastically changed. The Supreme Court decided to probe into fraud allegations and agreed to delay the certification of the results, preventing Yanukovich from being inaugurated.³⁵ The following day Yushchenko proposed his solution to the impasse: a third round with two candidates, a new electoral commission, changes in the electoral code in order to prevent fraud, equal access to the media, and the OSCE controlling the electoral process. The street mobilization went on.

On November 27 Parliament voted on a package bill, N6366, which included the pledge to hold a constitutional reform vote by December 3 at the latest, by a 363-strong majority. The crucial provisions on the electoral commission and amendments to the electoral code were supported by 228 and 233 MPs, respectively.³⁶ The speaker of the parliament Litvin and his block sided with the opposition and several MPs left the majority for the NU, BYT and SPU. This new majority hinted at the possibility of a viable presidency for Yushchenko even given the constitutional changes, should

³⁵It is not clear what made Court do so. Possibly the judges felt emboldened under the uncertainty of succession or they were influenced by the mass mobilization and the revolutionary fervor in the capital.

³⁶Bill N6366 did not have legal force, it was a political move by the pro-Yushchenko forces.

he choose to support it. Undoubtedly, the utility of a weak presidency (U_c) had increased. Also, even if declared a winner now, Yanukovich could no longer be inaugurated.³⁷

November 28 proved to be the decisive day. The legislature in Donetsk, a stronghold of Yanukovich, called a referendum on regional autonomy. The opposition leaders demanded that Kuchma fire Yanukovich from the prime ministerial position, but they were losing momentum as none of their demands had been met so far. The police were given live ammunition, and Yanukovich and the head of Presidential Administration Medvechuk allegedly called on Kuchma to suppress the demonstrations using the brute force.³⁸

The events in Donetsk provided Kuchma with a *casus belli* to brand both candidates as dangerous dividers that led the country to the brink of civil war. He also expected the Supreme Court to declare a second round invalid and to order a brand new re-run of the elections with the two major candidates dropped. Not accidentally, Yanukovich's campaign chief Tihipko (a leader of Labour Ukraine of the Dnepropetrovsk "clan", the second strongest oligarchic group, as opposed to the Donetsk oligarchic "clan" of Yanukovich), resigned and signaled his willingness to participate in the new campaign.³⁹ Under such circumstances, and should the constitutional reform have been enacted on December 1-3, Kuchma could have become the "uniter" of the country, given the threat of secession of the Eastern regions and the increasing possibility of violence on the streets between the supporters of the two candidates. According to this line of reasoning, neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovich would have had been able to perform the role of President of Ukraine as both were too partisan. On November 29 Kuchma hinted that "a political solution" was necessary and that new elections were possible.⁴⁰

In the event of new, re-run elections without two major candidates present, Kuchma would have been able to continue his presidency well into 2005, when constitutional change would have come into force. Therefore, the possible strategies for

³⁷According to the law, he had to be inaugurated in the parliament.

³⁸*New York Times*. 2005, January 17. "Back Channels: A Crackdown Averted: How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path". January 17, 2005, Section A, Page 1, Column 1.

³⁹*RFE/RL*. 2004, November 30. "Ukrainian National Bank Chief Resigns, Pledges to Go for Politics". In *RFE/RL Newsline*, Volume 8 Number 223.

⁴⁰*RFE/RL*. 2004, November 30. "Ukrainian President Could Accept New Presidential Election." In *RFE/RL Newsline*, Volume 8 Number 223. But to engage in counterfactual speculations as to what would have had happened should the Court have ruled along the lines of Kuchma's vaguely revealed preferences is something I am not prepared to pursue. Clearly, however, this scenario could have been realized under slightly different circumstances.

Kuchma after November 28 were: 1) to side with Yanukovich, disperse the crowds and declare his successor the winner (and suffer serious reputational costs, R); 2) declare a state of emergency and wait for the court to declare a new re-run (also R); or 3) make sure Yushchenko votes for the constitutional reform and, should the court declare a new re-run, preside over the interim period before constitutional changes come into force.

Kuchma chose the option of cooperating with the democratic challenger. Although I can only explain the observed behavior of major actors, cooperation or no cooperation, one note on the motivation of Kuchma to promote the reform in the heat of crisis is necessary. One might think that it would be easier for Kuchma to negotiate immunity with a strong president, whether Yanukovich or Yushchenko, since a stronger president would be better positioned to guarantee this immunity than a weaker one. As discussed in the decision problem earlier, however, when constraints on the future ruler are low, the stakes of stepping down for the outgoing ruler are very high, as the future ruler cannot credibly commit to preserve the immunity of his predecessor in the absence of checks and balances. Kuchma, undoubtedly concerned about his immunity, pursued the reform option. There are several plausible explanations for this. With no law on perpetual presidential immunity Kuchma was vulnerable under any circumstances, with or without reform. Besides, as far as the oligarchs were concerned, reform could have somewhat protected their interests in a post-Kuchma world. It would also have been easier to negotiate with dispersed rather than concentrated powers. Perceiving that Yanukovich was losing, Kuchma could have also hoped to weaken a future presidency, expecting the new government to be in disarray for 9-12 months up to the parliamentary elections in 2006.⁴¹

The incumbent president did not order a crackdown. It is possible that he was losing control over the security forces and perceived that his order wouldn't be obeyed.⁴² Also, Kuchma clearly saw the consequences of a violent crackdown:

As a result of a violent crackdown blood would have spilt for sure. Under no circumstances I could accept that. Every drop of blood would have tainted only one person — the acting President. (Interview with Kuchma, *Vremia Novostej*, 2005, March 16).

Kuchma was also aware of the November 27 pledge in the parliament to hold a

⁴¹I would like to thank Katya Ryabiko of USAID and John Kubinec of Freedom House for their generous comments on Kuchma's possible incentives

⁴²*New York Times*. 2005, January 17. "Back Channels: A Crackdown Averted: How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path". January 17, 2005, Section A, Page 1, Column 1.

vote on reform on December 1–3, as well as Yushchenko's earlier promise to Moroz of SPU to enact the reform before January 1, 2005. Besides, Yushchenko would be under international pressure to agree to reform in order to resolve the crisis.

Last, but not the least, was the role of the international community and media that had a very prominent presence during the crisis. In the model developed in the previous chapter, I stipulated that reputational concerns should increase the probability of stepping down. In this particular case, reputational concerns undoubtedly increased not only the probability of President Kuchma's stepping down, but also made the former's support of his successor, Prime Minister Yanukovich, conditional and with certain reservations attached. Indeed, the influence of international mediators, such as the former Polish President, Alexander Kwasniewski, Lithuania's President Valdas Adamkus, and the European Union's Foreign Affairs Commissioner Javier Solana, who worked in Kiev to negotiate the pact among the rival interests, was enormous (Karatnycky 2005). The U.S. State Department made clear that President Kuchma would be personally responsible for electoral irregularities or the application of force against the protestors. Both the U.S. Secretary of State Powell and President Bush made several calls to President Kuchma, linking his post tenure fate with his conduct during elections. The head of the election campaign of Prime Minister Yanukovich, Taras Chornovil, recalled after elections:

Kuchma rejected any negotiation whatsoever first. Then Kwasniewski would make a phone call to Bush, Bush would call Putin and Kuchma. . . In a way, Kwasniewski contributed to the peaceful resolution of this crisis.⁴³

Clearly, the pay-offs have changed and the major players began negotiations. During the round table on December 1 Kuchma and the two candidates signed a declaration in which they discussed the possibility of a vote on a package that included both constitutional reform and amendments to the electoral code to prevent electoral fraud. Yushchenko had signed the deal. On the same day the parliament cast a vote of no confidence with 229 votes in support on a secret ballot, reflecting the changing balance of forces in the parliament (approximately 20 more MPs switched sides to the opposition).⁴⁴ In the past, Yushchenko did not support the constitutional reform since he could not be sure that the incumbent president would not be using it in order to remain in power and render the Presidential elections

⁴³ROSBALT. 2005, July 21 (interview with Taras Chornovil).

⁴⁴However, Yanukovich couldn't be legally dismissed till April 2005, as the parliament approved his budget April 2004, besides he was officially on vacation, and couldn't be dismissed from his job according to the Labour Code.

meaningless. Now, however, Yushchenko's payoffs have changed: U_c increased, as he enjoyed a majority in the parliament and could have sustained his government even after reform was enacted, and S would also decrease should the electoral amendments against fraud come into force. The challenger was prepared to vote for the constitutional amendment in exchange for the amendments to the electoral law.

On December 3 the Supreme Court rendered the electoral results invalid and, rather unexpectedly ordered a new re-run of the second round with the present candidates, which was tantamount to Yushchenko's victory should the provisions against fraud be enacted. Kuchma lost the possibility to have a new re-run with the candidates dropped and to sustain this crisis into 2005. He lost new re-run, but did not lose prospect for reform. Yushchenko had to calculate the possibility of winning a new re-run facing the same obstacles he had faced during the second round (thus no changes in the electoral code), and weigh it against the utility of having a strong or a weak presidency. U_c increased for Yushchenko, as he commanded a *de facto* majority in the parliament. It was impossible not to vote on constitutional reform and to change the electoral code. Besides, the proposed amendments would have rendered the probability of his victory almost certain.⁴⁵ Kuchma also promised to dismiss the Prime Minister only after the package vote.

Yushchenko had to take into consideration the costs of ruling a divided country as well (the reputational costs, R). Undoubtedly, his refusal to compromise on reform would have antagonized his opponents even further. On December 4 the Parliament held a "signal vote" to see whether there was a 2/3 majority, but the NU, the BYT and several other MPs voted against it. The SPU, Yushchenko's ally, threatened to leave the coalition, frustrated that the NU would not honor its commitments. Undoubtedly, the position of the SPU on the constitutional reform and its position on free and fair elections proved pivotal. Moving to the side of Yushchenko after the first round and bundling its support with the constitutional reform pledge at that time, SPU contributed to the repositioning of Yushchenko on reform during the crisis.

As the relative values of U , S , and R changed, the equilibrium has changed: $EU(c) > EU(n)$ and $Pr(S_c)U_c + R_c > Pr(S_n)U_n + R_n$. On December 8 the Parliament held a crucial vote on the proposed package. On a package vote on the consti-

⁴⁵Yushchenko could still have attempted voting on the electoral amendments, as undoubtedly he enjoyed the support of 226 MPs necessary for these amendments to pass, and then to vote against the constitutional amendment, for which 300 MPs were necessary and which only his coalition could block. But Kuchma could veto his bill on the electoral amendments, which could only be overridden by 300, which Yushchenko did not command.

tutional change and amendments to the electoral vote, 402 registered a “Yes” vote (with the BYT against) — the result, ironically, that pro-Kuchma deputy Havrish had predicted in spring.⁴⁶ Constitutional amendments envisaged the transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential system with measures to make parliamentary parties more cohesive and the Prime Minister dominant.⁴⁷ The electoral amendments in turn limited the possibility of fraud, regulating absentee ballots and voting at home, inter alia. Therefore, the old equilibrium moved to a new one as the payoffs of cooperation increased and payoffs of non-cooperation decreased.

On December 8 Yushchenko made sure he could win a decisive victory in the December 26 re-run. And indeed, the leader of the opposition obtained a 52 per cent majority in the “third round”, a 8 per cent margin of victory over Yanukovich, and Kuchma created an opportunity for a political “after-life” in a new parliamentary-presidential republic, if not for himself then for his coalition, or, at the very minimum increased his chances for immunity.⁴⁸

After elections Kuchma calmly contemplated his situation:

I can look straight into my people’s eyes because I can give an account of everything I did. It is absolutely absurd for me to be afraid of any legal action. Of course, I cannot exclude that some attempts will be made, but I look upon it philosophically (*New York Times* 2005, January 21).⁴⁹

Yanukovich had lost as Kuchma ceased cooperation with him. The continued relationship with Yanukovich for Kuchma meant escalating reputational costs, R and decreased U_c .

5.5 Discussion and Conclusion

Cases of high stakes and high constraints, of which the Ukrainian succession of 2004 is an example par excellence, are difficult to estimate statistically, as a lot depends on the idiosyncratic factors and uncertainty. I have chosen this case in order to

⁴⁶See section on the interaction between president and the opposition.

⁴⁷Into effect on January 1, 2006 should the changes to the law on local self-government were not be enacted by September 1, 2005

⁴⁸‘The biggest winner, according to lawmakers and political analysts, appeared to be Kuchma himself’. (*International Herald Tribune*, December 9, 2004)

⁴⁹Whether a deal on immunity has been made or not is not known and, probably would never be. At the time of this writing, end of 2006, the ex-president runs his own foundation in Kiev. No charges have been brought against him.

understand the structure of preferences, the degree of uncertainty, and the available strategies, and to map the outcomes from these strategies. In order to achieve this, I used an in-depth analytic narrative with elements of game theory. Unlike cases of low constraints and high stakes, where incumbents are most likely to prolong their rule (strategy 1), President Kuchma was prevented from doing so by relatively high constraints on his authority, linkages with the West that any third term bid would jeopardize, and, perhaps, by his own preferences and reputational concerns. Likewise, unlike cases of high constraints and low stakes, where presidents are almost certain to step down (strategy 5), Ukrainian president could not simply leave office and await his fate. After the “Kuchmagate” scandal, his immunity could no longer be taken for granted; after a series of corrupt privatization deals, his assets and those of his winning coalition could not longer be secure after his departure.

Instead, the president pursued a combination of strategies in between these two extreme options. Since Ukraine is not a federal state, he could not prolong the rule by transferring authority between the center and its units, like Milošević of Yugoslavia did in 1997, — an option open to President Putin in 2008 should he choose to pursue a Union State with Belarus. Instead, he relied on a constitutional reform to transform Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential republic. The reform allowed him certain flexibility in pursuing several strategies in turn. First, he attempted to prolong his rule: to synchronize the elections and thereby postpone his succession, or to become a powerful Prime Minister should the reform be enacted (strategy 2). Having failed to do so, he still relied on this reform to weaken the next president and lower the stakes of succession (strategy 3). Finally, he “appointed” his successor (strategy 4).

The Ukrainian case has certain idiosyncratic factors that did not allow the president to realize any of these strategies, but led to a more interesting and lasting outcome. The president was prevented from relying on strategy 4 alone, that is, to ensure that the successor is elected and then step down, by the uncertainty over his affinity with his successor Yanukovich, and the ability of the latter to win elections, as well as by the strength of the opposing challenger. Instead, the outgoing president designed an open-ended scenario that allowed him not to commit fully to his successor and to leave room for cooperation with the challenger. Thereby Kuchma ensured agreement on the new contract between opposing elites in the middle of the crisis. In turn, the new contract lowered the stakes of succession and ensured credible commitments of all major players to a new status quo. In a way, the eventual outcome resembles the one out of strategy 3: transformation into a

parliamentary-presidential regime and weakening of a future president.

In retrospect, it is clear why Kuchma failed to enact the constitutional reform prior to elections, or, more accurately, why Yushchenko did not support it. The challenger would have had to move first in the game and face the consequences, if Kuchma did not move simultaneously with him. However, being the most popular politician in the country, Yushchenko estimated that he had a very high probability of winning elections, hence defection was his dominant strategy. Kuchma had to defect in this interaction with Yushchenko and he chose to cooperate with Yanukovich instead. Speaker Litvin's repositioning in the parliament rendered reform impossible before the vote but that made the parliament pivotal during election. Clearly, the payoffs in the arena of the constitutional reform were affected by the expected probabilities of the presidential vote. A vote against fraud in a bundle with reform in the parliament increased payoffs from cooperating.

Kuchma and Yanukovich's cooperation had sustained as long as Yanukovich was able to deliver the constitutional reform after election. The problem of commitment was partially solved by Russia's external enforcement, but Kuchma did not commit himself fully to the cooperation with his agent. The parity between the two candidates had been retained prior to and after the first round, thus rendering the reform between the two rounds impossible. Straight after the second round the parity remained: Yanukovich possessed the resources of the administrative apparatus and Yushchenko had mobilized and commanded the streets. Yet Kuchma's reputational costs from suppressing the demonstrators, and those from the possibility of running a divided country after winning a third round for Yushchenko, escalated. The chances for agreement increased. "When correlated strategies are possible, the likelihood of cooperation increases with the payoffs of cooperation (rewards for mutual cooperation and sanctions for unilateral defection) increasing" (Tsebelis 1990).

The incumbent president and the opposition were no longer better off defecting. A coalition with Moroz of SPU in the electoral arena came in exchange for a pledge to support constitutional reform in the parliamentary arena, thus increasing R costs, should Yushchenko defect on his pledge. Kuchma proposed constitutional reform in a bundle with a series of measures to prevent electoral fraud (the amendments to the electoral code and dismissal of the Prime Minister, thus leveling the playing field). This increased the payoffs from cooperation and the probability of winning the third round. Last, but not least, the genuine 40 per cent support for Yanukovich rendered the possibility of a fully revolutionary scenario undesirable and also contributed to

the cooperation.

Applying the logic of these two interactions to the decision problem of a ruler discussed in Chapter 4, this change in pay-offs decreased the perceived affinity with the next ruler and increased the value of the reputation costs associated with the office. As a result, the ruler stepped down.

Undoubtedly, President Kuchma played a very complex game prior to and during the Orange Revolution. Kuchma had to sustain the situation of a “manageable crisis” in order to affect the payoffs of both candidates so that they would “cooperate”, without resorting to violence. This strategy would have prevented Yanukovich from winning on his own and gave Yushchenko an option to “cooperate” once the payoffs changed. The escalating reputational costs arising from continuing support of a successor for Kuchma forced the latter to choose a weak opponent over a weak successor, thus his third over second preference. After the second round Kuchma signaled the availability of an alternative position to Yushchenko, bundling constitutional change with anti-fraud measures. In a sense, he played the role of a *focal arbiter* (Riker 1986) in the whole, nested game.

We would not be able to understand the Orange Revolution fully if we disregard the dynamics of the presidential succession and strategies played by the outgoing president. Constitutional contracting in the middle of the succession crisis decreased the stakes for all major actors and allowed them to commit credibly to democracy in Ukraine. The constitutional reform weakened the powers of the future president, lowered the stakes of losing office for the outgoing president and increased the probability of immunity and decreased the probability of redistribution. Paradoxically, as the post election events unfolded, Yanukovich turned out to be better off as a result of the reform and his lost presidential bid. Following the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovich became a new Prime Minister, empowered by the constitutional changes in force from January 1, 2006. In the words of Juan Linz, “Non democrats of yesterday can become democrats” (Linz 1997, 408).

The Ukrainian elections of 2004 proved that presidential succession can be a highly uncertain business for the outgoing incumbent, his designated successor and the pro-democratic opposition. In this particular instance the regime elites were uncertain about the likely outcome of elections and became split, the designated successor indeed lost to the pro-democratic candidate and a liberalizing election ensued. Can we conclude that presidential succession render the probability of democratic transition more likely, and why? Indeed, transitions to democracy almost

always result from splits within authoritarian regimes (Przeworski 1991; Di Palma 1990; Karl 1990; Stepan 1986) and the process of presidential succession introduces uncertainty about the distribution of power in society and likely electoral outcomes. In the next and last chapter I employ a sample of ninety elections and investigate whether democratic transitions are more likely during presidential succession than when an incumbent presents himself for re-election.

Chapter 6

Presidential Succession and Democratic Transitions

6.1 Introduction

After nearly two decades in office, on 7 January 2001 President Rawlings of Ghana stepped down, passing power to the pro-democratic opposition after his designated successor and Vice-President Atta Mills lost a second round of the December 2000 presidential election despite the support of the ruling party, military, media and the outgoing president himself. One of the most important elements of this contest was that the charismatic incumbent Rawlings who won two elections in the past did not run due to term limits (Gyimah-Boadi 2001, 107). Indeed, in the 2000 elections “a great wave of excitement swept the country with President Rawlings no longer on the ballot chapter, and the scent of change in the air.”¹ The hopes of the Ghanaian electorate were not unfounded, as Rawlings’s successor indeed lost, and, following the election, Ghana’s Freedom House ranking was changed from “Partly Free” to “Free”. Does presidential succession in partly- and non-democratic regimes render the probability of democratic transition more likely and why?

In this chapter, I build upon my previous findings about presidential re-election, term limits, incumbency and democracy and investigate the impact of incumbency on the probability of democratic transitions. Previously, in Chapter 4 I focused on what made incumbents remained incumbents. I endogenized tenure institutions and found that presidents stepped down when the stakes were low and constraints were

¹ *IRIN*. 2004, November 26. “Kufuor Likely to Be Re-elected in Ghana”.

high, and strived to remain in office when stakes were high and constraints were low. The value of political office, constraints, the tenure and post tenure experience of other rulers influence how hard the rulers hold to political office. What difference does holding to political office make for their countries, for democracy in general? In this chapter I will show that the long-standing incumbents are less likely to lose elections than their successors, that democratic transitions occur more often when incumbents step down and successors run in elections in their stead, and that many incumbents step down because of term limits.

Earlier I demonstrated that term limits constitute a very important factor preventing continuous re-election in world presidencies. All things being equal, there is 0.84 chance of getting re-elected, should a leader present himself for re-election. In other words, the data suggests that incumbents are more difficult to defeat in elections than other electoral candidates. When presidents the world over present themselves for re-election, they are more likely to win. But when incumbents step down due to higher executive constraints and lower costs of doing so, very often they designate their successors in their stead. They can select from the ranks of their own party (Mexico under PRI), their relatives (Azerbaijan 2003, Syria 2000), public officials or people they share business interests with (Ukraine 2004). Depending on such factors as degree of democracy, the affinity with successors, strength of the opposition and concerns over post tenure fate, the incumbent presidents can remain in office or they can empower their successor in order to make sure the latter become the new presidents. But they often do so at the peril for their regimes.

I argue that, when presidents appoint successors in nondemocratic or partly democratic regimes, the uncertainty in the ruling coalition over whether rents will continue to be distributed as well as over whether designated successors are strong enough to deter or punish potential challengers often causes elite splits. This, in turn, makes an opposition victory more likely. Transitions to democracy almost always result from splits within authoritarian regimes, as many researchers have noted (Di Palma 1990; Karl 1990; Meyer 2004; Przeworski 1991; Stepan 1986). I test this argument empirically, focusing on 90 elections in partly- and non-democratic presidential regimes, from 1990 to 2004. I find that longstanding incumbents obtain more votes and are less likely to lose elections than their designated successors, and that democratic transitions occur more often when incumbents step down and successors run in elections in their stead. I also find that the presence of hegemonic parties somewhat reduces the handicaps of successors. Finally, I find that the major reason why the incumbent presidents step down is because of tenure restrictions.

The findings of this chapter suggest that defeats at so-called ‘stunning elections’ are driven not only by the opposition’s mobilization, but also by the absence of the incumbent that reduces the costs of the collective action. This follows the work of Geddes (1999) and Huntington (1991), who have argued that the absence of a leader due to the incapacity or death of a personalist ruler often precipitates elite splits and eases collective action problems within the opposition. The broader implication is that democracy practitioners should focus their attention not only on free and fair elections, but also on the executive tenure restrictions and the observance thereof.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I elaborate on the process of presidential succession and why it affects democratic transitions in presidential regimes in developing world. To put it simply, I expect incumbents to win, and designated successors to lose. Next I discuss how I build upon the data on liberalizing electoral outcomes (Howard and Roessler 2006) and present the results of logit and OLS estimations and discuss the impact of incumbency on the probability of democratic change. I then focus on the outlier cases in which incumbents ran and lost or successors ran and won in order to illuminate the causal mechanism and see whether theory holds under adverse conditions. Finally, I investigate the reasons for the absence of incumbents in some elections and conclude.

6.2 Succession, Incumbency and Democratic Transitions

The most dangerous time in office for the presidents is the first one or two years in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bienen and Van der Walle 1991). Likewise, in Chapter 3 I found that leaders, once they survived the initial stage in office, accumulated significant incumbency advantages over their challengers: we observe decelerating or constant hazard rates. Also, earlier in Chapter 2 I found that when incumbents present themselves for re-election, they are most likely to win. Likewise, Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) found that among presidents who faced elections without impending term limits only 27 per cent were defeated, and the rest either won them or did not run. It seems that incumbents are more difficult to defeat in elections than other electoral candidates. Incumbent re-election goes beyond the personal concerns of presidents and their challengers, however, and has larger implications for the fate of the country’s political system.

The question of political succession is not a trivial one. Throughout recorded history, the failure to achieve smooth transitions of power brought havoc to the government, and the need to transfer power has been an important force in fostering the rise of new political patterns (Burling 1974, 2). In fact, by looking at how rulers depart (or do not depart) from power, we involve in some of the most important questions in political science. Political stability, long-term economic policy and growth, as well as instances and the very success of transitions are affected by political decisions that rulers take, how secure they are in office, and, crucially, by their time horizons.

Democracy is the only form of government that is designed to arrange for an orderly succession of leaders. Dictator cannot appoint his successor in advance, as he would undermine his own authority. There should be no unambiguous second position. When a dictator dies, very often “war of all against all” follows and the strongest contender emerges as a new dictator. The difference between succession in dictatorships as described by the public choice literature (e.g., Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Tullock 1987) and succession in modern presidential regimes lies in the fact that the latter is legitimated by elections. Often described as electoral authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2002), these, unlike democratic regimes, in which ex ante electoral uncertainty is one of the inherent features of democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997), are designed to prevent electoral defeats through fraud or intimidation of the opponents (Schedler 2002, 37).

It is important to explore how succession is arranged in presidential regimes in modern developing countries that either could or could not be dictatorships, but that have elections, however unfree the latter could be. When incumbents step down for whatever reason, elections are supposed to facilitate an orderly succession by conferring legitimacy on the new ruler. These electoral authoritarian regimes oscillate between democracy and dictatorship, and can gravitate to either, or remain in between. The outcomes of succession impact on their future democratic development.

The issue of succession is the most severe problem for dictatorships throughout recorded history and the hereditary succession is the most stable form of succession for dictatorships (Egorov and Sonin 2005; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Tullock 1987). A dictator cannot appoint his successor in advance without undermining his own authority. If it were, everyone would coordinate around the latter and then the first position would be endangered (Burling 1974).

In the seminal paper on authoritarian regimes, Geddes (1999) focused on the behavioral incentives of elites in non-democratic regimes and analyzed their stability and breakdown as the functions of elite splitting and unity. She also found that single-party and personalist regimes were more resilient than military ones:

In normal times the members of a ruling personalist clique have little reason to desert their leader or oppose the regime. We should expect to see elite desertions of the regime only if rents and opportunities can no longer be distributed to supporters or if the leader loses control over the security apparatus and armed forces, thus reducing the risk of plotting his overthrow. Loss of control or the ability to distribute benefits can happen for various reasons, but one obvious and usually insurmountable reason for loss of control is the death or physical incapacity of the leader. Dead and incapacitated leaders are replaced in all political systems, but the demise of the leader does not usually end other kinds of authoritarianism. Because control of the armed and security forces is usually concentrated in the dictator's hands in personalistic regimes, however, his death or incapacity often reduces the risks of opposition (Geddes 1999, 15-16).

Likewise, Huntington (1991) predicted that as long the ruler remained in power, transitions were not very likely in personalist regimes:

Personalist regimes are also relatively immune to internal splits, except when calamitous economic conditions disrupt the material underpinnings of regime loyalty. They tend to collapse when the leader dies, however, whether of natural causes or assassination, and they are more likely to end in bloody upheaval of one kind or another than either of the other types of authoritarianism (Huntington 1991, 120-121).

Many of these regimes have term limits, as I described in previous sections of this thesis. Succession often creates uncertainty, and many democratic openings occur during succession, when the incumbent does not run. In the majority of cases, the inherent uncertainty of succession triggered infighting and political instability. When Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi decided not to participate in the 2002 elections and obey term limits, he designated Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor. The absence of the incumbent running made the president himself and the regime insiders less motivated to spend large amounts of money on the electoral campaign and led to splits within the governing party, KANU, among those who wanted to choose their own presidential candidate and those standing by the incumbent's choice (Howard and Roessler 2006; Throup 2003). Presidential succession in Zambia was even messier, with two former vice presidents — Godfrey Miyanda and Genenarl Christon Tembo — running against another former vice president, Mwanawasa, who was selected as the governing party's presidential candidate for the 2001 elections (Burnell 2001). Similarly, despite appointing his Prime Minister as his successor in

Ukraine in 2004, President Leonid Kuchma failed to transfer his enormous powers to the former and remained in firm control until his departure. The united and strong opposition increased the costs of suppression, while regime elites became split between supporters of the designated successor and those that hesitated up until the last moment. This ultimately led to a democratic breakthrough in Ukraine.

Thus, I put forward the following hypothesis:

- H_1 : *Successors are more likely to lose elections than incumbents.* The corollary of this hypothesis is that I expect successors to gain a lower number of votes than incumbents, all things being equal.

The very uncertainty of elections creates focal point for societal coordination and enables the horizontal communication that is needed for the collective action (Barzel 2002). In turn, this sudden collective action during electoral contests often produces the so-called “stunning elections” phenomenon (Huntington 1991, 175-80; Markoff 1996, 113-4; Thompson and Kuntz 2004).

The absence of a long-standing ruler compounds uncertainty and increases the probability of democratic change through the following process. Firstly, rulers are at their weakest in the initial period in office (Bienen and Van der Walle 1991), when they still have to prove their strength, neutralize challengers, accumulate resources for their coalitions and gain experience in office. Designated successors are about to live through this dangerous period and hence are more vulnerable than longer-serving rulers. Secondly, in the absence of strong institutions in personalist presidential regimes (later on I also check whether hegemonic parties ease the costs of succession), rewards and the access to rents depend on the access to a leader (Bates 2001; Geddes 1999). If some elite groups are not confident in their continuing access to rents under the new ruler, or unsure of a new ruler’s ability to provide rents, they are likely to designate an alternative candidate instead, or even place bets on several likely winners. Thirdly, ambitious politicians could feel they are capable of defeating a weaker candidate and gaining office for themselves, something that they would not dare under the old ruler. For example, politicians that failed to obtain a party presidential nomination represented very serious threat to hegemonic party regime in Mexico (Magaloni 2006, 258). In turn, elite splits will compound the electoral uncertainty and increase chances for regime’s defeat. Finally, elite splits and succession could affect the chances for democratic change indirectly, via easing the collective action and breaking the apathy of a population through the novelty effects of new candidates.

Why would this process necessarily lead to a democratic transition? The incumbents or their designated successors, as representatives of the status quo (stability of partly- or non-democratic regime), run against the opposition that, in turn, challenges this status quo. Most of the time, and especially after the end of the Cold War this challenge came from the groups espousing democratic values rather than socialist, nationalist or pro-independence creeds, like they did in earlier periods (McFaul 2002; Przeworski in Munck and Snyder 2007).²

If designated successors are more likely to lose, then the absence of incumbents can be seen as the cause of democratic change during elections. However, if rulers step down because they simply cannot run, then their absence is the result of increasing regime democratization rather than its cause. While some presidents do not face restrictions on the number of terms they can serve (Syria, Egypt), the majority face term limits and have to step down. However, many term-bound presidents extend their terms and proceed to win elections: for example, in Uganda in 2005, Belarus in 2004, Gabon in 2003 or Togo in 2002. These rulers did not designate successors, elite splits were absent and democratic change did not occur. If these rulers had stepped down and initiated succession, the likelihood of transition would have gone up only because of their absence, as argued above.

The absence of incumbents, however, is also a manifestation of the overall regime liberalization. Presidential succession causes elite splits but it also, as described by an observer of the Ghanaian politics in the beginning of this chapter, changes the expectations about the likely electoral outcomes and the overall political environment. On average, the Freedom House civil liberties index in a two-year period before an “incumbent” election is 5.1 and with “successor” it is 4.2, where higher values represent less open environment. If ruler steps down, he or she does not subvert the constitutional process by extending the term, which also contributes to

²McFaul (2002) posed the question: why were the challengers democrats and not fascists or communists? As a plausible hypothesis he proposed that the origins of democracy as the ideology of opposition could be understood if one took into account the balance of ideologies in the international system at the time (1980-90s). “The enemies of communism called themselves democracies. Therefore, the challengers to communism within these regimes adopted the ideological orientation of the international enemies of their internal enemies.” (ibid, 228). Likewise, Adam Przeworski contemplated that after the disastrous experience with the military dictatorships in Latin America, the opposition (the left) came to realize the importance of democracy as the value in itself (Przeworski cited in Munck and Snyder, 2007 forthcoming, 24). Similar argument was advanced by Castaneda (1993). It is less clear, however, whether the challengers to the status quo in the Muslim-majority countries espouse democratic ideas. While the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt or Algeria advocate for the democratic participation and freedoms, it remains to be seen whether these groups, should they acquire power, will reconcile their demands for Islamic state with modern democracy, or subvert it.

overall liberalization, for which I account in the empirical section of this chapter. It is also in the interests of the departing ruler to leave office for a more democratic setting where his interests as a private citizen are not at the mercy of the all-powerful ruler to be. In this sense, while the absence of incumbent is both the cause of the electoral breakthrough and the manifestation of the overall democratization, it is the multifaceted process of presidential succession that causes democratic change directly and indirectly.

This leads us to a further hypothesis:

- H_2 : The fact of *successors running in elections (executive turnover) increases the probability of democratic transitions*. Since successors are more likely to lose than incumbents, and since they are most likely to lose to the opposition groups espousing democratic ideas, the fact whether an incumbent runs or not affects the probability of successful democratic transition.

What conditions might allow succession to take place in a more mannered fashion? In the first half of the XXth century, only a few rulers managed their orderly succession in developing world (Herz 1952). However, succession does not always have to be unruly. Sometimes it proceeds smoothly as a successor consolidates his or her power and becomes a new incumbent (e.g., Russia 2000, Syria 2000, Azerbaijan 2003). The paradigmatic case of a long-standing regime with an orderly presidential succession is Mexico. Indeed, while Mexico has remained non-democratic for most of the 20th century, its presidents were replaced every six years. Castaneda (2000) described how Mexican presidents chose their successors in a process called the *dedazo* (the finger tap): the former picked the ruler to be at will, so that the incumbents were the only ‘voters’ deciding on the next president among members of the cabinet, the population at large was only presented with the opportunity to endorse the chosen candidates. The presidents guarded their right to appoint their successors vigilantly and punished those aspiring politicians that made their wish to become the top executive public.

If the presidents possessed such broad powers over succession, why did not they remain incumbents and *dedazo* themselves instead? The reasons can be found in the political history of Mexican presidential office. Indeed, the Mexican revolution of 1910 was fought under the slogan “*suffragio efectivo, no re-election*” (“no re-election and the right to have votes effectively counted”) against the long-standing president Porfirio Diaz. The 1917 constitution banned presidential re-election. When president Alvaro Obregon (1920-24) avoided this ban, winning a second term, he was

subsequently assassinated in 1928. Following this, the Mexican elites established a new umbrella party, PRI, as a collective agreement to prevent one single individual from becoming dictator (Hall 1990). The assassination of Obregon created a powerful focal point for coordination against possible re-election attempts in the future (Magaloni 2006, 8). In other words, the all-powerful party, combined with the specific institutional agreement, placed insurmountable constraints on the executive should the latter decide to prolong his rule, and lowered the stakes of losing office. The incumbent could elect his successor on his own on the basis of the affinity with the latter, and the hegemonic party, PRI, with its long horizon, together with the specific institutional agreement as described above, placed insurmountable constraints on the executive should the latter decide to prolong his rule, lowered the stakes of losing office, and, by making regime elites into stakeholders of the status quo, largely prevented the splits during succession.

Brownlee (2004) focused on regime stability and breakdown as functions of elite unity and defections, which, in turn, depended on whether ruling political parties were capable of mediating inter-elite conflicts. Magaloni (2006) and Smith (2005) explored the determinants of stability of hegemonic party regimes and found that hegemonic parties mediated elite conflicts and perpetuated these regimes beyond the lives of individual rulers.

We can state these propositions in our third hypothesis:

- *H₃: Hegemonic parties reduce probability of democratic transition during presidential succession.*

Earlier in Chapter 4 I theorized that strong institutional constraints would make easier for a ruler to step down. Strong institutions with long time horizons, such as hegemonic parties, would make elite contracting easier and make incumbents be less concerned about their post tenure fate. If we can find that the presence of hegemonic parties makes the defeat of successors, and the probability of transition to democracy less likely, then this finding will provide an additional empirical support for the stipulated theory: incumbents rulers will find it easier to step down because they are assured of the victory of their designated successors by the presence of strong parties, and the latter could also guarantee that the next president would abide by the agreement with the previous ruler and do not jeopardize his post tenure fate.

Finally, I investigate the reasons for the absence of incumbents in elections. If incumbents do not run because of sickness, death or the previous overthrow from

power, then succession is the only option available to regime elites and tenure restrictions have nothing to do with democratic transitions. If, however, incumbents step down because of term limits, self-imposed or otherwise, then it could suggest that tenure restrictions constitute an important institution that facilitates the executive turnover and policy change, and prevents the possibility of a further sliding into authoritarianism through the inherent logic of the self-perpetuating power.

This leads to the final hypothesis:

- *H₄: Term limits constitute the main reason why incumbent presidents step down.*

To sum it up, elite splits are almost always precipitate transition to democracy. Presidential succession often generates these splits, as elites are less likely to split under a long-standing ruler than under designated successor. Since the process of presidential succession introduces uncertainty about the distribution of power in society and the likely election outcomes not unlike in the event of the incapacity or death of the personalist ruler (Geddes 1999, Huntington 1991), I investigate whether democratic transitions are more likely during presidential succession than when the incumbent presents himself for re-election. The fact whether incumbent or his successor runs in elections affects the probability of democratic change: successors are more likely to lose than incumbents and they do so to the pro-democratic opposition. I also expect that the presence of hegemonic parties mitigates these effects.

In other words, transition in power is likely to lead to the democratic transition. Transition in power (succession) creates uncertainty along the chain of command and the society at large. Democratic transitions “grow” on uncertainty, they arise out of uncertainty about the distribution of power in society, and once uncertainty about regime capabilities and resolve, the authority of a successor, sets in, the public opinion cascades ensue and many regimes previously seen as very stable collapse almost overnight (Kuran 1995, Colomer 2000).³ Finally, I examine whether term limits is important reason for the absence of incumbents at elections.

³For example, by early 1970s the Spanish society became ready for the democratic change, as demonstrated by the public and elite attitudes, yet the status quo persisted until the death of General Franco, the powerful long-serving incumbent. Once Franco was out of scene, the status quo rapidly disintegrated.

6.2.1 Domestic and International Determinants of Transitions to Democracy

I define incumbents as presidents that have been in office for at least one year prior to elections. Successors are presidential candidates from the same party as presidents, relatives, or all those designated as successors and/or campaigned for by the departing presidents. In all but three elections analyzed in this chapter I was able to identify designated successors. The exceptions are cases in which incumbent presidents were ousted in coups or were forced to resign and thus neither participated in elections nor designated successors. Prime Ministers, Vice Presidents or other officials of the incumbent regime that run for the presidency are defined as successors.

In order to investigate the impact of incumbency on the probability of democratic transitions, and to control for other determinants, I build upon a model from a recent paper by Howard and Roessler (2006) that investigates the occurrences of so-called liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes.⁴ Their paper takes into account both the actor-driven and structural parameters that are likely to influence democratic transitions. Crucially, one of the parameters in their model is the incumbent turnover — whether an incumbent is present at elections or not.

Their sample contains 50 elections held in parliamentary and presidential electoral autocracies in the period of 1990-02. Howard and Roessler operationalize competitive autocracies by excluding those countries that received Freedom House (henceforth *FH*)’s score of 2 or lower (democracies) — indeed, democracies do not need to democratize — on the one hand, and those with the worst *FH*’s score of 7 (“closed” autocracies), and also those where the winning party or candidate received over 70 per cent of the vote, on the other hand (ibid, 368). That is, the authors focus on “competitive”, and exclude “hegemonic” authoritarian regimes, since the probability of a liberalizing election in the latter regimes is rather minimal, as they argue. They also exclude foundational elections. Some of the elections occur in the same country twice or even three times. The dependent variable is liberalizing electoral outcome (increases in the levels of democracy scores in election year: at least by 1 on *FH* score and by 3 on Polity score).

I build upon this dataset in the following manner. Firstly, I exclude elections in non-presidential regimes (e.g., Albania, Singapore and Malaysia). Secondly, to the

⁴I would like to thank Marc M. Howard for generously sharing these data.

35 presidential elections held in 1990-2002 I add 55 more elections from 1990-2004. The modified data include 90 elections in all presidential regimes, even those with incumbents gaining more than 70 per cent of votes (I also estimate excluding “hegemonic” elections, separately). The sample now includes hegemonic authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The reason behind the inclusion is twofold. Firstly, the opposition might boycott certain elections, which would inflate executive vote shares but does not necessarily render such regimes uncompetitive. For example, in 1996 elections in Zimbabwe the incumbent Mugabe gained 92.8 per cent after two main contenders withdrew from the race in protest. Later, in the 2002 election, Mugabe gained 56.2 per cent, even though the *FH* democracy scores deteriorated from 5 in 1996 to 6 in 2002. Secondly, the 70 per cent cut point is rather arbitrary. Kyrgyzstan was not included in Howard and Roessler’s (2006) study, yet President Akayev, who gained 74.5 per cent in 2000 elections (above the 70 per cent threshold), was subsequently ousted after the 2005 elections in a splendid example of a liberalizing electoral outcome. The presidential succession of 2003 in Azerbaijan nearly resulted in another liberalizing electoral outcome despite its high executive vote margins.

These broader criteria, however, leads to the inclusion of several non-competitive plebiscite “elections” (Syria, Egypt), where the chances for democratic breakthrough are minuscule. I also estimate the sample of elections below 75 per cent margins separately. Also, I match the executive turnover with leaders at the time of elections and identify incumbents and their designated successors. There are only three elections with both incumbents and their designated successors absent (following military coups). I examine every election and report the name of the incumbent and successor (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006), as well as their electoral performance. Variable definitions and data sources are described in appendix.

Thus, I re-estimate and re-specify the Howard and Roessler (2006) model, focusing on succession in presidential regimes, and add hegemonic party and international democracy diffusion variables. I also estimate an OLS regression, with votes cast for incumbent/successor as the dependent variable and using a number of new parameters that are likely to affect the vote.

The liberalizing electoral outcome is a function of whether a successor or an incumbent runs (*Successor*), opposition unity (*Opposition coalition*), the average number of anti-governmental demonstrations in year prior to election and election year (*Opposition mobilization*), economic factors (*Growth*), international and global

factors (*FDI* flows and *Foreign Aid* per capita, both averaged as above), *Democracy* as the regime's average *FH* civil liberties score for the two years prior to the election; *Prior Liberalization*: whether regimes experienced changes on democracy score 5 years prior to elections. I refer the reader to Howard and Roessler (2006) article for a more detailed discussion (ibid, 370-74). Their major explanatory variable is the *Unity of the Opposition*. Thus, the model includes actor-centered parameters, as well as economic and political structural factors and is well-suited to test the impact of presidential succession on democratic transition while controlling for other parameters.

The diffusion of ideas and policies across borders is a topic that has been of concern to social sciences in the past several decades and has recently been tackled by political methodologists.⁵ In a recent paper on diffusion of democracy, Gleditsch and Ward (2006) employ a battery of parameters to measure diffusion, such as the proportion of democracies locally and globally, as well as democratic transitions locally.

To account for the demonstration effects of "stunning elections", I add two new variables: *Regional Liberalization* and *Regional Transitions*. I count the number of liberalizing outcomes in the region, 3 years prior to election.⁶ Clearly, the opposition's efforts to mobilize and win elections in one country were triggered and mobilized by the successful efforts in other countries; the opposition activists traveled and shared their methods and practices, international donor programs were designed according to the successfully implemented ones, etc.⁷ (Carothers 2003; McFaul 2005).

Figure 6.1 is a two-by-two matrix that plots the occurrence of democratic transitions depending on whether incumbent or successor is present in elections. Four elections in quadrants are included for illustrative purposes. In 67 elections, or 74 per cent of cases, incumbents run in elections, and in 23 elections (26 per cent) incumbents do not run for one reason or another. As can be seen, when an incumbent runs, a liberalizing electoral outcome occurs in only 12 per cent of elections (8 cases) in presidential regimes (1990-2004). In contrast, democratic breakthrough occurs in 52 per cent of elections (12 cases) in which an incumbent does not run.

⁵Beck et al. 2006; Cederman and Gleditsch 2004; Darmofal 2006; Franzese and Hays 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2000, 2006; O'Loughlin et al. 1998.

⁶Regional groups are West Africa, Middle Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Middle East and North Africa, CEE/NIS, Central America, South America, and Asia

⁷For example, see *Washington Post*. 2003, November 25. Tbilisi's "Revolution of Roses" Mentored by Serbian Activists: Foes of Milosević Trained Georgians, (by Peter Baker) Page A22.

Figure 6.1: Incumbency and Democratic Transitions

	11 elections* (48 per cent)	12 elections (52 per cent)
SUCCESSOR	Malawi 2004	Ghana 2001
INCUMBENT	Uganda 2001	Senegal 2000
	59 elections (88 per cent)	8 elections** (12 per cent)
	NO	LIBERALIZING ELECTORAL OUTCOME YES

*Even though the executive turnover and no transition were observed, in 3 cases successors either lost or there were no successors. In Guinea-Bissau following the coup neither incumbent Veiera nor his successor participated in elections. In Guatemala of 1990 designated successor Cabrera Hidalgo did not even get past the first round. In Iranian elections of 1997 president Rafsanjani stepped down and his conservative 'successor' lost to the 'reformist' candidate Khatami. If we discard these 3 cases, the proportion goes down to 35 per cent (8 elections) **In Peru 2000 the incumbent Fujimori ran for a third term, and, proper speaking, won. He was subsequently ousted in a series of post-election protests. The 'Rose revolution' in Georgia in 2003 followed the parliamentary elections in which incumbent did not run. In Ghana in 1996 the opposition made advances in the legislative elections, yet the incumbent president Rawlings won the presidential contest that same year, so this case is not an incumbent's defeat as such. If we leave out these 3 cases, the proportion changes to 8 per cent (5 elections).

Figure 6.2: Incumbents and Successors: Descriptive Statistics




Figure 6.2 provides another view of the relationship between transitions and the identity of the ruler at elections. As can be seen, on average, two pre-electoral years are more authoritarian (higher scores, and, hence lower levels, of Democracy, *FH*) in cases in which incumbents ran and won. This parameter differs from other 3 categories, including cases of successors running and winning, by 1 point on a seven-point *FH* scale. It suggests that democratic transitions are driven not only by the elite splits during succession, but also by the overall degree of authoritarianism, how closed the regimes are.

Also, incumbents, whether winning or losing, gain more votes in the first and or only round, than successors. Comparing vote shares, we can see that even if incumbents lose, they still gain 7 per cent more than losing successors, and when the former win, they perform better by 11 per cent, than winning successors. Overall, incumbents obtain 68.6 (18) v. successors' 49.9 (21) per cent of popular vote in the first and/or only round. This difference could be attributed to the fact that successors do not enjoy the unquestionable support of the ruling coalitions as the longer-serving incumbents do and hence are weaker and thus gain fewer votes: because they cannot commit electoral fraud on a sufficiently large scale; or they lack resources to rally and buy their supporters or to provide goods for their winning

coalition; or because of unusually high international pressure.

While the size of fraud is difficult to estimate, the Database of Political Institutions, DPI (Beck et al. 2001) includes a variable coded as 1 if allegations of fraud were reported. On average, incumbents win 71.5 v. 66.1 per cent in fraudulent v. “clean” elections, while successors gain 49 in “clean” and only 43.8 per cent in fraudulent elections. While we should treat these data with caution, it could also indicate that successors are less adept at manipulating the ballot when there is uncertainty along the chain of command.

6.3 Model Estimation and Discussion

Models 1 – 4 are specified as logit regressions, with a binary dependent variable denoting democratic change or not. Model 5 is an OLS regression with per cent of votes cast for the executive (incumbent or his successor) in first and or only round (Beck et al. 2001) as the dependent variable. Models 1 – 3 are estimated on the same estimation sample. All four models are specified with robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors. Unit of analysis is election.

The first, “base” model follows the specification in the original Howard and Roessler (2006) article, extending the sample to 90 elections in presidential regimes, with robust (cluster (geographic regions)-adjusted) standard errors. Like in their estimation, the unity of the opposition, incumbent turnover and mobilization have statistically significant effects. In fact, in all three logit models (1 – 3), when *Successor* runs instead of incumbent, the probability of democratic change increases. Likewise, when the opposition is united, the probability increases in all three specifications. Economic growth exerts a negative influence on democratic transitions: economic performance helps to sustain regimes in power the world over (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 302-9). Likewise, low levels of democracy reduce the chances for change — no doubt, democratic breakthrough was much more likely in Ukraine of 2004, with democracy levels of 4 (on a seven-point scale, with the 7 being the worst score), than in neighboring Belarus with its score of 6.

Models Two and Three are estimated on the basis of the same sample of 90 elections in presidential regimes (1990-2004). In Model Two I test the impact of the hegemonic party on electoral outcomes. Clearly, the presence of the hegemonic

Table 6.1: Democratic Transitions During Elections in Presidential Regimes

	Logit	Regression	(1 - 4)	OLS (5)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	
	Base	with	with Party	Excluding	
	Model	Party	& Diffusion	votes > .75	
				Model 5	
				Vote Share	
				(OLS)	
Successor	2.377*** (.599)	3.080*** (.920)	2.919*** (.766)	2.888*** (.586)	-8.190** (1.636)
Opp. Coalition	1.983** (.870)	2.257** (.962)	1.719** (.723)	1.948*** (.705)	-3.908 (2.884)
Opp. Mobilization	.462*** (.066)	.365*** (.048)	.162 (.163)	.223 (.343)	-1.336 (1.055)
Growth	-.049* (.030)	-.075** (.025)	-.103** (.032)	-.123* (.048)	.419** (.155)
Foreign Aid	.001 (.007)	.003 (.006)	.008 (.009)	.001 (.006)	-.021 (.032)
FDI	-.102 (.117)	-.138 (.184)	-.118 (.161)	-.039 (.074)	-.012 (.203)
Democracy (FH)	-.702** (.356)	-.873** (.349)	-.670** (.293)	-.397* (.233)	6.341** (1.610)
Prior Liberalization	.447 (.713)	.239 (.742)	.530 (.824)	.700 (.825)	-
Hegemonic Party	-	-2.044** (.951)	-2.138** (.934)	-2.375** (.895)	2.066 (2.270)
Regional Transitions	-	-	.928** (.386)	.893** (.438)	-
Regional Liberalization	-	-	-.749 (.714)	-.489 (.765)	-
Previous Vote	-	-	-	-	.376** (.075)
Political Constraints	-	-	-	-	-12.224 (11.493)
Electoral Fraud	-	-	-	-	1.906 (2.863)
Intercept	-.073 (1.395)	1.014 (1.266)	3.109 (3.276)	1.126 (3.541)	11.661 (11.037)
N	90	90	90	60	90
Log-Likelihood	-29.195	-26.495	-24.003	-21.703	F = 22.71
Pseudo R^2	.39	.44	.50	.43	$R^2 = .62$

Models 1 - 4 estimate the probability of democratic transition during elections, 1990-2004, logit regression, with robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors. Model 5 estimates the vote share cast for incumbent or successor in first/only round, OLS regression, with robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors. *Significant at .1 level, **significant at .05 level, *** significant at .01 level. Robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors in parentheses. Adjustments are made for within-region correlation, regions are specified as follows: West Africa, Middle Africa, East Africa, South Africa, Middle East and North Africa, NIS/CEE, Central America, South America, Asia.

party reduces the chances for democratic change. The effects of *Successor* remain significant, however, whether the former runs in a hegemonic-party regime or not. In Model Three I add two “diffusion” parameters, indicating overall regional levels of democracy and instances of democratic transitions in the region. Clearly, demonstration effects do seem to be at work: the *Regional Transitions* variable is positively significant, indicating that successful “stunning” elections in the region affect the probability of similar elections nearby. Interestingly enough, preceding transitions in the region seem to cancel the effects of preceding mobilization in the country — the effects of this variable become insignificant. The overall degree of *Regional Liberalization* does not affect democratic change, however. I perform the likelihood-ratio test on these three models and the results indicate that the prediction is improved with each new specification. Model 4 is estimated on a more “democratic sample” — elections in which winners obtain less than 75 per cent. As can be seen, the latter estimation produces results very similar to the more inclusive models.

Finally, I employ OLS regression (Model Five) in order to test whether successors are expected to obtain fewer votes. In this model I include all variables from Model Two apart from *Prior Liberalization*. If binary models are capable of predicting whether regime elites win or lose, the OLS model with a similar specification should predict votes cast for the incumbents/successors. If the latter obtain less than 50 per cent in majoritarian elections, they lose. I expect successors to obtain fewer votes, the unity of opposition should decrease votes cast for regime representative, growth should improve vote shares, and lower democracy scores should be associated with the larger shares.

In the OLS regression model (5) I also included several variables that are expected to influence votes cast: *Political Constraints* (Henisz 2002), *Fraud* (Beck et al. 2005) and vote cast for the executive in previous elections (*Previous Vote*). Political constraints make it more difficult to commit fraud and amass large margins. They also account for the overall institutionalization (yet they also are correlated with *Democracy*). Reported fraud indicates that votes margins are probably inflated. Votes cast in the past election are included for two reasons: to control for the typical executive vote in a country as an additional control for the degrees of democracy, and also because regime elites coordinate election returns on the basis of past performance so as not to look weaker than in the past. The ratio of votes cast to votes cast in previous election is 1.03; for incumbents it is 1.1 and for successors it is 0.85: overall, the executives tend to gain more in each consecutive elections, while successors gain less than the outgoing rulers. Simpser (2005) and Magaloni (2006)

explain possible reasons behind amassing large margins of victory: to discourage opposition supporters from voting, establish and signal a long-term dominance and co-opt the opposition. Large margins can also result from the competition between regional operators as to who could deliver the largest vote, etc.⁸

Results of Model 5 indicate that *Previous Vote* affects the proportion of votes cast for incumbent at present, *Democracy* is also highly significant: more dictatorial rulers do gain more votes. *Economic Growth* is also conducive for gaining more votes in presidencies throughout the world. Likewise, the fact of *Successor* running decreases the vote share received by the representative of the regime.

Figure 6.3 visualizes results. I plot the predicted values of democratic transition during elections (*liberalizing electoral outcome, LEO*) and *Democracy* (Freedom House score, 2 years prior to elections, averaged), weighted by votes cast for incumbent/successor. Points filled with colour represent observations where democratic transitions actually occur. The graph shows that the probability of transition is lowest for big-vote-winning incumbents, they also tend to be more authoritarian. In both categories of incumbents and successors, there is a slight evidence of a mild negative relationship between levels of *Democracy* and probability. Evidently, the model predicts that incumbents will succeed.


Finally, holding all independent variables at their means, I calculate first differences to assess the influence of changes in parameters of interest on the probability of democratic breakthrough (Model 3) and calculate expected values for votes cast for the regime representatives (Model 5).⁹ Figure 4.6 plots the predicted changes in probabilities and values. The lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals, and all included parameters are statistically significant.

The overall probability that the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 is 8 percent (s.e. = 4) holding all predictors at their means. I find that all things being equal, the probability of transition increases by 34.8 per cent (s.e. = 15) when the incumbent does not run. Interestingly enough, when a successor runs in the hegemonic party regime, the former still increases the chances for change, but with less magnitude: by 13.3 per cent.

⁸As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1999 elections in Kazakhstan, regional governors responsible for rallying the voters to polling stations and ensuring required turnout, apparently competed against each other on who would be able to 'deliver' the highest vote for the president. As a result, Nazarbaev gained unprecedented 91.15 per cent of vote cast. One journalist rather appropriately called him 'Nursultan the Ninety-Two Percent.'


⁹See King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003.

Figure 6.3: Predicted Democratic Transitions, Incumbents and Successors



Plot of predicted values of democratic transition during elections and democracy (Freedom House averaged score, 2 years prior to elections), weighted by votes cast for incumbent/successor in first/only round, based on the results of Model 3. Points filled with colour represent observations where democratic transitions actually occur. If they are located above .5 probability line, they are deemed to be predicted correctly. Larger circles represent larger vote shares, in [23, 99] interval. The graph shows that the probability of transition is lowest for big-vote-winning authoritarian incumbents. The model predicts 13 transitions correctly, and fails to predict 7. Overall, the model predict 88 per cent of observations correctly ($p > .5$ and transition; $p < .5$ and no transition).

Figure 6.4: Simulated Effects on the Dependent Variable



Simulated effects represent the change in the predicted probability of the dependent variable using Model 3 (predicted probabilities of democratic transition) and Model 5 (expected values of votes cast for president/successor in first/only round), given changes in particular predictors. For example, the fact of successor running in elections (rather than incumbent) increases predicted probability of democratic change by 34.8 per cent. However, when incumbent runs in the hegemonic party regime, it increases the probability by only 13 per cent. Likewise, incumbent is expected to obtain 8 per cent more than successor, but successors hegemonic party system gain 3 more than successors in regular regimes.

Also, the shift from the closed authoritarian regime to electoral democracy (from 7 to 2.5 on *Democracy* scale in 2 years prior to election) results in the drop of probability of transition by 24 per cent. This is a rather extreme counterfactual scenario, as such significant improvement can hardly occur. Note, however, that Benin democratized very rapidly: from FH = 7 in 1989 to 2.5 in 1991. There is no surprise that during this opening the incumbent president Kerekou suffered defeat at elections. Likewise, successful democratic breakthrough in the region gives the boost for democratization in this region by 5.5 per cent, but 3 successful “stunning” elections in a row increase it by 31 per cent. Indeed, electoral revolutions in Slovakia 1998, Croatia 1999, Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was inspired by successes of their neighbors.¹⁰ All things being equal, incumbency gives additional 8.3 per cent of votes in a first round. Comparing successors’ performance in hegemonic and non-hegemonic party regimes, the former are expected to gain 3 per cent more than the latter, however. And, returning to the case of large margins of victory in authoritarian regimes, the shift from the electoral democratic regime, e.g., Romania to the hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime, e.g., Syria, will increase the incumbent vote share by 31 per cent.¹¹

6.4 Incumbents, Successors and Democratic Transitions

In the theoretical section of this chapter, I proposed the hypotheses that successors are more likely to lose elections than incumbents and this fact increases the probability of democratic transitions. The results of my statistical analyses support these hypotheses: successors gain a smaller proportion of votes than incumbents, and their participation in election increases the chances of democratic transition. Indeed, when an incumbent runs, breakthrough occurs in only 12 per cent of such elections (8) and does not occur in 88 per cent (59). When a successor runs, a liberalizing outcome occurs in 52 per cent (12) and does not occur in 48 per cent (11).

¹⁰E.g., *Eurasian Daily Monitor*. 2004, October 13. “Ukrainian Authorities Target Student Youth Election-Monitoring Groups” 1 (104).

¹¹See Simpser 2005, Magaloni 2006 for the possible reasons behind these large margins of victory: to discourage opposition supporters from voting, establish and signal a long-term dominance and co-opt the opposition. It can also result from the competition between the regional operators as to who could deliver the largest vote, etc.

The hypotheses stipulated in the beginning of this chapter predicted that the incumbents should win and successors lose. Since we live in a probabilistic world, the quadrants representing these outcomes in Figure 6.1 are not empty. In an ideal world, every time an incumbent runs, there is no democratic change, and every time a successor runs, there is a change. In other words, the upper left and the lower right quadrants of this figure should be empty. In order to test under what conditions theory does not hold, in this section I focus on outliers: elections when incumbents run and lose, and successors run and win.

Also, I stipulated hypothesis 4 that the term limits constitute the main reason why incumbent presidents step down. It is interesting to know the reasons as to why the incumbents did not run in all these 23 elections, whether liberalizing outcomes occurred or not. In this section I focus on the outliers: elections when incumbents run and lose, and successors run and win. I also investigate the reasons as to why successors run rather than incumbents and whether term limits is the reason behind it.

Incumbents Run and Lose

Incumbents run and lose only in 12 per cent of cases in the sample (8 out of 67). A closer look at these elections could reveal what it takes to defeat a standing incumbent in elections in the developing world. I discard three cases in which presidents either did not participate in elections or did not lose, even though democratic change occurred (see note to Figure 6.1). Altogether, five incumbent presidents lost: the incumbent president Ion Iliescu of Romania lost in 1996 (only to regain office in 2000); President Ortega of Nicaragua lost re-election in 1990 (the only Latin American “re-election loser” according to Cheibub and Przeworski 1999) — only to return to office in 2006; in Benin the multiparty elections were introduced after a long one-party rule and incumbent Kerekou quite unexpectedly failed to win the first round of 2001 presidential elections and lost in the second round (to return to office in 1996) (Decalo 1997); Slobodan Milošević of Yugoslavia lost in 2000 in a democratic revolution (“Serbian October”), and President Abdou Diouf of Senegal lost to Abdoulaye Wade in 2000.

The defeats of Milošević in Serbia and of Diouf in Senegal indicate that long-standing incumbents are extremely difficult to unseat. In the latter case, Diouf has won 4 re-elections as a president with an unlimited mandate since 1981, yet each time with smaller margins. Finally, in 2000 he lost. “Many analysts were predicting that Diouf would prevail again, with Wade being confirmed as the eternal front-

runner among the challengers” (Ottaway 2003, 101). In February of 2000 Diouf was able to win the first round of the presidential election, yet he was unable to garner the necessary majority of the popular vote required to prevent a run-off election. It is very likely that if incumbents fail to win a first round, they fail to win the second, as their failure mobilizes their opposition and signals their weakness — the opposition became united for a second round only after Diouf failed to win in a first round. The former minister Niassa joined the second-runner Wade in exchange for the promise of a prime ministerial post. Through a series of political arrangements in the opposition camp and following a series of protests, the opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade was finally able to defeat President Diouf in a second round.

While these cases indicate that incumbents are not immune to losing, these are also examples of the extraordinary efforts that are necessary to unseat the standing presidents: all five cases can be counted as “watershed” or “stunning” elections (Huntington 1991). It is easier to defeat successors. One can also view transitions in these elections as the result of the accumulation of random hazards (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) — the long-standing rulers could have failed because they encountered more problems and made more errors than usual — in other 59 elections, incumbents prevail.

Table 6.2 in appendix lists all elections in presidential regimes in the sample, incumbency status (incumbency), as well as the identities of leaders at the time of elections.

Incumbents Do Not Run, Successors Win

There are 11 elections recorded as successors running and winning (the upper left quadrant). I discard three cases in which either there were no successors or they lost, even if not to the pro-democratic opposition (see note to Figure 6.1).

There are eight elections (out of 23, or 35 per cent), which successors won. In 2 cases the designated successors had a very early start and consolidated their power base in advance and managed to prevent possible elite splits during succession. In Russia an aging and highly unpopular President Yeltsin appointed Prime Minister Putin as his designated successor in 1999 well in advance of the forthcoming 2000 poll. Then Yeltsin retired three months prior to the 2000 elections so that Putin became the *de facto* president for the crucial pre-election period, and was able to consolidate his power base. In Azerbaijan in 2003, a terminally ill incumbent president, Heidar Aliev, began the electoral campaign, but then at the last moment

withdrew in favor of his son, Ilham. Having a designated successor prevented elite splits and uncertainty. Like in Russia, Aliev junior had an unusually early start and had been a de facto incumbent president prior to the vote. Elites were assured that the status quo would remain not only by the family ties between the rulers, but also by the presence of the hegemonic party.

Together with Azerbaijan in 2003, Syria in 2000 represents another case of dynastic succession, in which Bashar Al-Asad succeeded his father, endorsed by a plebiscite. After the sudden death of the designated successor, his son Basil in 1994, President Hafiz al-Asad prepared his younger son, Bashar, ophthalmologist with no political or military experience whatsoever, to become his successor instead. President al-Asad avoided dealing with contenders for his successors directly and instead lulled them into belief that he was not against their plans, and then, when they reached the legal retirement age, forced them into retirement. Instead, Bashar was carefully groomed and assumed the task of brigade commander, then colonel, and then had a series of diplomatic appointments in order to build up his public image (Zisser 2007, 28-35). Upon the death of President Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000, Bashar was quickly promoted to the commander of the armed forces and field-marshal, appointed as secretary-general of the ruling Ba'th party and the member of its highest bodies, then chosen as the presidential candidate and swiftly approved by the parliament and referendum. Like in Azerbaijan, the transfer of power was rapid and smooth, and the ruling elite did not get split. The editor of the leading newspaper, Turki al-Sadr, proclaimed:

Bashar has inherited the wisdom, courage and political acumen of the leader Hafiz al-Asad, and is the most suitable candidate to steer the ship of the homeland at a time when it faces dangers and challenges and sails in stormy seas (quoted in Zisser 2007, 40).

Likewise, in five more elections presidential succession was facilitated by a strong hegemonic party (Mexico 1994, Malawi 2004, Djibouti 1999, Mozambique 2004 and the Zambia 2001). I elaborated on Mexican exceptionalism and the stringent adherence to the no re-election rule in the theoretical section. In Mexico in 1994 president Salinas honored term limits and stepped down, like all Mexican presidents had done for 60 years prior to him. The election of Zedillo ensued, even though he was not the expected successor. In Djibouti, 82-year-old president Gouled stepped down in favor of his nephew, Gulleh, who promptly became the new ruler. The hegemonic People's Rally for Progress party ensured a smooth succession. Likewise, in Malawi,

having failed to extend his term, the outgoing president Muluzi appointed Bingu wa Mutharika, Minister of Economic Planning and Development and his opponent in 1999 presidential elections, as his successor for 2004 elections, which the latter won.¹² (VonDoepp 2005). In Mozambique president Chissano appointed Armando Guebuzo as his successor and the candidate from the ruling, Frelimo party, and stepped down, following the victory of Guebuzo.

In the Zambian elections of 2001 the outgoing President Chiluba did not support Mwanawasa, a former vice president, who was selected as the governing party, MMD's presidential candidate for 2001 elections. The splits within the ruling elite were so severe that two more former vice presidents, Godfrey Miyanda and General Christon Tembo, ran against each other and another former vice president, Mwanawasa (Burnell 2002). The designated successor was endorsed by the governing party, however, and prevailed.

In summary, out of eight cases of successors running and "winning" (no democratic change), six successors won elections with the help of the hegemonic parties and two were appointed well in advance, so that they could consolidate their early incumbency advantage. In fact, two were sons of the incumbent presidents (and a third one was a nephew, in addition to the presence of a hegemonic party). In all eight cases elite splits did not occur, successors remained in control, displaying all the characteristics of standing incumbents, and proceeded to win the elections. The opposition failed to coordinate the collective action and to mobilize for the "stunning elections." These exceptions suggest that under certain circumstances, successors do not have to lose and succession can proceed in an orderly manner. The process of presidential succession seems to be mitigated by the presence of strong hegemonic parties: institutions ensure the continuation of careers and policies of regime elites despite the uncertainty of executive turnover (Brownlee 2004). Strong, hegemonic parties are able to engineer the ex post elite contracting, and the early delegation of power that signals that successors are in control and de facto incumbents, facilitates presidential succession.

Incumbents Do Not Run: Reasons for Stepping Down

Incumbent turnover occurs, however, only if incumbents do not run for one reason or another. In the sample, 23 elections record executive turnover. Why did not incumbents run in these elections? Out of these 23 cases, 3 presidents were ousted in coups or forced to resign and could not run (for example, Vieira in Guinea-Bissau

¹²*Chronicle*. 2003, July 7. "Malawi: Dictatorship Defeated!"

in 1999 and President Ter-Petrosian in Armenia in 1998, when he was ousted in the in-house coup led by a group of officials headed by Prime-Minister Robert Kocharian, who consolidated his power base and proceeded to win presidential elections), 4 died in office (for example, Tudjman of Croatia died in 1999 shortly before 2000 elections and Heidar Aliev of Azerbaijan in 2003), 4 did not run even though they could stand (for example, Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan in 2000, or Ghuled of Djibouti who stepped down in favor of his nephew Guelleh in 1999), and 12 presidents stepped down because of term limits.

President Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana stepped down in 2000 facing self-imposed term limits. In 1994 in the Dominican Republic President Balaguer was re-elected for sixth term in a fraudulent elections, causing an intense period of political activity throughout the country by the opposing parties. As a result, the competing political parties signed a Pact for Democracy on reducing the long-serving President Balaguer's term of office from 4 to 2 years, setting early elections, and reforming the constitution. The opposition candidate won the 1996 elections. In Kenya 2002 president Daniel arap Moi obeyed his self-imposed term limits, and his designated successor lost to a pro-democratic candidate. Likewise, in Guatemala in 1995 the incumbent stepped down because of term limits, as well as his predecessor, president Cerezo of Guatemala in 1990. As described in the previous section, President Yeltsin of Russia stepped down in 1999 facing term limits, just as president Kuchma of Ukraine did in 2004, and Salinas and Zedillo of Mexico did in 1994 and 2000, respectively, and president Chissano of Mozambique did in 2004. The latter ruler told the Frelimo ruling party's Central Committee that he had taken his decision "out of respect for the democratic process."¹³ In Iranian elections of 1997 president Rafsanjani also honored term limits and did not run.

2 presidents clearly flirted with the idea of a third term, but in the end stepped down.¹⁴ In Zambia prior to 2001 elections president Chiluba launched a third term bid but lost facing a very strong opposition from the elite and society at large. The governing MMD party was split by the campaign, and the Vice-President and several ministers asked Chiluba to withdraw. His two successors lost to a pro-democratic candidate.¹⁵

¹³*Afrol News*. 2006, May 16. "Mozambique Avoids Third Term Crisis." http://www.afrol.com/News2001/moz009_hissano3term.htm.

¹⁴Proper speaking, almost all of these presidents themselves or through proxies raised the idea of a tenure prolongation. I will refer the reader to chapter 4 for the explanation of the prolongation strategies and outcomes during presidential succession.

¹⁵*Times of Zambia (Lusaka)*. 1998, October 13. "Will Chiluba Desire Another Third Term." 13 October 1998; *Monitor (Lusaka)*. 2000, April 13. "Succession Fever Hightens." Issue 101, April 7

In Malawi in 2002 president Muluzi proposed an amendment to Malawi's constitution that would have allowed him to run for a third term, but this attempt was abandoned due to widespread opposition against (VonDoepp 2005).¹⁶ Instead, the president endorsed Mutharika as the candidate of the presidential party UDF for 2004 elections, and the latter subsequently won. Muluzi himself remained the head of the party after elections. However, the post election events proved that the attempts of the president to prolong his rule were founded on the justified concerns about his post tenure fate. During Muluzi's tenure a controversial sale of foodstuffs to other countries occurred, followed by a drought that caused a famine in a country. The state coffers have never seen the proceeds from this sale and allegedly the former ended up on the accounts of Muluzi and his cronies. Soon after assuming a new office, his successor Mutharika initiated a corruption investigation against his predecessor¹⁷. Ex-President Muluzi reportedly said that he became disappointed after having lost influence over the new President and intimidated by the new anti-corruption campaign. A bitter power struggle has broken out.¹⁸

These 23 cases of presidential succession suggest that hypothesis 4 is correct: Term limits do constitute the main reason why incumbent presidents step down. In 52 per cent of cases incumbents did not run because of term limits, in 17 per cent they died in office, in 13 per cent there were neither clear incumbent nor successor and they represented the interim situations after military coups, and in 17 per cent rulers did not stand in elections for idiosyncratic reasons (for example, Ghouled of Djibouti was very old to run again). In many instances in which incumbents honored limits and stepped down, rulers attempted to prolong their rule but failed, and Chapter 4 previously focused on the determinants of succession strategies and outcomes. However, these rulers stepped and thereby increased chances for democratic change. In contrast, in a number of elections turnover did not occur because presidents scrapped restrictions: for example, in Gabon in 2003 or Togo in 2002. As a result, prospects for transitions remain grim in these societies.

- Thursday April 13, 2000.

¹⁶ *Chronicle*. 2003, July 7. "Malawi: Dictatorship Defeated!"

¹⁷ *Independent (Zambia)*. 2006, July 27. "Former President Held for Corruption Charges."

¹⁸ *Chronicle*. 2005, January 18. "Malawi's ex-President Muluzi "Should Be Arrested."

6.5 Conclusion

Clearly, the absence of incumbents is important for democratic transitions: it increases the probability of a successful democratic breakthrough by 35 per cent during elections in presidential regimes. Controlling for other factors, when incumbent presidents are absent, successors are more likely to lose elections. Thus, they obtain 8 per cent less than the longer-standing rulers irrespective of the degree of authoritarianism. Successors in hegemonic-party regimes tend to perform better, however. Because since 1990 partly- and non-democratic regimes are challenged by the pro-democratic opposition, rather than by the pro-Soviet, nationalist, fascist or other anti-system forces of the earlier periods, defeat at elections is very likely to lead to democratization.

The findings in this chapter indicate that we should not neglect the dynamics of succession in presidential regimes when we try to understand and predict democratic transitions. Using statistical analyses and a careful examination of all the outlier observations, I found that the stipulated hypotheses hold: presidential succession does increase the chances for democratic breakthrough in the developing world. The process of democratic transition thrives on uncertainty and elite splits. Presidential succession often triggers these splits and uncertainty, because successors are relatively weak and have yet to consolidate their incumbency advantage.

Incumbents decide between stepping down and prolonging the rule, when faced with term limits. Out of 23 incumbents that did not run, 12 (52 per cent) stepped down because of term limits, which suggests that term limits is the most important obstacle for re-election. If presidents do step down, the probability of democratic transition increases, as successors lose more often to the pro-democratic opposition — in 52 per cent of elections. In contrast, incumbents lose in only 12 percent per cent of elections. As the experience of battling with Milošević in 2000 and Abdu Diouf in 2000 suggests, defeating a standing incumbent is possible, but extremely difficult.

The conclusion is unequivocal: incumbency is crucial in forestalling democratic change. I found that the absence of incumbent at elections increases the probability of democratic breakthrough by 35 per cent, and that successors are expected to gain 8 per cent less than incumbents - the margin that could signal victory or defeat at elections.

Earlier in Chapter 4 I theorized that strong institutions (executive constraints)

would make a ruler more likely to step down because, firstly, it would be more difficult to launch an institutional change in order to extend his rule, and secondly, because strong institutions with long time horizons, such as hegemonic parties, would make elite contracting easier and make incumbents less concerned about their post tenure fate. Likewise, the affinity with designated successors also should decrease the costs of stepping down and the findings in Chapter 6 supported the theory as elaborated earlier in Chapter 4.

The succession behaviour and its outcomes have direct effects on the prospects of democracy in many developing countries. To measure the affinity between incumbents and their successors and to map this affinity to the outcomes of succession is an interesting project to study in the future. Likewise, the presence of hegemonic parties seems to reduce the uncertainty and costs of succession in presidential regimes. There are other possible factors influencing how succession interacts with transition. Magaloni stipulates that when presidential elections take place concurrently with legislative elections, stakes can be lower for incumbent elites because they can lose presidential office, but still retain legislative seats (Magaloni 2006, 231-233). Indeed, I find that 60 per cent of democratizing elections in this sample are concurrent (legislative and presidential), while only 40 per cent of regular elections are. Further studies should focus on the interaction of incentives and institutions during succession and study which institutions and elite pacts could ease the ex post contracting in order to ensure transition to and consolidation of democracy in developing world.

Appendix to Chapter 6

Variable Definitions and Data Sources

Democratic Change (Liberalizing Electoral Outcome) 1 if $\Delta\text{POLITY} \geq 3$ and $\Delta\text{FH} \geq 1$ (democratization) in election year, 55 new presidential elections are added to H&R data.

Vote share Per cent of votes in the 1st/only round, cast for incumbent/successor, DPI.

Successor 0 if incumbent, 1 if successor (incumbent does not run, or president served < 1 year prior to elections). Every effort was made to identify the designated successor in cases in which incumbents do not run. Table 2 in Appendix lists all incumbent presidents and their successors.

Opposition Coalition 1 if Opposition united, 0 otherwise. The author followed the coding by H&R, 55 new obs. are added.

Opposition Mobilization The average number of anti-governmental demonstrations, a year preceding elections and election year, added from Banks.

Growth GDP growth per capita, per cent, averaged 2 years prior to elections, WDI.

FDI FDI as per cent of GDP, averaged 2 years prior to elections, WDI.

Foreign Aid Aid per capita, averaged 2 years prior to elections, WDI.

Democracy Averaged FH civil liberties score, 2 years prior to elections, FH.

Prior Liberalization 0 if $\text{FH}_{t-5} \geq \text{FH}_{t-1}$, 1 otherwise, FH.

Hegemonic Party 1 if regime is hegemonic party autocracy at the time of the election, as coded in Magaloni (2006, 36–41): (1) regularized multiparty competition, (2) the chief executive and legislature are elected, (3) the incumbent held office for more than 20 y., (4) the ruling party never lost elections. I cross-check these regimes and add those coded as the single-party regimes in Smith (2005, 424).

Regional Transitions Number of transitions ($DV = 1$) in the region (West Africa, Middle Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Middle East and North Africa, CEE/NIS, Central America, South America, and Asia), 3 years prior to an election.

Regional Liberalization Averaged FH score in the region, year preceding election and election year.

Previous Vote Vote share cast for the winner of the previous elections, DPI.

Political Constraints *PolconIII*: the feasibility of policy change on the [0, 1] scale, where 0 is the unlimited authority, Henisz (2002).

Electoral Fraud *Fraud* reported in elections, yes (1) or no (0), DPI.

Data sources: H&R: Howard and Roessler (2006); FH: Freedom House (various years); DPI: Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001); WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank); GFD: Global Financial Data (GFD database); Banks: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2005).

Table 6.2: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions

Transition	Incumbency	Election	Leader	Vote Share	Prev. Leader
transition	incumbent	Benin 1991	Kerekou	27.2	
no	incumbent	Burkina Faso 1998	Campaore	87.5	
transition	successor	Cote d'Ivoire ¹ 2000	Guei	32.7	Bedie
no	incumbent	Gambia 1996	Jammeh	55.76	
no	incumbent	Gambia 2001	Jammeh	52.6	
transition	incumbent	Ghana 1996	Rawlings	58.3	
transition	successor	Ghana 2000	Atta-Mills	44.8	Rawlings
no	incumbent	Guinea 1998	Conte	56.1	
no	incumbent	Guinea 2003	Conte	95.6	
no	successor	Guinea-Bissau 1999 ²	Kumba Yala	56.11	Vieira
no	incumbent	Mauritania 1997	Taya	90.1	
no	incumbent	Mauritania 2003	Taya	66.7	
no	incumbent	Niger 2004	Tandja	40.7	
no	incumbent	Nigeria 2003	Obasanjo	61.8	
no	incumbent	Senegal 1993	Diouf	73	
transition	incumbent	Senegal 2000	Diouf	41.6	
no	incumbent	Sierra Leone 2002	Kabbah	70.1	
no	incumbent	Togo 1998	Eyadema	52.1	
no	incumbent	Togo 2003	Eyadema	57.8	
no	incumbent	CAR 1999	Patasse	51.6	
no	incumbent	Cameroon 1997	Biya	92.6	
no	incumbent	Cameroon 2004	Biya	75.2	
no	incumbent	Chad 2001	Deby	67.3	
no	incumbent	Congo 2002	Sassou-Nguesso	89.4	
no	incumbent	Eq. Guinea 1996	Obiang	99	

Continued on next page

Table 6.2: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions (continued)

Transition	Incumb.	Election	Leader	Vote Share	Prev. Leader
no	incumbent	Eq. Guinea 2002	Obiang	99	
no	incumbent	Gabon 1998	Bongo	51.18	
no	successor	Djibouti 1999	Guelleh	72.02	Gouled
no	incumbent	Kenya 1997	D. arap Moi	40.6	
transition	successor	Kenya 2002	Kenyatta	30.6	Moi
no	incumbent	Malawi 1999	Muluzi	52.4	
no	successor	Malawi 2004	Mutharika	35.9	Muluzi
no	incumbent	Mozambique 1999	Chissano	52.3	
no	successor	Mozambique 2004	Guebuza	65	Chissano
no	incumbent	Rwanda 2003	Kagame	95	
no	incumbent	Uganda 1996	Museveni	75.5	
no	incumbent	Uganda 2001	Museveni	74.2	
no	successor	Zambia 2001 ³	Mwanawasa	72.5	Chiluba
no	incumbent	Zimbabwe 1990	Mugabe	83.5	
no	incumbent	Zimbabwe 1996	Mugabe	92.7	
no	incumbent	Zimbabwe 2002	Mugabe	56.2	
no	incumbent	Algeria 2004	Bouteflika	85	
no	incumbent	Egypt 1999 ⁴	Mubarak	99	
no	incumbent	Iran 1993	Rafsanjani	94.5	
no	successor	Iran 1997	Khatami	63.3	Rafsanjani
no	incumbent	Sudan 2000	Ahmad al-Bashir	86.5	
no	incumbent	Syria 1999 ⁴	Assad	99.9	
no	successor	Syria 2000 ⁴	B. Assad	99	
no	incumbent	Tunisia 1999	Ben Ali	99	
no	incumbent	Tunisia 2004	Ben Ali	94.5	

Continued on next page

Table 6.2: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions (continued)

Transition	Incumb.	Election	Leader	Vote Share	Prev. Leader
no	incumbent	Armenia 1996	Ter-Petrosian	83	
transition	successor	Armenia 1998	Kocharian	52	Ter-Petrosyan
no	incumbent	Armenia 2003	Kocharyan	48.3	
no	incumbent	Azerbaijan 1993	H. Aliev	99	
no	incumbent	Azerbaijan 1998	H. Aliev	77.6	
no	successor	Azerbaijan 2003	H. Aliev	76.8	Aliev
no	incumbent	Belarus 2001	Lukashenko	75.6	
no	incumbent	Belarus 2004 ⁵	Lukashenko	79.4	
no	incumbent	Croatia 1997	Tudjman	57	
transition	successor	Croatia 2000	Granic	26.7	Tudjman
no	incumbent	Georgia 2000	Shevarnadze	40.1	
transition	incumbent	Georgia 2003 ⁶	Shevarnadze	42.2	
no	incumbent	Kazakhstan 1999	Nazarbaev	81	
no	incumbent	Kyrgyzstan 1995	Akayev	71.6	
no	incumbent	Kyrgyzstan 2000	Akaev	74.5	
no	incumbent	Romania 1992	Iliescu	85.1	
transition	incumbent	Romania 1996	Iliescu	47.34	
no	incumbent	Russia 1996	Yeltsin	35.79	
no	successor	Russia 2000	Putin	50.6	Yeltsin
no	incumbent	Russia 2004	Putin	71.1	
no	incumbent	Tajikistan 1999	Rakhmonov	97	
no	incumbent	Ukraine 1999	Kuchma	38	
transition	successor	Ukraine 2004	Yanukovich	41.4	Kuchma
no	incumbent	Uzbekistan 2000	Karimov	91.9	
no	incumbent	Yugoslavia 1996	Milosevic	57.46	

Continued on next page

Table 6.2: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions (continued)

Transition	Incumb.	Election	Leader	Vote Share	Prev. Leader
transition	incumbent	Yugoslavia 2000	Milosevic	37.8	
transition	successor	Dominican Rep. 1996 ⁷	Reynado	36	Balaguer
no	successor	Guatemala 1990	Hidalgo	38.65	Cerezo
transition	successor	Guatemala 1995 ⁸	Arzu	42.6	Carpio
no	successor	Mexico 1994	Zedillo	50.39	Salinas
transition	successor	Mexico 2000	Labastido	36.1	Zedillo
transition	incumbent	Nicaragua 1990	Daniel Ortega	45	
no	incumbent	Peru 1995	Fujimori	44.52	
transition	incumbent	Peru 2000 ⁹	Fujimori	49.8	
transition	successor	Peru 2001 ⁹	Paniagua	49.87	Fujimori
no	incumbent	Venezuela 2004 ¹⁰	Chavez	59	
transition	successor	Sri Lanka 1994	Dissanayake	35.9	Premadasa
no	incumbent	Sri Lanka 1999	Kumaratunga	62.2	
no	incumbent	Taiwan 1996	Lee Teng-hui	54	
transition	successor	Taiwan 2000 ¹¹	Lian Chan	23.1	Lee Teng-hui

Previous Leader is listed if *Incumbency* equals "Successor". ¹President Bedie (1993-99) was overthrown in a coup in 1999. Military junta encouraged Guéi to run in elections as its candidate but he lost. ²Military coup of 1999 ousted president Veiera. ³Although the party of President Chiluba - MMD - elected Mwanawasa as its presidential candidate for 2001 elections, Chiluba did not endorse Mwanawasa. ⁴Plebiscites (to endorse the candidate). ⁵2004 Parliamentary elections and a third term referendum. ⁶2003 Parliamentary elections, following which the incumbent was ousted. Vote share is reported for the incumbent parties. ⁷President Balaguer and his party supported Reynado in the first round of 1996 elections. ⁸Arzu defeated Carpio, who was an interim president (1993-95) after President Elias and his Vice-President were forced to resign after constitutional violations. ⁹Fujimori was the winner of 2000 elections, even though democratic transition ensued after corruption allegations. Fujimori did not have a successor in 2001 elections. ¹⁰2004 Recall referendum. ¹¹The outgoing president Lee failed to ensure the victory of his successor. It appears that he helped the opposition candidate to win instead. In 2000 Freedom House rated Taiwan as democracy, yet this election is included as it was the first alternation in power in Taiwan.

Conclusion

This dissertation has focused on the study of the logic of presidential succession. Succession in term-bound presidencies is about the following choice: when presidents face term limits, they can either step down or attempt to prolong their tenure. While presidents in advanced industrial democracies honour their constitutions and step down if required, many rulers of transitional and developing countries often attempt to change their constitutions and stay in power. Why are the latter more reluctant to leave office than the former? Could it be the case that there are more dictators in developing areas and more democrats in developed ones? Then, what makes dictators into dictators and democrats into democrats?

As I elaborated earlier in this thesis, a deep but rather idiosyncratic examination of what makes some rulers value their office and political power more than other rulers do would involve inferences drawn from the fields of social and individual psychology and the examination of rulers' personalities. That would be an extremely difficult and time-consuming exercise, should we decide to examine a large number of rulers in order to draw some far-reaching conclusions about how their personalities affect policies. More importantly, we would be drawn into ad hoc and ex post theorizing, since we would have had to attribute the will for power and "survival" skills to those rulers that did whatever it took to remain in office, or the lack of skills or commitment to democratic values otherwise. However, such attributes as leadership skills, charisma, and the ability to survive in office become evident only ex post facto — many rulers that had been previously seen as lacking in skills and charisma proved to be very skilful politicians once they acquired power, and vice versa.

There are certain idiosyncrasies among politicians, and their ideology, as well as their preferred policies very often influence the direction that their regimes take. Sometimes, against all expectations a liberalizing leader comes into power in a dictatorship and directs his or her regime towards democracy, as Michael Gorbachev did in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union. Alternatively, a leader can enter office in

a democracy and undermine the existing checks and balances in a quest for greater power, as Adolf Hitler did in the Weimar Republic in Germany, or more recently, as did many Latin American presidents, such as Alberto Fujimori of Peru, who performed a so-called “auto-golpe” (self-coups) in an attempt to remain in office by whatever means.

However, the majority of leaders in democracies obey their constitutions, and in presidential democracies, step down when required. The majority of closed dictatorships (countries classified as “not free” by Freedom House) do not impose limits on their executives. It is regimes “in the middle”, which are neither consolidated democracies nor closed dictatorships, that can gravitate towards either consolidated democracy or stronger authoritarianism. In a recent paper on the determinants of transitions to democracy, Epstein et al. (2006) found that the most difficult category to predict was partial democracy: the authors concluded that they lacked explanations for what made partial regimes democratize or revert back to full authoritarianism (ibid, 564).

The focus on term limits and changes thereof in presidential regimes addresses this very question: what makes democracies and autocracies endure, and what undermines them? Presidents that have unlimited tenure or extend their rule make the probability of democracy or democratic transition a less likely outcome, as the logic of long-term survival in office makes regimes more repressive. Presidents that step down increase the probability of democratic transition and consolidation, as incumbent turnover is associated with increased uncertainty about the likely electoral outcomes and political change.

As I argued earlier in this thesis, during the third wave of democratization many nations imposed elections and tenure restrictions in a genuine attempt to build democratic institutions or to maintain a façade of democratic legitimacy. Many partly- and non-democratic regimes have learnt to use elections for their own advantage, to gain democratic legitimacy (see Levitsky and Way 2002; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2002). Similarly, executive term limits seem to have become the norm of modern democracy. As I demonstrate throughout this thesis, many rulers also fail or are deterred, and step down. Perhaps inadvertently, by imposing tenure restrictions at the onset of democratization, whether genuine or not, many presidents created very powerful focal points for societal, elite and international coordination against dictatorial takeover.

In order to address how the incentives of rulers affect the stability and change of

democracy and dictatorship, I focused on presidential regimes and the behaviour of their rulers during succession. I was especially interested in those rulers facing term limits — that is, those having a choice between stepping down and prolonging their rule. Term limits and changes thereof provide an observable implication of how much presidents value their office and whether they are willing to abide by their constitutions and let their often nascent democracies consolidate, by stepping down or not. I also examined the factors influencing the value of political office.

Also, instead of looking at individual data and attributes of political leaders, I focused on observable politico-economic data and, as far as the psychology of rulers was concerned, assumed that the primary motivation of a politician was to remain in office. Looking at a handful of rulers, the individual factors of rulers' personality loomed large, but once the sample grew to all presidents in the world, from 1975 to 2004, certain patterns and similarities necessarily emerged, and I examined and analyzed these patterns.

Many factors influence whether certain countries are democracies and others are dictatorships. For decades, political scientists have puzzled over the origins and stability of democracy and dictatorship (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Moore 1966; Olson 1993). For more than five decades, economic and social development has played a central role in explaining political regimes and transitions between dictatorships and democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Diamond 1993; Epstein et al. 2006; Deutsch 1961; Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Muller 1995; Przeworski et al. 2000; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Vibrant, ongoing debate continues today between the proponents of the modernization hypothesis (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006) and those authors that question the systematic relationship between modernization and democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). Recently, an emerging consensus in the study of the political economy of development and developing countries highlighted that “the reassessment of development as a key factor behind political liberalization has not been accompanied by a systematic theoretical effort to trace the mechanisms that link wealth to democracy” (Boix 2003, 234).

The explanation I have advanced here is most closely related to a strand of literature that analyzes the origins of regimes and democratic transitions as a problem of economic redistribution and inequality, rather than income as such (for example, Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 1999). This literature focuses on the long-run processes of economic and political change and looks at how different levels of income and of inequality affect the incentives of elites to democratize or repress

their societies: elites calculate the costs of prospective redistribution and decide accordingly, so that democratization results when the loss of income arising from the democratization exceeds the costs of repressing democratic transition. Similarly, in this thesis I theorized that rulers in presidential regimes stepped down if the costs of doing so were lower than the costs of attempting to remain in office.

Likewise, recent advances in international relations (Buena de Mesquita 2003, Goe-mans 2004) and comparative politics (Przeworski 1999) link the utility-maximization of politicians to observable political and economic outcomes. When focusing on the origins and stability of democracy and dictatorship, and analyzing the interplay between democracy and dictatorship on a macro-level, we should not neglect the micro-foundations: rulers' incentives and their behavior. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) analyzed how political institutions that regulated the selection of rulers affected the political behavior of the latter, and how different survival strategies conditioned by these institutions influenced economic development. In this thesis, I analyzed how the overall state of development and various macro-politico-economic aggregates affected the motivation of rulers and how these rulers, given constraints and the value of office, conditioned by their environment and state of economic development, "selected" institutions that enhanced political survival.

My dissertation is much more modest in scope and implications than the studies above. My ambition was not to explain the logic of political survival or the stability and breakdown of democracy and dictatorship; or to propose a theory of revolutions or of the emergence and alternation between the left-wing and the right-wing dictatorships.

Instead, I focused on what presidents did when they faced term limits and explained what caused different succession outcomes. At its core, the argument of this dissertation is very simple: when rulers face high constraints and low stakes, they step down, when they face low constraints and high stakes, they prolong. The focus is also very narrow: succession in term-bound presidencies. Yet I was able to address many important questions, and the focus on term limits and succession allowed it because, as I argued in the first chapters of this thesis, limited tenure is at the center of our understanding of democracy and dictatorship in personalist regimes. The focus on what presidents do during succession served as a springboard for the examination of a number of questions simultaneously, without sacrificing the rigidity of empirical analysis and the overall focus of the thesis.

In order to understand what makes some rulers more reluctant to leave office and to

attempt to perpetuate themselves in power, I proposed a very simple decision-making framework conditioned by the costs of stepping down (stakes) and the constraints imposed on the executive. It is very plausible that leaders' motivations are more complicated than just reflecting the perks of office and the fear of retribution once out of office. There are a number of potential alternative explanations, and in Chapter 4 I discussed policy-seeking, reputational concerns and age as alternative explanations for the succession strategies that rulers choose. However, I focused on the lack of constraints and the high costs of losing office as a plausible and testable explanation.

Because it captures directly how highly rulers value their office, the analysis of presidential behavior during succession and of term limits allowed me to address a number of questions in one integrated framework. First of all, by assembling data on tenure institutions in all world presidencies and analyzing term limits, re-election, incumbency advantage and survival in office, this dissertation contributes to the literature on comparative presidentialism (e.g., Cheibub 2006; Shugart and Carey 1997) and survival in office (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bienen and Van der Walle 1991, Machiavelli 1999 [1515]), in presidential regimes.

By analyzing how the state of economic development influences the stakes of losing and holding office, as well as rulers' behavior in office, and how, in turn, these stakes affect succession behavior and the outcomes thereof, this dissertation contributes to the literature on democracy and development (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000).

By looking at the impact of term limits on incumbency, and the impact of elite splits induced by the absence of incumbent during presidential succession on the likelihood of democratic change, I also contribute to the literature on transitions to democracy (e.g., Geddes 1999; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). All together, the study of democracy and dictatorship as outcomes of individual strategies in pursuit of survival in office, which in turn are determined by the state of economic development and rulers' own actions in office, contributes to the literature on the stability and breakdown of democracy and dictatorship in general (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Olson 1993).

Main Findings

The results of my inquiry have been discussed at length throughout this dissertation. In this section I summarize the most important findings as elaborated in the preceding six chapters:

- On average, 29 per cent of rulers (1970-2000) are dead, imprisoned or in exile in the period of up to 1 year after their exit from office (Chapter 1).
- Democracy is associated with limited tenure: $FH=5.5$ for countries without limits and it is 3.3 for those with limits, on average (Chapter 2).
- Colonial and legal origins, as well as other national macro-parameters, have some sway over what tenure institutions countries will have in 2000s: for example, former Spanish colonies tend to have a single-term arrangement both in the 1970s and 2000s; those countries that had 7-year term length in 1975 tend to have the same length in 2000s, irrespective of a number of terms (Chapter 2).
- 84 per cent of presidents get reelected in a two-term presidential regime, if present themselves for running for office (Chapter 3).
- 19 per cent extend their tenure in one- or two-term offices, and 81 per cent comply with term limits (Chapter 3).
- 54 per cent survive a full, constitutionally allowed tenure in term-bounded presidencies (Chapter 3).
- Rulers that enter limited office and extend their rule, on average, survive 2.7 years longer than those that enter office without limits (Chapter 3).
- Rulers do become more authoritarian as their tenure progresses, $FH=4.6$ in the 1st half of their rule becomes 5.1 (more repressive) in the last half of their rule (Chapter 3).
- Tenure institutions at entry have significant effects both on the hazard rate and on how this hazard rate changed over time. Hazard declines with time, so that incumbents become more difficult to unseat. Entry in unlimited office increases the expected tenure by 3.1 years in comparison with a two-term office, controlling for the overall levels of democracy (Chapter 3).
- In game theoretic terms, the utility of staying in office increases as the value of office vis-a-vis life outside of office increases, when a ruler does not value democracy as his ideology or discards his reputational costs, when the experience of other rulers ex post is unenviable, when the expected affinity with the next ruler is low, and when the constraints are low (Chapter 4).

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- Higher stakes at elections, lower constraints, previous successful term changes in the region and longer horizons increased the probability of tenure change. I also found some evidence for concerns over reputation (Chapter 4).
 - Both “Constraints” and “Stakes” exert a lot of influence on tenure prolongation. In substantive terms, the former outweigh the latter by 22 per cent: 0.99 versus - 0.77 (changing the value of the covariate contribution of “stakes” and of “constraints”, from its minimum to its maximum, increases (or decreases) the probability of tenure change by 0.99 and 0.77, respectively) (Chapter 4).
 - Rulers evaluate their post-tenure fate and pursue different succession strategies from the menu described in Chapter 4. Statistically, it is difficult to predict cases of high costs (stakes) and high constraints; instead, one needs to employ analytic narratives (Chapter 5).
 - Succession triggers elite splits, which in turn often precipitate transitions to democracy. The absence of incumbents at elections increases the probability of democratic change by 34 per cent on average. The incumbents lose in 12 per cent of elections and successors in 52 per cent of elections, 1990-2004. The presence of hegemonic parties mitigates these effects, however (Chapter 6).
 - Successors are expected to gain 8.3 per cent less votes than incumbents (Chapter 6).
 - Term limits are the reason for the absence of incumbents in 52 per cent of elections in 1990-2004 period (Chapter 6).

Looking at world presidencies, I found that, apart from France, all presidencies in developed industrialized countries had term limits in 2005, and there were 27 countries in total that did not limit their executive tenure in 2005. The predominant majority of the latter were found in developing areas. Also, looking at the distribution of term-bound and unlimited tenures, between 1975 and 2005, I observed a similar pattern. Likewise, all recent changes of tenure institutions occurred in the developing world. Altogether, 39 rulers extended their tenures in one way or another in the sample of all presidents in the 1975-2004 period, and majority of them came from the developing areas. Apparently, rulers in developing world tend to have unlimited tenure and, if they have restrictions, many attempt to prolong their rule.

Why are the rulers in the developing world more reluctant to leave office than those in the West? Intuitively, it seems that the answer can be found if we understand what the presidents of the world stand to lose should they exit from office. I found that on average, 29 per cent of presidents (1970-2000) were dead, imprisoned or in exile in the period of up to 1 year after exit from office. If we compare the post tenure fate of rulers in advanced democracies and those in developing areas, we

observe that all cases of “bad” post tenure fate come from the developing world, and the predominant majority of rulers in the West, as I illustrated with some examples in Chapter 1, enjoy a similar status of life after they exit office as the one they had while in office. Clearly, some rulers might be more reluctant to leave office because stakes of losing office are too high and they would do their utmost to remain in that office.

In order to understand the interaction between democracy, dictatorship, limited tenure and what influenced rulers to remain in office or step down, I proceeded in several steps. Firstly, I investigated the relationship between limited tenure and democracy. I found that the average score on the *FH* index for “no limits” countries was 5.5 on a seven-point scale, where 7 was the worst score; and for countries that imposed limits it was 3.3. Likewise, I found that there was a significant correlation between various measures of executive constraints and tenure indicators: between tenure and the executive index of executive electoral constraints (Beck et al 2001) it was - 0.38 and between tenure and political constraints (Henisz 2002), it was - 0.38. I also found that rulers became more authoritarian as their tenure progressed. During the first half of their tenure, presidents with unlimited tenure and those that extended their rule, on average had $FH = 4.6$, while in the last half they had 5.1: a half-point drop in democracy on a seven-point scale. Also, for those that extended their rule, $FH=4.9$ prior to term change, and it became, on average, 5.7 post change for the same ruler. It is evident that there is a link between limited tenure and democracy.

I also found that in 2005 alone, there were 11 “unfree” and 25 “partly” free countries that imposed restrictions on their executives, thus indicating that we should disentangle the precise relationship between democracy and limited tenure and how the latter was enforced not only in democracies but also in partly- or non-free countries and why some presidents stepped down and others prolonged their term-bounded tenures.

In Chapter 2 I tested whether it was possible to explain the patterns of tenure institutions on the basis of countries’ historical characteristics, such as colonial or legal origins, as well as by regional clustering or the tenure institutions in the past. If countries simply “inherited” their tenure institutions from the time of the latter’s adoption after independence, then the explanation for the diversity of tenure institutions the world over would be found by examining the initial institutional configuration. Using a series of multinomial logit regressions, I found some evidence

for regional or group clustering, such as the tendency for most countries with Spanish colonial origins to have a single presidential term, for countries that had a 7-year length in 1975 to have the same length 30 years later, or for countries with higher ethnic polarization to have unlimited tenure in 1975 (the first year of observations in the dataset). Yet, due to the small sample size, the evidence was not conclusive. Most importantly, the data indicated that a great number of presidents changed their tenure arrangements, some of them even several times, and thus I turned to the leader level for an explanation instead.

How relevant are tenure restrictions for political survival? The existing literature on political survival subscribes to the view that term limits are not important for survival in office. Bienen and Van der Walle (1991) argue that term limits have little effect on longevity, as they can be easily scrapped. In Chapter 3 I assessed whether term institutions mattered for survival in office. In contrast to a Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) study, which examined 86 democratic presidents, I looked at term limits in 373 presidencies the world over, be they democratic or dictatorial. I found that barring term limits and all things being equal, the probability of re-election in presidential regimes was close to 1 throughout the world. When sitting presidents presented themselves for re-election, the odds of winning elections were 5 to 1 in their favor, on average. I also employed this finding about the re-election advantage when I looked at the probability of democratic transition during presidential succession in Chapter 6. Also, I found that 23 per cent of presidents extend their tenure after serving 1 full term in one- or two-term offices, and that 44 per cent did so after serving 2 terms.

Does this ability to present oneself for re-election and, consequently, win, stem from the absence of term limits that allowed this continuing re-election or from the overall degree of authoritarianism, so that more authoritarian leaders could run as many times as they pleased? Using an additional tenure institution parameter, in Chapter 3 I re-examined two models of political survival, by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Bienen and van der Walle (1991). I focused on term limits at entry into office. If these limits determined survival in office and entry horizons (the expected maximum possible length in office at entry into this office) matched tenure lengths that were actually served, this would have indicated that terms were not easy to change. If they had been easy to change, then tenure institutions should not have influenced the length of tenure; rather the degrees of authoritarianism should have. I found that the more authoritarian presidents did survive longer in office, that those rulers that entered office without limits were expected to survive longer, controlling for the

degree of authoritarianism; that presidents that entered office without restrictions were increasingly difficult to unseat (I observed a decelerating hazard rate) and those with limits faced increasing hazards as time for the scheduled exit approached.

In other words, while term limits did varied with the degrees of democracy, I also found that the former had a separate impact on political survival, independent of the overall degree of democracy and of other regime parameters. This separate effect could be attributed to the fact that tenure institutions were costly to change even in less democratic settings, as they provided important focal points against dictatorial takeover, or even mobilized ambitious individuals from the ranks of the regime elites that wanted to run for the highest office themselves. In Chapter 6 I discussed the example of the Mexican regime, which imposed single six-year terms for its presidents, and I also discussed historic and institutional reasons for the existence of term limits in this regime that remained non-democratic for most of the twentieth century. To understand the costs of tenure changes, in Chapter 4 I turned to explore why some presidents stepped down while others prolonged their rule – that is, what made certain incumbents remained incumbents.

In order to understand the process of presidential succession, I stipulated that a ruler's choice over prolonging his rule and stepping down depended on the expected probability of a successful tenure change, the values of office and of life “outside-of-office” and a ruler's ideology (how committed a ruler was to democracy vis-a-vis his commitment to office per se, and how much he valued his reputation so as to attempt the tenure extension). It also depended on executive constraints and the tenure prolongation experience of other rulers in a “peer” group (“demonstration”). I stipulated that the utility of staying in office increased, as the value of office vis-a-vis life outside of office increased, when the ruler did not value democracy as his ideology or discarded his reputational costs, when the experience of other rulers ex post was unenviable, when the expected affinity with the next ruler was low, and constraints were low.

Next I operationalized the stakes of losing office, constraints, regional diffusion effects, entry horizons and concerns about reputation and estimated tenure changes empirically, using a sample that included all presidents that entered office with term limits. The costs (stakes) were a function of the income in the country, ethnic polarization, the probability of immunity after the exit from office, the black market exchange premium, levels of corruption and events during leader's tenure that were likely to affect his post tenure fate. Alongside “stakes”, regional demonstration

effects and the length of time horizons at entry into office, I also proposed the hypothesis that executive constraints made it more difficult to extend the terms, which would also serve as an alternative hypothesis: levels of authoritarianism, constraints on the executives alone should explain whether presidents extended their tenures or not. In other words, democrats should step down, while dictators extend their rule.

I found that higher stakes at elections, lower constraints, previous successful term changes in the region and longer horizons increased the probability of tenure change. I also found some evidence for the concerns about leaders' reputation. In Chapter 4 I explained in detail the impact of different predictors and the covariate contribution as a whole on the probability of tenure change.

In Chapter 4 I employed a battery of statistical methods to estimate tenure changes. However, I also found that it was extremely difficult to predict the outcome of a succession scenario when both the stakes and constraints were high. To address such a scenario, in Chapter 5 I employed analytic narratives with elements of game theory in order to examine the internal workings of the theory, as described in Chapters 1 and 4. I focused on the presidential succession in Ukraine in 2004 as a case "in the middle" of the distribution of presidential successions, neither democratic nor strongly authoritarian, in which a number of strategies resulting in diverse outcomes were very likely. In case of Ukraine in 2004, I analyzed 5 possible succession strategies. Unlike cases of low constraints and high stakes, where the incumbents were most likely to prolong the rule, Ukrainian president Kuchma was prevented from doing so by relatively high constraints on his authority, economic and political linkages with the West that any third term bid would have jeopardized, and, perhaps, by his own preferences and reputational concerns ("ideology"). Likewise, unlike cases of high constraints and low costs of stepping down, in which presidents were almost certainly to step down, the Ukrainian president could not simply leave office and await the consequences, as his immunity could not have been taken for granted due to a series of corruption scandals during his tenure. Instead, the president pursued a combination of strategies in between these two extreme options. I explained a number of puzzles during the Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine by focusing on how the president interacted with other players over his succession. This case also illustrated the importance of elite interactions during succession for the transitions to democracy.

Earlier in Chapters 2 and 3 I found that unlimited tenure was associated with dictatorships, and that barring term limits, incumbent presidents lost elections very

rarely. These findings suggested that the outcomes of presidential succession should matter for democracy, or more specifically, for democratic transitions. Building on the literature on transitions and previous findings of this thesis, in Chapter 6 I examined the effects of incumbency advantage and, indirectly, term limits on the probability of democratic transitions. I found that presidential successors were more likely to lose elections than long-standing incumbents as the process of presidential succession often triggered elite splits and uncertainty, and successors had yet to consolidate their incumbency advantage. When incumbents ran, liberalizing electoral outcomes occurred in only 12 per cent of elections; when successors ran, they occurred in 52 per cent of elections in presidential regimes (1990-2004).

In turn, since the latter lost to the pro-democratic opposition, incumbency influenced the probability of a successful democratic breakthrough. On the basis of statistical simulations, I found that the absence of incumbents at elections increased the probability of democratic change by 35 per cent, and that all things being equal, successors were expected to gain 8 per cent less votes than incumbents, which constitutes a sizeable margin that could signal victory or defeat at elections. The presence of strong hegemonic parties rendered the dangers of successorship to be twice as low, however, in comparison with succession in less institutionalized regimes. I also found that in all cases in which designated successors were relatives of the previous rulers, such as sons, and a nephew in one case, the process of succession proceeded smoothly and regime elites retained power. Earlier in Chapter 4 I theorized that the affinity with designated successors should decrease the costs of stepping down and the some of the findings in Chapter 6 corroborates the theory as elaborated earlier in Chapter 4.

Finally, I found that in 52 per cent of elections the incumbents did not run because of term limits, while in the remaining cases they did not run because they died or exited “irregularly”. I also examined all outlier cases in which incumbents ran and lost or successors ran and won, as well as the reasons for the absence of incumbents in some elections in order to illuminate the causal mechanism and see whether the theory held under adverse conditions.

Areas for Future Research

In an effort to build a generalizable theory of succession in all presidential regimes, I abstracted from many details as well as other potentially important parameters. In

terms of improvements and further research, I suggest several things. The central theme of this thesis is that the costs of stepping down and executive constraints affect a ruler's behavior in office and during succession. While the operationalization of constraints was based on a number of parameters, well known and used in the literature, alternative and further operationalizations of the value of political office ("stakes") for power-holders could be an interesting and fruitful research program in the future. While it is correct to assume that those rulers facing too high stakes will do their best to remain in power, and that all selected variables together constitute the plausible proxies to account for the value of office, the alternative measures of the latter are something to explore in the future.

In this thesis, I constructed a new, individual-level parameter, *Events* (see Chapter 4), that is a very plausible operationalization for the actions in office that are likely to bear effects on a ruler's post-tenure fate. Other and better individual-level data on the actual behavior of politicians in office, rather than a system-level approximation of the value of office, will be necessary to evaluate the stakes of losing office in more detail. Also, not only the level of national income, but also other economic variables, such as the degree of inequality or natural resource endowments, are potential candidates in further specifications of the value of political office.

I discuss but do not measure empirically the affinity between incumbents and their successors. To measure this affinity and how it affects succession behavior would be an interesting project in the future. I collected some data on the affinity between incumbents and their successors in 2000s (0 if no affinity, 1 if from the same party or ethnic group, 2 if family-related or close business connections, or, where applicable, from the same tribe; and 3 if a direct relative), but did not include it into estimations because of the low number of observations at this stage.

Another improvement concerns model specification. Since I was dealing with data that ranges spatially and temporally, and specified the dependent variable as a binary outcome (tenure change or not), I employed logit and a BTSCS model, which was designed to deal with issues of spatial and temporal dependence. However, as I described in Chapters 2 and 4, some rulers first initiate a short-term change and only subsequently a long-term one. In order to address this issue, we can also specify the dependent variable as a tripartite outcome and estimated the probability of tenure change using multinomial logit. However, the literature has not yet developed as to whether one can control for temporal and spatial dependence in multinomial logit models and to use splines, as I did. In the future, if new work on multinomial logit

with TSCS data is published, it would be interesting to re-examine this estimation. Likewise, in the thesis I rather crudely operationalized demonstration effects as the lagged proportion of rulers in the region exhibiting parameters of interest. The proper estimation of diffusion effects requires the construction of a spatial distance (or any other spatial proximity) matrix to account for temporal and spatial-temporal interdependence in the data. However, at the moment there is no literature that addresses the problem of spatial interdependence in BTSCS data.

Behavior during succession and tenure changes in term-bound presidencies is a good manifestation of how much rulers value their office. Measuring the value of political office that do not result in tenure changes — how much rulers value office irrespective of their time horizons — would be an interesting project to explore. Likewise, because term limits and behavior during succession provide observable and direct approximation of costs of stepping down, I focused on presidential regimes only. In further studies it would be interesting to understand the interaction of stakes and constraints in other regimes, not only presidential. Because of the lack of resources and time constraints inherent in any dissertation project, I focused on presidencies in 1975-2004. In further and improved versions of this research, it would be interesting to explore succession behavior extending earlier in time. Likewise, I analyzed the impact of presidential succession on the probability of democratic transitions in the 1990-2004 period, and it would be interesting to check whether these findings hold in the earlier period just as well.

In this thesis I focused on how the costs of stepping down and constraints affected behavior in office and during succession, and how, in turn, the outcomes of succession affected the emergence and stability of institutions (term limits and changes thereof) and democracy (democratic transitions). A logical extension would be to explore the impact of the value of office on behavior in office, and, consequently on other outcomes of interest, for example, economic policies or international relations, such as compliance with the international treaties or war initiation.

Most importantly, the question of why rulers in developing world are more reluctant to leave office and what they do to perpetuate themselves in power is very broad and could lead to the inclusion of more cases and phenomena beyond succession strategies and outcomes in term-bound presidencies. Indeed, if a poor state of economic development, the lack of other options outside of office, and the high costs of stepping down influence rulers' decision-making, they can perpetuate themselves in power by other means, such as through corrupt elections or by shutting down

parliaments. In this thesis I only look at one of the instances as to why some term-bound presidents are reluctant to leave office and what can explain their behavior. There is nothing that prevents the explanation advanced in this thesis from being generalizable as a broader phenomenon of the value of political office in democracy and dictatorship, whether in the environment of elections or not.

The study of term limits and changes thereof provides another interesting venue for research in the future: time horizons. In Chapter 4 I discussed how Hugo Chavez, who was elected for a single 5-year term, extended his tenure from the initial 5 to 13 years, and in 2005 indicated his project would not be finished until 2021. This example indicates that rulers update their time horizons as their tenure progresses. The current models that discuss time horizons and their impact parameterize these horizons retrospectively, such as the time served in office (Franzese 2002) or as the life spans of political parties — they do not account for hazards, and for the fact that horizons lengthen or shorten. The experience of term-bound presidents suggests that horizons do change depending on how far a president has progressed along his constitutional tenure; that presidents discount the future differently, depending on the entry horizons; and that they update and extend their horizons. I discussed time horizons throughout this thesis implicitly. However, in the near future, I intend to analyze time horizons explicitly, using the data on term limits and incumbency advantage. The study of horizons and discounting rates is one of the most promising fields in economics (Laibson 2003, Price 1993) and has only just begun to be addressed in political science (Streich and Levy 2007).

Implications for Democracy in Presidential Regimes

The findings in this dissertation underscore the fundamental importance of tenure restrictions and a limited mandate, for the health and survival of democracy. Firstly, in presidential regimes elections and the checks and balances must be strengthened by the institution of term limits. Without tenure restrictions and barring exogenous shocks, executives build their incumbency advantage and could be reelected forever. Incumbency advantage, together with the absence of tenure limitations, renders the predominant majority of legislators and governors virtually unbeatable even in such settings as the rather healthy and mature democracy of the United States. Likewise, the absence of term limits in many world presidencies makes their chief executives really difficult to unseat, as I demonstrate in this thesis.

Simon Bolivar advocated for life-long Presidency, believing that if we can “elect monarchs whom we call presidents” (quoted in Przeworski et al. 1996, 234), provided these quasi-monarchs are checked by other institutions, then political and policy stability will be enhanced and democracy will be protected. However, we should not forget the same Simon Bolivar’s own words seven years prior, in 1819, when he cautioned that “nothing is more perilous than to permit one citizen to retain power for an extended period. The people become accustomed to obeying him, and he forms the habit of commanding them; herein lie the origins of usurpation and tyranny”.^s

Term limits are designed to hinder the transformation of presidents into monarchs. More than 200 years ago, Alexander Hamilton argued against term limits as they undermine policy continuity: “To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert ... the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations” (*The Federalist No. 71 and 72*, 2004 [1788]). Thomas Jefferson, on the contrary, emphasized the dangers of long tenures: “If some termination to the services of the Chief Magistrate be not fixed by the Constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nominally four years, will in fact, become for life; and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance”.^t As discussed and demonstrated with the assistance of a great number of empirical examples, cases, and cross-national statistical research that I employed in this dissertation, in this debate Thomas Jefferson seems to have been proven right: the danger of dictatorial takeover outweighs the possible benefits from the policy continuity.

While term limits constitute a very important safeguard against tyranny, opponents of term limits, or, more narrowly, the opponents of a no-reelection rule have some valid points that need to be addressed. Indeed, the abolishment of tenure restrictions is very likely to lead to, and entrench, incumbency in power. Sitting presidents will be able to exploit their advantage in resources and information over their opponents; to manipulate the conservative sentiments of stability and continuity that are prevalent in many countries; to claim credit for national achievements; to rely on the bureaucratic apparatus and resources; and, ultimately, to control the political agenda and change political institutions to their advantage.

However, these considerations should not prevent nations with single-term presiden-

^sQuoted in Carey 2003, 121, originally quoted in Bierck 1951, 175.

^tLetter to Vermont State Legislature, December 10, 1807, quoted in Stein, 1943, 38.

tial regimes from discussing the possibility of moving to a two-term arrangement, provided a second term is enshrined in the constitution and there exists a broad elite and public consensus that a second term is final, however “indispensable” a sitting president can seem. In principle, a one-reelection rule will allow the possibility of a policy correction mid-course via subjecting the incumbent president and his policies to the test of elections, and will make ruler a “lame duck” president only during his or her second term and thus make him or her perform better during the first term. Also, by allowing the possibility of one reelection, nations will lengthen the policy horizons for chief executives so that the latter will be able to take more informed policy decisions. There are other arguments against a one-reelection rule, such as the possibility that presidents will shirk from taking unpopular but perhaps necessary measures during their first terms in order to be re-elected. However, provided checks and balances do constrain the executives, and provided there is a broad consensus against dictatorial takeover and “simple solutions”, arguments for a one-reelection rule appear to outweigh the opposing arguments.

As regards the length of one term, I prefer to remain agnostic on this question. The length can be four, five or six years, provided that tenure restrictions are in place. However, given the fact that presidents cannot be dismissed by a simple vote of no confidence and that the continuing acceleration of economic and global processes the world over could demand new choices, policies or new individuals to implement them, a term length of six or seven years seems unduly long and could leave nations waiting patiently, or, even worse, impatiently, for their presidents to retire. Therefore, the ideal and tested presidential tenure arrangement seems to be the institution of a four- or five-year term with the possibility of one immediate, and final, reelection.

The recent changes from a single presidential term to a one-reelection rule in Argentina in 1993, Brazil in 1997 and Colombia in 2005, at the very least did not trigger the erosion of democracy in these nations, and, perhaps, even improved economic decision-making and accountability. However, other recent changes from a single-term arrangement to a one reelection rule triggered further changes and a desire to remain in power “forever”. Thus, the introduction of a second term in 1993 in Peru led President Alberto Fujimori, who was duly reelected in 1995, to discard his first term and count his second term as his first. Fujimori was elected for a third term in 2000, and only an unprecedented series of protests and elite defections forced him to relinquish his power. Likewise, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, who also introduced an immediate reelection, plans to abolish term limits altogether, as I discussed earlier

in this thesis.

In this regard, what can proponents of tenure restrictions, nationally and internationally, do to protect tenure restrictions? The findings of this thesis suggest that continuing economic development and strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law should render tenure changes less likely and more difficult. Beyond that, donor governments and international organizations that engage in international development assistance programmes should recognize that there is a long and established tradition of tenure restrictions going back to the *XIXth* century and even earlier, that this tradition is almost as old as the experience of modern democracy itself. The international community should recognize and emphasize that term limits are not one of the institutional features that democracies can experiment with and adopt or not adopt depending on local circumstances, such as the choice over a unicameral or bicameral legislature or Central Bank independence. Instead, terms limits are one of the most fundamental and inalienable institutions of presidential democracy, and if a presidential democracy drops it, it can no longer be deemed a democracy. Many nations' early experience with long-serving dictators brought them to realize the importance of term limits. For example, the experience of Argentina with Juan Manuel de Rosa and Mexico with Porfirio Diaz, which led them to introduce limits in 1853 and 1917, respectively.

The broader implication is that democracy practitioners should focus their attention not only on free and fair elections, but also on executive tenure restrictions and the observance thereof. Other undemocratic practices such as unfree and unfair elections, dependence of the judiciary on the executive, and unfree media can all be open to interpretation and allegations of bias. By contrast, term limits are easy to monitor and interpret: the incumbent president either steps down when term limits approach, or not. When designing various technical assistance programmes in transitional and post-conflict societies, democracy practitioners should emphasize the importance of term limits and, if possible, make them extremely difficult to change, by designating a super-majority requirement in order to implement change, placing term limits' provisions into a section of the constitution that cannot be amended under any circumstances, or disallowing referenda.

Crucially, however, donor governments and democracy practitioners should recognize what is at stake for sitting presidents and act accordingly, by minimizing the stakes of stepping down. Such measures could include credible pledges of immunity guaranteed by third parties, provided that rulers did not commit gross violations of

human rights while in office; provisions to fund a high-status life after departure from power; and the legitimizing of rulers' economic assets. The international community should avoid isolating rulers of developing and transitional countries who enter presidential office and who, depending on choices they make, could become "democrats" or "dictators". Instead, donor governments should encourage these rulers to "socialize" in the global political and economic clubs, and encourage membership in various international organizations, so that these rulers will value their international standing and reputation. Rulers of developing countries should be encouraged to become stakeholders of their own, and their countries', futures, by allowing them to trade with and invest in the world's advanced democracies and linking the future of these investments and trade ties with the continuing democratization of these developing countries.

Succession behavior and its outcomes have direct effects on the prospects of democracy in many developing countries. We should not neglect the dynamics of succession in presidential regimes when we try to understand and predict democratic transitions. My findings suggest that defeats at so-called "stunning elections" are driven not only by the opposition's mobilization, but also by the absence of an incumbent that reduces the costs of collective action.

The behavior of incumbents that do their utmost to designate in advance and ensure the election of their successors is surely deplorable behavior from the point of view of democratic theory. However, a proper understanding of rulers' succession strategies and the potential outcomes could lead democracy practitioners to reexamine what is at stake for a typical ruler in a developing country, and which institutions and elite pacts could ease ex post contracting in order to ensure transition to and consolidation of democracy in developing world.



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