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Depoliticisation and the Post-Conflict State in Northern Ireland: Sovereignty, Citizenship and Universality
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Summary

This thesis focuses on the transformation of the state in Northern Ireland (NI) and what is at stake politically in that transformation. More specifically, it is an empirically grounded social-theoretical investigation into the relationship between state universality and depoliticisation in the transformation of the NI state. I address this question by investigating historical depoliticisation, sovereignty and citizenship.

I am interested in a specific dimension of the state: the 'idea of the state'. This refers to the production of the symbolic identity of the state such that the state is disassociated from any particular group, raising it to the level of universality. I thus focus on the way in which the identity and the universality of the post-GFA state are constructed. In terms of what is at stake politically, I analyse a process of what I call depoliticisation in the transformations under investigation. I draw on the work of Alan Badiou (2005; 2010) and Jacques Ranciere (1998; 2001), both of whom allow us to conceptualise the specificity of politics and therefore to clearly conceptualise depoliticisation. Depoliticisation is conceptualised in two senses. On the one hand, depoliticisation refers to the reduction of political subjectivity to the logic of identification, a move which eliminates the universal dimension of political subjectivity. On the other hand, depoliticisation refers to the monopolisation of universality by the state.

I investigate the relationship between state universality and depoliticisation in two distinct but very much related senses. First of all, I analyse and theorise how the contemporary NI state constructs its monopoly on universality. In order to do so I focus on two fields in which the question of state universality has historically been at play: sovereignty and citizenship. I explore the specific mode in which citizenship and sovereignty construct the universality of the post-GFA state by recognising and incorporating 'both communities', particularly the 'Republican community'. This novel form of state universality, which I characterise as multicultural, has important implications for how we understand the state but also for politics. Second of all, I situate these transformations historically. The transformation of the NI state is part of a historical sequence. This sequence began with the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) that emerged in 1968 to challenge the sectarian...
exclusions of the state. The conflict generated by the CRM led to the suspension of the NI parliament in 1972 and the imposition of direct rule from London. The CRM was gradually overtaken by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Republican movement, which quickly entered a political and military stalemate lasting until the peace process of the 1990s. As noted, contemporary NI state universality is constructed via the recognition of the ‘Republican community’. In other words, it is founded on the recognition and incorporation of the oppositional movement which emerged out of NI’s 1968. In this sense, NI can be located among many other situations in which contemporary forms of power and statehood reflect the incorporation and depoliticisation of the movements and subjectivities of 1968. In researching the historical dimension of the transformation of the NI state, I argue that the crisis which led to the collapse of the state in 1972 can be understood as a crisis of universality. At the centre of this crisis is the CRM, a political movement emerging in 1968 and challenging the sectarianism of the NI state. I go on to argue that as the CRM was overtaken by the IRA the universal dimension of the CRM was lost, and was replaced by a politics of nation-statism ultimately founded on the logic of identification. The logic of identification, by which I mean the reduction of political subjectivity to identity, is central to the re-construction of state-universality because the latter operates via the recognition of identity. As such, the depoliticisation of the CRM, which is fundamental to the development of the peace process, can be understood in terms of the collapse of the universal dimension of the movement, and this collapse can be linked to the emergence of the IRA and Irish Republicanism as the dominant oppositional force.

The focus of this thesis, then, is the relationship between state universality and depoliticisation in the transformation of the NI state.
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Introduction

This thesis focuses on the transformation of the state in Northern Ireland (NI) and what is at stake politically in that transformation. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA), which represents the culmination of the Northern Irish peace process and establishes the post-conflict state, represents a deeply significant end to the Irish twentieth century. In fact, if one is to believe the celebratory claims made on its behalf, it might be considered to represent the end of Irish political modernity. I refer here to the fact that the GFA claims to resolve the ‘sectarian conflict’ which has played out in Ireland since its colonisation. More specifically, the GFA claims to have finally created a NI state which is universal because it recognises ‘both communities’. This research, however, seeks to unsettle the consensus around the ‘triumph of politics’ the GFA supposedly represents. My contention is that, rather than resolving questions of sectarianism and universality in Ireland, the transformation of the NI state poses these questions anew.

The state, of course, is both immensely complex and notoriously obscure (Abrams, 2006; Runciman, 2003; Bartelson, 2001). The objective of this thesis is not the analysis of the NI state in general, a task which would go beyond the scope of any PhD. Rather, I am interested in a specific dimension of the state. Philip Abrams’s distinction between the ‘idea of the state’ and the ‘state-system’ is useful here. The state-system refers to the network of institutionalized power: hospitals; education; social welfare; revenue etc. The state-system is neither unified nor homogenous. It is penetrated by many different logics and contradictions (Abrams, 2006; Rose and Miller, 1992). The ‘idea of the state’, in contrast, refers to the representation of the state as a unity. This representation has two dimensions: (1) it produces the symbolic identity of the state; (2) it disassociates the state from any particular group, raising it to the level of universality. The focus of this thesis is the ‘idea of the state’, and specifically the second dimension, that of state universality. This is what Bourdieu (1994; 1996) calls the state’s ‘monopoly on universality’, a dimension which is closely related to the legitimacy and efficacy of the state (Abrams, 2006; Bourdieu, 1994). However, as many have argued with regard to the nation-state, the universality of the state typically collapses back into identity, an identity which tends to be both normative and
exclusionary (Habermas, 2001; Goldberg, 2002; Hardt and Negri, 2000). This theoretical approach to the state is developed in Chapter 1.

In terms of what is at stake politically, I analyse a process of what I call depoliticisation in the transformations under investigation. From the beginning I was interested in the effects of these transformations with regard to politics. There is already a body of work arguing that the contemporary NI state militates against meaningful social transformation (Taylor, 2009; Finlay, 2004; Whitaker, 2004). I contribute to this body of work by drawing on the work of Alain Badiou (2005; 2010) and Jacques Ranciere (1998; 2001), both of whom allow us to conceptualise the specificity of politics and therefore to clearly conceptualise depoliticisation. I investigate the relationship between state universality and depoliticisation in two distinct but very much related senses. First of all, I analyse and theorise how the contemporary NI state constructs its monopoly on universality. In order to do so I focus on two fields in which the question of state universality has historically been at play: sovereignty and citizenship. I explore the specific mode in which citizenship and sovereignty under the post-GFA state reconstruct the universality of the state by recognising and incorporating ‘both communities’, particularly the ‘Republican community’. This novel form of state universality has important implications for how we understand the state but also for state-politics. I discuss this in the final section of this introduction. Second of all, I situate these transformations historically. The transformation of the NI state is part of a historical sequence. This sequence began with the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) that emerged in 1968 to challenge the sectarian exclusions of the state. The conflict generated by the CRM led to the suspension of the NI parliament in 1972 and the imposition of direct rule from London. The CRM was gradually overtaken by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Republican movement, which quickly entered a political and military stalemate lasting until the peace process of the 1990s. As noted, contemporary NI state universality is constructed via the recognition of the ‘Republican community’. In other words, it is founded on the recognition and incorporation of the oppositional movement which emerged out of NI’s 1968. In this sense, NI can be located among many other situations in which contemporary forms of power and statehood reflect the incorporation and depoliticisation of the movements and subjectivities of 1968. In researching the historical dimension of the transformation of the NI state, I argue that the
crisis which led to the collapse of the state in 1972 can be understood as a crisis of universality. At the centre of this crisis is the CRM, a political movement emerging in 1968 and challenging the sectarianism of the NI state. I go on to argue that as the CRM was overtaken by the IRA the universal dimension of the CRM was lost, and was replaced by a politics of nation-stateism ultimately founded on the logic of identification. The logic of identification, by which I mean the reduction of political subjectivity to identity, is central to the re-construction of state-universality because the latter operates via the recognition of identity. As such, the depoliticisation of the CRM, which is fundamental to the development of the peace process, can be understood in terms of the collapse of the universal dimension of the movement, and this collapse can be linked to the emergence of the IRA and Irish Republicanism as the dominant oppositional force. This is discussed further below.

The focus of this thesis, then, is the relationship between state universality and depoliticisation in the transformation of the NI state. In what follows I first describe how I came to focus on this relationship as well how I propose to investigate it in relation to the two dimensions introduced above: (a) the investigation of state universality at the level of sovereignty and citizenship; (b) and the historical process of state transformation and depoliticisation. Along the way I also give some background to NI politics and the GFA.

**Background**

This thesis originally stemmed from my interest in new forms of power and control. I was particularly interested in ‘postmodern’ or ‘postnational’ mechanisms for incorporating and managing subjectivities. This interest stemmed from a number of sources. Firstly, as an activist I seemed to be confronting again and again the exhaustion of established modes of politics. As a teenager I was involved in a Marxist-Leninist party and it was difficult not to notice that the proletarian subjectivity we were supposed to be organizing either didn’t exist or had been almost completely absorbed by the state and capital. Later, as a participant in the Caravan for the Freedom of Movement and the Underground Railroad, two projects oriented around migration struggles, I was struck by the apparent transformation of the relationship between power and difference.
On the other hand, as an undergraduate I took a number of courses that put these experiences in a broader context. In particular, studying NI and the peace process seemed to encapsulate, in a very visible and tangible way, new forms of the management and incorporation of subjectivities and a new relationship between power and difference. When I began studying NI I had already read Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, which was circulating in the alter-globalisation movement at the time. Much of what Hardt and Negri talked about seemed relevant to NI: new forms of post-national governance; the recognition and incorporation of difference; the normative horizon of global peace.

Since the early 1990’s the NI peace process had been trying to find a formula which could achieve ‘peace’. This primarily meant demobilization of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA, and the Provisional Republican movement more broadly, had been conducting an armed struggle since the very early 1970s with the objective of achieving a United Ireland. They claimed that the British state was an imperialist force in Ireland. They claimed that the Irish people are sovereign and that this sovereignty should be expressed in an all-Ireland nation-state. And, finally, they saw this as an emancipatory struggle for ‘Irish Freedom’, as the title of their 1974 booklet would have it (Provisional IRA, 1974).

Earlier attempts to defuse the IRA had floundered. In particular, early multicultural policies which attempted to incorporate the ‘cultural identity’ of Irish nationalists (Rolston, 1998) came up against the Republican demand for full sovereignty. From the Republican point of view the conflict wasn’t about folkloristic culture but about what they considered to be a political struggle, specifically the struggle for national sovereignty. In contrast, the peace process of the 1990’s has, in its own terms, been hugely successful. The Provisional IRA has given up its armed struggle, decommissioned its weapons and demobilized its personnel. Sinn Fein, the political party of the Republican movement, participates in liberal democratic representational politics. Under the GFA, the peace agreement signed in 1998 by all the major participants to the conflict, the NI local state apparatus, which had been suspended since 1972, was reinstated, but with huge differences.

The existing literature describes the most important of these differences. Firstly, the GFA recognises the “equally legitimate aspirations” (i.e. claims to national sovereignty) of both Republicans and Unionists. Secondly, there is the recognition of the “parity of esteem” for
the "identity and ethos of both communities". This refers to a variety of state mechanisms for the recognition of the identity of both communities, especially Irish nationalists (McGarry, 2001). Such mechanisms include new state emblems and public holidays (Bryan and McIntosh, 2007); promotion of identity through culture and arts (Bryan and McIntosh, 2007); recognition of the Irish language; anti-discrimination employment legislation (Finlay, 2010), etc. This has also involved the disarticulation of the link between the NI state and Unionist or Protestant identity (McGarry, 2001; Bryan and McIntosh, 2007). Thirdly, novel political institutions have transformed political representation. Under the consociational or 'power sharing' arrangements, political representation is assured for 'both communities'. The central mechanisms here are the working of the Assembly and the formation of the Executive. Each Member of the Local Assembly (MLA, equivalent of Member of Parliament), upon taking their seat in the Assembly (parliament), must undertake a 'designation of identity' in which they designate themselves as "unionist, nationalist or other" (Carmichael and Knox, 2004). As such, the parliamentarians are divided into three blocs. Key decisions can only be taken according to the principle of 'cross-community' support. This means that in addition to an overall majority, decisions require the support of at least 40% of the Nationalist and Unionist blocs. The 'others' are excluded from this process (Wilford and Wilson, 2001; Finlay, 2004; 2010). Since 'cross-community support' is described by the GFA as the basis of the Assembly, this is a significant exclusion1.

The Executive is then formed via the D'Hondt principle. This means that ministerial seats are distributed according to the relative strength of each party in the Assembly. As such, the Executive incorporates virtually all the political parties and there is effectively no opposition. The equivalent of the office of the Prime Minister takes the form of two positions: the First Minister (FM) and the Deputy First Minister (DFM). The titles here are misleading since they govern jointly (Knox, 2010). The selection of the FM and DFM is subject to cross-community support and as such since the establishment of the Executive the FM has been a Unionist and the DFM a Nationalist. These combined mechanisms ensure that both the decision making power of the Assembly and the Executive will feature strong representation from both designated 'identities'. As such the Republican movement,

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1 Cross-community support is required for all key decisions. This is discussed further in Chapter 6 and in Appendix A.
once the object of enormous state repression, has been incorporated into the state. In many instances former leading members of the IRA are now statesmen.

In sum, the peace process and the GFA are characterized by what we might call a ‘recognition and representation’ formula: the institutional recognition of the ‘identity and aspirations’ of ‘both communities’ and guaranteed political representation for ‘both communities’.

Initially I intended to examine the post-GFA state through the notion of governmentality. The governmentality approach allows us to investigate how discourses and techniques are put to work in processes of subjectification with specific objectives (Rose, 1999; Dean, 1999). The governmentality approach draws our attention away from the state imagined as a central over-arching apparatus of domination, towards micro-practices of power which are immanent to the discourses and practices of government, understood as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Miller and Rose, 1992; Rose, 1999). In NI there are a whole host of novel governmental projects oriented towards incorporating, integrating and managing the ‘two communities’ (Finlay, 2010). Such governmental programmes typically incorporate a variety of state and non-state actors. Many of these actors, moreover, are linked to the Republican movement. In fact, the participation of the Republican movement is crucial because other elements of the state-apparatus, especially the police, cannot operate effectively with regard to the Republican population (Jarman 2006; McEvoy and Mika, 2001).

A clear problem arises here. The notion of governmentality can help us describe the processes of subjectification at work in a given field, but it cannot explain how the Republican movement comes to cooperate with the state in the first place. Governmentality theory explicitly eschews concerns with state legitimacy (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999), and this seems to assume that the state is able to operate with more or less ease. Such a notion is problematic, to say the least, in the context of an armed oppositional movement demanding the abolition of the state. In short, governmentality theory treats

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2 During the conflict the IRA took over the policing of many areas and large sections of the population refused to cooperate with the police. During large periods of time the police could not enter many areas, or could do so only with the support of the army.
government as a process “without an outside” (Singer and Weir, 2006) and ignores the problematic of state legitimacy (Brown, 2006). In the case of NI there is a whole set of transformations at every level of the state which were necessary before specific governmental interventions could become effective. Papadopoulos et al. (2008: 11) pose this problem on a more general level:

[T]his extraordinary attempt [of Foucault’s account of governmentality] to link the subject with power seems to neglect one important aspect of the modern state, what Elias calls its capacity to pacify society. The modern state is more than a paramount form of government. It is not exhausted in technologies of the self and technologies of government.

The limitations of the governmentality approach initially emerged in a pilot interview I conducted with a former Republican political prisoner who is today involved in ‘conflict transformation’ work, a type of work which very much typifies new modes of governmentality in NI. She made it clear to me that I had to understand first of all why and how the Republican movement had agreed to begin operating non-militarily and within the sphere of the state. The question can be posed even more starkly, however, when we consider that until the GFA Republicans did not even recognise NI as a state or polity. Some years ago, in a Dublin pub, a friend of a friend asked me what my PhD research was about. “Northern Ireland”, I replied. His response to this was “I don’t accept the existence of Northern Ireland”. He was an Irish Republican who opposed the peace process. His statement reveals an attitude which would have been common to Republicans prior to the peace process. At bottom, we have here the non-recognition of NI as a polity, i.e. as a meaningful socio-political space. It is a negation of the identity, the symbolic integrity, of NI. These questions go beyond government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ to the construction of the ‘idea of the state’

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3 Conflict transformation engages former political prisoners in working against conflict and the sectarian attitudes which are thought to reproduce conflict in NI. They also frequently undertake a number of quasi-policing functions (Bloomer, 2008).

4 The crisis of the symbolic identity of NI as a state and polity can be discerned in the multiple names that exist for that particular part of the world. Generally, Republicans will use terms such as ‘the six counties’ (which refuses to recognise that territory as a unit) or ‘the North of Ireland’ (which recognises that territory as a part of the larger unit of Ireland).
The dispute over the identity of the polity has been linked to a dispute over the legitimacy of the state. Just as they have rejected the very existence of NI as a polity, Republicans (and Irish nationalists in general) have argued that the NI state does not represent everyone, that it represents a particular group (the British), and that as such it is a tool of domination. What this indicates, or so I will argue (in Chapter 1 and throughout), is that there is a link between the identity of the polity and the universality of the state. This link, and its importance in terms of the transformation of the NI state, was not something I had in mind when I began my research. Rather, as I explored the peace process this issue seemed to touch upon the essential problems with which the GFA grappled: How to reconstruct the universality of the state? How to re-establish the identity of the polity? How to do this in a way which brings Irish republicans along? My contention is that the reconstruction of state universality allows us to approach the question of the state’s capacity to ‘pacify’ society’. This is what I mean by depoliticisation, a situation in which the state can successfully claim a monopoly on universality.

It is also important to situate the transformation of the NI state historically. This is because the form of that transformation is shaped by the conflict which brought it about. This is the case empirically, as I show in the Chapters 5, 6 and 7. But I will also make the claim, in Chapter 1, that on a theoretical level state transformation is propelled by conflict. Just as my purpose is not to analyse the NI state in general, but rather to focus on the ‘idea of the state’ and state universality my analysis of the historical dimension of state transformation targets the dimension of state universality which I argue is key to the transformations under consideration here.

Having briefly introduced how I came to pose the transformation of the NI state in terms of the question of the universality of the state and depoliticisation, I now want to address the question of how I set about researching these themes.

**Approaching State Universality and Depoliticisation**

First of all it is important to distance ourselves from the dominant ideological accounts of the NI conflict. In a nutshell, these accounts argue that the conflict in NI is the result of the existence of a national minority and that minorities inevitably demand recognition, a
demand which could not be accommodated by the pre-conflict NI state because of the homogeneity of the nation-state form. Given that the population is divided in terms of national identity, or so the argument goes, a bi-national state is needed which can recognise the cultural and political identities of both communities (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995; Kearney, 1997; Delanty, 2004).

It is not difficult to see the ideological tendencies at work here. I refer to the retrospective reading of the conflict which presents the contemporary state as inevitable and necessary. Underpinning such accounts is the notion that NI society is made up of two identities and that the post-GFA state is properly universal (in the sense that it represents everyone) because it recognise both identities. In order to critically approach the NI state, I move beyond the celebration of the GFA’s bi-national achievements and interrogate the relationship between universality and identity at work here. In this research I do this in two ways. Firstly, I examine the question of identity and universality at stake in the early years of the conflict. The years 1968-1972 saw the emergence of a political movement, the CRM, which charged the NI state with systematic discrimination. The CRM led to a massive delegitimisation of the state, eventually leading to its collapse in 1972. In contrast to those dominant accounts that argue that the CRM was a struggle for identitarian recognition, I am interested in the way the movement challenges the identitarian exclusions of the state and poses itself as the locus of universal politics. In other words, I investigate the way the CRM challenges the NI state’s ‘monopoly on universality’. The second way in which I approach the theme of universality in the transformation of the NI state is by examining the way in which the post-GFA Sate re-constructs the state’s monopoly on universality. I do this by examining sovereignty and citizenship under the post-GFA state. Each of these fields has historically been central to the relationship between the state and universality.

**Historical relationship between state universality and depoliticisation**

As noted, my research examines the politics of the CRM. I address this by examining the ‘political singularity’ (Badiou, 2010; 2005) at stake in the subjectivity of the Civil Rights Movement. As will be discussed further in Chapters 1 and 4, Badiou argues that each political movement is characterised by a singular subjectivity. The historical analysis of
specific political singularities is an important task today in terms of reconstructing the possibility of emancipatory politics (Badiou, 2010; Bosteels, 2010). In relation to this thesis, I am specifically interested in how this movement relates to state universality. I draw on the accounts of militants at the time and, in particular, the demands launched by the movement. However, the CRM was a tragically short-lived movement as it was eventually over-taken by the Provisional IRA and its politics of Irish Republicanism. This shift, or so I will argue, would be central to the transformation of the NI state as it is through the recognition and incorporation of the Republican movement that the state would later re-construct its monopoly on universality. At the heart of this is what I will call, following Ranciere, the logic of identification. I argue that the universal politics of the CRM gives way to the identitarian nation-statism of Irish Republicanism, and that the introduction of this identitarian dimension paves the way for state recognition. My research thus has an affinity with those critical accounts which treat the ‘identitarianisation’ of NI as a process. However, while existing accounts tend to situate the origins of this process at the level of the state (McVeigh and Rolston, 2007) and governmentality (Finlay, 2010), I trace the emergence of the logic of identification within the movement. The vector of this process is Republicanism and its identitarian and nationalist politics, which gain hegemony within the movement by around 1972.

I refer to the shift from the universal politics of the CRM to the identitarianism of Irish Republicanism under the Badiouian term ‘point’ (Badiou, 2010; 2005). A ‘point’, Badiou argues, is a ‘failure’ within a movement, a failure to remain faithful to and to develop its singularity. The analysis of a point is an important critical exercise:

\[\text{Any failure is a lesson which, ultimately can be incorporated into the positive universality of the construction of a truth. Before that can be done, the point over which the choice proved to be disastrous must be located, found and reconstructed. (Badiou, 2010: 39)}\]

Moreover, as opposed to the Euro-soviet bias noticeable in the work of Badiou and Ranciere, I follow Bruno Bosteels in arguing that today it is also important to examine experiences from the colonial and post-colonial world, “including the legacy of insurrectionary mass action and armed struggle, which in the context of Latin America, Asia and Africa is certainly at least as important, if not more so than, the old questions of
party and state” (Bosteels, 2010: 64). While there are many debates around Ireland and the North of Ireland’s colonial status, the centrality of armed insurrection and national liberation in Northern Ireland’s ‘long 1968’ means it falls outside a more euro-centric focus on worker’s struggles and student movements.

This thesis, then, seeks to situate the transformation of the NI state and depoliticisation in relation to the experience of the political sequence which commenced in October 1968, and in doing so to contribute to our understanding of what was specific to that experience and what accounts for its ultimate exhaustion and collapse. It will also be argued that the collapse of the CRM into identitarian politics is central to the transformation of the state as it is the nationalist subjectivity of Republicanism which will be incorporated via the transformation of the NI state.

**Depoliticisation and state universality in the contemporary NI state**

The incorporation of the Republican movement into the state finds its apex in the GFA. On a broad level we can see, based on even a cursory understanding of the peace process, that the Republican movement has accepted the legitimacy of the new NI state. However, developing a specific analysis of the way in which the ‘idea of the state’ and the symbolic construction of its universality occurs is less straightforward. In order to investigate this we will need to focus on concrete spheres in which the universality of the state is presented, declared or otherwise at stake. I focus on two spheres in which the universality of the state has historically been central: sovereignty and citizenship. I will argue that both of these spheres are underpinned by a specific mode of staging the unity and universality of the state.

**Sovereignty**

The theoretical approach to sovereignty employed in this thesis is laid out in Chapter 2. I conceptualise sovereignty in terms of what I call a meta-political rationality, a discourse on the authority of the state and on the source of power. This discourse, I argue, both establishes the identity of the polity and, by aligning itself with that identity, stages the universality of the state, presenting the state as transcendental vis-à-vis particular interests. Sovereignty is thus a curious and paradoxical phenomenon; it is a rationality which both
appears within the polity and at the same time it is constitutive of the very polity within which it appears as an intelligible discourse (Bartelson, 1995). I develop a specific theoretical approach and analytical strategy through which to analyse the mode of sovereignty underpinning the GFA. It is necessary to do so because the GFA differs in substantial ways from national sovereignty (Bell, 2008; Morison, 2009). Hence the task is to develop a conceptual approach to sovereignty which is not over-determined by our conception of national sovereignty in order to grasp sovereignty beyond the nation (Walker, 2000; Keating, 2003). Chapter 6 presents my analysis of sovereignty. Here I argue that, in contrast to those writers who see GFA sovereignty as a ‘blurred’ (Bell, 2008) or ‘flexible’ (Doyle, 1999; 2004) version of national sovereignty, GFA sovereignty represents a qualitatively new form of sovereignty. This, I argue is a multicultural sovereignty because it constructs the universality of the state on the basis of the ‘principle of recognition’. The recognition of two national communities, and their equal legitimacy, is, somewhat paradoxically, the foundation for the identity of the polity and the unity of the state. I also examine the effects of this form of sovereignty on politics, specifically examining the implications of the way in which the state appropriates universality.

Citizenship
The second field in which I investigate state universality is that of citizenship. Existing research shows that the nation-state founds itself on a whole host of technologies of citizenship eliciting a particular form of identification (Kiberd, 1996; Anderson, 1993; Hardt and Negri, 2000). In contemporary NI, the transformation of the state in general has been accompanied by a new discourse and set of policies promoting a new type of citizenship. In chapter 3 I develop the theoretical approach to citizenship employed here. I conceptualise citizenship as a technology which has a normative ethico-political dimension: it relates to the production of the subject qua political subject. I draw here on the governmentality school (Rose, 1999; Cruikshank, 1994) and on Egin Isin's (2002a; 2002b) approach to citizenship, identity and difference. Chapter 7 presents my analysis of NI citizenship, focusing on a particular set of policy documents which both articulate a vision of citizenship and also attempt to implement this vision through urban design and regeneration. I argue that this set of technologies of citizenship are also founded on the 'principle of recognition', i.e. the mutual recognition of the identities of each 'community'.
This is thus a multicultural citizenship. Again I examine the political implications of such a vision of citizenship, particularly given that the citizen is apparently deprived of any universal dimension, other than the universal injunction to tolerate difference.

Depoliticisation and the contemporary Northern Irish state

In addition to identifying and theorising the mode in which, at the level of citizenship and sovereignty, the contemporary NI state constructs its monopoly on universality I also identify the dimension of depoliticisation at work in this process. I argue that the state appropriates universality in a way which evacuates universality from the polity such that it is no longer a field of contestation. By founding the universality of the state on the principle of recognition political actors within the polity are reduced to the logic of identification. The dimension of universality is permanently appropriated by the state. As such politics is factionalised, becoming the mere negotiation of identities and interest between the two communities which are recognised. Following the political philosophy of Claude Lefort (1986; 1988), I argue that democracy, in its modern form, is not operative, because universality is not subject to contestation.

Conclusion

In sum, I examine the transformation of the NI state in terms of state universality, its crisis and eventual reconstruction. I examine this process as it operated historically in the crucial years of the challenging and eventual collapse of the previous NI state (1968-72). I then analyse the reconstruction of state universality in the forms of sovereignty and citizenship which underpin the contemporary state. Throughout this process I examine the process of depoliticisation, both within the movement and in the institutionalised forms of sovereignty and citizenship
Chapter Overview

Chapter 1 deals with the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in terms of the relationship between state transformation and politics. In the first section I discuss the state as symbolic regime and specifically the symbolic staging of the state's identity, or the 'idea of the state'. I develop this theorisation with regard to the question of state universality. In the second section I examine politics, drawing primarily on the work of Jacques Ranciere. I conceptualise politics as a form of subjectivity characterised by an antagonistic relationship towards the state and by an egalitarian and, most importantly, universal dimension. The final section theorises the relationship between politics and the state. I discuss contemporary theory which foregrounds the transformative potential of political subjectivity and theorises the state and other forms of power in terms of the way in which they respond to and incorporate politics. In this chapter I discuss relevant literature and develop my own theoretical approach to state transformation. This theoretical dimension is also central to the methodology of this thesis.

Chapter 2 deals with the theory of sovereignty in relation to the question of state universality. I discuss and critique existing theoretical literature on sovereignty by way of developing my own approach. I conceptualise sovereignty as a meta-political rationality which constitutes the identity of the polity and, by aligning the state with that identity, establishes the state's claim to universality. The theorisation of sovereignty I develop is central to my analysis of contemporary Northern Irish sovereignty (Chapter 6) and as such forms part of my methodology. In this chapter I also discuss literature on post-national forms of sovereignty and on the Good Friday Agreement.

Chapter 3 deals with existing literature on citizenship and sets out the approach which underpins my analysis of citizenship in Chapter 7. I conceptualise citizenship as a form of governmentality. I examine the relationship between citizenship and the state, identity and depoliticisation, respectively. This chapter also deals with the literature on multicultural citizenship in relation to depoliticisation.

Chapter 4 deals with methodology. Given the social-theoretical nature of my research, the preceding chapters form part of my broader methodology in that they develop the
theoretical and conceptual tools which underpin my analysis. This chapter develops on the methodological dimension of my theoretical framework. I also describe the form of analysis employed in my research as well as the sources I draw on.

Chapter 5 is the first of three chapters which present my analysis and deals with historical depoliticisation. I step back from the analysis of state universality in contemporary Northern Ireland in order to situate recent state transformation in its historical context. The historical context is central to my analysis for two reasons. I argue that the contemporary state represents the incorporation and depoliticisation of the political subjectivity which emerged during Northern Ireland’s 1968. As such, it is necessary to understand the nature of that subjectivity, a task I undertake in this chapter. I also argue that the process of depoliticisation commences within the movement in the form of the Provisional IRA and its logic of identification. I describe the development of the Civil Rights Movement and the process through which that movement was overtaken by the Provisional IRA, and I conceptualise the implications of the latter in terms of depoliticisation.

Chapter 6 presents my analysis of the form of sovereignty set out in the Good Friday Agreement in terms of state universality. I argue that GFA sovereignty recognises and incorporates the Republican movement in a manner which reconstructs state universality. I conceptualise this form of universality in terms of multicultural sovereignty because it subordinates the sovereignty of the people to the principle of recognition. This chapter theorises the GFA’s multicultural sovereignty. I also develop a critique of this form of sovereignty by examining the way in which the state appropriates universality.

Chapter 7 continues with the theme of state universality, this time focusing on the analysis of citizenship. I analyse the most significant policy framework around citizenship to have emerged since the GFA. I also analyse the implementation of the political rationality which underpins this form of citizenship in a specific policy field: urban regeneration. I argue that what is at stake here is a form of multicultural citizenship which, like sovereignty, is underpinned by the principle of recognition. I develop a critique of this multicultural citizenship by demonstrating the way in which it is characterised by the logic of identification and the way in which it evacuates citizenship of any universal dimension.
In the concluding chapter I bring together the analysis developed in relation to historical depoliticisation, sovereignty and citizenship. I describe the trajectory of depoliticisation we can trace throughout these three fields. I then situate my research with regard to three bodies of contemporary literature: multiculturalism and depoliticisation; post-politics; and contemporary accounts of ‘Imperial’ and ‘transnational’ sovereignty.

I have included three appendices. Appendix A provides a summary of the Good Friday Agreement, including the various institutions and agencies it sets up. Appendix B provides a summary of sources used and additional information on those sources. I give some historical background on the activists whose accounts I draw on. Appendix B also includes further information on the policies of *A Shared Future* and shared space and on the Skainos project. Appendix C is a short glossary of concepts which some readers may find useful.
Chapter 1
Thinking the State: Theoretical Overview

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and elaborate the theoretical and conceptual tools that form the heart and soul of this thesis. Given the social theoretical aspirations of this thesis, the theoretical considerations I will discuss here are also methodological in nature, in that the conceptual tools I develop are central to the method of this research. The central question I address here is how to conceptualise the universality of the state and its relationship with politics and depoliticisation.

I want to begin, however, with some methodological considerations developed by Bourdieu (1994) in his *Rethinking the state: origin and genesis of the bureaucratic field*. Bourdieu commences with an invaluable observation:

To endeavour to think the state is to take the risk of taking over (or being taken over by) a thought of the state, i.e. of applying to the state categories of thought produced and guaranteed by the state and hence to misrecognise its most profound truth. (Bourdieu, 1994:1)

Why should this be the case? Bourdieu argues that the state can only be understood when we grasp what he calls its ‘monopoly of symbolic violence’, by which he means the state’s highly concentrated capacity to organise the symbolic field via the production and inculcation of ‘cognitive structures’. In this Bourdieu’s approach bears similarities to that of both Ranciere and Badiou. Their approaches to the state in terms of symbolic and representational issues will be explored more fully below. Here I want to focus on the reflexive implications of Bourdieu’s insights. Given that the state is itself productive of the categories, the ‘visions and divisions’, which render key social fields operative (education, law, commerce), when thought proceeds through these categories it cannot think the state but, rather, is thought by the state, in other words it becomes a state operation. No wonder, then, that social science has had a key role in producing the state itself:
Most of the writings devoted to the state partake, more or less efficaciously and directly, of the construction of the state, i.e., of its very existence...From its inception, social science itself has been part and parcel of this work of construction of the representation of the state which makes up part of the reality of the state itself. (Bourdieu, 1994: 3, author’s emphasis)

In Northern Ireland, due to the recentness of the present state, we have the opportunity to witness the relation between social sciences and state-formation at close range (Finlay, 2010; Zalewski, 2006). I want to explore this briefly in relation to two categories which are central to state discourse in NI: ‘conflict’ and the new politics of ‘peaceful democracy’. According to the dominant reading, the problem in NI was that of a violent conflict between two identitarian groups oriented around competing national claims. The solution is to inaugurate a mode of politics capable of achieving consensus between diverse subjects on the basis of dialogue and respect for difference, i.e. a Habermasian, multiculturalist conception of politics (O’Neill, 2007). This solution is usually referred to in state documents and the discourse of its representatives as ‘peaceful democracy’. There is already a substantial literature on this new politics. The great majority of this literature, however, takes as its point of departure that the problem in Northern Ireland is an identitarian conflict and the objective of the state should be the resolution of this via a new politics capable of achieving consensus through dialogue and respect for difference (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; McGarry, 2001; O’Neill, 2007; Delanty, 2004; Kibed, 2000; Aughey, 2005; Knox, 2010; Kearney, 1997). In other words it operates within the coordinates of state-sanctioned conceptions of politics and democracy. Such writers not only rationalise the legitimacy of the current state but participate in the very symbolic formation of the state. The result is a circular and sterile debate completely trapped within the terms of the state itself.

5 With regard to the nation-state this has been explored in terms of Beck’s critique of social science’s ‘methodological nationalism’. Today, it seems to me that sociology is most complicit with the production and reproduction of the state where it takes ‘state-sanctioned’ problems as its point of departure, adopting the pseudo-universality of the state and attempting to stand over and order the social field with ‘policy fixes’ (Agulles, 2010). To quote Bourdieu once more, ‘state bureaucracies and their representatives are great producers of “social problems” that social science does little more than ratify whenever it takes them over as “sociological” problems.’ (Bourdieu, 1994: 2)
The methodological upshot of this is that in order to think the state it is imperative that we think at a distance from the state. This means developing concepts which are heterogeneous to those state-sanctioned concepts through which the state presents itself to thought. The purpose of this chapter, then, could be described as a conceptual destatification. I approach this conceptual destatification via critical social theory, in particular the work of Alain Badiou and Jacques Ranciere. These writers are of particular importance with regard to the NI state, since the predominant rendering of the state, the state's auto-representation, is characterised by a reduction of politics to consensual negotiation between identitarian communities. Badiou and Ranciere's approach to the state (or power) and politics, and the antagonistic relation between the two, presents a radically alternative notion. By developing concepts of conflict and politics which are foundationally heterogeneous to the state-sanctioned versions I aim to provide a novel and critical account of the state outside its own terms.

But there is another reason why these two terms should be central to any theory of the state, and this relates to the question of how we can account for the particular form taken by a given state. The state, as Marx said, is the 'table of contents' of conflict. The politics of the state, what I will call state-politics, reflects a process of capture, incorporation and depoliticisation of the conflicts and antagonisms which traverse the social (Badiou, 2005; Russo, 2006; Negri, 1999; Papadopoulos et al., 2008). In other words, the form of the state is to be explained by examining the ways in which the state absorbs oppositional, extra-statist politics. This is also necessarily a depoliticisation as the terms of the conflict are translated into state-sanctioned categories, thus becoming elements in the process of state reproduction itself. This dynamic has been explored in relation to forms of state which have emerged to incorporate and depoliticise political movements such as African National Liberation struggles (Neocosmos, 1998); the Cultural Revolution (Russo, 2006); the global 1968 (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Badiou, 2010); the workers movement (Negri, 1988; Hardt and Negri, 2000); the 'refusal of work' (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Virno, 1996; De Giorgi, 2006); and the French Revolution (Negri, 1999).

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6 Here I am paraphrasing Badiou's insistence that politics operates 'at a distance from the state' (Badiou, 2005)
7 I take this term from Michael Neocosmos (1998; 2009b). In this chapter I distinguish between politics, or political subjectivity and the state. state-politics refers to the public activities (elections, negotiations, etc) normally referred to as politics. This distinction is elaborated fully below.
I will argue here then that the state can be thought through its depoliticisation of conflict. Political conflict, in this view, evinces a politics which is excessive vis-à-vis the state. It is precisely because political conflict is excessive vis-à-vis the state that it is capable of generating qualitative transformations (Badiou, 2005; Negri, 1999), such as that which has occurred in contemporary NI.

I begin by examining the concept of the state and state universality. In the second section I develop a concept of politics and depoliticisation, and in the final section I examine the relation between the two with regard to state transformation.

The theoretical and conceptual issues pertaining to the more specific fields through which I examine the NI state, sovereignty and citizenship, are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3.

**The State and Universality**

My conception of the state involves a number of arguments:

1. The symbolic dimension is crucial to the state;
2. The idea and identity of the state is symbolically staged;
3. The symbolic staging of the identity of the state is central to the state universality.

I will now take these issues in turn, beginning with the symbolic nature of the state.

**The symbolic dimension of the state**

As noted in the Introduction, following Abrams (2006) we can distinguish between the 'idea of the state' and the 'state-system'. In other words, the state is both a bureaucratic apparatus and a symbolic regime (Lefort, 1986; Badiou, 2005; Ranciere, 1998; Bourdieu, 1994; 1996; Abrams, 2006). Within political sociology and especially political science the state is generally seen simply as a bureaucratic apparatus, i.e. as a set of administrative functions of a public nature. This element of the state, the state-system, refers to the actual institutional mechanisms of the state with which we are all familiar. However, Wacquant (1996: xvii) notes:
We remain overly wedded to the (eighteenth-century) view of the state as “revenue collector and recruiting sergeant” when we see in it that agent which successfully monopolizes legitimate physical violence and neglect to notice alongside that it also, more decisively, monopolizes legitimate *symbolic* violence.

In this view, which neglects the symbolic dimension of the state, the question of the subject’s relation to the state is only secondarily examined through the notion of ‘legitimacy’. The state is presented as an institution which can go about getting legitimacy from subjects who are essentially external to it (Bourdieu, 1992). What such an account fails to grasp is that the subject always-already encounters themselves as a subject of the state (Althusser, 2006; Badiou, 2005). Bourdieu’s work is instructive here:

If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought. By realizing itself in social structures and in mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts of *institution* (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of the *natural*. (Bourdieu, 1994: 4)

It is indeed this element which, I argue, makes the state resistant to definition. As many have highlighted, the state is illusive in nature, its ‘essence’ always eludes our grasp (Bartelson, 2001; Jessop, 2007; Runciman, 2003; Abrams, 2006; Badiou, 2005). This is no coincidence. The fact that the state cannot be identified with any one institution, function or actor is a symptom of its mode of domination. Bourdieu notes (1992: 115) that under “symbolic domination, resistance is more difficult, since it is something you absorb like air, something you don’t feel pressured by; it is everywhere and nowhere and to escape from that is very difficult”.

As such the subject is part of the state and the submission of the subject is more or less automatically guaranteed by the subject’s immersion in the symbolic regime of the state. As many have highlighted, the state is illusive in nature, its ‘essence’ always eludes our grasp (Bartelson, 2001; Jessop, 2007; Runciman, 2003; Abrams, 2006; Badiou, 2005). This is no coincidence. The fact that the state cannot be identified with any one institution, function or actor is a symptom of its mode of domination. Bourdieu notes (1992: 115) that under “symbolic domination, resistance is more difficult, since it is something you absorb like air, something you don’t feel pressured by; it is everywhere and nowhere and to escape from that is very difficult”.

As such the subject is part of the state and the submission of the subject is more or less automatically guaranteed by the subject’s immersion in the symbolic regime of the state. In other words “[t]he state is not only “out there” in the form of bureaucracies, authorities, and ceremonies. It is also “in here”, inefficibly engraved within us, lodged in the intimacy

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8 This is not to suggest that there are not innumerable points in which subjectivity slips beyond the reach of the symbolic regime of the state
of our being in the shared manners in which we feel, think, and judge” (Wacquant, 1996: xviii).

To take a familiar example, the patriarchal state is clearly a set of institutions of a bureaucratic nature. However, these institutions would be completely unintelligible and inoperative if they did not correspond to the symbolic regime of gender, a regime which goes beyond the narrowly defined remit of the state-system. If we take the various institutions and policies organized around the family as an example, it is clear that these are reliant on their subjects being inscribed within particular gender roles. This means that the apparent naturalness or obviousness with which state institutions can function in an administrative sense belies the fact that both institutions and the subjects they operate upon are inscribed within the same symbolic regime, in this case that of the patriarchal state.

A further example here is the nation-state. A wide variety of researchers and theorists have argued that the state as national state is constituted at the level of representation; there is nothing given or pre-symbolic about the national (Anderson, 1993; Bhaba, 1990). It is also well known that the subjects of the nation-state have generally been inscribed within the symbolic regime of the nation via processes of subjectification and othering (Anderson, 1993; Hartd and Negri, 2000). The result is that both state-system and subject are inscribed within the same symbolic regime, the national. The subject encounters themselves within a symbolic social space, say Ireland, which is coterminous with the state-system itself (i.e. the state-system’s institutional reach is coterminous with the borders of Ireland) and finds themselves caught up in a community (the Irish people) who are also the population and polity of the state. The subject, the polity and the state are symbolically aligned such that they appear to come together naturally.

The identity of the state

However, while the state can be conceptualised as a symbolic regime, we can identify a specific dimension of this which is central for the present research. Here we can return again to Abrams’ term the ‘idea of the state’ and its staging of the identity of the state. What I mean by the identity of the state is simply that the state, as an overarching unit must be established. The idea of, say, ‘Ireland’ as a nation-state has to be established at a
symbolic level. The very coherence of the socio-symbolic space of the state, within which we encounter ourselves as state-political subjects, has to be accomplished. Moreover, in each case we can say that there is a principle which establishes the 'oneness' of the state, which makes it meaningful and intelligible to speak of Ireland or Germany etc.

This is best described via an example. In the case of the nation-state, 'the national' is what gives meaning to the state; it renders a more or less arbitrary territory and set of elements (bureaucratic organisations, social groups and classes, etc.) intelligible as a coherent and unified socio-symbolic space. In other words, the inscription of the state within the national as symbolic regime establishes the identity, the ontological integrity, of the state. The national can thus be described as the principle which establishes the identity of the state, what Badiou calls the state's symbolic 'counting as one' of the situation (Badiou, 2005; Hallward, 2003).

The relationship between identity and the state, in terms of the identity of the state and the socio-symbolic space of the state, has been a theme in political philosophy for many centuries. One of the earliest expressions of this theme can be found in Marsilius of Padua's (1324) *Defensor Pacis*, in which he articulates the state as 'a plurality of men who are said to be some one thing in number not because they are one in number formally but rather because they are said to be related to one thing in number' (quoted in Bartelson, 1995: 103, my emphasis). More well-known treatise, such as Hobbes' (1996) Leviathan or Rousseau's (1895) General Will, also evoke a kind of symbolic or representational transformation of the 'multitude' (an inchoate set of disparate elements) into one 'people' via the singular figure of the state (see also Hardt and Negri, 2000; Brown, 2010)⁹.

**The identity of the state and universality**

The state is the principal (or only) agency within society which is experienced as universal, i.e. not as a particular agency relating to a particular group within the polity. It relates to, 'stands for' or represents the whole polity in a way that transcends the particular differences of groups. My contention is that this is achieved through the staging of the

⁹ On a more general level we are reminded of Durkheim's observation that through the worship of the totem, the religious community establishes its oneness as they relate to the totem as a single object.
symbolic identity of the state (Abrams, 2006). We can take a number of examples here. If the national establishes the identity of the state, then the state becomes not just an institution within the nation but is identified with the nation tout court. In other words the state transcends the particular interests and identities operative within the socio-symbolic space and comes to stand for the socio-symbolic space in general. Other instances include the communist state’s alignment with the universality of the Proletariat or the theocratic state’s self-identification with the universal community of God.

It is this transcendence vis-à-vis any particular section or interest within the polity that positions the state as the guarantor of stability, as the glue that prevents society falling apart in a war of all against all. The classic philosophical expression of the state’s universality can be found in Hegel’s (2005) *On the Philosophy of Right*, in which Hegel conceptualises the modern state as the embodiment of the historical development of universal rationality (see also Bartelson, 2001). Across modern political philosophy, whether in the form of the Leviathan (Hobbes, 1996) or the General Will (Rousseau, 1895), the state will continue to be identified with the universal transcendence of the particular interests within the polity (Hartd and Negri, 2000). It is for this reason, for example, that state violence is presented not as a particular violence for particular interests but as a universal violence behind which lies no interest other than that of ‘checking’ or limiting particular, private interests and violences.

Moreover, because of the state’s appropriation of universality, groups within the polity are particularised, reduced to representing specific sectoral or factional interests. Universality can only be accessed via the state. In this sense the state’s monopoly on universality tends to foreclose the emergence of universal political subjectivity outside the state (Badiou, 2005).

Whereas political universality, as argued in the next section, consists in the suspension of identity, state universality, as argued above, stems precisely from identity. Not a specific identity within, say the nation, but the identity of the nation in general. Here it becomes important to recall the theoretical work which has demonstrated that identity, and in particular the identity of the national, is symbolically constituted via exclusions or othering
(Hall, 1996; Bhaba, 1990; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Thus, state universality is perhaps a ‘false’ universality. Whereas political universality tends to open up the symbolic regime of the state and unleash multiplicity, the state universal is precisely, as Goldberg (2002) characterises it, ‘heterogeneity in denial’.

It is only in relatively rare moments of political conflict, in which the ‘oneness’ of the situation is split by the ‘two’ of conflict, that the state’s sham universality is revealed and contested. Returning once more to classic modern philosophy, Marx’ powerful critique of Hegel’s political philosophy consisted precisely in demonstrating that “the state is not an embodiment of universal interest, but that it is ultimately derivative and expressive of particular interests in society” (Bartelson, 2001: 118) and that “[a]s a consequence, the symbolic expressions of unity and universality associated with the state are in fact arbitrary and contingent, reflecting particular claims to universality”. (Bartelons, 2001: 119, author’s emphasis). In short, for Marx “[T]he state is essentially particularity dressed up as universality”. (Bartelons, 2001: 119)

In terms of politics, it is the emergence of a subjectivity excessive to the symbolic regime of the state which reveals the particularity which stands behind the state’s appearance of universality (Badiou, 2005). Hence it is the proletariat that shows the specifically bourgeoisie nature of the state just as it is subaltern movements which reveal the way in which the state is linked to the identity of the dominant identitarian group. In NI, as argues in Chapter 5, the Civil Rights Movement demonstrates the sectarian/identitarian truth behind the state’s claims of neutrality.

Moving to more general concerns for a moment, it seems to me that state universality, as discussed above, guarantees the submission of the state-political subject and mitigates against radical transformation; it makes us “gently bow under a yoke we do not even feel”. (Wacquant, 1996: xviii). This is because of the fact that the state becomes aligned with the identity of the socio-symbolic space within which we become state-political subjects. Thus, the prospect of the end of the state (for example anarchism) is experienced generally not just as the disappearance of one institution but as a situation of absolute chaos. In other

10 See Badiou’s text ‘One divides into two’ which features in his 2007 book The Century.
words it is experienced as the traumatic loss of the principle which gives symbolic integrity to the socio-political space. When we imagine the end of the state we tend to imagine society *falling apart* in a war of ‘all against all’. I believe that analyzing how the state comes to be experienced as such is an important research agenda if we are to understand the question posed by Spinoza, and again by Deleuze and Guattari, as the key political question: ‘Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?’

In the next chapter I explore the relationship between the identity of the state and the polity with regard to sovereignty. I address the construction of state universality via sovereignty in terms of sovereignty’s alignment of the state with the identity of the polity.

**Politics and Depoliticisation**

If we want to provide a critique of the state in terms of depoliticisation it will be necessary to develop an explicit concept of politics. In my view, the lack of a clear understanding of the specificity of politics is a problem in critical sociological accounts of depoliticisation (for example, in relation to the NI state, see McVeigh and Rolston, 2007; Rolston, 1998). Jacques Ranciere is a philosopher who has attempted to think the specificity of politics without founding the latter on any empirical characteristic, interest or contradiction. Ranciere is also a writer who more than any other allows us to appreciate what is lost when conflict is eliminated or foreclosed. In this sense, his work diverges from the present emphasis on consensus, deliberation, participation and collaboration associated with the work of Jurgen Habermas. Ranciere’s work is of crucial importance for the present research because of both the way in which he establishes the foundational link between politics and conflict and the way in which he examines the modes of thought and practice through which this conflict is ‘domesticated’. In what follows I elaborate on his notions of politics and depoliticisation.

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11 Habermas’ work has been quite influential in NI, as elsewhere. Two prominent academics who strongly support the current NI state do so on the basis of Habermasian social theory (O’Neill, 2007; Delanty, 2004).

12 Much of Ranciere’s work closely resembles that of Badiou. Here I examine these issues through Ranciere’s ideas because he himself develops these ideas in a more direct relation with the question of politics. Badiou’s is *a prima philosophia* and as such his conception of conflict and politics are linked to his broader theory of being, concerns which go beyond the scope of this thesis.
Ranciere's disagreement

In confronting the relationship between conflict and politics in his key work of political philosophy, *Disagreement*, Ranciere goes back to the beginning, to Aristotle.

Aristotle’s conception of politics centres on the distinction between *logos* and *phone*. All animals can emit a noise which indicates pleasure or pain but humans are political animals in their possession of *logos*, their ability to understand the sign, to speak and comprehend. Spivak once pointed out that there is a crucial difference between the question ‘can the subaltern speak?’ and ‘can the subaltern talk?’ Anyone can say words, but not everyone’s words count. This difference defines the inside and outside of the political community, those who can speak and those who cannot. Ranciere’s key philosophical move consists in demonstrating that the distinction between those who can speak and those who cannot, between discourse and noise, between the political and the extra-political, is the gap within which politics occurs. In other words, Aristotle’s distinction between *logos* and *phone* doesn’t ‘settle’ the question of politics; it is the question through which the political occurs (Ranciere, 1998).

The politics of every situation, for Ranciere, is defined by a particular mode of organising who can speak and what they can speak about, as well as a certain distribution of space, time, bodies and functions. This is what Ranciere (2004) calls the ‘distribution of the sensible’. The distinction between *logos* and *phone* is also the distinction between a community within which the *logos* circulates and ‘makes common’ matters which pertain to that community, and the world outside the community, the natural or extra-political world:

I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in common lends

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13 Spivak made this point at a conference entitled ‘Feminism and Deconstruction’ which took place between the 25th and 27th of January, 2006 in the MACBA, Barcelona.
itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution. (Ranciere, 2004: 12)

To take an example which Ranciere refers to in *Disagreement*, and mentioned already above, feminism (of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} wave) turns around the question of the personal and the political. Feminism confronts a regime in which the domestic sphere, the sphere of reproduction, is not designated as political; it is not a matter for the community. The domestic sphere is ruled by an extra-political authority, the ‘natural’ authority of the law of the father. Domestic concerns are thus an issue for the consideration of the father. The subject who is assigned to this sphere, woman, is not a political subject\textsuperscript{14}. Feminists have theorised this in terms of the public/private sphere and comprehensively demonstrated that emancipation and politicisation depend precisely on the contestation of this split between that which is political and that which is private and between the subject of politics and the object of the law of the father. Patriarchy can thus be described in terms of a particular distribution of the sensible, an organisation of bodies, spaces, functions and times which delimits that which is political and that which is not. Turning a given object or grievance (e.g. reproductive work) into a political concern depends on the emergence of a political subject who names that grievance. A dispute over the naming of an object as a political grievance is always a dispute over the status of the object and the status of the subject who names the object as a political grievance. The distribution of the sensible is thus an organisation of who can speak, what is sayable and what is visible. Within a properly patriarchal scenario ‘domestic’ matters are simply not visible from the point of view of the distribution of the sensible, political statements about them are not sayable and the subject of the enunciation of those statements is not perceivable as a political subject.

The feminist declaration ‘the personal is political’, from Ranciere’s perspective, is an effect of feminist politicisation and not an empirical declaration. The fact that there are power relations in the sphere assigned the name domestic does not mean that it is automatically political\textsuperscript{15}. Ranciere thus introduces a distinction between a field in which

\textsuperscript{14} Holston (2008: 311) also makes use of this example by way of elucidating generic political dynamics. He traces the distinction around which patriarchy turns back to Aristotle’s distinction between oikos (the household, considered extra-political) and Polis.

\textsuperscript{15} “The fact that there are always forms of power does not mean that there is always such a thing as politics...” (Ranciere, 2004: 51). Badiou insists on the same point, as Hallward notes with reference to
there are power relations organised around a particular distribution of the sensible and ‘politics’ which interrupts that field, which suspends the distribution of the sensible or reveals its contingency (Ranciere, 1998; 2001). ‘Police’ is the name Ranciere gives to the aesthetic and discursive regime which maintains the distribution of the sensible. I take the term police to be more or less consistent with the notion of the state as symbolic regime outlined above. ‘Politics’ is the name Ranciere gives to the activity of interrupting the police, or the state in my terms. *Politics is thus excessive vis-à-vis any police attempt to define what is political and what is not.*

The police or the distribution of the sensible is thus always a mode of perceiving who counts and who does not count, who is taken into account and who is not taken into account, who is counted and who is uncounted. Each police order maintains a ‘count of the parts’ of the community which is simultaneously an exclusion or invisibilisation of those who are not considered equal parts of the community, for example due to some racial or other characteristic. This produces a part which is not considered a full part of the community, particularly in relation to the question of rule. This ‘part’ is what Ranciere calls ‘the part of no part’ (1998). For example, in a Bourgeoisie state, the working class is clearly part of the situation but only as productive bodies, i.e. they are assigned a particular place (the factory) and role (production) which simultaneously includes them in the situation, reduces them to a particular function and excludes them from the business of government. Ranciere often refers to Plato’s classic formula here, whereby the workers cannot participate in government because they only have time for work and because their aptitudes are only suitable for work (e.g. Ranciere, 2006). This is the sense in which the working class might be considered a ‘part of no part’. The politics which interrupts the distribution of the sensible turns around the confrontation of the ‘part of no part’ and the ‘count of the parts’, i.e. the police/distribution of the sensible. Politics thus involves a subjectivisation of the part of no part in an antagonistic relation with the police. While in a Foucauldian mode we would speak of subjectivisation as the constitution of the subject within a power relation, I use the term subjectivisation to refer to the antagonistic

_Badiou’s philosophy: “as much as love or art, true politics is exceptional, an exception to the contemporary cliché that ‘everything is political’”. (Hallward, 2003: 224)_

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establishment of a political subject which is excessive to the subject-identities that are perceivable within the police order of representation, or the symbolic regime of the state. Ranciere himself alternates between the terms subjectivisation and subjectification\(^{16}\), but the concept is the same:

By *subjectification* I mean the production through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience. (Ranciere, 1998: 35, author’s emphasis)

By grounding the subjectivisation proper to politics in the excessive outside of the subject positions constituted within the field of power relations, Ranciere’s work resembles Butler’s (2004) notion of dis-identification, a term which he employs himself in his 1992 article ‘Politics, Identification, Subjectivisation’. While Butler’s notion of disidentification relates primarily to the possibility of transformation within the sexual-symbolic order, Ranciere attempts to account for politics as a *generic possibility of transformation within any symbolic, representational or, as he puts it, aesthetic regime.*

It is worth emphasising that the gap between the police and politics (the gap which sustains the very possibility of politics) is *incommensurable*. A dispute between two subjects can be resolved. If there is a misunderstanding terms can be clarified, if there is an unwillingness to listen force of various kinds can be applied. This kind of negotiating, which is normally called politics and which is what the police order declares politics, is not political in Ranciere’s terms. For Ranciere, in fact, everything which we associate with mainstream politics is understood as police. It is undertaken within the distribution of the sensible between already visible actors, i.e. it does not interrupt the police order. The police, in fact, is precisely all of the arrangements for the apportionment of resources, the participation of already visible actors, the mechanisms for addressing problems etc. A *political* subject, in contrast, is not visible prior to the interruption of the police order which opens up an antagonism around the visible and the sayable. A *political* dispute centres not just on the apportionment of rights and resources but on the very regime of perception which allows for some to ‘appear’ as a part of the community while others are

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\(^{16}\) This possibly relates to different translations. I prefer to use the term subjectivisation to refer to a political becoming and the term subjectification to refer to the production of the subject within a power relation. I retain the term ‘subjectification’, however, when the term appears in Rancier’s quotations.
made to disappear. Here Ranciere’s work is diametrically opposed to Habermasian conceptions of democracy. For Habermas the democratic encounter is a particular form of communication between divergent subjects with different interests and objectives. For Ranciere, democracy (which is synonymous with politics in his work) refers to the encounter between divergent worlds, when the world in which there is a part which is invisiblised (the world of the police) clashes against the political subject as the latter demonstrates the existence and equality of the part of no part. “It”, as Ranciere (1998: 42) states “is indeed a question of incommensurables”:

Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common a world that is nothing more than this very confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world; the world where they are and the world where they are not... (Ranciere, 1998: 26)

Politics, equality and universality

For Ranciere, this ‘making oneself of some account’ is a fundamentally egalitarian and universal operation. To begin with the former, the suspension of the representational order which underpins the inegalitarian distribution of the sensible is always simultaneously a demonstration of what Ranciere, like Badiou, takes as axiomatic: the unqualified equality of all human beings (Ranciere, 1998; Badiou, 2010; Power, 2009). Ranciere thinks of this primarily as the staging of a dispute about who can participate in politics which sets in play the axiomatic equality of the political subject qua speaking being, by virtue of the forcing of the recognition the subject’s very capacity to enter into dispute (Power, 2009). This is how Ranciere (1998) theorises the playing out of the supposition of equality within the structure of the ‘disagreement’ (i.e. conflict) as the generic form of politics.

But what does it mean to conceive of such a political subjectivisation in terms of universality? In order to pursue this question, I draw on Badiou’s conception of universality as he relates it to politics. This is an entirely different mode of universality to that of the state, which we as have already seen, is ultimately bound up with identity.

17 The ‘axiomatic’ approach to equality is central to the thought of Ranciere and Badiou (Power, 2009), but can only be addressed briefly here.
Let's begin with a discussion of what universality is not. First of all, the universal, for Badiou, is not a transcendental and eternal plain. Likewise the political subject is not a transcendental humanist subject endowed with a ‘natural’ reason which makes possible access to the universal: ‘the universal is in no way the result of a transcendental constitution, which would presuppose a constituting subject’ (Badiou, 2006: 145). Badiou also rejects, however, and this is where his work goes against the grain of much contemporary social theory, that either there is no universal or that the particular provides access to the universal. Like Zizek (1999), Badiou (2005) maintains that the surrendering of the possibility of universality is ultimately a capitulation to the invisible universality of liberal capitalism. On the other hand, the particular, for Badiou (2006:147), is “of the order of being”. In Ranciere’s terms this means that the particular is a subject-position or identity which is already inscribed within the ‘police’. As Badiou (2005) would say, it is a term in the encyclopaedia of the situation. The particular is a function of the ‘count of the parts’. In contrast, universality is accessed or activated at the level of singularity.

I will call particular whatever can be discerned in knowledge by means of descriptive predicates. But I will call singular that which, although identifiable as a procedure at work in a situation, is nevertheless subtracted from every predicative description. Thus the cultural traits of this or that population are particular. But that which, traversing these traits and deactivating every registered description, universally summons a thought-subject, is singular (Badiou, 2006: 146).

Badiou’s conception of singularity relates to an immanent plane of infinite multiplicity (Hallward, 2003). This is obviously not a countable series of identities. Rather it is precisely the uncountable in-between of these identities. Singularity is the suspension of the particular. A universal operation, then, is one which is ‘subtractive’ vis-à-vis any particularity and vis-à-vis the normal symbolic order. As we have seen above, this is also what is at stake in political subjectivisation. This subtractive notion of universality can only be thought ‘negatively’, i.e. it has no empirical or substantial grounding or foundation.

What is crucial to emphasise here is the conceptual distinction between particularity or identity (which is a function of the police) and singularity and universality which is activated in the field of politics or political subjectivisation. I will refer to universality in
this sense as 'political universality'. In addition to the issues already discussed, political universality disrupts and encroaches upon the state's own universality:

We know that when politics exists, it immediately gives rise to a show of power by the state. This is obviously due to the fact that politics is collective, and hence universally concerns the parts of the situation, thereby encroaching upon the domain from which the state of the situation draws its existence' (Badiou, 2005: 145)

As we have seen the universality of the state is altogether different to the universality of the political.

To conclude this section, it is important to note that the gap between political and state universality, between political subjectivisation and identification, between the police or state and politics, is incommensurable. The incommensurability of the political disagreement is what leads Ranciere to insist on the centrality of conflict to politics. Alberto Toscano once described Badiou's thought as "Maoism without the Marx," and a similar dynamic is at work in Ranciere's philosophy. Both Ranciere and Badiou maintain Marx' conception of the political subject as a subjectivisation within an antagonistic relation, but lose the economic foundation to which the more economistic Marx ties the political. Ranciere's philosophy, like Badiou's, allows us to appreciate politics as an antagonistic practice grounded in itself, relying on nothing other than the pure contingency of a given order and the ever present excess from which a disagreement can reveal and contest that order (Marchart, 2011).

In Chapter 5 I investigate the politics of NI's 1968 from the perspective outlined in this section, in other words I attempt to grasp the excessive, antagonistic, universal and egalitarian subjectivity which emerged to rupture the order of the state and to open up possibilities beyond that order. As discussed further in Chapter 4 (methodology) I address this form of subjectivity under the Badiouian term 'political singularity'. The task will be to understand the political singularity at stake in NI's Civil Rights Movement in its own terms.

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18 This appears in Toscano's 'Marxism Expatriated' in issue 8 of Preлом magazine, available for download: http://www.prelokolektiv.org/eng/08.htm
Depoliticisation and identification

As discussed above, this research approaches the state from the point of view of depoliticisation. What makes Ranciere’s work so useful for this task is that he develops a strong and positive conceptualisation of politics which in turn allows us to develop a coherent critique of depoliticisation. Having discussed Ranciere’s conception of politics, I now want to turn to his conception of depoliticisation, and in particular the ‘logic of identification’ as a mode of depoliticisation. Depoliticisation refers to a force or process through which politics is translated into police or police is inserted within politics. It is a ‘restatification’ which collapses the gap between police and politics and hence both domesticates conflict and re-establishes a ‘count of the parts’ in which there is no more excess, or in which the excess itself can be ‘accounted for’. For this thesis, the most important way in which this takes place consists in the identification of the ‘part of no part’ with an empirical social group and the consequent reduction of the incommensurable gap which sustains political conflict to a mere difference. This conceptualisation of depoliticisation turns on the distinction between the ‘logic of subjectivisation’ and the ‘logic of identification’ (Ranciere, 1992). For Ranciere, subjectivisation refers to an antagonistic becoming which demonstrates the inequality of the existing distribution of the sensible in the form of a disagreement or conflict. The logic behind this political moment does not rest on the realisation of the ‘self’ or ‘interest’ of a community, but on the emergence of a subject which has no empirical or objective existence outside of the political conflict through which it contests the ‘count of the parts’ (Ranciere, 1992). This means that the political subject cannot be reduced to any empirical characteristic or interest of an essentialist or non-essentialist variety (Ranciere, 2001). As Ranciere says, “[p]olitical subjectivisation is the enactment of equality - or the handling of a wrong - by people who are together to the extent that they are between”. (Ranciere, 1992: 61)

To the extent that politics arises against the distribution of places and functions which characterise a given distribution of the sensible, the political subject can be defined as the

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19 I use the term ‘difference’ here to refer to the identititarian representation of difference at the level of what Deleuze terms ‘organic representation’ (Olkowski, 1999). Difference in this sense must be distinguished from the use Deleuze and Guattarri give it as an immanent plain of singularity and multiplicity which resists any identitarian representation. Their use of ‘difference’, in this regard, shares much with Badiou’s conception of the ‘unthinkable multiplicity’ which forms the immanent excess of any situation. Throughout this thesis I will use the terms ‘multiplicity’ and ‘singularity’ to refer to this dimension.
operator of declassification or as a disidentification (Ranciere, 2004; 1992). To take the example of the proletariat as a political subject. For Ranciere a politics which identifies the proletariat with an empirical economic group immediately loses sight of the specifically political component of that subject. Of course we can identify a group in society which is assigned a particular function within the mode of production. However, the proletariat exists as a political subject precisely to the extent that it undoes this assignment of places, refusing the reduction of the proletariat to the function of production:

[Class] is the perfect example of one of those homonyms over which the counts of the police order and those of the political demonstration are divided. In the police sense, a class is a grouping of people assigned a particular status and rank according to their origins or their activity....In the political sense, a class is something else entirely: an operator of conflict, a name for counting the uncounted, a mode of subjectification superimposed on the reality of all social groups. (Ranciere quoted in Toscano, 2011: 224, author’s emphasis)

In this sense the proletariat are those who refuse work\(^{20}\) or those who disidentify with the identity/function of ‘worker’. This can be juxtaposed to mainstream trade union politics which identifies workers with a series of activities and functions and then tries to reapportion resources between that part and other parts of society. Here the relationship between the rich and the workers is posited as quantifiable material difference. The distribution of places, functions and identities not only goes unchallenged, but is in fact fully asserted; i.e. such a ‘politics’ can’t be meaningfully distinguished from a police operation or state-politics. In relation to identity politics, as in NI, the subjects taken to be at the centre of conflict are defined in terms of a particular empirically identifiable difference (ethnicity, religion, nationality) and then attempts are made to fairly apportion resources, rights and representation to each. This kind of operation, for Ranciere, is a police procedure rather than a political procedure. The difference lies in the fact that the above police procedures represent the respective subjects through a fixed representation in which there is an exhaustive identification of the subject and in which the resulting objectivist conception of society or polity can only perceive the gap between subjects or groups in the form of a mere quantitative or empirical difference. As such, the possibility of the appearance of an incommensurable gap is drowned out by the ‘fullness’ of the representation. In other words, there is no outside, there is nothing beyond the symbolic

\(^{20}\) Here there a strong parallels with both the autonomist notion of the refusal of labour (Hardt and Virmo, 1996) and Holloway’s (2010) approach.
regime of the state, or the police in Ranciere's terms. The strength of Ranciere's conception is, then, that it allows us to perceive the essential and generic homogeneity between the police (or the state) and the logic of identification, and hence theorise the depoliticising dimension of the latter. In other words, we can develop a theory of depoliticisation in relation to representation in general and not solely in terms of a particular field of representation (such as cultural identity).

Furthermore, returning to the theme of universality, the equation of political subjectivity with an empirical identity collapses political universality. This is because, as already argued, political universality must be conceptualised as subtractive vis-à-vis any particular identity.

The conception of politics developed thus far helps us to distinguish between the hegemonic conception of conflict in Northern Ireland (and more generally) and a properly political conception of conflict. In 'conflict resolution' and 'peace and reconciliation' discourse, which are hegemonic discourses in NI, conflict is conceptualised as a hostile relation between two different empirical social groups, almost always understood in ethnic terms (for a critique of this see Finlay, 2010). Given that the subjects of such a situation are identified in terms of empirical differences, I distinguish such a conflict from political conflict. I use the term 'difference-conflict' to refer to antagonisms or militaristic relations between empirical social groups. I counter-pose this to the term 'political conflict', by which I mean the kind of antagonistic, disidentified and universal politics described above.

In Chapter 5 I analyse the process of depoliticisation as it operated historically in NI. In particular, I examine the process through which the political subjectivity of the Civil Rights Movement was supplanted by the identitarian politics of the IRA, a politics which precisely founded the subject on an empirical identity thus succumbing to the logic of identification. As discussed further in relation to methodology (Chapter 4), I address this through Badiou's notion of 'the point', by which he refers to a point in the development of a political movement at which the political singularity of the movement begins to be eroded or collapses.
Chapter's 6 and 7 address depoliticisation in relation to the logic of identification operated at the levels of sovereignty and citizenship, i.e. at the level of the state.

**State Transformation and Depoliticisation**

[T]he political state represents the table of contents of man's practical conflicts. (Karl Marx)

So far in this chapter we have looked at some general theoretical issues with regard to politics and the state. What remains to be seen is the relationship between the two with regard to state transformation. In exploring this, I follow many theorists in privileging the transformative and constituent role of politics and in seeing the state as a response or reaction to politics, one that seeks to limit and stabilise the explosive potentiality of politics.

The notion of what we might call the 'political primacy of struggle' has become a recurrent theme in much contemporary critical theory. In terms of philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari, Badiou, Ranciere and Negri\(^{21}\) all, in different ways, argue that politics, understood as an excessive and constituent force, is characterised by the capacity to invent and to radically transform and that power (or the state or police, depending on the theorist) merely captures this force. Consequently, the form of power or the state can be understood as a hollow imprint or shell of a previous phase of political invention. For example, for the Italian Autonomist tradition the form of contemporary capitalism is to be explained by its capture and integration of the desires and potentialities unleashed by the multitude of 1968, a multitude whose valorisation of desire, language, aesthetics etc, proved fertile ground for the emergence of immaterial capitalism (Virno, 1996; Lazarato, 2006; Hardt and Negri, 2000). For Hardt and Negri (2000) as for Papadopoulos et al. (2008) the form of contemporary global sovereignty and governance reflects the integration and management of the new political subjectivities which emerged around 1968. These approaches have a certain affinity with an older theoretical emphasis on the state as the point of suture or stability between conflicting social forces in that they see the form of the state

\(^{21}\) Some would add Foucault to this list, see De Giorgi, 2006.
state as the outcome and embodiment of conflict (e.g. Poulantzas, 1978; Balibar, 1977; Abrams, 2006).

In this section I explore the relationship between the state and politics with regard to state transformation from the point of view of Badiou as his philosophy is closest to the conception of politics and depoliticisation developed above and because Badiou, in addition, has placed greater emphasis on the state than other writers.

Badiou accounts for the form of a given state by the way in which a state is founded on the depoliticisation of a previous ‘political sequence’, i.e. phase of politicisation. Like Ranciere, Badiou insists upon the heterogeneity (and indeed incommensurability) of what he calls ‘politics’, on the one hand, and the state on the other (Hallward 2003; Pluth, 2010). What Badiou can help us to understand is how a politics, which initiates in a subtractive manner (vis-à-vis the state), can go through a process of statification (depoliticisation) such that the form of state itself changes to reflect the imprint of this politics.

Michael Neocosmos’ development (1998; 2009b) of Badiou’s work in post-colonial Africa is particularly relevant here, and has been an important influence on my research. He identifies within national liberation struggles an emancipatory politics defined by an expansive and participative notion of citizenship: everyone who struggles against colonialism is a citizen of the nation-in-struggle (Neocosmos, 1998). This is a disidentified and antagonistic conception of political subjectivity, in which political subjectivity cannot be defined by anything outside of the political conflict. However, at the same time, there are two related elements which work to depoliticize the emancipatory potential of the national liberation struggle. On the one hand, national liberation struggles typically develop a proto-state subjectivity and organizational form, e.g. forming an executive, ‘official army’, judicial system etc. Here we can see a ‘state subjectivity’ emerging within the movement, with the associated hierarchical, bureaucratic and militaristic functions. As Wallerstein and Braganca (1983: 162) note in their introduction to the *African Liberation Reader*, “in a guerrilla situation the party was the state...” More

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22 Such proto-states were often recognised by the UN before emerging as fully fledged states with control over the territory (Neocosmos, 2009b).
importantly, and this leads us to our second element, Neocosmos asks what kind of subject sustains the state form which emerges within the movement? The answer is, of course, the concept of the nation, or national community, the universal dimension of which tends to collapse as the movement becomes the state. This is the point at which Neocosmos (2009b: 29) highlights the key feature of depoliticisation:

[The reasons for the difficulty in thinking the emancipatory character of mid-twentieth century anti-imperialist politics, are arguably related to the fact that, while ostensibly concerned with emancipating colonial populations, the national liberation struggle mode equated such emancipation with the construction of a nation, thus unavoidably referring politics to an external (social) invariant such as the nation, state and/or class.

I relate Neocosmos notion of an ‘external invariant’ to the concept of identification developed above. The nation, as external invariant, is an empirical characteristic, a form of subjection or identity which is defined by territorial, cultural, historical (and this can be a history of oppression) or other characteristics, i.e. by factors which are external to and independent of political subjectivity proper. This is precisely the moment of the collapse of a political subjectivity into a logic of identification which reduces the political subject to some empirical characteristic which has an ontological existence outside the political relation. Neocosmos is careful to distinguish between a political concept of nation and a depoliticized concept, where the political concept refers to an unlimited conception of the political subject defined as all those who struggle against colonialism. As national liberation movements have played out historically, we see a subtle slippage from an expansive (universal) conception of the nation as antagonistic subjectivity to an exclusive conception defined by a substantive identity. It is a transition:

[Common to the continent [of Africa] in which citizenship was transformed from an active and inclusive conception (in which citizens were those who fought colonialism, hence the dominance of pan-Africanist discourse in the struggle) to a passive and exclusive one founded on indigeneity and national essentialism underpinned by state power. (Neocosmos, 2009b: 13)

Just as we have seen that particularity and identity are categories of the police or state, here we see how nation and state are characterized by a homology. For it is no coincidence that

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23 It’s worth pointing out that it makes little difference whether this identity is conceived in terms of immutable characteristics or as a product of history/culture (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Papadopoulos, 2008).
every state seeks support in an identitarian or organic notion of community (Goldberg, 2002).

To return to the theoretical question of the state/depoliticisation relation, the result of the process described by Neocosmos (1998) is that the state which emerges from the national liberation struggle resembles the depoliticized movement. The most depoliticized components (essentialist identity, strong hierarchy, militarism, revolutionary party’s monopoly on politics) tend to characterize the post-colonial state.

Continuing with the question of the state and its relationship to depoliticisation, Alessandro Russo, who has used a Badiouian perspective to analyze the depoliticisation of the Cultural Revolution, develops a similar analysis to that of Neocosmos in more general terms:

[It is very probable that the concrete form of the state in a given moment is the hollow imprint of the last great political sequence, or that it is shaped by the depoliticization of the previous political sequence. I would tend to delimit the scope of this hypothesis to the present conjuncture, but I also have the impression that it can have a more general value, at least for the modern era. (Russo, 2006: 676)

Russo concludes that the actual form of a given state in any moment (particularly the present) is an institutionalized expression of the incorporation of depoliticisation. Indeed, this perspective on the relationship between the state and depoliticisation recalls an older body of state theory. One of the central tenets of Poulantzas (1978) conception of the state was that the ideal representation of state universality functioned precisely to depoliticise class conflict. Poulantzas draws on Engel’s famous argument in the Origins of the Family, Private Property and the state that in order that:

...classes with conflicting economic interests, shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, a power, apparently standing above society, has become necessary to moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power arisen out of society, but placing itself above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state. (Engels, quoted in Bartelson, 2001:138).

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24 The Irish free-state (later the Republic of Ireland) is a case in point.
While Badiou in many ways carries on the Marxist tradition of the critique of the state, one of his most important contributions is to allow us to conceptualise the relationship between state and depoliticisation without recourse to economic determinism and in a manner which is not limited to the specific question of the capitalist state.

The relationship between state transformation and depoliticisation described here helps to explain why every defeat of politics is, as a rule, presented by the state as a triumph of politics. What is the nation-state if not the subordination of national liberation movements to an authoritarian and identitarian state? (Neocosmos, 1998; Hardt and Negri, 2000) What is multiculturalism if not the annihilation of the political potential of subaltern revolts in the west? (Gilroy, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2000). What is the social state (whether social democratic or soviet) if not the incorporation and domestication of proletarian subjectivity? (Negri, 1998)

Conclusion

At this point let me indicate the kind of critical approach which follows from the theoretical outline developed thus far. As mentioned, my interest is not to provide an account of the state in general. My interest is the inter-relation between state universality, politics and depoliticisation. A concern with these issues cannot be pursued unless we grasp the state as symbolic regime, since it is the symbolic exclusions operated by the state which account for politics and its antagonistic relation vis-à-vis the state. This means that the key area of interest becomes what we might call the symbolic interface between the state and politics. While this ‘interface’ is no doubt enormously complex, by examining the way in which questions of universality and particularity/identity are played out in the forms of political subjectivisation and identification operative within a political process and a process of state formation, we can reveal something important about the state - namely, how it appropriates universality and forecloses, more or less successfully, the emergence of a counter-state subjectivity which might threaten its universality.

In this sense the theoretical approach to the state and politics presented in this chapter allows me to explore the relationship between NI’s 1968, the reconstruction of state universality and depoliticisation.
In the next chapter I will develop a theoretical approach to sovereignty as a specific field within which the universality of the state can be analysed.
Chapter 2
Theorising Sovereignty

Introduction

One of the most powerful and central innovations of the Good Friday Agreement is no doubt its reworking of sovereignty such as to permit the resolution of a deep national conflict (Bell, 2008; Morrison, 2009; Doyle, 1999; 2004). Several commentators have pointed out that this reworking represents a shift away from national sovereignty. However, as Michael Keating points out, ambiguity around the concept of sovereignty has left us "ill-prepared for a new order in which the relationship between state and nation is called into question". (Keating, 2003: 198). The purpose of this chapter is to develop the theoretical tools which can render legible a shift away from national sovereignty and critically theorise the mode of sovereignty inaugurated by the GFA. I also elaborate here on the relationship between sovereignty and state universality and propose an approach to the investigation of that relationship.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section I deals with the general concept of sovereignty through a review of some of the dominant approaches within social sciences and political theory at the moment. Through this analysis I introduce and situate my own approach which emphasises the constitutive dimension of sovereignty. In the second Section of this chapter I introduce the specific concept of sovereignty I develop in order to examine the question of state universality. I develop the notion of sovereignty as a meta-political rationality and theorise the way in which the meta-political problematisation of the exercise of power in general has a constitutive or productive dimension, specifically in relation to the production of what I call the identity of the polity. As we will see, this is central to investigating the dynamics of state universality. In Section III, I explore recent theory on sovereignty beyond the nation-state and situate my own work vis-à-vis that body of literature. In Section IV, finally, I deal with some existing analyses of sovereignty in NI, highlighting the contributions as well as limitations of that work and situating my own approach in relation to it.
Section I. Sovereignty and the Symbolic Constitution of the Polity

In the political symbolic, the sovereign is formed in representation; the people as democratic sovereign do not exist as a thing prior to representation in political speech. The symbolic gives sense, coherence, and order to what is represented; it has a normative horizon of world making (Weir and Mykhalovskoy, 2010: 165).

This section will review some of the most prevalent accounts of sovereignty appearing in the literature today. Throughout this section I will argue that some of the most widely-known existing accounts fail to distinguish the constitutive dimension of sovereignty, by which I mean the fact that sovereign discourse produces the polity (symbolically) as its object-effect.

In examining the question of sovereignty we will see that much of the theoretical difficulty here arises from the ambiguous space sovereignty occupies as a phenomenon. Sovereignty is clearly a directly intelligible discourse which appears within the social space, within the polity. We frequently hear politicians, for example, referring to the sovereignty of the people. However, what is not so apparent is that sovereignty also constitutes that polity as a meaningful social space, i.e. it constitutes the very space within which sovereignty itself becomes intelligible. This paradox frequently appears in discussions around constitutional law. Specifically, writers have highlighted the fact that national sovereignty draws its authority from the people, but that the people are at the same time an effect of national sovereignty (Bell, 2008; Walker, 2003a; Hardt and Negri, 2000). National sovereignty becomes effective within a polity (the nation) which national sovereignty itself constitutes as its object-effect (Hartd and Negri, 2010; Brown, 2010).

The constitutive dimension of sovereignty is paramount, I argue, if we are to understand the relationship between sovereignty and state universality. Today’s more sociological writers, however, seem to downplay or even ignore this constitutive dimension of sovereignty. In this section I begin by reviewing and critiquing this literature and developing my own approach in contradistinction to it. Bartelson (1995) has developed an
important critique of the approaches of political science and political sociology to sovereignty. Bartelson’s contention is that these disciplines neglect to address sovereignty’s constitutive dimension, arguing that they cannot address sovereignty because it constitutes the very domain which defines their sphere of knowledge. I discuss Bartelson’s critique, which I draw on to a large extent, but also differentiate my approach from that of Bartleson. Bartelson chooses to opt for a genealogy of the mutually constituting historical relationships between discourse and sovereignty, as opposed to my attempt to directly theorise sovereignty. It is possible, I argue, to directly theorise sovereignty as a form of authority which constitutes the very space within which it operates.

Let me begin by developing a critique of some of the existing approaches to sovereignty which are perhaps most easily recognisable as ‘sociological’. The work of writers such as Ong (1999; 2000) has been important in ‘reclaiming’ sovereignty as an object of sociological and anthropological inquiry. However, Ong’s approach treats sovereignty in a typically political-sociological way, which is to say it treats sovereignty as a particular type of empirical phenomenon occurring within the political ‘sub-system’, i.e. within the sphere of society we consider political. She quotes Latham in defining sovereignty in terms of “the existence of a final, highest, or supreme power over a set of people, things, or places.” (Latham quoted in Ong, 1999: 215). This notion of sovereignty is, needless to say, not particularly illuminating; if we take sovereignty as a merely empirical phenomenon (i.e. a supreme power) we run into the problem which Bartelson (1995) identifies as taking the givenness of sovereignty as its principal characteristic (discussed further below).

The other main approach to sovereignty within the sociological literature, and one that has come in for much criticism of late, argues that national sovereignty is giving way to globalisation (Bauman, 1998; Beck, 1992; Habermas, 1998). Much research of this sort treats national-sovereignty in an almost quantitative fashion, arguing that more global processes equals less national sovereignty (for a critique of these approaches see Sassen, 2006; Latham, 2000; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002)25. This

25 This is what Sharma and Gupta (2006: 6) critique as ‘the equation “more globalization = less nation-state sovereignty = weaker states.”’
approach, like that of Ong, however, ignores the constitutive role of sovereignty vis-à-vis the polity. If we treat national sovereignty as simply the capacity to exercise control over processes within a territorial/national polity we ignore that sovereignty is in fact a privileged (though not the only) mode through which the national polity is established and becomes intelligible (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Singer and Weir, 2006). Unless we are to fall into the trap of treating polities (national or otherwise) as natural, the fact that they are constituted symbolically must be given centre stage. Moreover, it is surely clear that national sovereignty never referred to an exhaustive ordering power. Just as under divine sovereignty the King’s actual ability to administer his kingdom was rather limited, nation-states have also had limits to their powers. To focus solely on a relative reduction in the effective capacity of the state to administer its population or resources is to ignore the qualitative transformations in the nature of sovereignty which have been occurring for a number of decades (Sassen, 2006; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Papadopoulos et al., 2008). What is crucial is the form of sovereignty and not the ‘amount’ of it. To grasp the form of sovereignty is to analyse the mode in which sovereignty establishes an ultimate authority in the very act of constituting the polity over which that authority operates.

Indeed, according to Bartelson (1995) the tendency for disciplines such as political science and political sociology to obscure sovereignty’s constitutive dimension is no coincidence. As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, Lefort argues that those who treat politics as a set of actions or institutions within a particular sphere of society ignore the process through which that sphere is constituted (Lefort, 1988; Marchart, 2007). Bartelson makes a similar critique, focusing on International Political Theory (IPT). IPT investigates the interaction between states in the ‘international sphere’. To the extent that such theorists investigate sovereignty, Bartelson argues, they are ensnared by the fact that the sovereignty of the state, the principle which constitutes the state as a unity and hence underpins an international sphere which has the state as its unit, is the condition of possibility of IPT itself. Hence, they can only conclude that sovereignty is that which divides the domestic and international spheres (and hence constitutes their sphere of analysis) and thus posit the “giveness of sovereignty as its defining property”. (Bartelson, 1995: 24). At the centre of this tautology Bartelson identifies the following difficulty: any knowledge oriented around the state and which takes sovereignty as an empirical
phenomenon (i.e. separate from signs and representation) cannot, *de facto*, address the way in which sovereignty constitutes the representational space within which the empirical object of that knowledge appears.

How does Bartelson respond to this dilemma? Following what he calls a genealogical approach (though one that differs from Foucault’s), Bartelson investigates the relationship between sovereignty and knowledge/discourse at a historical level, i.e. the different ways in which sovereignty and knowledge/discourse (especially political knowledge) mutually produce each other in different historical configurations. While Bartelson’s approach is indeed productive, what is missed is that although sovereignty plays a role in constituting a representational space, this is not only a space of knowledge but also the space of the polity itself, and hence is at the heart of all manner of political phenomenon (Singer and Weir, 2006; 2008). Bartelson’s genealogy of sovereignty tells us much about the history of political thought but little about effects of sovereignty on politics.

Moreover, it seems to me that Bartelson is too quick to give up the possibility of a more robust theoretical conception of sovereignty because he takes the tautological nature of IPT approaches to sovereignty as indicative of the weakness of those approaches and indeed of any approach that attempts to directly define sovereignty. According to Bartelson, “sovereignty has no essence, since it is what makes different spheres of politics empirically representable and intelligible” (Bartelson, 1995: 51). In this sense he refers to the “paragonality” of sovereignty, by which he means that sovereignty is but a frame within which things appear but which never appears itself. I would propose here a more symptomatic reading: IPT’s difficulties in grasping sovereignty are a symptom that reveals sovereignty’s ambiguous status as a phenomenon which operates within the polity and at

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26 “[Sovereignty] renders the state susceptible to empirical knowledge as an object...Sovereignty not only establishes the transcendental limits of political knowledge, but constitutes its proper object....’ (Bartelson, 1995: 190)

27 Bartelson’s approach thus turns to political philosophical texts on sovereignty and the state. One danger here is that political philosophy may not primarily function to introduce transformations (as Bartelson maintains) but rather to account for, at the level of knowledge, the immanent excess revealed by politics and hence to ward off transformation. Here I draw on Ranciere’s critique of political philosophy. He argues that political philosophy “Political philosophy...exists because the division is there, because democracy offers the paradox of a specific incommensurable, of the part of those who have no part, as a problem for philosophy to solve.” (Ranciere, 1998: 64). What strikes me as strange, and yet perhaps typical of theories of sovereignty, is Bartelson’s complete silence on the question of revolution, emancipation and their relation to shifts in sovereignty. This theme has been taken up by Antonio Negri (1999; Hardt and Negri, 2000).
the same time is constitutive of the polity. It seems to me that Bartelson takes the
tautological dimension of sovereignty to be a problem of theory, rather than a component
of sovereignty. In contrast, I argue that this tautology attests to the fact that sovereignty is
both an effective discourse within the polity and a mode of the constitution of the polity. It
is also of note that my approach here bears a certain resemblance to Agamben’s emphasis
on the paradoxical relation between sovereignty and the juridical order, ‘wherein the
sovereign is simultaneously inside and outside the juridical order’ (Mills, 2008: 61). It is
my contention that once we grasp the paradoxical relationship between sovereignty and the
polity the status and nature of sovereignty can be theorised directly and we do not need to
retreat into circular analyses of the ways in which discourses on sovereignty construct their
object.

In conclusion to this section, I argue that sovereignty is not merely an empirical
phenomenon pertaining to the field of ‘politics’ but is bound up with the symbolic
constitution of a social space within which politics can become intelligible as a domain. In
this sense sovereignty has a *meta-political* dimension (discussed further below). Such an
approach has important implications for sovereignty in the sense that sovereignty works to
establish the identity of the polity. By identity of the polity, again, I mean the symbolic or
representational process whereby the polity is rendered amenable to human perception and
experience as a meaningful or intelligible space, e.g. the process by which it becomes
possible to treat this or that territory as a political unit. Sovereignty relates to the identity
of the polity because in the moment that sovereignty proclaims authority over the polity it
constitutes the polity as what Foucault would call its ‘object-effect’. In this sense
sovereignty, like power in general, is productive. But it is productive in a very special
sense, since its object is the polity itself, the very symbolic space within which subjects
encounter themselves as state-political subjects, through which basic distinctions such as
public/private are rendered intelligible, and within which the empirical objects of political
sociology and political science appear. In sum, sovereignty’s specific relationship to the
theory of the identity and universality of the state is defined by the fact that it reveals
within the polity the ‘counting as one’ which constitutes the symbolic space of the polity
as such. In other words, it manifests the logic of state universality.

28 That said, as mentioned below and again in Chapter 6, my conception of sovereignty is otherwise very
much at odds with that of Agamben.
These are the issues to which I turn in the following section which elaborates more fully the theory of sovereignty employed in this thesis.

Section II. Theorising Sovereignty

In section II of this chapter I will first of all specify what I mean by sovereignty in the sense of the specific type of phenomenon I am interested in here, which I refer to as constitutional sovereignty. Secondly, I will elaborate and conceptualise sovereignty following on from the introductory observations provided above.

Before discussing further the concept of sovereignty I will highlight some of the features of the form of sovereignty I am concerned with in this thesis. This is necessary as the theory of sovereignty I employ is developed in order to analyse the specific form of sovereignty found in the GFA. While I frequently write in general terms and while I consider the theory of sovereignty developed here to have a more general applicability, my primary objective is to theorise sovereignty in a fashion which makes it possible to critically think the contemporary NI state. In this thesis I am concerned with an explicit claim to sovereignty, that which appears in the GFA. In this sense I am interested in a specific discourse on sovereignty. GFA sovereignty refers to a polity and territory, with political institutions which correspond, at least to some degree, to what we would consider a normal modern constitutional polity. These are important points because many contemporary accounts of post-national modes of sovereignty theorise what I would call non-declaratory forms of sovereignty, i.e. they focus neither on a sovereign discourse nor on a constitutional document. For example, both Hardt and Negri (2000) and Papadopoulos et al. (2008) theorise contemporary sovereignty by drawing out the implicit logics underpinning contemporary dynamics of global rule (discussed further below). Likewise, Giorgio Agamben (1998) gives the name ‘sovereignty’ to an implicit structure (exception, sovereign ban) which underpins the law. Indeed Agamben understands this precisely as a law which is “in force but does not signify” (Agamben, 1998: 51). In contrast, I am interested in the explicit discourse which declares the source of authority. This is what I call ‘constitutional sovereignty’. The GFA explicitly presents a sovereign discourse, ritualises and gives juridical effect to this discourse via a constitutional or quasi-
constitutional document (Bell, 2008) and as such performs a 'constitutional moment' with regard to the polity of NI. I return to some of the differences between 'constitutional sovereignty' and other forms later on in this chapter.

Let us turn now to examine how I propose to theorise constitutional sovereignty, following on from the arguments advanced in the above section and in Chapter 1. The argument here proceeds under the following headings:

1) Sovereignty as a meta-political rationality
2) The polity as the object-effect of sovereignty
3) Sovereignty and universality

**Sovereignty as a meta-political rationality**

Sovereignty, in the first place, involves the claim to ultimate or highest authority in relation to a polity. Here I take as my point of departure Neil Walker's understanding of sovereignty as "the discursive form in which a claim concerning the existence and character of a supreme ordering power for a particular polity is expressed..." (Walker, 2003b: 6, author's emphasis).

While Walker conceptualises sovereignty in discursive terms, as a speech act, I would prefer to discuss sovereignty as a particular form of political rationality, drawing on a late-Foucauldian concept which has become prevalent in recent years (Foucault, 2007; Burchell et al., 1991; Rose, 1999). The concept of political rationality is fully compatible with that of discourse (Rose, 1999), but it allows us to emphasise the performative aspects of sovereignty; sovereignty as a political rationality is always directly linked to institutional and organisational practices.  

However, sovereignty, as a political rationality, differs from the Foucauldian concept of political rationality in one key respect: sovereignty problematises the authoritative exercise

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29 As Walker notes 'Constitutional reasoning, like all legal reasoning, is a form of practical reasoning. It is anchored in the social and political world and purports to make a difference to that world...' (Walker, 2002: 333; see also MacCormick, 1983)
of power in general. Sovereignty involves a claim to ultimate authority (Walker, 2003; Prokhovnik, 2007). In this sense it is a meta-political rationality. Rather than rendering a particular object/problem amenable to government (as in the standard use of the term political rationality) sovereignty renders government itself practicable, as an explicit act of political power (Singer and Weir, 2006; 2008; Walker, 2003). In other words, where as (Foucauldian) political rationality materialises through a particular problematisation, sovereignty is constituted through the problematisation of the exercise of power as such. As a response to that problem, it renders authoritative government thinkable and practicable.

The term meta-political rationality clearly draws on the Foucauldian term political rationality, and the latter is associated with work on governance or governmentality. In this regard it is important to underline the distinction between sovereignty, on the hand, and governance on the other. This is a distinction which is all too often obscured in the literature. For example, Latham argues that sovereignty “should refer to the construction and maintenance of structures of relations that set the terms for - or are constitutive of - a domain of social existence.” (Latham quoted in Ong, 1999: 215). Latham is right to point out that sovereignty is constitutive of domains but fails to recognise that sovereignty constitutes a particular type of domain - the polity. As a result, he broadens out the term sovereignty to include any set of institutional practices constitutive of a domain in which power can be exercised, and herein lies the inability to distinguish between sovereignty and governance. Likewise Ong (2000), in a later article which seemingly contradicts her previous argument that sovereignty refers to a supreme power, makes the following argument which once again demonstrates the tendency to conflate sovereignty and governance or governmentality:

Any attempt to grasp sovereignty in practice requires an understanding of the different mechanisms of governance beyond the military and the legal powers. In his discussion of the ‘art of government’, Foucault notes that modern sovereignty is no longer simply a ‘supreme power’ over the population...Different modalities of state power coexist, and the distinctive modern forms are concerned with ‘governing’ populations, individuals and oneself. (Ong, 2000: 56)
Given that this approach seems to conflate sovereignty and governm entality/governance, this begs the question, why do we need the concept of sovereignty at all? Indeed, much contemporary research extends sovereignty to all manner of institutions, from FIFA (Walker, 2002) to the financial markets (Latham, 2000). In contrast, I argue that governance or governmentality refer to particular problems or domains (Rose, 1999; Rose and Miller, 1992; Dean, 1999). The term sovereignty, on the other hand, should be retained for meta-political rationalities which transcend particular political problems and pose the exercise of power itself as a problem. Indeed, this is one of the elements that makes sovereignty such an important object of investigation. As Singer and Weir argue, “the ‘power effects’ of the discourse that has power as its explicit object will, of necessity, have a particularly general and weighty significance” (Singer and Weir, 2008: 51).

The polity as the object-effect of sovereignty

The second key element of the theoretical approach to sovereignty employed in this research is the productive relationship between sovereignty and the polity (Walker, 2003a; 2002; Prokhovnik, 2007; Bell, 2008; Singer and Weir, 2006; 2008). The meta-political rationality of sovereignty responds to the problem of the exercise of power in a manner which constitutes the socio-symbolic space within which the authoritative exercise of power is rendered intelligible, i.e. the polity (Singer and Weir, 2006; 2008; Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2010). Just as political rationalities, in a Foucaultian sense, constitute their object (Rose, 1999), so we can conceptualise the polity as what Foucault (1998) would call the ‘object-effect’ of sovereignty. More specifically, sovereignty constitutes not just the polity but the identity of the polity, the symbolic integrity of the polity as a socio-symbolic space.

I argue that sovereignty’s production of the polity as object-effect primarily occurs on a symbolic or representational level, captured in Claude Lefort’s term ‘symbolic dispositif’. Lefort’s term refers to a certain way of ‘disposing’ or positing a situation, of producing it at the representational level, or a mode of articulating a mise-en-scene (this last term is also from Lefort (Marchart, 2007)). Alex Demirovic (2004: 2) defines a symbolic dispositif as “a symbolic ordering, that organizes a specific representation of societal space”. 
Consider for example the production of the polity under national sovereignty. National sovereignty declares the sovereignty of the nation, and in so doing constitutes the nation as the subject of sovereignty. Thus, while national sovereignty claims to draw its authority from the nation, the latter is in fact constituted in the making of that very claim (Walker, 2003a; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Brown, 2010). The nation is of course a specific form of polity, i.e. of political community. The national, which is an effect of national sovereignty, is the principle of intelligently of the polity, i.e. it grounds the identity of the polity. This is the sense in which I mean that sovereignty produces or establishes the polity, and the identity of the polity, as its object-effect. This productive relationship is evident in the fact that where sovereignty rests in the national people, and this people is constituted on the basis of nationality, race and territoriality, then the polity itself will be nationalised, racialised and territorialised.

The declaration of sovereignty is thus a constitutive moment of a particular nature: in the act of claiming ultimate authority sovereignty constitutes the polity as socio-symbolic space (Singer and Weir, 2008; Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2010; Hartd and Negri, 2000).

**Sovereignty and universality**

Following on from the above, my contention is that the establishment of the identity of the polity is bound up with the universal dimension of the state via the alignment of the ‘idea of the state’ with the identity of the polity tout court. The example of the nation-state is again illustrative here. Under the nation-state the state is presented as the expression of the nation or the national people. The nation is in turn presented as universal, in that it transcends the differences between the people, thus establishing their unity. Discourses of national sovereignty have displayed an obsessive concern with the universal dimension of the nation and its ability to transcend differences. For example, the French Constitution of 1791 says: “Sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible. It belongs to the nation; no one section of the people, no individual can claim the right to exercise it.” (Jaume, 2003: 133). By aligning the state with the nation, national sovereignty aligns the state with the identity of the polity. Hence, the state is presented as a power which transcends the differences within the polity, and thus as an institution which does not represent this or that interest but which represents the nation tout court. As the state is
aligned with the identity of the polity it transcends particular differences within the polity and thus universalises itself. This establishes a foundation of power which is not particular, i.e. not the power of a particular class or caste but a power which transcends and unites particularities. By founding the state on the subject or principle through which sovereignty establishes the identity of the polity, sovereignty appropriates universality for the state. As such, sovereignty is at the centre of 'state universality' and of the 'idea of the state' in general.

This theoretical approach also reflects the argument, made in Chapter 1, that the state's appearance as universal is founded on identity (specifically the identity of the polity). As such the state universality at work in sovereignty ultimately collapses back into particularity.

According to this theoretical approach to the relationship between sovereignty and state universality I propose the following periodisation:

- Divine sovereignty: ideal identification of state, monarch and God. State appropriates the universality of God.
- Popular-national sovereignty: ideal identification of state and the people as the universal subject of politics. The state appropriates the universality of the people.

This approach to the universality of the state also sheds light on the way in which state 'legitimacy' might be understood. Following from the above arguments, 'legitimacy' is best understood not as a rationalisation of domination but in terms of a more fundamental symbolic alignment of the state and the 'oneness' of the situation, such that only the state can be posed as a public authority. Sovereignty, as meta-political rationality, is necessarily a mode of legitimation of the state because of the very fact that it identifies the state with the identity of the polity and with the dimension of universality, thus providing the

30 Rousseau, Bodin and Hobbes all exemplify this, see Hardt and Negri, 2000.
31 I do not wish to conjure up the Marxist understanding of the term 'legitimation', with its conceptual baggage of 'false consciousness' and so on (for a critique of which see Miller, 1987)
In sum, my conceptualisation of sovereignty is composed of the following key elements:

a) Sovereignty is a meta-political rationality which renders authoritative government thinkable, practicable and legitimate;

b) Sovereignty constitutes the polity as its object-effect on a symbolic/representational level;

c) Sovereignty aligns the state with the identity of the polity such that the state is represented as a public power identified with the generality of the polity and not a particular group of faction, i.e. such that the state is represented as universal.

In Section III I depart from my own theorisation of sovereignty to look at some of the most compelling contemporary accounts of sovereignty. While the literature discussed below comes from a rather different conception of sovereignty, the conclusions reached in this literature have been crucial to my own analysis of sovereignty in NI, particularly with regard to the question of what Papadopoulos et al. (2008) call 'sovereignty without the people'.

**Section III. Sovereignty beyond the Nation**

Foucault famously challenged political theory to ‘cut off the King’s head’ in order to understand contemporary power relations. Today, following Papadopoulos et al. (2008) and Hardt and Negri (2000), we might say that the challenge is to *cut off the people’s head*. What I mean here is that the people no longer function as the subject of sovereignty and that the regime of difference, authority and domination within which the people, nation, and state are inscribed is being transformed (Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Hardt and Negri, 2000; 2004; 2009; Negri, 2008; Brown, 2010; Sassen, 2006). In this section I will examine how this symbolic shift has been conceptualised. In this discussion we will also elaborate on the theory of national sovereignty.
National sovereignty posits the people as the source of all sovereignty and the state as the expression of the will or identity of the people. Needless to say, and in keeping with the approach to sovereignty developed above, the people is the product of representation:

A people...is not a natural or spontaneous formation but rather is formed by mechanisms of representation that translate the diversity and plurality of existing subjectivities into a unit through identification with a leader, a governing group or in some cases a central idea (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 304).

National sovereignty, to the extent that it posits both nation and people, symbolically inscribes the polity over which it establishes authority and constitutes the subject of that authority. At the same time the sovereign discourse of the people can be activated and reactivated within the polity in order to maintain the identity of the polity (in the face of antagonisms) and the universality of the state (in the face of accusations that the state represents bourgeois or other interests). Central to our understanding of the political effects of national sovereignty is its relationship to the production of alterity. The identity of the nation is constituted through representation, and hence its definition depends on what it is not, its ‘constitutive outside’ (Hall, 1996). The constitution of the nation is thus embedded in the production of sameness and difference:

Whereas within its domain, the nation-state and its attendant ideological structures work tirelessly to create and reproduce the purity of the people, on the outside the nation-state is a machine that produces Others, creates racial difference, and raises boundaries that delimit and support the modern subject of sovereignty. (Hardt and Negri, 2000:114, my emphasis)

This process is symbolic and cultural. The symbolic regime through which the production of identity and difference takes place depends on the ‘play of differences’ (Hall, 1996; see also Bhabha, 1990) through which meaning is established in representation:

Like all signifying practices, it [identification] is subject to the ‘play’ of difference...And since as a process it operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of ‘frontier effects’. It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process. (Hall 1996: 3, authors emphasis)

Historically this exclusionary production of the nation through self/other binaries has mobilised a variety of key signifiers; blood, language, tradition etc (Habermas, 1998; Weber, 1994). These elements, which secure the identity of the polity, become
mechanisms of exclusion on the borders of the polity (Habermas, 1998). In different ways ‘the people’ are territorialised and spatialised through the symbolic production of identity and alterity which necessarily tends towards internal homogenisation and external exclusion (Hall, 1996). As Habermas (1998; 2001) points out, this notion of national identity makes possible the ‘solidarity’ upon which the modern state was founded, in other words, it is what makes the polity thinkable and effective. The process through which the national people became thinkable as the subject of sovereignty, indeed as the only possible subject of sovereignty, was of course a long and varied one (Sassen, 2006). Nevertheless, by the 19th century this principle came to define the political orders of the European powers (Giddens, 1994) and throughout the 19th and 20th century it came to define the projects of national liberation which appeared all over the colonised world (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Neocosmos, 1998).

Within sociological literature ‘national identity’ is often understood in terms of the identity of individual subjects who constitute the nation or make up its ‘imagined community’ (e.g. Jenkins, 2008). What is more central, as far as sovereignty goes, is ‘national identity’ in the sense of the very thinkability of the national, i.e. the production of the symbolic space or polity under the sign of the nation. As Singer and Weir (2006: 452) argue, national sovereignty “establishes the stage on which the play of social and political forces acquires intelligibility”. Sovereign discourses are crucial to this process, and this is perhaps most clear in national liberation struggles where the polity and the people as political subject must be constructed through militancy, organisation and propaganda, with the sovereignty of the people as its central ideal (Wallerstein and De Braganca, 1983; Neocosmos, 1998).

Both Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al. argue that national sovereignty no longer functions as the principle of authority in the contemporary global order. Hardt and Negri (2000) identify some of the symptoms of this passage in the ineffectiveness of post-modern and post-colonial critiques. Both ‘posties’ centre their critiques on the Manichaean binary order of modernity with its rigid distinction between inside and outside (nature/culture; man/woman; black/white) and both demonstrate how this order is fundamental to power relations in modernity. The intervention of these critical discourses consists in attacking modernity’s essentialist binaries and celebrating the world of
hybridity, singularity and the play of differences (e.g. Bhabha, 1990; Loomba, 1998). Hardt and Negri argue, however, that today’s forms of power have left the fortress of binary oppositions and joined the postmodernists and postcolonialists in their attack on essentialist categories, proclaiming “Long live difference! Down with essentialist binaries!” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 138). Hardt and Negri identify how various forms of control today promote and exploit difference, fomenting processes of hybridisation and rendering them useful from the point of view of capital.

Papadopoulos et al. (2008) point out that the transformation of borders is another way in which these changes can be perceived. National borders, of course, are rigid mechanisms which define the inside and outside of national sovereignties (Giddens, 1994). Indeed, as Habermas (1998: 120) argues, “[t]he nation-state at one time guarded its territorial and social boundaries with a zeal bordering on the neurotic”. Today’s ‘transnational governance networks’ rework the politics of borders:

Historically borders were lines of demarcation between national sovereignties. Transnationalism implodes these demarcation lines and re-interpolates on a global scale the participating actors of national sovereignty in many different ways. Transnational sovereignty merges national spaces and their actors with other international players into a unified horizontal plane by asserting arbitrariness in the way borders are established. Borders are no longer by definition the limits between national sovereignties…they are erected wherever there is a need to solve and to organise social space and political governance. (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 27)

We are witnessing a parallel process of border suspension (e.g. the Schengen agreement; ‘free trade’) and at the same time the proliferation of borders inside and outside traditional territories (Brown, 2010). The control of movement is paradigmatic here. While national borders within Europe are increasingly porous, new forms of European borders are developed outside European territories. The straight of Gibraltar, in this sense, has become a kind of network border governing movement between Europe and Africa. Simultaneously ‘internal borders’ are deployed to control movement within state territories, through identity checks and many other dispositifs (Papadopoulos et al., 2008; 32).

32 See for example the counter-cartography of the Straight of Gibraltar created by the Indymedia Estrecho collective for the Fadaiat encounter of 2006, available at http://areaciega.net/index.php/plain/Cartografias/fadaiat/cartografia-del-Estrecho/Estrecho-cara-A. The alliance of Italy and Libya with regard to the imprisonment of migrants would be another example of this externalization of borders.
Walters, 2010). NI provides a similar example here. As the border between the Republic and the north of Ireland has become less significant (due to new cross border institutions set up through the peace process) micro-borders have proliferated which physically divide the ‘two communities’ were conflict is likely to occur (Jarman, 2002). These examples point towards the reworking of sovereignty (Papadopoulos et al., 2008).

The reworking of borders transforms the inside/outside of modernity in spatial terms. This is paralleled by a transformed relationship between state formations and difference, between the symbolic inside and outside of nation and people. Today’s forms of power function by incorporating differences in order to manage conflicts (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Papadopolous et al., 2008). This is deeply significant in relation to sovereignty. As argued above, the ideology of a united national people was mobilised to legitimise the state and manage the conflicts of modernity (Habermas, 1998; 2001; Gellner, 1983; Hardt and Negri, 2000). The central tenet of Hardt and Negri’s (2000) argument, and the reason they characterise today’s transformations as qualitative and epochal, is that ‘imperial sovereignty’ can function outside of the bounded and internally homogenous space of the nation-state. Imperial sovereignty, they argue, is characterised by permeable mobile borders, which open outwards, allowing new nodes to be incorporated into the network. This is a form of sovereignty which is not threatened by difference; multiple subjectivities, identities and desires are incorporated and managed. In contrast to modern national sovereignty, "[t]he imperial “solution” will not be to negate or attenuate these differences, but rather to affirm and arrange them in an effective apparatus of command…" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 200). In this situation the people no longer anchors the political order:

The concept of the people no longer functions as the organised subject of the system of command, and consequently the identity of the people is replaced by the mobility, flexibility, and perpetual differentiation of the multitude. This shift demystifies and destroys the circular modern idea of the legitimacy of power which constructs from the multitude a single subject that could then in turn legitimate that same power. That sophistic tautology no longer works. (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 344)

As Papadopoulos et al. (2008: 19) point out, this does not mean that nationalism ceases to exist (in some cases it proliferates uncontrollably), but it does mean that the “triptych of people, nation and state” is displaced as the principle of intelligibility of authoritative
government. A useful comparison might be to remember that the toppling of divine sovereignty did not mean that religious discourses ceased to exist, to be effective and to be politically important. It did mean however, that the relationship between polity, authority and divine order were fundamentally transformed.

For both Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al., there is a marked discontinuity between national sovereignty and contemporary sovereignty. Whereas national sovereignty is characterised as a symbolic regime which constructs the universality of the state and the identity of the polity, contemporary sovereignty is theorised by both sets of writers as a kind of implicit logic of rule, to a large extent post-normative and ad hoc. They juxtapose the nation-state, with its powerful symbolic apparatus, and the network of global governmentality, conceptualised as a kind of internal coding of the smooth global space. They describe this global formation as “post-constitutional” (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 33) or as a process of “deconstitutionalisation” (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 226). As such the conceptualisation of sovereignty employed in this thesis differs from the approach of Hardt and Negri or Papadopoulos et al., despite much affinity. Indeed this distinction is central to one of the key contributions of this thesis. In the Conclusion to this thesis I argue that NI presents a case in which the incorporation and management of difference operates through the constitutional reconstruction of state universality rather than through the erosion and displacement of the later.

While it is clear that there is certainly no constitutional sovereignty at a global level (Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2010) the target of this thesis is not the global level but a constitutional sovereign discourse which relates to a specific polity and territory. The critique of NI sovereignty, as I hope to demonstrate in Chapter 6, is impossible without understanding the way in which, while recognising the diversity of the polity, it constitutes anew the identity of the polity and hence introduces a novel mode of state universality.

33 See also Brown’s (2010) discussion of the continuing salience of the national in a post-national world.
Section IV. Sovereignty and the Good Friday Agreement

The literature on the GFA has focused primarily on the emergence of a form of sovereignty capable of operating in an 'ethno-nationally' divided society. McGarry and O'Leary note that "consociation is normally associated with institutional arrangements that maintain the territorial integrity of the existing state" (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: authors' emphasis). In my view the fact that no territorial change occurred has led many writers to underplay the qualitative transformation of sovereignty at stake in NI. Many writers consider the post-GFA state in terms of a kind of 'squeezing in' of another identity, e.g. as 'binational' (O'Neill, 2007) or 'bicommunal' (Bryan, 2006). Likewise, work on post-GFA sovereignty has taken a similar approach, as indicated by the concepts of 'shared' (Crighton, 2003), 'blurred' (Bell, 2008), and 'flexible' (Doyle, 2004) sovereignty. Such approaches emphasise the capacity of the GFA to recognise the existence and legitimacy of more than one national community in a much deeper manner than standard multiculturalism (McGarry, 2001) but fails to recognise the significance of the recognition of the legitimacy of competing national sovereignty claims within one territory. To posit a notion of binational or blurred sovereignty is to ignore the constitutive indivisibility of national sovereignty (Brown, 2010), which is also to surrender the possibility of a critical understanding of the disaster of the nation-state in the twentieth century. Such a conceptualisation is, as Brown (2010: 50) puts it, "worse than unstable and incoherent". As discussed above, we have seen that the ‘others’ of the nation-state are not simply those which have not yet been included but a constitutive feature of the identity of the nation-state (Bhabha, 1990; Hardt and Negri, 2000). It follows that the ‘other’ cannot be included without some deep transformation.

Christine Bell (2009) and John Morison (2009) identify some of the most important elements of this transformation. The two foremost elements are (i) the disappearance of the people and consequently the rearticulation of the link between nation and state and (ii) the internalisation of difference-conflict.

To begin with the former, the notion that the link between the people and the nation must be weakened in order to accommodate minority nationalisms is one of the key ways in which transformations in sovereignty have been explored in the international literature.
Morrison’s contribution is important in that he points out that the people simply don’t figure in the GFA. He notes that “[t]here is no “We, the people...” moment where individuals seeing themselves as somehow possessing some commonality that transcends other allegiances so that the universal rights expressed here can form a basis for a common citizenship” (Morison, 2009: 287). This means that there is no constitutive moment in the terms of national-sovereignty, i.e. no moment in which the people constitute themselves as the subject of sovereignty or in which sovereignty establishes the people as its subject. Here we can see an obvious consonance with the work of Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al. Bell’s contribution clarifies this furthermore by pointing out that what is at stake here is a reworking of the link between demos and state, which she calls ‘state redefinition’. Moving on to the second issue noted above, both Bell and Morrison have highlighted the GFA’s internalisation of conflict. The GFA makes possible the stabilisation of difference-conflict via its incorporation into the new form of sovereignty and the state that corresponds to it. Indeed, this is one of the most significant and most difficult to theorise elements of the GFA, and similar constitutional arrangements: its apparent capacity to incorporate and maintain conflicts at the heart of the constitution or of sovereignty (Walker, 2002; Bell, 2008; Morison, 2009). In the case of the GFA, this centres on the incorporation of the conflicting parties and their conflict into the apparatus of the state made possible by a form of ‘processual’ constitutionalism which does not need to resolve all conflicts in order to function (Walker, 2002). In the GFA the possibility of alternative futures in terms of sovereignty is not only contemplated and recognised; it is enshrined as a fundamental right. This is what Walker describes as the paradox of “‘mutual recognition’...a recognition within the authoritative...constitutional vision, of the legitimacy of other constitutional visions, and an ‘agonistic’ process of negotiation between these alternative visions on the basis of consent and mutual respect” (Walker, 2002: 354). Thus, conflict itself is internalized right through the state institutions:

Indeed the [Good Friday] Agreement structures seek simply to provide a place where these conflicts can be contained and worked upon over time with the instruments of rights, equality, and partnership that are provided. Conflict is

34 Both ‘the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations’ and the ‘right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means’ feature in the GFA.
acknowledged, difference is accommodated, and institutional power is separated and divided among competing factions. (Morison, 2009: 287)

Of course, once conflict is ‘contained’, to use Morison’s term, once it can be played out in a way which is completely consistent with the norms of the situation, it can no longer be conceptualised as conflict, unless we broaden that term to the point in which it no longer has any meaning. Thus, conflict is transformed into a strange kind of consensus, which Bell characterises as the ‘agreement to disagree’: “peace agreements attempt to provide a way for people to try to disagree more peacefully than before” (Bell, 2008: 207). Conflict is thus incorporated into state and sovereignty but on the basis of a consensus which centres on the acceptance of the new form of sovereignty and its capacity to accommodate competing constitutional claims. This form of sovereignty thus transforms difference-conflict into a difference-consensus. By difference-conflict I mean the clash of identitarian claims to national sovereignty. This can be meaningfully conceptualised as a conflict (although not a political conflict) if it is an antagonistic relation which calls into question the situation itself and not just the distribution of resources etc. within the situation. Difference-consensus refers to a relation between identitarian claims which no longer calls into question the situation but in fact underpins the normal administration of the situation, i.e. underpins the state. There are differences between the parties, but these are recognised and integrated within the state and hence should no longer be given the status of conflicts.

Bell explores this hybrid constitutionality in terms of its implications for law, arguing that a new lex pacificatoria can be traced in peace agreements. However, in terms of the question of sovereignty, her analysis, like other existing analyses (Doyle, 1999; 2004; Crighton, 2003), goes no further than the notion of a ‘blurred sovereignty’. What is missing is a positive theorisation of this new mode of sovereignty in its own right. What I want to do in this thesis is describe the form of sovereignty articulated in the GFA in terms of a completely new mode of sovereignty and to do so in a way which addresses the core transformations at work via the conceptualization of sovereignty advanced at the beginning of this chapter.

35 I.e. the clash of national-sovereignties, as mentioned, cannot be resolved within the nation-state.
36 This is not to say that there are no historical precedents or that this development is not a part of broader tendencies.
Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have advanced a conception of sovereignty which emphasises its constitutive dimension vis-à-vis the polity. I insist on such a conception in order to make possible a critical understanding of the state and sovereignty, one which can elucidate the way in which the state becomes aligned with the identity of the polity such that it appears universal. The way in which this takes place, as we shall see in Chapter 6, has decisive impacts on the polity, on state-politics and on depoliticisation. It seems to me that the idea of sovereignty as 'supreme power' explains very little and leads to arguments that rest on little more than identifying an institution or agency which appears to be the most powerful in relation to a particular sphere or process. It seems much more important to illuminate how we come to experience the polity as an integral and meaningful social space and in what way the state is wrapped up in this process. This is perhaps clearer in the case of NI than elsewhere, because the status of the polity was the subject of a dispute. In such situations the meaningfulness of the symbolic social space of the polity cannot be taken for granted and any approach which sidesteps the process through which it becomes once more taken for granted misses a fundamental dimension of power.

In many senses, my aim in conceptualising sovereignty corresponds to a large degree with Marchart’s (2007) characterisation of the work of Claude Lefort. For the latter, “the role of power is precisely to institute society by signifying social identity - and only by relating to this representational signification of identity can people relate to the space in which they live as a coherent ensemble.” (Marchart, 2007: 93). Moreover, Lefort’s interrogation of the historical shift towards democracy reveals that “[w]hat occurred historically was a mutation at the symbolic level which affected the way society’s unity is staged: its mise-en-scène”. (Marchart, 2007: 94). I analyse the GFA and its mode of sovereignty in terms of such a symbolic mutation of the way the polity’s ‘unity is staged’ and link this to the universality of the state.

This reference to the mutation of sovereignty, however, reminds us that in this thesis I am concerned with a transformation of sovereignty and also with the relationship between that transformation and depoliticisation. The relationship between sovereignty and depoliticisation has already been touched upon in relation to the state’s monopolisation of
universality. However, there is another important point here. The transformation of sovereignty in NI is also part of a historical movement of depoliticisation in which the subjectivity which set in motion that transformation is incorporated into the new state. In Chapter 6, in which we turn to the analysis of the mode of sovereignty articulated in the GFA, we will see that GFA sovereignty re-appropriates universality precisely through the depoliticised and depoliticising recognition of that subjectivity. In this sense we will see that there is a relationship between transformations in sovereignty and state universality and politics, as conceptualised in Chapter 1. In this regard, my analysis of GFA sovereignty in Chapter 6 draws on and recalls Negri’s (1999) understanding of the relationship between constituent power and sovereignty. The relationship between sovereignty and politics (as a radically excessive and transformative force) has not been addressed here as I wanted to focus on the conceptualisation of sovereignty. However, I return to this theme in Chapter 6.
Introduction

The question of citizenship in Northern Ireland is striking first and foremost due to the prevalence of an explicit discourse aiming to foster a new kind of citizenship. According to various intellectuals, NGOs, politicians and policy documents the peace process cannot be founded on institutions alone but must create a new and tolerant subject in order to guarantee the enduring stability of ‘peace’. In contemporary NI citizenship emerges as a governmental theme via a problematisation of the relationship between identity and politics deemed to have characterised the ‘troubles’ (i.e. the conflict). According to this problematisation, the nationalistic identification which has characterised NI’s ‘two communities’ has perpetuated a self/other dynamic and fuelled conflict via a zero-sum conception of national identity (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; Morrissey and Gaffikin, 2006). Despite the advances of the peace process at the macro-institutional level, these patterns of identification persist resulting in a segregated society and maintaining the possibility of further outbreaks of violence. Hence, the peace process can only be sustainable on the basis of a new form of identification which can underpin the post-conflict polity. This would mean a new way of conceiving self and other, a new way of relating across difference characterised by mutual recognition and tolerance. In other words a new form of identification/subjectification is needed to found the peace process (i.e. the state). In short, this is a project of multicultural citizenship. Massimo d’Azeglio famously said ‘we have made Italy, now we must make Italians’. The NI parallel might be ‘we have made the multicultural state, now we must make multicultural citizens’. Such discourses on citizenship might be described, in the words of Ranciere (1998: 68), as “the complete psychologising and sociologizing of the elements of the political apparatus” since, at bottom, they represent the project of constructing a subject which will underpin the state.
This is the general context within which my interrogation of citizenship is situated. The role of this chapter will be to develop the concept of citizenship I employ for this task. In this chapter I am not concerned with developing a global or general conception of citizenship. Rather, my objective here is to develop a concept of citizenship which will allow me to elucidate, to describe and to critique a particular process or set of processes which are central to the NI state. In this sense, my conception of citizenship stays close to the themes of the state and depoliticisation. Specifically, I am interested in the ways in which particularisation/identity are mobilised within technologies of citizenship and the relationship this has with the state and universality.

I discuss citizenship as a technology of government. Foucault and many others have demonstrated that citizenship should not be reduced to a contract whereby the state recognises the natural rights of the liberal and humanist individual. Such a conception of citizenship, indeed, would succumb to the risk identified by Bourdieu: when we try to ‘think the state’ we risk being ‘thought by the state’ (Bourdieu, 1994). Rather, citizenship, as an institution of the modern state, must be seen as a technology or a set of technologies which produce the modern subject (Foucault, 2007; Rose, 1999; Cruikshank, 1994). The first task of this chapter, then, will be to set out exactly what kind of technology we refer to with the term citizenship. I answer this question by highlighting the three key dimensions of the concept of citizenship employed in this thesis: the statist dimension; the identitarian dimension; the dimension of depoliticisation. Together, these three dimensions make up a statist technology oriented towards a particular type of subjectification. This is the production of a subject which identifies with the state and the polity. It is also a subjectification linked to an institutionalised and statist mode of politics (i.e. a state-politics). Given that citizenship is bound up with both identification and a prescribed conception of what politics is and what the political community is, it is traversed by depoliticisation (Isin, 2002a).

The classic mode of citizenship is of course that of the nation-state. Today, however, new modes of citizenship are proliferating everywhere (Sassen, 2002; Ong, 1999; Isin and Turner, 2007). Given that the themes of difference and conflict are central to the contemporary NI state, the most relevant field in which mutations of citizenship are visible
is of course multiculturalism. I examine multicultural citizenship in this chapter, arguing that it fails to confront difference politically and is best conceptualised as a technology of government, drawing largely on the work of Wendy Brown.

Before beginning, however, it is important to highlight that citizenship has generally been a field of contestation, in which political subjectivity has tended to stretch the political possibilities at stake within that concept (Isin, 2002a; Papadopoulos et al., 2008). For instance, James Holston (2008) has explored the interplay between ‘entrenched’ and ‘insurgent’ citizenship in modern Brazil. However, here I am only interested in the non-political and Statist dimension of citizenship. As we will see in Chapter 5, my discussion of the NI Civil Rights Movement might well be considered in terms of struggle around citizenship. However, I have chosen to retain the terms politics and political subjectivity for addressing questions of conflict and transformation and to use the term citizenship to refer to the limited, institutionalised side of that term.

**Conceptualising Citizenship**

Citizenship refers to the link between political subjecthood, identity (in both the broad philosophical and more narrow ‘cultural’ sense) and, I will argue, the ‘ethico-political’. However, citizenship is also an institutional form which links all three issues (identity, ethics, political subjecthood) to the modern state. The classic view conceptualises citizenship as a “bundle of rights and obligations that formally define the legal status of a person within the state” (Turner, 2001: 11). Today, however, Isin and Turner argue for “a sociologically informed definition of citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings, and identities.” (Isin and Turner, 2002: 4). Moreover, many elements of citizenship as classically conceived are experiencing transformation related to globalisation, challenges to the nation-state, migration, multiculturalism, neo-liberalism, transformations in work, the rise of human rights discourse and new social movements (Papadopoulos et al. 2008; Isin and Turner, 2002; Sassen, 2002). As a result, a new literature on citizenship has emerged which has expanded the traditional conception of citizenship and today includes a well-developed conceptual vocabulary which permits the interrogation of the manifold relationships between identity, difference, power, governmentality and ethics which circulate through citizenship (Isin and
Turner, 2007; Ong, 1999; Brown, 2006; Cruikshank, 1994; Rose, 1999). These are concepts I make use of below in exploring the development of citizenship, its recent multiculturalist turn and in developing a critical approach to citizenship.

The central concept I employ is citizenship as technology of government. Citizenship is not simply, as classic liberal theorists would have argued, the state’s contractual recognition of a naturally free subject endowed with certain inalienable rights. Rather, from a Foucauldian perspective, citizenship is a mode through which the modern subject is produced (Isin, 2002a; Cruickshank, 1994; Rose, 1999; Brown, 2006). In this sense citizenship can be conceptualised as a technology of power, sometimes operating in a disciplinary mode and sometimes in a governmental one (Isin, 2002c). If the various institutions, policies and projects of citizenship are productive of the subject, then the importance of the concept of citizenship as technology lies in the particular form of production of subjectivity it captures. I will propose a number of interrelated elements here.

a) While there are many ways in which state operations are productive of subjects, citizenship can be distinguished to the extent that it produces (or aims to produce) a subject which explicitly experiences itself as bound up with state and polity. In other words it produces a subject which is self-consciously a member of a political community identified with the state;

b) Relatedly, this type of subjectification always involves a form of identification and belonging in the sense that the subject comes to experience themselves as a member of a political community. This is the inclusionary aspect of citizenship and can involve shared traits such as race or language as well narratives of historical progress or political ideology;

c) Membership of and belonging to a political community is always normative in the specific sense that the subject’s very membership of the political community is bound up with particular forms of behaviour, characteristics or belief. In this sense citizenship as
technology involves the *government* of the state-political subject’s mode of being political.

On the basis of these briefly introduced points I want to argue that citizenship as technology is distinguished by its statist dimension, its identitarian dimension and its depoliticising dimension. I will elaborate on each dimension below.

**The statist dimension**

I am interested in processes in which the subject becomes identified with the state and polity, i.e. the way the subject encounters themselves as a political subject within the symbolic social space of the state. For example, under the nation-state subject and polity are identified such that the subject (qua political subject) experiences their socio-symbolic reality as coterminal with the borders of the state. There is a kind of alignment between our subjective sense of the political space we inhabit and the actual institutional extent of the state, and this is obviously no coincidence (Bourdieu, 1992; 1994). What this attests to is that the state, as argued in previous chapters, is not simply an institution but a symbolic regime. If citizenship is oriented towards an identification whereby the subject encounters themselves as a political subject within a socio-symbolic space coterminal and coextensive with the state and polity, then citizenship can be conceptualized as the *inscription of the subject within the symbolic regime of the state*. In this sense, the identification which underpins citizenship in terms of the state is of specific importance:

The peculiarity of this modern citizenship is that although it is one of many associational identities people normally assume, the state that defines it is like no other association. Although the state is part of society, it also frames it. Although the state is an association, it is also an association of associations that establishes the rules of other associations and regulates their membership. Therefore, as the primary identity of state association, citizenship is like no other status. (Holston, 2008: 21)

But we also know, on the basis of the rich body of work on the nation-state, that the symbolic regime of the nation-state materializes at the level of the subjectivity of the citizens or the population. By this I mean that the nation-state cannot exist and has not existed historically outside of or independently of its subjects. The nation-state, as a statist symbolic regime, must be cultivated in ‘hearts and minds’. As such I propose to
conceptualize the relationship between the state and citizenship in terms of a ‘double inscription’ which inscribes the citizenry within the symbolic regime of the state and at the same time inscribes the symbolic regime of the state into the subjectivity of the citizenry. In this sense, I employ the term citizenship to refer to an element of the state rather than a relationship with the state. The statist dimension of citizenship as technology is precisely the moment of ‘double inscription’ which institutes the state within us and us within the symbolic regime of the state.

That this ‘double inscription’ can be conceptualised in ‘technological’ terms has been most thoroughly demonstrated with regard to nation building. The inculcation of national citizenship involved all manner of interventions including rituals, e.g. songs, anthems, dances, processions, official funerals (Shore, 2000, Damsholt, 2000); monuments, symbols, flags and emblems (Shore, 2000); temporal techniques such as calendars and national holidays (Anderson, 1993; Bourdieu, 1992); education (Bourdieu, 1992); linguistic (normative grammar, linguistic homogenisation, destruction of vernacular languages) and geographical standardisation (Anderson, 1993; Bhabha, 1990; Habermas, 1998; Wolff, 1994); as well as a whole host of narrative and other techniques associated with modern literature and print media (Bhabha, 1990; Anderson, 1993; Said, 1978; Kiberd, 1996). This array of techniques and projects were oriented towards a specific type of subject which corresponded to and underpinned the nation-state. This means that as subjects we come to experience ourselves within a national space which coincides with the space of the state itself, such that the state is identified or bound up with our experience of ourselves as members of a collective or community.

The final issue with regard to the statist dimension of citizenship is the theme of state universality, already addressed in Chapters 1 and 2. Because citizenship is identified with the political community tout court it transcends the differences within the polity, i.e. it has a universal dimension along the same lines as the universality of the state as described in Chapters 1 and 2. This universal dimension has of course long been recognised:

[T]he modern state is the first to have the concept of the citizen of the state [according to which]...the individual for once, is not, as he is everywhere else, considered in terms of the particular professional and family position he
occupies, not in relation to differences of material and social situation, but purely as a citizen. (Weber quoted in Isin, 2002b: 122; author’s emphasis)

Given that the universality of citizenship is connected to membership of the political community bound up with the state it, as in the case of sovereignty, ultimately collapses back into an identitarian construction, as discussed in the following section (Habermas, 1998; Marion Young, 1990; Isin, 2002a; 2002b). In other words, what is most important is that state universality has tended to manifest in a similar fashion at the level of both citizenship and sovereignty via an alignment with a pseudo-universal political community (the polity). As such, citizenship is an important field within which to investigate state universality.

The identitarian dimension

Technologies of citizenship depend on identification, i.e. they depend on the active identification of the subject with the political community/polity/state. Identification, of course, is dependent on the production of alterity. Citizenship always involves the production of others. These are not simply a ‘remainder’ who will be integrated as rights expand over the progressive march of history, as social democrats and multiculturalists would have us believe. The production of identity upon which inclusion depends requires a constitutive outside through which citizenship qua inclusion becomes meaningful. This has been demonstrated in the many studies of nationhood and otherness (Kiberd, 1996; Isin, 2002a). This means that citizenship operates within a ‘regime of visibility’ in which the subject’s ‘right to have rights’ involves their symbolic inscription within the national community, what Papadopoulos et al. (2008) call ‘the rights and representation matrix’. At the same time, groups which are invisibilised are deprived of those rights (either officially or through various para-state mechanisms, Zizek, 1999). Thus citizenship is a relational phenomenon, a matrix of inclusion-exclusion. As Isin says:

[C]itizenship at any given moment and space cannot be defined without investigating strategies and technologies as modes of being political that implicate beings in solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating orientations of being political, constituting them as citizens, strangers, outsiders, or aliens. (Isin, 2002a: 30)
Thus, while citizenship often holds out a universal promise (Weber, 1994; Habermas, 2001) its identitarian constitution collapses towards particularisation. The lesson of the 20th century in particular is that this has political consequences of the utmost importance.

**The dimension of depoliticisation**

In this section I will introduce Isin’s (2002a) notion of ‘being political’, which has parallels with the theoretical approach to politics developed in Chapter 1. Isin’s notion of citizenship as ‘being political’ allows us to conceptualise the relationship between citizenship and political subjecthood more clearly. Isin uses the term to describe the component of ‘being’ (the identity of the subject), on the one hand, and the political (in the sense of the mode of exercising oneself as a political subject and of relating politically to other members of the polity), on the other. What is most useful about Isin’s term is that he properly considers this ‘being political’ in terms of its relation to politics. For Isin, the ‘being political’ of citizenship is a kind of incorporation and domestication of politics within the dominant order. It is the mode of ‘being’ officially sanctioned as political. Isin distinguishes this from ‘becoming political’, where ‘becoming’ implies a subjective transformation which disrupts the dominant order. The citizen is not a political subject in the sense of the subject of politics, but in the sense of being identified with an institutionalised mode of exercising their ‘political’ or ‘politicalness’. This is what I mean with the term ‘state-political subject’. Under the nation-state this might be paying taxes, being a member of/voting for a political party, governing the family in a particular way, willingness to join the army, national pride etc. Isin describes the distinction between the two terms as follows:

> When social groups succeed in including their own virtues as dominant, citizenship is constituted as an expression and embodiment of those virtues against others who lack them...Becoming political is that moment when the naturalness of the dominant virtues is called into question and their arbitrariness revealed. (Isin, 2002a: 275)

As such Isin concludes that we owe politics to the outsider, i.e. that which is excessive vis-à-vis citizenship’s regime of visibility.

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37 "Becoming political can perhaps be defined as acts of transfiguration and transvaluation by noncitizens. In the end, we may owe the existence of politics not to citizens, but to strangers, outsiders and aliens". (Isin, 2002a: 283)
Moreover Isin’s work allows us to understand how citizenship operates as a *depoliticising* technology, in that it seeks to govern the citizen’s being political; it grasps and problematises the subject’s political capacity but seeks to govern this in terms of a normalised and statist conception of politics. Historically, one of the key mechanisms through which this has been undertaken has been through what I will call, following Rose (1999), the ‘ethico-political’ and what Isin (2002a) calls ‘virtue’. Isin defines ‘virtue’ as a “broad field in which a citizen conducts himself (later also herself) towards the conduct of others” (Isin, 2002c: 309). By identifying citizenship with a ‘virtue’ or regime of virtues the way in which the subject acts politically is rendered amenable to government. Such ethico-politics is exemplified in the stoic, rational, industrial virtues frequently associated with the bourgeois citizen or, in today’s case, the ‘tolerance’ deemed to characterise the multicultural citizen (Brown, 2006). Rose (1999) describes such technologies of government as ethico-political because they link a particular and normative conception of the good (ethics, virtue) to particular modes of exercising oneself as a subject and both are linked to the stability of the polity. For example, in a classic bourgeois situation it is the very ‘reason’ and ‘industriousness’ of the bourgeois citizen which is deemed to make democracy possible, and hence those who lack such virtues are seen as unfit for democracy (women, colonial subjects etc).

The way in which Isin conceptualizes the antagonism between being and becoming political resonates with the theoretical approach to politics developed in Chapter 1. Indeed, Isin makes reference to Ranciere’s work. As we seen in chapter 1, for Ranciere politics consists in a subjectivisation that disrupts the ‘police’ or symbolic order and which the

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38 The reference to ‘conduct of conduct’ signals Isin’s affinity with the governmentality approach. His twist here is to see citizenship as the conduct of conduct in relation to the conduct of fellow citizens, thus emphasising the relational dimension of citizenship as technology, i.e. citizenship constructs subjects in relation to the polity and its members.

39 In the last chapter of his *Being Political* Isin distinguishes his own conception of politics from that of Ranciere, arguing that by situating politics outside the dominant order (the police) Ranciere falls victim to depoliticisation. This is because, according to Isin, politics is never a relation between inside and outside or friend and enemy (in Schmitt’s sense) but a gap inside the political community. Thus, Isin sees politics as emerging from that which is within a situation but included as a subordinate element. I think Isin misreads Ranciere here. In my view, Ranciere’s notion of the part of no part refers precisely to this kind of subordinate inclusion. For example, the proletariat has been a constant referent in Ranciere’s studies of political subjectivisation and the proletariat is very much a part of the capitalist political order, but the part which, as a consequence of its reduction to a productive function, cannot ‘take part’ in the political order, i.e. the part of no part. On this point, I read Isin and Ranciere as compatible.
state seeks to domesticate or pacify via its reintroduction to the normalised order of things. This takes place by designating ‘politics’ and aligning it with a specific series of actors, spaces, capacities and functions. Isin’s work shows that citizenship has been one of the sites within which this dynamic has played out historically.

As indicated, I conceptualise citizenship as a technology linked to depoliticisation. It is worth noting, however, that from the perspective of the governmentality approach, the notion of a technology of depoliticisation is problematic. Indeed, it is not possible to investigate depoliticisation at all through governmentality theory, given its prohibition of any conception of emancipatory politics (see especially Rose, 1996a, see also Dean, 1999). Indeed, Papadopoulos (2008) argues that the governmentality approach, by eschewing the possibility of a subjectivity which is excessive to regimes of governmentality or power, reproduces elements of contemporary neo-liberal governance. Hence, the governmentality approach might itself be understood as depoliticising. In this research, I link my critique of citizenship as technology of governmentality to a specific theory of political subjectivity as excessive in order to critique citizenship as a technology of depoliticisation.

We can now sum up our three dimensions of citizenship as productive technology: the statist dimension, the identitarian dimension, and the dimension of depoliticisation. I use the concept of citizenship to refer to a set of processes through which the citizen is inscribed within the symbolic regime of the state and state universality involving the depoliticizing identification of the subject with the polity and the ethico-political government of the subject qua state-political subject.

**Citizenship as Multicultural**

The most pertinent transformations in NI citizenship relate to questions of difference and the recognition thereof. Hence, the literature on multiculturalism (especially the critical literature) is a useful point of departure and at the same time provides a vital set of conceptual resources for the analysis undertaken in Chapter 7.

The multiculturalist critique of national citizenship essentially involves the revelation of the particularism which stands behind national citizenship’s supposed universalism.
Multiculturalists have argued that national citizenship, far from being universal, excludes the ‘others’ of the nation. This is related to the inscription of the modern state within the national, which is itself identified with a particular cultural/racial/ethnic/religious content (Kymlicka, 1995; Modood, 2010; Marion Young, 1990; Joppke, 2002). In keeping with liberal philosophy, the fact that citizenship is grounded in a dominant identity has been considered a ‘legitimate grievance’ of minorities on the basis that ‘identity’ is an inalienable part of the individual and therefore minority identities must be recognised by the state (Talyor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995), i.e. it has been explored on the basis of a fixed and humanistic conception of the subject to which a ‘cultural identity’ has now been added (on the relationship between multiculturalist and ethnic conceptions of identity and liberal philosophy see Finlay, 2010).

The promise of multicultural citizenship is that by loosening the relationship between citizen and nation a more open and pluralistic citizenship can be developed. Such a citizenship would be able to correspond to not one, but many different identitarian groups, hence reducing the oppression of minorities and making for a more convivial society. One of the main objectives of Kymlika’s work is, tellingly, the securing of a stable state in the context of difference. However, multicultural citizenship confronts difference by reducing it to identity (Goldberg, 1994; Gilroy, 2000; Brown, 2006; Zizek, 1999), an argument which is sufficiently well rehearsed and need not be rehashed here. As such, it seems much more fruitful to confront multicultural citizenship as a technology for governing difference.

Citizenship as multicultural technology and depoliticisation

While multiculturalism has not engaged effectively or politically with difference, it has become one of the most dominant state technologies for managing and depoliticising certain forms of conflict related to representation, difference, race etc (Brown, 2006; Goldberg, 1994; Rolston, 1998). I want to discuss here a key investigation of multicultural citizenship as depoliticising, Wendy Brown’s Regulating Aversion.

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40 Zibechi (2010: 115) critiques the ‘statist’ dimension of Kymlicka’s work in his interrogation of Garcia Linera’s ‘multinationalism’.
Brown approaches liberal multiculturalism via its key normative category: tolerance. She points out that tolerance has become a ubiquitous feature of state-politics and has become identified with democracy and the vision of the good society. Her critical strategy, however, is to approach tolerance as a technology. She favours:

...surrendering an understanding of tolerance as a transcendent or universal concept, principle, doctrine or virtue so that it can be considered instead as a political discourse and practice of governmentality that is historically and geographically variable in purpose, content, agents and objects. As a consortium of para-legal and para-statist practices in modern constitutional liberalism...tolerance is exemplary of Foucault’s account of governmentality as that which organizes “the conduct of conduct” at a variety of sites and through rationalities not limited to those formally countenanced as political...tolerance...produces and positions subjects, orchestrates meaning and practices of identity, marks bodies and conditions of political subjectivities.’ (Brown, 2006: 3, author’s emphasis)

Brown treats tolerance as a mechanism for the government of identities and political subjectivities. These two components refer to what is captured in Isin’s term ‘being political’. My own investigation of contemporary NI citizenship can be understood in much the same way; as an investigation into a particular rationality and technology for the government of being political in a particular context, and, crucially, the effects of this government on politics. The question of effects is important as it forces us to confront the question: “What kind of citizens does it [tolerance] hail, with what orientation to politics, to the state, and to fellow citizens”. (Brown, 2006: 5).

Brown’s critique emphasises the way in which tolerance, as a rationality of relating to the other, re-inscribes and reproduces alterity in two ways. First of all, tolerance recognises the other but in a way which maintains and even depends on the difference of the other. As Brown (2006: 29) says; “What is tolerated remains distinct even as it is incorporated”. The very prescription to tolerate implies difference and hence the object of tolerance is always-already different. Secondly, ‘tolerance’ also has its other. Every tolerance is always supported by and depends upon intolerance (Badiou, 2006). Today, ‘culture’, in a particular sense, is itself the other of liberal multiculturalism. In an extensive commentary on Brown’s work, Zizek defines more precisely the way in which tolerance ‘others’ culture, arguing that under multiculturalism “the ultimate source of barbarism is culture itself, one’s direct identification with a particular culture which renders one intolerant
towards other cultures." (Zizek, 2009b: 120). 'Culture' here refers specifically to a 'pre-multicultural' mode of culture in which a particular culture is directly experienced as the world. Under the multicultural mode, 'minority culture' is of course permitted, and indeed celebrated endlessly, but only once it is maintained at a distance. We are allowed to identify with a culture but only in a mode which recognises that this culture is a particular and arbitrary idiosyncrasy devoid of any transcendent, universal or cosmological value (Zizek, 2009b). For example, we can identify as Muslim, but if we believe that Sharia law is transcendental vis-à-vis secular law we are immediately denounced as an 'islamo-fascist'. Tolerance tolerates difference but only where it does not threaten the universality of liberalism itself (Brown, 2006). A direct identification with one's culture can be recognised as the other of tolerance precisely to the extent that it is what tolerance sets out to subdue and domesticate:

[C]ulture [for liberalism] must be contained by liberalism, forced into a position in which it makes no political claim and is established as optional for individuals. Rather than a universe for organising ideas, values and modes of being together, culture must be shrunk to the status of a house that individuals may enter and exit. Liberalism represents itself as the sole mode of governance that can do this. (Brown, 2006: 22)

In addition, Brown argues that tolerance must be conceptualised in terms of depoliticisation. Much like other critiques of multiculturalism (Goldberg, 1994; Rolston, 1998), Brown thinks of this depoliticisation in the following terms:

1. Tolerance culturalises politics;
2. Tolerance dehistoricises conflicts articulated around difference thus naturalising conflict;
3. Tolerance, while presenting itself as a transcendental and universal value, is in fact "thick with protestant bourgeoisie norms" (Brown, 2006: 7) and, moreover, reproduces the dominance of the majority culture by positioning the other as that which must be tolerated and hence as somehow deviant.

In Chapter 7 I discuss many of Brown's ideas but take them in a different direction in accordance with the specific form of depoliticisation operated by multicultural technologies of citizenship in that context. As we will see, some of Brown's arguments fall
short in the NI context. First of all, in the case of NI, multiculturalism is not a mere policy fix which attempts to deal with difference while avoiding any qualitative transformation of the state. On the contrary, it is the very logic which characterises state transformation. Second of all, Brown’s account of depoliticisation focuses on the critique of the ‘culturalisation of politics’, a critique which rests on a distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘politics’ that obscures more than it reveals in the NI context. Finally, rather than surreptitiously reproducing the dominance of the majority culture, NI’s multicultural citizenship is based on *mutual* recognition, such that each citizen must be both tolerant and tolerated.

**Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter has been to clarify the particular process I examine through the notion of citizenship as well as to develop and set out the set of concepts through which I provide a critique of this process. *The process essentially involves the movement of depoliticisation present in the activation of an identitarian subject which is inscribed in the state and in which the state is inscribed.* Depoliticisation here operates through the reduction of subjectivity via the logic of identification, the alignment or grounding of politics in a *particular* subject and a normative conception of politics and, moreover, through the reproduction of state universality and hence the state’s monopoly on universality. All of this militates against or forecloses the emergence of politics, i.e. the emergence of a universal subjectivity which is excessive to the particular identities and norms of the state and therefore possesses a radically transformative potentiality.

I have also sought to demonstrate that citizenship, conceived in this manner, operates at a technological level. That is to say that it materializes in rationalities and technologies which construct problems and subjects, rendering them amenable to government. This involves eliciting, affirming and producing particular forms of identification as well as certain orientations to “the state, politics and fellow citizens” (Brown, 2006: 5).

In Chapter 7 I investigate and analyse the forms of citizenship at stake in contemporary NI and their relationship both to depoliticisation and to state universality.
Chapter 4
Methodology

[T]he state is not necessarily where we look for it (that is, where it silently instructs us to cast our gaze and net), or, more accurately, [...] its efficacy might be strongest precisely where and when we neither expect nor suspect them. (Wacquant, 1996: xvii)

Introduction

In the Introduction and in Chapter 1 I have argued that the state must be conceptualised as a symbolic regime if we are to address the questions of state universality and depoliticisation. I have also noted that the subject is always-already immersed in the symbolic regime of the state. This raises the question of how we can critically investigate the state and depoliticisation, or how to approach the relationship between critique and representation with regard to the state. My contention is that it is critical social thought's capacity to exceed what is, to operate at a distance from the given, which grants it an emancipatory potential. Here I follow Papadopoulos (2008: 148) when he argues that “[i]nstead of solely focusing on existing representations” what is needed is a methodological sensitivity to “an excess which pertains to forms of social imagination which are beyond existing representations...” In order to think beyond representation we will need to abandon much of the commitment to narrow empirical research (in the sense discussed below) which has become increasingly prevalent in social sciences (Frade, 2010; Neocosmos; 2009a). We will need to grasp not just ‘what is’, but also potentialities which are repressed by ‘what is’, tensions between ‘what is’ and ‘what could be’, and the processes through which ‘what is’ presents itself as all that can be. I argue that such a challenge calls for a philosophical orientation as it is philosophy that allows us to question ‘what is’, i.e. to think ‘being’ critically (Badiou, 2005). As such I draw on the work of philosophers such as Badiou, Ranciere and Lefort in order to frame my methodological approach. While I take an initial philosophical orientation I develop this in a sociological direction, in terms of the actual analysis and theorisation of the transformations of state universality in contemporary NI.
One of the challenges I confronted in writing this methodology chapter is the difficulty of dealing with methodological concerns as a discrete chapter when methodology and theory are in fact intertwined throughout this thesis. We will also see here that my discussion of methodology will raise once more a number of theoretical issues. As such, this chapter theoretically situates methodological concerns as it sets out the rationale behind my epistemological approach, methodology, analytical approach and the sources I draw on.

I begin by examining the methodological implications which emerge from the theoretical discussion outlined in Chapter 1. In particular, when we link together the state and the notion of a symbolic regime, the relationship between representation and critique becomes paramount. This requires a form of critique which can cut through or ‘subtract itself’ from the symbolic regime of the state. I then move on to discuss my analytical strategy and specifically the role of concepts therein. Finally, I describe the role of documentary sources in my research with regard to the three areas under investigation. Documents form the central sources in terms of sovereignty, citizenship and the historical dimension of depoliticisation.

**Representation and Critique: Initial methodological and political problems**

Much existing social science research casts itself as empirical in a specific sense of that term. My concern is with “the ‘cult of empiricism’ in social science research which conceives the investigation of existing representations - be it in qualitative or quantitative form - as the primary starting point for the generation of knowledge” (Papadopoulos, 2008: 148; see also Neocosmos, 2009a; Frade, 2009). This perspective throws up serious problems, methodologically and politically.

To begin with the methodological issues, representations do not exhaust the materiality of the social world (Papadopoulos, 2008; Stephenson and Papadopoulos, 2006; Olkowski, 1999). There is simply more to the social world than meets the eye. This means that much is missed when we take existing representations as the ‘be-all and end-all’ of the social world. Notably, anything which is excessive to normalized identities (conceived in a constructivist or essentialist manner) is disregarded (Papadopoulos, 2008). Moreover, to
examine 'empirical' phenomena is often to obscure the representational processes through which those phenomena appear as more or less discrete objects of inquiry (Lefort, 1988; Marchart, 2007). For example, to examine the different attitudes of women and men, or even unequal access to power between them, presupposes a symbolic regime within which the subjects 'men' and 'women' become amenable to perception (Butler, 1998).

Secondly, and in relation to matters political, the result of these methodological difficulties is that, where representations are taken as the point of departure for knowledge, the representational order within which empirical phenomena appear is reproduced (Papadopoulos, 2008). As such it is no surprise that critical writers have been drawn away from the description and explanation of empirical phenomena, in the sense I have been critiquing, and focused on the constitution of those phenomena. Foucauldians have not been concerned with the activities of subjects but with their constitution at the level of discourse and power/knowledge (Foucault, 1998; Gordon, 1991). Feminists have not (or not only) been concerned with the differences between women and men but with the symbolic constitution of gendered difference itself (Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1990). Post-colonialists have not been concerned with the relations between 'ethnic groups' but with regimes of difference and their relationship to identity and power (Loomba, 1998; Said, 1978). This is of course because critical writers are concerned not just with 'what is' but with 'what could be', and the ways in which the former suppresses the possibility of the later. From such a perspective we can see that the reproduction, at the level of knowledge, of existing representations is also the suppression of possibilities which are excessive to them (Papadopoulos, 2008; Neocosmos, 2009a). If we want to open up possibilities, then, we need to open up representation to critical inquiry and we need to think outside or beyond existing representations (Papadopoulos, 2008; Neocosmos, 2009a; Badiou, 2005).

In this regard I distinguish between what I call the 'meta-social' and 'social' dimensions of phenomena. This distinction serves to highlight the process of symbolic constitution. By social dimension I refer to more or less 'normal' phenomena which appear within the representational social space and can be readily apprehended. The 'meta-social' dimension refers to processes that symbolically constitute social phenomena and the representational
space within which they become amenable to apprehension. For example a particular set
of power relations may be considered as a social phenomenon. But power can also be
conceptualised at a meta-social level in order to highlight its constitutive role. Where we
think in terms of the social we will be more inclined to address the power of one subject
over another (bosses over workers, men over women etc). Where we talk about power as a
meta-social we will also be able to address the process through which power constitutes
those very subjects.

Critically Investigating the State as Symbolic Regime

The above discussion is of general methodological and political importance but is of
special relevance in relation to the analysis of the state, politics and depoliticisation as
conceptualized in this thesis. In particular, when we conceptualise the state as symbolic
regime, the relationship between critique and representation becomes paramount. Before
dealing directly with my own approach, however, I will discuss some of the more
prevalent methodological approaches to the state which characterise political science and
political sociology by way of situating my own methodology.

Political science, political sociology and the critique of the state

The issues discussed so far raise a number of issues for the standard methodologies
associated with political science and political sociology. My own approach is very much at
odds with the empirical focus which characterises political science in particular. The
critique of political science and sociology developed by Claude Lefort allows us to
highlight some of the issues here as well as introducing the importance of a more
philosophical orientation.

Staying with the terminology of the previous section, we can say that because the meta-
social dimensions of phenomena are not directly amenable to apprehension they tend to
resist standard methodological approaches oriented around empirical social phenomenon

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This is very much the distinction which I refer to, although with out recourse to the terminology applied
here, in discussing sovereignty. As we have seen in Chapter 2, sovereignty has both a social dimension, as an
immediately intelligible discourse within the polity, and a meta-social dimension as a constitutive force of
the polity itself.
Lefort argues that political sociology and political science treat politics as a set of actions and institutions within a particular sphere of society and so doing ignore the process through which that sphere is constituted:

Modern democratic societies are characterised by the delimitation of a sphere of institutions, relations and activities which appears to be political, as distinct from other spheres. Political sociologists and scientists find the preconditions that define their object and their approach to knowledge in this mode of appearance of the political, without ever examining the form of society within which the division of reality into various sectors appears and is legitimated… (Lefort, 1988: 11)

Moreover, within both disciplines politics is generally identified with the state, such that the state itself ultimately guarantees their disciplinary identity (Lefort, 1988; Bartelson, 2001). Lefort’s point is that the representational or symbolic processes of differentiation through which ‘politics’ is constituted as a separate domain, a process upon which political sociology and political science are ultimately founded, must itself become a target of enquiry. It is here that Lefort sees a key role for philosophy or political theory. Marchart has elaborated upon Lefort’s critique of political sociology and political science and emphasises the role of philosophy in contradistinction to those disciplines:

What the subject of science looks out for are value-neutral and positive facts or laws which correspond to social domains. Thus the very domain of science is established through the delimitation of social domains and the delimitation of disciplines...From this vantage point, politics - as a particular subsystem - becomes the subject matter of a positive science, be it political science or political sociology. On the other hand, it is the very tradition of philosophy to pursue an interrogation of what transgresses the limits of every social domain. (Marchart, 2007: 89, my emphasis)

Rather than investigating the state as a straightforward empirical object, I am interested in the much less readily apprehensible process through which the state is produced as a symbolic regime. This thesis applies a kind of ‘transgressive’ critical-philosophical approach to the research of the ‘meta-social’ constitution of the state and its universality as a process, and specifically as a process of depoliticisation. It asks, for example, how does the polity come to be a meaningful socio-symbolic space or community? How does the state come to ‘capture’ politics by presenting itself as ‘public’, as ‘the illusory point of common interest’, to quote Marx and Engels. And how does all of this work to suppress the potentiality of politics as a radically excessive force?
Conceptual destatification as methodology of the critique of the state

It is worth recalling here that, as discussed in the Chapter 1, the specific component of the state I want to address is the dimension of universality and how this relates to politics and depoliticisation. My research aims to identify the particular mode through which the state appropriates universality and through which it evacuates the polity of any possibility of a universal subjectivity.

As discussed in Chapter 1, I understand the question of the state and its relationship to politics in symbolic terms. If we understand the state as not just an administrative/bureaucratic institution but as a symbolic regime than the methodological and political issues outlined in the previous section are of course pertinent. In particular, any research strategy which stays within the terms of the representational order of the state will tend to reproduce the state (Bourdieu, 1994).

The core methodological question, then, is, if the state is understood as a form of symbolic domination, as a regime within which we are inscribed, then how can we grasp the reality of the state at the level of thought? Specifically, if we (as subjects) are caught up in the representation and experience of the state as universal, how can we grasp the mode through which the state appropriates universality? Is thought not always-already inscribed within the symbolic regime of the state? Here we confront a challenge long ago articulated by Kant:

[T]he origin of supreme power...is not discoverable by the people who are subject to it. In other words, the subject ought not to indulge in speculations about its origin with a view to acting upon them...these are completely futile arguments for a people which is already subject to civil law, and they constitute a menace to a state. (Kant quoted in Bartelson, 2001: 3)

Following Bartelson (2001), I contend that the limits Kant imposes on critique can and indeed should be transgressed. In response to this challenge, the strategy adopted here, mentioned briefly at the outset of Chapter 1, is that of a destatification of thought. Here Ranciere’s work is again useful. In a short article in which he deals with the political and methodological role of his use of ‘distinctions’ (such as police/politics), Ranciere (2010a)
argues that such distinctions permit a disruption of existing distinctions and a way to think beyond them. He develops and employs conceptual distinctions as “replacements for other distinctions, and against them. They effectuate less another type of classification than a type of declassification”. (Ranciere, 2010a: 205) For example, in the case of NI today, and no doubt more broadly, politics is identified with the state. Specifically, the move from ‘violence’ to a ‘politics’ of ‘dialogue’ is framed through the post-GFA state. The identification of the state and politics not only has evident ideological overtones, it renders unthinkable the possibility of politics beyond the state. As such, it renders any critique of the state qua depoliticisation impossible. My conceptual distinction between the state and politics, such that politics can be thought independently of the state, allows me to critically explore the foreclosure of politics at stake in the transformation of the NI state.

In this sense, such a strategy makes possible a form of critical inquiry that Ranciere describes in terms of “a certain dissensual practice of philosophy as an activity of de-classification that undermines all policing of domains and formulas….This critical practice of philosophy is an inseparably egalitarian or anarchistic, practice…” (Ranciere, 2010a: 218). This resonates with Marchart’s (2007) conception of philosophy’s unraveling of inherited distinctions and distributions. In this thesis I adopt this Rancierian strategy in relation to the ‘use of distinctions’ as well as by developing concepts which are heterogeneous to the state. It must be noted that this is a strategy which is not oriented towards ‘objectivity’ (it is not that behind the symbolic regime of the state there is an objective reality waiting to be revealed), but towards “Engaging in critique of the instituted division” that “paves the way for renewing our interrogations into what we are able to think and do”. (Ranciere, 2010a: 218). For the present research, identitarian representations are particularly significant in relation to the issues of state universality and depoliticisation. Indeed, a number of writers have argued that in the NI context undoing identitarian representations is a prerequisite of critical inquiry (Finlay, 2010; Edkins, 2006; Zalewski, 2006; Whitaker, 2004).

It is perhaps in its unraveling of dominant representations that critical thought comes closest to politics, as conceptualised in this thesis. As I argue in Chapter 1, politics has an antagonistic and excessive relationship with the symbolic regime of the state, it is “the
refusal of representation” (Papadopoulos, 2008: 156). Politics’ refusal of representation opens up a space or a subjective movement which cuts across the representational order of the state, hence opening up possibilities beyond the domination of the state (Badiou, 2005). My aim is to operationalise a similar ‘refusal of representation’ via a philosophical orientation, but also to operationalise the critical dimension of philosophy within a sociological analysis of state transformation and depoliticisation. The workings of this operationalisation are the subject of the next section.

**Analysis and Concepts**

In this section, I elaborate the implementation of my methodological approach in terms of the role of concepts in analysis. I begin by situating my approach via a critique of one of the more dominant ways in which concepts are used within social sciences, focusing on grounded theory. I then develop on my own use of concepts and conceptual distinction as analytical tools, already touched upon in the previous section.

In certain strands of qualitative research, such as grounded theory, concepts are initial, low-level abstractions which describe relevant elements of the data. Their work is to ‘reduce’ or ‘condense’ elements of the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). These abstractions form building blocks with which to build the analysis and ultimately the explanatory framework (i.e. theory, as understood within such approaches). Concepts are generated via analytic techniques such as ‘breaking up the data’, ‘line-by-line’ analysis or ‘list all possible meanings’ (see chapter four of Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In short, concepts emerge out of analysis and interpretation and not the other way around. I think there are two key difficulties with grounded theory’s attempt to avoid a priori interpretative mechanisms by replacing them with analytic techniques, at least with regard to my own research. Firstly because it reflects a wider tendency of replacing thoughtful interpretation with technique (Law, 2004) and secondly because the interpretation will inevitably have to proceed according to interpretative mechanisms, regardless of the analytic techniques employed, and this will now occur on an unconscious or ‘doxic’ level. As argued above this is particularly problematic with regard to the state. In contrast I employ concepts as ‘tools’ which are used to work on the data, as the prism through which the analysis and
interpretation of data can proceed. The interpretation of meaning necessarily involves interpretative mechanisms which give meaning to data.

What tends to motivate grounded theory and similar approaches is a suspicion with theory based on the notion that one will find what one sets out to find when analysis proceeds on the basis of pre-existing theories. There are however many analytic approaches which involve neither the vulgar imposition of theory on data nor the empiricist retreat to analytic techniques. In this research I use concepts as a mobile set of interpretative mechanisms to engage with the data. This engagement is “creative and active rather than merely representative, descriptive or simplifying”, as Cliff Stagoll (2005: 51) says of Deleuze’s approach to concepts. In other words, rather than using concepts as condensed descriptions of existing representations, as representations of representations, I use them as tools through which to think anew existing representations.

As discussed in the previous section with reference to Ranciere, distinctions are particularly useful here as declassificatory tools. In addition to these distinctions I employ a number of concepts which play a similar role. For example, within a given governmental technology ‘problems’ are positioned as objective features to which the technology in question merely provides a solution. The notion of ‘problematisation’, however, opens up the constitutive and representative function of problems.

I develop these analytical tools whenever I confront a kind of blockage or obstacle which cannot be thought outside the terms of the state. For example, anyone familiar with the Northern Irish literature will be aware that the distinction between ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ is one of the most common in state-political discourse. This distinction constructs possibilities in terms of either a peaceful coexistence of identitarian communities or a violent relation between them. This kind of distinction, needless to say, systematically prevents any kind of political thought by aligning conflict with inter-communal violence. We thus confront a state-sanctioned notion of conflict which prevents us from grasping the history of the NI conflict as anything other than a problem to which the contemporary state provides a solution. To think beyond this statist scenario it is necessary to disentangle what is at stake in that notion of conflict. I distinguish between the state-sanctioned notion of
conflict, which I call 'difference-conflict', and what I call political conflict. The state-sanctioned notion reduces conflict to violent or militaristic relations between identitarian communities. Political conflict, in contrast and as discussed in Chapter 1, refers to antagonism between a universal and excessive subjectivity and the dominant state symbolic regime. I rely primarily on existing theory for such concepts, which are developed, modified and applied within my own work. A glossary of concepts and conceptual distinctions can be found in Appendix C.

Sources and Documents

Documents provide the main source of data for this thesis. I draw on documentary sources in two different, although related, ways. The difference here corresponds to my concern with politics, on the one hand, and state universality on the other.

However, there are some important underlying similarities and these have implications insofar as they raise questions around some of the standard assumptions associated with documentary sources. Much of the literature on documentary research emphasises the role documents play in the representation of occurrences which are conceptualised as essentially external or independent of the document (Scott, 1990; May, 2001; Prior, 2004). While documents are given a certain amount of agency with regard to the way in which representation constructs occurrences, documents are ultimately imagined as a record. Key texts on documentary research (in particular Scott's (1990) classic *A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research*, but also more introductory texts such as May (2001)) rely on this distinction between 'documents' and occurrences. In these texts, documents come after occurrences and are essentially textual records of those occurrences. Researchers have also argued that documents are not simply passive or neutral receptacles of occurrences but actively construct particular interpretations of the reality of occurrences (May, 2001). The methodological upshot of this is the idea that documents involve a representation of occurrences, where representation is understood as essentially separate and secondary to that which is represented.

The documents I am interested in don't seek primarily to represent occurrences which are external to them, rather they constitute a social occurrence in themselves, they are
significant for the way they construct reality rather than through the way they represent realities occurring externally or independently. To use a familiar distinction, documents are ‘topic’ rather than ‘resource’ within this research. This means that several important elements of documentary research are not relevant for my own project, e.g. the primary/secondary source distinction. Scott (1990) describes primary sources as those which are written by a person who has witnessed the occurrence, while secondary sources are those written after the occurrence by another. Once the document/occurrence distinction becomes irrelevant such distinctions clearly loose their meaning.

What I am interested in is not documents themselves but in the political (or meta-political) rationalities and singularities which are ‘sedimented’ in particular types of documents. In terms of the analysis of state universality (with regard to sovereignty and citizenship), I conceptualise the latter as political rationality and the former as meta-political rationality. Such rationalities are not examined as representations or records of occurrences which are external to them, but rather as phenomena in their own right. In terms of politicisation and political singularity, I argue that politics has a fundamentally declaratory nature (discussed further below). Documents as such can express political singularity. Here documentary sources are framed as expressive rather than representative. In what follows I detail what is at stake in these approaches to documents. I begin with the political and meta-political rationalities operative in sovereignty and citizenship, the two fields in which I investigate state universality.

**Documentary sources and the analysis of sovereignty and citizenship**

As argued in Chapter 2, the type of sovereignty I am concerned with in this thesis is *constitutional* sovereignty, i.e. an explicit declaration of sovereign authority. Such a declaration can be found in the GFA document, specifically in Item (V) of the Constitutional Issues. While I analyse the GFA document and its context more generally, Item (V) is the central source I draw on in analyzing sovereignty. As discussed in Chapter 2, I conceptualise sovereignty as a meta-political rationality and my analytical approach can be usefully compared to that of the governmentality school, in that I am concerned with how sovereignty as a rationality, articulated in a discursive claim, constructs its problem and solution and what is at stake politically therein.
As set out in Chapter 3, I conceptualise citizenship as a form of governmentality and propose to analyse it in terms of political rationalities and technologies. I focus on a specific policy framework which deals with the relationship between identity, the polity and the state. This is *A Shared Future: Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland* (ASF) published in 2005. This document sets forth a rationality for an essentially multicultural conception of citizenship. ASF is a framework document or a ‘mainstreaming document’, in other words it sets forth a rationality to be implemented across the state-system. In order to analyse its implementation, I focus on one particular policy area: urban regeneration. Urban regeneration is an area which has been strongly influenced by ASF and is seen as crucial to ‘building the peace process’ (Morrissey and Gaffikin, 2006; Brand et al., 2008; Neil, 2004). I examine a number of key urban regeneration policy documents which have been published over the last number of years. I also provide one illustrative example of urban regeneration today, in the form of the Skainos project in Belfast. Skainos is a large ‘community regeneration’ project situated in Inner-East Belfast and involving the construction of a new street and ‘civic square’. The objective of Skainos is to create ‘shared space’ where the ‘two communities’ can come together and interact across difference, thus strengthening the peace process (i.e. the state). In analysing Skainos I draw on a number of documentary sources and I also conducted a number of face-to-face qualitative interviews. The interviews were semi-structured and generally lasted about 2 hours. I conducted interviews with four members of the Skainos board as well as a number of community workers working under the umbrella of Skainos.

The qualitative interviews undertaken in relation to Skainos were not in-depth interpretative exercises. My interest was in the rationalities and technologies that were being deployed. I was aware that what was being communicated to me in the interviews were representations and discourses of a particular sort, one that would be consistent with that used in funding applications and interactions with other actors involved in the project. But this is very much the type of discourse I was interested in, i.e. the expression of political rationalities and technologies in language in a way that makes possible the organisation of ‘government at a distance’. The relevant sources with regard to Skainos are set out in Appendix B.
The methodological underpinnings for the approach to documents I employ in relation to both sovereignty and citizenship can be usefully discussed via the literature on governmentality as method.

The term governmentality brings together ‘government’ and ‘rationality’, and the later term, unsurprisingly given Foucault’s concern with power/knowledge, emphasises the role of thought. Rationality here refers to more or less systematic forms of thought which have a performative orientation such that they construct problems and objects in ways which render them amenable to action. Clearly, rationality here (like discourse) is seen as a productive phenomenon, one that makes and remakes the world in particular ways:

A rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of activity thinkable or practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practiced. (Burchell et al., 1991: 3)

Political rationalities are elaborated in thought and therefore in language (Rose, 1999), and this language is ‘sedimented’ (May, 2001) in the documents produced within particular governmental regimes. As far back as Weber’s work on bureaucracy the importance of written records in organisations has been noted by sociologists (Prior, 2004). As Prior (2004: 375) argues “in the modern world the organisation of things is anchored in writing”. Bruno Latour has developed substantially upon this theme, using the term ‘action at distance’ to describe how what is written down in one context has implications for what happens in another (Latour, 1987). This concept has been developed by Miller and Rose (1992) in their term ‘government at a distance’ which highlights the fact that in advanced liberal societies the elaboration of government in writing is fundamental to its capacity to function across time and space. The documents I am interested in are precisely those documents which can be conceived as forms of ‘government at a distance’, that is to say documents which aim to guide or govern the actions of people in other contexts. In this sense documents are conceptualised as ‘agents’ (Prior, 2004).
Documentary sources and the analysis of politicisation and depoliticisation

Documents also form the basis of my analysis of the Civil Rights Movement and the depoliticisation thereof. Here, however, the approach to documentary sources is somewhat different.

There is already interesting theoretical work being done on the question of how to conduct social-historical investigation according to a Badiouian conception of politics (Russo, 2006; Neocosmos, 2009a). It seems to me that there is also important work to be done on Ranciere’s use of archives as a critical-philosophical resource. Just as Deleuze (1988) once called Foucault the ‘new archivist’, Ranciere’s use of documentary archives in investigating emancipatory politics seems full of potential for future research (see especially Ranciere, 1989). However, I focus on Badiou’s approach because, in contradistinction to that of Ranciere, this has been developed in a more sociological direction. Particularly relevant here is the work of Alessandro Russo and Michael Neocosmos.

Russo (2006) has advanced two important points with regard to the investigation of politicisation and depoliticisation. Firstly, a political singularity is subjective. Secondly, politics is declaratory. In relation to the first, the ‘truth’ of a political event or singularity is immanent to the form of subjectivity generated within and through that event. Since political subjectivity is an exception, i.e. it is excessive to the objectivity of the situation, it cannot be described in terms of the objective factors operative within the situation (Russo, 2006). For example, proletarian subjectivity cannot be reduced to the worker’s objective position within the mode of production (Badiou, 2006; Ranciere, 1998; 1989). The researcher’s task is made all the more difficult because politics, as a mode of subjectivity, is precarious and transient (Russo, 2006; Badiou, 2005; 2010). All too often the same militants who are caught up in a political event later deny that such an event ever really occurred or betray everything about it. Witness the number of contemporary European

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42 I especially draw on conversations with Alessandro Zagato who is conducting PhD research at the sociology department, National University of Ireland, Maynooth.
elites who were once caught up in 1968. This means, of course, that if one were to interview former 68ers today one would not necessarily be able to access the political singularity of 1968. Ideally, then, we would deal with data from that historical moment, which evinces something of the energy of the time.

In relation to the second point, politics’ declaratory nature, we can say that politics always announces itself. Indeed, such a conception chimes well with Ranciere’s argument that politics always involves a discursive dimension in which a new capacity for annunciation presents itself. Thus, the classic textual-declaratory forms associated with politics: the flier, pamphlet, slogan, manifesto or newspaper. Such political declarations provide a unique insight into the kind of subjectivity and politics at work in a given movement and as such provide invaluable data (Russo, 2006).

In order to investigate political singularity I initially draw on two different sources (for a full list of sources see Appendix B). Firstly, I draw on the accounts of militants of the Civil Rights Movements at the time, in particular those of Eamonn McCann, Michael Farrell, and Bernadette Devlin. Secondly, I examine a number of pamphlet or leaflet type documents produced between 1968 and 1972.

In addition, one of the main focuses of my analysis (though by no means the only one), is the demands of the Civil Rights Movement. The demands of a political movement are an important declaratory form of politics and, I argue, they can express the subjectivity and singularity operative within a movement (Hallward, 2005). These demands are recorded in pamphlets and leaflets and in the first person accounts of militants (i.e. the two sources already mentioned) and they are also recorded in the existing research on the Civil Rights Movement. Peter Hallward’s (2005) conception of ‘prescriptive politics’ allows us to reveal the political singularity which can be operative in the form of a demand. Hallward’s notion of prescriptive politics is a broad project. I use just some aspects of his work with the aim of drawing out what is at stake in a specific political demand and in thinking its singularity. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.

43 Why this is the case is a frequent cause of concern for Badiou (e.g. 2005, chapter 7; see also Badiou, 2008).
So far the issues raised relate to the question of political singularity. However, given that depoliticisation is another central theme of this research, I will also seek to examine the collapse of that singularity, which is to say the collapse of the subjectivity which constitutes that singularity. Here Badiou's notion of the 'point' is useful:

A point is a moment within a truth procedure (such as a sequence of emancipatory politics) when a binary choice (do this or that) decides the future of the entire process... We have to realize that almost all failures have to do with the fact that a point has been badly handled. Any failure can be located in a point. (Badiou, 2010: 39)

Just as my concern with the political singularity of the Civil Rights Movement is focused on the question of subjectivity, in analysing the 'point' I will focus on the form of subjectivity which is presupposed or 'summoned' by the politics of the Provisional IRA. Having identified the political singularity of subjectivity within the CRM I will be able to trace the extent to which it continues to thrive or is overtaken by an alternative mode of subjectivity. As I will argue in Chapter 5, the 'point' of Northern Ireland's 1968 occurs in the first years of the 1970s when it becomes clear that the CRM lacks the organizational capacity to either develop its potentiality or protect itself from the counter-revolution. At this point the IRA begins to emerge as the dominant force, with its 'statist' and nationalist mode of politics. Moreover, in our case the point will also prove to be central to the broader movement of depoliticisation which is at the heart of the transformation of the NI state.

In terms of sources, I primarily draw on the principle political documents published by the Provisional IRA or Provisional Sinn Fein in the 1970s. I also make use of existing research on the Provisional IRA during the relevant period. A full list of these sources can be found in Appendix B.
Chapter 5
Politicisation, Depoliticisation and Northern Ireland’s 1968

[W]e must ask the question that, without a doubt constitutes the great enigma of the century: why does the subsumption of politics, either through the form of the immediate bond (the masses), or the mediate bond (the party), ultimately give rise to bureaucratic submission and the cult of the state? Why do the most heroic popular uprisings, the most persistent wars of liberation, the most indisputable mobilisations in the name of justice and liberty end...in opaque statist constructions wherein none of the factors that gave meaning and possibility to their historical genesis is decipherable? (Badiou, 2005: 71)

Why has the “non-violent, non-sectarian” civil rights movement led to sectarian violence? (Civil Rights leaflet, 1969)

Introduction

A political singularity is primarily a subjective phenomenon - it is a change that traverses us in the form of an expansion of possibility and potentiality (Badiou, 2010). Accounts of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) from participants are full of references to such a force. Peter Bunting, a CRM activist, recalls that “Every person who went through the events of the year of our lord 1968 came out differently...They were changed because they saw the world anew. They believed that there were possibilities that were not apparent before the things they witnessed and the actions in which they participated.” (Bunting, 2009: 6) Likewise, Eamonn McCann, one of the key militants, remembers walking around Derry the day after one of the most important demonstrations of the CRM (October 5th 1968), hearing “over and over” the phrase “things will never by the same again”, and describes this as a moment in which “The sense of the new was shimmering.” (McCann, 2009a: 146). This subjective expansion of possibilities captures the emancipatory dimension of Northern Ireland’s 1968 and it is this which explains the dramatic transformations which took place in that society, particularly in the 1968-1972 period. Writing in the heat of the

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44 This is a quote from a leaflet which seems to have been issued by the Young Socialist Alliance, one of the more radical groups within the Civil Rights Movement, on the 19th of July 1969.
moment, Bernadette Devlin, an iconic figure in the movement, captured the essence of social change in the following simple but effective statement:

At some time in a country's history there are enough people who feel the same way at the same time to create a force and change the pattern of events. That's what happened in Northern Ireland in the autumn of 1968. (Devlin, 1969: 91)

Understanding the force Devlin describes is an initial challenge I tackle in this chapter. The task is to think what the people ‘felt’ from the point of view of political singularity, to grasp the political subjectivity at stake. This is an important part of the investigation of the broader process of depoliticisation. It is necessary to first understand the process of politicisation which brought about the crisis of the NI state in 1972 before we can analyse the process of depoliticisation and state transformation which occurred in the subsequent years. This is of additional importance because, as indicated already in Chapter 1, the form of state transformation, the way in which the post-conflict state reconstructs its monopoly on universality, is intimately related to the depoliticisation of the political subjectivity of 1968. In this chapter I analyse and conceptualise the politicisation that took place around 1968 and the initial process of depoliticisation as it emerged within the movement. This process of depoliticisation would eventually pave the way for the new state form enshrined in the GFA and analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. The objective of the chapter is thus to develop an original analysis of the political singularity of NI’s 1968 and the historical relationship between depoliticisation and identification in relation to that singularity.

The CRM was never a fully-fledged ‘revolutionary’ movement. From the beginning it existed in an ambiguous and tense relationship with other subjective tendencies, most notably the identitarian politics which encroached from various sides. However a careful analysis can reveal the egalitarian and universal potentiality which characterised the political singularity of the CRM. To situate this movement I want to demonstrate the way in which it emerges to challenge the exclusions of a state which is inscribed within a sectarian paradigm. NI’s ‘Orange state’, to use Farrell’s (1976) term, reflected a

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45 Sectarianism literally refers to discrimination between religions or sects. However, in Ireland sectarianism has a broader frame of reference as it is often used to describe forms of discrimination or oppression in which a number of differences are operative. To take the case of the Orange state, ‘Catholic’ was linked to other signifiers such as ‘Irish’ and ‘Irish nationalist’ as well as ‘disloyal’. In this thesis I use the term sectarianism to refer to the regime of difference which links all of these signifiers together (political,
territorial and identitarian state built on the normative inclusion of the Protestant working class and the ‘othering’ of Irish/Catholics, who were perceived as inherently ‘disloyal’ to the Orange state. This mode of exclusion was institutionalised in many key sectors, most famously in the highly undemocratic voting structures. Moreover, I argue that the CRM, by contesting these exclusions, challenges the state’s monopoly of universality and in fact presents itself as the point of universality.

Having grasped the emergence of this political subjectivity, and hence the process of politicisation which occurred in those years, we will be in a position to address more precisely the question of depoliticisation and the emergence of the identitarian politics which would dominate over the following decades, and indeed until today. Here we must recall the relationship between identification and depoliticisation, conceptualised in Chapter 1 as the identification of the ‘part of no part’ with an empirical social group defined by an identity or other empirical characteristic, or the subordination of the logic of subjectivisation to the logic of identification. The primary, although by no means the only, vehicle for this was Irish Republicanism, with its ideal identification of people, state, and territory. I conceptualise this as the fundamental ‘point’ in the depoliticisation of the political sequence initiated by the CRM. The shift from the egalitarian political subjectivity which characterised the CRM to the identitarian conception of the ‘Irish Nationalist community’ is the fundamental building block of the peace process, without which all its instruments for recognising and incorporating the ‘identity’ of ‘both communities’ could not be effective. In this sense, while Republicans have always spoken of ‘armed struggle’, I want to place what I call ‘armed depoliticisation’ and its relation to both the state and identity at the heart of the historical dimension of depoliticisation. My precise concern here is not a general analysis of Irish Republicanism in the relevant time period. Rather, I want to isolate and conceptualise the way in which the politics of the movement came to be bound up with the logic of identification. As a result, there are many aspects of the Republican movement which I will not address here. For the present purposes it will suffice to grasp the form of subjectivity which is summoned or supposed in the Republican politics of national liberation.

national, cultural and religious). As such, and most importantly, my use of the term sectarian should not be taken to emphasise the religious dimension of the conflict, a dimension which has been much overblown in international media. For a good discussion of sectarianism in Ireland see McVeigh, 1998.
My analysis of the operation of the logic of identification within the movement brings a novel perspective. In terms of the existing critical literature on the peace process, the critique of its identitarian dimensions has focused largely on state strategies (Finlay, 2010; McVeigh and Rolston, 2007; Rolston, 1998). However, it seems clear that during this period the state had little ability to influence the subjectivity of the movement, given that the CRM was excessive vis-à-vis the state. What the state was able to do was to create the kind of militarised situation which was clearly going to facilitate the collapse of the CRM’s ‘street politics’ (Purdie, 1990) and the re-emergence of the IRA. Many historical accounts tend to describe the militarization of NI by the British state in terms of a series of unfortunate blunders, the folly of which can be perceived in hindsight (e.g. English, 2003; Coogan, 1995). However, greater theoretical sensitivity to the relationship between the state and depoliticisation draws our attention to the way in which the state may facilitate the depoliticisation of political subjectivities.

In the first section of this chapter I analyse Ulster Unionism and the Orange state, the context out of which the CRM emerged. The second section examines the CRM. I give an account of the emergence and development of the CRM as well as the mode of political subjectivity at stake. The third and final section focuses on the shift from the CRM to an armed nationalist struggle via the ascendency of the Provisional IRA within the movement. Here I primarily focus on the politics of the Provisional IRA particularly in the early 70’s. In this chapter I present an analysis of NI’s 1968 and the historical relationship between depoliticisation and identification which would play out in the following years. In the next chapter we will see how this shift is crucial to the formation of the contemporary NI state.

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46 This was the case in many countries in the ‘60s and ‘70s, especially in Italy where the state’s ‘strategy of tension’ sought to polarise and militarise Italy in order to destroy the emancipatory potential of the autonomist movement (see Nanni Ballestrini’s (1989) historical novel The Unseen for a great account of this period).

47 This question is explored by Raul Zibechi in Dispersing Power. Zibechi argues, based on his analysis of Latin American social movements, that the state will frequently seek “to build upon statist elements that already exist" within anti-state movements (Zibechi, 2010: 66).
Section I. The Context of the Civil Rights Movement: the Orange state

In this section I focus on the NI state that existed between the early 1920s and 1972. I examine that state as a symbolic regime, primarily emphasising the symbolic exclusions operative in NI in order to understand the context of the CRM. The question of symbolic exclusion will no doubt bring to mind the nation-state and its inclusion/exclusion matrix. However, in the context of NI there is some debate about whether that state should be considered in national or colonial terms. For some writers, Ulster Unionism and the Orange state are essentially nationalist constructions (Kearney, 1997; Gibbon, 1975; Prince, 2007; McIntosh, 1999). Such writers highlight the symbolic and ritualised production of a territorial polity ideally identified with state and people. Others, however, focus on NI’s colonial genesis. In this view the NI state and its identitarian machinery are bound up with the maintenance of a colonial state-apparatus. They highlight the racist ‘othering’ of the catholic population, the state’s ‘civilising mission’ and its ‘permanent state of exception’ (McVeigh and Rolston, 2009; McVeigh, 2008).

Rather than taking a position within this debate, I draw on the common elements of these two approaches as these suffice in terms of contextualising the CRM. These are:

- The NI state (1921-1972) was embedded in a symbolic regime which produced and reproduced the socio-symbolic space of NI as a meaningful entity and polity;
- Difference and ‘othering’ played a crucial part in this symbolic regime.

Ulster Unionism

Ulster Unionism emerged out of a variety of political positions and alliances (the Orange Order perhaps the foremost among them) which crystallised in response to the threat of ‘home rule’ in Ireland. Whether or not Ireland was ever a colony is itself the subject of debate (Walker, 1990). Home rule refers to the question of an autonomous regional parliament for Ireland. This question dominated mainstream politics in Ireland during the late 19th and early 20th century.
however, a distinct form of Unionism emerged which reworked the Protestant class alliance into a *territorial* political identity, i.e. *Ulster* Unionism. Ulster Unionism was primarily a response to the realisation that Ireland was on the verge of independence; it was an attempt to 'save' Ulster, which was the centre of industry, from that fate. The Unionist party, which would go on to dominate the NI 'Orange' state for its entire duration, arose from the Unionist convention established in 1886 as an attempt by the Protestant bourgeoisie to gain hegemony over the anti-home rule movement through a politics which involved the "the elaboration of the qualities purportedly distinguishing Ulster from the rest of Ireland" (Gibbon, 1975: 132). The event which signalled the official launch of the Unionist convention took place on 17 June 1892 in Belfast's Botanic Gardens and was attended by over 120,000 people. Gibbon's discussion of the ideological and symbolic component of the event highlights the centrality of the 'production of the people':

The construction of the pavilion, housing delegates and a large choir, was begun on 21 May and completed the day before the convention took place. The building's exterior was decorated with flags, shields and emblems, while inside tapestries depicting famous moments in Protestant history were hung from walls and ceilings. The names of Unionist leaders were painted round the rim of the balcony. The pavilion symbolised operational monumentalism - the capacity of the party to create a monument to the qualities of Ulster and its Protestant inhabitants. Commemorated in this monument were the achievements and potentialities of the imperial experience in general, and its modernising mission in particular. The pavilion also embodied the potential power-to-be-reckoned-with of the Ulster people: immensity, substantiality, safety, attention to the smallest detail...It was a monument, moreover, to the existence in Ulster...of 'tradition' and 'progress', the favourite twin themes of Unionist demagogues. A monument, finally, which made a silent comment on the lack of such qualities in the remainder of the Irish population. (Gibbon, 1975: 132)

The symbolic production of the people underway here was, evidently, linked to the production of an identity. This identity was facilitated by Unionist historiography (McIntosh, 1999). Shirlow and McGovern (1997), in relation to Unionist historiography describe a narrative of a "history of collective allegiance to the crown, constitution and the 'Protestant People'..." The following example from Unionist historian Lord Ernst Hamilton is typical here:
There is a wonderful freemasonry amongst Ulstermen - stronger, I think than that which binds together any other race on earth. It is perhaps because they are so few that they are bound together by such strong and sacred ties...[Here] in the Ulsterman is a man to be trusted; with such salient features as fidelity, courage, and that peculiar Ulster characteristic one may describe as staunchness... (Hamilton quoted in Gibbon, 1975: 5)

The Orange Order was to play a particularly strong role in the ideological definition and reproduction of the identity of the 'loyal Ulsterman' (Gibbon, 1975; McIntosh, 1999). Several sociologists (McVeigh and Rolston, 2009) define the identity which underpins the notion of the Ulsterman and the Protestant people in terms of a colonial 'civilisation' mission, reflecting Goldberg's (2002) conception of 'historicist racism'.

In all of this the 'othering' of Catholics was central. Two examples, from opposite ends of Unionist ideology, might be useful here. Terrence O'Neill, NI Prime Minister from 1963 to 1969, is typically seen as representing the 'progressive' side of Unionist ideology, as demonstrated in the following infamous comment:

It is frightfully hard to explain to Protestants that if you give Roman Catholics a good job and a good house, they will live like Protestants because they will see neighbours with cars and television sets; they will refuse to have eighteen children. But if a Roman Catholic is jobless, and lives in the most ghastly hovel, he will rear eighteen children on National Assistance. If you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness, they will live like Protestants in spite of the authoritative nature of their Church. (O'Neill quoted in NICRA, 1979:18)

The difference of the 'other' is positioned here as potentially assimilable. As with older forms of religious assimilationism, O'Neil "can think equality only in terms of pure sameness". On the other hand we have the more absolutist negation of difference summed up by Ian Paisley's comment from the same year as the above quote: "They [Catholics] breed like rabbits and multiply like vermin". While Irish Catholics were the primary focus of the othering through which Unionist ideology functioned, there were

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50 This quote is taken from Hardt and Negri (2001: 116) in reference to Bartolomé de Las Casas' Christian humanism.
also, as in most European nationalisms, elements of anti-Semitism, homophobia etc.\textsuperscript{51}

The ideology of Ulster Unionism produced a ‘protestant people’ which was to underpin the resistance to the Irish Nationalist movement and ultimately the foundation of a separate state in six of the counties of Ulster which became NI (Shirlow and McGovern, 1997). Unionism also played the crucial role of establishing a cross-class alliance between the Protestant Bourgeoisie and the Protestant working class, who dominated key industries such as textile, heavy engineering and shipbuilding during the period in which industrial capitalism was dominant in NI, i.e. until the 1960s (O’Dowd, 1980; Gibbon, 1975; Shirlow and McGovern, 1997; Farrell, 1976; Bew et al., 1979). Antonio Negri (1988) has argued that a key factor in the political dynamic of the ‘short twentieth century’ was the need to integrate the proletariat, which by 1917 had entered the world stage as a revolutionary political subject. In Ireland, as in other colonial contexts, the revolutionary subjectivity of the working class was coupled with (and frequently subordinated to) the movement for national liberation\textsuperscript{52}. Unionists, in their own paranoid way, correctly perceived the revolutionary forces as the ‘twin evils’ of Bolshevism and Republicanism. When the colonial regime in Ireland collapsed and the Northern state was formed, Unionists faced threats from all sides: non-nationalist militant labour, Irish Nationalists, and Marxist-nationalists. The ‘short history’ of the Unionist state (1925-1972) was defined, as indicated above, by an interlinked strategy for the hierarchical inclusion of the Protestant proletariat and the exclusion of the Catholic population. Key to this was the definition of the Catholic population as inherently ‘disloyal’ by virtue of their identification with the south of Ireland and with Rome\textsuperscript{53}. The notion of inherent disloyalty to the nation was a defining feature of twentieth century anti-communism, anti-Semitism and anti-nomadism. The Ulster Unionist identity manufactured by the state was defined against the notion of the ‘disloyal’, against the threat of the internal enemy and against the external enemy on the southern border (Shirlow and McGovern, 1997; McIntosh, 1999).

\textsuperscript{51} Speaking of the Ulster Unionist Party’s Jewish candidate, Harold Smith, Ian Paisley commented, “he is a Jew. As a Jew, he rejects our Lord Jesus, the New Testament, Protestant principles, the Glorious Reformation and the sanctity of the Lord’s Day. The Protestant throne and the Protestant constitution are nothing to him.” On Loyalism and homophobia see Shirlow (2000).

\textsuperscript{52} At the height of the national independence movement (1919-21), over 100 soviets were declared in factories and towns all over Ireland (Kostick, 1996).

\textsuperscript{53} One of the most bizarre features of Unionist propaganda was the association it sought to establish between bolshevism, Irish Nationalism and Catholicism. As a result Northern Ireland is surely the only place in which communists were considered papist conspirators!
The Orange State

The NI state was established in 1921, following the Anglo-Irish treaty, but due to the resulting civil war and the continuing contestation of the Northern state, its birth date is usually considered to be from 1921 until 1925. The legislative basis for the state was the Government of Ireland Act which provided for two separate 'home rule' (regional autonomy) parliaments in the North and South of Ireland. The Northern state took on responsibility for "the majority of services directly affecting the lives of Ulster people" (Rose, 1971: 117) and had its own Ministry of Finance and annual budget. Tax collection was primarily undertaken by the British state. However, Rose concludes that Westminster was left with "few other formal powers" (Rose, 1971: 117) and Morrison and Livingstone argue that "the government of the United Kingdom largely left the regional administration to its own devices" (Morison and Livingstone, 1995:124). Moreover, according to Rose (1971), Protestants regarded Stormont (where the Northern Parliament was based) as 'their government'. NI, then, was very much the polity within which people perceived themselves to be living and within which they understood themselves as state-political subjects. In this sense I follow all the major critiques of the NI state in situating internal dynamics as fundamental to the state and ideology (Bew et al., 1979; Farrell, 1976). That said, there is an important question about British nationalism and what some consider as its 'pluri-national' form, which I will not go into here (Rose, 1971; Kearney, 1997). This also brings us back to the colonial versus national debate. It is of course important to keep in mind that while the NI state was inscribed within a symbolic regime which was particular to the NI situation, the state did not exercise independent sovereignty and could be suspended by Westminster - as indeed happened in 1972. Here the colonial quagmire from which the state emerged resurfaces and raises further ambiguities in terms of precise conceptualisations of the Orange State.

The new state quickly institutionalised the ideology of Ulster Unionism, operating a simultaneous hierarchical inclusion of the Protestant proletariat and exclusion of the Catholic minority. All of the critical accounts of the NI state emphasise these two elements (Farrell, 1976; Bew et al., 1979; Shirlow and McGovern, 1997; McVeigh and Rolston, 2009; O'Dowd, 1980; McCann, 1980). Here, I will briefly outline some of the most salient features of this matrix of exclusion and inclusion:
1. Political representation: Initially, following the 1921 election, Irish Nationalist controlled local councils were simply dissolved\(^{54}\). Subsequently more sophisticated measures appeared. First of all, franchise in local elections was restricted to rate-paying citizens and their wives. As many Catholics did not own properties and therefore did not pay rates they were excluded from electoral representation. This meant that housing became an important focus of discrimination. Unionist controlled local councils could reduce Catholic franchise by denying Catholics access to social housing. Secondly, university graduates and company directors held an additional vote in local elections. Thirdly, gerrymandering (manipulation of electoral boundaries) famously eliminated the possibility of fair representation for the Catholic or Irish Nationalist population in all but the few electoral districts in which Catholics had a very large majority. This was also linked to housing as Unionist controlled councils tended to restrict housing development for the growing Catholic population in order to prevent them moving into ‘Protestant’ electoral districts. As a result, the Unionist party ruled for the entire history of the state and controlled local government even where there was a clear Nationalist majority, e.g. the city of Derry. In addition, under the Special Powers Act (see point 4 below) Republican (and often communist) publications were banned as were Republican organisations (Farrell, 1976).

2. Culture/identity: The state promoted a Protestant, British and Orange identity in a number of ways. For example making the 12\(^{th}\) of July a national holiday\(^ {55}\) and through the celebration of royal visits (McIntosh, 1999). The Orange Order was, however, perhaps the central vehicle for this (O'Dowd, 1980; Gibbon, 1975). The Orange Order linked the celebration of Ulster Protestant culture, Empire and inter-class patronage and exercised enormous political power (Gibbon, 1975, McIntosh, 1999). Indeed Prime Minister Craig once declared “I have always said that I am an

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\(^{54}\) In 1921 the government seized Tyrone (Sinn Fein controlled) county council and passed emergency legislation allowing the government to dissolve any county council which did not ‘carry out its duties’ and replace it with a government-appointed commission. Over the following number of years many Sinn Fein controlled councils were dissolved (Farrell, 1976).

\(^{55}\) On the 12th of July 1690 the Protestant William of Orange defeated the Catholic James at the Battle of the Boyne, this historical victory is a key point in the historiography and rituals of Unionism.
Orangeman first and a politician and a member of this parliament afterwards…” (Craig, quoted in Farrell, 1976: 92). Until 1966 all but one Minister were members of the Orange Order (Farrell, 1976). The Flags and Emblems Act (1954) made it illegal to interfere with the Union Jack and gave the RUC powers to take down any flag or emblem on public or private property if they thought it could lead to a breach of the peace, which in practice meant the Irish flag (Farrell, 1976).

3. Policing: The NI state had strong totalitarian tendencies in terms of state repression. McVeigh (2008) argues the NI state was in a permanent state of exception. The Special Powers Act 1922 gave the state extraordinary powers in relation to the policing of dissent including the prohibition of inquests; the death penalty; arrest without warrant; internment without trial; power for ministers to make further regulations without consulting parliament. To top it off, the Act also allowed for virtually indiscriminate retrospective criminalisation: “If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations, he shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the regulations” (Special Powers Act quoted in Farrell, 1976: 93). Internment without trial was in place for large periods of the state’s history. The RUC police force is widely held to have been sectarian. More importantly, perhaps, the infamous B Specials, a reserve Protestant police force, played a key role in policing the Catholic population (McVeigh, 2008; Bew et al., 1979).

4. Employment: Catholics were massively under-represented in public sector employment (Bew et al., 1979; O’Dowd, 1980). Many Unionist ministers refused to have even a single Catholic within their departments. Senior Unionist politicians such as Prime Ministers Craig and Brooke publicly argued that Catholics should not be employed by the state due to their ‘disloyalty’. In the private sector,

56 John Vorster, South African Minister for Justice, upon the introduction of the Coercion Act in 1963, famously said, “I would be willing to exchange all the legislation of this sort for one clause of the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act” (Vorster quoted in McVeigh, 2008: 232).

57 Brooke went further by participating in public campaigns against the employment of Catholics (Farrell, 1976). According to Bew et al. (1979: 78), in 1943 Prime minister Andrews informed the head of the Civil
Orange patronage tended to exclude Catholics from skilled labour in particular. There were various campaigns against the employment of Catholics (Farrell, 1976; Bew et al., 1979). Moreover, workplace expulsions were frequent, particularly during periods of unemployment or high levels of Republican activism (Gibbon, 1975; Farrell, 1976). All of the above meant that the proportion of Catholics in unskilled manual labour and precarious agricultural work rose between 1921 to 1971 (Bew et al., 1979). It should be noted that militant Protestant workers were also excluded from work and forced out of work places and ‘Bolshevism’ and Republicanism were generally equated.

The above represent some of the key modes of exclusion operated by the state, summarised by Gibbon in terms of a state formation “heavily dependent upon confessional particularism, discrimination and often oppression” (Gibbon, 1975: 146). Similarly, Farrell argues that:

[T]he Unionists set about constructing an Orange and Protestant state with almost all political power and patronage in their own hands...and operated an elaborate and comprehensive system of discrimination in housing and jobs which kept the minority in a position of permanent and hopeless inferiority. (Farrell, 1976: 79)

All the above indicates that under the Orange State there is a crucial gap between the people and the population. The people ground the legitimacy of the state and are loyal to it. However there is a part which is in the population but not of the people, a part which is potentially or actually disloyal or deviant, a part which has no part. Of course, this part of no part forms what Hall (1996) calls the ‘constitutive outside’ of the people. This ‘national’ or ‘racial’ distribution of the sensible thus operates a count under the name of the people which is always a ‘miscount’, in the sense that there is a part which ‘does not count’. In 1946, after the UK government extended the franchise, NI restricted it even further by taking the vote away from rate-paying lodgers. The government chief whip, Major L.E. Curran, said the measure was to prevent “[Irish] Nationalists getting control of [T]he Unionists set about constructing an Orange and Protestant state with almost all political power and patronage in their own hands...and operated an elaborate and comprehensive system of discrimination in housing and jobs which kept the minority in a position of permanent and hopeless inferiority. (Farrell, 1976: 79)

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Service of his doubts about employing Catholics “claiming that the hierarchy’s attitude made it impossible for them to be loyal”.

58 Similarly, Ranciere refers to the classic reactionary position in early 19th century France (i.e. following the French revolution) which considers certain groups to be ‘in’ society without being ‘of’ society (Ranciere, 2010b).
the three border counties and Derry City...The best way to prevent the overthrow of the government by people who had no stake in the country and had not the welfare of the people of Ulster at heart was to disenfranchise them”. (Curran quote in Farrell, 1976: 86).

The Orange State miscounts the “people who had no stake in the country”, the part of no part. The political subjectivisation of this part of no part accounts for the singularity and radicalism of the CRM.

As we can see from the above the Orange State was founded on identitarian exclusion. However, the state presented itself as universal. The question of the universality of the Orange State has not been given much consideration in the literature and, given that the Orange State is the context rather than the subject of this research, I will limit myself here to a few observations. First of all, it has been noted that the construction of a Protestant identity aligned the state and the Protestant people with the universal movement of history, progress and reason (McVeigh and Rolston, 2009; Nic Craith, 2003; Finlay, 2001). In this sense it must be remembered that the raison d'être of Ulster Unionism is the maintenance of the Union with Great Britain. The colonial myth which poses the coloniser on the side of progress and reduces the colonial other to a pre-civilised, backward rump was thus very much in evidence (Shirlow and McGovern, 1997). For Ulster Unionists it was the Republic of Ireland which was particulartist and identitarian and the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Irish state was frequently cited in that regard. The British state, in contrast, or so they argued, granted civil liberties with respect to issues such as divorce. The second strand of universal thinking with regard to Unionism, and this has not been addressed in the literature, is the universality of Protestantism itself. The element of Unionism which explicitly identified itself with Protestantism has generally been associated with extreme bigotry, exemplified in the figure of the Reverend Ian Paisley. However, as Badiou (2003) notes, it should be recalled that the Christian Church was the first universal institution. From the point of view of fundamentalists, Protestantism was universal and was identified with the universality of the word of God. Indeed it is true that anyone can become Protestant.

Neither form of universality was particularly powerful with respect to the Catholic population, who generally felt excluded from the state. The Orange State was thus
characterised by a weak claim to universality. As such, it should come as no surprise that it survived less than 50 years. But while the universality of the Orange State was always weak, it was not until the emergence of the CRM, which demonstrated and politicised the identitarian exclusions of the Orange State, that this fragile universality would be placed in crisis.

Section II. 1968 and the End of the Orange Regime: The Civil Rights Movement

The task of this section is to discern the political singularity of the CRM and to investigate what Badiou calls a “concrete, time-specific sequence in which a new thought and a new practice of collective emancipation arise, exist, and eventually disappear” (Badiou, 2010: 231). This means understanding the CRM’s relationship with the context described above and how its mode of politics can be understood as subtractive vis-à-vis that state. What I hope to show is that the CRM represents a decisive break with the state and includes a dimension of non-identitarian, egalitarian and universal politics, and that, moreover, the way in which the CRM challenges the state’s apparatus of exclusion undermines the state’s monopoly on universality. In fact, the CRM presents itself as the true locus of universality. However, these dimensions, from the beginning, existed in a fragile, precarious and ambiguous relationship with a host of other factors. In what follows I will trace the emergence of the movement and the role of both the ‘logic of identification’ and the ‘logic of subjectivisation’ therein, demonstrating how these two threads existed in tension within the movement. Moreover, we will see that from the beginning the movement evinced an excessive potentiality which was never to be fully expressed by any of the organisations embedded in the movement, and as such is difficult to decipher. Nevertheless, through a careful analysis of what I will call, following Peter Hallward (2005), the ‘prescriptive politics’ of the CRM I want to articulate the universal and egalitarian subjectivity operating within the CRM. In what follows I provide a considerable degree of historical detail in order to properly contextualise and account for the complexities of the CRM.
The origins of the Civil Rights Movement

From the early 60’s a number of initiatives had emerged which challenged inequality and discrimination in NI. The organisation from this period which would go on to be most important, however, was the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA), established in 1966. NICRA was set up to visibilise and protest against discrimination. The objectives of NICRA indicate from the beginning a shift toward a universalist politics:

1. To defend the basic freedoms of all citizens;
2. To protest the rights of the individual;
3. To highlight all possible abuses of power;
4. To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly, and association;
5. To inform the public of their lawful rights.

These objectives were innovative in themselves: up until this point opposition to the Orange State had focused on partition and the unification of Ireland (O'Dochartaigh, 1997). Such an opposition was of course both statist and identitarian - it was explicitly focused on the ‘catholic community’ and it understood politics in terms of national subjects. The above demands already represent a rupture with this tradition because they do not imply an identitarian subject, but rather a universal one, and because they don’t propose a united Irish nation-state as the solution. Rather they divide the NI state from within. As NICRA later stated, its “refusal to equate civil rights with Irish nationalism made it a virtually unknown quantity in politics”. (NICRA, 1979: 13).

As with much of the CRM, Republican activists were involved from the start and NICRA provides an important example of the ambiguous role played by Republicans within the movement. While Unionists have always argued that the CRM was a ‘Republican plot’ historical analysis shows that this was far from the case (O’Dochartaigh, 1997; Purdie, 1990). The IRA at this point had moved substantially to the left, particularly as far as the

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59 For example, in the mid ‘60s the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) was founded by the McCluskeys, two doctors with a background in housing activism. They had been involved in the Homeless Citizens League, an organisation which came about after some Catholic women occupied disused social housing. The HCL transformed into the CSJ and focused on lobbying, research and publicising discrimination. The campaign for Derry University was another prominent mid-60s campaign (see Purdie, 1990; O’Dochartaigh, 1997).

60 These objectives are recorded in NICRA, 1979: 8.
leadership went. This was in part influenced by the zeitgeist of the time, in terms of Cuba, Vietnam and Algeria (Hanley and Millar, 2009). A number of left-wing intellectuals had become influential over the leadership. Anthony Coughlan and Roy Johnston were not members of the IRA, but they were involved in the Wolfe Tone Societies (WTS), an independent adjunct to the Republican movement and through the WTS they pushed for a campaign for civil rights in NI (Purdie, 1990). Being communists, they believed that the ‘objective conditions’ for revolution did not exist and so wanted to focus on some progressive reforms which they hoped would lead to wider politicisation. Civil rights in the north was one such set of ‘progressive reforms’. In relation to the role of Republicans, Purdie concludes that while an element of the Republican movement (the WTS) had a strategy around civil rights, they did not control NICRA nor did NICRA’s political strategy reflect the WTS’s strategy. When NICRA was formed it was predominantly made up of individuals outside the Republican movement. On the 29th of January 1967 a meeting was held and a thirteen-person steering committee was elected with people from Trade Unions, the Belfast WTS, the Republican clubs, Belfast Trades Council, the Republican Labour Party, the Ulster Liberal Party, the NI Labour Party, the Ardoyne Tenants Association and the Young Unionists. On this board there were only two members of the WTS and one member of the IRA. Betty Sinclair, Communist Party, was the chair. Purdie concludes, “There is also clear evidence that the republicans were not actually in control of NICRA in the period up to and including the 5 October march”. (Purdie, 1990: 150). In short, Republicans were involved in but not in control of NICRA. Moreover, NICRA was only one organisation and, as Purdie comments, by October ’68 “the situation had run out of their - or anyone else’s - control”. (Purdie, 1990: 157)

For their first two years NICRA wrote letters, petitioned and lobbied; it was “a period of general ineffectuality” (Purdie, 1990: 133, see also NICRA, 1979). Indeed, at this point many would argue that NICRA was largely a ‘counter-revolutionary’ organisation, to use the language of the ‘60s. Most clearly, Betty Sinclair was opposed “to the whole idea of protest” (Purdie, 1990: 135). Bernadette Devlin, one of the most important figures in the CRM, remembers that Sinclair was always saying “the time is not right for action” (Devlin, 1969: 147). Likewise, the Republican position at this time involved a very

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61 The IRA volunteer in question was Liam McMillen, Belfast Officer Commanding at the time (Hanley and Millar, 2009; Purdie, 1990)
specific view of confrontation with the state: guerrilla warfare. They had no interest in civil disobedience or direct action. Nevertheless, NICRA ‘somewhat hesitantly’ (Farrell, 1976) agreed to hold their first protest march from Coalisland to Dungannon on August 24th, 1968. The march was announced as a ‘Civil Rights march’ and the organisers emphasised its non-sectarian dimension. Devlin, who was present at the march and recalls it as her first experience of politicisation, described a friendly festival atmosphere which turned ‘uglier’ when the police stopped the march from entering Dungannon, where a counter-demonstration had been called by the ‘paisleyites’⁶². The NICRA organisers had no appetite for confrontation and began announcing that they would not breach the police cordon (Devlin, 1969). However, as Devlin recalls, they began to “lose their hold on the marchers” (Devlin, 1969: 93). Sinclair tried to wind down the protest, but when she was ignored she and the other organisers “scuttled off” and the marchers “sat down in big circles all over the road and sang rebel songs till midnight”. (Devlin, 1969: 94). Devlin remembers how afterwards she:

...felt very cynical about the performance of the politicians and organizers: it was hilarious to see how out of touch they were with the people they supposedly represented. They thought they could come down, make big speeches, and be listened to respectively, but when the people all got out together, they had turned around and said in effect to the politicians, ‘Clear off, you don’t even think the way we think’. And that’s exactly what the politicians did: they cleared off. (Devlin, 1969: 9)

Already at this first march there was a tension between the organisers of the demonstration and the people who were on the demonstrations, and this would only grow as the movement developed, particularly after the second Civil Rights march on the 5th of October 1968. Devlin also recalls that while the politics of the marchers were ‘crude’ they refused to accept “that the problem could be seen in terms of Catholic versus Protestant”. (Devlin, 1969: 97).

The second march was proposed by activists involved in the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC). DHAC came about in early 1968, and was a loose association of the young radicals around the Northern Irish Labour Party (NILP) and the Republican groups.

⁶² During these early years the main reactionary movement was that of the Rev. Ian Paisley, a fundamentalist who was at the centre of the far-right Loyalist reaction to the CRM.
They were primarily responsible for the turn towards innovative civil disobedience in the CRM. They campaigned against discrimination in housing and the general shortage of social housing in Derry, one of NI's most depressed towns. Interestingly, Purdie notes that Derry was specifically characterised by its weak labour and Republican movements and suggests that DHAC was able to develop innovative political strategies because they "were not hampered by tradition and did not have to placate their seniors before or after embracing heresy" (Purdie, 1990: 171). A flavour of the DHAC tactics is given by the case of John Wilson, which is related by Fionbarra O'Dochartaigh (1994), a leading member of the DHAC, in his *Ulster's White Negros*. Wilson was living with his family in a caravan and was told he was unlikely to get social housing. On the 22nd of June 1968, DHAC put his caravan in the middle of a main road and blocked the traffic for 24 hours, the next weekend they did the same thing for 48 hours. After this they planned to block the city centre but the Wilsons were given a house (see also Purdie, 1990; McCann, 1980). Eamonn McCann, another key member of the DHAC, signals this as an important victory because "It had been made very publicly clear that outrageous tactics worked, that blocking roads worked better than an MP's intervention..." (McCann, 1980: 34)

Eamonn McCann was one of the most important figures in Derry at this point (Devlin, 1969; Purdie, 1990). His account of this period further indicates a rupture with any of the established political organisations at the time. He remembers that DHAC activists were "frowned on by both local party establishments" and that:

Any perspective of building a clear-minded political organization...was forgotten in the frenetic round of breaking into empty houses, organizing pickets and encouraging individuals to stand up to the landlords and local bureaucrats. And, anyway, such activities seemed to be bearing some fruit. (McCann, 1980: 33)

According to McCann, the DHAC essentially had no organisation - if someone had a good idea they just went ahead and did it (McCann, 1980). NICRA accepted the Derry activists' proposed march for October 5 1968 in Derry. However, the March was banned by Minister for Home Affairs William Craig, and NICRA wanted to pull out. The march route

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63 DHAC member Dermie McClenaghan (2009) makes the same point.
64 He is referring here to the Labour and Republican 'party establishments'.

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included the city centre, which was seen as a bastion of Protestantism and was effectively out of bounds for Catholic public events. NICRA wanted to cancel the march but DHAC and the Young Socialists\(^{65}\) in Belfast said they would go ahead regardless, thus forcing NICRA to go ahead with the march or be seen to capitulate (Farrell, 1976; Purdie, 1990; McCann, 1980). The march went ahead. Devlin (1969: 96) describes the atmosphere on the day:

> Derry is a dead city; about one in five of the men is unemployed and the whole feeling is depressed. But it was electric that day. You could see it on people’s faces – excitement, or alarm, or anger. Derry was alive.

Again the march was characterised by non-sectarian demands, including an end to discrimination in housing, franchise and electoral boundaries. However, it was attacked by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the NI police) and ‘dozens’ of people were hospitalised, according to O’Dochartaigh (1997)\(^{66}\). Once the RUC attacked, Betty Sinclair began asking the crowd to disperse (Devlin, 1990; O’Dochartaigh, 1994). However, chaos erupted as the protesters found themselves trapped between two lines of RUC men. The police drove the protesters across the river and into the Catholic ghetto of the Bogside, “By this time the original confrontation between marchers and the police had given way to a general battle between the police and young residents of the Bogside, most of whom had taken no part in the march”. (Purdie, 1990: 143)

October 5th 1968 is usually taken to be the birth-date of the CRM (Baxter et al., 1969). Images of police brutality were broadcast all over the world and much of NI’s population was horrified. For activists like Dermie McClenaghan, the violence of the police was meant “to remind the nationalist people generally of their place in the scheme of things in Northern Ireland” (McClenaghan, 2009: 38). October 5th demonstrates a number of the key features of this period. Firstly, the determination of activists to push their vision of equality in the face of state repression. Secondly, explosive confrontation with the police protagonised by young people in Catholic Ghettos. And finally, the excessive nature of the

\(^{65}\) The Young Socialist Alliance brought together many young leftist radicals at the time. Its leading figure was Michael Farrell. Both Farrell and the Young Socialists in general would go on to form part of the People’s Democracy, one of the most important organisations within the movement. More on this later.

\(^{66}\) Purdie (1990) reports that seventy-seven people were injured but only two were hospitalised.
movement vis-a-vis any political organisation. This latter point is clear in two respects. First of all the marchers themselves were unwilling to follow the lead of NICRA, the organisers of the march (Baxter et al., 1969). NICRA was very concerned with avoiding confrontation with the police and had asked the people to disperse rather than risk a clash. Second of all, Civil Rights marches consistently resulted in generalised rioting involving many people who were not even on the march in the first place - the so-called 'hooligan' element. This ‘hooligan’ element essentially involved young Catholics, many of them unemployed, who were passionate about direct confrontation with the state forces but who did not, at this point, express themselves in any explicit organisation or political position. As is generally the case, when ordinary people revolt without an explicit position/organisation they are dismissed as ‘non political’, deviant or criminal. According to McCann it was this ‘hooligan’ element that drove the movement:

Energetic and instinctively aggressive, they could be counted on to turn out for sit-downs, marches, pickets or any other protest activity which was organized. It was they who turned out on the 5th of October. It was their impatience which had then impelled the [DCAC] into more activity, and more militant activity...It was their energy and aggression which had powered the civil rights campaign through its first frenetic months. (McCann, 1980: 57)

In Derry the period immediately following October 5th was one in which organised political forces sought to harness the energy of the movement and to control the ‘hooligan’ revolt. In Belfast, this period saw the birth of the People’s Democracy, the organisation which perhaps more than any other expresses the politics of the CRM. At the same time, NICRA mushroomed with local organisations appearing all over NI (NICRA, 1979). I will begin with Derry and then discuss the development of the People’s Democracy and NICRA.

After October 5th Derry was fundamentally changed. McCann captures the energy of the time: “a howl of elemental rage was unleashed across Northern Ireland, and it was clear things were never going to be the same again.” (McCann, 1980: 43). Something had appeared in the city, a force or subjectivity, which had not been present before and,

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67 This whole issue has gained much attention in recent years, primarily as a result of the revolt of the Banlieus in France in 2005, a revolt which had no leaders, demands nor ideology (see Hardt and Negri’s (2010) discussion of the Jacqueries).
moreover, which could not easily be represented. The conservative and nationalist Derry Journal articulated the ‘problem’ thus:

The new situation presented all the leaders of nationalist protest with a large and looming problem - how to harness the energies and enthusiasm of the people in a disciplined manner. Unless the growing spirit of the movement can be harnessed coherently, mob rule would replace Unionist minority rule. (Derry Journal editorial quoted in Purdie, 1990: 190)

From the position of the Nationalist politicians, who at this point held hegemony over the Catholic population of Derry, the goal was to replace Unionist rule with Nationalist rule. What they feared was ‘mob rule’ - which seems to refer to some kind of undefined militant subjectivity, what Papadopoulos et al. have called the ‘wild anomaly of the escaping and refusing mobs’ (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 18). After the 5th of October march the DHAC radicals called another march along the same route for the 12th of October. However, at this point Derry’s ‘moderates’ emerged and announced a meeting attended by “local professionals, business people, trade unionists and clergy” (O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 22) from the Catholic ‘community’. This led to the setting up of Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC), which effectively, if temporarily, took over leadership of the movement (O’Dochartaigh, 1997). The radicals from DHAC, afraid of losing relevance to the movement, joined the DCAC, with the exception of Eamonn McCann who famously denounced them as ‘middle class, middle aged and middle of the road’ (McCann, 1980). The DCAC fought for civil rights using the tactics of non-violent civil disobedience and direct action, but this was now given a mainstream leadership which was careful to provide a large body of stewards at each action to prevent confrontations with the police (O’Dochartaigh, 1997). DCAC continued to push for non-sectarian demands. Its first action, a mass sit-down in Derry’s Guildhall Square (home of the Derry Corporation), focused on housing and put forward the following demands:

- Crash house-building programme;

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68 In Derry Catholics/Nationalists are and were the majority of the population, the goal of the nationalist politicians was to control Derry corporation. According to Devlin, there was from the beginning a tension between the politicians who wanted to mobilise the Catholic community in order to achieve a greater share of the vote, one the one hand, and the majority of demonstrators, on the other: “In spite of their ‘civil rights’ label, the politicians had demanded Catholic equality and majority rule for Catholic areas. People like myself had not come out to support such demands”. (Devlin, 1969: 97)
• A fair points system for housing allocation;
• Legal control over letting furnished accommodation.\(^69\)

DCAC went on to organise a series of actions, many of which defied Craig’s ban on protests and demonstrated “its ability to mount a peaceful protest and maintain discipline over its followers” (Purdie, 1990: 194). The movement was growing and many of its demands looked like they would be achieved. However, as Purdie notes, “the committee’s rank-and-file supporters were becoming increasingly militant” (Purdie, 1990: 194). By the 18th of November the movement once again demonstrated its tendency to exceed any organisation, and the DCAC began to lose control (O’Dochartaigh, 1994; O’Dochartaigh, 1997). By that point all demonstrations within the city of Derry were banned. On the 18th protesters who had been arrested at the October 5 march were being prosecuted. After their trial they were carried down to Guildhall Square by a large crowd of supporters, where they were attacked by the police (O’Dochartaigh, 1994). Thirty minutes later about 400 dockers left work in protest against these attacks and marched through the city centre. The DCAC had earlier cancelled a planned strike of shirt-factory workers, “but at about 3pm one thousand workers, mostly young women from some half dozen factories, left work and marched up Strand Road, through Guildhall Square...to the Diamond”. (Purdie, 1990: 195). This was in many ways one of the high points of the movement. Derry was in revolt and the ban on political protest was being broken several times a day - groups formed more or less spontaneously and held demonstrations for any number of demands - both the police and DCAC were struggling to control the situation (O’Dochartaigh, 1997; Purdie, 1990). By now, the DCAC felt the need to pull back. One of their leading members, Ivan Cooper, “appealed for an end to unplanned marches” (Purdie, 1990: 195, see also O’Dochartaigh, 1994). Prime Minister O’Neill was beginning to concede political victories to the movement. On the 22nd of November O’Neill announced the dissolution of Derry Corporation\(^70\), the end of the company directors vote, and a fair points system to end housing discrimination (O’Dochartaigh, 1994). O’Neill made a famous television address in which he appealed for the CRM to ‘give him time’ to introduce reforms. Consequently, DCAC called a truce and announced they would not be organising any further marches for one month (Devlin, 1969).

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\(^69\) These demands are recorded in Purdie (1990).

\(^70\) Derry Corporation was the local government in Derry and a key locus of descrimination.
Stepping back a little from the events of the time, I want to draw out a number of significant elements of the DCAC. First of all, as indicated above, it gave the movement in Derry a middle-class and 'disciplined' leadership. Secondly, however, and this point is not emphasised sufficiently by Purdie or O'Dochartaigh, the DCAC introduced a new and identitarian dimension into the movement. This was immediately sensed by the more radical activists (Baxter et al., 1969; McCann, 1980; Devlin, 1969; Farrell, 1976). One immediate consequence of the moderates moving into the movement was that it had a more 'Catholic' make up. Before the DCAC Civil Rights groups were a loose coalition of Republicans, socialists, student activists and working-class Catholics, especially younger ones. They were people who felt as alienated from the leaders and institutions of the Catholic community as they did from the Protestant community:

Each of them [those involved in the movement] was bitterly opposed to both 'Green and Orange Toryism'. Each of them denounced the Unionist and Nationalist Parties with equal vehemence. Whether or not one agreed with what they were doing, no one could have accused them of representing a united Catholic movement. Indeed, no-one could have accused them of wanting to represent a United Catholic movement. (McCann, c.1969: 1, author's emphasis)

Once the 'great and the good' of the Catholic community got involved, the composition of the movement changed to include virtually all elements of the Catholic community. On a more explicitly political level, a leaflet at the time, written by Eamonn McCann, indicates that the DCAC introduced a new concept into the movement: 'Catholic Unity'. DCAC advocated unity of 'the whole community' and attempted to marginalise those who would 'divide' them. This is a classic tactic of depoliticisation. As mentioned in the Chapter 1, political subjectivity always represents an antagonistic and conflictual dimension, it is always divisive. Traditionally, those who wish to tame that subjectivity will call for unity, for the wholeness and harmony of community. This was in stark contrast, as McCann argued in a flier he circulated in early '69 entitled 'who's wrecking the civil rights movement', to the movement in Derry before DCAC emerged. He argues that the movement:

...had been acutely conscious of the fact that it is not enough to preach non-Sectarianism. It had at all times tried to put forward slogans and ideas which cut
across the religious divide. As well as campaigning for the repeal of Repressive Laws and an end to gerrymandering and discrimination, it demanded the appointment of a Rents Assessment Tribunal. It attacked the Corporation Sanitary Dept. for failing rigorously to enforce laws relating to the upkeep of rented accommodation. It involved itself in the formation of Tenants Associations and helped fight Housing Trust rent-rises. And so on. All of these were economic issues which could not be represented as “Catholic”. By campaigning on them the movement before October 5th showed itself willing deliberately to split the whole community - including the Catholic community - between the haves and the have-nots... (McCann, c.1969: 2, my emphasis)

After the DCAC emerged and ‘unity’ became a central idea, “It had become impossible to criticize a Catholic on a Civil Rights platform without being denounced as a ‘wrecker’”. (McCann, c.1969: 3)

It is very significant that DCAC’s attempt to ‘discipline’ the movement, to develop an organisational expression of it under the guidance of the elites of the Catholic community, was also the vehicle for the introduction of identitarian politics into the movement and the first activation of the Catholic/Protestant divide within the movement.

Having said that, the DCAC was involved in organising a number of significant marches, and their contribution in that regard was later acknowledged by McCann (O’Dochartaigh, 1994). More importantly, perhaps, at this point the situation was far from coherent - the movement was always largely excessive to the DCAC and the demands being launched were still resolutely non-sectarian. As McCann notes, the emphasis was still on civil rights, on addressing inequality within NI:

In 1968 and 1969 the left and the right, the ‘militants’ and the ‘moderates’, in the civil rights movement were united on one point: partition was irrelevant. No meeting was complete without at least one speaker declaring that we wished to make it clear that we were not setting out to unite Ireland, rather to achieve change within Northern Ireland.... (McCann, 1980: 239).

This was crucial because, as I will discuss further below, ‘partition’ was the key issue which would fully activate a statist and identitarian scenario - it was the issue which divided the population of NI along nation-statist lines. As long as this issue was not
activated the movement was a force which divided NI between a movement for equality and a sectarian state, rather than a movement which divided Britain and Ireland.

**The People’s Democracy**

In Belfast, the situation was quite different. Here the students at Queen’s University (QUB) were at the centre of events. Just as Derry had changed so had QUB. Bernadette Devlin, the most iconic leader of the PD and one of the foremost figures of the CRM in general, describes her return to QUB after the Derry October 5 march:

> I went up to Belfast thinking I had changed, and I found that everyone had. The atmosphere at Queen’s was joltingly different. The silence barrier was down. Derry was being talked about in the lecture rooms, in the tutorial rooms, in the snackbar at dinner, in the cloakrooms, in the showers, in the bar....People were talking and thinking about the society they were living in - not as an intellectual exercise, but enthusiastically and emotionally and as if it mattered. (Devlin, 1969: 100)

On the 9th of October Devlin and others organized a protest march to Belfast City Hall against police brutality: “2,000 people turned up spontaneously. All the complacent attitudes were gone”. (Devlin, 1969: 100). After this protest the students returned to campus and held a meeting, at which the People’s Democracy (PD) was formed, with 6 demands: one man, one vote; a fair drawing of electoral boundaries; freedom of speech and assembly; repeal of the Special Powers Act; and a fair allocation of jobs and rent (Devlin, 1969). ‘One man, one vote’ would go on to become the central demand of the movement up until about 1970, when police repression emerged as the main issue (O’Dochartaign, 1997). The slogan ‘one man, one vote’ juxtaposes an egalitarian count in which each is counted equally to the miscount of the Orange regime, described previously. The PD would become the leading force within the movement between late 1968 and the first part of 1969. They were both wholly committed to street politics and at the same time virulently anti-sectarian.

One of the most interesting things about the PD was its organisational form. As Purdie (1990: 207) notes, “open unstructured meetings...were the chief characteristic of the early

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71 McCann notes the PD’s ability to transcend the sectarian barrier: “the PD wanted and was able to address mainly-Protestant workforces…” (McCann, 2009a: 154)
PD”. Devlin describes it as an “experiment in mass democracy” (Devlin, 1969: 106) while Michael Farrell, the most influential figure within the PD, has said that they were influenced by the radical democratic practices of the Sorbonne Assembly (Baxter et al., 1969; see also Arthur, 1974). The PD elected a ‘Faceless Committee’ “so called because it was deliberately selected from people who were unknown and who were not likely to act in the interests of their career or a political faction”. (Purdie, 1990: 207). While there was no formal membership, Devlin remembers up to 700 people attending their mass assemblies. Following October 1968 the PD was probably the organisation that organised the most radical, spontaneous and energetic actions. Their lack of formal structure and spontaneous interventions meant that more than any other group they seemed to be in tune with the energy of the CRM. Moreover, whereas both NICRA and DCAC were trying to stop political protest by the later months of 1968, PD were enthusiastically pushing for them (Arthur, 1974; NICRA, 1979). Their actions in this period included, protests, public open-air meetings, sit-downs and, perhaps most spectacularly, the occupation of the NI Parliament on the 24th of October72 (Arthur, 1974).

Following O’Neill’s planned reforms and the DCAC’s move away from civil disobedience, rifts began to emerge within the CRM. The PD, as Purdie (1990) shows, was at the centre of this because of its increasingly radical stance. In January 1969 the PD organised a ‘Long March’ from Belfast to Derry, modelled on the black civil rights march to Montgomery, Alabama. This was during the ‘truce’ which NICRA and DCAC were both maintaining. The march was criticised as ‘reckless’- the DCAC, NICRA, and the Republicans were all against it. The purpose of the march was described by one militant as “pushing a structure...towards a point where its internal proceedings would cause a snapping and breaking to begin” (PD militant Eoin Sweeney quoted in Arthur, 1974: 41), while Devlin described it as an attempt to “pull the carpet off the floor to show the dirt that was underneath” (Devlin, 1969: 165).

72 It is indicative of the excitement and energy of the time that the students from QUB, which had been a completely depoliticised campus prior to October ’68 (Devlin, 1969), had gotten together on the 8th of October and managed to occupy the Parliament within just a few weeks.
The march was attacked repeatedly along the way, but as it developed it drew more and more supporters and participants. By marching through ‘Protestant territory’, where it was repeatedly blocked and threatened, the Long March visibilised the sectarianism of the NI state, as well as the unwillingness of the police to defend their right to protest. In this sense it was one of the key moments in which the CRM revealed the particularity behind the NI state’s sham universality. As they neared Derry, at Burntollet Bridge, the marchers were savagely ambushed by Loyalists and members of the state forces\textsuperscript{73}. Eighty-seven activists were hospitalised and some nearly died. When the marchers finally reached Derry, the city exploded in riots. Following a night of rioting, RUC men, some drunk, entered the Bogside (a Catholic Ghetto), wrecked a number of houses and attacked several people. This led to a new development: the Bogside residents, with the consent of the DCAC, set up ‘vigilante’ groups to defend the area. Barricades were put up and manned by the locals for 5 days. In this context, DCAC was pushed in to a situation “where they were uneasy and no longer in control”. (O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 41). Moreover, this was the first time that the idea of ‘defence’ emerged within the CRM, and this would become a central theme as the conflict hardened. It also created the context in which older Republican veterans could emerge for the first time as prominent figures within the movement. In particular Sean Keenan, who would later be instrumental in the Derry Provisional IRA, was involved in pushing for defensive patrols and barricades (O’Dochartaigh, 1997). However, it would be unwise to exaggerate Republican influence at this stage. The IRA was still weak, with few activists and almost no guns (Purdie, 1990; McCann, 1980; O’Dochartaigh, 1997). Moreover, the older ‘traditionalists’\textsuperscript{74}, like Keenan, who had abandoned the movement due to its leftward shift, were only beginning to become active again. Most of the younger Republicans, such as Fionbarra O’Dochartaigh, were more interested in social agitation than armed struggle (McCann, 1980; O’Dochartaigh, 1997). After 5 days without any police entering the Bogside, the barricades came down, although they would not stay down for long.

\textsuperscript{73} There is conflicting evidence about the actions of the RUC here, many activists reported that the RUC joined in the attack and certainly did nothing to prevent it. Later it emerged that over half of the Loyalist attackers were off-duty B-specials.

\textsuperscript{74} In reference to the Republican movement, ‘traditionalist’ refers to conservative, militaristic Nationalists, suspicious of leftist ideas and generally of a strongly Catholic persuasion. Many of these had distanced themselves from the movement during the 1960s, having been turned off by the leftward drift of the leadership.
The first half of 1969 continued to be characterised by explosive protests and innovative direct action. The PD had entered NICRA en masse and succeeded in radicalising the organisation, with a number of PD members gaining seats on the executive. NICRA organised marches and demonstrations all over the country. The DCAC also called off its truce and began organising marches again. The government introduced more repressive legislation which specifically banned civil disobedience tactics such as sit-ins, and this gave the movement something else to resist. In April there were more serious riots in Derry and the barricades went up again for a brief period. Meanwhile, direct action around concrete issues continued. According to Devlin, in the first half of 1969 the activists around Eamonn McCann “housed more families [via squatting] than all the respectable housing bodies in Derry put together”. (Devlin, 1990: 196; see also McCann, 1980; O’Dochartaigh, 1994)

The excessive tendency of the movement was still very much in evidence. In Derry people were now organising impromptu sit-ins or demonstrations. O’Dochartaigh (1997: 51) notes that the “DCAC was swept aside” while a key activist at the time, Paddy Devlin, said “The kids on the streets had taken control” (Devlin quoted in O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 51).

In mid-1969 Prime Minister O’Neill resigned and was replaced by Chichester-Clarke who announced the introduction of ‘one man, one vote’ - the CRM had achieved its key demand. However, at this point things had gone beyond the initial CRM demands. First of all, there was an energy which was ultimately excessive to any demand. Second of all the issue of policing, which “went to the heart of the problems of the state” (O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 52), had become a central conflict.

The ‘Battle of the Bogside’

The next significant development of this period was the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ - in which confrontation with the police would reach fever pitch in Derry’s most militant Catholic Ghetto. As indicated, the first half of 1969 was an intense period of political conflict, and Derry had been the epicentre of this. On August 12th an Orange Order parade was scheduled to take place in Derry, and would pass near the Bogside area. Many people feared it would erupt into a sectarian bloodbath. Activists in Derry made provisions to
limit this possibility by building barricades along the route and providing stewards. People like Eamonn McCann perceived that this was a symptom of the movement collapsing towards sectarianism but still felt it necessary to avoid any clash between Bogsiders and Orangemen. In a leaflet he circulated shortly before the event McCann notes that, despite the CRM’s non-sectarian intentions:

In Derry we have finished up participating in the “Defence Association” locking ourselves inside the Catholic area. Probably it is necessary. One must make some attempt to avoid a Catholic versus Protestant fight. And in the situation in which we find ourselves there seems to be no other way of doing it…But that doesn’t mean that we like it. (McCann, c.1969: 4)

The Defence Association McCann refers to was the Derry Citizens’ Defence Association, set up in the run up to August 12th and largely promoted by Republicans. This was another step towards the politics of ‘community defence’, which would become an increasingly significant theme. The DCDA, over the coming months, became the dominant organisation in Derry, displacing the DCAC.

On August 12th there was indeed confrontation. Some have argued that the Bogsiders were provoked by Loyalists (Devlin, 1969) while others suggest that Catholic youths stoned the Orange march (O’Dochartaigh, 1997). Either way, riots soon kicked off and the RUC began to baton the Bogsiders. The barricades that had been prepared went up but the RUC were determined to take them down - despite the fact that this would clearly lead to a huge confrontation. After an initial retreat, the Bogsiders began to force the RUC back. It became clear that the DCDA had prepared well, the barricades were effective and rocks and petrol bombs had been prepared. What followed was an epic fifty-hour confrontation in which the entire population of the Bogside was mobilised - with women and children making and distributing petrol bombs while others stationed on tower block roofs kept the police at bay with them. Finally, exhausted, the RUC withdrew. At this point the government called in the B-Specials to take over the fight. However, just as they prepared to enter, Westminster made the historical decision of sending in British army troops. The troops moved in between the barricades and the RUC, preventing any further conflict without interfering with the barricades.
During the 3 day ‘Battle of the Bogside’ the CRM effectively became a localised insurrection against the state. The entire population was involved in the riots. Eamonn McCann remembers that the door of every house was open, with pots of soup permanently available for replenishment. People slept wherever there was a bed. At the end, when the RUC retreated and the British army respected the barricades, there was an overwhelming sense of victory. As Devlin, who took part, recalls:

We reached then a turning point in Irish history, and we reached it because of the determination of one group of people in a Catholic slum area in Derry. In fifty hours we brought a government to its knees, and we gave back to a downtrodden people their pride and the strength of their convictions. (Devlin, 1969: 205)

For the following month ‘Free Derry’, as it became known, “was surrounded by barricades... and was administered by the DCDA, in constant negotiation with the local British army commanders. In the process, the DCDA displaced the political authority of the local MP, John Hume, and of all the political parties”. (O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 131). But what was the politics of Free Derry? Again the situation was riddled with complexities and ambiguities. The government, needless to say, denounced it as a Republican plot. The evidence indicates a much more complex picture. The Republicans had been instrumental in setting up DCDA, but once the organisation was established it included virtually all sections of the Bogside. DCDA had forty-four members including nine older Republicans who would later become members of the Provisional IRA; younger Republicans of the more radical/leftist variety; NILP activists; Young Socialist Alliance; tenants associations; and ‘moderate’ activists around John Hume. Moreover, during the actual Battle of the Bogside there was no one ‘in control’. Two academics who were present noted that “The organization of the fighting seemed to be largely spontaneous and ad hoc...Better known figures moved from place to place and gave instructions and advice, but there appeared to be no centrally co-ordinated body”. (Bailed and Loizos quoted in O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 122). Eamonn McCann, among others, has noted that the IRA still had no guns and only a few activists at this point, and indeed right up until 1971. O’Dochartaigh concludes that it

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75 Although the Battle of the Bogside was localised, it is worth pointing out that riots broke out across NI in an attempt to draw police resources away from Derry (Devlin, 1969).
“would be quite inaccurate to say the area was under Republican rule”. (O’Dochartaigh, 1997: 131).

Bernadette Devlin’s account of the event emphasises that, in fact, what occurred was something much more powerful than a ‘Republican plot’:

The Battle of the Bogside, according to [Prime Minster] Major Chichester-Clark, was part of a planned conspiracy to overthrow the Government. If the Major had been inside the barricades he would have found something much stronger and more terrifying than the plots of any organization. What was happening there was the ordinary, peaceful people, who had no desire to spend fifty hours throwing stones and petrol bombs, had realized the harm that had been done to them for half a century and were learning how to fight in self-defence. (Devlin, 1969: 202)

The Bogside had, effectively, ‘seceded’ from NI and as O'Dochartaigh notes, this was a direct erosion of the sovereignty of the state (O’Dochartaigh, 1997). As a PD pamphlet published shortly after puts it, “a whole area of Derry had defied the Stormont Government and got away with it. There was a part of “loyal Ulster” where Stormont’s writ no longer ran” (Farrell, 1970:13). Free Derry was a space effectively subtracted from sovereignty, existing outside and against the Orange State. And at the same time, it existed outside of any statist imagination or programme. While all most all those involved were Catholic and would have no doubt had a preference for a United Ireland, at this point the struggle and the subjectivity could not be reduced to such a politics nor understood through it. The Bogside declared that the barricades would come down under the following conditions: the abolition of Stormont; abolition of the B-Specials; abolition of the Special Powers Act; and the disarming of the RUC. Each of these demands focuses on the erosion of the state and its capacity for violence. At this point there was still no mention of a United Ireland.

The radicals continued to propose radical and non-sectarian demands and wanted to use Free Derry as an experiment in self-organisation. In an issue of their newsletter, the ‘Barricade Bulletin,’ they called on “the DCDA to use its authority in the area to, among other things, control rents, ensure that overtime and minimum wage rates were paid, demand equal pay for women, and provide free travel on the two bus routes that served the
area for students, the unemployed and pensioners” (quoted in O'Dochartaigh, 1997: 135). It is important to note that these radicals, organised around the Young Socialist Alliance, included socialists as well as the younger and more radical members of Republican-affiliated organisations. O'Dochartaigh (1997: 135) makes the point that the other elements involved in DCDA had a very different vision:

The moderates could make common cause with traditionalist Republicans in resisting such plans for social transformation behind the barricades. Both groups simply wanted to use the barricades to extract some short-term political concessions and were not interested in building an alternative society behind them.

Despite these ambiguities, at this point the excessive, anti-statist and non-identitarian subjectivity within the movement continued to exist and to develop its potentiality. Indeed even at this point, activists like Bernadette Devlin believed the movement could transcend the identitarian divisions. In 1969, shortly after the Battle of the Bogside, she argued that the movement could “get through to the Protestants in the end. Some of them have burned down Catholic homes, but we will not allow our forces to terrorize the ordinary Protestant population”. (Devlin, 1969: 206)

In early August 1969 the RUC and Loyalist forces also attacked Catholic areas in west Belfast and, in response, barricades were erected behind which ‘Free Belfast’ was born. As in Derry, the Belfast experiment was organised internally by a Citizens Defence Committee. The demands launched from the barricades echoed those of Derry: disband the B Specials; disarm the RUC; amnesty for internees (Arthur, 1974: 69). Free Belfast seems to have had many of the characteristics of its Derry counterpart, although Republicans had a stronger influence (Arthur, 1974). I will not elaborate any further on Free Belfast for reasons of space, because there is much less literature and because the above discussion of Free Derry suffices in terms of the present analysis of the CRM.76

Free Derry was the last great experiment of the CRM. And yet it was, to a certain extent, to generate the conditions for the demise of the CRM and the ascendancy of the IRA. The

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76 The only first-hand account of Free Belfast written by a CRM activist is contained in two-paragraphs in Michael Farrell’s (1970) Struggle in the North.
intervention of the British troops and the related increase in state repression was the key factor here.

The events of the next few months are complex and I will summarise them briefly here. The relationship between the British army and the Catholic population deteriorated quickly and confrontations became more frequent. Civil disobedience and street politics became increasingly untenable. Many activists were imprisoned based on soldiers' false testimony and the army announced it would shoot rioters. Moreover, Loyalist para-state forces had been increasingly active. Already in 1969 they had planted a series of bombs and blamed them on the IRA, in a pattern that resembles Italy's 1970s 'strategy of tension'. In August 1969, riots broke out all over NI in support of Free Derry. During this period, Loyalists attacked and burned down large swathes of Catholic residential areas, leading to mass migration of Catholics across the border. Particularly in Belfast the IRA was criticised for its inability to 'defend' Catholic areas - it was dubbed 'I Ran Away' (Hanley and Millar, 2009; Arthur, 1974). The situation was essentially becoming militarised - and in this context the IRA could emerge much more easily.

Towards the end of 1969 things were beginning to change within the IRA itself. Many older 'traditionalists' had become active once more and were pushing for more military action to defend Catholic areas, a strategy which was resisted by the left-leaning leadership who favoured social and political agitation over military action. At the end of 1969 the IRA split and the Provisional IRA emerged. In early 1970 they undertook their first actions, most famously the armed defence of St. Mathew's church in the Short Strand which Loyalists were attempting to burn down. Between 1970 and 1972 the Provisional IRA became more and more active, taking a more active part in rioting and targeting British soldiers. In 1971 internment without trial was introduced. In response NICRA, which as a result of the emergence of the Provisional IRA and the PD's drift towards quasi-Leninist party politics was the main organisation pushing civil rights, organised a campaign of non-payment of rates and rent in which an estimated 30,000 households participated (NICRA, 1979). Despite such attempts at continuing the politics of civil

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77 The PD's Marxism had been developing since early 1969 (Devlin, 1969). In November of that year it formally changed as an organisation, developing formal membership. Over the following year it would develop a specific ideological line (Arthur, 1974).
disobedience, the CRM floundered in the more militarised context of 1971 and 1972. Finally, in January 1972, British soldiers attacked a peaceful demonstration and killed 13 civilians in what became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. NICRA organised a protest in response in which over 100,000 people took part. This was, however, to be the organisation’s “last significant” march (NICRA, 1979: 36). Bloody Sunday had “immobilised NICRA from returning to the streets” (NICRA, 1979: 36). As clashes escalated the London government suspended the NI parliament. Indeed, until the signing of the GFA NI would be ruled directly from London. This marked the end of the CRM and of street politics more generally - the Provisional IRA emerged as the dominant force within the movement and Irish nationalism became the foremost political position.

In the next section, I take a closer look at the shift from the CRM to the IRA’s military campaign and analyse the political shift involved. This requires an analysis of the split in the IRA as well as the politics of the Provisional IRA. This is also a key moment in the depoliticisation of NI’s 1968. Before discussing the Provisional IRA, however, I will conclude the present section with an analysis of the political singularity of the CRM.

**Prescriptive politics and political singularity**

The CRM was never a fully-fledged ‘revolutionary philosophy’ nor did it have a coherent and systematic organisational form. As such, the task of deciphering its political singularity presents a challenge. In the above I have already introduced some of the key issues relating to this task. In this section I will develop on the analysis of the CRM’s political singularity by examining the demands of the movement. It seems that much historical analysis of the CRM has not been able to politically tackle the demands of the CRM. Perhaps such historical approaches have been trapped within the ‘reform or revolution’ approach which passes over political singularity via the false of opposition between a politics which makes prescriptions to the state and a politics which smashes the state and founds a new order. In fact, prescription has its own radical political potentiality - a fact which is more than adequately demonstrated by the way in which the CRM unravelled the NI state in a much more effective manner than the supposedly revolutionary politics of the IRA. In Chapter 4, I noted my use Peter Hallward’s (2005) notion of ‘prescriptive politics’ in order to grasp the universal and divisive application of a
prescription, or a demand, on the state, and to analyse the form of subjectivity and singularity summoned by a demand. Specifically, I am interested in demands which summon, or propose, a subjectivity which is both subtracted from the categories of the state and which is self-founding in the sense that it is established within the relational-conflictual dimension of the prescription itself.

Hallward (2005: 721) begins with the following assertion: “A prescriptive politics involves the direct and divisive application of a universal principle”. This initial statement indicates two key elements. First of all, Hallward is drawing our attention to the kind of prescriptions which can be characterised as universal. Here Hallward is in tune with the dimension of universality at work in the politics of Ranciere and Badiou, as outlined in Chapter 1. The universality or otherwise of a prescription or demand can be discerned in the type of subject it ‘summons’. As Hallward (2005:771) notes, prescriptions presuppose or imply a subject:

[I]f we uphold the axiom of equality, we can prescribe the rejection of slavery, and with it the organization of a force capable of transforming the relations that sustain the plantation economy. If we uphold the axiom of the worker, we can prescribe the restriction of corporate power, that is, the organization of forces capable of reversing the subordination of politics to profit.

A prescriptive politics summons a universal subject in that it refers to a subjectivity which is subtracted from the categories of the state, a subjectivity which is self-founding in the sense that it is established within the relational-conflictual dimension of the prescription itself. Moreover, and this is the second key issue referred to above, such a demand, in the sense discussed so far, is divisive in a specific sense. As argued in Chapter 1, the division proper to politics is not between two empirical or identitarian subjects, but between a universal subjectivity and the state.

Let us take the two principal demands of the CRM. The first is that of equal access to housing, a demand articulated by the DHAC, NICRA, DCAC and PD. This demand concerns the universal application of the principal of equality in a concrete instance of inequality. If everyone is equal, than the state should not operate hierarchical exclusions in the provision of housing. Moreover, the subjectivity which is announced or activated by
this demand is not founded on any of the identitarian positions which characterise the situation. It is neither Catholic nor Protestant, Nationalist nor Unionist, as the CRM militants so frequently emphasised. The same goes for the demand ‘one man, one vote’. It is a demand that is not made in the name of a particular subject and depends only on the ‘axiom of equality’.

Moreover, these demands are bound up with what Hallward calls ‘historical conditions of pertinence’. What is meant here is that political prescription touches upon mechanisms which are central to the reproduction of the state. This facet is clear with regard to the demands of the CRM. As mentioned earlier, in NI the question of elections and franchise was one of the principal ways in which the exclusion of Catholics was manifested. Moreover, housing was linked to this since the two key mechanisms for the manipulation of elections were that franchise was linked to rate-payment and the drawing of electoral boundaries to artificially reduce the Catholic vote. An increase in Catholic households or a spreading of Catholics to new electoral districts would thus undermine the mechanisms for the reproduction of the sectarian state. Hence the Unionist controlled local councils generally limited the number of Catholics who could access social housing and resisted building new social housing for Catholics. By applying universal and egalitarian prescriptions to these specific contexts, the CRM demonstrated an immense capacity to unravel the state. What is crucial about such demands is that they materialise a conflict which draws out a sectarian state which, while clearly exclusionary, is at the same time perfectly egalitarian at a formal level. There was no formal discrimination against Catholics qua Catholics, but there was a whole system of invisible state and para-state mechanisms through which Catholics were in fact excluded and dominated, a system which is adequately captured in Holston’s term ‘differentiated citizenship’, which he defines in terms of “a regime of inclusive membership and inegalitarian distribution” (Holston, 2008: 40). The prescriptive politics of the CRM definitively revealed this in the public and political sphere, forcing the state to “declare itself, to show its hand” (Hallward, 2003: 97) and thus challenging the false universality of the Orange State. The sham universality of Unionism, predicated on the presentation of the United Kingdom as the

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78 Hallward is quick to add that ‘historical conditions of pertinence’ are distinct from ‘historical conditions of possibility’, strictly speaking politics has no conditions of possibility since it operates outside the objectivity of the situation.
apex of modernisation and the universal movement of history, is undermined as it is confronted with a demand: if everyone is equal why can’t everyone vote? Moreover, the CRM, a movement which is excessive and antagonistic to the state, claims the terrain of universality, juxtaposing its own universal subjectivity to the manifest particularism into which the state collapsed.

Finally, prescriptive politics are developed in so far as they uphold the consequences of their prescription, a point made by both Hallward and Badiou. For example, the squatting of social housing is one practice which upholds the axiom of equality vis-à-vis the CRM’s housing struggle. The development of a prescriptive politics proceeds via “the development of subjective resources or “organs”, capable of upholding the consequences of its commitment to transform a situation” (Badiou quoted in Hallward, 2005: 778). It is in this context that we must understand the Battle of the Bogside and Free Derry. The establishment of ‘police-free zones’, or ‘no-go areas’, as they were known, developed the consequences of the prescriptive politics of the CRM. Consider here the demands launched from the barricades of the Bogside; the abolition of the B-Specials, the abolition of the Special Powers Act, the disarming of the RUC and, most radically of all, the abolition of Stormont (the NI parliament). Free Derry is an experiment in the consequences of the CRM’s egalitarian prescription: it subtracts itself from the sectarian violence of the situation which seeks to keep things in their place - a violence which materialises in the form of the RUC and the rest of the state’s apparatus of repression. Free Derry stands for the erosion of sovereignty, the negative (subtractive) creation of a space where the writ of the state does not run. As such, Free Derry can only be thought as a void in Orange sovereignty. In the words of Papadopoulos et al. (2008: 18), “This is the moment when imperceptible politics coalesces as an escape from national sovereignty”. The demands of CRM are ‘negative’ prescriptions in the sense that they don’t seek to establish a new state, they don’t declare an alternative form of sovereignty or a new conception of the ‘good society’: the demands of Free Derry simply express the erosion of the state. It is the most radical and consistent attempt to develop the consequences of the CRM’s prescriptive politics.
Raul Zibechi’s analysis of recent Bolivian social movements is instructive here. Specifically, Zibechi, in a line of thinking close to John Holloway (2010), seeks to think a counter-power which does not express itself in any state-centred organisational form but, on the contrary, works towards the “dispersion of state institutions” (Zibechi, 2010: 12). In his writings on the movements of the Aymara of El Alto, Zibechi conceptualises the operation of this dispersion as ‘war machines’ that are:

[D]ispersion machines, both outwardly and inwardly because they combat the state and break it up without creating a centralized and unified apparatus to replace it. Or we could say that they disperse the state without re-creating it. That is precisely why they can disperse it. Simply put: the way to disperse the state is by not creating a state. (Zibechi, 2010: 56, my emphasis)

The political singularity of Free Derry and the CRM more generally can also be conceptualised in this fashion. In that brief period we see a movement struggling to develop the ‘subjective resources’ and ‘organs’ through which its singularity can be upheld. The barricade, the riot, horizontal communication and cooperation, all of these become ‘dispersion machines’, eroding the power and sovereignty of the state without collapsing back into a statist construction.

Summarising, we can say that the CRM’s prescriptive politics evinces a universal, egalitarian subjectivity in an antagonistic relation with the state, and that, moreover, it is characterised by the experimental creation of ‘resources’ or ‘organs’ through which to develop the consequences of its singularity and in which we can discern a dispersal of the state and its sovereignty.

Many writers have argued that Civil Rights type movements, both in NI and internationally, are paradigmatic struggles for the recognition of identity (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995; Isin, 2002a; Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994). However, as the analysis of NI’s CRM indicates, such a perspective annihilates the radically excessive and extra-state dimension of such movements. As Papadopoulos et al. (2008: 13) argue in the global context, “subversion...is performed by social actors who negotiate their embeddedness in state power under the signature of ‘escape’, not under the imperative of inclusion.”
The Battle of the Bogside was followed by the entry of British army troops on the scene, a development which the CRM would not be able to overcome. Free Derry, viewed retrospectively, is the ‘endgame’ of the CRM, the limit of its politics of prescription. From this endgame would emerge the Provisional IRA and its politics, which would ultimately displace the universal and egalitarian dimension CRM’s political singularity and hence its mode of political subjectivity and subordinate politics to an identitarian and statist construction.

Section III. Armed Depoliticisation: the Logic of Identification and the Provisional IRA

The emergence of the Provisional IRA as the dominant organisation within the movement shifted the politics of NI in two important ways. Firstly, the mode of subjectivity which underpinned the politics of the movement became nationalist. Secondly, the movement became imbued with what we can call a statist imagination, a different way of conceiving the objectives and organization of emancipation. The result was the nation-statification of the movement. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are many aspects of the Republican movement which are not addressed in this chapter. My concerns are limited here to the analysis of the process through which the logic of identification emerged as a principle mode of imagining emancipation and political subjectivity within the movement.

In what follows I will discuss the twin issues of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in the politics of the Provisional IRA. Let us first recall that the notion of ‘Catholic unity’ had already become an important strain of thinking within the movement and this introduced the first clear example of identitarian thinking founded on the division Catholic community/Unionism (McCann, 1980; Devlin, 1969). This already signalled an erosion of the CRM’s thinking, which was founded on the division universal equality/the state. However, we have also seen that ‘Catholic unity’ was pushed by a more moderate grouping which lost control and ultimately relevance when confronted with the ever-increasing militancy of the movement (Purdie, 1990; McCann, 1980). The second primary way in which a more identitarian politics emerged was through the notion of ‘defence of the community’, strongly pushed
by Republicans as early as the summer of 1969 (Purdie, 1990). The ‘pogroms’ against Belfast Catholics of August 1969 created the context for ‘defence’ to emerge as a key theme. This is linked to the split in the IRA and the emergence of the Provisional IRA (Hanley and Millar, 2009). The following quote presents their reading of the events and indicates the importance of the theme of ‘defence’ in their politics:

In August 1969, nine people were killed and 500 houses gutted, and many thousands of men, women, and children fled south of the border, as a result of Unionist mobs led by the forces of ‘law and order’, attacking nationalist ghetto areas of Belfast and Derry...The 1969 pogrom was different in some ways to previous attempts at extermination...the traditional defenders of the nationalist people [i.e. the IRA] were unarmed and unorganized. Of all occasions when Unionist extremists ran amok, there was no reason on this occasion for the absence of defence. (The Provisional IRA, 1974: 9)

That there was a community in need of defence is unquestionable, but nevertheless this is a completely different way of conceiving politics. Moreover, the logic of ‘defence’ was the vehicle through which more leftist and political orientations were attacked and sidelined:

The state of the IRA [in August ‘69]...was a logical result of the policy pursued by the then leadership....these people had gained power in the movement by various means, including ballot-rigging, and at the instigation of former members of the Communist Party of Great Britain and Ireland, who came back to Ireland with the intention of setting up an ultra-left wing front based in the Republican movement, had diverted the movement to political and social agitation to the almost total exclusion of the traditional military role. (The Provisional IRA, 1974: 10)

During the ‘60s the IRA had indeed moved dramatically to the left, moved away from military campaigns and focused on inserting the IRA into political conflicts, in particular the civil rights issue in the north and housing action committees in the south, as well as trade union activities (Hanley and Millar, 2009; English, 2003). The perceived unwillingness of the leadership to pursue a more militaristic strategy, criticised particularly by older Republicans such as Sean McStiofáin and Billy McKee, lead to a split in the IRA in 1969 from which the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA emerged (English, 2003)^79.

^79 Formally the split related to the question of abstention from parliament. However, the underlying factors were those relating to the nationalist-militarist/leftist-political divide, as Hanley and Millar (2009) demonstrate.
In the North the Officials were quickly sidelined by the Provisional IRA and their activities were largely determined by the Provos, in the sense that the latter set the pace and parameters of the unfolding situation.

The Provisional IRA quickly reasserted traditional nationalism and it is here we see most clearly a shift in the subjectivity of the movement. Their 1971 document *Eire Nua: The Social and Economic Programme of Sinn Fein*, declares their objective as "the establishment of a 'reign of social justice based on Christian principles by a just distribution and effective control of the nation's wealth' and the institution of 'a system of government suited to the particular needs of the Irish people'". (Sinn Fein, 1971: 3, my emphasis). A document from three years later, the above quoted *Freedom Struggle*, states that "the nationhood of all Ireland had been an accepted fact for more than 1500 years" (The Provisional IRA, 1974:1). The 1979 2nd edition of *Eire Nua* was even more forceful in positing nationalism as the central plank of the movement. It begins with the following:

1. The Irish nation is one.
2. The Irish nation, like all nations, has an indefeasible right to freedom.
3. Freedom denotes separation and sovereignty.
4. The right to national freedom rests upon the right to personal freedom and true national freedom guarantees true personal freedom.
5. The object of freedom is the pursuit of the happiness of the nation and of the individuals that compose the nation.
6. Freedom is necessary to the happiness and prosperity of the nation. In the particular case of Ireland, separation from England is necessary not only to the happiness and prosperity but almost to the continued existence of Ireland, in as much as the interests of Ireland and England are fundamentally at variance, and while the two nations are connected, England must necessarily predominate.
7. The national sovereignty implied in national freedom holds good both externally and internally, i.e. the sovereign rights of the nation are good as against all other nations and good as against all parts of the nation.
8. The nation has jurisdiction over lives and property within the nation.

9. The people are the nation.\(^8\)

Along with this assertion of nationhood came an emphasis on ‘Irish culture’ and in particular the Irish language, conceived in classic Herderian terms:

Irish is an ancient language and over a period in excess of two thousand years, at least, successive generations have used it, moulding and developing this particular mode of speech so that the Irish nation possessed a distinctive mind of its own. This distinctive nationality enshrines all the spiritual and intellectual possessions and characteristics which distinguish us from other peoples...A national language is the medium of a nation’s culture. By culture we mean the total network of knowledge, belief, art, customs, feelings and patterns of thought shared by a group of people; in short, a whole way of life or a community design for living. It is because the Irish language “grew up” with our people and was the medium of expression of or distinctive culture that it is best fitted to bring about the spiritual regeneration necessary to foster the self-reliance among our people which is a pre-requisite for the solution of our many social and economic problems. (The Provisional IRA, 1974: 39)

At the same time, just as the ‘Catholic unity’ principle had set up the ‘Catholic community’ against the Unionist state, the Provisional’s nationalism introduced the division between England and Ireland as the primary antagonism around which their politics was structured. In 1972 an issue of Republican News, the principle Belfast based newspaper of the Provisional IRA, carried an article stating “we are not British, WE ARE IRISH. We will not willingly accept British rule. England for the English and Ireland for the Irish”. (Quoted in English, 2003: 126, from Republican News 28 July 1972)

*Freedom Struggle* sets out as its objective “the establishment of an entirely new political system designed to replace the *foreign system* that was imposed on our people by the *invader*”. (The Provisional IRA, 1974: 40, my emphasis). *Eire Nua* consistently implies that all Ireland’s problems (north and south) are the result of Britain and also identifies capitalism with Britain. They encourage the movement to “oppose effectively the purchase of land by foreigners” (Sinn Fein, 1971: 10) and criticize the southern government for “taking the advice of foreign experts” and having policies “based on slavish imitation and

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8 This appears in the first pages of the 2nd edition and is a quote from Patrick Pearse, nationalist leader who was executed following the insurrection of 1916
misunderstanding of the foreigner’s practice...” (Sinn Fein, 1971: 26). The use of the term ‘foreigner’ in this way was not limited to the British. One of the Provisional IRA’s main lines of attack against leftists in the CRM, what Farrell calls their ‘vehement anti-communism’, was around the theme of the ‘foreign’. Indeed the claim that leftist elements were infiltrating the Catholic population with ‘foreign ideologies’ (i.e. Marxism) and ‘foreign allegiances’ (i.e. Moscow) was a constant refrain of the Provos during the ‘70s (Farrell, 1976). In contrast, the Provisional IRA presents a new type of socialism which was founded on ‘native Irish’ values and practices: “Ours is a socialism based on the native Irish tradition of Comhar na gComharsan which is founded on the right to worker-ownership and on our Irish and Christian values”. (Sinn Fein Caretaker Council, quoted in Farrell, 1976: 270). Comhar na gComharsan, which they describe elsewhere (The Provisional IRA, 1974) as ‘native Irish as well as being co-operative or distributive in character,’ refers to a traditional Irish form of cooperation between peasants at harvest time. In the Irish language ‘comhar’ is associated with a kind of organic cooperation and solidarity. The use of this Irish language term here is significant in the sense that its function seems to be to bypass the term ‘communist’ while at the same time sublimating something of its cooperative and egalitarian character within a nationalistic and organic sense of community.

The second key issue in terms of the political shift signalled by the Provisional IRA is that of ‘statism’. The Provisional IRA is so called because of its allegiance to the provisional government of the Irish Republic declared during the 1916 Easter rising, the event which initiated the political sequence leading to Irish independence. As in many national liberation struggles (Neocosmos, 1998), the 1916 movement developed a pre-independence proto-state form (constitution, parliament, courts etc). The IRA (and factions of it) has always considered their political authority to arise from the constitutional moment of 1916. This has meant that Irish Republicanism has always had a ‘statist’ outlook, not only in the sense that it strove to create an independent state but in the sense that it operated within the statist imaginary of the national independence movement 1916-1921. For example, the military council of the IRA was always considered to be the supreme authority within the movement, on the basis that the remaining Parliamentarians elected in the pre-partition parliament had ‘delegated their authority’ to the Army council
in 1938. Thus, the Army council of the various IRAs have considered themselves to be the official government of a 32 county (all-Ireland) Republic. When the IRA split in 1969 the newly formed Provisional IRA sought the support of Thomas Maguire, the only surviving member of the parliamentarians who had delegated their authority in 1938 (English, 2003). He responded as follows:

I hereby fully declare that the Provisional Executive and the Provisional Army Council are the lawful Executive and Army Council respectively of the IRA and that the governmental authority delegated in the Proclamation of 1938 now resides in the Provisional Army Council and its lawful successors. (Maguire quoted in English, 2003: 114)

The provisional IRA, just like the movement of 1919-21 sought to take on a proto-state institutional form. *Eire Nua* argues for the need to “build up an institutional structure which will foreshadow certain state organs of the future Republican Government” (Sinn Fein, 1971: 7). In practice this had limited success, although the Provisional IRA was the effective police force in many areas of NI right up to the 1990s.

This statist dimension was crucially bound up with the particular conception of emancipation that characterizes the Republican movement, in that it was founded on a nationalist conception of sovereignty, i.e. the ideal identification of state, people and territory. Such a perspective imagines the state as the institutional expression of the self of the community and is, as such, sustained by an identitarian logic. In this sense politics or emancipation is equated with and founded on a mode of being (Irish identity) which is an 'external invariant', an empirical characteristic outside of the immediate antagonistic political relation. Hence, the political is subordinated to the extra-political, in this case the nation. This is the key moment of the depoliticisation of the political singularity of NI’s 1968. While Republicans generally see this shift as one from the ‘immature’ politics of the CRM to the recognition of the ‘need’ for ‘armed struggle’, I describe this shift as ‘armed depoliticisation’.

In the above I have presented the politics of the IRA in a somewhat schematic form. In reality, individuals joined the IRA mainly because it was a way to fight back, to ‘defend their community’, and because there was no other realistic way of continuing to struggle.
The presence of the British army on the streets meant the CRM politics of direct action was increasingly untenable:

[N]otwithstanding the absence of organized Republican involvement in rioting, Republican sentiment was growing, and most strongly among rioting elements. In 1969 it had been perfectly possible to see the struggle as one ‘to defend the area’ and, more generally, to end oppression by Unionists at Stormont. But now it was the British Army whom one had to fight, it was they who acted as the instruments of oppression, who wielded the Special Powers Act against us. The struggle ‘against injustice’ became, in practice, a struggle against the British forces - a pattern of play which matched perfectly the old Republican idea of the way things were... ‘We shall overcome’ and ‘we shall not be moved’ gave way to ‘The Soldiers Song’ and ‘Kevin Barry’. (McCann, 1980: 83)

The radical CRM militants at the time realized that their politics was being eclipsed by the situation itself, but where unable to prevent it. Robson, a member of the DHAC and NILP describes this difficulty:

Attempts to build a grass-roots organization of youth from the ranks of those most active in confronting the British Army and RUC failed in the main because the Labour Party and Young Socialists could not provide them with the means to extend their resistance. The republican movement, on the other hand, did. (Robson, 2009: 113)

McCann, in a recent retrospective piece, has suggested that he underestimated “the extent to which actually existing conditions led catholic workers to continue to regard themselves more as part of an oppressed community than as a section of an exploited class”. (McCann, 2009a: 149) This was the crux of the problem for the left - they were unable to express or grasp the political singularity of the CRM and tried to fit it within the frame work of socialist politics (i.e. class). This, however, never resonated with those driving the movement forward. The IRA were equally unable to grasp the political singularity of the CRM, but their militaristic and nation-statist politics, in the specific context of the end of the ‘60s, was able to capture the hearts and minds of the movement.

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81 The Soldier’s Song is the national anthem of the Republic of Ireland. ‘Kevin Barry’ is a classic Republican song referring to a republican martyr.
82 In the New Left Review interview of 1969, McCann notes the reluctance of Catholic workers to respond to a class analysis, but seems to attribute this to Unionist ideology: “When you say to the people of the Bogside area in Derry that they are being exploited because they are workers not because they are Catholics, they are not very inclined to believe you. They have been told all their lives by the Unionist party that this is a Protestant state for a Protestant people...” (McCann quoted in Baxter et al., 1969: 3).
In a sense the tragedy of this period is the inability of any group or 'thought' to express the political subjectivity and potentiality of the CRM. Both attempts to do so, leftist and Nationalist, reverted to older political forms. On the one hand, leftist activists, believing that class was both a reflection of objective interests and the only true universal subject, attempted to reduce the movement to objective economic conditions. In other words, they reverted to the 1917 mode of politics. On the other hand, the nationalist attempt to develop the movement involved the abandonment of its universal and anti-identitarian logic and its extra-statist form. In other words, they reverted to the nation-statist mode of 1916. Both wings might be characterised in terms of an 'over fidelity' to the events of 1916 and 1917 respectively. Badiou describes the subject of such an over-fidelity as *sujet obscure*, which Hallward, in his work on Badiou, describes as a figure which:

...entertains a negative relation to the present consequences of an evental statement. This is the figure of obscurity, *le sujet obscure*, who refuses to recognize the possibility of truth *en acte*. The obscurantist devalues an ongoing (and thus unproven or unapproved) fidelity in favour of a rigid conformity to the absolute past of an allegedly original event or revelation (Hallward, 2003: 147)

In spite of its inability to escape from 1916, its inability to imagine emancipation ‘beyond nineteenth century nation-building paradigms that were focused on territorial sovereignty’ (Gilroy, 1987), the Provisional IRA apparently presented the only way of continuing conflict with the state in an increasingly militarised environment.

**Conclusion**

In the above we have seen that the CRM can be characterised as a rupture with the Orange State and its identitarian categories and in terms of a new emancipatory subjectivity, which I have analysed in terms of its egalitarian and universal prescriptive politics. From the

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83 In a sense NICRA would later make a somewhat similar analysis, although theirs seems to be defined by a rather polemical anti-socialism. In their 1979 pamphlet, in which they describe the PD as a “lunatic fringe”, they argue that “Initiated into politics by civil rights, [the PD] decided that only socialism could provide such rights...Like the Nationalist party, they confused the demand for civil rights in the existing state with a demand for a specific form of government which only the abolition of the state could provide”. (NICRA, 1979: 14)
beginning of the CRM this subjectivity existed in a precarious tension with other elements of the situation and a constant pressure was exerted upon it by the logic of identification, in the guise of sectarianism or ‘Catholic unity’. Nevertheless, there were some important moments which developed the ‘consequences’ of the CRM’s singularity, in particular what I have described as Free Derry’s radical ‘subtraction’ from sovereignty. The CRM was founded on the subjectivisation of the ‘part of no part’ through a conflict which challenged the sectarian ‘miscount’ of the Orange regime. Demands such as ‘one man, one vote’ confronted the exclusions of Orange rule with a universal prescription. The Orange regime, however, was too deeply inscribed within an exclusionary symbolic regime which was founded on the ‘othering’ of Catholics, and hence it was unable to recognise the CRM’s universal and egalitarian politics as anything other than an enemy of the state. The conflict was thus incommensurable.

Ultimately, however, the universal and subtractive singularity of the CRM was submerged as it was transformed into ‘armed struggle’. The shift from the ‘street politics’ of 1968 to paramilitary activity was of course a tendency which featured across Europe in the 1970s, especially in Germany and Italy. As Zizek (2009a: 58) notes, “when the emancipatory sequence of 1968 had exhausted its potential...the only option was a direct, brutal, passage a l’acte, a push towards the Real”. One of the forms this took was what Zizek calls “leftist political terrorism”, a form which he describes in terms of the belief that “in an epoch in which the masses have become totally immersed in the capitalist ideological morass, the standard critique of ideology is no longer operative, and only a resort to the raw Real of direct violence....will awaken the masses”. (Zizek, 2009a: 58). Zizek’s reading is, characteristically, somewhat Eurocentric. The shift towards ‘armed struggle’ in the Irish context emerged in a different context, one in which the ‘masses’ were already mobilised and the problem, from the perspective of the movement, was that of state repression. The shift towards the politics of the IRA was also a shift towards national liberation as a specific political mode, i.e. as a concrete perspective on emancipation and the organisation thereof.

As the IRA emerged as the principal force within the movement the political conflict is transformed into a difference-conflict: a conflict between two identitarian and nation-
statist constructions. Of course, the nation-state is ill-equipped for dealing with two rival nationalisms in one territory, and hence the difference-conflict proved almost as incommensurable as the CRM’s political conflict, leading to thirty years of political stalemate. The movement had transformed into an identitarian yet militant movement. Now the state itself would have to transform in order to incorporate this movement through new forms of recognition and inclusion.

I conceptualise this overall political sequence in terms of a number of developments which move from politicisation to depoliticisation. Firstly, the CRM is characterised by a new subjectivity which confronts the Orange State and exposes its ‘true’ character - i.e. its inegalitarian logic. We can relate this to the themes of universality and particularity, in two senses: (a) because the movement reveals the hierarchical and repressive nature of the state, it erodes and eventually destroys the state’s claim to universality - the state now appears as a particular force representing a particular section of society and not as universal institution which represents everyone; (b) the CRM claims to be the true universal force in the polity - thus appropriating universality within an extra-statist subjectivity. Secondly, the IRA subordinates the universal subjectivity of the CRM to a particular and identitarian subjectivity. This means that while the state continues to lack its universal dimension there is no alternative universal subjectivity in the polity. There are only two particular and statist subjectivities locked into a militaristic combat. Moreover, in this phase the very identity of the polity breaks down, with a large section of the population refusing to recognise the existence of NI as a polity. I call this situation partial depoliticisation. Finally, the last step involves the reappropriation of universality by the state via new forms of recognition. I call this situation (in which the state holds the monopoly on universality and in which, as such, there is no extra-statist universal subjectivity within the polity) complete depoliticisation. This final step will be the subject of the next two chapters.
Chapter 6

Multicultural Sovereignty

Sovereignty is shifting away from the nation state and is going somewhere else. The problem is to define precisely where it is going, and this is the problem that remains unsolved. (Negri, 2008: 3)

Introduction

In this Chapter I begin my analysis of the form of state universality at stake in the post-GFA state via a theoretical engagement with GFA sovereignty. While this chapter jumps forward to the peace process and the GFA, signed in 1998, the themes of the last chapter remain relevant. As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis is situated within a theoretical perspective which emphasises the relationship between state transformation and the incorporation and depoliticisation of political subjectivity. This chapter examines this process at the level of sovereignty. Central to this will be the argument that GFA sovereignty centres on the recognition and incorporation of the Republican movement.

In the last chapter we have seen how the Civil Rights Movement’s (CRM) logic of subjectivisation was gradually supplanted by the Provisional IRA and its logic of identification. This is a process of depoliticisation within the movement. In this chapter I will examine the process of depoliticisation in terms of sovereignty. Once Irish nationalism had emerged as the dominant politics of the movement the context was created for a series of statist strategies oriented towards the interpolation of the Catholic ‘community’ in identititarian and, broadly speaking, multicultural terms. In Section I below I draw on existing research to give an overview and analysis of these strategies. However, while these strategies could recognise and incorporate the ‘cultural identity’ of the Catholic ‘community’ they could not recognise the more ‘political’ dimension of Irish nationalism, i.e. its claim to national sovereignty. Throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s the state’s multiculturalist policies were haunted by the question of sovereignty. This was to be the case up until the peace process of the 1990s, through which a new form of sovereignty emerged, one able to recognise and incorporate the sovereign claims of the Republican movement. This new form of sovereignty is at the heart of the formation of the post-GFA...
state. It also represents the incorporation of the logic of identification at the centre of the state. Section II theorises this new form of sovereignty in terms of the question of state universality and depoliticisation. I begin by theorising the specific form of sovereignty declared by the GFA and then move on to an analysis of the way in which this form of sovereignty impacts upon political representation under the representative institutions set up by the GFA.

My account of GFA sovereignty is a critical one in that I emphasise the relationship between the mode through which it establishes the state’s monopoly on universality and depoliticisation. I argue that under the GFA the state rather than the people is sovereign and that, as such, the state appropriates universality exclusively for itself. The way in which this is achieved, moreover, particularises the population, reducing it to a series of identitarian communities. Hence, universality is not subject to contestation. On this basis, and somewhat provocatively, I suggest that we can not describe the contemporary NI state as democratic, in the modern sense of that term.

Section I. Multicultural Policies and the Background to the Peace Process

The state strategies which sought to respond to ‘Catholic grievances’ were initially more oriented towards socio-economic reform than towards multicultural recognition (Rolston, 1998). Although elements of multiculturalist thinking were apparent as early as the first years of the 1970s, this was very much overshadowed by the notion that the IRA had capitalised on Catholic poverty (Rolston, 1998). By the early 1980s, however, a more multiculturalist logic was already beginning to characterise the state’s approach to conflict and it is this approach which would form the central tendency of the peace process.  

84 The factors leading to the drift towards multicultural strategies is itself an interesting question. No doubt the recession coupled with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism throughout the 1970s undermined any thinking that might lead to redistributive policies. It seems to me, however, that the Provisional IRA’s insistence that the conflict was a war of national liberation pushed things in this direction too.
Here I want to examine some of the various strands of thought and action through which the logic of identification emerged as the statist strategy of choice for the management of difference-conflict.

These can be broken down into three areas:

1) Multicultural Education
2) Conflict resolution and Community Relations
3) Irish Revisionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement

**Multicultural education**

Multiculturalism can refer to many different things. In this thesis I use the term to refer to the whole set of state strategies for the recognition and management of difference. In this sense, multiculturalism is the common theme of all the identitarian strategies I discuss in this section. It is also important, however, to draw attention to a specific type of educational policy which emerged particularly in the Anglo-American world in the 1980s, and this also goes by the name of multiculturalism. As Bill Rolston argues, NI was influenced by liberal multiculturalist ideas, coming in particular from the UK, and such ideas were implemented through education reform. The Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order (1989) established a compulsory curriculum including two subjects which relate to ‘engineering’ better community relations (Rolston, 1998). These subjects were Education for Mutual Understanding and Cultural Heritage. Both were underpinned by a resolutely multiculturalist logic which focused on the ‘two traditions’ of NI and attempted to promote a new way of relating to one’s identity and of relating across difference. As elsewhere (Brown, 2006), the vision here was one which presented conflict in terms of clashes between horizontal cultures, removed the state from the equation, and tended towards a fuzzy interpretation of history (Rolston, 1998).

**Conflict resolution and community relations**

One of the most prominent ways in which multicultural concerns became enshrined in governmental practices in NI has been ‘community relations’ (McVeigh and Rolston,
2007; Bryan, 2006; Finlay, 2004). If one wanted to express as succinctly as possible Ranciere’s conception of depoliticisation the term ‘community relations’ would no doubt be a frontrunner. Indeed, community relations relates precisely to the project of interpolating people as identitarian communities and then working towards their consensual relation, i.e. the elimination of conflict between them. The intellectual background to community relations work is thought to lie in Gordon Alport’s ‘contact hypothesis’. Alport argued that conflict arises from prejudice which in turn arises from ignorance and lack of shared experience. The remedy, then, is dialogue between groups in order to facilitate mutual understanding (Finlay, 2010). In the mid 1980s Northern Ireland’s Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights (SACHR) commissioned a review of community relations, undertaken by Frazer and Fitzduff and first published as Improving Community Relations in 1986. This review recommended the setting up of a community relations agency to support community relations work across NI. Their approach closely resembles Alport’s (Finlay, 2010) but they also recommend that groups should be supported to “explore their own culture and heritage with the aim of developing a new awareness and appreciation of their own and other traditions and a recognition of the developing nature of identity and culture” (Frazer and Fitzduff, quoted in Finlay, 2010: 52). We can see here a rationality which links modes of identification with how individuals and communities relate across difference. In addition to Alport, there are also resonances with UK multiculturalism here: Frazer and Fitzduff draw on the Commission for Racial Equality in Britain (Finlay, 2010). Following their report the Community Relations Council was set up. This organisation would go on to fund a wide variety of activities across NI based on political rationality of community relations. Increasingly, we have seen a move from Alport’s original conception of cross-community work to an emphasis on what is called ‘single-identity’ work (Finlay, 2010). This was introduced on the premise that groups may initially require ‘own group validation’ before their ‘identity’ is ‘secure’ enough for contact with the other. Over the course of the peace process the European Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation pumped millions of euros into this work and much of the funding has been managed by the Community Relations Council. Throughout the 1990s (and indeed until today) one could find a host of projects and programmes across NI which sought to foster the ‘community’s’ sense of their own

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85 This section is largely based on Andrew Finlay’s work, in particular Governing Ethnic Conflict (2010).
identity, explore their heritage, protect their traditions and to facilitate better relations across difference in doing so.

**Revisionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement**

Andrew Finlay has identified a further strand of identitarian thinking which came to be intertwined with state strategies, this time the strategies are those of the Irish state and the identitarian thinking takes the form of 'Irish revisionism'. Briefly, Irish revisionism refers to a body of academic (mainly historical) work emerging most forcefully in the early 1980s and seeking “to replace the monocultural vision of Irish identity projected in traditional nationalist historiography with a more pluralist vision” (Finlay, 2010: 56). One of its main theses was that the political problems in Ireland were the result of a “clash of cultural identities” (Finlay, 2010: 56). A key figure in these debates was Gareth Fitzgerald, who later became the leader of Fine Gael and the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of the Irish Republic. Fitzgerald would go on to frame, in conjunction with Irish and British diplomats, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed in 1985. Revisionist thinking made possible a shift in mainstream Irish Nationalist thinking. Specifically, it meant the N1 question could be addressed from the point of view of accommodating Ireland’s ‘two traditions’ in contrast to the classic nationalist position which favoured a straightforward united Ireland founded on a homogenous conception of the Irish people. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is the first treaty which reflects this new thinking.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement can be understood as the first building block as far as the constitutional changes culminating in the GFA are concerned. For example, the Anglo-Irish Agreement granted the Irish government a (limited) role in some matters concerning NI. Most importantly for the present discussion, it also included a commitment by the British government to introduce “measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland” (quoted in Finlay, 2010: 32). This was further developed by the SACHR in the late 80’s through the notion of ‘parity of esteem’ for the identity and culture of ‘both communities’ (Finlay, 2010; 2006) and, indeed, provided much of the impetus for the setting up of the Community Relations Council.

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86 It is important to bear in mind here that up until the Good Friday Agreement (1998) the Irish constitution claimed sovereignty over the entire island of Ireland.
discussed in the previous section. One of the agencies operating under the CRC was the Cultural Traditions Group. This group brought together many of the identitarian tendencies mentioned so far. It had a strong multiculturalist inflection (Rolston, 1998) and at the same time it was dominated by Irish revisionists (such as Roy Foster - see Finlay, 2010). The Anglo-Irish Agreement is significant in terms of the role of the logic of identification. On a state-political level, however, it proved problematic. The Unionist/Loyalist movement violently rejected any role for Dublin in the affairs of NI and at the same time it did not go nearly far enough from the Irish Republican perspective.

All of the above are characterised by a form of multicultural state recognition which interpolates the Catholic or Nationalist community in identitarian terms. In this regard, they represent the most significant forms of state-led depoliticisation in the ‘80s and ‘90s. However, as noted in the introduction, the spectre of sovereignty haunted the multiculturalist state strategies described so far. The IRA continued to demand full self-determination and a United Ireland. The central innovation of the GFA would be its capacity to recognise the Republican movement’s claim to self-determination, while at the same time formulating a form of sovereignty upon which to base the NI state, one that could win over the Republican movement and reappropriate universality for the state. Thus, while multicultural education, community relations and Irish revisionism all attempted to grapple with cultural division without dealing with the question of sovereignty, the GFA addresses that vexed question and does so in a way which can be conceptualised as a qualitative transformation of the state. That said, the GFA also represents the continuation, and indeed constitutionalisation, of the multicultural strategies described so far.

Section II: Sovereignty and the Good Friday Agreement

In this section we turn to the GFA itself. I begin by examining consociationalism, the intellectual underpinning of the GFA, as it appears in the work Breandan O’Leary and John McGarry, who exercised an important influence in terms of the thinking behind the

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87 Unionist/loyalist reaction led to serious and violent clashes with the RUC, whom unionist/loyalist had previously perceived as their allies.
GFA. Following this I begin my analysis of the form of sovereignty articulated in the GFA.

Consociational theory: the architecture of the Good Friday Agreement

Consociational theory, particularly in relation to NI, is most strongly associated with the names of two political scientists, John McGarry and Breandan O’Leary, who have had an enormous impact on the peace process and the GFA. Their work takes as its point of departure John Stuart Mill’s observation that, “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among people without fellow-feeling…the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist” (Mill quoted in McGarry and O’Leary, 1990: 268). NI, they claim, is an ethno-nationally divided society. Hence, one section of the population does not identify with the state, making conflict unsolvable within the conventional framework of the nation-state. Consociation is essentially an institutional architecture for such societies involving mechanisms for the inclusion of all national communities within the state, thus overcoming Mill’s dilemma. I would argue that it is the most advanced and deepest form of the ‘inclusion of the other’ within the state to have emerged in the ‘age of multiculturalism’.

McGarry defines the key features of consociation as follows:

1. A grand coalition, an executive inclusive of all the state’s main subcultures;
2. proportional representation for the state’s main subcultures, in public institutions, including the legislature and bureaucracy;
3. group autonomy, allowing subcultures to be self-governing where possible;
4. minority vetoes, at least when vital interests were effected (McGarry, 2001: 15)

In the case of the GFA, the arrangements for the Assembly (the parliament) require that all Members of the Local Assembly (MLAs) declare themselves as ‘Nationalist’, ‘Unionist’ or ‘other’. These designations play a part in key decisions where both an overall majority and at least 40% of the Nationalist and Unionist ‘voting blocs’ are required (Wilford and Wilson, 2001). This effectively gives a veto to the two electoral blocs. This mechanism guarantees a degree of security from majority rule politics to both ‘communities’.

88 See Appendix B.
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2009) but marginalises those who choose to designate themselves as ‘other’ (Finlay, 2004; Whitaker, 2004). Once the Assembly has been formed the Executive is put together on the basis of the D’Hondt principle, which allocates places on the Executive proportionally to all the parties. The result is that Irish Nationalist representatives are well represented in the Executive despite being an overall minority. Irish nationalists have almost half of the ministerial positions and have had the position of ‘Deputy First Minister’ since the inception of the Assembly. Leading sections of the Republican movement have been included within the state; for example former IRA commander Martin McGuinness is the Deputy First Minister. Consociation is thus an institutional arrangement which allows for the incorporation of minority Nationalist movements.

Aside from the design of the electoral system, Assembly and Executive, there are a variety of cultural and political innovations centred on the ‘inclusion of the other’ associated with consociationalism. In the GFA, the key term in this regard is ‘parity of esteem’ which refers to the notion that the state should recognise and support the ‘identity, ethos and aspirations’ of ‘both communities’. McGarry and O’Leary argue that “In Northern Ireland authentic equality requires that both groups’ (national) identities be accepted as equally valid and legitimate” (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995: 286). This means that various state institutions (e.g. the police, education, public buildings) have transformed in line with the ‘cultures’ of both communities. The rationale behind this is explained by McGarry in his critique of civic nationalism:

Civic nationalism, even in its multicultural variant, is incompatible with the substantive institutional recognition that national minorities want. These seek more than to be treated as equal individuals within someone else’s nation state or to be given a limited form of cultural recognition on par with immigrant minorities. They want far reaching institutional recognition of their national identity. (McGarry, 2001:127, my emphasis)

McGarry and O’Leary have also supported the incorporation of international and transnational institutional arrangements which are designed to give institutional reflection to the fact that “Northern Ireland has primarily experienced a self-determination dispute

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89 The D’Hondt method is an algorithm for allocating seats in a Proportional Representation system.
spanning two states”. (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009: 24). They consider this important to the extent that it introduces elements outside the framework of the traditional nation-state by, for example, giving the Irish government a role in certain matters relating to NI and creating all-Ireland institutions which allow cooperation between north and south.

As Taylor has points out, “Consociational theory is an empirically grounded normative theory that - through promoting power sharing of a specific kind - promises a democratic solution to societies confronted by durable division and political conflict”. (Taylor, 2009: 1). I want to pick up here on the word ‘empirical’. Central to consociational theory, from Lijphart’s (consociationalism’s founding farther) assertion that NI is the “most unambiguously plural society in the western world” (quoted in Taylor, 2009: 8) to McGarry and O’Leary insistence on the durability of ethno-national identity in NI, is the notion that NI is divided between two ‘empirical’ communities defined by identification with their respective nation-states. McGarry and O’Leary give different names to these communities (ethno-national, national, ethnic, subculture) in different writings. The important thing, as the below quote from one of their earliest works reveals, is the way in which they conceptualise the ‘two communities’:

Northern Ireland is a segregated society. Segregated societies are divided into separate subcultures which possess radically different identities and values. The subcultures frequently have their own network of separate and exclusive voluntary associations, such as political parties. They enjoy different leisure activities, read separate newspapers, attend separate educational institutions, and live in segregated neighbourhoods. The division in these societies may be racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological, or some permutation thereof. (McGarry and O’Leary, 1990: 268)

The divisions are thus seen as more or less apolitical empirical characteristics which can be correlated to each group (Finlay, 2010). The form of ‘empiricism’ at stake here is most profoundly evoked by O’Leary and McGarry’s reliance on election results (i.e. a state operation) to support their claims about ethno-national identity. This is evident in the way in which they defend themselves form critics:

As for the suggestion that consociational politics promotes a superficial ethno-national politics at the expense of more popular questions of class or gender, we submit that there is no evidence, either from public opinion data or from
elections, that the latter questions are more popular. If they were, why do people not vote for parties that put such questions at the top of their agenda? (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009: 83, my emphasis)

Consociationalism thus suffers from the deficiency evident in the worst forms of political science; taking as data the distribution of preferences generated by the liberal democratic state, and being unable to see anything beyond this\(^9\). Consociationalism grasps the existing depolitised representations and translates them into the foundation of a form of post-national state. It is reminiscent in this sense of Hardt and Negri’s description of ‘Empire’ as form of command which “does not create differences. It takes what it is given and works with it” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 199). Consociation is a mechanism for reading the depoliticised differences which characterise a difference-conflict and incorporating them into the state in order to produce a difference-consensus.

The Good Friday Agreement: problematising the people

The key feature of the GFA’s consociationalism I am interested in is the question of sovereignty. Sovereignty is of crucial importance in part because it was central to the conflict. However, from the point of view of this thesis, sovereignty is of significance because it is related to the question of state universality. This section analyses GFA sovereignty in terms of its move beyond national sovereignty and its reconstruction of the state’s monopoly on universality via the formulation of a multicultural sovereignty.

After an initial reference to the ‘tragedies of the past’ and a ‘fresh start’ defined in terms of ‘reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust’, the GFA gets into its most important section, certainly from the point of view of this research. The first pages of the Constitutional Issues section elaborate a problematisation of the absence of a unified polity or people. Items (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) paint a clearly unworkable mix of sovereign claims while item (v), the crucial moment for this thesis, formulates a mode of sovereignty which transcends the impasse signalled by the previous items.

\(^9\) For example, there is ethnographic evidence that the identitarian conception of politics associated with consociationalism is experienced as an imposition, see Whitaker, 2004; Finlay, 2010. More generally, in classic ideological fashion, McGarry and O’Leary systematically ignore any form of critical thought on the question of identity, conflict or indeed Northern Ireland, the occasional straw-man critique of Marxism or Foucault notwithstanding (e.g. McGarry and O’Leary, 2009).
The first item begins with a reference to what we might initially assume would be the political subject at the heart of the GFA, the ‘people of Northern Ireland’:

(i) [The participants] recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;

Already in the second item, however, another ‘people’ appears:

(ii) [The participants] recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;

There is obviously a tension between these concepts, as the people of Ireland criss-crosses the people of Northern Ireland. This jumble is further complicated in item (iii):

(iii) [The participants] acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;

Clearly, the foregoing items do not present any mode for the constitution of the identity of the polity, any principle by which the polity could be ‘counted as one’ and through which the state could be presented as a universal institution rather than pertaining to one or other of the antagonists. Item (v), however, does precisely this as it introduces the form of sovereignty at work in the GFA in a way which renders rule possible within the context described by the above cited items:

(v) [The participants] affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign
government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities;

The remainder of this chapter sets about the task of analysing how this new mode of sovereignty establishes the identity of the polity and inscribes the state in a symbolic regime that achieves the production of a new ‘state universal’. I do this by picking apart the formulation of sovereignty in item (v) of the Constitutional Issues. I proceed via a number of elements of sovereignty and work towards a complete and precise theoretical formulation. Following this I extend and build on my analysis of GFA sovereignty by examining the form of political representation at stake in the institutions established by the GFA. I will show how the operation of state universality and the logic of identification at the level of sovereignty is bound up with the form of political representation, as evidenced in the formation of the Assembly and the Executive. The second part of section II thus develops the critique of sovereignty by showing its effect on the field of political representation.

**GFA sovereignty**

In this section I develop my conceptualisation of GFA sovereignty through an analysis of its elimination of the subject of ‘the people’ and the emergence of what I call ‘the principle of recognition’ as the foundation of sovereignty. I examine this in terms of the foundational recognition of the ‘equally legitimate national aspirations’. I then discuss the way in which this recognition subordinates the people to the ‘principle of recognition’. Finally, I look at how the sovereign principle of recognition relates to the identity of the polity and the question of state universality.

**The paradox of ‘equal and legitimate’ claims to sovereignty**

The GFA posits a new mode of recognising national sovereignty in which competing national sovereignty claims are recognised as equally legitimate. This is evidenced both in the ‘declaration of support’ in which the participants ‘acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations’ and in
item (v) of the Constitutional Issues, which commits to “parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities”. The aspirations referred to here are obviously those of a United Ireland or the maintenance of the Union with Great Britain. The principle of ‘parity of esteem’ and the fact that ‘sovereign government’ is ‘founded on’ that principle means that GFA sovereignty is not only capable of but founded on the recognition of a plurality of competing national sovereignty claims. The GFA also guarantees as fundamental rights both “the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations” and the “the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means”. Given that ‘political aspirations’ and positions on ‘constitutional change’ in NI include the abolition of the state, these rights may be understood as contemplating the right to seek the abolition of the state itself.

As Walker (2002) points out, this kind of formulation is literally unthinkable within the framework of the Westphalian nation-statist order. Likewise, Brown argues that a definitive feature of national sovereignty is that there cannot be “multiple sovereigns in a single jurisdiction” (Brown, 2010: 50). Nevertheless, many writers posit the recognition of competing visions of sovereignty in all too unproblematic terms, as if the ‘inclusion of the other’ (Habermas, 1998) could be achieved without any major shift in the symbolic regime of national sovereignty (O’Neill, 2007; Delanty, 2004). This approach has two significant difficulties: (1) it does not pay sufficient attention to the relational dimension of the other, i.e. the inclusion of the other is most problematic to the extent that it is the relation between self and other which establishes the symbolic regime of the state; (2) it renders completely unintelligible the dramatically exclusionary history of the nation-state, i.e. if the other can be included relatively unproblematically how can we understand the powerful negation of difference which characterises the national sovereignty? Indeed Brown argues, provocatively but in my view correctly, that “the idea of a partial or provisional sovereignty is worse than unstable and incoherent” (Brown, 2010: 50). Hence, I see the paradox of ‘parity of esteem’ as the first signal of a foundational rupture with national sovereignty.
The subordination of the people to the principle of recognition

The recognition of multiple national communities ultimately involves the subordination of the people in the sense that sovereignty is no longer primarily identified with the people. The most explicit elimination of the people as the subject of sovereignty takes place in the following formulation, cited already above:

(v) [The participants] affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities; (my emphasis)

This statement affirms that regardless of the will of the people ('whatever choice') sovereign government will be exercised according to and founded upon principles which 'trump' the will of the people, or which are transcendental vis-à-vis the people. This is a crucial declaration because it explicitly states that sovereignty is not founded on the people but upon a number of principles which transcend the people. These principles are, essentially, of a liberal multiculturalist nature. At their heart is the recognition of the 'parity of esteem' of the 'identities and aspirations' of 'both communities'. As such I maintain that sovereignty is founded on what I will call the 'principle of recognition'. The principle of recognition differs from national sovereignty in that the latter represents itself as the direct expression of the sovereignty of the people (i.e. the people and sovereignty are tightly fused) whereas recognition posits a separation or distance between sovereignty and the two peoples or national communities, as discussed further below. The GFA is thus quite unique in international terms in the sense that it explicitly founds sovereignty on liberal multiculturalist principles.

Disidentification of sovereignty and the people under the 'principle of recognition'

The recognition of competing claims to national sovereignty and the subordination of the will of the people to multicultural principles involve a disidentification of sovereignty vis-à-vis the people, by which I mean the breaking of the symbolic link between sovereignty, the state and the people. Indeed the very figure of the people is undermined by the GFA's
claim that sovereignty is exercised 'with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions' and is 'founded on...parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities'. Here the polity is represented as fragmented into diverse identities. The GFA, as the constitutional or quasi-constitutional document for the NI state, directly undermines the notion of the unitary national people. This is reinforced by the almost complete absence, as Morrison has pointed out, of the term 'the people' in the document. The term the people appears several times, as we have seen, in the 'Constitutional Issues' section (the first 3 pages) but virtually disappears thereafter, to be replaced by the term 'community'. In short, sovereignty is not identified with any one people.

The disidentification of sovereignty and any one people is what makes possible the 'parity' of the national identities vis-à-vis sovereignty. Much of the literature on this point sees the GFA's ability to recognise multiple national communities as an expedient capability. But I think we have to emphasise that the recognition of multiple national communities is not only a capacity of the GFA, it is presented as the foundation of sovereignty. The shift here is from founding sovereignty directly on the people to founding sovereignty on the recognition of the legitimate claims of multiple peoples or communities. This disidentification of sovereignty with any 'people' is what leads me to Papadopoulos and Tsianos' (2007) concept of 'subjectless sovereignty'. Sovereignty is no longer founded on a subject but on the principle of recognition.

In this regard the GFA has been accompanied by a whole series of changes in the symbolism of the state, i.e. flags, emblems, public space, public rituals, the symbolics of public institutions, cultural and language rights etc (Bell, 2008). This change can be characterised as the inauguration of a post-national, or perhaps transnational, symbolic regime of difference, in which the relationship between the polity, the state and the production of alterity is fundamentally changed through a thorough incorporation of the other. This attests to a mode of sovereignty which is founded on the recognition of differences, rather than on their negation.
My own analysis of sovereignty differs most crucially from existing accounts at this point. All of the existing accounts describe the contemporary NI state as ‘binational’ (O’Neill, 2007) or ‘bicommunal’, or in terms of ‘blurred’ (Bell, 2008), ‘shared’ (Crighton, 2003), ‘flexible’ (Doyle, 2004) or ‘plurinational’ (Keating, 2003) sovereignty. In contrast, I argue that sovereignty is not founded on a ‘blurring’ of the principle of national sovereignty nor is it ‘shared’ by two peoples. It is founded on the recognition of the equal legitimacy of two peoples and their sovereign claims. In order to appreciate the significance of this distinction, in terms of symbolic transformation, we must analyse the way recognition functions here as a ‘symbolic dispositif’.

A central contention of my theorisation of GFA sovereignty is that its recognition of multiple sovereignty claims and the national identities of both communities establishes a distance between sovereignty and the particular national sovereign claims. Whereas national sovereignty represents itself as the direct expression of the people, GFA sovereignty represents itself as the recognition of multiple peoples, and this recognition requires a distance, i.e. the distance between sovereignty and the claims and groups it recognises. ‘Distance’ here denotes that the recogniser and the recognised cannot be identical; a separation is required for recognition to function. Furthermore, recognition is the very mode through which this symbolic distance is established. The mechanism at work here is essentially that which underpins liberal multiculturalism:

Multiculturalism...respects the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which the multiculturalist maintains a distance made possible by his/her universal position. Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist; he or she does not oppose to the other the particular values of his or her own culture); none the less he or she retains the position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) other particular cultures properly- multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority. (Zizek, 1999: 216)

I don’t want to suggest that the GFA is necessarily racist91. Rather, I am interested in the way Zizek conceptualises the functioning of multicultural recognition. Under the GFA,

91 For a discussion of racism and the contemporary NI state see Lentin and McVeigh (2006).
recognition of the specificity of the two communities is the mode of establishing a distance between sovereignty and either national community. Moreover, the recognition of both national communities is the very form of establishing those as particular communities while simultaneously positioning sovereignty in the ‘empty point of universality’ from which recognition can operate. This is the central operation of the symbolic dispositif through which GFA sovereignty represents itself in universal terms, refusing to identify itself with any one subject (hence ‘subjectless sovereignty’) and instead identifying itself with the principle of recognition, which is posited independently of any subject or identity, and hence as universal, making possible the recognition of multiple communities.

In sum, the GFA’s sovereign recognition of ‘both communities’ necessitates a disidentification of sovereignty and the people and simultaneously establishes the empty point of universality which permits the neutral recognition of particular differences, which I call ‘multicultural universality’.

The identity of the polity
In Chapter 1 I argued that sovereignty, as it establishes authority over the polity, constitutes the identity of the polity as its object-effect. I also argued that the identity of the polity is bound up with state universality. In the case of the GFA, the recognition of difference that underpins the multicultural universal is also the principle through which the identity of the polity is established. The fragmentation of the people into two identities may seem initially to reproduce the central problem of the NI conflict, i.e. the inexistence of a principle which could count the situation as one. Indeed many critiques have focused on this dimension (McCann, 2009; Taylor, 2001). However, I want to argue for a more nuanced understanding of the identity of the polity, one that can allow us to understand the way in which recognition of difference can function to unify the polity.

A brief reference to modern sovereignty as understood in political philosophy is useful here. While modern, national sovereignty is generally, and correctly, associated with homogeneity, we should not forget the way homogeneity is organised in relation to difference. In Hobess’ theory of popular sovereignty, unity is staged not as the absence of difference but as the resolution or transcendence of particular and conflicting interests.
Indeed it is these conflicts, posited as *a priori* in modern political philosophy, which make necessary a universal state. In the words of Rousseau, “the clashing of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary, the agreement of those interests made it possible” (Rousseau quoted in Bartelson, 1995: 212). In other words, the ‘counting as one’, the establishment of the identity of the polity performed by the sovereign state, has been conceived of not as the ‘counting as one’ of something which is in itself one, but as something which is made one through the counting of the parts as one (Badiou, 2005). The representation of the national people as homogenous is not achieved by simply ignoring differences, but rather by *incorporating* them under the identity of the people, a process which, as noted in Chapter 2 externalises difference. In this regard is seems useful to recall Hobbes’ contention that “A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, represented...For it is the unity of the representer and not the unity of the represented that maketh the person one” (quoted in Bourdieu, 2004: 37, author’s emphasis).

My contention is that the principle of recognition can be conceptualised in terms of a somewhat similar operation. However, a novel form of organising the relationship between the state and difference is at work. While the GFA does institutionalise the difference between the ‘communities’, it does so in a manner which, somewhat paradoxically, establishes the identity of the polity. I conceptualise the recognition of each ‘community’ as a ‘count’, and it is this very count, and the ‘one’ of the position from which the count is undertaken, that establishes the unity of the polity, i.e. it is the unity of the representer and not the represented which is paramount. So while the ‘communities’ are counted as two different particular identities, they share a relationship to state recognition, they are part of the same count. The count operated by recognition is the universal which traverses and transcends their differences and, paradoxically, unites them in the very recognition of their disunity.

Under the GFA’s multicultural sovereignty, the diversity of the polity becomes the very principle which sustains its identity. GFA sovereignty provides the principle of intelligibility of this mode of establishing the identity of the polity in the moment it founds

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92 The notion of a clash of unchecked particular interests, Hobbes’ ‘war of each against all’, is of course the foundation of social contract theory.
sovereignty on the recognition of both national communities. As the GFA introduces recognition as the principle of sovereignty it institutes the ‘diverse polity’ as the object upon which sovereignty is exercised.

Sovereignty, the identity of the polity and universality

We can now relate sovereignty, the identity of the polity and universality. Just as under national sovereignty the principle which establishes the identity of the polity (the people as the subject which transcends the particular differences) is also the principle of universality (the universality of the people precisely as the subject which transcends differences), under GFA sovereignty the principle which establishes universality (the principle of recognition which transcends the particular differences precisely by recognising them as particular differences) is also the principle which establishes the identity of the polity. As noted above, the sovereign principle of recognition institutes the identity of the polity as a field of particularities and at the same time produces a distance across which recognition functions, a distance which separates the field of particularities from the neutral and universal point of recognition. GFA sovereignty aligns universality with recognition (the multicultural universal) as it establishes recognition as the principle of the ‘counting as one’ of the situation, i.e. the establishment of the identity of the polity. The state is thus identified with recognition, which is to say the identity of the polity. This is the mode in which the state appropriates or is identified with the multicultural universal.

Furthermore, as the state appropriates the multicultural universal it simultaneously operates a profound particularisation. Consider the fate of Irish Republicanism under GFA sovereignty. The GFA has been celebrated for its capacity to recognise and integrate rival claims to national sovereignty (Delanty, 2004; Kiberd, 2000). It seems to me, however, that this is better conceptualised as an achievement-negation of national sovereignty in that national sovereign claims, for example that of Irish Republicanism, are recognised as ‘equally legitimate’, but only at the price of eliminating the subject of the people. So it’s a kind of tit-for-tat which says, we’ll recognise the sovereignty of the Irish people if the Irish people recognise that sovereignty can be founded on a principle that subordinates the people. This achievement-negation even has its own ‘constitutional moment’ in the referenda on the GFA, which took place separately north and south of the border. In
particular, the electorate of the Republic were asked to renounce the Republic’s claim to sovereignty over the northern part of the country while at the same time voting for a document which precisely recognised the legitimacy of the sovereign claim to a united Ireland93. This immediately poses the following question: what is Irish Republicanism once it renounces the belief in the absolute sovereignty of the people? It becomes a mere identity. Herein lies the heart of the proliferation of an identititarian logic in NI politics. There is a similar process at work here to that of multiculturalism in the sense that under multiculturalism, as Wendy Brown (2006) shows, you can identify with a particular culture as long as you subordinate that culture to the transcendental principles of liberal multiculturalism (see also Zizek, 1999). The same thing takes place in NI; you can identify as a Republican as long as you act like a liberal multiculturalist. Once you start to act as if the Irish people actually are sovereign you’re denounced as a violent extremist.

What has been gotten rid of here is the universal component of national sovereignty and of Irish Republicanism; it is reduced to a particular claim, a kind of idiosyncrasy of a particular community. We can see here the key dynamic of GFA sovereignty: as the state appropriates (multicultural) universality it simultaneously particularises state-politics. The population is represented as a field of particular differences, the state is represented as the universal guarantor of recognition.

While Republicanism is particularised, this mode of state universality allows the Republican movement to operate in a new symbolic space in which, while the sovereignty of the Irish people doesn’t find its full expression, the Irish people are no longer subordinated to an alien nation, since all national sovereignties are subordinated by GFA sovereignty. The state is no longer perceived as the expression of British domination but as ‘neutral’, i.e. the state is no longer a form of organised violence at the service of a particular interest, but a universal institution which is aligned with the oneness of the situation precisely because it recognises the diversity of the situation.

93 The Irish constitution, prior to 1998, maintained sovereignty over the island of Ireland as a whole (including the sea, islands etc.), much to the chagrin of Unionists. The relevant articles were changed via a referendum which took place simultaneously to the referendum on the GFA, both were passed with almost universal support (94%) in the Irish Republic.
Transformation of sovereignty and depoliticisation

Before moving on to the next section that elaborates on multicultural sovereignty and its consequences in terms of political representation, I want to discuss the transformation in sovereignty described so far in relation to the historical dimension of depoliticisation examined in the previous chapter. As argued throughout this chapter, the principle of recognition is at the heart of the mutation of NI sovereignty. The object of that recognition is, primarily, the Republican movement. As such, the recognition (and thus incorporation) of the subjectivity of 1968 is the central move of the GFA. However, it is not the subjectivity of the CRM, but rather its depoliticised mode which is recognised. The reduction of the political singularity of the CRM to the logic of identification, a reduction which, as argued in the previous chapter, is operated by Republicanism, is fundamental to state transformation - the logic of identification opens up a kind of interface with the state, presenting a mode of subjectivity which can be represented, recognised and incorporated.

In this sense, my analysis recalls Negri’s (and later Hardt and Negri’s) approach to the role of ‘constituent power’ in transforming sovereignty (Negri, 1998; Hardt and Negri, 2000). For Negri, constituent power, much like what I call political subjectivity, refers to an excessive subjectivity capable of opening up new possibilities and hence of forcing transformation. He argues that it is this power which is captured as sovereignty transforms itself in order to re-integrate the anomaly of constituent power. Negri describes this process as the move from ‘constituent’ to ‘constituted’ power. Echoing Negri, but switching to the theoretical language employed in this research, my analysis indicates that the GFA’s ‘multicultural sovereignty’ emerges to ‘restore order’ by re-establishing the identity of the polity after the ‘trauma’ of politics (i.e. the CRM) has shattered the ‘oneness’ of the situation. In this regard, the form of sovereignty introduced by the GFA can be conceptualised as part of a broader movement of depoliticisation, in the specific sense that it accounts for the antagonism announced by the CRM in a way which re-establishes the identity of the polity and the universality of the state.

94 To my mind this is the most significant difference between the approach of Hardt and Negri and that of Agamben. As Mills notes, for Hardt and Negri “Agamben’s error is to construe bare or naked life as fundamentally passive in relation to sovereign violence” (Mills, 2008: 75).
Multicultural sovereignty and political representation

In the rest of this chapter I want to set out two consequences of the form of sovereignty described above in terms of the transformation of the field of political representation. The symbolic field of political representation, as it is manifested in elections, the formation of the Assembly and the Executive, completely changes with the elimination of the subject of the people. The GFA institutes a new mode of state-politics which defines itself as the ‘resolution of differences’, based on the reduction of all political positions to particularities which have no universal element. The GFA’s ‘multicultural sovereignty’ has important impacts on the form of political representation as it materialises in the various institutions established by the GFA. Moreover, examining the way political representation functions allows us to elaborate further on GFA sovereignty. These are the issues I turn to in the following section.

Following Claude Lefort’s straightforward definition, I define political representation as “the field of competition between protagonists whose mode of action and programmes explicitly designate them as laying claim to the exercise of public authority” (Lefort quoted in Marchart, 2007: 91). The transformation of the field of political representation, and particularly the effects of the elimination of the people, can best be explored through Lefort’s work on the ‘symbolic place of the people’ and its centrality to the ‘political forms of modernity’ (Lefort, 1986). I will first look at how Lefort understands the place of the people under the nation-state and the corresponding form of representational politics. I will then look at the situation in NI in Lefort’s terms.

Lefort argues that while popular sovereignty is founded on the people as the subject of sovereignty, the people is never directly ‘present’ and thus needs to be ‘represented’. So the question of what actually is the will of the people can never be answered completely. For this reason, Lefort conceptualises the people not as an empirical subject but as a symbolic place which is structurally empty: the place of the people can never be completely occupied (Lefort, 1986; Marchart, 2007; Singer and Weir, 2006). Political parties compete to represent the people and occupy their place, but they can only occupy that structurally empty place temporarily as representation is never complete, it is subject
to contestation (Lefort, 1986; Singer and Weir, 2006). Elections, the key mode of political representation in democracies, are the mechanisms through which a particular party comes to represent the universal sovereignty of the people, and when that party occupies the state via the formation of the Executive the sovereignty of the people is identified with the state (Lefort, 1986). This is the mode of political representation under the democratic form of popular sovereignty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a party becomes directly and irrevocably identified with the people, such that political representation breaks down altogether (Lefort, 1986). The place of the people is no longer 'empty', or subject to contestation, and hence the democratic form of representation no longer operates (Marchart, 2007). Conversely, in one brief but insightful passage, Lefort describes the contrary situation, in which the place of the people is not only structurally empty, but structurally absent:

If the place of power appears, no longer as symbolically, but as really empty, then those who exercise it are perceived as mere ordinary individuals, as forming a faction at the service of private interests and, by the same token, legitimacy collapses throughout society. The privatization of groups, of individuals and of each sector of activity increases: each strives to make its individual or corporate interests prevail. Carried to an extreme there is no longer a civil society. (Lefort, 2006: 279, author’s emphasis)

For Lefort, then, the democratic form is characterised by a symbolic space (the place of the people) which is structurally empty, such that the universality of the people is always open to contestation. The above quote also suggests that where the place of the people disappears, those who compete in the field of political representation are reduced to factions; the universal dimension of the people no longer exists and hence political representation is particularised. My contention is that this is exactly what has taken place in NI. Under GFA sovereignty the ‘place of the people’ is not only structurally empty but structurally absent. This manifests in the fact that the form of political representation structurally prevents the occupation of the place of the people. This is the case, as argued below, in terms of the formation of the Assembly (parliament) and the formation of the Executive under the ‘consociational’ or ‘power-sharing’ arrangements of the GFA. The consequence of this is that the protagonists of the field of political representation appear now as ‘factions at the service of private interests’. To discuss these issues further I will now turn to the formation of the Assembly and Executive.
State-politics under GFA sovereignty

In terms of elections, the casting and counting of votes in NI operates according to the standard PR system. The crucial difference happens when the delegates take their seats in the Assembly. The GFA stipulates that “members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above”. On the basis of this designation the Assembly divides the elected representatives in two politically privileged blocks (Unionist and Nationalist) and a third category of ‘others’. The latter suffer a formal exclusion in the sense that they are not counted for the purpose of measuring ‘cross-community support’. Cross-community support is required for the formation of the Executive, key decisions, the annual programme for government and budget, and a host of other matters. It is the central operational principle of government. Cross-community support means that the authority of the Assembly can only be exercised when there is both a simple majority and the support of at least 40% of each of the national blocs. This means two things. First of all, that the Assembly is divided into identitarian blocs. Second of all, it means that government is founded on the ‘resolution of differences’ in the sense that consensus underpins the decision making process. This corresponds quite clearly to the shift from the sovereignty of the people to a multicultural sovereignty. The people’s symbolic power as universal subject means that the government that represents them operates unilaterally or directly. In the NI Assembly, in contrast, the operation of government becomes a consensual resolution of differences between the particular communities.

The formation of the Executive, moreover, is based on the consociationalist principle of power sharing and this further compounds the dynamic operating in the formation of the Assembly. The ‘power-sharing executive’ incorporates, through the D’Hondt procedure, virtually all of the parties in the Assembly. So what you get is a ‘cross-community’ Executive which represents the diversity of the population. Because of the way the Executive is formed one ‘party’ or ‘community’ cannot occupy the Executive or become even partially identified with the state. Because no one community can become a ‘people’ (in the sense of a foundational political subject) each national community can be
incorporated into the Executive. As such, there is no opposition in parliament. The Assembly and Executive absorb all of the identitarian groups, operating as a mirror to the population, reinforcing the particular differences upon which sovereignty founds itself, and introducing a consensual dimension of politics which effectively bans any meaningful conflict.

This is what we might call 'representative democracy after the people'. When sovereignty is subjectless (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2007), elections become an almost sociological operation whose function is merely to count the parts of the population, what Bell (2008) calls an 'ethnic headcount'. What is lost in this is, again, any universal dimension. Elections are simply a mechanism for counting the parts of the population, a ritualisation of the principle of recognition. The representational dynamic constitutive of the democratic form, the struggle to occupy the place of the people, ceases to operate. The Executive, the Assembly and the field of state-politics in general is factionalised.

Conclusion: Depoliticisation and Exclusion under Multicultural Universality

I will conclude by summarising my analysis of GFA sovereignty before developing my critique of this form of sovereignty in terms of depoliticisation. GFA sovereignty, operating as a meta-political rationality and a symbolic dipositif, founds itself on the principle of recognition, the principle by which the polity can be counted as one and its identity established. The multicultural recognition at work here simultaneously represents the population in terms of particular identitarian differences and aligns sovereignty and the state with the 'neutral' and subjectless universal point of recognition from which these differences can be recognised as 'equally legitimate'. As sovereignty and the state appropriate the multicultural universal the polity is particularised or factionalised. The field of political representation is deuniversalised and state-politics becomes the resolution of differences between the identitarian groups recognised by the state. Sovereignty is founded on the logic of identification. From this perspective, and recalling the critique of identification developed in Chapter 1, we can identify the key way in which politics is foreclosed. The mode of the state's universality is the particularisation of the polity, in the
sense that the polity is represented in terms of particular identities, i.e. *a space in which no universal subject is present.*

The very recognition of differences strengthens the state’s role as the guarantor of recognition, in a manner reminiscent of Ranciere’s notion of consensus:

Consensualist centrism flourishes with the multiplication of differences and identities. It nourishes itself with the complexification of the elements that need to be accounted for in a community, with the permanent process of autorepresentation, with all the elements and all their differences: the larger the number of groups and identities that need to be taken into account in society, *the greater the need for arbitration.* (Ranciere, 2000: 125)

If we compare GFA sovereignty to popular sovereignty and the regime of the people we will see that what occurs here is a kind of separating out of two dimensions of the people. On the one hand the universal dimension of the people is ‘captured’ and transformed by the state. On the other, the identitarian dimension of the people is projected into the polity and into the ‘two communities’. Under the reign of the people, the state’s dimension of universality was always borrowed, so to speak, from the people. This meant there was always a possibility of rising against the state in the name of the people, as was so often the case in the twentieth century. Under GFA sovereignty the state claims for itself *all universality.* We are told that the politics of the people, any political position which is founded on the absolute sovereignty of the people, brings civil war. Only the GFA state, as the empty point of universality, can recognise, integrate and administer all the different would-be peoples. Once the state appropriates the universal dimension of politics, the latter is necessarily reduced to the administration of resources and rights among the recognised parts, what Ranciere calls ‘post-politics’ (Ranciere, 1998; see also Zizek, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2009). The danger here is that the state is *permanently identified* with the multicultural universal, *the dimension of universality is no longer subject to political contestation.* As a result, the field of politics, just like that of culture under multiculturalism, undergoes a deuniversalisation. The very theme of universality is banned from the polity. Politics becomes, as the GFA itself states, the resolution of differences. Once the state is *permanently* identified with universality it is no longer meaningful to talk about democracy within the sphere of the state.
The baby has been thrown out with the bath water. In order to get rid of the violence of nationalism, the GFA claims to do away with the dimension of universality. In fact, as we have seen, universality is not done away with but surreptitiously appropriated by the state in the new form of the multicultural universal. This is when post-conflict becomes post-politics.

On this basis we can historically situate GFA sovereignty in the following way:

- Divine sovereignty: ideal identification of state, monarch and God. The state appropriates the universality of God.
- National sovereignty: ideal identification of state and the people as the universal subject of politics. The state appropriates the universality of the people.
- Multicultural sovereignty: identification of the state as the empty point of universality establishing the state as the guarantor for the recognition of particular differences. The state appropriates the subjectless universality of the principle of recognition.

What is perhaps most interesting and novel in the GFA is that it moves beyond, far beyond, multiculturalism as a policy, positing what I call multicultural sovereignty as the very foundation of the polity and the authority of the state. My argument is also that in so doing it develops the type of universality which writers like Zizek, Brown and Badiou have identified in multiculturalism into a sovereign principle.

I have already argued above that this is deeply problematic as it involves the complete appropriation by the state of universality, the reduction of the polity to particular identitarian positions, and that, hence, universality is no longer the subject of contestation. In this sense universality is excluded from the polity. I would like to add a few comments on the kind of exclusions operated here. As argued in Chapter 2, state universality is typically a false universality since it collapses back into the identity of the polity. Does multicultural sovereignty overcome this exclusionary dynamic? Or does it operate some new exclusion?
I think we can identify at least three exclusions here, which are inter-related. First of all, as already argued, universality is excluded from the polity and any subject outside the state which claims universality is treated as a dangerous extremist.

A second sense of exclusion has been addressed by the writers mentioned previously, Zizek, Brown and Badiou. For Zizek (1999), the multicultural universal establishes itself as the ‘empty point’ of recognition, a deculturalised position from which particular cultures can be recognised. The exclusionary move here, somewhat paradoxically, is to establish one’s superiority precisely on the basis of the ability to recognise that other particular cultures are or are not equally legitimate. Multicultural universality is thus a normative universal; cultures deemed unable to respect particular differences are not recognised as equal and, as such, are excluded. As Wendy Brown (2006) shows, tolerance is constituted in the intolerance of intolerance. Badiou develops on this theme in a formal philosophical sense:

It is commonly claimed nowadays that the only genuinely universal prescription consists in respecting particularities. In my opinion, this thesis is inconsistent. This is demonstrated by the fact that any attempt to put it into practice invariably runs up against particularities which the advocates of formal universality find intolerable. The truth is that in order to maintain that respect for particularity is a universal value, it is necessary to have first distinguished between good particularities and bad ones. In other words, it is necessary to have established a hierarchy in the list of descriptive predicates. It will be claimed, for example, that a cultural or religious particularity is bad if it does not include within itself respect for other particularities. But this is obviously to stipulate that the formal universal already be included in the particularity. (Badiou, 2006: 146)

The multicultural universal is thus “fatally tautological” because “the universality of respect for particularities is only the universality of universality” (Badiou, 2006: 147).

The ultimate absurdity of this from of universality is indicated in the fact that we can easily imagine a way to rank people according to how closely they approximate multicultural universality, e.g. how tolerant they are. In a similar example, today the process of applying for citizenship in many European countries includes a ‘test’ the
purpose of which is to identify to what extent the applicant is integrated into the universality that underpins citizenship in ‘civilised’ European nations. This false universality is thus best conceived in terms of the regulation and normalisation, rather than the suspension, of difference (Badiou, 2006; Zizek, 1999; 2009b; Brown, 2006). Against the multicultural universal “it is necessary to maintain that every universal presents itself not as a regularization of the particular or of differences, but as a singularity that is subtracted from identitarian predicates...” (Badiou, 2006: 147, my emphasis).

However, the first theme, the exclusion of universality, reappears here. My sense is that it is primarily positions which claim universality for a subject other than the NI state, especially the ‘Irish People’, which are excluded as ‘bad particularities’, since they are de facto particularities within which the multicultural universal is not already included. As such they not only fall foul of multicultural normativity, they also encroach upon or threaten the state’s monopoly on universality. This area requires further investigation, but broadly speaking the figure of the ‘dissident Republican’ has become the new bogey man of NI discourse, generally represented as an extremist whose belief in their inherent legitimacy as representatives of their nation raises the spectre of civil war.

Finally, multicultural sovereignty does not recognise all differences, but only those groups deemed to have a ‘legitimate’ claim to self-determination, i.e. Unionists and Nationalists, as argued by a number of scholars (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006; Finlay 2010, Whitaker, 2004).

However, and finally, what I am primarily interested in is the new mode in which the state establishes the identity of the polity and appropriates universality, and the particularisation this visits on the polity. Ultimately, following Lefort, we can say that because universality is no longer subject to contestation, the NI state is not a democracy in the modern sense of the term.

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95 ‘Dissident Republicans’ refers to anti-GFA Republicans. There are currently at least three paramilitary organisations who oppose the peace process.
96 Here we see a further global and historical dimension of depoliticisation. The principle of self-determination was at the heart of the depoliticisation of anti-colonial movements and their integration into the international statist order in the period following World War II (Neocosmos, 1998).
Chapter 7
Multicultural Citizenship: a shared future and shared space

Introduction
In the foregoing Chapter I have developed an analysis of the mode of state universality at work in Northern Ireland’s multicultural sovereignty. My discussion of multicultural sovereignty in the Good Friday Agreement has a critical dimension to the extent that I show that what is at stake here is the appropriation of universality for the state and at the same time the particularisation of subjects within the polity and of the field of political representation. This chapter moves away from the macro-level meta-rationality of sovereignty to the more everyday political rationalities and technologies of citizenship. While I turn to more quotidian discourses and practices, the emphasis remains on state universality and depoliticisation. Specifically, in this chapter I will argue that the principle of recognition underpins the technologies of citizenship I investigate. In this sense, I identify a consistency here with the form of sovereignty in terms of the way in which state universality is framed and, moreover, in the sense citizenship is characterised by a logic of identification and, hence, depoliticisation.

It should also be noted that recognition at the level of citizenship, just as in the case of sovereignty, accounts for and incorporates the subjectivity of the Republican movement. In this sense forms of citizenship bound up with the post-GFA state are characterised by the way in which they are able to integrate the ‘other’ into the symbolic regime of the state. Here we can recall Egin Isin’s (2002a) conceptualisation of the transformation of citizenship as the incorporation and domestication of the ‘outsider’s’ subversion of the exclusions operated by the previous form of citizenship.

My research on technologies of citizenship focuses on A Shared Future: Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland (ASF), a mainstreaming
framework for the promotion of ‘good relations’ between the ‘communities’. I examine the
ASF document itself in order to elucidate the political rationalities at stake therein. I
develop on this and explore the technological dimension of these rationalities by
examining the application of ASF in the specific policy field of urban regeneration. Here I
draw on policy documents around urban regeneration. I also draw on one illustrative
example, the Skainos ‘community regeneration’ project.

I begin this chapter with an overview and analysis of ASF. I go on then to discuss urban
regeneration, where I give an overview and background to this policy area and to the
Skainos project and then develop an analysis of the rationalities and technologies of
‘shared space’, a term which captures the implementation of ASF at the level of urban
planning, design and regeneration. The final section develops the analysis of the
rationalities and technologies discussed throughout the chapter and links these themes to
those of previous chapters.

A Shared Future

Overview and background
Despite the enormous transformations which have taken place during the peace process
and in subsequent years the ‘reality of a divided society’ continues to be a key political
problem from the perspective of the NI state (Knox, 2010). Segregation in education and
housing, violent confrontations at ‘interfaces’ between the ‘two communities’, weak
legitimacy of the police, continuing paramilitary activity, all remain very visible problems
which in the years after the signing of the GFA have threatened to undermine the stability
it promised. In this sense the recognition of cultural and political difference in the
governmental institutions and in the form of sovereignty has not meant the ultimate
resolution of the ‘problem’ (Knox, 2010). Rather, once difference has been recognised at
the macro-political level we have witnessed a renewed emphasis on the government of
difference at every level. The project of transforming cultural/political relations in NI by
working on the identities of the ‘two communities’ preceded the GFA (see Chapter 6), but
in the years following the GFA we have seen a renewed government-wide effort to
‘mainstream’ the community relations agenda under the new title of ‘good relations’
(McVeigh and Rolston, 2007).
The origins of ASF and the term ‘good relations’ lie in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (section 75(2)), which forms part of the wider constitutional machinery of the peace process. The NI Act introduced the various legislative changes which the GFA made necessary as well as a number of pieces of legislation which would govern the functioning of the GFA institutions but were not included in the GFA itself (section 75 is one of these). Section 75(2) states:

(2) Without prejudice to its obligations under subsection (1), a public authority shall in carrying out its functions relating to Northern Ireland have regard to the desirability of promoting good relations between persons of different religious belief, political opinion or racial group. (My emphasis)

This piece of legislation places a statutory obligation on all public authorities to promote ‘good relations’. ASF has been the policy vehicle through which this statutory obligation is put into effect (McVeigh and Rolston, 2007). In 2002, prior to the publication of ASF, the first programme for government made a commitment to review community relations policy and develop a ‘cross-departmental strategy for the promotion of community relations’. That review, known as the Harbison report, was published in 2002. Central elements of the Harbison report are summed up in one of the reviews ‘principles’:

Acknowledgement of the problem: acceptance that the issue of dysfunctional relationships between communities in Northern Ireland is a major and continuing problem facing society and that divisions are the manifestation of deeply rooted mistrust and suspicion which extend into the core patterns and structures of relationships at all levels in Northern Ireland. Policy should focus on encouraging action which engages people in their public and private relationships at all levels of society. (Harbison, 2002: 45)

Key to this is the recognition that Northern Ireland is a society shot through with divisions, that these divisions take the form of ‘dysfunctional relationships’ at ‘every level’ of society and, consequently, policy must act to ‘improve relationships’ at ‘all levels of society’. These remain some of the key aspects of ASF, which developed a strategic framework aimed precisely at ‘improving relationships’ throughout society. ASF was published by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) in 2005, after one of the biggest consultation exercises ever undertaken in the UK (Colin
Knox, 2010), and sets out a broad range of actions and reforms to place ‘the promotion of
good relations’ at the heart of government. The central objective of ASF is to ‘mainstream’
the notion of the ‘promotion of good relations’ across all areas and all levels of
government activity, and this was articulated not only in terms of meeting the statutory
requirements set forth by Section 75(2) of the NI Act, but also in terms of realising the
aims of the GFA: the creation of a ‘peaceful, democratic society’.

ASF introduced the following changes to the state instruments of community relations: a
cross-departmental group to ‘harness actions across government’ was established; the
Community Relations Council (in existence since 1990) was revamped and given a
regional role in terms of a ‘challenge function’, funding provision and training in good
relations work; the phasing out of the District Council Community Relations programme
and its replacement by a Good Relations Challenge Programme, an “enhanced, permanent
programme for the promotion of good relations through the new District Council
arrangements” (OFMDFM, 2005: 53); requirement on District Councils to draw up three-
year Good Relations Plans (these local action plans were to draw on and compliment the A
Shared Future: First Triennial Action Plan published in 2006); finally, ASF emphasises
the involvement of the community and voluntary sector, as well as the combination of
community development and community relations work.

It should also be noted that ASF was developed during a period in which the Local
Assembly was not functioning in NI, due to a number of disagreements relating to the
outworking of the GFA. Consequently, it was developed by British civil servants and the
Secretary of state for NI (Knox, 2010). Following the restoration of all the GFA
institutions and the subsequent elections in 2008, Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist
Party were the largest parties and as such held the Office of the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister. Both parties placed little importance on ASF and, given OFMDFM’s role in
its implementation, this has had important consequences. However, I argue that ASF is of
continuing importance for a number of reasons. First of all, a number of important
elements of the state continue to pursue this policy, including the Department for Social
Development (held by the Social Democratic and Labour Party), Belfast City Council and
the Community Relations Council. Secondly, the overall political rationality of ‘good
relations’ has become hegemonic in NI above and beyond the specific remit of ASF (McVeigh and Rolston, 2007). Finally, Sinn Fein and the DUP are developing their own policy around community relations, currently out for consultation, entitled Cohesion, Sharing and Integration. CSI strongly resembles ASF. (This issue is addressed in more detail in Appendix B which deals with sources, so as not to distract from the analytical focus of the present chapter.)

The aim in this chapter is not a detailed description of the policy instruments and reforms laid out in ASF. Rather, I want to focus, in the below analysis section, on the core political rationality at stake in ASF and its notion of ‘good relations’, asking in what way identity, difference and state-political subjecthood are conceptualised and problematised in ASF.

A Shared Future: the political rationality of multicultural citizenship

As indicated previously, the ‘problem’ of difference is at the heart of the ASF agenda and at the heart of the GFA itself. Or perhaps, rather than the ‘problem’ of difference we should speak of the ‘fact’ of difference. For a central operation of ASF is to distinguish between different forms of difference, a distinction which is at once instrumental and normative. Difference in its ‘problematic’ dimension is articulated in ASF as ‘division’ and this is counter posed, not to unity, identity or homogeneity, but to ‘diversity’, which is the positive pole of ‘difference’. Thus, in the style of Foucault’s ‘apparatuses of security’\footnote{We can also draw a parallel here with Foucault’s discussion of the way in which the relationship between sex and power was transformed in the 18th century: “One had to speak of it [sex] as of a thing not to be simply condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according to an optimum. Sex was not something one simply judged: it was a thing one administered. It was in the nature of a public potential; it called for management procedures” (Foucault, 1998: 24).}, ASF constructs difference not as an evil to be eliminated, but rather as something to be governed according to an ‘optimum’. ‘Diversity’, in this case, represents the ‘optimum’ to which ‘relations’ are to be directed.

In this regard, ASF (OFMDFM, 2005: 15) declares that “[n]o one is arguing for an artificially homogeneous Northern Ireland and no one will be asked to suppress or give up their chosen identity”. The implication here is that difference (conceived in an identitarian fashion) itself is not the problem. The problem, rather, is ‘division’. The above quote
continues; “However, the costs of a divided society... are abundantly clear: segregated housing and education, security costs, less than efficient public service provision, and deep-rooted intolerance that has too often been used to justify violent sectarianism and racism.” (OFMDFM, 2005: 15, my emphasis). The problem of division is thus expressed as being “costly both socially and economically.” Economically, there are obviously the associated security costs. Moreover, the ‘inefficiencies’ involved in the provision of services in a ‘divided society’ are a constant concern of ASF, resulting in what it calls an ‘unquestionable’ ‘economic imperative to tackle these costs’. The ‘social costs’ are those of a systemic ‘lack of trust’, widespread ‘intolerance’ and associated patterns of violence, fear and segregation.

According to ASF (OFMDFM, 2005: 7), “In every society today, how we live together is a major challenge for governments and individuals” and ASF distinguishes between two types of society in relation to how the question of difference is played out, with dramatic social and political implications. In “multi-ethnic societies that don’t work”:

Individuals are reduced to simple group stereotypes, which easily turn into enemy images. Those who exploit difference can then widen communal divisions. In such societies, segregation and periodic violence are the norm and democratic institutions are inherently unstable, corroded by mistrust of ‘the other side’ (OFMDFM, 2005: 7, my emphasis).

Thus difference is constructed as problematic when it is ‘exploited’ in order to widen ‘communal divisions’, which are seen as leading to generalised violence and a weakening of democracy. Division is thus conflated with conflict. In his speech at the launch of the ASF Triennial Action Plan (OFMDFM, 2006), Duncan Morrow, chief executive of the Community Relations Council, raises the fear of conflict quite starkly:

The difficulty is that there are alternatives to a shared future, and we have lived in the foothills of them for decades. But be in no doubt about what they involve: Killing, expulsion from homes and property, massive economic destruction, random violence - particularly to the most vulnerable - the old, the young and

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Many people in NI are afraid to access services in areas outside their ‘own community’, hence many state services are duplicated, which is of course anathema in the context of the efficiency drive in public services in the UK (see Graham and Nash, 2006; Nagle, 2009).
the unarmed (often women), and (overwhelmingly) the poor - and no certainty about outcome. (Morrow, 2006: 3)

As we can see from the above quote, division is conflated with conflict. The distinction between division and diversity and the conflation of the former with conflict is what allows this political rationality to work on differences as a way of managing, resolving or transforming conflict. In this problematisation conflict is presented as difference-conflict (the violent clash between identitarian groups). Such a representation has in itself a depoliticising function in that it reproduces the logic of identification. Moreover, ASF suggests that when societies are characterised by ‘division’ ‘democratic institutions are inherently unstable’. This problematisation of difference is what renders the government of difference intelligible as part of the establishment of a ‘stable democracy’ and in the generation of a post-conflict polity. Finally, ASF identifies ‘intolerance’ as the ‘difficulty’ which underlies the social disintegration and political instability it problematises: “The underlying difficulty is a culture of intolerance, which we will need to remedy if we are to make Northern Ireland a more ‘normal’ society” (OFMDFM, 2005: 8, author’s emphasis).

In contrast to the above mentioned ‘multi-ethnic societies that don’t work’ are societies which ‘embrace diversity.’ ASF posits ‘diversity’ as directly facilitating the functioning of democracy: “Such societies, though never devoid of tension, can stay integrated. They can have viable democratic structures, which put a premium on dialogue” (OFMDFM, 2005: 7, my emphasis).

For ASF, societies which “embrace diversity” are founded on a particular way of relating to identity which “involves the opportunity to express one’s own culture, and to experience the expression of other cultures, in formal and informal contexts, in ways which are fair, inclusive, safe, tolerant and enjoyable” (OFMDFM, 2005: 31). Just as ‘division’ and ‘conflict’ are underpinned by ‘intolerance’, ‘diversity’ and the mode of dealing with difference depicted in the above quote are founded on ‘tolerance’. Indeed, “The overall aim of this policy [ASF] is to establish, over time, a shared society defined by a culture of tolerance” (OFMDFM: 10). As the above quote concerning ‘multi-ethnic societies that do work’ indicates, ‘tolerance’ is linked to the possibility of ‘viable democratic structures’. 
This ‘tolerant’ mode of relating across difference, underpinned by a ‘mutual recognition’ of each other’s identity, can be linked to the principle of recognition outlined in Chapter 6. Here again we say that the principle of recognition, a principle which, as argued in the previous chapter is aligned with the state, is presented as the factor which is needed so that, as quoted above, ‘societies can stay integrated’, i.e. as the guarantor of the identity of the polity. As ASF states, “A shared society, which is our goal...is held together by a willingness to engage in dialogue, on a basis of equality and by a commitment to the common good — by a culture of tolerance”. (OFMDFM, 2005: 31, my emphasis). In other words, ‘tolerance’ is presented as the principle which can ‘hold society together’ and is thus aligned with the notion of the ‘common good’.

We can see from the discussion so far that ASF proposes a specific form of society which deals with difference in a particular fashion via a particular way of imagining identity, and poses this as the foundation for democratic institutions and hence the very possibility of the polity. Hence, the political rationality of multicultural identification set out in ASF is directly focused on the profoundly political question of the production of a ‘post-conflict’ polity. There is also a clear normative and ‘ethical’ dimension here, indicated by the very term ‘good relations’. In this sense we can think of technologies of identification as a technology of citizenship linking identification, the ethico-political and state-political subjecthood (mode of belonging/relating to a polity).

In relation to the ethico-political dimension, the criminalisation of non-conformance to the mode of identification underpinning ‘good relations’ is contemplated in ASF:

All forms of intolerance and violence based on racism, sectarianism or any other extremism are abhorrent in a democracy. There are norms and behaviours within society that are acceptable and those that simply are unacceptable...The Government expects enforcement by the police and action by the criminal justice system to deal firmly with behaviour that is not consistent with what is expected in a normal society. (OFMDFM, 2005: 18, my emphasis)

Going back to a concept set out in Chapter 1, we can relate ‘division’ to the concept of difference-conflict. Within the terms of ASF, division corresponds to the concept of difference-conflict: a confrontation between human groups in which the conflict is articulated in terms of identitarian and empirical characteristics. The objective of ASF is to
outline rationalities and technologies which might shift the difference-conflict to what we might call a ‘difference-consensus’, where the later is founded on the notion of diversity: a tolerant relation between empirical and identitarian human groups. This ‘tolerant’ relation across difference is founded on a recognition of the particularity of one’s own identity and the equal value of other particular identities.

The rationality and technology of ASF is deployed in many different contexts. In the next section I look at how ASF is put into practice in urban regeneration.

Shared Space: Spatial Technologies of Multicultural Citizenship

Overview and background

‘Shared space’ is the term I use for the general way in which ‘good relations’ is translated into and shapes urban regeneration and urban planning. ASF, as noted in the previous section, is primarily concerned with mainstreaming the ‘good relations’ agenda across government. Hence, its objective is to transform and shape other areas of policy or to ‘govern government’. In this sense, it is important to explore how this happens and how the ‘good relations’ agenda interacts with other areas of policy. Moreover, by examining the way in which urban regeneration projects contain in-built mechanisms designed to promote ‘good relations’, we can further illuminate the techniques and rationalities at the centre of ‘good relations’. In order to do this, I focus on what is often called the ‘twinning of regeneration and reconciliation’ (Brand et al., 2008). Policy around ASF and urban regeneration makes constant reference to the need to bring these two policy fields together99. In the analysis below of the political rationalities and governmental techniques around shared space I draw on three sets of primary sources: relevant urban regeneration policy documents; the work of researchers focusing on shared space who have played a substantial role in policy development; and documentary and interview sources related to the Skainos project. All of the relevant sources are set out in Appendix B.

I use the Skainos project as an illustrative example at a number of points in what follows. Skainos is a ‘community led’ urban regeneration project taking place on the Newtownards Road, a large arterial route which cuts through Inner-East Belfast. The regeneration involves the construction of an entirely new ‘urban village’ (including a new street and ‘civic square’) on a two-acre ‘brownfield’ site and began in 2000.

The objectives of Skainos include:

- The regeneration of a ‘deprived Loyalist community’
- Building Loyalist ‘confidence in the peace process’ and hence ‘nurturing community relations’
- Creating shared space for ‘both communities’ as well as ‘ethnic minority communities’

For further details on the Skainos project see Appendix B.

**Space, citizenship, identity**

How can urban planning, design and regeneration contribute to the development of a ‘shared future’, the management/ transformation of conflict and underpin the peace process and the new NI state? This is the question which many researchers and policy makers have set themselves. Morrisey and Gaffikin put it succinctly:

> [I]t became clear that the peculiarities of Belfast and its region, in terms of the legacies of political violence, residential segregation and communities characterised by mutual fears and suspicions, were critical factors in the development process. Within many parts of the city, space was contested in ways that reflected the political conflict. Planning had to engage with such issues but lacked the conceptual tools for engagement. There was thus a need for a serious consideration of the issues associated with planning for contested space. (Morrisey and Gaffikin, 2008: 17)

The development of the ‘conceptual tools for engagement’ has involved an increased recognition of the relationship between space, meaning and the symbolic. This amounts to the rearticulation of urban planning by rethinking the object upon which it operates. The city is not just an empty container for urban life; it is symbolically constructed through
meaning making practices. Brand et al., in their introduction to an important report entitled *Changing the Contested City*, identify key features of space in relation to ‘planning in contested cities’: space is ‘socially constructed; space is subject to “diverse and contested readings”; space is “relational”; space is not passive, it is an “active agent” (Brand et al., 2008: 11).

This approach to conceptualising urban space grants space a key role in the production of the symbolic and in meaning-making and therefore in transforming forms of identification, much like Said’s ‘imaginative geographies’. This way of conceptualising space draws on the ‘spatial turn’ in critical social theory, most closely associated with Lefebvre (1991) and Soja (2000). The key outcome of all this is that urban planners are now to use the design and development of the urban to impact on the symbolic, the social and the political, by inserting their designs in the meaning-making processes through which city and space are constituted. Such a conception of planning, often referred to as ‘spatial planning’, is not unique to NI: it has become a key feature of UK (Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004) and EU (the European Spatial Development Perspective) thinking on planning.

The questions of meaning and the symbolic allow us to approach the way in which the ‘good relations’ agenda has been incorporated into urban regeneration. Key to urban planning, design and regeneration thinking is the way in which space in Belfast is bound up with processes of ‘ethnic’ identification which operate through a self/other binary and militates against a ‘shared future’. Thus, Belfast is problematised as an ‘ethnoscape’ (Morrisey and Gaffikin, 2008), ‘ethnic space’ (Gaffikin and Brand, 2007) or as an ‘ethnocratic city’ (Murtagh and Keaveney, 2006), meaning that the urban landscape is inscribed in and inscribes ‘territorial’ and ‘ethnic’ identification. The notion of the

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100 This report was published by C2U (see appendix B) and was funded by the Belfast Local Strategy Partnership, which is now phased out but previously had a role in both urban regeneration and peace and reconciliation work.

101 Brown describes this concept in terms of “the mental organization of space producing identities through boundaries” (Brown, 2010: 74).

102 The term ‘territory’ is frequently used in connection with the term ‘ethnic’ while the term ‘space’ is usually used with regard to ‘diversity’. It seems to me that animalistic images are frequently conjured up in attempts to problematise ‘rigid ethnic identities’, in particular the consistent reference ‘marking ethnic territory’, with its obvious canine connotations, is counter-posed to ‘creating shared space’ (Morrisey and Gaffikin, 2008; see also Murtagh and Keaveney, 2006).
‘ethnoscape’ etc. refers to problematised forms of ‘rigid’ ‘ethnic’ identification deemed to reproduce ‘communal division’. Transforming the ‘ethnoscape’ into ‘shared space’ is not seen in terms of the elimination of difference, but rather through an alternative mode of difference: “difference doesn’t have to mean division” (Morrissey and Gaffikin, 2008: 36). As with ‘good relations’ more generally, the challenge is not to get rid of difference, but to transform division into diversity. Morrissey and Gaffikin, for example, promote a policy of “zero tolerance on intimidating ethnic symbols” and at the same time advocate “Supporting affirmative non-threatening displays of identity” (Morrison and Gaffikin, 2008: 37). The goal is “to support a social mosaic” (Brand et al., 2008: 12) and to see diversity as “an asset rather than a problem” (SBPB, 2008).

But what are the technologies which might effect this spatial-subjective transformation? This question will be addressed in the next section in which I analyse a series of technologies which foster the form of citizenship described thus far via the production of particular forms of subjectivity. By intervening in the socio-symbolic dimensions of space, these technologies aim to construct forms of identification which underpin a ‘tolerant’ mode of relating across difference, hence underpinning the post-conflict polity. I refer to the technologies under discussion here as ‘technologies of spatial identification’, which I define as technologies which intervene in patterns of spatial identification by working through the socio-symbolic dimension of space. I discuss these technologies under the following headings: remapping space; technologies of circulation; and culture and arts as technologies of spatial identification.

Technologies of spatial identification

Remapping Space

A number of technologies can be identified which seek to remap space in a manner which spatialises the division/diversity axis. In this regard Gaffikin et al. recommend the use of ‘good relations audits’ aimed at distinguishing between shared and not shared space and to measure the extent and quality of ‘shared space’:
City planning and relevant regeneration agencies should undertake a regular ‘good relations’ audit of key public spaces, that would include: the measurement of shared space in the city; its extent; its users; the quality of their engagement; identification of hindrances such as poor access, safety, etc. (Gaffikin et al., 2008: xii)

On a more local level, the following project, entitled ‘Remapping Belfast’ and undertaken as part of the Skainos project, both maps out division/diversity and attempts to build ‘shared space’. It began as a ‘single identity project’ but worked towards cross-community objectives from the beginning. The project was about “where people feel comfortable in the city and where they don’t, how we can look at the city with new eyes, challenge the use of space” (Cooke, interview). The project was facilitated by an artists and poet who were also community workers:

They took maps of Belfast and each group marked where they felt safe, and then the artist painted in blue around where they didn’t feel safe, and said ‘so what we have here are Islands in the city where you feel comfortable, what would it look like to build more dry ground, can you build bridges between them...’ (Cooke, interview)

A scrap book of these maps (as well as poetry written by the groups) was passed back and forth between the two groups during the ‘single identity’ phase “so that they would get curious” (Cooke, interview). From January until the present they have been meeting on a weekly basis and “sharing about family history, and holidays and weddings and sports, kind of looking at a lot of ...of daily life, but also weaving in their experiences of the conflict, you know, why there’s some distrust between the two communities, and how we can change that...” (Cooke, interview). As an example of the success of the project Sarah Cooke told me that the women had gone on to share time together in the community centre in Short Strand and in EBM, i.e. in each other’s ‘communities’. As with many of the projects discussed above, this kind of project is designed to change people’s subjective perception of and relationship with the geography of the area, which is in turn thought to underpin new relations and a less hostile mode of relating with ‘the other’.

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103 This project is run by Corrymelea in conjunction with EBM.
104 Meaning that in the initial phase of the project the respective groups met separately.
105 Sarah Cooke is responsible for the development of the ‘family centre’ within Skainos and works for the EBM, for more information see Appendix B.
Continuing with the theme of subjective maps of spatial boundaries, an interesting project undertaken by Ralf Brand was celebrated in an issue of the Community Relations Council’s e-bulletin under the headline ‘Architecture has both healed and inflamed Belfast troubles’ (Brand, 2009a). The project adopted a novel technique in order to reach the subjective element of the spatio-symbolic domain:

The researchers handed out disposable cameras to community workers, teachers, pupils and other locals to photograph all kinds of urban artefacts which somehow influenced their subjective perception of safety, their commuting routes, shopping routines, preferences for playgrounds etc. (Brand, 2009a: 1)

This allowed the researchers to identify the subtle interaction between space, subjectivity and conflict:

We identified many examples of how architecture can inadvertently accentuate the concrete practice of conflict and division. What I found most depressing were some rather mundane objects that ‘socialise’ our children into a world-view of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. These can be quite unspectacular things like fences but tell children to internalise or normalise the material division mentally… (Brand, 2009a: 1)

Brand argues that techniques of ‘Crime Prevention through Environmental Design’ should be adapted to transform behaviour in relation to conflict and division (Brand, 2009a). In this sense, Brand argues for “the potential of architects to contribute to the peace process through behavioural-petal spaces where it is safe and convenient to make friendly encounters with ‘others’”. (Brand, 2009b: 2675).

Technologies of circulation
During the troubles many people tended to move in ways which were defined by Belfast’s micro geo-politics due to fear of intimidation or worse. Certain technologies operate by initiating patterns of circulation oriented towards the creation of ‘shared space’. These ‘technologies of circulation’ have the same objective as the technologies described above, but focus on changing patterns of circulation in the city. One such technology is that of developing transport and ‘neighbourhood networks’ “that are cross-community, and are
designed to foster social over ethnic capital" (Morrissey and Gaffikin, 2008: 37). This essentially involves building a network of walking and cycling paths which would be well lit and safe and would encourage new patterns of circulation through the city. Rather than individuals moving within spaces identified with their ‘community’, the hope here is that individuals will be induced to circulate through the city in new ways producing new ‘shared spaces’.

In addition, the ‘geography of conflict’ has meant that public services have been duplicated as members of one ‘community’ would not access services based in the ‘other community’. The duplication of services is consistently identified as a problem in NI, partially due to its supposed inefficiency (Graham and Nash, 2006) and partially because under the political rationality of ‘shared space’ it is deemed to reinforce patterns of ‘communal division’:

In the context of a drive to create more sustainable communities within Belfast, it is important that planning, in its broadest sense, avoids where possible, reinforcing sectarian territory through locating and facilitating local services, including commercial services, in the geographical heart of 'exclusive' territories. (Gaffikin et al., 2008: 56)

Relocating services, in this context, has been one way of changing patterns of circulation. Gaffikin et al. (2008: 38) go on to suggest that services should be located in “shared spaces” outside “exclusivist territories” and that this may help to “draw people out of their territories into an area that offers a mix of commercial, social, cultural and leisure facilities”. This kind of technique is a way of designing the city in order to change the way people circulate, transforming existing patterns of movement in ways which are seen to undermine the ‘ethnoscape’. There are many examples of this now in Belfast, for example, Stewart’s Town Road Regeneration Project is located between ‘two communities’ as opposed to in the middle of one (Brand, 2009a). A new community centre in Inner-South

106 ‘Social’ versus ‘ethnic’ capital is a further distinction through which the division/diversity axis is translated into policy. The two forms of capital refer to relations across difference and relations which reinforce ‘ethnic’ identities, respectively. This features throughout Morrissey and Gaffikin’s work (e.g. 2008) as well as in policy documents such as Community Engagement, a research report commissioned by Belfast City Council’s Good Relation Unit to develop best practice around good relations work (BCC, 2006).
Belfast provides services for the ‘Protestant community’ of Donegall Pass and the neighbouring ‘Catholic community’ of Lower Ormeau.

The Skainos project also provides examples of transforming patterns of circulation and moving people ‘out of their comfort zones’ (Jordan, interview)\textsuperscript{107}. East Belfast Mission has already begun cooperating with community projects in the Short Strand with the view to creating better links when the Skainos project is completed. Services offered at Skainos will then try to attract service-users from the Short Strand. Cooperation in terms of services is already taking place with regard to labour market inclusion. EBM’s ‘stepping stones’ agency, which supports return to employment, has been working with the Short Strand Community Centre (Mason, interview; O’Donnell, interview)\textsuperscript{108}. Within the Skainos development itself, upon completion, there will be a number of shared services. These will include the development of the ‘stepping stones’ agency itself as well as a ‘family centre’ which will provide, among other things counselling for victims of the conflict and those suffering from post-conflict trauma.

Culture and art as technologies of spatial identification

Belfast’s political movements have long recognised the potential of space in the process of political mobilisation (Murtagh, 2002). As a result, Belfast is today characterised by a huge variety of murals, bunting, flags and painted kerbstones. Often this involves the various national flags or images associated with paramilitary groups. As noted, in the rationality of ‘shared space’ this so-called ‘ethnoscape’ is considered to reinforce ‘communal division’ by fostering forms of exclusionary identification. While in fact many of the images, such as murals, are political rather than ethnic they are all considered to reproduce patterns of ethnic identification\textsuperscript{109}. ‘Shared space’ transforms the symbolic dimension of space, thus eliciting new forms of identification which are congruent with ‘good relations’ and the peace process more generally.

\textsuperscript{107} Glen Jordan is director of the Skainos Unit, for more information see Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{108} Gary Mason is the Chairperson of the board of Skainos Ltd. Gary is also the Superintendent Minister of East Belfast Mission. Joe O’Donnell is a community representative on the Skainos board. For more information see Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{109} For example, there are murals of Che Guevara and the Palestinian struggle (apparently from the first Intifada) in West Belfast. It also seems clear to me that murals of Bobby Sands and many others should not be considered as ethnic.
One programme which is representative here is entitled 'Re-Imaging Communities'. As in the cases of most 'good relations' work, Re-imaging Communities operates by linking together 'local communities', mediators and statutory agencies. In this case the objective is to intervene in community-level spatial identification by "grant fund[ing] the development of community based projects with particular emphasis on the replacement of existing paramilitary murals and other offensive items with new and more positive imagery" (DSD, 2006: 42). The 'new and more positive imagery' referred to here would typically be an image of a local sports hero (or something of the sort) and the objective is not so much to get rid of local expressions of 'identity' but to reformulate those expressions in ways that are thought to promote 'good relations'. Similarly, the Community Cohesion Unit at the Northern Irish Housing Executive, the role of which is to 'translate good relations objectives into actions on the ground', commits to 'consult and support local communities about the removal of sectional symbols' and to 'focus on more acceptable expressions of cultural identity' (NIHE, 2005).

The Carnival Arts Development Project (CADP) further exemplifies attempts to intervene in the symbolic production of space, this time focusing on public performance. This project emerged as an attempt to enhance the role of public performance in 'urban revitalisation' while recognizing the 'contested nature of public performance in Belfast'. Like many of the above mentioned projects, CADP sought to use culture and art to transform attitudes and identities based on a problematization of the NI conflict which understands that conflict in terms of divisive identity:

One of the successes of the project is the role of carnival to transform public performance and contribute to creating a shared public space, based on a civic identity, in a city emerging from three decades of sustained conflict and conflicting identities. (MacBride, 2008: 60, my emphasis)
This intervention embraces difference and promotes diversity by celebrating various identities through “cultural activity which is relevant and inclusive of all of Belfast’s identities, in line with the Good Relations Strategy” (MacBride, 2008: 60).

In the case of Skainos, the ‘newness’ of the ‘urban village’ under construction is seen as an important resource; the absence of existing communal identifications means the space can be used to engender new forms of identification and new relationships. From the point of view of spatial identification, the development is seen as a kind of ‘blank slate’:

The aim from the beginning has been to create a new development or a new street in the Inner-East area that would be untouched by the troubles. So we’ve talked from the beginning of an urban village or this new street, which has never borne a flag or its kerbstones have never been painted, and it afforded an opportunity from the beginning of creating a space that was unmarked. (Jordan, interview, my emphasis)

The ‘civic square’ at the centre of the Skainos development will provide a space for cultural events. It was described by Glen Jordan as “a public space that is programmable” (Jordan, interview). The kinds of events envisaged were described as “events that are not happening anywhere else in this immediate area and are not tied to the historic communities here”, e.g. live concerts, farmers markets and Christmas fairs. The shared space component is explicitly articulated as an alternative to the existing identifications and usages of public space. As Glen Jordan pointed out, the largest public event in that area is the 12th of July celebrations. The “challenge”, according to Glen Jordan, is whether “in the face of all that culture, this space can be different”.

The objective in relation to events held in the civic square is to “fund vehicles that actually contribute to changing the ways people perceive this community.” (Jordan, interview). The events are also thought of as contributing to the “permeability” of a traditionally “enclosed community” (Jordan, interview). By attracting “people from outside in” it is thought that stereotypes and prejudices can be broken down and that the “community” can be “opened up” to “outside influences” (Jordan, interview).
Likewise, the design features of Skainos are oriented towards the creation of space which is familiar and inviting for everyone. For example, there will be a large selection of original art works along one of the prominent walls. The art works will “capture some of the colours of east Belfast” (Jordan, interview) these include a sandstone brick colour typical in Belfast, a sky blue (not that the sky is ever particularly blue in Belfast) and the yellow of the Harland and Wolfe Cranes. Around the corner a separate façade will be designed to recall “folk images and community memories” of the mills (Jordan, interview). A further example is a wet planted area designed to evoke the pre-urbanisation geography of the area, a geography which goes back “long past any of the divisions we’ve imposed on the landscape” (Jordan, interview). Aside from these subtle design strategies, there will be more explicit policies relating to “flags and emblems all that kind of stuff to ensure that this is shared space, signage on the site, all sorts of small and practical ways” (Jordan, interview).

The above are just some examples of a general transformation being pursued in Belfast. When taken together the various projects designed to transform identification amount to a significant enrolment of urban space in the ASF agenda. Gaffikin et al., capture the flavour of this general process in the following quote:

Extension of shared space in Belfast involves the creation of contrasts to the ‘ethnic norm’ via ‘pilots’ of alternatives. Such a strategy is best delivered through a systematic approach based on...incrementalism: that starts with securing the centre and waterfront for integrated living; moves out to tackle the symbols, flags, emblems, and other barriers on arterial routes that mark them as ethnic territory rather than the public peaceful right of way that they should be; and then follows through with the neighbourhoods adjoining the arterial routes. (Gaffikin et al., 2008: x, author’s emphasis)

This is how a gradual change in the symbolic dimension of urban space is to be operationalised. This change is envisioned as transforming the city in order to transform the citizens that inhabit it. The objective is to change the way people identify with a view to changing how they relate across difference. If new forms of identification can be elicited

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113 The cranes of the Harland and Wolfe shipyard loom large in east Belfast. Harland and Wolfe was often seen as a form of employment monopolised by Protestants.

114 East Belfast was home to various types of industrial mills. According to Glen Jordan both ‘communities’ identify with that industrial past.
it is thought that modes of relating across difference can be infused with a liberal multiculturalist ethico-politics defined by tolerance and respect for diversity.

Summary Analysis and Conclusion

In the above discussion of ASF and shared space we can detect a series of political rationalities and technologies which amount to a form of citizenship penetrated by the 'principle of recognition'. This multicultural citizenship is characterised by the mutual recognition of different identities across the 'two communities'. Recognition is linked to identification in a number of respects. Firstly, it is recognition of the identity of the other 'community'. Secondly, recognition, for ASF, is made possible by a form of identification. 'Good relations' problematises 'rigid ethnic identity' in which there is an absolute identification with one's community. This form of identification, according to ASF, leads to violence and the collapse of political institutions in general. In its stead, ASF proposes what we might call a relative identification in which we acknowledge and celebrate our identity as a particular identity which has no universal or transcendental component and hence we can recognise the identity of another community as equally valid and legitimate. This form of identity, based on tolerance, is presented as what will allow NI to 'stay integrated'.

The principle of recognition which underpins multicultural citizenship thus reproduces difference. As Brown (2006) notes, multiculturalism presupposes difference in the very injunction to tolerate. In the case of NI, it is not that 'we' (i.e. the majority community) must tolerate 'the other', but rather that the two communities must tolerate each other, such that each presupposes the difference of the other. The rationalities and technologies of citizenship discussed in this chapter are thus based on a chain of particularisation set off by the notion of mutual recognition. The citizen as subject is not considered universal but particular; the subject's access to citizenship passes through the recognition of their particular identity and not through the suspension of the particular. Herein lies a clear contrast with modern conceptions of citizenship, as indicated when we recall the quote from Weber featured in Chapter 3, which emphasises that under modern citizenship "the individual for once, is not...considered in terms of the particular professional and family position he occupies, not in relation to differences of material and social situation, but
purely *as a citizen*. (Weber quoted in Isin, 2002b: 122; author’s emphasis). In NI, in contrast, it is precisely the empirical ‘differences of social situation’ which define the individual’s relation with citizenship. In this regard, multicultural citizenship operates according to the logic of identification. The only universal dimension to citizenship is the universal principles of tolerance, respect for difference and so forth. As such, it is nothing more than the ‘fatally tautological’ universality of the injunction to recognise and tolerate particularities. Such a pseudo-universal dimension is predicated on the logic of identification.

It is also important to recall that according to ASF, as well as numerous policy documents and academic articles on shared space, the stability of NI qua polity depends upon multicultural citizenship, i.e. the cultivation of a new and tolerant mode of relating across difference. Tolerance is required for NI to ‘stay integrated’. In this sense the very possibility of the polity is founded on the logic of identification and the evacuation of any universality from the citizenry.

At this point the parallels between the political rationality of multicultural citizenship and the meta-political rationality of multicultural sovereignty can be addressed. Both rationalities are founded on a principle of recognition which founds a specific form of state universality (the multicultural universal) and which at the same time particularises the population or citizenry. This is an important observation when we consider that forms of governmentality, such as technologies of citizenship, have generally been conceptualised in the literature as a ‘process without an outside’, i.e. as mobile sets of force relations which do not refer to an authority, power or structure above or beyond them. In contrast, my analysis indicates that the technologies of citizenship investigated here can be conceptualised as modes of subjectification which inscribe the subject within the symbolic regime of the state, in the specific sense of the mode of the symbolic production of state universality. Technologies of citizenship are thus linked to another level of power, the meta-political level, in which the question of the intelligibility of the state qua public power is at stake. This touches upon the notion of ‘double-inscription’ described in Chapter 3, the symbolic regime of the state is inscribed at the level of subjectivity as the subject is inscribed in the symbolic regime of the state.
Finally, I would now like to develop some of these arguments in relation to the international literature on multiculturalism and depoliticisation. Brown (2006) is representative of a broader critique of multiculturalism (e.g. Goldberg, 1994; in NI see Rolston, 1998; Chan, 2006), in that she argues that the key to depoliticisation is the ‘culturalisation of politics’. Such a critique of depoliticisation, however, rests on a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘culture’, a distinction which involves a more or less explicit reduction of ‘politics’ to questions of access to material resources and state power (Butler, 1998). On a theoretical level, which I will discuss further in the concluding chapter, I have a difficulty with such a position because it seems to rely on a conceptual distinction between culture and politics, a distinction which posits both concepts as specific social domains, one which is political and another which is not. Moreover, and with specific reference to NI, ‘good relations’ is not limited to ‘cultural groups’. While I have emphasised throughout this chapter that ‘good relations’ is an identitarian regime it is important that identity not be conflated with ‘culture’, but is understood, rather, as a mode of representation in which the integrity of the subject is grounded on some empirical characteristic or signifier, as indicated in Chapter 1. ‘Good relations’ specifically includes ‘political groups’ within such a mode of representation, and this is a key feature of the legislative mechanisms upon which it is based, section 75 (2) of the NI Act:

(2) Without prejudice to its obligations under subsection (1), a public authority shall in carrying out its functions relating to Northern Ireland have regard to the desirability of promoting good relations between persons of different religious belief, political opinion or racial group. (My emphasis)

Likewise, ASF contends that it is “necessary to accommodate the range of ideologies and interests of the long-resident communities in Northern Ireland” (OFMDFM, 2005: 32, my emphasis). In practice while there are a large amount of governmental interventions which are focused on a more cultural conception of identity or ethnicity (Finlay, 2010; McVeigh and Roslton, 2007), similar technologies are also undertaken with regard to groups defined as ‘Loyalist’ and ‘Republican’. These technologies operate on those groups as ‘political’ actors. What we see, then, is less the ‘culturalisation of politics’ than the extension of multicultural rationalities and technologies to ‘politics’. The moment of depoliticisation, I argue, is best conceptualised not as shift from ‘politics’ to ‘culture’, but rather in terms of
the logic of identification, conceptualised as a specific mode of imagining the subject, be it 'cultural' or 'political'. What makes this possible is the particularisation unleashed by the principle of recognition. Let us recall here the analysis of sovereignty laid out in the foregoing chapter. The mode of sovereignty which constitutes the polity and founds the authority of the NI state is characterised by the subordination of national sovereignty to the principle of recognition and the related reduction of national political positions to a particular identity. This transformation lays the ground for the deployment of multicultural technologies that govern ‘Loyalists’ and ‘Republicans’ as particular identitarian communities. I return to some of these issues in the concluding chapter.

On this basis, I would argue that the central problem with multiculturalism in NI goes beyond the ‘culturalisation of politics’. In the case of NI we see that multiculturalism is extended to ‘politics’ itself, a transformation linked to a novel form of multicultural citizenship. Depoliticisation is thus more precisely conceptualised as in terms of a rationality and technology which forecloses any universal dimension of citizenship.
Conclusion

Introduction

In this concluding chapter I want to give an overview of my analysis and bring together the different elements. I also want to set out what I consider the contribution of this thesis to be. Finally, I will make some suggestions about the implications of my research. I begin by discussing the three axes of my thesis in the following order: citizenship, sovereignty, and historical depoliticisation. I then go on to outline the contribution of my work in relation to contemporary social and political theory. Specifically I address how my work contributes to international literature on the relationship between politics, identification and contemporary forms of power. This literature includes multicultural concerns with depoliticisation and identification; work on post-politics; and theories of ‘imperial’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000) and ‘transnational’ (Papadopoulos et al., 2008) sovereignty. In the final section I look at some potential political implications suggested by my research with reference to existing research on the relationship between identity and politics in Ireland.

Citizenship

In the foregoing chapter, I have presented an investigation of citizenship which reveals a set of rationalities and technologies that inscribe the principle of recognition at the level of subjectivity. The form of citizenship at work within the rationality of ‘A Shared Future’ and ‘shared space’ links the very possibility of the polity, of political community, to the recognition of the particularity of the other. I have also analysed a variety of technologies designed to foster this recognition by cultivating forms of ‘relative identification’ in which we recognise that we have our particular identity and the other has theirs, and that they are both equal as particular identities. In short, this form of citizenship is founded on the ‘principle of recognition’, which is in turn predicated on the logic of identification. The citizen as subject is not considered universal but particular; the subject’s access to citizenship passes through the recognition of their particular identity rather than through the suspension of the particular. We can contrast such a conception of citizenship with the modern one, under which, as described by Weber, “the individual for once, is not...considered in terms of the particular professional and family position he occupies,
not in relation to differences of material and social situation, but purely as a citizen”.
(Weber quoted in Isin, 2002b: 122; author’s emphasis). In NI, in contrast, it is precisely
the empirical differences of social positioning and of identity which ground the subject’s
access to citizenship. In addition to the particularisation inherent in this multicultural
citizenship, the only universal dimension is the universal injunction to ‘respect
particularities’ (Badiou, 2006).

We can see the huge gulf between this multicultural citizenship and the political practices
of the CRM discussed in Chapter 5. If the technologies of citizenship at work in
contemporary NI inscribe the subject in the symbolic regime of the state and do so in a
manner which forecloses universality, or the contestation and politicisation of universality,
the CRM proposed a very different conception of the relationship between subject and
state. The CRM is characterised by a prescriptive politics in which a subjectivity outside
the state advances and enforces egalitarian prescriptions against the state. The relationship
between subject, or rather subjectivity, and the state is here characterised by antagonism
and excess. It is the movement’s antagonistic, excessive relationship with the state, as well
as, crucially, the fact that it contests the universality of the state, that accounts for its
transformative potential. This is a long way from the vacuous mutual recognition of
particularity that, while celebrated as a ‘triumph of citizenship’ (for example, by Delanty,
2004), is in fact a triumph of the state.

Sovereignty
Unlike many existing accounts of technologies of citizenship (Rose, 1999; Cruikshank,
1994), I theorise a relationship between citizenship and sovereignty, where the later is
conceptualised as a meta-political rationality which addresses the very possibility of
authoritative government. Moreover, I identify a consistency between sovereignty and
citizenship in relation to the principle of recognition. In the case of sovereignty, I theorise
this in terms of a multicultural sovereignty which reconstructs the universality of the state
and the identity of the polity by recognising the ‘parity of esteem’ of each national
community and their competing visions of national sovereignty. This recognition functions
to align sovereignty and the state with the ‘empty point of universality’ from which
particular identities can be recognised. Because the ‘people’ as sovereign subject is
explicitly subordinated to the principle of recognition, the two 'national communities' are reduced to particular identities. Moreover, recognition of the different particularities is presented as the key to the integrity of the polity, as the glue which holds it together. The state, by aligning itself with recognition, monopolises the 'empty point of universality' and identifies itself with the possibility of the polity.

Both the meta-political rationality of sovereignty and the more everyday rationalities and technologies of citizenship thus operate according to a multicultural principle of recognition which reflects a shared mode for the construction of state universality. Rather than the negation of difference under the false universality of the people, we find here that the recognition of difference, in the sense of different 'national communities', becomes the mode in which state universality is staged. Consequently, I theorise the post-conflict NI state as a properly multicultural state. By this I mean that multicultural recognition is not a policy fix or a strategically deployed discourse, but the logic which founds the idea of the state, the universality of the state and, hence, the power of the state.

I have also argued throughout this thesis that we can conceptualise the above in terms of depoliticisation because of the way the NI state permanently appropriates universality and particularises the polity. It is the state itself, rather than the people or any other subject, which is represented as the guarantor of recognition and therefore the only agency capable of maintaining the integrity of the state and polity. This is not up for contestation, a fact which is reflected in the field of political representation. This field is reduced to factional interests via the elimination of the 'place of the people'. Just as the citizen can never rise above their particular identity, political groups participating in the field of political representation can not rise above the status of a faction. If we follow Lefort's conception of democracy as a political regime in which universality is contestable from within the polity, the form of sovereignty and state-politics established by the GFA cannot be considered properly democratic.

Summarising what has been said thus far, I present an analysis here of the NI state in terms of a multicultural mode of constructing state universality via the particularising recognition of each national community in a manner which forecloses the contestation of
universality within the polity. This is the analysis I have developed of the contemporary NI state, but what of the process of transformation leading to this state form? As discussed in Chapter 5 in particular, I approach this as a historical process of depoliticisation.

**Historical depoliticisation**

Comparing the multicultural state discussed above with the politics of the CRM puts in to focus what is at stake in the process of depoliticisation traced in this research. In Chapter 5 I argued that the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ constructs a kind of void in sovereignty, a space outside the state. This is expressed most clearly in the fact that the movement claims spaces which are autonomous from the state and into which the police can not enter. It is also expressed in the demands launched from the barricades which effectively call for the abolition of the state. ‘Free Derry’ disperses state power and does so explicitly on the basis that the state is not universal, that it does not represent everyone and hence lacks authority and legitimacy. This moment of anti-sovereignty is, again, characterised by an excessive, antagonistic subjectivity, a subjectivity which transcends the identitarian categories of the Orange State, operating in a space beyond the symbolic regime of the state. My analysis of the political singularity of the CRM, as manifested in instances such as the Battle of the Bogside, indicates that the dominance of the logic of identification was neither natural nor inevitable. In this sense, a further important element of this research has been to approach the logic of identification as a *process*. In this regard, I have traced the logic of identification historically, and in doing so I have found that today’s NI state can be situated in a historical process of depoliticisation.

My analysis of the historical process of depoliticisation centres on the emergence of the logic of identification *within* the movement. In this regard my work differs from other accounts of the role of identity in NI politics which focus on state-led identitarian strategies (Finlay, 2010; McVeigh and Rolston, 2007). The concepts of ‘political singularity’ and the ‘point’ are the axes around which my analysis turns. I conceptualise the political singularity of the CRM by examining the way its politics of prescription summons a subjectivity which is subtracted from the sectarian divisions that characterised the Orange State. Through these prescriptions, and the CRM’s development of the
consequences of the prescriptions, a conflict was set in motion in which the question of state universality was at stake. During the early period (1968-69) the movement more or less successfully presents itself as being ‘on the side of universality’, as opposed to the state which finds itself more and more identified with sectarianism. By analysing first-hand accounts and leaflets and pamphlets from the period, and by situating these by drawing on existing research, I go beyond more familiar accounts which tend to reduce the CRM to the ‘Catholic minority’s’ quest for recognition of their identity. In contrast, my contention is that the CRM evinces a universal subjectivity and an experimental politics that points beyond the logic of identification.

Having grasped the political singularity of the CRM, I was then able to clearly detect and analyse the political shift which took place as the Provisional Republican movement came to dominance (1970-72). This is the ‘point’ at which the universal subjectivity of the CRM collapses into the logic of identification at work within the nation-statist politics of the ‘Provos’. An analysis of the initial publications of the Provisional IRA demonstrates that their politics ‘summoned’ a subject (the Irish people) which is founded on the logic of identification, and that, moreover, they conceived the political expression of that subject in the form of the state. As the logic of identification emerged as the dominant way of imagining politics among those involved in mobilisations against the NI state and later the British state, an interface was opened up between the state and the political subjectivity of the oppositional movement. It is this interface which would ultimately make possible the recognition of the claim to Irish national sovereignty and the identity upon which it is founded, a recognition which, as argued above and throughout, would be fundamental to the reconstruction of state universality.

My approach to the task of tracing this historical process of depoliticisation draws on the work of Neocosmos (2009b; 1998) and Russo (2006), two Badiouian sociologists of social movements and depoliticisation who show that depoliticisation is a complex process and not simply a state strategy. Indeed, it seems as if many NI commentators are not willing to entertain the possibility that a movement which fights the state can be depoliticising, perhaps because such a position would involve criticism of the Provisional Republican movement. Over the last 30 years most leftist and critical thinkers have refused to attack
the Provisional IRA because to do so would be to effectively side with the British state. But the simple insight that fighting the state can be depoliticising permits a new reading of the relationship between identification and depoliticisation in NI.

**Contribution to Social and Political Theory**

In this section I will discuss the contribution my research can make in relation to contemporary international literature on the relationship between the logic of identification, or simply identity, and contemporary forms of power and command. More specifically, there are three relevant bodies of literature. First of all, there is what I will call the literature on multiculturalism. However, such a title could be misleading and requires clarification. This is because multiculturalism, as noted by many, is a "maddeningly spongy and imprecise discursive field" (Stuart Hall quoted in Lentin and Titley, 2011: 11). Moreover, I am not concerned with multicultural policies or discourses in general, but more specifically with the set of relationships between identity, universality, politics and depoliticisation, relationships which raise questions that are at once both more specific and more general than those suggested by the term multiculturalism. Consequently, I focus on the literature in which these four themes are at stake. The second body of literature addressed is work around 'post-politics'. This term, introduced by Zizek (1999), refers to the manifold ways in which our political present is characterised by the collapse of ideological conflict and the ascendancy of a consensual and technocratic form of governance. The literature on post-politics contends that the rise of consensual technocracy is related to the demise of the subject of the people and characterised by the logic of identification. In this regard, this literature touches on three themes of direct relevance to my research: the end of the people, the logic of identification and depoliticisation. The final body of research I hope to contribute to is the international literature on new forms of post-national or trans-national sovereignty. I will discuss how my work both supports and challenges Hardt and Negri's (2000) notion of 'Imperial sovereignty' and Papadopoulos et al.'s (2008) work on 'transnational sovereignty'. As with the work of Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al., my research indicates that new relationships between power and difference have emerged to re-incorporate the political subjectivities associated with 1968. However, my research indicates that, in contrast to the post- or extra-state configurations described by Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al., in NI the state and specifically the
universality of the state, is at the centre of the incorporation and depoliticisation of the political subjectivities of 1968. The following discussion serves to situate this thesis within the above mentioned bodies of literature as well as to elaborate upon the argument presented thus far.

**Multiculturalism and depoliticisation**

One of the most important contributions of my research relates to the task of debunking the myth that ‘minority’ struggles are necessarily struggles for recognition. The argument, or more often the statement, that the struggles of subaltern groups in the 1960’s and 1970’s revolved around the recognition of identity has become an article of faith in the multiculturalist literature (excluding the literature critical of multiculturalism of course, e.g. Hesse, 1999; Goldberg, 1994; Lentin, 2006.). For instance, the two classic multiculturalist interventions, Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship* and Taylor’s *The Politics of Recognition*, make this claim. In NI, where the assumptions and underpinnings of liberal multiculturalism have been of great influence (Rolston, 1998; Finlay, 2004), the most influential writers consider the CRM and later the Republican movement to be essentially struggles for recognition (e.g. O’Leary and McGarry, 1995). Indeed this claim constitutes a central plank of the narrative of the peace process and hence of the post-conflict state. The salience of this claim rests, it seems to me, on a certain ambiguity with regard to the nature of the CRM. This ambiguity relates to the fact that the subjectivity summoned by the politics of the CRM manifests primarily in people living in ‘Catholic communities’, thus giving the movement a ‘Catholic’ composition. Here we find a familiar paradox: a universal politics is enunciated by a particular subject (Hesse, 1999). If we take, for example, the Battle of the Bogside it is understandable that observers may consider this struggle as a ‘Catholic struggle’, given that it occurred in a neighbourhood which was majority Catholic. The difficulty here is that the empirical categories which structure the situation (i.e. Catholic and Protestant) obscure the political subjectivisation at stake. It is necessary to think beyond the signifiers which position an individual or collective subject in order to grasp the fundamentally universal potentiality which is operative within the political singularity of the CRM. My research troubles the perspective which naturalises identity by undertaking a sustained engagement with the subjective political singularity which was operative in the politics and practices of the CRM, thus providing an
engagement often missing from multiculturalist accounts. First and foremost we must emphasise that the demands of the CRM, its prescriptions on the state, presuppose a universal subjectivity founded on the axiom that everyone is equal. In this regard the political relationship between subjectivity and state is not founded on the state's inclusion of an empirical subject by recognising the identity that grounds that subject qua collective subject (as the multiculturalists would have us believe). There is no empirical evidence whatsoever that the CRM was concerned with the state recognition of the identity of the Catholic or Irish nationalist 'community'. The demands of the movement make this abundantly clear: one man, one vote; build more social housing; abolish the Special Powers Act; disarm the RUC; abolish the B-Specials and, ultimately, abolish the parliament. If on an empirical level most participants in the CRM were Catholic, on a political level the subject of the CRM is what Ranciere would call an agent of declassification, because it is a subject which is defined precisely by the attempt to subtract politics from the empirical and sectarian classifications which defined NI. What is at stake here is a political subjectivity which is generated within an antagonistic prescription on the state, a subjectivity which is as such excessive to the state and to the identitarian categories which constitute the symbolic regime of the state. The investigation of the singularity of the CRM presented here, then, is both an important theoretical and empirical contribution to research into NI's 1968 (and as such 1968 and subaltern struggles more generally) and an important critical rebuttal to the multiculturalist commonplace that "national minorities...want far reaching institutional recognition of their national identity". (McGarry, 2001:127)

In this regard, there are echoes between my own work and Papadopoulos et al.'s (2008) broader analysis of the relationship between subaltern revolt and post-war nation-states in the global North Atlantic societies. For Papadopoulos et al. (2008: 15) those struggles "pointed in a direction which would radically surpass the oppressive national social compromise which existed at that time". This dimension of subaltern struggle, as noted above, has largely been obscured within academic literature, not least in NI. Alana Lentin argues:

Current scholarly preoccupations with "culture" and "identity" as almost the sole means of conceiving both of societal positionings and of the struggle of
As Lentin goes on to argue, Charles Taylor’s (1994) recycling of Fanon is paradigmatic here. Taylor covers over the subtle negotiation of universality in Fanon’s thought, thus reducing it to the ‘politics of recognition’ (Lentin, 2006). In this context my engagement with the CRM takes on a critical importance. I aim to retrieve a mode of political subjectivisation which is very much at odds with the existing scholarly reduction of that struggle to reified categories which obscure the significance of NI’s 1968. This task, as indicated already, represents important critical work in the sense that it challenges the multicultural state’s self-representation as the enlightened answer to the demands of minorities. But it is also important to the extent that it contributes to the reconstruction of what Badiou often calls ‘the last great political sequence’ (the global ’68) and to understanding an important instance of the struggle of human beings for equality, the struggle of the ‘communist hypothesis’ (Badiou, 2010). Each experiment in this struggle must be remembered and analysed. As Bruno Bosteels argues, we must “actively continue to historicize the communist hypothesis” by investigating “different sequences of the communist hypothesis in a strictly immanent determination, with all this entails in terms of assessment of failures, and of the legacy of unsolved problems handed down from one sequence to the other”. (Bosteels, 2011: 59)

The second area of research and theory to which I hope to contribute in relation to multiculturalism and the ‘politics of difference’ relates to my analysis of the contemporary NI state. Here I turn to the relationship between identification and depoliticisation at stake in today’s forms of state and power. As noted at several points throughout this thesis there is an existing body of literature which highlights the depoliticising nature of the contemporary NI state’s identitarian strategies. Such critiques go back to the beginning of the peace process, most notably Bill Rolston’s critique of the ‘hegemony’ of liberal multicultural discourse (Rolston, 1998; see also Chan, 2006). A similar concern is also to be found in Rolston’s later work with McVeigh (McVeigh and Rolston, 2007) and in more Foucauldian inspired critiques of the way in which identitarian constructions foreclose and exclude alternative subjectivities (Finlay, 2010; Whitaker, 2004; Zalewski, 2006; Edkins,
Much of this literature, in particular Rolston, McVeigh and Chan, draws on the critical international literature on multiculturalism, a central contention of which is that multiculturalism represents a ‘culturalisation of politics’, and hence a form of depoliticisation (Goldberg, 1994, Lentin 2006; Lentin and Titley, 2011). In the case of NI, and internationally, those critical of multiculturalism have tended to focus on the displacement of ‘political and economic’ matters via discourses that invoke cultural positioning. A similar critique has been advanced in some of the literature on peace agreements and conflict resolution. For instance, Jabri (2011: 61) argues that “Culture is used in the inscription of individuals and populations, so that articulations of political grievance and opposition are translated into issues relating to cross-cultural communication.” (See also Jabri, 2007, especially Chapter 5).

On a theoretical level, as noted briefly in the conclusion of Chapter 7, this line of critique seems to be inadequately developed. For example, Goldberg (1994: 14) argues that “managed multiculturalism” has “served to cover (up) the political and economic roots of [racial] marginalisation”. He advances a conception of politics which includes “three interrelated forms”; questions of “representation” but also “the politics of the state apparatus, the struggle over the distribution of institutionalized powers and its material effects” as well as “local issues of mobilization and social movements around material resources, power and opportunities” (Goldberg, 1994: 29). While Goldberg acknowledges that these forms are “interrelated”, his critique of depoliticisation is founded on a conceptual distinction between them as he invokes the reduction of “the political to questions about symbolic representation” (Goldberg, 1994: 29). I do not wish to argue here that Goldberg does not appreciate the centrality of symbolic representation to the state (an appreciation which is clearly demonstrated in other work, e.g. Goldberg, 2002), but rather that his critique of depoliticisation rests on an insufficiently elaborated distinction between politics and culture which risks positing an artificial separation between symbolic representation, one the one hand, and the state and economy, on the other. As Lentin and Titley (2011: 26) argue, the critique of culturalisation should avoid an “artificial divide between ‘identity politics’ and political economy” (see also Judith Butler’s (1998) critique of the distinction between political economy and symbolic representation). Staying for the moment at a theoretical level, my own contention is that the philosophical interventions of
Ranciere and Badiou, which seldom make explicit reference to multiculturalism, provide a conceptual framework which allows us to refine what is at stake in terms of depoliticisation in relation to difference and identity. Most significantly, they provide a conceptualization of politics as a subjectivisation which ruptures the categories and possibilities inscribed in the world as it appears, and the appearance of the world is always a matter of representation. Politics, in this reading, depends on a subjective excess which points beyond existing representations, thus holding out the potential of the radical transformation of our world. This approach allows us to clearly distinguish between what Ranciere calls the logic of political subjectivisation and the logic of identification, and this means we can develop a critique of depoliticisation and identification without working with the unwieldy distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘politics’. It allows us, for instance, to account for the fact that a trade union can be just as depoliticised as an African drumming workshop. One of the contributions of this thesis, then, has been to develop a Badiouian and Rancierian conception of politics/depoliticisation in the interrogation of a concrete instance of what we might call multicultural depoliticisation. And I hope that this contribution might be useful in other contexts.

Moving to a more empirical level, my engagement with the philosophy of Ranciere and Badiou was initially provoked by the inadequacy of the ‘culturalisation of politics’ approach in terms of critiquing the NI state and the peace process. There are a number of senses in which that approach falls short. First of all, my research on sovereignty revealed that while the GFA does recognize the ‘identity’ of ‘both communities’ it also recognizes their claims to national sovereignty. This means, for example, that it recognizes the legitimacy of the Irish Republican vision of the relationship between authority, legitimacy, territory, state and political subjectivity. While Irish Republicanism is founded on the logic of identification, it would clearly be insufficient to dismiss the recognition of Irish sovereignty as ‘cultural’. Similarly, this recognition is not merely rhetorical; each ‘national community’ is incorporated within the state, including the power-sharing Executive. While it has been argued that “tolerance, rather than, say, equality, emancipation, or power sharing, becomes a basic term in the vocabulary describing and prescribing for conflicts rendered as cultural” (Brown, 2006: 151, my emphasis), in NI we see that tolerance operates in conjunction with, and indeed underpins, power sharing.
At the level of citizenship we find, again, that the recognition of identity proceeds hand-in-glove with the recognition of the more ‘political’ dimension of the conflict. As noted in Chapter 7, Section 75 (2) of the NI Act, the legislative basis of A Shared Future (ASF), stipulates that public authorities promote ‘good relations’ between persons of ‘different religious belief, political opinion or racial group’. ASF itself, as cited in Chapter 7, highlights the importance of accommodating the ‘range of ideologies’ across NI’s ‘two communities’. In this sense, the rationalities and technologies of ASF, seem to traverse the fields of ‘culture’ and ‘politics’. What emerged in my research, then, was not so much the reduction of politics to culture, but the extension of multiculturalism to ‘politics’, or, more specifically, the extension of multicultural techniques for managing relations between groups to ‘political’ as well as ‘cultural’ groups. In this context, it was necessary to rework the concept of depoliticisation in order to approach the question from another angle. As such, my research developed into a very different approach to the relationship between identification and depoliticisation. In addition to developing a Rancierian/Badiouian conception of depoliticisation in order to move beyond the argument that ‘cultural’ discourses were “invoked to solve problems that previously were the province of economics and politics” (Yudice quoted in Lentin and Titley, 2011: 189), I began to highlight the relationship between depoliticisation and the state. I investigated the way in which the logic of identification can be conceptualised in terms of depoliticisation by researching the way in which the universality of the state is silently staged at the level of sovereignty and citizenship. This meant bringing together Ranciere’s critique of the logic of identification, Badiou’s understanding of the relationship between the state, universality and politics, and the critique of multicultural depoliticisation in order to pin point the intersection of particularity, universality and depoliticisation. In doing so, my aim has been to provide a more comprehensive and coherent critique of depoliticisation with regard to the contemporary NI state and to provide the fullest critical theorisation of the ways in which the contemporary NI state erodes democracy and the very possibility of politics.

Post-politics

Multiculturalism is not the only research area in which the relationship between identification and depoliticisation has been critically addressed. The literature around post-
politics represents a more recent but equally rich body of work. The term post-politics was coined by Zizek (1999) but is largely based on Ranciere’s critique of the ‘dead end’ of contemporary politics. For Ranciere, the politics of the people has been eroded and undermined by the identitarian interpolation of the population in various guises. Under post-politics the figure of the ‘people’ is increasingly sidelined (Ranciere, 2007). Governments no longer claim to represent the people but rather aim towards the recognition of all of the different interest/identity groups and a consensual collaboration between them (Zizek, 1999; Ranciere, 1998; 2007; Swyngedouw, 2009). Ideological division has given way to a pragmatic and consensual approach which is defined by the objectivist definition of common problems, the inclusion of the parties which circulate around the problem and the production of a consensualist and technocratic solution:

In post-politics, the conflict between global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists...) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasises the need to leave old ideological divisions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account. (Zizek, 1999: 198)

This form of interpolation can be conceptualised as post-political (which is to say depoliticising) in the sense that it forecloses in advance the possibility of a universal subjectivisation around a given conflict.

An illustrative example here relates to ‘participative governance’, which Swynegdouw characterises as “a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement and technocratic management.” (Swynegdouw, 2009: 1). Such strategies involve networks which weave together state and non-state actors oriented around a pre-identified problem. The network is founded on the pre-definition of the problem in the pragmatic terms of the ‘lack of a solution’ and involving the reduction of the issue at hand to a particularity (e.g. the lack of skills among the long-term unemployed) and the pre-identification of the subjects of the network or the ‘stakeholders’ (Swynegdouw, 2009). The groups which circulate around a given problem are interpolated into ‘participative’
mechanisms for the resolution of that problem. The state thus recognises the diversity of the population in identitarian terms and deploys mechanisms which can operate within that diversity, building alliances, drawing connections, incorporating different groups, linking together various actors. The consensus is a ‘minimal’ one: we only have to accept that the problem is a concrete issue relating to a specific social actor or phenomenon of an empirical variety. And yet, from a Rancierian or Badiouian perspective, the core of politics is lost the moment we enter this ‘minimal consensus’.

By the very fact of recognising the ‘problem’ as an empirical ‘lack’ and the actors as particularised ‘stakeholders’ we foreclose politics (Zizek, 1999).

While contemporary forms of governance are frequently cited in the literature on post-politics, both Ranciere and, especially, Zizek (1999; 2008) indicate that the identitarian interpolation of cultural minorities is the paradigmatic form of post-politics. In the following quote summarising the political impasse of our post-political present, Ranciere conceptualises the two key modes of the logic of identification:

Now for me the current dead end of political reflection and action is due to the identification of politics with the self of a community. This may be in the big community or in smaller ones; it may be the identification of the process of governing with the principle of the community under the heading of universality, the reign of the law, liberal democracy, and so on. Or it may be, on the contrary, the claim for identity on the part of so-called minorities against the hegemonic law of the ruling culture or identity. (Ranciere, 1992: 59, author’s emphasis)

In the above Ranciere identifies two forms in which depoliticisation operates, both of which are characterised by the logic of identification. On the one hand there is the ‘big community’. Here he refers to the classic mode in which the liberal state identifies itself with the polity but obscures the identitarian community which underpins that polity via the false universality of law and progress. In this mode the ‘dead end’ of politics takes the form of the state’s alignment with the ‘big community’, in other words the people or the polity. On the other hand, we have the ‘small community’, the identification of politics with the recognition of ‘minorities’ who are excluded from the false universality of the

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115 I take the idea of a ‘minimal consensus’ and its relation to contemporary governance from Patrick Bresnihan, currently conducting PhD research at the Trinity College Dublin.
‘big community’. The overall argument of the critics of post-politics is that there is a general tendency for the logic of the ‘small community’ to overtake the logic of the ‘big community’, or that the politics of the people is giving way to a multitude of mechanisms through which the identitarian interpolation of the population is eroding any possibility for the universalisation of political struggle.

At first glance it may appear that my own research supports such a claim, given my concern with the recognition of the ‘two communities’ and the way in which this forecloses the contestation of universality. However, on closer inspection my research suggests a somewhat more complex analysis. While the NI state is indeed characterised by the proliferation of the logic of identification, I also argue that this occurs in a manner which reconstructs the universality of the state and the identity of the polity. In this sense, my argument is that the NI state combines and integrates both forms of the logic of identification described by Ranciere in the above quote. The universality of the state and polity and the recognition of diverse identities do not stand in contrast here, as they do for Ranciere and for many writers critical of post-politics. Rather, the recognition of particular identities is the very mode in which the identity of the ‘big community’ is established. As such, with reference to NI, and paraphrasing Ranciere, I would argue that the current dead end of politics consists in the establishment of the ‘big community’ under the heading of universality via the recognition of the identity of ‘small communities’. The big community is constructed through the counting of the small communities as one, on the basis of the principle of recognition. As is the case with the critical literature on multiculturalism and depoliticisation, I draw on research and theory around post-politics in conceptualising and investigating depoliticisation in contemporary NI. However, in researching the NI case, a case in which the broad transformation of the state is at stake, I develop the notion of depoliticisation in relation to the construction of state universality at stake in sovereignty and citizenship, and as such, in the construction of the ‘idea of the state’. This constitutes a contribution both to the analysis of the NI state and to literature on post-politics.

**Transnational and imperial sovereignty**

The final body of contemporary political theory to which this thesis can contribute deals with critical analyses of contemporary global forms of sovereignty and command, in
particular the work of Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al., already discussed in Chapter 2. My contribution here rests on the continuing importance of state universality and constitutional sovereignty, even as we confront new and global mechanisms oriented towards the recognition and incorporation of difference. Like Ranciere, Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004; 2009, see also Negri 2008) and Papadopoulos et al. (2008) tend to juxtapose the form of universality of the modern liberal nation-state with today’s mechanisms for the recognition and integration of new (or newly salient) subjectivities. In Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al.’s work this juxtaposition is expressed in terms of national constitutional sovereignty, on the one hand, and a multiplicity of networked governmental mechanisms for the management of difference, on the other. The specific components of Hardt and Negri’s and Papadopoulos et al.’s analysis can be summarised as follows. First of all, today’s forms of power operate “in the absence of any pre-defined authority” (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 33). In this sense they are “post-constitutional” (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 33), i.e. there is no moment in which sovereign power constitutes itself as the explicit source of authority. This “deinstitutionalisation” (Hardt and Negri, 2009) takes shape via the proliferation of ad hoc modes of governmentality which expediently manage emerging conflicts and antagonisms. In this context, the symbolic integrity of the state, once guaranteed by the figure of the people, collapses (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 344). The state “ceases to act as representing itself, it splits itself” (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 32) and becomes interwoven with extra-state agencies above, below and beyond the state in an expanding network composed of “nodes and lines, no beginning or end” (Papadopoulos et al., 2008: 21). In all this, and again as discussed in Chapter 2, Hardt and Negri and Papadopoulos et al. discern a foundational rupture with the nation-state and the emergence of a new network of global command.

In many ways my work supports these arguments. My investigation of the NI state reveals a ‘post-people’ regime for the management of difference and conflict via the recognition and incorporation of identities, a process which is made possible by the surpassing of the symbolic regime of the nation and the specific relation to identity/alterity which characterised that regime. To an extent, then, this thesis is an empirical-theoretical contribution to theories of ‘imperial’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000) or ‘transnational’ (Papadopoulos et al., 2008) sovereignty. However, my work also suggests a note of
caution here. As already argued, my research identifies and theorises a process in which
the recognition of difference is precisely the mode in which a constitutional sovereignty
takes shape, one which undertakes the crucial representational work of establishing both
the identity of the polity and the universality of the state. The recognition (rather than
negation) of difference is indeed at the heart of transformations in NI, but this has taken a
sovereign and constitutional form which reconstructs the state’s monopoly on universality.
This thesis thus suggests that the universality of the state, the identity of the polity and
constitutional forms of sovereignty are of continuing importance. This means that as well
as developing conceptual tools sensitive to post-state forms of power and command, we
must also re-develop concepts through which to critique older questions around state
universality. My theoretical work on sovereignty, in particular, contributes to this broader
task.

However, my research also uncovered a number of tendencies which suggest that the NI
state is embedded in a transnational institutional network which might be seen to usurp
some of the ground traditionally associated with the state. There are two central ways in
which this is occurring. First of all, the GFA itself provides for transnational institutions,
the North-South and East-West axes. These institutions can readily be understood in
terms of multicultural sovereignty: they are an institutional expression of the recognition
of each national community. On the other hand, and perhaps more interestingly,
governance is certainly characterised by a network of local and transnational actors. The
Skainos project is itself a good example here. The agencies which make up that project
include local (EBM), transnational (EU; International Fund for Ireland); Statutory
(Department for Social Development) and Quangos (Oaklee Housing Association). This is
certainly not an isolated example (Morison, 2000; Knox, 2010). Andrew Finlay’s (2010)
research on governmentality and the NI peace process provides further indications of the
significance of forms of government ‘beyond the state’. In this regard, the investigation of
the relationship between the multicultural state and governmental networks beyond the
state constitutes an important area of further research.

116 These are quasi-parliamentary fora which bring together elected representatives from the different
jurisdictions to promote cooperation in certain areas of policy, including agriculture, transport and a number
of others. For more information see Appendix C.
Identity and Exclusion in Contemporary NI

Before concluding this chapter, I want to address some of the issues around the implications of the new relationship between power and difference suggested by my analysis. Throughout this thesis I have described the way in which the NI state is founded on the logic of identification, particularly in terms of the recognition of the ‘two national communities’. Given the rich critical literature on the relationship between identity and exclusion, it is pertinent to ask what forms of exclusion might be at stake under the new NI state. Indeed there is already an important body of work on this issue. Existing research in the Irish context indicates that, in relation to the peace process, a proliferating logic of identification is resulting in new interconnections between difference, power and exclusion. Two examples stand out here. First of all, there has been a clear, and often state-sanctioned, attempt to foster an ethnic underpinning to Unionist/protestant identity (Finaly, 2010). Whereas Protestant/Unionist identity has typically been more closely associated with modernisation, progress etc. (Nic Craith, 2003; Finlay, 2001) today we can see the emergence of a more essentialist view of Ulster Protestant identity, for example the attempt to revive the Ulster-Scots dialect. Andrew Finlay argues that a form of normative ethnicity has become hegemonic, such that ambivalence, other ways of being and other forms of politics are denied. Other research supports this claim by focusing on the way in which concerns around gender and non-heteronormative sexualities are excluded from state-politics (Whitaker, 2004, Edkins, 2006). The second example is that of Irish citizenship (of the Republic), which was subject to a referendum in 2004, a referendum which linked Irish citizenship for the first time to blood or Jus Sanguinis (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006; Lentin, 2007; Finlay, 2004)\(^{117}\). In other words, there was a clear shift to frame Irishness in essentialist and primordial terms. This referendum was largely a response to the GFA because of the way the later extended citizenship to all those born in Ireland (Lentin, 2007). The extension of citizenship promised in the GFA was intended predominantly to offer citizenship of the Republic of Ireland to individuals in NI. In the contest of the referendum, however, the government claimed that this opened up citizenship in way which undermined the state’s capacity to control its borders. The discourse of the government during this referendum was clearly racialised, citing, for

\[^{117}\text{The citizenship referendum of 2004 changed the Irish constitution such that only those born in Ireland and and/or with at least one parent eligible for Irish citizenship are automatically entitled to Irish citizenship.}\]
example, the threat to Irish society posed by African women (Lentin, 2007). In this sense, the citizenship referendum of 2004 suggests important questions about the relationship between the logic of identification in the NI context and the racialisation and securitisation of migration. In NI itself, it has been argued that the institutionalisation of identification at stake in the GFA legitimises the exclusions of migrants and other groups who are excluded from the ‘two communities’ (Lentin an McVeigh, 2006). What is at stake here clearly diverges from the standard analysis of racial exclusion and the nation-state, given that the contemporary NI state reworks the relationship between the state and difference. In sum, there appears to be a number of ways in which depoliticisation in contemporary NI and the related logic of identification suggest the need for further research on the relationship between multiculturalism, ‘post-politics’, and forms of exclusion and power linked to difference (Finlay, 2004).

Conclusion

In concluding this chapter I would like to step back a bit from the way in which my research relates to the existing literature and the theoretical and empirical questions it raises and reflect on some broader historical dynamics. The GFA has been referred to, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, as Ireland’s ‘end of history’ (Ruane, 1999). Indeed there are reasons to suggest that the GFA represents, if not the Irish ‘end of history’, then perhaps the end of Irish political modernity. Throughout Irish modernity the themes of universality and identity have been played out in political struggles. The key events here correspond to the three major political sequences Badiou discerns in Euro-soviet modernity and associated with the years 1789, 1917 and 1968. In Ireland we talk about 1798 (the Republican rebellion), 1916 (war of national liberation) and 1968. With regard to 1798, Wolfe Tone, the rebellion’s leader, articulated an aim startlingly reminiscent of Pauline universalism: ‘To unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissentions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman, in the place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic, and Dissenter’. This rebellion was crushed by the British army and by the counter-revolutionary organisations it gave rise to, specifically the Orange Order, one of the key sectarian organisations of Irish modernity. Likewise, 1916 posited the nation-in-struggle as a universal force against the ‘artificial’ divisions of colonialism. But the movement, again confronting the British Army, was forced to accept
the sectarian partition of Ireland leading to the formation of the Orange State in the North. Finally, 1968’s Civil Rights Movement, as argued in Chapter 5, attempted to construct a prescriptive politics which might challenge the state without subsuming itself under Irish nationalism. Under the pressure of state violence this movement collapsed into nation-statism, reactivating the centuries old identitarian conflict.

The contemporary NI state might be seen to reconcile the antinomy between sectarianism and universality, in that it founds state universality on the recognition of ‘both communities’. It is this reconciliation that suggests the GFA as the synthesis which brings to a close three-hundred years of Irish political modernity. But it does so at the cost of appropriating universality for the state and, at the same time, unleashing the very logic of identification which underpins sectarianism. In this sense, it seems to me that, rather than resolving the question of universality and particularity, the NI state poses in a new form the question of the relationship between identification, universality and the state. The critique of the NI state is an important part of responding to these questions. I hope this thesis both opens up and contributes to that project.
Appendix A:
Summary of Good Friday Agreement

This appendix provides an overall, section-by-section summary of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA).

Declaration of Support

The GFA begins with a declaration of support for the GFA on behalf of the participants. The signatories of the GFA are the Government of the UK and of the Republic of Ireland. This agreement was then signed up to by most of the Northern Ireland’s political parties, including those linked to paramilitary organisations such as Sinn Fein, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Democratic Ulster Party. The other parties were the Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Alliance Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, and the Labour Group. The declaration signals some of the key rationalities which underpin the wider peace process. This section begins with the assertion that the agreement “offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning”. The ‘new beginning’ marks a separation between the past and the future. The second point introduces ‘the past’ in traumatic terms, emphasizing in particular violence and suffering, and juxtaposes it to the multiculturalist aspirations of the peace process:

2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.

By positioning “reconciliation, tolerance, mutual trust” and “human rights” as a “fresh start” and juxtaposing this to a violent past, the GFA introduces the notion that the violence of the past can be attributed to intolerance, mistrust etc. The third point emphasises further values which will underpin the “new beginning” and commits “to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands”.

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The fourth point commits the participants to “democratic and peaceful means”. This section introduces what is obviously a key theme, discussed further below: demilitarisation.

4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise.

The fifth point in this section signals the notion that both “political aspirations” (union with Britain/ a united Ireland) are equally legitimate:

5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements.

Constitutional Issues

The constitutional issues section introduces the question of sovereignty. All five items in this section are quoted and discussed in Chapter 6 and will therefore not be reproduced here.

Representative Institutions in Northern Ireland

The Assembly and Executive

The central democratic institution set out in the peace process is the Assembly (parliament), which contains 108 seats elected by proportional representation (Single Transferable Vote). The Assembly has “full legislative and executive authority” and is the “principal source of authority” with regard to the devolved issues. The GFA provides for the devolution of most of the issues associated with executive power to the Assembly. Certain more polemical matters (namely Policing and Justice), known as ‘reserved matters’, were to be devolved over a period of time (all of these have now been devolved). Authority over certain matters is to remain permanently at Westminster, e.g. foreign policy and border control.
The Assembly operates according to the ‘cross-community principle’. Upon taking their seat in the assembly Members of the Local Assembly (MLAs, equivalent to Members of Parliament) must “register a designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of measuring cross-community support”. Cross-community support is measured in the Assembly in the following way:

(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;
(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.

Cross-community support is required for the following issues:

- Election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
- Election of the Chair of the Assembly
- The annual programme for government and the budget
- Other ‘key decisions’

Additionally, following a petition by a majority of members of the Assembly, any issue can be brought to a cross-community vote.

The GFA establishes a power-sharing executive via the d’Hondt procedure for assigning ministerial positions; the executive is in a permanent coalition between the two main voting blocks (i.e. Irish nationalist and Unionists). Ministers have executive authority in relation to their area of responsibility. There is a committee, the chair and deputy chair of which are elected by the D’Hondt principle, for each ministerial department. Committees can initiate legislation and play “a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role”.

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The transnational institutions
There are three transnational institutions which link the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the UK in various ways.

North South Ministerial Council
This institution brings together “those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South.” There are two plenary meetings per year and “regular and frequent” meetings on particular areas of mutual concern. The areas for North-South cooperation listed in the GFA are: Agriculture; Education; Transport; Environment; Waterways; Social Security/Social Welfare; Tourism; Relevant EU Programmes; Inland Fisheries; Aquaculture and marine matters; Health; Urban and rural development.

British-Irish Council (BIC)
According to the GFA, BIC is established “to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands.” As with the North-South Council, BIC meets twice a year in plenary form and holds ‘regular’ meetings on specific areas of policy. It is made up of representatives of the British, NI and Irish parliaments as well as those of Scotland and Wales. Some of the issues of mutual concern suggested by the GFA are “transport links, agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues, education issues and approaches to EU issues”.

British-Irish Intergovernmental conference
The intergovernmental will bring together members of the British and Irish governments in relation to areas of cooperation and mutual concern. The Intergovernmental conference provides a forum in which the government of the Republic of Ireland can make recommendations in relation to the non-devolved issues, “In recognition of the Irish Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland”.
Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity

Human rights

An important component of the GFA has been the inclusion of a strong human rights dimension which is enshrined within the treaty itself. In the text of the GFA this is rationalized in relation to a traumatic non-multicultural past, here defined specifically as inter-communal conflict:

1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict...

The rights affirmed by the participants “against the background of recent history” are wide-ranging (emphasis mine):

- the right of free political thought;
- the right to freedom and expression of religion;
- the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;
- the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;
- the right to freely choose one’s place of residence;
- the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;
- the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and
- the right of women to full and equal political participation.

Of particular interest here are the rights emphasized above, to pursue national aspirations and to seek constitutional change. These refer not just to rights within the polity or within the framework of the sovereignty of the state but rights which transcend in many respects the very sovereignty of the state which grants them, for example the right to undo the state itself.

The GFA also commits to the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into NI law. Moreover, the GFA commits Westminster to the establishment of the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) to undertake a variety of functions related to the promotion of human rights, reviewing legislation, and bringing court proceedings in relation to human rights. The NIHRC is also ‘invited’:

...to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland...These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem. (My emphasis)

The GFA suggest that “among the issues for consideration by the Commission will be...the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland.”

Through the GFA the Irish government commits to “proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities” (already ratified by the UK) and “continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for the different traditions in the island of Ireland.”

Victims

The section of the GFA dealing with ‘victims’ again plays on the distinction drawn between a past characterised by violence and a future of reconciliation and mutual recognition, and links the two through the suggestion, which echoes the first lines of the declaration of support, that the peace process is itself a ‘memorial’ to the suffering of victims. Within the text, emphasis is placed on ‘community-based initiatives’, which the GFA pledges to support, to address reconciliation and support victims. The process of reconciliation is characterised in terms of “the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society”.

Economic, social and cultural issues

The importance of locally based initiatives is also reflected in the GFA’s commitment to support ‘community development’ in the section dealing with “economic, social and cultural issues”. In the same section the GFA commits to non-discrimination in relation to
employment and the elimination of "the differential in unemployment rates between the two communities". As well as the focus on human rights referred to above, there are several references to cultural rights:

All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.

There are commitments to support the Irish language in particular in a number of areas and to set up new institutions which will manage the use of symbols and emblems "in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division".

**Demilitarisation**

There are four key areas dealing with demilitarisation in its most direct sense: decommissioning; security; policing and justice; and prisoners. In the section on decommissioning all the participants commit to the disarmament of paramilitary organisations. The disarmament of paramilitary organisations and the consequent 'peaceful environment', as stipulated in the section on Security, "should mean a normalisation of security arrangements and practices". To this extent the British government commits to the 'normalisation' of security arrangements including the reduction of troop numbers, installations, the removal of emergency powers, and "other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful society".

Policing in NI has been one of the most controversial issues, going back to the Civil Rights Movement. The section dealing with policing again links the history of violence and division to a peaceful future associated with a police force representative and inclusive of both communities:

The participants recognise that policing is a central issue in any society. They equally recognise that Northern Ireland's history of deep divisions has made it highly emotive, with great hurt suffered and sacrifices made by many individuals and their families, including those in the RUC and other public servants. They believe that the agreement provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole. They also
believe that this agreement offers a unique opportunity to bring about a new political dispensation which will recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland. They consider that this opportunity should inform and underpin the development of a police service representative in terms of the make-up of the community as a whole and which, in a peaceful environment, should be routinely unarmed.

The GFA initiated a subsequent review of policing, as a result of which the Royal Ulster Constabulary was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Finally, the GFA released political prisoners who were members of organisations which maintained ceasefires, i.e. supported the peace process.
Appendix B: Sources

This Appendix details the sources used in relation to the three analytical fields that make up my research: historical depoliticisation; sovereignty; and citizenship.

The historical depoliticisation section details primary sources in relation to the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) and the Provisional IRA, as well as the existing historical research I draw in my analysis. The sovereignty section details the relevant government documents as well as the literature on consociationalism, which forms the intellectual architecture of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The citizenship section begins by discussing the continuing relevance of *A Shared Future* (ASF) and ‘good relations’ before detailing the relevant policy documents with regard to ASF and ‘shared space’. I also detail the relevant academic work with regard to ‘shared space’. Finally, I provide background information on the Skainos project as well as detailing the interviews conducted with regard to Skainos.

**Historical Depoliticisation**

**Civil Rights Movement**

*First-hand accounts written by militants from the Civil Rights Movement:*

Paul Arthur: Paul Arthur was a member of the People’s Democracy (PD) from October 1968 to Easter 1969. However, unlike the other works in this section, this book, which was prepared as part of a Masters Degree, is not quite a first-hand account. It is partially a first-hand account and yet Arthur presents the book as a somewhat ‘objective’ account. In the introduction he states that he “was closely involved in some of the important decisions taken during that period (1968-69); and some of those I write about were my contemporaries at university. I leave it to the reader to decide whether my involvement has clouded my judgment” (Arthur, 1974: 9). From the point of view of this research, Arthur
does not focus on his own or others subjective experience at the time, and as such I draw on his work mainly in relation to details, contextual information, demands and so on.


**Peter Bunting**: Bunting was a Civil Rights activists involved from the early stages of the movement. He later went on to become a leading trade unionist.


**Bernadette Devlin**: Bernadette Devlin’s account of the CRM was first published at the end of 1969, just after the Battle of the Bogside. Devlin was at the centre of a number of key organizations discussed in Chapter 5 (the People’s Democracy (PD); the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)). She was also central to a number of key events discussed in Chapter 5 (first Civil Rights march, Dungannon August 24 1968; second Civil Rights march, Derry, October 5th 1968; occupation of parliament with the PD, October 24th 1968; the PD’s Long March, January 1969, the Battle of the Bogside, August 1969).


**Michael Farrell**: Michael Farrell’s account of the CRM was first published in 1976. Farrell was central to a number of organizations discussed in Chapter 5 (the PD; NICRA; the Young Socialists). He was involved in a number of key events discussed in Chapter 5 (second Civil Rights March, Derry October 5th 1968; occupation of Parliament, October 24th 1968; PD’s Long March, January 1969; Free Belfast, August 1969).


**Eamonn McCann**: Eamonn McCann’s classic account of the CRM, *War in an Irish Town*, was first published in 1973. McCann was a key figure in the CRM, and in NI politics since then. He was instrumental in a number of key organizations discussed in Chapter 5 (Derry
Housing Action Committee (DHAC); Northern Irish Labour Party (NILP); he was also very close to the PD). He was instrumental in many of the key events of in the 1968-1972 period discussed in Chapter 5 (October 5th, 1968 Derry Civil Rights march; the PD’s ‘Long March’, January 1969; the Battle of the Bogside, August 1969; Bloody Sunday, January 1972).


Dermie McClenaghan: Dermie McClenaghan was active in DHAC, NILP and the Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC).


Fionbarra O’Dochartaigh: Foinbarra O’Dochartaigh’s (also known as Finbarr O’Doherty) account of the CRM was published in 1994 and is based on notes he took at the time. He was a leading Derry activist. He was a member of DHAC and DCAC. He was an organizer of the 2nd Civil Rights march in Derry October 5th 1968, and participated in the first march in August. He was instrumental in the multiple marches on November 18th. O’Dochartaigh was a left-Republican and would go on to be a member of the Official IRA.


Terry Robson: Robson was a member of DHAC and NILP.

Pamphlets, leaflets and interviews


Provisional IRA/ Sinn Fein

Pamphlets


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118 This interview took place in Derry on April 20 1969. Although the introduction to the interview claims that Eamonn McCann was a member of the PD, in fact he was a member of the NILP during this whole period and never joined the PD, although he was very close to them politically.

119 Available at http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/pd-mf.pdf

120 This text of this leaflet was mainly written by McCann, although a small section of the leaflet is attributed to the Young Socialists. It is available here: http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/emc.pdf
**Sovereignty**

**Peace Process documents**


**Consociational literature**

Consociational theory forms the intellectual architecture of the GFA. Consociational theory, particularly in relation to NI, is most strongly associated with the names of two political scientists, John McGarry and Breandan O'Leary, who have had an enormous impact on the peace process and the GFA. It is well recognised that the GFA closely resembles the political framework they developed during the late '80s and the '90s (Taylor, 2009; Finlay, 2006). As an adviser to the British Labour Party, “O'Leary worked with Mo Mowlam, who as Secretary of state for NI, 1997-1999, oversaw the negotiations leading to the signing of the GFA” (Finlay, 2006: 6). Mo Mowlam had herself undertaken a PhD on consociationalism (Finlay, 2010). McGarry and O'Leary advised the ‘Morrison delegation’, an envoy from the Clinton Administration, during the early years of the peace process (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009). O'Leary has gone on to work as the constitutional advisor on Kurdistan in Iraq, and both have written about the Iraqi constitution and peace process (O'Leary et al, 2005).

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121 This is the official title of the Good Friday Agreement, also known as the Belfast Agreement.
122 Usually referred to as the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
123 Usually referred to as the Downing Street Declaration.


Citizenship

A Shared Future

As noted in Chapter 7, ASF has been largely sidelined as a policy framework by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minster (OFMDFM), which is held by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein (SF). However, ASF is of continuing importance for a number of reasons. First of all, a number of important elements of the state continue to pursue this policy, including the Department for Social Development (held by the Social Democratic and Labour Party124), the Department of Policing and Justice (held by the Alliance Party) and the Community Relations Council. Secondly, the overall political rationality of 'good relations' has become hegemonic in NI above and

124 The SDLP are committed to a ‘Shared Future’ and the first in their list of commitments under that heading is ‘promoting shared spaces’, see http://www.sdlp.ie/index.php/the_issues/shared_future/, accessed 25/07/2010
beyond the specific remit of ASF (McVeigh and Rolston, 2007). For example, important sources of funding such as the EU Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation\textsuperscript{125} and the International Fund for Ireland\textsuperscript{126} operate according to the 'good relations' and 'shared future' framework. As a result, some SF/DUP controlled fora continue to support ASF. For example, Belfast City Council (BCC), despite being SF/DUP controlled, continues to fund 'good relations' work through its Good Relations Unit. This is because under PEACE III Belfast City Council oversees funding provision in the capital, and as such operates according to the objectives and guidelines of Peace III, which are very much in tune with the rationality of 'good relations' and, moreover, emphasise shared space. It is also of note that BCC Good Relations Unit is an important source of funding. In fact, many people in the community and voluntary sector will tailor activities to the 'good relations' agenda on the basis that the GRU is one of the most significant sources of funding.

Staying with the issue of 'good relations' hegemonic status, the Skainos example, discussed further below, is relevant here. Skainos was possible because the principal funders (Department of Social Development, the community and voluntary sector, PEACE III and the International Fund for Ireland) were all working according to the logic of ASF

Thirdly, OFMDFM continues to fund 'good relations' work, despite having sidelined the

\textsuperscript{125} One of the two key objectives of PEACE III, the third instalment of the European Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, is that of ‘building a shared society’ with the creation of ‘shared public spaces’ featuring as one of the main mechanisms for achieving this, see SEUPR website, accessed 25/07/2010

\textsuperscript{126} The International Fund for Ireland is an international organisation established by the British and Irish Governments in 1986. It is primarily financed by the USA, the EU, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. IFI describes itself as promoting “economic and social advance, and encourages contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland” (see http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/, accessed 25/07/2010). The current ‘strategic framework for action’ is revealingly entitled ‘Sharing this Space’ and includes a core commitment to “helping to build and realise the vision of a shared future for the communities in Northern Ireland and both parts of the island” (see International Fund for Ireland. 2006. Sharing this Space: A strategic framework for actions, 2006-2010, available at http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/images/stories/documents/publications/sharin g_this_space/ifistrategy.pdf)
ASF policy framework.\(^{127}\)

Finally, Sinn Fein and the DUP are developing their own policy around community relations, currently out for consultation, entitled *Cohesion, Sharing and Integration*\(^{128}\). CSI strongly resembles ASF.

### A Shared Future: documents


BCC, Belfast City Council. (2006). *Community Engagement, Good Relations and Good Practice: Guidelines to good practice in relation to community engagement to promote good relations in Northern Ireland*. Belfast: BCC.


In addition, I spoke with Professor Colin Knox, who worked on the ASF consultation process to gain further insight. I also met with Dr. Mike Morrissey who prepared Belfast City Council’s Good Relations Plan.

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\(^{127}\) James Brown, a Skainos board member (see below) told me that he had tailored a regeneration project he was working on to a ‘good relations’ agenda because elements of the civil service assured him that as a ‘good relations’ issue it would fall under the remit of the OFMDFM were it could receive funding.


\(^{129}\) Duncan Morrow is chief executive of the Community Relations Council.
Shared Space

Shared Space: documents


DSD, Department for Social Development. (2005). *People and Place: Neighbourhood renewal in Belfast implementation plan*. Belfast: DSD.


Shared space: academic/research

I draw on research occurring within an academic context but focused on the development of rationalities and technologies for the management of conflict and difference via urban regeneration or related elements of the urban. Specifically, I draw on the work of researchers who have had a close relationship with policy making. Frank Gaffikin worked on many of the key planning policies in the 1990s including *Shaping Our Future* and *Making Belfast Work*\(^\text{130}\). Michael Morrissey was policy adviser to Belfast City Council for their *Good Relations Plan* and worked with the East Belfast Partnership in drawing up their *Strategic Regeneration Framework* (2008). Breandan Murtagh has worked for the South Belfast Partnership in relation to their *Strategic Regeneration Framework* (2008) and has done workshops on Neighbourhood Renewal, for example for the North Belfast Partnership. Finally, Gaffikin, Sterret, Rafferty, Brand and McEldowney have all been involved in a project based at Queen’s University, entitled ‘Contested Cities Urban

Universities’ (CU2)\textsuperscript{131}, which works towards ‘combining regeneration and reconciliation’. CU2 has done work for Belfast City Council and Belfast Local Strategy Partnership, an agency which worked on regeneration before being dismantled a number of years ago.


\textbf{Skainos community regeneration project}

\textbf{Background}

The Skainos project has as two of its principal aims the creation of ‘shared space’ for the ‘two communities’ and “building Loyalist confidence in the peace process”. Skainos seeks

\textsuperscript{131} http://www.qub.ac.uk/ep/research/cu2/, last accessed 11/09/2011
to link together the regeneration of Inner-East Belfast, "building support for the peace process" and "nurturing community relations" (http://www.skainos.org/about/, last accessed 12/09/07). It involves the construction of a new street and 'civil square' on a two-acre site and includes community facilities, retail and office space as well as social housing.

The Skainos community regeneration project is spearheaded by the East Belfast Mission. EBM is a large faith-based community development project which has for many years undertaken a variety of projects and services in Inner-East Belfast, including peace and reconciliation work; employment services, homeless hostel, community café, Meals on Wheels, youth and community work through arts and events, charity shop, a worshipping congregation, Parents and toddlers group, women's group, counselling service and so on. Upon completion these activities will be transferred to a new building in the Skainos development. In addition Skainos also includes the construction of mixed tenure housing and office and retail space.

Skainos is one of the largest 'community regeneration' projects (meaning the lead partner is a community organisation rather than commercial/statutory) in Europe with a budget of just over £20m.

Skainos is situated in Inner-East Belfast, usually considered a 'Loyalist community' with a continuing strong paramilitary influence. Nearby is the famous 'freedom corner' featuring a series of aggressive Loyalist paramilitary murals with slogans such as 'no surrender to the Irish' etc. Directly adjacent to Inner-East Belfast is the Republican area of Short Strand. Relations between Short Strand and Inner-East have been characterized by political and sectarian violence. As a result residents of the Short Strand would typically be afraid to enter into what they perceive to by the Loyalist paramilitary controlled territory of Inner-East, and vice versa. A key part of the raison d'etre of Skainos is to overcome this by changing the way these 'communities' relate to one another. Inner-East is also one of the most deprived wards in NI (and the UK), according to the official index of deprivation in NI (Noble Index), with high rates of unemployment, 'welfare dependency', mental illness, ill-health and so on.
Skainos is managed by a board of management lead by Glen Jordan (EBM). Two board members are from the Methodist Church Trust, four are from EBM, three from Oaklee Housing Association (a key partner in terms of the social housing component), two people representing the Short Strand and two representing Inner-East (these are referred to as ‘community representatives’). The ‘community representatives’ include two of my interviewees: James Brown, a local business man from the Inner-East and Joe O’Donnell, a community worker with a Republican background working in the Short Strand. The funding sources breakdown as follows:

- European Union Special Programme in Peace and Reconciliation (Peace III): £6.1m
- Department of Social Development: £5.4 m
- International Fund for Ireland: £2.9m
- EBM: £1.4m
- Oaklee Housing Association (funded by the DSD): £4.2m (designated for social housing)

All of the main funding bodies are characterised by a ‘shared future’ approach.

Skainos Interviews

- Rev Dr. Gary Mason (17/11/09): Gary is the Chairperson of the board of Skainos Ltd, the development company which oversees Skainos. Gary is also the Superintendent Minister of East Belfast Mission. EBM has been the driving organisation behind the project and Gary Mason has been at the centre of this drive. He is the chairperson of the board of Skainos Ltd., the development company set up to deliver Skainos. He has a long experience of conflict resolution work and has very strong links to loyalist paramilitaries, particularly in East Belfast. Gary is the chair of EBM. The ‘vision’ of Skainos is widely attributed to Dr. Mason;
• Glen Jordan (17/11/09): Glen Jordan is the Director of the Skainos Unit and works for EBM. As chair of the project he has a major role in decision making and accessing funding;

• Sarah Cooke (10/05/10): Sarah is responsible for the development of the ‘family centre’ element of Skainos. This will be a resource centre in which conflict resolution and peace and reconciliation work will take place. In addition, Sarah is already involved in projects which bring together the ‘two communities’ of inner-east Belfast, and this is understood as an important part of the preparation work for Skainos;

• James Brown (12/05/10): James sits on the board of Skainos as the community representative for Inner-east Belfast. James is a local businessman and evangelical Protestant. He was asked to be on the board by Gary Mason. He is also involved in work on the regeneration of the Newtownards Road;

• Joe O’Donnell (10/05/2010): Joe sits on the board of Skainos as the community representative for the Short Strand. Joe is a Republican and a member of Sinn Fein. He has been active in the Republican movement in the Short Strand since the 1970s. Today he runs Short Strand community centre. This community centre is a key partner in terms of the Skainos project, as any connections with the Republican community are reached through this project. Joe’s participation in the project, as a representative of the Republican community, was central to bringing in EU funding.
Appendix C: Glossary of Concepts

**Depoliticisation:** This term is used in two senses: (1) The reduction of political subjectivity to the logic of identification, hence eliminating the former’s excessive relation to the state as well as its universal dimension; (2) the appropriation of universality by the state, i.e. the successful establishment of the state’s monopoly on universality which forecloses the emergence of a universal subjectivity beyond and against the state. The latter is also referred to as ‘complete depoliticisation’. The first concept of depoliticisation is based on Ranciere’s work (1992; 1998). The second draws on Badiou’s (2005; see also Russo, 2006) conception of depoliticisation, which I develop by focusing specifically on the theme of universality.

**Difference-conflict:** An antagonism between groups imagined in terms of the logic of identification, i.e. empirical groups such as nations, ethnic groups etc.

**The logic of identification:** A mode of conceiving subjectivity which establishes the symbolic integrity of the subject via an empirical characteristic or signifier. Since subjectivity is not exhausted in representation, the logic of identification can be conceptualized as a reduction of subjectivity. The logic of identification is bound up with and reproduces the state qua symbolic regime. This concept is drawn from Ranciere (1992).

**Partial depoliticisation:** A situation in which the state’s monopoly on universality is in crisis but in which there is no alternative extra-statist mode of universality. This situation prevailed, I argue, in Northern Ireland between 1972 (approximately) and 1998.

**Political conflict:** An incommensurable antagonism between, on the one hand, a subjectivity which is subtracted from the state and characterized by a universal and egalitarian dimension (i.e. political subjectivity) and, on the other hand, the state. This draws on the work of Ranciere (1992; 1998; 2001).
**Political subjectivity:** A mode of subjectivisation, generated in an antagonistic relation, which transcends the symbolic regime of the state. Political subjectivity is characterized by its excessive, universal and egalitarian dimensions. Sometimes referred to simply as ‘politics’. I take this concept from the work of Badiou (2005; 2010) and Ranciere (1998; 1992).

**Political universality:** A form of universality which, as opposed to state universality, is activated by political subjectivisation, and which is bound up with the latter’s suspension or subtraction of itself from the state and the identitarian categories of the state. Whereas state universality operates via the particular (i.e. identity), political universality operates via singularity. This subtractive notion of universality can only be thought ‘negatively’, i.e. it has no empirical or substantial grounding or foundation. This concept is based on Badiou’s (2008) theory of universality.

**The state:** I use the term ‘the state’ to refer to the ‘idea of the state’, in the specific sense of the symbolic principle which establishes the identity of the state, i.e. its integrity and coherence. Other dimensions of the state, such as the ‘state-system’ are not addressed in this thesis. In developing this concept I draw on an older Marxist approach to the state (Abrams, 2006; Poulantzas, 1978) but more importantly on post-Marxist perspectives on the symbolic dimension of the state and power (Badiou, 2005; Ranciere, 1998; Bourdieu, 1994; Lefort, 1986).

**State-politics:** The mode of managing public affairs which the state presents as politics, characterized by the negotiation of interests and rights between already visible empirical groups, and in which the question of universality is more or less excluded from contestation. This concept is based on Ranciere’s (1998) notion of the police.

**State universality:** state universality refers to the way in which the state appears to transcend particular divisions such that it is aligned with the polity as a whole and hence is experienced as universal. state universality is achieved by aligning the state with the identity of the polity. As such it is a ‘false universality’. Sometimes referred to in this
thesis as the 'state's monopoly on universality'. In developing this concept I draw on Badiou's understanding of the state (Badiou, 2005) and universality (Badiou, 2008).
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