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THE DUBLIN FENIANS 1858-79
THE DUBLIN FENIANS 1858 - 79

By Shin-ichi Takagami
SUMMARY

In the mid-1860s Fenianism reached its peak; perhaps as many as ten thousand Fenians existed in Dublin; and the Dublin organisation was the largest in Ireland. On 5 March 1867 the American leadership started the rising without detailed military planning and adequate preparations. Though several thousand Dublin Fenians responded to the leaders' call, the rising in the capital ended in fiasco. In consequence, Fenianism has often been dismissed either as a debacle or, in the realm of ideas, as an instance of the romantic triumph of failure in the long run.

However, Fenianism was a formidable organisation. The Fenian organisation in Dublin was potentially a more serious threat than the commonly accepted picture would suggest. They both drilled extensively and imported arms from England. Furthermore, police penetration of the organisation was rather limited.

The first object of this study is to describe the foundation of an organisation which was to survive the fiasco of the 1867 rising and continued to exist until Easter 1916. The second object is to examine the Dublin rising which remains unanalysed in detail by historians. Thirdly, the ways in which the authorities dealt with the movement are discussed. Finally, the thesis examines the decline of the organisation after the rising, especially in the early 1870s. This study ends before the Land War, the major issue of late nineteenth-century Irish history; and one in which the Dublin Fenians were far from the main scene. Some historians have tended to rely uncritically on the memoirs of Fenian leaders, such as John Devoy. These memoirs, though they reveal the inside story of the movement, contain inaccurate and unreliable information, partly because they were written many years later, and partly because leaders exaggerated their own role. For a balanced history, the main sources are the
documents in the State Paper Office. Among them were the reports, mainly by Superintendent Ryan, of the detective department of the Dublin Metropolitan Police. Ryan, until his retirement in 1874, actively dealt with Fenian affairs in Dublin, often reporting on a daily basis.

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university, and that it is entirely my own work.

Shin-ichi Takahashi
Shin-ichi Takahashi
March 1999
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university, and that it is entirely my own work.

Shin-ichi Takagami

March 1990
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ABBREVIATIONS

B.L. British Library
C.P. Commissioners of Dublin Metropolitan Police
C.S.O., R.P. Chief Secretary's Office, Registered papers
D.M.P. Dublin Metropolitan Police
F.P.R. Fenian police reports
H.C. Head constable of the Royal Irish Constabulary
I.G.P. Inspector general of police, Royal Irish Constabulary
MS 311 and MS 333 T.C. Luby's recollections of Fenianism and the Irish People, (N.L.I.)
MS 5964 [General Millen's] account of Fenianism as from April 1865 to April 1866 (N.L.I., S.L. Anderson papers)
N.L.I. National Library of Ireland
S.P.O. National Archives (State Paper Office)
U.S. Under Secretary
W.O. War Office papers, P.R.O.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

We believe the men of Dublin are true and sound. We believe they will never disgrace the Irish name. In all the struggles of the past century they have had their share. We believe that, when the great day arrives, they will do their duty as valiantly as the sons of cities a present-day vanquished. We trust we shall live to see Dublin magnificent and famous - the worthy capital of a free Ireland.

Irish Party. 16 February 1868.

This study is concerned with the history of Fenianism in Dublin from the establishment of the subscription to the rise of the Land War; special attention is paid to the Dublin rising of March 1867. In February of that year, St. Patrick’s Day 1867 a small number of Irishmen started a secret subversive society calling itself the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.). The members were called Fenians and their goal was to overthrow British rule over Ireland by physical force, establishing an Irish republic. Despite many difficulties these Fenians had faced, the organisation spread into other parts of Ireland and even into Britain, and finally succeeded in imposing an impact on British politics over long periods.

This study is concerned with Fenianism; the organisation in Dublin was the largest and strongest in the 1860s. It seemed to have outpaced even the Fenians thousand to the thousand Fenians at its goal. There is even an estimate of 14,000 but this is an exaggerated figure. Some Fenian leaders publicised their activities. John O’Leary, The Irish in Politics, The story of Fenianism from the fall of 1867 to the death of Patrick (London, 1907); the Teachta, 1906; John O’Donovan, The Life of 1867 of An Duhshoill (Dublin, 1910); John O’Donovan, Recollections of Fenians and Irishmen (London, 1866); Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, Páras na Reolanta, 1866 to 1891 (New York, 1908); Michael Davitt, The Free of Fenianism in Ireland (London and New York, 1904); Joseph Devins, A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (New York, 1868); Jane Genov, Recollections of an Irish Rebel (New York, 1902); Frank Kavanagh, Ethel Smyth, Irish Rebel and California Labour.
We believe the men of Dublin are true and sound. We believe they will never disgrace the Irish name. In all the struggles of the past century they have had their share. We believe that, when the great day arrives, they will do their duty as valiantly as the men of cities at present more renowned. We trust we shall live to see Dublin brilliant and famous - the worthy capital of a free Ireland!

_Irish People, 18 February 1865._

The object of this study is to examine the history of Fenianism in Dublin from its establishment to the eve of the Land War; special attention is paid to the Dublin rising in March 1867. In Dublin on 17 March, St Patrick's Day 1858 a small number of Irishmen formed a secret oathbound society called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.). The members were called Fenians and their aim was to overthrow English rule in Ireland by physical force, establishing an Irish republic. Despite many difficulties these founders had faced, the organisation spread into other parts of Ireland and even into Britain, and finally occupied an important part in national politics over long periods. This study is confined to Dublin Fenianism; the organisation in Dublin was the largest and strongest in the 1860s: it seems to have contained from several thousand to ten thousand Fenians at its peak. There is even one estimate of 14,000 but this is an exaggerated figure. Some Fenian leaders published their memoirs. John Denvir, _The Irish in Britain from the earliest times to the fall and death of Parnell_ (London, 1894), and _The life story of an old rebel_ (Dublin, 1910); John O'Leary, _Recollections of Fenians and Fenianism_ (London, 1896); Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa, _Rossa's recollections, 1838 to 1898_ (New York, 1898); Michael Davitt, _The fall of feudalism in Ireland_ (London and New York, 1904); Joseph Denieffe, _A personal narrative of the Irish revolutionary brotherhood_ (New York, 1906); John Devoy, _Recollections of an Irish rebel_ (New York, 1929); Frank Roney, _Frank Roney, Irish rebel and California labour_
leader, ed. by Ira B. Cross (Berkeley, 1931) and Mark Ryan, Fenian memories (Dublin, 1945), are useful accounts. Moreover, unpublished reminiscences of Thomas Clark Luby and J.F.X. O'Brien are available in the National Library of Ireland. As far as the Dublin organisation is concerned, Denieffe's, Devoy's and Luby's provide useful information to which non-Fenians, particularly the authorities, failed to have access. Luby attended the inauguration of the I.R.B. and until his arrest in September 1865 took a prominent part in the organisation. In the late 1850s and early 1860s Luby, one of two Dublin Centres, was actively involved in the Dublin organisation. Therefore concerning early Fenianism Luby's information is quite valuable. Though there is no hard evidence that Denieffe was a Dublin Centre, he, residing in Dublin, held a high position in the I.R.B. and he had direct contact with James Stephens, head centre of the I.R.B., and other prominent leaders. Devoy's book is frequently used by many writers and indeed is more balanced and accurate than others. Devoy became the chief organiser of the Fenian organisation in the British army in October 1865, so his account about Fenianism in the British army is very helpful. And Devoy's activities were largely confined to the British army stationed in Dublin, so that Devoy frequently met prominent leaders in Dublin and witnessed important events in the history of the I.R.B.

O'Donovan Rossa and O'Leary worked at the office of the Irish People in Dublin from November 1863 until the seizure of the newspaper in September 1865. It appears that either Fenian had little chance to involve himself in the Dublin organisation. O'Leary's active career as a Fenian started when he became the editor of the Irish People in the second half of 1863 and before that, though he was a financial agent of the I.R.B., he did not take a conspicuous part in the organisation. O'Leary concentrated his efforts on editing the paper
rather than on other Fenian activities. This is reflected in the second
volume of his book containing no more than a description of the Irish People.
The first volume of O'Leary's book deals with early Fenianism but his
statement was based on Luby's unpublished memoir. Other leaders whom we have
listed above did not hold a position allowing them to know the inner workings
of the I.R.B. or of the Dublin organisation in the 1860s; Michael Davitt, Mark
Ryan and John Denvir resided in England; Frank Roney was a Belfast Fenian and
J.F.X. O'Brien was a Cork Fenian.

Though the memoirs of Fenian leaders undoubtedly shed some light on the
history of Fenianism, they also contain inaccurate and unreliable information,
partly because they had been written after many years had passed and partly
because Fenian leaders either exaggerated or justified their actions. For
example Devoy, the chief organiser of the British army, emphasised his
contribution to the I.R.B.:

The organization in the British Army ... was the right
arm of the movement and if used at the proper time would
have contributed to success in two ways, both of which
were very important militarily. First, it would have
broken the morale of the British Army in Ireland and
crippled its power to suppress an Insurrection; and
secondly, it would have supplied the Fenians with a
splendid nucleus for a trained army and provided the
conditions which would have enabled the Republic (which
they intended to proclaim) to demand International
Recognition. 3

Devoy's account is very doubtful as to the effectiveness of the organisation
in the British army. Such Fenian memoirs must be treated with caution.
Another problem of Fenian memoirs was the lack of a clear story of Fenianism
after 1866 and especially of the 1867 rising. This was caused by the arrest
of Fenians who later left memoirs; Devoy, O'Donovan Rossa, O'Leary and Luby.
O'Donovan Rossa, O'Leary and Luby were arrested in September 1865; Devoy was captured in February 1866. Though these Fenians were released in the early 1870s they did not take an active part in the Irish organisation any more. As a result for readers of Fenian memoirs, Fenian history in Ireland ends in February 1866, when the authorities suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, arresting Devoy; Denieffe, though he left Ireland immediately after the rising, did not give a clear picture of Fenianism in 1866 and early 1867. Though Devoy described the rising in his recollections, as he had been in prison at that time, his account was not based on his own experience.

Contemporaries also wrote the history of Fenianism; but their works hardly succeeded in producing full and faultless accounts. This is partly because primary sources which are now available to us were not accessible to them. Such works are A.M. Sullivan, New Ireland (London, 1877), John Rutherford, The secret history of the Fenian conspiracy (London, 1877), Richard Pigott, Recollections of an Irish national journalist (Dublin, 1882) and T.D. Sullivan, Recollections of troubled times in Irish politics (Dublin, 1905); above all Rutherford's book, immediately after it was published, was severely criticised by Fenians, for he distorted facts.4 Dublin Castle officials who witnessed Fenianism from a different angle surveyed Fenianism. Under Secretary Larcom wrote a valuable history of Fenianism from its establishment to the late 1860s.5 Robert Anderson, a lawyer dealing with Fenianism, published an article and two books.6 These works provide quite a different perspective of the I.R.B. from that of the memoirs of Fenians but in some respects they were unaware of facts that only Fenians had known.

Some studies by later historians failed to present a Fenian history without error or distortion mainly because they used Fenian memoirs and contemporary
works as their chief sources. The works of Desmond Ryan, a pioneering historian of Fenianism, are by no means free from errors. His biography of John Devoy was chiefly based on Devoy's Recollections.⁷ The Fenian chief: a biography of James Stephens (Dublin, 1967), accepted Devoy's account as a general textbook for Fenianism. Ryan constructed a picture of Fenianism in the 1860s from Fenian memoirs such as Devoy's, O'Leary's, Denieffe's and O'Donovan Rossa's. In order to write a more balanced and detailed history of Fenianism we have to use Fenian documents in the National Archives (State Paper Office) created by the authorities who dealt with the problem of Fenianism, and which are divided into several categories.⁸ In recent years a number of studies based on these documents have appeared, but most of the documents still remain untouched. The main sources of this study are the Fenian documents in the State Paper Office and they are supplemented by Fenian memoirs and contemporary works.

The standard introduction to Fenian history is the Thomas Davis lectures on Fenianism; The Fenian movement edited by T.W. Moody (Cork, 1968). The book contains four essays and the same number of short biographies of Fenian leaders.⁹ T.W. Moody, in his 'The Fenian movement in Irish history', summarised the characters of Fenianism: firstly, 'Fenianism was essentially a physical force movement, which absolutely, and from the beginning, repudiated constitutional action'; secondly, 'the Fenian movement concentrated on a single aim, independence, and insisted that all other aims were beside the point'; thirdly, 'Fenianism made its converts almost entirely among the poorer classes - small farmers and labourers, soldiers, school masters, clerks, shop assistants, and urban workers generally'; fourthly, 'Fenianism embraced not only the Irish at home but also the new Ireland that emigration had created in Britain and America'; fifthly, 'the Fenian movement had in it a distinct tinge
of Gaelic revivalism of which the primary inspiration was John O'Mahony; sixthly, 'one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Fenians was the firmness with which they withstood the hostility of the catholic church'; finally, 'the Fenian movement was unique in its longevity'.

Though T.W. Moody pointed out several features of Fenianism, historians have tended to approach it from limited perspectives.

(1) Much attention is directed to the relations between Fenianism and the Catholic Church. Most studies discuss the MacManus funeral in November 1861 - Archbishop Cullen refused to allow funeral masses - and Fenian advocacy of 'no priests in politics' in the Irish People; Charles Kickham opposed the Catholic Church intervention in politics. The I.R.B. was described as an advocate of the separation between state and church.

(2) Fenianism is regarded as a socialist movement. Karl Marx wrote:

Fenianism is characterised by a socialistic tendency (in a negative sense, directed against the appropriation of the soil) and by being a lower orders movement.

The International Working Men's Association in which Marx was prominent displayed a great interest in Fenian prisoners associated with the Manchester rescue in September 1867 and in the Fenian Amnesty movement in 1869; and James Stephens was said to join the International in 1866. Furthermore the International established branches in Ireland in 1872. Accordingly James Connolly stressed the relations between Fenianism and the International:

So Fenianism was a response throb in the Irish heart to those pulsations in the heart of the European working class which elsewhere produced the International Working Men's Association.
Branches of that Association flourished in Dublin and Cork until after the Paris Commune. Indeed, J.P. McDonnell, the secretary for Ireland of the International, was a Dublin Fenian. However, Fenianism was not such a movement as James Connolly and Marxist historians have discussed. In December 1871 a deputy from the International arrived in Dublin but Fenian leaders 'gave him the cold shoulder'. The International appears to have established its branch in Dublin in early 1872, but in April when they held a meeting, fifty persons under the leadership of Thomas Bracken, a prominent Dublin Fenian, broke it up. Chief Superintendent Ryan stated, 'it appears that the promoters of the International will find it difficult to establish themselves in Dublin'. This failure of the International meant that Dublin Fenians hardly accepted the idea of the International.

(3) We have several biographies of Fenian leaders - John Boyle O'Reilly, John Devoy, James Stephens, John O'Leary, O'Donovan Rossa, Charles Kickham and Michael Davitt. These works undoubtedly give a deeper insight into Fenianism but they ignore the rank and file Fenians who had rarely left records of their own. Most of the above Fenian leaders did not take an important role in the movement after 1866 because of imprisonment, so the studies failed to give a clear picture of Fenianism in the second half of the 1860s.

(4) The social composition of Fenianism in the 1860s has been the subject of some studies. Fenian leaders asserted that artisans and shop assistants had been very active in the movement. This is fully supported by a document in the State Paper Office, in which Robert Anderson analysed...
the occupations of 1,086 Fenian prisoners. The same conclusion has been reached by historians examining other Fenian documents, 'Fenianism: index of names, 1866-71' and 'Habeas Corpus Act, abstract of cases, 1866-8'. S. Clark sampled 141 Fenians from the former source and K.T. Hoppen analysed 1,081 Fenians from the latter. From 'Fenianism: index of names, 1866-71', M. Murphy collected the names of Cork Fenians and surveyed their occupations. B. MacGiolla Choille has provided analyses of the occupations of processionists at the Manchester Martyrs' demonstration in Limerick city in December 1867; and his information comes from the police observing the procession.

In recent years two important studies appeared - L. Ó Broin, Fenian fever: an Anglo-American dilemma (New York, 1971), and R.V. Comerford, The Fenians in context: Irish politics and society 1848-82 (Dublin, 1985). L. Ó Broin has reconstructed Fenian history in the 1860s, using information chiefly derived from police reports. Ó Broin has thrown light on neglected aspects of the history, such as the process in which Fenian leaders organised the rising and what happened in the 1867 rising. R.V. Comerford selects information critically, presenting the history not only of the Fenians but of nationalist politics between the Great Famine and the Land War. Furthermore, Comerford has given a fresh interpretation to Fenian history dominated by a nationalist interpretation. Comerford claims, 'The fenian movement can legitimately be depicted as a reaction against fundamental social, economic and cultural change. But that is only one side of the story: the fenians can also be seen as people striving to find a place for themselves in the new dispensation'. Comerford's reassessment of Fenian history can be discerned in his other studies, 'Anglo-French tension and the origins of Fenianism' in Ireland under the union varieties of tension (Oxford, 1980) and 'Patriotism as pastime: the
appeal of fenianism in the mid-1860s'. The former study examines the impact of a crisis of Anglo-French relations on early Fenianism. The latter study claims that young Irishmen joined Fenianism in the search for a pastime in the company of other young men.

Though Fenianism spread from Dublin into other areas of Ireland and Britain, where there existed some strong organisations in the mid-1860s, the local study of the I.R.B. remains neglected by historians. Generally speaking local studies demonstrate the complexity of local differences and make it difficult to generalise. However, only such studies can offer deeper insight to subjects. Brian Griffin's unpublished thesis is an attempt to examine the rank and file Fenians in Connacht and Leinster (minus Dublin city and county) from 1858 to 1878 showing that the stronghold of Fenianism moved from Leinster to Connacht after the rising. The other areas for which we have some studies are County Monaghan, Kerry, Breifne, Dublin (1858-65), Kilkenny and England.

The history of Fenianism in the 1870s has been also disregarded by historians, partly because the I.R.B. declined compared with the 1860s. The only theme attracting the attention of historians was the 'New Departure': this topic was fully described and analysed by T.W. Moody's Davitt and Irish revolution 1846-82 (Oxford, 1981). "The I.R.B. Supreme Council 1868-78" edited by T.W. Moody and L. Ó Broin, threw some light on the history of the period. There have been some signs that new approaches to Fenian history are on increase in recent years. This is reflected in several dissertations: R.D. FitzSimon, 'The Irish government and the Phoenix society', (M.A. thesis, U.C.D., 1965), A.J. Semple, 'The Fenian infiltration of the British army in Ireland 1864-7' (M.Litt thesis, T.C.D., 1971), M. Leo, 'The influence of the Fenians and their

Here we examine how historians have placed Fenianism in nineteenth century Irish history. Revisionist historians have tended to confine the legacies of Fenianism to moral and spiritual aspects of the movement, emphasising the influence of the Manchester Martyrs and the Amnesty movement on Irish nationalism. On the other hand they pay little attention to Fenianism in its military phase particularly the 1867 rising which is allowed little space in their studies compared with the 1916 rising. F.S.L. Lyons, who argued that the 1867 rising was a total failure, wrote:

Fenianism, by its call to arms, reiterated for its own generation the old, harsh maxim that freedom had to be fought for, while by their integrity and bravery in hopeless circumstances its champions passed on to their successors like a living flame the lesson that to sacrifice himself for his country was the highest good to which a man might aspire. Fifty years later the full meaning of that lesson would be made plain.38

This view is further discussed by R. Foster, saying that: 'Its importance was to sustain republican separatism as part of the political language of mid-nineteenth century Ireland; and, in a sense, to make it respectable'.39

Another legacy which historians have recognised is the relationship between Fenianism and the Land War. J. Lee states that Fenianism modernised the mentality of people in Connacht:

Fenianism was the first political movement to channel the energies of agricultural labourers and small farmers, hitherto expressed in
T. Garvin examines the emergence of the new I.R.B. with an agrarian character - 'Ribbon-Fenian' pattern - in the 1870s, quite distinct from the Fenianism of the 1860s whose strongholds lay urban areas, such as Dublin.

Historians who put an emphasis on cultural, religious and spiritual aspects of Fenianism have failed to answer why the I.R.B. continued to exist until 1916, when they started another rising. It is difficult to explain this question by Fenian idealism, that is, the Phoenix flame 'that burned, sometimes brightly, more often dimly, in the hearts of ordinary Irishmen.' It is likely that the vitality and longevity of Fenianism lay in the basic structure of the organisation which James Stephens had established by the mid-1860s, rather than in Fenian idealism. Indeed, the circle system Stephens introduced into the I.R.B. remained for sixty years.

One aim of this study is to examine the foundation-stone of the I.R.B. established by Fenian leaders. Chapter 2 describes how Fenian leaders developed a small group of men into a national organisation taking an important role in Irish politics through the following generation. Chapter 3 shows the structure of the Dublin organisation: how did the Dublin Centres organise their circles? Furthermore, by examining the membership of the Dublin organisation in the 1860s - their occupations and locations - as we will see in Chapter 4, some light is thrown on Dublin lower class life which existed independently from the middle and upper classes.

The second aim of this study is to examine, as will be shown in Chapter 8, the Dublin rising in March 1867. The rising remains unanalysed in detail by
historians except for L. Ó Broin's book, which, useful though it is, is general. R. Kee's account of the rising is much shorter still.\textsuperscript{43} F.S.L. Lyons described the rising as follows:

\begin{quote}
There was no coherent plan of operations, nor perhaps any policy other than the desperate hope that the insurgents might hold out long enough to be accorded belligerent rights by the USA and thus precipitate that long cherished Anglo-American war which had become so embedded in Fenian mythology. Groups of brave, unorganised, miserably armed men turned out in Dublin, Cork, Tipperary and Limerick, and to a lesser extent in Clare, Waterford and Louth.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

Though the rising resulted in a disaster, it was more elaborate than is generally believed. The failure of the rising led historians to underestimate the I.R.B. as a military organisation. Indeed, Fenjans were poorly armed but they tried to import fire arms and had held drilling sessions. This is the subject of Chapter 5. The Fenian infiltration into the British army aroused much fear in the authorities who relied on the army to defend the state against the Fenian threat. This is examined in Chapter 6.

The third object of the study is to discuss how the authorities directed their counterattack against the I.R.B.: their intelligence network will be explored. In Chapter 7 the role of Superintendent Ryan, head of the detective department of the D.M.P.\textsuperscript{:}, from 1864 in observing the Fenian movement in Dublin and in collecting systematic information is examined. Finally the study tries to describe not only what happened to the Dublin organisation after the rising but the reason why it declined in the 1870s.
Chapter One: Footnotes

1. N.L.I., MS 331.
2. N.L.I., MS 16695-6.
5. N.L.I., MS 7517.
15. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Apr. 1872 (S.P.O., F papers, 8130R).
17. D. Ryan, *The phoenix flame*.


44. F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, p. 136.
Chapter 2

THE GROWTH OF THE DUBLIN ORGANISATION

The failure of the Dublin organisation to develop is explained by lack of funds and the absence of James Stephens from Ireland. In this period, the Irish Americans who had planned to send enough money to enable Stephens to organise the I.R.B., failed to keep their promises. Responding to this, in October 1887 Stephens himself visited America in order to urge the Irish Americans to send funds to finance the new organisation. Stephens did not return from America to Ireland; instead he went to Paris in March 1888, and during most of 1888 and all of 1889 he remained there. Probably his absence was a result of his fear that he would be arrested on his return. To overcome
The Dublin organisation, 1858-67

On 17 March 1858 (St Patrick's Day) James Stephens, who had a promise of assistance from Irish Americans (the members of the Emmet Monument Association) launched the I.R.B. in a room 'in the street behind and parallel to Lombard Street' - probably Magennis Place in Dublin.¹ Men from the 1848 and 49 movement took a leading part in the new venture: Peter Langan in Dublin and John Hickey in Kingstown seem to have laid the foundation of the Dublin organisation.² John Hickey, a future Kingstown Centre, not only organised Kingstown men but, as a foreman bricklayer, he brought men in the Dublin building trade into the organisation.³ However, for about two and a half years - from its establishment to the autumn of 1860 - the organisation appears to have stagnated in the Dublin region. In the autumn of 1860 the Dublin organisation consisted of only about fifty members - including a small group of Kingstown men.⁴

The failure of the Dublin organisation to develop is explained by both the lack of funds and the absence of James Stephens from Ireland in this period. The Irish Americans who had promised to send enough money to enable Stephens to organise the I.R.B., failed to keep their promises.⁵ Responding to this, in October 1858 Stephens himself visited America in order to urge the Irish Americans to send funds to finance the new organisation. Stephens did not return from America to Ireland: instead he went to Paris in March 1859, and during most of 1859 and all of 1860 he remained there.⁶ Probably his absence was a result of his fear that he would be arrested on his return. In December
1858 and January 1859 the authorities arrested members of the I.R.B. mainly in Munster - the so-called Phoenix Society.

A turning point in the history of the Dublin organisation took place in the autumn of 1860, when Luby made the acquaintance of several young men, some of whom became Dublin Centres - James O'Callaghan and Nicholas Walsh - and others who were later very active in the I.R.B. elsewhere; one of them Edward Duffy, organised the movement in Connacht. It was these young men that rescued the I.R.B. from its stagnation. As a result until the MacManus funeral in November 1861, the Dublin organisation grew in size and importance; and Stephens promoted Luby's new recruits and Langan's men to the rank of Centre, probably some time in 1861.

The year 1860 was favourable for the growth of the I.R.B. The national petition movement to demand a plebiscite on Irish self-determination was launched from April 1860 on the initiative of the Nation, and finally collected over 400,000 signatures within a year. Undoubtedly the national petition movement boosted national sentiment, making it easier for Fenians to swear in members. Indeed, the national petition movement directly provided a recruiting ground for Fenianism: Devoy later claimed that its parish committees in Dublin were organised within the I.R.B. Moreover, during this period, James O'Callaghan actively engaged in enlisting men at the classes of the Society for the Promotion and Cultivation of the Irish Language which had been commenced in the summer of 1858.
In 1861, after the national petition movement ended, the National Brotherhood of St. Patrick emerged as the best recruiting ground. The National Brotherhood of St Patrick, started by Thomas Neilson Underwood who had no connection with the I.R.B., first appeared in public by holding St Patrick's Day banquets in Dublin and elsewhere in Ireland and Britain. And its purpose was not to be devotion to the national cause but the creation of social and intellectual contacts between nationalists. Therefore at its outset it had no specific political objectives; and there is no evidence that Fenians took part in its establishment. However, once it had been launched, Fenians began to infiltrate it and even tried to take control of it.

The Dublin organisation made progress in the course of 1861. Its growth is clearly reflected in the success of the MacManus funeral in November 1861, which was the first great achievement of the Dublin Fenians. T.B. MacManus, a Young Irelader, died in America on 15 January 1861 and American Fenians planned to transfer his remains to Ireland for burial. On 4 November 1861 the remains arrived in Dublin from Cork and were placed in the Mechanics Institute, Lower Abbey St, to lie in state. On 10 November the procession took place from the Mechanics Institute to Glasnevin cemetry and according to the police report between 7,000 and 8,000 people took part. The funeral was organised by a committee composed mainly of Dublin Fenians in particular its recent recruits such as James O'Callaghan, Andrew Nolan and Maurice O'Donohoe. This does not suggest that the large number of men who turned up at the funeral were necessarily either Fenian sympathisers or actual Fenians - as R.V. Comerford has pointed out: 'it would be a grave error to assume that the crowd was giving assent to MacManus's political doctrines'. Nevertheless the funeral revived
Irish nationalism, which had declined after the late 1840s, especially in the hearts of the new generation which had taken no part in the 1848 and 49 movement. A.M. Sullivan later asserted that 'Some of the Fenian authorities have estimated that a larger number of adherents were sworn in during the three weeks of the MacManus obsequies than during two previous years'.15 The success of the funeral bolstered the young men who had organised it, and after the funeral they took a major part in the organisation of the I.R.B. Unfortunately we have no information about the size of the Dublin organisation at the end of 1861, after its recruitment of members from the national petition movement and the National Brotherhood of St. Patrick, and the success of the MacManus funeral. What is clear, however, is that Fenian leaders had succeeded in paving the way for the development of Fenianism as a mass movement.

In spite of the success of the MacManus funeral, from 1862 to the establishment of the Irish People in November 1863, the Dublin organisation seems to have marked time. In 1862 Luby stated that 'we had to pass through a long and dreary period of severe trials and partial inaction'.16 In the summer Hugh Brophy, a Dublin Centre, criticised Stephens's laziness and inaction.17 In early 1863 Stephens called a meeting of 'chosen Dublin Centres and perhaps, one or two other men, in his confidence, not Centres', at which he said that the stagnation in the I.R.B. was due to O'Mahony not sending over money. Finally, in February 1863, Luby was sent to America to stir up the Fenian Brotherhood.18 Luby, when he came back from America in July 1863, discovered that the situation of the I.R.B. was more or less the same as before his departure. The Dublin Fenians were irritated by Stephens's inaction.19 Thus before the founding of the Irish People the Dublin Fenians were discontented with
Stephens. We have no information as to the size of the Dublin organisation at this time. However, judging from the condition of the I.R.B., the Dublin organisation was more or less the same as in late 1861 and early 1862, when the success of the MacManus funeral swelled recruitment, though some Fenians may have dropped out in 1862 and 1863.

The stagnation of the Dublin organisation in 1862 and 1863 resulted from the denunciation by the Catholic Church as well as from the lack of funds. The first confrontation between the Catholic Church and the I.R.B. had taken place at the MacManus funeral. Archbishop Cullen refused to allow funeral masses in the churches in Dublin. After the funeral he criticised secret societies and informed his clergy that they should caution their congregation against secret societies. In those days Cullen did not know of the existence of the I.R.B. itself. He denounced secret societies in general terms and his denunciation centred on the National Brotherhood of St. Patrick which he regarded as a secret society.

In February 1862 Cullen claimed that the National Brotherhood of St. Patrick was 'nothing more or less than Irish Mazzinians'. His fear of a revolution and his opposition to secret societies was much aroused by Fr Lavelle who was vice president of the National Brotherhood of St Patrick from March 1862 and who in February 1862 had given a lecture in Dublin entitled 'the Catholic Doctrine of the Right of Revolution'. In 1862 and 1863 the Catholic Church condemned, particularly, the National Brotherhood of St Patrick and advised their flock not to join secret societies. Finally in August 1863, the Irish bishops condemned the National Brotherhood of St. Patrick by name at their
meetings. Though in 1862 and 1863 the Church did not condemn the I.R.B. by name, individual Fenians faced the possibility of the Church's condemnation. Luby wrote that 'all the confessional boxes in Dublin - I suppose more or less those over all Ireland - were shut in the faces of "Fenians"'. It is difficult to know to what extent the Catholic Church damaged the Dublin organisation during this period. Several years later in 1870, when Rome's condemnation against Fenianism and Cullen's Lenten pastoral were issued, many Dublin Fenians, according to the police, tried to give up their cause, but they were deterred by fellow Fenians. Therefore the condemnation by the Catholic Church probably had some impact on the Dublin Fenians and perhaps Fenians encountered some difficulty in swearing in further members. However, in the light of the growth of the Dublin organisation in 1864 and 1865, Fenianism may have had the capacity or persuasiveness to overcome the Church's denunciation. It was indeed the foundation of the movement's newspaper, the Irish People, which publicly opposed the hierarchy and defended the right to organise, which gave the movement this capacity.

With the establishment of the Irish People in November 1863, the Dublin organisation, indeed, began its remarkable development. At that time, too, whereas the organisation had hitherto no clear title, the term Fenians came into popular and widespread use in Ireland. The organisation between 1858 and 1863, in spite of the success of its young activists in late 1860 and the triumph of the MacManus funeral in November 1861, had attained a growth that was modest compared with what followed the establishment of the Irish People. This can be seen in the fact that the police were not aware of any organisation in Dublin until December 1863, when Superintendent Ryan reported
that a revolutionary movement, whose object was to invade Ireland, was confined to America: the actual term used by Ryan was the Fenian Brotherhood. However, as a structure existed in the form of circles headed by Centres, and meetings took place of the Centres at the least, police complacency or failure in intelligence gathering cannot be excluded.

In late July 1863, Stephens announced the *Irish People* project, but most Dublin Centres were opposed to his idea because they anticipated that they would be involved in trouble produced by the paper. However, Stephens who was supported by the men in the south and south east of the country, put his idea into practice and launched the *Irish People* in November 1863. Its registered proprietor was Luby, and O'Donovan Rossa took charge of the business with James O'Connor. John O'Leary edited the paper, assisted by Charles Kickham, Denis Dowling Mulcahy and Luby. It would appear that less than 10,000 copies were printed weekly. Pierce Nagle at the Dublin Special Commission answered that they had published 8,000 weekly. We have another estimate as to the circulation of the paper from the police report. At first 10,000 copies were produced, Superintendent Ryan stated, but after some time the circulation was reduced to 5,000 and in February 1864 it was increased to 6,000. In March 1864, 7,000 copies were printed and 5,000 were sent to America. This suggests that the greater part of the edition was circulated not in Ireland but in America. Unfortunately there is no hard information about the extent of the circulation in Dublin. Probably the best guess is that the Dublin organisation took in at least several hundred copies. Documents on the *Irish People* in the State Paper Office reveal that Cahill, 81 Great Britain St, sold the papers, but identify no other seller.
The *Irish People*, as the Dublin Centres had foreseen, brought the I.R.B. into trouble. It did so in two ways. Firstly, the Fenians had to spend money to sustain the paper out of the scant Fenian resources which had been intended for the purpose of arming themselves. Though Stephens had intended to raise sufficient money from the sales of the paper, instead they 'had a weekly struggle to bring out each number'.34 Secondly, the Dublin police, hitherto unaware of its existence, began to become aware of Fenianism in Dublin and the regular gathering of prominent members at its office, 12 Parliament St, made their task all the easier. Joseph Denieffe wrote:

From the start the office became a lounging place for anyone who wished to take advantage of it. At first none but the curious, inquisitive, and those who had otherwise good intentions were continually around, but soon we saw detectives hovering around like birds of prey.35

In September 1865 before the seizure of the office, the police carefully watched the movements of Luby, O'Leary and O'Donovan Rossa at the office.36 Probably Dublin Centres who visited the office were identified as Fenians by the police.

In spite of these drawbacks the *Irish People* was the prime mover in promoting membership of the Dublin organisation. In terms of a wider context the paper transformed 'Stephens's movement into a major phenomenon in Irish public life in the mid-1860s' and 'gave fenians an enhanced sense of solidarity'.37 The paper propagated Fenian principles, serving as an able recruiting agency. A young Dubliner wrote to the editor of the paper:
I would like your advice and maintained on the getting up among the youths of Dublin an embodiment for the purpose of encouraging the practice of arms and getting their rights by such.38

Undoubtedly the paper enabled the Fenians to swear in new members more easily than before. Moreover, the paper repeatedly denied the Church's right to intervene in politics and hence supported the rank and file Fenians against the force of the Church's denunciation. As the rank and file had no strong anti-clerical tendency, they were very vulnerable to the Church's attack, without the strong public backing that the newspaper provided. In March 1864 Archbishop Cullen accused Fenians in his pastoral:

I shall now merely add one word of caution against secret societies, and the so-called Fenians or Brothers of St. Patrick, ... directing them to schemes of armed resistance and violence, and utopian projects, which never can be realised.39

Responding to such an attack, Charles Kickham in the paper advocated the separation of state and church.40

Another reason for the growth of the I.R.B. since 1864, apart from the emergence of the Irish People, is that constitutional nationalists failed to organise a strong group as a more pacific alternative to Fenianism. Towards the end of 1863, when a crisis emerged in the relationship between Britain and the Federal States as a result of the seizure on a British mail steamer - the Trent - of the Confederal envoys to England on the high seas, constitutional nationalists planned to hold a public meeting at the Rotunda to express their sympathy with the Federals. And it was believed that the meeting would lead to the inauguration of a new constitutional organisation. However, on 5 December Fenians, including Luby and men from Peter Langan's circle, took
control of the meeting and thus deprived constitutional nationalists of an organisational focus.41

In February 1864 constitutional nationalists made another effort to organise themselves. The Dublin corporation announced that a memorial to the late Prince Albert would be built on College Green, already designated, as was well known, for a statue to Henry Grattan.42 A.M. Sullivan, The O'Donoghue and other non-Fenian nationalists held a public meeting to denounce the corporation's decision at the Rotunda on 22 February. The Fenians, in response to this initiative by moderate nationalists, broke up the meeting. Though these events made Sullivan and other constitutional nationalists turn away from the I.R.B., they did mean that Fenianism dominated the course of Irish politics. John O'Leary stated, 'Indeed from this time forward the weight of opinion in favour of Fenianism seemed to be constantly growing, or rather it was perhaps that Fenianism was getting better known'.43 While non-constitutionalists joined the banner of Fenianism and were organised into a group, constitutionalists failed to develop a strong organisation to flourish in Irish politics, comparable to the Home Rule movement of the 1870s. Nevertheless, two organisations were launched in 1864 - the Irish National League in January and the National Association of Ireland in December. Archbishop Cullen and the Catholic Church were actively involved in the National Association, but the Association failed to stop the growth of Fenianism.44 Indeed, their failure lay in their negative character: intended to lessen the appeal of Fenianism, they had little positive purpose of their own, and in their opposition to Fenianism, they actually bolstered the prestige of the Fenians.
Since 1864 the I.R.B. was growing rapidly in the whole country. In September 1864 Stephens, on an excursion to Delgany, County Wicklow, declared that 1865 was to be the year of action. It would appear that the Dublin Centres believed Stephens's statement and made efforts to prepare for a rising. Towards the summer of 1865 the Dublin organisation was more powerful than before. The police later referred to 'July 1865 when Fenianism was becoming more alarming than before, and when as it is presumed the leading members were most active ...' At that time the Dublin organisation appears to have consisted of fifteen circles, counting several thousand men. The organisations elsewhere in Ireland also flourished vigorously. On Under Secretary Larcom's words:

Towards mid-summer the Constabulary reports received from all parts of Ireland, especially the South, stated that Fenianism was spreading rapidly; that the Fenians were constantly holding meetings and drilling; and that a rising was generally talked of and expected to take place soon after harvest time. In Kilkenny, Cork, Waterford and some other places, the police reported that half the male population were Fenians.

In early September 1865 Lord Lieutenant Lord Wodehouse, admitted the gravity of the threat: 'They mean mischief and if they can get arms and leaders from America may attempt an outbreak which would cause bloodshed and confusion' - though he found difficulty in securing tangible proofs to prosecute them. Eventually the authorities, who had in their possession the lost documents of a Fenian envoy from America and a note showing Stephens's intention to mount a campaign in 1865, decided to take firm steps against Fenianism. On 15 September, between 9 and 10 p.m. the police raided the office of the Irish People, arresting some staff and seizing documents. They continued to arrest
Fenians whom they had on their lists; and arrests were also made in other parts of Ireland and in Britain. Between September and early October 1865, the authorities arrested 187 Fenian suspects in Ireland and Britain: 179 in Ireland and 8 in England. In Dublin, the number of arrests by the police was 41 men. They were more or less connected with the office of the Irish People. Therefore these prisoners included both prominent Fenians such as O'Donovan Rossa, Thomas Clark Luby and John O'Leary, and rank and file Fenians who had worked at the office. As far as the Dublin organisation itself was concerned, the arrests were not critical: of fifteen Dublin Centres, only three Centres - Michael Moore, John O'Clohissey and James O'Connor were among the prisoners.

A more serious blow to the Dublin organisation was the arrest of Stephens on 11 November 1865. As the I.R.B., as we shall see in Chapter 3, was in effect Stephens's dictatorship, orders to the Dublin Centres came only from Stephens and Centres lacked any sense of autonomy. Stephens's arrest revealed one of the weak points of the I.R.B., leading to great fear and uncertainty among the Dublin Centres. The American officer, General Millen, filled a leadership vacuum temporarily. However, the dramatic rescue of Stephens from prison on 24 November ended the potentially damaging confusion among the I.R.B.

In November and December 1865 the Fenian trials were held in Dublin and the appearance of the Fenian leaders - Luby, O'Leary, O'Donovan Rossa and others - awoke sympathy among the people, for their respectful and manly conduct, and was probably valuable publicity for the Fenians. Devoy wrote that 'A few ran away, but the great majority rose splendidly to the occasion and became more
active than ever. Many outsiders, some of them men of standing, joined the organization throughout the country and recruiting went on rapidly.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, Fenianism grew, in spite of the seizure of the Irish People office. This is reflected in information that the authorities received towards the end of 1865: Fenianism made great progress and the rising would take place shortly.\textsuperscript{55}

The authorities felt the need of another measure to strike a blow at the I.R.B. and finally decided to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act on 17 February 1866. This measure was more decisive than the seizure of the Irish People office in September 1865. On 16 February, Superintendent Ryan was advised of the government's intention to suspend the Act and he ordered forty-six men of the G division to be at the detective office Exchange Court at 6 \text{am.} on the following day. On 17 February, men of the G division were provided with the list which Superintendent Ryan had prepared as to the places where he had traced American officers, strangers and suspicious persons. Assisted by men of other divisions, they arrested 91 men including 38 Americans and 38 strangers from England between 8 \text{am.} and noon.\textsuperscript{56} From 17 February to 1 March the police arrested 165 men; 94 from England, 45 from America, 1 from Canada, 2 deserters from the British army, 4 publicans, 6 Kingstown Fenians and 13 others.\textsuperscript{57} Most arrests were made on 17 February and the successive two or three days. From 26 February to 20 March 1866, 56 were arrested - 21 from England, 1 from America, 1 Centre, 2 Bs and 2 paymasters.\textsuperscript{58} In short from 17 February to 20 March over 200 men were arrested in Dublin: over 100 men from England and over 40 from America. During the period the police raided two pubs, Pilsworth's, 132 and 133 James's St on 22 February, and Slattery's, 7 Cork Hill, on 6 March. In Pilsworth's, John Devoy, the organiser of Fenian
soldiers, and his subordinates were arrested. This was a critical blow to the Fenian organisation in the British army. In Slattery's, 26 men were arrested. By suspending the Habeas Corpus Act the police arrested in particular, strangers in Dublin, Fenians from England and American officers. Consequently a large number of strangers who had been seen in the streets in Dublin before the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act disappeared. On the other hand during this period only three Dublin Centres (John Hickey, J.P. McDonnell and Edmund O'Donovan) were arrested. However, some Centres no doubt fled the country to escape arrest. In this way, the Dublin organisation received a severe blow. The police overoptimistically believed that the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act resulted in the effective extinction of the movement in Dublin, and that the Fenian threat was gone.

The reality was that by April 1866, the Dublin organisation recovered by replacing Centres who either fled or had been arrested, by new ones; moreover, as far as the rank and file Fenians were concerned, the arrests left the movement intact. If at first oversanguine about the results of the arrests, the police at least became aware with little loss of time of the revival. As a result in April and May they arrested six Centres - James O'Callaghan, Simon Brady, George Connolly, Bryan Gibney, Patrick Kearney and William Sheedy. Such arrests deprived the Dublin organisation, at least temporarily, of its vitality, and for a while it disappeared from public view. A later statement by the commissioner of the D.M.P. summarised aptly the police view of the effects of the enforcement of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act:

The effects were magical; private Fenian meetings were given up, drilling ceased, the menacing tone of Fenianism so much heard in the streets and public houses was silent, the public alarm subsided, people
resumed their ordinary pursuits, and before the end of May, Fenianism was forgotten, and was apparently extinct, or, at least was no longer active. 62

Certainly, the Fenians gave up both drilling and meetings in pubs, and this was the basis of police optimism about the effects of the suspension. In July and August 1866 the police asserted that Dublin was tranquil and Fenianism collapsed. 63 These assertions reflect partly the limitations of police information on Fenian activities and partly the fact that the Fenians became more secretive. Lord Lieutenant Lord Wodehouse, who left Ireland on 18 July 1866, began before his departure to release Fenians who had been arrested under the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. Optimists though the police were, the release of men seemed to them ill-advised, and Superintendent Ryan, in expressing grave apprehension about the release observed:

It would be a mistake to suppose that arrest and imprisonment has had a beneficial effect on the person arrested by virtue of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, the greater portion of whom are now at liberty. I have paid particular attention to the manner in which those who have got their discharge spoke and acted after they regained their liberty and were being accompanied to the steamer and my impression is that only married men, or men who had relatives depending on them for support, felt the effects of imprisonment, and acknowledged they were gulled by misrepresentations. 64

In the latter half of 1866 Fenians actively started to prepare for a rising in the wake of an announcement by Stephens of his intention to launch a rising before 1 January 1867. It was not until late September 1866 that the police reported the rumours that Fenianism had acquired a new life in Dublin. 65 In November the police discovered that the Fenians were collecting money for Fenian purposes by subscriptions and holding raffles and the pubs were filled by strangers. 66 Furthermore, as they reported, Dr Power and his Bs were
actively engaged not only in importing and distributing arms but also swearing in soldiers. These circumstances forced the authorities to abandon their complacency and to act again. In December eleven Centres were arrested; Richard Bracken, Brady, Joseph Byrne, Laurence Clancy, William Connolly, John Hickey, John J. Kelly, Patrick O'Connor, Dr Power, Michael Stanley and Nicholas Walsh. The arrests damaged Dr Power's circle in particular, because the Centres who succeeded him - Michael Stanley and Laurence Clancy - were also arrested inside a month. And the circle lost four Bs: William Stack who was actively engaged in swearing in soldiers, George Browne, J.B. Walsh and Edward O'Reagan were taken into custody. In this way the police not only eliminated much of the Dublin leadership but broke its most successful circle, Dr Power's. Considering the number of arrested Centres, the police attempts in December 1866 were more effective than in September 1865 or February 1866. The arrests disheartened the Dublin Fenians, who had hoped to start a rising before New Year's day, 1867, and introduced confusion into the Dublin ranks; their meetings were less frequent; orders were given to stop the importation of arms; money was not collected.

On 5 March 1867 the Dublin organisation which lost eleven Centres and some Bs in December 1866, started the rising. In January and February the Dublin Fenians tried, as far as we can judge from the evidence in February of former Bs who had now become Centres, to reconstruct their organisation by filling the positions of arrested Centres with their Bs. Undoubtedly they had not sufficient time to re-organise completely within such a short period. However, as the police arrested only active Fenians, the likelihood is that the general structure of the Dublin organisation remained intact and the rank and file
Fenians, though disheartened by the arrests, were ready to respond to orders. There existed, according to Devoy, twenty-five Circles in 1865, while in February 1867, twenty-four Centres turned up at a meeting to discuss a future rising. In terms of numerical strength the Dublin organisation in March 1867 might have been stronger than in 1865. However, the arrest of a great number of Centres and active Bs, such as Dr Power's Bs, meant that the organisation was deprived of its most experienced commanders. By depriving the organisation of the heads of circles, accustomed, through meetings of Centres, to have some regular contact, the arrests may also have damaged the cohesiveness of the organisation and impaired its ability to mobilise all of its members at the same time.

Dublin and other districts in Ireland and Britain

The I.R.B., several years after its foundation, developed into a national organisation to occupy an important role in Irish politics; and it had its branches in provincial towns in Ireland and in cities in Britain. According to General Millen who was informed of the number of the I.R.B. in the summer of 1865, 53,000 men existed in the I.R.B. in Ireland: 16,000 in Leinster, 16,000 in Munster, 11,000 in Ulster and 10,000 in Connacht.

The spread of the I.R.B. was at the outset most rapid in the south in counties such as Kilkenny, Tipperary and Cork. On the day following the establishment of the I.R.B., on 17 March 1858, Stephens and Luby commenced an organising tour through the south, where they visited prominent nationalists, explaining the plan of the I.R.B. to them. One of the biggest success in Stephens's organising tour took place in May 1858, when he swore in the leaders of the Phoenix National and Literary Society in Skibbereen, such as O'Donovan Rossa.
and Dan McCartie. They started to organise their surrounding areas, for example, Kenmare and Killarney and by the autumn of 1858 Joseph Denieffe wrote that the southern half of the country had been organised. In this way Stephens built up a good foundation of the I.R.B. in the south, where the 1848 and 49 tradition existed. Stephens appears to have concentrated his personal efforts on Leinster and Munster. In early Fenianism Munster appears to have been better organised than Leinster. But Stephens's success in organising the south was seriously damaged by the arrest of Fenians in December 1858 and January 1859; the authorities captured Fenian suspects in Skibbereen, Bantry, Kenmare, Killarney and Callan. And in those days the lack of funds to some extent prevented Fenian leaders from visiting local organisers and searching after new ground.

Despite these drawbacks Fenian leaders continued to make trips to develop the movement. As in most of 1859 and 1860 Stephens spent his days in Paris, it was Luby who took a vital role in spreading the I.R.B. In 1859 Luby made more journeys than in 1858; for example, he visited Kilkenny, Wicklow, Waterford, Carrick-on-Suir, Clonmel and Cork. By March 1860 there existed thirty-two Centres in Ireland but the I.R.B. in Ireland was likely to be a loose bounded society: Stephens did not establish a regular communication system with these Centres. Overall effectiveness of the I.R.B. was much less impressive than the number of leaders of circles.

In 1861 'the new young men' whom Luby had recruited in late 1860 and 1861 provided Stephens and Luby with sufficient funds for 'a fresh tour of reorganization through Leinster and Munster.' Denieffe asserted that this
tour was the most successful one. In 1862 Stephens and Luby visited Kildare, Carlow and Kilkenny. After this tour, Stephens seems to have stopped an organising tour until the opening months of 1863, when O'Mahony sent money to Stephens. The money enabled Stephens to start a southern tour, distributing copies of the printed proceedings of the Philadelphia meeting of the Fenian Brotherhood: he visited Kilkenny, Clonmel, Cork, Macroom and Skibbereen. The Irish People gave a fresh impetus to the I.R.B. In August 1863 Stephens, who planned to start the Irish People, went down south to collect funds and subscribers, and to establish local committees. Luby went to Drogheda and Belfast to announce the project of the Irish People. Thus from 1858 to 1863 Stephens and Luby organised the I.R.B. in Leinster and Munster.

Stephens and Luby were ably assisted by the members of the Dublin organisation in expanding the I.R.B. According to Devoy after the end of the national petition movement in 1861 the newly recruited young men started to spread the organisation into the provincial towns in Leinster. In 1862 Dublin Centre John O'Clohissey introduced his Drogheda friend to Luby, and since then Luby, accompanied by O'Clohissey, started propagandism there by the Sunday excursion train: and up to the time of his arrest Luby made trips to Drogheda. O'Clohissey also was active in Wexford, and he recruited Bs and a number of Cs there in April 1865. Other Dublin Centres who were prominent in organising districts outside Dublin were Hugh Brophy, John Hickey, Edmund O'Donovan and James McCabe. Brophy was reported to have enrolled 'about 1,500 men including Protestants and Roman Catholics' in Belfast. Superintendent Ryan stated in 1865 that the Kingstown Centre John Hickey had been in Enniscorthy on Fenian business. Edmund O'Donovan introduced Fenianism into
Clare, 'one of the best Fenian counties' and James McCabe was said to go to Tipperary on Fenian business. Some Dublin Fenians who had been recruited in Dublin moved to the provincial towns and started the organisation there; Byrne in Athy, Sullivan in Newbridge, Tom Williams in Longford and Tom Owens in Westmeath.

In the early stage of Fenianism, drapers' assistants employed their Sundays and leisure time on Fenian business and commercial travellers were conspicuous in spreading the movement. Andrew Nolan, a traveller for a large hardware house in Thomas St, swore in members in Carlow, Kildare and the surrounding counties and John W. Foley, a commercial traveller, was also active. As the I.R.B. grew, agents who devoted their entire time to spreading the organisation and lived on Fenian pay emerged and they travelled through Ireland and Britain. Such agents were John Ryan, John Flood, John B. Walsh, John Harrison, Kelly, David Bell, James Lambe and Dr McKenna. Thus through the combined efforts of Stephens, and various Fenian Centres and agents, the I.R.B. permeated the provincial towns in late 1863 and early 1864. However, organisation was at first confined to certain parts of Leinster and Munster, which Dublin or Cork Centres and agents could reach by spending their own money and time.

It is only after the establishment of the Irish People in November 1863 that the I.R.B. made great progress especially in Connacht, Ulster and Britain. Edward Duffy, one of the young men newly recruited by Luby, was the principal organiser for Connacht and his work also extended into Longford, Cavan and Westmeath. He achieved great success during the Irish People period. It was John Nolan, working in a drapery establishment in Belfast, that started the
organisation in Ulster.\textsuperscript{97} In Belfast, under Nolan, assisted by Frank Roney, the organisation grew to the extent that several Centres were appointed.\textsuperscript{98} Another able Ulster organiser was James Blayney Rice, Ribbonmen, who organised Monaghan, absorbing Ribbonmen into the I.R.B.\textsuperscript{99}

By the end of 1865 the I.R.B. in Britain, as we shall see, became strong enough to send between 400 and 500 Fenians to Dublin. The Irish communities to which Fenianism strongly appealed were London, Sheffield, Manchester, Birkenhead and Liverpool. Furthermore, Fenianism existed in Wigan, Bolton, Glasgow, Oldham, Leeds, Bradford, Dundee, Edinburgh, Chesterfield and so on.\textsuperscript{100} The National Brotherhood of St. Patrick contributed to the growth of the I.R.B. in Britain; and it had branches in the principal cities in Britain and afterwards these branches seem to have been Fenianised.\textsuperscript{101} The growth of the I.R.B. in Britain also drew a stimulus from the establishment of the Irish People in November 1863.\textsuperscript{102} In 1865 Stephens spent five weeks in Britain, where he appointed 65 Centres.\textsuperscript{103}
Chapter Two: Footnotes

1. N.L.I., MS 331, p.8.
2. Ibid., pp 5-6
4. N.L.I., MS 331, p.31.
5. Denieffe, A personal narrative, p.5.
7. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 26-9.
8. Ibid., p. 40.
12. Comerford, The Fenians in context, pp 71, 74; Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 56. In Dublin J.P. McDonnell, a prominent Dublin Fenian, became a secretary of the Central and Governing Council of the National Brotherhood of St Patrick with C.G. Doran, who later was the secretary of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. In 1864 Stephens ordered Fenians to give up the membership of the National Brotherhood of St Patrick. Subsequently at the end of 1864, J.P. McDonnell resigned as the secretary. And in early 1865 the National Brotherhood of St Patrick in Dublin ceased its function (Supt. Ryan to C.P., 25 July 1864. [S.P.O., F.P.R. 36]; Comerford, The Fenians in context, p. 81; Daly, Ireland and the first International, pp 33, 58-9; Devoy, Recollections, pp 33, 35).
16. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 143.
17. Ibid., p. 160.
18. Ibid., pp 179, 185, 187; Denieffe, A Personal narrative, pp 77-8.


24. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 144.


26. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 213.


28. Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 82.

29. Report of the proceedings at the first sitting of the special commission for the county of the city of Dublin held at Green Street, Dublin, for the trial of Thomas Clarke Luby and others for treason-felony, 'the Fenian conspiracy', commencing on November 27, 1865 (Dublin, 1866), (hereafter Report of Dublin special commission for the trial of T.C. Luby, 1865), p. 903.


32. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, no. 5, envelope 18.


38. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, no. 2, envelope 3.

40. Comerford, Charles J. Kickham, pp 69-76.
41. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 32; Comerford, The Fenians in context, p. 86; Denieffe, A personal narrative, pp 72-3.
42. A.M. Sullivan, New Ireland, p. 250.
45. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 339.
47. P.R.O., Russell papers, 30/22/28, quoted in Larkin, The consolidation of the Roman Catholic Church, pp 400-1.
48. Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 Sept. 1865 (C.S.O., R.P. 1865/14664). The Dublin Centres who had received news of the seizure of the Irish People gathered at the different rendezvous places to wait for Stephens's order. Stephens directed them not to undertake any action and to keep their men under control. As a result the Dublin organisation made no protest against the authorities (N.L.I., MS 5964, pp 70-1).
50. Ibid., 22 Sept. 1865.
51. Ibid., 22 Sept. 1865.
52. Supt Ryan to C.P., 12 Nov. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 340).
53. N.L.I., MS 5964, pp 103-4; Devoy, Recollections, pp 77-87.
54. Devoy, Recollections, p. 70.
57. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/4852.
61. S.P.O., 'Habeas corpus suspension act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'.
62. C.P. Lake, O'Ferrall to Chief Secretary, 23 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/1316).
63. Supt Ryan to C.P., 13 July 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/13407 on 1866/15376);
    Supt Ryan to C.P., 30 July 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/14353 on 1867/1524);
    Supt Ryan to C.P., 4 Aug. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/16941).
64. Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Aug. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/14958 on 1866/17277).
66. C.P. Lake, O'Ferrall to Chief Secretary. 23 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/1316).
67. S.P.O., 'Habeas corpus suspension act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'.
69. C.P., Lake, O'Ferrall to Chief Secretary, 23 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/1316).
70. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 8.
72. Denieffe, A personal narrative, pp 25-6, 36.
73. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 41-6, 49; Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 26;
    Rossa, Rossa's recollections, pp 149-50.
76. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 214; Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 27.
77. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 18, 88; Luby to Stephens, 31 July 1859 (T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/227).
78. Stephens to O'Mahony, 5 Mar. 1860, quoted in Denieffe, A personal
    narrative, p. 161.
79. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 31-2.
81. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 137-42.
82. Ibid., pp 162-5, 329-31.
84. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 154.
85. O’Clohissey to —, 29 Apr. 1865 (T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/203).
88. Devoy, Recollections, p. 32.
89. C.S.O., R.P. 1867/7199.
96. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 156, 340; Comerford, The Fenians in context, p. 118.
97. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 155; Devoy, Recollections, P. 28.
102. N.L.I., MS 333, p. 1.
The leadership of the I.R.A.

The Fenian organisation consisted of the I.R.A., the Fenian Brotherhood and the Fenian Brotherhood in America. The Fenian Brotherhood was the main and the military arm for the I.R.A. and was started as a volunteer army for the I.R.A.7 However, the Fenian Brotherhood gradually increased its relationship between the two organisations and eventually dominated the independence from the I.R.A. John O'Mahony, who was in Pretoria shortly after the end of 1901, was criticized by Stephen for his failure to send money. Said to Stephen that he would not be subordinate to anyone.8 Mahony's intention to clearly demonstrate in the Chicago Convention of the Fenian Brotherhood in December 1885, which declared not only that the I.R.A. was subordinate to the Fenian Brotherhood but that Mahony was representative for every one of the officers of the Irish people.9 In 1884 Stephen, who was in America, to strengthen the Fenian Brotherhood in sending money to Mahony, tried to establish an authority, asking him to appoint a deputy head centre of the Fenian Brotherhood and deputy centres within the American organisation; and to open direct communication between Stephens and the American deputy centres.9 The Fenian Brotherhood was not despotically controlled by O'Mahony. As early as November 1883, when the Chicago Convention was held, O'Mahony was asked to nominate five members to a Central Council and to consult them about important matters.10 This Central Council, later the Senate, developed its influence over the Fenian Brotherhood and at last in December 1886 deposed O'Mahony as the head of the organisation, O'Mahony summoned a rival congress in New York on 3 January 1886 and asserted his authority.9 In this way the Fenian Brotherhood was split into two groups, the O'Mahony wing and the Senate wing; the Senate wing elected
The leadership of the I.R.B.

The Fenian organisation consisted of the I.R.B. in Ireland and Britain and the Fenian Brotherhood in America. The Fenian Brotherhood was the source of money and military leaders for the I.R.B. and was started as a subordinate body to the I.R.B.¹ However, the Fenian Brotherhood gradually reversed the relationship between the two organisations and eventually asserted its independence from the I.R.B. John O'Mahony who was in Ireland towards the end of 1860, when criticised by Stephens for his failure to send money, said to Stephens that he would not be subordinate any longer.² O'Mahony's intention is clearly discernible in the Chicago Convention of the Fenian Brotherhood in November 1863, which declared not only that the I.R.B. was subordinate to the Fenian Brotherhood but that Stephens was its representative for Europe and the organiser of the Irish people.³ In 1864 Stephens, who went to America to encourage the Fenian Brotherhood in sending money briskly, tried to countermand the resolution of the Chicago Convention, in order to decrease O'Mahony's authority, asking him to appoint a deputy head Centre of the Fenian Brotherhood and deputy Centres within the American organisation, and to open direct communication between Stephens and the American deputy Centres.⁴ The Fenian Brotherhood was not despotically controlled by O'Mahony. As early as November 1863, when the Chicago Convention was held, O'Mahony was asked to nominate five members to a Central Council and to consult them about important matters.⁵ This Central Council, later the Senate, developed its influence over the Fenian Brotherhood and at last in December 1865 deposed O'Mahony as the head of the organisation. O'Mahony summoned a rival congress in New York on 3 January 1866 and asserted his authority.⁶ In this way the Fenian Brotherhood was split into two groups, the O'Mahony wing and the Senate wing; the Senate wing elected
Roberts as their president and devoted themselves to an invasion of Canada without paying attention to the I.R.B. Undoubtedly the split in the Fenian Brotherhood beclouded the prospect of the I.R.B. starting a rising.

Within Ireland a contrast existed between the large number of circles (and the elaborate organisation within them), and the rudimentary organisation at the top of the movement. As the organisation grew, the case for more effective central organisation became more acute. Some prominent Fenian leaders were critical of the I.R.B. as a system despotically controlled by Stephens. Stephens as the chief organiser of the Irish Republic had complete control of a large number of Centres whom he had appointed in Ireland and Britain, and did not allow any intermediate position between the Centres and himself. For example an informer related that no resolution 'could be adopted without Stephens's approval.' General Millen, the president of the Military Council founded in September 1865, described the reason for Stephens's despotism:

I thought I perceived in Stephens a sort of jealous feeling towards any person or persons who might be likely hereafter to become formidable to him as a rival in power."

As far back as early 1861 John O'Mahony recommended that Stephens should have a council to manage the organisation in his absence. However, Stephens did not accept this recommendation until March 1864 when he left for America. At this time Stephens appointed Thomas Clarke Luby, John O'Leary and Charles Kickham as members of the Committee of Organisation or Executive. Stephens wrote a document for providing for the government of the organisation in his absence:
I hereby appoint Thomas Clarke Luby, John O'Leary and Charles J. Kickham, a Committee of Organization, or Executive with the same supreme control over the Home Organization (Ireland, England, Scotland, etc.) I have exercised myself.

I further empower them to appoint a Committee of Military Inspection, and a Committee of Appeal and Judgement, the functions of which Committees will be made known to each member of them by the Executive.

Trusting to the patriotism and ability of the Executive, I fully endorse their action beforehand, and call on every man in our ranks to support and be guided by them in all that concerns our military brotherhood.

J. Stephens, Dublin, March 9 1864.

According to John Devoy, the Executive Committee never took any action during Stephens's absence, and the committee appears to have been abolished after Stephens's return from America.

In 1864 American Fenians proposed that the I.R.B. should be managed by a regularly constituted council or governing body, but Stephens managed to reject it. In July 1865 American Fenians who insisted on changing the constitution of the I.R.B. had their way. Stephens who was anxious to gain a large amount of American money could not refuse the proposal by American envoys - P.W. Dunne and Patrick Meehan - to appoint an advisory council. Consequently John O'Leary, Charles Kickham, Thomas Clark Luby, O'Donovan Rossa, Daniel Bell and General Millen were appointed as members of the Council. However, the power of the Council was rather limited and according to General Millen, it merely gave its consent to Stephens's action. Immediately after the arrest of O'Leary, Luby and O'Donovan Rossa in September 1865, Stephens, instead of appointing new members of the council, created a new council, the so-called, Military Council.
consisting mainly of American officers. The Military Council was not an important decision maker of the I.R.B. but merely its adjunct. Though Stephens had successively created two councils - the advisory Council in July and the so-called Military Council in September - he never shared his power with them; and no Centres of circles were represented in either committee, whose membership was confined to only a small group of prominent Fenian leaders. Moreover, the failure to create a more effective or representative military council was especially critical.

After the seizure of the Irish People office, Stephens remained in hiding in a house in Newbridge Avenue, Sandymount, with Hugh Brophy, Charles Kickham and Edward Duffy until his arrest on 11 November 1865. Within this period Stephens stopped meeting both provincial and Dublin Centres. He delegated responsibility for districts outside the capital: Hugh Brophy took charge of the northern district, Kickham of the southern district and Edward Duffy of the western. Stephens retained special charge of the Dublin district but relied on John Nolan for personal communication with Dublin Centres, and orders and reports between Stephens and Nolan were passed through the hands of Hugh Brophy and Edward Duffy. This was the first stage in which a Dublin Centre - Hugh Brophy - had a role in the central organisation. It seems unreasonable, however, that someone closely associated with the Dublin organisation was not given more formal responsibility for the Dublin district. This system continued until the arrest of Stephens, Kickham, Brophy and Duffy on 11 November 1865.
Stephens, after his rescue from prison, filled the positions formerly held by Kickham, Brophy and Duffy: John Nolan succeeded Brophy in charge of the north, and Mortimer Moynahan and David Murphy succeeded Kickham for the south - we have no evidence regarding the successor of Duffy for the west. Characteristically the ambiguous pattern for Dublin remained: no clear central authority existed, and Stephens utilised Colonel Kelly as a medium of communication between him and Centres. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866 introduced confusion into the I.R.B. However, Stephens made no efforts to reorganise the I.R.B. Undoubtedly the I.R.B. was neglected by Stephens. Stephens left for America in March, accompanied by Colonel Kelly purporting to get American help. He appointed Edward Duffy, who had been arrested with him and was bailed because he was mortally ill, as his deputy (the nominal head of the I.R.B.) - there is no doubt that Duffy was unable to play an active role in the movement because of his ill health. There is no evidence that Stephens created a governing body of the I.R.B. before his departure. What is certain is, however, that there existed no effective command structure between the top and the circles. The point was clearly revealed in the failure of the rising. Nevertheless within these limitations of structure the Dublin organisation worked well. In the summer of 1866, after Stephens launched his plan for a rising by the end of that year, the Fenians, responding to his call, made preparations for a rising in the autumn. Fenianism revived, in spite of its central weakness in organisation. This meant in effect that each circle enjoyed autonomy to do its business more or less in its own way.
While he had been in Ireland, Stephens was unwilling to hold regular meetings to discuss Fenian affairs with prominent Fenians and Centres. Meetings were held only for some special or particular reason. First of all, Stephens had to deal with disaffection among Centres who were irritated by his inactivity. Before the establishment of the Irish People in 1863, Stephens asked Luby to summon a meeting of the prominent leaders of Dublin, at which Luby requested them to explain their grievances. This meeting was followed by another one in early September 1863. About two years later at Denieffe's place, Stephens frequently had to hold meetings with Luby, O'Leary and American officers to deal with disaffection.18

Secondly, by holding meetings of prominent leaders, Stephens expressed his intention of making a degree of concession to a demand from the Fenian Brotherhood that the I.R.B. should be governed by a council. In 1864 Stephens held a meeting of all the Centres of Dublin and the nearby towns, at which they discussed the document from the Fenian Brotherhood to request a change in what was claimed to be Stephens's dictatorship.19 In 1865 Stephens who wanted to seek immediate assistance, especially money from America had a meeting with O'Leary, Bell, O'Donovan Rossa and Luby to adopt a memorial to John O'Mahony.20 In the same year Stephens held another meeting with O'Leary, Bell, O'Donovan Rossa, Meehan, Kickham, General Halpin and General Millen for the same purpose.21 At these meetings Stephens seems to have tried to show to the Fenian Brotherhood that the I.R.B. was not his personal autocracy. Though Stephens did not intend to change the system of the I.R.B., these meetings were, according to Luby, 'indications of the approaching spontaneous birth and growth of a council around Stephens's autocracy'.22 From the time of
Stephens's escape from prison in November 1865 to his departure for America in March 1866, Stephens held three important meetings with Centres and American officers to consult as to whether they would start a rising or not.23 By this time it would appear that Stephens had lost the confidence of Fenian leaders and he could not maintain the organisation without consulting them, though formally he shared his power with no one.

Here we examine the communication system between Stephens and Centres. Before the seizure of the Irish People, Centres met Stephens in Dublin and received orders directly from him; and in some cases Stephens visited them. Stephens met Centres from all parts of the country, and from Britain in George Hopper's house in Sandymount.24 And Stephens's visits to Centres and their circles were important in uniting Fenians. Luby said that 'without repeated visits from Stephens, centres and circles were sure to go to pieces when left unvisited by him'.25 Similarly messengers from Stephens played an important part in the communication system. In the early stages of Fenianism Stephens met Centres and prominent leaders at his own lodgings; he changed them quite often for safety. Lodgings we can trace were a house in Lennox St, three successive residences in which Hopper lived (in Charlemont St, Camden St and Sandymount), Hugh Brophy's cottage in Harold's Cross, two successive houses in Rathmines (whose precise addresses we do not know), a house in Hamilton Row, Fairfield House in Sandymount and the house of Mrs Butler in Kildare St.26 As the organisation grew, Stephens stopped meeting at his lodgings and met his subordinates at the lodgings of his trusted men, for example, Cornelius O'Mahony's at 102 Phibsborough Road, Dan Downey's at 68 Great Brunswick St, John Flood's at 20 Denzille St, Joseph Denieffe's shop in South Ann St and

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George Hopper's in 80 Dame St. Stephens did not meet many people at the same time, possibly 'some dozen or so'. When Stephens gave orders to subordinates and received reports from them, he separated them from others who were present to keep their conversation as secret as possible. According to Pierce Nagle, when he met Stephens, Cornelius Dwyer Keane, Ryan from Liverpool and Dan Dowyer at Dowyer's lodgings in August 1865, each person had a separate meeting with Stephens in Dowyer's bedroom. After the seizure of the Irish People, Stephens gave up meeting Centres in order to minimise the risk of attracting police attention.

There is thus no doubt that up until 1865 Stephens met Dublin Centres, and gave orders to them. Communications between Stephens and individual Centres may have been maintained. On the other hand there is no evidence that Dublin Centres had effective communications among themselves, though they did hold some meetings of their own, at which some resolutions were adopted. For example in March 1866, Superintendent Ryan reported that at a conference of Centres they had decided to have no meetings in pubs and in December 1866 he was informed that at a meeting of Centres it had been resolved that no fire arms be served out. But it is doubtful if they had regular meetings. The fact that such meetings, which were not provided for in Fenian structures, did take place in 1866, is evidence of the void which existed at the heart of the Dublin organisation from 1866.

During the period between Stephens's departure for America in March 1866 and December 1866, no one attempted to assume his authority over the I.R.B. Edward Duffy, Stephens's deputy, was merely trying to organise the I.R.B. on behalf
of Stephens in America. Stephens, himself, during this period, did not pay much attention to the I.R.B. Duffy was to be in constant communication with Stephens, conveying his instructions to several Centres and regulating the disbursements. However, from April 1866 to probably early October 1866 Duffy did not receive any letters or money from Stephens; Duffy received only Colonel Kelly's letter dated 1 June by which he got £210. Therefore during this period, lacking money, he seems to have given no instructions to Centres. In August 1866 Duffy admitted that:

Owing to the want of funds we have had no communication with the country than 9 weeks. Even if we had money, we had nothing new to tell and to send any one without fresh news ...

Duffy, because of his ill health, could not attend meetings with Centres and he relied on communication with several confidential men, such as John O'Connor, Maurice O'Donohoe and Michael Graham.

After his arrival in America in May 1866, Stephens took the head of the O'Mahony wing of the Fenian Brotherhood, appointing Colonel Kelly as his deputy. However, in December 1866 Stephens, who postponed an intended rising, was deposed as head of the O'Mahony wing of the Fenian Brotherhood by Colonel Kelly and other American officers - Stephens's long 'dictatorship' had ended. Consequently Stephens played no role in the immediate background to the rising in March 1867. Though Stephens was removed from the leadership of the Fenian Brotherhood, he retained the position of the chief organiser of the I.R.B. for a while. In January 1867 Duffy had given up the position of deputy to Stephens because of his ill health and then was succeeded by an Irish American
named 'Evans'. There is little evidence that Stephens had given approval either to Duffy's resignation or the promotion of Evans to his place.

From the start of the movement, Fenians faced a continuing financial problem and they had to start the rising without sufficient funds. Colonel Kelly later stated that the rising had been carried out on £1,500. The Fenian Brotherhood supplied money to the I.R.B., though the amount was never satisfactory to the leaders of the I.R.B. The organisation spent money on the purchase of arms, on organising tours and on payments to Fenians who depended on the movement's financial support - Fenian full-time agents, American officers and Fenians from England. Therefore as the organisation grew, more money was needed. Before Stephens founded the I.R.B., Irish Americans had promised to supply from £80 to £100 a month. The Fenian Brotherhood sent £43,000 to the I.R.B. from its establishment in 1858 to March 1867; the greater part of the money, about £31,000 was remitted from 1864 to 1 April 1866, while only £1,596 was sent from 1858 to 1863. The I.R.B. also raised money by subscriptions from the members and by raffles but they could not collect enough money at home. In 1863 Stephens wrote to O'Mahony that 'owing to the great distress at home, I have not been able to raise the necessary funds'. In these circumstances Stephens set out to establish the Irish People, the Fenians' weekly newspaper in November 1863 to raise funds. He explained his intention:

On average the receipts of the house yonder have not reached £250 a year. And what have we not been compelled to endure for this? No matter now [sic], the paper once established would certainly give us five or six times that amount, and might be made to give us fifteen or eighteen times as much!
However, in financial terms, the establishment of the Irish People was not successful. For example, during Stephens's tour in America in 1864, the printers who had never received their full salaries struck for wages. Thus the likelihood is that Fenians lacked the sufficient funds to run the organisation.

The first financial agent of the I.R.B. was John O'Leary, who received money orders and bank drafts from the Fenian Brotherhood and managed to give a certain amount of money to Fenian leaders. Money orders and bank drafts were transmitted by Fenian messengers and through the British post. The authorities found that from 9 April 1864 to 12 September 1865 over £7,800 in bank drafts had been sent from America to the I.R.B. After a 'final call' to prompt action in Ireland was issued on 5 August 1865, O'Mahony was said to forward several drafts, amounting to about £6,000 through the British post. Of these bank drafts two drafts amounting £2,000 which had been enclosed in letters dated 9 and 12 September 1865 addressed to George Hopper were intercepted in the post office. These seizures of the bank drafts and the arrest of John O'Leary in September 1865 forced the Fenians to change the remittance system. They gave up sending bank drafts directly from America to Ireland and instead adopted a new system under which Fenian agents carried bank notes to Paris, whence money was brought into Ireland. Subsequently Captain Laurence O'Brien brought £1,000 in gold and in October Captain Smith brought £1,000 in notes and gold to Ireland. In November 1865 Edmund O'Leary, a brother of John O'Leary, started his mission as a financial agent in Paris to receive money from America and to send it to Ireland. He was almost immediately replaced by John Mitchel who accomplished his duty from December 1865 to June 1866 and received
about £9,000 from 7 December 1865 to 15 March 1866. And money was brought from Paris to Dublin mainly by American officers. The name of only one of these officers survives - Captain Laurence O'Brien who was the intermediary from December 1865 to February 1866. There is no evidence as to who succeeded John Mitchel as a financial agent in Paris. What is certain is that American Fenians failed in transferring sufficient money to the I.R.B. during 1866. According to Edward Duffy who managed the financial matters, from April to October 1866 only £745 was sent to him.

Wives and sisters of Fenian prisoners raised some money but this money was used not for Fenian business but for relieving the families of Fenian prisoners. Mrs Luby and Mrs O'Donovan Rossa established the Ladies Committee in late 1865. On 18 and 19 January 1866 they held a bazaar in the Mechanics Institute and by early 1866 they collected over £500. In January 1867 the Ladies Committee held meetings at 17 Mountjoy St on every Wednesday and Friday and about seventy applicants from all parts in Ireland received from 7s 6d to 25s per week. The fact that the individual who advised strangers from America to draw money from the Ladies Committee was rebuked seems to confirm that basically the funds of the Ladies Committee was not used for the Fenian purpose.

From late 1866 to before the rising Fenians in Britain collected money actively there. In January 1867 Superintendent Ryan was informed that 'there is more money contributed in England than there is in America, for the Fenian funds because every member in Manchester at present subscribes from 6 1/2d to 8d per week each, besides concerts and raffles 2 or 3 of which are held each week'. There is no evidence concerning the amount of money collected in Britain at
this period or which suggests that money was sent from Britain to Ireland. Before the rising the I.R.B. lacked funds. This is confirmed by Superintendent Ryan, reporting in January 1867 that it had been impossible to gain any money from Duffy. The lack of funds must be regarded as one of the major factors in the failure of the rising.

Centres and circles

In 1858 Peter Langan controlled a small group of men in Dublin and Kingstown who practised military exercises in the hills or mountains near Kingstown and Killiney. The Dublin Fenian organisation was to spring from this group. From the very start the concept of organisation revolved around circles: each circle in theory should consist of 820 men; a Centrê or A, 9 Captains or Bs, 81 Sergeants or Cs and 729 Privates or Ds. In theory each man should know only his superior. However, it is impossible to find evidence of any circle which observed this principle. Probably Stephens who was from the start the leading member appointed Langan as a Dublin Centre and in turn Langan appointed several of his followers as Bs. According to Luby in the autumn of 1860 the Dublin organisation was effectively confined to Langan's circle and consisted of about 50 members. Luby appears to have been appointed as a second Centre but his circle had few or no men before the autumn of 1860, when Luby appointed James O'Callaghan and five or six young men as his Bs. In this way Stephens launched the Dublin organisation by appointing two Centres. Neither Centre, however, had the full complement of Bs, Cs and Ds in his circle. Stephens was to select several of Luby's and Langan's Bs as Centres or As for new circles. For example James O'Callaghan (Luby's B), Michael Moore and Matthew O'Neill
New Centres reflected a growth in the strength of the Dublin organisation. At the national petition meetings in 1860 and 1861, James O'Callaghan, one of the three new Centres, swore in 'most of the men who later became Centres in Dublin.' These men at first joined O'Callaghan's and after recruiting men within that circle, eventually became Centres of further circles. Though Peter Langan died in 1863, the Dublin organisation did not experience a serious setback until the seizure of the Irish People office in September 1865. According to General Millen who investigated the Dublin organisation during the summer of 1865, the numerical strength of the Dublin Fenians was 8,030, divided between sixteen circles. We have information from John Devoy concerning the Dublin organisation in the same year which broadly corroborates General Millen's information. According to Devoy's information the Dublin organisation consisted of fifteen circles amounting to 10,500 men. The Centres and the numbers in their respective circles were as follows:
### Table 3:1 Dublin Centres in 1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>No. in Circle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niall Breslin</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Brophy</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Cook</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Cromien</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hickey</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Kearney</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kirwan</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Moore</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O'Callaghan</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O'Clohissey</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O'Connor</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund O'Donovan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew O'Neill</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrett O'Shaughnessy</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Walsh</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** ............... **10,500**

Source: N.L.I., Devoy papers, MS 18025

This information affords some idea of how practice diverged from theory. Fifteen circles would suggest a book strength of 12,300 members. While some circles had well below 820 members, which might reflect circles in the early stages of growth, other circles greatly exceeded the theoretical maximum. Overall, three circles had a greatly inflated recruitment, five with between 600 and 900 were close to the theoretical size, and seven fell below it. Thus, O'Callaghan one of the first Centres appointed after the initial two circles had been created, with 900 men had clearly a full circle, and two other circles created at the same time, Moore's and O'Neill's had substantial and overfull complements respectively. These may be regarded as mature circles, several years in existence, and smaller circles may represent more recent creations.
In September 1865 Michael Moore, John O'Clohissey and James O'Connor were arrested and in November Hugh Brophy was taken prisoner. After the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866, John Hickey, Patrick Kearney and Edmund O'Donovan were captured. Some Centres gave up their position and fled from Ireland. When a Centre was arrested, one of his Bs was promoted to his place and maintained the circle, though some of the smaller circles may well have become extinct. The Fenians sometimes found difficulty in finding a new Centre either because ambitious Bs had already become a Centre or because no one wanted to be a Centre whose position was now a risky one. Before Michael Moore was arrested in September 1865, he had stated that Owen Leonard would be his successor. However, as Owen Leonard either declined the proposal or escaped from Ireland to avoid arrest, David Toole became Centre. After William Sheedy was arrested on 4 May 1866, his Bs held several meetings to decide Sheedy's successor but they failed. Subsequently a letter from 'the Head Boss' (probably Edward Duffy) nominated Bryan Gibney for Sheedy's place. Immediately after Gibney became Centre, he was arrested on 31 May. Consequently other Bs were very much afraid of taking on the responsibility of Centre; there is no evidence to suggest Gibney's replacement.

In December 1866 the government struck a critical blow at the Dublin organisation by arresting eleven Centres; John Hickey, Nicholas Walsh, Richard Bracken, Brady, Joseph Byrne, William Connolly, Patrick O'Connor, Edward Power (or Dr Power), John J. Kelly, William Clancy and Michael Stanley. As only two of those arrested, Hickey and Walsh figured in Devoy's list, the other nine must have come from replacement Centres or from the Centres of more recently established circles. Dr Power is not mentioned as a Centre in Millen's or
Devoy's lists in 1865, which suggests either that he was as yet either a lower grade Fenian or else that he had not yet been recruited. However, the multiple evidence of his activity in 1866 suggests that in the aftermath of the arrest of so many experienced Centres, he was not only the most prominent Centre but arguably the most effective organisational figure in concrete terms yet seen in the Dublin organisation. The 1866 arrests are the most important of all. They represented a 'second generation' of commander or leader which had made up some of the losses occasioned by the arrests of September 1865 and February 1866, and some of whom, certainly Dr Power, were very effective. No organisation could continue to reproduce new heads of circles or battalions indefinitely, and the Fenians were now in essence, as a date for rebellion approached, in the impossible position of having to find a 'third generation' of battalion commander.

Alfred Aylward, an informer, stated that in February 1867 there were twenty-three circles in Dublin and named seventeen Centres;

**Table 3:2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known Dublin Centres in February 1867</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Brady</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Brady</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niall Breslin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Connolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph D'Arcy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Hayes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Henry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hughes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kirwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Knot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Lambert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. P. McDonnell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward O'Byrne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt O'Neill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Toole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: S.P.O. Fenian Briefs, 8.

If this information is correct, it suggests some expansion from the fifteen or
sixteen circles suggested by Millen or Devoy. Of six unidentified Centres, probably five were Samuel Clampett, John Walsh, James McCabe, Stephen O'Donoghue, and Joseph Tomkins. Before the rising the police arrested twenty-five Centre:

Table 3:3  
Dublin Centres arrested before the rising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Bracken</td>
<td>3 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Brady</td>
<td>4 May 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brady</td>
<td>8 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Brophy</td>
<td>11 Nov. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Byrne</td>
<td>8 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Cashman</td>
<td>12 Jan. 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence Clancy</td>
<td>27 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Connolly</td>
<td>3 May 66 (rearrested Mar. 67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Connolly</td>
<td>4 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Cook</td>
<td>25 Nov. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryan Gibney</td>
<td>29 May 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hickey</td>
<td>17 Feb. 66 (rearrested 3 Dec. 66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Kearney</td>
<td>3 May 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. Kelly</td>
<td>5 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.P. McDonnell</td>
<td>20 Feb. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Moore</td>
<td>Sept. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O'Callaghan</td>
<td>5 Apr. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O'Clohissey</td>
<td>Sept. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O'Connor</td>
<td>Sept. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick O'Connor</td>
<td>4 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund O'Donovan</td>
<td>14 Mar. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Power</td>
<td>3 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Sheedy</td>
<td>18 May 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Stanley</td>
<td>15 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Walsh</td>
<td>3 Dec. 66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: S.P.O., 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'.

Of the fifteen Centres whom Devoy mentioned in 1865, only five Centres - Niall Breslin, Matthew O'Neill, Denis Cromien, John Kirwan and Garrett O'Shaughnessy
escaped arrest. The total number holding the position of Centre in Dublin from 1865 to 1867, who can be traced is forty seven. As the total number of circles was between fifteen and twenty three, this suggests a turnover of between two and three Centres per circle in roughly twenty months, which illustrates how effectively police arrests emasculated the leadership. The fact that twenty five arrests were made suggests twenty-two changes for other reasons; resignation or precipitate departure from the country to escape arrest. What is interesting of course is that on paper at least, assuming that we accept Aylward's evidence as accurate, the number of circles was not only maintained but increased though at the price of new and inexperienced leaders or Centres.

Source: as Table 3:12 and 3:13

How many Fenians were in Dublin? Harley who attended the meeting of the Dublin Centres in February 1867 learned that the number in the Dublin organisation was 14,000.16 It is difficult to estimate the number of the Fenians partly because some Centres exaggerated the number in their circle and partly because there was the difference between the practical strength and the theoretical strength. 140 in a circle. Therefore it would appear that 14,000 was the approximate number. However, judging from the information of General Kilfeather, John Conroy and Doherty, it would not be wrong to suggest that from several thousand to ten thousand Fenians existed in the Dublin organisation.
Table 3:4  Dublin Centres before the rising

| 1. Richard Bracken | 26. Pat Knot |
| 2. Brady            | 27. Michael Lambert |
| 5. William Brady    | 30. Michael Moore |
| 7. Hugh Brophy      | 32. James O'Callaghan |
| 8. Joseph Byrne     | 33. John O'Clohissey |
| 9. Denis Cashman    | 34. James O'Connor |
| 10. Samuel Clampett  | 35. Patrick O'Connor |
| 11. Laurence Clancy | 36. Stephen O'Donoghue |
| 12. George Connolly  | 37. Edmund O'Donovan |
| 15. Denis Cromien   | 40. Edward Power |
| 16. Bryan Gibney    | 41. William Sheedy |
| 17. James Hayes     | 42. Michael Stanley |
| 19. John Hickey     | 44. David Toole |
| 20. Henry Hughes    | 45. Stephen Tracey |
| 21. Patrick Kearney | 46. John Walsh |
| 22. J. Kelly        | 47. Nicholas Walsh |
| 23. James Kelly     |               |
| 24. John J. Kelly   |               |
| 25. John Kirwan     |               |

Source: as Table 3:2 and 3:3

How many Fenians were in Dublin? Massey who attended the meeting of the Dublin Centres in February 1867 learned that the number in the Dublin organisation was 14,000.\textsuperscript{73} It is difficult to estimate the number of the Fenians partly because some Centres exaggerated the number in their circle and partly because there was the difference between the practical strength and the theoretical strength, 820 in a circle. Therefore it would appear that 14,000 was not an accurate number. However, judging from the information of General Millen, John Devoy and Massey, it would not be wrong to suggest that from several thousand to ten thousand Fenians existed in the Dublin organisation.
The recruiting grounds for the Dublin Fenian circles can be classified into four categories. First of all, large establishments, shops or factories provided a basis for forming a circle or at least a section of it. For example, there were two circles among the employees of the gas company. Moreover, before his arrest in December 1866, Edward Power (Dr Power) had eight Bs; Michael Stanley, Laurence Clancy, William Stack, Denis Cashman, George Browne, J.B. Walsh, Edward St. Clair and Edward O'Regan. Michael Stanley represented the section of the employees of the ship building establishment of Messrs Walpole Webb & Bewley - Superintendent Ryan thought the number was at least 200-300 - and this section was the predominant group in Dr Power's circle. As Laurence Clancy, another of Dr Power's Bs, was the head of a department in the drapery establishment of McSwiney, Delaney & Co, he appears to have been a representative of drapers' assistants at least in McSwiney, Delaney & Co. In this way Dr Power's circle included the employees of two large establishments, one a ship building business and the other a drapers' establishment. However, his circle was not confined to these businesses: another B, George Browne was a shoemaker.

After the rising, Superintendent Ryan reported the number of the employees who had been absent on the night of 5 March 1867 and the morning of the following day in establishments. This report throws some light on which establishments produced Fenians, though according to Superintendent Ryan, because of the unwillingness of the employers to report on employees, these figures were by no means a complete picture of participation in the rising.
Table 3:5  Number of employees absent from their employment on 5 and 6 March 1867

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>No. of men absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boileau Boyd, druggist, Bride St</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booth &amp; Sons, timber yard, Bride St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtney &amp; Stephens, iron founders, Blackhall Place</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson Bakery, Stephens St.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon, druggist, Upper Erne St</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin &amp; Drogheda Railway Company</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmundson &amp; Co., ironmongers, Capel St</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinness James Gate brewery, James's Gate</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern &amp; Western Railway Co.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Arnott &amp; Co., draper, Henry St</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobs &amp; Sons, biscuit factory, Peter's Row</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMaster &amp; Co., druggist, Capel St.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McSwiney, Delaney &amp; Co., draper, Lr Sackville St</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manders &amp; Co., brewery, James's St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin &amp; Sons, timber yard, North Wall</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meade, builder, Gt. Brunswick St</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Wall iron works, North Wall</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry &amp; Co., baker, Store St</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pim Bros, draper, 5th Gt. George's St</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, mill owner, Amiens' St</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer, pawnbroker, The Coombe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd, Burns &amp; Co., draper, Mary St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL ........................................ 124


Secondly, members of the same trade, especially the building trades formed a largely self-contained circle. According to John Devoy, Matthew O'Neill's circle consisted mainly of men from the building trades.78 Other Centres who were engaged in the building trades were Hugh Brophy, Simon Brady, Denis Cromien, Bryan Gibney, John Kirwan. As they held the position of either employer or foreman, they assumed control over a large number of carpenters, bricklayers, plasterers, labourers and so on.79 The employees in Kelly's timber yard in Thomas St and Kelly's timber yard at the North Wall seem to have
belonged to Hugh Brophy's circle. Pawnbrokers' assistants appear to have formed a circle under Patrick O'Connor.

Thirdly, people who resided in the same locality formed a circle or section of it through social intercourse or kinship irrespective of their trades. A crown witness said that at Michael Moore's meeting he had met several men from Francis St and there is no evidence to suggest that they belonged to the same trades. There existed a circle in Kevin St and a circle or its section in Dundrum and Rathmines. Furthermore, people who lived in Clondalkin, Fox & Geese and Crumlin were said to be members of Patrick Kearney's circle.

Finally, quite exceptionally a locally recruited circle could consist of members largely of the same trade. This only applied to Kingstown circle. In consequence of the numbers of new building under construction at Kingstown, a great number of bricklayers, carpenters and painters were employed and resided there. Kingstown's Centre was John Hickey, a foreman bricklayer.

According to the theoretical system, each Fenian should have known only his superior. However, meetings undermined the secrecy intended by the system and made it easier for the police to identify membership. According to John Devoy, 'Every man knew all the members of his own Circle and practically those of every other Circle in the town ... Touching elbows with fellow-members at public demonstrations and having "a pint" with others was a great factor.' Each circle held meetings at different levels; A and Bs, B and Cs, A, Bs, Cs and Ds and so on. Patrick Keogh, a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission said that at O'Rourke's after the general meeting of his circle.
and Bs had held a meeting to settle about money that had been received at the concert. He also said that he had attended a meeting of only Cs. 86

At meetings of a circle - A, Bs, Cs and Ds - Centre usually made a speech to the effect that they would have a rising soon to encourage their members and Fenians contributed money for the purchase of arms; and in some cases drilling sessions were held. Laurence O'Toole, a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission reported the proceedings of a meeting summoned by a Centre, George Connolly. 87 Some months before the rising O'Toole was in Whelan's pub in Marlborough St where he found drink on tables, and windows and shutters closed at eight o'clock. Thomas Clarke, who took the chair in the absence of the Centre, George Connolly, unfolding a large green flag with 'a harp and sunburst', made a speech to fifty Fenians that their business was going well and declared that the green flag would take the place of the Union Jack on Dublin Castle. His speech was followed by singing songs of a Fenian character and the collection of contributions for arms. Thus the meeting ended at about ten o'clock. Moreover, Fenians had meetings for their recreation, where they sang songs and danced. 88

Circle meetings were held in members' houses and pubs. Superintendent Ryan reported that:

I have only to observe that throughout my enquiries it was invariably stated to me that the Fenians made it a point never to meet in any house in which the proprietor or some one of the family, or some person doing business was not a Fenian. 89

68
The police reported that Fenians held meetings in members' houses; Edward McClusky, 19 Abbey St, Richard McKeon, Patrick J. Tynan, Lower George's St, Kingstown. In 1865 the attention of the police was directed towards two houses, 26 Capel St and 1 and 2 Cook St. At the latter place, the police observed from 9° young people gathered on Sundays from April to September 1865.

Fenians used pubs as their favourite meeting places and appear to have succeeded in propagating the organisation in them. Superintendent Ryan explained the effect of pub meetings:

It is decidedly my opinion that if Fenians and their sympathisers can find publicans who will accommodate them without regard to what game they are carrying on they will make an effort to hold meetings in public houses in the course of evenings of the approaching winter. Public house meetings were I believe the most successful mediums of propagating the conspiracy.

As early as October 1864 two pubs, James Bergin's, 65 Thomas St and Moran's, 10 Cork Hill, attracted the attention of the police who were watching the movements of reputed Fenians and were placed under surveillance. The fact that in January 1866 a simultaneous search for arms were made in eleven pubs suggests that by that time the police regarded the eleven pubs as Fenian resorts, though there are no names of the eleven pubs except for Slattery's, 7 Cork Hill and Bergin's. In February 1866 the military authorities prohibited soldiers from entering the following pubs; James Bergin's 65 Thomas St, Joseph Berrie's, (Trinity Tavern), 14 Trinity St, Joseph Cromien's, 57 South George's St, Richard Parker's, 86 Thomas St and John Slattery's, 7 Cork Hill. It would not be wrong to assume that these pubs were among the eleven
pubs. Furthermore, Superintendent Ryan reported that Peter Curran's at 1 Clare Lane, Patrick Lynch's at 143 Thomas St and Edward Hoey's two pubs at 1 Bonham St and in Bridgefoot St, were on his list of pubs in which reputed Fenians had been accustomed to meet. Added to these pubs, the police and crown witnesses named the following Fenian pubs; Ryan's in Middle Abbey St, Cleary's in William's Row, a beer shop at 11 Leeson Lane, Charles McArdle's at 12 Lower Bridge St, Kenny's in Francis St, the White Bait in Bolton St, O'Callaghan's in Bolton St, Ward's in Britain St, McCormick's in Camden St, James Mackey's in Lower George's St Kingstown.96

Table 3:6 Fenian pubs before the rising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Bergin</td>
<td>65 Thomas St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Berrie</td>
<td>14 Trinity St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Trinity Tavern)</td>
<td>William's Row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleary</td>
<td>57 South Great George's St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Cromien</td>
<td>1 Clare Lane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Curran</td>
<td>1 Bonham St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Hoey</td>
<td>Bridgefoot St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do</td>
<td>Francis St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenny</td>
<td>143 Thomas St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Lynch</td>
<td>79 Lr George's St Kingstown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Mackey</td>
<td>12 Lr Bridge St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles McArdle</td>
<td>92 Camden St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John McCormick</td>
<td>10 Cork Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.E. Moran</td>
<td>Clondalkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray</td>
<td>13 High St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.F. O'Rourke</td>
<td>43 Bolton St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret O'Callaghan</td>
<td>86 Thomas St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Parker</td>
<td>132 and 133 James's St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilsworth</td>
<td>78 Middle Abbey St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryan</td>
<td>7 Cork Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Slattery</td>
<td>160 Britain St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Ward</td>
<td>97 Marlborough St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Whelan</td>
<td>Bolton St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The White Bait</td>
<td>11 Leeson Lane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beer shop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 24

Source: Various police reports.
Fenian pubs were concentrated on the south side of the city: out of twenty-four pubs, sixteen were situated in the south, while six were in the north and only two pubs were located outside the city - Kingstown and Clondalkin. And Fenian pubs in the south were situated mainly in the south-west of the city, as we shall see, which was the stronghold of Dublin Fenianism.

There is no evidence that publicans in Dublin held the position of Centre. However, they had some connections with Fenianism, even if they were not members. For instance Joseph Cromien was a brother to Dublin Centre Denis Cromien and Cleary's brother held the rank of C. The proprietor of a beer shop at 11 Leeson Lane had sons who were members of Simon Brady's circle and Slattery's sons belonged to John O'Clohissey's circle.97

After the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866 the Fenians, afraid of arrests, gave up meetings in pubs. Within about three months from its suspension six publicans were arrested: James Bergin, Joseph Cromien, Edward Hoey, Patrick Lynch, Richard Parker and John Slattery.98 Pubs that Fenians had patronised suffered a severe blow economically. In March 1866 Superintendent Ryan was informed that Parker's and Bergin's were about to be sold off.99 Three months later Superintendent Ryan reported that Lynch's had been sold off and Hoey's had been closed and that in Cromien's, 'no extraordinary muster of men has been observed'.100 Fenians stopped meeting in pubs and instead met in members' houses or in the open air. In March 1866 Superintendent Ryan was informed that:

at a Conference of Fenian centres it was resolved that in future no meetings of the Brotherhood should be held in public houses but in the rooms occupied by some of their Brethren or in some out of the way
unfrequented place in the Phoenix Park or some other part of the City'.

Six months later Acting Superintendent Hughes stated that Fenians met in twos, threes and fives in the suburbs of the city and that their conversations were very brief.

However as Fenianism revived gradually in the latter part of 1866, they restarted to organise meetings in pubs. In November Americans were observed in pubs, and in Murray's which was situated on the Grand Canal Banks in the Constabulary district of Clondalkin, Fenians were reported to enter on Saturday nights. In the meantime the police discovered that in Joseph Whelan's, 97 Marlborough St and in D.F. O'Rourke's, 13 High St, Fenians held meetings and the meetings in O'Rourke's were said to be held on Wednesday and Friday evenings regularly and occasionally on other evenings in the week. And Whelan's was the resort mainly of the men from the ship building yard of Messrs Walpole, Webb & Bewley. In early December 1866 the authorities arrested prominent leaders, including Dr Power, so publicans who grew apprehensive about their safety declined to have meetings in their places. On 11 January 1867 the police arrested Whelan who had allowed some few prominent leaders to have meetings in his house even after the massive arrests. His arrest seems to have ended meetings in pubs again. In February 1867 immediately before the rising, Fenians carried out their business as secretly as possible and they never met in pubs. Superintendent Ryan reported that 'they meet in one another's rooms in 5, 6 or 7 at a time ostensibly for some lawful purpose in connection with their trade in order to elude the police'.
Chapter Three: Footnotes

2. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 39-40.
5. Ibid., pp 36-7.
7. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R., 135).
8. N.L.I., MS 5964, p.49.
9. N.L.I., MS 331, p.38.
12. Ibid., pp 47-8.
13. N.L.I., MS 333, pp 46-7; N.L.I., MS 5964, pp 56, 69-70.
16. N.L.I., MS 5964, pp 70-2.
18. N.L.I., MS 331, p.331; Denieffe, *A personal narrative*, pp 79, 81, 94.
20. N.L.I., MS 333, p.45.
21. N.L.I., MS 5964, p.57.
22. N.L.I., MS 333, pp 45-6.
24. N.L.I., MS 5964, pp 26, 42.
25. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 213.
26. N.L.I., MS 331, pp 136, 159, 325, 333; N.L.I., MS 333, p. 22; Ryan, Fenian chief, p. 181.
32. Duffy to Stephens, 1 Aug. 1866 (T. C. D., Davitt papers, 9659d/97); Duffy to -, 9 Aug. 1866 (T. C. D., Davitt papers, 9659d/98); Duffy to -, 15 Oct. 1866 (T. C. D., Davitt papers, 9659d/101).
33. Duffy to Stephens, 1 Aug. 1866 (T. C. D., Davitt papers, 9659d/97).
36. Ibid., p. 220.
40. Stephens to Michael Doheny, 1 Jan. 1858, quoted in Denieffe, A personal narrative, pp 159-60.
42. See Supt Ryan to C. P., 20 Apr. 1866 (C. S. O., R. P. 1866/7792 on 1866/15128).
43. Stephens to O'Mahony, 13 Mar. 1863, quoted in Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 182.


45. N.L.I., MS 333, p. 9.


48. Irishman, 8 Feb. 1868.


50. N.L.I., MS 5964, p. 97; O'Arcy, Fenian movement in U.S., pp 76-7.

51. Edmund O'Leary to O'Mahony, 16 Nov. 1865, quoted in Bourke, O'Leary, p. 80.

52. Quigley, 'American financing of Fenianism in Ireland 1858-1867', pp 61, 64.

53. John Mitchel to O'Mahony, 7 Apr. 1866, quoted in Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 225.


55. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Jan. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/1268); Irishman, 20 Jan. 1866.


61. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 6.

62. Devoy, Recollections, p. 27.
63. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 31.
64. Ibid., pp 26-31.
65. Ibid., pp 32, 40.
68. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), 'Q.V. Thomas Burke, John McCafferty and others Dublin city and co. special commission, April, 1867', {hereafter Fenian Briefs, 6(a)} p. 127.
70. Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10634 on 1866/10278); Supt Ryan to C.P., 9 July 1866 (1866/13126 on 1866/10278).
71. S.P.O., 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'.
72. C.S.O., R.P. 1867/7199; Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 Nov. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5086R on 5174R).
73. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), 'Q.V. Thomas Burke and Patrick Doran, Dublin co. special commission, 26 April - 1 May 1867', {hereafter Fenian briefs, 6(c)}, p. 22.
79. Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/6322); Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8701 on 1866/17148); Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 25 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8191 on 1866/10190); Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 85.
82. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), p. 126.


85. Devoy, Recollections, p. 27.

86. C.S.O., R.P. 1867/7199; S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), p. 127.

87. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), pp 58-9.


91. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 218); Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Apr. 1865 (C.S.O., R.P. 1865/3909); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 161); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 218); Supt Ryan to C.P., 11 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 235).


93. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Oct. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 71); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 137); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 161); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 218).


96. Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Aug. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8189 on 1866/16249); Supt Ryan to C.P., 3 Sept. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 50); Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 14 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/7373 on 1867/450); Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 Dec. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/22930); S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), pp 127, 161; S.P.O., 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'.


98. S.P.O., 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'.

77

100. Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11211 on 1866/11413); Supt Ryan to C.P., 12 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11412 on 1866/19357).


Chapter 4

WHO WERE THE DUBLIN FENIANS?
Occupations

Rank and file Fenians, unlike some prominent leaders, never wrote down their story, so we have no clear picture of them. However, their occupation and residence, sometimes recorded by the authorities, help us to present part of the picture. Fenian leaders suggested that the lower-class - artisans and shop assistants - were prime movers in the movement. John O'Leary emphasised the importance of artisans in the movement:

that it is this class [artisan] I have always found the best Irishmen. Mechanics are, as a rule, in my opinion, more intelligent, and even often more cultured, than any, save the professional and professedly cultured class; that is, such portions of the middle or upper class as in some shape or other devote themselves to the acquisition of knowledge, either for its own sake, or for the material gain to be got out of it. The middle class, I believe, in Ireland and elsewhere, to be distinctly the lowest class morally - that is, the class influenced by the lowest motives.¹

The occupations of 1,086 Fenians in Ireland as a whole were identified and classified into several categories by Robert Anderson. Artisans constituted the majority of the Fenians: they numbered 520 (47.8%). On the other hand, farmers, their sons and agricultural labourers formed a small group, accounting for 118 (10.9%). This suggests that the I.R.B. was not an agrarian secret society but a town-based organisation. Furthermore, very few Fenians - 14 or 1.3% - belonged to the professional classes. Therefore Fenianism appealed to 'the lower class but not the lowest' in towns.²

This national pattern is strongly reflected in the Dublin organisation. Obviously there is no list of the Dublin Fenians during the period. However, we have the occupation and address of over 400 Dublin Fenians, most of whom were arrested
under the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1866 or were detained by the authorities immediately after the rising. This sample, though we cannot be sure, is large enough to be a fairly representative one. It is based on three sources: 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8', 'Fenianism: index of names, 1866-7' and 'Dublin special commission, April 1867: alphabetical list of prisoners arrested for complicity in the Fenian Conspiracy'.

The Dublin organisation drew its members from all social grades, from labourers to law clerks, though artisans in particular were prominent in the organisation. From a Fenian point of view all members were equal irrespective of occupation or social status. Eugene O'Sullivan, a chimney sweeper, was found in the 'aristocratic company of law clerks', while in the ordinary course of social life he would have never been associated with law clerks. Moreover, even a man who was a subordinate in a business might take precedence over his social superior. Patrick Breslin, an assistant in Tallon's stationery warehouse was 'B' under Sheedy, a porter in the same establishment.

The following table shows the breakdown of the Dublin Fenians. Of the total of 474, 449 lived in the city (95%). Of this total in Dublin 280 or 59 per cent belonged to the artisan class:
Table 4:1  Occupations of Dublin Fenians, 1865-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>As % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>artisans</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled workers(I)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shop assistants(2)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clerks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traders and business proprietors(3)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>publicans and waiters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professionals(4)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others(5)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no occupation(6)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(1) guard (1), labourer (28), letter carrier (1), messenger (3), night watchman (1) and porter (20).

(2) drapers' assistant (22), grocers' assistant (12), shop assistant (5), stationers' assistant (3) and pawnbrokers' assistant (3)

(3) apothecary (3), auctioneer (1), bookseller (2), dealer (4), draper (2), feather and egg dealer (1), grocer (1), hotel proprietor (2) and tobacconist (2).

(4) medical doctor (1), national teacher (1), school master (1), sub-editor of the Irishman (1), lecturer (1) and tutor (1).

(5) artist (1), book keeper (2), car driver (2), cart driver (4), domestic servant (1), engine driver (2), garden boy (1), gardener (1), pig jobber (1), sailor (1), ship broker's worker (1) and van driver (1).

(6) the number includes 4 pensioners.

Sources:  S.P.O., 'Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8'; 'Fenianism: index of names, 1866-7'; 'Dublin special commission, April, 1867'.

Though the 280 artisans belonged to no less than 83 trades, several trades stood out in the Dublin organisation; carpenters (33, 11.8%), shoemakers (28, 10.0%), tailors (26, 9.3%), bricklayers (20, 7.1%), painters (10, 3.6%), blacksmiths (9, 3.2%), bootmakers (9, 3.2%), cork cutters (9, 3.2%), bakers (8,
Furthermore 84 (30%) can be grouped in the building trade; bricklayers (20), carpenters (33), marble masons (2), marble polisher (1), mason (1), painters (10), pavior (1), plasterers (5), plumbers (4), slators (3) and stone cutters (4). John Devoy noted that 'Next to the building trades, shoemakers and tailors were the most numerous artisans in the organization'. This is borne out by the evidence. Shoemakers and tailors were next to carpenters, the most important single occupations, and combined they amounted to 54 or 19.3 per cent of the total.

The government sources never distinguished whether artisans arrested as Fenians were master tradesmen, journeymen or apprentices. However, it is likely that they were mostly journeymen and apprentices. From the trade directory for 1866 only 7 artisans can be identified as masters who had their own workshops. In addition, the ages of the Dublin Fenian prisoners suggest that they were unlikely to have been master tradesmen. We have the ages of 227 Dublin Fenians. They vary from 16 to 72, but their average age was 24.2. The vast majority (202, 89.0%) were from 16 to 30 years of age. After several years' apprenticeship, apprentices were promoted to journeymen, some of whom became masters. Therefore the majority of the Dublin Fenians, classified as artisans, whose average age was 24.2 were, we can assume with confidence, journeymen or apprentices.

Unskilled workers (54, 11.4%) formed the second group in terms of numerical importance; and out of the total of 54, labourers numbered 28, followed by porters (20). Considering the total number of the unskilled workers in the
city - there were over ten thousand labourers in the 1860s, unskilled workers were a lightly Fenianised group.

The third group was shop assistants, consisting of drapers' assistants (22), grocers' assistants (12), shop assistants (5), stationers' assistants (3) and pawnbrokers' assistants (3). Drapers' assistants took an important part in the Dublin organisation, though in terms of numbers, as we have seen, they lagged far behind artisans in the organisation. In particular, drapers' assistants in the three big Dublin establishments, Cannock, White & Co, Todd, Burns & Co. and McSwiney, Delaney & Co. were involved in the movement. According to John Devoy, they were all born in the countryside, lodged over the establishments and were 'well mannered and very intelligent'. It was James O'Callaghan in Cannock, White & Co. who introduced Fenianism to drapers' assistants. As has been noted, the Dublin organisation then developed gradually from the small group around Peter Langan. In May 1865 Superintendent Ryan reported, 'at present nearly all the drapers' assistants in Dublin have assumed an air of careless independence that renders them almost unmanageable by their employers'. Thus the Dublin organisation drew its members from 'lower class but not the lowest': artisans and shop assistants together amount to 325, making up 68.6 per cent of the sample, while unskilled workers amount only to 54 (11.4%). The commissioners of the D.M.P. noticed that relatively superior people among the lower orders were active:

It is, indeed, remarkable that the peasantry are very little engaged in this movement, except by sympathy. It is entirely carried on by young men of a superior class, whose education has been more attended to, and who seem infatuated by the revolutionary spirit. It is for this reason that the commissioners fear that it will not be short-lived.
Comparing the occupational pattern of Dublin Centres with that in the sample, unskilled workers were under-represented and the proportion of artisans fell slightly among Centres. By contrast, shop assistants, clerks and traders and business proprietors improved their positions.

**Table 4:2 Occupations of Dublin Centres, 1865-7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>As % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>artisans</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shop assistants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traders and business proprietors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clerks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

(1) gas company worker (2), employee at a timber yard (1), book keeper (1) and artist (1)

**Source:** as Table 4:1.

The artisan class produced about half of the 37 Dublin Centres. The most prominent single occupation of artisan was tailor, to which 5 Centres belonged. Other occupations in the artisan category were blacksmith (2), bricklayer (2), carpenter (2), shoemaker (2), brass finisher (1), cooper (1), silk weaver (1), jeweller (1), painter (1) and a foreman on the building of a church (1). These artisan Centres might have occupied superior positions to their fellow workers in workshops or establishments. At least 3 Centres were foremen: Simon Brady was a foreman carpenter, John Hickey a foreman bricklayer and Denis Cromien the
foreman on the building of the Augustinian Church at John's Lane. Shop assistants constituted the second group - drapers' assistant (2), grocers' assistant (1), stationers' assistant (1) and pawnbrokers' assistant (1). Notably drapers' assistants rose above the rank and file position in the organisation to a degree disproportionate to their number. Superintendent Ryan reported that drapers' assistants 'are burning with anxiety to get an opportunity to wear an officer's uniform'. In relation to traders and business proprietors, Hugh Brophy stood out as an employer in the building trade, Edward Power (Dr Power) as an apothecary and property owner and John J. Kelly as a tobacconist. The position of Centres required higher intelligence and probably money which they were able to spend on the organisation.

Here we examine the proportions of Fenians residing in the city to the male workforce in the city - we choose fourteen occupations which produced relatively large numbers of Fenians. In the 1860s the composition of the male workforce in the city changed: those engaged in the manufacturing sector declined while the transport, building and dealing sectors increased their proportions. How was such a change reflected in the social composition of the Dublin Fenians?
Table 4:3  Structure of male workforce in Dublin city, 1861 and 1871

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1861 %</th>
<th>1871 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic service</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrial service</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general labour</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dealing</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacture</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Daly, Dublin, p. 18.

The number of the principal occupations of city Fenians arrested (Dublin minus the Dublin suburbs) is as follows: 266 artisans (including 31 carpenters, 28 shoemakers, 25 tailors, 13 bricklayers, 9 painters, 9 blacksmiths, 9 bootmakers, 9 cork cutters, 7 bakers and 7 coopers); 42 shop assistants (22 drapers' assistants, 9 grocers' assistants, 8 shop assistants and 3 pawnbrokers' assistants). Table 4:4 shows the number of the city Fenians arrested, the number of males engaged in occupations in 1861 and 1871, and Fenians arrested as a percentage of 1861 male workforce. Two final columns show the proportion of the Roman Catholics in the 1871 male workforce for each of the employment categories, and the percentage increase or decrease in the total numbers in each category between 1861 and 1871.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No. of Fenians</th>
<th>No of males arrested</th>
<th>No of males employed in 1861</th>
<th>No of males employed in 1871</th>
<th>RC as % of males</th>
<th>Males employed % increase or decrease in nos 1861-71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>boot &amp; shoemakers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carpenters</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2,294</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tailors</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bricklayers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacksmiths</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>+54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cork cutters</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bakers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coopers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>+35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drapers' assistants</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>1,283(1)</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>+16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grocers' assistants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>1,782(2)</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>+79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shop assistants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pawnbrokers' assistants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>+58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>publicans</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labourers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12,686</td>
<td>11,488</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The census does not make a distinction between owners and assistants: (1) the number includes linen drapers; (2) the number includes tea dealers.

**Sources:** as Table 4:1; Census Ireland, 1861, 1871.

From 1861 to 1871 carpenters, boot and shoemakers, tailors, bricklayers, cork cutters and bakers experienced a decrease in numbers, while blacksmiths, coopers, drapers' assistants, grocers' assistants and pawnbrokers' assistants increased. This suggests that the former group was more vulnerable to adverse changes in employment; the building trade (carpenters and bricklayers), however, fared better than boot and shoemakers, tailors and cork cutters, declining relatively little. On the other hand, blacksmiths, coopers and shop
assistants (drapers' assistants, grocers' assistants and pawnbrokers' assistants) show no sign of deterioration. Therefore Fenianism cannot be explained only by the economic dimension, and indeed these were years of general business prosperity. Apart from individual crafts or trade which felt the blast of competition, employment prospects appear to have been good. Indeed, the poorest category - labourers - with the lowest wages, the greatest susceptibility to fluctuation in employment and a seasonal pattern of engagement, were the group conspicuously least involved in Fenianism.

The number of cork cutters and publicans in the organisation was not conspicuous, but the proportion of Fenians in these trades was higher than in other trades: cork cutters (3.6%) and publicans (4.7%). Superintendent Ryan referred to cork cutters; 'Thomas Wallace ... served his apprenticeship to a trade which has produced many Fenians and in a shop where disaffection is known to have prevailed to a very considerable extent among the employees'.

According to John Devoy, Pat Flood was one of the most active recruiters in the cork cutting trade. Probably the apparent depression in the trade, combined with the high proportion of Roman Catholics (93%), accounted for the high proportion of Fenians among cork cutters. We do not know the reason why publicans joined the movement, but swearing in publicans was one of the most important objectives of the Fenians who held meetings in pubs and gave treats or free drinks to Fenian soldiers. The tendency for Fenians to congregate in particular pubs may have encouraged publicans to become Fenians as involvement was good for business. Another drink interest, grocers' assistants, also attracts attention. In those days, grocers' shops often combined the grocery trade with a bar, and hence served drink on their premises.
grocers' assistants had opportunities to propagate Fenianism among the drinking class.\textsuperscript{14}

The shop assistant group - drapers' assistants, grocers' assistants, shop assistants and pawnbrokers' assistants - though its total number was much smaller than that of the artisan class, was infiltrated by Fenianism more than other occupational groups. Drapers' assistants may well have had a unique propensity to affiliate to the movement: as the category had a higher proportion of Protestants than any of the other occupational groups, \textit{arranged} Fenian drapers' assistants expressed as a percentage of Catholics only would be very high indeed. Patrick O'Connell, a pawnbrokers' assistant and later an auctioneer, effectively organised pawnbrokers' assistants, who had contacts with the lower classes through their business and probably took an active role in spreading Fenianism among them.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Locations}

Nineteenth-century Dublin was divided into two broad communities, the working class on one hand and the middle class and professional class on the other. The latter group had already begun to desert the city, moving to the suburbs. The expansion of Dublin suburbs from 1851 to 1881 is as follows:

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Percentage \hline
1851 & 25% \hline
1861 & 30% \hline
1871 & 35% \hline
1881 & 40% \hline
\end{tabular}
### Table 4:5 Expansion of the Dublin suburbs, 1851-81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Decadal change</th>
<th>Suburbs</th>
<th>Decadal change</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Decadal change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>59,468</td>
<td>+2.27</td>
<td>317,837</td>
<td>+1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>70,323</td>
<td>+1.78</td>
<td>325,131</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>83,410</td>
<td>+1.86</td>
<td>329,736</td>
<td>+0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>+0.13</td>
<td>95,450</td>
<td>+1.45</td>
<td>345,052</td>
<td>+0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Daly, Dublin, p. 3

On the other hand the working class lived in the city and their ideal was for their districts 'to be close enough to its denizens' places of employment for them to walk to work in the morning and ideally, to get home for the midday meal.16

Dublin industry had traditionally developed in the west of the city on both sides of the river Liffey and of its tributary the Poddle. Food-processing industries in particular had concentrated in the Thomas St / James's St region because of the proximity of the river Poddle and later of the city basin, main source until 1867 of the city's water supply. By contrast the metal industries tended to locate on the north side of the Liffey, especially in and around Pill Lane and Blackhall Place. And in Ringsend - the south-east of the city and the mouth of the Liffey - another traditional though small industrial area was located owing to its advantageous proximity to the port. As the emergence of steam power did not lead to the opening of new industrial areas, the Dublin industries during our period remained in the traditional districts. The one significant exception was the North Wall (the north side of the mouth of the Liffey), where a number of factories, relying on imported materials, were
established. The south-west of the city had a far heavier concentration of manufacturing than any other district in the city; and the Liberties which had enjoyed prosperity as the centre of textiles up to the 1820s was located within this district. The most successful industrial firm during our period was Guinness's brewery which had a large establishment in James's Gate; and the other brewing interests and some of the distilling were concentrated in the same area. In the south-west, a large number of workshops in shoemaking and tailoring, which produced many Fenians, were situated. These activities grew out of the cloth-dressing and -finishing traditions of the Liberties, now in decline. Added to the food industries, they ensured that the south-west was easily the main centre of industrial employment within the city; and the cheap and decaying tenement accommodation also added to the attractions of the area for the working classes. Next to the south-west, the north-west of the city was the main industrial area. It was characterised especially by the concentration of metal working in the region of Blackhall Place."

The addresses have been identified of 441 Dublin Fenians; 400 (90.7%) lived in the city, while 41 (9.3%) lived in the suburbs. In the suburbs the highest number was the 12 for Kingstown, followed by Kilmainham (4), Chapelizod (3), Roundtown (3), Blackrock (2), Fox & Geese (2), Howth (2), Phibsborough (2), Rathmines (2), Clontarf (2), Donnybrook (1), Dundrum (1), Finglas (1), Milltown (1), Mount Anville (1), Ranelagh (1), and Sandymount (1). Of the 400 Fenians who lived in the city, 176 (44%) lived on the north side and 224 (56%) on the south side. When we divide the north into the north-east and the north-west with Sackville St/Frederick St as the divide and the south into the south-east and the south-west with Westmoreland St/Grafton St/Harcourt St as the dividing
line, about half of the Fenians (202 or 50.5% of the city Fenians) lived in the south-west, followed by the north-west with 135 or 33.8 per cent. The north-east (41 or 10.3%) and the south-east (22 or 5.5%) were much less important. The fact that 50.5 per cent lived in the south-west reflected the traditional industrial importance of the old city and the Liberties. The north-west with 33.8 per cent of the arrested Fenians living there reflected a contrasting pattern. In absolute numbers it had only half the number of artisan members of the south-west (Table 4:7), but it had far more shop assistants than any other district, and proximity to commerce in and around Sackville St combined with better housing held those working in commerce.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>No. of Fenians</th>
<th>% of city Fenians</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>north-east</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>north-west</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>south-east</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>south-west</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suburbs</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>441</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: as Table 4:1*

For 344 city Fenians not only residence but also occupation can be identified. The correlation between their occupations and residence throws further light on the social structure of the city.
Table 4:7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations and residence of 344 City Fenians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>north-east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artisians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shop assistants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traders and business proprietors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>publicans and waiters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total as % of city total | 9.3% | 33.1% | 4.1% | 53.5% | 100% |

Source: as Table 4:1.

The fact that about 80 per cent of Fenians in the south-west were artisans and unskilled workers reflects the working class characteristics of the district. This is further supported by the fact that a vast majority of Fenian boot and shoemakers as well as Fenian tailors resided in this district: 75 per cent of boot and shoemakers (out of 28) and 68.2 per cent of tailors (out of 22). Furthermore, the presence of the majority of publicans and waiters in this area reflects the fact that drinking in public places was an important part of working class social life.

The north-west also had a high proportion of artisans and unskilled workers: about half of those who engaged in metal working, such as blacksmiths and iron founders, lived in this area. But this area was characterised by a high
proportion of shop assistants: 23 out of the city total of 34. This is reflected in the fact that this area included the prospering commercial district between Capel St and Sackville St. The north-east included the newly developed North Wall region. This may explain the presence of working class members. On the other hand, the fact that there was a higher proportion of traders and business proprietors and clerks in this area than any other area reflects both the presence of the port and a middle and professional class accounted for by the proximity of the area to the Sackville St district now emerging as the main focus of commerce in the city.

The addresses of the Dublin Centres afford a contrast to those of the rank and file. We know the residences of 24 Dublin Centres, 20 in the city and 4 in the suburbs (Kingstown, Rathmines, Rathgar and Mount Anville). Of the 20 city Centres, 14 lived on the north side of the city. In other words, relative to the pattern of ordinary Fenians, more of the Centres lived in the suburbs and more lived on the north side.

Table 4:8 Residence of the city Centres, 1865-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aungier St</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Plunkett St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Britain St</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pill Lane</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Brunswick St</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Preston St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham St</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Queen St</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry St</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sackville St</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holles St</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Upper Temple St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malpas St</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tighe St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas St</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Trinity Place</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 20

Source: as Table 4:1.
11 (55%) Centres lived in the north-west when 33.8 per cent of the Dublin Fenians were, while 25 per cent of the Centres resided in the south-west in which 50.5 per cent of the Dublin Fenians took up their residence. This contrast can be explained by the difference in the social status between the Centres and the rank and file. As we have seen, shop assistants, clerks and traders and business proprietors were over-represented among the Centres. Closely associated by the location of industries, the Dublin working class formed their own community free from the intervention of the middle and professional classes. And the working class community produced community consciousness among the members, which in turn helped to promote Fenianism. Superintendent Ryan described Pill Lane - in the north-west of the city - one of the best Fenianised areas, as follows:

My attention having been directed to that neighbourhood for several days past I had reason to know that at least 200 members of the Fenian Conspiracy reside there and are most lawless and determined composed of blacksmiths, foundry men and smith's labourers, and my impression now is that the four men arrested on yesterday ... were the leading spirits who sustained the movement in the locality. On yesterday when the officers made their appearance in the place, it would seem that all had a preconception of their particular business, and in less than 5 minutes more than 500 persons men women and children were around the house while the four officers ... were engaged searching the premises and they exhibited a disposition to assault the officers and rescue the prisoners ... About 200 men evidently Fenians were recognized in the crowd ... Had it been dark when the arrests were made I have no moral doubt the officers would have been assassinated, just as Constable O'Neill was murdered in the same neighbourhood, and as in his case no trace of the assassins ever would be found. It would be difficult to discover in this city a corner in which more cowardly, treacherous, and cold blooded men might be found and as I am convinced the breaking up of the den in no. 64 Pill Lane would contribute largely to restore good order in the locality.19

Furthermore, when it became known that a Fenian Laurence O'Toole who resided in Plunket St was a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission in April 1867,
The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866 provided Dublin addresses for 91 Fenians from England who were arrested. Of these, 74(81%) stayed on the south side of the city, especially the south-west (63 or 69%); 17 (19%) on the north side and 16 (18%) in the north-east. While 33.8 per cent of the city Fenians lived in the north-west, only one Fenian from England was in the north-west. In the case of the south-west, the proportion of English Fenians (69%) was higher than that of Dublin Fenians for the south-west arrested (50.5%). This confirms the importance of the south-west of the city as the focal point of the rank and file strength of Fenianism. It is easy to infer that this district provides not only extensive organisation but ready or cheap lodgings for lower grade Fenians. Police information concerning Fenians from England revealed that shoemakers from England lodged in Thomas St and Francis St where many Dublin shoemakers resided and that they spent their money in pubs in these streets. A number of streets like Francis St, Exchequer St, Cuffe St and Bride St stood out as host streets. While 33.8 per cent of the city Fenians lived in the north-west, only 1 per cent of the English Fenians lodged there. On the other hand, the north-east and the south-east which had a low proportion of Dublin Fenians provided the addresses of a high proportion of English Fenians. This reflects the presence of lodging houses, and English Fenians were accommodated in streets with few Dublin Fenians in residence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No of Fenians</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No of Fenians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Back Lane</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lambe Alley, no.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bow Lane</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bride St, no.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Marlborough St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(Model lodging house)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden St, no.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Meath St, no.62</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ Church Place</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Upper Mecklenburgh St, no.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church St, no.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mercer St, no.29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common's St, no.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nottingham Parade, no.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook St, no.28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Old Abbey St</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuffe Lane, no.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Patrick St</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuffe St, no.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Queen's Square, North, no.27</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Redmond Hill</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchequer St, no.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thomas St, no.121</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>no.123</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis St, no.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Townsend St, no.144</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no.162</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no.164</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.123</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no.126</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C.S.O., R.P. 1866/4852.

For American officers who were arrested in Dublin in February 1866, we have the addresses of 41:
Table 4:10  Addresses of 41 American officers arrested in Dublin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No of American Officers</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No of American Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayview Ave, no.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moss St, no.32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lr Bridge St (the City Mansion Hotel)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mountpleasant Square no.33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole's Lane, no.12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Palmerston Place, no.19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cullenswood, no.20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Phibsborough Rd, no.64</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'Olier St (The Star and Garter Hotel)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ranelagh, no.25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Dominick St, no.73</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Summerhill, no.27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough St (Model lodging house)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Townsend St, no.156</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Lr Gloucester St, no.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C.S.O., R.P. 1866/4852.

American officers were, it seems obvious, provided with better accommodation than Fenians from England. 9 American officers stayed at two hotels, the City Mansion Hotel and the Star and Garter Hotel and 10 lived in Ranelagh, though 3 American officers, apparently not important ones, lived in tenements at 12 Cole's Lane, 7 Lr Gloucester St and 32 Moss St. In general the American officers did not live in the areas where many Dublin Fenians resided. This further reduced their opportunity to have contact with the rank and file Dublin Fenians. This indicates one of the weak points of the Dublin organisation; its American officers, were in effect totally separated from the rank and file.
Let us now look at the four districts of the city (the north-east, the north-west, the south-east and the south-west) in detail. This presents a clearer picture, not merely of Dublin Fenianism but of lower-class life in Dublin. The character of the four districts is brought out by examining both the locations of establishments where Fenians worked and of the principal streets where Fenians lived.

**North-east:** 41 Fenians (10.3%)

This area includes the North Wall, a newly developed industrial area, where establishments depending on imported materials such as timber works, or fertiliser plant were located. There were three Fenian establishments in the North Wall; North Wall Iron Works (55 North Wall), Martin & Sons (timber merchant, 66-81 North Wall) and the ship building yard of Walpole, Webb & Bewley. Other establishments in this area known for Fenianism were Power (miller, 2, 3 and 4 Amiens St), Perry Brothers & Co (baker, 5 Store St) and McDowell (timber and building yard, Montgomery St). Dr Power, one of the most prominent Centres, residing at 3 Upper Temple St, organised his circle by recruiting the employees of Walpole, Webb & Bewley. And their meeting place was, close to the North Wall and Dr Power's residence, in Joseph Whelan's pub at 97 Marlborough St. We have no information about the residence of the employees of Walpole, Webb & Bewley, but some of them appear to have lived in Summerhill where 5 out of the 41 Fenians arrested resided; and Thomas Egan, a foreman in McDowell (timber and building yard) lived at 81 Summerhill. Because of the proximity of passenger boat arrivals and railway stations, there were
two boarding houses - 8 Common's St and Model lodging house (Marlborough St) -
to which American officers and Fenians from England resorted.

North-west: 135 Fenians (33.8%)

Three big drapers establishments which produced many Fenians; Todd, Burns &
Co., Mary St, Cannock, White & Co., 11-15 Henry St and McSwiney, Delaney & Co.,
23-27 Lr Sackville St, were on the eastern perimeter of this district. Fenians
also seem to have worked in Arnott & Co, 11 Henry St, because an employee was
found to be absent on the night of the rising. Samuel Clampett, a Centre,
worked in Edmundson, J. & Co (iron mongers, 34, 35 and 36 Capel St) and William
Sheedy a Centre in Tallon's stationery warehouse, 1 Upper Sackville St. It
is true to say that the main concentration of shop assistants was in this
district. Undoubtedly their fellow workers were Fenians. In 1866 the police
succeeded in discovering three revolvers in the store of Barry & Norton (corn
merchants, Middle Abbey St). Other establishments where Fenians worked were
McMaster & Co (druggist, 121 Capel St) and Courtney & Stephens (iron founders
1 and 2 Blackhall Place).

Of the total of 135 arrested Fenians, the highest number was 17 for Sackville
St, (16 of whom worked in McSwiney, Delany & Co); followed by Dorset St (7),
Britain St (7), Church St (6), Capel St (5), North King St (5), Moore St (5),
Tighe St (5), Upper Abbey St (4), Jervis St (4), Mary's Lane (4), Pill Lane (4)
and Queen St (4). An examination of Thom's directory demonstrates that most
Fenians lodged in other people's houses or in tenements. Of the above places,
the places with a high proportion of tenements were Jervis St (43%), Church St
(37%), Tighe St (30%) and Abbey St (29%). As we have seen, Pill Lane was one of the best organised places in Dublin. Superintendent Ryan stated that 200 Fenians, mostly blacksmiths, foundry men and smith's labourers resided there. This estimate is an interesting illustration of the fact that the police arrested only a small number of Fenians: the actual number of arrests for Pill Lane was a mere four. The social composition of Pill Lane - mainly metal industry workers - can be explained by the concentration of metal industries in Capel St, Pill Lane, Church St and Blackhall Place. There were two iron mongers and two iron founders in Pill Lane; five iron merchants and founders in Church St; eight iron mongers in Capel St. Metal workers employed nearby lived in Pill Lane. The pattern in these streets seems to be one of a district in which those belonging to the same trade tended to reside together and in turn to be ready for recruits. Some circles held meetings in this district; there were two pubs in Bolton St. On the other hand, some Centres residing in this district, without organising their neighbours, became the heads of circles far away from their own residences. Over 50 per cent of the Centres in the occupational tables lived in the north-west, while only 33.8 per cent of the city Fenians arrested had resided there.

South-east; 22 Fenians (5.5%) This district had the least association with Fenianism. This is owing to its character: the middle and professional classes dominated this district except near the Liffey. In spite of the importance of this area in early Fenianism - in 1858 the I.R.B. was started near Lombard St and Peter Langan's timber yard (16 Lombard St) was an important meeting place - only a small number of Fenians
took up residence there. The police reported two establishments, Meade (builder, 152 Great Brunswick St) and Dixon (druggist 1, 2 and 11-15 Upper Erne St) as suspicious Fenian places. Of 22 men arrested in the district, 13 lived in the area bounded by the Liffey, Great Brunswick St, South Cumberland St and Lower Mount St; the only working class members among the 22 were to be found in this area. Some Fenians from England stayed in boarding houses in Townsend St. On the other hand, Merrion Square and St Stephen's Green - high valuation areas - and their vicinity were exclusively middle and professional classes areas, totally free from Fenian elements.

South-west; 202 Fenians (50.5%) 

Dublin Fenianism revolved around this district: half the Dublin city Fenians lived there; 14 out of 24 Fenian pubs were situated there; and the area lodged 70 per cent of the Fenians from England arrested in Dublin city and suburbs. 11 Fenians lived in Bride St, followed by Kevin St (9), Thomas St (9), Francis St (7), New St (7), Bridge St (6), Exchange St (5), James's St (5), Back Lane (4), Brabazon St (4), Camden St (4), Cork Hill (4), Meath St (4), Patrick St (4), Plunket St (4) and Trinity Place (4). Undoubtedly Fenians worked in factories and workshops in their neighbourhood. There were nine establishments in which, the police reported, Fenians worked: Boileau Boyd (druggist, 91, 92 and 93 Bride St), Booth, Richard & Co (timber yard and saw mills, 16 and 17 Bride St), Spencer (pawnbroker, 120, 121 and 122 The Coombe), Pim Bros (drapers, South Great George's St), Guinness (brewery, James's Gate), Manders & Co (brewery, 113 James's St), Jacob & Son (biscuit factory, 5 and 6 Peter's Row), Dawson (bakery, 27 Stephen St) and Heather (shoe factory, Bridge St).
Superintendent Ryan paid special attention to Mander's Brewery where Richard Bracken, a Centre, worked as a clerk and Heather's shoe factory where Peter Kelly, a foreman leather cutter and a prominent Fenian, worked.  

Two establishments (Boileau Boyd and Booth, Richard & Co) were in Bride St where the highest number of arrested Fenians (11) in the south-west had addresses. In the absence of police comment on the street as a Fenian strong-point, we have no way of estimating the number. 11 arrests would suggest a much greater presence. On the other hand, Kevin St was for the police a known Fenian redoubt. Fenians in Kevin St seem to have formed a circle for Superintendent Ryan mentioned a 'Kevin St Circle'. In this street there were two coal factories and four butter factories. As a butter porter in this street was arrested, workers in the above factories are likely to have been involved in the movement. In December 1865 Fry, William & Co (manufacturers of carriage laces and dealers in coach makers' wares and fringes) in the street issued a circular to their employees to the effect that they should not join the Fenian movement. This circular may hint that the establishment had already been infected. Moreover, the concentration of harness makers and saddlers attracts attention: thirteen harness makers and saddlers were situated in the street. It is likely that workers in these crafts were prominent in the Kevin St circle.

Patrick Keogh, a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission in 1867, who resided in Plunket St, stated that at a meeting of Michael Moore's circle he had met men mainly from Francis St, Plunket St and Swift's Alley. The meeting took place in Long Lane, very close to these streets. It may be inferred
that men in these streets may have formed a single circle. As there was a concentration of shoemakers' workshops in Francis St - fourteen on a directory count - shoemakers, one of the most Fenianised artisan categories, possibly took an active role in this circle.

Most Fenians appear to have lived in tenements. This is fully supported by the fact that tenements were concentrated in the areas surrounded by Thomas St, Patrick St and The Coombe. The majority of the houses (82%) in Plunket St were tenements, followed by Brabazon St (68%). Back Lane (41%) and Meath St (36%).

There were 14 out of 24 Fenian pubs in this district. Perhaps in the evening the streets here were crowded not only with Fenians who resided in this district but with Fenians who came from other districts to these pubs. 7 pubs were located in the line of main thoroughfare from Dublin Castle to James's St (Cork Hill/ High St/ Thomas St): M.E. Moran's and John Slattery's in Cork Hill; D.F. O'Rourke's in High St; James Bergin's, Patrick Lynch's and Richard Parker's in Thomas St; Pilsworth's in James's St. In the area surrounded by Bridge St, Thomas St, Watling St and the Liffey, 3 pubs were situated. In the streets from the city centre towards Rathmines there existed 2 pubs - Joseph Cromien's in South Great George's St and John McCormick's in Camden St. The other pubs were Joseph Berrie's in Trinity St and Kenny's in Francis St.

Cheap lodging houses were concentrated in this district. John Devoy wrote:

There were at that time between Francis Street, Patrick Street, Nicholas Street and Bride Street, a number of short lanes which I believe do not now exist and the names of which I do not remember.
They contained a lot of lodging houses where a bed could be had for four-pence.\(^{39}\)

This can explain the high proportion of Fenians from England arrested with addresses in this district: 69 per cent of the total. And the area between Francis St, Patrick St, Nicholas St and Bride St, pointed out by Devoy, provided lodging places to about 30 per cent of the Fenians from England - Back Lane (2), Bride St (5), Christ Church Place (1), Francis St (17), Lambe Alley (3) and Patrick St (1).

**Suburbs: 41 Fenians (9.3%)**

The Dublin organisation had some well organised areas outside the city. Its largest and most important circle existed in Kingstown which had a similar character to the city with a strong transport sector and a large number of general labourers.\(^{40}\) The Kingstown circle was composed mainly of the building trade. In 1861 there were 2,448 houses in Kingstown and two years later the number increased to 2,964.\(^{41}\) Such a building boom in Kingstown accounted for a great number of bricklayers, carpenters and painters residing there; and they were effectively organised by a foreman bricklayer John Hickey.

At the rising, twenty-eight employees were reported to be absent from the Great Southern and Western Railway Company, whose locomotive works were situated at Inchicore in Kilmainham.\(^{42}\) At Inchicore the company provided the employees with housing around the locomotive works.\(^{43}\) Probably many Fenians who worked at the company lived there and formed a circle or part of it. Moreover many Fenians seem to have lived in Chapelizod where workers at the Chapelizod Flax
The group which attacked Dundrum, Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks successively at the rising was observed to assemble at Palmerston demesne. At Windy Arbour it was strengthened by another group. The first group seems to have been composed of the Fenians in Rathmines and the latter group of the Fenians from Dundrum and Carrickmines. Before the rising Patrick Keogh, a crown witness, was told that the Fenians in the Rathmines district were ready to take part in the rising at a moment's notice. Geographically Palmerston demesne was a convenient assembling point for the Rathmines Fenians. Carrickmines and Dundrum were strongholds of Fenianism. In December 1866 Superintendent Ryan received information that these places were hot beds of the movement with regard to men and arms and that their meetings were held in a house in Dundrum.

Men in Clondalkin, Fox & Geese and Crumlin were organised under Patrick Kearney a Centre. Patrick Fitzsimons was the leader of the movement in Clontarf and Dollymount and William Connolly, a Centre, successfully propagated Fenianism in Bray. Thus though a vast majority of Fenians were in the city, we cannot ignore the organisation in the suburbs.
Chapter Four: Footnotes


2. Comerford, 'Patriotism as pastime: the appeal of Fenianism in the mid-1860s'. See S.P.O., F papers, 5477R.

3. S.P.O.


5. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9079 on 1866/13546).


8. Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1866 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 157).


18. The north-west includes Sackville St and Frederick St, and the south-west covers Westmoreland St, Grafton St and Harcourt St.


22. Daly, *Dublin*, p. 23.


29. Thom's directory, 1867.

30. Ibid.


33. Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10634 on 1866/10278); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/8697).

34. Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 July 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/13282 on 1867/13604).

35. N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7687.

36. Thom's directory, 1867.


38. Thom's directory, 1867.

39. Devoy, Recollections, p. 100.

40. Daly, Dublin, p. 148.

41. Ibid., p. 176.


44. Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Dec. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/22175).

45. C.S.O., R.P. 1867/7199.


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47. Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 Nov. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/22293).

Chapter 5

Active Preparations For The Rising: American Officers, Fenians from England, Drilling and Arms

The Fenian organisation in Ireland was, especially before the formation of the Holborn Corps in 1865, in active preparation for a rising by carrying out drilling exercises and by importing arms. The Fenian organisation and the organisation in Britain also attempted to assist the Irish organisation by sending their members - American officers and Fenians from England - to take part in a rising. This chapter attempts to examine not only the preparations of the Dublin Fenians for the rising, but also the role of American officers and Fenians from England staying in Dublin.

In 1865 John O'Mahony, the head of the Fenian Brotherhood, sent three American officers successively - Colonel Kelly, General Hilles and General Keplin (their names were given by the Fenian organisation) - to investigate the organisation in Ireland and the possibility of a rising in 1865. Colonel Kelly, the most prominent American officer in the Fenian movement in the 1860s and the eventual leader of the 1867 rising, was dispatched to Ireland in March. He was joined by...
The Fenian organisation in Ireland was, especially before the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866, in active preparation for a rising by carrying out drilling exercises and by importing arms. The American organisation and the organisation in Britain also attempted to assist the home organisation by sending their members - American officers and Fenians from England - to take part in a rising. This chapter tries to examine not only the preparations of the Dublin Fenians for the rising, but also the role of American officers and Fenians from England staying in Dublin.

**American Officers**

The I.R.B. expected that Irish American officers would assume the military leadership of Fenians once a rising started. They were experienced and resolute soldiers who had fought in the Civil War between 1861 and 1865. It is generally accepted that up to 150,000 Irish born may have served in the Federal army and up to 40,000 in the Confederate army.\(^1\) Therefore there was a fair possibility that a large number of American officers would come to Ireland for the purpose of leading the Fenian army.

In 1865 John O'Mahony, the head of the Fenian Brotherhood, sent three American officers successively - Colonel Kelly, General Millen and General Halpin (their ranks were given by the Fenian organisation) - to investigate the organisation in Ireland and the possibility of a rising in 1865. Colonel Kelly, the most prominent American officer in the Fenian movement in the 1860s and the eventual leader of the 1867 rising, was dispatched to Ireland in March. He was born in
County Galway in 1833 and at the age of eighteen, he went to America, where he
joined the 10th Ohio as a private, becoming eventually a captain in the Federal
army. The next military envoy, General Millen arrived in Dublin in May and
he was followed by General Halpin, who later became the military leader of the
Dublin Fenians in the rising. The three American officers submitted favourable
reports on the state of the organisation in Ireland to the Fenian Brotherhood.
But in July the Fenian Brotherhood ordered P.W. Dunne and Patrick J. Meehan to
go to Ireland to re-examine their predecessors' reviews. Finally the Fenian
Brotherhood, receiving a favourable report from Dunne and Meehan, issued a
'final call' on 5 August: preparations for a rising were pushed forward rapidly
in America. In these circumstances the Fenian Brotherhood started to send
American officers to Ireland. The dispatch of American officers greatly
alarmed the authorities. In August, Archbald, British Consul in New York,
reported that by almost every steamer small squads of men with arms left New
York for Ireland. A month later Superintendent Ryan reported both the
appearance of several Federal officers in Dublin and rumours that a pretty
good number would be on the next mail boat from America and that the rising
would take place soon.

Most American officers came to Ireland in August and September 1865 and they
were, before their departure from America, provided with some money by the
Fenian Brotherhood. Table 5:1 gives the names of 23 American officers, their
ranks (probably in the American army), the amount of money given by the I.R.B.
after their arrival in Dublin, the amount of money given by the Fenian
Brotherhood and the time of sailing.
### Table 5.1: List of 23 American Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Money Advanced in Dublin £</th>
<th>Money Advanced in U.S. £</th>
<th>Time of Sailing</th>
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<td>Burke</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
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<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>37 10 0</td>
<td>9 Sept.</td>
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<td>2 10 0</td>
<td>37 10 0</td>
<td>4 Sept.</td>
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<td>2 10 0</td>
<td>37 10 0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Capt</td>
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<td>15 July</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
<td>4 0 0</td>
<td>25 0 0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michans</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>4 0 0</td>
<td>37 10 0</td>
<td>26 Aug.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
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<td>Capt</td>
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<td>5 0 0</td>
<td>10 Sept.</td>
</tr>
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<td>0 0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>McGuinness</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>70 0 0</td>
<td>16 Aug.</td>
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<td>Burns</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>37 10 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>L.McGuinness</td>
<td>Privt</td>
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<td></td>
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**Source:** Report of Dublin special commission for the trial of T.C. Luby, 1865, p. 1083.

Thirteen American officers sailed in August and nine sailed in September while only one American officer left in July. American officers, according to their ranks, received different amounts of money from the Fenian Brotherhood: those who had superior ranks obtained larger sums. Compared with the amount of money given to the officers in America, the organisation in Ireland could not
match the levels. Table 5:1 indicates that not all American officers had held officer ranks in the American army. This is supported by the fact that the police reported the ranks of twenty-six American officers out of forty-one arrested American officers in February 1866: two colonels, two majors, eight captains, five lieutenants, two sergeants, one corporal, one drummer and five privates. Nevertheless, the majority of American officers had held the rank of officer in the American army. And according to General Millen, thirty-five non-commissioned officers arrived in Ireland.

All the American officers came to the headquarters in Dublin either via Liverpool or via Queenstown. As soon as American officers arrived in Dublin, they communicated news of their arrival to Stephens or to the Military Council established in September 1865. Stephens or the Military Council assigned individual American officers to particular districts outside Dublin to assist a Centre in organising the Fenians and in making preparations for a rising. However, Stephens also ordered Centres to continue in their own way, so that American officers were in effect only assistants to Centres. No American officers were assigned to the Centres in the Dublin organisation probably because Stephens, who took a strong interest in it, wished to avoid any intervention by the American officers in the most concentrated location of Fenian strength.

The American officers who had been assigned to districts immediately repaired to them. It was generally said that American officers were travelling to every part of Ireland. According to Joseph Denieffe, Stephens assigned Captain Patrick Magrath to Antrim, and he was then reassigned to Kilkenny. From
police reports we know of the following American officers' activities in certain areas: James Murphy in Athlone and Mullingar, Captain O'Carroll in Mullingar, Joseph Henry Lawler in Mullingar and Leixlip, Colonel Michael Kirwan in Armagh and Thurles, Francis N. Kavanagh in County Limerick, John Dunne in Belfast and Maurice Fitzharris in County Carlow. Moreover, Patrick Lynch and Michael Fay appear to have taken charge of the Fenians from England because they were seen always in the company of them. Undoubtedly the American officers who had been dispatched to their districts attended Fenian meetings there. And they infused Fenians with an idea of republicanism and imparted a knowledge of the use of a revolver. However, many American officers who were not given any charge remained in Dublin without doing anything. We have no information that they involved themselves actively in the Dublin organisation. 

After the seizure of the Irish People office in September 1865 seven American officers - General Millen (who was the president), General Halpin, Colonel Michael Kirwan, Colonel Denis F. Burke, Colonel Kelly and Captain Murphy - and a civilian John Nolan were appointed members of the Military Council by Stephens. The American officers, under the Military Council, formed an independent body from the civilian organisation and were subject to the authority of Stephens. There is no evidence that they adopted a circle system like the civilian organisation. The knowledge of the movements of the American officers was confined to Stephens and to prominent leaders. Even a Dublin Centre did not know their movements: J. P. McDonnell, though he was acquainted with several officers, had no idea of their actual activities. This is corroborated by the fact that Corydon, who had served in the Federal
army and had been sent by O'Mahony to Dublin in August 1865, attended several meetings not of the rank and file Fenians but of prominent leaders such as Hugh Brophy, Luby and O'Donovan Rossa. The American officers were in constant communication with each other. Mrs Moloney, wife to the proprietor of the European Hotel, said that they would stay there in parties of four or five for a week or so and went off leaving one behind to meet the next party. Moreover, Superintendent Ryan observed that they were in private lodgings, two or three or four together and visited one another. The American officers seem to have had meetings of their own. Corydon stated that he had attended several meetings held by Colonel Kelly and leading American officers at three city addresses (the City Mansion Hotel, Grantham St and 41 Buckingham St); they had initiated the proposal for the formation of the Military Council and discussed instructions intended for the Centres.

The Military Council met every single day in billiard saloons or in the different lodging places of the members and occupied itself with three principal concerns. First, the Military Council provided American officers with lodging places in Dublin. So the Council knew their whereabouts and could mobilise them if this was required. Secondly, the Military Council assigned American officers to certain districts for the purpose of helping Centres there. Thirdly, the members of the Military Council allayed disaffection among the American officers caused by their poor pay and by Stephens's inaction. American officers, before their departure from America were given a large sum of money but some of them spent money so extravagantly that they had none left. Moreover, American officers who were to earn regular salaries from the I.R.B. could not receive them because of the paucity of Fenian resources.
Similarly Stephens's inaction caused serious complaints among American officers especially in Dublin. Though some were assigned to districts in the provinces and had gone there, others were left in Dublin with no responsibilities assigned to them and waiting for orders. Most American officers thought that they would take command of Fenian regiments as soon as they would disembark. In October 1865 members of the Military Council met at the City Mansion Hotel; nine American officers had complained of poor pay, nothing to do and no prospect of a fight. The efforts of the Military Council resulted in the agreement that they would remain in Ireland until New Year's day 1866. Furthermore, in late October or early November Colonel Buckley tried to hold a meeting to discuss starting a rising on the American officers' initiative. However, this meeting was effectively prohibited by the Military Council. The Military Council had no authority over the 'civilian' organisation (i.e. the organisation under the Centres) and was totally ignorant of what was going on in it. This was due to the structure of the I.R.B. As Stephens controlled the organisation by himself, using his confidential men as the means of communication between him and Centres, there was no room for the Military Council to take part in Fenian business. The arrest of Stephens on 11 November 1865 gave a temporary authority over the organisation to the Military Council, which now called a meeting of the Dublin Centres to deal with the emergency caused by the arrest. At the meeting John Devoy proposed General Millen for Stephens's place on the grounds that a military man would start a rising as soon as possible. The members of the Military Council, except for its president General Millen, were against Devoy's proposal, because they expected
that Stephens would be rescued soon and they regarded General Millen as unfit for the position. However, the Centres present were less cautious, and the proposal was passed by a large majority subject to the approval of the absent Centres. Colonel Kelly called the second meeting at which a letter from Stephens in prison was read: Stephens ordered General Millen to return to America to take command of the expedition to Ireland. This meant that Stephens rejected the proposal that General Millen would take over his place. Consequently General Millen returned to America towards the end of November 1865, thinking that Stephens had feared that he would usurp Stephens's authority.

The purpose of the meeting was to ask them for their opinion regarding whether the I.R.B. should start a rising. The American officers favoured immediate action but Stephens did not accept their view. This suggests that Stephens's opinion carried more weight than that of professional soldiers. Finally Stephens decided to postpone a rising for a while. Some Fenian leaders, notably John Devoy, accused Stephens of cowardice. However, even though the I.R.B. in 1865 was stronger than in 1867 from the military point of view, Stephens's decision seemed to be more reasonable than that of other leaders who favoured immediate action; it is very doubtful whether poorly armed Fenians would defeat the British army.

In the last week of December 1865 a second meeting to discuss a decision concerning a rising took place at Colonel Kelly's lodgings in Grantham St,
where along with Stephens, the members of the Military Council assembled. Stephens stated that because of the split in the Fenian Brotherhood, they had no adequate preparations for a rising and that they should postpone a rising for three weeks or a month. The members of the Military Council opposed Stephens's idea and advised an immediate fight. Immediately after Stephens's consultation with the Military Council, Stephens met groups of two or three Dublin Centres at a time to listen to their opinions. On the following day, Stephens and Colonel Kelly met the country Centres separately at the City Mansion Hotel in Bridge St. There is no evidence about the opinion of the Dublin and country Centres concerning the postponement of a rising. Finally the postponement was decided again. Thus the fact that Stephens put off a rising though the Military Council supported immediate action, shows clearly both that the Military Council was only Stephens's advisory committee and that Stephens assumed complete control of the organisation.

After suspending the Habeas Corpus Act on 17 February 1866, the government, according to John Devoy, arrested all the American officers in Dublin, except twelve, within two days. The arrested officers included Colonel Michael Kirwan, Colonel Burke and Captain Murphy - members of the Military Council. As no fresh members were appointed to the Military Council, it seems to have ceased functioning. Afterwards only two American officers - Colonel Kelly and General Halpin - took part in the decision-making of the I.R.B. On 20 February 1866 Stephens called a meeting with Colonel Kelly, General Halpin, Edmund O'Donovan (a Dublin Centre), Mortimer Moynahan of Skibbereen, David Murphy of Limerick, John Nolan and John Devoy, at Mrs Butler's house (Kildare St) to discuss whether they would start a rising. On the following day they
gathered again at the same place. At that time Devoy proposed to launch a rising by concentrating their attack on Richmond Barracks where, according to Devoy, many Fenian soldiers were. Colonel Kelly and General Halpin did not agree with Devoy partly because they did not have sufficient arms to make a good start and partly because as most American officers had been arrested, they were leaderless. It would appear that the two American officers' opinion dominated the meeting. As a result the postponement was decided. Devoy criticised Colonel Kelly and General Halpin:

... but it seemed that to some of us a question of "now or never". We knew the Irish people better than the American officers, who had only recently returned from the United States, where they had been for many years.

Thus the I.R.B. postponed a rising in 1865 and 1866. Though a great number of American officers came to Ireland for the purpose of taking command of the Fenian army, they were arrested by the authorities without any opportunity of showing their military abilities.

Several estimates were made of the number of American officers who had come to Ireland. The maximum number was given by Archbald, British Consul in New York. He passed on to the government reports that 50,000 men had gone or were in the process of going over, though he himself thought the number was greatly exaggerated. J.P. McDonnell who had a high position in the Dublin organisation informed the government that about 5,000 American officers were spread through Ireland up to his arrest in February 1866. Undoubtedly these numbers do not tell the truth. The reliable number of American officers in Ireland was given by General Millen, the president of the Military Council, who
was ordered by Stephens to return to America and then informed the government of his knowledge about the Fenian organisation. According to General Millen, when in October 1865 the adjutant general of O'Mahony made a call for volunteers to go to Ireland, 1,037 men in the whole Fenian organisation in America showed their willingness to go to Ireland. Moreover, he stated that 150 American officers had been sent over to Ireland, about 30 of whom had returned to America. This number 150 is supported by Devoy's statement. With regard to the number of American officers in Dublin, Devoy mentioned that all the American officers in Dublin, except 12 were arrested. In Dublin, 41 American officers were arrested. Therefore about 50 American officers must have been in Dublin.

In May 1866 Superintendent Ryan advised the government not to set any American officers at liberty. However, the Irish government, under pressure from the American government, started to release American officers. In consequence, most American officers seem to have secured their liberty and left for America, though eight American officers were still in Mountjoy prison in January 1867. While some American officers who either avoided arrest or were discharged from prison returned to America, others, instead of going back to America, went to England where they were waiting for opportunities to take part in a rising. Before Stephens started for America in March 1866, he ordered Captain O'Rourke alias Beecher, a paymaster of the American officers, to send all officers in Ireland to England. John Nolan, a member of the Military Council, also went to London and took charge of the organisation in London and, according to an informer, looked after American officers as well. Thus after the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, American officers disappeared from the streets in Dublin.
In the summer and autumn of 1866 Stephens, who had arrived in America in May and then taken O'Mahony's place as the head of the O'Mahony wing of the Fenian Brotherhood, made several speeches to the effect that he would start a campaign in Ireland before 1 January 1867. Responding to Stephens's speeches, the Fenian Brotherhood began to make preparations for a rising. On 23 November 1866 Colonel Kelly, the deputy of Stephens, issued the announcement that they needed volunteers who would take the field in Ireland. Some volunteers started to leave for Ireland, though there is no evidence about the number of these volunteers; in December, P. Edwards, acting British Consul in New York, reported that a large number of suspicious persons continued to leave New York.

In November 1866 the police received information that Fenians were arriving in Britain from America at the rate of from forty to sixty per week and were settling down about Birkenhead, Liverpool, Chester, Manchester, Sheffield and Birmingham. Some American officers undoubtedly came to Ireland, and their appearance attracted police attention: in November American officers from England as well as from America were observed in pubs by night and in the streets in Dublin. In January 1867 Superintendent Ryan reported that within the past few weeks a number of American officers had arrived in Ireland via Londonderry, Glasgow and Queenstown, whence they spread themselves over the country and that several American officers were in Dublin, visiting Whelan's public house at 97 Marlborough St and Bolger's gin palace at the corner of Abbey St in Sackville St. Superintendent Ryan's informer observed that Whelan
treated shabbily dressed American officers and whose conversation would at once create suspicion. The police information that large numbers of American officers came to Ireland appears to have been exaggerated. There is little evidence to support it. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act probably prevented American officers from arriving in Ireland. Instead, they went to England, where they ran no risk of being arrested. In England some American officers, along with American officers already there, formed a Directory to commence a rising, while others gathered under the leadership of Colonel Kelly, a chairman of the Provisional Government.

In February 1867 the Provisional Government, who had decided to start the rising in March, began to move American officers from Britain to Ireland. According to Corydon, on 14 February American officers in Liverpool received final orders from Beecher to proceed to Ireland. Superintendent Ryan obtained information that two generals, four brigadier generals, and two colonels had just arrived in Ireland and that a schooner with seventeen American officers had left England. As late as 25 February American officers who were to take command in the rising arrived in Ireland. Superintendent Ryan reported as follows:

Large numbers of Irish Americans are in the country at the present time and that several of them who are in Dublin and its vicinity have resolved to leave this evening for the North and South of Ireland and to spread themselves over the country in those quarters ready at a moment's notice to take command in an insurrectionary movement... It would appear that the largest proportion of the Irish American officers have gone to the South of Ireland and gone off in directions of lines diverging from the Mallow Junction.
According to Massey's later account, Colonel Burke was to take command in Tipperary, Captain Dunne in Charleville, Captain Morand in Kanturk, Captain Devine in Mill St Cork, Massey in Mitchelstown, Joyce in Fermoy and General Halpin in Dublin. The number of American officers who arrived in Ireland for the rising was smaller than in 1865. The Earl of Mayo, Chief Secretary, stated that before the rising forty-three American officers had been expected in Ireland (of whom three failed to arrive) and that twenty American officers had been arrested. With regard to the Dublin rising no American officers except General Halpin were arrested.

About a week before the rising the American officers were dispatched to their districts. They may well have been total strangers to their assigned districts, though some of them had stayed there in late 1865 and early 1866. Probably the presence of the American officers as military leaders introduced confusion to the command structure, such as it was, which already existed in each district; and undoubtedly such confusion contributed to the fiasco of the 1867 rising. Fenian leaders expected the American officers to take effective command of the Fenian army, but they were not a substitute for a coherent command structure, involving the Centres who had charge of the circles in the I.R.B. This is clearly reflected in the failure of the Dublin rising. The dilemma is discerned also in the circumstances, as we shall see, in which in the week before the rebellion, the circles were deemed to have been subsumed into one large Fenian military organisation for Dublin. The evidence for how this was thought-out or worked out is vague: what it reflects is that the military leaders, devoid of practical contacts with the organisation on the ground, took over command of an abstract organisation rather than of effective
lines of command between leadership and battalion leaders or Centres. The unrealistic assumption underlying the unification of the Dublin Fenians into one vast command can be seen in the fact that what strength existed on the ground depended on the old Centre-circle organisation: men if they gathered, seem to have done so in the context of their circle allegiance or command, and some Centres played a prominent role in marshalling or leading their men on the day or night of the rising.

**Fenians from England**

Fenians in England were ordered to come to Ireland to supplement the strength of the rank and file. There were two flows of Fenians from England: in late 1865 and early 1866, and again in February 1867. In both cases they were to return to England either after arrest or in order to escape it. The authorities effectively prevented these men from carrying out their intentions.

In late 1865 Stephens ordered the I.R.B. in Britain to send members to Ireland for an intended rising which was to take place before New year's day 1866. According to Devoy most Fenians in the North of England came to Dublin, and London Fenians were divided into two groups, sent to Dublin and Cork respectively, while Fenians in Scotland came to Belfast, Derry, Sligo and Galway. In Dublin between 400 and 500 Fenians from England were said to stay. Because of the postponement of a rising in 1866, as has been noted, they did not take part in a rising as they had expected and over 100 of them were arrested after the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866.
A year later, Fenians came to Dublin from England again. On 11 February 1867, as we shall see, the Directory planned to seize arms in the military arsenal at Chester but the government who had secured information foiled their plan. Subsequently a large number of Fenians who were to take part in the Chester raid made their way to Dublin via Holyhead or Liverpool for the purpose of joining the intended rising. However, the Dublin police who had expected their arrival were waiting at the North Wall. From 12 to 19 February, 175 men were arrested at the North Wall; 63 on 12th, 33 on 13th, 12 on 14th, 22 on 15th, 16 on 16th, 23 on 17th and 6 on 19th. Towards the end of February Fenians from England appear to have stopped coming to Dublin, for there is no information about further arrests after 20 February. On 28 February Superintendent Ryan reported that of all the men from England arrested only 14 remained in custody in Richmond Bridewell, some had been sent to England by the police and others had been set free in Dublin. Some of these Fenians no doubt had already been in Dublin in late 1865 and early 1866. Superintendent Ryan said:

"I have very little doubt if the officials at Mountjoy convict prison had an opportunity of seeing them they would identify several of them as having been in their custody on a former occasion."

The Fenians from England in February 1867 were arrested at the North Wall immediately after their landing. On the other hand the Fenians who came in December 1865 and January 1866 spent a couple of months in Dublin until the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. A question must be asked: what did they do in Dublin? They seemed to be stalwarts of the movement, for Superintendent Ryan suspected that they had been drilled and had been in the army, the militia or rifle volunteers. They were systematically organised and received their
pay from Fenian resources; they were divided into circles each of which had its own Centre, paymaster and drill instructor.\textsuperscript{58} According to the police the paymasters visited members' lodging houses every day about the middle of the day to pay 1s 4d per person. Francis Balfe paid the parties from Lancashire. Other paymasters were Thomas Murray, James O'Connor, Sweeny who succeeded Balfe after his arrest and John Warren who took the place of James O'Connor.\textsuperscript{59}

Though they were organised under Centres and received daily pay, the Fenians from England had to spend most of their time idling about in the Dublin streets. However, sometimes they paraded the streets in groups of four and five, and occasionally their numbers were increased to an extent which suggested that they had gathered for an inspection.\textsuperscript{60} The police watched carefully the movements of the Fenians from England. Towards the end of January 1866 the police reported that fifty men wearing 'blue pilot jackets and cloth caps' - undoubtedly they came from England - were at the south side of Merrion Square.\textsuperscript{61} Moreover, they were also observed at the North Wall Quay; on 4 February 300 men, watching all the passengers, seem to have looked for their fellow Fenians.\textsuperscript{62} In the evening they resorted to pubs, where probably they had contact with the Dublin Fenians; according to the police, a pub owned by Charles McArdle, 12 Lower Bridge St was frequently visited by Fenians from England.\textsuperscript{63} After the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the Fenians from England disappeared from the streets; over 100 were arrested and others returned to England.

We have the home residence of the 68 Fenians from England arrested in February 1866.\textsuperscript{64} The highest number was 10 for London, followed by Liverpool (9),
Bolton (7), Chesterfield (6), Leeds (5), Ashton-under-Lyne (4) and Manchester (3). Concerning the Fenians who came to Dublin in February 1867, we can identify the residence of 133 Fenians. 26 came from Liverpool, followed by Leeds (16), Bolton (14), Manchester (12), Bradford (7), Oldham (6), Sheffield (6), Birkenhead (5), Runcorn (3) and Chester (2). Fenians came chiefly from the north of England: Liverpool, Bolton, Leeds and Manchester. In 1866 10 Fenians came from London, while only one from London was arrested in 1867. Probably in 1867 the Fenians in the London organisation as a whole did not receive orders to go to Dublin.

Let us now look at the social composition of the Fenians from England. Of the 93 Fenians arrested in February 1866, half were artisans (43 or 46%); shoemakers (9), cotton spinners (6), painters (4), tailors (3) and so on. Next to artisans, unskilled workers - labourers, and factory or mill workers - accounted for 42 per cent or 39. Compared with the occupations of the Dublin Fenians unskilled workers were over-represented and no shop assistants were among the Fenians from England. The same pattern is discerned in the 134 Fenians who came from England in February 1867: 69 (59%) were artisans; tailors (7), shoemakers (6), carpenters (6), bricklayers (5) and so on. Unskilled workers - carriers, coal heavers, fruit market men and labourers - formed the second group (51 or 38%). There was only one shop assistant (warehouseman) among the Fenians. Thus the Fenians from England consisted mainly of artisans and unskilled workers.

Other information about the Fenians from England are their age and birth places. There is evidence about the age of 132 Fenians coming in February
1867; and their average age was 26 years old. The majority of the Fenians were not born in England but in Ireland, and later emigrated to England. This information is summarised by Superintendent Ryan:

"... all the men in custody are from 18 to 30 or 35 years of age, they are comfortably clad, and according to their own accounts gave up their employment in the course of last week and earned in England from 2s/8d to 5s/- and 6s/- per diem at their trades etc. The sums of money found with the parties named in the annexed varied from ls/2d to 20s/- and almost all said they were natives of remote country places, were many years in England did not know the friends they were coming to see ... They were manifestly trained to discipline, and must have been drilled, ..."  

**Drilling**

Though the rising resulted in disaster, some groups attacking police barracks demonstrated that they had been well drilled. Before the establishment of the I.R.B., Peter Langan and his companies in Dublin and Kingstown took Sunday excursions to the hills or mountains near Dublin in order to carry out drilling. Even in the first stage of Fenianism drilling constituted an important Fenian activity, though drilling was in contradiction of a Fenian principle (Stephens formulated a cellular system in which a Fenian should know only his superior). The information about drilling in the early 1860s is scarce partly because Fenians did not carry out drilling extensively and partly because police informers did not penetrate the I.R.B. Up to the time of the MacManus funeral in November 1861 eleven companies are said to have conducted drilling exercises in Dublin. Moreover, in 1863 four rifle clubs had been set up and several drill rooms opened.
An informer Thomas Saunders described the picture of a drilling room:

four young men went thro a form of drill with four rifles up and down thro the room, others were engaged learning the sword exercise with foils, more employed themselves sparring with gloves - others were playing cards.70

There seem to have been four types of drilling places: pubs, Fenian leaders' houses, drill rooms rented by Fenians and fields. First, pubs were convenient for Fenians to gather without at first attracting much attention from the police. Superintendent Ryan, however, received information that Brophy's circle had been drilled in Cleary's, William's Row and a circle - he had no information - in Cromien's, 57 South Great George's St.71 Fenians no doubt carried out drilling in other pubs. Secondly, Fenians rented rooms for drilling purposes. In some cases members were obliged to pay a subscription towards the cost of the rent: an informer stated that after drilling several paid 2s as their subscription towards the rent of the room at 70 Bride St. John O'Clohissey's circle rented a house at 14 Lr Exchange St and Hugh Brophy engaged a concern in Longford Lane in order to give drilling to his circle.72

Thirdly Fenian leaders provided their houses for their circles' drilling. Michael Moore, a Centre, took a house in Long Lane in 1864 and used the upper part of his house for his circle's drilling. When the police arrested Richard McKeon, they discovered that his house had been a drill and meeting place.73

In these drilling rooms Fenians pretended to practise gymnastics and dancing to dispel suspicion that they did illegal activities. No sooner had Fenians assembled at 4 Holston St, the police reported, than they started dancing and singing.74

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Finally Fenian drilling took place in fields on Sundays especially in mid summer 1865 when all Fenian activities were at a zenith. From several informations, we know that drilling exercises were conducted in Greenhills, 'Molloy's Fields' bounded by the Canal and the Crumlin Road, Blue Wall and Blue Bell. Above all 'Molloy's Fields' was notorious as a Fenian drilling place to the police in 1864, 1865 and 1866. Superintendent Ryan explained that 'This field is so close that no one outside the hedge could observe what was going on inside and as they had outposts in the adjoining fields, having first ascertained that no stranger was concealed on the grounds, none could approach without being observed by those outposts who would give the signal'. According to Patrick Keogh, a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission, 100 Fenians were drilled in Greenhills late in 1863 and the police observed that about 60 Fenians had assembled in Greenhills in September 1865.

Who drilled Fenians? The police claimed that pensioners from the army, discharged soldiers and militiamen drilled Dublin Fenians. As about 1,600 men belonged to the Dublin militia in 1865, it was not so difficult to find militiamen among Fenians. For example Thomas Farrell, a militiaman, was said to drill about twenty men in the Phoenix Park. Furthermore, it would appear that British soldiers and deserters were drill instructors. A private of the 60th Rifles and a private of the 61st Regiment were observed to leave drilling rooms. There is no evidence that American officers drilled Fenians except in 1859 when Stephens sent for American drill-masters; but it was not long before they returned to America because of the lack of money.
General Millen, who investigated the I.R.B. in the summer of 1865, has provided us with information as to how far the Dublin Fenians had been drilled.

Table 5:2 Drilling by the Dublin Fenians in the summer of 1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number in circle</th>
<th>Condition of drilling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>partially drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>partially drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>1/3 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1/2 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>1/2 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>all drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>515</td>
<td>all drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>3/4 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>3/4 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>2/3 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>1/2 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>1/4 drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>950</td>
<td>all drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>470</td>
<td>1/3 well drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>1/2 well drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>all drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>1/3 well drilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>1/2 well drilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: S.P.O., A files, A124.

The condition of drilling varied with the circle. This suggests that each Centre had responsibility for his own circle: some Centres succeeded in drilling their men to some extent, while others did not. Of sixteen circles, only three Centres drilled all members of their circles and two circles, though not for all their men, were reported to be well drilled. The remaining eleven Centres drilled from one-quarter to three-quarters of the men.

The failure of the Centres to drill their men fully can be explained not merely by the fact that police attention prevented Fenians from conducting drilling
at their will, but by the fact that the number of Fenians that could be drilled at one place was rather limited. Table 5:3 is compiled from the reports of the police who watched suspicious drilling places, counting the number of people entering these places.

Table 5:3 Average attendance at drilling places

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Average number in attendance</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Halston St</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14 Nov. - 20 Nov. 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island St</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26 Nov. - 13 Dec. 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Bride St</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5 May and 8 May 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Lr Exchange St</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17 July - 26 Aug 1865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Nov. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 84); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Dec. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 87); Supt Ryan to C.P., 14 Dec. 1864 (C.S.O., R.P. 1864/22616); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R., 157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 161); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 218).

Though a circle consisted of from a few hundred to many hundred, the number of men drilled was less than sixty. Obviously only a small part of a circle could conduct drilling. Therefore Centres had to divide their circles into several groups under several Bs. Patrick Keogh, belonging to Michael Moore's circle, was drilled with his Captain James Brien. Though Moore held drilling every night, Keogh's group was drilled every Sunday; and he attended drilling from June 1864 to March 1865. He took part in the field drilling twice, so it would appear that the scale of field drilling was larger than in drill rooms but field drilling did not take place often.
After the seizure of the Irish People office in September 1865 and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866, Fenians seem to have carried out drilling more secretly than before or to have abandoned drilling exercises for a while. In May 1866 Superintendent Ryan reported that he had had 'no moral doubt that drilling is abandoned about the city and county of Dublin at present'. Meanwhile in September 1866 the police obtained information about Fenians' drilling or meetings held out at Lansdowne Valley and in October also received information that suspicious men gathered in the vicinity of Drimnagh and Greenhills. These people might have assembled to carry out drilling.

Towards the end of 1866 the police possessed strong evidence about Fenian drilling. After arresting several Centres in December, the police discovered that Fenians had been carrying out drilling at some Centres' houses. Three arrested Centres - Nicholas Walsh, Dr Power and Patrick O'Connor - had large houses, which provided a number of Fenians with drilling, in Holles St, 3 Upper Temple St and 17 Queen St respectively. Superintendent Ryan described these houses:

There was little or no furniture in either of the 3 houses indicated two were evidently used for drilling purposes, ingress might be had to either without attracting attention.

The police were further informed that Richard Bracken, a Centre, drilled his circle and James M' Gough, a deserter from the Military Train, drilled Stanley (Dr Power's B) and his men at 24 Luke St and Whelan in his pub. There is no
doubt that these arrests forced Fenians to give up drilling. Afterwards there are no informations that Fenians hold drilling exercises actively.

In sum, in spite of police vigilance, the Dublin organisation drilled the members better than is generally believed. However, some Centres failed to drill their men properly. This was revealed in the group attacking the police barracks at Tallaght. On the other hand the group attacking Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks demonstrated that they had been well drilled.

Arms

In spite of their efforts to acquire arms, the Fenians had not enough arms. This is one of the causes of the failure of the rising. It was not until 1864 that the I.R.B. started to purchase or import arms: according to the plan of Stephens, the I.R.B. was to be supplied with sufficient arms by the Fenian Brotherhood. Each Fenian seems to have been required to arm himself with a rifle or pike. Therefore Fenians had the obligation to buy arms from the organisation with their own money, because the I.R.B. had not sufficient resources to provide the members with arms.

The American Fenians in fact sent fire arms as secretly as possible, though their numbers were not adequate for the I.R.B. Under Secretary Larcom wrote that in February 1865 a package of fire arms had been sent from John O'Mahony to O'Donovan Rossa at the Irish People office. Archbald, British Consul in New York, received several informations that many arms had been or would be

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transported to Ireland. But his information did not lead to any arms seizures. Probably the Fenian Brotherhood did not export a large number of arms for fear of attracting the attention of the authorities.

As a result the Fenians had to purchase arms in Ireland or to import them from England. In the early and middle 1860s, the Fenians could buy arms and ammunition outside of proclaimed districts in Ireland. Superintendent Ryan reported that 'fire arms are purchased from hardware dealers brokers & C in Dublin with usual briskness ... into the hands of members'. However, under police vigilance it was impossible to buy many fire arms. The Fenians had no choice but to import fire arms from England where they could buy them legally. Immediately after the 1867 rising, the military authorities found arms and ammunition, thrown away by Fenians in the Tallaght hills, stating that 'there were quantities of boxes of copper capped cartridges made by two manufacturers in London, one of them, as the labels showed, employed by the War Department'. It would appear that Fenians imported these cartridges from England and probably they imported fire arms as well.

From late 1864 the Dublin Fenians were very active in importing fire arms from England. In September 1864 Superintendent Ryan was informed that Brophy, a builder, was importing rifles for 35s each from Sheffield to Dublin and a month later he was also informed that Brophy had obtained 10 or 12 rifles and was importing 25 or so from Sheffield. Brophy was the first key figure in importing fire arms from England and distributing them among the Fenians. In spite of these informations, the police were unable to seize fire arms sent from England to Brophy. Meanwhile Brophy appears to have given up his activity
in importing fire arms, because we have no further information concerning his involvement in an arms traffic.

The Fenians devised a more systematic importing system: the members who were working at some establishments such as large mercantile establishments dealing with imported goods from England, received fire arms concealed in a box or bag. Inspector general of the Irish Constabulary described the importing system as follows:

"... there is scarcely a Firm in any county in Ireland some of whose members do not belong to the Fenian Conspiracy. A box or bag or barrel containing flour or some other article of merchandise, is consigned to a respectable firm and it is pre-notified to the Fenian member of the Establishment that such a box is to be forwarded, who then intercepts it at some point, short of its pretended destination, and it is readily handed over to him on the strength of his known connexion with the firm - if the arms are for Dublin no time is lost in stealing distributing them to people who are in their confidence and they are immediately secreted." 96

In May 1865 Superintendent Ryan reported that Patrick Tier, a buyer for one of the departments in the drapery establishment of Messrs Brown & McConky, Dame St, had received four rifles from Birmingham. 97 Furthermore, J.P. McDonnell started a rope and twine company in April 1865 in order to import fire arms. In late 1865 custom officials discovered a case assigned to 'Mr J. McDonnell, Rope and Twine Manufacturer, 36 New Row West, off Thomas St' containing five Enfield rifles. 98 Superintendent Ryan claimed that McDonnell had imported rifles 'by the way the cases that contained them were cases of goods in the rope and trim way'. 99

After the arrest of J.P. McDonnell in February 1866 there is little evidence about the import of fire arms. But towards the end of 1866 the police
discovered that Dr Power and his Bs - Michael Stanley and Laurence Clancy - were very active in importing fire arms. Stanley was in some position of trust in the ship building establishment of Messrs Walpole, Webb & Bewley at the end of the North Wall where he had enrolled 100 of the employees. Probably Stanley and his subordinates could intercept cases containing arms shipped from England without police attention. Clancy held a position at the head of some departments in the drapery establishment of McSweeny, Delany & Co, Sackville St and imported fire arms under cover of drapery goods. Moreover, Denis Downey who was proprietor of a tailoring establishment also seems to have imported rifles in conjunction with Dr Power. Perhaps he imported fire arms as goods for tailors. In this way Fenians who worked in some establishment imported cases or barrels containing fire arms as goods of the firms to avoid arousing suspicion.

Who exported fire arms from England? The I.R.B. had arms agents in England, purchasing fire arms there and sending them to Ireland. The most prominent agent was Colonel Ricard O'Sullivan Burke, an American officer, who had proceeded to England, probably in the latter part of 1865 and according to Devoy, stored 2,000 Enfield rifles in Liverpool and a London Centre Hennessey was said to send several cases of fire arms to Dublin. The Fenians also made arms such as pikes, bullets, percussion caps, blades and 'greek fires'. Michael Moore, a Centre and blacksmith, had charge of the department of pike making and afterwards Patrick Kearney, a Centre, made himself the head of another pike making department. Though even in those days pikes were believed to be useless against rifles - Colonel Kelly and
General Halpin had no faith in pikes - pikes, in the case of the city fighting, could be useful and be obtained by the poor. The military resources of Ireland (third edition, 1858) explained the use of pikes:

The chief and primary arm of Ireland's military force must be composed of pikemen, whose armament and equipment are so cheap and simple that the very poorest man can at all times stand armed and equipped.

Though there is little evidence that the Fenians were making rifles and guns, they made bullets and percussion caps. Edmund O'Donovan took care of the ammunition - powder, balls, lead - and supervised the manufacture of small arms and ball cartridges. Moreover, Edmund O'Donovan taught Fenians to manufacture detonating caps at a Fenian 'classic' training school. There seem to have been several arms factories in Dublin where Fenians made pike heads, caps and rifle bullets. The police discovered four 'large scale' Fenian factories - a workshop in Blackhall Row, a concern at 5 Longford Lane, a stable at rear of the house 204 Great Britain St and 18 Moore St. The police also found that lead bullets had been made in Joseph Cromien's pub, 57 South Great George St. In December 1866 Superintendent Ryan reported that a blade which could be used for close fighting had been made at Chapelizod flax spinning mills. He also reported that John Smyth had been making greek fire, assisted by Patrick Fitzsimons at Smyth's house in Ballybough Road.

A further question remains over the number of arms the Dublin Fenians had on the occasion of the rising. We have no information that American officers brought a great number of arms to Ireland with them immediately before the rising. Superintendent Ryan was informed that the Fenians at the rising had
had at their disposal in Ireland about 3,000 rifles and 12,000 revolvers with inadequate supply of ammunition. In February 1867 Godfrey Massey learned at the Dublin Centres meeting that Dublin Fenians' weapons of all kind had not exceeded about 3,000. General Millen who knew the military condition of the Fenian organisation in 1865 gave the information that in Dublin 8,030 Fenians had had 1,383 fire arms and 1,315 other arms. From these informations it would not be wrong to conclude that about 3,000 arms existed in the Dublin organisation. Of about 3,000 arms, approximately 800 seem to have been rifles. In February 1866 Colonel Kelly told Devoy that in Dublin the number of rifles was 800; and five years later a Fenian informer reported that Dublin Fenians possessed 261 new rifles and 502 old rifles. Probably 1,500 Dublin Fenians had fire arms - revolvers or rifles - and another 1,500 had pikes or other arms. Indeed the Dublin organisation was poorly armed and was not a strong military threat to the authorities. However, the organisation was no doubt better armed than the commonly accepted picture would suggest: it is a myth that Fenians without arms attacked the police barracks.
Chapter Five: Footnotes


2. Denieffe, A personal narrative, p. 91.


6. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Mar. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/4967); N.L.I., MS 333, p. 44; N.L.I., MS 5964, p. 68.


8. N.L.I., MS 5964, p. 68.


10. N.L.I., MS 5964, p. 78.


14. N.L.I., MS 5964.


19. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 9(a), 'Dublin Co. commission, October 1867', p. 54.

20. N.L.I., MS 5964, pp 72, 73, 90, 99.

21. Ibid., p. 87.
22. Ibid., pp 92-3.
24. Ibid., p.89.
25. Denieffe, A personal narrative, pp. 203; Devoy, Recollections, pp 73-5.
27. For Stephens's rescue, see Devoy, Recollections, pp 77-87.
29. Devoy, Recollections, pp 91-5.
30. Ibid., p. 99.
33. Ibid., p.108.
35. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/16868.
37. Devoy, Recollections, p. 92.
44. C.P. O'Ferrall, Lake to Chief Secretary, 23 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/1316).
49. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), pp 19-20.
52. N.L.I., MS 7517, p. 169; C.P. O'Ferrall, Lake to Chief Secretary, 23 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/1316); Devoy, Recollections, p. 113.
53. Denvir, The Irish in Britain, p. 224; Devoy, Recollections, p. 189.
58. C.P., O'Ferrall, Lake to Chief Secretary, 23 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/1316).
59. Supt Ryan to C.P., 22 Feb. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/3454 on 1866/13851); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 Mar. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5451); Supt Ryan to C.P., 14 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9627 on 1866/16267); Supt Ryan to C.P., 20 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11897 on 1866/14745); Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 8 Sept. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/16929 on 1866/7444); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 Mar. 1866/5451).
60. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9091).
64. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/4852.
65. See note no. 60.
66. Ibid.
68. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 6.
69. 'The story of the F.B. by nobody at all' (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7687), pp. 8, 16.
72. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 216); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1866 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 218); C.P. Lake to U.S., 3 July 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 9013R); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Feb. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/2198 on 1866/4882).
73. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), p. 126; Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/12289 on 1867/1524).
74. Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Nov. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 84).
75. C.S.O., R.P. 1867/7199; Inspector Kelly to Supt Donovan, 10 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 239); Supt Ryan to C.P., 27 Apr. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4062R on 4170R); Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Sept. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 52); Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11820 on 1866/13223); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8693 on 1866/20136); Supt Ryan to C.P., 9 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11348 on 1866/10278); Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11820 on 1866/13223); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9079 on 1866/13546).
76. Supt Ryan to C.P., 27 Apr. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4062R on 4170R).
77. Inspector Kelly to Supt Donovan, 10 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 239); C.S.O., R.P. 1866/7199.
78. Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Aug. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/15981 on 1866/19660); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 May 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4161R); C.S.O., R.P. 1865/4112; Acting Supt Hughes, 17 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/7542 on 1866/8263).
79. Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 161); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 216).
81. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp. 126-7.
82. C.S.O., R.P., 1867/7199.
83. Supt Ryan to C.P., 18 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9914).
84. Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 4 Sept. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/16579); Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 2 Oct. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/1819 on 1866/18403).
89. Brophy sold rifles at 25s. to the Fenians. Though the end of the Civil War in April 1865 dropped rifle prices in English markets, Fenian rifles might have been of bad quality: General Millen who calculated rifles at 60s. saw one of Brophy's 25s. rifles for inspector's rejection mark. The Fenians who could not afford to pay for rifles bought pike heads at 2s 6d, and handles or shafts at 5s (N.L.I., MS 5964, p.44; Supt Ryan to C.P., 15 Oct.1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.73)).
90. N.L.I., MS 7517, p.137.
94. Lord Strathnairn to the Adjutant General, the Horse Guard, 7 Mar.1867 (N.L.I., Kilmainham papers, MS 1240).
95. N.L.I., MS 5964, p.43; Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Sept.1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.52); Supt Ryan to C.P., 15 Oct.1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.73).
97. Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1867 (S.P.O., F.P.R.157).
102. Devoy, Recollections, p.349.
103. Statement by Nicholas English, (N.L.I., MS 7517).
104. Devoy, Recollections, p.50.
105. Ibid., p. 107.


107. N. L. I., MS 333, p. 41.


111. Supt Ryan to C.P., 18 June 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/474 on 1867/21886).

112. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), p. 22.


Chapter 6

The Fenian Organisation in the British Army in Dublin
The development of the army organisation

The government relied on the British army in Ireland - during our period about 20,000 troops were stationed in Ireland - against a possible Fenian rising. As long as the army remained loyal to the government, the poorly armed I.R.B. was not a serious threat to them. However, when the I.R.B. recruited British soldiers, this was undoubtedly a serious problem for the government.

The aim of using Fenian soldiers was a consistent part of Fenian plans. It was not an entirely original policy in the sense that the United Irishmen had laid great emphasis in the 1790s on infiltrating the militia regiments which were at that time the core of the army in Ireland. The policy, as pursued by the Fenians, had clear-cut objectives. First of all, Fenian soldiers would attack non-Fenian soldiers and take over military barracks from inside once a rising started. Secondly, the Fenian soldiers planned to distribute arms stored in military barracks to civilian Fenians. It was said that there were a large number of rifles in the Pigeon House Fort. Thirdly, the Fenian soldiers were to be made into officers in the Fenian army under the leadership of the American officers, who had superior military knowledge and experience to that of the Fenian soldiers, most of whom were rank and file in the British army. As the number of the American officers was not large, the I.R.B. needed intermediate grade officers between the American officers and the rank and file Fenians.

The Fenian organisation in the army gradually developed its system under three successive organisers, Pagan O'Leary, William Francis Roantree and John Devoy, and reached its height in terms of numbers and an organisational structure.
under John Devoy. Though Pagan O'Leary and William Roantree had appointed a Centre for each regiment except the 10th Hussars, no subordinate Fenians were given responsibility for companies within a regiment. Devoy turned the organisation into a more sophisticated one by selecting a man as a leader of each company; and a company was further divided into sections or squads which had their own heads. The structure of the organisation in the British army was totally different from that of the civilian organisation and was based rather on the army structure. After Devoy and his principal assistants had been arrested in February 1866, Dr Power, a Dublin Centre, was prominent in organising the Fenian soldiers. But it is unlikely that he restored the army organisation to the same level as Devoy had achieved.

The organisation in the army was supplementary to the civilian organisation and Fenian leaders expected Fenian soldiers only to cooperate with civilian Fenians in the intended rising. Consequently, when they regarded the Fenian business among soldiers as risky and hopeless, they virtually gave it up. This was a contrast with the United Irishmen where the policy of penetrating the militia was a central one right up to the time of the rising in May 1798. In terms of structure the O'Leary-Roantree-Devoy organisation existed independently of the civilian organisation. Though Roantree was a Centre in charge of a civilian circle, we have no information that his Bs or his circle as a body played an active role in the task of recruiting Fenians in the army. In Dublin some Centres of civilian circles, such as Denis Cromien and Matthew O'Neill, cooperated with the chief organisers for the army but their business in the army organisation seems to have been a secondary task. By contrast Dr Power's organisation in the army was more or less part of his circle from a structural point of view. This is reflected in the fact that his Bs, such as William
Stack, devoted time to recruiting and organising Fenian soldiers. However, Dr Power's army work took place in the aftermath of Devoy's arrest. Dr Power's work, while it may have had some intention of wider spread into the army, in practice concentrated on a single regiment; and a broad-based structure of soldier Centres for circles within the army no longer existed. With Dr Power's arrest in early December 1866 efforts at infiltrating the army or keeping the Fenian structure in the army afoot were for all practical purposes disorganised.

Pagan O'Leary was the first chief organiser for the British army appointed by James Stephens who had, however, at first opposed O'Leary's idea of demoralising the British army because he had thought that such a business was dangerous and premature. We have no definite information regarding when O'Leary started to organise soldiers in the army for the Fenian cause. However, considering Devoy's account that O'Leary sailed from Boston for Galway on 6 October 1863 and that he was arrested a year later (in Athlone on 13 November 1864), O'Leary can only have worked in all probability for a little less than a year. O'Leary propagated Fenianism among the soldiers rather than recruiting them into a structured relationship, and occasionally reported his work to Stephens. The work of O'Leary was unique in that he appealed to the hearts of the soldiers by telling them how England turned out young and healthy soldiers as beggars on the streets or to die in the poor-house and by reciting the story of heartless evictions carried out by the troops.

Pagan O'Leary's successor, after his arrest in November 1864, was William Francis Roantree, a Centre whose circle - one of the largest - consisted of Leixlip, Maynooth, Celbridge, Lucan and other towns in Kildare and Dublin. Roantree was actively organising the Fenian soldiers and turned Pagan O'Leary's
'loose' organisation into better shape, appointing a Centre for each regiment. The police observed that Roantree associated with soldiers at Bergin's (65 Thomas St) in June, July and August 1865. It seems likely from this evidence that Roantree did his work mainly in Dublin rather than in the wider district covered by the circle of which he was Centre.

After the arrest of Roantree in September 1865, James Stephens, in a letter dated 26 October, appointed John Devoy chief organiser of the British army at £3 a week and with a staff of eight men under him - two of these were to be civilians and the rest were to be soldiers. Devoy became the chief organiser on condition that Colonel Kelly would help him with directions and advice. Colonel Kelly ordered Devoy to organise the soldiers already sworn in, rather than to spread the recruitment net further. Devoy, though an able organiser, had to give up his position after only four months' duty - he was arrested in February 1866.

Devoy's successor faced a hard time caused by the authorities' counteraction and the split in the Fenian Brotherhood. By suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, the authorities were able to arrest the civilian Fenians involved in the organisation in the army. Fenian soldiers themselves were court-martialled. In December 1866, when a private of the 85th was approached, he said, 'No, that too many soldiers had already got into it, and that a good many of them got themselves into Mountjoy prison by this Fenian affair'. Besides, because of the split in the Fenian Brotherhood, the money indispensable to seducing and organising the soldiers was in short supply. Dr Power seems to have assumed the mantle of Devoy more than any other particular Fenian. However, we have no information that Dr Power was formally appointed chief organiser of the army.
Some documents simply reveal incidentally that Dr Power had a prominent role. The balance of probability is that he was a chief organiser in a formal sense, though the fact that the known agents now came from a single circle, in contrast to the more broad-based band of assistants of his predecessors, points to an increasingly circumscribed role for this work. At his trial in February 1867, a crown witness said that Dr Power had the right to appoint a Centre for the 85th and used to give money to two Fenian soldiers' leaders, Kavanagh and Simpson, out of his own pocket (until money would come from America to him).\textsuperscript{12}

On 11 December 1866 Superintendent Ryan reported that very many of the soldiers of the 85th had been sworn in by Dr Power, William Stack and Private Simpson and that on the Saturday night before his arrest Dr Power had sworn in thirty-six soldiers of the 85th Regiment.\textsuperscript{13}

However, one reference does refer to activity by him at the Curragh Camp, though the lack of further information to work outside the 85th Regiment suggests that little effort was made to widen the range of recruitment. With the authorities now fully on the alert, the policy of bringing in Scottish and English regiments chosen because they had few Irish soldiers and of dispersing the regiments suspected of infection to several locations within Ireland, made the task far more difficult. The concentration by Dr Power and his Bs on the 85th may simply reflect the facts that it had been already stationed in Dublin sufficiently long and had a sufficiently large component of Irish-born soldiers for it to be one of the few promising targets for a recruiting drive. It is plausible to see the prominence of the 85th Regiment in Dr Power's activities.
as less a reflection of a change in the terms of reference for his work than of a more circumscribed field for penetration of regiments. After Dr Power's arrest, evidence of systematic organisation in the army does not exist, although some Fenians continued to be arrested on the charge of swearing in soldiers. Dr Power may have been the last Fenian chief organiser for the British army in the 1860s.

Agents to infiltrate the army can be classified into two groups: civilian Fenians and Fenian soldiers. Generally speaking a watershed existed between the O'Leary-Roantree-Devoy organisation and Dr Power's. Dr Power had to start his organisation with new assistants. The principal works of agents were as follows. Firstly, agents supplied Fenian soldiers with drink in pubs: as long as soldiers were members of the I.R.B., they could be given free drink. Undoubtedly some soldiers joined the movement for the purpose of obtaining free drink. Secondly, Fenians tried to maintain regular communication with soldiers already recruited into Fenianism. Devoy wrote how he had communicated with the Fenian soldiers:

Mostly there were other men present, both civilians and soldiers, in the taprooms where those gatherings took place, and there was absolutely no discussion. While the others sat at a table, conversing about nothing in particular, I took the man I wanted to talk to aside and spoke to him privately, either receiving reports (which was most commonly the case), or giving orders.14

Thomas Chambers, the Centre of the 61st, claimed that a man from each company should attend every meeting to give intelligence to the men of each regiment.15 Thirdly, Fenian agents held meetings to encourage Fenian soldiers. Reports exist of two meetings of Devoy's in Hoey's of Bridgefoot St and Curran's of Clare Lane respectively. Corporal Fitzgerald of the 10th Hussars took an
active part at Devoy's meeting in Hoey's, making a speech before the soldiers.16 The meeting in Curran's was a conference between Fenian soldiers and an American officer, Captain McCafferty. This was the only occasion that an American officer was present at the British soldiers' meeting.17

In October 1864 the police reported that two Dublin Fire Brigade men (one of whom was Baines) and two other men - apparently masons or stone cutters - were observed in the company of Pagan O'Leary.18 Probably they were O'Leary's assistants, and after O'Leary's arrest, appear to have worked under Roantree. William Roantree was, according to Devoy, helped by James Rynd and Thomas Baines of the Dublin Fire Brigade and by Jack Mullen.19 In April 1865 Superintendent Ryan reported that in Bergin's of 65 Thomas St, Roantree, Roantree's brother, another man Hickey, who kept a tobacco shop at 71 Thomas St, Wrin [Rynd] of the Fire Brigade and Cromeen [Cromien] - foreman on the site of the new Augustinian church (then in the course of erection at John's Lane) had seemed to pay great attention to the soldiers present; and the police further wrote that O'Connor, a mason, was with Roantree, Baines and Rynd at Bergin's.20 It would appear that Roantree had seven assistants: James Rynd (Wrin), Thomas Baines, Jack Mullen, Roantree's brother, Denis Cromien, Hickey and O'Connor. Only one Dublin Centre, Denis Cromien, helped Roantree.

Stephens authorised Devoy to appoint a staff of eight men to act under him, of whom two should have been civilians and the other six soldiers. In practice, Devoy appointed eight civilians as his staff. Devoy mentioned five names in his Recollections: Jack Mullen, Edward St Clair (Pilsworth), Denis Duggan, Matthew O'Neill and William Hampson.21 On 22 February 1866 John Devoy was arrested with five civilians, one deserter and eleven soldiers at a Fenian
meeting in Pilsworth's, 132 and 133 James's St and they were said to be the members of the 'Military branch'. The civilians arrested on that occasion were Edward St Clair, Stephen O'Kelly, Denis Duggan, James Byrne and (Robert) Hampson. It would appear that the eight staff of Devoy were Jack Mullen, Edward St Clair, Denis Duggan, Matthew O'Neill, William Hampson, Stephen O'Kelly, James Byrne and Thomas Baines. Thomas Baines had worked under O'Leary, Roantree and Devoy. James Rynd, Denis Cromien and O'Connor helped both O'Leary and Roantree but did not help Devoy. An agent who assisted Roantree and Devoy was Jack Mullen. Devoy selected six men who did not work with Roantree — Edward St Clair, Stephen O'Kelly, Denis Duggan, James Byrne, Matthew O'Neill, and William Hampson. This was probably owing to the action of the authorities in September 1865: James Rynd was arrested and Denis Cromien and O'Connor seem to have quitted Ireland to avoid arrest. At this point the Fenian soldier agents may be looked at. The regular rotation of troops made it difficult for the Fenian soldiers to play a continued role. For example O'Leary organised the soldiers of the 84th with the assistance of two privates Murphy Lacy and Welsh in the regiment. By the time Devoy was the chief organiser, this regiment was no longer stationed in Dublin. Roantree had appointed Centres for all regiments except the 10th Hussars for which Devoy made the appointment.
### TABLE 6 : 1 Centres for Fenian regiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Chambers</td>
<td>61st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Curry</td>
<td>87th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fennessy</td>
<td>3rd Buffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flynn</td>
<td>73rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Keating</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Montague</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Boyle O'Reilly</td>
<td>10th Hussars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Note:** Montague was succeeded by Keating.

**Sources:** C.S.O., R.P.1866/5005; Devoy, *Recollections*, pp 62, 110, 143, 148, 151, 152.

William Curry, the Centre of the 87th, who came from Portsmouth on furlough with twenty of his regiment towards the end of 1865 and then deserted, was Devoy's most efficient assistant. He visited the barracks everyday, carrying messages from Devoy to his men, arranging for meetings, ascertaining the strength of the guards and pickets and counting the number of Fenian soldiers. Such things he reported to Devoy several times a day and he always accompanied Devoy to meetings.\(^{25}\) John Boyle O'Reilly of the 10th Hussars was the only Centre Devoy had appointed and through him Devoy made progress in the 10th Hussars.\(^ {26}\) The Centre for each regiment reported the strength of the garrison and of the Fenians there and swore in soldiers and gave drink to soldiers of his own and other regiments. The courts martial evidence identifies for us some soldiers who were Bs: Robert Cranston, Michael Harrington, Patrick McNulty, John Priestly and James McCoy of the 61st, Thomas Delany, Martin Hogan, James Wilson, John Lynch and William Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guards, John Donoghoe and Thomas Hasset of the 24th and John Shine of the 2/60 Rifles.\(^ {27}\)
The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and the courts martial destroyed the O'Leary-Roantree-Devoy organisation completely, so that Dr Power had to start work virtually from scratch. Almost all his assistants were new members of the army organisation with the exception of Edmund O'Regan, a B; Edmund O'Regan had already been active in the army organisation in Dublin under Devoy and was associated with Edward St Clair and Thomas Chambers. Dr Power had two other Bs active in organising the Fenian soldiers - William Stack and George Browne; William Stack was the most prominent agent in Dr Power's organisation and used his whole leisure time to swear in soldiers. Other Fenian agents were Daniel Gillespie, afterwards a witness at Dr Power's trial and Edward Butler who was arrested on a charge of swearing in John Rein of the 85th. Superintendent Ryan reported that Edward Butler, though he was a labourer whose wages was 10s per week, spent much money freely in public houses every night. Dr Power seems to have tried to swear in soldiers at the Curragh Camp as well as in Dublin. Eugene O'Sullivan, a chimney sweeper, who worked at the Military Barracks at the Curragh Camp and at Newbridge was arrested with William Stack.

Dr Power's army organisation was much smaller than his predecessors and appears to have been largely confined to one regiment, the 85th. This is reflected in the fact that only four Fenian soldiers and of a single regiment, the 85th, faced courts martial in January and April 1867: Thomas Simpson (John O'Brien), Philip Murtha, James Kavanagh and Caleb Richings. Thomas Simpson and James Kavanagh were said to be two of the Centres in the 85th and Thomas Simpson was the principal man introducing Fenianism into the 85th. Simpson had worked as a paymaster in London and came to Dublin to avoid arrest. He joined the 8th in May 1866. It is hard to say when he met Dr Power, but according to Private McCarthy of the 85th, he was with Dr Power in the months of August, September

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and October 1866. It was said that Dr Power induced him to desert from the 8th and to join the 85th, which he did on 13 November 1866. During the very short time from his enlistment on 13 November 1866 to Dr Power's arrest in early December 1866, they succeeded in swearing in soldiers mainly of the 85th. However, such a short period did not enable Dr Power and Simpson to organise soldiers well. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the army authorities were now well aware of the threat of Fenianism, and that progress was much more difficult than in the earlier stages.

Some prominent Fenian soldiers deserted from their regiments in order to specialise in army recruitment; they received 1s 6d a day from the I.R.B. Superintendent Ryan explained deserters' effectiveness in the army:

Discharged soldiers and deserters were the persons deputed to go among soldiers because they were the best accustomed to their habits. I regard any man who has ever been in Her Majesty Service in any Department, and who has been found engaged in treasonable practices as more culpable than those who had no experience in such matters.

Deserters took a crucial part in swearing in soldiers and in establishing a medium of communication between the civilian Fenians and the Fenian soldiers. Martin Hogan, a deserter from the 5th Dragoon Guards, went into the Royal Barracks in plain clothes (some of the deserters were given plain clothes in Hoey's public house) to relay messages from a Centre to Sergeant McEntee.

The following Fenian soldiers deserted from their regiments: Thomas Chambers and Michael Harrington of the 61st, Martin Hogan, William Foley, James Wilson and James Montague of the 5th Dragoon Guards, Thomas Hasset of the 1/24th, Fennessy of the 3rd and William Curry of the 87th. Of the nine deserters, four - Thomas Chambers, James Montague, Fennessy and William Curry - were Centres of
their regiments. Other deserters may have been Centres or Bs, in the light of the nature of their activities.

Moreover, Fenian soldiers stationed in England deserted from their regiments and came to Dublin. Fenian agents were swearing in soldiers not only in Ireland but also in England, because they anticipated that regiments outside Ireland might come to Ireland. Superintendent Ryan himself claimed that their work was not confined to the United Kingdom and took place in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, though we have no information to support this. In 1865 Thomas Chambers and Thomas Baines were recruiting soldiers in Aldershot, Thorncliff and London. After the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866, Arthur Forrester, sub-Centre for all Manchester and Thoms Baines engaged in swearing in soldiers in Manchester. Of these soldiers sworn in in England, over forty soldiers deserted from their regiments and came to Dublin before the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. There were three groups of deserters: firstly, William Curry and another twenty men from the 87th came to Dublin; secondly, a batch of twenty men was sent by St Clair who had been active in swearing in soldiers in London and Woolwich; thirdly, several soldiers - we have no information - were dispatched to Dublin.

Pubs and canteens at the military barracks were the places where Fenians built up the organisation in the army. Recruitments usually took place in pubs, where soldiers took the Fenian oath singly in the yard or in an occupied room upstairs, if in a Fenian's house. This created an atmosphere in which soldiers could not refuse to take the oath, for they feared to do so in the presence of other Fenian soldiers. Moreover, some soldiers seem to have taken the oath under the influence of drink. Superintendent Ryan reported: 'it was through
the medium of drinking and meeting in public houses, that many and particularly soldiers were induced to become members, and the contagion spread'. At the Curragh Camp, Daniel Byrne, working in one of the canteens, looked after the Fenian organisation there, giving money and beer. In addition, Fenian agents went down from Dublin to the Curragh Camp. Two men of the 32nd charged with desertion said:

The greater part of the soldiers at present at the Curragh Camp were Fenians, and particularly the 3rd Buffs and also that there were Fenian agents down from Dublin daily through the Camp who were well supplied with cash and give the soldiers plenty of drink.

Superintendent Ryan suggested that there were certain pubs where Fenian agents met soldiers. Pagan O'Leary and William Roantree had used pubs near the various barracks, while Devoy selected pubs owned or managed by Fenians and changed them frequently to avoid police attention. Dr Power did not resort to the same pubs as his predecessors had done. O'Leary met Fenian soldiers especially in three pubs in Dublin: Bergin's (65 Thomas St), Moran's (10 Cork Hill) and Slattery's (7 Cork Hill). The staff of the Irish People, Pagan O'Leary, James Montague—the Centre of the 5th Dragoon Guards—and soldiers frequented Slattery's, where a waiter, Thomas Kelly, a discharged soldier, was employed on account of his efficiency in recruiting soldiers. Furthermore the pub kept by Farrell in Strand St is said to have been the place where Pagan O'Leary and Thomas Baines tampered with soldiers. At Newbridge, O'Leary frequented Shaughnessy's. Roantree also used Moran's and Bergin's. It would appear that Roantree used O'Leary's pubs.
Devoy used many pubs which had not been used by his predecessors and changed them frequently to avoid police attention. The Dublin Special Commission held in February 1867 (Dr Power, John Devoy and 12 others) and the proceedings of the courts martial show pubs which Devoy frequented: Hoey's Bridgefoot St, Pilsworth 132 and 133 James's St, Ward's Fishamble St, the Canal Tavern, Waugh's, Curran's Clare Lane, Tully's, Fortune's Golden Lane, Doyle's, Dolan's Capel St, Barclay's James's St, Blue Lamp, Walsh's and the Kilmainham Tavern. In February 1866 the military authorities prohibited soldiers from entering the following pubs; James Bergin's 65 Thomas St, Richard Parker 86 Thomas St, John Slattery 7 Cork Hill, Joseph Cromien 57 South George's St, Joseph Berrie Trinity Tavern 14 Trinity St. Moreover, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act increased their difficulties in meeting soldiers in pubs. The commissioners of the D.M.P. claimed that the soldiers had been no longer seen in pubs and that they appeared to have given up meeting there.

However, Dr Power and his Fenian agents began to use pubs as meeting places with soldiers, though they never used the same pubs as O'Leary, Roantree and Devoy had done before. The pubs they used are as follows: the Harp saloon Grafton St, the 2 Soldiers Tavern Usher's Quay, the Crow Barrack St, the Enniskillen Dragoon Ellis's Quay, Carey's Cork Hill, Anne Boshell's Arran Quay, James Murphy's Bridgefoot St and Melville's Model Tavern Crampton Court.

**Counterattack by the military authorities**

Once Lord Strathnairn, formerly Sir Hugh Rose, became the commander in chief in July 1865, the military authorities began to take some measures to put down Fenianism in the army. Lord Strathnairn started his soldier's career in the
19th Regiment in Ireland in 1820, and in the 1820s and 1830s, he succeeded in putting down Ribbon outrages and anti-tithe meetings, especially a large meeting at Cullen in County Tipperary. From Ireland he moved to Gibraltar, Malta and Syria. The Indian mutiny made him volunteer for service in India and he arrived at Bombay in September 1857 to be appointed commander of the Puna division in Bombay. About three years later he was appointed commander in chief in India and was said to improve the discipline of the army during his administration. He approved the death sentence on a soldier of the mutinous 5th European Regiment tried at a court martial. From July 1865 to June 1870 he was the commander in chief in Ireland and in July 1866 he was raised to the peerage as Baron Strathnairn. Devoy said, 'his character for ruthless sterness seemed to fit him best for the work of putting down the Fenians' and that he was an enterprising and resourceful general. Interestingly Lord Strathnairn experienced two rebellious activities of the British army in India and Ireland.

No sooner had Lord Strathnairn arrived in Ireland than he asked Under Secretary Larcom to furnish him with copies of any reports on Fenianism in the army that Larcom had already had or would possess. The military authorities, before Lord Strathnairn became the commander in chief, had already obtained some information about Fenianism in the army. Sir George Brown, Lord Strathnairn's predecessor, received a memo dated 6 April 1865 from the colonel commanding the 5th Dragoon Guards on Fenianism in the army. However, according to Lord Strathnairn, Sir George Brown had the delusion that the British soldiers never turned traitor, and disregarded numerous proofs brought to him by commanding officers.
In September 1865 the military authorities issued a circular asking commanding officers to report Fenianism in their regiments. Most answers to the circular were that no Fenianism existed in their regiments, partly because they were virtually ignorant of the Fenian activities and partly because the officers resented the imputation cast on their men. Useful information came from about twenty Fenian soldiers - after their arrest in early 1866 - as well as from the police. These soldiers were witnesses at later courts martial. Patrick Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guard, John Abraham of the 61st and James Maher (Meara) of the 8th were particularly useful; John Abraham and James Maher started to give information to the military authorities after their arrest, while Patrick Foley worked as an informer since he had been sworn in by Pagan O'Leary in the latter part of 1864; on the morning following Foley reported his recruitment to his troop sergeant. About two months afterwards he was brought to Colonel Calthorpe and Superintendent Ryan, and was ordered to act as an informer. Among registered papers at the State Paper Office, there are several statements by Foley between 20 April 1865 and 5 April 1866. His information was not decisive, because it was general in character and was already known to the police. However, his information led to the arrest of Devoy and other leaders of the organisation in the army in Pilsworths in February 1866. The military authorities, once provided with information by Fenian soldiers, were capable of dealing efficiently with the Fenian threat in the army.

The military authorities tried to resolve the Fenian problem, if possible, by themselves; and as secretly as possible in order not to attract public attention. When detectives were sent to the barracks without any advance communication, Lord Strathnairn protested to the government. When Private
Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guards and James Maher were examined at the Royal Barracks, none of the detectives were present. On the other hand the military authorities used reports from Superintendent Ryan to inquire into Fenianism in the army. When the military authorities thought that they could not deal with a problem, they asked the police to help them. On 23 August 1866 Sergeant Henry Middleton of the Coldstream Guards at Beggar's Bush Barracks called on the detective office to ask their assistance, explaining that Private Maynard had been treated by a stranger in a pub at Booterstown Avenue, Rock Road. When the informer James Maher gave information to the military authorities that he had a forthcoming appointment with Thomas Baines, a prominent Fenian agent in the army, insisted that they should ask some of the detectives to give support to them on the grounds that 'they are much cleverer, know their business, know what to do, better than soldiers ...'.

So Colonel Fielding asked the detective police to assist him in capturing Thomas Baines. However, while thus acquiescing in Maher's request, it may have been Fielding's intention to anticipate the police assistance. Because Colonel Fielding and three soldiers entered the meeting place, a beershop 11 Leeson Lane, earlier than Maher's appointment without communicating with the police, they failed to arrest Thomas Baines. This hints at an ongoing rivalry between the army and police which is recognised in the observations of Superintendent Ryan on this incident:

I have at all times reminded the men of this division of the necessity of a hearty co-operation with the Military Authorities and even on the occasion of telling off the men to act with Colonel Fielding ... it would be the more to be regretted if any symptoms of jealousy would appear at the present time.
Here we examine the measures by the military authorities to suppress Fenianism in the army. In February 1866 they began to launch a serious counter attack on the Fenians. As we have seen they ordered soldiers not to go to five pubs: these pubs were based on the list of Superintendent Ryan's report to the commissioners of the D.M.P. on 7 February 1866. And they issued the second circular dated 19 February 1866 to seek assistance from commanding officers, who would be obliged to report on Fenianism in their regiments.

The most effective action was to try thirty soldiers for their involvement with Fenianism at courts martial in Dublin in February, April, June, July and August 1866, January, April and May 1867 and February 1868 - other courts martial took place in Enniskillen, Cork and Limerick. In spite of their connection with Fenianism, not all the Fenian soldiers faced the courts martial because of the lack of sufficient evidence. Captain Whelan of the 61st, the prosecutor at the courts martial, made some of the arrested Fenian soldiers witnesses. Devoy wrote: 'He went from cell to cell in Arbor Hill Military Prison, where the soldiers charged with Fenianism were on starvation diet, telling each man that the others had all turned informers and that I [Devoy] had supplied to the Castle a list of all the men I had sworn in. Several of them broke down and he schooled and drilled them in the evidence'. Afterwards Lord Strathnairn transferred almost every soldier who had given information against Fenianism from Ireland to England or abroad, probably because he intended to minimise the risk to witnesses.

As Lord Strathnairn thought that discipline in the army should be stricter than in civil life, heavy sentences were inflicted on the Fenian soldiers. Six soldiers of the 61st were tried and three of them were sentenced to penal
servitude for life. The 5th Dragoon Guards also produced six convicted Fenian soldiers, of whom three received penal servitude for life. Next to the 61st and the 5th Dragoon Guards, the 85th was most infiltrated by Fenianism, and this regiment was tampered with by Dr Power and his associates. Out of thirty soldiers six were Centres - Thomas Chambers of the 61st, William Curry of the 87th, Patrick Keating of the 5th Dragoon Guards, John O'Reilly of the 10th Hussars, Thomas Simpson of the 85th and James Kavanagh of the 85th. Unfortunately we have no information as to whether or not the other soldiers were Centres. But it is clear that they held high positions in the organisation.

Some soldiers did not receive heavy sentences, partly because they were not directly connected with the Fenian organisation and partly because they were not prominent. Gunner John Flood of the 9th Brigade Royal Artillery, Lance Corporal and Private John Mulvehill of the 1st Batt 3rd and Gunner John Flood of the 9th Brigade Royal Artillery were charged with treasonable language and thus was not related directly to Fenianism in the army. Patrick Killeen and John Foley of the Royal Artillery and William Leonard of the Military Train were charged with desertion from their regiments towards the end of 1865 - they were induced to do so by Fenian agents. The three soldiers of the 86th were accused of attending the Manchester Martyrs' procession held in Dublin in December 1867. [See Table 6:2]
Table 6.2: Courts martial in Dublin, 1866-8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gunner John Flood</td>
<td>9th Brigade Royal Artillery</td>
<td>IMP 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lance Corporal and</td>
<td>1st Batt 3rd</td>
<td>IMP 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pte John Mulvehill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gunner John Flood</td>
<td>9th Brigade Royal Artillery</td>
<td>IMP 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Corporal Thomas Chambers</td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pte Robert Cranston</td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pte Michael Harrington</td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pte James McCoy</td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>P.S. 15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pte Patrick McNulty</td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>IMP 168 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pte John Priestly</td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>IMP 168 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pte Patrick Keating</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Pte Martin Hogan</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Pte James Wilson</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Pte Thomas Delany</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>P.S. 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Pte John Lynch</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>P.S. 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Pte William Foley</td>
<td>5th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>P.S. 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Thomas Hassett</td>
<td>1/24th</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Pte John Donoghoe</td>
<td>24th</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Pte John O'Reilly</td>
<td>10th Hussars</td>
<td>P.S. 20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Pte John Shine</td>
<td>2/60th Rifles</td>
<td>P.S. 4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Pte William Curry</td>
<td>87th</td>
<td>IMP 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Pte Thomas Simpson</td>
<td>(John O'Brien)</td>
<td>P.S. Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Pte James Kavanagh</td>
<td>85th</td>
<td>P.S. 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Pte Philip Murtha</td>
<td>85th</td>
<td>P.S. 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Pte Caleb Richings</td>
<td>85th</td>
<td>H.L. 2 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Driver Patrick Killeen</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>P.S. 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Driver John Foley</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>P.S. 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Pte William Leonard</td>
<td>Military Train</td>
<td>P.S. 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Pte Thomas Farrelly</td>
<td>86th</td>
<td>IMP 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Driver Michael Ivers</td>
<td>86th</td>
<td>not guilty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Driver James Rourke</td>
<td>86th</td>
<td>not guilty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: P.S. - penal servitude  
IMP - imprisonment  
H.L. - hard labour

Source: P.R.O., W.O. 91/44; 91/45.

The military authorities, as part one of their counterattack, transferred an English regiment and a Scottish regiment from Britain to Dublin, while they divided Fenian regiments in Dublin into several groups and sent them out of Dublin. Devoy claimed that the government who feared the existence of Fenian
regiments in Ireland removed them from Ireland before the rising.\textsuperscript{77} The fact was more complicated than Devoy's statement. In April 1865 the military authorities ordered three Fenian regiments (the 29th, the 41st and the 49th) to go to Malta, Bengal and Bombay respectively.\textsuperscript{78} A. J. Semple has explained that this was due to the expiration of home duty, not the result of the military authorities' counteraction against Fenianism: regiments should have served five years at home for every ten years served abroad.\textsuperscript{79} This is supported by the fact that Sir George Brown who was commander in chief in Ireland until June 1865 did not pay any attention to Fenianism in the army at all.

Lord Strathnairn never lost his confidence in Irish soldiers as a body and refrained from expressing mistrust of them:

I have never entertained or expressed any mistrust of the Irish soldiers as a body. I have carefully abstained from showing it, so much so, that when on my arrival in Ireland, I found that the 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards had been sent to the borders of the disaffected districts. I directed them, on its becoming their tour of duty, although a national regiment with a great many connections in those Fenian districts, to occupy them in a detached state, in aid of the civil power.\textsuperscript{80}

Furthermore he argued that the 5th Dragoon Guards was sufficient for the duties in Dublin, in spite of the fact that the 5th Dragoon Guards, as we have seen, was a Fenian regiment.\textsuperscript{81} His belief probably came from his experiences of the Indian mutiny: Lord Strathnairn crushed the rebellion in central India with regiments which consisted mainly of Indian soldiers.\textsuperscript{82}
Regiments were not sent abroad simply because they were penetrated by the Fenians. For instance, when the 61st, which had six convicted Fenian soldiers, was ordered to go to Canada,\textsuperscript{83} it is likely that the regiment had completed its tour of duty.\textsuperscript{84} On the other hand suspect regiments were distributed into groups spread across several garrisons. The Fenian regiments in Dublin, such as the 10th Hussars and the 5th Dragoon Guards, were divided into several groups and were sent outside Dublin towards the end of 1866: before the rising in March 1867, 392 of the soldiers of the 10th Hussars were in Dundalk, 54 in Belfast, 51 in Belturbet and 39 in Athlone; 238 of the soldiers of the 5th Dragoon Guards were in Newbridge, 65 in the Curragh, 51 in Carlow, 89 in Longford and 46 in Castlebar.\textsuperscript{85}

Furthermore, the military authorities took steps to send to Ireland English and Scottish regiments which did not contain many Irish soldiers and consequently ran no risk of penetration by Fenianism. As early as January 1866 Lord Strathnairn supported General Cunyngham's suggestion that Scottish regiments should be transferred to Ireland.\textsuperscript{86} And Lord Strathnairn further proposed that regiments which had as many Irish as English soldiers should be withdrawn from Ireland.\textsuperscript{87} In consequence, the military authorities, by March 1867, had already transferred an English regiment - the 52nd - and a Scottish regiment - the 92nd - from Britain to Ireland; and when the rising took place, Lord Strathnairn was accompanied by the 52nd to the Tallaght hills (the Dublin Fenians' assembling point).
Fenian regiments

Which regiments were infiltrated by Fenians? The courts martial reveal the soldiers' clear connection with Fenianism, though not all Fenian soldiers confronted the courts martial for the want of evidence. The courts martial in Dublin, 1866-8 indicate that eleven regiments produced Fenian soldiers: the 3rd, 24th, 61st, 85th, 86th, 87th, Royal Artillery, Military Train, 5th Dragoon Guards, 10th Hussars and 60th Rifles. John Devoy's account, though he may have exaggerated the extent of Fenian infiltration, gives a clue to our question. Devoy wrote that the Fenian regiments were the 8th, 24th, 61st, 73rd, 1st Battalion of the 60th Rifles, 5th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars; the 73rd, however, is excluded here for it was not stationed in the Dublin region. To these regiments should be added the regiments which had been infiltrated by Fenianism before Devoy became the chief organiser. From October 1864 to September 1865 the police observed that soldiers in certain regiments entered the two Fenian pubs, Moran's and Bergin's. The total number of soldiers who entered Moran's and Bergin's were 48 soldiers of the 41st, 32 of the 29th and 19 of the 61st, 12 of the Royal Artillery, 10 of the 60th Rifles, 10 of the 8th, 9 of the 49th, 5 of the 5th Dragoon Guards, 5 of the 84th, 2 of the 9th Lancers, 1 of the 4th Dragoon Guards. Information from the courts martial, John Devoy and the police reports shows that the following regiments may have been infiltrated by Fenians: the 3rd, 8th, 24th 29th, 41st, 49th, 61st, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 10th Hussars, 60th Rifles, 9th Lancers, Royal Artillery and the Military Train.
Here we examine the number of the Fenian soldiers in the army in Dublin, where about 5,000 troops were stationed. It was difficult to know the precise number for three reasons. First, many Fenian soldiers pretended to be Fenians in order to get money and drink. We cannot distinguish such Fenians from real ones. Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guards reported that more than a hundred in his regiment were in some way connected with the Fenians, although there were only some twenty-five to thirty who were real Fenians. Secondly, the Fenian agents purposely exaggerated the number of the Fenians in the army partly because they emphasised their activity and partly because they were anxious to encourage morale. Thirdly, there are no documents written on the subject at the time by Fenian leaders because of the emphasis on secrecy. Devoy, about sixty years later, stated that the total number of the Fenian soldiers in Ireland was 8,000, of whom 1,600 were in Dublin.

According to a memo dated 3 December 1865, Colonel Kelly, who was fully informed by Devoy, stated that 5,500 belonged to the organisation in the army. This suggests that Devoy may have exaggerated the number. There is evidence that even Devoy's earlier account contradicts the account in his Recollections: he said in Hoey's on 17 January 1866 that there were about 100 Fenians in the 5th Dragoon Guards, while in his Recollections the number is given as 300. Devoy's Recollections mentioned the number in some other regiments: 80 in the 10th Hussars, 600 in the 61st, 300 in the 60th Rifles and 200 in the 8th. We must take Devoy's evidence with reserve, and put the likely estimate of Fenians at less than 1,600. However, that said, a large number of soldiers were recruited into the Fenians in Dublin that the more sweeping assertions are not borne out by what evidence there is. Private Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guards said that he saw a hundred soldiers of his regiment associating with the Fenians, though Colonel Calthorpe, the
commander of the regiment, reported that the number was 22. Concerning the number in the 61st, Cranston, a private in the regiment claimed that there were 500, a figure not much short of Devoy's figure of 600 for the regiment. In the aftermath of Devoy's arrest, Dr Power's organisation was much smaller because of the counter-attack by the military authorities. His organisation seems to have been confined to the 85th in Dublin. We have some information about the number of Fenian soldiers in the 85th. Superintendent Ryan reported not only that two-thirds of the 85th - over 600 member of the regiment were stationed in Dublin in late 1866 - were stated to have taken the Fenian oath, but that on the Saturday night before Dr Power had been arrested he swore in thirty-six soldiers of the 85th. Another evidence comes from Private Murtha of the regiment: he said there were over 100 Fenians in the 85th. Considering the ambiguities of these informations, it is perhaps safe to suggest that the number of Fenian soldiers in the 85th lay between 36 and 100.

One of the reasons why soldiers took the Fenian oath can be explained by the bad conditions of soldiers in the British army: poorly paid soldiers were badly housed in military barracks and they had no recreation except drink. Probably the temptation of money or drink made soldiers take the oath. Soldiers received about 1s per day, plus an allowance for beer of 1d per day - their wages were low compared with other occupations. If they took the Fenian oath, they could receive 18d a day from the Fenian organisation. Another temptation was drink. In those days drink was the only recreation of soldiers; and drunkenness was a major problem for the military authorities. Fenian soldiers always enjoyed the privilege of free drink from Fenian agents in pubs and in the canteens of barracks. Devoy stated some drinks had to be called for as an excuse, but it was never whiskey, and the quantity of porter
consumed was very small'.\footnote{101} This is doubtful, for many soldiers joined the Fenian organisation to get drink and soldiers indeed drank plenty of beer without paying.\footnote{102} A Fenian who had come from England for the purpose of swearing in soldiers expressed his opinion to Superintendent Ryan that it was doubtful to regard the soldiers who took the Fenian oath and had taken a crown or a drink from a Fenian agent as a genuine Fenian.\footnote{103} This was the weak point of the Fenian organisation in the army, for they could not place their absolute confidence in those soldiers and there was the possibility that some 'Fenians' would turn informer.

Secondly, nationalism accounted for the infiltration of Fenianism into the army. There is little evidence that soldiers of English and Scottish nationalities, whose conditions were as bad as the Irish, became Fenians. Fenianism appealed exclusively to Irish soldiers who represented about 30 per cent of the non-commissioned ranks of the British army in the 1860s.\footnote{104} In those days bloody fights between the Irish and English regiments were very common in the garrisons.\footnote{105} Hostility against the English, was a potent force in promoting the Fenian organisation in the army. Therefore Lord Strathnairn claimed that punishing Fenian soldiers was not the basic solution to military Fenianism and that England should settle patriotically Irish social and political discontent to eradicate Fenianism in the army.\footnote{106} He argued in favour of:

Remedial measures for the historical evils of Ireland, which are the consequences of a rude conquest of an intelligent impassioned, vindicative race, the Irish by another race, the English, wholly different in the feeling, character and customs followed by a stern Reformation which adopted by the conquerors became the dominant church of the dominant Race.\footnote{107}
During the period from the arrest of Dr Power to the rising on 5 March 1867, Fenians tried to swear in soldiers, although the difficulty in their activity was obviously growing. In February 1867 the expectation of the rising may have urged Fenians to enlist soldiers as soon as possible. On 12 February 1867 John Connor was arrested on a charge of trying to swear in Private Lockhurst of the Royal Horse Artillery. John Connor said to Lockhurst that 'I will give you £20 if you join us'. This shows that Fenians now had difficulty in seducing soldiers, for they had never proposed to give such a large amount of money (£20) to soldiers before.

In January 1867 Superintendent Ryan received information that Fenians had 'the utmost confidence in the disaffected among the British army and boast that there is not a regiment in the service in which they have not plenty of friends except indeed in a few regiments of the Guards and some Highland Regiments'. In February 1867 a month before the rising, Superintendent Ryan said that Fenians had rested great hopes in the disaffection of the troops. This information is partly true. Though Devoy and other leaders' arrests destroyed the effectiveness of Fenian communications in the army, there were many Irish soldiers who were still Fenians or sympathisers with Fenianism. When the 73rd which, Devoy said, had 300 Fenians, faced the Fenian insurgents of Kerry rising which took place in February 1867, the soldiers let Fenians pass through in safety. On 6 March 1867 the 4th Dragoon Guards received orders to go to Tallaght where the Dublin Fenians were to assemble together. A soldier of the regiment later said to Devoy that 'they were whispering to one another: "When will the boys come?" and were ready to join them at the first shot'. However, their arrival was too late, on the evening of 7 March, to join the rising.
There is no evidence that soldiers joined the Dublin rising, but one soldier took part in the rising at Drumcliffe. After the rising Lord Strathnairn possessed uncertain information that two soldiers, respectively, of the 6th and of the 74th had joined the rising. Later the military authorities found that Private Power of the 1st Battalion of the 6th Foot did not engage in the attack on the Ardagh Police Barrack and that Private Richard Meade of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Foot had been one of an armed party of Fenians at Drumcliffe. While there were Fenians or Fenian sympathisers in the army in March 1867, because of the collapse of the organisational system, Fenian leaders could not make use of Fenian soldiers.

The 'Manchester Martyrs' procession held in Dublin on 8 December 1867 attracted the attention of the government and the military authorities again. Immediately after the procession the military authorities were informed that five or six soldiers had marched in the procession. But it seemed to be difficult to identify the soldiers who attended it. Lieut. Colonel Hastings, 'President of the Court of Inquiry investigating the charge against certain soldiers for having attended and taken part in the Dublin seditious procession', asked the chief commissioner of D.M.P. to assist the identification of the soldiers. Consequently, Driver Michael Ivers of the Royal Artillery, Privates James Rourke and Thomas Farrelly of the 86th faced courts martial in February 1868 but only Thomas Farrelly was sentenced to a year's imprisonment with hard labour.

Gradually Fenians lost their confidence in organising the movement in the army. In June 1867 Superintendent Ryan reported that the Fenians advised the organisers against an emphasis on seducing soldiers, as they had learned from
their experience that soldiers had joined the organisation to get drink, which caused a great drag on their finances and that recruiting soldiers had been very risky, but that they had no objection to individual Fenians joining the army to do the work.\textsuperscript{117} Finally in January 1870 Superintendent Ryan reported that the Fenians had abandoned tampering with the soldiers.\textsuperscript{118} This is supported by the fact that no proceedings concerning Fenianism in the army were held in the 1870s. Thus the Fenians finding their activities a failure among the British soldiers since the early 1860s, gave them up.
Chapter Six: Footnotes

1. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 4(a), 'Edward Power, John Devoy and 12 others. Dublin City Commission Court, February 1867' (hereafter, Fenian briefs, 4(a)), p. 35.

2. Ibid., p. 42.

3. Ibid.


6. Irish Times, 24 Jan. 1866; Devoy, Recollections, pp 143, 166.

7. Devoy, Recollections, pp 140-1.

8. Ibid., p. 143.


10. Devoy, Recollections, pp 63, 146.


12. Ibid., p. 6.


14. Devoy, Recollections, p. 64.

15. Daily Express, 21 June 1866.


17. Devoy, Recollections, pp 65-6. Patrick Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guards informed the military authorities of this meeting held on 17 January 1866. A few days before 17 January, a soldier of the 8th Brigade Royal Artillery sent Devoy's message to Foley, Keating and Lynch of the 5th Dragoon Guards to the effect that they were asked to go to Ward's (Fishamble St), bringing all the men they could. In Ward's Devoy said to them that he wanted to collect ten or twelve men to attend a meeting in a few nights so that they would see an American officer. Eventually, the Fenian soldiers who attended the meeting were Patrick Foley, William Campbell, John Lynch, Patrick Keating, Thomas Delany, William Brady, Michael Goggan, William O'Seay and Martin Hogan of the 5th Dragoon Guards, William Curry of the 87th and John Boyle O'Reilly of the 10th Hussars (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5005).


20. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 137a); Irish Times, 24 Jan. 1866.


23. Thomas Baines was not arrested at the meeting but he was very active in the Fenian organisation in the army.


27. P.R.O., W.O. 91/44.

28. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 4(b), 'Edmund O'Regan, Dublin city commission, 8th April 1867'.


32. P.R.O., W.O. 91/44; Irish Times, 8 Jan. 1867.

33. Supt Ryan to C.P., 11 Dec. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/22385); Irish Times, 7, 8 Jan. 1867.

34. Devoy, Recollections, p. 149.


37. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5005; Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Mar. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5918 on 1866/11639); P.R.O., W.O. 91/44.


41. Devoy, Recollections, pp 66-7, 148. In Dublin they were under the control of Devoy, who paid them 1s 6d per day until the middle of February 1866;
and then James Flood paid them for about a fortnight. (S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 4(a)).

44. Supt Ryan to C.P., 12 Dec. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P.1866/22550); Daily Express, 21 June 1866.
47. Devoy, Recollections, pp 64-5.
50. C.P. Lake to U.S., 6 June 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 8992R on 8992R).
52. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.137a); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.218).
58. Devoy, Recollections, pp 62, 190.
59. Curzon to U.S., 13 July 1865 (N.L.I., Kilmainham papers, MS 1305).
60. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 6 Mar 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn) papers, MS 42822).
61. Lord Strathnairn to Lord Spencer, 26 Dec. 1869 (Ibid., MS 42826).
63. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge 15 Feb.1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42822).

64. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 4(a), p.49.

65. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5005.


70. Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 14 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/7373 on 1867/450); Supt Ryan to C.P., 14 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8189 on 1866/16249).

71. Supt Ryan to C.P., 4 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8878).


74. P.R.O., W.O. 91/44, 45.

75. Devoy, Recollections, p.156. These witnesses were: John Abraham, Tooly, Thomas Morrison, Kearney, Smith, Miles Doyle and Macauly of the 61st, Foley and Goggins of the 5th Dragoon Guards, Lance Corporal Fitzgerald, McDonnell, John Smith, Denis Denny, Mullarkey and Rorreson of the 10th Hussars, James Maher of the 8th, Richard Hankerd, Thomas Caden of the 24th, John Atkinson, James, McCarthy and McKenny of the 85th, James McGough, McCarthy and John Molony of the Military Train. Most witnesses denied their connection with Fenianism, although they were undoubtedly Fenians. Private Goggins of the 5th Dragoon Guards said that he did not consider himself a sworn Fenian after taking the oath. Lance Corporal Fitzgerald of the 10th Hussars said that he had never taken the oath, though there were informations that he attended meetings regularly and took a very active part. (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5005; S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 4(a), p.41; Freeman's Journal, 18 Aug. 1866).

76. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 6 Dec. 1865 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42821).

77. Devoy, Recollections, p.68.

78. Military Secretary to U.S., 19 Apr. 1865 (N.L.I., MS 1058).

80. Lord Strathnairn's annual confidential report (N.L.I., Mayo papers, MS 11188).
81. Lord Strathnairn to M.G. Cunnyngham, 4 June 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42822).
83. See Lord Strathnairn to M.G. Foster, 30 Mar. 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42822).
84. Irish Times, 8 Jan. 1867.
85. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 3 Jan. 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42821).
86. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 4 May 1866 (Ibid., MS 42822).
87. 'Distribution of the army in Great Britain and Ireland' (P.R.O., W.O. 73/6).
88. Devoy, Recollections, p. 62.
89. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Oct. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 71); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 137a); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 218).
90. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/5005.
91. Devoy, Recollections, p. 130.
92. B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42821.
94. Devoy, Recollections, pp 108-10, 150.
95. Daily Express, 21 June 1866.
96. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 15 Feb. 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42822).
98. Irish Times, 8 Jan. 1867.
100. Devoy, Recollections, p. 63.


105. Devoy, Recollections, p. 141.

106. Lord Strathnairn to Lord Grey, 12 Oct. 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42822).


111. Devoy, Recollections, p. 191.

112. Ibid., pp 205-6.

113. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 16 Mar. 1867 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42823).


Chapter 7

THE DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE

The Dublin Metropolitan Police began to collect information about disorders in 1844 and the first arrests occurred in the following year. The D.M.P. established in 1847 was administratively separate from the Dublin Metropolitan Police and in many points differed from the Royal Irish Constabulary. In structure the D.M.P. was under the direct control of the chief secretary to Dublin Castle. In the chief secretary, a civilian figure, lay to stay in the Irish office in London for parliamentary sessions. The promotion of the D.M.P. was the responsibility of the permanent under secretary. During the period the chief under secretary was Thomas O’connor, 1853-68 and Thomas Henry Donnelly, 1869-82, worked in Dublin Castle, and in opposition they dealt with police affairs. The chief secretary, under whom a chief superintendent administered the superintendents of seven divisions: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Concerning the rank structure the D.M.P. adopted the structure of the London Metropolitan Police: Inspectors, Sergeants, and Constables. While the Royal Irish Constabulary was usually viewed like an army, the D.M.P. provided their policemen with only truncheons 'because of the rarity of homicides and serious personal violence in Dublin compared to the countryside'. The D.M.P. was, however, particularly significant in the proportion which its chief and police expenditures have to the Dublin population - the D.M.P. was one of the largest police forces in the United Kingdom. In 1872, the Commissioner of the D.M.P., Lete revealed that a feeling of dissatisfaction prevailed among the D.M.P. due to their low salary; the consequence naturally is, that many give after two or three years service,
The D.M.P. intelligence network

The Dublin Metropolitan Police began to collect information about Fenianism in 1864 and the first arrest occurred in the following year. The D.M.P., established in 1837, was deliberately modelled on the London Metropolitan Police and in many points differed from the (Royal) Irish Constabulary. In structure the D.M.P. was under the direct control of the chief secretary in Dublin Castle. As the chief secretary, a political figure, had to stay in the Irish office in London during parliamentary sessions, supervision of the D.M.P. was the responsibility of the permanent under secretary. During our period two able under secretaries - Thomas Larcom, 1853-69 and Thomas Henry Burke, 1869-82 - worked in Dublin Castle, and in succession they dealt with Fenian affairs.

The chief secretary appointed two commissioners of the D.M.P., under whom a chief superintendent administered the superintendents of seven divisions - A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Concerning the rank structure the D.M.P. adopted the structure of the London Metropolitan Police - inspectors, sergeants and constables. While the Royal Irish Constabulary was heavily armed like an army, the D.M.P. provided their policemen with only truncheons 'because of the rarity of homicides and serious personal violence in Dublin compared to the countryside'. The D.M.P. was, however, particularly significant in the proportion which its size and police expenditure bore to the Dublin population - the D.M.P. was one of the largest police forces in the United Kingdom. In 1872, the Commissioner of the D.M.P., Lake revealed that a feeling of disaffection prevailed among the D.M.P. due to their low salary: 'the consequence naturally is, that many men after two or three years service,
remaining just long enough to establish their characters, have sent in their resignations, and gone over to the London, Liverpool or other Police Forces'.

However, according to Lake, this was a comparatively recent phenomenon. In 1858 he had many applicants 'tall stalwart well educated men' for their appointments. It is likely that the D.M.P. in the 1860s was an efficient police force.

The D.M.P. was composed of seven divisions, in all about 1,100 men. The city was divided into four districts; the A division had charge of the south-west, the B division the south-east, the C division the north-east and the D division the north-west. The E division covered the Donnybrook area and the F division were situated in the Booterstown - Kingstown - Dalkey area. The structure of the D.M.P. revealed its weak point in dealing with Fenianism in Dublin. Outside the city the D.M.P. covered the Kingstown area where a strong circle existed but did not include the Dundrum area which was within the Royal Irish Constabulary's district. Therefore the D.M.P. had not much information concerning the Dundrum area, one of the strongholds of Fenianism. The G division was a detective department, established in 1843; after 1864 its main task was almost exclusively confined to Fenianism.

The work of the G division was rather different from that of other divisions. John Mallon, the successor of Superintendent Ryan who was head of the G division until his retirement in 1874, stated in evidence concerning the detective police before the parliamentary committee in 1872:
I may state that in the detective department the men do duty in plain clothes, and their duties are of a more disagreeable character than the duties of the men on ordinary police duty — for instance, a detective requires more fact than the ordinary man, as he is obliged to deal with and encounter persons who commit crimes, whose detection is more or less difficult. We apply ourselves to the detection of crime — of serious crime. Besides that, we have the supervision of convicts who are released on licence; the supervision of persons who reside in the Metropolitan Police district who are discharged from prison, subject to police supervision under the Prevention of Crimes Act of 1871. We have the supervision of pawn offices, and the supervision of all public vehicles, and of the drivers and conductors is attached to the detective department.

The G division consisted of forty-four men in 1872: one superintendent, one inspector, thirteen acting inspectors, four sergeants, six acting sergeants and nineteen constables.

It was not until 1864 that the D.M.P. was aware of the existence of the I.R.B. in Dublin. This conclusion is supported by the fact of Superintendent Ryan's observation in December 1863 that

"The Fenian Brotherhood" which I believe is confined to America has for its object the invasion of Ireland and the establishing of an Irish Republic.

Subsequently the police, helped by the information of Nagle working at the Irish People office, began to watch Fenianism in Dublin. We have 1,347 letters in the State Paper Office concerning the Fenians written by the detectives of the D.M.P. from December 1863 to November 1874.
Table 7:1 Number of letters from D.M.P. detectives, 1864-74.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
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<td>153</td>
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<td>1869</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>1,347</td>
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About half the reports were written in 1866 and 1867, when the police arrested numerous Fenians after the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866, and again immediately after the rising in 1867; and the police were particularly active in gathering information about a rising especially in late 1866 and early 1867. Superintendent Ryan wrote 1,061 (79%) of the 1,347 letters; no less than 339 letters in 1866 and 243 in 1867 are in his hand. 87 letters were written by Commissioner Lake in particular after 1871 - followed by Inspector James Ryan (65), Inspector Edward Hughes (57), Inspector John Mallon (51), Assistant Commissioner Talbot (9), Acting Inspector Edward Entwistle (7), Acting Inspector Fox (2), and so on. The highest number of letters by Superintendent Ryan was 70 in May 1866 when he reported about the Fenians arrested in February and March 1866. The next is December 1866 when the police tried again to crush Fenianism which had revived from the blow delivered by the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and consequently they arrested many Fenians including Dr Power, a prominent Dublin Centre. In that month Superintendent Ryan wrote 50 letters. The period from January to May 1867 was the most important for the police, because the rising took place on 5 March 1867. Before the rising the police engaged actively in gathering information about the expected rising. After the rising the police arrested
great numbers of Fenians who had taken part in the rising and Superintendent Ryan collected information to prosecute the arrested Fenians. He wrote 179 letters from January to May 1867.

Superintendent Ryan, who was promoted to chief superintendent in 1869, seems to have worked as a detective from the establishment of the G division in 1843, and he was succeeded by John Mallon in 1874. Ryan was said to be a shrewd and persevering officer with a keen sense of morality. Indeed, he was a cautious man. For instance though the city was quiet after the arrest of Fenian leaders in December 1866, Superintendent Ryan, who thought that the prevailing quietness might be the forerunner of mischief, was: 'exerting all the powers I possess to gather information of an authentic character respecting the general disposition of the conspirators'.

Superintendent Ryan never believed information from a single source. When the same information came from different persons, who were strangers to one another, though the information in detail might not be the same, the information was reliable:

I never confided myself to the unsupported story of an individual but heard what every one had to say, made my own enquiry and observations upon it afterwards and proved to what extent the story of two or three distinct parties would accord before I would take any action.

Superintendent Ryan received information from many informers and had to distinguish good intelligence from bad. For him the most reliable information was the observation of his officers, though obviously his officers could not cover all Fenian activities. Some officers, as we shall see, were dispatched outside Dublin including England, America and France to investigate Fenianism. In August 1864 Superintendent Ryan ordered detectives Dawson and
Smollen to constantly watch the Irish People office. Thus the office seems to have been under the police surveillance until the seizure in September 1865. At the same time drilling rooms and the haunts of Fenians, such as pubs, were carefully observed by Superintendent Ryan and his officers. Probably it was not before August 1864 that the police started to watch the meeting places of Fenians. Once Superintendent Ryan was informed that Fenians met in a house, the officers were dispatched to invigilate that place.

Moreover, the movements of prominent Fenians, such as Stephens and O'Donovan Rossa were watched by the police and their attentions were unflagging. Colonel Kelly, followed by a detective wrote, in mid-1865:

... as extraordinary vigilance has been, and is lately exercised, and the detectives appear to be untiring. Indeed on one occasion I led the inspector of the wretches a walk of fully two miles, to prevent his knowing my residence and having me "set", and finally had to take a car twice to get rid of him.

Undoubtedly such detective attention prevented Fenian leaders from going about their affairs. Towards the end of 1869 the police discovered that Edmund O'Donovan was the most active Fenian then in Dublin and started to keep watch on his movements. As a result O'Donovan left Dublin in March 1870.

Some informers tried to get some money from Superintendent Ryan by giving false or exaggerated information. The following information was, Superintendent Ryan thought, exaggerated:

It is alleged that they have succeeded in landing on some part of the Coast of the County Cork nearly 3,000 men and 6,000 breech loaders besides 8 guns also that 25 vessels from different ports in America each having from 500 to 550 men aboard are on their way to Ireland.
Therefore Superintendent Ryan needed caution in dealing with informers and their information. It seems that Superintendent Ryan took the greatest caution about informers who had never given information before. A. F. Foster gave information to Superintendent Ryan but after private inquiry he found that Foster was addicted to drink, and relied little on Foster's information.\textsuperscript{20} In January 1866 Acting Superintendent Edward Hughes, one of Superintendent Ryan's officers who faithfully observed his attitude about informers, received information from William McGrath about Stephens's location. McGrath's several informations never led to the discovery of Stephens, so Edward Hughes asked McGrath for details of the rising, number of Fenians and so on. As McGrath declined to answer these questions, Hughes concluded that McGrath was seeking to obtain money by false pretences.\textsuperscript{21}

Informers received money from Superintendent Ryan according to the quality of their information. He reported the amount of money which he paid to informers from November 1865 to March 1871, when the commissioner of the D.M.P. decided to fix the sum which should be paid to informers.\textsuperscript{22} The average amount of money per week Superintendent Ryan paid to informers was about £28; unfortunately we have no evidence about their names and the amount which each informer received. From December 1866 to May 1867 the police disbursed a greater amount of money than they had done before. The payments correspond to the period of the arrest of Fenian leaders in December 1866 and to the collection of information about the rising and subsequent prosecution. From 4 to 25 November 1867 the police paid about £190 (about £63 per week). This is explained by the fact that October two policemen were shot by the shooting circle, undertaking the police tried to obtain
information about this incident. An extraordinary amount was paid from 20 December 1867 to 22 January 1868 - £572.11s.3d (about £120 per week). Probably the police spent money on collecting information about the Manchester Martyrs procession in Dublin on 10 December and later about Patrick Lennon, the head of the shooting circle who was arrested in early January 1868. After January 1868 two periods, February 1869 and January 1871 attract attention. In February 1869 the government decided to release forty-nine Fenian prisoners. Probably the increase of payments was the result of police activity in keeping an eye on Fenianism for any upsurge stirred up by the release. An increase in January 1871 is explained by the excitement prevailing among Dublin Fenians because of the release of five Fenian convicts including O'Donovan Rossa and Devoy.

The Irish government, trusting to some extent the ability of Superintendent Ryan to handle Fenianism, accepted his advice. After the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the police arrested a good many Fenians, especially Fenians from England and American officers. The decision whether they would be discharged or detained was left to Superintendent Ryan. In April 1866 Superintendent Ryan who thought 'their incarceration has not beneficially affected them', did not recommend the release of Fenians from England and American. However, a month later as Fenianism declined Ryan concluded that English Fenians should be discharged on condition of returning to England, though they should not all be discharged at the same time. Subsequently the government accepting Superintendent Ryan's decision, released most English Fenians in July and August 1866. On the other hand even in July 1866, Superintendent Ryan advised against the release of the American officers stating:
I would not feel myself justified under any circumstances to suggest conditions for the discharge of any of the Irish Americans or any of those who are well known to have taken an active part in the Fenian conspiracy as long as they can be consistently detained.\textsuperscript{25}

However, the American government put pressure on the Irish government, asking for the release of those American officers who had American citizenship. Consequently the Irish government decided to release the American officers in spite of Superintendent Ryan's objection.

In some respects the level of police activity is impressive. The information at their disposal was large enough to make a large number of arrests before the rebellion. Moreover, some of their information related to the holding of actual meetings of Fenians and they were enabled to arrest a number of Fenians while actually meeting in pubs or in other Fenians' houses. The police arrested the attendance at four Fenian meetings in pubs, three in February, March and April of 1866 and one in March 1867. The first arrests were in February 1866, when the information of Private Foley of the 5th Dragoon Guards about Fenian soldiers' meeting in Pilsworth's led to the arrest of twenty-seven men including John Devoy, the organiser for Fenianism in the British army.\textsuperscript{26} In March information came from a Fenian who had attended meetings in Slattery's pub, saying that Fenians were holding a meeting there. Immediately after Superintendent Ryan received this information, he proceeded to Slattery's, arresting twenty-six men.\textsuperscript{27} In terms of the number of arrested Fenians these arrests were remarkable. A month later Acting Superintendent Hughes was given information that the military authorities had received from Private James Maher of a Fenian meeting in a beer shop at 11 Leeson Lane. The
police arrested five men, though they failed to arrest Thomas Baines a prominent leader in the organisation in the British army. In March 1867 information from the military authorities resulted in the arrest of nine Fenians including two Dublin Centres, Henry Hughes and John Walsh in a pub at 92 Camden St. The police also succeeded in arresting Fenians attending meetings in members' houses. In December 1866 Superintendent Ryan, receiving information, arrested two Dublin Centres, John Hickey and Nicholas Walsh, in P.J. Tynan's house and William Stack and several prominent leaders in the house of William Stack, Dr Power's B. These arrests were made by the police who acted on information from an informer of Superintendent Ryan's.

There is no doubt that Superintendent Ryan was a diligent and able officer. However, the task remains of assessing the overall effectiveness of the police operation. Stephens held important meetings with leaders but the police failed to collect information about his meetings. Most Fenian meetings eluded police attention and informers usually were unable to provide the precise place and time of meetings. Although towards the end of 1866 Fenianism revived rapidly, the police had no tangible evidence of the revival until late November. This ineffectiveness was partly owing to the absence of Superintendent Ryan in the detective office. In September and October, a critical period in the revival of Fenianism in Dublin, he seems either to have been on leave or to have been ill, because most police reports were written by Acting Superintendent Hughes. Hughes received rumours about the revival of Fenianism but he obtained no precise information. At certain periods Superintendent Ryan failed to secure useful information. In March 1867 immediately after the rising and in November 1869 Superintendent Ryan reported his difficulty in collecting accurate
information. In the latter case he was criticised by a crown solicitor Samuel Lee Anderson; that he was 'utterly ignorant of what is going on'. Probably the ineffectiveness lay less in Superintendent Ryan than in his informers who were unable to penetrate the upper circles of the movement.

Who were informers?

It is a very difficult task to identify informers because police reports usually did not mention their names. However, some informers turned up before the public as crown witnesses at the Dublin Special Commission. Pierce Nagle, a paper folder in the Irish People office, who was a Fenian and had opportunities to be familiar with the movements of Fenian leaders and to acquire general information about Fenian affairs, was a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission in late 1865. Nagle, who had started work in the office in March 1864, and continued his work for about one and a half years, enjoyed Stephens's confidence and no one suspected that he was an informer.

On 3 April 1864 Superintendent Ryan had his first interview with Nagle and after that received information mostly by post and sometimes through Acting Superintendent Hughes who had interviews with Nagle in Nagle's house, in the street or at the Phoenix Park. Nagle received £41 from the police from 25 May 1864 to July 1865. There are thirty-one letters from 1 June 1864 to 5 September 1865 concerning Nagle's information in the State Paper Office. Nagle paid most of his attention to the whereabouts of Stephens; there are nineteen of his letters on this topic. Because Nagle worked as a folder in the Irish People office, he
was naturally acquainted with prominent Fenian leaders who came to the office. Accordingly he reported the movements of O'Donovan Rossa, James O'Connor and so on. Nagle's low position in the movement - he was neither a Centre nor belonged to a circle - prevented him from giving access to important information, such as arms. As far as the Dublin organisation was concerned, in October 1864 Nagle mentioned the names of fifty-eight Dublin Fenians and sixteen Kingstown Fenians. Among the fifty-eight Dublin Fenians, the names of only three Centres, J.P. McDonnell, James Cook and Matthew O'Neill can be found.\

In the early stages when Superintendent Ryan was only beginning the task of collecting intelligence about Fenianism, Nagle's information was very valuable. Superintendent Ryan wrote:

In considering the disclosures made by this man I feel that it is of great importance that I shall be prepared to meet any emergency that may occur, hence I respectfully request that I may be instructed whether I shall act immediately if I receive information that those persons are assembled in Parliament St, and what course am I to adopt.

However, as Ryan gradually made wider contacts and was securing useful intelligence from other sources, he came to regard Nagle's information as being 'in a general way, and nothing definite referred to'. Moreover, Nagle was unable to supply information which Superintendent Ryan desired to know and he and his officers had no other means of securing - for example arms, the movements of American officers and so on. Finally in July 1865 Superintendent Ryan thought, 'it would not be prudent to abandon him just now, however I believe it would be equally imprudent to advance him a large sum of money'.

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The doubtful police appraisal of his work seems to be confirmed in the relatively small payments made to him.

The amount of money paid to informers rose sharply in December 1866; and this is also a period when the police discarded the complacency they had displayed in 1866. Probably towards the end of 1866 Superintendent Ryan had better informants than he had had previously partly because Fenians after release from prison gave information to him. This is supported by the fact that in December 1866 eleven Centres were arrested by the police. According to the police reports informers infiltrated Richard Bracken's and John J. Kelly's circles.42

Moreover, Superintendent Ryan, after Dr Power's arrest, seems to have received information from a B in Dr Power's circle. This is reflected in the fact that his three successors as Centre, Michael Stanley, William Clancy and Denis Cashman were arrested about a month after Dr Power's arrest and that Superintendent Ryan obtained valuable information about the election of Centres at the meetings of Dr Power's Bs. The members of the circle declared that there was some one who had links with the police, but they could not find who had.43 The same thing had happened in William Sheedy's circle in May 1866, when Sheedy's successor Bryan Gibney was arrested as soon as Gibney was elected Centre. This was due to information from John Wilson, Sheedy's B.44

Before the rising in March 1867, it seems that most of Superintendent Ryan's informers were lower grade Fenians. In December 1866 Ryan was informed that a meeting of Centres would be held, but his informers were unable to be specific about the meeting place.45 This suggests that the informer was not a Centre. In short the only informers who held high position in the Dublin organisation and who provided information while they were active Fenians before
the rising were John Wilson, a B in Sheedy's circle and an unidentified B in Dr Power's. There was in fact one Centre informer before the rising, to whom reference will be made shortly, but he was a Centre in England. Two Dublin Centres did give information to the police, but only following their arrest: J.P. McDonnell and Denis Cashman - Cashman had only recently been elected a Centre. In any event the most useful informers were those who supplied information without colleagues being aware at the time. Information from arrested individuals was less useful because arrests put the Fenians on their guard: certainly the information from Cashman and McDonnell was of no value. Again, it is worth noting how few B informers can be either identified or suspected. This suggests that most informers were either Cs or Ds. This would certainly tend to account for the vagueness of information about meetings, the lack of reports on arms, and the total inability of the police to keep trace of Stephens's or subsequently, Duffy's movements.

In February 1867 both Denis Gillespie who engaged in distributing arms under Dr Power, and Timothy Healy were crown witnesses at the Dublin Special Commission. Gillespie was arrested in December 1866 and after his arrest he gave information to the police. His information led to the seizure of nine rifles. In April 1867 the Dublin Special Commission sat in order to prosecute Fenians charged with taking part in the rising. Patrick Keogh belonging to the circle of David Toole, and Laurence O'Toole who held the rank of C under George Connolly gave evidence against the Fenians. Neither witness had given information to the police before their arrests in March 1867.

Apart from those informers who became crown witnesses, most never appear in public. Some Dublin Fenians after their arrests tried to secure their release
by volunteering to give information to the authorities. J.P. McDonnell, a Centre, wrote seven letters from prison in March 1866. Though McDonnell, after Brophy's arrest, had taken a prominent part in importing arms, his information resulted in no arms seizures. Two of Dr Power's Bs, William Stack and Denis Cashman, later a Centre, gave information but their information was useless for the police. Thomas Reilly, who had worked in the Irish People office, Denis Moloney (a C of Sheedy's), Patrick Connolly and William Manson disclosed information to the police. However, the police thought it was out of date or merely duplicated what they already knew. The one exception was information from Thomas Tracey, which led to the seizures of nine rifles in March 1866. A few Fenians turned out to be useful informers after their release. Probably they re-started Fenian activities, concealing the fact that they were informers. In January 1867 Superintendent Ryan had an interview with a Fenian - we do not have evidence of his name - 'who had been in custody under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, and of whose complicity in the Fenian movement and consequently his good opportunities of learning useful information there can be no doubt'.

After the rising Superintendent Ryan had two important informers, Alfred Aylward and W. Kavanagh. Aylward disclosed the names of prominent Dublin Fenians who had been Centres or Bs in 1867. Superintendent Ryan regarded his information as 'correct and may be useful, but it contains also its proportions of inaccuracies and exaggeration'. The informer who held the highest position in the organisation was W. Kavanagh, but his information relates only to the early 1870s. There are thirty seven letters about his information from July 1871 to February 1873. In September 1871 Kavanagh was requested to form a circle in Dublin and he probably became a Centre and he also held some
position in the Supreme Council. This high position in the organisation enabled him to obtain precise information about the Supreme Council party in Ireland. However, in the early 1870s there existed two parties, the Supreme Council party and the Stephens party in Ireland, and Kavanagh was unable to provide detailed information about the second, or Stephens party. Superintendent Ryan had informers not only in Ireland but in England. In October 1865 he requested the chief constable of police at Oldham to have an interview with David Johnston, a Centre for Oldham; there is no evidence to suggest how Superintendent Ryan knew Johnston. Many Fenians came to Dublin from England towards the end of 1865. As early as 2 December Ryan had heard from informers residing in London, saying that Fenians in London would go to Dublin. William Gaynor, one of the Fenians from England in late 1865 provided information regularly. During his stay in Dublin, Gaynor disclosed the number of Fenians from England, their instructions, their lodging places, mode of meeting, manner of payment and so on. Gaynor seems to have returned to England in March 1866 and settled down in Preston, where he wrote several letters to Superintendent Ryan mainly about Fenianism in England. Some Fenians from England, like Gaynor, turned informer after their arrival in Dublin because they were disillusioned with the stagnant condition of the I.R.B. They had been led to expect a rising. Such information, however, was not helpful in revealing the details of local organisation in Dublin. For instance, Francis Pettit and two Manchester Fenians holding the position of B and C respectively, gave information to the police, but their information was confined to the movement in England.

Superintendent Ryan received information not only from Fenians but also from informants who never belonged to the Fenian movement. Most information came from the artisan class, to which, as has been noted, over half the Dublin
Fenians belonged. Individuals socially superior to artisans, such as merchants and gentlemen, sometimes gave useful intelligence but this did not frequently occur. Furthermore, useful information came from publicans and hotel keepers who would be associated with Fenians and their fellow artisans. Anonymous letters, though some letters were exaggerated, helped the police. In May 1866 Sylvester Kingston was arrested by the police acting on information from an anonymous letter. Superintendent Ryan always dealt carefully with letters:

As a general rule I observe great caution in acting on anonymous information and unless it bears the impress of reality or that I have some previous knowledge of the parties named or places indicated I act slowly.

The Home Office and the Royal Irish Constabulary passed on information to Superintendent Ryan. One of the most valuable informations the Home Office provided him was that concerning General Millen who was the president of the Military Council in 1865. General Millen offered a list of Fenian circles in Ireland, showing the location of circles, the number of men in the circles, the number of arms, the condition of drilling and the names of some Centres. He also wrote a short history of Fenianism for the authorities. His information was general in character and was largely confined to Stephens and the prominent leaders around him, although it helped Superintendent Ryan to deal with the Dublin Fenians.

John Corydon was a prominent informer in the history of Fenianism during our period. In 1865 Corydon came to Dublin as one of American officers who would take command in the intended rising and in April 1866, left Dublin for
England. In England Corydon started to give information to the policemen of the Irish Constabulary residing in Liverpool. The earliest information from Corydon, we can trace, was dated 12 November 1866. We have seventeen letters from November 1866 to February 1867; thirteen letters were written in February - Corydon did not give any information from 1 January to 1 February because of illness. In February 1867 Corydon was the most useful informer for the authorities. Fenians planned to seize arms stored in Chester Castle on 11 February but this attempt was foiled by Corydon's timely information. Corydon supplied the authorities with information on the date and general plan of the rising. However, Corydon was unable to retail detailed information concerning the Dublin rising. Indeed, Corydon's information, itself emanating from outside the Dublin Fenians themselves, was the only top-level information the police had, and underlines the fact that in Dublin itself the police failed before the rising to obtain any active informant at the level of Centre or A.

The quality of information

The quality of the information which Superintendent Ryan received can best be appreciated by an analysis of its specific content. This can be done under several individual headings: (1) Stephens's movements, (2) arms, (3) drilling, (4) American officers, (5) Fenians from England, and (6) the Fenian organisation in the British army.

(1) Stephens's movements

The police paid special attention to the movements of James Stephens who had autocratic power over the I.R.B. from its establishment in 1858 to his deposition in December 1866. In August 1864 the police started to keep a constant watch on Stephens who had come back from his American tour. Before
Stephens returned to Ireland, Nagle wrote nine letters giving information on when Stephens would be back in Ireland. On 23 April 1864 Nagle reported that Stephens had arrived in Kingstown. A few days later Superintendent Ryan discovered that Stephens lodged in Mountpleasant Avenue. In September, October and November 1864 Superintendent Ryan received nine letters from Nagle with regard to Stephens's whereabouts and his intention of making an organising tour. In March 1865 Ryan reported that Stephens lodged in Rathmines. His lodgings was under surveillance and O'Leary, Luby and Kickham were observed there. On 28 March Ryan, who had learned that Stephens would leave Dublin, ordered his officers to proceed to Stephens's lodgings for the purpose of watching his movements. Stephens eventually went to Cork and Ryan sent Acting Inspector Smollen to keep Stephens under observation there.

In spite of these efforts Superintendent Ryan lost trace of Stephens before the seizure of the Irish People office in September 1865. As a result, the police failed to arrest Stephens and other leading Fenian members. In October Superintendent Ryan was informed incorrectly that Stephens had left for America on 21 September. Eventually on 9 November he received information from a man who was neither a Fenian nor a police informer, that Stephens was living with his wife in Fairfield House in Sandymount. This information, itself in its origins an ironic comment on the limitations of police intelligence, enabled the police to arrest Stephens. As Stephens had been living in Fairfield House from 1 July 1865, Superintendent Ryan had in effect lost all trace of him for at least four months.

Stephens, who was rescued from prison on 24 November 1865, eluded the investigations of Superintendent Ryan yet again. The police concentrated
their efforts on Stephens's rearrest: in December Superintendent Ryan received information on six occasions about Stephens, but the information was useless to the police. At that time Stephens was staying in Mrs Butler's house in Kildare St and held several meetings with American officers, Dublin Centres and county Centres. This itself illustrates the vital failure of the police to penetrate the Dublin Fenians at the highest level. In the middle of March the police, who had totally failed to trace Stephens, obtained information that Stephens had already left Ireland for America via Liverpool on 5 March. Superintendent Ryan himself thought that 'Stephens is not out of the United Kingdom', and sent his officers to Glasgow to gain clues about Stephens. They found no trace of him. Correct information about Stephens came from the French police in late March or early April, saying that Stephens was in Paris since 23 March. Superintendent Ryan dispatched an officer to Paris, where the officer identified Stephens. It was reported that Stephens had gone to Scotland by boat and travelled to London and left Dover for Calais and Paris.

Thus Superintendent Ryan did not know Stephens's whereabouts from late November 1865 to early April 1866. Because of police ineffectiveness in tracing Stephens, he escaped from Ireland and arrived in America in May 1866. Before Stephens left Ireland in March 1866, he appointed Edward Duffy as his deputy. Duffy had direct communication with Stephens and relayed his orders to several Centres. Though Duffy had been arrested with Stephens in November 1865, he had been released because of his ill health. Superintendent Ryan who learned of Duffy's appointment, though there is no evidence concerning when he learned this, was anxious to keep an eye on Duffy's movements. In June 1866 Superintendent Ryan reported that Duffy was very active in the organisation.
However, after that date he was totally ignorant of Duffy's movements and whereabouts apart from information that Duffy was in Castlerea in September 1866. Not until January 1867 did Superintendent Ryan possess intelligence about Duffy, reporting that Duffy was superseded as deputy of Stephens as a consequence of his ill health. After Stephens's departure, Duffy in fact was the head of the I.R.B. and the most wanted Fenian but the police failed to trace him.

In September 1866 two detectives of the D.M.P. were sent to New York for the special duty of watching Stephens's movements. In the summer and autumn of 1866 Stephens announced his intention of going to Ireland in order to start a rising before 1 January 1867. Accordingly in December and January Superintendent Ryan devoted himself to collecting information as to when Stephens would return to Ireland. In December he had two informations; both related that Stephens had left America, and one source asserted that Stephens was in Dublin. Besides collecting information, the police kept watch on the arrivals of trains, steamers and coal vessels in Kingstown and Dublin, and the movements of Mrs Stephens, who was likely to meet Stephens shortly after he came to Ireland. However, Superintendent Ryan lost her in early January 1867 partly because of her efforts in eluding police attention.

In January Superintendent Ryan wrote six letters concerning the location of Stephens, but not a single informer was able to report correctly that Stephens was in America at that time. On 18 January Ryan wrote:

> From all I can learn it is manifest, that very few if any of the conspirators here know where Stephens is at the present time. The parties from whom I receive information from time to time have some
knowledge of every point except that, and their opinion on that particular point is nothing more than mere supposition.83

The truth was that in December 1866 Stephens had been deposed as head of the Fenian Brotherhood and he remained in America until the end of January 1867, when he left for France. One question must be answered. When did Superintendent Ryan learn of Stephens's deposition? As far as we know, it was the middle of February. Ryan reported, 'All power is now vested in military men consequently all civilian leaders have been superseded.'84 Finally on 11 February he was informed that Stephens was in France. And subsequently he reported both that Stephens was staying with his wife in a hotel in France and that two American officers prevented Stephens from moving.85 Thus informers could not give accurate information about Stephens until February 1867. In short Superintendent Ryan had no correct information about the movements of Stephens after the middle of 1865. This suggests that his informers did not have a sufficiently high position in the organisation to know either Stephens's intention and whereabouts, or the 'high politics' of the organisation.

(2) Arms

The police were anxious to secure information about arms, trying not only to deprive Fenians of their arms but also to stop their importation from England. Though the police could not seize great numbers of Fenian arms, their vigilance in fact prevented Fenians from making sufficient preparations for the rising. In September 1864 Nagle reported that Brophy had bought rifles for 35s each in Sheffield. A month later Nagle mentioned that Brophy had acquired ten or twelve rifles.86 Brophy, a Dublin Centre, seems to have exercised great caution in importing
rifles. There is no evidence to suggest that the authorities intercepted rifles before they reached Fenians until late 1865, when the custom officials discovered a case containing five Enfield rifles; this case was to be delivered to J.P. McDonnell. From late 1865 to November 1866 the police made no reports concerning the importation of rifles. The Dublin Fenians may have succeeded in importing rifles. This is reflected in the fact that Dr Power imported rifles successfully. Before the rising the authorities intercepted only five rifles from England and Fenians succeeded in importing rifles, though not in quantity. This suggests that information respecting the importation of arms was not reliable.

In January 1866 the government brought the Arms Act into operation, so the police started to search for arms. On 20 January 1866 a simultaneous search for arms was made in eleven pubs and in the house of McEvatt in Parkgate St. Unwisely the police search for arms in Kingstown was delayed by three days, probably giving Kingstown Fenians the opportunity of removing their arms, anticipating a police search. The police found no arms, but 'there were sufficient traces to indicate clearly that we hit on the right places although too late'.

Table 7:2 shows the number of arms seized by the G division of the D.M.P. from September 1865 to September 1867.
Table 7:2 Number of arms seized by the G division of the D.M.P., September 1865—September 1867.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rifle</th>
<th>Revolver</th>
<th>Pistol</th>
<th>Gun</th>
<th>Pike Head</th>
<th>Dagger</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Oct.65</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.66</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 66</td>
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<td>Sept.66</td>
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Total 39 37 10 8 626 4


In January, February and March 1866 14 rifles and 563 pike heads were seized, and this period was the most successful. Nevertheless the commissioner of the D.M.P. expressed his disappointment that the search for arms were 'made in every probable place, have not been as successful as might have been expected'. This suggests not only that the information about concealed arms which Superintendent Ryan had from January to March 1866 was not substantial but that before the rising the police were unable to effectively seize Fenian arms.

Before the rising the police had twenty-six successful arms seizures. However, as far as we know, only in six of the twenty-six arms seizures, were the police acting on information which they had received; and they seized 22 rifles, 184
pike heads, 3 revolvers and liquid fire. We can identify two informers whose information resulted in the arms seizure, but unfortunately concerning the other four cases, we do not have the names of the informers. Thomas Tracy who was in the confidence of Brophy and who took part in importing rifles, gave information after his arrest that there was a case of rifles in the ceiling of a house under construction in the Temple Road near Milltown. There the police discovered nine rifles. In late1866 Dr Power was actively distributing arms among Dublin Fenians. Denis Gillespie, one of the carmen whom Dr Power hired to distribute arms, gave information after his arrest in December 1866 which led to the seizure of nine rifles. In 1866 J.P. McDonnell, who after Brophy's arrest took a leading part in importing arms from England, gave information to the police. However, his information was too general, and the police were unable to act on it.

In January 1866 306 pike heads were seized in Blackhall Row and a month later 161 pike heads and 227 handles in Longford Lane, and 66 pike heads at 204 Great Britain St. The seizures of a large number of pike heads were by no means the result solely of information which Superintendent Ryan secured from his informers. The police's close and accurate observation of the movements of Fenians resulted in three seizures, and the seizure in Longford Lane was closely connected with that in Blackhall Row. Superintendent Ryan, who learned that Thomas Tracy was in Brophy's confidence, searched Tracy's workshop in Blackhall Row, where, as has been noted, great numbers of pike heads were discovered. Subsequently Superintendent Ryan discovered that the handles of the pikes seized in Blackhall Row had been made of American ash sold in a certain timber yard and then began to watch this timber yard, expecting that Fenians would take the American ash to the place where they made pike handles.
His guess proved true. The officers whom Ryan ordered to maintain a vigilant watch on the timber yard observed its removal to Longford Lane.\(^96\)

While in December 1866 the police arrested eleven Centres - the arrests were a critical blow to the Dublin organisation - they were less successful in seizing arms: the Dublin Fenians seem to have had 800 rifles in December 1866 but the police seized only 13 rifles in that month. In January and February 1867 the police, though they were on the alert for the rising, did not seize a large number of arms. Immediately before the rising Superintendent Ryan received two informations; one of arms concealed in the vicinity of the Church in Dominick St; and another of rifles concealed somewhere about Summerhill.\(^97\) Neither information led to the seizure of arms.

After the rising there is no evidence to suggest that the police discovered a number of concealed arms in Dublin. On the other hand the police intercepted fifty-nine rifles and six revolvers at the North Wall between January, March and April 1870.\(^98\) After that the police did not discover any arms at the North Wall for several years in spite of the fact that two officers of the G division constantly watched suspicious cases and casks.\(^99\)

It is likely that knowledge of arms was confined to Fenian leaders and the lower grade Fenians consequently did not have access to details of arms. The ineffectiveness of Superintendent Ryan in seizing arms seems to provide further evidence that the police did not have informers holding high positions in the Dublin organisation.
In October 1864 Nagle informed the police that drilling was taking place in the city. This was the first information about drilling, and Superintendent Ryan seems to have been unaware of drilling taking place until he received this information. It was said that in November 1861 eleven companies carried out drilling in Dublin and that in 1863 the Dublin Fenians had several drill rooms. This suggests that for a long while Fenians succeeded in drilling without attracting police attention. Nagle's information helped the police to discover drilling rooms. In November 1864 the police, given information by Nagle, discovered drilling rooms at 4 Halston St, where Nagle himself was drilled. This place was under the surveillance of the police from 14 to 21 November 1864. The Fenians, however, who noticed that the police were watching them, gave up the drilling room in Halston St and opened another drill room in Island St. Immediately after the Fenians started drilling in Island St, Superintendent Ryan, informed by Nagle, discovered the place. The police kept a constant watch on this place, as they had done in Halston St, and from 24 November to 13 December 1864 Ryan reported the number of Fenians entering the place. Meanwhile the Fenians changed the place again. The other drilling places which Ryan reported were 70 Bridge St in May 1865 and 14 Lr Exchange St in July and August 1865. Undoubtedly the police did not discover all the drilling rooms in Dublin. This is supported by the fact that in February 1866 Superintendent Ryan incidentally discovered, after searching for arms in Longford Lane, that drilling had been carried on there by Brophy's circle. This suggests that Superintendent Ryan had no informers in Brophy's circle. Fenians did drilling not only in drilling
rooms in the city but in the fields. In 1865 a group of young people was observed in Greenhills by the police. Probably they conducted drilling exercises, although Superintendent Ryan failed to secure definite information about their activities.

From the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866 to August 1866, Superintendent Ryan received no information about drilling activities, saying 'I cannot learn anything that would lead me to believe that drilling has not been abandoned in this city since the H[abeas] C[orpus] was suspended, but before that time I am of opinion they drilled extensively'. Towards the end of August 1866 Acting Superintendent Hughes was informed by the superintendent of the E division that suspicious persons gathered about the neighbourhood of Greenhills and Drimnagh but Acting Superintendent Hughes had no tangible information of their purpose. Acting Superintendent Hughes could only write that:

It has also been stated that drilling is being carried on to some extent just now and that reputed Fenians hold meetings and communicate the state of their affairs to one another, but nothing has come under the notice of the police to induce me to think that drilling is being carried on, in the city at least.

This report reveals the police inability to collect information about drilling in late 1866. After arresting three Centres, Dr Power (3 Upper Temple St), Nicholas Walsh (Holles St) and Patrick O'Connor (17 Queen St) in early December 1866, Superintendent Ryan thought that drilling had been held in these Centres' houses. Again this indicates that there were no informers in the circles of Dr Power, Nicholas Walsh and Patrick O'Connor in early December 1866.
There is no further evidence, so far as we know, to suggest drilling in Dublin until April 1869. The guess is either that after the rising in 1867 the Dublin organisation did not drill or that the police failed to obtain information about it. In April 1869 the police observed that about 200 people went into a field near 'Molloy's Fields', where Fenians previously had conducted drilling exercises in 1864, 1865 and 1866. Accordingly the police started to watch the neighbourhood but they could not secure evidence about drilling. In November 1870 Fenians decided to engage rooms for the purpose of drilling. This information was immediately given to Chief Superintendent Ryan, who discovered one on the north side of the city and one on the south side.

Many rank and file Fenians took part in drilling, so it was easier for the police to collect information about drilling compared with other topics, such as fire arms, information about which was confined to Fenian leaders. The frequent failure of the police to detect drilling places suggests that police informers did not penetrate all circles in Dublin.

(4) American officers

After the end of the Civil War in America, particularly in August and September 1865, Irish American officers came to Ireland in order to take command in a rising which, they believed, would take place in 1865. Before the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended in February 1866, about fifty American officers seem to have stayed in Dublin. The first American officer, attracting Superintendent Ryan's attention, was Captain (or Colonel) Kelly who started his inspection tour in April 1865. Superintendent Ryan reported, 'when he has completed his tour he will take charge of the complement of Fenians allotted
to him and remain in this country', and that in the future all Fenian
circles would be under the command of American officers. After the
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the police succeeded in arresting most
American officers staying in Dublin. However, prominent American officers
General Halpin and Colonel Kelly escaped from the police, who had had
information that they were stopping at 9 or 19 Grantham St. Concerning
American officers, Superintendent Ryan was poorly informed and knew of their
activities in Dublin only in a general way. This suggests two things.
Firstly, no American officers turned informer. So Superintendent Ryan could
follow their activities only by the routine detective work of his officers
but he had no idea of what was going on among the American officers. Secondly,
American officers formed an independent body from civilian circles in the
Dublin organisation. In short Superintendent Ryan’s informers had no access
to information with regard to American officers.

In November 1866 Corydon told the police that about 500 experienced American
officers were to leave America. A month later Superintendent Ryan had no
reason to doubt that a good many American officers were scattered over the
country and in January 1867 he reported that a very large number of American
officers were located about Liverpool, Birkenhead and Manchester and that
Colonel Kelly, Captain McCafferty and other American officers were in London.
However, Superintendent Ryan could secure no further information about their
movements.

There were some reports about American officers' movements in Dublin in January
and February 1867. Perhaps the most useful information Superintendent Ryan had
was that several American officers resorted to Whelan's pub and Bolger's gin
palace, and probably the police watched their movements. Subsequently a few American officers were arrested. Perhaps Superintendent Ryan, as in late 1865 and early 1866, faced difficulty in gathering information about American officers.

After the rising Superintendent Ryan still paid his attention to American officers. In March 1867 he reported that Colonel Kelly was in Dublin and two months later was informed that Colonel Kelly planned to disturb the peace on the day fixed for the execution of a Fenian Thomas F. Burke. In September 1867 Colonel Kelly and Captain Timothy Deasy were rescued in Manchester. Superintendent Ryan and Acting Superintendent James Ryan reported some information about the subsequent location of Colonel Kelly but their information did not lead to Colonel Kelly's arrest. As American officers lost their influence in the movement in the late 1860s, we have little further information about them.

(5) Fenians from England

Fenianism spread from Dublin to Britain, where a strong organisation existed by 1865. As we have seen, Stephens ordered Fenians in Britain to come to Ireland to take part in the intended rising in late 1865 or early 1866. In December 1865 Superintendent Ryan received two informations from London, saying that Fenians in London had received orders to go to Dublin. A month later he was informed by the chief constable of police at Ashton-under-Lyne that twenty-four young men had left for Dublin. This information is fully supported by the fact that between 400 and 500 Fenians from England were staying in Dublin. At the latter end of 1865 William Gaynor, a member of one
of the Fenian contingents from England supplied the police with information about their number, their instructions, their lodgings, mode of meeting and manner in which they were paid. By his information Superintendent Ryan seems to have acquired a general grasp of the English Fenians' movements in Dublin. As a result, it was not a difficult task to arrest English Fenians after the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866; in February and March over 100 English Fenians were detained. Though Superintendent Ryan succeeded in arresting a large number of Fenians from England, he failed to collect sufficient information to prosecute them. Superintendent Ryan, though he thought that they had been drilled in the army, the militia or rifle volunteers, could not establish their identities.

Fenians in England tried to seize arms in Chester Castle on 11 February 1867 but their plan was foiled by Corydon's information. Subsequently they came to Ireland to join Fenians in Ireland to start the rising. On 11 February Superintendent Ryan received five telegrams from the head constable of the Irish Constabulary in Liverpool, two English police forces, the Coast Guard and the mayor of Bolton respectively, saying that large numbers of supposed Fenians had left for Dublin. On the following day the police, who had been waiting for boats at the North Wall arrested 63 men from England. From 12 to 19 February 175 men were arrested at the North Wall and during this period Superintendent Ryan received other telegrams from police officers in Liverpool who watched passengers board. In this way the D.M.P. arrested Fenians from England effectively thanks to the telegrams from England and prevented them from taking part in the rising in March 1867.
In late 1863 or early 1864 Pagan O'Leary started to recruit British soldiers into the Fenian organisation. In June 1864 Superintendent Ryan received, as far as we know, the first information about Fenianism in the British army from Nagle. By the end of 1864 Superintendent Ryan learned that Pagan O'Leary and several soldiers, such as James Montague of the 5th Dragoon Guards, Darcy, Lacy and Welsh of the 84th Regiment, were prominent among Fenian soldiers and that Pagan O'Leary met soldiers in three pubs in the city. These informations came from Nagle. Superintendent Ryan started to watch the movements of Pagan O'Leary (he was arrested in Athlone in November 1864) and to keep two pubs, Moran's (10 Cork Hill) and Bergin's (65 Thomas St) under surveillance. Superintendent Ryan reported that soldiers of several regiments resorted to the pubs but he failed to obtain detailed information about the Fenian organisation in the army. This suggests that Superintendent Ryan had no Fenian soldier informers.

Superintendent Ryan acquired his information by observing prominent Fenians and their pubs, and received information from his own non-soldier informers. Therefore Superintendent Ryan's information with regard to the army organisation was in fact vague. For example one of his informers said, 'Devoy was present at a meeting in a public house here some nights ago, that a good many soldiers were in attendance', and another reported that 'the 83rd came to this city reputed Fenians boasted that 83rd were all right'. Furthermore, according to Lord Strathnairn, the reports of the police were not always to be credited. The following report by Superintendent Ryan supports Lord Strathnairn's doubts about the accuracy of police information:
Stephens is said to be the first who attempted to swear in soldiers and that he first made a tour of the United Kingdom visited all the Military Stations and made himself acquainted with how the soldiers felt with regard to the British Government and then began to swear men in and of himself swore in several hundred men principally about Aldershot Camp.130

Though Stephens visited London in early 1865, there is no evidence to support the assertion that he had sworn in several hundred men about Aldershot Camp. Moreover, Lord Strathnairn thought that two reports of Superintendent Ryan were exaggerated; these reports claimed that almost all the Royals, the 2nd Queens and the 8th Regiment were Fenians and that there were 300 deserters in Dublin.131 Indeed, there is no information to corroborate these reports. Superintendent Ryan said that great numbers of the crew of the 'Royal George' were Fenians. Deputy Coast General J.W. Tarleton, after inquiry, concluded that it was unnecessary to pursue the matter further.132

Vague and exaggerated though these reports were, the military authorities may nonetheless have been guilty of complacency. Arrested Fenian soldiers in early 1866 began to provide information about the organisation in the army. From early 1866 on, the military authorities passed this information to the police: it came mainly from two Privates, Patrick Foley in the 5th Dragoon Guards and James Maher in the 8th. For instance, the police asked Foley and Maher for information about Edward St Clair (Dr Power's B) taking a prominent role in swearing in soldiers.133 Moreover, early in December 1866 Edward Butler, in charge of tampering with soldiers was arrested by police who acted on information from the military authorities.134
Superintendent Ryan's information concerning Fenianism in the army was not as trustworthy as his information on the civilian organisation in Dublin, because of the lack of Fenian soldier informers and the inability of his regular informers to acquire correct information about Fenianism in the army. These circumstances support the more general conclusion that the organisation in the army existed independently from the civilian organisation.

Fenian detectives and shooting circle
The efforts of the police to put down Fenianism were to some extent foiled by Fenians who sought to keep the movement informed of the activities of the authorities. It proved very difficult for the officers of G division to keep watch on the movements of Fenians, because the Fenians in turn had their own detectives to watch the police and could gain information not only about the movements of the police but about the government from members or sympathisers working at places where they were in a position to acquire information on the authorities.

John Devoy claimed that both Roantree and he had known all the officers of the G division. This is confirmed by Superintendent Ryan, saying that most Dublin Fenians knew Acting Inspector Smollen who was specially employed to keep a strict vigilance over Fenianism. Moreover, the organisation employed some Fenians as their own detectives. Michael Graham, one of their detectives, was said to be fairly familiar with all the members of the G division. In May 1866 the police arrested three Fenian detectives. Superintendent Ryan wrote of the movements of Patrick Cuddyre, one of those arrested:

... he was making every possible exertion to watch the movements of the police. He frequently placed himself at hall doors and close by walls
where he could have ample opportunity of seeing every one to whom the police spoke and perhaps of overhearing what passed between them.  

In 1870 the police reported that discharged soldiers were employed as Fenian detectives to watch the police. Furthermore, a Fenian pretending to give information to the police, put himself in communication with Superintendent Ryan and attempted to acquire knowledge of the police system in 1866, but his efforts were frustrated by Superintendent Ryan.

Some evidence suggested that Fenians and Fenian sympathisers existed in the D.M.P., but there is no evidence that they were in the G division. According to John Devoy, some Fenians escaped from arrest thanks to timely warnings from the police. In 1864 Nagle reported that Fenianism existed in the Constabulary depot and that O'Donovan Rossa had proposed to swear in as many policemen as possible. Devoy wrote that in 1865 a drill instructor for the Constabulary recruits at the depot in the Phoenix Park had been enlisted by Roantree.

We have no information about the number of Fenians in the police force in Dublin. In 1865 and 1866 there were two further reports that policemen had been observed among Fenians in Dublin. As the authorities did not pursue the matters further, there is no evidence concerning who they were. However, during our period, one policeman of the D.M.P. was arrested for his involvement with Fenianism in April 1867. After the escape of John Kirwan, a Dublin Centre, from the Meath Hospital on 9 April, Constable Patrick Kelly of the A division was arrested on the charge of freeing Kirwan and later he was identified as having attended Fenian meetings. This incident supports the possibility that
there were Fenians in the D.M.P. and shows that Fenians may have received some information from police Fenians. But there cannot have been many Fenians in the police as authorities paid little attention to the question of Fenianism in the police.

However, even if Fenians in the police were few, the Fenians could rely on others in the police or in government service for information. Michael Breslin who was a clerk in the police superintendent's office, though he was not a Fenian, seems to have passed police information to Fenians.\textsuperscript{146} It was said that Fenians worked in Thom's printing office, the ordnance office in the Castle Yard and the Telegraph Company.\textsuperscript{147} And a hackney carriage proprietor who had a contract for driving the messengers and others in the Upper Castle Yard was a Fenian sympathiser.\textsuperscript{148} Probably Fenians obtained information from these quarters.

As Fenians began to recognise that informers existed in the organisation, they needed to take measures to protect their activities from informers, such as Pierce Nagle. In 1865 Colonel Kelly established a 'shooting circle' to assassinate informers and 'the Vigilance Committee' with the duty of deciding who should be shot.\textsuperscript{149} In May 1866 Superintendent Ryan reported that the head of the Vigilance Committee was Thomas Hynes, an Irish-American.\textsuperscript{150} Perhaps Hynes succeeded Colonel Kelly who had left for America with Stephens in March 1866. It is possible for the police to exaggerate the shooting circle, as John O'Leary strongly denied its existence.\textsuperscript{151} However, the following evidence is against O'Leary's denial. Information concerning the shooting circle in 1865 and 1866 is scarce. We have to guess about the circle from other evidence. In November 1867 Superintendent Ryan was informed as follows:
...a special circle of Fenians comprising 30 men whose duty is to watch the movements of the Police and persons suspected of giving them information and as opportunity may serve, assassinate them. Some members of this circle are regularly appointed in their turn for duty by night each man so appointed is armed with a revolver and paid 6s/6d per night, for each night they are out, ... the majority of the members of the assassination circle are shoemakers who have been on tramp in the United Kingdom for many years, and some in America. 

Probably such a circle already existed in 1865 and 1866.

The Centre of the shooting circle in late 1865 and early 1866 was Cody, alias Michael Byrne, who was under the control of Colonel Kelly. The shooting circle seems to have accomplished their first act in February 1866, when James Clarke was shot on the suspicion of giving information to the police; the police denied that they had received information from Clarke. In the middle of April 1866 the police, acting on information from an informer Private James Maher, arrested Cody. The Fenians must have suspected that Private Maher gave information to the authorities because on 22 April 1866 he was shot in Hoey's pub in Bridgefoot St. Superintendent Ryan reported that Patrick Kearney, Sylvester Kingston and Richard Dowling had been implicated in the shooting of Maher. It seems that these men belonged to the shooting circle.

Some informers made efforts to deny the allegation that they had passed information to the police. For example John Wilson suspected of being an informer by Fenians, proposed to have himself arrested in order to dispel the suspicion. Moreover, Superintendent Ryan probably made his best efforts to hide his informers from Fenian eyes.

The main purpose of the shooting circle was to eliminate informers and not to shoot policemen. However, in November 1865 Acting Inspectors Edward Hughes and
William Doyle of the G division were shot and wounded near Dame St. And three policemen from the non-detective ranks were shot dead - Constable O'Neill of the D division in April 1866, Constable Keena of the A division in November 1867 and late Head Constable of the Royal Irish Constabulary, Talbot in July 1871. Hughes and Doyle were the only members of the G division shot. According to John Devoy, this attempt was made by Tom Frith, whose intention was to shoot the policemen in revenge for the arrest of Stephens, though fellow Fenians were opposed to the attempt. In spite of the fact that Superintendent Ryan, whom the Fenians held a special hatred for, received threatening letters, there were no attempts on his life. This suggests that the Fenians prior to the rising did not concentrate on shooting policemen. The Fenian leaders refrained from shooting the police and thought that shooting the police would be an obstacle to their final goal.

After the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866 feeling among the Fenians against the police increased, and in March some officers who were very active in arresting Fenians were assaulted by Fenians. At this stage not only members of the shooting circle but ordinary Fenians seem to have made despairing attempts to shoot the police. Superintendent Ryan was informed that the rank and file Fenians who came to despair of having a rising and who imagined themselves abandoned by their leaders, 'are resolved to strike terror into the minds of all by shooting down indiscriminately all who were in anywise concerned in the suppression of the Fenian Conspiracy'. At the same time some Centres, who also thought that a rising would be too far away, advocated the shooting down of detectives and informers. In these circumstances Constable Charles O'Neill of the D division was shot dead on the night of 28
April 1866. Constable O'Neills was not active in suppressing Fenianism, so even some Fenians were surprised at the killing. Richard Kearney was supposed to have murdered Constable O'Neill, but as the police failed to arrest him, we have no definite information as to who killed Constable O'Neill and whether or not the shooting circle was involved.\textsuperscript{163} In May there is evidence that the shooting circle tried to assassinate detectives, though the attempt did not materialise.\textsuperscript{164} Therefore - though we can never be sure - Constable O'Neill may have been killed by the shooting circle.

There is no evidence to suggest that the shooting circle made an effort to assassinate informers during the period from the second half of 1866 to September 1867. There is a strong possibility that the circle was disorganised, and this would account both for the absence of attempts on informers' lives and for a halt to what may have been a new policy in April 1866 of shooting police. However, the circle acted again in October 1867 when crown witness George Reilly and two policemen - Constable Patrick Keena of the A division and Sergeant Kelly - were shot.\textsuperscript{165} The police asserted that these shootings were made by the shooting circle. As these policemen had not made themselves obnoxious to Fenians, the police thought that Fenians aimed at producing a sort of general terror. Perhaps the police guess was right, because in October 1867 Fenianism was in a desperate condition and they had no hope of having a rising. In October and November several Fenians - according to the police, members of the shooting circle - were arrested: the arrest included the Centre of the shooting circle, Thomas Francis and his B, James Sweeney.\textsuperscript{166} Towards the end of 1867 Thomas Francis was succeeded by Patrick Lennon. Again the police struck against the shooting circle by arresting
Patrick Lennon and other members in January 1868. The last shooting incident during our period occurred in July 1871, when late Head Constable Thomas Talbot who had been working as a spy in the organisation was killed by Robert Kelly. We have no information whether or not Kelly was a member of the shooting circle.
Chapter Seven: Footnotes


2. Ibid., p. 404.

3. Ibid., p. 405.


5. Ibid.


7. Reports from commissioners to inquire into the condition of the civil service in Ireland on the Dublin Metropolitan Police, H.C. 1873 (c 788), xii, p. 10.


18. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 30 Dec. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5388R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 28 Feb. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5857R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Apr. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6164R on 6200R).


22. C.S.O., R.P. 1865/12518; 1866/4982; 1866/5751; 1866/6961; 1866/9290; 1866/10518; 1866/12234; 1866/13641; 1866/18084; 1866/20564; 1866/22239; 1866/23234; 1867/822; 1867/1676; 1867/2901; 1867/4259; 1867/5452; 1867/6801; 1867/7865; 1867/8989; 1867/10700; 1867/11849; 1867/12931; 1867/14184; 1867/14891; 1867/16469; 1867/18307; 1867/19305; 1867/19967; 1867/20609; 1867/22108; 1868/300; 1868/1169; 1868/1823; 1868/2808; 1868/3567; 1868/4579; 1868/5479; 1868/7019; 1868/7858; 1868/9628; 1868/11797; 1868/13413; 1868/15095; 1868/17139; 1869/1491; 1869/4069; 1869/5377; 1869/9447; 1869/12355; 1869/14766; 1869/16747; 1869/19257; 1870/3150; 1870/6073; 1870/8281; 1870/11424; 1870/13468; 1870/15238; 1870/17121; 1870/19461; 1870/21402; 1871/969; 1871/4723; 1871/8450.


34. Samuel Anderson to Larcom, 19 Dec. 1869 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7694).


37. S.P.O., F.P.R. 22; 32; 33; 34; 36; 38; 39A; 40; 41; 43; 44A; 45; 46; 47A; 49; 50; 52; 57; 62; 65; 68; 72; 73; 76; 77; 81; 85; 86; 96; 217; Supt Ryan to C.P., 31 July 1856 (C.S.O., R.P. 1865/7576).


39. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 June 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 22).

40. Supt Ryan to C.P., 4 Aug. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 40).


44. Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10634 on 1867/10278); Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/12428 on 1866/13223).


48. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a).

49. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/16868.

50. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/5820); Acting Supt James Ryan to C.P., 29 June 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/11246 on 1867/15695).


54. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 8.

55. C.S.O., R.P. 1871/7828 on 1870/13772; 1871/7079 on 1870/13772; 1871/17873; 1872/13895; 1872/8439 on 1872/19341; 1872/8060 on 1881/6856; 1871/7686 on


61. See Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8701 on 1866/17148); Supt Ryan to C.P., 25 July 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/14152 on 1867/450); Supt Ryan to C.P., 23 Nov. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/21093 on 1866/21977).


63. Acting Supt James Ryan to C.P., 29 June 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/11247 on 1867/16553); N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7517, p. 380.


66. N.L.I., MS 5964.

67. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), pp 38, 42-3, 182.

68. S.P.O., F papers, F1454 on C.S.O., R.P. 1866/20849; F1967 on 1866/22930; F2138 on 1866/23299; 1867/1453 on 1867/3004; 1867/1454 on 1867/3004; 1867/1375 on 1867/3178; 1867/1366 on 1867/10822; 1867/13756; 1868/3070; F2391; F2440; F2441; F2442; F2458; F2522; F2540; N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7593; N.L.I., Mayo papers, MS 11188.


70. Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 Aug. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 47).

72. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 135); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 136); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 136A).


74. Supt Ryan to C.P., 12 Nov. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 340).

75. See Supt Ryan to C.P., 20 Dec. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 393).


86. Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Sept. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 32); Supt Ryan to C.P., 15 Oct. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 73).


98. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Jan. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5578R on 5694R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6095R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 31 May 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6090R on 6095R).


100. Supt Ryan to C.P., 15 Oct. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.73).


102. Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 Nov. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.84); Supt Ryan to C.P., 28 Nov. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.86); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Dec. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.87); Supt Ryan to C.P., 14 Dec. 1864 (C.S.O., R.P.1866/22616); Acting Inspector Fox to C.P., 29 Dec. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R.96).

103. Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.161); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.218).


110. Supt Ryan to C.P., 27 Apr. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4062R on 4170R); Supt Ryan to C.P., 3 May 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4092R on 4170R).


112. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 140).


125. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 June 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 22).


127. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Oct. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 71); Supt Ryan to C.P., 23 Nov. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 83); Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 137a); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 157); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May

129. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 24 Sept. 1865 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42821).


131. Lord Strathnairn to Duke of Cambridge, 27 Jan. 1866 (B.L., Sir Hugh Rose papers, MS 42821); Lord Strathnairn to Lord Wodehouse, 18 Feb. 1866 (ibid., MS 42822).


133. Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 15 Oct. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/18757 on 1866/20075); Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Nov. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/20075).


135. Devoy, Recollections, p. 57.


137. Devoy, Recollections, p. 93.


140. Supt Ryan to C.P., 9 May 1866 (S.P.O., F papers, 2129R).

141. Devoy, Recollections, p. 98.

142. Supt Ryan to C.P., 9 July 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 34).

143. Devoy, Recollections, p. 64.

144. Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 161); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Jan. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/1089).


146. Devoy, Recollections, pp 77-8.


150. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10209 on 1866/11639.


152. Supt Ryan to C.P., 4 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/19348 on 1867/19481).


156. Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 22 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/7918 on 1866/16249); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8694 on 1866/16249); Supt Ryan to C.P., 9 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9239); Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9355); Supt Ryan to C.P., 18 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10011 on 1866/16249); Supt Ryan to C.P., 24 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10442 on F papers, 5724R); Supt Ryan to C.P., 30 May 1866 (S.P.O., F papers, 330R).


162. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/9079 on 1866/13546).

163. Supt Ryan to C.P., 30 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/20388); Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 May 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10094); Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 June 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/11197 on 1866/12291).

164. C.S.O., R.P. 1866/10209 on 1866/11639.


166. Acting Supt James Ryan to C.P., 30 Oct. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/19068); Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/19361); Supt Ryan to C.P., 14 Nov.
1867 (C.S.O.,R.P.1867/19343); Acting Supt James Ryan to C.P., 16 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O.,R.P.1867/20036 on 1867/20374).


Chapter 8

THE RISING IN DUBLIN IN MARCH 1867

Nine years after the establishment of the society, the uprising started on 3 and 5 March 1867. Though civil unrest was on the increase, a large number of the Dublin faction turned up in the resultant violent outbreaks. This suggests that the organisation in Dublin was not by any means the product of Fenian leaders' inspiration and that certain problems, such as the Knappin-Bryan Suspension Act, had failed to reach resolution.

The story of the 1867 rising begins with Stephens's deposition from the leadership of the Fenian Brotherhood by Colonel Kelly and other American officers in December 1866. General Moynihan considered that Colonel Kelly was such a very dangerous and illsustrious character that it was necessary to exclude him. Considering the major military resources of the I.R.R., the decision of Stephens to postpone the rising seems to have been wise. However, the Fenian leaders, lacking the co-ordination of a central body, were always subject to internal dissatisifaction of its rank and file for the lack of action. Superintendent Ryan had reported in January 1867 that:

...the minor members of the conspiracy made open confession of doubts regarding the sincerity of James Stephens and some even as far as to say they would abandon the movement altogether. But the more practical members ... made all sorts of apologies for the inability of Stephens to fulfill his promise.

In December 1866 Colonel Kelly wrote to have communicated his intention of starting the rising to the organisation in Ireland. Superintendent Ryan had information that three missionaries from America had arrived in Dublin towards the end of December with instructions from Colonel Kelly, saying that...
Nine years after the establishment of the movement, the Fenians started the rising on 5 and 6 March 1867. Though the attempt ended in a fiasco, a large number of the Dublin Fenians turned up in the mountains behind Tallaght. This suggests that the organisation in Dublin was not by any means the product of Fenian leaders' imagination and that coercive measures, such as the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, had failed to crush Fenianism.

The story of the 1867 rising begins with Stephens's deposition from the headship of the Fenian Brotherhood by Colonel Kelly and other American officers in December 1866. General Millen considered that Colonel Kelly was much more dangerous and less scrupulous than Stephens. Considering the meagre military resources of the I.R.B., the decision of Stephens to postpone the rising seems to have been wiser than Colonel Kelly's wish to start one. However, the Fenian organisation was anxious to prove its leaders' sincerity by taking action and they must have been under pressure from the vocal dissatisfaction of its rank and file at the lack of action. Superintendent Ryan had reported in January 1867 that:

the minor members of the conspiracy made open profession of doubts regarding the sincerity of James Stephens and some even so far as to say they would abandon the movement altogether, but the more prominent members ... made all sorts of apologies for the inability of Stephens to fulfil his promise.2

In December 1866 Colonel Kelly seems to have communicated his intention of starting the rising to the organisation in Ireland. Superintendent Ryan had information that three emissaries from America had arrived in Dublin towards the end of December with instructions from Colonel Kelly, saying that 'the men
in Ireland should not despair and that one of the three emissaries was Edmund McCahill alias Davis, sent over to Dr Power; suggesting that Dr Power appears to have been in practice at the time the most important local Fenian in the Dublin organisation. During this period some prominent American officers like Thomas F. Burke and Captain McCafferty left New York and were observed in Liverpool in early January 1867. Probably some of these American officers actually came to Ireland. Undoubtedly the arrival of American officers in England and Ireland cheered up the spirits of the Fenians who had lost hope in the fulfilment of Stephens's promise.

In spite of the fresh arrival of American officers in England, the Americans who had already been in England—largely men who had fled from Ireland after the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act—no less than the Irish Fenians entertained doubts about the future purpose of the organisation as they held that the American Fenians had broken the promise to organise a rising before 1 January 1867. As a result the American officers and Fenians in England decided to commence a rising without waiting for future American help, and for this purpose formed a Directory in England not later than early February but more probably in January 1867. The Directory consisted of seven civilians and eight American officers; among the civilians were John Nolan, John Ryan, John Flood alias Howard, Murphy (ex-Centre for Limerick) and Leddy (Centre for Limerick); General Halpin, Colonels Burke, and Healy, Beecher and Captain McCafferty were among the officers.

The Directory, immediately after its formation, seems to have established some control over the organisation in Ireland. Since Stephens's departure for America in March 1866 the organisation in Ireland had been directed by Edward Duffy. According to Superintendent Ryan, Duffy was succeeded in January 1867...
by an American officer 'Evans' who was a member of the Directory though there is no detailed information about him. Furthermore, on 18 January 1867 Superintendent Ryan reported that Beecher, a member of the Directory, had been in Dublin and had returned to England and would be back again. Thus it seems probable that close links existed between the Directory and the Irish organisation at the time of its being formed or immediately afterwards. Subsequently they seem to have decided to launch a rising on 11 February 1867. This is supported by the fact that in early February John Ryan, a member of the Directory, said that things were coming to a crisis and that there would be fighting in London, Liverpool and Ireland at the same time. However, the rising was postponed. About 9 February John Devoy in prison received a verbal message from Duffy, 'the fight will be in three weeks, but we'll be badly beaten'. Perhaps the postponement can be explained by Colonel Kelly's arrival in London from America at the end of January with several officers intended to be the military leaders of the rising. It is likely that leaders of the Irish organisation, who regarded Colonel Kelly as their head, refused to participate in a rising under the leadership of the Directory.

Colonel Kelly, having travelled to Paris on 25 January with Cluseret, (appointed commander in chief of the Fenian army by Stephens), and Vifquain, on 28 January arrived at 5 Crescent Chenies St London with General Halpin. No sooner had he done so than he rallied the American officers round him. It was not a difficult task for him, because he had a considerable sum of money, which the American officers in England needed badly, and Godfrey Massey, directed by Colonel Kelly, distributed £550 among the Fenians in London. Nevertheless, Colonel Kelly was soon in disaccord with the Directory and the rest of the Directory, led by Captain McCafferty and John Flood, drew up a plan to seize arms in the military arsenal at Chester on 11 February without Colonel
Kelly's consent. Their plan was foiled by Corydon who informed the government of their intention on 10 February.\textsuperscript{14}

Colonel Kelly and his adherents, however, built up the basis for starting the rising. On 10 February Colonel Kelly became chairman of the 'Provisional Government of the Irish Republic' consisting of Edward Duffy representative for Connacht, William Harbison for Ulster, Edward O'Byrne for Leinster and Dominick Mahony for Munster. Cluseret was also approved as commander in chief and Fariola as adjutant general, chief of staff to Cluseret.\textsuperscript{15} Immediately on the establishment of the Provisional Government, Colonel Kelly sent Massey to obtain first-hand knowledge of the military condition of the organisation in Ireland. On 12 February Massey attended a meeting of the Dublin Centres, at which he was informed that the number in the Dublin organisation was 14,000 and that weapons of all kinds did not exceed about 3,000. Massey continued his mission to investigate the organisation further afield, visiting Castlebar, Cork and Tipperary and finally returned to London on 24 February. After reporting he was ordered by Colonel Kelly to return to Ireland in order to announce the date and plan of the rising; it would take place at midnight on 5 March. On 26 February Massey conveyed Colonel Kelly's direction to about twenty Dublin Centres at a meeting convened by Edward O'Byrne, a Dublin Centre and representative for Leinster in the Provisional Government.\textsuperscript{16}

The plan for the rising

In March 1867 Dublin was protected by over 5,000 British soldiers who were well armed, while the Dublin Fenians, numbering from several thousand to ten thousand, had no more than several hundred rifles.\textsuperscript{17} In these circumstances it was impossible for the Fenians to defeat the army directly. General Millen,
the former president of the Military Council, who was one of the Fenian leaders thoroughly acquainted with the Fenian army, had held the opinion that 'if we take the field before England becomes involved in some foreign or domestic difficulty, we will be "stamped out" '.18 For this reason poorly armed Fenians in Ireland counted on the Fenian Brotherhood organising an expedition to Ireland with men and arms and assistance from the Fenian Brotherhood occupied an important part of plans for the rising until the end of 1865, when the Fenian Brotherhood split into two factions. In 1864 and 1865 Superintendent Ryan made several reports concerning the American Fenians' expedition to Ireland.19

Apart from the expedition, the only evidence in the early stages of planning for the rising, is the plan of General Millen which in the latter part of 1865 he submitted to Stephens; the seizure of Dublin was the central part of his plan. He proposed that the Fenians should place all the fire arms which they possessed in Ireland and Britain to Dublin, where they would start a rising; its success would be followed by a general rising all over Ireland. In Dublin 10,000 Dublin Fenians, provided with 4,000 fire arms from other regions, were to be divided into three separate columns and they were to attack the Pigeon House Fort, Magazine Fort and Portobello Barracks. Stephens did not adopt General Millen's plan; he opposed the concentration of arms in Dublin because he thought that he could arm the whole organisation quite soon.20

The seizure of Dublin was also projected by John Devoy, Edmund O'Donovan (a Dublin Centre) and others. On the night of 21 February 1866 Devoy proposed his plan to a meeting convened by Stephens. Devoy, the chief organiser of the Fenian organisation in the British army, tried to make full use of Fenian soldiers in a rising. In his Recollections Devoy wrote that Fenians would
concentrate their attack on the Richmond Barracks with the help of the Fenian soldiers in the 61st Regiment and the 60th Rifles stationed there, and that after the capture of the Richmond Barracks, attacks were to be made on the Island Bridge Barracks and subsequently on the Royal Barracks. Compared with General Millen's plan, this plan reflecting Devoy's concentration on recruiting soldiers into the Fenian movement, revolved around the city's military barracks. The Fenians from the Richmond Barracks would then attack the other units of the army in the streets as it marched out of its garrison positions. Colonel Kelly and General Halpin, who attended the meeting, did not consent to Devoy's plan because of the lack of arms and leaders caused by the arrests of American officers a few days previously.21

The police had some sense of Fenian rising plans even before Devoy's plan was put to the February meeting. In January 1866 the police had discovered at a Fenian leader's house a map representing the plan of attack on the city.22 Again, from information in December 1866, Superintendent Ryan reported that the city was divided into four districts, each of which had mustering points and that in the event of a rising these four groups would make simultaneous attacks on focal points in the city.23 These were not the plans finally adopted for the March 1867 rising, though the concept of Fenian activity in Dublin was in fact to be retained.

The plan finally adopted was devised by General Gustave Cluseret, a Frenchman, who had served in the French army in the Italian campaign of 1859-60 and in the Federal army during the Civil War.24 In the latter part of 1866 Cluseret drew up his first plan, which was later revised, based on the assumption that the organisation had 10,000 armed members: 10,000 armed Fenians would defeat the 30,000 British forces in Ireland by seizing 'upon the most important points for
embarkation and the principal roads of communication, and operating under the shelter of popular sympathy'. His plan was handed to Stephens. In November 1866 the authorities received information concerning a rising plan from persons 'who are in confidential relations with Mr Stephens Head Quarters'. There is no evidence whether or not the plan which the authorities possessed was Cluseret's. Nevertheless, this information helps us to understand the plan by Cluseret. According to it the capture of Dublin had a central role in a rising as it had in General Millen's and Devoy's plans; 30,000 Fenians would be concentrated in Dublin and 500 pikemen under Captain McCafferty would attack Dublin Castle to hold the lord lieutenant and state officers as hostages. At the same time the barracks in Dublin and other cities would be attacked by Fenians, some of whom would be armed with 'greek fire'. After the seizure of Dublin, 20,000 Fenians would march to Athlone. Moreover, Fenians would simultaneously try to disrupt communications by cutting telegraphs and railways.

In February 1867 Cluseret, who was thoroughly informed of badly armed condition of the I.R.B., had no alternative but to draw up a plan on the basis that he was to be given 5,000 armed men instead of 10,000. This proved to be the final plan adopted for the 1867 rising. Cluseret did not hold much hope for the rising. Holding no hopes for success, he returned to Paris on 15 February taking no part in the rising at all. Fariola, chief of staff to General Cluseret, informed us of the rising plan. There were two stages in the plan; Fenians should in the first phase engage in guerrilla war in order to possess the best possible positions for their tactics and later they would start a more regular war. In this first stage the Fenians seem to have proposed to acquire the railway centres and principal roads for the purpose of preventing the
movement of troops. Fariola gives us details of the first stage of the rising, guerrilla war:

The burden on them was to begin with very small bands of men fifteen to twenty men at most, two or three being allowed to unite only in very rare cases, when success would be twice certain, and not at all in the first outset. These bands were never to fight regularly against troops or police; on the contrary, they were to avoid all encounters, using their legs whenever met by the enemy to draw it in vain and tiresome marches; they were to resort to ambushes to cut off all isolated or small parties of police or soldiers; to cut the roads, railways, telegraphs, and bridges everywhere and every day, so as to keep the country in a perpetual state of apprehension and insecurity, to disperse whenever hotly pursued, and after every little expedition. Each Chief of band was to be independent of his neighbours, and to receive general instructions only from the Military Centre of his district; this alone should order the union of several bands for a common purpose requiring any length of time. But every band was to keep constant correspondence with its neighbours and a system of signals should be established for some general and predetermined movements of all the bands of a district.

Attacks within the city were part of the plan, but in contrast to General Millen's or Devoy's plan, they were subordinated to a wider strategy of guerrilla warfare. The linking of action in Dublin to wider national action was, of course, already part of Cluseret's first plan; the essential difference was the shift from the confident frontal assault on Dublin Castle and other nerve Centre in the country to a flexible or decentralised pattern of guerrilla warfare which would only in a second stage culminate in regular war. As we shall see, the gathering of a main force of Dublin Fenians at Tallaght and diversionary tactics in the Dublin and Wicklow hills seem to have been part of the final plan. The thinking in the plan would seem to be that the guerrilla activity outside the city would draw the soldiers out of the city, and make it easier for the Fenians remaining within to make their attacks effective.
We have no information about the second stage of the rising-regular war. Given the pessimism of Cluseret, this may well result from the reckless qualities of Colonel Kelly to which General Millen had already adverted. Colonel Kelly seems to have assumed that 'The most we expected to accomplish was to hold our ground until we should be recognized as belligerents or until aide would come from America'. Colonel Kelly's hopes were pinned on the belief that help would arrive from the Irish Americans, and no doubt this possibility would be greatly encouraged by a rising which actually succeeded in holding out. Certainly there were some positive elements to sustain such hopes. Two concrete developments in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion reveal the not wholly unrealistic basis for Colonel Kelly's expectations. First, as Anglo-American relations deteriorated at that time, the American government may have recognised belligerency. This is confirmed by the fact that on 17 March the Congress adopted a resolution to support the Irish. Secondly, the O'Mahony wing of the Fenian Brotherhood sent an expedition to Ireland with great numbers of Springfield rifles and forty officers in May. As it took place two months after the rising had ended, this was of no practical benefit, but it makes it easier to appreciate the context of Colonel Kelly's expectations.

The weakness of Colonel Kelly's approach is the lack of any evidence of careful appraisal of the problems of holding out. In particular, there seems something unrealistic in the confidence of a general guerrilla uprising taking place on 5/6 March and in the apparent lack of attention to the purely administrative and logistical problems of launching it. While we lack any written evidence of Colonel Kelly's plans (which might make some case in his favour), the actual plans look very much like a proposed action combining Colonel Kelly's
recklessness and a desperate attempt in the effort to save credibility, to respond to the widespread rank and file expectations of a rising.

On 26 February Massey, as we have seen, revealed the basic plan to the Dublin Centres. So it is safe to assume that afterwards General Halpin, the Military Centre of the Dublin district, and the Dublin Centres made a more detailed plan respecting the Dublin rising. For instance, before the rising General Halpin was observed by the police in the village of Stepaside where the police barrack later attacked by the Fenians was situated. We have no detailed information about the Dublin rising strategy, partly because it was confined to General Halpin and a handful of the Dublin Centres, and partly because the rising ended within a day before their plan could reveal itself. Nevertheless, so far as we know, the essence of the plan was:

The Fenians would first assemble in the Tallaght hills. From a military base established there, they would launch a guerrilla war. At the same time some Fenians would gather elsewhere and with a short time lag attack the city.

This latter activity would appear to be a phase of the planned guerrilla action. Logically it would also follow from the effects of the diversionary impact they had expected from guerrilla war: troops would be drawn out of the city. This is consistent with the admittedly unsupported and unreliable information received by the Castle in late February that the rising in Dublin was to take place a day or two later than in other parts of the country.
Information about the rising

The authorities received information both about the plan and about the date of the rising. Since the D.M.P. had commenced to watch the movement in 1864, they accumulated information from many sources, and arguably it was very difficult to distinguish good from bad information.

After the establishment of the Irish People in November 1863, the organisation grew rapidly and accordingly expectations were aroused of starting a rising in spite of their poorly prepared condition. The rank and file Fenians were assured by their leaders that a rising would take place soon; probably by doing so the leaders hoped to prevent rank and file Fenians from dropping out of the movement. In September 1864 on an excursion to Delgany, County Wicklow, Stephens declared to Centres: 'You know that next year [1865] is to be the year of action'. In April 1865 Superintendent Ryan reported Stephens's intention to mount a rising in 1865. A month later he received information that a rising was to take place in the summer of 1865. Nagle gave two informations to Ryan in late July and early September 1865, suggesting that a rising would take place in 1865, sooner than the government expected. Nagle's information may have prompted the authorities to arrest Fenian leaders; they raided the Irish People office on 15 September. Undoubtedly these arrests introduced confusion into the I.R.B. and for the time being their hope of a rising subsided.

Nevertheless, towards the end of 1865 the Fenians planned positively to start a rising. According to John Devoy, Colonel Kelly ordered the members to be ready for a rising up to the last week in December. Superintendent Ryan
received several informations as to a rising during this period. One suggested that a rising would take place in November to liberate Fenian prisoners before their trial. On 2 December Superintendent Ryan reported two informations, saying that the time for a rising would be in the middle of December and that '14 iron clads having 20,000 American Fenians with arms and munitions of war aboard' were on their way to Ireland. In the middle of December the superintendent of police in Sheffield wrote to Superintendent Ryan reporting a prevailing rumour that there would be a rising in Ireland on Christmas Eve. And Ryan thought that Stephens might launch a rising regardless of the consequences. Stephens, as noted previously, put off a rising at the meeting of Centres towards the end of 1865. In February 1866 before the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, Superintendent Ryan wrote that though Stephens did not want to rise, another party was anxious to have a rising and that Stephens was unable to restrain them. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act on 17 February yet again destroyed the expectation of a rising by the arrest of the American officers. Moreover, the authorities succeeded in crushing the Fenian organisation in the British army. Subsequently from March 1866 to October 1866 the police obtained little information about a rising.

In the summer and autumn of 1866 Stephens, who had left Ireland in March 1866, was trying to galvanise American Fenians to help the I.R.B. in Ireland and announced his intention to return to Ireland for a rising before 1 January 1867. Therefore in December 1866 most Dublin Fenians seem to have believed that a rising would take place at least by the end of 1866. The police were on the alert towards the end of 1866, collecting information about a rising. According to Superintendent Ryan, in late November 1866 it was generally believed that a rising would take place, though no one was able to suggest a definite date. In December Stephens, who wanted to postpone the rising, was
deposed by Colonel Kelly and other American officers. As a result there was
at the moment of his deposition no effective plan to start a rising in
December. But several informations in December 1866 had made Superintendent
Ryan believe that a rising would take place in that month. For instance the
police received information which was, as the wisdom of hindsight tells us,
false from three independent sources to the effect that the Fenians would start
a rising on 13 December. Moreover, another information reported that a
rising would occur on 15 December. The year 1866, when Stephens promised to
commence a rising, passed without any disturbances and Stephens did not come
to Ireland in December. In January 1867 the police were still alert to the
Fenians' intention of launching a rising.

In February 1867 Colonel Kelly and other American officers set in motion the
plan which finally culminated in a rising. The first correct information about
the rising came from Corydon, an American officer, who stayed in Liverpool and
gave information to the officers of the Irish Constabulary residing there.
Corydon was in a better position to learn of the preparation for the rising
than were Superintendent Ryan's informants: the American officers had to be
kept fully informed about the rising, as they were to take command. In spite
of this advantage not until 27 February did Corydon give correct information
about the date. For example on 14 February Corydon stated that fighting was
to commence on 18 February. And he reported the departure of American
officers from England; all the American officers received final orders from
Beecher to remove to Ireland on 14 February. Corydon himself, having left
Liverpool for Dublin on 16 February, continued to keep in touch with the
officers of the Irish Constabulary in Dublin. On 26 February he attended a
meeting where Massey issued instructions about the rising and the following day
Corydon reported the date of the rising to the authorities. Concerning the
Dublin rising Corydon reported that the rising would be a day or two later than in other places, though Corydon confessed that he was rather in the dark about the Dublin rising.51 As Corydon had apparently no access to the command of the Dublin district, he was unable to provide detailed information about the Dublin plans. Apart from the date, his information was vague and indeed less explicit than information coming into Superintendent Ryan's possession in the course of the following week.

On 26 February the Dublin Centres learned that they would start the rising a week later on 5 March. Centres were not to communicate with their subordinates until twenty-four hours before the rising.52 Therefore, the information about the rising was effectively confined to the Centres until the eve of the rising. Superintendent Ryan, as has been noted, did not have informers of sufficiently high position in the Dublin organisation, so his information about the rising was in some respects obscure. On 11 February Superintendent Ryan reported that Colonel Kelly had come to England intent on starting a rising as soon as possible.53 In the middle of February Ryan made several reports that a rising was imminent though he had not learned the date.54 On 25 February Ryan wrote that the rising would take place not earlier than 28 February but certainly not later than 2 March. His inability to report the date of the rising can be fully accounted for by the fact that Massey announced the date to the Dublin Centres only on 26 February. But Superintendent Ryan had formed the conviction that the Fenians would start a rising soon:

During the progress of the conspiracy especially the past 18 months the day for commencing an insurrection has been so often fixed and nothing done, that it is very difficult to come to any correct conclusion on the point or to attach any credit to the various reports on the subject that are put into circulation but of one thing I feel quite certain that if some important movement were not contemplated and that very soon Captain McCafferty and his companion would not have come here. Perhaps that at no period within the past 4 or 5 years have the Fenians residing here been less demonstrative and there is a manifest decrease...
in the number of street rows, disorderly conduct and drunkenness, or in fact anything that may bring parties into collision with the Police.\textsuperscript{55}

Superintendent Ryan was unable to secure correct information about the date immediately after Massey's announcement on 26 February. So far as we know, on 3 March a few days after Massey's announcement Ryan knew the correct date 5 March, saying that 'a general rising in almost every county in Ireland may be expected in about 48 hours hence'.\textsuperscript{56} However, on the following day Superintendent Ryan wrote that one of his informers had heard an American officer Captain Joseph J. Bible indicate that he could not positively say 5 March.\textsuperscript{57} This information, no doubt, confused Superintendent Ryan's mind. On the night of 4 March a day before the rising, he finally seems to have realised from his officers' observation of the Fenians that the rising would take place on 5 March. Superintendent Ryan noticed that 'there were very apparent signs of a stir manifested by the reputed Fenians in this City and Kingstown as frequent groups of 5 to 8 men were to be met with in the streets'.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, on the morning of 5 March Superintendent Ryan received an anonymous letter saying that Fenians contemplated the rising on that night.\textsuperscript{59} In this way Superintendent Ryan was not able to conclude before the night of 4 March that 5 March was the date fixed for the rising partly because his informers were rank and file Fenians who did not have access to information about the rising immediately after Massey's announcement. The fact that numerous intelligence about a rising which he had received in the past had led to nothing, can only have added to his caution.

Before the rising the authorities were informed not only of the date of the rising but of the basic strategy of the Fenians. Undoubtedly before Massey's announcement about the rising plan on 26 February, Superintendent Ryan had not
possessed accurate information about it. Until the middle of February the authorities had received information that Fenians planned to have a rising not only in Ireland but in England, especially in Liverpool at the same time. On 19 February Superintendent Ryan mentioned that Fenians 'contemplate mustering in large numbers at some suitable place about two miles out of Dublin for an attack on the city', and that they tried to attack the Barracks and the Castle. Thus at that time Superintendent Ryan seems not to have known that the Dublin Fenians mustering in the Tallaght hills were to start a guerrilla war.

On 26 February Massey gave instructions not only to the Dublin Centres but to American officers including Corydon. On the following day Corydon informed the authorities of the main feature of the plan; the Fenians were to occupy the central and high lands of the country. Concerning the Dublin rising Corydon provided a somewhat garbled account that the Fenians intended to burn several points in the city and that 7,000 Fenians (4,000 well armed) would turn up in the Dublin region. Corydon, however, was unable to convey information of precise locations. It is unlikely that Corydon knew that the Tallaght hills were the mustering point for the Dublin Fenians.

As the date of the rising was approaching, Superintendent Ryan seems to have had better information on the Dublin rising than Corydon. This suggests that Fenian leaders had some success in keeping their plan secret. One report stated that the Dublin Fenians would march towards Wicklow, where they were to be joined by the men of Wicklow and Wexford, and that they then contemplated attacking the city. Much accurate information came from a Fenian residing in Dalkey, who had met Captain Joseph J. Bible. According to this information, the Dalkey Fenians were to proceed to Wicklow and along the line of mountains
for the purpose of drawing troops from Dublin and of weakening the protection of Dublin city by the troops. This was the information received on 1 March. Two days later, on 3 March, a report suggested that the Fenians from Dalkey, Kingstown and the outlying districts were to march to the Tallaght hills and there to be joined by 5,000 Fenians from the city. While Fenians in the Tallaght hills would draw out of the troops, 10,000 Fenians in the city would start to attack the city. While it was suggested that this plan countermanded a preceding order (which could possibly be the movement of Dalkey Fenians to Wicklow), the sequence of events on 5 March itself suggests a complex operation possibly involving some division of the Dalkey and Kingstown Fenians between a force for County Wicklow and another for diversion to Tallaght. The place for mustering in the Tallaght hills was confirmed by an anonymous letter which Superintendent Ryan received on 5 March. In this way, the authorities learned the Dublin Fenians would be divided into two groups, one of which was to muster in the Tallaght hills for the purpose of drawing troops from the city, while another group would attack the city. The information, while general enough, was vital for government decisions on troop location, because it revealed the divisionary purpose visualised for the Fenian forces in the Tallaght hills.

The rising

John Devoy, confined in Mountjoy prison, later recalled the night of 5 and 6 March when he had allegedly anticipated the Fenian's defeat:

I climbed up to the cell window, which only opened slantingly, and found that rain, sleet and snow followed each other in quick succession, and I said to myself sadly: "God help the poor fellows who are out to-night without overcoats or warm clothing. And what are they going to fight with?" With all the handicaps which I knew to
exist, and the blizzard added, what kind of a fight would the boys put up? As described by Devoy the weather conditions of the night were very bad. And Joseph Denieffe, who was in the city on the night, wrote that 'The wind blew a hurricane, accompanied by sleet and rain...the only sounds heard were those of wind and rain falling in torrents'. However, the weather conditions in the city were not quite so dramatic, though as to the wind speed at the night we have no information except Devoy's and Denieff's accounts. The weather conditions recorded in the Phoenix Park were 'generally cool and cloudy with easterly winds - some light rain at times especially in the early hours of 6th'. And the temperature in the Phoenix Park at 9 p.m. on 5th was 4.6°C. Thus in the Phoenix Park cloudy conditions had turned into light rain in the early hours. There is no evidence in the city of the high winds, heavy rain, sleet and snow alleged by Devoy and Denieffe.

The mountain conditions could of course be different from those in the city. The magistrate marching over the hills with the British troops after midnight reported that sleet and heavy rain was falling. This is the only precise report of the weather conditions in the hills which we have. Undoubtedly because of sleet and rain the situation in the hills would have been disagreeable for men who were not specially clad against the weather. However, a dramatic picture of snow in the hills has to be ruled out. This means that at the time of mobilisation of the Fenians, physical mobility would not have been a problem. Significantly, none of the police accounts of the action of the night of 5 March into the morning of the 6th lay any stress on snow. However, cold or wet men, especially if left leaderless, would be all the harder to retain in the hills.
Dublin was heavily protected by the authorities who, as noted previously, had received information that the city would be attacked from inside as well as outside. Under Secretary Larcom wrote that 'The Dublin Fenians are to assemble at Tallaght, the Green Hills, leaving a certain chosen number in Dublin to plunder etc., as soon as the troops are withdrawn to deal with those outside, but the troops will not be withdrawn. We shall get upon their rear.'

Lord Strathnairn, commander in chief of the British army in Ireland, undertook the responsibility of protecting the city from Fenian attack, giving orders for making himself master of all the principal points of the city; the Four Courts, the Custom House, the Royal Exchange, the Broadstone and Amiens St termini were guarded. On the other hand, the authorities allowed Fenians to go to their meeting point, the Tallaght hills.

In terms of their activities in the rising, the Dublin Fenians can be classified into six groups. First, one group, the Kingstown circle need not concern us in particular; they had few arms and did not move at all on the night of 5 March. Secondly, John Kirwan's group assembled at Palmerston demesne and Windy Arbour successively; they attacked the police barracks at Dundrum, Stepaside and Glencullen on their way to the Dublin mountains. Thirdly, another group consisting of a large number of Fenians, a key group in the whole operation, succeeded in gathering in the hills above Tallaght, but later dispersed without hope. A fourth group was made up of three different contingents, one of which attacked the police barrack at Tallaght on their way to the hills from the city. A fifth group, though we have no information about their number and their plan, seems to have contemplated attacks within the city. Joseph Denieffe wrote that he, having had orders from General Halpin, had been waiting all night - probably in the city - for further instructions from General Halpin to execute his orders. Denieffe did not hear from
General Halpin, so that nothing happened in the city. Finally, the sixth group assembled at Colonel White's demesne, Clonsilla in the north-west of Dublin; General Halpin, the Military Centre of the Dublin district, with Breslin's circle numbering fifty or sixty, waited there for other circles in vain. There is no evidence to suggest how many circles should have turned up.

The arrests in December 1866 greatly damaged the command structure of the Dublin organisation. This seems to be the purport of a report in February 1867 to the effect that: 'They contemplate dividing the country into districts and allocating a certain number of American officers to each district, Dublin city and suburbs to be re-organized and placed under one Centre, the original Centres, and their circles having been more or less disheartened and broken up by the arrests made by the police, and one Irish American officer is to have command of all the men who will comprise the Dublin circle'. While we are not clear about the extent of re-organisation or the extent to which circles were subsumed into one great circle, the likelihood of uncertainty and confusion is strong. The pattern of the rising would suggest that where some of the former command structure survived, the Fenians were able to take to the field. The fact that many of the Fenians were identified by their rank or the units by their former title of 'circle' seems to suggest that organisational loyalties helped to bring the Fenians out. It is ironic but a commentary on the limitations of dependence on external general staff officers that the group to be led by the commander for the Dublin area, General Halpin, failed to gather and apart from the Kingstown Fenians, was the main failure in mobilisation. Perhaps it also underlines an unreasonable optimism about the capacity of unarmed Fenians to maintain themselves without much ado once they had reached their destined refuge in the hills.
On the evening of 5 March pubs were used as meeting places for some Fenians who were to proceed to the Tallaght hills. Laurence O'Toole, a member of George Connolly's circle, went to Hoey's at 5:30 p.m. In the morning O'Toole had been told by John Hughes, a B of Connolly's, to do so and at the same time he was informed of going to the Tallaght hills. This suggests that the rank and file Fenians did not know about the rising immediately before the evening of 5 March. Furthermore, the rank and file Fenians started their activities without any knowledge of the plan of the rising, as O'Toole was simply told by John Hughes, 'the meeting was to be at Tallaght.' An expectation of an easy victory prevailed among them. Some Fenians believed that Stephens would be in the Tallaght hills with 20,000 men.

Moreover, it was generally believed that once they reached the Tallaght hills, they would be supplied with fire arms. This hope was not without foundation. Towards the end of 1866 the Dublin Centers had decided not to distribute fire arms among individual Fenians; otherwise the police might obtain information through their families. Instead, they concealed fire arms at certain places in the city to be held in readiness for the rising. On the day of the rising, according to Superintendent Ryan, Fenians were unable to move their arms freely from their hiding places to the Tallaght hills because of police surveillance. This is reflected in the fact that on the morning of 6 March the police seized a case containing 249 pikes, 113 pike handles and 21 rifles in Halston St. These arms had been intended for the Fenians in the Tallaght hills; afterwards the police discovered that Patrick Connolly, a hackney car owner and driver, had planned to take them from the egg market to the Tallaght hills. In spite of police activity, the Fenians succeeded in moving some arms from concealed places. On 5 March the police were informed that floats
with huge quantities of arms had gone from McDowell's timber yard in the direction of Kingstown.81

There were mainly two routes which the Fenians took in withdrawing from the city; one was Crumlin-Walkinstown-Greenhills, and another Rathmines-Rathgar-Roundtown(Terenure).82 The flow of Fenians from the city to the Tallaght hills attracted police attention. In the city the police observed that a large number of outside cars left the Coombe and Kevin St. The sergeant from Crumlin station stated that 'the Dublin road is crowded with young men all taking the direction of Tallaght'.83 Some circles appointed certain points in the city for their meeting and then proceeded to the Tallaght hills together. One circle—we have no detailed information about this circle—consisted of about six or seven hundred men armed with rifles and bayonets, 'took up a position from Doyles forge on the Crumlin Road to Mr Kavanagh's on the Walkinstown Road'.84 Another circle—300 men—was observed by the police on Crumlin Road between Dolphin's Barn and Crumlin.85 On the other hand other circles ordered their members to go directly to the Tallaght hills without forming in circle strength. Clarke, a B of George Connolly's circle, warned his Cs to send men to the Tallaght hills. Subsequently Fenian groups of two, three, four and five men walked to the Tallaght hills.86 Some men, whether or not members of the organisation, were forced to go to the Tallaght hills by threats or persuasion. Laurence O'Toole was told, 'If you don't go, by G-d you'll be shot'.87 According to Patrick Keogh, some Fenians on their way to the Tallaght hills warned that they would shoot men who wanted to go home.88

The first stage of the night's action is associated with John Kirwan's group, who succeeded in securing the surrender of Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks. There is some mystery about this group's intention, because from
what we know of the general plan, part of it was for Dublin Fenians to muster in the hills to start a guerrilla war without attacking any police barracks beforehand. For whatever reason, the group attacked the barracks. Possibly it was a premature launch of the guerrilla tactics which the Fenians were to engage in later, possibly a result of a belief that the barracks could be easily taken and the Fenians meagre stock of arms enlarged. However, as will be seen shortly, the most likely explanation of the behaviour of this group whose origin - it gathered strength in Palmerston demesne and Windy Arbour - was quite distinct from those who were moving simultaneously towards Tallaght (drawn from the city and the Liberties), is that diversionary or guerrilla tactics in the hills were its purpose. The hard core of this group was John Kirwan's circle, although we cannot deny the possibility that an other circle or circles had joined it. This was the best-directed and most successful group of the night. Its nucleus was John Kirwan's circle, and if other participated, they can have in all probability been drawn at most from a single circle. Hence it was comparatively homogenous, and enjoyed the enormous advantage of comparatively effective leadership. As John Kirwan had been a sergeant in the Irish Papal Brigade, he had good military knowledge and drilled his circle better than other Centres did. And his circle was better armed than others. Furthermore, this group also had another able man, possibly a B within Kirwan's circle, Patrick Lennon, who was a deserter from the 9th Lancers.

At the outset of the night's action, about half of this group had gathered at Palmerston demesne in Rathmines. The police reported 'At Palmerston demesne I saw about 500 men. They were in groups. I heard the word "slope" given aloud by one of them. A noise followed, as if the command obeyed. Probably this group consisted of Fenians residing in Rathmines, because they were said to be well prepared for the rising. This group, led at this stage by Patrick
Lennon, was marching on Milltown Road towards Dundrum Road when four policemen of the E division of the D.M.P. on duty at Milltown encountered them at about 12 a.m. and the police were taken prisoners. According to the policemen, the Fenians were armed with rifles, revolvers, pikes and swords. The Fenians with the four captured policemen proceeded towards Dundrum and at Windy Arbour they were strengthened by a well-armed group commanded by John Kirwan Centre of the circle, who now became the commander in chief of the whole group. The first police barrack attacked by this group was at Dundrum, where they fired shots and broke the windows of the adjoining the houses. But they could not take it and left there for Stepaside. During the attack, John Kirwan was wounded and was superseded by Patrick Lennon.

About 2 a.m. 6 March, this group reached Stepaside police barracks where Constable M'Ilwaine and four other members of the Irish Constabulary were stationed. Though the policemen had been given information of the Fenian rising, they do not appear to have been fully prepared for the Fenian attack. Before reaching the barrack Patrick Lennon ordered sixteen riflemen to make ready for battle and then knocked on the door, asking the police to surrender in the name of the 'Irish Republic'. The Fenians, after the police's refusal, started to fire and the police launched a counterattack. In the meantime the Fenians tried to set fire to the building, by breaking the windows and pushing in a large quantity of straw. Finally Constable M'Ilwaine decided to surrender unconditionally to the Fenians. The Fenians made the five policemen prisoners and took five rifles and ammunition.

The Fenians with four policemen of the D.M.P. and the five men of the Irish Constabulary who had been captured at Stepaside police barrack then marched in the direction of Bray. When they reached Old Connaught, scouts were ordered
to go to Bray for the purpose of ascertaining the strength of the barrack there. As the group had already engaged in attacks on barracks, we have to decide whether the intention of advancing to Bray was unplanned or part of a larger strategy. Indeed, we have some reason for thinking that the guerrilla strategy may have involved a wider geographical framework than the main assembly at Tallaght. It is possible that this contingent - or at least part of it - had a broader brief than that of the circles whose instructions had been to move in small groups of two or three to Tallaght. The fact that it gathered in hundreds in military formation and moved south-eastwards rather than south-westwards to Tallaght suggests as much. According to Harry Filgate who was a member of this group, their destination was a place near Arklow, County Wicklow. As he wrote this story about forty years later, we cannot necessarily rely on its accuracy. However, his account is supported by the fact that Superintendent Ryan had received information that the Dalkey Fenians were told to go to Wicklow and along the line of mountains for the purpose of drawing the troops from Dublin. Discouraging news from Bray may have resulted in a change of plan and direction.

Informed by the scouts that 'the Bray [barrack] was too strong, and that the cavalry was on their way out from Dublin', the group decided to return the same road as they had marched, and to 'take to the Dublin mountains, and destroy all the police barracks we could find'. And a party of about 300 or 400 men, separating at this stage from the main body went towards the Tallaght hills. The main body went to Kiltiernan and then Golden Ball, where they carried away a large quantity of bread from Sutton's bakery. Then they started to march along Glencullen Road. As this second group reached Glencullen barrack only in the morning-between 6 and 7 a.m.-it may not have been their intention to advance to Tallaght itself. The group may conceivably
have hesitated at first what to do, having withdrawn from the low ground—in all probability adhering to the Cluseret/Fariola instructions to avoid combat with military forces—and the attack on Glencullen barrack would be perfectly consistent with their plans. It was nearby and an attack on a small police post would fit in with the pattern of diversionary tactics and of their own actions earlier on the night. The two stage pattern in the movement of this force into the hills is interesting, as some earlier information has hinted at two distinct assignments for this force, one group to move into Wicklow, and the other to direct itself for Tallaght. The two distinct phases on the part of the force which withdrew from Old Connaught (near Bray) - one group moving towards Tallaght, the other group, later, advancing to Glencullen - may have corresponded to two units in its composition. It is possible that one group may have been detailed for local action, and the other for more long-ranging action, possibly even Arklow as Harry Filgate later recorded. Significantly, it is the larger group - the one which did not march off towards Tallaght - which eventually attacked Glencullen barrack.

The Fenians reached Glencullen police barrack between 6 and 7 o'clock in the morning, Constable M'Ilwaine, one of the prisoners taken by the Fenians, later reported that 'on nearing Glencullen a body of fifty riflemen were ordered to go to the front and attack the barrack, and a detachment of pikemen to the rere; the prisoners were kept at some distance from the front'. Lennon knocked on the door, demanding surrender. Constable O'Brien and four other policemen had been instructed to be on the alert for Fenian attack; the doors and windows were closed as at night. The Fenians tried to break in 'smashing the glass of the windows and beating the back door with a heavy weapon like a sledge-hammer'. The police started to fire at the Fenians. The resistance at Glencullen to the Fenians was more formidable than at Stepaside. The
exchange of fire went on for about an hour. Subsequently the Fenians ordered Constable M'Ilwaine to persuade the policemen inside the barrack to surrender to them. Constable M'Ilwaine told Constable O'Brien that if Constable O'Brien did not give up firing, the policemen taken as prisoners would be shot. Constable O'Brien consented to the proposal and opened the door on condition that the prisoners should be released. Immediately after the door was opened, the Fenians took away arms and ammunition and went away in the direction of Rockbrook, leaving a party of men to watch the policemen, who were eventually released at 8:45 a.m.  

We have no definite information concerning the number of the Fenians in this group. Policemen captured by the Fenians may have exaggerated it because they were unwilling to reveal their ineffectiveness which had led to their surrender. The Fenians who were mustered at Palmerston demesne were reinforced by John Kirwan's group at Windy Arbour, and then attacked Stepaside police barrack. Later, before reaching Glencullen, a contingent separated from this group to go directly to the Tallaght hills. Thus at the time of reaching Stepaside police barrack, the group would have been at its maximum numerical strength. The police, who observed the first appearance of this group at Palmerston demesne, stated that 500 men had turned up there. This group, before being strengthened by John Kirwan's group at Windy Arbour, was encountered by further police at Milltown Road. One of these policemen said that the number was 300 or 400, while another reported 800 or 900. When Stepaside police barrack was attacked, the Fenians, joined by John Kirwan's group, were now at its maximum strength. According to Constable McIlwaine at the barrack, 1,000 Fenians attacked them, while Constable McIlwaine later stated that the number of the Fenians was 500. The various statements are consistent with a group of 500 and upwards (as only one of five observers put the figure at less than 500) and two observations even support a size of 800 to 1,000 men. After a contingent left for the Tallaght hills, the Fenians
attacked Glencullen police barrack. There are two informations about the number in this group. The police at Glencullen later testified that they had been attacked by about 600 Fenians. On the other hand a gentleman from Golden Ball witnessed 200 Fenians with policeman prisoners marching in the direction of Glencullen - undoubtedly this group was on the way to attack the barrack there. The later statement, perhaps the more credible of the two, is consistent with the reduction in the force after the attack on Stepaside police barrack.

The action at Glencullen barrack ended either at 7 a.m. or shortly afterwards. By this time the army presence several hours earlier at Tallaght had caused the Fenians there variously to disperse or even to retreat to the city. In the light of failure of the main assembly of the Fenians, this group too dispersed to lurk either in the countryside or suburbs awaiting a decline in the intensity of police and military activity in the mountains in the daylight hours of the 6th. Devoy's testimony suggests that they eventually got home safely. While the action of the Rathmines/Dundrum Fenians ended in dispersal, they had not at any stage been put to flight. In all respects this was the most purposeful action of the night. They had advanced as far as Old Connaught; then withdrew in good order, and in the process took Glencullen barrack. Given the fact that their leader, John Kirwan, was injured in the initial action of the night and replaced as leader, their performance is all the more meritorious, and bears out the comparative competence of Kirwan's B, Lennon, who took over. Why they dispersed we do not know: whether in isolation from other news or in the light of news filtering from Tallaght. At Rockbrook they would have been close to Tallaght, and at 8:45 the hills could conceivably have been covered far and wide with Fenians silently melting away, and carrying with them the news of the debacle at Tallaght. The role of this group has been neglected, because its action has been seen as subsidiary to the gathering of the Fenians in the hills at Tallaght. If it is seen as having an independent purpose, then it gains in significance. Indeed if it is seen somewhat more conjecturally as having had a twofold task of both organising
guerrilla activity on the eastern side of the Dublin/Wicklow hills and of spreading the diversionary action far afield – as far as Arklow – then the importance of its intended role is greatly enhanced. At all events, it underlines the fact that the gathering of the Fenians at Tallaght was only part of a strategy, which on paper at any rate was far more complex.

The main contingent of the night was the one which had gathered on the Tallaght hills from the city. Though some Fenians – according to Joseph Denieffe, 800 Fenians – assembled at the village of Tallaght, most of this contingent was likely to have gone directly to the Tallaght hills. The Fenians seem to have fixed a certain place in the hills for their gathering point. At 1 a.m. on 6 March the firing of some rockets on the hill was observed. Undoubtedly a large number of Fenians reached the hill. However, a small section of the contingent caused the so-called 'disaster' at Tallaght. John Devoy, who had been in prison at the night and hence was poorly informed, subsequently stated:

The main body of Fenians, several thousand strong, but mostly unarmed, was marching along the road to Tallaght and near the village, on a pitch dark night, without an advance guard or any other precaution, when a volley from sixty police rifles was poured into them, killing O'Donoghue and wounding several others...they broke, retreated in confusion, and tried to make their way to Dublin as best they could.

As we shall see, there are some mistakes in Devoy's story.

The authorities, anticipating that Fenians would attack the police barrack at Tallaght, increased the number of policemen there from five to fifteen. At about 2 p.m. on 5 March Head Constable John Kennedy, stationed at Rathfarnham, received instructions from Sub-Inspector Burke to protect the barrack at Tallaght and at 9:30 p.m. Head Constable John Kennedy reached there with four men to supplement the existing guard. Sub-Inspector Burke who took command
of the police at Tallaght barrack arrived there with other policemen at 12 a.m. Within about forty yards of the building, he happened to come across a party of Fenians with a cart of ammunition. Some of the Fenians were arrested and the cart was brought into the barrack.\footnote{113}

Before Sub-Inspector Burke commenced action against the Fenians, there is no evidence to suggest that there had already been fighting between the police and the Fenians at Tallaght. The Fenians probably avoided intended direct confrontation with the police and were proceeding towards the Tallaght hills. If the Fenians had attacked the barrack at Tallaght before Sub-Inspector Burke's action, they may have captured the barrack as they did at Stepaside and Glencullen. Sub-Inspector Burke's action presents a great contrast to that of the Stepaside and Glencullen police. His force was a comparatively larger one and this permitted him to take the offensive rather than relying on a defensive posture. Of course, his force at fifteen men was still small, but well armed and disciplined men had at least some advantages for action against lightly armed and almost certainly badly drilled men. Between 12 and 1 o'clock Sub-Inspector Burke ordered the policemen to turn out of the barrack and to fall in line across the road outside, to intercept the Fenians.\footnote{114}

Three groups of Fenians on their way to the hills encountered the police at Tallaght. The first and second group avoided confrontation with the police; their aim was not to attack the police but to reach the Tallaght hills. However, the third group attacked the police in disregard of the orders that they should avoid fighting against the troops or the police, and they caused the 'disaster'. The first group had come from the road leading from Roundtown and Sub-Inspector Burke told them that 'he would fire on them, if they advanced'.\footnote{115} Avoiding offensive action, this group retreated. The second
group was observed coming from the direction of Greenhills. Sub-Inspector Burke challenged the Fenians, in the Queen's name, to surrender when they came within thirty or forty paces of his men's position and warned that he would fire on them if they came nearer. The Fenians threw some stones and then withdrew in the direction they had come from.116

At about 1 a.m. the third group - Stephen O'Donoghue's circle - came from the direction of Roundtown. Sub-Inspector Burke ordered them to surrender when they reached within about thirty paces from where the policemen were stationed. According to later testimony by some of the policemen, 'One of the insurgents, who appeared to be their leader, ordered them to fire by calling out, "Now, boys! now fire!". A volley of not less than fifty shots was then discharged at us by the insurgents. Sub-Inspector Burke immediately commanded us to kneel and fire, which command was obeyed'. The counterattack by the police introduced confusion among the Fenians, whom an ex-British soldier tried to rally in vain.118 Furthermore, two Fenians, Stephen O'Donoghue, the Centre, and Thomas Farrell were mortally wounded and afterwards died.119

We have a document written by a Fenian - we do not know his identity - who took part in this group. He pointed out four reasons why this group had caused the 'disaster'.120 First, the group was poorly armed; the 150 men had only 20 rifles. The majority of men were counting on the belief that once they reached the Tallaght hills they would find weapons to fight with. Second, Stephen O'Donoghue had failed to drill his members properly. The 20 rifles they had were given to 'a few who knew and some who boasted they knew how to use them'. Third, the group not only disobeyed orders that the Fenians should march to the Tallaght hills without attacking the police, but indeed had an attack on the barracks in mind. Finally, some members, especially 'very young fellows' -
number of youths of about sixteen or seventeen years of age feature among Fenian prisoners—did not understand the nature of the rising. These youths were calling out for an attack on the barrack. Probably the leader was unable to keep them quiet. After the attack on the police, it was these young fellows who were the first to run. Undoubtedly their behaviour triggered confusion among other Fenians, and resulted in the 'disaster'.

There are three objections to John Devoy's account. First, the number of the Fenians under the command of Stephen O'Donoghue was not 'several thousand strong'. As we have seen, the number of the Fenians who attacked the barrack was only 150, although we have no information about the number of men in the first and second groups who earlier had wisely and in accord with their instructions avoided confrontation. Secondly, 'fifteen policemen stationed at the Tallaght police barrack could not fire 'sixty rifles'. The police were aware of the Fenians' intention of starting the rising and of marching towards the Tallaght hills. The strategy of the authorities was to let the Fenians go to the Tallaght hills. In line with this strategy the authorities had not gathered a great number of police at Tallaght police barrack to intercept the Fenians. This is reflected in the fact that only fifteen policemen guarded the barrack. Finally, Devoy ended the story with no mention that a large number of Fenians had already succeeded in reaching the Tallaght hills. There was a pub at Jobstown which was situated beyond the village of Tallaght and near the foot of the Dublin mountains. A publican named Clarke observed that several armed parties had entered his house to obtain refreshments during the night. Undoubtedly these parties were on the way to the Tallaght hills.

How many of the Dublin Fenians reached the Tallaght hills? In February 1867 at a meeting where Massey announced the date and the plan of the rising Corydon
was informed that the number of the Dublin Fenians was calculated at 7,000.\textsuperscript{122} Under Secretary Larcom wrote that it was impossible to estimate the number of Fenians taking part in the rising because of the darkness of the night.\textsuperscript{123} For example the \textit{Freeman's Journal} dated 7 March reported that 4,000 or 5,000 Fenians were said to have reached the Tallaght hills. On the following day, the same paper asserted that the Fenians had mustered there to the number of about 2,000.\textsuperscript{124} The maximum number is given by the police; from 7,000 to 8,000 men mustered at Tallaght. This number was not a mere guess because the policemen who were on duty on the night observed several thousand men pass from the E division or rural district near Tallaght towards the hills from 10:45 p.m. till about 1 or 2 a.m.\textsuperscript{125} Therefore it would not be wrong to assume that at least several thousand Fenians succeeded in reaching the Tallaght hills.

The real 'disaster' was not the unsuccessful skirmish at the barrack, but the fact that there was no effective command of this large gathering who had attained successfully their intended base. Apart from the failure of the Fenian leaders to ensure that all circles turned out their men for the rebellion, the weakness of the plan was that there was apparently no effective leadership group in the Tallaght hills to take command of the men assembling and to ensure that morale was maintained.

\textbf{Arrests and the Dublin Special Commission}

The authorities had permitted the Fenians to go to the Tallaght hills but they did not envisage tolerating 'rebellious' activities of the Fenians. Lord Strathnairn, the commander in chief of the British army in Ireland, sent two flying columns to the Tallaght hills; one marched from Dublin to attack the Fenians on the front and right flank, and the other from Newbridge against the Fenians' left flank.\textsuperscript{126} And some of the 92nd Highlanders were dispatched to
Palmerston demesne where, as has been noted, the Fenians attacking Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks had mustered, but the troops arrived too late. Lord Strathnairn himself proceeded along Crumlin Road with a flying column consisting of the 52nd Regiment, and some squads of the Scots Greys, the 9th Lancers and the Royal Horse Artillery, and reached the village of Crumlin at 2 a.m. on 6 March. There the troops left a battery of the Royal Horse Artillery and started to move towards Greenhills. On their way to Tallaght the advance picket of the troops arrested Fenians who were coming from Tallaght. Probably these Fenians were members of the group which had attacked the police at Tallaght and subsequently retreated.

When the troops arrived at Tallaght, the policemen, patrolling the road in their neighbourhood and arresting everyone they met, had succeeded in capturing sixty Fenians. After leaving the prisoners during their march at the police barrack under guard of the 52nd Regiment, the troops started to proceed towards the Tallaght hills where a large number of the Fenians had gathered. The appearance of the troops caused some Fenians to throw down arms and to attempt to escape to the higher ground, and the troops captured several men. The army action at this stage, even if limited, was crucial because by compelling the Fenians to move, it added to the pressures preventing the Fenians from establishing order among their men (assuming even that leaders were present). It was very difficult for the regular army to march in the mountains especially during the night. The troops had to give up their march after making several arrests. There was no confrontation between the Fenians and the troops in the hills.

There had been a very fair possibility that the Fenians could have started guerrilla war in the hills, and even if they had to withdraw further into the
hills, they might have been able to regroup under cover of darkness, as the army could not proceed. However, to do so would require both more military training than the Fenians had, and the presence of effective military leaders. These considerations made effective regrouping improbable or perhaps impossible. If the rain was heavy, as the magistrate states, then the task would have been all the greater, and any prospect of regrouping would have depended not only on good command of the men but effective knowledge of the terrain as movement would have to be executed in darkness and, probably even towards dawn, in poor visibility. According to Lord Strathnairn, the troops captured 93 Fenians during the night. It is clear that most Fenians mustering in the hills escaped arrest. Eventually the troops brought 140 prisoners including those arrested by the police to the Lower Castle Yard, Dublin Castle.

The police placed pickets on the canal bridges to intercept the return of the Fenians from the Tallaght hills to the city. At Portobello Bridge, Island Bridge, and Griffith Bridge, about twenty men were caught on the morning of 6 March. Furthermore, the police tried to arrest any person on the road who could not answer satisfactorily for himself; Superintendent Ryan reported that sixty-eight persons were held in custody at several police stations; thirty-three at Kilmainham station, five at Donnybrook station, four at Green St station and so on. Thus the number of the prisoners captured not only by the army but by the police and taken into Dublin Castle on the afternoon of 6 March was 207. Obviously the authorities failed to capture the majority of the Fenians taking part in the rising. According to Devoy, the Fenians attacking Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks hung around the suburbs until the police withdrew the pickets on the bridges and returned to their homes safely.
In March the police made efforts to arrest Fenians who took part in the rising and to collect information about the Fenians already in custody. On 9 March Dublin Castle announced their intention to offer a reward of £100 to persons whose information would lead to the arrest of Fenians and £50 to those who would give evidence to convict prisoners. Subsequently the police arrested eight Centres: Niall Breslin, Samuel Clampett, George Connolly, Henry Hughes, John Kirwan, Edward O'Byrne, Joseph Tomkins and John Walsh. With the exception of John Kirwan, no other Centres took an active part in the rising. The most important arrest was probably that of Patrick Doran who had taken a prominent part in attacking Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks.

The Special Commission began at Green St in Dublin on 8 April 1867 and about 200 men were tried for their complicity in the Dublin rising. Fenians and their sympathisers showed an open hostility towards the authorities. The cavalry escorting the prison van from Kilmainham jail to the Court House were hissed and the streets near the Court House were crowded by those who displayed disaffected tendencies. The authorities produced 140 crown witnesses, of whom eighty-one crown witnesses gave evidence against the Fenians implicated in the Dublin rising; and of eighty-one crown witnesses, forty-seven were policemen, fifteen soldiers and one justice of the peace, while only three Fenians turned up as witnesses. This suggests not only the authorities' difficulty in arranging crown witnesses but also their failure in persuading Fenians to speak against other Fenian prisoners. The evidence of ten policemen-four who had been stationed at Tallaght police barracks and six who had been taken prisoners by the party attacking Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks-was crucial for the prosecutors. They were able to give evidence about the Fenian attack on the police. By contrast, other witnesses including...
the other policemen and the fifteen soldiers did not provide critical evidence. They had been engaged either in arresting Fenians or in observing the Fenians march towards the Tallaght hills.\footnote{138}

After examining individual cases, the prosecutor realised that most arrested Fenians were rank-and-file; they had done nothing but muster in the Tallaght hills. Most of them were released unconditionally or released on bail by the end of May. The prosecutors did not make a charge of high treason against most cases except George Connolly and Patrick Doran, and dealt with them under the Military and Arms Acts. Accordingly, twenty-eight persons were sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for various periods.\footnote{139} Penal servitude was pronounced for George Connolly (seven years), a Centre actively engaged in preparation of the rising, and Patrick Doran (life), one of the leaders whose party had attacked Stepaside and Glencullen police barracks. Though ten other persons were accused of taking part in the Stepaside and Glencullen attack, only four persons were sentenced to imprisonment for between one and two years. Twenty-two persons were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between three months and two years, for having arms without license in proclaimed districts.\footnote{140} General Halpin who was to have taken command of the Dublin Fenians failed to evade arrest. He was arrested with Niall Breslin, on 4 July 1867. In October General Halpin was sentenced to fifteen years penal servitude.\footnote{141}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Why was the Dublin rising a failure? The Fenians no doubt were poorly armed and the authorities received information about the intended rising. However, we can find more crucial reasons for the failure than these. The failure of
the Dublin rising lay not in the defeat at Tallaght police barrack, but in the fact that the several thousand Fenians who actually reached the Tallaght hills took no effective part in the rising.

From the military point of view, the selection of the Tallaght hills as a gathering point was entirely satisfactory. Tallaght, at the junction of several roads from Dublin, enabled the Fenians to reach there unimpeded. The British forces, as we have seen, could not readily penetrate the Dublin mountains, so most Fenians assembling in the Tallaght hills were not arrested. When we consider the situation General Halpin, the Military Centre for the Dublin district, was in, a key to the reason why the Dublin rising failed is discovered. On the night of 5 March, Joseph Denieffe met General Halpin in a pub in Camden St where he never seemed to be 'more cool, calm, and rational than he was'. But on the following day General Halpin looked discouraged and disheartened. According to John Devoy, informed by General Halpin himself, General Halpin played billiards in a pub in Rathfarnham on 6 March awaiting the withdrawal of the police picket and finally returned to the city at night.

General Halpin, on the night of 5/6 March, was waiting at Colonel White's demesne at Clonsilla (north-west of Dublin) with Niall Breslin and men from Breslin's circle for members of other circles to join them. How many circles were involved we do not know, but the fact is that apart from Breslin's men, no one from other circles appeared at the expected rendezvous at Colonel White's demesne. Many Fenians on the north side actually mobilised on the night of 5 March, and proceeded to Tallaght. The list of Fenians arrested near Tallaght immediately after the rising indicates that 40 per cent of the total of 209 resided in the north, while 60 per cent resided in the south.
We have no information about the precise intention of the group due to assemble at Colonel White's demesne. The fact that General Halpin, intended leader of the rising, was at such a comparatively isolated location in the early hours of a general rising, however, gives it peculiar significance. If the Fenians on the south side, and many of the Fenians on the north side, proceeded according to plan to Tallaght, this group, gathering outside the city, may conceivably have had a different purpose. Perhaps it was with a time lag to attack sites within the city once the presence of the Fenians in the hills had drawn the army out of the city. Certainly just as the gathering of John Kirwan's men at Palmerston demesne was related to a course of action quite distinct from the Tallaght assembly, a gathering point at Colonel White's demesne, quite distant from Tallaght, and well outside the city, could have had a very well-identified purpose. If this hypothesis is correct, the sole failure in mobilising men was the absence of a large-scale response at Colonel White's demesne.

According to the rising plan, each group received only instructions of a very general character from the Military Centre, General Halpin, on the basis of which Fenians were to assemble and start their operation. There were two weaknesses exposed in this situation. First, there was apparently a breakdown in the communication of details of the rising to the men of some circles, hence a lack of response from several circles. Secondly, General Halpin had no lines of communication with the leaders of circles on the ground or already in the Tallaght hills. A hopelessly unsatisfactory situation existed of groups in the hills waiting for orders or leadership, and of the designated leader, General Halpin, finding himself in a comparatively isolated location (Clonsilla) - far from both the city and Tallaght and with only fifty men. The wounding of two
of the Centres, the capable Kirwan at Stepaside and of O'Donoghue at Tallaght, can only have further weakened any sense of direction and damaged morale directly.

General Halpin must have moved to Rathfarnham after his fruitless wait at Clonsilla, probably knowing that something had gone wrong with the central diversionary gathering at Tallaght. We do not know at what time General Halpin actually went to Rathfarnham; our only knowledge is that he spent the day of 6 March there, and hence he may well have gone there well into that day. It may even have been news disseminated by the dispersal of men from Tallaght that alerted him to events there, and drew him closer to the scene of the night's main failure. The Fenians in the hills were left at a loose end and had to draw their own conclusion that the rising was over. Overall, despite the impact of successive events, the response from Fenian circles was substantial; poor quality staff work and a lack of detailed military planning, rather than a lack of rank and file response doomed the Dublin rising to a failure.

The conduct of the rising amply confirmed the dangers of a headquarters staff of American officers totally divorced from the Centres or effective leaders of the individual circles. It resulted, perhaps inevitably as much as from any accidents of 5 March itself, in the singular isolation of the designated leader of the rebellion from the main body of rebels who responded to the summons to action. General Halpin, on 6 March, was looking for his forces; they in turn seem to have had no leader in the hills with a wider view than that of individual Centres, none of whom by definition formed part of the military leadership. In the process, the myth of a barrack raid became the centre piece of future tellings of the story. One is tempted to conclude that Fenian
leadership went along with this version to prevent their own incompetence being more fully exposed.
Chapter Eight: Footnotes

3. Ibid.
5. Supt Ryan to C.P., 18 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P.1867/1153); Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 Jan. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P.1867/1157); S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), p.44.
6. N.L.I., MS7517, p.233; S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), p.44.
14. N.L.I., MS 7517, p.236; S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), p.45; Irishman, 12 Sept. 1868.
15. N.L.I., MS 7517, p.238; S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), pp 20 - 1; Irishman 12 Sept. 1868.
16. N.L.I., MS 7517, p.259; S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(c), pp 21 - 3.
17. 'Distribution of the army in Great Britain and Ireland' (P.R.O., W.O. 73/8).
19. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 June 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 22); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Aug. 1864 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 39A); Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.135); Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R.227A); Supt Ryan to C.P., 21 Sept. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 288).
27. Ibid.
29. Irishman, 12 Sept. 1868.
32. Devoy, Recollections, pp 235 - 6.
34. N.L.I., MS 331, p. 339; MS 333, p. 39.
35. Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Apr. 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 140).
36. Supt Ryan to C.P., 6 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 154).
38. Devoy, Recollections, p. 91.
42. Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 Feb. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/4376).
44. Supt Ryan to C.P., 27 Nov. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/21564).


50. Brownrigg to -, 27 Feb.1867 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7593).

51. Brownrigg to -, 28 Feb.1867 (ibid.).


59. Ibid.


64. Ibid.


66. Denieffe, A personal narrative, p.137.

67. Meteorological service, department of tourism and transport kindly provided me with this information.

68. Magistrate Carte to Chief Secretary, 8 Mar.1867 (C.S.O., R.P.1867/3829).


71. Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/5820).


76. Ibid, p. 128.


78. Supt Ryan to C.P., 4 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/19348 on 1867/19481).


83. C.P. O'Ferrall to U.S., 5 Mar. 1867 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7594).


85. C.P. O'Ferrall to U.S., 5 Mar. 1867 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7594).

86. Supt Ryan to C.P., 6 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3750); S.P.O., *Fenian briefs*, 6(a), pp 60, 92, 94.


93. Supt Donovan to C.P., 6 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3819); Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Apr. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/5841 on F3637); S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 97, 155; Devoy, Recollections, p. 200.

94. Freeman's Journal, 7 Mar. 1867.

95. Devoy, Recollections, p. 200.

96. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 21, 155.

97. Constable M'Ilwaine to Sub-Inspector Burke, 7 Mar. 1867 (S.P.O., F papers, F2694); S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), p. 95; Devoy, Recollections, p. 200.

98. Devoy, Recollections, p. 200.

99. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), p. 98.

100. Devoy, Recollections, p. 200.

101. Supt Donovan to C.P., 6 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3819); S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 95, 98, 165.

102. Ibid., p. 155.

103. Ibid., p. 169.

104. Ibid., pp 156, 167, 169; Supt Donovan to C.P., 6 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3819).


108. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 93, 97, 155.


110. Devoy, Recollections, p. 201.


112. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 3, 36.

113. ÓBroin, Fenian Fever, p. 151.

114. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), p. 36.

115. Ibid., p. 68.

116. Ibid., pp 36, 41.

117. Ibid., p. 36.
118. Devoy, Recollections, p. 204.
121. Magistrate Carte to Chief Secretary, 8 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3829).
122. Brownrigg to -, 28 Feb. 1867 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7593).
123. Larcom to Lord Naas, 6 Mar. 1867 (N.L.I., Mayo papers, MS 11188).
124. Freeman's Journal, 7, 8 Mar. 1867.
127. Magistrate Carte to Chief Secretary, 8 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3829); S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 12, 14; Freeman's Journal, 7 Mar. 1867; Irishman, 9 Mar. 1867.
128. Magistrate Carte to Chief Secretary, 8 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3829).
130. Magistrate Carte to Chief Secretary, 8 Mar. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/3829).
131. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 74, 103-4, 106, 116.
133. Irishman, 19 Mar. 1867.
135. C.S.O., R.P. 1867/14141.
136. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), p. 22.
137. Chief Supt. Campbell, 2 May 1867 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7594); C.P. Lake to U.S., 6 May 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/8113); Inspector Kelly to Chief Supt Campbell, 9 May 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/8524).
138. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a).
139. N.L.I., MS7517, p. 285; S.P.O., 'Fenianism: index of names, 1866-71'.
140. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 6(a), pp 20, 58-9, 163, 165, 177.
141. S.P.O., papers, F4092; 5246R.
143. Ibid., p. 137.

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144. Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 204.

145. Ibid., p. 203.

146. S.P.O., 'Dublin special commission April 1867: alphabetical list of prisoners arrested for complicity in the Fenian conspiracy.'
Chapter 9

THE DUBLIN FENIANS AFTER THE RISING, 1867-79
This study of the Dublin Fenians ends in 1879 before the Land War which was the major issue of late nineteenth century Irish history. As far as the Dublin organisation was concerned, the Dublin Fenians were far from the main scene of the Land War. As a terminal date we have chosen January 1879 when the Supreme Council of the I.R.B., as we shall see, held an important meeting in Paris to discuss the 'New Departure' - a proposal by John Devoy and other members of Clan na Gael in October 1878 to the effect that Fenians should actively engage not only in parliamentary activities but also in agrarian issues. The Supreme Council rejected the New Departure and confirmed their physical force principle. In consequence, the I.R.B. as a body did not take a prominent role in the Land War. The Council decision more or less settled the issue for Dublin members, but members in rural Ireland, notably in the west and north-west counties, seem to have joined the Land War despite the comparatively larger presence of the post-1867 Fenian movement there.

The years after the March 1867 rising witnessed the decline of the Dublin organisation which before the rising had formed at its peak twenty-three circles numbering from several thousand to ten thousand. In the 1870s the Dublin organisation never regained the pre-rising level. In late 1878 and early 1879 the numbers in the Dublin organisation had fallen drastically to 576; these men belonged to the Supreme Council party. While Stephens did have followers in Dublin, the number was insignificant.¹ In Ireland at large the membership had declined by late 1878 and early 1879 from about 50,000 before the rising to about 24,000.² Furthermore, the I.R.B. as a whole changed its geographical strongholds from Munster and Leinster to north Connacht and south Ulster.
Table 9:1  Membership by province of the I.R.B. in the 1860s and late 1870s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1860s</th>
<th>Late 1870s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munster</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>19.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connacht</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>29.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>42.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This suggests a new I.R.B. with an agrarian character emerging in the 1870s at the expense of the town-based old I.R.B., in which the Dublin organisation had taken a prominent part.

The first section tries to examine the Dublin Fenians from 1867 to 1873. The year 1873 marked a turning point in Fenianism in Dublin in two ways. Firstly, the Supreme Council allowed Fenians to be involved in constitutional movements—the Home Rule movement. Secondly, by 1873 the Dublin organisation, dramatically reduced in membership, was confined to a small group of men and did not revive in the 1870s.

Part 1 The Dublin Fenians, 1867-73

The impact of the abortive rising on the Dublin organisation

F.S.L. Lyons attributed the decline of the old I.R.B. to 'the fiasco of the 1867 rising': 'there can be no disputing the fact that the immediate consequence of the fiasco of 1867 was to throw the whole Fenian movement into confusion and discouragement from which it took long to recover'. Indeed,
as no rising took place in Connacht and Ulster, one might say that the I.R.B. in Leinster and Munster declined because they had the rising, while Connacht and Ulster, not sharing in the fiasco, became the future strongholds of the I.R.B. However, all the evidence, as far as the Dublin organisation was concerned, reveals that the failure of the rising was not a fatal blow to the organisation. The Supreme Council succeeded in reorganising the I.R.B. by early 1870.

Immediately after the rising the Dublin organisation even thought in terms of starting another rising. Most of the thousands of Fenians dispersing without any military action by the morning of 6 March, still had their arms and most of their leaders were not arrested. On 9 March Superintendent Ryan received information that on 10 or 11 March the Fenians would launch another military action, attacking the city. Superintendent Ryan felt unable to dismiss the information claiming that 'few of the respectable shopmen, clerks and artisans that to my certain knowledge are Fenians were to be seen among the prisoners arrested on Wednesday morning [6 March]. I fear something serious may be apprehended if the men will be found plucky and numerous enough and I repeat it that on this all will depend, as the leaders do not lack determination'. In spite of Superintendent Ryan's apprehension, nothing happened on 11 and 12 March; but another information that St Patrick's Day, 17 March, was the day fixed for the general rising reached Superintendent Ryan in the succeeding days. Later Superintendent Ryan was informed that they would start a rising about the end of April or beginning of May. In this way immediately after the rising the Fenians who had not suffered serious material losses on 6 March seemed bent on planning another rebellion.

The failure of the rising did, of course, inevitably bring about confusion in the Dublin organisation. As the police tried to arrest Fenian leaders in
March 1867, some Centres fled to England or disbanded their circles. Between March and early April the police arrested seven Centres, and a further Centre was captured in July. Indeed, by April the Dublin organisation had disintegrated to such an extent that after April Superintendent Ryan received no further information about a rising. Alfred Aylward provided the authorities with information concerning the Dublin Centres: his information furnishes us with some details of the fate of twenty-two of the twenty-three circles known to have existed in Dublin before the rising. Aylward stated that six of the twenty-two circles had broken up; only four were positively confirmed as being still in existence, and in the case of the remaining twelve, the heads of seven were variously accounted for by arrest, or flight to England.

Table 9: Impact of the rising on the Dublin organisation in the summer of 1867

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Successor</th>
<th>Fate of Circle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Brady</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>in existence broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Brady</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>in existence broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niall Breslin</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>in existence broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Clampett</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>in existence broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Connolly</td>
<td>gave up</td>
<td>in existence broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph O'Arcy</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Hayes</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Henry</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hughes</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Kelly</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Kelly</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kirwan</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>John Gillerdan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Knot</td>
<td>to England</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Lambert</td>
<td>killed</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. McCabe</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>Pat Monks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph McDonnell</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>in existence broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen O'Donoghue</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>to England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward O'Byrne</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt O'Neill</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Toole</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Tomkins</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Walsh</td>
<td>arrested</td>
<td>Broken up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 Centres

Source: S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 8.
The Dublin movement, however, was replaced by a new organisation by the autumn of 1867. The problem of the Dublin organisation was the lack of officers: the Dublin organisation lost at least twelve of the twenty-three Centres who were in service in early 1867. Therefore the Fenians concentrated on appointing Centres rather than on expanding the size of the circles they commanded by swearing in new members actively. In the autumn of 1867 Aylward gave the authorities the names of twenty-three men and four unknown persons holding high positions in the Dublin organisation, together with their occupations and the number of their subordinates - in most cases he made no distinction between Centres and Bs. Table 9:3 is based on Aylward's information and other police reports.
Table 9:3 The Dublin organisation in the autumn of 1867

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No. of Subordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Brophy</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>carpenter</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. D'Arcy</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>rope maker</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Feely</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>carpenter</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Fitzsimons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Francis</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>shoemaker</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffin</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>shoemaker</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Kelly</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>shoemaker</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Kelly</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>tailor</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killeen</td>
<td></td>
<td>clerk</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Kingston</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James McCabe</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>tobacconist</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph MacGrath</td>
<td></td>
<td>foreman, timber yard</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McEvoy</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>rope maker</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas McGarry</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>bottle glass worker</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Monks(I)</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Murphy</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>dairyman</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Neil</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. O'Loughlin</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>pawnbrokers' assistant</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Walsh</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>pawnbrokers' assistant</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healy(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>supplier of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Connor</td>
<td></td>
<td>gunmaker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anon.</td>
<td></td>
<td>shoemaker</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anon.(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anon.</td>
<td></td>
<td>chairman of baker's association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anon.(4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) E. O'Byrne's circle  
(2) John O'Neil's B  
(3) John O'Neil's B  
(4) William Brophy's brother in law

Sources: S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 8; Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., P.P. 1867/19381 on 2266R); Supt Ryan to C.P., 9 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/19348 on 1867/19481); Supt Ryan to C.P., 11 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/20374); Supt Ryan to C.P., 20 Jan. 1868 (C.S.O., R.P. 1868/545 on 3105R).
Table 9: 3 shows that there were at least eleven Centres in the Dublin organisation. Theoretically a circle consisted of 820 men, but Centres could form circles without meeting the theoretical number. Thomas Francis, although he had only 65 men, was a Centre. Judging from the number of men under their direction, Charles Fitzsimons (who had 280), James Kelly (150), James Kingston (200) and McEvoy (200) might have been Centres. Consequently it would not be wrong to assume that there were at least fifteen circles in the Dublin organisation numbering over 4,635 men in the autumn of 1867. Compared with the Centres before the rising, what is striking is the lack of continuity: only three Centres - J. D'Arcy, James Kelly and James McCabe - seem to have continued work from before the rising. After the rising a completely new leadership emerged in the Dublin organisation. While the failure of the rising damaged the organisation and the numbers were smaller, within about six months the Dublin Fenians had succeeded in reorganising themselves.

By the autumn of 1867 the Dublin organisation was under the control of a Directory consisting of three Centres, John Walsh, Michael Feely and John Murphy. Above all John Walsh was the most active Centre after the rising; and Superintendent Ryan's report in November 1867 noted his recent rise to prominence. Walsh was a pawnbrokers' assistant and according to Superintendent Ryan, it was pawnbrokers' assistants that revived Fenianism in Dublin after the rising. As early as May 1867, when the funeral of Richard Stowell - a Fenian who had died after his discharge from Naas gaol - took place, pawnbrokers' assistants demonstrated their leadership in this event. From 500 to 600 people consisting principally of shop assistants and clerks formed a procession and all pawnbrokers' assistants in Dublin were there.
The fact that the Dublin organisation, in spite of the failure of the rising, succeeded in reorganising itself is reflected in the fact that in December 1871 7,050 men were said to belong to the Supreme Council party of the I.R.B. in Dublin. Unfortunately we have no information about the number of circles and membership of the Dublin organisation in 1872 and 1873. However, disintegration of the Dublin organisation appears to have taken place since 1872. There is evidence about the condition of the Dublin organisation in September 1874. At that time there merely existed a total of more than 300 men under four Centres. Therefore disintegration took place during the period from 1872 to September 1874. This is supported by J.F.X. O'Brien, a prominent Fenian and commercial traveller, who had chances of investigating the I.R.B. in the whole country except Ulster and claimed that 'I should say the I.R.B. was at its full strength, vigour and activity up to 1871'. We can not ascribe the disorganisation of the Dublin Fenians merely to the fact of the failure of the 1867 rising.

**The emergence of the Supreme Council**

After Stephens's deposition by American officers in December 1866, no 'charismatic' leader like Stephens who had dominated the I.R.B. from 1858 to 1866 appeared in the organisation. As a result factionalism predominated. As we have seen, Colonel Kelly established the Provisional Government with four representatives from each province in Ireland in February 1867, and started the rising, when the Dublin organisation was under the control of the Provisional Government. But Colonel Kelly then abolished the Provisional Government in order to strengthen his power in the I.R.B. Instead he established a Directory in London - probably in April 1867 - and became its president, and appointed Beecher as treasurer and John Nolan as secretary. Other members of the Directory were General Halpin who had general charge of
Ireland and Fariola in charge of England. In Dublin Colonel Kelly built a
governing body, according to Aylward, consisting of five men - Joseph Cromien
(the chief executive), Murphy (army organiser), John Ryan alias Doherty
(General Halpin's agent), Patrick Lennon and Naill Breslin. A formidable rival to Colonel Kelly came from America. Before the end of
April 1867, Roberts' party, the second one of the two parties organising
American Fenians, anxious to gain absolute power over the I.R.B. in Ireland
and Britain, sent two emissaries, O'Donohoe and Cooke to Ireland and Britain
for the purpose of making an agreement with the I.R.B. Moreover, Daniel
O'Sullivan, Roberts' secretary, came to England on 10 May. Then these envoys
had contact with Colonel Kelly and finally succeeded in securing delegates to
visit Roberts in Paris in early July. On 18 June Superintendent Ryan reported
that 'Colonel Kelly consented to acknowledge President Roberts as the supreme
head of the organisation throughout the world.' However, according to
Superintendent Ryan, Colonel Kelly's aim was to draw financial support from
Roberts' party which was prosperous. This suggests that the agreement between
Colonel Kelly and Roberts was not a solid one. In Dublin before the end of
June, Michael Feely, John Murphy and John Walsh formed a Directory to represent
the Dublin organisation; they were elected by the Dublin Centres. And Michael
Feely and John Walsh were dispatched to Paris to see Roberts. On 4 July the
so-called 'Treaty of Paris' was agreed; firstly, Roberts would be the head of
the I.R.B. in Ireland and Britain as well as of the Fenians in America on the
condition that Roberts would give military and financial support to the I.R.B.;
secondly, the Supreme Council should be founded to govern the I.R.B.: the
Supreme Council should consist of seven members, four in Ireland and three in
Britain.
The establishment of the Supreme Council reflects the fact that Roberts intended to reduce Colonel Kelly's authority. On 17 August 1867 Colonel Kelly held an I.R.B. convention in Manchester in order to countermand the Paris agreement and to restore his authority over the I.R.B. In the convention Colonel Kelly secured support for himself as chief executive of the I.R.B. and he divided the I.R.B. into four districts, north Ireland, south Ireland, England and Wales, and Scotland, and established as part of his aim - evident already before the rising - of securing American leadership. He put American officers in charge of all the districts except the north of Ireland: Captain MacKey was in charge of the south of Ireland; Captain Ricard O'Sullivan Burke of England and Wales; and Captain James Murphy of Scotland; a civilian Edmund O'Donovan acted for the north of Ireland. Furthermore, the convention adopted a resolution that the I.R.B. would cooperate with Clan na Gael: a new organisation in America. After the convention in Manchester Colonel Kelly failed to keep the I.R.B. under his own control. Colonel Kelly was arrested in Manchester on 11 September 1867 but the Fenians in England rescued him in dramatic circumstances a week later. In spite of the success of the rescue, three Fenians, Allen, Larkin and O'Brien were executed on a charge of murdering a policeman. In the aftermath Colonel Kelly was regarded as 'a curse' to the organisation and lost his influence in the I.R.B. This is reflected in the very fact that the first Supreme Council, the new body which Colonel Kelly had intended to undermine, met on 13 or 14 February 1868. Roberts' party also failed to subject the Supreme Council to them.

The Supreme Council declared its autonomy. This reflects its first message dated 24 April 1868 intended to repudiate both Colonel Kelly and Roberts. First, according to the message, the rising had been caused by some individuals
in the United States - obviously Colonel Kelly was in mind - without adequate preparations. Second, the Supreme Council prescribed that the I.R.B. derived its authority 'from the army and people of Ireland', and therefore that 'no agents nor officers accredited and commissioned from the United States, or elsewhere, should or shall be received, recognised, nor obeyed by the army of the Irish Republic, or by any owing allegiance to the Irish Republic, unless and until their authority is ratified by the military or civil authority constituted for that purpose by the Supreme Council'. This is significant, because, as we have seen earlier, one of the weaknesses of the pre-rising structure was the imposition of an American leadership on a secret military association within Ireland. The rising thus discredited the military leaders more than the actual organisation itself, and the events surrounding the Supreme Council suggest that, taking advantage of this discredit, a leadership within Ireland reasserted itself. It is an added reason for caution in accepting the thesis that the rising 'fiasco' paralysed the entire movement. Significantly the structures as they took shape were more democratic than the old ones. More of the impetus at the top came from below. There is little evidence about the members of the Supreme Council in 1868. Nevertheless, the representative for Leinster seems to have been John C. Waters (Dr Waters), for Superintendent Ryan reported in January 1868 that Dr Waters was 'the Head Fenian Executive for the entire province of Leinster'. In this way by February 1868, more than a year after Stephens's downfall, not only had establishment of a Supreme Council, the I.R.B., led to a new leadership but produced the basic structure to exist in later years.

The Supreme Council, 1869-73

By the summer of 1869 the Supreme Council of 1868 was succeeded by a new Supreme Council which subsequently directed the I.R.B. in the early 1870s.
The new Supreme Council issued the first constitution in August 1869 and an amended one in March 1873. The 1869 constitution vested authority in the Supreme Council consisting of eleven members; seven representatives were one each from the four provinces of Ireland and three further provinces representing north England, south England and Scotland, and these representatives elected four honourary members. The Supreme Council elected the Executive consisting of the president, the secretary and the treasurer. Each member of the Council was elected by a committee of the district, which was composed of five delegates chosen by Centres in a convention. The system adopted by the 1869 constitution was much more democratic than that of the pre-rising organisation. Furthermore, in Dublin there existed a committee of five members elected by the Centres in order to govern the local organisation, and such committees were established in large cities such as Cork, Limerick and Belfast.

According to the constitution, each Fenian was obliged to pay a subscription to the organisation. It was said not only that the artisan class paid not less than 3d and the labouring class one penny but that those who failed to pay their subscription would be rejected. This requirement undoubtedly changed the pattern of recruitment. Fenians were no longer sworn in indiscriminately and a new member was examined before taking the oath. The structure of the circle remained the same; a circle composed of 820 members - A, 9 Bs, 81 Cs and 729 Ds. Under the constitution the Supreme Council succeeded in uniting all factions to some extent and in December 1869 Fenians in Ireland were said to be 'almost exclusively confined to the Supreme Council party' and the Supreme Council party made the Irishman their organ to propagate their cause.

The Supreme Council was assisted by the Amnesty movement to develop its authority over the I.R.B. and to reorganise it. The relationship between the
I.R.B. and the Amnesty movement was very complicated. The Amnesty movement was by no means identical with Fenianism, for non-Fenian nationalists like A.M. Sullivan, Liberal supporters and clergymen joined the movement. Here we examine the history of the Amnesty movement briefly. Until late July 1868, though prisoners detained without trial under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act had been released, about 100 Fenians were still held in prison. In November 1868 the Amnesty Committee was founded by John McCorry, who did not belong to the I.R.B., but the Amnesty Committee was infiltrated by Fenians. The Amnesty Committee established a finance committee consisting of twenty-four men, including Fenians such as Patrick Egan and Thomas Bracken. In December John Nolan, a Fenian, became a new honorary secretary of the Amnesty Committee. By early February 1869 the Amnesty Committee succeeded in collecting 100,000 signatures including several bishops to request the government to release Fenian prisoners. In consequence, the government released forty-nine Fenians in February 1869. In the meantime the Amnesty movement split, because of trouble which arose over money, into two groups, the Amnesty Committee and the Amnesty Association; and leadership of the Amnesty movement passed to the latter. Isaac Butt assumed the presidency of the Amnesty Association and John Nolan acted as its honorary secretary.  

In the summer and autumn of 1869 the Amnesty Association held public demonstrations for the purpose of appealing to the government to release the remaining Fenian prisoners. In Dublin two large meetings were organised at Inchicore on 26 September and at Cabra on 10 October; the police reported that a crowd numbering from 35,000 to 40,000 gathered at Inchicore and 200,000 at Cabra. People residing in Dublin also attended meetings in the neighbouring counties, such as Dundalk, Longford and Kilkenny. The Fenians who had been successful in mobilising a large number of people in support of amnesty appear to have redoubled their Fenian activities. This is supported by Chief
Superintendent Ryan, saying in early November that the Fenians 'resolved not to hold any more meetings, or adopt any other measure except physical force'\(^\text{32}\). Indeed the Amnesty movement, especially its meetings, provided a focal point for the Fenians, and favourable conditions for the Supreme Council's efforts to reorganise the I.R.B. Towards the end of November 1869 Chief Superintendent Ryan was informed that 'in Dublin some of the old Fenian circles disorganized after the Tallaght stampede are reorganized, and presided over by well known Fenians'.\(^\text{33}\) In this way the Amnesty movement contributed to the development of the Supreme Council's strength in the I.R.B.

Nevertheless, though the Supreme Council dominated the I.R.B., there still existed factions within the I.R.B. opposed to the Supreme Council. This is reflected in the address issued by the Supreme Council in January 1870, which, according to the police, had been adopted at meetings held in Dublin on 27 and 29 December 1869.\(^\text{34}\) This address hints at a shift from the unanimity of preceding participation in the Amnesty movement, and in this context suggests a divide in the central councils of the Fenians. This change may have come from the quarter of the Fenians discredited in 1867, and who now sought to bid for leadership by advocacy of more hardline action. Chief Superintendent Ryan was of the opinion that Colonel James Kelly alias Martin was deeply involved in drawing up the address. It stated the Supreme Council party's operations in 1869 and gave its members a guide for their future action. The address reveals that the Supreme Council, despite its success, did not overcome factionalism after the rising. In the address the Supreme Council confirmed Fenian orthodoxy to gain independence by physical force, ordering members to refrain from taking part not only in parliamentary elections, but in all public demonstrations.\(^\text{35}\) This implied that the Fenians were not to take an active part in the Amnesty movement.
In the autumn of 1870 the Supreme Council experienced a serious crisis by the revival of the Stephens party, so far stagnant. As early as September 1869, T. F. McCarthy, one of Stephens's adherents, started a journal, the People of Ireland against the Irishman (the Supreme Council's organ). George Hopper, a brother in law of Stephens, and other Fenians were involved in the attempt, but about three months later the People of Ireland ceased to exist. It is clear that in 1869 the Stephens party failed to erode the authority of the Supreme Council, which had strengthened its foundations by issuing the constitution in August 1869. Agents for Stephens who resided in France, continued to engage in organising Fenians under the leadership of Stephens in spite of the failure of the People of Ireland.

The circumstances in Ireland turned favourable to the Stephens party in July 1870 when the Franco-Prussian war broke out. No sooner had the news about the war reached Ireland than sympathy for France was expressed by a large crowd in Dublin; on 19 July, when France declared war against Prussia, a crowd numbering from 15,000 to 18,000 turned up near the French consul's residence in Gardiner St to express sympathy for France. On 24 and 31 July meetings for the same purpose were held in Sandymount and Harold's Cross respectively. According to the police, Stephens planned to come to Ireland to become a principal figure in enlisting French sympathy - probably Stephens intended to organise Fenian elements under his leadership again by stirring up sympathy for France among the people. However, Stephens in exile in France was not in a position to bring the movement to show sympathy for France under his control. In September a number of gentlemen in Dublin - obviously non-Fenians - formed a committee to raise an ambulance corps for France and for that purpose they started to collect money and members volunteering to go to France; finally, on 7 October 1870 the corps, consisting of over 200 men, left the North Wall for Le Havre.
The emergence of Republican government in France on the collapse of the Empire in early 1870 gave another opportunity to Stephens. At this time Stephens emerged as a mediator to draw support from the French republican party. Several Fenians who had been prominent in the movement under the leadership of Stephens before the rising responded to his call; they included James O'Connor and John O'Clohissey, both of whom had been Dublin Centres in 1865, and David Murphy and Joseph Hanley of the Irishman, Martin Hanley Carey and John Delany. In September important meetings were held in Dublin. On 10 September Acting Superintendent John Mallon reported that about twenty-five men, including all the Fenian Centres in Leinster, attended a meeting where a letter from Stephens was read. At another important meeting a letter from Stephens suggesting that Stephens would secure support from the French-republican party was read, and two persons were chosen as agents to reconcile the Stephens party with the Supreme Council party and the party of Fr Mullen, who had his own independent body. Stephens appears to have hoped both to unite the Supreme Council party and Fr Mullen's party under his leadership and return the movement into his dictatorship as before his deposition in December 1866. But the Supreme Council party and Fr Mullen's party refused to make a compromise with Stephens and did not offer any authority to him. Subsequently, the Supreme Council party and the Stephens party started quarrelling over the hegemony of the I.R.B. This hampered the development of Fenianism and possibly lowered morale. However, by December 1870 the Supreme Council regained their ascendancy in the I.R.B. because internal quarrels within the Stephens party left it divided hopelessly.

Stephens did not give up his hope in spite of the failure in 1870. In January 1871 the Stephens party attempted to reorganise their body by setting up a committee consisting of six members, perhaps in Dublin.
later an agent of Stephens mentioned the difficulty of impairing the influence of the Supreme Council party over the I.R.B. and of bringing the I.R.B. under his control. According to the agent, the Supreme Council had the 'national journal' - probably the Irishman - to promote their cause, and through the Amnesty Association, collected money to sell members rifles and revolvers at a comparatively low price. In August 1871 Stephens dissolved the committee and tried to create a new committee to reorganise his party in Ireland. We have no information about Stephens's intention in dissolving the committee, but probably the committee did not work properly. At that time Stephens had three agents, Hanley Carey, John Brady, and a third of whom we have no details. They became members of the new committee.

At that time the Supreme Council made efforts to conciliate the Stephens party and to form a united body. In early September 1871 the police received information that 'great exertions are now being made to unite two parties of the Brotherhood in Ireland'. The same efforts were also made in Dublin. The Stephens party initiated negotiations with the Supreme Council party but towards the end of September their attempt was reported as a failure. At the end of 1871 the Supreme Council party swallowed up the Stephens party in Dublin. In early October 1871 the adherents of Stephens in Kingstown - there is no evidence about their number - converted to the Supreme Council party. As a result in December 1871 the Supreme Council claimed that 7,050 men belonged to their Dublin organisation. We have no information concerning the numbers in the Stephens party. The party was said, however, to make progress outside Dublin in Munster, especially in Cork. In February 1872 the strongholds of the Stephens party were said to be Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Clare, Wexford, Galway, Monaghan, Cavan, Belfast and Newry.
Stephens continued to make every effort to regain his authority in the I.R.B. in 1872 and succeeded in doing so in certain areas. In early 1872 he established an agency of a French wine firm at Merchants Quay in the city with George Hopper, and Stephens's supporters, such as persons of 'the original Fenian School in the Irish People Office' resorted to the place. In February 1872 a meeting was held between the Stephens party and the Supreme Council party; J. F. X. O'Brien and John Nolan from the Supreme Council met John Brady from the Stephens party. But the meeting did not promote any improvement in relations between the Stephens and the Supreme Council.

Undoubtedly the activity of the Stephens party damaged the Supreme Council's authority and the I.R.B. as a whole. This is revealed in the address of the Supreme Council dated 17 March 1873 (On 16 and 17 March the Supreme Council held a national convention in Dublin attended by about fifty delegates). According to the address, the Supreme Council experienced 'the shock of years of merciless persecution', and established a committee 'to investigate a misunderstanding by which a considerable section of the men of an important city were estranged from the administration'. Furthermore the Supreme Council issued its amended constitution suggesting a radical change in the policy towards the constitutional movements, especially the Home Rule movement. The address prescribed that the I.R.B. give 'support to every movement calculated to advance the cause of Irish Independence'. Probably by the time the Supreme Council issued the address, many Fenians, as we shall see, were taking part in the Home Rule movement, and the Supreme Council thought that without supporting the Home Rule movement, they could not halt further disintegration of the I.R.B. The decision would also reflect decline in support for Stephens's stance or policy. In November 1873 the Supreme Council approved divergence from Fenian orthodoxy and supported the Home Rule League founded by Isaac Butt - T.W. Moody called this the first New Departure. This marks a turning point
in the I.R.B. because the organisation had never supported the constitutional movements before. This cooperation continued until 1876 when the Supreme Council decided to withdraw from the Home Rule movement, and subsequently some members of the Supreme Council being involved in parliamentary activities were purged from it.

The growth and decline of the Dublin organisation, 1867-73

By the autumn of 1867, as has already been argued, the Dublin Fenians had revived their organisation. In November 1867 the police struck a blow at it by arresting four Centres, Michael Feely, Thomas Francis, James McCabe and John Walsh. By these arrests police not only responded to the revival of Fenianism in Dublin but met the challenge of shooting incidents by Fenians. On 20 October a crown witness, George Reilly, was shot at a pub in Blackrock and on 31 October two policemen were shot. Subsequently the police discovered the existence of the shooting circle and arrested both its Centre, Thomas Francis, and John Walsh who was said to have been involved in the shootings.\(^{57}\) The arrested Centres Michael Feely and John Walsh, as has been noted, were members of the Directory in Dublin. Clearly these arrests damaged the development of the Dublin organisation. On 19 December 1867 Superintendent Ryan reported that 'since the arrest of John Walsh and Michael Feely, "the Directory" has ceased to exist, but efforts are being made to reconstruct it and the only difficulty they experience is the lack of candidates for the appointment'.\(^{58}\)

However, it would appear that the Dublin Fenians made a recovery from the arrest of the Centres. And in early 1868 John O'Connor Power, the agent of Roberts, reported that 'there are 14 circles in Dublin each numbering from hundred men and upwards'.\(^{59}\) The limited success of the organisation after the rising is reflected, however, in the shortage of evidence about the Dublin
organisation in 1868 and by evidence of replacement of the Centres of 1867-8 in the upturn in the movement in 1869. The stagnation of the organisation is owing to the fact that though the Supreme Council issued the first address dated February 1868, factionalism dominated the Dublin organisation too. By late July 1868 Fenian prisoners detained without trial under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act were released, but some prisoners were liberated on condition of going to America. As a result, the releases of the prisoners did not in all cases benefit the organisation, although some Fenians released from prison were to be more active than prior to their arrest.

The autumn of 1868 witnessed the revival of Fenianism in Dublin; and pawnbrokers' assistants took a prominent role again. The commissioner of the D.M.P. reported that a series of private meetings in smoking saloons, attended by 'young men of the class of pawnbrokers' assistants and other Fenian sympathizers' was held. This culminated in the size of the turnout at the funeral of William Sheedy, a prominent Dublin Fenian, on 4 October. The processionists numbering from 3,000 to 3,300 were principally Fenian sympathisers (artisans & labourers) and some were well known Fenians. The police described the procession as 'a proof that there is a well organized conspiracy still in existence'.

In 1869 the prospects for the Fenians changed for the better. First, in February the government announced the release of forty-nine Fenian prisoners, including four ex-Dublin Centres, Hugh Brophy, Denis Cashman, Michael Moore and James O'Connor. With the exception of James O'Connor, the former Centres did not take a prominent part in the Dublin organisation during our period. However, the release gave some impetus to the organisation. Secondly, the authorities did not renew the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act first introduced in February 1866. The Act had effectively prevented the Fenians from carrying out
drilling and from meeting in pubs. In May Superintendent Ryan wrote that 'the propagators of Fenianism are more active at present'. This stage of affairs, somewhere between apathy and activity, is well summed up in a police report of 29 July:

If an opinion was formed on what may be superficially heard and observed, a person should say Fenianism as an organization is defunct in Dublin, but when the private movements of certain parties are watched and enquired after ... a person is forced to admit the existence of an organization.

This situation led to the emergence of the new organisation under the control of the Supreme Council towards the end of 1869. This development was due to the re-structured Supreme Council (which issued the constitution dated August 1869) and to a series of public demonstrations by the Amnesty Association in the autumn. According to Chief Superintendent Ryan, some circles, disorganised after the rising, had been reorganised by well-known Fenians. In November the police mentioned the names of nine prominent Fenians in Dublin, but we have no information about whether or not these men were centres except in the case of Joseph Tomkins.
Table 9:4 Prominent Dublin Fenians in November 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Bracken</td>
<td>tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Carey</td>
<td>hardware dealer's assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Cox</td>
<td>drapers' assistant (McSwiney &amp; Co.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Egan</td>
<td>clerk, a corn and flour store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O’Clohissey</td>
<td>bog oak shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon</td>
<td>waiter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stackpole</td>
<td>drapers' assistant (Arnott)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Tomkins</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lyons</td>
<td>clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 Nov.1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4956R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 Nov.1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5086R on 5174R).

We cannot find these names in Table 9:3 (The Dublin organisation in the autumn of 1867). Obviously the Centres engaged at that time in reorganising the Dublin organisation had now been replaced by new Centres. Moreover, only two released Dublin Centres, John O’Clohissey arrested in September 1865 and Joseph Tomkins arrested in March 1867 resumed their role as prominent Fenians. According to the police, William Lyons held the highest position in the Dublin organisation. The communication system with other parts of Ireland, Britain and America was established: John O’Clohissey took an important part in communication with London, Manchester and Liverpool; Thomas Bracken had charge of communication with England and America; Salmon was a principal figure in communicating with the rest of Ireland. These men no doubt were central figures in the Dublin organisation. In March 1870, when the funeral of J. K. Casey, a contributor to the National press, took place, Thomas Bracken and John O’Clohissey were conspicuous in the affair. By the summer of 1870 the Dublin organisation appears to have developed, and John O’Shea emerged as the most active Centre. Moreover, when the Franco-Prussian war broke out in July, the Dublin Centres who thought that the war would spark off a European war and that
England would be involved, were reported to be 'determined to work harder than ever'.

The leadership of the Dublin organisation established towards the end of 1869, however, was replaced by a new one by early 1871. Perhaps this is explained by the confusion introduced by the Stephens party which tried to develop their power. As we have seen, after the Franco-Prussian war broke out in July 1870, Stephens attempted from France to develop his authority over the I.R.B. in place of the control of the Supreme Council. Indeed, this damaged the Dublin organisation. In particular, John O'Clohissey who worked for the Supreme Council became one of the adherents of the Stephens party. In September the police reported that David Murphy and Joseph Hanley of the Irishman, John O'Clohissey, Martin Hanley, John Delany and James O'Connor were prominent among the Stephens party. Stephens, as noted previously, failed to establish his authority among the I.R.B., but he seems to have had adherents in Dublin.

The Supreme Council consequently started to repair the damage caused by the Stephens party and may have established the new leadership in the Dublin organisation. In March 1871 the Supreme Council appears to have actively engaged in uniting the factions. According to Chief Superintendent Ryan, Fenian leaders planned 'to unite the rival factions of Fenians, either under the old name of Fenians, or to adopt the new title of the United Irishmen'. Subsequently new leaders appeared in the Dublin organisation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purcell</td>
<td>proprietor of a grocery establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLevy (Levy)</td>
<td>skin &amp; hide trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath</td>
<td>hardwareman's assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy</td>
<td>iron monger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muldoon</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It would appear that they made a sort of a committee which had a secretary. Levy afterwards became a representative for Leinster in the Supreme Council. The Dublin organisation showed its strength in the latter half of 1871. In July Thomas Talbot, ex-Head Constable of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who had been notorious as a spy among Fenians, was shot dead by Robert Kelly. After the arrest of Kelly, money was collected for the purpose of defending Kelly and relieving his wife and family, and consequently the Defence Committee was established. Thomas Bracken, who became conspicuous towards the end of 1869, took a prominent part in collecting money for Kelly and was said to have collected £300.73

During 1871 the Dublin organisation did not experience any serious setback and under the Supreme Council developed to such an extent that in December 7,050 men existed in the Dublin organisation. This figure probably represents the peak of the post-1867 rising movement in Dublin. Something of a cyclical pattern existed in the movement in Dublin in these years: a post-rising recovery in 1867-8 was offset by decline in 1868, and a sustained phase of recovery to 1871. What is clear is that the Dublin organisation revived under the Supreme Council until the end of 1871 in spite of the erosion by the Stephens party. Unfortunately there is little evidence about the number of Centres and their circles. The end of 1871 witnessed the repetition of a downward phase: in 1872 and 1873 disintegration took place in the Dublin organisation. Obviously more Fenians left the organisation than joined it. Besides no able and prominent Centres, with a marked capacity to organise people, emerged in the organisation.

After the rising the Fenians continued to have their meetings in pubs, but there is not much information concerning Fenian meetings in pubs. Fenians kept their meetings as secret as possible in order to avoid police attention. In
June 1869 the police wrote that the Fenians did not recruit new members at meetings and that they did not 'do a single act that in the existing state of the Law would render them liable to arrest.' The following eleven pubs emerged as Fenian pubs from 1867 to 1871.

**Table 9 : 5 Fenian pubs, 1867-71**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pub</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byrne's</td>
<td>Dollymount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cromien's</td>
<td>South Great George. St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donnelly's</td>
<td>Holles St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laird's</td>
<td>on the back road the Phoenix Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGuardn's</td>
<td>Harmony Row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meleady's</td>
<td>Abbey St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rorke's</td>
<td>High St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Donoghue Tavern</td>
<td>Abbey St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Rorke's</td>
<td>41 The Coombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter's</td>
<td>42 Henry St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexton's</td>
<td>Stillorgan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 Nov.1867 (C.S.O., R.P.1867/20362); Supt Ryan to C.P., 30 Nov.1867 (C.S.O., R.P.1867/20888); Supt Ryan to C.P., 22 Apr. 1868 (S.P.O., F papers, 2388R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 28 Jan.1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5619R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 13 July 1871 (C.S.O., R.P.1871/13191 on 1871/14460); Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 3 Oct.1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7717R on 7747R); C.S.O., R.P.1881/6856.

Only Cromiens was a pub to which Fenians resorted before the rising, while the others appeared as Fenian pubs for the first time. Perhaps membership changed after the rising.

During the period we have information only on two occasions about drilling - in April 1869 and in November 1870. It was not until April 1869 that the police secured information about drilling carried out by the Fenians. Probably the expiry of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act gave opportunities to the Fenians. In April 1869 the police were informed that at 'Molloy's Fields', a field near Crumlin, a large number of young men from the city had assembled on Sundays. Some policemen were dispatched to Molloy's Fields and they observed three or four men standing there, who recognised the police, and gave a signal.
to their companies. Subsequently, we have no information about drilling at Molloy's Fields. Perhaps the Fenians gave up drilling there because the police paid attention to that place. In the middle of November 1870 Chief Superintendent Ryan received information that the Fenians would engage some houses for the purpose of drilling during the winter. A week later the police discovered two drilling rooms on the north side of the city and on the south side respectively.\textsuperscript{76}

In January 1870 Chief Superintendent Ryan claimed that the Fenians had more arms than they had had before.\textsuperscript{77} And in December 1870 the Dublin organisation was reported to have 763 rifles (261 new ones and 502 old ones) and 1880 revolvers.\textsuperscript{78} The Dublin organisation imported arms from agents in England. Until the seizure of a great number of arms at the North Wall in March and April 1870, Fenian agents in England succeeded in sending arms to Ireland. Arthur Forrester after October 1867 became a prominent arms agent of the Supreme Council in the north of England, buying arms in Birmingham and distributing them among Fenians in Lancashire or exporting them to Ireland. Another able agent was Michael Davitt, who succeeded Ricard O'Sullivan Burke as arms agent for England and Scotland in late 1868.\textsuperscript{79} In Dublin, according to the police, the Fenians purchased a breech loading rifle at 45s and a muzzle loading rifle at 15s.\textsuperscript{80} In Dublin John Woodhouse (or Woodbyrne), P. Clarke and W. Morgan appear to have acted as agents receiving arms.\textsuperscript{81} It was shown upon indisputable evidence that Morgan received arms, while the police could not obtain full evidence against two others. In January 1870 the police at the North Wall discovered a case from R. & J. Keating General Dealers & Co., Birmingham, to Mrs Kennedy grocer at 9 Sheriff St containing two breech loading rifles, one muzzle loading rifle and four six-chamber revolvers. Chief Superintendent Ryan wrote that though the case had been consigned to Mrs Kennedy whose dead husband was a Fenian, the receiver had been W. Morgan.\textsuperscript{82}
About two months later on 31 March and 1 April the police at the North Wall discovered six cases or casks containing twenty-four breech loading rifles, nineteen muzzle loading rifles and thirteen revolvers. These cases should have been sent not to the Dublin organisation but to the provincial organisation; they were consigned to Mrs Cecilia Higgins of Newport, Messrs McDonnell of Tuam, Mr John Flannery of Ballaghdereen, Mr John James White of London Bergin's Hotel, Athlone, Miss Margaret Delmeyre of Castlerea and Mr Richard Cunningham of Main St Boyle respectively. It was Michael Davitt who sent this consignment to Ireland, but he was arrested on 14 May 1870. These seizures and the arrest of Davitt seem to have halted the importation of arms from England temporarily. John O'Shea, a Dublin Centre, who was known to have £34 for the purpose of getting arms, was reported to say that 'he would be better pleased to throw it in the Liffey than buy arms to be seized by the authorities'.

In spite of the seizure of a large number of arms and the arrest of Michael Davitt, Fenians started to import arms from England again. In July 1870 the police received information that some rifles and revolvers had been transferred into the country. And in the autumn of 1870 Patrick Egan and John Mullen were said to acquire large quantities of revolvers, though the police could not discover these arms. Though some arms were seized at the North Wall, the police did not discover any large quantity of arms in Dublin. This suggests that the Dublin organisation was better armed than before the rising.

The reasons for the decline of the Dublin organisation

We must answer the question. Why did the Dublin organisation decline after the rising? Despite the failure of the rising, the year 1867 witnessed
favourable conditions for the growth of Fenianism. On 23 November Allen, Larkin and O'Brien were executed on a charge of murdering an English policeman on the occasion of rescuing Colonel Kelly in Manchester. The execution appealed profoundly to the Irish people. On 8 December in spite of bad weather, about 30,000 formed the Manchester Martyrs procession in Dublin. If the weather had been fine, Superintendent Ryan wrote, the number of the processionists would have been double or treble what it was. The Fenian 'class'—drapers' assistants, pawnbrokers' assistants, cabinet makers, carpenters and plasterers—was very prominent in the procession in terms of their respectable appearance and numbers. However, the Fenians did not succeed in utilising the occasion for developing the organisation, as they had done in the MacManus funeral in 1861.

The failure is reflected in the fact that factionalism, as already pointed out, overtook the movement; when in April 1868 the Prince and Princess of Wales visited Ireland, crowds in the streets of the Liberties, where many Fenians lived, welcomed them. But, as we have seen, the Dublin organisation also later revived to such an extent that 7,050 men had existed in the organisation in December 1871 and on tighter conditions of enlistment than in the pre-1867 years. Serious disintegration, from which the Dublin organisation never recovered in the 1870s, set in probably in 1872 and 1873. No individual set back, such as the arrest of large numbers of Fenians or a military failure, took place in 1872 and 1873. Therefore it is likely that disintegration took place gradually in the Dublin organisation. No one reason accounts for it.

There are possibly five reasons. First of all, the I.R.B. lacked really effective leadership since Stephens's downfall in December 1866. The I.R.B. had been united under the leadership of Stephens from its establishment in 1858 to 1866, and without the threat of factionalism. On the other hand the
Fenian Brotherhood in America had split into two groups; this prevented American Fenians from giving effective support to the I.R.B. The I.R.B. started the rising under the Provisional Government, established in February 1867 and initiated by Colonel Kelly, but after the failure of the rising the Provisional Government did not maintain its authority. Since then, Colonel Kelly, Roberts (the president of one of the American Fenian groups) and Stephens sought to challenge the Supreme Council for control of the I.R.B. These struggles damaged the organisation seriously. While by the end of 1871 the Supreme Council dominated the Dublin organisation, Stephens still had followers. Stephens himself ascribed the cause of the decline of the I.R.B. as a whole to the leadership:

the disastrous effects occasioned by the pretCy ambition of mushroom leaders, it had behind it the honesty, zeal & patriotism of the rank & file the individual members of which, in the vast majority of cases, remained true to its teachings.91

Secondly, for those who were or would be Fenians, the Home Rule movement became a substitute for Fenianism. Indeed, the Home Rule movement was itself a product of the Fenian rising, both because the movement had stirred up much national feeling, and also because Conservatives for various reasons made cognisant of this feeling, were anxious to take or support steps which might pacify Ireland in the future. Whatever the reasons for its establishment, a strong Home Rule movement, once in existence, offered an alternative which would appeal to many who, in the ineffectiveness of the early 1860s, had supported a more extreme movement. In consequence, the attention of Fenian leaders was distracted from narrow Fenian orthodoxy and as a result, Fenian activity in its 'purer' sense was neglected. Some Fenian leaders even took an active part in the Home Rule movement. Subsequently, the interest of rank
and file Fenians in Fenianism, even though most of them had no vote in elections, waned.

How many Fenians could vote in the 1870s? The 1868 Reform Act reduced the qualification of rated occupiers from £8 to over £4 and introduced a lodger franchise in the boroughs such as Dublin city, while rated occupier franchise in the counties remained unchanged at £12. A 50 per cent rise in the borough electorate was due less to the extension of the franchise than to a change in boundaries. The Dublin city electorate - as opposed to the total for the borough - increased only by about 600 between 1867 and 1873.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1873</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rated occupiers at £8 and upwards</td>
<td>7,486</td>
<td>over £4 8,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owners of property</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>owners of property 1,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freemen</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>freemen 2,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lodgers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>lodgers 476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,161</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,763</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Report from the select committee on parliamentary and municipal elections, H.C.1868-9 (352), viii; Returns as respects each of the parliamentary boroughs in Ireland..., H.C. 1874 (45), iii.

However, the overall change concealed greater detail. The Reform Act added the lower middle class and the better-off artisans to the poll books: by the addition of 1,000 rated occupiers as a result of the reduction of the qualification to over £4 and a further 476 voters under the novelty of the lodger franchise.
K. T. Hoppen has showed the occupations of voters in Dublin city in 1865: this pattern can be applied loosely to the electorate in the 1870s.93

Table 9 : 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>% as whole</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>% as whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gentlemen</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>shop keepers</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professionals</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>drink interest</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merchants, manufacturers</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>artisans</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and commercial</td>
<td></td>
<td>others</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hoppen, elections, politics, and society, pp 40-1.

Artisans and the drink interest who produced many Fenians accounted in 1865 for 21.9 per cent of the total electorate in the city. On the other hand, gentlemen, professionals, and merchants, manufacturers and commercial constituted the majority of the electorate, although their proportion to the male work force was small. In this way most Fenians, such as artisans, as we have seen, mainly journeymen and shop assistants, could not express their opinion through parliamentary elections. However, the changes in 1868 were significant even if the rise in the total number of votes in the city was slight. The decline in the number of freemen and property owners reflected the movement of the better-off to the suburbs. In consequence, while the number of voters within the city area did not rise sharply, the 1,500 or so voters added to the register, gave the less well-off a significant new leverage in the city politics. The 21.9 per cent of the city electorate in 1865 represented by the drink and artisan interest was augmented in very crude mathematics by a further 12 per cent, all by definition lower-class voters. In consequence, the issues in the city wards were likely to change radically, and in the borough at large, given a divide among property owners between
Conservatives and Liberals, this conferred a new power on the radical forces within city politics. Home Rule candidates had become a force both in 1870 and 1874 and on neither occasion, could have so without the support of the new vote.

Consequently, the Home Rule movement had a great impact on the I.R.B., and damaged the organisation. The first electoral contest which attracted Fenians’ attention was the Dungarvan election in the 1868 general election. An English Catholic Liberal Henry Mathews defeated a Liberal C. R. Barry who at the Dublin Special Commission appointed in 1865 to try John O’Leary, O’Donovan Rossa and others, had described Fenianism as a revolutionary and socialist movement, whose aim was to massacre all except the lower class. Though the clergy and Liberal papers, for example the *Freeman’s Journal* supported Barry, the opposition of Fenian elements resulted in his defeat. In later years Chief Superintendent Ryan regarded the Dungarvan election as a turning point in the attitude of Fenians towards parliamentary elections:

> The Fenian influence in respect to Parliamentary representation has become Americanised, especially since the defeat of Mr Barry at Dungarvan on the occasion of the last general election. The Fenians look to that election as their first victory and from that time to the present their votes and influence have been sought for by parties ambitious to enter Parliament.

This trend was further accelerated when Fenians ran candidates of their own at parliamentary elections. In November 1869 O’Donovan Rossa, who became a symbol of the Amnesty movement at that time, was nominated and surprisingly elected in the Tipperary by-election - he was then disqualified as an unpardoned convict. Subsequently Charles Kickham was nominated as candidate at another election in February 1870, but he was defeated by D. C. Heron. In Dublin money was collected to meet the expenses of the election of O'Donovan
Rossa and perhaps Kickham through Richard Pigott, Edmund O'Donovan and other staff of the Irishman. Undoubtedly the Dublin Fenians subscribed money for that purpose. And the Fenians were said to succeed in raising a large amount of money. 97

The Fenian involvement in parliamentary politics from the end of 1869 changed the Supreme Council's policy concerning parliamentary elections. In their address issued in January 1870 the Supreme Council said that permission from its provincial representatives allowed individual members to vote, though the Supreme Council instructed the members to 'refrain from taking part in parliament elections'. 95 In these circumstances Issac Butt was able to provide people with the Home Rule movement as an alternative to Fenianism. It was not a difficult task for Butt, who had defended Fenian leaders such as O'Donovan Rossa and C. Kickham at the Dublin Special Commission and took a prominent part in the Amnesty movement, to bring Fenians together under his leadership. In May 1870 Butt launched the Home Government Association without Fenians' interference. R. V. Comerford explains the motives for their neutrality: 'The fenians were not simply repaying a debt of gratitude to Butt, defender of their prisoners and champion of amnesty. Many of the new fenian élite felt no qualms about mixing armed conspiracy with conventional political activity and they responded eagerly to the prospect of action on any front.' 99

After the establishment of the Home Government Association, the Home Rule movement gradually gained support from the city electorate and in the 1874 general election a Home Ruler obtained one of two seats in the city. Table 9:8 demonstrates candidates, their political affiliations and numbers of votes in 1865, 1868 and 1874 general elections and 1870 by-election.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate 1</th>
<th>Party 1</th>
<th>Votes 1</th>
<th>Candidate 2</th>
<th>Party 2</th>
<th>Votes 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Sir B. L. Guinness</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>4739</td>
<td>Jonathan Pim</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>4653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Vance</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>4073</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Sir A. E. Guinness</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>5587</td>
<td>Jonathan Pim</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>5586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. R. Plunkett</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>5452</td>
<td>Sir D. J. Corrigan</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>5379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(on petition Guinness unseated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Sir D. J. Corrigan</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>4468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>E. R. King-Harman</td>
<td>H.R.</td>
<td>3444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir A. E. Guinness</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>5213</td>
<td>Maurice Brooks</td>
<td>H.R.</td>
<td>4838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jonathan Pim</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Edward Fox</td>
<td>H.R.</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Conservative  L = Liberal  H.R. = Home Ruler


After the 1865 and 1868 elections on the other hand a Conservative businessman, B. L. Guinness in 1865 or A. E. Guinness in 1868 and a Liberal businessman, Jonathan Pim represented the city in parliament. In addition to their appeal to the propertied voters, they appealed to artisan voters as good employers, and promoters of the manufactures of the country.  

The Home Rule movement and the Reform Act of 1868 which gave votes to rated occupiers of between £8 and £4 and lodgers, changed the elections. As early
as January 1870 Chief Superintendent Ryan reported that Fenians would oppose Liberal candidates to embarrass the Liberal government under Gladstone by the votes of "the persons entitled to vote as lodgers and artisans and traders who are also small proprietors and have votes on account of their property." In the city by-election which took place in August 1870, a Liberal D. J. Corrigan who had failed to get a seat in the city general election in 1868, and a Conservative Home Ruler E. R. King-Harman, who was a founder of Home Rule movement competed for the seat. Corrigan gained support from the Catholic clergy and the Liberal press because of his advocacy of a Catholic university, denominational education, and the secret ballot. On the other hand King-Harman, though a Conservative, was opportunistically but actively assisted by the Fenians. The meeting of his supporters held in the Rotunda was dominated by the Fenians; and well known Dublin Fenians, such as Martin Hanley Carey even occupied seats on the platform. The result of the election was that Corrigan defeated King-Harman by 4468 votes to 3444. Though Corrigan had had 5379 votes in the 1868 election, his support had declined by about 1,000 with 4,468. On the other hand King-Harman failed to obtain all the Conservative votes; A. E. Guinness had received 5,587 Conservative votes in 1868. Many Conservative supporters failed to vote for King-Harman on the grounds that they disapproved of the Home Rule movement, and the active role of the Fenians in support of him helped to keep them aloof. In all the circumstances, King-Harman's near success points to the weight of a radical new force in Dublin politics.

Encouraged by this, the Fenians continued to support the Home Rule movement actively, and the Home Rule question became a central issue for all parties. In February 1871, according to the police, all political parties, including Fenians and Orangemen, held well-attended meetings almost every evening in Dublin to debate the Home Rule question. This trend continued in 1872. In October 1871 a large meeting of the Home Rule movement was held in the Rotunda...
where from 1,000 to 1,500 members of the labouring and artisan classes attended. This suggests that the Home Rule movement attracted the attention of the lower class which had produced many Fenians in the 1860s, although they were not qualified to vote at elections. In these circumstances Butt's Home Rule Association, reorganised as the Home Rule League in November 1873, was not only not interfered with by the Fenians but was supported by them.

In January 1874 the parliament had been dissolved by Gladstone, and in February a general election took place. Home Rule dominated the election, and the Home Rule party was welcomed by the electorate. The Home Rule party won 59 seats out of 102, while compared with the result of the 1868 general election, Liberal seats fell from 65 to 10 and Conservative seats from 40 to 33. In Dublin the Conservative party kept a seat - A. E. Guinness was elected, while a Liberal Jonathan Pim who had retained a seat in the 1865 and 1868 election, was defeated by a Home Ruler the Lord Mayor Maurice Brooks. The Home Rule movement had a great impact on the city. In July 1874 the commissioner of the D.M.P. reported the upsurge of lower class interest in the Home Rule movement:

Since the recent Home Rule debate in the House of Commons... artisans and humbler classes in and about Dublin have remarkable on account of the numbers in which they assemble in public houses especially in a few of them that were notorious places of Fenian rendezvous during 1864 & 65.

The third main cause of the disintegration of the Dublin organisation was Gladstone's conciliatory attitudes towards Ireland - the Irish Church Act of 1869, the Land Act of 1870 and the release of the Fenian prisoners in February 1869 and January 1871. In those days Fenians realised that these measures would satisfy the people and deprive Fenians of their sympathy. Consequently, some Fenians were of the opinion that Fenians should start a rising to prevent the passing of conciliatory measures. These measures, though Fenian would
be 'activists' might not welcome them, convinced many of the benefits of parliamentary activities. This conviction may have resulted in Fenians' participation in the Home Rule movement, and subsequently the Home Rule movement absorbed much of the support for the I.R.B. Undoubtedly these conciliatory measures calmed down Irish nationalism, whereas coercive measures, such as the Manchester Martyrs execution, led to an upsurge in nationalism.

Above all the Irish Church Act was of great importance. Perhaps the Irish Church Act gave the Irish Catholics the impression that the Liberal government led by Gladstone would proceed to grant even greater concessions to Ireland, paving the way for the repeal of the Union itself.\textsuperscript{110} After the Irish Church Act was passed, the Fenians were reported to be dejected because they thought that the Act would deprive them of the sympathy of the people.\textsuperscript{111} The impact of the Land Act on the I.R.B. was complicated. The Land Act of 1870 was limited in scope, so it gave disappointment to small tenants. In response to agrarian violence, the government introduced a coercion act, the so-called Westmeath Act of 1871.\textsuperscript{112} It would appear that these circumstances gave Fenians opportunities to develop their strength in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{113} In February 1870 Chief Superintendent Ryan, who had analysed the conversations of leading Fenians in Dublin, reported that they thought that the Act would give stimulus to Fenianism:

\textit{Up to the time the provisions of the Bill were made public they apprehended fixity of tenure would be introduced, and although they do not admit that any measure would crush out the conspiracy, they say that fixity of tenure would deprive them of the sympathy of the agricultural classes to a very large extent.}\textsuperscript{114}

By contrast the Land Act had no significance for the Dublin Fenians. The rank and file of the Dublin organisation, consisting of artisans and labourers, with no stake or interest in the Land question were not influenced by the Land
This is reflected in the fact that immediately after the passing of the Land Act in August 1870, the Dublin Fenians were interested not in the Land Act, but in, as has already been argued, the Franco-Prussian War.

As we have seen, the autumn of 1869 saw the large public demonstrations of the Amnesty movement and in such circumstances the Dublin organisation developed. But in January 1871 the government released over thirty Fenian prisoners including O'Donovan Rossa. From that time the Amnesty movement lost strength. If Gladstone had refused to give an amnesty to Fenian prisoners, the Amnesty movement would have developed the organisation. From September to November 1873 the Amnesty Association organised a series of public demonstrations again. In Dublin two meetings were held - at Clontarf on 7 September and at Phibsborough on 23 November; and a large number of people turned up. However, these meetings benefited the Home Rule movement rather than Fenianism. The amnesty issue itself had ceased to be a major political question.

The fourth major reason of the disintegration of the Dublin organisation was the prosperity of the Dublin economy in the late 1860s and into the early 1870s. The economic prosperity is strikingly illustrated by the building trade which, as has been noted, produced about 30 per cent of Dublin artisan Fenians in the 1860s. The building trade began to expand from 1869, reaching its peak in 1872, and maintained its prosperity to some extent until 1880. From 1871 to 1881 the number of carpenters in the city increased by 10 per cent from 2,294 to 2,527 and that of bricklayers by 65 per cent from 674 to 1,111. The Irish Times described 1872 as follows:

Notwithstanding the dearness of money, as well as all other articles in daily use, trade and commerce of the city are in a most healthy condition. On the quays business is in a progressive state. Factories send up their lofty chimneys in many directions and suburbs on two sides are likely to become identical with the city.
Accordingly, artisans and labourers of every trade obtained higher wages. Table 9:9 indicates an increase in the weekly pay of some occupations between 1867 and 1872.

Table 9:9 Weekly wages, in 1867 and 1872

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1872</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steam packet companies'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>porters</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corn porters</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coal porters</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; carters</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas company's employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smiths</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stokers</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke wheelers</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke coolers &amp; fillers</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Firemen</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamp lighters</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>19.60</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricklayers</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Labourers</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: C.S.O., R.P. 1872/7794.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus probably the better conditions detached the lower class from the revolutionary movement. Recession in 1874 was far more widely experienced in industrial areas than in agricultural regions. Thus, in Ireland in the second half of the 1870s the railways in the Dublin region fared much better than the railways centred in Belfast. The high prosperity of the years 1869-73 did not turn down as sharply or as suddenly in Dublin as in Belfast or in British industrial cities, and a sense of crisis did not emerge before 1878 or 1879.119
The fifth cause of the decline of the Dublin organisation is that in the 1870s the artisan class was more concerned with trade unions than with political movements (though some artisans took an active role in the Home Rule movement). Trade unions grew rapidly, and better economic conditions suggested that concessions might be wrung more readily by industrial action from employers. Some trades fared well, and while others fared badly between census date in 1871 and 1881, the peak of the boom in Britain and Ireland in the early 1870s must have seemed a rare favourable moment to press for better conditions, or to unionise to achieve security, even in manufacturing.

Dublin, hit by the industrial revolution in England, was characterised by a decline in manufacturing industry in the nineteenth century. Though the 1870s saw prosperity of the economy, from 1871 to 1881 the number of male manufacturing workers in the city fell 5 per cent from 18,580 to 17,628. Table 9:10 shows the number of workers in occupations to which Fenianism in Dublin largely appealed in the 1860s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>From 1861</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>From 1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carpenters</td>
<td>2,294</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>- 8</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>+ 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boot &amp; shoemakers</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>- 17</td>
<td>2,449</td>
<td>- 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tailors</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>- 22</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bricklayers</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>- 4</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>+ 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacksmiths</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>+ 54</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>- 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cork cutters</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>- 28</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>- 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bakers</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>- 10</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>+ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coopers</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>+ 35</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>- 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labourers</td>
<td>12,686</td>
<td>11,488</td>
<td>- 9</td>
<td>14,392</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Census Ireland, 1861, 1871, 1881.
Comparing the numbers in 1871 with 1881, with the exceptions of carpenters, bricklayers and bakers, other trades reduced their numbers. However, the census in 1881 would have reflected the sharp recession in Ireland from the late 1870s, and over the 1870s the downturn had been more moderate and later than the crude comparison of census figures would suggest. Significantly the number of labourers had risen sharply from 1871 to 1881. An interesting measure of underlying stability is the fact that in many occupations numbers remained higher than in 1861. Sharp decline within the 1870s was concentrated on cork cutters - already in crisis in the 1860s - and on boot and shoe makers and tailors. The prosperity of the building trades well into the 1870s which had provided both many Fenian rank and file and many Centres must have been a key faction in weakening support for the Fenians.

The decline of boot and shoemakers and of tailors represented part of the general crisis of the Liberties area. This might be regarded as a factor sustaining extremism, but on the other hand the Liberties had passed its peak, its population was already beginning to fall, the area and properties within it experienced the first stages of redevelopment - and for the first time comfortable artisan houses were being built within it by the 1870s - and declining trades like clothing and boot making were probably disproportionately hit by emigration. Fenian strength within the Liberties with its traditional crafts and its sociability revolving around its own age-old pubs was not simply a political response of the 1860s, but in a way which has still to be comprehended aright an older revolutionary fervour, that of the 1790s or akin to the Paris that Haussmann subdued with his great boulevards.

The artisan class, responding to these circumstances, was likely to take an active part in trade union activity to protect their own interest, by
controlling skills and by limiting entry through an apprenticeship. In this way skilled workers formed a privileged class among the workers, the so-called 'labour aristocracy'. During our period, in Dublin there were locally organised unions and English based unions such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. And some locally organised unions made up the United Trades Association as early as 1863. Unskilled workers also gathered to some extent; the Amalgamated Unskilled Labourer's Association held the first meeting of its committee in April 1872. From 1870 to 1872 skilled and unskilled workers in Dublin carried out many strikes for higher wages and shorter working hours. In July 1871 the police reported that 1,000 carpenters and other tradesmen struck for higher wages. Three months later corn porters were reported to be on strike for higher wages. Under the United Trades Association, trades which were on strike, acquired financial assistance from other trades. In September 1872 curriers on strike received £5 from ropemakers and £4 from cabinetmakers. Thus it is likely that the lower class, both skilled and unskilled workers, concentrated their efforts on their individual improvement rather than a self sacrificing revolutionary movement.

Part 2 The Dublin Fenians, 1874 - 9

The Supreme Council and Clan na Gael

From the time of the establishment of the Home Rule League in November 1873, the Supreme Council cooperated with Butt and Home Rulers. However by 1876 Butt's Home Rule movement which had failed to achieve much was a source of disillusionment to the Fenians. In August 1876 the Supreme Council adopted a resolution that Fenians should withdraw from the Home Rule movement. As a
result, four members of the Supreme Council, who took an active part in the Home Rule movement - Joseph Biggar, John O'Connor Power, John Barry and Patrick Egan - either resigned or were expelled from the Supreme Council by August 1877; Biggar and O'Connor Power took a prominent part in 'obstruction' tactics at Westminster with Charles Stewart Parnell.127

This introduced confusion into the I.R.B. For instance the north England division revolted against the Supreme Council's authority, withdrawing its allegiance to the Supreme Council. Furthermore, the expulsion of the Home Rulers from the Supreme Council gave Stephens the hope of bidding for the authority of the I.R.B. again; in early 1876 the Fenian Brotherhood in America recognised Stephens as the head of the I.R.B. Indeed, the development of the Stephens party coincided with the disappearance of the Home Rulers from the Supreme Council, and Stephens developed his strength especially in Leinster. By early 1878 the Stephens party, whose stronghold was Leinster, numbering 1,500, whereas the Supreme Council had 19,000 members in Ireland and Britain.128

The erosion of the I.R.B. by Stephens was halted by Clan na Gael (established in America in 1867) which in June 1875 had already an agreement with the Supreme Council, giving its assistance to it.129 In January 1878 Carroll of Clan na Gael came to Ireland for the purpose not merely of inspecting the I.R.B., but of reorganising it and he made a four or five months tour through Ireland and Britain. Carroll reorganised the I.R.B. by replacing C. G. Doran, the secretary of the Supreme Council by John O'Connor. By 1878 the Leinster district of the Supreme Council, as a result of the development of the Stephens party, had deteriorated to such an extent that the Dublin, Louth and Wexford organisations were out of control by the Supreme Council.130 In 1878 John Levy resigned from or was deposed as the representative for Leinster - we do not
know whether or not Carroll was associated with this. We have no information about Levy's successor. However, it is likely that Levy was succeeded by James O'Connor of the Irishman, who was the brother of John O'Connor, the secretary of the Supreme Council, for James O'Connor was reported to have some connections with the Supreme Council in 1878. In May 1878 the police reported that John Ryan (the representative for the south of England) had visited James O'Connor's house. And in December 1878 the police reported not merely that 'James O'Connor of the Irishman is to all intents the leader of Fenianism in Dublin', but that he conducted correspondence with Paris, where in January 1879 the meeting of the Supreme Council was held. The new secretary of the Supreme Council and new representative for Leinster seem to have revived the strength of the Supreme Council, and the Supreme Council claimed in 1879 that 24,000 members existed in Ireland, and that Stephens had only a few hundred followers.

In October 1878 John Devoy and other members of Clan na Gael made a new proposal, the so-called 'New Departure' to the reorganised Supreme Council and to constitutional nationalists, particularly Parnell. The New Departure was the future plan of the I.R.B. drawn up by Clan na Gael, and it set forth five points: firstly, Fenians should reject Butt's federalism; secondly, the land question should be paid more attention; thirdly, Fenians should exclude all sectarian issues; fourthly, parliamentary activities should be one of the most important activities of the I.R.B.; fifthly, Irish nationalists should support all oppressed nationalities.

The New Departure was discussed at the meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris, 19–26 January 1879. Devoy attended the meeting but he found no support except from Michael Davitt, the representative of the north of England. As a result, the Supreme Council rejected the New Departure, although Fenians were allowed
to vote at parliamentary elections and were urged to control the local public bodies.\textsuperscript{134} Thus, though the Supreme Council itself held aloof from engaging both in constitutional movements and in agrarian agitation, members of the I.R.B. in rural areas who could interpret the directive by the Supreme Council to control public bodies as a decision in favour of political action, were able to take part in the Land War.\textsuperscript{135} By contrast, the Dublin Fenians totally disallowed the New Departure. In January 1879 a proclamation to denounce the New Departure was placarded in Dublin.\textsuperscript{136} And in April when Davitt visited Fenians' drilling places, the New Departure was hissed by the Fenians there.\textsuperscript{137}

\textit{The Dublin organisation, 1874 - 9}

From 1874 to 1879 the Dublin organisation had two opportunities to show their strength in public - the O'Connell centenary procession in April 1875 and John O'Mahony's funeral in March 1877. In the O'Connell centenary procession a great number of people turned up, but Fenians did not organise the procession. The promoters were both the Liberals who sought to exploit the occasion to inaugurate a new political movement and Home Rulers who wanted to maintain their influence over Irish politics.\textsuperscript{138} In May 1877 the funeral of John O'Mahony occurred in Dublin, when 15,000 men marched.\textsuperscript{139} But its success cannot be seen as a measure of the size of the Fenian movement in Dublin which was now minuscule.

The disintegration of the Dublin organisation first took place in 1872 and 1873. In 1874 the Dublin organisation consisted of four circles with a total membership in excess of 300. Furthermore in March 1874 the Dublin Centres broke with the Supreme Council and formed themselves into an independent body called a Directory. Of the four Dublin Centres, two Centres had already occupied their positions in 1871.\textsuperscript{140} As there was some turnover of Centres, the fact that only two Centres held their position over a period of three years bears out the instability of the City organisation.
There is no good information about the four Dublin Centres. However, the police reported the names of prominent Fenians in Dublin in 1874, so the four Centres are likely to be among these names.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Barry</td>
<td>cabinet maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Bracken</td>
<td>tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Brophy</td>
<td>carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Cook</td>
<td>carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Downey</td>
<td>tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Dunne</td>
<td>wine porter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Levy</td>
<td>foreman, Cannon, Dunne &amp; Kellys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mullen</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O'Clohissey</td>
<td>working jeweller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O' Connor</td>
<td>staff of Irishman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 10

**Sources:**
- C.P. Lake to U.S., 6 June 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 8992R);
- C.P. Lake to U.S., 13 June 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 8989R);
- C.P. Lake to U.S., 3 July 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 9013R);
- Assistant C.P. Talbot to U.S., 16 July 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 9026R);
- C.P. Lake to U.S., 23 July 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 9032R).

Compared with the names of prominent Dublin Fenians towards the end of 1869, only Thomas Bracken and John O'Clohissey were on the above list. And by early 1871 a new leadership emerged in the Dublin organisation; Purcell, Levy, McGrath, McCarthy and Muldoon. Only Levy was an active Fenian. John Levy was, according to the police, the most active Fenian in Dublin: he seems both to have taken part in the rising and to have become prominent afterwards. His followers resided particularly in Watling St and James St and also in other towns in Ireland and England as a result of the contacts his trade (hide, skin, leather trade) offered.141

Levy was the representative for Leinster in the Supreme Council from 1875 to 1878.142 As he had a large number of followers in Dublin, it is likely that in
1875 the Dublin organisation under him joined the Supreme Council party. However in 1877, as we have seen, Stephens developed his strength in the I.R.B. and in August 1877 Stephens secured eight Centres in Dublin - we have no information about them. Probably the Dublin organisation withdrew its allegiance from the Supreme Council again. This is supported by the fact that when Carroll of Clan na Gael inspected the Dublin organisation in 1878, the organisation had already seceded from the Supreme Council. It is likely that Carroll met the eight Dublin Centres in May 1878. And Carroll succeeded in persuading them to throw their support to the Supreme Council. However, the figure of eight Centres reflects aspirations rather than effective strength. Actual manpower was almost at a nadir point. In 1879 the Supreme Council said that 576 men belonged to the Dublin organisation. Moreover, Stephens had followers in Dublin whose number was, however, very small; Levy, after his displacement in 1878, joined the Stephens party, but he appears to have failed to recruit a number of men for Stephens.

The Dublin organisation numbered 300 in 1874 and five years later in 1879 it had 576 members. Unfortunately there is no evidence about the number of its members in the years between 1875 and 1878. But there was no upsurge in Fenianism during the period. Therefore it would not be false to assume that from 1874 to 1879 the Dublin organisation consisted of no more than a few hundred Fenians. There is no evidence concerning the number of circles in Dublin from 1875 to 1879; but considering the number of the members, a few Centres may have existed in Dublin and each circle undoubtedly was far below the theoretical number - 820 men. Nor did we have information about Centres, although Stephens reportedly had eight Centres. The police reported the names of ten prominent Fenians in Dublin from 1876 to 1879.
Table 9: 12 Prominent Dublin Fenians, 1876 - 9.

Table: Thomas Bracken
Patrick Brennan
J. J. Clancy
Dr Colbet
Robert Dunne
John Levy
P. J. McAlister
Joseph McGrath
P. D. Mulcahy
Patrick Rogers

Total 10

Sources: S.P.O., F.P.R. 1864-80; S.P.O. A files, A559, A590.

Perhaps some of the above men were Centres. Compared with the lists of prominent Fenians in Dublin previously, only two men, Thomas Bracken and John Levy, had a long record of work for Fenianism, and the other men are likely to have risen to prominence only after 1876.

In spite of the stagnant condition of the Dublin organisation, the Dublin Fenians imported arms and carried out drilling during the period. Peter Doyle, watch smith, residing in Aungier St, Clancy working at a china and delf warehouse in Nicholas St and John Levy were said to import arms from England. In May 1878 the police discovered three drilling places - 55 Bolton St, 10 Peter St and the Old Temperance Hall, Cuffe Lane. As the Dublin organisation declined, Fenian activities, importing arms and drilling, also lost vigour.

By the middle of the 1860s Fenianism dominated nationalist politics, and made a strong organisation in Dublin with a membership which may have reached ten thousand. Subsequently, a large number of Fenians were involved in the Tallaght affair, the poorly organised rising in March 1867. After the rising,
especially in the early 1870s, the Dublin organisation declined and its members seem to have amounted to less than 10 per cent of the organisation before the rising. By the late 1870s the Dublin organisation was confined to a small group of men. However, they maintained Fenian orthodoxy by importing arms and drilling, and they were never conciliated by the constitutional nationalist movement and parliamentary activities. Fenianism declined but it never totally disappeared. In December 1878 Superintendent Mallon suggested that the revival of Fenianism might take place although he did not think that Fenianism would revive to the same extent as in the 1860s:

There is another class of persons who are accustomed to meet at certain places in the city supposed for the purposes of drilling and otherwise furthering some secret movement. They do not appear to have been influenced by the state of political affairs recently and they had not intelligence to render them capable of disturbing the peace of this country on a very extensive scale under any circumstances, but they are no doubt disloyal, very gullible, and would be mischievous material in the hands of a clever knave. It would be difficult to revive Fenianism in Ireland, so as to bring it up to the dimensions it assumed in 1865, and subsequently.

As the wisdom of hindsight tells us, the Fenians succeeded in maintaining their tradition and a new generation who had not lived through the 1867 rising started another rising at Easter 1916.
1. N.L.I., Devoy papers, MS 18036.

2. Special commission act 1888: reprint of the shorthand notes of the speeches, proceedings and evidence taken before the commissioners appointed under the above named act (12 vols. London, 1890), vol. 4, pp 505-11.


6. S.P.O., Fenian briefs, 8.


8. Though the name John Walsh occurs in both Table 9 : 2 and Table 9 : 3, they were different persons.

9. Supt Ryan to C.P., 11 Nov. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/20374); Supt Ryan to C.P., 22 Nov. 1867 (ibid.).


12. Stephens to E. Walsh, 19 Nov. 1874 (N.L.I., Stephens papers. MS 10492).


24. Comerford, Charles J. Kickham, p. 121; The Fenians in context, pp 161, 166.
29. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Nov. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4902R); Comerford, The Fenians in context, pp 165-6, 170; Johnson, 'The Fenian amnesty movement'.
30. Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 Sept. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4605R on 7622R; 4683R on 7622R; Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Oct. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4699R).
32. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 Nov. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4877R on 4956R).
33. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 Nov. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5086R on 5174R).
34. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 Dec. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5378R on 5562R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 30 Dec. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5388R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 Feb. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7141R).
36. Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 Sept. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4666R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 4 Dec. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5169R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 13 Dec. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5244R on 5366R).
37. Stephens to -, 6 Apr. 1870 (T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/22).

41. Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 10 Sept. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6816R).

42. Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 22 Sept. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6852 R); Comerford, The Fenians in context, p.187.

43. T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/265.

44. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Dec. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 7019R).

45. T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/28; 9659d/30; 9659d/265.

46. T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/266.

47. N.L.I., Stephens papers, MS 10492; Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Aug. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7545R on 7622R).


49. C.S.O., R.P. 1881/6856.


52. C.P. Lake to U.S., 23 Feb. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 8039R).


55. Ibid. p.314.

56. Moody, Davitt and Irish revolution, p.123.


59. S.P.O., A files, A316.


61. Supt Ryan to C.P., 6 Mar. 1868 (S.P.O. F papers, 1667R on 1822R); Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 Mar. 1868 (S.P.O., F papers, 2475R).
62. C.P. O'Ferrall to Chief Secretary, 26 Sept. 1868 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7694).
65. Supt Ryan to C.P., 5 May 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4161R).
67. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 19 Nov. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4956R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 29 Nov. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 5086R on 5174R).
69. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 8 Apr. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6164R on 6200R).
71. Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 10 Sept. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6816R).
72. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 7 Mar. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7233R on 7388R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 Mar. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7241R on 7304R).
73. Supt Ryan to C.P., 12 July 1871 (C.S.O., R.P. 1871/13098 on 1871/14460); Supt Ryan to C.P., 21 July 1871 (C.S.O., R.P. 1871/13731 on 1871/15406); Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 3 Oct. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7717R on 7747R); Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 16 Oct. 1871 (S.P.O., F papers, 7747R).
74. Acting Supt James Ryan to C.P., 7 June 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4278R).
75. Supt Ryan to C.P., 27 Apr. 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4062R on 4170R).
76. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 17 Nov. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6977R on 6995R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 25 Nov. 1876 (S.P.O., F papers, 6995R).
83. Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 31 Mar. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6090R on 6095R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6095R).
Moody, Davitt and Irish revolution, pp 80-1.

Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 May 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6388R). See Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 2 May 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6344R).

Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 22 July 1870 (C.S.O., R.P. 1870/14701 on 1870/20587).

Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 23 Sept. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6848R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 22 Oct. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6926R).


Stephens, 'Fenianism past and present' (N.L.I., Stephens papers, MS 10492).

Hoppen, Elections, politics, and society, p.31.

Ibid., pp 40-1.


Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 Jan. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5599R).


Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 Jan. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5599R); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 28 Feb. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5859R).


Comerford, The Fenians in context, p.188.

Hoppen, Elections, politics and society, p.51.

Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 26 Jan, 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 5599R).

Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 10 Aug. 1870 (C.S.O., R.P., 1870/15741 on 1870/16147); Chief Supt Ryan to C.P., 11 Aug. 1870 (C.S.O., R.P., 1870/15763 on 1870/16147); Acting Supt Mallon to C.P., 10 Sept. 1870 (S.P.O., F papers, 6816R); Thornley, Isaac Butt, pp 110-1.


Thornley, Isaac Butt, Chapter 4.
107. Ibid., pp 176, 179, 207. In 1872 the secret ballot was introduced. In April 1869 F. Stokes, a magistrate in Dublin, stated that the Catholic priests influenced the electorate in voting, and that 'Most of the voting papers were collected at the chapel, and of course they were signed there under the influence of the priests'. So the secret ballot might have prevented the Catholic priests from influencing voters in elections, but we do not know the effect of the secret ballot upon subsequent elections (Report from the select committee on parliamentary and municipal elections, H.C. 1868-9 (352), viii, p.176).


110. 32 & 33 Vict., C.42; Comerford, The Fenians in context, p.164.

111. Acting Supt James Ryan to C.P., 29 July 1869 (S.P.O., F papers, 4446R on 4476R).


113. See S. Anderson to Larcom, 19 Dec. 1869 (N.L.I., Larcom papers, MS 7694).


115. Ibid.


117. Daly, Dublin, pp 55-7.

118. Irish Times, 5 Dec. 1872, quoted in Daly, Dublin, p.57.


120. Census Ireland, 1871, 1881.


123. Irishman, 13 Apr. 1872.


126. Irishman, 7 Sept. 1872.


133. Moody, Davitt and Irish revolution, pp 249-53.

134. Ibid., pp 278-81.


139. Irishman, 10 Mar. 1877.

140. Stephens to E. Walsh, 19 Nov. 1874 (N.L.I., Stephens papers, MS 10492).

141. Assistant C.P. Talbot to U.S., 10 July 1874 (S.P.O., F papers, 9026R).


143. T.C.D., Davitt papers, 9659d/276; 9659d/315.

144. Ibid., 9659d/286; 9659d/287.


Chapter 10

CONCLUSION

...
We must answer the final question. Why did Fenianism appeal to artisans and shop assistants in Dublin in the 1860s, in particular before the rising? Generally speaking it is very difficult to identify the motives of people joining revolutionary movements. J. Stevenson states the difficulties in clarifying the causes of popular disturbances even in recent years.

Popular disturbances were, and still are, a highly complex phenomenon. One has only to observe the enormous output of analysis and interpretation about the disturbances in American cities and universities in the 1960s to be aware that there are no simple answers to why they occurred or about their role in larger social and political processes.¹

Some historians regard economic factors, in particular absolute deterioration, as the main reason to explain popular disturbances. W. W. Rostow compiled an 'index of social tension' in economic conditions from 1792 to 1850 to show the relations between popular unrest and economic factors (food prices and the fluctuations of trade cycles).² Another tool to explain popular disturbance is the concept of 'relative deprivation': discontent takes place when people feel injustice even though they are not caught by absolute deterioration. This view is further developed by sociologists explaining the causes of popular disturbances as a result of a difference between the conditions in which people are and the aspirations they formed when conditions had been becoming better.³ J. C. Davies invented a 'J-curve' model of discontent aroused by relative deprivation; disturbances or revolutions occur when economic and social development is checked by a short-term crisis.⁴ These explanations may help to account for Fenianism in the 1860s. However, nineteenth century Ireland presented a great contrast to England and twentieth century America on the grounds that Ireland was part of the United Kingdom as a result of colonisation by England. Therefore nationalism - an ambiguous term - can help to explain our question. Yet as nationalism is subject to discontent among
people, the concepts of absolute deterioration and relative deprivation are still useful tools.

Irish nationalism came not only from economic factors - for example, as suggested in contemporary arguments that the Union brought economic depression into Ireland and English absentee landlords exploited Irish peasants - but from social and cultural factors 'moulded in a long and complex history of Anglo-Irish contacts': we cannot make a distinction between economic and non-economic factors in Irish nationalism. What made a distinction between the oppressed and the oppressor in nineteenth century Ireland was religion - the vast majority of the Irish people were Catholics, whereas a small group of Protestants formed the 'ascendancy' class.

The 1871 census of Dublin city demonstrates that Protestants who accounted for about 20 per cent of the male workforce (the total number was 79,030) were over-represented in the upper and middle classes. Protestants accounted for between over 40 and about 55 per cent of the property owning and independent, public service and professional clerks and industrial service (banking jobs) classes. On the other hand the vast majority of general labourers were Catholics (97 per cent). In the class between the middle and upper classes, and the lowest class - those who worked mainly in the manufacturing, transport and dealing sectors - Catholics found their place: about 80 per cent of these sectors were Catholics. Accordingly, Catholics in the city 'had the sense of being a minority in wealth or power', although their number exceeded that of Protestants. Therefore Irish Catholics, especially the lower class, detached from the establishment economically, politically and socially, resented the existence of the outsiders.
Though Fenian leaders advocated a non-sectarian principle as Wolfe Tone and Thomas Davis had done, there is no doubt that the majority of the rank and file Fenians were Catholics. However, Fenianism by no means excluded Protestants from the movement. John Devoy stated that the circle of Edmund O'Donovan, a Dublin Centre, was composed mainly of Protestants and according to the police, Samuel Clampett, a Dublin Centre, was a Protestant. When Clampett was arrested 'he said he was a Protestant and as a consequence a loyal man ... he used a profession of Protestantism to ward off suspicion'.

Disaffection in Ireland did not always lead to revolutionary movements because, by contrast with other countries, a large amount of emigration mitigated discontent. From 1858, when Fenianism was established, to 1870, over 20,000 males emigrated from the county and city of Dublin. Especially the years from 1862 to 1866 saw heavy emigration.

Table 10 : 1 Male emigration from the county and city of Dublin, 1858-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>109.8</td>
<td>1866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>129.8</td>
<td>1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>1868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>229.2</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>133.6</td>
<td>1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>2,561</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Ireland, 1871.

Irish nationalism can explain in a general way why Fenianism appealed to people, but not why in the 1860s a large revolutionary movement spread rapidly among the city's working class. First of all, we examine the economic
background of Dublin Fenianism in the 1860s; secondly, social change, in particular the increase of literacy, provides a clue to our question; thirdly, the way in which Fenianism penetrated the social world of the lower class in Dublin, with social pressures leaving males who moved in a narrow world of work, pub and male mates with little alternative to taking the Fenian oath.

**Economic background**

As part of the economic background to Fenianism, relevant factors are both the economic structure and the course of short-term business cycles. From the 1850s to the mid-1870s, the early 1860s apart, Irish society as a whole enjoyed economic prosperity: bank deposits rose, as did living standards. The expansion of the economy was in part owing to agricultural exports especially livestock to the British market; cattle farming expanded at the expense of tillage, and by the mid-1870s three-quarters of agricultural output was livestock. On the other hand the manufacturing sector outside the north-east declined as a result of the dominance of British factory-made products in the Irish market. In mid-century, in spite of free trade between Ireland and Britain since 1825, high transport costs still prevented British goods from predominating in the Irish market, apart from textiles. However, since mid-century the threat of British competition in the Irish market became more widespread. The Irish traditional crafts were expelled from the market by cheaper goods which Britain - the workshop of the world and the forerunner of the Industrial Revolution - produced. There were a few exceptions to this trend; Guinness's brewery achieved extraordinary success and two industries in Ulster, shipbuilding and linen, also enjoyed prosperity.

This structural transformation of the economy in Ireland into an exporter of cattle to the British market and an importer of British factory goods was clearly reflected in Dublin's economy. In the second half of the nineteenth
century Dublin became a transport centre, importing British products and exporting agricultural products, with the decline of the manufacturing sector. In 1851 28.5 per cent of the city male workforce was engaged in the manufacturing sector and the proportion fell to 22.8 per cent in 1891, while male workers in transport increased from 9.19 per cent in 1851 to 14.3 per cent in 1891. The number of male workers in manufacturing industry in Dublin declined steadily in the second half of the nineteenth century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Workers</th>
<th>% decline since preceding census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>20,992</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>20,192</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>18,580</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>17,628</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>16,751</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Daly, Dublin, p.50.

Table 10:2 demonstrates that the 1860s experienced the most remarkable decline in the second half of the century. The percentage fall in employment between 1861 and 1871 was 8.0 per cent, while in the 1850s it was only 3.8 per cent, and in the 1870s and 1880s respectively only 5.1 per cent and 4.8 per cent. However, the decline was heavily concentrated on tailoring and shoemaking. If the fall in both occupations is excluded, there was little fall in male employment in manufacturing in the 1860s. Only cork cutting offered a comparable rate of decline, and in both decades, but the aggregate numbers in cork cutting were small. The decline in tailoring and shoemaking reflected the
introduction of the sewing machine. British firms, adopting the sewing machine, were able to produce cheaper goods than Irish counterparts. And some Irish firms, by the introduction of the machine, began to replace skilled workers by semi- or unskilled workers including female workers.\textsuperscript{15} From 1861 to 1871, as Table 4:4 shows, shoemakers and bootmakers fell by 17 per cent and tailors fell by 22 per cent. The decline of tailoring and shoemaking is clearly reflected in the fact that shoemakers and tailors were prominent in the Dublin Fenians. Undoubtedly shoemakers and tailors lost employment or were under threat of unemployment, and joined Fenianism probably because they believed that independence would bring employment to them again. Nevertheless, there existed trades, in spite of the influx of British goods into the market, which maintained their production level or even increased it in the 1860s. Such trades also produced many Fenians; from 1861 to 1871 blacksmiths increased by 54 per cent and coopers, associated with the increase in both brewing and distilling, increased by 35 per cent. Therefore we cannot explain the growth of Fenianism merely by the transformation of the structure of the Dublin economy.

The next step in the search for the causes of the development of Dublin Fenianism in the 1860s is to look for the relationship between Fenianism and trade cycles. The Dublin economy was vulnerable not merely to the condition of Irish agriculture but to the state of the British economy. Poor harvests reduced agricultural exports and purchasing power in the countryside, and consequently lowered the level of activity in Dublin as a centre of transport and manufacturing industry in Ireland. In the early 1860s poor harvests resulted in a slump in the Dublin economy.\textsuperscript{16} But the economy, accompanied by the improvement of agriculture by 1864 revived and was in good condition in 1865, when Britain itself experienced the peak of a cyclical boom. The year 1866 witnessed a temporary depression in the Dublin economy caused by the
English financial crisis as well as the Fenian alarm; British capital ceased
to flow into Ireland and in some cases was withdrawn.\textsuperscript{17}

Before concluding examination of the relation between Fenianism and the trade
cycle, we examine food prices and wages to measure the levels of disaffection
among the lower class in Dublin. As there is no comprehensive price index for
nineteenth century Ireland, the price of the 4 lb. loaf of bread in Dublin
markets may be used as a proxy.

\textbf{Table 10 : 3} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{Bread prices 1860-1870, 1865=100}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Note:} From 1860 to 1863 the price of bread was the January price.

\textit{Sources:} \textit{Thom's directory, 1875; Irish Times, 1860-3.}

The early 1860s were marked by higher bread prices, which reflected the bad
harvests but in 1864 the price fell. Thus 1864 to 1866 were years of moderate
prices. From 1866 the price was on the increase again. Table 10 : 4 shows
the comparison of weekly wages of some Dublin trades between 1858 or 1859 and
1869.
### Table 10 : 4  Weekly wages of Dublin trades in 1858, 1859 and 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>bricklayers (s)</th>
<th>carpenters</th>
<th>painters</th>
<th>plasterers</th>
<th>plumbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>cabinetmakers (s)</th>
<th>coachmakers</th>
<th>printers</th>
<th>shipwrights</th>
<th>coopers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858 or 59</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>bakers (s)</th>
<th>basketmakers</th>
<th>brassfounders</th>
<th>bookbinders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858 or 59</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Data for some Dublin trades suggest that artisans not only maintained their wages but that some trades increased them, and in some instances quite sharply. Wages were in fact rising sharply at the end of the period and in a number of occupations as shown elsewhere, the increases between 1867 and 1872 were substantial. Therefore at least in nominal terms wages of artisans in Dublin in the 1860s held up well.

Judging from the evidence of food prices and wages, the years from 1860 to 1863 occasioned hardships for the lower class in Dublin. The situation improved in 1864 and 1865. In 1866, however, conditions began to deteriorate and did so more decisively in 1867 and 1868. From the autumn of 1860, as has
been noted, the Dublin organisation experienced expansion mainly because Luby recruited several able young men, and they succeeded in organising the MacManus funeral in November 1861. Despite the success of the funeral, the Dublin organisation stagnated until the establishment of the Irish People in November 1863. The organisation developed rapidly in 1864 and 1865; two years in which real wages must have improved rapidly. The organisation seems to have kept the level of 1865 or even enlarged it in 1866, in spite of the seizure of the Irish People office in September 1865 and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in February 1866; the number of circles increased from fifteen in 1865 to twenty-three before the rising in February 1867.

The first development of the Dublin organisation from late 1860 to late 1861 coincided with a deterioration in economic conditions possibly caused by the agrarian depression. The second development in 1864 and 1865 took place, when conditions were improving. This period might correspond to the period of relative deprivation when some improvement in conditions whets the appetite for more. But the third phase culminating in the 1867 rising coincided with a downturn in conditions. This might be seen as the J-curve model when a short-term crisis worsened living standards somewhat, and the resultant discontent made people more ready to espouse radical causes. The Dublin Fenians, even though they were not sufficiently prepared, seem to have been mobilised easily by American officers. Thus the study of economic fluctuations gives us some clue to the question but any economic explanation of the movement must be carefully nuanced because the spread of the organisation in 1864 and 1865 had originated in relatively favourable conditions. Overall, however, even in 1866 and 1867 there was no dramatic downturn in business conditions. Irish bank note circulation which had been at a high level in March 1866 had fallen fairly sharply by September 1866, but for the half year to March 1867 there had been an upturn again which was seasonally exceptional. This
recovery was in turn prelude to a sharp upswing which peaked in 1872. The outset of the 1860s apart, it was a prosperous decade, and deep economic discontent was absent.

**Literacy and Fenianism**

Fenianism developed markedly since Fenians launched their organ, the *Irish People*, in November 1863. There is no doubt that the paper was a prime mover in mobilising the lower classes. The increase of literacy among the lower class, by which political awareness arose, was one of the main reasons to account for the development of Fenianism. By the mid-nineteenth century literacy in Ireland increased to such an extent that about half the population could read. Accordingly public opinion, closely associated with the widespread circulation of newspapers, 'hardened and deepened irrevocably in a remarkably homogeneous form of expression'.

The increase of literacy among the lower class was greatly boosted by the national school system introduced in 1831, whose aim was to keep Irish education under state control in order to prevent the growth of a subversive tendency among the Irish people otherwise educated by other institutions. Though the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church also provided education based on their faith outside the national school system, the system increased the number of its schools; 789 national schools with 107,042 pupils in 1833 grew to 5,632 schools with 804,000 pupils in 1860. The 1871 census shows that there were 98 national schools among 257 primary schools in Dublin city and that about 12,000 pupils (48.6 per cent) - the total number was 25,226 - attended national schools. The 1871 census also shows literacy in each occupation - the number of male workers who could read or write. Owing to the national school system, literacy of Dublin male workers was very high.
### Table 10:5  Literacy of Male Workers in Dublin City in 1871.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clerk</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shop assistants</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>draper</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pawnbroker</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goldsmith, silversmith, jeweller</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>printer</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inn keeper, hotel keeper, publican</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>watchmaker, clockmaker</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coachmaker</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gas fitter</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grocer, tea dealer</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>1,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carpenter</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>2,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cabinetmaker</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cork cutter</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silk, tabinet manufacturer</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plumber, painter, glazier</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>1,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saddler, harness, whip maker</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tailor</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>1,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baker</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bricklayer</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooper</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iron manufacturer</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mason</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shoemaker, bootmaker</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>3,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slater</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacksmith</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stone cutter</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawyer</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soldier</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>2,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tanner</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shopkeeper</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general labourer</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>11,488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Census Ireland, 1871.

As we have seen, shop assistants and artisans accounted for about 70 per cent of the Dublin Fenians and unskilled workers represented about 10 per cent. From Table 10:5 shop assistants enjoyed 100 per cent literacy and at least over 85 per cent of artisans were literate, whereas 67.2 per cent of general labourers could read or write. Undoubtedly Fenianism appealed to relatively educated people among the lower class.
The National Board, the supervising body for the national school system, which tried to promote cultural assimilation of Ireland into Britain, completely controlled the school curriculum and published most of the school books. Consequently, at national schools Irish history, which undoubtedly would produce anti-British feeling among the people, was deliberately ignored.

J.F.X. O'Brien, a prominent Fenian leader, stated:

It is easy to understand why the teaching of Irish history is discouraged in our government schools miscalled National Schools; - for the more I read of that terrible history of fraud and oppression the more was my heart filled with hatred of the oppressor -.

Fenians educated people by means of the *Irish People* and after its suppression by the *Irishman*, and by holding political and historical lectures in the Mechanics Institute in particular. Furthermore the influence of the United States, in terms of political education, cannot be disregarded. Emigrants wrote letters about the democratic political system based on republicanism in the United States, and some emigrants with a new political thinking came back to Ireland as 'Returned Yanks' - this is true of Irish American officers after the end of the Civil War.

As in 1855 the stamp tax was abolished, newspapers were more easily accessible to the lower class in the 1860s. This situation was favourable to the *Irish People*, which cost three pence stamped and two pence unstamped. Though we have no information about the circulation of the paper in the city, the effect of the paper was more striking than mere circulation might suggest. It is likely that pubs and barber shops - favourite resorts for Fenians - took in the *Irish People*. Perhaps in these places a single copy of the paper was read by a large number of customers, and even more decisively discussed.
According to the police, the Irish People disseminated democratic ideas among the lower class and tried to wean the people from submission to the Catholic priest in temporal matters. The slogans and doctrines which the Irish People advocated were expressed simply enough for lower class people whose intelligence was not high - though they could read - to be able to understand them. The paper preached that emigration, poverty and the depression of trades were caused by British rule in Ireland, and that national revival could be restored by independence from Britain. Constitutional nationalism was attacked because Daniel O'Connell failed to gain independence from the British Parliament which, in the interest of the British people, always dismissed Irish interests. Therefore, armed rebellion was the only method by which people should secure their independence.

The connection with America and some Fenian leaders' contact with revolutionaries in France made Fenianism a formidable movement; Stephens started the movement based on a republican principle: the Fenian oath showed that Fenians were asked to 'do solemnly swear allegiance to the Irish Republic, now virtually established'. Subsequently the Irish People infused people with democratic and republican ideas, such as the separation of church and state and peasant proprietorship, though for Fenian leaders peasant proprietorship would be achieved only after independence. At the Mechanics Institute Fenians held lectures to propagate their revolutionary spirit among the people; for instance on 5 November 1866 a lecture entitled 'the life and writings of Thomas Davis' was given there.

As a result of such Fenian activities, associated with the increase of literacy among people, shop assistants and artisans by expressing their revolutionary tendency, supported the growth of Fenianism in the 1860s. The
employers in the iron works told the police concerning the feelings of their employees:

When they have remonstrated with them on the folly of their conduct and the absurdity of thinking that any numbers of working men could, by combination, be able to affect the stability of the government, they answer, that they could do what the working men of France had done, who, so often had changed the government of that country.32

The world of Fenians

John Roberts was arrested on 6 March 1867 on a charge of taking part in the rising. He was a cooper and was in constant employment earning at an average 30s per week.33 On the same day the police captured Michael Hart who, according to those who knew him, had a good character and a record of inoffensiveness.34 Why did these people become Fenians? In the 1860s the lower class people in Dublin formed their own world consisting of local communities, workshops, trade unions and leisure activities. Fenianism succeeded in infiltrating this world. Consequently, if people did not become Fenians, they ran the risk of exclusion from it and even of persecution. The police reported that some young men who had refused to become Fenians were forced to emigrate as a result of persecution at fairs and markets.35 It is likely that those who were not interested in Fenianism at all could not help but join the movement.

The nineteenth century saw the outflow of the middle class from the city centre leaving the lower class behind. Accordingly, they were increasingly confined to specialised quarters where they made their own communities. This is strongly confirmed by their marriage patterns, showing that a vast majority of the working class found partners from their neighbourhood.36 Fenianism appealed to certain areas in the city, where Fenians tended to live in close
proximity to fellow Fenians. Therefore, it was very difficult to keep aloof from the movement.

Communities of the Dublin lower class also had a revolutionary tradition. It appears that a majority of the Dublin Fenians were not first generation in the city. They may have inherited the tradition of the United Irishmen, the Emmet rising in 1803, and the Young Irelanders as an oral tradition or folk-memory. About 60 per cent of the Dublin Fenians belonged to the artisan class, and there existed strong occupational continuity from father to son chiefly owing to the trades' restrictive attitude on apprenticeship. Furthermore the 1871 census demonstrates that over 60 per cent of the population were born in the city. Such communities enabled people to inherit certain tradition from past generations; the revolutionary tradition and anti-English feeling derived even from Cromwellian terror in the seventeenth century as folklore. T. Garvin points out as follows:

Family memories often spanned a century or more; these memories were admittedly selective, but surprisingly detailed and accurate. The history of Ireland and its relationships with Britain was often thought of as an extension of these family histories, thereby creating a direct psychological link between the individual, his family and the history of the island as an entity.

Establishments and workshops occupied an important part of the world of Fenians. Foremen, overseers and clerks took a significant part in introducing Fenianism into their establishments. Guinness's brewery was said to be free from Fenianism, because, according to Superintendent Ryan, foremen had actively opposed it:

Many coopers were implicated in the conspiracy. However, it is right I should state that the employees in Mr Guinness's establishment were considered pretty clear of the Fenian mania as himself and his foremen in every department exerted themselves against it.
In December 1866, 515 employees of Guinness James's Gate brewery expressed their opposition to Fenianism. By way of contrast, Manders' brewery was said to produce many Fenians as a result of the activity of Richard Bracken, a clerk. Consequently, Fenians made every effort either to recruit foremen, overseers and clerks or to replace non-Fenians holding such positions by Fenians.

Mr Ross of the firm of Ross & Murray, plumbers, received a threatening letter asking him to dismiss two Scottish foremen in his workshop. Superintendent Ryan concluded that 'the letter was written by some Fenian in the employment who finding that the Scotchmen could not be induced to wink at Fenianism, or tolerate anything connected with it, sought to get them removed with a view if possible to have them replaced by men who would permit the manufacture of bullets in the establishment'. It is likely that foremen exercised their power not to employ any man who was not a Fenian and endeavoured to make Fenians of all fellow workers; and probably workers who refused in taking the Fenian oath were forced to give up their employment. Indeed, Cromien, the overseer of the works at Augustine Church, John's Lane, and Thomas Egan, foreman in the timber and building yard of Messrs McDowell, were reported not to employ any men who were not or would not be a Fenian. But in some cases Fenian infiltration into establishments was effectively prevented by employers dismissing Fenians or suspicious persons. Charles Moorehouse, clerk at the distillery of John Power, was discharged because of his connection with Fenianism.

Trade unions were very important institutions for artisans because trade unions gave various benefits, such as unemployment, superannuation and sick allowances, to members. There is no evidence that trade unions supported Fenianism actively. Trade unions avoided political matters and instead
concentrated their efforts on bread and butter problems. Frank Rooney, a Belfast Fenian and a member of the Friendly Society of Iron Founders of England, Ireland and Wales, described the procedure of the society:

The ties binding its members were its benefits. Strike, out-of-work, sick, death and superannuation benefits were the only links I could see holding it together... Political and related matters were strictly prohibited.45

Undoubtedly many Fenians were members of trade unions. After Laurence O'Toole became a crown witness at the Dublin Special Commission after the rising, his father, a tailor, was deprived of any benefits allowed by the trade union.46 Though trade unions did not discuss political matters at their formal meetings, they provided a focal point for artisans of the same trade. Therefore once some members of a trade union were recruited by Fenians, the trade union turned to be a good recruiting ground for Fenianism. Perhaps its members took the Fenian oath by intimidation or temptation of a fellow member who had already joined the movement.

Fenianism, as R.V. Comerford points out, provided social outlets to the lower class young men who were excluded from the establishment; as we have seen, most Fenians were young men.47 Superintendent Ryan reported that bricklayers, carpenters and painters in Kingstown were 'ambitious to make themselves appear important' and that 'consequently they have always taken a prominent part in political movements especially in the Fenian movement'.48 Furthermore, through Fenianism migrants from outside Dublin found 'the camaraderie that helped integrate them into their new urban environment'.49 This was true of drapers' assistants, working in department stores, the so-called 'monster houses'. According to John Devoy, draper s'assistants 'were all country boys and were a fine set of fellows'.50 This is supported by the fact that 95 per cent of the staff of Clery's department store in 1901 came from outside Dublin.51 The
occupation of clerks produced Fenians for the same reason. For example William Stack, a prominent Fenian in swearing in soldiers, was a native of County Kerry.

Young men seeking social outlets found their place in Fenianism by spending their leisure hours with fellow Fenians. One of the reasons for the growth of Fenianism was the success of Fenian infiltration into leisure activities of young men. For the rank and file Fenian membership generally speaking involved attendance at meetings in pubs and at drilling sessions. As most Fenians, except prominent leaders, had jobs - in those days town workers worked up to fourteen hours a day - their own free time began at about 7 or 8 p.m. on weekdays and they had a free day on Sundays. This is reflected in Fenian activities such as meetings and drilling sessions. Most meetings and drilling were held between 8 and 11 o'clock in the evening and on Sundays Fenians drilled in the suburbs.

During this period pubs were a centre of recreation of town workers - 'For the single man in lodgings the pub was the closest thing to a home - here he would take his meals and read the newspapers. And always there was beer....Thus in an age of social dislocation ... the pub remained a centre of warmth, light and sociability for the urban poor'. The increase of beer consumption particularly from the 1850s - the growth of the Guinness's brewery - also suggests the importance of pubs in lower class leisure. One of the reasons why pubs were popular lay in the wretchedness of people's housing; most working people in Dublin lived in a tenement (people shared a large house of three or four storeys with many families). A police magistrate of Dublin before the Select Committee in 1877 reported:

As a sanitary magistrate I have come to the conclusion that anything like the vile abomination, the filth, and the squalid and helpless
misery of those unhealthy overcrowded tenements is not to be found elsewhere...but anything like the horrid condition in which most of those houses are you could not possibly conceive unless you were a police magistrate. Their yards reeking with filth and abomination, the halls and staircases neglected, the lathe falling, and the plaster falling off, and the people, let them be ever so well inclined and their ideas ever so decent, are liable to those nuisances beyond their control. The hall door is generally open all night, the lobby is common to a half a dozen families, and the family in the next room may be a most miserable, squalid, and drunken lot, and what are the others to do.56

Fenian meetings in pubs were convivial creating a friendly and pleasant atmosphere. After finishing Fenian business, such as collecting money for the purchase of arms and the addresses of leaders, Fenians drank and sang songs of a Fenian character.57

Another Fenian recreation which appealed to the lower class was drilling. During our period, drilling exercises also attracted the attention of the working class in Britain, where in 1859 the volunteer force, as a reaction to the French threat, was established chiefly by the initiative of the middle class.58 By the 1870s a large number of young working men joined the volunteer force. It is generally explained that 'it was the opportunities for recreation and camaraderie, rather than the appeal to patriotism, that pulled in these part-time soldiers.'59 This explanation also applied to Fenian drilling. Probably some young men enjoyed drilling for physical fitness. Furthermore the Fenians conducted drilling exercises in suburbs on Sundays. In those days the artisan class in Dublin often took a walk towards the mountains and seas on Sundays; their favourite places were the Phoenix Park, Dollymount and Sandymount.60 This recreational tendency made it easier for Fenians to organise drilling sessions outside the city centre on Sundays. In this way Fenianism provided young men with recreation and fraternity, so even those without marked revolutionary fervour may easily have joined the movement.
Economic difficulties, the increase of literacy and the presence of an almost self-contained world of artisans and shop assistants in which the Fenians circulated may help to explain the reason for the growth of Fenianism in the 1860s. These factors were closely related to each other. Obviously it is a myth that young men became Fenians simply through patriotism. Some Fenians joined the movement not because of their patriotism but because of intimidation by fellow Fenians or in the search for recreation. However, it is impossible to know what proportion of the Dublin Fenians consisted of such people. On the other hand, there existed, as the Dublin rising showed, serious and patriotic Fenians in the Dublin organisation. What is certain is that Fenianism was the Irish lower class people's reaction against British rule in Ireland. John O'Leary claimed:

If the English had not come to Ireland, and if they had not stayed there and done all the evil so many of them now allow they have been doing all along, then there would have been no Fenianism.61

In its leadership, in its cadres of As and Bs within circles and in its membership of artisans and clerks, it reflected a novel articulateness of the lower classes. Unlike the United Irishmen and the Young Irelanders, it owed little to the upper middle classes, and represented a novel and broader basis for articulate political thought. Fenianism has often been dismissed either as a debacle or, in the realm of ideals, as an instance of the romantic triumph of failure in the long run. But it was more. It was at the time, even if badly led and encumbered with an unworkable structure of external officers divorced from the 'grass-roots' milieu of Centres, a formidable organisation. This was reflected too in the fact that police penetration of the organisation was limited. The police relied largely on hearsay, and above all on observation. They recruited as agents before their arrest no As, and remarkably few Bs.
The police dimension of the Fenians is almost as intriguing as the organisation itself. The Dublin police were, judging by their names, in the main Catholic and Irish. The police reports are largely passionless, they display no racial or religious antipathy, and in a sense breathe understanding rather than dislike of the Fenians. There was no police illegality or brutality, in other words precious little police action that might itself become a vehicle of propaganda. This was in itself a marked contrast with the 'policing' of the 1790s. Action too by the authorities was circumspect, and Lord Strathnairn's outlook seems to have been cautious but unpartisan. This itself enhanced the victory of the authorities in the aftermath of the rising, because the only propaganda argument left to the Fenians was the harsh condition of prisoners doing penal servitude in England. The behaviour of the authorities was one of the fruits of professionalisation of law and order, and in a sense helped to make their post-rebellion task easier.

The true measure of the Fenian conspiracy is the unease it created. The police complacency of the early 1860s was never repeated; the 'political' reporting of the G division was now institutionalised, just as in London the secret service originated ultimately from the new division created to deal with the Fenian problem. The Catholic Church too, whose condemnations were ignored by Fenians in the 1860s, feared it, and out of this fear grew the insistent propaganda of later decades that secret societies were not only dangerous but that members left themselves open to betrayal by spies. The irony of this is that it did less than justice both to the Fenians and to the police.
Chapter Ten: Footnotes


15. Ibid., p.15.


18. See Table 9 : 9.


22. Ibid., pp 6-7.
23. N.L.I., J.F.X. O'Brien papers, MS 16 695, p.149.
27. Ibid., 11 Feb. 1865; 15 July 1865.
30. *Irish People*, 4 June 1864; 30 July 1864.
36. Daly, *Dublin*, p.145.
37. Ibid., p.137.
43. Acting Supt Hughes to C.P., 25 Apr. 1866 (C.S.O., R.P. 1866/8191 on 1866/10790); Supt Ryan to C.P., 1 Apr. 1867 (C.S.O., R.P. 1867/5820).
44. Supt Ryan to C.P., 21 Sept. 1869, (S.P.O., F papers 4583R).
47. Comerford, 'Patriotism as pastime', pp 111-12.


51. Daly, Dublin, p.142.


53. See Supt Ryan to C.P., 16 May 1865 (S.P.O., F.P.R. 161).


56. Report from the select committee on sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday (Ireland) Bill, H.C. 1877 (198), xvi, p.126.

57. See C.S.O., R.P. 1867/7199.


59. Ibid., p.96.

60. Report from the select committee on the sale of liquors on Sunday (Ireland) Bill, H.C. 1867-8 (280), xiv.

61. O'Leary, Fenians and Fenianism, vol i, p.78.
LOCATION OF ARRESTED DUBLIN FENIANS

NUMBER OF FENIANS ARRESTED

- 1 - 4
- 5 - 9
- 10 - 20

Public houses
Drilling places
Boundary of the City of Dublin

CIRCULAR ROAD
MOUNTJOY SQUARE
RUTLAND SQUARE
LINEN HALL
TRINITY COLLEGE
GRAND CANAL HARBOUR

1. LYING-IN HOSPITAL
2. BARRACKS
3. BLUECOAT HOSPITAL
4. THE FOURCOURTS
5. THE CUSTOM HOUSE
6. PARLIAMENT HOUSE
7. CHRISTCHURCH CATHEDRAL
8. ST. PATRICKS CATHEDRAL

367
31st March, 1867

TALLYAGHT HILLS
ON THE
MARCH

Dublin District
لالن
Colonial Whites desam
Cranston

Park or demesne
Dunliff Castle
3. St. Peter's
2. Christchurch
1. The Four Courts
City of Dublin

Railway
Town with barracks

Town of Village

Turner's Mill

O'Donnell's Mill

Johnson's Mills

Large number dispersed without hope

Dublin Bay

2 miles
1 miles
0 miles

368
The amount of money paid to informers (per week)
Primary Sources

I. Manuscript Sources

British Library

Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn) papers, MSS 42821-6

National Archives (State Paper Office)

Chief Secretary's Office: registered papers.

Police and crime records, Fenian papers:

- F papers, 1866-74;
- Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, abstracts of cases, 1866-8;
- Fenianism, index of names, 1866-71;
- Fenian crown briefs;
- Fenian police reports, 1864-5;
- A files, 1864-8, 1877-83;
- Fenian suspects photographs.

National Library of Ireland

Samuel Lee Anderson papers, MS 5964.

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