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A Seventeenth Century Survivor: *The Political Career of Randal MacDonnell, First Marquis and Second Earl of Antrim (1609-83)*

Volume I
A Seventeenth Century Survivor: The political career of Randal MacDonnell, first marquis and second earl of Antrim (1609-83)

Jane Helen Ohlmeyer

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis is entirely the product of my own work and has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other university. I agree that the library of Trinity College, Dublin may lend or copy this thesis upon request.

JANE H. OHLMEYER
Summary

Condemned and scorned by his more influential contemporaries and largely ignored by later historians, the first marquis of Antrim was nevertheless (as George Hill, historian of the MacDonnell family, quite rightly observed) 'destined to take a prominent place in the affairs of Ulster, and indeed of Ireland, during the greater part of the seventeenth century'.

1 This study - based on documents housed in Irish, British, Continental and North American archives and libraries - provides a critical, chronological account of the life of an important catholic statesman who, thanks to his Irish patrimony, his Scottish ancestry and his marriage to an English heiress, enjoyed rare prominence in all the three kingdoms of the Stuart monarchy.

The thesis focuses on Antrim's political career between his marriage to the duchess of Buckingham in 1635 and his restoration to his County Antrim estates in 1665 and on how he survived the political, social and economic upheavals of the intervening years with his lands and political power largely intact. Chapters one and two discuss the physical and mental world in which he operated: the impact of the physical environment on his actions, ambitions and behaviour; his resources - both human and landed - and his ability

1 George Hill, An Historical Account of the MacDonnells of Antrim including notices of some other septs, Irish and Scottish (Belfast, 1873; reprinted 1978), p. 252.
to manage them; the role of indebtedness in his life; his position at the Stuart court and his skill in manipulating factional groupings to his own advantage. The remainder of the study addresses Antrim’s role in, and his contribution to, the great political and military events of the mid-seventeenth century: his part in the royalist suppression of the Scottish covenanters during the Bishops’ Wars and in the ‘war of the three kingdoms’ (chapters three, five and six); his role in the various ‘popish plots’ of the early 1640s, especially the ‘Antrim plot’ of spring 1641 (chapter four); his relationship with the Irish insurgents after the outbreak of rebellion in 1641 and his position in the confederation of Kilkenny (chapters four to eight); his relations with the Cromwellians during the 1650s and with the Restoration government in the 1660s (chapters nine and ten).

Motivated almost exclusively by dynastic ambition, Antrim was prepared to offer his services (as a powerful Ulster magnate, as a troop raiser and as a privateering entrepreneur) to whoever was in a position to protect his catholic, celtic inheritance. Antrim’s resourcefulness, his determination, his willingness to compromise - together with a measure of ‘good luck’ - all helped him to survive. But his ‘secret weapon’ was the political geography of the lands around the Dalriadic Sea, situated on the very periphery of Stuart Britain and united only by the sea and by the leader of Clan Donald.
Randal MacDonnell, first marquis and second earl of Antrim (1609-83). Painted at the Restoration.
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Secondly, I would like to thank the following people who have allowed me to draw on their expert knowledge and have offered support and encouragement throughout: Dr John Adamson, Dr Jerrold Casway, Kathleen Colquhoun, Tom Connors, Father Donal Cregan, Dr Peter Donald, Dr Raymond Gillespie, Professor Caroline Hibbard, Robert Hunter, Phil Kilroy, Dr Peter Le Fevre, Professor John Lynn, Br Íd McGrath, Dr John Morrill, Professor Geoffrey Parker, Trevor Parkhill, Professor Michael Perceval-Maxwell, Professor Peter Roebuck, Professor Conrad Russell, Dr Kevin Sharpe, Dr Victor Treadwell and Dr Kevin Whelan. I would particularly like to thank the Honourable Hector McDonnell for reading this manuscript and for making numerous helpful and incisive comments. I am also grateful to Julie Fawcett and Bruce Swann for helping me to translate some Latin, Spanish and Italian items.

Finally, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Aidan Clarke, who gave me his time, advice and support with unlimited generosity. My greatest debt, however, is to my family - especially my husband Geoffrey and my mother Shirley - who, from the outset, have unstintingly supported my research and without whose encouragement and enthusiasm this thesis would never have been possible.
Note on dates, currencies and spelling

Dates throughout are given according to the Old (Julian) Calendar, which was used in Britain but not in catholic Europe. The beginning of each year is taken, however, as 1 January rather than 25 March. It has been assumed, unless specifically stated otherwise, that foreign catholics writing from Britain in the seventeenth century and that British persons writing from catholic Europe dated their correspondence according to the New (Gregorian) Style, which was ten days ahead of the Julian calendar.

As far as possible, all foreign currencies have been given with a rough conversion into pounds sterling at the exchange rates prevailing at the time, as follows:

13 Brabant florins
4.5 Spanish escudos
12 livres tournois

£1

Spellings from contemporary sources have been modernised. With proper names, too, the modern spellings have been preferred. Quotes from Spanish, French, Italian and Latin sources have all been translated in the interests of consistency and comprehensibility.
Abbreviations and Conventions

A.G.S. Archivo General, Simancas
A.G.S.,C.M.C. - , Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas
A.G.S.,Eo. - , Secretaría de Estado
A.G.S.,G.A. - , Guerra Antigua
A.G.S.,T.M.C. - , Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas
A.G.R. Archives Générales du Royaume
A.G.R.,S.E.G. - , Secrétairerie d'Etat et de Guerre
A.H.N. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
A.H.N.,Eo. Libro - , Sección de Estado, Libro
A.M.A.E., Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris

Anal.Hib. Anaelecta Hibernica, including the reports of the Irish Manuscripts Commission (Dublin, 1930- )

Archiv.Hib Archivium Hibernicum: or Irish historical record (Catholic Record Society of Ireland, Maynooth, 1912- )

B.L. British Library
B.L.,Add.MSS - , Additional MSS
B.L.,Eg.MSS - , Egerton MSS
B.L.,Harl.MSS - , Harleian MSS
B.L.,Lansd.MSS - , Lansdowne MSS

B.N. Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris

Bibl. Apost. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome

Bodl. Bodleian Library, Oxford

Cal.S.P.Dom., Calendar of state papers, domestic 1635-6 [etc.], (London, 1866- )

Cal.S.P.Ire., Calendar of state papers relating to 1625-32 [etc.] Ireland, 1625-32 [etc.], (London, 1900- )

Cal.S.P.Ven., Calendar of state papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice 1642-3 [etc.], (London, 1925- )

C.U.L. Cambridge University Library
C.U.L., Add. - , Additional MSS

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Egmont (H.M.C., 2 vols., London, 1905-9)

Franciscan MSS Report on Franciscan manuscripts preserved at the Convent, Merchants' Quay, Dublin (H.M.C., Dublin, 1906)


H.M.C. Historical Manuscripts Commission

H.M.C. rep.1 [etc.] Historical Manuscripts Commission, first [etc.] report (London, 1870-)

H.L.R.O. House of Lords Record Office

Hunt. Huntington Library, San Marino, California

Hunt. HA MSS -, Hastings MSS

Innes Review Innes Review: Journal of the Scottish Catholic Historical Association (Glasgow, 1950-)


Ir. Econ. & Soc. Hist. Irish Economic and Social History: the Journal of the Economic and History Society of Ireland (Dublin and Belfast, 1974-)

viii
Ireland

Ir. Sword

The Irish Sword: the journal of the
Military History Society of Ireland
(Dublin, 1949– )

Laud

Works

The works of...William Laud...Archbishop
of Canterbury, eds. W. Scott and J.
Bliss (7 vols., Oxford, 1847-60)

Montagu MSS

Report on the manuscripts of Lord
Montagu of Beaulieu (H.M.C., London,
1900)

N.H.I.

A New History of Ireland (Oxford, 1976–)

N.L.I.

National Library of Ireland

N.L.S.

National Library of Scotland

N.L.S., Adv. MSS -, Advocates Manuscripts

N.L.S., Wod. MSS -, Wodrow Manuscripts

N.S.

New series; or, in dating, New Style

Ormonde MSS

Report on the manuscripts of the duke of
Ormonde, N.S. (H.M.C., 8 vols., London
1902-1920)

P.R.O.

Public Record Office of England

P.R.O., H.C.A. -, High Court of Admiralty

P.R.O., L.C. -, Lord Chamberlain’s Department

P.R.O., S.P. -, State Papers

P.R.O.I.

Public Record Office of Ireland

P.R.O.N.I.

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland

R.C.B.

Representative Church Body, Dublin

R.C.B., MS Libr. -, Manuscript Library

Reg. privy
council Scot.,

Register of the privy council of
Scotland, 2nd series, ii, 1630–2 [etc.]
(Edinburgh, 1902– )

R.Hist Soc.

Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society (London, 1872– )

R.I.A.

Royal Irish Academy

R.I.A. Proc.

Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy
(Dublin, 1836– )

S.H.R.

Scottish Historical Review (Glasgow,
1903– )

S.R.O.

Scottish Record Office

S.R.O., G.D. -, Gifts and Deposits

Seanchas

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<td>Trinity College Dublin</td>
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Introduction: Antrim and the Historians

I

Arrogant, condescending, crafty, calculating, childish, fickle, greedy, headstrong, haughty, indiscreet, impatient, importuning, interfering, loudmouthed, manipulative, myopic, perfidious, pretentious, self-centered, uncooperative and whining: these are merely a selection of the adjectives used by his contemporaries to describe the personality of Randal MacDonnell, second earl and first marquis of Antrim, the subject of this study. And the criticisms started at the top. Lords lieutenant Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, and James Butler, duke of Ormond, were his most vocal and malevolent critics. The former denigrated and ridiculed Antrim at every opportunity. 'That lord hath much of the Irish in him. Whatsoever they desire must be done: and in their own time forsooth, or else they presently fall out with you' began one letter to Archbishop Laud, continuing ' [he is] all for ostentation, no moderate thing will suffice, as if land and sea and all were to minister to [his] glory'.

Many members of the Old English, the New English, the presbyterian and even the native Irish communities clearly shared this contempt for Antrim. For instance, his disloyalty to the Stuart cause during the 1640s

1 Wentworth to Laud, [September] 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 131v).
particularly rankled with the powerful grandee, Ulick Burke, earl of Clanricard, who alleged spitefully that he had 'gained the reputation of pulling down the side he is on'.2 His 'differing tempers' (read: temper tantrums) infuriated everyone. Ormond suggested that one particular outburst in 1644 'proceeded rather from some present passion or resentment, than from any settled solution'; while his catholic colleagues in the confederation of Kilkenny (catholic Ireland's governing body between 1642 and 1649) attributed his unpredictable behaviour 'to his own inclination, his youth and want of experience'.3 But it was Antrim's 'vanity' and 'boastfulness' which attracted most adverse comment. According to one observer, he might 'promise very largely: but I presume your excellency [Ormond] guesses whereabout the balance of the account will be'; while another waspishly suggested that 'a good piece of battery is much more powerful to take in a castle than is his lordship's oratory'.4

Contemporary historians shared - and thereby perpetuated - this unflattering image. Sir Richard

2 Clanricard to Fanshawe, 27 August 1651 (Ormonde MSS, i, 194).

3 Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (William Knowler (ed.), The earl of Strafforde's letters and despatches,... (2 vols., London, 1739), ii, 335-6); Wentworth to Laud, [April] 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 181v); Ormond to Antrim, 1 June 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 139); Supreme council to Ormond, 30 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, ff 67-v).

4 Trevor to Ormond, 9 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 57); Barry to Ormond, 18 April 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., iii, 150).
Bellings, a much respected politician and author of *Fragmentum Historicum: or, the Second and Third Books of the War in Ireland*, portrayed him as bombastic, pompous, two-faced, conniving and untrustworthy. In another near-contemporary history of the Irish civil war, Antrim's stupidity, vanity and self-interest were vigorously condemned - for, according to the author, he only deluded 'his maggot paled brains with a dream of being great'. The English statesman and historian Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, openly admitted that he was never 'fond' of Antrim and found him vain, presumptuous, undiscerning and of limited intelligence.

To quote further condemnations of Antrim, which are extremely numerous, would be both boring and pointless. Suffice it to say that the opinions and writings of these men - the majority of whom were either political opponents or jealous rivals - have

5 *Desid. cur. Hib.*, pp 241-5, 249-51. Bellings, for instance, believed that Antrim had betrayed the confederate cause in 1644: 'for the lord of Antrim coming to Oxford with so large a trust from the confederates, he made a double return, being magnified at court upon the account of the confederates, and at Waterford upon the score of his favour at court' (p. 244).

6 N.L.I., Plunkett MSS 345, pp 942-3, 946.

left a permanent blemish on the marquis's historical reputation which has influenced the writings of later historians. Thus in his eighteenth century life of the duke of Ormond, Thomas Carte clearly followed the bias of his hero despite his claim that 'I have been very particular in my account of the marquis of Antrim... I am sure I have been very impartial'.

The nineteenth century historian, Sir John Gilbert, dismissed him as 'well meaning but unstable' as did S. R. Gardiner who, in his influential *History of England*, dubbed Antrim 'a weak and inefficient catholic peer'. Richard Bagwell, author of the only comprehensive narrative account of Stuart Ireland to date, described Antrim as 'a man of much ambition and some cunning, but his practical abilities were small, and neither Strafford, Ormonde nor Clarendon rated him highly'.

Hardly surprisingly, then, such recent scholarly attention as the marquis has attracted is largely unfavourable:

Jerrold Casway in his biography of General Owen Roe O'Neill described Antrim as 'vain and impulsive', while a recent biographer of Montrose dismissed him as 'a stage Irishman...with no money, no brains, and a limitless supply of charm and vain promises...

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8 Carte, *Ormond*, i, xii.


married the blowsy, aging widow of the duke of Buckingham'.

One objective of this study will therefore be to establish the degree to which Antrim deserved his dismal reputation. Did he, for instance, like his contemporary Sir Piers Crosby, suffer 'the dual misfortune of crossing Wentworth's path and being remembered only by what Wentworth wrote of him'? Certainly this was also true of Richard Boyle, first earl of Cork, for as Nicholas Canny has recently noted:

'Despite the several acknowledgements of his importance, historians have viewed Boyle from a distance, and would appear to have been repelled by the aura of suspicion which surrounded him in his own lifetime. Consequently, what is known of Boyle comes from official records, or the frequently hostile correspondence of his contemporaries'.

A second objective is simply to provide a more balanced account of the life of an important Irish statesman who (as the MacDonnell family historian quite rightly observed) was 'destined to take a prominent place in the affairs of Ulster, and indeed of Ireland,

---


during the greater part of the seventeenth century'.

As yet there is no critical biography - witness a recent call by Strafford's biographer, Hugh Kearney, for a fresh analysis of the role played by the MacDonnells of Antrim in the events of the later 1630s and 1640s. The only serious account of his career was written over a century ago by George Hill who, in his history of the MacDonnells of Antrim, devoted a long chapter to the marquis and published many of the seminal documents relating to his life. But, for all its merits, his narrative is chaotically arranged and often inaccurate: moreover, though he used every source available to him in the nineteenth century, he did not have access to the important collections of papers (such as the Hamilton manuscripts) which were then in private hands, or to documents in European and North American archives. Apart from Hill, Antrim's career has only been noted by recent historians when it impinged upon Scottish history: his role in the First

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14 George Hill, An Historical Account of the MacDonnells of Antrim including notices of some other septs, Irish and Scottish (Belfast, 1873; reprinted 1978), p. 252. Yet even Hill, in The Stewarts of Ballintoy: with notices of other families of the district in the seventeenth century (reprint, Ballycastle, 1976), p. 8, described him as 'imprudent, ambitious and unprincipled'.


16 Hill, MacDonnells, chapter 5.
Bishops' War of 1638-9 and his contribution to the Scottish war effort in 1644-5.17

Unfortunately this dearth of secondary literature is not particularly unusual: apart from the Boyle family - particularly Nicholas Canny's refreshing, thematic study of Richard Boyle, first earl of Cork - very few seventeenth century Irish figures have commanded any serious, recent scholarly attention at all.18 Unlike Professor Canny's biography of The Upstart Earl, however, this study takes a more traditional chronological approach. It focuses on Antrim's political career between his marriage to the duchess of Buckingham in 1635 and his restoration to his County Antrim estates in 1665; and on how he survived the great political, social and economic upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century. Chapters one and two discuss the physical and mental world in which


he operated: the impact of the physical environment on his actions, ambitions and behaviour; his resources — both human and territorial — and his ability to manage them; the role of indebtedness in his life; his position at the Stuart court, and his skill in manipulating factional groupings to his own advantage. The remainder of the study addresses Antrim's role in, and his contribution to, the great political and military events of the mid-seventeenth century: his part in the royalist suppression of the Scottish covenanters during the Bishops' Wars and in the 'war of the three kingdoms' (chapters three, five and six); his role in the various 'popish plots' of the early 1640s, especially the 'Antrim plot' of spring 1641 (chapter four); his relationship with the Irish insurgents after the outbreak of rebellion in 1641 and his position in the catholic confederacy (chapters four to eight); his relations with the Cromwellians during the 1650s and with the Restoration government in the 1660s (chapters nine and ten).

II

However, for all its advantages, a chronological framework gives rise to an obvious limitation: it tends to underplay the continuities and constants which shaped and moulded Antrim's career, and thus prevents him from being seen in the context of his own times. It obscures the salient themes which appeared and reappeared throughout his complex life.
Antrim's own 'agenda' would probably have stressed three pertinent facts: physical geography, political geography and inherited values. In the first place, the geographical setting of Antrim's world was of paramount importance in his life. In the early modern period distance was 'public enemy number one' and the marquis's territorial and political base was far from the centre of power. His traditional world stretched from the Hebridean islands of Uist, Skye, Rum and Canna in the north to Kintyre and Jura in the east and to County Antrim in the west, encompassing some of the most remote and inaccessible regions of Stuart Britain. Inaccessible, that is, by land. Though there were 'several high ways' linking Glenarm with the more northerly towns of the county, overland travel was almost impossible without a guide since 'the lower ways are deep clay, and the upper ways great and steep hills'.19 But one could travel easily between the outposts of Antrim's world by sea. Thus the North Channel between Torr Head and Kintyre was only twelve miles wide and on a fine day could be crossed in a matter of hours (while, by contrast, the journey to London - via Dublin - could take between seven and ten days even in good weather). It was the sea, not the land, which united the MacDonald/MacDonnell archipelago.20

19 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 386.

20 For a detailed discussion of the close links between MacDonalds and MacDonnells see Stevenson, Scottish
This physical proximity between Ulster and Western Scotland also facilitated social interaction at every level. Indeed, to all intents and purposes, gaelic Ireland and gaelic Scotland 'were parts of the same ethos' and had formed a single cultural, linguistic and even political entity since earliest times. The fact that a peculiar dialect, known as 'Highland Irish', was spoken in County Antrim well into the eighteenth century reflected this symbiotic relationship; as did the king's preference (during the mid-1640s) for sending troops from Ulster to fight in Scotland 'as agreeing perfectly with the highlanders in their


manners and language'. The location of Antrim's power base on the periphery of Britain, which was a particularly 'high risk' area during the early modern period, and the cultural homogeneity of his followers, made him a particularly valuable asset to all other political figures.

At the same time political events in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, in England both influenced and served as a motor for the marquis's career. As his determination to preserve MacDonald-MacDonnell influence and reduce that of Clan Campbell in Western Scotland admirably illustrates, Antrim was not 'merely Irish'; but rather a gaelic lord of Highland extraction with a vested interest in Scottish and (after his marriage to the duchess of Buckingham in 1635) in English affairs. His cosmopolitan heritage in fact offered him three potential theatres of action, and this was particularly pertinent during the 'war of the three kingdoms' of the 1640s. The conflict between Charles I and his various groups of subjects created opportunities and openings for the enterprising marquis which would otherwise have been denied him: thwarted in


Ireland, he could always try his luck in Scotland or even in England. 'Public comotions' had become (as one covenanter pointed out) Antrim's 'private subsistence'.

Of almost equal importance were the political events in western Europe, especially the conflict between the Bourbons and Habsburgs, for Antrim's willingness to serve as a diplomat, as a military entrepreneur or eventually as a privateer drew him into the European theatre of war and so transformed — for him at least — the 'war of the three kingdoms' into a 'war of five kingdoms'. Moreover war provided him with an opportunity to flex, as chief of the MacDonnell's, his military muscles, for the ability to muster and lead his kinsmen and followers — whether in Ireland, Scotland or Flanders — played an important part in determining his status in the eyes of both gaelic and royalist contemporaries.

The final and overriding constant was Antrim's 'tribal' ambition to use every artifice available to him in order to preserve his inheritance intact. He was determined to further consolidate the MacDonnell


25 Attempts have been made to set seventeenth century Ireland in its European context. See for instance Donal F. Cregan, 'Some members of the Confederation of Kilkenny', in Sylvester O'Brien (ed.), Measgra Cúlmaich Mhichil Uí Chleirigh (Dublin, 1944), p. 34 and Michael J. Hynes, 'The Irish Republic in the seventeenth century' in The Catholic Historical Review, xxiii, no. 3 (Oct. 1937), pp 293-4.
foothold in East Ulster; to regain the forfeited lands of Clan Donald South (Kintyre and Jura) which were controlled by the earls of Argyll; and, in addition, to keep his corner of Stuart Britain catholic. But Antrim’s Scottish ancestry, his Irish upbringing and his determination to uphold these gaelic values created a personal dilemma for him. On the one hand, he wished to preserve catholic Ireland, to see Clan Donald rise again in both Ireland and Scotland with him at its head, and to protect the great families of catholic Ulster; while, on the other, he hoped to secure political power in protestant England and favour at the Caroline court. In short, he sincerely wanted to succeed in, and to be accepted by, two very different worlds. Strafford captured the dilemma exactly in a letter to Laud written after a meeting with Antrim in the spring of 1639:

‘His lordship was in [as] differing tempers as ever I saw; sometimes the grand-child of great Tyrone...and sometimes again he descended and became more merciful and gracious, indeed, even to make himself like one of ourselves, such was his gentleness and civility’.

His divided loyalties, occasionally amounting almost to an identity crisis, help to explain his inconsistent behaviour, particularly during the 1640s.

III

Nevertheless, while keeping these 'constants' in mind, there is one overriding reason why a framework

26 Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 335-6).
that is chronological - the timetable of others - must be preferred over one that is thematic: the absence of 'a body of "master" records'.27 The 'Antrim archive' presently housed in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland consists of two hundred boxes (the majority of which remain uncatalogued) containing grants, warrants, maps, land surveys and leases relating almost exclusively to the Antrim estate; roughly forty-three of these contain seventeenth century material.28 But although the Antrim papers are extensive and seminal for any study of his Irish property, they unfortunately contain virtually no personal correspondence. Instead one is forced to rely on letters written to or by the marquis which have been preserved among the papers of his contemporaries. In all, over two hundred of his own letters have been located and used in this study; but, sadly, the majority of them are terse, allusive and distinctly uninformative. Only a handful (largely to his great friend, the marquis of Hamilton, and to his first wife, Geoffrey R. Elton, The Practice of History (London, 1967), p. 93.

Katherine Villiers, dowager duchess of Buckingham) can be considered either intimate or revealing.29

Writing an authoritative history of Antrim, or indeed of any seventeenth century Irish grandee during this period, is further frustrated by the destruction of the records of the Irish government and of the confederation of Kilkenny which almost all perished either in the Four Courts fire in 1922 or in other less spectacular disasters.30 However, this is partly compensated by the survival of a substantial amount of material relating to Antrim among the administrative records of the English and Scottish governments. The papers of the English High Court of Admiralty, for example, detail the fortunes of his privateering frigates, while the archive of the parliamentary committee of compounding sheds light on his English interests, and the records of the Scottish privy council report his activities in the Western Isles.

The destruction of so much material in 1922 nevertheless makes it necessary to search more widely

29 A considerable number of Antrim’s letters are printed in Knowler, Letters; Carte, Ormond; Gilbert, Ir. confed.; Comment. Rinucc.; Cal. S. P., Ire.; and in various contemporary newspapers and pamphlets. The remainder are located among the unpublished papers of the earl of Strafford (Sheffield City Library), the duke of Ormond (Bodleian Library, Oxford), the marquis of Hamilton (Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh) and the state papers (Public Record Office, London).

30 This can be partly compensated by a careful scrutiny of the transcripts of documents now lost made by contemporary, and later, antiquarians and historians — men such as the earl of Clarendon, Edmund Borlase, Thomas Carte, Sir John T. Gilbert, J.P. Prendergast, P.H. Hore, C.H. Firth and S.R. Gardiner.
for documentation. Firstly, other third-party sources, especially those compiled by or for the English government, are particularly rich. These include the papers of government ministers and politicians - royalist and cromwellian alike - in Dublin and London: influential figures such as Lords Strafford, Ormond, Hamilton and Clarendon or Charles Fleetwood, Henry Ireton and Henry Cromwell all had to deal with Antrim. These collections not only contain much pertinent correspondence, but also illuminate the nature of the marquis's relationship with leading political figures in all three Stuart kingdoms.

Secondly, the papers of foreign governments in Rome, Paris, Madrid and Brussels contain a wealth of tantalizing information: the dispatches, reports and correspondence of their agents in Ireland - namely Foissotte and La Torre for the Habsburgs, Dumolin and Talon for France and the papal nuncio, Rinuccini - and of their ambassadors in London and Edinburgh, particularly the Spanish ambassador Cardenas, together with discussions at the respective courts of the appropriate action to be taken.31 Antrim's career as a troop raiser is particularly well documented. Details of his offers to raise Irish mercenaries to serve in Flanders, the logistics of transporting two regiments to the continent and the payments he received, are all

31 Of course diplomatic sources such as these should be used with caution as Caroline Hibbard notes in Charles I and the Popish Plot (Chapel Hill, 1983), p. 12.
noted in the correspondence between the Spanish envoys in Ireland and their masters in Madrid and Brussels, in the reports of the Spanish council of state, in the register of orders kept by the administration in Flanders, and in the accounts of various Spanish paymasters. In addition the numerous diplomatic dispatches of the day provide fascinating details, otherwise lost, on his activities as a member of the supreme council and, later, as president of the confederation of Kilkenny; on his military campaigns in Ireland and Scotland; and on his relationship with the English parliamentarians after 1648.

Thirdly, the work of contemporary Scottish and Irish poets (such as Fear Flatha Ó Gnímh of County Antrim, Niall MacVurich, hereditary bard and historian of Clanranald, or John MacDonald, bard of Keppoch) helps to unravel the celtic dimension to Antrim’s character and reveals the viewpoint of his gaelic kinsmen.32 Finally, the extensive contemporary

pamphlet collections - above all the Thorpe, Lough Fea, Thomason and Bradshaw tracts - and the broadsheets and newletters printed by the thousand during the mid-seventeenth century not only reproduce documentation otherwise lost (especially letters intercepted by the parliament) but offer a clear indication of how Antrim in particular and Irish papists in general were perceived by their English or Scottish counterparts.33

Unfortunately these gems are currently scattered among thirty-three archives and libraries in Ireland, England, Scotland, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy and the United States. What follows is a first attempt to bring them together in order to illuminate the life and political career of Randal MacDonnell, marquis of Antrim.


33 The biases of the various newspapers and the accuracy with which events were reported is discussed in A. N. B. Cotton, ‘London newsbooks in the civil war: their attitudes and sources of information’ (unpublished D.Phil., Oxford, 1971) and Walter D. Love, ‘Civil War in Ireland: Appearances in three centuries of historical writing’ in *Emory University Quarterly*, xxii, no. 1 (Spring 1966), pp 58-64, 69.
CHAPTER 1: A Man of the 'Three Kingdoms' (1609-37)

Randal MacDonnell was born in 1609 and 'bred the highland way' wearing 'neither hat, cap, nor shoe, nor stocking' until he was seven or eight years old. He was the eldest legitimate son of Sir Randal MacDonnell, first earl of Antrim and Ellis (or Alice) O'Neill, daughter of Hugh, third earl of Tyrone.

He enjoyed an illustrious pedigree. In brief, he was descended from Somerled, first Lord of the Isles, through his son Domhnall (the eponymous ancestor of the Clan Donald) whose descendent John Mor (the second son of John of Islay and Princess Margaret of Scotland) married Margery, daughter and heiress of the MacEoin Bisset, Lord of the Glynns of Antrim. They ruled the Glynns jointly with the MacEoin Bissets throughout the fifteenth century, the MacDonnells being primarily based in Scotland, though John Mor’s son temporarily

1 Quoted in Hill, *MacDonnells*, p. 252. Gaelic was his mother tongue, *Clan Donald*, ii, 719.

TABLE I: THE MAGDONNELLS OF ANTRIM

DOMNALL (or Donnell, chief of the various branches of the MacDonalds)

ANGUS OKE of Argyll

JOHN OF BALLY = Margaret, d. of Robert II of Scotland

JOHN MUR = Margaret, d. of Mackin

Sir DONELL DALLOCH = Joan d. of O'Donnell, chief of Tirconnell

JOHN = Sarah, d. of Phelim O'Neill of Claneboy

JOHN CATHAGH = Cecily, d. of Savage of Ardcarne

ALEXANDER, 5th of Dunveg, d.1538 = Catherine Macfadyen of Ardmurchan

Donald = Angus Alexander Coll Moel Dubh

SORELY O'MOY = Mary Shane

Donald = Angus Campbell of Argyll

Donald James, 6th of Dunveg, d.1565

AUCHALD, 7th of Dunveg, d.1568

Angus, 8th of Dunveg, d.1614

Sir James d.1626

Sir James d.1615

Sir James = Mary O'Neill of Donville of Claneboy d.1601

Donald = Sorley Coll Moel Dhlub

Donald Gorm of Moye d.1634 d.c.1632

Sir Alexander d.1694 d.c.1632

KATHERINE = RANDAL = Rose O'Neill, dower, duchess of Buckingham (1596-1649)

Elizabeth Annesley = ALEXANDER = Helena Durie m.1665 d.1669 3rd earl d.1710 (1615-96)

RANDAL, 4th earl d.1680-92

See Table II opposite p 46

1st marquis (1609-83)

1st earl from 1620 d.1636

2nd earl 5 (1631-95)
resided in the Glynns and married a daughter of O'Donnell, chief of Tirconnell. Their great-grandson, Alexander, fifth of Dunnyveg (who died in 1538) was the first MacDonnell to reside permanently in County Antrim and from this point on the family began to extend its sphere of influence from the original Bisset inheritance of the Glens to include the lands to the north-west, known as the Route.

MacDonnell hegemony in County Antrim (which was won at the expense of the native ruling family of MacQuillan) was officially recognized by Elizabeth I in 1561 when she granted Sir James, sixth of Dunnyveg (Alexander’s son) the ‘captainship’ of the Route for twenty-one years. Although control of the Glens and Route should have passed to James’s son Angus, the territory was effectively dominated by his uncle Sorley Boy MacDonnell (the youngest son of Alexander, fifth of Dunnyveg) who, ruling from the powerful castle of Dunluce, managed ‘through a combination of political manoeuvres and military force’ to establish, by the end of the sixteenth century, the MacDonnells ‘as one of the more important east Ulster families’. Sorley Boy was succeeded by his son, James, who continued a policy of territorial expansion by seizing any remaining

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MacQuillan lands in the Route and in 1596 annexed lands belonging to his Scottish cousins in the Glens.5

The succession became confused after Sir James died in 1601 and his eldest son and natural heir Alexander was passed over in favour of his younger brother (and Antrim's father) Randal Arranach. But Randal, by skillfully demonstrating his loyalty to the crown (he not only dissociated himself from his rebellious father-in-law, the earl of Tyrone, after his defeat at Kinsale in 1601 but also supported James VI's expedition against his cousin Angus who had also risen in rebellion), was able to secure in 1603 a legal title to the territories he had in effect usurped.6 Hardly surprisingly, his dubious claim to much of his County Antrim estate was later challenged by Sir James's eldest son Alexander, who in 1614-5 conspired with his Irish and Scottish kinsmen to recover his rightful inheritance by force.7 But the king always sided with


7 Lord Deputy Arthur Chichester also (unsuccessfully) challenged his title, Chichester to Argyll, 12 April 1608 (N.L.S., MS 3368, f. 26); Cal. S.P. Dom., 1629-31, p. 39; Bigger, 'Some Historical Notes', pp 25-34; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 39-41; Raymond
Randal. In addition to a legal title to the County Antrim estates, which were now held in knight service, James VI and I rewarded Randal with a knighthood in 1603, then in 1618 he created him Viscount Dunluce and finally, on 12 December 1620, elevated him to the dignity of earl of Antrim.

Though the earl had been handsomely compensated by the crown for betraying his kinsmen, the crown did not trust him. In an attempt to ensure that his heir would be brought up ‘religiously and civilly’, the young Lord Dunluce – as the earl’s elder son was known – was made a ward to the earl of Abercorn. Nothing else is known of Dunluce’s childhood, except that (between 1625 and 1627) he was sent for eighteen months to France, allegedly to complete his education and to master the language; but presumably the earl was also eager (as

Gillespie, Conspiracy. Ulster Plots and plotters in 1615 (Belfast, 1987); ibid., Colonial Ulster, pp 85, 87-8, 109, 130. For a transcript of the trial see Thomas Gogarty, ‘Ulster roll of gaol delivery 1615’ in Arch. Hib., vi (1917), pp 83-93.

8 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1615-25, p. 307. But his meteoric rise through the Irish peerage excited much jealousy and every effort was made by his protestant peers to discredit him. For instance he was accused, of harbouring popish priests, Cal. S.P. Ire., 1615-25, pp 324-5, 337.

9 Clan Donald, ii, 711, 714-5; D. J. MacDonald, Clan Donald (Loanhead, 1978), pp 261-74. As it was he continued to dominate and bully his son. For instance the earl later promised Hamilton that if Dunluce failed to attend him as instructed ‘your lordship shall see what punishment I will inflict upon him for his neglect’! Antrim to Hamilton, 22 April 1636 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/333).
his enemies suggested) to expose the youth to continental catholicism.10

No doubt Dunluce was a more sophisticated and refined young man than his father when he was finally presented at the English court of King Charles I and his French queen, Henrietta Maria, in the spring of 1627.11 Though the only surviving portrait of him dates from the Restoration period (see frontispiece), he was allegedly 'a tall, clean-limbed, handsome man with red hair'.12 Certainly he made a favourable impression and was later described as 'one of the best courtiers in the three kingdoms'.13 One privy councillor even predicted that 'it is not to be doubted, but that his good partes and virtuous qualities will soon improve him within that favour and good opinion His Majesty is pleased to conceive of him'.14 Moreover Charles I, anxious to keep the

10 Antrim to Wentworth, 19 September 1632 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 22, f.101) and Cal. S.P. Ire., 1625-32, pp 81, 186, 689. How exactly Dunluce spent his time in France is unclear: presumably he did indeed master the French language; certainly he enjoyed the company of other Irish, catholic youths (such as Lord Roscommon's son, George Talbot, Lord Louth's son and Father Robert Netterville), Cal. S.P. Ire., 1625-32, p. 168.


12 D.N.B. 'Randal MacDonnell'; Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 509.

13 MacDonald, 'A Fragment of an Irish MSS', pp 280, 282.

14 [Conway] to Antrim, 31 May 1627 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1625-32, p. 239/P.R.O., S.P. 63/244 f. 691).
headstrong earl of Antrim in line, insisted that Dunluce remain at court and ensured that all his visits to Ireland were brief.15

No record of what Dunluce did or who he knew during his years as a young bachelor at court appears to have survived. His father provided him with an allowance, but it was evidently inadequate since on the eve of his marriage in 1635 he had contracted debts in excess of £3,000.16 He was, at first, equally unfortunate in matters of love. Shortly after he returned from France he jilted his fiancée - Lady Lucy Hamilton, daughter of his guardian the earl of Abercorn - in favour of one of the duke of Lennoxt's daughters, but nothing came of this match either.17 Then, in 1632, the countess of St. Albans refused him the hand of her daughter on the grounds that Dunluce's seat was 'so far remote for my daughter from all her frends and acquaintance, the uttermost north part of Irelande, and a contry soe different in condition and breeding'.18


16 Wentworth to Antrim, 30 July 1636 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 21, f. 149). For instance, Antrim bet £151 with William Owny and Tibbett McPhillibin that Ormond would win a suit over land. Antrim won the wager but the debt was never paid and so he sued his debtors in 1638 (P.R.O.I., MS 2448A p. 148).

17 The first earl had promised Abercorn £3,000 as his son's dowry which he then had to repay, Cal. S.P. Ire., 1625-22, pp 325, 480 and Clan Donald, ii, 714-5, 779.

The countess of St. Albans’s prejudice against suitors from the celtic fringe was not, however, shared by Katherine Villiers, duchess of Buckingham since the murder of her husband, Charles I’s favourite, in 1628; for early in April 1635, amidst intense speculation and cruel gossip, the couple were married.19 The duchess was without doubt the most eligible widow at court. Her father, Francis Manners, sixth earl of Rutland, was the leading noble of the Midlands while her mother was the daughter and heiress of a rich Wiltshire gentleman, Sir Francis Knyvet. In 1620, at the tender age of seventeen, she had married George Villiers, marquess of Buckingham; she bore him four children (Charles, George, Francis and Mary) and remained a loyal and devoted wife to him until his assassination. Together with her sons she inherited an enormous fortune from Buckingham which included Wallingford House, Walsingham House and York House, regarded by contemporaries as one of the finest palaces in Europe. These were all near Whitehall. There were nineteen more modest properties on the Strand, a mansion in Chelsea and another, New Hall, north of Chelmsford in Essex. The duchess was also extremely

19 Knowler, Letters, i, 413. ‘This which she hath done’ Archbishop Laud waspishly noted ‘being but a piece of women’s frailty’. Laud to Wentworth, 21 April 1635 (Laud Works, vii, 124). The marriage was consummated and the duchess conceived almost at once but miscarried in the autumn of 1635. Garrard to [Conway], 18 September 1635 (Cal. S.P. Dom., 1635, p. 385). Garrard to Wentworth, 3 October 1635 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 15, f. 232).
wealthy in her own right. She received an annual income of roughly £4550 from the Irish customs and a state pension of £6000, was sole heir both to her mother’s fortune and to extensive, unentailed portions of the Manners estates in Northamptonshire and Yorkshire. She also owned estates near Winslow and Bletchley in Buckinghamshire and others in Leicestershire.

Of her personality little is known, though Clarendon described her as a woman of ‘very great wit and spirit’. Buckingham’s most recent biographer suggested that ‘Katherine was no doormat. She had a temper to match her husband’s....[she] could be jealous...Yet she could also be remarkably generous and understanding’. An examination of her household

20 Roger Lockyer, Buckingham. The life and political career of George Villiers, first duke of Buckingham 1592-1628 (London, 1981), pp 26, 56-8, 60, 119-20, 212-6, 286, 412-3, 419, 460-2. E. B. Chancellor, The private palaces of London, past and present (London, 1908), pp 27, 40-6, 161-5; Edgar Shephard, The old royal palace of Whitehall (London, 1902), pp 176-7. For details of the duchess’s indenture for Irish customs see Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 12, f. 289 and Lawrence Stone, Family and fortune. Studies in aristocratic finance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Oxford, 1973), pp 197-200 and on her pension, Montagu MSS, p. 147. In June 1634 it was reported from court that the duchess of Buckingham and the earl of Rutland (her uncle) had divided the Rutland estate between them: the earl was to receive an annual income of £7000; his heir - Mr John Manners - Belvoir and £2000 per annum; ‘all the rest falls upon the duchess and her children’, Garrard to Wentworth, 3 June 1634 (Knowler, Letters, i, 261). See also William Page (ed.), Victoria History of the Counties of England. Buckinghamshire, iii, 466 and iv, 277.

21 Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 509.

22 Lockyer, Buckingham, p. 60.
accounts, which she carefully annotated in her rather childish hand, between 1629 and 1634 provide a fascinating insight into the style and quality of her life. As one would expect she lived at the height of luxury with attendants at every turn. She had a delicate palate for wine and exotic food; her wine bill (white wine, canary wine, muscadet, port and claret) over six months amounted to £73-15-04 and a small fortune was spent on buying exotic delicacies such as pistachio nuts, almonds, orange chips, damsons, apricots, cherries, amber and raspberries, sweet fennel seeds, marshmallow roots, red sugar aloes, tartar oil and shavings of ivory. Despite their repetitive monotony, these accounts suggest that she was pampered and extravagant, yet fastidious, resilient and an extremely shrewd business woman. Extant letters (roughly thirty in all) which she either wrote or received, between her marriage in 1635 and her death in 1649, confirm this impression and illustrate her loyalty and devotion to her second husband to whom she appears to have been temperamentally well matched. She was his closest confidante and adviser, acted as his deputy, secretary and watchdog, and was prepared to

23 Accounts of the household of the duchess of Buckingham, 1629-34 (Bodl., Eng. Misc.C.208, ff 61-73). I am grateful to Dr John Adamson for bringing this item to my attention.

24 Ibid., ff 56-7, 74-81, 109-19, 122-32. Though Katherine’s household accounts for the years after her marriage are sadly lacking, the couple’s subsequent expenditure suggests that her husband shared her expensive tastes and habits, see pp 82-3 below.
abandon her friends, her royal mentors and even her children for his sake.25

The duchess was forced to pay a high price for marrying a catholic from Ireland seven years her junior. Every measure was also taken to ensure that Dunluce, who was obviously regarded by many at court as something of a 'gold digger', should have no jurisdiction over her children's inheritance. And so, shortly after their marriage, the couple had to agree that the contents of York House, including the first duke's art collection, the Chelsea house, and various manors and lands in the counties of Hereford, Derby, York, Rutland, Essex and Buckingham would pass intact to the young duke of Buckingham.26 In addition, the duchess was snubbed by her contemporaries. Her friends were all 'ill-satisfied with her marriage' which had lost her much ground 'with the king himself as well as

25 All jurisdiction over her daughter, Lady Mary, was handed over to her father-in-law Philip, earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, Lord Chamberlain; while the well-being of her sons became the responsibility of William Laud, archbishop of Canterbury. Pembroke, Sir Robert Pye, William, earl of Newcastle and George, earl of Rutland were appointed legal guardians of the children and trustees of the estate of the young duke (a ward of the king), Knowler, Letters, i, 413.

26 The collection included paintings by Michelangelo, Breugel, Correggio, Dürer, Holbein, Rubens, Raphael, Van Dyke and Titian: see Indenture between Lord Dunluce, Katherine duchess of Buckingham his wife and the earl of Pembroke and Sir Robert Pye, 11 May 1635 (B.L., Add. MS 18,914 ff 2-15); Cal. S.P. Dom., 1635-6, p. 342; Knowler, Letters, i, 427. Other courtiers were concerned how the interests of the first duke's children would be affected if the couple had their own offspring, Knowler, Letters, i, 518.
all others of quality'.27 Even Wentworth in Dublin 'conceived some displeasure against the young lord' and only after much coaxing agreed to treat him 'with all outward civility possible'.28 However, within a relatively short period of time, the court - led by the king - became reconciled to the match, and the duchess was restored to her former position of favour.29 By the summer of 1635 even Wentworth, who now referred to Dunluce as 'my creature', had been temporarily won over.30

It would seem that the first earl never fully accepted his son's marriage. Though he had been initially delighted with the match, and had promised to settle his estate upon his son at once, to pay off his debts, and to allow the couple an annual allowance of £2,000, he quickly took umbrage with the duchess and refused to honour his word.31 His dishonourable

27 Laud to Wentworth, 26 May 1635 (Laud Works, vii, 137) and Laud to Wentworth, 12 May 1635 (ibid., 133).

28 Laud to Wentworth, 12 May 1635 (Laud Works, vii, 133); Laud to Wentworth, 26 May 1635 (ibid., 137); Wentworth to Laud, 18 May 1635 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 6, f. 185). Laud thanked Wentworth for supporting Dunluce: 'I shall still be you debtor, and pay as I am able', Laud to Wentworth, 12 June 1635 (Laud Works, vii, 146) and Laud to Wentworth, 14 July 1635 (ibid., vii, 151). Gardiner, Eng., viii, 146.

29 Knowler, Letters, i, 427.

30 Wentworth to Wandesford, 25 July 1636 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 22); Laud Works, vii, 156; Dunluce to Wentworth, 25 [October?] 1635 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 15, ff 303+1); Wentworth to Laud, 14 July 1635 (ibid., MSS 6, f. 202).

31 Laud Works, vii, 133; Wentworth to Antrim, 30 July 1636 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 21, f. 29
behaviour made little difference to the couple in the end, for within eighteen months of their wedding the first earl was dead.

His twenty-seven year old son now succeeded him as the second earl of Antrim and left England for Ireland towards the end of January 1637 amid rumours that he had been disinherited by his father who 'had an older son now living'. The story was untrue: although he did have elder illegitimate brothers the second earl of Antrim was his father's legal heir and primary beneficiary. He was bequeathed the baronies of Dunluce and Kilconway, together with Dunluce castle, which had been described in the late sixteenth century as 'the strongest piece of this realm'. His legitimate younger brother, Alexander, inherited the barony and castle of Glenarm; while his mother - Countess Ellis - received lands in the barony of Cary (worth £1,500 per annum) and a house at Ballycastle as her jointure. To each of his six daughters the first earl left £2,800; to his illegitimate son Maurice he left an annual allowance of £100. Though the will divided the

149). As Laud was quick to note, 'now my lady duchess is married to his son he [the earl] proves not overkind, or overfull of performance', Laud to Wentworth, 30 November 1635 (Laud Works, vii, 213-4) and Laud to Wentworth, 8 April 1636 (ibid., 247).

32 Wentworth to Laud, 28 February 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 21). Laud Works, vii, 312, 330-1.

33 Bigger, 'Some Historical Notes', p. 23.

34 Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, p. 148; Hill, MacDonnells, pp 246-7 - an extract of the will is printed pp 430-37; Francis Joseph Bigger, 'The Bally
estate between the first earl’s two legitimate sons, Alexander - in return for 'a certain sum of money yearly for his maintenance' - handed over his inheritance to his brother who also controlled his mother's jointure. 35

The new earl's empire - 'thirty miles of territory and vast estates with several castles' - measured just over 350,000 acres and was divided untidily by the seven Glens of Antrim. It was bounded by the river Bann in the west, the Giant's Causeway and the coastal towns of Coleraine and Ballycastle in the north and the ports of Cushendall, Glenarm and Larne in the east. 36

It comprised four baronies (Dunluce, Cary, Kilconway and Glenarm) in County Antrim, 2,200 acres in the Long Liberties of Coleraine in neighbouring County Londonderry, and thirty parishes in the diocese of Down and Connor: the earl ruled over six hundred townlands. 37

The estate's topography was varied. All


37 The number of townlands in each parish varied enormously: for example, the parish of Culfeightrin in Cary was the largest parish in the barony with 72 townlands, Cahal Dallat, 'Place names in the Parish of...
four baronies were littered with patches of bogland and were in places barren, mountainous, wooded or inaccessible, but this was offset by fertile coastal plains suitable for tillage, especially along the north-east coast. Of the 2,200 acres he owned in County Londonderry 2,030 acres were described in the 'Civil Survey' (of 1654) as 'profitable' and fit for both arable and pastoral farming while only the remaining 170 acres of 'red bog' were described as 'unprofitable and waste'. Despite the first earl's attempts to improve the roads and build bridges, internal communications remained poor and only two roads, one of which was impassable in winter, linked the Antrim estate with the outside world. Nevertheless this sprawling, isolated territorial base on the periphery of Stuart Britain made its owner by far the largest landowner in Ulster and one of the largest in Ireland.

The foremost question in the second earl's mind was, naturally, how best to manage his vast inheritance. He discussed the matter at some length


38 Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, pp 11-13; Civil Survey, x, 56-7, 60-1.


with Lord Deputy Wentworth and Archbishop Laud as well as with his wife over the spring of 1637. In June he returned to County Antrim with Patrick Darcy, one of Ireland's most able lawyers, in order to put his estates on a stable footing. The 123 surviving estate deeds from 1637, besides painting a vivid picture of life on the Antrim estate during the early seventeenth century, provide a fascinating insight into the earl's ability to husband his resources. The provisions in each lease were remarkably consistent. First came the name of the townland, or quarter of land, being let together with the amount of rent to be paid biannually in cash to the earl, the amount due to the king and to the receiver who executed the transaction, followed by a provision for distraint if

41 Wentworth to Laud, 28 February 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 21); Antrim to Wentworth, 30 April [1637] (ibid, MSS 17, f. 49). Darcy also represented the earls of Ormond and Cork, Liam O'Malley, 'Patrick Darcy, Galway Lawyer and Politician, 1598-1668' in Diarmuid O Cearbaill (ed.), *Galway: Town and Gown 1484-1984* (Dublin, 1984), pp 91-9.

42 The leases are particularly abundant (123 out of 152) for the 1637 re-leasing which the earl set in motion on his return from London. The Glenarm deeds (thirty-one) were made between 4 and 17 August; the Dunluce ones (fifty-one) were completed between 20 June and 17 August with most of the re-leasing taking place late in June and late in July; the Kilconway leases (thirty-three) were made between 21 July and 17 August; and the Cary leases (eight) dated from 8 to 27 July. Unfortunately these deeds are sadly incomplete: later leases often recite a deed dating from 1637 which does not appear to have survived; while a careful comparison of names with the 1641 rental for the barony of Dunluce indicates that for a sizable number of tenants, who leased their property directly from the earl, no deed has survived. See B.L., Harl. MS 2138, ff 111-6 and appendix 1.2 below.
the rent was not paid or if the terms of the lease were not upheld. The earl retained his rights to the estates’s assets which included all mills, waterways, mines or quarries, together with all fishing, hawking and gaming rights. He insisted that the lessee should grind grain at his mill and seek justice at the manor courts of Glenarm, Dunluce, Oldstone or Ballycastle. The tenant was also obliged to offer his best beast or a fine in lieu as heriot, and to improve the land either by fencing or digging ditches and by planting trees although no fine was levied for failing to do so.

43 There was no common agreement on land measurement in seventeenth century Ulster. There were 40 square perches to a rood and 4 roods to an acre but an English perch was 16.5 feet; while an Irish one varied between 21, 24 and 29 feet! A plantation acre was equivalent to an Irish acre and they were larger than a statute (or English) acre by a ratio of 1.62 to 1. See J. S. Carroll, ‘Cromwell’s Plantation Measure’, in Decies, Old Waterford Society, iii (Oct. 1976), p. 25 and Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, The Munster Plantation. English Migration to Southern Ireland 1583–1641 (Oxford, 1986), pp 287–9. By and large all acres given in the 1637 leases were Irish ones (21 feet to the perch).

44 Both of these stipulations made good economic sense; moreover the manor courts provided a point of contact between the tenants and the landlord, or his factors, and an important forum for settling disputes. The first earl made extensive use of his manorial courts and resented any interference with the way he dispensed justice on his territory, Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, pp 90–2, 133–5, 153–5; ibid., (ed.), Settlement and Survival on an Ulster Estate. The Brownlow Leasebook 1667–1711, (Belfast, 1988), pp lvii–lix; I. D. Whyte, Agriculture and Society in seventeenth century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1979), pp 44–7. Peter Roebuck, 'The economic situation and functions of substantial landowners 1600–1815: Ulster and Lowland Scotland compared' in Rosalind Mitchison and Peter Roebuck (eds.), Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland, 1500–1939 (Edinburgh, 1988), p. 86 suggests that by the later seventeenth century these manor courts had become redundant.
Some - but by no means all - of the leases included a clause obliging the tenant to contribute to 'all risings and general hostings and other public services that will require to be done in or by the inhabitants of the said County of Antrim'. Leases were, however, mutual contracts. The quid pro quo was that the landlord agreed to provide his tenant with land for a fixed period of time and to protect and safeguard his interests legal, physical and financial. The lengths of these 1637 leases were varied: thirty-nine (or 31.7%) of those which survive ran for twenty-one years (expiring in 1658) and seventy (or 56.9%) ran for forty-one years (expiring in 1678). On the one hand, the notable absence of short leases (under ten years) suggests that there was stability and continuity of tenantry on the Antrim estates while, on the other, it indicates that the earl was prepared to forgo any immediate financial reward in return 'for capital investment by the tenants in improving their properties'.


46 See appendix 1.1/A. Interestingly, there is no apparent correlation between the length of lease issued and the status or occupation of the lessee in any of the four baronies. For a breakdown of the occupations of the lessees see appendix 1.1/B.

improving leases were a means of retaining better tenants and of preventing neighbours from poaching them.48 Antrim also encouraged a select handful of tenants, almost ten percent according to the surviving leases, to participate in developing his property by leasing land in 'fee farm' (that is in perpetuity) at fixed rents.49

The prudent way in which the young earl reorganized his inheritance indicates that he was not as frivolous and carefree as his early, rather debauched, career had suggested. On the contrary, he emerged as a balanced, astute individual who was willing to listen to his advisers in London and Dublin and to his factors in Ulster. In the eyes of his contemporaries (and subsequent historians) he qualified, as his father had done, as an 'improving' landlord.50

Firstly, he encouraged English and

48 Ibid., p. 11; I. D. Whyte and K. A. Whyte 'Some aspects of the structure of rural society in seventeenth century Lowland Scotland' in Devine and Dickson, Ireland and Scotland, p. 40 and Whyte, Agriculture and Society, pp 159-62.


50 Dickson, 'Property and Social Structure', pp 131-3; Gillespie, Settlement and Survival, pp xxvii-xxviii; ibid., Colonial Ulster, pp 77, 133; Whyte, Agriculture and Society, chapter 8. The first earl's qualities as a landlord and local magnate have received recent scholarly attention from Michael Perceval-Maxwell in his study of Scottish migration to Ulster and from
Scottish protestant tenants to settle on his estates: thus Simon Hillman, an alderman from Coleraine who took out a lease of some property in the barony of Dunluce, was obliged to introduce ten English families to Oldstone within three years.51 The Antrim estate could by now boast well over 300 'British' (or protestant) families (particularly Lowland Scots), the majority of whom had settled in the baronies of Dunluce and Glenarm where they had been pampered by the first earl.52 However, like his father, the second earl did not encourage protestant tenants at the expense of catholic ones, whether native Irish or highland Scots.53 At least half of his known chief tenants (including one of his factors) were catholic and the incomplete 1641 rental for the barony of Dunluce clearly illustrates that these men - James MacDonnell, James McHenry, Alexander, Daniel and John MacNaughten, Donnell and


52 B.L., Add. MS 4770, f. 280v; Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, pp 55, 59; S. Alexander Blair, 'Presbyterianism in Glenarm' in The Glynns, ix (1981), p. 37. By c.1630 there were between 2,000 and 3,000 Scottish adults in County Antrim, which was the most popular destination for emigrants, Perceval-Maxwell, The Scottish Migration, pp 229-34.

53 Families such as the Stewarts of Bute, the MacNeills of the Isles and the MacNaughtens from Galloway settled in the sixteenth century. George Hill, 'Gleanings in Family History from the Antrim coast - the MacNaughtens and MacNeills', in U.J.A., 1st series, viii (1860), pp 127-44; Hume, 'Origin and Characteristics...', pp 121-3.
William O’Sheyll - acted as landlords to the protestant immigrants. Although the first earl had rebuilt and refurbished churches for his protestant tenants, he had also encouraged the Franciscans to maintain a friary at Bonamargy near Ballycastle. This became the headquarters from which they ministered to his tenants and set out on missions in the Western Isles. The second earl continued this policy, and supported their missionary activities until the Superior of the mission - Patrick Hegarty - was arrested late in 1641.

The second aspect which earned Antrim the accolade of an 'improving' landlord was the way in which he carved his estate into manageable units of around one or more townlands which were then handed over to men of substance who were prepared to invest time and capital in improving the property and in attracting good subtenants. The size of the units leased to the chief tenants varied considerably: at one end of the tenurial spectrum were the Agnews, Stewarts, MacNaughtens and Shaws who leased very large estates of up to six townlands; at the other were the Dunlops, Hamiltons, McAuleys and O’Cahans, whose holdings (while still substantial) were by comparison more modest.

54 For details see appendix 1.2.


56 For details see appendix 1.3.
individuals (described in the leases as 'gentlemen' or occasionally as 'yeomen') were made responsible for finding suitable subtenants to farm and improve the land. As has already been noted, the leading catholic families and their protestant neighbours (such as the Boyds, Shaws and Stewarts) in the barony of Dunluce attracted both 'British' and native subtenants. In the barony of Glenarm the Agnew estate was doled out in a similar fashion to around 125 individuals. These subtenants presumably repeated the process by subletting holdings to a silent and undocumented rural peasantry which was undoubtedly as diverse and stratified as the hierarchy above it.

Thirdly, and finally, there were other ways in which Antrim acknowledged that his estate was capable of improvement. Beside the prevalence of long leases, the earl insisted that his rents be paid in cash rather than in kind, as had been the custom, thus stimulating - in theory at least - the development of a market economy. He was also eager to encourage his tenants to enclose poor land, to mark boundaries, to build stone houses and to plant trees. The skillful way he


husbanded the land's natural resources is also revealing. Fishing rights (especially for salmon) were parsimoniously handed out to a select coterie of favoured tenants, while liberty to cut wood and turf was carefully monitored. All rights to coal and mineral deposits were jealously guarded and leased out separately: thus the salt pans and coal mines at Bonamargy, near Ballycastle, were granted for twenty-one years at an annual rent of £80 to Archibald Stewart and Henry Maxwell, chancellor of Connor.60

Naturally the earl was well aware of his own achievement and it was with some pride that he reported to Dublin in August 1637 that 'I have compounded my affairs here with my tenants wherein I was not so inward to my [own] profit as to the general good and settlement by binding them to plant [trees] and husband their holdings so near as may be to the manner of England'.61 Nevertheless the massive re-leaseing raises a number of intriguing questions. First, on what basis - legal or otherwise - was Antrim able to call in, and then reissue, all the leases made by his father? Second, why did his tenants offer virtually no opposition to such an arbitrary move by a landlord who was, in effect, an 'outsider'? 


60 The Macnaughtens of Benvarden for instance enjoyed salmon fishing rights, P.R.O.N.I., D.2977.

61 Antrim to Ormond[?], 2 August 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 17, f. 151).
There seems to have been no historical or legal precedent for this unilateral re-leasing either in Ireland or Scotland. It is possible that until this point a number of the tenants were tenants-at-will (that is, they held their farms without a written deed) and therefore had no recourse to legal redress for breach of contract.62 But there may have been more at stake. A casual remark by Wentworth — that Antrim 'hath improved his estate very much, having absolutely overthrown all his father's leases' — not only suggests that he both knew about and approved of this, but may also have encouraged it in an attempt to further anglicize, civilize and discipline one of the darkest corners of Ireland.63 Equally significant was the apparent support of the king — no doubt for similar reasons — for the reorganization of the estate.64 Wentworth's patronage of the earl, combined with royal support, may help to explain why his tenants — Irish, English and Scottish alike — fearing retribution from...

62 This was certainly the case in Lowland Scotland where written leases only really appeared in the 1620s and 1630s, Whyte, *Agriculture and Society*, pp 153-4.

63 Wentworth to Laud, 18 October 1637 (Knowler, *Letters*, ii, 120). Certainly Antrim's agent was instructed 'to acquaint you with the abuses and grievances of the country from time to time', Antrim to Wentworth, 21 November 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 17, f. 234).

64 Laud later remarked casually that only O'Hara 'refused to submit upon my lord's petition to the king' which suggests that Antrim had secured the king's support for the re-leasing while in London during the spring of 1637, Laud to Wentworth, 23 November 1637 (*Laud Works*, vii, 391).
London, or even worse from Dublin, accepted the releaseing. Laud stated that if the lord deputy agreed 'to take care of my lord's [Antrim's] estate in that kingdom... I presume none will offer violence to it'. And, as it was, only Cahill O'Hara, who had been involved in endless disputes with the first earl, 'refused to compound and agree with me for he is the only man of my tenants that hath refused to submit, though he is come by what he holds of me'. Significantly Antrim dealt with his recalcitrance by asking Wentworth to discipline him 'more for example, and credit, than any benefit'. When this did not suffice, the king himself intervened on Antrim's behalf. Small wonder that any opposition from the tenants soon crumbled.

But owning, and successfully managing, a vast estate was merely one of the pivots about which Antrim's power and influence turned. Equally important was the way in which he controlled and nurtured his human resources, since his was after all still a patrimonial society where the ability to call out one's family and followers was as important in determining a

65 Ibid.

66 Antrim to Wentworth, 21 November 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 17, f. 234). The king ruled in favour of Antrim and against O'Hara, Charles I to Wentworth, 6 November 1637 (ibid., MSS 4, ff 304-5). For details on the first earl's dispute with O'Hara see, Wentworth to Coke, 8 November 1633 (ibid., MSS 5, f. 26); Antrim to Wentworth, 21 January 1634 (ibid., MSS 22 f. 103). Cal. S.P. Ire., 1615-25, p. 491; Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, p. 119; Hill, Stewarts of Ballintoy, p. 16.
man's status as the property he owned. An historian of the Yorkshire gentry of this period has noted that 'kinship was not simply a matter of genealogical interest. Contemporary opinion held that ties of blood, however tenuous, involved special obligations and loyalties'.67 The cultural homogeneity and physical isolation of Antrim's estates accentuated these tendencies, and virtually all members of this gaelic society enjoyed 'kinship status'.68 English observers were particularly conscious of these powerful ties, and one who feared a gaelic revival under Antrim's leadership during the 1640s inadvertently paid tribute to the earl's human power base. He warned Ormond to watch him carefully:

'lest Antrim's friends and dependents in Ulster should under the pretense of serving the king...carry along designs of reestablishing themselves of their ancient territories and their ancient septs'.69

But who exactly were Antrim's friends and dependents? Firstly, he was able to command the loyalty and support of many of his County Antrim tenants (especially the native Irish and Highland Scottish ones). Secondly, the second earl, as head of the Irish MacDonnells (the majority of whom had


69 Digby to Ormond, 29 March 1644 (Carte, *Ormond*, vi, 80).
originally come to Ireland, from the thirteenth century onwards, as ‘gallowglass’ or mercenaries), was able to call upon the services of families such as the MacDonnells of Tennekille in Queen’s County or those in Counties Mayo and Tyrone and other MacDonnell kinsmen who were scattered throughout the four provinces.

Thirdly, the MacDonnells of Antrim, the MacDonalds of Dunvegan and the Glens, of Clanranald, of Glengarry, of Keppoch and of Sleat all shared a common name. The MacDonnells and MacDonalds were also united by a common ambition to rid the Western Isles of their arch-rivals, Clan Campbell. As Lords of the Isles, the MacDonalds had ruled the Western Highlands and Islands from the late fourteenth century until the forfeiture of the lordship in 1493 which had wreaked havoc among the already feuding clans and enabled Clan Campbell, which had long been established in mainland Argyll, to emerge, by the late sixteenth century, as the most powerful clan in the Western Highlands. Their power was further enhanced after a series of feuds - instigated by Clan Donald South - which had so destabilized the west of Scotland that King James VI

was forced in 1607 to declare forfeit their hereditary lands of Kintyre and Jura - which he then promptly assigned to Archibald Campbell, seventh earl of Argyll, on the condition that the land was not leased to MacDonalds.71 Despite this attempt to tame the recalcitrant MacDonalds, they continued to feud with Clan Campbell and so, in return for the support of his Scottish kin, Antrim offered them protection from Campbell aggression. 'I have a natural affection to these [islanders] allied to me both by name and blood' he later wrote, and added that 'their safety I shall seek as much as my own'.72 For their part his Scottish kinsmen saw him as the 'helping warrior of the fair plain of the chieftains and unique protecting hand of our churches'.73 He was also closely allied to the great catholic, Scottish house of Gordon and, as an opponent of Campbell hegemony, was supported by the

71 Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 20-8; Stewart, 'Peoples of the Clanranald', pp 37, 57.


73 Ó Cuív, 'A poem on the second earl of Antrim', p. 303.
Ogilvies, the Hamiltons and the lesser clans of MacLeod of Lewis, MacNeils of Gigha, MacAllasters of Loup and MacFies of Colonsay.74

These ties of blood and animosity were supplemented by bonds of marriage. Appropriate suitors were found for each of the first earl’s daughters. The eldest girl, Lady Anne, was married first to Christopher Nugent, Viscount Delvin and heir to the first earl of Westmeath; and second to William Flemming, baron of Slane. Lady Mary’s first husband was Luke, second Viscount Dillon of Costelloe-Gallen, and her second was Oliver Plunkett, sixth Baron Louth. Lady Sarah was married three times: first to Neal O’Neill of Killelagh, County Antrim, second, to Donough O’Connor of Sligo, and third, to Donal MacCarthy More. Lady Catherine wed Edward Plunkett, son of Patrick ninth Baron Dunsany, and Lady Rose married the Scotsman George Gordon, a younger brother of the twelfth earl of Sutherland. Finally his ‘natural daughter’, Lady Ellis, married first Neil O’Neill of Clandeboy and then Tirloogh Oge O’Neill (brother of Sir Phelim O’Neill of Kinard).75 The first earl also secured good matches


75 Hill, MacDonnells, pp 247-50; Donald Jackson, Intermarriage in Ireland 1550-1650 (Montreal, 1970), pp
for his extended family. For example his nephew Sir Alexander of Moye (the son of Sir James MacDonnell and Mary O’Neill of Clandeboy) married the daughter of Arthur Magennis, first Viscount Iveagh, while Sir Alexander’s sister Mary married Sir William Burke (brother of the fifth earl of Clanricard).

Thanks to these and other carefully calculated marriages, leading Old English families in the Pale (the Westmeaths, Slanes, Dillons and Louths) and native Irish ones in Munster (MacCarthy More) and in Connaught (the O’Connors and Burkes) were now allied with the MacDonnells of Antrim.76 But, as one might expect, their strongest connections were in Ulster where they had intermarried with most of the leading gaelic families (the O’Haras, O’Cahans, MacQuillans, O’Donnells, Savages) and even with English protestant settlers such as Sir Moses Hill. The links between the MacDonnells and the ‘Great O’Neills’, overlords of Ulster, were particularly strong. The second earl’s grandfather (Sorley Boy) had married Catherine O’Neill, daughter of the first earl of Tyrone; his mother was a daughter of Hugh, third earl of Tyrone; while other family members had intermarried with the O’Neills of


Killelagh, of Kinard and of Clandeboy. These close MacDonnell-O’Neill ties alarmed many English administrators. Wentworth, for one, was later convinced that Antrim - 'of the race of O’Neale, and upon my own knowledge the great admirer of his grandfather Tyrone' - would rally the native Irish in rebellion as his grandfather had done nearly fifty years before.

Wentworth found equally alarming the fact that the two families had remained in close contact after the O’Neills had fled from Ireland to the continent during the early years of the century. MacDonnell ties with the continent were further strengthened by the presence there of Antrim’s four natural half-brothers. Two of them, James and Alasdair, died in Spain, another (described by the first earl as ‘onlie a bastard’) - Maurice - served as an infantry captain in Flanders, while the fourth - Daniel (or Francis as he was later known) - was a Franciscan friar who, after being trained at St. Anthony’s College in Louvain, returned to County Antrim and, using Bonamargy friary as his


78 Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 124v).

79 Dunluce’s sojourn on the continent (1625-7) would also have given him the opportunity to make contact with his exiled cousins and he may even have visited them, Cal. S.P. Ire., 1625-32, p. 398; Micheline Walsh, 'O’Neills in Exile' in Seanchas Ardmhacha, viii, no. 1 (1976-7), pp 55-60.

48
base, served in the Scottish mission in the Western Isles until 1684.80 Antrim, like his father, was eager to maintain these intimate links with catholic Europe and in addition to remaining in close contact with his two surviving half-brothers, he formalized his relationship with his exiled kinsmen by becoming patron of Tyrone's regiment, which was then serving in Flanders.81

The heterogeneous, human pool from which the earl was able to draw supporters (and later sailors and soldiers too) over the course of the next half century thus stretched from the Hebrides in the north-west to Flanders in the south-east and was, without a doubt, one of his most valuable assets. Clearly his power and influence were not limited to the celtic fringe as his father's had been. For, despite the fact that he was principally an 'Irish Scot' of gaelic extraction, he had also - thanks to his marriage to an influential


81 For details on Maurice see pp180,247 below. Knowler, Letters, ii, 225-6. For details on the services performed by later MacDonnells in the armies of the king of Spain see Micheline Walsh, The MacDonnell's of Antrim on the Continent (O'Donnell Lecture, Dublin, 1960).
heiress - a strong foothold in Britain's other kingdom, England. Antrim enjoyed the rare privilege of truly being a man of the 'three kingdoms'.
CHAPTER 2: Caroline Courtier (1637-40)

Having settled his estate in Ulster, Antrim now handed over the day-to-day running of his rationalized estates to his factors and hurried back to London. At court (according to Edward Hyde, later earl of Clarendon) he was 'very well received by both their majesties, and was frequently in their presence'. His marriage to the duchess had transformed his status from that of a peripheral bystander to a courtier with 'permanent influence' who was now in a position to advance the interests of his family and friends and to hinder those of his opponents. That influence, however, stemmed not from any office he held - for he held none - but from his privileged access to the royal couple.

1 His factors, Archibald Stewart and Daniel MacNaughten, were now responsible for maintaining good relations with, and among, the tenants and for collecting the rents. The importance of a good agent cannot be overstated, Whyte, Agriculture and Society, pp 41-5; Gillespie, Settlement and Survival, pp lvii-lix; ibid., Colonial Ulster, pp 133-5. De L'Isle MSS, vi, 122-3.

2 Hyde, Life, ii, 77; Aikin, Memoirs of the Court, i, 536. Whether he was 'bred in his [Charles I's] own bosom, his fellow gamster and comrade' (as the anonymous author of the Aphorismical Discovery claimed) is another matter, Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 80.

3 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 253; Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 509.

4 The typed index to P.R.O., L.C. 3/1 suggests that Antrim was a gentleman of Charles's bedchamber after 1641; in fact the entry (f. 1) should read the earl of ANCRAM. For further details on the workings and paths of patronage within the court see the articles by David Starkey and Kevin Sharpe in David Starkey (ed.), The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the
There were a number of reasons for this close contact. The physical proximity of Antrim’s London residences (Wallingford - and later York - Houses) to Whitehall facilitated close and easy communications with the royal couple. At the same time his wife was cultivating the king and queen on his behalf. Next to Henrietta Maria, the duchess of Buckingham, as one of Charles I’s favourites, was probably the most important and influential woman at the Caroline court and, together with her sister-in-law Lady Denbigh, she had held a position of honour in the queen’s household since 1626.5

Closely related to this were Katherine’s extensive contacts at court which in turn provided her husband with a large pool of allies and benefactors who were prepared to keep his interests under the king’s nose. Thanks to her Villiers connections, she was related to the earls of Desmond, Arundel, Suffolk, Northampton, Nithsdale and Pembroke. Loyalty to the late duke’s memory also brought the patronage of numerous old


Buckingham clients, of whom the most important and influential was William Laud, archbishop of Canterbury, who intervened on many occasions with the Irish lord deputy on Antrim’s behalf and even with the king himself.6

The marriage of Katherine’s daughter - Lady Mary Herbert - to James Stewart, fourth duke of Lennox (and, after 1641, of Richmond) in the summer of 1637 brought the earl another ally who had the king’s ear, for Lennox was not only lord warden of the cinque ports and a privy councilor but also Charles’s closest blood relative and one of his most intimate friends who ‘used to discourse with his majesty in his bedchamber rather than at the council board’.7 The duke’s sympathetic attitude towards catholicism (the D’Aubigny-Lennox

6 Endymion Porter, Sir Robert Pye, Patrick Maule (of the bedchamber) and Secretary Windebank had all been Buckingham clients and continued to serve his widow. Laud Works, vii, 133, 169-71. Laud had been devoted to the first duke of Buckingham, upon whose patronage his career was founded, and had served him both as an intimate friend and religious advisor. See Lockyer, Buckingham, pp 115, 372 and Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, Archbishop Laud 1573-1645 (London, 1940; 3rd edn., London, 1988), pp 59-60, 184.

7 Lady Mary’s first husband was Charles Herbert who had died of smallpox shortly after their marriage. She was betrothed to Lennox in January 1637. Hamilton, Dorset, Holland, Portland, Russell, Goring, and Ladies Carlisle, Denbigh, Holland, Portland, Blanch, Arundel and Mme Vantelet were all guests at her wedding that summer; and Lady Mary was sworn in as a member of the queen’s household the following day. Knowler, Letters, ii, 45, 47-8, 114-8; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1637, pp 355-6; Birch, The Court and Times, ii, 407; Clarendon, History, i, 160-1, 207, 361. Brian Manning, ‘The Aristocracy and the downfall of Charles I’ in Brian Manning (ed.), Politics, Religion and the English civil war (London, 1973), pp 69-70.

53
branch of the Stewarts, of which he was head, was almost entirely catholic) further endeared him to the earl.8 Antrim’s other great Scottish patron at court during this period - James, third marquis of Hamilton - may have been inferior in rank to Lennox but was his equal in influence, for he was also the king’s cousin and had replaced Buckingham as Charles’s favourite and trusted advisor. Hamilton’s marriage to Lady Mary Fielding (the duke of Buckingham’s niece) brought him into close contact with her catholic relatives; and his leasing of Wallingford House (until 1640) and a common fear of Campbell hegemony in Scotland cemented a close alliance between the marquis and Antrim.9

Such close proximity to the king’s ear was a luxury few Irish nobles - never mind a catholic one - enjoyed, and Antrim undoubtedly used his advantage to maximum effect. Unfortunately the earl’s career as a


Caroline courtier during the later 1630s is so poorly documented that we cannot be sure of his affiliations; but his wife's patronage of the wife of the Spanish envoy, and his family's traditional ties to the house of Habsburg, suggests that the couple were members of the 'Spanish faction' at court. Pro-Spanish tendencies went hand-in-hand with devotion to the catholic faith, which the couple openly flaunted as members of the queen's court. The duchess was particularly devout and later vowed that she 'would pour out my life in defence of it [catholicism]... nothing can frighten me from my faith' and she was instrumental in converting 'women of quality' (including Endymion Porter's wife, Olive, and Lady Newport) to catholicism, while her husband harboured Irish catholics, entertained foreign priests and cultivated the papal agent George Con.

10 This is also true of the other Irish nobles - such as the earls of Ormond, Kildare, Desmond and Clanricard - at court. The only Irish courtiers to have received any recent historical attention are Daniel O'Neill and Sir Piers Crosby, Cregan, 'An Irish Cavalier' and Clarke, 'Sir Piers Crosby', pp 144-5, 150-1. But there was a distinct absence of Irishmen in the king's household, Nicholas Carlisle, An Inquiry into the Place and Quality of the Gentlemen of His Majesty's most honourable privy chamber (London, 1829), pp 105, 125-44. I am grateful to Dr Kevin Sharpe for bringing this reference to my attention. Albert J. Loomie, 'The Spanish faction at the court of Charles I, 1630-8' in B.I.H.R., lix, no. 139 (May 1986), pp 37-49; ibid., 'Alonso de Cárdenas and the Long Parliament, 1640-1648' in E.H.R., xcvi (Apr. 1982), p. 289; Hibbard, Popish Plot, pp 30-7, 83-9.

11 Duchess of Buckingham to Rinuccini, 10/20 February 1647 (Comment. Rinucc., ii, 757). Garrard to Wentworth, 9 November 1637 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 128-30); Birch, The Court and Times, ii, 412-3; H.M.C., Rep. 12, app. 2.
Antrim clearly gained fresh confidence from his newly inherited Irish titles and estates, as well as from the favour of the royal court and the patronage of leading Caroline courtiers, for after returning to London he exploited these networks consistently to further the causes of his catholic friends, kin and dependents, together with his own interests in Ireland.12 He (together with Laud, Lennox and the duchess) begged Wentworth that his elderly and impoverished cousin 'germain', Lord Magennis of Iveagh, 'be admitted to composition [before the commission of grace] as other men are' and requested that 'no part of that which he now possesses be diminished or taken from him'.13 On Iveagh's death the earl immediately pleaded

12 Mary O'Dowd, 'Land and Lordship in sixteenth and seventeenth century Ireland' in Mitchison and Roebuck, Economy and Society, pp 20-22 and Raymond Gillespie, 'The Trials of Bishop Spottiswood 1620-40' in Clogher Record, xii, no. 3 (1987), pp 324-32 emphasize the importance of having powerful friends at court who could act as brokers with the English administration.

with the king and with Hamilton that the wardship of
Iveagh’s teenage son - ‘his oldest son by the daughter
of Tyrone’ - be granted either to him or to his English
second cousin Arthur Hill.14 Wentworth was resolutely
opposed to this and referred the matter to the court of
wards with the recommendation that the youth be
educated under the king’s supervision so that ‘he might
easily be set straight in his religion, and civilized
in his education...for I do not take the earl of Antrim
to be so good at breeding up of children’.15 But the
king ruled yet again in Antrim’s favour on the rather
unpromising grounds that ‘the youth had but little time
to be in wardship and was soured already’.16 The earl

14 Antrim to Hamilton, 6 January [1639] (S.R.O., G.D.
406/1/1171). Hugh Magneil [Magennis] to Antrim, 6
February 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1145), Antrim to
Wentworth, 9 January [1639] (Sheffield City Library,
Strafford MSS 18, f. 168). For further details on Hill
see appendix 1.5. Once again he seems to have been
following his father’s example in applying for the
wardship of his kinsmen; for instance, see Cal. S.P.
Irel., 1625-32, p. 487.

15 Wentworth to Laud, 12 February 1639 (Sheffield City
Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 169), Wentworth to Laud,
10 April 1639 (ibid., MSS 7, f. 178).

16 Laud to Wentworth, 27 February 1639 (Laud Works,
vii, 528). There was some confusion over the youth’s
age: Wentworth claimed that he was only thirteen while
Antrim assured the king that he was sixteen and
therefore beyond redemption! Antrim to [Hamilton], 17
March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154); Laud Works, vii,
562, 571-2; Wentworth to Antrim, 3 June 1639 (Sheffield
City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, ff 335-7). The king’s
letter in favour of Antrim was delivered to the court
of wards in July and at that point he confessed ‘if the
young lord be not ruined I am indifferent how it is
disposed’, Antrim to [Hamilton], 13 July 1639 (S.R.O.,
G.D. 406/1/1164). Since the Iveagh estates in County
Down (worth only £1,300) were heavily encumbered with
jointures and the family was in debt to the tune of
£4,500 it is unlikely that the earl was motivated by
also interceded on behalf of another cousin - Hugh MacMahon - who (he argued) had been ‘oppressed by his elder and illegitimate brothers in his minority’.17 In 1639 he persuaded Wentworth to knight his catholic kinsman Phelim O’Neill of Kinard.18 He further supported his protestant cousin Daniel O’Neill, son and heir to Con O’Neill of Clandeboy, by supporting his suit for the return of his hereditary estates in County Down and by providing him with an annual pension of £400.19 In addition to protecting his own family and power base among the native Irish families in east Ulster, Antrim also promoted the causes of his Irish friends. He worked hard, for instance, to have the outlawed catholic lawyers from Galway - Patrick Darcy and Richard Martin (Darcy’s brother-in-law) - restored to the bar.20 Though Wentworth eventually agreed to all these requests he was clearly irritated by Antrim’s interference and particularly by his support for Darcy.21

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17 Antrim to Wentworth, 13 November [1638] (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 18, f. 114).


19 Cregan, ‘An Irish Cavalier’, pp 77-8, 82.

20 Wentworth to Laud, 26 April 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 96). Laud drew the line with Darcy and, after muttering a few words in his favour, abandoned his cause, Laud to Wentworth, 8 October 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 492).
Despite spending most of his time in London he was eager to speculate in the Irish property market in order to maintain, reinforce and enhance his traditional authority there. In July 1637 Antrim's sister, Lady Sara, allowed him £2,000 from her inheritance on condition that he buy a certain 'manor and...land in the County of Meath'.22 In August he purchased 866 acres in the barony of Glenarm and paid £440 for a number of tenements and 120 acres of land in the 'newtowne of Inver [Larne]'.23 After discovering that the king had in effect put the city of London's lands on the market he also offered to buy 3,000 acres around Coleraine which his father had sold to the plantation.24 However this straightforward attempt to

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21 Wentworth to Laud, [September] 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 131v).

22 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/3A/Various Old Nos...Upper Dunluce Barony. Whether he actually bought land in Meath is unclear since the surviving sources contain no further mention of the transaction.

23 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/1/Title Deeds, Glenarm Old No. 11 and D.2977/3A/Old No. 72. Leases Larne. Antrim may have bought other property in County Antrim. Certainly he had contemplated doing so, '[He] speaks of great purchases of house there for himself and of lands here for his brother', Wentworth to Laud, 10 July 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 35v-6v).

24 In fact the first earl only surrendered 2,000 acres in 1610, George Hill, An Historical Account of the Plantation in Ulster in the seventeenth century: 1608-1620 (Belfast, 1877; reprint Shannon, 1980), pp 395-7. The city of London and the Irish society were tried early in 1635 in the court of Star chamber for mismanagement and neglect of the Londonderry plantations. They were fined £70,000. For a discussion of the various offers made see pp 61-4 below. Interestingly, Hamilton was one of the judges at the trial in Star Chamber. For a full discussion of the bungled plantation and subsequent trial see T. W.
regain part of his hereditary lands in County Londonderry soon led to a much more ambitious venture involving not just 3,000 acres in the Long Liberties but all the lands belonging to the city of London in the county.

The subsequent power struggles over the 'Londonderry business' illustrate very clearly that Antrim's power at court revolved around his ability to manipulate the machinery of patronage to his own advantage. After his offer for the 3,000 acres had been rejected by Wentworth he promptly appealed to Hamilton for assistance. This time he found a more sympathetic ear. Whether or not the marquis actually broached the matter with the king is unclear, for there is no further mention of Antrim's petition for the lands about Coleraine in the records. The surviving evidence in Hamilton's archive indicates, however, that he probably advised Antrim against pursuing the matter further, since it was unlikely that plantation lands would be handed over to an Irish catholic, however loyal to the crown. Instead, during the autumn of 1637, the two noblemen hammered out the details of a combined offer for all of the city of London's lands in County Londonderry with Antrim acting as a 'silent' partner.


partner.26 Despite being the smallest county in Ireland with few natural assets and 'not much arable [land]' one estimate prepared for them claimed that the annual income from the city of London's lands was about £10,200.27 Another suggested that if the lands and waterways were well managed they would yield an annual income in excess of £19,500.28 While Archibald Stewart (the earl's factor) provided Hamilton with facts and figures, Antrim advised the marquis how his patent should be drawn up, should the king accept his offer, and what was worth bargaining for: for example, if the king refused to accept £500 for the town of Coleraine (which the earl desperately coveted) 'I [Antrim] would wish your lordship to double the said rent, rather than go without it'.29

Initially Hamilton, confident that 'the deputy nor none for him will give so much', thought in terms of

26 He had already made tentative enquires about acquiring lands in Connaught and in County Down, Hamilton to 'Lord Depute Sibolds', 7 October 1635 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/246); Hamilton to Wentworth, [1636] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/8381); Hamilton to Thomas Lord Cromwell, [1636] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/8377).

27 See appendix 1.4/A for details.

28 The customs alone were said to be worth £3,000, Archibald Stewart to Hamilton, 1 February 1637[-8] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/359). Wentworth valued the lands at £8,000 per annum, Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 124-5).

29 See appendix 1.4/B and 1.4/C for details. Stewart repeated this advice, Archibald Stewart to Hamilton, 1 February 1637[-8] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/359). Unfortunately none of the memoranda were annotated or drafted in Antrim's hand.
proposing an annual rent of £9,200.30 However in December 1637 he offered £12,000 for the Londoners’ lands - payable to the English Exchequer in installments every May and November - together with an entry fine of £10,000 on condition that he receive the lands by May 1638, that he be exempt from paying rent for the first six months 'for the settling and disposing of the estate', that he should have liberty to cut timber from the king's woods for building and firewood, and that fish worth under 100 marks should be exported without charge.31 Wentworth nevertheless rejected this offer on three grounds.32 Firstly, including the customs in the agreement would deprive the king of many thousands of pounds.33 Secondly, the offer made no provision for the future security of the present tenants: on the contrary the 'main drift' was 'to turn out all the now occupants without any consideration' which would ruin the English plantation in Ulster so that the province would become 'totally

30 See appendix 1.4/D.

31 See appendix 1.4/E - Offer II. Moody, Londonderry Plantation, pp 394-6, discusses this offer but misleadingly suggests that it 'must have come from a group of Scottish projectors...' (p. 394).

32 Charles I to Wentworth, 29 January 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 40, ff 28+1 and MSS 3, ff 308-9). Laud was clearly not privy to Antrim's intrigues with the marquis and was only aware that they 'are grown into some nearness', Laud to Wentworth, [10 September] 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 483-5).

33 The customs of Derry and Coleraine between 1632 and 1636 brought in £6829-13-10 (an annual average of £1365-18-09), (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 3, f. 321).
possessed by the Scottish'.34 Finally, he objected to selling the county to an individual and argued that the state should control it.35 Laud enthusiastically supported Wentworth’s objections but for slightly different reasons:

‘First, that they [Hamilton and Antrim] which make the offer can never make it good. Secondly, if they could, it will be of very ill operation and full of disheartening to the English in relation to the plantation now in hand. And thirdly, you have all the reason in the world to fear, if the Scottishmen should multiply too much in those parts, they may break into the same distempers there, which now trouble their own country’.36

The anxious archbishop even feared that if Hamilton were granted the lands and they ceased to be ‘independent upon the state...that example will go on

34 Wentworth to Charles I, 27 February 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 3, f. 310). This was clearly only Wentworth’s opinion; in fact the only surviving mention of the existing tenants clearly suggests that Hamilton was more sympathetic to them than Wentworth argued. For example, Hamilton was loath to increase Derry’s rent to over £800 (from £450) because the present inhabitants ‘will clamour much if their rent be doubled they being so ancient inhabitants and having built some of the houses with their own stock’, Details of the offer made by Hamilton for County Londonderry including customs and fishing rights, [c. mid 1637-c.spring 1638] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/M 1/33).

35 Wentworth to Charles I, 7 May 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 3, ff 319-20). Laud agreed that Londonderry should not be ‘under the command of any one great man’, Laud to Wentworth, 13 November 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 504). As time passed by, Wentworth’s resolution was strengthened: ‘198 [Hamilton] must not, will not have’ the Londonderry lands, Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 124-5). Wentworth also urged the king to assign the lands to the duke of York for in 21 years the value of the lands will have doubled, Wentworth to Charles I, 3 April 1637, (ibid., MSS 3, ff 275-6).

36 Laud to Wentworth, 30 May 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 439).
like a canker and that government be lost...and perhaps that kingdom too'. 37

Due to Hamilton's lengthy absences from court in Scotland after the spring of 1638, Antrim feared that the marquis had lost interest in the venture and made a further, very similar offer on his own behalf in August 1638. 38 Hardly surprisingly the lord deputy scornfully rejected this also: 'I am believing that his lordship will fail there too...[and] will loose much by it, having offered more than the lands are worth'. 39 In the final analysis this proposition was not even seriously considered when, in October 1638, the merits of all offers made for the city of London's lands were assessed. 40 Renewed hostilities in Scotland, however, delayed making a firm decision over Londonderry and only during the winter of 1639 was Hamilton's offer, made precisely two years previously, finally rejected. 41

37 Laud to Wentworth, [10 September] 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 484).

38 Antrim to Hamilton, 11 June 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1156). Antrim was not named specifically but other evidence suggests that it was the earl who offered an entry fine of £10,000 and £11,500 annual rent to the king for the Londonderry lands and the customs, Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 124-5).

39 Wentworth to Conway, 31 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, f. 172).

40 See appendix 1.4/E where the offers are discussed in detail.

41 As far as the earl was concerned this loss was offset by the grant (in September 1639) of a lease, for twenty-one years, to 300 acres in the Long Liberties of
Wentworth was well-informed concerning Antrim. Even if the king had accepted his offer the earl could indeed not have afforded it for, besides his speculations in Ireland, he was also investing heavily in the English property market. Late in 1637 he purchased for £12,000 a magnificent mansion at Bramshill in Hampshire, together with neighbouring lands which were worth £400 per year, because his wife disliked 'the air at Newhall [in Essex]'. Almost everyone regarded the purchase as 'an excellent bargain'; but Wentworth was furious that Antrim had ignored his advice to economise and claimed that he 'did not exchange Newhall with Bramsell[sic] for unhealthfulness so much, as because he conceived it in diminution to himself to live in his wife's house forth of his own. This I assure you was the magnificat which fell forth of his own mouth'.

Coleraine near Mountsandle 'to build him a house on', Wentworth also opposed this but, on this occasion, was outwitted by Hamilton, Antrim to [Hamilton], 13 July 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1164), Knowler, Letters, ii, 422-4, Order by [Charles I] to the Irish treasury commissioners, Edinburgh Castle, [13] July 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1163) - this draft is in Antrim's hand. Antrim to Hamilton, 26 September 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1166).

42 The original medieval manor of Bramshill, formerly owned by Henry VIII, Edward VI and the Winchesters, was demolished by Edward Lord Zouch of Haringworth during the first decade of the seventeenth century. In its place he built a vast, beautiful and highly ornate mansion. For a detailed description see William Page (ed.), The Victoria County History of Hampshire and the Isle of White, vol. iv (London, 1911), pp 37-9. Laud to Wentworth, 11 November 1637 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 131-2); Laud to Wentworth, 28 August 1637 (ibid., ii, 100). It was claimed that Antrim had in fact paid £14,000 for Bramshill, ibid., ii, 85-7.
Whatever the reason, the earl had well and truly overstretched himself. Contemporary estimates of his debts vary enormously, but all figures were large. In August 1638 Wentworth suggested that Antrim was £30,000 in debt and increased his estimate to £50,000 the following spring which was the total sale value of the Antrim estate, according to Wentworth. His debts most probably hovered between £40,000 and £42,000 during the late 1630s.

43 Wentworth to Laud, 18 October 1637 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 120). Knowler, Letters, ii, 85-7. 'A great pennyworth' was how the archbishop described Bramshill, Laud to Wentworth, 28 August 1637 (ibid., ii, 100). Antrim, anticipating Wentworth's fury, apologized for seeming 'fickle in any weighty matter that ever I promised your lordship'; but his wife had persuaded him to purchase the house, Antrim to Wentworth, [c. May] 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 22, f. 141).

44 Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 124-5).

45 Knowler, Letters, ii, 278, 289, 296-7; Wentworth to Laud, [April?] 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 181v).

46 Cal. S. P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 70. Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, p. 138 estimated Antrim’s debts to be £39,377 by 1640; while Bagwell, Stuarts, i, 285 misleadingly suggested that he was £80,000 in debt! Calculating precisely how much the earl spent between the death of his father in December 1636 and the outbreak of the Irish rebellion is frustrated by the fragmentary nature of the sources. For instance, the list of Antrim’s debts and creditors in 1638 reproduced by George Hill (MacDonnells, pp 473-7) is misleading, incomplete and inaccurately transcribed from the original in P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Kintyre papers. Hill has not only transcribed names and figures incorrectly but also failed to indicate whether the debt had been paid or was being paid. This list in any case does not include any debts contracted before 1638; nor those of his wife, who unbeknownst to the trustees of her son’s estate, also borrowed considerable sums from other courtiers, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1635, pp 449, 512; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1635-6, pp 372, 429, 467, 535; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1636-7, p. 217.
How then had the earl managed to accumulate such enormous debts in such a relatively short period of time? To some extent extravagance was to blame.47 Gambling was one of Antrim's vices. According to one account he lost 'at the Wells at Tunbridge almost £2,000 at ninepins, most of it to Sir John Sutlin [Suckling?].'48 Living lavishly was another: Antrim, according to Hyde, 'lived in the court in great expense and some lustre'.49 By the end of 1638 it appears that there was hardly a leading merchant or tradesman in London and Dublin to whom Antrim did not owe money. His creditors included three individual goldsmiths, five jewelers, three merchants, four widows, the court painter (Anthony Van Dyke), two physicians, and haberdashers, linen drapers, mercers, milliners, seamstresses, seamsters, shoemakers, stocking sellers, tailors, upholsters and woollen drapers. All had supplied goods to Antrim on credit; many waited in vain for repayment.50 In addition the couple entertained in York House, attended court masques and pageants and

47 He obviously worked (as his predecessor the duke of Buckingham had done) 'on the assumption that means would somehow be found to pay for his expenditure - an attitude ...widely shared at the Stuart... Court', Lockyer, Buckingham, p 213. Keith Brown, 'Aristocratic finances and the origins of the Scottish Revolution' in E.H.R., civ, no. 410 (Jan. 1989), pp 60, 62, 64, 71 suggests that extravagance was seen as a means of protecting a nobleman's honour.

48 Garrard to [Conway], 18 September 1635 (Cal. S.P. Dom., 1635, p. 385).

49 Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 509, 522.

50 See appendix 1.6.
gave generous gifts to their family, friends and benefactors: for example, the earl sent Wentworth a suit of rare Indian armour and presented Hamilton with a 'bag [of money]...found upon my land, which I believe has been long coined'.

Living at court and keeping the wheels of patronage well lubricated were in and of themselves major outgoings; but around £15,000 were also spent buying property in Ireland and in England, and in furnishing his houses in a style appropriate to the couple's station. Finally, the earl, although mainly resident in England, was heavily taxed in Ireland. He was charged £3,200 in parliamentary subsidies (which he claimed was four times as much as any English nobleman 'that had double my fortune') and a further £3,500 in extraordinary taxation.

But the scale of indebtedness is always relative to income. Antrim's Ulster estates should in theory have been a major source of revenue. His annual income in 1637 (calculated from the 123 surviving leases) amounted to only £2424-14-08, which seems pitifully low for a man whose annual expenditure was so high. However more realistic estimates are provided by

51 Antrim to Wentworth, 23 May 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Wentworth MSS 22, f. 133); Antrim to Hamilton, 15 April 1640 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1161); Charles Dalton, Life and times of Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon... (2 vols., London, 1885), ii, 333.

52 P.R.O., C.231/5 f. 306; Antrim to Charles I, 4 June 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1356).
contemporary valuations which suggest that he received an approximate annual rental of £6,000 from all his Irish lands.53 This was supplemented by £400 from Bramshill and by the revenues accruing from estates the duchess owned in her own right. Her Buckinghamshire manors yielded a yearly rental of just under £2,000, while her property in Leicestershire brought in a further £1,400.54 Their combined annual income from land was therefore in the region of £10,000 which was nearly double that of the earl of Chichester, the other great landowner in Ulster, and this was supplemented by an annual pension of £6,000 and the £4,450 which the duchess received each year from Irish customs - making a total in excess of £20,000.55


54 It is unlikely that Antrim was able to cream off any of the profit produced by the second duke’s estates. Estimating accurately the value of the estates held by the duchess is, in the absence of further sources, impossible; but crude (and very probably undervalued) estimates of their pre-civil war income are given in Calendar of the proceedings of the committee for compounding 1643-1160 ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (5 vols., London, 1889-1892), i, pp 66-7/P.R.O., S.P. 23/246/63I (f.112), P.R.O., S.P. 23/96/p. 619. For a discussion on the problems involved in using these sources see C. B. Phillips, ‘The Royalist Composition Papers and the landed income of the gentry: A note of warning from Cumbria’ in Northern History, xiii (1977), pp 161-70 and J. T. Cliffe, ‘The Royalist Composition Papers and the landed income of the gentry: A rejoinder’ in ibid., xiv (1978), pp 164-8.

But all this income, which made Antrim the richest man in Ulster and one of the most affluent in Ireland, was clearly not enough. Hence he mortgaged many of his own - and his wife's - properties and other assets in order to raise money. In July 1638, using Bramshill as collateral, Antrim borrowed £10,000 from the estate of his step-son, the second duke of Buckingham. At much the same time the rental of York House was used as security for various bonds amounting to £2,000, and nineteen older and more modest properties on the Strand were mortgaged for £800. In East Ulster any available land was leased out at ridiculously low rents in return for the payment of

56 Daniel O'Neill claimed that his father's estate had been worth £12,000 per annum, which was probably an exaggeration, Cregan 'An Irish Cavalier', pp 74, 77; in 1624 Conway's estate was valued at £2,000 per annum and in 1632 Arthur Hill received an income of £1,000 from his, Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, pp 129, 136, 232. Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 24/25 (121).

57 The ease with which land could be mortgaged in Ulster during the 1630s is discussed in Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, pp 124-6, 140-1, 200, 203-4. For Scotland see Keith Brown, 'Noble Indebtedness in Scotland between the Reformation and the Revolution' in Historical Research: Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, lxii, no. 149 (Oct. 1989), pp 260-75.

58 Sir Robert Pye believed that, even if the duchess died, the debt would be honoured or would be secured in the court of wards, Cal. S.P. Dom., 1637-8, p. 574. In fact the debt had been repaid by 1640 but only after legal action against the earl had been taken, see Hill, MacDonnells, p. 475 and P.R.O., L.C.4/217.
substantial entry fines. Finally, in November 1637, he had to mortgage the barony of Cary, the lordship of Ballycastle and Rathlin Island for 99 years in trust for payment of select debts. The earl even pawned for £900 ‘the two pendant pearles given my Lady by the Queen, and hangings of [the story of] Alexander’. The pawnbroker was found to have resold these treasures by the time he went to redeem them.

When even this did not suffice Antrim simply borrowed money from anyone who would lend it. A close analysis of surviving material dealing with his debts indicates that, apart from the mortgages, he tended to borrow relatively small amounts of money - ranging between £100 and £1,500 - from a wide group of individuals. Family members, friends, fellow

59 Hill, *MacDonnell*, p. 476. Petition to the committee for compounding with delinquents, 19 January 1652 (P.R.O., S.P. 23/79/pp 759-63 and 23/135/p.267-8). See appendix 1.5 for further details. It is possible that the earl mortgaged other property (for £900) to John Green, Hill, *MacDonnell*, p. 474. The mortgaging of Cary was intended to protect his principal guarantors - Archibald Stewart, Alexander MacDonnell, John Traylman and Dr Moore. However it did not prevent Antrim’s guarantors being hounded by his creditors. In the autumn of 1639 Hamilton was obliged to protect Stewart from them during his trip to England. Antrim’s brother Alexander was harassed by a number of creditors when he visited England late in 1641 while others petioned parliament that Alexander not be jailed in the hope that they would finally be repaid, Antrim to Hamilton, 26 September 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1166) and Petition from Alexander MacDonnell, 16 December 1641 (*H.M.C. Fourth Report*, p. 108/H.L.R.O., 16/12/1641); *ibid.* [4 February 1642] (*H.M.C. Fifth Report*, p. 6/H.L.R.O., 4/2/1642).


61 For a more detailed analysis see appendix 1.6.
courtiers and royal servants all lent him cash during the later 1630s. He borrowed from his step son-in-law the duke of Lennox, from Lord and Lady Dunsany (his sister’s in-laws), from Viscount Purbeck (his wife’s brother-in-law by her first marriage), from Lord Deputy Wentworth, from the catholic lawyer Patrick Darcy, from Arthur Hill (his second cousin), from Lord Justice Sir William Parsons (Hill’s father-in-law), from James Maxwell (a groom of the bedchamber and Derbyshire iron manufacturer), from the merchant-adventurers Sir Paul Pindar and Sir John Wolstenhome, from Lady FitzGerald, from Viscount Wimbledon, from the king’s jewelers, James Duart and Alexander Herriott, and from his saddler Thomas Smithsby. Between 1637 and 1640 these sixteen individuals alone lent the earl in excess of £24,000 (the equivalent of roughly four years’ rental from his Ulster estates) of which almost half (£10,700) was still outstanding in October 1641.62 The earl also borrowed substantial sums from his English servants and his Irish tenants. For instance, Edmund Cooper and Matthew Dalby (servants at Newhall), and John Glasse, James Hamilton, Robert Harper, Walter Kennedy, John Oge McCollum, Mrs MacNaughten, Edward Muddreman, and John Ross (all tenants from County Antrim) between them lent their lord in only two years some £5,000.63

62 How much money he borrowed from Lennox and Wentworth is unclear. Laud merely thanked Wentworth for lending Antrim ‘so much money’, Laud to Wentworth, 28 August 1637 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 100). See appendix 1.5 for further details.
Borrowing, however, was one thing, repaying overdue loans or outstanding debts was quite another. Antrim was rarely able to repay his creditors on time. Early in January 1639 Wentworth took considerable delight in letting it be known that the earl was unable to scrape £300 together in Dublin 'to stay a seizure which in default was ready to issue against his lands'.

Antrim was not the only Stuart nobleman to be reputed a 'poor risk'. The majority of his Ulster neighbours, catholic and protestant alike - the Magennises of Iveagh, Sir Phelim O’Neill, Antrim’s future in-laws the O’Neills of Edenduffcarrick, Sir William Brownlow and Lords Chichester, Cromwell and

63 Only half of this sum was repaid before the outbreak of rebellion. These calculations are based on appendix 1.5. Borrowing from servants and tenants was not uncommon in Lowland Scotland, L. D. Whyte and K. A. Whyte, 'Debt and credit, poverty and prosperity in a seventeenth century rural community' in Mitchison and Roebuck, Economy and Society, pp 72-3, 76-8.

64 If the earl paid his debt by the date stated in the bond no interest appears to have been charged. Working out interest rates is in this instance frustrated by the fact that the rate was not stated in the bond. Creditors could, and did, take legal action against Antrim. The 'Index of bad debtors' in 1638 (P.R.O., L.C. 4/185) lists Antrim, Alexander MacDonnell, John Moore and Archibald Stewart. Unfortunately the reference given in the index is incompatible with the corresponding recognizance rolls (P.R.O., L.C. 4/66, 67). The same is true for the main working registers - the entry books - of the clerk of the recognizances (P.R.O., L.C. 4/202): though the index (P.R.O., L.C. 4/216) lists Antrim, Alexander, Moore and Stewart, no corresponding reference in the originals was found.

65 Wentworth to Windebank, 15 February 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 289); Wentworth to Charles I, 10 February 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 278); Wentworth to Cottington, 10 February 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, f. 35).
Conway - were in a similar predicament. In fact indebtedness plagued leading figures throughout early modern Europe: consider the extreme example of a Castilian nobleman, the duke of Infantado, whose rents did not even cover the interest due on his debts, while his compatriot - the duke of Béjar - spent fifty percent of his income merely on servicing his debts!

Ironically, however, indebtedness also had a positive side, and in Antrim's case his indebtedness - particularly to leading landowners in Ulster and to members of the London business community - ensured his political survival. At the Restoration his creditors formed a powerful pressure group which lobbied for the earl's restoration principally to ensure that the money he owed them from the late 1630s might at last be repaid.

In the long term, therefore, Antrim's debts bought him political and tenurial security, while in the middle term (1640s and 1650s) his indebtedness was


68 For details see chapter 10 below.
relative since the majority of his class were similarly embarrassed. However his debts had their dangers for him in the short term (the late 1630s) because they put him in severely straightened circumstances. Frequently he could neither meet his current expenses nor raise further capital. This brought him social and political embarrassment, and Wentworth in particular was aghast both at Antrim's debts and at the dubious methods used to alleviate them. The lord deputy was, for instance, determined to prevent Antrim exploiting the young duke of Buckingham's inheritance to his own advantage. In England there was little Wentworth could do to curb Antrim's manipulation of the Buckingham estate, but Ireland was another matter. When in the summer of 1637 the couple demanded that the Lord President of Munster - William St. Leger - pay the duchess 'her dower' (an annual allowance of £200) out of a manor and estate in Queen's County demised to him by the late duke for twenty-one years, Wentworth immediately took St. Leger's part on the grounds that he was a loyal and faithful servant to the crown. After much wrangling Antrim secured a ruling in his favour whereby St. Leger was to pay him £200 per annum for the twelve remaining years of his lease plus £1,800

69 Knowler, Letters, ii, 131-2; Wentworth to Laud, 10 July 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 35v-6v).

70 Petition from St. Leger to Charles I, [c. October 1637] (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 4, ff 300-1).
in arrears.71 Determined not to suffer any slight either to his own authority or to that of his representative Wentworth refused to accept the settlement and, early in 1638, insisted that the matter be referred to the court of wards.72 The battle between Antrim and the Lord President of Munster therefore raged on for a further eight months until the king finally intervened and ruled against Antrim.73

The St. Leger affair was merely one source of friction between Antrim and Wentworth. Relations between the two had deteriorated steadily since the earl had visited Ireland in the spring of 1637 and had - according to Wentworth - passed 'his judgment upon me privately that he liked me not, and that I was proud'.74 Antrim's patronage of St. Patrick's Purgatory on Lough Derg (County Donegal) forced the rift even wider.75 The devoutly catholic queen -

71 The second duke also received an annual sum of £100, Coke to Wentworth, 5 October 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 11, f. 325) and Coke to Wentworth, 7 November 1637 (ibid., MSS 11, f. 331).

72 Before the matter was referred to the court of wards Laud tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade the duchess to acquiesce in Wentworth’s demands, Laud to Wentworth, 11 November 1637 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 131-2) and Laud to Wentworth, 23 November 1637 (Laud Works, vii, 391-2). Laud to Wentworth, 27 March 1638 (ibid., vii, 418-9); Wentworth to Laud, 10 April 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 157); Laud to Wentworth, 14 May 1638 (ibid., ii, 169, 171).

73 Knowler, Letters, ii, 205-8, 207.

74 Wentworth to Laud, 10 July 1637 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 35v).

75 For details see William Pinkerton, 'Saint Patrick’s Purgatory, part iv’ in J.A., 1st series, v (1857), pp
unaware that it had already been destroyed— instructed
Antrim to discuss the preservation of St. Patrick's
Purgatory with Wentworth on her behalf.76 Wentworth
penned a polite reply to the queen explaining that
since the site had been destroyed for over six years it
was impossible to restore it, especially since it was
situated 'in the midst of the great Scottish
plantations'; and so he begged her 'to let this
devotion rest a while, till there may be a fitter
opportunity'.77 There was no need, however, for such
respect towards the queen's catholic agent and so
Antrim became the target of Wentworth's waspish pen.
Lord Conway was sarcastically informed how Antrim
'desires St. Patrick may have his purgatory here on
earth again where I thought he had been sure enough in
heaven'. Laud, who agreed that St. Patrick's was 'a
Babel indeed', received similar outbursts.78 Seen in
the context of Antrim's ambitions towards the

61-81 especially pp 74-5. The first earl built a house
at Lough Derg and gave a yearly pension to the prior,
MacDonald, 'A Fragment of an Irish MSS', p. 280.

76 Antrim to Wentworth, 25 June 1638 (Sheffield City
Library, Strafford MSS 18, f. 69); Knowler, Letters, ii, 221; Cathaldus Giblin, 'Vatican Library: Mss
Barberini Latini. A guide to the material of Irish
interest on microfilm in the National Library, Dublin'
in Archiv. Hib., xviii (1955), p. 127; Bagwell,
Stuarts, i, 188-9; Hibbard, Popish Plot, p. 60.

77 Wentworth to Henrietta Maria, 10 October 1638
(Knowler, Letters, ii, 221-2).

78 Wentworth to Conway, 31 August 1638 (Sheffield City
Library, Strafford MSS 10A, f. 172). Wentworth to Laud,
11 August 1638 (ibid., MSS 7, ff 124-5). Laud to
Wentworth, [10 September] 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 483-
5). Laud to Wentworth, 29 December 1638 (ibid., vii, 
508).
plantation lands in Londonderry and the volatile political situation in Scotland, Wentworth's outrage was understandable. At times he must have seriously wondered if the earl — whom both he and the archbishop of Canterbury had supported — was trying to recreate the old, gaelic world into which he had been born.

Antrim's active catholicism did not endear him to Wentworth, who hoped to transform the Church of Ireland into Ireland's national church. He was also adversely affected by the lord deputy's attempts to make Ireland financially self-sufficient by developing and revitalizing instruments of royal government such as the commission for defective titles, created to overhaul security of tenure, and the court of wards, which was responsible for collecting alienation fines, livery and wardship dues. The trouble began in 1638. Upon his father's death, the new earl of Antrim was eager to secure a fresh title to his inheritance in the form of a new patent. He naively hoped this would include the 2,000 acres in the Long Liberties of Coleraine which he claimed that his father had given

for the plantation. 80 The Dublin administration insisted, however, that he should in turn relinquish some of his lucrative fishing rights and pay a number of hefty fines. 81 He was charged £2,200 in livery and alienation fines, and a further £1,300 in extraordinary fines. 82 By the spring of 1639 he still owed £700 to the court of wards, ‘being the last payment of all my fines of alienation and liveries’ and £1,200 to the Dublin Exchequer. 83 This was noted by the lord deputy:

‘As for my Lord of Antrim, all is quiet and still there; all so fast asleep, as his lordship neither pays licenses of alienation, subsidies or rents’

He went on to wonder whether the king wished him to be awakened, ‘lest otherwise he fall into the cave of those seven sleepers we read of in the legend?’ 84

80 Gillespie, Colonial Ulster, p. 97. Reason’s why the king should consider Antrim’s petition, [c. September 1637] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/M 1/277); Laud Works, vii, 391-2, 438-9, 444-5, 448; Knowler, Letters, ii, 157; Wentworth to Laud, 8 June 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 104-v).

81 Antrim to Wentworth, 6 April 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 18, f. 12); Antrim to Wentworth, 25 June 1638 (ibid., MSS 18, f. 69); Laud Works, vii, 438-9, 444-5; Knowler, Letters, ii, 426-8. Note that Chichester also was only granted a new patent after he surrendered his Lough Neagh fishing rights and paid a composition fine of £500, Roebuck, ‘The Making of an Ulster Great Estate’, p. 20.


83 Antrim to Wentworth, 29 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford, MSS 19, f. 63). Antrim to Wentworth, 10 November 1637 (ibid., MSS 22, f. 139), Antrim to Wentworth, 17 April 1639 (ibid., MSS 19, f. 22),
Wentworth was determined to make the earl pay in case 'others by his example will immediately pretend like reasons' thereby creating 'very great disorder and confusion to his majesty’s receipts here'. However no cash was forthcoming.85

Antrim’s refusal to compromise over the dispute with St. Leger, his zeal to have St. Patrick’s Purgatory restored and his slow payment of crown dues totally alienated the lord deputy who, in retaliation, ignored the earl.86 Laud, once again, came to the rescue and ordered Wentworth to restore his patronage:

‘The truth is I will not be denied this kindness from you but that you shall be heartily reconciled to my Lord Antrim and do him and his estate there all the real and just kindness that you can’.87

84 Wentworth to Vane, 24 July 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 426).

85 Wentworth and council to Vane, 4 June 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 358). Finally he asked Hamilton to arrange for him to pay the money off in instalments, Antrim to Hamilton, 15 April 1640 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1161). On the eve of the rebellion the debt to the exchequer had still not been repaid, Antrim to Hamilton, 19 July 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1389). Interestingly his father had been equally tardy in paying his fines, Laud Works, vii, 169-71, 236.

86 Antrim was genuinely peeved by this and claimed only to want Wentworth’s affection, Antrim to Wentworth, 25 April 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 18, f. 23). This then upset Laud who was distressed that '192 [Antrim] is much fallen from your favour...and I am heartily sorry for it’. He begged to know what the earl had done now so that he could straighten matters out between them, Laud to Wentworth, 30 May 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 438-9, 444-5).

87 Laud to Wentworth, [June?] 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 455). The duchess reinforced Laud’s message, Duchess of Buckingham to Wentworth, [June 1638?] (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 22, f. 42).
Shortly afterwards the archbishop issued a further warning claiming that if his request was denied Wentworth would ‘utterly discredit me, and make the world think I have no interest in you’.88 It was with Laud’s full support and Wentworth’s grudging approval that the couple prepared to move to Ireland in order to economize and thus reduce their debts.89 To facilitate the move the king agreed that they should use one of his ships for the passage and in July 1638 Antrim asked Wentworth to send a ‘great ship’ with a ‘large sweet cabin’ for the duchess to meet them near Liverpool during the last week in August.90 After a series of delays they were finally met by a pinnace at Chester which transferred them to Captain Kettleby’s ‘great ship’ at Beaumaris.91 This journey cost the crown nearly £500, and Wentworth was furious: ‘we are all for ostentation, no moderate thing will suffice, as if land, sea and all were to minister to [his] glory’

88 Laud to Wentworth, 31 August 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 479). [Laud] to Wentworth, July 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 128). Impoverished Scottish nobles also retreated to their estates to economize, Brown ‘Aristocratic Finances’, p. 76.

89 Knowler, Letters, ii, 217.

90 Antrim to Wentworth, 17 July 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 184). Once again Laud backed up his request, Laud to Wentworth, 30 July 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 467, 471). Antrim to Wentworth, 6 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 18, f. 99).

91 Wentworth to Laud, [September] 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 131v); Laud to Wentworth, 8 October 1638 (ibid., MSS 7, f. 140); Cal. S.P. Dom., 1638–9, p. 4.
he fumed. 92 In another letter to Lord High Admiral Northumberland he complained of the navy being 'led up and down in the masques or pageants' of one man's vanity. 93 On 29 September 1638, 'Randal earl of Antrim and his wife Katherine duchess of Buckingham landed at Bloick in the County of Dublin and went that night to Powerscourt. From whence the next day they took their journey towards the north'. 94

The couple settled down to life in east Ulster remarkably swiftly. They made Dunluce castle their primary residence and, after September 1639 (when the king leased them 300 acres in the Long Liberties), they also spent time in a house near Coleraine. 95 As an inventory of furnishings removed from these properties in 1642 illustrates, the duchess furnished her Irish homes as lavishly as her English ones. 96 Furniture in

92 Wentworth to Laud, [September] 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 131v); Knowler, Letters, ii, 300-5.

93 Wentworth to Northumberland, 18 September 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 108, f. 19).

94 Sir John Ware's Diary of Occurrences (Dublin City Library, MS 169 p. 218). Their reception (much to Laud's chagrin) was not, however, a particularly warm one, Knowler, Letters, ii, 248, 262-3.

95 Where exactly they lived is a mystery; certainly Antrim intended building a house on this land but whether it was ever completed, or even started, is another matter.

96 The need to keep up appearances was crucial, Brown 'Aristocratic Finances', pp 63-4. Most of their furniture was probably bought in London and this would certainly explain why between June and August 1638 Antrim ran up debts to various tradesmen to the tune of nearly £22,000!. See appendix 1.5 and Hill, MacDonnells, pp 475-6.
the living quarters included twelve armchairs, sixty-three stools, thirty-seven cushions and sixty-six pairs of curtains, all of which were either upholstered in or made out of the most exquisite, expensive fabrics (scarlet and blue silk, crimson and black velvet, gold and silver lace, white silver damask, and green satin predominated). These handsomely upholstered items were complemented by over thirty Turkish or Persian carpets of varying sizes; cabinets; folding screens; gilt framed pictures and tapestries; and fifty-nine damask tablecloths with matching napkins to adorn the earl’s table. The sleeping quarters - containing at least seventeen beds - were equally well equipped with over 100 damask towels and astonishing amounts of bedlinen (pillows, bolsters, counterpanes, blankets, quilts, vallances and so on). There was also a library of over fifty books (in octavo, quarto and folio), and an opulent collection of miscellaneous items such as mirrors, maps, abacuses, a telescope, a celestial and terrestrial globe and ‘sixteen pieces of rich embroidered green satin vestments and their furniture for altars and pulpits’.97 Yet despite these luxurious

97 P.R.O., S.P. 23/237/25 ff 62-9. Presumably this inventory is incomplete and comprises only the couple’s more valuable and easily portable possessions. For a discussion of how the Commonwealth sequestered and then disposed of goods see Ian Roy, ‘The Libraries of Edward, second Viscount Conway and others: an inventory and valuation of 1643’ in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xli (1968), pp 35-40. The duchess continued to import goods. For instance, in June 1639 one trunk and 6 boxes of Dutch cloth were dispatched from Chester to Dublin for her, Chester Port Book, 1639
appearances, Dunluce was an Irish castle. The men wore Irish clothing, and an Irish harper formed part of an extensive gaelic retinue which included bards, poets, musicians and priests.98

The couple had moved to Ireland in order to economize, however, and this they began to do with a vengeance.99 In the spring of 1639 Wentworth updated Laud on their progress:

'It is reported the duchess expresseth much satisfaction in her present condition, and that they contract themselves into a narrow room, put away many of their servants, especially such, if not all of them, that were protestant'.100

But reducing the size of their Irish household and cutting back on the amount spent educating the duchess’s sons did relatively little to pay off their ‘great debt in England’ so they decided, in the autumn of 1639, to sell Bramshill and the family jewels.101 By the early summer of 1640 matters were looking up:

(P.R.O., E.190/1336/3 f. 8v). I am grateful to Robert Hunter for bringing this reference to my attention.

98 I am grateful to Hector MacDonnell for bringing these details to my attention.


100 Wentworth to Laud, 11 February 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 160v). Laud to Wentworth, 22 March 1639 (Laud Works, vii, 531).

Bramshill was sold, and some of the creditors had received satisfaction.102

As the financial picture brightened in some areas, however, it darkened in others. Continued prosperity on the Antrim estates was threatened by a run of poor harvests between 1636 and 1639 and in the spring of 1639 the earl complained about the 'great want of money we have in these parts; and for my part I am sorry I find it true: for I am not like to receive the half of my rents in money'.103 Worse yet, the economic crisis was exacerbated by the gathering political storm. The Scottish wars (see chapter 3) caused considerable disruption on the Antrim estates. On the one hand, Wentworth's tyrannical measures against the Ulster presbyterians forced hordes of Scotsmen, including many of the earl's own 'puritan' tenants, back across the Dalriadic sea, thereby depleting his pool of labour and his income.104 On the other, Argyll's 'threatenings'


forced the earl’s catholic tenants on Rathlin Island to flee to the mainland (‘and by that means I loose my rent there’). They were soon joined by hundreds of MacDonald refugees from the Isles whom he was then obliged to support out of his own pocket. For Antrim, as for his royal master, the outbreak of a rebellion in Scotland which could only be defeated by military action could scarcely have come at a worse time.

105 Duchess of Buckingham to Hamilton, 14 October [1639] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/8175); Antrim to Hamilton, 13 October 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/653); Antrim to Wentworth, 16 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 339-40). Wentworth, barely surprisingly, forbade him to billet them on the countryside ‘for that would amount to a public scandal, and affright the whole kingdom’, Wentworth to [Vane?], 21 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, ff 87-8) and Wentworth to Antrim, 23 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 353-4); Antrim to Hamilton, 23 December 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1168). Considerable numbers of these refugees were still in Ulster the following summer, Antrim to Hamilton, 3 June 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1355).
CHAPTER 3: Antrim and the Bishops' Wars (1638-41)

'The Scottish business is extream ill indeed, and what will become of it God knows, but certainly no good' predicted Archbishop Laud in July 1638. The 'Scottish business' had reached a head the previous year with riots in St Giles's church, Edinburgh, against the introduction of Laud's new English service book and over the course of the next six months the king's opponents in Scotland had organized their resistance.2 In March 1638 a national covenant binding these dissenters 'to defend both true religion and the king's authority' was signed, and with this control over Scottish affairs passed into the hands of the covenanters.3 Shortly afterwards the marquis of Hamilton was dispatched north to solve Scotland's problems. He failed. His uncompromising master, determined 'to stick to my grounds', now decided to use force to 'reduce that people [the Scots] to their obedience...[since] not only now my crown but my reputation, forever, lies at stake'. He added ominously that 'I will rather die, than yield to those impertinent and damnable demands'.4 The English

1 Laud to Wentworth, 20 July 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 185).


3 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, p. 85.
ambassador in Brussels supported his king's decision to use force against the Scots:

'Tis a thousand pities the Scots are possessed with a rebellious humour on pretense of religion, which hath ever been the worst pretense in all states and proved almost an incurable fire, except the member infected be cut off at first instant'.

As the revolt in Scotland gathered momentum the need to cut off the infected 'member' became increasingly urgent. Early in 1638, the catholic earl of Nithsdale (who had been urging the king to use force since October 1637) suggested sending an army of Irish and Scottish troops against the covenanters. The cooperation of all the leading Scottish catholic nobles (Huntly, Douglas, Hamilton of Abercorn and Seton of Winton) reinforced by Lennox, Dumfries, Galloway and Herries was seen as vital if his plan was to succeed; equally important was support from the leading Irish nobles.

Whether Nithsdale had actually selected Antrim as a potential ally at this stage is unclear, but their subsequent relationship suggests that the earl was somehow privy to their plans. Antrim was certainly involved in other plots, this time hatched by Hamilton.

Over the summer of 1638 covenanting spies in London


5 [Gerbier] to Windebank, 1/11 June 1639 (P.R.O., S.P. 105/16 f. 203).

(particularly the earl's Ulster neighbour, Sir John Clotworthy) were convinced that he was up to no good. 'Antrim was recommended by the marquis [of Hamilton] to the king, as a man that might contribute largely to his service in this business' it was reported back to Edinburgh. Even the earl's intention to move back to Ireland was made to seem sinister:

'I am certified he takes with your employment, and as a vizor to cover his intent this way he very shortly carries his duchess into Ireland with him and there resolves to live. Now I suppose his main design is to make what party he can there and in the highlands of Argyll.'

Antrim's letters to the marquis of Hamilton reveal that Clotworthy was extraordinarily well-informed. Prior to his departure to Edinburgh in May, Hamilton - who was eager to foster an anti-Campbell alliance - had indeed recommended Antrim to the king and suggested using the MacDonnells on both sides of the North Channel as bulwarks against the covenanters in Western Scotland; and on 11 June 1638 Antrim offered to put Irish troops at the king's disposal.

7 [Clotworthy?] to John Flemming, 21 June 1638 (Cal. S.P. Dom., 1637-8, pp 524-5). Also see [Clotworthy] to John Flemming, 26 June 1638 (N.L.S., Wod. Fo. 66 ff 92-3); [Clotworthy] to 'my worthy friends', 11 July 1638 (N.L.S., Wod. Fo. 66 ff 109-10) printed in David Dalrymple, Memoria and Letters relating to the history of Britain in the Reign of Charles I (Glasgow, 1766), pp 42-3. It was rumoured in Scotland that Antrim 'has hired a Scottish ship, laden and furnished with powder and munition of war for Ireland', News from England, 15 July [1638] (Laing, Letter and Journals, i, 72). For details on Clotworthy's mission to London see Donald, 'The King and the Scottish Troubles', pp 180-3 and Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 15-6.

8 Antrim to Hamilton, 11 June 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1156). Edward J. Cowan, Montrose for Covenant and
His offer came at an opportune moment, for it was precisely in the middle of June that Hamilton recognised that all hope of concluding a peaceful settlement with the covenanters had vanished and recommended the use of force to the king as the only realistic solution. From Edinburgh he urged Charles to use the earl:

'I can not neglect the representing to your majesty that the earl of Antrim may be of use to you in this business, for [he] is beloved by divers of his name, and hath some pretensions to lands in Kintyre, [the] isles and highlands and will no doubt repair to Ireland and bring such forces with him as will put those covenanters in that disorder; and chiefly if the deputy can spare any of the army then to join with him, as I hope, that part of the country will do us little hurt'.

In short Hamilton suggested that an army levied and paid for by Antrim, and supplemented where possible by Wentworth, should be the first line of royalist offence in the west of Scotland. For his part, Antrim now had a legitimate excuse for stirring up the old MacDonnell-Campbell feud and for making a fresh bid

King (London, 1977), pp 50-3; Donald, 'The King and the Scottish Troubles', p. 75; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 65.


10 Antrim later mentioned 'directions and authority by his majesty given at his last being in England, concerning his lordship's going upon the Isles of Scotland', Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 300).
for Clan Donald's patrimonial lands in the Western Isles. For at this point he was promised by Charles I 'whatsoever land he can conquer from them, he, having pretense of right, he shall have the same'. And so over the summer of 1638, while still in London, the earl began mobilizing his support groups on both sides of the north channel.

Antrim hoped to take by force what his father, only three years previously, had failed to buy. For in January 1635 the first earl nearly succeeded in

11 Vane to Wentworth, 11 April 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 319); Wentworth to Charles I, 17 October 1638 (ibid., ii, 225-6); McKerral, Kintyre, p. 38. Nearly a year later (April 1639) Wentworth discovered the truth: 'It would seem to me, for I was not of the council, my lord marquis of Hamilton and my lord of Antrim, had to his majesty undertaken the business before the earl's coming forth of England, consequently before Argyll was declared covenanter; my lord of Antrim was for his reward to have a share of his estate: What other shares there were, any, or none, in truth I know not', Wentworth to Vane, 16 April 1639 (ibid., ii, 325).

12 Archibald Stewart acted as his intermediary and contacted the leading Scottish MacDonalds - Archibald MacDonald of Sand, Coll Ciotach MacDonald, the captain of Clan Ranald, the laird of Glengarry and Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat - who were only too willing to serve the Stuart king. Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 65-6; ibid., Scottish Covenanters, pp 22-3; Stewart, 'Peoples of the Clanranald', p. 65. Huntly to [Hamilton], 18 January 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/412); Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat to Hamilton, 24 August 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/533; H.M.C. Supplementary Report, p. 50); Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat to Huntly, 25 July 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/427); Antrim to Hamilton, 11 June 1638 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1156).

13 The MacDonalds, with Irish support, had tried to regain these lands in 1614-5, Bagwell, Stuarts, i, 142-3. In 1627 the first earl of Antrim unsuccessfully tried to purchase lands in Islay from Sir John Campbell of Calder for £5000; early in 1633 he attempted (again without success) to buy Kintyre and Jura from Lord Kintyre, Clan Donald, ii, 714-7.
buying Kintyre and Jura for which he paid Lord Kintyre (Argyll's younger son) £1,500 'earnest money' plus £250 for legal expenses. However just as the transaction was being finalized Kintyre's elder brother Lord Lorne (who succeeded his father as the eighth earl of Argyll in October 1638) discovered who the true purchaser of his brother's estates was and, with 'a great number of his friends', hurried to Edinburgh to frustrate the deal. Lorne petitioned the Scottish privy council to intervene on the grounds that 'there were many of the name of McDonnell dwelling there and if they got one of the McDonnells to dwell there and to be their master that they would prove rebels'. In addition to destabilizing the political status quo in the Isles, Lorne claimed that Antrim 'would bring in a number of priests and so make the people turn papists'. Finally he threatened that if the transaction went through he would not be able to 'quiet his own name but that they and the McDonnells would be still in blood'.


15 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Kintyre Papers. He also complained to the earl of Morton of his brother's 'ignorant carriage in all his business' and begged Morton to inform the king of this 'and to secure myself again of His Majesty's favour', Lord Lorne to Morton, 25 January [1635] (N.L.S., MS 79, f. 34). The first earl also had recourse to powerful friends at court. He begged the marquis of Hamilton to support his case on the grounds that Lorne was simply unwilling that anyone 'should come there but those that should be at his command' and he promised to treat these lands as he had his own in Ulster (to rebuild the ruined churches and populate the countryside with 'land Scots men' or lowlanders), First earl of Antrim to Hamilton, 10 February 1635 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/283).
Convinced by his plea, the council ordered (on 14 January) the clerk of the register of sasines 'to discharge...any enfeoffment or seisin' taken out by the first earl, Lord Dunluce or anyone else in Kintyre.16

It was almost too late for, back in Kintyre, an extract of sasine (dated 16 January) had already been issued to Archibald Stewart, the earl's representative and factor, for the lands.17 Nevertheless, early in February 1635, the privy council (with the king's full backing) issued a further order forbidding any member of Clandonald or their representatives from taking possession of land in Jura or Kintyre and ordered Stewart to destroy the original extract of sasine.18

The first earl of Antrim made no further effort to regain his Scottish patrimony but his son resolved that, even though the Campbells had won the first round, the fight was far from finished.

Charles I's refusal to 'yield to the demands of those traitors the covenanters' offered an attractive opportunity for Antrim to revive the feud which, as David Stevenson has recently noted, 'now became a minor part of the great struggle between King Charles I and the covenanters'.19 His willingness to serve the king

17 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Kintyre Papers.
19 Charles I to Hamilton, 20 June 1638 (Gilbert Burnet, Memoirs of the lives and actions of James and William, dukes of Hamilton... (London, 1677)), p. 59; David
in Scotland bought Antrim instant favour at court and Laud noted (without knowing the details) that 'he hath done the king lately very good service in Scotland. And I believe there will be further use of him and his kindred there'. The king's willingness to make use of the earl can be explained by Hamilton's persistent and timely interventions on Antrim's behalf; by his own desperation and exasperation with the covenanters; and by the need to find a speedy and, above all, a cheap solution to his Scottish problems.

While this plan made sound economic and military sense, it was disastrous politically for it alienated from the king's cause Lord Lorne - one of the most important Scottish noblemen. Thanks to well-informed covenanting leaks at court and in the Isles Lorne had quickly learnt of Antrim's plans and, fearing a catholic crusade on his own doorstep, allied with the covenanting movement. He argued that this was an

Stevenson, 'The Massacre at Dunaverty, 1647' in 

20 Laud to Wentworth, [June?] 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 455). Laud later claimed that if Antrim had been 'led into any undertaking by 198 [Hamilton]' he would have confided this to the archbishop!, Laud to Wentworth, 1 May 1639 (ibid., vii, 571-2). Wentworth later asserted that Antrim had actually admitted that 'his intent only was thereby to gain favour and honour from his majesty, without either hazard or expense to himself', Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 336).

21 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 23-4; Lorne believed 'That the earl came to take it [Kintyre] by strong hand; to which purpose three of your majesty's ships full of arms were appointed to bring and furnish him for the attempt', Wentworth to Charles I, 17 October 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 225-6); Wentworth to Vane, 16 April 1639 (ibid., ii, 325).
attempt by 'the rebellious race of Clandonald' to take 'advantage of troublesome times to execute their rebellions' and believed that they were not only conspiring with the exiled Irish O'Donnells and O'Neills but also with the MacDonnells under Antrim's command. 22 And so, on the grounds 'that some of the Clandonalds had a design upon his country', he began to fortify Kintyre (including Lochhead fort), to construct long boats, and to mobilize his men in preparation for war. 23 Having goaded Argyll into taking an offensive stance Antrim now claimed to be the 'injured' party and begged Wentworth - who was unaware of the minutiae of his clandestine negotiations with the king - for help. He asserted that his Campbell rival was preparing to attack his Ulster estates and insisted that his men should be armed by the crown, promising that 'these arms may alway[s] be kept in a store house in Coleraine, because it would be too far for me and my tenants to send to Carrickfergus, if there were any sudden invasion'. 24 Wentworth not only

22 Lorne to Wentworth, 25 July 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 187). Wentworth encouraged Lorne's outbursts against Clan Donald by reciting how a clan member - after being rejected as a suitable suitor for a County Down lass - murdered her father and then raped and abducted the girl. See Wentworth to [Coke], 8 May 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 11, f. 77); Wentworth to Lorne, 28 August 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 210); Lorne to Wentworth, 9 October 1638 (ibid., ii, 220-1).

resented arming a catholic 'of the race of O'Neale, and upon my own knowledge the great admirer of his grandfather Tyrone', but feared that the arms could be used against the crown by either the Irish ('ill affected to the English') or the Ulster Scots '[who are] ready to burn the hierarchy of the church to ashes, nay to show and scatter them through the four corners of the world'.25 So Wentworth not only refused to arm Antrim's tenants but also insisted that the earl should have no part in the army which he hoped to send against the covenanters:

‘His religion, nor yet his descent (being the grandchild and son of your majesty knows whom) sort not well with it. And I am upon very probable reason for believing that in the way of pretending service, but doing nothing for your majesty, he attentively watcheth to do something for his own fortune and power, for which hereafter to thank himself far more than your majesty’.26

At first it seemed as if Wentworth would have his way for, on his return to Ireland, Antrim made no apparent effort to mobilize his own army or to

24 Antrim to Wentworth, 17 July 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 184); Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 124-5).

25 Wentworth to Laud, 11 August 1638 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, ff 124-5). Knowler, Letters, ii, 187-8, 211. Laud, while empathising with Wentworth’s fears (if Antrim was furnished with arms 'the world will have cause to wonder, and I to despair'), also believed that he was not a threat, Laud to Wentworth, [10 September] 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 483-5).

26 Wentworth to Charles I, 11 August 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 203-4). There was considerable opposition to using Irish troops at all in Scotland, George Gage to Windebank, 2/12 March 1639 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 15, f. 173). Donald, 'The King and the Scottish Troubles', pp 112-3.
intervene in Wentworth’s levy.27 But in fact the nine months between August 1638 and May 1639 represented a period of ‘phoney war’ which fell neatly into two phases. The first stage (August to December 1638) was a war of nerves during which Antrim (based primarily at Carrickfergus) vigilantly monitored the Campbells’ preparations, fretted about the fate of his Scottish allies and worried about the future of his own tenants.28 The five months between December 1638 and the actual outbreak of the First Bishops’ War in May 1639 marked the second phase which was characterised by preparations for war in all three kingdoms.

This move towards outright hostility was precipitated by the covenanters’ refusal to sign the proclamation dissolving the assembly convened by Hamilton. At this point Argyll, though he resisted signing the covenant for several more months, openly joined the covenanters to ensure that ‘no MacDonnell shall be allowed to enjoy a foot of land in Scotland’.29 This was interpreted as a formal declaration by Argyll for the king’s enemies and gave Antrim the ‘green light’ to set in motion the plans

27 This may also be attributed to the king’s (temporary) decision not to use Irish troops, Charles I to Wentworth, 22 October 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 228).


which had been discussed the previous summer. The royalist grand strategy envisaged a four-fold attack: Charles I and the main English army were to invade Scotland from the Borders; Hamilton and the fleet were to land 5,000 troops at Aberdeen to join forces with those prepared in the north-east by Huntly; Wentworth was to send an Irish expeditionary force to Dumbarton; and, finally, Antrim was to invade the Western Isles and join forces with the men mobilized by Sir Donald MacDonald (who was also in close contact with Huntly). The king's supporters hoped that this 'may drain them [the covenanters] out of the world, for rebels are monsters not to be suffered amongst reasonable creatures'.

Early in January 1639 Antrim renewed his requests for government arms and munition. The king immediately instructed Wentworth to provide them: 'I should be glad if you could find some way to furnish the earl of Antrim with arms, though he be a Roman Catholic; for he may be of much use to me at this time, to shake loose upon the earl of Argyle'. Though totally against arming 'so great a body of Irish


31 [Gerbier] to Mr Walker, 10/20 April 1639 (P.R.O., S.P. 105/16 ff 120-1).


33 Charles I to Wentworth, 25 January 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 275).
together', Wentworth reluctantly agreed to do so, although even at this stage he placed little importance on Antrim's contribution to his master's grand strategy:34

'There is some opinion there may be some heats break forth betwixt the two great earls of Antrim and Argyle, but the sea is so happily set betwixt them, as perchance may so allay their warmth, as they will not give any great hurt one to the other, nor much trouble to other men'.35

In spite of the lord deputy's characteristic pessimism, Antrim began levying his army of 5,000 foot and 200 horse. In the absence of a formal commission from the king this was difficult.36 Nevertheless he exploited his position as a gaelic lord in both Ulster and the Western Isles and summoned, as his ancestors had done, the men of his own lordship and of neighbouring sublordships to mobilize for war.37 His Scottish allies, who could muster up to 4,000 catholic MacDonalds, willingly agreed 'to recover me Kintyre and

34 Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 301). Knowler, Letters, ii, 278. Antrim's later demands for 1200 barrels of powder were, however, denied since there were only 528 barrels in the whole kingdom! Wentworth and council to Vane, 4 June 1639 (ibid., ii, 357-9).

35 Wentworth to Newcastle, 10 February 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 281). Wentworth did suggest that of the two Argyll was more likely to act aggressively, Wentworth to Windebank, 15 February 1639 (ibid., ii, 289).

36 Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 300-5).

37 Gillespie, 'End of an Era', p. 209 argues that the plantation had not destroyed, but rather rationalized, the basic structure of Gaelic society. O'Dowd, 'Land and Lordship', pp 18-22.
my ancient right to the Isles’, while his Irish kin, friends and tenants also rallied to his call.38 By March 1639 Antrim had written to ‘all my chief kindred and tenants acquainting them with the king’s pleasure, and [asking them] to prepare a list of such number of men they were able to raise and to have them in readiness upon a week’s warning’.39 These men were drawn from the leading Irish families in Ulster: the O’Neills, O’Haras, O’Lurgans, Magennisess, MacGuire’s, Macmahons, MacDonnel’s, MacHenry’s; or, as the lord deputy charmingly phrased it, ‘as many Oe’s and Macs’s as would startle a whole council board’ and ‘in a great part the sons of habituated traitors’.40 Antrim’s personal army was to be supplemented by other units. For example, Lord Dillon from Athlone - ‘a noble gallant gentleman, and a special friend...and very ambitious to serve the king in this public action’ - offered to serve with 2,000 men ‘upon such conditions as others have’.41

39 Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154).
40 Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 300); Wentworth and council to Vane, 4 June 1639 (ibid., ii, 358).
41 Dillon to Antrim, 8 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1152); Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1155). The earl of Kildare also suggested that Crosby raise a regiment to serve in Scotland, Clarke ‘Sir Piers Crosby’, p. 147.
Rallying an army 'of naked and inexperienced Irishmen' (as Wentworth dubbed it) on paper was one thing; preparing it for war, however, was quite another. Antrim needed experienced officers not only to train and discipline his motley bunch, but also to lead them 'for there are no principal commanders in these parts' and he had 'no experience in war'. In the absence of veteran officers in Ulster, Antrim's first instinct was to import from the continent men - such as his cousins Owen Roe O'Neill and Daniel O'Neill, or his half-brother Captain Maurice MacDonnell - well versed in the ways of modern warfare. The very idea horrified Wentworth and so the earl was forced to make do with 100 relatively inexperienced drill sergeants from the king's army with 'one or two able old soldiers to be commanders'.


43 Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154).

44 Antrim to Wentworth, 26 February 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, ff 257-8); Antrim to Wentworth [copy], 22 February 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1150). Antrim was only interested in bringing back carefully selected Irish officers and even warned the king of the dangers of allowing Tyrone and his regiment to return, Antrim to Hamilton, 14 January [1639] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/652) and Knowler, *Letters*, ii, 357-9. Despite being warned not to, he asked his half-brother Maurice to return, which he did in mid-1639, Cardinal Infante to Charles I, 17/27 June 1639 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 17, f. 17). Cregan, 'An Irish Cavalier', p. 79.

45 Antrim's propositions [March] 1639 (Knowler, *Letters*, ii, 305); Knowler, *Letters*, ii, 296-7. Henry Spottiswood (of whom nothing further is heard), Sir Henry Bruce - 'a very fair conditioned gentleman, and
Though inexperienced, Antrim had a surprisingly clear idea of how his army should be organised. The three regiments of foot were to consist of two parts 'shot' (musketeers), and one third pike ('with head-pieces and corslets, and small targents for defense against arrows'). The 200 horse were to be supplied with carbines, pistols, swords and buffcoats, the 3,200 musketeers were to be issued with 2lb of powder per man per week and appropriate amounts of lead, and the army as a unit was to be equipped with twelve field pieces, 2,000 spades, shovels and pick axes, 200 sledges (to ferry victuals and munitions from the ships) and 1,000 sand baskets. If this 'shopping list' was indeed drawn up without professional advice (as the earl claimed) it indicates that he had a very sound understanding of the latest developments in the ways of early modern warfare and that Wentworth's claims that he was an ignorant, incompetent amateur were unfounded. 


The earl had also worked out a very precise invasion plan. His men were to land first on Islay, which he intended to make 'my magazine' so that 'all my friends in the Isles may have free access to me'. Then, joined by his highland allies, whom he intended to arm with long bows, he hoped to advance on the west side of Kintyre and to send about 500 men 'about the mule [sic] of Kintyre' to meet with Hamilton's forces in Arran. The logistics of transporting and feeding 5,000 hungry men was a further formidable problem, but Antrim proposed to ship the soldiers in thirty Clan Donnell galleys 'of the burden to carry 100, or 200 men and their arms' which were to be built at his expense with wood cut from the king's forests in County Londonderry. For victuals he intended shipping 'ten thousand live cows to furnish them with milk, which he affirmed had been his grandfather's [Tyrone's] play';

Wentworth's verdict on Antrim's military inexperience is well-known: 'few men are born generals, they have not that from their mothers but gain it by time and practice', Wentworth to Vane, 14 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, f. 76).

48 Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154).

49 Ibid. His initial estimate had been for 50-60 longboats, Antrim to Hamilton, 14 January [1639] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/652); Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 300-5). Ultimately Antrim claimed the longboats had cost £4,000 to build which Wentworth found hard to believe and estimated their cost to have been only £720, Wentworth to Vane, 7 July 1639 (Ibid., ii, 422-4); Antrim to Hamilton, 23 December 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1169). Ultimately construction was delayed by the absence of skilled ship builders: 'carpenters (especially Scots) are very hard to be found; unless they be prepaid they will not work for this occasion', Antrim to Wentworth, 17 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 19, f. 22).
if the cattle were captured the soldiers would 'feed their horses with leaves of trees, and themselves with shamrocks'.50 Here the lord deputy's scorn was more justified. He concluded that a shamrock-fed army would operate poorly, and warned that no support could be expected from Dublin.51

Since Antrim's role in, and contribution to, the First Bishops' War has been thoroughly documented by Aidan Clarke, David Stevenson and, more recently, Brendan FitzPatrick, it is unnecessary to re-examine the minutiae here.52 However in the light of previously unavailable archival material, a summary review of the chronology and an explanation of why Antrim's plans failed so miserably seems justified. Until recently, historians interested in Antrim's role in the Scottish troubles were forced to rely almost exclusively on Lord Deputy Wentworth's papers for information; the animosity felt by him towards the earl has therefore inevitably seeped into subsequent accounts. As Clarke has recently noted:

'one of Wentworth's major achievements was to impose his version of the events of his deputyship upon generations of historians... His influence

50 Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 301-2).

51 Wentworth to Antrim, 3 June 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, ff 335-7).

This bias must be balanced by a thorough examination of the papers of Antrim's dearest and closest ally during these months of tortuous negotiation - the marquis of Hamilton: for Antrim's uncharacteristically long, rambling and often intimate letters to the marquis provide a unique insight into his own motives, ambitions and feelings. Moreover they illustrate very clearly that it was not incompetence on the earl's part, nor lack of support for the enterprise in the Isles, which frustrated the mission, but rather a breakdown of communications between Antrim and the king and a total lack of support - financial or otherwise - from the administration in Dublin.

From the outset preparations for the expedition were severely hindered by Charles I's inconsistent attitude towards it. After endorsing Antrim's plan in August 1638 Charles appears to have had cold feet about executing it until early in 1639; and, even then, the earl's ability to set the venture in motion was further compromised by a lack of royal orders or 'particular

53 Clarke, 'Sir Piers Crosby', p. 142.

54 Twenty-five letters from Antrim to Hamilton between October 1638 and October 1641 have survived. They were usually delivered by Antrim's most trusted servants (Traylman, Babington and Stewart), Antrim to Hamilton, 14 January [1639] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/652). Despite the worsening situation in Scotland channels of communication between the two were maintained, Antrim to Wentworth, 31 December 1638 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 266).
directions'.55 Then suddenly, towards the end of February 1639, Antrim was given the impossible task of preparing his army - which he still had not been formally commissioned to muster - for the invasion of Western Scotland by the beginning of April.56 Somewhat alarmed, Antrim hurried to Dublin to inform the lord deputy of the 'honour and charge the king did impose on me and to demand his lordship's assistance and instructions' for he had been warned not to levy men without a warrant or a commission under the great seal. Wentworth feared that Antrim was intent on making a laughing-stock of him and claimed that he knew nothing of the venture. He then asked for his demands in writing, but the earl was reluctant to comply 'having taken no advise from experienced soldiers'.57

According to Antrim's own account of the interview, Wentworth was totally uncooperative. He was loath to give advice, and claimed that there were no arms to spare. He also asserted that there was no shipping


56 Wentworth to Antrim [copy], 22 February 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1149); Antrim to Wentworth, 26 February 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, ff 257-8); Antrim to Wentworth [copy], 22 February 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1150); Wentworth to Northumberland, 15 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, ff 65-6).

57 Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154); Wentworth to Windebank, 2 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 296-7); Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (ibid., ii, 300-5); Antrim to Wentworth, 12 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1153).
available to support Antrim's invasion force.58 The lord deputy’s reasons for opposing the venture, which he articulated loudly, were endless. In order to avoid having to take any action he suggested the campaign be delayed until the following spring.59 However Antrim was insistent. He was angered by the recent capture of his kinsman Archibald MacDonald of Sana and his sons by Argyll, and so begged Wentworth for immediate leave to “revenge my friends, and especially the king's quarrel, and you shall shortly see or hear a great alteration”.60

Early in April the king ordered Wentworth to stop hindering the design and to ensure that ‘Antrim be set upon Argyll’ as soon as possible.61 Now at last, precisely ten months after the matter had been first discussed and three months after Antrim had been given permission to begin preparations, did Charles think

58 Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154); Wentworth to Laud, [April?] 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 181v).

59 Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 300-5). Wentworth complained about Antrim to the king, Laud, Northumberland and the royal secretaries. As time passed his account of the interview became increasingly polished, for instance: ‘But his lordship had not been twelve hours in town, but the crack of his bolt was heard all over the town, that my lord of Antrim was forthwith in an expedition against the Isles of Scotland’, Wentworth to Northumberland, 15 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, ff 65-6).

60 Antrim to Wentworth, 12 April 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 321); Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154).

61 Charles I to Wentworth, 10 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 40, f. 32).
the time to be proper now to pass his lordship a commission under the Great Seal of Ireland for the raising of forces, with power to transport them to Scotland'.62 This letter of 11 April sent from York was, however, contradicted by one sent two days later from the king’s secretary of state in London.63 This second missive suggested that the expedition be delayed until the following spring, since ‘the fire in Scotland is not likely to be so soon extinguished’. This would give the earl (encouraged and supported this time by Wentworth) sufficient time to prepare his forces.64 These conflicting orders naturally created crisis and chaos in Dublin and a brief period of utter confusion followed. Initially Wentworth and the council decided to follow the orders from York on the grounds that they had been received eight days before those from London. Antrim, however, now changed his tune and favoured delaying the invasion.65 This prevarication was a great tactical error on the earl’s part for Wentworth

62 Vane to Wentworth, 11 April 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 318-90), Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (ibid., ii, 334).

63 Windebank to Wentworth, 13 April 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 322).

64 Windebank to Antrim, 13 April 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 323); Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (ibid., ii, 336); Knowler, Letters, ii, 322.

65 Antrim to Wentworth, 17 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 19, f. 22); Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 334-7); Wentworth and council to Vane, 16 May and 4 June 1639 (ibid., ii, 419-21, 357-9); Wentworth to Vane, 14 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, f. 76 and S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1162).
seized the opportunity to place all blame for the delays squarely on his shoulders. The lord deputy suggested abandoning the campaign altogether due to the lateness of the season and to Antrim's ill preparedness.66

It was by now apparent that the king's grand strategy for the recovery of Scotland was in a shambles. Charles had experienced enormous difficulties in raising - never mind training - an English army; Huntly's resistance had been quickly overwhelmed so that there was no army with which Hamilton (who was sailing aimlessly up and down the east coast of Scotland) might rendez-vous; Wentworth's own offensive had been frustrated by the covenanters' capture of Dumbarton castle; while Antrim's contribution had collapsed.67 Despite these setbacks, however, an alternative strategy was cobbled together. Hamilton's force was to be redirected to the Forth where it was to meet up with an English army of invasion under the command of the king, who had arrived at York on 31 March 1639. In order to maintain the threat (it could be nothing more than this) from Ireland, Antrim was urged to 'make show of having purpose to invade Kintyre, and other the western parts of Scotland belonging to the earl of Argyll'.68

66 Wentworth to Charles I, [end April] 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 3, f. 71).
67 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, p. 141.
While Wentworth realized the importance of having 'a party in the north [and west] of Scotland which, hanging over the covenanters as a dark cloud, might give them the apprehension to have their coats soundly washed in case they went too far from home', he was not convinced that this strategy would prevent Argyll from joining up with the main covenanting army on the borders.69 He remarked, with typically bluff Yorkshire humour, 'How this physick will work with Argyll I know not, who looks upon things with other eyes (for I am told they are squint ones) perchance then our earl doth'.70

Towards the end of May this plan too was modified. Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat and Archibald Stewart were sent to the Borders, with Hamilton’s approbation but without Wentworth’s, on the pretext of securing royal shipping and aid for those persecuted by Argyll in the Isles. In fact Antrim had sent them to discuss with the king the possibility of a renewed MacDonnell–MacDonald offensive and to secure a commission 'to seize upon all covenanters goods that we can [acquire]

68 Windebank to Antrim, 23 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 323); Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (ibid., ii, 336); Wentworth and council to Vane, 16 May and 4 June 1639 (ibid., ii, 419-21, 357-9). To keep his spirits up the king sent the earl £300 and Sir Henry Bruce, Vane to Hamilton, 8 May 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1199/2).

69 Wentworth to [Vane?], 21 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 108, ff 87-8).

70 Wentworth to Northumberland, 15 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 108, f. 66).
of the Isles, and Highlands of Scotland’.71 Charles met with Sir Donald and Stewart near Berwick on 5 June (just before negotiations with the covenanters began) and agreed to supply them with a ship and arms for over 1,000 men. The following week, after negotiations had begun, he appointed Antrim and Sir Donald to be his joint lieutenants and commissioners in the Highlands and Islands. Therefore at the very last minute Charles gave Antrim the commission for which he had been waiting so long and promised to confer on him his ancestral lands in Kintyre and Isla. Sir Donald was to be rewarded with Argyll’s holdings in Ardnamurchan and Strathordale.72

Meanwhile, anticipating a favourable response from the king, Antrim had already begun to badger Wentworth for naval support for his invasion force.73 Once again the lord deputy refused. As always his excuses were cogent and comprehensive. He was unable to issue a warrant without the king’s express order; any money for the expedition must come from the English treasury; the campaigning season was virtually over; ‘the earl of

71 Antrim to Wentworth, 29 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 19, f. 63); Antrim to [Hamilton], 13 July 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1164); Knowler, Letters, ii, 353-4, 386, 387); Wentworth to Sir Donald MacDonald, 23 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, f. 317).

72 Hill, MacDonnells, pp 253-4, 444-6; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 30-1; ibid., Alasdair MacColla, pp 68, 71; Cowan, Montrose, p. 53.

73 Antrim to Wentworth, 29 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 19, f. 63).
Antrim's party [in the Isles] is not so powerful as his lordship pretends'; the treacherous waters around the Isles were unnavigable; and, finally, Antrim was only reviving the matter in an attempt to shift responsibility for failure onto the king and to undermine his representative in Ireland.74 Privately, however, Wentworth wondered whether the king had lost his senses altogether and concluded that his dependence on Antrim's promises clearly indicated that 'His majesty is too close to himself, too scant to his ministers in his counceles'.75

While Antrim and the lord deputy were still squabbling in Ireland the king made his peace with the covenanters at Berwick on 18 June.76 As far as Antrim was concerned, the First Bishops' War was over before it had begun, but the debate over who was really to blame for the failure of his expedition continued to

74 Wentworth and council to Vane, 4 June 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 357-9); Wentworth to Antrim, 30 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10A, f. 329); Wentworth to Vane, 30 May 1639 (ibid., MSS 10B, f. 96); Wentworth to Antrim, 3 June 1639 (ibid., MSS 10A, ff 335-7); Wentworth to Charles I, 6 June 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 359). Wentworth later added that as for 'the Isle of Skye, I had rather seek it forth in the map, than be bound to go thither for it, and for that and those mentioned by my lord of Antrim...they are neither worth the taking nor the keeping', Wentworth to Vane, 7 July 1639 (ibid., ii, 422-4).

75 Wentworth to Northumberland, 15 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, ff 65-6).

76 On 16 June Antrim actually went to Dublin to repeat his request for arms and shipping, Wentworth to Vane, 19 June 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 10B, ff 109-11). Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp 151-6.
rage well into July when the king finally accepted (as subsequent historians have done) Wentworth's version of events. 77 Even then Antrim, eager to relate his side of the fiasco and to prevent Argyll's recent title to Kintyre being confirmed by parliament, begged Hamilton's permission to join the king at Berwick 'since he is so near me and I have much to say to your lordship which I cannot trust to paper'. 78 In the event he was unable to do so and no record of his 'defense' has survived; but, judging by his correspondence with Hamilton, he would have claimed that it was lack of direction from London and Dublin, together with Wentworth's animosity, which had thwarted the venture. Would he have been right; or was Wentworth justified in asserting that the earl's plans were doomed to fail from the outset?

A number of Scottish covenanters certainly took the expedition extremely seriously and felt that only Argyll's vigilance (combined, of course, with divine intervention) prevented the anti-Campbell alliance in Ireland and the highlands, united by 'the king's money and authority', from recovering 'their ancestor's patrimony'. 79 The most convincing argument in Antrim's

77 Wentworth to Charles I, 23 July 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 363); Wentworth to Vane, 7 July 1639 (ibid., ii, 422-4); Vane to Wentworth, 8 July 1639 (ibid., ii, 424). FitzPatrick, Seventeenth century Ireland, pp 108-12.

78 Antrim to [Hamilton], 13 July 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1164).
defence is that only five years later (in 1644) he succeeded in executing a plan similar to the one mooted in 1638-9, under even more stressful and difficult conditions.80 There were, however, two key differences between the situation in 1639 and 1644. Above all, in 1639 Antrim suffered from a chronic shortage of money which, in turn, increased his dependence on the Dublin administration. Though the earl had resolved to 'set my whole fortune' on the successful execution of the expedition, his enormous debts and his inability to secure further credit prevented him from doing so.81 He was therefore forced to ask the king for a loan of £20,000 in order to maintain his army for three months and to beg Wentworth to delay the payment of £1200 owed to the Irish exchequer and a further £700 owed to the court of wards, so that some money would be available for victuals 'for I must lay out all my own rents in provision'.82 The virtually empty Irish and English treasuries were unable to meet these demands, still

79 Baillie to Spang, 28 September 1639 (Laing, Letters and Journals, i, 193, 194, 196, 206). Stewart, 'Peoples of the Clanranald', p. 88 stresses that 'divided, the clans were merely anachronistic and troublesome; united, they were a very real threat'.

80 See chapter 5 for details.

81 For details on Antrim’s debts see pp 65-72 above. Antrim to Wentworth, 29 May 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 19, f. 63); Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 334-7).

82 Antrim’s propositions [March] 1639; Wentworth to Windebank, 20 March 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 305, 303-4); Antrim to Wentworth, 17 April 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 19, f. 22); Antrim to Wentworth, 29 May 1639 (ibid., MSS 19, f. 63); Antrim to [Hamilton], 17 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1154).
less to pay out the £29,751 requested to cover Antrim’s purchase of arms, munitions, shipping and equipment.83 By contrast, in 1644, though the confederate catholics and the marquis of Ormond were virtually bankrupt, their determination to send Irish troops to Scotland inspired them to find the necessary resources.

The second factor which ultimately torpedoed Antrim’s plan stemmed from the earl’s poor relationship with Ireland’s lord deputy. Though Ormond had his own misgivings about Antrim and his expedition in 1644 he supported him to the hilt.84 Wentworth in 1639, by contrast, did everything possible to obstruct, misrepresent and undermine the earl.85 In many ways conflict between the two was inevitable. On the one hand Wentworth was a colonizing, protestant Englishman determined to bring the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland to a happy conclusion; on the other, Antrim - despite his marriage and his other English connections - was born and bred a catholic in Ireland.86 While there is no surviving evidence to justify Wentworth’s fears that

83 Wentworth and council to Vane, 16 May and 4 June 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 419–21, 357–9). In addition to the expenses generated by Antrim’s expedition, a further £50,000 was needed to pay for the 8,000 men to be levied by Wentworth, Wentworth to Hamilton, 24 March 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/803).

84 See chapter 5 below.

85 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 25–31; their relationship is discussed at some length in FitzPatrick, Seventeenth century Ireland, pp 80–5, 92–9, 102. Gardiner, Eng., ix, 8.

Antrim was a traitor to the English cause, they were entirely understandable — and were indeed exacerbated by the earl's own insensitivity. Wentworth exactly captured the dichotomy of Antrim's position and personality in a perceptive description of their disastrous interview in March 1639:

'His lordship was in [as] differing tempers as ever I saw; sometimes the grand-child of great Tyrone, using me so roughly indeed and yet was not heard without offence to the rest of the company; and sometimes again he descended and became more merciful and gracious, indeed, even to make himself like one of ourselves, such was his gentleness and civility'.

Jealousy of any credit which the venture could win for Antrim exacerbated these cultural differences. As it was, he had already antagonized the lord deputy over a number of issues (discussed in chapter 2) and his undiplomatic, even clumsy, handling of the Scottish expedition did nothing to improve matters. Several specific incidents excited the lord deputy's sense of paranoia: the conception and orchestration of the invasion of the Isles without his knowledge; the earl's continued willingness to plot and conspire behind his back (exemplified in Sir Donald's trip to court in May 1639); and his tactless insistence that Phelim O'Neill (later a leading insurgent in 1641) be knighted at the height of the Scottish crisis. Finally Antrim's

87 Laud to Wentworth, 29 December 1638 (Laud Works, vii, 508).

88 Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 336).
private correspondence with Hamilton and Charles was a constant irritant: 'I know full well what I think of these kinds of traps laid to take me by the fingers' Wentworth wrote, and continued '[I intend] to catch the earl in his own snares'.90 It was really Wentworth's obsession with trapping Antrim 'in his own snares' that sabotaged Irish aid for the king against the Scottish covenanters.

The abortive expedition was not without its significance however. In Ireland the divisions and animosities aroused by Antrim's plans only served to generate negative and hostile feelings at all levels of society and, more practically, to divide the country's meagre resources at a time when a united and concerted effort might have produced very dramatic results in all three kingdoms.91 As for England, the king's willingness to conspire with an Irish papist - never mind with English and Scottish ones - against his protestant subjects (albeit Scottish ones) did little either to dispel the rumours of popish plots which were circulating around London or to inspire confidence in a monarch reputed to have been brainwashed by a catholic coterie at court.92

89 Wentworth to Laud, [April?] 1639 (Sheffield City Library, Strafford MSS 7, f. 181v).

90 Wentworth to Laud, 10 May 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 334-7).

91 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 31-2; FitzPatrick, Seventeenth century Ireland, pp 112-4.

However the peace signed at Berwick was an uneasy one. For as the king was reminded:

'There is a Scottish proverb, that bids you put two locks on your door, when you have made friends with a foe'.

As far as Antrim was concerned the peace settled nothing and a 'cold war' raged with Argyll (who retained a force of 200 troops and continued to build ships). There were reports among the Campbells of MacDonnell atrocities, and the Campbells were quick to retaliate. Argyll, for instance, molested many of Antrim's kin when they returned to the Isles to claim their land and goods under the terms of the peace, and he later raided the island of Colonsay, stripping and raping the women, 'which barbarity was never practiced by the Turks and all this cruelty is for my sake'.

93 Wentworth to Charles I, 22 June 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 361).


95 For example, MacDonnell seamen supposedly killed 50 Campbells in Jura in June, J. McLene [MacClean] to Sir Colin Campbell, 25 June 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 112/39/776). A few months later a raiding party of eighty Irishmen, led by Coll McGillespik's sons, attempted to take Campbell hostages, George Campbell to Sir Colin Campbell, 18 November 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 112/39/823). There was nothing novel in this. For instance, the previous spring, suspected 'MacDonnell spies' in Kintyre were arrested, while MacDonnells, loyal to the king, living in Campbell territories were persecuted, Archibald Campbell of Glencarradale to Sir Colin Campbell, 5 April 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 112/39/757); Antrim to Wentworth, 11 April 1639 (Knowler, Letters, ii, 321). Antrim was greatly disturbed by this, Antrim to Wentworth, 11 April 1639 (ibid., ii, 321).

96 Antrim to [Hamilton], 14 July 1639 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1165); Wentworth to Charles I, 31 July 1639.
In order to antagonize Antrim further, Argyll not only continued to seize MacDonnell property and possessions but also arrested his principal supporters - including Coll Ciotach and two of his sons - in the Isles.97 The earl was powerless to offer his allies practical help apart from begging Wentworth to discipline Argyll for violating the articles of the peace treaty; pleading with Hamilton to 'save them [his kinsmen] from this great covenanters oppressions'. He also supported the anti-Campbell alliance orchestrated by Sir Donald in the weeks after Berwick.98

Seen from the perspective of Antrim in East Ulster and his kinsmen in Western Scotland the treaty of Berwick, which had brought a temporary, uneasy peace to the rest of Stuart Britain, was worthless. There was persistent violence in the Isles and this formed a bridge between the end of the First Bishops' War in June 1639 and the beginning of the second in August of the following year. In fact from the spring of 1640 frenzied preparations began in Ireland to levy a fresh


army of 8,000 foot and 1,000 horse. Despite the fact that this 'new Irish army' was largely composed of catholics, with Carrickfergus as its headquarters, Lord Deputy Wentworth (or Lord Lieutenant Strafford as he was now styled) excluded Antrim from all preparations. He did, however, requisition the long boats built the previous year as troop carriers, and three or four of these, 'each of about fifteen tons, with twelve men a piece', were earmarked for the invasion of Dumbarton in August 1640. However by interfering with the appointment of the army's chaplains through the Franciscan Father Hegarty the earl did attempt to gain some influence over the catholic rank and file, while the return from Flanders of his half-brother Maurice (who joined Charles's English army in September 1640) provided a link with developments in England.

The general situation for the king and his supporters remained depressing, however. The

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99 Knowler, Letters, ii, 399, 400. The cost of levying, arming and paying 8,000 foot and 1,000 horse between April and September 1640 amounted to £50,000, P.R.O., E.405/285 f.143.


101 Strafford to Ormond, 17 August 1640 (Bodl., Carte MSS 1, ff 229-v); Demands of Captain Taverner [governor of Dumbarton castle?], [August] 1640 (ibid., MSS 1, f. 335); Strafford to the governor of Dumbarton castle, 24 August 1640 (ibid., MSS 1, f. 237).

mobilization of Strafford’s army had caused much anxiety in Scotland, and Argyll was appointed to defend the west coast from an Irish attack. Moreover, just as Antrim’s plans had been fraught with delay the previous year, so too were Strafford’s, and his army was not even assembled until July 1640. Meanwhile centres of royalist resistance in Scotland (Nithsdale in the south-west; Dumbarton and Edinburgh castles; the Ogilvies in the central highlands; the Gordons in the north-east) were quickly overcome by the covenanters.103 On 20 August the main covenanting army invaded England and eight days later defeated the king’s army at Newburn near Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Two days later negotiations which culminated in the treaty of Ripon (21 October) began.

The Bishops’ Wars were both military and political catastrophes for Charles. The ‘Short parliament’ (April 13 - May 5 ) had been summoned in England to finance the king’s army against the Scots in 1640. It had refused to do so until its grievances were redressed and so was dissolved. Military defeat in 1640 forced the king to call yet another English parliament (the ‘Long parliament’) which met on 3 November and, rather than supporting the continuation of the war effort as Charles had naively hoped, the house of commons instead resolved to impeach his Irish

103 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, chapter 6; Donald, ‘The King and the Scottish Troubles’, p. 345.
lord lieutenant. The Irish parliament, which had been summoned in March 1640 to pay for the 'new army', supported its English counterpart by adopting a petition of remonstrance which condemned every aspect of Strafford's government in Ireland. It also provided evidence against the lord lieutenant at Westminster in the lengthy trial which followed.

Unable to participate directly in the war, Antrim apparently lurked at Dunluce castle and buried himself in domestic affairs hoping to 'make satisfaction for my follies in my youth'. His precise movements between the spring of 1640 and the autumn of 1641 remain something of a mystery. He remained in Ulster at Dunluce at least until the end of April 1640 and in Dublin from June 1640 (when he took his seat in the Irish house of lords) until the outbreak of the Irish rebellion. He appears to have lived principally in


107 No letter either to or from Antrim between 29 April 1640 and 3 June 1641 appears to have survived: Antrim to Hamilton, 29 April 1640 (S.R.O., G.D., 406/1/1172) and Antrim to Hamilton, 3 June 1641 (S.R.O., G.D., 406/1/1355).
Dublin where Sir Adam Loftus, Viscount Loftus Ely, leased to the couple his house. What role, if any, the earl played in the great parliamentary issues of the day is unclear, for the only mention of him in the journals of the lords was in February 1641 when the house heard his petition against Ralph Gee, one of his creditors, ‘for uttering many scandalous speeches of the said earl’. Presumably Antrim joined the protestant and Old English peers in condemning Strafford and was delighted by the king’s decision in April 1641, in the midst of Strafford’s trial, to implement the ‘Graces’ (the religious, tenurial and other concessions granted by the king in 1628 to his catholic subjects in return for subsidies, but never confirmed by parliament). Whether he rejoiced over Strafford’s execution on Tower Hill on 12 May is likewise unknown.

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108 Hill, *MacDonnells*, pp 257, 270, 305. Antrim later enquired whether any of the king’s houses in the Pale—such as the one near Naas (which may well have been the Jiggenstown mansion built for the king by Strafford)—were vacant, Antrim to Hamilton, 3 June 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1355). In between he could well have ‘resided for a time’ with the king at Oxford as stated by Hill, *MacDonnells*, p. 255, but he offered no evidence to support this assertion.

109 *Lords’ in. Ire.*, i, 148-9. Antrim’s father had also been uninterested in national politics and while he took his seat in the Irish house of lords in July 1634 he quickly returned to Dunluce after appointing Westmeath as his proxy, Knowler, *Letters*, i, 285; *Lords’ in. Ire.*, i, 13.

While the earl may not have made any novel contribution to the parliamentary debates raging in Ireland during these tumultuous months he certainly did not abandon political intrigue.111 For some time early in the spring of 1641 Charles I sent a messenger, Thomas Bourke, to Antrim and Ormond with instructions that:

‘those eight thousand men, raised by the earl of Strafford in Ireland, should be continued without disbanding, and that they should be made up to twenty thousand, and that they should be armed out of the store of Dublin, and employed against the parliament’.112

Upon receipt of 'the king's pleasure', as he dubbed it ten years later, Antrim, who was in Dublin at this point, met with Ormond - ‘in the inner room within the parliament house' and at the bowling alley on College Green - in order to discuss the matter further.113 It was decided that Lords Maguire and Muskerry should be sent to the king to secure fresh instructions, and that - in order to plot in greater privacy - the noblemen should retreat from Dublin and meet up again at Kilka in County Kildare on the pretext of hawking.114 At the last minute, however, Ormond

111 For a detailed discussion of the 'Antrim plot' see appendix 1.7.


113 Charles I to Ormond, 8 May 1641 (Bodl., Carte MSS 1, f. 381); Ormond to Vane, 10 June 1641 (ibid., MSS 1, f. 426).
changed his mind and, sending John Barry as his proxy, urged Antrim to visit the king at court in person for 'having been long a courtier [he] might go without suspicion'. The earl refused to go alone, but agreed to send Captain Digby, constable of Dunluce castle, to the king instead. Almost a month later - around 12 August - Digby (who had no doubt travelled first to London in search of Charles) finally 'overtook his majesty on his journey to Scotland' at York.

Towards the end of August William Hamerton, one of Antrim’s English servants who had presumably accompanied Digby to York, returned to Ireland with orders 'that all possible endeavours should be used for getting together again those 8,000 men so disbanded; and that an army should immediately be raised in Ireland, that should declare for him [the king] against the parliament in England'. In order to carry out the royal 'design' - 'if occasion should be for so doing' -

114 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 449. According to a letter from Antrim to Hamilton he left Dublin in the middle of June and spent a month 'at a friend’s house'. As luck would have it he did not state where his anonymous friend’s house was, Antrim to Hamilton, 19 July 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1389). It was later claimed that he met Ormond at Castlehaven’s house at Maddenstown, County Kildare. See, Viscount Montgomery’s account of how he obtained a copy of Antrim’s declaration, c.September 1650 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 40, f. 152).

115 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 450; Richard Cox, Hibernia Anglicana, or the history of Ireland from the conquest thereof by the English to this present time (2 vols., 2nd edn., London, 1692), ii, 207-8.

116 The substance of Antrim’s examination in Broghill’s possession, ['midsummer 1650'] (Bodl., Carte MSS 65, ff 508-9); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 450; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 207; P.R.O., S.P. 23/10/p. 228.
Antrim hoped to secure the approval of the lords justices and, if they opposed him, to persuade the Irish parliament to declare 'for the king against the parliament of England'. However, ultimately, the earl's grand strategy to solve his royal master's British problems was frustrated by the outbreak of the Irish rebellion in October 1641.

117 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 450; see also appendix 1.7.

118 Patrick J. Corish, 'The rising of 1641 and the catholic confederacy, 1641-5' in N.H.I., iii, 289-91.
CHAPTER 4: Antrim and the 'Popish Plots' (1641-3)

To rehearse the immediate origins and early progress of the Irish rebellion here would be both superfluous and pointless.1 Suffice to say that while Sir Phelim O’Neill and his co-conspirators succeeded in throwing Ulster into chaos on 22 October 1641 by successfully seizing the key strongholds of Charlemount, Mountjoy castle, Tandragee and Newry, their primary objective—Dublin castle—eluded Lord Maguire, Hugh MacMahon and their accomplices because of their arrest.

Reverberations from the uprising were quickly felt throughout Stuart Britain. Secretary Vane was not alone in wondering how ‘those accidents in Ireland’ would affect England.2 He did not have long to wait for an answer, for the struggle between the king and his English parliament over who should control the army to be raised to quell the Irish insurrection began almost at once, and ultimately resulted in parliament taking up arms against its monarch.

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2 Vane to [Hamilton], 27 October 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1447).

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The news of the rebellion, and subsequent rumours that Charles had somehow been involved in it, both confirmed and inflamed fears of a great catholic conspiracy. The parliamentary leaders - especially John Pym - exploited this ruthlessly, claiming that England was on the verge of being reduced to popery.3

An alarmed papal agent in London reported back to Rome in November how effective the anti-catholic campaign was:

'the uprising in Ireland has greatly increased the malice of the puritans...it has also universally disposed people to believe anything evil about the catholics'.4

Fortunately for their personal safety, the earl of Antrim and his wife were in Dublin, not London, in late October 1641, but this led to accusations that Antrim had somehow been involved in planning the seizure of Dublin castle.5 While this was understandable,

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5 Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to king, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7); Information against the marquis of Antrim, [August] 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, f. 328); Cal. S.P.
considering that he was either related to, or intimate with, nearly all the leading insurgents, these accusations were certainly false. Equally unfounded were the rumours, circulating in the months immediately following the rebellion, that he was the leader of the insurgents in the Pale. Secretary Nicholas, for one, praised the earls of Antrim and Clanricard (‘albeit they are Catholics’) for their loyalty to the crown, and as late as April 1642, Sir William Parsons - one of the lords justices in Dublin - reassured his English counterparts that, despite rumours to the contrary, Antrim was still loyal to the king. His refusal to involve himself in the rebellion was, however, severely criticised by foreign catholic powers. At the Spanish court in Madrid, for example, he was later condemned for having remained neutral, for it was generally believed that if Antrim and Clanricard had supported

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Ire., 1663-5, p. 214; Hill, MacDonnells, pp 310-11. For propaganda, and financial, purposes it later suited Scottish and parliamentary opponents to accuse Antrim of instigating the rising and to label him a rebel, New Treason plotted in France...; Likewise a letter sent from the council of scotland, to the house of commons... (London, 1642) and A Continuation of certain speciall and remarkable passages from both houses of parliament...From Wednesday 5-8 October 1642, no. 13 (London, 1642), pp 1, 5.


7 Nicholas to Sir Thomas Roe, 17 December 1641 (Cal. S.P. Dom., 1641-3, p. 204); P.R.O., S.P. 16/486/f.66); A Letter written from Sir William Parsons...to Sir Robert Pye...(London, 1642), p. 3.
the insurgents from the outset the rebellion would have succeeded.8

Antrim’s neutrality did place him in an unusual and potentially compromising position. While he remained in very close contact with his tenants and family in County Antrim he was loath to leave Dublin and the Pale fearing that this would be interpreted as a sign that he had joined, or at least sympathized with, the insurrection.9 He later articulated his predicament to Hamilton:

‘I should not strive to excuse myself if my knowledge could inform me to be plotter, or actor in the Irish rebellion. It was my misfortune to be absent out of my own country at the beginning of the troubles, which was much against my desires’.10

Initially he remained in Dublin and ‘did make several applications to the lords justices and council... desiring them that they would give him their directions and assistance’ to suppress the rebellion in Ulster.11 He also resumed his seat in the predominantly protestant house of lords and, his opponents later

8 Relation of the state of Ireland since December 1644 (A.G.S., Eo. 2253, unfol.); A Declaration sent to the king of France and Spain, from the catholic or rebels in Ireland... (Paris, [14/24 April]; reprinted London 1642), p. 3; Franciscan MSS, p. 135.

9 The messengers sent by the earl from Dublin aroused much suspicion since in order to reach his estates they managed to pass safely through territory held by the enemy, Memorandum by Colonel Arthur Chichester (C.U.L., Add. 4352, ff 22v-23).

10 Antrim to [Hamilton], 16 July 1642 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1674).

11 Hill, MacDonnellls, p. 305.
asserted, 'urged (with unusual vehemence) that the Irish rebels should not be so termed rebels, but rather discontented gentlemen'.

Antrim's qualities as an intermediary with these 'discontented gentlemen' were, however, quickly recognized and before the Irish parliament was prorogued in November he was one of those selected as a person fit to treat with the rebels, to hear their grievances and to persuade them to lay down their arms. To execute his orders he moved to County Meath to stay with his brother-in-law, Lord Slane, but Slane's adherence to an alliance between the Old Irish insurgents and the Old English, forged early in December, forced the earl - who could not afford to be seen to live with 'rebels' - to seek lodgings elsewhere. Nevertheless, using the earl of Castlehaven's house at Maddenstown in County Kildare as his base, Antrim continued to liaise with local insurgents. He could well have visited (as was claimed twenty years later) 'rebels' quarters at Tenekilly in Queen's County (commanded by his kinsman James


13 Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 370-1; Late and Lamentable News from Ireland...(London, 1641), p. 6; Franciscan MSS, p. 111. Clarke, Old English, pp 172-3.

14 D.N.B., 'Randal MacDonnell'; Some observations of adventurers and soldiers on the estate claimed by Antrim, [1661] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 328-31) - a version of this, dated 28 June 1665, is printed in Hill, MacDonells, pp 326-339. Clarke, Old English, pp 178-92.
MacDonnell) or at Tullymore in King’s County; but later assertions that he supplied them with money and ammunition and warned them of imminent attacks from Dublin seem unlikely. On the contrary, early in April 1642 he warmly welcomed an expeditionary force under Sir Charles Coote sent from Dublin to relieve Athy and other key locations in Queen’s County, and he entertained Ormond after the battle of Kilrush (15 April 1642). While the earl was not present at the battle, he was involved in other skirmishes against the insurgents: for instance, the headlines of one pamphlet revealed how ‘Lord Dunluce obtained a wreath of fame, which shall never wither, for he with two bare troops of horse attempted to recover a drove of cattle that the rebels had taken from the inhabitants’ and in the

15 Hill, MacDonnell’s, pp 304, 311; Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to king, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7); Some observations of adventurers and soldiers on the estate claimed by Antrim, [1661?] (ibid., ff 328-31).

16 The Earl of Castlehaven’s Review: Or his memoirs of his engagement and carriage in the Irish Wars... (London, 1684), pp 42-3; A Full relation, not only of our good success in general, but how, and in what manner God hath fought his own cause miraculously... (London, 1642), p. 1. There are similar accounts in A True and Perfect Diurnall: Of the most remarkable passages in Ireland...(London, 3 May 1642), p. 1; A New Declaration of the last affairs in Ireland, shewing the great overthrow given to the Irish rebels... (London, 2 May 1642), pp 3-4; A Remonstrance of the right honourable James earl of Castlehaven... (Waterford, 1643), p. 9; A Continuation of very good news from Ireland. From 8-19 April (London, 1642), p. 5. Apparently the duchess insulted Coote by calling him ‘a poor mechanical fellow, raised by blind fortune, as informer and promoter, against all that is just and godly...’, Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 31.
process captured his brother-in-law, Lord Dunsany, after engaging him in 'a hot combat'.

By and large, though, the earl and his wife lived a much less glamorous life at Maddenstown where they first harboured 'a great number of English protestants that had been robbed by the rebels' and then helped them find their way to safety. Nevertheless Antrim's prolonged residence in County Kildare, 'where at the first this business was begun', was not viewed favourably by protestants and many felt that, while he maintained a neutral facade, his heart was in fact with the 'rebels'. These reports clearly distressed him.

'It is a great sorrow to me, [that] my name and my honour should be so much defamed and scandalized by false and slanderous reports, nay permitted to be published in print, that I have revolted from my king and turned rebel, the very name wounds me sore' he confided to his wife's uncle early in 1642, and added

17 A Renowned victory obtained against the rebels on the first day of June, neere Burros... (London, 9 June 1642).

18 For instance, a Kildare saddler - William Collis - and his family were sheltered, fed and clothed by Antrim for two months and then smuggled to the relative safety of Dublin, Examination of William Collis, 4 May 1643 (T.C.D., MS 813, ff 285-v). Interestingly it was claimed that these protestant refugees joined Antrim and Castlehaven in celebrating the mass, Examination of William Dynes, 1 June 1642 (ibid., f. 360v); Castlehaven's Review, pp 45-6.

19 Articles of Impeachment against George Lord Digby.... (London, 28 February 1642); Egmont MSS, p. 163. These rumours delighted catholic powers, see for example, Franciscan MSS, pp 116, 126, 134.
that 'I will rather perish at his majesty's feet, and suffer any punishment... than live stained with such a horrid denomination as traitor'.20 But in the same missive the earl also articulated his devotion to the catholic faith and his ambition to see 'the free exercise of the Roman religion, which I am devoted to and am engaged to maintain in duty to God and respect of my future happiness and salvation'.21 This letter, which was subsequently intercepted and published by parliament, highlights the impossible position in which the rebellion placed Antrim. On the one hand he was a loyal and ardent servant of the crown; on the other, he was bonded by ties of kinship and friendship to many of the leading rebels and dedicated to preserving catholicism in Ireland. His tragic dilemma was further exacerbated when members of his own family and most of his catholic tenants in County Antrim joined the rebellion in January 1642.22

After the outbreak of the insurrection in October 1641 the earl kept a watchful eye on his estates and remained in constant communication with his trusted, protestant factor, Archibald Stewart, and with Antrim’s

20 A Copie of a letter from the Lord Intrim [Antrim] in Ireland to the right honourable earl of Rutland, bearing date the 25 day of February...1642 (London, 1642 [sic]), pp 3-4.
21 Ibid.
younger brother, Alexander.23 Early intelligence of
the rising enabled Stewart to organize a sophisticated
system of local defence. Within days he had mustered
and armed Antrim’s protestant tenants; and once it was
clear that ‘the natives’ in Antrim’s ‘half county’ did
not intend to join their neighbours in insurrection he
organized them too into units under the command of
Alasdair MacColla and Tirlough O’Cahan.24 In all a
force of between 700 and 1,500 troops were maintained
to protect the earl’s estates, armed either with their
own swords or with weapons which had been stored in
Dunluce since 1639.25 While Stewart took charge at
home, Alexander MacDonnell hurried first to Edinburgh
and later to London in search of further
instructions.26

23 _Cal. S.P. Ire._ 1633-47 p. 344; Memorandum by Colonel
Hill, _Stewarts of Ballintoy_, pp 11-28.

24 _Cal. S.P. Ire._ 1633-47 p. 344; Memorandum by Colonel
Phelim O’Neill tried – unsuccessfully – to persuade the
Scottish MacDonalds to join the insurgents, Stevenson,
Alasdair MacColla, pp 75-6; _ibid._, _Scottish
Covenanter_; _ibid._, ‘The Irish Franciscan Mission’, pp
54-61.

25 These soldiers were maintained at Antrim’s expense
since ‘the tenants think while they serve the king upon
their own charges they owe us no rent’, Petition from
Alexander MacDonnell, 16 December 1641 (H.M.C. rep. 4,
p. 108; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 16/12/1641). As the 1630
muster illustrates, only half of Antrim’s protestant
tenants were even armed with swords, B.L., Add. MSS
4770, f. 280v.

26 Argyll to Hamilton, 22 November 1641 (S.R.O., G.D.
406/1/875). Despite claims to the contrary, Alexander
remained loyal to the crown until after the 1643
‘cessation’, _Cal. S.P. Ire._, 1669-70, p. 421 and
Franciscan MSS, p. 111. When the king refused to give
This Indian summer of co-operation was, however, shortlived. Early in January 1642 Antrim’s native Irish tenants, under the leadership of his cousin Sir James MacDonnell, O’Cahan and MacColla (of whom Stewart noted ‘I trusted too much for my lord of Antrim his sake’) joined the rebellion on the pretext that Stewart’s ‘cowboys’ had daily provoked ‘our tenants of purpose to pick quarrels, which no flesh was able to endure’. Their only aim, Sir James claimed, was ‘to have their religion settled and everyone his ancient inheritance’.27 However Stewart and the protestant settlers saw it differently. The papists’ cruelty was ‘never used by the Turks to Christians...no quarter is given, no faith kept, all houses burnt and demolished, man, wife and child put to the sword’; so they begged the king, the lords justices in Dublin, and more significantly, the marquis of Argyll for aid.28

Alexander a commission to raise troops on the grounds he was a catholic he begged for one for Stewart, Petition from Alexander MacDonnell, 16 December 1641 (H.M.C. rep. 4, p. 108; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 16/12/1641).

27 James McDonnell to Archibald Stewart, 10 January 1642 (James Hogan (ed.), Letters and papers relating to the Irish Rebellion between 1642-6 (I.M.C., Dublin, 1936), pp 6-7); Sir John Vaughan to the lords justices, 10 January 1642 (ibid., pp 7-8). Hill, MacDonnell, pp 64-8. It is not clear whether ‘James MacDonnell’ was Sir James or James MacColl MacDonnell, Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 100-2; ibid., Alasdair MacColla, pp 76-80.

Whether the character of the war in County Antrim actually lived up to Stewart’s vivid imagery is debatable. Certainly there were violent deaths on both sides during the various military encounters of 1642. Over sixty protestant soldiers were killed at Portnaw by MacColla’s men early in January and the following month Stewart’s forces were routed at the battle of the Laney near Ballymoney. There were further casualties at Coleraine, Ballycastle, Ballintoy and Dunluce. Determining how many people actually died in these various encounters and skirmishes is impossible since the historian is forced to rely for information almost

29 Between sixty and ninety protestant soldiers appear to have been killed at Portnaw, Hill, *The Stewarts of Ballintoy*, pp 11-2; Examination of Gilduff O’Cahan, 10 March 1653 (T.C.D., MS 838, f. 25); Examination of Robert Futhy, 2 March 1653 (ibid., f. 59v); Examination of William McPhedris, 8 March 1653 (ibid., f. 72v). 600 were supposedly killed at, and 300 escaped from, the Laney, Hill, *The Stewarts of Ballintoy*, pp 17-23; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 82-4 and E. H[ogan] (ed.), *The History of the Warr of Ireland from 1641 to 1653* by a British Officer of the Regiment of Sir John Clotworthy (Dublin, 1873), pp 22-3; and for a good account of the war in County Antrim see Hugh Hazlett, ‘A History of the Military Forces operating in Ireland, 1641-9’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Belfast, 1938), pp 69-71. Ballintoy and Dunluce castles held firm but the neighbouring town was burnt to the ground; Oldstone castle quickly surrendered as did Ballycastle: Examination of Gilduff O’Cahan, 10 March 1653 (T.C.D., MS 838, f. 26). Oldstone was surrendered by Walter Kennedy to James McColl MacDonnell and it was later asserted that at least twenty women and children were slaughtered ‘under the castle wall’ and a further sixty (who had been given quarter) were murdered en route to Larne or Carrickfergus by MacDonnell’s troops, Examination of Donnell Graham McDonnell, 11 March 1653 (ibid., f. 30v); Examination of John Blaire, 8 March 1653 (ibid., f. 69); Hill, *MacDonnell’s*, p. 311. There was supposedly a further massacre of protestants at Ballycastle and the surrounding countryside, Hill, *The Stewarts of Ballintoy*, pp 17-23.
exclusively on the controversial depositions which in
the case of County Antrim all date from the 1650s.30
It seems clear though that there was regional variation
within the county. The baronies of Cary and Dunluce,
where the bulk of the fighting was concentrated, appear
to have been the worst affected, while Kilconway was
the least affected. Atrocities in the barony of
Glenarm were limited to isolated encounters rather than
'massacres'.31 By and large, then, horror stories of
massacres were gross exaggerations and more people seem
to have perished in the famine and pestilence which
accompanied the disruption than by the sword.32 At

30 Their historical value is assessed by Aidan Clarke,
'The 1641 Depositions' in P. Fox, Treasures of the
Library, Trinity College Dublin (Dublin, 1986), pp 111-
21 especially at pp 116-8. Raymond Gillespie,
'Migration and Opportunity: A Comment' in Ir. Econ. &
Soc. Hist., xiii (1986), pp 91-2, also highlights the
problems involved in using them. See further Perceval-

31 Donnell O'Cahan 'a gentleman', for instance, claimed
that well over a thousand protestants were murdered
throughout the barony of Cary; while Shane McVickar
McCormack a husbandman from the barony of Kilconway
'did not see any dead body at all', Examination of
Donnell O'Cahan, 14 March 1653 (T.C.D., MS 838, f.
33v); examination of Rorie O'Deaghan, 9 March 1653
(ibid., f. 74); and examination of Shane McVickar
McCormack, 14 March 1653 (ibid., f. 34). It was later
claimed that 954 people were murdered in one morning in
County Antrim; and a further 1100-1200 supposedly
killed, A Remonstrance of the Barbarous cruelties and
bloody murders committed by the Irish rebels...

32 Claims such as the one made by a soldier in Sir John
Borlase's company that he saw 'divers houses and towns
wherein were very great numbers of the persons of
murdered British protestants thrown upon heaps and
stripped naked both men, women and children, and saw
the very dogs feed upon some of their carcasses' should
be written off as mere fabrication, Examination of
Ballycastle, for instance, witnesses (albeit ones of Irish extraction) consistently deposed that only one or two individuals, rather than hundreds of protestants, were murdered. Stories of kindness also pepper most of these testimonials. Donnell Magee, for instance, hurried to Oldstone when he heard of the Irish advance in order 'to save some British [protestant] acquaintance of his'. The pattern of warfare on the Antrim estates reflected the national picture. Massacres were the exception; much more common was the plundering and pillaging of protestant property and the theft of their livestock. The major towns and cities

Anthony Stephens, 25 June 1646 (T.C.D., MS 830, f. 41v). [Anonymous] Historical Collections relative to the town of Belfast: from the earliest period to the union with Great Britain (Belfast, 1817), p. 11.

33 T.C.D., MS 838, ff 31v, 38, 62.

34 Examination of Donnell Magee, 15 March 1653 (T.C.D., MS 838, f. 34v); Examination of James Allen, 1 March 1653 (ibid., f. 50). Other 'rebels' saved the lives of Isabell Kerr and her husband after the Portnaw massacre, Examination of Isabell Kerr, 1 March 1653 (ibid., f. 51). Various protestants were taken in by the countess of Antrim: Jennett and John Hunter, John Murghlar a blacksmith - were merely three of the Ballycastle residents who found refuge there, Examination of John Murghlar, 28 February 1653 (ibid., f. 47v).

35 [Lords justices] to [Scottish privy council], [autumn] 1641 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/8335); No Pamphlet but a detestation against all such pamphlets as are printed concerning the Irish rebellion... (London, 1642). For a similar critique see C.U.L., Add. 4353. Clarke, 'The 1641 Depositions', p. 113. In neighbouring County Fermanagh 'the reproach of the insurrection of 1641 is pillage and not massacre or deliberate murder', Thomas FitzPatrick, 'The Ulster Civil War, 1641. "The King's Commission" in the County Fermanagh' in U.J.A., 2nd series, xiii, no. 3 (Aug. 1907), p. 156. This was also true in England, see for instance Donald Pennington, 'The War and the People' in
Dublin, Cork, Waterford, Youghal, Limerick, Galway, Kilkenny, Wexford, Ross, Clonmel, Londonderry, Carrickfergus and Belfast, where most of the protestants resided — were not plundered; and when a town was attacked, most of the inhabitants were saved by their Irish neighbours.36

True or false, however, these rumours of murder and pillage, and the news that 'his country' had risen in rebellion, depressed the earl of Antrim greatly. Equally disconcerting was a decision by the English house of commons in February 1642 to invite his arch-enemy Argyll to occupy the earl’s Ulster estates, thereby sucking the bitter MacDonnell-Campbell feud into the First Civil War.37 But rather than hurrying to Ulster, Antrim remained in Leinster and planned 'how he might order his affairs to keep his country in peace that he might receive his rents'.38 It seems that in return for a formal military command (Clotworthy later suggested he was to be made 'General of the catholic


36 Even Ormond later calculated that since the total protestant population of Ireland could not have exceeded 125,000 it was impossible that 250,000 could have been murdered (or even 154,000 as the lords justices claimed) 'and it is certain that the half of them that were plundered and stripped were not killed', An account [by Ormond] of the Irish that preserved English protestants, [1660s] (Bodl., Carte MSS 2, ff 238-v). Clarke, 'The 1641 Depositions', p. 111.

37 The duchess's annual pension of £6,000 was also stopped, Montagu MSS, p. 147.

38 Conway to Ormond, 5 June 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 239v).
army in Ulster'), and a guarantee that his property would not be tampered with, Antrim offered to negotiate a peace in the north and to win Robert Monro (who had arrived from Scotland with three companies on 3 April), and his Scottish allies in Ulster, over to the royalist camp. Some time in the late spring of 1642 Charles I approved his proposal and towards the end of April Antrim began his journey north. As he travelled he was careful to spend the nights only with those of his kin loyal to the crown refusing, for instance, to stay with his natural sister Ellis in Newry because of her rebel connections. He also promised to protect the persons and property of leading protestant landowners. En route he did, however, meet - as his plan necessitated - with Sir Phelim O'Neill and other leading rebels and upon his arrival

39 H.M.C., Supplementary Report of the Hamilton MSS, pp 68-9. Rumour had it that Antrim and the king and queen were regular correspondents, Examination of Job Warde, 23 July 1642 (T.C.D., MS 815, f. 103); Franciscan MSS, pp 151, 154). Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 62, 103.

40 When he was subsequently arrested by Monro the duchess assured Hamilton that he 'was not inclined to rebellion' and added cryptically that he had been 'sent to Monro to meet for the king's service', Duchess of Buckingham to Hamilton, 17 July 1642 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/3110). As 1642 progressed the king was forced to recruit English catholics in increasing numbers, Paul H. Hardacre, The Royalists during the Puritan Revolution (London, 1956), pp 8-10.

41 For his full itinerary see Hill, MacDonnells, pp 258-60. For instance he secured the release of William Brownlow of Lurgan and prevented the Irish plundering Lieutenant Thirsbies' house.
in County Antrim he summoned those of his kin and tenants who were in revolt for a parley.42

The carefully calculated talks were immediately productive, for the ensuing truce enabled the earl to send provisions, 100 fat cattle and 60 loads of corn bought at his own expense, into the besieged town of Coleraine, and to relieve Ballintoy.43 Having skillfully demonstrated a willingness among the Irish rebels to compromise, the earl focused his attention on winning over Monro and his supporters. He wrote to welcome the colonel and his army to Ireland, apologized 'that in my absence my people were so unfortunate as to do any hostile act' and, finally, requested a meeting at Glenarm.44 Similar letters were dispatched to the other parliamentary sympathizers in the province;

42 His political opponents later interpreted his progress simply as an opportunity to plot with Sir Phelim and Tirlough O'Neill, who (they claimed) 'attended [him] with all demonstrations of joy and affection', Some observations of adventurers and soldiers on the estate claimed by Antrim, [1661] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 328-31). He also sent regular intelligence reports back to the lords justices in Dublin, Conway to Ormond, 5 June 1642 (ibid., MSS 3, ff 239-240v).

43 Examination of Charles Anthony, 12 June 1642 (T.C.D., MS 839, f. 97); Hill, MacDonnells, pp 270-5; Comment. Rinucc. i, 328, 453-4. A contemporary estimated that 2,000 (out of 6,000) inhabitants died in Coleraine, T.C.D., MS 866, f. 235. The anonymous author of the Aphoristical Discovery dubbed 'that oversighted, seeming mercy of Coleraine' as 'Antrim's mistake', Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 33.

General Lesley, Sir John Clotworthy and Colonel Arthur Hill were all invited to a meeting ‘not in a soldierly manner but like friends’.45

Antrim’s peace-making initiatives puzzled them all and their initial response was to ignore his request.46 Only his move from Dunluce to Glenarm precipitated a response from Monro, who finally agreed to a rendezvous at Dunluce.47 To celebrate the occasion Antrim set about preparing a ‘mighty feast’.48 But towards the end of May 1642 Monro, who believed that the earl was ‘joined strong with the rebels, making a pretext of laying down of arms, in the meantime doth what he can to cut our throats’, marched to Dunluce (according to a London pamphlet) with 1,000 foot and ‘sent a trumpet to the gate to summon him, having all things in a readiness to assault the castle, if he refused upon summons’.49 Antrim duly surrendered his house and

45 Conway to Ormond, 25 May 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 214v). Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 422-3.

46 A True Relation of the proceedings of the Scottish Armie..., p. 5. Antrim’s behaviour also puzzled Conway, Conway to Ormond, 25 May 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, ff 214-v).


48 Conway to Ormond, 5 June 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 239v).

49 Monroe to Leslie, 13 May 1642 (Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 423); A True and exact relation of divers principal actions of a late expedition.
person to the Scottish commander, who took 'an inventory of all that he had', left a heavy guard on the castle, and dispatched his prisoner to Carrickfergus.50

Monro had probably been planning Antrim's arrest ever since he received his letter. Having captured him the colonel put himself at the head of three regiments of foot, four troops of horse and one of dragoons and set about cleansing County Antrim of 'the rebels being O'Neills, O'Haras, MacDonnells, and the MacHenry's'. Clotworthy and Campbell chased Alasdair MacColla's band of 700 Highlanders into the Glynns, killing a number and capturing 3,000 head of cattle. They then took a fort built by the MacNaughtens and executed 100 of the 'rebels'.51 For his part Monro took Ballycastle, though not before the dowager duchess, with Antrim's 'bastard brother and sisters', had escaped across the

undertaken in the north of Ireland... (London, 13 July 1642);


51 Conway to Ormond, 5 June 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 240). An enquiry, in which Alexander MacNaughten laid the blame on Clotworthy, was made into this massacre at the Restoration. Clotworthy justified his behaviour on two grounds: firstly, many of his troops were Campbells who were eager to vent their fury on MacDonnell dependents 'for such hath been their practice, as is notoriously known'; and secondly, his men were enraged to discover English colours in the fort, Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, pp 455-8.
Bann. 52 This offensive took a mere three days, but it freed County Antrim of insurgents; and the strategic placing of protestant garrisons throughout the four baronies (Dunluce, Coleraine, Ballycastle, Clough, Glenarm ‘and some other of the earl of Antrim’s houses’) precluded any concerted attempt to regain the county. 53

The consequences of Monro’s actions were profound. Firstly, at one fell swoop, a substantial proportion of the county’s population was forced into exile. Thus Donnell Groome McDonnell, after fleeing across the Bann, first joined Phelim O’Neill’s army and then lived by his ‘husbandry’ before signing up - in 1649 - with Alexander MacDonnell’s regiment of foot. 54 The tale of Brian Modder McHenry O’Cahan was similar. After the Route had been cleared he ‘and all the Irish fled over the Bann and...he went into Ossory in the Queen’s County’ where Antrim had given him a piece of land; he

52 Henry Manners to [Lord Montagu], 22 June 1642 Montagu MSS, pp 154-5.


lived there for five years until 1647 when he joined the confederate army. These dislocated tenants were to be a major source of recruits for the various regiments raised by Antrim during the 1640s. Secondly, there was great disruption and upheaval among Antrim’s protestant tenants. Some, like their catholic neighbours, simply abandoned their homes. Thomas Dixon later claimed that he fled with 120 other families from County Antrim to a place near Armagh; and Hugh Cunningham, after the insurgents had pillaged and burned his farm, crossed the border into County Down. As many English families fled inland, their Scottish counterparts retreated (albeit often temporarily) across the North Channel to Scotland; while those who remained now faced life with a greatly reduced pool of labour and without a patron to protect them from the demands of an army of occupation.

Inevitably these events brought chaos to the earl’s affairs and deprived him of his only remaining source of Irish income. Though Stewart and Alexander had encountered tremendous problems in collecting rents in the months after the outbreak of the rebellion there still remained the hope that cash would again be

55 Examination of Brian Modder McHenry O’Cahan, 11 March 1653 (T.C.D., MS 838, ff 29-v).

56 Examination of Thomas Dixon, [25] March 1653 (T.C.D., MS 838, f. 87); Examination of Hugh Cunningham, 21 April 1642 (T.C.D., MS 836, ff 80-v).
forthcoming soon. The need to recover his confiscated estates therefore remained a permanent priority in the earl’s mind for the next twenty years, and he was prepared to do almost anything in order to secure their return. As a leading covenanter astutely pointed out, now that Antrim and his royalist associates ‘are ruined in their estates, public commotions are their private subsistence’.58

In June 1642, however, financial worries were eclipsed by the more pressing matter of Antrim’s captivity. Lord Conway was uncertain about his ultimate fate but felt that ‘the appearances are not very handsome’. He had not only spent the previous winter living in territory effectively controlled by the insurgents but had also journeyed north ‘through all the country of the rebels free and untouched’ which would be interpreted by his enemies as ‘signs that they bear him not any ill will’ and that in fact he was their accomplice.59 Truth to tell Monro was in a quandary about what to do next and begged Argyll ‘for any order concerning the earl of Antrim, his house, person and goods - how to carry myself therein without


58 Baillie to Spang, 26 July 1643 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 74).

59 Conway to Ormond, 5 June 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 240).
prejudice to my credit'.60 Hardly surprisingly the marquis urged Monro, the Scottish commissioners, Hamilton and the king to try Antrim as a traitor.61 But in the end it was the English parliament which decided his fate and, late in June, the house of commons ordered that he should be committed to 'the castle of Carrickfergus or to some such other place of strength' until he could be transferred to London for trial.62

Literally within days of his arrest the duchess of Buckingham, who had recently arrived from Dublin at Charles I’s court in York, heard rumours of his capture and begged to be allowed to see her husband or, at least, to send him a messenger and money.63 Throughout the summer and autumn of 1642 she pestered Hamilton for

60 Monro to [Argyll], 11 June 1642 (N.L.S., MS 3368, ff 1-3).


62 Order for Antrim’s imprisonment, [18 June 1642] (H.M.C. rep., 5, app., p. 30; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 18/6/1642); Commons’ jn., ii, 631, 665, iii, 127, 137. It was not until October that the house of commons ordered Captain Ashley in the Implementation to transport Antrim from Carrickfergus to London, H.M.C. rep., 5, app., p. 52; Commons’ jn., ii, 797.

63 Early in May Castlehaven escorted the duchess and her servants to Dublin. More good news from Ireland in two letters from Dublin dated May 6...(London, 16 May 1642), p. 3; Castlehaven to Sir Arthur Loftus, 9 May 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 126); Duchess of Buckingham to [Hamilton], 1 June [1642] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/2410). The duchess spent ten days with the king before travelling on to her Leicestershire estates, Nicholas to Ormond, 11 July 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 314).
similar favours. She asked that her furniture from their residences in Dunluce and Coleraine be shipped to England, that messengers be sent to her husband and that every measure possible be taken to secure his release either to England or, failing that, to Dublin.64 But the marquis, though acquiescing in each request, was unwilling to side openly with the earl.65 Hamilton's coolness upset Antrim who felt confident that once he had heard the truth he would 'not be ashamed to appear my friend, for no man better knows my heart, and the loyalty of it than yourself'.66 Hamilton nevertheless remained aloof. By the beginning of September Antrim had become depressed by his continued confinement and only the king's efforts to have him released cheered him.67 Leven, the commander of the Scottish army in Ulster, claimed to be bound by


65 Hamilton frequently met the duchess at York, Duchess of Buckingham to Hamilton: 17 July 1642 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/3110); Duchess of Buckingham to [Hamilton], 5 October [1642] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/3113). Shortly before Antrim finally escaped in October the more valuable items of their household were shipped to England and stored at Chester until 1651 when they were auctioned for roughly £1850 by the Commonwealth, see Hill, MacDonnell's, pp 265-6; P.R.O., S.P. 23/237/25 ff 62-79.


67 'I suffer greatly by my long stay in this place', Antrim to [Hamilton], 3 September 1642 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1778). Hill, MacDonnell's, pp 265-6; 'A narrative of the marquis of Antrim's deportment', (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2); Commons' Jn., ii, 763.
parliament's orders and refused to hand him over. 68

Escape now seemed the only solution to Antrim's predicament, and this was precisely what he did towards the end of October. 69 A relative of Archibald Stewart procured a passport for an invalid to leave Carrickfergus castle. Antrim, disguised as an invalid, escaped to a waiting ship bound for Carlisle and from there journeyed on to York, where he joined his wife some time in November 1642. 70

During the six months he had been in prison the political situation had changed considerably. England had plunged into civil war: Edgehill had been fought; London had not been taken. Both king and parliament

68 Leven wrote to Archibald Stewart informing him of the king's demands for Antrim's release and requesting his presence to discuss 'moneys towards his [Antrim's] transportation'. Hill suggested that Leven was in fact extracting money under false pretenses, Leven to Stewart, [15 September] 1642 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/1 and Hill, MacDonnells, p. 262); Lesley to lords justices, [early] November 1642 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1790). Whether Alasdair MacColla and his brother defected to the Scottish side in September 1642 in the hope of securing Antrim's release is debatable; and if this had been their intention it failed. Orders for Randal and Alexander MacDonald, [10 November] 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 4, f. 32); Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 125-6; ibid., Alasdair MacColla, pp 88-90; ibid., 'The Desertion of the Irish', pp 78-81; T. W. Moody and J. G. Simms, The Bishopric of Derry and the Irish Society of London, 1602-1705, vol. i 1602-70 (I.M.C., Dublin, 1968), p. 245.

69 Conway reported to Ormond that 'I do now hear from Knockfergus that the earl of Antrim did the last night make an escape, and is gone but which way either by land or sea I know not', Conway to Ormond, 22 October 1642 (Bodl., Carte MSS 3, f. 579).

70 Hill, The Stewarts of Ballintoy, p. 29; Baillie to Spang, 26 July 1643 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 73).
had appealed to Scotland for assistance. This had divided the covenanting movement between the moderates who were unwilling to join parliament, and the hardliners who allied with parliament fearing that if it were subdued the king would turn once more against Scotland. 71 Meanwhile in Ireland the catholic party had organized itself into a confederation bound by an oath of association. 72 Their first general assembly met at Kilkenny on 24 October and elected its executive, the supreme council, a committee of twenty-four members (six representatives from each province), twelve of whom were supposed to sit permanently and run the confederation. But as Clarke has noted:

'extensive as the powers of the supreme council were, it was strictly subordinate to the assembly, a unicameral legislature composed partly of members elected on the normal parliamentary basis, and partly of temporal and spiritual peers who...were differentiated from commoners only by certain ceremonil marks of precedence'. 73

Political homogeneity at Kilkenny was reinforced by military cohesion on the battlefield. In August 1642 Antrim's cousin Owen Roe O'Neill - 'an old experienced commander' from the Spanish Army of Flanders - had been

71 Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 95.
72 Clarke, Old English, pp 214-5.
73 Clarke, Old English, p. 218; Donal F. Cregan, 'The Confederation of Kilkenny' in Farrell, The Irish Parliamentary Tradition, pp 102-15, describes the origins, structure and composition of the confederation. In addition to the supreme council there were councils for justice and finance and a chancery. The financial council had the least power, despite the fact that the army was (at least initially) very regularly paid, Relation of the state of Ireland since December 1644 (A.G.S., Eo. 2253, unfol.).

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welcomed to Ireland by Sir James MacDonnell, who had been the catholic leader of the rebellion on the Antrim estates and was to be closely associated with the earl during the 1640s. The following month Colonel Thomas Preston, also fresh from a command in Spanish Flanders, landed at Wexford.74 Within a relatively short period of time these and other continental veterans had 'reduced many of the natives to a more civil deportment, and to a pretty good understanding of military discipline'.75

Into 'these turbulent and murkey waters the earl of Antrim set out to fish'.76 Between his escape in October 1642 and his return to Ireland the following April he spent most of his time with the queen's court at York where, according to Charles I, 'he so behaved himself, as became the duty of a good and loyal subject'.77 But it all depends on one's definition of 'good and loyal', for subsequent evidence clearly indicates that during these months Antrim furtively and frantically conspired to solve both the king's British


76 Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 95.

77 Charles I to Leven, 11 June 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, ff 405-v).
problems and also his own economic and territorial ones. The plan was very similar to the projects of 1638-9 and 1644. First, a truce between the Irish royalists and confederate catholics was to be negotiated; then their united armies were to move initially against the Scots in Ulster and then into the Western Isles. Once in Scotland, the Irish troops were to join forces with an army raised by Antrim, Huntly, his son Aboyne, Montrose and Airlie in the Highlands; meanwhile a separate force would invade from England led by Nithsdale and Newcastle. Finally, 'Hamilton and many others' were supposed to rise in rebellion in the heart of Scotland so that, according to one horrified covenanter, 'in a trice we should become a field of blood'. It was even hoped that this Irish army, after helping to subdue Scotland in the king’s name, would then cross the border and invade England. Though John MacDonald, bard of

78 Henrietta Maria reminded her husband that nothing was ‘more necessary and essential to the support of your affairs, than the peace of that kingdom [Ireland]’, and that ‘all means possible’ should be used to secure it, Henrietta Maria to Charles I, 20/30 January 1643 (Mary Anne Everett Green, Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria (London, 1857), p. 156).

79 Examination of James Stewart, 12 June 1643 (H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 122-3; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43). Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 95-9; ibid., Scottish Revolution, pp 270-2; Cowan, Montrose, pp 139-41.

80 Baillie to Spang, 26 July 1643 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 74).

81 Proceedings of the council of war, 24 May 1643 and examination of Antrim, 12 June 1643 (H.M.C. rep. 13, pp
Keppoch, identified Antrim as the 'leader of hosts' he did not conceive the plan alone: Nithsdale, Aboyne, Airlie and Newcastle were his leading accomplices. 82

What royal support did this 'devilish plot' (as it was later called) have? The queen was certainly involved. 83 But it was not until 11 May 1643, in a cyphered letter, that she articulated her enthusiasm to her husband informing him that she had instructed Antrim to proceed to Ireland 'to persuade the Irish to reach a reasonable compromise' and begged him to inform Ormond and no one else of his mission. 84

120-2; H.M.C. rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43).

82 MacKenzie, Orain Iain Luim, pp 15-9. Montrose was less enthusiastic and only agreed to support the venture if it were endorsed by the king, H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 121-2; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43.

83 Antrim also suggested that the king endorsed his mission when he claimed to Ormond that 'I have so powerful commands laid upon me out of England to apply myself to your lordship and to your ways', Antrim to Ormond, 14 April 1643, (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, f. 83). Antrim later suggested that the king's approval for the venture would only be sought after he had secured 'easy conditions' from the Irish. And so it was on Newcastle's warrant that Antrim and Aboyne were to raise their army in the Highlands, H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 121-2; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43.

84 Henrietta Maria to Charles I, 11 May 1643 (B.L., Eg. MSS 2619 ff 18v-19); Green, Letters, pp 198-9. From this letter it is clear that this strategy had already been suggested to the king by the duchess of Buckingham. In an effort to disguise the queen's early involvement, Antrim later claimed that it was only early in May when ammunition, destined for the Western Isles, was held up at York that he had asked her to secure its redirection to Scarborough, H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 121-2; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43; Charles McNeill, The Tanner Letters. Original Documents and Notices of Irish Affairs in the sixteenth
In order to prepare the ground for the successful implementation of the design Antrim returned to Ireland in April. His brother was immediately dispatched to Ulster to confer with Sir Phelim O’Neill while the earl liaised between with Lords Taaffe, Dillon and Ormond. This preliminary reconnaissance trip appears to have been reasonably fruitful, although Monro refused to join the king’s party in spite of the inducement of an offer of £5,000. By the middle of April, Antrim felt confident that Ormond would be willing ‘to hasten the army into Ulster’ and asked him to have ships ready at Carlingford or Greencastle by the end of the month ‘where I shall have men ready and much more than I undertook which I considered would be no disadvantage to the service’.86

Back in England and Scotland, however, the complex plan was running awry. Firstly, there was a breakdown of communications between the leading protagonists; a disconsolate Nithsdale even feared that Hamilton and Montrose had reneged on their promises. ‘Matters are fallen out quite contrary to my expectation’ he

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85 H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 121-2; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43; Reg. privy council of Scot., 1638-43, pp xxx, 648.

86 Antrim to Ormond, 14 April 1643, (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, f. 83); Monro to Crafford, 25 May 1643 (ibid., ff 323-324v); H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 121-3; rep. 5, App., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43.
lamented to Antrim early in May and added 'how great folly it were to look for any assistance from Scotland'. Secondly, the Scottish covenanters had caught wind of the plot and suspected that Antrim intended shipping Irish troops 'to take in this country'. The advantage of surprise was thus now lost. Thirdly, the ammunition so desperately needed to arm the highland levies was embargoed. While it was subsequently redirected via Scarborough, this unexpected delay unnerved and unsettled the conspirators.87 But the final, and fatal, blow to the venture came in the middle of May when the vessel commandeered to carry Antrim, who had briefly returned to York, and the arms to Ireland was captured by one of Monro's colonels off the coast of County Down.88 Protesting that he was merely en route to collect some hangings and pictures belonging to his wife, and rents owed to his brother, Antrim was 'carried to his old lodging at Carrickfergus'.89 In order to decide what

87 McNeill, Tanner Letters, pp 158-60; Sergeant Major Rosse to Sir Hugh Chomeley, 8 May 1643 (H.M.C. rep. 13, p. 133; rep. 5, app., p. 84; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 8/5/43).

88 A Letter of Great consequence; sent by ... Monro ... to the committee for Irish affairs ... (London, 8 July 1643), pp 4-6; Monro to Crafford, 25 May 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, ff 323-324v). It is unlikely that the ship was laden with arms for 6,000 as reported in The Kingdome Weekly Intelligencer... From Tuesday 13 - 20 June 1643, no. 24 (London, 1643), p. 188; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 132-3.

89 H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 122-3; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43; McNeill, Tanner Letters, pp 158-9; Comment. Rinucc., i, 454; Baillie to Spang, 26 July 1643 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii,
should be done with the incorrigible earl Monro summoned a council of war which interrogated him and his servants about the contents of letters he was carrying from his co-conspirators.90 It was immediately concluded that they were resolved 'to do all mischief they could against the kingdom of Scotland' and that the earl should be held prisoner until a formal trial could be arranged.91

Monro now let it be known that Antrim - 'a prime man of the papist faction' - was being directed by the queen. He notified the English house of commons of the dangerous plot, advised the government in Edinburgh to 'spread the true report hereof to those you may trust unto, to guard the well-affected', and reminded men in Dublin loyal to the parliamentary cause to be on their guard.92 Both the English and Scottish administrations condemned the 'treacherous plot of the Irish, English and Scottish papists' and ordered that the protagonists be punished.93 In order to maximize

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90 Monro to Crafford, 25 May 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, ff 323-324v).

91 H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 120-1; rep. 5, app., pp 93-4; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 28/6/43; A Letter of Great consequence..., pp 4-6.

92 Monro to Crafford, 25 May 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, ff 323-324v); A Letter of Great consequence... pp 4-6.

93 A Declaration of his majesty's privie-counsell in Scotland: and commissioners for conserving the articles of the treaty... (Edinburgh, 26 June 1643; reprinted London, 27 June 1643), pp 4-8; Reg. privy council of Scot., 1638-43, pp xxx, 442-4. Early in June Aboyne and
the full value of the plot in propaganda terms
parliament also had the conspirators’ correspondence
published.94 All the leading London papers carried the
story in varying degrees of accuracy and each one
emphasized the traitorous character of ‘popish Irish
rebels’ in general and of the earl of Antrim in
particular.95 One particularly colourful pamphlet —
**The Character of an Oxford Incendiary** — described the
earl as:

‘a rebel not worth the naming, nor that precious
piece of iron-work, his duchess; yet I must needs
say, she was a lady rarely marked out for two
eminent husbands, the beds of Buckingham and
Antrim: this latter more pernicious than a bed of
scorpions’.96

More damaging still to the royalist cause was the
accusation that the queen had orchestrated ‘this Horrid

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Nithsdale were brought before the justice-general on
charges arising from the letters; while the house of
commons ordered that Antrim be dispatched to England
for further questioning, *Reg. privy council of Scot.*, 1638-43, pp xxx, 436; English commissioners to Monro, 2
September 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 6, f. 339v); *A
Declaration of the commons assembled in parliament
concerning the rise and progress of the grand rebellion
in Ireland...with some letters and papers of great
consequence of the earl of Antrim’s...* (London, [25
July] 1643), pp 17-22, 51-3; Stevenson, *Scottish
Revolution*, pp 270-4.

94 Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters*, p. 133; *ibid.*,

95 See for example, *The Kingdomes Weekly
Intelligencer*... From Tuesday 23 - 30 May and 27 June -
4 July 1643, nos. 21 and 24 (London, 1643), pp 161; 3-
4; *Mercurius Civicus*...Thursday 20-28 July 1643

96 Printed in *The Harleian Miscellany. Or, a collection
of scarce, curious and entertaining pamphlets and
tracts...found in the late Earl of Oxford’s library*,
Plot' and the apparent proof that the Ulster massacres and the original

‘monstrous rebellion of Ireland, was projected, incited, and assisted, by those councils now only prevalent with his majesty. That the queen with her romish priests, the papists of all...three kingdoms, have been principal actors’.97

The editor of the Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer hoped that this would now convert any waverers to the parliamentary cause so that ‘they may not still be seduced by the cunning connivers of the declarations ... from Oxford, that there is no intention to set up popery’.98 A propaganda campaign directed against the queen was combined with a flood of literature over the summer of 1643 reminding the population at large of the atrocities supposedly committed by Irish papists against English and Scottish protestants since the outbreak of the Irish rebellion.99

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97 A Declaration of the commons assembled in parliament..., pp 17-22, 51-3. The Parliament Scout accused the queen of having ‘countenanced and maintained that horrid and execrable rebellion now on foot in Ireland whereby many thousand protestants have been barbarously murdered’, The Parliament Scout...From Tuesday 20-27 June 1643, no. 1 (London, 1643), p. 4; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer... From Tuesday 4-11 July 1643, no. 25 (London, 1643), p. 193.

98 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Tuesday 27 June - 4 July 1643, no. 24 (London, 1643), pp 3-4.

The protestant population was clearly alarmed. Edward Hyde later acknowledged the damage caused by 'the imputation raised by parliament upon the king, of an intention to bring in, or...of conniving at and tolerating, Popery'; while 'The plot of Antrim' according to that discerning Scotsman Robert Baillie, 'had wakened in all a great fear of our own safety, and distrust of all the fair words that were or could be given us'.

A parliamentary sympathizer in Dublin even suggested that 'it is one of the worst plots against this kingdom and Scotland, and so by consequence against England that hath yet been discovered except the plot of the rebellion which hath already almost consumed us'.

The political and military ramifications ran even deeper. In Scotland news that the royal couple had been conspiring against the covenanters was decisive in convincing the more moderate party to ally with parliament and accordingly in August 1643 'a military, political and religious alliance based on the solemn league and covenant, was agreed between a Scottish convention of estates and the English commissioners'.

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101 'T.N.' to Robert Reynolds, 7 June 1643 (H.M.C. rep. S, app., p. 89; H.L.R.O., Main Papers, 7/6/43).

now agreed to send an army of 21,000 men into England to fight for parliament against the king.103

Hardly surprisingly, both the king and queen denied any knowledge of 'any such business'.104 Charles was very probably lying, and his wife definitely was.105 Their subsequent frenzied efforts to secure Antrim's release did little to inspire confidence in their denials. Thus Henrietta Maria, on hearing of his arrest on 30 May wrote to Hamilton of Antrim's 'misfortune'. She begged that he be 'not rudely treated' since he had only gone to take up outstanding rents and added significantly that 'if he were able to serve the king he would do so even against those of his own country and that he has none other intention'.106 For his part, the king wrote similar letters to Leven and Monro insisting that the earl be


104 The king even ordered an enquiry into those 'raisers and divulgers of such a false scandal', Charles I to the Scottish privy council, 31 June 1643 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/8303).

105 'I fear that he [Antrim] is taken by the Scots in Ireland; but he has nothing of mine in writing', Henrietta Maria to Charles I, 27 May 1643 (Green, Letters, pp 212-3).

106 Henrietta Maria to Hamilton, 30 May [1643] (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/9602). The king also claimed that Antrim was in Ulster only 'to provide for the security of his estates', Charles I to Leven, 11 June 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, ff 405-v). The queen also badgered Ormond, Henrietta Maria to Ormond, 27 September 1643 (ibid., MSS 7, f. 111).
dispatched to Dublin for trial and that his estates and possessions be ‘saved harmless both from the spoil of the Irish rebels, and our own forces there’. 107 Charles also whipped up support for Antrim among the Irish royalists. Initially the Dublin government, afraid of a scandal involving the queen, prevaricated but then (at the king’s insistence) dismissed Monro’s reports as idle rumours; and both the lords justices and Ormond ordered him to send Antrim to Dublin. But Monro refused. 108 So desperate were the king and queen to have Antrim released that they even sought French intervention. In September the duke of Orleans, the premier peer of France and Henrietta Maria’s brother, made a personal plea on the earl’s behalf to Hamilton; and early in November a French agent (disparagingly described by one covenanter as ‘A little Monsieur, some agent with letters from the Queen’) was sent to Edinburgh to negotiate (among other things) for Antrim’s release. 109 He arrived too late. On the very

107 Charles I to Leven, 11 June 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 5, ff 405-v); Charles I to Ormond, 12 June 1643 (ibid., f. 418).

108 They only learnt of the plot early in June, lords justices to Nicholas, 10 June 1643 (Ormonde MSS, ii, 288); Ormond to Monro, 11 August 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 65, ff 61-2); lords justices to Monro, 11 August 1643 (ibid., MSS 6, ff 194-5); Ormond to Monro, 16 August 1643 (ibid., MSS 65, f. 220); Monro to Ormond, 9 September 1643 (ibid., MSS 6, f. 440).

day the agent made his formal application to the
Scottish council, news reached Edinburgh that Antrim
had in fact escaped from Carrickfergus castle for the
second time.110

On this occasion Captain George Gordon, the
twelfth earl of Sutherland’s brother ‘had a cord sent
into him amongst his linens, which a man carried to him
by the friendship of an officer in the garrison’.111

That night, using the rope, he escaped to a pre-
arranged spot a mile from Carrickfergus where a man and
horse were supposed to be waiting for him. When his
accomplice, who was later caught and hanged, failed to
appear he set off on foot towards Lisnagarvey where,

110 The French agent sent a detailed account of his
embassy to Edinburgh back to Brienne:
‘They had refused to me the release of the earl of
Antrim and a quarter of an hour before my
audience, I learned they had received the news of
his escape from prison. I pretended not to know
of it, and insisted strongly that they should
gratify France by releasing this earl, which I
learned afterwards they considered a very great
mockery on my part, and as a reputation of this
nature is not advantageous for those engaged in
treating matters of importance, I called on the
Chancellor and the principal members of [the]
council, and showed that they had very badly
interpreted what I had said at my audience
relating to the earl of Antrim, and although I
might have known of his escape or not, it was my
duty to ask them that he be liberated, seeing I
had received that order and that it was not for me
to verify the exactitude of rumours circulating in
the town’.

Boisivon to Brienne, 10/20 November 1643 (Diplomatic
Correspondence, ii, 543).

111 History of the Warr, p. 24. Stevenson, Scottish
Covenanter, p. 136; A. S. Murdock and H. M. F. Simpson
(eds.), The Memoirs of James, Marquis of Montrose 1632-
50, Written by his chaplain George (later Bishop)
Wishart (London, 1893), p. 38; Clan Donald, ii, 725.
the next morning, an old man found and fed him and then
guided him to Charlemount. From there he made his way
to Mellifont and Kilkenny, where he arrived late in
November 1643.112

Antrim's second escape from Carrickfergus marked
the conclusion of apparently the third attempt by
Charles I, within a period of less than two and a half
years, to use Irish catholic soldiers against his
protestant English and Scottish subjects. Without
question, the king was deeply involved in both of the
plots hatched by the earl of Antrim in 1642 and 1643;
and this in turn adds weight to the circumstantial
evidence that he was also compromised in the more
nebulous 'Antrim plot' of 1641.113 At the very least,
it is clear that the rumours of 'popish plots' which
abounded from the spring of 1641 were entirely
justified.

112 History of the Warr, pp 24-6. The old man remained
a servant; the washer-woman, who smuggled in his rope,
[Ann Orphin] was given an annual pension of £10, Hill,
MacDonnells, pp 265-6, 271; Diplomatic Correspondence,
ii, 543; The Weekly Account...no. 16 (London, 20
December 1643), p. 8; Comment. Rinucc., i, 455.

113 For a detailed discussion of this plot see appendix
1.7.
CHAPTER 5: Antrim at War I: Scotland (November 1643-December 1644)

In September 1643 a ceasefire for one year - known as the 'cessation of arms' - was concluded between the Irish royalists, led by Ormond (who was soon to be appointed lord lieutenant), and the catholic forces. In effect, negotiations had begun the previous July, shortly after the fall of Galway into catholic hands. After much haggling it was agreed that the confederates should pay the king £20,000 and provide him with troops and equipment for his English war-effort. In return the confederates were led to expect, but were not actually granted, the repeal of the penal laws and 'a large measure of political independence, permanent tenure of their lands, safeguards against reprisals, and a guarantee that the whole settlement would be enshrined in law'.1 As things turned out the agreement was never ratified, so that the 'cessation' proved a high price to pay for little more than formal recognition of the confederate cause by the king, at a time when its armies enjoyed a military and strategic advantage.2

Nevertheless, the ceasefire heralded a new departure in Anglo-Irish relations. Hardly

surprisingly, it was not well received in Britain. One Scottish covenantant credited that it 'is much dislike[d] here, and particular exception taken against his majesty calling the Irish natives his Catholic subjects'.

As far as the English parliament was concerned, a 'united' Ireland - however tenuous the union - constituted a major strategic and military threat since the king now had access to previously unexploited resources in terms of men and money. The cessation also embarrassed English royalists, anxious to avoid being tarred as 'pro-papist', but considering the poor state of the king's affairs they either had to accept it reluctantly or to shift their allegiance to parliament (as some, indeed, did). In Ireland itself the ceasefire temporarily allied the protestant Irish royalists, whose power was essentially limited to Dublin and part of the Pale, with the catholic confederates who controlled all the rest of the country except for most of Ulster and sundry strongholds along the south and west coast. The new allies were opposed only by the forces loyal to the English parliament, primarily represented by the Scottish covenanting army in Ulster, which did not adhere to the cessation.

It was in this much altered world that the earl of Antrim attempted to find his niche after escaping from

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Carrickfergus for the second time. This was not hard, for the cessation removed the dilemma into which the 1641 rebellion had plunged him. At last he could fraternise openly and legally with his 'rebel' friends and family without fear of retribution from the royalist party. It also created fresh opportunities to gain political power and prestige.

In order to exploit the new political configuration the earl hurried to Waterford, where the third general assembly had just convened in order to elect agents responsible for negotiating a permanent peace with the king. Antrim immediately used his influence as a traditional Ulster power-broker to ensure that the gaelic lords in the north-east fulfilled their obligation under the terms of the cessation to provide the king's supporters with cattle.5 He was also eager to secure formal office.6 According to Richard Bellings, at this time the earl:

'entertained thoughts of having himself declared lieutenant general of the confederate catholics of Ireland, and having received encouragement therein

5 Antrim to Ormond, [c.7 November] 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 7, f. 407); Henry O'Neill to Antrim, 8 November 1643 (ibid., f. 381); Phelim O'Neill to Antrim, 8 November 1643 (ibid., f. 381); Ormond to [Henry O'Neill], 17 November 1643 (ibid., f. 483). Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 166-7.

6 Anonymous author of the Aphorismical Discovery (Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 79-80) suggested that there was a faction within the assembly which wanted Antrim declared lord lieutenant. This may well have been the case but Antrim's priorities at this point lay with retrieving his hereditary estates and not seriously vying 'for spectacular [political] reward' in the form of the lord lieutenancy, Lowe, 'The Earl of Antrim', p. 191.
from some friends of his that had a part in the government, the design was formed with much industry, and prosecuted with no little earnestness in his behalf at council'.7

If offered this prestigious (but powerless) post, the earl promised to use his own and his wife's influence at court - about which, according to the same source, he boasted at great length - to further the confederate cause. He also argued that if he were given nominal command of the confederate forces his followers in Scotland would join the struggle and 'consequently by diversion, free the confederates from some part of the harm they were to expect from the daily increasing power of the Scots in the north'.8 The general assembly accepted the earl's proposals 'without debate' and, before its dissolution on 1 December, ordered the supreme council to inform him of their decision.9 In addition the couple were awarded a generous pension to compensate them for the loss of revenue from their Irish and English estates.10


9 Desid. cur. Hib., p. 243; Carte, Ormond, vi, 43-6; Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to king, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 313.

10 The pension was never paid in full: Ormond to Fennell, 26 October 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, f. 503); Duchess of Buckingham to Oliver Darcy, 26 October 1644 (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1633-47, p. 396/P.R.O., S.P. 63/260/127); Crelly to Antrim, 6 November 1644 (ibid., p. 396/P.R.O., S.P. 63/260/128).
By making much of his own importance at court and in Scotland Antrim had secured — in theory at least — the position of lieutenant-general of the confederate army. He at once set off to the king’s headquarters at Oxford to receive his master’s approval. When he arrived there, some time late in December, he pursued a similar tactic, or rather, in the words of Richard Bellings, ‘he made a double return, being magnified at court upon the account of the confederates, and at Waterford upon the score of his favour at court’.11 By inflating his standing among the catholic confederates (he said he was commander-in-chief of their armies) and by suggesting that he would be able to manipulate the catholic party into filling all of Charles’s needs, he was able to win the king’s approval for plans he had been hatching with leading courtiers and Scottish royalists.12

Antrim’s plan had three components. Firstly, he was to raise in the name of the confederates and at


12 Carte, Ormond, vi, 31-4, 39; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 166-7; ibid., Alasdair MacColla, pp 102-3; Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 116; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Tuesday 2-9 January 1644, no. 38 (London, 1644), pp 289-90. T. M’Crie (ed.), The Life of Mr Robert Blair, Minister of St. Andrews containing his autobiography from 1593 to 1636 with supplement to his life, and continuation of the history of the times to 1680... (Wodrow Society, Edinburgh, 1884), p. 173. Hyde, Life, ii, 78-9; Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 510-11.
their expense 10,000 armed men, who were to be shipped to England 'to resist the Scotch invasion' (a covenanted army crossed the Tweed on 19 January 1644). In case the confederates 'insist upon such things as we cannot without great inconvenience and danger to the whole frame of our affairs grant', Antrim was empowered to transport to Scotland as many men as he could muster in his own name.

The second component of his plan resembled the anti-Campbell alliances proposed in 1639, 1642 and 1643. Charles authorized Antrim to persuade the confederates to raise and transport 2,000-3,000 men to the Western Isles 'where you are to excite your party to rise with you to fall upon the marquis of Argyll's country'. Upon arrival in Scotland, he was first to join forces with troops levied by the earl of Seaforth and Sir Donald MacDonald and then to rendez-vous with the king's army under the command the earl of Montrose. Towards the end of January 1644, Antrim signed a formal agreement with Montrose promising to have his troops in Scotland by 1 April, to liaise closely with the earl, and to follow his orders.13 As in 1639 and 1643, Antrim's invasion of Scotland was to coincide not only

with uprisings in Scotland - orchestrated in this instance by Montrose (named captain-general of the king's Scottish forces), Huntly ('lord lieutenant of all forces that may be raised in Scotland'), and other leading Scottish grandees (including the earlier co-conspirators Nithsdale and Aboyne) who had condemned the solemn league and covenant - but also with an invasion from England, under the command of the marquis of Newcastle.14

Thirdly, Antrim was instructed to try to win over, or failing that at least to neutralize, the covenanting army in Ulster by promising Monro in the king's name a Scottish title and an annual pension of £2000. Finally, if the confederates refused to agree to any of the proposals, the earl was to do his utmost to sow dissension amongst their ranks so that they would provide no threat to the royalist cause.15

Antrim made several demands in return. First and foremost he asked for the immediate restitution of his estates in Ulster which were now occupied by Monro's forces, and the governorship of Derry and Coleraine.16


15 Instructions for Antrim, [c.January], 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 13, f. 158-v); Instructions for Daniel O'Neill, early 1644 (ibid., ff 166-167v); Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 88-90; Bagwell, Stuarts, ii, 61; H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 172-3; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 167-8.

16 Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 572; Carte, Ormond, vi, 43-6, 79-82. Though he was promised the latter, a commission was never issued. For details on
The king agreed. In addition, he requested the return of his ancestral Scottish possessions and a formal command to take it by force. Almost immediately 'a commission of the lieutenant general of the Isles and highlands, and a commission of justiciary' was drawn up in his name.17 He also wanted the wardship of his young nephew, Baron Slane, but because he was a catholic Ormond refused to grant him this.18 Finally he was promised a marquisate.19 According to Hyde, this was thanks to his importuning wife who was 'resolved he [Antrim] should carry with him [to Ireland] some testimony of the king's esteem'. Charles reluctantly agreed: 'Though his majesty was neither pleased with the matter nor the manner, he did not discern so great an inconvenience in gratifying him, as might weigh down the benefit he expected with reference to Scotland'.20 However instead of creating Antrim a marquis immediately (as Hyde misleadingly recorded in his History of the Rebellion), the king prudently

his earlier attempts to buy lands in County Londonderry see pp 59-64 above.


18 For further details on Slane's wardship see, Sir John Ware's Diary of Occurrences (Dublin City Library, MS 169, p. 227); Digby to Ormond, 29 November 1643 (ibid., MSS 7, f. 643); Digby to Ormond, 22 January 1645 (ibid., MSS 13, f. 515); Carte, Ormond, vi, 63.


20 Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 522-3.
insisted that he complete his side of the bargain first.21

Royal favour did little to improve Antrim's relations with the Irish lord lieutenant. The king was aware that Ormond, who had been totally excluded from the planning of the venture, would feel threatened by Antrim's commission, so he attached Daniel O'Neill to the mission.22 O'Neill was Antrim's cousin and Digby reassured Ormond that he was 'the fittest person to

21 Though he had to wait until January 1645 before officially collecting his marquisate, some historians and many contemporaries referred to him as the 'marquis of Antrim' from this point on. The patent for Antrim's marquisate (P.R.O.N.I., T.473/1, pp 43-5) was dated 1 January 1644[-5]. See for example, Hill, MacDonnell's, p. 268; A. Webb, A Compendium of Irish Bibliography (New York, 1970), p. 310; O Cuív, 'Some Irish items relating to the MacDonells', p. 152; Consulta of the junta on Irish levies, 29 January/8 February 1645 (A.G.S., Eo.2523, unfol.); Contreras to Foissotte, 19 February/1 March 1645 (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.). Apparently Antrim encouraged this, Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 149-50. Numerous London weeklies carried stories about 'the new created marquis of Antrim'. See for examples, A Perfect Diurnall...From Monday 22 - 29 April 1644, no. 39 (London, 1644), p. 311; The True Informer...Saturday 3 - 10 August 1644 (London, 1644), p. 305; The Weekly Account...Wednesday 10 - 17 April 1644, no. 33 (London, 1644); The Spie, communicating intelligence from Oxford...From Tuesday 5-13 February 1644, no. 12 (London, 1644), p. 96; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Wednesday 10 - Tuesday 16 April 1644, no. 50 (London, 1644), p. 405 and ibid., From Thursday 25 - 30 April 1644, no. 52 (London, 1644), p. 421.

22 Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 515-21. As his reward Daniel O'Neill was created a groom of the bedchamber, Cregan, 'An Irish cavalier...1642-51', pp 168-112. Pressure was put on Ormond to co-operate with Antrim. Minute on O'Neill and Antrim's instructions, 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 13, ff 152-v); Charles I to Ormond, 20 January 1644 (ibid., MSS 9, f. 9); Carte, Ormond, vi, 20-2, 62-3.
steer my Lord Antrim by your directions'.\textsuperscript{23} He was expected to mediate between Antrim and Ormond, to 'sway the said earl of Antrim according to the advice and direction of the marquis of Ormond' so that the two will co-operate, and to prevent 'all kind of jealousies that may arise not only in the marquis of Ormond but in any of our protestant subjects of this employment'.\textsuperscript{24} In the final analysis, the success or failure of the plan lay not in the hands of the confederates, but with Antrim’s ability to co-operate with Ireland’s lord lieutenant. As O’Neill despondently noted, the supreme council 'are so divided between these two great men, [the] marquis [of] Ormond and [the] earl [of] Antrim, that neither can serve the king eminently in this kind separate, but joined may do anything'. He added that if only Antrim and Ormond could agree they would be able to levy 'the old[est] and best soldiers in this kingdom' so that there would be no need to yield 'to any exorbitant demands of the agents, either of religion or anything else'.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} Digby to Ormond, 8 February 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 32). According to Hyde, \textit{Life}, ii, 79, O’Neill enjoyed 'great power over him [Antrim], and very much credit with the marquis of Ormond'. Also see Clarendon, \textit{Rebellion}, iii, 515 and Donal Cregan, ‘Daniel O’Neill, a Royalist Agent in Ireland, 1644-50’ in \textit{I.H.S.}, ii, no. 8 (Sept. 1941), p. 399.


Early in February 1644, Antrim and O'Neill sailed for Ireland from Bristol in one of the king’s ships. Upon arrival they hurried directly to Kilkenny where the earl immediately requested the supreme council to provide Charles with 10,000 men for England and at least 2,000 for Scotland ‘with arms and a sufficient proportion of ammunition and provisions’, as well as with arms for Prince Rupert’s forces in England (which Ormond was to pay for). The council deliberated for five days over this; on 29 February they finally endorsed his plan to raise forces for the Isles and agreed to provide him, by 1 May 1644, with 2,000 muskets, 2,400 hundredweight of powder with match, and 200 barrels of oatmeal - providing there was a safe port (such as Carlingford in County Louth or Greencastle in County Down) to receive them. They also agreed to provide the arms and munitions requested for Prince Rupert on condition that Ormond accepted as ‘payment’ the non-delivery of 2,800 cattle due to the king under the terms of the cessation. Concerning the 10,000 men for England the council was less cooperative and refused to commit themselves until they had heard how negotiations between their commissioners agreed.

26 News from Waterford, 28 February/10 March 1644 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 51, ff 22-v); The Military Scribe...Tuesday 26 March – 2 April 1644, no. 6 (London, 1644), p. 43.

27 O'Neill’s notes on Antrim’s audience with the supreme council, 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 13, f. 168 and MSS 63, f. 291); Antrim to Ormond, 25 February 1644 (ibid., MSS 9, f. 330); Carte, Ormond, vi, 42; Hazlett, ‘A History of the Military Forces’, pp 309-14.
and the king (over the redress of their religious, tenurial and political grievances) were progressing at Oxford. 28 A rather dispirited Antrim therefore reported to Ormond that 'I have obtained part of my desires, and part is delayed, though not denied; but delays are equally dangerous to the king'. 29 Antrim and O'Neill, to judge from the letters sent to court, nevertheless remained confident that the council would finally agree to send the 10,000 troops to England. 30 The earl even tried (unsuccessfully) to press-gang the army being prepared against Monro's forces and to send it instead to England. 31

Since the earl had been primed 'to improve his own interest' amongst the confederates 'if the Irish would not come to such terms as his majesty could descend to', he lingered on in Kilkenny rather than following O'Neill to meet Ormond in Dublin. 32 His enemies on the supreme council, who 'would be ready to oppose any undertaking of his', ensured that the executive was


29 Antrim to Ormond, 2 March [1644] (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 114); Antrim to Ormond, 29 February 1644 (ibid.).


31 Desid. cur. Hib., p. 245.

32 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2.
quickly divided into two clearly opposed factions. 33 Therefore, in order to have 'any credit' (as Antrim termed it) and to maintain his influence over the supreme council, he was obliged to take the confederate oath of association and also to become a member of the supreme council. 34

By officially and publicly siding with the confederates before a formal peace treaty - rather than a mere cessation of arms - had been concluded with the king, the earl offered a great hostage to fortune. Clanricard realized at once the dangers involved in 'entering into their association in so high a degree, and carrying such with him, as may perhaps stand charged with the foulest actions committed here'. 35

In the short-term, however, if he was to drive Monro's army from East Ulster and revive the anti-Campbell crusade in the Western Isles, the earl simply had no alternative but to offer himself as Charles's sacrificial lamb. 36 But, as Ormond observed, 'I doubt

33 This delighted O'Neill who was now convinced that 'it is not in the power of either catholic clergy, or pope's nuncio, Spanish or French, to make any party against the king', O'Neill to Digby, 2 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 43, 45).

34 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2; Carte, Ormond, vi, 71-3.

35 Clanricard to Ormond, 25 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 72). Certainly, at the Restoration, this is exactly what happened. The earl's enemies repeatedly cited the fact that he had both taken the oath of association in 1644 and sat on the supreme council before the peace treaties of 1646 and 1649 as evidence of his complicity with the 'rebels', Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to the king, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7), Hill, MacDonnells, p. 313; Lowe, 'The Earl of Antrim', p. 196.
he [also] minds other business’ - no doubt a reference to Antrim’s efforts to secure a commission for ‘the government of Coleraine and Londonderry’.37

While his zeal for the king’s service (‘tis so much that it hurts’) was placed uppermost, Antrim obviously also enjoyed his new political status and used it to his own advantage wherever possible:

‘he hath received late letters of high expressions of affection and trust both from the king and queen, which he shows to all men of considerable condition, and upon my word, my lord, that, with his ways, gains him no small opinion amongst the people, he being of their council and association’.38

His popularity at large was mirrored by the influence he enjoyed within the supreme council. For instance, no sooner had he been elected to the executive than it was rumoured that he had persuaded them to ‘offer £4,000 by the month to the queen’ if she came to Ireland to give birth to her baby.39

Antrim had nothing to lose and everything to gain by raising and sending Irish troops to fight in

36 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 170-1.

37 Ormond to Radcliffe, 11 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 59); Digby to Ormond, 29 March 1644 (ibid., 79-82); O’Neill to Digby, 2 March 1644 (ibid., 43-5). It seems unlikely that he was also seriously vying ‘for spectacular [political] reward’ in the form of the lord lieutenancy, as one recent historian has suggested, since the earl’s priorities at this point lay with retrieving his hereditary estates and power; Lowe, ‘The Earl of Antrim’, p. 191.

38 O’Neill to Digby, 2 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 46); Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 139-40.

39 Trevor to Ormond, 9 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 57); Trevor to Ormond, 25 March 1644 (ibid., 69-70).
Scotland and in England. But the stakes were much higher for the king since mobilizing catholic, Irish aid would inevitably cause problems. The ever-astute earl of Clanricard was quick to recognize the dangers and feared that it 'may somewhat reflect upon the king of England, and lessen his party in that kingdom; there being those that will make use of the least shadows to put a prejudice upon his government and proceedings'. Predictably, Charles’s enemies did indeed seize on news of the invasion as yet further evidence of an insidious plot by the papists (led by the queen) to engulf and destroy the king’s loyal, protestant subjects. The parliamentary press vigilantly monitored, and then broadcast to the nation, Antrim’s movements. Late in January, The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer announced that he had been sent to Ireland to raise ‘10,000 popish and natural Irish rebels’ to fight for the royalist cause. A Perfect Diurnall then followed this up with a more detailed, misleading, account of his commission:

'that the king had given a commission to the new created marquis of Antrim, that notorious popish and professed rebel, to be general and commander-

40 Clanricard to Ormond, 25 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 72).


42 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Tuesday 30 January – Wednesday 7 1644, no. 42 (London, 1644), p. 322.
in-chief over all his catholic good subjects in
the province of Ulster, and all the provinces
adjacent, and with such forces as he should raise,
to use all possible means to suppress all the
British and Scottish protestants that submitted
not to the late hellish cessation'.

The Weekly Account, Scottish Dove and The Kingdomes
Weekly Intelligencer all ran similar stories condemning
- with varying degrees of accuracy - the activities of
the popish earl.

More serious for Antrim, however, was the
resentment and jealousy generated at Charles's court
among the king's protestant supporters by their
master's eagerness to patronize 'popish undertakers'.

Some perceived a risk of a gaelic revival in Ireland
with the earl acting (as his grandfather, Hugh O'Neill,
had done) as the focal point and feared that, in Lord
Digby's words:

'Antrim's friends and dependents of Ulster should,
upon the pretense of serving the king under his
command, carry along designs of reestablishing
themselves in their ancient territories of their
ancient septs... and that when they had got a
power together, under colour of serving his
majesty's interest, they should apply it to serve
their own... This is so dangerous a point,
especially with all those who having been of those

43 A Perfect Diurnall...From Monday 22 - 29 April 1644,

44 The Weekly Account...Wednesday 10-17 April 1644, no.
33 (London, 1644); Scottish Dove...Friday 26 April-3
May 1644, no. 29 (London, 1644), p. 228; The Kingdomes
Weekly Intelligencer...From Thursday 25-30 April 1644,
no. 52 (London, 1644), p. 421; Gazette [de Naples], no.
40, p. 252.

45 Nicholas to Ormond, 4 March 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS
63, f. 325); Radcliffe to Ormond, 17 January 1644
(ibid., MSS 8, f. 528); Carte, Ormond, vi, 125, 166-7;
great and powerful families, have now nothing left'.46

Therefore, contrary to parliamentary propaganda, the court's attitude towards Irish intervention was distinctly hostile. As a result the negotiators sent by the general assembly to discuss their grievances with the king received a frosty reception.47 For his part, Antrim was accused of being sympathetic to the commissioners' demands because his brother was one of the negotiators and he himself was 'a person likely to encourage the agents to demand in that kind [religion]'.48 Ironically, however, the earl's immediate success in persuading the confederates to send 2,000 troops to Scotland only served to undermine further any bargaining power enjoyed by the agents in Oxford.49 Why, it was asked, should Charles alienate his protestant followers further by making formal

46 Digby to Ormond, 29 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 80-1).

47 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Wednesday 10- Tuesday 16 April 1644, no. 50 (London, 1644), p. 405; The Spy, communicating intelligence from Oxford...From Tuesday 5-13 February 1644, no. 12 (London, 1644), p. 96; Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 17 June 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 221).

48 Digby to Ormond, 14 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 63); Bellings to Ormond, 19 December 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 8, f. 163); Carte, Ormond, vi, 43-5 57. This was nonsense: at this point the earl's devotion to catholicism was, as even Digby was forced to admit, 'quite overborne by the interest of his majesty's honour and power', Digby to Ormond, 14 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 62).

49 Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 137-8; Elkin, 'The Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars', pp 162-5.

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concessions to the catholic party when he could evidently secure Irish aid without doing so?

The fact that Antrim had been singled out as the king's emissary also created jealous ill-feeling among his Irish contemporaries, particularly the earl of Clanricard.50 One unsympathetic observer, for example, commented caustically on his abilities as a soldier in the field. For after having promised the council 'that he [Antrim] would take in...all the refractory castles in this province for that they were all held for him and by such as in obedience to him would surrender them' the earl had failed to do so. 'A good piece of battery [he concluded] is much more powerful to take in a castle than is his Lordship's oratory'.51

For the time being, however, despite their jealousy, the majority of Ireland's catholic grandees were prepared - for the good of the royalist cause - to assist Antrim to levy his army, and they agreed to meet at Loughreagh (in County Galway) for a council of war towards the middle of March.52 But the meeting, attended by Lords Castlehaven, Taaffe, Clanricard and Sir James Dillon was a disaster. Instead of concentrating on how best to mobilize an army, Antrim and Castlehaven dominated the proceedings by squabbling

50 Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 139-40; Clanricarde Letter-Book, pp 42, 59, 80-1; Carte, Ormond, vi, 63-4.
51 Barry to Ormond, 18 April 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 150).
52 Carte, Ormond, vi, 63-4; Comment. Rinucc., i, 457.
over who was the supreme commander of the confederate armies.53 Nevertheless, the earl continued his troop-raising progress along the west coast of Ireland: on 24 March he left Loughreagh for Galway town and from there he moved on to Counties Mayo, Sligo and Roscommon before journeying into the north in search of volunteers for the king's army and support for the confederate cause.54 By the middle of April he had finished recruiting and prepared to leave County Roscommon amid rumours that he, 'with a great army, is marching towards Monro, with the relics of our army. God be there; else, if they be defeated, it will be very ill for Scotland'.55

The press also caught wind of these developments, but retaliated by flaunting Antrim's failure to win over Monro and other key commanders (such as Sir Robert Stewart in Londonderry) to the royalist cause.56 Early in April, Captain John Gordon - 'least [a] MacDonnell should give offense' - was dispatched to discuss the colonel's defection from parliament.57 When Monro

53 Carte, Ormond, vi, 71-3. For further details see p. 203 below.

54 Carte, Ormond, vi, 71-3; Clanricarde Letter-Book, p. 68.

55 Baillie to Spang, 12 April 1644 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 164); James Galbraith to Owen O'Neill, 19 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 300).

56 Antrim to O'Neill, 14 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10 f. 209); Antrim to Ormond, 23 April 1644 (ibid., ff 344-v); Clanricarde Letter-Book, p. 71.

57 O'Neill to Ormond, 23 April 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 97).
refused to countenance it, hoping rather to 'catch him [Antrim] the third time to vindicate myself from aspersion of the wicked', Antrim tried intimidation.58

According to a London newspaper, he:

'sent express to General Monro commander of the Scots regiments, to be gone out of Ulster or else he will compel him. To which the valiant general, having received the supplies...from Holland, returned this answer - that he would see him and take his leave [in battle] before he did go'.59

Thus nothing came of the earl's efforts to neutralize the parliamentary enemy in East Ulster and, towards the end of April, he hurried to County Westmeath 'to be near those men for Scotland'.60

But who exactly were 'those men for Scotland'? The rank and file were almost exclusively native Irishmen 'of Ulster, [and] some of the Old Irish in other parts of the kingdom'.61 Many were Antrim's 'own dependents, the residents of his land and Clandeboy' who had been forced into exile by Monro and were (according to Daniel O’Neill) 'hardy and stout for any service'. A further 800 (at least) were highlanders under the command of Alasdair MacColla.62 Much more is

58 Monro to [the committee of the estates of Scotland], 23 February 1644 (H.M.C. rep. 13, pp 172-3).

59 The Weekly Account...no. 33 (London, 1644).

60 Taaffe to Ormond, 13 April 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 139-40); Antrim to O'Neill, 14 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 209); Antrim to Ormond, 27 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 435).

61 Clanricard to Ormond, 25 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 71); O’Neill to Ormond, 21 June 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 256).

62 Comment. Rinucc., i, 456; Clarendon, Rebellion, iii, 516. Ormond had refused to employ MacColla, Ormond to
known about the officers selected to command the force: an extant muster roll for the army lists the names of seventy-three officers who appear to have originated largely in either Counties Antrim or Londonderry. The bulk of these names (fifty-six) were native Irish: MacAllesters, MacCormacks, MacDonnells, MacDermots, MacHenrys, MacQuillans, O’Cahans, O’Haras and O’Neills, as one might expect, predominated. These men were supplemented by ‘discontented officers’ - particularly from Ulster and the Pale - who had been unable to find employment in the confederate armies. But, by the beginning of April, the earl had still not found a suitable commander for his expeditionary force. Ideally he wanted the continental veteran Hugh Dubh O’Neill to lead his army but, since he was unable to secure O’Neill’s release from Londonderry, he nominated his kinsman Alasdair MacColla as his major-general.

Alexander MacDonald, 2 August 1643 (Bodl., Carte MSS 6, f. 154); Carte, Ormond, vi, 71-3.


64 Clanricard to Ormond, 25 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 71); Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 106-7.

Nothing is known about how Antrim’s army was trained for the wars in Scotland, but their subsequent performance suggests that they included a fair number of seasoned veterans, who had learnt the ways of modern warfare (presumably from Owen Roe O’Neill or other continental officers) over the course of the previous two and a half years. Others may well have gained additional military experience by fighting in the Thirty Years’ War or in Spanish Flanders. Either way, the force was blessed with remarkable stamina, courage and endurance.66 Even Edward Hyde, never one to praise Irish catholics needlessly, later asserted that Antrim’s levies were ‘very good, and with very good officers; all so hardy, that neither the ill fare nor the ill lodging in the Highlands gave them any discouragement’.67

Antrim’s army was, however, poorly disciplined. While Alasdair MacColla’s 800 highlanderers were in County Galway, Clanricard vowed either ‘to destroy’ them or to send them into another county on account of the damage they were doing, while in County Roscommon, Lord Taaffe claimed that 1,500 of Antrim’s recruits had ‘destroyed all my tenants’.68 They seemed to have


67 Hyde, Life, ii, 80.

68 Clanricard to Ormond, 25 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 73); Taaffe to Ormond, 13 April 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 140).
wreaked havoc far and wide: early in May it was reported that 'some of those northern men that say they belong to my lord of Antrim do wander as far as Cashel and are now there, others are in the County of Sligo, most part in the County of Longford and Westmeath'.

As time passed, the number of complaints escalated. In mid-May, the supreme council lamented to Ormond that the inhabitants of Meath, Westmeath, Longford, King's and Queen's Counties 'do suffer by those Ulstermen who are designed for the service of the Isles and such (who are many in number) that join themselves unto them and do eat upon the country'. The council even feared that the local population 'may use force to expel them, and that unless the counties be eased it will be utterly disabled to contribute assistance to any service'.

The earl was distressed by these complaints; but in the absence of any vessels to ship his men to Scotland, or of a regular supply of provisions for them, he could do nothing (except, of course, disband them).

Time was clearly of the essence if the Scottish expedition was to enjoy any chance of success. By the end of April circumstances in Scotland seemed uniquely favourable for Irish intervention, for although

69 Bellings to Ormond, 6 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 531).

70 Supreme council to Ormond, 18 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 686).

71 Antrim to Ormond, 12 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 612); Supreme council to Ormond, 30 May 1644 (ibid., MSS 11, ff 67-v); Carte, Ormond, vi, 121-2.
Montrose had been unable to recruit allies, Huntly seized Aberdeen and thus drew the covenanting army away northwards; while Antrim's kinsmen in the Isles declared themselves ready to join him, being 'disgusted with the present government of their country'.72 'Now or never is the time to complete the distraction of that fatal kingdom' observed Ormond 'and to return to their bosom their own mischief'.73 With the benefit of hindsight, however, it was probably fortuitous that the venture was delayed, for had Antrim's forces landed in Scotland early in April - as was initially planned - they would no doubt have been cut down by the 600 horse dispatched by the covenanters expressly to welcome them.74 But, back in Ireland, the constant delays infuriated the earl, who had fulfilled his part of the bargain by the end of April.75 What angered him above all was the persistent refusal of the executive to appoint him the supreme commander of all of their forces. Since taking the confederate oath, Antrim had nurtured hopes that the restrictions which had been attached to his command (namely that the council

72 O'Neill to Ormond, 23 April 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 96-8); Carte, Ormond, vi, 97; Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 160-1; Ormond to Fennell and Bellings, 28 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 447).

73 Ormond to O'Neill 22 April 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 91); Cowan, Montrose, pp 147-8.

74 Extract of a letter from Scotland, 22 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 413).

75 Ormond to Digby, [30] April 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 106); Digby to Ormond, 4 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 521-2).
retained ultimate control over the army - which Antrim was forbidden to take out of the country unless he was ordered to do so by the executive - and that he could have no jurisdiction over Castlehaven’s force of 6,000 foot and 600 horse) would be lifted.76 Daniel O’Neill outlined the dilemma to Ormond:

'Here are symptoms of great distraction in this most irregular commonwealth. They [the supreme council] gave my lord of Antrim an absolute command of all their forces; unto my Lord Castlehaven they gave another, independent of any but themselves. The one desires the benefit of his commission, which the council will not give him; the other endeavours to preserve his possession'.

Worse still, O’Neill feared that 'This folly is grown to such a high, that if it be not prevented by your lordships, evidently the country will be destroyed. The supreme council passionately maintain Castlehaven; the other clearly can draw the army from him and them'.77

Despite O’Neill’s attempts to soothe Antrim’s hurt pride, the earl was unable to contain his temper for long and, towards the end of May, the supreme council bore the full brunt of his rage. He threatened that:

'unless he might be satisfied of his pretensions he would desert the employment into the Isles, and for his part his men should not go. Now my lord his pretensions being to command this army into Ulster which by instructions under his own signature, whereunto his commission [is] express

76 Propositions sent to Antrim and his reply, [c.25 March] 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, ff 80-v); Desid. cur. Hib., pp 241-50; Order by the supreme council, 1 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 88).

77 O’Neill to Ormond, 24 May 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 134-5).
worded...we may not condescend thereunto, so as we fear the bad event of that resolution, wherein his lordship has persisted these two days, and much the more by his carriage towards us. We find him full of haughtiness, and desire to be at distance with us'.78

Antrim's temper tantrum obviously worried the supreme council who feared that he would, simply out of spite, torpedo the entire operation. They attributed 'this unsettledness in his resolution, concerning so weighty a matter... both in his private fortune and particular undertakings to his majesty' to the earl's 'own inclination, his youth and want of experience in managing affairs of this nature'. As a precautionary measure they arrested two of his friends (Roger Moore and Philip MacMulmore O'Reilley) - 'men of their own disposition turbulent and much taken...with the condition of troublesome times' - whom they believed had been misadvising him; and they publicly gave Castlehaven 'full and absolute power and authority' over the army of Ulster. They also begged Ormond to placate the earl.79

This request placed Ormond in an awkward position. Until this point, thanks largely to Daniel O'Neill's skills as a diplomat, relations between Ormond and Antrim had been remarkably amicable and the latter (according to Digby) went on 'cheerfully, without

78 Supreme council to Ormond, 30 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, ff 67-v).

79 Ibid.: Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 170-1; Carte, Ormond, vi, 133-5; Proclamation by the supreme council, 20 June 1644 (Hunt., H.A. MSS 15001).
mutiny and discontent'. For his part, Ormond had pressurized his clients within the supreme council - Dr Gerald Fennell and Secretary Richard Bellings - to meet all of the earl's demands and to prepare for the Scottish expedition with all haste. Ormond at once recognized the importance of settling the dispute with Castlehaven as amicably as possible, since:

'the contention that is betwixt two great men for the chief command... is said to be risen to that height, and the factions divided so equally, as to threaten the frustrating of their designs against the Scots, the loss of very great and irrecoverable preparations, and the embroiling of them in unseasonable and destructive quarrels amongst themselves'.

Therefore, in an attempt to salvage matters, he berated the volatile earl, hoping that the outburst 'proceeded rather from some present passion or resentment, than from any settled resolution' and that it was now forgotten. To sweeten his rebuff, however, the lord lieutenant demonstrated his confidence in Antrim by handing over to him full control of the shipping which was being prepared for the expedition in Wexford and Waterford.

80 Digby to Ormond, 29 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 78-82); Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 8 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 559); Antrim to Ormond, 10 March 1644 (ibid., MSS 9, f. 481);


82 O'Neill urged that Ormond should take over 'the command and conduct of the Irish forces against the Scots', Ormond to Digby, 9 July 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 155).

83 Ormond to Antrim, 1 June 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 139); Ormond to Archer, 1 June 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 82).
Nevertheless the invasion of Scotland was still beset by logistical difficulties. Firstly, the confederates had failed to provide Antrim with his full quota of arms, ammunition and oatmeal, so Ormond agreed to supply the outstanding match and powder, a number of spades, shovels and pickaxes, and the meal.84 Secondly, suitable shipping to transport the troops to Scotland was hard to find. The king was unable to send vessels from England due to the parliamentary blockade of Liverpool, and so this responsibility also fell entirely on Ormond’s shoulders.85 At last, towards the middle of April, two well-armed Flemish frigates, The Angel Gabriel of 350 tons and The Christopher of Surdame, of 450 tons - together with an Irish vessel, The Jacob of Ross, armed with twelve guns - were commissioned to transport Antrim’s army.86 To ‘secure our journey through the [North] Channel’ Ormond also recruited ‘some pirate friends of mine’ (Antonio Nicholas Vanderkipp and his frigate) to accompany the

84 The confederates had managed to come up with 1,200 muskets (instead of 2,000), 2,500 hundredweight of powder ‘without match’, and 100 barrels of oatmeal (instead of 200). For further details see Bellings to Ormond, 14 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10 f. 629); Archer to Ormond, 19 May 1644 (ibid., ff 690-v); Bellings to Ormond, 26 March 1644 (ibid., f. 26); Supreme council to Ormond, 17 April 1644 (ibid., f. 419); Ormond to Bellings, 19 June 1644 (ibid., MSS 11, f. 238); Bellings to Ormond, 6 May 1644 (ibid., MSS 10, f. 530-1); Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 157-8; Carte, Ormond, vi, 152-3; Hill, MacDonnells, p. 269.


86 Milo Power to Ormond, 18 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, ff 289-91); Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., v, 225.
three transport vessels. However the captains of the frigates (who were also privateers sailing under confederate letters of marque) were worried about how and when they would receive payment for their services and so a few more precious weeks were wasted while Ormond scratched around for the necessary collateral.

Eventually, Patrick Archer, a leading merchant from Kilkenny, agreed to provide the financial backing needed - though Ormond, his brother (Richard Butler) and his factor (Patrick Comerford) were all obliged to enter into bonds with Archer to cover all costs.

Only towards the end of May was the lord lieutenant able to reassure Antrim that 'The ships are certainly ready, and taken on for three months'.

87 Ormond to Antrim, 17 May 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 122); O'Neill to Ormond, 24 May 1644 (ibid., 134).

88 For further details on the privateering community see, Jane H. Ohlmeyer, 'Irish privateers during the Civil War, 1642-50' in The Mariner's Mirror, lxxvi, no. 2 (May, 1990), pp 119-38; ibid., "The Dunkirk of Ireland": The Wexford privateers during the 1640s' in Journal of the Wexford Historical Society, xii (1988-9), pp 23-49.

89 Ormond to Comerford, 22 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 315); Milo Power to Ormond, 18 April 1644 (ibid., ff 289-91); Ormond to Archer, 27 April 1644 (ibid., f. 393v); Ormond to Power, [28] April 1644 (ibid., f. 447); Ormond to Archer, 2 May 1644 (ibid., ff 393v-4); Bellings to Ormond, 6 May 1644 (ibid., f. 530-1). If Archer had refused to provide collateral Ormond was prepared to mortgage his own and his brother's house in order to raise sufficient funds for the shipping, Ormond to Richard Butler, 22 April 1644 (ibid., f. 311). For details on Archer, see Cregan, 'Some members of the confederation of Kilkenny', pp 36-8.

90 Ormond to Antrim, 17 May 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 122); Archer to Ormond, 8 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 557).
Even then, there was dispute and much confusion over the ports at which the troops, arms and provisions should be loaded.91 Although Ormond refused to hand over one of the few ports in Ulster in his possession ('which will be odious to the English') as the confederates had demanded, he finally agreed that Antrim's troops and the necessary provisions could be mustered at Carlingford.92 In the event, the presence of parliamentary vessels along the east coast of Ireland and in Dublin harbour itself convinced Ormond that the expeditionary force should now assemble at one of the harbours held by the confederates along the south-east or west coasts.93 The port of Ballyhack in County Wexford was quickly selected. It was the perfect choice. Conveniently situated between the large privateering ports of Wexford and Waterford, where even parliamentary vessels feared to patrol, it also enjoyed easy access to the deep yet fairly sheltered waters of Wexford Bay and the Passage.94

91 Archer to Ormond, 12 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 610); Antrim to Ormond, 12 May 1644 (ibid., f. 612).

92 Ormond to Digby, 13 March 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 60-1); Ormond to O’Neill, 22 April 1644 (ibid., 92); Ormond to Digby, [c.mid March] 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 13, f. 134).


94 Ormond to Archer, 10 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, f. 597); Archer to Ormond, 12 May 1644 (ibid., f. 608);
an attempt to keep the place and day (6 June) of
embarkation secret from enemy shipping, all vessels in
confederate harbours were allowed to set sail only with
the council's express command, while Ormond monitored
Dublin shipping equally carefully.95

At long last, Antrim - who had 'these three months
maintained by my credit with my friends at least 2,000
men, which in these times [is] no small charge' - was
instructed to march his men to Ballyhack.96 To
minimize the destruction which the passage of 2,000
restless soldiers were likely to cause, the supreme
council appointed a committee 'to set down what way
they shall march to the waterside and where they shall
lodge each night without being dispersed into the
country and from what places provision shall be brought
into them'. The earl was, however, warned that if his
men wandered into the 'unwasted parts of the country'
the local inhabitants 'will lay about them most
unmercifully'.97

The troops were finally embarked on 24 June
(nearly three weeks after the date originally set for

Archer to Ormond, 15 May 1644 (ibid., ff 646v-7);
Carte, Ormond, vi, 133-5.

95 Supreme council to Ormond, 29 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte
MSS 11, f. 56).

96 Antrim to Ormond, 16 May 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi,
121); O'Neill to Ormond, 24 May 1644 (ibid., 133-5).

97 Bellings to Ormond, 24 May 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS
10, f. 781); Antrim to Ormond, 27 May 1644 (ibid., MSS
11, f. 20).
their departure) but remained windbound. A week later, as Antrim recounted to Ormond, they tried again:

'After the ships went to sea they were driven back by a violent storm, and after one day’s stay they went yesterday to sea and I am confident they will not return any more into any harbour till they land unless they be beaten by shipping stronger than themselves'.

Some 1,600 fully armed soldiers under the command of Alasdair MacColla were dispatched, while the earl reluctantly disbanded a further 800 troops due to lack of arms and provisions.

After leaving Ballyhack the small flotilla sailed up the west coast of Ireland towards its destination, the Dunkirk frigates taking a number of prizes along the way (including a passenger vessel carrying a number of presbyterian ministers '[that] came out of Scotland to promote the covenant and sow sedition here [in Ireland]').

Early in July, the expeditionary force arrived safely on Ardnamurchan where they took and garrisoned two of Argyll’s castles. At this point Alasdair MacColla, who had intended marching the troops

98 Antrim to Ormond, 1 July 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 332); Comment, Rinucc., i, 457-8.

99 Apparently some of the 800 were subsequently rallied so that, by the middle of July, between 2,000 and 2,500 troops had been dispatched to serve in the Isles. N.L.S., Adv. MS 34.6.11., pp 452-3; Carte, Ormond, vi, 150, 164-5, 179; Sir John Ware’s diary of occurrences (Pearse Street Library, MS 169, p. 239); Bagwell, Stuarts, ii, 62; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 172-3.

100 Ormond to Nicholas, 22 July 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 179); Carte, Ormond, vi, 164-5, 179-80); H.M.C. Hamilton MSS, p. 77; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 108-9; Comment, Rinucc., i, 458.
to the Isle of Skye and handing over his command to Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat, learnt of Sir Donald’s sudden death and of his son’s refusal to command the force. Alasdair’s immediate reaction was to order a retreat to Ireland, but he was prevented from doing so by the capture of his transport vessels by parliamentary warships. He therefore pressed on instead to Inverlochy – ‘burning, killing, pillaging and spoiling all the way’ – where he was joined by the captain of Clanranald, Clans McVarrick and Findlay and the earls of Sutherland and Seaforth. Their combined forces finally met up with Montrose (created a marquis on 6 May) in Atholl late in August 1644.101

The London newspapers offered their own interpretations of the invasion. The Weekly Account, Scottish Dove and Perfect Diurnall, for instance, reported that 2,500 Irish soldiers – with six heavily armed warships at their disposal – had just landed in Scotland ‘intending to cut the throats of the protestants of that kingdom, as they have already in Ireland’.102 In a similarly biased editorial, The True


102 The Weekly Account...no. 49 (London, 1644), p. 240; Scottish Dove...Friday 2 - 9 August [1644], no. 43
Intelligencer further suggested that the force had in fact been destined for England: 'The marquis of Antrim, who hath gained that title of honour since his rebellion in Ireland, is come out of Ireland into the north of Scotland. His design (as is reported) was for Liverpool in Lancashire, but divers of the earl of Warwick's ships' forced him to Scotland.103

Perhaps significantly, the weeklies failed either to perceive or to discuss the implications of the invasion on British politics. But the Edinburgh parliament was in no doubt about the danger: it immediately adjourned and sent an army of 6,000 covenanters, led by Argyll, against 'these idolatrous butchers'.104 This force, Baillie reported 'no doubt will handle them...and let Antrim know, though he once brake prison yet if he is caught again, he is not like to have such kind usage'.105 The Irish brigade’s role in the string of royalist victories ('those wonderful acts', as Hyde called them) at Tippermuir (1 September), Aberdeen (13 September), Inverlochy (2


103 The True Informer...Saturday 3 - 10 August 1644 (London, 1644), p. 305. Again, Antrim's title was incorrectly given.


105 The Parliament Scout...From Thursday 8-15 August 1644 (London, 1644), p. 482; Baillie to Spang, 10 August 1644 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 217).
February 1645), Auldearn (9 May), Alford (2 July) and Kilsyth (15 August) was to prove Baillie’s confidence wholly misplaced.106

In the short-term the invasion also impinged significantly on English affairs. Argyll’s pursuit of Montrose immediately reduced the pressure on the marquis of Newcastle’s northern army and thus gave a breathing space to the English royalist cause, which was in a shambles after Marston Moor (July 1644).107 Moreover, Montrose’s continued victories in the north resulted in the removal of regiment after regiment of the covenanting army from English soil and also prevented a second Scottish army of invasion from crossing the border. Ultimately, of course, the victories of Antrim’s Irish brigade, which was the only concrete aid provided by the catholic confederates to the king, did not prevent Charles’s defeat in the first civil war; but they did throw Scottish affairs into chaos for a year and thereby reduced to a bare minimum covenanting aid for the English parliament’s war-effort.108 Moreover they offered the king (as the

106 Hyde, Life, ii, 80-1; Carte, Ormond, vi, 225-6; Ó Danachair, ‘Montrose’s Irish Regiments’, pp 61-2; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 174-7; Hill, Celtic Warfare, pp 48-60. See pp 209-10 below.

107 Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 17 June 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 221); Dispatch from London, 7/17 September 1644 (Bibl. Apost. Vat., Barberini Latini 8673, ff 139-v); Dispatch from London, 20/30 September 1644 (ibid., ff 147-v); Carte, Ormond, vi, 221.

108 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 178-9; Lowe, ‘The Earl of Antrim’, p. 197; The Scottish
duchess of Buckingham astutely observed) 'most hopes to bring him with honour out of his misfortunes'.

In Ireland, however, the success of the expeditionary force brought the catholic party little immediate military reward. Though 1,400 of Monro’s soldiers and Argyll’s regiment, which had been garrisoned on the Antrim estates, fled back across the North Channel to protect their homes, a sizable force remained in Ulster. In the long-term, it is true, the upheavals in Scotland prevented them from taking the offensive, but this was only achieved through Antrim’s enormously costly expedition, which the confederates had to fund single-handed.

The largest known expense was the hire of the shipping - a total of well over £2,500. But arms, ammunition and provisions were also costly: twenty barrels of powder alone had cost £154-14-4. How much more was spent on the remaining powder and 1,200 muskets (all of which had

Dove...Friday 16 - 23 August 1644, no. 45 (London, 1644), p. 354.

109 Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 20 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 257).

110 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 179-180.

111 £2,006 of this was owed to Archer and the remainder to Vanderkipp and Stafford, Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., v, 225; Milo Power to Ormond, 18 April 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 10, ff 289-91); Antrim to Ormond, 23 April 1644 (ibid., ff 344-v); Archer to Ormond, 8 May 1644 (ibid., f. 555); Bond with Archer, 8 May 1644 (ibid., f. 477); Antrim to Ormond, 6 September 1644 (ibid., MSS 12, f. 297); Ormond to Captain Stafford, 7 November 1644 (ibid., f. 579); Archer to Ormond, 17 July 1644 (ibid., MSS 11, f. 471); Ormond to Andrew Moore, 17 October 1644 (N.L.I., Ormonde MSS 2310, f. 551).
been imported from the continent) remains a mystery. Presumably it was, as was claimed at the time, equivalent to a small fortune. Moreover, the supreme council had to placate the disgruntled population which had borne the burden of quartering and feeding in excess of 2,000 hungry, restless men for over three months.

Little wonder then that Antrim's requests over the summer of 1644 for further provisions and arms received a frosty reception at Kilkenny. Furthermore, in an attempt to reduce the overall cost of the expedition, it was also decided that the frigates (which, unbeknownst to the supreme council, had already been captured by the enemy) should be recalled from Scotland. The earl, equally ignorant of the ships' fate, bitterly opposed this decision and begged that the ships should be allowed to remain in the Isles for at least another month. Antrim even suggested to Ormond that the vessels should be used as privateers in order to cover the hiring costs:

'I cannot but acquaint your lordship that there will be this next month more occasion for the ships than in all this time past, by reason of the

112 Bellings to Ormond, 26 August 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, f. 194); Bellings to Ormond, 4 June 1644 (ibid., MSS 11, f. 111).

113 Carte, Ormond, vi 209.

114 Ormond to Bellings, 20 July 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 526); Ormond to Archer, 3 August 1644 (ibid., MSS 12, f. 16); Gilbert, Ir. Confedn, iii, 256-7, 268.

herring fishing where many boats will be employed which may be easily taken by those ships...’116

Ormond was convinced, and urged the supreme council not only to agree to Antrim’s request but also to bear the cost (since crown funds earmarked for shipping had already been exhausted).117 He argued that ‘if those ships be now recalled we conceive that such inconveniences will fall upon the king’s party in Scotland, that perhaps it had been better those men had not been sent at all’.118

Antrim’s relationship with the catholic confederates in the months after his force sailed was ambiguous. On the one hand, he enjoyed a popular following among the members of the fourth general assembly convened at Kilkenny between 20 July and 31 August. He was elected to serve (along with his brother) both on the supreme council and as one of the thirteen commissioners to negotiate a peace with Ormond; he was also appointed ‘a commissioner to regulate the affairs of the nation, and putting the judicatories [sic] in order and finding subsistence for the army’.119 But the freshly-elected supreme council

116 Antrim to Ormond, 14 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 248-9); Antrim to Ormond, 20 August 1644 (ibid., 255).

117 Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 259-60; Archer to Ormond, 25 September 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, f. 368).

118 Ormond to Plunkett, 23 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 259); Ormond to [Plunkett], 23 August 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, f. 177).

119 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 314; A True copie of two letters brought by Mr Peters... (London, 1642) and A
felt ill at ease with Antrim and, where possible, excluded him from policy-making. The duchess of Buckingham, who had recently arrived in Ireland, explained his predicament to Ormond as follows: 'My Lord is believed here so much the king's creature as I was told by good hands that was the reason they would not trust him'. Furious at being snubbed by the supreme council, Antrim made a formal complaint to the general assembly towards the end of August and (according to Bellings) 'laid down his commission, thinking it would be restored to him without those clogs and restrictions which accompanied it'. Much to the disgust of Antrim's enemies, a body within the assembly rose in his support, criticizing the supreme council and charging it with neglect; but the terms of his commission were not altered as he wished.

Having surrendered his military command, the earl was now anxious to leave Kilkenny for Dublin, where fresh talks ('the main business') between the king and the confederates were about to begin. The cessation

Declaration made by the rebels in Ireland... (Waterford 1644; reprinted London, [19 November] 1644), pp 5-7; Plunkett to Ormond, 11 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 252).

120 Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 268; Comment. Rinucc., i, 464, 475.

121 Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 20 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 258).


123 John Walshe to Ormond, 30 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 268). Elkin, 'The Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars', p. 188; Comment. Rinucc., i, 486, 523.
of arms which had been concluded for one year the previous September had temporarily united Irish royalists and the catholic party, but it was now about to expire. Since the confederate delegation which had been sent to negotiate directly with Charles in Oxford had failed to secure redress of any of their grievances, it was now necessary to begin discussions afresh. In June 1644 Charles had authorized Ormond to initiate the talks and, towards the end of August, had agreed to a further cessation of arms.¹²⁴ Both Ormond and Digby had at once urged the earl of Antrim to use his political influence at Kilkenny to secure terms advantageous to the king. He was advised:

‘to make use of your power and interest in this assembly now at Kilkenny, to bring them into that moderation, and humble submission to his majesty, as befits the duty of good subjects, and is most like to bring this kingdom into a happy and lasting peace; for I am confident this was a great part of your business into the kingdom, and I believe a principal reason that induced you to join yourself to their party’.¹²⁵

For his part, Antrim, who genuinely wanted a more permanent peace settlement, even if this meant that the confederates did not achieve all of their religious and political aims, promised Ormond ‘to use all my endeavours for the settlement of this kingdom in which

¹²⁴ Commission of the delegates of the supreme council, 31 August 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, ff 230-v).

¹²⁵ Ormond to Antrim, 22 July 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 179-80); Digby to the duchess of Buckingham, 30 June 1644 (Cal. S.P. Dom., 1644, pp 317-8/P.R.O., S.P. 16/502/f. 46) - this letter was then printed in A Full relation of the late expedition of the right honourable the Lord Monroe... (London, 27 August 1644), pp 13-4.
I find much difficulty and cunning, but I hope your lordship's wisdom will find remedies to bring it under one governor which will be a huge happiness to all that has relation and interest in it'.126

During these months, Antrim and the lord lieutenant (despite rumours to the contrary) worked together harmoniously.127 The earl not only promoted the interests of 'Ormond's faction' within the council against those of Castlehaven; but he also tried to undermine the influence of the more extreme clerical commissioners, who were determined not to make peace with the king without key religious concessions.128 No peace treaty was in fact signed until 1646, although in November 1644 the two sides agreed to an extension of the cessation until 10 January 1645. However, Antrim's stand, according to his wife, 'lost [him] credit with the most of the bishops and supreme council. If it were not for the king's service and good of this kingdom, he had little reason to stay amongst them'.129

At least, once a settlement favourable to the interests of Charles I had been secured, Antrim was free again to focus all his energies on reinforcing his

126 Antrim to Ormond, 24 August 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, f. 181).

127 Hill, MacDonnells, p.269; Ormond to Antrim, 1 July 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 152-3).

128 Carte, Ormond, vi, 215; Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 249-50; Antrim to Ormond, 24 August 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 12, f. 181); Cal. S.P. Ire. 1633-47, p. 395.

129 Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 23 August 1644 (Gilbert, Ir. Confedn., iii, 260).
brigade in Scotland. In principle, the supreme council favoured sending supplies, but in practice they were 'jealous that the honour and thanks of any service, that was or may be done there, shall be rather attributed to a particular person [Antrim] than to this nation; at whose cost only they conceive all that expedition from hence was effected, and they will hardly be drawn to be at further charges upon the same terms'.

Ormond generously responded with a reminder that Antrim had originally conceived the whole strategy and that 'if he attribute to himself more then belongs to his part, his vanity cannot be reason for sober men to leave the pursuit of a design of such huge advantage'.

The need to supply his victorious soldiers with arms and fresh recruits preoccupied the earl, for he quickly realized that their continued success in Scotland (they took Aberdeen by storm on 13 September 1644) not only increased his own chances of ousting Argyll from the Western Isles but, more importantly, of regaining his Ulster estates which would, in turn, relieve his pressing financial burdens. But how could he afford it, since the confederates had refused to aid him and his English master's hands were tied? In

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130 Fennell to Ormond, 2 November 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 212); Duchess of Buckingham to Oliver Darcy, 26 October 1644 (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1633-47, p. 396/P.R.O., S.P. 63/260/127).

131 Ormond to Fennell, 2 November 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 213).
desperation he decided to approach the great continental, catholic powers of France and Spain 'for arms and munition in that service'.132 Before seeking foreign aid, however, the earl first had to secure the king's permission and so, in November 1644, he and the duchess left Dublin for Wexford in search of shipping for England.133 Towards the end of the month they managed to hire a frigate for the extortionate sum of £200 and left for England shortly afterwards, arriving safely in Exeter early in December (despite being chased by a parliamentary warship).134 From there they joined the king in Oxford once again.

132 Ormond to Digby, 19 October 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi 209). He was not 'banished' from the council as claimed in Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 89.

133 Gilbert, Jr. Confedn., iv, 57-8.

134 Ibid., 58.
CHAPTER 6: Antrim at war II: Flanders, Scotland and Ireland (January 1645 - c. June 1646)

The marquis of Antrim and his wife arrived in Oxford early in January 1645. The London Post speculated on what had brought them back to England and concluded that they had come to 'acquaint some evil councillors here with their new designs, or to provide monies for the continuing of the war in Ireland, or to give, or to receive instructions'.

While this was certainly the case, Antrim was also eager to bask in the royal favour which the successful outcome of the 'Scotch business' had brought him and to claim his marquisate which, according to one covenanter, was 'the reward of misdeserving'.

He now enjoyed an equal social footing with Ireland's most influential peer, the marquis of Ormond (who was created a duke only in 1661).

In theory at least, he was the second most powerful man in Ireland.

1 The London Post, 13 December 1644, no. 17 (London, 1644), p. 5. See also The True Informer... Saturday 21-28 December 1644, no. 59 (London, 1644), p. 441.

2 Baillie to Spang, 12 April 1644 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 164). Clarendon S.P., i, 255; P.R.O.N.I., T.473/1, pp 43-5. More practically, he was granted an annual fee of £40 out of the customs of the port of Coleraine, P.R.O.N.I., T.473/1, p. 44. Antrim received his first payment from the Coleraine customs in February 1663, see order of Ormond, 10 January 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 165, f.65v). Also see pp 172-3 above.

3 One of Antrim's kinsmen claimed 'that Ormond envied Antrim the success of the expedition and his favour with the king, formerly great, but now very considerable', Comment. Rinucc., i, 464.
For the time being, however, preserving cordial relations with Ormond was to Antrim’s advantage since the responsibility for maintaining the Irish presence in Scotland was left entirely in the lord lieutenant’s hands. Early in January 1645, before Antrim’s arrival at court, messengers had been sent from Oxford to Dublin to harry Ormond for further supplies for Scotland.4 Ormond took prompt action: the following month he began to lobby the supreme council for a renewed offensive in Scotland.5 Anticipating speedy compliance with his demands, he promised Montrose, the master of Reay and the earl of Seaforth that ‘no time shall be lost or pains spared to procure and send your lordship from hence armed men and ammunition’.6 The supreme council, however, was less enthusiastic. ‘The sending of two thousand fighting men last summer to that service’ Ormond was reminded ‘hath taught us the charge and difficulties interposed [sic] in such enterprises’.7

Despite these grumblings, however, it was fast becoming apparent that Antrim’s Irish brigade was

4 Carte, Ormond, iii, 157-8; Clarendon S. P., i, 255.

5 Ormond to Mountgarret, 1 February 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 14, ff 14-5); Remembrances [by Ormond] for Sir Edmund Butler, 3 February 1645 (ibid., MSS 63, f. 311); Carte, Ormond, vi, 251.

6 Carte, Ormond, vi, 247; Ormond to Reay, 10 February 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 14, f. 53); Ormond to Seaforth, 10 February 1645 (ibid., MSS 14, f. 55).

7 Mountgarret to Ormond 13 February 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 14, f. 80).
enjoying great victories. Daniel O’Neill, referring to the battle of Inverlochy (2 February), reported that ‘within this three weeks MacDonnell gave an overthrow [to the] earl of Argyll [and] killed fourteen or fifteen hundred men’. The report continued that the rest of Argyll’s army was captured and that the earl himself had only narrowly escaped, fleeing to Edinburgh.8 The continuing successes in Scotland soon eroded the confederates’ reserve. On 14 March the supreme council agreed to send one thousand armed men with one month’s provisions, match and powder for service in Scotland - but on three conditions: Ormond must supply the shipping, hand over the port of Carlingford (in Ulster) to the confederates, and declare against the Scots in Ulster.9 Unfortunately the lord lieutenant was unable to meet any of these demands. The presence of parliamentary warships outside Dublin frustrated his attempts to secure the necessary transport vessels; he flatly refused to deliver Carlingford into catholic hands; and he declined to declare war on the Scots in Ulster since this would have increased his dependence on the confederates.10 As a result, reinforcements were never

8 [Mathew] to Ormond, 24 February 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 14, f. 121); Captain Audley Mervyn to Ormond, 1 February 1645 (ibid., ff 2-3); Carte, Ormond, vi, 250.

9 Supreme council to Ormond, 14 March 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 14, f. 258v).

10 Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 24 March 1645; Ormond to Muskerry, Fennell 21 March and 2 April 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 14, ff 283, 279; Carte, Ormond, vi, 275); Mountgarret to Ormond, 13 February 1645 (Bodl.,
sent. By early May a rather disconsolate Ormond reported to the king that he should not 'expect any considerable succour from hence, either into England or Scotland'.

Back in Oxford, the need to maintain the offensive against the covenanting armies in general - and the marquis of Argyll in particular - no doubt weighed heavily on Antrim's mind and formed the basis of his discussions with the king. He was now determined to procure continental arms, munitions and shipping for his men. Charles supported his plan with enthusiasm, which was hardly surprising considering that the failure of the peace negotiations held between the king and parliament at Uxbridge (29 January - 22 February 1645) made a continuation of hostilities inevitable.

From Charles I's perspective, Montrose's Scottish army needed to maintain its offensive and therefore needed to be constantly supplied with ordnance and troops;

Carte MSS 14, f. 80). On a more personal level the duchess of Buckingham, who like Alexander acted as a watchdog for her husband's interests, was absolutely disgusted with Ormond's refusal to compromise. The lord lieutenant - obviously fearing that the duchess, or for that matter Antrim himself, would pursue the matter further with Charles I - confessed to Clanricard that he hoped to be 'restored to her favour' as soon as possible. Ormond to Clanricard, 30 May 1645 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 296).

11 Ormond to Charles I, 8 May 1645 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 282).

12 He claimed that he had already approached the pope for money, Comment. Rinucc., i, 456; Ormond to Digby, 19 October 1644 (Carte, Ormond, vi 209); Instructions for Arthur Trevor, 21 June 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 11, f. 266); Cal. S. P. Dom., 1644-5, p. 507.
while frigates could (as Ormond had observed) 'annoy the rebels of Scotland, hinder the relieving of their army here, and secure intelligence'.

The marquis left Oxford and arrived in the Spanish Netherlands late in the spring of 1645, presumably armed with appropriate letters of introduction from Charles I. He secured an audience with the papal representative in Brussels, Internuncio Bichi, towards the end of April 'for the purpose of protesting his attachment to the Holy See'. Bichi praised Antrim's support for the catholic cause in Ireland, his 'zeal for the Catholic cause', and his disapproval of Ormond's policies, and encouraged him to continue his labours. However in his subsequent dispatch back to Rome the internuncio reported that the marquis's true loyalties lay elsewhere. 'Antrim' he wrote 'is not inclined to join with the Irish confederates, as he wishes to be in good grace with the king of England'. The marquis was also well received and handsomely entertained by the Spanish court in Brussels and

13 Ormond to Digby, 4 February 1645 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 244).

14 The exact date of his arrival is unknown. He had, however, visited the papal internuncio in Brussels some time before 28 April which suggests he arrived in the middle of April, Cathaldus Giblin (ed.), 'Catalogue of material of Irish Interest in the Collection of Nunziatura di Fiandra, Vatican Archives', in Coll. Hib., i (1958), p. 66; Foissotte to Cárdenas, 22 May/June 1645 (A.G.S. Eo. 2566, unfol.).

15 Bichi to Secretariate of State, 29 April/6 May 1645, Bichi to Cardinal Panzirolo, 29 September/8 October 1648 (Giblin, 'Catalogue of material of Irish Interest', pp 66, 74-75).
especially by Don Manuel de Moura y Cortereal, marquis of Castel Rodrigo, governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands. Castel Rodrigo was obviously impressed by Antrim and later (in a letter to Philip IV) described him as an 'Irish gentleman and one of the most rich and important of that kingdom of Ireland'. To complete his depiction of someone (presumably) hitherto unknown in Spanish court circles, the governor-general added that he was 'married to the widow of Buckingham'.

Official negotiations with Castel Rodrigo began almost at once. In return for Spanish military and naval support, Antrim was prepared to promise almost anything. In the contract signed with Castel Rodrigo on 6 May 1645 Antrim was offered 'two ships each of 160 tons, armed, gunned, and furnished with everything necessary' which were to be supplied 'on account'.

16 Leopold William to La Torre, 10/20 January 1648 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 239, f. 56).
18 Unfortunately the particulars of their understanding are somewhat obscure since the conditions upon which they agreed, though often referred to in various missives and reports, appear to have been lost, Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV, 22 May/1 June 1645 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 233, f. 184v) and consulta of the council of state, 16/26 July 1645 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.) both refer to 'conditions' which are no longer 'enclosed'. Philip IV to Castel Rodrigo, 17/27 July 1645 (A.H.N., Eo. Libro 97, unfol.) suggests that the original conditions were deposited among the papers of the secretary of war ('en la secretaría de guerra').
return Antrim promised to recruit, from amongst his Irish and Scottish dependents, ‘2,000 men, of which he is to be the colonel’. On 22 May 1645 in a cyphered letter to Madrid, Castel Rodrigo informed Philip IV of the offer of two regiments of ‘well-seasoned veterans’. Less than two months later the Spanish council of state appears to have accepted the offer without any qualms, probably because of its eagerness to augment the hard-pressed Army of Flanders. The king was more cautious. In a holograph annotation to the consulta, and in the subsequent reply to Brussels, Philip IV cautioned Castel Rodrigo against recruiting any possible ‘fifth column’ or, even worse, heretics.

19 'Registre aux Ordres' 4/14 September (A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, ff 65-65v); Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, p. 368.

20 Minute of the letter from Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV, 22 May/1 June 1645 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 233, f. 184v); Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, p. 366; Bichi to Secretariate of State, 29 April/6 May 1645, (Giblin, 'Catalogue of material of Irish Interest', p. 66). In fact this was the second time Antrim had suggested levying mercenaries for Flanders. The previous November, while he was still in Nexford, he had offered the Spanish envoy in Ireland ‘6,000 [men] from the Isles of Scotland and Ireland which are all his [Antrim’s]’. The envoy, François Foissotte, had duly notified Philip IV of the offer even though he had feared that nothing would come of it since the earl’s wife ‘being a confident of the queen of England, and so much a friend of France and enemy of Spain, would not let him do it if it were not for the extreme shortage they have of money’. More seriously, he argued that Antrim’s first condition would be for an advance ‘and then he will find problems which will prevent him from seeing through the affair’. Foissotte to Melo, 25 November/5 December 1644 (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.). A reply, advising Foissotte against the levy, was only sent from Madrid late in February 1645. Consulta of the junta on Irish levies, 29 January/8 February 1645 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.); Contreras to Foissotte, 19 February/1 March 1645 (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.).
into the Army of Flanders. 'The Scots are new in my service but have served the Crown of France for a long time' warned the king, and added 'moreover they are of a different religion'. Apart from this word of warning, however, he left the matter entirely to his governor-general's discretion.21

Others were as cautious as the king. Antrim's reliability and motivation were questioned by an anonymous author 'well known to the court'. The marquis, it was claimed, lay 'under suspicion of dealings with England, because he allows himself to be much influenced by his wife the duchess of Buckingham, an Englishwoman'.22 Another anonymous correspondent caustically predicted that the troops would never arrive. 'In return for this great gift he is to procure us a few men this summer, which I must tell you freely I esteem very little considering the delays and difficulties which may occur in their coming hither'. The author patronisingly concluded his letter by adding that this generous gesture by the Spanish administration at least indicated 'how on this side we


22 'La relación del estado del Reyno de Irlanda desde Deziembre de 1644', enclosed in a letter to Philip IV from 'a person in Spain' 11/21 June 1645 (A.H.N., Eo. Libro 975, unfol.).
are not wanting to contribute to his [Charles I’s]
prosperity’.23

Castel Rodrigo was eager to attract well-trained,
catholic troops to Flanders and so was unperturbed by
the carping of his compatriots .24 In fact,
anticipating the king’s approval for the enterprise, he
had already set in motion the paperwork involved in any
seventeenth-century troop levy long before he received
Philip IV’s guarded approval early in the autumn of
1645. A commission had been issued to the marquis on
22 May to act as colonel of his embryonic regiment,
together with blank commissions for fifteen officers —
a sergeant-major and fourteen captains.25 The 2,000
new recruits for Flanders were to be divided into
fifteen companies of roughly 130 soldiers each and they
were to receive the same treatment, privileges and pay
as Spanish soldiers.26 In return, the regiment was

23 Letter of intelligence from the continent, 10/20 May

24 Copy of the recommendations of the committee dealing
with Irish levies, 22 January 1644/1 February 1645
(A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.); recommendations of the
committee of state, 2/12 June 1645 (A.G.S., Eo. 2525,
unfol.).

25 ‘Registre aux Ordres’, 4/14 September 1645 (A.G.R.,
S.E.G. 45, f. 65). Interestingly in the spring of 1645
Castel Rodrigo had been given 25,000 florins£1923
specifically for a levy of Irish troops for Flanders,
see consulta of the junta of state, 2/12 June 1645
(A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.); ibid., 22 May/1 June 1645
(A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, ff 28-9); Wild Geese in Spanish
Flanders, p. 366 (Jennings here states that the blank
commission was for the major of the Irish regiment: in
fact it was for the sergeant-major).

26 For further details on recruiting for the army of
Flanders see Parker, The Army of Flanders, pp 35-48 and
pp 158-61; the rates of pay for Irish officers and
required to 'obey, comply with and execute the orders which are given to them by paper or by mouth with regard to the service of his Majesty'.27 Towards the end of June 1645 a licence was also issued to Antrim's illegitimate half-brother Maurice, releasing him for one year from service in Patrick Daniel's regiment (then garrisoned at Nieuport) with full retention of his pay 'to help in the recruiting to be done by the marquis of Antrim and to bring them to these states [Flanders]'.28 An arms dealer from Dunkirk made arrangements in November for the actual transport of the new regiment from Britain to Flanders.29

soldiers in the Army of Flanders are discussed in *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders*, pp 25-6.

27 'Registre aux Ordres', 22 May/1 June 1645 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, f. 28)

28 Ibid., 20/30 June 1645 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, f. 46); *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders*, p. 367; Hill, *MacDonells*, p. 223, stated that Maurice was 'hanged in Coleraine in 1643' which does not appear to have been the case. Mauricio MacDonel (as he is referred to in the Spanish sources) is mentioned again in *ibid.*, 7/17 February 1647 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 46 bis, f. 68) as a member of Daniel's regiment.

29 Ibid., 26 November/6 December 1645 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, ff 116-7). Van der Ripen only agreed on the following conditions: firstly, that the voyage should take place during the winter of 1645-6, at a time thought appropriate by the contractor; secondly, that Van der Ripen, in order to avoid confusion, should be told the exact time and place of embarkation; thirdly, that fifteen days should be allowed for the crossing, and if it took longer a daily supplement of eight placas per man would be payable; fourthly, that if the embarkation had to take place in Scotland, 'where there is more risk', Van der Ripen should receive a higher fee; and, finally, that the shipper should be paid 20 florins for each man landed in Flanders, half of which was to be paid in advance (20,000 florins £1,540), and the remainder in two installments, the first four months, and the second six months, after the 'merchandise' had been safely disembarked on Flemish
Word quickly filtered back to England that Antrim’s mission had been an amazing success. An anonymous source reported from Brussels, on 20 May, that he was ‘negotiating here something for his Majesty’s service, which is now concluded, and in which he hath been very fortunate, considering our extreme wants here’. The writer continued that the marquis ‘has carried himself discreetly, and gained much upon our ministers’, adding that the Spanish authorities:

‘have promised in writing to give him instantly two brave frigates of twenty pieces of artillery each, and well provided, with which he intends to depart away for Scotland, and will carry along with him a great quantity of arms, to arm men there, and so have a considerable army for reducing those rebels’.30

The marquis’s power, status and standing could only have been enhanced in the eyes of his numerous patrons and contemporaries — particularly Charles I in England, Henrietta Maria in Paris, and the confederates. For Antrim was now an asset of great potential value to both the royalists and the Irish confederates. His frigates were not only potential troop and munition carriers for all three kingdoms;

soil. There was also provision for what would happen if Antrim’s soldiers forced Van der Ripen’s ships into an enemy harbour; or if any of the vessels were captured by the enemy.

30 Letter of intelligence from the continent, 10/20 May 1645 (Cal. S. P. Dom., 1644-5, p. 507). Who exactly this anonymous correspondent was is unclear: presumably he was either an official, or someone with close connections, at the court in Brussels. The fact that the dispatch is now found among the State Papers Domestic suggests that it was intercepted by parliamentary agents before it reached Oxford.
they were also precious additions to the confederate armada of privateers which protected the Irish coasts and victualed the Irish armies with remarkable efficiency.31

Antrim had managed to procure Spanish aid at a time when royalist fortunes were at their lowest ebb in England. The defeat of the king’s army at Naseby on 14 June 1645 was so complete that it ‘relapsed his majesty’s affairs into a doubtful condition’ and was promptly followed by the surrender of eighteen royalist garrisons including Leicester (21 June), Carlisle (2 July), Pontefract (21 July) and Scarborough (22 July).32 Military disaster in England therefore increased Charles I’s desire and need for immediate and substantial support from Ireland. ‘It hath pleased God by many successless misfortunes to reduce my affairs of late from a very prosperous condition to so low an ebb as to be a perfect trial of all men’s integrities to me’ the king informed Ormond ‘and I do principally rely upon you for utmost assistance in my present hazards’.33 Continued royalist victory in Scotland - Alford (2 July) and Kilsyth (15 August) - partly compensated for the débâcle at Naseby; and, after

31 For details see Ohlmeyer, ‘Irish privateers’, pp 121-7.
33 Charles I to Ormond, 31 July 1645 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 305).
Kilsyth, it was even hoped that Montrose and his army would march into England. But on 13 September these hopes were dashed with the rout of Montrose's royalist army, which included a portion of the Irish brigade, at Philiphaugh. The safe and speedy dispatch of Antrim’s frigates to the British Isles, together with their precious cargo of munitions, was now more important to the royalist war effort than ever before.

Antrim had been promised the required munitions in May, but he still had not received them when he left for France some time late in July. From Flanders he travelled directly to Henrietta Maria, at St. Germain, to deliver the 'letters from his Majesty' which he had been given at Oxford the previous spring. Parliamentary news reporters speculated on the nature of his mission. For instance, on 4 August it was reported in the Perfect Occurrences of Parliament that:

34 Carte, Ormond, vi, 313; Byron to Ormond, 16 August 1645 (Bodl., Carte MSS 15, f. 442).

35 Ormond later hinted that Antrim and McColla were responsible for the disaster which he claimed was caused 'through the treachery of some seeming friends'. Ormond’s caustic comment was justified to the extent that MacColla and a substantial portion of his Irish brigade had retreated to the Western Isles shortly after the battle of Kilsyth and thus saved themselves from extermination, see Ormond to Montrose, 9 April 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 17, f. 106).

36 Antrim received permission to pass from Dunkirk to France on 22 May, 'Registre aux Ordres' 22 May/1 June 1645 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, f. 29v).

37 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2). This version is significantly different from the one published in Hill, MacDonnells, pp 270-5.
'From France we hear that the earl of Antrim hath been received by the Queen with a great deal of respect and favour, that he brought letters to her, of the prosperous success of her good subjects the Irish catholics, there against the protestants, and what hope there is of routing them out of Ireland'.

The parliamentary correspondent was also convinced (no doubt correctly) that Antrim and the queen were formulating fresh schemes and plots against parliament:

'something was desired of the queen for the encouragement of their proceedings, and divers other passages, which brought great joy to the papists and priests about her majesty, but such their joying is but sad for us'.

The marquis remained with the queen and her exiled court throughout August and into early September, meeting also with the newly appointed papal nuncio to Ireland, Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, archbishop of Fermo, who had been delayed in France due to lack of shipping for his entourage. According to Antrim's own account of this meeting, the nuncio 'desired to borrow those frigates to transport him, with which the marquis of Antrim acquainted the queen, and was commanded by her not to lend them, or have any hand in bringing him over'. Henrietta Maria did add the significant proviso, however, that once Rinuccini had arrived in Ireland 'there might be a necessity for the king's service of being civil and complying with him'.

38 Perfect Occurrences of Parliament And chief collections of letters from the Armie...From Friday 1 - Friday 8 August 1645, Week 32 (London, 1645), p. 6. Also see Perfect Passages of Every Days Proceedings...From Wednesday 30 July - 6 August 1645, no. 41 (London, 1645), pp 321-2.

39 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2).
is to say, Antrim was to refuse to transport the nuncio, despite being offered £1,000 to do so, but he was given a carte blanche by the queen to cooperate with the nuncio should the need ever arise at some later date. After spending about six weeks in France, Antrim returned to Dunkirk to collect his frigates.40

Parliamentary journalists once again monitored the marquis's movements closely and, late in October, the headlines in Mercurius Civicus reported that Antrim had returned to Dunkirk but misleadingly suggested that he was there to take to Ireland 'four and twenty thousand pound sent from the Pope to the Marquis of Antrim to bring over Irish rebels'!41 Rather his mission was to collect the two frigates weighing 160 tons and armed with sixteen guns, which had cost Castel Rodrigo (rather than the pope) 44,445 florins - roughly £3,420 - plus '1500 arms with ammunition'.42 Antrim was not

40 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 272. It seems, however, that at some point Antrim sold Rinuccini one of his frigates (the San Pedro), Leopold William to Torre, 28 August/7 September 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 3019, unfol.); Comment. Rinucc., i, 709, 732, ii, 1-8; G. Aiazza (ed.), The Embassy in Ireland of Monsignor G.B. Rinuccini archbishop of Fermo, in the years 1645-1649, translated by Annie Hutton (Dublin, 1873), pp 77-8).


42 Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 89, the anonymous author of the Aphorismical Discovery valued Antrim's frigates at a conservative £1,500. He also stated that Antrim acquired the frigates in 1644 which is incorrect, see 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2); Esmond MSS, i, 295. The negotiations involved in purchasing and outfitting the Dunkirkers
even required to provide any collateral for the frigates he received 'in view of his high quality and the zeal he has for the service of his majesty [Philip IV]'.

One of these frigates was called the San Pedro and the other very probably was the ship later known as the Mary of Antrim. Certainly the former, and very

began on 4 September: the marquis of Lede, captain-general of the fleet at Dunkirk, was instructed to prepare the vessels for departure. Three days later, Lede charged Jacques Vandeval, a ship builder from Nieuport, to make the ships ready and for this he received 13,000 florins in advance from the Treasury of the Low Countries. However, the outstanding sum of 31,445 florins - drawn from funds earmarked for army provisions - was not paid to Vandeval, but rather divided equally between Jacques Le Goveurneur, an arms dealer, and Alonso de Urribarri, purveyor of the fleet at Dunkirk. This modification was justified on the grounds that one ship belonged to Le Goveurneur while the other was owned by 'arms-dealers and merchants' from Dunkirk on whose behalf Urribarri was acting. Copy of the Relación sent by secretary Miguel Routtarte to the marquis of Monasterio, 30 [O.S.] November 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2576, unfol.); 'Registre aux Ordres' 4/14 September (A.G.R., S.E.G. 45, ff 65-65v). (In Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, p. 368, Jennings states that Vandeval made his original agreement with the marquis of Lede on 9/19 September, but this should in fact be 19/29 September.) On 10/20 October 1645 a letter of exchange for 1,000 escudos (200) was sent to Urribarri for the 'preparation of some ships' delivered to Antrain [sic]; and on 2/12 November 1645 Urribarri and Le Goveurneur were finally paid in full for providing Antrim with two frigates (A.G.S., C.M.C. 3A época, Legajo 2871, Cuentas of Thomas López de Ulloa, 1642-5, 'Datta de lo pagado extraordinariamente a diferentes personas', pliego 60).

43 Leopold William to La Torre, 10/20 January 1648 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 239, f. 56).

probably the latter, were manned by crews provided by the king of Spain. The virtues of the Dunkirk frigates are well known. One distinguished naval historian described them ‘as combining something of the agility of the Mediterranean oared craft with the fighting power of the Northern broadside ship’. More recently a Flemish historian noted that ‘as a class of ship the frigate was brought into service at sea by the Dunkirkers. It rode low in the water and could be distinguished by the number of cannon with which it was equipped’. Thus Antrim had procured two of the most sophisticated and formidable warships of the day for the royalist cause.

Due to the French blockade, the marquis’s departure from Dunkirk proved difficult and he later complained to Hyde that he had ‘more trouble in getting out his frigates than in procuring them’. Rather than sailing directly to Scotland as originally planned, Antrim’s armada proceeded (in November 1645) instead to Falmouth in Cornwall ‘to wait on his now

45 Copy of the Relación sent by Miguel Routtarte to the marquis of Monasterio, 30 November [O.S.] 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2526, unfol.).


48 Antrim to Clarendon, 19 November 1645 (Clarendon S. P., i, 287).

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Majesty [i.e. Charles, prince of Wales], who having employment for arms, did make use of the said arms, with store of ammunition, and eight or ten pieces of cannon, and soon after did also make use of both the frigates'.49 In his autobiography, Hyde, who was at Falmouth when Antrim’s frigates arrived, observed that:

'most of the arms and ammunition were employed with his [Antrim’s] consent, for the supply of the troops and garrisons in Cornwall; and the prince made use of one of his frigates to transport his person into Scilly, and from thence to Jersey; without which convenience his highness had been exposed to great difficulties, and could hardly have escaped the hands of his enemies'.50

Thus by his timely arrival at Falmouth Antrim had saved the prince of Wales from capture, and provided supplies (which were subsequently stored in Pendennis Castle) for the beleaguered royalist garrisons in Cornwall. He thus further ingratiated himself with the royalist leadership.51

There was still an outstanding obligation to the king of Spain, but on his return to Ireland in December 1645 Antrim apparently made no effort to secure confederate approval for a new levy of troops. Instead he immersed himself in the factional jostling over a

49 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 272. Antrim’s change of itinerary may have been at Henrietta’s insistence; or due to Montrose’s rout at Philiphaugh (13 September).

50 Hyde, Life. ii, 82.

51 Clarendon S. P., i, 303. Clause 173 of the Act of Explanation (1665) referred to this: 'besides assisting him [Charles II] with arms and ammunition when he was in the west, [Antrim] furnished him with ships to make his escape into foreign parts'. The statutes at large, passed in the parliaments held in Ireland (1310-1761) (Dublin, 1765), iii, 101.
proposed peace treaty between the confederates and the king which had been engineered by Edward Somerset, earl of Glamorgan. Glamorgan, a catholic, had arrived in Ireland the previous June with instructions from Charles I to facilitate a peace among the Irish factions and to persuade the supreme council, in return for religious concessions, to provide Irish troops for royalist service. A secret treaty was agreed on 25 August whereby the confederates, in return for guarantees of complete tolerance for catholics and other significant religious concessions, agreed to supply Charles I with 10,000 troops, but it was ultimately frustrated by the arrival of the papal nuncio, Rinuccini.52

Rinuccini reached Kilkenny on 12 November armed with the overriding papal mandate 'to restore and re-establish the public exercise of the catholic religion in the island of Ireland'. He rejected the Glamorgan treaty on the grounds that he was unsatisfied with the provisions made for the catholic religion and because he feared that Glamorgan had insufficient powers to implement them.53 So the negotiations began again with the nuncio in attendance and a second treaty was finally concluded between Rinuccini and Glamorgan on 20


December. Shortly afterwards, Ormond discovered the extent to which Glamorgan had acquiesced in the nuncio's demands and, on 26 January 1646, had him arrested.

Antrim was always anxious to negotiate a suitable compromise between the catholic party and the king, and so for the time being he enthusiastically supported Glamorgan and the agreement. The terms of this treaty certainly suited his personal interests. On the one hand, it offered considerable concessions for the catholic cause and, more importantly as far as Antrim was concerned, stated that the next lord lieutenant was to be a catholic; on the other, it promised considerable aid - in the form of 10,000 troops, arms and ammunition - for the royalist cause in England.54 Antrim's support for Glamorgan was admirably reflected in the fact that (together with Clanricard) he put up £20,000 as the earl's bail late in January 1646.55 By supporting Glamorgan so vigorously, and therefore obliquely condemning the actions of the lord lieutenant, the marquis superficially at least joined ranks with Rinuccini and the supreme council, which had also been badgering Ormond for Glamorgan's release.56

54 Ibid., p. 318; John Lowe, 'The Glamorgan Mission to Ireland', pp 166-7;

55 Several letters of great consequence intercepted by Colonel Milton...concerning Irish forces to be brought into England, (London, 17 February 1645[-6]), p. 6; Desid. cur. hib., p. 313.

56 Lowe, 'The Glamorgan Mission to Ireland' p. 184; The Weekly Account...from 14 - 20 January 1646, no. 4 (London, 1646) suggested that, save for the nuncio's
Whether this gesture is evidence that Antrim genuinely sympathized with Glamorgan’s plight, or merely that he was using the earl to further his own political career, is unclear. Certainly, the nature of Glamorgan’s mission was very similar to the one Antrim had been commissioned to undertake in 1644 and, interestingly, some contemporaries saw many parallels between the two noblemen. Thus, in an ‘Account of the war and rebellion in Ireland since the year 1641’ which has been ascribed to Nicholas Plunkett, the author suggested that Antrim and Glamorgan were alike ‘in their deportment’ and added that they had both been manipulated by the nuncio and his followers who ‘made use of these noblemen’s weaknesses and vanity’. Plunkett also noted that during this period they behaved like ‘a pair of stalking horses to gain their villainous ends under pretence of zeal to God and their king’.57 Finally, he suggested that Antrim’s devotion to the nuncio’s faction was exclusively based on self-interest and political ambition:

‘Here you may see how the marquis of Antrim too gave his helping hand to the destruction he being married to the widow of Buckingham...[who] vainly dreams of making himself viceroy by preventing Ormond from being employed in the same place as formerly’.58

\[\text{influence over the marquis, there would have been a reconciliation between Antrim and Ormond.}\]

57 N.L.I., Plunkett MSS 345, p. 942.

58 Ibid.
More convincing evidence that Antrim's support of Glamorgan, and indirectly of the nuncio and his 'revolutionary' party, did indeed form a decisive point in his political career is found in an unusual, and particularly revealing, letter which he wrote to his wife on 10 January 1646. It began reassuringly enough.

'I will follow your advice concerning the nuncio. The earl of Ormond was ever false, and now it will be discovered. We must think only of Ireland unless there be a peace. I am beholding to the king for his good opinion, but I will rely on myself and not on him or any about him, they were ever base and so they will ever be. It is impossible Montrose or I can keep the Scots from coming into England in the condition wherein the king now stands, therefore let him think of nothing but a peace upon any terms, and be sure to make our peace with the parliament as other of the king's friends have. I believe you will be sacrificed, and so will my name and men in [Scotland].'

In a lengthy postscript he enquired about his old friend Hamilton, instructed his wife to take all necessary steps to ensure that they were 'not forgot in the peace', and requested that 'my letters should not come through Ormond's hands... because Ormond and I be not upon good terms'. Finally, he apologized for not sending her money, begged her to 'be cheerful, though I grieve for us both' and declared his deep affection for

59 Antrim to [duchess of Buckingham], 10 January 1646 (Cal. S. P. Dom., 1645-7, pp 301-2/P.R.O., S.P. 16/513 ff 7-8v). This highly compromising letter is particularly important since it offers an unusual insight into the mind and personality of a man who rarely committed his thoughts, emotions and ambitions to paper. It would seem that this is merely one of several letters 'Randel' (as he signed himself) wrote to his wife; unfortunately the rest have perished. This one only survived because it was intercepted by parliament.
her: 'I am only [yours], or God forsake me, your own, Randel'.60

From this Antrim emerges not only as a devoted husband but also as a political realist, very much in control of his own affairs, who was intent on protecting his family and his MacDonnell inheritance no matter what the cost. The winter and spring of 1645-6 represented a turning point in his career because external developments - the destabilization of Irish politics caused jointly by the arrival of Rinuccini in Ireland and by the defeat of the royalist forces in England and Scotland - reinforced Antrim's personal disillusionment with Ormond to convince him that the only means of satisfying his political and territorial ambitions was to abandon (however reluctantly) the cause of Charles I.

In order to be 'his own man', however, Antrim needed money and since his only real assets were his frigates he focused his attention on setting them up as privateers.61 He obtained letters of marque from the confederate high court of admiralty, and probably from the king as well, which authorized them to 'hinder at sea' the enemies of Charles I and of the catholic cause.

60 Ibid.

61 During his lengthy sojourns in Waterford and Wexford in 1644 Antrim had not only made useful contacts with other privateers but had also seen at first hand just how lucrative the trade could be. For a more general account of these privateering communities see Ohlmeyer, 'Irish privateers'.
in Ireland. A contemporary noted that he stationed his frigates in Wexford 'where he appointed some of the best sort in that art captains of those frigates which, with two others of Owen O'Neill's, did scour the coasts and brought in many rich prizes, to the advantage of the confederates, if well managed'. Antrim's personal armada was not exclusively based in Wexford, however, and his frigates were often anchored in the other privateering ports scattered along Ireland's coastline (particularly Waterford).

Both Wexford and Waterford were ideal havens for freebooters. The Atlantic ocean and the Irish sea meet along the lengthy Wexford coastline, which bristles with off-shore islands (the most important being the Saltees) while Waterford enjoys close proximity to the west coast of England - especially Bristol.


63 Gilbert, Contemp. hist. 1641-52, i, 89-90. See pp below for details on the captains of the frigates and their prizes.

Furthermore, during the seventeenth century Wexford was the nearest safe harbour in Ireland to England, Wales and mainland Europe. Waterford was valued as a safe harbour because of its location thirty miles inland on a river estuary which was able to provide much needed shelter against the winter storms and gales for even the larger privateering men-of-war.

In addition to privateering, Antrim’s frigates were earmarked for supplying and reinforcing his army in Scotland, which had been isolated after Montrose’s defeat at Philiphaugh. However, before shipping fresh men and supplies to the Isles, the marquis first had to secure confederate support. In a proposal which he submitted to the supreme council, early in 1646, he chastised them because the Irish troops, which had cost the confederates so much to send, had been in Scotland for ‘a year and three quarters...and have received no manner of relief or assistance in all that time from this kingdom, nor any correspondence kept from hence with them’. He drew the council’s attention to the possible consequences of their negligence:

‘they will, if so continually neglected, forget any tie that the nation may imagine to have on them; and consequently not only so many able, experienced soldiers lost, but also become probably serviceable against us, if not looked on with more from hence, than hitherto they have been’.

In an attempt to remedy the situation Antrim suggested that he should raise ‘two thousand men sometime inhabitants in the County of Antrim’ and place them under the command of his brother, Alexander. He also
assured the council that 'the Islanders and Highland Scots...having greater affection to the Irish than they have to the other inhabitants of Scotland', who had failed to join Montrose's army, would be encouraged to join the war by the presence of further forces from Ireland under a MacDonnell commander.65

Almost immediately Antrim's suggestions were presented to the sixth general assembly. They were embraced with enthusiastic approval. On 28 February, the assembly ordered that Antrim 'shall have and receive...the sum of three thousand pounds sterling, for the raising, arming and transporting of the said two thousand, and furnishing them with ammunition, shipping, victuals and all other necessaries'. The assembly insisted, however, that Antrim should give 'very good and sufficient security' for the money he was to receive; and that Rinuccini (who strongly supported Irish intervention in Scotland) should be asked 'for the loan of the three thousand pounds'.66

But the nuncio was either unwilling or unable to lend the assembly the money and therefore the supreme council was ordered 'to cause the said three thousand pounds to be brought in, and by Saturday next'. By 10 March the necessary capital (which was to be paid

65 'Reasons propounded by the marquis of Antrim...' undated [c.February, 1646] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/1); Hill, MacDonells, pp 446-7 misleadingly suggested that these documents date from 1645.

66 Order by the general assembly, 28 February 1646 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/1); Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 224.
directly to the marquis) had been raised 'by way of loan on security of able merchants within our quarters'. Ultimately it was the confederates, not the marquis, who provided the necessary security and offered as collateral 'the accruing profits of the excise in the cities of Waterford, Kilkenny and Limerick and in the towns of Galway, Wexford and Clonmell Ross'.

In addition to raising his own 2,000 troops for Scotland, the marquis had also agreed to ship to Wales a portion of the men Glamorgan had been given permission to levy for the king. On 3 April, Glamorgan reported to Ormond, from Waterford, that 'my Lord of Antrim's frigates are come', that five other well armed men-of-war were available at Waterford to ship his troops and that only the fall of Chester (3 February) to parliament was delaying the embarkation of the three regiments. But then, while both Antrim and Glamorgan were frantically trying to export cannon fodder to Britain, Lord Digby also began to mobilize Irish aid for the royalists in the isles of Scilly and informed Ormond that he had written to Antrim requesting the

67 Order of the general assembly, 2 March and order of the supreme council, 10 March 1646 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/1). The extent to which Ormond was involved in the organization of Antrim's expedition is unclear. The lord lieutenant did appear, however reluctantly, to support the design and in a letter to the supreme council recommended that supplies be sent to Scotland at once, see Ormond to Muskerry, 28 March 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 17, f.21).

68 Glamorgan to Ormond, 3 April 1646 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., v, 319).
services of his frigates. The lord lieutenant's reply noted sarcastically that:

'I fear your lordship will find it a harder task to persuade my lord of Antrim out of his frigates, the rather that my lord of Glamorgan is gone before you to Waterford, whose oratory he will perhaps more listen to, as more suitable to his capacity, than anything you can descend unto'.

Digby, however, would not have received Ormond's warning before he travelled to Waterford to broach the matter in person with the marquis. The outcome of the encounter was as Ormond had foreseen: Antrim refused to lend his frigates. Disgusted, Digby reported to Ormond:

'that we discover clearly in him a desire rather to hinder than further anything that shall be propounded, as advantageous to Ireland; especially under any kind of relation to your excellence, or indeed to the supreme council, it being hard to tell against which of the two he discovers the greater animosity'.

Any plan Antrim may have had for transporting Glamorgan's troops fell through when, on 8 April, the supreme council ordered that the 3,000 men destined for England were now required to besiege Bunratty castle in County Clare, which had recently been captured by a parliamentary expeditionary force. Yet despite this, the marquis still refused to lend Digby his frigates.

69 Carte, Ormond, vi, 363.

70 Ormond to Digby, 5 April 1646 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 365).

71 Digby to Ormond, 7 April 1646 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 369).

72 Supreme council to Ormond, 8 May 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 17, ff 94-v).
For their part the council was clearly infuriated by Antrim's uncooperativeness and claimed that because 'my Lord of Antrim would by no means lend his frigates, being absolutely averse to the whole design' it would cost the council in excess of £1,000 to provide alternative shipping.73

Antrim's reluctance to ship Digby's levy might be ascribed merely to jealousy and personal rivalry between two courtiers. But he also desperately needed the frigates to ship his own levy to Scotland since 'the Cantyre [Kintyre] people' who had been contracted to transport Antrim's troops from Grenagh Castle in County Cork to the Western Isles had failed to arrive, which delayed the departure of his two regiments 'and forced all my men to scatter'.74 This already unpromising situation was further exacerbated early in March when the French resident in Ireland - Dumolin - fired his own broadside against the expedition. Dumolin had caught wind of Antrim's outstanding obligation to levy a regiment of Irish infantry for Flanders and on 7 March he wrote an agitated (and rather garbled) letter to the lord lieutenant requesting that everything possible should be done to prevent Antrim from sending his troops to Scotland,

73 Fennell to Ormond, 14 April 1646 (Gilbert, IR confed., v, 329).

74 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2); Hill, MacDonnells, pp 297-8.
because he feared that they were ultimately destined for Flanders:

‘In a word...I say that my lord marquis of Antrim cannot carry twelve hundred men over to Flanders, as he hath declared himself to the said Assembly, except he gets here the two thousand, for the enemies in Scotland will grant him none for that purpose except he furnish [them] with others, being not in case to lessen their strength. These reasons and many I have will persuade all the world that the said marquis intends to send those men to Flanders.’

Dumolin also broached the matter with the supreme council, and with some success for he then reported to Cardinal Mazarin that ‘the Spanish are waiting for Antrim’s [levy], which is being held up because of the opposition which I made’. By the end of March, Dumolin’s lobbying - plus a timely gift of '3,000 pistoles' (roughly £750) for the catholic cause - appeared to have paid off and he reported to Mazarin, with notable delight, that ‘the permission to raise 2,000 men here for Scotland has been stopped’.77

75 Dumolin to Ormond, 7 March 1646 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., v, 265). Also see Dumolin to Brienne, 4/14 July 1646 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, ff 226-7).

76 Dumolin to Mazarin, 14/24 March 1646 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., v, 275); Dumolin’s protest against the transport of Irish soldiers to Scotland, 4/14 March 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 16, ff 582v-3).

77 Dumolin to Mazarin, 22 March/1 April, (Gilbert, Ir. confed., v, 315); Gilbert, Ir. confed., vi, 50 and vii, 322-3. But were these soldiers in fact raised as reinforcements for the remains of Montrose’s decimated army; or (as Dumolin claimed so confidently) were they really destined, via a port in Scotland, for Flanders? The surviving fragmentary evidence - not least the fact that in June 1646 he and his troops did sail to Kintyre - suggests that this was indeed Antrim’s strategy. It also indicates that only a portion of his mercenaries actually arrived in Flanders. Firstly, an anonymous French source claimed that, by the middle of June, a portion of Antrim’s levy had landed in Flanders.
In an attempt to counteract the council's decision, Antrim and his friends implored Ormond to intervene on his behalf.\textsuperscript{78} It is hardly surprising that the lord lieutenant's response was cool and unhelpful and at this point, according to Antrim, 'such of the supreme council as were always opposed to my ways' - 'the Ormondists' - placed an embargo on the levy.\textsuperscript{79} An obstructive circular was issued on 26 May to the mayor of Waterford, and presumably to the mayors of the other Irish ports under confederate control, instructing them 'to keep their men from any foreign employment, accordingly they enjoin the mayor not to allow any vessel to leave his harbour carrying any

Secondly, the records of the auditors of the Army of Flanders (Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas) indicate that twenty-four Irish soldiers reported at Dunkirk late in July for service in 'the new regiment of that nation raised for his majesty's service'; while in August, about 250 further new recruits, who 'have just come from Ireland', received payment for the services they had already rendered. Finally, Castel Rodrigo was prepared to 'do business' again with Antrim when, in the autumn of 1646, he offered an additional 1,200 veterans for service in Flanders. Had he defaulted totally on the earlier levy, this would have been highly unlikely. For further details see, McNeill, Tanner Letters, p.223; 'Registre aux Ordres', 24 October/4 November and 25 October/5 November 1646 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 46, ff 154v-5, 172v-3). Since Antrim did not accompany these soldiers, they probably formed the skeleton of a new regiment, commanded by one John Morphy, cuentas of Thomas López de Ulloa, 1646-8, 23 July/2 August 1646 and 17/27 August 1646 (A.G.S., C.M.C. 3A época, Legajo 937, 'Datta de lo pagado a la infantería yrlandesa e inglesa', pliegos 2, 3 and 4).

\textsuperscript{78} Antrim to Ormond, 17 April 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 17, f. 169); Gilbert, Ir. confed., v, 334. In a letter to Hyde, the marquis averred his desire to be reconciled with Ormond, Clarendon S. P., i, 312.

\textsuperscript{79} Ormond to Antrim, 22 April 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 17, f.204).
soldiers to serve beyond the seas without the writers' special license and command'.

The council followed up the embargo by ordering the captain of the fort at Passage where Antrim's own ships were anchored 'to take the sails from my ships [and] to stop my voyage'.

The marquis then in desperation cut the ship's cables and, although 'his men dispersed', he put to sea with 'such of his friends as willingly followed him'.

Antrim and 'his friends' (allegedly 500 infantry) sailed to the Western Isles and arrived at Campbeltown, Kintyre late in May or early in June 1646. His fellow clansmen had been eagerly awaiting the arrival of this 'youthful lord that shall aid his people in their need' and had prayed that God would indeed protect:

'The two frigates of Moy Linny's chief and all their appointed crew safe from terror of wind and sea that no weakness may distress our hearts'.

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80 Supreme council to mayor of Waterford, 26 May 1646 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/1); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 274. The following week, Ormond was informed of the council's decision, see Bellings to Ormond, 2 June 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 17, f. 439v).

81 Hill, MacDonnells, pp 298.

82 Ibid.; 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2).

83 Comment. Rinucc., ii, 163; H.M.C. rep., 11 app.6, p.111; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 225. Antrim later (misleadingly) claimed that he 'went to Scotland in April 1646', 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2); while D.N.R., 'Randal MacDonnell', suggests that he arrived in Scotland in July 1646: this was clearly not the case.

The anonymous author of the Aphorismical Discovery recorded the rapturous reception that the marquis and his soldiers received:

‘his lordship and his freight was welcome, to his Irish party...though thitherunto [they] went bravely forward[,] this relief did highly encourage them, so that within a short time there were 3,000 men’.85

The size of Antrim’s army at this point is unclear. The Moderate Intelligencer suggested late in June that he had ‘three ships and nine galleys, with near 2,000 Irish’ at his disposal, while Montrose’s chaplain George Wishart misleadingly asserted that Antrim arrived ‘without men or arms’.86 Certainly numbers were bolstered when the remains of Montrose’s army joined with the marquis’s force.87 No doubt Antrim, like the anonymous kinsman who composed this verse welcoming him to the Isles, now believed that:

‘Every rogue will get what he deserves, every traitor will be snuffed out. We will not have to bear the yoke, and the spiteful ones will not get their wishes. Those of the twisted mouths [i.e. the Campbells] will be under our heels and Clan Donald will be on top as is the custom of the progeny’.88

85 Gilbert, Contemp. hist. 1641-52, i, 89.


87 MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celticae, ii, 203.

88 Quoted in MacInnes, 'Scottish Gaeldom', p. 78.
CHAPTER 7: Antrim at war III: Scotland, Flanders and Ireland (c. June 1646 - August 1647)

The situation in all three kingdoms was transformed when Charles I handed himself over to the Scots, near Newark in Nottinghamshire, on 5 May 1646. Almost immediately, the king sent orders that all men in arms in Scotland in his name should disband their forces. This unexpected change put Antrim in an impossible situation and forced him to declare where his true loyalties lay: with the king, or with his personal interests in Kintyre (even without reinforcements from Ireland). Initially, Antrim chose the latter - largely due to the prospect of a renewed Campbell offensive in Cowal. His clansmen in the Western Isles obviously supported his decision, for at this point the bard of Clanranald recorded that:  

'A good many of the gentry of the Hebrides flocked to the earl of Antrim, such as the Clan Maclean and the Clanranald, intending to set an army on foot again on behalf of the king'.1

After at least three direct orders - 15 and 19 June and 29 July - commanding him to lay down his arms, the marquis finally agreed to commit no further act of hostility 'as far as it may stand with the preservation of me and mine'.2 And with evident relief the Moderate

1 MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celticae, ii, 203.
Intelligencer further reported that 'it's certified that the earl of Antrim is willing to return to Ireland'. The king, in an attempt to pacify Parliament, also instructed the marquis to return immediately the parliamentary frigate and three other vessels which one of Antrim’s privateers - together with one commanded by 'Captain Trois' - had captured some time in June 1646, after depositing the reinforcements for Alasdair MacColla in Kintyre. Over this, however, the marquis remained evasive. In his reply, in July, he informed Charles I that it 'is a misfortune to me, that it lies not now in my power to obey...by reason I had transmitted them into Ireland within [a] few days after they had been taken, where I understand they are disposed amongst those who were interested with me in the adventure'. The following month Antrim, who was obviously furious that the king had seemingly abandoned him and that Argyll, in defiance of the cease-fire, had executed 'a prisoner, being a gentleman of my name', had second thoughts about capitulating to parliament at all. In a letter dated 4 August he threatened 'to violate my engagement to your Majesty' on the grounds that 'I can hardly any longer keep those whose fortunes and security depended upon your Majesty's grace and fortune, seeing the

3 Moderate Intelligencer... From Thursday July 9 – Thursday July 16 1646, no. 71 (London, 1646), p. 547.

4 Antrim to Charles I, 13 July 1646 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/1993); Gilbert, Ir. confed., vi, 250-1; Egmont MSS, i, 295.
remnant of Argyll’s forces are drawn to a head not far from hence’. 5 Finally on 15 August, having taken ‘the advise of my friends...in whose hands and power I am at this time’, he flatly refused to surrender. 6

The precise size of Antrim’s army during the autumn of 1646 remains elusive. One parliamentary newspaper reported that it consisted of 12,000 men ‘a greater army than ever the rebels had in that kingdom since the beginning of these wars’: the Scottish Dove estimated the force to consist of a more modest 6,000 troops; while the Moderate Intelligencer hedged its bets by merely claiming that Antrim’s army was ‘very numerous’ and ‘well appointed’. But rather than descending upon Newcastle in order to free the king, as the parliamentary propagandists predicted, the army adopted a defensive stance and entrenched itself in Argyll’s lands. 7

Throughout August and September Sir James Lesley, the future Lord Lindores and a privy councillor, attempted to mediate a truce between Antrim and the covenanters. His efforts were, however, to little

5 Antrim to Charles I, 4 August 1646 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/2005); H.M.C. rep. 11, app. 6, p. 113; Hill, MacDonnell, p. 273; Diplomatic Correspondence, i, 225.


7 Perfect Occurrences of both Houses of Parliament...The 37th week ending the 11 September 1646, (London, 1646); The Scottish Dove...From Wednesday 23 September - Thursday 1 October 1646, no. 153 (London, 1646), p. 52; Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday September 3 - Thursday September 9 1646, no. 79 (London, 1646), p. 635.
Avail. 'Antrim and Kilketo [reported the Moderate Intelligencer]... will by no means obey His Majesty's letters as to laying down arms; they say he is not free in writing and hope in a few months to be able with an army to restore him to his crown again'.

Antrim's decision to defy the king's wishes and to remain in arms in the Western Isles was fired both by his desire to keep the traditional Clan Donald heartland under his command and by the hope that his continued presence there would free his lands in County Antrim from the Scottish army of occupation. For he hoped that Argyll, who returned briefly to Ulster in mid-April, would manage to persuade Monro and the Scots army to return to fight in Scotland. But Argyll failed, and the declaration of the 'Ormond peace' between the Irish royalists and the confederates (the peace was declared in Dublin on 30 July and in Kilkenny on 3 August 1646) threw events in Ireland back into the melting pot.

Rinuccini and the clerical faction at Kilkenny declared against the peace and, early in August, the nuncio convened a legatine synod at Waterford and proclaimed that confederate catholics adhering to the Ormond peace had broken the oath of association.

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8 Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday August 6 - Thursday August 13 1646, no. 75 (London, 1646), p. 609; ibid., ...From Thursday September 3 - Thursday September 9 1646, no. 79 (London, 1646), p. 636.

9 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 211-14.

10 Carte, Ormond, iii, 253.
the end of August the nuncio sent 'one Patrick O'Haggerty, a priest' to Antrim informing him of the latest developments in Ireland. Rinuccini also requested the marquis's support since he was 'a most considerable and faithful child of ours, upon whom this congregation doth look as a principal protector of the Roman Catholic faith'. As a more practical token of the nuncio's faith Antrim was sent eighty barrels of powder and two field pieces.11

On 1 September the Waterford synod excommunicated all who favoured the Ormond peace and on 18 September Rinuccini arrived at Kilkenny to dictate the terms of a new peace and ordered the arrest of the 'Ormondists' within the council - including Lord Muskerry, Lord Mountgarret, Sir Piers Crosby, Sir Lucas Dillon and Richard Bellings. Meanwhile Owen Roe O'Neill marched on Dublin.12 Dumolin (who was busy fortifying his house in Kilkenny) reported the ensuing chaos to Ormond and added that it was rumoured that Antrim would be recalled to act as a mediator.13 On 26 September a new supreme council - free from Ormond's influence - was nominated. According to the account ascribed to Nicholas Plunkett, the nuncio 'compose[d] a council of

11 Rinuccini to Antrim, 28 August 1646 (Scrope and Monkhouse, _State Papers_, ii, 253); Hill, _MacDonnells_, p. 331. For details on Hegarty see pp 38, 119 above, and Giblin, _Irish Franciscan Mission_, p. 187.

12 Carte, _Ormond_, iii, 247-52; Casway, _Owen Roe O'Neill_, pp 141, 149-152.

13 Dumolin to Ormond, 14 September 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 28, f. 509).
his own bigoted creatures, himself the President...[or] Generalissimo'. 14 Antrim's brother, Alexander, was one of the 'bigoted creatures' nominated by the nuncio to sit on the supreme council and Antrim, who was still in Scotland, thus gained a toehold in the new regime. 15

The continued recalcitrance of the marquis in Kintyre alarmed both the royalists and the Scottish covenanters. The king's English supporters feared that it would undermine Charles's bargaining power with parliament. As early as 15 June Lord Loudoun had advised that Antrim and Alasdair MacColla should be ordered back to Ireland since their presence in Kintyre 'may be prejudicial to the King's cause and a hindrance to peace, which all men are looking for'. 16 In Paris it was rumoured that Charles I had made Antrim commander-in-chief of the royalist forces in Scotland, and George Leyburn (who confided this to Clanricard) was worried that this clandestine arrangement would divide the royalist party even further: 'for my own part, I do fear that the marquis of Antrim's going to Scotland will be the occasion of some dissension amongst the king's party'. 17 The covenanters were

14 N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345, p. 55.

15 It is even possible that the marquis himself returned briefly to Ireland during September - as Hill, MacDonnells, pp 273-4 asserts - in order to pay homage to Rinuccini and to provide for a MacDonnell presence in the new regime.

16 Loudoun to Charles I, 15 June 1646 (H.M.C. rep. 11, app. 6, p. 111).

17 Leyburn to Clanricard, 18/28 August 1646 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., vi, 105).
terrified that Antrim would serve as a rallying point for the renewal of the king's war effort. Robert Baillie noted with some consternation, in a letter written in June, that Antrim and Montrose had refused to lay down their arms and that if 'the king escape to them, it will be a woeful case'.

The covenanters's worst fears were almost realized during the late summer and autumn of 1646 when Antrim mooted 'a design to raise...30,000 men...to reduce Scotland this winter...and from hence to march into England...Their quarrel' royalists at court later reported to the king, 'is to be, to free your majesty from imprisonment'. Antrim secured promises from the leading clans - MacDonald, MacLean, MacRanald, MacLeod (of Harris), together with the lesser highland clans of Gregor, Grant, Chattan and Farquharson, and the personal armies of Lords Seaforth, Airlie, Airth, Nithsdale, Reay, Dalkeith and Huntly - that an army of 23,400 men should be raised on the king's behalf. The outstanding quota of men was to be supplied from Ireland. The earl of Crawford was sent to Ireland to

18 Baillie to Spang, 26 June 1646 (Laing, Letters and Journals, ii, 377).

19 Jermyn and Culpepper to Charles I, 9/19 October 1646 (Scrope and Monkhouse, State Papers, ii, 271).

discuss the matter with the nuncio, who readily agreed to send the men providing 'they may be satisfied in the effect of my Lord Glamorgan's articles touching the Roman religion'. Crawford then travelled on to Paris to secure approval from the royal family for the venture; the young prince of Wales responded warmly to the enterprise in October and asked Antrim to keep his men ready for action. Early in September, the Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer caught wind of the plan and warned its readers that it would not be long before 'those malignants' descended upon Newcastle to release the king. Antrim's recalcitrance in Scotland was no longer merely an embarrassment, but rather a serious threat to any chance of securing a peace.

Finally, therefore, Charles I himself finally offered a way to break the deadlock. After being reminded by the Scottish commissioners that he 'had promised they should be free of the enemy in Scotland, and yet they were in and like to do great mischief', Charles I suggested that 'one of Antrim's gentlemen may come unto me and see in what condition I am, and to receive my express command, and I will undertake that

21 Jermyn and Culpepper to Charles I, 9/19 October 1646 (Scrope and Monkhouse, State Papers, ii, 271); Crawford to Charles I, 15 August 1646 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/2009); Comment. Rinucc., ii, 753.

22 Clarendon S., P., i, 340; Scrope and Monkhouse, State Papers, ii, 271.

23 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Tuesday September 1 - Tuesday September 8 1646, no. 164 (London, 1646), pp 226, 229, 232.
they will lay down arms’.24 The Scottish privy council was loathe to grant safe conduct to one of Antrim’s own men, presumably on the assumption that this would give the perfidious king an opportunity to encourage the marquis; but they finally agreed, on 13 October, that Charles I should send a messenger, who was ‘not forfeited or excommunicated’, to treat with Antrim and so to solve ‘our troubles’.25

Sir James Lesley was therefore once again sent to Kintyre. On this occasion, according to his own account at the Restoration, Lesley was instructed to:

‘show Antrim that as he trusted my verbal promise to protect him from any inconveniency that should be offered to him or his family, by the taking the oath of Association with those in the late Irish rebellion, which begot that interest with them to afford us that party from Ireland to Montrose...so by that token we do expect that he will disband those people under his command, and trust to our word for the lands of Kintyre, which shall be given to him so soon as the marquis of Argyll is forfeited’.

Now at last in accordance with his king’s wishes, the marquis ordered his army to disband. Antrim’s compliance was thus bought by an express, verbal undertaking that, as soon as Argyll’s estates in Kintyre could be forfeited, he would receive all those lands that he claimed belonged to the MacDonnells.26

24 Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday September 17 - Thursday September 24 1646, no. 81 (London, 1646), p. 641.

25 Scottish privy council to Charles I, 13 October 1646 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/2034); H.M.C. rep. 11, app. 6, 113.

26 Privy Council of Scotland to Charles I, 13 October 1646 (H.M.C. rep. 11, app. 6, p. 113); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 306. Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 231 suggests that Antrim and MacColla had agreed to
Presumably, under different circumstances (as the Scottish parliament feared), Charles I would have encouraged Antrim's continued resistance. Sir James Lesley certainly suggested this at the Restoration:

'he [Lesley] did hear, in the year 1646, his late royal majesty often express as great and as high a sense of the marquis of Antrim's loyalty and sufferings, as ever he [Lesley]... heard his majesty speak of any subject'.27

Though technically at peace with the covenanters Alasdair MacColla and Antrim nevertheless remained in Kintyre and continued to ravage Argyll's territory, while troops from the other clans returned home to fortify their own lands.28 During the autumn of 1646 it was reported that Antrim's somewhat diminished force 'made diverse forts and sconses about Forlane, quite close to Eyll and [made] much spoil upon Lorne', terrorizing the fishing boats which frequented the waters around the Western Isles.29 In November the

divide Clan Mor lands between them: Antrim's portion would be Kintyre, and MacColla's, Islay.

27 Hill, MacDonnells, pp 306-7. It seems that the king both knew and approved of Crawford's efforts to secure Irish aid for Antrim's cause, Crawford to Charles I, 15 August 1646 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/2009); Comment. Rinucc., ii, 753.

28 MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celtica, ii, 203.

29 Papers from the Scots Quarters, containing some passages concerning the king, the Estates of Scotland...,(London, 14 October 1646), pp 4-5; A Perfect Diurnall...From Monday 12 - Monday 19 October 1646, no. 168 (London, 1646), p. 1345; Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday 5 - Thursday 12 November 1646, no. 88 (London, 1646), p. 735. The fact that a ship from Hamburg was harboured off Passage the following spring adds substance to the Moderate Intelligencer's claims, see Jacques Talbot to Du Bosc, December 1647 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 55, ff 412-v).
Moderate Intelligencer, which seemed to see the black side of everything, assured its readers that ‘There is a ship come from Hamburg with arms to the Islands where Antrim and Kilketto are’. The editor also lamented Antrim’s failure to lay down arms and claimed that this ‘was not fair play’.30 In a last desperate attempt to rid Scotland of the marquis’s army, commissioners were dispatched from Edinburgh to persuade Antrim and MacColla to be gone from Scotland.31 The commissioners met only with moderate success: although some stragglers from Montrose’s army did surrender, Antrim’s brigade – allegedly reinforced by arms and munitions from the continent – remained in the Western Isles.32

During these months Antrim continued to hope that his fortunes would mend. His confidence was reflected by his eagerness to levy troops for Flanders again. Although due to the unsettled nature of affairs in the Western Isles he was unable to travel to Brussels in person until late in 1646,33 during the summer and autumn of 1646 his wife, who was then resident in

30 Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday 19 - Thursday 26 November 1646, no. 90 (London, 1646), p. 763.


33 Montreu 1 to Comte de Brienne, 23 February/5 March 1647 reported that the marquis 'had recently come from Holland' (B.N., Fonds Français 17,979, f.123v); consulta of the council of state, May 1646 (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.).
Flanders, struck a deal on his behalf and offered Castel Rodrigo 1,200 armed troops. What the duchess asked in return is unclear. The French agent, Dumolin, claimed she demanded an annual pension of 10,000 escudos [roughly £1,900].34

Whatever the terms, the contract for the levy was drawn up in October, and vessels to ship a force of 1,200 troops from ‘the port of Kintyre in Scotland’ to Ostend were hired at once.35 The remarkable speed with which the negotiations were concluded and the efficiency with which the transportation was arranged once again clearly illustrates how desperately trained

34 Gilbert, Ir. *confid.*, vi, 50. The duchess appears to have been poverty stricken during her stay in Flanders. Madame Preston in a letter to her husband noted that the duchess of Buckingham wanted to borrow ‘3,000 mil fran [sic]’, see (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633–47, p. 603). She remained in Flanders until October 1647 when Rinuccini paid her passage to Ireland, Dumolin to Brienne, 5/15 October 1647 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 266v) and *Comment. Riuucc.*., ii, 757-8.

35 'Registre aux Ordres', 25 October/5 November 1646 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 46, ff 172v-3); *ibid.*, 24 October/4 November 1646 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 46, ff 154v-5). The conditions of this agreement were significantly different from that contracted with Van der Ripen in November 1645 (see p. 217 n. 29 above). No doubt owing to the greater risks which the voyage obviously entailed, Le Gouverneur’s rates were exceedingly high: he demanded 30 florins (£2.30) for every man reaching Ostend (10 florins more per man than Van der Ripen had settled for) and he required half of this – some 18,000 florins (£1,385 – in cash and in advance. Le Gouverneur further stipulated that if the journey from Kintyre to Flanders took more than 15 days, a daily surcharge of 100 florins (£7.70 per boat would be payable to cover the cost of feeding at least 1,200 mouths. On 25 October 1646, the day after the initial agreement with Le Gouverneur was concluded, a warrant was issued paying him the 18,000 florins, which had been requested as an advance payment.
soldiers were required in Flanders. The most illuminating indication of how urgently Antrim's recruits were needed was the bizarre stratagem considered by the Flanders Treasury in order to pay 36,000 florins (2,270 at a time when the Spanish Crown was virtually bankrupt. The Pagaduría General, the military treasury in the Netherlands, had been unable to pay Jacques Le Goveurneur (the man contracted to ship the troops) his 18,000 florin advance and was therefore forced to ask García de Yllán, a Portuguese banker based in Antwerp and victualler of the Army of Flanders, to pay Le Goveurneur on their behalf 'with the right to reimburse himself with the first money from Spain to arrive in January 1647...and if there is no money in January 1647, then from the first arrival of money after that'.37

Castel Rodrigo's confidence in Antrim's ability to raise seasoned soldiers for Spanish service also

36 Consulta of council of state, 1/11 May 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.).

37 'Registre aux Ordres', 25 October/5 November 1646 (A.G.R., S.E.G. 46, ff 172v-3). For further details on these Portuguese bankers, and on García de Yllán in particular, see James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain 1626-1650 (New Brunswick, 1983), pp 35, 152, 157, 177. Boyajian cites the Portuguese spelling of Yllán: Ilhão. Shortly after arriving in Kilkenny in January 1647 Antrim offered the French agent his troops providing he made him a better offer, Dumolin to Brienne, 28 January/7 February 1647 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 247). But subsequent diplomatic dispatches reveal that the French considered it futile to recruit Antrim as a creature on the grounds that he was part of the 'Spanish faction', Brienne to Grignon, 22 April/2 May, 29 April/7 May, 13/23 May, 15/25 July 1648 (B.N., Fonds Français 15,996, ff 339v, 349v, 367v, 424v).
reflects the favourable position that Spain enjoyed in Ireland at this point. Since Rinuccini’s coup d’état the previous November the Spanish faction in Ireland had made a remarkable recovery. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, Pope Innocent X clearly favoured Spain and therefore the papal nuncio in Ireland, in accordance with his master’s wishes, was also obliged to favour the Spanish cause there.38 Secondly, since the French faction was almost entirely dependent on Ormond and his faction to further Louis XIV’s interests in Ireland, it was only natural that French influence should decline as Ormond’s did.39 It was even incorrectly rumoured, late in 1646, that Dumolin had been forced to abandon his post in Ireland ‘seeing the Spaniards had too great influence there’.40 Finally, Spanish influence over the nuncio and his party was greatly enhanced by the fact that their envoys (Diego de la Torre and François Foissotte) had wholeheartedly supported Rinuccini’s coup; indeed verbal approval on the part of the Spanish agents was combined with financial assistance. ‘It is probable’

38 Desid. cur. Hib., p. 267. Mazarin was clearly alarmed by any plea the Irish made to Rome since this threatened France’s position in Ireland due to the unfriendly relations between France and the Papacy: ‘the pope who was believed to have been partial to the Spaniard, might have disposed the Irish to have an absolute dependence upon the catholic king [Philip IV]’.

39 Ormond to Mazarin, 7 August 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 28, f. 193v).

40 Bellièvre to Brienne, 15/25 October and 17/27 December 1646 (Diplomatic Correspondence, i, 358).
complained Ormond 'that they may hope to be supported by the Pope's and Spaniard's purse, [and] by such of the Old Irish...whose guilt...of bloodshed makes them not dare to trust either to the peace, or [to] his majesty's clemency'.

Ormond's suspicions were in fact correct: La Torre's secret accounts reveal that he did indeed subsidise the nuncio's cause with modest payments throughout the autumn of 1646. This resurgence of Spanish influence within Irish politics could only have acted in Antrim's favour since (as the agreement of October 1646 illustrates) he was still held in high esteem in Brussels.

The marquis returned Ireland on 7 January 1647 and was warmly received by Rinuccini who (according to Clanricard) sent his personal coach to Ross to welcome him, while 'a great number of the Irish nobility, splendidly arrayed on horseback, met him'.

He then hurried to Kilkenny, which he reached on the 10 January just as the seventh general assembly convened.

'The morning of that day' noted C.P. Meehan in his nineteenth-century history of the catholic confederates 'saw the confederate representatives assisting at High

41 Ormond to Foillott, 22 August 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 63, f. 463); Desid. cur. Hib., P. 267.

42 Accounts of La Torre (A.G.S., Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas 4a, legajo 2635, unfol.).

43 Comment., Rinucc., ii, 752; Carte, Ormond, vi, 490.

44 Charles Lambert to Ormond, 10 and 12 January 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 20, f. 103); Carte, Ormond, vi, 489, 490, 491.
Mass in the cathedral’. Rinuccini sat on the left of
the altar, with eleven bishops seated close to him, and
behind the bishops sat the temporal peers, who
undoubtedly included the marquis of Antrim.45 Later
the same day the general assembly convened in Kilkenny
castle – Ormond’s family residence – and Antrim
proposed that the confederates should send yet more
reinforcements to Scotland where they would join up
with the forces which Montrose and Crawford hoped to
raise.46 The assembly received his proposal warmly and
after reminiscing about ‘the great benefit accrued unto
the king by a small party heretofore employed from
hence into Scotland’ and, mindful of the advantages of
making Scotland ‘the seat of war’, agreed to Antrim’s
design. It ordered that an expedition should be
dispatched to Scotland as quickly as possible.47
Antrim smugly reported this victory in his own account
of the day’s proceedings: he noted that he had been
given ‘permission to raise five thousand [men] and
[was] given £7,000’.48

45 Meehan, Confederation, pp. 204–5. Meehan
incorrectly suggested that no serious business was
discussed on the first day. In fact Meehan failed even
to allude to Antrim’s proposed expedition in his
account.

46 Henrietta Maria to Montrose, 26 January/5 February
1647 (S.R.O., G.D. 220/3/99); Sir James McDonnell to
the prince of Wales, 18 May 1647 (Christ Church,

47 Order of the general assembly, 10 January 1647 (St.
Peter’s College, Wexford, Hore MSS F, p. 239).

48 ‘A narrative of the marquis’s deportment…’.
undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2); Carte,
Ormond, vi, 493. In fact the marquis had only been
Antrim’s success on 10 January horrified Ormond and his supporters, who had fervently hoped that the general assembly would have discussed and approved the Ormond peace instead of being side-tracked by Antrim’s schemes. The following day, when the peace was debated, Clanricard even felt it necessary to reassure the lord lieutenant that despite Antrim ‘and all opposers’ he himself would remain loyal.49 Two days later Ormond was informed that Antrim met with most of the other Irish leaders in Kilkenny where, it was claimed, ‘they will contrive and design all the mischief that possibly they may against your Excellency and your party’.50 Presumably Antrim used the considerable influence he enjoyed over the rank and file members of general assembly to ensure that the Ormond peace was rejected on 2 February 1647.51

awarded £5,000 for his mission, and the burden of paying this was to be divided between the cities and corporation towns of Leinster, Munster and Connaught. The task of provisioning Antrim’s force was also divided between the counties occupied by the confederate armies in the three provinces: County Wexford, for instance, was responsible for providing the marquis with 300 barrels of corn by the end of May. Order by the general assembly, 23 March 1647 (St. Peter’s College, Wexford, Hore MSS F, p. 240, E p. 1897); Cal. S. P. Ire., 1633-47, p. 666.

49 Clanricard to Ormond, 11 January 1647 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 493).

50 Charles Lambert to Ormond, 10 and 12 January 1647 (Bodl, Carte MSS 20, f. 103).

51 The ‘adventurers’ were thus quite right to claim (when they opposed Antrim’s restoration) that he was totally opposed to peace with Ormond. Hill, MacDonells, pp 331-2; Meehan, Confederation, pp 206-7; Moderate Intelligence...From Thursday 11 - Thursday 18 February 1647, no. 102 (London, 1647), p. 913.
in his favour, sent a Scottish protestant messenger called James Boyd, one of his chief tenants from County Antrim, to France 'for new commissions' from the queen and prince of Wales. In February (presumably after Boyd's arrival), Oliver Fitzwilliam wrote from Paris to the supreme council, on behalf of 'our English court', urging them 'to keep in mind your great supplies for the marquis of Antrim, by which you will keep Ireland from ever being the seat of war'.

Meanwhile the marquis was doing his utmost to ensure that his regiment was levied. On 18 February, he mortgaged one of his warships, the Mary of Antrim, to James Dillon and Michael Tooting, Wexford merchants, as collateral for 'certain sums of money'.

While the royalist court in Paris was urging the supreme council to make haste with the preparations for Scotland and the marquis was frantically scratching capital together, an Irish sea captain was reported to have left Ostend destined for Scotland and 'the marquis of Antrim'. This suggests that the marquis was


53 Fitzwilliam to the supreme council, 9 and 25 February 1647 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., vi, 180, 182).

54 Petition of James Dillon to Ormond, c.21 April 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 155, ff 71-2v).

55 Madame Preston to General Preston, 10/20 February 1647 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47, p. 603).
intending to repeat the ploy he had engineered the previous year for sending troops to Flanders: that he hoped to raise sufficient troops, at the supreme council’s expense, both to fulfill his obligation to Castel Rodrigo and to launch an offensive against his enemies in the Western Isles.56 The French ambassador in Edinburgh, who monitored all troop movements closely, perversely hoped that Antrim’s forces would indeed launch a new offensive in Scotland since

‘France would thereby also derive some advantage, for it would give the marquis of Antrim an opportunity of occupying here the thousand men that he is raising in Ireland to send to Spain.’57

But Montreu, need not have worried, for the following week he discovered that (fortunately for France) Antrim’s plan had misfired.

‘As regards the thousand men the marquis of Antrim was to send to Spain [Montreu, reported], I have seen letters [from Argyll] in which it is stated that a ship from Spain had arrived in order to take a part of them, but that it had returned without having a single man’.58

Despite Antrim’s failure to rendez-vous with the Spanish troopships, he continued to try to muster forces in Ireland. But the failure of the corporate towns in the province of Leinster to contribute £2,000 out of the £5,000 voted by the general assembly

56 See p. 237 n. 77 above. This is also what Dumolin believed, Dumolin to Brienne, (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, ff 252-3).

57 Montreu, to Cardinal Mazarin, 2/12 March 1647 (Diplomatic Correspondence, ii, 41).

58 Ibid., 9/19 March 1647 (ibid., ii, 50).
jeopardized the entire expedition. In an attempt to circumvent this, the supreme council ordered one of its members (Nicholas French, bishop of Ferns) to advance £800 from the tenths of prizes collected by Wexford, Ross and Enniscorthy. Other bishops were likewise instructed to contribute £600 out of the tithes of their dioceses; the remaining £600 was to be paid by the town of Kilkenny. The cash was to be forwarded as quickly as possible to Nicholas Fitzharris, a Ross merchant, or any other agent nominated by the marquis.59 In addition to this £5,000, the council at the end of March voted the marquis £300 towards supplies for Scotland from the tenths of prizes due to the council.60

Even so, despite the enthusiastic support of Rinuccini and his clerics, progress continued to be painfully slow.61 Infuriated by the constant delays the marquis blamed Owen Roe’s intervention (and O’Neill was indeed terrified that a new Scottish enterprise would undermine his position in Ulster): ‘I suppose all the nation knew how little kindness was between Owen Roe and me’ the marquis later complained, ‘who often


60 Ibid.; order by the supreme council, 1647 (St. Peter’s College, Wexford Hore MSS F, p. 240).

61 The corn still had not been delivered by June and therefore the council issued another order requesting the immediate delivery of ‘300 barrels of wheat, oatmeal and rye’ to the marquis, see order by the supreme council, 7 June 1647 (St. Peter’s College, Wexford, Hore MSS F, p. 236).
fouled... my undertakings... for the king's service’.62

Even Clanricard regretted (in a letter to Antrim) the consequences of the confederates' inability to mobilize their resources quickly:

‘There is none can have a more deep apprehension and sad impression than myself of the king's condition in England; and that falls more heavily upon me by the consideration of our misfortunes here that have continued in such a lasting division that we have not attended the sending of those expected supplies that might probably have prevented much of the inconveniences that have since happened, to the hazard of monarchy, religion and all other interests of our own’.63

The considerable problems which the marquis experienced over the levies is surprising when one considers the political power which he wielded during the first half of 1647. From January onwards he had played a key role in the general assembly by leading the opposition to any peace with Ormond. During February and March he focused his efforts on trying to persuade Ormond to break off his negotiations with parliament and on persuading Ormond's catholic supporters to defect to the confederate camp.64 On behalf of the general assembly Antrim wrote to Lord

62 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 301.

63 Clanricard to Antrim, 31 March 1647 (Clanricarde Letter-book, p. 383). It is possible that Dumolin had a hand in the delays since he also believed that these troops were ultimately destined for service in Flanders, Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 321-3.

64 Supreme council to Ormond, 10 May 1647, (Bodl., Carte MSS 21, f. 42).
Dunsany, Sir Nicholas White, Sir Henry Talbot and Sir Andrew Aylmer pleading for their support.65

On 4 April his position was formalized when the general assembly selected a new supreme council which included both the marquis and Alexander MacDonnell among the members appointed to represent Ulster.66 Antrim's eagerness to serve as member of the supreme council marked a new phase in his political career and illustrates his willingness to be formally associated with the Irish catholic - as opposed to the royalist - cause. For while he had been intimately involved with the confederates after the autumn of 1643, when he took the oath of association, he had only served on the council's executive briefly in 1644 (and this was with Charles I's approval).67 Alexander, by contrast, was a familiar face in the supreme council and had served on it continuously since July 1644.

65 Antrim to Dunsany, 28 March 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 27. f.13, 20); Antrim to White 28 March 1647 (ibid., MSS 20, f. 556); Antrim to Talbot, 28 March 1647 (ibid., f. 558); Antrim to Aylmer, 28 March 1647 (ibid., f. 560).

66 'The names of the supreme council chosen by the late assembly at Kilkenny, 1647' (Bodl., Carte MSS 21, f. 571v). The positioning of this document in the Carte papers among other documents dating from November 1647 misleadingly suggests that it refers to the supreme council chosen by the eighth general assembly (November 12 - December 24 1647). However, internal evidence - naming Owen Roe O'Neill who was present for the seventh, but not the eighth general assembly, as a member for Ulster - suggests that this document refers to April 1647.

67 See pp 176-7 above for details.
Since Rinuccini had, on 11 January, resigned as president of the confederate government which had been formed at Waterford the previous September, in order (according to Meehan) 'to conciliate and unite all parties', a new president of the supreme council needed to be appointed at this stage. Circumstantial evidence of three sorts strongly suggests that Antrim was chosen for this position. Firstly, contemporaries specifically referred to him as 'the president of the council'. For example, George Leyburn noted that he had sat 'in a chair not far from my Lord of Antrim their Lord President' during his visit to Kilkenny in April 1647.68 While Patrick Barnewall, in the summer of 1647, assured the king of Spain that Antrim 'is President of the Council'.69 Secondly, at the Restoration, it was claimed that, after Antrim had successfully frustrated the Ormond peace treaty, he was 'made president of the confederate council, and signed all orders and was of all committees'.70 Thirdly,

68 L[eyburn], Memoirs of George Leyburn...chaplain to Henrietta Maria...being a journal of his agency for Prince Charles in Ireland... (London, 1722), p. 12.

69 Barnewall to Philip IV, undated (because it was presented in person) (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.); consulta of the council of state, 20/30 July 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.; there is also an undated copy of this consulta in Eo.2525 unfol.). In a memorial presented by Monasterio, undated [c. late 1647] (A.G.S., Eo. 3019, unfol.), Antrim was described as 'president of the council of war of Ireland'. He was also regarded by the French as president of the supreme council, see Dumolin to Brienne, 30 April/10 May 1647 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 249v) and (B.N., Fonds Français, nouvelle acquisition 9691, f. 3).

70 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 332.
these assertions are corroborated by the fact that Antrim’s signature does indeed appear on all surviving orders and legislation from the council during the first half of 1647. Moreover his was always the first signature, an honour usually reserved for the highest-ranking member of the supreme council, who had previously been the president.71

The assembly’s choice of Antrim as their leader was based on solid foundations. Socially, Antrim was the most senior member of the supreme council (rivalled only by Lord Muskerry who, as Ormond’s brother-in-law, had unacceptable ‘Ormondist’ sympathies). Moreover he was relatively experienced in the workings of the confederation and enjoyed a popular following within the general assembly, where it was felt that he was the only suitable person to head their government.72

Inadvertently Ormond paid tribute to this when he informed Clanricard that personally he did not care what happened to Glamorgan and Antrim ‘if there were not a natural propension in this people to love their cozeners’[!].73

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71 For numerous examples, see orders of the supreme council, 4 April – 8 April 1647 (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1633-47, pp 605-6); orders of the supreme council, 4 April – 12 May 1647 (P.R.O., S.P. 63/263/98; P.R.O., S.P. 63/264/12/19/56 pp 130, 148, 167-8).

72 Dumolin to Brienne, 30 April/10 May 1647 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 249v); ibid., 14/24 May, 1647 (ibid., f. 258v). For a list of members see T. de Burgo, Hibernia Dominicana sive Historia Provinciae Hiberniae ordinis praedictorum... (1762), pp 884-5.

73 Ormond to Clanricard, 8 January 1647 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 489).
On ideological grounds the marquis was also sound. Despite his royalist record, he was evidently a staunch catholic with no 'Ormondist' sympathies. Antrim soon proved his devotion to catholicism again by taking the revised oath of association early in March. He thereby swore that he would never lay down arms until full religious toleration for the catholic religion was granted; that the catholic clergy should secure all their pre-reformation privileges, immunities and jurisdictions; and that the clergy should be restored to their benefices as they were before the rebellion. It was a shallow promise on Antrim's part, as subsequent events were to show; but, in the short term, it demonstrated where his loyalties lay.

The marquis enjoyed a good working relationship with the most powerful man in catholic Ireland - the papal nuncio. Although his arrival in Ireland in 1645 had successfully undermined Ormond's influence over the confederates, Rinuccini had failed to create a faction capable of purging the 'Ormondists' altogether. The result was political deadlock. 'This kingdom' Ormond had informed Louis XIV in May 1646. 'is divided into so many several parties, scarce anyone adhering to another, and so little portion thereof is at present actually under the king my master's obedience'.74 But in order to achieve his ambitions and legitimize his authority in Ireland, the nuncio had discovered that he

74 Ormond to Louis XIV, 19 May 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 20, f. 127v).
could not depend purely on the clerical party and the army of Ulster for support, but rather needed to build up a popular following among the Old Irish at least. Antrim was thus a man – perhaps the only man – acceptable to the majority of Rinuccini’s adherents.

The nuncio also appeared to like the marquis personally. For instance, he had sent his coach to meet him upon his arrival in Ireland the previous January, and later that spring he provided the duchess of Buckingham with funds with which to return to Ireland from Flanders. Antrim and the nuncio also shared a desire to continue the war in Scotland (though for very different reasons), and even an interest in privateering. It seems that their frigates hunted together regularly while Antrim readily put his own men-of-war at Rinuccini’s disposal. In addition, the nuncio and his followers controlled the privateering ports of Wexford, Waterford, Limerick, Ross, Dungarvan, Galway and Duncannon – which served as a further factor to bind Antrim firmly to his party.

75 See p. 252 and n. 34 above.
76 Upon his arrival in Ireland the nuncio had claimed that he had ‘four frigates to join with the rest of that nation’, N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345, p. 53. Details on only two of his warships have been located, see Ohlmeyer, "The Dunkirk of Ireland", pp 34-5, 37.
78 After June 1647, when Dublin was handed over to the parliamentarians, Ormond commanded no major Irish port. Even after the truce with Lord Inchiquin, in May 1648, the lord lieutenant only had nominal control over the
For all these reasons, from 4 April 1647 the marquis became responsible for the day-to-day administration of, and the tactics employed by, the armies of Leinster, Munster and Ulster, for the smooth running of the confederate provincial assemblies, for the distribution of confederate material and financial resources, and for dealing with foreign princes. He also acted as the principal liaison officer with the lord lieutenant, and it was to Antrim that Ormond wrote if he wanted any favour from the supreme council. Thus, late in April, the lord lieutenant was worried about the treatment of two royalist officers imprisoned in Kilkenny castle and requested that Antrim should take care of the matter. He also asked that a package addressed to Sir George Hamilton, which had been intercepted by confederate forces, be forwarded to his sister, Lady Hamilton. The following month, he important Munster ports of Youghal, Cork and Kinsale, see John A. Murphy, 'The politics of the Munster Protestants, 1641-49' in Journal of the Cork historical and archaeological society, lxxxvi, no. 223 (Jan.-June 1971), pp 16-9; Liam Irwin, 'Politics, religion and economy: Cork in the seventeenth century' in ibid., lxxxv, nos. 241-2 (Jan.-Dec. 1980), pp 8-9; Ormond to Piers Butler, 22 August 1646 (Bodl., Carte MSS 18, f. 320); Lambert to Ormond, 25 December 1646 (ibid., MSS 19, f. 699v).

79 For numerous examples, see orders of the supreme council, 4 April - 8 April 1647, Cal. S.P. Ire. 1633-47, pp 605-6; orders of the supreme council, 4 April - 12 May 1647 (P.R.O., S.P. 63/263/98; P.R.O., S.P. 63/264/12/19/56 pp 130, 148, 167-8); supreme council to Philip IV, 21 April 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.); supreme council to Mazarin, 27 April 1647 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 55, f. 170); Comment. Rinucc., II, 620, 658, 664, 668, 693.

80 Ormond to Antrim, 21 April 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 20, f. 631); ibid., 23 April 1647 (ibid., f. 643).
complained that a party of royalist troops had been attacked and imprisoned by soldiers under Preston’s command and desired that Antrim should secure their release.81 So when Ormond’s fortunes were at their lowest ebb in Ireland, Antrim’s were at their highest.

By overtly joining Rinuccini’s party, however, Antrim had not automatically betrayed the Stuart cause. After all, Henrietta Maria had instructed the marquis - in the autumn of 1645 - that if need arose he was to manipulate the nuncio in order to further the king’s interests in Ireland.82 And in May 1647 a message was sent to the prince of Wales warning him that, contrary to rumours circulated ‘by some malicious persons’, Antrim ‘with his kinsmen and confederates, is the only life of your business, both in Ireland and Scotland, if God forwards him as He is likely to do in so godly an expedition’.83

However the marquis drew the line at doing anything which nurtured friendship between Ormond and Rinuccini for to have done so would have undermined his own position. So, finding Antrim unwilling to negotiate a peace between Ormond and the confederates, the queen sent her chaplain George Leyburn (he used the

81 Ormond to Antrim, 10 May 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 21, f. 56).
82 See pp 221-2 above.
83 Sir James McDonnell to the prince of Wales, 18 May 1647 (Christ Church, Oxford, Brown correspondance, ‘M-P’, unfol.).
pseudonym 'Winter Grant') who arrived in Ireland early in April to mediate. In essence Leyburn proposed that 'each government should continue their respective governments independent of each other' but that they should agree to join forces 'both at land and at sea' against parliament; and in return for this he assured the confederation that there would be freedom of worship for all Irish catholics'.

Ormond rejected Leyburn's proposals and told him 'that if there were necessity, he would rather give up the city and the places under his command to the English, than to the Irish rebels'. The marquis was prepared to let Leyburn try to procure a cessation of arms; but in the event the negotiations, which dragged on throughout May and June, ended in failure.

Despite pressure, particularly from the queen, to intervene in the proceedings and to urge the confederates to submit to Leyburn's proposals, Antrim remained elusive and, shortly after Leyburn's arrival in Ireland, he accompanied the nuncio - as one of his entourage - to Wexford. Considering the prominent role the marquis later played in trying to cajole Ormond not to hand over Dublin to a parliamentary army it is surprising that he insisted on keeping such a low

84 L[eyburn], Memoirs of George Leyburn, p. 19; Comment. Rinucc., ii, 595.

85 L[eyburn], Memoirs of George Leyburn, pp vii, 14.

86 'A narrative of the marquis's deportment...', undated [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/5/1/2); St. Peter's College, Wexford, Hore MSS 22, p. 36.
profile during the Leyburn talks. It can only be assumed that his absence from Kilkenny was a timely attempt to avoid being trapped between his loyalty to the Stuart cause in general, and to Henrietta Maria in particular, and his desire to maintain cordial relations with the nuncio, who in the final analysis would never have agreed to anything less than complete toleration for the catholic religion. To this, as Antrim well knew, Ormond would never have consented.

Antrim's appointment to serve in the papal entourage at Wexford not only provided a plausible excuse for his absence from the negotiations but also enabled him to pay some attention to his privateering business. Despite the fact that the Mary of Antrim (commanded first by William O'Doran and then by Anthony Vandermarche) had been mortgaged in February 1647, Antrim continued to enjoy the profits from its captures until early in 1648 when it was possessed by his creditors. And, in addition, he owned at least four other frigates which were probably captured prizes which had been renamed. The St. Peter of Waterford, commanded by Joseph Constant, was a vessel of between fifty and sixty tons, while the Mary of the Isles (initially commanded by Vandermarche and then by O'Doran) was armed with at least fourteen guns. The names of the two remaining frigates in Antrim's personal armada are as yet unknown: one was armed with twenty-two pieces of ordnance ('one of the best frigates that the earl of Antrim hath') and the other
with twenty-six guns. It is even possible (though no specific details appear to have survived) that he owned other men-of-war. As it was, apart from a Flemish merchant and entrepreneur (Antonio Nicholas Vanderkipp), Antrim ran the largest, and possibly the most successful, privateering business in Ireland during the later 1640s.

Unfortunately, calculating the exact number of prizes captured by his privateers during these years is, in the absence of quantitative sources, impossible. However the extant literary and second-hand accounts suggest that his men-of-war were extremely successful and, together with those of Vanderkipp, Rinuccini and others, exacted a heavy toll from English, Scottish, Dutch, French and Spanish shipping. For instance, during 1645, together with Owen Roe O’Neill’s frigates, they took ‘many rich prizes’. In June 1646 one of

87 For further details on O’Doran, Vandemarche and Constant, and on the individual warships, see Ohlmeyer, “The Dunkirk of Ireland”, pp 31, 33, 36, 40; A Great victory at sea against the Irish Rebels, by Captain Robert Dare commander of the English...’, (London, 9 February 1647[-8]), pp 2-3; Jacques Talbot to Du Bosc, December 1647 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Cote 55, f. 412).

88 ‘The Earl of Antrim hath two frigates of sixteen guns apiece, and there are five or six frigates more at Wexford and Waterford, which are very busy on the sea, and have lately taken one of Parliament’s frigates’, Valentine Savage to [Sir Philip Percivall], 26 June 1646 (Egmont MSS, i, 295).

89 Dumolin to Brienne, 30 October/9 November 1646 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 235); Memorial presented by Monasterio, [c.1647], (A.G.S., Eo. 3019, unfol.); Ohlmeyer, ‘The Dunkirk of Ireland”, pp 30-41; ibid., ‘Irish privateers during the Civil War, 1642-50’, pp 126-8.

90 Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 90.

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his frigates captured a parliamentary warship and three merchant vessels off the west coast of Scotland.91 Later the same year two merchant ships coming from the Canaries, laden with wine and fruit, were set upon by two lusty frigates well manned that were Antrim’s frigates...these being light, and nimble, boarded the two merchant ships, and bound their men...and manned the [captured] ships with Irish’.92 However as the frigates were returning to sell their quarry at Waterford they were intercepted by parliamentary men-of-war: the prizes were captured and the sixty Irish sailors thrown overboard. Early in 1647 a ship which was presumably English, carrying wool from Laredo to Holland on behalf of the Portuguese bankers in Antwerp, was taken and sold as a ‘good prize’ in Ireland.93 In June 1647 it was probably Antrim’s frigates that captured in Derry harbour over thirty small Irish and Scottish vessels.94 During 1648 the St. Peter took at least two Dutch vessels (carrying rye) as prizes and the Unitie of Yarmouth; the Mary of the Isles seized three more Dutch vessels also laden with grain.95

There were undoubtedly many other prizes of which no

91 See p. 242 above.

92 The Scottish Dove...From Wednesday 12 - Wednesday 19 of August 1646, no. 147 (London, 1646), p. 7.

93 Barnewall to Philip IV, [July 1647], (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.).

94 Sir Charles Coote to the committee at Derby House, 11 June 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 67, f. 133).

95 Ohlmeyer, "The Dunkirk of Ireland", pp 33, 36, 40.

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Complete freedom for his frigates to rove the seas, and a dispensation from paying tenths to the court of admiralty, were two of the perquisites which the marquis secured during his period of political ascendancy, but there were others. He also used his position to consolidate alliances with members of the Old Irish community outside Ulster. Thanks to his sisters' marriages he already enjoyed strong connections in Counties Meath, Louth, Sligo and Kerry. He now reinforced his connections in Leinster by securing the support of the Kavanaghs of County Carlow and the O'Byrnes of County Wicklow. The timely marriages of two of the most eligible MacDonnell men (Sir James Macdonnell, his second cousin, and Alasdair MacColla's son Daniel) to two daughters of Sir Daniel O'Brien of Duagh, County Clare - who served on the eighth supreme council - added to his patronage networks in Munster. In addition, largely due to his

96 For further details see Ohlmeyer, 'Irish privateers during the Civil War, 1642-50', pp 126-7.

97 Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, 25 March 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 24, f. 247); Ormond to the duchess of Buckingham, 3 April 1649 (ibid., 304).

privateering activities, he secured the support of prominent figures in Waterford and Wexford. For instance, Hugh Rochford, a lawyer, recorder of Wexford and a member of the seventh supreme council, was one of his staunchest supporters as was Dr Walter Enos, later president of the Irish College at Louvain, who spent most of the 1640s in Wexford. The building up of centres of support outside Ulster during the later 1640s was no coincidence, but rather a political statement that the marquis now intended to throw in his lot exclusively with the Old Irish. He also looked to members of the clergy for support. Oliver Darcy, a dominican and bishop of Dromore, was an Antrim client, as was Patrick Crelly, cistercian abbot of Newry - described at the Restoration as 'the great intelligencer and confident of the said marquis and of the late usurper [Oliver Cromwell]'. He loyally served Antrim as his agent, mentor and friend throughout the 1640s and early 1650s.99

Political patronage was self-rewarding, but the marquis and his wife also received direct financial remuneration from the confederates. In addition to a papal subsidy, the duchess was granted a pension of £600, while Antrim was awarded a pension of £1,000, which he promptly used as collateral to borrow further.

99 Some observations of the adventurers and soldiers, [April], 1661 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 330); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-42, p. 396; Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 103; Alasdair MacColla, pp 87, 243. For further details on Crelly see pp 290-99, 304-9, 317-25, 330, 335, 369-70.
He was also voted compensation money in lieu of the rents he was losing from his Ulster estates. For example, the Leinster committee ordered that £40 be paid to the marquis as part of £100 the province was obliged to pay him and 'This is the province's share of £250 awarded to him by the council in reparation for having been turned out of his estates by the power of the enemy'. Meanwhile the couple continued to receive about £500 a year from the estates belonging to the second duke of Buckingham near Borris-in-Ossary (in Queen's County) where Colonel James McDonnell acted as their factor. Their combined annual income during this period, in theory at least, amounted to well over £2,500 and this figure did not include the profits made by Antrim's frigates which must have been considerable, given the number of prizes they captured and the profits made by other privateering entrepreneurs.

100 H.M.C. rep. ii, app. 2, p. 226; Aiazza, Embassy, p. 372; Comment. Rinucc., i, 758.


102 The estate and manor were subsequently seized by Andreas FitzPatrick - who by 1649 was high sheriff of Queen's County - 'to the said Lord marquis's prejudice of (at least) £500'. McDonnell requested that FitzPatrick be removed and that he should be liable for any rents and arrears due from the land, Petition of Colonel James McDonnell to Ormond, c. September 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 155, f. 85). For further details on James McDonnell, J. Huband Smith, 'Letters Patent of James MacDonnell, Lord of the Castel and Manor of Tenekilly, in the barony of Portnehinch, and Queen's County' in U.J.A., 1st series, ii (1854), pp 121-5; Borrowes, 'Tennekille Castle', pp 38-9.

103 See pp 290-3 above. Ohlmeyer, 'Irish privateers during the Civil War, 1642-50'. For instance after Antrim had mortgaged it, the Mary of Antrim brought in
It was estimated that over a six year period, over 1900 vessels were captured by Wexford-based frigates in 1640.
And Antrim needed every penny he could muster if his new military expedition to Scotland were to succeed! Preparations to send the two regiments of Irish soldiers continued throughout April and May 1647. The necessary arms and ammunition for the venture (according to Montreuèl) arrived in Ireland towards the end of April, when:

'It is reported from the west of Scotland that a Dutch ship carrying ammunition to the marquis of Antrim, having been obliged by bad weather to take shelter in the Lewis islands, the captain, contrary to what he expected, was well received by the earl of Seaforth’s people, and obtained permission to continue his voyage as soon as the weather permits'.

By then, however, it would appear that the incessant delays in Ireland had forced the marquis to abandon all hopes of sending a portion of this new levy to Flanders via Kintyre, as had been promised in the autumn of 1646. Instead MacColla’s veterans were offered. MacColla requested permission from the government in Edinburgh to leave Scotland 'with his men' provided they were allowed to go to Spain. The Scottish parliament, eager to be rid of them, intended to give his request serious consideration until Argyll intervened and vindictively asserted (much to Montreuèl’s delight) that he ‘would effectively deprive

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prizes worth about £8,000 sterling (over a period of twelve months); but this all went to his creditors, Petition of James Dillon to Ormond, [c.21 April] 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 155, ff 71v-72v).

104 Montreuèl to Cardinal Mazarin, 20/30 April 1647 (Diplomatic Correspondence, ii, 117).
him of the means of leaving the country and of taking
men with him'.105

Argyll was true to his word and did indeed ensure
that MacColla’s regiment was never shipped to Spain.
The 1,200 ‘seasoned veterans’, promised by the marquis
the previous autumn, never arrived. Instead, on 24
May, Leslie’s army entered Kintyre and, in a series of
encounters, routed MacColla’s main force. Thus in one
fell swoop Antrim lost not only his foothold in Kintyre
but also, it would seem, a large part of the force he
had hoped to transport to the territories of Philip IV.
‘The defeat of MacDonald’, Montreuil reported to
Mazarin, ‘[has] removed from me every reason to fear
that Spain may obtain forces from this kingdom’.106

He was wrong. Shortly after the covenantant
offensive began in earnest Alasdair retreated to
Ireland with the rump of the force he had taken to
Scotland in 1644. Early in June 1647 it was reported
in Dublin that ‘all, or most of the force, late in
Scotland with Colketto [sic], are for certain landed in
Ulster. They came in fifteen vessels, which they ‘ran
upon the sands near Dundrum, in the isle of Lecall

105 Montreuil to Cardinal Mazarin, 11/21 May 1647
(Diplomatic Correspondence, ii, 140); Stevenson,
Alasdair MacColla, p. 230. The ambassador also hoped,
however, that it would be possible to divert these
troops – whom Antrim ‘was intending for service in
Spain’ – to France, see Montreuil to Brienne, 12/22
March and 5/15 June 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 83, ff 148v–
150v, 179v–181).

106 Montreuil to Mazarin 15/25 June 1647 (Diplomatic
Correspondence, ii, 167-8); Stevenson, ‘The Massacre at
Dunaverty’, pp 30-6.
MacColla was subsequently followed (according to an anonymous chronicler of the MacDonnells) by 'all the Irish that lay' in Daniel laird of Clanranald's lands, under Angus, laird of Glengarry's command. MacColla's brigade should join the Army of Munster and that Glengarry's men should be seconded to fight in the Army of Leinster.

During June, however, Antrim's attentions were directed elsewhere. Having failed to send either a new Irish regiment, or MacColla's troops, to Spanish service he put his frigates (no doubt for a price) at

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107 Rushworth, Historical Collections, part iv, i, p. 561; Moderate Intelligencer... From Thursday 10 - Thursday 17 June 1647, no. 118 (London, 1647), p. 1127; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 234-41, 245; ibid., 'The Massacre at Dunaverty', p. 30; McKerral, Kintyre, pp 49-66.

108 'History of the MacDonalds'(P.R.O.N.I., D.358, p. 9); Robert Menteith, The History of the Troubles of Great Britain, containing a particular account of the most remarkable passages in Scotland ([London], 1739), p. 254. Sir Charles Coote reported back to London that a large number of soldiers 'suspected to be Highlanders driven out of Scotland by the state's forces there' in 'certain frigates' en route to Connaught were picking off enemy shipping in Derry harbour. Already these vessels had 'taken above thirty small barques belonging to this kingdom and to Scotland freighted with provisions and other commodities' with disastrous consequences for the parliamentary garrison there, see Coote to the committee at Derby House, 11 June 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 67, ff 133-v).

109 Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 247-8; Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, i, 153.
the disposal of the Spanish agents who were preparing to ship an Irish regiment raised by Patrick Barnewall to Spain. Towards the end of the month the troops were duly embarked onto one of Antrim's frigates, armed with twenty-six pieces of artillery, and another German vessel of 500 tons. Despite 'the weather being the most favourable and suitable that one could desire', his sailors refused to make the voyage. This mutiny - as French diplomatic sources reveal - was in fact the work of the French agents in Ireland who, unable to sabotage the levy before it was embarked, had at the last minute managed to stir up trouble among the crews of the two frigates. The ship from Hamburg was wrecked between Passage and Ross and Antrim’s crew, fearing a similar fate, abandoned their posts.

Patrick Barnewall, furious and frustrated, knew nothing of this. Looking for a scapegoat he instead laid the blame for the mutiny entirely on Antrim's shoulders:

'There can be no doubt that the marquis has thwarted this voyage because without the support

110 Jacques Talbot to Du Bosc, December 1647 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 55, f. 412); Dumolin to Brienne, 30 April/10 May 1647 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 253).

111 Barnewall to Philip IV, undated (because it was presented in person) (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.); consulta of the council of state, 20/30 July 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.; there is also an undated copy of this consulta in Eo. 2525, unfol.); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47, p. 695. (Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, p. 601, incorrectly cites the date as 8 June.)

112 Jacques Talbot to Du Bosc, December 1647 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 55, ff 412-v).
of a person of such great authority the sea captains could not have conceived such a plan; nor, without his consent and approval, would the sailors have dared to disband, fearing the punishment and example they would deserve. And this will not be inflicted, nor would it be appropriate to try it because the marquis, with his [personal] authority, and as he is President of the Council, will always find means - and excuses - to exonerate them, or at least to protect them.'113

Barnewall suggested that Antrim himself should be punished by having his frigates either embargoed when next in an Iberian port or re-possessed on the grounds that:

'the marquis was given them in Flanders on condition that they were to carry from his lands to the service of your Majesty 2,000 men; and since he did not comply..., failing in his promise and obligation, it does not seem that the frigates belong to him'.114

The Spanish council of state accepted these recommendations and ordered that the frigates be sequestered at the earliest opportunity.115

This incident indicates that Antrim's political influence in Ireland had withered. Though he continued

113 Barnewall to Philip IV, undated (A.G.S., Eo. 2525, unfol.). Barnewall offered three reasons for Antrim's 'base and infamous conduct'. First, the marquis might have been influenced by 'activity by France'; second, he was well aware that he had not fulfilled the promises that he had made in Flanders in 1645 and 1646 and realized that his frigates 'would be detained there'; and, finally, he felt guilty about the ship carrying wool from Laredo to Holland on behalf of Philip IV's Portuguese bankers, which his frigates had captured and sold as a 'good prize' in Ireland (p. 169 above).

114 Ibid.

115 Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, p. 41; Consulta of the council of state, 20/30 July 1647 (A.G.S., Eo. 2523, unfol.).
to sign confederate documents until August 1647, it is apparent that he no longer directed confederate affairs.116 Therefore, after only six months at the helm, Antrim had apparently fallen from grace. Part of the explanation no doubt lies in Antrim’s own political ineptitude. He was a selfish man, motivated on the one hand by the desire to enjoy a prominent political position and on the other by the patrimonial ambitions to regain control over the MacDonnell estates in East Ulster and the Western Isles. These personal considerations seriously distorted his effectiveness as leader of the confederation. In short, Antrim pursued policies, such as renewing the war in Scotland, which did little to further the confederate cause. It was therefore inevitable that, sooner or later, even his most loyal supporters among the Old Irish and clerical factions would become disenchanted by his attempts to funnel whatever meagre resources the confederates had into abortive, selfish ventures. But Antrim’s political clout was also undermined by a political shift during the course of 1647. In order to rule at all, the nuncio’s faction in Ireland was forced to dilute their ranks by admitting Ormondist sympathizers back into the supreme council. Since Antrim was firmly attached to the clerical party it was only natural that any

116 Comment. Rinucc., ii, 664, 693.
resurgence by its opponents would undermine his own political position.

Whatever the reasons, by August 1647 Antrim’s brief and inglorious career as the confederate figurehead was over. Moreover his continued support of Rinuccini’s party, combined with his failure to fulfill obligations to the Spanish crown whether in terms of levying or of shipping troops, meant that he had clearly lost any favour he might have enjoyed among his three principal sponsors – the Spanish faction in Ireland, the Spanish court in Brussels, and Charles I and his queen. Finally, all this had happened before he had achieved any of his own objectives. His estates in Ulster were still occupied by Monro’s army, and Kintyre and Jura had been regained by Argyll. Antrim had thus squandered all his own assets, whether measured in terms of men and land or of political standing, and had gained nothing.
CHAPTER 8: In Search of New Patrons (August 1647—August 1649)

In June 1647 Ormond handed over Dublin to a parliamentary army under the command of Colonel Michael Jones and the following month withdrew to England. These developments perpetuated and exacerbated factional divisions among the confederates between the clerical faction, supported largely by the native Irish, and the 'Ormondists', who had slowly infiltrated back into the ranks of the supreme council. Moreover, the presence of a parliamentary army in Dublin and another in Munster (under the command of Murrough O'Brien, Lord Inchiquin) rendered catholic military supremacy over Ireland unattainable.

The confederates had three options open to them. The first was to continue the war, alone, against the English parliament. The second was to invite one of the European catholic powers—Spain, France or the papacy—to become the 'protector' of Ireland in return for military and financial support. The third was to persuade Charles I, or his son, to continue—with confederate support—the royalist war effort from Ireland (in return for certain concessions over religion) either in person or through a catholic deputy who would rule Ireland on their behalf.1 A series of military reverses in the late summer and autumn of 1647

1 Monnerie to [Brienne], 31 January/10 February 1648 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, ff 34v-35).
forced the confederates to give serious consideration to each of these possibilities.

If the political complexity of Irish politics seems confusing in retrospect, how much more complicated must it have appeared to the participants, such as Antrim, whose survival depended upon forecasting how matters would develop. By the late summer of 1647 the marquis's political muscle in Ireland rested on three foundations: his small armada of privateers stationed at Wexford and Waterford; whatever influence he enjoyed among members of the nuncio's faction; and his personal army of highlanders who were serving both in the Armies of Leinster and of Munster.

The defeat of General Preston and the Army of Leinster, which included five regiments of soldiers loyal to Antrim, by Michael Jones at Dungan's Hill near Trim (8 August) was disaster enough for Antrim, for 'amongst those slain were 400 of Kilketto's men'. Fortunately MacColla and a regiment of redshanks escaped unscathed and joined the Army of Munster. But the battle of Knockanauss (County Cork) on 13 November saw the defeat of the Army of Munster, under Lord

2 Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 347. For a summary account of Michael Jones see Alma Brooke-Tyrrell, 'Michael Jones, governor of Dublin' in Dublin Historical Record, xxiv, no. 1 (Dec. 1970), pp 159-171.

3 An Exact and full relation of the great victory obtained against the rebels at Dungans-Hill in Ireland, August 8 1647. By the forces under the command of Colonel Michael Jones... (London, 19 August 1647), p. 10; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 248.
Taaffe's command by Inchiquin and his parliamentary forces. Like Dungan's Hill, this defeat was a personal disaster for Antrim, for Alasdair MacColla was killed along 'with most of his redshanks, of whom... there was not above a fourth part that escaped'.4 A few of Antrim's kin, including Colonel Randal MacDonnell, escaped death but were imprisoned by Inchiquin.5 Thus within four months the confederates had lost two armies, and Antrim's personal forces in Leinster and Munster had been virtually annihilated.

Military humiliation struck terror into the marquis as it did into the eighth general assembly, which convened on 12 November 1647 at Kilkenny. Antrim and his brother Alexander were among the few representatives from Ulster. The majority, including O'Neill, who was having difficulty in finding winter quarters for his troops, were absent and in an attempt to compensate for this, the sixty-three votes assigned to the Ulster contingent in the assembly were delegated to nine individuals - including Antrim and his brother. Even so, since the majority of the nuncio's lay followers were unable to attend the assembly, the

4 A True Relation of a great victory obtained by the forces under the command of Lord Inchiquin... against the rebels..., November 13 1647..., (London, 30 November 1647), p. 4; MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celticae, ii, 205; Aiazza, Embassy, pp 335-7; Cary, Memorials, i, 360-7; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 249-50.

5 A Perfect Narrative of the battell of Knocknones within the County of Cork...betwixt the parliaments forces...and the forces of the Irish rebels... (London, 1647), p. 10.
members from Leinster dominated the proceedings. As La Torre later complained to Philip IV:

'the deputies of this province of Leinster took the initiative in the assembly... Almost all of them inclined towards France because they are clients of the ex-viceroy, the marquis of Ormond... They were joined by some gentlemen from the provinces of Munster and Connaught who, because they tended the same way and were there from the beginning, began to discuss and decide certain issues without waiting for the views of of many other gentlemen... who are known to be (and are) naturally affected to Spain.'

The composition of the new supreme council elected by the assembly reflected the bias against the Old Irish/Spanish faction. Many leading 'Ormondists' were once again returned to the council: Mountgarret and Bellings were chosen as members for Leinster; Muskerry and Fennell for Munster; Darcy, Dillon and Brown for Connaught. Only the members from Ulster, who included Antrim, Alexander and Ever MacMahon, catholic bishop of Clogher, continued to represent the interests of the nuncio's faction. Inchiquin, who was at this stage still technically a parliamentarian, was delighted that the factional balance within the council had once again shifted in Ormond's favour.

'At the last General Assembly [he informed Ormond] there was [at] first a great contention between the two factions, but Muskerry prevailed. And [they] have followed good example in now moulding their council; Gerrald Fennell is now put in again

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6 La Torre to Philip IV, 8/18 February 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2526, unfol.).

7 Ibid.

8 Monnerie to Mazarin, 31 January/10 February 1648 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Cote 57, ff 55-62).
with divers others whom they term moderate men, and Dermot O’Bryen and divers (whom they accompt violent) thrust out."9

Thus when the council began to debate future strategies the clerical/Old Irish/Spanish faction was at a decided disadvantage. Initially, the 'Ormondists' suggested a direct appeal directly to Charles I. This proposal was, however, abandoned when news arrived of the king's arrest by parliament at Carisbrooke castle.10 Since any alliance with Charles I himself was now out of the question, the assembly was forced to examine the other alternatives open to them. Rejecting outright the notion that they should surrender to parliament, the assembly debated whether to secure the support of the queen and prince of Wales, or to invite either Pope Innocent X, Louis XIV or Philip IV to become Ireland’s saviour. Discussion of who should be made protector raged for thirty-six days. Ormond, in an account drawn up for Cardinal Mazarin, assumed that they would choose a foreign protector:

'It is impossible that Ireland can subsist [alone] but must immediately submit to England, and so considerably increase the power thereof; or else give herself to the pope or the king of Spain.'11

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9 Inchiquin to Ormond, 19 January 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 5).

10 Meehan, Confederation, p. 239; Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday 13 - Thursday 20 January 1648 no. 148 (London, 1648), p. 1496.

11 An account of the political condition of the dominions of Great Britain drawn for Mazarin by Ormond, 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 21, f. 573).
The Spanish agent La Torre urged the special committee of twenty-four deputed to debate the matter to choose Spain, since a French 'protector' would not only refuse to restore catholicism but would leave the reins of power in the hands of Ormond and other 'heretics'.

The French agents, fearing that Ireland would be dominated by Spain, made similar patriotic pleas - even suggesting, during the penultimate meeting of the assembly, that Louis XIV should 'not only become arbiter but absolute master of all the affairs of the confederates'. Superimposed on the heated debate between the two opposing Irish factions of who should govern, therefore, was the struggle between France and Spain to manipulate Irish affairs to their own advantage.

In the final analysis the assembly listened to neither the French nor the Spanish agents and decided instead to invite the Prince of Wales either to come in person to Ireland as their 'protector' or to nominate a catholic lord deputy. Viscount Muskerry, Geoffrey Browne and the bishop of Clogher were appointed to

12 Torre's reasons for not allowing the French faction to control Ireland, [1648] (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.); La Torre to Philip IV, 8/18 February 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.).

13 Foissotte to Philip IV, 8/18 May 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.); Monnerie to [Brienne], 31 January/9 February 1648 (B.L., Harl. MSS 4551, f. 34v).

14 If this failed Brown was instructed to solicit French aid, Brown's secret instructions from the supreme council, [February 1648] (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.).

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visit the royal court, in exile in France, to solicit the queen’s support for their venture.15 Clogher, however, refused to participate in the mission on the grounds that he was ‘odious to the queen’ and had no knowledge of French or English. Five days later Antrim was nominated in his place.16 On the 24 December the assembly broke up.

By selecting Antrim as a member of the delegation the council presumably hoped that his royalist connections would both stand the mission in good stead and also forestall any protests from the beleaguered Old Irish/clerical faction within the assembly.17 For his part, the marquis (according to the French agent, Monnerie):

‘was delighted to be named for this mission hoping that it would serve to replace him in the good opinion of their majesties, whose very humble servant he showed himself to be; and he repented having done what he had done, attributing it to necessity and to the impoverished situation in which he then found himself.’18

15 Corish, 'Rinuccini and the confederation’, N.H.L., iii, 325; Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, pp 378-9; La Torre to Philip IV, 8/18 February 1648 (A.G.S., Eo.2566, unfol.). At the Restoration it was insisted that the confederates would only have asked ‘aid and protection of some of those foreign princes’ as a last resort, 'The defense of his majesty’s catholic subjects of Ireland', [1661] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 259).

16 Jerrold Casway, 'The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Crellry, 1648-1649', Collect. Hib., viii (1978), p. 8; Inchiquin to Ormond, 19 January 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 5); Carte, Ormond, iii, 346; Comment. Rinucc., ii, 796; iii, 1, 392.

17 Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80).

Interestingly, Monnerie added that even at this stage Antrim 'is a very popular man and one who could be easily won over. He has scarcely any spirit; he is a courtier'.

Because of Antrim's royalist record, Rinuccini also feared that he might easily be won over by the other delegates and so the nuncio insisted that his cistercian agent, friend and mentor Patrick Crelly abbot of Newry 'accompany Antrim to temper his excessive good nature and to bring it about that he remain firm in the midst of the plots of the other two envoys who will always make an effort to trip him up'.

The marquis, for his part, promised the nuncio that he would not agree to anything in France without Crelly's advice; but he also warned him that the prince of Wales would never consider coming to Ireland as long as Rinuccini was there.

In addition to acting as watch-dog for the catholic interest in Paris, Antrim was instructed to collect money promised to the nuncio by the pope; and he was to agitate, via the nuncio in

19 Ibid. The choice of the marquis as the Old Irish representative was not, however, universally welcomed: Owen Roe O'Neill, for instance, later complained to Philip IV that Antrim favoured France and should be excluded, O'Neill to Philip IV, 1/11 February 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.).

20 Comment. Rinucc., iii, 381; Aiazza, Embassy, p. 369.

21 Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80); Aiazza, Embassy, p. 365.
Paris, for a fresh alliance with Montrose so that a renewed offensive in Scotland could be launched.22

The preparations involved in dispatching the delegation began early in January 1648 just as peace was being concluded after the long wars in the Netherlands and in Germany. Letters of introduction from the supreme council were drawn up on behalf of the delegates and the envoys were issued with their instructions.23 'The key point of the instructions', Professor Patrick Corish recently pointed out, 'was that in any agreement with the queen they were to secure the terms for the catholic religion already granted by Glamorgan, and also that the viceroy should be a catholic, unless the pope waived this point'.24

The general assembly had already agreed that the envoys were not to reach a final accord until they received papal approval, which Nicholas French and Nicholas Plunkett were sent to Rome to secure.

Antrim and Crelly left Waterford late in February, thanks to the good offices of the nuncio and the Spanish agent who lent them the necessary money for the


23 Supreme council to Mazarin, 18/28 January 1648 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 55, f. 62); Gilbert, Ir. confed., vi, 226-7; Aiazza, Embassy, p. 363; Carte, Ormond, iii, 347-8, 350. A set of private instructions - signed by Taaffe and Preston - was issued to Muskerry and Brown.

24 Corish, 'Ormond, Rinuccini and the confederation', N.H.I, iii, p. 325.
voyage.25 Muskerry and Brown, however, were delayed in Ireland for a further week due to poor weather and lack of funds until, in order to ensure that France should not be disadvantaged by their late departure, Monnerie agreed to lend them 1,200 pistoles (roughly £300) for the trip.26 The French agent interpreted Antrim's early exit as an attempt to ensure that Ireland was placed under Spanish - rather than French - protection, but it seems more likely that Antrim and Crelly hoped to beat the 'Ormondists' to St. Germain so that they would have an opportunity of stating their version of events to the queen before the others arrived.27

Antrim and the abbot made excellent progress and were in St Germain by early March, arriving shortly after Ormond himself. Muskerry and Brown reached St. Malo only around the middle of the month.28 On arriving at the Stuart court-in-exile, Muskerry and Brown detached themselves from the others, joined up

25 Monnerie to Mazarin, 31 January/10 February 1648 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 57, ff 52-3); Hill, MacDonnell s, p.274. Carte later suggested that Antrim left Ireland 'full of hopes of being made the Roman Catholic lord lieutenant', see Carte, Ormond, iii, 350; Comment. Rinucc., iii. 49.

26 Monnerie to Mazarin, 31 January/10 February 1648 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 57, ff 52-3).

27 Indeed Antrim later claimed that 'he himself approached the queen before the other envoys [had arrived] and obtained everything according to the confederates's wishes from her'. Ormond, Muskerry and Brown then persuaded her to change her mind, Comment. Rinucc., iii, 450.

28 Cal. S. P. Venetian, 1647-52, p. 50; Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 37.
with Ormond, Muskerry’s brother-in-law, and ‘agreed to
do everything Ormond told them’.29

Official negotiations with Henrietta Maria began
almost immediately. The envoys were granted a formal
audience on 23 March (2 April N.S.) and the agents
presented their proposals to the queen. Since their
directives forbade them to make any agreement until
instructions had been received from Rome, the audience
produced no decisions.30 Nevertheless Henrietta Maria
pondered their proposals and sought Ormond’s advice on
how they should be dealt with.31

Just over a month later on 30 April (10 May N.S.)
the agents had a further audience: Antrim acted as the
chief confederate negotiator, while Ormond represented
the queen. Ormond asked whether the confederates were
willing to offer any concessions over religion and
whether Antrim had the power ‘to alter and to recede
from what they have proposed, and to conclude
thereupon’.32 Antrim replied that ‘we are not yet
ready to propose any certainty in the matter concerning

29 Cardenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S.,
Eo. 2524, f. 80); Brienne to Grignon, 29 April/9 May
1648 (B.N., Fonds Français 15,966, f. 394v); Brienne to
Grignon, 6/16 May 1648 (B.N., Fonds Français 15,966, f.
357v).

30 Gilbert, Jr. Confed., vi, 228-231; Casway, 'The
clandestine correspondence of Father Crely', p. 8;
Comment. Rinucc., vi, 127; Carte, Ormond, iii, 351.

31 Carte, Ormond, iii, 352.

32 Ormond to Antrim, 30 April/10 May 1648 (Bodl., Carte
MSS 22, f. 76; 65, f. 417); Carte, Ormond, iii, 359.
religion, being [bound] by our instructions, to be judged in that particular by his holiness'. He explained that agents had been sent to Rome 'from whom we expect to hear very speedily'; but he requested that the queen should make clear what compromise she would accept, so that the negotiations might continue.33 Religion, as Ormond had no doubt anticipated, was once again the major stumbling block to any political settlement. Antrim confessed that he was unable to conclude any agreement without first securing papal approval.34 On 3 May the queen told the envoys that 'we shall speedily give power to some such as we think fit' and that this person would be empowered to grant 'whatever may consist with justice and with his Majesty's interest and honour'. The queen's address brought the talks to a seemingly innocuous end.35

From Antrim's perspective, however, the negotiations had been a defeat. On a personal level, his rival Ormond had dominated the proceedings while, more generally, he had failed to find help for the confederate cause in Ireland. Unlike his fellow negotiators, Antrim had remained loyal to the Old Irish

33 Antrim's answer, [30 April/10 May] 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 87; 63 f. 540).

34 Muskerry and Brown to Bellings, 30 May/10 June 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349v); Brienne to Grignon, 13/23 May 1648 (B.N., Fonds Français 15,966, f. 367v).

35 Reply from the queen and the price of Wales, 3/13 May 1648 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., vi, 231); Comment. Rinucc., iii, 184, 367, 378, 383; Carte, Ormond, iii, 360-1.
interest and his steadfast devotion to the nuncio’s faction was duly reported back to Ireland by Crelly: Brown and Muskerry had 'played the traitors', wrote the abbot, while Antrim conducted himself 'devotedly and honourably... He continually sets himself in opposition to the queen of England, the prince, Ormond, Muskerry, Brown and the remaining presbyterians'.36

The breakdown of the negotiations had serious consequences. Firstly, Henrietta Maria, Jermyn, Ormond and Digby set about engineering a plot, which was supported by the French, to use Ireland 'as the great and principal instrument to reduce Scotland and England'.37 This involved Ormond’s return to Ireland in order to unite the Irish confederate factions, to win over Owen Roe O’Neill and to join forces with the 'Baron [Inchiquin] and the presbyterians in England, Scotland and Ireland' who (as Crelly informed Rinuccini early in May) 'all form against the present parliament and the Independents'.38 (Colonel John Barry had

36 Crelly to Rinuccini, 14/24 May 1648 (Comment. Rinucc., iii, 385); Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80).

37 Crelly discovered the plot from various sources including Dr Tirrell, the confederate envoy in Paris, and the count of Brienne. Foissotte to Philip IV 8/18 May 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.); Grignon to Brienne, 1/11 May 1648 (B.N., Fonds Français 15,966, f. 347); paper I, presented by Crelly to parliamentary committee, December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 81). Crelly’s paper, translated into Spanish, was enclosed in Cárdenas’s letter to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80). Apparently no version of Crelly’s proposals in English has survived.

38 Crelly to Rinuccini, 14/24 May 1648 (Comment. Rinucc., iii, 385).
already secured Inchiquin's allegiance in February.)
Once the forces of Clanricard, Inchiquin, Taaffe,  
Preston and O'Neill had been amalgamated, this army was  
to take Dublin and then send an expeditionary force  
under the prince of Wales's command to invade England  
and Scotland. In May 1648 the 'engagers' (as the  
Scottish royalists were now known) made a tentative  
alliance with the royalists in Ireland and pledged to  
support those Irish 'who are willing to submit to the  
king's authority' (without prejudice to the Protestant  
religion).39

France was to provide the necessary money for this  
combined assault and in return was promised possession  
of all major ports and forts in Ireland together with a  
supply of mercenaries to be raised by Muskerry.40 But  
from May 1648, as the civil wars in France (known as  
the Fronde) gained momentum, it became increasingly  
difficult for the Bourbon Treasury to divert scarce  
resources into foreign ventures. The French secretary  
of state, Brienne, regretted this, but felt that at all  
costs it must be ensured that Ireland should not fall  
under Spanish control, which would be worse than if it  
became protestant.41 Muskerry and Brown, who prepared

39 'A copy of an answer of the committee of estates in  
Scotland...', May 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f.222);  
David Stevenson, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in  

40 Paper I, presented by Crelly to parliamentary  
committee, December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 81);  
Comment. Rinnucc., iii, 371, 378-9; Gilbert, Contemp.  
hist., 1641-52, i, 210-1.
to leave France in mid-June, were delegated to execute the plot in Ireland.42 Brienne hoped that Muskerry would 'sabotage the designs of the Spaniards and will succeed in convincing the catholics [in Ireland] to support the king's party'.43

The breakdown of the negotiations forced Antrim and Crelly to initiate an alternative strategy. Rather than simply turning to Spain for help, as the 'Ormondists' and French expected them to, they adopted a more sophisticated and ultimately more dangerous plan: soliciting aid for Ireland from the 'Independent' faction in parliament.44 Since the creation of the New Model Army in February 1645, the dominance of the Presbyterian party at Westminster had been slowly undermined while the influence of the more religiously radical Independent party, supported by the army, steadily increased.45 It was from the latter that Antrim and the abbot intended to secure support in the hope that their policy of religious toleration and liberty of conscience would preserve the catholic

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42 Carte, Ormond, iii, 361-2.


44 Brienne to Grignon, 15/25 June 1648 (B.N., Fonds Francais 15,999, ff 247-v).

religion in Ireland.46

Early in May 1648, Crelly notified Rinuccini that a channel of communication with the Independent party in parliament had been opened.47 In addition to uniting the resources, and forces, of the Independent and the clerical parties, Antrim—who never lost sight of his personal goals—intended to launch a fresh expedition, in conjunction with Montrose (who was also in France at this point) and with papal backing, into Scotland. And so, some time in May 1648, (according to Crelly) 'Montrose and Antrim made an agreement according to your [Rinuccini's] directive which will result (I hope) in some good'.48

In order both to legitimize their plot and to secure funds for the Scottish expedition, Antrim sent Crelly to Rome (towards the end of May) while he himself hurried back to Ireland to ensure that his plot had the backing of the nuncio's entire faction.49 However his plans were soon frustrated. The 'Ormondists' and the French, eager to set in motion


47 Comment. Rnucc., iii, 386-7, 395; iv, 274.

48 Crelly to Rinuccini, 1/11 May 1648 (Comment. Rnucc., iii, 383). Also see Comment. Rnucc., ii, 756; iii, 387-8; iv, 274.

49 Muskerry and Brown to Bellings, 30 May/10 June 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349v); Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, i, 81-2, (incorrectly) suggested that Antrim sent Crelly to Rome in 1647.
their own plan and to prevent Antrim from sabotaging it, procured an edict from Louis XIV which prevented the marquis from leaving St. Malo until the admiralty officials there had received news of Muskerry's safe arrival in Ireland.50 Stranded, the marquis went into hiding in France, under the pseudonym 'Francis Chapman', and remained there for a month.51

Even without Antrim's meddling, the situation continued to become more complex. Just as the second civil war was gaining momentum in England, a truce was signed between Inchiquin and the confederates (20 May); seven days later Rinuccini - aware of the royalist design to unite Ireland under Ormond's authority - excommunicated the supporters of the truce. On this occasion the supreme council was not intimidated by the nuncio and in retaliation appealed to Rome against the excommunication.52 An already divided catholic Ireland was thus more polarized than ever before, and the battle lines between the 'moderate' party and the

50 Order of Louis XIV to admiralty officials in St. Malo, 25 June/5 July 1648 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 57, ff 247).

51 'Francis Chapman' [= Antrim] to Mr. Williams, 8 June 1648, (Clarendon S. P., i, 426); Hill, MacDonnell's, p. 259; Comment. Rinucc., iii, 450, 514.

'violent' faction were formalized on 11 June when O'Neill declared war on the supreme council.

There were now two ad hoc alliances among the catholics. On the one hand, there were the 'Ormondists' within the council who were supported by the combined forces of the Army of Leinster and Lord Inchiquin. On the other there was the nuncio and his isolated caucus of clerics as well as the more radical members of the Old Irish community (such as the O'Byrnes of County Wicklow), who depended exclusively on Owen Roe O'Neill and the Army of Ulster for military assistance. These internecine quarrels mystified foreign observers, who could not understand the Irish myopia.

'What really surprises the majority of those who contemplate the affairs of Ireland' the French ambassador in London reported back to Paris 'is to see that people of the same nation and of the same religion - who are well aware that the resolution to exterminate them totally has already been taken - should differ so strongly in their private hostilities; that their zeal for religion, the preservation of their country and their own self interest are not sufficient to make them lay down - at least, for a short time - the passions which divide them one from the other.'

It was easy to take such a detached viewpoint of Irish politics in London: in Kilkenny or Dublin matters were less clear cut. And it was into this quagmire of factional intrigue that Antrim sank when he finally

53 William Paterson to [ ], 22 June 1648 (S.R.O., G.D. 406/1/2413).

arrived back in Ireland late in July 1648. Unlike his brother Alexander, the marquis refused to have anything to do with the 'Ormondists' and promptly rejoined the nuncio's party. In an attempt to forestall Ormond's embryonic coup, he suggested that the Army of Ulster should seize Kilkenny, the seat of confederate government, and that a new supreme council, controlled by Rinuccini and the clerical party, should be established.

'Antrim is wholly devoted to O'Neill and the Ulster army, and he will procure all his [forces] to side with him' [Father Paul King informed the bishop of Clogher late in July, and added that] 'He [Antrim] most earnestly desires that Owen O'Neill and the Ulster army should come without delay towards Kilkenny; and let them not doubt that all Leinster, nay, Ireland, will be at their dispose'.

But the element of surprise, which was crucial if the seizure of Kilkenny were to succeed, was lost when a number of Father King's letters were intercepted by the 'Ormondists' and King himself was arrested. O'Neill, however, was unaware of this disaster and marched his army into County Kilkenny where the troops wreaked

55 The History of the Warr, p. 69; Comment. Rinucc., iii, 450, 514, 664. Carte, Ormond, iii, 393-4, claimed that Antrim returned from France "highly discontented at not being made lord lieutenant, a dignity which his vanity had long made him desire, and which the nuncio had flattered him with hopes of obtaining".

56 King to bishop of Clogher, [27 July 1648], (Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 103-4); Comment. Rinucc., iii, 632.

57 Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill, p. 219; Comment. Rinucc., iii, 633, 636; Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 104. Plunkett described King as a 'favourite' of the bishop of Clogher and as 'an implacable firebrand and instigator of mischief', see N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345 p. 941.
havoc on Lord Mountgarret's estates until the supreme council mobilized the combined forces of Preston and Inchiquin, which forced O'Neill and the Army of Ulster to retreat.\textsuperscript{58} Antrim's proposed coup d'état had failed.

Unperturbed, Antrim now pursued two alternative strategies. On the one hand, he seems to have attempted to persuade Thomas Preston and the Army of Leinster (which, significantly, included six brigades of highlanders loyal to Antrim) to defect to the clerical cause.\textsuperscript{59} On the other, he urged the nuncio to open channels of communication with the parliamentarians in Dublin. Father Edmund O'Reilly, vicar-general of Dublin and later catholic archbishop of Armagh, acted as their intermediary while Henry Jones, protestant bishop of Clogher (Colonel Michael Jones's brother) represented the parliamentary regime in Dublin.\textsuperscript{60} By August Owen Roe and Jones were reported to be in close correspondence 'upon which it is believed Owen has released Sir Theophilus Jones

\textsuperscript{58} Carte, Ormond, iii, 381, 386; Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{59} Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill, p. 217; Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335). Late in August it was mistakenly rumoured in Brussels that 'the differences between O'Neill and Preston have been composed by Antrim at the direction of Rinuccini', see news from Brussels and Bichi to Panzirolo, 28 September/8 October 1648 (Giblin, 'Catalogue of material of Irish interest', pp 74-5).

\textsuperscript{60} Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill, p. 227; Carte, Ormond, iii, 467. O'Reilly is often referred to in the documents as 'Rely'.
Antrim’s attempts to create a force capable of both defeating the armies of the ruling faction in Kilkenny and preventing Ormond from reestablishing his control in Ireland coincided with the resounding defeat of the new Scottish invasion of England at the battle of Preston (17 August) and with the speedy repression of sporadic royalist outbreaks in Wales and southern England. Charles I had lost the second civil war. Ironically, the course of events in England acted in Antrim’s favour. The New Model Army was determined, now that it had won the war, also to win the peace and to make Charles I (‘that man of blood’) pay for the chaos which his actions had initiated. The army’s decision - taken in April - to bring the king to trial caused havoc among the English parliamentary factions and divided the Independent party: after bitter debates, the more radical faction decided to support the army’s decision while the moderate Independents allied with the presbyterian party and agitated for a compromise with the king.62 This offered a golden opportunity for the clerical party to exploit the

61 Inchiquin to Ormond, 19 August 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 65, f. 420); Comment. Rinucc., ii, 691. O’Neill had refused to release Jones to Ormond the previous year.

factional deadlock at Westminster to their own advantage; but their success depended on the successful outcome of Crelly’s negotiations in Rome.

Crelly spent three weeks in Rome where he secured an audience with Innocent X in which he implored the pope to recognize the English parliament which, he claimed, would then grant toleration for the catholic religion. While the pope refused to ‘meddle positively in the matter’, he referred Crelly to the nuncio in Paris and the Spanish ambassador in London.63 By 22 August the abbot had arrived in Paris and immediately visited the nuncio there, who advised him - on behalf of the pope - that the best course of action would be for the ‘Old Irish to negotiate a settlement with the faction of the Independents in England and that this was the pope’s intention not only in Ireland but in all the dominions of this crown’.64

Shortly afterwards Crelly found his way to the royalist court, which was now in Louvain, and Walsingham (Digby’s private secretary) reported to Ormond that Crelly had arrived ‘as tame as a lamb’. Walsingham also suggested that Crelly had been poorly received by the pope (which was clearly not the case)

63 Clarendon S.P., ii, 509-10.

64 Cardenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80); Casway, ‘The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Crelly’, p. 9. Confirmation of Crelly’s account came from an English Jesuit who was staying with the French nuncio at the time and was instructed to assist Crelly in his mission by writing to all Jesuit priests in Britain.
and that no papal assistance for Ireland could be relied upon.65 Perhaps more reliably, Walsingham also related the proceedings of an interview the abbot had had with the queen and Lord Hatton. Crelly offered the queen three pieces of advice: firstly, that a 'person well thought of by the fierce party in Ireland' - presumably Crelly himself - should be sent there to convince the nuncio's party to negotiate with Ormond; secondly, that she should intervene on behalf of a 'particular person for what is past' (this anonymous individual was very likely Antrim, who was always eager to make his peace with the queen) and soothe relations between this individual and Ormond; thirdly, that Crelly should be nominated as an advisor to Ormond 'to deliver freely his opinion to you especially concerning the several most eminent persons that lead amongst the untractable party'. Walsingham, though suspicious of Crelly's motives, advised that these proposals be accepted at face value in an attempt to manipulate the nuncio's party to the king's best advantage.66

What is one to make of all this? Was Crelly genuinely trying to negotiate a settlement favourable to the nuncio's party and advantageous to the interests of himself and Antrim in particular? Or was the misleading account of his trip to Rome, together with

65 Casway, 'The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Crelly', p. 10.

66 Walsingham to Ormond, 6/16 September 1648 (Casway, 'The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Crelly', pp 16, 17).
his three proposals, merely a skillful ploy to divert royalist attention away from his true purpose - concluding an alliance with the Independents in parliament? The most plausible verdict is that Crelly’s diplomacy was a last-ditch attempt to secure royal recognition for the catholic cause in Ireland and to undermine Ormond’s authority when he eventually returned to Ireland.67

In the event, nothing came of Crelly’s attempts at reconciliation and, significantly, he made no reference to the subject in the letters he wrote later the same week to Antrim, the nuncio, the duchess of Buckingham and the catholic bishop of Clogher, which were all subsequently intercepted.68 The abbot, though frustrated by the poor communications with Ireland, nevertheless seemed pleased with the progress of the design. He extended the pope’s good wishes to Antrim and added ‘I suppose very shortly you shall see some

67 *Ibid.* Presumably Crelly was instructed, either by the confederate envoys in Rome or by Antrim or, more likely, by the duchess of Buckingham (from whom he had received at least two letters), to make a last attempt to secure the queen’s favour for the ‘fierce party’.

68 It is unclear who actually intercepted these letters dated 6/16 September. Walsingham’s letter to Ormond, also dated 6/16 September, included no direct reference to Crelly’s missives. If they were enclosed with Walsingham’s letter, they must have been intercepted the day Crelly wrote them; and Walsingham must have decyphered and dispatched them to Ormond immediately. More likely, they were captured by the supreme council - certainly the duchess of Buckingham complained, late in September, that this was the case - and presumably forwarded to Ormond, see deputy mayor of Wexford to supreme council, 21 September 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349).
badge of his thankfullness to you and her grace'. Claiming to have 'license from his holiness in the business you know', he begged the marquis both to refrain from making a treaty with Ormond, and to restrain Rinuccini, O'Neill and the bishop of Clogher from doing so. Creelly was now ready to leave the continent for London where he intended to put the next stage of his plan into effect.

Late in September he made contact with the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Alonso de Cárdenas, and asked him to procure a passport and protection so that he could come to England. Before granting him a pass Cárdenas insisted on being informed of the full details of his business, and it is thanks to Cárdenas's subsequent dispatch to Madrid that the full extent of the design is known. Creelly had a two-fold mission: firstly, to tell the English parliament about French ambitions in Ireland; secondly, to press upon parliament how desperate the position of the nuncio's party was in Ireland so that it might be persuaded to form a military alliance with the nuncio's faction and the Army of Ulster. Cárdenas warned Creelly that it was

69 Creelly to Antrim, 6/16 September 1648 (Casway, 'The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Creelly', p. 14). The duchess of Buckingham, the bishop of Clogher and the nuncio received similar letters, except that in his communication to Rinuccini Creelly urged the nuncio to continue 'whatever discussions might have taken place with Montrose, [the] Independents and others'. Creelly to the duchess of Buckingham, the bishop of Clogher 6/16 September 1648 and Rinuccini, [September 1648] (Casway, 'The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Creelly', p. 13).
rash to deal with parliament without first securing a safe-conduct since the 'Irish had been declared rebels and were hated with an extreme passion, especially the Old Irish to whom were attributed all the cruelties and atrocities committed against the English in Ireland at the beginning of this rebellion'. Furthermore, Crelly was a Roman Catholic priest who had been intimately and publicly involved in negotiations against parliament in France and Italy. However once Cárdenas was satisfied that Crelly's mission was genuine and 'without risk' to Spain he agreed to secure safe conduct for him from 'a trustworthy Independent'. Crelly appears to have arrived in England in late October.70 The willingness of some Independents to listen to a popish priest demonstrates clearly their desire to keep the factional pot boiling in Ireland and to prevent any truce being made between Ormond and O'Neill.71

The defeat of the Scots at Preston and the subsequent overthrow of the royalists in England had greatly increased the importance of Ormond's mission in Ireland, since any hope of continuing the royalist war-effort in the other two kingdoms now depended exclusively on the ability of the lord lieutenant to

70 Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80). Leading Independents - Henry Marten, Henry Nevill, Thomas and James Chaloner, Thomas Scott, Colonel Popham and Denis Bond - were all on Cárdenas's pay roll, see Cárdenas's secret accounts (A.G.S., Eo. 2532, unfol.).

71 Elkin, 'Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars', p. 259.
unite the divided factions in Ireland under the authority of the king (now a prisoner of the English parliament). Despite Antrim's various attempts to stop him - whether by the abortive plan to seize Kilkenny or Crely's dealings at Louvain - Ormond landed at Cork on 30 September, with arms (paid for by the French) for 4000 foot and 1000 horse, and immediately joined forces with Inchiquin. This jeopardized any chance the marquis may have had of rallying the Irish to the nuncio's cause and threatened his ambition to be created viceroy of Ireland.

During the autumn of 1648, Antrim was living in Wexford with Brian MacPhelim O'Byrne, where he formulated yet another strategy designed to topple Ormond's party and restore the nuncio's faction to power. His plan was simple. He proposed to call out his followers in Ulster, together with the highland veterans serving under the command of his kinsmen Angus, Laird of Glengarry, in the Army of Leinster and others sent from the Isles (early in 1648) by the Captain of Clanranald under Donald MacDonald's command. These crack troops were to muster at Wexford and from there to march to County Wicklow where they were to be joined by men raised by Brian O'Byrne

72 Paper I, presented by Crely to parliamentary committee, December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 81).
73 Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, ii, 19.
74 Comment. Rinucc. iii, 514; MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celticae, ii, 205-7; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp 257-8.
(a favourite of Rinuccini) and Charles Kavanagh and equipped with 1600 guns and ammunition which had been purchased in France. This army was to rendez-vous with Antrim at Arklow on 11 October and rise in rebellion against Ormond.

The plan ran awry from the start. Colonel 'MacThomas' (Pierce Fitzgerald) - a former member of Rinuccini's party - caught wind of the proposed rebellion and, in an attempt to defuse it, tried to dissuade Glengarry, who had just arrived in Wexford, from joining with the O'Byrnes and Kavanaghs on the grounds that they were 'strangers in the kingdom' and had no quarrel with Ormond. Glengarry 'having already engaged with his kinsman the marquis of Antrim' refused to be persuaded and so his 600 highlanders joined with Charles Kavanagh's troops. Glengarry marched from Wexford on 8 October 'with a party of six or seven hundred Scotch and five hundred Kavanaghs with forty or fifty horse towards the Kavanagh's and O'Byrne's country to put them all in arms'. However, en route, Butler and two regiments of cavalry ambushed Glengarry's men, whereupon they fled into a nearby

75 Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335); La Torre to Philip IV, 13/23 June 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2566, unfol.); Birch, An Inquiry, p. 221.

76 Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335); Aiazza, Embassy, p. 419. O'Neill's role in the rebellion is unclear and no reference is made to it in Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill.

77 Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335).
wood.78 Shortly after the ambush Butler was reinforced by Sir Thomas Esmond, major-general of the Army of Leinster, and his infantry and their combined force 'hunted them out until night'.79 The next morning '300 dead bodies were found in the wood besides eighty prisoners (including Glengarry and his uncle, the laird of Clanranald) wherein all the Scotch officers were either taken or killed'.80 Meanwhile Antrim's frigates, carrying the arms and munitions for the rising, were captured and held at Wexford ('his great armada is broken at present' the supreme council was informed on 9 October). The marquis himself appears to have escaped, but his 'plot' was squashed in its infancy.81

78 Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335); MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celticae, ii, 207.

79 N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345, p. 944.

80 Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335); MacBain and Kennedy, Reliquiae Celticae, ii, 207; Gilbert, Contemp. hist... 1641-52, ii, 20; MacKenzie, History of the MacDonalds, pp 333-4. The lairds of Clanranald and Glengarry were later ransomed by the duchess of Buckingham. Glengarry 'then went to Wexford; a ship was sent for him by the marquis of Antrim which conveyed him to...Uist'. Preston later suggested that some of the prisoners captured after Antrim's rebellion (except Highlanders) should be exchanged for officers from the confederate party held by O'Neill, see Preston to supreme council, 26 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349).

81 Esmond to supreme council, 9 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349); ibid., 18 October 1648 (ibid., f. 349v). Hill, MacDonnells, pp 333-4. The following week, Antrim's frigates were allowed to return to sea, see Esmond to supreme council, 19 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349).
News of the abortive rising spread quickly. On 11 October Taaffe informed Ormond that 'the town of Wexford desired the council to remove my lord of Antrim and his duchess thence’. Antrim’s whereabouts remained unknown - it was rumoured that he had fled either to Arklow castle or to Owen Roe O’Neill - but the duchess certainly remained uncomfortably at Wexford. Taaffe added ‘I am sorry for the poor lady, though she be guilty of his late folly’.82 Antrim’s civilian accomplices in the rebellion - Hugh Rochford, who had served on the ‘revolutionary’ seventh supreme council as a member for Leinster, and other ‘suspected persons’ including Dr Walter Enos - were quickly rounded up despite protests against their arrest by the duchess of Buckingham.83 On 12 October Ormond persuaded the assembly to declare the nuncio and his adherents traitors (although they were given twenty days in which to change their minds and return to the fold).84

Ironically the only person to benefit from Antrim’s abortive rebellion was Ormond himself.85

The account of the rebellion ascribed to Nicholas Plunkett, condemned Antrim - quite appropriately - for

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82 Taaffe to Ormond, 11 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, ff 347-8).

83 Esmond to supreme council, 14 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349).

84 Ormond to Jermyn, 12 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 63, f. 548); Casway, Owen Roe O’Neill, p. 233.

85 Theobald Butler to Ormond, 10 October 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 335).
using Glengarry and his Highlanders to satisfy his personal ambitions:

'pleasing only his maggot paled brains with a dream of being great, [Antrim] involved these innocent soldiers in his unjust contrivances, and they being strangers never examined the matter further than to advance one faction against another, concluding they were still to fight against their old enemies the parliament of England.'

The author continued that because of Antrim's desire to be made viceroy of Ireland he 'deceived those good and otherwise well meaning men...and drove them headlong into their own ruin'. Admittedly Antrim's rebellion was motivated by his jealousy towards Ormond but, seen from his perspective, it was also his last chance to overthrow the lord lieutenant before peace negotiations with the confederates officially began. Had it been a well organized operation in conjunction with the Army of Ulster - rather than an impulsive, isolated gesture of defiance against Ormond - the outcome might have been very different. For if Antrim had succeeded in humilitating Ormond on the battlefield, the desperation of the Stuart cause in England might have forced the queen to replace Ormond with a commander acceptable to the clerical party: namely himself.

Shortly after the abortive rebellion O'Neill used Father O'Reilly and the two bishops of Clogher as mediators to renew his talks with Michael Jones.

86 N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345, pp 943, 946.
87 Ormond to Inchiquin, 17 November 1648 (Carte, Ormond, vi, 584-5); N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345, p. 140; Irish news, 3/13 April 1649 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 37, ff 70-v); Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill, pp 232-3.
Jones's willingness to parley was justified by the fact that he was desperately short of supplies and therefore wanted to ensure that the Army of Ulster did not join forces with those of the Irish royalists. At this point it was rumoured that O'Neill and his commanders had agreed, in writing, to make Antrim general of the Army of Ulster and that he would 'bring all the Irish and Scots of that province [Ulster] to a right understanding and perfect unity', and that the army in Cavan was daily awaiting his arrival. Why O'Neill should have offered Antrim - whom he obviously disliked - the command of 'his' army is unclear. Perhaps he believed that Antrim's presence would give the beleaguered Ulstermen fresh hope and prevent them from deserting to the confederates, or perhaps he was merely following instructions from Rinuccini, who was now a virtual prisoner in Galway.

88 Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday 23 - Thursday 30 December 1648, no. 193 (London, 1648), p. 2012; Michael Jones to Lenthall, 18 October 1648 (Bodl., Ballard MSS 53, f. 54). Also, Jones's policy toward the Irish was based on the assumption that 'the Irish being a people to be bought, though to the betraying of their dearest friend...', see Jones to House of Lords, 10 November 1647 (Bodl., Carte MSS 118, ff 41-v).

89 Dillon to supreme council, 10 November 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349v); Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, ii, 19-20.

90 The History of the Warr, p. 69. Apart from noting that the army was both 'ill-provisioned' and 'discontented', no explanation of the decision to offer Antrim command of the army is suggested by Casway in his biography of the general, see Casway, Owen Roe O'Neill, p. 233.
Whatever the reason, this new prospect of power smoked the marquis out of hiding and on 6 November he wrote to Sir Richard Blake, chairman of the supreme council, requesting information on the progress of the treaty with Ormond and refusing Blake's offer of a safe-conduct to Kilkenny. Instead he requested a passport for Ulster; his request, hardly surprisingly, was refused.

Within three days of snubbing the council, however, Antrim was well on his way to Ulster under parliamentary aegis. The Moderate Intelligencer reported his trip in remarkably neutral terms:

'The lord marquis of Antrim has relinquished the marquis of Ormond and is empowered Generalissimo for the pope's interest in this kingdom, and to that purpose rode through our quarter by Maynooth, to Owen Roe (as is conceived) to claim his authority'.

The Moderate Intelligencer denied, however, that Colonel Michael Jones had had any contact with this Irish papist.

'By the way he wrote a letter to Colonel Jones, desiring that a gentleman might be admitted to Dublin, with propositions tending to engage the northern party under the command of Owen Roe to the parliament's service, which (if this his request might be granted) in his opinion it was

91 Comment. Rinucc., iii, 664.

92 Antrim to Sir Richard Blake, 6 November 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 349v).

93 Moderate Intelligencer...From Thursday 30 November - Thursday 7 December 1648, no. 194 (London, 1648), p. 2022.
reputed feasible, but his overture being denied, he made no further stay but marched on.'94

Other accounts of Antrim’s journey through the parliamentary-held areas paint a very different picture, however. Lord Castlehaven, for instance, informed Ormond that some sort of agreement between Jones and Antrim had indeed been reached.

'The meeting between my Lord of Antrim and Colonel Jones was at Killcock: from whence my lord, with frier Rely [O’Reilly]...(the instrument in the agreement between Jones and O’Neill) were conveyed to Trim where my Lord expressed himself at large against your excellency and that he would join with the devil rather than with you.'95

Late in November Ormond reported Antrim’s latest antics back to the Stuart court in exile:

'My lord of Antrim (having raised an unsuccessful commotion, against not the king nor his old masters the supreme council, but as he says against me) is now gone to command the Ulster army; whereunto he is invited, as some believe, not so much for his conduct as for his quality, to give countenance by it to that declining faction. Jones has given him rope enough; for so his giving him passage and convoy through his quarters, which was refused by this assembly'.96

Ormond then condemned Jones for his hypocritical actions and for supplying O’Neill with sixty barrels of powder in return for cattle.97

94 Ibid. For a similar account see A Perfect Diurnall.... From Monday 4-11 December 1648, no. 281 (London, 1648), p. 2251.

95 Castlehaven to Ormond, 27 November 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 22, f. 694); Carte, Ormond, vi, 584-5, 585-6.

96 Ormond to Digby, 21 November (Carte, Ormond, vi, 585-6).

97 Carte, Ormond, vi, 584-5.
By the end of November, therefore, Antrim had arrived safely in O’Neill’s camp in Ulster but it seems that he never took up his military command because ‘a provincial assembly’ voted against it.98 Nevertheless the marquis, O’Neill, and the leading officers of the northern army now declared their severance from the assembly on the grounds that they were treating with the lord lieutenant for peace.99 Rinuccini reported to Rome that the ‘Ormondists’ ‘are greatly in fear of O’Neill and the Marquis of Antrim, and therefore make them large offers; but, on the other hand, the parliamentarians offer still more’. The nuncio felt that ‘there is a chance of their uniting with the Independents, and steeping this kingdom in blood’.100 But the clerical faction was now effectively isolated from the rest of the catholic Irish world and, in order to survive, could only hope that Crelly would succeed in formalizing the tenuous association which the Army of Ulster enjoyed with Michael Jones.

Crelly’s continued presence in London – ‘as agent with the parliament for Antrim and O’Neill’ – was well known in Ireland by the time he met with a parliamentary delegation (at least twice) in late

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98 Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, ii, 20.

99 Antrim and others to Sir Richard Blake, 30 November 1648 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 350); N.L.I., Plunkett MS 345, pp 943, 946; Giblin, ‘Catalogue of material of Irish interest’, p. 75.

100 Rinuccini to Cardinal Panzirolo, 21/31 October and 19/29 November 1648 (Aiazza, Embassy, pp 424-6, 441).
November.101 This committee included 'five Independent commissioners: two peers and three commoners with
authority from parliament to listen to Creelly'.102 One
of the peers was probably the earl of Pembroke while
the other could have been either the earl of Denbigh or
the earl of Mulgrave.103 Identifying the 'three
commoners' is more problematic but circumstantial
evidence points to Thomas Scott, Denis Bond and Edmund
Ludlow. All three were Independents and members of the
first council of state, while Scott and Bond served on
the standing committee responsible for Irish affairs
and were also Spanish clients.104

   At the first meeting Creelly brought two matters to
the commissioners' attention. He relayed the details
of the 'horrendous design' hatched in Paris the
previous spring and suggested that there was a faction

101 Castlehaven to Ormond, 27 November 1648 (Bodl.,
Carte MSS 22, f. 694); Irish news, 3/13 April 1649
(Bodl., Clarendon MSS 37, f. 70v).

102 Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S.,
Eo. 2524, f. 80).

103 All three later served on the first council of
state, Edward Raymond Turner, The Privy Council of
England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
1603-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, 1927-8), i, 248;
Underdown, Pride's purge, p. 205. Pembroke was also a
Spanish client, Cárdenas's secret accounts (A.G.S., Eo.
2532, unfol.).

104 Turner, Privy Council, i, 248-9; ii, 186-7, 235-6;
Cárdenas's secret accounts (A.G.S., Eo. 2532, unfol.).
Another of Creelly's contacts was 'the secretary of
state of parliament' (Comment. Rinuc., v, 5).
Presumably this was a reference to the secretary of the
council of state who was initially Walter Frost and
after 1652 John Thurloe. Frost and Thurloe were both on
Cárdenas's pay roll.
in Paris lobbying for peace with Spain in order to allow France to intervene more decisively in the British Isles.105 He also explained how desperate was the plight of the Old Irish party in Ireland and how necessary it was to preserve Ireland 'under English rule'.106 Two days later Crelly met with the commissioners again. They had apparently chewed over the abbot's information and now requested his advice on how the royalist plot could be undermined. Crelly offered three suggestions. Firstly, parliament should unite its forces with those of Owen Roe against Ormond's armies. Secondly, if parliament agreed to this, 'someone of authority' must be sent to Ireland to alert the parliamentary leaders of their decision and to warn Antrim and O'Neill, and their followers, so that a 'suspension of arms' could be arranged while the forces united. Thirdly, now that the French had made peace with their enemies in the German war, there was some support for France to do the same with Spain 'in order to apply themselves with more force to the plans they have for these three kingdoms'. Therefore parliament should either 'make a league' with Philip IV or try to prevent a peace between France and Spain 'at least until you have arranged and established matters in the three kingdoms'.107 Early in December Crelly

105 Paper I, presented by Crelly to parliamentary committee, December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 81).

106 Ibid.

107 Paper II, presented by Crelly to parliamentary committee, December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 83);
had two further meetings with the Independent representatives, who were particularly worried about a possible union between France and Spain in favour of Charles I and against parliament. Cárdenas forwarded a summary of the negotiations to Philip IV and noted that nothing had been decided.108 And before any action could be taken, affairs in London were thrown into chaos when Colonel Thomas Pride on 6 December 1648 excluded from parliament all members (largely presbyterian ones) who had voted in favour of a treaty with the king.109

Pride's purge, together with news of the 'Rump's' decision to try the king (which reached Ireland on 28 December) must have caused Antrim to think very seriously about his strategy. After all, parliament had already tried and executed the king's most intimate advisors from the 1630s - the earl of Strafford and Archbishop Laud; would the king himself be next?

Probably only Antrim's personal hatred of Ormond, whose authority was formally recognized by the

Crelly's memorial, 23 January/2 February 1650 (A.G.S., Eo. 3020, unfol.). Philip IV instructed Cárdenas to use every means at his disposal to obstruct French interests in Ireland and in the English parliament, Philip IV to Cárdenas, [18/28 March 1649] (A.G.S., Eo. 2576, unfol.).

108 Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80).

109 Underdown, Pride's purge, makes no reference to Crelly's negotiations. Interestingly, Cárdenas believed that the purge was advantageous to the Spanish and nuncio's cause since the presbyterians were 'pro-royalist and pro-French', see Cárdenas to Philip IV, 8/18 December 1648 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 80).
confederates on 17 January 1649, prevented him from returning to the royalist camp at this stage. In the peace concluded between the confederates and the royalists, the lord lieutenant verbally agreed to 'give unto the Roman Catholics full assurance that they shall not be molested in the possession of the churches and church livings, or of the exercise of their respective jurisdictions as they now exercise the same' until the king heard their case in a free parliament. All attainders against catholics issued since 7 August 1641 were to be declared null and void, and there was to be some provision for the security of catholic property.110 By the treaty, the confederate government was formally dissolved and twelve 'commissioners of trust' - including Alexander MacDonnell - were appointed to mediate between Ormond and the confederates.111 In the meantime Antrim and his isolated caucus in Ulster continued to support the nuncio. Even after Charles I's execution on 30 January 1649 by 'usurpers', 'anarchists' and 'subverters of the

110 Articles of peace, 17 January 1649 (Gilbert, *Ir. confed.*, vii, 184-211); Corish, 'Ormond, Rinuccini and the confederates', p.334.

111 Carte, *Ormond*, iii, 408. Was Alexander, however, acting as his brother's mole? In the light of the prominent role Alexander played in arranging the junction of the confederate Armies of Leinster and Munster during the spring of 1649, this is unlikely; but Antrim, nevertheless, now had access to a sympathetic ear within the Ormond regime, see Alexander MacDonnell and others to Ormond, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10 February; 2, 4 March; and 12 May 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 23, ff 404, 419, 428, 438, 448, 457; MSS 24, ff 6, 34, 689).
true religion' he refused to approve the election of the 'commissioners of trust' and denounced the Ormond peace.112 According to the count of Berehaven, who had recently arrived from Spain to replace La Torre, Antrim and O'Neill 'declared that they would support the nuncio with their arms and army'.113

News of the second Ormond peace increased parliamentary fears in London that Ireland would now become the hub of royalist activity, and this gave Crely a decided advantage in his negotiations. But the newly created council of state, according to Edmund Ludlow, refused Crely an audience 'to avoid any misconstruction of their actions, but appointed a committee to speak with him'.114 One of the members was Ludlow himself.115 The commissioners, who were suspicious of Crely, asked him why the clerical faction had not asked the royalists for assistance.

112 Antrim and others to Blake, 30 January 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 350); Ormond to the bishop of Clogher, 14 February 1649 (ibid., ff 480-2); news from Brussels, 22 March/1 April 1649 (Giblin, 'Catalogue of material of Irish interest', p. 75).

113 Berehaven to [Philip IV], 18/28 May 1649 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 26). Berehaven was the son of Donal O'Sullivan Beare and grew up at the court of Philip III, Micheline Walsh, 'Destruction by Peace': Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale (Monaghan, 1986), p. 127.


115 Firth, Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow i, 228. The other members probably included Scott, Bond and Frost, see p. 318 above.
Crelly replied that 'the king had broken his word with them;...he had made them many fair promises, yet when he could make better terms with any other party, he had been always ready to sacrifice them'. The representatives were also curious to know why Crelly and his accomplices had not approached them sooner. 'He told us', Ludlow later noted, 'because such men had been possessed of the power, who had sworn their extirpation; but that now it was believed to be the interest of those in authority to grant liberty of conscience'. Crelly added that if religious toleration were granted to the Irish catholics 'they would be as zealous for a commonwealth as any other party.'116

What actions the commissioners decided to take, however, are unknown since no parliamentary reference to these protracted talks was apparently allowed to survive.117 Parliamentary legislation during the spring of 1649 does, however, provide a clue. Early in February Commonwealth officials mooted the idea that the government would extend toleration to catholics who agreed to renounce their belief that loyalty to the pope took precedence over their loyalty to the

116 Ibid., i, 229.

117 Certainly no trace of the negotiations are to be found in the relevant volumes of Rushworth, Historical Collections, the Journals of the House of Commons (or Lords), Cal. S.P. Dom., or Cal. S.P. Ire. Even Cardenas's dispatches to Philip IV are unhelpful. Cardenas merely urged Philip IV to send money to the 'clerical party' in Ireland because this would then enable the Old Irish to unite with parliament against the Scots and the 'Ormondists': Consulta of the council of state, 3/13 March 1649 (A.G.S. Eo. 2524, f. 82).
In the following month the house of commons voted that 'Papists in arms might compound at a moiety of their estates'. On the one hand, Crelly was being tempted with promises of religious toleration and security of land-holding by this legislation while, on the other, the commissioners refused to make any positive response to his proposals.

The climate, however, was changing rapidly. The parliamentary negotiators, who now apparently included Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton, were unwilling to compromise publicly with Irish papists and therefore simply played for time while they mustered an army of conquest. Charles I's alliance with the Scots in December 1647 had prevented an army being sent to reduce the rebellious Irish before; but by the spring of 1649, with Scotland temporarily subdued and royalist resistance in England totally crushed, parliament was at last ready to deal with Ireland.

118 Elkin, 'Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars', pp 288-91; Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, i, 81; Carte, Ormond, iii, 423-4.


120 Inchiquin to Ormond, 31 January 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 23, f. 372); Jerrold Casway, 'George Monck and the Controversial Catholic Truce of 1649', in Studia Hib., xvi (1976), p. 66.

Despite this Crelly, who continued to reside in the Spanish embassy under the pseudonym 'Mr Haley', felt that progress was being made and believed that his talks about 'the entire catholic faith' with 'great men' were 'general and serious' and would soon produce results. He was, however, worried about the lack of communication from Ireland. In a letter to Antrim dated 6 March he assumed that the marquis, Owen Roe and Rinuccini 'agree with Parliament', but he added that he must have 'timely notice' of what their intentions were, or else his case would be lost.

In fact it was lost already, for time was running out fast for Antrim and O'Neill. They were increasingly isolated, particularly since Rinuccini’s departure for the continent on 25 February: 'Being not able to subsist in opposition' (as The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer had predicted in December 1648) they were at last forced to 'unite themselves with the marquis of Ormond'. In the spring of 1649 another cleric,

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122 Crelly to Rinuccini, 9 July 1649 (Comment. Rinucc., iv, 281).

123 Crelly to Antrim, 6 March 1649 (Casway, 'The clandestine correspondence of Father Patrick Crelly', pp 18-9); Aiazza, Embassy, p. 465. Unbeknownst to Crelly the Spanish council of state, despite some pressure from leading ministers (including the marquis of Castel Rodrigo), instructed Cárdenas not to interfere further in Irish affairs on the grounds that if the troubles in France continued, the French would not be able to intervene in Ireland either. Subsequent events in Ireland were to vindicate Philip IV’s decision; but Spain’s lack of support undermined Crelly. Consulta of the council of state, 3/13 March and Philip IV to Cárdenas, 8/18 March 1649 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 82 and Eo. 2579, unfol.).
Francis Nugent - a Capuchin and probably one of Antrim's kinsman - had been sent to France to discuss a reconciliation with the queen mother and Charles II; while Antrim and O'Neill, who had by now accepted the Ormond peace, opened negotiations with the Irish royalists. On 28 February Antrim was granted a safe-conduct to go where he pleased in the territories which Ormond controlled. He travelled first to Kilkenny and then to Wexford where, early in March, he wrote to the lord lieutenant suggesting that the two should meet. Their parley was delayed by Ormond's departure from Kilkenny to Limerick; nevertheless Antrim persisted in writing. On 17 March he requested an audience on Ormond's return to Kilkenny, or at Carrick. No reply was received to this letter and so Antrim renewed his request on 25 March:

'finding no time by your lordship appointed to the bishop of Dromore for my going to wait upon you, I have sent my servant express to desire [from] your lordship [that] my safe conduct may be renewed,

124 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer...From Tuesday 12-19 December 1648, no. 290 (London, 1648), p. 1192; Casway, 'George Monck and the controversial catholic truce', pp 71-2. Antrim only told Crelly on 29 March that Owen Roe, who was 'without assistance from any quarter, will force those of that party to make a deal with Ormond on the best conditions that can be obtained', Cárdenas to Philip IV, [August] 1649 (A.G.S., Eo., 2524, f. 33).

125 Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, i, 76; Cárdenas to Philip IV, [August] 1649 (A.G.S., Eo., 2524, f. 33); Irish news, 3/13 April 1649 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 37, f. 69).

126 Ormond to Antrim, 28 February 1649 (Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 269); The Marquis of Ormond's proclamation concerning the peace concluded with the Irish rebels..., (London, 27 February 1649), p. 16.
and as soon as you please to appoint me your time to kiss your hands'. 127

Shortly afterwards, despite being warned that 'for all his...pretenses [the marquis] pursues his old ways', Ormond agreed to meet him and to discuss a compromise. 128 Even at this late stage, however, Antrim still intended (or so he claimed in a letter dated 29 March to Creelly) to do everything possible to frustrate an alliance between the forces of Ormond and O’Neill. While he was not directly involved in the negotiations, he must have been delighted when O’Neill and the parliamentary commander in Ulster, George Monck, agreed (on 8 May) to a cessation of hostilities for three months. 129

His extreme reluctance to bow to Ormond’s authority is also illustrated by his efforts to strike up a separate deal with Prince Rupert of the Rhine who

127 Antrim to Ormond, 25 March 1649 (ibid., MSS 24, f. 246); ibid., 17 March 1649 (ibid., MSS 24, f. 168). The only one of the nuncio’s party who was not pro-Spanish was Oliver Darcy, bishop of Dromore, see James Preston to Mazarin, 25 August/4 September 1648 (A.M.A.E., Correspondance Politique Angleterre, Côte 52, f. 277).

128 Edmund Butler to Ormond, 24 March 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 24, f. 208); Irish news, 3/13 April 1649 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 37, f. 69).

129 Cited in a letter from Cárdenas to Philip IV, [August] 1649 (A.G.S., Eo., 2524, f. 33). The truce negotiations are discussed in Casway, ‘George Monck and the controversial catholic truce’: The true state of the transactions of Colonel George Monk with Owen-Mac-Art-O-Neal: As it was reported to the parliament by the council of state... (London, 15 August, 1649), pp 3-5; Elkin, ‘Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars’, pp 287-90.
had arrived at Kinsale with the royalist fleet late in February 1649.130

'I pray you tell his excellency [Ormond]' Daniel O’Neill wrote on 29 March 'that lately there has passed two or three expresses between Prince Rupert and my lord of Antrim... that Prince Rupert assures my lord of Antrim he shall be admiral of this kingdom under him as soon as the king comes'.131

Though O’Neill condemned their 'foolish designs', this arrangement made perfect sense since Rupert was experiencing real difficulties in finding enough sailors to man his fleet.132 Antrim, thanks to his privateering contacts, was not only in a position to provide him with the necessary manpower but also to put his own frigates, and those of his privateering accomplices, at Rupert's disposal. The London press quickly caught wind of this:

'Many of Prince Rupert’s men have left him; and he hath scarce half men enough to man his ships... Divers of the Irish mariners have declared that they will not sail under him, but desire that the earl of Antrim...may be their admiral'.133

Considering how successful the Irish privateers were at this point - 'Every day brings in some intelligence or other of their piracies on the western

130 Casway, Owen Roe O’Neill, p. 239.
131 Daniel O’Neill to Lane, 29 March 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 24, f. 304); Carte, Ormond, iii, 438-9.
133 Continued Heads of Perfect Passages...From Friday 27 April - 4 May 1649, no. 3 (London, 1649), p. 17.
seas' *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer* lamented in December 1648 - creating Antrim Vice-Admiral of the fleet was a small price to pay for their support.134 For his part, Antrim hoped that this position would help him both to protect his privateering fleet from interference from an administration loyal to Ormond and to provide him with a much needed source of revenue, since the royalist ascendancy over the confederates denied him, and his wife, the pensions they had formerly received from the catholic administration. Moreover Antrim's status as a 'traitor' to the royalist cause gave Andreas FitzPatrick, high sheriff of Queen's County, an opportunity to seize estates there belonging to the second duke of Buckingham, which had up that point provided the couple with £500 per year.135

Ultimately Antrim's ambitions were frustrated by the parliamentary blockade of Kinsale over the summer of 1649.136 And to make matters worse, the news from London was depressing. The O'Neill-Monck truce was condemned by parliament and Monck was recalled.137

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135 Petition of Colonel James MacDonnell to Ormond, c. September 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 155, f. 85). The second duke of Buckingham - via Lord Byron - also requested that Ormond should secure 'such ease for the tenants, that his grace may hope for some benefit out of it...Notwithstanding his mother's follies which no man [censures] more than he', see Byron to Ormond, 27 July/6 August (*Ormonde MSS*, i, 131).


Then, early in August, negotiations with Crelly were abandoned because the Independents did not wish 'to take upon themselves the conclusion of an agreement with the Old Irish (even though they wanted to) because they know the the populace abhors them [the Irish] passionately'.138 Isolated and desperate, Antrim now finally offered his services (and presumably his frigates) to Ormond, who reluctantly agreed to 'employ his present and effectual endeavours in the king's service' and advanced him £100 'least he should not be able to put his good intentions into execution through want of means'.139 But this half-hearted reconciliation was too little and came too late to save the royalist cause, for on 15 August 1649 a large parliamentarian army landed in Ireland under the personal control of Oliver Cromwell and thereby opened a new Pandora's box.

138 Cardenas to Philip IV, [August] 1649 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 33); Comment. Rinucc., iv, 282; Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, i, 93-4.

139 Ormond to the commissioners of trust, 21 August 1649 (P.R.O.I., Carte Transcripts 25, p. 200).
'Crumwell came over' Bishop Nicholas French later reminisced, 'and like a lightening passed through the land'. 1 The rout of the marquis of Ormond's army by the parliamentarians at Rathmines on 2 August 1649 enabled Oliver Cromwell and his force of 12,000 veterans, armed with heavy artillery, to land unmolested near Dublin. Within three months the key royalist and confederate strongholds of Drogheda (11 September), Wexford (11 October), New Ross (19 October) and Carrickfergus (2 November) had been either taken or surrendered to the English invaders. The capture of Kilkenny (27 March), Clonmel (10 May), Carlow (24 July) and Charlemount (14 August) in 1650, of Limerick (27 October 1651) and finally of Galway (12 April 1652) completed the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland. In just under three years the parliamentary army had succeeded in uniting Ireland under one ruler, something Ormond, the Scottish covenanters, and the confederate armies had all failed to do.

But what did the military conquest of Ireland mean to the marquis of Antrim, who was based in Waterford during the 1649 offensive? The extermination of the 'flower of Ormond's army' at Drogheda affected him little, but the extirpation of the privateering fleet,

1 Nicholas French, The Unkinde desertor of loyall men and true frinde (1846 edn.), p. 13.
which doubled as Ireland's navy, at Wexford - now described as 'the Dunkirk of Ireland, and a place only famous for being infamous' - was another matter. On the eve of Wexford's fall (10 October) 'a party of his Excellencies foot, by the help of some vessels, took the Earl of Antrim's frigate with 14 guns'. This was probably the Mary of the Isles and was the fourth of Antrim's warships to have been taken by the parliamentary navy in less than two years.

In February 1648 a formidable frigate ('one of the best frigates that the earl of Antrim hath') armed with twenty-two guns had been chased and finally captured by parliamentary warships off the south-west coast of Ireland. In addition to the twenty-two guns, three barrels of gunpowder, 100 muskets, 200 'halberts', pikes and other weapons, twenty barrels of beef, forty barrels of beer and wine, plus 'good store of furniture...and divers chests, trunks and boxes' were plundered from this vessel. The Mary of Antrim, which had been mortgaged in February 1647 but was still referred to as Antrim's 'vice-admiral', was also captured by a parliamentary frigate (the Tiger) off Land's End in February 1649. In July 1649 the St. 

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2 Simms, War and Politics, p. 4; The Irish Monthly Mercury, Issue 1, (London, 1649), p. 3.

3 A History or brief chronicle of the chief matters of the Irish warres... (London, 1650); Denis Murphy, Cromwell in Ireland. A History of Cromwell's Irish Campaign (Dublin, 1897), p. 160.

4 A Great Victory at Sea..., pp 2-3, 6.
Peter of Waterford met a similar fate when it was captured by the Phoenix near Portland Bill after a chase lasting two days. According to a London newspaper 'ten guns, fourteen oars and seventy-five men' were taken off the frigate which was described as 'an excellent sayler'. Thus the capture of the Mary of the Isles in Wexford harbour three months later spelt the end of Antrim's brief yet remarkably successful career as a privateer.

During the autumn of 1649, however, the marquis was apparently more worried about his wife's future than that of his privateering flotilla. Though the duchess had been granted permission to join her son and the exiled royal court in France towards the end of August, lack of funds forced her to remain in Waterford with her husband. The marquis badgered Ormond for money 'by reason my good woman must be forced for security to move further and if the danger increases

5 See pp 270-2 above; James Peacock to Warwick, 6 February 1649 (Bodl., Tanner MSS 57/2, f. 514); Appleby, 'An Irish letter of marque', pp 218-21; examination of Antonio 'Undermerch', 5 February 1649 (P.R.O., H.C.A. 13/250 Part I) and P.R.O., H.C.A. 34/4, ff 76-7, 96-7. The frigate was allegedly en route to Newfoundland, Continued Heads of Perfect Passages... From Friday 4 - 11 May 1649, no. 4 (London, 1649), p. 34.

6 Sentence delivered on the St. Peter of Waterford, 3 August 1649 (P.R.O., H.C.A. 34/4/131-2); Perfect Occurrences of Every Dales Journall in Parliament... From Friday 6-12 July 1649, no. 131 (London, 1649), p. 1105.

7 Gilbert, Ir. confed., vii, 268; Robert Long to Ormond, 24 July/3 August 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 25, f. 138). Antrim's permit was however, only to be issued at Ormond's discretion.
she must part this kingdom'.8 But no money arrived and
the duchess remained in Waterford, where her health
took a dramatic turn for the worse in late October.
This time Antrim begged the lord lieutenant to send Dr
Fennell at once to tend to the dying duchess. In a
desperate attempt to force Ormond to act immediately
Antrim concluded his distraught letter:

'I beg this favour upon my knees... and for her
son’s sake, which will be of much more force than
any argument that can possible be alleged by your
excellence’s most humble servant'.9

But his efforts were to no avail. Early in
November 1649 Katherine, duchess of Buckingham and
marchioness of Antrim died, perhaps from the plague
that was raging through Ireland. She was buried
outside the walls of Waterford.10

With the death of the wife whom he had loved and
cherished deeply, Antrim’s prospects looked bleaker
than ever. Any claims he may have had to at least some
of her extensive English estates and properties all
passed now to her son, the second duke of Buckingham.
He also lost an influential and powerful partner who
was experienced in manipulating the networks of
patronage on which his survival was so dependent.
Finally, her death left him a childless widower —
albeit aged only thirty-nine.

8 Antrim to Ormond, 1 October 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS
25, f. 640).

9 Antrim to Ormond, 26 October 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS
26, f. 35).

10 Comment. Rinucc. , iv, 362.
Politically speaking, Antrim was also now bereft and so he clandestinely threw in his lot with the Cromwellians. Though the details are obscure, he appears to have been in fairly close contact with the invaders ever since their arrival in Ireland the previous summer. He communicated with them through Patrick Crelly who, after the failure of his talks with the Independents in London, had followed Cromwell to Ireland in the knowledge that, even though negotiations for religious toleration for catholics had foundered, 'Cromwell or anyone else who goes as general will carry an order and full powers to negotiate with the marquis of Antrim and O'Neill'. Therefore Crelly put the marquis in touch with with two leading Cromwellians: Henry Ireton, Cromwell’s son-in-law, and Henry Jones bishop of Clogher. Whether, as some suggested, Antrim was actively involved (using Hugh Rochford as his intermediary) in persuading the inhabitants of Wexford to surrender to Cromwell is unclear. But he

11 For further details on Crelly’s talks see pp 317-25 above. Cardenas to Philip IV, [August] 1649 (A.G.S., Eo. 2524, f. 33).

12 Inchiquin to Ormond, 3 November 1649 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 38, f. 101); John Dongan to Ormond, 24 August 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 25, f. 349); Warrant by Ireton, 7 January 1650 (ibid., MSS 118, f. 45v and T.C.D., MS 844, f. 96); Henry Jones to Antrim, 11 February 1650 (ibid.). Robert W. Ramsey, *Henry Ireton* (London, 1949), chapters 15 and 16 highlight the compromising, conciliatory nature of Ireton’s rule in Ireland.

13 John Dongan to Ormond, 24 August 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 25, f. 349); Robert Dunlop (ed.), *Ireland under the Commonwealth*. Being a selection of documents relating to the government of Ireland from 1651 to 1659 2 vols.
certainly demonstrated his willingness to serve the
Cromwellians by securing the surrender of nearby New
Ross (19 October) for Ireton later reminded the English
council of state of the 'singular service' Antrim had
done the army 'since the first day they came before
Rosse'.

There are several possible reasons for the
marquis's decision to side with 'the enemy'. Firstly,
he believed that only Cromwellian support would enable
him to retrieve his Ulster inheritance. Secondly, it
offered him an opportunity to regain some of the
political power he had enjoyed during the later 1640s.
Thirdly, and equally important to Antrim, it provided a
forum from which to continue his personal feud against
the lord lieutenant.

Ormond's future at this moment looked bleak
indeed. His troops were dispirited and mutinous: the
'men of our side' he complained to Inchiquin 'have as
much mind to destroy one the other, as either have to

(Manchester, 1913), i, 124; Murphy, Cromwell in
Ireland, p. 145; Carte, Ormond, iii, 489-90,

14 The substance of the earl of Antrim's declaration,
undated (Bodl., Carte MSS 28, f. 366).

15 It will be recalled that the situation in East
Ulster was characteristically complex during the later
1640s: the Scottish army remained in Counties Antrim
and Down (despite being routed at Benburb in 1646)
until the bulk of the force returned to fight for the
king in Scotland late in 1648; over the course of the
next twelve months effective military control of the
key strongholds in East Ulster passed to parliamentary
forces (under the commands first of George Monck and,
after his recall, of Sir Charles Coote and then of
Colonel Venables).
destroy the common enemy'. Ormond had managed to offset some of the disastrous losses suffered by his armies at the hands of the Cromwellians by persuading Owen Roe O'Neill and the Army of Ulster to join him, but O'Neill's death (6 November), less than three weeks after the treaty had been signed, created a power vacuum. Ormond was determined to keep O'Neill's veteran warriors in the royalist camp, but Antrim, who saw himself as O'Neill's heir apparent, as usual had an alternative strategy. After burying his wife, he hurried from Waterford to nearby Clonmel where he assured the mayor of the town 'that all the Ulster men were ready to forsake... [Ormond] and are discontented', and directed the 'dispersing of printed papers amongst his majesty's garrisons for debauching the soldiers therein'. He also disseminated the rumour, which he claimed that he had from reliable parliamentary source (Colonel Michael Jones), that Lord Inchiquin, commander-in-chief of the king's army in Ireland and lord president of Munster, had sold out to the Commonwealth. Inchiquin denied the charge. But, as Gardiner noted, 'Whatever the truth may have been,

16 Inchiquin to Ormond, 3 November 1649 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 38, f. 101).

17 Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to Charles II, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7); John Walshe to Ormond, 16 November 1649 (ibid., MSS 26, f. 219).

the mere fact that the charge was made weakened the authority of Inchiquin, weak enough already'.

Ormond, at least, saw Antrim's efforts as highly effective. In a revealing letter to Charles II, he claimed that the royalist war-effort in Ireland was crippled by the 'natural distrust of the people and by the use thereof made by my lord marquis of Antrim, who hath not ceased...to disturb the minds of the [people] and to render my Lord of Inchiquin and me suspected of them'. Ormond admitted that he had intended to arrest Antrim but 'he, suspecting my intention, pretended sickness'. In utter desperation the lord lieutenant even contemplated resigning his post: 'I should not esteem myself unhappy or much prejudiced by having no more to do with a people that can be wrought upon by so shallow an engine as my Lord Antrim'.

Ormond had not overestimated Antrim's influence, for it was soon reported in royalist circles that the people were so fed up with the lord lieutenant that they wanted the papal nuncio Rinuccini to return and take over the reins of power! This rumour was no doubt occasioned by Crelly's return to Rome late in the autumn of 1649 to secure foreign assistance for


20 Ormond to Charles II, 15 December 1649 (Bodl., Carte MSS 26, ff 381-3v).

21 A report on Irish affairs, 21/31 January 1650 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 39, f. 56).
Antrim's attempts to unseat Ormond.22 Towards the end of January 1650 the abbot approached the Spanish ambassador there for assistance: after explaining the factional alignment in Ireland, and the influence of the French over the 'New Irish' (as he termed them) led by Ormond and Inchiquin, he begged that Spain intervene on behalf of the Old Irish (led by Antrim and supported by the Independents) in order to prevent a French takeover in Ireland.23

In addition to soliciting Spanish succour for Antrim's party in Ireland, Crelly continued to work for 'a right understanding... between independence [sic] and catholics'.24 In all he spent six months in Rome lobbying leading cardinals for aid and finally, thanks to Rinuccini's intervention, he secured another

22 Comment. Rinucc., iv, 283. By early January 1650 Crelly, described by one royalist source as 'a cunning fellow and a boldface', was living 'incognito among the O'Neilists at St. Isidors' in Rome, Robert Meynell to Cottington, 8/18 January 1650 (Clarendon S. F., ii, 509-10).

23 Copy of a memorial given to the duke of Infantado by an Irish gentleman [Crelly], 23 January/ 2 February 1650 (A.G.S., Eo. 3020, unfol.); Comment. Rinucc., iv, 536. Ignorant of Irish affairs, Infantado could only refer Crelly's request to Madrid where it appears to have been ignored, Infantado to Philip IV, 10/20 February 1650 (ibid., Eo. 3020, unfol.). Relations between the Spaniards and the Independents were at this point remarkably harmonious, Loomie, 'Cárdenas and the Long Parliament', pp 306-7; ibid., 'London's Spanish Chapel', p. 413.

24 Anthony Geoghegan to Mr Haly [Crelly], 4 February 1652 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 42, f. 347). Crelly was not alone. For example a catholic Englishman (William Metham) believed that 'cooperation with the Protectorate was the right policy for catholics, and he went to Rome to act as an unofficial agent of the policy', Hugh Aveling, Northern Catholics (London, 1966), p. 307.
audience with the pope himself. Crelly set out to demonstrate that 'Cromwell was much disposed to a liberty of religion, if not formal toleration of popery, and would much incline the parliament thereto, and therefore that it was not safe to provoke either'.25 The papacy accepted Crelly's analysis and (much to the disgust of the royalists) not only refused to assist Charles II but even sent an agent (Anthony Geoghegan) to take the matter up with the Irish clergy.26 Ultimately nothing came of these talks (though the following year it was rumoured that, together with Antrim, Crelly had secured concessions for Irish catholics of which the English parliament, the pope and Philip IV all approved.)27 So in June 1650 Crelly jubilantly hurried back to England to attend to 'affairs of the catholic faith and his own house'.28

25 C. H. Firth, 'Thomas Scot's account of his actions as Intelligencer during the Commonwealth' in E.H.R., xii, (1897), p. 120.

26 Ibid., p. 120; Loomie, 'London's Spanish Chapel', p. 413.

27 Royalist spies in Rome also feared the conclusion of some sort of alliance, however unlikely, between the parliament and the pope. Father Thomas Babthorpe to Cottington 21/31 July 1650 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 40, f. 75v); Anthony Geoghegan to Mr Haly [Crelly], 4 February 1652 (ibid., MSS 42, ff 347-8). Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, iii, xvi; Comment. Rinucc., iv, 536; v, 210. On Crelly's death in 1655 Geoghegan appears to have continued negotiations with the Independents in his place, P[eter] T[albot] to Ormond, 2/12 August 1656 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 52, f. 164).

28 Copy of a memorial given to Infantado by an Irish gentleman, 23 January/ 2 February 1650 (A.G.S., Eo. 3020, unfol.); Robert Meynell to Cottington and Hyde,
Meanwhile, in Ireland, Antrim sought to have himself elected as Owen Roe’s successor as commander of the Army of Ulster. There were four leading candidates: Hugh Dubh O’Neill, who was Owen Roe’s nephew and major-general of the army; Antrim’s protestant cousin and former ally Daniel O’Neill; Heber MacMahon, catholic bishop of Clogher, who had been an intimate of Owen Roe; and Antrim himself. Since the election date was set for March 1650, the candidates and their factions spent January and February jockeying for support.29 Little is known about Antrim’s faction except that, at long last, he succeeded in winning over to his camp Sir George Monro (who in 1648 had embraced the royalist cause; in April 1650 he was to return to the parliamentary fold) and that he seems to have been supported by those clerics who had followed Rinuccini.30 The marquis must also have enjoyed a considerable following among the Ulster gentry since Ormond genuinely feared that they intended electing Antrim - although a ‘known instrument of Cromwell’ - as

14/24 June 1650 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 40, f. 75v). Creelly also served as a papal agent in London, Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, ii, 138-9.

29 Jerrold Casway, ‘The Belturbet Council and election of March 1650’ in Clogher Record, xii, no. 2 (1986), pp 160-8; Cregan, ‘An Irish Cavalier... 1642-51’, pp 128-9; Gilbert, Contemp. hist., 1641-52, ii, 70; iii, 212.

30 Clanricard to Ormond, 15 February 1650 (Bodl., Carte MSS 26, f. 408); Anthony Geoghegan to Mr Haly [Creelly], 4 February 1652 (ibid., MSS 42, ff 345-6); Comment. Rinucc., v, 5, 26. History of the War of Ireland, pp 113-5; Casway, ‘The Belturbet Council’, pp 163-4; Gardiner, Commonwealth and protectorate, i, 171; Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp 277-8.
the army's new commander. The lord lieutenant could only hope that Clogher's influence would prevent a person 'so unfit that cannot keep his own foolish council' from being chosen.31

Despite rumours that Antrim had in fact won the election, Ormond's wishes were realized: the politically astute but militarily inexperienced bishop of Clogher was appointed commander of the army on 18 March.32 But it would seem that every effort was made to buy Antrim's continued support. The archbishop of Dublin (according to an Ormondist informer) suggested that 'if his lordship and his friends would give way to the election of bishop McMahon to be general, means should be used that Antrim should be made lord lieutenant in your excellency's place'.33

Rather than winning the marquis over to the royalist side, however, the failure to secure military command and thus political power pushed him even deeper into the parliamentary camp. Immediately after the election, he made for Cromwellian quarters in County Meath where he appears to have remained with the main army for the remainder of 1650. The bishop of Cork later asserted that Ireton's tent 'was his sanctuary' and that Antrim spent most of his time with the general

31 Ormond to Clanricard, 16 February 1650 (Bodl., Carte MSS 26, f. 696).
32 H.M.C. rep., 13, p. 523.
33 Humphrey Galbraith to Ormond, 26 March 1650 (Bodl., Carte MSS 27, f. 203).
who, after Cromwell's departure for Britain at the end of May, became commander-in-chief of the parliamentary forces in Ireland. While Antrim appears to have played no direct part in defeating the Army of Ulster under MacMahon at Scarrifhollis in County Donegal (21 June 1650), he was present at the siege of Carlow (July) and tried to persuade his former followers there to surrender peacefully and quietly.

During these months relations between Antrim and Ireton and his officers became increasingly friendly and intimate. So much so that in May 1650 the marquis revealed to them the late king's eagerness in the spring of 1641 to use Strafford's 'new Irish army' against his recalcitrant English parliament. Antrim's confessions clearly delighted the Cromwellians (who then insisted that he formally swear to their authenticity) since they offered further justification for the recent decision to execute their late sovereign. Colonel Venables, commander of the parliamentary forces in Ulster, lost no time in informing the bishop of Cork of Charles I's involvement.

34 Examination of bishop of Cork, Cloyne and Ross, 1 February 1661 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 208/P.R.O., S.P. 63/306/45 (f.87)).

35 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 214-7; Some observations of adventurers and soldiers on the estate claimed by Antrim, [1661] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 328-31); Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to Charles II, [August, 1663] (ibid., ff 376-7); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 336.

36 The details and significance of this 'Antrim plot' have been discussed at length in appendix 1.7 and on pp 122-4 above.
with Irish papists early in 1641. When the bishop suggested (or so he claimed at the Restoration) that the colonel was lying, Venables 'broke forth into a violent declaration against all cavaliers, blaming them that they should still continue obstinate [in] the discoursing of that which was so conspicuous to all [in]different persons in the world'.

For his part, Antrim received several important favours from the new regime. Ireton promised Antrim that he should either be allowed to compound for his estates in Ulster or be awarded lands equivalent to them elsewhere in Ireland. Accordingly, the marquis received permission in August 1650 to put his case before the council of state in London and to 'go among his tenants to gather what money he could for the fitting of him for his journey and by virtue thereof he raised £1,000 amongst them'. He was also given an amnesty from being arrested by his creditors for two months. The marquis arrived at Chester on 3 December with his factors, Archibald Stewart and Daniel

37 Examination of bishop of Cork, Cloyne and Ross, 1 February 1661 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 208/P.R.O., S.P. 63/306/45 (f.87)).

38 A similar offer was made to Castlehaven: Ireton promised him that 'if I would retire and live in England, I should not only enjoy my estate, but remain in safety with esteem and favour of the parliament', The Earl of Castlehaven's Review, p. 172.

39 The substance of the earl of Antrim's declaration, undated (Bodl., Carte MSS 28, f. 366); Some observations of the adventurers and soldiers, [April], 1661 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 330); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 278. For further details on Antrim's debts see pp 65-8 above.
MacNaughten, whom he sent on to London to make the necessary arrangements for his sojourn there. Within six days Antrim had reached the earl of Newport's house 'but he was scarce lighted, when Stewart and [Mac]Naughten finding what entertainment he was like to receive sent him word that he should instantly return to Barnard [Barnet?] until he heard from them'. He left at once but 'it being late, he took up his lodging at Highgate, where he was scarce settled when the constable of the town did beset the house with his guard and secured him until the next morning and then carried him before a justice of the peace'. The council of state was immediately informed of Antrim's mission and of Ireton's support for his case but, though loath to offend Ireton, they felt obliged to instruct the local officers to send Antrim 'back from wither he came'. On 10 December it was recorded in the 'Day's Proceedings' of the council of state that the marquis of Antrim had been 'denied his composition with Parliament' and the appropriate officials in Ireland were notified accordingly. Forbidden even to set foot in London the marquis returned to Dublin, arriving early in January 1651.

40 The substance of the earl of Antrim's declaration, undated (Bodl., Carte MSS 28, f. 366). Newport was a court favourite during the 1630s who had served the king until his capture by parliament in 1646. He was tried but allowed to live in London, D.N.B., 'Newport'.

41 The substance of the earl of Antrim's declaration, undated (Bodl., Carte MSS 28, f. 366); Cal. S.P. Dom., 1650, pp 463, 465, 567.
Depressed at being denied a hearing, the marquis visited Ireton in Kilkenny before returning to Ulster where he continued to promote the Cromwellian war-effort, and to hinder ‘all levies and assistances’ in the province on the king’s behalf. His success in winning over the general population in Ulster – ‘the marquis of Antrim having too great an influence upon the affections of most of that province’ – was duly reported to Ormond who, after handing over his command to Clanricard, had left for the continent the previous December.

Equally valuable to the Commonwealth were Antrim’s efforts to disrupt the Scottish royalists’ war-effort. The ‘third civil war’ had begun with Charles II’s arrival in Scotland in June 1650 and the raising of a formidable royalist army under David Leslie. However the following month Cromwell and a parliamentary army of 15,000 invaded Scotland and on 3 September routed Leslie’s army at Dunbar, leading an increasingly desperate Charles II to counterattack the next year by marching into England. This shift in events greatly strengthened Antrim’s position since the Republic now needed his support for an anti-Stuart coalition more than ever. Just as his ‘secret weapon’ during the Bishops’ Wars and the 1640s had been the political

42 Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to Ormond, [30 July 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 374). Whether or not he was allowed to reside on his estates is unclear.

43 Lane to Ormond, 6/16 March 1651 (Bodl., Carte MSS 29, ff 320-2).
geography of East Ulster and the Western Isles, and the influence he enjoyed on both sides of the North Channel, so too from the summer of 1650 he played upon the fear in royalist circles that he was about to invade Scotland again. For instance in July 1651 Ormond was informed of 'the malicious folly of Antrim, who is now as vainly, though more dishonestly, as in my Lord Strafford's time threatening Scotland with an invasion'. But Antrim's threat was not 'vain': he had, after all, previously planned at least five separate invasions of the Isles - under much less favourable circumstances; and one of them, in 1644-5, had succeeded beyond all expectation. Unfortunately evidence detailing how the marquis intended to assemble men and ships in 1650-1 is entirely lacking; but presumably he proposed to call out his followers, kin and tenants as he had done so many times before.

Antrim's intrigues infuriated King Charles II, whose political survival now depended on Scottish support:

'The disloyal proceedings and undertakings of the marquis of Antrim with the English rebels to secure the North of Ireland to them, and so disturb the north of Scotland on their behalf, are


45 Montgomery to Ormond, 26 June/6 July 1651 (Bodl., Carte MSS 29, f. 590v). 'Charges against Randall Marquis of Antrim contained in the petition of Adventurers and soldiers', circa December, 1663 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Book 8).
so open and notorious that you cannot but be well
aware of him, and watchful (as we are here) to
prevent any mischief he can attempt.'

In order to distract him the king advised Clanricard
'to raise up such a disturbance to himself [Antrim] in
the enjoyment of his possessions there (which were not
given by the Crown to this use) as may make him soon
repent...of his bargain'. In the event, however, the
plan was abandoned when Charles II's army was routed at
the battle of Worcester on 3 September 1651. The
Cromwellian conquest of Scotland quickly followed this
'crowning mercy' and the 'war of the three kingdoms'
was to all intents and purposes over.

II - Surviving the storm (1651-60)

Even before Worcester, as Clanricard tartly
related to Ormond, Antrim's personal fortunes had begun
to wane once more:

'The marquis of Antrim hath long been quartered by
the rebels in Lord Viscount Gallmoy's [sic] house
not far from Kilkenny in a very obscure and
unregarded condition and I believe his
undertakings are so well understood by them that I
apprehend little danger can proceed from him
unless he can find a contrivement to appear for
His Majesty, having gained the reputation of
pulling down the side he is on.'

46 Charles II to Clanricard, 10 March 1651 (Bodl.,
Carte MSS 29, ff 66-7).
47 The war officially dragged on in Ireland until 27
April 1653 when Philip McHugh O'Reilly surrendered at
Cloughoughter.
48 Clanricard to Fanshaw, 27 August 1651 (Ormonde MSS,
i, 194). "His lordship lives "honourably" upon free
quarter from one house to another and was lately at my
Clearly Antrim’s very success in rallying support for the parliamentary cause alarmed his new benefactors who feared that he would in turn incite rebellion against the Commonwealth.49 Therefore, towards the end of March 1651, the council of state ordered that ‘the earl of Antrim do within ten days after the sight of this repair to Dublin and there remain for the space of six months’.50

The reluctance of the London government to use Irish catholics to fight their battles, combined with the outbreak of peace on the Celtic Fringe, thus proved disastrous for Antrim. For as long as Scotland and Ireland were submerged in warfare, the marquis was able to exploit his abilities as a military entrepreneur and troop-raiser in the hope that his traditional estates would be returned to him as his reward; but peace in all three kingdoms deprived him of his one surviving asset. Matters were made worse by the death in November 1651 of his Cromwellian benefactor Henry Ireton, which jeopardized Antrim’s already uncertain position within the new regime.

From this point onward, however, references to the marquis of Antrim in the extant historical sources all but disappear. For instance, nothing is known about


him — where he was living, what he was doing or with whom — between May 1652 and April 1654; between July 1654 and July 1655; between October 1655 and January 1657; and between May 1657 and June 1658. In other words nearly sixty-five months, or the better part of seven years (1652-9), of Antrim’s life remain unaccounted for.51 As the surviving extracts and contemporary references indicate, there was once a considerable amount of information about him in the now lost Commonwealth records.52 Yet it probably did not amount to much: Antrim’s political importance during the 1650s should not be overstated. There is little concrete evidence elsewhere to suggest that he was anything more than a ‘Cromwellian pensioner’ who focused all his energies and his meagre resources on trying to salvage what he could out of his mangled inheritance.

When Antrim first sold out to the new regime, in 1649-50, the Cromwellian land settlement — albeit firmly rooted in the ‘Adventurers’ Act’ of 19 March

51 He did not, however, ‘retire to England, where he lived till the Restoration’ as stated in Clan Donald, ii, 729-30.

1642 and the 'Doubling Ordinance' of 14 July 1642 which allotted Irish forfeited lands to protestant adventurers - was still by no means inevitable. Even though Antrim's estates had been declared forfeit by the English parliament in February 1642, and reserved for these property speculators, every effort was made by the Dublin administration 'to preserve him [Antrim], and to free him from being an excepted person for life and estate'. Therefore, early in January 1652, parliamentary commissioners requested that Antrim - 'not having been so active as most others have against the parliament, nor being a man of designing head, or guilty of the massacres' - might be 'left out of the exception for life and estate' and allowed to compound for his property.53 Until a decision on this matter had been reached in England the commissioners ordered that he should live in Ulster in a 'convenient' place provided by Colonel Venables.54 But, as in 1650, Antrim's application was rejected by the English council of state.

To make matters worse, in June 1653 lots were finally drawn for the adventurers' lands in Ireland and the barony of Dunluce was accordingly set aside for sixteen entrepreneurs (largely Londoners) who had advanced a total of £8,656 in return for 42,611 Irish

53 Commissioners in Dublin to lord lieutenant, 8 January 1652 (Dunlop, Commonwealth, i, 124-5).

54 Commissioners in Dublin to Venables, 8 January 1652 (Dunlop, Commonwealth, i, 123); Antrim to the council of state, [c.January, 1652] (B.L., Add. MSS 34,326, ff 2-3).
acres of land. In the months following the lottery the speculators either sold or exchanged their adventures. Sir John Clotworthy (later Lord Massareene), who had originally invested £2,254 and received 11,231 acres in the baronies of Massareene and Dunluce, doubled his territorial empire in County Antrim by buying up lots in the barony of Dunluce to the value of £3,187.56

Unfortunately for Antrim, the land settlement did not end there. In 1654 the remainder of his estate was surveyed (the 'Civil Survey') in order to establish how much land was available for distribution to the Commonwealth's unpaid soldiers in lieu of wages. As


56 Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, p. 201. Assignments to Clotworthy (between 10 November 1653 and 26 April 1654) by Richard Darnelly, William Firth, Thomas Andrews, Nicholas Williams, Bartholomew Fosson (Cal. S.P. Ire., Adventurers 1642-59, pp 6, 7, 64, 119/P.R.O., S.P. 63/288/76, 79; S.P., 63/290/172; S.P., 63/292/250, 251). Clotworthy also bought a residence from 'one Doc a goldsmith' which was never paid for, Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 204-6).

57 Thus in the survey of his lands in County Londonderry, Antrim was listed as 'the proprietor' of three parishes in the barony of Coleraine, Civil Survey, iii, pp 155-7. Unfortunately the county Antrim
a result, over the course of the next two years over 65,000 acres of the Antrim estate were parcelled out to over 800 Cromwellian soldiers. Troops in seven separate companies were allotted 'debentures' in the baronies of Kilconway, Cary and Glenarm and in the Long Liberties. The average debenture was between nine and fifteen acres with the officers receiving substantially more than the enlisted men. For example, Captain Richard Franklin received 1,476 acres while privates Henry Langdale and Abraham Thompson were each allotted just under two acres.

'Civil Survey' itself has not survived but the Books of Survey and Distribution for the county have. Though drawn up during the Restoration period, they were probably based on the Civil Survey and may therefore serve as an alternative source to the missing volumes. Civil Survey, x, pp xv, 56-7, 60-1; Hill, MacDonnells, pp 451-66; Robert C. Simington, 'Annesley collection photographic acquisition by the National Library' in Anal. Hib., xvi (1946), pp 350-4, Geraldine Talon, 'Books of Survey and Distribution, County Westmeath: A comparative survey, with reference to their administrative context and chronological sequence' in Anal. Hib., xxviii (1978), pp 105-15.

58 This figure varied between 65,000 and 72,688 acres (the latter included 23,224 acres in Glenarm), Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 338-40; Papers concerning adventurers and soldiers, [c. December] 1662 (ibid., 1660-2, pp 649-60/P.R.O., S.P. 63/311/17 ff 29-45v).

The majority of Cromwell's troops were eager for cash and merely sold their debentures and went home so that, as with the adventurers' lots, there was an immediate redistribution. Three categories of individual purchased the new acres. Firstly, several Cromwellian officers with debentures in the area added to their own holdings by acquiring those of their men. Secondly, local landowners, particularly Clotworthy and Dr Ralph King, bought up this cheap land so as to expand and consolidate their own estates. Finally, the original tenants of the marquis's estates, who were naturally anxious to return to their farms, also purchased debentures wherever they could.60

This rapid turnover of landholding makes it impossible to estimate accurately the number of adventurers and soldiers who actually settled on the Antrim estates during the later 1650s. Even at the Restoration the matter was hotly disputed. Antrim's enemies suggested that 900 persons had settled on the estate between 1656 and 1659, while the marquis argued that no more than five adventurers and one hundred soldiers had taken up residence.61 The latter figure was confirmed by contemporary observers. One noted

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60 For an English parallel see Ian Gentles, 'The Purchasers of Northamptonshire Crown Lands 1649-1660' in *Midland History*, iii, no. 3 (Spring 1976), pp 207-11.

that the only adventurer ‘of condition’ was Clotworthy while ‘the rest [were] without names, save some citizens of London, for whom he [Clotworthy] is an undertaker’. 62 The same source added that ‘there were not six English tenants placed by those into the north unto whom it was assigned’. 63 While Antrim claimed at the Restoration that those few adventurers and soldiers who had actually settled did nothing to encourage further English plantation or to improve their holdings. Only one even bothered to build a house of ‘stone and timber’, while others allowed the property on their lots to fall into disrepair. Antrim’s house at Dunluce, which was improved during the 1630s, was totally neglected. 64 Moreover they bled their holdings for a quick economic return on their investment, with the result that within a three year period the adventurers whose lots fell in the barony of Dunluce were said to have ‘received treble their adventure or debenture money’. Other settlers allegedly ‘received more than seven fold’. 65

Yet despite having his inheritance carved up, and well over 100,000 acres of it parcelled out to

62 Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, f. 206).
63 Ibid. f. 205.
65 Antrim’s case, no date [late 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 332-v); Hill, MacDonnells, pp 340; Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 206).
mercenary entrepreneurs, Antrim was able to maintain very close links with his estates throughout the Interregnum. This was largely thanks to the fact that over 200,000 acres (roughly two-thirds) of his property was apparently not allotted to adventurers and soldiers. Who actually 'owned' or, at least, controlled these acres is unclear; presumably they remained in government hands and continued to be farmed by Antrim's previous tenants. This would certainly explain why a considerable portion of the estate rental continued to find its way into the marquis's pocket.

For instance, after 1652 he received a monthly allowance of £40 'out of the profits from his estate in Ulster'.66 In May 1654, he was awarded £100 'out of the rents and profits that Archibald Stewart makes out of the said Earl his estate in Ulster'.67 In addition to these legitimate stipends, he was involved in endless schemes designed either to raise further revenue from the land or to re-establish his hold over it. In the barony of Cary, for example, he was somehow able to conceal from the authorities over 2,194 acres of land which were later 'discovered' by Dr Ralph King. He also collected over £200 worth of rents in the

66 E. MacLysaght (ed.), 'Commonwealth State Accounts, 1650-56' in Anál. Híb., xv (1944), p. 245; Commissioners in Dublin to commissioners in Belfast, 14 April 1652 (Dunlop, Commonwealth, i, 175); transcript of an undated order (King's Inns, Prendergast Papers 3, p. 674).

67 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 278; MacLysaght, 'Commonwealth State Accounts' p. 247.
barony of Glenarm between 1658 and 1660 and appears to have leased (for twenty-one years) a substantial holding on his own property from Clotworthy.68

Finally, he instructed his old tenants to purchase back land for him. Thus during the later 1650s, John Shaw of Ballygally bought 'four towns and a half' in the barony of Kilconway for £359-3-9 from Alderman Thomas Miller of Limerick and other property from Captain Samuel Porter, which he conveyed to Antrim in 1666 (when it was at last safe to do so). In addition to paying the principal, the marquis allowed Shaw, as his reward, the annual rental (of £11) from the lands for forty-one years.69

Presumably he made similar arrangements with the inhabitants of the barony of Glenarm who paid £2,000 to Major Smith and his men for their Glenarm holdings; with the former occupier of a farm of eighty acres in the barony of Cary who was able to re-enter his holding on paying the soldier to whom it had been allotted the sum of £10; and with the tenant on a neighbouring farm who re-purchased it from soldiers for a relatively small sum, explaining to them 'that as it had become overgrown with "whins" the land was of little value!'.70

68 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 286; Charles II to lord justices of Ireland, 10 October 1661 (Bodl., Carte MSS 42, f. 404); Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 204-6).

69 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/3A: Kilconway Barony. Only this example appears to have survived among the Antrim papers; undoubtedly there were others.
A further factor which minimized disruption on the Antrim estate was the fact that Archibald Stewart had continued to oversee the daily running of the property during the 1640s and stayed on as Antrim’s watchdog during the 1650s. Despite the upheaval caused first by the rebellion and then by the covenanting army of occupation, Stewart had striven to protect the interests and economic welfare of Antrim’s tenants.  

Conditions were only really desperate between 1642 and 1644 when the Scottish army had levied ‘intolerable taxe[s] and sess [= cess] upon my lands’, had quartered an insufferable number of soldiers on Antrim’s property, had harassed the local population, and had threatened to dispossess 4,000 of them. Matters improved somewhat after 1645 when most of Argyll’s men were recalled across the North Channel to protect their own farms from the ravages of Antrim’s brigade. With fewer men to feed and quarter, the marquis’s tenants were able to focus their energies on repairing the

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71 For further details see pp 132-7 and 141-4 above. For a recent discussion of the impact of the war on an English county see Ann Hughes, ‘Parliamentary tyranny? Indemnity proceedings and the impact of the Civil War: a case study from Warwickshire’ in Midland History, xi (1986), pp 49-78.

72 Stewart to Ormond, 23 February 1644 (Bodl., Carte MSS 9, f. 312); Remonstrance from Stewart to Ormond, [23] February 1644 (ibid., ff 301-v); Remonstrance by Archibald Stewart to Sir William Stewart and others, 5 March 1644 (Hunt., H.A. MSS Box 8/15904).
damage. Though this process of recuperation may have been temporarily interrupted by the Cromwellian conquest of Ulster in 1649-50, it was still possible for Antrim to raise the very considerable sum of £1,000 from his tenants in 1650.

A third and final factor which ensured continuity on the Antrim estates was the survival in place of many tenants, particularly protestant ones, who had taken long leases for their farms from the marquis in 1637. Thus in 1651 it was reported to the council of state how the northern tip of County Antrim was 'planted and inhabited by the Scots and some Irish, very few English being among them'; while a decade later the tenants on the Antrim estate were essentially 'such Scotch and Irish whose fathers and grandfathers were undertenants to the old earl'. Not only was there continuity of landholding at the tenant level but the Commonwealth also recognized as legally binding leases that Antrim had made with his protestant tenants before the rebellion. Therefore in February 1655 Colonel Arthur

73 The Antrim estates still had to finance, quarter and feed the Scottish soldiers who stayed on until the late 1640s; but the burden was less than during the earlier period, see for example Orders by Monck, 13 December 1648 and 3 January 1649 (Hunt., H.A. MSS Box 8/15301 and Box 9/15307); Raymond Gillespie, 'Landed Society and the Interregnum in Ireland and Scotland' in Mitchison and Roebuck, Economy and Society, pp 39-41.


75 [    ] to council of state, 1 August 1651 (St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, O'Renehan MSS 2, f. 257); Broderick to Ormond, 1 September 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 624-5); Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 204-6).
Hill was awarded 'the quiet possession of those lands [that] formerly the earl of Antrim granted him' and the state refused to countenance Clotworthy's claim to them.76 Two years later, Antrim's former tenants refused to give up lands in the Long Liberties (which had been assigned to Captain John Galland and his troop) 'by virtue of a lease or leases from the earl of Antrim' and in this they received the support of the Dublin administration.77 As the 1659 census returns of the 'titulados' (or individuals with local influence) illustrate, Antrim's leading protestant tenants from the 1630s (the Shaws, Stewarts, Dunlops, Boyds and Kennedys) continued to influence local affairs and they were only occasionally supplemented by fresh settlers such as Galland.78

What then of Antrim's catholic tenants? Only a third of the people counted in the '1659 census' were either Scottish or English (and presumably protestant), while almost two-thirds were Irish (and presumably catholic).79 It therefore seems clear that, as the

76 Order 1 February 1655 (N.L.I., MS 11,959, p. 389).
77 Captain John Galland to Henry Cromwell, 6 March 1657 (B.L., Lansd. MSS 821, f. 318).
78 Seamus Pender (ed.), A Census of Ireland circa 1659, with supplementary material from the poll money ordinances (1660-1661) (I.M.C., Dublin, 1939), pp ix, 3-21, 139-40; R. C. Simington, 'A "Census" of Ireland, c.1659' in Anal. Hib., xii (1943), pp 177-8.
79 The population of Antrim's three parishes in the Long Liberties of Coleraine, County Londonderry (Ballyrashean, Ballywillin and Ballaghran) have been included in these calculations. In County Antrim as a whole, 56% of the population was Irish and presumably
1650s progressed, increasing numbers of native Irishmen had returned 'home' to their old farms and dwellings.80 No doubt some simply followed their lord back to Ulster; others may have been encouraged to return by their protestant neighbours who needed the labour of Irish sub-tenants, 'being easier to get, and of more present profit than English'.81 This was apparently true throughout Ireland. A study of the parish of Donaghmore in County Tyrone indicates that while there was 'a change of proprietors', the Cromwellian settlement 'had but little effect on the local population' since the Cromwellian settlers needed the native Irish to hew their wood and draw their water. Similarly, in the baronies of upper and lower Ormond in County Tipperary, there was 'no general clearance' of native catholics.82

catholic and 44% Scottish or English and presumably protestant. It is worth noting, as Pender did in the introduction to the *Census*, that in order to avoid possible transplantation many evaded the census and therefore the figures should be regarded as a conservative estimate, *Census Ire.*, 1659, pp ix, 3-21, 139-40.

80 Major Brian Smith to Henry Cromwell, 9 June 1658 (B.L., Lansd. MSS 823, f. 60).


The English government did draw the line at allowing catholic proprietors in Ireland to resume formal control over their pre-war estates, but nevertheless in 1654 Antrim tried again, with the full backing of the Cromwellian regime in Ireland, to compound for his inheritance. On this occasion he was provided with £30 'for and towards the defraying the charge of his journey' to London and with a letter of recommendation from Charles Fleetwood, Henry Ireton's replacement.83

'I think [he] is as much an object of pity as any of this nation, and I should be glad [if] something were done for his future subsistence; but, because of his relations, and some about him, I should not desire he might come often to my lord, though I know no man deserves so much mercy to be showed him as he does, of this nation'.

While he sympathized with Antrim's plight, however, Fleetwood did not trust him: 'the truth is, these people are an abominable false, cunning and perfidious people; and the best of them to be pitied, but not to be trusted'.84 The council of state shared Fleetwood's basic mistrust of Irish catholics and, in June 1654, refused Antrim permission to 'represent his condition' since his petition would be denied in any case.85

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83 Hill, O'Brien of Thomond. The O'Briens in Irish History 1500-1865 (Chichester, Sussex, 1986), p. 89.
84 Fleetwood to Thurloe, 2 June 1654 (Thurloe S.P., ii, 343).
Though the administration in Dublin might be unable to restore the marquis to his estate, it could still reward him financially for his loyalty to the regime. Right up to his death in November 1651, Ireton had been 'very sensible of the hard condition of the Lord Antrim who not only submitted to him, but so far endeavoured to serve him, as had gained him some esteem and place in his Lordship's opinion, and some tenderness and care of his future well-being' and had awarded him an annual pension of £500 which was later increased to £800. This substantial regular income was supplemented throughout the 1650s by occasional, additional contributions towards everyday expenses.86

As the 1658 'civil list' clearly demonstrates, Antrim received a larger allowance than any other Irish pensioner (Lord and Lady Mayo were his closest competitors, with a combined stipend of only £134). In fact he was paid nearly as much as Lord Deputy Henry Cromwell, whose annual salary was only £1,000, and considerably more than the average civil servant who received between £20 to £30 per annum.87

86 Commissioners in Dublin to Lord Lieutenant, 8 January 1652 (Dunlop, Commonwealth, i, 124-5); Hill, MacDonnells, p. 278; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 215; MacLysaght, 'Commonwealth State Accounts', pp 245, 317, 318. Order 6 January 1657 (King's Inns, Prendergast Papers 2, p. 679); B.L., Eg. MSS 212, ff 8v, 66. Moreover this allowance was supplemented by lump sum payments: for example, in December 1651 Antrim received, out of Customs and Excise duties, £500 formerly ordered the Earl by the late Deputy [Ireton]. At the Restoration Antrim claimed that his pension was £500, later reduced to £300 under Henry Cromwell, see Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 542.
In addition, Antrim now had access to the assets of his second wife - Rose O’Neill - whom he married some time in 1652 or 1653. Rose was the daughter of Sir Henry O’Neill, chief of the O’Neills of Clandeboy who had died in 1638, and Martha Stafford daughter of the English administrator Sir Francis Stafford. While she was not in the same social league as the duchess of Buckingham, she was both a protestant and the heiress to her father’s estates in the barony of Toome in County Antrim which were reputed to have brought in an annual rental of £1,600 throughout the 1650s.88 By their union Antrim also acquired Rose’s marriage portion of 699 acres in the barony of Toome.89

Despite being judged an ‘innocent papist’ in March 1655, Antrim does not appear to have been granted lands in Connaught or Clare reserved by the ‘Act of satisfaction’ (September 1653) for transplanted Irish families.90 However in 1655-6 Rose was allotted 26,664 Irish acres of good quality land, ‘with convenient accommodation’, in Connaught (8,888 acres in County

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87 The Civil List for Ireland for 1654 (B.L., Add. MSS 19,833, f. 27v).


89 P.R.O.I., Lodge Ms 11, f. 19.

90 O’Hart, Irish Landed Gentry, p. 305.
Galway and the remaining 17,776 in County Mayo). The state agreed to provide her with 'some convenient seat that is undisposed of and that doth belong unto the Commonwealth', although there is no evidence to suggest that she ever left Ulster. Where the couple actually resided remains unclear: Rose's address in 1656 was given as 'Dunluce', while the marquis was living in a small village (Eden) near Carrickfergus in 1657, and in Belfast when the census of 1659 was conducted.

Clearly then, Antrim did not spend the Interregnum 'in great misery' as he claimed at the Restoration, for his average annual income throughout the 1650s probably totalled at least £2,000, as indeed some later claimed.

91 In addition Antrim's brother Alexander was granted a further 7,000 acres in County Galway, R.C. Simington (ed.), The Transplantation to Connaught 1654-58 (I. M. C., Shannon, 1970), pp 172, 206, 214, 123, 175; Order 30 July 1655 (N.L.I., MS 839, [f. 20]). Samuel R. Gardiner, 'The Transplantation to Connaught' in E.H.R., xiv (1899), pp 700-34.

92 Order of 7 September 1655 (N.L.I., MS 11,961, p. 208); Significantly, Antrim's name is not mentioned in the list of transplanted Irish Catholics 1655-1659, Ormonde MSS, ii, 114; O'Hart, Irish Landed Gentry, pp 247, 328, 359.

93 Since Dunluce castle and Antrim's other principal residences had been destroyed during the civil wars, it is possible that they lived at Ballymagarry (near Dunluce) and also spent time at Rose's house at Edenduffcarrick (also known as Shane's castle). Simington, Transplantation to Connaught, pp 172, 206, 214; Census Ire., 1659, p. 8; R. W. Ramsey, Henry Cromwell (London, 1933), p. 183. Antrim was later joined by his younger brother, Alexander (who had spent nearly three years in a London jail), Cal. S.P. Dom., 1651-2, pp 146, 165, 182, 401; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1653-4, p. 82; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, p. 421.

94 Antrim's petition to Charles II, [April, 1661] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 326); Hill, MacDonnells, p.
£2,000 was slight in comparison with the marquis’s outstanding debts from the 1630s (still amounting to roughly £42,000). Only state intervention ensured that he was not arrested by his creditors when he visited England in 1650 and 1654. Admittedly Antrim and his brother made some effort to pacify the creditors - thus in November 1656 Alexander agreed to pay off £1,000 (plus £300 in interest) owed by his brother since July 1638 to a London merchant. But an already unsatisfactory situation was exacerbated in 1657 when the barony of Cary, which had been mortgaged as collateral for Antrim’s debts in 1637, was allotted to Fleetwood’s unpaid troops. The majority of Antrim’s creditors thereby lost any guarantee that the money owed to them would ever be repaid. By the spring of 1657 matters had become so desperate that Antrim begged Henry Cromwell (made lord deputy in November 1656) for help.

'I am reduced to such a condition that I cannot forbear to make my complaint to your lordship and to beg that you will commiserate and relieve me


97 Petition of Archibald Stewart to Ormond, [1663?] (Bodl., Carte MSS 33, f. 275); Petition of Antrim’s creditors to Charles II, [31 October 1660] (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660–2, p. 70/P.R.O., S.P. 63/304/95).
from the continual persecution of my creditors who are now so violent that they do daily employ bailiffs and soldiers to arrest me’.

Their constant harassment, Antrim claimed, ‘has kept me for a long time in the nature of a prisoner that I dare not look out of my door and they threaten withall to force the house and carry me to prison’. Finally he implored Cromwell to:

‘find some certain means to secure my person or to satisfy my debts which is a grace I hear his Highness has been pleased to grant the nobility of Scotland... and until your lordship has seriously considered of this...I beseech you to grant a positive order to all soldiers to forbear to execute any writ against [me]...which will be a means to give some little ease from these perpetual alarms and will be a new addition to all your favours’.98

The Cromwellians had in fact paid off a significant number of Antrim’s debts. Sir David Cunningham, for example, was owed £1,000 and was allowed to set the rents first of Wallingford House and later of the duchess’s houses on the Strand, against the debt, and Henry Dawson, a London skinner who was owed £800, was briefly allowed the rents of York House in a similar arrangement.99 Others received direct compensation. In April 1650 the council of state agreed to pay in full the £5,566 plus interest owed by Antrim to Arthur Hill since 1639 ‘out of the

98 Antrim to Henry Cromwell, 11 April 1657 (Ramsey, Henry Cromwell, p. 183).

99 For details on Cunningham and Dawson see appendix 1.5.
sequestrations of the estates in Ireland'. Hill was paid £6,000 the following September.

One is left wondering why, as the 1650s progressed, the Commonwealth should have continued to patronize and protect Antrim? There are several possible explanations. Firstly, though it may not have seemed like it at the time, in the long term Antrim’s heavy debts actually worked in his favour for his creditors harangued the Commonwealth, as they were later to badger the Restoration government, to help them secure repayment. Secondly, Antrim was also protected by friends and benefactors from the 1630s, such as Sir Robert Pye, who were now favoured servants of the Commonwealth and therefore in a position to help him (just as other Cromwellians, such as John Rushworth, helped English catholics).

100 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1650, pp 100-1.

101 P.R.O., S.P. 28/350/7, f. 31. Similar payments of between £60 and £5,000 were also made to at least eight of Antrim’s other creditors from the sale of the king’s goods during the 1650s. See appendix 1.5: entries for Edward Basse, Humphrey Bradbourne, Abraham Corsellis, Henry Dawson, James Duart, Ralph Grinder, Arthur Hill, Adam and John Lawrence.

102 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1650, pp 100-1.

103 Peter Roebuck, 'The Constables of Everingham. The fortunes of a catholic royalist family during the Civil War and Interregnum' in Recusant History, ix (1967), pp 77-9, 84; Aveling, Northern Catholics, p. 305; P. G. Holiday, 'Land Sales and Repurchase in Yorkshire after the Civil Wars, 1650-1670' in Northern History, v (1970), pp 73-80. His other friends and patrons in London during the 1650s included the duke of Lennox, the eighth earl of Rutland (the duchess of Buckingham’s cousin) and his English agent John Traylman. Whether the second duke of Buckingham, who married General
By far the most important and influential of Antrim's contacts at the Cromwellian court, however, was Abbot Patrick Crelly who, according to the Spanish ambassador, Cárdenas, was 'a well informed person with excellent contacts with several members of parliament in our [Spain's] confidence...The said abbot enjoyed the entire confidence of secretary of state John Thurloe, who was most trusted by Oliver Cromwell'.

In addition to the government's chief minister, Crelly cultivated some leading Independents. For example, between 1649 and 1653 he supplied Thomas Scot (who was the Commonwealth intelligencer and also a regicide) with information about the royalist cause in Ireland and their fund-raising activities in France, Spain, Italy, and 'the general affairs of Vienna'.

No doubt in return for accurate intelligence Scot, who

Fairfax's daughter in 1657 and moved into York house, was also prepared to help him is debatable.

104 Cárdenas’s secret accounts, 1638-55 (A.G.S., Eo. 2532, unfol.). Between April 1651 and his death in August 1655 Crelly was the recipient of a healthy (600 escudos) annual Spanish pension; the embassy also paid his expense account - he spent £249-15-0 on 'various banquets, lunches, dinners and presents made to certain members of parliament and other of his friends in the said parliament' between 1651 and 1653; P[eter] T[albot] to Charles II, 3/13 September 1655 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 50, f. 136v). In royalist circles it was claimed that Crelly was Cárdenas's 'oracle', P[eter] T[albot] to Charles II, 6/16 October 1655 (ibid., f. 156v). Firth, 'Thomas Scot's account', p. 119; Loomie, 'London's Spanish Chapel', p. 413. It was later rumoured that Crelly converted to protestantism and married, Comment. Rinucc., v, 210.

served on the council of state and on numerous ad hoc committees dealing with Irish affairs, was willing to watch over the interests of Crely and therefore of his erstwhile benefactor, the marquis of Antrim.

Antrim also enjoyed good relations with leading Cromwellians in East Ulster and was related to Colonels Robert Stewart and Arthur Hill. Hill had not only been responsible for supplying Cromwell’s army during the 1649 offensive but was an important local official during the later 1650s (representing Belfast in the parliament of 1654) and was responsible for paying the marquis his allowance from his old estate.106 Furthermore many of Antrim’s tenants from the 1630s (such as Alexander and Robert Colvill, Thomas Boyd of Lisrahan, Alexander McCauley of Ballycastle, and Thomas Boyd of Ballyhuderland) were also prominent Cromwellian sympathizers or officials, which could only have worked in his favour.107

Having friends (or creditors) in high places, however, while extremely useful, was probably not enough by itself to guarantee Antrim’s survival during the 1650s. Other, less personal, factors were also crucial. The Commonwealth protected Antrim because what it needed above all was stability, and this could only be achieved through a policy of persuasion rather


107 Transcripts of Inquisitions, Counties Antrim and Down, 1657 (R.C.B., MS Libr. 26, p. 1).
than compulsion, by co-operation rather than coercion. Indeed the need for a 'deal' between rulers and ruled was explicitly stated by many leading Commonwealth apologists, such as Anthony Ascham and Marchamont Nedham, editor of the influential Republican newspaper Mercurius Politicus. All of them urged political co-operation from the subjects of the late king Charles in return for 'protection' from the new regime (for, as Ascham indelicately put it, 'He who spits against the wind, spits in his own face').

The apologists desperately sought to legitimize and bolster up the Republic, whose power it is easy to overestimate. This was particularly true in Ireland where there had never been a substantial 'parliamentary party'. In any case, the Cromwellian mission was to defeat the supporters of Charles II, not to extirpate the native Irish. Consequently they pursued a strategy of buying off 'considerable' royalist supporters (both catholic and protestant) as a 'ready way for shortening the war' wherever possible.


109 Elkin, 'Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars', pp 299, 303-4, 321;
The volatile nature of politics on the Celtic Fringe increased the state's dependence on local power-brokers like Antrim. Throughout the 1650s reports of royalist invasions and uprisings were rife in both England and Scotland and Henry Cromwell's Scottish counterpart, Lord Broghill, was aware of 'a close correspondence between the royal party in Scotland and that in Ireland'.

For instance, in 1655 it was rumoured that 'both the Scottish and Irish are in great expectations of some sudden change in England, which may encourage their attempts here' and that Inchiquin and Ormond ('or some of that gang') were planning an invasion of Ireland.

The following year, intelligence that the Irish regiments serving in Flanders were about to invade Ireland led Henry Cromwell to round up any priests and other 'considerable, active and dangerous persons'. As it happened the only serious royalist rising erupted in Scotland in 1654 and was quickly controlled by Cromwell's veterans and Broghill's skillful management of the highland chiefs. But had Glencairn's rebellion (as the rising in Scotland was called) succeeded, no

Account of the state of Ireland, [by Henry Jones, c.1651] (C.U.L., MS Add. 4352, ff 67-9v).


111 Fleetwood to Thurloe, 6 March 1655 (Thurloe S.P., ii, 196).

112 Henry Cromwell to Thurloe, 30 January 1656 (Thurloe S.P., iv, 483). See also ibid., 446, 509, 607; v, 348-9, 349-50, 443, 477-8; vi, 378, 539-40.
doubt the Commonwealth would have been obliged to rely upon Antrim's services again, just as they had to call upon those of his Scottish counterparts.113 A fragile regime simply could not afford to alienate its potential supporters.

The 'difficult' geography of Ulster exacerbated the security problem even further. The physical terrain of the province was particularly hostile - for as Henry Jones noted 'bogs, woods and mountains hath ever found us most work' - and internal communications were further hampered by the absence of decent roads.114 East Ulster's geographic isolation, and its strategic proximity to Scotland, thus constituted a permanent potential threat to the newly founded Republic - unless it could secure the support of individuals like Antrim. Without them, the Celtic Fringe could fast become ungovernable, as it had been for much of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In return for the policing of the periphery, putting a few hundred pounds a year from state funds into Antrim's pocket could seem like the bargain of the decade.115

113 Sir James MacDonald, for instance was also a Cromwellian pensioner and informant: the civil list for Scotland (Thurloe S.P., vi, 527); Fleetwood to Thurloe, 6 March 1655 (Thurloe S.P., iii, 196); Broghill to Thurloe, 22 April 1656 (ibid., 725-7); ibid., 13 May 1656 (ibid., v, 18). For details on Glencairn's rising see F. D. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660 (Edinburgh, 1979), chapters 4 and 5.

114 Account of the state of Ireland, [by Henry Jones, c.1651] (C.U.L., MS Add. 4352, f. 67).

115 For instance Antrim, unlike the local law enforcement officers, could control his fractious
The sudden death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658, the subsequent collapse of republican government under his son Richard, followed by the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in the spring of 1660 overturned this modus vivendi. The marquis of Antrim was merely one of many ex-Cromwellian collaborators who was forced to find a fresh niche in the new regime. Therefore, in the hope of being received at Charles II’s court, he secured (10 May) a letter of recommendation from Arthur Annesley.

'This gentleman, Mr Dalmahoy, husband to the late duchess of Buckingham having resolved to kiss his majesty’s hands and being unacquainted at court. Being much his servant and sensible of his merit I cannot let him pass without a line or two to your lordship that by being known to you he may have the free admittance to his majesty’s presence'.

The marquis arrived in London shortly after Charles II made his formal entry into the city, on 29 May. The king, according to Hyde, ‘had been very few days in London...when he was informed that the marquis of Antrim was upon his way from Ireland towards the court’. But he was never given the opportunity of presenting himself to Charles. Upon his arrival in the capital Antrim was ‘by the king’s special order committed to the Tower; nor could any petition from him, or entreaty of his friends, of which he had some very powerful [ones], prevail with his majesty to admit

kinsmen and was prepared to hand over foreign priests to the authorities, Major Brian Smith to Henry Cromwell, 9 June 1658 (B.L., Lansd. MSS 823, f. 60).

116 Annesley to Ormond, 10 May 1660 (N.L.I., Ormonde MSS 2324, f. 205).
him into his presence’. After ‘having gained the reputation of pulling down the side he is on’ (as Clanricard so acerbically noted), it must have seemed that at last the marquis’s luck had run out.


118 Clanricard to Fanshaw, 27 August 1651 (Ormonde MSS., i, 194).
Chapter 10: Antrim and the Restoration (1660-83)

At the Restoration the marquis of Antrim was accused of having committed twelve 'crimes' during the 1640s and 1650s. To begin with, his enemies (largely adventurers and soldiers from County Antrim) claimed that he had been involved in plotting the Irish rebellion of October 1641, that he had then been a spy for the 'rebels' and had supplied them with money, ammunition and intelligence of royalist manoeuvres. Half of his 'crimes' revolved around his relationship with the catholic confederates. His opponents asserted that he had entered the 'Roman Catholic Confederacy' before the peace of 1649; had signed the oath of association; had been commissioned as a lieutenant-general of the confederate army; had sat on the supreme councils before the peace treaties of 1646 and 1649 made it lawful to do so; had constantly adhered to the papal nuncio's party 'with whom he sat in public assemblies, and in great solemnity through Kilkenny Street bore up one end of the canopy over the head of the said nuncio'; had stirred up a rebellion against Ormond and had consistently opposed the 1649 peace concluded by him. Antrim's remaining 'crimes' concerned his behaviour during the Interregnum. According to his enemies, he was after January 1649 in 'constant correspondence' with the parliamentarians and directed the 'dispersing of printed papers amongst his majesty's garrisons for debauching the soldiers therein'. In May 1650, they claimed, he had joined the
Cromwellians rather than submit to Ormond, he had accused Charles I of having tried to stir up rebellion in Ulster in the spring of 1641, and had done his utmost to turn Ulster against the king between 1649 and 1651. In addition he had received yearly stipends and pensions first from Henry Ireton and later from his successors and, finally, had been 'employed by the said Ireton in preparing forces and boats to be transported into Scotland against his majesty's interest there'.

As the preceding chapters have shown, these charges were almost entirely correct. With the exception of the first two, Antrim was guilty of each of them. It therefore comes as little surprise to learn that the MacDonnell family historian considered 'the period 1660 to 1665, was perhaps the most anxious and distracting in Antrim's eventful life'.

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From July 1660 until May 1661 the marquis languished in the Tower of London 'under strict restraint' and, so he later claimed, 'in a condition worse than death'.

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2 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 290.

3 Antrim's petition to king, [April, 1661] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 326); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 216; David Laing (ed.), A Diary of Public Transactions and
privy council investigated his assertion (made in May 1650) that Charles I had instructed him to rally Strafford’s army.4 After bail of £20,000 had been agreed he was released and ordered to appear before the lords justices in Ireland within six weeks.5 The ordeal left ‘his fleece dry and himself broken’ and was quickly repeated, for upon his arrival in Dublin early in June he was rearrested and committed ‘to the custody of the black rod with a guard’ while investigations into his ‘crimes’ were continued.6 And then suddenly, towards the end of October 1662, all charges against the marquis were dropped on the grounds that no


4 For details see appendix 1.7.

5 Warrant to Sir John Robinson, lieutenant of the Tower authorizing Antrim’s bail, 29 March 1661 (B.L., Eg. MS 3349 (Danby papers), ff 22-v). Henry Viscount Moore, Thomas Viscount Dillon of Costillo and Theobald Viscount Taaffe provided security to the value of £20,000, Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 325. The recognizance was canceled fourteen months later in August 1662, Petition of the marchioness of Antrim, 29 June 1662 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 353); Minutes of the meeting of the privy council, 29 June 1662 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 355); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 212.

6 Petition from Antrim to Charles II, [before 19 December] 1660 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, p. 493). His health was certainly adversely affected by his imprisonment, medical certificate for Antrim, 29 December 1660 (ibid., p. 494). ‘Brief Occurrences touching Ireland begun 25 March 1661 [-29 October 1666] (Bodl., Carte MSS 64, f. 470v); Ormond and council to Bennet, 31 July 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, ff 370-3); Antrim to Ormond, 24 April 1661 (ibid., MSS 44, f.334); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, pp 195, 207-9, 217, 363-4, 384-5, 542.

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evidence 'of weight' could be unearthed against him. However Ormond and the Irish privy council drew the line at restoring him to his Ulster inheritance by inserting a special clause concerning him in the 'bill of explanation' which was then being debated and drawn up by the Irish parliament. The bill was a sequel to the act of settlement (July 1662) designed to resolve the conflicting claims of those who had acquired land during the 1650s and the former proprietors. It was executed by seven commissioners appointed to hear the claims of those who had lost their estates and to decide whether a claimant's behaviour during the 1641 rebellion and its aftermath made him worthy of restoration. However difficulties in executing the decrees of the 'court of claims' (as this body was known) quickly arose and further legislation to cover the intricacies of the land settlement - the bill of explanation - became necessary.

The refusal of the Dublin administration to include Antrim in this bill left him in a difficult position and forced him to apply instead for a hearing before the court of claims. This, however, panicked Antrim's enemies who, led by Lord Massareene (formerly Sir John Clotworthy), called for a further

7 Ormond to Charles II, 20 October 1662 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 78, f. 39).
investigation into his behaviour during the 1640s in
the hope that evidence would be found which would
disqualify him from being declared an 'innocent papist'
by the commissioners (and thereby recovering his former
lands from them). To appease them Charles II
referred their complaints to an English ad hoc
committee which also quickly ruled in Antrim's favour
and urged him to apply for a trial before the court of
claims. According to the committee's report, his
actions were all 'warranted by his instructions and the
trust reposed in him' by the late king and the queen
mother. In a letter dated 10 July 1663, Charles II
declared the marquis 'innocent of any malice or
rebellious purpose towards the crown' and ordered
Ormond to assist him to recover his estates by making
known the king's wishes to the commissioners of the
court of claims.

This royal bombshell threw the Irish council into
a quandary. For, as Ormond complained to Clarendon:

10 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, pp 648-60; Cal. S.P. Ire.,
1663-5, pp 44, 216; Ormond and council to Bennet, 31
July 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 370-3); Petition of
Adventurers and soldiers to Ormond, [30 July 1663]
(ibid., MSS 44, f. 374).

11 Clarendon, Albemarle, Northumberland, St. Albans and
Hollis 'or any three of them' were deputed to
Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, p. 453; Hill, MacDonnellis, pp
293-4.

12 Charles II's Instructions to the commissioners for
executing the declaration and act of settlement, 11
August 1663 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 216). King to
Ormond, 10 July 1663 (ibid., pp 207-9); Hill,
MacDonells, pp 467-8.
'I know not what kind of letter the king can write, or what we here can do upon any letter for my lord of Antrim. You know the king, as well as me, is bound by the act of settlement'.

The council decided to ignore the king’s request and refused to forward his letter of recommendation to the commissioners. But as soon as Antrim learned of their decision he procured a copy of the same royal letter (although now dated 11 August) which Lady Antrim made haste to deliver directly to the commissioners just before his case was heard on 20 August 1663.

The hearing itself was a dramatic affair. It began with the king’s letter – which declared the marquis an ‘innocent papist’ – being read to the court. At this point one of the commissioners (Sir Richard Rainsford) declared the letter to be ‘evidence without exception’ and suggested that Antrim be declared innocent without the prosecution being heard at all. However Sir Edward Dering, whose summary minutes of the proceedings have survived, insisted that the case be heard since it contained ‘new evidence’. In all, over twenty witnesses for the prosecution took the stand, and numerous letters, orders and other documentation (some in Antrim’s own hand) supporting their testimonials and exposing ‘to the world the history of

13 Ormond to Clarendon, 17 July 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 143, f. 147).

14 Ibid. See also Ormond to Clarendon, 22 July 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 398-v); Ormonde MSS, iii, 62; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 211-4; Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 204-6); Ormond to Clarendon, 27 October 1663 (ibid., Carte MSS 143, ff 200-1).
his life during that time' were produced in court.15
In the event, despite establishing that the marquis was
clearly not entitled to be restored in accordance with
the regulations laid down in the act of settlement, the
commissioners declared him by four votes to three to be
an 'innocent papist' and decreed that he be restored to
his property.16

Hardly surprisingly, the public reaction to the
verdict was mixed.

'That pronounced [one of the commissioners later
reported to Clarendon] a great shout of joy
followed in the court than was ever heard since
the opening of the commission. My lord's agent
never desired any injunction to the sheriff for
possession, the tenants with tears of joy
attorning to their old lord. Many of the poor men
coming from the north to this town in expectation
of this jubilee, the rest in the country making
bonfires and feasts throughout the four
baronies'.17

Any tenants disloyal to the marquis were promptly
evicted and so, before long, all but some small pockets

15 Ormond to Bennett, 26 August 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS
143, f. 172); Murder Will Out: or the king's letter,
justifying the marquis of Antrim, and declaring that
what he did in the Irish rebellion was direction from
his royal father and mother for the service of the
crown (1663), p. 4.

16 Sir Richard Rainsford, Sir Thomas Beverly, Sir Allen
Broderick and Mr Winston Churchill voted in Antrim's
favour while Sir Edward Smith urged the case be
referred to Ormond as Patrick Sarsfield's case had
been. Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 216-220; Hill,
MacDonnells, pp 430-44; Edward Smith to Clarendon, 17
October 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 233-4);
Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to king, [August,
1663] (ibid., MSS 44, ff 376-7); Act of settlement
commissioners to sheriff of Antrim, 26 August 1663
(P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Hambros bank box).

17 Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl.,
Clarendon MSS 80, f. 205).
of land in the Long Liberties of Coleraine and in the barony of Kilconway were once more under the control of Antrim's factor Archibald Stewart.18

The jubilation was naturally not shared by the adventurers and soldiers who resided on the Antrim estate. On the contrary, they immediately expressed their displeasure.19 Some rioted at a fair in Dunluce; others refused to surrender their holdings; all called for a retrial on the grounds that the king's letter had intimidated a number of key witnesses such as Henry Jones, bishop of Clogher, who had refused to give evidence.20 Anti-Antrim leagues were quickly organized and shortly after the trial it was reported from Dublin that 'my Lord Massareene from hence and my Lord Anglesey in England raised a strange alarum as if a total revolt of the English would ensue my Lord Antrim's adjudication'.21 The publication of a

18 Archibald Stewart to Antrim, 13 July 1664 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Book 8).

19 Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to king, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7).

20 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 282-3; Instructions for Mr George Hull, 2 November 1663 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Book 8); Account of what happened at Dunluce fair on 2/11/63, 13 November 1663 (ibid.); [Antrim] to [Mr George Hull], c.November 1663 (ibid.); 'H. P[arnell]' to Lady Massereene, 6 May 1665 (ibid., D. 562/37); Antrim to Anglesey, 18 November 1665 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 83, ff 309-10); Petition of Adventurers and soldiers to king, [August, 1663] (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 376-7).

21 Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, f. 204). Massareene, who had the most to lose, 'took very much to heart [Antrim's restoration] and spoke very high in the face of the court, who were not at all daunted', Robert Lye [sic]
pamphlet entitled *Murder Will Out* towards the end of August drew public attention to their grievances.22 After giving a detailed account of Antrim’s trial and reproducing the king’s letter of 10 July in his favour, the anonymous author of the pamphlet concluded:

‘There never was so great a rebel, that had so much favour from so good a king. And it is very evident to me...that the consequence of these things will be very bad; and if God of his extraordinary mercy do not prevent it, war, and (if possible) greater judgments, cannot be far from us, where vice is patronized, and Antrim, a rebel upon record, and so lately and clearly proved one, should have no other colour for his actions but the king’s own letter, which takes all imputations from Antrim, and lays them totally upon his own father’.23

Attempts were immediately made in all three kingdoms to suppress the pamphlet and to hush up the entire affair, but it was not long before the Antrim scandal was being discussed throughout Stuart Britain and Ireland.24 In September 1663 it was reported from London that ‘The cry here is so loud against that and other late proceedings of the court of claims’, while Samuel Pepys recorded in his diary how the ‘king hath done himself all imaginable wrong in that business of my Lord Antrim to Williamson, 23 August 1663 (*Cal. S.P. Ire.*, 1663-5, p. 222).


23 *Murder Will Out*, p. 5.

24 Arlington to Ormond, 17 October 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 118, f. 18). Ormond to Bennet, 27 October 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 143, f. 205).
in Ireland'.25 The affair was deemed important enough to merit lengthy reports in the French and Papal ambassadorial dispatches of the day.26

Gossip, rumour and idle speculation were merely one consequence of Antrim’s restoration. The affair also had serious political repercussions. Towards the end of August 1663, Ormond asked for permission to dissolve the Irish parliament since ‘there will now be greater reason to apprehend their ill temper’.27 More seriously, ‘His Majesty restoring some few innocent papists to their estates’ threatened the entire future of the restoration land settlement.28 Sir Daniel O’Neill was not alone in wondering ‘how far what is done in his [Antrim’s] favour will disfavour your act’; while Ormond, who had to face ‘all the clamour that can be raised by undone men’, despaired ‘of any settlement by this or any other act’.29

25 Anglesey to Ormond, 1 September 1663 (Ormonde MSS, iii, 82); Robert Latham and William Matthews (eds.), The Diary of Samuel Pepys (11 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), v, 57.

26 Count of Comminges to Louis XIV, 23 June/3 July 1664 (B.N., Fonds Francais 10,712, f. 200v); Count of Comminges to Mon. de Lionne, 24 October/3 November 1664 (ibid., f. 233); Giblin, 'Catalogue of material of Irish interest', pp 104, 116.

27 Ormond to Bennett, 26 August 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 143, f. 172).

28 [Bennet to Ormond], [c.Autumn 1663] (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 29/P.R.O., S.P. 63/313/46 f. 98); Ormond to Bennett, 26 August 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 143, ff 172-4).

29 O’Neill to Ormond, 25 July 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 32, f. 732); Ormond to Clarendon, 17 July 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 398 and 143 ff 147-8); Ormond to Clarendon,
The outcry had its desired effect. In October the king claimed to have learned that Antrim had committed 'greater crimes than his majesty conceived him guilty of' and therefore reversed the commissioners' verdict. Towards the middle of November, another ad hoc committee was appointed in London to review the case for the third time. As a result of this enquiry the controversy between Antrim and his opponents dragged on for a further two years. In order to defend himself and promote his case, he was forced to divide his time between London and Dublin, while the status quo on the Antrim estates was maintained by Archibald Stewart.

However Antrim's tenacity was eventually rewarded. He was ultimately pardoned 'of all crimes and offences whatsoever whether the same were committed in England, Ireland [or] Scotland...and without any exception or limitation whatsoever', and in December 1665 by the act of explanation, Antrim was restored for the second time.

1 October 1663 (ibid., MSS 47, f. 65). Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, pp 464-5; Cal. S. P. Dom., 1663-4, pp 313-4. As soon as Tyrconnel heard of the verdict in Antrim's favour he begged for similar treatment, as did Lady Clanricard, Ormonde MSS, iii, 82, and Lady Clanricard to Ormond, 18 May 1665 (Bodl., Carte MSS 215, f. 201).

30 Arlington to Ormond, 27 October 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 118, f. 18); King to Ormond and council, late 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 392); Arlington to Orrery, 27 October 1663 (ibid., MSS 118, f. 18); Ormond[?] to Clarendon, 17 October 1663 (ibid., MSS 143, f. 216); Ormonde MSS, iii, 96-7, 102. Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 279-80.
to his property in East Ulster.31 Clause 173 of the act specified that:

> 'the commissioners for execution of this act shall forthwith, and without staying for any previous reprizall, set out, restore, and allot unto the said marquess of Antrim...the honors, manors, castles, messuages, lands, tenements...possessed [by him] on the two and twentieth of October one thousand six hundred forty one'.32

Those adventurers and soldiers who had actually settled on his estate were compensated with land elsewhere.33

So much for the bare facts; but what do they really mean? In the first place how did Antrim, who was (after all) 'guilty' of virtually every charge brought against him between 1660 and 1665, manage to get restored? Secondly, how was the marquis, poverty-stricken and a social pariah, able to secure both the king's support for his cause and a favorable trial before the commissioners of the court of claims? And finally, why, after going to such lengths to have the marquis restored in July 1663, did Charles II suddenly change his mind and reverse the commissioners's verdict two months later, only to change his mind for a second time in 1665? A careful examination of the voluminous

31 Memorandum on behalf of Antrim, [c.1664] Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, pp 520-1; King's Inns, Prendergast Papers vol. 5, ff 310-6; Ormonde MSS, iii, 185; Hill, MacDonnells, pp 292, 326-43.

32 Clauses 172-80 of the act relate to Antrim, Rose and Alexander (who were all restored), Statutes at large, pp 100-6; Charles II's patent for Antrim's restoration, 20 July 1666 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1666-9, pp 179, 564.

33 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1666-9, p. 52; Petition of Massareene to the king, [c.16 December] 1679 (N.L.I., MS 11,296) and P.R.O.N.I., D. 562/10.
documentation, both official and personal, which deals with Antrim’s trials and tribulations between 1660 and 1665, indicates that the answer lies in the roles played by his family, his creditors, his patrons and his friends from the 1630s, together with his own ability skilfully to manipulate the Caroline bureaucracy.

To begin with, Antrim’s Irish and Scottish kinsmen harried the great men involved in his case in both London and Dublin and provided him with some of the cash he so desperately needed to organize his legal defence. Their generosity was more than matched by that of his second wife, Rose O’Neill, who mortgaged her own property, although it was already charged ‘with Lady O’Neill’s jointure and... encumbered with debts and engagements’, to cover his legal expenses. In addition, she acted as a courier between London and Dublin and bombarded the king, his secretaries, the privy council, Ormond and the lords justices with petitions and letters demanding either money or her husband’s release. She followed up her written

34 The Carte and Clarendon papers contain a mine of information as do the State Papers for the 1660s.


offensives with verbal harangues. Her targets complained frequently about Lady Antrim’s ‘importunity’ during these years.38

Lady Antrim’s tenacity and terrier-like qualities were almost equalled by her husband’s creditors, who were still owed roughly £42,000 from the late 1630s. In addition to molesting Antrim physically while he was in London (he was, for instance, unable in June 1663 to deliver a letter to Whitehall ‘by reason of the violence of my creditors’), they regularly petitioned the king for his restoration so that he would be able to pay his debts ‘which will be a preservation to many families of this city [of London]’.39 In an attempt to pacify them, Charles’s letter of 10 July 1663 specified that Antrim’s estate should be liable for ‘the payment of his just debts’; while the act of explanation (December 1665) included a clause which also guaranteed this.40 Antrim’s longstanding debts were working to

37 Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 204-6); Ormond to Clarendon, 22 July 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 398-v); Ormond to St. Albans, 3 August 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 390); Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660-2, pp 50, 323, 348, 363-4.

38 Broderick to Clarendon, 16 September 1663 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 80, ff 204-6); Broderick to Ormond, 2 October 1663 (ibid., Carte MSS 33, f. 166).


his advantage in two ways. On the one hand he benefitted from the pressure exerted on the king in his behalf by a vocal, determined and influential caucus; on the other he was able to argue that, if he were not restored, his lands (and anyone living on them) would be liable for his debts together with those of the first earl, his mother’s jointure and other allowances charged to the estate.41

The queen mother and members of her court were the third pressure group instrumental in securing Antrim’s restoration. Initially, the court had distanced itself from the disgraced marquis, but suddenly in the summer of 1662 Henrietta Maria took up his cause. She wrote numerous letters to Ormond pleading for the restoration of ‘so ancient a family to its possessions’. She even prevailed upon her son to write similar letters.42 Above all, it was she who railroaded through the controversial letter of 10 July 1663 to Ormond and insisted that the second letter of 11 August be sent directly to the commissioners of the court of claims.43

41 Antrim’s case, no date [late 1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Book 8).

42 Charles II to Ormond, 8 December 1662 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1660–2, p. 643/P.R.O., S.P. 63/312/pp 5–6); Henrietta Maria to Ormond, 8/18 June 1662 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, ff 351–v); Henrietta Maria to Ormond, 9 October 1662 (ibid., MSS 214, f. 369); Henrietta Maria to Ormond, 22 March 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 361); St. Albans to Ormond, 18 July 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 366); Henrietta Maria to Ormond, 11 July 1665 (ibid., MSS 215, f. 207).

'The queen mother' the marquis noted at the end of July 'upon advice out of Ireland has moved the king that my late letter relating to my restoration may be renewed and immediately directed to the commissioners of the court of claims'.44

Antrim's 'few (though very powerful) friends' (as Clarendon dubbed them) followed her lead and importuned the king on his behalf at every opportunity.45 Sir Daniel O'Neill, now a groom of the bedchamber and an intimate of Charles II whom Antrim had supported during the 1630s (and who continued to receive an annual allowance of £400 from him), urged Ormond to restore him because of 'the Queen mother's concernment and the king's intentions'.46 Other influential benefactors at court included Henry Jermyn, first earl of St. Albans, who (at Henrietta Maria's insistence) also badgered those involved in the Antrim case for a decision in his favour.47 As a member both of the committee for Irish


45 Clarendon to Ormond, 1 August 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 33, f. 15); Bennett to Ormond, 3 September 1663 (ibid., MSS 46, ff 76-81).


47 Hamilton to Ormond, 17 January 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 32, f. 247v); Hamilton to Ormond, 10 February 1663 (ibid., MSS 32, f. 275-v); St. Albans to Hamilton, 4 March 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 359); St. Albans to
affairs and of the ad hoc committee appointed by the privy council to examine Antrim’s case in February 1663, St. Albans was in a position to press Antrim’s suit at every opportunity.48 The same was true of another benefactor, Lord Hollis, who was appointed to the ad hoc committee.49 While Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery and lord president of Munster assured Secretary Bennet in June 1664 that ‘I have provided that my lord of Antrim shall be restored to every foot of his estate’.50

The question remains why the queen mother and her predominantly catholic court suddenly took pity on the marquis mid-way through his ordeal. A sense of loyalty to the late duchess of Buckingham no doubt influenced Henrietta Maria. Perhaps, too, she hoped that if she helped Antrim he would not parade her, and her late husband’s, clandestine negotiations with Irish catholics before a predominantly protestant populace. Samuel Pepys went so far as to suggest that the marquis, in return for her support, had agreed to settle his estate ‘upon a daughter of the queen-mother’s (by my Lord Germin [Jermyn], I suppose) in

Ormond, 18 July 1663 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 366); Ormond to James Hamilton, 27 October 1663 (ibid., MSS 49, f. 238).


marriage'. This was certainly not the case, but the fact remains that St. Albans was 'very ready, for his profit, to engage himself in any undertaking where he had credit, in which he neither considered the justice of the suit, or the honour of the person with whom he desired to prevail'. And he was indeed awarded the annual quit rents charged on the Antrim estate. As for Orrery, it seems that his brother-in-law, Colonel Gilbert Talbot, had persuaded him to secure Antrim's restoration: according to Orrery, 'Talbot and his friends had been very industrious and useful to the said marquis to procure him his estate' and in return the marquis had promised Talbot a thirty-one year lease to lands on his estate worth £300 per annum.

Greed also ensured that important royal administrators were on Antrim’s side. Secretary of state Sir Henry Bennet (later first earl of Arlington) and another favourite of Henrietta Maria who, according to Clarendon, 'loves money immoderately, and would get it by all means imaginable', Secretary Morris, through whose hands all of Ormond’s letters to the king passed,


53 Orrery's memorandum, 2 December 1669 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, p. 40/P.R.O., S.P. 63/326/67 (ff 133-v)).
and Joseph Williamson (Bennet's secretary) were all promised financial reward by Antrim in return for information, the speedy processing of petitions and letters and securing the king's signature on letters which Antrim had drafted. Since Antrim was unable to pay them fully at the time it was in their future interests to see him restored and he frequently promised 'that if ever I be again established in my fortune, I shall endeavour a return answerable to the trouble you take in assisting my restoration, and providing for my distressed condition'.

The weakness of his opponents also facilitated Antrim's restoration. While his enemies were extremely vocal they were nevertheless disorganized, disunited and unprepared. Their incompetence was typified by the fact that they forgot to present a copy of the decree issued by the court of claims when Antrim's case was re-examined in November 1663. Even Ormond had to admit

54 Ollard, Clarendon's Four Portraits, pp 42-8, 134; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 207; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, pp 464-5. Bennet later claimed that he was a 'purely passive' participant, Bennett to Ormond, 3 September 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 46, ff 76-81). The marquis either drafted, or had a close hand in drafting, the king's letter in his favour dated 10 July 1663 since the draft is endorsed 'Mr Williamson. Pray let this be the draft'. King to Ormond, 10 July 1663 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-65, pp 207-9); Hill, MacDonnells, pp 467-8. It was mistakenly rumoured that Clarendon (the chancellor) had drawn up the king's letter in Antrim's favour. O'Neill to Ormond, 25 July 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 32, f. 732); Ormond to Clarendon, 8 August 1663 (ibid., MSS 143, f. 157).

55 Antrim to Joseph Williamson, 22 April 1663 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, p. 452/P.R.O., S.P. 63/345/145 (ff 210-v)).
that ‘my lord of Antrim hath gained much by the negligence of his opponents’.

Unlike the marquis, the soldiers and adventurers had few powerful patrons at court while those who would normally have sympathized with their plight were, in the light of the royal family’s evident support for the marquis, unwilling to articulate it. Even Arthur Annesley, earl of Anglesey, who had initially taken up their cause with enthusiasm, changed sides when his daughter, Elizabeth, married Antrim’s younger brother – and sole heir – Alexander in 1665.

Although the adventurers and soldiers found Ormond and the lords justices in Dublin sympathetic to their plight, even they were reluctant to cross swords consistently the king, the queen mother and their other English benefactors. Ormond, for his part, would have been personally delighted to see Antrim receive the punishment he felt that his behaviour deserved, but he was unwilling publicly to condemn him, and this greatly undermined the opposition’s case.

56 Ormond to Anglesey, 21 November 1663 (Ormonde MSS, iii, 106).

57 Southwell to Ormond, 12 October 1665 (Bodl., Carte MSS 34, f. 431). From then on Anglesey monitored the marquis’s affairs very closely, no doubt to prevent his daughter’s inheritance from being squandered. See for instance Antrim to Anglesey, 18 November 1665 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 83, ff 309-10); Anglesey to Antrim, 4 January 1668 (ibid., MSS 87, ff 1-1v).

58 Ormond to St. Albans, 3 August 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 390); Ormond to James Hamilton, 27 October 1663 (ibid., MSS 49, f. 238); Ormonde MSS, iii, 91; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, p. 252.
hamstrung by the fact that he had been instrumental in securing the restoration of other catholics whose records were as sullied as Antrim's. For example, neither Lord Galmoy, a known Cromwellian sympathizer with whom Antrim had conspired during the early 1650s, nor the earl of Clancarty (formerly Lord Muskerry) who had been a leading confederate, nor Lord Dungan who (according to one of the commissioners of the court of claims) 'subscribed every roll with the marquis, and one more notorious, the renunciation of the peace which the marquis never subscribed', would not have been restored without Ormond's support.59 Antrim therefore had precedents to appeal to, while the lord lieutenant, who had favoured others in a similar predicament, was unable justly to single out Antrim for particular persecution.

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By the end of 1665, therefore, Antrim was officially restored, and with that his dramatic political career came to an end. Henceforth he distanced himself from international and even national affairs, but as one of the most influential proprietors in Ulster he remained intimately involved in local matters.60 He divided his time between Dunluce, which

59 Broderick to Ormond, 19 September 1663 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 625); Hill, MacDonnells, pp 467-8; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1663-5, pp 144, 216-220; O'Brien, 'The Butlers of Lower Grange', p. 18. Patrick Sarsfield was also only judged innocent because the king's letter was read in his favour, ibid., p. 144; Simms, 'The restoration', p. 427.
was described by one visitor as 'a noble building, the palace is perched on a high rock, which is lashed on every side by the sea', his summer residence at Ballymagarry, and his wife’s estate near Randalstown. He passed his time hunting, gaming, arranging suitable matches for his family and friends, interfering in county politics, and socializing with the other local grandees in Belfast, Lisburn and Newry.61 At the outbreak of war against France in 1666 he helped mobilize the local militia, and likewise played an important role in organizing the area’s internal defence against local (including many MacDonnell) ‘tories’ or Scottish ‘subversives’ during the 1660s and 1670s.62

Antrim’s decision to confine himself to local affairs and to leave national politics alone suggests that his primary objective was to preserve his

60 Hanly, The letters of St. Oliver Plunkett, pp 141, 144; Clan Donald, ii, 732–4.


62 Cal. S.P. Ire., 1666-9, pp 252-3, 267, 608-9; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1669-70, p. 271. Certificate for arms, 6 January 1677 (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/Hambros Bank Box); duke of York to Antrim, 22 March 1681 (ibid., D.2977); Alexander MacDonnell to Clanricard, 14 June 1679 (Bodl., Carte MSS 221, ff 409-10); Ormond to Rawdon, 28 June 1679 (ibid., MSS 221 f. 415). I am grateful to Phil Kilroy for bringing these references from Carte to my attention.
inheritance. The catholic Archbishop Oliver Plunkett found him 'good and prudent, but slow and scrupulous in everything' when he visited him in 1671.63 And there was good cause: the marquis was still haunted by his extravagant past. Above all, despite being regarded as the third richest man in Ireland after Cork and Ormond, Antrim was (as Plunkett indelicately put it), 'up to his eyes in debt'.64 For in addition to servicing and paying off debts contracted nearly thirty years before, he was also burdened with repaying money he had borrowed to cover his legal expenses after the Restoration.65 His income between 1660 and 1665 had been negligible (a weekly allowance of £10 from the baronies of Dunluce and Kilconway and a small stipend from Rose's estate) and he had resorted once again to borrowing.66 In all he appears to have borrowed nearly £20,000 more during the 1660s, mostly from

63 Plunkett to Baldeschi, 13/23 February 1671 (Hill, MacDonnell's, p. 345).
64 Plunkett to [Airoldi], 17/27 September 1671 (Hanly, The Letters of St. Oliver Plunkett, p. 247). Rose was considered to be the third richest lady in Ireland, Nobility's subsidy, 1669 (U.L. London, MS 30 ff 24-6). I am grateful to Raymond Gillespie for bringing this reference to my attention. According to Sir George Rawdon, Lady Antrim was 'very rich', Rawdon to Conway, 14 February 1683 (Cal. S. P. Dom., Jan.-June 1683, p. 56/ P.R.O., S.P. 63/343 no.94)
65 Petition of Marchioness of Antrim, 29 June 1662 (Bodl., Carte MSS 44, f. 353); Minutes of the meeting of the privy council, 29 June 1662 (ibid., MSS 44, f. 355); Antrim to Anglesey, 18 November 1665 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 83, ff 309-10).
acquaintances in London, from his family and from his tenants in County Antrim. St. Albans lent him at least £300, the Scottish entrepreneur William Ross lent him roughly £4,000, Sir Daniel Bellingham lent him £720, while his mother-in-law, Lady Martha O’Neill, advanced him £2,000 as did Sir Charles White of Leixlip, County Kildare. His Scottish kinsmen guaranteed other debts; and his Irish tenants lent him well over £3,000.67 As security for these debts he either offered rentals from his property or granted his creditors land at a ‘peppercorn rent’.68 As in the 1630s, he also mortgaged property: in 1667 Rose’s estate was mortgaged to Sir Robert Colvill for £1,200, while in 1675 866 acres in the barony of Glenarm (which he had purchased before the civil wars) was mortgaged to cover debts totalling just under £2,000.69 By the later 1670s he was so desperate for cash that he used his brother’s marriage portion of £3,000 to pay off his debt to William Ross.70 He then raised at least £4,250 (over


68 Appendix 1.5 - Babington, Garnon, Huston, Sara MacDonnell, Ross and Shaw.

69 P.R.O.N.I., D.774, D.896/30; D.2977/3A/’Dunluce barony, 1700s and 1800s’.

70 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/1.
sixteen years) by charging his tenants hefty entry fines and a low rental.71

Despite these valiant efforts to pay off his debts, however, the marquis was involved in endless lawsuits with frustrated, unpaid creditors.72 Finally in 1682 he mortgaged his entire estate for thirty-one years so that his financial obligations - some incurred nearly fifty years before - could be honoured.73 The following year Richard Dobbs, in his survey of County Antrim, described the marquis's estate as 'much altered, impaired, mangled, and engaged in debts, mortgages, grants and otherwise'.74 Antrim had, it seemed, successfully seen off his political opponents only to succumb to his creditors.

Shortly after he had thus settled his affairs, his wife noted that 'his limbs are weak but I think his constitution strong being he has overcome several

71 P.R.O.N.I., D.2977.

72 Chancery Decree books 1669-85 (P.R.O.I., Decrees pronounced by High Court of Chancery, 1.A.49.129 ff 3, 12-4, 41); Ormond to Arran, 1 September 1683 (Bodl., Carte MSS 40, f. 118); St. Albans to Arran, 14 September 1683 (ibid., MSS 40, f. 124); Ormond's report to the king, 11 November 1683 (ibid., MSS 40, f. 122). See appendix 1.5 - Chapman, White, Wimbledon, Woodward.

73 This left his brother and heir powerless since he was unable to make leases without the permission of the trustees appointed by the marquis to administer the estate. Copy of a deed between Antrim and others, 18 February 1682 (N.L.I., Domville Papers 9,387); Third earl of Antrim to Donald McDonald of Muddart, 12 December 1683 and 8 December 1684 (N.L.S., MS 3784, f. 46); Donald McDonald of Muddart to the captain of Clanranald, 13 December 1684 (S.R.O., G.D. 201/4/28).

74 Hill, MacDonnells, p. 377.
strange fits since winter and I hope will yet continue'. They were wrong: within six months Randal MacDonnell, second earl and first marquis of Antrim died 'at his dwelling near Dunluce'. He was seventy-four years old. Since he had not produced an heir, the marquisate died out and his younger brother Alexander succeeded him as the third earl. Antrim's body lay in state from 3 February until 14 March 1683 when he was finally buried - after 'a great funeral' - alongside many of his ancestors in the family vault at Bonamargy near Ballycastle.


76 Rawdon to Conway, 14 February 1683 (Cal. S.P. Dom., Jan.-June 1683, p. 56/ P.R.O., S.P. 63/343 no.94)

77 Apart from a cursory discussion in Hill, MacDonnell's, and an article by Hector McDonnell, 'Jacobitism and the Third and Fourth Earls of Antrim' in The Glynns, xiii (1985), pp 50-4, Alexander's career has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. Interestingly, had Alexander also failed to produce legitimate issue, the estate was bequeathed firstly to the sons of Sir James MacDonnell and failing that to the Scottish MacDonalds. Copy of a deed between Antrim and others, 18 February 1682 (N.L.I., Domville Papers 9,387).

78 Rawdon to Conway, 14 February 1683 (Cal. S.P. Dom., Jan.-June 1683, p. 56/ P.R.O., S.P. 63/343 no.94); Hill, MacDonnell's, pp 346-7; F. J. Bigger, The Ancient Franciscan Friary of Bun-Na-Margie, Ballycastle, on the north coast of Antrim (Belfast, 1898), p. 36.
Conclusion: A Seventeenth Century Survivor

Randalle, invincible for country, Charles, and God, Thyself a golden warrior, thou residest within the lead Whose fidelity in the adverse fortunes of war, Neither rebels nor gibbets could bend.1

This inscription on Antrim’s coffin pays tribute to the fact of his survival which was, perhaps, the greatest triumph of his political career - especially when one remembers that this was an achievement denied to his enemy Lord Strafford (executed in 1641), his patron Archbishop Laud (executed in 1645), his master Charles I (executed in 1649), his friend Hamilton (executed in 1649) and his arch-rival Argyll, chief of Clan Campbell (executed in 1661).

It is true that Antrim had not won great political acclaim or power (except for a very brief spell during the later 1640s) or profited by the civil wars, as many had; but on the other hand, unlike many, he had lost relatively little. Above all he had preserved what, to him, was worth preserving. First and foremost, after a twenty-three year struggle (1642-1665), he had regained his Irish property intact - ‘thirty miles of territory and vast estates with several castles’ - and was able to pass it on to his appointed successor.2 Secondly, and closely related to this, he had preserved his power and influence in both Ireland and Western Scotland. Even though he had consistently failed to unite his

1 Quoted in Hill, MacDonnells, p. 347.

2 Plunkett to [Airoldi], 17/27 September 1671 (Hanly, The letters of St. Oliver Plunkett, p. 247).
dual celtic inheritances under his leadership (he tried but failed to buy Kintyre again in 1663, after Argyll’s forfeiture), Antrim continued to enjoy ‘a great following in those islands’. Thirdly, the marquis remained a devout – ‘very zealous’ – catholic in an age of ‘confessional absolutism’ when a timely conversion to protestantism might have solved many of his problems. Moreover he was able to preserve the old faith on his own estates.

Seen in the context of his own times, therefore, the marquis may be deemed remarkably 'successful'. And yet he was still damned both by his contemporaries and subsequent historians. Why? Undoubtedly, there was an unsavory, greedy, myopic side to Antrim’s character.

3 Plunkett to Baldeschi, 14/24 January 1671 (Hanly, The letters of St. Oliver Plunkett, pp 156-7). Plunkett to Baldeschi, 13/23 February 1671 (ibid., p. 167); Hill, MacDonnells, pp 345-6; Antrim’s Kintyre claims, [c.1663] (P.R.O.N.I., D.2977/).

4 As a result the north-east corner of County Antrim has remained predominantly catholic until today, J.R.B. McMinn, ‘The Social and Political Structure of North Antrim in 1869’ in The Glynns, x (1982), p. 11. John Bossy, The English Catholic Community 1570-1859 (London, 1976), pp 78-80, 102, 217. However, while he was prepared to patronize priests and protect his catholic tenants and kin, he was unwilling to compromise the security of his Irish property for the sake of a mass and during the early 1670s he refused to patronize a missionary offensive in the Western Isles, Hanly, The letters of St. Oliver Plunkett, pp 141, 144, 156-7, 167; Giblin, ‘St. Oliver Plunkett’, pp 72-3. Nevertheless he never joined the many catholics in all three kingdoms, including his kinsmen the Savages, who did renounce their faith, Brother Albert, ‘The Savages (now Nugents) of the Ards’ in Upper Ards Historical Society Journal, iii (1979), p. 22. For other examples see, B. G. Blackwood, The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion 1640-1660 (Manchester, 1970), p. 120; Gallwey, The Wall Family in Ireland, pp 93-4.
and, equally, he was prepared both to abandon his friends and benefactors if he saw no other alternative, and to twist ruthlessly every opportunity and opening to his own advantage. But this was also true of many of his contemporaries. Consider the example of Murrough O'Brien, sixth baron of Inchiquin who, like Antrim, was motivated almost exclusively by 'tribal' ambitions and was prepared to offer his services to whoever was in a position to protect the protestant ascendancy in Munster. However there was also a very positive (and often overlooked) dimension to Antrim's character. Thus he was as loyal and devoted to both of his wives as they were to him; and, as we have seen, he genuinely cared for his tenants and for his immediate and extended family on both sides of the North Channel. Furthermore, as his entrepreneurial operations during the civil wars vividly demonstrate, he was enterprising, resourceful and determined; while his various trips to the continent during the 1640s highlight his abilities and energy as a diplomat. He was also blessed with a dynamic, charming and affable personality which, except with a select handful of powerful individuals, made him extremely likeable. In short, while he was not without faults he also possessed qualities which were overlooked or misrepresented by contemporaries such as Strafford or

Ormond as well as by subsequent historians. Without them he could never have survived.

Moreover a re-examination of Antrim's political career calls into question the adverse judgment of his principal critics. For instance, his record in Scotland (1644-6) admirably demonstrates that Lord Deputy Wentworth had underestimated his ability to raise an army during the First Bishops' War, while Ormond's authority as lord lieutenant in Ireland between 1648 and 1649 (and, again briefly, in 1663) was dangerously undermined by his failure to control the recalcitrant marquis.6

How 'typical', then, was Antrim's career? His activities as a courtier, as a military and privateering entrepreneur, and as landlord and politician were, in themselves, by no means exceptional (even though few men tried them all). For instance Clanricard, Ormond, Desmond and even the 'rebel' Sir Phelim O'Neill had served their time as courtiers; Sir Piers Crosby, James Preston, Patrick Barnewall and Christopher Mayo earned livings by exporting veterans to the European theatre of war; and privateering businesses were set up during the 1640s by a host of entrepreneurs.7 Even the marquis's restoration under

6 For details see chapter 3 above.

Charles II was by no means unusual. In Ulster his nephew Sir Henry O'Neill of Killelagh 'recovered an income of 4,000 scudi per annum'; while Lord Iveagh was restored to his lands in County Down. Elsewhere, Lord and Lady Mayo, Lady Anne Clanricard, Lords Dunsany, Galmoy and Westmeath and many others re-emerged at the Restoration with their lands intact - despite having made deals with Cromwell. A willingness to collaborate, together with the geographical remoteness of County Sligo, also explains why the O'Haras of Annaghmore were able to maintain their position in the county throughout the mid-seventeenth century.

Henry Cromwell attributed this willingness to compromise to Ireland's 'colonial' status:

'Tis true we are but a kind of colony the inhabitants of which places are commonly more compliant with their present governors, more flexible to changes, more dexterous in the practice of flattery than other men'.

He concluded that this quality ('a genius') in the Irish was due to the fact that they were more used to


9 Thurloe S.P., iii, 566; vi, 618; Order, 9 March 1653 (B.L., Eg. MSS 1762 f. 73v); Order, 9 March 1654 (King's Inns, Prendergast Papers 1, p. 56); Petition from Lady Clanricard, 8 June 1658 (B.L., Lansd. MSS 823. f. 55); Raymond Gillespie, 'Lords and Commons in seventeenth century Mayo' in Raymond Gillespie and Gerard Moran (eds.), 'A Various County'. Essays in Mayo History 1500-1900 (Westport, County Mayo, 1987), pp 54-57; Hill, MacDonnells, pp 247-50.

10 Bartlett, 'The O'Haras of Annaghmore', p. 52.
the 'little tyrannies of county governors...than those...who reside [near] the seat of empire'. This may well have been so, but the tolerant attitude adopted by the Cromwellians to the catholic religion also facilitated an atmosphere of conciliation and cooperation. In September 1650 all penalties on recusancy were repealed and, by and large, catholics were treated more favourably under the Protectorate than under any previous government; while Cromwell was unable to grant them toleration, he was not one to interfere with the liberty of men's consciences. As one pamphleteer complained in 1656, there were no longer laws 'against any man's being and doing almost what he himself will in matters of religion'.

Not surprisingly, many British catholics made haste to follow Antrim's example. In Scotland by the mid-1650s General George Monck succeeded in winning the support of the highland chiefs who, in return for certain privileges, agreed to support the new regime.

11 Henry Cromwell to Fauconbridge, 28 April 1658 (Thurloe S.P., vii, 101).

12 It was rumoured that Cromwell 'will give liberty of conscience even to catholics', Hay, The Blairs Papers, pp 48-9. Hyde attributed this to Creely ('who hath always held good intelligence with Cromwell'), Hyde to Mr Taylor, 13/23 August 1652 (Bodl., Clarendon MSS 43, ff 259-60). On the survival of English catholics see Roebuck, 'The Constables of Everingham', pp 75-85; Aveling, Northern Catholics, pp 305-9; B. G. Blackwood, 'Plebian Catholics in the 1640s and 1650s' in Recusant History, xviii (1986), pp 45-9.

13 Quoted in Hardacre, The Royalists, p. 92.

14 MacInnes, 'The Impact of the Civil Wars', pp 60-1;
For example, Antrim's catholic kinsman Angus, laird of Glengarry, who had fought for the confederates during the later 1640s and then raised men in the Isles for Glencairn, made his peace with the protector in June 1655 after his castle was burned. Yet he was still raised to the peerage - as Lord MacDonnell and Aros - at the Restoration. In England, according to one recent scholar, 'Some Roman Catholics were much readier than others to do a deal with whoever came out on top in the civil wars, in order to improve the position of their own religion'. One of the best know was Sir Kenelm Digby, a cosmopolitan catholic royalist, who after returning to England in 1654 remained 'in close intercourse with Cromwell' and acted as his agent in France and Spain. Despite this, Digby was well received at the Restoration and continued to hold office as Henrietta Maria's chancellor. Henry Arundell, third Lord Arundell of Wardour, and Henry Howard, sixth duke of Norfolk - both staunch catholics - also reached an accommodation with both the Cromwellian and the Restoration regimes. While the


16 Aylmer, 'Neutrals, Trimmers and Others', p. 20.

17 *Ibid.*; *D.N.B.*, 'Kenelm Digby'.

18 *D.N.B.*, 'Henry Arundell'; *D.N.B.*, 'Henry Howard'.

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devoutly catholic (and royalist) marquis of Worcester - who, during the 1640s, as Lord Glamorgan, had first negotiated with and later joined forces with the Irish confederates - solicited Cromwellian employment in 1656, modestly boasting: 'I am able to do his highness more service than any one subject of his three nations'. At the Restoration he nevertheless recovered his extensive estates in Wales virtually intact.19

What really singled the marquis of Antrim out, and made him a more remarkable and influential figure, was not so much his complex career - which, by and large, was moulded by immediate pressures or needs - nor yet his faith, for other catholics managed to survive and prosper amid all the wars and revolutions. It was the milieu in which he wielded his power and influence, which did not dramatically change over the course of the seventeenth century. The continuities and constants were the same in the 1660s as they had been in the 1630s: Antrim's extensive empire remained as close to Western Scotland and as remote from the seats of Stuart power; the political geography of the 'MacDonnell archipelago' was still cemented by clan loyalties and ties of kinship. As long as this state of affairs lasted, the presence of Antrim and men like him would always be essential on Britain's Celtic

19 Thurloe S.P., V, 713. Worcester returned to England in 1652, was imprisoned in the tower until 1654 when he was released 'probably through Cromwell's influence'. His wife was awarded a tenth of his estate and he was granted a weekly pension of £6, D.N.B., 'Edward Somerset'.
Fringe. Hence even in the 1660s, according to Lord Clarendon, 'the surest way to preserve that kingdom' - that is, to achieve a lasting settlement in Ireland - was by restoring handpicked catholics, both Old English and native Irish, to their lands.20 One of the commissioners of the court of claims went further and argued that the new land settlement would only succeed, and discontent among the catholic population be abated, if Antrim were restored in the north, Clanricard in the west and Clancarty in the south: 'Each of which beside their proper dependents have very considerable neighbours that have given good proof of their loyalty'.21

In the early years, the course of Charles II's government was just as unpredictable and turbulent as that of his father. There were republican risings in England; there was a covenanter rebellion in Scotland; and there was a cromwellian plot to seize Dublin in Ireland. In the absence of an army to coerce the population and without the support of local power-brokers in peripheral areas the king was practically helpless. Thus Charles II, like Oliver Cromwell and Charles I before him, found it so hard to rule East Ulster (and Western Scotland) that, for all his misgivings and scruples, he too needed Antrim. As long

20 Clarendon to Ormond, 18 July 1663 (Bodl., Carte Ms 32, f. 719).

as these areas remained dark corners of the land, 'neither rebels nor gibbets' could indeed bend the 'invincible' Randall MacDonnell to their broader purpose.