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CITIZENSHIP, COLONIALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION
DUBLIN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1885-1918

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A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN (TRINITY COLLEGE)

OCTOBER 1987
DECLARATION

This Thesis Has Not Previously Been Submitted to Any Other University And Is Entirely My Own Work.

Peter Murray

Peter Murray
SUMMARY

The nineteenth century Union between Britain and Ireland functioned within a wider dynamic context of state liberalisation. The dismantling of internal and external tariff barriers exposed the existing Irish economy to the full influence of market forces operating at the statewide and international levels. As centralisation and concentration of capital increased, the type of manufacturing specialisation which proved viable in Dublin provided the basis for only an attenuated form of industrialisation.

The decline and dislocation experienced in the city under these conditions stimulated popular anti-Union sentiment but the unification of the UK state economy meant that the extension of sustained and effective trade union organisation took place primarily within statewide rather than national organisations or that local upswings in militancy occurred in line with statewide patterns.

Liberalisation took political as well as economic forms. The state adopted an increasingly neutral attitude on religious questions while in the course of successive extensions of the parliamentary franchise statewide parity of political rights became institutionalised. But because of the radically uneven pattern of capitalist development to which it gave rise liberalisation produced a polarisation rather than an integration of Irish society.

Such uneven development in the course of industrialisation is the starting point for the theory of Internal Colonialism which argues that, as a result, a division between an English core and 'Celtic' peripheral regions was institutionalised within the United Kingdom. It holds that subsequent reaction to the disadvantages suffered by the peripheries took the form of a broadly-based nationalism only when the cities of a disadvantaged periphery did not develop a cultural pattern which diverged from that of the surrounding rural areas. The supposed
absence of such cultural divergences has been put forward to explain why most of Ireland seceded from the United Kingdom: their presence has been seen as the reason why Scotland and Wales failed to follow suit.

In this thesis the case of Dublin is used to assess these arguments. The hypothesis that similarity or difference between urban and rural cultures had a decisive effect on the political outcome of British uneven development is rejected. In place of cultural divergence, it is argued that, to explain how Irish independence came about, it is necessary to examine the performance of the UK state in its role as manager of conflict within civil society in Ireland.

Following the solidification of Catholic Nationalist and Protestant Unionist blocs in the 1680s the UK government sought to widen the basis of consent for its rule in Ireland. In the course of expanding its role this state became both more colonial and more metropolitan. The autonomy of the state from indigenous social forces associated with its "overdevelopment" in a colonial context was exploited. But consensual rule also brought the extension of new political and social rights to the Irish population. Home Rule was not "killed by kindness" but a more complex and differentiated political environment was created as new grassroots movements emerged whose activities intertwined with the initiatives of the state in a series of specific fields of policy.

The expansion of the consensual elements of rule was, however, accompanied by the breakdown of the state's function of coercion. The conjunction of an intractable crisis over the third Home Rule Bill and the outbreak of a war which could only be waged by an unprecedented state mobilisation of social resources created a situation of 'dual militarisation' in which the UK state first lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its Irish territory and ultimately forfeited the degree of qualified legitimacy it had enjoyed.
I would like to thank Professor John Jackson and the staff of the Department of Sociology at Trinity College for the active interest they have shown throughout the course of my postgraduate research. As Department Secretary Dee Jones has generously come to my aid in innumerable ways over the years and I would particularly like to thank her for adapting to illustrate this text the maps of Dublin drawn by Martha Lyons of the Department of Geography. As my supervisor James Wickham provided detailed critical comments on a multitude of drafts and a broader enthusiasm for the enterprise of historical sociology, both of which proved invaluable.

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Awards from the Committee for Social Science Research in Ireland enabled me to attend the Summer Schools of the British Sociological Association and of the European Consortium for Political Research. A grant from the Committee also paid the cost of preparing the data drawn from Census Schedules and Voters Lists for computer analysis. I would like to express my gratitude to the Committee for this support and also to Jim Larray of Trinity College's Computer Laboratory who helped me to speedily sort out any problems I encountered in using the computer.

My father's knowledge of the development of local government law was an important research resource in its own right. Among a very supportive family I am especially indebted to my wife Mary who had much to put up with during the researching and writing of this thesis. Without her unwavering faith, consistent encouragement and great patience it could not have been brought to a conclusion.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGIBS</td>
<td>Ancient Guild of Incorporated Brick and Stonelayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOH</td>
<td>Ancient Order of Hibernians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASE</td>
<td>Amalgamated Society of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASRS</td>
<td>Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Congested Districts Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATI</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMP</td>
<td>Dublin Metropolitan Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>Dublin Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTC</td>
<td>Dublin Trades Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCC</td>
<td>General Council of County Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSH</td>
<td>Head of Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAOS</td>
<td>Irish Agricultural Organisation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Industrial Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIL</td>
<td>Irish Industrial League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRDA</td>
<td>Interregional Organisational Affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITGWU</td>
<td>Irish Transport and General Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITUC</td>
<td>Irish Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB</td>
<td>Local Government Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUML</td>
<td>National Union of Dock Labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLG</td>
<td>Poor Law Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC</td>
<td>Royal Irish Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNSD</td>
<td>Right of Nations to Self-Determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIC</td>
<td>Standard Industrial Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTL</td>
<td>Town Tenants League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBLGWU</td>
<td>United Builders Labourers and General Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIL</td>
<td>United Irish League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland</td>
</tr>
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</table>
CHAPTER ONE
NATIONS AND STATES, SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

For a select group of cities the status of political capital exerts important influence over cultural and economic formation (Kiernan, 1972). Eighteenth century enjoyment, nineteenth century loss and twentieth century restoration of this status has played a crucial part in the physical and social shaping of Dublin. A study of political and social movements in pre-independence Dublin thus raises the issue of the creation and transformation of political units. Such movements were constrained to define their identities primarily in relation to conceptions of nationhood and statehood. In the ideological disputes that raged around these concepts between and within Dublin movements particular and universal considerations intertwined.

In present day discussions "the nation" is almost automatically coupled with "the state". A general imperative of one-to-one correspondence between the terms is assumed to exist:

"The political crux of modern nationalism is the demand for 'self-determination' i.e. to constitute something like a 'nation-state' as today understood: a sovereign and ideally homogenous territorial unit inhabited as 'citizens' by the members of a 'nation' as defined in a variety of conventional ways (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical etc). Conversely, the citizens of modern territorial states are believed normally to constitute such a 'nation', those who do not fit the bill being classified as 'minorities' or other 'nations' who ought logically to have their own state." (Hobsbawm, 1977, 3-4)

This doctrine of self-determination has underpinned a massive expansion of the number of at least nominally sovereign states first in Europe, and later, via decolonisation, throughout the world. Yet the dynamic of proliferation appears far from exhausted: correspondence remains an ideal rather than an actuality. Some scholars have suggested that, on the conventional criteria, there may be ten times as many potential claimants to nationhood as there are presently nation-states (Gellner, 1983, 43-50). What has been termed the "ethnic revival" is
bringing many separatisms - Welsh, Scottish, Corsican, Basque and Catalan to name but a west European handful - out of the realm of intellectual speculation and onto the streets (A.D. Smith, 1981).

The doctrine of the right of 'nations' to exercise self-determination (RNSD) dates back to the French Revolution. Under liberal auspices it gained a new lease of life after 1848 ('the Springtime of the peoples') with the unification of Italy and Germany before the military annexationist manner in which the latter process was carried through its later stages substituted reasons of state for popular sovereignty. RNSD was thrust to the centre of the world stage during the First World War as revolutionary Russia under Lenin and the USA under President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed rival marxist and liberal variants of the doctrine. Honoured as much in the breach as in the observance in the aftermath of the war, RNSD has subsequently become a recognised component of international law and a major concern of intergovernmental organisations whose titles have paid tribute to its sway - first the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations (Wambaugh, 1933; Cobban, 1969; Sureda, 1973: Buchheit, 1978).

Within social theory the two partners in the nation/state couple have fared rather differently. Agreement as to whether the nation, nationality or nationalism constitute an object which can be theorised is absent from sociological debate. Some writers argue that insuperable epistemological obstacles bar the way (Zubaida, 1978). Others, while usually admitting the current absence of a satisfactory general theory, regard its construction as both possible and urgently necessary (Nairn, 1977; Debray, 1977; A.D. Smith, 1983; Nimni, 1985). Spanning both positions within sociology there has been an underlying attitude of rationalist scepticism towards nationalist self-images. Where antiquity and continuity have been claimed by nationalist movements, novelty and innovation have been highlighted by social scientists.
Such scepticism has, however, been diluted by its location within the relatively marginal position ‘the nation’ has tended to occupy in the spectrum of sociological concerns. ‘The state’, by contrast, has been much more central to the development of social theory. This emphasis on issues relating to the structure and functioning of the state has in practice tended to be accompanied by the taking-for-granted of the existence of a nation/state correspondence except where the facts of a particular case strongly call this assumption into question. Moreover such cases are generally seen to raise problems of practice rather than theory. Thus Lenin’s formulation of RNSO is often commended for its avoidance of any attempt to define a nation combined with its statement of clear procedures by which socialists could in practice separate the sheep from the goats amid the jostle of nationalist assertions (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1979, 15-20: Zubaida, 1978, 70).

This reactive practicality, however, is confined to dealing with only part of the enigmatic phenomenon of nationality. Oriented to conflict and movements for change, it fails to address the ubiquity of national – as opposed to nationalist – ideologies through which the western capitalist status quo is reproduced as a multiplicity of class-divided yet normally cohesive nation-states. The legitimacy of modern states is founded on popular sovereignty: it exists, in constitutional theory, because its people through the suffrage will it to exist. But it is the state whose structures constitute the legally free and equal human subjects who compose the people in the first place. It is thus not the people who create the state, but the state the people. In the context of the multiplicity of states national ideology serves to define a people as the subjects of this state and not of that state (E. Weber, 1977).

This definition of the situation may well be contested - externally
by another state laying claim, with varying degrees of democratic justification, to some of the same territory and population and/or internally by a group which perceives itself as suffering long-term disadvantage and unequal treatment. But, apart from circumstances of military defeat, it is relatively rare for a developed capitalist state to suffer an actual secession by a population to which full - civil, political and social - rights of citizenship have been extended. The cases of Norway (1905) and southern Ireland (1922) stand out in this respect. The 'national' has generally proved to be negotiable via ideological and institutional innovations. A sociology tending to treat nation/state correspondences as unproblematical, and to fall back on reacting in a practical mode to cases which cannot reasonably be treated in this manner, is, however, not well placed to analyse such contests of collective definition or to account for their outcomes.

The resulting limitations are illustrated by a recent study of capitalist democracy in Britain written by one of the protagonists in a classic theoretical debate (Poulantzas and Miliband, 1972) on the problem of the capitalist state. Here the specificity of the British case is argued for in the following terms:

"Other capitalist countries have also successfully contained pressure and conflict. But in no other major capitalist country has this been achieved quite so smoothly and effectively [as in the British case]. This is in no way to minimise the degree to which repression or the threat of repression have been part of the containment of pressure: coercion by the state has been an essential element in the achievement of consent in society. But it is nevertheless also true that, in comparison with all other major capitalist countries, power and privilege in Britain have been enjoyed by some and accepted by the majority, in conditions of relative but quite remarkable social peace. A mere glance at the way in which Britain has ruled Ireland, and in which it continues to rule Northern Ireland, marks the contrast between success and failure in the management and containment of conflict." (Miliband, 1982, 2)

The validity of a contrast which places Ireland completely outside the field of normal operation of the state of which it formed part is,
however, questionable. The Ireland = coercion/Britain = consent dichotomy was certainly true, so far as Ireland is concerned, at the time the break occurred and Miliband correctly refers to the state terrorism for which the Black and Tans remain a shorthand expression.

But this position was reached not as the logical outcome of a long-term pattern of development but rather via a historical discontinuity, or rupture, in the mode of rule. A period stretching from the early 1890s until 1916, when Home Rule devolution was the demand of the nationalist majority in Ireland and during which elements of consent were increasingly grafted onto an undoubtedly formidable apparatus of coercion, abruptly gave way to one in which nationalism was radicalised behind Sinn Fein's demand for separation while an almost entirely coercive, and increasingly degenerate, quasi-military form of rule was imposed (Townshend, 1975).

The other, British, side of the dichotomy turns out, on examination, to be equally misleading. Drawing a distinction between 'political crisis' in its everyday journalistic sense, where it usually refers to some aspect of the normal functioning of a competitive multi-party political system, and 'crisis of the regime', in which 'the whole political system itself, and quite often the social system as well, comes under challenge', Miliband states that there has been no crisis of the regime in Britain in this century:

"Ulster and Home Rule caused a serious political crisis before the First World War: but it was much less serious and profound than appeared to many protagonists at the time. Nor did the combination of the crisis over Ulster with the other manifestations of the 'strange death of Liberal England' - the struggle over the House of Lords, Labour unrest and the suffragette movement - amount to a crisis of the regime" (Miliband, 1982, 149)

Here, so far as the political system is concerned, the protagonists were right and Miliband is wrong. The third Home Rule Bill accentuated a wider set of problems concerning the adaptation of the United Kingdom (UK) state to novel conditions of mass political participation to a
point of intractability where its complex of representative institutions were threatened with imminent disintegration (Jalland, 1980). This disintegration was averted by the displacement of the domestic crisis which the outbreak of the First World War produced.

The civilian and military mobilisation for 'total war' through which displacement occurred massively expanded the role of the state and redefined the parameters of its political system. It produced both new types of alignment within parliamentary politics and a reduction in parliament's importance within the overall process of the representation of societal interests (Middlemas, 1979; Fair, 1980). By these means crisis displacement created conditions in which, by the early 1920s, 'mainland' politics had become insulated from destabilising Irish influences and political and social breakdown had been quarantined 'offshore' (Wilson, 1985).

It could further be argued that the truncation of its metropolitan territory, which the UK suffered in 1922 when southern Ireland seceded, marks that state out as a failed rather than a successful conflict manager among developed capitalist states. Here, however, the prevalent assumption of a norm of one-to-one nation/state correspondence has the effect of making such a break seem retrospectively 'natural'. The state which broke up is posthumously delegitimised as an inorganic entity, the process by which its break up occurred is rendered unproblematical and its successors are treated as representing a higher stage of political evolution.

The state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is largely historyless because it almost never serves as a unit of historical analysis. For political history the object is instead a pair of ethnocentric anachronisms - UK Britain with Ireland externalised and UK Ireland with Britain externalised - whose study gives rise to twin teleologies which turn the material on which they work into a series of
appearances beneath which the unfolding of national essences is to be discerned. Political connection between the two nations with their different essences is implicitly or explicitly seen as a source of deformity and distortion until it is finally, for the most part, sloughed off. A work like Miliband's, which constructs a new framework within which to reorder secondary historical material, may thus discover the management of conflict failing in Ireland and succeeding in Britain because these are premises built into the corpus of historical writings on which it relies.

With regard to the management failure premise the point is not that such did not occur - it patently did - but that teleological construction of the historical object results in its always having been there. The unifying purpose, or telos, of Irish history becomes the breaking of the British connection. Whether the narrative strives to be even-handed or adopts a partisan stance, historical events get lined up as stages in the gestation of such an occurrence. The making of the break, bringing with it a transition from political opposition to national-state power for a new elite and from nationalist to national ideology for the mass of the population, acts to powerfully reinforce the grip of such a teleology:

"With the attainment of independence or self-determination at the latest the nation starts to represent an ideological and institutional structure of immense power which - within negotiable limits - already determines the possible forms of political activity and belief. As Nairn has said, under these circumstances nationalism turns into 'a name for the general body politic, more like the climate of political and social thought than just another doctrine'. Quite apart from anything else, the formation of the nation state immeasurably simplifies the cultural unification of the nation through a system of shared identifications, and on this basis the transition to statehood marks a fundamental watershed in the life of a nationalist movement." (Eley, 1981, 104)

This determination of the politically possible in the southern Irish case quickly resulted in the disappearance of the old 'other' as
Unionism was liquidated within the seceding area. Its former adherents negotiated accommodations within the new political system or voted with their feet by emigrating (R. Kennedy, 1973, 110-138; K. Bowen, 1983). Southern Irish Unionism lingered on only in exile, providing relief to violently displaced loyalists and becoming, in the words of its historian, "a part of the futile die-hard imperial movement in Great Britain" (Buckland, 1972, 297).

Seeking to refashion the institutions it had inherited in a Catholic and Gaelic cultural likeness, the new Irish state derived its political ideals from what had become enshrined as its the founding act, the proclamation of an Irish republic in Dublin at the outset of the Easter 1916 rebellion. The complete and historically continuous illegitimacy of British rule was an article of faith for the rebel leadership - albeit one from which they saw the bulk of their fellow-countrymen as having lapsed. Hence the centrality of the 'redemption' motif in the symbolism of the rising (O'Farrell, 1971, 264-267; Lyons, 1973, 329-339; Dangerfield, 1976, 179-183). The post-1916 radicalisation brought this unifying myth of a martyred vanguard first into the nationalist mainstream and later into the new state's structures (Cruise O'Brien, 1966).

Irish national ideology, however, continued to remain strongly marked by oppositional nationalist features because the realisation of statehood left the historical national self invoked by both devolutionist and separatist movements truncated. The offer of restricted autonomy was replaced by that of virtually complete independence but the price was the acceptance of partition. Ulster Protestant opposition to inclusion in a Catholic dominated unit had made this inevitable in some form but both the prevalence of a strongly territorial conception of nationality and the specific way in which a division was imposed, via an 'unequal treaty' and unrectified
boundaries which cut off large contiguous nationalist populations without any mechanism for protecting their rights as a minority, left the nationalist project incomplete (Farrell, 1976; Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1979; Bowman, 1982).

Since the division between north and south was regarded as an artificial product of dominant nation strategy, the 'management failure' of British rule continued to be indicted in official propaganda from the south on account of the existence of partition and the discrimination suffered under its regime by northern Catholics (Cruise O'Brien, 1974, 137-140). The radical nationalist strategy of the 1917-22 period had made the south all but ungovernable, squeezing out in the process a considerable part of the small southern loyalist minority. But it had left the interests of a much larger northern Catholic minority defenceless while the framework of a settlement was being constructed - a development which the southern civil war of 1922-23 served only to compound. Ironically, what Catholic Church leaders in the north had dreaded at the time of the break up was not the continuation of the existing system of rule but what they were to get instead of it - devolved government, and accompanying Orange dominance, within the excluded area (Miller, 1973, 337-338).

'Management success' was not built into mainland history in the course of an ideological watershed, as unmitigated 'management failure' was in Ireland, but rather as part of the ongoing process of the adaptation and elaboration of an established, and more internally differentiated, national ideology. Given the restructuring of the British political system begun in wartime, Irish secession meant much less to Britain than continued British occupation of part of what it claimed as its national territory did to an Irish state whose sovereignty was ultimately enjoyed on the sufferance of its former "predominant partner". It did, however, represent the acceptance of
what had long been declared - by both opponents and supporters of Home Rule - to be fundamentally unacceptable. Some cosmetic surgery to the national story was therefore necessary but its minor nature rendered it a suitable case for academic treatment. The awkward, and often scene-stealing, Irish character got written out of the success story's script. How this occurred emerges when accounts of the issue with which the Irish question had intertwined, the democratisation of the UK, are examined.

Since the mid-1960s the emphasis in studies of the democratisation of the British political system has appeared to shift away from political culture models based on patterns of normative integration and value allegiance created through the gradual extension of citizenship rights by successive franchise reforms. As earlier assumptions about the scale of the extensions brought about by the three nineteenth century Reform Acts have been shown to be exaggerated the continuing operation until the end of the First World War (at least) of effective structural constraints on the most basic form of mass political participation - voting - has increasingly become the central research issue (Moorhouse, 1973).

Prior to 1918 the lowering of property and occupation qualifications had been offset by the effects of the operation of an unreformed system of voter registration in which party agencies played a key manipulative role (Blewett, 1965). The survival of plural voting and of large variations in the size of constituencies had also violated the democratic norms of "one man, one vote" and "one vote, one value" among that portion of the adult male population that possessed the franchise.

In the place of political culture there has arisen electoral sociology. Its paradigmatic thesis is that during the "Edwardian" period between 1900 and the First World War "class" replaced status
group community as the key to electoral salvation for the parties. Large-scale disfranchisement left about 40% of the adult male (and the entire adult female) population without a parliamentary vote yet over half the electorate, it seems generally agreed, were members of the working class. Thus, despite severe participation constraints, a genuine - if by no means proportionately weighted - male mass presence existed within the electoral system. This degree of working class inclusion is regarded as sufficiently extensive to generate electoral pressure to which the parties were forced to respond by bringing forward new policies of "social reform".

The "New Liberalism", with its progressive taxation and welfare legislation, and the social imperialism of Unionist Tariff Reform have been fitted into this competitive base-broadening enterprise (Clarke, 1971; Sykes, 1979; Middlemas, 1979; Dutton, 1981). In its terms the former appears to represent a successful adaptation: the latter a failed one. The Liberals seemed to be containing the threat of displacement from their left by Labour, with the two parties cooperating in a "progressive alliance" rather than competing with one another. The Tariff Reformers, on the other hand, split the Unionist Party into warring factions while the food tax costs of their strategy made more impact on the electorate than the employment and welfare benefits it promised.

A challenge to what has been dubbed 'the new orthodoxy' of New Liberal hegemony has come from those who question the long term viability of the "progressive alliance". These counter-arguments are also developed within the framework of electoral sociology: differences arise only on the effects which the paramount role of class is posited as having on the respective positions of the Labour and Liberal parties. Orthodoxy is challenged by the contention that, disguised by the mechanisms of exclusion, Labour's strength was both greater than it
appeared and growing (Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, 1976). Its continued containment as the junior partner of the "progressive alliance" was therefore unlikely even if the Liberal Party had not disintegrated in wartime (Petter, 1973; Howkins, 1977). The element of disguise is, however, central to this argument since in the pre-war period Labour depended on Liberal cooperation for nearly all the parliamentary seats it held and tended to trail in a poor third when it initiated three-cornered contests.

Within British electoral sociology the rise of social reform is seen as creating conditions for further political reform because competition to secure a working class base created a strategic big party interest in the further extension of the franchise. The emergence of the Edwardian Liberals as a "class" party within a democratic exclusivist context is held to have demonstrated a capacity to adapt successfully to the further development of class-based party cleavage which might be expected to follow an extension of the franchise. It also created a direct Liberal interest in further suffrage extension by increasing the negative impact of the class bias built into the exclusive system on the party's electoral performance (Clarke, 1971; Pugh, 1978).

On the other side of the party divide it has yet to be argued that parliamentary reform was a priority of the pre-war Unionist Party or that it had a particular interest in its enactment. But, although substantial anti-democratic sentiment persisted within the party (Close, 1977), its leadership did not oppose suffrage extension directly. They sought instead to link any extension of the franchise to a simultaneous redistribution of parliamentary seats (Blewett, 1965; Pugh, 1978). Traditional elitism was not wholly stifled by social imperialist radicalism but continued to find expression in the use of an overwhelming House of Lords majority to nullify a large part of the
Liberal legislative programme. This, however, was a practice that tended to be justified in strongly populist terms (Searle, 1981).

The outcome of the competitive politics of social reform was, according to the orthodox interpretation, the creation in the two general elections of 1910 of a 'Progressive' electoral majority whose components both had a direct interest in widening the franchise to what both perceived as their 'natural' supporters. At the same time party competition in the social policy field indirectly contributed to the removal of the major institutional constraint on franchise reform with the curtailment of the House of Lords power of veto after the constitutional crisis precipitated by the peers rejection of the 1909 People's Budget. At this point in the story of New Liberal hegemony, however, things began to go wrong. Divided, particularly at Cabinet level, on the principle of women's suffrage the Liberals succumbed to irresolution and failed to follow through the logic of their party's evolution by passing a fourth Reform Bill (Clarke, 1971, 399). Instead a further instalment of democratic reform had to await the advent of a Unionist-dominated wartime coalition (Pugh, 1978).

For present purposes it is chiefly notable that at no point in the story is the Irish ghost permitted access to the levers of the political machinery. Electoral sociology's dominance of the field rests on a distinction, usually implicit, between a relevant modernity (class, social reform) and an irrelevant traditionalism (Irish Home Rule, Scottish and Welsh church disestablishment etc) whose curious tenacity clogs up the real political agenda. Such tenacity, however, is not allowed to cramp the style of the modern British political historian: "Irish politics ran on their own peculiar lines. Suppose, therefore, that we exclude the Irish MPs - all of them" (Clarke, 1975, 829): "we have excluded Ireland from our discussion as far as possible" (Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, 1976, 723).
The make-believe system thus constructed reaches a fitting apotheosis in the fighting of the 1915 general election that never was to determine whether the "progressive alliance" was viable or not. A world war having been suspended for the purpose, it is hardly surprising that a little local difficulty like the Home Rule crisis, which might reasonably be expected to have come out of suspension in this circumstance, is not allowed to impinge on the proceedings. Yet because of the polarisation between key institutions it produced - Commons and Lords from the time of the second Home Rule Bill, executive and army at the time of the third - Home Rule threatened, as class politics did not, the imminent destruction of the whole framework within which the British parties of the left, conducted their minutely analysed pas de deux (Jalland, 1980).

Further, any discussion of a "progressive alliance" ought to recognise that the parliamentary bloc it rested on consisted of three rather than two parties - Labour, Liberal and Nationalist. Supposing unrestricted electoral competition between Labour and Liberals had broken out in a peaceful 1915, then given the integration of strategically situated Irish Catholic communities in Britain into the nationalist movement, it would have taken place in a context significantly different from that in which it was to operate in the Britain of the 1920s when such integration no longer existed (Russell, 1973, 189-191; Blewett, 1972, 350-353). Finally, the linkage between redistribution of seats and franchise reform insisted on by the Unionists tied the latter to Irish rather than class politics since its main effect would have been to greatly reduce the number of Irish seats and, almost certainly to halve the representation of Irish Nationalists, something neither of the British 'parties of progress' could have accepted in the absence of Home Rule (Pugh, 1978, 38).

Such "methodological nationalism" has ensured that the shift away
from political culture has been more apparent than real. By means of party responsiveness to the perceived demands of a quasi-mass electorate for social reform, rather than the earlier celebrations of the extension of political rights through ruling class openness and sagacity, the evolutionary and gradualist model of British political development - which is, of course, a central component of British national ideology - is reproduced. Political culture assumptions, operating now through the electoral sociology of a part of the party system, continue to dominate the debate about the democratisation of the UK state.

In practice this new electoral sociology has ignored or distorted the structural questions initially raised by the demonstration of the longevity of systemic participation constraints - at least some of which are of more than historical relevance (Hindess, 1983; Hunt, 1980). Within its debates the object of investigation appropriate to the study of 'early' democratisation, the state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, within whose institutional field a specific set of means of representation is embodied, has been replaced by that of the class stratified population of mainland Britain.

A substantial break with this anachronistic and ethnocentric constitution of objects has been made by Hechter's (1975) study "Internal Colonialism" which "seeks to explain the relative failure of national development in the United Kingdom as indicated not only by the secession of southern Ireland in 1921, but by the existence of a social basis for ethnic politics within Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland today." Here a statistical analysis of the patterning of long run regional economic inequalities is used to underpin the thesis that the institutionalisation of a cultural division of labour has created a structural cleavage between a dominant English core and subordinate
Celtic peripheries. Even within a unified political framework increased interaction on such an unequal basis does not lead to assimilation of the different cultural groups and the persistence of differences leaves reactive nationalism as a permanent possibility in all the peripheries.

That reactive nationalism is a possibility rather than an automatic effect is inherent in Hechter's use of the generic term "peripheral sectionalism". Nationalism is one variant of such peripheral sectionalism: the other is overidentification (as measured against the social class composition of the peripheral population) with the parties of the left in the politics of the existing state. Thus southern Ireland differed from the other Celtic peripheries in its development of "a solidary and broad-based political party capable of effecting independence" whereas in Scotland and Wales peripheral sectionalist sentiment became divided at a crucial point between urban support for the Labour Party and rural support for the Liberals, producing "negative integration" into the existing system.

These different political expressions of peripheral sectionalism are, Hechter argues, crucially related to the way in which core/periphery inequality was reproduced in the epoch of industrialisation. Industrial development of the core region (England) was characterised by product diversification and geographical dispersion: when it occurred in the Celtic peripheries, however, it took the form of narrow product specialisation and high spatial concentration:
"Industrialisation in the Celtic regions created small urbanised enclaves oriented to English and international markets which featured cosmopolitan life-styles. With the passing of time the social and cultural gap between enclave and hinterland areas grew steadily wider. To the extent that southern Irish economy maintained its traditional role as a source of agricultural produce for England - such that its regional specialisation was agricultural rather than industrial or extractive - no significant industrial enclave region emerged outside of Dublin. This relative social and economic homogeneity had decisive consequences for the development of a politically cohesive nationalist movement." (Hechter, 1975, 143-144)

Enclave industrialisation gives rise to interregional organisational affiliations (IROAs) which link segments of the enclave populations to their 'functional' (social class) counterparts in the core. Politically, the key class is the working class with its organisational complex, the labour and trade union movement. The presence at the popular level of IROAs through the labour movement creates the principal basis for negative integration of peripheries into the statewide political system: their absence facilitates the building of a successful movement for secession.

While Hechter's approach breaks important new ground it's treatment of British national development suffers from a number of shortcomings. His discussion of dependent development in Ireland is marked off by equivocation from his more coherent and internally consistent examinations of the dependent industrialisation of Scotland and Wales. Ireland for Hechter consists of two distinct peripheral regions, a northern one corresponding to the present-day six county UK 'province' and a southern one corresponding to the contemporary Republic of Ireland. The southern periphery, as we have seen, Hechter regards as an internal colony distinguished by the agrarian nature of its specialisation and its general failure to industrialise.

The northern periphery Hechter treats as a genuinely, as opposed to an internally, colonial entity whose basic structure is defined by the plantation of English and Scottish settlers in the seventeenth century.
Its nineteenth century industrialisation in a spatially concentrated and product specialised manner similar to that of Scotland - in the course of which its economy acquired a structural separateness - is not seen as modifying in a fundamental way the northern Irish periphery's 'genuinely colonial' essence. An a priori and ahistorical isolation of northern Ireland's development from that of the rest of the British isles thus inconsistently places it outside the terms of the models that Hechter has constructed. This leaves his discussion of Irish nationalism in a decidedly lopsided state while Irish Unionism is almost completely out of the frame. Both northern and southern peripheries possessed large urban centres in Belfast and Dublin. Both cities are referred to at various points in Hechter's discussion as enclaves but here we encounter further equivocation. The term is used in a purely descriptive way and the development of neither of these urban centres is situated within a structurally significant enclave/hinterland relationship. The passage quoted above exemplifies this: here significance is first attributed to the existence of Dublin as an enclave but is then discounted by the stress placed immediately afterwards on the economic and cultural homogeneity of the southern Irish region as a whole. Hechter assigns the enclave/hinterland schema a crucial role in the differentiation of peripheral sectionalism but in its application to Ireland it is simply incoherent.

Peripheral enclaves are conceived as entities whose populations are unified, and increasingly distinguished from those of the hinterlands, by a common culture of urbanism. They are said to be "relatively cosmopolitan and anglicised" or "far more cosmopolitan, English-oriented in culture and secular". Yet, according to the model, the enclave populations are not culturally assimilated to the core because the cultural division of labour operates within their occupational structures to allocate a disproportionate share of high status
positions to individuals of the core culture. Enclave culture is thus conceived as being simultaneously unified and divided.

But since the dimension of cultural division in the enclaves is not explored by Hechter the contradictory nature of enclave culture and the political consequences of such contradictions are not confronted in his analysis. This is especially true of the persistence of religious sectarian conflict - documented for Belfast, Cardiff, Dublin and Glasgow as well as for the core city of Liverpool - which appear to cut across the postulates of cosmopolitanism and secularism.

The process of the growth or inhibition of IROAs is presented by Hechter as an automatic effect of the structuring of the economy through specialisation. But IROAs have been (and are) a site of political struggle. Thus for militant Irish nationalists at the turn of the century the more voluntary the nature of the affiliation through trade unions (or feminist organisations) the more pernicious its effects were held to be. Likewise, in a case where the direction of the affiliating thrust was reversed, the ideological Irishness of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union was to make it unacceptable to Protestant potential members around Belfast.

Questions of timing and organisational priority appear to be central to the outcome of such struggles. In the Irish case polarisation of Nationalist and Unionist blocs (in the 1880s) predated the major phases of trade union growth. In Scotland and Wales, by contrast, the onset of economic crisis stimulated peripheral sectionalist sentiment at a time (the 1920s) when the Labour movement and its network of IROAs were already established. The notion of affiliation is too mechanistic to cope with this contextual variation and needs to be replaced by one of alliance formation. The appropriateness of the latter can be illustrated by the case of industrial west-central Scotland where the Labour Party could not rely
solely on class appeal to establish its dominance: there it had also to
reach an accommodation with the Catholicism of the Irish immigrant
community (McLean, 1983).

But perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming of Hechter’s approach
lies in its static treatment of the state. In “Internal Colonialism”
the state figures more as a potentiality than as an actuality. The
argument that retention of sovereignty might have facilitated and
encouraged economic diversification in the Celtic territories is
stressed but changes in what it is that a state does under a ‘maturing’
and increasingly global capitalist system go largely unexamined. Thus
while Hechter can problematise “the nation” and pose the question of
its relationship to the state in novel and challenging ways, the
dynamics of the growth and internal differentiation of state structures
are not addressed.

Yet the timings of the crises of economic specialisation on the UK
periphery – southern Irish agrarian from the late 1870s, other
industrial in the 1920s – mark off a period of fundamental
transformation in the western European states. A note of Gramsci’s
registers these changes and their consequences for revolutionary
politics:

“The formula [of Permanent Revolution] belongs to a period in
which the great mass political parties and the great economic
trade unions did not yet exist and society was still so to
speak in a state of fluidity from many points of view... In
the period after 1870, with the colonial expansion of Europe
all these elements change: the internal and international
organisational relations of the state become more complex and
massive and the Forty-Eightist formula of the “Permanent
Revolution” is expanded and transcended in political science
by that of "civil hegemony". The same thing happens in the
art of politics as happens in military art: war of movement
increasingly becomes war of position. The massive structures
of the modern democracies, both as State organisations and as
complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for
the art of politics as it were the "trenches" and the
permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position:
they render merely "partial" the element of movement which
before used to be "the whole" of war." (Gramsci, 1971, 243)

In this period industrialised states grew more complex but they did
not do so after a uniform pattern. Within a world system of competing imperial states the UK increasingly exhibited archaic peculiarities traceable to its developmental priority: as Nairn (1977) has noted, it could not be 'typical' of general modern development simply because it initiated so much of that development. For the UK, industrial pioneering and by far the greatest degree of imperial expansion acquired a symbiotic relationship: as Cain and Hopkins (1980, 466) put it, "the extension of Britain's presence overseas can be seen as an expression of her failure to dominate her chief competitors and especially to prevent their industrialisation."

These authors trace the successive operation in the nineteenth century of two strategies which sought to exploit the UK's advantage of industrial priority. The first was a failed mercantilism based on a prohibition of the export of machinery and skilled labour to foreign competitor countries. The second was a strategy of trade liberalisation or free trade imperialism. The shift to free trade in the second quarter of the nineteenth century produced major long-term changes in the domestic economy.

Initially industrial exports and the invisible earnings generated by London's enhanced role as the world's financial centre rose in tandem, with agriculture bearing the brunt of the strategy's exposure costs. Over the longer term, however, UK manufacturing too went into decline. A more gradual process than agriculture's travail, this principally took the form of the failure of UK firms to establish leading positions within the new growth sectors of the 'second industrial revolution' such as chemicals and electrical engineering. Continuation of the historical division between financial and industrial capital retarded the development of UK manufacturing relative to that of its competitors. Before the First World War the UK's traditional industries had come increasingly to depend on exports
to formally or informally captive markets while a finance cap, whose links were directed outwards into the colonial empire and beyond, continued to grow in importance.

It is Cain and Hopkins' contention that an understanding of the British presence abroad requires prior examination of the structure and performance of the British economy, and of the changing bases of political authority in the metropole. Ireland was incorporated into this domestic context of conflict management and through it into the ambit of the wider strategic project of liberalisation - with its initial internal as well as progressively expanding external dimensions - by the Union of 1801. Because of the radically uneven pattern of capitalist development to which the sectoral and spatial distribution of costs and benefits associated with liberalisation gave rise, the Union produced (or rather, reproduced) a polarisation rather than an integration of civil society in Ireland. Under pressure of agriculture's crisis in the 1880s Nationalist and Unionist blocs, the rival products of a mass mobilisation of unprecedented dimensions, solidified. The central state responded to this crisis with a series of direct interventions aimed at promoting greater economic and social development in Ireland in order to widen the basis of consent for its rule.

The state response which curbed the agrarian-cum-national onslaughts of the 1880s by a mixture of "coercion and conciliation" (Curtis, 1963) transformed the struggle around Irish self-government from a war of manoeuvre to a war of position. "Partial" movement within an increasingly complex environment came to characterise Irish nationalist and unionist political activity during the period of almost twenty years separating the second and third Home Rule bills. But "partial movement" did not guarantee stalemate or preclude the gaining of apparently decisive advantage within a political system in transition
between class exclusiveness and democracy. The eventual securing of such an advantage by the Nationalist movement was, however, to precipitate a much wider and deeper crisis of hegemony for the UK than that produced by the initial mass upsurge of the 1880s.

Taking Hechter's analysis of the relative failure of the UK's national development as its starting point, this study seeks to relate this to the particular UK trajectory of state expansion within which legitimation was sought but not achieved. The reasons for attempting to explore this relationship within the localised context of Dublin city are methodological and strategic. Methodologically, whereas a study like Miliband's rewrites existing accounts, Hechter's work goes further through its construction, and quantitative testing, of alternative models. But, while this is certainly a more analytical and innovative approach, its empirical basis remains limited to series of published statistics, supplemented where possible by secondary historical materials. Confined by this procedure to an external relationship with his historical subject matter, Hechter's ability to reshape the ground he has broken is circumscribed. The insertion of long, uncritically accepted, quotes from James Connolly to fill in the gaps arising between regression equations in the treatment of Ireland is an obvious symptom of this.

Hechter rightly justifies his use of models by pointing out that any writing of history requires a theoretical framework, whether this is made explicit or remains implicit. But he himself appears to assume that the facts made available by historical research in his "ideal site from which to explore some fundamental issues in sociological theory" will be adequate for his theoretical purposes. Yet if the production of historical facts is invariably framework-bound then the creation of a new framework must also depend on the production of a new body of facts through concrete research guided by the criteria of relevance it
Such primary research is complicated by the loss of records which occurred through physical destruction or the eclipse of once-powerful organisations in the course of the Anglo-Irish war. But political turmoil itself tends, by way of compensation, to generate recorded information (e.g. police intelligence reports) while material to which access may be restricted in an "old" country (such as through closure period rules on manuscript census materials) can become freely available in a "new" one. Though far from ideal, the research site does present archival opportunities which this study has sought to exploit while the obstacles of destruction and discontinuity are to some extent mitigated by the existence of a differentiated and generally vigorous capital city press and by the existence of personal paper collections which have usually been drawn on for biographies or studies of 'high politics' but contain much hitherto unused material of relevance to grassroots organisation.

In the first instance at least, the best chance of satisfying the twin requirements of a properly theoretical history is supplied by a locally focussed study - one whose concerns differ from those on which urban histories of Dublin have hitherto focussed (O'Brien, 1982; Daly, 1984). Here the city is approached both as one of Hechter's equivocal enclaves and as a space within which the strains of the pre-First World War crisis of the regime appeared in a particularly concentrated form.

Between 1913 and 1916 Dublin was the site of a major capital/labour confrontation, of an uneasy standoff between the military apparatus of the state and armed civilian bodies and, in a sideshow to a world war, of a secessionist uprising. The city's pivotal role in the transformation of the nationalist movement grew out of its being sufficiently differentiated from a socially predominant rural sector to generate political forces independent of the agrarianism which had
acted as the motor of nationalist politics since the formation of the Land League in 1879. But the gap opened up between urban and rural never became sufficiently wide to undermine the cohesiveness of nationalism’s social base.

The existence of independent political currents in Dublin did not, in Hechter’s terms, segment southern nationalist/peripheral sectionalist political forces into urban and agrarian blocs: it served to radicalise them within a new pan-nationalist alliance. In the conjuncture formed by the twin crises of the passage of the Third Home Rule Bill and the First World War the Sinn Fein alliance, created around the pre-war urban movements, expanded its base within the Catholic community, virtually destroyed the old Parliamentary Party and emerged in its place as a new ‘solidary and broad-based party’ of parliamentary abstentionism in the 1918 electoral landslide.

Yet the city was not in any simple sense ‘more radically nationalist’ than the countryside. It contained the largest concentration of Unionists outside Ulster, a Protestant minority only slightly smaller in proportional terms than the Catholic minority in Belfast. While it was the centre of an armed rebellion against the UK state in wartime, the city was also a substantial source of voluntary recruits – from both majority and minority religious groups – for that state’s army. The independent political forces which emerged within it – Labour, Sinn Fein – were in their initial phases distinguished from the mainstream of the nationalist movement on broad (as opposed to local) questions as much by a leaning towards different statewide alliances within which to pursue the devolution demand as by the advocacy of separation instead of devolution. Moreover it was around local rather than broad issues that the distinction acquired a difference. The urban independents were themselves radicalised before they acted as a nucleus for a wider turning upside down of the
nationalist world. The state as a political arena rather than the urban as a cultural and economic form is thus the context in which the genesis and development of these independent forces needs to be situated. The first group of four chapters deals with the impact on Dublin society of the four key components of the political economy of UK liberalisation - market unification, religious pluralism, trade union rights and franchise extension. Why, as centralisation and concentration of capital increased, the form of manufacturing specialisation which proved viable in Dublin provided the basis for only an attenuated industrialisation is examined in Chapter Two. The abolition of religious disabilities and privileges interacted with economic restructuring to reshape the relations between Dublin's Protestant and Catholic status communities. The new class-cum-spatial contours of sectarian conflict in the city and the state's involvement as conflict manager or bureaucratic role model are outlined within a comparative context in Chapter Three.

A statewide economy tended to promote statewide trade union organisation. The initial form and the subsequent extension of trade union penetration within the Dublin economy, together with the political implications of the way in which this growth took place, are analysed in Chapter Four. Statewide parity of voting qualifications became institutionalised in the course of successive extensions of the franchise. The quasi-mass character of the electorate that resulted has been referred to earlier. Chapter Five uses archive material accessible only in Ireland to analyse the big city composition of this electorate and to assess the role of party manipulation in its formation.

The second group of four chapters focuses on the effects of the state's efforts to manage the crisis induced by liberalisation through growing interventionism. The 'overdeveloped' autonomy of the state from Irish civil society into which that interventionism was inserted is
analysed in Chapter Six, together with the contrasting effects state interventions produced in Irish rural and urban contexts. Chapter Seven looks first at how the nationalist mobilisation of the 1880s equated Home Rule with the construction in urban miniature of "Catholic Ireland". It then examines the political effects of the shattering of the alliance of "priests and people" by the Parnell split and traces the way in which Catholic communalism subsequently emerged in a renovated form to defend orthodox nationalism against the fragmenting pressure of independent organisation on a class or sectarian basis which state interventionism helped to stimulate.

Chapters Eight and Nine focus on different aspects of the more complex environment within which the Home Rule movement strove to secure its hegemony. The basis upon which opposition to orthodox nationalism was maintained in Dublin from the turn of the century by a succession of Labour and Sinn Fein organisations is the subject of Chapter Eight. Widely diverging in their national political projects these movements were of negligible importance at the statewide level before the world war. Independent opposition cohered instead, under a newly enlarged local government franchise, around a common socially radical critique of the running of the city by Home Rulers.

Chapter Nine opens up an area which the operation of national-history teleology has largely kept closed to the cost of those who depend on secondary sources - that of the growth of a variety of "non-political and non-sectarian" movements of national revival. The intertwining of these movements' activities with the initiatives of the expanding state is documented for the policy areas of agriculture, education and industry and the role of harbingers of a qualitatively new nationalist conciousness usually imputed to them is questioned.

Finally, a concluding chapter addresses the breakdown occurring during the course of 'crisis of the regime' and world war in the
relationship between the state and civil society in Ireland. It first traces the process of the dual militarisation of Ireland, whereby armed bodies were simultaneously mobilised by the state for warfare against external enemy states and by political parties or quasi-parties to advance or protect domestic communal interests. It then identifies the political effects of the UK state's failure to make good a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force through the Irish part of its territory within the context of the waging of a "total war".
CHAPTER TWO

DUBLIN: A CASE OF ATTENUATED INDUSTRIALISATION

1. Introduction

In 1801, when the Union between Britain and Ireland came into force, Dublin was easily the second largest city in the newly United Kingdom. The city then had a diversified manufacturing base but during the nineteenth century this base contracted and Dublin’s growth slowed, allowing several emergent UK centres of the new industrial order to match or outstrip its population. By the early twentieth century the former Irish capital exhibited extensive poverty rooted in patterns of chronic unemployment and underemployment, particularly bad housing conditions and a very poor public health record (Dickson, 1983: Daly, 1984: O’Brien, 1982).

The broad economic base of eighteenth century Dublin had three principal components: food and drink processing, textiles and luxury trades catering to the conspicuous consumption of the elite which gravitated to the Irish political capital. In the nineteenth century only food and drink processing survived and prospered as Dublin’s textile industries failed to make the transition from manufacture to machinofacture and the city’s luxury trades lost their market.

This chapter begins by detailing the simultaneous contraction and specialisation of manufacturing that took place in Dublin. It then seeks to explain the peculiarly attenuated pattern of local industrialisation which resulted from it in terms of the different characters of the industries lost and the industries retained rather than the general predilection of the city’s businessmen for quality over quantity posited by Daly (1984, 47-48). Finally the employment structure produced by this pattern of "development" is examined, the problems involved in interpreting the relevant census data are
highlighted and a polarised local pattern of occupational growth is identified.

2. Fashion

Despite the sheer scale on which a relatively small group of elite consumers had spent in Dublin (Dickson, 1983, 185-186), and the central importance which the social season retained for London's employment pattern through the nineteenth century, the demise of the Dublin luxury trades is a phenomenon to which little importance has generally been attached. Joseph Lee (1969a) is briskly dismissive of the idea that such a loss might have had any long-term significance:

"The migration of (elite) families caused unemployment and hardship among those who catered for their wants - but these wants were for luxury goods for conspicuous consumption... The industrial revolution depended on getting away from this type of good, catering to the cheap wants of thousands of consumers, on mass production for a mass market. There is no recorded case of an industrial revolution based on the fashion industry, and the migration of these aristocratic families had a very limited impact on the development of the home market" (J. Lee, 1969a, 58).

Certainly capital city status did not prevent London experiencing manufacturing decline and social distress similar in a number of respects to what took place in Dublin (Stedman Jones, 1971). These parallels might suggest that, sharing many 'pre-industrial' features, both of these old cities were locked into structures of production and consumption which largely precluded their successful adaptation to the new age of mechanised industry. Closer examination, however, fails to bear this out while at the same time pointing up the way in which Lee's treatment of "fashion" is somewhat peremptory.

As a nineteenth century manufacturing centre, London suffered from relatively high fuel costs, due to its distance from coal sources, and from an enormous rise in rents produced by the expansion of its commercial, financial and governmental service functions. Large-scale production became almost prohibitively expensive there unless the advantage derived by a particular industry from proximity to market - a
key factor for finished consumer good industries - was sufficient to
counterbalance its disadvantages. The sweating system adopted in such
trades was an attempt to reduce London overheads - principally wages
and rent - to a minimum.

The failure of Dublin manufacturers to make the sort of adaptation
entailed by the development of the sweating system in London has
attracted comment (Daly, 1981, 223). However a metropolitan proximity
factor operates, even where production is for the mass market, when
'fashion' and allied forms of market information are vital to
entrepreneurial calculation. To the degree that fashion is important,
a symbiosis exists between the luxury bespoke sector where changes
originate and the sweated mass production sector where they are
diffused. Thus Dublin's loss of its conspicuous consumption function
and the contraction of the 'West End' component of its economy left it
at a disadvantage, despite its undoubted reservoir of cheap labour, in
the very metropolitan phenomenon of large-scale sweating.

Where immediate proximity to the market was less vital industries
responded to London's cost pressures by relocating away from the city.
But they frequently remained within the fast-growing Greater London
area. Little or no 'short-haul' relocation of industry occurred around
Dublin as the city's slow growth meant that the pressure exerted on
rents by the expansion of competing economic and social functions was
slight. Yet such a phenomenon has been noted in eighteenth century
Dublin as manufacturers, and the Irish parliament, reacted to the
pressure exerted by illegal, but apparently effective, trade unions
(Dickson, 1983, 188).

Differences between the two cities with regard to the development
of sweating primarily reflected the contrast between continuity and
discontinuity in their specialised roles as capitals. Differences with
regard to the relocation of industry reflected the emergent character
of the UK industrial economy. It is only when Dublin and London are placed within a regional as opposed to a purely 'urban' context that the content of this new type of structural differentiation is revealed. For all its intractability, London’s nineteenth century crisis was a localized one, concentrated on the city’s traditional industrial quarter, what Stedman Jones (1971) terms its 'inner industrial perimeter'. Beyond this affected area Greater London, and the South-East England region which cohered around it, has been identified by C.H. Lee (1981) as the major growth area in the Victorian British economy - 'the world’s first large-scale consumer society' whose affluence and scale generated a huge demand for services and provided the most advantageous location for new technologically advanced and consumer-orientated industries such as electricity generating and electrical engineering.

The growth of the South-East England region C.H. Lee characterizes as 'internally generated' in contrast to the export orientation of the 'staple' (textile or mining and metals) industrial regions of Britain. But it was in fact London’s role - considerably enhanced by the shift to Free Trade - as the financial and commercial centre of world trade which acted as the motor of this regional growth. Behind regional differentiation lay strategic liberalisation and empire building. Through it the 'everyman' character of consumer demand extolled by Joseph Lee was subverted and patrician sovereignty subtly reasserted.

"Fashion", where it shaded first into a general pattern of overconsumption by a spatially concentrated imperial elite and later into the patronage of state institutions controlled from the political centre by that elite, was to prove capable of exerting a highly significant locational pull within a changing industrial structure. Thus Dublin’s deposition as a capital contributed to a wider process of elite concentration in the UK which was later to redound to the city's
industrial disadvantage.

3. Textiles and Other Casualties

Earlier, and more directly, UK economic liberalisation had led to a sharp overall decline in Irish industry which reversed the trend of the previous century when:

"Ireland was within the largely domestic technology of the eighteenth century a highly developed and rapidly expanding economy." (Cullen, 1969, 124)

Cullen (1972) identifies two phases of this manufacturing contraction. The earliest was associated with the severe statewide depression of 1825-26. In most branches of industry this took the form of a temporary downturn but in the case of textiles it marked - with one exception - the onset of an unreversed decline. Linen centralised in the North East but cotton and woolen manufacturing disappeared in the face of external competition leaving only a shrunken remnant of silk to attempt a revival, under royal and aristocratic patronage, at the end of the century (Collins, 1982: Dickson, 1977: Webb, 1913).

A degree of protection for textiles and a range of consumer goods was carried over under the Act of Union for an initial period of twenty years. On the expiry of this period the maintainance of internal tariffs became a subject of political contention which resulted in a government decision to immediately abolish all of the 'union duties' in 1824 (Green, 1969, 93). This terminal crisis of most Irish textiles thus coincided with the removal of tariffs on imports into Ireland.

However the 'union duties' do not appear to have been actually providing effective protection for the textile industries in Ireland (Cullen, 1969, 114): the crucial institutional change had occurred with the Union itself when Ireland ceased to be an entity which could impose or adjust tariffs according to the exigencies of its own economic situation. The significance of the 1824 removal of trade barriers internal to the UK lay rather in its forming part of the first phase of
the shift to a UK free trade policy which in the external sphere simultaneously produced liberalising modifications in the Corn Laws, external tariff schedules and Navigation Acts (Hilton, 1977; Gordon, 1979).

The second phase of Irish manufacturing contraction identified by Cullen (1972) occurred much later, in the later 1870s and through the 1880s, coinciding with the Victorian Great Depression. In this period southern Irish firms across a wide range of industries were squeezed between the depressed state of local market demand as the full effects of free trade in foodstuffs began to be felt in Irish agriculture and intensifying competition from British manufacturers.

Falling transport costs opened up Irish markets to British producers whose international dominance was declining in the face of competition from continental and American rivals which had grown up behind tariff walls. The technological backwardness which proved fatal to so many Irish firms in an increasingly competitive environment can, O'Malley (1981) suggests, be largely explained by the constraints imposed by the nature of local product markets - small, declining and dispersed as a result of declining agricultural population since the 1840s and the earlier failure of textile-based industrialisation - on the adoption of large-scale production methods.

In the decline of Irish industry the centralisation of production and concentration of capital set in motion by technological change were mainly experienced as an overwhelming external force. But these processes also operated internally, imparting to the decline a spatially uneven character and producing local beneficiaries as well as victims. The main beneficiary was the Belfast and Lagan Valley area. Here 'full' (machinofacture) industrialisation was achieved when, with the advent of mechanisation from the mid-1820s, the area emerged first as the centre of a linen industry previously dispersed through the
northern half of Ireland and later as a site of large-scale shipbuilding and engineering industries.

The experience of Dublin, which Belfast grew to rival in size, was a mixed one with heavy early losses offset to some extent by later gains. The particular importance in the city of textile employment, alongside the luxury trades, meant that the effects of manufacturing decline were felt early. Employment in cotton, silk and woolen manufacture, and also in textile printing, dwindled in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In Ireland this was relatively unusual as an urban experience since textile manufacture was, in general, highly dispersed through the countryside, a fact which has prompted Cullen's comment that:

"the background to the Famine, through the crisis in domestic industry is as much an industrial as an agrarian one." (Cullen, 1972, 121)

However a number of important southern urban centres of textile manufacture - Bandon, Drogheda and the Liberties district of Dublin - did exist and here too the effects of the crisis were severe. During the 1825-26 crisis almost twenty thousand people were said to have been thrown out of work in the Dublin Liberties (O'arcy, 1968, 27).

By contrast the city's experience of the later nineteenth century contraction was mitigated by growth within the third group of industries which had constituted the city's manufacturing base at the beginning of the Union period - food and drink processing. These industries - principally brewing, distilling and biscuit making - represent virtually the only successful form of industrial product specialisation to develop within southern Ireland in the nineteenth century and it is to a brief examination of their growth that we now turn.

4. Food and Drink Processing

Specialising in porter brewing, Dublin, alongside Burton and
London, emerged as a major centre of large-scale brewing in the early nineteenth century. In the course of the century, one spectacularly successful firm, Guinness's, assumed an overwhelmingly dominant position among Dublin brewers, although five smaller firms appear to have survived into the twentieth century. By 1914 St James's Gate was the largest brewery in the world with an annual output of nearly three million barrels (Dennison, 1959, 5).

The historians of Guinness's first century of existence, Lynch and Vaizey (1960), trace a pattern of growth whereby the establishment of a successful export trade to Britain in the early nineteenth century was followed in the second half of the century by the domination of the local Dublin market and increasing penetration of the beer market in the rest of Ireland. The virtual monopoly structure of the Irish brewing industry was largely formed by the success of Guinness, and the bankruptcy of its principal rival, Manders, in a battle for control of the Dublin porter trade fought through the 1870s. This success was based on aggressive price competition against which its rival's strategy of relying on a partially developed tied house system proved ineffective (Lynch and Vaizey, 1960, 213-216).

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the end of a period of growth in the overall market for beer combined with a tightening of licensing requirements to produce a massive extension of the tied house system and a consequent segmentation of the retail beer market in Britain (Pass and Hawkins, 1979). At the same time Guinness in Dublin was able by exploiting economies of scale to preempt the development of a similar market segmentation through the 'tying' of public houses. Outside Dublin - with the notable exception of Cork city - such barriers to growing market penetration were insignificant and, given the notorious permissiveness of rural Irish licensing practice, would have been virtually impossible to develop effectively.
Since the major part of Guinness's trade by volume was in Ireland, the existence of an extremely favourable combination of the capacity to exploit economies of scale in production with an independent, and therefore permeable, retail market structure for beer in Ireland was a crucial factor in Guinness's growth in the second half of the nineteenth century. Had a tied house system been extensively developed in Ireland the firm's structure and strategies would necessarily have been different.

In relation to tied houses Guinness's could be said to have enjoyed the best of both worlds, for its British export trade continued to grow without the acquisition by the firm of licensed property. Porter was a successfully differentiated product in the British market, enabling it to bypass the barriers set up by tied house segmentation. After a highly successful floatation in 1886 the company established itself as a darling of the London Stock Exchange through its ability to finance continuous growth from its own resources while maintaining a good dividend record. Such a performance was remarkably different from that of the typical debt-laden large British brewing company (Payne, 1967, 531). This bucking of the UK industry trend was possible only because of the combination of dominance in an open home market with a specialist product niche in the otherwise closed British one.

The structure of the brewing industry in the late nineteenth century was shaped by the growth (or, in the Irish case, non-growth) of 'forward integration' between manufacturing and retailing. Over the same period, the structure of the distilling industry was similarly determined by the responses of the firms within it to the effects of technological innovation. The invention of a new method of distilling sharply differentiated patent still distillers, who adopted the new technology, from the traditional pot still producers. Pot still production was a discontinuous, batch process: patent
still production was a continuous process allowing lower unit costs to be achieved provided the entry barrier of a large initial fixed capital investment could be surmounted. Further cost savings were made by patent distillers through the substitution of cheap raw materials, such as maize, for barley or malt (Weir, 1977). The process innovations introduced by the patent still gave rise in turn to a product innovation, the development of blended whiskey, in which the cheap patent spirit was mixed by patent distillers or independent blenders with pot spirit in order to produce a relatively cheap and palatable drink. The popularity acquired by the resultant blends in the large and relatively buoyant English market was the basis of a strong late nineteenth century export-led recovery in both Irish and Scottish distilling.

Based as it was on the new blends this export boom largely passed the Irish pot still producers by, confining them to a home market which, thanks to local spirit consumer loyalty, they continued to dominate. This market was sharply contracting due to the combined effects of population decline and the shift in consumer preference from spirits to beer. Thus even before the UK market for home produced spirits peaked in 1900 Irish pot still output was contracting and this branch of the industry was declining in absolute as well as relative terms (Weir, 1980).

Within Irish distilling patent still production was concentrated in the north, principally around Belfast. Dublin was the principal centre of the contracting pot still branch: at the turn of the century only one of the six city distilleries, Phoenix Park, which was owned by the Distillers Company of Scotland, was a patent still manufacturer. In its debilitation and confinement to the home market distilling contrasted not only with brewing but with mineral water manufacture in which Dublin firms, notably Thwaites and Cantrell & Cochrane, had built
up a significant export trade (Cullen, 1972, 162).

Belfast’s emergence as the major centre of the dynamic patent still branch of the distilling industry in the late nineteenth century was part of a trend discernible in other, non-alcoholic, food and drink processing industries. Thus in the 1907 Census of Production:

"one of the most striking aspects of Belfast’s industrial dominance is not its expectedly high proportion of output in textiles and engineering generally but its disproportionately large share, emerging in the late nineteenth century, in many of the industries in the food and beverage category, more particularly where exports are concerned" (Cullen, 1972, 161).

This development was due to the emergence of enclave-type processing activities whose primary source of raw materials was the world market rather than the Irish agricultural hinterland. Belfast’s predominance in such enclave processing areas was, Cullen suggests, principally related to external economies in foreign trade generated by the growth of its industrial base.

The smaller port of Dublin, more oriented to cross-channel trade, did develop enclave-processing industries such as tobacco on a small scale and one major Dublin industry also belonged to this category, biscuit making. As in brewing, one firm, Jacobs, virtually constituted the entire local biscuit industry. Originally based in Waterford, the company moved to Dublin in the 1850s. Thereafter it expanded rapidly to become, after Guinness’s, the city’s second largest employer and one of the leading firms in the UK biscuit industry. Most of Jacob’s raw materials were imported into Ireland and three-quarters of its output was exported.

S. Product Specialisation, Employment and Linkages

In terms of output or of capital investment Dublin’s specialised growth sector was by no means insubstantial. But it was, in general, highly capital intensive and provided little or no stimulus to broad-
based industrial growth in the city because it had few dynamic linkages at the local level to other industry sectors. The 'size effect' usually associated with production centralisation and capital concentration did not carry over from capital to labour. Hobsbawm (1968) has aptly chosen Guinness's brewery as a supporting example for the observation that although food industries were important pioneers of technological innovation:

"They do not so much transform the surrounding economy as appear, like giant monuments of modernity, within it."

(Hobsbawm, 1968, 46)

At the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century Guinness's wage costs represented only one eighth of its total costs of production. Daly (1981, 223) cites the comparison, beloved of contemporary temperance orators, between the £6m. capitalization of Guinness's brewery in 1886 when it employed 2,000 and the £500,000 capitalization of the York Street spinning mills in Belfast which employed between four and five thousand.

In a wider framework, this capital-intensiveness emerges from a comparison of the rankings of large UK firms in the early twentieth century carried out by Payne (1967) and by Shaw (1983). Ranked by capital in Payne's list Guinness comes tenth: when employment is the criterion, the brewery (with a suspiciously high 3,550) drops to eighty-first in Shaw's. When the brewing industry is considered on its own, Guinness comes second on both employment and capital. This latter ranking is remarkable when account is taken of the fact that, because of its non-involvement in licensed property acquisition, Guinness's investment was, almost in its entirety, directly productive.

Table 2.1 estimates the total direct employment level generated by the food and drink processing sector in Dublin using a variety of reported figures from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century:
TABLE 2.1 Estimated Total Food and Drink Manufacturing Employment in Dublin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinness</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobs</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distilling</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Brewing</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1889-1891/1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Waters</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Food Processing (e.g. tobacco, milling)</td>
<td>1,000 (?)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,300</strong></td>
<td><strong>(?)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National (i.e. Irish) figures from the 1907 Census of Production show brewing, distilling, milling and mineral water manufacture to have had overwhelmingly male workforces. Tobacco (for which only statewide figures are available) employed mainly females, as did Jacob’s biscuit factory where two-thirds of the workers were women. Thus of an estimated total of around 10,000 direct large-scale food and drink processing employees it is very likely that three quarters were male and a quarter female. This represents less than 10% of the 1911 census figure for occupied males in the city and just over 5% of the figure for occupied females.

The critical area in which dynamic linkage effects, expanding the processes of specialization and centralization occurring in food and drink processing into a broader local base of multi-sector manufacturing, might have been expected to occur in this period was that of mechanical engineering. What type of engineering firms developed in Dublin and how did their activities relate to the pattern of industrial development occurring within the city?

At the turn of the century most of Dublin’s skilled engineers were employed in railway company engineering works, of which there were...
three in the city. The major part of Dublin's engineering activity in the early twentieth century had thus grown up around the city's role within the transport system and was divorced from its role as a manufacturing centre. Surveying Dublin's industrial enterprises Arnold Wright (1914) found only two jobbing engineering firms worthy of note: Spence's of Cork Street and, in the port area, the Dublin Dockyard Company.

In Spence's case there was a linkage between engineering and food and drink processing. Between the 1880s and 1920s the firm built a series of engines for use on the internal railway system in Guinness's. It had also, according to Wright, built up a substantial British and foreign business to supplement this connection and was, by 1913, 'very far from being merely a local enterprise' (Wright, 1914, 21). In his history of the Dublin Dockyard Company one of its proprietors, John Smellie, also alludes to an adequate and reliable local availability of iron and brass founding and copper smithing suppliers to the shipyard and, in the case of coppersmiths, and specifically links this to the importance of brewing and distilling in the city (Smellie, n.d., 102).

This, however, appears to be a very low level of local engineering 'spinoff' from a growing industrial sector embracing some highly capital-intensive industries with large investments in plant and machinery. The 'giant monuments of modernity' syndrome noted by Hobsbawm arose in the case of the drink industries out of the physical character of their specific production processes. Within them the central roles were performed by natural processes, as opposed to the labour process.

This meant that, while in most manufacturing processes mechanization in what has been termed its primary (nineteenth century) phase was applied directly to the transformation of work-pieces, in brewing and distilling it was largely confined in its application to
the transfer of work-pieces between work stations (Littler, 1983). The mechanisation of these transfer operations massively enlarged the scale of production in these industries but without fundamentally altering the pre-existing character of the processes through which this increased output was produced.

Such a process-specific explanation of the failure of large-scale brewing and distilling to stimulate local engineering growth appears to fit well with the evidence on sectoral linkages in Dublin cited above. Coppersmithing benefited because the growth in scale of brewing and distilling was accompanied by a shift from wooden to metal storage vessels. The building of railway engines by Spence for an internal brewery railway too is obviously related to the primacy of transfer over transformation operations in the mechanization of these industries. The natural processes at the centre of such manufacturing were not, of course, immune to the influence of technical change. Such change, however, took place not in the engineering field of mechanization but through the systematic application of biological and chemical research to process and product improvements, the use of refrigeration to reduce perishability being an early and important example here.

Within the UK economy machine building for the brewing and distilling industries appears by the late nineteenth century to have become one of the branches of the heavy engineering complex of west-central Scotland. Published by a London drink trade periodical in 1887, Alfred Barnard's book, 'The Whisky Distilleries of the United Kingdom', for example, contains advertisements for nineteen engineering firms specializing in machine building for these industries: of these twelve were located in central Scotland (nine were in Glasgow), four in different parts of England, two in Belfast and one, the Church Street coppersmiths, Daniel Miller and Company, in Dublin.
In Dublin both Spence’s and the Dublin Dockyard Company were offshoots of this Scottish specialism. Spence’s founder came to Dublin from Linlithgow in the 1850s. The partners in the Dockyard Company, which began operation in 1901, both came from Clydeside shipbuilding backgrounds and the Clyde remained their company’s constant point of reference with regard to both business competition and labour relations (Smellie, nd, 54-65).

From the outset the Dockyard Company ran a combined shipbuilding and repairing business, the latter being the greater part of the business. To carry out large-scale repair work economically, construction work was necessary in order to offset labour and fixed capital overheads. But a shipbuilding yard alone would not have been viable in Dublin, according to Smellie, because:

"It was not sufficiently well-placed with regard to the more important markets, or with regard to the advantages which a shipbuilding background of long standing commands" (Smellie, nd, 103).

The shipbuilding side of the business did however develop on a scale greater than that initially envisaged by the promoters. By the outbreak of the Great War about fifty ships had been built in a yard employing about seven hundred workers. Skilled labour had to be imported by the company which became involved in a variety of welfare-type activities designed to settle the incoming workers (Smellie, nd, 62).

6. Linkage, Location and Skilled Labour Pools

The rise of Dublin’s modest shipbuilding industry invites comparison with the development of its more substantial counterpart further up Ireland’s east coast in Belfast. Here in 1914 the two shipyards, Harland and Woolf and Workman and Clark, employed 20,000 workers (Patterson, 1980a, 88). The gulf separating the shipbuilding industries of the two cities is not explained by natural resource endowment: as Budge and O’Leary (1973, 73) note the development of a
large shipbuilding industry in an area with no native supplies of coal or iron such as Belfast has been described as an 'industrial miracle'. Explanations for the occurrence of this miracle have tended to focus on the presence in Belfast of entrepreneurial genius, embodied principally in the person of yet another Scottish immigrant, Edward Harland. Such an emphasis, as O'Malley (1981) points out, complements an important theme in the interpretation of nineteenth century Ireland's poor industrial performance, outside the North East: a dearth of entrepreneurs due to the aversion of the Irish middle class to risk taking.

However, as O'Malley argues, the 'genius' of Harland lay in combining entrepreneurial ability with a favourable local industrial environment. What made the Belfast environment favourable for Harland's purposes was the availability there of a pool of engineering skills. Such a pool existed in the early 1850s largely because of the development in the city of a machine building industry whose growth had been symbiotic with that of a mechanized linen industry. This initial engineering growth in response to local demand created conditions whereby:

Other industries arose ... not in response to local demand, but rather due to the availability of skills, marketing organization and other advantages of a large manufacturing centre which developed earlier due to local demand, but could be turned to specialized manufacture of new products for other markets (O'Malley, 1981, 38).

The initial stimulus given by mechanized textile production to the growth of Belfast's industrial base recalls a contrast between Ireland's two east coast cities noted earlier. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, when mechanization was producing a rapid centralization of the linen industry in Belfast, Dublin was suffering the destruction of its textile industries. Nineteenth century Belfast experienced two distinct phases of growth, the first of which acted,
through the creation of a pool of strategic skills, to secure a vital condition for the development of the second phase. Nineteenth century Dublin experienced, first, a sharp industrial contraction, whose worst effects were felt in the terminal decline of the manufacturing sector, textiles, whose expansion was in the same period creating the conditions for Belfast's broad-based industrialisation.

Manufacturing centralization/product specialization did later occur successfully with the growth of food and drink processing in Dublin. But this growth did not stimulate extensive industrialization of the local economy, partly, as we have suggested above, because of the character of the production processes involved and of the specific ways in which technical change was embodied within them. A further limiting factor was the relatively late date at which the major expansion of food and drink processing took place. Its growth occurred during a period by which engineering specializations had become more firmly rooted than had been the case in the early nineteenth century. This faced late local entrants, with, as the shipbuilding case demonstrates, relatively impoverished skill pools, with formidable obstacles to development.

Skill pools were of such critical importance because of the 'Britishness' of what Irish industry there was. In the late nineteenth century UK manufacturers were slow, compared with their US and German rivals, to adopt new techniques which utilised interchangeable parts, special purpose machine tools and the assembly line. The use of these systems required a greater input of capital but a much less skilled workforce. Entrepreneurial shortcomings have again been diagnosed as the cause of this failure to adapt but it has also been argued that, given - among other factors - the higher quality of the labour force available to them, skill intensive techniques represented a rational choice by UK firms in this period (Harley, 1974: More, 1980).
Where they were adopted, the new lower skill systems of manufacturing could significantly alter industrial locational constraints which stemmed from the spatial concentration of skills, as the Ford Motor Company's 1913 consideration of Dublin, and subsequent (1917) choice of Cork, as a production site demonstrates. Ford chose Cork to manufacture tractors, a capital good for which, as Jacobson (1977, 40) notes, practically no location provided a large enough market to justify the minimum profitable plant size. Following a slump in demand for tractors the Cork plant was switched to the production of components for the Model T car in 1922 but the 1928 decision to make Dagenham the Ford production centre for Europe brought the company into line with the increasing concentration of British consumer goods industries in the midlands and south-east of England (Hobsbawm, 1968, 218-220).

7. The Politics of Industrial Investment

In the Ford case low skill techniques were introduced to southern Ireland through the extension of a branch plant network at a time when, as Ford found to their discomfiture, that region was on the point of seceding from the UK and attempting to create its own small national-state economy. As Jacobson (1977) shows, the presence of this large, modern industrial enterprise within its boundaries confronted the new Irish Free State with a painful dilemma in relation to the implementation of a protectionist industrial policy. For the effective utilisation of Ford's new production technology required free access for its products to what had now become - in the fullest sense - export markets, an access which automatically became subject to tariffs on car parts when the state came into existence and which any significant move in a protectionist direction would inevitably have the effect of further restricting.

In the event extensive protection was resorted to, with
disappointing long-term results which have tended to colour subsequent evaluations of the general efficacy of this type of development strategy in the Irish case (Meenan, 1970). But a reappraisal which stresses the vital difference between nineteenth and twentieth century industrial conditions has begun to take place. With Hechter (1975) this emergent argument would put sovereignty back at the centre of Irish economic history:

"It does seem clear that, given effective protection, the woollen and cotton industries in particular could have grown and carried on much longer. In an age of simple and newly developing technology in which engineering industries arose to meet local needs (unlike in the twentieth century, as with Ireland’s post-1930s protectionist phase) the dynamic benefits for machinery and related industries could have been of considerable value for several generations at least, even if the textile industries eventually proved inefficient. The argument that protection could have done little good seems to give little consideration to the nature of the early pattern of development from textiles (or other leading sectors) to a wide range of related industries." (O’Malley, 1981, 36)

While the capacity for protective state intervention remained absent the struggle to regain a degree of self-government had by the late nineteenth century come to dominate the ‘climate’ within which what Irish industry there was operated. That the recurring unrest and underlying communal antagonism characteristic of this climate might have inhibited industrial investment in Dublin is suggested by two sets of events. The first was the moving in 1891 of pneumatic tyre manufacturing from the city to the English midlands by what was to grow into Dunlop, amid recriminations between the company and Dublin Corporation (Du Cros, 1938). The second was the announcement, while the crisis deepened around the third Home Rule Bill, that first Jacob’s (1912) and then Guinness’s (1913) intended to build manufacturing plants in England, at Liverpool and Manchester respectively.

But whatever ‘spirit’ might be imputed to its action, Dublin Corporation was only one of a number of politically variegated complainants about the nuisance of smells emanating from the city’s
pioneering tyre factory before the decision to move it was taken. Du Cros, whose family built up Dunlop and who succeeded his father as chairman of the company, himself admits that it would have been impossible to continue to operate at such a distance from a cycle industry which, after its initial boom phase, centred increasingly in the midlands and south of England, a pattern followed by subsequent motor car production:

"As the consumers were in England, the suppliers had to be on their doorstep." (Du Cros, 1938, 100)

Likewise, despite their Unionist affiliations, the chairmen of Jacob's and Guinness's both presented their firms decisions to locate new manufacturing facilities away from their existing Dublin bases in neutrally technical economic terms, with an identical stress on the importance of freight cost considerations. A statewide centripetal pull on industrial location appears to have sufficed to divorce enterprise growth from local growth for Dublin's most successful food and drink processing firms. Its influence also appears in the change of site from Manchester to London which accompanied the postponement and subsequent revival of Guinness's plans to build its English brewery. The period after 1890 has been characterised as one of modest industrial recovery in southern Ireland after the nadir of the decline of the 1870s and 1880s (Cullen, 1972, 156-157) but by 1914 the growth limits at such a peripheral location had apparently been reached for the region's main area of successful specialisation and employment in its 'giant monuments of modernity' had peaked.

8. Attenuated Industry and Overall Employment

What shape did Dublin's overall employment structure assume in the absence of broad-based industrial development? The contours of this structure are mapped in Table 2.2 using Charles Booth's scheme for the sectoral classification of census information on occupations.
(Armstrong, 1972) to calculate the distribution of occupied city and county males in 1871 and 1911:

TABLE 2.2 Sectoral Distribution of Occupied Males, Dublin City and County, 1871 and 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1911 figure as % 1871 figure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>17,670</td>
<td>10,754</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>9,827</td>
<td>11,642</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing</td>
<td>13,980</td>
<td>15,456</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>5,557</td>
<td>5,982</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Labour</td>
<td>12,699</td>
<td>24,033</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Service</td>
<td>4,498</td>
<td>8,661</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>24,464</td>
<td>23,710</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian P.S. &amp; P.</td>
<td>11,614</td>
<td>15,427</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military P.S. &amp; P.</td>
<td>7,720</td>
<td>6,905</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14,028</td>
<td>17,909</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Classifiable</td>
<td>3,285</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>125,749</td>
<td>142,143</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) Percentage Share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Labour</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Service</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian P.S. &amp; P.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military P.S. &amp; P.</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C./Residual</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On these definitions male manufacturing employment actually fell between 1871 and 1911 while the male labour force was growing by 13% and local employment in agriculture continued to decline sharply. By 1911 manufacturing had been replaced as the largest sector by a general labour category which had virtually doubled in size since 1871. As politico-industrial manifestations of militancy were added to this growth in numbers increasing attention began to be directed towards
general, and other unskilled, labourers in the immediate pre-war period (Chart, 1914: Wright, 1914).

The category itself, however, is less an employment sector than an indicator of the limits which apply to the allocation of census occupations to such sectors. The extent to which it is an artifact of the classification procedures used by census administrators emerges through trying to relate the occupational distribution of Dublin, with its attenuated industrial development, to the more 'normal' distribution that a core/periphery model would posit to exist in England. In their guide to British employment statistics Buxton and MacKay (1977) note the problem posed by changes over time in the treatment of the general labourer:

"As census classification became more elaborate over time, many of these persons 'found' a more specific occupation. Thus the growth of employment in some occupations and the employment of labourers are distorted by this type of classificatory refinement." (Buxton and MacKay, 1977, 21)

But they discount the existence of a problem of procedures changing over space by stating that from 1871 the Irish census adopted the British system of classifying occupations. However, although the scheme of orders and sub-orders is similar - though not identical - in both sets of census tables from this date, zeal for refinement was not uniformly distributed among census administrators. While the British census squeezed the general labourer, by attaching him wherever possible to a specific industry (by 1911 on the basis of a question on 'nature of employer's business'), no similar effort was made in Ireland.

Recently two classification schemes have been promoted as standard tools for the analysis of census data on occupations. The Booth scheme, used above in Table 2.2, has been advocated by Armstrong (1972) and used by Hill (1981) and Daly (1982) on Dublin data but it has not been widely taken up in Britain. An alternative scheme based on the present
day standard industrial classification (SIC) has been proposed by C. H. Lee (1977). Accompanied by two series in which the occupational data from all the censuses between 1841 and 1971 are reordered into the SIC categories at county and/or regional as well as British national levels this has understandably cornered the cross-channel market. The Lee scheme assigns general labourers to a residual 'unclassified' category. Applied to the 1911 census data for Britain as a whole, the residual for this scheme is 8%; but when applied to the Dublin data the residual rises to a huge 26%.

Because a bias towards industrial attachment is built into the British figures while the Irish figures retain a traditionalist tolerance for free-floating generality there is a basic divergence between classification procedures blocking comparison in detail of the different sets of figures. The Dublin data will therefore be examined on its own to see to what extent it is possible to unpack its general labourers into specific industrial or sectoral attachments. The aim is to clarify the effects of the use of a generalist mode of classification: it is not meant to imply that a particularist one necessarily provides a more accurate reflection of the employment situation of the subjects to whom it is applied.

The manuscript census household census forms from the 1911 census are accessible in Ireland but they contain no information source, such as the British 'nature of employer's business' question, which could be directly used to reallocate occupations on a more specific basis. But an indirect approach which uses non-census and census sources does enable some of the major contributors to the swelling of the general labourers' ranks to be identified. In manufacturing the firm-centred employment estimates of Table 2.1 suggest a 'turn of the century' figure in the region of 5,000 for brewing and distilling, industries providing mainly labouring employment. While by 1911 loss of jobs in
distilling and the smaller breweries probably make this too high in the census: brewers, distillers and maltsters total a mere 1,100. Again there are no building labourers in the Irish census although in Britain builders, carpenters, bricklayers, masons and plasterers all have labourer categories attached to them. Trade union sources indicate that at the outset of the 1913-14 Lockout there were 3,000 organised building labourers in Dublin.

Analysis of a sample of household census forms for sixteen city wards throws some light on the general labourer category from a different angle. It shows the highest concentration of households headed by a general labourer to have been at the eastern end of the city in the port area. With North Dock and South Dock wards containing less than 15% of sample households but 23% of those headed by a male general labourer transport, and the port’s cluster of mainly small chemical-type manufacturers (gas, fertiliser, glass and soap), seem also to have been underattached.

However, although certain more or less regularly attached groups can be identified as being for the greater part merged into general labour, the census sample does not support the idea that it is a category arbitrarily produced by bureaucratic assignment. When life chances are assessed in terms of literacy, child mortality and standard of housing households headed by a male general labourer emerge as disadvantaged on all three counts - not only, as might be expected, compared to households with non-manual and skilled manual male heads but also in relation to those headed by a male with a specific partly skilled or unskilled occupation:
TABLE 2.3 Distribution of Life Chances, Families of Male General Labourers and Those of Other Specifically Occupied Males, 1911 census sample (for details of which see Appendix A).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% HoHs able to read and write</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of children born to wives still alive</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Household members to rooms occupied</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases (Unweighted)</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, a significant amount of unpacking of workers more usefully regarded as having been located in other sectors has been shown to be possible but the disadvantageous life chances which general labour as a whole exhibits, in spite of the presence of these groups, suggests that it also contained a solid central component of the especially casualised and marginalised.

While comparisons across space are unexpectedly confounded by diverging classifications those across time in Dublin do not seem to be affected to any major extent by changing categories. The sectoral shifts in local employment - whether growth or decline, absolute or relative - shown in Table 2.2 are, within the limits of the definitions noted above, apparently valid ones. What overall pattern, if any, can these series of shifts be said to form part of?

The outstanding characteristic of the Irish economy at the turn of the century was openness: it was "certainly the most export-oriented small country in the world" (Cullen, 1972, 185-186). The other side of the
export-orientation coin was an import penetration which proceeded entirely unhindered by state policies of substitution. The result was a polarisation of economic activity which moulded the pattern of employment. At one pole activity revolved around the specialisations dictated by the free operation of market forces. Here southern Ireland was, apart from its beer and biscuits, overwhelmingly a primary producer exchanging agricultural for manufactured goods with Britain.

The nature, and abnormally large scale, of these exchanges fuelled the high growth exhibited by industrial service - accounting, banking, commercial and insurance employees, with the commercial clerk category making up nearly three-quarters of the total - and the less dramatic expansions of transport and dealing. In the civilian public service and professional sector, growth was occurring among public servants rather than professionals. This was largely a product of the development initiatives that the state began to undertake from the 1880s in response to the what we have termed the crisis of liberalisation, at the heart of which lay economic openness.

At the opposite pole lay employment in the production of a series of goods which were not internationally or inter-regionally traded and whose producers were more or less sheltered from external competition. A product might be non-traded, and its production dispersed rather than centralised, for a variety of reasons. Buildings were non-traded because they were non-transportable. Perishability defined local product markets for a food product such as bread. National administrative and cultural divisions protected a good deal of printing work. Peculiarities of industry structure provided a degree of protection for railway engineering:

"Unlike most other countries - Germany and the USA in particular - in Britain the major railway companies made and repaired their own engines in what were some of the largest engineering establishments in the country. These company workshops were private empires, largely isolated from the market." (Saul, 1977, 34-35)
Non-traded industries straddled the building and manufacturing sectors. Building grew in relative as well as absolute terms while within manufacturing it is notable that occupations enjoying the protection of non-tradedness - bakers, fitters and turners, printers - grew at about the rate at which the male labour force expanded (13%) although the sector overall registered a slight absolute decline.

Between them the open and closed poles of this employment pattern threw up a distinctively shaped and weighted juxtaposition of forces at the base of Dublin’s class structure and it is in this that the social and political significance of the polarisation resides. Around the open pole employment divided into two strata. The larger and lower of these was composed mainly of unskilled or partly skilled transport or factory workers. The upper stratum consisted of white collar (‘new’ petty bourgeois) employees, private or public, which Dublin appears to have possessed in an abundance matched in the UK only by London and Edinburgh. Around the closed pole the dominant presence was that of skilled craftsmen, its sheltered areas ensuring that if, as argued above, Dublin was relatively lacking in pools of strategic skills, the city still possessed a solid craft cadre whose representatives could project an image of its economy in which Dublin’s ‘giant monuments of modernity’ completely disappeared from view. Hence the following exchange when the president and secretary of Dublin Trades Council gave evidence to the Royal Commission on Labour in the early 1890s:

"May we assume that members of your Trades Council are mainly employed in trades for the use of Dublin itself? For the use of Dublin itself.

..It does not embrace manufacturing? I am sorry to say that Dublin is very much bereft of manufactures.

And there is no manufacturing for export at all? No, positively, no.

And very little for redistribution in other parts of Ireland? Very little for redistribution."
CHAPTER THREE
ETHNIC IDENTITY AND URBAN COMMUNITY

1. Introduction

By the end of the nineteenth century large Catholic and Protestant status communities coexisted uneasily in a number of major UK cities. There religion served to mark out the boundaries of ethnic groups, pairing Catholicism with Irish nationalism and Protestantism with British/Imperial unionism in relationships of mutual reinforcement (S. Connolly, 1985; Cox, 1982, 13-20; Currie, Gilbert and Horsley, 1977, 55-56 and 61; McLeod, 1981, 15-21). For Marx, writing at the end of the 1860s, this sectarian antagonism was "the secret of the impotence of the English working class, in spite of its organisation" (Marx and Engels, 1971, 264) But, in spite of Marx's enormous influence, it is a phenomenon of which there has been relatively little analysis.

By placing sectarianism "in every industrial and commercial centre in England" Marx undoubtedly exaggerated its geographical diffusion and, as the one great cause of British working class political weakness, it has subsequently to find any taker of note. Instead its manifestations have tended either to be studied within the narrow confines of strictly local studies (e.g. Waller, 1981) or, at best, to be compared unsystematically within ad hoc frames of reference (J. Smith, 1984). What has been lacking is a comprehensive specification of the spatial field within which sectarian conflict was a factor of primary social importance.

If, as seems the most plausible starting point for such a specification, the level of sectarian tension is assumed to be related to the degree to which a city's population is mixed and ethnic/religious cleavage is then regarded as likely to be of primary importance where the minority group made up roughly 20% of the total, a group of four large religiously-divided UK cities is formed - Belfast,
Dublin, Glasgow and Liverpool. But "critical mass" provides only a starting point, as the wide variation in the experiences of these cities clearly indicates. Dublin, in particular, stands out from the other members of the group in a number of respects. It was the only one in which Catholics comprised a majority of the population. It was an old big city, not a creation of liberal industrial capitalism but of economic growth in the 'penal' pre-industrial era. Yet, while the newer cities were largely unencumbered by such a legacy of institutionalised division, Dublin was the member of the group least prone to suffer outbreaks of communal violence.

This chapter examines the relatively muted character of sectarian conflict in Dublin, tracing the ways in which the content of its status community relations converged with or diverged from the experiences of the newer UK cities in which "national and religious antagonisms" had put down roots. It first deals with the demographic background to such conflict. It then traces the implantation of sectarianism in the urban structures of employment, residence and political power. Finally the religiosity and the violence of sectarian division are considered. On the basis of this examination it is argued that Dublin's more pacific experience can be attributed to three factors: a division of the local elite which separated economic power from political control, peculiarities of the class structure which derived from attenuated industrialisation and active central state impingement on the running of a city serving as the centre of a national administrative system.

2. Growing Cities, Colliding Cultures

The centralisation of industry which accompanied its nineteenth century mechanisation meant uneven development for cities and regions. Belfast and Glasgow grew as manufacturing centres initially around a textile base and later through shipbuilding and engineering. Liverpool, like Dublin, had few large manufacturers but integration with the
growing industrial concentrations of Lancashire and the English Midlands enabled it to expand the strong position it had acquired in the eighteenth century British colonial trade to become a giant port. A similar servicing role in relation to the linen industry had helped to stimulate Dublin's growth in the eighteenth century (Dickson, 1983, 182-184) but in the nineteenth an autonomous regional economy emerged in the north-east of Ireland as Belfast severed Dublin's links with the successfully industrialising part of the Irish economy. In population growth Dublin lagged well behind the other three cities as Table 3.1 shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population 1800</th>
<th>Population 1911</th>
<th>1911 growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>386,947</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>371,936</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>77,385</td>
<td>784,496</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>77,653</td>
<td>746,421</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most growing cities seem to have drawn the great majority of their migrants from adjacent rural hinterlands but the uneven character of overall economic growth triggered off additional long-haul population movement a large part of which was contributed by the growing Irish diaspora (Jackson, 1963). Irish Catholicism was certainly not the only element of cultural heterogeneity in the new cities: Liverpool, for instance, housed a large Welsh-speaking community (Pooley, 1977, 375-377). But the social disaster of the Great Famine lent a peculiarly concentrated and traumatic character to the Irish Catholic influx which aroused strong reactions in the receiving areas:

"The backlash against Famine migrants produced anti-Irish riots in cities as far apart as Boston and Liverpool, New York and London in the 1850s. (Hepburn, 1983, 34)"

Belfast provides the most dramatic instance of the development of an ethnic backlash in the context of a shifting and unstable communal
balance. Here the growth of the Catholic proportion of the population from less than 10% in 1800 to 34% in 1861 was accompanied by a sharply rising level of sectarian conflict. Between 1861 and 1911 the city’s population more than tripled but its Catholic proportion fell, or was driven, back to 24% (Hepburn and Collins, 1881, 211).

The powerful 'push' factors propelling the exodus of the Irish Catholic rural poor contrasted with the more discriminating 'pull' factors which governed their internal movement into a slowly growing Dublin. Dublin's severe housing, health and poverty problems did not arise from a massive influx of unskilled labour from its rural hinterland. Table 3.2 indicates that immigrant Catholic male heads of household (HoHs) were more likely than their city-born counterparts to be found in the higher social classes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Unweighted Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>Rest of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Mental</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Manual</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among Dublin's non-Catholics immigration and emigration cancelled one another out. Almost two-thirds of non-Catholic male HoHs were immigrants to the city compared with one-third of Catholic ones but, with non-Catholic numbers in the city and county stationary at 100,000 from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there was no net contribution to population increase from the religious minorities. Compared with that of Catholics, non-Catholic immigration was longer haul and governed by even more discriminating 'pull' factors. While immigrant Catholic male HoHs were overwhelmingly drawn from within
Ireland (88%) nearly half of non-Catholic ones were born outside Ireland. As Table 3.3 shows such non-Catholics were more than twice as likely as their Catholic counterparts to belong to the non-manual classes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Unweighted Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Mental</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Manual</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Doubly selective migration stabilised Dublin's communal balance. Slow population growth was accompanied by a very gradual but continuous shift in the direction of greater Catholic preponderance. The city probably ceased to have a majority of Protestants in its population in the second quarter of the eighteenth century: religious returns indicated that there was still a predominance of Protestant households in 1732 but all later informal estimates assumed a Catholic majority (Dickson, 1983, 188). A century later, in 1834, non-Catholics probably made up just over 27% of the city's population. With the onset of suburbanisation the combined city and county breakdown becomes a more meaningful measure than that for the city alone. Between 1881 and 1911 each inter-censal period saw an increase of between half a per cent and one per cent in the Catholic proportion of the city and county population. This rose from 76.5% in 1881 to 78.7% in 1911. Over the same period this population itself increased by only 14%.

3. The Structural Bases of Sectarian Conflict

In the rapidly growing cities status community antagonism was constructed around a historical division between churches which had not
previously served as a major focus for local socio-political conflict (Budge and O’Leary, 1973: Waller, 1981). Sectarian animosity put down popular roots in the competition for jobs and housing. The reliance of immigrants on kinship and wider ethnic/religious networks to secure access to these resources (M. Anderson, 1971), and the willingness of the ‘gatekeepers’ of housing and employment opportunities to discriminate between potential recipients on these grounds (Pooley, 1984, 104; Melling, 1980, 192) served to divide workers along religious lines into culturally dominant and culturally subordinate groups.

Orange and Green polarisation was thus a compound of longstanding religious differences with novel economic and social antagonisms. In Belfast and Liverpool this was politicised through the Unionist and Nationalist parties: in Glasgow Liberalism managed to maintain largely intact a loose but broad coalition of Presbyterian and Catholic support and confined Orange/Green antagonism to the sphere of popular culture (J. Smith, 1984; B. Murray, 1984).

In Dublin the struggle between Protestants and Catholics can be said to have been central to politics since its sixteenth century emergence. Symptomatic of the continuing importance attached to this conflict was the allegation that in 1798 the thwarted rebellion plans of the city’s United Irishmen encompassed a general massacre of Dublin Protestants (Musgrave, 1801). During the nineteenth century, however, the monolith of ‘Protestant ascendancy’ broke up and sectarian conflict became sub-divided into separate political and economic components which cut across rather than reinforced one another.

(a) Democracy and Disability

Politically the Catholic majority accumulated power as its legal disabilities were removed, the basis of local government was reformed and franchise qualifications were lowered. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1840 which removed municipal control from the city’s exclusively
Protestant guilds (Hill, 1982) and the Local Government Act of 1898 which created a democratised structure for local government in the counties and for Poor Law Unions were the major landmarks in this process. By 1914 the Rathmines Urban District Council was the only part of the local government system in Dublin to remain outside the reach of Catholic voting power.

But Catholic advances on the political front were not accompanied by a corresponding growth in economic power. The regime of the Penal Laws, it has been argued, promoted the urbanisation of Irish Catholics and led to the 'rise' of a Catholic middle class in the southern ports. Catholics were principally disqualified by law from holding landed property: a narrowed range of opportunities concentrated better-off Catholic families in trade where their insecure social position predisposed them to accumulate capital rather than to consume wealth (Wall, 1958).

More recent research, however, has stressed that eighteenth century "trade" had two tiers with different costs of entry, capital requirements and profit opportunities and has pointed to evidence of the relative absence of Catholics from the top tier. The commanding heights of the mercantile economy thus remained firmly in Protestant hands through the eighteenth century (Dickson, 1978). But, given the active role played by Catholic merchants in applying new technology and business organisation methods in several branches of manufacturing in the last quarter of the eighteenth century which Dickson notes, a disruption of the status quo favourable to Catholic advance might have been expected to form part of the changes which made up nineteenth century restructuring in Dublin. This, however, was not the case.

By the late nineteenth century Protestant predominance was clearly evident right across the new, open economy. In the manufacturing sector Power's distillery was the only major Catholic firm. The railway and
steamship industries were mainly controlled by Protestant or cross-channel interests: of the four railway companies with a terminus in Dublin only the smallest - the Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Company - was Catholic managed. British penetration and Protestant direction were also salient features of banking and insurance. Large-scale building and property development, particularly of the more prestigious suburbs, were also dominated by Protestant firms, the entrepreneurs at the core of the Rathmines ruling group supplying an example. Only in the category of public utilities like gas and tramways, where links with local government institutions were necessarily close, were industry's principal captains Catholic.

The causes of Catholic failure to sustain the commercial momentum of which there were signs in the later eighteenth century seem to lie in a changing pattern of investment. As landed property and the professions became accessible there was a debilitating diversion of Catholic capital away from urban business activity (Wall, 1969, 47-48). In a liberalised environment the broadening of the Catholic occupational base into previously closed areas thus helped to reproduce the tiered structure of the Dublin bourgeoisie.

(b) Occupational Segmentation

Below the bourgeoisie the different profiles of the Catholic and non-Catholic immigrant streams in the census sample have already thrown up evidence for the existence of segmentation along religious lines. As a base from which to to explore such segmentation in detail, however, the sample is limited because the geographical confinement of its coverage makes it 'bottom heavy'. For this reason the crosstabulation of occupation with religion published from 1871 onwards in the Irish census tables will be examined for an aggregate of the city and county. As there is no way of bringing employment status into this frame a satisfactory class analysis is not possible and Booth's industrial
sector classification is used. Table 3.4 provides a Catholic/non-Catholic breakdown for each sector in 1871 and 1911:

**Table 3.4 Sectoral Distribution of Catholic and Non-Catholic Occupied Males in Dublin City and County, 1871 and 1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1871 Number</th>
<th>%RC</th>
<th>%NC</th>
<th>1911 Number</th>
<th>%RC</th>
<th>%NC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>17,670</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10,574</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>9,827</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>11,642</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing</td>
<td>13,980</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>15,456</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. S.*</td>
<td>5,557</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>5,982</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.S.*</td>
<td>4,498</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>8,861</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Lab.*</td>
<td>12,699</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>24,033</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>24,464</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>23,710</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.S. &amp; P.*</td>
<td>11,614</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>15,427</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>7,720</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>6,905</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14,028</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17,909</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>122,057</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>140,679</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Leaving aside the armed forces and taking a range of plus or minus 5% around the percentages of Catholics and non-Catholics in the whole male labour force as the criterion of proportional representation the sectors can be divided into three distinct groups whose composition is in each case the same in 1911 as in 1871. These are: those within which Catholics are underrepresented and non-Catholics overrepresented - industrial service and public service & professional; those within which representation is more or less proportional - building, dealing, domestic service and manufacture; and those within which Catholics are overrepresented and non-Catholics underrepresented - agriculture, general labour and transport.

Between 1871 and 1911 changes in the distribution of Catholic males mirrored shifts taking place in the city's employment structure as a whole - decline in agriculture and manufacture together with growth in general labour, industrial service, public service & professional and transport. Non-Catholic male employment, by contrast, hardly altered at
all in its distribution. Only two sectors registered gains or losses of more than 2% in their share of the total - manufacture, where three-quarters of the sector's shrinkage is accounted for by the reduction in non-Catholic numbers, and industrial service where there was a large increase.

That the operation of religious segmentation was concentrated at the top end of the occupational spectrum is strongly suggested by the emergence of the wholly white collar industrial service sector as the area of both the greatest and the most persistent Catholic underrepresentation. An examination of employment discrimination as a socio-political issue reinforces this impression. From the turn of the century the salience of this issue increased noticeably as a succession of organisations - Catholic Association, Catholic Defence Society, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Knights of Columbanus - emerged to combat Catholic disadvantage (Bolster, 1979). But in only one documented case did discrimination impinge on the working class world of trade unionism. This concerned the dismissal of the Catholic engineer William Partridge from the Great Southern and Western (GSWR) works at Inchicore after he refused to withdraw allegations he had made of sectarian discrimination in the promotion of skilled men to supervisory jobs there.

Partridge was a prominent figure in the Dublin trade union movement, a former member of Dublin Corporation who had been secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers Strike Committee during a major dispute in 1902. After his sacking in the Summer of 1912, however, Partridge did not turn to the labour movement to take up his case but called for the reactivation of the GSWR Catholic Shareholders Committee, a middle class pressure group which had been formed a decade earlier to pursue fairness in the recruitment of the company's clerks.
Discrimination was thus an issue which can be shown to have touched the Dublin working class only at its boundary with the lower middle class. Where it was practiced within firms the tendency of discrimination was not, as elsewhere, to create workforces wholly Protestant from top to bottom but rather to reserve the non-manual jobs to Protestants as, for instance, in the ships' chandlers in which Sean O'Casey was first employed:

"Every worker in the front shop and every clerk, or the possible makings of a clerk, in the despatch department was a protestant of one kind or another. The catholics drove the vans, took charge of the crates, mulled in the stores and acted as messengers, pushing huge deep wicker three-wheel prams filled with goods for customers throughout the day and half-way through the night." (O'Casey, 1981, 247-248)

The principal victims of the discrimination which reserved the non-manual jobs for Protestants were less the Catholic manual workers lower down the discriminating firms' hierarchies than the better educated Catholics who were prevented from entering them. For this reason religious segmentation attracted much greater attention from those above the manual labour/mental labour divide than from those below it. Anti-discrimination strategy, for its part, further partitioned the non-manual area into private and public compartments.

The form of remedial action prescribed for the private sphere of owner-managed businesses and professions was that of 'favouring our friends', with preferential dealing being urged to strengthen existing Catholic enterprises or to create new ones. Within an economy whose balance was to be altered in this way religious discrimination in employment was accepted as a legitimate proprietorial prerogative in 'family firms'.

But acquiescence in this prerogative did not extend to all legally private concerns. Larger corporate institutions were, it was argued, quasi-public concerns with a duty to recruit and promote employees fairly. This contention turned the white collar occupations of the
new or collectivised petit bourgeoisie into the ground over which active campaigns against employment discrimination were waged in Dublin. At the core of this stratum lay the industrial service occupations with their 60/40 breakdown between Catholic and Protestant males compared with the 80/20 one among occupied males as a whole. But the principal target of anti-discrimination activity lay elsewhere in the transport sector. This was the occupation of railway clerk for which, ironically, it is not possible to get a religious breakdown from the census.

The classification used by the Irish census has four categories of railway employee and clerks find themselves merged into "other railway officials and servants". In Dublin this category comprised 80% of the railway total in 1911 and within it Catholics and Protestants were proportionally represented. Using the composition of the railway workforces of Edinburgh and London as a yardstick, between a quarter and a third of these 'others' would have been clerks. There is no way of telling how many would have been Protestant clerks and how many Catholic ones but it is unlikely that a particularly glaring imbalance in numbers singled out the railway clerk. He stood out rather because of the ability of charges of discrimination in his recruitment to merge into a wider well-established critique of Irish railway management.

This body of criticisms is seen by J. Lee (1969b) as being largely unjustified: the railways, in his view, were simply being made scapegoats for wider economic failings. But while railway reform is too vast a subject to be embarked upon here some reasons why this view of the railway companies as neutral transmission belts of economic rationality is questionable can be briefly advanced.

First, railway management was an integrated statewide (and, indeed, international) occupational elite. Its members were often without ties or commitment to the regions in which they were employed. Serving
external economic interests, the 'normal commercial practice' of the railways could plausibly be seen as an ethnocentric luxury which an underdeveloping nation could not afford. Second, continental precedents could be - and were - cited to support the view that economic development could be stimulated by departures from such practice. Some neutral contemporaries, who were highly sceptical of other parts of the standard nationalist economic view, were impressed by the strength of the case for Irish railway reform (Dennis, 1887; Daly, 1889; Pim, 1899). Finally, in relation to the specific impact of ethnocentricity on employment practice, Ireland was not the only part of the United Kingdom, where railway companies became embroiled in 'cultural politics': in north Wales they were alleged to discriminate against Welsh speakers even in filling labouring jobs (Wrigley, 1976, 11-13).

Catholic Shareholders Committees (CSCs) were formed in 1902 and 1903 to demand the filling of railway clerkships by open competitive examination in tandem with the launching of a national Catholic Association which aimed to overthrow the economic and social ascendancy of Protestants and to give 'organic' expression to Catholic values in Irish life. Initial support for this wider project from the Catholic hierarchy gave way to a condemnation by Archbishop Walsh of Dublin which left the Association fatally wounded.

The CSCs, however, survived this collision and, having succeeded in securing the concession of open competition from the three biggest railway companies, began to broaden their criticisms away from the original discrimination question. Such dissident shareholders campaigns, however, served mainly to underline the security of the positions enjoyed by the railway company boards. The forcing of votes on the re-election of directors or motions to reduce the directors' fees at company half-yearly meetings in 1904 and 1905 saw the boards pile up huge majorities. Thereafter the return of a Liberal
government and the setting up of a Vice Regal Commission on the Irish Railways - whose majority report was to recommend nationalisation - provided a new forum for advocates of railway reform.

The sectarian issue was not, however, completely displaced by wider questions of railway policy. 'Open competition' had both to be realised in practice and defended against dilution. Urged on by shareholder activists, Nationalist MPs twice - in 1908 and 1913 - used their ability to obstruct privately promoted Irish railway bills in parliament to secure or to forestall changes in the ways particular companies recruited their clerks.

Faced with white collar employment disadvantage Catholic activists were able to obtain a degree of amelioration by harnessing their community's political strengths. A solidaristic Catholic counter-masonry was cultivated by a succession of anti-discrimination movements while pressure group activity made some headway in extracting open competitive recruitment for white collar jobs from large private sector organisations. However, as with the shift in the population balance, the erosion of occupational segmentation proceeded slowly if steadily. It was not until the nationalist movement succeeded in creating a separate state in southern Ireland that the pace quickened. The effects of secession were felt almost immediately within a reconstructed public service. Over the longer term it also produced conditions of low Protestant immigration and increased Protestant emigration - including the apparent abandonment of established urban careers by older men (Kennedy, 1973, 132) - which radically altered private sector patterns (K. Bowen, 1983). In the process Dublin ceased to be a mixed city and became an overwhelmingly Catholic one.

(c) Residential Segregation

Alongside employment the other major urban resource whose
distribution was subject to ethnic/religious influences was that of housing. The comparative study of patterns of sectarian neighbourhood segregation faces a number of difficulties. First, the information collected by the census was not, as we have already seen, the same in all three administrative units of the UK. In Ireland, from 1861, religious affiliation was included: in Britain it was not. This means that birthplace is the only indicator of ethnicity usable with British data. The Irish born were not, however, a homogenous group, since there was Orange as well as Green emigration. Further no estimate of the reproduction of emigrants' ethnic identity into the second, or subsequent, generation can be derived from place of birth data.

There are also differences in the degree to which manuscript census material has been preserved and is accessible. Little Irish material has survived: what has is mainly from the early twentieth century and is accessible. Much more has been preserved in Britain: this material stretches back to the middle of the nineteenth century but access to its more recent parts is subject to greater restriction.

Within these constraints, in the case of the four large religiously mixed cities under discussion, strong segregation patterns have been documented for Belfast from the census of 1901 (Hepburn, 1983) and for Liverpool using 1871 census data (Pooley, 1977). Glasgow does not appear to have been the subject of any detailed investigation on this topic, in the absence of which conflicting impressionistic claims have been put forward. Where neighbouring industrial towns, such as Greenock or Coatbridge, have been studied (Lobban, 1971: Campbell, 1979, 178-204) significant segregation has shown up in 1891 and 1861 data respectively. In Dublin there has been no suggestion that ethnic/religious differences found expression in segregated neighbourhoods but a difference in ethos which had strong sectarian undertones has been detected between the old city and the new suburbs.
growing up around it (Daly, 1984).

The major factor influencing the presence or absence of neighbourhood segregation appears to have been the level of the class hierarchy at which the greatest religious mixing occurred. The lower this level was, the greater the extent of segregation tended to be. The Irish were only one of a number of culturally distinct groups in Liverpool, but their neighbourhoods were overwhelmingly single, lower working, class concentrations in contrast to the multi-class clusterings of other - Scots, Welsh - migrants. For this reason, Pooley (1977) argues, the Irish areas had the characteristics of ‘ghettos’ rather than the less isolated ‘ethnic communities’ formed by the Scots and Welsh.

This single class pattern seems to have been generally characteristic of the distinctively Irish enclaves ("Little Irelands") found in other, less mixed, British towns or cities. The segregated Irish Catholic neighbourhood was essentially a slum community stabilised by its parish organisation by about 1880 and surviving until it was engulfed by the slum clearance and bureaucratically-administered rehousing programmes undertaken by local authorities from the 1920s onwards (Mc Leod, 1981, 128-131; Samuel, 1985).

In Britain then the class of greatest mixing was clearly the working class, and within that class mixing occurred mainly in the lower, less skilled and culturally ‘rougher’ stratum. This was also true of Belfast:

"Within the working class the majority of Protestants as well as of the Catholics were still semi- or unskilled in 1901." (Hepburn, 1983, 50)

But there were important differences between the situation of Belfast Catholics and their emigrant counterparts in Britain. Perhaps surprisingly, given their clear position of relative deprivation in the local context, the Catholics of 1901 Belfast emerge not as a single
(lower) class community but as having a class profile similar to that of the British population as a whole (Hepburn and Collins, 1981, Table 12). And the higher the class position of a Belfast male Catholic HoH, the lower was the probability that he would live in a highly segregated area. A comparison of the 1901 data with measurements made in 1969 and 1972 not only demonstrates Belfast's overall level of segregation to have increased over the period but shows the phenomenon to have moved up the class hierarchy:

"The main change in the twentieth century has been the development of white collar Catholic neighbourhoods. In 1901 only about half the Catholic working class, and virtually no other members of the denomination, lived in exclusively Catholic areas." (Hepburn, 1983, 37)

Dublin differed from Belfast in the range of social classes across which religious mixing occurred and it differed from British cities in having its more restricted range of mixing located towards the top rather than at the bottom of the class pyramid. The combination of these factors ensured that Dublin neighbourhoods did not polarise along religious lines to any significant extent. Dublin municipalities, however, did.

Attenuated economic development left nineteenth century Dublin without a growing local tax base from which to fund the provision of urban services (Daly, 1984, 226-228). In this respect its situation was not that of a typical British Victorian city but rather resembled the present-day fiscal crisis of some of the cities of the US "rustbelt", increasingly dominated by poor racial minority populations as higher income white residents and businesses migrate beyond their boundaries. While its richer UK counterparts absorbed satellite districts with relative ease, a decrepit Dublin found itself locked into an adversarial relationship with the suburban townships which had grown up around it (Daly, 1984, 228-239).

In the middle of the century, between the collapse of O'Connell's
Repeal movement and transformation of the Home Rule Party under Parnell, a local accommodation had emerged in the city between Catholic voting strength and Protestant economic power. The office of Lord Mayor was alternated between Catholic and Protestant holders and a two-thirds Liberal/one-third Conservative balance maintained within the Corporation. However this informal compact collapsed amid the renewed national polarisation of the 1880s (Sullivan, 1905, 224-225). The mayoralty was not alternated after 1881 and the Conservative third of the Corporation shrank in the face of Parnellite challenges at the polls.

Accommodation had developed at the end of the 1840s around the successful promotion of a parliamentary bill to give the Corporation more effective powers and a campaign to save from abolition the office of Lord Lieutenant, the last vestige of Dublin's former status of a capital city (Hill, 1973, 200). In initiating active efforts to secure the extension of the city's boundaries from the time of the repudiation of these arrangements the Nationalist Corporation was operating in a climate of politico-religious rancour partly of its own making.

But although sectarianism was a complicating factor, class provided the primary basis of the city/suburban divide. While Dublin's adjacent townships were developed mainly under Protestant direction all but one of them had a Catholic majority in its population as early as 1881. Across the religious divide middle class migration to the suburbs had been stimulated by the gap between local taxes levied within and without the city. Over time this gap was eroded but it never entirely disappeared. The common middle class interest which crystallised around lower taxes thus prevented what might have been expected to take place if the issue had been primarily a sectarian one, the emergence of an actively amalgamationist suburban Catholic 'fifth column'.

In the absence of local consensus the normal private parliamentary
The coincidence of this solution to the boundary issue with the nationwide extension of the municipal franchise in 1899 marked the beginning of a new phase in the politics of the suburbs which remained outside the city. Where local control had previously resided, largely uncontested, in the hands of the property owners directing suburban development it now became party politicised at triennial elections as Catholics, acquiescent during the amalgamation dispute, sought greater influence within their particular districts. The pattern which emerged from these contests is set out in Table 3.5 for the four major independent Urban Districts in Dublin county, two of which, Pembroke and Rathmines, adjoined the city and had been threatened with amalgamation into it:

Table 3.5 Party Control of the Larger County Dublin Urban Districts, 1899-1914.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackrock</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingstown</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembroke</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rathmines</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = Nationalist; U = Unionist

In three of the four cases the situation was finely balanced with control liable to shift from one party to the other: only Rathmines deviated from this pattern with Unionists enjoying unbroken control in what was effectively a one-party suburb in which the Catholic opposition was unable to win a single seat on the council.

Rathmines consisted of two wards returning in one case nine and in
the other twelve members to the District Council. With a Unionist majority on the register in both wards and each elector entitled to cast as many 'straight' votes as there were seats to be filled, disciplined ticket voting ensured a clean sweep for the old township board when Nationalists mounted a challenge under the new franchise in 1899. With no representation to show for a 33% share of the vote, Catholic attention subsequently switched from fighting elections to a fruitless campaign to get the district divided into a larger number of wards. It was not until 1914 that a full-scale Nationalist challenge was once again mounted in the two Rathmines wards: on this occasion its share of the vote topped 42% but once again no Council seats were won.

In the city the election of a Unionist Lord Mayor or High Sherriff became unacceptable to the Corporation's Catholic caucus after 1881 on the grounds that it would represent an abandonment of the national demand for self-government by Ireland's premier representative body. In "Loyal Rathmines" - in valuation terms Ireland's fourth largest municipality after Dublin, Belfast and Cork - any break in the monopoly of the "Commercial" ticket would, its apologists claimed, replace businesslike administration with political and sectarian controversy. Thanks to the peculiar mechanics of an electoral system which will be examined in detail in Chapter Five, two representative institutions of an exclusive politico-religious character confronted one another across the Grand Canal despite the absence of sectarian residential segregation from both their populations.

4. Religious Revivalism and Sectarian Division

The churches, whether Protestant or Catholic, were not simply repositories of symbols which could be appropriated to mark out what were essentially secular boundaries between ethnic groups. Strictly
religious revivals took place within both Protestantism and Catholicism in the nineteenth century (S. Connolly, 1985; D. Bowen, 1978; Larkin, 1976; Miller, 1975) and, quite distinct from the widening scope of economic and political competition between ethnic groups, the ways in which these revivals changed the churches created new conflicts which deepened sectarian divisions.

Progressive dilution of the prerogatives of the establishment created an environment of religious - and, indeed, wider ideological - pluralism in which churches were free to compete for members. In some urban contexts this could draw different denominations closer together as a common religious sub-culture developed out of missionary efforts to reach a large 'Godless' segment of the population (Meller, 1976: Evans, 1982). But where religion asserted ethnic identity church attachment was stronger and even those not actively practicing any religion were, on national grounds, regarded by one church or another as rightfully belonging to it. Here winning converts was effectively "poaching" members, denominational competition became cultural aggression and 'philanthrophy' turned into 'proselytism'.

In Ireland proselytism was identified with a variety of Protestant missionary societies expressing a newly influential current of evangelical enthusiasm and seeking to win converts among the Catholic population. Following the launching of the Society for Irish Church Missions to Roman Catholics (ICM) this type of missionary activity reached a peak in the 1850s amid widespread controversy over the offering of material inducements to potential converts - "souperism" (D. Bowen, 1978). Thereafter it declined although the sporadic appearance in the south of Ireland of itinerant street preachers from a variety of sources continued to be accompanied by disorder and recrimination into the twentieth century.

The proselytism issue retained particular salience in Dublin, however,
because the ICM responded to organisational decline by redirecting its missionary work away from the remote Irish-speaking far west, concentrating instead on a city where a permanent support base of charitable institutions had been established during the initial phase of evangelical endeavour. The activities of one prominent Dublin charity, Mrs Smyly's Homes and Schools for Necessitous Children, were interlocked with those of a shrunken ICM down to the First World War at least and the name of one of these homes, the Bird's Nest, became synonymous with its stock-in-trade.

The persistence of proselytism was less important for the number of converts/perverts it produced than for the stimulus that belief in the gravity of the threat it posed gave to the formation of a network of strictly denominational institutions enclosing the Catholic community. Linked to the assertion of 'majority rights' strong tendencies towards denominational exclusiveness were developing independently of proselytism within Irish Catholicism but its existence provided both reinforcement and a persuasive public rationale for such sub-cultural separation. First invoked to secure the extension of denominational control within an originally non-denominational National School system, the threat of proselytism later served to help cast urban welfare services in the same mould.

Up to the First World War the reports of local conferences of Dublin's largest private charitable relieving agency, the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul (SVP), reveal a constant and almost obsessive concern with the activities of Protestant missionaries. Many of the 'special works' undertaken by SVP in the city - including the provision of free Sunday breakfasts, a seaman's institute, a labour yard and a discharged prisoners society - originated as responses to actual or suspected proselytism by other charities. Other groups of Catholic lay activists also became involved in 'reclamation' work, seeking, for
instance, to identify families whose children were being sent to proselytising schools and to persuade them to return to their original allegiance. One such group, which mounted a picket outside a proselytising soup kitchen, was to provide the founding nucleus of the Legion of Mary (O’Broin, 1982, 1-3).

The ambivalent attitude towards proselytism of the Protestant population in general was cited as grounds for refusing episcopal sanction to the operation of almost any charitable organisation on ‘mixed’ lines in Dublin. A few mixed charitable societies did operate in face of such discouragement. The secretary of one, the Police Aided Clothing Society (PACS), reported having ‘great difficulty with regard to religion’. No PACS visitor could go to visit a family unless she was a co-religionist. In cases of mixed marriage efforts were made to find out what religion a child being considered for assistance was being brought up in before a visitor was sent: where doubt remained a Protestant and a Catholic visitor would be sent out together to visit the family.

Mixed marriage itself joined proselytism as an arena of conflict and perceived aggression following the promulgation by the Vatican of the Ne Temere decree in 1908 and the publicity attracted by the 1911 McCann case in Belfast. Here a Catholic husband was alleged to have deserted his Protestant wife, taking their children and leaving her destitute after being advised by a priest that the marriage had no validity (R. Lee, 1985).

While it is accepted that the requirement that a mixed couple being married by a Catholic priest must give an undertaking to bring up as Catholics any children of their marriage existed long before Ne Temere’s promulgation (R. Lee, 1973), the decree has been seen as having imposed a rigid regime of canon law where there previously existed a tradition of customary accommodation in which frequently boys
were brought up in their father’s religion and girls in their mother’s (Fitzgerald, 1972, 36; D. Bowen, 1978, x-xi).

Evidence on social practice, as opposed to canonical precept, is generally rare and usually anecdotal in this area. The 1911 census sample casts light on the affiliation arrangements adopted by Dublin mixed marriage families around the time of Ne Temere’s promulgation. Only nine cases in a sample of over 1,750 fall into the mixed category, in which husband and wife or widowed parent and children professed different religions, and all but one of these cases involved the marriage of a Protestant man to a Catholic woman. One couple was childless, in seven other cases all the children were returned as Catholics (5) or Protestants (2) and in only one case was mixed affiliation of children found.

The cases in which the children were all returned as Protestants involved marriages contracted at earlier dates than the others, suggesting that the Catholic clergy may over time have become increasingly successful in securing compliance with their church’s requirements. The belief that a customary sexual division of the religious affiliation of children of mixed marriages existed prior to Ne Temere receives virtually no support. Indeed in the one case where the affiliation of the children was found to be mixed it was only the eldest son who was returned as a Protestant: all the other children, boys as well as girls, were returned as Catholics.

Such a low level of mixed marriage in a community where residential segregation was absent provides impressive testimony to the separateness of the social worlds which revolved around the different types of church. A shifting of the focus to individual documented cases of mixed marriage also reveals how marginal secular ideologies were in the context of this divide. At least two of the leaders of the Dublin Labour movement - James Connolly and William Partridge - had experience
of such marriages, the former as a husband and the latter as a child. The attitudes one man brought to, and the other derived from, this family situation show how communal loyalties influenced even the views of activists who defined their politics in class terms.

In writing of his campaign to expose discrimination in the GSWR works Partridge is at pains to disclaim any desire on his own part to become a martyr or to act as a champion of his religion. At the same time he exhibits an emotionally-charged identification with his church that seems to be rooted in childhood experience of family division over religious issues. Partridge’s father, to whom he does not directly refer, was an English train driver who settled, shortly after William’s birth, in the Roscommon town of Ballaghdereen. His son writes of being compelled to go to Protestant church service as a child and of not being baptised a Catholic until he was thirteen:

"Yet I was given the most precious gift that God in a worldly sense ever bestowed upon a child - that of a good mother and at her knee I learned the religion I profess."

James Connolly met his future wife, a Protestant domestic servant, when he was serving with the Army in Dublin. In 1890, after he had deserted from the army, they were married in a Catholic Church in his native Scotland. To get a dispensation for their marriage the couple had to give an undertaking to bring up any children they might have as Catholics. Broaching this "distasteful job" in a letter to his fiancee, Connolly anticipated her misgivings about making such promises but nonetheless added that in the future "I'd like you to keep them" (Levenson, 1977, 26). One of Connolly’s socialist comrades in Dublin, reminiscing many years later, recollected Mrs Connolly’s being ‘of protestant ancestry’ and recalled that:

"In a lunchour conversation with Jim I enquired why he brought his children up as Catholic? "Where I was raised we hated the Protestants & I did not want the Parson around as they are unbearable..."
5. Sectarian Violence

The construction of separate social worlds exemplified by the endogamy which confined mixed marriage to the margins was one side of the sectarian coin: the occurrence of violent clashes between the inhabitants of these social worlds was the other. The extent to which sectarianism expressed itself through violence varied considerably between the large mixed cities and these variations reflected differences in the way the phenomenon had become woven into the fabric of urban life.

The most destructive and protracted outbreaks - Belfast in 1886 and 1912, Liverpool in 1909 - occurred where clear patterns of workplace and residential segregation had already crystallised and characteristically took the form of shipyard, factory and neighbourhood expulsions which raised the pre-existing levels of such segregations to new heights. Briefer, less extensive and more easily contained sectarian rioting was associated with the celebration of national-religious feasts and anniversaries - Saint Patrick’s Day, the Twelfth of July and Lady Day (August 15) - election contests or football club rivalries, especially that between Glasgow’s "Old Firm", Celtic and Rangers.

Apart from an election riot in 1886 which culminated in shots being fired into a Nationalist crowd from the Conservative Workmen’s Club in York Street and an attempt set the building housing the club on fire, Dublin was relatively free from disturbances of both types. The city’s perceived Catholic enemy was the Masonic cabal rather than the Orange march: Dublin celebrations of the July anniversaries took place indoors rather than on the streets.

Such ethnic-religious street fighting as there was centred on the presence in the city of two institutional populations - students in Trinity College and soldiers in Army barracks. "Town versus gown" rows threatened to escalate into something more serious at the time of the
Boer War with student jingoism running counter to nationalist sentiment in favour of the Boers. After Ladysmith, however, the college authorities confined student celebration of British successes within its walls.

The disorderly conduct of soldiers promenading with their women on Dublin streets was a recurring subject of Catholic clerical and assorted nationalist complaints. The soldiers’ strolling was officially confined to a number of the main thoroughfares and the ordinary police presence was supplemented by a picket of military police in Sackville Street on Sunday evenings. In the 1900s hostile gangs, the best organised of which was known as the "Alarmers", gravitated to this central area to pick fights with the soldiers in which brass belt buckles and iron bars were used as weapons (O’Kelly, 1963, 103-104).

The relative absence of sectarian violence from Dublin can be attributed to the rupturing of an artisan tradition of Protestant militancy by the attenuation of the city’s industrial base - and in particular by the loss of its textile industries - in the first half of the nineteenth century. Key occupational groups often act as the guardians of such traditions, as the "Island men" of the shipyards came to do in Belfast (Gibbon, 1975, 67-86; Patterson, 1980a, 88-91), and through the eighteenth century Protestant silk weavers from the Dublin Liberties had been involved in recurrent sectarian rioting. However the crisis of Dublin’s textile industries led to large-scale emigration among this group with many Dublin weavers settling in the Cheshire silk-manufacturing centre of Macclesfield (Green, 1969, 96).

The contraction of Dublin’s manufacturing base in this period had vital implications for the character of its working class institutions. The polarisation of the organised and politically active component of this class along religious lines has been documented up to the middle
of the nineteenth century (Hill, 1980: Hill, 1981). But subsequently the influential trade unionist who was also an active political Unionist, such as the printer William Merry, became a rarity. Had its textile industries been enabled to survive by effective protection, and had they acted as a leading sector in a wider process of development as posited in Chapter 2, the character of Dublin's labour movement might have been very different from the cohesively Catholic and Nationalist one it possessed in the early twentieth century.

Why should sectarian violence, and the patterns of segregation with which its most virulent forms dovetailed, be associated with working class rather than middle class milieux? The answer lies in the way sectarianism was superimposed on the more 'normal' class division of labour. Above the mental labour/manual labour divide sectarian struggle revolved around the sharing out of the spoils of class privilege. It was conducted through the manipulation by the contending groups of the mechanisms which already ensured the subordination of the working class - property, credentials and political influence.

Within the working class only the system of craft apprenticeship provided a comparably organised arena of contest and, as we have seen, contrary to the common tendency to posit a polarisation between Protestant craftsmen and Catholic labourers (Strauss, 1951, 228; Hobsbawm, 1982, 84), the greatest degree of religious mixing usually occurred below this level. Here any effective form of sectarian exclusion had to block the market mechanism's general tendency to treat individuals who resemble one another in their relative lack of skills and resources in a similar exploitative fashion (Parkin, 1979, 89-115).

Violent enforcement of religious segregation in workplaces and neighbourhoods - or the intimidatory threat of such enforcement - became the means by which the requisite barrier was erected. It is significant in this context that accounts of how expulsions were
carried out in the Belfast shipyards identify semi-skilled adults and juvenile apprentices as the principal enforcers of Protestant territorial rights (Patterson, 1980a, 89).

6. Conclusion

In Dublin local issues were subject to central state management to a greater extent than in other mixed cities. First, the central state was a major local employer and by the early twentieth century Catholic underrepresentation in public service employment was diminishing more rapidly than in comparable parts of the private sector. The partial institutionalisation of open competitive recruitment within the civil service (McDowell, 1964, 37) was a major factor in this and it provided the norm of fairness through which Catholic activists sought to attack their community's disadvantage in privately controlled areas like the railways.

Second the poverty of Dublin's tax base eroded the city's local government autonomy and drew much of its strategic decision-making under the control of the Castle's Local Government Board (LGB). In this situation the LGB used its powers to hold Corporation expenditure down and block municipal borrowing (Daly, 1984, 221). It was central government fiat, and not any expression of local opinion, which dictated the shape of the 1900 boundary extension and the terms of the accompanying financial settlement.

Third, and perhaps most important, Dublin, like London, was policed from the late 1830s on the metropolitan model with central rather than local political control. As the case of Belfast, where a local force permeated by Orangeism was disbanded and replaced by the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in the mid-1860s, demonstrates, central control was not a universal panacea since the RIC never overcame Protestant hostility in the city. By the time of its arrival, however, the pattern of recurring violence, which it failed to break, was well established.
In Dublin, by contrast, even before metropolitan policing existed, the Castle had in the 1820s, by deploying troops, suppressed Orange coat-trailing on the July anniversaries (Hill, 1984, 46). The proximity of central state office holders and their offices was thus a significant factor in the regulation of Dublin’s community relations which was absent in the cases of the mixed provincial cities.
CHAPTER FOUR

ALIENS OR BROTHERS? ETHNIC ANTAGONISM AND TRADE UNION GROWTH

1. Introduction

Two radically different views of the dynamics of Irish trade union growth are to be found in the works of Sydney and Beatrice Webb. In "Industrial Democracy" (1897) they posit a gradual but ongoing absorption of Irish local societies into larger UK organisations: past experience, they conclude, points to "the whole extent of each trade within the British Isles as forming the proper unit of government for any combination of the wage earners in that trade". Indeed they regarded the Irish case as providing a particularly striking example of the operation of this 'dominant impulse' since the expansion there of British unions was occurring in spite of a traditional reluctance among their officials to 'having anything to do with Ireland' on the grounds that Irish branches tended to be financially profligate.

In the second (1920) edition of their "History of Trade Unionism", however, the Webbs, impressed by the growth of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) which originated as a breakaway from a Liverpool-based dockers union in 1909, declare that, "fired with nationalist spirit and almost revolutionary fervour", the Irish trade union movement has little connection with that in Britain.

Hechter (1975) also sees the formation of the ITGWU as a "critical departure" with vital political implications. The severing of links to the British trade unions it brought about precluded "the chance that any further advantages would accrue to the (southern) Irish working class from continued association with the United Kingdom" and ensured that class differentiation would not erode nationalism's broad-based support.

But Irish trade unionism was (and is) a more untidy business than such either/or schemas allow for. Since the early 1900s it has
consisted of a mix of organisations operating on a local, an Irish or a British Isles basis (McCarthy, 1977). Nor, in the south of Ireland, has it been possible to read off the political outlook of a trade unionist from the type of union to which s/he is attached (Hannigan, 1981). Membership of or employment by a British-based union carries no implication of anglophile attitudes. It is against the backdrop of this patchwork quilt of trade union tradition, and not as the embodiment of an abstract principle either of nationality or of nationality plus syndicalism, that the development of the ITGWU has to be analysed.

Up to the First World War trade union expansion in Ireland (including that of the ITGWU) was closely tied into a wider pattern of growth 'waves' which swept across the UK. When Dublin employers sought through a concerted lockout to roll back this expansion it was donations from British trade unionists that prevented the locked out workers being quickly crushed. In the 1913-14 lockout the employers sought to isolate the ITGWU - "a union in name only" - from the 'legitimate' trade unionism of the city. The failure of this gambit reveals Dublin "Larkinism" to have been a movement in which ideas of remoulding trade unionism into a revolutionary political instrument existed alongside strong traditions of craft sectionalism.

Focussing on the interaction of these diverse elements, this chapter examines how sustained and effective trade union organisation extended beyond the upper working class stratum of skilled craftsmen to begin to take in the mass of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in Dublin. It first examines the characteristics of the original craft cadre of Dublin trade unionism. Then, by identifying who was and who was not caught up in the 1913-14 lockout and with what effects, it analyses union penetration of sub-craft areas of Dublin employment. Finally, turning to the political implications of the way in which trade union organisation took place, it evaluates the claim - mooted by
Hechter and explicitly formulated by Greaves (1982) - that statewide unionism was an inherently imperialistic phenomenon which exploited Irish recruits by subordinating their interests to those of a larger 'mainland' membership.

2. Craft power in Dublin?

A spectrum along which nineteenth century UK cities are placed according to the degree of effectiveness of craft union regulation in their local labour markets has been sketched by Pelling (1968). Dublin is placed at one end, London is towards the centre while Manchester is placed at the other end.

In Manchester, a city largely created by the growth of mechanised textile production, the level of such regulation was low. In London a strong historical craft tradition existed but nineteenth century conditions institutionalised a division in many trades between high class and low class branches. In the area of high class luxury trades, craft apprenticeship continued intact. But in the growing low class branches work was sub-divided to produce cheaper goods for a mass market, reducing skill requirements and facilitating the employment of 'inferior' workers who had not served an apprenticeship in the trade. Across a wide range of trades - furniture making, shoemaking, clothing and building - local apprenticeship systems collapsed in the face of rapid population growth and more open entry conditions. Dublin Pelling characterises as:

"...the one city in the United Kingdom which seemed to contain the most effectively organised crafts, with the strongest control over apprenticeship... - also the one city which did not grow rapidly and which was least affected by all the changes resulting from industrialisation." (Pelling, 1968, 43)

This formulation implies that strong craft unions somehow insulated Dublin from structural changes occurring within the wider UK economy. But far from being "least affected by all the changes resulting from
industrialisation", Dublin’s economy underwent a radical restructuring discussed in Chapter Two. Slow growth was associated in Dublin not with the absence of change but with the predominantly negative ways in which change occurred.

Labour market restriction, backed by trade union violence and intimidation, has indeed been blamed for the city’s manufacturing decline (J.J. Webb, 1913, 92-99). But the concentration of violent incidents - which had ceased by 1840 - in disputes relating to the building trades (D’arcy, 1968, Appendix IV) and the apparent absence of efforts to relocate industries beyond the reach of the city’s trade unions but within the south of Ireland - the eighteenth century response to combination pressures (Dickson, 1983, 188) - suggest that such decline stemmed from forces operating in product markets rather than in the labour market. In a wider context such product market forces have been seen as creating a set of conditions in which craft organisation, far from hampering the growth of industrial capitalism, actually functioned to meet the needs of some of its sectors.

In differentiating cities according to the degree of strength possessed locally by craft unions Pelling assumes that apprenticeship is essentially a restrictionist device used by trade unions to socially construct what is technically unnecessary - ‘skill’ - in order to secure or preserve high earnings. Against this approach, however, it has been argued that unions did not have the capacity to enforce such restriction because of the low density of union membership in many of the trades recruiting via apprenticeship. The survival of the institution therefore reflected objective requirements for genuine skill arising out of product market conditions which inhibited the use of mass production techniques and gave employers, as well as unions, an interest in its maintainance. In the industries where these conditions prevailed a period of training was actually needed and it imparted real
skills which increased the market capacity of their possessors (More, 1980).

When a 'product market' approach to craft organisation is substituted for a 'labour market' one quite different placings in the spectrum of cities are suggested. London no longer represents the central tendency while Dublin ceases to be an isolated special case. Instead there are good grounds for regarding London as sui generis and Dublin as having much in common with provincial British norms.

Because of London's role as 'a locus of sociological investigation' More argues that contemporary commentators tended to generalise the city's restricted range of opportunities for entering apprenticeships into a countrywide 'decline of apprenticeship'. But while high overhead costs meant that London firms took few apprentices they provided a large market for workers migrating to the city having served apprenticeships elsewhere. Outside the capital the institution was widespread and was particularly associated with a number of growing industries - engineering, shipbuilding, building, woodworking and printing.

In Dublin, as Chapter Two showed, attenuated development increasingly concentrated craftsmen in non-traded goods industries and/or repair, maintainance or ancillary work in the food and drink processing sector - baking, coopering, engineering, printing and the building trades. Since these trades are a sub-set of those in which apprenticeship was firmly established in most British centres in the same period the link between product market forces and craft organisation appears to hold good for the Dublin case as well. Indeed the non-tradedness of certain goods, which we have suggested assumed particular importance in the context of attenuated industrialisation, provides an instance of the adoption of mass production techniques being constrained by product market structure.
In one respect, however, the ‘product market’ approach as it has been developed for England does not fit the Dublin situation. Stressing the general weakness of trade unionism during the formative period in which apprenticeship training became incorporated into the industrial capitalist order, it sees customary norms and market forces as the agencies which provided the system with regulatory checks and balances. But in Dublin craft union strength developed relatively early and its influence needs to be given greater weight.

The Webbs described the Dublin trades as 'the best organised in the (United) Kingdom' when the Combination Acts were repealed in 1824 and complaints against the activities of illegal combinations date back to the middle of the eighteenth century when the city experienced its most rapid growth (Dickson, 1983, 188). The average level of union membership among the Dublin skilled trades in the 1830s is estimated to have been between 50 and 60% (D’arcy, 1968, 2-4). The 1830s membership density estimates for unions in some of the trades in which craft workers tended to become concentrated through the nineteenth century are reproduced in Table 4.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trades</th>
<th>Percent in Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painters</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plasterers</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumbers</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printers</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: D’arcy (1968) pp 2-4

The high level of union membership in the building trades is particularly striking in a comparative context. Estimates from the 1870s and 1880s agree that in the British building industry as a whole only between 10 and 20 per cent of skilled tradesmen were union members (Burgess, 1975, 100: Price, 1980, 62). In a number of Dublin building trades it was alleged that union strength was used to enforce drastic
limitations on access to and numbers of apprenticeships. Arnold Wright, citing as his authority a paper written 'some years ago' by the Dublin building employers' spokesman John Good, claimed in 1914 that in three cases - brick and stonelaying, plastering and stonecutting - apprenticeship was virtually exclusively confined to the sons of men already working in the trade.

In brick and stonelaying Good had calculated that apprentices and improvers together made up less than five per cent of the labour force. If these calculations are accurate, the Dublin ratio of brick and stonelaying apprentices to journeymen, 1:24, diverged considerably from that prevailing in Britain, which in 1909 was estimated to be 1:5 (More, 1980, Table 5.12). Good went on to claim that the operation of such restrictions was creating a scarcity of skilled building labour in Dublin, while preventing unskilled city and country workers making up the manpower shortfall and drawing in tradesmen from 'elsewhere', by which he presumably meant Britain (Wright, 1914, 35-36).

But in an industry such as building where there were wide regional variations in levels of activity (Burgess, 1975, 92) no automatic relationship between relatively tight apprenticeship controls and skilled labour scarcity can be assumed. Whether a scarcity would actually arise depended on the local level of building activity, a factor largely influenced in its turn by regional variations in the overall rate of economic growth. Where regional growth was slow, tight restriction of apprenticeship might act to prevent the overstocking of the labour market - as trade unions claimed in defence of such policies - rather than to create actual scarcity.

That craftsmen in the indicted trades were migrating to Dublin from 'elsewhere' to fill skill vacuums created by undue restriction on apprentice taking there is not apparent from the birthplaces of craftsmen HoHs in the 1911 census sample which are set out in Table
4.2. There is no evidence here of what Good’s scenario would lead one to expect: higher proportions of both Dublin-born and British-born HoHs in the 'hereditary' trades:

Table 4.2 Birthplaces of Dublin Craftsman Heads of Household By Trade, 1911 Census Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Trade</th>
<th>Dublin</th>
<th>Rest of Ireland</th>
<th>Britain &amp; Elsewhere</th>
<th>Unweighted Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alleged Hereditary Trades (1)</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Building Trades (2)</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Leading Trades (3)</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>146</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) = bricklayers, plasterers and stonecutters.  
(2) = carpenters, joiners, painters and plumbers.  
(3) = bakers, coopers, engineers and printers.

Away from apprenticeship an instance of Dublin building craft union strength being used to curb the operation of market forces can be found in active attempts to enforce the 'closed shop'. Replying to a questionnaire from the Royal Commission on Labour in the early 1890s, one Dublin building firm, S.H. Bolton and Sons, stated that they employed union men as a rule "as they refuse to work with non-unionists". Oral testimony to the Royal Commission along the same lines prompted A.J. Mundella, a pioneer of 'progressive' industrial relations in Britain, to remark that:

"Trade unionism is prevalent in England but no witness has come into that chair, I think, except two from Dublin who objects to working with non-unionists and says it is their policy to strike against them."

This was the policy not only of local societies but also of the branches of statewide unions in the city as a Dublin representative of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners made clear:
"The way we stand in Dublin at present is that all the employers - what we may term first-water employers - employ unionists and recognise their rates. They find amongst the unionists the best class of men. These non-unionists that I have spoken about are to an extent in a small minority in Dublin and they frequently work in small shops - black or jerry shops as they are termed - where they receive a small rate of wages comparatively speaking. [...] therefore through the action you take (in striking against non-unionists) you set up inferior workshops at lower rates of wages to compete against the general trade is that not so?"

Those inferior shops never get a fair class of work or never do any work of importance nor of note."

Even in painting, the building trade most vulnerable to 'invasion' and casualisation because of the relative absence of a skill content which was genuinely difficult to acquire (Stedman Jones, 1971, 59-60: Gray, 1976, 65-67: More, 1980, 128), a substantial "regular" component was preserved in Dublin through strikes to exclude non-unionists (Callan, 1981). Here the union also engaged in extensive lobbying to have contracts awarded to the "regular" employers. Regular employers, for their part, accommodated to the fact of union strength by insisting that where any concession was made by a union to firms outside their ranks this must also be made available to their members. It was to win this concession that the Master Builders Association locked out the Dublin bricklayers in 1905.

In Dublin the pursuit of closed shop control by relatively strong unions accentuated a division of building work into different 'classes' which was found more generally. Invasion of apprenticed crafts by 'inferior' men was associated in Britain with the growth of the 'cheap end' of the industry and the rise of general contracting (Burgess, 1975: Price, 1980). But general contracting 'rose' to greater or lesser heights in different regions. It was particularly a phenomenon of Greater London and North-West England, the regions of most rapid economic and population growth, where it was concentrated in government work and speculative housebuilding. Overall, however, the industry continued to be made up of a variety of types of firm whose particular
mix in any locality depended on the nature of the local market environment.

Dublin's slowly growing market was not conducive to the extensive development of general contracting or the burgeoning growth of a cheap end in building. In rapidly growing regions the emergence of a large cheap end did not necessarily entail substantial direct displacement of skilled labour since other classes of building work would also be expanding, although not necessarily at the same rate. In a stagnating region adjustment between the shares of different classes of work did tend to cause displacement. Here local craft resistance to the practices through which general contracting operated - such as the use of piecework, the employment of 'driving' foremen and the 'promotion' of labourers to tradesmen's jobs - was likely to be as strong as the "imperative" of general contracting was weak.

Building was the sector in which the local strength of trade unions particularly marked Dublin off from other areas of the UK with regard to the organisation of the apprenticed trades. This distinctiveness resulted from a specific interaction between early unionisation and the marked sensitivity of the building industry to regional variations in the general pattern of economic growth. The regional factor was particularly pronounced in the case of building because change, in the relative absence of technological innovation, took an almost entirely organisational form.

Outside building the ubiquity of mechanisation - and the changes in work practices which employers sought to introduce to maximise the productivity gain from new machinery - meant that any local distinctiveness stemming from relatively strong unionisation was far more muted. The printer's union struck in 1890 for the abolition of piecework and the establishment of a "universal wage". But they succeeded only in securing a change in working practice which
eliminated unpaid preparatory work together with an improvement in piece rates. The tailors' union struggled fruitlessly to end outworking. Returning at the old wage rates after a five months strike in 1902, engineers had to accept the introduction of the piecework system they had previously resisted into the railway engineering works (Geraghty and Rigney, 1983).

Any notion that "effectively organised crafts" could block the thrust of industrial capitalism's development, rather than securing viable niches within its complex structure, is disabused by the example of the long established Dublin bakers' union which by 1912 was all but destroyed at the end of a protracted struggle against the introduction of new machinery (Swift, 1948, 305-318). Even the strict local monopoly of the Dublin cooperers, whose 'ingenious arrangement' for controlling labour supply strongly impressed the Webbs (S. & B. Webb, 1897, 75), crucially depended on continuing employer goodwill. In 1909 Guinness's, who employed nearly half the Dublin society's members, identified the cooperage as the only department within the capital intensive brewery in which further cost savings could be made by introducing new machinery. "Local and sentimental reasons" inclined the company against this course, however, and:

"As the relations...with the Coopers Union have always been of the friendliest character the Board have not yet so far been forced to consider this alternative".

3. Union Growth and Class Confrontation

Until a broadening out of the UK trade union base to embrace the greater part of the working class began in the 1870s trade unionism was almost entirely a craftsman's prerogative. This was the case not because other manual workers did not form unions to represent their interests but because they found it extremely difficult to sustain their organisations over time. Expansion, once under way, was not
smoothly continuous but occurred in large part through three explosive waves of militancy in 1871-73, 1889-90 and 1911-13.

In each case union membership rose rapidly over a short period of time and employers responded by mounting a counter-attack. Parts of the initial union expansion were thus beaten back yet each of the waves did succeed in permanently raising the level of effective organisation within the working class (J. Cronin, 1982). In the case of the last two waves at least, Dublin workers and their employers faithfully followed the wider UK trend and, in doing so, they produced one of the major confrontations of the pre-First World War ‘labour unrest’ - the lockout which the Dublin Employers Federation launched in September 1913 with the aim of destroying the ITGWU’s base in the city.

This use of a lockout to attack an organisation regardless of where its members were to be found prompted a defensive closing of trade union ranks and generated a capital/labour conflict of a relatively clear-cut and generalised kind not usually found outside of localities dominated by a single industry. Yet because it was a lockout and not, as it has sometimes been termed, a general strike, participation in the struggle was also limited.

If we look at the labour groups directly involved we find that these consisted principally of workers on the docks, on the tramway system, in Jacob’s biscuit factory and in the building industry. Unlike the tramway service, the railway system continued to function normally while, unlike Jacob’s, most of the city’s largest manufacturing firms such as Guinness’s brewery or Power’s and Jameson’s distilleries were only marginally affected. To understand why this division came about it is necessary to go beyond the usual personalised presentation of the conflict - James Larkin versus William Martin Murphy - to examine how industrial relations had come to be structured in each of the major sectors of the local economy. In this exercise manufacturing, transport
and building will be examined in turn.

(3a) Large Scale Manufacturing

The central role played by Jacob's, alongside the Murphy-directed tramway company (DUTC) and Irish Independent newspaper, in initiating the movement to destroy the ITGWU contrasts strikingly with the virtual non-involvement of the city's other major manufacturers. Guinness's and the DUTC were singled out for organisation by the ITGWU in 1912 (W. O'Brien, 1969, 60) but little, if any, progress seems to have been made in recruiting the brewery workers by the beginning of the lockout.

A month after the lockout began six boatmen were dismissed by Guinness's for refusing to load empty barrels at a strike-bound berth in the port. The ITGWU sought in vain to secure their reinstatement first by blacking the movement of Guinness's goods and later, having unconditionally lifted the blacking, by appealing for a goodwill gesture from the company which might help to promote a general settlement. No action in support of the sacked men appears to have been taken within the brewery: a 'loyalty bonus' was paid by the company to both manual and clerical workers as the lockout drew to an end in early 1914.

General unionism had more success in the case of Jacob's where brief strikes took place in August 1911 and in April 1913. On Saturday August 30 1913, the company dismissed three men who had refused to unload a consignment of flour from Shackleton's mill in Lucan: a notice was posted instructing its employees that they must handle all goods tendered and at the same time a regulation was issued forbidding the wearing of union badges in its factory. On the following Monday 670 of Jacob's male employees struck in support of the dismissed men. On the same day over 250 women, members of the Irish Women Workers Union (IWWU), were dismissed for refusing to remove their union badges.
These figures suggest that around a third of the workforce were union members and that organisation was much stronger among its male than among its female section. The numbers reported as striking or refusing to remove badges account for over two-thirds of male workers but only one in eight of women workers in the factory. The company closed its factory for two weeks and, upon reopening it, refused to employ any ITGWU or IWWU member. When the general return to work began in early 1914 the mass of Jacob's union members applying for reemployment were victimised.

Two diametrically opposed images of Jacob's emerge out of the controversies surrounding the lockout but the Quakerism of the firm's directors provides an element common to both. Shackleton's, the mill from which the fateful load of flour had come, was another Quaker-owned firm which had on August 27 locked out its workers specifically on account of their membership of the ITGWU - the first employer to follow the example set by the Murphy enterprises. Giving evidence at the Board of Trade Inquiry, George Jacob did not deny that his firm had had the notices it posted immediately after the refusal to handle Shackleton's flour printed a week beforehand. Quakerism could thus appear to be a channel through which these employers had colluded to attack the ITGWU presence in both workplaces.

Yet in Britain a network of Quaker employers is credited with having done much to professionalise personnel management practice (Child, 1964). From Dublin Jacob's played a leading part in the institution and diffusion of the major managerial innovation associated with this group - "welfare work". In Dublin, but unconnected with any wider "management movement", an elaborate welfare system had also been constructed by Guinness's. A paternalistic style of management was thus to be found within both workplaces but relations between managers and workers differed radically between them. Why should
paternalism minimise conflict in one case but fail to do so in the other?

A key factor differentiating the two Dublin firms' abilities to manufacture consent by means of company welfare policies is what Newby (1977, 71) has termed the "room to manoeuvre an employer is given by his own source of power - the conditions of the markets for his products". As we have seen, Guinness enjoyed a monopoly position in its main markets. It was also a highly capital intensive firm upon whose profitability high wage rates or the provision of other benefits had a relatively small impact. Moreover the operating requirements of its continuous process technology gave its labour the character of a fixed rather than a variable cost. These factors combined to maximise the company's ability to "look after" its workforce.

Jacob's operated in a much more competitive product market. By the early 1900s "grave problems of overproduction" in the UK biscuit industry were prompting attempts to form a cartel but no basis for joint action could be agreed (Corley, 1972, 170). This industry was also highly sensitive to labour costs. Its largest firm, Huntley and Palmer, who came into conflict with trade unionism about the same time as its fellow Quakers Jacob's, were from the turn of the century substituting cheaper female for more expensive male labour (Corley, 1972, 175-179). Yet Reading, the town in which Huntley and Palmer were the largest employer, already suffered from unusually severe poverty which stemmed from the prevalence of low wages (Bowley and Burnett Hurst, 1915).

The situation of those employing paternalist strategies is one factor determining their effectiveness: the situation of those to whom they are applied is the other. It has been argued that industrial capitalist paternalism can only exist within relatively small, clearly bounded geographical areas (Norris, 1978) but the Dublin evidence
suggests that the captive audience required by a strategy of this type could be constituted even in a big city through cultural or gender discrimination.

Guinness's recruited what appears to have been a highly stratified workforce using formalised screening procedures. "Boys and youths" were recruited from the sons of employees or pensioners and promoted into adult jobs through an internal labour market. From the time of the Boer War ex-soldiers were also, within limits, accorded preference. Where the general external labour market was tapped, "few town-bred men satisfy the requirements of the Board as regards physique" and more malleable young country labourers were drawn off. Such screening produced what Malone (1927, 466) termed a "state of independent dependence" which cut Guinness workers off from participation in general social movements and subjected the totality of their activities to a pervasive company influence.

For the low wage biscuit industry women represented a pool of relatively cheap and docile labour enabling costs to be further pared in the face of competitive pressures. Welfare work concerned itself primarily with maintaining the desirable characteristics which women were perceived to bring into waged work. The Quaker paternalist philosophy sought to maximise the segregation of the sexes throughout the workplace. It refused to countenance the employment of married women and prescribed the recruitment of girls straight from school with the provision of continued schooling and/or supervised social activities at the factory to inculcate the 'right spirit'. The outward manifestation of this inward grace was held to be an acceptance of monotonous tasks which were deliberately allocated to women in the factory division of labour (Cadbury, 1912: Rowntree, 1921).

When trade unionism appeared upon the scene, as in Jacob's, its spread was hampered by the operation of such control techniques.
Segregation blocked communication between different sections of the workforce and, within the female ghetto, welfare surveillance thwarted the use of peer pressure to gain new union recruits. Union building, like employer strategy, needs room to manoeuvre. Paternalism ensured that Jacob’s women had little, leaving union organisation much weaker among them than among Jacob’s men when the company took the offensive.

3b Transport

Trade unionism’s great leap forward of the 1911-13 expansion wave took place in the transport sector of the UK economy. The mobilising transport workers were a very diverse group ranging from a “uniformed working class” on the railways or tramways to the casually engaged workers on the docks and quays. Within these different contexts unions were constrained to adopt a variety of strategies to capitalise on opportunities for encroachment. Throw together in a single, wider struggle by the Dublin lockout these strategies were to prove not to be compatible with one another.

The key factors in industrial relations on the railways were state regulation of the system and the concerted opposition of the railway companies to union recognition. The two problems were interconnected: the legal obligations of the companies as ‘common carriers’ and the statutory freezing of railway rates in the 1890s encouraged the traditionally authoritarian railway managements to persist in their use of strikebreakers supplied by “Free Labour” organisations against union action.

The railwaymen’s unions, principally the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS), based their strategy for securing recognition on forcing the government to wring concessions from the companies in order to forestall the damaging effects of statewide railway strikes. The railway conciliation schemes which gave the ASRS and other unions a
negotiating foothold they sought to develop were created and extended by government action under this type of pressure in 1907 and 1911 (Alderman, 1973).

Dissatisfaction with the working of the conciliation scheme set up in 1907 led to local railway strikes in England as the wave of trade union expansion gathered pace in 1911. To control these developing local movements the RSRS executive threatened a national (UK) strike unless the railway companies agreed to hold negotiations. A five-day national (UK) strike ensued which the Liberal government intervened to bring to a negotiated end against the backdrop of an international diplomatic crisis.

The national strike had not been well-supported in Ireland where the conciliation machinery, with which English railwaymen were dissatisfied, had come into operation at a later date and a general opinion on its effectiveness had not had time to form. Less than a month later, and with a Royal Commission, established under the terms of the August settlement, reviewing the effectiveness of the existing conciliation machinery, a strike began at Kingsbridge station when goods belonging to a strikebound Dublin timber firm were blacked.

Unlike the August strike this action received strong rank and file support and quickly spread to most of the major Irish lines. The RSRS called an all-Ireland strike but, faced with united employer resistance and unwilling to jeopardise what it had gained through backing local strikes in August by widening this one, the union quickly found itself pursuing, with limited success, the reinstatement of the strikers (Rigney, 1977, 45-60).

During the 1913-14 lockout conflict between sympathetic industrial action and the safeguarding of gains within the railway industry itself reemerged. It took place not in Dublin, where the railway companies did not join the employers’ offensive and the debacle of September 1911
precluded the spontaneous development of sympathetic action, but in
Britain where, at one point, the blacking of Dublin goods had 9,000
railwaymen out on unofficial strike. The national union leadership,
however, set its face against a principle ("tainted goods") which
threatened to place railway workers in the front line of every major
dispute and its opposition broke the blacking movement.

If in railway industrial relations central government was a key
third party, whom union leaders were anxious not to drive into the arms
of the employers, local government played a comparable role on the
tramways. Municipalisation of tramway systems became common in UK
cities at the end of the nineteenth century and "the progress of trade
unionism was eased under municipal ownership" (Bagwell, 1982, 247).
Local authorities like London, Manchester and Salford established
conciliation machinery and negotiated collective agreements. Every where
old-style management authoritarianism was carried over under public
ownership, as in Tory Liverpool, political considerations operated to
curb its excesses (Waller, 1981, 256-257).

Straitened finances appear to have ruled out the option of tramway
municipalisation in Dublin and conditions for the system's workforce
seem to have been considerably worse than in Liverpool or Belfast
(Keogh, 1982, 184-185). By the time of its 1913 battle with the ITGWU
the privately-owned DUTC had already beaten off, through a judicious
mixture of promotions, threats and sackings, a number of organising
attempts (Mc Donnell, 1979) and it held in readiness a reserve pool of
labour, made up of men from country districts, which it could draft in
to counter any strike action.

Dock workers generally faced very different conditions from those
of the "uniformed working class" but their unions, like those of the
railwaymen, had to contend with statewide employer counter-
organisation. In the ports strike-breaking was the function of the
Shipping Federation who sent 'free labourers' to Dublin during dock
strikes in 1891 and 1900 as well as in 1913. Dublin branches of the
Gasworkers Union and the National Union of Dock Labourers (NUOL) had
collapsed as a result of defeats suffered in the earlier strikes.

The ITGWU came into existence in 1908 as the result of a split in
the NUOL while it was attempting to reestablish an Irish base. In
Dublin the new union was the local beneficiary when in the Summer of
1911 a tidal wave of transport strikes temporarily left the Shipping
Federation floundering and opened the way to effective collective
bargaining in UK ports. Over the next two years the ITGWU orchestrated
the setting up of an association for the stevedores who employed casual
dock labour and secured a new schedule of wages in the shipping
companies which ran regular cross-channel steamer services and which
maintained permanently employed workforces. The local employer counter-
offensive, however, led to the breakdown of these arrangements.

The instrument through which the union had sought to curb some of
the most dangerous and divisive aspects of the casual hiring system,
the stevedores association, was broken up when, with employer support,
a stevedore who had refused to join, and from whom the union had
withheld labour, took a successful court action. The union itself
drew the shipping companies in to the general lockout movement of
September 1913 by breaking an undertaking in its agreement with them
which precluded the use of sympathetic action as it sought to counter,
through blacking the movement of goods, the purge of its members
initiated by the OUTC, Irish Independent, Shackleton's and Jacob's.

As mediation efforts failed to secure a settlement - foundering on
the issue of an acceptable formula to govern reinstatement - the Dublin
labour leaders increasingly pinned their hopes of breaking the deadlock
on an extension of the blacking of Dublin goods to Britain. But other
transport unions like the seamen and railwaymen, upon whose support
such a strategy depended but whose recently won gains its failure could wipe out, led the opposition to its adoption, and a special conference of the British TUC overwhelmingly backed this position in December 1913.

3c Building

Industrial relations in the Dublin building industry were regulated by a series of detailed local agreements between the master builders and the various building craft unions. Each craft had its own agreement but the craft unions tended to seek major changes in wage rates and working hours simultaneously. When several unions served strike notices expiring on 1 May 1896 a complete shutdown of Dublin building activity for nearly three months followed before each union or group of unions negotiated a new agreement for its/their trade with the master builders.

To force the resolution of one of the issues which had been left over for further discussion in 1896 the Master Builders Association locked out the Dublin bricklayers in 1905 and imported blacklegs from Britain. Only after three and a half months lockout was it agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. Thus an elaborate bargaining system, within which extended trials of strength periodically led to the conclusion of new formal agreements, characterised the Dublin building industry, so far as its skilled workers were concerned.

Building labourers were, apart from Corporation labourers, the only unskilled group in the city to maintain a union continuously from the 1890s. Continuity of existence seems, however, to have been the union’s major achievement. Lacking effective control over labour supply, it was dependent on the goodwill of the master builders to gain concessions.

Without the funds of the craft unions or their members’ ability to migrate with relative ease to other centres during disputes, the members of the Builders Labourers Union (UBLGWU) suffered severe
distress during the prolonged 1896 dispute. Its marginal role was again demonstrated in 1913 when some of the craft unions negotiated new agreements which provided their members with higher wage rates and shorter working hours. Since the UBLGWU was not involved in these negotiations, and labourers' wage rates remained the same, this effectively passed on a wage cut to the labourers who worked with these tradesmen.

When compensatory adjustments were subsequently introduced the Trades Council received a complaint from the ITGWU that these changes had been made without consulting its builder's labourer members, of whom there were 500 compared with the UBLGWU's 2,500. But no noticeable increase in strike activity accompanied the ITGWU's entry into building. Upheaval within their industry does not provide an explanation for the building employers decision to join in the general employer offensive against the ITGWU in September 1913.

Realignment was, however, taking place on the employers as well as on the trade union side of building. By 1913 the older Master Builders Association had been effectively superseded by the Building Trades Employers Association (BTEA) which comprises not merely building contractors but various classes of merchants and builders' providers etc'. This was the body which led the building employers into the lockout. Although the UBLGWU had earlier spurned a Trades Council recommendation that it should act jointly with the ITGWU in representing builders' labourers, united trade union resistance to the BTEA's presentation of "the document" quickly brought Dublin's building industry to a halt.

Despite the changes which had taken place in the organisation of the forces of both capital and labour, the conflict, once set in motion, followed the pattern established by previous building struggles. Even if, as some dissenting voices claimed, the question at
issue had little relevance to the industry's own concerns, the structure of its industrial relations dictated a clear-cut, formal end to the lockout - either the withdrawal of the employers' undertaking or a formal submission to it. After nearly five months the latter took place when the UBLGWU capitulated, endorsing the employers' document.

This marked the effective end of the lockout and was followed by a return to work by the building craftsmen. They did so under threat of a second lockout as the BTEA had in January 1914 served notice of alterations in their working rules. As accepted, however, the altered rules represented a making explicit of the pre-lockout status quo rather than an extraction of concessions from the craft unions in its wake. Amicable working (with non-unionists) applied only to trades other than the craftsman's own while the obligation to handle materials supplied did not extend to a longstanding craft bête noire like the foreign joinery or joinery made under unfair conditions anathemised by the carpenters' union. Building thus took up where it had left off in September 1913 as an industry with strongly organised craft sections and weakly organised labourers.

3d After the Lockout

The ITGWU was the major vehicle of trade union expansion in Dublin in the pre-war years. But whereas over 10,000 ITGWU members had been receiving lockout pay in 1913-14 the Roll Book of the union for 1915 shows a Dublin area membership of about 3,500. The union had no members at Jacob's, Shackleton's, the Irish Independent or DUTC: in Guinness's it had less than half a dozen members. The five hundred builders' labourers of 1913 had by 1915 shrunk to less than fifty. County Dublin farmers, who repudiated an agreement reached with the union in August 1913 to join in the lockout of the following month, had reduced its agricultural labourer membership to just over sixty.

After the lockout the ITGWU was a port union: the employees of coal
merchants and cross-channel shipping companies, casual dockers and casual coal porters accounted for half its Dublin membership. Although there was undoubtedly victimisation in this sector, to a large extent the Employers Federation document had, as the lockout dragged on, become a dead letter on the quays and, in contrast to the cases of Jacob’s and the building employers, the union was not broken by the return to work.

The 1915 ITGWU membership in manufacturing industries was also largely concentrated in the port area in a handful of shipbuilding, engineering and chemical firms. The branches the union had earlier established in the western part of the city, with offices at Aungier Street, High Street and Emmet Road in Inchicore, had either collapsed or were in severe difficulty after the lockout. This then was the principal base from which the union was to expand spectacularly in the later war and immediate post-war years. Some growth in its heartland membership is evident even in 1915 as wartime inflation forced down working class living standards and the union, in spite of its parlous financial state, struck for compensatory wage increases.

4 Conclusion: "One-Way Solidarity"?

During the initial phase of the 1913-14 lockout British trade unionists rallied to provide generous financial support to the Dublin Labour movement (Sweeney, 1980). But the final phase of the struggle was marked by bitter recrimination within trade union ranks and a tailing off of subscriptions (Moran, n.d.). Class solidarity, it has been claimed, was undermined by dominant nation chauvinism towards a subject people:

"They (British labour leaders) gave their consent to a system of international plunder. Their attitude to the Irish was bound to be affected by this general outlook. In this sense the betrayal of Irish labour was imperialist." (Greaves, 1882, 126)

Where individual unions operated on an "amalgamated" basis, with
British headquarters and Irish branches, a related syndrome of "one-way solidarity" has also been diagnosed by Greaves. Here the 1908 split in the NUOL and the September 1911 railway strike provide the supporting evidence.

Is such an "internally colonialist" analysis of trade union leadership behaviour in this period justified? In the NUOL split a conflict over tactics developed between the union's organiser in Ireland, James Larkin, and its executive. Alarmed by the depletion of funds produced by a rash of disputes in Irish ports the executive suspended Larkin. Taking part of the NUOL's Irish membership with him, Larkin broke away to form the ITGWU; he was subsequently to be prosecuted and imprisoned for appropriating funds subscribed in Cork to the NUOL for the new union.

The implication that these events disclose a British union treating its Irish members as second class citizens is, however, questionable. For all general union organisation in this period a tension arose between the aggressive policies required to stimulate recruitment and the need to demobilise the rank-and-file thus attracted at critical junctures. Failure to resolve this tension was a major factor in the collapse or contraction of many of the general unions in the later 1890s. Unions found themselves fighting strikes without funds and disaster followed.

Until circumstances changed in its favour in the Summer of 1911, the ITGWU was itself forced to react pragmatically to events, relying on appeals to public opinion and arbitration to get out of difficult situations caused by the spontaneous actions of its members. The balance of class forces here provides a more useful explanatory tool than the imputation of national prejudice to the NUOL which, ironically, was built up in Britain under ethnic Irish leaders (Waller, 1981, 103-105).
By the time of the 1911 railway strikes the balance of forces was more favourable to labour but the relative improvement should not be exaggerated. An element of surprise had helped the railway unions to move forward in August but it was not available to them in September. The consolidation of their August advance towards recognition depended on getting government backing for what they hoped the Royal Commission on railway conciliation schemes would recommend. Railway union membership was growing but it was not such that union leaders could approach a trial of strength with confidence.

These considerations applied across the board, but they did so with a vengeance in Ireland. Here a predominantly agrarian economy compounded the difficulties of building up union organisation while the companies injected a genuinely national element into the industrial relations context by maintaining peculiarly intransigent attitudes even in the face of government pressure. When the 1911 Royal Commission reported the Irish companies broke the employers' united front by refusing to implement the (modest) changes in conciliation procedures it had recommended. In retaliation the government subsequently excluded Ireland from a bill relaxing the freeze on railway rates so that labour cost increases incurred through conciliation scheme awards could be recouped by the companies (Alderman, 1973, 212-221).

As we have seen, deep divisions between the transport unions emerged in the course of the 1913-14 lockout over blacking the movement of Dublin goods. But the interpretation that British unions refused Irish workers what they would have undertaken on behalf of those on the mainland is dubious. The Transport Workers Federation had in fact tried to call a national (British) strike to support London dockers in the Summer of 1912 but the unwillingness of provincial ports to hazard their own local agreements by such a stoppage scotched the proposal (Clegg, 1985, 52-56). Transport workers' gains had been hard-won, and
they were by no means securely held. Many of their union leaders had seen similar advances wiped out by employer counter-action in the "new unionism" of the 1890s. Unwillingness to generalise the disputes in London and Dublin stemmed from an assessment of the risk of defeat faced by trade unionism across the transport sector as a whole should the employers respond in kind.

The realism of this assessment cannot be lightly dismissed, even if it left those who came under local counter-attacks, as in London and Dublin, to limit their losses as best they could. By financially sustaining the Dublin workers for so long - to the chagrin of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy, among others - British trade unionism at least helped to blunt the employers' offensive enabling the ITGWU to survive to fight another day. UK trade unionism's network of 'interregional organisational affiliations' can thus be credited with sustaining on Dublin's quays an urban enclave differentiated from its surrounding hinterland. The politics of this proletarian enclave were not, however, those of negative integration into the existing state but of a nationalist-separatism feeding off a sense of class betrayal:

"Aye, bitter hot, or cold neglect or lukewarm love at best
is all we have or can expect,
we aliens of the west"
CHAPTER FIVE

VOTES, PARTIES AND STRATAGEMS: THE "FRANCHISE FACTOR"

1 Introduction

Class conflict pervades capitalist social formations but the mechanism of citizenship has institutionalised such conflict in a manageable form within the structure of the Western nation-state. Marshall's (1950) model identifies three successive stages in the development of British citizenship. Basic civil rights were secured in the eighteenth century: political rights were progressively widened in the nineteenth and social (welfare) rights added in the twentieth. The general applicability of this schema to advanced capitalist nation-states has been upheld (Rokkan et al., 1970) although Marshall's work has been criticised for anglocentricity and evolutionism (Mann, 1987).

In the present context the relevance of citizenship lies in its operation as an agency for the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon political mores into UK state territory in which very traditions of group solidarity and group conflict held sway (Garvin, 1981; Miller, 1978).

Ireland's incorporation into the Union at the beginning of the nineteenth century led to its inhabitants acquiring political rights equivalent to those enjoyed on the mainland. With the Third Reform Act of 1864-85 "the rules governing the Irish (parliamentary) electorate were brought almost completely into line with the rules in Great Britain" (Walker, 1972/73, 365). In Ireland the local government franchise was assimilated to the parliamentary one in 1898, with provision for the inclusion of "eligible women", while in England and Wales the two remained structurally separate, with women again being eligible to vote locally. The proportion of the adult population on which the two systems conferred voting rights was much the same, however.

Greater inclusiveness of voting rights promoted changes in the
structure of the party system as the interests of previously 'submerged' groups became factors in the electoral contest. Chapter One has already sketched the developments associated with this process in urban-industrial Britain: a working arrangement between a renovated Liberal and a newly-launched Labour Party confronted at general elections a Unionism whose Tariff Reform policy sought to appeal to workers over the heads of official Labour leaders. At parliamentary by-elections and at local government elections, by contrast, three cornered contests were common with Labour fighting both Liberals and Unionists.

In Ireland the static nature of parliamentary representation from the mid-1880s might suggest a smothering of the effects of greater inclusiveness by powerful mechanisms of status community solidarity. But the picture is modified in Belfast and Dublin, at least, when local level representation is taken into account. Here franchise extension stimulated the emergence of radical challenges to orthodox Unionist or orthodox Nationalist domination from within the ranks of the local majority.

But greater inclusiveness was only one aspect of the operation of this sub-democratic electoral system. The scale of continuing exclusion was such that in 1911 an estimated 40% of adult males were not on the parliamentary register. At the same time some voters possessed more than one vote and large variations in the size of constituencies violated the norm of "one vote, one value". Moreover these distortions could be manipulated by power-holders to their own advantage. They placed at the disposal of the established parties means of maintaining their dominant positions and of containing the challenges of new entrants into the party system such as Labour and Sinn Fein.

An awareness of the persistence of such biases within the electoral system is well developed in Britain but is usually absent from Irish
discussions of the election results of the "Edwardian" period. Ironically, it is only in Ireland that, because of the accessibility of twentieth century manuscript census material which can be linked to information obtained from electoral registers, it is at present possible to measure, rather than to speculate about, these biases.

This chapter is centred around such an exercise in quantification. It begins by surveying the mechanics of the electoral system - the franchise law, the voter registration procedures and the division of space into units of representation. Next it examines the Dublin electorate produced by this machinery at a particular point in time - April 2, 1911, the day on which the census was taken. Conclusions which have been drawn about the direction of the biases which made up "the franchise factor" are then reassessed in the light of this evidence. Finally reactions to the chicanery of the system and the extent to which in Ireland those disadvantaged by it mobilised to demand democratic fairness are considered.

2 How the Vote Was Won: The Franchise and Registration

In theory the franchise law provided a broad basis for household, if not individual adult suffrage following its third reform in 1834-85. Four different franchises enabled property owners, rated occupiers, "inhabitant householders" and lodgers to qualify for inclusion on the register. In urban boroughs like Dublin, where it had existed prior to the first Reform Act of 1832, the status of freeman provided another possible qualification. In university seats - the two Irish ones belonged to Dublin University (Trinity College) - graduate or academic status entitled its holder to a vote (Blewett, 1965, Table 1).

The law prescribed disqualifications as well as qualifications. The most numerically important groups to suffer specific exclusion were women (at parliamentary elections), paupers, lunatics and (in Ireland only) policemen. The terms in which the property occupation franchises
were framed also indirectly excluded a series of groups whose members were adjudged not to constitute separate households. These included domestic servants residing with their employers, most adult children living with their parents and soldiers in barracks.

The law also required possession of the franchise qualification by the potential voter for a minimum period prior to registration. In the case of the franchises under which over 95% of Irish voters qualified (Rated Occupier, Inhabitant Householder and Lodger) the period was twelve months. However, since the period of occupation was only counted backwards from July 20 of a particular year and the new register came into force on January 1 of the following year, a minimum of eighteen months residence was in practice required to get a vote.

Any change of residence or type of qualification in the twelve months prior to July could mean an actual qualifying period of up to two and a half years. If a householder changed residence within the same borough or county unit "successive occupation" might enable him to save his vote but a lodger was allowed to move only to other rooms in the same house - otherwise he was disqualified. The result was that "where mobility was greatest, the voters were fewest" (Clarke, 1971, 111) and such requirements were responsible for large-scale disfranchisement, especially in the cities.

The often arbitrary nature of such units - in Dublin the parliamentary borough and county did not correspond to the municipal entities with the same names and bore even less relation to the actual social patterning of space - added an extra turn to this screw. Another legal requirement attaching to some of the franchises was the payment of rates due by a certain date: where it was his responsibility, the failure of a landlord to pay rates cost the tenants of his property their votes.

The administrative procedures which gave effect to the franchise
law were set in motion in April or May of each year with the service of Requisition Forms by the Rate Collectors. Those on whom the forms were served, normally the occupier or landlord, were legally bound to have them filled in and returned to the Town Clerk's office. They then formed the basis of the "Long List" which was published on or before July 22 with the Town Clerk's objections noted in the margin.

New claims had to be lodged with the Town Clerk by August 4 and a list of claimants was published by August 11 again with the Town Clerk's objections noted. Private objections to any name on the list of voters could be lodged up until August 20 and a list of objections had to be published by August 24. In September and October the Revising Barristers adjudicated on the disputed claims under review by the courts. A large body of case law was thereby built up with each Autumn's sessions providing a fresh crop of judgements, often on cases stated by the Revising Barristers. The revised register was published in December and came into force on January 1 of the following year.

The whole registration process has been aptly characterised as "cumbersome, creaking and capricious" (Blewett, 1965, 38) but method lurked within its madness. The element of rational calculation was injected by the political parties' assumption of control over the lodging and sustaining in court of claims and objections. The parties established themselves as "custodians of the register" (Clarke, 1972, 33) because:

"It is a commonplace of politics that elections are won or lost, not at the polls, but before the Revising Barrister; and this commonplace like many others is often despised, and as often recalled, with regret."

3 Where The Vote Was Cast and How It Was Valued: Redistribution

As numerous instances of gerrymandering testify, the value of having a vote, that is the influence which can be exercised over the make-up of representative assemblies, depends on how the spatial units
within which that vote is cast are constituted. In 1884-85 a redistribution creating seats with more nearly equal populations formed part of the parliamentary reform package. This redistribution made single-member seats the norm in Ireland. Under it, Dublin gained increased representation, a parliamentary borough and a parliamentary county, each of which had elected two M.P.s, being replaced by four borough and two county divisions, each electing one member.

However no effort towards the equalisation of the value of votes accompanied the 1898 local government reform. The fifteen Dublin wards defined by an Improvement Act of 1849, each of which returned an alderman and three councillors, remained the units of representation within which the extended municipal franchise operated. Inequality in the value of municipal votes was further accentuated when in the 1901 extension of the city boundaries five additional wards, each with four Corporation representatives, were simply added onto the existing structure. With twenty wards of roughly equal size, each would have had a population of around 15,000 in 1911. In fact, as Table 5.1 shows, the largest ward had a population of 35,000 while the smallest was less than a tenth of its size:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Pop.</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay</td>
<td>35,019</td>
<td>New Kilmainham</td>
<td>9,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clontarf East</td>
<td>3,303</td>
<td>North City</td>
<td>7,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clontarf West</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>North Dock</td>
<td>24,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drumcondra</td>
<td>9,774</td>
<td>Rotunda</td>
<td>15,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzwilliam</td>
<td>12,404</td>
<td>Royal Exchange</td>
<td>6,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasnevin</td>
<td>10,481</td>
<td>South City</td>
<td>3,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inns Quay</td>
<td>23,305</td>
<td>South Dock</td>
<td>15,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansion House</td>
<td>11,189</td>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>11,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay</td>
<td>25,705</td>
<td>Ushers Quay</td>
<td>25,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountjoy</td>
<td>25,996</td>
<td>Wood Quay</td>
<td>21,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>304,802</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>304,802</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Chapter Three noted, central state intervention was necessary to produce a resolution of sorts to the Dublin municipal boundary dispute. This was directed towards the relations of the city to the
independent suburbs and ignored the internal arrangements of both, hence the remarkable one-party regime of two-ward Rathmines remained undisturbed while the lopsidedness of the city's electoral districts increased. Where Irish city boundaries were extended by wholly private parliamentary bills, as with Belfast and Derry (both in 1896), whole new schemes of ward division accompanied the proposals.

In both cases the cities' Catholic minorities took their opposition to the proposed divisions to the Select Committees considering the bills. Weakened by entanglement in the factional divisions of the Irish Parliamentary Party, the Derry Catholic case made no headway (D. Murphy, 1981, 166-167): the Belfast Lobby, however, mobilised effective support and succeeded in having that segregated city's Catholic ghetto allotted two of the fifteen new wards (Budge and O'Leary, 1973, 117-120).

Political horsetrading, albeit at a more exalted level, had also surrounded the 1885 redistribution of parliamentary seats. The Boundary Commissioners who carried it out, and the instructions they followed, had been agreed by Conservative and Liberal leaders at a conference called to break the deadlock which had developed between Lords and Commons over the Reform issue. A say in how the new constituencies were to be carved out was in essence the quid pro quo offered to secure Conservative acceptance of Liberal franchise extension (Chadwick, 1978).

In the boroughs the Conservatives' object was to consolidate middle class residential districts into a distinct division or divisions: in the counties they were (in England) primarily concerned to insulate the rural areas they dominated from suspect urban industrial growths. To meet these concerns, the Commissioners were, in addition to equalising populations and following existing administrative boundaries as far as possible, to give 'special regard' to 'the pursuits of the population'
in dividing the boroughs while seeking to include all 'populous localities of an urban character' in the same county division.

When the Commissioners came to Dublin to hold hearings on the schemes they had prepared, the Corporation argued that the parliamentary borough should be enlarged to bring in all the suburban areas which the Municipal Boundaries Commission of 1880 had recommended to be amalgamated with the city. This was the procedure which was being applied in the case of Belfast, but, no doubt conscious that their remit was to assuage Tory sensibilities rather than to outrage them, the Commissioners declined to repeat it in Dublin's case, sticking instead to existing parliamentary borough and county units which had no ecological justification.

The schemes it was proposed to implement within these units met with a mixed reception. Corporation and Nationalist Party spokesmen supported the county scheme but opposed that for the borough: the representatives of Rathmines and of the Conservative Party objected to the county proposals. In the county the original proposals placed Rathmines in the northern division in order to equalise its population with that of the proposed southern one. But, inverting its English intention, the Conservatives successfully pressed into service the instruction to include 'populous districts of an urban character' in the same division to secure the creation in the county of a south-eastern suburban corridor stretching from Rathmines through Dundrum, Blackrock and Kingstown and on to Little Bray. As a result the whole south-west of the county found itself shunted into the 'northern' division.

In the borough the Nationalists and the Corporation objected to the way the proposed scheme divided wards - in one case into four parts - and used Church of Ireland parish boundaries where it departed from ward ones. An alternative scheme equalising populations but retaining
MAP 1

Dublin Parliamentary County Divisions 1885

NORTH COUNTY

Rathmines
Blackrock
Kingstown

SOUTH COUNTY

10 km
wards intact was put forward by them. While parochial boundaries were
dispensed with in favour of main thoroughfares and the number of wards
to be divided was reduced, the Commissioners insisted that the grouping
of populations of similar pursuits justified their breaking up of wards
on the south side of the river to separate a proletarian Harbour
division from a middle class residential Stephen’s Green.

The Nationalists had clearly lost out in borough and county but
their reaction to these proceedings was muted by an expectation that,
whatever division arrangements were adopted, they could win all the
Dublin seats under the new franchise. This they went on to achieve in
the general elections of 1885 and 1886 but subsequently, apart from
1900 when Dublin Unionists were deeply split, the clean sweep was only
to be repeated in the December 1910 election. Unionists won both
Stephen’s Green and South County in 1892. They were unable to win
Stephen’s Green back after its 1900 loss but they continued to average
43% of the vote there. South County was retaken by Unionism in 1906,
held in January 1910 and lost by 133 votes in December of the same
year.

By contrast with these two marginals, the other four Dublin
divisions were safe Nationalist seats. One of the four, St. Patrick’s,
went through five successive general elections without a contest while
the intermittent contests in the other three were as likely to stem
from divisions within nationalism as from the opposition of Unionists,
for whom propaganda campaigns aimed at British public opinion
represented a more productive investment than hopeless electoral
activity at home.

The local government prospects were, however, more promising for
Unionism in parts of this territory. South City ward, saved from
quartering in 1885 to end up intact within College Green division, was,
until internal divisions loosened the party’s grip, a Unionist
stronghold in the municipal elections. Clontarf, Drumcondra and Glasnevin - the northside suburbs added by the 1901 boundary extension - initially returned more Unionists than Nationalists to the Corporation, despite the fact that all were part of safely Nationalist North County division. The Unionist Party routinely looked after the register here as well as in the marginal seats.

It was in the other, larger part of the safe Nationalist territory that a succession of new entrants into municipal politics - Labour Electoral Association (LEA), Irish Socialist Republican Party (ISRP), Sinn Fein and Dublin Labour Party (DLP) - made most of their electoral impact following local government franchise reform. All seven wards which elected a DLP councillor had also at some time elected a Sinn Fein one. Of the nine wards which returned at least once a DLP or a Sinn Fein councillor, only one (Mansion House) and a part of one other (Trinity) either returned a Unionist councillor after 1898 or formed part of a marginal parliamentary seat.

The social base to which these new entrants were primarily appealing was, as later chapters will show, the working class component of the Dublin Catholic community. The immediate threat they posed was, therefore, to the Catholic (mostly small) business stratum which had been the beneficiary of the erosion of Protestant political power produced by the nineteenth century reforms but now found its own local leadership credentials impugned from below. In the longer term their emergence also jeopardised Home Rule Nationalism's safe parliamentary seats in Dublin city. St. Patrick's appeared to be most vulnerable as Sinn Fein advanced and later, as James Larkin's influence waxed, Harbour joined it as a seat under apparent threat from Labour.

Under extended franchises at both levels of representation, and their associated spatial regimes, therefore, Dublin became divided into two electoral zones, each with its own type of party competition. In
one zone Nationalists took on Unionists at the polls and in the Revision Courts. In the other "orthodox" nationalists, loyal to the Home Rule leadership in parliament, faced a challenge from independent nationalists and this contest was fought out on same two fronts. Between the zones the degree of overlap was small.

Overleaf these zones are mapped out to their full extent. The Unionist sphere of interest comprised eight and two-half wards and contained 25% of the city's population. The zone of intra-nationalist competition consisted of thirteen wards with 82% of the population. About 8% of the population lived in the area of overlap between the zones made up by Mansion House ward, part of South Dock and part of Trinity. Because the more extensive resources of manipulation brought to bear on behalf of the interests it defined ensured that the older cleavage between Nationalist and Unionist retained primacy within this area, it is treated here as belonging to the zone of that type of competition.

4 The Composition of the Dublin Electorate

To date estimates of Edwardian enfranchisement have been arrived at by taking from official returns the number of municipal or parliamentary electors in the UK or some part of it and expressing this figure as a percentage of the relevant number of adults living in the same area as shown in the published census of population tables (Blewett, 1965: Walker, 1972/73: Matthew, McKibbin and Kay, 1977: Sheppard, 1982).

However these sources can throw no direct light on the social pattern of exclusion and inclusion through which the franchise influenced the balance of political forces. Even the figures they do yield are of questionable reliability because the presence of plural, duplicate and bogus votes on the register tends to inflate the level of
MAP 2

Dublin Parliamentary Borough 1885 Divisions

- College Green
- St. Patrick's
- Harbour
- Stephen's Green
- Pembroke
- Rathmines

Legend:
- Municipal Boundary
- River Mouth
- Zone A
- Zone B
Areas Added to Dublin City in 1901 Municipal Boundary Extension

MAP 3
enfranchisement (with which votes as a percentage of all adult males/adults is equated) and it is possible to adjust for such distortions only to a limited extent.

In an attempt to surmount these obstacles the Dublin sample of 1911 census forms has been linked with the electoral register current at the time the census was taken. This makes it possible to examine the relationship between having or not having a vote and key social variables such as religion and class. To examine plural voting, additional samples of names have been drawn from some voters' lists and, where necessary, each name has been checked against the census forms to establish whether or not a voter resided in the premises s/he voted from. Since the lists drawn upon are those used by the Revising Barristers at the Revision Sessions, they include both the names of those struck off the Long List and of those whose claims to a vote were struck out. The manipulation of the voter registration process referred to above is thus brought within the scope of the analysis.

(a) Households and the vote

Census enumeration and the most widely held franchise qualifications converged upon a common social unit: the household, defined in terms of its separate occupation of a 'dwelling' whether that dwelling was a house or merely a portion of a house. Had a general election, rather than a census, been held on 2 April 1911, 54.3% of male heads of households (HoHs) in the area sampled would have been able to vote from their current addresses. Had municipal elections been held on the Local Government Register on the same date 51.1% of all HoHs, and 42.1% of female HoHs, in this area would have been able to vote from their current addresses.

An additional but unknown proportion of HoHs would have been able to vote out of addresses from which they had 'removed': in early April, however, the register was still comparatively fresh and the number of
removals was probably not that great. With a mean number of voters per household of just over 0.5 the reality of enfranchisement clearly fell a long way short of a norm of universal household suffrage even when allowance is made for removals. A mean of 2.4 adults per household is indicative of the extent of adult disfranchisement which would have existed even had such a norm been attained in practice.

Women who "but for being women" would have been entitled to a parliamentary vote were enfranchised at the local government level in 1898. Legally, however, married women were subject to two electoral disabilities - sex and coverture - and this removed only sex. To get a vote, a woman had, as a rule, to be unhusbanded. As she moved through the life cycle she might well become enfranchised as a single adult householder, lose the right to vote after marriage and acquire it again on being widowed.

Just over a quarter of households in the sample were headed by women. The mean age of a male HoH with a vote was 44 years: that of a female HoH with a vote was 54 years. Although enfranchisement among HoHs varied with age, being below average in the under 30 and over 70 age groups, differences in age structure do not account for the lower general level of female HoH enfranchisement. Within each of the age groups a lower proportion of female than of male HoHs was enfranchised.

The household qualification to vote might have been claimed on behalf of an adult member of the household other than the census 'Head of Family' who has, up to this point, been assumed to be the household head. If this did occur to any significant extent one might, because of the sex discrimination built into the franchise laws, expect to find it most often in female-headed households containing adult male members. But in only 3.3% of cases where a HoH of either sex had no vote, and 7.7% of cases where a female HoH was voteless, was another adult member of the household on the register. Thus where voting rights were not
 possessed by the census 'Head of Family' they were seldom held by another member of the household s/he headed.

b. Who were the plural voters?

Precise estimation of the extent of plural voting is bedevilled by the difficulty of disentangling the plural from the singular voter. Membership of the two groups cuts across the different franchise categories. Those registered under the ownership or freeman franchises were not necessarily non-resident pluralists while, 'because of the extreme looseness of the inhabitancy and occupation provisions' (Blewett, 1965, 46), some holders of the occupation franchises were in fact plural voters.

It is generally accepted that there were between five and six hundred thousand plural voters in the UK in 1911, making up about 7% of the electorate. It is also agreed that the pluralist was of much greater importance in England than in other parts of the UK. An Irish seat in which a significant role for plural voting has been suggested is Stephen's Green (Walker, 1972/73, 371). As Table 5.2 shows, its mix of franchises was notably different from that of the other Dublin divisions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Occupiers</th>
<th>Lodgers</th>
<th>Freemen, Col.3 as</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College Green</td>
<td>8,508</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour</td>
<td>8,447</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8,974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen's Green</td>
<td>6,551</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8,105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Patricks</td>
<td>10,038</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10,366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33,544</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>36,495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The right to be on the Dublin Freeman's Roll could be acquired by birth, marriage to a freeman's daughter or the service of a seven year apprenticeship to a freeman. Residence within the city or within seven miles of the usual place of election during a six-month qualifying period was also required. In divided boroughs such as Dublin the
Revising Barrister had to register a resident freeman in the division in which his place of abode was situated. Non-resident freemen he was required to allot in a way that maintained as nearly as possible an equal number on the register of each division.

Just over 400 freemen were registered in Stephen’s Green in 1911. A 10% systematic sample of its freeman’s list in that year reveals that nearly three-quarters of the freeman voters resided within the division and could have qualified under the occupation franchises to vote in the division if no Freeman’s Roll had existed. Virtually all the non-resident quarter resided in the Rathmines district and in many cases would have had occupation votes in South County as well.

Among a 10% systematic sample of freeholders and leaseholders registered in Stephen’s Green in 1911 the proportion of non-residents, at just under 50%, was much higher than among freemen. Place of residence was irrelevant to this cluster of qualifications but here too non-residents were concentrated close to the city. Nearly 80% lived in Dublin county and most would presumably have had occupation votes in a county division. Of the combined freeman and property vote in Stephen’s Green about one-third can thus be identified as having been pluralist.

As Table 5.2 shows, occupiers constituted around 95% of electors in three of the Dublin borough divisions and just over 80% in Stephen’s Green. Two categories, inhabitant householders and £10 rated occupiers, were joined in a single list on the register but there is a column in the list specifying each voter’s type of qualification. To what extent were these occupation franchises permeated by non-resident voting?

Presence at the address on census night provides a basis upon which an estimate can be made. Here this criterion will be applied to two wards in Dublin’s central business district, the type of area chiefly suspected of harbouring hidden pluralism on a large scale, and also to the two wards whose division by the Boundary Commissioners left them
straddling the line between safe nationalist and marginal parliamentary territory, South Dock and Trinity. The Stephen's Green portion of the two wards have here been combined in one unit, referred to as Divward SG, and the Harbour portions in another (Divward Harbour).

As Table 5.3 shows, the proportions of the two occupier qualifications fluctuated considerably between the lists of the different areas but with no clear pattern of variation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Inhabitant Householders</th>
<th>Rated Occupiers</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Exchange</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South City</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divward SG</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divward Harbour</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A clear difference does, however, emerge from the tracing of inhabitant householders and rated occupiers through the census. A high proportion of inhabitant householders - averaging 85% once a small number of untraceable cases are excluded - were resident on census night at the addresses stated on the electoral register. The proportion of resident rated occupiers, however, was considerably lower: in the two 'Divward' units it was around 60% but in Royal Exchange it was 33% and in South City 16%.

In a number of cases rated occupiers were entitled to vote out of premises which the census enumerators' returns described as "not inhabited" or even "demolished" and, particularly among occupiers rated at high valuations, the profile of the rated occupier tends to converge with that of the property voter. Thus in South City the sample turned up William Martin Murphy, a Rathmines resident, voting as an occupier rated at £45 out of the Dame St. office of his electric railway and tramway contracting firm. In South Dock and Trinity wards the non-resident rated occupiers made up between 10 and 15% of all occupiers:
in Royal Exchange this rose to 22% and in South City to 38%.

c. Enter The Political Parties

How did the parties, in their self-appointed role as "custodians of the register", influence the shape of this electorate? There can be little doubt that pluralism was boosted by Unionist registration efforts. Because of its origins in the old system of guilds with their exclusively Protestant membership, the freeman franchise had a clear partisan identity and would overwhelmingly have favoured the Unionists. The Englishness of many of the names plus the strong representation of Anglican clergymen and of army or navy officers in the Stephen’s Green property vote sample suggests that the registration of non-resident voters under this qualification was also very much to the Unionists' advantage.

Blewett's (1965) estimate that, overall, the UK plural vote split 2:1 in favour of the Unionists has struck subsequent writers as an underestimation of its partisan bias to the right. If a 3:1 split of ownership pluralists in favour of the Unionists is assumed, together with universal support for that party among freemen, then, on our earlier calculations, non-resident freemen and owners would, if fully turned out in 1911, have given a Unionist candidate in Stephen’s Green an extra 250 votes in a seat where the nationalist majority in the two 1910 general elections averaged less than 750.

The more diffuse hidden pluralism of the rated occupier franchise is less easy to place. A strong Unionist municipal electoral performance in central business district wards, despite a small resident Protestant base, is certainly attributable to it. But because the central business district was broken up in the division of the parliamentary borough, and little difference is discernible in this regard between the different parts of the divided South Dock and Trinity wards, it is not clear that hidden pluralism was a particularly
significant factor in the struggle for the city's marginal parliamentary seat. If the ten to fifteen per cent level of hidden pluralism found in South Dock and Trinity prevailed throughout safe Nationalist territory, on the other hand, its class bias would be expected to have favoured orthodox nationalists against their radical challengers.

Turning from plural to singular voters, the influence of the parties is clearly evident in the way the level of municipal enfranchisement varies between wards. Overall 51.1% of all HoHs had a local government vote but, as Table 5.4 shows, in individual wards this figure varies from 61.1% down to 41.1%:

**TABLE 5.4 Ward By Local Government Vote (Male and Female HoHs), 1911 Census Sample.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Has No Vote</th>
<th>Struck Claim</th>
<th>Unweighted Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arran Quay</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzwilliam</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inns Quay</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansion House</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants Quay</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountjoy</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Kilmainham</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North City</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dock</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotunda</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Exchange</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South City</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dock</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushers Quay</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Quay</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most notable contrast is that shown in columns 3 and 4 of the table which record the names struck off the Long List and the claims struck out. At the overall level less than 7% of HoHs fall into these two categories. But in four wards - Fitzwilliam, Mansion House, Royal Exchange, and South City - this figure rises to around 20% or more of
HoHs. Since all of these wards were sites of Nationalist versus Unionist competition the difference appears to be one between the two electoral zones identified earlier. A full regrouping of wards and part-wards into zones confirms this:

TABLE 5.5 Electoral Zone By HoH Vote, Male and Female HoHs, Dublin City census sample, 1911.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone/Type of Competition</th>
<th>Has Struck Off</th>
<th>No Struck Out</th>
<th>Claim Unweighted % of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: Nationalist Versus Unionist</td>
<td>10.1 %</td>
<td>34.2 %</td>
<td>46.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Intra-Nationalist</td>
<td>2.8 %</td>
<td>43.9 %</td>
<td>52.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.8 %</td>
<td>41.2 %</td>
<td>51.2 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summing columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 5.5 to produce a category of participants in the voter registration process, the system is shown to have drawn a higher proportion of households in Zone A into its workings (65% compared with 56%) yet a higher proportion of Zone B households emerged from these trammels in possession of a vote (52% compared with 46%). The explanation for this lies in the strategies pursued by the parties in registration work.

With religion forming the primary basis of cleavage between Nationalism and Unionism, Dublin’s status community arithmetic dictated that, while the Nationalist Party could sweep the board by matching numbers with votes, the Unionist Party’s main scope for improving its electoral chances lay in recruiting pluralists or in keeping Catholic householders off the register. The Unionists consistently lodged three to four times as many objections as claims in Stephen’s Green and in the South City ward while the Nationalist claims in the same area consistently exceeded their objections. How the parliamentary electorate emerged from these manoeuvres is set out in Table 5.6:
TABLE 5.6 Religious Affiliation by HoH vote, male HoHs only, 1911 census sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Has Vote %</th>
<th>No Record %</th>
<th>Struck Off %</th>
<th>Claim Struck Out %</th>
<th>Unweighted Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All R.C.s</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone A R.C.s</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone B R.C.s</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Prot.s</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone A Prot.s</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone B Prot.s</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Protestant male HoHs had a higher overall enfranchisement level than Catholic ones. But ironically they were most likely to have votes where it was of little or no electoral benefit to the Unionist Party, in Zone B. In Zone A the Nationalists seem to have absorbed most of the exclusionary thrust of Unionist register manipulation by their own success in objecting to potential Unionist voters. Thus 16.5% of Protestant male HoHs were struck off or had claims struck out here compared with 22.7% of their Catholic counterparts. For both parties it was in practice easier to succeed with an objection than with a claim and this bias in the system meant that the vigorous party activity of Zone A tended to depress rather than raise the level of enfranchisement.

The absence of a large sectarian imbalance in male HoH enfranchisement suggests that in Zone A the parties had roughly similar resources with which to implement their strategies. The Unionist Party had elaborate arrangements for channeling funds to meet the heavy expense of registration in marginal seats and a streamlined Dublin organisation to carry out the work. Following a wider trend towards professional specialisation, in which the direction of local party registration machinery was passing from firms of solicitors to full-time constituency agents (Jones, 1966, 134-135), a new post of General
Secretary was created within its Dublin Association in 1904. The first holder of the post, Captain (later Sir) Robert Topping, who remained in the city until 1912, subsequently went on to become Chief Agent at Conservative Central Office.

The Nationalists, by contrast, came to rely on wealthy individual MPs to carry the cost and make the arrangements for registration work in the marginals. While individuals willing and able to spend what was required to win were eventually found for both seats, dependence on them entailed a degree of ideological dilution. In Stephen’s Green it twice led to the endorsement by party leaders of candidates who would not take the party pledge; in South County it involved selecting one who in the Corporation had twice defied the party by voting in favour of loyal addresses to visiting British monarchs. But, while they involved compromises of this kind, sub-contracting arrangements worked reasonably well to keep seats out of Unionist hands and to divert a large burden away from party funds.

While Dublin Home Rulers were, on balance, inclusive when competing against the Unionists their registration strategy shifted to exclusion when faced with radical local level challenges emerging out of their own Catholic communal base. Admittedly, this is not apparent from the Zone B figures in Table 5.5 for those struck off the Long List or whose claims were struck out - less than 4%. There was in 1911 a temporary hiatus in this type of party competition as a disintegrating Sinn Fein had withdrawn from electoral activity while the OLP was only preparing to embark upon it. Earlier, between 1907 and 1909, growing Sinn Fein success had prompted a registration ‘war’ with orthodox nationalism. The success of a OLP candidate at the June 1911 Poor Law elections was enough to reactivate register manipulation of this kind in one ward. The widening of the OLP challenge subsequently ensured that such manipulation revived in other parts of Zone B.
In contrast to the situation prevailing in Zone A, registration 'wars' in Zone B were one-sided affairs with the orthodox nationalist side enjoying a substantial resource advantage. The independent nationalist parties relied on the amateur efforts of (in Sinn Fein's case) ward branch registration committees or (in that of the OLP) trade union halls and branch offices which acted as contact points for registration advice and assistance. But effectively their sympathisers were left with the daunting task of "looking after" their own votes. At only one Revision Session, that of 1909, was either party represented by a professional agent. Apparently responsible for the whole city, he faced on this occasion a representation on the orthodox nationalist side of a barrister-MP, a solicitor and eight registration agents.

Register manipulation for purposes of intra-nationalist conflict never reached the same scale as that prompted by the struggle between Nationalism and Unionism in Zone A. But this is less a measure of the intensity of the two types of competition than an indicator that in Zone B the ends usually served by parties claiming for supporters and objecting to opponents could be attained by other, and easier, means. This was the "stuffing" of the lists with the "bogus votes" of fictitious individuals.

"Stuffs" were inserted into register in main two ways. In the first the Requisition Forms were collected by registration agents who filled in false information on them, forged a signature at their foot and returned them to the Town Clerk's office. In the second false information was filled in on a lodger's claim form which was returned with forged signatures for the purported claimant and for the necessary witness to his/her claim.

For the registration agent tempted to practice it in the Dublin marginal seats "stuffing" was fraught with risk - of exposure by the
opposing party, of police investigation, of prosecution and even of imprisonment. Strong deterents which placed tight limits on the manufacture of bogus votes therefore operated in Zone A. This was not the case, however, in zone B. Within this zone, despite the exposure of blatant irregularities, and estimates that as many as 20% of the names on the register were bogus, no prosecutions in relation to stuffing were ever brought, or, it would appear, officially contemplated.

The only official response to stuffing in Zone B came after a 1914 contest between two orthodox nationalist councillors for an aldermanship highlighted the state of affairs in the Rotunda ward. The Corporation subsequently voted funds for a detailed house-to-house inspection covering the whole city to check on the state of the register. This, however, was carried out under the direction of officials who were long suspected of having connived at stuffing. Suspicion particularly centred on Stephen Hand, who had been employed as a registration agent by the Home Rule party’s mass organisation, the United Irish League (UIL), before being recruited to deal with the preparation of the register in the Town Clerk’s office in 1907.

This appointment of a man previously found guilty of indulging in illegal election practices coincided with a turn by Dublin Home Rulers to systematic register manipulation directed against a growing Sinn Fein challenge. Hand was to be repeatedly accused of a biased use of the official objection to harass independent nationalists and his presence in the Town Clerk’s office was seen as providing a safe environment for the employment by the UIL of registration stratagems which crossed the line separating legitimate manipulation of the register from breaches of the criminal law.

But allegations concerning Hand’s activities - or the Town Clerk’s attitude towards them - were confined to independent nationalists. Hand
continued to be actively identified with Home Rule politics while deployment of the official objection - which, unlike the private or party kind, automatically cast the burden of proof of the right to be on the register on the person objected to (Hunt, 1898, 187) - put a powerful manipulative tool in his hands. Yet the Unionists, with their separate sphere of electoral activity beyond which their agents rarely ventured, do not appear to have been perturbed, and did not therefore see themselves as disadvantaged, by the way Hand discharged his duties.

Associated with the exploitation of bogus voters stuffed into the registers of Zone B was a persistence of the corruption which legislation passed in the early 1880s had sought to eliminate from UK elections (O'Leary, 1962). The annual municipal elections were regularly followed by the publication of a litany of independent nationalist complaints about bribery, treating and personation. The United Irishman observed on one such occasion that "there is an Act of the British Parliament known as the Corrupt Practices Act but apparently it does not run in Dublin".

While such complaints were directed at perceived official and police inactivity, independent nationalists' own failure to use - as opposed to threatening to use - the election petition mechanism of redress provided by the legislation also contributed to the sanction-free environment in which corruption persisted. What inhibited petitioning were the legal expenses it entailed (Lehane, 1905, 48). The imbalance in resources available to different parties which allowed stuffing to flourish in the first place thus ensured that the corruption which accompanied the use of bogus votes would go unchecked by those against whom they were employed.

5 The Electoral System and Its Biases

Can wider conclusions be drawn about the operation of the UK electoral system be drawn from this Dublin evidence? A spatial pattern
of manipulative activity more complex than the conventional contrast between concentration of party effort in marginal seats and relative neglect of safe ones has been mapped out for Dublin. This pattern may, however, be a peculiarly Irish one. There are parallels between Dublin and Belfast, where a bitter civil war was fought between clerical and lay leaders for control of the Catholic ghetto's representation while a parallel, but almost entirely separate, contest was waged elsewhere in the city between a Labour Party tacitly allied with Orange dissidents and the dominant Unionist Party (Budge and O'Leary, 1973, 119-125). But no similar division of party competition into segregated compartments has been suggested by any British study to have accompanied Labour's entry as an electoral third force (Bernstein, 1983). The primacy of ethnic cleavage imposed a rigidity on urban political partisanship in Ireland, which was absent from the more complex and fluid amalgam of class and status loyalties found in Britain.

Because of the break in intra-nationalist competition and in the type of register manipulation it stimulated around 1911 the class composition of the Dublin electorate was not considered in detail earlier. This class question is, however, of particular interest in the light of British debates on the effects of the franchise factor. Here proponents of a New Liberal regeneration and those of an inevitable rise of Labour are at one in positing a wide divergence between the level of enfranchisement of skilled and that of other manual workers. Possession of the vote before the First World War is associated by both sides with location in the upper stratum of the working class. Table 5.7 Looks at the extent to which this was true of Dublin in 1911:
TABLE 5.7 Social Class By HoH Vote, Male HoHs only, 1911 census sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Has No</th>
<th>Struck</th>
<th>Claim Struck Out</th>
<th>Unweighted Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Record Off Struck Out %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Mental</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Skilled</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here a pattern of class bias is readily apparent with enfranchisement rising as the class pyramid is ascended and declining as it is descended. But "labour aristocracy" characterisations of enfranchised manual workers - "largely lower middle and artisan class" (McKibbin, 1975, xv): "the organised workers,.. almost by definition, a privileged section of the working class as a whole" (Clarke, 1976, 159) - can hardly be justified on the size of the gap between the different types of manual worker evident in Dublin. In this instance the notion of systemic bias appears to have been unjustifiably sharpened from a difference of degree into one of kind.

In accounts of register manipulation attention has centred on the role of the parties and how, by managing claims and objections, they "virtually selected the voters" (Clarke, 1972, 33). The administrative functions of the registration process, on the other hand, are usually supposed to have been carried out in the neutral fashion associated with the Weberian model of bureaucracy. The Dublin evidence, however, points to the existence of a "politocracy" in which public administration took on, in one of the city's two zones, a strong partisan character.

Because the manufacture of bogus votes was one of its main operations, politocratic manipulation was intertwined with the maintenance of corrupt and illegal electoral practices. In a cross-cultural study of the elimination or persistence of electoral
corruption Etzioni-Halevy (1979) concludes that the development of elite codes of ethics or notions of propriety play a crucial role where corrupt electoral practices are successfully eliminated. In the case of the British electoral system, she argues, "unequivocal codes of propriety" prevailed by the end of the nineteenth century.

The Dublin evidence might suggest that, because Zone B's corruption went unchecked from above as well as from below, such codes were only partly operative in the case of Irish nationalism. While "moderate nationalism", like unionism, was seen by the Dublin Castle elite as having legitimate rights and interests to be vindicated by official action in the area of electoral propriety an overriding elite antipathy towards Nationalist "extremists" may have legitimated official inaction against abuses of which they were the sole victims. A 1911 comment of "Sinn Fein" subscribed to such an internal colonial view of the situation:

"In a ward where a Sinn Fein candidate was nominated against an alleged United Irish Leaguer, it was a usual practice of the latter to have three of four bogus candidates nominated with him as a regulation existed that where there were more than a certain number of candidates two must join together to have agents within the polling booths. The Sinn Feiner, tricked out of his rights, and left without representation at the polling tables, was powerless to prevent personation. For years, as we have said, this practice prevailed. Even as late as last January it was resorted to. Now the Local Government Board - blessed, non-political institution - has stepped in to prevent this scandalous violation of election rights. The reason it has stepped in is that the trick has been played against the Unionist candidate in the South City Ward. It is the first time it has been attempted in Dublin against the Unionists and lo! the L.G.B. steps in and squelches the tricksters. So long as it was merely Sinn Feiners who were affected the Local Government Board looked on equably. As an example of how the Castle administers even-handed justice we can ask for nothing better."

Alternatively, the degree to which the prevailing codes of propriety were actually unequivocal might be questioned on a statewide basis. Whether the town halls of Britain - or, indeed, of other parts of Ireland - housed local equivalents of Stephen Hand is unknown.
Significantly, however, the likely effects of a general appointment of permanent officials to supervise voter registration - sometimes put forward as a means of sorting out the anomalies of the existing system - were viewed with apprehension by the British parties. As the Liberal expert on franchise and registration, Sir Charles Dilke, put it in 1909:

"In London all were willing to trust the county nominees to prepare the Register. In Wales, the Liberals are willing to trust the counties, as in Scotland, but the Tories have their doubts. In the rural counties of England the more a Liberal knows about registration the more he fears to find the local Tory agent put in to supervise it officially for the county."

(Quoted in Blewett, 1965, 53).

6 Conclusion: The Demand for Democracy

For all the electorally competing varieties of Irish nationalism the franchise constituted an externally given element of their political environment. The Home Rule leaders were not allowed to participate in the elite horse-trading which gave shape to the 1884-85 reforms and subsequently the terms in which the issue appeared on the UK political agenda continued to be dictated by the self-interested calculations of the leaders and managers of the two major British parties. In such circumstances the Irish nationalist stance was to demand parity with the British norm in franchise and registration requirements and, in the absence of Home Rule, to resist any reduction in the number of Irish seats at Westminster through redistribution.

The parity norm was formulated by Parnell’s Irish National League in the early 1880s and was embodied in the 1884-85 reform package despite the opposition of the Whig faction within Gladstone’s cabinet. The likelihood that Parnell would gain as large a representation under the existing as under the new franchise undermined the case against full extension while in some quarters of the elite the hope glimmered that a wide franchise might turn the agrarianism the nationalists had so successfully harnessed against them by allowing antagonisms between
farmer and labourer to come to the fore (A. Jones, 1972). Parity with Britain was also the banner behind which municipal franchise extension was pursued in the nineties, with local and national trade union centres marking their appearance on the political scene by emerging as the most persistent lobbyists. The substance of this demand was conceded by the 1898 Act.

Redistribution (which, if strict population equality were applied to the existing number of parliamentary seats in 1905, would have reduced the number of Irish members from 101 to 71) was supported by southern Irish Unionists and opposed by Nationalists with the argument that Ireland had been guaranteed a specific proportion of parliamentary representation by the Act of Union (Lecky, 1896, 216-218; T.W. Russell, 1901, 244-248; Clery, 1905). Ireland had been underrepresented through the first half of the nineteenth century and was now overrepresented, this argument ran, because the way the country was misgoverned had led to catastrophic population loss. Although church disestablishment had earlier altered the terms of the Union, that measure had enjoyed the support of both British and Irish opinion which redistribution clearly did not. These arguments probably inhibited Unionist government action to redistribute seats less than the fact that gains made in Ireland would be largely cancelled out by the effects such a measure would produce in Britain (Pugh, 1978, 78).

A specifically Irish franchise debate which went beyond the parity norm had to await the publication of the third Home Rule Bill in 1912. Motions passed at the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC) called for adult suffrage and greater representation of urban areas to be embodied in the bill. The women's suffrage societies called for the use of the Local Government, rather than the existing Parliamentary, Register in elections to the Home Rule parliament (Ward, 1984). From the political periphery, this demand received Sinn Fein and socialist support but was
never discussed by the ITUC.

While an amendment introducing into the bill an innovative (if partial) use of proportional representation was successful (O'Leary, 1979, 6), pressure for women's suffrage or for the Scottish-style separate urban representation, on which trade union lobbying came to concentrate almost exclusively, proved fruitless. Trade union attention subsequently shifted to the threat of partition. Southern feminists launched a campaign of protest against the Liberal government and its Nationalist Party allies while in Ulster other feminists pursued by more extreme methods the enfranchisement of women under the 'Provisional Government' the Unionist leadership were creating to thwart Home Rule. Thus, as trade unionists and feminists each fashioned their own more limited, sectional goals the basic democratic demand for adult suffrage was hopelessly lost from an early stage.

The local electoral experience of Dublin, a centre of both feminism and trade unionism, suggests why this should have been so. Here the press catalogues of stratagems - legal and illegal - practiced against independent nationalists were never distilled into a critique of the system within which such practices were accommodated. Projection of a fair alternative based on universal participation was preempted by fantasies of a virtuous manipulation of what existed ("next year, we'll see to the register") or of securing retribution in the courts against those who corrupted it. Moreover the blame for this electoral corruption tended to become attached to its camp followers rather than to its initiators, promoting social pessimism and exclusive attitudes among radical political activists.

In 1902 the United Irishman published an account of the municipal elections which focussed on Wood Quay ward where James Connolly was the socialist candidate. Referring to the way in which Connolly's meetings were interrupted by drunken rowdies, the circulation of free drink and
the alliance of priest and publicans against his candidature, the

writer comments:

"Really considering the level of animalism prevailing among
the masses, it is something that such comparatively large
polls were secured in some of the wards against corruption."

Recalling such elections, Connolly himself later wrote of "male and
female criminals" being "dragged up out of the haunts of vice and
crime..in the city of Dublin to vote for the Home Rule candidates".
Recurring images of "the criminal classes recruited from the slums"
or of "cab loads of Kip Bullies and Prostitutes in procession from a
shebeen public house in a slum corner going to personate voters"
suggested the desirability of repressing an irresponsible social
residuum rather than that of conferring the franchise on all adults.

The increasing salience of the women's suffrage issue was also to
reveal among the cause's supporters a lurking distrust of the masses
which effectively endorsed the view that they were in large part unfit
to be citizens. The backlash against the campaign for women's suffrage
which followed a British suffragette disruption of the 1912 Home Rule
demonstration in which Asquith had come to Dublin to take part prompted
the following reaction from one Dublin woman activist:

"As I looked down on that sea of angry faces, I could not
help reflecting that if Mr. Asquith's Manhood Suffrage Bill
became law, nearly all the individuals in that mob would have
the right to help determine the conditions under which I and
my children should live, I myself being denied all rights to
representation."

But a similarly pejorative view was taken of the performance of
Dublin women who did have the right to local government representation
by the pro-woman's suffrage "Sinn Fein" after the municipal elections
of 1910:
"The woman vote in Dublin was in the bulk of instances...cast in favour of the worst type of candidates before the electors. The cynical explanation given was that presents of coal or pounds of tea could buy three-fourths of the women voters. This may be, and we think it is, an exaggeration, but it is within our knowledge that in the worst wards in Dublin the woman vote, which had been looked forward to by some optimists to produce reform, goes invariably against it...The strongest opposition to woman suffrage arises from the manner in which they use their votes at municipal elections."

Thus, in Dublin at least, a radical activist perception of the masses as more derelict in their duties than robbed of their rights prevented any consolidation of opinion behind a straightforward demand for an end to all forms of exclusion and to 'fancy franchises'. To the extent that they internalised the distrust generated by its electoral system Dublin radicals proved themselves to be good UK citizens.
CHAPTER SIX

THE UNITED KINGDOM STATE AND IRISH CIVIL SOCIETY

1 Introduction

The nationalisation of Irish politics occurred in the watershed decade of the 1880s. Overcoming the regional limitations which had earlier characterised O'Connell's movement for Repeal, Parnell's linking of Home Rule to the dynamic force of agrarian agitation succeeded in mobilising mass support in Connaught and Ulster (Clark, 1977; Comerford, 1985, 223-249; J. Lee, 1973, 65-105; Garvin, 1981, 69-88). The new party machinery of Home Rule broke down a prevailing pattern of "fragmented localism" (Hoppen, 1984, 485), replacing it by effective direction from a central party leadership (Cruise O'Brien, 1957). Landlord electoral influence was liquidated while that of the Catholic clergy was assigned a subaltern role within the national scheme of mass organisation (Whyte, 1960; Whyte, 1965).

Nationalism's religious limitations remained intact, however, and its advance crystallised a minority reaction in defence of the Union which displayed similar tendencies towards centralised organisation (Buckland, 1973). Nationalisation thus polarised politics. Ireland was wrenched from the 'Celtic Fringe' ambit of British Liberalism which suffered an almost total erosion of the twin northern and southern bases it had previously enjoyed on the island (Cruise O'Brien, 1957, 8; Thornley, 1964, 109-137; Gibbon, 1975, 89-110; Bew and Wright, 1983). From 1886, when British Liberalism was 'converted' to Home Rule, two nationally organised pan-class political blocs confronted one another in Ireland - one overwhelmingly Catholic and Nationalist, the other overwhelmingly Protestant and Unionist.

At Westminster, however, Liberal conviction was impotent in the
face of Unionist control. During the two decades following the introduction and defeat in the House of Commons of the first Home Rule Bill Unionist governments held office for almost seventeen years. While out of office between 1892 and 1895 the Unionist opposition held the whip hand over an irresolute Liberal ministry and Irish Nationalists now bitterly divided over whether or not to ally themselves with that government (Hamer, 1968, Hamer, 1972). Thus the veto exercised by the overwhelmingly Unionist House of Lords against the second Home Rule Bill in 1893 went unchallenged by the Commons majority which had passed it.

On assuming office in the wake of the first Home Rule Bill’s defeat the Unionists found themselves faced almost immediately with a resurgence of Irish agrarian agitation in the form of the Plan of Campaign. Their response was the Crimes Act of 1888 which provided a permanent legislative framework of sweeping repressive powers in the place of a long succession of temporary Coercion Acts. Its introduction was accompanied by that of a harsher prison regime for agrarian prisoners (Curtis, 1963).

But through the 1890s, with agrarian agitation contained and Home Rule indefinitely stymied by the Lords’ veto, Unionist administrations pursued a widening of the basis of consent for the UK state’s rule in Ireland (Lyons, 1973, 202-219). In the process this state’s separation from Irish civil society - and, in particular, from the constraints and imperatives of Ireland’s polarised politics (Garvin, 1981, 181) - was to be exploited to the full. The fragmentation of the blocs implicit in the achievement of wider consent and the ‘overdeveloped’ autonomy of the state employed in its pursuit are the subjects of this chapter.

The simultaneous growth and reorientation of state activity which occurred under "Constructive Unionist" auspices between 1890 and 1905 are analysed in its first and major part. Here, it is argued, that the
establishment of an effective framework for social engineering within the rural sector by land purchase acts, local government reform and the creation of new development agencies - the Congested Districts Board (CBD) and the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (DATI) - coexisted alongside an anomic dislocation of urban status community relations. Because of these contradictory effects the new governing stance exacerbated conflict at the same time as it opened up a space for the politics of conciliation.

Even the autonomy of the Irish executive had limits. The second part of the chapter looks first at how, by creating within the administration managerial figures of a part-administrative, part-political hybridity, the new "constructive" initiatives transgressed these limits and left themselves fatally short of legitimation. It then details how the party political alliances forged in the realignment of the mid-1880s were put back in command of the Castle - first by the Unionists in 1905 and then by the Liberals in 1907.

Although there was some development of centrist tendencies arising out of the land settlement (J. V. O'Brien, 1976, 149-211), "Constructive Unionism's" legacy was as much financial as political. It kept in motion a rising level of state expenditure in Ireland, a trend continued by the statewide programme of welfare reforms enacted by the Liberals after 1906. The result was a budget deficit with critical implications for the economics of Irish self-government. The final part of the chapter shows how its British ally's espousal of urban-oriented state welfare policies began to split the nationalist class alliance and how the uncertain future of their citizen-members' new social rights under Home Rule pushed the trade unions towards launching an independent Irish Labour politics.
2 Engineering Conciliation and Exacerbating Conflict

(a) The Rural Settlement

In the rural sector state participation in the construction of a negotiated transition from the 'dual ownership' established by the Land Act of 1881 to peasant proprietorship took three principal forms. First, while accepting the desirability of a transfer of ownership to tenant farmers, it refused to countenance the use of compulsion to achieve this end. Second, it showed itself at the same time unwilling to intervene to redress landlord grievances with regard to the operation of the judicial rent-fixing machinery established in 1881 and subsequently extended, thus, by omission, increasing the attractiveness to landlords of outright sale. Third, after poor take up of loan funds provided for land purchase under early acts, a state subsidy to top up sale prices was introduced to get voluntary land purchase agreements under way on a large scale.

This 'carrot and stick' approach was as much reactive as pro-active (Gailey, 1984) and its emergence was by no means conflict free. In 1902 the coercive machinery of the Crimes Act was reactivated after a decade of disuse in order to curb the revival of agrarian agitation by the United Irish League (UIL). By the middle of 1903, however, the government's adoption of a formula for land purchase worked out by a conference of landlord and tenant representatives prompted a sharp reduction in disorder and the withdrawal of the previous year's proclamations. Earlier, in 1898, the failure of the government to include minority safeguards in its reform of local government, and the subsequent sweeping away of southern landlord power at this level, provoked strong Unionist resentment. At the same time the Local Government Act provided a substantial financial benefit for landowners by relieving the burden of rates on agricultural land.
In a transition smoothed by state expenditure, the liquidation of the landlord interest was carried through on generous financial terms. Former landlords could remain substantial owners of land which was directly farmed or let for grazing on the eleven-months system (D. Jones, 1979). In the public sphere participation in the activities of new state or voluntary agencies seeking to increase the viability of the new peasant proprietor stratum through the improvement of farming methods appeared to provide an opportunity for the restoration of some of the social influence lost by the gentry in the Land War (Plunkett, 1908).

The land conference format's success was to inspire a number of attempts to put aside party divisions and apply the same techniques to the solution of other Irish social or constitutional issues. The most notable of these were the Irish Reform Association whose landlord members published a devolution scheme in 1904 and the All For Ireland League founded by William O’Brien in 1909 after he had broken with the Home Rule movement in which he had been a central figure for nearly thirty years because it was supporting land legislation which he considered incompatible with the spirit of the 1902-03 settlement. Thus the state’s involvement in rural social engineering did stimulate a development of consensual political tendencies for which O’Brien’s movement succeeded in securing a sub-regional electoral base in Cork. A national third force proved, however, to be beyond the resources of the post-agrarian moderates.

Superficially the urban sector of Irish society appears to have been largely by-passed by Constructive Unionism’s extension of state activity. Only local government reform directly had a major urban impact and here, in contrast to the rural sector, no dramatic shifts in local control across the sectarian divide took place. But the creation of new state institutions clustered around the transformation of the
tenant farmer into a peasant proprietor formed only a part of the state's adjustment to the full politicisation of the Catholic majority-Protestant minority structure which the mobilisations of the eighties had produced in Ireland. In a catch-phrase of the period, this involved "governing Ireland according to Irish ideas" - a process touching upon administrative practice across the entire range of the state's institutional complex which responded to the new balance of forces by attaching more weight to majority aspirations and less to minority fears.

Cutting across the party political distribution of the social spoils of office, reorientation of 'their' government's policy threatened to make southern Unionists permanent outsiders at the statewide as well as at the local level. Where it took place outside a framework of interest group accommodation such as that constructed by the state around the land question, it left the urbanised part of this minority, unlike the landed gentry, uncushioned in its losses and without the prospect of social redemption. State recognition that the communal balance had changed helped to tilt that balance further: the urban impact of its actions differed from that on the rural sector because in the former case the state did not attempt to impose parameters of its own for managing the conflicts which ensued.

b Urban Anomie - the loyalist revolt

Thus as the land settlement evolved in the early 1800s choruses of urban loyalist protest were arising over a succession of instances in which Catholic groups were alleged to have encroached on the rights of minority members - the long-running tribulations of the Limerick medical missionary Doctor Long, the launching of the Catholic Association with its aggressive programme for "putting Catholics on top", the boycott initiated against Limerick's Jews, insults to Protestant clergymen on Dublin's streets, the dismissal of Constable
Anderson ("The Irish Dreyfus") from the RIC and the 'scandal' of medical appointments at Ballinasloe Asylum.

Along with discrimination in recruitment to or wrongful dismissal from public service employment the targets of these protests were allegedly lax policing or magisterial complacency - all of which were seen as going unchecked by, if not taking their cues from, the acquiescent posture of those running Dublin Castle. In virtually all cases the encroaching movements were said to enjoy Catholic clerical encouragement while the alleged inactivity of the authorities was attributed to the administration's anxiety not to jeopardise the good relations it had established with influential members of that clergy.

Such loyalist grievances were to have a major disruptive impact on Irish Unionist politics as attacks from the polito-religious fringe on the ineffectual nature of the leadership being provided by the traditional Unionist 'establishment' began to attract a new, wider following. The party establishment was itself plainly signalling discontent when early in 1900 the Irish Unionist Alliance sent the Lord Lieutenant a memorandum, on which he refused to receive a delegation, warning that there existed:

"Such a want of confidence and sense of alienation that if a General Election were now imminent it would be impossible for the Alliance to rally Unionists as in 1895 to support the present administration."

But, as Patterson (1980b, 4-8) has argued, an incoherent party traditionalist reaction which "could not rise above the negative level of carping and denunciation" was to be supplemented (and challenged) by the emergence of a critique sharpened by "stepping backwards from the more developed and secular forms of Unionist ideology into a Protestant Manicheanism" which identified conciliation of an irreconcilable Catholic Church as the "fundamentally subversive" object of Constructive Unionism.
The Dublin Unionist splits of 1900 and 1904, centred in the former case on a movement to oust Horace Plunkett from his South Dublin seat and in the latter on Michael McCarthy's Independent Unionist candidature in Stephen's Green, exemplify these two tendencies. In the first case an group of party insiders seceded from the constituency Registration Association to run one of their number as a rival candidate to the Irish politician most strongly identified with Constructive Unionist policies. In the second an outsider group of militant Protestant sectarians attempted to bypass the party association and put forward as Unionist candidate a religious controversialist who purported to be a Catholic disgusted by the power and baneful social influence of the clergy of his church.

The movement centred on McCarthy revived a strand in Dublin popular politics dormant since the 1840s when a combination of economic and political dislocation had prompted the emergence of the Dublin Protestant Operative Association (DPOA) for whose sizeable lower class support "the state's apparent indulgence towards popery was [the] overwhelming preoccupation" (Hill, 1980). The DPOA disbanded in 1848, urging its members to join the Orange Order. Its leader, the Reverend Tresham Gregg, retained a personal following in the city until his death in 1881 (O. Bowen, 1978, 111) and the memory of his millenial brand of Protestantism continued thereafter to be invoked within the milieu of Dublin city and county's thirty or so Orange Lodges (Askin, 1895, 14).

But in Dublin, unlike the case of Belfast which Patterson (1980b) analyses, divergent expressions of the increasing loyalist alienation of the 1900s did not lead to a formal split in the Orange Order. Instead Dublin Orangeism remained precariously balanced between its institutionalised role within official Unionism and the pull exerted by a current urging that Protestantism be given priority over party.
Although there was reckoned to be a Unionist majority on the registers of the Stephen’s Green and South Dublin divisions, both seats, held by the Unionists since 1892, were lost at the ‘khaki’ general election in the Autumn of 1900. In Stephen’s Green the outgoing Unionist MP, J.H. Campbell, was penalised by a substantial, and, in part at least, deliberately organised, voter abstention. In South County two Unionist candidates split the vote allowing a Nationalist to take the seat with over a thousand votes less than the combined Unionist total.

Actual or potential association with the policy of the government was the common factor in provoking loyalist opposition to the sitting MPs in both cases. In Stephen’s Green Campbell was a backbench MP but, as a prominent barrister he was likely to follow his predecessor into an Irish law office and thence onto the bench. Increasing loyalist discontent was accompanied by increased suspicion of lawyers as Dublin Unionist candidates.

In South Dublin Horace Plunkett had taken ministerial office as the OIT’s Vice President during the last year of the government’s life. His appointment of T.P. Gill, a former Nationalist MP and participant in the direction of the Plan of Campaign, as secretary of the new department caused particular outrage among Unionists but the movement against Plunkett was also highly diffuse in the themes it threw up. Its leadership comprised immigrant businessmen from Britain without hereditary ties to Anglo-Irish land ownership as well as spokesmen for the landlord interest. Plunkett was to find himself accused of lending assistance to an attack on that other Protestant bastion, ‘the railway interests of Ireland’, and of threatening private businesses through his promotion of cooperatives.

In these circumstances the minority who seceded from the registration association fell back on the assertion of party sentiment.
and the claim that Plunkett could not be returned to parliament by Unionist votes alone to synthesise and legitimise their campaign. An ironic upshot of this was a shift in focus from Irish to imperial issues at the end of the election campaign, with Plunkett being charged with fudging his position on the South African war to try and attract Nationalist votes.

A different and more tightly focussed expression of disaffection with a government policy thrust which was not deflected by the loss of the Dublin seats occurred in February 1904 when the Stephen's Green seat fell vacant. The Unionist Registration Association found its selected candidate unwilling to go forward and, as it cast around for a replacement, the initiative was seized by an unofficial Unionist candidate, Michael McCarthy.

McCarthy's intention to contest Stephen's Green at the next election was publicly announced in 1902, when J.H. Campbell became one of Trinity College's MPs, but he made no attempt to secure his party's nomination. Instead he called for it's organisation to stand aside:

"and allow me to give an Irish constituency an opportunity of deciding for the first time whether Ireland was to be a priestridden land, hastening to senility and decay with no prospect of regeneration."

In assailing the Registration Association McCarthy was backed by a current of militant Protestants who, responding to contemporary developments in Britain, had coalesced in a campaign against ritualism in the Church of Ireland. To this concern with the purity of Irish Protestantism was added a determination to resist the perceived encroachments of militant Catholics on Protestant civil rights and criticism of the government's inactivity in the face of Catholic 'aggression'.

Leading figures in this ideological current such as Sir Robert Jackson, chairman of Pembroke's District Council before the
Nationalists first won control of that body in 1902, and Lindsay Crawford, editor of the Irish Protestant, gravitated to McCarthy from the outset of the lecturing career he launched following the publication of his book, "Five Years in Ireland," in 1901. Jackson was chairman and Crawford secretary of McCarthy's election committee: the Crawford-Jackson-McCarthy axis was also apparent in an organisation launched in January 1904 to counter the Catholic Association, the Protestant Defence Society.

The tensions between militant Protestantism and official Unionism which McCarthy's intervention in Stephen's Green revealed were particularly acute in the case of the Orange Order, itself a champion of the former and an affiliate of the latter. Orangemen were predictably to the fore in articulating opposition to Constructive Unionist policies. In 1900 the city and county Grand Lodges backed Plunkett's Unionist rival in South Dublin and directed Orange voters in Stephen's Green not to go the polls because Campbell was "a government nominee and a supporter of their Irish policy" and would not commit himself to opposing a state-endowed Catholic University.

In August 1902 Unionist dissension moved northwards when the official Conservative Association candidate in the South Belfast by-election was opposed and defeated by an 'Orange Democrat', T.H. Sloan. Sloan was supported in his fight by the Dublin City Grand Orange Lodge. At the December 1902 half-yearly meeting of the Grand Lodge of Ireland the powerful Belfast Grand Lodge had endorsed a motion expressing its resentment at the Dublin interference in 'the local and political affairs of Belfast' and calling on the Grand Lodge of Ireland to prevent any recurrence of such a scandal.

The suspension from membership of Sloan and the Belfast lodges which had supported his candidature was confirmed by the Grand Lodge of Ireland in June 1903 and in the following December the same body had
This move was aimed primarily at Lindsay Crawford, who had spoken at a Twelfth of July demonstration of Sloan’s followers. At the meeting the Dublin Grand Lodge officers moved an amendment to hold the matter over for a year and to appoint a reconciliation committee. Its proposer, Dublin Grand Secretary, Frank Donaldson, put the Dublin Orange viewpoint:

"He had no doubt that disaster would result to the institution in Dublin if this thing were carried out in the spirit of vindictiveness which permeated the resolution and the speeches which emanated from Belfast. In Belfast the Orangemen were a large body and would to a certain extent appear to be indifferent to splits: but in Dublin they could ill spare even one man, and much less one like Mr. Crawford who for some years had stood by them through thick and thin..."

The amendment was, however, swept aside by northern voting power and Crawford was expelled. Interviewed after his expulsion, Crawford put forward an analysis which was also organised around the contrast between the state of Orangeism in Dublin and that in the north. The real trouble, he argued, lay in "the incompetence of the leaders of Orangeism and the dissatisfaction which has taken root in the minds of the Protestant people of this country with the Irish Protestant representation in Parliament". But while the formation of an independent order was essential to defend Protestant principles in Belfast and Antrim, Orangeism in Dublin was in safe keeping.

Despite the receipt of this clean bill of Protestant health, the Stephen’s Green by-election was shortly to divide Dublin Orangeism. Even before the vacancy occurred Donaldson, although actively involved in campaigns against ritualism and Catholic encroachment with McCarthy’s leading supporters, had signalled his disapproval of McCarthy’s designs on the seat. With the seat vacant he swung Grand Lodge support behind a newly-chosen official candidate, whose
opposition to a Catholic University could be counted as a victory for Orange pressure. But as party establishment ranks closed against the interloper, and Mc Carthy came under pressure to withdraw, the Order's Dublin members were reported to be deeply split between the rival candidates.

Because of the informal nature of his intervention, and because Mc Carthy did eventually withdraw, urging his supporters to back the official candidate, the size and social composition of his following is impossible to gauge with any certainty. Only his socially prominent admirers can be identified from press reports, the tip of an iceberg of unknown proportions. The Dublin correspondent of the Times reported that "the greatest difference of opinion exists as to the number of votes Mr. Mc Carthy is likely to poll" and, attempting his own assessment, commented:

"If one may judge from the size and enthusiasm of the audiences which Mr. Mc Carthy has recently addressed, his candidature will have considerable support."

This support was for the ending of a style of government which was seen as having made Unionism, as well as Home Rule, synonymous with "Rome Rule" and for a strong response to what was perceived as the latest tool of Romanism's aggrandising designs, the Catholic Association. It reflected a crisis of confidence in the institutions of Dublin Unionist politics which even a shift towards a more 'Protestant' stance on issues like the university question could not arrest. Even Mc Carthy's endorsement in withdrawal of the official candidate could not deliver this support back to the party organisation with a hard core of his following reportedly abstaining from voting.

c Loyalist alienation, Nationalist attraction?

If loyalist Protestants were being alienated to a greater or lesser extent by Constructive Unionism were nationalist Catholics being attracted towards an embryonic centrist politics by it's reorientation
of state activity? The emergence of manifestations of loyalty to Britain's royal family as an issue in turn-of-the-century Dublin politics might suggest that a centre-lean deviant deviation from nationalist orthodoxy was beginning to develop.

Lines upon which visiting royalty should be treated were laid down by the Nationalist Parliamentary Party in response to a request for guidance from Dublin Corporation before a visit to the city by the Prince of Wales in 1885. The resolution passed on that occasion declared that:

"It is, in our view, the duty of the Irish people and of their representatives in all public bodies, while avoiding any act of discourtesy to the Prince and Princess of Wales, to maintain an attitude of reserve which will sufficiently demonstrate their inalienable attachment to national principles and their resolute resentment at the suppression of their constitutional liberties". (Quoted in Sullivan, 1905, 223).

But in 1900, despite Nationalist Party disapproval, Dublin Corporation presented a loyal address to Queen Victoria when she visited the city and in 1903 a motion to present King Edward VII with an address was only narrowly defeated. As their terms of office expired Nationalist "flunkeys" who had voted for these addresses faced orchestrated campaigns to prevent their re-election but in the face of these efforts to oust them the majority succeeded in retaining their seats.

"Flunkeyism", however, represented not so much a change in the way Catholics had previously behaved as a reaction to a newly encountered phenomenon. Up to the end of the nineteenth century royalty generally kept away from its Irish subjects and displayed a determined aversion to the establishment of a permanent residence in the country where one of its number would be regularly expected to spend part of the year. At that point, however, the frequency of contact between the monarchy and Ireland increased from its previously low level. Between 1900 and
the First World War a reigning monarch visited Ireland five times while
Queen Victoria’s visit in 1900 was only her third in a reign of over
sixty years.

Nationalists entered this situation with a single precedent rather
than a well established norm and they brought with them highly
qualified formulae concerning the legitimacy of the monarchy rather
than any straightforward anti-royalism. Despite the strenuous
denunciations as ‘servility’, ‘snobbery’, ‘crawling’ etc which its
opponents heaped on loyal addressing, at some future date when Irish
national rights had been restored in the form of Home Rule, the
official ‘reserve’ prescribed towards the monarchy would,
theoretically, be replaced by a willingly expressed loyalty to the
crown on the part of Irish Nationalists.

A republican ideology did exist as a minority current within Irish
Nationalism but in the 1900s it was almost devoid of coherent public
expression. An ‘advanced’ alternative to parliamentary nationalism was
to emerge in the abstentionist Sinn Fein, which grew out of the ad hoc
National Council formed to oppose the presentation of a loyal address
in 1903. Its formal ideology was not, however, republican but dual
monarchist, calling for the restoration of the late eighteenth century
constitution of Grattan’s Parliament with its King, Lords and Commons.
For want of a viable alternative, republicans - who, significantly,
normally termed themselves separatists in this period - were
constrained to operate within this formally monarchist ‘1782’ movement.

The contingent basis on which nationalist reserve towards the
monarchy was founded made it possible to argue from within the
nationalist mainstream that expressions of loyalty should be used as a
means of obtaining Home Rule rather than being withheld until the goal
of self-government had been achieved. This line was taken, for
instance, by the Irish Independent before the King’s visit in 1903.
Such expressions were in any case already a fact of the corporate life of the Dublin upper middle class. Loyal addresses were presented, apparently without divisive controversy, by a variety of organisations which must in most cases have had substantial Catholic memberships — learned societies operating under royal patronage, governing bodies of professions, organisations representing commercial interests and most of the Urban District Councils of the Dublin suburbs.

The institutions of Catholic working or lower middle class life, by contrast, appear to have been virtually untouched by the rituals of loyalty. One lower class group, the Dublin Car Owners and Drivers, whose trade was a direct material beneficiary of the royal spectacle, presented an address to Edward VII in 1903. Another, the Silk Weavers trade union, published a letter expressing its gratitude to Queen Mary for her patronage of Dublin poplin while she and King George V were visiting the city in 1911. But these classes seem to have been merely uninvolved rather than actively hostile: they clearly did not provide opponents of "flunkeyism" with the sort of support they needed to "wipe out the stain affixed to Dublin".

Moreover, while the Home Rule movement’s leaders were united in opposing the presentation of loyal addresses by public bodies they were divided on whether or not anti-flunkeyism should be actively promoted by the party organisation. Support for such a policy came from former anti-Parnellites such as John Dillon and William O’Brien, whose base during the party split of the 1890s had been a rural one, while former leaders of the Parnellism which had predominated in Dublin during the split were either ambivalent about purges, like John Redmond, or openly deprecated their divisiveness, like Timothy Harrington.

The party factions had adopted the agrarian United Irish League as Home Rule’s "national organisation" when they reunited in 1900. But the
UIL's attempt to use anti-flunkeyism as a means of establishing its presence in Dublin was a failure. More extreme nationalists, who had been drawn into Parnellism, refused to work with the UIL and sought to break it up. What support it did recruit was soon diverting energy from the UIL's attempts to expel "flunkeys" from the city's public life to trying to change the "national organisation" in ways that would rid it of the image of a country movement attempting to "boss" Dublin.

As it had been expressed through the Parnellism of the later nineties, Dublin's own nationalist sentiment had appeared to be moving in two different directions. On the one hand the demand for self-government was reformulated in stronger terms than those of Parnell himself. On the other there was a readiness to praise and a willingness to cooperate with Constructive Unionist initiatives as well as the use of these reforms as an ideological stick with which to beat the Liberal alliance espoused by the anti-Parnellites. Parnellite politics thus simultaneously developed what may be termed maximalist and minimalist positions. A minimalist acceptance of individual reform measures on their own terms helped to erode reserve towards an increasingly frequent royal presence while a maximalist demand for more than Home Rule, temporarily left homeless by party reunification, weakened the UIL's effectiveness in pursuing its reinstatement.

A ground of antagonism less contingent than that of "national principle" was, however, available in the religious character of the monarchy. Not alone was the British monarch a Protestant but he or she on acceding to the throne had to make a declaration, whose form had been laid down by the Bill of Rights in 1689, in which Catholic doctrines and practices were specifically repudiated. Edward VII's accession, the third since Catholic Emancipation and the first since the 1830s, had the effect of drawing public attention to this oath.
Shortley afterwards a House of Lords Select Committee was set up on the Prime Minister’s motion and a government bill based on this committee’s report was subsequently introduced. The bill proposed a watering down of the language of the existing oath but, because Catholic spokesmen regarded this as insufficient and unsatisfactory, it was dropped by the government and the original declaration stood unamended.

In 1903 this Catholic religious grievance was seized on by opponents of a loyal address. The first reaction of Maud Gonne MacBride to news that the King was likely to be well received in Dublin was, according to her reminiscences, a plan to print and circulate the coronation oath (MacBride, 1974, 334). The National Council, of which she was a founder member, included the following paragraph in the circular it issued at the end of May 1903:

“We write from a National point of view, regardless of the different religious opinions of Nationalists. If we wrote from a Catholic point of view we might say – can any Catholic welcome the King who, scarce two years ago, took an oath grossly insulting their religion.”

In taking this line, however, nationalist activists were being considerably more ‘Catholic’ than the church authorities. During his visit the King was received, and presented with a loyal address, by the hierarchy at St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth. Apart from military reviews and court levees, the programme of royal tours consisted, in Dublin, mainly of visits to colleges, schools and hospitals. These institutions were almost all denominational in character and a balancing between Protestant and Catholic recipients is apparent. Whatever the royal oath might avow, royal visits acknowledged the legitimacy and substance of Catholic clerical interests and the considerable, if, from the church’s point of view, incomplete, accommodation of them by state policies.

Despite the offensive character of the accession declaration, the most radical proposal for the abandonment of Nationalist reserve
towards the monarchy and the adoption of a frankly loyal stance was to come from the chief source of inspiration to the Catholic Association, D.P. Moran, proprietor of The Leader. Such loyalty was for Moran a means to an end - the undermining of the Protestant Ascendancy and its self-proclaimed role as "England's faithful garrison" in Ireland. The under-representation of Catholics in the loyal-addressing upper classes could be tackled more effectively if Catholics expressed the loyalty inherent in the Home Rule demand they put forward.

Although he had earlier made considerable play with the terms of the accession declaration, Moran argued before the King's visit that local authorities should present loyal addresses, using them to articulate the social and educational grievances felt by Irish Catholics. Such addresses might be rejected in the censorship process but, whether accepted or rejected, their publication would be an effective form of propaganda. After the visit had taken place he took this argument further. The tone of the visit, in his view, gave evidence of growing official impatience with the persistence of Irish Protestant exclusivism:

"We want the people to fight the Ascendancy: and fight them on the ground that they accept the Crown and the Ascendancy have no right to their monopoly...Whatever we may think of the King. Whether we think that somebody else composed his speeches and that he does not mean a bit of them. Still they are facts: they are on record and capable of being used as weapons in the desperate struggle of Irish Ireland...at the lowest and worst cannot we look upon these facts as raw material out of which effective propaganda might be made? For ourselves we do not apprise these things at their lowest: we believe there was goodwill and real significance in the conduct of the King whilst here."

While Corporation flunkeyism was an incoherent amalgam of class propriety, localism and party split residue this was a clear programme for Nationalist loyalty. It was not a programme for centrist social peace, however, but for the opening up of a new front on which the sectarian struggle might be more advantageously pursued. The Catholic
Association was not, however, to be permitted to take the lead in waging that struggle, by a strategy of "collaring the King" or otherwise.

Early in 1904 Archbishop Walsh of Dublin moved decisively to break up the fledgling movement - although the narrowness of the grounds on which he did so left Protestant reaction substantially unassuaged. Aborted though it was, the potentially 'loyalist' form in which the Catholic Association emerged illustrates the way in which, far from creating a middle ground, the new Unionist governing stance was in the urban context splintering off the party blocs sharply contradictory new forces for which Mc Carthy on the one side and Moran on the other acted as spokesmen. King Edward might discern "the dawning of a brighter day upon Ireland" but in Dublin the sun was rising upon heightened sectarian feeling.

2 Executive Autonomy and Political Legitimacy

The Irish executive's autonomy from internal political forces was such that it could remain impervious to the united opposition of the Irish parliamentary representation, as it did in 1904 when, with the ties of party loyalty strained to breaking point, the Ulster Unionist MPs moved from criticism to outright censure of the administration. Only the appearance later in the same year of divisions within the executive opened it up to effective parliamentary sanction, leading to the resignation of the Chief Secretary in March 1905.

The series of events which culminated in Wyndham's resignation are usually referred to as the Devolution Crisis. This is a misnomer: the crisis centred not on the devolution proposals put forward by the Irish Reform Association (IRA), which Unionist political leaders were unanimous in repudiating, but on the constitutional irregularity of the creation during the period of Constructive Unionist initiative of hybrid managerial roles at the apex of the Irish administration. The
occupants of these roles combined some of the attributes of both the offices of government minister and that of administrative civil servant. It was this hybridity of its principal innovators which pushed the autonomy exercised by the Irish executive beyond bounds acceptable within the UK parliamentary system.

Executive hybridity first appeared in the OQTI which on its establishment was given its own ministerial head directly responsible to parliament. While the Chief Secretary was its President and titular head, the responsible minister was to be its Vice President. This provision was intended to emphasise the 'popular' character of the new department, distinguishing it from the existing 'Castle Boards' through which much of the Irish administration was carried on (Plunkett, 1904, 228). Horace Plunkett was to retain this ministerial Vice Presidency without a parliamentary seat for over six years after his 1900 defeat in South Dublin (Hutton, 1976; Clune, 1982). But, presiding over a specialised state apparatus, Plunkett's position within the administration was a relatively peripheral one and his admirers were far more vociferous in demanding that he should stay than were his detractors in highlighting his anomalous position.

The emergence of the devolution question, however, was to expose the existence of hybridity previously screened off by bureaucratic secrecy at the very centre of Dublin Castle. Parliamentary probing of the involvement the Castle's most senior civil servant - the Under Secretary, Sir Antony Mac Donnell - in the drafting of the IRA's proposals - an involvement which had unwittingly set him at odds with the Chief Secretary, Wyndham - eventually led to the disclosure of the special terms upon which Mac Donnell had been appointed to the Under Secretary's post and the extraordinary powers of initiative which it appeared he could legitimately claim to have been given under these terms.
It was on this issue that the 'devolution crisis' came to centre as it unfolded and that Wyndham, isolated in the midst of parliamentary cross-fire, was forced to resign (Lyons, 1948). An Irish Catholic with Liberal political leanings and a distinguished record in the Indian Civil Service, Mac Donnell had been the object of intense Irish Unionist suspicion - and a lesser degree of Nationalist expectation - from the outset. Revelation of the terms of his appointment stripped the Under Secretary of his facade of bureaucratic neutrality without removing the permanency of his civil service tenure of office.

But, during his brief period as Chief Secretary, Wyndham's successor Walter Long set out to mollify the discontent of Irish Unionists underscoring the repudiation of devolution by adopting in his administration a strong law and order stance and displaying a local political partisanship his predecessors had avoided. Constructive Unionism was thus brought to an abrupt halt and local loyalism came in from the cold - with a predictable effect on Nationalist opinion.

When the Unionist government fell in December 1905, Long's empathy with the Irish loyalist minority and the decisiveness of the break which he had made in office with 'governing Ireland according to Irish ideas' became the rallying points for official Unionism's efforts to repair the divisions which had rent its party over the previous decade. This 'Long factor' was to be internalised when the candidate for South Dublin stood down in his favour after Long had lost his English seat in the Liberal landslide. The effectiveness of this strategy was shown by the failure of two attempts to oppose Long's election for Plunkett's old seat from different ends of the Unionist spectrum.

Since the Stephen's Green by-election Lindsay Crawford, while he continued to reside in Dublin and to edit the Irish Protestant from there, had become increasingly absorbed in the Ulster activities of the
Independent Orange Order, of which he was Grand Master. Based on the assertion that, in spite of Long's period in office, nothing had really changed in official Unionism, his protest intervention in the election campaign appears to have attracted little or no Orange, or other Unionist, support. Rather his position on this occasion inverted that formerly occupied by Michael McCarthy, a purportedly dissident Catholic attracting a Protestant audience being replaced by an Orangeman attracting a Catholic one. At the same time an attempt by the IRA to nominate a candidate against Long on the diametrically opposite ground of his abandonment in office of constructive policies - its first electoral initiative - led to a split in that body. A spate of resignations followed which effectively destroyed its credibility as a political force.

But, as Long restored cohesion to Dublin Unionism, Liberalism was on the point of embracing the hybrid figures whose activities had thrown it into disarray. Divided on the Irish question since Gladstone’s retirement in 1894 (McCready, 1962/63), the Liberal Party entered office at the end of 1905 united around the formula that its policy in the immediate future should be devoted to "the great social questions" while Irish Nationalists would be offered "an instalment of representative control... or administrative improvements" which should be consistent with and lead up to the larger policy of Home Rule.

Attacking Long's reactionary pandering to Irish Unionist 'ultras', Liberal spokesmen counterposed to it a continuity with the more progressive policy previously pursued by Wyndham (Russell, 1973, 75). Such continuity gave the Constructive Unionist era an eighteen month resurrection from the dead during which the hybrid MacDonnell returned to the centre of the stage:
"Although Mac Donnell no longer retained under the Liberals the special powers he had been granted by Wyndham, in practice his habit of approaching various cabinet ministers as colleagues and his frequent threats of resignation gave him a position of essentially political importance in the government." (Hepburn, 1971, 497. Emphasis in original)

Mac Donnell’s politics expressed the quintessentially hybrid belief that party contention produced a distorted representation of Irish public opinion and that a potential third force of moderates existed whose emergence and growth could be assisted by the construction of suitable institutional channels of communication. Common to the various attempts to construct centre party incubators this inspired was a mixture of elected and nominated membership. The Council of Agriculture attached to the DARTI in 1899 was prototypical in this respect and the absence of party polarisation from its deliberations encouraged the further experimentation along these lines found in the IRA devolution scheme and in the Irish Council Bill produced by Mac Donnell under Liberal auspices.

But the ‘step by step’ approach the Liberal government sought to adopt and the survival of the executive hybrids to whom they looked to implement it were dependent on acceptability to the Nationalist leaders. For tactical reasons - such as the need to "liberate the Liberal Party from Lord Roseberry" and his ‘clean slate’ - this acquiescence was initially forthcoming: by the middle of 1907 it was clearly at an end.

In April 1907, preempting the report of a committee of inquiry into the operation of the DARTI set up when the Liberals took office, the Nationalist Party finally forced the issue of Plunkett’s retention of the DARTI Vice-Presidency and secured his resignation. In May the Irish Council Bill was rejected by a specially summoned convention of the UIL in the wake of which it was withdrawn by the government. This collapse of his second set of devolution proposals effectively ended MacDonnell’s influence on Irish policy-making and replaced executive
hybridity by direct negotiation within a parliamentary alliance of parties. A second, and more decisive, reining in of state autonomy in Ireland clarified once again the lines of cleavage formed around Home Rule in the 1880s, reintegrating the political blocs through the isolation of both their 'moderate' and 'extremist' splinters.

In 1907 neither the Liberals nor the Nationalist leaders believed that the Lords would have passed the Irish Council Bill if the Nationalists had not rejected it first and their calculations in relation to the bill were shaped accordingly. Thanks to the obstruction of the Liberal Commons majority by the Unionist Lords, the inextricably linked issues of Irish Home Rule and the House of Lords veto now returned to the top of the political agenda. By January 1910, when the Liberals went to the country on the 'peers versus the people' issue, they were also, as a result of the successful application of Nationalist pressure following the collapse of the devolution proposals, committed to introducing an Irish Home Rule bill in the next parliament.

3 Home Rule, Social Rights and State Expenditure

Between 1906 and 1914 the Liberal government enacted a series of welfare reforms to which British historians usually trace the beginnings of the 'welfare state' - the introduction of old age pensions, labour exchanges, unemployment and health insurance, minimum wages for sweated trades and a Development Fund whose projects were intended to mitigate the employment effects of business cycle fluctuations. Irish political conditions have never figured among the suggested origins of these Liberal reforms. They tend rather to be seen as a specific form of adaptation to the structural shift from status to class-based political cleavage in Britain, a response designed to secure the electoral position of the Liberal Party in the face of competing Unionist (Tariff Reform) and Labour social programmes to its
right and to its left (Hay, 1975).

In Britain welfare reform was in part a response to the emergence of a trade union-based Labour Party: in Ireland gaps in the extension of such state welfare provision helped to push forward the movement for the formation of an Irish version of such a Labour party. In the years before the war two specific areas of exclusion became the focal point of Irish trade union lobbying - the free medical benefit under the National Insurance Act and the provision for feeding necessitous children in school.

Responding to pressure from the Irish medical profession, the Nationalist Party had moved amendments to exclude Ireland from the medical benefit in spite of trade union protests. The feeding of school children in Britain had been possible since 1906 under the Education (Provision of Meals) Act. This was originally a Labour private member's bill for whose passage the Liberal government agreed to provide parliamentary time. The act was not mandatory but allowed local authorities to fund school meal provision out of the rates. This element of local authority involvement would not have been acceptable to the Catholic Church in Ireland which saw support of education through the rates as leading to the eventual ending of clerical control over the schools. Repeated calls for the extension of this Act to Ireland thus fell on deaf Nationalist ears at Westminster.

Proponents of an independent Irish Labour party within the Irish TUC used these issues to highlight the indifference of the Nationalist Party to working class demands. Against northern advocates of affiliation to the British Labour Party they provided evidence of the failure of that party, out of deference to what it treated as the Nationalists' sphere of influence, to act in protection of Irish working class interests. In themselves the exclusions might be regarded as relatively minor issues. But as portents of what was likely to
become a more general trend under Home Rule they acquired wider significance.

At the time of the second Home Rule Bill Irish revenue was estimated to exceed Irish local expenditure by over £2 million: by the time the third was introduced nineteen years later such local expenditure was estimated to exceed revenue by over £1 million and this deficit was projected to increase in the future. Between 1896 and 1911 Irish revenue increased by 28% but Irish local expenditure rose by 91%. Old age pensions accounted for half the total increase and for one-third of all Irish local expenditure in 1911.

The central bone of financial contention in the case of the first two Home Rule Bills had been the size of the 'Imperial Contribution' which Ireland, under Home Rule, would be required to make to the cost of providing Imperially-controlled services. In the case of the third Home Rule Bill it was how the Irish budget was to be brought into balance. The principle that Ireland should make an 'Imperial Contribution' remained, but its determination and payment were to be postponed until the Irish budget deficit had been eliminated (Bogdanor, 1979, 16-27).

Under the financial scheme of the third Home Rule Bill all Irish revenue was to be paid into the Imperial Exchequer and services accounting for almost half of Irish local expenditure were to be controlled from and paid for by Westminster. The services 'reserved' to Westminster included old age pensions and national insurance. A 'transferred sum' of just over £5 million was to be paid annually to the Irish Exchequer to cover the cost of the services controlled by the Irish Parliament and, through a surplus sum reducing over time, to provide it with a working margin.

The Irish government was to have the option of taking over any or all of the reserved services and, if it decided to do so, the
transferred sum was to be increased by an amount certified by a supervisory body as being the equivalent to any saving to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom by reason of the transfer. This amount remained fixed thereafter at the value certified at the time of the transfer. A reexamination of the entire scheme was provided for when Irish revenue exceeded Irish expenditure for three consecutive years, at which time an 'Imperial Contribution' was to be determined and brought into operation (Jalland, 1983).

Assuming that the Irish Parliament would move to expand its otherwise very restricted responsibilities by taking over the reserved services, the scheme provided a mechanism whereby the deficit would eventually be eliminated even in the absence of reductions in expenditure imposed by the Irish Parliament through the fixing of an upper limit to Irish spending while the modest, but definite, natural increase in Irish revenue accrued to the Imperial Exchequer. Once a reserved service was transferred, however, the Irish Parliament would be free to economise on its provision while remaining in receipt of the sum certified as its cost at the time of transfer. This was of particular potential significance in relation to welfare spending, which 'expert' financial opinion in Britain and Ireland deemed to be unsuitable to a predominantly rural society.

Between the second and third Home Rule Bills the extension of the UK state in Ireland took two forms: on the one hand measures which were peculiar to Ireland and were directed exclusively at its rural peasant sector and, on the other, measures which extended to Ireland parity of political or social citizenship rights with other parts of the UK and were mainly urban/industrial in orientation. Treatment of the former as organically determined, and therefore to be exempted from expenditure reductions, while the latter were viewed as artificial and unjustified by Irish needs promised to continue and exacerbate in a Home Ruled
Ireland the rural/urban sectoral differences which UK state policy had already semi-institutionalised.

Such a situation promised to create a clear and immediate role for an Irish Labour Party, albeit in a situation which, as the Belfast Labour supporter of the Union had repeatedly pointed out, Labour’s constituency of wage-earners would find itself numerically at a disadvantage in relation to socially conservative property-owning classes which UK state action had so assiduously expanded. But, pending a solution to the national question, on which it was unable to take up an unambiguous position, Labour remained submerged in the politics of pan-class alliance. It is to an examination of the embodiment of this structure in the Home Rule movement that the next chapter turns.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE HEGEMONY OF HOME RULE

1 Introduction

Until the party's demise during the First World War the land question which had awakened the west continued to dominate the social politics of Home Rule. Within an alliance with a broadened base the priority given to agrarian issues necessarily involved the subordination of the interests of other social groups whose anti-Union sentiments had, as in Dublin, been harnessed to nationalist politics at a much earlier date (D'arcy, 1970/71; Hill, 1973). If control over parliamentary representation is taken as the test, then acquiescence to this subordination appears to have been readily forthcoming from Dublin nationalists of all classes over a period of more than thirty years.

If this subordination was not generally experienced as such - and the durability of Home Rule dominance clearly suggests that it was not - this was because in a local context a different kind of political community was being expressed through the same constitutional demand. In religiously mixed Dublin an appeal to sectarian solidarity was to serve as a mobilising substitute for agrarianism. Home Rule was initially to be constructed in the city as the imagined community of a fully Catholic Ireland, its priests and people of all classes united behind a strong national leader and moulding the urban institutions within their grasp to an uncompromising correspondence to their cultural pattern.

When this mould was shattered by a factional division whose fault line severed a city minority from a country majority the urban elements of this minority faction could not be welded together into a coherent and stable alternative political community capable of imposing its own identity on nationalism. Reunification of the Home Rule Party produced a series of organisational attempts to reinvent the integrated
community lost in the split. These were most successful where they updated Catholic militancy to address a broadened set of social concerns but the limits of the reintegration they achieved led to the techniques of electoral system manipulation being turned in on nationalism’s own communal base where once they had been solely directed outwards at Protestant Unionist opposition.

This chapter examines the process by which Home Rule became and remained the nationalist mainstream in Dublin. It first looks at the initial phase of mobilisation-through-polarisation the early 1880s. It then examines how the transition from local assertion of majority prerogative to a national split which began with the O’Shea divorce case in 1890 and lasted until 1900 affected the three main pillars of support on which the Dublin Home Rule alliance rested - the Catholic working class, the clergy, and the Catholic section of the middle class which controlled local government. Finally it looks at how the leadership of a reunited Nationalist Party attempted to remobilise Dublin support through a variety of mass organisations - the United Irish League, the Town Tenants League and the Ancient Order of Hibernians - and the degree to which these efforts met with success.

2. Nationalist Control and Community Polarisation

A local accommodation existed in Dublin between Catholic Liberalism and Protestant Conservatism from the middle of the nineteenth century. As noted in Chapter Three, this revolved around an alternation of the mayoralty and a two-thirds/one-third balance in the Corporation. The heightening of sectarian passions recurrently threatened this local power-sharing. In the early 1880s it finally succumbed to the polarisation fuelled by agrarian violence and state repression.

Through his use of obstruction tactics in parliament Parnell had built up a personal following among the most urbanised supporters of the Home Rule movement prior to his participation in the agrarian New
Departure of the Land League (Lyons, 1977, 57-69). Due to the absence of organisational machinery he was prevented from trying to capitalise on his standing in Dublin at the 1880 general election (Woods, 1973, 102) but his arrest in the government crackdown on the land agitation of October 1881 provoked serious rioting in the city. It was a campaign to confer the freedom of the city on Parnell while he was being held in Kilmainham gaol that precipitated the breakdown of the alternating mayoralty.

Through the early 1880s the municipal Liberalism of Dublin's Catholic majority evolved into a Nationalism attuned to the aggressive new parliamentary leadership provided by Parnell and his lieutenants. At grassroots level a dual pattern developed with a network of National League branches co-existing with branches of the old Liberal Registration Association. At the convention held before the 1885 general election to choose candidates for the four borough divisions delegates from League branches were outnumbered by those from branches of the Registration Association. Over the same period the Conservatism of the Protestant minority, increasingly portrayed by its opponents as a malignant force to be extirpated rather than to be offered a share of local government offices, was pushed to the margin in city politics.

The specifically local dimensions of the growing polarisation can be traced through two issues upon which the 1885 election campaign centred in Dublin: the siting of the new hall of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland and the sale of the building in which the 1865 exhibition of art and industries had been held.

In 1880 the Orange Order had become actively involved through its Emergency Committee in attempting to protect isolated Loyalists and to break Land League boycotts. The manpower it supplied was recruited in Ulster but the committee's operations were directed from Dublin. In 1883 the Grand Lodge began to raise funds to acquire a new and larger
premises in the city. Edward Cecil Guinness, the paternalistic brewery magnate and Conservative candidate in the marginal Stephen's Green division, was among a number of prominent non-Orange Conservatives from whom subscriptions were solicited and received. The new Orange Hall was sited in Rutland (now Parnell) Square, as was the palace of the Catholic archbishop. The opening of the hall in 1885 coincided with the appointment of a new archbishop and a dramatic local shift in the church's political stance.

The choice of the Dublin clergy, Dr. William Walsh's appointment was confirmed despite lobbying on the British government's behalf at the Vatican (Woods, 1972/73, 57-59). Its effect was to promote the active participation of the clergy in Dublin nationalism: the attendance of a large clerical contingent at the city convention a few months later signalled this change of policy. Previously blocked by the hostile attitude of the unpopular Cardinal McCabe (Woods, 1973, 106), such clerical involvement stood in marked contrast to the situation which had prevailed forty years earlier in the Dublin Repeal movement (Hill, 1973, 105).

The Archbishop's own public contribution to the election campaign was to stress the fact that Parnell's party now acted as an official spokesman for Irish Catholic educational interests in parliament and to equate voting against that party's candidates with supporting the registration of Catholic children as Protestants which he alleged to be "of no infrequent occurrence" in a Dublin workhouse under Conservative control. The location of an Orange Hall within a few doors of the palace of this new champion of the popular cause was repeatedly characterised in the campaign as a deliberate insult:
"They might be certain that Sir Cecil Guinness chuckled with joy when he found that the Orange Hall for which he subscribed was to be established in that particular place. In fact it was the most toothsome morsel that he had for his money (groans), this public insult to a patriotic prelate (great cheering for Dr. Walsh) whose memory would be dear and fragrant to the Irish race when one stone did not stand upon another of any Orange Hall in Ireland (cheers)."

While Dublin was acquiring a new Orange Hall it was losing the Earlsfort Terrace exhibition building, which had passed into Guinness’s ownership, in scarcely less controversial circumstances. Industrial exhibitions provided the main channel of community response to the terminal crisis being experienced by many Irish industries in the Victorian Great Depression. A National Exhibition was held in Dublin to promote Irish manufactures in 1882 followed by an Artisans Exhibition with a similar object in 1885. The organisation of the exhibitions, however, revealed the depth of division within that community.

The original proposal to hold an exhibition in 1882 had enjoyed cross-party, aristocratic and business support. In the Autumn of 1881, however, the organisers split over the question of whether or not royal patronage should be sought and the project was abandoned. The idea of an exhibition was to be revived in the new year with a very different base of support: "the new movement sprang chiefly from the artisan classes and, except in a few instances, has received no countenance from the merchants and respectable traders who have been identified with former exhibitions".

This movement was strongly Nationalist and the opening of the exhibition in August was linked into ceremonies for the unveiling of Daniel O’Connell’s statue. By then the Earlsfort Terrace building had been sold - "for a song" and in order to deprive the ‘82 exhibition organisers of its use, according to Guinness’s critics. Dismantled to be reerected in Battersea Park, the loss of the building to the city was blamed when both the 1882 and 1885 exhibitions incurred financial
losses.13

The 1885 exhibition differed from that of 1882 in being not simply supported by artisans but completely organised by them through their trade unions. The enterprise sought to be non-political but its efforts in this direction only served to underline how little space there was for such a concept in Dublin in the mid-1880s. For its opening a cantata, entitled "Awake, Arise", was specially composed:

"The words of the cantata point at the outset to the union of different classes of Irishmen and their awakening as a united race: and the composer sought to illustrate this idea by introducing, much in the manner that characteristic motifs are employed in modern opera to symbolise distinct elements, four well known themes namely the old Irish air popularly known as "the Boyne Water", "Patrick's Day", "God Save the Queen" and "Garryowen"."

The performance was drowned by hissing for several minutes when the "God Save the Queen" theme was played, about three-quarters of the audience being reported to have joined in while a minority raised counter-cheers. In the event the staging of the exhibition had the political effect of drawing its organising group, whose individual unions had long been regular participants in nationalist demonstrations (Loftus, 1978, 19-41), closer to Nationalist Party "friends of Labour". These actively associated themselves with unsuccessful efforts to preserve the building which had housed the exhibition as a school of technical education and a meeting place for the trades. When a Trades Council was formed for the city as a result of the exhibition a number of wealthy Nationalists acted as financial guarantors for the acquisition of the Capel Street Trades Hall.

By the mid-1880s the partial insulation of municipal politics and urban community initiatives from the wider polito-sectarian struggle between parties had been brought to an end. The Corporation, the Catholic clergy and the "home manufacture" movement had all become adjuncts of the transformed Home Rule movement. The 1885 clean sweep of
Dublin seats was rowdily celebrated by large crowds who smashed loyalist windows and, after the first Home Rule Bill was defeated, an enormous demonstration marked the departure from Dublin of the Viceroy, Lord Aberdeen.

Within its base of urban Catholic communalism Home Rule encountered only one antagonistic current, the 'physical force' nationalism of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). During its initial period of growth in the early 1860s, Fenianism, of which the IRB was a continuation, had recruited a mainly lower-class urban membership. From the late 1860s, however, its base had shifted geographically and socially to comprise mainly rural smallholders (Garvin, 1981, 59-65: Comerford, 1985, 212-213). With the majority of the IRB Supreme Council opposed to involvement in agrarian agitation the New Departure prompted a mass rural defection to Parnell's rival movement. A shrunken IRB was thus reurbanised, but its state of demoralisation and internal division precluded the mounting of an effective opposition to parliamentary nationalism in the cities and towns through the eighties (Comerford, 1985, 243).

3 Changing The Formula

The Nationalist Party split in December 1890 over Parnell's continued leadership in the wake of the O'Shea divorce case hearing. A decisive confrontation between the factions took place at the general election of 1892 (Woods, 1980). In this election the Anti-Parnellites won seventy-one seats, the Parnellites won nine and most of the marginals, including the two in Dublin, were lost to the Unionists. The strongest support for Parnellism was recorded in Dublin where its share of the vote in the six city and county seats was 70%. Four of the nine Parnellites returned sat for these divisions. In terms of policy the anti-Parnellites represented continuity with that pursued by the Home Rulers since 1886 - alliance with a Liberal Party committed to Home
Rule. It was the Parnellites whose "independent opposition" introduced new elements. This section of the chapter looks at how the different components of the Home Rule community were affected by this novelty in Parnellism's Dublin stronghold.

(a) Factions and Workers

The start of the split in the Nationalist Party coincided with a general statewide upsurge in trade union activity and the spread of the "new unionism" militancy to Dublin. A feature of Parnell's efforts to win popular support for a continuation of his leadership was to be 'his courtship of the working class in both England and Ireland' (Lyons, 1977, 579). In May 1891 he attended the founding conference of the Irish Industrial League (IIL) in Dublin and more or less endorsed its programme which included manhood suffrage for all local and parliamentary elections, payment of members and of all election expenses, an eight hour day, nationalisation of land, reduction of food taxes, state control of the transport system, extension of the Factory Acts and the provision of workers' dwellings at low rents.

While Parnell's previous attitude towards labour issues undoubtedly invited the reaction that this was 'a desperate casting about for fresh allies, any allies on any terms, for a losing cause' (Lyons, 1977, 580) his overtures evoked a positive response in Dublin among the leaders of the new movement of the hitherto unorganised semi-skilled and unskilled workers. However the leadership of the Trades Council, drawn from the long-established craft unions, sought to avoid direct involvement in the political split, blocking moves towards a local Labour alliance with Parnell and leaving the IIL severely alone (McDonnell, 1979, li-lvi; Cody, 1982, 39-40).

Parnell's death in October 1891, the subsequent Parnellite leadership's lack of enthusiasm for adventures in working class politics and the destruction by an employers' counter-offensive of much
of the extension of trade union organisation initially achieved in Dublin by the 'new unionism' together removed the question of such an alliance from the political agenda. Urban workers were not to occupy in the new movement of the Parnellite minority the 'most favoured class' position enjoyed by tenant farmers in its catch-all predecessor.

The Trades Council did not, however, confine itself to avoiding factional entanglement. Along with the Irish Trade Union Congress, which it and its Belfast equivalent were responsible for establishing in 1894, it became the principal source of consistent pressure for the assimilation of the Irish municipal and parliamentary franchises. With this object achieved in 1898 the Trades Council created the Labour Electoral Association to secure direct labour representation on local authorities under the extended franchise.

(b) The Dublin Clergy: Priests minus People?

One of the most notorious aspects of the split was the manner in which the Catholic clergy swung their influence behind the anti-Parnellite cause. Dublin was no exception with regard to the prevalence of active clerical involvement - in 1892 priests attended the anti-Parnellite convention, signed their candidates' nomination papers and figured prominently at their meetings - though clerical behaviour in and around the polling booths on election days was not critically commented on in the Parnellite press. Having suffered a decisive defeat, the Dublin clergy withdrew from political activity as the anti-Parnellites abandoned the city and county to their opponents, making no further effort to win control over their local or parliamentary representation during the split.

These events disclose the difference that existed between a politics based on Catholic communalism and one based on clericalism. The marking of ethnic identity by Catholic Church membership did not imply any automatic deference to the political authority of even a united
clerical leadership. Within strictly limited confines, a tension existed between the clerical and lay leadership elites within the nationalist movement. Indeed Irish mass nationalist politics could be said to have as its premise that, while lay nationalists could be relied upon to defend the special political concerns of the church, the church could not be depended upon to put national self-government before the interests of its own institutional complex.

Thus, although the Parnellites denounced 'clerical dictation' in politics, their leaders claimed that priests sympathetic to their cause were being silenced by an illegitimate application of internal church discipline and that, with the moral issue of the divorce removed, there was now no reason why any churchman should not support the independent opposition policy on its merits. As disillusion grew with the impotence and vacillation of the Liberal government of 1892-95 it opened up the possibility that the Independents, starting from a base of roughly one-third of the total nationalist vote outside Ulster, could reverse the imbalance of parliamentary numbers provided clerical opposition was neutralised. Thus the Parnellites were to be found vying to outdo the anti-Parnellites in promoting Catholic educational demands in the mid-1890s.

Such a stance made no significant impact on clerics who, thanks to the further splintering taking place in the ranks of the nationalist majority, now had the congenial option of supporting Timothy Healy's faction to advance their interests or express their frustrations and who remained, in any case, utterly hostile to the "secret society" following which the split had drawn from the ranks of the IRB into Parnellism. Stymied in its to secure clerical neutrality, and with the survival of the symbolic activities and institutional embodiments which the faction had established in Dublin threatened by an atrophy of active support, Parnellism began to seek salvation by moving closer
to this extreme form of nationalism.

Following a visit to America by the Parnellite leader, John Redmond, on which he received guarantees of financial support for a new organisation, the Independent League was launched in 1897 with a programme in which a stronger national self-government demand was substituted for the Home Rule formula accepted by Parnell, the importance of agrarian issues downplayed and a flourish of defiance directed at the clergy with a call for "full civil and religious liberty".

C. Dublin Corporation, The New Franchise and the New Parnellism

At the time of the split the members of the Corporation overwhelmingly took the Parnellite side. By the end of the 1890s however this united corporate front had been fragmented by the revamping of Parnellism along newly 'advanced' lines and by the emergence of an independent labour organisation. The first municipal elections held under the extended franchise in 1899 brought these two developments together. Apart from the advent of Labour, the main feature of the election campaign was the competition between two 'tickets', one put forward by the Independent League and the other backed by the Freeman's Journal. The Independent ticket included less than half the thirty-eight retiring Nationalist members seeking re-election to the Corporation reflecting the division its creation had caused among Parnellism's supporters.

In 1897 the programme of the Independent League and the manner in which it had been formed were immediately repudiated by Timothy Harrington, who was the most senior member of the Party of the 1880s to have taken the Parnellite side. Objecting to the strengthening of Parnellism's extremist connection, which he had previously denounced, through the advancing of the national demand beyond Home Rule and also to the anti-clerical tone, Harrington had put forward a counter-
programme aimed at reunifying the party factions. Breaking with Redmond, he began to use the journal he edited, a United Ireland much shrunken from its eighties heyday, to advocate this alternative strategy.

Harrington thus found himself left off the Independent ticket for the 1899 elections and the composition of the two tickets indicates that the Parnellite members of the old Corporation were fairly evenly divided between Independent Leagues adherents and supporters of his "national unity" campaign. In national terms an anti-Parnellite paper, the Freeman's Journal intervened to adopt the Dublin Parnellite councillors orphaned by their opposition to the Independent League's "new departure".

In the election the performance of the Independent ticket was mixed: the casualty rate among retiring members was much the same for candidates on each of the tickets but most of the newly-elected Nationalists were on the Independent ticket. The elections also produced a ten-strong Labour group and a reduction of the number of seats held by Unionists from eleven to seven. Of the forty-three non-Labour and non-Unionist members of the new Corporation twenty-two had been on the Independent ticket, fifteen on the Freeman ticket, five on neither and one on both.

The Independent League had thus failed to establish any clear ascendancy but more crucial to its fate than the fragmentation these results disclosed was to be the failure of the American financial aid, upon which its hopes of revitalising Parnellism were pinned, to materialise. Unabated financial pressure squeezed hardest on the principal item of Parnellite infrastructure, the Independent newspapers. Launched to give Parnellism a national daily voice after the defection in the Summer of 1891 of the initially supportive Freeman's Journal, the Independent combined a parliamentarian board
with a strong IRB presence on its staff (O’Broin, 1976, 54-57 and 98-101).

By the later part of the decade it was in severe financial difficulty, a state compounded by use of the paper’s board as a means of funding the Parnellite parliamentary group and by the neglect of some of the basic requirements of efficient newspaper production by its highly politicised staff. In 1888 the commercial management of the papers was handed over to a syndicate which included the Linotype Company, control over editorial policy being retained by the existing board of MPs and ex-MPs. Thereafter the paper’s two political elements were prised apart as a manager whom the syndicate recruited in England slashed the staff and introduced new machinery.

As the alignment of Parnellite parliamentarians with physical force nationalists broke up it removed an obstacle to reunification along the old pre-split lines, impetus for such a move having already been generated by the counter-tendencies which the launching of the Independent League had crystallised. The Parnellite leaders entered the tortuous negotiations by which this was brought about without either of two forces disruptive of the old unity which the formation of their faction had pulled from the chorus line of nationalist politics to the centre of the political stage - labour, now organised independently, albeit on a "non-political and non-sectarian" basis, and extreme, physical force nationalists whose Irish-American backers, embroiled in their own split, had failed to come up with the money which might have maintained in existence a more 'advanced' political alternative to a movement of the eighties type.

Putting Humpty Together Again

(a) Agrarianism Restored

After the reunification of the parliamentary factions in February 1900 the task of remobilising mass support for the Home Rule movement
was assigned to the United Irish League (UIL). Founded in 1898 by William O'Brien, the UIL had already succeeded in reviving large-scale coordinated agrarian agitation in the west of Ireland. A growing, but still very much a regional, movement, it was adopted as the new national organisation at a National Convention held in the following June. The introduction of the UIL into Dublin did not proceed by coopting the existing local government cadre but rather by attempting to mobilise popular opinion against a large segment of it. The 'degradation' of the national capital by the Corporation's presentation of a loyal address to Queen Victoria during her visit a few months earlier provided the issue on which the drive to establish in the city this previously purely agrarian organisation was focussed.

This local purge had its parallel at the national level in the UIL's confrontation with renewed parliamentary factionalism. A dispute over representation at the June convention had breached the party's fragile unity and drawn new battle lines within the nationalist movement. Those supporting the authoritative role assigned by the convention to the UIL faced the dissident followers of Tim Healy. Healy enjoyed substantial clerical backing in his defiance of the League but at the Autumn general election his parliamentary following was swept away and he was left isolated. The holding of a second National Convention in December 1900, at which Healy's expulsion from the Parliamentary Party was approved, set the seal on the UIL's emergence as the new centre of power within the movement.

In Lyons' (1951) view, the outcome of the 1900 general election was sufficient "to convince the country that unity and discipline had been restored by the new system and that the League was worthy of all support". But in Dublin this was far from being the case. Not only did the city's 'flunkeys' enjoy, as we have seen, a much higher survival rate than the Healyites but the organisation seeking to purge them
failed to consolidate a substantial core of activist support.

From the date of its adoption as the national organisation the UIL set about implanting itself in Dublin by attempting to build up a citywide network of ward branches and divisional executives. This effort was initially pursued intensively with six paid organisers reported to be working for the League in the DMP district in late 1900. But a poor response to these efforts, and the continuous drain on League resources which resulted, soon led to the scaling down of organising work and eventually, sometime in 1903, to its abandonment. By the end of 1903 UIL organisation - previously kept alive only by regular resuscitation - was virtually non-existent in the city and it was to remain in this state until 1909. Only in one of the city's twenty wards, Arran Quay, was continuous regular UIL activity maintained through this period. The summoning of conventions to select parliamentary candidates was the primary political responsibility entrusted to the League. These were dispensed with islandwide by the UIL National Directory before the December 1910 general election. None had been held in Dublin before either the 1906 or January 1910 elections.

Two features of the UIL's failure to establish itself in Dublin are particularly noteworthy. The first was the rejection from the outset of the 'dualist' pattern of organisation which had underpinned the electoral triumphs of the mid-1880s. The second was the way in which the direction of an appeal over the heads of local elite 'flunkeys' prompted the early renewal of Nationalist courtship of organised labour.

The split had broken up the registration machinery which had delivered the clean sweep of Dublin parliamentary seats in 1885 and 1886. In May 1900 a meeting of Nationalist public representatives as well as the officers and committees of the different Nationalist
organisations that have existed in the city for the past ten years together with ward committees that had been engaged in registration was convened to consider a proposal to form a central registration association for the whole parliamentary borough area. The initiative came from two of the city's MPs and the task of the proposed association was defined as the winning back of the Stephen's Green seat.

At the inaugural meeting arguments for as wide a base as possible to restore Dublin's Nationalist parliamentary representation to its former level were met by strong opposition to the ideological impurity permitted by registration associations. Critics of the registration association as a form almost invariably referred to the recent presentation of the loyal address to Queen Victoria. The establishment of the UIL in the city was advocated as an alternative to that of the proposed central registration body, a line that was to prevail over the succeeding months with the registration association proving to be stillborn. It was the weakness of the UIL which led to the arrangements noted in Chapter Five whereby the marginal seats were effectively sub-contracted to wealthy individuals who were, ironically, particularly prone to indulge in the displays of loyalty to whose elimination from the public life of the nation the UIL attached overriding importance.

Organised labour's response to the renewal of Nationalist overtures by the UIL was initially cautious. Reaffirming its non-political and non-sectarian constitution, the LEA declined an invitation to send delegates to the June 1900 National Convention. In August, however, OTC appeared to react more positively to a call made by Michael Davitt and supported by Redmond for an increase in working class representation in the Parliamentary Party. The names of J.P. Nannetti and John Simmons were put forward as prospective candidates at the
forthcoming general election. Nannetti was chosen by a UIL convention to fight College Green against its former Parnellite incumbent, J.L. Carew, who had been rejected as a 'flunkey'. At the election Nannetti won a narrow victory. Simmons, however, declared that he would only go forward in a safe rural seat - something the UIL was unwilling and/or unable to offer him.

But even as DTC nominated potential 'Nat-Lab' candidates its delegates were displaying ambivalent attitudes towards the UIL and a disposition to keep the 'national organisation' at arm's length. The increasing absorption of the LEA into the UIL brought matters to a head at the end of the year. When the LEA reversed its June decision by sending delegates to the December convention and joined in the UIL's anti-flunkey campaign against one of its own, now estranged, founding members DTC repudiated its mandate to speak for Dublin trade unionists on local electoral questions.

b. Organisational Responses to the UIL's Failure

The UIL had failed in Dublin in the basic task of recruiting members. It had also largely failed in its attempts to purge the local political elite and to enlist Labour's support. The organisational response to this set of facts was to take three forms. First there were abortive attempts to revamp the UIL along lines reminiscent of the Independent League:

"to lift the movement to a higher platform with more of a National aim, eliminating the agrarian element to a large extent, and to get hold of Dublin and places not now with them and get help from America."

Second there was the sponsorship of independent if complementary movements to supplement the appeal of the UIL which will be examined in the later parts of this section. Finally there was an accommodation with the local political elite which the UIL had set out to purge in which the proscription on 'flunkeys' was dropped in the face of the emergence of a common enemy. This was Sinn Fein whose modest, if growing,
presence in Dublin municipal politics suddenly acquired new national dimensions in the Summer of 1907 when dissatisfaction with what the Liberal government was prepared to offer in the Irish Council Bill led a number of nationalist MPs to turn towards its parliamentary abstentionism.

The perception of Sinn Fein as a potentially serious rival imparted a new urgency to efforts to strengthen the Home Rule movement where it's dominance seemed likely to come under most serious threat. A general reorganisation was begun in the city, linked to the formation of a broad-based grouping of Nationalist councillors to counter Sinn Fein's influence on the Corporation. UIL central funds were made available for registration work and, whether by coincidence or not, a stalwart of the city's one successful UIL branch in Arran Quay joined the staff of the Town Clerk's office taking administrative responsibility for the preparation of the register. Thus while the old UIL had concentrated on trying to purge Dublin city's local government elite without contributing to the registration battle with the Unionists in the marginal seats, its new revived form embraced the "flunkeys" it had not been able to displace and began to systematically employ the techniques of register manipulation against the enemy within its own communal base.

(c)The Town Tenant Joins His Country Cousin

In 1903 the first supplementary movement made its appearance when the Town Tenants League (TTL) was formed. Town tenants' demands were a longstanding, if very much a secondary, feature of nationalist programmes. The formation in 1903 of a separate organisation to pursue them was initially opposed by the Standing Committee of the UIL. However the anxiety of Nationalist leaders to find a means of mobilising urban support resulted in such opposition being quickly overridden.
A watershed for the new movement was the passage in 1906 of the Town Tenants Act which gave tenants rights, under certain circumstances, to compensation for improvements and for disturbance. Initially a private member’s bill it had received the government support essential to its passage after the intervention of Sir Antony McDonnell to settle a Loughrea, Co. Galway, case in which a town tenant was strenuously resisting attempts to evict him. Although this was denied in Parliament, it was widely believed that a bargain had been struck by which the Loughrea house was surrendered in return for government intervention to ensure the passage of the Town Tenants Bill. The legislation was thus seen as a fruit of direct action. Comparisons were drawn between the new Town Tenants Act and the 1881 Land Act and its passage encouraged the growth in the following years of local level town tenant agitations.

The TTL could claim a Dublin membership of over 1,000 in 1911 but the movement’s recruitment of new support proved to be greater in a small town than in a city context. In the former the TTL proved itself a flexible vehicle capable of accommodating groups as different as business leaseholders and landless labourers. Typically TTL agitations took place in towns which formed part of estates whose agricultural land was in the process of being sold to tenants. There campaigns often incorporated agrarian as well as ‘urban’ objectives, attempting to insert themselves into the collective bargaining process constructed by the Land purchase legislation.

But while small town tenants could often scavenge around the transfer of land ownership the state was not directing a comparable social engineering exercise in Dublin. Given the appalling state of much working class housing state intervention was urgently needed in the cities to provide new safe and sanitary dwellings at affordable (i.e. subsidised) rents. But - with the ironical exception of the Irish rural
sector - large scale housing subsidies remained at the outbreak of the First World War a policy area untouched by 'New Liberal' initiatives.

In Dublin therefore the TTL fell between two stools. It failed to put itself at the head of a growing current of opinion demanding central state aid for slum clearance and rehousing (Daly, 1984, 308-317) but under existing conditions of fragmented property ownership it found the mass of tenants to unorganisable because sustained collective agitation could not be generated by the highlighting of individual cases. The landlord in the city was not easily recognised as a cultural alien and, indeed, as an individual he was - like the country grazier - too often uncomfortably 'popular' in his social characteristics and political allegiance.

The importance attached to the blurring of communal social imagery can be illustrated by the way in which it is absent from the most notable instances of town tenant agitation in the Dublin area. The first was the case of Kingstown - a part-port, part seaside resort and part-suburb largely in the ownership of Lords Longford and De Vesci - where a sustained campaign was provoked by estate management policies of substantially raising rents and imposing onerous rebuilding conditions as the leases of houses and commercial property began to fall in around the turn of the century. The second was the 1909 episode of "Foley's Fort" where widespread publicity was attracted by an O'Connell Street businessman under notice to quit who, in addition to appealing to the League for support, seized on the fact that the intended new tenant of the premises was a Jew to launch a generalised attack on Jewish methods of trading.

d) The Ancient Order of Hibernians

A second Dublin supplement to the UIL was to be provided by a movement which, unlike the TTL, was able to turn state welfare reform to its own organisation-building advantage and did not suffer from any
difficulty in establishing an unambiguous social identity, the Ancient
Order of Hibernians (AOH). Exclusively Catholic in its membership, Hibernianism continued a previously underground tradition stretching
back through nineteenth century Ribbonism to the Defenders movement of
the 1790s in which nationalism was fused with religious sectarianism.
In effect a counter-Orangeism, the AOH shared with its Protestant enemy
a common geographical heartland and an affinity to the European
artisan-masonic family of brotherhoods with its characteristic use of
symbols, signs, passwords and rituals (Beames, 1982).

Although seriously disorganised by splits, and an object of strong,
if informal, clerical disapproval, the AOH was growing slowly but
surely through the 1890s. A new constitution brought unity and
increased respectability to the Order in 1902, further stimulating
membership growth. The vitality of the AOH, however, attracted the
attention of the contending nationalist political forces and, when a
new split occurred in the Order over an internal organisational question
at the end of 1904 the factions formed by it quickly became
politicised. The larger of the two, the Board of Erin, of which Joseph
Devlin became President in 1905, became identified with the
Parliamentary Party: the smaller "Scottish Section" gave its support to
Sinn Fein. By 1910 this struggle for the political mastery of
Hibernianism was effectively over, with Devlin and the Board of Erin
the comprehensive victors (Foy, 1976).

As it grew the AOH tended to spread, albeit slowly and into areas
adjoining its heartland. But in July 1904 it was introduced into Dublin
by John Dillon Nugent, an insurance agent who was already a leading
figure in the UIL. For several years Dublin was to remain an isolated
southern outpost of Hibernianism. The number of members in the city
probably did not exceed five hundred in late 1907 but, through its
association with Devlin's rising political influence, the Order was
beginning to take on a significant political role.

The steady but modest Dublin growth of the AOH - 1,000 members in January 1909; 2,000 in September 1911 - was to be transformed by the National Insurance Act. The sub-contracted administrative structure created by this act, in which "approved societies" - usually friendly societies, insurance companies or trade unions - collected contributions and paid out benefits under general state supervision, provided the means by which the AOH achieved national penetration and massive membership growth.

By the Spring of 1913 the insurance section of the Board of Erin had recruited 150,000 members or one in five of Ireland's insured population. In Dublin there were 30,000 insured members in the city and a further 10,000 in the county by this date. This was equal to the number of city and county workers the city's Trades Council claimed to represent. AOH growth formed part of a wider sectarian stratification of the Irish insured population. Competition for members was mainly between Irish Catholic or Protestant societies - of which the AOH was by far the largest - and British insurance companies such as the Prudential while only a few trade unions sought to become directly involved in national insurance administration.

Clearly a question mark has to be placed against the level of commitment such a conscripted membership would have possessed. Figures published by the Order in 1915 distinguish between private (i.e. full) and purely insurance members within Britain and Ireland as a whole: these show that out of every three AOH members one was private and two were insurance only. This ratio may well have been subject to considerable local variation, but the crucial point about the AOH is not how many people joined it because they had to join some insurance society so much as the tendency of the huge extension of the organisation's activities to generate its own momentum of attraction.
Provision of social centres and leisure facilities promised to root commitment to the Order, its "Faith and Fatherland" ideology and its aggressive political loyalties in the areas of new or greatly increased penetration. A first demonstration of the political effects which this penetration could produce came in 1912 with AOH organisation of a widespread southern boycott of Belfast firms in retaliation for the expulsion of Catholic workers from that city's shipyards.

Critics of the expanding AOH frequently accused it of seeking to subordinate the whole of the wider nationalist movement to its control. In this vein it was alleged in January 1910 that twenty-eight out of eighty Dublin Corporation members were in the Order. As early as 1907 Timothy Harrington, who was then directing the reorganisation of the Dublin UIL to counter Sinn Fein, expressed misgivings about the growth of Hibernian influence in the city to John Redmond:

"Their programme so far as I can learn of preferring a Catholic first in everything and a Hibernian to any other Catholic is in direct opposition to our policy of uniting all creeds and classes of Irishmen and though at the present they are all right and giving us good service the day of division and dissension will come. I am giving you my view frankly. You may not see matters in the same light but I have undertaken to be frank with you and I could not omit a view that presses upon me a good deal."

But while many prominent figures in Dublin municipal politics joined the AOH they did not necessarily place the resources of patronage they controlled at the disposal of the Hibernian organisation. A rare glimpse of the channels through which such local government "pork" flowed in Dublin is provided in a letter from John Muldoon MP to John Dillon in September 1911:

"I had an hour with John D. Nugent today. He is thoroughly disaffected at the moment. He says he has 2,000 members in Dublin who would be 1,500 of them Sinn Feiners if he had not got them and he gets no help from anyone except two or three members of the Party to promote their interests but the Party is always ready to avail of their help. Lorcan Sherlock has beaten him because he had the Corporation behind him into whose service he has dumped several of his friends. I reasoned with him as best I could..."
The Hibernian contribution to the Home Rule movement in Dublin had two principal aspects: one rough and the other respectable. On the rough side it gave the movement a new combatative presence in the city's politics of street and meeting hall confrontations. During the 1913-14 lockout Hibernians were to the fore in physically preventing the 'deportation' of Dublin workers' children from the city to the homes of Labour sympathisers in Britain or other parts of Ireland on the grounds that the children's Catholic religion might be interfered with.

Hibernians also frequently organised the stewarding at UIL conventions and public meetings and, here again, accusations of violent treatment of dissenters arose. Against this, however, should be set the fact that prior to the emergence of Hibernianism there had been a consistent pattern of organised disruption or breaking up of the reunited Home Rule Party's Dublin meetings and demonstrations by more extreme nationalists and that, within the Home Rule movement itself, the rough handling of those expressing unpopular minority views long predated the rise of the AOH.

On the respectable side Hibernianism brought about a renewal of active clerical participation in the Dublin Home Rule movement for the first time since 1892. The appearance of Sinn Fein or Labour rivals to Home Rule in Dublin did not attract support from priests. Nomination of candidates by members of the clergy was common - though erratic in its spatial distribution - at Dublin municipal elections but it was invariably exercised on behalf of orthodox nationalists. But the weakness of the Dublin UIL had preempted any restoration of the clergy's original role within the Home Rule movement after the splits of the nineties came to an end: ex officio membership of conventions was, after all, meaningless when conventions were not actually held.

At the same time a qualitatively new current of Catholic militancy,
mobilising clerical and lay participation, was taking shape in the city. Initially 'non-political' in its stance - "The Catholic Unionist is as welcome to become a member of the Catholic Association as anyone else" - this current, and its employment discrimination resentments, was to be largely absorbed into the "faith and fatherland" politics of the AOH. In some northern dioceses Hibernian mobilisation of the laity was counterbalanced by a 'Healyite' withdrawal of active support from the Nationalist Party but in Dublin the growth of the AOH did not result in a lay/clerical division.

Successfully winning archdiocesan recognition of its religious bona fides after the Catholic Association had fallen foul of Archbishop Walsh, the AOH wooed priests back into Dublin Home Rule politics through its campaigns against 'indecency' in postcards and the press. Thus, in spite of the pointed stance of distance from the Party adopted by the Archbishop himself (Miller, 1973, 343), when a convention of the properly prescribed form was finally held in Dublin to nominate the founder of Dublin Hibernianism, J.O. Nugent, for the College Green vacancy in 1915 the clergy of the division turned out in impressive numbers.

§ Conclusion

The Home Rule hegemony constructed in Dublin in the 1880s rested on three institutional pillars - the Catholic Church, city government institutions under the complete control of the Catholic section of the middle class and a local labour movement cohesively Catholic in its culture. Over time one of these pillars began to wobble while the other two continued to provide firm support. A degree of instability was thus created but the structure, which possessed means of buttressing itself against erosion, continued to stand in its place.

In the case of the church there occurred a broadening of the definition of Catholic political interests which enjoyed the support of...
both clergy and lay zealots in its addition of job discrimination and the content of the expanding mass media to the control of education. In the case of its two 'pillar' classes, however, Home Rule's national organisation found itself forced to take sides.

Initially bent on purging the local government elite because of its contamination by flunkeyism, it sought LEA support for this project but only succeeded in precipitating the break up of a non-threatening form of labour organisation. As the social programme of the LEA and the leading personnel of its Trades Council sponsor moved into the ranks of a political competitor, however, the UIL closed ranks with the flunkey-ridden local government elite and identified Home Rule with its class character and administrative record. As the next chapter will show, this class identification was to provide the basis for a continuing current of independent nationalist opposition politics which ran through the party organisations of Sinn Fein and Larkinite Labour.
CHAPTER EIGHT

INDEPENDENT NATIONALIST OPPOSITION

1 Introduction

Home Rule installed a political framework which, despite efforts to foster a moderate centre from above or the disruptions entailed by recurring outbreaks of factional conflict within its ranks, endured for more than thirty years. In this period two efforts were made to organise Irish nationalists on a mass basis which broke with one or other of the Home Rule fundamentals - a pan class unity channelled into parliamentary pressure. Sinn Fein, founded in 1905, advocated a strategy of parliamentary abstentionism together with the organisation of local government institutions into a national alternative to the existing state as the way forward to Irish autonomy. In 1912 the Irish Trade Union Congress declared itself to be a political party which would pursue the representation of Irish working class interests on an independent basis.

Traditionally these two attempts to break with existing nationalist orthodoxy have been seen as representing diametrically opposed social interests with Labour's desire to emancipate Ireland's working class contradicting the thrust of Sinn Fein's policies in the direction of identifying national development with the establishment of a strong Irish industrial capitalism (Henry, 1920; Clarkson, 1925; Strauss, 1951; Greaves, 1961; Mitchell, 1974). When the focus is switched from abstract programmatic statements to social movements actually mobilising some degree of popular support, however, the fixed antagonism of these class characterisations dissolves.

Neither of these organisations succeeded in making good their pretensions to represent a large segment of Irish opinion on national issues. As parties Irish Labour and Sinn Fein succeeded in sustaining a
significant political presence only in a localised context and around local political issues. In parts of Dublin city - specifically in the safe Nationalist territory which Chapter Five labelled Zone B - the two parties established their heartland and here they constituted a single movement of popular opposition to a Home Rule local administration bourgeoisified in a way peculiarly shaped by Dublin's combination of economic attenuation and communal division.

This chapter identifies the core of common characteristics which permits these two organisations, which appear at first sight to differ radically from one another, to be regarded in their common heartland as part of a single entity. It begins by showing how, in the face of the political cleavage defined in Ireland during the 1880s, Sinn Fein and Labour shared a common impotence which shut them out of national politics. It then demonstrates that in the one area where they were able to make even a limited local level impact, these parties were successive rather than competitive and that here their relative success was built around progressive municipal programmes which contents were almost indistinguishable from one another.

The core of personnel continuity that existed between the Sinn Fein and Labour local government cadres is analysed in the next section. This is followed by an examination of the common spatial pattern of their electoral support. Finally the questioned is posed of to what this opposition was opposed. The strong links between Dublin Home Rule and the drink trade is shown to have been of central importance here and participation in the sub-culture of temperance to have marked out a cultural boundary between independence and orthodoxy which imparted an energising moral passion to the critique of actually existing Home Rule.

2 Parties Mainly on Paper: Sinn Fein and Labour Nationally

The theory of Sinn Fein's parliamentary abstentionism inverted the
existing structures of political representation, denying legitimacy to a sovereign parliament while investing it in the subordinate tier of local government. Local authorities under nationalist control were to constitute a new centre of authority which would create around itself a complex of institutions forming in effect a shadow state which would displace the control exercised by the UK over Irish affairs. The General Council of County Councils (GCCC), a voluntary umbrella organisation set up shortly after the new local authorities came into existence in 1889, was designated by Sinn Fein as the nucleus of such a national authority.

The nation, as represented by the GCCC, had already been partitioned by the time Sinn Fein was founded as northern Unionist delegates had withdrawn in protest in October 1904 when the policy which had prevailed up until then of excluding contentious subjects from its discussions was reversed. The disappointment of nationalist opinion with the Irish Council Bill was to bring Sinn Fein into national prominence for the first time in 1907 when a number of MPs seemed to be on the point of embracing the abstentionism it advocated. The price of this prominence was a new awareness of the GCCC among Home Rule organisations which had previously tended to leave this body to its own devices. In the Autumn of 1907 the election of a new set of GCCC officers was orchestrated to bring the body firmly into line with parliamentarian policy and shut out Sinn Fein influence. The chosen instrument of the new strategy was not now one of which the abstentionists had any chance of getting hold.

One disillusioned MP, C.J. Dolan of North Leitrim, did actually take the step of joining Sinn Fein and resigned his seat to fight a by-election under its banner. The holding of this by-election was delayed for eight months after Dolan’s defection while Sinn Fein built up a network of branches in an area in which it was barely known. When the
by-election was held. Dolan won just over a quarter of the vote. Thereafter Sinn Fein’s Leitrim branches speedily collapsed and Dolan went to America.

Having had prominence thrust upon it, Sinn Fein sought to project the image of a major national party. But the stimulus it derived from the Irish Council Bill debacle was a relatively modest and shortlived one. In August 1909 Sinn Fein’s annual report revealed that the party had only 581 fully paid up members in the whole country. This figure is probably an underestimation of real support since between October 1908 and May 1909 more than twice as many individuals (1,338) applied to take up the £1 debentures being issued by the Sinn Fein Printing and Publishing Company to fund the launch of a daily newspaper. Either figure, however, is remarkably low for a party which claimed to represent a quarter of the Irish people.

Saturation point for an Irish nationalist mass movement of the period has been estimated by Garvin (1981) at approximately 1,250 branches: on this criterion Sinn Fein (with 115 in August 1908) had achieved an islandwide penetration of less than 10%. By August 1909 this figure was down to 106 but nearly half of these branches had failed to discharge any of the financial obligations laid down by party rules in the intervening period.

Moreover from the Summer of 1907 the emphasis of Sinn Fein propaganda tended to shift from opposition to parliamentary participation per se to opposition to the alliance of Nationalist MPs with the British Liberal (and Labour) parties. In making this shift Sinn Fein reproduced the old Parnellite Independent policy of the 1890s and, in effect, opened the door to the possibility of a legitimate parliamentary alliance.

In December 1909 it was revealed that negotiations had taken place between Sinn Fein leaders and William O’Brien’s All For Ireland League.
The basis of this projected alliance, for which O'Brien would provide funds, was that MPs elected under its auspices at the forthcoming general election should act under the direction of a "National Council" which would be established in Dublin. These MPs would not be abstentionists but would attend at Westminster only if, and for as long as, they were directed to do so by the proposed National Council.

The majority of the Sinn Fein Executive rejected these proposals when they were placed before it at a special meeting on 20 December 1909. But the secret negotiations, the manner in which the "Sinn Fein" press had prepared the ground for such an arrangement and the manner in which the Sinn Fein Executive reacted to public disclosure of its consideration turned organisational decline into galloping disintegration. By the end of 1910 Sinn Fein was a party in name only.

The Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC) was, like the original GCCC, an islandwide organisation which political involvement threatened to break up. Within the national trade union centre three distinct political tendencies came to co-exist; nationalists who continued to back the Home Rule Party and opposed proposals to form a rival Irish Labour one; northern supporters of the development of labour politics through affiliation to a British Labour Party; and Sinn Feiners who wanted trade unionism reorganised and labour politics launched on strictly Irish national lines (Mitchell, 1974, 21-24).

A Sinn Fein caucus became active in the ITUC in 1905 but it was unable to overturn the modus vivendi which had earlier been established by the other political tendencies. This was founded on a resolution recommending Irish trade unions to affiliate to the Labour Representation Committee in Britain as a means of securing independent labour representation in Ireland. Thus the Irish congress was not
committed to taking any political initiative of its own and only Belfast Trades Council actually acted upon the resolution it repeatedly approved.

Liberal welfare reform and the third Home Rule Bill created conditions in which the campaign for an Irish Labour Party finally achieved success in 1912. With the aim of securing labour representation in the new Home Rule parliament, the functions of a party executive were added onto the existing responsibilities of the Parliamentary Committee of the ITUC and the national trade union centre was declared to be also a political movement. No attempt to mobilise the support of those the congress-party claimed to represent followed, thus again avoiding the brute fact of the divided political loyalties of Irish workers. Instead, under the new regime as under the old, the initiative on political organisation was left to Trades Councils at local level. Thus it was Dublin Trades Council, and not the new national party, which nominated the first Labour candidate to fight a parliamentary seat outside Belfast in 1915.

3 Succession not Competition: Sinn Fein and Dublin Labour

Despite their impotence at the national level, Sinn Fein and Trades Council labourism enjoyed a level of support which, as Chapter Five noted, placed question marks against the safety of some of the Home Rule seats in Dublin. When Labour fought College Green in 1915 their candidate polled almost 43% of the vote in an election where corrupt practices were alleged to have been used against him. Sinn Fein and Labour did not, however, compete against one another but formed part of a succession of opposition movements which the dominant supporters of Home Rule had to face in city politics and against whom they resorted to the arts (legal and illegal) of register manipulation.

The starting point of this opposition was 1899 when the municipal franchise was extended and both the LEA and the Irish Socialist
Republican party (ISRP) put up candidates. As the previous chapter showed, the pressure group activity of DTC on the single issue of the franchise could not be transformed into a durable independent Local Labour party and the LEA was repudiated as it became absorbed into the UIL. But even before its "non-political and non-sectarian" posture was ended by such colonisation, the LEA had failed either to establish a structure of independent organisation or to maintain internal discipline.

Chosen by an assembly of delegates from affiliated trade unions, six of the ten LEA candidates in 1899 appeared on the tickets being promoted by the rival Independent and Freeman newspapers: at least four of the ten - all of whom were elected - participated in ward level 'slates' with non-Labour candidates. When the local pacts of individuals were later extended to central LEA endorsement of 'sympathetic' Nationalists independence was utterly compromised amid acrimonious personal feuding. Thus before, its involvement with the UIL began, disenchantment with the LEA had taken root as allegations of self-seeking and even outright corruption were levelled against some of its members.

Having repudiated its political creature, the Trades Council began to give its own endorsement to individual candidates with good trade union credentials. One of the First beneficiaries in 1901 was a former LEA councillor facing opposition as a flunkey because of his vote for Queen Victoria's loyal address, but this development also opened the way to the endorsement of socialist candidates.

In seven contests between 1901 and 1903 ISRP candidates took, on average, 20% of the vote in the wards they contested but won no seats. The tiny party was being pulled in two different directions at this time. On the one hand, some of its members were achieving prominence within the local trade union movement. On the other, it was
increasingly preoccupied with the ideological disputes of the international socialist movement - within which it took an extreme De Leonite position - and acquired thereby an increasingly sectlike character. After 1903 a protracted round of splits and expulsions was to take it out of Dublin electoral politics completely (O’Brien, 1969, 30-41: F. Cronin, 1978).

Originally a single issue pressure group formed to oppose manifestations of loyalty to King Edward VII during his 1903 visit, the National Council, unlike the LER, did successfully transform itself into a political party by adding social reform to its uncompromising nationalism. In January 1904 a distinct advanced nationalist group with five members was formed on the Corporation, initially styling itself the Nationalist and Reform Party. Through various changes in nomenclature, Sinn Fein went on to build up by 1908 a network of twelve city branches, with four more in the county, holding by that date twelve of the eighty seats on the Corporation. As party disintegration proceeded what remained of this network was fused into a single central branch in October 1910 and after 1911 Sinn Fein withdrew from municipal election contests apart from a small number of its sitting councillors who continued to defend their seats.

Almost immediately independent labour representation was revived when the Trades Council voted in favour of creating a Dublin Labour Party. Consisting of delegates from DTC and from affiliated trade unions it was in structure virtually identical to the old LER. Its organisational culture, however, was very different. The new Labour Party characterised the reasons for the failure of its LER predecessor as being the careerism and opportunism of its Corporation members and sought to ensure the strict accountability and discipline of the new generation of Labour politicians. The means it adopted to achieve these ends was increased centralised control. The concept of delegation was
extended to cover councillors, of whom five were elected in January 1912. These received detailed voting instructions in advance of Corporation meetings from the party's executive or general delegate assemblies.

For the Dublin municipal election campaigns which represented the most significant political activities of Sinn Fein and Trades Council labourism, a series of highly similar programmes were produced. The progressive policy proposals common to them included municipalisation of public utilities; the clearing of slums, enforcement of proper public health inspection and building of new working class housing; observance of trade union rules in municipal employment; the municipal provision of educational and recreational facilities and the holding of evening sittings by public bodies.

While programmes of 'gas and water socialism' are hardly surprising in the case of Labour or socialist organisations they hardly square with the usual image of Sinn Fein as the epitome of bourgeois economic nationalism. But this programme and the type of social support it attracted was nonetheless to be an important factor in the way disintegration overtook Sinn Fein and it was succeeded by a renewed local labourism.

The abstentionist Sinn Fein project represented an attempt to break out of what had, amid mass defection to Home Rule and internal division even more chronic than that suffered by its parliamentarian enemy, become the shrunken ghetto of physical force nationalism. Within this ghetto the 1900s saw transatlantic unity restored and the leadership of the IRB in Ireland revitalised. Backing Sinn Fein as a means of extending its influence in a situation which offered no realistic prospects of military action, an IRB leadership group drawn mainly from the north of Ireland found itself thwarted in its efforts to get the party to adopt an unambiguously separatist stance (Davis, 1974, 17-36).
Its resulting frustrations became cast in a Dublin versus the rest of the movement mould and eventually produced a withdrawal from Sinn Fein rationalised in terms of a clash between the preoccupation of those controlling the party with "winning a few seats on Dublin Corporation" (which was seen as having prepared the ground for the proposed deal with William O'Brien in his Cork fiefdom) and the separatists' desire to organise the country as a whole. But, ironically, although the separatists professed an overriding concern with building up Sinn Fein's organisation, they began their 1910 withdrawal to conduct a semi-mystical propaganda of arms in a situation where their own failure to recruit into the party a counterbalancing membership left the weight of Dublin - with 37% of the fully paid up membership in 1909 - disproportionately large.

The North Leitrim experience suggests why "organisation" which was not allied to a concrete social programme was a chimera. Eschewing agrarian demands of any sort, Sinn Fein had little to offer a rural area of this type and the local organisation it had poured its resources into creating soon crumbled. Greater Sinn Fein strength in Dublin, by contrast, was rooted not in parochialism, as separatists implied, nor in the type of positive organisational discrimination lavished on Leitrim but in relevance to the social concerns of specific urban groups. Yet, because of this relevance, a different type of dissatisfaction with the way Sinn Fein was being led was to develop in the city, contributing to the party's disintegration and local replacement.

The way in which the press which shared the party's name was controlled lay at the centre of a division between 'official' and 'democratic' elements of Sinn Fein which developed in Dublin. "Sinn Fein" was the property of the Sinn Fein Printing and Publishing Company formed in April 1906. Of an authorised share capital of £1,000, one
hundred and sixty seven £1 shares were issued. After the initial allocation of shares a policy was adopted of refusing to issue ordinary shares to non-members of the company's board which consisted of the paper's editor, Arthur Griffith, and four close personal and political associates.

With shareholding, and voting rights, limited in this way, most of the company's capital was raised in the form of debentures. The launch of a Sinn Fein Daily, which was published for almost five months, from August 1909 until January 1910, was funded entirely through the sale of debentures. The central position Griffith occupied within the movement was thus inscribed in the financial structure of this publishing company and rested on the absence of any mechanism through which the Sinn Fein party's organisation could exercise control over 'its' newspaper.

Divergence between the views of paper and Dublin party first appeared in public during the carters' strike which James Larkin led in Dublin at the end of 1908. "Sinn Fein" adopted a strongly hostile attitude towards this trade union struggle while a number of the party's councillors who were also prominent trade unionists gave strong support to the strikers. "Sinn Fein", however, did enjoy a complete press monopoly over the expression of movement opinion.

A second weekly identified with Sinn Fein, the Irish Nation, had its origins in the Navan-based Irish Peasant. This paper had become a cause celebre when its proprietors ceased publication in December 1906 under pressure from Cardinal Logue who had been incensed by its criticisms of clerical management of the education system. Moved from Navan to Dublin, a revived Peasant, still under the editorship of W.P. Ryan, was produced from January 1907 by the Irish Ireland Printing and Publishing Works. This was a cooperative venture registered under the Friendly Societies Act. A capital of £1,800 was subscribed in the first
three years of its existence: in July 1910 it had one hundred and
fifty members on its books.

From the time of its revival in Dublin the Peasant (later the Irish
Nation and Peasant) espoused Sinn Fein principles. Initially the two
press advocates of the Sinn Fein movement co-existed cordially but from
the beginning of 1909 Ryan and other contributors to the paper he
edited began to draw a distinction between the Sinn Fein philosophy and
its "official" expression by a leadership with an increasingly
reactionary stance:

"The official political Sinn Fein - which is not shared
however by various workers and branches - appears to grow
more narrow and less democratic. Anything that has not the
breath of true democracy is not calculated to inspire
enthusiasm nowadays. Official Sinn Fein needs humanising,
broadening and strengthening."

Links were created between critics of "official" Sinn Fein and a
Dublin socialism which had been reactivated and made more outward-
looking by the revival of general union organisation manifested in the
carters' strike and in the subsequent formation of the ITGWU. On OTC
socialists and trade unionists who had been drawn to Sinn Fein by its
municipal reform policies as well as the unofficial project of creating
a purely Irish trade unionism and Labour politics were moving closer
together to form a dominant "progressive bloc" (Cody, 1982). In June
1908 a new Socialist Party of Ireland (SPI) was formed which permitted
dual membership of other political organisations. It attracted a number
of 'left' Sinn Feiners into its ranks and its activities received
extensive and sympathetic coverage from the Irish Nation until
financial difficulties forced that paper's closure in December 1910.

Thereafter, prompted by the strike wave which began in 1911, the
press war of words, which has been used to underpin the image of Sinn
Fein and Labour as representatives of diametrically opposed class
interests, got under way in earnest between Griffith's "Sinn Fein" and
James Larkin's new Irish Worker weekly. But "Sinn Fein" was not simply,
as before, not responsible to its party: there was no longer any functioning political movement to which it could have corresponded. At the same time Larkin, whose journalism at its worst degenerated into tirades of personal abuse, was careful to employ in his salvoes the distinction between a reactionary leadership and a democratic rank-and-file developed earlier by the left Sinn Feiners. Thus he contrasted "the remnant...known as the Official Sinn Fein Party, of which Griffith is the prophet" with "the common sense section, that is the working class portion of the Sinn Fein party [who] will...be the backbone of the only party to which the Irish worker should belong - i.e. an Irish Labour Party."

4 Continuity of Personnel: The Independents in Local Government

The organisational succession and even interpenetration described in the previous section is reflected by the fact that five of the thirteen Dublin Labour Party councillors elected to the Corporation between 1912 and 1915, when municipal elections were suspended for the duration of the war, had previously been Sinn Fein councillors or candidates. The continuity embodied by figures such as P.T. Daly, Peter Macken, Richard O'Carroll and William Partridge indicates Sinn Fein's success in establishing itself as "a type of Labour Party" (Cody, 1982, 41) 308 but the party's local government cadre as a whole tapped a much wider occupational spectrum than did trade union-base labourism. Table 8.1 groups the occupations of all the orthodox nationalist councillors and Poor Law Guardians (PLGs) elected between 1899 and 1915 as well as those of all Sinn Fein and Labour Corporation and Poor Law candidates. In the latter case LEA candidates from 1899-1900 have been combined with DLP ones from 1911-14:
Table 8.1 Occupational Backgrounds of Orthodox Nationalists and Sinn Feiners in Dublin Municipal Politics, 1888-1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Orth. Nat Cllr.s/PLGs</th>
<th>SF Corp/PLG candidates</th>
<th>Labour Corp/PLG candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% N=</td>
<td>% N=</td>
<td>% N=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Drink Business Prop.</td>
<td>55.7 166</td>
<td>40.0 20</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink Trades Prop.</td>
<td>27.2 81</td>
<td>4.0 2</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>7.4 22</td>
<td>10.0 5</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Employee</td>
<td>5.4 16</td>
<td>24.0 12</td>
<td>29.0 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>4.4 13</td>
<td>22.0 11</td>
<td>71.0 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 298</td>
<td>100 50</td>
<td>100 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation/ Missing Info.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Bus. = business; props. = proprietors.

This table shows that Sinn Fein and Labour not only shared a common core of key activists but that there were also striking differences in social background which marked off Sinn Feiners as a group from the representatives of the dominant Home Rule nationalism. The dominance of business proprietors is much less in the case of Sinn Fein although they remain the largest single occupational group.

Totalling the rateable valuations of all the business and residential properties for which the business proprietors among orthodox nationalist councillors/PLGs and Sinn Fein candidates are listed in Thoms Directories the orthodox nationalist businessman emerges as, on average, bigger (mean: £54.4) than his Sinn Fein counterpart (mean: £29.5). Among orthodox nationalists a third of all business proprietors were involved in the drink trade but hardly any Sinn Feiners were. White collar employees and manual workers made up only ten per cent of orthodox nationalist councillors and PLGs compared with nearly half the Sinn Fein candidates. Trade union officials or organisers account for almost every Labour 'white collar'.

A further factor differentiating orthodox nationalists and Sinn Feiners was the participation of women. Apart from its Young Ireland Branch ginger group, composed mainly of university graduates, women
were excluded from membership of the ÚIL. The IRB remained as exclusive as its parliamentarian enemy but Sinn Fein was open to both sexes. The rapid growth of the Gaelic League from the turn of the century created the first nationally significant integrated organisation and in this regard Sinn Fein, many of whose members were active Gaelic Leaguers, followed in its wake. However many Gaelic League women activists, in common with a significant group of their male colleagues, espoused a purely cultural nationalism which verge on being anti-political while some with political leanings encountered norms of social respectability as a barrier to participation.

Jenny Wyse Power became Vice President of Sinn Fein in 1911 and there were usually either two or three female members of its thirty-strong Executive but the proportion of women among Sinn Fein’s rank-and-file membership is unknown. The pattern of women’s participation in the party’s local electoral activity was constrained by legal restrictions on their ability to hold office. In addition to enfranchising some categories of women the 1898 Act made them eligible to sit on the lower-tier Rural District or Urban District councils (such as, in the Dublin area, Kingstown, Rathmines or Pembroke) but not on the upper-tier County or County Borough councils, such as Dublin Corporation.

By the time this restriction was removed by amending legislation in 1911 Sinn Fein’s involvement in electoral politics had effectively come to an end. Because of the timespan of its electoral activity none of the party’s Dublin Corporation representatives were women: because of the spatial concentration of that activity it had no seats on the District Councils in Dublin county.

Women were, however, prominent in the Poor Law branch of Sinn Fein’s electoral activity. Women had been eligible to serve as PLGs since 1896 and a conventional wisdom, which crossed party lines and
divisions on the question of women's parliamentary suffrage (Harrison, 1978, 133), existed in the period as to the desirability of increasing the involvement of 'Lady Guardians' in the administration of the health and social service functions discharged by the Poor Law Unions.

Subscribing to this view "Sinn Fein", whose accusation that Dublin women voters were particularly susceptible to corruption we noted earlier, advised its readers before the June 1911 triennial PLG elections that women candidates everywhere should be voted for: "whatever politics they profess the women Guardians have always shown themselves genuinely interested in discharging their duties honestly". Just over 10% of all the PLGs elected between 1899 and 1915 from the city's twenty wards to the Boards of the two Unions of which they formed part were women. A quarter of these women PLGs were Sinn Feiners although members of that party accounted for only 5% of all the Guardians elected from this area during this period. Sinn Fein's own PLGs were evenly divided between men and women.

A purely trade union delegate base, which did not permit the affiliation of socialist, cooperative or women's organisations and made no provision for individual membership, left little room for women's participation in Dublin Labour politics - in spite of a commitment to full adult suffrage. Although the legal barrier to women's election to the Corporation had been removed in 1911 the only woman run as a DLP candidate was James Larkin's sister, Delia, organiser of the Irish Women Workers Union, at the Poor Law elections of June 1914.

As reorganised in 1909 Dublin socialism had recruited some women active in the suffrage movement but the structure adopted for local Labourism was subsequently to consign it to a devitalised and marginal existence in which its leading figures were lost to other activisms or to emigration. This structure was to be reproduced at national level when the ITUC turned itself into a Labour Party in 1912. At least half
the members of the first (1914) executive to function under a
copyright revised to take account of this dual role were, or had
been, members of a socialist party in Ireland but they appear to have
regarded any formal association between Labour and such parties in
Irish conditions as a liability to be avoided.

The growing level of trade union membership in the working class
did, however, ensure that participation was extended in at least one
direction by a purely trade union local party. ITGWU involvement
created a fairly even balance within the DLP between craft and general
unions and ensured that in recruiting local government representatives
it would reach lower down into the male working class than either the
LEA or Sinn Fein had done.

As noted earlier in the process of defining Dublin’s two electoral
zones, the independent nationalist opposition was restricted in the
area of Dublin in which it operated. It was a phenomenon of the city
but not the suburbs and, within the city, it was capable of winning
seats in straight fight with orthodox nationalists but only rarely
initiated three-cornered contests in which Unionists were seriously in
contention. Broadly speaking this meant that Sinn Fein and Labour
fought the predominantly working class wards of the city and tended to
be inactive in those of a central business district or middle class
residential character. The resulting absence of three-cornered contests
suggests, especially in the case of Sinn Fein which actually had ward
branches in parts of Zone A, that where there was a Unionist presence
that required to be taken account of, communal solidarity operated to
keep nationalism monolithic at election times.

In one instance, however, something approaching an alliance between
Unionism and Sinn Fein took place. In 1908 Walter Cole was heavily
defeated in seeking reelection to the Aldermanship of the Zone B Inns
Quay ward, where his fruit merchant’s business was located, as a result
of the stand he had taken in the Corporation opposing a motion condemning the French government’s policy of separating church and state. Crossing the zone boundary to fight a by-election in the Drumcondra ward in which he resided as a "Municipal Reform" candidate, Cole received the support of a section of the local Unionists, who were not running a candidate, because of the role imputed to the Catholic Church in bringing about his defeat in Inns Quay. Cole was again defeated and the most politically significant aspect of the episode was the way in which the efforts of Sinn Fein’s enemies to capitalise on the stand taken by Cole - which was a personal and not a party one - helped bring about the AOH capture for Home Rule of the militancy previously expressed through the Catholic Association.

Within Zone B Sinn Fein captured almost the entire representation of two wards when it first began to fight municipal elections but as orthodox nationalism began to respond to the independent threat by manipulating the electoral system further takeovers of this sort were preempted. In one case the existence of a strong occupational community and in the other prior organisation for a different political purpose provided Sinn Fein with a means of establish its dominant position.

The new party’s commitment to the promotion of Irish industry dovetailed in New Kilmainham with the railway engineering craftsmen’s concern that rolling stock should be manufactured by the Irish railway companies and not imported. Attempts by national temperance pressure groups to build up a "Temperance Party" on the Corporation fell apart when the flunkeyism issue set the cause’s supporters at one another’s throats. But in Mansion House where the total abstinence York Street Workmen’s Club was situated, local organisational machinery they had created were inherited by Sinn Fein.

5 The Demon Drink

Temperance, which in this context equated with a belief that the
influence of publicans (who in this period almost always doubled as grocers) needed to be cut down to a much smaller size with personal commitment to abstinence as an optional - though commonly adopted - extra, was to become a key issue around which a differentiation of orthodox and independent political sub-cultures developed within the Dublin nationalist community.

Sinn Fein candidates frequently styled themselves "Irish Ireland and Temperance" in their literature and the party's municipal programme specifically called for an end to the "undue representation" of the drink trade "to increase the opportunities of other members of the Community for taking part in the Public Life of Dublin". In addition to strictly political activity, its (sexually mixed) branches often provided recreational activities of a Gaelic revivalist nature in the atmosphere of earnest sobriety which was also characteristic of the Gaelic League. A similar theme was to run through Dublin Labour's "Larkinisation".

Larkin himself was a strong advocate of total abstinence and publicly called for closure of the bar in the Capel Street Trades Hall. While OTC had actively opposed campaigns to extend Sunday closing of pubs to Dublin in the 1880s and 1890s, temperance was a key value of a movement to create (or, at least, imagine the creation) around the social centres the ITGWU set up in Fairview and Inchicore the type of self-contained and self-sufficient proletarian culture whose development was a feature of the development of the socialist movement in most European countries (Holton, 1976, 187-188; O'Brien, 1969, 261-262). In the absence of such a socialist milieu the type of white collar employee or skilled manual worker whose British (or even Belfast) equivalent might have gravitated towards Labour Colleges, cooperative societies or the Independent Labour Party was often recruited into the Gaelic revival organisations which provided a not
dissimilar mix of social activities but in a distinctly different ideological context.

In the late nineteenth century a high level of drink trade involvement in UK politics mobilised resistance to the programme of radical restriction shading into outright prohibition which a statewide temperance movement sought to impose on what it saw as the moral and social evil of alcohol consumption through licensing reform. In Britain, as Chapter Two noted, the retailing of drink was being vertically integrated with its manufacture: there 'the trade' constituted a unitary entity closely integrated with the Unionist party while the temperance cause was close to the heart Liberalism (Blewett, 1972, 333; Harrison, 1971, 271-296). This left any comprehensive measure of licensing reform to await the removal of the House of Lords veto.

In Ireland the situation was significantly different and division on the drink question actually crossed national party lines. The Nationalist Party resolved this problem by allowing champions of 'trade' interests and temperance supporters to go their own ways on the piecemeal Irish licensing reforms that were usually proposed in private bills. For the Unionist Party the issue proved more difficult to manage: Dissenting Protestants tended, like their British Nonconformist brethren, to be whole-hogging temperance enthusiasts and alliance with the British party of beer was a major irritant to many of them which helped to promote party splits while Home Rule was off the boil.

A second Irish difference lay in the structure of the drink industry. As Chapter Two also showed, manufacturing and retailing were independent of one another and, while united in repelling temperance movement attacks on specific trade interests, the religious composition and political allegiance of the two branches diverged. The manufacturers were mainly Protestant and Unionist but retailing came to
be an overwhelmingly Catholic and Nationalist preserve—one undoubtedly capable of accumulating wealth but not of guaranteeing enjoyment of the social status that usually accompanies its possession (Hepburn, 1983, 41).

Thus, while the unitary British trade appeared to its critics as a single gigantic engine of degradation, there was in Ireland a notable contrast in the volume of criticism directed at the two distinct branches of 'the trade' in Ireland. Because drink manufacturing was almost the only large-scale southern Irish industry, an ambivalent attitude prevailed towards it even among those generally hostile to drink. Temperance orators sought to counteract this by pointing to the relatively small numbers employed in the industry's capital intensive operations, but there was nonetheless a definite displacement effect whereby the brunt of hostility towards drink was borne by the owners of the businesses which retailed it.

In Dublin, where big business tended to be Protestant while an apparently well regulated and increasingly prosperous public house trade formed a sizeable part of the Catholic middle class, the progressive accumulation of Catholic power in local government inevitably meant the creation of a political elite composed of small businessmen the largest single section of whom, as Table 8.1 showed, were holders of drink licences. Moreover the nature of the environment in which he carried on his business had a tendency to make the Dublin publican politically hyperactive.

The publican's business might be prosperous but, even if prohibition remained a speck on the horizon, new legislation (Sunday closing, a ban on the mixing of grocery and drink trading) or court decisions (the overturning of the criteria for granting the transfer of a license laid down by Clitheroe's case) could at a stroke lessen his revenue or undermine the value of his property. Collective
accumulation of political influence represented a form of insurance against such a calamity. At local level the trade existed in a state of permanent mobilisation as the annual Licensing Sessions brought its association face to face with the organised pressure of a "Temperance Party". Participation in this ongoing interplay of forces undoubtedly developed expertise which could be transferred to "looking after" the electoral register. Indeed the Temperance Party itself was to try, unsuccessfully, to make this extension.

The publican, however, has no need to move into electoral politics because, through the time-honoured practice of "treating", he had traditionally played an active role in the process. By the end of the nineteenth century, legislation had been passed repudiating this tradition and defining many of the practices which had formed of it as corruption. But where enforcement of this legislation was not effective, as we have suggested was the case in Dublin's zone of intra-nationalist competition, old-style treating might continue to flourish or even be resurrected to meet the needs of new conditions - such as Dublin's extended municipal franchise.

Hence the compound of slum clientelism and corruption of which the independent nationalists regularly complained following Dublin elections, the United Irishman in 1902 depicting publicans as "stealing control of the city's finances" after "drugging a section of the electorate". As he accumulated political influence hostility to the Dublin publican had initially expressed disdain: the presence in public life of men who "keep a place where anyone who has a penny or two-pence can get a glass of whiskey" portended to Tory critics the degradation of Dublin Corporation to the depths associated with Tammany Hall.

But as he came under fire from his left the publican was ideologically transformed from a man too close to the people to one who used his closeness to batten off the poverty and insecurity of the
Dublin poor - an urban gombeenman. The differentiation of local political sub-cultures around attitudes to drink thus gave rise to a demonology which imparted an energising force to the dry bones of municipal reform and supplied movements of opposition lacking in wider political influence with a moral pariah against whom to carry on a crusade.
1. Introduction

Between the second and third Home Rule Bills a sphere of 'non-political and non-sectarian' movements of national revival was created in Ireland. Historians have imposed on the diverse movements which inhabited this sphere a teleological unity and a retrospective politicisation. All such movements tend to be viewed, in spite of their protestations, as part of a maturing movement of opposition to Home Rule orthodoxy which embodied a qualitatively new type of nationalist consciousness.

Thus Lyons (1968) views the IRB, Sinn Fein, the Gaelic League and "the whole movement towards self-reliance in culture, economics and politics which was coming to be known as Irish Ireland" as containing the "seeds of a revivified nationalism". Despite their differences all had in common that "they were independent of and largely ignored by the representatives of 'official', i.e. constitutional nationalism". Dangerfield (1976) depicts the Parliamentary Party resisting or ignoring the efforts of "a new world struggling to be born" through the same spectrum of 'extra-parliamentary movements' which represented "change, hope and creation". Miller (1973), for whom a conflict of generations within the one-party nation of Catholic Ireland is crucial, sees "the political energies of the younger generation" assuming a variety of forms in the late 1900s "not all of which were labelled 'Sinn Fein' but nearly all of which were intended to distinguish them from the Irish Party". For Larkin (1976) the various groups making up the heterogenous Irish Ireland movement were actually a newly emerged opposition forced, again within a one-party Catholic nation, to legitimise itself in non-political terms:
"Their cultural nationalism, though abstractly sincere, served as a very useful cover in securing for them that ideological toleration so necessary for their political survival." (Larkin, 1976, 1268)

Pushed to its logical extreme the teleological politicisation of everything outside the structure of the Home Rule party completely empties a term like cultural nationalism of meaning. And, paradoxically, while teleological accounts appear to stress the importance of 'Irish Ireland', their dominance has meant that the components aggregated into this highly elastic overarching entity have received little attention in their own right. Waters' (1977) observation, that while it is generally agreed that the Gaelic League had a powerful impact on Irish history no systematic attempt has been made to describe its progress as an organisation or to discover what kinds of people were inclined to play an active role in its affairs, is equally applicable to other movements of the period organised on a 'non-political and non-sectarian' basis.

By examining its functioning in the three principal areas of operation - the cooperative, language revival and industrial revival movements - this chapter seeks to reconstruct the specificity of the context within which 'non-political and non-sectarian' movements were organised and to identify the nature of their relationships with the state and with nationalist political parties. These movements, it will argue, were in the state rather than against it: each assembled a coalition of social forces to represent 'national' - rather than party - interests within a particular strategic niche of public policy.

2. Cooperation

Between 1889 and 1914 over a thousand producer cooperative societies with a farmer membership of over 100,000 were set up in Ireland. in 1894 a national federation of agricultural cooperatives, the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS), was founded. Subsidisation of the IAOS by the state began shortly after Horace...
Plunkett, its founding father and first president, became Vice President of the OQTI. For Plunkett the emerging rural settlement base on peasant proprietorship could only succeed if it were accompanied by the modernisation of farming methods. Two developments were essential to ensure the 'well-being of the peasant proprietary': the spread of agricultural cooperation through voluntary organisations and the introduction of a system of state aid to supplement voluntary effort (Plunkett, 1904, 44-45). From 1900 this state aid took the form of payment by the DATI for the services of IAOS officers providing instruction in agricultural subjects and organising cooperative societies.

Following Plunkett's resignation, however, the Board of Agriculture decided to withdraw subsidies from the IAOS on the grounds of its association with "hostility to a political party and to certain trading interests". Departmental aid to agricultural cooperation "of a non-controversial character" was henceforth to be given directly. Agricultural cooperation became one of the objects eligible for state aid from the newly-created Development Fund in 1911 but access was at first blocked to the IAOS by the insistence of the DATI that it should administer all such grants in Ireland.

When the Development Commissioners rejected this position and proposed to make a grant to the IAOS subject to the addition of nominees from DATI, Council of Agriculture and CBO to the IAOS governing body the DATI refused to make nominations. The Development Commissioners then directly approached a group of 'leading representatives' of the county councils and the Council of Agriculture to act as its nominees but failed to secure recruits. Finally the Commissioners nominated some of their own number and a member of their staff to the IAOS executive.

The party to which the IAOS was adjudged to be hostile in 1908,
whose adherents sought OQTI control over Development Fund grants and refused nomination by Development Commissioners onto the IAOS executive was that of Home Rule nationalism. From the outset many of its leaders had regarded the promotion of agricultural cooperation by Plunkett as a part of "killing Home Rule by kindness". The Dublin independents, by contrast, exhibited sympathy with the IAOS and its cooperative project.

Agrarian agitation found no place in Sinn Fein's conception of nationalist politics. Its programme ignored the land tenure question and the only specific reference to agriculture in "The Sinn Fein Policy" consists of a call for the reversal of the shift in land use from tillage to cattle grazing. Beyond this it simply stressed the interdependence of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy: increased manufacturing activity would create a bigger home market for farmers' produce while the extension of labour-intensive tillage would enlarge the home market for industrial products. For this reason there ought to be a union of manufacturers and farmers "classes who, at the present time, through an extraordinary delusion are unfriendly to one another." (National Council, 1907, 10).

Sinn Fein as a party displayed no programmatic commitment to cooperation but among some of its more socially radical adherents such a commitment was evident. The Irish Ireland Printing Works, which published the Irish Nation and Peasant, was run on cooperative lines and cooperative organisation of industry was among the reforms advocated by that paper. In the growing conflict between the OQTI and IAOS "Sinn Fein" supported the IAOS, strongly attacking Plunkett's successor as OQTI Vice President, T.W. Russell, and the attitude of Nationalist MPs. The agricultural cooperation movement was characterised as being "a Sinn Fein movement in as much as it teaches the people self-trust and self-respect."
Even stronger affinity between urban radicalism and rural cooperation was to be expressed in the wake of the 1913-14 lockout by James Connolly. For Connolly the class conflict of the lockout demonstrated the anachronism of the old religion-based political divisions. It had also revealed that intellectuals, including IAOS 'apostles of cooperation', were potential allies of the Labour movement. Developing ideas put forward by George Russell, editor of the IAOS weekly the Irish Homestead, Connolly sketched an alliance to build around solidarity between rural producer and urban consumer cooperatives.

Faced with intensifying international competition, Connolly argued, Irish farmers needed a stronger home market. Increased working class purchasing power was the most effective means of expanding this market, giving farmers - the bulk of whom relied on family, and not wage, labour - a material interest in the advance of trade unionism. This provided a basis for developing common action between rural cooperators and urban consumer counterparts who would be organised under the aegis of the Labour movement. Trade union funds would be invested in cooperative enterprises rather than deposited in capitalist banks while the assets accumulated by cooperation would be a resource upon which trade unionists could draw in their industrial struggles (J. Connolly, 1983, 62-73).

The receipt by the IAOS of Sinn Fein's imprimatur and its designation as a natural ally of the Labour might appear to vindicate the type of teleological aggregation criticised at the beginning of this chapter. However any such vindication disappears when cooperation is examined not as an ideological construct relieving the isolation of urban movements from a predominant rural sector but as a concrete social practice.

Writing of consumer cooperation, Connolly referred to the 'firm
foothold' the movement had taken "in the North and in the extreme South". As a result of the experience of the Dublin lockout he predicted that "a great crop of cooperative enterprises under the auspices of the [Labour] movement may be confidently expected in the very near future" (J. Connolly, 1983, 66). During the lockout two-thirds of the £100,000 contributed to the British TUC's Dublin Food Fund was channeled to the city via the Cooperative Wholesale Society (CWS) (Sweeney, 1980, 105-106). But the close relationship between British cooperation and British trade unionism exemplified by this massive relief operation was absent from Ireland.

In 1914 consumer cooperative societies in Ireland were concentrated on Belfast and the manufacturing towns adjacent to it where they had built up a membership of between fifteen and twenty thousand. Outside the north-east consumer cooperation had established itself only in isolated enclaves and around specific, untypical occupational communities. Railwaymen in railway-created centres (Inchicore, Rosslare Harbour) were active cooperators but it is noteworthy that the Inchicore society, founded in 1859, remained in 1914 exclusive to GS&WR employees although suburbanisation had greatly diluted the company town character of the locality. Cooperative activity elsewhere in Dublin had been stimulated by the immigration of skilled workers following the revival of shipbuilding and repair by the Dublin Dockyard Company. The growth of interlinked societies in Cork and Queenstown followed a similar influx created by the expansion of the naval dockyard at Haulbowline (Cooperative Congress, 1914).

The CWS food ships of the lockout did not stimulate the emergence of indigenous consumer cooperative activity Connolly envisaged. The occupational structure produced by attenuated southern industrialisation militated against such a development while the political division between cooperation's northern Protestant base and a
nationalist-controlled Irish trade union centre diluted any offsetting impact the subsequent rapid growth of trade union membership might have had on this constraint.

In the case of agricultural cooperation recent research has pointed up the prevalence of a narrow conception at the local level in contrast with the 'visionary' approach of the IAOS leadership. Where cooperative and proprietary creameries co-existed "hard-nosed" farmers played the market showing little commitment to cooperative ideals. Cooperative creamery managers were out of sympathy with cross-subsidisation of activities to broaden the cooperative base (O'Grada, 1977, 300-301). The participation of the Catholic clergy became widespread but their support was often conditional and selective. Priests tended to be anxious to avoid or defuse conflict between cooperative and private interests - an attitude which encouraged the spread of purely milk processing rather than multi-purpose societies (L. Kennedy, 1978, 68-72).

The wider significance of such prevailing "narrowness" emerges when it is related to the analysis of the rural economy which the IAOS became associated with in the course of the state subsidiation controversies and whose social imagery, as Chapter Eight argued, the urban independents shared. This argued that farmers were no longer tenants subordinated to landlords but producers exploited by parasitic middlemen. The passing of the landlords had served to strengthen the power of the "gombeenmen" who were seen as exercising control over Home Rule politics at parliamentary and local levels (Birmingham, 1911; Phillips 1914; AE, 1916). Such an analysis pointed in some formulations towards the formation of a Farmers' Party to take political representation out of the hands of the farmers' enemies.

The issue of economic exploitation in farmer/trader relations remains a subject of vigorous debate (Gibbon and Higgins, 1974/75;
Gibbon and Higgins 1976/77; L. Kennedy, 1976/77; Tovey, 1982): the negligible political effects of its growing importance as an element of IAOS ideology are, however, clear. The alliance of farmers and traders constructed during the Land War remained intact as, at the local level, a predominating 'narrow' cooperation pulled the teeth of the IAOS critique of the class nature of orthodox nationalist politics. Despite the growth of cooperative societies affiliated to the IAOS the Home Rule party continued to be perceived in its rural Catholic base not as the tool of a parasitic stratum of middlemen but as the party of the people.

In a well-known analysis Rumpf and Hepburn (1977) have linked concentrations of IRA activity in the 1919-21 period to the pre-existence of developed farmer cooperative networks. Reexamining the issue, however, Garvin (1981) concludes that the link is not to cooperation as a social innovation but to the existence of much older structures of collective action in the rural community. The influence of these older structures can also be detected, prior to the political deluge, in the moulding of cooperation into its 'narrow', consensus-compatible form.

3. The Language Revival

The creation of a popular movement for the preservation and revival of the Irish language dates from the turn of the century. In the years after 1890 the Gaelic League, which originated as a metropolitan circle of academics and scholars, built up a national network of several hundred branches and a cadre of full-time officials and organisers. The League was Ireland's second 'gaelic' movement, following the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), founded in 1884. Its 'non-political and non-sectarian' stance contrasted with the GAA's early association with physical force nationalist politics. Because of this association the GAA had suffered severe disruption in the 1890s. Its subsequent
recovery was to a considerable extent a by-product of the language movement (de Burca, 1980, 88-89) and was accompanied by the muting of its political tone.

Through its branches the growing Gaelic League did much to develop adult education while, at a more academically advanced level, it helped to create a network of Summer Colleges to increase the supply of qualified language teachers. Continuous pressure also began to be exerted at all levels of the state educational system - from the National and Intermediate Boards at its apex, through local clerical managers at its base and out into the expanding field of occupational recruitment based on formal educational qualifications. As a result the number of children being taught Irish in primary schools rose from 1,825 in 1888 to 180,000 in 1911. Catholic school managers in several counties were pledged to appoint only teachers who could speak Irish and some local authorities had made knowledge of Irish a condition of appointment to their staffs.

Such pressure was being exerted by the Gaelic League in a field central to the complex relationships existing between the churches, the political parties and the state. Its emergence coincided with a disturbance of established interests by a shift in state policy. In the early 1900s government proposals for the reform of the National Schools had come to be based on the premises that the absence of effective public opinion on educational matters and the divorce between (government) financial responsibility and (clerical) managerial powers lay at the heart of the system's chronic deficiencies. The remedy, it was held, was to make the new local authorities responsible for the operation of the system, thus allowing central subvention to be supplemented by local rates as in Britain. In order to bring about movement in this direction the policy of withholding financial resources from the existing system was adopted (Miller, 1973, 80-83 and
An active public opinion did in fact emerge in response to financial stringency, but not along the lines envisaged by government educational experts. Rather the Catholic Church authorities, the teachers and the newly emergent language revivalists formed a united front against the 'parsimonious' English Treasury and the 'supine' National Board. But while state policy unwittingly operated to smooth the entry of a new force into a highly sensitive area of operation the new League was not, as Miller (1973) has depicted it, completely integrated into the complex of institutions which defended the Catholic Church's strategic educational interests. Indeed within the League a radical current unwilling to accept the political taboos surrounding the subject of the school management system and favourable to popular, rather than clerical, control had emerged.

Insinuations from the pulpit about the motives of those attending the sexually mixed classes of the local League branch sparked off the famous "Battle of Portarlington" in 1905: but as the dispute progressed the issues widened and school management was brought to the fore. Towards the end of 1906 the proprietors of the weekly Peasant newspaper, edited in Navan by a member of the Gaelic League executive, W.P. Ryan, ceased publication under clerical pressure which had been prompted by critical discussion of the school management question in its columns. Commenting on the state of the League at the end of 1906 one of its vice presidents, Eoin Mac Neill, described the Peasant and Portarlington affairs as:

"the main expression of the ideas of Gaelic Leaguers at the moment. I don't say they express the ideas of the League, but what they don't express is comparatively unheard"

Far from being, as Miller would have it, subject to the direction of the Catholic church authorities the Gaelic League appeared at this point to be on a collision course with them. The social movement aspect
of the League which prompted this development has been examined by Waters (1977) who highlights the key roles played by geographically and socially mobile Gaelic League activists such as Ryan and the Portarlington leaders P.T. Mac Ginlay and S.B. Roche, in challenging rural clerical hegemony. But if the growth of the League was associated with the appearance of cuckoos 'acculturated to more secular society' within the rigid confines of small town Catholicism's social nest a countervailing tendency was also making its presence felt. This took the form of a conservative provincialism with an active base among Leaguers whom social mobility into white collar employment had drawn to Dublin.

A League leadership with a strong Connaught/Ulster orientation faced on this second front a 'Munster chauvinist' opposition whose vanguard consisted of the emigres of the Dublin Keating branch. Through its leading figures this 'Munster chauvinism' became linked to a socially conservative conception of the social role of the language and of the 'Gaelic outlook' as bulwarks against the secularising and irreligious effects of cosmopolitanism in general and the 'indecent' and 'vulgar' products of Britain's burgeoning mass culture in particular. In June 1908 the lexicographer and President of the Keating branch, Fr. P.S. Dinneen, resigned from the League's executive claiming that the leadership had lost the confidence of the Irish public and was "trimming its sails to please a Castle department". With Dinneen went one of the League's Vice Presidents and one of the most popular writers of the language revival, Fr. Peter O'Leary.

O'Leary, like Dinneen, was a fierce critic of the 'rotten' and 'poisonous' English language and its degenerate literature. Although a Vice President until 1908, he had, after disagreements in the 1890s with the editor of the Gaelic Journal (Mac Neill) and the League's Publications Committee, published almost all his writings outside the
machinery of the League. He and his supporters saw this as a boycott of his work and "an tAthair Peadar's" frequently rehearsed grievances made him a symbol of the opposition of provincial and religious gaelic authenticity to the League's liberal 'establishment' (W.P. Ryan, 1912, 92-101: O'Cuiv, 1973).

The emergence in the course of the League's expansion of these two opposite social tendencies was to facilitate its leadership's efforts to defuse the conflict with the Catholic clergy which Portarlington and the Peasant appeared to presage. A reassertion of centrist leadership succeeded after 1906 in corralling left-wing radicals into a "party behind the President" and facing down critics on the right - whom the radicals accused of wishing to oust Douglas Hyde and to reconstruct the League on a sectarian basis (W.P. Ryan, 1912, 130-135). It is from this point that with 'external' entanglements cut away, the educational pressure group role of the League decisively predominated. A pressure group centrism which clearly operated within and not against the managerial status quo allowed the League to win greater concessions within the educational system but it did so at the cost of eroding the movement's non-sectarianism.

The League's preeminent gain in this period was the achievement of its demand for "essential Irish" in the matriculation syllabus of the new National University of Ireland. Two features of this 1909-10 campaign are noteworthy. First, although the critical source of opposition to the demand was the Catholic hierarchy, the contending forces did not polarise along clerical versus anti-clerical lines. Instead the demand created a serious division within clerical ranks with substantial support for the League's position among younger priests and clerical students. This division was most marked within the national seminary, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Second, the League displayed an ability to mount a series of large demonstrations
across the country and it succeeded in enlisting the support of the County Councils and of the National Convention of the UIL. As Hyde later characterised the campaign:

"That fight was won chiefly by two things, the resolution of the National Convention under Mr. John Redmond, and the action of the County Councils in promising scholarships only on condition that Irish was made essential... The National Convention having expressed the feeling of the country in a way that could not be disregarded, and the County Councils having supplied the leverage, the rest of the work was to apply it at the proper points and in the proper manner, a task of much delicacy and difficulty."

This task was accomplished, to Hyde’s satisfaction at least, when the University senate in June 1910 adopted a resolution making Irish a compulsory matriculation subject from 1913 - the intervening period being allowed for secondary schools preparing students for the examination to adjust their programmes.

The Gaelic League has been presented as having lost much of its Protestant membership in the process of its rapid turn of the century growth. But because of the desirable social by-products thought to accompany language revivalism - character development, greater economic initiative, temperance and the moderation of class and sectarian hostilities - a rapidly growing Gaelic League was more rather than less attractive to Plunkettite Unionists who hoped to see the reintegration into the community of the gentry - ‘the natural leaders of the people’ - in the wake of the land settlement. Among upper class Protestants Gaelic League sympathy thus tended to be correlated with IAOS involvement. The advocacy of the League’s cause by the Church of Ireland rector of Westport, Reverend J.O. Hannay, who was elected to the executive in 1905, seems also to have stimulated some sympathetic interest in the expanding movement among his fellow clergy.

These were tender growths, admittedly, apparently nurtured in Dublin by an informal segregation of a large part of the Protestant membership in one of the city’s branches. Early in 1906 the public
identification of Hannay as George A. Birmingham, author of "The Seething Pot" and "Hyacinth", placed him at the centre of a controversy about the way in which Catholic priests and religious orders were portrayed in those novels (French, 1986). Increasingly linked to the "free speech" aspects of the "Battle of Portarlington", Hannay’s case presented a League leadership desperate to avoid any further taint of anti-clericalism with a dilemma when, in September 1906, he was excluded through the action of a Catholic priest, from a committee of branch delegates being formed to organise a Connaught Feis. This dilemma was resolved when Hannay, in deference to Hyde, did not press the executive to give a ruling on the action taken against him, but retired, embittered by the 'cowardice' and 'funk' of the leadership, from Gaelic League activity.

A complex figure whose links to Plunkett and the Independent Orange movement as well as to Sinn Fein and the Portarlington/Peasant current of League radicalism illustrate the fluidity which the ‘non-political and non-sectarian’ mode of organisation could produce, Hannay’s abandonment did not end efforts to increase Protestant involvement in the Gaelic League. But it did place them in the hands of individuals whose activism had resulted in their almost complete removal from the social and political milieu of the Protestant community. When in May 1907 a "Committee for the Propagation of Gaelic League Principles among Protestants" was formed in Dublin three of its leading members - Ernest Blythe, Seamus Deakin and Sean O’Casey - were IRB members.

Blythe had come to Dublin from Antrim in 1905 to work as a boy clerk in the civil service. Although he was sufficiently interested in the language to try and learn it by himself with aid of a primer, he did not initially join the Gaelic League because he felt that, as a Protestant, he would not be socially accepted by its members. After seeing a demonstration organised by the League to mark the departure of
Douglas Hyde on a fund-raising tour of America, Blyth decided to join, applying to the Ard Craobh. In doing so, he concealed the fact that he had lodgings in the Presbyterian Association house in O'Connell Street. Having become a member continuing self-consciousness about his address was one of the factors which prompted him to change his lodgings (De Blaghd, 1957, 75-77 and 87). Similarly an increasing commitment to cultural and political nationalism led Sean O'Casey, an active lay member of St. Barnabas Church in the East Wall district, who sang in the church choir and taught in its Sunday school, to sever his connections with the church (Margulies, 1970, 41-49).

In one area of concern to this committee - the teaching of Irish in National Schools - a return submitted by its organiser to Dublin Coisde Ceanntair of the League after an ‘exhaustive’ inspection of city schools in November and December 1807 illustrates the extent to which different attitudes towards the language revival were prevalent in the Catholic and Protestant communities. 205 National Schools were contacted by the organiser: information was refused or could not obtained from 32 of these. When Infant Schools were disregarded 134 schools remained on which information was available. In almost one-third (44) of these schools Irish was taught: in the remainder it was not. Of the 90 schools in which the language was not taught, 57 were Protestant and 33 Catholic. An attempt was also made to ascertain why the language was not being taught in these schools and the reasons were broken down by the denomination of the school. The results are set out in Table 9.1:
Table 9.1 Reason Given Why Irish Was Not Being Taught

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Protestant Schools</th>
<th>Catholic Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No teacher competent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager hostile or indifferent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers hostile or indifferent</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents hostile or indifferent</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad attendance/Understaffing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowded programme</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons missing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assuming that this assignment of causes is reasonably accurate, the table suggests that the League was faced with two different sets of obstacles in its campaign to extend the teaching of Irish in schools. In Catholic schools such teaching was constrained by lack of resources - in particular by lack of qualified teachers. In Protestant schools teaching of Irish was inhibited chiefly by the absence of parental support and the existence of different educational priorities.

Ironically Protestant participation in the Gaelic League did not at any stage compound its leaders' difficulties over the school management question. The position of the Church of Ireland was as militantly denominational as that of the Catholic Church and this identity of interest between ecclesiastical authorities was frankly admitted from its side. The campaign of the League for the 'reconstruction' of the National Board, launched with the approval of the Catholic bishops, in 1905 did have sectarian implications since it would have ended the practice of having a Board composed of equal numbers of Catholic and Protestant nominees. This demand, however, was a political non-starter. The Unionists wished to replace the National Board through decentralisation to local government: the Liberals proposed either to create an Education Department controlled by a devolved Irish Council or to hand responsibility over to a Home Rule parliament. Neither party would 'reconstruct' and the Catholic hierarchy itself drew back from the agitation upon discovering that it created a space for the
expression of heterodox views on the managerial question.

But although the ascendancy of pressure group centrisim defused the threat of conflict between the League and the Catholic Church, and opened the way to the "essential Irish" victory, its operation within a changed state policy environment was to lead to new divisions within the language movement itself. Unlike the upheavals of the 1905-08 period described above these divisions were to be political rather than social in character, centred on the League's relationship to the state rather than that with the church.

Abandoning a major overhaul of the education system with the loss of the Irish Council Bill in 1907 Liberal administration concentrated on conciliating Irish educational interests. A successful, if essentially partitionist, university settlement was put in place, the financial squeeze on the National School system initiated by the Unionists was discontinued and fees for the teaching of Irish as an extra school subject - whose withdrawal had galvanised the 1905 campaign to reconstruct the National Board - were restored. An accommodative state posture produced concessions to the League's demands but it also broke up the united Catholic educational front of the financial squeeze period, constraining the League leadership to proceed in a more circumspect, consensus-building and less agitational manner. Focussing on this shift, a Sinn Fein opposition faction developed which accused the leadership, like the Parliamentary Party, to whose mainstream support the official voice of the Language revival was increasingly directing its appeals, of showing favouritism to the Liberal government.

"Sinn Fein" had supported the League's radical causes - Portarlington, the Reverend Hannay and the Peasant - in 1905-06 on free speech grounds. The official education policy of the party - to build an 'Irish' system of primary and secondary education around the
Christian Brothers schools - was fully compatible with denominational and clerical orthodoxy, however. In 1908 the conservative Fr. Dinneen's attack on the League leadership received "Sinn Fein" backing: a revived Peasant - in whose columns the Christian Brothers scheme met with scepticism - took a different view of Dinneen's motives and supported Hyde (W.P. Ryan, 1912, 130-135). Subsequently "Sinn Fein", whose critical coverage of language movement issues increased as its own party's disintegration proceeded, sought to push the League into confrontation with the state over the university legislation and the administration of the National Insurance Act.

This latter issue brought the question of Sinn Fein interference in the internal affairs of the League to a head in 1913 when Hyde threatened to resign his presidency, alleging that "a determined attempt has been made, and is being made, to discredit the Gaelic League, and its Coisde Gnotha and its President." Shortly afterwards he published a detailed rebuttal of criticism of the League's policy which had appeared in "Sinn Fein" and accused Arthur Griffith of wishing to see the League subordinated to his party. At the League's Ard Fheis in September 1913 Hyde's leadership was strongly endorsed by the delegates. But because the composition of the executive remained much as it had been the base of factional opposition remained intact.

Apart from the element of alleged party political takeover the new division of the language movement was exacerbated by evidence, principally from the 1911 census, that, despite the League's efforts, the proportion of Irish speakers was continuing to decline. This deterioration fuelled calls to extend the compulsory use of Irish within the educational system. But while compulsion could be successfully pursued in an institution Catholic in all but name like the National University it foundered immediately at lower levels of the system on the rock of the denominational division institutionalised in
the National and Intermediate Boards.

The leadership of the Gaelic League was thus left waiting for Home Rule when it hoped that, as in the case of "essential Irish", the links it had cultivated with the nationalist mainstream would serve "to get our programme placed upon the statute books of our future educational authorities." Sinn Fein, on the other hand, maintained that this policy was misconceived. Behind the existing boards it espied a hidden enemy: "forces now friendly or acquiescent" (i.e. the Parliamentary Party) would not be so under Home Rule.

4. Industrial Revival

A variety of industrial revival movements which aimed at the exclusion of imports and the stimulation of Irish manufacturing through patriotic consumer behaviour can be traced at least as far back as the 1840s. Such movements were temporarily in abeyance in the 1890s, thanks to political splits, when the CBO and OATI came into existence with powers to extend state aid to industry. In the case of the OATI these powers were subject to a sectoral limitation, being confined to a category of "rural industries": in the case of the CBO a spatial limitation to the designated congested districts applied. The use made of these powers can be illustrated by the three principal instances of intervention.

(A) Portadown Here a fruit and vegetable processing factory was established on an experimental basis. Although this appeared to fall well within the powers of the new department, pressure from competing business interests in Britain succeeded in making the OATI sever its connection with the enterprise.

(B) Kilkenny A movement to revive the once substantial local woolen industry was started by aristocratic supporters of the Gaelic League backed by Protestant and Catholic clergy. £18,000 was subscribed as capital for a woolen mill which opened in 1906. This was not a rural
industry within the terms of the Act but the promoters requested that
during an initial period of three to five years the OATI should provide
the salaries of the mill's manager, foremen and skilled workers, as
their function would be that of technical instructors, and also pay
allowances to its inexperienced workers. Such a level of support (for a
mill with an initial workforce of 58) was essential, it was argued, if
a newly-created Irish enterprise was to be able to compete on equal
terms with Yorkshire. OATI rejected this proposal although some
industrial scholarships were provided to allow prospective Kilkenny
employees to learn power loom weaving at two existing Irish mills.

(C) Foxford Providence Woolen Mill was established in the 1890s by
the Sisters of Charity. By 1906 it employed 120 workers. Advances from
the CDB amounted to 45% of the £35,000 capital of the mill and outright
grants to 25%. The provision of such aid attracted criticism as
government subsidisation of 'ecclesiasticism', the phenomenon of the
growth of the membership and, it was argued, wealth and social
influence of religious orders in the midst of a dwindling and
economically inert laity. Providence Mill was virtually the only
factory-scale enterprise established with CDB aid: religious orders
also provided the organisational base of much of the "cottage industry"
activity assisted by the Board (Micks, 1925, 66-84).

Where it was attempted or solicited, aid to industries by state
agencies was surrounded by controversy. The policy was authoritatively
reviewed when the incoming Liberal government set up a departmental
committee of inquiry into the operation of the OATI in 1906. The
majority report favoured a restrictive approach. It supported the
retention of the "rural industries" limitation, which the OATI itself
had earlier tried unsuccessfully to get rid of, and opposed any
blurring of the line dividing technical instruction from grant or loan
aid. A one-man minority report, by W.L. Micks of the CDB, took a
radically different line calling for a Development Department with
unfettered powers over the whole of Ireland to replace the CBD and
35 DATI. The only legislative change made to Constructive Unionist
structures by the Liberals was the extension of the CBD's area of
operation in 1909. The criticisms of the majority report steered DATI
policy towards avoiding any further direct involvement in the
manufacturing sector.

As state intervention from this source faltered grassroots
initiative was reviving, largely as a by-product of the growth of the
Gaelic League. It was doing so in the cities whose sectors and spaces
the new Irish state agencies had been largely precluded from entering.
The Cork Industrial Development Association, formed in 1903, was
quickly imitated in other centres and a national body, the Irish
Industrial Development Association (IIDA), was set up in 1905.

Within the new movement a division of labour emerged. Local
associations operated as pressure groups monitoring the purchasing
decisions of private and public institutions in their areas, but
focusing mainly on the recently reformed local authorities. The
national body, on the other hand, concentrated on exploiting new UK
legislation in the field of commercial inventions, patents and trade
marks to bolster industrial production in Ireland. In part this effort
complemented the local lobbying function but it also had the effect of
leading the IIDA into activity far removed from the traditional
revivalist injunction to buy Irish-made goods.

The Dublin IOA came into existence early in 1905 in circumstances
which were hardly supportive of 'non-political and non-sectarian'
solidarity. As in the early 1880s, a proposal to hold an international
exhibition in the city was coming under strong attack. Backed
principally by interests involved in the development of tourism and
mass leisure - notably the railway, steamship and Dublin tramway
companies - the proposed exhibition secured the support of the Chamber of Commerce and the Trades Council as well as the neutrality of the Corporation.

Opposition came from the mainstream nationalist press, with the provincial papers taking their cue from the Freeman’s Journal, as well as from the newer ‘Irish Ireland’ groups and newspapers. A rival national exhibition company was formed to focus this opposition and the police reported public opinion, outside Dublin and the north-east, to have swung entirely in favour of a national, rather than an international, exhibition. Opponents of the national exhibition scored their major victory when the Council of Agriculture resolved against the OATI making any financial contribution to it. The exhibition went ahead nonetheless, running from May until November 1907, but accumulated a deficit of almost £100,000 (Turpin, 1981, 39).

The Dublin exhibition battle lines had shifted slightly since the 1880s when William Martin Murphy, the major promoter of the 1907 debacle had been a director of the company which organised the 1882 National Exhibition, but the city’s earlier divisions were in large part reproduced with a similar spoiling effect. At the national level, by contrast, the IIOA succeeded in transcending such divisions and achieving collaboration on a broad front thanks to the provisions of a UK Trade Marks Act passed in the year of its foundation. This made it possible for the IIOA to register an Irish trade mark, to license its use by Irish manufacturers and to take action in the courts against instances of the passing off of foreign goods as Irish made. Several hundred Irish firms applied for licenses to use what was claimed to be the first national trade mark in the world: these included a number of firms with well-established brand identities such as Power’s and Jameson's whiskey and Gallagher’s tobacco (Riordan, 1920, 275-279 and
The Trade Mark Act allowed consumer patriot propaganda, with its traditional stress on the role of historic state policy and contemporary commercial malpractices in inhibiting Irish industrial development, to be put on a literally businesslike footing. But further UK legislative reform in a closely related field had the effect of turning the IIDIA’s attentions from Irish to foreign manufacturers. The Patents and Designs Amendment Act of 1907 provided for the ‘compulsory working’ of patents registered in the UK. Under its terms foreign patent holders were faced with the choice of licensing or selling their patents to UK manufacturers, opening manufacturing branch plants within the UK or forfeiting legal protection for their proprietary knowledge within that state. The promotion of Ireland as a location for the branch plants of affected patent holders was taken up by the IIDIA when the Act came into effect and in November 1908 a joint DATI/IIDIA deputation travelled to Germany, at whose chemical manufacturers the new legislation was principally aimed, to make contact with industrialists.

In this radical shift away from the stimulation of Irish industries through the patriotic mobilisation of consumers in the home market to efforts to attract foreign capital investment an emergent dimension of political competition between Home Rule nationalism and Sinn Fein was evident. In its conception of consumer patriotism Sinn Fein went a good deal further than revivalist orthodoxy advocating "voluntary protection" through the payment of a premium for Irish made goods. While the IIDIA presented its trade mark as primarily a quality standard and "never asked any one to spend one half-penny more on an Irish article than on another" Sinn Fein ideologues derided the 'as good and as cheap' criterion as "cant" and a "shibboleth". But from its inception the new party had also entertained the idea that the
attraction of foreign capital was a desirable development - as long as that capital wasn’t British.

With the passage of the Patents Act Sinn Fein initiated the despatch of promotional memoranda to the continent and called on the Irish local authorities to follow its example, which a number did. Ireland, the party argued, needed consular representation in America and Europe rather than MPs at Westminster to reap the benefits of measures like the Patents Act for whose discovery Sinn Fein was insistent that it should be given the credit. More cautious assessments of the likely effects of the Act - from T.W. Russell of the DRTI and the Freeman’s Journal - were brushed aside with the intimation that a "huge syndicate of German, Russian, American and French capitalists" was being formed for the purpose of acquiring factories in England "at which their patented articles will be made at cost price, the syndicate charging merely a small commission on the sales":

"The Syndicatists speak of England because Ireland is unknown to them. Thirty years of Parliamentarianism has blotted us out of the commercial as well as the political memory of Europe".

The report of the DRTI/IIDA deputation, however, endorsed the cautious rather than the bullish view of the effects of the Act triggering a reaction to the euphoria which had been generated around it. The image of a bubble bursting was employed by several critics of what now came to be regarded as the delusive, exaggerated and self-serving claims of Sinn Fein. Yet the reaction itself - with its renewed stress on Ireland learning "to consume her own produce and produce what she consumes" and its revulsion against the dangling of 'cheap Irish labour' in front of foreign patent holders - is less remarkable than the length of time it took to crystallise. The Patents Act revealed the co-existence in nationalist economic thinking of a precocious "open" strand pointing towards industrialisation by
invitation alongside the protectionist one of self-sufficiency which is usually thought to have constituted an unchallenged orthodoxy in this period.

The opening created by the Patents Act was a product of British and not Irish industrial politics. Although the new legislation was passed with cross-party support there was a strong link between the cause of 'compulsory working' and the movement for Tariff Reform then gaining ascendancy within the Unionist Party. While no direct investment or licensing was reported as having taken place in Ireland, the benefits of a full UK protectionist system were prefigured for its advocates by the nine thousand jobs created by the Patents Act, despite a court decision imposing a minimalist interpretation on compulsory working, in over a hundred branch plants and British licensees by 1913. Like its adopted legislative child Tariff Reform too was to come under investigation as a source of potential benefit to Irish industry.

The rise of the Tariff Reform movement's challenge to Free Trade orthodoxy after 1903 plunged Unionism into a state of factional disunity leading to the production within the party of a plethora of "unauthorised programmes". The upheaval brought into prominence within the party new individuals and groupings who attached relatively less importance to the issue of Home Rule and whose advocacy of protectionism formed part of ambitious schemes for imperial federation within which Ireland seemed hardly more than a little local difficulty (Fanning, 1966, 160-161).

These developments were brought into focus when the Unionist opposition put down an amendment to the Address at the beginning of the 1909 parliamentary session calling for the introduction of Tariff Reform and specifically referring to the benefits which, it was claimed, would accrue to Ireland under the policy. But, challenged by
John Redmond, who cited proposals which had been published by the Confederate group within the party, the Unionist leader, Arthur Balfour, categorically repudiated any idea that the extension of self-government to Ireland could form part of a Tariff Reform package.

On the merits or demerits of Tariff Reform Redmond had taken a non-committal position, noting that most Irish advocates of protection were purely concerned with the development of industries within Ireland and that, from this point of view, the Tariff Reform programme as it stood was practically useless. For once Sinn Fein was in agreement with the Parliamentary Party: the Advice to Voters manifesto the party issued before the January 1910 general election rejected any scheme of Tariff Reform which did not treat Ireland as a separate entity. During the election campaign, however, "Sinn Fein" went on to argue that it was possible to secure such treatment - together with self-government - if the Nationalist MPs held the balance of power after the election. In that event the Parliamentary Party should use its position to put the Unionists, and not the Liberals, into office.

Tariff Reform thus lured "Sinn Fein" away from its central tenet of parliamentary abstentionism to argue for a change in Irish nationalism's parliamentary allies. Consumer super-patriotism was retained as a theoretical ideal but the underdeveloped state, from a Sinn Fein viewpoint, of the industrial revival movement - which in the wake of the bursting of the Patents Act 'bubble' had concentrated its efforts on developing its trade mark - was held to dictate the downgrading in practice of "voluntary protection" in favour of "securing terms" from the architects of what was assumed to be the coming revolution in British fiscal policy.

5. Conclusion

The foregoing survey of the major movements organised on a "non-political and non-sectarian" basis allow some general conclusions to be
drawn about the nature of this type of organisational context and the autonomous spaces created within it. Non-political and non-sectarian organisations exhibited a different mode of operation from political parties: the former operated within particular policy fields of the state - agriculture, education, trade and industry - while the latter were engaged in defending or opposing the form of the state. This difference, as we saw in the introduction, has generally been conflated with growing opposition to one political party and emergent support for another. But the actual relationships which existed between 'non-political and non-sectarian' organisations and the two nationalist parties do not support this view.

Operating as pressure groups, the language and industrial revival organisations became integrated into the constituency of interests politically represented by Home Rule nationalism. Sinn Fein, by contrast, as the 1913 confrontation within the Gaelic League and the Patents Act 'bubble' showed, tended in this period to be cast in the role of an intriguing or exploitative interloper in relation to these movements. The IAOS was not integrated into this constituency of interests but in its case an independent or representative character was never properly established. Because of state subsidisation the cooperative organisation operated not as a pressure group representing a specific social interest but, first, as a state sub-contractor and, later, as a sort of DATI in exile. When fees were withdrawn for the teaching of Irish as an extra school subject the Gaelic League mobilised widespread support for their restoration: when the DATI halted subsidies to the IAOS the cooperative movement, despite the size of its membership, did not. 'Narrow' cooperation as constructed at the local level, on the other hand, appears to have swum with relative ease in the nationalist mainstream.

Again, the emergence of the 'non-political and non-sectarian'
movements of this period has generally been seen as embodying a growing spirit of 'self-reliance'. But the particularistic mode of action of these movements had the effect of setting up a series of interplays between state intervention and voluntary initiative whose content was very much at variance with self-reliance rhetoric. The consumer supernationalism of Sinn Fein economics and the various departures from it in search of foreign patent-holding capitalists or tariff reforming Unionist allies provide perhaps the most remarkable instance of this but the ambivalence of the position of a Gaéllic League increasingly enmeshed in high educational politics was also symptomatic.

'Irish Ireland' has usually connotated an anti-politics, a movement of cumulative withdrawal of consent and participation from the UK state. It is more accurately conceptualised as the growth of the autonomous definition and specialised representation of 'national interests' in a number of discrete policy fields, a growth stimulated in part by the extension of the state itself. These movements did not, as has been claimed, constitute a new political opposition but they became available for alignment with or incorporation into one when the twin crises of Home Rule and the First World War shattered the political system into which they had previously been integrated.
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION - AUX ARMES CIToyENS !

1. Introduction

Three forms of nineteenth century state activity have classically been seen as promoting from above the processes of cultural unification which underpin the mass diffusion of a developed sense of national identity - railway building, schooling and conscription (Eley, 1981, 93). Two Irish members of this trinity have already been encountered: a railway system assailed for operating practices alleged to be inimical to Ireland's economic development as well as for sectarian discrimination in its white collar recruitment and promotion procedures and an education system structured around the balancing of Catholic and Protestant interests and subject from the turn of the century to intensive pressure from Irish language revivalists. The third member, conscription, was outside the Irish experience and that of other parts of the UK, or of the British Empire, through the nineteenth century.

Naval supremacy was the linchpin of Britain's role as the leading world power: control of the seas obviated the need for a state without land borders to maintain a large standing army. The First World War, however, brought this situation to an abrupt end, creating an insatiable demand for manpower which was to draw the UK government and the Irish Catholic population into an unprecedented state of confrontation over the introduction of military conscription. When it came, this confrontation was of central importance in two respects: in its course the process of the radicalisation of the Irish nationalist mainstream, which replaced Home Rule by a demand for separation, was decisively consolidated while the destruction of the consensual elements of British rule, whose development during the long Home Rule hiatus was examined earlier, was effectively completed.

The crisis which led to this confrontation was a complex one going
beyond a conflict between a state massively extended in order to wage "total war" and a distinct national/religious section of its citizens. In Weber's definition the existence of a state is founded upon a successful claim to "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1948, 78). In Ireland this monopoly had effectively been surrendered prior to the war as Unionists armed to resist Home Rule legislation and Nationalists imitated their action in order to preserve it. From 1913, but especially from the outbreak of the world war in August 1914, Irish politics and society were characterised by a dual militarisation with armed bodies mobilised by the state for warfare against external enemy states and by political parties or quasi-parties to advance or protect domestic communal interests.

The watershed of this dual militarisation and the breakdown of the pre-existing relationship between the state and civil society in Ireland it produced are the subjects of this concluding chapter. Three key aspects are analysed. First, the specificity of the Irish conscription crisis is located by placing it in the wider context of the series of political crises the issue provoked within the British Empire during the First World War. Second, the domestic origins of dual militarisation, the political effects of its continuation in wartime and the strategies adopted by the state to deal with it in that context are traced. Finally the wartime military recruitment policy of the UK state in Ireland is situated in the wider domestic context of the mobilisation of that society's resources for a "total war" effort.

2. Conscription and the British Imperial identity

The 1918 confrontation between Catholic Ireland and the UK state over the introduction of military conscription formed part of a wider pattern of polarisation which the issue served to reveal within Britain's empire. In Australia the government twice - in October 1916
and December 1917 - attempted to carry referenda to introduce conscription. The results showed an even division of public opinion - 48% for, 52% against in 1916; 46% for, 54% against in 1917 - and statistical analysis has revealed a complex interplay of age, sex, region, religion, nationality and class factors in the voting patterns (Withers, 1982).

The political legacy of the conscription issue, however, was to emphasise the division between British Protestant and Irish Catholic identities. Anglophobia, fanned by the action of the British military authorities after the Easter 1916 insurrection in Ireland, provided a vocal source of anti-conscription sentiment: supporters of the measure, on the other hand, readily tarred the opposition with a disloyal "Sinn Fein" brush. The Australian Labour Party split over the issue, losing electoral support and acquiring a pronounced association with Catholicism as a result (O. J. Murphy, 1974).

Increased ethnic/sectarian cleavage within the political system was also a legacy of the conscription issue in Canada. Here legislation was pushed through the federal parliament by an English Canadian majority against French Canadian opposition in the Summer of 1917. The opposition Liberal Party split along ethnic lines over the issue and in December 1917 was heavily defeated by a 'Union government' composed of Conservatives and anglophone former Liberals (McNaught, 1976, 213-237).

Enforcement of the military draft led to serious rioting in Quebec in the Spring of 1918 although French Canada's clerical and political leaders advised compliance with the law. In Quebec the default rate among those ordered to report for military service was over 40%, posing a major problem for the military authorities in such a huge, sparsely populated country with a long land border (Wade, 1968, 762-777).

In the UK an act allowing conscription to be applied to Ireland, and extending the net of a British scheme which had been in force since
the beginning of 1916, was passed in April 1918. In May, however the War Cabinet backed away from activating the legislation in the face of united opposition from all shades of nationalist opinion - including Labour and a resurgent Sinn Fein - backed by the Catholic bishops. Voluntary recruitment would, it was announced, be given a last chance before conscription was resorted to in Ireland. Only about 20% of the minimum level of voluntary recruitment specified as being acceptable was to be attained. But by October, when this 'last chance' was revealed to have been passed up, the war was on the point of ending: the November armistice finally disposed of a threat which had overshadowed nationalist politics since late 1915.

The innovation of conscription polarised ethnically heterogenous British-style polities because it raised the most fundamental questions with regard to the central integrating mechanism of citizenship with its 'duties' as well as its 'rights' - civil, political and social. Resistance to its advent was far from being a purely Irish phenomenon, but the limbo-like political context within which this opposition was expressed and the insurrectionary form it threatened to assume were specific to the Irish case. Both Australia and Canada were self-governing entities with mechanisms of legitimation (general elections, referenda) which either allowed opposition to conscription to prevail or facilitated its containment.

Irish conscription confronted external government action with a broad front of internal opposition forces. At the same time this polarisation served to conceal internal divisions. Channeling protest through such forms as a national novena and a church-gate pledge "to resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal" the opposition had a predominantly Catholic communal character. This was evident when a general strike over the issue - Ireland's first - drew much less support in the north-east than in other areas where its
success was virtually complete (Mitchell, 1974, 87-89).

An attempt was made to confer legitimacy on the proposed introduction of conscription to Ireland by the simultaneous announcement of an intention to pass Home Rule legislation. Had this - the third abortive attempt to produce legislation enacting some form of Irish self-government in two years - been proceeded with, the nature of the issue would almost certainly have altered dramatically with internal divisions becoming more exacerbated. In the event the deferral of conscription in favour of voluntary recruitment's 'last chance' was accompanied by a further shelving of Home Rule.

A 'legitimation deficit' was not, however, the only peculiar feature of the Irish conscription crisis. Another was the availability of military action as a means of resisting, as well as enforcing, such a measure. This duopoly of armed force, which critically influenced wartime policy, had its origins in the pre-war domestic crisis surrounding the passage of the third Home Rule Bill. It is to the growth of this duopoly and the critical political effects it produced that the next section turns.

3 Dual Militarisation: internal crisis and external war

Military style drilling began in Ulster Orange lodges after the December 1910 general election had returned the Liberals to office and pushed Home Rule back to the top of the UK political agenda. The movement spread rapidly acquiring formal structure and central coordination by early 1913. The accumulation of arms began as plans were laid for the establishment of a provisional government in Ulster to prevent Home Rule being implemented. The Unionist Party in Britain gave unreserved support to these actions. In November 1913 a Nationalist volunteer force was launched to resist the new policy of the Unionists "which proposes to leave us the political franchise in name, and to annihilate it in fact." "They have rights", the manifesto

Despite a proclamation forbidding the importation of arms to Ireland issued in December 1913 communal militarisation accelerated dramatically in the new year. Unionists mounted a massive gunrunning operation at Larne in April and there were smaller Nationalist landings of arms at Howth and Kilcoole in the Summer. As the ground was being laid for armed communal confrontation the state's ability to uphold parliamentary authority in Ireland was cut away by the "Curragh mutiny" in the course of which army officers stationed in Ireland secured an undertaking that they would not be called upon to enforce the Home Rule Bill (A.P. Ryan, 1956; Fergusson, 1964).

The impotence of the Liberal government served to fatally undermine the political efforts it made to negotiate a solution to the impasse. With the failure of the Buckingham Palace interparty conference in July 1914 "the deadlock was absolute" (Jalland, 1980, 258), the UK parliamentary system appeared to be on the brink of collapse and large-scale armed clashes to be inevitable in Ireland. The Ulster Volunteers were 85,000 strong and were estimated by the police to possess 50,000 rifles: the Irish Volunteers had much larger numbers (almost 190,000 men) but far fewer guns - less than 10,000 rifles (Mac Giolla Choille, 1966, 102 and 109-112). Even in the absence of collision between the different volunteer forces militarisation, in spite of its rudimentary and uneven character, had radically altered Irish political realities. As the Inspector-General of the RIC observed in May 1914:

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"In Ireland the training and drilling to the use of arms of a great part of the male population is a new departure which is bound in the not too distant future to profoundly alter the existing conditions of life. Obedience to the law has never been a prominent characteristic of the people. In times of passion or excitement the law has only been maintained by force, and this has been rendered practicable owing to the want of cohesion among crowds hostile to the police. If the people become armed and drilled effective police control will vanish...Events are moving. Each county will soon have a trained army far outnumbering the police, and those who control the Volunteers will be in a position to dictate to what extent the law of the land may be carried into effect."

Domestic crisis was displaced by the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. With great difficulty - in spite of a wartime party 'truce' - a holding formula was devised on Home Rule (Jalland and Stubbs, 1981). The bill would be placed as it stood on the statute book but its operation was to be suspended for the duration of the war. When the war ended it would not be implemented until parliament had had an opportunity to amend it to take account of the Ulster problem. Simultaneously the European war was transforming the existing relationship between official and unofficial military forces in Ireland. Both the Nationalist and Unionist political leaders supported the war effort and advised their followers to enlist in the army. A small minority (less than 10,000) of the nationalist Volunteers, however, broke away, repudiating any involvement in a 'foreign war' other than through the action of an Irish national government (Mac Giolla Choille, 1966, 104-112 and 176-178).

Across the country the minority represented no more than 6 or 7% of the total nationalist volunteer numbers: in Dublin, however, the published result of a ballot of Volunteers held at the time of the split suggests that about a third of the membership went with the minority. There opposition to the UK war effort was also expressed by the Irish Citizen Army (ICA), a militia numbering its members in hundreds, which had originated during the 1913-14 lockout, and was associated with, but not controlled by, the ITGWU. Although still locally a minority of
arming and drilling nationalists, the concentration of anti-war effort militants in the city acquired further significance from the fact that nationalist militia organisation and training was at the time of the split, and continued thereafter to be, most advanced in Dublin (Townshend, 1983, 290).

To a considerable extent this concentration reflected the pre-existence of the division between orthodox and independent nationalists discussed earlier. But while this division was reproduced around the war issue, with the drawing together of the Labour and Sinn Fein groups which between them held nine of the eighty Corporation seats to form what the Freeman's Journal pejoratively termed a "Sinn Fein-Larkinite-Pro-German Coterie" which specialised in subverting the Catholic themes of war effort propaganda, no linking of military to party political organisation initially took place. The ICA's relationship to the wider Dublin Labour movement was an ambivalent one while the Volunteer minority, although sometimes referred to - again usually with pejorative intent - as the Sinn Fein Volunteers, eschewed any connection with party politics. Instead the political dimension of the Volunteer split became displaced into the 'non-political' Gaelic League.

The involvement of leading Gaelic League figures in the foundation of the Irish Volunteers did not disturb the balance of forces within the League described in the previous chapter. In the rapidly deepening domestic crisis of 1913-14 the Volunteers could be said to have been 'non-political' in two senses. First, the existence and role of the movement was not a matter of public contention between the different nationalist currents. Second, its development was enveloped in a myopic rhetoric of 'manly' comradeship in arms, largely contributed by former stalwarts of a primarily cultural nationalism such as Eoin Mac Neill and Patrick Pearse, which conjured out of existence the conflict,
rapidly escalating in the direction of civil war, which had spawned the rival volunteer forces.

But the Volunteer split after the outbreak of the world war quickly engulfed the Gaelic League. The Volunteer minority, including mainstays of the old "party behind the President" like Mac Neill and Pearse, made a concerted effort to identify the League with its cause (O'Kelly, 1963, 153-155; Tierney, 1980, 178-179) while adherents of the majority/supporters of the war effort were among those pushing forward a constitutional reform scheme. This aimed at securing an end to the debilitating factionalism of the immediate pre-war period by making the League executive more representative of the membership and through the devolution of power to county committees.

At the Dundalk Ard Fheis in July 1915 the reform scheme was voted down by a two-to-one margin while the Volunteer minority succeeded in electing a number of 'political prisoners', jailed under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), to the executive. This latter development prompted Hyde to resign as President and his departure was followed by that of Patrick O'Daly, the League's Secretary. The presidency was left vacant by the Ard Fheis in the hope that Hyde would reconsider a decision said in his letter of resignation to have been made on health grounds. The key post of Secretary was filled by Sean T. O'Kelly, a Dublin Sinn Fein councillor since 1906 and a prominent figure in both the IRB and the Volunteer minority.

The following year, in the wake of the 1916 rising, the reform movement proposals were revived and updated at a conference held in Dublin in June which Hyde appears to have attended. The League was to be reorganised on decentralised and representative lines and was to be kept free from partisan activities. Hyde was to be asked to resume the presidency and given "such assured guarantees of future policy as may induce him to do so." A joint committee of nominees of the Ard Fheis
and signatories of the reform proposals was to draft a new constitution for the League along these lines. In August, however, this attempt to restore the old 'non-political' position was repudiated by the League’s Ard Fheis. It also removed the last symbolic link with the old order by electing Eoin Mac Neill, then serving a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by a post-rising court martial, to fill the vacant presidency.

The UK state was divided in its response to the existence of militarised opposition to the war effort. Military opinion favoured the suppression of the Volunteer minority and the ICA from the outset but the Liberal civilian administration, in consultation with the Nationalist parliamentary leaders, adopted a policy of containment aimed at preserving intact the prevailing pro-war effort sentiment (O’Broin, 1966). This policy, and the personnel who administered it, continued undisturbed through the formation of a coalition government, which the Nationalists declined an invitation to join, in the Spring of 1915.

The essence of containment lay in a discriminate and sparing use of the sweeping powers available under DORRA. A number of ‘seditious’ newspapers, including Irish Freedom, Sinn Fein and the Irish Worker, were suppressed at the end of 1914 and orders were made excluding particular Volunteer organisers from specified areas within Ireland or deporting them out of the country. The thrust of government action, however, was aimed less at disrupting the Volunteer minority’s organisation - through 1915 its national membership grew to around 15,000 - than at preventing interference with the army’s recruitment campaign.

But increasingly the containment policy was squeezed between the demands of "total war" and the growth of 'pro-German' militancy among
the forces it sought to hold in check. The Volunteer minority had officially adopted a defensive posture which defined conscription or an attempt to disarm its organisation as its sticking points: its Chief of Staff had specifically warned the tiny, but offensively-oriented, ICA that his force would not become drawn into any insurrection the latter attempted to start. But the nature and scale of the war was pushing towards conscription by late 1915. At the same time pressure towards disarming was increased by aggressive foraging for arms, particularly by the ICA, and finally made irresistible by the discovery that an insurrection was being prepared, for which Germany had sent a shipment of arms intercepted off the Kerry coast.

The insurrection plans were the work of a secret movement within a movement - the Military Council - which had operated conspiratorially within the Volunteer minority and incorporated the ICA leadership. Coinciding with the attempted arms landing, the uncovering by the Volunteer minority's Chief of Staff of the preparations for the rising led to the cancellation of Easter 1916 manoeuvres which were to have been used as a cover for its initiation. With the arms shipment intercepted and the Volunteer minority in apparent disarray, the government prepared to move against the militias incriminated by their links with Germany. Before it did so a localised uprising was launched in Dublin by the Military Council group. It lasted a week leaving 450 dead, 2614 injured and much of the centre of the city devastated by artillery bombardment (D. Ryan, 1949; Caulfield, 1963).

While a shift from containment to active repression was certain by Easter 1916 the rising had the effect of transforming its character and the political context within which it was to operate. The consultative relationship between the Nationalist Party leaders and the Castle administration was shattered. The principal Castle ministers and officials, resigned in its wake and control passed temporarily into
military hands. Under martial law 15 executions were carried out and 145 sentences of imprisonment imposed. A round up of suspects, together with the surrender of the rebel positions, produced almost 3,500 arrests. Over 1,800 of those held were deported to internment in Britain. Stringent restrictions were also imposed on the activities of the Volunteer majority which, although denied incorporation as an auxiliary home defence force, had been officially allowed to import arms in wartime.

The disorganising effects of this large-scale, if often capriciously administered, repression were, however, to be blunted by simultaneous attempts to neutralise the hostile public reaction it aroused throughout nationalist Ireland. These attempts brought the Home Rule Act out of the state of suspended animation in which it had been placed for the duration of the war. Within a month of the rising's suppression Lloyd George had been deputed by the Cabinet to negotiate with Irish Nationalist and Ulster Unionist leaders in order to secure an immediate implementation in some form of Home Rule.

His attempt collapsed two months later amid bitter recriminations, inflicting serious damage on the credibility of the Nationalist leaders (Dangerfield, 1976, 225-242; Fair, 1980, 120-140). In the following year, partly in response to pressure from the US government, a nominated Irish Convention was set up to try and produce a self-government formula based on internal consensus (McDowell, 1970; Fair, 1980, 198-223).

Undermined from the outset by refusals to accept nomination, the Convention failed to produce an agreed scheme. Its conclusion, which had in any case been overtaken by the development of the conscription crisis, was of less significance than the circumstances surrounding its initiation. Ostensibly on the grounds that the convention should "be able to meet in an atmosphere of goodwill and harmony" its summoning
was accompanied in June 1917 by the release of the sentenced prisoners of the rising. Following the release of all internees the previous December, this completed, within little more than a year, the liberation of all those rounded up by the martial law authorities and not executed.

As Laffan (1971) has shown, the timing of the release of these two batches of prisoners was of crucial importance in the process by which the current of revulsion against government repression and of disenchantment with the Nationalist Party leaders, manifesting itself at a series of by-elections through 1917, acquired unified organisational embodiment. By October 1917 a renovated Sinn Fein had been installed, under the leadership of rising veterans, as the vehicle of a resurgent advanced nationalism. Alongside it the Volunteers had also been reconstructed as a single military force, the former minority having attracted the activist remnant of the old majority, whose reactivation in the wake of the post-rising wave of repression had been repeatedly thwarted by the parliamentary leaders. Into this Sinn Fein/Volunteer nexus the Gaelic League had been absorbed.

After a period in early 1918, when by-election results suggested that its momentum might be beginning to falter, this radical nationalist current consolidated its ascendancy when "in resistance to conscription, Sinn Fein found for the first time a national political issue which could mobilise the mass of the people" (Townshend, 1983, 319). The drawing back - at least temporarily - from conscription and the abandonment of yet another abortive Home Rule initiative (Dangerfield, 1976, 275-279) brought to an end a two year period in which UK state policy had been characterised by an oscillation between repression and political negotiation whose scope had been fatally narrowed by the survival imperatives of a coalition government in which the Unionists had increasingly become the predominant partner. In May
1918 a senior military figure, Lord French, was appointed Lord Lieutenant with an agenda whose contents were exhausted by coercion. Four years of "total war" thus encompassed the complete destruction of the "governing of Ireland according to Irish ideas" built up over the previous twenty five.

4 Mobilisation on the Home Front

(a) The Economy

Spared conscription, Ireland enjoyed no similar exemption from the sweeping changes in the organisation of economic activity which the UK state imposed to complement its massive mobilisation of military forces. Through the war the state assumed increasing control over the allocation of the resources of manpower and raw materials. In Britain, although inequality of sacrifice between labour and capital was widely perceived to have resulted, the experience is commonly seen as having provided labour leaders with an education in the positive possibilities of state intervention (Wrigley, 1976). In Ireland, on the other hand, wartime state direction of the economy served to revive nationalist memories of eighteenth century mercantilist discrimination and nineteenth century laissez-faire export of food in famine conditions (Riordan, 1920, 280-283).

The manufacturing sector of highest priority and greatest intervention, that of war munitions, generated relatively little employment in Ireland. A statement issued with official authority by John Redmond in October 1915, when the sector's reorganisation under tight centralised control was substantially complete, expressed the hope that 11,000 workers would shortly be employed in Ireland producing munitions. It was expected that 6,000 of these jobs would be in the north and 5,000 in the south; 2,000 of the latter would be at the Kynoch's explosives factory in Arklow. In Dublin a National Shell Factory, which eventually employed about a thousand workers, was
established and munitions work led to a doubling of the number employed by the Dublin Dockyard Company to 1,500.

While munitions work generated fewest jobs in the south of Ireland the disruption there of existing industries with direct or indirect loss of employment resulting from government control was disproportionately greatest. In the two principal industries of the region wartime legislation enforced a sharp reduction of brewing output and brought pot still distilling to a complete halt. These restrictions also led to job losses in ancillary industries such as bottlemaking. Where the state took direct action to expand or contract industrial production the tendency was to destroy existing male jobs and to promote female employment. Thus the Dublin Dockyard Company’s contract with the Ministry of Munitions "only permitted 5 per cent of the staff to be men or boys" (Smellie, n.d., 146).

In other industries, however, labour supply was such that what had been men’s work in Dublin remained men’s work, although employers frequently operated the policy of not taking on men of military age unless they had previously been declared unfit for military service. This, for instance, was the case in Jacob’s in Dublin whereas in its new Liverpool factory the shortage of men had forced the firm to employ women in what it defined as male jobs. Indeed the absence of any substantial new net stimulus to industrial employment, together with the operation of discriminatory employment policies, led to a situation where the supply of male labour very visibly exceeded the demand for it as voluntary enlistment dropped off sharply after 1915.

Divergence between Dublin and British conditions reached an apparent height in the late Spring of 1917 when, in the midst of a statewide - indeed continentwide - manpower shortage, there were a series of demonstrations by unemployed men in the city. At the same time a pamphlet entitled "Starvation in Dublin", and written from a
Plunkettite cooperative perspective, was published. It argued that the primary poverty prevailing in the city before the war had been converted into actual starvation by wartime conditions and warned that serious disorder could break out if nothing was done to relieve it (Smith-Gordon and Cruise O'Brien, 1917).

Wages in Dublin were rising much more slowly than in munitions-producing Britain - where working class diets were actually improving significantly (Winter, 1985, 3-4) - but Irish food prices were ruled by conditions prevailing in the British market. This prompted Irish trade union demands that Irish needs should determine government food control policy in Ireland and that only produce surplus to these needs should be made available for export. Failing to secure any shift in government practice labour representatives resigned from the Irish Food Control Committee towards the end of 1917 and trade unionists began to work through local groups set up by Sinn Fein to try to ensure adequate supplies. In Ireland, unlike Britain, a system of food rationing hardly operated. This decision was justified on the grounds that:

"Speaking generally, there was no likelihood of excessive consumption in that country and this proved to be correct. It may be sufficient to add, in evidence, that per head consumption of meat, which in normal times is half that of the British populations, has kept this proportion during the war."

Given wartime boom conditions in the agricultural sector this suggests substantial additional privation in Irish cities and towns, although no mention of the latter is made in official accounts of the administration of food control.

The exemption of Ireland from conscription legislation had the effect of increasing demands that the state should act to alleviate local unemployment and prevent living standards falling further. Thus the proposition that the solution to local unemployment lay in increased enlistment was strongly rejected with even moderates arguing
that "to attempt to do by indirect methods what has been abandoned by
direct is unjustifiable" (Smith-Gordon and Cruise O'Brien, 1917, 20).
Instead they advocated that the state should act to provide work in
Ireland for the unemployed and that it should supplement very low wages
or provide means for underpaid workers to obtain cheaper food.

Falling living standards were to be addressed in the last eighteen
months of the war by a major upswing in strike activity. Over the same
period increased employment was generated locally by government action
to release supplies of building materials for post-rising rebuilding
and by military construction projects. The middle of 1917, when the
city remained economically dislocated by the unrepaired damage caused
by the suppression of the rising and the brewing and distilling
restrictions took full effect, was thus the period in which wartime
unemployment appeared to reach a peak in Dublin.

The movement of labour from Dublin to areas of shortage in Britain
provided a possible solution to this unemployment. The extent and
experience of individual migration is undocumented but attempts to
organise the transfer of labour on a large scale clearly aroused
hostile local reaction in receiving areas. In July 1917 over two
hundred unemployed men were sent by the Dublin Labour Exchange to
Levinstein's chemical works near Manchester. The majority carried cards
exempting them from military service.

They were being recruited into an industry whose strategic nature
gave its British workforce a high degree of exemption from conscription
but which was at the same time, untypically for an industry with such
protection, characterised by high enlistment rates (Dewey, 1984, 216).
The entire party returned home when trade unionists at the factory
threatened to strike if Irishmen of military age were employed. A
Labour Exchange official subsequently referred to this incident as "not
an isolated case of trouble" but it is a particularly poignant one in
the light of the hopes raised in Ireland by the Patents Act of 1907.

The synthetic dyes branch of the chemicals industry had been central to the campaign for "compulsory working" and Levenstein's had been one of the most vocal advocates of legislative change (Miall, 1931, 76). By 1914 two German chemical branch plants - subsidiaries of the Hoechst and Badische companies - had been established in the Merseyside area as a result of the act but the UK remained 80% dependent on imports for its supply of dyestuffs (Miall, 1931, 93; Haber, 1971, 188). With the outbreak of the war these plants were seized and the UK government began to consider ways of founding an indigenous dyestuffs industry. The IIDR convened a conference of Irish users of dyes which resolved in favour of a government initiative in this field provided a 'fair proportion' of the manufacturing capacity would be located in Ireland and there were Irish representatives among the directors.

What transpired was the takeover in 1915 and subsequent expansion by the government of a Yorkshire firm, Read Holiday, which was renamed British Dyes, followed by government orchestration of a 1918 amalgamation between British Dyes and Levenstein's to form the British Dyestuffs Corporation, which later became one of the major components out of which Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) was constructed. Prior to the 1918 amalgamation Levenstein's had acquired from the Board of Trade, on very favourable terms and without any tenders being invited, Hoechst's indigo plant at Ellesmere Port as well as the German firm's UK patent for the drug Novocain which it also began to manufacture there (Haber, 1971, 192-193).

ICI's historian has described the creation of British Dyes as "a turning point in the relations between government and industry in Britain" (Reader, 1970, 270): despite the IIDR's efforts, the Dublin labourers blacked at Blackley in July 1917 appear to have been the only
significant Irish participants in this UK turning point. The case illustrates how, on the one hand, wartime state intervention in the organisation of industry operated within an existing field of interests whose spatial pattern its restructuring efforts tended to entrench and, on the other, how norms of spatial fairness came into play, albeit ineffectually, around this innovation. A perceived violation of these norms was to lead to the replacement of the ‘businesslike’ perspectives predominant in pre-war industrial revivalism by a politicised view of the UK state as an agency of economic exploitation. As a DTC delegate to a 1917 Dublin meeting protesting against the government’s continued failure to establish a Receiving Depot in Ireland put it:

"The story of Ireland from Limerick to Lloyd George was simply a story of broken promises."

b Politics

Economic development was not evened out by wartime mobilisation but a radical statewide extension of political rights did form part of the process. Therborn (1977) has distinguished three paths to western democratisation - internal development, national mobilisation and military defeat - of which the second and third are closely bound up with the waging of war. The UK in his view belongs to the internal development category with wartime mobilisation providing only a stimulation of the pace of reform. But when proper weight is given to the linkage which came to exist in the British political system between political reform and Irish Home Rule, and the collapse of that system, which the crisis over Home Rule appeared to be about to precipitate in the Summer of 1914, the case more justly belongs in the national mobilisation category.

The war effort created political conditions in which the logjam created by Home Rule linkage was broken, allowing the Irish issue to be isolated - especially through the mechanism of the 1917-18 Convention - while a radical reform of franchise qualifications and registration
procedures as well as a redistribution of parliamentary seats was undertaken. At the same time military defeat - or rather the basis on which that of the Central Powers was to be secured - was moving the terms in which democratic freedom was conceived by the mass of Irish nationalists far beyond the confines of UK efforts to construct a 'union sacree' which produced the Representation of the People Act of 1918 and the ill-fated Irish Convention.

Although an alleged 'German Plot' served as the pretext for a roundup of Sinn Fein leaders in May 1918 US entry into the war in April 1917 had effectively removed the conditions in which a conspiracy with Germany, such as that which preceded the 1916 rising, could be carried on. But the war aims of President Wilson, set out in the famous Fourteen Points of January 1918, which proclaimed that the right of nations to self-determination should be the basis for the construction of a new international order, provided a new external focal point for Irish national aspirations. Whereas pro-German sentiments had been the prerogative of a tiny minority of Nationalists Wilson’s programme was ground shared by all sections. Through 1918 the US president was the recipient of a stream of addresses, honours and invitations to visit Ireland - a local part of the almost global pattern of the raising of subject peoples' expectations which Wilson, when taxed with his failure to have the self-determination principle applied to Ireland, was subsequently to term "the great metaphysical tragedy of today" (Wambaugh, 1933, 12-13; Carroll, 1978, 136).

In the interim, during the run up to the UK general election held in December 1918, Sinn Fein disputed with the Nationalist parliamentarians who was best qualified to present Ireland's case for self-determination at the forthcoming Peace Conference in Versailles while Labour stood aside in Sinn Fein’s favour (Mitchell, 1974, 91-103). In Dublin no test of electoral support had taken place since the
rising. A by-election in South County in July 1917 had given the Nationalists their only unopposed victory of 1917-18. The Unionists, so narrowly defeated in December 1910, had decided they were bound by the wartime party truce not to contest it: Sinn Fein made no move to fight an election which would have been contested on the same day as that in East Clare won by Eamonn De Valera.

The banning of public meetings or processions and, following the conscription crisis, the arrest of its leaders thereafter forced Dublin Sinn Fein into a semi-underground existence. Only the revival of open-air recruiting meetings for the first time since the rising in late August 1918 provided an unintended opportunity for Sinn Fein supporters to demonstrate. Actively promoted by some Nationalist MPs, these meetings were part of a campaign to avert the still overhanging threat of conscription by filling the 'last chance' voluntary quotas. Associated with it were quixotic proposals for Irish recruits to be attached to the French or American armies - to fight for any of the Allies but Britain. Disruption or takeover by hostile crowds quickly led to the abandonment of these meetings.

When the general election was held the collapse of Nationalist Party support was quickly evident in Sinn Fein's taking over a third of the safe nationalist seats unopposed, the largest concentration of these being in what once had been the old party's agrarian activist strongholds in the south-west. In Dublin where Parliamentary Party organisation had been weakest in the fifteen years before the war Sinn Fein still faced Nationalist opposition in all city and county seats. The supporters of the war effort were making a fight - however forlorn - in the areas where military recruitment had been highest. Separately registered military voters made up almost 9% of all male voters in Irish constituencies. In the counties the figure dropped to 6.5%: in the six boroughs left after the pre-election redistribution of seats it
was almost 19% and in Dublin city and county it was 16.2%.

The great majority of military voters were unable to exercise their votes due to administrative disorganisation (Pugh, 1978, 173). Published city and (incomplete) county figures both suggest that only a quarter of military voters actually cast their votes. Sinn Fein probably derived some benefit from this shambles but even if the unused military votes had all been cast against it the party's share of the vote would only have fallen from 65 to 55% in the city and from 41 to 37% in the three new south county divisions. Three-cornered contests worked to Sinn Fein's advantage in the south of the county giving it two out of three seats with just over 40% of the vote: in the city divisions, in all but one of which there was no Unionist candidate, the common cause of the war appears to have brought out a substantial Unionist vote to bolster the Nationalists.

With manhood suffrage and votes for women over thirty the structure of the electorate had changed radically. So too had the procedures for registering voters and the boundaries of the constituencies within which their votes were cast. But some of the major features of the old Dublin electoral regime identified earlier continued to manifest themselves under the new.

In Rathmines, the only southern Irish seat it won, the Unionist party continued the use of the traditional weapon of large-scale objection. Protests about their tactics led to the withdrawal of about two-thirds of those originally served: but about four hundred were pressed on with. In the city the systematic exploitation of claims to manufacture bogus votes was also alleged in relation to the new register. Here, however, the wartime transformation of nationalist politics was reflected with the allegations emanating from a source previously silent on the subject, the Nationalist Party's all-but-official organ, the Freeman's Journal. The pre-war radical victim of
electoral illegalities had thus apparently achieved a position of organisational dominance from which it could employ such devices to its own lily-gilding advantage.
APPENDIX ONE

A NOTE ON THE QUANTITATIVE DATA PRESENTED

The 1911 census sample consists of information drawn from 1,753 Household Forms for sixteen city wards—the fifteen within the pre-1901 municipal boundary plus New Kilmainham (see Maps 2 and 3). It covers what may be termed the “old city” and does not include the suburban areas which grew up around it in the later nineteenth century. The sample was drawn systematically, with the sampling fraction varied to take account of the disparities in ward size set out in Table 5.1. Weighting was used at the analysis stage to adjust for this variation and restore uniformity. In all of the tables which draw on the census sample the percentage figures quoted are weighted and the unweighted numbers of cases upon which these percentages are based are given.

In the assignment of heads of household to a social class on the basis of information about their occupations (Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 5.7) the procedure recommended by Armstrong (1972) is followed and the British Registrar-General’s classification as revised in 1951 is used—with one major modification. The Registrar-General’s Class III is divided into “skilled mental” and “skilled manual” components. This was done by assigning the following occupations to the “skilled mental” group: foreman, shop assistant, commercial traveller, commercial clerk, civil service clerk, local government clerk, bank clerk, insurance clerk, railway clerk, law clerk, school teacher, bookkeeper, scrivener, typist, non-commissioned officer, policeman, prison warder.

Through its address each household in the census sample was traced to the electoral register in force on census day—2 April 1911. A check was made against each of the sections into which the register was divided for all adult members of the household (defined as those aged 22 or over). Because the Voters Lists used were those on which the Revising Barristers had actually adjudicated in the preparation of the
it was possible to identify not just individuals who could vote from their current addresses and those who could not but also those who— from their current addresses— had been struck off or whose claims had been struck out in the course of the 1910 Revision Sessions.

A number of tables—2.2, 3.4, 5.1 and 5.2—draw on information contained in parliamentary papers. These are the Census Returns for Ireland, 1871: Province of Leinster, P.P. 1872 LXVII; Census Returns for Ireland, 1911: Province of Leinster, P.P. 1912-13 CXIV and the Return showing, with regard to each Parliamentary Constituency in the United Kingdom, the Total Number and Number in each Class of Electors on the Register now in force, P.P. 1911 LXII.

Details on the occupations of councillors, Poor Law Guardians and the unsuccessful candidates for these offices put up by the Labour and Sinn Fein parties presented in Table 8.1 were drawn from newspaper reports of election nominations. Through their addresses, individuals were then traced to Thom's Directory (for the year of their first nomination or election) and details of the rateable valuations of the properties they were listed as occupying noted.
Chapter One: Introduction

1. Nationalism has presented itself as a problem to Marxism's internationalist conception of the proletarian revolution rather than to the conventionally patriotic attitudes of sociology's other, academic "founding fathers" (A.D. Smith, 1983). Today Marxist writers display both the most urgent concern with constructing a theory of nationalism and the greatest scepticism about the validity of such an exercise. Thus Nairn (1977) regards an inadequate understanding of the dynamics of nationalism as Marxism's "great historical failure" but his efforts to remedy this deficiency using the concept of uneven capitalist development has been criticised by other Marxist writers such as Hobsbawm (1977) and Zubaida (1978) for conceding too much ground to nationalist nostrums. Another development within a tradition founded on the belief that the proletariat has no fatherland has been the revival of interest in the hitherto neglected and only partially translated writings on nationality questions of the Hapsburg Empire's "Austro-Marxists" as a possible foundation for a new general theory of nationalism (Munck, 1985).

2. The literature on Edwardian social change has as its starting point Dangerfield's (1936) study, "The Strange Death Of Liberal England" but the debate of the 1970s has greatly narrowed the original frame of reference. Dangerfield's argument centres on the crisis of Liberal 'values' caused by the rise of 'violence' in the immediate pre-war years. Labour was only one of the gravediggers in "The Strange Death" - female, Irish and Tory extremists being the others - and in Labour's case it is industrial militancy that is the focal point, not electoral politics. Subsequently, however, debate has come to be concerned with the Liberal and Labour parties to the exclusion of almost all else. One attempt has been made to reinsert Irish Home Rule into it (O'Day, 1979) but this degenerates into a restatement of the themes of Edwardian Unionist propaganda in updated language and presents no evidence to support its contentions.

3. Yet it is 'southern Ireland' which Hechter (1985) has subsequently described as the "prototype" for his discussion - "a stunningly clear example of internal colonial development" produced by a strategy which was "essentially... a precursor of apartheid". This has been coupled with an admission that Scotland "may not have experienced internal colonialism to any great degree". Regrettably Hechter, in a display of disciplinary chauvinism, has shown himself willing only to address the criticisms made of his model by sociologists of a quantitative orientation. He has largely ignored those made by historians which he appears to regard as both predictable and unimportant.

5. For example, a leading Dublin Sinn Feiner, W. L. Cole on trade unionism: "I am convinced that trades unionism on the lines it is on as between England and Ireland is sheer stark national madness and has done more to anglicise and denationalise the mass of the workers in Ireland than all the laws of England together. Because what is voluntary becomes a habit and what is coercion is permanently resisted, the voluntary connection between the two Irish and British workers has drawn the weaker unto the stronger, until now the connection is so strong that the Irish worker will not give it up.": S.F. 5/5/1906. And a contribution to a debate on Sinn Fein and Women’s Suffrage: "The agitation entails allying ourselves in effect if not in name with English suffragists in striving for a common end and similarity of end is one of the strongest of ties. Irishwomen who have hitherto walked free of English bonds will be enmeshed in the net of English interests which already hold the men of the nation - the Trade Unions, benevolent societies, political parties, commercial unions, associations for religious, charitable, quasi-scientific and sporting objects to one or another of which every second Irishman belongs. It is an illogical Sinn Feiner who can hold that an extension of the principle is desirable, and that there will be an alliance, tacit or expressed, between those who in Ireland and England are working for the one end by kindred methods can hardly be doubted.": Irish Nation and Peasant 27/3/1909.

6. James Connolly, the Union’s Belfast organiser, complained in 1913 that "He (James Larkin) is forever drawing comparisons between what he accomplished in Belfast in 1807 and what I have done, conveniently forgetting that he was then the secretary of an English organisation and that as soon as he started an Irish one his union fell to pieces...the feeling in the city is so violently Orange and anti-Irish at present that our task has been a hard one all along." Connolly to William O’Brien 29/7/1913 NLI Ms. 13,908.

Chapter Two: Dublin - A Case of Attenuated Industrialisation

1. This pattern of spatial concentration and its political and economic consequences - nowadays known as "the north-south divide" - were first extensively commented on by J.A. Hobson (1902).

2. What is known of the smaller Dublin breweries, their output and employment levels can be summarised as follows:
Phoenix Brewery not known
Anchor Brewery, Usher St 250,000 barrels max.
Joseph Watkins, Ardee St. not known
Mountjoy Brewery 100,000 barrels plus (a) 120 (a)
Jameson Pim, North Anne St. 100,000 hogshead (a) 200 (a,b)

Sources: (a) Barnard (1889-91): (b) MacArdle, T.C. and Callan, W. (1902). Both sources refer to Phoenix as having the second largest capacity after Guinness. Export trades are referred to in the cases of the Mountjoy Brewery (said to be second after Guinness in export volume) and Jameson Pim.

3. A volume of this bicentenary history covering the firm's second century was projected (Lynch and Vaizey, 1960, vii) but not published.

4. On the ease with which public house licenses could be obtained outside the major cities see the Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, Minutes of Evidence relating to Ireland, P.P. 1898 XXXVIII.

5. For details of the operations of individual Dublin distilleries see McGuire (1973) 338-343 and 370-374.

6. For details see "Activity in the Dublin Tobacco Trade" I.T. 6/2/1900.

7. An account of the firm's competitive position was given by its chairman to the Board of Trade Inquiry held during the 1913-14 lockout: "The majority of produce from which we manufacture our biscuits comes from across Channel, though we use some Irish flour. There is one very large item which is English flour which we have to use. It is no secret in the biscuit trade that flour grown in the south of England and milled there is better than that grown anywhere else and we have to pay for that flour coming into Dublin... We have to pay three freights. We have to pay the actual rate in and for the goods going out, because three fourths of ... what we produce goes across the water. We have to pay also on the empties coming back." I.T. 3/10/1913.

8. Sources for Table 2.1's employment estimates: (a) Guinness - Times 8/6/1914. From the 1908 edition of the Red Book of Commerce Shaw (1983) cites a figure of 3,550 for 1907. A Statement of Evidence by the firm dated 1/1/09, and referring to manual workers only gives a total of 2,506: Royal Commission on Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress, Minutes of Evidence Relating to Ireland, Appendix XLVII, P.P. 1910 LI. The firm's reply to a Royal Commission on Labour questionnaire in the early 1890s gives a total of 1,906, again covering manual workers only (P.P. 1892 XXXVI) (b) Jacob - Times 8/6/1914; evidence of George Jacob to Board of Trade Inquiry, I.T. 20/9/1913. (c) Distilling - Webb (1913, 112) basing
himself on Barnard (1887) (d) Other Brewing - Estimate based on information presented in Note 2 above. (e) Mineral Waters - Times 8/6/1914; Webb (1913, 115).

9. See Preliminary Tables Summarising the Results of the Returns received under the Census of Production Act of 1906, Part V, P.P. 1910 CIX.

10. This contrasts with the estimate by Hepburn and Collins (1981) that a minimum of 46% of Belfast's adult male population was engaged in the city's principal industrial sectors - engineering, shipbuilding, linen or textile finishing - in 1901. At the same date 43% of women and girls over 10 years of age were at work, with three-fifths of this total being employed in textile mills or factories or in the finishing trades. In Dublin at the same date less than 30% of the same female group was occupied. Persons working or dealing in textile fabrics' accounted for less than 1% of occupied Dublin females.

11. At the time of the 1902 strike called by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in its Dublin District nearly 60% of the union's members were employed in railway company engineering works (McDonnell, 1979, 174).

12. Cf. Marx's distinction between production time and working time in Volume Two of Capital: "What is involved is ... an interruption (in the labour process) conditioned by the nature of the product and its production, during which the object of labour is subjected to natural processes of shorter or longer duration, and has to undergo physical, chemical or physiological changes while th labour process is either completely or partially suspended" (Marx, 1978, 316).


14. "The Ford Motor Co. Ltd Manchester, through the Town Clerk Dublin, wrote asking information as to spaces of 6 to 7 acres available in Dublin for a large factory. Also as to transit facilities - steamships etc. from and to this point. Council instructed the Secretary to furnish any particulars he possibly can to the Ford Co." Dublin Industrial Development Association Minute Books, 27/1/1913, NLI Ms. 16,240.

15. See the account of the decision to move production from Dublin given to a shareholders meeting by Harvey Du Cros I.T. 17/12/1891.

16. See George Jacob's reply to a deputation organised by the Irish Industrial Development Association to urge the firm to reconsider its decision and invest at an Irish location: 'For years past we have had under consideration the suggestion for a branch factory in England, and it must be manifest to everyone that considerable economy could be effected by the saving in cost of transit of many
articles used in the manufacture of our goods, as well as of the finished products and returned empties. But we deferred doing so heretofore while we had sufficient room for extension here. The point has now been reached when we can no further extend so as to deal with our trade in a satisfactory manner and any further attempt to fit in more producing power in one block would cause too much congestion and handicap our efforts in keeping our biscuits in the front rank as regards quality and turnout. We had no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that if we were to have a second factory it should be in England and not in another part of Dublin and this I think must be obvious to anyone who carefully studies the subject. Several of our Scottish competitors have duplicate factories in England and in other industries the course is often adopted. We are really only taking an ordinary up-to-date policy which we hope will so strengthen our business that our factory here ought to be maintained in a flourishing condition. We have taken a larger piece of land than we require at present and our intention is to erect a comparatively small factory there and add to it as required. We have sunk too much capital in our factory here to contemplate moving it ... " F.J. 12/6/1912. Also Lord Iveagh, addressing a Guinness shareholders meeting in London: "The company's trade at home particularly in Great Britain had grown steadily year by year and they were now face to face with the necessity of increasing the capacity of their brewing and other plant. Such a question had to be considered in all its aspects, and especially in view of the development of their trade in England and Scotland and the large increase which had taken place in the cost of freight, both on the raw material into Dublin and on manufactured beer to the consumer in Great Britain. These considerations had led the Board to decide on opening a branch of their brewery in England and they had secured a site in the Manchester district possessing facilities for business which should result in many economies." Times 15/8/1913.

17. The First World War seriously disrupted the brewing industry and both the home and British markets for beer remained depressed during the post-war years. The British market moreover, became an export market in the fullest sense with the secession of southern Ireland from the United Kingdom in 1922. Guinness were adversely affected by the resort of a depression-stricken UK to tariff protection in 1932 while the advent of a protectionist Fianna Fail government in Ireland in the same year introduced new uncertainties into the economic and political situation facing an export-oriented manufacturer. In the 1930s the company proceeded with the plan, first announced in 1913, to build an English brewery. After the opening of the London Park Royal plant the volume of beer production in Ireland, around 90% of which was Guinness's, fell by nearly a quarter between 1935 and 1938. This decline was entirely in production for export and its pattern closely matched that of the output of Park Royal. (K. Kennedy, 1971, 55-61).

18. In the 1911 Irish Census tables there are 24 orders and 77 sub-orders of occupations: in the tables for England and Wales there are 23 orders and 81 sub-orders.

19. For an example of the use which has been made of these series see Kendrick, Bechhofer and Mc Crone (1965).
20. F.J. 11/9/1913 and Thomas Johnson’s memorandum on the build-up to the lockout, NLI Ms. 17,228.

21. The four departments set up from 1881 onwards to deal with economic problems...were among the six largest government departments in 1914 and between them employed just over fifty per cent of the total staff in specifically Irish offices.": McDowell, 1964, 27).

22. Crossick (1977) shows that in 1911 Edinburgh and London had around 10% of their occupied male populations over 15 years of age in the nine major ‘white collar’ occupations but precise comparison between Dublin and these British cities is confounded by differences in the occupational definitions applied to white collar workers by the British and Irish censuses. On differences in the treatment of the case of the railway clerk see p.67 below.

23. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence, Group C, P.P. 1892 Part II Qs. 16,246-16,250.

Chapter Three: Ethnic Identity and Urban Community

1. See Stedman Jones (1984, 133-134): "Even at the end of the 1860s...Marx was still unwilling to examine seriously the political and economic conditions of existence of reformism...Casting around for a more structural explanation...he began to think Ireland the principal reason for the immobility of English workers...this analysis...once again evaded the principal point that needed to be explained."

2. As Section 3 (c) below shows, precise information on the religious breakdown of the population is not available for Britain but a figure of around 20% is widely, if tacitly, assumed in the literature for the Irish Catholic communities of Glasgow and Liverpool.

3. The 1898 Act transferred to elected County Councils the business of Grand Juries and Presentment Sessions in so far as the business was not connected with the administration of justice. The composition of the Boards of Poor Law Guardians had previously been half-elected, the other half consisting of magistrates sitting ex-officio. These now became purely elected bodies. This change transferred the South Dublin Union to Nationalist control.

4. Outside the six largest cities (administratively known as County Boroughs) each county was divided into a series of Rural and Urban
Districts each of which had had a Council responsible chiefly for roads and public works.

5. William Martin Murphy, who achieved notoriety in the 1913-14 lockout, was chairman of the Dublin United Tramways Company: William Cotton, who began his career as a Dublin Corporation official, was managing director of the Dublin Gas Company. Murphy was MP for Dublin St. Patrick's from 1885 to 1892. Cotton sat in parliament for South County Dublin from 1910 until his death in 1917.

6. For allegations of discrimination in white collar railway employment see Catholic Association (1903), in banking see H.P. (1907), in insurance see statement by the Catholic Defence Society published in The Leader 28/9/1912. For a series of allegations relating to promotion within various branches of the public service see The Leader 12/10/1912, 19/10/1912, 26/10/1912, 25/1/1913, 1/2/1913, 8/2/1913 and 15/2/1913.

7. See the pamphlet Partridge wrote and published, "My Crime", (Partridge, 1912) and also articles by him in The Leader 14/9/1912 and 19/10/1912.

8. For a biographical sketch see "Have you heard of William Partridge?" Liberty, April 1978. See also Geraghty and Rigney (1983).

9. The Leader 19/10/1912.

10. Catholic Association (1903, 28-33).

11. Catholic Association (1903, 11).

12. Archbishop Walsh publicly accused it of being responsible for 'enormous injury' to Catholic interests: "I could mention case after case, many of them very painful ones in which, as a result of what is being done in Dublin, Catholic tradesmen and Catholic employees, and some even of the most worthy Catholic charitable and benevolent institutions in the diocese, have suffereded substantial loss." It has also been suggested that he may privately have feared that its strident articulation of lay concerns in the area of job discrimination would jeopardise the attainment of the longstanding clerical objective of a state-endowed Catholic University (Miller, 1973, 109-112: Bolster, 1979, 9-10).


17. See Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Local Government and Taxation of Towns (Ireland) P.P. 1876 X and P.P. 1877 XII especially the evidence of A.M. Sullivan, Q.s 4,685-4,686 and Q.s 4,766 to 4,771, and that of E.O. Gray Q.s 6,573-6,579.


19. I.T. 18/1/1899.

20. In 1903 a petition was organised and presented to Dublin County Council to have the two Rathmines wards divided. The County Council subsequently made an order increasing the number of wards to five but Rathmines Urban District Council appealed against the order to the Local Government Board (LGB) supported by a second residents' group which counter-petitioned against the division of the wards. After a local inquiry by an LGB Inspector, it was held that, as the division of the District into two wards had been created by a local and personal Act of Parliament in 1885, neither the County Council nor the LGB had the power to make any change I.T. 26/5/1904, 27/5/1904 and 2/9/1904. The one local branch of the Catholic Association of whose activities we have evidence was involved in initiating the petition for a division: the Dublin correspondent of The Times reported (2/9/1904) that the LGB's decision "has given great satisfaction to local Unionists."


22. Sir Robert Sexton, however, came close to being elected with the support of the Trades Council and a section of Nationalist councillors who seem to have backed him in the hope that his election might help solve the municipal boundaries impasse CO 903 S B Series XVII.

23. I.T. edit. 17/1/1914.

24. For police reports on disturbances connected with street preaching in a variety of locations during the 1890s and 1900s see CO 903 S Miscellaneous Notes B Series (4), CO 903 6 Miscellaneous Notes B Series, CO 903 7 Miscellaneous Notes W Series.

25. See the series of six articles "Is the I.C.M. a Failure?" which appeared in The Leader in September and October 1913. That of 11/10/1913 describes ICM activities in Dublin and contrasts their "qualified success" here with the "abject and ignominious failure" experienced by its work in other parts of Ireland.
26. See, for instance, the 1915 report of the Conference of Our Lady of the Rosary: "The strike at the docks and the shortage of shipping have had a tendency to spread destitution among the Quay Labourers. In times of labour troubles the proselytiser is unusually busy and of late the visitors of this conference found many evidences of their activities...". In 1914 SVP had 31 conferences with 551 active members operating between Dublin's two canals. In that year these conferences provided relief to 5,720 families to whom they made 31,464 visits. Fundamental to the work of the locally-based SVP conferences was the principle that relief should only be dispensed through home visits. Castigating breaches of this 'cardinal rule' revealed by reports from some conferences the Superior Council of SVP in 1899 emphasised the wider, two-sided relationship of moral and religious discipline within which the society's provision of relief was situated: "The first reason for requiring visitation is to be found in the fact that the Church has granted a Special Indulgence to the Active Members for each visit paid to a poor family, and the second is that visitation of the abodes of the persons relieved is absolutely essential for the prevention of imposition on the Society and for the purpose of enabling its members to discharge the paramount duty of endeavouring to improve the moral and social condition of all whom they assist and, in the case of the Catholic poor, of seeing to the fulfilment of their religious duties."


28. Archbishop Walsh publicly declared that: "He could not reconcile it with his duty as Archbishop of that diocese to give any personal sanction to any organisation for charitable work, especially where it involved visiting the poor in their homes, if even there was engaged even one Protestant lady or gentleman who had not publicly protested against the shocking and sinful trade in souls" D.E. 22/12/1902.

29. Evidence of Mrs. H. Tolerton (Q. 430) to the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Employment of Children, especially in Street-trading, in the Large Centres of Population in Ireland P.P. 1902 XLIX.

30. The Leader 14/9/1912.


32. I.T. 6/7/1886

33. See Programmes of the annual celebration under the auspices of the City of Dublin Grand Orange Lodge in the Rotunda buildings 15/7/1903 and 1/7/1908 in the NLI Pamphlet Collection.


36. As President of the Dublin Typographical Provident Society Merry gave evidence to the Royal Commission on Labour in the early 1890s P.P. 1893-94 XXXIV Q.s 27,451 to 27,503. Before the first Corporation elections under the extended municipal franchise he published a letter addressed to his ‘fellow Unionist workmen’ criticising Labour Electoral Association candidates for their sotto voce Nationalist entanglements O.E. 16/1/1899.

Chapter Four: Ethnic Antagonism and Trade Union Growth

1. This was a feature noted at the time by Arnold Wright’s hostile - to the trade unions - account of the lockout (Wright, 1914, 50) but which has subsequently tended to get overlooked.

2. Royal Commission on Labour P.P. 1892 XXXVI Part IV.


6. Resolutions calling for the amendment of the Factories and Workshops legislation to abolish homeworking in the tailoring trade were regularly brought forward at the ITUC by the Amalgamated Society of Tailors. See also Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Public Health of Dublin, Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1900 XXXIX Q.s 4,688-4,733 and Committee appointed to advise on the application of the National Insurance Act to outworkers in Ireland, Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1914-16, XXXI, Q.s 1,403-1,442.

7. Royal Commission on the Poor Law and the Relief of Distress, Minutes of Evidence relating to Ireland, Appendix XLVII, P.P. 1910 LI.

8. Daly (1984, 68-70) notes an upsurge in strikes in Dublin in the early 1870s, although the decade, and indeed the whole period between 1848 and 1889, remain largely uncharted territory for Dublin labour history. The widespread participation of Dublin workers in the strike wave of the early 1890s and the ‘beating back’ of union organisation in the city by a subsequent employers'
offensive is well documented (Cody, 1982; Keogh, 1975 and 1982; McDonnell, 1979).

9. See copy of letter from James Connolly to Mr. Cusack, Locomotive Engineers Dept., Broadstone Station 26/11/1913 NLI Ms. 13,921.

10. See the correspondence between ITGWU officials and Guinness’s NLI Ms. 13,921. For the announcement of the loyalty bonus I.T. 13/2/1914.


12. On the number of men involved, see George Jacob’s evidence to the Board of Trade inquiry into the lockout Times 3/10/1913. On the number of women refusing to remove union badges, Irish Worker 9/9/1913.

13. According to Jacob, the firm employed 1,059 males and 2,095 females Times 3/10/1913.

14. About one hundred men were reported to have been taken back at reduced wages: women applicants were alleged to have subjected to a grossly humiliating ordeal. Daily Herald 14/2/1914; Irish Worker 14/3/1914; NLI Ms. 13,944.


16. James Larkin claimed at the Board of Trade inquiry that these notices had been printed as early as August 23. I.T. 3/10/1913.

17. See "How Murphy Wages War" by Thomas Johnson, Daily Herald 1/12/1913.

18. A welfare secretary was appointed in the Dublin factory in 1906. The company was represented at a weekend conference of employers and welfare workers held at Bournville in September 1909. Charles Jacob, one of the directors, was among the organisers of a 'welfare section' exhibit at the Trade Exhibition held in London in 1913. He also attended the founding conference of the Welfare Workers Association, from which the Institute of Personnel Management was later to grow, in June 1913. This meeting was held at York under Rowntree's auspices and Jacob was one of two employers elected to the Association's six person committee (Niven, 1967, 24 and 31-36).

19. See the account written by the firm's long-serving Chief Medical Officer, Sir John Lumsden, "The Medical Department and Social Services at St. James Gate Brewery, Dublin, 1894-1943" TCD Library, Manuscripts Dept., Ms. V4. 13.(3463).
20. For a review of the literature on the effects of automated, capital-intensive and continuous process technology on management/ labour relations within firms see Gallie (1981).

21. Exacting physical standards were adopted as the general method of screening applicants. Labourers, according to Malone (1927, 467), were principally recruited from the barley-growing rural districts. After the Boer War the company gave preference to ex-soldiers and extended its usual upper age limit from 26 to 31 to facilitate their recruitment. Ex-servicemen were not, however, to exceed ten per cent of the total manual workforce. After the First World War a similar preferential scheme was instituted and remained in force until 1933. The upper age limit was further extended (to 35) for ex-servicemen and no stipulation as to the maximum proportion of the workforce they might comprise was made (Halterman, 1948, 7).

22. The First World War, however, marked the end of a period of virtually continuous growth stretching back into the middle of the nineteenth century for the company. Recruitment of workers slowed and, given the very low turnover of workers the company's high wages and welfare programmes produced, the rate of absorption of "boys and youths" into the adult labour force decreased sharply. By the late 1920s Malone could observe that: "In the past the prospects of boys entering the service of the Brewery were very much better than they are at present. It was somewhat unusual for a boy to leave the service when once he had entered it: nowadays it seems to be just as unusual for a boy to remain". (Malone, 1927, 474).

The brewery's workforce aged while the costs of the welfare benefits with which it was provided continued to increase. By the late 1930s only about 5% of labourers were aged under forty: in 1918, by contrast, 60% of labourers were under forty-three. As Halterman, who studied the operation of the company's industrial relations policy between 1914 and 1937, noted: "This change in the age composition will create a heavy financial obligation upon the company in the near future when the men are retired on a pension". (Halterman, 1948, 8). Yet even before these (discretionary but in practice automatic) obligations fell due the costs to the company of its welfare programmes was spiralling. In 1913 the amount paid to pensioners was 8% of the total paid for current wages: by 1928 it was above 10% and by 1936 it had reached 19.5% (Halterman, 1948, 54).

With the opening of Guinness's London brewery in 1935 a large reduction in output from Dublin was not matched by a reduction in employment in Ireland and labour productivity declined by almost as much as output (K. Kennedy, 1971, 55-61). As the paternalist capitalist's 'room to manoeuvre' decreased "Scientific Management was introduced in the 1940s-50s and was strenuously resisted by workers with strong unionisation" (Anagnostelis, 1983, 33).

23. At the Board of Trade inquiry George Jacob cited a case referred to him by the factory's Lady Superintendent. "This girl was penalised by her fellow workers because she was in a batch of about a dozen girls and she happened to be the only girl in the batch who had not the (union) badge up. That girl was persecuted not only verbally,
and shunned by these other girls, but it actually went so far that they prevailed on the man taking the boxes of biscuits backwards and forwards to boycott this girl and he would not take her boxes... I investigated the matter and found there were two or three men concerned in it. We got them all up, and they were spoken to on the subject, and one, whose record had been very bad, and who had committed himself in various ways before he had been cautioned, was sent away": I.T. 3/10/1913. See also Melling (1980, 214).

24. This relatively undocumented dispute lasted for just over a fortnight F.J. 4/7/1900, 20/7/1900. Four hundred "free labourers" were imported into Dublin. For a riot involving "free labourers" and striking NUOL members see F.J. 16/7/1900.


26. See MacDonnell (1979) Chapter Four for an account and Appendix A for the Agreements negotiated with the Master Builders Association by the bricklayers’ union in 1890 and 1896.

27. See MacDonnell (1979, 163-170) for an account of this dispute. The use by Dublin employers of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers of Great Britain and Ireland to recruit blackleg bricklayers was cited by the ITUC’s Parliamentary Committee to counter Sinn Fein calls for a purely Irish trade unionism: while employers continued "to form associations, trusts and combines to protect vested interests and exploit wage workers" it was imperative that all workers drew closer together and solidified their organisations (ITUC Annual Report 1907, 14-15).

28. A hand-written and undated report compiled by the Trades Council executive on friction between theUBLGWU and ITGWU is in NLI Ms. 13,913. The issue was discussed by Trades Council delegate meetings on 30/6/1913 and 28/7/1913, OTC Minute Books, NLI Ms. 12,780 (A).

29. Irish Builder and Engineer 17/1/1914


31. See editorial "Dublin Labour Struggle" Irish Builder and Engineer 17/1/1914.

32. I.I. 2/2/1914; NLI Ms. 13,913.

33. Irish Builder and Engineer 17/1/1914.

34. See letter from J. Gibson, BTERA secretary, Irish Builder and
Engineer 17/1/1914.

35. The carpenters union overwhelmingly rejected the alterations in a first ballot: A second ballot agreed to them following clarification of these two points: F.J. 28/3/1914.

36. NLI Ms. 13,913 and Ms. 3,097.

37. On the relatively "casual" character of the return to work on the docks see W. O’Brien (1969, 101)

38. See Minute Book of Dublin No. 1 branch of ITGWU NLI Ms. 7,298.

39. Greaves (1982, 139-156); NLI Ms. 7,298.

40. According to Bagwell (1982, 230-231) "at no time before 1914 was a majority of the railway workforce organised."

41. Reacting to an irruption of urban class conflict unprecedented in 'Catholic Ireland' the entire Catholic hierarchy issued a pastoral letter shortly after the ending of the lockout in which they commented on the dispute and the means by which a recurrence of conflict on this scale could be avoided. Much of this pastoral was devoted to an exposition of papal teaching on the relations between social classes in industrial society as set out in the encyclical Rerum Novarum. The recent Dublin dispute it dealt with primarily in nationalist terms, laying heavy emphasis on the baleful effects of British trade union intervention on the workers side. The other 'British dimension' of the dispute, the importation by Dublin employers of scabs and by the government of troops to protect them, received no mention.

From the dispute the hierarchy retained a 'humiliating memory' that: "in a year of plenty many thousands of the toiling masses in the capital city of our country were left in idle dependence on rations and strike pay from England and that large numbers of children had to be fed by charity away from their homes when not deported into strange fosterage across the channel." Their 'sense of misery' was further deepened by the fact that: "The contest arose and went on between Irish employers and Irish workers to the serious prejudice of the nation's interests at a time when the near prospect of native government should have raised the hearts of true Irishmen and drawn them together in harmonious and dignified relations."

42. Part of an article written by James Connolly explaining his rejection of an invitation to speak at a 1914 May Day meeting in Glasgow; quoted in Levenson (1977, 253).
Chapter Five Voters, Parties and Stratagems

1. Cf. P. Anderson (1977, 30): "The peculiarity of the historical consent won from the masses within modern capitalist social formations...is that it takes the fundamental form of a belief by the masses that they exercise an ultimate self-determination within the existing social order."

2. In England and Wales Sheppard (1982, 20) estimates that about six to seven per cent more males possessed the municipal vote than possessed the parliamentary vote.

3. Cf. Mitchell (1974, 53-54) and Keogh (1982, 237) on the results of the 1914 municipal elections held during the fifth month of the lockout. Compare also Patterson (1980a) on William Walker's three contests as a Labour candidate in North Belfast with the Ulster Guardian editorial 20/4/1907 - "North Belfast was fought and lost in the Revision Courts last year". But see D. Murphy (1981) for an appreciation of the importance of voter registration in the politics of north-west Ireland.

4. The standard Irish legal work on the subject is Hunt (1898).

5. See the case of Daly v Campbell, Irish Law Times Reports XLIII (1909), 97-98.

6. See the New Kilmainham case reported I.T. 21/9/1909.

7. Franchise and Registration was a standard heading under which judgements were reported by the Irish Law Times.


9. Musgrove (1977) provides a theoretical treatment of this dubious institution.

10. Only Cork City remained a two-member, single constituency borough in Ireland.


12. Reports of proceedings and editorial comments F.J. 3/2/1885, 4/2/1885.


15. Advertisements setting out the proposed division appeared in the Dublin press 24/1/1885.

16. Letter from the Town Clerk of Dublin to Commissioners 19/1/1885 in Minutes, Correspondence and other papers of the Boundary Commission (Ireland), PROI.

17. Report of the Boundary Commission (Ireland) P.P. 1884-85, XIX, 429; Copy of a Communication...Relative to the Alterations Made After Local Inquiry in the Provisional Schemes for the Division of... Dublin and the Borough of Dublin P.P. 1884-85, LXII, 253.


19. The Irish Unionist Alliance's monthly publication "Notes From Ireland" was directed at a British audience: for the variety of other propaganda undertaken by Irish Unionists in Great Britain see Buckland (1973, 265-339).

20. R. Hazleton to W. Field 17/12/1906 NLI Ms. 15.195 (3). "Sinn Fein" challenged William Field to resign his seat and face its party at a by-election after winning in two and endorsing the victorious candidate in the third of St. Patrick's wards at the 1908 municipal elections S.F. 25/1/1908.

21. J.J. Cullen to J. Dillon 14/9/1912, Dillon Papers, Irish General Correspondence, 1437.

22. These Voters Lists form part of the PROI's Records of the Clerks of the Crown and Peace.

23. See Hunt (1898, 192). Actual registration practice seems to have departed, albeit to a very limited extent, from judicial precept. Just under 3% of the wives of married male HoHs in the Dublin sample were found to have a local government vote.

24. During the 1890s the Unionist Party had in operation A joint registration fund making grants to associations in Irish constituencies which were either held by Unionists or offered reasonable prospects for a Unionist success. This was maintained by Conservative Central Office, the Liberal Unionist Association in
London and the Irish Unionist Alliance. The Irish body contributed two-fifths of the total amount. In 1894 its Parliamentary Consultative Committee had, in the course of discussions leading up to the formation of the joint fund, divided all Irish constituencies into four classes according to the possibility of Unionist success in each of them: Irish Unionist Alliance Parliamentary Consultative Committee Minute Book 17/6/1896 PRONI D 989 A 1/7; Irish Unionist Alliance Annual Report 1897 PRONI D 989 A 7/2; Undated report of the Parliamentary Consultative Committee whose recommendations were approved by the Irish Unionist Alliance executive 30/5/1894 PRONI D 989 A 1/5.

25. The beneficiary of a split in the South Dublin Unionist vote in 1900, J.J. Mooney, found the financial burden of trying to hold the seat thrust largely upon his personal resources. Unable and/or unwilling to continue discharging it, he successfully sought another constituency (Newry) in which to stand at the 1906 general election. The Unionists took South Dublin back with a large majority in that election. William Cotton seems to have largely financed the registration efforts that paved the way for its recapture in December 1910: P.C. Doyle to J. Dillon 12/4/1900, Dillon Papers, Irish General Correspondence, 884; J.J. Mooney to J. Redmond 29/3/1901, 28/5/1901 and 7/12/1904 NLI Ms. 15,206 (6); L. Ginnell to J. Redmond 11/12/1902 NLI Ms. 15,191 (1); J.J. Dunne to J. Dillon 12/10/1909 and 16/5/1910 Dillon Papers, Irish General Correspondence, 1231 and 1298.

26. In 1900 James McCann, a wealthy Catholic stockbroker, stood as a Nationalist candidate who had not signed the party pledge but was endorsed by the Nationalist Party leaders (V. Dillon to J. Redmond 21/9/1900, 25/9/1900 NLI Ms. 15,183). McCann had opposed the 1893 Home Rule Bill because of its financial clauses and had signed a Dublin Stock Exchange petition against the bill. He had also voted for the victorious Unionist candidate in Stephens Green in the elections of 1892 and 1895 (speech of J.H. Campbell, I.T. 29/9/1900). By 1900, however, he had turned against the Unionist government because of its refusal to rectify the financial relations between Britain and Ireland. McCann's election address (F.J. 26/9/1900) emphasised the importance of the question of the overtaxation suffered by Ireland and committed him to resigning his seat if a Home Rule Bill was introduced whose financial provisions he could not support.

When McCann died in 1904 the party leaders set out to find another 'independent Nationalist' to fight the seat. Finally Laurence Waldron, a friend of the late MP as well as a fellow stockbroker and fellow supporter of Unionist candidates in Stephen's Green in the 1890s, was prevailed upon to stand on this basis: J. Dillon to J. Redmond 29/2/1904 NLI Ms. 15,182 (7); J. Muldoon to J. Redmond 18/2/1904, 24/2/1904 NLI Ms. 15,286, J. Muldoon to J. Dillon 22/2/1904 Dillon Papers, Ms. 6734, Muldoon Correspondence 16; T.C. Harrington to J. Redmond 19/2/1904; 21/2/1904, 25/2/1904, 29/2/1904, 2/3/1904, 6/3/1904 NLI Ms. 15,194; J.J. Clancy to J. Redmond 19/2/1904, 20/2/1904 NLI Ms. 15,176; J. Redmond to J. Muldoon 22/2/1904 NLI Ms. 24, 836.

27. To Queen Victoria in 1900 and Edward VII in 1903 - see below
Chapter Six. In addition William Cotton was also connected to Tory Party organisations such as the Tariff Reform League and the Constitutional Club in London: I.T. editorial 18/1/1910.


29. Irish Worker 20/1/1912.


33. In the closing weeks of 1897, with a by-election pending in Stephen's Green, the Daily Nation published a series of articles highlighting the large number of bogus Unionist lodger votes on the register about to come into force in that division. In anticipation of the matter being raised in parliament, the government law officers ordered a police investigation. Application was made to the Town Clerk for the original claim forms. When these were made available every doubtful lodger claim was examined and its contents checked in a house-to-house police inspection.

As a result two party agents, one Nationalist and one Unionist, were prosecuted in June 1898 and were fined £20 and £25 respectively on being found guilty of 'having manufactured false evidence to pervert the course of law and justice' (SPO CSORP 10.337/1898). In 1904, following Nationalist complaints, two Unionist agents were prosecuted for registration frauds in South Dublin, this time for tampering with Requisition Forms in Rathmines and Kingstown. Both were convicted and jailed, one for three months and the other for one month (SPO CSORP 14,801/1904). In 1907 Unionist complaints led to detailed police investigation of bogus Nationalist lodger claims in Rathmines. In this case the law officers decided that the evidence assembled was insufficient to sustain a prosecution (SPO CSORP 25,867/1907).

34. In 1904 the jailing of the Unionist agents for fraud followed shortly after the exposure by other Unionist agents of around two hundred bogus claims in the safe Nationalist Rotunda ward (E.M. 21/9/1904, 22/9/1904, 27/9/1904) At the Revision Sessions the solicitor and the agent representing the Nationalists in Rotunda disclaimed all knowledge of the bogus claims. The Revising Barrister, for his part, adopted a sanguine attitude: asked by the Unionist solicitor what steps he intended to take in the matter he replied that the publicity given to the case would most likely prevent it recurring again. The contrast between the South County sentences and the Rotunda revelations, prompted the observation that "one cannot be blamed for thinking there must be one law for Unionists and another for Nationalists" (letter to I.T. 294
26/10/1904). But since Nationalists were prosecuted or actively considered for prosecution on registration fraud charges in Stephen's Green and South Dublin, what differential enforcement of the law was related to was not parties but zones of electoral competition.

In the light of the argument concerning the zoning of the city, it might well be asked what Unionist agents were doing inspecting the Rotunda ward in 1904? This presence resulted from the adoption of a 'consolidation scheme' providing for the expansion of the number of wards in which revision work would be carried out by the Unionist Association to fifteen. What electoral return could conceivably have been expected from Unionist registration efforts in a ward like Rotunda it is hard to imagine and in subsequent years the party's activity shrunk back to its normal dimensions as the additional local subscriptions needed to operate the consolidation scheme no doubt failed to materialise. In 1904 its expanded - if quixotic - character had the effect of casting light into normally darkened areas of the register.

35. See report of Dublin Citizens Association Central Council meeting D.E. 11/9/1912; also Irish Worker editorial 18/1/1913.

36. In 1912 a series of articles in the Irish Worker by Michael Mullen detailed the stuffed state of the register in Zone B (Irish Worker 21/9/1912, 26/10/1912, 9/11/1912, 23/11/1912, 19/7/1913). By contrast with that of the Daily Nation in 1897, the Irish Worker's exposure of stuffing evoked no official response. This can hardly have been because the authorities were unaware of it: a very thick file in the London Public Record Office (CO 904 159) testifies to the interest taken in the contents of James Larkin's newspaper. It was, however, to its own possible prosecution for intimidation, sedition etc. rather than that of those responsible for the electoral illegalities it had exposed, that official attention was directed.


38. D.E. 21/4/1914, 19/5/1914. The corporation voted up to £500 to the Town Clerk to have detailed inspections carried out as a preliminary to purifying the register. While the value of this exercise was viewed with considerable scepticism in independent nationalist quarters (Irish Worker 30/5/1914) it did produce a sizeable increase in the number of official objections lodged at the 1914 Revision Sessions. As a result the last parliamentary register to be produced in the city under the third Reform Act was 8% smaller than its predecessor and 19% smaller than that of 1885.

39. Dubbed "Stephen the Stuffer" by the Irish Worker, Hand was appointed as a temporary official in the Town Clerk's office in March 1907 as part of an official drive ostensibly aimed at 'purifying' the register. His appointment was shortly afterwards made permanent his salary, it was claimed, would be counterbalanced by savings made in the consultation of Counsel on complicated registration cases and he was responsible in
subsequent years for lodging official objections and sustaining them in the Revision Courts (Irish Labour Journal 21/9/1909). Prior to his employment by the Corporation Hand had taken an active part in organising the United Irish League in Dublin and had been secretary and registration agent of its Arran Quay ward branch. His involvement with the UIL continued long after he had gone to work for the Corporation: as late as 1915 he attended a Convention to select a candidate for the vacant College Green parliamentary division as a delegate from the Arran Quay UIL branch. He also featured among a crowd of "friends and supporters" who accompanied the candidate selected by this Convention when he lodged his nomination papers (F.J. 3/6/1915, 9/6/1915).

40. Hand acted as election agent for the UIL candidate at the 1902 election of an alderman for Arran Quay. The candidate was victorious but an election petition subsequently succeeded in having the result declared void on the grounds of Hand's indulgence in illegal practices. Hand was reported for his activities by the Election Commissioner, an action which carried a penalty of seven years disfranchisement. In the following year he was again involved in a dirty electoral battle in the same ward which also gave rise to an election petition: giving evidence during this case he declared that "he would not stop at trifles especially where the League would be concerned": Irish Worker 26/9/1912.


42. E.g. United Irishman 25/1/1902, 1/2/1902, 23/1/1904; The Harp, March 1908; S.F. Daily 17/1/1910, 22/1/1910; Irish Worker 29/6/1912.

43. S.F. 18/2/1911.

44. See Programme adopted by the Irish National League 17/10/1882: CO 904 16.

45. ITUC Annual Reports 1894-1898; Cody (1982, 138-142).

46. In 1917 the Unionists expected to "gain" 29 seats out of redistribution in Ireland but "lose" 19 through the changes it would bring about in Britain.

47. ITUC Annual Report 1912: for a list of the fourteen proposed urban borough constituencies to be created by grouping towns within counties or across county boundaries see pp 29-30.


49. United Irishman 1/2/1902.
Chapter Six: The United Kingdom State and Irish Civil Society

1. The concept of the 'overdevelopment' of the state in a context of colonialism has been formulated by Alavi (1972) as follows: "The bourgeois revolution in the colony, in so far as that consists of the establishment of a bourgeois state and the attendant legal and institutional framework, is an event which takes place with the imposition of colonial rule by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. In carrying out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in the colony, however, the metropolitan bourgeoisie had to accomplish an additional task which was specific to the colonial situation. Its task in the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally it had to create a state apparatus through which it could exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said, therefore, that the "superstructure" in the colony is "overdeveloped" in relation to the "structure" in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself..." (Alavi, 1972, 61).

2. With eight MPs after December 1910 the parliamentary strength of the All For Ireland League was almost the same as that of the Parnellite faction in the 1890s but Parnellism had had a much wider geographical spread (Woods, 1980).

3. J. Long (n.d.) is an account of his missionary work written for fundraising purposes by the doctor. On assaults on and boycotts of Dr. Long, attacks on the homes of some of the (Protestant) patients of his dispensary and criticism of the response to these incidents by police and magistrates see also D.E. 10/6/1901-25/6/1901, 6/10/1901, 6/10/1902, 11/11/1902, 21/7/1904.

4. Society for the Protection of Protestant Interests (1904) and Connellan (1906).


8. See Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. 137 7/7/1904 Cols. 1026-1048. Also Church of Ireland Gazette 24/6/1904; Dowden (1904); Connellan (1906).


10. D.E. 8/10/1901; D.E. 28/7/1904, 29/7/1904.

11. A prime example here is Monsignor Dennis O'Hara, parish priest of Kiltimagh, Co. Mayo, a member of the CBD who retained this position in spite of his active support for UIL agitation and the chief source of complaints against Constable Anderson, a Protestant member of the RIC stationed in Kiltimagh and courting a local Catholic girl. Anderson was dismissed from the force on the grounds of "indecent behaviour" but was later reinstated.


14. McCarthy's religious allegiance at the time of the by-election is in some doubt. He subsequently stated that "I was born a Roman Catholic and remained a Roman Catholic until after the appearance of my book 'Priests and People in Ireland'" (quoted in The Leader 10/1/1914). This book was published in London in 1902 and in Dublin in 1903.

15. Lists of Officers of the City and County of Dublin Grand Orange Lodges, district lodges and private lodges for 1889 and 1893 in NLI pamphlet collection.


17. Mooney (N) 3,410 Plunkett (U) 2,906 Ball (U) 1,539.
18. The leading figures were Lord Ardilaun, member of the Guinness family, proprietor of the Daily Express, and large landowner; Professor Edward Dowden of Trinity College; W.J. Goulding, fertiliser manufacturer and railway company director; Sir Malcolm Inglis, a Scot who was director of Heiton, a firm of coal importers, and J.G. Nutting, an Englishman who was chairman of E. & J. Burke, bottlers, bonders and wholesalers of whiskey and stout.


20. Letter from W.J. Goulding D.E. 30/8/1900; speech of J.G. Nutting D.E. 18/9/1900


22. D.E. edit. 29/9/1900; The Times 20/10/1900.


26. Anti-Ritualist protest was particularly a feature of Liverpool politics (Waller, 1981, 174-177 and 191-193). The death of the leading British militant, John Kensit, was mourned at a meeting of the Dublin Protestant Thousand: D.E. 5/12/1902. In Dublin at this time ritualist controversy centred particularly on All Saints church in Grangegorman.

27. See McCarthy (1904, 2-5).


29. Times 5/10/1900.

30. For blow-by-blow details see Jurist (1903).

31. Letter from William Hill, past District Grand Secretary, D.E. 14/2/1903.

Meeting 10/2/1902.


34. D.E. 11/12/1903.

35. I.T. 25/1/1904.


40. Times 29/2/1904.


42. F.J. 15/3/1900; F.J. 14/7/1903.

43. Only seven of the twenty-one surviving Nationalists who voted for the 1900 address failed to secure re-election. Of these four retired from the Corporation and three were defeated at the polls. Eleven of the twenty-four Nationalist supporters of the 1903 address were not re-elected. Of these eight retired when their terms expired and three were defeated seeking re-election.

44. In the wake of the revolutionary spasm of Fenianism, and faced with the problem of trying to find something for the Prince of Wales to do, Gladstone proposed in the early 1870s to abolish the Irish Lord Lieutenancy, a political office whose occupant went in and out with the government of the day, and, for its ceremonial function, to substitute a regular residence in the country of a member of the royal family. Vigorous resistance from the royal family to any of its members being regularly confined to Ireland for a part of the year squashed this idea (Guedella, 1933, Vol. 1, 351-381). Thereafter it resurfaced periodically, having its last outing in the wake of the 1916 rising when Asquith, returning from a visit to Ireland to assess the political situation, put it forward in a
memorandum on Irish policy to his Coalition Cabinet colleagues (Fair, 1980, 297-298). On this, as on previous occasions, nothing was done to put it into practice.

45. Queen Victoria in 1900, Edward VII in 1903 and (semi-privately) in 1904 and 1907, George V in 1911.

46. I.I. edit. 3/7/1903.

47. See press lists of addresses presented on 22/7/1903, 23/7/1903; 8/7/1911, 9/7/1911, 10/7/1911.

48. Presented on 27/7/1903 with 1,154 signatures.

49. I.T. 10/7/1911. One of its signatories, the union's secretary Michael Mallin, was later executed for his part in the 1916 rising.

50. The only Labour councillor to vote for the 1900 address, E.L. Richardson, secured Trades Council endorsement when he (unsuccessfully) sought re-election in 1901; F.J. 5/12/1900.

51. L. Ginnell to J. Dillon 9/8/1900 Dillon Papers, Ms. 6,732 Ginnell Correspondence 177.

52. F.J. 27/9/1900, 1/11/1900.

53. SPO CBS 23,203 S 16/8/1900; SPO CBS 24,149 S 14/1/1901; SPO CBS 24,667 S 14/5/1901. See also Chapter Seven below.

54. L. Ginnell to J. Dillon 11/1/1901 Dillon Papers Ms. 6,732 Ginnell Correspondence 189; SPO CBS 24,327 S 23/3/1901; SPO CBS 26,449S 23/7/1902.

55. For the circumstances in which the Independent League was launched in April 1897 see SPO CBS 13,520 S 29/4/1897; also Chapter Seven below.


57. On the history of the declaration issue up to the passing of the Accession Declaration Act of 1910 see The Liberal Magazine June 1910 258-262.

58. See copy in SPO CBS 28,498 S 28/5/1903.
59. The Leader 29/8/1903, 10/10/1903, 17/10/1903, 24/10/1903. There is a remarkable similarity between the argument of 29/8/1903, that a "law of social gravitation" exists by which "all roads to social distinction converge towards the King" and the Handbook of the Catholic Association's contention (p.35) that "social ascendancy remains where it was: the centre of gravity has not yet shifted in that sphere and Protestant society is still the centre towards which all that is socially ambitious tends to rush".

60. The Leader 17/10/1903.

61. "Would he (Dr. Walsh) have condemned the Association if it had been a success, and Protestants had not been aroused to protective measures?" (Society for the Protection of Protestant Interests, 1904, 30).


63. On a motion to reduce the Chief Secretary's salary moved on 3/8/1904 to register disapproval of the handling of Constable Anderson's case.

64. After the loss of his seat Plunkett's admirers organised a banquet in his honour and presented him with an address urging him to remain at the head of the D.A.T.I. I.T. 10/4/1901.


66. At Crawford's meeting in Kingstown "the hall was crowded to excess but very few of those present appeared to be Unionists of any sort": I.T. 24/1/1906. For the ruling invalid of Crawford's nomination as a candidate and a statement of the considerations which had prompted him to stand: I.T. 18/1/1906.


68. See Campbell-Bannerman's speech at Stirling: Times 24/11/1905.

69. On the functioning of the Council of Agriculture see Plunkett (1904, 232-236 and 257).

71. For a discussion of increasing UK state expenditure in Ireland in terms of "the diminishing returns of imperialism" which are seen as undermining Britain's interest in keeping Ireland within the UK see Strauss (1951, 197-205).

72. ITUC Annual Report 1912, 35 quotes Joseph Devlin as telling a delegation from the Parliamentary Committee that "it was the doctors who compelled the party to delete that portion of the bill."

73. Report of the Committee on Irish Finance (Primrose Committee) P.P. 1912-13 XXIV.

74. Ibid., especially Paras. 13, 15 and 56: also letter of Herbert Samuel (architect of the scheme actually incorporated into the bill) 26/4/1912 in Ennis (1917, 3).

75. The Report of a Committee appointed to consider the extension of the Medical Benefit under the National Insurance Act to Ireland recommended that separate arrangements, similar to those operating in Britain, be introduced for the six Irish county borough areas. In doing so the local government boundary should not be adopted but 'a special area' should be marked out "which will include the whole industrial population in centre": P.P. 1913 XXXVIII.


Chapter Seven: The Hegemony of Home Rule

1. Times 19/10/1881, 20/10/1881, 24/10/1881.

2. Times 24/10/1881, 25/10/1881, 26/10/1881, 21/12/1881, 23/12/1881, 4/1/1882, 10/1/1882.

3. F.J. 7/11/1885


5. See Report(s) of the Proceedings of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland at the General Half-Yearly Meeting...for details. In the Summer of 1881 there were three hundred labourers supplied to work on boycotted estates and farms. In December 1884 there were forty-three.


8. Speech of T.M. Healy F.J 20/11/1885; F.J. edits. 20/11/1885, 23/11/1885. For Guinness’s response to such charges D.E. 27/11/1885. In reality the Orange Lodge’s appeal for funds did not meet with the response that had been hoped for and, according to the report of the Building Committee responsible for the project in the 1885 Report of the Proceedings of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland at the General Half-Yearly Meeting, the new hall ended up in Rutland Square because "(houses) in the best and most central streets were too expensive for the means at the disposal of your committee."

9. For a brief account of the earlier Dublin exhibitions see J. Turpin "Dublin’s First Concert Hall" I.T. 1/12/1981.

10. Times 14/9/1881, 15/9/1881, 10/12/1881, 12/12/1881, 13/12/1881, 23/12/1881.


13. F.J. edit. 20/11/1885. According to Guinness’s opponent E.D. Gray, proprietor of the Freeman, "he shipped it off as old iron for Cockneys to enjoy themselves in."


15. ibid.


17. The guarantors were Joseph Meade (later Lord Mayor, Parnellite parliamentary candidate and Privy Councillor), William Field (MP for St. Patrick’s 1892-1916) and Patrick Sheeran.

18. "At no former election within living memory was so much popular feeling displayed" Times 1/12/1885. On post-election rioting and attacks on loyalist targets Times 2/12/1885. On the demonstration marking the departure of Lord Aberdeen Times 4/8/1886.

19. See Chapter Four above.
20. For the convention F.J. 21/6/1892; for nominations F.J. 5/7/1892; for city meetings with clergy on the platform F.J. 25/6/1892-6/7/1892.

21. I.I. 8/7/1892, 15/7/1892.


23. For John Redmond's 1895 overtures to Archbishop Walsh see Gwynn (1932, 86-88).


25. For the winding up of the National Club CO 903 6 B Series XXVII 20/12/1897; on the decline in numbers turning out for the Ivy Day procession CO 903 6 B Series XXVII 10/10/1897, CO 903 6 B Series XXXIV 9/10/1898.


27. E.H. 7/1/1899.


29. According to E.H. 18/1/1899 of the forty-four councillors who were not Labour or Unionist only five had been known to be Anti-Parnellites. The police reckoned that there were 37 Redmondites, 2 Dillonites, 1 Healyite and 3 Undefined: CO 904 184.

30. T. Baker to J. Redmond 30/11/1897 NLI Ms. 15,167.

31. T. Baker to J. Redmond 22/7/1897 NLI Ms. 15,167; T. Baker to J.L. Carew 30/7/1897 NLI Ms. 15,167.


34. Arising out of the Irish-American bombing campaign in British cities of the 1880s (Short, 1979), this was compounded by the murder of Dr. Cronin in Chicago in 1889 and was only brought to an end in 1900. The Irish ramifications are explored in O'Broin (1976).
35. F.J. 20/5/1900.

36. F.J. 7/5/1900.

37. F.J. 12/12/1900.

38. SPO CBS 23,504 S 16/11/1900.

39. L. Ginnell to J. Redmond 9/2/1904 NLI Ms. 15,191 (2).

40. Conclusion based on the series of reports: Precis of Reports of Meetings Etc. held by the UIL in the Dublin Metropolitan Police District begun in November 1900 and continued until December 1914. Up to February 1905 these form part of the SPO CBS reports. From March 1905 they belong to the London Colonial Office papers. There is a gap in the series between October 1906 and September 1907.


42. CO 904 21 585 S 1/12/1906; S.F. Daily 18/1/1910.

43. Daily Nation 12/2/1900; F.J. 30/4/1900.

44. F.J. 5/5/1900.

45. See Chapter Five, Note 27 above. Also, in relation to James McCann and Queen Victoria’s visit, speech of J.H. Campbell: I.T. 2/10/1900.

46. E.T. 22/6/1900.

47. SPO CBS 22,683 S 2/9/1900; F.J. 28/9/1900; F.J. 18/10/1900. The College Green figures were Nannetti 2,467 Carew 2,173.


49. F.J. 4/12/1900.

50. SPO CBS 26,449 S 23/7/1902.

51. CO 904 21 1,772 S October 1907.
52. The earliest indication of UIL concern with the city register comes from CO 904 21 752 S referring to a special meeting of the Standing Committee held on 20/4/1906. Stephen Hand began work in the Town Clerk's Office on 19/3/1907: Irish Labour Journal 21/9/1909.

53. I.T. 10/1/1902; D.E. 27/8/1904; L. Ginnell to J. Redmond 12/2/1904 enclosing circular issued by UIL Standing Committee opposing the separate organisation of Town Tenants Ms. 15,191 (2). Copy of the circular is in Dillon Papers Ms. 6,732 Ginnell Corres. 274. M. Davitt to J. Dillon 3/10/1904, 6/10/1904, 10/10/1904, 27/10/1904 Dillon Papers Ms. 6,728 Davitt Corres. 220, 221, 222, 225.

54. Outlook (1907, 55-57); also "Parnell and the Policies of Today" by Red Hand in Irish Nation and Peasant 18/12/1909.

55. I.T. 1/7/1911; a list of achievements incorporated into the League's notepaper ran as follows in 1910:

- Loughrea fight against Clarricaroe June 1906.
- Athenry fight and settlement, December 1906.
- Athenry sold to occupying tenants and 500 acres of land divided amongst same, 1908.
- Housing Act passed, December 1908.
- Kilfinane struggle and settlement, February 1909.
- Athboy sold to tenants, June 1909.
- Templemore rents reduced and accommodation land provided, November 1909.
- Mullingar Fair Rents fixed, January 1910.
- Towns being sold to tenants: Thurles, Hospital, Emly, Gort.


59. SPD CBS 29,692 S 1/7/1904; 29,880 S 22/12/1904; 29,914 S 1/1/1905; CO 904 117 1,892 S 6/12/1907.

60. Hibernian Journal, January 1909: J. Muldoon to J. Dillon 20/9/1911 Dillon Papers Ms. 6,734 Muldoon Corres. 146.

61. Committee Appointed into to Consider the Extension of Medical Benefit under the National Insurance Act to Ireland, Minutes of Evidence P.P. 1913 XXXVII Q. 962 (J.O. Nugent) and Q. 1,457 (Richard O'Carroll).

62. Expanding unions recruiting hitherto unorganised groups in Dublin like the ITGWU and the Drapers Assistants Association formed.
societies. The Orange and Protestant Society claimed between 65,000 and 70,000 members while British insurance companies had around 100,000: Ibid.


64. CO 904 87 3,885 S September 1912.


66. T.C. Harrington to J. Redmond 20/8/1907 NLI Ms. 15,194.

67. J. Muldoon to J. Dillon 20/9/1911 Dillon Papers Ms. 6,734 Muldoon Corres. 146.

68. Daily Herald 28/10/1913; Irish Worker 8/11/1913.


70. Only W.T. Cosgrave, seeking re-election for a third term in 1915, had a clerical nominator among Sinn Fein or Labour candidates.

71. Catholic Association (1903, 16).

72. See "The AOH and Labour" Irish Worker 30/8/1913. The AOH insurance business represented a spectacularly successful form of white-collar sectarian self-help in a 'discrimination' black spot. By 1915 its Dublin head office employed 200 clerical staff "over 80%" of whom "walked from the schoolroom to the office as a result of a competitive examination conducted by the Christian Brothers": Hibernian Journal January 1916.

73. From Armagh Cardinal Logue was an implacable AOH enemy. For manifestations of episcopal hostility and obstruction further south and west (including the sponsorship of rival diocesan insurance societies) see CO 904 86 3,582 S; April 1912.

74. For "dirty" postcards and organisation-building see Hibernian Journal January 1908. For Hibernian zeal on behalf of the Vigilance Committees, which began to campaign against the circulation of "dirty" English Sunday newspapers in Limerick and Dublin in 1911 and later extended their attention to cinema screens, see Hibernian Journal December 1915.

75. F.J. 3/6/1915.
Chapter Eight: Independent Nationalist Opposition

1. National Council (1907, 31); Dungannon Club (1905, 5); F.J. 29/11/1905.

2. Notes From Ireland, November 1904.

3. The MPs involved were Sir Thomas Esmonde (Chairman of GCCC since its inception), C.J. O'Otan, James O'Mara and Thomas O'Donnell: Notes From Ireland, August 1907.

4. Only when it was believed that the UIL might be suppressed under the reactivated Crimes Act in 1902 was orchestrated use of the local authorities for agitational purposes considered by the Home Rule movement SPO CBS 27,833 5 8/10/1902. In the Summer of 1907 not only was the wobbling Esmonde Chairman of GCCC but its Vice Chairman was John Sweetman, Vice President of Sinn Fein, who before his conversion to abstentionism had been both an Anti-Parnellite and a Parnellite MP (for East Wicklow, 1892-95).

5. Notes From Ireland, August 1907; S.F. 12/10/1907; I.T. 18/1/1907; 1908 Sinn Fein Annual Report S.F. 22/8/1908.

6. Meehan (Home Rule) 3,103 Dolan (Sinn Fein) 1,157.


9. See circular appealing for funds issued by the party 1/11/1907 in NLI pamphlet collection. Also "Unionism and the Situation" edit. S.F. 24/12/1910.


11. See Executive resolutions quoted in Notes From Ireland, July 1907; and pro-House of Lords statements in S.F. 18/1/1908 and S.F. edit. 27/2/1909.

12. Irish Nation and Peasant 1/1/1910; Sinn Fein Daily 30/12/1909.


17. Thomas Farren's election address (Cody, O'Dowd and Rigney, 1986, 112) states: "As president of the Dublin Trades Council I have been asked by that body to contest the College Green division in the interests of Labour."

18. These were Michael Canty (North City), Patrick Dowd (Mansion House), William Doyle (Rotunda) and E.L. Richardson (Inns Quay).

19. Daily Nation 3/1/1900; see also speech of J. Derham, LER secretary, in support of Phillip Meagher, a publican, in Trinity ward F.J. 12/1/1900.


25. Those sitting on the Corporation in 1915 were Thomas Kelly (Mansion House), Sean T. O’Kelly (Inns Quay), Lorcan O’Toole (Trinity) and W.T. Cosgrave (Usher’s Quay).

26. F.J. 31/1/1911.

27. Irish Worker 14/10/1911, 18/11/1911.

28. Labour Representation Committee and Dublin Labour Party Minute Book 1911-12 NLI Ms. 16,271.
29. A point also noted by Cody (1982, 164 and 307).

30. B. Hobson (1968, 9 and 12); B. Hobson to J. Devoy 10/8/1909 in O'Brien and Ryan (1953, 384); B. Hobson to J. McGarrity 21/7/1907 NLI Ms. 17,612.

31. See O'Hegarty and Hobson (Eds.) (1913). This Fenian fundamentalism stands in stark contrast to the discovery by traditional labour history (e.g. Clarkson, 1925; Strauss, 1951; Greaves, 1961; Mitchell, 1974) of an IRB whose socially radical tendencies place it in opposition to a right-wing Sinn Fein and create the necessary conditions for an effectively socialist convergence with James Connolly’s Citizen Army to launch the 1916 rising.


33. Sinn Fein Printing and publishing Co. Ltd. Directors Minute Book 24/7/1909 NLI Ms. 2,140.

34. See the prospectus published by the company in S.F. 19/12/1908.

35. The Leader 5/12/1908, 12/12/1908; letter from P.T. Daly to Irish Worker 9/9/1911.

36. On the Cardinal, The Peasant and educational questions see below Chapter Nine.

37. Irish Ireland Printing Works circulars NLI Ms. 13,966 (4).


40. For abortive attempts involving a variety of Irish Irelanders and socialists to reconstruct and save the Irish Nation see NLI Ms. 13,966.

41. For police comment on this see CO 904 2,275 S, January 1909.

42. For a survey of women’s activisms see H. Sheehy Skeffington "Women and the National Movement" Irish Nation and Peasant 6/3/1909: for a case of inhibited political activism see M. Butler to W. Bulfin 27/1/1906 NLI Ms. 13,810.
43. For arguments that Boards should be given powers of co-option in order to increase the numbers of Lady Guardians serving on them see Vice Regal Commission on Poor Law Reform in Ireland, Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1906 LII Qs. 715; 25,883; 25,938-25,941 and 25,535-25,536.

44. S.F. 27/5/1911.


47. ITUC Annual Report 1913, 7.

48. In Clontarf West, Drumcondra/Glasnevin and Fitzwilliam.


50. The Leader 7/3/1908.


52. I.I. 17/8/1903; Dublin Trades Council Minute Book 3/10/1903, 19/10/1903, 3/11/1903 NLI Ms. 12,779; letter from W. Partridge to Irish Worker 8/1/1912.

53. On the disruption of the Temperance Party see United Irishman 2/1/1904. Thomas Kelly, Sinn Fein alderman for Mansion House from 1905, was a temperance agent and secretary of the York St. Total Abstinence Workmen’s Club which served as the base from which Sinn Fein captured the ward.


55. S.F. 12/1/1907

56. The League campaigned in the early 1900s for St. Patrick’s Day to be made a public holiday and to get the public houses in Dublin to close on that day. For a comment on the distinctive character of Dublin League supporters see "Irish Language Procession" I.T. edit. 14/3/1904.

57. The Leader 29/8/1908.
58. Both T.W. Russell and T.H. Sloan, the principal thorns in the flesh of the Ulster Unionist establishment in the 1900s, were champions of the temperance cause. For a detailed discussion of the role of temperance movements in nineteenth century Irish politics and society see Malcolm (1986).

59. An attitude brought to the fore in the case of Sinn Fein by the taxation proposals contained in the 1909 People’s Budget to which it sought unsuccessfully to organise a united campaign of opposition by all the affected Irish interests: S.F. 15/5/1909, 5/6/1909, 28/8/1909.

60. For regulation of the size of the city trade, as opposed to the rural free-for-all prevailing up to the turn of the century see Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, Minutes of Evidence relating to Ireland, P.P. 1898 XXXVIII Q.s 407, 408 and 61,272.

61. On all these issues see Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, Minutes of Evidence relating to Ireland, P.P. 1898 XXXVIII.

62. For one such encounter, in which a Dublin license transfer was blocked, see Irish Temperance Journal 1/11/1899.

63. See report of meeting of the United Temperance Council F.J. 18/1/1900; Mansion House and Mountjoy wards, in both of which workmen’s total abstinence clubs were situated, were the main foci of post-1898 attention.

64. United Irishman 25/1/1902.

65. Select Committee on Local Government and Taxation of Towns (Ireland), Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1876 X Q. 3036, evidence of Frederick Stokes, a founding father of Rathmines township.

66. On the relation of this town demon to his country brother see Chapter Nine below.

Chapter Nine: The Politics of National Regeneration

1. Return showing the amount paid from April 1900 to February 1905 to the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society in respect of each officer of the society whose services were utilised by the Department... P.P. 1906 XCVI.
2. I.T. 29/1/1908.


4. See circulars and other material relating to the Irish Ireland Printing Works in NLI Ms. 13,966 (4).


7. See the letter written by T.W. Rolleston, whom Plunkett had appointed Organiser of Lectures at the OATI, the publication of which provided the pretext on which subsidisation of the IPDS was withdrawn: The Leader 25/1/1908.

8. See letter from A.N. Bonaparte Wyse F.J. 19/6/1911; speech of Douglas Hyde at Roscommon quoted in Notes From Ireland, June 1904.


11. E. MacNeill to O. Hyde 19/12/1906 NLI Ms. 21,099.


13. Here it culminated in the dismissal of Fr. Michael O'Hickey from the chair of Professor of Irish: see Miller (1973, 238-241)

14. S.F. 26/7/1913.

15. Plunkett (1904, 148-156); Desart (1905); Lord Monteagle "What the Gaelic League has done for our Village" Church of Ireland Gazette 25/5/1906.


17. This was the Five Provinces (Cuig Cuigi) branch. On its ambience
see letters from N. O’Brien to O. Hyde NLI Ms. 18,252.


23. See motion moved by Griffith at Sinn Fein’s second annual convention S.F. 8/9/1906;

24. The Irish Peasant 1/8/1908.


26. F.J. 4/7.1913; S.F. 26/7/1913.

27. Claideamh Solais edit. 21/2/1914.

28. S.F. edit. 18/5/1912.

29. A "rural industry" is defined in Section 30 of The Agriculture and Technical Instruction (Ireland) Act of 1899.

30. Departmental Committee of Inquiry into the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction Ireland Minutes of Evidence P.P. 1907 XVIII Qs. 629-633; 1,152-1,153; 15,485-15,495; 17,233-17,246.

31. Departmental Committee of Inquiry into the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction Ireland, Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1907 XVIII Qs. 354; 356-386; 406; 615-617; 1,077-1,105; 1,168-1,171; 2,440-2,448.

32. T.R.F. (1906, 56); H. Plunkett to J.O. Hannay 14/7/1906 Hannay Papers TCD.
33. McCarthy (1901, 81-86); T.A.F. (1906).

34. Report of the Departmental Committee of Inquiry into the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction Ireland P.P. 1907 XVII.

35. Ibid.


37. Industrial revivalist efforts to get local authorities to purchase Irish made goods were in many ways similar to those of the trade union movement aimed at getting the same bodies to observe the Fair Wages Resolution in their contracts. Whether local authorities had discretion with regard to the acceptance of tenders, or whether their members risked surcharges if they favoured Irish and/or fair wage contractors, remained in doubt until 1909. Then the Richmond Asylum judgement upheld the right of a public body not to accept the lowest tender when it had previously specified adherence to the Fair Wages Resolution and/or preference for Irish materials: ITUC Annual Report 1909, 3-6; Sinn Fein Daily edit. 13/12/1909. However trade unionists diverged from some of the jewels in the crown of the industrial revival on questions of wages and trade union recognition. A series of disputes between 1909 and 1911 - at the Dublin brushmakers Varian’s, at Kilkenny Woodworkers and at Pearce’s, the Wexford engineering firm - led to a sharp increase in trade union scepticism with regard to the industrial revival movement.

38. DTC Minute Book 26/1/1904, 30/5/1904 NLI Ms. 12, 779. A Corporation motion supporting the National Exhibition alternative was defeated by 35 votes to 19: I.T. 15/3/1904.

39. CD 903 12 Judicial Division Intelligence Notes.

40. S.F. 19/5/1906. The paper claimed that the exhibition’s promoters had been assuring businessmen that the Department was going to back the venture to the tune of £60,000.

41. A detailed description of the exhibition can be found in Turpin (1981) but its political context is completely misconstrued by this author.

42. The All Ireland Industrial Conference at Galway passed a motion inviting manufacturers to investigate the facilities offered by Ireland and promising, on behalf of the Irish people, "exceptional encouragement" to any who did: F.J. 18/9/1908.

43. Dungannon Club (1905, 3), National Council (1907, 11).
44. National Council (1907, 17).

45. See Limerick Corporation memorandum in S.F. 22/8/1908.


47. Report of meeting between Dublin I.O.A. delegation and T.W. Russell and edit. on same F.J. 8/10/1908; S.F. edit. 17/10/1908.


49. Only the Irish Homestead (26/9/1908, 24/10/1908, 23/1/1909) initially expressed scepticism: "a new mirage has arisen to allure us away from the one thing that will finally avail us" i.e. proper cultivation of the land and the development of industries allied to it.

50. On the international background to the Act see Lawrence (1906).


52. For Redmond’s queries see Parl. Debates 1909 Vol. 1 Cols. 263-265; for Balfour’s reply Vol. 1, Col. 790.

53. Ibid.


Chapter Ten: Conclusion

1. There are also, within the "Imperial" context, parallels between Ireland and South Africa in wartime. Here the agreement of the
dominion government to move its armed forces against Germany's African colonies split the Afrikaner community and led to a small-scale rebellion in late 1914. The treatment of the defeated rebels - there was only one execution - was to be pressed into service as an argument for leniency after the 1916 Dublin rising by John Redmond among others. In the South African case military service, whether in Africa or in Europe, remained voluntary. Militant Afrikaner nationalism grew in strength nonetheless and an attempt was made by its leader Hertzog to put the case for a restoration of the independence lost by the Transvaal and Orange Free State following the Boer War of 1899-1902 before the Versailles Peace Conference (Selby, 1973, 213-225).


3. CO 904 93 5,811 5 May 1914.


5. F.J. edit. 1/10/1915; "'Vive Viviani ! Irish Hibernians and French Freemasons" handbill NLI L0 P 119 Item 81.


7. F.J. 17/6/1915, 1/7/1915.


11. CO 903 18 Judicial Division Intelligence Notes 28/11/1914.

12. Up to July 7 1915 fifteen individuals had been banished from Ireland or from particular parts of Ireland under DORRA: Times 8/7/1915.


14. Col. M. Moore to General Maxwell 7/7/1916 NLI Ms. 10,561 (1).

15. On attempts to hold a National Volunteer convention and their obstruction see Executive Minute Book NLI Ms. 9,239: see also Col.


17. F.J. 19/10/1915.


20. See Power's Recruiting File 1915, File 262, John Power & Son Collection, PROI.


24. ITUC Annual Report 1918, 23. As a former representative put it: "The Food Control Committees had been brought into existence not to look after Irish interests but to carry out the wishes of the government of England. The Committee was dominated by government officials who dared not disobey the wishes of their paymasters".


26. After the general strike against conscription 600 men were dismissed from an aerodrome construction site: Times 26/4/1918.

27. I.T. 23/7/1917.


29. I.T. 19/7/1917.

30. See the appeal from the Irish Parliamentary Party to the United States government calling for the immediate application of the principles of democratic freedom and nation self-determination "so magnificently set forth in the declaration of President Wilson"
31. The only public indication of Sinn Fein's attitude to the only southern vacancy of 1917-18 it did not contest was a statement which Arthur Griffith apparently authorised an advocate of Sir Horace Plunkett's unopposed return for his old seat to make. According to this if Plunkett were chosen and agreed to accept the seat, he (Griffith) would do nothing to oppose his election: I.T. 29/6/1918. The Nationalist Party, however, was unresponsive to the idea of Plunkett's second coming and nominated Michael Hearn, a solicitor and director of the Freeman newspaper company, to fill the vacancy.

32. F.J. 26/8/1918.


34. Return showing for each parliamentary constituency in the United Kingdom the Number of Parliamentary and Local Government Electors on the First Register compiled under the Representation of the People Act 1918 P.P. 1918 XIX.

35. I.T. 10/12/1918, 28/12/1918. A breakdown of how the military vote was cast in the new Rathmines constituency appeared in the press. In the only seat won by a Unionist outside Ulster and Trinity College the 539 military votes went to: Dockrell (U) 459 Moonan (Home Rule) 50 Little (Sinn Fein) 30.

36. "In Dublin Unionists many of them displaying red white and blue favours voted openly for Mr. J.O. Nugent in St. Michan's and for Sir P. Shortall in Clontarf. In St. Michan's their poll was very exhaustive": I.I. 16/12/1918. The same paper reports "a heavy Unionist poll" in College Green where there was no Unionist candidate. Also in Clontarf Archbishop Walsh, voting in mid-morning, afterwards handed his polling card to a Sinn Fein agent. The constituency was subsequently placarded "The Archbishop has voted Sinn Fein and wants you to know it."

37. The major change in the shape of the constituencies arose from the redefinition of the parliamentary borough to match the boundaries of the municipal borough. The 1901 added areas thus joined the city
from North County while Pembroke was moved out of the city and into
the county. Dublin gained five seats out of the redistribution: the
borough now consisted of seven divisions instead of four and the
county of four instead of two: see Report of the Boundary
Commission (Ireland) P.P. 1917-18 XIV.

38. F.J. 22/8/1918.

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Manuscript Material

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(a) Personal Paper Collections

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William O'Brien (Labour and Trade Union) Papers
Timothy Harrington Papers
Douglas Hyde Papers
Thomas Johnson Papers
Maurice Moore Papers
John Muldoon Papers
Horace Plunkett Diaries (microfilm)
John Redmond Papers
Francis Sheehy-Skeffington Papers

(b) Organisational Records

Dublin Industrial Development Association Minute Books
Dublin Trades Council Minute Books
Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland Reports of Proceedings
Irish Trade Union Congress Annual Reports
Irish Transport and General Workers Union Assorted Material
Society of Saint Vincent de Paul Annual Reports
Miscellaneous Manuscript Material

Public Record Office of Ireland (PROI)

Ancient Guild of Incorporated Brick and Stonelayers Minute Books
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Census of Population 1911 Household Forms and Enumerators Schedules
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John Power & Son Records

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI)

Basil Blackwood Papers
Irish Unionist Alliance Papers

Public Record Office, London

Colonial Office Papers (CO series)
State Paper Office Dublin Castle

Chief Secretary's Office Registered Papers (SPO CSORP)
Crime Branch Special Report Series (SPO CBS)

Trinity College Dublin Library: Manuscripts Department (TCD)

John Dillon Papers
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W.E.H. Lecky Papers

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Communication from the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Boundary Commissioners relative to the alterations made after local inquiry in the Provisional Schemes for the Division of Armagh, Donegal, Londonderry, Tyrone and Dublin and the Borough of Dublin, P.P. 1884-85 LXII.

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Vice-Regal Commission on Irish Railways, Fifth and Final Report, P.P. 1910 XXXVII.

Committee on Irish Finance, Report, P.P. 1912-13 XXIV.

Development Commissioners, Third Annual Report, P.P. 1913 XIX.

Committee Appointed to Consider the Extension of Medical Benefit under the National Insurance Act to Ireland, Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1913 XXXVII: Report, P.P. 1913 XXVIII.

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Boundary Commission (Ireland), Report, P.P. 1917-18 XIV.

Redistribution of Seats Conference. Letter from Mr. Speaker to the Prime Minister P.P. 1917-18 XXV.

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(a) Daily Newspapers

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  Daily Herald (London)
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  Freeman's Journal (F.J.)
  Irish Independent (I.I.)
  Irish Times (I.T.)
  Sinn Fein Daily
  The Times (London)
(b) Weekly, Monthly, Annual or Occasional Newspapers or Magazines

Annual Register (London)
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