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GLADSTONE, IRISH NATIONALISM AND THE

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GLADSTONE, IRISH NATIONALISM AND THE
HOME RULE QUESTION, 1882-93, WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ULSTER PROBLEM

by

J. P. LOUGHLIN

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Dublin, September 1983
As a proportion of their total population in Ireland, the number of protestants who became committed to the home rule cause was undoubtedly small; and that being so, their role in nationalist politics in this period has usually been either overlooked, minimised, or misrepresented. Indeed one recent writer has claimed that in Ulster 'almost nobody - except my grandfather' was prepared to support Gladstone's first home rule bill.¹

The purpose of this chapter, though, is not just to provide a description of protestant home rule activities, but to attempt an assessment of their influence on nationalist politics and the home rule campaign. Although numerically a minor part of the home rule movement, their existence and activities as a protestant organisation had an influence on British liberal thinking on the home rule question and revealed a perspective on nationalism that was in highly important respects different from that of the overwhelmingly catholic National League. Consequently, among other things, it threw into sharp relief some of the problems involved in the Parnellite claim that theirs was a truly national movement.
Protestant involvement in the home rule movement had existed long before 1886. Under Issac Butt protestants had been largely responsible for instigating the movement in 1873, and it was one of the most respected protestant nationalists, the Rev. J. A. Galbraith, who first adopted the term 'home rule' to describe the movement for Irish autonomy. The period 1873-6, however, had seen them largely desert the nationalist movement, and it was not until Gladstone's conversion to home rule that significant groups of protestants, willing to openly support home rule, began to re-emerge. The initiative in forming the I.P.H.R.A. was taken by a Belfast protestant, David Briggs, who, in a letter to the Belfast Morning News in mid-April 1886, suggested that such an organisation be set up. Consequently, in mid-May, a meeting was held in Belfast to establish a protestant home rule movement, to counter the unionist claim that Irish protestants unanimously rejected home rule.

Following this meeting a gathering of Dublin protestants met to discuss the possibility of setting up a southern branch of the movement, and a cautiously worded open letter to Irish protestants was published asking 'whether or not an Irish parliament will be the natural outcome of Mr Gladstone's home rule bill and/or of the present political climate in Ireland'. Irish protestants were now discussing 'whether steps should not now be taken to actively apply their influence in
promoting this end'. It concluded with an invitation for an 'exchange of views' with the specific aim of establishing a branch of the movement. A meeting of protestant home rulers followed on the 28 May and appointed a committee of fourteen to confer with the Belfast group and 'other protestants in sympathy with the movement'. Meeting again on the following day they decided that their association would be based on three principles; self-government for Ireland; an exclusively protestant membership 'for meeting the religious argument' that protestants would be persecuted under home rule; and that it would be one association for all Ireland. It was also agreed that three representatives would go to Belfast on 1 June, to arrange with that group the settlement of a constitution for all Ireland 'with a second executive in Dublin'. Arrangements were also made for the setting up of local branches in Limerick and Cork.

The meeting of 1 June was apparently a success. It was agreed that the country be divided into two districts, consisting of Ulster and the rest of Ireland, with respective executive centres in Belfast and Dublin. Work on the constitution of the association was concluded on 5 June and decisions reached on this subject by the Belfast branch at its inaugural meeting of 22 May, were, in the main, endorsed. The association would have a president and 7 vice-presidents, 3 honorary secretaries for the central, and nominally 'parent'
executive in Belfast, and 1 each for Dublin and Cork. The more substantial part of the constitution consisted of 6 clauses governing the establishment and running of local branches, which could be formed in any town or district of Ireland by any number of people. Belfast was to be the executive centre for Ulster and Dublin for the south and west of Ireland. Each branch was annually to elect by ballot its own president, treasurer, secretary and working committee. Each individual member of the association would pay an annual subscription of 2s 6d while each branch would forward 75 per cent of its subscriptions to its executive centre, plus a monthly report of its activities as required. Each local branch would be entitled to representation on the 'General Council' of the I.P.H.R.A.; the number of such representatives to be established by the relevant executive centre.

Just as the meeting that approved this constitution was about to conclude, however, a telegram arrived from the Belfast executive abrogating the agreement of 1 June, and among other things, declaring their intention to implement their original decision of having one executive and treasurer in Belfast for the whole of Ireland. Needless to say this news caused great displeasure. But on consideration of the contents of the Belfast telegram shortly afterwards, it was decided that despite their displeasure they would accept the new arrangements in the interests of 'harmony and peace' and the
need to suppress any 'local or parochial feeling' for the 'national good'. It was also decided that a meeting be arranged between representatives of both executive centres on 12 June. It would appear that at this meeting the Dublin representatives succeeded in modifying, significantly, the previous decision of the Belfast executive on the constitution of the movement, for a subsequent minute of the meeting recorded a decision of the latter to establish a 'sub-committee' in Dublin which would remit 10 per cent of its funds to the Belfast centre. With the decision of the Dublin centre to cancel their own manifesto to the Irish protestants in favour of one written by the Belfast group, this struggle for supremacy, or equality, between the two executive centres ended.

Its real importance, however, lay in indicating a basic disharmony between the two groups. Although they were ostensibly part of the one organisation they were to weaken their cause by a failure to integrate properly. In effect they operated as separate and autonomous groups. The Belfast executive tended to see the Dublin section of the movement as usurpers, and indeed, some wanted to let the Dublin executive go completely adrift. Nevertheless, the organisation remained formally intact and set to work publicising its cause. But what kind of person tended to respond to the propaganda of the association?

The general distinction to be made in its membership
is that between north and south. In the main, the chief support for the association in Ulster came from presbyterian tenant-farmers, led by members of the business and commercial classes, who usually had a long background in the struggle for land reform. Prominent among these were Thomas Shillington, the president of the association, and John Pinkerton M.P., a County Antrim tenant-farmer who was actively involved in promoting its activities though he held no specific office within it. Prominent at a later date was T. A. Dickson, a Dungannon linen merchant. Other leading members included Thomas McClelland, a vice-president of the association and president of the Incorporated Law Society of Ulster, and a retired general of the Royal Artillery, W. J. Smythe.

For many northern supporters, acceptance of home rule was inextricably bound up with devotion to Gladstone. Condemning home rule when proposed by Parnellites, they were prepared reluctantly to accept it when proposed by Gladstone, out of loyalty to him. For this section of the movement, representing undoubtedly a majority of protestant home rule opinion, Gladstonian liberalism and protestant patriotism were synonymous terms; and self-government was not so much a right to be claimed as a liberal reform to be granted. The northern protestant home ruler's attitude to self-government was clearly demonstrated by the Rev. J. D. C. Houston at the general assembly of the presbyterian church on 9 June 1893:
In saying that I and those who think with me do not view the passing of a legislative measure establishing a home rule parliament in Dublin with any serious anxiety, much less alarm, I do not wish to be understood as affirming that we are feverishly impatient for the passing of such a measure as that indicated, or that it will be utterly impossible for us to enjoy any serenity of mind until a parliament sitting in College Green has become an established fact. It is constantly being said that such a thing as a protestant home ruler is as great a rarity in Ulster as a white blackbird or a primrose in December. If by a protestant home ruler is meant one whose aspirations after self-government are as ardent, and whose belief in the potential advantages of such a legislative change is as sanguine as are those of their nationalist compatriots, then I frankly admit that there are comparatively few protestant home rulers in the north, or, indeed, in any part of Ireland. On the other hand, if by a protestant home ruler is simply meant a liberal-minded politician - one who is willing to acquiesce in a fairly reasonable legislative scheme for the better government of Ireland...who is disposed to give the scheme...a fair trial, and who refuses to condemn it as unworkable and absurd until after having been tried by the practical test of experience it has proved itself to be so - if such, I say, is a permissible definition of a protestant home ruler, then there is a large number of such people in Ulster, far more, I believe than anti-home rule writers and speakers are disposed to admit. 19

What was significant here was not just the conditional attitude of protestant home rulers to Irish autonomy, but also the clear distinction that was made between this view and the mainly sentimental commitment to autonomy of most catholic nationalists. For the latter, home rule was an end in itself, while for those protestants Houston describes, it was more a means to an end - the better government of Ireland. Implicit in this view was the possibility that home rule would be ultimately rejected if it failed to result in a better form of government than that enjoyed by Ireland under the union. Of
course to stress this aspect of protestant home rule thinking is not to deny, as will be seen, that among protestant home rulers full-blooded nationalists did not exist, but it was undisputably the case that such were in a minority. Where they were likely to be found, though, was in the Dublin section of the movement.

If it is true that most of the association's rank-and-file lay in Ulster, it is also true that its intellectual leadership was firmly based in Dublin. Associated with the Dublin executive were figures whose major importance in Irish politics was to lie in their influence on the cultural nationalism that emerged when the home rule cause failed in the late 1890s: T. W. Rolleston, Douglas Hyde and Maud Gonne. C. H. Oldham, honorary secretary to the Dublin centre and in many ways its driving force, was to become a distinguished economist. In addition it contained well known protestant home rulers such as Alfred Webb, and the most respected of all, the Rev. J. A. Galbraith. Also, many lesser known figures held important civil service and professional posts.

Unlike the committed Gladstonianism that inspired the Ulster section of the movement, the background influences of the Dublin centre were more diverse. Devotion to Gladstone there certainly was, but apparently just as important, at least among the younger members, was a fenian outlook that owed little to either Gladstonianism, or indeed Parnellism.
Stephen Gwynn, a member of the association at this time, wrote of this group:

It is a curious fact that neither I nor...any of the young men with whom I associated, ever went to the political meetings of the Land League, or its successor the National League....The connecting link for us with Irish nationalism was the romantic figure of old John O'Leary - one of the chief founders of the fenian movement. 23

Both Oldham and Rolleston were closely involved with the activities of the Young Ireland Society of which O'Leary was president. 24 The society concerned itself at this time with promoting nationalist literature and boycotts of English goods and literature. Oldham was the society's vice-president in 1886, and both he and Rolleston regularly read papers at its meetings. 25 The fenian influence among protestant home rulers, however, was confined mainly to the Dublin area, and thus it was undoubtedly of less significance in the movement as a whole than Gladstonian liberalism. Nevertheless, it was still important because it entailed a perspective on Irish nationalism that in some respects was markedly different from that of the Parnellite movement. As will be seen, these differences led to a public dispute with leading nationalists that had a damaging effect on the I.P.H.R.A.'s propaganda effort. 26

Apart from the leading members of Dublin executive, personal details of the association's membership in the south and west of Ireland were difficult to ascertain. However, one
important source of information on the general make-up of the association in the south and west of Ireland, is a pamphlet compiled by Alfred Webb to counter the unionist claim that protestants would be persecuted under home rule. The pamphlet consisted of replies to the following question that Webb had sent to many fellow protestants in the south and west:

Have you during your experience of life in Ireland observed any instances of intolerance amongst your catholic friends and neighbours, such as would lead you to fear for your liberty and safety, and for the free exercise of your religion, under an Irish constitution such as that sketched out in Mr Gladstone's bill?

Webb claimed that the replies published in his pamphlet were merely the first of many that had arrived, and that 'Were it not for the delay, trouble and expense, the record might be very largely extended.' In all, he published replies from forty-four correspondents, all of whom denied vociferously, on the basis of their own personal experience, that there would be any likelihood of persecution under home rule. But what, perhaps, is most important about Webb's correspondents is what can be discovered about their occupations. Webb made no attempt systematically to record these and they are not given in all instances, but it is clear that a majority were urban based clergymen, merchants, doctors, shopkeepers and academics, though not all were enthusiastic for home rule. Most replies indicated frequent social intercourse with catholics by
correspondents, and that being so, they were, presumably able to make projections about their future treatment under home rule that were more realistic than those of protestants lacking that experience. This advantage, however, was more than counter-balanced by their social position on the fringe of southern Irish landed society, which it was the ostensible object of protestant home rulers to win over to home rule.

Indeed, one study of Anglo-Irish landed society has argued that it would be wrong to include protestants of the business and professional classes as belonging to 'Anglo-Ireland', which consisted of 'approximately 2,500 families who owned upwards of 1,000 acres of agricultural land, who were resident landlords, and belonging to the Church of Ireland'. Moreover, it was a society tightly knit and in-bred and not likely to be susceptible to the propaganda of a relatively small group of enthusiasts, who were not only politically and sociably beyond the pale, but given that most were nonconformists, religiously also. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the only Irish peer to become publicly associated with the I.P.H.R.A. was Lord Greville, an 'advanced liberal' of long standing, and whose sole involvement with the association's activities consisted of a letter to the press endorsing its aims. Nevertheless, despite the enormity of the task facing it in the south of Ireland, the Dublin executive, like the Belfast executive, was highly optimistic about its
prospects.

At the inaugural meeting of the association in Belfast, Alexander Bowman argued that despite the great protest against home rule made by the presbyterian church, it did not represent the views of the laity. In fact: 'They...did not represent protestant feeling at all.' At the same meeting John Pinkerton claimed that 'clerical cranks' posing as political leaders were misrepresenting the views of the protestant population: '...in reality...the tide of popular sympathy is rising surely and steadily in favour of self-government for Ireland'. These views exhibited a consistent line of argument employed by protestant home rulers, north and south: clerical leaders were either misrepresenting or suppressing the views of the protestant population who, in reality, favoured or were willing to accept, home rule. Such statements, of course, were only to be expected: no propaganda movement can admit publicly that overwhelming obstacles to its success exist. Nevertheless, there is a significant degree of genuine self-delusion in these attempts to wish away protestant rejection of home rule.

To have admitted the enormity of their task would have entailed the admission that it was not likely to succeed, and given the strength of commitment most protestant home rulers felt towards Gladstone, this they were not prepared to accept. Moreover, Gladstone's record of Irish legislation since 1869
was impressive and it must have been tempting to assume that his conversion to home rule would, in the foreseeable future, ensure the success of that policy.

In many respects the outlook, certainly of Ulster protestant home rulers, was close to that of British radicals, whose 'habit of thought was both utilitarian and moralistic', and inclined towards 'simplistic applications of principles'. The 'Address to the protestants of Ireland', compiled by the Belfast executive, combined moral indignation at the 'misgovernment' of the past with an apocalyptic choice to be made by Irish protestants between the polar opposites of Gladstonian home rule and Ireland's consequent future prosperity, and, 'the combined forces of those territorial and class interests whose influence in maintaining social conditions which have tended to raise rents and reduce wages, has perpetuated pauperism and crime, driven away capital, discouraged manufactures, and disorganised commerce'. Such was the general tenor of the propaganda emanating from the Belfast executive. The political realities faced by its Dublin counterpart, however, were not identical and a more detailed examination of the arguments used by both indicates the extent to which they reflected the differing political situations in each area of operation. For example, the fact that the majority of presbyterian tenant-farmers - potential supporters - lived in Ulster, dictated a different line of argument from that employed
by the Dublin executive in the more 'vulnerable' social and religious context of southern Ireland.37

The resolutions passed at the first meeting of the Belfast executive exhibited a robust presentation of the Gladstonian argument for home rule, allied with some specific Roman Catholic and presbyterian grievances. Home rule was necessary because Irish local necessities were disregarded at Westminster; because Irish dissatisfaction with the existing form of government endangered the safety of 'the empire of Great Britain and Ireland, whose integrity, legitimate extension, and increasing power and influence in the world we have deeply at heart'; because the national struggle was keeping the people's minds off steady industry; because the exclusion of Roman Catholics from positions of 'official authority' and the monopoly of these offices by 'the ascendency party' created sectarian animosity and was 'subversive of true religion'. Finally because 'positions of trust' were unequally distributed between the religious communities, society was 'disorganised'. These resolutions appealed not only to the Gladstonian liberalism the association believed still existed among the presbyterians of the north, but, in its condemnation of the monopoly of 'positions of trust' by the 'ascendency party', to the deeply felt presbyterian grievance that they were discriminated against in the distribution of government patronage much more than Roman Catholics.38
By contrast, the appeal made by the Dublin executive stressed protestant and unionist vulnerability and isolation among a nationalist population, in a situation that would soon see the enactment of a home rule bill, and argued that their interests would only be safeguarded if they changed their political attitude towards self-government:

We belong to Ireland; our fortunes and lives are bound up with the Irish people; we remain here....This government which now makes us responsible for their acts [the Salisbury government] will remain in this country only so long as the lifetime of the present parliament. The future of Irish protestantism depends solely on the position and influence it can secure in Ireland. We can better exercise that influence through the instrumentality of one parliament in Dublin, representing the whole people of Ireland....But if Irish protestants are to have a share in moulding a home rule bill to take account of their interests their attitudes will have to change. It can only come about by each individual protestant taking action for himself. 39

In practice, the different approaches of the two executives would cause, in 1887-9, different policies on the land question and in 1890 different positions on the Parnellite split; but initially both sections, and individual protestants, got down to publicising the home rule cause. Within two weeks of the formation of the Belfast executive, T. A. Dickson had, on his own initiative, collected and forwarded to Gladstone a petition in favour of home rule signed by 500 protestants in Belfast and surrounding districts; 40 and with the approach of the 1886 general election the movement assisted the campaigns of nation-
alist members in both north and south and sent deputations of speakers to assist the liberals in Great Britain. In Ulster six protestant home rulers stood, unsuccessfully, for election in North and Mid-Antrim, North Armagh, South and East Belfast, and North Tyrone. In all, they polled a total of 9,283 votes, though there is no way of knowing how many came from protestants.

The general election provided the I.P.H.R.A. with its first burst of activity. It was, however, soon evident, certainly in the south of Ireland, that there would be no great exodus of protestants from unionism to the home rule cause. On the 10 July 1886, C. H. Oldham, secretary of the Dublin executive, wrote to Alfred Webb expressing his 'utter disappointment' with his fellow protestants who, he declared, 'must be aware that home rule is inevitable now that Mr Gladstone and his party have taken it upon themselves to concede this great demand; they cannot remain in the dark for ever'. The worries of the association about their lack of success were compounded by the fact that due to fears of social ostracism or persecution, many protestants who were sympathetic to the association would not come forward, and despite protests to the contrary, there is considerable evidence to show that at various times, varying degrees of social ostracism and persecution did exist. Jeremiah Jordan argued that as early as 1865 his association with liberal politics had
resulted in his life and business being endangered:

So offensive was my action to the general protestant population of [County Fermanagh] and adjoining counties, that my life and property were endangered, and my business was boycotted... (long before the new term was known) almost to ruin. The methodist societies believed and acted thereon that, to support a liberal candidate and policy was a disqualification for church office, and proof of backsliding in heart and life, and some index that such protestants would ultimately join the Church of Rome. 45

When six young cows belonging to John Pinkerton were poisoned, the Route Reform Club offered a reward 'for such evidence as would lead to the conviction' of the parties responsible. 46 The Rev. S. Sandys had to resign his curacy of St Mary's church Donnybrook, Dublin, having been rejected by his congregation for having attended the inaugural meeting of the Dublin section of the I.P.H.R.A. 47 Alexander Bowman, secretary of the Belfast Trades Council, was sacked because of his public identification with, and role in establishing, the Belfast section of the movement. 48 James Hammond, a vice-president of the association, was attacked and beaten in Ballymacarett: 'It was only one of many assaults of the Orange party on individuals.' 49 Again, in an outrage that was to be made much of in parliament, the outspoken presbyterian home ruler, the Rev. M. J. Macaulay of Castleblayney, had his church desecrated and was himself attacked in the presence of his wife by 'a gang of Orangemen'. 50 The kind of feeling that
protestant home rulers sometimes aroused in their communities was illustrated by what happened when Justin McCarthy, M.P. for Derry City, was invited to dinner by the protestant bishop of Derry, Dr Alexander. Although the occasion was purely a social one and Alexander a firm unionist, the following morning the bishop's palace was 'bedaubed over with the word "Ishabod" in many places'. With the possibility that pressures such as these might be directed against them, protestants sympathetic to the movement did not make themselves conspicuous, and thus it is virtually impossible to estimate accurately their numbers, though Thomas Shillington claimed, on the basis of the polls in the six Ulster constituencies in which protestant home rulers stood: 'I am sure we polled over 2,500 in our interest'.

But even if social ostracism and persecution had not been present it is clear that the organisation's task in persuading Irish protestants to accept home rule was not amenable to a quick or easy solution. An indication of the strength of the opposition to be overcome can be gauged from a letter sent by a methodist clergyman of Athy, County Kildare, to Jeremiah Jordan, shortly before the formation of the I.P.H.R.A., in which he described the problems involved in creating converts to home rule in his area:

...In these parts the protestants...are about one in ten [of the population], composed of Irish church, presbyterian,
methodists, brethren, and an odd antique of a Quaker. The church folk are afraid of the loss of the landlords, who are the chief payers of the voluntary portion registered to support their agents - now only clerics. Few of them can see over their spectacles and all who read fed with the pabulum of the Daily Express. The presbyterians as a rule are too busy in their farms to weigh well such a weighty question as the "Rule" one, but all ready to reap any advantage from the land bill (Gladstone's land purchase bill intended to accompany home rule). They, however, need to be broadened to confidence in the independent and non-clerical Irish legislation of the future.

The majority of the methodists are willing to see the whole [home rule issue] only from a sectarian viewpoint, rather than the higher and noble one of our country's need....A few get the Methodist Times (which is very useful) but the "dailies" are either the "Express" or "Irish Times"; only in an odd case is the "Freeman" taken in...a real loss to themselves....A few of our ministers in the district - possibly a fifth of them - see the reasonableness of home rule, but most of them see the matter from the point and in the light of [the] old-fashioned ascendency notion and distrust, and...local and past prejudices still hold our laity....Just now, perhaps a twentieth of the elderly ones of our sect can swallow the whole, [accept home rule] not more than a fifth of our juniors, but their eyes will gradually open. 53

Despite the hopeful note on which this letter ended, it is clear that the obstacles facing the association were extremely formidable and it was soon evident that the latter's tactics were unlikely to overcome them. The initial response of the Dublin executive to inquiries was to post out circulars detailing the aims of the association and the rules for forming local branches. But of twenty-two circulars with details of branch formation sent out to members in different parts of southern Ireland in June 1886, few resulted in the establishment of local branches. The feeling of the Dublin executive on this state of affairs was recorded in the following terms:
'If even six protestants favouring the home rule cause...got together it would be a matter of considerable importance to have such a branch formed.' It was also suggested that association members might obtain recruits by inviting 'one or two protestants' to discuss home rule.\(^54\)

Over the next month, however, local branches were started in Phillipstown in King's County and in Limerick city, Cork city, Athlone and in five other places, though the membership figures of these branches are not obtainable. The lack of more local branches could be partly explained by the fact that some people preferred to join the Dublin centre directly rather than have the responsibility of running a local organisation.\(^55\)

Nevertheless, despite the progress that was made, the prospect of the association becoming widespread was not good.

The Dublin executive settled down to a long-term campaign of propaganda after the heightened activity of the general election, and it soon became evident that its activities would be confined to monthly public meetings and attempts to establish local branches: "Each member of the committee was requested to communicate with any of his acquaintances in county towns and if a lecturer could be sent wherever a meeting could be arranged by local men it would most expedite the formation of branches in the several localities visited." It was also agreed to write to defeated liberal candidates and M.P.s to arrange a winter lecture tour of association speakers in Great
Britain. \textsuperscript{56} Thus the association conceived its role primarily as an educational one and this was emphasised during the early stages of the plan of campaign when the Dublin executive made a firm decision not to become involved in the land question:

'...no member of the committee should pledge the association to any views on this question'. \textsuperscript{57}

Even the educational role of the association, however, was characterised by a certain timidity of approach, after an invitation to the I.L.P.U. to debate home rule publicly met with no response. \textsuperscript{58} Although convinced that protestants would not be persecuted in a self-governing Ireland, both the Rev. J. A. Galbraith and Samuel Walker curiously refused to open a discussion on this subject; the latter stating that 'for several reasons' his accepting the duty would be 'a disadvantage'. \textsuperscript{59} Their attitude suggests, in fact, that the Dublin executive at least, was very reluctant, in defining home rule, to proceed beyond the very broad generalisations of their propaganda. When the Irish peer, Lord Monck, wrote to \textit{The Times} \textsuperscript{60} urging that the home rule question should be discussed on the basis of the commitments Parnell gave to Gladstone on the bill of 1886, the Dublin executive, after an initial welcome to Monck's proposal, refused to provide him with a platform to air his views, on the ground that the association would 'be held compromised' by his opinions. \textsuperscript{61} A similar situation arose in 1887 when Stephen Gwynn and C. H. Oldham proposed
that they discuss Sir Charles Gavan Duffy's suggestions on a new home rule scheme, 'A fair constitution for Ireland'; fear of being 'compromised' by Duffy's views again prevented a debate.

At the end of 1886, though, the association, north and south, did have some successes to look back on. At a meeting in Belfast reviewing their progress, James Johnston, a vice-president of the association, claimed that in terms of numbers, the Belfast executive had 1,000 members associated with it, and the Dublin executive 1,200, 'with 1,000 at least in the south and west of the country'. Throughout the north, the number of members and supporters allied with them, though 'not necessarily members', he put at between 5,000 to 10,000.

In 1887, however, the timid policies of the previous year continued to be pursued. The Dublin committee met weekly and at least one public meeting was usually held every month, but their insistence on non-involvement in the land question left the southern-based protestant home rulers on the sidelines of the most pressing political development of the time - the plan of campaign. Given the nature of their political activities, committee-room resolutions to the effect that Balfour's forthcoming crimes act would be met with 'the most determined hostility' by 'a large proportion of the protestants of Ireland', were not likely to carry much weight, though one very impressive public meeting held to condemn this 'coercion' act
did take place in Dublin in April. One new development early in the year, was the establishment of North and South, a newspaper that existed specifically as an organ of protestant home rule opinion; but as the leading article in the first issue praising Parnell’s non-involvement in the plan of campaign suggested, it was, editorially, to follow very closely the line of the Dublin executive.

In an effort to extend their activities the Dublin executive offered assistance to the National League at their meetings in the Dublin area; Oldham and the Rev. H. S. Lunn were authorised to represent the Dublin body at a series of public meetings arranged in Ulster by its Belfast counterpart; and it was decided that in view of existing government policies the association would take a ‘passive attitude’ to Queen Victoria’s jubilee celebrations. Later in the year arrangements were made for a great meeting in Dublin on the occasion of a visit by liberal M.P.s and parliamentary candidates representing the Home Rule Union. But the most revolutionary proposal was that the citizens of Dublin ought to be induced to strike against the police tax in the event of T. D. Sullivan, the lord mayor, being imprisoned under the crimes act for publishing reports of suppressed branches of the National League. When put to the vote, however, this proposal was defeated.

The policies pursued in 1887 were continued into 1888, and the studied cautiousness of the Dublin executive to its
task was again illustrated, in March 1888, when a proposal that C. H. Oldham lecture on the subject of 'the best way of presenting an argument calculated to remove the apprehension in the minds of so many protestants that home rule would involve catholic supremacy in Ireland', was abandoned: '...more harm than good would be done by following out the argument in public, as the catholic clergy would be almost certainly annoyed'.

It was inevitable, however, that these policies would sooner or later have an adverse effect on the association's members, and this was strikingly illustrated in April 1888 when Thomas Shillington wrote to the Dublin executive informing them of his intention to resign the presidency of the movement, so that he would have a free hand to concentrate on the plan of campaign and 'to support the tenant-farmers against coercion'. Shillington's action indicated, and was followed by, an increasing loss of interest by many members of the association in its activities, and from this time it began to go into decline. A circular convening the annual meeting of the southern section of the movement in October 1888 complained: 'The executive has hitherto been the only active part of the organisation. Most of the members have done nothing to spread the principles of the association or enlarge the number of its members. As a result they have merely paid their annual subscriptions....' The cause of this inactivity was located in the fact that their meetings had always been public ones, with
individual members having no opportunity of getting to know their leaders 'and of assisting them in their work'. It was proposed that in future this defect would be remedied by concentrating on private meetings, at which members of the executive would confer with rank-and-file members on how to further the association's cause. 73

This tactic, however, did not reverse the movement's organisational decline. Attempts to organise public meetings addressed specifically to Irish methodists were unsuccessful because speakers could not be found. 74 More telling, though, was the involvement of leading figures of the Dublin executive with the activities of National League. As early as September 1887, Alfred Webb wrote to Timothy Harrington, national organiser of the league, offering his services: 'I am willing to take any dangerous part that could be thought desirable (printing notices, putting my name to calls for meetings of local league branches, etc.) in connection with the Wexford suppressions [of local league branches].' 75 Shortly afterwards, the Rev. J. A. Galbraith joined the National League, 76 while sometime in late 1888, or early 1889, he was followed by John Shanks and C. H. Oldham. 77 One protestant adherent of importance to the National League at this time, Maud Gonne, was able, due to diplomatic contacts in Europe, to make a considerable personal effort towards publicising the home rule cause. 78 Samuel Walker, Irish lord chancellor in the Gladstone government of 1892-5, did
not join the National League, but took little part in the Dublin executive's activities after he failed to persuade it to take a more strenuous line in the formulation of its resolutions. Against this background, the gradual demise of the organisation in the period 1889-90 is hardly surprising. Given the extreme caution which characterised its approach to propaganda work at a time when the immediate prospects of the home rule campaign did not seem good, and its rejection of any involvement in the land question—which might at least have provided the stimulus to constant activity—the demise of the association was only to be expected. But although it failed in its self-appointed task of converting the Irish protestant community to home rule, it nevertheless did play an important role in the politics of home rule nationalism, as is revealed in its relations with the Parnellite movement and the liberal party.

PROTESTANT HOME RULERS AND THE PARNELLIITE MOVEMENT
Certainly the emergence of the I.P.H.R.A. was very welcome to Parnellites, coming at a time when the strength of Ulster unionism was being forcefully presented in England: the association's printed 'Address to the protestants of Ireland' was quickly incorporated into the propaganda of the National Press Agency and circulated in Britain. The effect the emergence of the movement had on Parnellite opinion, in areas in which branches were established, was generally euphoric.
Reporting on the inaugural meeting of the Dublin section of the association, the *Freeman's Journal* declared: 'There can be no doubt that the I.P.H.R.A. is destined to play an important part in the settlement of the great question upon which the minds of all thinking men in the three kingdoms are focused.' The *Cork Daily Herald* wrote of the movement's activities in Cork city and southern Ireland generally: 'the action in the south will be the centre point of the movement' as it would 'wear a special significance in showing how well protestants were treated by their Roman Catholic fellow-country-men'. The *Weekly Examiner* described the formation of the association in Ulster as a 'good example' to the protestants of the province: 'They are not all in a position to act independently, and boldly proclaim their convictions, but it is well known that large numbers of the best and most intelligent of the protestants of Belfast and other towns in the province have strong sympathy with the movement for home rule.' Moreover, evidence of the practical assistance that the association could offer the Parnellite party was soon forthcoming.

It was seen that when protestant home rulers put up parliamentary candidates in protestant constituencies during the 1886 general election, they were all defeated, but the situation was very difficult in constituencies that were evenly balanced between nationalists and unionists, such as Londonderry City and West Belfast. It may very well have been true,
as Sir John Ross dismissively argued, that the number of pro-
testant home rulers in Derry city 'were never more than twenty
or thirty', but they were clearly crucially important in a
constituency, where, as in 1886, only four votes separated
victor from vanquished. In West Belfast the margin of vic-
tory for Thomas Sexton was much greater, and the associat-
ion's active involvement in the contest consequently less
crucial, but it was still made much of by Parnellites.

Sexton refuted the unionist claim that protestants were
opposed to home rule with the declaration: 'The protestant
home rule association is a formidable physical fact which no
argument can get rid of', while a nationalist newspaper
optimistically projected, that on the basis of the West Belfast
result, the movement's influence could be relied on to 'bring
the other divisions [of Belfast] around'. Yet, important as
both their influence in marginal constituencies and role as a
propaganda organisation in the home rule movement was, there
was also a negative aspect to the association's activities.
While it may have provided catholic nationalists with a link
to Ireland's protestant community, that did not mean that the
former became more aware of the strength and extent of protest-
ant objections and fears on the home rule question; in fact
the protestant home rulers' influence was mainly in exactly
the opposite direction. Had the latter not existed, it is
clear that the strenuous opposition with which most Irish
protestants greeted the prospect of Irish autonomy would have been a grave embarrassment to the nationalist party, given its policy of obtaining home rule by persuading British political opinion that such was the wish of the overwhelming majority of the Irish nation. But with the formation of the protestant home rule movement the Parnellite claim was given a validity it would not otherwise have had, especially since the movement's leadership was, especially in the south, respectably middle-class. 92 Had it not existed, it is quite possible that Parnellites, lacking this connecting link with the protestant community, might conceivable have been driven to reassess their policy on the Ulster question.

Certainly the enmity existing between the catholic nationalist and protestant unionist elements of the Irish population would have been brought more sharply into relief. As it was, apart from a section of the Dublin executive, the protestant home rule movement merely endorsed the Parnellite case for home rule. The arguments presented at their inaugural meetings 93 also provided the case put by their deputations in Great Britain. For example, the protestant home rule delegation which campaigned in London during the 1886 general election, argued that the majority of Irish protestants did not believe that Roman Catholics would tyrannise over them, and that home rule would benefit the whole United Kingdom: home rule would be the 'death of religious animosity in Ireland' and Ulster
Orangemen would 'honourably' accept home rule 'in a little time'.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Parnellites, when faced with unionist objections to home rule, should complacently point to the work of protestant home rulers and their endorsement of their case for Irish autonomy. In this context, the Nation, in an article noting the publication of Alfred Webb's 'poll' of protestants in the south on the subject of their treatment by Roman Catholics, also declared: 'We ourselves know very well the protestants of Ireland - that is, Irish protestant farmers, shopkeepers, and labourers - could not be so blind as not to be warmly in favour of that which is so much in their interest to support.' Similarly, a revealing indication of the complacency engendered among rank-and-file catholic nationalists by the activities of protestant home rulers, can be gauged from correspondence in the Jeremiah Jordan papers. When Jordan made his maiden speech in the house of commons, endorsing the Parnellite case for home rule, the parish priest of Kilshanny, County Cork, wrote:

It was rather pleasant to read in the Freeman...how W. O'Brien for protestant Fermanagh (sic) and Mr Jordan for catholic Clare proved eloquently both by the places they respectively represent and by their practical and splendid speeches, how absurd the fears, real or pretended of Orangemen are, that we, if we had a parliament of our own, would prove intolerant to protestants.
Another catholic clergyman, from Jordan's home town in Enniskillen, wrote: 'The people are wonderfully well pleased with the masterly way in which you answered those rabid Orange members from Ulster who are endeavouring to create discord and hatred among the different creeds and classes of people in Ireland.' Yet another Enniskillen correspondent declared, in terms which suggested the attitude of one-upmanship that often characterised relations between nationalists and unionists in Ulster: 'Your opponents are in kicking bad temper that you have done so well....you's (sic) are doing good work for Ireland.'

In the main, protestant home rulers contributed to the nationalist propaganda campaign by writing pamphlets on Irish nationality, home rule and the Ulster problem, rejecting unionist claims that protestants had been massacred in 1641, and highlighting the 'corruption' with which the act of union was carried. By the end of 1886 they had become quite an important element in the nationalist movement and had received representation on every other nationalist organisation in the country. In 1887 their series of meetings in Ulster forged another link with the national movement, as John Dillon, the first leading Parnellite M.P. to speak from a protestant home rule platform, was the chief speaker at the most of the twelve meetings held there.

Not all members of the movement, however, had an accurate
idea of the extent to which protestant interests were represented in the Parnellite party. Alexander Bowman, a founder of the Belfast executive, replied thus to a liberal unionist critic who thought home rule would result in Roman Catholic domination: 'Take, for example, the parliamentary representation, and we find thirty-three protestant gentlemen elected by overwhelmingly catholic constituencies.'\(^{105}\) This was a wildly exaggerated claim by any account: at the time Bowman wrote only eight protestants, including Parnell, were members of the party, representing a little under 11 per cent of its strength. It is true, though, that Parnell had adopted a policy at this time of filling vacant seats with 'suitable' protestants. In conversation with A. J. Kettle he admitted

that the imperial parliament would find it very difficult to delegate the right of governing powers of Ireland into the hands of such an overmastering catholic party as he led... and he was trying to change the character of the party by getting in suitable protestants...\(^{106}\)

The nationalist definition of 'suitable' was succinctly expressed by Michael Davitt, in describing the protestant candidates selected by county conventions prior to the 1885 general election: 'well educated and well informed and gentlemanly'. It was in this context that the I.P.H.R.A. was especially important, and during the period 1886-90 several members were approached to represent the Parnellite party. When South
Donegal fell vacant in 1887, J. G. S. McNeill gratefully accepted Parnell's invitation to stand. In 1888, when the Stephen's Green division of Dublin fell vacant on the death of E. D. Gray, association members were again consulted. The Rev. J. A. Galbraith was unsuccessfully approached by Parnell, who argued: 'It would tend to assuage the feeling of alarm undoubtedly existing amongst many of our protestant fellowcountry-men at the prospect of home rule... [and] would be most gratifying to me personally.'

G. H. Kidd was next approached, but graciously declined. Finally T. A. Dickson was selected, though he still refused to take the party pledge on grounds of conscience, and stood as a liberal. From then until the Parnell split, four more protestants were elected as members of the Parnellite party: Alfred Webb, E. F. Vesey Knox, Henry Harrison and J. R. Maguire, though it is unclear whether Harrison and Maguire were associated with the protestant home rule movement, which, by 1890, was well into decline. At any rate, in that year there was a total of thirteen protestant M.P.s in the nationalist party, making up 16 per cent of its membership. As Conor Cruise O'Brien has pointed out, they thus formed a considerably larger proportion of the Parnellite party than they did of nationalist Ireland. But what was their specific contribution to the party?

None took a leading role in the party's affairs, and the cases of W. A. McDonald and G. D. Pyne supported the
view that the role of the protestant group was chiefly an ornamental one—of bearing witness to the tolerance of Irish Roman Catholics. Moreover, most belonged to the moderate wing of the party. Their most significant role in the nationalist cause was, apparently, that of propagandists for home rule in Great Britain. A handbill distributed in John Pinkerton's Galway constituency during the general election of 1892, and which sought to justify his mainland activities and consequent neglect of his constituency, as well as to press home the importance of a strong protestant representation in the party, declared:

What could Pinkerton honestly do for the town with the conservatives in office?... He preferred to face the tories across the floor of the house of commons and on the platforms in England. "What did Pinkerton do for the town?" is a tory question.... Pinkerton as member for Galway is an object lesson in tolerance, the best answer to Lord Salisbury's argument that home rule would mean Rome rule. The rejection of the Ulster protestant would influence many a wavering vote in these [Ulster] constituencies.... If the Galway electors reject Pinkerton...they will postpone the spreading of home rule principals (sic) among northern farmers....

But despite the public declarations of Roman Catholic tolerance that emanated from both catholic Parnellite and protestant home rule sources, the fact that the nationalist movement was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic carried certain implications as to the ethos of life in an autonomous Ireland if catholics dominated both the legislature and executive.
The implications of this state of affairs were realised as fully by protestant home rulers as by protestant unionists. It has been noted\textsuperscript{116} that the former were unwilling to initiate a serious debate on their position in Irish society after the granting of self-government; but in their contacts with British liberals some indication of their thinking on this subject can be gauged. In a revealing interview with the editor of the \textbf{Eastern Daily Press}, Pinkerton replied to the question of how the various sections of the Irish people would work together in a self-governing Ireland: 'Mr Parnell might lead the more conservative section of an Irish parliament and Mr Davitt the more democratic. We should have some men more extreme than Mr Davitt, so that the protestant party from north-east Ulster would hold the balance of power.'\textsuperscript{117}

What Pinkerton had to say on the role of Ulster protestants was crucial to the thinking of both northern and southern protestant home rulers on their position in an autonomous Ireland.\textsuperscript{118} All, it would seem, took the view that the role they would have in Irish affairs would be determined by the large protestant community in Ulster. Thus it was essential to their interests that Ulster be included in any home rule scheme. Alfred Webb, a forceful public exponent of the view that home rule would not mean Rome rule, was yet privately apprehensive of the position of southern protestants
were Ulster not included in a future home rule scheme. In a private interview with the English liberal, C. S. Roundell—a record of which was forwarded to Gladstone—he exclaimed: '... Ulster cannot be left out. It would mean the desertion of the protestants in the rest of Ireland....To separate Ulster from the rest of Ireland would leave the protestants elsewhere to themselves, without the protestant force which Ulster gives.'

Implicit in this argument was the belief that, however fair-minded catholics might be, protestant interests could only be safeguarded by a strong protestant representation in a Dublin parliament. Thus when Gladstone indicated, in a speech at the end of July 1887, that the exclusion of Ulster from a home rule bill might be acceptable if 'the public mind' was in favour of it, North and South completely disagreed: 'This we regret to see. It is not a point that is likely to be pressed by anyone. But if proposed, Mr Parnell will never agree to give up a single Irishman.' That many protestant home rulers had relied on Parnell to safeguard their interests within the nationalist movement, was demonstrated by the reaction of the Dublin executive to his death: Parnell had been fighting 'the battle of Irish protestants under home rule', and the latter should join the national movement to forestall the tendency 'of any dominant [R.C.] church' to 'annihilate the national character of the claim for self-government'.

It is hardly surprising to find, therefore, that
protestant home rulers were, until 1914, the most vocal element
in the nationalist movement in arguing Ulster's community of
interests with the rest of Ireland, and in dismissing Ulster
unionist threats of resistance as bluff. Thus, as protest-
ant home rulers' fears on the Ulster question show, the union-
ist claim that they were 'degenerate' protestants, or 'prot-
estants simply because they were not Roman Catholics' was
clearly ill-founded. Indeed, as the address of the Dublin
executive of the I.P.H.R.A., in 1886, implied, the view of
nationalism endorsed by Irish catholics would need significant
modifications if protestant interests were to be adequately safe-
guarded; and this point was forcefully made during the plan of
campaign.

While most protestant home rulers followed Gladstone's
lead on the home rule question, an important and mainly fenian
inspired section of the Dublin executive, refused either to
accept Irish nationalism on his authority, or - as in the case
of catholic nationalists - take it as self-evident. This group
was prone to debate the nature of nationalism in Ireland and,
as will be seen, to distinguish between activity that could be
termed truly 'national', as distinct from that which was merely
factional. Their attitude can be gauged from a typical utter-
ance of C. H. Oldham:

We want a clearer view of our individuality as a people, of
our destiny as a nation. We want a centre for our political life. We want the gathering together and the glorification before us of an ideal, of a goal, which may stand out in our minds a mark for honourable enthusiasm, a soul of citizenship, at once the support, the inspiration, and the pride of a much tried people. 128

It was their more analytical approach to Irish nationalism that originally prevented them, particularly Oldham and T. W. Rolleston, from joining the Parnellite movement, which would have entailed accepting the party pledge binding all members to speak, act, and vote, according to the decision of the majority: 'they definitely decided against submitting to this sacrifice of their free judgment'. 129 Moreover, while catholic nationalists saw the association of the Roman Catholic church with nationalist politics as perfectly understandable and acceptable, this group tended to be far more critical.

When Archbishop Walsh condemned a Mr Cogan, a Roman Catholic critic of the National League, for having also criticised himself and his episcopal office since they were allied with the National League, Rolleston replied with a powerful article that condemned Walsh's view and the overwhelming support it received from the nationalist press: 'it should not be open to an archbishop or to anyone else, to require that the opponent of his politics...should keep silent about them simply because those politics are the politics of an archbishop;
or of twenty archbishops'. In the same article, he also condemned Archbishop Croke's remark, that unionists in Tipperary who fielded candidates during the 1885 general election and inconvenienced local Parnellites, might themselves be met with nationalists who would 'annoy and remorselessly exact reprisals from them, in turn'. Invoking the spirit of Robert Emmet and Thomas Davis, Rolleston claimed that Croke's utterances were 'typical...of much that is prevalent in our time from the standpoint of national policy' and condemned them as sectarian:

The Irish patriot must love his country with no cramped or sectarian love, but with one which includes all classes, all creeds, all political divisions. True, he may fight to death against English or Irish unionists, to his own death, or theirs. But he must never forget that the cause he is fighting for is at bottom that of the West Briton (if they could only see it) as well as of the nationalists; and, the victory once won, he must look forward not to a policy of reprisals, but to one of healing, reconciliation, union.

Rolleston's comments clarify the distinction between a view of Irish nationality ideologically rooted in the writings of Thomas Davis, urging the reconciliation of Ireland's divided factions, and that of the Parnellites whose definition of nationalism tended to be restricted to those prepared actually to ally with, and work in, the nationalist cause. This distinction was to be clearly brought out during the political struggles of the plan of campaign.
Writing to the *Freeman's Journal*, in February 1887, enclosing £10 for the defence fund of the plan of campaign, Archbishop Croke also argued that it was 'inadequate and inconsistent' merely to stop the landlords' rent: to be effective nationalists should also refuse to pay the taxes used by the government to support the anti-Irish 'foreign garrison'. Croke's sentiments were endorsed a few days later by Michael Davitt, who described them as a 'masculine national policy'.

North & South, however, condemned Croke's proposals; they confused the 'public mind' and hindered the promotion of the home rule cause in England. It was to 'speak without thinking' to believe that the simple extension of the plan of campaign to the whole country would exterminate the landlords and overthrow the 'castle system'. The plan of campaign was only morally justifiable and practically sustainable against a small number of oppressive landlords: 'To extend it further is to openly organise fraud.'

This response provoked a debate on the nature of Irish nationalism which brought into conflict different concepts of what the term 'national' meant. Writing in reply, Michael Davitt accused those whom North and South represented of being 'neophyte nationalists' and denied that Croke's proposals had had an adverse effect in Britain. The Irish national movement, he continued, was like most others, in being composed of conservative and radical elements, and while the conservatives
represented by North and South had a role to play in conciliating British opinion, the radical section was doing the more important aggressive work of fighting against 'the castle and...landlordism'; work that 'has converted Mr Gladstone to home rule, and advanced the national cause to its present position'.

Issue was immediately taken, however, with Davitt's definition of the nationalist movement; his immutable categories of 'conservative' and 'radical' were rejected in favour of a more flexible attitude that allowed both stances to be taken up, as and when required. In this context it was argued: 'The two movements [radical and conservative] are not parallel; but the one movement is continuous throughout... We are yet neither radical or conservative in Ireland: we are still nationalists - pure and simple.' Moreover:

We do not agree that this country is to be maimed and weakened by the lopping off of one important section of the Irish community. The Irish country gentry are on the average as Irish as any other class in Ireland. It is the duty of Irish nationalists as such to labour for a settlement of the land question that will confiscate neither the property equitably belonging to the landlord as owner, nor the improvements effected by the tenant as working occupier....nationality is not the privilege of a class; nor would Mr Davitt's class movement be really national.

This view was endorsed shortly afterwards by the veteran fenian, John O'Leary, who failed to see anything necessarily 'masculine'
or 'Irish' in no-tax manifestoes: '...opposition to English rule in Ireland, not landlordism', determined whether 'a man is Irish in my understanding of the word'. At this point, Davitt's place in the controversy was taken by A. J. Kettle, who justified the no-tax manifesto on the grounds that rents were extortionate and taxes 'fraudulently apportioned for the last sixty years': the 'Norman freebooter and materialist Saxon' would only be impressed if their 'supplies' were withdrawn. When O'Leary replied condemning the idea of a tax strike, Kettle retorted:

North and South seems to think that the garrison people are about to take the Irish side as they did for a short time in Grattan's day, but what about the seven years Issac Butt spent trying to win them over? Still there is a large and influential section of protestants apart from the garrison...led by the unchanged and unchangeable Galbraith; and North and South will be doing good work in pulling them together in the coming time.

Here the immediate controversy ended, but the different views which prompted it remained. Later in 1887, Archbishop Walsh, inspired by the Round Table conference that sought to re-unite the liberal party, suggested that such a conference between Irish landlords and tenants might solve the land question. With the plan of campaign in full swing, however, there was little chance of this suggestion being favourably received by Parnellites. William O'Brien, in particular,
denounced the suggestion in a lecture devoted to the subject, arguing that the existing Irish landlords were 'foreigners in race and language', the cause of famines and rack-rents; their position in Ireland was due to the massive confiscations undertaken by their 'throat-cutting and psalm singing' ancestors, who came over with Cromwell. The 'real' Irish gentry, he argued, were now among those tenants whose ancestors had been dispossessed. It had been a delusion of Young Ireland that the Anglo-Irish gentry could be won over to nationalism.\footnote{145} Predictably, North and South completely disagreed; despite their faults the gentry were still Irishmen with many fine qualities: 'we should strive to retain them and not drive them away'.\footnote{146}

The most serious consequence of this conflict of views, however, occurred in 1888, when T. W. Rolleston published a pamphlet in reply to one produced by the liberal radical, Samuel Laing, in which he explained and commended boycotting as a legitimate response to landlord oppression.\footnote{147} Rolleston lamented the absence of an 'independent national journal in Ireland' in which to protest against 'evil things said and done by the dominant section of the national movement'.\footnote{148} In particular:

A tenant will be boycotted if he does not join the plan of campaign - if he makes and pays his rent for his own farm. United Ireland calls for the boycotting of jurymen who, in
cases of disagreement, desire to convict agrarian prisoners. Witnesses who give evidence against agrarian criminals are boycotted, and not one nationalist leader dares to risk unpopularity in the defence of these innocent sufferers. I have known a man ruthlessly boycotted by a whole countryside, and his life attempted, simply for taking a situation from which a drunken, dishonest bogranger was dismissed, who used to take money from the neighbours to let their cattle break in upon their master's land....[The plan]....has in reality become an engine for the wholesale suppression of independent thought, of honest enterprise and industry; for the handicapping of sober, honest, hardworking men all over Ireland down to the level of drunkards and idlers, of those who would rather get twenty five per cent off their rent by clamour and intimidation than treble their profits by toil and thrift. 149

Rolleston also declared that approval or support for the National League meant 'a consent to iniquities' and that the chronicle of the world's iniquities, though perhaps bloodier, could show 'nothing more abominably vile'. 150 Given that the chief function of the I.P.H.R.A. was propaganda in favour of home rule, Rolleston's article was a severe embarrassment. Both the I.L.P.U. and liberal unionists produced and circulated copies of it in Great Britain. 151 Moreover, it is likely that it also assisted in furthering the decline of the I.P.H.R.A. that was noticeable at this time. It was seen that many members, frustrated by the apparent ineffectiveness of the association, were becoming more identified with the National League. 152 One of these, Alfred Webb, answered Rolleston with a letter to the Freeman's Journal, attacking his wholesale condemnation of the nationalist movement and the tendency of such critics only to favour 'past patriots
who stand in no one's way'.

When the Parnellite party split in 1890, the decline of protestant home rule movement was complete. Although by this time it was merely a formal shell, its membership was divided between an anti-Parnellite position, taken up by the northern branch, and a strenuously pro-Parnellite stance adopted by the Dublin executive and branches of the association in Limerick, Waterford, Athlone and Phillipstown. Of the twelve protestants who were nationalist M.P.s, and who had mostly been either I.P.H.R.A. members or supporters of the association, eight became anti-Parnellites: Abraham, Dickson, Jordan, Knox, McNeill, Pinkerton, Tanner and Webb. The four remaining Parnellites were Henry Harrison, W. A. Macdonald, Pierce Mahony and J. R. Maguire. Conor Cruise O'Brien has suggested the possibility that the larger member of anti-Parnellites could partly, at least, be attributed to the argument—widely used by catholic nationalists in the aftermath of the O'Shea divorce case—that Parnell, being a protestant should not be judged as a catholic would; the implication, greatly resented by Irish protestants, being that they could not be expected to have any morals.

With protestant home rulers divided, the work of the organisation as an independent body came virtually to an end, though it remained formally in existence and was to re-emerge during the debates on the second home rule bill. But until
then, protestant home rulers identified with, and worked in, the differing nationalist factions, where—especially in the anti-Parnellite National Federation in Ulster—representative membership was provided for them in local organisations, in the hope that this would attract increased protestant support.158

THE I.P.H.R.A. AND BRITISH LIBERAL OPINION
It has been pointed out elsewhere that Gladstone's knowledge of Ireland and Irish affairs was very limited.159 Thus a movement like the I.P.H.R.A., could, through effective tactics, exert an influence on him out of all proportion to its numbers. This was all the more probable when it is considered that the majority of Irish protestant home rulers were Gladstonians, whose views of the Irish question were synonymous with his own. Irish unionists were alive to this possibility. As the Weekly Northern Whig put it: although the leaders of the I.P.H.R.A. - Thomas Shillington, Thomas McClelland and J. J. Johnston - might not pretend to represent protestant opinion, Mr Gladstone had no one to tell him differently.160 Certainly it would appear that the association sought to maximise every opportunity of making its presence felt among British Liberals.

While it is generally true, as Cooke and Vincent argue,161 that Gladstone did not have close personal contacts with Parnellites, this statement has to be qualified to some extent in respect of protestant home rulers, several
of whom were in personal contact with him and other leading liberals with reference to various aspects of the Irish question in the period 1886-93. Indeed, when I.P.H.R.A. deputations campaigned in Great Britain during the general election of 1886, they did not do so in co-operation with Parnellites, but put themselves at the disposal of the liberal party, which also paid their expenses. Subsequent speaking tours between 1886 and 1890 were also in association with the liberal party. Again, it would appear that almost every local branch of the protestant home rule movement sent a copy of its resolutions to all leading liberals. Certainly by the end of 1886 the association had secured representation on the council of the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain and established very close links with the liberal party.

The success of their speaking tours in Great Britain, at least among those willing to accept the protestant home rule case, can be measured by the correspondence reaching the Dublin office from Britain. C. H. Oldham wrote to Alfred Webb:

Since our invasion of the English and Scottish political arena our offices have had numerous inquiries; many people asked us to send them leaflets and pamphlets in order that they might be able to confront unionists in their areas....Indeed, we have had several people writing, asking if they could join our association or if they could establish branches of our movement there. 166
But although their general propaganda work in England was important, how did Protestant home rulers influence the view of the Irish question of leading liberals, particularly Gladstone? It was seen that Gladstone's perception of the Irish problem was conceptualised within an extensive historical framework, at the centre of which was a view of Irish Protestants—derived from the period of Grattan's parliament—as essentially nationalists. Protestant home rule propaganda worked to confirm that view. In reply to T. H. Webb, on receipt of the first few issues of *North and South*, Gladstone declared:

I have received the commencing numbers of *North and South*, and I have been reading them with great interest. Nothing can be more legitimate than the appeal to the Protestants of Ireland to retain and maintain the tradition of their sires. Strange as it may seem, a very large proportion of the English people, and no small number of their representatives in parliament, are still ignorant of the elementary fact of Irish history that down to the time of the union the Irish Protestants...were undoubtedly the most prominent supporters of Irish nationality. They have now the opportunity of supporting that nationality within safe and constitutional bounds....I...heartily...wish well to the efforts which you inform me that you intend to make. 168

Similarly, the most impressive propaganda event to be arranged by the I.P.H.R.A. — the great meeting held in Dublin on 12 April 1887 with representatives from all over Ireland — received a letter of encouragement from Gladstone: 'I trust your meeting in Dublin will do much to dispel the absurd idea that the Protestants throughout Ireland are, as a body,
apprehensive of the consequences of home rule to themselves, or are anything like unanimous in opposing it....'169 Such were the sentiments generally expressed by Gladstone in his correspondence with branches of the I.P.H.R.A. 170

Events in Ireland in 1887 continued to keep the association before Gladstone's notice. The series of meetings it arranged in Ulster were met by loyalist counter-demonstrations, which often occasioned the proclaiming of protestant home rule demonstrations and consequent questions in the house of commons. When association meetings were proclaimed in Dungannon, Kilkeel, Armagh, and Caledon, John Dillon and others made repeated requests for clarification of government policy on their suppression, and on what action they were prepared to take to prevent counter-demonstrations. 171 Likely to be just as important in confirming Gladstone's view that Irish protestants were increasingly coming to accept home rule, were the cases of persecution and boycotting of protestant home rulers that were brought to his notice. Speaking during the debates on the criminal law amendment bill of 1887, Gladstone rejected conservative claims that protestant home rulers were virtually non-existent:

Yes sir, there are protestant home rulers, and there are protestant home rulers who have come under the lash, not for their protestantism, but for their home rule, notwithstanding their protestantism. The cases are very rare in which boycotting does anything worse...than to deprive people of the sole and
honourable means of subsistence - some persons on account simply of their political opinions. Well sir, I had a case made known to me a few weeks ago, when I was called upon to subscribe for the support of a protestant clergyman who was turned out of his curacy in the disestablished church for this reason - and no other reason was even alleged - that he was a protestant home ruler...there are not only protestant home rulers...but...protestant home rulers who have suffered for their opinions. 172

The case Gladstone referred to here, was that of the Rev. S. Sandys of Donnybrook, Dublin, 173 and brought to his attention in October 1886 by the Dublin executive of the I.P.H.R.A., with a request that leading liberals might help to secure Sandys a living in Great Britain. 174 This was, indeed, to be accomplished, and in the meantime Gladstone sent £5 towards a 'memorial' for Sandys. 175 At a time when he was being criticised for his alliance with 'extreme' Parnellites, and when he himself personally disapproved of the illegalities associated with the plan of campaign, 176 it must have been of some comfort to him to be able to show that boycotting was not confined to nationalists.

Following his reference in parliament to the boycotting of protestant home rulers, more instances were rapidly brought to his attention. Speaking at a later date during the debate on the criminal law amendment bill, he declared:

exclusive dealing [boycotting] is cruelly practised in Ireland towards any protestant who is disposed to show himself a home ruler. A short time ago I gave an instance of an Irish clergyman
who was reduced to beggary for the offence of being a home ruler, and after I mentioned that case I immediately received in my correspondence offers from Ireland to make me acquainted with the particulars of many other cases. 177

One of the most widely publicised instances of alleged persecution of a protestant home ruler was that of the Rev. Matthew Macaulay of Castleblayney, County Monaghan, who claimed that fifty families in his congregation had signed a document drawn up by local Orangemen declaring that they would not enter his church 'nor pay a farthing' of his stipend while he was its minister. In addition, his church had been broken into and desecrated on 11 July 1886 and he and his wife harassed and harangued by a crowd of 'Orange rowdies' a short time previously. He was thus compelled to resign. 178 Macaulay was an outspoken home ruler and his case received much publicity. 179

British liberal interest in the I.P.H.R.A. was further increased in 1887 when a deputation of English liberals visited Ireland and attended many of its meetings, especially in Ulster. On their return to Britain some claimed that the protestant home rule association was a 'very important' and 'highly influential' body, and that its membership in Ulster alone was over 10,000. 180 Another development likely to have influenced British liberals was the various petitions raised by protestant home rulers in the period 1886-93. It was seen that within a fortnight of the formation of the Belfast executive
of the protestant home rule association, T. A. Dickson had collected and forwarded to Gladstone, a petition of 500 protestant signatures in favour of home rule. The occasion for more petitions arose in 1888, when, in consequence to a large extent of the movement's propaganda in Great Britain, several religious denominations gathered signatures for submission to Gladstone. These included 250 English episcopalian ministers, 274 clergymen of all denominations in the West Riding of Yorkshire - only a dozen of whom were Roman Catholics - 4,000 nonconformist ministers in London, and many other smaller groups.

In an attempt to combat these expressions of protestant support, the Irish presbyterian, methodist, congregational and baptist churches compiled and submitted their own anti-home rule petition to Lord Salisbury. Of a total of 990 nonconformist ministers, the petition was signed by 864. It was argued that only 8 of the 126 who refused to sign were home rulers, and that the rest refused because they considered the petition a political document. Nevertheless, the fact that 126 ministers stood aloof from their colleagues on home rule delighted protestant home rulers, because although they would not all support self-government, it was also possible that they were not strongly opposed to it either. For the I.P.H.R.A., however, the occasion for presenting petitions to Gladstone did not arise until the second home rule debate in 1893.
These began with a public address to Gladstone signed by over 400 protestants and arranged by the Dublin executive of the movement, which had recently been brought together again through the efforts of C. H. Oldham. At the same time, John Pinkerton was compiling a home rule 'memorial' to Gladstone signed by 543 Belfast unitarians, which Gladstone was to describe as 'a manifestation of enlightened opinion amid a sea of violence and intolerance which seems to rage in Belfast'.

The largest petition, however, was compiled, not under the auspices of the protestant home rule association, but by a group of liberal presbyterians in Ulster which included the Rev. J. B. Armour and J. B. Dougherty; though given that the Ulster executive of the association was now defunct, it is likely that many signatories were its supporters and also signatories of the Dublin petition.

Armour, the chief mover of the petition, was reacting to resolutions condemning home rule passed at the special meeting of the presbyterian general assembly, held in March 1892. There was an attendance of 750 at this meeting, and while only eight recorded their votes in favour of home rule, there were at least 250 who abstained and walked out. Armour concluded that "devotion to what is called the union is not growing among Irish presbyterians". The idea behind the petition was to estimate the size of the growing minority in favour of home rule and it was thought that if even 1,000 signatures could be
secured the petition would have served its purpose. However, despite the application of social and political pressure on those willing to sign, 2,535 presbyterians put their names to the address. It is unlikely, though, that all were in favour of home rule: the reference in the address to self-government was vague and placed in the context of an expression of gratitude for 'the great benefit which your [Gladstone's] statesmanship has already conferred on our country'. Some people were undoubtedly influenced by an interest in land reform, while others were very likely motivated by a hatred of the old episcopal ascendancy. Moreover, vigorous efforts were made by Ulster unionists to show that many signatures were either bogus or were not those of presbyterians at all. Nevertheless, Gladstone attached 'great value' to the address:

I look forward with confidence to a very large and early return of presbyterians, in particular, to the sentiments in favour of union with their fellow-countrymen which governed them as a body one century ago, but this will in all likelihood be delayed till the parliamentary controversy has been closed.

The effect of the address on Gladstone was indicative of the influence of protestant home rulers generally on both nationalists and liberals since 1886: it sustained unrealistic hopes of the eventual acceptability of home rule by Ulster protestants and, in consequence, policies and attitudes that, as shall now be seen, offered little hope of a solution to the problem.
Although the 1886 general election saw the overwhelming defeat of the liberal party in Britain, it produced virtually no change in the political representation of Ireland. In Ulster, it is true, the electoral successes of Timothy Healy and William O’Brien in Tyrone South and Londonderry South, which seemed in 1885 to herald a trend of continued nationalist successes in the north, were not repeated. These, however, were compensated for by the winning of West Belfast by Thomas Sexton and Londonderry City by Justin McCarthy; the latter following a successful election petition. Thus the Parnellites retained the political advantage they acquired in 1885 of winning a majority of the parliamentary seats in Ulster. But the strength of Ulster protestant opposition to home rule required a more forceful reply than a simple reference to the relative parliamentary strength of political parties in the province, and Parnellites answered the Ulster unionist challenge stridently, both on a practical and ideological level.

As was seen, by 1886 the National League had established 287 branches in Ulster, though the mere enumeration of branches gives a poor idea of the strength of the National
League in the province. Information on its membership is difficult to come by because the central branch of the organisation in Dublin did not keep records of members while the membership of local branches could range from 50 to 1000. Information on this subject, however, was gathered by the special branch of the R.I.C. in an attempt to quantify the strength of nationalist associations in Ireland in 1889. The estimates arrived at were, the compilers stressed, 'approximate', and given that the sources from which they were derived were largely police informers, it is likely that there would have been a tendency to exaggeration. Nevertheless, given the absence of other sources of information, the police estimate is, to say the least, interesting.

**TABLE 5**

**Estimated membership of the National League in Ulster in 1889**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antrim</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>3,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armagh</td>
<td>4,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donegal</td>
<td>5,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down</td>
<td>2,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fermanagh</td>
<td>5,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londonderry</td>
<td>4,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaghan</td>
<td>8,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrone</td>
<td>8,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,878</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It would seem that the organisation's Ulster membership was higher than that of both Connaught and Munster, though lower than Leinster; the figures for these provinces, respectively were 26,466, 35,103 and 47,091. The north of Ireland, then, was well represented in the Parnellite movement; however, the significant role in the nationalist struggle it consequently might have been expected to play never materialised.

Despite the fact that the agricultural crisis of 1886-7 affected Ulster as much as southern Ireland and that a majority of Ulster farmers were Roman Catholics, the enthusiasm which greeted the plan of campaign in the south was noticeably absent in the north. As a rule, it would appear that catholic as well as protestant tenant-farmers sought to keep the agitation for lower rents on a non-political level. Lord O'Neill's catholic and protestant tenants held a meeting in Toombridge in December 1886 - arranged by the local catholic priest and presbyterian minister - to discuss a demand for a 25 per cent rent abatement, but there was no question of adopting the plan of campaign. The Ards tenantry of John Mulholland met at Ballybooley to demand a rent reduction and stressed that though their landlord was generous and philanthropic, they still could not pay their rents. Again, any association with the plan of campaign was specifically rejected. Similar action was taken two weeks later by another group seeking rent abatements, while the Cahore tenants of B. H. Lane, having
asked for a 25 per cent reduction, were offered half that amount, and warned that unless rents were paid within two weeks this offer would be withdrawn and action taken against them. Nevertheless, these tenants also rejected the plan of campaign. Such was the general character of tenant meetings in connection with the rent reductions in many parts of north at this time, particularly in counties Down, Tyrone and Londonderry.

Catholics, it seems, were concerned to conduct a strictly legal agitation for lower rents. The president of one meeting at Draperstown, in calling for the formation of a tenant's defence association, emphasised that 'they were simply there to protect themselves by some legal means'. For protestant tenant-farmers, any action in pursuit of agrarian objectives similar to that employed in the plan of campaign, was hindered by an intense distaste for the inevitable association with nationalism such action would have entailed. Thus the union of protestants and catholics on agrarian questions in Ulster was only really feasible on a strictly non-political basis, and while United Ireland could describe the joint action of protestant and catholics demanding a rent reduction on the earl of Charlemont's Castlecaulfield estate as, 'the spirit of the north aroused', the 'spirit' aroused was not a nationalist one. It would seem that attempts to extend the plan of campaign into Ulster were kept to the predominantly catholic
counties of Donegal and Monaghan. William O'Brien declared that he and John Dillon had 'persistently refused' the most pressing invitations to come to Ulster to instigate the plan of campaign because they understood the tenants' difficulties in the north, where the landlords' strength lay in their divisions. 17

Hereafter, nationalist attempts to attract support among Ulster protestants generally took the form of cautioning against acceptance of what they argued was the inadequate remedial legislation of the unionist government, and relatedly, of holding out the prospect of extensive social and land reforms to be enacted once Ireland had home rule. In a speech in Belfast, in April 1887, Michael Davitt held out the prospect of a prosperous Ireland when home rule was established; 'landlordism' would be abolished, rents reduced by 50 per cent, new industries established and other benefits. 18 Later that month John Dillon addressed a meeting at Ballymoney, composed mainly of presbyterian tenant-farmers, and urged them not to purchase their holdings under the land bill then before parliament, as the crimes bill which accompanied it was intended to break all combinations of tenants. Existing rents were too high and if accepted as the basis of land purchases the government would use the crimes act to ensure that no combinations to effect reductions would succeed. 19 Similar advice was given by Davitt later in the year at Sheepbridge, County
Down. Davitt described tenants buying their holdings from the Duke of Abercorn as 'fools', as the terms were too high: they should have awaited the enactment of home rule: 'An Irish state could easily find the money out of which to give to the landlords such compensation as would be reward or justice for the transfer of their rights to the Irish nation.'

However, Davitt's vision of Ireland's future was inconsistent with the glaring financial inadequacies of Gladstone's home rule bill. The Weekly Northern Whig pointed out that what Davitt envisaged a home rule government doing 'in two or three years' would be frankly impossible. Indeed, it was inescapably the case that a state without credit or money would have to 'lay hands' on the wealth of its subjects: 'We see that the Irish farmers might soon be the victims after the landlords, especially the Ulster tenant-farmers, who as loyal citizens of the crown might easily be put into the same category as the landlords.'

The unattractiveness of nationalist policies for Ulster farmers is perhaps best illustrated by the extensive selling off of landed property in Ulster in the 1880s, particularly that of Lords Charlemont, Gosford, Lurgan and property belonging to the London companies. Of 16,788 tenants who bought their holdings during the six years from 1885 to 1891 that the Ashbourne act was in operation, about half of them were in Ulster. Indeed, even among committed protestant Gladstonians in northern Ireland, the shift in emphasis in
liberal policy away from land legislation to the home rule
issue in the late 1880s, had a very disappointing effect: the
enthusiasm of some for tory land legislation was to become
much more pronounced than their support for home rule.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, as if to compound the inadequacies of nationalist polic-
ies on land and home rule in Ulster, these were accompanied
at a more ideological level, with a propaganda campaign that,
given its nature, could not hope to appeal to the northern
protestant community.

Parnellite chagrin at the role Ulster unionists played
in the defeat of home rule in 1886 was exhibited in more ways
than one. At one level, it manifested itself in a demand by a
southern branch of the National League for a boycott of ships
belonging to the White Star Line, because they were built in
Harland and Wolff's shipyard where the Belfast riots had
started.\textsuperscript{25} That this call did not find support among southern
nationalists, and was in fact condemned, did not alter its
effect in the north where it was taken as evidence of future
nationalist intentions towards Ulster industries. These, many
protestants believed, were already being boycotted by their
nationalist customers in rural Ulster. Support for this belief
was provided by a call supposedly made by E. D. Gray's news-
papers, for nationalists to boycott 'unionist and protestant
journals' as advertising mediums.\textsuperscript{26} At another level, the
nature of the nationalist reaction to northern unionism was
demonstrated by their evident need to emphasise Ulster's place in nationalist ideology; a need dramatically displayed in United Ireland's description of Justin McCarthy's victory in taking Derry city from the unionists.

Given the importance of Derry's place in Ulster protestant politics and culture, Parnellites put great significance on winning the seat for the home rule cause. United Ireland, in describing McCarthy's victory, employed enthusiastically the historically infused rhetoric of nationalist propaganda:

Derry is ours. "No surrender" has got a new meaning. It is a national watchword now. The nation holds the inviolate city and means to keep it for all time....The difference between the situation in Ireland when Derry was besieged two hundred years ago and the present situation, is in the main the difference between the seventeenth century and the nineteenth. The Irish nationalists then held every part of the country but Derry and Enniskillen....The English garrison had been driven out of every corner of the south and west and the greater portion of the north. They had fled from Kenmare to Enniskillen, from Cavan to the city of the London companies. The parliament [James 11's Irish parliament] was giving the "aboriginal Irish" (as Macaulay calls us) their own again....At Lough Foyle and Lough Erne the Englishry who refused to coalesce with the aborigines alone held out. Today the territory occupied by the West Britons who won't become Irishmen is growing narrower and narrower.

This article went on to deny that the besieged in Derry in 1689 were members of the 'imperial Anglo-Saxon race', and thus racially separate and superior to the native Irish, as argued by Froude and Macaulay.

To Ulster protestants, already imbued with their own
historically infused apprehensions of Irish nationalism, this attempt at what might be termed 'cultural sabotage' could not be expected to allay those fears. Nevertheless, this aspect of their propaganda remained important to Parnellites. John Redmond contributed to the campaign stressing Ulster's place in nationalist ideology with a lecture on Hugh O'Neill in 1887 that was to be repeated many times over. He argued that the struggle of O'Neill and Red Hugh O'Donnell against the English and Ireland's 'hereditary enemies', was the same as that being waged by the Parnellites, and that it would soon be successfully completed. In Redmond's synthesis of sixteenth and nineteenth century struggles, the position occupied by the Ulster protestant community was necessarily among 'Ireland's hereditary enemies'; and it is indicative of the Ulster protestant reaction to such propaganda that Ronald McNeill, writing nearly forty years later, could single out Redmond's lecture for comment. Ulstermen, he declared, were aware of those earlier Irish rebellions and were under no illusion as to the design for which arms had been taken up: 'the names of Hugh O'Neill, of Owen Roe, of Emmet, or of Wolfe Tone...carry very definite meaning to the ears of Irishmen, whether nationalist or unionist'.

Certainly the Parnellite propaganda technique of conceptualising the land and home rule struggles within a historical framework of nationalist and catholic grievances raised
the prospect, among others than fanatical Orangemen, that the contemporary agitation might go beyond its stated aims. Hugh de F. Montgomery, the most liberal of Ulster unionist landlords, presented his view of what could happen were the gentry bought out by compulsory purchase and a government dependent on nationalists to come to power: 'there is nothing to prevent a radical government applying it [compulsory purchase] to any body of protestant occupiers that a popish or fenian majority wish removed out of any part of Ireland to make room for "men of their own"'.31 What was being implicitly invoked here were fears redolent of the Irish wars of 1641 and 1689, and these were echoed among Montgomery's correspondents. As one explicitly put it: 'Two hundred years of warfare and national revenge, of rebellion and confiscation, accumulated in the defeated party a bitter tradition of national hatred and fierce thirst for restitution, which is the essence of the Irish difficulty and the danger of an independent Ireland.'32

Naturally, when Gladstone attempted to implement his home rule policy in 1892, such fears again came to the fore. In an interview with the press, Dr Edgar, moderator of the presbyterian general assembly, declared: "the feeling with us is that Gladstone is trying to steal from us what we won at Derry and the Boyne".33 However, the historicist dimension to nationalist propaganda not only intensified protestant fears, but provoked a predictable reaction.
One presbyterian clergyman, the Rev. Thomas Hamilton, quickly produced a history of Irish presbyterianism, designed to acquaint his co-religionists with Ulster history since the plantation: it was vital that 'the position and past of Ulster should be accurately discerned and read'. His work, unusually, was not intended for a middle-class readership: 'A three volume work can never be expected to penetrate to the farmhouses and cottages of the countryside, or to the artisans' dwellings in the city. In sum, the book was a predictable record of protestant persecution at the hands of Romish hordes, emphasising in particular 'the horrors of 1641' and later rebellions. Consequently it was extremely popular: three cheap editions were printed in the period 1886-7, while the latter year saw an even cheaper edition, produced in response to a circular letter 'signed by a number of the best known ministers and laymen of the Irish presbyterian church headed by the moderator of the general assembly'. Needless to say, the reinforcement of existing political positions produced by the use of arguments emphasising the historical strife associated with the Irish question, made no contribution at all to the solution of the Ulster problem, but merely inspired future acrimony; a tendency that was already well promoted by the Belfast riots of 1886 and their aftermath. These were to provide much material for nationalist propaganda on Ulster in this period.

The riots did not end until September 1886 and though
they involved, for the greater part, protestants and the police, it was the catholic community in Belfast that suffered most. Of £2,600 awarded as compensation for malicious injuries, £2,500 was awarded to catholics; 28 public houses owned by catholics were destroyed and 2 belonging to protestants, while some 3,000 people evicted from their employment were dependent for their survival on collections made by a 'committee of catholic gentlemen, headed by a bishop'.

Material for controversy in parliament arose in the debate on the appointment of the commission to inquire into the riots. Nationalists argued that the composition of the inquiry, consisting of three protestant commissioners and only one catholic, whose position would be merely that of secretary, was unfair. Objection was also taken to the presence on the commission of one Commander M'Hardy, whom they accused of being an Orange partisan. In the event, M'Hardy kept his position, though the catholic representation was increased by the inclusion, as president, of the eminent English judge, Mr Justice Day. The Ulster unionist contribution to the debate was strong if not constructive. Colonel Saunderson, for example, concentrated mainly on provoking Parnellites, while his position as an Orange leader gave colour to the nationalist view that the riots were all the work of Orangemen. As the Weekly Northern Whig put it: for Saunderson to speak on the riots as the Orange leader 'will only confirm the
statements of the nationalist press that the rioters were all Orangemen, and that the attacks were, in effect, the work of the Orange lodges. Certainly this view was widely accepted by Parnellites, but how far was it accurate?

Orange leaders in Belfast vigorously denied that their organisation had any responsibility for the disturbances, and it was indeed the case that the inquiry into the riots did not implicate the Orange Order as such. The actions of individual members, however, were condemned. The Orange M.P. for East Belfast, E. S. W. de Cobain, and other protestant leaders, were named for heightening tension during the disturbances by encouraging the rioters and spreading the false idea that catholic policemen were being drafted into Belfast from the nationalist south to shoot protestants. It was also on the basis of such evidence that the Parnellite analysis of the riots rested, and plausibility was given to that analysis by the less than wholesome activities of some prominent Orangemen. In June 1886, for example, Viscount Cole publicly called on protestants not to employ Roman Catholics. This plea was made the subject of a nationalist leaflet and widely distributed in Great Britain to show that Ulster unionists were only interested in religious ascendancy.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the riots, several protestants, charged with offences arising out of them, were tried at Omagh with some scandalous results. In more than one case
juries refused to convict defendants despite explicit directions from the bench to do so. The worst example was the case of Joseph Walker, who was charged with the murder of a soldier and a head constable. Although he was tried twice and the juries instructed to find a verdict of wilful murder, they refused, with the result that Walker went unpunished for about six months until convicted of manslaughter in April 1887 - the jury again refusing to bring in a verdict of wilful murder. In a case of riotous behaviour, the jury not only refused to convict the defendant but local magistrates persistently frustrated the attempts of the attorney general to have the case retried.

The publicity nationalists gave to such incidents ran in tandem with more traditional themes in their propaganda on Ulster unionism, stressing the disreputable history of Orangeism, its encouragement by English politicians anxious to keep the Irish people divided, and self-government as the only remedy for the religious bigotry promoted by Orangeism: 'He [the Orangeman] will soon learn to bless you for it. He will forget his factious fanaticism and remember that he is an Irishman.' Indeed, some very slight evidence appeared to support such a view when W. G. Flood, grand master of Dungannon Orange lodge, acted as a sponsor for William O'Brien at the general election of 1886. Flood, however, was swiftly removed from his post shortly afterwards by outraged brethren.
Nationalist propaganda received a major fillip when the report of the commission of inquiry into the Belfast riots was published, early in 1887. Blame was firmly placed on Protestant mobs while Catholic restraint was praised. Most important, though, were the appendices attached to the report detailing the exclusion of Roman Catholics from positions of employment under Belfast corporation. Of its 89 employees only 2 were Roman Catholics, in lowly paid positions. This evidence of discrimination was to figure prominently in Parnellite and liberal propaganda in subsequent years. The riots commission's report, however, was not unanimous. Commander M'Hardy, against whose presence on the commission nationalists had protested because of his Orange sympathies, dissented and produced his own findings. He denied the existence of religious antagonism in Belfast and of discrimination against Catholics in employment. Moreover, he sought to apportion blame for the riots to Catholics and the police, as well as Protestants, though with more justice he attributed the small number of Catholics on the corporation to the fact that they had fewer numbers qualified under the £10 municipal franchise. However, as an attempt to modify the findings of the main report, M'Hardy's contribution was a failure. Thomas Sexton effectively secured an admission from A. J. Balfour that his report would be ignored by the government.

But what were the implications of the Belfast riots in
general for the northern Ireland question? For Ulster unionists, even those who most deplored them, the riots could be used as a demonstration of what would inevitably occur if home rule were enacted: 'their lesson...is that the attempt to rule the north by Parnellite police will create a rising of a most serious character'. For nationalists, though, a different lesson was to be drawn, especially with reference to the proposal that part of Ulster might be given its own parliament:

If Ulster is split up and a separate parliament given to the protestant counties what guarantee will there be for the safety of the catholic community? The Orange riots in Belfast supply the answer. The protestant majority is too strong to be coerced, and too bigoted to be trusted with power. [my italics].

Thus for nationalists the riots could serve a two-fold purpose: they could be used to show that Ulster protestants were strong enough to deal with any supposed coercion emanating from a Dublin parliament, and at the same time, that separate treatment for Ulster was undesirable because of the threat to the northern catholic community.

Apart from their propaganda on the Ulster question and attempts to instigate agrarian agitation in the north of Ireland, Parnellites sought also, by action in the house of commons, to demonstrate that they could prevent the Westminster parliament from effectively dealing with Ulster issues. When T. W. Russell introduced a bill in 1887 with the intention of
enabling 35,000 leaseholders to enjoy the benefits of the 1881 land act, it was blocked by nationalists even though it would have effected for this class of landholder what Parnell's rejected tenants' relief bill of 1886 intended. The Weekly Northern Whig noted: 'They do not like any member to have the credit of carrying a bill in favour of the tenants unless he is a member of their own party.'

More significantly, Parnellites succeeded in preventing for over a year the passing of a bill to provide a main drainage system for Belfast, costing over £500,000, on the grounds that the municipal franchise in Belfast was too high, and at £10, far higher than any city in Great Britain.

Eventually a compact between Ulster unionists and nationalist M.P.s was agreed, whereby the drainage scheme bill passed at the same time as a franchise bill lowering the municipal franchise from £10 to £4. Undoubtedly, nationalists hoped that this development would secure the election of nationalists to the corporation. However, this was not to be in the near future, as the crucial factor here was not the franchise but the distribution of the Catholic population over the five wards of the city. Nationalist obstruction of unionist measures continued, in varying degrees, into the 1890s. When William Johnston introduced an 'Asylum Superannuation Bill', stiff opposition came from Joseph Biggar, though Timothy Healy informed Johnston that he 'had prevented that
ruffian (Dr) Tanner blocking it'. At the same time Parnellites were keen to detach, if possible, any able member from the unionist parliamentary group.

T. W. Russell, widely accepted as the most able of the Ulster unionist M.P.s, was personally approached by Parnell in this period to join the nationalist party:

Mr Parnell pleaded with me to stop what he called my war against Ireland - to come over and help the nationalist party. I told him what I thought of the (National) League, of the plan (of campaign), and all the rest of it, and I succeeded in eliciting the great man's views, which did not differ materially from my own. I was vehement. Mr Parnell was calm. The interview resulted in nothing save a great memory for me, and as we parted the Irish leader said: "Well think it over, and remember there will always be an open door for you". 62

In general, though, the Parnellite attitude on Ulster appears to have hardened in the late 1880's. Nationalists resented particularly the practice of southern landlords in 'importing' bailiffs and emergency men from Ulster to do their 'dirty work', and their attempts to encourage Ulster protestants to occupy vacant farms in the south. 63 By 1890 it would seem, according at least to one important source, Parnellites were becoming less inclined to claim that Ulster protestants were 'really' nationalists, than to describe them instead as a foreign element in Ireland. In his compilation of the historical and political case for home rule, The Home-ruler's manual, R. B. O'Brien declared:
The Ulster colony...represents...a comparatively weak force in Irish politics. The nation has upon the whole conquered. But the question still is, "shall the Ulster colony dominate all Ireland?" So far the tide of events has flowed in favour of the nation. Is the tide to be turned back? Is the "whisper of a faction" to prevail against "the voice of a nation"? 64

THE ULSTER DEBATE IN BRITISH POLITICS:
THE GLADSTONIAN POLICY, 1886-90

Notwithstanding the fact that liberals and Parnellites were in alliance from 1886, their positions on the Ulster question were not entirely synonymous. Parnellites argued forcefully for the inclusion of Ulster in any home rule scheme. Gladstone, as befitted his position as prime minister, was concerned, publicly at least, to display a more objective attitude to the problem; willing to listen to proposals for separate treatment for Ulster, or part of it, if such were made. Indeed, in being prepared to give Ulster this 'option', he argued: 'we are giving more...in that shape than we are giving to any other part [of Ireland]'. 65 This was how the position stood when the liberal party found itself in opposition after the 1886 general election, and as such, it at least offered the possibility of a resolution of the issue.

However, such was not to be, and the close of this period was to see the Ulster problem as far from resolution as ever. Unionists, for the most part, had little interest in seeing the most formidable obstacle to home rule removed, and thus were not going to take the initiative in that direction.
This left the onus on Gladstone: what determined his approach to the northern Ireland problem in this period? This question will be approached through an examination of Gladstone’s political strategy, his temperament, and the ideological framework within which he viewed the problem.

This last is of crucial importance in understanding the Gladstonian view of the Ulster issue. It has been shown in chapter six that Gladstone’s campaign for home rule was heavily influenced by his views on Irish history. His attitude to the Ulster question was similarly influenced, but in a more marked degree. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that he had become so emotionally involved with the history of the problem at this time that he was incapable of taking a detached view of the subject; and nothing invoked Gladstone’s prodigious moral and emotional senses more than the atrocities which made up so much of Irish history. Lord Rosebery has left a revealing record of his impressions of Gladstone’s state of mind on this subject, during a visit to Hawarden Castle:

I sent for the boys [his sons]....They went to a performance at the Hawarden gymnasium, sitting on each side of Mr G.[ladstone]. He later came back chilled and tired, and lost control of himself (for the third time in my experience) in speaking of the Irish rebellion of 1798. In vain did I try to keep him off and turn the subject. 67
This frame of mind became more set as time passed. When the Rosebery government planned to erect a statue to Cromwell in 1895 Gladstone strongly opposed the plan: "The blot on his character I cannot forgive was the Irish massacres". Given that Gladstone shared the Parnellite view that strong opposition to home rule in Ulster came only from bigoted Orangemen, it is important to relate his increasing preoccupation with their role in the 1798 rebellion to his attitude towards their political actions in the late 1880s if his approach to the Ulster question is to be properly understood.

Gladstone's views of their action in 1798 were explicitly and vehemently expressed in 1889, when, in the course of explaining the atrocities perpetrated by government forces, he referred to the 'ferocious proceedings such as those by which Orange bigotry desolated the County Armagh; the disarming of the Roman Catholic population with circumstances of extreme violence'. He was, as his son Herbert records, 'always aroused by injustice, by anything that was cowardly and bad, and particularly by an defence of what was bad'; and the moral outrage conveyed in his reference to Orange activities in 1798 had a direct carry-over to the actions of their descendants in the 1880s. In particular, the policies of the Ulster Orangemen in parliament, especially Colonel Saunderson, were greatly to increase Gladstone's distaste for them.

In general their arguments were infused with a
virulent anti-catholicism. As the professedly partisan biographer of Saunderson put it: 'it must be admitted that he persistently spoke of Roman Catholics with pointed harshness. It was a fixed principle in his philosophy.' Similarly, protests against the lord lieutenant having knelt in Cork's catholic cathedral and votes against measures relating to catholic chapels in Ireland, would not have induced Gladstone to take a more favourable view of Orangemen.

Colonel Saunderson, in fact, made it a part of his policy to bait Gladstone whenever possible: 'Saunderson made it his business to fire at the godfather of home rule whenever he could get a shot, and he was not likely to show mercy.' In one speech he denounced Gladstone for associating with those he had once accused of murder and treason; a charge Gladstone described as "deliberate misrepresentation" by one whose threats to violently resist home rule in 1886 placed him closer to crime than Parnell had ever been. Following some evictions on Gladstone's Hawarden estate in 1889, Saunderson, employing 'a violent use of personal illustration', sought to make capital out of them with reference to English liberals who came to Ireland to support the plan of campaign. But much the worst aspect of his campaign against Gladstone were his repeated jibes that the liberal leader would soon be destined for a 'higher and more peaceful place'. To protests against this kind of remark, Saunderson replied that he meant
the house of lords, but the implications of such utterances were unavoidable. Saunderson was fond of boasting that 'there is no one Gladstone fears as he fears me'. This was certainly untrue, but that he could provoke Gladstone is clear enough. Unlike most Parnellites, who generally dismissed, indeed often enjoyed Saunderson's taunts, such was not Gladstone's way: 'Intensely earnest about everything, big or little, he had no time for toying with topics'. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Saunderson's estimate of his effect on Gladstone, following one of his thrusts: 'The G. O. M. was terribly angry....He looked quite mad'. A similar reaction was noted by William Johnston and Sir John Ross, who declared: 'I found to my great delight that it was easy for me to "draw" Gladstone....I was astonished that he would allow himself to be moved by the attack of an obscure young tory.'

Following an interview with Gladstone on the Ulster question, Thomas McKnight, editor of the Northern Whig newspapers, affirmed that he 'greatly' distrusted the Ulster Orange M.P.s 'whom he looks upon as fanatics' and who seemed incapable of 'influencing in any satisfactory manner intelligent liberal opinion in Great Britain'. His evident distrust of Ulster Orangemen was, it will be seen, an important influence on Gladstone's Ulster policy in this period.

The first opportunity for seriously discussing the Ulster question was occasioned by the Round Table conference
of 1887. At first sight the prospect of agreement on this issue seemed reasonable. Gladstone was maintaining his willingness to consider favourably a workable plan of separate treatment for Ulster if such were forthcoming, and this was not inconsistent with Joseph Chamberlain's demand that Ulster be given its own assembly in any home rule plan. Moreover, in Ulster the Northern Whig newspapers, the most important organs of liberal Unionism in the province, were constantly promoting the cause of a separate assembly for northern Ireland. 84

Chamberlain made the establishment of a 'provincial' assembly for Ulster an essential part of his argument; his idea being that two such assemblies would be set up in Ireland, one for Ulster and one for the rest of Ireland, 'entirely subordinate to the unionist principle', and in the same relationship to Westminster as that enjoyed by Quebec or Ontario to the federal Canadian parliament. 85 The problem was raised as a 'fundamental' issue on the second set of Round Table talks on 14 January 1887. It was suggested that some power be given to Ulster, or part of it, to join the southern legislature if desired. Interestingly, a plebiscite of counties was suggested as a basis for deciding the jurisdiction of the two local assemblies; the plebiscite to be taken then or 'at the expiry of a fixed time'. At this point discussion of the question ended, as John Morley, Gladstone's intermediary with the
Parnellites, 'desired to consult with others'.

However, Morley, whose role in these talks was most important, was intensely suspicious of Chamberlain and informed Gladstone to the effect that the former was not sincere in wanting to settle the Ulster issue: the discussion of provincial assemblies had been 'launched in mid-ocean', and Chamberlain, if an excuse was wanted to break off the talks, would use the Ulster question to do it. Nevertheless, Morley resolved 'to see whether Mr P.[arnell] has any ideas about Ulster during the next few days'.

Apparently Parnell, while wary of the fact that the conference in itself implied a readiness to compromise, was also 'awake' to the satisfactory significance of 'the Chamberlain overtures'; though the Irish party generally were very uneasy about any compromise 'at the expense of the nation's rights'.

Shortly afterwards, Morley informed Gladstone:

As to Ulster, I am firmly persuaded that there can be no sort of severance; severance would rob the Dublin body of a valuable element; it would damage the whole financial scheme; and it would be a standing affront to the rest of the nation. Parnell, I am certain, will have nothing to do with such a plan.

As to whether Morley's information was the result of a personal interview with Parnell—not the most accessible of men at this time—or merely his own conclusions based on past experience, is not absolutely clear. Gladstone was later to inform
Chamberlain that he did not believe Parnell had been informed in any detail of the result of the Round Table discussions. Although Parnell, himself, in a speech four years later in Belfast — though in a very different political climate— was to claim that Gladstone had kept him in complete ignorance of what was occurring at the talks. In any event, the January meetings effectively ended the discussions, as relations between the two sides deteriorated so much between then and the meeting of 14 February that the latter was reduced to little more than a formality: the Ulster question, moreover, was the most important topic discussed. Chamberlain insisted that separate treatment for Ulster was essential. Harcourt and Morley declared that it was a 'great difficulty', as Parnell objected that it would both destroy the chance of giving full satisfaction to the idea of nationality and seriously interfere with the financial position of the Irish legislature. There the conference ended.

But surprisingly, despite Parnell's undoubted refusal to consider a separate settlement for Ulster, Gladstone continued to maintain that such a solution was possible if Ulster unionists proposed a workable plan. When Thomas McKnight visited him in 1887, Gladstone repeated the offer and added: "There will be some difficulty, I know, in inducing certain parties to consent to such a proposal, but I have no doubt that we can carry it. Let the Ulster unionists think over a plan."
Perhaps Gladstone’s view of the nationalist attitude to Ulster was similar to that of his son Herbert, who speculated that while Parnell was against separate treatment, if it had been acceptable to northern unionists he would not have wrecked home rule on that account. In any event, when McKnight tried to persuade Ulster unionists to formulate such a plan he was met with a blank refusal: the ‘universal response’ was that it was not part of their job to make home rule easier to carry and that ‘complete separation’ would be preferable to any home rule scheme.

The debate on the Ulster question, however, continued in 1887. When Gladstone repeated the offer of separate treatment in a speech at Swansea on 4 June, during a tour of South Wales, John Bright entered the fray, and in an open letter pointed out the nub of the Ulster problem: ‘you must know that any plan for dealing only with the protestants of Ulster by themselves and not associated with the catholics of the province ‘is an impossible plan and not worth a moment’s consideration’. Gladstone replied that he was aware of no final or general pronouncement about Ulster, or a part of Ulster: ‘The only tory declaration as yet known to me in particular is that of Colonel Saunderson strongly against the severance [of Ulster from the rest of Ireland]. Our position is exactly what it was on 8 April 1886’. Gladstone’s reply to Bright is important and could explain why he publicly adhered to his
offer of separate Ulster treatment even though such was against the frequently expressed wishes of Parnell. Such a 'conciliatory' proposal could be safely made if it was certain, was unionist rejection of it indicated, that it would never be accepted; and, indeed, if accepted in principle, would be found unacceptable and unworkable in practice. As Bright explained, given the extent to which the differing religious communities were intermixed, any separate treatment for Ulster protestants alone would be virtually impossible to devise; and unlike his insistence on constructing his own home rule bill in 1886, Gladstone always insisted that the onus to devise a workable scheme of separate treatment was on the unionists of the province. Moreover, he did not, as he could have done, assist in the construction of such a scheme by suggesting - as was discussed at the Round Table conference - the use of a plebiscite to settle the political identity of religiously mixed areas. Additionally, the prospects of a compromise between home rulers and unionists on Ulster were certainly not helped by Gladstone's repugnance for Orangemen.

When he made it known later in the year that he was prepared in a future home rule bill to keep Irish M.P.s at Westminster, the grand master of the Orange Order in Belfast, Dr R. R. Kane, wrote asking him for an elaboration of his views as these could affect the Ulster unionist attitude to home rule. Gladstone's reaction, however, was intemperate and negative.
His son Herbert, who was acting as his secretary at this time, records that Gladstone's letter answering Dr Kane was 'formidable': it was only after three attempts that he could be persuaded to reply 'in a more conciliatory spirit'. Even then it could hardly be described as a straightforward expression of opinion, being studiously vague and non-committal. Of the correspondence, when published, the Weekly Northern Whig declared that it 'was not uninteresting as an example of skill in controversial fencing but it adds absolutely nothing to our knowledge of Mr Gladstone's attitude'. The Ulster question, however, was to be more intensely debated in the last few months of 1887 than at any other time in this period.

Shortly after the Gladstone - Kane correspondence an English deputation arrived in Ulster on what would now be called a 'fact-finding' mission, with the object of assessing support for home rule in northern Ireland. Their attitudes, however, could hardly be described as objective and exhibited a strong desire to minimise the strength of Ulster unionism. They concluded:

...in Ulster the great majority of the people who are opposed to home rule will, when home rule is granted, forget past differences....considerations of common interests will make them join with their fellow-countrymen in carrying on the government of Ireland...they themselves even now are well aware that this will be the case.

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Such a conclusion was, no doubt, highly satisfying to Parnellites, and would also have been to Gladstone, as his expressed views at this time illustrated. Uncongenial as he found contacts with Ulster Orangemen, Gladstone was to urge them repeatedly to return to what he described as the nationalist sentiments of their forefathers in the 1780s, from which they had 'degenerated' by their adherence to the union. The frequency with which Gladstone was to make such appeals indicate the strength of their hold on his mind and the extent to which his hopes for a resolution of the Ulster problem was dependent on a view of Ulster protestants derived from the history of Gratten's parliament.

At a meeting in Derby in October 1887, Gladstone, having treated his audience to an account of the Ulster protestant role in establishing Grattan's parliament, declared:

Gentlemen, depend upon it, when you see now the utter falsity of the supposition that there is a radical and ingrained hostility among Irish protestants to Irish local government, depend upon it that there is a misunderstanding, and a complete misunderstanding on the part of our opponents of what it is that the protestants of Ulster want. What the protestants of Ulster want, because, after all, they are intelligent and reasonable men, ...is full assurance that the connection of Ireland to this country is to be maintained.

This, Gladstone suggested, could be effected by Irish representation at Westminster. His tendency to draw contemporary political conclusions from the 'evidence' of history indicates,
to say the least, an inadequate analysis of the problem, but it was an element in Gladstone's thinking that seemed to intensify rather than diminish in succeeding years. More immediately, the Ulster issue was kept to the forefront of politics by Joseph Chamberlain's visit to the province in October 1887. His motives in coming to northern Ireland were inspired less by a concern for the intrinsic welfare of Ulster protestants, than by a desire to exacerbate what he considered to be Gladstone's greatest problem in regard to home rule. As he cautioned Hartington before leaving for America at the end of October: 'Do not forget Ulster - it is a terrible nut for the G.O.M. to crack.'

Consequently, in his Ulster campaign he emphasised the northern protestants' racial, economic and religious separation from, and superiority to, the rest of Ireland. At meetings in Coleraine and Belfast he endorsed a radical programme of reforms, including extensive land purchases and elected local government, and made a point of addressing business and professional men as well as tenant-farmers. In particular, he stressed that while Parnellites may have had a majority of M.P.s in the province they did not have a majority of the votes, as in county constituencies the nationalist vote averaged 30,000 and the unionist 50,000. But most importantly, it was known that Gladstone was to speak at Nottingham on 18 October and Chamberlain put several questions for him to answer. For
example, would he coerce Ulster to accept home rule or would he give a separate government to all, or a part of, the province? He went on:

We all know that though Mr Gladstone has hinted something about being willing to concede a separate government here, he has proposed no plan to effect that object, and he will not propose one. He dares not do it. Mr Parnell has unmistakably intimated that he will have no home rule for Ireland without Ulster being included in it, and Mr Gladstone must do what Mr Parnell wishes. 106

This was indeed an accurate description of Gladstone's position, but while it is true that his scope for manoeuvre on this question was certainly limited, it could hardly be said that Chamberlain's utterances were couched in terms likely to inspire a constructive approach from liberals. The cynicism of his motives, as much as what he had to say, provoked John Morley to exclaim: 'Chamberlain's performance in Ulster is surely one of the most dishonest that was ever seen. It is really quite desperate.' 107 Gladstone shared this view and in his speech at Nottingham on 18 October 1887, declared his refusal to be drawn into a trap:

When I am asked at this juncture, without knowing the sentiments of my friends, without knowing the sentiments of the English people, the Scotch people, or the Welsh people, without knowing the sentiments of Ulster...to bind myself to the proposition that Ulster, or part of Ulster shall be absolutely excluded from any Irish arrangements...gentlemen I tell you that is rather too large a demand upon the credibility or even the folly of man. 108

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What is significant about this part of Gladstone's speech, however, is its emphasis on not accepting the proposition of separate treatment for Ulster: Chamberlain, it would seem, had effectively called Gladstone's bluff. The latter's argument, that he could not commit himself to separate treatment for Ulster because he did not know the views of all interested parties, was, given the many occasions on which these views had been pressed on him—especially those of Irish unionists and nationalists—hardly a convincing argument. In particular, it was at odds with his previously confident assertions that if unionists formulated a plan he was sure he could have it carried. He was, in fact, not to mention separate treatment for Ulster again, except to point out that such an option had been rejected by Ulster unionists. In this speech he set the pattern of his future and more vague approach to the Ulster difficulty, by declaring his intention 'to act as might seem fair for the protection of minorities'. He also specifically ruled out any debate with Chamberlain on the Ulster issue, on the grounds that such would 'exasperate the dispute, and render more difficult and distant the solution'.

Gladstone's unwillingness to meet Chamberlain on this issue, however, was felt by some liberals to reflect badly on their Irish policy. At the end of November 1887, John Morley was pressing on him the necessity of a 'counter-demonstration' in Dublin to offset the effect of Chamberlain's Ulster visit;
though in Morley's proposed counter-demonstration it would seem that the Ulster issue would be played down—representatives were to be invited from all over Ireland except Belfast. Chamberlain's northern Ireland campaign, however, did elicit one thoughtful contribution to the Ulster debate, from R. T. Reid, a liberal lawyer who was to represent Parnellites at the special commission proceedings of the following year. Reid's article endorsed many of the standard elements in the liberal-nationalist view of the problem, with regard to Orange extremism, the small area in which unionists had an overwhelming majority, the 'nationalist' sympathies of protestants in Grattan's time as 'proof' of their political identity, the relative prosperity argument and the groundless fears of unionists about Parnellite persecution.

Nevertheless, he concluded that if northern protestants were to maintain their opposition to home rule after a Dublin parliament was established it would be useless to force them to accept union with the rest of Ireland. In that event, the only sensible course open for nationalists in the independent part of Ireland would be to persuade unionists 'by sensible government' to accept home rule. In making this admission, Reid's was the only home rule contribution to the Ulster debate that attempted to face up to and accept the reality of continued protestant opposition to self-government. Gladstone's policy on Ulster, however, increasingly relied on his reading
of Irish history in the late eighteenth century, and in particular, on arguing that current unionist policy was the same as that of English governments in the past that had brought so much suffering to Ireland.

When Lord Hartington visited Belfast in October 1888, Gladstone professed himself 'astonished' that Ulster protestants should gather 'to applaud everything that their grandfathers condemned, and to condemn everything that their grandfathers applauded'. Similarly, when 864 out of a total of 999 Irish nonconformist ministers signed a petition against home rule, that was shortly to be presented to Lord Salisbury, Gladstone dismissed them as 'a handful of men in the north' whose appeal to religious prejudice was no better than that employed in Irish government in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

But how did Ulster protestants answer Gladstone's charge of political 'degeneracy'? Briefly, their reply was twofold. Orangemen and conservatives denied that any real union of the religious groups occurred in the 1780s, but given Gladstone's condemnation of Orange atrocities during the 1798 rebellion, were mostly concerned to defend the reputation of their ancestors. Presbyterian liberal unionists, though, to whom Gladstone's complaint was believed more to apply, argued that they felt utterly bereft of the 'incentives to disaffection and disloyalty' that goaded their ancestors to
The commercial and manufacturing restrictions that oppressed our grandfathers have long since been abolished, and our trade and industries are now unfettered and free; the civil and religious disabilities they groaned under have all been swept away; the tithe system that galled them is a thing of the past; no state church now lords it, and extorts reluctant tribute; complete religious equality exists, and religious animosities are fast dying away; and educational privileges are unsurpassed, and within reach of the poorest classes; our parliamentary representation exceeds proportionately that of any other part of the United Kingdom, and we have the protection of the ballot; and, above all, the occupiers of the soil hold their homesteads and farms - not as their fathers did, at the pleasure or caprice of a despotic landlord, under cruel arbitrary exactions and degrading serfdom, but - as joint owners in the land they till, with a fixed and secure tenure, subject only to a rent which is equitably determinable.... Yes Ulster has gained all our fathers fought and bled for, and has thriven and prospered under the united parliament. 118

This reply to Gladstone's charge of political degeneracy was, in substance, repeated many times in the late 1880s, but did not affect his perception of the Ulster question. Indeed, given Gladstone's view that the act of union and the 'corrupt' methods by which it was carried were morally reprehensible, constituting an evil which had to be atoned for, the fact that Ulster unionists could claim to have benefited by it might well have seemed a compounding of the error. In 1889 he replied to resolutions passed at a meeting of the Belfast branch of the Young Ireland Society, by congratulating them on their efforts to bring Ulster Protestants back to the patriotism of their forefathers: 'Here is the sacred fire that
should again be lighted. It alone can guide those who have been misled by sinister influences back to that love of country which...affords the only solid basis for true loyalty to the empire and the throne.' A record of how far Ulster had materially benefited by the union was irrelevant, if, as it appears Gladstone's view was, the issue at stake was essentially moral; of a people led astray by 'sinister influences' and requiring redemption by a 'sacred fire'. Indeed, in such a conception of the Ulster question, northern unionist emphasis on the material gain that had attended the union might well have seemed analogous to the Israelite worship of the golden calf.

Just how far apart the views of both sides were on the Ulster issue was further demonstrated in Gladstone's article, 'Home rule for Ireland', published in 1890. He exhibited his ignorance of the province by declaring that since Protestants in Ulster were 'possibly near half a million in number', and thus in a similar number to Ulster Catholics, they could 'hold their own'. Commending their refusal to accept separate treatment for Ulster, he also emphasised that this only made their opposition to home rule all the more unreasonable: 'to meet the views held in a corner of the country' the majority of the Irish people were being asked to sacrifice their national traditions and long held desire for self-government, now within 'one stage of its accomplishment'. Declaring that
the desire for self-government was strongest among northern protestants one hundred years before, Gladstone could not understand their present opposition to home rule: 'The result of our endeavours to find an answer to the great and troublesome Why? has not thus far been encouraging.' Nor would their frequent contacts with Ulster protestant home rulers have enabled liberals to acquire a more perceptive understanding of the views of the province's unionist population.

Liberals had a tendency to place much importance on the views of such people, who certainly did not represent the body of opinion they were often wont to claim; and despite much evidence to the contrary, Gladstonians were always ready to take heart from their assurances that their cause would ultimately succeed in Ulster. Just before the Parnell divorce crisis erupted, John Morley was gleefully informing Gladstone of a conversation he had had with the protestant home rule M.P., T. A. Dickson, who informed him that by advocating compulsory purchase and putting forward protestant candidates, 'we should win seats in Ulster, and not lose any except West Belfast'.

ULSTER UNIONISTS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
Realising the importance of the Ulster issue to unionism, the incoming tory government of 1886 was anxious to consolidate the position of Ulster protestants within the unionist camp.
To this end they were prepared to lend a sympathetic ear to demands - particularly from liberal unionists who were believed to represent the interests of the great mass of presbyterian tenant-farmers for agrarian and social reforms. For their part the latter were anxious to provide a radical alternative to home rule, including the abolition of dual-ownership, the inclusion of leaseholders and townpark tenants within the scope of the land act of 1881, local government reform and agrarian development - particularly state assistance for rail and tramway enterprise to open up the development of the country.

These proposals were presented by a fifty-strong deputation to the first liberal unionist conference, on 7 December 1886, and at Lord Hartington's suggestion they were communicated to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Irish chief secretary.

Hicks-Beach, however, was soon to vacate this office due to deteriorating health, but the influence Ulster liberal-unionists were able to bring to bear on his successor, A. J. Balfour, was demonstrated by the land act of 1887. The agrarian issues that most concerned liberal unionists were the problems relating to 35,000 leaseholders excluded from the fair rent provisions of the 1881 land act and the difficulties arising from the fall in agricultural prices, that made excessive the judicial rents fixed between 1881 and 1885. In both respects, Balfour's bill, as introduced, was totally inadequate: it intended to cater for only a small section of
leaseholders and avoided the problem of judicial rents altogether. However, at the instigation of the two Ulster liberal unionist M.P.s, Thomas Lea and T. W. Russell, Lord Hartington convened a meeting at Devonshire House. Here the bill was critically examined and a committee of seven, including Russell, appointed to draft amendments to it. The leaseholder clauses of the bill were completely eliminated and others constructed which enabled all leaseholders whose term did not extend over ninety-nine years to enter the land court. The issue of judicial rents was more difficult, but the tories eventually gave way and a clause was included in the bill under which a temporary and automatic revision of these rents took place by poor law unions. On the question of townsparks, and rent arrears the tory opposition was too great, but given the concessions they did obtain, liberal unionists accepted the position.

That the government accepted their amendments - especially those relating to leaseholders - was clearly due to their fear that without such changes the Ulster protestants' allegiance to the unionist cause would diminish. Balfour starkly presented the issue as he saw it: 'Those clauses whether good or bad, are necessary if for no other reason still because they are essential if Ulster is to be retained.' Some colour was given to this view by the agitation made for a widening of the bill's terms and for another measure abolishing dual ownership by the
U.L.U.A. and its two M.P.s. Indeed when the bill was first introduced T. W. Russell demonstrated his disappointment with it by resigning from the liberal unionist party.

Balfour's apprehensions about Ulster protestant loyalty to the union, moreover, were indicative of an opinion that was widely prevalent, not just among British tory leaders: Ulster landlords also shared the opinion that the attachment of the mass of Ulster presbyterian tenant-farmers to the union was not a matter of ideology, or attachment to a sense of British identity, but of material interest. Believing that the engine of home rule was the land agitation and that its solution would mean the demise of the demand for self-government, liberal unionist landlords and their sympathisers in Ulster consequently saw the land issue as one which home rulers might exploit to gain converts, and to obviate this possibility were constrained to accept agrarian measures they personally despised. When Parnell introduced a rent arrears bill in 1888, T. W. Russell replied by introducing his own arrears bill: a move which infuriated the landlord element of the U.L.U.A. E. T. Herdman wrote to Hugh de F. Montgomery: 'Russell is going too far. These perpetual land acts are simply preposterous in my humble judgment.' However, the opinion of the membership in Belfast was that, though Russell's bill was undesirable, it would have to be accepted because of 'the danger of advanced farmers turning nationalist'. Russell, in fact, was actually
promoting this view in order to obtain support for his measure in Ulster, as well as among British liberal unionists—not all of whom were keen to support him. Moreover, his arguments found powerful support in the person of Lord Dufferin. In frequent communication with tory leaders during the period when the land bill of 1890 was being implemented, Dufferin argued forcefully for the conversion of protestant tenant farmers into landowners; such a policy would remove the danger of their accepting 'the bribe of the land' in return for supporting home rule: 'once they become proprietors they will fight to the death against separation from England'. Ironically, the view that their attachment to the union had to be bought with land purchases was essentially synonymous with that of the Parnellites, who argued that Ulster unionism was devoid of ideological content, being a matter of material gain. But was there any truth in this opinion? It would appear not.

What information can be gathered from the published memoirs of Ulster unionist M.P.s in this period indicates a hatred of Roman Catholic home rulers among the protestant farming and labouring class that often verged on the pathological; as Russell himself found when he tried to discuss the 'religious question' with 'a more than ordinarily intelligent' farmer:

We argued the question in and out, and after I had driven him
from every stronghold of prejudice, he exclaimed: "You know, sir, what them papists are. They must be kept down, or we cannot live in this country." This is the whole sum and substance of the matter....Nothing is really possible until this spirit is allayed. 137

Similar attitudes were recorded by other Ulster M.P.s,138 and, as was seen, found expression in less extreme and more articulated form among the better educated in the Ulster protestant community.139 Yet, notwithstanding their intense protestantism, the fear that northern farmers were vulnerable to Parnellite appeals was to influence government policy throughout the period 1886-92.

For example, Balfour ruled out an overt 'mission' to Rome against the plan of campaign because 'it would alienate or shock a good deal of protestant feeling in Ulster....and though I have little sympathy with their views in this matter we are bound to respect them'.140 Again, although the title of 'city' was conferred on Belfast by royal charter in 1888, Lord Salisbury had wanted to defer this until a general election,'as a substantial present to the north of Ireland',141 and doubtless to enhance the unionist cause on an important political occasion. In general, Balfour's Irish policy followed closely the recommendations made by the Ulster liberal unionist deputation to Hicks-Beach in December 1886. Apart from land legislation, four drainage bills and a light railways bill were introduced in 1889, though only the latter reached the
However, as the reaction provoked by Russell's arrears bill of 1888 indicated, division existed within the U.L.U.A. and the main liberal unionist body in Britain on how far agrarian and social reforms should be taken.

Despite the impression of total unity given in the 'official' history of the Ulster association, this body was divided into conservative and advanced factions. The 'left' wing was based mostly in Belfast and represented in parliament by Thomas Lea and T. W. Russell. Although smaller than the conservative element, the strength of this group lay in the support it received from Joseph Chamberlain and in the personal talents of Russell, whose effectiveness as a propagandist for the union compensated for his efforts in pursuit of the tenants' interests and consequent offence to landlords.

The latter and their sympathisers represented the 'right' wing of the movement, which numbered among its leading members, Montgomery, Robert McGeogh, Thomas Sinclair, John Sinclair, Samuel Black and E. T. Herdman. In addition to the rent arrears question in 1888, conflict between the two factions was most clearly expressed on the subjects of compulsory land purchase and local government. Demands for the implementation of legislation relevant to both these issues was pressed most strongly by members of the Belfast committee of the association; but on Irish local government the tories adamantly refused to move in 1888, while opposition within the
main liberal unionist body in Great Britain was also significant. Craig-Sellars informed Montgomery: 'The demand for Irish local government...rather staggered me'. Moreover, the continual threats and demands for reforms from the Ulster body were such that, 'if we are to have a pistol at our heads every time we do not yield to all the Ulster liberal unionist demands, we had better give the game up as far as Ulster is concerned'.

However, the issue of local government was one on which all Irish liberal unionists showed substantial agreement. None had much faith in Joseph Chamberlain's ill-defined plan for provincial councils, especially those in the more vulnerable south and west of Ireland, but all campaigned consistently for elected local government as in England and Wales. The issue of compulsory purchase, however, produced far greater division in liberal unionist ranks.

This subject was much discussed in the period 1886-90; a period which T. W. Russell has described as an 'experimental' one in the parliamentary treatment of the land question. Until Balfour's land act of 1890, which provided £33,000,000 for land purchase in Ireland, the advent of some great scheme of compulsory purchase seemed possible. However, the landlord element of the U.L.U.A. was strongly opposed to such a measure and the issue at one stage threatened to split the association. By 1889, though, the drift of opinion in the liberal unionist party had moved away from compulsion in favour
of a great extension of voluntary purchase, leaving the farmers' representatives as the only section of the party pressing for compulsory purchase. 152

At one level, the contribution of liberal unionists to the Ulster question was to demonstrate that radical policies for the province could be successfully pursued with a tory administration at Westminster and need not be the preserve of home rule politicians. At another level, they sought, with a view mainly to British public opinion, to show that Ulster unionism need not be the preserve of extreme Orangeism; and indeed, were anxious to exclude Orangemen as much as possible when deputations from Ulster went to speak on the mainland. 153 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the progressive presence of the liberal body, Orangeism was ineradicably associated with northern unionism, and despite the public congratulation that was bestowed on Ulster protestant M.P.s from unionist leaders, privately they were held in low esteem. Joseph Chamberlain confided to T. W. Russell that, 'notwithstanding the grave risk the province of Ulster ran, it had produced no real native-born leader during the crisis of its fate'. 154 Again, while conservative leaders were amenable to pressure for reform from Ulster liberal unionists, their own followers in the province - whose support could be taken more for granted - were unable personally to exercise any appreciable influence. It was widely noted with disfavour in Ulster
that William Johnston—removed from his post as a fisheries inspector by the previous liberal government—was unable to secure a post of any kind under the tory government of 1886-92. Similarly, E. S. W. de Cobain made several attempts to obtain government help in securing his clergymen brother, Fletcher, a 'suitable living'; but despite having the assistance of Colonel Saunderson, he met with no success. Lord Arthur Hill met with the same result when he sought government patronage for a similar purpose.

Indeed, in this period it would appear that the only post for which Saunderson was asked to provide an occupant, was that of a postman 'in a rural part of Armagh'. Nor were relations between the Ulster Orange body and the government improved by the tendency of the former to act contrary to government wishes at times. When Lord Randolph Churchill sought to obviate nationalist obstruction in parliament in the autumn of 1886, by providing Parnell with an occasion to present a tenant relief bill, Saunderson—despite Churchill's pleading to the contrary—insisted on attacking the nationalist leader. Churchill's consequent opinion of the Ulstermen was delivered sharply, shortly afterwards, to the Irish lord chief justice, Sir Michael Morris: '...if only you could... contemplate the proceedings and manners of your countrymen in parliament, including soi disant Ulster tories I think you would publicly and formally renounce your nationality.'
similar reaction was provoked when the idea of a catholic university was being discussed by the government in the late 1880s, and the intensity of the Ulster Orange reaction effectively prevented action on the project. Discussing their views on catholic education with Arthur Balfour and how these reflected on the government, Lord Salisbury confided: 'I fear you will find their affection and ardour...very embarrassing'.

FROM THE PARNELLITE SPLIT TO THE SECOND HOME RULE BILL

The immediate reaction of northern unionists to the Parnellite split was two-fold. The prevalent opinion among liberal unionists was one of private exultation and publicly professed indifference. Robert McGeogh advised Hugh de F. Montgomery: 'Our policy should be to keep observantly quiet, and "let the curs fight it out"', leaving political capital to be made out of the crisis by unionist leaders at Westminster. Among Orangemen, however, especially Saunderson, the temptation to delight publicly in nationalist misfortunes was irresistible: he frequently spiced his speeches in this period with details of the divorce court revelations.

Certainly, as John Morley confided to Gladstone, the realignment of nationalist politics occasioned by the Parnellite split, with the catholic clergy becoming vigorously identified and involved with the larger anti-Parnellite faction, would inevitably damage the home rule cause in Ulster. The
salient issue in the crisis for northern protestants rapidly became that of the political power of the priests, and, as will be seen, the defeat of the Parnellite faction for political control of southern Ireland would be viewed in the province as validating age-old fears as to the secular ambitions of the Roman church. Moreover, the plausibility of these fears was already accentuated by the fact that clerical control of nationalist politics in Ulster was much more complete than in other parts of Ireland.

It could be as truly remarked of the catholic population in northern Ireland, as it was of the protestants, that in the crisis of their fate they had produced no real native-born leader. Indeed, in the catholic population there existed no substantial middle-class strata out of which such a leader might have arisen. From the occasion of the alliance between the catholic church and the Parnellite party in 1885, the clergy virtually took control of Ulster nationalist politics. In Belfast they provided 29 members out of a local executive of 80, in Armagh 32 out of 98, and in Antrim 25 out of 66. Thus the conflicts between the two nationalist factions in Ulster following the Parnellite split inevitably produced a higher degree of political involvement by the priests than elsewhere.

The most important of these struggles was for control of the most prominent nationalist paper in Ulster, the Belfast
Morning News, and this fight in particular, was led and waged by the hierarchy and clergy of the province. Taking the Parnellite side at the outset of the crisis, it quickly earned the wrath of the Catholic clergy, who, led by Dr McAllister, bishop of Down and Connor and two of the most energetic priests in the diocese, Father James Hamill and Dr Marner, quickly moved to establish a rival, the Irish News. 165 During the summer of 1891 canvassers circulated throughout the north selling shares in the new paper; and though the prospect of profits were remote there was hardly a village in which these were not taken. As might have been expected, the most important shareholders were clergymen, including Archbishop Logue of Armagh, Bishop McAllister of Down and Connor, Bishop Donnelly of Clogher, Bishop McGennis of Kilmore and most of the parish priests of their diocese. 166 The aim of the new paper, of course, was to provide an organ of anti-Parnellite opinion and given the influence of the clergy this was quickly achieved.

But most importantly, the clergy urged a boycott of the Belfast Morning News and following their advice its readership quickly fell away. Their intention was obviously not just to silence the voice of Parnellism, for even though the Belfast Morning News soon ceased to support that cause, the boycott was maintained. 167 Such was its effectiveness that at the end of 1891 it was proposed to Bishop McAllister of Down and Connor that the Irish News buy out its rival. At McAllister's
suggestion the directors of the paper agreed, and following six months of negotiation the purchase was completed.168

But while the anti-Parnellite faction was undoubtedly supreme in Ulster, the nationalist split did produce a rather modified view of the northern problem from Parnell. In a speech in the Ulster Hall, in May 1891, he dealt with the question in a manner different from his previous bellicose utterances on the subject. Among other things, he praised Ulster for its industry, commerce and for the settled agricultural aspect of the province compared to other parts of Ireland. In particular, his remarks on the problem of Ulster protestant opposition to home rule were highly conciliatory. Parnell declared that it was the duty of nationalists to leave no stone unturned, no means unused to conciliate the reasonable or unreasonable prejudices of the minority.169 I think the majority have always been inclined to go a long way in that direction; but it has been undoubtedly true that every Irish patriot has always recognised...from the time of Wolfe Tone until now that until the religious prejudices of the minority whether reasonable or unreasonable, are conciliated...Ireland can never enjoy perfect freedom, Ireland can never be united....

Parnell went on to say that so long as the minority felt that Ireland's 'legitimate freedom' threatened their spiritual and temporal interests, 'the work of building up an independent Ireland will have upon it a fatal log and a fatal drag'.170 Much has recently been made of these remarks: it has been
suggested that freed from the constraints of an alliance with the Roman Catholic hierarchy Parnell could give expression to his real views on the place of protestants in Irish politics: 'The truth is that it is inconceivable that any of his major lieutenants of the 1880s could have produced so substantive an analysis of the obstacles to Irish unity.... The doctrine that there could be no legitimate freedom for Ireland until the minority was conciliated fell on unreceptive ears.' But just how 'substantive' was Parnell's analysis of Ulster unionism, and how far did it really differ from that of catholic nationalists?

Parnell's remarks, in fact, were innovative only superficially. His call for the conciliation of the 'reasonable or unreasonable prejudices of the minority', and what was perhaps the major theme of this speech - that it was only he who was pressing for thorough-going self-government - are only compatible at the most general level. On closer examination the mutual incompatibility of these demands become clear. The crucial question here is, what was the constitutional framework within which Parnell thought it appropriate for minority prejudices to be conciliated? The best way to approach this issue is to examine, in the context of this speech, how Parnell defined the nature of Ulster unionism. Before addressing himself directly to the Ulster question he argued that if his nationalist rivals persisted in their alliance with Gladstone
they would be presented with a measure that was not home rule; a measure such as Lord Salisbury would 'be willing to give at any time'; one that 'our Orange friends in Belfast would be willing to accept (laughter)'; a bill in which all powers over land, the magistracy, law and order and the police would be retained at Westminster. 172

Clearly, as his references to the Orangemen indicate, the home rule scheme he would accept would inevitably go far beyond one that might be acceptable to them; their prejudices were not to be conciliated. But more importantly, what these remarks suggest is how far Parnell's 'new' attitude to Ulster unionism retained the essential features of the orthodox nationalist view. As has been shown elsewhere, 173 the basis of that analysis was to identify the Ulster Orangemen as the only element in the northern protestant community that was irreversibly opposed to home rule, and that while the protestant community generally was fearful of self-government, they were open to persuasion on the question. This is also the context within which Parnell's conciliatory overtures to the Ulster protestants have to be seen: militant Orangeism could not be conciliated, but protestants generally would accept self-government for the whole of Ireland. Thus it was clearly within the framework of an all-Ireland parliament that their prejudices would be conciliated.

Parnell's adherence to the orthodox nationalist analysis
of the Ulster problem is clearly demonstrated in his remarks on the consequences of a failure to conciliate the protestant community. The outcome of such an eventuality he describes in the following terms: 'Ireland can never enjoy perfect freedom, Ireland can never be united...practically united....the work of building up an independent Ireland will have upon it a fatal log and a fatal drag'.

What is essential to note here is that Parnell, like other nationalists, did not envisage continued protestant alienation from their catholic fellow-countrymen as a fatal obstacle to the achievement of self-government. The disunity he refers to is defined, not in political, but implicitly and vaguely in social, economic and religious terms; as a factor that would hinder the general progress of a self-governing Ireland. This was the central weakness of his 'new' approach to the problem; for in failing to point out the implications of protestant alienation for the achievement of home rule, his remarks were deprived of the necessary incisive element that might have stimulated a meaningful debate on the most important problem facing the home rule cause. Instead, Parnell assured Ulster unionists that the majority of nationalists 'have always been inclined to go a long way to conciliate protestant fears'. But as this study has shown, nationalists made no special efforts in this direction; they rather tended to rely on protestants simply accepting the situation once
home rule was established.

Moreover, for all his concern to conciliate Ulster protestants, Parnell made no practical suggestions towards that end, while his successor as leader of the Parnellite faction, John Redmond, was to reject absolutely any concessions whatever to northern unionists. To accept Parnell's call for nationalists to conciliate protestant prejudices at face value, is to miss what was really novel in this part of his speech; and that was how he managed to restate the orthodox nationalist view of the Ulster problem, in language which appeared to reject that position and offer a radically new approach. In fact, his remarks on the Ulster issue are of the same order as his 'republican' appeals to the 'hillside men', also made at this stage in his career—superficially striking but in reality meaning very little. Certainly they were to find no responsive chord among Ulster unionists, who saw the dissolving of Parnellite support in nationalist Ireland as a demonstration of the power of the priests. Not surprisingly, therefore, Parnell's death was seen to mark the supremacy of the catholic church in nationalist politics. As the [Belfast News-Letter] put it: 'The rule of Mr Parnell is now the rule of the priest.' Ulster protestants were to find evidence of that clerical power in the Meath election petitions of 1892. But how accurate was this view of the Parnellite crisis?
Patrick O'Farrell's researches have shown that there is indeed much truth in it: the split did re-align nationalist politics in a way that brought the catholic hierarchy into a dominant position, and just as importantly, it produced a conviction among the bishops that it was necessary to re-establish and enhance a catholic world-view in Irish politics. Both these developments were highly inimical to a rapprochement with Ulster protestants, which, if possible at all, could only have been established on a definitely secular basis. A survey of nationalist associations in Ireland, compiled by the R.I.C. in December 1892, demonstrated the increased sectarian bent of nationalist politics in northern Ireland. This survey was of a more sophisticated nature than previous efforts; it sought not just to show the number of branches and membership of each association, but to make a distinction between those who were merely nominal members and those in 'good standing', or active membership. Moreover, unlike previous attempts to estimate the strength of nationalist movements, much greater confidence was expressed as to the accuracy of the statistics involved, especially those for Ulster.

A memorandum attached to the statistics for the northern division, which consisted of Ulster plus County Louth, provides a revealing insight into the strength of the clergy in the north. Of 153 branches of the Irish National Federation in this division, it was noted that no less than
129 were controlled by the clergy. The Parnellite National League was dismissed as having no influence; their supporters having been won over to the National Federation 'by the R.C. clergy who completely control the nationalist electorate in Ulster'. The relative strength of the two movements are demonstrated below:

TABLE 6

Estimated membership of the National League and Irish National Federation in Ulster in 1892.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National League</th>
<th>National Federation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>branches</td>
<td>members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approx. number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in 'good' standing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antrim</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armagh</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donegal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fermanagh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londonderry</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaghan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrone</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavan</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most obvious feature of these statistics, is of course, the demise of the Parnellite faction; reduced to ten
branches from 287 in 1886, and to less than 1,000 members, only two-thirds of whom were active. Interestingly, though, the Irish National Federation, while outnumbering the National League by more than 30 to 1, had a similar proportion of active to nominal members.

Also included in the information supplied from Ulster were figures showing the growth of the Ancient Order of Hibernians: although divided into two factions, this organisation had a total of 118 branches and a membership of 5,877 across the province, and was most numerous in areas where catholics and protestants were highly represented—Armagh, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Londonderry and Belfast. The only non-sectarian development was the emergence of trade and labour societies, with a membership of 32,823, though it was reckoned that three quarters of these were unionists. Nevertheless, then as now, they seemed to have constituted a relative haven of religious integration. The divisional commissioner for northern Ireland wrote of their influence in Derry city, which had seen considerable sectarian rioting in the 1880s:

The labor (sic) movement is bringing together the workingmen of all creeds and politics in Derry. At the annual labor (sic) demonstration held in May [1892], unionists and nationalists mingled freely and without hostility. One happy result of this fusion is the disappearance during late years of party and sectarian strife from the city.
He added, however: 'All the same...the old lines of severance on political questions - especially that of home rule - remain clearly marked.' Evidence for this assertion was easily obtained and was indeed dramatically demonstrated in the same month at the great convention of unionists in Belfast. Deliberately timed just before the general election of 1892, it was to demonstrate to the world, in a more striking way than heretofore, the strength of Ulster protestant opposition to Irish autonomy.

The effectiveness of this gathering, as a great propaganda act, lay in its almost faultless organisation: 13,000 delegates from all over the province assembled under the presidency of the duke of Abercorn, in an especially erected pavilion, and in sober, well constructed speeches, affirmed their determination not to accept home rule and to follow a policy of passive non-cooperation with a Dublin parliament if such was established.

Impressive as the convention was, though, it produced no change in opinion on the part of either liberals or nationalists. Justin McCarthy, leader of the anti-Parnellites, dismissed the convention as a gathering mainly of those who feared the downfall of the protestant ascendancy and while admitting that Ulster did contain 'a considerable minority sincerely against home rule', declared that the province had a majority of M.P.'s and population in favour of autonomy. Nor did he
believe that 'respectable and reasonable' ratepayers would stage a rebellion to oblige the duke of Abercorn. 185 Other reactions from home rule sources were equally dismissive. The Freeman's Journal described the convention as a skilfully manipulated political demonstration organised for a purely party purpose. 186 Lord Rosebery took the view that Ulster's interests were ultimately guaranteed by the house of commons, and that the convention was a device to save the conservative government. John Morley declared that the real lesson of the demonstration was that Ulster unionists were strong enough to take care of themselves in a home rule parliament, and that no speaker at the convention had argued that Irishmen could not live in peace together. 187 Sir William Harcourt, having no strong liking for either northern or southern Irishmen, dismissed threats of resistance by Colonel Saunderson in a letter characterised by unremitting sarcasm: 'I assure you that I shall watch your strategy with interest, and try to alarm myself as much as I can manage.' 188

The most important reaction, however, was that of Gladstone, and his reply was delivered the day after the convention in a major speech at Clapham, London. He pointed to the unreasonableness of the Ulster unionist claim to overrule the wishes of the majority of Irishmen, and to Irish history for proof that catholics would not persecute protestants. Indeed, with the proceedings of a recent parliamentary
investigation into the local government of Belfast in mind, Gladstone highlighted the continued discrimination against catholics in public offices there. Again, he referred to the nationalist rejection of the papal rescript of 1888 and the fact that Parnellites represented one third of the Irish electorate, as evidence that they were not dominated by the clergy. Gladstone dismissed threats of resistance to home rule made at the convention by noting that despite the incitement to rebellion recently made by Lord Salisbury and A. J. Balfour, the sobriety of the speeches was creditable. In particular:

They have spoken about not electing members to the home rule parliament, using every legitimate method of resisting, not every method of resistance [My italics], and repudiating this parliament....I think that the limitation which they have put upon their own prophesies...of what is to come, does them no inconsiderable credit.

On the question of a separate assembly for 'the small proportion of Ulster in which the protestants are so concentrated', he again congratulated Colonel Saunderson and Dr R. R. Kane for having rejected such an idea, and was confident that there was 'no reasonable and...fairly presentable proposition' for the protection of minorities to which home rulers would not agree. As to the future of protestants in a home rule Ireland, Gladstone returned yet again to the precedent of Grattan's parliament and recommended Ulster
protestants to consult 'the deeds of their ancestors' which would tell them that 'Irish freedom' would 'unite protestants and Roman catholics into one indissoluble mass' and restore social peace and stability to Ireland. Thus, if a major objective of the Ulster convention was—by a massive demonstration—to force a reconsideration of his Irish policy on Gladstone, it was a signal failure. Nevertheless, unionists could take some heart from the general election which followed shortly afterwards, for although the liberals would win, the nationalist parliamentary majority in Ulster would be lost.

This reversal of nationalist fortunes has recently been attributed to the work of unionist electoral agents. However, this is only part of the story: there were other factors. For example, there was the failure of nationalist agents to take care properly of constituency registration work. Police reports on the election results in marginal Ulster constituencies in 1892 are revealing. It was estimated that T. W. Russell's majority of 372 over his liberal opponent, T. A. Dickson, in South Tyrone, was mainly due to the laziness of the nationalist agent in not having removed between 'two and three hundred bogus unionist votes' from the register. Although the anti-Parnellite M.P., W. J. Reynolds, kept his seat in East Tyrone, unionists gained 126 votes, largely because T. C. Corbett, the unionist candidate, was energetic, while Reynolds was regarded 'by some of his party as not
hardworking enough'. In North Fermanagh, unionists consolidated their position with a gain of 126 votes against only six for the nationalists, though in this county the latter were desperately short of funds: the county convention of the Irish National Federation had to be postponed because of expenses incurred at the general election.\textsuperscript{193}

The highly important West Belfast seat was also lost in 1892, and was attributed by Belfast nationalists to the fact that protestant home rulers who had voted for home rule in 1886 failed to do so in 1892.\textsuperscript{194} However a more plausible account of the unionist victory is provided by Mary Arnold-Forster, wife of the successful candidate, H. O. Arnold-Forster. She credited his success to the efforts of earnest working-class protestants in the period 1886-92:

Every home and every vote that either party could secure in "the West" became of importance. Our elections were said to be lost and won in the revision court but their results were determined by the efforts of the working men... who quietly took the matter into their own hands, and, at any cost to themselves, moved into each house that fell vacant in our deatable land, and at last by their determination converted the minority of 1886 into the solid unionist majority of 1892.\textsuperscript{195}

Probably the most serious loss to nationalists in the north, though, was that of Derry city. It is true that their hold on the seat was tenuous, having been taken in 1886 only after an election petition unseated the sitting unionist M.P., but
given its place in protestant ideology it was of great importance, and A. J. Balfour was determined that it should be re-taken for the unionist cause. To this end, he persuaded Sir John Ross, who was committed to stand elsewhere, that it was of vital importance that he contest the Derry seat. 196 Ross's chances were undoubtedly enhanced by the fact that he was a local man and his family were popular in the city. The result gave the unionists victory by a small but clear majority, with Ross polling 1,986 votes and Justin McCarthy 1,960. With these gains unionists succeeded in decisively eliminating the nationalist parliamentary majority in the province: they now had 18 seats and the latter 15.

Interestingly, though, it has been pointed out that of the votes cast in the area that was eventually to be encompassed in Northern Ireland, the combined vote of nationalists and liberals, at 41,300, was not quite 4,000 votes less than the unionist figure for the same area, which was 45,100. 197 Nevertheless, the Ulster unionist position was greatly strengthened by the reversal of the nationalist majority. Moreover, the election was to provide evidence - in the form of Bishop Nulty's pastoral letter to the electors of Meath not to vote for the Parnellite candidates - to support the Ulster protestant view of nationalists as being priest-dominated. As a result of this letter, the anti-Parnellite victors in the election, Michael Davitt and Patrick Fulham, were unseated.
Colonel Saunderson cited the Meath petitions especially to emphasise the strength of the Ulster unionist case, and the political activities of the priests generally to account for the fact that John Redmond's party was able to elect only nine M.P.s. William Redmond replied pointing out that 70,000 votes had been cast against the influence of the priests. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the clerical intervention at the general election was unmistakable and Ulster unionists were anxious to exploit its less acceptable aspects.
CHAPTER X

LIBERALS, NATIONALISTS AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR HOME RULE, 1892-3

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND THE HOME RULE SCHEME
Conditions in 1892 were unfavourable for the preparation of
Gladstone's second home rule bill. Following the Parnell
scandal, it was only his personal influence that kept home
rule at the forefront of liberal party policy. Moreover, the
liberal party majority at the 1892 election, which Gladstone
had expected to be in three figures, returned 273 liberals,
81 nationalists and 1 labour member; a majority of 45 over 269
conservatives and 46 liberal unionists. His own personal
majority fell from the 4,000 of 1886 to 690. Gladstone, mort-
ified, blamed this situation on the Parnell scandal and the
adverse effect of the nationalist party split on the English
people, who 'cannot comprehend how a quarrel utterly unintell-
gible...should be allowed to divide the host in the face of
the enemy; and their unity and zeal have been deadened in
proportion'.

Nevertheless, he proceeded to construct his home rule
scheme. As Morley argued, given that the Irish had thrown
over Parnell in his support he could do little else. As to
its prospects of success, Gladstone informed Lady Aberdeen:
"We can sum up the whole position in one word, 'Oremus' [...]

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A significant change had occurred, however, since 1886. John Morley was now taking a far more prominent role in prosecuting the home rule cause, and being a vain man, excluded both Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Hamilton from his Irish administration on the grounds that his leading role would be jeopardised by their presence: 'He...wished to carve out his own way and felt that any of "the old gang" in his immediate entourage would be an impediment, both to himself and the cause.'

But surprisingly, for one so committed to home rule, Morley believed the Irish had great character defects: he thought the 'despotic' rule of the landlords had made the peasantry prone to laziness and untruthfulness. Sir Herbert Jekyll, Lord Houghton's secretary, held similar views. He informed Sir Algernon West: 'There would seem to be some racial instinct in the pure Celt too strong to be overcome, otherwise it is impossible to account for the deliberate squalor in which he elects to live.' As was seen, a not dissimilar opinion was expressed by James Bryce, comparing the merits of catholics and protestants in Ulster in 1886, while in 1907 he was to consider the Irish unfit for home rule. In addition to critical attitudes towards the Irish, moreover, the cabinet was unenthusiastic about home rule. Morley described it thus: 'The temperature of feeling for the Irish task was not by any means uniform or equable. Some took that task prosaically as
coming in the day's work and they contributed with sober loyalty to the common cause. Others proved disappointing to themselves and their colleagues alike.'

The preparation of the home rule bill was entrusted to a committee of the cabinet, including Gladstone, Morley, Bryce, Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Herschell and Lord Spencer. Formed on 21 November 1892, it set to work immediately, assisted in its task by a more accommodating attitude as to what home rule should consist of, on Gladstone's part. Unlike 1886, when he had practically constructed the scheme himself, he was now 'eager to do justice to all the points and arguments of other people... he went into counsel for the sake of counsel, and not to cajole, or bully, or insist on his own way because it was his own way.'

Essential to the effective construction of a home rule bill, of course, was consultation with nationalists. Indeed as regards the Parnellites, this was necessary even before the general election of 1892 to ensure that despite their internal divisions, nationalists generally, and Gladstone, would speak broadly with one voice on the essentials of a satisfactory scheme. To this end, John Redmond and J. L. Carew met with William Mather and Sir Charles Hall Q.C., on 30 March 1892 in the Devonshire club. This meeting and subsequent correspondence between Redmond and Mather produced agreement on Redmond's ideas for a future home rule bill. He suggested a bill similar
to that of 1886, to have complete control over internal Irish affairs, with the maintenance of imperial 'perogatives' but with two houses instead of 'orders'. He was indifferent as to whether the Irish were represented in the imperial parliament or not, though, if the latter retained control of the police and judges he wanted full Irish representation until such control was relinquished. Redmond theoretically accepted the idea of a tribunal or court to oversee the Irish parliament but, in practice, saw no need for it and thought the Irish legislature should not be subject to a judicial tribunal in the management of any Irish affair. As to religious safeguards, Redmond thought the bill of 1886 perfectly adequate and expected the royal veto be exercised as it was exercised in Great Britain. Finally, he thought the land question incapable of a final settlement and that it should be left to the Irish parliament.

Redmond had wanted to publish an article incorporating his ideas but Mather argued that such action would damage home rule in England, where the policy would only be acceptable if it was seen to emanate from Gladstone:

The great value and influence of Mr Gladstone's proposals will depend upon their originality in himself. If their origin were identified in so powerful a leader as yourself, Mr Gladstone would appear when assuming his rightful position as leader, in the character of special pleader for the claims of others. His strength and our only hope lies in the fact that he will pronounce the unbiased judgment of himself and his colleagues.
Mather urged instead that he take Redmond's article 'to use privately, in the quarter where it will have only a very useful effect'. Following Gladstone's return to office, John Morley met Redmond and assured him that the new home rule scheme would be one Parnellites could freely accept, despite the fact that some in the cabinet preferred a 'county council' type of administration for Ireland.

The initial process of consultation with the anti-Parnellites was naturally more even-flowing, and - as the correspondence of both Michael Davitt and Justin McCarthy reveal - the latter were confident of obtaining a satisfactory scheme, given Gladstone's repeated admissions of the need for improving on the 1886 bill. Preliminary meetings between Gladstone and leading anti-Parnellites to discuss the general shape of a future home rule bill took place on 7 March and 21 June 1893, and were broadly satisfactory to the nationalists: Gladstone reiterated his commitment to producing a better financial scheme than that proposed in the bill of 1886, and declared his intention to instigate an inquiry by royal commission into the financial question. He also appeared to accept their objections to any kind of 'tribunal' or external body empowered to judge the legitimacy of any act passed by the Irish parliament.

Shortly before he took office on 15 August 1893, Gladstone, in company with John Morley, had another meeting.
with John Dillon, Justin McCarthy and Thomas Sexton. According to McCarthy nationalists were highly satisfied with its outcome. Even the fact that the liberal majority of forty depended upon nationalist support was not a cause of consternation. It was accepted that, given so small a majority, home rule would be rejected by the house of lords in the next session of parliament. Nevertheless, it would be submitted a second time, rejected again, and then 'Gladstone would ask the queen's permission to create new peers, and they would give in'. The only cause for worry, apparently, was whether or not Gladstone would live to see this process through to a successful conclusion.

John Dillon's record of this meeting, however, differed considerably from McCarthy's. He noted that Gladstone was despondent at the prospect of the strenuous unionist opposition that would be provoked by the small parliamentary majority for home rule: 'he looked very much worse than when I last saw him'. But most significantly, unlike McCarthy's explicit projection of the course to be followed should the house of lords reject the home rule bill, Dillon recorded that 'during the whole conversation' the issue was not debated: 'The matter was not raised'21. Judged against Dillon's account of this meeting the expectations held by McCarthy appear to have consisted largely of wishful thinking. When the lords did reject his bill, Gladstone apparently did not consider the idea of creating liberal peers - at least as a first step - but preferred
an appeal to the country.  

Nevertheless, in the short term, further discussions between anti-Parnellites and liberals took place, conducted chiefly by Dillon, Thomas Sexton and Morley. These were so successful in the period up to mid-December 1892 that both sides were confident of a trouble free settlement of the home rule question. McCarthy wrote: 'Nothing could be more satisfactory than the way things have gone, and I think we shall be in perfect understanding'. Morley, for his part, seems to have conveyed a similar message to Gladstone. In a memorandum referring to the meetings, the latter declared that on the 25 November Sir Herbert Jenkyns was given materials for drawing up a bill, and Morley, having had several meetings with nationalists, hoped that 'by the middle of next week to bring his conferences in Ireland to a close'. Consequently Gladstone hoped to have the bill discussed in cabinet before Christmas and to deal with it in January 1893: 'The impression as to the temper of the Irish members is favourable, but there are some points of importance raised by them or inherent in the case which only the cabinet can determine.'

That the early discussions with nationalists on the general nature of an acceptable scheme went so well, must have been due, to a considerable extent, to Edward Blake. Of Irish ancestry, Blake, a respected Canadian lawyer and politician, had agreed to come over to Ireland to play a part in the
prosecution of the home rule cause. But even before he left for Ireland, James Bryce wrote asking about the working of local legislatures in Canada, especially the working of single and dual chamber assemblies. Blake replied stating that the experience of Canada - especially that of his native province of Ontario - was so 'moderate', peaceful, and unlike Irish experience over the past fifty years that it could not provide a 'safe guide' for Ireland. In effect, he argued that the events of 1886 determined generally what course should be taken.

For instance, since Parnell had endorsed a two-chamber type of legislature in 1886, it would certainly be used against you if it were rejected now. But as to the upper chamber in the home rule legislature, Blake suggested that it should be of a smaller number than in 1886, so as to dissuade it from assuming the position of a 'co-ordinate power'. Blake also placed the utmost importance on a distinction being made between 'permanent' and 'transitory' provisions in a future home rule bill: 'Ireland could not accept to work under defective stipulations unless they were to be clearly seen to be liable of elimination'. The composition and powers of the second chamber should be changeable, unlike the bill of 1886 which allowed for no such alteration. Bryce replied agreeing virtually with every word of Blake's recommendations, and the general influence of his ideas is clearly perceivable in the memorandum on foreign and colonial legislatures, drawn up by Bryce at
Gladstone's request.

It began by surveying the several types of such legislatures, but cautioned against using any one as a model for Ireland since their 'political conditions differed too widely from those of Ireland to make conclusions drawn from them applicable to her'. The question was, was Ireland to have a single or two chamber assembly? In answering this question Bryce quoted directly from Sir Charles Gavan Duffy's 'A fair constitution for Ireland', to the effect that the only 'true' way of allaying minority apprehensions and those of the English, without at the same time alienating nationalists, was not, as in 1886, to rely on restrictions imposed on the actions of a home rule parliament, but to provide - in framing the scheme - ample safeguards against 'haste' and full protection for minorities. To this end Bryce suggested a two-chamber assembly with special minority representation in the upper house - as Duffy had recommended in 1887. The Irish knew that Parnell had accepted Duffy's scheme and it had thus been accepted provisionally by them.

In recommending a two-chamber assembly, Bryce repeated Blake's view that since a two-tier system had been accepted in 1886 it could not easily be rejected now without both hostile English criticism and a lack of corresponding satisfaction in Ireland. Comparing the 'two orders' system with the 'two houses' type, Bryce favoured the latter: two orders emphasised
in too sharp a way the check of the wealthier classes and 'loses the benefit of fresh and healthy discussion'. Regarded as a 'check', the bi-cameral system would probably be more efficient 'and would certainly seem so'.

As to the character of a second chamber, Bryce made some suggestions, based on an examination of foreign and colonial systems. First, it should be a small assembly, given the paucity of suitable men in Ireland to stock it. The numbers in the 1886 scheme were too large: 100 for the larger house and 30-40 for the smaller body were now suggested instead of 204 and 103 - a conclusion supported by the 'experience of foreign bodies and of the British colonies'. Secondly, as in 1886, the majority of the upper house should be elected or it would lose touch with the people, have little weight with them, and be out of touch with the lower house. Thirdly, the franchise of such a chamber should not be too high or else the numbers qualified to enter it would be too small: 'Ireland is so poor a country that a franchise not high for England would be very high there'. Bryce doubted whether a property qualification would improve the composition of the upper house, and only in the legislature of Victoria did such a system prevail.

Fourthly, a small number of places in the upper house should be left to be filled by Irish peers 'by election or otherwise'. The peers should also be eligible for election to the lower house so that the more 'public-spirited' among them
could identify with the public life of the country. Fifthly, foreign examples suggested a larger term of office for the upper house. It was, moreover, important that effective means for the lower house to oppose the dictates of the upper should exist; either by a proportional majority, a joint majority of both houses as in 1886, or for the vote of the lower house to prevail after a certain period when a disputed bill had been submitted two or three times to the upper house.\textsuperscript{33} This memorandum was, as will be seen, the basis on which the second home rule bill was constructed. Also, two days after it was printed, it was agreed in cabinet that the constitution of any Irish assembly succeeding the first 'may be altered by Irish act',\textsuperscript{34} thus following the advice urged strongly by Blake.

However, from the middle of December 1892 until the home rule bill was introduced in the commons on 13 February 1893 discussions between the government and the anti-Parnellites were strained. On 19 December Justin McCarthy wrote to Mrs Campbell Praed, of divisions in the cabinet, of ministers reluctant to follow Gladstone, and of the inability of the nationalists to go any further 'in the way of compromise'.\textsuperscript{35} Yet, on 22 December he received a telegram from the deputation negotiating with Morley in Dublin, stating that all was satisfactory.\textsuperscript{36} One point of discussion at this time was the question of a royal veto and how it should be used,\textsuperscript{37} but of much more importance was the question of home rule finance.
Gladstone's repeated admissions in the period 1886-92 that Ireland had suffered financially under the act of union, fuelled nationalist hopes that the fiscal clauses of the new bill would be based on an extensive examination of the taxable capacity of Great Britain and Ireland and, as such, they would be much more favourable to Ireland than those proposed in 1886. This expectation, however, was not to be fulfilled.

LIBERALS, NATIONALISTS AND HOME RULE FINANCE
Gladstone's views on home rule finance in late 1892 were expressed in a cabinet memorandum of 24 November, which illustrated the extent to which his thinking was still influenced by the scheme of 1886. For example, he apparently held to the principle adopted then that Ireland's imperial contribution should be a fixed quota of imperial expenses, though he now proposed a contribution of one-twenthieth rather than the one-fifteenth proposed in 1886. Again, as in 1886, the imperial contribution, in conjunction with £950,000 for the constabulary, would be a first claim on Irish revenues, while customs and excise would again remain under imperial control. Moreover, a court of exchequer was to be established, as in the bill of 1886, whose decrees would be supported by civil, and if need be, military force. The financial provisions, though, could be altered after twenty years by the imperial parliament, in compliance with an address from the Irish legislature. The Irish body would also have control of
Irish post and telegraphs in respect of revenue and charges, but would be forbidden from raising postal rates.\textsuperscript{38}

Some of these recommendations, especially those regarding the imperial contribution, constabulary expenses and the control to be exercised by the imperial exchequer over Irish finances, were, with minor changes, included in the first financial scheme of the bill. However, Gladstone's views on how Ireland's imperial contribution should be determined were to undergo fundamental changes, as a result of a memorandum on Irish finance drawn up by Lord Welby, Sir Edward Hamilton and Alfred Milner on 14 December 1892, and which made an important contribution to cabinet discussions of the subject.

First, they uncovered sources of revenue overlooked in the haste with which the home rule bill of 1886 was constructed. These derived from small branches of hereditary revenues, payments made to the bank of England, profits on silver coinage, patents, etc., and, a large sum realised by the commissioners of wood from 'the sale of quitrents forming part of the crown revenues in Ireland' and which deprived the department of woods in Ireland of £14,000 or £15,000 per year. Allowing for reparation in respect of past Irish losses, the authors estimated that a total of £683,000 was due to Ireland from both sources of revenue.\textsuperscript{39}

Secondly, they made a strong argument against using the financial scheme of the bill of 1886 as a model for a future bill. In 1886 it was intended that Ireland would be credited
with taxes on spirits consumed in Great Britain though paid in Ireland. That sum now amounted to £1,300,000 and—as in 1886—if Ireland was credited with it her contributions to imperial charges would appear larger than it was. But more importantly, it was now recognised that this sum could actually disappear, because the law allowed for spirits to be moved from warehouse to warehouse within the United Kingdom with duty not being paid until they were actually sold. Enormous problems for both British and Irish exchequers would occur were this to happen. Again, if the financial scheme of 1886 was adopted difficulties would arise if customs duty had to be increased, or if stamp and income taxes under Irish control were levied at a different rate from that of Great Britain.

Thirdly, they made proposals for a new financial scheme. Despite Gladstone's repeated assurances since 1886 that future fiscal provisions would take better account of Ireland's taxable capacity than was the case in 1886, the compilers confessed that their attempts to assess the taxable capacity of both countries involved such complicated calculations that they were unable to complete that part of their task. However, they declared that a 'more recent and complete examination of Irish finance' led to the conclusion that it constituted not more than one-twentieth of United Kingdom resources, and that the Irish proportion of imperial expenditure could be calculated on that basis. But it was also important that Ireland's imperial contribution under home
rule did not exceed the present contribution so that the Irish could not plead that they paid more under home rule than under the existing system - something that could not be guaranteed if the Irish contribution was to be a proportion of an imperial expenditure, which, in a period of imperial expansion, was likely to rise steadily. Alternatively, it was proposed that the imperial government retain the collection and management of Irish revenue equivalent to the sum of Ireland's existing imperial contribution, leaving the rest for local expenditure.\(^44\) Two plans were proposed to effect this, both of which envisaged imperial retention of Irish customs duties,\(^45\) and this proposal was eventually accepted by the cabinet.

Two factors, in particular, commended it. First, John Morley informed Gladstone of his belief that the retention of Irish customs duties was preferred by the Irish as 'payment in full of their imperial liabilities'.\(^46\) Secondly, and more important, was the discovery that by 'a curious coincidence' the total of Irish civil expenses and charges connected with the collection of inland revenue and post office revenue, amounted, for 1892-3, to £5,660,000 - exactly equivalent to Irish combined revenues from excise duties on beer and spirits paid by the consuming classes in Ireland, stamp duties, income tax, excise licenses and the postal service, in addition to miscellaneous revenues and revenue from crown lands. Accordingly, the account of Ireland when credited with this sum would have exactly balanced.
But it was necessary for Ireland to have a working balance, and to this end she would be rebated £500,000 - one third the cost of maintaining the R.I.C.; justified on the grounds that it was a quasi-imperial force and that it would be wrong to expect Ireland to pay the full cost. Moreover, the R.I.C. would gradually be replaced by local Irish forces and the charge would thus be temporary. Apart from this rebate, Ireland would contribute to imperial charges after home rule what she now contributed: 'This is the underlying principle of the financial scheme of the bill and is the simplest that can be devised.' But how did nationalists react to the cabinet's deliberations on home rule finance? It appears that they were informed by Morley of cabinet thinking on this subject sometime in late December 1892, when, apparently, Gladstone's proposal that Ireland contribute one-twentieth of imperial expenditure was still under consideration, and before the scheme outlined above was finally settled on.

Their reaction was one of dismay, though they realised that any public expression of disagreement would be 'distinctly injurious'. Instead, John Dillon urged on Morley that the cabinet reach no final decision until they had conferred with him again, when a memorandum on home rule finance, prepared by Thomas Sexton, would be submitted for the cabinet's consideration. Delivered by Justin McCarthy to Morley on 13 January 1893, Sexton's memorandum presented an argument greatly at odds with cabinet thinking on the subject.
Nationalists complained of the departure from the policy of 1886 which credited Ireland with all taxes collected there, and argued that, had time allowed in 1886, they would have pressed Gladstone to reduce his nominal estimate of Ireland's imperial contribution from one-fifteenth to one-twentieth. Taking into account the £1,400,000 derived from British taxes on spirits that were collected in Ireland, this amendment would have meant an effective reduction in contributions from one-twenty-sixth to one-forty-seventh, and should again be considered. However, they also accepted the cabinet's view, outlined above, of the problems that could arise through the transfer of spirits before duties on them were paid, and also that any law designed to credit the Irish exchequer with duties on spirits consumed in Britain would be fiercely resisted.

As an alternative, they proposed that Ireland's imperial contribution be fixed 'at a stated proportion of her annual income'. To fix Ireland's contribution as a quota of imperial expenses was unfair, because the empire was wealthy, was expanding and her expenses were likely to increase, whereas Ireland was a poor country with her revenue mainly derived from consumer goods; given that her population was diminishing it was also reasonable to expect that her revenue would diminish also. However, a quota of Irish revenue would be free from this danger:

Such a quota would be measured by the only genuine test - how
much could Ireland spare? And this could be determined by the answers to two simple questions: what balance of Irish revenues was left after local charges were met, and what part of this balance does Ireland need to establish and maintain her credit...without laying new burdens on the people?

Taking into account both local charges and an allowance made for various other expenses incurred by the imperial parliament, Sexton estimated that balance to be £1,679,000.\textsuperscript{55} But what amount would the Irish government need for its own purposes:

It must be borne in mind that the Irish government, unless their credit is established by the possession of a substantial surplus, cannot hope to take up and continue the loan services of the Board of Public Works - amounting last year to £348,000 - advanced to town councils and commissioners, grand juries, poor law guardians, harbour and drainage boards, and other public bodies for necessary public purposes, as well as to landlords, tenants, and occupying purchasers for main and through drainage, planting for shelter, farm buildings, and dwellings for agricultural labourers - a class of services certain to make more extensive demands as the system of land purchase is developed.\textsuperscript{56}

To meet these commitments the Irish government would need £1,250,000 at the outset. Gladstone's argument that a surplus should be obtained by retrenchment in public expenditure did not hold up. This could only be a work of small beginnings with a lapse of years before any substantial surplus was acquired, while an Irish government would need extensive sums to begin its work.

For example, it would be impossible for the Irish government to cut down substantially the civil service since these
were the only class of people qualified and trained to carry on the Irish administration; the home rule government would have no such experience. Moreover, Ireland could not cut down charges returned by the imperial parliament and there was again the question of the police. Sexton argued that since they were imperial forces they should be financed by the imperial exchequer while they existed, especially since the cost of establishing an Irish local force to replace them was likely to be £800,000. The report ended by declaring that if the Irish claims were reasonably met on the terms set out, they would not press the case for a 'special abatement' or restitution for Ireland in respect of her financial exploitation since the union. 57

Gladstone's reaction to this communication - with its intention, effectively, to reduce Ireland's imperial contribution to a sum smaller than the surplus he would propose for an Irish budget - was explosive. Under great pressure of work and suffering from deteriorating eyesight and hearing, he was in no mood to question dearly held principles of public economy, even in regard to home rule. He declared that if the Irish did not like his proposals they must 'lump' it. The question for them was whether they would accept 'home rule with my finance or no home rule'. 58 His view of the nationalist argument on finance, throughout this period, was that it consisted of 'large pecuniary claims'. 59
The dispute between Gladstone and nationalists on home rule finance reflected their widely differing perceptions of the responsibilities of an Irish government. Nationalists, at the least, expected that it should be able to maintain the existing levels of public expenditure; something for which the proposed small budget surplus would be wholly inadequate. Gladstone - as he put it to a deputation from the Belfast chamber of commerce - thought that the Irish should be concerned primarily with removing what he believed to be a great evil - fiscal extravagance. Moreover, he would not have been disposed to take a conciliatory attitude towards nationalist claims, given that his request for nationalists to sit on the government side of the house - something Gladstone considered would be of immense importance for purposes of consultation during the debates on the bill - was refused by Justin McCarthy, who argued that Irish opinion would not tolerate their being pledged to any English party.

However, Gladstone's financial scheme for home rule also came under attack from W. V. Harcourt, the chancellor of the exchequer. Harcourt had no enthusiasm for home rule and was excluded from the cabinet committee preparing the bill, but his memorandum on home rule finance of 16 January was one of the best contributions on the subject. This has been cited already in assessing the scheme of 1886, and concentrated on the problems that would be created for the Irish and British
exchequers were any change in the levy of duty on goods such as spirits, porter, and tobacco, to occur. If the duty was lowered it would diminish the fund out of which Ireland was to pay the imperial contribution; if risen, it would provide Ireland with a great surplus that would not have been budgeted for by the Irish chancellor. He concluded: 'The result of all this will be that the financial policy of Great Britain, which represents twenty-five parts out of twenty-six, will practically, if a conflict is to be avoided have to be regulated by considerations belonging to the twenty-sixth part.'

Harcourt would have preferred a 'fixed sum' as the Irish imperial contribution, but this was argued against in cabinet, apparently on the grounds that if the Irish were once secured on a fixed payment which was adequate to all their wants, "they may reflect that it is not necessary to pay taxes at all.... What it proves is that the best plan which is possible is impossible - an observation which applies to a good deal else in the same connection". The financial scheme of the bill was the cause of much discord between Morley and Harcourt; nor, indeed, were discussions with the nationalists concluded when the home rule bill was introduced on 13 February 1893.

THE HOME RULE BILL AND THE STRUGGLE IN PARLIAMENT
The second home rule bill began with a preamble clearly designed to allay unionist fears: it declared that the bill did not
impair or restrict 'the supreme authority of parliament'. Subsequently, clauses 1 and 2 set out the basic structure of the legislature, consisting of the crown and two houses - a legislative council and assembly. Clause 3 set out the restrictions on their powers, and followed generally the bill of 1886, with the exception of inland trade and navigation. Executive authority would, as in 1886, rest in the lord lieutenant, representing the queen, with the assistance of the executive committee of the Irish privy council. Unlike 1886, though, when an indefinite period of office was proposed for the lord lieutenant, it would now be for a period of six years.

The clauses defining the membership of the Irish legislature exhibited the influence of Duffy's and Blake's thinking, though there was to be no special minority representation. The second chamber proposed would consist of an upper house of 48 members, elected by owners and occupiers of land or tenements of a rateable value of £20 or over. They would be elected for eight years, with one-half of their number retiring every fourth year, and their seats filled by a new election. This was a significant change from the bill of 1886 which proposed a first order of 75 elected and 28 peerage members. The lower house would consist of 103 members, instead of the 203 proposed in 1886, to be elected under the existing franchise for a five year term. Moreover, after six years the Irish legislature would have the power of altering the qualifications of electors,
constituencies, and the distribution of members within them, provided that in such distribution due regard was had to their populations. 68

Settlement of disagreements between the two houses would be by a joint majority vote if a bill was introduced after a dissolution, or lapse of two years, 69 as opposed to three in 1886. Irish representation at Westminster would consist of eighty members on an 'in-out' basis, voting only on imperial matters or in debates discussing whether particular bills should be extended to Ireland. 70 As to the powers reserved to the imperial parliament, whereas in 1886 these consisted of the power to erect forts and dockyards, this power was now applied to land laws which would remain under imperial control for three years. 71 The subjects on which the Irish legislature would have no power to make laws remained substantially the same as in 1886, with the exception of inland trade and navigation which would now come under Irish jurisdiction. As to finance, particularly Ireland's imperial contribution, the scheme outlined above was adopted. Additionally, customs and excise duties were to be regulated and collected by the imperial authority, which was also to fix postal rates, but all other taxes were to be imposed by the Irish legislature. Moreover, in an attempt to prevent the difficulties for the British and Irish budgets that could arise from the increase or decrease in excise duty, outlined by Harcourt, it was proposed in clause 10 that if excise duty was increased
above the rate in force on 1 March 1893, the net proceeds in
excess of the above rates in Ireland would be paid into the imp-
perial exchequer. On the other hand, were the excise duty low-
ered, 'a sum equal to the deficiency' would be paid from the
imperial exchequer to the Irish exchequer. However it was
also proposed that the financial scheme could be revised after
a period of fifteen years. Finally, the interests of judges
and civil servants would be secured as in 1886, and while
existing police forces would be under imperial control as long
as they existed, a locally controlled police could gradually be
established to replace them.

Nationalist reaction to the scheme was mixed. The
anti-Parnellites decided not to criticise the home rule bill
too sharply, as it was a better bill than that of 1886,
though the fiscal clauses would need amendment. They also
issued an address 'to the friends of Ireland abroad', declaring
their acceptance 'without hesitation' of the constitution
proposed in the bill; its enactment would be 'a final and
triumphant close of the long, bloody and sorrowful Irish
struggle'.

A rather more critical attitude was taken by Parnell-
ites. John Redmond, while praising the two-chamber legis-
lature, criticised the royal veto, and argued that as long as
the police and land were to remain under Westminster's control
the Irish should have full representation in the imperial
parliament. The reaction in the press and country generally, was 'lukewarm in both commendation and recommendation'. For nearly everyone except Mr Gladstone 'the subject was threadbare'. However, the campaign of opposition in parliament was to be ferocious. It was observed that the general campaign was threefold, with the conservatives concentrating on the unfairness of the bill's provision in regard to England and the English taxpayer, liberal unionists on the danger to the empire and prestige of the United Kingdom, while Ulster unionists emphasised the danger to Irish loyalists.

The intensity of unionist opposition can be gauged by the amount of time spent on the bill, which occupied parliament for eighty-two days, and by the number and length of speeches devoted to it by both opposition and government. Apart from the last three days of the debate, the government delivered 459 speeches on home rule, lasting 57 ¼ hours. Unionists, however, delivered 938 speeches, occupying 152 ¼ hours, giving a proportion of 2 to 1 in number and 3 to 1 in time. Moreover, the nature of their opposition was simply to obstruct the passage of the bill by any possible means. The bill was debated clause by clause and on each of these, destructive, contradictory, or impractical amendments were proposed.

For example, on 12 May, an amendment to clause 2, which defined the powers of the Irish legislature, sought to
specify the powers the latter would have rather than those to be restricted. This was followed on 15 May by an amendment that proposed cutting out all restrictions from the bill. Again, in the debate on clause 3, which explained those restrictions, it was proposed on 7 June to include the power to restrict and control trade, and on the 8 June, to forbid the Irish legislature from giving bounties or enacting protectionist measures. Additionally, the debate on the executive power in Ireland, defined in clause 5, included an attempt to destroy the bill by making the cabinet system unworkable: on 3 July an amendment proposing to give the lord lieutenant sole executive power, was followed two days later by another investing the imperial parliament with the power to appoint the Irish cabinet. Yet another amendment, on 23 August, proposed giving the imperial parliament the power to dissolve the Irish parliament. The unionist approach to the bill on all clauses followed this pattern; nor was this policy without some success.

Due to obstruction and diminishing majorities, Gladstone was compelled to postpone the second reading of the bill until after Easter 1893. Indeed, Gladstone's method of conducting the debate facilitated unionist aims. Morley has described it thus: 'His discoursive treatment exposed an enormous surface. His abundance of illustration multiplied points for debate. His fertility in improvised arguments encouraged
improvisation in disputants without the gift.'

Unionists succeeded, moreover, in obtaining a number of amendments. On 16 May Gladstone agreed to accept an amendment attached to clause 1 making imperial supremacy much more explicit; a move which antagonised both nationalist factions who viewed it as an insult, without encouraging unionists to take a more constructive approach to the bill. On 1 June unionists succeeded with another amendment preventing the Irish parliament from constituting a centralised force to replace the R.I.C.; a concession which provoked vigorous protests from nationalists. They were annoyed as much by the manner in which these concessions were made, as by the concessions themselves. Gladstone tended to make them on the spur of the moment without consultation with nationalists, nor would he consider such consultation. When Morley pointed out the 'obvious drawback of setting delicate questions as we went along', and urged discussion, Gladstone declared this impossible due to lack of time. Moreover, he would hardly have been disposed to conciliate nationalists in this matter given their refusal of his request to sit on the government benches to facilitate consultation.

The anti-Parnellite faction, though, was concerned not just with the home rule bill, but with intense personal jealousies and disputes over what was to be done about the Paris funds of the old National League. The effect of these disputes
on Michael Davitt was well expressed in a letter to Dillon: 'I feel almost ashamed to go before an educated English audience while we are showing ourselves so unworthy of home rule.'

So dismayed was Edward Blake with these internal divisions - which more than once threatened to break out into open division - and with the apparent disinclination of nationalists to prepare any organised method of argument during the home rule debate, that he eventually resigned from the committee charged with prosecuting the anti-Parnellite approach to the home rule bill. Additionally, internal dissensions almost provoked Thomas Sexton, the best financial mind in the party, to resign from public life - a possibility Justin McCarthy took so seriously that he intended to have Gladstone dissuade him. In some despair, McCarthy declared:

It is all a conflict of jealousies and hates, and the national cause is forgotten. And we are fighting this difficult battle with a narrow majority and with Gladstone's declining years - and we are frankly telling our opponents that we are not able, even at such a crisis, to govern ourselves and our rancours and our tempers! I am well nigh sick of it all....I am sorry from my heart for Blake...who gave up his home and his well-earned ease to come and fight this hopeless battle - which is to be lost by our fault! He says he feels broken-hearted - and his conviction is that the present bill is lost. I am not quite so unhopeful - but I feel terribly depressed.

Moreover, in addition to the effect of nationalist divisions on the home rule cause, it was soon evident that two important parts of Gladstone's bill would require amendment:
the proposals for Irish representation at Westminster and the financial provisions. The former was an object of special attack. In fact, as shown in discussing the bill of 1886, it was difficult to establish any mode of Irish representation at Westminster that did not permit Irish interference in domestic British politics. Nor did the change Gladstone made in 1893 solve the problem. Intending initially to have eighty nationalist M.P.s attend at Westminster for imperial affairs, the strength of parliamentary opposition to this proposal moved him to adopt the only other proposal which had not yet been taken up - the inclusion of eighty Irish members, with power of voting on all questions. Gladstone frankly admitted that the decision was not based on principle, but 'expediency', and such was the liberal radical reaction to this decision that for a time it appeared that the government would be defeated on this clause.

Amendments to the financial scheme, however, had an even greater basis in necessity. Shortly after the introduction of the bill it became apparent that the basis on which the financial clauses were constructed was false. The 'curious coincidence', noted above that apart from customs duties Ireland's revenue and government expenses balanced exactly, and so provided a simple method of arranging Irish finance - did not, in fact, exist.Erroneous statistics had been supplied by inland revenue officers which resulted in Irish revenue from spirit duty being considerably
overestimated. When corrected, it would have left Ireland with a greatly reduced surplus on the Irish budget to begin the work of self-government. More specifically, the error, attributed mainly to one unnamed individual, would have reduced the proposed £500,000 surplus by £352,000. Gladstone described the mistake as a 'heinous crime' without precedent in his huge experience, and its discovery led to an extensive recasting of the financial clauses in committee. This mistake alone did not necessitate such drastic action; a relatively small grant from the imperial exchequer would have made up the difference. However, it provided an excuse for Harcourt, who, it was seen, opposed the original financial scheme, to push for a complete reorganisation of the financial clauses along his own lines. The real difficulty would lie in getting nationalists to accept the new scheme. As was seen, the chief thrust of their criticism of the home rule bill was directed to the fiscal clauses, and shortly after the bill's introduction the views of both nationalist factions, in this respect, were aired in various political journals.

Writing in the Nineteenth Century, Justin McCarthy praised the bill generally but declared that the financial proposals threatened 'at the very outset something like national bankruptcy'. His detailed criticism on this issue, though, consisted of an extensive statement, included verbatim in the article, and compiled by Thomas Sexton. He argued against the
proposal to take Irish customs revenue as an imperial contribution, as it was an expanding revenue, involving a significantly larger sum than existed in 1886. Sexton pointed out that nationalists had objected to the amount of their imperial contribution then, and liberals since had admitted it was excessive. Thereafter Sexton concentrated on the inadequacy of the surplus allowed to Ireland, compared with the excessive expenses she would be committed to, and concluded that the surplus would easily be swallowed up: 'We demand a real surplus.'

In the April issue of the same journal, John Redmond argued that Ireland should not have to pay more than one-third the cost of the R.I.C., nor more than one-half of the pensions and gratuities of the civil service, which on Gladstone's own estimation was twice as large as it should have been. The proposal to take control of Ireland's customs duties as an imperial contribution 'could not be accepted'. As with Sexton, Redmond complained that the imperial contribution was larger than in 1886, and that the £500,000 surplus could easily be swallowed up by the Irish government's expenses. But perhaps most importantly, Redmond argued that given the complexity of the financial question and the impossibility of it being adequately dealt with by a committee of the house of commons, a 'small representative commission to....inquire into and report on the subject' should be established before the financial clauses reached the committee stage. At any rate,
he concluded, no one now talked of 'finality' in regard to home rule, though a suitably amended bill could provide the basis of a settlement. A virtually identical argument was made in the same month by Redmond's fellow-Parnellite, J. J. Clancy, in the *Fortnightly Review*. To conciliate nationalist opinion Morley promised conferences with treasury officials with a view to satisfactory amendments being made. But with the decision to recast the financial clauses the plans changed, and the cabinet, faced with strenuous unionist obstruction, sought for ways to mitigate it.

One such proposal was for the imperial parliament to retain control, not just of customs and excise, but of Irish income tax as well. Personally Morley approved of this plan but anticipated nationalist objections. Indeed both nationalist factions strenuously opposed the adoption of such a plan. Consequently, Morley, fearing the advantage that 'the turbulent element in Irish society' would reap from a quarrel between liberals and nationalists 'on a critical part of the bill', proposed that the safest course to take would be to retain the original financial plan with the imperial parliament paying a larger proportion of the upkeep of the police, or to adopt 'the (old?) quota plan.'

However, on 20 June Gladstone decided on a plan that entailed letting Irish customs duties fall into the common stock of Irish revenue and taking out of the total one-third
of the **true** Irish revenue as an imperial contribution. Under the amended financial scheme Ireland would retain £4,660,000 or her total true revenue of £6,922,000 for domestic government expenses. But the latter were equal to that sum, so to provide a surplus on the Irish budget Ireland's imperial contribution would be reduced by one-third the cost of maintaining the police - £512,000. In addition, true revenue derived from customs and excise was to be ascertained by a joint committee of the treasury and Irish government, while the imperial government would retain control of Irish customs, excise and income tax for six years, and then revert to the original proposal of securing the Irish customs duties as an imperial contribution.  

This scheme, however, had no greater degree of approval from nationalists than the others. Conscious of the admitted error in establishing the original scheme, Edward Blake informed Morley: 'having...no material in our possession to enable us to analyse the figures on either side of this...it is impossible for us to treat it as a basis upon which the financial relations of the two countries for future years should be fixed'. They had already proposed some amendments to the original financial scheme and preferred to proceed to a conclusion on that basis. But there was to be no revision of the new financial plan: nationalists had to accept what was offered or nothing. Michael Davitt wrote of the bill in terms which could well have
reflected the general nationalist attitude:

I cannot and will not help to destroy this bill, so long as the admitted deadly enemies of any form of home rule oppose and denounce it as dangerous to their principles and to the ascendency and anti-Irish party in Ireland.

When Balfour, Salisbury, Chamberlain and co., espouse this bill—laud it as a new act of union, and help Gladstone to pass it into law: then but not till then will you find me willing to help wreck this measure.

....I look at the whole of what this constitution will enable the Irish people - the Celtic people - to do, and I am satisfied that it would be unwise and unpatriotic on the part of the Irish party to reject a constitution which will take the government of Ireland out of the hands of the anti-Irish classes and place it in those of the elected representatives of that race which England has failed to exterminate. 106

If Davitt's view was representative of nationalist opinion, it appears that their acceptance of Gladstone's bill was determined less by considerations of any good it might achieve for Ireland than by the emotionally satisfying prospect of inflicting a defeat on their enemies. Of course there was the commitment to estimate Ireland's true revenue from customs and excise by a joint committee of the treasury and the Irish government, which could bring some financial benefit to Ireland. The necessity of conciliating the recalcitrant Parnellites, however, was to result in a more substantial concession still - a commission of inquiry into the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland since the union. This subject came up at a dinner attended by Lord Welby, Sir Algernon West, Weymss Reid and R. B. O'Brien. Welby and
West put the case for the retention of the collection of Irish revenue for six years, which O'Brien seemed to agree with. The latter also accepted that the government could not guarantee the £512,000 surplus on the Irish budget without leaving themselves open to damaging criticism from unionists. On the other hand, Welby and West reacted favourably when O'Brien suggested a commission of inquiry into Anglo-Irish financial relations since the union — all agreeing that it should be set up in the following year. The meeting ended with O'Brien declaring that 'if this commission were granted, he believed Mr Gladstone would have no further trouble with the Parnellites'. For his part, Gladstone — who, indeed, had proposed just such an inquiry to Parnell in 1889 — thought it was the best arrangement that could be made. Shortly afterwards Redmond formally asked for the commission in parliament and Gladstone agreed: it was chaired by Hugh Childers in 1894.

As is known, the home rule bill was thrown out by the lords on 8 September 1893, by 419 votes to 41. Given the smallness of the liberal majority it was easy for the lords 'to assume that they had a "mission" from the country to destroy any measure passed through the commons which harmed vested interests, or prejudiced the prospects of their party'. Moreover few liberal peers actually favoured home rule, despite the fact that thirty-eight held offices in the government or had been made peers in recent years. Henry Ponsonby
has described how all those he knew 'express delight at being saved from speaking on home rule, and do not show any enthusiasm at the prospect of voting....I am anxious to find a hearty home ruler but, except Mr Gladstone, he is not easy to find.'

Perhaps the best comment on the debate in the lords was made by Harold Spender, describing the defeat of the bill:

'There was a slight cheer, and then a great laugh as the whole body rapidly melted out of the house. Both sides joined in the laugh. It was impossible to keep up the big farce any longer.' Angered both by the rejection of his home rule scheme and the 'mutilation' of other liberal measures by the upper house, Gladstone sought to call an election on the issue of "Peers versus People". His cabinet colleagues, however, were never enthusiastic for home rule and refused the call. Consequently Gladstone let the matter drop, though with the optimistic belief that when the upper house 'mutilated' further liberal measures the cabinet would take his advice. But as R. C. K. Ensor argues, despite its defeat, the second home rule bill, was not without importance:

Had it [the 1886 bill] lacked a sequel for nineteen years there might not have been one. But the bill of 1893 went through all stages in the elected house. It emerged a complete measure which, but for the veto of the house of lords, would have come into force. It was almost bound to be revived if and when a majority of the nation took the view that the lords used their veto unfairly.
There was, however, one very important question that the defeat of the home rule bill would - in the long term - aggravate: the Ulster problem. It will be suggested here that had the second home rule bill been enacted a real possibility would have existed of a peaceful settlement of this issue.

HOME RULE AND THE ULSTER PROBLEM, 1892-3

The re-introduction of the home rule question in 1892 naturally brought to the fore again many of the controversies associated with the Ulster problem. However, as was seen, Gladstone's position had changed somewhat since 1886, and while he had abandoned his willingness to accept a separate assembly for Ulster, he was prepared to go to some lengths to conciliate Ulster protestant fears of being 'plundered' in a home rule parliament.

In the approaches he made to John Redmond through William Mather and Sir Charles Hall Q.C., in March 1892,115 Gladstone sought to provide some safeguards for 'the prejudiced and feeble-minded' in Ulster, with particular reference to allaying their fears of being over-taxed by nationalists. Redmond, however, replied indignantly: 'I only remind you of this fact. The Ulster people cannot object to the same principle of taxation as that which prevails in Great Britain.'116 Shortly afterwards, he declared, that as to the Ulster question generally 'I don't consider any special safeguards necessary at all'.117 His disposition on this subject was to become
increasingly negative as the home rule debate progressed. At one stage he argued that there was 'no Ulster question', only a question of a 'small corner of Ulster': the agitation against home rule was waged by a 'small minority' of protestants while the rest were only fearful for their position and of the 'dictation' of the catholic clergy. As to the latter, the election of his own party against the wishes of the priests had shown that protestant fears were largely ill-founded. 118 Redmond's intransigence on Ulster, moreover, was mirrored among anti-Parnellites.

During his meeting with Dillon, McCarthy and Sexton, on 21 June 1892, Gladstone asked 'how they would view a provision [in the home rule bill] giving power to any public body in Ireland to raise a question of ultra vires in relation to any part of an...act' passed by the Irish parliament, with such questions to be settled by the judicial committee of the privy council, as was the case with colonial legislation. The nationalists objected strongly to this proposal, pointing out that it would enable 'the Belfast Corporation...to bring forward in a most offensive way the subordinate position of the Irish parliament'. Despite Gladstone's argument that their acceptance of this provision would have a 'very powerful conciliatory effect', they remained adamant, adding that their acceptance would 'give a powerful argument to Parnellites'. 119

Nevertheless, during the preparation of the home rule
In a memorandum discussing what changes were to be made in the home rule bill of 1886, it was set out as a question for discussion, whether, in the clauses containing the restrictions on the Irish legislature, the following additions should be included in an effort 'to meet the Ulstermen':

1. A limit on the amount of borrowing by the Irish executive so long as the debt due to the British exchequer under the Irish land act of 1891 remains undischarged: a limit on local debt;
2. A restriction to secure equality of taxation, and to prevent (say) a common poor rate for the whole country, so as to relieve Ulster from the fear of being unduly taxed for the benefit of the poorer parts of Ireland;
3. A prohibition on the alteration for a term of years of the Irish land act, 1891;
4. A prohibition on controlling or hampering the exercise of authority under the imperial government.

Given the nationalist opposition to any concessions for Ulster, however, and equally, the refusal of Ulster unionists to aid in any way the enactment of the home rule bill, it is not surprising that these were not major issues of debate. But that some such provisions were essential to allay northern unionist fears was clear from the latter's opinion of the financial scheme of the bill. They agreed with the nationalists view that the proposed small surplus on the Irish budget would leave the Irish government virtually without funds and concluded that if the home rule scheme were enacted, a Dublin
parliament would inevitably 'waste taxes raised in Belfast and Ulster' in an attempt to create and foster trade in other places on an 'unnatural foundation'. Similarly it would establish a system of 'extravagant bounties' to bring trade to other parts of Ireland, to Ulster's detriment.¹²² Nor did they believe that Ulster M.P.s in the home rule parliament would be of sufficient numbers to protect the province's interests. They expected that the upper house of the parliament - which, as was seen, was to have 48 members elected on a £20 rating qualification - would have only 8 or 10 members elected from Ulster.¹²³ Unlike 1886, though, Ulster unionists were to be given the opportunity of putting their objections directly to Gladstone; in an interview which took place on 28 March 1893 and which is worth following in some detail.

The deputation consisted of ten members, representing the Belfast chamber of commerce, the harbour commissioners and the linen merchants' association. The spirit in which Gladstone approached the meeting can be gauged from the fact that, despite his subsequent claims of having listened to 'interminable speeches', he allowed only twenty minutes to the representatives of the chamber of commerce, practically none at all to the representatives of the other two bodies, and during that time interjected fourteen times.¹²⁴ Indeed, one member of the deputation recorded: 'the old man was jumping with impatience and we have had it clearly brought out that he closed
us'. The influence that recent disclosures on the employment practices of Belfast corporation had on Gladstone's thinking was immediately apparent, when, on the representatives of the Belfast chamber of commerce having introduced themselves, he declared that the latter was 'almost entirely protestant I think....I have understood that there were eight out of 260 who were not protestant.'

The deputation, having instanced the facts of religious division in Ulster and Ireland, emphasised the spectacular growth in the population and prosperity of Belfast and the fact that since the introduction of the home rule bill on 13 February 1893, £938,000 was wiped off the stock of the seven banks in Ireland and £1,000,000 off that of Irish railways. The union between Britain and Ireland, they argued, had been the cause of great prosperity, while an impoverished home rule parliament would attempt to effect an extravagant system of bounties to establish trade that would be harmful to Ulster industries and place them in a position where they could not compete with their English competitors.

Gladstone answered these points by stating that since the propertied classes opposed home rule he only expected that their securities would momentarily 'undergo an unfavourable influence', while the argument that most of the Irish people had no interest in Ulster's prosperity was unacceptable: it was tantamount to saying that they had no interest in Irish
prosperity. On the issue of religious antagonism, he referred yet again to the harmony between the various creeds at the time of Grattan's parliament, and declared that the presence of the deputation suggested that it was certainly not the catholics who entertained such antagonism.

More importantly, though, on the question of Irish resources, Gladstone argued that Ireland's case was comparable to that of Canada, in terms of revenue and population, and that home rule had worked well there despite religious antagonism between French and British settlers. His argument on this point, however, turned out to be very superficial. In a supplementary letter answering these points, the chamber of commerce could show that in terms of size, mineral resources, value of imports, railways systems and land availability, Canada was extremely rich and Ireland pitifully poor. The issue of Ireland's relative lack of natural resources had obvious implications for the finances of a home rule parliament and this subject was heatedly debated.

When the deputation pointed out that a surplus of £500,000 was a contemptible figure for the purposes of running a government, Gladstone disagreed, saying it was 'a very large amount indeed' and that Irish government was conducted on terms of 'enormous extravagance', with civil expenditure at £1 per head of population when it was only 10s in Great Britain. He continued: 'Ireland is a poor country. Ought Ireland to require
more expenditure on civil government than England and Scotland which are richer countries...? Gladstone expected the advent of home rule to result in a gradual decline in the expense of running the country, to a level proportionate to that of Great Britain: it would then be possible, 'with prudence', for a saving of more than £2½ millions to be made. 131

In a written reply to his financial argument, however, the deputation was able to show that his contention that Ireland's civil expenditure was twice that of Great Britain, was wrong. An estimate based on the most recent parliamentary returns showed a per capita estimate for Great Britain of 19s, and for Ireland, £1.4s. Moreover, the Irish charge included the police, special expenses under the 1891 land act and charges for education, whereas in Britain similar charges were supplemented by local rates. A true comparison could only be made by eliminating these items from both accounts, with results for Great Britain and Ireland, of 15s and 13s per head, respectively. On these figures it was impossible for Ireland to make the economies envisaged by Gladstone. But accepting that a saving of £2½ millions was to be made, from what items was it to come? The total amount of Gladstone's expenditure budget was £5,160,000, and if £2,500,000 were deducted it would leave a balance of £2,660,000. However, there were combined charges for education, the post office and the collection of revenue, amounting to about £2,000,000 and this sum could not
be reduced. Thus about £600,000 remained to meet government expenses for the police, land act charges, grants in aid of local charges, salaries for judges and other officials, and for all other purposes whatever. These expenses were estimated to be about £2,500,000, and given these facts, Ulster unionists argued, Gladstone's expectation of great economies to be made in Irish government was 'a mere dream'. The case made here was substantially the same as that made by nationalists, but made to much greater effect. But whereas nationalists sought for necessary amendments, unionists were simply reinforced in their opposition to home rule.

Ulster unionists did not profess to favour a separate parliament for Ulster, or separate treatment if home rule was enacted, being content to argue instead that, if given time, Ireland's problems could be solved within the union. But there is some evidence to show that if Gladstone had made a proposal for separate treatment for Ulster, it might have been taken up. For example, while unionists argued against home rule for all Ireland the substance of that case more clearly applied to Ulster. But although the liberal unionist M.P.s, T. W. Russell, Thomas Lea and H. O. Arnold-Forster, opposed an amendment to the home rule bill by Jesse Collings which sought to exclude Ulster from its scope—on the ground that they were opposed to any kind of separate treatment—they did accept that if a home rule bill was enacted they would press for Ulster's
exclusion from it.  

Here was an opportunity, had Gladstone been willing to grasp it, of at least seriously debating the issue of separate treatment. Moreover, conscious of the antagonism to himself in Ulster in 1886, John Morley was now making a special effort to appear to be acting fairly towards the northern protestant community. His policy of maintaining an impartial attitude when rioting appeared to be beginning in Belfast, was noted favourably in the north. Indeed one source put it that his action, in not appearing to be the dupe of the nationalist party, helped considerably to defuse a potentially explosive situation. There would, of course, be nationalist opposition to any policy that would exclude protestant Ulster from the scope of a home rule scheme, but it was at least debatable whether they would have rejected the chance of gaining home rule for the greater part of the island because of a provision to exclude part of Ulster from its jurisdiction. However Gladstone's feeling towards Ulster protestants merely became increasingly intolerant. At one stage during his meeting with the Ulster unionist deputation on 28 March 1893 he accused them of creating the disunion of parties and creeds in Ireland: 'it is the disunion of Ireland which constitutes the real obstacle [to social and economic progress] now...disunion, for which you, I think, are largely - frankly let me say so ("No, no") - I beg your pardon, allow me, I wish to put it without
any offence whatever - your opinions constitute the disunion'.

The failure to compromise on Ulster appeared to leave only one solution; that if home rule was enacted Ulster protestants would resist its application to the province, by force if necessary. And certainly - as in 1886 - there was plenty of encouragement for Ulster protestants to fight against home rule. During their visits to Ulster in 1892 and 1893, such a policy was urged by Lord Salisbury and A. J. Balfour. Again, Joseph Chamberlain repeatedly called on northern protestants to rebel and was convinced they would: 'his own agents sent to Ulster reported that the deeper you went down among the protestant masses the starker was the spirit [of rebellion]'. That this should be so, however, is not surprising: the willingness of the protestant working-class for this kind of activity was amply demonstrated in Belfast in 1886. The question is, to what extent and in what circumstances were their political leaders prepared to lead a revolt?

Certainly warlike preparations were being made by some at this time. The Irish correspondent of the virulently unionist Birmingham Daily Gazette claimed to have seen 'proof positive' of such plans, in the form of documents offering massive quantities of arms and ammunition with offers from England to assist the Ulster rebellion. The 'guarantee fund' for the first campaign, he was told, was nearly £1,500,000, while on Lord Ranfurly's authority he was informed that 'ten thousand
and five' offers to fight in Ulster had come from Great Britain. Again, it is known that Colonel Saunderson was in correspondence with potential volunteers in England and Scotland at this time, who were assured of Ulster's will to resist the authority of a Dublin parliament by force. Moreover, another group entitled 'Young Ulster', and led by F. H. Crawford, was also making war-like preparations.

Nevertheless, the policy that appears to have had most support among Ulster unionists - as an immediate reaction to home rule - was, in fact, 'passive resistance', such as that proposed by William Johnston in 1886. It was explained by the province's leading liberal unionist, Thomas Sinclair, at the Ulster convention of 1892:

...we shall have nothing to do with a Dublin parliament. If ever it be set up we shall simply ignore its existence. Its acts will be but as waste paper; police will find our barracks preoccupied with our own constabulary; its judges will sit in empty courthouses. The early efforts of its executive will be spent in devising means to deal with a passive resistance to its taxation co-extensive with loyalist Ulster.

It was with this speech in mind that Gladstone congratulated the Ulster unionists in being prepared not to go beyond the law in their opposition to home rule. A plausible scenario in which passive resistance would be enacted as a policy for northern protestants, was sketched by St Loe Strachey, an
Englishman in close contact with Ulster unionists:

What would happen supposing Mr Gladstone were to pass his bill would be something like this. The home rule act would probably direct that writs should be immediately issued for the return of the Irish parliament. In the north, the returning officers would throw writs aside, risking the actions that would be brought against them, and no election would take place. This, however, would not prevent the Dublin parliament meeting and falling to business. Presumably that parliament's earliest duty would be to fill its coffers, and taxation would be at once imposed. Here, then, would come the first point of friction. The Ulstermen would, of course, refuse to pay a tax levied in Dublin, and then the Dublin parliament would be face to face with a strike against taxes in which every merchant of wealth and position in Belfast and Derry and every landlord in the north would be engaged.

The result of this action would be a 'Quaker rebellion'; an extensive passive resistance, in which attempts by the Dublin parliament to punish the Ulstermen by seizing their goods would be met by a boycott of all the institutions of the home rule state and their supplanting by a 'voluntary government' based on the grand jury framework and the municipalities. This policy would be successful, Strachey argued, because a 'penniless' Dublin parliament could ill afford the enormous expense involved in raising a few pounds of taxation. This certainly seemed to be an effective course of action: it would not only secure Ulster unionists exclusion from the home rule scheme, but would do so without recourse to a rebellion that could bring them into conflict with the British army. Indeed, it was argued by J. A. Rentoul - who first thought of holding the
Ulster convention - that passive resistance was the farthest any Ulster unionist leader was prepared to go:

"We will not have home rule" became a watchword among unionists, but I never met anyone who regarded that statement as committing us to civil war or war against Great Britain in any contingency whatever. These words were simply taken to mean "We will oppose home rule by every constitutional means...." Lord Randolph Churchill's statement, "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right", though quoted with great frequency was, so far as I know, never regarded seriously even by the keenest unionists [My italics]. It was merely used as a political catchword. 147

This passage clearly supports the view that rebellious utterances made in the emotional atmosphere of the home rule crisis gave a very unreliable indication of Ulster unionists' intentions. In this respect, it is worth noting that in 1892 Thomas McKnight assured Joseph Chamberlain that Lord Dufferin had told him, that if the home rule scheme was enacted he would come home and place himself at the head of the protestants. 148 But in his reminiscences, published a few years later, he described Dufferin's plan as 'a rumour'. 149 An interesting incident took place when the question of an Ulster rebellion was raised in the house of commons. Thomas Sexton, with William Johnston's agreement, informed the house: "My hon. friend, if I may so call him" - and Mr Johnston nodded - "will never fight". 150 Moreover, Adam Duffin, a leading organiser of the convention league which followed the great
demonstration of 1892, was anxious to ensure that there was no fear of it 'getting left without proper control in dangerous hands'.

Of course it could be argued that, unlike 1914, the house of lords in 1893 was still a powerful impediment to home rule and that there was thus less need for a militant stance by Ulster unionists. But although they were certainly mindful of the importance of the house of lords to their cause, it was not regarded as the absolute guarantee against home rule it might have seemed. A. J. Balfour confided to Sir John Ross his view - correct as far as Gladstone's intentions were concerned - that when the house of lords threw out Gladstone's home rule bill he would call a general election on the issue and return with a massive majority to enact it. Again, the heightening tension in Belfast as the home rule debate progressed did not suggest the existence of a widespread confidence that the house of lords could be safely left to dispose of the issue.

Thus it is highly unlikely that 'passive resistance' was adopted as a policy which unionists believed would never have to be put into effect. Nor indeed - as in 1886 - was it entirely the case that this policy had no place for armed revolt. What information there is on those who were preparing military resistance to home rule indicates quite clearly that this was to take place, not on the implementation of home rule, but when, and if, a Dublin parliament sought to deal with passive
resistance by force: 'at that point the Ulster rebellion would occur'. However Thomas Sexton declared in parliament: "There will be no fighting in Ulster, unless there is something to fight about, and the Irish parliament will never give them a reason." Sexton's remarks indicate a policy on Ulster that a Dublin parliament might well be driven to by sheer force of economic circumstances: 'sensible government' such as that suggested by R. T. Reid in 1887. Such a policy would have had - as one of its chief purposes - to demonstrate that Irish autonomy was not inconsistent with the promotion and safeguarding of specific Ulster interests.
CONCLUSION

In the course of this study many long-established views associated with the home rule struggle have been questioned; views about Gladstone's conversion to home rule, his insight into Irish nationalism, his home rule schemes, the Irish demand for home rule and their reaction to Gladstone's plans, and the importance of the Ulster question in this period. That misconceptions about many of these subjects have existed for so long, can, to a significant extent, be seen as a demonstration of the influence of the contemporary political arguments in defining the terms within which historians would deal with the home rule question.

For example, the claims of nationalists in 1886 - that they represented a people earnestly desiring home rule and wholeheartedly in favour of Gladstone's proposals - have been accepted by historians, convinced, in the words of Robert Kee, that 'experienced politicians like Parnell, O'Brien, and Healy' would never have accepted Gladstone's scheme had there been any danger of a great wave of 'national disappointment' with it. This study, however, has shown that the Irish attitude, both to home rule in general and to Gladstone's proposals, was distinctly less enthusiastic. It is too simple an equation to read Irish support for the Parnellite party as an index of their commitment to home rule - as Timothy Harrington's assessment of
the reasons behind the great upsurge in party support in 1885 shows. Harrington's view—that the motive force here was an anxiety in each county to have its interests represented at Westminster—indicates, ironically, that the party's great electoral triumph in 1885—usually seen as evidence of an intense Irish desire for home rule—was based more on an appreciation of the imperial connection and a desire to exploit it rather than a wish to see it broken. In this context it is worth remembering that Parnellites in the parliament of 1880-85 were generally young, energetic and good constituency M.P.s. In fact, their electoral successes in 1885 served to mask the difficulties of nationalists since 1882 in increasing the membership of the National League and the worries of the party leadership that the home rule agitation could collapse. As the contrast between the strong popular support for the plan of campaign and the weak response to Sir Charles Gavan Duffy's attempt at initiating an Irish debate on home rule in 1887, indicates, 'consciousness' rather than enthusiastic commitment best describes the Irish attitude to home rule. Certainly there is little to support Patrick O'Farrell's view that the 'illusion' of home rule 'dazzled the Irish'.

Of course it was only to be expected that following the 1885 general election Gladstone would take nationalist claims at face-value. Nevertheless, neither the election result or the influential parliamentary position it gave the Parnellites,
accounts adequately for Gladstone's decision to introduce a home rule bill in 1886. A mere commitment to home rule in general would have aligned the Parnellites with the liberal party; and as was intimated by both Davitt and Healy, nationalists realised the need to educate British opinion on the home rule question if there was to be any hope of a successful outcome. Gladstone's rejection of this course of action was determined by his belief—certainly exaggerated—that Ireland was on the verge of revolution and that there was no time to pursue a gradual approach; and this belief in turn derived from the fact that he had virtually no personal knowledge of Ireland and that his sources on Irish affairs were limited. Thus that Gladstone was not well informed about Ireland was of greater importance in determining his actions in 1886 than any special insight he had into the Irish problem. Indeed both Morley and Gladstone seem to have been convinced, throughout the period 1886-93, that only their commitment to home rule prevented a revolutionary situation developing in Ireland. When a violent reaction failed to follow the rejection of the second home rule bill, Morley declared: 'The tranquillity is profound for the time'.

However, the view given here of Gladstone's reasons for producing a home rule bill in 1886, differs not only from the traditional interpretations, but also from the recently more influential case made by Cooke and Vincent. Arguing that
Gladstone was motivated mainly by reasons of intra-party advantage rather than by either morality or political necessity, they claim that his home rule plans were nothing more than 'useful contingency exercises' written purely 'for his own benefit', and that their importance or otherwise would be determined by the political situation as it developed....(home rule] might be tailed to a land bill...or...linked to coercion and a land bill. Context would be everything, and it would be impossible to see home rule emerging as front runner in an Irish programme until the last moment. It is impossible to say when Gladstone decided to make home rule the centre of his policy for 1886, but it could have been very late in the spring. The land bill...looked during February as though it would smother home rule, and yet within weeks it had been quietly pigeon-holed. 10

This argument, however, is open to the same objections as that made by John Vincent in Gladstone and Ireland, and dealt with in chapter two. For example, it was shown that the relationship between the land and home rule bills was not haphazard, with the latter coming to the fore as a result of political chance: Gladstone conceived both bills as vitally related parts of one comprehensive scheme aimed at solving the Irish problem. His decision to construct the land purchase bill first was determined by the fact that no materials were available with which to construct an effective home rule bill when he took office, while he felt more qualified to deal with the land issue. 11

Certainly it is true that the land bill was 'pigeon-holed' shortly after its introduction but surely this is less
significant than the fact that its shelving was designed primarily to facilitate the passage of the home rule bill, and that Gladstone planned to reintroduce it when the former was at a later stage of its progress through parliament. Indeed Gladstone had been convinced in 1882 that a comprehensive solution to the land question necessitated some kind of local government authority to actually put it into effect; the latter would constitute bodies charged with the 'working of the clauses' of a land bill. The vital importance he attached to the linkage between the land and home rule elements of his Irish plan in 1886 can best be appreciated through an understanding of what the scheme as a whole was intended to achieve.

Its first purpose, of course, was to establish Irish autonomy, but this study has argued that there were two other objectives he considered highly important: (i) the removal of the land issue as a source of social strife, so paving the way for the re-introduction of the landlords into the political life of Ireland and thus restoring what he considered was the 'natural' order of society; (ii) that the Irish would meet their commitments to the imperial exchequer when home rule was established; an object to be effected by the provisions for appointing an 'imperial receiver' to ensure that Ireland's imperial contributions were made, and for making the finances of a Dublin government partially dependent on commissions drawn from the collection of tenants' repayments for land purchases.
Historians generally have failed to appreciate the close interconnection between the land and autonomy elements of Gladstone's scheme; an omission, no doubt, largely due to the fact that its enormous scope meant that its introduction in one piece was highly impractical, and that the land scheme was quickly withdrawn. Consequently they have also failed to deal adequately with the question of how far the financial clauses of the scheme contributed to its rejection. The proposal to appoint an 'imperial receiver' to enforce Ireland's imperial commitments, the stringent financial basis of the home rule scheme and the unfavourable economic circumstances in which it was to be implemented - all provided abundant evidence to contradict Gladstone's claims that his scheme would be a final settlement of the Irish question. And, as was seen, these factors were at the centre of the unionist case against the home rule plan, a case sometimes unjustly dismissed as one simply of anti-Irish prejudice. The cost of the scheme's failure, moreover, could be measured in terms of the sums being committed to its operation. For instance, Gladstone planned initially to commit £50,000,000 to the operation of his land measure at a time when the yearly cost of the navy - the mainstay of the empire - was only £12,000,000.

One of the most criticised aspects of Gladstone's financial proposals was the small surplus of £404,000 on the Irish budget he envisaged, yet he remained impervious to criticism.
Why? There was, of course, his passion for economy, but while this would explain why he proposed such a small surplus, it fails to account adequately for his refusal to heed the warnings of both nationalists and unionists during the home rule debate as to the difficulties for an Irish government it would create. The answer to this problem would appear to lie more in a peculiarity of his moral outlook.

Lionel Tollemache recorded that what Gladstone found most offensive about slavery was not the actual physical suffering involved, but moral debasement: slavery "degrades God's creatures below the human level". J. L. Hammond has written that on a visit to Birmingham in 1877, Gladstone was unimpressed by the immense reforms that had swept away the slums and made Birmingham 'the pioneer city' in respect of public amenities and the general level of its social life:

Gladstone's warm praise of Birmingham...had little to do with its municipal achievements or with the use it made of its best men; it was concerned with its active life of discussion and government and its power of attracting its best citizens to its service. These were to him of sovereign value.

Both these observations on Gladstone demonstrate a pre-occupation with the probity of social and political actions and a remarkable tendency to undervalue their human or material effects, whether bad or good. A similar attitude was evident in his approach to home rule. Concerned to satisfy the Irish
desire for self-government, restore social peace and bring Ireland's 'best citizens' - the landlords - once more into the centre of political life, Gladstone failed to perceive that the practical effects of his financial provisions would very likely have rendered impossible the realisation of these hopes. Indeed they could very well have encouraged the revival of the revolutionary nationalism that the conferring of home rule was intended to forestall. That this could happen, does not seem to have occurred to Gladstone who, moreover, was not inclined to allow for difference of opinion once having convinced himself of some view. In this respect it is worth remembering that despite his admissions in the period 1886-92 that Ireland had been over-taxed since the union and of the need to deal generously with her in a future home rule bill, the scheme of 1892 proposed a surplus similar to that of 1886, while unlike 1886, it was to be unaccompanied by a land measure that could have provided a much-needed additional source of revenue. That the second home rule bill was not linked with a land bill can be seen as an effect of tory land legislation since 1886; by 1893 the land problem was regarded as much less acute.

Of course the defeat of Gladstone's measures meant that their defects never produced the problems expected of them, and in this context there was surely much point to A. J. Kettle's claim that the defects in the scheme of 1886 were so enormous that
Parnell's reputation and position as an Irish political leader had been saved by its demise. It could be equally well argued that the defeat of his home rule plans also ensured Gladstone's reputation as one of the few British politicians with a correct understanding of Irish nationalism and who proposed enlightened legislation to deal with it.

This aspect of the home rule struggle presents another significant example of how contemporary political argument has influenced subsequent historiography, for despite the claims of both contemporaries and historians commending Gladstone's insight into Irish nationalism, this study shows that his perception of it was highly flawed. In emphasising the supposedly 'constitutional' character of its historical development and ignoring the bloody struggles that more truly characterised it, Gladstone exhibited a striking failure of historical perception - most evident in his inability to understand the strength of Ulster unionist fears about home rule. Thus his arguments were easily faulted by his unionist critics, who, it could be argued, more often showed the historical sensitivity usually seen as his preserve. Indeed not only did his historical arguments present a distorted view of the development of Irish nationalism, but they were notoriously weak as propaganda in Britain, where the public's acquaintance with Irish history consisted mainly of tales of 'Romish' persecution during the 1641 rebellion. In ignoring these aspects of Irish history
Gladstone failed to deal with the only subjects on which he was likely to have a point of contact with the public, and which had been the source of much anti-Irish prejudice. The factors that conditioned his view of Irish nationalism and history — especially his power of self-deception\(^2^5\) have been dealt with in chapter six; however, our understanding of Gladstone's thinking on these subjects is enhanced when we remember the political background to the home rule crusade. Gladstone's study of Irish nationalism was hurried and concurrent with his belief as to the necessity of producing a home rule scheme to stave off a revolutionary situation in Ireland. Since this was the purpose of home rule it was necessary to prove that Irish nationalist sentiment was constitutional in character and would thus be satisfied with it. Obsessed with his home rule crusade, thereafter, he looked to Irish history with a fixed idea of what he wanted to discover, oblivious to the glaring inadequacies of his arguments and the scope of criticism they provided unionists.

Probably the most convincing of Gladstone's arguments, and most indicative of his ignorance of Irish political realities, was his claim — made during the plan of campaign — that when home rule was established the landlords would once more come to the fore as Irish political leaders.\(^2^6\) Gladstone was not contradicted by nationalists, almost certainly because of his importance to the home rule campaign. Moreover, given that liberal and nationalist propaganda efforts were designed
for different audiences - in Ireland and Great Britain - and that the energies of both parties were mainly given over to fighting the tory government's Irish policies, it would have been easy to let Gladstone's claims in this respect pass unchallenged. Nevertheless, the disparity of view between Gladstone and nationalists on the place of the landlords in the Irish nation was certainly real; as was demonstrated by the nationalist reaction to the activities of the I.P.H.R.A.

This movement represented, in the main, the only specifically Gladstonian body of support for home rule in Ireland, and as such its views naturally corresponded to Gladstone's on many points. Like both Morley and Gladstone, the I.P.H.R.A. hoped that after home rule was established 'the free play of forces' would lead to the growth of liberal catholicism and the demise of the high level of involvement in politics by the catholic clergy. And while the southern section of the movement had a vocal fenian element, it was, nevertheless, like Gladstone, most concerned about the place of the landlords in the Irish nation and that the home rule agitation be divorced from the plan of campaign. The hostility of the Parnellite reaction to their concern in this regard, however, demonstrated forcefully the unreality of Gladstone's hopes for the political resurrection of the landlords. At the same time, it also demonstrated the constraints within which the I.P.H.R.A. had to operate.

The movement sought to convert Irish protestants to home
rule, but this objective necessitated not just appeals to protestants, but also policies that would appeal to them. Inevitably this endeavour involved some criticism of catholic nationalism, but as their critique of boycotting and the plan of campaign showed, such criticisms placed protestant home rulers in a difficult position, as they both offered damaging propaganda material to unionists and tended to produce resentment among catholics. And certainly these factors proved highly inhibiting to the effective working of the I.P.H.R.A. in the south, where a fear of annoying the catholic clergy prevented the Dublin executive centre from initiating a debate on the position of protestants in a home rule Ireland - a very necessary debate if any substantial progress was to be made toward the development of liberal catholicism. In general, the influence of protestant home rulers in nationalist politics was more negative than positive. Unable or unwilling to convince catholic nationalists of the necessity of pursuing policies that would appeal to protestants, their very existence as a protestant movement yet fed Gladstonian and nationalist complacency that all Irish protestants would come to accept home rule eventually. Nowhere was that complacency more in evidence than in their approach to the Ulster problem.

It has been a major aim of this study to examine the attitudes of both nationalists and liberals to this issue. But while their substantial agreement on the solution to this problem has
been demonstrated, their views, nevertheless, were not identical. For instance, at the level of political debate, it was seen that Gladstone, as befitted his position as prime minister and potential prime minister, had to appear to be dealing impartially with the problem, and so professed a willingness to accept separate treatment for Ulster despite the nationalist rejection of this option. At a more ideological level, while he emphasised the unifying influence of nationalism by reference to the political activities of northern protestants in Grattan's time, nationalist propaganda, while making similar references, invoked also the divisive struggles of plantation times, with the implication that the success of the home rule campaign in Ulster would mean the victory of catholics over protestants. Relatively, although both shared the view that Ulster unionism was largely created by English intrigue, nationalists' attitudes - because they were more emotionally involved with the Ulster problem - tended to be more sharply defined than Gladstone's.

While repelled by the violent reputation of Orangeism and the antics of Orange M.P.s in parliament, Gladstone relied generally on the precedent of protestant involvement in Grattan's parliament as an assurance of the eventual acceptability of home rule in the north. Nationalists, however, concentrated more on their Orange stereotype, which defined the only real Ulster unionists as bigoted Orangemen, unrepresentative of northern protestants who were open to persuasion on home rule. 
a viewpoint, ironically, which exhibited a similar kind of stereotypy to that of unionists who argued that nationalist agitators were unrepresentative of Irish opinion, which was naturally law-abiding and loyal to the union. Nevertheless, 'evidence' of sorts could be found to support the views of home rulers. For instance, both Gladstone and nationalists placed much importance on the activities of Colonel Saunderson, the Ulster unionist leader, to 'prove' that Ulster unionists would not only decline violently to resist home rule but would eventually accept it. Additionally, there was the nationalist majority of one seat in the province; the fact that the relative prosperity argument was not well handled on the unionist side and appeared to tell in the nationalists' favour; the difficulty of defining a specifically protestant 'homeland' to be excluded from nationalist rule, and, relatedly, the fact that the unionist tendency to apply the term 'Ulster' to the protestant and unionist parts of the province, favoured nationalists who could then 'prove' the falsity of unionist arguments by pointing to the large catholic population in the province as a whole.

At best, however, these were debating points and did not change the fact that a large proportion of Ulster was protestant, unionist, economically distinct from the rest of Ireland and effectively denying the legitimacy of nationalist claims to obtain home rule for the whole island. Indeed it was also seen that some liberal unionists in the province were not merely
content to oppose home rule, but were quick to exploit Ulster's importance to the unionist cause to gain reforms.

T. W. Russell, in particular, was wont to threaten that Ulster protestant tenant-farmers would be vulnerable to Parnellite appeals if extensive land reforms were not granted, even though he knew from his own experience that the almost pathological aversion among this group to Roman Catholics made such a possibility extremely unlikely. In using this ploy Russell was exploiting, not just the home rule issue, but also the considerable ignorance of northern protestant tenant-farmers evidenced by Ulster landlords and the administration - particularly A. J. Balfour. Certainly Balfour, in constructing the land bill in 1887, believed that it had to be amended along the lines suggested by Ulster liberal unionists if Ulster was to be retained for the union, while the government's Irish reform programme of 1886-92 followed, generally, their suggestions. Consequently, a quite remarkable aspect of Balfour's thinking on the Irish question was revealed. He apparently believed, not just that the home rule movement was spurious and could be undermined by reforms, but also that Ulster protestant attachment to the union was largely devoid of any genuine ideological basis and needed to be bought by reforms. Thus, both Balfour and Gladstone in their quite different ways misconceived the character and strength of Ulster unionism.

Nor, moreover, have misconceptions been absent from the
work of historians dealing with the question of Ulster pro-
testant resistance to home rule. For instance, A. T. Q.
Stewart—reading the open rebellion planned by Ulster unionists
in the period 1912-14 back into 1880s—has written: 'It is
sometimes assumed that the protestant plans to resist by force
of arms appeared first in the crisis of 1912-14, but when we
look more closely we find that this is not true....it was in
1886 that the first co-ordinated proposals were made by Ulster
unionists, led by Colonel Saunderson, for resisting home rule
by force.' The similarity between 1886 and 1912, however,
is more apparent than real. Unlike the period 1911-14 when
open rebellion was planned in conjunction with a specific pro-
ject for taking over the government of Ulster on the enactment
of the home rule bill, no such plans existed either in 1886
or 1893. As John Morley wrote, in regard to the Ulster union-
ist reaction to the introduction of the second home rule bill:
there was 'no fear of an organised rising'. Instead a rather
vaguely conceptualised programme of passive resistance was en-
visaged, that, it was hoped, would be successful enough to
secure for protestant north-east Ulster, either its own admin-
istration or some kind of special treatment. The possibility
that violence might be resorted to was not overlooked, but that
eventuality would be clearly dependent on how a Dublin parlia-
ment reacted to events in the north.

Thus, unlike 1914, resistance to the point of violence
was not a policy to be pursued, but rather a contingency of a political situation the outcome of which was yet very unclear. It was this more circumspect policy of Ulster unionists in 1892 that gave Gladstone grounds for hope that some kind of peaceful settlement of the problem was possible, that would not, at the same time, invalidate home rule. As for nationalists, given the financial constraints within which a Dublin parliament would have operated, it is unlikely that they could have afforded to pursue any other policy towards Ulster protestants than that of conciliation.
This attempt to assess nationalist opinion on Gladstone's first home rule plan is based on a study of predominant themes in local press reactions to the home rule scheme. A sample of 26 local newspapers out of approximately 55 that supported home rule were examined; about half of which circulated mainly in areas of the west of Ireland that had seen much agrarian agitation. In each case the unit of study has been the leading article, as this item invariably expressed the political views of newspapers, and for many local papers was the only political column. The particular leading articles used in the study were those providing the fullest discussion of the home rule and land bills in the period April - June 1886. The choice of newspaper studied was determined partly by availability, but also by the desire to use the most popular papers.

There is, of course, a debate about the extent to which newspapers reflect public opinion rather than mould it. But however this may be, for this period local newspapers provide the only sources on which to base a study of public opinion. Moreover it is a reasonable assumption that they reflect the political concerns of their readers, though, as D. G. Boyce rightly puts it: 'we also have to remember that we are seeing it through the eyes of some intermediary.'
TABLE 7a

Predominant themes in nationalist press reactions to the home rule bill of 1886

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<thead>
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<th>no. of times recorded</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 uncritical praise</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 acceptance subject to unspecified changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 approval with objections to the extent of minority safeguards</td>
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<td>4 acceptance subject to modifications suggested by Parnell in parliament on 8 April</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 approval with objections to the financial scheme</td>
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TABLE 7b

Newspapers, dates of issue, and itemisation of themes in nationalist press reactions to the home rule bill of 1886

<table>
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<tr>
<th>categories of press reaction</th>
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<td>3 approval with objection to minority safeguards</td>
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<td>5 approval with objections to financial scheme</td>
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| ULSTER                                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Anglo-Celt, 17, 24 Apr.                                                                   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Derry Journal, 9 Apr.                                                                     |   | X |   |   |   |
| Newry Reporter, 13, 24 Apr.                                                               | X |   |   |   |   |
| Weekly Examiner, 10 Apr., 1 May                                                           |   | X |   |   |   |

| LEINSTER                                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Dundalk Democrat, 10 Apr.                                                                  |   |   | X |   |   |
| Kilkenny Journal, 10 Apr.                                                                  | X |   |   |   |   |
| Leinster Leader, 10 Apr.                                                                   |   | X |   |   |   |
| Midland Tribune, 15 Apr.                                                                   |   |   | X |   |   |
| Nationalist and Leinster Times, 10, 24 Apr.                                               |   |   |   | X |   |
| The Nation, 24 Apr.                                                                        |   |   |   |   | X |
| The People, 10, 21 Apr.                                                                    | X |   |   |   |   |
| Wexford Express, 17 Apr.                                                                   |   | X |   |   |   |

| MUNSTER                                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Clare Examiner, 10, 17 Apr.                                                                |   |   | X |   |   |
| Cork Daily Herald, 9, 23 Apr.                                                              | X |   |   |   |   |
| Limerick Reporter, 9, 20 Apr.                                                              |   | X |   |   |   |
| Munster News, 9, 20 Apr.                                                                   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Waterford Daily Mail, 24 Apr., 10 May                                                      |   |   |   |   | X |

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TABLE 8a
Predominant themes in nationalist press reactions to the land purchase bill of 1886

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</table>

1 spectrum of general reactions to the land bill:
(a) no mention 9
(b) non-committal 2
(c) uncritical praise 1
(d) accepted as moderate and generous to landlords 1
(e) accepted as a necessary evil despite its being over-generous to landlords 3
(f) rejected as over-generous to landlords and unfair to tenants 5
(g) accepted but feared its expense and complexity would render the bill unworkable by the Irish parliament 1

2 endorsed the bill but objected to lack of provision for evicted tenants to repossess their holdings 2

3 acceptance subject to amendment granting tenants lower rental repayments 1

4 approval subject to amendments published by the Ulster Land Committee 3

1 'Over-generous' usually referred to the average number of years purchase to be awarded to the landlord.
2 'Unfair' usually meant the failure to make provision for tenants to compel landlords to sell, and to the expected small reduction in existing rental repayments.
3 See chapter III, pp 168-9.
TABLE 8b

Newspapers, dates of issue, and itemisation of themes in nationalist press reactions to the land purchase bill of 1886

categories of press reaction

1 spectrum of general reactions:
   (a) no mention
   (b) non-committal
   (c) uncritical praise
   (d) accepted as moderate and generous to landlords
   (e) accepted as a necessary evil
   (f) rejected as over-generous to landlords
   (g) accepted but thought it unworkable by Irish parliament
2 endorsed with objections to lack of provision for evicted tenants to repossess their holdings
3 accepted subject to amendment granting tenants lower rental repayments
4 approved subject to amendments published by the Ulster Land Committee

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<td>Ballina Journal, 14 June</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connaught People, 10 Apr.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connaught Telegraph, 10, 24 Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo Examiner, 10 Apr.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roscommon Herald, 10, 24 Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sligo Champion, 17, 24 Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuam Herald, 10, 17, 24 Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuam News, 16, 30 Apr.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western News, 10, 24 Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>totals</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**An essential basis for such a study is an extensive familiarity with the literature of relevant issues.** In 1876, and as a result of the existing interest by key actors and parties, given that in material such as newspapers, the issue is likely to find more than one form of expression. **Restrictions on the purpose stated above should be noted.**
APPENDIX 2.

ULSTER UNIONIST EXPECTATIONS OF HOW THEY
WOULD BE AFFECTED BY HOME RULE IN 1886

The purpose of this study is to provide some insight into how the Ulster loyalist community defined their national identity, and how they believed home rule would affect both it and their material welfare. To this end an examination of thirty speeches, delivered by unionist orators at various venues, mainly in Ulster, during the home rule debate, has been made. As with appendix one, the technique found most appropriate to this study has been 'thematic'; however, there are some differences of treatment. First, whereas the study in appendix one sought to identify predominant themes in the material examined, this study is restricted to the identification of themes specifically relevant to the purpose stated above. Secondly, whereas the analysis of reactions to specific pieces of legislation is relatively straightforward, the task of assessing the variety of apprehensions raised among Ulster unionists by the prospect of home rule in general, is more complex.

An essential basis for such a study is an extensive familiarity with the dimensions of unionist ideology in 1886, and an awareness of the meaning invoked by key symbols and phrases, given that in material such as political speeches the same theme is likely to find more than one form of expression
on different occasions. For example, while the warning, 'Under home rule the catholic priesthood will attempt to exterminate protestants as in centuries past', is self-explanatory, the meaning of the phrase 'the historical ambitions of the catholic priesthood' is only apparent if its ideological context is fully understood, even though it expresses the same theme. Consequently, the thematic categories established for this study have generally been more complex than those in appendix one, and have been based on inference as well as explicit expressions of opinion.
TABLE 9a

Themes in Ulster unionist speeches in 1886 reflecting their views of how home rule would affect them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>no. of times recorded</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>given their historic role in holding Ireland for England, home rule would mean the betrayal of Ulster loyalists to their enemies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalists and the Roman Catholic priesthood who largely controlled them, had aimed for centuries at the destruction of the loyal minority and the extirpation of protestantism: these policies would be pursued under home rule</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalists had no respect for law and order and their policies (e.g. protectionism) would mean social and economic ruin for Ulster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under home rule Ulster would have to pay the expenses of the rest of Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlike an impoverished Irish assembly, the imperial parliament had the resources to finance the social and economic regeneration of Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>given nationalist hatred of England and their widely publicised separatist views, home rule was not consistent with the integrity of the empire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by relegating Ulster loyalists to membership of a subordinate parliament, home rule would deprive them of their imperial heritage, and greatly reduce their status in the world</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 9b

Itemisation of themes in Ulster unionist speeches in 1886, with a list of speakers, venues, and dates of publication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>categories of unionist reactions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 home rule was a betrayal of Ulster loyalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 nationalists and the catholic priesthood would attempt to extirpate protestantism under home rule</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 nationalists were lawless and their economic policies would ruin Ulster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 under home rule Ulster would have to pay the expenses of the rest of Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 only the imperial parliament had the resources to finance the social and economic regeneration of Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 nationalists were separatists and home rule was inconsistent with imperial integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 home rule would cut Ulster loyalists off from their imperial heritage and reduce their status in the world.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rev. R.J. Lynd</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>6.1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Leslie</td>
<td>Glasslough</td>
<td>6.1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Saunderson</td>
<td>Lurgan</td>
<td>8.1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.W.B. Ker M.P.</td>
<td>Ballynahinch</td>
<td>9.1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Hugh Hanna</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.H. Gordon</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Mr McCreedy</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Mr Alexander</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Erne</td>
<td>Florencecourt</td>
<td>15.1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Brooke</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr R.R. Kane</td>
<td>Dungannon</td>
<td>30.1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Alex Dobbin</td>
<td>Lisburn</td>
<td>3.2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. W. Browne</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Canon Fitzgerald</td>
<td>Antrim</td>
<td>11.2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Byrne Dean of Clonfert</td>
<td>Omagh</td>
<td>15.2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. James Dill</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Michael Beattie</td>
<td>Lurgan</td>
<td>4.3.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

552
TABLE 9b continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Dr Morrell, Belfast, 10.3.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Visc. Mandeville, Tandragee, 22.3.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rev. M'Endoo, ibid.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. J.A.Crozier, ibid.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Ledlie, ibid.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.Q.Ewart, Belfast, 20.3.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Waring, Battle, S. of Eng., 8.4.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.S.W.DeCobain, Belfast, 1.5.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Dr Gray, ibid.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Sinclair, Ulster Hall, 1.5.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Earnest Hamilton, Fintona, 8.5.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Porter, ibid.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.W.Russell, Dungannon, 18.6.86</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All speeches are taken from issues of the Belfast News-Letter for the dates given.
APPENDIX 3

THE PROTESTANT HOME RULE ADDRESS OF APRIL 1893

The 'Address to the protestants of Ireland', published by the Dublin section of the I.P.H.R.A. on 5 April 1893, was an appeal to Irish protestants to support Gladstone's second home rule bill. It was based largely on a recapitulation of the nationalist myth of Irish unity that was supposed to have existed in Grattan's time: their forefathers had established Grattan's parliament supported by a 'united Ireland' and sought to extend the full rights of citizenship to their catholic fellow-countrymen. However, this 'noble project' was defeated by English politicians, who, taking advantage of Ireland being 'rent in twain' after the 1798 rebellion, forced through the act of union against the wishes of the Irish people. The period since 1800 entailed a legacy of continual agitation, disloyalty, and poverty which only home rule could reverse. Irish protestants were called on to accept their 'destiny', take their place once more in the Irish nation, and help in this 'noble work'.

From 5 to 24 April 417 protestant names from various parts of Ireland were appended to the address. This figure, however, was far from representing the true extent of Irish protestant support for home rule. As was the case since 1886, many sympathisers would have been most reluctant to publish
their names for fear of unionist retaliation. Moreover, as C. H. Oldham explained, in many cases where several names from the same household were forwarded, it was thought sufficient to publish only the name of the head of the family. Again, it is unlikely that all protestants wishing to sign the address would have had time, given the short period from the promulgation of the address to the publication of signatures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>no. of signatures</th>
<th>no. of signatures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LEINSTER</td>
<td>ULSTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Antrim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Armagh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin city</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kildare</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cavan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilkenny</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Donegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King's</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longford</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fermanagh</td>
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<td>Louth</td>
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<td>Londonderry</td>
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<td>Monaghan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queen's</td>
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<td>Tyrone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmeath</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wexford</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wicklow</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
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<td></td>
<td>121</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CONNAUGHT</td>
<td>MUNSTER</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galway</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Clare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leitrim</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Cork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kerry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roscommon</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sligo</td>
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<td>Waterford</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1. See chapter VI, p. 275.
4. See particularly, A. B. Cooke and John Vincent, The governing passion: cabinet government and party politics in Britain, 1885-6 (Brighton, 1974).

I: NATIONALISM AND THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT 1882-6

1. See chapter II, pp 81-3.
4. O'Brien, Parnell (2nd ed., London, n.d. [1910]), p. 285. F. S. L. Lyons has suggested that Parnell offered no 'precise explanation' of home rule, partly because he was not a 'theorist', and as a 'pragmatist' he believed vagueness was best when it was impossible to tell how the British political situation would develop. See Lyons, Parnell, p. 259.
NOTES TO PAGES 9-11

Kenneth Minogue, Nationalism (London, 1967), pp 54-8;


17 George Salmon, The infallibility of the church: a course of lectures delivered in the divinity school of the
NOTES TO PAGES 11-12

University of Dublin (2nd ed., Dublin, 1890), p. 3. W. J. O'Neill Daunt was to make essentially the same point much more bluntly in his diary, when he recorded a friend's remark: "When I was in Trinity College some thirty years ago, a standing toast at the students' supper parties was, 'To hell with the pope!' Now any man giving that toast would be deemed mad". See entry dated 16 Jan. 1881 in W. J. O'Neill Daunt, A life spent for Ireland, edited by his daughter (London, 1896), p. 366.

18 A. S. G. Canning, Revolted Ireland, 1798 and 1803 (London, 1886), p. 10. Macaulay's Eng. (5 vols, London, 1848-61), was an influential text in the dissemination of ethnocentric ideas about the Irish. He wrote: 'On the same soil dwelt two populations, locally intermixed, morally and politically sundered.... They sprang from different stocks... They were in widely different stages of civilisation.... The relation in which the minority (loyalists) stood to the majority resembled the relation... in which the followers of Cortes stood to the Indians of Mexico.... The great preponderance of numbers on one side was more than compensated by a superiority of intelligence, vigour, and organisation on the other.' See vol 1 (Everyman's Library Edition, London, 1953), p. 597.

19 Criticising Goldwin Smith's Irish history and Irish character (London, 1861) for its ambivalence on the role of race in Irish history, Acton declared: 'The Celts are not among the progressive, initiative races, but among those which supply the material rather than the impulse of history, and are either stationary or retrogressive.' See J. E. E. Dalberg-Acton, The history of freedom and other essays, intro. J. R. Figgis and R. V. Lawrence (London, 1907), p. 240. For the extent to which such ideas informed English social thinking, see Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English thought (Brighton, 1980), passim; Christine Bolt, Victorian attitudes to race (London, 1972), passim; W. S. Lilly, 'Darwinism and democracy' in F.R., xxxix (Jan. 1886), p. 34.


21 Published in 3 vols, (London, 1872-4). Froude described his attitude to historical inquiry thus: 'I do not pretend
to impartiality. I believe the Reformation to have been the greatest incident in English history; the root and source of the expansive force which has spread the Anglo-Saxon race over the globe, and imprinted the English genius and character in the constitution of mankind': quoted in Hale, Evolut. of Brit. Hist., p. 54.

22 Originally produced as part of his Eng. (8 vols, London, 1878-90), it received separate publication in 5 vols, (London, 1892).


24 Ibid., p. 397: An important factor in keeping the historiographical controversy focused on the works of Froude and Lecky was the inability of scholars to examine Irish government records after 1769. As one prospective author explained to Gladstone: '...a study of Irish history is impossible for the period since that date without them. Without the records of Irish government one has to search for enlightenment in the pages of Froude and Lecky': Colin Campbell to Gladstone, 12 Nov. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44 499).


26 J. A. Fox to Lecky, 4 Feb. 1890 (T.C.D., Lecky Correspondence, no. 574). However see Anne Wyatt, 'Froude, Lecky and "the humblest Irishman"' in _I.H.S.,_ xix, no. 75 (Mar. 1975), pp 261-85. Wyatt points out that Lecky as well as Froude had little confidence in the governing capabilities of the ordinary catholic Irishman. But as can be seen from the views of leading nationalists as to how, and by whom, Ireland would be ruled after home rule, few of these intended to rely on the governing capabilities of the "humblest Irishman". See chapter III, pp 155-6.


NOTES TO PAGES 16-19


31 McCartney, 'Lecky's leaders of public opinion in Ireland' in I. H. S., xiv, no. 54 (Sept. 1964), pp 133-5.

32 Huxley had written a paper in the manner of Macaulay, condemning the leaders of the 1798 rebellion as criminals. Lecky criticised it severely as 'not consonant with the spirit in which history should be written', to which Huxley replied: 'any historian who glosses over such deeds as those [1798 rebellion] would not in my opinion, be true to...his great office'. See Huxley to Lecky, 4 Feb. 1890 (T.C.D., Lecky Correspondence, no. 606) It is also worth pointing out that when Richard Bagwell, a firm liberal unionist, produced his Tudors in 1886, it was complained of him that he had not followed 'the method...by which Mr Froude has interested the whole world in Irish character and Irish life'. See 'Bagwell's Ireland under the Tudors' in Edinburgh Review, clxiii (Apr. 1886), p. 439.


34 See chapter VI, pp 279-80, 287-9.


36 For example, see Burke's lecture on the 1641 rebellion, in T. N. Burke, Ireland's vindication: refutation of Froude and other lectures (Glasgow, n.d.), pp 197-201.


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NOTES TO PAGES 19-22


42 See the publication list in Sullivan, New Ireland. This material ranged in price from 1 to 5 shillings.


44 This was C. P. Meehan's The fate and fortunes of Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone (Dublin and London, 1868).


48 T. N. Brown, Ir. Amer. nationalism,1870-90 (Philadelphia, and New York, 1966), pp 31-2. See also John Mitchel's exclamation on British race theorising in regard to Irish history: 'Britain being in possession of the floor, any hostile comment upon her way of telling our story is an unmannerly interruption; nay it is nothing short of an Irish howl.... barbarian Celtic nature forever revolting in its senseless drifting way, against the genius of British civilisation'. See John Mitchel, Jail journal; or, five years in British prisons (Glasgow, n.d.), p. 9.


NOTES TO PAGES 22-5

52 S.O.G. 'Imperial government and the Irish national schools' in Graphic, 20. Aug, 1887. 'S.O.G.' was quite possibly Standish O'Grady.


54 Samuel Clark has shown, that it was the urban group to which these leading Parnellites generally belonged that provided the organisational leadership of the Land League during the land war. See Clark, 'The political mobilisation of Irish farmers' in Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 12 (4pt. 2, 1975), p. 496; Social origins of the land war (Princeton, 1979), p. 263.

55 Justin McCarthy, The story of an Irishman (London, 1904), chapters 1 and 5.


59 Maev Sullivan, No man's man (Dublin, 1943), pp 1-4. This biography of her father, Timothy Healy, is chiefly preoccupied with a defence of his actions during the Parnell split of 1890.

60 Duffy, My life, i, 80; T. P. O'Connor and Robert McWade, Gladstone-Parnell, and the great Irish struggle (Philadelphia, 1886), p. 406. This work is 846 pages of the historical and political case for home rule.

61 Lyons, Parnell, p. 32. See also Ged Martin, 'Parnell at Cambridge: the education of an Irish nationalist' in I.H.S., xix, no. 73 (Mar. 1974), pp 72-82.


63 E. R. Norman has detected the same combination of personal alienation and 'advanced' political theories, as motivating agents in the leading group of Young Irelanders. See Norman, History of modern Ire., p. 120.
NOTES TO PAGES 25-31

64 U.I., 13 Aug. 1881. During the special commission proceed-
ings T. P. O’Connor was to exasperate the attorney general
by insisting that the Parnell movement 'started about three
centuries ago'. See Special comm. 1888 proc., ix, 16. The
attorney general pointed out that the historically based
view of Irish nationalism propagated to Irish-Americans,
was one which emphasised Ireland's revolutionary heroes,
and omitted its constitutional leaders. See ibid., i, 213.


66 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, (2nd ed., Oxford, 1974),
pp 5-6.

67 List of nationalist M.P.s giving short particulars about
the political views of each (S.P.O., C.B.S., Police
reports, 1886-1915, carton no. 4).

68 C. J. Woods, The catholic church and Irish politics, 1879-92
(PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 1968), p. 139, foot-
note 2. See also Wilfrid Blunt, The land war in Ireland
(London, 1912), p. 44. Having inspected the books of the
central branch of the National League in Dublin, Blunt noted:
'The parish priest is in four cases out of five the pres-
ident of the local branch, a great guarantee for order.'

69 Woods, Catholic church and Ir. politics, pp 434-5.

70 Timothy Harrington declared before the special commission
in 1889 that the executive of the National League had only
eight members of the former Land League executive or that
had anything to do with it. As for agrarian issues, the
National League sought to relieve the evicted tenants left
as a 'heritage' from the Land League and to judge every
other case on its 'merits', and chiefly with reference to
the tenants' 'ability or inability to pay their rent'.
See Special comm. 1888 proc., ix, 202-3, 234.

71 See McCarthy, Ir. revolution, pp 191-2. Moreover, it is
in the context of the nationalist legend that Parnell's
declaration in 1885, that Ireland could accept nothing less
than Grattan's parliament, has to be seen. See Lyons,
Parnell, pp 260-62.

72 Quoted in Special comm. 1888 proc., i, 254.

73 Ibid.

74 See Alan O'Day, The English face of Irish nationalism:
Parnellite involvement in British politics, 1880-86
75 See Special comm. 1888 proc., ii, 265. Many years later O'Brien was to claim that his hatred of England and the English was 'an abstraction, and an abstraction that, once her grip was loosed (sic) of Ireland, might be transfigured into something very different'. See Michael McDonagh, The life of William O'Brien (London, 1928), p. 31.


77 Nation, 2 Jan. 1886.

78 See for example, Waterford Daily Mail, 7 June 1886; Midland Tribune, 24 Apr. 1886; Leinster Leader, 1 May 1886; Kilkenny Journal, 5 May 1886; U.I., 24 Apr. 1886; Wexford Express, 8 May 1886; Cork Daily Herald, 17 June 1886; Western News, 29 May 1886.


80 Standish O'Grady, History of Ireland: critical and philosophical (Dublin, 1881).


82 U.I., 15 May 1886.

83 U.I., 2 Jan. 1886.

84 O'Connor and McWade, Gladstone-Parnell, p. 121.

85 Published in Dublin, 1886.


87 Western News, 29 May 1886.


89 Sullivan, Green Leaves, p. 217.

90 Special comm. 1888 proc., ix, 73.
NOTES TO PAGES 37-42

91 See evidence of Head Constables William Irwin and Bernard O'Malley in Special comm. 1888 proc., i, 408, 434.

92 Ibid., viii, 182-3.

93 Ibid., ii, 17-18.

94 Ibid., i, 409.

95 Ibid., 625.

96 Ibid., ix, 547.


100 Davitt, Fall of feudalism, p. 164.

101 Bew, Land and the national question, p. 20.

102 See pp 7-8.

103 Sullivan, Green leaves, p. 222.

104 O'Donnell, Ir. parl. party, ii, 194. It has been shown that Parnell was willing to accept an elected local government scheme for Ireland, provided it was not intended as a substitute for home rule. When it appeared that this might be the case with the 'Central Board' scheme suggested by Joseph Chamberlain in 1884, Parnell rejected it outright. See C. H. D. Howard, 'Joseph Chamberlain, Parnell and the Irish "Central Board" scheme' in I.H.S., viii, no 32 (Sept. 1953), passim; Lyons, Parnell, pp 271-2.

105 Michael McDonagh, The home rule movement (Dublin, 1920), p. 13 McDonagh is here speaking of the earlier home rule movement of the 1870s, but his remarks apply equally well to the 1880s.

106 For example, see the first leading article in United Ireland, and the militant conceptualisation of their entering the British parliament by leading nationalists, above pp 25,31.

McCarthy, Ir. revolution, p. 288. Lyons, however, argues that Parnell had never believed that such progress as could be won on the way to that final goal (home rule) would corrode the peoples' will to liberty. See Parnell, p. 610.

Special comm. 1888 proc., x, 179.
Blunt, Land war, p. 47.
Ibid., p. 93.
O'Brien, Parnell and his party, pp 85-6.
O'Brien, Recollections, pp 360, 497-503. So extreme did the policy of the paper become that Parnell and other directors quickly withdrew from the board of the paper. See ibid., p. 308, footnote 1.
McCarthy, Ir. revolution, pp 384-8.

In his evidence to the special commission O'Brien argued that to have shut this paper down would have invited the criticism that the Parnellite party was opposed to fenianism. From 1882 until it stopped production in 1885, he argued, the party simply let it die quietly. See Special comm. 1888 proc., viii, 89. However, the truth was that active efforts were made in the columns of United Ireland to stimulate the fortunes of Irishman. When the fenian, James Stephens, published his memoirs, they were serialised in the latter, and advertised in U.I. See the issue of 28 Aug. 1882.


Parnell certainly was alive to the importance of the press to the nationalist movement. He informed a meeting at Cookstown: 'In these days of the press, of penny newspapers, of the electric telegraph, the cause of the people was ever progressing'. See Parnell at Cookstown, 31 Aug. 1881 in Mr Parnell's speeches, letters, and public addresses (out of parliament) in the United Kingdom, 1879-88 (Dublin, 1889), p. 168.
NOTES TO PAGES 46-7

121 McCarthy, Ir. revolution, p. 169.

122 Ibid., p. 335.


124 Captain Owen Slack, divisional commissioner for counties Waterford, Kilkenny, Tipperary, Carlow, Wexford, Wicklow and Queen's County, testified that in his area, 215 such courts were held in 1885, and 221 in 1886. See ibid., ii, 197. See also the memorandum on the activities of the National League drawn up by the Inspector General of the R.I.C. for the chief secretary, 17 Jan. 1886 (S.P.O., C.S.O., R.P./1886/17972).

125 Special comm. 1888 proc., ix, 202-3.

126 Ibid., x, 94. Other witnesses testified to the same effect, included bank managers, merchants, and town commissioners. See ibid., pp 90-94. See also Tom Garvin, The Evolution of Irish nationalist politics (Dublin 1981), pp 80-81. Garvin's correlation of farm size with the rate of formation of National League branches in the period 1888-7 provides factual evidence of the 'strong cross-class character of the movement'.


128 McCarthy, Ir. revolution, pp 141, 328-9.

129 Northern Whig, 28 Aug. 1883.

130 Lyons, Parnell, p. 616. A. J. Kettle declared: 'Parnell in his own person, standing up alone in the house of commons to challenge England to give fair play to Ireland, seemed to quietly inspire the Irish people to stand up before England's garrison landlords to demand fair play for themselves. The emancipation of the people from the fear of the landlords was a wonderful business.' See Andrew Kettle, The material for victory, ed. L. J. Kettle (Dublin, 1958), p. 79.

131 Evidence of Head Constable Bernard O'Malley in Special comm. 1888 proc., i, 434. From the founding of the Land League in October 1879 until the end of 1880, an average of 46 meetings per month were held. See Clark, Social origins of the land war, p. 309.
NOTES TO PAGES 47-52

132 Special comm. 1888 proc., ix, 203, 235. Harrington's estimate of 1,700 branches existing in 1886, is supported by Jeremiah Jordan (Hansard 3, cccv, 651 (10 May 1886)). and contradicts the estimate of 1,286 given in Tom Garvin, Evolution of Ir. nat. politics, p. 80. Moreover, Garvin's view that the development of the National League in the period 1882-5 was satisfactory, was, as Harrington's evidence shows, not shared by party leaders at the time.

133 Special comm. 1888 proc., viii, 136. See also the evidence of William O'Brien, broadly supporting Egan's figures as to the regional distribution of the movement, in ibid., ii, 247.

134 Ibid., viii, 199.

135 Notes of a conversation between T. D. Sullivan and Parnell, 16 July 1881 (N.L.I., Sullivan papers, MS 8237 (14)). Anna Parnell's declaration, though exaggerated, contains a substantial element of truth: 'What it is possible for a political party to owe to journalistic efforts, the present dominant party in Irish politics owes to the Nation under Mr T. D. Sullivan.' Quoted in S. J. Brown, The press in Ireland: a survey and a guide (Dublin, 1937), p. 31.

136 Sullivan to Patrick Egan, 14 July 1881 (N.L.I., Sullivan papers, MS 8237 (15)).

137 O'Donnell, Ir. parl. party, ii, 194.

138 Copy of letter from Webb to Parnell, 19 May 1883 (N.L.I., Webb papers, MS 1745).

139 Circular dated 19 May 1883, ibid.

140 Diary entry dated 31 Dec. 1882 in Daunt, Life spent for Ireland, p. 380.

141 Daunt to Lecky, June 1882 (T.C.D., Lecky Correspondence, no. 262).

142 Andrew Dunlop, Fifty years of Irish journalism (Dublin, 1911), pp 135-6, 269, 277. Significantly Dunlop noted that T. D. Sullivan, Gray and Webb 'strongly' avoided the policy of condemning individual persons, pursued by William O'Brien.

NOTES TO PAGES 52-8

144 William O'Brien, 'The party': who they are and what they did (Dublin, 1917), pp 5-6.


II : GLADSTONE, LIBERALS AND IRISH NATIONALISM:
THE MAKING OF THE HOME RULE SCHEME OF 1886


2 The most famous statement of this interpretation of Gladstone's motives for adopting home rule is, of course, J. L. Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish nation (London, 1938). It has received influential endorsement in Magnus, Gladstone. It is a view supported also by T. J. Dunne, The political ideology of home rule (M.A. thesis N.U.I. (U.C.C.) 1972), pp 153-9.

3 Cooke and Vincent, The governing passion, p. 51. See also John Vincent's published lecture, Gladstone and Ireland (Oxford, 1978), passim.


5 Hammond, Gladstone, p. 401; Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 52.


7 The speech Gladstone refers to was delivered in early March 1885. Letter of Lee Warner to The Times, 10 Oct. 1913, quoted in McDonagh, Life of William O'Brien, p. 81.
NOTES TO PAGES 58-67

8 Lord Hartington's speech at the Eighty Club, 8 Mar. 1886 in F. W. Hirst, 'Mr Gladstone and home rule 1885-92' in Sir Wemyss Reid. (ed.), The life of W. E. Gladstone (London, 1899), p. 699. Similarly, Justin McCarthy, who was as close to Gladstone as it was possible for a member of the Parnellite party to be, dismissed the idea that he had made a 'sudden' conversion to home rule. He claimed Gladstone had been studying the home rule question since 1879 with regard to how far it had support in Ireland and whether it would be conceded without endangering the stability of the empire. See Justin McCarthy, Reminiscences (London, 1899), ii, 456-7.

9 W. E. Gladstone, 'History of an idea - why I became a home ruler' in O'Connor and McWade, Gladstone-Parnell, pp 824-5.

10 Morley, Gladstone, ii, 220.


12 Gladstone to Lord Rosebery, 13 Nov. 1885 in Morley, Gladstone, iii, 181.

13 Gladstone, After thirty years, p. 287.

14 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 175.


16 Gladstone to Lord Richard Grosvenor, 7 Jan. 1886, ibid. (Add. MS 56477).

17 Hammond, Gladstone, p. 521.

18 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 317. John Vincent in his Gladstone and Ire., accords more importance to this fear but regards such a view as 'unduly alarmist'. See p. 220.

19 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 162.


22 Healy to Labouchere, 'Xmas' 1885, ibid., pp 263-4.

See the files of the Tuam News for Jan. 1886 for the development of the movement.


The Times, 13 Mar. 1886.

See the files of the Tuam News for Jan. 1886 for the development of the movement.


The Times, 13 Mar. 1886.

Quotation from Balfour's letter to the press, 5 July 1886 in A. J. Balfour, Chapters of autobiography, ed. E. Dugdale (London, 1930), pp 211-12. In a letter to Hartington giving his views on the Irish question, Gladstone again declared: '...my opinion is that there is a Parnell party and a civil war party, and the question which is to have the upper hand will have to be decided in a limited time'. See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 199-200.

Gladstone to Balfour, 23 Dec. 1885 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add. MS 49692); Gladstone, After thirty years, pp 397-8.

Balfour to Gladstone, 22 Dec. 1885, ibid., p. 397.

Gladstone to Balfour, 23 Dec. 1885 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add. MS 49692); Gladstone, After thirty years, pp 297-8.

However, Lord Salisbury, writing to the queen on 29 November 1885, noted that although Lord Carnarvon's ideas on home rule were repudiated by all who spoke on them in cabinet' ....no general discussion was opened; and it was agreed to defer the matter until we should have ascertained by the elections how far the matter was a practical one for us'. See Salisbury to the queen, 29 Nov. 1885 in Arthur Ponsonby, Henry Ponsonby: Queen Victoria's private secretary: his life from his letters (London, 1942), p. 199.

Gladstone to W. V. Harcourt, 12 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44200). See also Morley Gladstone, iii, 225: 'Social order in Ireland was in a profoundly unsatisfactory phase. That fact was the starting-point of the reversal of policy which the government had come into existence to carry out [My italics].' Healy to Labouchere, 23 Dec. 1885 in Thorold, Labouchere, pp 258-9.

Extract from a letter marked 'Private', from Davitt to Labouchere, 29 Jan. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44494).

See p. 60.

Gladstone, 'History of an idea', p. 842. Nevertheless, despite the strength of Gladstone's conviction that he had
pursued the right policy in 1886, he was later to admit that a more cautious course might well have ensured the successful passage of the home rule bill through the commons. See, Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery (London, 1931), i, 318.


38 Hammond, Gladstone, p. 405.

39 Mrs O'Shea to Gladstone, 30 Jan. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44269).

40 H. V. Stuart to Gladstone, 10 Feb. 1886 in ibid., (Add. MS 44494).

41 Lord Midleton to Gladstone, 17 Feb. 1886 in ibid. (Add. MS 44494).

42 W. D. Webber to Gladstone, 18 Feb. 1886 in ibid.

43 Lord Powerscourt to Gladstone, 19 Feb. 1886 in ibid.

44 Parnell to Mrs O'Shea, 6 Jan. 1886 in ibid. (Add. MS 44269).

45 Hartington to Gladstone, enclosing Curry's reports of meetings and the opinions of Irish landlords on the land question, 11 Mar. 1886 in ibid. (Add. MS 56447).


48 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 198.

49 Morley, Recollections, i, 219.


53 See p. 106.
54 Fisher, Bryce, i, 221.


57 Ponsonby to Horace Seymour, 8 Mar. 1886 in Ponsonby, Henry Ponsonby, p. 209.


60 Hufford, Analysis of the debates on the home rule bill, p. 299.

61 Undated newspaper cutting entitled 'The essential basis of the Irish question' in vol 2 of letter cuttings and speeches (N.L.I., Webb papers, MS 1746).

62 P.M.G., 28 Apr. 1886. Editorially committed to imperial federation, this newspaper gave qualified support to the home rule cause provided Ireland continued to be represented at Westminster.

63 P.M.G., 1 May 1886.

64 P.M.G., 5 May 1886.

65 P.M.G., 7 May 1886.

66 P.M.G., 3 May 1886.

67 Labouchere to Joseph Chamberlain, 18 Oct. 1885, describing the contents of a letter he had received from T. M. Healy concerning what sort of home rule scheme would satisfy the Parnellite party, in Thorold, Labouchere, p. 237.

68 Lyons, Parnell, pp 294-7. See also Kettle, Material for victory, pp 63-4.

69 Mrs O'Shea to Gladstone, enclosing Parnell's views on a home rule settlement, 14 Dec. 1885 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44269).

NOTES TO PAGES 83-8

72 Ibid., p. 350.
76 Ibid., p. 36.
77 Ibid., p. 37.
78 Ibid., pp 37-8.
79 Ibid., p. 38.
80 See p. 64. It was also similar in many respects to the scheme devised by Issac Butt in the 1870s. See David Thornley, *Issac Butt and home rule* (London, 1964), pp 98-102.
81 Gladstone to Mrs O'Shea, 29 Jan. 1886 in *Lyons, Parnell*, p. 342.
82 Morley, *Gladstone*, iii, 229.
83 Parnell, in fact, was to inform Gladstone during the only meeting he was to have with him, just before the home rule bill was presented to parliament, that it might eventually be rejected by the nationalists on the finance question. See ibid., p. 231.
85 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 9 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).
86 See pp 76-8.
89 See Hammond, *Gladstone*, p. 56: 'Christianity meant for Gladstone not just the truth to be found in the bible, but a whole tradition of art and letters and politics...'
illuminated and guided by the Christian revelation, and itself contributing to its power.' This point is also emphasised in Dunne, Political ideology of home rule, pp 7, 11-13.

90 Gladstone's speech in the commons, 7 June 1886, in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 127.

91 See chapter vi, passim.

92 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 13. His scheme, Gladstone claimed, would only modify the union 'in some particulars', not repeal it.

93 Ibid., pp 14-15.

94 Gladstone's speech in the commons, 10 May 1886 in ibid., pp 89-90.

95 Ibid., pp 14-15.


97 Gladstone's speech in the commons, 10 May 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 58.

98 Lord Aberdeen on Gladstone, quoted in Sir Weymss Reid, 'Mr Gladstone's character and career: a general appreciation' in Reid (ed.), Life of Gladstone, pp 25-6. See also Selborne, Memorials, p. 352.

99 Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44200).

100 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum 14 Mar. 1886 in ibid., (Add. MS 44,647).

101 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 225.

102 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, pp 395-6.

103 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 230.

104 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 26 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).

105 A bill to amend the provision for the future government of Ireland, p. 3, H.C. 1886 (181), ii, 467 (Hereafter referred to as Government of Ire. bill).

106 Gladstone's speech in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 35.

107 Ibid.
NOTES TO PAGES 93-8

108 Lord Thring, 'The Irish government bill and the Irish land bill' in Bryce (ed.), Handbook of home rule, p. 84.


111 Ibid.


113 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 15 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48644).

114 Lord Welby, 'Financial relations' in Morgan, New Ir. constitution, p. 132.

115 Gladstone to Lord Granville, 15 Feb. 1886 in The political correspondence of Mr Gladstone to Lord Granville 1876-86, ed. Agatha Ramm (London, 1962), ii, 431. Although having a life-long interest in colonial affairs Gladstone had only once held the post of colonial secretary, briefly in 1845-6. See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 466.

116 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 29 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44647). It was, however, a term used in defining colonial institutions. See Sir John Macdonell, 'Constitutional limitations on the Irish legislature' in Morgan (ed.), New Ir. constitution, pp 99-100.


118 Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 88.

119 Government of Ire. bill, pp 469-70; Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 90.

120 Government of Ire. bill, pp 467-8; Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 89.

121 Gladstone, though, did not envisage that the two orders would reflect rigidly opposed political views. In a letter to John Morley, referring apparently to Parnellite queries on the representation of the legislative body, he wrote: 'Surely it cannot be thought that a constituency of 25 occupiers would return a homogeneous body of tories; and I should have thought one fifth an excessive estimate of the anti-nationalists on the other side to be chosen by the popular electorate'. See Gladstone to John Morley 22 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).
NOTES TO PAGES 99-103

122 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 10 May 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 94-5. For a discussion of this aspect of Gladstone's thought see Chapter VI, pp 287-92.

123 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1794 (16 Apr. 1886); Dunne, Political ideology of home rule, pp 209-10.

124 Hansard 3, cccv, 675 (10 May 1886). It was, moreover, an expectation similar to that shown by some leading nationalists. See chapter III, pp 155-7.

125 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 10 May 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 96

126 The Daily News on Gladstone's home rule bill, quoted in the P.M.G., 9 Apr. 1886.


128 Harcourt to Gladstone, 7 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44200).

129 Gladstone's speech in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 32-3.

130 In his explanation of the home rule scheme in 1887, Lord Thring explicitly stated that a peer taking his place in the Irish assembly would 'cease to sit in the English parliament.' See Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 89.

131 Mrs O'Shea to Gladstone, 6 Jan. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44269); Paul Bew, C. S. Parnell (Dublin, 1980), pp 81-2.

132 Lord Hartington to Gladstone, 11 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 56447). See above, pp 128-30, for a discussion of these.


134 Gladstone to the duke of Argyll, 27 Jan. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 56447).

135 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 26 Mar. 1886, ibid. (Add. MS 48643).

136 Lord Derby's diary entry, quoted in Vincent, Gladstone and Ireland, p. 123.

NOTES TO PAGES 104-8

139 Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 85.
141 Ibid., p. 466; Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 86.
143 Ibid., pp 480-81.
144 Gladstone's speech in the commons, 13 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 54.
148 Sale and purchase of land (Ireland) bill, p. 1, H.C. 1886 (193), v, 395-9 (Hereafter referred to as land purchase bill).
149 Quoted in Morley, Gladstone, iii, 231.
150 Sir J. N. McKenna to John Redmond, 30 July 1893 (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MS 15203(1)). For a more detailed account of McKenna's discussions on home rule finance with Parnell see Thomas Kennedy, A history of Irish protest against over-taxation from 1853-97 (Dublin, 1897), pp 103-9.
151 Thomas Lough, England's wealth Ireland's poverty (London, 1896), p. 7. Lough's book was based on the work of the royal commission which sat in 1894 to study the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland, and to which he and only seventeen other witnesses, each considered authorities in their field, were asked to give evidence. See also Lord Welby's comments on the problem of obtaining adequate information on which to construct the home rule scheme, pp 95-6.
NOTES TO PAGES 108-14

154 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 40-41. Consequently, it was not the case that Ireland was 'being asked to sign a blank cheque for an amount indefinitely expandable by wartime inflation' as has recently been implied by F. S. L. Lyons. See Lyons, Parnell, p. 344.
155 Land purchase bill, pp 394-5.
156 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 459.
157 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 44-6. See also Lord Welby, 'Financial relations', p. 129.
158 See chapter III, passim.
159 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 459.
160 See Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 30 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).
161 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 42-3. Lord Welby, taking into account an additional grant of £500,000 which Great Britain would, in effect, have made to the upkeep of the R.I.C., put Ireland's real prospective contribution to imperial funds at the proportion of nearly £2 to £60. See Welby, 'Financial relations', p. 131. See also relevant material in James Bryce, Memorandum on the financial scheme of the 1893 home rule bill (N.L.I., James (Viscount) Bryce papers, MS 11009(4)).
162 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 43-4.
163 See p. 124.
164 See Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 30 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).
164a See pp 133-8.
164b Welby, 'Financial relations', p. 129.
164c See p. 491.
165 Welby, 'Financial relations', p. 133.
166 See p. 490.

169 John Morley to Gladstone, 2 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255); Harcourt to Gladstone, 7 Mar. 1886 in ibid., (Add. MS 44200).

170 Ramm, Gladstone-Granville correspondence, p. 441, footnote 4.

171 Gladstone to John Morley, 2 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).


173 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 26 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).

174 Following his own survey of Scottish liberal opinion on the home rule scheme, James Bryce also noted: 'The objections made chiefly refer to the absence of the Irish members from the house of commons'. See Bryce to A. V. Dicey, 27 Apr. 1886 (N.L.I., James (Viscount) Bryce papers, MS 11009 (2)).

175 P.M.G., 9 Apr. 1886.

176 Gladstone's speech on home rule in the commons, 8 Apr. 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 21-2.

177 Ibid., 10 May 1886, p. 88.

178 John Morley to Gladstone, 19 Apr. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).

179 Gladstone to Granville, 30 Apr. 1886 in Ramm, Gladstone-Granville correspondence, ii, 445. Harcourt, though, had at one stage threatened to resign if Gladstone showed signs of wavering on the original intention to exclude the Irish from Westminster. See Gardiner, Harcourt, i, 578-9.


181 Gladstone's 'Memorandum on bill for Irish government: 2nd reading division', quoted in full in Hammond, Gladstone, p. 507.
NOTES TO PAGES 119-24


183 Ibid., p. 508.

184 Ibid., p. 509. See also p. 510, footnote 1, for an elaboration of the circumstances and manner in which such a delegation could be expected to function.

185 Ibid., p. 525.

186 Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 92-4.

187 Bogdanor, Devolution, p. 23.

188 Chamberlain, Political memoir, pp 210-17; Hammond, Gladstone, pp 525-31. Chamberlain had wanted permanent Irish representation at Westminster.

189 Gladstone's speech introducing the land purchase bill, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1779-80 (16 Apr. 1886).

190 Between 1884—6 the yearly total of agrarian outrages rose from 762 to 1,056. See Return of agrarian outrages specially reported throughout Ireland, during each of the years from 1869 to 1896 inclusive (S.P.O., Outrage returns/1896/3476). Hereafter cited as Return of outrages, 1896.

191 See p. 64.

192 Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44200).

193 Lord Thring, 'Home rule and imperial unity' in Bryce, Handbook of home rule, p. 75.

194 Ibid., p. 76. Edward Hamilton described Lord Ashbourne's land act as 'much more dangerous in principle than any measure which Mr G. (ladstone) can now put forward'. See his diary entry, 19 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).

195 Thring, 'Home rule and imperial unity', pp 75, 74

196 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 19 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).

197 See P.M.G., 19 Jan. 1886. This issue sketched the scenario of a Parnellite government in need of revenue derived from rents, being unable to obtain them due to an agricultural depression, and being then forced to implement, with much great severity, the odious policies such as evictions which was presently the lot of British administrations: 'If Mr Parnell were in power in Dublin...he would from
sheer self-preservation to be a harder ruler than even Lord Wolseley. Those who are crying out against English tyranny will find that Mr Healy's little finger is thicker than Lord Spencer's loins'.

198 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1800 (16 Apr. 1886).
199 See Vincent, Gladstone and Ireland, pp 227-9.
200 Ibid., p. 229.
201 Gladstone to John Morley, 2 Feb. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).
202 See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 224.
203 See pp 96, 100, 110, 116.
204 See p. 95.
205 Chamberlain's memorandum of the cabinet meeting, quoted in Gavin, Chamberlain, ii, 186.
206 See footnote 223, p. 585.
207 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 186.
208 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 9 March 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).
209 Harcourt to Gladstone, 7 March 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44200).
210 Noting his tendency to give 'undue weight' to Labouchere's views, Hamilton described Gladstone as 'not a little' impressed by his letter. Hamilton's diary entry, 23 March 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).
212 Taylor, Salisbury, p. 92.
213 Vincent, Gladstone and Ireland, p. 227.
214 See p. 75.
215 See I.L.P.U., A critical analysis of the sale and purchase of land (Ireland) bill (Dublin, n.d. (1886)), passim.
216 On this point, Vincent's argument that there 'was no conceivable situation in the 1880s or 1890s in which the house of lords would have passed a Gladstonian home rule bill' (Gladstone and Ireland, p. 224) is highly debatable. Indeed, Lord Salisbury, in a signed article in the National Review in November 1892, accepted that the house of lords would be bound to accept any measure from the lower house if the
commons enjoyed the obvious support of the people expressed at a general election. In this respect it is worth noting that his nephew, A. J. Balfour, expressed the belief at this time that when the house of lords rejected his home rule bill Gladstone would call a general election on the issue and return with a massive majority to enact it. See Taylor, Salisbury, p. 149; Conclusion, p. 523.

217 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 31 May 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44647).

218 See Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 Feb. 1886, ibid. (Add. MS 44200).

219 In 1885-6 the value of Irish agricultural output fell to £31,921,000 or 21 per cent below the 1881 figure of £40,374,000. See Solow, Land quest and the Irish economy, pp 71-2.


222 See the survey of opinion supporting Giffen's plan in ibid., p. 502.

223 Giffen's article in the Statist, 6 Feb. 1886, quoted at length in Davitt, Fall of feudalism, pp 510-12.

224 In 1892 Gladstone described Giffen as a 'very high authority on financial questions'. See John Dillon's memorandum of a conversation with Gladstone, 7 Mar. 1892 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS 6296/27).

225 William Currey to Lord Hartington, 10 Mar. 1886, enclosed with Hartington's letter to Gladstone, 11 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 56447).

226 Ibid., 13 Mar. 1886 (Add. MS 44200).

227 Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 Feb. 1886, ibid.

228 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 24 Feb. 1886, ibid (Add. MS 48643).

229 Ibid., 25 Feb. 1886. Where no judicial rental existed on an estate, the land purchase act was to provide for a land court to take a specific district, probably an electoral division, and record both the judicial rent and Griffith's valuation for that area. The relation between the two was to be used as a guide in determining what would be the standard rental to be used as the basis of
the land sale. See Gladstone's speech introducing the land purchase bill in the commons, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1798 (16 Apr. 1886).


231 Lord Granville to Gladstone, 21 Mar. 1886 in Ramm, Gladstone-Granville correspondence, ii, 436.

232 Lord Spencer's cabinet minute to the memorandum circulated by Gladstone on 20 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44647).

233 John Morley's cabinet minute to the memorandum circulated by Gladstone on 20 Mar. 1886, in ibid.

234 Gladstone to Lord Granville, 22 Mar. 1886 in Ramm, Gladstone-Granville correspondence, ii, 437.

235 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 26 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).

236 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 14 Apr. 1886 in ibid. (Add. MS 44647); Gladstone's speech introducing the land bill, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1801 (16 Apr. 1886).

237 See p. 110.

238 See pp 137-8.

239 While 20 years' purchase of the gross rental was to be the norm, Gladstone also provided that in the case of exceptionally good estates this figure could be raised to a maximum of 22 years, and similarly at the other extreme, the figure of 20 years' purchase could be reduced as the land commission saw fit. See Gladstone's speech introducing the land purchase bill in the commons, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1799-1800 (16 Apr. 1886); Land purchase bill, clauses 15 and 16, pp 384-5.

240 The 'outgoings' to be deducted from the payment made to the landlord would include, tithe rent charge (if any), bad debts, rates or cess paid by the landlord, management expenses, repairs, and a chief rent, if any. These would be estimated by the land commission. See the landlord assessment of the bill in I.L.P.U., A critical analysis of the sale and purchase of land (Ireland) bill (Dublin, n.d. [1886]), p. 12; Land purchase bill, pp 400-01.
On holdings valued above £4, it was usual for the tenant to share the payment of the poor rate with the landlord. On becoming owners, however, the payment of all the poor rate would devolve on the tenants. See I.L.P.U., Analysis of the land purchase bill, p. 19.

This body would be appointed by the Irish government to hold land and collect rents. See Land purchase bill, pp 410-11.

Gladstone's speech introducing the land purchase bill in the commons, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1807-8 (16 Apr. 1886); Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', pp 101-2; Land purchase bill, pp 387-91.

See Caird's article and editorial in The Times, 22 Mar. 1886.

Land purchase bill, p. 387.

Thring, 'Ir. government and land bills', p. 100.

See chapter III, pp 164-5, 168-9; also appendix 1, pp 542, 546-8.

Gladstone's cabinet memorandum n.d., [early March] (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44647).

Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 12 Mar. 1886 in ibid. (Add. MS 48643).

See Edward Hamilton's note on the cabinet meeting in diary entry, dated 15 Mar. 1886, ibid.

John Morley was to argue that of Gladstone's cabinet colleagues only he and Lord Spencer were really wholeheartedly in favour of the land purchase scheme. See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 227-8.

See the description of Trevelyan's views as noted by Edward Hamilton in his diary, 20 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48643).

Sir Robert Hamilton's views on the land purchase scheme as contained in Edward Hamilton's diary, 23 Mar. 1886 in ibid.

Chamberlain to Gladstone, 15 Mar. 1886 in Chamberlain, Political memoir, p. 195.

Ibid., p. 196.

Ibid., p. 191.

Gladstone's speech introducing the land purchase bill in the commons, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1797-8 (16 Apr. 1886).
III: POLITICAL OPINION AND THE HOME RULE SCHEME:
THE NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST REACTION

1 See chapter II, pp 106-7.

2 Davitt's presence at this meeting is denied by T. M. Healy. However, William O'Brien claims he was present and Davitt writes of it as one who was there. See p. 144; O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 185.

3 The Parnellite split: or, the disruption of the Irish parliamentary party, reprinted from The Times (London, 1891), pp 135-6.

4 Ibid., pp 146-7.

5 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 230.


7 See chapter II, pp 84-5.

8 See B.N.L., 6 Jan. 1886.

9 Parnell to Kettle, 21 Mar. 1886 in Kettle, Material for victory, facsimilie of letter between pp 82-3. He communicated the same views to Justin McCarthy. See Justin McCarthy to Mrs Campbell Praed, Mar. 1886 in Justin McCarthy and Mrs Campbell Praed, Our book of memories (London, 1912), p. 34.

10 Parnell's willingness to drop the land bill completely at this early stage, would seem to contradict the rather Machiavellian view, recently argued, that he used the home rule bill as bait to foist the land bill on his party. See Bew, Parnell, pp 83-4.

11 Davitt, Fall of feudalism, pp 489-90.


13 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 186.
For a detailed account of the financial provisions of the home rule bill, see chapter II, pp 106-15.

Hansard 3, ccciv, 1130-32 (Apr. 1886). Parnell's anxiety on the financial clauses was heightened on the morning of 8 April, when The Times carried a three-column report on the financial resources of Ireland; this provoked him to make a last minute attempt to have Ireland's imperial contribution reduced from one-fifteenth to one-twentieth. See Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 402.

Hansard 3, ccciv, 1132.

For Trevelyan's speech see pp 176-7.

Hansard 3, ccciv, 1132-34 (8 Apr. 1886). Sir J. N. McKenna, a banker and financier, was to inform John Redmond in 1894 that Parnell was convinced that if the 1886 home rule bill had gone into committee on its second reading, Gladstone would have included the following clause, drawn up by McKenna, and intended to limit the 'wholesale absorption of Irish revenues' proposed by the bill: "that nothing in the bill...should operate as a sanction for a greater sum being taken from Ireland for imperial purposes than on the scale of the imperial taxation of Great Britain as demanded by the proportion of contributors to income-tax on like scales for both countries". See McKenna to Redmond, 25 Nov. 1894 (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MS 15203 (7)).

See pp 162-3.

See report of Davitt's speech on the bill at Glasgow in Western News, 24 Apr. 1886.

See report of the debate in The Times, 17 Apr. 1886; O'Brien, Parnell, p. 396.

Hufford, Analysis of the debates on the home rule bill, p. 188.

Hansard 3, cccv, 626-7 (10 May 1886).

Ibid.

The Parnellite split, p. 147.

Hansard 3, cccv, 960 (13 May 1886).

Ibid., 1348-9 (18 May 1886); ibid., 1667-79 (21 May 1886).

Ibid., cccvi, 112, 126 (25 May 1886); ibid., 715 (1 June 1886).

Ibid., 848-9 (3 June 1886).
NOTES TO PAGES 151-6

30 Hansard 3, cccv, 929 (13 May 1886).

31 Ibid., cccvi, 1171-4 (7 June 1886).

32 Only John Dillon and J. F. X. O'Brien stressed the necessity of amending the bill on the lines of Parnell's speech on 8 April, See ibid., cccv, 997 (13 May 1886); ibid., 1706-7 (21 May 1886).

33 This attempt failed, when, provoked by unionist taunts, Gladstone declared that he intended to make no significant changes in the bill. See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 253-4.

34 O'Connor, Parnell, p. 183.

35 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 252; Lyons, Parnell, p. 347.

36 It is interesting to note, however, that neither Parnell nor John Dillon believed that Gladstone took up the home rule question primarily out of a sense of justice to Ireland. Both were of the view that Gladstone simply realised that the Irish national question had to be dealt with, and was tackling it now on the best possible terms for England and the empire. See Kettle, Material for victory, p. 83; Blunt, Land War, p. 139.

37 Hansard 3, cccv, 77-8 (25 May 1886).

38 Ibid., 77-8 (13 May 1886).

39 See the following speeches, William O'Brien, Hansard 3, cccv, 630-32 (10 May 1886); John Redmond, ibid., 961-73 (13 May 1886); John Dillon, ibid., 1000-08; T. D. Sullivan ibid., 1347-54 (18 May 1886); J. F. X. O'Brien, ibid., 1706-14 (21 May 1886); Thomas Sexton, 719-24 (25 May 1886).

40 Lord Fitzmaurice, 'Ireland, 1782 and 1912' in Morgan (ed.), New Ir. constitution, p. 280.

41 See chapter VI, pp 282-90, 297-306.

42 See chapter II, p. 99.

43 This disparity of view is usually illustrated by reference to a conversation between Parnell and Davitt, in which the former suggested that a home rule parliament should not aim for a wholesale settlement of the land question, and when Davitt protested, declared that if he were an Irish secretary in an Irish parliament....The first thing I would do would be to lock you up,' See O'Brien, Parnell, pp 406-7; Lyons, Parnell, p. 357.

44 Blunt, Land War, pp 256-7.
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46 Blunt, Land war, p. 322.

47 For a description of Davitt's political views, especially his democratic vision of Ireland, see Moody, Davitt and Irish revolution, pp. 555-7.

48 This development he clearly perceived much later, and is succinctly described in his Fall of feudalism, p. 466.

49 Blunt, Land war, p. 311.


51 Kettle, Material for victory, p. 74.

52 O'Day, English face of Irish nationalism, p. 26; O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 33. O'Brien shows that of the home rule party elected in 1880, only 5 were landowners of estates over 1,000 acres, and only 2 were from the farmer, small shopkeeper, and wage earning class.

53 P.M.G., 10 Apr. 1886.

54 Duffy to O'Brien, 26 Dec. 1887 (N.L.I., O'Brien papers, MS 13424).

55 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 187.

56 See appendix 1, p. 542.


58 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 187.


60 Lord and Lady Aberdeen, "We twa": reminiscences (2 vols in one, 2nd ed., London, 1927), i, 253.

61 Ibid., pp. 255-63; ii, 190-91.

62 McDonagh, Life of William O'Brien, p. 85.

63 U.I., 17 Apr. 1886.

64 U.I., 24 Apr. 1886.

65 F.J., 9 Apr. 1886.

66 F.J., 20 Apr. 1886.

67 Tuam Herald, 2 Jan. 1886.

68 Western News, 29 May 1886.
NOTES TO PAGES 166-70

69 Connaught Telegraph, 10 Apr. 1886.
70 Limerick Chronicle, 10 Apr. 1886. See also the editorial in the liberal unionist Donegal Democrat, 17 Apr. 1886, cautioning against exaggerated expectations of the practical benefits to be gained from home rule.

71 During the Cowper commission inquiry in October 1886, James Hamilton, the Recorder of Cork, described how tenants on land owned by Lord Cunningham had been willing to pay 14 to 15 years' purchase before the introduction of the home rule bill, but only 6 to 7 years' purchase thereafter. G. A. Adamson, a land valuer under the Ashbourne act, gave similar evidence. See Report of the royal commission on the land law (Ireland) act, 1881, and purchase of land (Ireland) act, 1885; vol 2, minutes of evidence and appendices, pp 87, 567, H.C. 1887 (13), xxvi, 119, 597. (Hereafter referred to as Cowper comm. report).

72 Davitt, Fall of feudalism, p. 164.
73 See p. 542.
74 Roscommon Herald, 10 Apr. 1886.
75 See p. 543.
76 See pp 544-5.
77 As was seen, though, Gladstone intended to reintroduce it when the home rule bill was at a later stage of its parliamentary progress. See chapter III, p. 146.
78 See table 8a, p. 546.
79 See chapter VIII, p. 360.
80 For a full report on the committee's recommendations, see Ballymoney Free Press, 29 Apr. 1886.
81 For example, the Connaught Telegraph, which greeted the bill in April with unqualified praise, declared, after its defeat in June, that its loss 'need not be much deplored', since, 'however well intended', it 'could scarcely be called a solution to the Irish difficulty'. See the issues for 10 Apr., 12 June 1886.
82 McCarthy, Ir. revolution, pp 486-7. See also Blunt, chapter I, p. 43, for the opinion of Jasper Tully, editor of the Roscommon Herald, that the people in his area were chiefly concerned with the land question and did not 'care much for home rule'.

590
NOTES TO PAGES 170-78

83 Kettle, Material for Victory, p. 71.
84 See Lord Ribblesdale, 'A railway journey with Mr Parnell' in N.C., xxx (Dec. 1891), pp 969-74.
85 See chapter II, p. 76.
86 See Clifford Lloyd's letter to The Times, 4 Jan. 1886.
87 Hammond, Gladstone, pp 501-2.
88 During 1886 the I.L.P.U. was to produce and circulate over 11,000,000 leaflets, 500,000 pamphlets, and over 20,000 posters, maps and associated literature. For an account of the I.L.P.U. movement's activities in 1886 see the annual report for 1887 (P.R.O.N.I., I.L.P.U. papers, D989/A/7/1). Pamphlets of particular interest are: "Irish nationalism": illustrated by speeches of Parnellite M.P.s and other nationalists (Dublin 1886); A guide to the "eighty-six" chiefly contributed by themselves (Dublin, 1886); The National League and outrages (Dublin and London, 1886); The way we live now in Ireland (Dublin and London, 1886).
90 The Times, 17 May 1886.
91 See the following: Sir John Lubbock, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1236 (9 Apr. 1886). R. Bickersteth, ibid., 1505 (13 Apr. 1886); Hon. W. St. J. F. Broderick, ibid., 1514; Visc. Ebrington, ibid., cccv, 663 (10 May 1886); E. Ashmead-Bartlett, 643-4; E. A. Leathem, ibid., cccv, 1014 (13 May 1886); W. E. Beckett, ibid., cccvi, 358-70 (28 May 1886).
92 Annual Register 1886, p. 2.
93 Hufford, Analysis of the debates on the home rule bill, p. 152.
94 See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 236-40.
95 See chapter II, p. 137.
96 Hansard 3, ccciv, 116-18 (8 Apr. 1886).
97 Ibid., 119
98 Ibid., 120-21
99 See chapter II, pp 137-8.
100 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1330-32 (12 Apr. 1886).
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101 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1338 (12 Apr. 1886). See also G. J. Goschen, ibid., 1467-82 (13 Apr. 1886).

102 See 'Mr Gladstone and Ireland' in Quarterly Review, no. 326 (July 1886), p. 282.

103 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1523-6 (13 Apr. 1886).

104 Ibid., 1526-28.

105 Ibid., 1528-34.

106 Ibid., 1534-36.


108 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1806 (16 Apr. 1886).

109 The view that Gladstone distrusted the Irish on the question of rental repayments would seem to have some element of truth. During the period 1886-92 he was to publicly argue - not very wisely - that the advantage of his 1886 land purchase scheme over the 1885 Ashbourne act and its subsequent additions, was that his scheme provided absolute guarantees for repayment, while those measures did not. See chapter VII, pp 347-8.

110 I.L.P.U., Critical analysis of the land purchase bill, passim.

111 E. Ashmead-Bartlett, Hansard 3, cccv, 642-3 (10 May 1886); S. Hoare, ibid., 634.

112 Ibid., 912-30 (13 May 1886).

113 E. A. Leatham, ibid., 1013.

114 Viscount Wolmer, ibid., 1251-2 (17 May 1886).

115 McCarthy, Ir. revolution, p. 481. See also parliamentary report in F.J., 21 May 1886.

116 Interview of Bright with O'Brien, 28 May 1886 in O'Brien Parnell, pp 399-400. Bright had similarly expressed his views on home rule in a letter to Gladstone, 13 May 1886. See Morley, Gladstone, iii, 247-8.

117 Hansard 3, cccvi, 686-96 (1 June 1886).

118 See p. 170.

119 See chapter V, p. 245.

120 See G. O. Trevelyan, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1115 (8 Apr. 1886); Lord Randolph Churchill, ibid., 1329 (12 Apr. 1886);
G. J. Goschen, Hansard 3, ccciv 1473-5 (13 Apr. 1886); E. Ashmead-Bartlett, cccv, 648 (10 May 1886); Lord Hartington, ibid., 616-17.

Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 222, 226.

IV: THE ULSTER PROBLEM (1): THE PARNELLITE AND GLADSTONIAN VIEWS

1 Minutes of evidence and appendix to the report of the commissioners of inquiry, 1864, respecting the magisterial and police arrangements and establishment of the borough of Belfast, p. 124 \[C.3466-1\], H.C. 1865, xxvii, 154.


3 Canon \[John\] O'Rourke, The battle of the faith in Ireland (Dublin, 1887), p. 552.


5 J. N. Richardson to the Bessbrook Spinning Company, 22 Feb. 1892 (P.R.O.N.I., Richardson papers, D2956/1). The type of social situation Richardson refers to here, whereby groups of both religions could work side by side in the same factory and yet know very little of each other, has been noted by sociologists as typical of northern Irish society, both rural and urban. See Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and tolerance in Ulster (Manchester, 1972), p. 222; Frank Burton, The politics of legitimacy: struggles in a Belfast community (London, 1978), chapter 2.

NOTES TO PAGES 188-92

7 Moody, Davitt and Ir. revolution, p. 424.

8 Ibid., pp 433-4. M. J. F. McCarthy notes that after the publication of the address it was the procedure of nationalist speakers in Ulster to emphasise the 'pecunary profits' to be made by the land agitation while 'home rule was hardly ever mentioned'. See McCarthy, Ir. revolution, p. 145.


10 Moody, Davitt and Ir. revolution, p. 447.

11 Ibid., p. 461. By 1881 Ulster had the greatest number of evicted families - 1,219; between 70 and 80 per cent above the other provinces. See R. W. Kirkpatrick, 'The origins and development of the land war in mid-Ulster, 1879-85' in Lyons and Hawkins (ed.), Ireland under the Union, p. 222.

12 O'Brien, Recollections, pp 322-3.

13 Kirkpatrick, 'Land war in mid-Ulster', p. 232. Andrew Kettle was to claim that Jeremiah Jordan informed him before the by-election that Dickson 'could not be beaten just then', but that Parnell 'was in the toils and committed to the fight before he got my message'. See Kettle, Material for victory, p. 51.

14 Ibid., p. 52.

15 Parnell's speech in Derry, 30 Aug. 1881 in Parnell's speeches, p. 151.

16 Registration was a complex procedure, which, prior to the 1884 franchise act, came in for much criticism. For example, difficulties over the rating qualifications for registration and the ease and cheapness with which objections to claimants for registration could be made, had the effect of facilitating abuses and keeping many people off the electoral register. See Brian Walker, 'The Irish electorate, 1868-1915' in I.H.S., xviii, no. 71 (Mar. 1973), pp 359-65.

17 O'Kelly to John Devoy, 21 Sept. 1882 in O'Brien and Ryan, Devoy's post bag, ii, 142-3.

18 Parnell's speech in Enniskillen, 9 Nov. 1880 in Parnell's speeches, p. 84.
20 Parnell's speech at Hilltown, 23 Apr. 1881 in Parnell's speeches, p. 134.
21 Parnell's speech at Gortin, 31 Aug. 1881, ibid., p. 159.
22 Northern Whig, 29 Sept. 1883.
23 Ibid., 17 Oct. 1883.
24 Irish Times, 14 Feb. 1882.
26 See Parnell's speech in parliament, Hansard 3, ccclxxxiv, 323 (5 Feb. 1884).
27 Quoted in J. A. Taylor (ed.), The Rossmore incident. An account of the various nationalist and anti-nationalist meetings, held in Ulster in the autumn of 1883 (Dublin, 1884), p. 11.
28 For unionist views of the incident, see Taylor, Rossmore Incident, passim; Buckland, Ir. unionism: 2. Ulster unionism and the origins of Northern Ireland (Dublin, 1973), pp 2-5.
29 Hansard 3, ccclxxxiv, 324-5 (5 Feb. 1884).
30 Ibid., 335-6. Parnell's speech was followed on 22 February by a nationalist attempt to have a parliamentary inquiry set up to examine the affairs of the Orange Order, on the grounds that it had now adopted the same characteristics—enforcement of oaths, illegal tests, and declarations—that had led to its dissolution in 1836. See ibid., 1791-1806 (22 Feb. 1884).
31 For the purposes of this study a stereotype is defined as a prejudiced belief, or set of beliefs, about a community, which, though it is at variance with the objective reality of that group, is necessary to the purpose of those who apply it; in this case Parnell's view of Ulster unionists and his opponents' view of the nationalist movement.
32 O'Brien, Parnell, p. 285; Ribblesdale, 'Railway journey with Mr Parnell', p. 971.
33 The unsavoury reputation of Orangeism alienated not only nationalists but many liberal unionist protestants. One such, H. de F. Montgomery, noted with disgust the detrimental effect on protestantism and encouragement to religious hatred given by the Orange Order. See Patrick
NOTES TO PAGES 197-202

Buckland, (ed.), Irish Unionism 1885-1923: a documentary history (Belfast, 1973), pp 103-5. Similarly, British conservative leaders looked on Ulster unionist support as embarrassing, to say the least. See chapter IX, p. 456.

34 See chapter III, pp 153-5.
35 Parnell to Harrington, 9 June 1884 (N.L.I., Harrington papers, MS 8581(1)).
36 Parnell to Harrington, 2 Jan. 1885 in ibid.
38 See chapter I, p. 42.
39 No period is specified for these subscriptions.
41 T. M. Healy 'Ulster and Ireland' in C.R., xlviii (Nov. 1885), pp 728-9. See also Lord Ernest Hamilton's account of John Dillon's reaction to being beaten by Hamilton for the North Tyrone seat in 1885: 'I proffered my hand, according to custom, to the defeated candidate, but Mr John Dillon refused to take it, and turned bitterly away with the threat that he would yet wrest the seat from me'. See Lord Ernest Hamilton, Forty years on (London, n.d.), p. 211.
42 Connaught People, 29 May 1886.
43 Western News, 17 July 1886.
44 See Sligo Champion, 27 Mar. 1886; Munster News, 2 Apr. 1886; Connaught Telegraph, 15 May 1886; Limerick Reporter 18 May 1886; Clare Advertiser, 11 June 1886.
45 B.N.L., 11 May 1886.
46 Munster News, 19 May, June 12, July 7 1886; also Clare Advertiser, 11 June 1886.
47 Waterford Daily Mail, 11 June 1886; U.I., 19 June 1886; Kilkenny Journal, 9 June 1886; Wexford Express, 12 June 1886; Anglo-Celt, 3 July 1886; Derry Journal, 11 June 1886; Mayo Examiner, 12 June 1886; Connaught Telegraph, 12 June 1886; Cork Daily Herald, 10, 17 June 1886.
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49 Munster News, 12 June 1886.
50 T. M. Healy, Letters and leaders of my day (London, 1928), ii, 262.
51 See pp 218-19.
52 Cork Daily Herald, 17 June 1886.
53 T. D. Sullivan, Recollections of troubled times in Irish politics (Dublin, 1905), pp 348, 352.
54 McCarthy, Reminiscences, ii, 395.
55 W.N.W., 3 July 1886.
56 See chapter V, p. 262.
58 P.M.G., 13 Apr. 1886.
59 The Times, 28 Dec. 1885.
60 Hammond, Gladstone, p. 346.
63 Labouchere to Chamberlain, 17 May 1886, ibid., p. 314.
64 Fisher, Bryce, i, 202-3.
65 James Bryce to Gladstone, 12 Mar. 1886 (Gladstone papers, Add MS 56447, f. 1).
66 Ibid., f. 3.
67 Ibid., f. 4.
68 Ibid., f. 5.
69 Ibid., f. 7.
70 Ibid., f. 8.
71 Ibid., ff 8-10.
72 Ibid., f. 10. See also James Bryce, 'Alternative policies in Ireland' in N.C., xix (Feb. 1886), p. 326.
73 McCarthy, Reminiscences, ii, 234-6.
74 Sir Charles Russell's memorandum on the Ulster question, 17 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 56447, f. 1).
75 Ibid., ff 5-7.
76 Russell's memorandum on the Ulster question, f. 10.
77 Ibid., ff 11-12.
78 Ibid., f.13.
79 Walker to Lord Spencer, 10 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 56447).
80 See Thomas Sexton's retort to William De Cobain's reference to resolutions against home rule passed at the convention, Hansard 3, ccciv, 35-6 (26 Mar. 1886).
81 Duffin to his father, 28 Mar. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Duffin papers, Mic. 127/3D).
82 Robert McGeogh to Gladstone, 7 Apr. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44496).
83 Leaflet entitled Nationalist hostility to the Ulster linen industry, ibid. The charges made in this leaflet were refuted in parliament by E. D. Gray, the owner of the Belfast Morning News, in which the articles on the linen trade originally appeared. See Hansard 3, cccvi, 565-70 (31 May 1886).
84 O'Brien, Parnell, pp 366-7.
85 These reports were abroad from January 1886 and given wide publicity in P.M.G., 1-2 June 1886.
87 Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 18.
88 Gladstone to Hugh Childers, 28 Sept. 1885 in Morley, Gladstone, iii, 178.
89 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 14 Mar. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44647).
90 James Bryce to John Bryce, 17 May 1886, in Fisher, Bryce, i, 202-3.
91 Bryce's memorandum on home rule politics in the 1880s, cited in Fisher, James Bryce, i, 218.
92 On Bryce's behalf, Robert McGeogh put his ideas to a meeting of Ulster liberals in the Reform club in Belfast early in March 1886. However 'the meeting found it impossible to suggest adequate guarantees and anyhow they found it inconceivable how one section of the community could have special treatment'. See McGeogh to Bryce, 13 Mar. 1886.
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93 It is worth pointing out that in his influential article on the Irish problem in The Statist, in January 1886, Robert Giffen suggested separate autonomy as the most acceptable way of dealing with the Ulster question. See the reproduction of his article in F.J., 11 Jan. 1886.

94 Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 19. Significantly, even the call Gladstone made in a letter to Lord De Vesci, in February 1886, for information on Irish opinions to home rule, produced no suggestions for dealing with the Ulster problem. Representative sections of this correspondence were published as a parliamentary paper. See Copy of selection from the representations made to the first lord of the treasury by public bodies, in response to the invitation for the free communication of views on Ireland contained in a letter addressed by the first lord of the treasury to Viscount De Vesci on 12 February 1886; H.C. 1886 (117), lli, 773-846.

95 Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 107.

96 See p. 207.

97 See Parnell's speech in the commons, Hansard 3, cccvi, 1170-81 (7 June 1886). Gladstone described his Ulster argument as 'reasoned and elaborate' and 'required the careful attention of those who propose such a plan [the separate autonomy of Ulster]'. See, Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 107. Gladstone, like Parnell, thought that the only Irish minority requiring special treatment were the landlords; a point of view which John Bright contested, and urged instead: 'Why not go to the help of other interests in Belfast and Dublin?'. See Diaries of John Bright, ed. R. A. J. Walling (London, 1930), p. 536.

98 Hansard 3, cccv, 629 (10 May 1886).

99 Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 82-3.

100 See chapter IX, pp 436, 443-5.


102 Ibid., cccv, 630-31 (10 May 1886).

103 O'Brien, Irish land question, pp 44-5.
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104 Hansard 3, ccv, 967-72 (13 May 1886).
105 Ibid., 1352-3 (18 May 1886).
106 Ibid., 1704 (21 May 1886).
107 Ibid., 1668.
108 Ibid., 1676.
109 Ibid., cccvi, 676 (1 June 1886).
110 Ibid., 717-19.
111 Ibid., 1168-84 (7 June 1886). F. S. L. Lyons has argued that in his treatment of the 'relative prosperity' argument Parnell 'was driven to strange shifts, of which undoubtedly the oddest was his contention, based upon a juggling of the income tax statistics that while in terms of what he called "relative wealth" the north-east might be better off than the rest of the country, the taxation returns showed that Leinster and Munster were both richer than Ulster'. See Lyons, Parnell, p. 350. However, as the examination of the relative prosperity debate in this chapter has shown, the Ulster unionist case was badly handled by Goschen; its chief weakness consisting in the fact that he let the issue of Ulster's unique industrial prosperity become submerged in a debate about relative prosperity in general. In this context, Parnell's argument was a reasonable statement of the case.
112 Ibid., pp 350-51.
114 See Lawrence, Government of Northern Ireland, p. 4.
117 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1473-4 (13 Apr. 1886).
118 Ibid., cccvi, 81-2 (25 May 1886).
119 Ibid., 1176-7 (7 June 1886).
120 Ibid., 121-2 (25 May 1886).
121 Ibid., 717-18.
122 Thomas Sinclair, 'Ulster: facts and figures: a reply'
in C.R., lxiii (July-Dec. 1893), p. 37. This was grudgingly admitted partially by T. M. Healy. See his A word, pp 155-6.

123 Following the receipt of more statistical information from Adam Duffin, Goschen, in reply, noted this problem as a drawback to countering nationalist statistics. See Goschen to Adam Duffin, 20 Apr. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Duffin papers, Mic 127/5).


125 Return showing the population of 1871 and 1881; the number of electors in 1871 and 1881; the area in square miles; the number of members; the amount of property and income tax charged for the last year for which the returns are made up, in each county and parliamentary division of a county in the United Kingdom (exclusive of cities and boroughs)...And similar return for the cities and boroughs of the United Kingdom, p. 23, H.C. 1882 (149), lii, 422. National statistics were drawn partly from the 1881 census, but mostly from this table and the one following, which provided the latest information on Irish income-tax and valuation.

126 Return showing the population in each county, city, and borough in Ireland returning members to parliament; the acreage in each of the same; the number of registered voters in each of the same; the valuation of rateable property in each of the same; the number of land tenements, etc, in each county..., p. 1, H.C. 1884 (164), lxii, p. 223 (Hereafter cited as Return showing the population in Ireland etc, 1884).

127 See table 4, p. 231.

128 The figures were: unionist counties, 727,587; nationalist counties, 711,061. See Return showing the population in Ireland etc, 1884, p. 222. The poverty of western Ulster was underlined by its constantly falling population. T. W. Moody has shown that between 1841 and 1951 it fell by 67 per cent. See T. W. Moody, The Ulster question 1603-1973 (Dublin and Cork, 1973), p. 16.

129 Goschen to Duffin, 15 Apr. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Duffin papers, Mic. 127/4).

130 The debate about the relative prosperity of Ulster and the three southern provinces, however, was to re-emerge periodically until 1922. See, for example, W. A. McKnight Ireland and the Ulster legend (London, 1921), and the...
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Ulster unionist reply in, T. Moles, Ulster facts and the "Ulster legend". (Belfast, n.d., [1921]).

131 T. W. Russell, 'The actual and the political Ireland' in N.C., xxcii (Jan. 1890), pp 89-101. In this division of east and west, Russell included the counties of Ulster with those of the nationalist south-east and compared the prosperity of this area with the poverty of Connaught, and counties Donegal, Clare, and Kerry. This division between Ireland's poor and prosperous regions had earlier been made by the Cowper commission. See, Cowper Comm. report, vol 2., footnote to pp 972-3.

132 See p. 225.

V: THE ULSTER PROBLEM (2): THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE LOYALIST REACTION TO HOME RULE

1 See p. 245.
2 See Dr Byrne, dean of Clonfert, at Omagh in the B.N.L., 15 Feb. 1886.
3 See Russell's speech at Dungannon in the B.N.L., 18 June 1886.
4 See appendix 2, passim.
5 Miller, Queen's rebels, passim.
6 Ibid., pp 65-86.
7 See also Miller's 'Presbyterianism and modernisation in Ulster' in Past & Present, no. 80 (Aug. 1978), p. 90.
8 Miller, Queen's rebels, pp 71-2.
10 For a discussion of these riots and anti-Irish and anti-catholic opinion generally, see ibid., passim; Kevin O'Connor, The Irish in Britain (2nd ed., Dublin, 1974), pp 13-71; J. E. Handley, The Irish in Scotland, 1798-1845 (Cork, 1943), passim; John Denvir, The Irish in Britain from the earliest times to the fall and death of Parnell (London, 1892), pp 105, 117-296.
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12 Miller, Queen's rebels, p. 157.

13 See appendix 2, table 9a.


15 Dr William Park at the jubilee assembly of the presbyterian church in 1890, quoted in J. E. Davey, 1840-1940: the story of a hundred years: an account of the Irish presbyterian church from the formation of the general assembly to the present time (Belfast, 1940), pp 62-3.


17 Miller, Queen's rebels, pp 118-19.


19 Strauss, Chamberlain, pp 4, 60.

20 Hufford, Analysis of the debates on the home rule bill, pp 5-6.

21 Hansard 3, ccxcv, 1365-6 (18 May 1886).


23 See chapter I, pp 9-10.

24 See A. C. Hume, 'The origins and characteristics of the people in the counties of Down and Antrim' in U.J.A., series 1, i, (1852), pp 9-26, 120-29, 246-54. For a note on the popularity of these articles in 1852, see a separately printed second edition of the articles under
the same title (Belfast, 1872), pp 17-18. For a useful study of physical differences between groups of Ulster presbyterians, episcopalian and catholics, which was part of the process by which the different religious communities might differentiate each other, see E. A. Hooton and C. W. Dupertuis, The physical anthropology of Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 1955 ; reprinted 1974), p. 136. The techniques of differentiation employed by both communities in the past and present is covered with great insight in Burton, Politics of legitimacy, pp 47-67.

25 See note 13 to chapter I, p. 559 for an example of Macaulay's emphasis on the social and racial superiority of Ulster protestants to Irish catholics.

26 P.M.G., 10 May 1886

27 See B.N.L., 14 May 1886.

28 B.N.L., 15 Feb. 1886. It can also be added that many of the authorities Gibbon cites to support his theory do not in fact do so. For example, he lists Lord Ernest Hamilton's The soul of Ulster (London, 1917), but here Hamilton was merely repeating racist views he had held in 1886, as may be seen from a perusal of his speech cited in table 9b. Again, he cites James Logan, Ulster in the X-rays (2nd ed., London, n.d.). But Logan, far from clarifying a type of distinctive ethnic unionist 'Ulsterman', was concerned mainly to describe light-heartedly all aspects of Ulster life; and cited a long list of famous Ulstermen, nationalist and unionist, from John Mitchel and Lord Russell of Killowen, to Lords Dufferin and Cairns. See chapter 12. Gibbon also lists Rev. W. B. Woodburn, The Ulster Scot: his history and religion (London, n.d.). However, this work was limited to a description of the presbyterian community in Ulster. See also Miller, Queen's rebels, pp 109-10.

29 See chapter IV, p. 195.


31 E. J. Saunderson, Two Irelands; or loyalty versus treason (Dublin, 1884), p. 30; Moore, Truth about Ulster, p. 243.

32 See Taylor (ed.), Rossmore incident, pp 121-2. Thus the loyalist feeling expressed in the Rossmore address was in
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keeping with the movement of political opinion in Great Britain which saw the worsening of the Irish problem as symptomatic of a political malaise, and imperial crisis, taking shape under liberal leadership. See chapter II, p. 76. See also, A member of the Order, Orangeism in Ireland and throughout the empire (London, 1938), ii, 554; Lord Rossmore, Things I can tell (London, 1912), pp 240-7

33 For an expression of Ulster unionist fears as to the 'revolutionary' implications of a great extension of the franchise in Ireland, see the speech of John Mulholland, later Baron Dunleath, Hansard 3, cclxxv, 694-5 (9 Mar. 1883).

34 Buckland, Ulster unionism, pp 5-7

35 Thomas McKnight, Ulster as it is, or twenty-eight years as an Irish editor (London, 1896), ii, 79-80.

36 Ibid., pp 116-17


38 North Armagh political papers. (P.R.O.N.I., D1252/42/3/30).

39 Saunderson to his wife, 18 Dec. 1885 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T.2996/2/B/81).

40 Johnston's diary entry, 14 Jan. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Johnston diaries, D880/2/38).

41 Saunderson to his wife, 17 Jan. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T2996/1/63). Interestingly, in quoting this letter, Reginald Lucas eliminated the section referring to the attempt by conservatives to dissolve the Ulster group. See Lucas, Colonel Saunderson: a memoir (London, 1908), p. 93.

42 Saunderson to his wife, 23 Jan. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T2996/1/66).

43 Saunderson to his wife, 28 Jan. 1886 in ibid. (T2996/1/70).

44 For a detailed account of the emergence of organised unionism in Ulster in 1885-6, see Savage, 'Origins of the Ulster unionist party', passim.

45 See chapter I, pp 11-12.

46 P.M.G., 10 Feb. 1886. For the influence of Macaulay's history on Ulster protestant opinion, see McKnight, Ulster as it is, i, 10, 15, ii, 14.
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48 William Robinson to Saunderson, 3 Dec. 1885 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T2996/4/7). See also similar opinions in Lurgan and Portadown News, 6 Mar. 1886; Armagh Guardian, 18 June 1886; Down Recorder, 22 May 1886; Fermanagh Times, 4 May 1886.


50 L.S., 26 Jan., 20 Mar. 1886; Moore, Truth about Ulster, p. 56.

51 L.S., 26 Jan. 1886.


53 See Lord Ernest Hamilton's declaration that these fears were widespread in Ulster, Hansard 3, ccciv, 1498-99 (13 Apr. 1886).

54 See for example the first episode in B.N.L., 8 Jan. 1886.


56 A copy of this leaflet together with another entitled Bones of the protestants drowned in the Bann in 1641, which called on protestants not to employ Roman Catholics, is in the Saunderson papers (P.R.O.N.I., T2996/5/14).

57 B.N.L., 2 Jan. 1886.

58 For the extent to which this state of affairs prevailed, see chapter IV, pp 186-8.


60 See Hamilton, Forty years on, pp 66-7. Hamilton notes that though his family employed several Roman Catholics who supported home rule, 'they got on well with them'. Similarly Lord Rossmore, although a strong Orangeman, was determined to show he was 'not bigoted', and readily provided a site for a Roman Catholic chapel "where my Roman Catholic friends and neighbours can worship our common God". See Rossmore, Things I can tell, pp 38-40.

61 See table 9a, theme number 2, p. 551.
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62 See chapter II, pp 92-4.

63 Saunderson, *Two Irelands, or loyalty versus treason*, passim. See also L.S., 5 Jan. 1886, and B.N.L., 2 Jan. 1886, for a report on several militant Parnellite speeches in the United States entitled: 'What the Parnellites really aim at'.

64 E. P. S. Counsell, *Our Orange opponents* (Dublin, 1886), pp 31-4.


66 Ibid., p. 134.

67 B.N.L., 1 Feb. 1886.

68 U.I., 10 Apr. 1886.

69 See the speech of W. J. Hurst of Belfast chamber of commerce, in B.N.L., 27 Apr. 1886.

70 McKnight, *Ulster as it is*, ii, 141-2.


72 Hansard 3, ccciv, 1086 (8 Apr. 1886).

73 B.N.L., 23 Apr. 1886.

74 B.N.L., 14, 15, 18 June, 3 July 1886; W.N.W., 19 June 1886; L.S., 29 June 1886. It is not unlikely that the Sligo events helped to prolong the Belfast riots, as they occurred just as the latter were beginning to abate. As one home rule newspaper put it: 'just as the uproar at Belfast had begun to abate news was received that a serious riot had broken out at Sligo against the protestant population of that place'. See *Newry Reporter*, 19 June 1886.

75 McKnight, *Ulster as it is*, ii, 150-51.

76 P.M.G., 8 May 1886.

77 B.N.L., 8 Jan. 1886.

78 See a report of an interview given by William Johnston to the P.M.G., and reprinted in B.N.L., 6 Apr. 1886. Johnston admitted in this interview that no action to resist the imposition of home rule on Ulster had so far been organised.

79 Johnston's diary entry, 28 Apr. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Johnston diaries, D880/2/38).
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80 P.M.G., 8 May 1886.
81 Johnston's diary entry, 8 May 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Johnston diaries, D880/2/38).
82 P.M.G., 17 May 1886.
83 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 145.
84 Ibid., pp 146-7.
85 See Bryon Farewell, Queen Victoria's little wars (Newton Abbot, 1974), pp 256, 280, 291.
86 Jalland, Liberals and Ireland, p. 209; Morley, Recollections, ii, 341-2.
87 P.M.G., 31 May 1886.
88 P.M.G., 1 June 1886.
90 Portadown and Lurgan News, 5 June 1886.
91 P.M.G., 1 June 1886.
92 See chapter IV, pp 200-01.
93 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 147.
94 P.M.G., 4 June 1886.

VI: GLADSTONE'S CONCEPT OF IRISH NATIONALITY AND THE MORAL CRUSADE FOR HOME RULE, 1886-92


2 The public mood in Britain after the beginning of the dynamite campaign in 1881, was succinctly recorded by the Graphic in its issue 16 April: 'What may be termed an "assassination and dynamite panic" is just now prevailing in official circles;...innumerable scares are raised in towns where barracks or royal residences are situated, and if a trumpery fire takes place in an official building it is at once magnified into the act of a political incendiary. Now the public are informed that no "suspicious looking person" has been seen at Hawarden, where the premier is taking a few days well earned rest - as though conspirators in the nineteenth century walked about in Guy Fawkes costume, while singing silenzio silenzio, at the
top of their voice'. For the story of the dynamite war see K. R. M. Short, The dynamite war (Dublin, 1979).

3 See chapter I, p. 11.

4 Redmond, Historical and political address, p. 130. Three pamphlets published by the I.L.P.U., and extensively distributed in England during the home rule crisis of 1886, bore the following titles: Home rule in 1689; State of protestants under James II; Warning to protestants.


8 Walter Fitzpatrick to Gladstone, 12 Nov. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44699).

9 See G. J. Shaw Lefevre, Peel and O'Connell (London, 1887).

10 G. J. Shaw Lefevre to Gladstone, 10 July 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44151).

11 O'Brien, Parnell, pp 365-6.

12 See chapter I, p. 9.


16 See R. T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian agitation, 1876 (London, 1963), passim; Magnus, Gladstone, pp 237-42.


18 W. E. Gladstone, Special aspects of the Irish question (London, 1892), pp 72-3. Gladstone claimed that this volume, consisting mainly of arguments on Irish history, was 'least associated with the angry polemics of the [Irish] question'. See p. [v]. The quotation is from 'Notes and queries on the Irish demands' which first appeared in N.C. (Feb. 1887).
19 Gladstone, Special aspects of the Ir. quest., p. 73.
20 Mill, England and Ireland, passim.
21 E. D. Steele argues that as early as 1866 Gladstone perceived the Irish problem in terms of an 'Irish nationality confronting an English nationality'. See Steele, 'Gladstone and Ireland', p. 82.
22 Memorandum entitled 'Notes on Irish nationalism', 4 July 1888 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44773).
23 See chapter II, p. 57.
24 Steele, Irish land and Brit. politics, pp 252-4.
25 See chapter II, p. 91.
26 Memorandum entitled 'Notes on Irish nationalism', 4 July 1888 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44773).
27 Gladstone's belief that the solution to the problem of satisfying Irish nationalist feeling was to be found in Irish history, could be seen as a variant of the widely held Victorian idea that history embodied great lessons to be used in the formulation of future political policy. This was, for example, the theme of the most influential imperialist text of late nineteenth century England, J. R. Seeley's collection of Cambridge lectures, The expansion of England (London, 1883; 18th impression, 1911). For a discussion of the role of this idea in politics, see Anderson, The political uses of history in mid-nineteenth century England, pp 87-106. This idea as applied to Irish politics, was criticised by Lecky in The political uses of history (London, 1892).
28 See pp 272-3.
29 Gladstone to Dicey, 12 Nov. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44499). See also Gladstone, Special aspects of the Ir. quest., p. 138.
30 See chapter I, pp 12-17.
31 Edmund Burke: his works and correspondence (8 vols, London 1852).
32 Quoted in Morley, Gladstone, iii, 211.
34 Daniel O'Connell, A memoir of Ireland native and Saxon (London, 1842).
35 Gladstone to Dicey, 12 Nov. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44499).
36 Lecky, Leaders, ii, 213.
37 In the introduction to his book O'Connell declared British policy in Ireland to be condemned before the bar of history. See Memoir on Ire., pp vii-xi.
38 W. V. Harcourt to Gladstone, 28 Dec. 1883 in Gardiner, Harcourt, i, 497.
39 Significantly, there is nothing to show that Gladstone took any steps to make himself familiar with the great range of historicist propaganda produced by the Parnellite party in the early 1880s that was devoid of expressions of loyalty to the British crown.
40 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 320.
41 See, 'Lessons of Irish history in the eighteenth century' in Gladstone, Special aspects of the Irish quest., p. 110.
42 Ibid., p. 88.
44 Gladstone's speech at Liverpool, 28 June 1886, in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone speeches 1886-8, p. 174. See also Gladstone, Special aspects of the Irish quest., p. 111.
45 Ibid., p. 112.
46 Ibid., p. 113.
48 Ibid., pp 117-26.
49 In his private memorandum, 'Notes on Irish nationalism', written in 1888, his views had developed somewhat on this
matter. Here he described Irish nationalism from Henry II's reign down to the seventeenth century as having 'subsisted germinally as race feeling and was warned and hunted down. That it had the character of true nationalism was evinced strongly, perhaps namely, by its power of assimilation and of merging the English in the Irish element which however it largely modified.' (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44499). However, I have not found that he expressed this view publicly. In any event, by 1888, his former view was well established in print.

50 See chapter I, pp 22-8.
51 See chapter II, pp 89-90.
52 F. W. Hirst, 'Gladstone and home rule 1885-92', p. 719.
54 Lecky Ire., i, 252. See also chapter I, p. 14.
55 W. E. Gladstone, 'Kin beyond the sea' in Prose masterpieces from modern essayists (London, 1885), p. 381. This article was first published in 1878 in the North American Review.
56 Lecky, Ire., iv, 124.
57 Gladstone, Special aspects of the Irish quest., p. 133.
58 Ibid., p. 81.
59 Ibid., p. 82.
60 Bew, Parnell, p. 82.
61 Kettle, Material for victory, p. 58.
62 See Foster, Parnell, pp 167-8; Magnus, Gladstone, p. 257.
63 Gladstone, Special aspects of the Irish quest., p. 80.
64 Ibid., p. 82.
65 Ibid., p. 83.
66 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 194-5.
68 Lecky, Political uses of hist., p. 16.
69 Lecky, Ire., iv, 119-23.
The importance of agrarian struggle to nationalist agitation was clearly explained by Alfred Webb in 1878. Webb, a vigorous member of Butt's home rule movement, declared, not long before the depression of 1879, that the Irish people were materially doing so well that since 1870 'an enormous change, has taken place in the feeling of the mass of the people and in their present mood' they were not inclined to strongly support a nationalist movement. See newspaper cutting dated 11 Oct. 1878 in vol. I, letter cuttings and speeches (N.L.I., Webb papers, MS 1745).

Bryce, Handbook of home rule, p. ix.

Davitt, Fall of feudalism, p. 116.

O'Brien, Irish ideas, p. 21.

See Magnus, Gladstone, p. 315.

McCarthy, Reminiscences, ii, 451. See also Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 53, noting Gladstone's contempt for the average Parnellite M.P.

Quoted in Selbourne, Memorials, p. 352.

See The Times, 26 June 1886; W.N.W., 26 June 1886.

Lecky, Leaders, i, xiii.

See Gladstone to Dicey, 12 Nov. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44499). Gladstone described the events surrounding the act of union as 'most important' to the historical argument for home rule.

Gladstone, Special aspects of the Inquest., pp 61-2.

Shaw Lefevre to Gladstone, 10 July 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44151).

J. G. S. McNeill, How the Union was carried (London, 1887).

McNeill to Gladstone, 8 Nov. 1886 (B.M. Gladstone papers Add. MS 44499).

See p. 293.

Bryce to Sigerson, 29 Dec. 1886 (N.L.I., Sigerson papers MS 10904(2)).

Bryce to Sigerson, 1 Mar. 1887 in ibid.

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88 A. V. Dicey to Lecky, 10 Nov. 1886 (T.C.D., Lecky Correspondence, no. 405).
90 Majoribanks to Gladstone, 9 May 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44332).
91 See W.N.W., 20 Aug. 1887.
92 See the article 'Ingram's history of the Irish union' in Gladstone, Special aspects of the Irish quest., pp 135-95.
93 Majoribanks to Gladstone, 7 Oct. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44332).
94 Churchill to Majoribanks, 6 Oct. 1887 in ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 716. Recent scholarship has tended to endorse Brabourne's views of Grattan's parliament. Patrick O'Farrell has pointed out the illogical position of the parliament in claiming to speak for the whole Irish nation and being partially inclined to enact political reforms for Roman Catholics, while at the same time hoping to keep effective political power in protestant hands. See his Ireland's English question, pp 63-6.
98 Ibid., p. 730.
100 H. de F. Montgomery, Correspondence with Mr Gladstone and notes on the pamphlet "Gladstone and Burke" (Dublin, n.d. [1887]).
101 See p. 289.
102 Montgomery, Correspondence with Gladstone, pp 3-4.
103 Ibid., p. 5.
104 Ibid., p. 9.
105 See his speech in parliament on the report, in Morley, Gladstone, iii, 309-11.
106 See chapter X, pp 489-92.
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107 Morley to Gladstone, 2 Feb. 1894 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44257).

108 Gladstone to Morley, 5 Feb. 1894; ibid.

VII : THE HOME RULE DEBATE 1886-92: THE SEARCH FOR AN IRISH CONSTITUTION

1 Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 134.
2 Ibid., pp 134-8.
3 Ibid., pp 148-51.
4 Hirst, 'Gladstone and home rule 1885-92', p. 709; Gladstone at Liverpool, in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 154-66.
6 Blunt to Walsh, 13 Aug. 1886 in Blunt, Land war, pp 167-701.
8 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 261. In fact, despite the advice of 'experts' that the people were with Gladstone, the liberal party, following the desertion of its wealthy members during 1886 home rule, was in no position to contest an election. See Hirst, 'Gladstone and home rule 1885-92', p. 708.
9 See 'The Irish question in 1886' in Gladstone, Special aspects of the Ir. quest., pp 29-30
10 See Donald McCormack, The incredible Mr Kavanagh (New York, 1961), pp 195-6. Kavanagh had only stumps for arms and legs.
11 See p. 322.
12 F.J., 16 June 1886.
13 Walsh, William J. Walsh: pp 221, 224.
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15 Walsh to Gladstone, 10 Oct. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44499).

16 Gladstone to Walsh, 30 Oct. 1886 in Walsh, William J. Walsh, pp 222-3.

17 Ibid.

18 Gladstone to Walsh, 25 May 1887, ibid., p. 223.

19 By this was meant the criticism of the 1886 bill wherein Ireland's contribution to imperial charges was viewed merely as an English 'tribute' which Ireland would greatly resent and would be certain to agitate for the removal of. See chapter III, pp 176-7.

20 Walsh to Gladstone, 30 May 1887, in Walsh, William J. Walsh, pp 223-4.

21 Gladstone to Walsh, 31 May 1887, ibid., p. 225.

22 Morley to Gladstone, 18 Dec. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).

23 See pp 309-10.

24 Morley to Gladstone, 19 July 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).

25 Gladstone to Walsh, 1 June 1887 in Walsh, William J. Walsh, pp 225-6. See also Gladstone to Morley, 28 May 1887. (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).


27 Newspaper cutting of a letter from Gladstone to Mr Illingworth, 22 Nov. 1886, ibid.


29 Gladstone to Morley, 8 Dec. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).

30 Morley to Gladstone, 7 Dec. 1886, ibid.

31 Morley to Gladstone, 12 Dec. 1886, ibid.

32 See Michael Hurst, Joseph Chamberlain and liberal reunion: the Round Table conference of 1887 (London and Toronto, 1967), passim.

33 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 276-9.
NOTES TO PAGES 319-26

34 Morley to Gladstone, 24 Dec. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).


36 Morley to Gladstone, 1 Jan. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255). See also Hamer, John Morley, pp 216-17.

37 Morley to Gladstone, 2 Jan. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).

38 Gladstone to Morley, 3 Jan. 1887, ibid.

39 Chamberlain, Political memoir, p. 238.

40 For a discussion of the Ulster aspect of these talks, see chapter IX, pp 431-4.

41 See Chamberlain's memoranda on the first two meetings of the Round Table conference, in Chamberlain, Political memoir, pp 248-50.

42 Morley to Gladstone, 15 Jan. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).

43 Gladstone to Morley, 21 Jan. 1887, ibid.

44 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 289.

45 Chamberlain, Political memoir, p. 252.

46 The Times, 18 Jan. 1887.

47 See Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 293; Chamberlain, Political memoir, pp 258-61.

48 Ibid., pp 266-8.

49 For example, see D. T. Dorrity, 'Monkeys in a menagerie: the imagery of unionist opposition to home rule 1886-93' in Eire-Ireland, xii, no. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp 5-22.


52 Ibid., pp 28-9.

53 Ibid., p. 31.

54 Ibid., pp 274-7.

55 Ibid., p. 46.
NOTES TO PAGES 326-33

57 Ibid., pp 94-8, 278-90.
58 See chapter VI, p. 279.
59 Gladstone to Dicey, 12 Nov. 1886 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44499).
60 Morley, 'Some arguments considered' in Bryce, (ed.), *Handbook of home rule*, p. 246.
61 Ibid., pp 250, 253-8.
62 Ibid., p. 259.
64 See p. 323.
65 *The Times*, 18 Mar. 1887.
66 Ibid., 19 Mar. 1887.
67 Ibid., 28 Mar. 1887.
69 *The Times*, 9 Apr., 2 May 1887.
70 Hutton and Cohen, *Gladstone's speeches 1886-8*, pp 238-54. However, feeling in the liberal party was growing strongly in favour of retention. See Morley to Gladstone, 26 May 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).
71 Lord Salisbury also believed that coercion could have this effect on British opinion. Salisbury to A. J. Balfour, 24 Dec. 1887, 18 Jan. 1888 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add MSS 49688/49689).
72 Garvin, *Chamberlain*, ii, 310-16.
74 Morley to Gladstone, 14 Sept. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).
76 Morley to Gladstone, 13 Nov. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers Add. MS 44255).
77 Morley to Gladstone, 30 Nov. 1887, ibid.
78 *Graphic*, 2 July 1887.
NOTES TO PAGES 333-40


80 Aberdeen, 'We twa', p. 278.

81 In the preface to his history of the tenant-right movement of the 1850s, which appeared shortly after the defeat of Gladstone's first home rule bill, he criticised the Parnellite party for failing 'to unite the four provinces on a common platform as your predecessors did. What signal results it might produce at this hour had you been able to': Sir C. G. Duffy, The league of north and south (London, 1886), p. viii.


83 See chapter VI, passim.

84 Duffy, 'Fair constitution', p. 303.

85 Ibid., p. 302.

86 Ibid., p. 304.

87 Ibid., p. 305.

88 Ibid., p. 306.


90 Duffy, op. cit., pp 308-11.

91 Ibid., pp 312, 315-17.

92 See chapter II, pp 107-8.

93 Duffy, 'Fair constitution', pp 322-5.

94 Ibid., pp 326-7.

95 See a separate printing of this article (London, 1892), pp 1-3, 39-45.

96 Ibid., p. 104.

97 Ibid. See also Duffy to J. F. X. O'Brien, 29 Aug., 20 Dec. 1887 (N.L.I., O'Brien papers, MS 13424).

98 Galbraith to Duffy, 4 Sept. 1887 in Duffy, Fair constitution, pp 4-5.

99 Ibid., p. 5.

100 Ibid.
NOTES TO PAGES 340-5

101 Galbraith to Duffy, 4 Sept. 1887 in Duffy, Fair constitut-

102 See chapter VIII, pp 396-7.

103 Duffy to Sigerson, 31 Aug. 1888 (N.L.I., Sigerson papers, MS 81000(5)).

104 O'Brien, Parnell, p. 405.

105 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 267.


107 Magnus, Gladstone, p. 375.


109 Daunt, Ire. since the union, pp 296-8.

110 See pp 316-17.


112 Daunt to Gladstone, 9 Mar. 1888 in Daunt, Ire. since the union, pp 287-9.

113 Gladstone to Daunt, 14 Mar. 1888, ibid., p. 290.

114 Daunt to Gladstone, 29 Mar. 1888, ibid., pp 290-96.

115 First report of Her Majesty's commissioners appointed to inquire into the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland: minutes of evidence and appendices, 20 Mar. 1895, p. 52 [C7720-1], H.C. 1895, xxxvi, 113.

116 Gladstone's notes for a meeting with Parnell, 8 Mar. 1888 (B.N., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44773).

117 Gladstone's memorandum of a meeting with Parnell, 10 Mar, 1888, ibid. See also Lyons, Parnell, pp 440-42.

118 Ibid., p. 443. It is worth pointing out that Rhodes got far more for his £10,000 donation to Irish party funds than a largely insignificant contribution to his dream of imperial federation. At this time, he was having a royal charter 'steered' through parliament, which in 1889, granted to his British South Africa Company extensive loans to exploit the vast territory of Rhodesia. The bill conferring this grant, surprisingly went through parliament without a debate: 'No parliamentary inquiry
was granted; no parliamentary debate was allowed....'. It would not be overly cynical to see Rhode's grant to the Irish party as being as much intended to forestall criticism of this move by both liberals and Parnellites, while at the same time without raising tory suspicions as to his imperial patriotism. Personally, he was as contemptuous of the Parnellite party in general, as any tory could be. See the following, Simon Haxey, Tory M.P. (London, 1939), p. 104; Sir Lewis Mitchell, The life of Cecil John Rhodes (London, 1910), i, 249. Parnell's interest in imperial affairs, to the extent that it existed, was, moreover, centered on southern Africa. For the imperial interests of nationalist M.P.'s generally, See O'Day, English face of Irish nationalism, chapter 10; G. F. Taylor, 'Cecil Rhodes and the second home rule bill' in Hist. Jn., xiv, no. 4 (1971), pp 374-80.

119 See his interview in P.M.G., 10 July 1888.

120 W.N.W., 15 Dec. 1888.

121 In this respect it is worth noting that, since 1886, the unionist government had a formidable propaganda ally in the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union, which concentrated its efforts on English constituencies returning Gladstonian M.P.'s, and more importantly, in August 1887 initiated a policy of distributing 'to the editors of English, Scottish and foreign newspapers' weekly editions of their newsheet, Notes from Ireland, providing pro-government views of Irish politics. See Minutes of the executive council meetings of the I.L.P.U. 23 July 1886, 20 Aug. 1887 (P.R.O.N.I., I.L.P.U. papers D989/A1/3).

122 Balfour's memorandum on the Irish situation, early 1888 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add. MS 49822). The source of Balfour's views about the effects of the crimes act in Ireland, seems to have been a memorandum drawn up by C. K. Falconer, a member of a committee on Irish income-tax that toured the south and west of Ireland in late 1887. Falconer argued that Irish people formerly terrorised by the National League were now supporting the government and that many were fearful of the 'arbitrary taxation that would occur under home rule'. See memorandum on the state of the south and west of Ireland, 16 Dec. 1887, ibid. (Add. MS 49688).

123 Chamberlain, Political memoir, pp 279-81. Nationalists introduced their own Irish local government bill in this session. It was, however, doomed to failure. See A bill
for the better government of counties in Ireland, p.1
H.C. 1888 (6), ii, 377.

124 Chamberlain, Political memoir, p. 282.

125 Chamberlain's speech at Huddersfield, 17 Sept. 1889 in
L.U.A., Case for the union, leaflet no. 126.

126 Gladstone's speech at Bingley Hall, Birmingham, 7 Nov.
1888 in Hutton and Cohen, The speeches of W. E. Gladstone

127 Morley to Gladstone, 28 Dec. 1888 (B.M., Gladstone papers,
Add. MS 44255).

128 Morley to Gladstone 15 Jan. 1889, ibid.

129 This subject was discussed by Gladstone and some ex-
cabinet colleagues before his meeting with Parnell.
Gladstone, Lord Ripon, Morley and Spencer were generally
in favour of retention of reduced members, with Harcourt
dissenting. The radical element in the party at large,
however, led by Henry Labouchere and Sir Edward Reed,
adamantly favoured exclusion. See Lyons, Parnell, pp 448-9.

130 Gladstone's notes for a meeting with Parnell, 18 Dec. 1889
(B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44773).

131 Gladstone's record of his meeting with Parnell, 23 Dec.
1889, ibid.

132 Lyons, Parnell, p. 457; Sullivan, No man's man, p. 60.

133 Chamberlain to Hartington, 21 Nov. 1890 in Chamberlain,
Political memoir, p. 291.

134 See pp 318-20.

135 Morley to Gladstone, 15 Nov. 1890 (B.M., Gladstone papers,
Add. MS 44265). See also a detailed memorandum of the
meeting on which this letter was based, in Morley,
Recollections, i, 252-6.

136 Dicey to Balfour, 26 Apr. 1890 (B.M., Balfour papers,
Add. MS 49689).

137 Balfour to Dicey, 30 Apr. 1890, ibid.

138 Local government (Ireland) bill, pp 1-46, H.C. 1892
(174), iii, 609-55.

139 Blanche Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, first earl of
Balfour (London, 1936), i, 206.
NOTES TO PAGES 352-6

140 Morley to Gladstone, 21 Dec. 1890 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44256).
141 Sullivan, No Man's Man, p. 117.
142 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, pp 341-2.
143 McDonagh, Life of William O'Brien, p. 136; Morley, Gladstone, iii, 342.

VIII: THE IRISH PROTESTANT HOME RULE ASSOCIATION 1886-93:
THE PROTESTANT CONTRIBUTION TO HOME RULE NATIONALISM


2 Galbraith did not coin the phrase, but revived it. It was first used in nationalist literature in the period 1858-60. See McDonagh, Home rule movement, pp 12-13 and Thornley, Issac Butt and home rule, chapters 3 and 4.

3 Spontaneous gatherings of protestant home rulers occurred even before Gladstone produced his home rule bill. For example, in January 1886 a meeting of presbyterians in favour of home rule was recorded at Saintfield, County Down. See P.M.G., 23 Jan.1886. Londonderry unionists were embarrassed when, in mid-February, Derry city presbytery refused to pass a motion condemning home rule. See L.S., 6 Feb.1886

4 P. J. O. McCann, The protestant home rule movement, 1885-95 (M.A. thesis, N.U.I. (U.C.D.), 1972), p. 21. Despite the title of McCann's thesis, his work, as he acknowledges, is chiefly concerned with the activities of the Ulster executive of the I.P.H.R.A: being the first to be formed it was nominally the 'parent branch'. The contents of this chapter differ from that of McCann's thesis in three important respects. While mindful of the activities of the Belfast branch of the I.P.H.R.A., it is concerned to explain the role in home rule politics of protestant home rulers associated with the Dublin executive: it attempts to explain how the I.P.H.R.A. influenced Parnellite and catholic nationalist thinking on Irish protestant opposition to home rule. Similarly, it attempts to gauge their influence on Gladstone's view of the Irish question in this period.
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5 Belfast Morning News, 22 May 1886. Those who met to inaugurate the Belfast section of the I.P.H.R.A. were, in the main, the leaders of the minority section of the Ulster liberal party that declared against resolutions rejecting home rule, at the liberal party convention in Belfast on 15 Mar. 1886. See the report of the convention in the B.N.L., 20 Mar. 1886.

6 See the printed letter to Irish protestants dated 25 May 1886. (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657). This collection covers the activities of the Dublin part of the movement only; the papers of the Belfast executive no longer exist.

7 See minutes of meetings held on 28 and 29 May 1886, ibid.

8 Ibid., 3 June 1886.

9 Ibid., 5 June 1886.

10 Ibid., 7 June 1886.

11 Minute of the meeting held on the 12 June 1886 in Belfast, printed in the notice entitled, Address to the protestants of Ireland, ibid.

12 Ibid., 18 June 1886.

13 McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 30.


16 J. R. B. McMinn, The Reverend James Brown Armour and North Antrim politics 1869-1914 (Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1979), p. 281. The kind of difficulties many protestant liberals in Ulster had in coming to terms with home rule, found expression to a letter from S. C. Elroy to Jeremiah Jordan, 5 May 1886: 'I am still in the good old cause. I cannot give it up, notwithstanding my trials, political and agricultural....I am now close in line with Gladstone's home rule policy....You were able to get rid of northern prejudices, but better late than never is a saying of perpetual appropriateness.' (P.R.O.N.I., Jordan papers, D2073/3/5).
17 See appendix 3, table 10, p. 556. It will be seen that the number of signatures for Ulster at 257, was over double those for Leinster.

18 McCann, Prot. home rule move., pp 35-6.


20 See also McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 36.

21 Lyons, Ire. since the famine, p. 360. It was Oldham who introduced Maud Gonne to nationalist politics. See Maud Gonne McBride, A servant of the queen (2nd ed., Dublin, 1954), pp 82-6.


24 Although O'Leary, being a fenian, did not formally become involved in the home rule campaign, he did attend at least one meeting of the Dublin executive of the I.P.H.R.A., and implicitly became involved in its activities with an article on guarantees for the protestant minority, in the event of home rule being enacted. See minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 30 June 1886. (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657); John O'Leary 'Some guarantees for the protestant and unionist minority' in D.U.R., ii, (Dec. 1886), pp 959-65.

25 See the minutes of Young Ireland Society meetings on 16 May, 1 Oct. 1885, 14 Jan. 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book of the Young Ireland Society, 1885-6, MS 19158). Douglas Hyde, also a fenian, did not take a prominent part in the activities of the I.P.H.R.A., but apparently confined his role to lecturing. See the minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 18 Mar. 1887 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

26 See pp 391-8.
NOTES TO PAGES 363-7

27 Alfred Webb, The opinions of some protestants regarding their catholic fellow-countrymen (Dublin, 1886), p.3.
28 Ibid., passim.
29 Apart from Dublin City, Limerick and Cork cities were the other centres of significant I.P.H.R.A. activity. It has been argued that in County Cork 10 per cent of the protestant population was non-unionist, and that in Cork city considerable social interaction by protestants and catholics all 'along the economic and social line, from the railway director to the agricultural labourer, from the university professor to the milling hand', resulted in 'a society in which the conditions for the flourishing of such persons [protestant home rulers] were particularly favourable'. See Ian d'Alton, 'Southern Irish unionism: a study of Cork unionists, 1884-1914' in R. Hist. Soc. Trans., 5 series, 23 (June, 1972), pp 72,73,79.
31 Ibid., p. 40.
32 See Lord Greville's letter to the editor, Leinster Leader, 26 June 1886. Attempts to involve Lord Greville and Lord Powerscourt, who was also known to be favourable to home rule, in the movement's activities, met with no success. See the minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 30 Mar. 1887 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).
35 In defining the typical British Radical M.P. in this period, T. W. Heyck includes the following characteristics: 'The late Victorian radical M.P. was a businessman...of the second generation of the family firm....As a young man he devoted himself completely to his business, and after accumulating a large fortune, he won various civic honours....He was a strong non-conformist...regularly pious in his home life. He was acutely conscious of non-conformist disabilities and of the political and social
privileges of the landed aristocracy....He was loyal to Gladstone but hated whigs'. See T. W. Heyck, The dimensions of British radicalism: the case of Ireland 1874-95 (Chicago, 1974), pp 9-10. Allowing for differences of context many leading members of the I.P.H.R.A. would, to varying degrees, fall within this definition of radical, in particular, Thomas Shillington, T. A. Dickson, Samuel Young, Alfred Webb, T. H. Webb and Jeremiah Jordan.

36 See notice entitled 'Address to the protestants of Ireland' (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

37 In 1891 Ulster accounted for 830,232 of the largest protestant denominations, episcopalian, presbyterian, and methodist. Their collective membership outside Ulster was 282,520. See Census Ire., 1891: preliminary report of the enumerator's statistics, p. 6 [C.6779], H.C. 1892, xc, 6.

38 It was a long standing grievance of presbyterians that they were continually discriminated against by successive governments in favour of Irish episcopalians. It was a feeling which persisted into the 1890s and did not finally dissolve until Lord Aberdeen's Irish viceroyalty in 1906. In fact, Aberdeen, the first presbyterian to hold the post, was accused of doing nothing "save for presbyterians". See Alan J. Megahey, The Irish protestant churches and social and political issues 1870-1914 (Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1969), pp 46-7.

39 Leaflet explaining why Irish protestants should support home rule, in a small volume of leaflets and pamphlets published by the Dublin executive of the I.P.H.R.A. (N.L.I., Ir 32341;127). See also, Blunt Land war, p. 133. Edmund Harvey, a vice-president of the I.P.H.R.A., estimated that about 15 per cent of Waterford protestants 'affect home rule ideas'.

40 P.M.G., 2 June 1886; McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 25.

41 In all about forty speakers, most of them from Ulster, went over to the mainland. See the minutes of meetings of the Dublin committee held on 26, 28, 29 June 1886. (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657); McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 46.

42 None stood for election specifically as members of the I.P.H.R.A.: three stood as liberals and three as nationalists. See Walker, Parl. election results, pp 136-7, 141.
43 Oldham to Webb, 10 July 1886 (N.L.I., Webb papers, MS 1746). See also McCann, Prot. home rule move., pp 41-2.

44 W.N.W., 16 July 1887. This paper dismissed claims by protestant home rulers of persecution by fellow-protestants.

45 Jeremiah Jordan, 'An Irish methodist's reasons for supporting home rule' in Methodist Times, 14 Feb. 1886. See also the correspondence on the subject of Jordan's claim that a poor law election in which was a losing candidate, was unfairly conducted. (P.R.O.N.I., Jordan papers, D2073/1).

46 Minutes of the meeting of the Route Reform Club, held on 11 April 1888 (P.R.O.N.I., Minute book of the Route Reform Club, D.O.D. 1426).


49 See report of the attack in Wexford Express, 12 June 1886.

50 See p. 405.

51 McCarthy, Story of an Irishman, pp 384-5. In another incident in County Londonderry, a protestant home ruler had an explosion occur near his country residence: the perpetrators ran off shouting "Traitor, you sold us and deserted your religion". See the report of this affair in E.J., 13 July 1886. See also N.&S. [A specifically protestant home rule newspaper] 4 June 1887, for a report on the persistent intimidation of James Simms of Drumalane, Kilrea.

52 Shillington to John Pinkerton, 3 Aug. 1886 in McMinn, Armour, p. 288.

53 Rev. A. Duncan to Jordan, 4 May 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Jordan papers, D2073/2/1/13).

54 Minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 30 June 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).
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55 Minutes of the Dublin committee meetings, 19, 26 July 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657); John Shanks to Alfred Webb, mid-July 1886 (N.L.I., Webb papers MS 1746); McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 42.


57 A resolution passed at the meeting of the Dublin committee, 22 Dec. 1886, ibid. The Belfast executive, though, did not take such a firm stand on this question, and many protestant home rulers in Ulster, were in fact, more keen on land reform than home rule. See McCann, Prot. home rule move., pp 99-100; McMinn, Armour, chapter 9.

58 Minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 18 July 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

59 Ibid., 8 Oct. 1886.

60 See chapter VII, pp 317-18.


62 See chapter VII, pp 334-41.


64 Belfast Morning News, 10 Jan. 1887; McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 93. However, given the difficulty of ascertaining the true extent of the movement's support and the fact that Johnston's estimate was itself given as part of a public demonstration to further the association's objectives, it is more than likely that some degree of exaggeration, or speculation, was involved.


66 See the report of the meeting in N.&S., 16 Apr. 1887. Representatives of the I.P.H.R.A. came from all over Ireland; those on the platform were well over 100 strong. Many letters of encouragement were received, especially one from Gladstone.
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67 N.&S., 22 Jan. 1887. This paper was published by the printing firm of Alfred and T. H. Webb, and edited by C. H. Oldham. It ran from January to December 1887 and is an important source of protestant home rule opinion on many questions. An almost complete set of issues is in the library of Trinity College, Dublin.

68 Minutes of the Dublin committee meetings, 29 Apr., 2, 3 May, 2, 8 June, 1887 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

69 Ibid., 28 Aug., 6 Sept. 1887.

70 Ibid., 26, 30 Nov. 1887.

71 Ibid., 24, 31 Mar. 1888.

72 Thomas Shillington to the Dublin executive, 20 Apr. 1888, ibid. The reaction to this communication by the Dublin executive was to pass another resolution refusing to commit themselves 'to any views on the land question'.

73 Circular convening the annual meeting of 1888, ibid.

74 Minutes of Dublin committee meetings, 19 Jan., 16 Feb. 1889, ibid.

75 Webb to Harrington, 21 Sept. 1887 (N.L.I., Harrington papers, MS 8576(52)).

76 Galbraith's action in joining the National League led to his losing his seat on the finance committee of the Representative Body of the Church of Ireland. This he felt deeply, as, possessed of a fine business mind, he had been largely responsible for putting the finances of the church in order following disestablishment. It was argued that his membership of the National League was 'incompatible' with his duties as a member of the representative body, which, being a land owner, was required to 'enforce the just rights of property and to uphold law and order against the very body with which you have connected yourself'. Robert Knox, Lord Primate of Ireland to Galbraith, 28 Dec. 1887 (T.C.D., Galbraith papers, MS 3856/1/8).

77 See report of the meeting of the central branch of the National League in the first week of June 1889, at which Oldham was a prominent speaker, in U.I., 8 June 1889.

Cardozo claims that Gonne's speeches were well publicised in France, Germany, Russia and even Egypt: 'With her press service and her speeches she managed to get some two thousand items a year into the French press'.


80 This was also the fate of the Belfast executive, which also went into decline in 1888-9. See McCann, Prot. home rule move., pp 91-2.

81 Thinking that the Dublin executive was in the process of gathering a petition of protestant home rulers, similar to that presented by T. A. Dickson to Gladstone at the end of May 1886, Timothy Harrington sent an urgent telegram requesting that it be forwarded to London as quickly as possible. No such petition, however, was in existence, nor was one planned. A resolution of the Dublin committee endorsing home rule was offered instead. See minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 5 June 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

82 National Press Agency, The government of Ireland: address to the protestants of Ireland from the I.P.H.R.A. (London, 1886). See also the fine quality photogravure entitled 'Leaders of the Irish Nation' depicting Parnellite M.P.s with, in the foreground, the Rev. J. A. Galbraith in the company of Parnell and Archbishop Walsh. (T.C.D., Galbraith papers, MS 3856/2/4).

83 F.J., 23 June 1886.

84 Cork Daily Herald, 7 June 1886. See also earlier issues of 27, 28 May and 4 June, for similar endorsements of the I.P.H.R.A., and expressions of belief in the growing conversion of Irish protestants to home rule.

85 Weekly Examiner, 29 May 1886.

86 See p. 370.


88 The result of the election was: C. E. Lewis 1782: Justin McCarthy 1778. However, on petition Lewis was unseated and the seat awarded to McCarthy. See Walker, Parl. election results., p. 139.
The result was: Thomas Sexton (N) 3832: J. H. Haslett (U) 3729. See Walker, Parl election results, p. 137.

Weekly Examiner, 10 July 1886. See also the following: Nation, 5 June 1886; Anglo-Celt, 3 July 1888; Belfast Morning News, 22 May, 3 June 1886; Derry Journal, 30 June 5 July 1886; U.I., 26, 29 June 1886.

See Sophie Bryant, 'The Ripon and Morley demonstration [in Dublin]' in J.H.R.U., i,i (Mar. 1888), pp 5-7. This article emphasised the degree to which persons engaged in business and the professions, consisting to a large extent on protestants, supported the nationalist movement.

See p. 366.

Anderson of Cork, reported in the F.J., 2 July 1886.

See pp 364-5.

It is indicative of southern Parnellite ignorance of Ulster, that many thought County Fermanagh, which had a majority of catholics, was protestant. This ignorance went further on the Rev. McKilleen's part: O'Brien did not represent a Fermanagh constituency but South Tyrone.

Rev. McKilleen to Jordan, 13 May 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Jordan papers, D2073/2/8).

Rev. G. McNeill to Jordan 1 May 1886, ibid. (D2073/2/6).

James McAviney to Jordan 14 May 1886, ibid. (D2073/2/9). Although Jordan's representation of catholic County Clare was intended by Parnellites to demonstrate catholic tolerance, it is worth pointing out that the Parnellite party had originally wanted him to represent a County Fermanagh constituency. However, this idea was abandoned when Archdeacon Smollen of Enniskillen condemned the proposal, on the grounds that Jordan was 'nowhere with the catholics'. See Smollen to Timothy Harrington, 12 Oct. 1885 (N.L.I., Harrington papers, MS 8576(47)).

Rev. H. S. Fegan, Irish nationality - an appeal to educated Englishmen (London, 1886); An Ulster protestant, Some thoughts on home rule (London, 1886); Alfred Webb, The

103 McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 57; Minutes of the Dublin committee meetings, 26 July, 22 Dec. 1886, Jan 19, April 29 1887. (N.L.I. Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

104 McCann, Prot. home rule move., pp 70-72

105 Alexander Bowman's letter to the editor, W.N.W., 9 Oct. 1886.


107 Davitt to John O'Leary, n.d. [late 1885?] (T.C.D., Davitt papers, series i,z1122, f. 1057).

108 McNeill to Harrington, 22 Jan. 1887 (N.L.I., Harrington papers, MS 8576(27)). It was reported that T. A. Dickson was first approached about this seat but his refusal to take the party pledge ruled him out of consideration. See W.N.W., 12 Feb. 1887.

109 Parnell to Galbraith, 11 Apr. 1888 (T.C.D., Galbraith papers, MS 3856/1/13).

110 G. H. Kidd to Harrington, 28 Apr. 1888 (N.L.I., Harrington papers, MS 8576(28)). Kidd was typical of many professional Protestants who joined the I.P.H.R.A. Willing to identify with home rule, they yet found public political canvassing distasteful. It is likely that Kidd's reasons for declining the offer to stand for parliament was the same as his reason for dropping out of active involvement in the activities of the Dublin executive: 'He did not want to become habitually involved in public politics'. See the minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 3 Mar. 1888 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

111 O'Brien, Parnell and his party, p. 262.

112 Ibid., p. 261.

113 McDonald, an ex-Church of Ireland clergyman, was blind: Pyne, an Englishman, and untypical of Protestant home rule M.P.s, was reported to be a drunkard. See the notes on both men in 'List of nationalist members of parliament giving short particulars about the political views of each' (S.P.O., C.B.S., Police reports 1886-1915, carton no. 4). Davitt described Pyne thus: 'His politics may be defined as land leagueism with a good deal of
eccentricity': Davitt to John O'Leary, n.d. [late 1885?] (T.C.D., Davitt papers, series, i, z 1122, f. 1057).

114 The R.I.C. report on the Parnellite M.P.s and their political views, noted above, described only 3 of 9 protestant M.P.s - William Abraham, G. D. Pyne, and Dr Tanner - as likely to be 'violent' or 'fiery speakers'. The rest, including McNeill, Mahony, McDonald, Jordan and Pinkerton were described as 'moderate'. Parnell also belonged to this conservative section of the party. See 'List of nationalist members of parliament giving short particulars about the political views of each'(S.P.O., C.B.S., Police reports 1886-1915. carton no. 4). Indeed, at a time when he was delivering rousing speeches in Ulster during the plan of campaign in 1886, Pinkerton was also in correspondence with the Irish Lord chancellor's office, arguing: 'At every meeting I have exercised a restraining influence upon the people warning them against the semblence of disorder....' See Pinkerton to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, 24 Dec. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Pinkerton papers, D1078/P/27). Pinkerton's position as a justice of the peace had been under examination because of his activities during the plan of campaign.

115 Handbill entitled 'To the electors of Galway', ibid. (D1078/P/19). Pinkerton, an anti-Parnellite, was defending the seat against a Parnellite candidate, Arthur Lynch. The result was Pinkerton 642; Lynch 593. See Walker, Parl. election results, p. 146.

116 See p. 378.

117 See the pamphlet entitled The Irish question, consisting of an interview given by Pinkerton to the editor of the Eastern Daily Express (P.R.O.N.I., Pinkerton papers, D1078/P/44A).

118 See also N.&S., 20 Aug. 1887: 'The strongest body [in a home rule parliament] would consist of merchants, manufacturers, lawyers and journalists....In such a body as this Irish protestants would have a splendid chance....'


120 N.&S., 6 Aug. 1887.

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122 The historical case for Ulster protestant inclusion in both the Irish nation and a future home rule scheme, was provided in C. H. Oldham, The record of Ulster protestantism in the history of Irish patriotism (Belfast, 1888). See also the following leading articles in N.&S.: 'An appeal to the presbyterians of Ulster', 19 Feb. 1887; 'The problem of Ulster', 21 May 1887; 'The interests of Ulster', 9 July 1887.

123 Augustine Birrell was to write that, even as the 1914 Larne gun-running scandal was at its height, Samuel Young, an Ulster protestant nationalist M.P., was telling him that Ulster unionist talk about civil war and bloodshed was all "bluff, bluff, bluff". Cited in St. John Ervine, Craigavon: Ulsterman (London, 1949), p. 211

124 The Fermanagh Times described Jeremiah Jordan as a 'so-called protestant'. See the issue of 13 May 1886. A similar view was taken of Thomas Shillington by Portadown unionists. See the Portadown and Lurgan News, 5, 12 June 1886. See also the comments made on protestant home rulers by the Rev. R. J. Lynd, moderator of the presbyterian church, in W.N.W., 24 Nov. 1888.

125 In this respect it may be worth pointing out that despite many requests to attend nationalist meetings held on Sundays, the I.P.H.R.A. persistently refused to co-operate. See minutes of the Dublin committee meetings, 28 Jan., 22 Dec. 1886 (N.L.I. Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657). One contemporary catholic historian could describe the anxieties of protestant home rulers as residual elements of religious bigotry still to be eliminated. See M. F. J. McDonnell, Ireland and the home rule movement (2nd ed., Dublin 1908), p. 109.

126 See p. 369.

127 For one of the most perceptive studies of nationalism, despite its contemporary preoccupation with 'organic' terminology, see Sophie Bryant, 'The truth of national sentiment' in D.U.R., ii (Mar. 1886), pp 216-33. See also Oldham, 'Irish nationality', passim.

128 Ibid., p. 468.

129 Gwynn, Experiences, p. 56.

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131 Rolleston, 'The archbishop in politics', p. 100.
133 As was seen, Rolleston published a collection of Davis's prose writings in this period. See note 39 to chapter I, p. 561.
134 Irish unionists were described thus in N.&S.: 'In temperament and mental attitude they are Irish to the core. For good or ill the faults and virtues of their country are in their blood; nay they have ever claimed to speak as Irishmen and for Ireland.' See the article 'Must Irishmen be Irish?', which emphasised art and 'culture' as aspects of Irish nationality and not merely political struggle. See the issue of 29 Jan. 1887.
136 Ibid., p. 11.
137 N.&S., 26 Feb. 1887.
138 Davitt to the editor, N.&S., 5 Mar. 1887.
139 See the leading article entitled 'For nation or for class?' in ibid.
140 O'Leary to the editor, N.&S., 12 Mar. 1887.
141 Kettle to the editor, N.&S., 19 Mar. 1887.
142 O'Leary to the editor, N.&S., 26 Mar. 1887.
143 Kettle to the editor, N.&S., 2 Apr. 1887.
144 See Michael Davitt to Walsh, Aug. 1886 in Walsh, William J. Walsh, p. 231. Interestingly Davitt took a favourable view of this suggestion.
146 N.&S., 17 Sept. 1887. The emphasis placed on the importance of the gentry to Irish nationality was very similar to that found in many of Gladstone's publications of this period. However, the inspiration in each case was different. Gladstone was inspired by his hierarchical view of the 'proper' order of society in general, while the Dublin protestant home rulers were inspired by the writings of Thomas Davis.

149 Ibid., pp 6-7.

150 Ibid., p. 12.


152 See pp 378-9.

153 Newspaper cutting, dated 21 May 1888 (N.L.I., Webb papers MS 1746). Webb's objection, though, was not so much to Rolleston's views as to the manner in which he publicly voiced them. He himself had objected to the Parnellites' hostile reaction to the prince of Wales's visit to Ireland in 1885, and to the treatment meted out by nationalists to a family unjustly boycotted in early 1886. See relevant newspaper cuttings in ibid., (MS 1745).


155 O'Brien, *Parnell and his party*, p. 333.

156 Ibid., p. 284.

157 As an instance of the ill-feeling that existed between the northern and southern sections of the movement, see the letter of D. J. Higham to Timothy Harrington, 22 Nov. 1890 (N.L.I., Harrington papers, MS 8576(2)). Referring to T. W. Dickson's refusal to attend a pro-Parnell meeting in Dublin, Higham concluded: 'This comes of allowing gentlemen of this ilk into the party for the sake of effect.'


159 See chapter II, p. 62.

160 W.N.W., 26 June 1886.


162 Samuel Walker, T. A. Dickson, Pierce Mahony, and J. G. S. McNeill, for example, were in contact with Gladstone, John Morley and Lord Spencer in this period. See the following MSS in the Gladstone papers in the British Museum: Samuel Walker to Lord Spencer, 10 Mar. 1886, enclosing suggestings on the 1886 land purchase bill (Add. MS 56447); Henry Labouchere to Gladstone, n.d. [1890s] communicating T. A. Dickson's views on the land question (Add. MS 44153); J. G. S. McNeill to Gladstone, 8 Nov. 1886, on the publication of home rule propaganda. (Add. MS 44499);
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Pierce Mahony to Gladstone, 11 Mar. 1890, declining his invitation to dinner because of commitments in Ireland (Add. MS 44789).

163 The Dublin committee made a firm decision to accept no financial assistance whatever from the Parnellite party. See Minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 79 July 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657); McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 46.

164 Minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 23 Sept. 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

165 McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 57.

166 Oldham to Webb, 9 Apr. 1887 (N.L.I., Webb papers, MS 1746); McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 93. See also the minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 12 July 1886 (Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

John Pinkerton was one of the most effective of the protestant home rule speakers in England. For some favourable reaction to his efforts see the annual report of the Beesley and district Liberal Association, 1887: 'Mr Pinkerton, as an Ulster tenant-farmer and a protestant member of parliament for a catholic city, was well qualified to deal with the "religion" difficulty in Ireland.' (P.R.O.N.I., Pinkerton papers, D1078/P/32).

167 See chapter IX, p. 438.


169 Gladstone to C. H. Oldham, 9 Apr. 1887 in N.&S., 16 Apr. 1887.


171 See Dillon, Hansard 3, cccxv, 522-3 (19 May 1887); Alexander Blane, ibid., 718 (20 May 1887); M. J. Kenny, Michael McCartan, ibid., 886-80 (23 May 1887); McCartan ibid., 1221-2 (7 June 1887); McCartan, ibid., 245-6 (16 June 1887).

172 Gladstone's speech in the house of commons, 29 Mar. 1887 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone speeches, 1886-8, p. 188.

173 See p. 371.

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175 Minutes of the Dublin committee meeting, 3 Nov. 1886 (N.L.I., Minute book and notices of the I.P.H.R.A., MS 3657).

176 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 280-81.

177 Gladstone's speech in the house of commons, 7 July 1887 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, pp 264-5.

178 See Macaulay's letter to the P.M.G., 16 Apr. 1887, explaining these incidents, reprinted in N.&S., 30 Apr. 1887.

179 It was raised in parliament at least twice. See Patrick O'Brien, Hansard 3, ccxiii, 873-4 (14 Apr. 1887).

180 McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 96.

181 See p. 369.


184 McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 90. See also the reply to this petition from the Dublin branch of the I.P.H.R.A., in C. H. Oldham, Irish nonconformist ministers: their true weight in Irish politics examined (N.L.I., Ir 32341; 127). Oldham argued that the ministers did not represent the views of the laity which were well in advance of the clergy 'in liberal opinions'.

185 See appendix 3, pp 554-6.

186 See Alfred Webb to Oldham, n.d. [early 1893], congratulating him on 'having brought the society together again' (N.L.I., Webb papers, MS 1746).

187 See F.I., 29 Apr. 1893.


189 Ibid., p. 110.

190 J. B. Dougherty to Armour, n.d. 1893 (P.R.O.N.I., Armour papers, D1792/A1/1/6).

191 Armour, Armour of Ballymoney, pp 118-21.

192 Ibid., p. 121.

193 See McMinn, Armour, pp 89-90.

194 Gladstone to Armour, 12 Aug. 1893 in Armour, Armour of Ballymoney, p. 122. See also a subsequent letter of
NOTES TO PAGES 408-12

Gladstone to Armour, 29-30 Aug. 1893, ibid., p. 125, affirming his belief, despite unionist objections to the contrary, that the signatures associated with Armour's address were genuine.

IX: THE LIBERAL-NATIONALIST ALLIANCE AND THE ULSTER QUESTION, 1886-92

1 Walker, Parl. election results, pp 133, 134, 137, 139.
2 Of Ulster's 33 constituencies, the Parnellites held 17 and the unionists 16.
3 See chapter IV, table 2, p. 199.
5 Adapted from a report entitled 'Leading nationalist associations in Ireland (open and secret) with their approximate strength on 31 October 1889' (S.P.O., C.B.S., Police reports, 6317/S).
6 Adapted from ibid.
7 McElroy, Route land crusade, pp 45, 57, 74-5.
8 Jeremiah McVeagh claimed that 'of farmers and agriculturalists' in Ulster, Roman Catholics represented 87,453 out of a total of 154,876. See F.J., 2 May 1893.
9 Woods, Catholic church and Ir. politics, p. 441.
10 W.N.W., 15 Jan. 1887.
11 W.N.W., 29 Jan. 1887.
12 W.N.W., 5 Feb. 1887.
13 W.N.W., 26 Feb., 5, 12, 19 Mar. 1887: J. L. McCracken, notes that while the National League was strong enough to affect the payment of rents, and to prevent the letting of farms from which tenants had been evicted on the Drapers estate in Londonderry, 'I can safely say that where there was a mixed protestant and catholic population the league made little mark. More common was what a police officer called "a silent resistence" - no boycotting, no intimidation, simply the determination, not to pay a burdensome rent.' See J. L. McCracken, 'The
consequences of the land war' in Moody and Beckett, Ulster since 1800: polit. and economic survey, p. 65.

14 Newspaper cutting from the Belfast Morning News, (?) Dec. 1886, entitled 'The nationalist cause in the north' (P.R.O.N.I., Pinkerton papers, D1078/P/1).

15 See the report of a Daily News article on 'Ulster and the plan of campaign', in W.N.W., 1 Jan. 1887. The attitude of many presbyterian tenant-farmers would have been expressed by a ruined voting slip William O'Brien discovered during his election contest in South Tyrone, in 1886; this had written over it, against the name of Somerset Maxwell, his landlord opponent, 'No landlord!', and against his own, 'No pope!' See O'Brien, Evening memories (Dublin, 1920), p. 134.


17 See the report of an interview with William O'Brien on the plan of campaign, in the Dublin Evening Mail, 28 Mar. 1887.

18 W.N.W., 2 Apr. 1887.

19 W.N.W., 16 Apr. 1887.

20 W.N.W., 31 Dec. 1887.

21 See the leading article in W.N.W., 2 Apr. 1887.


23 Solow, Land quest, and the Ir. economy, p. 189.

24 McMinn, Armour, chapter 9.

25 W.N.W., 6 Dec. 1886.

26 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 167-8.

27 Ross, Pilgrimage, p. 63; McCarthy, Story of an Irishman, p. 282. Thomas Sexton had told McCarthy that to win Derry city 'would be to wear the blue ribbon of the Irish national party'.

28 U.I., 30 Oct. 1886. In a variation on the theme of the essential 'Irishness' of Ulster protestants, C. H. Oldham argued that by their heroism in 1689 the defendants of Derry had 'proved their right to live in this land'. See Oldham, The record of Ulster in the history of Ir. patriotism, p. 8.
29 John Redmond, "Hugh O'Neill": a lecture (Naas, 1887), p. 12. This kind of rhetoric was repeated at local meetings in Ulster. See the speech of Father McShane at Coalisland, Co. Tyrone, in W.N.W., 23 Apr. 1887.


31 Montgomery to R. M. Dane, 13 July 1892 (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery papers, D627/428/129).


35 Ibid., passim.

36 Ibid., pp viii-ix.

37 For example, see Murphy, 'Recent protestant historians of Ireland', passim. See also Archbishop Plunket, Our past lineage and present duties (Dublin, 1891), passim.

38 Thomas Sexton's speech in the house of commons, Hansard 3, cccvii, 1616-27 (7 Sept. 1886); Riots commission report 1887, p. 11.

39 It has been argued that the generation of rioting from mid-century up to 1886, established widespread segregation and discrimination in employment. See A. C. Hepburn, 'Catholics in the north of Ireland, 1880-1921: the urbanisation of a minority' in A. C. Hepburn (ed.), Minorities in history (London, 1978), p. 89

40 Thomas Sexton's speech in the house of commons, Hansard 3, cccvii, 1614-15 (7 Sept. 1886).

41 The nationalist demand for changes in the composition of the commission was given weight by the fact that T. W. Russell, the liberal-unionist M.P. for South Tyrone, supported their argument. Ibid., 1616-27 (7 Sept. 1886).

42 See Saunderson to his wife, 25 Aug., 4 Sept. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T 2996/1/100, 105).
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43 W.N.W., 21 Aug. 1886.
45 Riot commission report 1887, p. 17.
46 What the loyal minority really want - ascendency, in a collection of National Press leaflets (N.L.I., Ir 32341 n1).
47 For the progress of this case, see J. J. Clancy, Six months unionist rule in Ireland (London, 1887), pp 80-82; W.N.W., 2 Apr. 1887.
48 See Clancy, Six months unionist rule, pp 83-5
49 Andrew Commins, Orangeism; what is it? and what will you do with it?: facts and considerations for the people of Great Britain (London, 1886), pp 19-21.
50 McCann, Prot. home rule move., p. 60. McCann, though, gives no source for this information.
51 Riots commission report 1887, p. 11.
52 Ibid., pp 16-17.
53 For Gladstone's case of it, see p. 467, chapter X, p. 514.
54 Report of one of the commissioners of inquiry, 1886, respecting the origin and circumstances of the riots in Belfast, in June, July, August and September, 1886, and the action taken thereon by the authorities; also in regard to the magisterial and police jurisdiction, arrangements; and establishment, for the borough of Belfast, pp 5-13 (C.5029), H.C. 1887, xviii, 635-43.
55 Hansard 3, cccxii, 698-700 (7 Apr. 1887).
56 Speech by Thomas Sinclair at Cambridge, 20 Nov. 1888 in the W.N.W., 24 Nov. 1888.
58 See the editorial comment on this issue in W.N.W., 12 Feb. 1887; Timothy Healy's speech in the house of commons, Hansard 3, cccxii, 623 (5 Apr. 1887).
59 See the debate on the Belfast main drainage bill, Hansard 3, cccxiv, 186-206 (28 Apr. 1887).
60 T. J. Campbell, Fifty years of Ulster 1890-1940 (Belfast, 1941), p. 45.
NOTES TO PAGES 426-31


62 Russell, Ire. and the emp., p. 277.

63 Blunt, Land war, p. 283. Extracts from U.I., reacting to the news of Ulster protestants being allocated vacant farms on 'plan' estates, were compiled and made into a short pamphlet entitled, A massacre of protestant farmers predicted by United Ireland. See pamphlet no. 172 in L.U.A., Case for the Union.


65 Gladstone's speech at Liverpool, 28 June 1886 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1886-8, p. 155.

66 See chapter VI, passim.


69 See 'Plain speaking on the Irish union' in Gladstone, Special aspects of Ir. quest., p. 322.

70 Gladstone, After thirty years, p. 20.

71 Lucas, Saunderson, p. 276.

72 William Johnston's diary entry, 11 June 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Johnston diaries, D880/2/38).

73 Ibid., 20 Feb. 1888 (D880/2/40).

74 Lucas, Saunderson, p. 159.

75 Ibid., p. 145.

76 Ibid., p. 159.

77 Ibid., pp 125, 275.

78 Ibid., p. 187.

79 H. W. Lucy, 'Mr Gladstone as an orator' in Reid, Life of Gladstone, p. 523.

80 Saunderson to his wife, 15 Feb. 1888 in Lucas, Saunderson, p. 150.

81 William Johnston's diary entry, 7 June 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Johnston diaries, D880/2/38).
NOTES TO PAGES 431-5

82 Ross, Pilgrimage, pp 84, 77.
83 See the editorial in the W.N.W., 14 May 1887. The distaste for Ulster unionism felt by Gladstone, was more bluntly expressed by Lord Spencer, who freely admitted to having described the Ulster unionist community as a 'miserable minority'. See McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 183.
84 They had blamed Saunderson 'who looks at the question from the point of view of Cavan and not of Belfast' for planting the idea in Gladstone's mind that Ulster protest- 
ants objected to being separated from the nationalist part of Ireland. See the W.N.W., 3 July 1886.
85 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 285.
86 Chamberlain's notes of the conference discussions, 14 Jan. 1887, ibid., pp 286-7.
87 Morley to Gladstone, 15 Jan. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).
88 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 277.
89 Morley to Gladstone, 17 Jan. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).
90 When the idea was first mooted during the 1886 home rule crisis, Parnell firmly rejected it. See Thorold, Labouchere, p. 290.
91 Joseph Chamberlin, Political memoir, p. 267. Of course the obstacles to separate Ulster treatment were greater than Parnellite opposition. Gladstone confided to Harcourt on 16 January 1887 that even if agreement to accept such a proposal were achieved among home rulers, it would not greatly 'advance' the matter: 'Our bid last April [1886] for plans of severance had no sequel of any kind and the idea seemed stillborn.' Hurst, Round table talks, pp 224-5.
92 See Parnell's speech in the Ulster Hall, 29 May 1891 in W.N.W., 30 May 1891.
93 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 287.
94 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 189.
95 Gladstone, After thirty years, p. 291.
96 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 192.
97 See Bright's letter to Gladstone, in W.N.W., 18 June 1887. Bright's letter had much point. During the home rule
debate in 1886, Thomas Sexton had shown that, given the extent to which the Catholic population was distributed over the whole province, a separate assembly for Protestants would have been impossible to construct.

98 Gladstone to Bright in W.N.W., 25 June 1887. Given his position as leader of the Irish unionist parliamentary party, Saunderson’s rejection of separate Ulster treatment naturally carried more weight than that of his colleagues.

99 Gladstone, After thirty years, pp 19-20. Herbert Gladstone wrongly gives the period of this correspondence as 1889.

100 W.N.W., 17 Sept. 1887.

98 Gladstone to Bright in W.N.W., 25 June 1887. Given his position as leader of the Irish unionist parliamentary party, Saunderson’s rejection of separate Ulster treatment naturally carried more weight than that of his colleagues.

101 Quoted in Daunt, Ire. since the Union, p. 297. See also reports on the deputation in W.N.W., 24 Sept., 8 Oct. 1887.

102 Gladstone’s speech at Derby, 20 Oct. 1887 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone’s speeches 1886-8, p. 308. See also his letter to the Belfast branch of the Young Ireland Society, in W.N.W., 8 Oct. 1887.

103 See pp 443, 445-6.


106 Chamberlain’s speech in the Ulster Hall, 12 Oct. 1887, quoted in McKnight Ulster as it is, ii, 103.

107 Morley to Gladstone, 15 Oct. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).

108 Gladstone’s speech at Nottingham, in W.N.W., 22 Oct. 1887.

109 See p. 434.

110 In this speech he referred to the condemnation of separate treatment by Dr Kane and Colonel Saunderson, following Chamberlain’s speech of 12 Oct. Kane, however, was to argue that his views had been misrepresented on this point. See McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 211.

111 Morley to Gladstone, 30 Nov. 1887 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44255).

112 The Home Rule Union devoted a considerable pamphlet to illustrating this point by detailing the extent to which
the Ulster counties were religiously intermixed. See 'Protestant Ulster': where is it? (N.L.I., p. 2298).

114 Ibid., p. 616.
115 Gladstone to the Dublin executive of the I.P.H.R.A. in W.N.W., 3 Nov. 1888.
116 Gladstone's speech at Birmingham, 7 Nov. 1888 in Hutton and Cohen, Gladstone's speeches 1888–92, pp 88–94.
117 See, for example, the extensive editorial reaction to Gladstone's historical charges in B.N.L., 1 Feb. 1887.
119 See J. J. Shaw, Mr Gladstone's two Irish policies: 1868 and 1886 (Belfast, 1888), pp 9–12; McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 194, 231-2.
120 W.N.W., 8 June 1889.
121 In 1881 the total figure for the three most important protestant denominations, including episcopalian, presbyterians and methodists, was 865,856. The catholic figure was 833,560. See Vaughan and Fitzpatrick, Ir. hist. stat.: population 1821–1971, p. 57.
122 See 'Home rule for Ireland' in Special aspects of the Ir. quest., p. 359.
123 Ibid., pp 361–2.
125 Morley to Gladstone, 18 Nov. 1890 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44256).
126 The chief organ of liberal unionism, the Liberal Unionist, made a point of emphasising that Ulster would 'remain forever' provided that the agrarian needs of tenant-farmers were catered for. See the issue of 30 Mar. 1887,
NOTES TO PAGES 447-52

129 Ibid., p. 118.
130 See Balfour's 'Memoranda on proposed legislation as it affects the land bill', 8 Apr. 1887 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add. MS 49822).
133 Herdman to Montgomery 14 Mar. 1888, ibid. (D627/428/38).
135 Craig-Sellar to Montgomery, 13 Mar. 1888, ibid. (D617/428/38). Russell had similarly annoyed G. J. Goschen. According to his daughter: 'he was the principal plague of her father, and that in consequence of the said T. W.'s threats and other pranks Mr Goschen thinks the present alliance of conservatives and L. [liberal] U. [unionists]'s cannot last another year'. See Richard Bagwell to Montgomery, 31 Aug. 1888, ibid. (D627/428/52).
137 Russell, Ire. and the emp., p. 267.
138 See Rentoul, Stray thoughts, pp 201-2; Ross, Pilgrimage, p. 106.
139 See p. 418.
140 Balfour to Sir Redvers Buller, 6 Apr. 1887 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add. MS 49826).
NOTES TO PAGES 452-5

144 Arnold-Forster to Montgomery, 7 Sept. 1894 (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery papers, D627/428/266).


151 See John Sinclair to Montgomery, 2 Nov. 1888, ibid. (D627/428/62).

152 See also the copy of a letter from Montgomery to G. de L. Willis, 26 Apr. 1889, describing the diminished support for compulsory purchase at the liberal unionist conference in London. See also Thomas Lea to Montgomery, 4 Nov. 1889, claiming that opinion among liberal unionist and conservative farmers for compulsory purchase was still strong, ibid. (D627/428/99,114).


154 Russell, Ire. and the Emp., p. 249.

155 Moore, Truth about Ulster, p. 41.

156 E. S. W. de Cobain to Rev. Fletcher de Cobain, 19 Nov. 1888 (N.L.I., de Cobain papers, MS 17729(1)).

157 R. A. Egerton, secretary to the postmaster general, to Saunderson, 30 Dec. 1886 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T2996/4/13).

NOTES TO PAGES 456-64

159 Salisbury to Balfour, 24 Sept. 1891 (B.M., Balfour papers, Add. MS 49689).

160 McGeogh to Montgomery, 1 Jan. 1891 (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery papers, D627/428/151); McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 262. McKnight argues that in Ulster, by which he undoubtedly means protestant Ulster, the whole controversy was generally treated with indifference.


162 Morley to Gladstone, 'Memo. on the Irish crisis', 21 Dec. 1890 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44256).

163 See p. 454.

164 Belfast Morning News, 10, 16, 18 Nov. 1885, cited in Gibbon, Origins of Ulster unionism, p. 93.

165 H. S. Kennedy, The Irish News and Belfast Morning News 1855-1935. This account was privately printed for shareholders to mark the paper's eightieth birthday in 1935 (Linenhall Library, ref. N7798).

166 Ibid., p. 11.

167 Ibid., p. 12.


169 In the W.N.W. report of the speech, the word 'majority' was erroneously inserted here.

170 Parnell's speech in the Ulster Hall, 29 May 1891 in W.N.W., 30 May 1891.

171 Bew, Parnell, pp 127, 130.

172 Parnell's speech in W.N.W., 30 May 1891.

173 See chapter IV, pp 196-7.

174 See chapter X, pp 510-11.

175 Both these reactions are taken from a survey of Irish press opinion on Parnell's death in F.J., 8 Oct. 1891.

176 See pp 472-3.

177 See O'Farrell, Ireland's English question, pp 199-207.

NOTES TO PAGES 464-9


180 Ibid.

181 Adopted from report estimating the strength of nationalist associations in Ireland, Dec. 1892, ibid.

182 Note to the City of Belfast return, 11 Feb. 1893, ibid.

183 Note attached to returns from the northern division, 23 Feb. 1893, ibid.

184 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 300.

185 Justin McCarthy, 'The home rule view of the Ulster convention' in Black and White, 25 June 1892.

186 F.J., 18 June 1892.

187 F.J., 19 June 1892.

188 Harcourt to Saunderson, 29 May 1892 (P.R.O.N.I., Saunderson papers, T2996/3/23); Lucas, Saunderson, pp 180-81.

189 This investigation, held in 1891, was connected with the plan to elevate the mayor to the status of lord mayor by royal charter, but in the course of the investigation the employment practices of Belfast corporation, it was demonstrated that this body employed only 2 catholics out of 89 employees were again highlighted. Moreover, it was shown that the harbour board had 37 employees, none of whom were catholics, and that while the board of Belfast poor law guardians had 91 employees, only 3 were catholics and 2 of these, being teachers, were compulsory appointments. What was most scandalous, though, was that while the board had 1300 catholic paupers under its care, its refusal to employ more than 1 catholic nurse meant that numbers of them died yearly without receiving the last rites of their church - a state of affairs the committee of inquiry thought "perfectly monstrous". Again, the Rev. J. C. Street, a protestant clergyman, declared the system of discrimination so intense in Belfast that it was virtually impossible to introduce a catholic into public life. Naturally such evidence was prime material for home rule propagandists, and nationalists compiled large extracts from it in a pamphlet for circulation during the home rule debate of 1892-3. See, McVeagh, What orangeism means, passim.
NOTES TO PAGES 469-75

190 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 328, 344.


192 The result was Russell, L.U., 3468: Dickson L., 2096. See Walker, Parl. election results., p. 149.


196 Ross, Pilgrimage, p. 73.


199 Ibid., 274. The new member for West Belfast, H. O. Arnold-Forster, moved the amendment to the queen's speech calling attention to the proceedings at Meath. See Arnold-Forster, H. O. Arnold-Forster, p. 96.

X: LIBERALS, NATIONALISTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HOME RULE, 1892-3

1 Hirst, 'Gladstone and home rule, 1885-92', p. 720.

2 Magnus, Gladstone, p. 397; Morley, Gladstone, iii, 370-71.

3 Gladstone to Morley, 26 Nov. 1892 in ibid., p. 372.

4 Ibid., p. 371.

5 Aberdeen, "We twa", i, 317.

6 Ibid., pp 318-20. Gladstone, though distressed at Morley's action, felt that at his age he could not press his views 'on those who undertook the charge of the various departments'.

7 Morley, Recollections, i, 331-3.
NOTES TO PAGES 475-80


9 In 1907 he informed Sir Horace Plunkett that home rule was impractical, chiefly because of "the utter unfitness of the people for self-government". See L. P. Curtis jr., Anglo-Saxons and Celts (New York, 1968), p. 63.

10 Morley, Recollections, ii, 322.

11 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 21 Nov. 1892 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44648).

12 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 374.

13 Notes of a conversation on home rule at the Devonshire club, 30 Mar. 1892 (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MS 15206(1)).

14 Redmond to Mather, 28 Apr. 1892, ibid.

15 Mather to Redmond, 20 May 1892, ibid.

16 Notes of a conversation with John Morley, 17 Oct. 1892, ibid., (MS 15207(1)).

17 Davitt to (?) Doherty, 30 July 1892 (N.L.I., Davitt papers, MS 15347 acc. 2627).


19 Notes of conversations on home rule between Gladstone, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Sexton and John Dillon, on 7 Mar., 21 June 1893 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS 6796/27-8).

20 McCarthy to Praed, 11 Aug. 1892 in McCarthy and Praed, Our book of memories, p. 327. To offset this prospect, however, Lord Salisbury and Chamberlain agreed that it might be best to 'pass the bill at once with a clause requiring a referendum': Gladstone would have to accept the bill or take the responsibility for rejecting it, as he 'could not face an appeal to the country on this issue alone'. See Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 577.

21 Notes of a conversation on home rule with Gladstone, 3 Aug. 1892 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS 6796/29).

22 See p. 509.

NOTES TO PAGES 480-7


26 Bryce to Blake, 10 Oct. 1892 (N.L.I., Blake papers, Microfilm, p. 4681); Banks, Blake, pp 44-5.

27 Blake to Bryce, 24 Oct. 1892 (N.L.I., Blake papers, Microfilm p. 4681); Banks, Blake, pp 45-6.

28 Bryce to Blake, 18 Nov. 1892 (N.L.I., Blake papers, Microfilm p. 4681).

29 See chapter VII, pp 334-41.

30 James Bryce, Memorandum on foreign and colonial legislatures, 19 Nov. 1892 (N.L.I., Bryce papers, MS 11009 (4)), p. 7.

31 Ibid., p. 8.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., pp 8-9.

34 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 21 Nov. 1892 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44648).


36 McCarthy to Praed, 22 Dec. 1892, ibid., p. 341.

37 John Dillon wrote to Edward Blake at this time stressing the importance of Justin McCarthy fixing a date with John Morley to settle the 'veto question', on which 'we may be able to give a final answer on behalf of the whole committee [of the Irish parliamentary party]'. See Dillon to Blake, 22 Dec. 1892 (N.L.I., Blake papers, Microfilm, p. 4681).

38 Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 24 Nov. 1892 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44648).


40 Ibid., pp 15-18.

41 Ibid., p. 32.

42 Ibid. It is worth pointing out that in July 1891 Gladstone
suggested to Morley that a future liberal government should postpone a home rule bill for two years, in order to ascertain 'how the financial relations [between Britain and Ireland] really lie'. See Morley, Recollections, i, 278.

43 Welby, Hamilton and Milner, Memorandum on Irish finance, p. 33.
44 Ibid., p. 38.
46 Morley to Gladstone, 14 Dec. 1892 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44648).
47 W. V. Harcourt, Memorandum on the financial scheme of the home rule bill, 13 Apr. 1893 (N.L.I., Bryce papers, MS 11009(4)), p. 1.
48 Ibid., p. 2. See also Return showing the effect of the financial proposals in the government of Ireland bill, on the basis of the estimated revenue and expenditure for 1892-3, p. 3, H.C. 1893-4 (91), 1, 383.
49 Dillon to Blake, 11 Jan. 1893 (N.L.I., Blake papers, Microfilm, p. 4681).
50 Memorandum from the committee of the Irish parliamentary party on the contribution by Ireland to imperial charges, 13 Jan. 1893 (P.R.O., Cab 37/33, 1893, no. 7), pp 1-3.
51 Ibid., pp 3-5.
52 Ibid., pp 6-7.
53 Ibid., p. 8.
54 Ibid., pp 9-10.
55 Ibid., p. 12.
56 Ibid., pp 12-13.
57 Ibid., pp 13-17. For Ulster unionist criticisms of the financial scheme of the home rule bill, see pp 514-17.
58 Edward Hamilton's diary entry, 14 Jan. 1893 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 48659).
59 See Gladstone to the queen, 27-8 July 1893 in Guedalla, The queen and Mr Gladstone, ii, 472.
60 See p. 516.
61 McCarthy to Praed, 13 Jan. 1893 in McCarthy and Praed, Our book of memories, p. 348; McCarthy to Dillon, 14 Jan. 1893 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS 6733/49).
NOTES TO PAGES 493-500


64 Harcourt to Morley, 18 Jan. 1893 in Gardiner, Harcourt, ii, 220.

65 A bill to amend the provision for the future government of Ireland, pp 1-2, H.C., 1893-4 (bill 209), iii, 255-6.

66 Ibid., p. 257.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., p. 258.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., pp 258-9.

71 Ibid., p. 272.

72 Ibid., pp 259-60.

73 Ibid., pp 268-70.

74 Ibid., pp 270-71.

75 See minutes of meeting on 13 Feb. 1893 in Irish parliamentary party minute book (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS6501); Banks, Blake, pp 51-2.

76 Davitt, Fall of feudalism, pp 666-7.

77 Hansard 3, ccclxiv, 1463-80 (14 Feb. 1893).

78 Annual Register 1893 (London, 1894), p. 36.

79 Ibid., p. 39.


81 Ibid.

82 See the analysis of amendments on the bill, ibid., p. 93.


84 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 378.

85 Spender, Story of the home rule session, p. 36.

86 Morley to Gladstone, 15, 16, 17 May 1893 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44257).
NOTES TO PAGES 500-06

87 Spender, Story of the home rule session, p. 39.
88 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 375-6.
89 Davitt to Dillon, Nov. - Dec. 1892 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS 6728/18).
90 See Blake to McCarthy, 21 June 1893 in Banks, Blake, pp 64, 65.
91 McCarthy to Praed, 10 June 1893 in McCarthy and Praed, Our book of memories, p. 362.
92 See chapter II, pp 115-22.
93 Spender, Story of the home rule session, p. 56.
94 Ibid., pp 56-7.
95 Return showing the copy of the report of the commissioners of inland revenue to the treasury, 6 June 1893, explaining an error in the computation of Ireland's contribution to spirit duty as shown in the "financial relations" returns of 1891 and 1893, p. 3, H.C. 1893-4 (248), 1, 345.
96 Ibid.
97 Morley, Gladstone, iii, 374.
101 Morley to Gladstone, 26 May 1893 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44257).
102 Redmond to Morley, 13 June 1893 (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MS 15207(1)); Sir Robert Meade to Sir Algernon West, 19 June 1893 in Hutchinson (ed.), Private diaries of Sir Algernon West, p. 166.
103 Morley to Gladstone, 19 June 1893 (B.M., Gladstone papers, MS 44257). Morley would have been influenced in his fears for Irish social order by a dynamite explosion at Dublin Castle on Christmas eve 1892 which killed a policeman. See McCarthy to Praed, 26 Dec. 1892 in McCarthy and Praed, Our book of memories, p. 342.
104 Gardiner, Harcourt, ii, 222; Welby 'Financial relations', pp 136-8; Statement illustrating the effect of the amended

105 Blake to Morley, 10 July 1893 (N.L.I., Blake papers, Microfilm, p. 4683).

106 Davitt to Doherty, 1 July 1893 (N.L.I., Davitt papers, MS 15347 acc. 2627).

107 Hutchinson (ed.) Private diaries of Sir Algernon West, pp 172-3; chapter VII, p. 349.

108 Ibid., pp 174-6. In the following year Sir J. W. McKenna informed Redmond: 'Gladstone's concession to you, his promise of a royal commission, saved the point of honour for our party - that is all that can be said.' McKenna to Redmond, 25 Nov. 1894 (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MS 152037(7)). See also Lawrence, Government of Northern Ire., p. 183.

109 F. W. Hirst, 'Mr Gladstone's fourth premiership and final retirement 1892-5' in Reid, Life of W. E. Gladstone, p. 724.


111 Ponsonby to Lord Houghton, 2 Sept. 1893 in Ponsonby, Henry Ponsonby, p. 221.

112 Spender, Story of the home rule session, p. 91.

113 Magnus, Gladstone, p. 414.


115 See pp 476-7.

116 Redmond to Mather, 23 Apr. 1892 (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MS 15206(1)).

117 Redmond to Mather, 28 Apr. 1892, ibid.


119 Memorandum of conversation with Gladstone on home rule, 21 June 1892 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, MS 6796/27).

120 Memorandum on the home rule bill of 1886, 29 Oct. 1892 (N.L.I. Bryce papers, MS 11009(4)).

121 The bill as originally printed, though, did, in clauses 18 and 34 respectively, forbid both the Irish legislative assembly from passing any vote or bill appropriating any part of the public revenue without the consent of the lord lieutenant, and Irish local authorities from borrowing money without the approval of the Irish government.
Moreover, as was seen, the amended bill would place the raising and control of all Irish taxes under imperial control for 6 years. See Government of Ire. bill, pp 264, 272; Welby, 'Financial relations', p. 737.

122 See, Commercial Ulster and the home rule movement (Belfast, 1893), p. 55. This argument against home rule was apparently compiled by the Belfast chamber of commerce. See also Fisher, Ulster Lib. Un. Assoc., p. 37.

123 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 319.

124 John Greenhill, president of the Belfast chamber of commerce, to The Times, 13 Apr. 1893 in Mr Gladstone and the Belfast chamber of commerce (Belfast, 1893), pp 38-9.

125 Adam Duffin to 'Dearest', 20 Mar. 1893 (P.R.O.N.I., Duffin papers, Mic. 127/10B). By 'closed' Duffin is referring to the parliamentary device for curtailing debate - generally known as the 'closure' - as a metaphor for describing Gladstone's tendency to stifle criticism during the interview.

126 See footnote 189 to chapter IX, p. 651.

127 Gladstone and the Belfast ch. of comm., p. 3.

128 Ibid., pp 4-9.


130 Ibid., p. 28.

131 Ibid., p. 17.

132 Ibid., pp 30-31.

133 F.J., 29 Apr. 1893.

134 F.J., 2 May 1893. During this debate in the commons, Gladstone made the startling declaration that Parnell was prepared to accept separate treatment for Ulster in 1886. However, this was strongly objected to by both Irish nationalist factions.

135 Morley, Recollections, i, 355.

136 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 341.


138 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 331, 344.

139 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 540-41.
NOTES TO PAGES 520-24

140 Ireland as it is and as it would be under home rule: sixty-two letters written by the special commissioner of the Birmingham Daily Gazette between March and August 1893. (Birmingham, 1893), pp 16, 17-19, 28. Thomas McKnight also informed Joseph Chamberlain in 1892 that he 'had it positively on authority...he was able to trust that arms had been provided and stored'. See Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, 541-2.

141 Lucas, Saunderson, pp 196-7.


143 See chapter v, p. 268.

144 Quoted in McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 300.

145 See chapter ix, p. 469. However, one resolution passed as the convention did warn of 'disorder, violence and bloodshed' if any attempt was made to place Ulster under a Dublin parliament. See Fisher, Ulster Lib. Un. Assoc., p. 34.

146 St. Loe Strachey, 'Ulster and home rule' N.C., xxxi (June, 1892), pp 78-82.

147 Rentoul, Stray thoughts, pp 223-4, 225. Rentoul argued that many Ulster unionists thought the convention had killed home rule.

148 Garvin, Chamberlain, ii, pp 541-2.

149 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 238.

150 See Spender, Story of the home rule session, p. 24.

151 Duffin to Hugh de F. Montgomery, 27 Aug. 1892 (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery papers, D627/428/193). Both Dufferin and Rentoul were to dissociate themselves from the movement to resist home rule by force in 1914. See Dufferin to the secretary of the Ulster Unionist Council, 8 Oct. 1912 (P.R.O.N.I., Duffin papers, Mic. 127/14); Rentoul, Stray thoughts, chapter 15.

152 McKnight, Ulster as it is, ii, 310.

153 Ross, Pilgrimage, p. 64.

154 Lucas, Saunderson, pp 194-5.

155 Ireland as it is, pp 15-16. It is also worth pointing out that rumours were rife in Ulster that an 'Army of Independence' was being organised in the south, with the object of dealing with a protestant rising in northern Ireland. The R.I.C. took such reports seriously: at the
end of 1892 they claimed to have located thirteen branches with a total membership of 2,642, though only one of these was in Ulster: a branch in Belfast was reported to have 350 members. However, this 'army' doesn't seem to have played any role whatever during the second home rule crisis. See ibid., pp 18-19; 'Report on the strength of nationalist associations in Ireland at December 1892' (S.P.O., O.B.S., Police reports, 6364/S).

156 Spender, Story of the home rule session, p. 24. In fact, the only fighting to take place between nationalists and Ulster unionists, was on the floor of the house of commons, when both groups were drawn into a brawl started by two English M.P.s. See Ross, Pilgrimage, pp 78-80.

157 See chapter IX, p. 442.

CONCLUSION

1 See chapter III, pp 149-51.
3 See chapter I, p. 48.
4 O'Day, English face of Ir. nationalism, pp 17-19, 27, 133-6.
7 See chapter II, pp 71-2.
8 However Ireland was certainly not as close to revolution at this time as it was at the beginning of the land war. While agrarian outrages in the period 1884-6 rose by 294, from 762 to 1,056, their increase in the period 1878-80 was 2,284, from 301 to 2,585. See Return of outrages, 1896.
9 Morley to Gladstone, 25 Jan, 1894 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44257). See also chapter VII, p. 352.
10 Cooke and Vincent, Governing passion, p. 52. See also Vincent, Gladstone and Ire., pp 228-9.
11 See chapter II, pp 122-4.
NOTES TO PAGES 528-40

12 See chapter II, p. 140.
13 Hammond, Gladstone, pp 72-3.
14 See chapter II, pp 98-100, 110-11, 123-4.
15 See chapter III, pp 176-84.
18 Lionel Tollemache, Talks with Mr Gladstone (London, 1898), pp 59-60.
19 Hammond, Gladstone, p. 711.
20 See chapter II, pp 90-91.
22 See chapter III, p. 170.
23 See chapter VI, pp 304-6.
24 See chapter VI, p. 271.
25 See chapter VI, pp 295-6.
26 See chapter VI, passim.
28 See chapter VIII, pp 377-400.
29 See chapter IX, pp 416-17.
30 See chapter IV, p. 222; chapter VI, pp 299-300.
31 See chapter IV, pp 196, 220; chapter IX, p. 460-63.
33 See chapter IV, pp 203, 218-19, 222-37.
34 See chapter IX, pp 448-51.
35 Stewart, Narrow ground, pp 166-7.

662
NOTES TO PAGES 537-55

37 See Gladstone's cabinet memorandum, 9 Mar. 1893 (B.M., Gladstone papers, Add. MS 44648).

38 See chapter IX, p. 469.

APPENDIX 1

1 See Newspaper press directory 1886, pp 143-52.

2 The nature of this study has been strongly influenced by the material on 'content analysis' in Clair Sellitz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, Stuart Cook, Research methods in social relations (Revised one vol. ed., London, 1971), pp 335-42.

3 An R.I.C. study of the influence of the nationalist press in Ireland, was made at the height of the Parnellite split in 1891; see Register of newspapers (undated) [1891] (S.P.O., Irish crime records, VIIIIB WP, 3).


APPENDIX 3

1 F.J., 6 Apr. 1893.

2 F.J., 24, 26 Apr. 1893.
The plan of this bibliography is based generally on that in Dr T. W. Moody's *Davitt and Irish revolution* (pp 579-80). Sections II-VIII comprise sources; sections X and XI secondary works; sections I and IX combine material in both categories. With reference to items in section IX, it is important, as Dr Moody notes, to distinguish between contemporary writings and later works by contemporaries, as the two can differ so greatly in value as historical evidence. Apart from materials in section X and works of major relevance to more than one category, items are entered only in those sections or sub-sections to which I judge they most distinctively belong.

All works cited in the thesis are listed as well as other materials consulted.

I PUBLICATIONS ON GLADSTONE 666

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7 Irish-American nationalism 700
8 The historicist background to the home rule movement 701
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13 Other special studies 704

XI LATER WORKS OF REFERENCE AND TECHNICAL WORKS
1 Reference 705
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I PUBLICATIONS ON GLADSTONE

This section includes biographical works, studies of Gladstonian politics in general and some other works important for an understanding of Gladstone's attitude to home rule, Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism.


——— W. E. Mr Gladstone and the Belfast chamber of commerce, Belfast, 1893.


Hirst, F. W. Gladstone as financier and economist. London, 1931.

I PUBLICATIONS ON GLADSTONE


While the whole of this composite work is useful, the following articles are of particular interest:

Hirst, F. W. Gladstone and the eastern question. Pp 618-35.

——— Mr Gladstone's second premiership 1880-85. Pp 635-82.


I PUBLICATIONS ON GLADSTONE


Tollemache, Lionel. Talks with Mr Gladstone. London, 1898.


II THE GLADSTONE PAPERS

The Gladstone papers in the British Museum (Add. MSS 44086-835) naturally constitute the largest and most important collection for any study of the liberal leader and Irish material for the home rule period has been extensively examined. Of particular interest were the papers used by Morley when writing his biography of Gladstone (Add. MSS 56444-53), and only added to the collection quite recently. Additionally, the following printed documents were consulted:


II THE GLADSTONE PAPERS


III PUBLICATIONS OF GLADSTONE

This section, consisting mainly of works by Gladstone in the period 1886-92 on Irish nationalism and home rule, includes both his own publications and collections of his speeches.


This work consists of pamphlets and articles dealing particularly with the historical aspects of the argument for home rule, and published at different times in the period 1886-90. These are listed below in chronological order with the year of original publication in brackets.

The Irish question. Pp 1-57 (1886).


Dr Ingram and the Irish union. Pp 187-95 (1887).

III  PUBLICATIONS OF GLADSTONE

Home rule for Ireland: an appeal to the tory householder. Pp 342-72 (1890).


The speeches of W. E. Gladstone 1888-92. Ibid.


The foregoing, however, do not contain all Gladstone's home rule speeches. These can be examined more fully in The Times, Freeman's Journal and Hansard. For a complete guide to Gladstone's speeches, see Morley, Gladstone, iii, 463-95.

IV  MANUSCRIPT SOURCES OTHER THAN THE GLADSTONE PAPERS: 1

1  BELFAST

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Rev. J. B. Armour papers: D1792.
John McElderry papers: Mic. 57.
Adam Duffin papers: Mic. 127.
William Johnston diaries: D880/2/34-40.
Jeremiah Jordan papers: D2073.
John Pinkerton papers: D1078.
Newspaper cuttings on the anti-home rule campaign in Ulster, 1892-3: T1633.
Hugh de F. Montgomery papers: D627/428/1-293: T1089.
Minute Book of the Route Reform club: D1426.
J. N. Richardson papers 1868-94: D2956.
Colonel Edward Saunderson papers: T2996; Mic. 281.
IV MANUSCRIPT SOURCES OTHER THAN THE GLADSTONE PAPERS: 1-2

Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union papers: D989.
Anti-home rule printed material: T2917.
Home rule correspondence: Mic. 95.

2 DUBLIN

STATE PAPER OFFICE

Chief secretary's office, registered papers, 1886-90.
Irish crime records, 1882-92.
Crime branch special, police reports, 1886-1915, carton no. 4.

NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRELAND

E. S. W. de Cobain papers: MS 17729.
J. F. X. L'Brien papers: MS 13424.
James (Viscount) Bryce papers: MS 11009-10.
Contains many copies of cabinet papers and memoranda on the home rule bills of 1886 and 1893 and the devolution scheme of 1907-8.

William Haley papers: MS 3905.
Timothy Harrington papers: MS 8576-81.
Letters of Michael Davitt to (?) Doherty: MS 15347 acc. 2627.
F. S. Bourke papers: MS 10723.
Michael McDonagh papers: MSS 11439-46.
John Redmond papers: MSS 15191, 15203-7.
Alfred Webb papers: MSS 1745-6.
T. D. Sullivan papers: MS 8237.
T. P. Gill papers: MS 13478.
IV MANUSCRIPT SOURCES OTHER THAN THE GLADSTONE PAPERS: 2-3

Minute book of the Young Ireland Society, 1885-6: MS 19158.

LIBRARY OF TRINITY COLLEGE

Davitt papers: series 1: letters from and to Davitt, 1870-1906 and papers by and relating to him.
Rev. J. A. Galbraith papers: MS 3856.
Lecky Correspondence: nos. 1-719.
Dillon papers: MSS 6501-6837.

3 LONDON

BRITISH MUSEUM

Balfour papers.
Viscount Gladstone papers.

V PRINTED RECORDS

1 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS

(a) HOME RULE AND RELATED PAPERS

A bill to amend the provisions for the future government of Ireland, H.C. 1886 (181), ii, 461.
Sale and purchase of land (Ireland) bill, H.C. 1886 (193), v, 395.

Copy of selection from the representations made to the first lord of the treasury by public bodies, in response to the free communication of ideas on Ireland contained in a letter addressed by the first lord of the treasury to Viscount de Vesci on 12 February 1886, H.C. 1886 (177), lii, 773.

A bill to amend the provision for the government of Ireland, H.C. 1893-4 (209), iii, 255.

[The foregoing as amended in committee], ibid. (428), 287.
A bill to amend the provision for the government of Ireland [as amended in committee and on consideration], H.C. 1893-4 (448), iii, 323.

Return showing the effect of the financial proposals in the government of Ireland bill as regards Ireland, on the basis of the estimated revenue and expenditure for 1892-3, H.C. 1893-4 (91), 1, 383.

Return showing the copy of the report to the commissioners of inland revenue to the treasury, 6 June 1893, explaining an error in the computation of Ireland's contribution to spirit duty as shown in the "financial relations" returns of 1891 and 1893, H.C. 1893-4 (248), 1, 385.

Statement illustrating the effect of the amended financial proposals in the government of Ireland bill, H.C. 1893-4 (280), 1, 387.

First report by Her Majesty's commissioners appointed to inquire into the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland, [C7720], H.C. 1895, xxxvi, 1. Minutes of evidence up to 28 March 1895, [C7720-1], H.C. 1895, xxxvi, 5.

Final report of Her Majesty's commissioners appointed to inquire into the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland, [C8262], H.C. 1896, xxxiii, 59.

(b) LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A bill for the better government of counties in Ireland, H.C. 1888 (6), iii, 377. Introduced by John Dillon, Thomas Sexton, T. M. Healy, and others.

Local government (Ireland) bill, H.C. 1892 (174), iii, 609.

(c) POLICE AND CRIME

Report of the commissioners of inquiry, 1864, respecting the magisterial and police arrangements and establishment of the borough of Belfast, [C3466], H.C. 1865, xxvii, 1. Minutes of evidence and appendices, [C3466-2], H.C. 1865, xxviii, 27.

Report of the commissioners of inquiry 1886, respecting the origins and circumstances of the riots in Belfast, in June, July, August and September 1886, [C4925], H.C. 1887, xviii, 1.

Report of one of the commissioners of inquiry 1886, respecting the origin and circumstances of the riots in Belfast, in June, July, August and September, 1886, and the action taken thereon by the authorities; also in regard to the magisterial and police jurisdictions, arrangements and establishment, for the borough of Belfast, [C5029], H.C. 1887, xviii, 630.

Report of the special commission 1888 (appointed to inquiry into charges and allegations made against certain members of parliament in O'Donnell v. Walter, [C5891], H.C. 1890, xxvii, 477.

The special commission act, 1888: reprint of the shorthand notes of the speeches, proceedings and evidence taken before the commissioners appointed under the above-named act. 12 vols. London, 1890.

(d) POPULATION AND VALUATION, ETC.

Census of Ireland, 1881: preliminary report with abstract of the enumerators summaries, [C2931], H.C. 1881, xcvi, 159.

Return showing the population of 1871 and 1881; the number of electors in 1871 and 1881; the area in square miles; the number of members; the amount of property and income-tax charged for the last year for which the returns are made up, in each county and parliamentary division of a county in the United Kingdom (exclusive of cities and boroughs) ... and similar return for the cities and boroughs of the United Kingdom, H.C. 1882 (149), liii, 397.

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X HISTORICAL WORKS: 2-3


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7 IRISH AMERICAN NATIONALISM


8 THE HISTORICIST BACKGROUND TO THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT


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10 PROTESTANT HOME RULERS


11 SOUTHERN IRISH UNIONISM


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(a) REFERENCE


XI LATER WORKS OF REFERENCE AND TECHNICAL WORKS: (a)-(b)


(b) TECHNICAL

