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THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT AND GAELIC IRELAND
1272-1361

R.F. FRAME
THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT AND GAELIC IRELAND

1272 - 1361

The making of war and the making of peace in the Irish lordship

by

R.F. FRAME

Ph.D.

University of Dublin, 1971
THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL LISTS

THESIS

3.85

D 23 JUN 1971

UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN, 1971
I declare that what follows is my own unaided work, and that it has not been submitted for a degree of any other University.
Acknowledgements

I am indebted to my supervisor, Professor J.F. Lydon, for his unfailing encouragement and constructive criticism. He has read any drafts I have submitted to him with helpful speed, and has generously given of his time in discussing them with me. I have also benefited from the wise advice of Professor A.J. Otway-Ruthven. I have had valuable discussions with Dr Adrian Empey, now of Central Washington State University, and with Miss Katharine Simms. Dr Patricia M. Barnes of the London Public Record Office very kindly put the drafts of her index to the Ancient Correspondence at my disposal. Miss Linda Stevenson was so good as to check several references for me in the P.R.O. I have received courteous assistance from the staffs of the various libraries and repositories in which I have worked. Finally I would thank my wife for much forbearance, and for acute criticism, always gratefully, if not graciously, received.

I wish to acknowledge the generous financial assistance which I have received from the Ministry of Education of Northern Ireland and from Trinity College, Dublin. This made it possible for me to undertake my research.

Durham

16 December 1970
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### Abbreviations

In general, care has been taken to ensure that the relationship between short titles and the full titles given in the Bibliography is plain. The following may need explanation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.Clon.</td>
<td>Annals of Clonmacnois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Annals of Connacht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFM</td>
<td>Annals of the Kingdom of Ireland, by the Four Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Annals of Inisfallen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>Annals of Loch Ce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Annals of Ulster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.M.</td>
<td>British Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.I.H.R.</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.C.R.</td>
<td>Calendar of Close Rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.D.I.</td>
<td>Calendar of Documents relating to Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.J.R.</td>
<td>Calendar of Justiciary Rolls, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.R.</td>
<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart.St.Mary's, II</td>
<td>Chartularies of St. Mary's Abbey, Dublin, II (containing the so-called &quot;Pembridge&quot; chronicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.H.R.</td>
<td>English Historical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hil.</td>
<td>Hilary (term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.H.S.</td>
<td>Irish Historical Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just.roll</td>
<td>Justiciary roll (Irish)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mem.roll</td>
<td>Memoranda roll (of the Irish Exchequer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mich.</td>
<td>Michaelmas (term)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.L.I.</td>
<td>National Library of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat.roll</td>
<td>Patent roll (of the Irish chancery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R.O.</td>
<td>Public Record Office (London)</td>
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Giving references to Irish record material presents peculiar problems. Sometimes one is working from surviving originals (normally in the P.R.O., London), and sometimes from transcripts, extracts and calendars, of differing periods and quality. On occasion, moreover, it is necessary to use more than one of the latter in order to obtain an adequate text of a particular entry, and references are unavoidably cumbersome. The following conventions have been adopted:

1. When referring to an original in P.R.O., London, I give the type of record and the commonly-used call-number—e.g., P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/237/2.

2. When referring to a document surviving only in a late copy, I name the destroyed original (with membrane number where known), followed by the MS transcript or transcripts used, and finally note the position of the entry in any printed calendar (where such exists)—e.g., Pipe roll 3 Edw.II- N.L.I., MS 760, pp.290-1 (39th.Rep. D.K., p.34).
Introduction

cum terra Hibernie sit in continua guerra....

(Statement of the Irish council, 1351)

I

In the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries one of the most constant occupations of the Dublin government was conducting relations with the native Irish chieftains. The government was involved in continual negotiations, and all too often these had to give way to an expedition of war. What follows is an attempt to examine the problems the administration faced, and the expedients it adopted in order to deal with them. We shall look first at the military resources which the government could bring to bear, then at the ways it handled these matters of peace and war between 1272 and 1361, and lastly we shall attempt to discuss the relations between the government, the loyal tenants and the Irish in slightly broader terms.

The terminal dates of the investigation have been dictated partly by the survival of sources and partly by the nature of the subject itself. The Irish records, and in particular exchequer records, are the most important class of evidence available. These survive in bulk only from the 1270s. From then until the 1360s, and a little beyond, enough record evidence exists to make a continuous study possible, although, as we shall see, the quality of the surviving evidence varies enough within the period to make wariness essential and
generalization treacherous. Another factor makes the 1270s an acceptable starting-point. It was in this decade that the government first found itself faced by really serious outbreaks of disorder among the Leinster septs. These form our most important and continuous theme, and the disorder in Leinster largely determined the government's reaction to events outside that province. As a stopping-place, the year 1361 is to some extent arbitrary—the problems were to persist long beyond it. However, in 1361 Lionel, earl of Ulster arrived in Ireland as lieutenant, at the head of some 800 troops paid by his father king Edward III. Up to this date, the Dublin government had struggled to meet the Irish threat from its own meagre resources; after it, the English administration was forced to accept that some part of Ireland's military budget must be met by England. Thus the years from 1272 to 1361 have important elements of unity.

This topic is only one aspect of the whole subject of how the Gaelic and Anglo-Norman societies consorted together, but even within its limitations, it has been necessary to choose between many possible lines of investigation. Most important, perhaps, I have chosen to look at the problems through the eyes of the Dublin government and made only incidental efforts to see events from the standpoint of the government's opponents—although obviously certain assumptions have to be made about the Gaelic society with which the government was negotiating and fighting. I am aware that in adopting this course I have bought (I hope) some consistency of approach at the expense of rejecting a valuable extra dimension. But I think there are adequate reasons for
doing this. First of all, although Gaelic sources are plentiful, they tend to come from areas into which the government, as distinct from the great Anglo-Irish lords, rarely penetrated, and it is not often possible to see individual events from the standpoint of both government and Irish. In addition, it would be rash to assume that the Gaelic societies of Ulster and Connacht, to which the annals chiefly give us the entrée, were faithfully mirrored in the mountains of Leinster or the marches of Offaly and Leix. 1 Apart from these considerations, there is still an unfortunate gap between Celtic studies and those concerned with the medieval lordship, and it must be said that the shortage of published work on Gaelic Ireland in the later Middle Ages does not make it easy for the non-specialist to approach it, at least with any confidence.

Another place where a difficult decision had to be made is in the matter of military campaigns themselves. We are constantly discussing warfare, and warfare that takes place over a fair proportion of Ireland. The comparative paucity of chronicle evidence means that very little information has survived about actual strategy and tactics. 2 By combining a close familiarity with the documents, an understanding of military architecture, and a deep knowledge of the terrain, it should be possible to shed considerable light on these

1 It is interesting to note that Norman baptismal names, such as Henry, William or Richard, were common among some of the Leinster septs, in particular the O'Nolans and O'Ryans. There are many examples in the text.

2 The chronicle evidence is discussed below, pp. xviii-xxi.
topics. But this would be a laborious task, and could only be attempted on a regional basis. I have therefore regarded campaigns as an extension of government policy, and have not generally attempted to trace individual expeditions, so to speak on the ground. Of course where straightforward evidence does exist, I have drawn what conclusions may be drawn.

Finally, a word must be said about the use made of the financial evidence. It became obvious at an early stage that a systematic study of the financing of campaigns would be a project in itself. To determine the amounts spent on warfare involves a careful analysis and comparison of the evidence of the Irish Issue, Receipt, Memoranda and Pipe rolls, not to mention any warrants for issue that may survive on the Justiciary rolls and writs of liberate, and this would have to be followed up by an investigation of the evidence on the English Memoranda and Pipe rolls. Then, to give the resulting figures any broader meaning, they would have to be set in the context of the Irish revenue as a whole— and our knowledge of it remains slight indeed. Thus, although these subjects will often be referred to and figures will frequently be quoted (they are often our only guide to the importance of a particular expedition of war), it must be emphasized that figures can only be used in an impressionistic way. 3

3 Two problems may exemplify the difficulties of using the financial evidence "scientifically": the patchiness of the evidence— for some expeditions only the writ of liberate may survive; and the whole question of assignment and disbursement at local level— Irish exchequer practice remains a mystery, and needs urgent investigation.
Before turning to the sources and the ways in which they have determined the scope of the thesis, it is necessary to say a little about their publication. From this point of view, the period divides, somewhat untidily, into two parts. Up to approximately the end of Edward I's reign, the proportion of the Irish record evidence in print is very large. From about 1307 the proportion steadily decreases. This has had an important bearing on the scale of our treatment, for most of the historians who have attempted general narratives of the period have relied very largely on printed material. The result is that it has been possible to take much more for granted in the earlier period, and to treat the subject in a thematic way; after the Bruce invasion it has been necessary to construct a detailed narrative of events before attempting to draw any general conclusions.

The sources themselves may conveniently be divided into five broad groups: records of the Dublin government; Anglo-Irish chronicles; Irish annals; English records; and, finally, miscellaneous documents.

The Irish records are naturally the most important source for the dealings of the Dublin administration with the native Irish. Despite the destruction of the

---

4 Almost the only narrative works for the period after 1318 that make much use of unprinted sources are Professor Sayles's, "The rebellious first Earl of Desmond" in Medieval Studies presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J., and Professor Otway-Ruthven's, "Ireland in the 1350s: Sir Thomas de Rokeby and his successors", R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII (1967).
Public Record Office in the Four Courts in 1922, copious material survives, whether in original or in the form of later copies. In this introductory discussion, for convenience sake, no distinctions are made between original rolls and files, and transcripts, extracts or calendars, whether printed or unprinted. We are forced to take our evidence as we find it, and the available texts are often unsatisfactory.

Of the documents produced by the Irish exchequer, Issue and Receipt rolls, and associated documents, survive for most of the period, and gaps in the series can often be supplied from the accounts of Irish treasurers enrolled on the English Pipe rolls; Memoranda rolls exist for most years after the turn of the fourteenth century; Pipe rolls survive, though in much less satisfactory form, and with large gaps, from 1272 to 1348, with a little material for subsequent years. These documents provide the most varied information on all aspects of government activity which involved expenditure. It may be roughly divided into three categories. First there are payments made by the exchequer for expeditions of war, for official parleys, for the establishment of "wards" in the marches, for royal castles. Secondly, there are the accounts rendered by officials appointed to undertake certain duties- and in particular those of the paymasters of the king's armies. The accounts of these
"clerks of wages" are perhaps the most vital single sort of evidence available, for they provide details of the troops employed and the duration of expeditions. Then thirdly, there is evidence that cannot be neatly categorized: examples include payments to the Irish allies of the government, payments to individuals for their exploits against the Irish, payments for the upkeep of Irish hostages in government hands, details of fines owed by (and occasionally received from) Irish leaders—often the only inkling we have of the result of a campaign, receipts from royal services proclaimed in connection with expeditions of war. Essentially it is the exchequer records that provide the evidence for the narrative backbone of the thesis; without the precisely dated accounts in particular, a firm chronology would be almost impossible to construct. But here, the uneven nature even of this, our best evidence, is very important. The first surviving paymasters' accounts date from 1297-8, and it is not until 1306 that we begin to have detailed copies. Thereafter their survival, though frequent, is haphazard. The organization and dating of some campaigns we know in detail; about others we know almost nothing. And the amount of evidence remaining bears no relation to an expedition's size or effect.

The surviving chancery material contains equally diverse information, often of a similar sort (indeed the Irish Close roll often has the nature of a roll of writs of liberate, while the Patent roll records commissions to perform services for which the recipients might later be paid). The Irish Patent and Close rolls are, however, of much less value than the exchequer
records. For one thing, the series is much less complete, and this makes generalization from it difficult. To take one example, it is impossible to say whether a series of commissions to keepers of the peace, appearing on a chance surviving roll, are routine documents, or whether they have been called forth by some particular emergency. Apart from this, the surviving versions of much of the chancery material are especially unsatisfactory. The printed Record Commission Calendar is heavily abbreviated, and not, apparently, to any consistent plan. The lengthy recitals in the writs have sometimes been let stand and sometimes not, and of course it is not always possible to tell whether and to what extent entries have been cutailed. 6

Of the Irish judicial records, the rolls of the justiciar's court are by far the most important for our purposes. These, together with rolls of the Dublin Bench and rolls of Justices Itinerant, provide much varied information arising incidentally to legal cases. This class of evidence permits some of the bare bones provided by the exchequer records to be fleshed. The Justiciary rolls, however, are more than a purely legal record. Their "Common pleas" section could take the form of a virtual memoranda roll of the business transacted before the justiciar. 7 For this reason, their

6 These remarks are based on the use both of R.C.H. and the Harris transcripts in N.L.I., MSS 2-4. There is a preliminary study of the chancery in J. Otway-Ruthven, "The mediaeval Irish chancery", Album Helen Maud Cam, II. 119-38.

7 See Hand, English Law in Ireland, pp. 80, 240.
value for present purposes is greatly enhanced. The small amount of justiciary roll material that remains from the years after 1318 gives us a tantalizing glimpse of what has been lost; these are the sources which bring us closest to the mainspring of the government's actions. 8

No parliament or statute rolls as such survive for our period. But there are of course various groups of enactments made in Irish parliaments. These are important, for they provide a rare insight into the general principles which the Irish government and ruling class thought should apply in relations with the native Irish. We are therefore saved from the dangerous task of inferring principles from practice. Chapter IX is partly an attempt to set some of the better-known enactments of the fourteenth century in their practical context.

The variations in the record evidence have inevitably helped to govern the scope and texture of the thesis. For example, for Wogan's time we have Issue, Receipt, Memoranda, Pipeand Justiciary roll evidence; for the 1350s we have a particularly good run of clerks' accounts, longer and more detailed Issue rolls than before, and more surviving chancery rolls than usual. It is therefore possible to body out the narrative covering these

8 Some later justiciary roll evidence survives in the "Calendar of Memoranda rolls" in P.R.O.I., R.C. 8 and in the Betham Extracts in Genealogical Office, MSS 190-2. Our only two surviving records of the terms on which Irish chieftains submitted come from the Betham Extracts (O'Byrne in 1335 and O'More in 1347).
periods in a way that the evidence for parts of the 1320s, 1330s and 1340s does not permit. For parts of these latter periods, we are forced to work from sources that allow the compilation of little more than a dry catalogue of apparently inconsequential expeditions and parleys. Naturally I have condensed my treatment of these poorly covered years, but I have resisted the temptation to curtail it to the extent where this would affect the balance of the thesis as a whole.

The importance of the record sources will be plain from the foregoing account. But their value is restricted in certain predictable ways. They reveal what the government ordered to be done, and sometimes what was done. Yet they do not give much guidance as to why certain courses of action were decided upon, nor do they tell us how successfully military and administrative orders were carried out. Many questions remain unanswered. In deciding policy what were the relative roles of the justiciar, the senior officials (who tended to be more permanent than the justiciar), and the Irish magnates? What degree of support did the administration's military enterprises get from the more important tenants? How well did the government employ the resources which were available to it? How did contemporaries see the relative merits of punitive expeditions and patient conciliation? What level of disorder was normally necessary to provoke positive military intervention? Questions such as these we obviously cannot expect the record sources to answer, and we can legitimately look to the literary evidence for assistance with some of them.
For our purposes both the Anglo-Irish chronicles and the Irish annals are disappointing sources, though for different reasons. The two most important chronicles are the so-called "Pembridge" annals, printed by Gilbert in his Chartularies of St. Mary's Abbey, Dublin, and the annals of Friar John Clyn. The "Pembridge" annals are, of course, Dublin orientated, while Clyn is based on Kilkenny. The chief drawback of these two main chronicle sources is not so much their cryptic nature (in this they are of course no different from any chronicle of the period) as the fact that their authors were not interested in the matters we are interested in. Irish raids and the punitive expeditions and parleys of the government were, it may be suggested, such a normal feature of life in the medieval lordship that they were not thought worthy of detailed comment: a laconic note is all they normally provoke. Why a particular raid took place at a particular time, or how precisely it was dealt with, we rarely learn. On the other hand, any scraps of incidental information the chronicles do contain are the more valuable because of their scarcity. To take just one example, we hear in 1344 that the justiciar, as part of his campaign against the Irish of Leinster, destroyed their corn-crop—

9 For our period and topic, the other chronicles, such as those of Henry of Marleburgh, Thady Dowling, James Grace, or the material in the Book of Howth, have little of independent value. To all intents and purposes Grace= Pembridge; not until later in the 14th century does Marleburgh become of real value; Dowling and the Book of Howth are late and garbled, and have little not to be found more reliably elsewhere. Other scraps of chronicle evidence are listed in the Bibliography. A modern edition and textual study of the chronicles is overdue.
example of the tactics of the Irish being used against them. Yet within these important limitations, the evidence of the chronicles can be vital. They may tell us baldly of the success or failure of one of those expeditions about the preparations for and organization of which we know so much. They sometimes also provide us with the exact date of an attack on the Irish, and this can enable us to make sense of a pay-master's account which may cover several weeks, during which the army was gradually gathered and gradually disbanded. The Pembridge chronicler is particularly valuable for campaigns in Leinster, and he frequently supplies the crucial piece of evidence which complements the record sources.

We have already touched on the important fact that the Gaelic sources, for obvious reasons, tend to come from areas generally outside the reach of the Dublin government, and therefore do not contain very much information on the government's activities. As far as the annals are concerned, this statement needs some qualification. The two most important annalistic sources for our subject are the Annals of Connacht and the Annals of Inisfallen. The first has a bias

10 Clyn, p.30.
12 AU, AFM, ALC, A.Clon. and AC partake of the same common stock. Since AC is available in the most modern edition, I generally cite it alone, except where the others have independent information to offer. AI is more distinct, but unfortunately the text breaks off in 1326-7. Other minor annalistic sources are listed in the Bibliography. See in general, Bincny, "Lawyers and Historians" in Seven Centuries of Irish Learning, ed. O Cuiv, and
towards Connacht affairs, while the second has a bias towards events in Munster. During the second half of the thirteenth century the government was still launching regular expeditions into Connacht, to defend the line of castles (Athlone, Randown and Roscommon) and to interfere in the choice of O'Conor kings. Hence, in this period the Annals of Connacht are a valuable source. But after the turn of the fourteenth century, when direct intervention in Connacht all but ceased, they become much less important. The Annals of Inisfallen very unfortunately break off in 1326-7, at the very time when government involvement in the south was seriously beginning. For events outside the areas in which they originate, the annals are of little value. Only at moments of extreme crisis or drama do the government's actions penetrate the annalists' consciousness: the period of the Bruce invasion is an obvious case in point, and the startling murder of the O'Conors of Offaly by Peter de Bermingham in 1305 is another. In general, by the 1330s, 1340s and 1350s, when the government's area of operations has become extremely restricted, the Irish annals have ceased to be one of our basic sources.

It would be misleading to end on this negative note. Like the chronicles, the annals have the great merit of giving us a different point of view. The records, inevitably, place the Dublin government at


13 The latter event is noticed in AC, ALC, AU, AFM, AI and A. Clon., sub anno.
the centre of the stage. Yet this may have been far from the impression the government left on contemporaries. On more than one occasion government expeditions are described by Anglo-Irish and Irish witnesses alike without the government as much as being mentioned: it was the magnates with the royal army who attracted their attention. One example of this may be quoted, for it brings out very well the relationship between the records, the Anglo-Irish chronicles and Irish annals. According to the annals, the earl of Ulster led a great army into Ulster in 1291, deposing an O'Neil and setting up another. If we turn to the Pembroke chronicle, we hear that:

exercitus ductus est Ultoniam, contra Ohanlan et ceteros regulos pacem impedientes per Ricardum, comitem Ulsonie et Willelmum de Vescy, justiciarium Hibernie.  

Thus the government is added to the expedition, although the justiciar plays second fiddle in the chronicler's mind to the Red Earl. When we consult the records, a different picture emerges: de Vescy was paid £200 for an expedition against "the king's enemies of Uriel" in 1291. Assuming, as seems likely, that all these references refer to the same incident, they give a salutary warning, in their different emphasis, against over-reliance on one type of evidence alone.

The English records may be dealt with briefly. The most important source used is of course the printed

14 AC, 1291.
15 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 320.
16 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/139, m.9d.
Patent and Close rolls, together with other chancery enrolments. They contain a great body of royal orders for Ireland, but these do not, and cannot be expected to, bring us very close to immediate problems of government there. For example, only in the 1270s does the king issue instructions or express wishes about a specific Irish expedition, and even then the justiciar regards his views as unwise. Then again, in 1309 the king orders the justiciar to cease action against Maurice de Caunteton and his allies; but by the time the order reaches Ireland Maurice has already been killed *per posse regium*. For the most part the English government, when it turned its attention to the peace of Ireland, contented itself with general instructions about absentees, the leasing of waste lands and similar matters. The most relevant information often appears at the time of the appointment of a justiciar, when he may receive powers to pardon, or to admit the Irish to the peace at his discretion. He may also be given instructions about the defence of march areas, and perhaps permission to retain an augmented retinue during his period of office. We also find the king predictably concerned about the state of his own castles and demesne lands. But naturally sheer distance and the difficulty of communication meant that the day-to-day running of affairs had to be left to the Irish administration.

17 The to-ing and fro-ing of messengers revealed by the Issue rolls means that we should not underestimate the information at the king's disposal; but it would tend to be out-of-date.

18 See below, pp. 82-3.

19 See below, pp. 181-2.
Apart from other miscellaneous printed record sources, use has been made of certain collections in the P.R.O., London. The Irish treasurers' accounts on the English Pipe rolls provide an alternative source of information when the Issue roll is missing. Both the Ancient Correspondence and the Chancery Miscellanea contain material bearing on Ireland. The former has yielded up some interesting unpublished evidence, in particular for the early period. The latter has little bearing directly on our theme, but a roll of fees paid to the justiciar's retinue in the mid-fourteenth century proved of special value. Some use has also been made of the documents relating to the lands of Roger Bigod and Elizabeth de Clare surviving among the Ministers' Accounts, and a very important paymaster's account from the time of the Bruce invasion was discovered among this series. The Ancient Petitions have been dipped into, but they have not been systematically investigated.

It would be otiose to detail the many miscellaneous sources that have been of value; one or two of the more important must suffice as examples. As we have already

20 From a technical financial standpoint, the audited account is the definitive one, but for our purposes the Issue roll has much more to offer— the audited accounts tend to be abbreviated, and several payments to a clerk of wages will usually be totalled and recorded en bloc.

21 P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.

22 P.R.O., S.C.6/1239/13. The king demanded details of this account and of one concerning the earl of Gloucester's lands. They were transmitted together and have remained together ever since.
seen, to over-estimate the influence of the Dublin government would itself be an error. Ireland was a land of great lordships, and the fact that the present discussion is concerned with the government alone makes it doubly important to bear this in mind. Thus documents produced by the lordships are useful not only for comparative purposes, but also as a corrective to our perspective. The Ormond Deeds, Red Book of Kildare and the Mortimer documents in B.M., Add.MS 6041, to mention three sources out of many, contain important evidence concerning the relations between the magnates and the Irish. In a similar way, documents produced by the Church (and in particular the Armagh registers) contain evidence which, while it rarely bear directly on our theme, must contribute to our understanding of the social conditions within which government, magnates and ecclesiastics alike strove to enforce their authority.

Finally, two exceptionally valuable Gaelic sources must also be mentioned: the Caithreim Thoirdhealbháigh and the text published by O'Donovan in his Tribes and Customs of Hy-Many. They both provide evidence, additional to that of the annals, for Irish attitudes, and the former adds greatly to our knowledge of Thomond politics. In particular these sources tell us just a little about relationships between the Irish and the magnates from the Irish point-of-view.

23 The historicity of the Caithreim is vindicated on linguistic grounds by L.F. MacNamara, "An examination of the medieval Irish text Caithreim Thoirdhealbháigh", N. Munster Antiqu. Journ., VIII (1961), pp. 182-92. When one uses it in conjunction with record and annalistic evidence, its veracity appears conclusively.
PART I

Chapter I

Military obligation and organization in the Irish lordship

The Dublin government regularly raised forces to fight both the native Irish and their Anglo-Irish allies. This involved all the predictable problems of finding troops, whether by insisting on feudal and popular obligation, by contract or by offering wages, and of paying and feeding the resulting army. The administration was also concerned with a second type of organization: it had the task of co-ordinating shire defence, which involved ensuring that the tenants performed their duty of guarding the marches, and, where necessary, supplementing their efforts with troops levied and paid for by the Irish exchequer. These "offensive" and "defensive" operations were of course closely related— for instance wards might be established to guard neighbouring areas while a positive expedition of war was mounted— but it will be convenient if we discuss the military organization of fourteenth century Ireland under these broad categories.

A. The army of the lordship

a. The troops available in Ireland

The sort of troops available to the Irish government differed little from those in use in England. There were some divergences: for example, the
hobelar seems to have developed first in Ireland and to have remained of importance for longer there, while the surviving evidence suggests that the archer was scarcer and less important in Irish than in English armies. But nevertheless no lengthy exposition of the nature of Irish troops is called for. Irish armies were made up mostly of men-at-arms, hobelars and foot, and in this they corresponded closely to the armies employed by the English kings in the first three decades of the fourteenth century.¹

In the fourteenth century the heavy cavalry in Irish armies were normally known as "men-at-arms", a term which would include all ranks from earls and barons down to the ordinary heavily-armed horseman.² This term replaced the more varied ones used to describe the cavalry wing of the army in earlier years.³ The man-at-arms, with his mail armour and covered horse, was not particularly well suited to warfare in Irish terrain—at least this was true once the Irish learned to avoid the straightforward frontal attack in open country. On his horse the man-at-arms could move forward in a slow charge, but this was

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¹ Irish troops and military administration need a close study. In this chapter I have made much use of descriptions of English practice, comparing and contrasting it with Irish. The following works have been of particular value: Prince, "The Army and the Navy" in English Government at Work, I. 332-93; Hewitt, Organization of War under Edward III; Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England.

² For the term see Morris, Welsh Wars, p.51.

³ E.g., equites ad arma (P.R.O., Justiciari's account, E.101/230/6 in C.D.I. 1252-84, no.1412); "knights and esquires" (38th.Rep.D.K., p.87).
useless on mountainous, wooded or boggy ground, and even on the open plain his inability to wheel rapidly would place him at a disadvantage against the lightly armed and fleet Irishman. On foot too the man-at-arms would be cumbersome and vulnerable in the wooded defiles in which so much of Irish warfare took place. We shall see that the numbers of men-at-arms appearing in Irish armies declined steeply during the fourteenth century, and it could be that this unsuitability was a factor in their decline. In addition, the wage of a man-at-arms was normally a shilling a day, with increases for those of higher social status, and in a situation where the Irish exchequer had very little money to spend, the wages of men-at-arms may well have proved uneconomic.

Because of the terrain, and the handicap that Irish places of resort and methods of fighting imposed upon the heavily armed man, the hobelar, or light

4 Giraldus and Froissart both comment on the unsuitability of the heavily armed man in Ireland. For a brief discussion see Lydon, "Richard II's expeditions to Ireland", _R.S.A.I.Jn._, XCIII (1963), pp. 143-4.


6 In the 1350s the king was concerned about the numbers of men-at-arms leaving the country, a fact which might support this (C.C.R. 1349-54, pp. 587-8).

7 On two occasions the wages of certain men-at-arms did fall to eightpence, but this is exceptional (Mem. roll 22-3 Edw.III, mm.12d,31- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/24, pp. 456-64, 584-9).
mounted lancer, was especially important in Ireland, and seems, indeed, to have originated there. The hobelar rode a pony or "hobyn"; he wore only a helmet, gauntlets and doublet and not full armour; his typical weapons were the knife, sword and spear. He was very mobile, and in England was particularly used as a messenger and for reconnaissance duties. He normally dismounted for actual combat. The hobelar first appeared in English campaigns when the Irish justiciar brought a force to Edward I's 1296 Scottish expedition, and his earliest appearance in Irish warfare seems to date from only a year earlier, when Peter le Petit brought 105 hobelars from Meath to the Leinster war. It is hardly likely that these troops had suddenly started to appear in numbers in 1295, and we must presume that only the use of the name in surviving documents is new in that year. The hobelar is probably hidden under the indefinite terms which characterise the phraseology of the earlier period.

11 For example in 1276 Geoffrey de Geneville brought 2,000 men from Meath to Leinster, and they are described merely as satellites (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/230/4 in C.D.I. 1252-84, no.1389). Satellites seems at this period to be a term used to describe any forces other than the prestigious cavalry. Sweetman's translation of the term is inconsistent and misleading. Here he calls them "vassals"; on another occasion "sutlers". (C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 2291).
the 1340s and 1350s a distinction was sometimes made between hobelarii armati and hobelarii non armati. Since the hobelarius armatus received the normal rate of pay for a hobelar (fourpence) and the hobelarius non armatus received only threepence, it looks as if the latter must have lacked the iron headpiece, visor and gauntlets, rather than the former having more protection, but this is nowhere explicitly stated. The importance of the hobelars will be made clear when we examine the numbers of troops which made up the typical Irish army.

From about 1334 the hobelar began to decline in importance in England as he was replaced by the mounted archer. In Ireland this did not happen. Mounted archers do begin to appear in Irish armies, but they appear always in small numbers and often in the company of government officials. For instance, in 1348-9 on various of de Bermingham's expeditions Roger Darcy, the escheator, brought eight mounted archers, and John Larcher, the chancellor, brought eighteen. The justiciar might have more numerous mounted archers in his retinue, but these would normally have come from England with him. We can only speculate that the fact that the hobelar was indigenous to Ireland explains its lengthy survival there, and the corresponding failure of the mounted archer to come to the fore.

14 Prince, Govt. at Work, I. 341.
16 Retinues are discussed below, pp.13-20.
It is when we turn to the third main component of Irish armies—the foot-soldiers—that problems arise. The foot who figure in the accounts came almost invariably in the retinues of the Irish magnates. They are described simply as *pedites*, and the fact that they were paid as little as a penny or threepence a day suggests that their status was low.¹⁷ We know almost nothing about these troops, except that they seem to have been organised under centurions and vintenars as in England.¹⁸ Not until 1338 is there any evidence that archers played a part in Irish campaigns.¹⁹ In that year we find ten *sagittarii pedestres* with the Bishop of Hereford, the keeper of Ireland, in Leinster. To this campaign, however, the Irish magnates bring only *pedites* in the normal way.²⁰ At other times too archers are carefully distinguished from the ordinary foot.²¹ Thus we can only assume that the ordinary foot-soldier came armed with spear and knives like his English counterpart. But are we therefore to conclude

¹⁷ The wages can be found on the clerks' accounts *passim*. English foot normally received twopence (Prince, *Govt. at Work*, I. 342-3).


¹⁹ Crossbowmen ('balistarii') are occasionally mentioned in the thirteenth century, but not thereafter (e.g., P.R.O., Justiciar's account, E.101/230/6 in Gilbert, *Viceroy*, pp.519-20; Lydon, "Irish Army in Scotland, 1296", *Irish Sword*, V. 188-9). Some did come to Ireland with John of Hotham in 1315, but to protect him at sea (P.R.O., messenger's account, E.101/309/19).


²¹ E.g., ibid., m.53d— pp.113-9.
that the archer was unknown in Irish warfare before 1338? This seems most unlikely. Large bodies of foot-archers accompanied the Irish expedition to Scotland in 1301-2, and in the liberty of Meath in the thirteenth century all men with goods to the value of half-a-mark were required to possess a bow and a quiver of arrows. In the light of this evidence it would be dangerous to assume that none of the troops described as pedites possessed bows and arrows. There is, however, one possible solution to the problem which we may very tentatively advance. Archers might not normally have come in magnates' retinues, but rather among the county levies who rarely figure on the surviving records because they were not paid by the government. One piece of evidence seems to support this hypothesis: in 1354 the justiciar complained of a lack of archers in his army and ordered that suitable men should be arrayed in Dublín and its neighbourhood to supply this need. It is also possible that the long-bow, while not unknown, was not the most satisfactory weapon in Irish conditions. Certainly Richard II found it necessary to postpone warfare with the Irish until winter had denuded the trees of their leaves. It is clear that Irish armies did not

23 Cal.Gormanston Reg., p.182.
24 This important question is discussed below, pp.39-48.
depend on that balance of heavy cavalry and archers which characterised fourteenth century English armies on the continent.

So far, although we have seen differences in development between England and Ireland, they have been differences of degree or of speed rather than of nature. The conclusion that there was little peculiarly "Irish" about the Irish government's armies is highlighted by the fact that when native Irish allies of the government brought troops to serve the justiciar these troops too were "hobelars and foot", with perhaps the odd man-at-arms. Nevertheless there were some Irish features in these armies—though these are not of great moment.

In the later part of the period we find references to bodies of "kern" serving with the government. From the context the word seems to be used to denote recognizable bodies of mercenary foot-soldiers, who served under permanent leaders. In 1345 we find the justiciar joined by "McCuly hibernicus" with 100 "pedites"

27 Examples are numerous in subsequent chapters. The leader himself often seems to rank as a man-at-arms, and it is interesting to note that when MacMurrough went to Scotland in 1335 he was allowed the status of a banneret (P.R.O., Paymaster's account, E.101/19/16).

28 The word itself of course signifies no more than the English "rout", but it seems to have developed a more precise meaning. XVI century "kern" have normally been regarded as volunteers, but this does not seem to have been invariably so (see Hayes-McCoy, "The Galloglach Axe", Journ. Galway Hist. & Arch. Soc., XVII (1937), p.104).
de ketheryng" when he penetrates into Ulster, and we also find him employing John Butler and 42 kern to guard Newcastle McKynegan.29 Walter "Carragh" de Bermingham seems to have been a typical leader of kern. In Leinster in 1355 he brought 16 hobelars, 9 foot "captains of kern" and 171 foot to the royal army.30 In 1359 he came with 9 captains of kern, 20 "armoured" and 170 "unarmoured" foot.31 Walter also served with bodies of foot-soldiers on other occasions without the word "kern" being used to describe them.32 Thus it seems that the government was itself finding a use for the bands of "kerns and idlemen" against whose exactions from the countryside so much legislation was being directed.33

There is no proof that the government employed any of the heavily armed Scottish galloglasses, and only one hint that they may have done so. On two of de Bermingham's expeditions in 1348-9 a certain "Odony Mcdonnyld" brought a number of foot-soldiers.34 The MacDonnals of the Isles were, of course, the most famous of the Scottish mercenary leaders to settle in Ireland, and if "Odony" was a member of this family it seems likely that his foot-soldiers were galloglasses.

Unfortunately we cannot be sure that he was not a MacDonald of Clankelly in county Fermanagh, and so it is inadvisable to read any significance into this sole reference. 35

Thus Irish armies differed little from English armies of the same period as far as the types of troops employed in them were concerned. Irish armies were, however, on a smaller scale and the balance of troops in them was different, as we shall see in more detail when we come to discuss the paid forces as a whole. 36

b) the justiciar's household and retinue

The Irish justiciar was by virtue of his office commander in war, and at the centre of every army he raised was his own household, augmented from time to time by extra troops which the king might allow him to retain for a set period at the expense of the Irish exchequer.

In 1295 the Irish household was established on a regular basis: the justiciar was obliged to maintain twenty men-at-arms who were to form his permanent military establishment. 37 This followed quite quickly

35 For this point see Hayes-MacCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland, p.27. No "Odony" (Hugh?) Mac Donald appears in the index to this volume.

36 See section "d" of this chapter.

37 From 1315 the justiciar himself was regarded as the 20th. man, but it is not clear whether this had been so previously (see Otway-Ruthven, "The chief governors of medieval Ireland", R.S.A.I. Journ., XCV (1965), p.230).
of the English military household on a more permanent footing in 1291.\textsuperscript{38} The justiciar had to meet the expense incurred by these troops out of his annual fee of £500 per annum.\textsuperscript{39} This arrangement had an important side-effect. The £500 was paid to the justiciar from the exchequer, but he did not have to account for his expenditure of it, and so information about the household force has not survived in the records—we do not even know the names of the fourteenth century justiciars' men-at-arms, and this in its turn has deprived us of all information about their functions. It is necessary to turn back to the period before 1295, when the troops were still being paid by the justiciar or treasurer out of money which had to be accounted for, to discover anything about the personnel and duties of the household force.

In the 1270s men "of the king's household" were receiving fees, robes, caps and saddles for their horses at the exchequer's expense.\textsuperscript{40} In 1275-6, for example, there were nine men-at-arms receiving payments and gifts on this basis. The names of several of the justiciar's men-at-arms appear in other documents at the time of their employment with the household, and it is thus possible to gain an impression of the sort of duties these men might undertake. We find both William de Caunteton and Walter Lenfant acting as

\textsuperscript{38} See Powicke, \textit{Military Obligation}, p.97.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{C.D.I. 1293-1301}, no.267.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.}, 1252-84, nos.889,1038,1294,1389; Pipe roll 1 Edw.1- N.L.I., MS 760, p.53.
captains of wards in the Leinster mountains; Walter Lenfant was also responsible for the capture of MacMurrough at Norragh; William Cadel seems to have acted as paymaster for one of the Leinster expeditions. Although this evidence is slight, it does suggest that the household was more than the justiciar's personal bodyguard: like the bannerets of the royal household in England, the members of the king's Irish household were available to act as "staff-officers". And so, although the household was small, it was probably invaluable to the justiciar because it provided men of experience to whom important tasks might be delegated.

Evidence from the early fourteenth century suggests that the justiciar was entering into contracts with knights and esquires, retaining them of his household. These men would then be obliged to join him, with their "friends and tenants", whenever they were commanded to do so. In this the Irish household was following the pattern of the English one, where the king "received the advantage of contracts with distinguished warriors to become members of his household, attending at the court table in times of peace, and serving with a stipulated contingent in war-time".

42 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 318.
43 Mem. roll 42-3 Edw.III, m.11- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/30, p.37 (an enrolment of old debts).
44 Prince, Govt. at Work, I. 336-7.
It is possible that the household had always been organized on this basis (though without the written contract), and that it is misleading to think of the men-at-arms as being in permanent attendance. Indeed the fact that, at one shilling each a day, they would have eaten up £365 of the justiciar's meagre stipend makes the latter situation unlikely. 46

Apart from this household, individual justiciars were from time to time permitted, often by the terms of their appointment, to keep a body of troops permanently in pay. In the thirteenth century the only extra troops permanently retained seem to have been small bands of Welsh. For example, Welsh came to Ireland with Robert of Ufford in 1276, 47 and in 1290 John Fulbourne was sent to Wales to bring back certain chosen foot to Ireland "to keep and maintain the peace there against the Irish". 48 These Welsh remained, a dwindling band, until at least 1302. 49 Presumably it was thought that their experience in Welsh conditions would stand them in good stead in Ireland.

Up to the Bruce invasion we know only that Gaveston came to Ireland in 1308 "cum valida manus", "cum satis

46 The evidence on which these conclusions are based is difficult, and is discussed at length in Appendix I below.


48 Cole, Documents, pp.xix-xxii.

magna manu" or "cum multa familia". This was presumably dictated more by his high standing than by the needs of the Irish military situation. During the Bruce invasion Mortimer was provided with troops from England, and they must have been quite numerous to explain the amounts of money that the lieutenant was paid. From the annalist we hear that thirty-eight knights landed with him. But the Bruce invasion was an exceptional emergency, and the need for mopping-up operations after it probably explains why, when Mortimer returned as justiciar in 1319, he was empowered to retain twice the normal number of men-at-arms, for one year. From 1319 to 1337 there appear to have been no further additions to the justiciar's permanent military establishment.


51 He had assignments of £1,600 in England (C.C.R. 1313-8, p.382) and received £220 from the English exchequer (Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, pp.132-3). He was granted £1,000 for his familia of which £269-6-4 was received in Ireland. He received another £114-13-10 of £400 to meet the cost of purveyance, and £364-19-4 for "peace-keeping" (P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/5,8,9,12). He was to have 6,000 marks for "staying on the king's service" from English and Irish sources (C.P.R. 1317-21, pp.242-3) of which he received £201-11-3 in Ireland (P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/9,12,14).

52 Clyn, p.13.

53 It is not clear whether the force was to be English or Irish, but since Mortimer arrived on 12 June, and the Irish exchequer erroneously paid their wages from 12 May (they were to be paid from the day of the justiciar's arrival), it seems likely that they were raised in England and accompanied Mortimer to Ireland (see Richardson & Sayles, Administration of Ireland, p.84 and P.R.O., Issue...
After 1337 Edward III seems to have been forced to accept that the justiciar needed to have some sort of permanent force in Ireland. Between that date and 1358 Charlton, Ufford, de Bermingham, Rokeby and St. Amand were all provided with permanent retinues. De Bermingham is the only Irish justiciar among these names, and it seems—though we cannot be sure—that his extra forces were levied in Ireland. Those of the other justiciars came from England with them. It seems likely that great English lords were not prepared to undertake the task of governing Ireland without a more adequate military establishment than the household provided. Darcy, who was never equipped with a retinue, seems to have found his reliance on Irish troops disturbing, and requested that he should be allowed English forces to garrison important castles. By 1357 at the latest the justiciars were entering into indentures with the king, specifying the troops they were to bring and the terms on which they were to bring them.

rolls, E.101/237/9, 12). The justiciar had to repay the wages received for the extra month (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25).

In 1331 Lucy was to have 80 archers from Cumberland and Westmorland (C.F.R. 1330-4, p.135). There is nothing to show that they actually came to Ireland.

Baldwin, King's Council in England, p.474.

P.R.O., Indentures of War, E.101/68/4, no.77. This (St.Amand's indenture) appears to be the earliest surviving.
The nature and organization of these retinues may best be studied by taking an individual example. The amount of evidence which survives concerning the retinue of Ralph of Ufford makes it the obvious choice. Ufford's terms of appointment allowed him to maintain 40 men-at-arms and 200 archers, to be kept with him during his term of office. The wording of the appointment does not in itself make clear whether these were to be English or Irish troops, but payments describe them as having "landed with" the justiciar. Ships were to be collected at Dublin and Drogheda, and sent to England for Ufford's passage, and, in the normal manner of commanders, the justiciar procured protections for the men-at-arms coming with him. A record of the fees paid to the justiciar's men-at-arms survives, and it reveals that during his period in office Ufford employed a total of sixty-nine men-at-arms to keep his retinue up to its full strength of forty. Their time of service varied thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Time Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Eighteen months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>One year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nine months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Six months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57 C.P.R. 1343-5, p.227; C.C.R. 1343-6, p.304.
59 C.P.R. 1343-5, p.220.
60 See Brown, "The authorization of letters under the Great Seal", B.I.H.R., XXXVII (1964), p.130; and, for practice within Ireland, Council in Ireland, 16 Richard II, pp.70-1.
61 C.P.R. 1343-5, pp.244-5.
62 P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.
No similar details survive for the archers, but we can see how the whole retinue fluctuated during the justiciar's term of office:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>mounted archers</th>
<th>archers</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.7.1344</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.7.1344</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.10.1344</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.12.1344</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.3.1345</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.1345</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.7.1345</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.10.1345</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.12.1345</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1346</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not possible to be sure of the cause of the more violent fluctuations— for example the fall in the foot-archers from 81 to 9 between July and October 1344 could have been the result of a conflict with MacMurrough, but, on the other hand, they may merely have gone home for the winter. However the heavy fall in mounted archers between March and June 1345 certainly coincides with Ufford's severe defeat by MacCartan as he tried to traverse the pass of Humberdoylan and enter Ulster. The figures suggest that at various points some of the foot-archers may have been provided with horses and joined the body of the mounted archers. But, on the whole, these tables show that once the justiciar reached Ireland, losses in troops were liable to outrun replacements. The figures come from the clerk's account on Mem.roll 19-20 Edw.III, mm.16,16d,17 & 28-P.R.O.I., R.C.8/23, pp.496-533, 586-8.

The events are discussed in the narrative below. The tailing away of the retinue in 1346 was probably because Ufford was lying sick at Killmainham (See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 263).
explanation of the fact that the numbers of men-at-arms stayed more stable may be that men-at-arms were prepared to come to Ireland and take service there, whereas replacements of archers would be dependent on royal orders to array more in England and have them despatched to Ireland, or perhaps on the justiciar's presence in England to undertake recruitment. That this erosion of retinues was a usual occurrence can be seen from Rokeby's experience between September 1352 and September 1353. The justiciar, who should have had ten men-at-arms and twenty mounted archers, saw his force decline thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>archers</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.9-8.12.1352</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 21.1.1353</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 15.5.1353</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 10.8.1353</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 24.8.1353</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 22.9.1353</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To examine the retinues of the period 1337 to 1358 in detail would be to little purpose. Only the figures of the troops which each justiciar was permitted to xxim retain need concern us:

It seems likely that the justiciar recruited his own forces. We find Mortimer arranging terms of service with a captain before coming to Ireland (Holmes, Estates of the Higher Nobility in XIV century England, pp.130-1- I am indebted to Professor Otway-Ruthven for this reference), and William of Windsor raising men in London in 1365 when he was one of Clarence's commanders (Cal. Plea and Mem. Rolls, London, 1364-81, pp.36-7).

C.C.R. 1349-54, p.258; 1354-60, p.31.
Year | Justiciar | Troops
---|---|---
1337 | Charlton | 200 Welsh foot 68
1344 | Ufford | 40 men, 200 archers 69
1346 | Bermingham | 10 men, 50 archers 70
1349 | Rokeby | 20 men, 40 mt. archers 71
1350 | Rokeby | 20 men, 20 mt. archers 72
1350 | Rokeby | 10 men, 20 mt. archers 73
1356 | Rokeby | 19 men, 60 mt. archers 74
1357 | St. Amand | 40 men, 100 mt. archers 75

One important point needs to be made about these retinues: small as they appear, they laid an almost intolerable burden on the puny Irish revenue. For example, between 27 February 1358 and 27 February 1359 St. Amand's force cost £1,142-11-4. 76 From March 1358 until April 1359 the Irish revenue amounted to no more than £2,918. 77 Clearly the imposition of such an extra

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68 C.C.R. 1337-9, pp.169-70. At least 143 came (Mem. roll 12-13 Edw. III, m.4d- P.R.O. I., R.C. 8/21, pp. 30-1). Charlton's successor Hereford was to have the same number, but there is no evidence that they arrived. The phraseology ("for defence of the land against an expected invasion") suggests that the king had the French threat in mind (C.P.R. 1338-40, pp.355-6).

69 References as above.


74 C.C.R. 1354-60, p.271.

75 Ibid., p.372; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/204, m.41; Analect. Hib., II. 208-9; E.101/68/4, no.77.

76 E.372/204, m.41; Analect. Hib., II. 208-9.

burden could not be borne indefinitely by the exchequer. There was no point in the king sending further forces to Ireland since they could not be paid there.

It would be a mistake to regard these comparatively small forces as unimportant—though when they were as small as Rokeby's they could hardly be expected to play a major role. It is probable that a retinue of one or two hundred men was of value since it provided troops whose loyalty was assured: once they were in Ireland they were dependent on the justiciar in a way Irish troops were not. More important, a retinue of this size meant that the justiciar could undertake dangerous patrols without fear, when the situation did not demand recourse to a full-scale expedition of war.

c) the royal service

Ireland, like England, was apportioned out to its conquerors in return for knight service. This "royal service" owed to the crown was summoned regularly during our period, and this represents a divergence from practice in England, where the feudal levy and

78 Negative proof of this is afforded by the fact that when a justiciar died his retinue was liable to make for home (see Parliament & Councils, I. 116-8 for the dispersal of Mortimer's retinue in 1381).
79 There are lists in Otway-Ruthven, "Royal Service in Ireland", R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII (1968), pp. 41-6. Some of the services can be dated a little more precisely from unprinted sources, and a service of "Athbo" circa 1299-1300 should be added (Common pleas, Mich. 28-9 Edw.I, m.20-PR.C.7/6, p.376).
scutage were all but extinct in the fourteenth century. The most likely explanation of the difference is the incidence of internal war in Ireland, which gave the feudal levy a greater importance, and there is also the fact that overseas service, which gave rise to so many squabbles in England, was not a factor in Ireland.

The Irish royal service has been subjected to a detailed study from the tenurial aspect by Professor Otway-Ruthven, while Mr Richardson and Professor Sayles have examined it closely as a tax. For our purposes neither of these aspects of the service are of first importance, and it is proposed to look only at the evidence for the exaction of service in person during our period, and at the financial value of the scutage in supporting military campaigns. By approaching the service from this viewpoint, it will be seen that, at least after the Bruce invasion, it was invariably associated with a specific royal expedition of war, and that it is not satisfactory to regard the royal service as no more than an "aid on the knight's fee".

There is only one clear description of the summons and execution of the royal service in person between 1272 and 1361. This description is of great importance since it reveals some of the reasons why personal


service was unsatisfactory in Irish conditions. In 1288 John of Sandford, the keeper of Ireland, summoned the Leinster tenants to serve against the Irish of Offaly and Leix. Traditionally a warning of forty days was necessary for the assembly of the service; Sandford allowed the tenants fifty-one days notice. In the meantime the seneschal of Carlow had a banner of silk, satin and red cloth prepared for the occasion, which suggests that the seneschals of the Leinster liberties must have known from the beginning that personal service was required of them. The whole service of Leinster, under the four seneschals, arrived on the day assigned. Three clerks— the prior of the Hospital, Walter Lenfant and Richard de Saham— set about surveying the troops and entering up any defaults. Then Sandford himself reviewed the troops, and assigned each contingent to guard a section of the Offaly and Leix marches. At this point the keeper was called hastily south to deal with MacCarthy, and he had to hurry back to Leinster in order to get there before the period of the service ended (forty days from 9 September was 19/20 October). Sandford arrived in time, and by 21 October had replaced the feudal levies by paid guards in the same marches. This displays clearly one of the weaknesses of the service in Irish conditions: in a situation of endemic warfare service for forty days was inadequate—indeed the keeper proceeded to maintain the new paid guards for most of a year. In addition, the type of troops provided by the service (in the case of Leinster 100

83 Hore, Wexford: Old and New Ross, pp.159-60.
84 Gilbert, Facsimiles, II, plates LXXVIII-IX.
knight's) would not be those best suited to march warfare. 85

This example helps to explain why the royal service seems to have been taken in the form of a financial levy: in the context of Irish warfare, a levy in cash was of greater potential value to the hard pressed administration. All the surviving evidence up to the Bruce invasion shows no further sign of personal service being done: indeed throughout the period 1272-1315 the service could be granted to an individual to enable him to accomplish some military object regarded as of value by the government, and in these cases the levy was almost bound to be in money. 86 As well as this, grants on and allowances against royal services were frequent. 87

At this period, when the service was to be taken in cash, the normal procedure seems to have been to summon the tenants of the county through the sheriff. For example, in 1309 writs were issued summoning, through the sheriff of Dublin

all of his bailiwick who ought to do royal service to the king that they be before the justiciar or his lieutenant at Castlekevin in county Dublin on the day assigned, with horses and arms and suitably prepared, to do their service to the king. 88

85 Though of course sub-infeudation could mean that foot serjeants might be provided to form the equivalent of a knight (Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., LXXXIX. 3).  
87 E.g., C.J.R. 1305-07, pp.74,215-6,242; 1308-14, pp.3-4.  
This summons seems to have been issued on 22 April, and so the service cannot have been due to appear until 1 June, and probably rather later. The writ itself gives no hint that the levy was actually to be in cash, but on 27 May a further order was issued, commanding the sheriffs to levy the service in money. In 1304 a similar procedure had been adopted: the service had been called to Kilkenny for 7 January, and on 10 January a writ was sent to the exchequer ordering that the service was to be received there in money—presumably the sheriffs and seneschals had already been informed that cash and not service in person was required.

In these cases the services were taken in cash and that was that; no option to serve in person seems to have been left to the individual tenant. Later in the fourteenth century this procedure changed, and a choice appears to have been left available. For example, the summons of the service to Limerick in 1332 orders the treasurer and barons of the exchequer to issue writs levying the service in cash, but only de illis qui ibidem non venerunt, prout moris est. This is a very important change in procedure, and one that is crucial to any consideration of the incidence of personal service in the fourteenth century: we cannot assume that, because we know some services to have been taken in cash, they were all taken in cash.

89 The month is omitted in the Calendar, but the context suggests April.
91 Mem.rroll 31-5 Edw.I, m.3d- P.R.O.I., Cal.s, p.67; R.I.A., MS 12 D 11, p.2 (which dates the writ 5 and not 10 January). Cf. Mem.rroll 4-5 Edw.II, m.36- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/5, pp.531-2.
92 Parliaments & Councils, I, no.9.
cash and that no personal service was done. For instance, in the case of this 1332 service, we find a Dublin tenant and some of the forces of the Leinster liberties appearing in person and thus being exempted from the financial levy. 93

Our best view of the organization employed comes from 1355. In that year the sheriffs were to proclaim that all owing royal service were to be at Newcastle Mckynegan on 8 June—forty-nine days from the date of the summons. Those who could not come were to have money in lieu of their service at the exchequer before 8 June. The sheriffs were ordered to deliver the names of all those of their bailiwicks who owed service to the assembly point on the specified day. 94 The arrangements made for this last procedure suggest strongly that the assembly point was still genuinely important, and that the arrival of tenants in person was seriously contemplated. On 27 May, twelve days before the service was due, Robert de Beverley was appointed "to supervise and receive at the castle all those owing royal service", and the sheriff of Dublin was to provide him with an escort in going and returning. 95 We should perhaps see Robert fulfilling the role played by the three clerks who recorded and reviewed the service called by Sandford in 1288. 96 In 1348 too, the service of Mallow was to be surveyed and its defects recorded by two clerks, who were about their business at the

93 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.103 & n.
96 See above, pp.22-3.
assembly point from ten days before the service was due until twelve days afterwards. 97

The fact that the choice of personal service or cash was left to the individual tenant brings us to an important point: many of the tenants who owed royal service for their lands were the very men who might be expected to serve in a campaign at the king's wages anyway. It seems worth suggesting that when a campaign coincided with a service (and of course there were many more campaigns than services in the fourteenth century) sums owed for royal service might in effect be set off against wages— as happened in the case of the 1332 service just mentioned. If this were done, the fact would not necessarily be mentioned in the surviving records. 98

Despite the fact that we should not be too hasty in dismissing the possibility of personal service, there seems to be little doubt that during our period


98 In 1329 lords serving with Darcy were paid for troops "beyond the number they ought by their service to bring" (Pipe roll 2 Edw. III— N.I., MS 761, pp.10-12. The phrase is omitted in 43rd. Rep.D.K., pp.28-9). This is odd for no royal service seems to have been summoned between 1324 and 1330. They were mainly Dublin tenants serving in Dublin, and it could, just possibly, refer to their duty to bear arms in defence of the shire. In England in the late XIII and early XIV centuries we find summonses to arms couched in feudal terms which aimed to make the tenants bring what troops they could (quanto potencius poteritis), who would then be paid (see Powicke, Military Obligation, p.168). Irish summonses, however, seem to ask only for servicium debitum.
the service was overwhelmingly taken in the form of a scutage. We have seen that a cash levy was of greater value to the administration; it was also likely to be preferred by the great lords, who had often enfeoffed more sub-tenants than their service to the crown required, and who could thus make a profit by levying the service on their rear-vassals. We have examples of the royal service being recouped from the sub-tenants, and the petitions sent from Ireland in 1342 seem to show resentment at this process. They speak of justiciars who "compound in money for the services which ought to be done in person, to the great oppression of the people". The king retorted that it was the justiciar's prerogative to have the services taken in money or person as he saw fit.

In the summons of 1355 it was specifically stated that the purpose of the money levy was to provide troops to serve in place of those who did not put in a personal appearance—hence the cash was supposed to be in the exchequer before the assembly date of the service. It will be clear from the narrative of


campaigns that after 1315 every service coincided with a royal expedition of war, and that the service was only proclaimed in a genuine military emergency. There is thus no reason to doubt that this expressed purpose of the levy was the true one, and it seems worth asking how far the scutage was suited to its purpose of supporting the government's campaigns. To answer this question we may summarize the receipts of three services: that of Loughsewdy, proclaimed in Michaelmas term 1307; that of Castledermot, summoned for 10 September 1341; and that of Mallow, summoned for 1 August 1348.

Royal services of Loughsewdy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchequer term</th>
<th>Amount received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mich. 1307-8</td>
<td>£105 6 0½ 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hil. 1308</td>
<td>201 14 0 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hil. 1309</td>
<td>53 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East. 1309</td>
<td>25 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East. 1310</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trin. 1312</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hil. 1313</td>
<td>4 0 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>388 17 4½</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103 See Otway-Ruthven in *R.S.A.I. Journ.*, XCVIII. 39, 44 for comments on the decline in frequency of services after 1315 and for the list of services 1315-61.

104 Services were enrolled in three ways: i) on a special "roll of receipt of the service", followed by a special roll of arrears; ii) on a special roll of receipt, but with arrears on the ordinary receipt roll; iii) from first to last on the ordinary receipt roll among the other receipts. Loughsewdy was treated in the first way; Castledermot in either the first or the second (no arrears survive); and Mallow in the third.

105 P.R.O., Roll of receipt of the service, E.101/235/6.

106 P.R.O., Roll of arrears, E.101/235/15.
### Royal services of Castledermot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchequer term</th>
<th>Amount received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to 5.11.1341</td>
<td>£ 4 19 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to close Mich.</td>
<td>95 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hil. 1342</td>
<td>98 8 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East. 1342</td>
<td>1 6 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mich. 1342-3</td>
<td>14 13 4 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>214 10 0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Royal services of Mallow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchequer term</th>
<th>Amount received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-term (Trin./Mich.) 1348</td>
<td>£ 18 4 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mich. 1348-9</td>
<td>60 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hil. 1349</td>
<td>108 12 0 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East. 1349</td>
<td>18 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trin. 1350</td>
<td>10 0 0 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>216 3 6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures make two important points very clearly. The first is that the order for services to be in the day before the service was due to begin was a dead letter. The biggest receipts tended to come in during the period between three months and six months after the service. Only in the case of Loughsewdy was a large amount received in the exchequer during the term in which the service was proclaimed, and so very little money would be available to support troops during the campaign—though, of course, the money would be useful in recouping expenses after the expedition. The second point is that the royal service was bringing in far less than the £850 that it should have brought in. If we add the receipts of the service

107 P.R.O., Roll of receipt of service, E.101/241/3.
of Tullow in 1324 for comparative purposes (£185-10\(^{110}\)), we get a picture of receipts which remain fairly stable at just under a quarter of the proper amount in the thirty years following the Bruce invasion.\(^{111}\) If we analyse the receipts of the service of Mallow regionally, the result is much what might be expected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Service owed(^{112})</th>
<th>Service paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meath</td>
<td>£100</td>
<td>£51 4 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>84 5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limerick</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>30 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cork</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>20 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louth</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tipperary</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>6 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connacht</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterford</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>850</strong></td>
<td><strong>216 3 6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The heaviest falls were thus in the outlying areas, and it is probable that the royal service was following the pattern of decline that an analysis of the

\(^{110}\) P.R.O., Roll of receipt of service, E.101/238/15.

\(^{111}\) For the figure of £850 see Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., LXXXIX. 5. It seems likely that obligations had been reduced, but this question awaits proper investigation (see Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII. 39 & n.17). P.R.O., E.101/242/5 shows the Irish treasurer owing £460 for the services of Castledermot and Moydeshell. But for the present I have thought it advisable to accept the figure of £850 as a basis of argument.

\(^{112}\) Figures from Otway-Ruthven, R.S.A.I. Journ., LXXXIX. 5.

\(^{113}\) P.R.O., Receipt rolls, E.101/241/17,20.
whole Irish revenue would make visible. But we must, of course, remember that some personal service may have been done, which would make the falls less spectacular. In particular, since the service was at Mallow, Cork, Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford tenants may have turned up in person. Nevertheless, neither the speed with which the money came in nor the amount which came in can have satisfied the administration.

This brief survey of the royal service does not claim to be complete: its main aim has been to examine the service from a different viewpoint to that usually adopted. We should be warned against assuming that there was an automatic progression away from personal service towards scutage during the years under consideration. The evidence suggests that this would be at best an over-simplified view of the situation. Nevertheless, although personal service did not die out, it was hardly a major factor in warfare during our period. Financially, the royal service was not particularly productive, though the amounts it brought in were not negligible. It can only have had a marginal effect on the problem of paying for the endless wars which raged within the Irish lordship.

114 It is interesting to note in the context of regional variations that Ulster did pay for all the services of the 1307-12 period (Mem. roll 8 Edw.II, m.18d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, pp.214-5).

115 Like all medieval accounts those of the royal service tended to run on for decades. Examples are legion, but the debts of the earl of Ormond are of interest since he was a great tenant, whose loyalty was normally above suspicion (see Cal. Ormond Deeds, III, p.342).
d) The paid army

Much of the fighting in Ireland was done with troops paid by the Irish exchequer; their importance far outweighed that of feudal obligation. As we discuss successive campaigns in later chapters, considerable attention will have to be given to the size and personnel of the armies which were brought together at the king's wages. For this reason, comparatively little need be said here about these armies, though it must be emphasized that this runs the risk of lending disproportionate weight to other sections of the present chapter.

The first question to be asked is how the government found its troops. Almost all the forces which appear in the clerks' accounts were brought to the army by the Irish magnates. We have already seen that the justiciar used contracts to retain men of his household.\(^{116}\) There is also evidence that he might retain magnates outside his household, in order to have forces he knew he could call on. Ralph of Ufford retained Walter de Bermingham "for the king's service in war and peace", and he retained Fulk de la Freigne in a similar way, giving them both grants of **mote** lands or rents to the value of £40 a year.\(^{117}\) And both these men certainly brought retinues to Ufford's campaigns.\(^{118}\) But this exhausts our evidence for con-

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tracts between the justiciar and leaders of contingents, and we must assume that normally the promise of wages was sufficient to bring troops to the king's army. It is well known that the contract system had spread down the social order, and it must suffice to quote one interesting example of the relations between a magnate and his retainers in the context of a royal expedition. After the 1313 campaign in Leinster, David son of Alexander Roche brought a case against Robert son of Gregory de Caunteton, alleging that Robert was retained to him and obliged to take up arms on his behalf whenever summoned. He had failed to do so on the occasion of this expedition, in which David must have been serving with a contingent. David claimed, producing the indenture between them, that Robert owed him £40 for this breach of contract. The jury, however, said that Robert could not have gone with the armed band to Glenmalure sine magno periculo corporis sue, because of the enmity between him and other members of the Roche family who were also going in the army. David brought a similar case against Patrick son of Robert de Caunteton, alleging that he also had failed to come with him to the royal army as he should, and Patrick was obliged to pay the sum laid down as a penalty in his indenture; he and not David found himself in heavy mercy. This is clear evidence for the part contracts must have played in finding troops for the Irish government.

For indentured retinues see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 210, 274-5.

We have already seen that the justiciar was directly employing bands of kern, semi-professional mercenaries, in the mid-fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{121} It seems likely that, apart from this, "kerns and idlemen" would form a substantial part of the retinues of the magnates on royal expeditions. The great lords maintained these bands on their lands and those of other men throughout the period, as legislation against the practice clearly shows.\textsuperscript{122} The way in which these bands of retainers might come to take service with a lord, and could thereby indirectly come to serve the king, is shown by a case in 1307. The prioress of Oconyl in county Limerick lent a horse to Maurice son of Philip, on the understanding that he was going to join John fitz Thomas in his war against the Irish of Offaly. Maurice in the event did not go, but this is irrelevant. Maurice is shown to have been a captain of kern, and the case demonstrates that free-booters might come from far afield to take service under a great lord.\textsuperscript{123} Lords for their part could, illegally if they were not lords of liberties,\textsuperscript{124} furnish such men with letters of protection.\textsuperscript{125}

Apart from the contract system and such bands of kerns and idlemen there were all sorts of advantages

\textsuperscript{121} Above, pp.8-9.
\textsuperscript{122} See above, p.9 n.33.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{C.J.R. 1305-07}, p.453.
\textsuperscript{125} There is an example of a letter of protection in \textit{Gilbert, Facsimiles}, III, plate XIII. It is given by Thomas fitz John, son of John fitz Thomas.
both positive and negative which would bring men to the king's banner. Pardons for good service, either done or to be done in an imminent campaign, were common, and they must have been an attraction in a land full of outlaws.126 At the time of the Bruce invasion the government had to resort to pardons on a large scale in order to raise troops.127 Warfare in Ireland as elsewhere meant booty.128 We know that Irish custom spoke of the "king's portion of preys" taken by men in his pay,129 and this of course implies that the man who took the prey also had his portion. Unfortunately there is nowhere a statement of what form the division took, but in fourteenth century England, and in Scotland and Wales, one-third seems to have been the most normal figure: the taker of the prey or ransom paid a third to the leader, who then paid a third of this, plus a third of his own takings to the king.130 In addition to pardons and the normal "advantages of war", persons fighting in Ireland might also receive rewards or dona from the government for notable exploits. These dona for actions either on expeditions or outside them seem to have increased

126 E.g., C.J.R. 1305-07, pp.293,501. Our evidence of course peters out with the justiciary rolls. It has been estimated that 2 to 12% of English armies consisted of outlaws, of whom 3 in 4 were murderers. (See Hunt, Customs, p. 26-30.)

127 For this see below, pp.222-3.


notably during the course of the fourteenth century. The most common reason for their award was the capturing or killing of important Irish enemies. 131

But we may speculate that over and above all these inducements could lie the knowledge that in Irish conditions the interests of the king were often (though far from invariably) those of his subjects. Men who had been despoiled by the Irish, or by the Anglo-Irish rebels, might be prepared to join a royal expedition to revenge themselves upon them and to regain or ensure the safety of their lands. No doubt a time would come when the justiciar's protection was worth less than that of the rebels and enemies, but in Leinster at least that point does not seem to have been reached during our period. The tenants, or a sufficient number of them, were still willing to follow the king's banner.

The paid armies which the justiciar raised were not usually very large. The simplest way to study them is to present in tabular form the strength of those armies for which tolerably reliable figures survive. It should, however, be stressed that one of the most notable features of Irish armies is their fluctuation from day to day, and for this reason, and also because the clerk's accounts rarely survive in perfect form, no "definitive" figure can be arrived at. The figures presented here have been gained by estimating the army's size on a certain day on which it was near to

131 Many examples appear in the narrative chapters, and these matters are discussed more fully in the context of regulating relations between English and Irish in chapter IX.
This table brings out a number of striking facts about Irish armies. First, it emphasizes the importance of the hobelar in Irish warfare. On occasions the hobelars even outnumber the foot, and on more than half the occasions the number of hobelars is more than half the total of the foot contingents. Secondly, the figures show the marked decline in the number of men-at-arms during the fourteenth century, on which we have already remarked. In 1342, 1348, 1352 and 1358 the number of men-at-arms is almost ridiculously small in comparison with the light cavalry and foot contingents. Thirdly, the table shows that the paid armies in Ireland were comparatively small — though we must emphasize that paid troops did not form the whole of the force available. However, when the numbers of these paid

132 The days chosen here are not always the same as those selected for calculation in the narrative, which explains discrepancies. "L" = Leinster & "M" = Munster. References would be cumbersome here; they may be found in the narrative & in Appendix IV.

133 Above, p. 3.

134 See the next section of this chapter.
armies are compared with those used by the English kings in Scotland or on the continent, although they remain small, they cease to seem ludicrously so as they do at first to modern eyes. In Scotland in 1334-5 Edward III had 6,200 men; on the continent in 1338-40 he had little more than 5,000; in 1355 the Black Prince took 2,600 on expedition; the expeditionary force of 1359 with its 11,900 men has been described as "vast"; John of Gaunt's continental expeditions of 1369, 1370 and 1373 never reached 2,000 men. And for smaller operations even smaller armies might be employed: Edward III's famous Scottish forays of 1336—which were, perhaps, nearer in type to Irish warfare—may have been accomplished with as little as 800 men, and, indeed, when Edward sent his son Lionel to Ireland in 1361 he thought some 748 troops an adequate number to send with him. 135 We must also repeat what we said when discussing the justiciar's permanent retinue: the Irish government could only employ as many troops as it could pay for. With the revenue running at little more than £2,000 in the period from 1315 to 1361, it is small wonder that larger forces were not raised in the Irish lordship. 136 Until the king began to accept that Irish military operations needed adequate financial support from England, as he did after 1361, no increase in the size of Irish armies could take place.

139 See Stubb's "Irish Military Operations".
e) popular obligation and the shire levies

The general military obligation in Ireland seems to have been the same as it was in England: in 1333 we find the Dublin tenants being assessed to arms "according to the ancient ordinance and to the Statute of Winchester". 137 The Statute had been sent to Ireland in 1308, 138 and from then on it became the basis of the assessment to arms of the Irish populace: every man was required to bear arms according to his degree as the Statute laid down. 139 We hear very little about the obligation to arms in Ireland before 1308, though the "ancient ordinance" may well refer to the Assize of Arms of 1181. 140 In 1297 Irish legislation had laid down that every tenant with twenty librates of land was to have a horse "suitably caparisoned, together with the other arms which thereto pertain, constantly ready in his dwelling". Lesser men were to have hobbies and unarmed horses "according to their abilities". 141 Within the liberty of Meath twenty librates were supposed to support the horse and arms of a knight. 142 The exact details of assessment do not concern us, and it must suffice to say that there was obviously a long tradition of the popular obligation to bear arms, and that this was formalized and fossilized in the Statute of Winchester, twenty-three years after it had happened in England.

137 Just.roll 6-7 Edw.III, m.10d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/17, pp.359-60; Account Roll of Holy Trinity, p.176.
The question of the Statute raises one problem. We have already seen that the nature of troops in Ireland differed slightly from those available in England. How could the Statute be applied in Ireland? It seems likely that the Statute was loosely interpreted to suit the conditions prevalent there. In England the arms laid down by the Statute were tacitly equated with others as development proceeded, though this was several times a matter of controversy in the fourteenth century. So in Ireland, writs of assessment and array speak of the hobelar, even though the hobelar was unknown at the time of the promulgation of the Statute in 1285.

In the Irish countryside, at regular intervals, the people had to come to the view and demonstration of arms, where the local officials ensured that each man had weapons and armour *juxta statum*. Very little is known about the view, and we can only assume that it took place three times a year as the Statute of Winchester laid down, and was thus a normal feature of life in the Irish shires and baronies. At the time of the Bruce invasion, the sheriff of Louth was ordered

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142 Cal. Gormanstown Reg., p.182.
143 See Powicke, Military Obligation, pp.189-97 and also 148-9,160 and 209.
144 E.g., Frame in *Irish Jurist*, II. 310.
to take the view of arms more frequently than was accustomed because of the emergency, and this suggests that the sheriff would be responsible for the preparedness of the whole county and for the conduct of his under-officials. 146 Orders that betaghsh as well as English tenants should make view of arms shows that the Irish population of the manors were also obliged to serve in the defence of the lordship. 147 At the other end of the social scale even the great lords owed service as subjects of the king, and the earl of Ormond could be ordered to aid the justiciar in war "as he is bound to do by his allegiance and fealty". 148

These duties and their institutionalization in this manner meant that there was a reserve of troops available to serve the king in Ireland. These shire levies complete the resources that the government could tap, but they also raise serious problems. Some evidence has survived about how the levies performed their function of guarding their own counties, under the command of the sheriffs and keepers of the peace, 149 but the amount of evidence for the junction of these troops with armies raised by the justiciar at the king's wages is very small. In England there were two sections to most paid armies: the retinues of the magnates, and the troops of the shires and boroughs, often serving under the local knights who arrayed them. 150 We have

147 Mem. roll 5 Edw. II, m. 27—P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/6, p. 186.
148 C.C.R. 1354-60, p. 344.
149 See below, chapter IX, pp. 481-3.
150 See, e.g., Prince in E.H.R. XLVI. 353-71 passim.
already seen that in Ireland the paid armies were composed of the magnates and their retinues alone: at no time do the troops of the Irish shires and liberties appear in pay. This, to say the least, is odd. In England, since most war was external, the raw levies of the countryside were of little value - the fittest would be chosen, and would join the army at the king's wages. Ireland, with its unending internal wars, would be more rather than less suited to the use of the shire levies. Thus we know that the military obligation was the same in Ireland as in England, that Ireland seems a more suitable area for the use of the shire levies, and yet that no popular forces seem to have joined the justiciars' armies at the king's wages. The most likely conclusion seems to be that the Irish levies were normally employed on an unpaid basis - or that when selection was made the wages were met by the local communities. Thus, since the levies did not come into contact with the exchequer, very little evidence has survived concerning them. Their presence on campaigns normally has to be inferred from occasional scraps of evidence.

151 Mem. roll 29-30 Edw. III, mm. 23-24d - P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/27, pp. 165-7 shows tenants serving "for" certain counties at the king's expense. But these seem to be men taken into pay after their period of service at the shire's expense was up (see below, pp. 355-57).

152 Though when internal operations were concerned the levies tended to come back into their own (see Powicke, Military Obligation, pp. 150-2).

One, undated, summons does, however, exist, in which a long list of tenants in Meath are ordered to be before the justiciar and keepers of the peace, prepared to parley with O'Farrell and to do whatever else is required of them. The list as it survives is not complete, but something around 300 names are mentioned. The name of Matilda, Lady of Slane seems to place this document in the 1340s, and indeed there were operations against O'Farrell in 1341. Since the popular obligation was assessed on lands and goods, we may assume that these tenants would be expected considerably more than their own number of troops. Though the surviving text of this document is unsatisfactory, it makes one important point very strongly: Irish armies were certainly likely to be much bigger than the clerks' accounts suggest, and to consider these alone would be gravely misleading. This subject is so important that it seems worth piecing together other morsels of evidence which exist for the use of the shire levies in royal expeditions.

On several occasions we can see the justiciar summoning the populace to the king's banner. When Archbishop Sandford's lieutenants undertook military operations in Connacht in 1289, they led a force which the keeper had collected from the neighbouring areas.
He visited Tuam and Dunmore in Galway "to provide a force", and in the end raised an army of 100 war horses and 4,500 "vassals", "together with the king of Connacht with all his force". At once we notice that this army is much larger than those fourteenth century ones which we have been discussing. In addition, the wages of the army for the four days on which it was employed come to no more than £54-16-5½d, which is a figure far below that required to pay a force as large as Sandford described—even if all his troops were penny-a-day foot-soldiers. It seems inescapable that the keeper had summoned the local men, who were, at least within their own localities, bound to serve the king at their own costs. The same conclusion arises from events when the keeper returned to Leinster. He found the Irish of Leix and Offaly in a state of war, and, after unsuccessful parleys, went to Baltinglass on the fringe of the Wicklow mountains "and there caused to be summoned before him as well the English as the Irish of the mountains of Dublin and adjacent parts, who all promised at his request to be ready to attack the rebels". He progressed from Balt-

156 Gilbert, Facsimiles, II, plate LXXX; C.D.I. 1285-92, pp.2689.
158 There is no evidence to show the limits of the areas within which unpaid service was due in Ireland. In England forces would come from neighbouring counties; from further away they would serve at wages, and perhaps in relays (Powicke, Military Obligation, pp.94,121-3; Prince, Govt. at Work, I. 346). Irish legislation ordering neighbouring counties to assist each other and that Leinster should be one for peace and war suggests that forces would come from closer counties only (Stat.Ire.,John-Hen.V, pp.206-9,210-11).
inglass to Leighlin and Carlow, where he ordered "all men of good will to the king throughout Leinster and Munster to come with their force to Butavaunt in Leix". When the army did come, the average expenditure was about £14 a day, and again, after these widespread summonses, it seems unlikely that this figure can represent the army's wages. The "men of good will" must again represent the levies, serving at their own costs.\(^{159}\)

In 1316 we see the popular obligation clearly in operation in Dublin. Most of the evidence concerns its use in shire defence, but military summonses were also issued to the more important Dublin tenants. They were to come before the Irish council at Easter 1316 ad audiendum et faciendum ea que ex parte domini regis eis tunc plenius injungetur. The summonses were issued on pain of forfeiture of lands and rents and the arrest of their bodies.\(^{160}\) This type of summons is seen again in Dublin in later years, when we find tenants called, presumably to serve with the justiciar, at the rescue of Newcastle McKyneghan and Castlekevin.\(^{161}\)

In 1333, when Darcy led a campaign against the O'Conors of Offaly, he must have issued a military summons to the areas nearby, for we find the community of Castledermot being pardoned for "they had not men-at-arms in the company of the justiciar of Ireland to

\(^{159}\) C.D.I. 1285-92, pp.272-3.


\(^{161}\) R.C.H. p.43 no.13; Mem.roll 18-19 Edw.III, m.37-
ride with the army against O'Conwher of Offaly, enemy of the king". 162

But it was when Ufford led his large expedition south against Desmond in 1345 that the clearest view of a general military summons in our period is to be seen. After the justiciar had suffered a reverse at the hands of Desmond and his allies, he proclaimed:

quod omnes ligei domini Regis cuiuscumque condicionis fuerint venirent apud Cassell' coram prefato Iusticiario ad vexillum domini Regis prosequendum et ulterius faciendum et recipiendum quod eis ex parte domini Regis tunc fuerit injungendum. 163

This summons to all lieges "whatever their status" makes it plain that the general obligation to arms is concerned; it is not a summons to royal service, which at about the same time was called to Moydeshell. 164 We also have evidence which suggests that the levies did do their service during this campaign. George le Poer, sheriff of Wexford, was summoned to attend the justiciar with horses and arms during 1345, 165 and later we hear of mariners being provided to bring the men-at-arms of Cork and Waterford to the royal army when Ufford had pressed on into Kerry. 166

164 See chapter VII below, pp. 378.
165 Hore, Wexford: Tintern, Clonmines & Rosegarland, p. 159.
166 Just. roll 19 Edw. III- Genealogical Office, MS 191, p. 311. For an even clearer view of the summons of the levies under their local leaders in 1372 see R.C.H. p. 84 nos. 132-4; Parliaments & Councils, I. 49-51.
Thus it seems quite clear that the men of the
shire could be called upon to join the paid army, and
it is a great pity that we have not adequate evidence
to allow us to say how frequently this happened.
Certainly there are hints which suggest that the levies
were present on occasions other than the few that we
have mentioned. On odd occasions the chronicles speak
of the justiciar achieving a military object "with the
aid of the men of the country", and sometimes we
hear of the presence of sheriffs on expeditions, which
might suggest that they were there as captains of the
shire forces. It is possible that unpaid additions
to the armies we know from the clerks' accounts were
the rule rather than the exception.

It is quite another matter to estimate the numbers
or quality of the men the levies may have provided, or
to say anything worthwhile about their organization.
The needs of the agricultural round, and the necessity
of providing defence other than in the area of the
campaigns themselves must have meant that service was
by no means universal. For example, the archbishop
of Armagh could find it hard even to get counsel against
O'Hanlon because the magnates of the land were busy with
the harvest. It seems likely therefore that a quota

167 E.g., Chart. St. Mary's, II. 377, 385.
168 See, e.g., below, pp. 184 no. 103, 140, 272, 283, 300, 347.
169 Cf. Prince, Govt. at Work, I. 356.
170 "Cal. of Archbishop Sweteman's Reg.", ed. Lawlor,
could affect military operations in England.
of men serving at the wages of the community would be
the normal practice. The troops seem to have been
organized, like the foot in the retinues, in millen-
aries, centenaries and vintenaries, but we have no
further details. The existence of this reserve of
troops must, however, make any generalizations about
the size of armies based solely on the clerks' accounts
invalid. Irish armies were considerably bigger than
the surviving records would suggest, but how much
bigger we do not know.

f) pay and commissariat organization

The armies that we have been describing naturally
required an administrative system for paying and
supplying them. To enter into a detailed description
would take us far from our main topic, and so we shall
attempt only a brief outline of the office of paymaster,
and follow it up by drawing attention to some of the
main methods and problems involved in keeping an Irish
army supplied with victuals. The evidence for this
latter subject is unsatisfactory, and it does not allow
for many hard and fast conclusions.

Writs of assessment and array show this organiz-
ation. For a particularly full one see Pat. roll
5 Hen. IV- N.L.I., MS 4, f.112 (R.C.H. p.178 no.
77a). One wonders what effect the absence of
frankpledge may have had on military organization
at the lowest level (see Otway-Ruthven, "Anglo-
Irish shire government in the XIII century", I.H.
S., V (1946), p.18 ). I have deliberately left
out of account specific grants of troops by shires
and boroughs, and the related local subsidies. For
some examples of these see Otway-Ruthven, "Ireland
in the 1350s: Sir Thomas de Rokeby and his suc-
The office of clerk of wages or "of the war pay" was set on a regular basis in 1295, when John Wogan was appointed justiciar. Wogan was to have wages for all forces beyond his twenty men-at-arms whenever it was necessary for him to raise an army. One of the clerks of the exchequer was to be appointed by the justiciar, treasurer and barons to receive the necessary money from the treasurer and chamberlains. He was to disburse the money by view of the justiciar and of one other person whom the justiciar was to appoint, and was to render his account at the Dublin exchequer. 172 This procedure seems to have been strictly adhered to by Wogan. In the 1297 campaign in Ossory, and on the 1298 expedition to Bunratty, John Marshal acted as clerk, having been appointed in the manner laid down. Wogan then notified the exchequer that the money had been expended "by view of the justiciar and testimony of William de Kerlyon, the controller". 173 The clerk's accounts were enrolled on the Irish Pipe roll, 174 and the payments passed audit in England. 175 This procedure varied only in detail during the rest of our period.

The clerk of wages was not, of course, a new officer in 1295. We have already seen William Cadel, one of the men of the king's household in Ireland, acting as receiver of money for an expedition in the 1270s. 176

172 C.D.I. 1293-1301, no. 267.
173 Ibid., pp. 207-8, 223 and nos. 454, 508, 521.
175 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/144, m. 28, "anno xxvi".
176 Above, p. 12.
On the occasion of Fulbourne's reappointment in 1285, arrangements were made similar to those of 1295. Under Sandford and de Vescy in the years 1288 to 1294 we also find clerks staying with the justiciar on expedition. In the 1294-5 campaign in Leinster, however, no clerk appears and wages seem to have been paid directly to the leaders of contingents. The office of clerk of wages was not, therefore, as formal in the years before 1295 as it was to be afterwards, when the very existence of an "expedition of war" presupposed the appointment of a clerk.

The clerk's account was normally delivered to the exchequer under the justiciar's testing, and these writs of allocate were, at least after 1329, usually enrolled on the Memoranda roll. The final account itself was of course enrolled on the Pipe roll. Often, therefore, when the final enrolled account is missing, the Memoranda roll gives a serviceable version of the text of the account. The form of the account was the standard one: the clerk accounts for money received from the exchequer, and is then discharged with the enrolment of particulars of his disbursements. Unfortunately we have not got adequate texts of the early fourteenth century accounts, but what evidence there is suggests that they were becoming fuller during the first decade of the century, with the names of the leaders of contingents and the amounts they were paid.

177 C.D.I. 1285-92, pp.265,276-7; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/139, m.9d.
178 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/144, m.28, "anno xxiii"; Mem. roll 22-3 Edw.I, m.6d- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.27-8?.
The standard form of accounts after the period of the Bruce wars was one giving the name of each leader, the details of the troops he brought, their period of service, and the wages paid to the contingent. We know what details the English exchequer required, for in 1349 Thomas Peek, de Berwingham's clerk of wages, had his accounts challenged at Westminster. He ought to have had the reason for the raising of the army, the length of its employment, the number of troops employed, and the daily rate at which each type of soldier was paid. The Irish exchequer had to produce the writs of liberate which included these details in order to substantiate Peek's faulty account.

Although the procedure laid down in 1295 ordered that the clerk was to be appointed by the justiciar, treasurer and barons, the justiciar alone seems to have appointed the clerk during the fourteenth century. The commission would vary according to the purpose for which the appointment was made: normally clerks acted for one expedition, or related group of expeditions, only, and in this case the Irish or Anglo-Irish against whom the expedition was aimed would be named in the commission; sometimes, however, a clerk would be


181 E.g., Close roll 8 Edw. III- N. L. I., MS 2, f. 42 (R.C.H. p. 39 no. 93).
appointed paymaster for a justiciar's permanent force, and if this were so, his commission would make it plain. The commission of appointment would usually be enrolled in the exchequer as well as in the chancery. The form of the commission was standard. The clerk was to pay the wages of the troops (and sometimes to "supervise" them as well), and to certify all his actions to the treasurer and barons. On occasion we hear that he was to draw up rolls and tallies of the payments between himself and the justiciar, and this must have been normal practice. That the office had clearly recognized and little-varying duties is emphasized by the fact that in 1321 the exchequer did not record the clerk's commission in full, but contented itself with saying that it was the same as one issued in 1319. The clerk received a wage of two shillings a day (with an occasional drop to one shilling) and sometimes he might bring a small force of his own to the campaign.

In 1342 an attempt was made to change the system that we have been outlining. In response to a petition

183 E.g., P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 13-14 Edw.II, m.8.
184 Mem. roll 15-16 Edw.IIX, m.6- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/12, p.583.
claiming that officials were being paid both their normal fees of office and wages of war at the same time, the king ordered that a clerk of the war-pay was henceforth to be appointed in England. He was to "survey and put in writing" the number of troops employed, and also to record the valuations of horses taken for war. This seems to have taken effect to some extent: on 18 April 1342 Thomas of Quixhill was so appointed, and later on so was Thomas of Alberton, Rokeby's paymaster. In 1355 the earl of Desmond also thought it worthwhile to have his appointment of John Hale confirmed in England. But it does not seem that the new practice was rigidly enforced—many clerks operating in Ireland after 1342 have left no trace of their appointment on the English chancery rolls. However, when a clerk was appointed from England, this move had considerable significance. Normally, unless he was appointed to pay the wages of a justiciar with a permanent retinue, the clerk of wages would serve for one expedition only. When an appointment was made from England, the appointment would be longer lasting—it would be for all a particular justiciar's expeditions. This, we may presume, would give the clerk a position independent of the justiciar and the Irish exchequer. He could not be removed without the assent of the English government, and in this way he would act as a financial safeguard.

190 Ibid., 1347-56, p.248.
191 C.P.R. 1354-8, p.344. This confirmation was not enrolled until 1356 (after Desmond's death).
192 Cf., ibid., p.133.
The king's officers had the right to take prizes and purvey goods, provided, of course, that payment was eventually forthcoming. These powers were essential to the supplying of armies, and the king's rights seem to have been used extensively in Ireland—though it is not always clear whether the evidence for the taking of goods refers to the supplying of officials' households or to actual expeditions of war. One of the earliest complaints against prizes and purveyance dates from 1277-8, when John de Coventry accused Henry de Rochefort of entering his lands at Kildare and taking corn to the value of £20. Henry answered that "he took it at the time of the disturbance of the peace when Geoffrey de Geneville was justiciar, and at the latter's warrant and not otherwise". The use of purveyance seems to have been occasioned by the Bruce invasion, when problems of feeding troops were more than usually acute, and orders to purvey or to make payment for purveyance are numerous on the memoranda rolls. In 1317 we have a good view of the exercise of rights of purveyance on a large scale. The justiciar was about to lead troops against the Leinster Irish, and he ordered the local officials of Dublin, Kildare, Meath, Wexford, Carlow, and the keeper of the temporalities of the archbishopric of Dublin, to provide a total of 420 cows to the use of the army. This was to be done by the view of two lawful men. A later order to return some of the cows, apparently because of the postponement of the expedition, suggests that they

193 Common pleas 6 Edw.I, m.1d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/1, p. 23 (in fact pleas of the crown).

had all been delivered into the custody of the sheriff of Dublin. Evidence for purveyance in comparatively scanty in later years, but the number of complaints against it seem to prove that there was no slackening in the government's exercise of its rights.

The use of purveyance for an army often involved the appointment of official purveyors, although, as we have just seen, purveyance could proceed through the ordinary local officers without the appointment of special commissioners. Surprisingly little evidence has survived concerning purveyors for campaigns in fourteenth century Ireland. Writs of allocate to them do not seem to have been enrolled on the memoranda rolls, even though those for purveyors operating in Ireland for the king's Scottish expeditions were so enrolled. Only in the early fourteenth century do we have any adequate evidence about the operations of purveyors appointed for an Irish campaign, and it seems worth considering this evidence in detail in order to show the administrative procedure involved in organizing supplies.

For Gaveston's Leinster expedition of 1309 purveyors were appointed in Drogheda and Dublin. Those appointed in Drogheda were Reginald Irpe and John de Egge. Andrew Gerard, keeper of the great custom, was ordered to provide them with 100 marks for their purveyance, and


their account shows that they received this sum. The purveyors did not make their account until 1312-13, and from it we can see that they paid £66-9-2 in goods to Robert of Burton, the vicar of Newcastle McKynegan, who seems to have acted as a receiver in the area of the campaign. Robert in his turn paid over £50-12-6 worth of goods to John of Hotham, the clerk of wages for the campaign, but Robert seems to have neglected to render his account, and by 1312 he was being pursued for it by the exchequer. In 1313 he came into the exchequer and gave a recognizance that he had received the £66-92-2 in victuals from the purveyors at Newcastle: the victuals consisting of bread, wine, ale, flour and various other commodities. We learn from this that Reginald Irpe had sent a roll of particulars of the goods he had delivered to Robert to the exchequer when he made his own account. Robert now undertook to acquit Reginald of all these goods to the king. The Dublin purveyors received their cash from the city itself, and they too failed to make account. It seems that their supplies were sent not to Newcastle McKynegan but to Castlekevin, which Gaveston had

197 P.R.O.I., Mem.roll 3 Edw.II, m.38.
199 Ibid., p.34.
201 Ibid., 6-7 Edw.II, m.39- R.C.8/7, pp.436-7. In England the receiver and purveyor drew up an indenture (Prince in Govt. at Work, I. 367-8).
were formally organized in stages, with each person involved having to render an account. But unfortunately evidence later in the century is inadequate to allow any elaboration on this. At intervals we hear of purveyors in operation, but only once are their actions recorded in any detail.

One commission concerning the raising of supplies in Kildare in 1358 has survived in full, giving us some idea of the machinery used to victual armies in the later part of our period. The king had ordered that 100 crannocks of corn and 100 crannocks of oats were to be purveyed in the county for the Leinster war. He now appointed the sheriff of Kildare and two other men to do this, giving them power to act within and without liberties, but not within the cross lands. They were to take the goods where it would do least harm to the populace. If possible the supplies were to be paid for, but if money was not available tallies were to be cut and sent to the treasury, which would then satisfy those from whom the goods had been taken. The purveyors were allowed to take carriage for these supplies, and were to deliver them to "the purveyor". It seems, therefore, that on this occasion at least a chief purveyor, acting centrally, had been appointed. It may well be that supplies were much more stringently organized than would appear from surviving documents.

203 E.g., P.R.O., Issu rolls, E.101/240/10; 243/6; R.C.H. p.62 no.94.
204 Pat. roll 32 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 3, f.37 (R.C.H. p.73 no.51).
As the description of procedure in 1309 has shown, it was usual for supplies to be sent to the base from which operations were to be conducted. For instance in the 1270s provisions were delivered to Ufford at Castlekevin when he was leading the campaign that finally ended the prolonged troubles among the Leinster Irish at that period. 205 When Edmund Butler, justiciar in 1316, was preparing for the Skerries campaign against Bruce, supplies were delivered to Carlow, which seems to have been the meeting place for the royal army. 206 When a justiciar was setting out on patrol in remote areas, orders could be sent ahead to provide victuals in the places through which he expected to pass: for instance, in 1345 Ufford commanded that purveyance be set in train in the cities of Waterford, Cork and Limerick and in the counties of Wexford, Waterford, Cork and Limerick, before he set out for the south. 207 More striking, perhaps, are the preparations made for the coming of his army against Desmond in the same year. The army's route seems to have been plotted in advance, and the officials of Kildare, Carlow, Kilkenny and Waterford were to have victuals on specified days at specified boroughs within their counties. 208

It seems that the clerk of wages was often made responsible for the organization of supplies, and in

205 Pipe roll 7 Edw.I- N.L.I., MS 760, p.83.
208 Ibid., m.5d- pp.43-6. This is discussed more fully in the relevant narrative chapter below.
this Irish practice was a throw-back to earlier practice in England, where the clerk had once had control over both supplies and the munition store. We have already seen that supplies were turned over to the clerk in 1309. In the southern expedition of 1330, Thomas de Warilowe, the paymaster, both organized the purchase of supplies and was responsible for their carriage from Waterford to Clonmel. We also find another clerk, acting under the clerk of wages, being paid a pound in 1332 for carrying silver for wages and also flour to the garrison of Clonmore during Lucy's campaign. Transporting goods in Irish conditions could cause difficulties and, even for expeditions in the area immediately south of Dublin, provisions were liable to be carried by sea rather than overland: in 1329 Darcy's Leinster expedition was victualled by sea, through the port of Wicklow.

On occasion we know that provisions were used to pay the troops' wages, and, if English practice is anything to go by, this was probably quite common: the king's duty was more to provide for his troops according to their respective ranks than to put actual cash into

209 See Prince in Govt. at Work, I. 367.
212 43rd. Rep. D.K., p. 42; Mem. roll 3-4 Edw. III, m. 27-P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/15, p. 545. This was also the case in England, where ships could be used for quite short distances (see Hewitt, Organization of War, p. 75).
213 E.g., Mem. roll 5-6 Edw. III, m. 53- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/16, pp. 443-4.
their hands. Sometimes, too, there might be a surplus of provisions which would be sold off by the officer in whose hands they happened to be.

This evidence, scanty as it is, shows that there were commissariat arrangements in Ireland rather similar to those in use in England, but, as far as we can see, much less complex. The fact that Irish armies operated over a restricted area, and normally for a comparatively short time, meant that the organization of supplies did not need to be as involved as it was in England. For instance, even in campaigns across the channel, if the English army was operating just north of the Scottish border, it could rely on private enterprise plus an order to six of the nearer shires to keep itself supplied with victuals. In Ireland it may well be that private enterprise, aided by the local officials could cope, and that the supplies could be controlled by the army's paymaster without frequent resort to the elaborate machinery of special purveyors, receivers and their accounts. However, even if the machinery was relatively simple and ad hoc, there can be little doubt that every Irish army needed supplies. These could be, and often were, done without when troops were operating in "enemy" territory (for example in France), but Irish armies, fighting within the lordship, would have to be kept on a tighter rein.

214 See Powicke, Military Obligation, p.124; Prince in Govt. at Work, I. 375.
215 E.g., P.R.O., Receipt rolls, E.101/238/10; 239/28; 243/4.
B. Shire defence

a) the royal castles

The king possessed a number of castles in Ireland, the burden of whose support was borne by the Irish exchequer. In addition to the castles permanently on the exchequer's payroll there were others which came into the king's hands from time to time through minority, escheat and forfeiture, and whose garrisons would be supported sometimes directly by the exchequer and sometimes from the revenues of the lordships to which they belonged. The castles garrisoned at the exchequer's expense throughout our period were not many: basically the three Connacht castles of Athlone, Roscommon and Randown, Newcastle McKynegan in the Leinster mountains, and, of course, Dublin, Drogheda and Limerick. The safety of the royal castles weighed very heavily on the minds of both the English and Irish governments, and so their respective records contain a disproportionate amount of information concerning them. Despite this, the castles have never been closely studied from a historical viewpoint.

Obviously we cannot hope to remedy this state of affairs, but it is hoped that something of the role of the Leinster castles in particular will emerge from the

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217 The royal castles c.1300 are marked on the map at the end of Otway-Ruthven, *Medieval Ireland*.

218 Leask's *Irish Castles* and other writings deal with castles from an architectural point of view. The most useful historical accounts of individual castles are those of Orpen, especially in *R.S.A.I. Journ.*, XXXVII-XXXIX (1907-09).
narrative of campaigns in later chapters: we shall see the castle playing its part as a base for military expeditions, a local strong-point to be strengthened further when danger threatened, a link in the chain of communications, and as a place of refuge for the hard-pressed local population. Here it is proposed only to say something of the administrative relationship between the government and its castles. Most of our examples will be taken from Leinster, since the Leinster castles, although neither the largest nor the most impressive physically, are by far the most important for the purposes of the present study.

Each castle was in charge of a constable, who, in Leinster at least, was often an important local tenant. It seems likely that the constable normally entered into an agreement with the king for the castle's custody. For example, at Easter 1299 Simon Lawless acknowledged his appointment as constable of Castlekevin (which was then in the king's hand), agreeing to keep the castle, which "all the king's council in Ireland" had handed over to him, on pain of forfeiture of all his goods, lands and tenements, in return for a fee of £40 a year. The government for its part agreed that if there were "common war", and the castle were besieged, the king would come to Simon's aid to rescue the castle. Simon promised to surrender the castle to no-one but the king. 219 No other examples of the terms on which royal constables were appointed seem to have survived, but we can see from again agreements between lords and their constables that this sort of undertaking was

219 Common pleas, Easter 27 Edw. I, m. 81- P.R.O.I., R.C. 7/6, p. 6.
The king's promise to give a helping hand when war broke out probably lies behind the extra forces which were sent regularly to the Leinster castles in times of disturbance.

Castles were normally maintained on an annual fee from the exchequer, though not infrequently the provost of a neighbouring vill or another local officer might be ordered to pay the necessary sum to the constable. It is unfortunate that the payments on the issue rolls to the king's constables do not specify the number of troops the constables were expected to maintain on their fee, but it is clear that numbers cannot have been large. For example, in the 1350s we hear that the constable of Newcastle McKynegan was to have £40 a year, and that that sum was to support a garrison of a single man-at-arms and twelve archers. Since the traditional fee for Newcastle had been only £20, its normal garrison must have been even smaller than this.

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220 E.g., Cal. Ormond Deeds, II, nos.43,126; Cal. Gormanstown Reg., p.201.
221 Throughout the narrative we shall see such moves heralding the start of war.
222 Any issue roll makes this clear.
223 E.g., Mem.roll 4-5 Edw.II, m.45- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/5, pp.599-600. The reeve and constable might also be the same man (38th Rep. D.K., p.47).
224 C.P.R. 1354-8, p.187.
225 E.g., P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/9,12,14,16, 19; 238/1,6,12,17,19,26 etc. The issue rolls of course provide details of the fees of the constables of the other castles too.
If the Irish government suspected that a castle was ill-kept, a commission of inquiry might result. For example in 1310 the sheriff of Dublin was ordered to inquire into the constable of Newcastle McKynegan's keeping of the castle. He was to see how many men the constable kept in the castle on his fee, and how many at the king's wages, and he was to inspect the state of the buildings and review the troops, reporting any defects in both. This commission cannot have had the desired effect, for in the following year an even wider one was issued. Robert of Burton, the vicar of Newcastle (whom we have already met as a receiver of victuals) and Hugh Lawless were to discover how much the constable had spent on improvements, how far the value of the castle had decreased since the time of his predecessor, and what waste the constable had committed. They were also to find out whether he had kept his obligatory number of troops, and if he had done so continuously. They were finally to ascertain the amount needed to put the castle in good repair.

Arrangements for keeping close watch on the castles were strongly encouraged by the interest of the king. A stream of orders flowed from the English chancery: specific castles were to be surveyed, often after the king had heard reports of their bad state, defects were to be noted and repairs begun; a justiciar on his appointment would be ordered to inspect all castles.

226 P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 3 Edw.II, m.39d.
228 E.g., C.C.R. 1307-13, p.533; 1327-30, p.282; 1333-7, p.642.
making sure that they were properly guarded and munitioned, and punishing constables who had been remiss.\textsuperscript{229} The king also seems to have been aware of the situation of his Irish castles: he could order that the state of Castlekevin, thrown down while it was in his hand, should be looked into;\textsuperscript{230} and he could know that Turlough O'Conor had taken Roscommon and was holding it against him, ordering him to return it and appointing a new constable to act once the castle was given up by the Irishman.\textsuperscript{231}

But despite the importance both governments seem to have attached to the royal castles there is considerable evidence that castles were often ill-kept, and subject to the same administrative chicanery as other aspects of Irish government. As early as the 1280s we find the royal carpenter accused of gross dishonesty and inefficiency, and his offences involved the important Connacht castles and Newcastle McKynegan.\textsuperscript{232} Later on we find accusations being made which, if they were justified, give a horrifying picture of the neglect the Irish castles were liable to suffer even during the period when they were under heavy attack. In the petitions of 1342 it was claimed that Roscommon, Randown and Bunratty were in Irish hands because the treasurers would not pay the constables until the constables agreed to remit part of their fee. Constables for their part were failing to reside in their castles, and were

\textsuperscript{229} E.g., \textit{C.C.R.} 1337-9, pp. 423-4; 1339-41, pp. 98-9, 244; \textit{C.P.R.} 1350-4, pp. 250-1.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{C.C.R.} 1327-30, p. 149.

\textsuperscript{231} \textit{C.P.R.} 1340-3, p. 475. See Murphy, "The castle of Roscommon", \textit{R.S.A.I. Journ.}, XXI. 552.

\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Select Cases in the King's Bench}, II. 125-35. Cf. \textit{Memoranda de Parlamento}, no. 407.
making a profit by putting in deputys and paying over to them only part of the fee that they themselves were receiving from the exchequer. In addition money was being paid for castles where castles "were not”. The king in response to these complaints issued his usual orders for overseeing, stocking and guarding the castles, and commanded that constables were to be resident.233 Although we cannot be certain that these charges were completely well-founded, the fact that specific instances of the malpractices named in these petitions were alleged against the treasurer, John of Burnham, seven years later suggests strongly that they may have been justified.234 The English exchequer's attempts to inquire further into these alleged abuses on John's part were met by obtuse or obstructive bureaucracy on the part of the Irish exchequer, and the charges seem to have been let drop.

For all the evidence that survives about the royal castles, there are alarming gaps in our knowledge. It is not possible to come to any definite conclusion about the conscientiousness or otherwise with which constables fulfilled their duties, about the extent to which the Irish government genuinely took pains to ensure that castles were kept strong and in good repair, or even about the normal size of a castle's garrison. But from our point of view the most important aspect of the royal castles is their place in the scheme of military expeditions and shire defence, and this will best emerge from the study of individual campaigns.

234 See P.R.O., E.101/242/5, articuli ii-vi, viii-x and xxi.
b) wards in the marches

Apart from castles, the most important place in defensive warfare was held by the "ward"—a body of men assigned to guard a certain area for a length of time that could be as long as several years or as short as two or three days. The task of these wards was, naturally enough, to defend a strip of country which had either been attacked by the Irish or was under heavy threat of invasion by them. The wards would sometimes be established in a situation of general emergency, when they might prove adequate to contain the Irish without an expedition of war, and sometimes as part of a campaign—to protect the country near the scene of the fighting, while the government concentrated its resources on one or two points. As with castles, the strategic role of wards cannot usefully be discussed separately from our narrative of campaigns, but we may consider their organization and the types of military obligation which lay behind them. It will be best to illustrate the systems employed by considering some specific instances.

The sort of general unrest which could call for prolonged warding is well exemplified by Leinster in the 1270s. In the years between 1274 and 1277 the MacMurroughs, O'Byrnes and O'Tooles forced the government to mount several large expeditions of war into the mountains south of Dublin. At the same time a series

235 For all this see the following chapter, pp.74-85. Strategy is discussed below, pp.442-9.
of wards was established to protect the manors of the king and of the archbishop of Dublin in the south of county Dublin. These wards were of the simplest nature, paid for straightforwardly by the Irish exchequer and by the revenues of the archbishopric. In 1276 Hugh de Cruys seems to have been acting as a permanent keeper of the Vale of Dublin for some time, and between that date and 1280 we find Geoffrey le Bret, Ulfran de Bernevale, Nicholas Andrew, Reginald Typre and Ralph fitz John acting as custodes in that area, or specifically at Saggart, one of the most important manors within the Vale. All of these were paid directly by the exchequer. In addition to this, the government, either directly or indirectly, paid for wards at Newcastle McKynegan, Obrun (which lay between Bray and Newcastle) and at the entrance to the Irish stronghold of Glenmalure itself, which disgorged into a belt of fertile land lying between its entrance and the coast. At the same period wards were maintained on the archbishop's manors to the west of the mountains— at Ballymore and Dunlavin. Thus in this period the east, north and west of the mountains were all patrolled, either permanently, as in the case of the Vale, or in emergencies, as in the case of the other manors.

236 G.D.I. 1252-84, nos.1294,1389,1496,1634.
238 See the account of the keeper of the temporalities in R.I.A.Proc., V. 159-60.
We have already seen something of archbishop Sandford's use of the royal service of Leinster to guard the marches of Offaly and Leix in 1288.239 This is an example of wards being used not merely to guard manors during unrest or while a positive expedition of war went forward, but as an attempt in itself to solve a military problem without recourse to more positive measures. After the service came to an end the archbishop raised paid troops, and split the marches in four parts between them. Geoffrey de Geneville was to guard from Athlone to Tethmoy (the northern border of the disturbed region); Peter de Bermingham, the lord of Tethmoy, from Tethmoy to Rathangan; John fitz Thomas from Rathangan to Ballymadan, the archbishop's own manor. From Ballymadan to Kilkenny the archbishop himself guarded. We have details of the troops he employed: at Ballymadan and Reban he had 5 esquires and 20 men, while at Morett Castle he kept 12 esquires and 40 men. These custodies were kept up for no less than a year. The archbishop's alone cost £584 - more than the cost of many a quite large expedition - and yet at the end of it all "the Irish of Offaly and Leix, rebels and enemies of the king, remained so hostile that no peace could be established in the marches of Leinster....", and an expedition with positive aims had to be undertaken.240 On various other occasions we know that manoeuvres, which superficially look like positive campaigns, really involved this sort of prolonged

239 See above, pp.22-3.

and expensive "holding" operation. \(^{241}\)

So far we have been dealing with wards paid for by the central administration. More frequently, however, it was the local communities which were called upon to provide the defence needed in emergencies. It was to this sort of situation that the general military obligation, whose nature we have already discussed, \(^{242}\) was ideally suited. The best view of the use of the general obligation to man local defences comes from Leinster at the time of the Bruce invasion. The Scots had come south, confronted the justiciar at Skerries in Kildare, and had retreated, leaving behind them a legacy of unrest among the Leinster Irish. The administration set about mobilizing the populace to resist the threat the Irish posed. \(^{243}\) As early as 8 December 1315 Warin Owen and Walter Fox were assigned to choose eighty men from Newcastle Lyons, Lucan and Esker, and from the lands of the bishop of Killaloe, to keep guard at Saggart against the Irish. The king was to add six men-at-arms to these local forces, and the vigil was to be kept each night under command of Warin and Walter. \(^{244}\) On 25 May 1316 another commission was issued which shows the principle of choosing men to stay at ward at the expense of their fellows. Elia Lawless and Reginald Barnewall were ordered to hasten the levy of men in the area south of Dublin. Thirty men were to be chosen in Saggart and Newcastle Lyons.

\(^{241}\) E.g., Wogan in Offaly and Ossory, 1303-4, and Ormond's Leinster campaign of 1359 (see below, pp. 127, 372). It is not always clear from the documents what nature an "expedition" had.

\(^{242}\) Above, pp. 39-41.

\(^{243}\) See below, pp. 213-7.

\(^{244}\) Hist. & Mun. Docs., p. 372.
a similar number in all villages between the Liffey and the mountains, and four or six from each hamlet or grange. They were to serve at the wages of the villages, hamlets and granges, and were to be respondent to William Comyn and his company, who had been assigned to the safe-custody of the area. At the same time in Crumlin the popular obligation was to be used to have a fortress built, and its completion was to be certified to the treasurer.

In the autumn of 1316 there was a most dangerous attack by O'Toole, who came up to Cullenswood near Dublin with eighty followers, spent the night there, attacked Dublin the next day, but was defeated by Comyn. This was followed by further arrangements for defending the southern borders of the city: on 11 September two shillings were ordered to be levied from every carucate in Fingall by agreement of the men of the neighbourhood, to maintain twelve men-at-arms, twenty hobelars and forty foot until Michaelmas in a custody against the Irish of Leinster. On 20 September it was revealed that Leinster and Fingall had undertaken to maintain a total of twenty men-at-arms.

247 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 297.
arms, forty hobelars and eighty foot, Leinster contributing at forty pence per carucate. Comyn was once more appointed captain of the ward, and by the time we hear of it it was obviously already in session, for William and his men were complaining that the serjeants had not levied their wages, and that they were in danger of being unable to maintain the war. The king gave William power to distrain for the money and levy it as best he could, and to punish the serjeants who had been negligent, returning the estreats of all fines and amercements to the exchequer.

The machinery that was involved in mobilizing the local population to keep ward can be seen even more clearly from events in 1355-6. The justiciar established a ring of permanently maintained defences, paid from the exchequer through its own clerk of wages, round the border of the Leinster mountains. As a complement to this the men of counties Kildare and Dublin were organized to man and maintain other wards at their own costs. On 7 May 1355 the sheriff of Dublin and three other men were commanded to distrain the men-at-arms and other troops who had been ordered to stay in ward at Tallaght and Bray to go to their wards. On 19 May three further orders were issued. The constable of the castle of Tallaght and Nicholas Beg, one of the keepers of the peace in Dublin, were informed that "many men of the parts between Newcastle and Lyons and Donnybrook speak against contributing voluntarily to watches in the mountains against the

250 These are discussed in the context of the justiciar's campaigns (below, pp.359-61).
251 R.C.H., p.57 no.132.
O'Byrnes", and they were ordered to levy a reasonable wage from the men of the area so that a satisfactory watch could be kept. Associated with this was a further order to the sheriff and two others "to correct the unreasonable assessments said to have been made on divers men nominated for the wards of Bray and Tallaght". The same three commissioners were informed that "some of those elected and nominated by the council of the king and by the commons of the said county, to stay at Bray and Tallaght at ward for the defence of the marches of the said county against the O'Byrnes and their accomplices, have not gone to their wards". They were ordered to supervise the wards and those nominated to them. On 27 June a commission was issued to nine men, reciting that

it was formerly ordained by the council that a certain number of men of county Dublin be elected into certain wards to stay at Bray; the said men prayed that others from outside be provided, to stay there at the expense of the electors; at which it was ordained that John de Bermingham of Donadea, knight, with men-at-arms and horses, twenty hobelars and forty foot archers should stay in that ward.

The commissioners were ordered to levy the wages for John and his men. In county Kildare there were if anything greater difficulties experienced in getting the populace and the local magnates to fulfil their obligations. At one point we hear that the persons nominated to keep ward had been "changed with temerity and assigned in order by favour and hate, those having

253 Ibid., p.56 no.35.
the least land to the greatest burdens, and those having the most to the least." These pieces of evidence bring out several important points: the organization of the populace to ward was in the hands of the sheriff and of the developing office of keeper of the peace, assisted by special commissioners; the choice of the men—their "election"—was not by the local communities alone, but by government officials or assignees, who could be trusted to choose the fittest; the wages were provided by the community, and if as at Bray the men chosen wished to withdraw and permission was granted, the duty of finding substitutes lay with the community; when the marches were divided up amongst those chosen, the greatest responsibilities would be given to the greatest tenants.

These defensive operations could, therefore, take more than one institutional form. They could be established on the initiative of the central government and paid for by it; they could be organized by the agents of the administration, but manned and paid for by the local communities; they could also be instituted completely on local initiative, when the sheriff or keeper of the peace considered that the prevailing conditions demanded action. The importance of providing defence will be obvious when we come to discuss individual expeditions of war.

254 R.C.H. p.56 no.31. For measures in Kildare see ibid., p.56 nos.30,62; p.60 no.41; p.62 nos. 116-7 and 112. Full texts of some of these documents from the Patent & Close rolls are to be found in N.L.I., MS 2, ff.247,259,260.

255 Local defence is discussed in more detail in chapter IX below.
The organization of war in the lordship of Ireland thus involved a variety of forms of military obligation, and complex machinery to make use of the forces that the military obligation provided. The making of war was one of the greatest labours that rested on the Dublin administration. The keystone of military organization was of course the omni-competent justiciar. He or his deputy was the normal commander of the army in war-time: indeed an official "state of war" ipso facto required the justiciar's presence. This is shown by the fact that when Sandford did not command an expedition in Meath in person in 1289 (possibly because he was an archbishop and the campaign took place in Easter week), he appointed two official deputies, under whom the army served. Once the pay organization had been formalized in 1295, an expedition of war in the strict sense could not take place without the appointment by the justiciar of an official clerk of wages.

Like most other decisions, that to make war must normally have been taken by the justiciar and council. Such decisions are not normally preserved, but we do know that in 1306 it was "agreed by the justiciar, the earl of Ulster and others of the king's council in this land, that the justiciar lead an army against the Irish felons of the mountains of Leinster". Now and

256 C.D.I. 1285-92, p.270. Perusal of the account makes it clear that 1289 and not 1290 must be the year in question.

257 Above, pp.49-50.

then we catch a glimpse of similar consultation. This was normal procedure and there is no reason to think that, in normal circumstances, the justiciar would find it irksome. In military matters in particular, the justiciar, especially in his first months of office, would be dependent on the advice given him by officials and lords who had greater experience of Irish conditions than he had. In 1360 the king ordered that "no manner of war be undertaken or commenced by the justices without the assent and advice of the chancellor, treasurer and others of the council of the king in those parts". It was important that a justiciar should have the best advice possible, and other royal orders show that the king was concerned to see that the justiciar got such advice.

It was also common-sense that the government should listen to the advice of the great men of the areas within which the campaign took place. For example, at New Ross in 1312 a most interesting gathering discussed ways and means of dealing with the O'Byrnes. The keeper (Edmund Butler), the chancellor, the treasurer, members of the council, and the seneschal of Wexford were joined by "others of the same liberty who are nearest to those of that race". Even Murchertach MacMurrough, who was in the government's pay, seems to have appeared. It is a pity that the information which appears in the ancient sources is incomplete.


261 E.g., C.C.R. 1330-3, p.360; 1337-9, p.423; 1349-54, pp.47-8.
have attended the deliberations of this council. 262 A series of wards was decided on, and we hear that the dispositions had been "agreed and ordered both by the whole council of the said lord king in Ireland, the magnates of the marches of Leinster, and by the said custos". 263

The justiciar was thus commander in war, but he made war by advice of the council, both officials and lords, and where it was fitting he would consult with other persons whose advice was of value. Although the justiciar was leader of the army, he would often bring to it a much smaller contingent than many of the leaders serving under him, and this, when added to their experience of Irish warfare, must have made him more dependent on support and advice than might at first appear. It is a pity that the information which would allow us to see the factors lying behind military actions, and to estimate more exactly where the real control of military policy lay, does not exist. As it is, it was the justiciar who had the duty and responsibility of bringing the military organization which we have been describing into action against the native Irish.

262 Just. roll 6-7 Edw. II, m. 18d- P.R.O. I., Cal., pp. 44-5, 205. See Hore, Wexford (Old and New Ross) p. 177.

PART 2

Chapter II

The pattern of warfare in Ireland, 1272 to 1295

Between 1272 and 1295 the Dublin government fought the Irish on many fronts. The period saw the emergence of the Leinster septs as a really serious threat to the administration; the king's Connacht castles and the Irish who neighboured them called for continual intervention; the midland areas of Leix, Offaly and Meath saw many expeditions; other areas were intermittently disturbed. Most of the documents bearing on the military and political history of these years are in print. They were used by Orpen in his extensive survey, and his work has since been revised and added to by Professor Otway-Ruthven, who has made use of many of the unprinted sources. It would be pointless to go over this ground again, and so the present chapter has very limited objectives. Its main aim is to show the extent of the government's military involvement during these years, and to say something about the situation it faced in the different areas. By doing this it is hoped to provide the background to a more detailed study of the later period, when a considerable restriction of the government's military commitment can be discerned. It is proposed to con-

1 Orpen, Normans, IV, chapters XXXIII-XXXVI passim; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 200-13.
sider the lordship area by area, paying most attention to Leinster, which was to be the scene of the government's heaviest military involvement during the rest of our period.

a) Leinster

War in the Leinster mountains was the government's chief concern from 1274 to 1277, and the political complications in the area lasted until the murder of the MacMurrough leaders in 1282. There was a fresh outbreak of trouble in 1294-5. These developments were of the first importance for the future, for disorder in Leinster immediately faced the government with a crisis situation. The reasons for this are obvious: Dublin may not have been the "heart" of the lordship, but it was the traditional centre of the king's interests in Ireland. The Wicklow mountains come perilously close to the city itself, and the city was the seat of the exchequer and the courts: for instance, in later years an outbreak of trouble in Leinster could provoke the moving of the exchequer records from their usual keeping-place to a situation of greater safety. A second reason is that much of what demesne land the king had in Ireland was concentrated to the south of the city, in the manors of the Vale of Dublin. The mountain Irish presented a threat to these manors— for instance in 1277 we hear of a daylight raid on Saggart, in which the Irish were alleged to have carried off a huge prey of sheep, cows

LEINSTER WARDS IN THE 1270s

DUBLIN
Saggart X
Ballymore X
Dunlavin X
Baltinglass
Castle Dermot

Wicklow
Newcastle McKeonegan X
Glenmalure
Arklow

X Places Warded
horses, pigs and goats. We have already discussed the system of wards which was maintained in order to defend these manors. It is plain, therefore, that any outbreak of disorder in Leinster would have to be dealt with at once. The government's ability to act effectively outside this area was dependent on the keeping of peace within it.

Why the Irish of Leinster became a serious problem at this particular time has never been satisfactorily explained. Orpen suggested that the outbursts of disorder were provoked by the harsh government of royal officials who replaced the weak archiepiscopal regime during the 1271-9 vacancy. This seems doubtful. There appears to have been an aid "to overcome the Irish of Glenmalure" before the death of archbishop Fulk. And a petition, dating from the very beginning of Edward I's reign, describes the king's demesnes of Saggart as near the land of war, in comparison to those of Newcastle Lyons "adjoining the land of peace". Saggart stands at about 400 feet above sea-level, at the entrance of the defile leading up through Brittas into the

3 P.R.O., S.C.1/20/200. See also Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.201. Another fragment seems to date this letter as 1277 (P.R.O., S.C.1/23/46).
4 Above, pp.67-8.
5 Normans, IV. 15.
6 C.D.I. 1285-92, p.124 shows Henry III's nephew Henry of Almain charged with such an aid. Henry of Almain died in March 1271 (Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p.226); Fulk did not die until May.
7 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.930 dates this petition to Henry III's reign, but Richardson & Sayles (Administration of Ireland, p.230 & n.1) would assign it to 1274-5.
mountains. If we take this petition at its face-value, it implies that the archbishop's lands, which lay beyond Saggart, were firmly regarded as war-land at a very early stage indeed. It seems more likely that trouble had been building up in the mountains for some time, and that the additional responsibility for the archiepiscopal lands during the vacancy brought the government into direct contact with the nearer Irish, forcing it to take strong action against them. But this of course tells us nothing about the forces working among the Irish themselves. That problem remains insoluble.

Between 1274 and 1277 the government sent several armies into the mountains, and all but the last of them seem to have come to grief. Geoffrey de Geneville led unsuccessful expeditions in 1274 and 1276, and there were other operations, apparently under the control of Thomas de Clare, between those two dates. It was not until Robert of Ufford was sent back as justiciar that the disturbances were finally brought to an end in 1277. Why should the government have

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9 For the details see Orpen, Normans, IV. 15-18; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 201-2. Thomas de Clare had a special interest in the war, for once it was completed he was to have a grant of the royal service to enable him to make good his grant of Thomond (C.D.I. 1252-84, nos. 1191, 1476).
found it so difficult to deal with the Irish of these areas? The answer lies in the nature of the terrain, and the intractability of the problem will be seen from the history of the government's campaigns in the region throughout the rest of our period. To the south of Dublin lies a solid block of mountain and glen, complicated at that time by widespread woods. 

Between the mountains and the sea lay what Hugh Lawless, a local tenant, described in 1316 as

a confined and narrow part of the country, namely between Newcastle McKynegan and Wicklow, where they have the sea between Wales and Ireland for a wall on one side and the mountains of Leinster and divers other wooded and deserted places where the said Irish felons live on the other.

The Irish government was therefore facing a problem not dissimilar to that which Edward I himself had faced in North Wales, without ever having the resources of men or money to deal with it in the way the king had done. Several pieces of evidence from the 1270s bear this out. In 1276 the king was clearly anxious that the justiciar should make another determined effort to put an end to the rebellion, and had been urging de Geneville to do so. A letter from de Geneville shows him acceding to the king's request, but against his better judgement: he feels that his

10 For example, in 1311 we hear of the Irish lying close in Glenmalure "and other woody places" (Chart. St.Mary's II. 339).


12 For the strategic problems in Wales see Morris, Welsh Wars, pp.1-31.
resources are inadequate and that he would be courting disaster (in the event he was proved right). When Ufford replaced de Geneville later in the year, the king sent with him Welsh troops, and it is tempting to conclude, on the basis of Edward's obvious concern with the Leinster war, that he sent them with it specifically in mind. It is also interesting to note that Ufford's successful campaign, like those of Edward himself in Wales, was based on strategically situated castles. Both Newcastle McKynegan and Castlekevin were thoroughly, and expensively, rebuilt, and we hear of the former being supplied by sea.

It would be misleading, however, to see the Leinster problem in purely military terms. The military situation was a product of the whole pattern of settlement in Ireland. The mountains, interspersed with fertile valleys, supported the Irish way-of-life.

13 Gilbert, Facsimiles, II, plate LXXIV, no.3.
14 P.R.O., Justiciar's account, E.101/230/6, partly printed in Gilbert, Viceroys, pp.519-20.
16 Pipe roll 8 Edw.I- N.L.I., MS 760, p.80.
17 We know precious little about this subject, but references to the crops of the Irish (Chart. St. Mary's, II. 330; Clyn, p.30) and their vulnerability in war should make us wary of any generalizations about "pastoral economy". Cf. M.V. Duignan, "Irish agriculture in early historic times", R.S.A.I.Journ., LXXIV (1944), pp.124-45 passim.
whereas Norman colonization tended to stop about 600 feet above sea-level. \textsuperscript{18} We may suspect that necessity as well as cupidity encouraged the Irish to make their constant raids on the fertile manors of the neighbouring lowlands. We have already seen the carrying off of a great prey from Saggart. \textsuperscript{19} Robbery was a constant purpose of Irish raids: we hear of the archbishop's crops being stolen at Shankill, \textsuperscript{20} and of careful watches being kept on the mountain peaks adjoining Dean's Grange at harvest-time "for fear of the Irish". \textsuperscript{21} However, in the present state of our knowledge it would be unwise to make any categorical statements about the possible economic motivation of the Irish. But certainly Leinster was the type of area which might, in a remoter part of Ireland, have been left to go its own way. Leinster's geographical position meant that this could not be.

The distribution of the wards, to the east, and west of the mountains, makes it clear that the disturbances of the 1270s were widespread. This is confirmed by the fact that the O'Nolans as well as the MacMurroughs, O'Byrnes and O'Tooles were at war: the government was finding it necessary to take steps to ensure that supplies did not get through to this

\textsuperscript{18} See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.115. The whole subject of settlement is discussed in the same author's "Character of Norman settlement in Ireland", Historical Studies, V. 75-84.

\textsuperscript{19} Above, pp.79-80.

\textsuperscript{20} Hist. & Mun. Docs., p.371.

fourth of the major septs of Leinster. It also seems that there was a degree of co-ordination about the rebellion, and that the MacMurroughs, the traditional leaders, put themselves at the head of a coalition. The most striking thing about the troubles of the 1270s is the degree to which they seem to have been dependent on these individual leaders. It is therefore worth examining the role of the MacMurroughs: even after Ufford's military success in 1277 the MacMurrough chieftains were seen as a potential threat by the Irish government, and it was only after their murder in 1282 that Leinster was truly at peace. From this it would seem that warfare in Leinster was not yet endemic. The 1270s are important because they demonstrate the potential danger the area presented—a potential that was to be realised to the full after the turn of the fourteenth century.

The leaders of the MacMurroughs were Murchertach, the Irish king of Leinster, and his brother Art. There is no proof that they had been involved in the 1274 rising, but in 1275 Murchertach was captured at Norragh by Walter Lenfant, one of the justiciar's household knights. After this Art seems clearly to have emerged as the leader of the Irish: we hear of the "war of the McMurchys", of the "depredations of Art MacMurrough and his accomplices", and even more

23 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 318; Cole, Documents, p.56. Cf. above, pp.11-12.
than sixty years later the tenants in the areas of Saggart and Newcastle McKynegan remembered the "time of the war of Art MacMurrough" well enough to use it as an excuse for the burden of debt that they owed to the crown. 26

The events surrounding Ufford's victory of 1277 remain obscure, but it seems likely that the MacMurroughs were fairly rapidly received into the peace. A case from the regnal year November 1277 to November 1278 shows a Leinster tenant being accused of inviting Art to "run upon his lands and eat with him", but being acquitted when the jury testified that Art was at peace at the time of the event in question. 27 It is clear, however, that the justiciar felt he had reason to fear the brothers. When Roger Bigod, who as lord of Carlow was the MacMurroughs' immediate lord, came to Ireland in 1279, 28 Ufford explained their position to him. He told the Earl Marshal that they had been received to the peace, but that they still represented a threat to the government. He asked Bigod to keep them with him "lest any disturbance of the king's peace be plotted by them", and Roger seems to have complied with this request. When the time came for him to return to England he wrote to king Edward asking for his permission to bring the MacMurroughs with him. 29 The king issued a safe-conduct on 24 July

26 Mem. roll 16-17 Edw. III, mm. 16d, 64- P.R.O.LI., R.C.8/22, pp. 296-7, 632-4.
29 P.R.O., S.C.1/15/64.
1280, but there seems to be no way of telling whether the brothers did in fact travel to England with the Earl Marshal.

Throughout the years from 1279 to 1281 the MacMurroughs were under restraint either by the officers of Bigod's liberty of Carlow or by the Irish government. The records of the lordship of Carlow reveal payments of "fees", and gifts of money, of a robe, cap and furs, and even of wine, chiefly to Art. In the light of the position of the MacMurroughs at the time, these payments must be for their upkeep when in the custody of the Earl Marshal or his officers, and not, as has usually been suggested, for traditional services or for "policing the Irish districts".

30 C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 1716; V.P.R. 1272-81, p. 392.
31 Orpen's statement that Murchertach made the journey (Normans, IV. 20) seems to be based on a misapprehension. Slightly later David of Offington was paid for taking him from Dublin to Dunamase and back (see below, p. 38). A summary version of this payment leaves out the words "to Dunamase" and runs it together with payments to messengers going to England (C.D.I. 1285-92, p. 70). The fact that William de Caunteton was later burdened with a debt as Art's pledge "because he came not on the day assigned" might just possibly suggest that Art failed to turn up for the journey (36th. Rep. D.K., p. 72).
33 Cf. Orpen, New Ross in the XIII Century, pp. 23-4; Normans, IV. 17; Mills, "The Earl of Norfolk's estates in Ireland", R.S.A.I. Journ., XXII (1892), p. 55; Nugent in ibid., LXXXV. 74. The payments coincide exactly with the earl's visit to Ireland and the year immediately following. They were not continued to the new leaders of the MacMurroughs after the death of Murchertach and Art (P.R.O., Ministers' Accounts, S.C. 6/1239/2-9).
The fact that most of the Carlow payments are to Art, the junior brother, results from the taking of Murchertach once more into the government's hands: in the Michaelmas term of 1280 we find him being paid twenty shillings "for his carriage", and twenty shillings for a robe, on the justiciar's order, and in the following Hilary term the constable of Dublin castle advanced loans of ten shillings each to Murchertach and his wife. These payments are so large that they suggest that Murchertach was being treated as an important political prisoner, and not just as an ordinary penny-a-day hostage: he was being provided for in some comfort.

Thus, although the Leinster war was apparently over, the government felt that if the MacMurroughs were not kept under some form of restraint there was still a situation which they could turn to their advantage. In November 1281 the king issued a second safe-conduct for Art and certain other Irishmen to go to England, but again there is no evidence as to whether they did actually cross the sea. At about the same time the sheriff of Dublin was paid for "bringing Murchertach MacMurrough to Dunamase and bringing him back again to Dublin for fresh imprisonment". This could suggest that he was being used as a bargaining-counter in some negotiations, but, if so, the negotiations

35 Ibid. (ibid., no.1781).
36 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.1873; C.P.R. 1272-81, p.460.
were clearly unsuccessful. Four years had now gone by since the end of the Leinster war, and still the situation had not returned to normal. The government was still forced to handle the MacMurroughs gingerly.

In 1282 the problem was solved in a brutal manner. The evidence suggests that the government of the new justiciar, Stephen Fulbourne, procured their murder, and thereby procured peace in Leinster for twelve more years. The murder of the MacMurroughs is a well-known event, but its relationship to the political and military situation in Leinster has never been clear. The brothers were murdered at Arklow on 21 July 1282. The Annals of Inisfallen are aware that it took place "in violation of the peace of the king of England"—a clear reference to the fact that they had been received into the peace after 1277. The murder was remembered at the time of the Bruce invasion, when the Irish leaders included it among their catalogue of English crimes in the Remonstrance to pope John XXII. They attributed the crime to a certain "Geoffrey de Pencoyt", who must be the obscure Pynquietum mentioned in Dowling's annals. We know that the justiciar was accused of trying to make financial capital out of the crime by levying a capitagium or "head-money" on the men of Leinster, despite the fact

38 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 318; Clyn, p.9. This is confirmed by an incidental statement in C.J.R. 1305-07, p.143.
39 AC, 1282. The other annals baldly note the event. AC, 1282 is representative.
40 Irish Historical Documents, p.42.
41 Dowling, 1282. The identification is also made in Price, Place-names of Wicklow, VII, p.liv.
that the brothers were within the peace at the time of their death, and that their heads do not appear to have been "proclaimed" in the customary manner in the courts of the Leinster liberties.  

"Geoffrey de Pencoyt" has hitherto eluded identification—though the Pencoit family held lands in Kildare, and also, significantly, were lords of Killahurler in Arklow. But the only surviving medieval manuscript of Henry of Marleburgh's chronicle calls the guilty Pencoit not Geoffrey, but Henry, and we know that Henry fitz Rhys, son of Henry, lord of Pencoit, was living at this time: indeed one of his charters, witnessed by Fulbourne himself, was among the Christchurch deeds. Two documents which Sweetman overlooked when calendaring the bundles of complaints against Fulbourne provide a direct link between Fulbourne, Henry Pencoit and the murder.

42 C.D.I. 1252-84, nos.1919,2338; 1285-92, pp.6-7. Curtis misconstrued Bigod's complaint against the ignoring of this custom in Carlow, and thought he was complaining about the murder itself (Medieval Ireland, 2nd ed., p.162).

43 See Brooks, Knights' Fees, pp.169-70.

44 Bibliotheque de Troyes, MS 1316, f.43.


46 P.R.O., E.101/234/20. Sweetman's omission of the first one is inexplicable. His omission of the second can probably be explained by its poor condition, which makes it very difficult to read, even under ultra-violet light.
The first accuses the justiciar of receiving £300 for the Irishmen's heads, and of paying a portion of this sum to Pencoit "pro voluntate sua". This evidence is not, of course, conclusive, for the whole purpose of a capitāgium was to reward whoever killed the felon in question. However, the second document accuses the justiciar of arranging the murder in the first place. After the MacMurroughs had been received to the peace, Fulbourne, it is said, approached Henry and his brother (could the brother be Geoffrey?), Englishmen whom Murchertach and Art trusted. He made an agreement with Henry to kill the brothers, in return for a payment of 200 marks. The deed, the complaint runs, was done; the justiciar retrospectively adjudged the MacMurroughs to have been felons; he thereby levied an illegal capitāgium on the men of Leinster.

Although these complaints are, of course, one-sided evidence, there is no reason to doubt the facts they record concerning the murder. Fulbourne's accusers are complaining about his financial chicanery, not about the murder itself: the English of Leinster, of all people, had little reason to love the MacMurroughs. The political and military background elucidated above provides, we may suggest, a very strong motive for the Irish government to wish these leaders out of the way. It was a politically motivated murder, planned by the justiciar.

47 The surname is illegible, though, since a "k" and a "t" seem to be visible, it could be "Penkoyte". The coincidence of Christian names is striking, and the context points strongly to Pencoit. Even were this not so, the document still clearly implicates Fulbourne in the planning of the crime.
There was therefore in the 1270s and 1280s Irish pressure in Leinster. But there was clearly a need for ambitious and skilful leadership to translate this pressure into concerted action which the government could not contain. When the Irish did rise, the administration found the resulting rebellion extremely difficult to deal with. Both Ufford and Fulbourne appear to have been well aware of the importance of the position of the MacMurroughs, and to have taken great pains to neutralise the threat they posed.

Between 1282 and 1294 Leinster remained at peace for longer than it was ever to do again during our period. When in 1294 serious disorder did once more break out, the government reacted in the same ways that it had done in the 1270s, and it is worth paying some attention to the measures it adopted: they were the ones which were to become familiar in the next century. No precise reason can be discerned for the 1294 outbreak, and we can only speculate that the Irish seized the opportunity afforded by the serious political disputes which had been troubling the lordship during the recently-ended justiciaship of William de Vescy. Again, as we shall see, the rebellion was under the leadership of the MacMurroughs.

In the summer of 1294 it was necessary to place guards at Saggart and at Newcastle Mckynegan, and

48 Cf. Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 211, and below, pp. 102-4, 111-2.
49 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/144, m. 28 (Trinity, year 22).
the rent of Courtown in county Wexford was already seriously affected by war. The major outbreak does not, however, seem to have taken place until April in the following year, when the Irish succeeded in burning Newcastle and other Leinster towns. At that time the custos, Thomas fitz Maurice, was in Munster, and the earl of Ulster, the most important magnate, seems likewise to have been remote from the trouble area. At some point it must have been decided that the situation merited an expedition, and the royal service was called to Castledermot. The custos, the earl, Theobald Butler and John fitz Thomas all appeared in Leinster with troops. The calling of the service to Castledermot, and the fact that Theobald (and possibly the earl too) were carrying on operations at nearby Tullow, suggests that any attack must have been from that area. The custos stayed in Leinster for a month, while the three magnates each stayed for twenty days.

Associated with these measures was the establishment of wards in the marches. We hear that Ballymore, on

50 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw. I, m. 8- P.R.O. I., Cal., p. 37.
51 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 324.
52 C.J.R. 1305-07, p. vii gives his itinerary.
54 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw. I, m. 7d- P.R.O. I., Cal., p. 31. The calendar version is blundered, speaking of "the earl of Tebald le Boteler".
55 P.R.O., Pipe Roll, E. 372/144, m. 28 (year 23).
the west of the mountains, Dublin (presumably the vale) to their ~, and Glenmalure, Castlekevin and Newcastle McKynegan, to their east, were all guarded. There is no way of telling how large these custodies were, but since we know that Peter le Petit was involved in them, and that he brought a force of 105 hobelars and 360 foot from Meath, it is possible that they were of considerable size.

As usual, it is impossible to say anything about the tactics adopted by the government—though the evidence set out above may suggest that there was a positive assault on the Irish from Castledermot in the west, with wards at strategic points containing them within the area of the mountains. We do know, however, that the campaign was a success. On 8 July the custos had settled down to holding pleas at Dublin, and on 19 July the Irish were formally received into the peace. The terms of their submission survive. Maurice "Macmuryarthi" MacMurrough was accepted into the peace "with all his nation and following". He and the O'Byrnes and O'Tooles were to give hostages, but there is no indication that the other septs submitted separately: MacMurrough seems to have submitted for them, thus emphasising the role of the MacMurroughs as leaders. This seems to be confirmed by his undertaking to chastise the others if they infringe the

56 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/144, m.28 (year 23).
57 C.J.R. 1295-1303, p.4.
58 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw.I, m.6d- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.27-8.
60 Ibid., p.61.
the agreement. All three leaders undertook to deliver hostages at Castlekevin, and were to give the king 600 cows to repay him for their depredations. The betaghhs and other tenants of the king and archbishop were to be compensated, but, interestingly, it was to be a mutual restitution. This, therefore, was not entirely one-sided; it was a submission on comparatively light terms. The whole episode sets the pattern for warfare in Leinster: Irish raids; a brief campaign, often part offensive, part defensive; a submission accompanied by the giving (or at least the promise) of hostages and fines. From the first decade of the fourteenth century, disorder in Leinster becomes constant. The various septs, sometimes in coalition, sometimes independently, provoke the government into mounting expeditions. Sometimes one sept can be persuaded into serving against another, sometimes not. But clearly it no longer requires a concerted rising under MacMurrough leadership to pose a serious threat to the Dublin administration.

b) Connacht

Throughout the period covered by this chapter, the government found its attention continually drawn to Connacht, where it was regularly forced either to attempt to chastise the O'Conors, or to intervene in their endless dynastic disputes. These troubles were of long-standing in 1272, and they had clearer reasons behind them than had the outbreaks of trouble in Leinster. After the conquest of Connacht the king had retained in his hand five cantreds, generally known as
THE CONNACHT CASTLES AND THE SHANNON

ROSCOMMON
RANDOWN
ATHLONE
LOUGHSEWODY
the "King's Cantreds". These cantreds the king had normally leased to O'Conor for an annual rent. This was an endless source of difficulty: the king was always tempted to make grants within the area of the cantreds to Anglo-Norman tenants, while O'Conor's rent was far from invariably forthcoming. The whole area was in addition made unstable by the struggles among the various branches of the O'Conor family for the royal title—struggles which were bound to affect the king's interests. The key to and symbol of control of the area were the three castles of Athlone, Randown and Roscommon—the last-named recently constructed by Robert of Ufford during his first justiciarship.

The extent to which these factors involved the government in military action in Connacht may best be seen from a brief review of the expeditions between 1272 and 1288. We may then look at events between 1288 and 1294 in slightly more detail, for they bring out well the complex political relations between the government, the magnates and the O'Conors.

61 All these matters, much simplified here, are fully discussed in Orpen, Normans, III, chapter XXX.

62 The situation within Connacht itself is covered in detail in Orpen, Normans, IV, chapter XXXV. Brief details of the royal expeditions are to be found in Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 202-10. The present discussion aims only to expand these accounts in one or two relevant places, and to consider the developments of this period more rigidly from the point of view of the government. Almost all the evidence has long been in print.
Despite the work of the justiciars before 1272, both Roscommon and Randown were thrown down by the end of that year. Since O'Conor is also said to have ravaged as far north as Granard and to have broken the bridge of Athlone, the work of destruction was decidedly complete. Yet it was not until 1274 or 1275 that the justiciar was in a position to set affairs in Connacht to rights. We can only assume that Maurice fitz Maurice (justiciar in 1272-3) was fully occupied by his wars in Offaly and Thomond, and that his successor, de Geneville, was overtaken by events in Leinster. When Geoffrey did turn his attention to Connacht, he set out to repair the damage done in 1272. Operations took place around Randown and Roscommon, and the latter, together with the bridge of Athlone, was rebuilt. An attempt was also made to

AU and "Annals of Montefernandi" in Tracts relating to Ireland, II, 1272 record Randown as being destroyed; AC & AFM, 1272 say Roscommon. The statement of a later jury confirms that both castles were destroyed (C.J.R. 1305-07, pp.133-4).

AC, 1272.


restore the political situation. Taig O'Conor seems to have opposed the justiciar, but on 21 June 1275 the king gave permission—for which we must assume de Geneville had asked—to treat with him regarding the renewal of his lease of Connacht.

For the next ten years relations with the O'Conors continued on much the same lines, and the area was rarely trouble-free. The effects of de Geneville's expedition were clearly not long-lasting. The escheator's account shows Richard of Exeter "going to Connacht to assemble the constables etc. to pacify the land", and this may explain the justiciar's payments for "the army of Elphin" between Michaelmas 1275 and Michaelmas 1276. In 1277 the new justiciar, Robert of Ufford, was almost immediately faced by the destruction of Roscommon by O'Conor. That year saw Ufford in the area, but it was not until 1278 that a major expedition was launched. Once more Roscommon was strengthened, and repairs were set in train on both Randown and Athlone. Relations between the king and O'Conor were again reviewed, and he was to be given two-and-a-half

68 P.R.O., S.C.1/18/15.
69 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.1135.
72 AC, 1277.
cantreds on lease from the king. However, it seems that John Map and Jordan of Exeter were entrusted with his letters patent, which were not to be delivered to him until he gave security for the payment of his rent and of an entry fine, and that this was not forthcoming. In 1281 Ufford went once more on expedition to Connacht. We know very little about the events of this year, but the expedition must have been a major one since £1,000 was taken from Dublin to Roscommon, and when Ufford relinquished office in November, his successor, Fulbourne, seems to have continued whatever operations he had been carrying out in the area.

By Easter 1284 Fulbourne was recording that "the king's enemies had risen in Connacht", and the annals reveal disorders caused both by O'Connor and by the O'Flynnns. Yet again intervention was necessary. Fulbourne's campaign seems to have lasted from 24 July to 27 August 1284. It succeeded in forcing O'Connor

75 C.J.R. 1305-07, p.134.
77 Our information comes only from the escheator's account (C.D.I. 1252-84, no.2291).
79 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.2291; 1285-92, no.169.
80 Ibid., 1252-84, no.2189.
81 AC, 1284.
82 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.2310. This roll gives considerable detail on the troops which the justiciar employed on this expedition.
to pay £66-16-8 of fine, whether as part of the entry fine of £1, or for having the king's peace on the present occasion, is not clear. By December 1285 he had also entered into a bond by which he undertook to pay 1,000 marks of silver to have his land, and promised to keep the peace, delivering hostages to the king.

Up to this point we can see the government dealing with a plain, if difficult, problem by plain methods: enforcing its bargain on O'Conor time and again, only to be met by his repeated failure to keep it. From about 1286 the situation was less straightforward. In that year the young earl of Ulster came to Ireland, and soon the old rivalry between the de Burghs and Geraldines (whose representative was now John fitz Thomas) broke out in Connacht. John appears to have been involved in the government's military operations in Connacht late in Fulbourne's justiciarship. Very soon there are signs that the two magnates were supporting different candidates for the Connacht kingship, and that the government's interests were getting tangled up with their quarrel. Connacht still required the justiciar's attention, but he could no longer deal with it in the old simple way.

83 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/136, m.33. C.D.I. 1285-92, p.25 is not exact.
84 Ibid., no.172.
85 For the details and motives of their quarrel, see Orpen, Normans, IV. 113-9; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp.205-7,210-11.
86 C.D.I. 1293-1301, no.518.
There were two main lines contending for the throne of Connacht during this period: that of Murchertach Muimhneach, represented by Cathal Rua and his brother Manus, and that of Cathal Crovderg, represented by Aedh, son of Eoghan.  
The division was not in fact as clear as this, for Manus replaced Cathal Rua in 1288, and faced a rebellion by him in 1291, but generally speaking the earl of Ulster seems to have given his support to Aedh, while John fitz Thomas gave his to the other two brothers. The first sign of serious trouble was in 1288, when the earl came to Roscommon against Manus, but was held at bay by "fitzGerald (i.e. John fitz Thomas) and the king's men", turned back and disbanded his army.  

Already we can see the government becoming involved with the magnates' quarrels. It seems likely that the hasty departure of John of Sandford, now keeper of Ireland, for Connacht "to survey the king's castles and pacify the land" was not unconnected with these events. It is, however, impossible to tell whether the keeper went to settle the dispute, or whether he was a party in it, represented by the "king's men" of the annals. The latter could be the case, for when Sandford organised

87 For the O'Conor pedigree see Orpen, Normans, IV. 127 and Curtis, Medieval Ireland (2nd ed.), p.398.
88 AC, 1288, 1291.
89 Ibid., 1288.
an expedition against O'Melaghlin in the first half of 1289, Manus joined his lieutenants on the campaign. The line of Murchertach Muimhneach was plainly that in favour with the government at this time. The fact that in 1290 O'Melaghlin and William de Burgh, the earl's brother, were defeated by McCoghlan of Delvin, and that the earl himself in response "spoiled and destroyed the said McCoghlan and his country, although O'Melaghlin was in the wrong first", may even suggest that there was a political link between the government, fitzThomas, Manus O'Conor and McCoghlan, which was opposed to the earl's interests in Connacht, and that he for his part was allied with O'Melaghlin. But the evidence is not strong enough to allow this to be confidently asserted.

The advent of a new justiciar changed this situation. William de Vescy was the lord of Kildare, and thus John fitz Thomas's feudal superior in Offaly. This gave rise to a second quarrel, which had its repercussions in Connacht. In 1291 we find de Vescy and the earl jointly leading an expedition against O'Hanlon. In 1292 the earl attacked Manus, and exacted some form of submission from him. When Manus died

92 It was of course to Cathal Rua that the 2½ cantreds had been granted in 1284-5 (above, pp.99-100).
94 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 320.
95 AC, 1292 has the earl granting all Manus's petitions in return for submission; AFM, 1292 has Manus granting the earl "his full demands". Either would fit the situation.
in the following year, a realignment becomes obvious. The events of 1293 reveal quite clearly the difficulties the government faced in pursuing any clear policy, and in safe-guarding the king's interests in such a chaotic situation. We have three versions of what happened after Manus's death: de Vescy's, fitz Thomas's and that of the Irish annalists. According to de Vescy, when Manus died he came to Connacht with the agreement of the council

ad alium regem ibi faciendum, pro pace domini regis manutenenda et pro redditu de terra predicti regis Hibernici domino regi reddendo.

His choice lay between Cathal Rua and Aedh. However, whereas Aedh came when commanded, Cathal, apparently in fear, refused to approach the court without having a safe-conduct, and was thereupon adjudged a felon. De Vescy made Aedh king, and left Connacht. Fitz Thomas called Cathal before him, and together they invaded the king's land, captured Aedh and returned to Roscommon, where Cathal was received. Fitz Thomas, on the other hand, claimed that there was a dispute between Aedh and Cathal, who was still claiming the kingship. An official parley was held before the sheriff. Cathal accused Aedh of stealing a horse, and fitz Thomas had come merely to help the sheriff fulfil his duty against the latter. He denied receiving Cathal and invading the king's land. Although these statements are both naturally special pleadings, there seems to be no doubt that de Vescy came to make Aedh king, and that fitz Thomas, for whatever reason, later opposed that choice. The annals put it all more simply,

96 Rotuli Parliamentorum Anglie Hactenus Inediti, pp. 41-2. The subsequent deliberations of a jury have not survived.
and probably more truthfully: de Vescy came and made Aedh king; ten days later Aedh was captured by fitz Thomas and Cathal "assumed the kingship". Cathal was soon killed, and Aedh returned to regain the kingship with the justiciar's support.  

In 1294 and 1295 the quarrel between fitz Thomas and the earl of Ulster came to a head. The O'Conor kingship continued to be involved in the quarrel. In 1294 we find Aedh destroying fitz Thomas's castle of Sligo, only to find fitz Thomas and de Bermingham mounting "a great and treacherous raid" against him in return. Then in 1296 Aedh was deposed in favour of Conor Rua, the son of Cathal Rua, and only regained his throne through the aid of William and Theobald de Burgh. Significantly the subsequent settlement seems to have been made "in the house of the Earl".

Thus throughout the years from 1272 to 1295 the government was deeply involved in Connacht, and was finding it difficult to preserve political stability in the area, and to take the king's profits from his Cantreds. Repeated expeditions were required, and continual financial outlay was needed on the Connacht castles. With the return of the earl of Ulster to Ireland, and the emergence of John fitz Thomas, the government's political tasks became much more delicate, even if its military problems may have lessened to

97 AC, 1293.  
98 For the denouement of the quarrel see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.211.  
99 AC, 1294.  
100 Ibid., 1296.
some extent. The attitude to take to the O'Conors and the king's Connacht lands was not the least difficult of the decisions awaiting a new justiciar.

c) Offaly

Another of the government's most constant worries was the midland area, and in particular Offaly. Almost every justiciar found himself involved in negotiations and military operations there, and after about 1280 Offaly seems to have required more and more attention. The chief problem was the pressure of the O'Conors Faly, and in the 1290s the military situation in this area, as in Connacht, became involved in the quarrels between the Irish magnates; the period ended with Calvagh O'Conor sacking Kildare itself. One very important point needs to be emphasised here: to some extent the government was bearing a burden which ought to have been borne by others. The division of the Marshal inheritance of Leinster, and the consequent absenteeism, threw extra commitments on to the administration's shoulders. The fact that in 1288 the keeper made an attempt to deal with the situation in Offaly and Leix by using the royal service of Leinster, brings this out very clearly. In the event this move was unsuccessful, and further operations had to be paid for by the central administration. This consideration is not irrelevant to the position in the Leinster mountains also: de Geneville in 1276 was anxious to throw part of the burden of the war there on to the "lords of Leinster", and we have

101 Above, pp. 22-3, 69.
102 Gilbert, Facsimiles, II, plate LXXIV, no. 3.
already seen how Ufford made Roger Bigod, one of the Leinster lords, responsible for the MacMurroughs. 103

We may bring out the degree of government involvement in this area by briefly reviewing its expeditions between 1272 and 1288, and we may then consider the events of the 1288 to 1295 period in more detail, to show the nature of the problem the government faced and the methods which it adopted in order to try to solve it.

There was a campaign in Offaly, about which we know nothing, in 1272-3, 104 and there was an equally obscure expedition to Slieve Bloom in Leix before 1276. 105 Wards maintained by Roger Mortimer, the lord of Leix, 106 and steps taken by the government to enlist O'Dempsey on its side, 107 also emphasize the prevalence of disorder in the midland area at this period. During the justiciarship of Ufford, there is clear evidence that Offaly was a serious problem. Ufford claimed that he had contracted with one John de Dunhevet to subdue Offaly, paying him 100 marks and 100 shillings. John had defaulted, and the justiciar himself in consequence had had to mount an expedition which "with much labour and expense subjugated the land of Offaly and reduced its men to the king's peace". 108 We know very little about Ufford's expeditions in these areas,

103 Above, pp. 86-8.
105 Ibid., p. 33.
106 C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 1410.
108 C.D.I. 1285-92, no. 4; Gilbert, Facsimiles, II, plate LXXV, no. 1.
but the escheator's account reveals a campaign in February 1279, and a further expedition to Leix between November 1279 and November 1280. We hear of operations around Castlecomer and Roscrea, and of Walter Lenfant being put in charge of the castle of Geashill. The effects of the disorder are to be seen in extents of the lands of John fitz Thomas and William de Mohun, taken shortly after the end of Ufford's justiciarship. It is unfortunate that the nature of the evidence does not allow any sort of firm chronology to be arrived at.

The precise sequence of events during Fulbourne's term of office is also difficult to determine, but disorder was plainly widespread in Meath and Ossory as well as Offaly. The annals reveal a complicated series of disorders covering the whole midland area, and the royal service was called to the "New Town of Leix" during Fulbourne's time. The most striking

109 C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 2291. An expedition in the Leix/Ossory area may have failed: we hear of an army which was confounded because of the activities of the le Gras family (See Richardson & Sayles, Irish Parliament, p.296). Cf. Pleas of the crown 6 Edw.I, mm.12d,13d- R.R.O.I., R.C.8/1, pp.81-2, 89-90.


112 Chart. St. Mary's, I. 319; Clyn, pp.9-10; Dowling, 1283, 1286; A.I., 1283; A.Clon., 1285.

113 Otway-Ruthven, "Royal Service in Ireland", R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII (1968), p.42. There was also a service of Cashel, but it was hardly connected with these midland troubles.
feature of the period is, however, the evidence of co-operation between the Irish of Offaly and Meath. We hear that de Geneville and de Bermingham joined forces against the Irish of Offaly in 1285. The Irish of Offaly in their turn called on O'Melaghlin for help, and he seems to have succeeded in inflicting a heavy defeat on the magnates' army. 114

It is not easy to decide what the end result of the efforts of Ufford and Fulbourne was. They undoubtedly had some success against these Irish; fines appearing on the Pipe rolls prove this. For instance between 1280 and 1284 we find Calvagh O'Conor and O'Dempsey owing 100 cows and 100 marks of fine; 115 we hear that between Easter 1284 and July 1285 Fulbourne's deputy brought the men of Offaly to peace at a fine of 200 cows; 116 slightly later other fines begin to be noted on the accounts: "the Irish of Slieve Bloom", "OMorde OKalfvach", "Conechor de Offaly", "Kalvach Okonechor". We know that the Slieve Bloom Irish at least did pay their fine. Their 100 cows were regarded as equivalent to £16-13s-4d, and 50s. were allowed to the agent who sought the cows out in Slieve Bloom and brought them to Kilkenny. 117 In 1286 too Calvagh O'Conor was captured at Kildare by Walter Lenfant, who had captured MacMurrough eleven years before. 118

114 A.Clon., 1285; Chart. St. Mary's, II. 319.
116 C.D.I. 1285-92, p. 7. For the terminal dates see Richardson & Sayles, Administration of Ireland, p. 82.
118 Clym, p. 10; Chart. St. Mary's, II. 319; Cole, Documents, p. 56.
these successes were not of long-term significance, as the events of subsequent years were to show.

We have already said something in another context about the wards that John of Sandford, keeper of Ireland in 1288-90, was forced to establish in the marches of Offaly and Leix. Since Sandford's own portion of the custody alone cost £584, the total expenses on this defensive operation must have been very heavy indeed, and this points to the seriousness of the situation in Offaly and Leix. We have also seen that, after an unsuccessful round of parleys, Sandford was forced to mount a positive expedition of war, mobilizing the shire levies. He had found that:

119 Above, p. 69.

120 In 1305 de Geneville, one of those warding now, claimed £73-6-8 and 50 marks for a custody of 16 men-at-arms, 20 hobelars and 40 foot kept for about two and a half months (C.J.R. 1305-07, pp. 72-4, 83). This again shows the heavy expense for quite a small operation. This ward lasted from July to October 1290, and therefore cannot be that starting in November 1288 with which we are concerned here (cf. Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 208). It was possibly one assigned by Sandford when he went to Meath and Connacht in May 1290 (C.D.I. 1285-92, pp. 273-4). The enrolled account for 1285-91 (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/139, m. 9d) does show money being paid to de Bermingham and fitz Thomas, the other two magnates involved in the 1288-9 wards, but it is included with other general sums for the "defence of the land of Ireland", and so the amounts cannot be discovered.

121 See above, pp. 43-5, where the events are fully discussed in relation to the problem of the general military obligation in Ireland. Sandford raised his forces from a wide area: the Wicklow mountains, the district around Leighlin and Carlow, and from "all Leinster and Munster".
the Irish of Offaly and Leix, rebels and enemies of the king, remained so hostile that no peace could be established in the marches of Leinster, but the king's lieges were daily killed, their houses burned, and intolerable depredations were made. 122

The keeper claimed that his expedition was a success, and this seems to be borne out by the fines paid by the Irish of Offaly at this time. 123 But the problem of Offaly was not to be solved as simply as this: by a piece of skilful diplomacy Calvagh O'Conor managed to some extent at least to get the better of the administration. Calvagh had been released after his capture in 1286 in return for the huge fine of 1,000 marks. For the payment of this fine he seems to have given hostages. 124 Now, by capturing John of Fulbourne, brother of the former justiciar, during Sandford's campaign, Calvagh was able to force the release of his hostages in return for John, whom both the Irish and English governments seem to have been unwilling to leave to his fate. Calvagh struck a hard bargain, stepping up his demands, but the king seems to have stood firm against releasing "hostages for the peace" as distinct from "hostages for money. 125 But it is obvious that the justiciars of the period were dealing with no unworthy enemy.

123 Ibid., pp.273,277.
124 Ibid., no.1018; Cole, Documents, p.75.
125 The evidence concerning these interesting transactions is printed in full in Cole, Documents, pp. xix,55,73,123,126-7. See also C.D.I. 1285-92, nos.541,698 and pp.248,310.
The negotiations concerning the release of Calvagh went on into 1290, by which time de Vescy had become justiciar. We shall never know the precise events which led up to de Vescy's quarrel with John fitz Thomas, but by 1293 the situation was explosive. There was a conflict of interests between the lord of Kildare and the lord of Offaly, and the latter had the support of Peter de Bermingham the neighbouring lord of Tethmoy, who had been his retainers since 1289. In 1293 de Vescy seems to have intended to launch an expedition against Offaly, but the service he summoned was stayed by the king because "this summons tends to the injury of the king and his people of Ireland". It may be that fitz Thomas was already in England, and had gained the ear of the king; he was certainly there by the time of the Michaelmas parliament. It seems overwhelmingly likely that the proposed Offaly campaign was directed as much against fitz Thomas as against the Irish of Offaly.

That de Vescy was not just a wanton aggressor is shown by the events of the following year; the 1297 eyre of Kildare gives a fearful picture of the disorder in the "time of the disturbance" there. Apart from

126 Red Book of Kildare, no. 11. For all this see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 210-11.
128 AU; AFM, 1293.
129 Rotuli Parliamentorum Anglie Hactenus Inediti, pp. 41-2.
the general anarchy, it reveals definite alliances between fitz Thomas and the Irish of Offaly against de Vescy. In 1294 Kildare castle was captured, its surroundings laid waste by the English and Irish, and the rolls and tallies of the county were burnt by Calvagh O'Conor. In part at least this was the work of fitz Thomas, who appears at the robbery of Kildare with a series of English and Irish, including O'Conors. Peter de Bermingham was also involved with the local Irish. It may be that fitz Thomas's royal letters permitting him to treat with all Irish gave him a useful cover of legality, and in this context de Vescy's alleged abuse of his franchisal rights in Kildare, when he insisted that royal pardons to the Irish of Offaly didn't override his own right to pardon or not to pardon as lord of Kildare, may have been motivated as much by fear as by anything more sinister. It is therefore possible that the king's staying of the royal service in 1293, though it may have prevented open war with fitz Thomas, left the way open for fitz Thomas's own aggression in the following year.

The pattern of warfare in Offaly bore some similarities to that in Connacht. The years from 1272 to 1290 showed that this area was a serious problem to the administration: constant expeditions had to be organised against the Irish, and it was with great difficulty and expense that they were kept subdued. Then

132 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 323.
133 C.J.R. 1295-1303, pp. 174-5, 189-90, 205.
134 C.D.I. 1285-92, no. 1103.
135 Rotuli Parliamentorum Anglie Hactenus Inediti, pp. 44-5.
in 1290 the situation became entangled with the rivalries between the Irish magnates, one of whom happened to be the justiciar himself. De Vescy could not hope to hold Kildare in peace, when a man more powerful than he held lands there, and was prepared to make use of the king's enemies against him—a not insignificant fact when we remember that fitz Thomas had spent the years from 1288 to 1290 struggling on the government's side against these same Irish. An arrangement remained to be come to whereby the disputes between the lords of Kildare and Offaly might be settled, and which would also relieve the government of its recent involvement with the O'Conors of Offaly and their allies.

d) other areas

The government was also, of course, engaged directly and indirectly in military and political relations with the Irish in other parts of the lordship. But during the years from 1272 to 1295 such contacts were much more intermittent than those with the Irish of Leinster, Connacht and the midlands, and they may be passed over very briefly.

The details of Thomond history, in so far as they can be recovered, have been set out with particular fullness by Orpen, and only the main lines of government policy in that area need concern us here. At the very beginning of our period Thomond was one of the administration's most pressing problems. Both Audley (justiciar in 1270-2) and Maurice fitz Maurice (justiciar

136 Normans, IV. 65-79.
in 1272-3) were involved in military operations against Brian O'Brien, while de Geneville (1273-6) seems to have arranged the rebuilding of Bunratty. However, the grant of Thomond to Thomas de Clare in 1276 seems to have succeeded, to some extent at least, in what must have been one of its main aims: to relieve the government of its direct responsibility there. The handing over of the Thomond hostages to de Clare emphasizes that relations with the local Irish were henceforth to be his affair rather than the justiciar's.

In 1281 Ufford and Theobald Butler led an expedition which seems to have established de Clare securely in the areas of Bunratty and Quin. He was able to exploit divisions between the Irish, and it was not until after his death in 1287 that another royal campaign seems to have been needed.

137 Orpen, Normans, IV. 65; Curtis, "Sheriffs' accounts of county Tipperary, 1275-6", R.I.A.Proc., XLII, C, p.87. For the financial support these expeditions received locally see ibid., pp.87-8; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.200; P.R.O., C.47/10/13, nos. 12 & 13.

138 For the grant see Orpen, Normans, IV. 66-7 & for de Clare's subsequent career, ibid., pp.68-75.

139 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.1197.

140 Orpen, Normans, IV. 72-3. Either now or slightly earlier de Clare got the royal service promised him in 1276 (above, p.81 n.9). There was a service of "Confy" or "0konethy" in Ufford's time (Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I.Journ., XCVIII, 42) and it was granted to him (P.R.O., E.101/234/19). The name seems to stand for "Cuinche" or Quin (Westropp, "Early Italian maps of Ireland, 1300-1600", R.I.A.Proc., XXX, C, p.385).

141 For some idea of the working of his alliances see AI, 1281, 1283.
From 1287 until the end of the period covered by the present chapter there were more direct relations between the Dublin government and the Irish of Thomond and those of Desmond to the south of them. The 1287 expedition forced O'Brien to make fine for the peace, apparently without heavy fighting, and there is little sign of further disorder on his part for some years. On the other hand, MacCarthy seems to have posed a more difficult problem to the administration. MacCarthy had been involved in direct negotiations with the king about 1285, apparently to gain royal support for some unknown purpose. We know nothing of the result of his negotiations, but by the time of Sandford's keepership the government was forced to intervene against him. Sandford had to set off for Desmond in the autumn of 1288, again early in 1289 and for a third time in the summer of the same year. On each occasion determined negotiations seem to have been sufficient to restore the situation without resort to armed force. De Vescy too was forced to intervene in the area, and, typically, seems to have fallen foul of the local magnate, Thomas fitz Maurice. Thomas apparently had arranged a truce with MacCarthy. MacCarthy had promised to pay a fine and had given a hostage as surety for payment. accused de Vescy of releasing the hostage, and thereby leaving the way open for MacCarthy to ravage his lands with impunity. Thomas, who had been out of Ireland, returned and routed the Irishman, but the justiciar then came south and forced

142 Orpen, Normans, IV. 78-9.
143 C.D.I. 1252-84, no.2362; 1285-92, no.61.
144 Ibid., pp.266,268,271.
peace to be made—a peace which was, according to Thomas, minus honestam and in dedecus regis. He claimed that he had been forced to accept compensation of 100 marks, to his loss of £10,000! De Vescy did not answer Thomas's allegations, but he was forced to answer in so far as the accusations touched the king. He replied that the hostage had been no more than a pledge, and that, had he not been released (with, he claimed, the assent of Thomas's attorney and on good security)

"MacCarthy and other Irishmen would have risen to war". The accusation about the dishonest peace was not answered at all, but no doubt de Vescy's defence would have been similar—that it was for the king's good and the preservation of the peace.

It seems clear that here we have another minor example of a clash of interests between the administration and the local lords. Thomas was, of course, a Geraldine, and it may be significant that he was a witness to the Connacht quit-claim which his kinsman fitz Thomas forced on the earl of Ulster in 1295. We shall never know which story is nearer the truth, but in the light of Sandford's repeated journeys to Desmond and his negotiations to bring MacCarthy to the peace we should not be too hasty in condemning de Vescy.

In 1295 Thomas fitz Maurice was himself keeper of Ireland, and he seems to have used the government's authority to conduct an intensive mopping-up operation

145 Rotuli Parliamentorum Anglie Hactenus Inediti, pp. 35-6.

146 Red Book of Kildare, no. 9. Cf. nos. 14, 30, 63.
in his own district, and in the neighbouring de Clare
lands, which were still in the escheator's hands.
The eyre which fitz Maurice carried out reveals with
alarming frequency dealings between the English of
Thomond and Desmond and the "sons of Obren" (that is
of Brian Rua O'Brien) and MacCarthy. Fitz Maurice,
however, seems to have succeeded in establishing some
sort of peace in the area, for on 24 September 1295
we find him pardoning Turlough, the son and successor of
Brian Rua.

Therefore the pattern of the government's relations
with the southern Irish after the grant of Thomond to
de Clare in 1276 was one of very limited involvement.
Even during the minority which followed de Clare's
death in 1287 the situation seems to have been stable
enough to allow the government to avoid any heavy
military commitment such as had been necessary during
the early 1270s. Desmond too provoked no positive
military expedition; when necessary, the justiciar
seems to have been able to bring MacCarthy to the peace
without fighting, even if the government's methods were
not always approved of by the local lords.

Ulster, as was the case throughout most of our
period, impinged on the government even less than the
south. Although the earl of Ulster was a minor until

147 E.g., C.J.R. 1295-1303, pp.23,45,46,63.
148 Ibid., p.57.
149 In addition to the dispute between de Vescy and
fitz Maurice, it is interesting to note that in
about 1289 the prior of the Hospital was accused of
receiving MacCarthy to the peace "without regard for
those who had been prejudiced" (C.D.I. 1285-92, no.
817).
1280, there is no sign of direct intervention by the
government against the Ulster Irish, and any military
expeditions were left to the king's seneschal, William
fitz Warin. \(^{150}\) we know, for instance, that he led an
army against the O'Cahans, and received an allowance in
his account. \(^{151}\) Once the earl came to Ireland in 1286
relations with the Ulster chiefs were clearly his concern
and not the government's, but there is one interesting
hint of continuity of policy. In 1284 Fulbourne is
revealed as having been paying Aedh Buidhe O'Neill,
who had been killed by MacMahon and succeeded by his
cousin Donal, son of Brian, in the previous year. \(^{152}\)
One of the earl's first acts on coming to Ireland was
to depose Donal and set up Aedh's brother, Niall, as
king. \(^{153}\)

The Irish on the southern borders of Ulster were,
however, the government's concern, and there are signs
of contact with O'Hanlon in particular. In 1282 O'Hanlon was paid for coming to Dublin. \(^{154}\) Again in 1285

\(^{150}\) For fitz Warin's quarrels with the Ulster magnates
see Orpen, Normans, IV. 133-6. Before 1272 Audley,
presumably on taking the earldom into the king's
hand, had received some of the Irish into the peace
(C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 890).

\(^{151}\) N.L.I., MS 760, p. 89 (from an unnamed Pipe roll).

\(^{152}\) C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 2310. He had received the fines
of some unnamed "Irish of Ulster" in 1283 (P.R.O.,
Pipe roll, E. 372/136, m. 33). For the earl's re-
lations with the Irish see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval

\(^{153}\) AC, 1286. For the O'Neill pedigree see Curtis,
Medieval Ireland (2nd ed.), p. 401.

\(^{154}\) C.D.I. 1252-84, no. 1907. For the tenurial position
of the Irish of the Louth and Meath marches and
beyond see Otway-Ruthven, "The partition of the de
Verdon lands in Ireland in 1332", R.I.A. Proc.,
he seems to have come to the justiciar, this time with a body of troops "to expedite the affairs of the king", and the grant of a robe to him suggests that he was retained by the government.\textsuperscript{155} At the same time he and his tenants were paying a fine to have the king's peace.\textsuperscript{156} But apart from an expedition by de Vescy and the earl of Ulster in 1291 against O'Hanlon et ceteros regulos pacem impedientes,\textsuperscript{157} there does not seem to have been any military intervention in this area.

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The main conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is a simple one: that the Irish government was faced in the years 1272-95 by many areas of disturbance. Expeditions were necessary to persuade or force the Irish to the peace, and, generally speaking, the effect of any such royal expedition would only be temporary. The period shows in existence the basic problem which was later to become intense.

\textsuperscript{155} C.D.I. 1285-92, no.169.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., no.149.
\textsuperscript{157} Chart. St. Mary's, II. 320. P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/139, m.9d shows a payment for an expedition to Uriel in this year. The account shows the payment being disallowed later, with de Vescy claiming that Nicholas de Clere had paid him the money, telling him that the area was at war when it wasn't. This seems to be an incredible tale: the Red Earl was hardly likely to have been taken in by such a story put forward by the treasurer. Perhaps the expedition was in the earl's interests rather than in the king's. The truth behind the allegations of this period will never be known (cf. C.D.I. 1285-92, no.964, where other items of de Vescy's military expenditure are challenged).
One further point stands out very clearly from what has been said above: it is not possible to discuss the relations between government and Irish in simple terms, and any attempt to do so must distort reality. At every turn the Anglo-Irish magnates intrude themselves upon the scene, and the government is virtually never dealing with just one other interest; it has to steer its way among several. Nor were the Irish of many areas by choice the government's concern. Responsibility for keeping the peace rested with the government, but not with it alone. The Conquest had been a joint enterprise; power and duty rested with many lords, some little less powerful than the lord of Ireland himself. The problem the government faced in dealing with the Irish cannot be separated from the breakdown of the great lordships of the early thirteenth century. As we pursue the topic, absenteeism and "degeneracy" will, by implication at least, be an important part of our theme. "English rebels" cannot be neatly separated from "Irish enemies".
Chapter III

John Wogan and the limitation of the government's military commitment within Ireland, 1295-1315

In 1295 John Wogan was made justiciar. The period of his rule has traditionally been regarded as a landmark in the history of the English lordship. Both Orpen and Curtis saw him as a great justiciar: Orpen saw the years of his rule as an age of comparative peace; Curtis saw him as the "founder" of the Irish parliament. More recently, both Professor Otway-Ruthven and Dr. Hand have faced us squarely with the military failures of the second half of his justiciar-ship, and have suggested that his reputation springs less from his achievements than from the fact that the justiciary rolls for his period were calendared and printed before their destruction in 1922. This makes him the most accessibly documented justiciar of the Middle Ages: it is possible to follow his movements more closely than those of any of his predecessors, and more easily than those of any of his successors. There

1 A brief outline of his life can be found in Hand, English Law in Ireland, pp.21-2, 24-5.
2 Normans, IV. 39-41; Medieval Ireland (2nd ed.) pp. 171-3. It is interesting to note that he appeared not at all remarkable to Gilbert, writing in the 1860s (Viceroyds, pp.112-30).
3 Medieval Ireland, p.212; English Law in Ireland, p.25, and pp.25-6.
is undoubtedly much truth in these recent reappraisals, yet a study of the relations between government and Irish in Wogan's time leads to the conclusion that his justiciarship had a significance, though one very different to that expounded by Orpen and Curtis. Two things stand out: first the withdrawal of the government from direct involvement in areas which had occupied its attention constantly between 1272 and 1295, and, secondly, the rapid growth of the problem of the Leinster Irish. There are clear signs that Wogan deliberately tried to limit the administration's military commitment within Ireland by instituting a policy of co-operation with and reliance on the magnates in operations against the Irish. This policy was not a success, and any gains it did achieve were counterbalanced by the intensification of disorder in Leinster: Leinster, as we have seen, could not be ignored by the government. In this chapter we shall discuss the first of these aspects of Wogan's rule, and in the next chapter we shall consider the second.

It is impossible to understand the government's attitude to warfare in Ireland in this period in isolation. One of the most important tasks facing the administration in these years was that of providing men, money and supplies for the king's Scottish and continental wars; these commitments took up a large proportion of its energies and resources. 4 Between 1296 and 1302

the justiciar led armies to Scotland, and in addition many of the Irish tenants went with Edward I to the continent. From this point of view, the settlement of the various feuds which had been troubling Ireland was essential, and the process of pacification and definition of spheres of influence was the most important development of Wogan's first years. De Vescy was persuaded to resign Kildare, and receive it back for life, with reversion to the king. Upon his death in 1297 Kildare was shired, and the liberty extinguished. Thereby, any possibility of a conflict between an absentee lord and the powerful local magnates was removed. In these years too a settlement was worked out between the Geraldines and de Burghs, which resulted in the removal of the former from Connacht. Curtis rightly pointed to the significance of these various changes in providing the peace that was necessary if the king were to gain aid from Ireland in his many projects. But the consequences within Ireland were equally important, and we may examine Kildare and Connacht in turn.


7 For the details see Orpen, Normans, IV. 116-9 and Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.211. The importance of the removal of fitz Thomas from Connacht can hardly be over-estimated.

8 Medieval Ireland (2nd ed.), p.172.
a) Kildare

By a curious paradox, the shiring of Kildare meant less rather than more direct intervention in it by the government. Wogan adopted what can only have been a deliberate policy: he practically farmed-out the war there to John fitz Thomas, Peter de Bermingham, and Peter's son and successor, John. Throughout the 1297 to 1315 period military operations were conducted by these magnates (with varying types of royal support) and only once does the government seem to have intervened directly— and that only as a side-effect of an expedition to Slieve Bloom.

Wogan seems to have been on the best of terms with fitz Thomas, either through choice, or because he was unable, and from the point of view of the Scottish war unwilling, to antagonize him. Agnes de Valence repeatedly petitioned the king that she might have her Kildare lands, which fitz Thomas had taken by force, restored to her. The climax was reached in the English parliament of 1305. Agnes alleged that Johannes Wogan justiciarius Hibernie inimicus ejus extitit et favorabilis prefato Johanni filio Thome in hoc casu. The king had several times ordered Wogan to exhibit full justice, but eventually it was pleaded on his behalf that id facere non posset! He was ordered once again to restore Agnes to her rights and to procure her her damages under pain of forfeiture. After the Scottish campaign of 1296, fitz Thomas proceeded to join the

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king in Flanders. Wogan provided him with money for his passage and for the custody of his castle of Lea during his absence. When fitz Thomas returned in 1298 he found that his town of Rathangan had been burnt by the Irish, and on 26 May the king ordered the justiciar and council to consider granting him a royal service for its rebuilding. This is rather ironic, for the jurors of Offaly in the preceding year had presented that "John, son of Thomas, has not horses and arms at Rathangan as assessed". Nothing appears to have been done until January 1299, when the matter was again postponed because of the absence of the full council. Eventually a service was to be proclaimed at Dundalk, for 29 May 1299. However, John was unable to rebuild that summer, and the money was held over until he did begin to build. By February 1302 he still had not received the service. The king again ordered it to be paid over, and eventually he does seem to have received at least part of it. All this is not immediately relevant to our purposes, but it shows both that Wogan could be regarded as favouring fitz Thomas, and that fitz Thomas had a direct "line" to the king, which he was not afraid to use.

Meanwhile, more important matters were afoot. In the summer of 1299 in a council at Rathwire it was arranged that Peter de Bermingham should receive support in his war against the Irish of Offaly. He was to have 400

12 Ibid., p. 175.
13 Ibid., pp. 362-3.
14 C.D.I. 1302-07, nos. 48, 151.
foot-soldiers for forty days at the expense of the 
communities of Kildare and Meath. This was not to be 
in addition to scutage, but in anticipation of it, 
except in the case of townsfolk who did not owe royal 
service anyway. Fitz Thomas was to have similar aid 
if he wished, in order to attack the Irish on the other 
side of Offaly. Two officials were appointed, to act 
in fact, though not in name, as clerks of wages. 15 Thus, 
rather than mount a military expedition in Offaly, 
the government preferred to rely on two local magnates; 
magnates who not long before had been prepared to 
enter into unlawful relationships with the Irish of 
Offaly whom they were now supposed to fight on the 
government's behalf. 16 This was the beginning of a policy 
which was to bear bitter fruit in 1305 and subsequent 
years.

We know nothing of the result of this grant of royal 
service, and for four years we hear little of the 
situation in Kildare. Since the financial records of 
the government survive and reveal no trace of an ex-
pedition, we may assume that the area was left to the 
local lords. On 18 July 1303 at Lea, fitz Thomas 
granted Morett castle and other lands to "Nigel" O'More 
in return for the latter's "service, aid and counsel". 
Nigel also undertook to receive arms from his lord. 17 We 
must take this as a sign that fitz Thomas was following 
what was to become the usual policy of government and 
lords alike: using one Irishman against another, but 
it is the only view we have at this period of the relations

16 See above, p. 112.
17 *Red Book of Kildare*, no. 76.
between the Kildare magnates and the neighbouring Irish.18

In the autumn of this year Wogan was forced to intervene directly in this area for the only time during his justiciarship. By 31 October 1303 he was on his way to Slieve Bloom against the McGillapatricks of Ossory, who lived to the south of the O'Conors and O'Mores. He was fearful that the Irish of Offaly would take the opportunity to wreak havoc in Kildare, and so he arranged with the men of Kildare to provide a defensive force in the rear of his campaigning area. The sheriff of Kildare was provided with three horses and twelve guards at the king's expense, in addition to three horses at his own, while the county paid for 10 horses and 100 guards under the command of Henry de Veel and William Perceval.19 These forces were maintained until January 1304.20 At almost exactly this time, a royal service was due at Kilkenny, and the justiciar ordered that it be taken in money "for sustaining the wards and army against Irish felons who disturb the peace", and appointed a clerk to receive and disburse it.21 We know nothing of the result of these measures—a fine made by the McGillapatricks appears on the pipe roll for 1304-5, but the entry makes it clear that it is an old one, dating from at least 1301-2.22 But sub-

18 Who precisely "Nigel" was is not clear; he doesn't appear in the contemporary justiciary rolls.
21 Mem.roll 31-5 Edw.I, m.3d- P.R.O.I., Cal., p.67; R.I.A., MS 12 D 11, p.2.
sequent events suggest that the expedition and defensive measures did have some effect. By the autumn of 1305 the situation in Slieve Bloom, though disturbed, was manageable enough to be left in the hands of the earl of Gloucester's seneschal of Kilkenny.23

The year 1305 marked the crucial phase of the relations between the government, the Kildare magnates and the local Irish. Around 13 June the O'Conors of Offaly were murdered at Peter de Bermingham's castle of Carrick in Carbury. By Irish standards, this event has left an unusual amount of descriptive evidence behind it, and we may glean all we can from the literary sources before using the record evidence to set it in its background of the government's policy in Offaly.

The Remonstrance of the Irish chiefs to pope John XXII gives a detailed account of the murder, describing de Bermingham as inviting the "unsuspecting" O'Conors to a banquet, and after it murdering their two leaders, together with twenty-four of their following, selling their heads "to their enemies", and going unpunished by the king. The Remonstrance is concerned to erect slaughter at banquets into a general principle of English policy, and it mentions at the same time the murder of Brian O'Brien by Thomas de Clare in 1277 and that of the MacMurrough leaders by Pencoit in 1282. It also implicates fitz Thomas in the present crime, accusing him of murdering the son of Calvagh O'Conor, who had been "reared continuously in his house".24 This is the only

23 C.J.R. 1305-07, p.135. It was the earl's seneschal who had held the MacGillapatrick hostages before the outbreak in 1303 (38th. Rep. D.K., p.97).

The annals, Irish and Anglo-Irish alike, confirm the basic facts of the Remonstrance's story. Most of the Irish annals are cryptic enough: de Bermingham killed Murchertach O'Conor Faly, Maelmorda "the Calvagh" his brother, and twenty-nine of their followers "with hideous treachery at Carbury castle". The Annals of Inisfallen, however, embroider the tale with some juicy details. De Bermingham is represented personally casting a child over the battlements, while his wife is credited with regular espionage activities from the top of the castle. The Remonstrance's statement that the heads were sold at great profit in Dublin is confirmed. The Anglo-Irish annals also record the event, but more blandly. They attribute the actual killing to Jordan Comyn, but it still takes place in de Bermingham's castle. No value-judgement is made. Clyn specifies the number killed with the two leaders as twelve, and confirms the date circa festum Trinitatis given by the Remonstrance. Thus all the sources agree as to the place, the instigator, and the main

25 AC; AU; AFM; A. Clon., 1305.
26 AI, 1305.
27 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 332; Clyn, p. 11; Dowling, sub anno 1304; Bibliotheque de Troyes, MS 1316, f. 44d.
victims, although the numbers vary. The Irish sources naturally betray horror, and the Remonstrance and the Annals of Inisfallen both try to fit the deed into a usual pattern of English behaviour.

There is, however, one literary source which tells a different story to that outlined above. This is an English poem written in praise of de Bermingham after his death in 1308. It is interesting for two reasons. First of all, it too describes the murder in highly dramatic terms, and the basic details given in it confirm those given by the sources hostile to de Bermingham. The poem, however, claims that the murder was not a gratuitous act, but was in response to a conspiracy by the Irish against the great magnates: the earl of Ulster, Edmund Butler, John fitz Thomas and de Bermingham himself. There is no way of telling whether there is any truth in this version of the events, but it is hinting at a wider truth. The murder took place in a setting of suspicion and warfare which involved more than de Bermingham himself.

The records of the administration provide us with only two pieces of evidence, but these are vital to any interpretation of the events. The first is that Peter de Bermingham was described in an account running from the summer of 1303 to October 1305 as "custos of the

28 Heuser, Die Kildare-Gedichte, pp. 161-4. Also in Gilbert, Facsimiles, III, plate IV. There is a version in modern English in Seymour, Anglo-Irish Literature 1200-1582. The events are described in terms of some sort of ball-game, and with a grisly and decidedly Delphic humour.
peace in Offalye". He was clearly in some formal sense the government's agent at this period. The second piece of evidence is the payment to de Bermingham of £100 for the O'Conors' heads. Very shortly after the murder it was agreed by the justiciar and the whole Council in presence of Ric. de Burgo, Earl of Ulster, that Peter de Bermingham have £100, which was granted to him for the beheading of the captains of the race of the Oconoghors of Offaly, felons, who now sent here the heads of said captains and 16 heads of others of their company. As early as 2 July the writ of liberate itself was issued. It speaks of the money having been granted to expel the Irish of Offaly of the family of the O'Conors, our felons, and to decapitate the captains of the same progeny", and it names the captains as Murchertach and Maelmorda, thus agreeing with what we know from other sources. The wording of these documents, and the speed with which the grant went through, suggest very strongly that the government had been party to de Bermingham's plans, and that it was paying

29 38th. Rep. D.K., p.99. The membrane was destroyed and the calendar reads ".....James de Bermengham". Peter was normally known as "Peter fitz James", and this should certainly be supplied.

30 C.J.R. 1305-07, p.82. The membrane is undated, but it follows immediately on one headed June 20. Trinity Sunday 1305 was 13 June.

31 P.R.O., writ of liberate, E.101/233/23 (C.D.I. 1302-07, no.434). The writ mentions Geoffrey de Géneville as well as the earl of Ulster. The payment of the sum is to be found on P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/234/7 and on P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/153, m. 35. The wording of the payment follows that of the writ.
over a sum already promised. The administration and two great magnates were without doubt accessories after the fact; they were also probably accessories before it. And this conclusion accords well with the general background. We have already seen fitz Thomas and de Bermingham receiving government support in their operations against the Irish, with the government avoiding direct involvement; this pattern was to continue in subsequent years, with the two magnates needing heavier and heavier subvention.

The results of the murder of the O'Conors were not happy. Three weeks from Trinity, John fitz Thomas was involved in a law-suit at Dublin and was allowed to name an attorney because he is about to set out for the parts of Offaly, where a great part of his lands is, to fortify the marches of those parts which now are much disturbed by the death of the captains of the Okoneghors slain by said Peter (de Bermingham).

John was clearly still involved in military operations in Offaly, for earlier in the year he was alleged to have used goods of Agnes de Valence to support them, and to build his fortress of Geashill, on the northern

32 This is also the interpretation of Orpen (Normans, IV. 36) and Devitt (Journ.Kildare Arch.Soc., VIII. 300).

33 C.J.R. 1305-07, pp.77-8. It is interesting to note that in this case John had just received the backing of his fellow magnates, led by the earl of Ulster, Peter de Bermingham and Eustace le Poer, in resisting the inauguration of proceedings by writ of the English chancery when "the King has here his Chancery of which there issue and ought to issue all original writs by which as well the magnates as others of this land ought, and are accustomed to plead" (ibid., p.76).
fringes of the Slieve Bloom mountains. Then as early as January 1306 the O'Conors and their allies were once more presenting a serious military problem. On 27 January the government enlisted Fyn O'Dempsey. Fyn complained of the enmity a whole series of Irish bore him: O'Conor of Offaly, O'Dunn, McGeohegan and O'Molmoy of Meath, and, further south, McGillapatrick of Ossory. It seems that the government's transaction with Fyn was made through John fitz Thomas. John undertook to provide Fyn with ten equipped horses and to maintain ten himself. Fyn agreed not to make peace with the enemy except with the assent of the council, and John, together with three other magnates, stood as his pledge. Half Fyn's wages were to be paid out of the last service of Kildare, and half were to be maintained at the expense of the community of the county. The expedition was obviously urgent, for, if the money was not immediately forthcoming from these sources, the treasurer was to provide an advance. Here the annals complement the records, and provide us with information on the result of these arrangements. In April O'Dempsey and the English attacked O'Conor and his allies at Geashill, succeeding in defeating them. O'Dunn, obviously allied with O'Conor, was killed.

35 The service had been proclaimed in 1305- perhaps as a sequel to the O'Conor murder? (Oway-Ruthven, "Royal service in Ireland", R.S.A.I. Journ., XCUIII (1968), p.43).
37 A.I., 1306. This is supported by Dowling (s.a.1305). Chart. St. Mary's, II. 333 places the events in April but says that O'Dempsey "dux Reganorum" was killed. This is clearly a slip for O'Dunn, who was chief of Iregan.
Whether connected with this effort or not, we also hear that de Bermingham was defeated, and "many killed" by O'Melaghlin and McGeohegan.\textsuperscript{38} By June, John, Peter and Fyn were at Naas petitioning for their reward. John received £40 on behalf of Fyn and himself for the heads of O'Dunn and other felons, while Peter, despite the hint of his defeat, was granted £23 for beheading unspecified felons. John was also granted an aid of £28 for the keeping of Geashill until Michaelmas, half to be received from the exchequer, and half "at the cost of the country". He was to keep a total of twenty men-at-arms and one hundred foot, of which ten men-at-arms and sixty foot seem to have formed his normal defence obligation, while the wages of the rest were to come out of the aid. De Bermingham's cantreds of Tethmoy and Carbury were the only ones exempted from this levy for fitz Thomas, and we must suppose that they were regarded as having enough obligations of their own. Supervisors were appointed to see that the Geashill ward was adequately kept. It was then revealed that a certain Dermot O'Dempsey had been captured by McGeohegan—a fact that might lend support to the alleged defeat of de Bermingham by the same Irishman. There was a danger that Fyn might come to terms in order to procure his kinsman's release. To prevent this, he was required to give hostages (who were delivered to fitz Thomas and de Bermingham to keep), and to go "in the service of the king against all felons in the company of the justiciar and of John and Peter, as often as required".\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} A.I., 1306, Miscellaneous Irish Annals, p.105.
\textsuperscript{39} C.J.R. 1305-07, pp.270-1.
These precautions show that the situation was still dangerous, and this view is borne out by the events of 1307. The "predones de Offaly", presumably the O'Conors, destroyed Geashill, and in July burnt fitz Thomas's town of Lea, setting siege to the castle there. Edmund Butler seems to have joined fitz Thomas in dealing with this threat. By the beginning of 1308 the lords of Offaly and Tethmoy were again requiring government backing. On 9 January writs of liberate were ordered to be issued to them, and they were each to have fifty marks to overcome the Irish of Offaly. These amounts were paid in the same month, and later in the year a further 50 marks were paid to de Bermingham and a further £25-13s-4d to fitz Thomas for the same purposes. Wogan, who was in Ireland and acting personally at this time, seems to have continued to play no part in the operations, even though much of the support was coming from him. We have seen that in 1306 the Meath Irish appear to have been acting in conjunction with those of Offaly. The earl of Ulster was enlisted against them at about the same time as the other two lords were given support against the O'Conors and their allies. Wogan had sent a messenger to seek the earl in Connacht and Meath to induce the said earl to combat and vanquish Yertagh McYoghegan, felon. De Burgh must have agreed

40 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 335-6.
41 C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.3-4. The text is slightly garbled and it seems from the payments that the 50 marks were part of grants of 100 marks.
42 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/235/9 (roll ends 24 Jan.)
44 C.J.R. 1308-14, p.26. The order to pay the messenger was made on 28 January.
for on 20 January he was granted the very large sum of 1,000 marks for the expedition, which he appears to have completed successfully at his own expense. Thus, although Wogan was strikingly adept at using the magnates in the king's service and to that extent his policy in the midlands was proving a success, the problem of the Irish themselves was plainly not being lessened by it and the magnates were receiving very heavy financial backing indeed.

However, between 1308 and 1313 there does seem to have been a lull in the struggle with the Irish of Offaly, and John fitz Thomas's military energies were partly taken up by a struggle with Roger Mortimer, who had come to Ireland to enter into his wife's inheritance of Meath upon the retirement of her grandfather, Geoffrey de Geneville, to a monastery in 1308. The Irish government appealed for an end to the disturbances, and also forbade fitz Thomas to cross the king's land of Okethy, but the dispute, which seems to have been with Mortimer's de Lacy tenants rather than with Mortimer himself, was settled in England, where both fitz Thomas and Mortimer went in 1309.

Other incidents include the killing of Dermot O'Dempsey by the serjeants of Gaveston in 1308, and the murder of the king's seneschal of Kildare and Carlow in 1310.

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46 See Chart. St. Mary's, II. 337-8.
47 P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 3 Edw.II, mm.27,43d.
48 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 339; C.C.R. 1307-13, p.188.
49 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 338; AC, 1308.
50 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval History, p.220.
but since the first seems to have occurred at Tullow and the second at Carlow castle they were hardly connected with the situation in Offaly.

By 1313 fitz Thomas and John son of Peter de Bermingham were again attending to the Irish of Offaly with the government's support. Trouble had begun before this: in 1312 the king had provided victuals for wards in the marches of Dublin and Kildare against the Irish of Offaly; and early in February 1313 John de Wellesley was to have a grant of £20 to be levied on the community of Kildare for beheading a series of Irish. The list begins with two O'Conors, presumably the ring-leaders, and includes a variety of Irish names. They are not, however, of obvious political importance, and may have formed part of the sequela of the O'Conors. By the summer affairs had reached a serious state, but again the justiciar did not intervene in person (Wogan had by now been replaced by Edmund Butler). The O'Conors had invaded Kildare, and a "salutary remedy" was needed. It was to be provided by fitz Thomas, who was to have his troops collected by 24 June, in return for a subsidy of 500 marks granted by the custos and council. John undertook to maintain his forces for eighteen weeks, and the money was to be paid every quinzaine "proportionately as the expedition requires". 100 marks previously received by him was to be regarded as an advance towards the total sum, £100 of which was to be issued at once.

51 Mem. roll 4-5 Edw. II, m.57d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/5, p. 699.
52 P.R.O.I., Just. roll 6-7 Edw. II, m.46.
53 Ibid., m.64.
He did receive the first £100 from the exchequer, but does not seem to have received any further payments. On the other hand, the king did provide supplies, and paid for their carriage from Dublin to Kildare. But here our information peters out; John fitz Thomas disappears from the scene, and the war in Offaly seems to have been put under the control of John de Bermingham.

During the eighteen months preceding the Bruce invasion Offaly was plainly still giving cause for considerable concern. Unfortunately our only evidence is that provided by the payments to de Bermingham, and we know nothing of the course of events. Between Michaelmas 1313 and the end of the Hilary term of 1314, John was paid £333-6s-8d on the order of Butler and the council "to expel the Irish of the name and progeny of the O'Conors of Offaly, manifest felons and enemies", and during the same period of the following year he received half of a further grant of 100 marks. It is impossible to tell whether de Bermingham's expedition was a fresh one, or whether he had, for some unknown reason, taken over fitz Thomas's obligations. Although we can say no more about these events, the size of the sums which were being granted to the magnates speak loudly enough of themselves.

54 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/6. Subsequent Issue rolls and enrolled accounts reveal no further payments, though he may of course have received sums locally.
56 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/7.
57 Ibid., E.101/237/2.
b) Connacht

Like Offaly, Connacht presents a very different picture to the one it presented in 1272-95. Only once between 1295 and 1315 did the justiciar lead an expedition there, and that one expedition appears to have been on a small scale. From about 1304 the area was disturbed, but again Wogan seems to have tried to cope with the situation by using the magnates. The king's castles were put into the hands of the earl of Ulster for life, and an attempt was made to deal with the renewed dynastic squabbles of the O'Conors by removing them completely from the King's Cantred and replacing them with the earl's cousin, William de Burgh. As we shall see, this arrangement was not a success, and this period is crucial in marking the virtual end of control in Connacht by the government. After the Bruce invasion the administration rarely took positive steps to maintain the royal castles adequately, and little attempt seems to have been made to exact rent and obedience from the O'Conors, who again received Sil-Murray from the king. The evidence for the situation in Connacht up to about 1309 is distinctly fragmentary, but we may glean what we can in order to provide a background to the events of that and subsequent years.

As we have already seen, the powerful influence of the earl of Ulster was shown rapidly after the end of his quarrel with fitz Thomas: he was responsible for the re-establishment of Aedh O'Conor (de Vescy's candidate) in 1296. Events in the following years

58 Above, p.104.
are not well documented, but it is possible that the comparative silence of the annals denotes comparative stability. We know that the earl began to build the great castle of Ballymote in the manor of Sligo in 1300, and that some of the outstanding fine of Cathal Rua O'Conor was coming in through Jordan of Exeter at this period. On the other hand, although the garrisoning of the three great royal castles seems to have continued throughout these years, the exposed castle of Athleague was lost to the Irish, and we also have a statement that the king's Connacht lands were worth nothing until 1299 because of war. There is no sign of Aedh O'Conor paying his rent, and his son, presumably held as a hostage, escaped from custody. At least there do not appear to have been any of the serious disputes for the Connacht kingship at this period.

In the first half of 1304 Wogan appears to have gone to Connacht with a company of horse and foot "to repress the malice of rebels...threatening war". The aim of the expedition seems to have been the re-fortification of Roscommon, always the most critical of the castles, but, since wages for the expedition itself amounted only to £76-12s., it cannot have been especially large. We know nothing of the situation

59 AC, 1300.
60 C.D.I. 1293-1301, p.344; 1302-07, no.72. Part of the money was later respited (39th Rep.D.K., p.31).
61 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/144, m.28 passim.
62 C.D.I. 1293-1301, no.806.
63 Ibid. This also suggests that Randown & Roscommon were temporarily abandoned.
which provoked this expedition, nor do we hear of any of the events during it from the annals. However, evidence from the next year reveals a serious situation around Athlone and Randown. The power of the O'Farrells bestrode the Shannon, and they were apparently threatening the king's demesnes from their boats on the river. A galley was to be constructed and kept at Randown for the protection of that castle and of Athlone "where the entrance is very narrow into the king's land of Connacht". At the same time the repair of Athlone was put in hand.

Later in 1305 a most important inquisition was taken. It reveals very clearly how contemporaries regarded the problem of the king's Connacht lands, and suggests strongly that the government's subsequent reliance on the de Burghs was not merely dictated by circumstances, but was part of a consciously thought-out policy. The earl of Ulster petitioned that he might have O'Conor's land of Sil-Murray at rent, because O'Conor had "perpetrated many homicides and robberies in the earl's land of Connacht, and continues to do so in hurt of the king's peace". An inquisition ad quod damnum was taken by jurors of Sil-Murray, Connacht, Tipperary, Louth and Meath, with those of Roscommon and Limerick failing to come. They decided that the lands were now worth 100 marks, but could be worth the 250 marks that Felim O'Conor was originally obliged to pay for them. The lands, however, couldn't

66 C.J.R. 1305-07, pp.64-5.
67 Ibid., pp.133-5. There is a mutilated version in C.D.I. 1302-07, no.437. These events are discussed by Orpen (Normans, IV. 120-2) and Otway-Ruthven (Medieval Ireland, pp.216-7).
be recovered "without a great force of the king, and inestimable expense exceeding the value of the land". They also agreed that the grant would be to the king's advantage "especially as the earl has his lands in Connacht and Ulster, and a great force of English and Irish adjoining that land, by which he would be better able to chastise the Irish of that land, than another". The original writ came from England, and the inquisition was returned to the king. Although the jurors came from far afield, the inquisition was taken at Castledermot, in the heart of the territory closely controlled by the government, and before Wogan himself. There is no reason to suppose that the jurors were uttering anything but the truth as they saw it. It is a clear statement that the local magnate was more capable of exacting submission than the king was. Wogan must have had these sort of considerations fully in mind.68

At this period Aedh O'Connor was paying a proportion of his rent, with a total of £60 coming in from him between Easter 1305 and Trinity 1306.69 However, between Michaelmas 1306 and Easter 1309 nothing further was received from him.70 Significantly, at the time he ceased to pay rent, the annals begin to record the recrudescence of dynastic disputes among the O'Conors.

68 In 1303 Edmund Butler complained that he could not let his Connacht lands because their rents were too high. An inquisition returned that "if war arose in those parts.....the greatest portion of Edmund's lands in Ireland would scarcely suffice for the defence of the lands aforesaid." (C.D.I. 1302-07, no.198).

69 P.R.O., Receipt rolls, E.101/234/2, 9.

70 Ibid., E.101/234/16; 235/5, 12.
The details are complex, but the main division was
the old one, between king Aedh son of Eoghan, of the
line of Cathal Crovderg, and Aedh "of Breffny", son
of Cathal Rua, of the line of Murchertach Muimhneach. 71
The government was faced by a crisis in Connacht in
1307, when O'Kelly of Hy-Many killed "all the Galls
of Roscommon", but the annals reveal no trace of O'Conor involvement in these events. 72 Wogan does not
seem to have intervened personally, but Richard of
Exeter, the constable of Roscommon, received money
and supplies in April and May, 73 while it seems that
Edmund Butler eventually came to his aid, forcing the
Irish to the peace. 74 In the Michaelmas term of this
year the royal service was proclaimed at Loughsewdy,
presumably because of the situation in Connacht. 75
There is, however, no trace of a royal expedition, and
it may be that the service was intended to pay Butler's
expenses.

During the next two years there is evidence of
further concern with Connacht on the part of the
English government. On 7 April 1308 the king ordered

71 AC, 1306. See Orpen, Normans, IV, 122-3.
72 Chart. St. Mary's, II, 335; AC, 1306.
73 C.J.R. 1305-07, p. 355; C.D.I. 1302-07, no. 648,
leading to P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/234/17.
74 AC, 1307. The precise meaning of the entry is
hard to fathom: "...afterwards they made peace
because the town had been burned by Edmund Butler".
Cf. AC, p. 212, n, 2 for the editor's interpretation.
75 P.R.O., Roll of receipt of royal service, E.101/
235/6 provides the dating "proclaimed in Michael-
mas term" (1 Edward II).
that Randown be handed over to a certain Richard de Balibyn, who was to provide the requisite number of horse and foot for its defence. 76 Then, on 16 August 1309, the earl of Ulster was appointed constable of the three castles of Randown, Athlone and Roscommon for life. With the castles went their attached demesnes, for which he was to make an annual account at the Dublin exchequer. At the same time the earl was pardoned his arrears of rent for Connacht, and granted his own lands there to hold with accustomed services, but free of rent. 77 Although Sil-Murray was not involved in these arrangements, it seems plain that decisions were being taken which accorded well with the opinion of the jurors in the inquisition of 1305; the earl was far more likely to be able to uphold the king's rights than the king.

In 1309 Connacht descended into anarchy. Aedh son of Eoghan had indeed resumed paying his rent at Easter, when twenty marks were received from him, 78 but he was killed by the rival faction, headed by Aedh of Breffny. Succeeding events are extremely complex, but we must examine them closely for they are of great importance, not least because they mark the appearance in Connacht politics of William "Liath" de Burgh, the earl's first cousin, and founder of the "MacWilliam" Burkes. We may first examine the story told by the annals, and then use the administrative records to add an extra dimension to it. In response to Aedh son of

76 C.P.R. 1307-13, p.63.
77 Ibid., pp.182,186; P.R.O.I., Mem.roll 3 Edw.II, m.43.
78 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/235/19.
Eoghan's death, MacDermot came with William de Burgh to support Aedh's son Felim, who was his own foster-son. The chieftains of Connacht were forced to accept Felim. MacDermot and William then went to Elphin with the "Sil-Murray", while Aedh of Breffny, for a reason that does not appear, went to meet the earl of Ulster in Meath. His supporters turned against him in his absence, but he returned and defeated O'Flannagain. Meanwhile his brother, Rory son of Cathal Rua, irrupted into the county of Roscommon, but was met by William, who defeated him. This was followed by several expeditions on William's part. In the next year (1310) Aedh of Breffny defeated MacDermot, but was himself confronted by William. However, behind William's back, Aedh arranged for Rory to attack Bunnina, which was now in William's hands. William responded with a piece of cunning of his own, and Aedh was murdered by "Seonac" MacQuillan, the constable of bonnacht whom he had employed, but who was in fact in William's pay. William then proceeded to occupy Sil-Murray, and quarter the bonnacht on it. This action split the alliance with MacDermot, who saw that Felim's rights were being ignored, and who proceeded to inaugurate Felim as king of Connacht at Carnfree, in the face of William's opposition. Un-


80 AC; AU; AFM, 1309-10.
fortunately the annals are comparatively silent on Connacht affairs from 1310 until the Bruce invasion.

It would be foolish to deny that we are dealing here with Connacht politics, operating to a large extent independently of Dublin. But the appointment of the Red Earl to the constableships for life in 1309 should make us aware that the English and Irish governments were taking a close interest in the area, and that events in Connacht did not take place in complete isolation. Other evidence strengthens this view. It seems clear that the recommendations of the 1305 jury were put into effect eventually. After the death of Aedh son of Eoghan, the land of Sil-Murray was granted to William de Burgh. At Hilary 1310 we find him 50 marks of rent for it. Around the same time he was relieved of another 50 marks which he owed for it on account of his expenses with an armed force protecting Roscommon against Aedh of Breffny. He was also given credit for the killing of Aedh, who contra voluntatem nostram et ministrorum nostrorum se secisse voluit Regem Hibernicorum Connacie. And so, although de Burgh was obviously acting on his own behalf, he was also acting on behalf of the king. All this supports the annalists' story of MacDermot's pique and the inauguration at Carnfree. Thus, in a situation not unlike that which had developed in 1293, the justiciar, instead of intervening directly as had been done on the earlier occasion, attempted to leave the

81 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/235/22. This evidence supports Orpen's acute suggestion that William de Burgh had government backing (Normans, IV. 122).

82 P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 3 Edw. II, m. 43d.
area to the local magnate, and to divest the government of direct responsibility for the O'Conors by granting Sil-Murray to him. 83

The government's policy in these years was a failure. By 1312 William de Burgh's rule in Connacht had proved no more financially satisfactory to the king than that of the O'Conors. There is no sign of any rent coming in from Sil-Murray at this period, and on 28 April in that year the Irish exchequer was on William's heels:

\[
\text{Mandatum fuit Willelmo de Burgo custodi terrarum Regis quas Oconoghur nuper tenuit de Rege in Connacia quod habeat hic a die Sancte Trinitatis in 15 dies totam pecuniam de exitibus predictarum terrarum Regis aretro a toto tempore quo dictus Willelmus habuit inde custodiam ex commissione Regis.} 85
\]

Nor was the earl of Ulster's custody of Athlone, Randalown and Roscommon proving any more successful. A commission to survey the castles was appointed out of the Irish exchequer in May 1312, 86 but despite this, by the following May the castles had suffered badly, and the earl himself was petitioning the king about the ruinous state of their walls and houses. 87 A project for their repair was set in train. 88 In addition

83 William de Burgh had served as deputy justiciar, 1 Oct. 1308- 15 May 1309 (Richardson & Sayles, Administration of Ireland, p.83).

84 P.R.O., Receipt rolls, E.101/235/25; 236/1, 4, 8 and 12 (to Trinity 1314).

85 Mem.roll 5 Edw.II, m.35- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/6, p.218.

86 Ibid., m.37- pp.221-2.

87 C.C.R. 1307-13, p.533.

the earl seems to have failed to render his account for the castles and their demesnes, and was being pursued for it by the exchequer.\(^89\) The handing over of the three castles to the earl for life, and the grant to his cousin of O'Conor's land of Sil-Murray do not appear to have attained their likely objectives: the strong defence of the area, and the improvement of the king's finances. The failure of this policy is emphasised by the fact that by the summer of 1314 at the latest Sil-Murray had been returned to the O'Conors. In the Trinity term of that year Felim O'Conor was being ordered to hand over the rent he owed to the sheriff of Roscommon,\(^90\) and this order seems to have resulted in £10-13s-4d being received by the exchequer in the following Michaelmas term.\(^91\)

At this point, except for the untypical period of the Bruce invasion, Connacht virtually disappears from our narrative. It may be suggested that the history of the 1295 to 1315 period shows that this is not surprising; nor is it merely the result of the invasion. In not

\(^89\) The state of the castles may not have been the earl's fault entirely. Although he received his fee for Roscommon in 1309-10 and fees for all 3 castles in 1310-11 (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/235/24; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31), the exchequer does not seem to have made payments between 1311 and 1313 (P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/236/3, 6) - although it is of course possible that payments were made from local sources. Perhaps because of the king's interest, payments began again after 1313 (P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/236/7; 237/2).

\(^90\) Mem. roll 7-8 Edw.II, m.76 - P.R.O.I., R.C.8/9, p. 623.

\(^91\) P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/237/1.
mounting expeditions to insist on the king's rights in the area the justiciars of the 1318 to 1361 period were following in Wogan's footsteps. They were also, by implication at least, concurring the opinion of the 1305 jury: the cost of military operations far outweighed the value of the Connacht lands.

Evidence concerning the government's relations with Connacht after 1318 is too fragmentary to allow a coherent story to be told, but certain things stand out very clearly. First of all, to the best of our knowledge, no royal expedition of war went to Connacht between 1318 and 1361; the regular campaigns of the later thirteenth century, aimed at restoring the king's castles and exacting submission from the O'Conors, were at an end. The most that occurred was the occasional journey by a representative of the administration to treat for the peace: for example, in 1330 a certain brother Richard McCormegan was sent by the justiciar and council "to treat with O'Conoghur, prince of the Irish of Connacht, and bring him to the king's fealty and peace". The tour of the justiciar de Bermingham in 1347, which appears to have been the last serious attempt to assert the government's interests in Connacht, was, as far as we know, exceptional.

Secondly, the receipt rolls for the period reveal not a penny of rent being paid by the O'Conors for Sil-

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93 See Ibid., pp. 266, 270.
Murray. In 1318 O'Conor had been granted these lands again, together with the Faes and Tirmany. These latter lands formed a considerable part of the county of Roscommon, and so the grant of them marked a serious diminution of the royal authority in that area. That this was so seems to be confirmed by the absence of any revenue from Roscommon on the receipt rolls after the Bruce invasion. The last we hear of the O'Conors and the King's Cantreds is the grant "of the three cantreds which Fechelymus Oconeghor once held of the king in county Roscommon" to king Turlough in 1325. There was a "Fynnok O'Conor" in the king's custody in the following year, and it may be that he was the hostage whom Turlough was supposed to deliver in return for having his lands, but we cannot be certain of this. On the basis of the financial evidence, Orpen's conclusion that Turlough's reign "saw the virtual breaking of the link which connected Connaught with the English Crown" appears to be fully justified.

94 R.C.H. p.23 no.103. See Orpen, Normans, IV. 125; Curtis, Medieval Ireland, pp.193-4; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.236. It is not entirely clear whether "O'Conor" was Turlough, brother of Felim, or his rival, Cathal. In the present context it is immaterial which it was.

95 These statements are based on a rapid examination of all surviving receipt rolls. A detailed study of the revenue from this area should be fruitful, but it was not possible within the limitations of the present study.


97 He could of course have been an O'Conor of Offaly.

98 Normans, IV. 126.
Thirdly, although grants of the Connacht castles were regularly made by the king out of the English chancery, and the Irish exchequer continued to pay the constables' fees, it does not necessarily follow that the castles were well kept, or even on occasion kept at all. In the thirteenth century they had needed regular repairs and rebuilding, and it is unlikely that they were in good condition in the fourteenth century when comparable effort and expenditure were lacking. In 1342, for example, it was claimed that Randown and Roscommon were in Irish hands, and the claim certainly seems to have been true as far as Roscommon was concerned. Then in 1349 the slightly odd accusation was made against the Irish treasurer that fees had been being paid for Athlone, where there was no longer a castle, and where there had not been one for eleven years. In these circumstances it would be most inadvisable to take the payments on the Issue rolls and Enrolled accounts at face-value.

We have continued our consideration of Connacht beyond 1315 because the subsequent period brings the developments of Wogan's years into focus. The government's grip on Connacht had slackened to the point of non-existence and it is Wogan's justiciariarship which marks the crucial turningpoint. He virtually ignored


101 This can be seen from any Issue roll or Enrolled account.

102 For this see above, pp.65-6, and the references there given.

103 P.R.O., E.101/242/5, "articulus v".
Connacht, and there proved to be no true identity of interests between the king and the de Burghs. In the circumstances of the years after 1318 it was impossible for Wogan's successors to resume the policies which the thirteenth century justiciars had adopted.

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Wogan's policy of, where possible, leaving the control of the Irish to the magnates can be seen most clearly in Kildare and Connacht. But, apart from in Leinster, there was also a distinct lack of military action in other parts of Ireland, most notably in the south. In 1298 Bunratty, still in the king's hand because of the death of Thomas de Clare, was besieged by the Irish, and the justiciar found it necessary to go to Munster to raise the siege, but this was the only major expedition of war in that area. Trouble had been brewing in the preceding year. We hear that O'Brien had burnt and plundered the greater part of Limerick, and that it had been necessary to raise a force under John Harold to guard the county. According to a serjeant, conditions had been so bad that he had been unable to find provisions for the troops except in churches, and it was accepted that he had taken goods from them "for the common good of the county, for its defence, and not unlawfully". Bunratty castle was now besieged from 27 January to 3 March, and expeditions to relieve it came both by land and by the Shannon from Limerick. Wogan himself was at war between 11 and

104 Just. roll 11 Edw. II (R.C. no. 116), m. 11- P.R.O. I., R. Cal., pp. 36-7.
27 February, but we know nothing of the troops he employed. Later evidence suggests that the government had not taken adequate steps to safeguard the de Clare lands while they were in its custody. In 1320 Thomas de Clare, the son and successor of Richard de Clare, complained that:

> when Sir Gilbert de Clare his uncle was in the wardship of our late lord the king, by default of the king's ministers, who had the custody of his lands in Ireland, his Irish enemies destroyed his lands and his manors, and threw down his castles, so that when Sir Richard de Clare, brother and heir of Sir Gilbert, received his lands from the king, he found his lands, manors and castles in Ireland overthrown and destroyed, to his damage of 20,000 marks and more.

Richard had been forced to invoke the aid of God and of his friends to fight his enemies and recover his castles. There may well have been justice in this charge: the expedition of 1298 was not, as far as we know, followed or preceded by any other strong measures to ensure the security of this area. Nor do later events suggest that the government could exert any powerful influence there.

Southern politics after the death of Turlough O'Brien in 1306 have been discussed in detail by several

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106 38th, Rep., D.K., p. 45. See also C.D.I. 1293-1301, nos. 474, 508, 521, p. 269; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/144, m. 28.

107 Rot., Parl., I. 385.

108 Though there does seem to have been a peace-keeping journey to Waterford in 1299-1300 (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/150, m. 40).
scholars, and the broad picture is a familiar one. There was a dispute between two branches of the O'Brien family, with the de Burghs supporting first Donough and then Murtough, and Richard de Clare supporting the "Clan Brian" in the persons of Dermot, and then a second Donough. Despite the serious disorders arising from these alliances, the only sign of direct military involvement on the part of the justiciar is a peacekeeping mission "to settle discords between different persons in Munster" in 1310. Wogan's role appears to have been that of a mediator, and usually a remote one.

In 1308 the justiciar arranged an agreement between Donough O'Brien and the citizens of Limerick. Each party in effect forgave the other, agreed to remain at peace, to make restitution, and not to attempt to distress the other for it until the fifteen day reparation period was up. When by 1311 the disputes had begun to involve the magnates, the government tried to intervene, but only indirectly. Edmund Butler, John fitz Thomas, Maurice de Rocheford and Robert Bagot were appointed to "inhibit" de Clare and Donough from continuing their war. Despite this, two battles were fought at Bunratty in 1311. In the first one de Clare defeated William de Burgh, but in the second this result was reversed. The administration's ineffectiveness
is clear, and it is further emphasized by two other pieces of evidence. The government was forced to accept the financial consequences of this war, of which it plainly disapproved. Wogan himself testified that de Clare:

impeditus fuit per guerram motam inter ipsum et Hibernicos de Tothemon ita quod venire non potuit ad scaccarium ad reddendum compotum prout summonitus fuit.

He was pardoned the £35 in which he had been amerced. 113 Significantly too, the eventual partition of Thomond was arranged through the earl of Ulster, and not through the Dublin government. 114

It is not at all surprising that the administration was not involved in Ulster during Wogan's term of office; the northern province was the preserve of the Red Earl, then at the zenith of his power. But between 1295 and 1315 there is no sign of any military intervention in Louth or on the northern marches of Meath, apart from Wogan's abortive expedition to put down the rebellion of the de Verdons in 1312. 115 It would be dangerous to draw any definite conclusions from this: these were not areas which had demanded much serious attention between 1272 and 1295. On the other hand, one or two pieces of evidence suggest that Wogan was typically concerned to avoid military involvement here too.

At some time before Hilary 1299 Theobald de

113 Mem. roll 6-7 Edw. II, m. ld- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/7, p. 10.
114 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 222.
115 See ibid.*, pp. 222-3.
Verdon came to the justiciar to seek help in defending Meath in the face of a "great war" which was being raised by O'Reilly. Wogan simply told him to return to his own district, raise money from the community, and see to the matter himself. In 1306 and 1310 the justiciar dealt with a crisis in these northern counties by commissioning Richard of Exeter to treat for the peace. In 1306 Richard succeeded in arranging terms between McMahon and the English of Louth, and in 1310 he managed to settle what seems to have been a more serious dispute involving both McMahon and O'Reilly. Perhaps the situation in these areas did not call for large-scale measures, but Wogan's attitude accords well with that which we have seen him take up elsewhere.

Wogan shared power with the magnates. In their own lordships he left them to do their own work against the Irish, while in Connacht and Kildare he attempted to use them to do the king's. The justiciar's motives are not entirely clear. Was he merely, with an eye to the king's needs, attempting to keep the great lords sweet by giving them a free hand? Or was he trying to conserve the government's resources, and make them available for the king's use, by restricting military

116 Common pleas, Hil. 27 Edw.I, m.51d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 7/5, p.449.
commitment within the lordship? It is impossible to say which consideration weighed more heavily with Wogan. If the first was his main concern, he was tolerably successful. Not till late in his term of office did revolts and feuds such as had bedevilled Ireland in the early 1290s again became serious. But if his main aim was the second one, he most certainly did not achieve it. In Kildare fitz Thomas and de Bermingham fought the Irish, but they required heavier and heavier subvention to enable them to do so. In Connacht the justiciar may have limited the government's outgoings, but he did so at the expense of sacrificing whatever interests the king had there. Already the shrinkage of the lordship was ominous.
Chapter IV

The growth of the Leinster problem, 1295-1315

At the same time as the developments we have been describing were taking place, the Leinster mountains became a constant centre of disorder and the government's military priority. This they were to remain for the rest of our period. It must be admitted that for the years between 1295 and 1315 the chronicles are fuller, and we have abundant justiciary roll evidence, but nevertheless the fact that the government had to mount expeditions in 1302, 1306, 1308 (twice), 1309 (twice), 1311 and 1312-13 confirms that this picture of increasing disturbance is a true one. Between 1315 and 1361 the Irish of Leinster were to press the government almost without remission, and all aspects of the administration's activities must have been affected by the need for vigilance and for the regular diversion of energies and resources to that area. Warfare in the Leinster mountains was one of the most important facts of life in fourteenth century Ireland.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a straightforward account of events in Leinster during this critical period. The existence of the Irish pressure is taken for granted, and no attempt is made to explain why the Irish threat became more serious at this particular time. One could put forward possible economic, or even demographic, explanations, but in the present state of our knowledge it would be easier to make assertions of this kind than to substantiate...
them. An attempt to trace and explain the pushing back of the frontiers of the English settlement is not the least of the tasks that must soon be attempted if the history of these years is to be fully understood.

Only one campaign took place in Leinster before the turn of the fourteenth century. In 1297 the Irish of Slievemargy burnt Leighlin and other towns. It seems reasonable to associate this outbreak with the "trespass" at Lent 1297, for which the O'Mores of Slievemargy and their allies later made fine. These occurrences were not, of course, in the area which contemporaries knew as the "Leinster mountains" (that name seems to have been reserved for what are now the Wicklow mountains and the ranges to the south of them). However, they are significant because they draw our attention to an influential feature of Leinster geography. Leighlin, together with Athy, Carlow and Gowran, lies in the Barrow valley, and at this period the Barrow valley was the crucial overland route between Leinster and Munster: for instance Sandford's itinerary of 1288-90 shows that he used this route on his various peace-making journeys south. Anything that threatened the peace of the Barrow valley must perturb the government. For the moment it does not seem that the defence of the Barrow route was normally a critical matter, but it was to become so before the end

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1 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 327.
3 I am indebted to Dr Adrian Empey for first pointing out to me the importance of what follows.
of our period. Wogan's reaction to the events of 1297 is a pointer to the future.

The justiciar mounted an expedition after Michaelmas. The operations cost £157-6s-4½d, but, although for the first time we have the clerk of wages' account on the Pipe roll, it gives us no details of the troops Wogan employed. We know that the royal service was called to Castlecomer, at the heart of the mountainous region inhabited by the O'Mores, and we must assume that the fact that they were forced to make fine indicates that the expedition achieved its object. In some ways our evidence is typical—it allows us to say nothing more definite about the course or the result of the campaign.

The 1295 settlement in the Leinster mountains seems to have lasted until 1301. In the autumn of that year evidence of disorder begins to appear. We hear of

5 38th. Rep. D. K., p. 45. This of course may not have been true of the original. For other steps in the financial process see C. D. I. 1293-1301, no. 454 & P. R. O., Pipe roll, E. 372/144, m. 28.


7 We hear that the O'Mores also transgressed in the "autumn" of the regnal year 26 Edw. I. (See 39th. Rep. D. K., p. 31). Since the exchequer year 26 Edw. I ran from 30 September 1297 to 29 September 1298, it is not clear whether this should be taken as referring to autumn 1297 or autumn 1298 (though 1298 is possibly more likely, since the word "autumn" seems to have been applied to what we should regard as late summer). If 1297 is in question, then this and not the Lent trespass must have provoked Wogan's expedition; if 1298, it proves that the success of the expedition was only temporary.

8 For the settlement see above, pp. 94-5.
disturbances caused per Folanos, a name which probably signifies a branch of the O'Toole's. Then in the winter there was a serious attack, which took the form of burning Wicklow and Rathdown. Rathdown lies between Newcastle McKynegan and Bray, and so the outbreak involved a considerable part of the present-day Wicklow coastline. Nor was it limited to this area. We find a custody established at Rathvilly, near Baltinglass, to the west of the mountains, and the seneschal of Wexford was ordered by the deputy justiciar to arrange for guards to be placed in the marches of that county. That such a widespread defensive operation was necessary is explained by the fact that both the O'Byrnes and the MacMurroughs had risen to war. It is possible that the immediate cause of the trouble was the departure of the justiciar and many of the magnates for the Scottish war in the summer of 1301. We cannot be sure of this, but it may be significant that the Irish annals reveal cognisance of the fact that

9 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 330. Grace (s.a.1301) calls them simply "Leinstermen".
10 Folan O'Toole held lands in Imaal (Red Book of Ormond, p.20) and was involved in disturbances in 1308 (C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.14-16).
11 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 330.
13 C.J.R. 1305-07, p.87; Richardson & Sayles, Administration of Ireland, p.237. He had trouble in levying the necessary money on the community. Around this period the seneschal found it impossible to make account to his Lady because of war and the Irish (P.R.O., S.C.1/48/51).
14 The custody at Rathvilly was against them. Cf. Mem. roll 32-3 Edw.I, m.21- P.R.O.I., Molyneux Coll. (M.2551), ff.9d-10.
they had crossed the sea.\textsuperscript{15}

At the time of the outbreak of disorder Wogan's deputy was William of Ross, the prior of Kilmainham. William mounted an expedition, which officially lasted from 18 January to 14 March 1302.\textsuperscript{16} It seems clear that the base of operations was, as so often, Newcastle. McKynegan: the royal service was called to Newcastle;\textsuperscript{17} a victualler there seems to have been employed to provision the army;\textsuperscript{18} and it was there that William postponed all pleas to the Easter term, because his rolls and writs were not with him in the mountains.\textsuperscript{19} Whether because so many of the important men were out of Ireland, the prior seems to have had to go to considerable lengths in order to raise troops. We find him being paid "for going to the Meath parts and returning to seek Philip Orayly and other Irish felons in those parts, and likewise going to Waterford for like purposes".\textsuperscript{20} The fact that the money for his journeys came from the clerk of wages suggests that his purpose was to enlist these felons, and, indeed, we later find Philip and his men "going towards Newcastle McKynegan for custody of the town there".\textsuperscript{21} The

\textsuperscript{17} Otway-Ruthven in \textit{R.S.A.I.Journ.}, XCVIII. 43.
\textsuperscript{18} Mem.roll 32-3 Edw.I, m.21- P.R.O.I., Molyneux Coll. (M.2551), ff.9d-10.
\textsuperscript{19} C.J.R. 1295-1303, pp.382-3.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.68. He was similarly employed in 1295 (C.J.R. 1295-1303, p.4).
conclusion that the government was hard-pressed is inescapable, and from now until our justiciary roll evidence comes to an end we find the using of one set of felons against another growing in frequency.

We are again without details of the troops the government employed. There is some financial evidence, but it is difficult to interpret. The clerk of wages received £335-19s, which, spread over two months, suggests only a moderate-sized army even by Irish standards. However, Edmund Butler received the very large sum of £573-6s-8d for certain services concerning the peace of Leinster. It is impossible to tell if this sum was paid in connexion with the prior's expedition, but, if it was, it suggests that Edmund must have brought a very large independent force in support of the royal army. It is a pity that the precise purpose of this payment remains obscure.

On this occasion we have more information than we usually have about the result of the expedition, though this is not to say that we have very much. The Irish, the Dublin annalist tells us, did not go unpunished; a large part of their sustenance was burnt; they lost their cattle in a prey; and they would have been utterly destroyed in Lent, had it not been for the treachery of some unnamed English. It seems, there-

23 C.D.I. 1302-07, p. 5.
24 On later occasions the earl of Ormond (and the earl of Desmond) received payments for coming to Leinster to help the justiciar (below, pp. 237, 238, 330). Perhaps this was a similar incident.
fore, that there was a battle, and also that the royal army managed to set fire to the enemy's stores of food—presumably a telling blow in the latter half of the winter. Who the treacherous English were we do not hear, nor do we have any evidence about the extraction of fines or hostages on this occasion.

Little information has survived concerning Leinster between 1302 and 1305, and it seems almost certain that no expedition of any importance took place in these years.26 The lack of incidental evidence about conditions there is, however, partly due to gaps in the Anglo-Irish chronicles and the absence of Justiciary rolls between October 1303 and January 1305. The statements of a jury of 1305 bring home to us the perilous situation on the fringes of the mountains, describing Newcastle McKynegan, the most vital castle on the Wicklow coast, as "a castle, very weak, and in a strong march",27 and further evidence from this year and the next emphasizes the uncertainties of life in the whole area. Apparently in the autumn of 1305, some Mac Murroughs (Henry, Donald Og, Morght and Moryerdagh More) were murdered when coming under safe-conduct to the justiciar at Ferns.28 It is not clear whether the Mac Murroughs were concerned in the rising which soon followed this event, but they were certainly giving trouble early in 1307.29 In 1305 too, the seneschal of

26 The surviving financial evidence makes this clear, showing no trace of payments.
27 C.J.R. 1305-07, p.28. Interestingly, the grant of Newcastle to John fitz Thomas was being mooted.
28 Ibid., pp.466-7.
29 See below, pp.169.
Wexford was killed by the Irish, and it may be that the two events were connected. At some time before April 1306 Edmund Butler was holding a force at the king's expense to guard his own manor of Arklow, and the grant to him of £52 of royal service suggests that the custody was not a small one. Around the same time we find pardons of felonies being granted in consideration of future service "in fighting the Irish felons of Leinster". It was also necessary to pardon some of the Leinster tenants for receiving the O'Tooles because they "lived in a strong march", or because the receiving had only been done "for fear of death". Particularly interesting is the case of the Lawless family. They were at times in league with the Irish, but were pardoned at the instance of certain Dublin tenants-in-chief because of their value in fighting the O'Tooles. One member of the family was said to be of little use in war, but he was pardoned too because he lived so near the Irish that he could not resist them without danger to his life. The Irish government tended to act with a degree of charity and realism.

It was into this situation that Wogan led an army in the autumn of 1306. It is possible that a minor campaign had taken place in the previous year: on 1 May 1306 the followers of Walter de St.Aubyn were pardoned "for the good service which they did...with the Justiciar in fighting the Irish felons of the mountains

30 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 291,332.
32 Ibid., pp.500,504.
33 Ibid., pp.503-4.
of Leinster last autumn”. 34 But, if this is so, the expedition does not seem to have required exchequer payments. The immediate cause of the 1306 expedition appears to have been the burning of Ballymore by the Irish. 35 It is almost certain, therefore, that the service "of Ballymore", mentioned in the same year, was proclaimed for this campaign. 36 The 1306 campaign in Leinster was the most expensive one since the time of Ufford. The clerk of wages received £1,799-1s-4d from the exchequer, and payments from other sources brought the total to £2,050-18s-7d. He spent slightly more than this, accounting for £2,114-4s-10½d. 37 For the first time we have a list of the leaders of contingents in the army, together with the amounts paid to some of them: 38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Wogan, justiciar</td>
<td>£ 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Mandeville, banneret,</td>
<td>16s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with esquires &amp; hobelars</td>
<td>11½d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Butler, kt.</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice de Rocheford, kt.</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geo. &amp; Wm. de Rupe, esqs.</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George de Rupe, esq.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigel le Brun, esq.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Valle &amp; Walter de St. Aubyn, esqs.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 C.J.R. 1305-07, p.501. This could be a later enrolment, referring autumn 1396, but there is no way of telling.

35 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 333. Dowling (1306) calls the Irish "Moardhos", presumably meaning O'Mores, but there is no corroboration of this.

36 Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII. 43.


## Leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Lacy, esq.</td>
<td>£149 11s 0 d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Auney, esq.</td>
<td>51 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John fitz Ryryght, kt.</td>
<td>21 15 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Wogan, esq.</td>
<td>81 16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard le Poer, esq.</td>
<td>36 1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold le Poer</td>
<td>36 18 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey le Bret, kt.</td>
<td>28 0 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip de Barry &amp; David de Cogan</td>
<td>106 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Cristôfre</td>
<td>15 15 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter L'Enfant</td>
<td>25 12 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Boneville</td>
<td>48 15 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry le Fleming, William Pepe-wyky &amp; Walter le Bret</td>
<td>14 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Butler</td>
<td>7 5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£1,737 16s 1½d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the text of this, as of so many of the accounts, is unsatisfactory, it is still of great interest. It shows that the annalist was right in describing the army as a "great army from divers parts of Ireland". As well as the expected Leinster tenants, there were men from Ulster, Louth, Meath, Tipperary, Cork and Waterford, a fact that suggests that this was no small emergency. Unfortunately we have no details of the troops they brought, though the original account may well have contained details of them. All we know is that among the retinue of a certain Roger, son of John le Poer (not mentioned in the list) came "Mahoun Mc Carran and his kerne". The heavy expenditure suggests

39 As usual with Betham's work, this account is sadly defective.

40 *C.J.R. 1305-07*, p.501. See also p.293.
a large army by Irish standards, but it must be remembered that the clerk's account runs from 23 May right round to 23 October, and that the expenditure was not concentrated.

Several months must have been spent in preparations and in collecting the army, for the annalist assigns the actual campaign to the "autumn" of 1306. Wogan meanwhile seems to have imposed two important obligations on the local tenants. First of all, we hear that an "ordinance" had been made by the justiciar and all the Leinster tenants "that any of the men-at-arms who should lose his horse in fighting the felons of the mountains of Leinster in a feat of arms" should be compensated by the community of the county or liberty adjoining the marches in which the horse was lost. We only hear of this regulation because of a dispute over the levying of such a sum on the liberty of St. Sepulchre. A second obligation is revealed when we find a tenant maintaining a horse and a hobelar from August to 18 October "the justiciar then fighting the Irish felons of the mountains of Leinster, which expenses (Walter) laid out by precept of the justiciar". The order concerned something more than the normal defence obligation, for it was pleaded "that such assessment was made by the justiciar on account of common war which is not ruled by law......(and) is not any charge of right belonging to the tenements". Here again only a dispute has brought this order to our notice, and it may be assumed that other tenants were also obliged

41 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 333.
43 Ibid., p.356.
to maintain guards for the duration of the campaign.

Thus we know a considerable amount about the occasion of this expedition, and about the leaders and organization involved in it. On the other hand we know nothing of its result, and very little about what took place during it. What scraps of evidence there are suggest that it was aimed at west Wicklow, and not at the eastern coastal strip as had been the case in 1302. We have already seen that the royal service was called to Ballymore. The annals tell us that Thomas de Mandeville lost his horse at Glenealy. The horse for which the liberty of St. Sepulchre was asked to provide compensation was lost at Ballymore. We can only say that the effects of the lengthy and expensive campaign were at best very temporary; 1307 reveals Leinster still in a state of severe disturbance, and 1308 was to see two fresh expeditions launched.

In March 1307 a certain "Murchod Ballagh" Mac Murrough was killed by David de Caunteton. The records tell us that a payment was to be levied on Dublin and the four Leinster counties for the beheading, and delivered to "Edmund le Botiller or David de Caunteton his assignee". It seems likely that the government was ridding itself of an enemy in a not unprecedented way. Further evidence from later in the year emphasizes the continuing unrest, and the complexity of relations between English and Irish in Leinster, just as in other

44 Above, p.166.
45 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 333.
46 Above, p.168. 47 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 335.
48 C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.22-3.
areas. The background is a dispute over an advowson, between Arnold le Poer on the one hand, and two others, supported by Thomas Butler, on the other. Arnold claimed that he had been ejected from the church in question by Folan O'Toole, William O'Nolan, and their followings, supported by some betaghls. The jury found that Arnold had previously ejected the other two claimants, who in their turn had approached Thomas and requested him to maintain them in their rights. Thomas removed Arnold, but then let Folan with his kern, and other felons, enter the church and carry away tithes. And so, as in Connacht and Offaly, relations with the Irish could be both common and necessary. An important man like Thomas Butler was prepared to use the O'Tooles, while we have already seen that lesser men could not help but enter into illegal relations with the Irish.

Meanwhile, a most important parliament was held at Dublin. In it, on 9 April 1307, Wogan set about making political and military arrangements in Leinster. Castle Kevin was to have 30 nobelars and 80 foot beyond its normal garrison in order to resist the O'Tooles. The constable of Newcastle McKynegan, John of Stratton, was granted 40 marks "for secret parleys with some, for head-money of the worst felons". The meaning of this is far from clear, but it may be that he was to enlist the lesser felons against the greater. The mention of head-money may just possibly tie in with the reference in the annals to the beheading of an obscure "Lorcan

49 C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.14-16.
50 For this and what follows see ibid., pp.353-5. The constable was to have £20 from the king, until it could be decided who was liable. The custos of the archbishopric was to provide him with supplies.
O boni", which the constable of Newcastle had carried out on 17 March. Wogan also made two very shrewd political moves. Glenealy, which Archbishop Sandford had granted to O'Toole, was to be given to "Murhuthn" O'Byrne. It was openly recorded "be it known that this gift is made, that, by this, dissension may be moved between the said families". In addition, Hugh, the head of the Lawless family, was to have Kilfeith, which had been granted to another O'Toole. Wogan was attempting to enlist the O'Byrnes against the O'Tooles, and also to give the Lawlesses, the nearest major Anglo-Irish tenants to the mountains, a good reason for supporting the government's efforts against them.

Although there does not seem to have been a royal expedition in 1307, in this same parliament a force was provided under Nigel le Brun, later escheator of Ireland. He was given an assignment of £10-5s. on county Dublin for the wages of 33 hobelars and 106 foot which he commanded against the O'Tooles from 16 to 22 April. These were in addition to 13 men-at-arms, 20 hobelars and 40 foot, who were maintained at his own expense. Leinster was still very seriously disturbed,

51 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 334. This is dated 1306 by Gilbert, but it comes at the end of the entries for that year, and 1306 O.S. would be 1307 N.S. We cannot be entirely certain about the dating, but the event fits the context of 1307 better than that of 1306, when, as we have seen, operations were concentrated to the west of the mountains.

52 C.J.R. 1305-07, p. 355; 39th Rep. D.K., p. 53. The first source says the troops were kept for 6 days, but gives the dates as 18 to 22 April. The second source gives the dates as above, but describes the year, meaninglessly, as "a.r. Ed.I".
and a corollary to the strengthening of Castle Kevin and to Nigel's force was the maintenance of 35 hobelars and 113 foot at Newcastle McKynegan from 16 to 23 October "to repress the malice of Irish felons... and to conserve the peace". 53

The next two years brought what can only be described as an acute crisis in Leinster. Four expeditions were necessary. At the same time the English government was evincing a close interest in Irish affairs, and one which shows signs of being based on an appreciation of the military situation there. In a council on 17 March 1308 it was decided that the statute of Winchester should be sent to Ireland. 54 June saw a series of important events. On 4th. of that month Wogan received a fresh commission of appointment, in exactly the same terms as that of 1295. 55 On the next day the statute seems to have been actually transmitted, and the accompanying writ shows consideration of the state of Ireland. The king had:

been informed by some that very many of our enemies and other evildoers and disturbers of the peace, frequently committing homicides, burnings, robberies and other very serious injuries by night and day in Ireland, wander from county to county, and run to and fro, by reason of the default and negligence of most men.... 56

The statute, enacted as long ago as 1285, must have been sent now as a conscious act of policy. This was

55 C.P.R. 1307-12, pp.75-6.
followed by some odd vacillations. Ten days after Wogan’s reappointment, the earl of Ulster was inserted between him and the king as lieutenant, but on the very next day he was superseded by Gaveston, and ordered to be intendant to him. Gaveston was obliged by the barons to leave England, and it cannot be doubted that his appointment to Ireland was a way of mitigating his exile, but the English government was taking a close interest in Ireland before this, and the fact that the appointment of the earl was mooted suggests something more than a reflex reaction in Ireland to changes in England. Like the new financial policy inaugurated in 1311-12, these moves were partly governed by English politics, but "they can also be shown to be derived from the exigencies of the Irish situation at that time". As we shall see, it is a gross injustice to day of Gaveston that he "certainly enlivened Dublin for a year with a gay court, but did nothing else that was memorable". He also made a determined effort to deal with the threatening situation in Leinster.

A major rising of the Leinster Irish occurred in the spring of 1308. On 12 May Castle Kevin was burned by William "Macbaltor" (O'Toole?) and "Guynismio" O'Toole, who also burnt Courcouly. By 24 May the

57 Foedera, II, i. 51; C.P.R. 1307-13, p.83.
60 "Baltor" O'Toole held lands in Imaal (Red Book of Ormond, p.20).
61 Chart. St. Mary’s, II. 336.
constable of Newcastle McKynegan needed £30 for extra troops "stationed there to resist the malice of the Irish felons of those parts invading both the castle and the town there and adjacent places". 62 Wogan reacted swiftly, though not apparently in great force. A clerk of wages was appointed to pay the wages of troops at Newcastle and elsewhere in Leinster. He expended a total of £64-8s-6d, paying £25-14s-8d to the constable of Newcastle (presumably part of the £30 which had been granted to him), £22-12s. to John son of William Butler, stationed at Kylnynge with 4 men-at-arms, 9 hobelars and 28 foot, and £14-17s-8d to Jordan Comyn for payment to the justiciar himself. 63 The result of Wogan's own operations seems to have been disaster. The annals record that he was defeated at Glenmalure on 8 June, and that many English were killed there. The Irish rebels then proceeded to burn Dunlavin, Tober and other towns on 26 June. 64 It is hardly likely that Wogan had entered Glenmalure solely with the troops that £14 would have provided, and we must assume that he was accompanied by local tenants serving at their own expense: possibly the annalist's reference to the killing of many English suggests this. When Wogan withdrew from office in the late summer, he must have done so under a cloud. However, the picture was not

62 C.J.R. 1308-14, p.77.
63 The warrant for issue is on ibid., p.67, the payment on P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/235/13, a writ of allocate on R.C.H. p.9 no.77, and the clerk's account in 39th.Rep.D.K., p.34. The figures do not quite balance, but the discrepancies are small.
64 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 336-7.
one of unrelieved gloom. The campaign had officially ended on 16 July.\textsuperscript{65} William Macbaltor must have been captured, for he was condemned before Wogan, and finally hanged and drawn on 21 August.\textsuperscript{66}

Wogan left William de Burgh as his deputy, and William almost immediately had to attempt to recoup the position in Leinster. The seriousness of the situation is emphasized by the fact that, during the Michaelmas term of 1308, the Dublin exchequer itself was felt to be threatened, and its rolls and coffers were hastily taken to safety because of the imminence of war.\textsuperscript{67} Also, although the clerk of wages was employed from 23 October, de Burgh was given an advance of £30 as part payment for 200 hobelars and 500 foot five days before the clerk entered on his duties.\textsuperscript{68}

More striking, perhaps, is the fact that the deputy justiciar seems to have felt it necessary to use his own influence in Connacht to raise an army composed almost entirely of tenants from there, many of them Irish. For the first time we have an account showing not only the names of leaders of contingents, but also the troops each one brought with him.\textsuperscript{69} Thomas Dolfin seems to have made a journey from Dublin to Athlone in connexion with the expedition, and Geoffrey de Vale undertook the actual collecting of the army.

\textsuperscript{65} 39th.Rep.D.K., p.34.
\textsuperscript{66} Chart.St.Mary's, II. 336-7.
\textsuperscript{67} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/235/13.
\textsuperscript{68} R.C.H. p.8 no.41.
\textsuperscript{69} Pipe roll 3 Edw.II- N.L.I., MS 760, pp.290-1 (39th.Rep.D.K., p.34). Again Betham's text is incomplete, this time omitting most of the financial details.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen of Exeter</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Howellin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Haket &amp; David Cosyn</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey de Vale</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rory O'Connor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayg O'Kelly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loghlin Roe</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Burgh</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odo son of Donat O'Kelly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many O'Kelly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John son of Simon O'Kelly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O'Madid 72</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Roe</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnus O'Kelly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomultagh O'Kelly</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Lecto &amp; John 0'Fallowyn</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Dolfyn</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard le Blake &amp; Roger de Clon (sic)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total: 669

By Irish standards this army was a medium-sized one. It seems very odd that a Leinster campaign should be fought almost exclusively with these Connacht retainers,

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70 Sic Betham. The word obviously denotes men-at-arms.
71 No troops given against his name by Betham.
72 "O'Madid" presumably stands for "O'Madidan" or O'Madden. For the relations between the de Burghs and these Irish see Knox, "The occupation of Connacht by the Anglo-Normans", R.S.A.I. Journ., XXXIII (1903), pp.393-4, 398.
73 The figure 689 (above, p.37) is arrived at by assuming the presence of the justiciar's twenty men-at-arms.
74 For the financial details see R.C.H. p.8 nos.47,52;
but as always we cannot be certain that the local tenants did not serve without pay. Infuriatingly, there seems to be no evidence of what the army did. The annals are completely silent on the subject of this campaign, and only the fact that a certain Richard le Neyr was to have £18 in part payment for 128 foot at Newcastle McKynegan with the justiciar enables us to speculate that the expedition was once more launched from there. We may assume that de Burgh, like Wogan, was attacking the O'Tooles from the eastern side of the mountains. It was not long before Gaveston was mounting yet another expedition in the same area, although this time against the O'Byrnes.

During Gaveston's period of office, de Burgh remained as justiciar's deputy. Generally, however, he seems to have devoted himself to Connacht, and we also hear of him conducting peace-keeping operations in Tipperary. Gaveston, apart from a possible journey to Thomond, appears to have concerned himself with Leinster. No doubt this was merely a matter of convenience (and, as we shall see, de Burgh was present on Gaveston's actual Leinster expedition of 1309) but it is an interesting informal precursor of the later policy

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75 R.C.H. p.8 no.43.
76 See Richardson & Sayles, Administration of Ireland, p.83 & notes for the details.
77 Above, pp.144-7.
78 Mem. roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.32- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/7, p.389.
79 B.M., MS Titus B. XI, i, f.287v.
by which deputies were appointed on a regional basis. 80

A major attack on the Leinster Irish seems to have been delayed until the spring of 1309. There is no sign in the annals that the expedition was provoked by anything other than the general disorder in the mountains which had existed for some time, and what we hear of Gaveston's operations suggests that they were aimed at setting to rights the damage which had been done in 1308, and which had not been fully amended by Wogan and de Burgh. The chronology of Gaveston's expedition presents no problem: purveyance was ordered on 21 April; 81 the royal service called to Castle Kevin on 22nd; 82 a writ of liberate for wages issued on 23rd; 83 and the major attack took place on 25th. 84 Gaveston's army was of a more conventional sort than de Burgh's had been, consisting in the main of tenants from Meath and Tipperary, and from Leinster itself:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William de Burgh, Lt. of the</td>
<td>£ 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>justiciar, his hobelars &amp;c.</td>
<td>0s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Butler, esqs. &amp;c.</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Boneville</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Caunteton</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Lacy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice de Caunteton</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin le Fleming &quot;Brot Jordan&quot; (sic)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81 Mem. roll 2 Edw. II, m.25- P.R.O.I., Molyneux Coll. (M.2551), f.126. For details of the purveyance for this campaign see above, pp.55-7.
82 R.C.H. p.9 nos.106-7. See above, pp.23-4. It is clear that personal service cannot have been contemplated.
83 Ibid., p.9 no.103.
84 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 294,338.
The clerk of wages altogether spent £834-13s-8½d, the hundred pounds and more spent in addition to the amount disbursed in wages going on the rebuilding and repair of Newcastle McKynegan and Castle Kevin. We know nothing of the numbers of troops employed, but, since the expedition was a short one, £700 must have paid for the engagement of a sizeable force—perhaps of about 1,500 men.

We know a little about the campaign itself. The employment of O'Toole suggests that Gaveston succeeded in turning the O'Tooles, the government's erstwhile enemies, against the O'Byrnes, whom Wogan had tried to stir up against the O'Toole's only two years before. The annals credit the lieutenant with cutting a pass between Castle Kevin and Glendalough, and confirm that both Castle Kevin and Newcastle McKynegan were repaired. Two things, however, suggest that the campaign cannot be

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accounted a complete success. Gaveston is said to have been impeded by a "certain magnate of Leinster". Who this was, we do not know, but it is possible that it was Maurice de Caunteton. Maurice, as we have seen, was in the lieutenant's army. The annals record that he killed Richard Talon on 17 June, some days before Gaveston left Ireland. This was the beginning of a serious rebellion. In addition, although Gaveston is said to have conquered the O'Byrnes, the O'Byrnes appear as Maurice's allies later in the year. Despite the lieutenant's achievements, it is plain that Leinster was not to be pacified by one expedition, no matter how successful it appeared in the short-term.

The rising of the Cauntetons and the O'Byrnes is important because it is the first clear example of a positive alliance of the English and Irish of Leinster against the government. As such it is a logical extension of what we have seen happening before: if the English had alliances with the Irish, and Irish among their retainers, once a major tenant rebelled Irish were bound to be among his supporters in rebellion. A similar situation arose when fitz Thomas attacked de Vescy, and, as well as the unavoidable treaties with the Irish of the mountains on the part of the weaker tenants, we have already seen Thomas Butler using O'Toole in a dispute with Arnold le Poer.

86 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 281, 291, 294, 338.
87 Ibid., pp. 294, 338.
88 Above, pp. 111-12.
89 Above, p. 170.
Wogan seems to have been involved in more than one expedition against Caunteton and his allies. As early as the Trinity term of 1309 we find Henry de Haleford as clerk of wages receiving 20 marks for the armed men and foot-soldiers whom the justiciar was leading against Maurice and the O'Byrnes "felons of the death of Richard Talon". Money was also forthcoming from the revenues of Kilkenny and Wexford. By September, a second expedition, with John Warre as clerk, was under way, and between then and 24 November he received writs of liberate to the value of £460, a figure which suggests operations of some magnitude. However, on 22 October, the king ordered Wogan to grant peace to Maurice for Talon's death and other trespasses until Easter, and to restore his lands. This was to be done despite the king's previous orders "not to show him any favours in the king's court, but to let the law take its due course". The king's order shows the difficulty of trying to control Irish policy from Westminster. It must have taken some weeks to reach Ireland, and by then the situation was beyond repair. At a council on 1 November it was recorded that Maurice and some of his accomplices had been killed per posse regium. Many of his allies were, however, still roving Leinster committing crimes, and it was decided that the justiciar should once more set out to crush them, and to make

92 R.C.H. p. 12 nos. 9, 21 and p. 14 no. 223. He received £440 of this sum (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/235/24). He was soon being distrained to account (P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 3 Edw. II, m. 15).
93 C.C.R. 1307-13, p. 181.
inquiry into these illegal alliances. For this last operation Wogan employed only twenty extra men-at-arms. 94

We can glean very little information concerning the justiciar’s campaigns against Maurice and his allies, but a number of pieces of evidence do survive. With the royal army had been members of the Roche and Barrett families from the south, and, not unexpectedly, Talons. The retinues of these English all seem to have included Irish. 95 More interesting is the fact that the O’Nolans seem to have served the justiciar. 96 The significance of this is hard to assess. From one viewpoint, the need to invoke one set of Irish felons to fight against another is hardly a healthy sign. On the other hand, the fact that the government could induce them to do so is extremely important. While it was a confession of weakness, it was also one reason why the administration was able to avoid being overwhelmed in Leinster. And, to anticipate, by the 1350s skilful playing off of the Leinster septs against one another was an essential. Already in the early fourteenth century it seems that the government could no longer hope to take on all the Leinster septs at once, as it had been able to do in the 1270s and in 1294-5.

The result of Wogan’s 1309 expeditions, therefore, appears to have been success, although that success was not, apparently, congenial to the king. It also exacted

95 C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.145-6,199-200,247.
96 Ibid., p.146.
its price. Maurice de Caunteton's lands were taken into the king's hand, but before the government could enter them, his Wexford land of Glascarric had fallen to MacMurrough, and another Wexford manor was valueless because it was march-land and sterile. In addition, immediately after Maurice became a felon, his goods "were depredated by the Macmurghs, Irish enemies of Maurice de Caunteton and the others...". 97 As we shall see, declining values and the spread of waste land were the inevitable accompaniments of disorder such as we have been describing.

The year 1310 was less momentous, although it did see an alliance between Arnold le Poer and the Leinster Irish against the royal seneschal of Kildare and Carlow. 98 In 1311, however, Wogan was forced yet again to organize a campaign. Its occasion was the invasion of Saggart and Rathcoole by the O'Byrnes and O'Tooles on 25 June. A delay ensued, and then the justiciar pursued the Irish into Glenmalure "and other woody places". 99 Defensive measures were set in train very quickly after the Irish attack: throughout the month of July Geoffrey le Bret kept ten mounted men at Rathfarnham "for defence of the parts of the marches against the destruction of the king's Irish felons there". 100 The threat had moved very close to Dublin itself. During August the financing of the campaign went ahead. On

97 C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.159-60. The rebels had been received at Glascarric (ibid., p.237). Maurice's son seems to have redeemed himself by service in Scotland (C.C.R. 1307-13, pp.413,416,422).
98 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.220.
99 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 339.
100 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31.
5th. Nicholas of Balscot, receiver of the royal service of Carrickfergus, was ordered to deliver £50 of it for the war of Leinster, and five days later Nicholas is revealed as clerk of wages for the expedition, a writ of liberate for £600 being issued on his behalf. No account has survived, but the fact that he received £521-3s-4d of these sums shows that the expedition cannot have been a small one. What scraps of evidence we have suggest that the army was composed of the usual sort of leaders.

Nothing has survived about the conduct of the campaign, other than the fact that it was aimed at Glenmalure. But we do know that Wogan, pursuing the rapidly established custom of employing the Irish, succeeded in persuading Murcnertach MacMurrough to serve with him. MacMurrough was clearly in high favour with the government. He had been taken into pay as long ago as the parliament which met at Kilkenny at the Purification in 1310, and seems to have stayed loyal between then and the time of this expedition. He had captured Dalvagh Og O'Byrne and Dalvagh Ker, delivering them up to Wexford castle, had resisted the O'Byrnes generally, and had guarded the marches of Wexford, as

102 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/3 (partly destroyed). The figure is clearer on P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31.
103 The treasurer (39th.Rep.D.K., p.46); Thomas Butler (Mem.roll 5 Edw.II, m.10d–P.R.O.I., R.C.8/6, pp.83-4); William de Rupe (ibid., m.7- pp.24-5,89-90; Chart.St.Mary's, II. 340); the sheriff of Tipperary (Mem.roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.3–P.R.O.I., R.C.8/7, p.14).
ordered in the Kilkenny parliament. Now he served with Wogan for the ten weeks from 10 June to 20 August, and was paid at the rate of sixty shillings a week. The seneschal of Wexford was to receive allowances totalling £76-13s-4d for the sums he had paid to MacMurrough for these services. Murchertach received further tokens of the government's regard in the form of goods of Nicholas Avenel, in the king's hand because of debt, and of the grant of the manor of Courtown at the will of the king "so long as the same Maurice does not unduly vex the king's men and his tenants there". As well as MacMurrough, Donald, son of Simon O'More served with the justiciar.

Whatever Wogan accomplished in Glenmalure, the fact that a custody was necessary at Newcastle McKynegan as late as October suggests that the situation was

106 Ibid., m.53- p.309. It may be significant that the lordship of Carlow, with which the MacMurroughs had traditionally the closest relations, had been in the king's hand since 1306. It is also interesting to note that when Thomas of Brotherton, the king's half-brother, was granted Carlow in 1312, this was soon followed by the removal of Mac Murrough from Courtown and the transfer of it to Thomas. (Courtown was, of course, in Wexford, not Carlow). See Cal.Fine Rolls 1307-19, p.185 and Hore, "Ferns, county Wexford", R.S.A.I.Journ., XL (1910), p.303.
107 C.J.R. 1308-14, p.237. The exact date is not given, but it almost certainly refers to this campaign.
108 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31.
still dangerous. This is confirmed by the fact that Wogan's successor, Edmund Butler, had to mount a protracted expedition in 1312-13. The rising that provoked this campaign was led by Murgh, son of Gerald O'Byrne, who was to prove a persistent thorn in the government's side. The evidence suggests that what occurred was not a single raid by the Irish as in 1311, but a period of intensifying disorder, which finally forced the government to take action. The financial evidence shows that operations were taking place between 10 September 1312 and 23 June 1313, but the annals assign the keeper's positive raid on the Irish to Lent in the latter year. We know a considerable amount about the moves which preceded Edmund Butler's attack on Glenmalure. On 17 November 1312, in a council held at New Ross, it was recorded that the O'Byrnes, despite often having the king's peace in return for fines or hostages, never paid the fines or delivered the hostages. Instead they were "occupying the land as if conquerors". Butler, the council, Walter Wogan (the seneschal of Wexford), and "others of the same liberty who are nearest to those of that race" decided to set up three wards, in the hope of tempting those whom the Irish had chased out of their lands to return. Each ward was to be composed of 30 hobelars and 120 foot, and they were to be established at Clonmore under Thomas Butler, Wicklow under Maurice

109 It is possible that he was the "Murhuth" to whom Wogan had granted the O'Toole lands in 1307.

110 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31; P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/6.

111 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 341.
de Rocheford, and at Arklow under Arnold le Poer. They were to be maintained partly at the king's expense, and partly at the expense of the communities of Dublin, Kildare and Carlow. In addition, the seneschal of Wexford and Alexander de Roche were to keep a fourth ward at Ferns, at the cost of the lord of Wexford and the community of the liberty. Most interestingly, Murchertach MacMurrough seems to have been admitted to the deliberations of the council in which all this was decided upon. Later on the proceedings of the council were again recited, and some extra details emerge. The wards were not to begin until the Purification (2 February 1313), and were then to continue until the Irish were completely subdued. Murchertach was to have 30 nobelars and 80 foot to march about and remain wherever shall seem best for the said expedition, and was to receive £10 as his wages until the actual campaign began. At this time (27 January) a warrant was issued, ordering that £1,100 be paid to John de Dene, who was to act as clerk of wages for these forces and for others which the keeper was going to lead on the expedition. In addition, an attempt was to be made to induce all those who had been injured by the O'Byrnes to contribute to the wages.

Butler seems to have taken the use of MacMurrough a stage further than Wogan had done. Murchertach's employment ceased to be casual, and he was granted an

112 P.R.O.I., Just. roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.18d. See also Hore, Wexford (Old and New Ross), pp.177-8.
113 Hore, loc.cit., erroneously says twenty-four foot.
114 P.R.O.I., Just. roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.40d.
annual fee of forty marks. The first payment of twenty marks was made at this time, and the fee was to be continued at the king's pleasure. However, it soon seems to have fallen into arrears, for we hear that the seneschal of Wexford was ordered to pay him a further twenty marks "owing out of the forty marks which the king granted him for the conservation of the peace etc. each year". From time to time in the future we find mention of a fee being paid to Mac Murrough, but it was not apparently until the 1350s that such fees to him and others became a regular part of the government's policy in Leinster. Nevertheless, the appearance of the fee at this time is an important link in the chain which leads from individual payments for exploits, to temporary retainers and through permanent retainers to "black rents".

MacMurrough was paid £6 from the revenues of Carlow for engaging in this 1313 campaign against O'Byrne. The whole series of operations cost £1,076-17s-10d—only a little short of the £1,100 which the clerk of wages was originally to receive. This is the largest sum known to have been spent on an expedition since 1306, and it seems to have been well spent. Butler "besieged the O'Byrnes in Glenmalure, compelled them to surrender, and he would have put them to confusion had they not quickly come within the king's peace". This

116 Mem. roll 7-8 Edw.II, m.65d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/9, p.549.
117 P.R.O.I., Just. roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.10d.
118 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/6; clearer on P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31.
119 Chart. St. Mary's, II, 341.
description is of great interest, for it tallies well with what we know of the government's strategy from the records. The warding of Clonmore, Wicklow, Arklow and Ferns, added to MacMurrough's force and whatever troops Butler himself had, must have penned the Irish in the mountains, and thereby undermined their resistance. Again it is probably significant that the campaign was in the second half of the winter, when we should expect the O'Byrnes to have been feeling the effects of declining stores of food. The victory of 1313 does seem to have been a significant one. With the O'Byrnes chastised, and MacMurrough firmly on the king's side, the government appears to have gained a respite that lasted for the two years before the Bruce invasion.

During this prolonged period of trouble in the mountains (and also, it must not be forgotten, in Offaly) there do not seem to have been operations in Slievemargy and Ossory, apart from Wogan's campaigns of 1297 and 1303-4. It is clear, however, from evidence from 1311-12 that this area too was disturbed. The parliament held in June 1312 saw some notable absentees. The seneschal of Kilkenny had been gravely

120 Dowling mentions a campaign at Michaelmas (1313?), but his chronology is very confused at this period. He also tells us that it was so peaceful at this time that it was possible to go from Dublin to Limerick with no more than three horses in one's company. This is probably no more than an extravaganzra based on the record of Butler's victory in the more reliable annals.

121 These campaigns are discussed above, pp.159-60 and 127-8 respectively.

127 Mem,roll 4-5 Edw.11, m.40- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/5, pp. 336-7). Ibid., 8 Edw.11, m.2/3o, K.C.8/10, pp.270-1.
wounded by the Irish and could not come. The bishop of Kildare had been ordered to guard the Kildare marches, and the bishop of Leighlin had been treating with the Irish of Slievemargy. Both were absent.

By January 1313 pardons were being issued in return for service against the O'Mores, while a considerable emergency is suggested by the fact that the sheriff of Cork was present in the area, and had two horses slain by the Irish. There is, however, no trace of a formal royal expedition at this period, and we can only assume that affairs were being left in the hands of the local communities, aided by their neighbours. It may be that some success was achieved in these operations, for the sheriff of Carlow was ordered to levy a fine of £11 on the "Obrens" (O'Brennans?) of Slievemargy later in the year.

It would need a close study of the financial evidence to discover just how much effect these years of disorder had on Leinster. Without such a survey, we can only record the impression that the perpetual warfare had a very serious effect indeed on the area. Some examples may illustrate this suggestion. Thomas Butler was granted the manor of Fynnagh in county Carlow in 1310. Despite the fact that Thomas was a

122 Parliaments & Councils, I, no.1.
123 Mem.roll 6-7 Edw.II, mm.1,3- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/7, pp.7,16.
124 C.J.R. 1308-14, p.271.
126 Mem.roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.43- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/7, p.466.
127 Mem.roll 4-5 Edw.II, m.40- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/5, pp.556-7; ibid., 8 Edw.II, m.23d- R.C.8/10, pp.270-1.
powerful magnate, by the next year he could not pay his farm of 50 marks. The manor had been wasted by the O'Byrnes and O'Nolans, and the justiciar, treasurer and barons pardoned all his rent for the Michaelmas term, both because of the wasting of the manor, and because of his services in the Leinster war. 128 By 1312 Thomas was again in the exchequer, protesting that:  

se dictum manerium ulterius non posse tenere per extentam quam ipse hucusque inde reddidit per annum... propter destrucctionem et alia mala diversa que Hibernici felones regis in partibus illis d fecerunt.

The treasurer relieved Thomas and his pledges completely of the extent, 129

Lesser men than Thomas were in a similar position at the same time. The exchequer accepted that a tenant in Saggart had been "completely impoverished and oppressed" by the robberies and burning of the Irish there, and allowed him to pay his six marks arrears in annual instalments of one mark. 130 In 1312 William Douz petitioned the keeper for the grant of 40 acres in Saggart. The jury which was empanelled testified that such a grant would be to the king's advantage, because William had built a stone fortress there "for the defence of the country against the Irish of the Leinster mountains". The grant would make it easier for him to provide for the upkeep of the fortress. 131

129 Ibid., 6-7 Edw. II, m. 7d- R.C.8/7, p. 48.
130 Ibid., m. 23d- p. 198.
In Leixlip two tenants came and said:

\[ \text{se non posse terram illam ultra predictum terminum tenere occasione diversorum malefactorum in partibus illis diversas roberias et alia mala de die in diem perpetranclium.} \]

They were given the land in question for a term of ten years instead of the original two, to enable them to build a stone house, without which they could not hope to hold the land.\(^\text{132}\) In Bray, the wars had caused such a wasting of the king's lands that the tenants could not pay their farms. Again the exchequer accepted the situation, and no less than six provosts of Bray (who had each held the office for a year) were granted allowances ranging from £7-2s-8d to 32s-4½d in their accounts.\(^\text{133}\) It seems inescapable that serious deterioration had taken place. Fynnagh, Saggart, Leixlip and Bray all lie at different points on the marches of the mountains; there was trouble in them all. The exchequer must have been well apprised of conditions so close to Dublin, and the treasurer and barons would not have made these concessions had they not been necessary.

The archbishop's lands were in a similar condition. The last archbishop had alienated some land in Johnstown, near Ballymore, without royal consent. But, since the land was in the march, and it was unlikely that anyone would take it from the archbishop, the grantee was allowed to keep it. The king accepted that he would get nothing from it in vacancy anyway, and also

\(^{132}\) Mem. roll 6-7 Edw. II, m. 4- P.R. O.I., R.C. 8/7, pp. 20-22.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 7-8 Edw. II, m. 60- R.C. 8/9, pp. 506-7.
that its abandonment would threaten neighbouring vills. Later the same arguments were accepted about lands in Tallaght.

When this cursory survey is added to the military history of the time of Wogan and Edmund Butler there can be no doubt that the period saw a distinct turn for the worse as far as Leinster was concerned. From now on the Dublin government was faced with a permanent, costly and time-consuming threat on its own doorstep. The threat had first appeared in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, but at that time it could be withstood. Now, no matter what military measures the government took, the pressure of the Leinster Irish could not be contained for more than a year or two at a time. Even that could only be achieved by a determined justiciar, skilled in both war and diplomacy, and prepared to use the Irish as well as blindly resist them.

During the first fifteen years of the fourteenth century there had been a significant change in the government's position. There had been something of a disengagement from many of the areas which had been the military concern of the thirteenth century justiciars, but this was accompanied by the need to devote more and more attention to the situation near Dublin. By 1312 Leinster alone had become almost as burdensome as the much wider commitments of Wogan's predecessors. We have discussed Wogan's policy of reliance on the magnates in terms of royal needs, and there can be little doubt that in the beginning Wogan deliberately

134 P.R.O.I., Just. roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.40.
135 Ibid., m.47.
chose this path. But it is obvious that, by the second half of his justiciarship, he had little option but to continue to leave the outlying areas to their own devices. Pressures nearer home were too great, and the two lines of development that we have discerned were in fact closely interwoven. The records show that the justiciar's judicial arm stretched wide, but we do not know that it stretched any wider than that of earlier governors. Certainly our consideration of Wogan's military activities and of his relations with the Irish suggests that to view his justiciarship as the period when the Dublin government's power reached its fullest extent is gravely misleading. Indeed it could plausibly be argued that Wogan's period of office had a significance precisely opposite to that which has often been claimed for it.
Chapter V

The Dublin government, Edward Bruce and the Irish, 1315-1318

From 1315 to 1318 the relations between the Dublin government and the Irish were jerked out of their normal course by the presence of a third party: the Scots under Edward Bruce. These years, therefore, must stand by themselves as an exceptional period. It must be said at once that the Bruce invasion does not appear to have been a watershed as far as our topic is concerned. As we have just seen, the position of the Dublin government in relation to the Irish had weakened perceptibly before the Scots landed. Connacht had to a large extent passed out of the government's control, and Leinster had become an endless crisis-point. The period following the invasion, as will become apparent, shows little sign of deterioration; indeed, if anything, it was more peaceful than Wogan's last years. 1

The invasion must be studied, not because it marks an

1 These statements find some corroboration in the pattern of the decline of the revenue. The government's collecting power seems to have fallen sharply right at the beginning of Edward II's reign, and the Bruce invasion does not seem to have been a crucial factor (see Lydon, "Edward II and the revenues of Ireland", I.H.S., XIV (1964), p.43 note 12; Richardson & Sayles, "Irish Revenue, 1278-1384", R.I.A.Proc., LXII (1962), C, pp.94,100). I have made a brief examination of the receipt rolls for the period of the invasion and the years immediately following. They reveal the inevitable steep decline in the receipts of the royal demesne manors during the actual war, but the receipts quickly pick up again, and a surprising amount of arrears for the period of the invasion are paid in.
important change of direction, but for the light it sheds on the resources and potential of both government and Irish.

Two aspects of the Bruce invasion are of paramount importance. First we must ask again what reaction Edward Bruce inspired among the Irish, and, secondly, we must try to discover how the Dublin government attempted to cope with the joint Scottish and Irish menace in these years. By trying to see the invasion from the standpoint of the Dublin government we may hope to show the nature and extent of the threat Bruce and his allies were able to pose to the Irish lordship. In discussing this, it should be possible to see the strengths and weaknesses of the Irish themselves, and to understand why, while they were able to press the government hard throughout the fourteenth century, they were not able to threaten its existence. In a way, the invasion shows the limitations of both sides writ large.  

2 Detailed narratives of the invasion period are to be found in Orpen, Normans, IV, chapter XXXVII and Armstrong, Edward Bruce's Invasion. These were challenged (somewhat idiosyncratically) on points of detail by Dunlop, "Some notes on Barbour's Bruce" in Essays presented to T.F. Tout, pp.277-290. More recently, the invasion has been set in its English, Scottish and Irish background by Dr. Lydon ("The Bruce invasion of Ireland", Historical Studies, IV, pp.111-25), while Professor Otway-Ruthven, in Medieval Ireland, pp.224-39, has the clearest and most concise narrative yet to appear. Hore, "The Bruces in Ireland", Ulster Journal of Archaeology, V. 1-12, 128-36 and VI. 66-76, is still of value as providing a challenging "wet-blanket" view of the episode. The present chapter does not aim at producing a thorough discussion of the invasion as such, and it rests heavily on the works just mentioned, particularly those of Orpen and Professor Otway-Ruthven.
For our purposes, the invasion falls naturally into three divisions, each representing a major campaign. In 1315 Bruce landed and penetrated as far south as Ardee in county Louth, before retreating back into Ulster. In 1316 the Scots again came south, this time reaching Skerries, near Athy in county Kildare. In 1317, having been joined by king Robert himself, Bruce advanced as far as the Shannon at Limerick, before once more being forced to retreat. The first of these expeditions raises the question of Bruce's relations with the Irish of Ulster and Connacht, while the second and third show the Scots in contact with the Irish of Leinster and Munster respectively. It is proposed to discuss each expedition in turn, examining the reaction of the Irish in the areas involved, and showing how on each occasion the government managed to contain the joint Scottish and Irish threat.

Two traditions exist concerning the introduction of the Scots into Ireland; one sees the event as rooted in Ireland, and the other in Scotland and England. According to Irish tradition, as represented by the "Battle of Fochart of St. Bridget", Domnall O'Neill and many of his Ulster under-kings, having despaired of uniting the Irish themselves, sent messengers to Robert Bruce offering him the crown of Ireland. Robert could not come to Ireland himself, but agreed to send his brother. This view of the invasion was followed by Eoin MacNeill, who saw it as the culmination of Irish tendencies reaching far back into the thirteenth century,


6 The Bruce, ed. Skeat (Scottish Texts Society edition) II. 1.
when there had, it seems, been an offer of the crown to king Haakon of Norway. That O'Neill should now have offered the crown (or rather his claim to it) to Bruce is not inherently unlikely when we remember the long history of relations between Scotland and Ulster, and the widespread employment of gallowgásses and other Scottish satellites throughout the northern province. In addition, as we shall see, there is plenty of evidence for O'Neill's later loyalty to Bruce.

On the other hand, Scottish tradition, as represented by Barbour, attributes the initiative to Edward Bruce, who:

...send and had treting
With the Erischry of Irland
That in that lawte tuk on hand
Of Irland for to mak him king.

Evidence which has recently come to light seems to confirm that an attempt was made from Scotland to rouse discontent among the Irish—though the attempt was made by Robert rather than Edward Bruce. King Robert wrote to "all the kings of Ireland, the prelates and clergy and the inhabitants of all Ireland, his friends". He made a definite appeal to Irish sensibilities, referring to the "same national ancestry", "common language" and "common custom" of the Scots and Irish, and was concerned about "permanently strengthening and maintaining inviolate

6 The Bruce, ed. Skeat (Scottish Texts Society edition) II. 1.
the special friendship between us and you, so that by God's will your nation may be able to recover her ancient liberty." It is obvious that no invasion of Ireland could have taken place without careful consideration and planning by Robert. He had to weigh the disadvantages of sending an army, which he could ill spare, to Ireland, against whatever advantages might be gained by opening a second front and diverting Irish supplies from England. It is perhaps best to see the invasion as the result of the combined ambitions of O'Neill and Edward Bruce, which were given their head by the deliberate strategy of king Robert. The introduction of the Scots into Ireland at this time suited all parties.

Already we can see that, although the Scots appealed to "the Eriscry of Irland" or "all the kings of Ireland", Irish tradition associates the invasion with Domnall O'Neill and his Ulster followers alone. This is of great significance for the future of the enterprise. At every point the Scottish hope of provoking a united rising among the Irish was to be frustrated. O'Neill

7 Nicholson, "A sequel to Edward Bruce's invasion of Ireland", Scottish Hist. Rev., XLII. 38-9. It is interesting that a certain Henry "messenger of Robert le Bruys" was in prison in Dublin castle from 16 February 1315 (Hist. & Mun. Docs., p.388). This letter carries interesting echoes of the Remonstrance (cf. Ir. Hist. Docs., p.45), which appears to have been drawn up by a Scottish clerk (Curtis, Medieval Ireland, 2nd.ed., p.191).

8 This aspect is discussed in Lydon, Historical Studies, IV. 112,119-20. It does not directly concern us here.
and his urraghts, O'Cahan, O'Hanlon, McGilmurry, Mac Cartan and O'Hagan are said to have made muster in preparation for the Scottish landing. Yet as early as this, and even within Ulster, certain of the Irish seem to have held off, apparently through jealousy of O'Neill and the desire to hold their lands independently of him. Quite obviously the divisions which are supposed to have induced O'Neill to invite Bruce over ran deep. Bruce and his allies overcame the local levies in Antrim, and then moved southwards. In order to leave Ulster and descend into the plains of Louth and Meath the Scots had to negotiate the treacherous pass of "Humberdoylan" or "Endulan" (Moiry) in the mountains near Newry. This was a dangerous task, and even in the sixteenth century the pass could be described as "a broaken causey besette on both sydes with bogges, where the Irish might skyppe, but the English could not go". Here, according to Barbour, the Scots were attacked by MacCartan and MacDuilechain. This rings true. MacCartan, the lord of Iveagh, wreaked havoc on Ufford's army in the same pass in 1345, and during the 1350s anyone wishing to

10 The quotation is from Sir John Perrott's "Chronicle of Ireland", quoted in Hayes-McCoy, "The defence of the Moyry pass, 1600", Irish Sword, III (1957-8), pp.32-8 at p.32. For all these events see Orpen, Normans, IV. 162-3.
11 The Bruce, II. 5-6.
12 See below, pp. 313-4.
traverse the pass had to pay MacCartan a fee for safe-conduct. And so, not only had some of the Ulster Irish failed to rally to Bruce, but also, if Barbour may be trusted, one of those who originally joined him turned against the Scots once they approached his own territory. This resistance was overcome, however, and Bruce entered Louth and took Dundalk.

The Scots had landed near Larne about 25 May. On 16 May the Irish government had been at Dublin, but it had then gone south, for on 26 May Edmund Butler, the justiciar, was holding pleas at Cashel in county Tipperary. News of the Scottish landing must have reached Butler soon after this, for he is said to have held a parliamentum at Kilkenny at the beginning of June "to have aid and counsel against the Scots". If this is so, the justiciar's next move was not north to meet the Scots, but further south: by 12 June he was in Cork. On the analogy of later events we can only assume that Butler had gone south to enlist the southern magnates in the king's service. By 27 June the government was back in Dublin, and between then and 12 July preparations were being made to resist the invaders. The justiciar ordered supplies which had been collected for the king's Scottish war to be used to help defray the wages of the army that was gathering, and also (probably somewhat later) to succour the earl of Ulster's

14 Just.roll 8-9 Edw.II- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.30,32.
16 Just.roll 8-9 Edw.II- P.R.O.I., Cal., p.36.
17 See below, pp.221-3.
18 Just.roll 8-9 Edw.II- P.R.O.I., Cal., p.45.
castles of Carrickfergus and Northburgh. The royal service was called to Greencastle, while in the same Trinity term of 1315 the huge sum (by Irish standards) of £1,967-13s-9d was delivered to Nicholas of Balscot, who had been appointed clerk of wages for the impending campaign.

Bruce had taken Dundalk on 29 June, and had then come south to Ardee, burning it, and passing into Meath. While the government was preparing its expedition from the south, the earl of Ulster was collecting an army in Connacht. He moved east through Roscommon and Meath, meeting the royal army advancing from the south at Ardee. According to the story usually told, the earl and the justiciar met, but the earl insisted on following the Scots on his own. He caught up with the Scots, who had begun to retire northwards, at Inishkeen, but they gave him the slip, and, after a slight skirmish at the town of Louth, withdrew right

19 Hist. & Mun. Docs., pp. 327-8, 343-50 (misdated 1314). The use of provisions as wages was a common practice (see above, pp. 59-60), and the use of those already in hand was surely the obvious move, and not a sign of desperation (cf. Lydon in Historical Studies, IV. 120).

20 The date of the service is unknown and we do not know whether personal service was done. The receipt rolls show only £65-5s-10d received between Mich. 1315 and Trin. 1319. An aid brought in only £84-16s-7d and a clerical subsidy only £124-14s-9½d over the same period (P.R.O., Receipt rolls, E.101/236/14, nos. 6 & 7; 237/3, 7).

21 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/237/2. Later sums delivered to Balscot brought the total to £3,668-14s-8½d (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25).

22 Orpen, Normans, IV. 163-4.
to Coleraine, with de Burgh in hot pursuit. This was followed by the earl's defeat at the battle of Connor and his flight, leaving Ulster securely in Bruce's hands. The failure of de Burgh and Butler to cooperate has therefore been seen as a disaster, opening the way to the complete domination of Bruce in the north.

The exact details of this campaign are vital to an understanding of its significance, and they must lead us to revise the view of events just outlined. Since the earl and the justiciar met at Ardee, the Scots must already have been withdrawing. Bruce had taken Dundalk, but payments made before the end of 1315 for its repair, and to save it from further attack, show that the government must have re-occupied it. So much at least the justiciar had achieved. Accounts of the meeting between Butler and de Burgh have relied heavily on the annals of Connacht/Loch Ce', which have the earl refusing to join the justiciar at Ardee, and then proceeding alone against the Scots at Inishkeen. However, a slightly, but significantly, different story emerges from the record evidence. The prior of Louth was accused of receiving Bruce, and also of:

warning the said Scotch at Iniskeen in the autumn last past that the justiciar of Ireland and many other nobles and magnates of Ireland were coming....

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23 See Orpen, Normans, IV. 164-5; Armstrong, Edward Bruce's Invasion, pp.75-7; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.226.


25 AC/ALC, 1315. Their account tends to telescope events at this point.
...by means of which warning the Scotch, who should have been slain as it was hoped...then retreated in flight to the town of Coulrath in Ulster.  26

It seems, therefore, that the decision that the earl of Ulster alone should follow the Scots was not taken when the armies first met; it followed the escape of the Scots at Inishkeen. The decision was made when the Scottish army was already in full flight. The Irish annals have represented the earl's wish to proceed alone as a result of his pride and over-confidence.  27 But an overlooked passage gives a clearer view of what he may have felt. The annalist stresses that the army of the lordship had done as much damage to the countryside as the Scots themselves, and for this reason de Burgh did not wish the army to enter his earldom of Ulster.  28

To the Anglo-Irish annalist the earl's motives were not of prime interest. The leaders:

mutuo consulebant ut Scotos interficerent et quo modo ignoratur fugerunt; aliter, ut sperabatur, capti essent, quo facto, Dominus Comes Ultonie, cum Justiciario predicto et aliis magnatibus ibidem manuepit, Scotis interfectis, Dominum Edwardum le Brus vivum vel mortuum Dublin adducere, qui Comes eos sequerat ad aquam de Banne......  29


27 AC/ALC; AT, 1315.

28 AT, 1315. This point was made by Hore in Ulster Journ. of Archaeology, V. 9. For the suggestion that the earl may have been concerned about his franchisal rights see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval over
The most important aspect of these incidents was not the earl's motives, but the simple and understressed fact that Bruce was forced to retreat. Dundalk was recaptured, and the pressure on the southern shires was relieved. The government had acted with considerable speed, and, if not very gloriously, had achieved one of its most important aims. Butler's own view of the situation must have been very like that current in England. There the justiciar was credited with chasing the Scots up the mountains, and it was believed that "if the earl of Ulster be faithful, there will be nothing to fear from their plots".30

If we turn to the justiciar's motives, several considerations must have made it seem sensible to Butler to go no further. The threat seemed to have been contained, and, especially after the oaths taken at Dundalk, the earl should have been competent to defeat Bruce in his own territory—after all, Bruce had not yet been brought face-to-face with a full-scale army. Secondly, money was beginning to run out: arrears of wages remained to be paid,31 and assignment had begun to be used.32 What we have seen of the government's military operations in the years before the

Ireland, p.226.

29 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 345-6.

30 Chronicles of Edward I & II, ed. Stubbs, II. 211.


32 Mem. roll 9 Edw. II, mm.6,8,9- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, pp.437-8, 449-50, 452-5.
invasion will have shown that any unusual and pro-
longed military emergency would be bound to subject
the administration to great financial strain. Thirdly,
to follow the Scots into Ulster—even if it had been
politically and financially wise—would have risked
leaving Dublin and the southern counties open to the
attacks of the Irish. This consideration would have
weighed with the magnates as much as with Butler. A
fourth consideration may have been the imminent
arrival of the English fleet at Dublin. The justiciar
may well have wished to retire and coordinate oper-
ations with the fleet. For these reasons it made
sense for the royal army to withdraw, leaving de Burgh
to pursue the retreating Scots. And de Burgh did not
continue northwards without government support. The
forces of John le Poer, baron of Dunoll, left Butler's
army and went on into Ulster with the earl. De
Burgh also received financial assistance and further
supplies for his castles. The justiciar could not
reasonably have foreseen the disasters which were to
follow later in the year.

Bruce's retreat was guided by O'Neill and his
"Ultonians". It seems to have been O'Neill's advice
too which persuaded Bruce that withdrawal in face of
these superior forces was the wisest course. When the

33 See Cal. Doc. Scot., III, nos. 447, 450; Rot. Parl.,
I. 389.

34 Mem. roll 9 Edw. II, m. 12—P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/10, p. 471;
Chart. St. Mary's, II. 346.

35 Mem. roll 9 Edw. II, mm. 12d, 26—P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/10,

36 AC/ALC, 1315.
Scots and their allies reached Coleraine supplies were running low, and O'Neill, O'Cahan and O'Flynn are credited with keeping the army provided with food during its long stay there. This fits with the facts, since O'Cahan and O'Flynn controlled respectively Keenacht and Tuirtry, the territories lying on either side of Coleraine.

The earl reached Coleraine, but on the other side of the Bann, and found that the Scots had broken down the bridge across the river. After a series of skirmishes and complex manoeuvres, de Burgh was heavily defeated by Bruce at Connor. The details of this engagement do not concern us, but the role of the earl's Irish of Connacht at the time of the battle does do so.

When the earl approached the justiciar's army south of Ardee he had brought with him Felim O'Conor, the king of Connacht. Felim remained with the earl during the march northwards, but when Coleraine was reached he was approached by Bruce, who offered him "undivided power over Connacht, if he would steal away from the earl to defend his own province". Felim is said to have "listened patiently to these words, and agreed with Edward on that occasion". This rather ambiguous phrase does not, however, seem to denote any action on Felim's part, for we shall see that he remained with the earl for the moment. Meanwhile, Felim's rival for the Connacht kingship, Rory son of

37 _AI_, 1315.
38 See Orpen, _Normans_, IV. 164-72.
39 _AC/ALC_, 1315.
40 _Ibid_. _AI_ omits the approach to Felim.
Cathal Rua O'Connor, approached Bruce through Donegal. He offered to expel the English from Connacht, and Edward agreed to this, while warning him not to attack Felim's lands. Rory, however, ignored this warning, proceeded to invade Felim's territory of Sil-Murray, and get himself inaugurated as king. He then attempted to assert himself over Felim's foster-father and chief ally, MacDermot. Felim now took fright, left de Burgh and went hastily home. But he was too late to stop Rory's progress, and was forced to let his under-kings submit to Rory for the time being. At once we can see Bruce's plans for Connacht going awry. Instead of finding himself able to mobilize the Irish against the English, he found himself enmeshed in a much more complicated situation. In Connacht as in Ulster the Irish were at each other's throats. In Ulster Bruce established a secure basis of power and overcame the minor threat posed by O'Neill's enemies. In Connacht, however, the dynastic wars had been raging on and off for upwards of thirty years, and Bruce became just one more factor in the existing situation. Felim was cautiously playing his own game; Rory son of Cathal Rua was attempting to use Bruce to swing the balance of power in Connacht in his own favour.

After his defeat at Connor the earl fled back to Connacht, but failed to raise support there. A series of wars between Felim and MacDermot on the one hand, and Rory supported by Dermot Gall (MacDermot's rival) on the other, supervened. In 1316 Felim and his allies succeeded in killing Rory, but had themselves to face
the earl's powerful cousin William "Liath" de Burgh, whom Bruce had released from custody. The result was the battle of Athenry, where William together with Richard de Bermingham completely defeated Felim. Thus the battle of Athenry saw a re-assertion of Anglo-Irish power in Connacht, and Bruce's manoeuvres in the end proved self-defeating. And, indeed, it is conspicuous that Bruce and the Scots are at no stage involved in the story of the risings and counter-risings in Connacht. Once started, the trouble took its own (almost traditional) course, entirely independent of the Scots. There is no sign of any real sympathy with Bruce and his aims.

The view of the events which we have had from the annals is vividly supported by a contemporary tract written in praise of Eoghan O'Madden, chieftain of Ui Maine or "Hy-Many". The O'Maddens were traditional allies of the de Burghs, and had, for example, formed part of the army which William de Burgh had led to Leinster as justiciar's deputy in 1308. The tract accuses the other Connacht Irish of siding with the "foreigners less noble than our own foreigners, in imitation of the Eoghanachs (i.e. the O'Neills)". But, as the tale proceeds, once more the struggle between Rory and Felim emerges, which quite leaves Bruce out in the cold. O'Madden himself is shown to have sided with the de Burghs and to have received a grant of English

42 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 350; Clyn, p.12. For details of these struggles see AC/ALC, 1315-16 passim.
43 Above, p.176, where "John O'Madid" is almost certainly Eoghan O'Madden.
44 Tribes & Customs of Hy-Many.
law and other rewards for doing so. Whereas in Ulster Bruce's appeal to the Irish had met with eventual success, in Connacht it was an almost complete failure. When we turn to examine the campaigns of Bruce in the other two provinces an equally revealing pattern emerges.

Having secured his base in Ulster, Bruce came south again in November and December 1315. He defeated Roger Mortimer at Kells in his liberty of Meath, and after ravaging his way through Westmeath and Longford, came by Tethmoy and Offaly to Kildare and Castledermot. Throughout the period 1302 to 1313 the Dublin government had been carrying on constant warfare against the Irish of Leinster, but, as we have seen, 1314 and 1315 had been comparatively quiet years. The advent of the Scots was accompanied and followed by renewed outbreaks of trouble in the Leinster marches. Hugh Lawless, leader of one of the chief Anglo-Irish families of the Wicklow area, explained the trouble thus:

Scoti inimici domini Regis applicuerunt in hac terra, ob quorum adventum Hibernici de montanis Lagenie incontinenti contra dominum Regem manifeste se posuerunt ad guerram prout alii fecerunt Hibernici in hac terra, et predictas terras et tenementa domini Regis apud Bree necnon et alias omnes terras et tenementa diversorum fidelium domini Regis in partibus illis hostiliter invaserunt combusserunt et totaliter devastarunt.


46 Orpen, Normans, IV. 172-5; Armstrong, Edward Bruce's Invasion, pp.84-5.
Hugh offered this as a reason for non-payment of rent, a jury supported him, and he was pardoned his debts. 47 This reaction of the Irish to Bruce can be paralleled elsewhere, 48 and it seems clear that the arrival of the Scots in Leinster gave the Irish an opportunity to rise, which they gladly seized. Nevertheless, when we examine the events of the campaign, it will become obvious that Bruce did not manage to co-ordinate the Irish risings, nor did he capitalize on them. The disorder among the Irish of Leinster which followed Bruce's retreat from the area does not seem to have been any more severe, or of a different nature, than earlier disorders. In deed the troubles of 1316 were no more serious than those with which Butler himself had had to cope in 1312-13.

Disturbances seem to have been beginning among the Leinster Irish as Bruce approached the area. In the late autumn of 1315 it was necessary to garrison the marches of Slieve Bloom with 20 men-at-arms, 30 hobelars and 200 foot—quite a large force for this sort of operation. 49 By 8 December men were to be arrayed to guard the country around Saggart in south county Dublin. 50 The Justiciar was collecting another army to meet the renewed Scottish threat by 28 December, 51 and

47 Hist. & Mun. Docs., p.457; P.R.O.I., Mem.roll 13-14 Edw.II, mm.21,32d.
48 See below, pp.4q-6, for Munster at this time.
51 Mem.roll 8 Edw.II, m.15d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, pp.169-71 (a roll made up of entries from 6 to 12 Edw.II).
the force seems to have mustered at Carlow. The evidence suggests that the difficulty of paying the wages had now become acute. The exchequer had already carried a major campaign earlier in the year, and it does not seem to have been able to carry another one. This may explain why no clerk of wages is mentioned, and no payment of cash from the exchequer can be traced. Instead the financial burden of the campaign seems to have been met by assignment. Our evidence for the incidence of assignment is almost certainly not complete, but £718-16s-9d can be traced on the Memoranda roll for 9 Edward II alone. This was a large sum in the Irish context: the average annual revenue of the lordship in 1315-25 was no more than £2,370. Some of these assignments were met, but it is certain that many were not, and petitions have been begun to withdraw northwards, it appears that the county was large enough to have defeated the magnates of the south.}

52 Mem.roll 9 Edw.II, m.22d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, p.526.
53 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.228. P.R.O.; Issue roll, E.101/237/4; Mem.roll 9 Edw.II, m.47d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, pp.692-3; Just.roll 8-9 Edw. II, m.12- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.55-7 give some other names.
56 E.g., 39th.Rep.D.K., p.68; 42nd.Rep.D.K., pp.27, 76. Of course the absence of adequate pipe roll evidence makes it impossible to estimate to what extent the local revenues were able to bear the burdens placed upon them.
for payment of wages were soon reaching England. The inability of the Irish exchequer to withstand more than the initial threat from the Scots was clearly partly responsible for the lack of really positive measures against Bruce in 1316-7. When John of Hotham, the king's special emissary to Ireland, appealed urgently for financial help from England in March 1316, his appeal was not exaggerated. It is in this context of financial collapse that the second failure to strike a decisive blow against Bruce and his allies must be seen. The Scots had been wasting their way through Kildare, and by late January had reached Castledermot, south of Athy. Butler seems already to have put down a rising by the O'Mores of Leix earlier in the month, and the royal army advanced north from Carlow, meeting the Scots, who had again begun to withdraw northwards, at Skerries near Ardsull to the north of Athy. Here, without inflicting any serious casualties on the justiciar's force, the Scots succeeded in "keeping the field". Hotham explained to the king that the reverse was due to "bad luck", and that the army was large enough to have defeated the Scots. The Dublin annalist believed that one of the magnates alone should have been capable of defeating

58 The financial aspect and the king's policy are discussed by Dr Lydon (Historical Studies, IV, 111-25 passim).  
60 Chart, St. Mary's, II, 348; Clyn, p.12. Marleburgh places this in 1317 (Bibliotheque de Troyes, MS 1,316, f.45d).  
Bruce, and attributed the reverse to "discords" among the magnates: *omne regnum in seipsum divisum desolabitur*. 62 No evidence survives that would satisfactorily explain the events, but it is possible that lack of pay sparked off disaffection, or that Hotham, who was employing his own troops and acting independently, 63 and the justiciar failed to agree. It is, however, interesting to note that Richard de Clare, the most important southern magnate, did not arrive at the battle, though payments reveal that he was in the area of the campaign either at the time of the engagement or immediately after it—indeed he was described as one of the marshals of the army. 64 In the light of de Clare's later behaviour it is possible that the "discords" concerned him.

Whatever the truth about the battle of Skerries, the justiciar had evidently provided a show of force sufficient to make the Scots and their allies retreat. The lordship's military operations reveal serious shortcomings, but nevertheless Bruce could only withdraw. 65 Hotham told the king that the Scots had "betaken themselves to fortalices among the Irish in Leyss

62 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 347.
63 P.R.O., King's messenger's account, F. 101/309/19.
64 Mem. roll 9 Edw. II, m. 23d—P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/10, pp. 529-31. It could have been now that his Irish refused to join him on a campaign in Leinster (Caithreim Thordhealbhaigh, II. 76).
65 For this view of the events see Dunlop in Essays presented to T.F. Tout, p. 283. Orpen's verdict on the government's showing was rather less charitable (see Normans, IV. 176)
(Leix)\textsuperscript{,} and that they had left prisoners behind them.\textsuperscript{66} That they did retire in this direction is confirmed by the annals. They burned the castle of Lea, and, moving north to Geashill in Offaly, eventually returned to Ulster some three weeks after the battle of Skerries.\textsuperscript{67} No concerted action with the Irish of Leinster had taken place. If the Scots did succeed in inciting Irish risings in Leinster, those risings took no more than their initial impetus from the Scottish presence. Their subsequent development was independent of Bruce and of little value to him. While the Scots were in Leix and Offaly Bruce seems, if we are to trust the rather odd story told by Barbour, to have entered into relations with O'Dempsey— the only evidence we have of a direct link between the Scots and any Leinster sept. O'Dempsey, a chief often loyal to the Irish government,\textsuperscript{68} swore fealty to Bruce, guided the Scots, and then—according to Barbour's tale—attempted to starve and drown the Scottish army.\textsuperscript{69} This may be mere fable, but, remembering events in Ulster and Connacht, that an Irishman should have betrayed Bruce is not inherently unlikely. There is no sign at all of united action by the Irish of Leinster in favour of the Scots.

The withdrawal of Bruce was not followed immediately by the dispersal of the justiciar's army. For a time

\textsuperscript{66} Cal. Doc. Scot., III, no. 469.
\textsuperscript{67} Chart. St. Mary's, II, 348; Orpen, Normans, IV. 177-8.
\textsuperscript{68} See above, pp. 106, 133-4.
\textsuperscript{69} The Bruce, II. 14-15.
the magnates were kept together, and on 7 February a commission to a purveyor named the marshals of the army as John fitz Thomas, Maurice de Rocheford, Maurice fitz Thomas, Arnold le Poer, John le Poer and Richard de Clare. The purveyance was to be for the army's support "whithersoever in Ireland against the Scots and Irish". However, it does not seem that the army took any action against the Leinster Irish, and the Scots were by now out of reach. The magnates seem to have disbanded, while the government devoted its attention to organizing defensive measures against the Irish of the mountains. Dublin itself was warded by a special guard under Walter de Aqua, who was deputed to aid the mayor and community, while Dublin castle was repaired and a watch put on the exchequer. In the mountains, the castles of Newcastle McKynegan were strengthened by extra troops, and we find the local Anglo-Irish leaders (Archbolds, Lawlesses, Howels and fitz Eustaces) being engaged to defend them. The escheator saw to the custody of the archbishop's strategically placed stronghold of Castle Kevin. The popular defence machinery was brought into operation. All the Dublin tenants were summoned before the council in May, and at the lower end of the scale men in the villages were to be chosen to serve against the Irish at the wages of their fellows. A castle was to be

70 Mem.roll 9 Edw.II, m.23d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, pp. 529-30.
72 P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/4,5,8; Mem.roll 9 Edw.II, mm.21,49d- P.R.O.I., R.8/10, pp.516, 704.
73 Ibid., m.11-bb.466-7.
built at Crumlin, and the seneschals of the king's Dublin demesnes were to ensure that the tenants did not flee with their goods when the Irish attacked, leaving the surrounding areas all the more open to the marauders. These arrangements were sorely tested in the early summer of 1316. There were attacks on Newcastle and Tullow, but William Comyn, leader of the shire levies, did succeed in killing the leader of the O'Byrnes. It was not until July that the government began to prepare a proper expedition of war in Leinster.

The justiciar seems to have summoned the magnates to Leinster for early in July, but an unexplained delay occurred, and the sheriffs who had provided supplies were ordered to take them back again. By early September, the system of local defence was once more being placed in readiness, and a raid by the O'Tooles penetrated right to the city of Dublin itself.

74 This is also discussed in the context of popular obligation, above, p.45.


76 Ibid., p.378.

77 Mem.roll 9 Edw.II, m.32d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, p. 588. For the importance of these measures see Hewitt, Organization of War, pp.9-10.

78 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 296,349,350-1.

79 Ibid., p.350.


81 Ibid., m.62- pp.797-8.

82 Hist. & Mun.Docs., pp.380-3; Chart.St.Mary's, II. 297.
At this point the royal expedition does finally seem to have taken place, for Butler was prepared to set off against the Irish on 22 September.\textsuperscript{83} We know nothing of what the expedition achieved,\textsuperscript{84} but again it may be that lack of money was at the root of the hesitation and heavy reliance on the shire levies. The clerk of wages for the campaign received no more than £77-11s-3d, and the first instalment of this sum was not paid until 3 March 1317.\textsuperscript{85} Although Bruce's second foray south had had limited success in itself, it had succeeded in creating a minor crisis at the heart of the lordship. In Wicklow the government was forced to abrogate its own strict regulations for controlling relations with the Irish.\textsuperscript{86} The Lawlesses, whom the Irish were throwing out of their lands, were granted permission to treat with them "and take days with them in the manner of the marches" until conditions improved or the king ordered otherwise. Their leader agreed to chastise his own followers.\textsuperscript{87} When this was permitted in an area only twenty miles from Dublin, the government's control had certainly slackened.

\textsuperscript{83} Hist.& Mun. Docs., pp.357-8.

\textsuperscript{84} That it was a minor one may be suggested by the failure to use some of the provisions that had been collected for it (P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 13-14 Edw.II, m.49d).

\textsuperscript{85} P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/5,9; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25.

\textsuperscript{86} These are discussed below in chapter IX.

\textsuperscript{87} Just. roll 8-9 Edw.II, m.11d- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp. 52-4. See also Hand, English Law in Ireland, pp. 35-6 and above, p.82.
From February 1316 to January 1317 Edward Bruce remained in Ulster. While the government attempted to cope with the Leinster situation, the king, by now alarmed, prepared to send Mortimer to Ireland as lieutenant, with military support from England. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1317, Robert Bruce was persuaded by Edward to join him in Ireland. Between February and April the Bruces again came south from Ulster, and penetrated right to Limerick. This was the crucial stage of the invasion. If Edward Bruce were to draw the southern Irish and Anglo-Irish to his side this was his best, and as it turned out his last, opportunity to do so. For the moment the Dublin government was still bereft of money and supplies (Mortimer did not arrive until April). The 1317 campaign is therefore of great importance to our theme. Bruce attempted to link up with the Irish of Munster, but his attempt failed. It shows more clearly than any other episode the lack of success which attended attempts to create a joint Scottish-Irish front outside Ulster. It also demonstrates how the Irish government, apparently impotent, was able even at this stage to contain the Scottish threat.

The arrival of Bruce in Leinster in 1316 had had repercussions in Munster. Maurice Fitz Thomas, later first earl of Desmond, was accused of illegally taking crops of John Mautravers at Rathkeale. The jurors explained the emergency which had led to this act:

88 For all these events see Orpen, Normans, IV. 184; Armstrong, Edward Bruce's Invasion, pp. 98-9; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 231-2.
quando Hibernici de cognomine des Odoneganes qui fuerunt homines et tenentes predicti Mauricii filii Thome audiverunt de adventu Edwardi le Brus et aliorum Scotorum in partes Hibernie, quo tempore Scoti venerunt usque Sketheres predicti Hibernici de cognomine des Odoneganes et omnes alii Hibernici de partibus Desmonia hostiliter insurrexerunt contra Dominum Regem, guerram contra ipsum Dominum Regem et fideles suos manifeste facientes, incendia homicidia roberias et alia mala quamplurima tam in terris predicti Mauricii filii Thome quam aliorum fidellum Domini Regis parcium comitatus Lymer' hostiliter faciendē.

Maurice, then at Dungarvan in county Waterford, had rushed to county Limerick, and gathered together what men he could in the area, and had stayed to defend Limerick and Kerry. He had taken supplies from the manor of Rathkeale in this emergency, and only after taking the advice of the lords of the locality. The jury agreed that, had he not done this, the whole of these shires would have been destroyed. His parleys with the Irish had been for the good of the peace, and were not in contempt of the king. Allowing for an element of exaggeration, which may have been necessary to Maurice's defence, it is of great interest to see that in Munster as in Leinster the Irish—or at least some of them as we shall see—had responded to the Scots' arrival.

The Scots came south with their Ulster allies during January and February 1317. By now many of the Anglo-Irish of Ulster had gone over to the side of the

89 P.R.O.I., Just. roll, Hil., 11 Edw. II, m. 17. This case was on another roll surviving before 1922 (Westropp, "The Desmonds' castle at Newcastle 0 conyll", R.S.A.I. Journ, XXXIX (1909), p. 48).
Bruces, although we have no idea what size their army was. The earl of Ulster was once more defeated, at his manor of Rathoath in Meath, and by 24 February the Scots had reached Castleknock, some four miles to the north of Dublin. At this point the citizens fired their northern suburb, and retired within the walls. Edward and Robert made no attempt to take Dublin, but turned inland and continued southwards. They bypassed Kilkenny, and moved along the well-worn passes, through Gowran, and then west into Tipperary and towards Limerick.

The justiciar had been in Dublin as lately as 24 January, but by the time the Bruces arrived the government had left the city. It appears that Butler had gone, leaving specific instructions to burn the suburb if the Scots approached. The justiciar must have realised that the Bruces had not the strength to take the city, which could, of course, be victualled by sea. In fact Butler was himself pushing rapidly south ahead of the Scots. By 24 February he had reached Carrick-on-Suir, by 25th. he was at Dungarvan, and on 27th. he reached Cork, having collected a bodyguard of 80 men-at-arms in addition to his normal 20.

90 A jury of 1345 provided a (possibly tendentious) statement of those who had joined Bruce (P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.9a).
91 See Orpen, Normans, IV. 184-91; Armstrong, Edward Bruce’s Invasion, pp.101-7; Lydon in Historical Studies, IV. 117-9.
92 Chart. St. Mary’s, II. 407.
94 The siege of Carrickfergus had taken more than a year (see Sayles, "The siege of Carrickfergus castle, 1315-16", I.H.S., X. 94-100).
This apparently strange behaviour can be easily explained: Butler's purpose was to enlist the great lords of the south in the king's service. The tenants of Leinster had been under heavy pressure from both Scots and Irish throughout 1316, and they could not be expected to meet this new and more serious threat. The justiciar remained at Cork between 27 February and 4 March. On 28 February he called the Cork tenants before him "to treat with him and to arrange how the malignity of the Scotch who at present are striving to destroy the land of Ireland and the king's lieges may be repressed". A long list of tenants, headed by the Barrys and Cogans, refused to appear before the justiciar until they were given truces and safe-conducts (many of them were, of course, outlawed felons). When this had been done, Butler had virtually to buy their service with pardons. For the pardons they were nominally to pay £2,000, but in fact all but 1,000 marks of this was immediately pardoned in its turn, in consideration of their "good service". They were then allowed to stand as each other's pledges for the remaining 1,000 marks. It seems clear from all this that

95 P.R.O., S.C.6/1239/13. This clerk's account, our only one in journal form, has survived as an erratic among the Ministers' Accounts.

96 See A1, 1317 for an account of some of their recent exploits.

97 Just. roll 9-11 Edw.II, mm.17-18d- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.53-9; B.M., MS Titus B XI, i, f.78.

98 Butler, as lord of Tipperary, was worried about his own lands.

99 P.R.O.I., Just. roll, XIX, ii 3801, II, p.17.

the main strength of the government now lay in the south, and that the justiciar believed that his best chance of defeating the Scots was to mobilize the magnates of Munster against them. 98

We may also wonder whether Butler knew all along that the Bruces were intending to join up with the Irish of Thomond and Desmond, and to provoke a rising in the south. They had come down from Ulster, ignoring Drogheda, Dublin and now Kilkenny. King Robert must have realised that no conquest of Ireland could take place while he left these strong walled towns untaken in his wake. It seems that Bruce had been approached by one of the O'Briens of Thomond, and that the south-west was his goal from the beginning. One of the Irish who rose in 1316 when the Scots were at Skerries was Brian Ban O'Brien. 99 Brian and his brother Donough formed one of the parties in the current struggle for the kingship of Thomond, which had been raging since the death of Turlough Mor O'Brien in 1306. Donough is said to have gone to Ulster:

that in fact after spoiling all Ireland they (i.e. the Scots) now were entering into fair mid-Munster, and that clan Brian Rua (i.e. the party of Donough and Brian) closely accompanying the king of Scotland and Edward came on that hosting— for wonder in Ulster Donough mac Donall mac Brian Rua had been with the Scots, treating them that they would come on this progress; as come they did.... 100

98 Butler, as lord of Tipperary, would have been worried about his own lands.
99 P.R.O.I., Just.roll, Hil., II Edw.II, m.17.
As they had done in Connacht, the Scots were once more involving themselves in a complex Irish political situation.

Butler had left Cork on 5 March, and reached Carrick-on-Suir, on the eastern border of his own lordship, on 7th. He then headed rapidly north to Ardmayle, where he began to gather troops seriously, taking 80 men-at-arms and 200 hobelars into pay. \(^{101}\) By about 12 March the Scots had reached Callan, also on the Tipperary border. \(^{102}\) On 15 March measures began in earnest. The Scots were now in Tipperary, and Butler, back at Ardmayle, was joined by his brother Thomas, swelling the army to 200 men-at-arms, 440 hobelars and 300 foot. The royal army seems to have followed the Scots (it is described as setting out \emph{ad supervidendum et gravandum Scotos}), who continued westwards and reached Cashel on 20 March. For nine days Butler was in the Cashel area, with a posse varying between 320 and 620 men. There is no evidence that the royal army attempted to engage the Bruces in battle, and we can only assume that Butler did not regard himself as strong enough to do so. Between 30 March and 4 April the armies moved into county Limerick, and the justiciar's force increased to 920 men. A confrontation between the armies began; the justiciar encamping at Caherconlish and nearby Ludden. \(^{103}\)

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102 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 299-300.
while the Scots were at Castleconnell, rather nearer to Limerick itself. The Bruces had now reached the Shannon under the O'Briens' guidance, and we must examine the situation they found there.

When the Scots involved themselves with Donough O'Brien they automatically incurred the enmity of his rival, Murtough. The result was that Murtough and his supporters joined the justiciar, and, instead of finding support among the southern Irish, the Bruces found the army of Thomond on the opposite bank of the Shannon "with intent to attack them". Nor was this all. Donough had for many years been receiving the support of Richard de Clare. This meant that any approach to the Scots by Donough would place de Clare in a difficult position, and make his behaviour crucial to the success of the invasion in the south. De Clare's reaction was ambiguous. He seems to have withdrawn his support from Donough after Donough's approach to Bruce, without actually switching his support to Murtough, who still regarded him as an enemy. A conflict had clearly developed between the policy de Clare had carefully built up in his lordship and his duty to the king of England. To the author of the "Caithreim" de Clare's behaviour seemed puzzling:

\[
\text{this carriage of de Clare's was strange indeed: that one who on this expedition}\]

104 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 301; Clyn, p.13.
105 Caithreim Thordhealbhaigh, II. 83-4, 117.
106 See Orpen, Normans, IV. 89-90.
was joined with the king of England's people should at the same time help clan-Brian Rua now leagued with the Scots, and consequently outlaws from the king. 107

In fact there is nothing that casts doubt on de Clare's loyalty— he was, after all, one of the most English of the magnates, and for that reason never trusted by the Irish as, for example, the de Burghs appear to have been. 108 De Clare added his forces to the royal army: we find him stationed at Ludden, using crops of his own demesnes to support his troops. 109 Any hopes the Scots may have had of using de Clare, or the other Irish of Thomond, against the justiciar were now at an end.

The justiciar had succeeded in rallying the south against the Scots. In addition to his paid army, and the forces of de Clare and Murtough, we hear of Maurice de Carew providing his own supplies and coming from Cork, 110 and of the "army of the country" from Waterford joining the justiciar "against the Scotch enemies". 111 According to the "Caithreim" the Scots, who had intended to fight, found such a great force opposed to them that they decided to retreat. This source too suggests that it was the discovery that Murtough was with the English that was the deciding factor. 112 No engagement took place with the royal

107 Caithreim Thordhealbhach, II. 117.
108 See Orpen, Normans, IV. 94-5.
109 Just. roll 11 Edw. II (R.C. no. 116), m. 15- P.R.O. I., Cal., pp. 70-1.
110 Ibid., 11 Edw. II (R.C. no. 119), m. 12- pp. 16-17.
111 Ibid., 9-11 Edw. II, m. 15- pp. 87-8.
112 Caithreim Thordhealbhach, II. 117.
army— the Anglo-Irish annalists say that the armies lay close by each other for several days and did nothing. Barbour too has no action to describe at this point. The Scots turned back secretly by night, apparently convinced that any attack on the justiciar's force was doomed to failure. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Scots had been misled by Donough O'Brien, and had once more failed to understand the complexities of Irish politics. Butler's success is all the more praiseworthy when the critical financial position in the lordship is remembered. No more than 200 marks could be raised for his army by the exchequer, and the justiciar had to rely on an assignment of no less than 500 marks on the revenues of county Limerick.

Nevertheless, having achieved so much, the justiciar once more failed to bring the Scots to battle. The Bruces were retreating under heavy pressure from lack of supplies, and even the Scottish sources emphasize the straitened circumstances of king Robert's army. The Limerick campaign had been a miscalculation, and it can truly be said that Ireland is the great question—

113 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 301; Clyn, p.13.
114 The Bruce, II. 59-60.
115 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 353.
117 Mem. roll 15-16 Edw. II, m.13- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/12, pp.648-9. There is, of course, no way of telling how far, if at all, this assignment was met by the sheriff.
118 Fordun, Scotichronicon, p.347.
mark in king Robert's career.\textsuperscript{119} The annals suggest that Butler was content to see the Scots retreat, and he has been heavily criticized for doing so.\textsuperscript{120} The clerk's account, however, adds new information which shows that, for a time at least, the justiciar's army did follow the Scots. There seems to have been a delay after the Scottish army left Castleconnell, but then on 16 April, having returned to Cashel, the justiciar "recollected his posse" of 780 men. He caught up with the Scots in the bog of Eliogarty, and there the troops \textit{insultum dederunt Scotis}, before finally disbanding.\textsuperscript{121} Some of the Anglo-Irish of Ulster had joined the justiciar, and he now put them under the command of the earl of Kildare and ordered them to follow the Scots.\textsuperscript{122} We find them doing so, living off the countryside, on 20 April.\textsuperscript{123} Meanwhile the Bruces progressed northwards to Trim, where they rested, apparently starving, and made their way back into Ulster.\textsuperscript{124} Mortimer had now arrived— and indeed his arrival may have been another factor in convincing king Robert that his position was hopeless.\textsuperscript{125} The lieutenant

\textsuperscript{119} Barrow, Robert Bruce, p.435.

\textsuperscript{120} See Armstrong, Edward Bruce's Invasion, pp.106-7.

\textsuperscript{121} P.R.O., S.C.6/1239/13. The identification of the \textit{mora de Ely} I owe to Dr Adrian Empey.

\textsuperscript{122} Chart. St. Mary's, II. 300,353. The chronology of the whole period needs revising in the light of the unpublished record evidence.

\textsuperscript{123} Just. roll 11 Edw. II (R.C.no.116), m.25d— P.R.O.I., Cal., p.124.

\textsuperscript{124} Chart. St. Mary's, II. 300-01.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., pp.301-2.
is said to have sent Butler letters ordering him to
await his coming before proceeding further against
the Scots. Once Butler had received Mortimer's
order there was nothing he could do but let his
troops go home. Money was short, and the difficulties
of supplying a large army in countryside which had
left the Scots perishing of hunger must have been
immense. This was really the end of the Bruce invasion
in so far as it affected the Dublin government. From
now until the autumn of 1318 Edward Bruce was quiet
and did not emerge again from Ulster. He may well
have been penned there by the continuing famine.
When, in September 1318, he again moved south, he was
defeated and killed at Faughart by the levies of
Meath and Louth under the command of John de Bermingham.
The Irish government played no part in the final
defeat of the Scots. At no time between April 1317
and Faughart does Mortimer appear to have attempted
to deal with the Scottish army. He seems to have been
satisfied to leave Bruce undisturbed in Ulster, and
to set about re-establishing the government's authority
in Munster, the Leinster mountains and his own liberty
of Meath. Events proved this policy to have been

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126 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 301. For Mortimer's possible
forces, see above, p. 14 and "Caiteisi on g Ceathru
Cead Deag", ed. MacNiocaill, Gallvia, V (1958), p. 34
where he is said to have come cum magno exercitu.

127 See Duhlop, Essays presented to T. F. Tout, p. 287.

128 See MacIomhair, "The battle of Fochart", Irish
Sword, VIII (1967-8), pp. 192-209 for a detailed
study of this battle, informed by a deep topograph-
ical knowledge, but a little uncritical in the use
of late chronicle evidence.

129 For details see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland,
pp. 233-34 and also below, pp. 238-40.
the right one. 130

When king Robert appealed to "all the kings of Ireland" at the outset of the invasion, he was asking for a united front that was quite foreign to Gaelic Ireland at the time. We may suspect that he was unwittingly transferring Scottish feelings to Ireland. Even had there been a general will to unity among the Irish, the practical difficulties were insurmountable. The most notable feature of medieval Ireland was its strong regional nature, and even within each Irish area there was rarely an undisputed power. This was particularly noticeable in Connacht and Thomond, where attempts to produce an Irish rising, beneficial to the Scots, failed. Instead of being able to use the Irish against the English, Bruce found one section of the local Irish trying to use the Scots against its own rivals. Only in Ulster, with its uniquely close relations with Scotland, was Bruce able to establish a secure authority, and even in Ulster he had to cope with Domnall O'Neill's enemies.

O'Neill and Bruce tried to appeal to Irish sensibilities. Their famous Remonstrance against English rule in Ireland shows a remarkable breadth of vision. Although many of its grievances relate to Ulster, the mere citing of the murders of Brian O'Brien of Thomond in 1277, the MacMurroughs of Leinster in 1282, and the O'Conors of Offaly in 1305 shows that they were trying to make use of a common feeling of oppression 130 The fact that the Scottish presence in Ulster could be thus ignored is indicative of the "regional mentality" prevalent at the time.
among the Irish. But the history of the years from 1315 to 1317 shows that Bruce and O'Neill failed to put themselves at the head of any general movement. When O'Neill appealed to Fineen MacCarthy for his aid, probably in 1317 or 1318, this appeal, like an earlier one, seems to have fallen on deaf ears. At most it evoked an offer of troops. The failure of this appeal does no more than confirm the impression left by the other evidence. The Bruces made a serious misjudgement if they thought any general movement of the Irish in their favour was possible. Even had there been the will to such a movement—and the universal condemnation of Bruce in the Irish annals on his death shows that there was not—in the circumstances of fourteenth century Ireland it would have been impossible to bridge the gap between such feelings of support and concerted action. We have, after all, already seen that the government's own policy in Leinster was to use the Irish against each other. It was all too easily done.

When this is taken into account, the ability of the justiciar to force Bruce and his allies into retreat in 1315, 1316 and 1317 becomes comprehensible. The government has been castigated for its failure to force a decisive issue with the Scots, but when we remember the appalling lack of resources at Butler's command, and the famine which made living off the countryside very difficult, the administration must be

given credit for achieving as much as it did. In earlier chapters we have emphasized the declining military commitment of the Dublin government, and the existence of strong regional divisions and power centres. Just as this made it impossible for the government to control the whole country, so it frustrated the attempt of Edward Bruce to establish a kingdom in Ireland.133

133 As the title of the chapter suggests, this view of the invasion takes into account only Edward Bruce, the Dublin government and the Irish. Edward's ambitions were not realized. The government deserves, I would suggest, a more indulgent judgement than it has usually been accorded. The reaction of the Irish was predictable, and follows logically from what we have seen in earlier chapters. The invasion "failed". But if we take Robert Bruce and the English government into consideration, the picture is a different one. As Dr Lydon has argued, the invasion may well have fulfilled king Robert's objectives of ruining Ireland as a source of supply, and giving Edward II something to think about. Hence the invasion was a "success". It seems to me that these two views of the invasion are complementary, not mutually exclusive.
Chapter VI

The government under pressure (I)

1318-1332

It must be said at once that the years from 1318 to 1361 have important elements of unity and that the divisions we shall adopt are to some extent matters of convenience. Throughout these years the Dublin government was forced to pay continual attention to the Irish of Leinster, and in this the period can be seen as a continuation of Wogan's later years. The intensity of the Leinster threat fluctuated, and it is obviously not something that lends itself to precise measurement, but it seems true to say that the 1350s were worse than anything that had gone before, and that the overall trend was towards deterioration. Apart from the perennial Leinster problem, there are other strands of continuity. Connacht, by and large, remained outside the government's ambit, and Offaly, although it demanded the occasional expedition, never received the attention that it had done in the later thirteenth century. On the other hand, two important changes may be discerned. First of all, on the murder of the Brown Earl of Ulster in 1333 the earldom came into the king's hand, and thereafter was the property of a minor or an absentee. As a result, between 1333 and 1361 desultory intervention took place against the Ulster Irish (though more often in the form of peace-making journeys than of expeditions of war). Only
Ralph of Ufford, who had personal interests in the earldom, seems to have intervened with any real effect, but nevertheless the possession of Ulster saddled the administration with a responsibility which it had not normally had between 1280 and 1333. The second change in the government's position is of more moment and requires a separate discussion.

1318 was the year not only of Faughart but also of Disert O'Dea. At that battle the power of the de Clares was extinguished, and something of a vacuum was created in the south. Even apart from this, we have already seen the measures Edmund Butler had had to take in order to enlist the southern lords in the king's service in 1317. Mortimer, his successor, found it necessary to go against the Anglo-Irish of the south and south-west during both his terms of office. This disorder and the removal of the de Clares from Thomond had a profound influence on the history of the next three decades. Already in the autumn after Disert O'Dea Maurice fitz Thomas (later the first earl of Desmond) invaded Thomond in alliance with Dermot MacCarthy and Brian O'Brien. His alliance with Brian Ban O'Brien is of the first significance. Brian was the representative of "Clan Brian Rua", the branch of the O'Briens which had consistently been supported by Richard de Clare. It seems clear both from this and from succeeding

1 Above, pp.221-3.
2 See below, pp.239-41.
3 AT, 1318.
4 See above, pp.225-6.
events that fitz Thomas was trying to move into the vacant position left by Richard de Clare's death, and that he was doing so in collaboration with one of the parties in the long-standing O'Brien feuds.5 Although the escheator garrisoned Bunratty from 9 May 1318 to 30 July 1319,6 the de Clare lands were given into the custody of Maurice de Rocheford on 8 August 1318.7 In 1320 the position was made clear by Thomas de Clare, Richard's heir, who was still under age. He pointed out that the king took no profit from his lands, which were only being preserved for him by his "friends", and asked that the lands might be granted him despite his nonage, and that Maurice fitz Thomas his uncle and Maurice de Rocheford should then be given their custody on his behalf.8 (These were clearly the "friends" he had in mind). The king agreed to this, having heard a similar story from Mortimer, who told him that the revenues "do not suffice for their defence against the Irish and other rebels in those parts".9 This arrangement was upset when Thomas

5 Fitz Thomas's career is discussed by Professor Sayles, "The Rebellious First Earl of Desmond", Medieval Studies presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J., pp.203-29, and Professor Sayles has also edited an important series of inquisitions in "The legal proceedings against the First Earl of Desmond", Analect. Hib., XXIII. 3-47. It may be suggested that the factors discussed below provide a clearer motivation for many of Desmond's actions.


7 Cal.Fine Rolls 1307-19, p.372; C.C.R. 1318-23, p.84.

8 Rot.Parl., I. 385.

9 C.P.R. 1317-21, p.523.
de Clare died in 1321, and his inheritance fell to be divided between his aunts and their husbands. However, Bartholomew de Badelesmere, the husband of one of the co-heiresses, agreed that the custody of the lands should remain in the hands of the two Maurices. This lasted for one year only. On 20 April 1322 the other co-heirs got all the Thomond lands, with Bunratty and Quin castles, and fitz Thomas and de Rocheford were ordered to deliver them up. Fitz Thomas was not to be baulked by this, and it seems clear that he had seized the inheritance by 1330.

All this has taken us far from our theme, but it is part of the essential background to it. After 1318 the south became the government's military concern in a way it had not been since the 1270s. Fitz Thomas in particular presented a threat to the government's authority that was intermittently acute, and, because of the close links between him and the Irish (and Brian Ban O'Brien in particular) it is not possible to draw a distinction between his rebellions and the disorders caused by the southern Irish. These developments in the south are in a sense the key to the understanding of the period. The government is now faced by two main crisis points, whereas in Wogan's time there had only been one. At times expeditions to Leinster and Munster alternate with bewildering rapidity, and on occasion a campaign in one area has to be cut

12 Ibid., p.123.
13 *C.C.R. 1330-3*, pp.24-5,58.
short because of renewed disturbance in the other.

It is proposed to deal with the years from 1318 to 1361 in three divisions. The period from 1318 to 1332 shows the gradual increase in the Leinster threat (which had subsided somewhat in the years immediately following the Bruce invasion), and it also marks the first stage of the disturbances in Munster associated with the name of Maurice fitz Thomas. The period ends with a remarkably successful attempt by Anthony Lucy to deal with both these areas. From 1332 to 1349 the problems of both Leinster and Munster remained acute, and added to them was the need to make at least a gesture towards the Irish of Ulster. It was also a period during which the government can be shown to have been hard-pressed financially. Ralph of Ufford, however, succeeded in removing the Desmond threat, and when he died in 1346 he left a legacy of comparative quiet to his immediate successor. Between 1349 and 1361 the Leinster threat came to a climax. Up to 1357 the gravity of the situation was partly masked by the negotiating skill of Thomas of Rokeby, but after his death in the latter year the government was patently unable to keep Leinster under control, and the records betray evidence of desperation.

These very broad conclusions have been stated at the outset, for the whole period is one which shows few signs of policies unfolding month by month or even year by year. The actions of both government and Irish appear endlessly repetitive and monotonous, and individual events tend to have significance only within the context of the current expedition or "treating".
FOURTEENTH CENTURY
LEINSTER

DUBLIN

SAGGART

BALLYMORE

BALLYTENY

NEWCASTLE MCKYNEGAN

CASTLEKEVIN

GLENMALURE

GLENALOUGH

WICKLOW

ARKLOW

CARLOW

CLOMMORE

TULLOW

LEIGHTEN

GOWAN

DUISKE

K. O'GAN
Long-term developments may be discerned, but only when we have set out the evidence at considerable length.

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As has already been remarked, the years following the Bruce invasion do not suggest that it caused any notable decline in the government's ability to deal with the native Irish. Nor do they suggest that the invasion had the effect of increasing the Irish threat itself. The invasion had given the Irish in certain areas the opportunity to rise, but events after the retreat from the Shannon in 1317 do not reveal any pattern of heightened activity. Indeed the period from 1317 to 1324 seems to have been considerably more peaceful than Wogan's last years. Military activity was desultory, and the government only gradually came to be harassed by disorder in the south and the intensification of the Leinster war.

The last year of the Scottish presence in Ireland saw Mortimer engage in a widespread mopping-up operation, chiefly in the south. He also led an expedition to the Leinster mountains which seems to have been effective in extinguishing the disorders Bruce had caused. By late August 1317 a subsidy was being levied on Wexford ad reprimendum maliciam hibernicorum de montanis Lagenie, \(^{14}\) and there may also have been a levy of two shillings on the carucate in Fingall. \(^{15}\) Certainly

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\(^{14}\) R.C.H. p.24 no.128.

\(^{15}\) Mem. roll 8 Edw. II, m.13d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/10, p. 134 (Michaelmas year 11).
the financial evidence suggests that the Dublin exchequer was still unable to carry an extended campaign; Richard of York was clerk of wages, and, although he received a total of £210-2s-9d, payment was made in ten small instalments between Michaelmas 1317 and Michaelmas 1320. We do not know what size Mortimer's army was, but he seems to have been involved in heavy fighting. According to the annals he went against the Irish of Imaal and Glenealy in September. A thorough-going battle supervened, of which the Irish got the worst. O'Byrne came within the peace, and then, on 28 October, the earl of Kildare stood as surety for the Archbolds, who were also received into the peace. There had plainly been alliances between the Irish and the Anglo-Irish of the mountains, following on from the alleged conspiracy between the O'Byrnes, O'Tooles, Harolds and Archbolds to burn Wicklow and the surrounding area in 1316. Mortimer's victory seems to have quietened the area, for he was able now to set off for Munster, and the Leinster mountains were not apparently a serious threat for some years.

Mortimer appears to have been able to establish peace in the south without heavy fighting. Payments to him reveal "arduous negotiations" in Munster, a journey

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16 P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/8, 9, 12, 14; Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25. During this period debts to the clerk for Butler's Louth expedition of 1316 and his Leinster campaign of 1316 were still being paid off.


18 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 349.
to Waterford and other unspecified places "to repress the rebellion and pride of certain English and Irish", and to Desmond "to repress the rebellion of certain English and Irish". Neither annals nor records provide evidence of positive military campaigns, and it seems likely that the lieutenant's prestige and retinue encouraged submission rather than resistance. Mortimer also dealt sharply with the de Lacys, who had supported Bruce, and the O'Farrells in Meath and the Connacht borders.

Mortimer was absent from Ireland between May 1318 and June 1319, returning as justiciar, not lieutenant. Before his return the O'Nolans were giving trouble, and they rather than the more northerly O'Tooles and O'Byrnes were to be the government's main concern between 1318 and 1323. They are said to have joined with the O'Tooles and O'Byrnes in slaying John de Lyvet, and then to have killed eighty men who were campaigning against them under Arnold le Poer's command. Mortimer's reaction is not easily traced, but by the Hilary term of 1320 both the O'Nolans and the neighbouring Mac Murroughs had been forced to give hostages. Henry son of John O'Nolan gave his son Roger as a hostage for himself, his family and name pro firma pace de cetero versus quoscumque fideles domini Regis. Similarly,

19 P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/8,12.

20 The fact that money was paid in uninformative lump sums directly to Mortimer deprives us of our usual information.

21 For all this see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.234.

Donald son of "Morwyth Neth" MacMurrough gave his son William in obisidem pros se et toto eraghto (MS "etaghto") suo. Roger and William were delivered respectively to Thomas and Edmund Butler for safe-custody. In May 1320 the justiciary was setting out once more to Munster, but the evidence shows that there was an expedition to Slievemargy about the same time. We do not know whom it was directed against, or what it achieved, but the fact that the clerk of wages was compensated for the loss of a horse suggests that there was fighting. It may be that these hostages were not enough to restrain the Irish of southern Leinster.

Mortimer's southern expedition seems to have been aimed solely against the Anglo-Irish rebels, and he succeeded in exacting submissions from the Barrys, Roches, de Courcys, Cogans and Carews. His work was successful enough to ensure his successor, the earl of Kildare, a remarkably peaceful year in office. However, when Kildare was replaced by John de Bermingham (now earl of Louth) in August 1321, it soon became obvious that the O'Nolans were far from pacified. Before

23 Just.roll, Hil. 13 Edw.II- Genealogical Office, MS 190, p.177.
24 R.C.H. p.28 no.11. A series of assignments were made on the southern shires to the clerk of wages at this time (P.R.O.I., Mem.roll 13-14 Edw.II, m.47).
26 For the events see Pat.roll 13 Edw.II- P.R.O.I., Ferguson Coll., I, f.154 (R.C.H. p.27 no.72); R.C.H. p.26 no.31; P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/237/12. The cost was £450-18s-3d.
28 He appears to have done no more than maintain 10 extra men-at-arms against the Roches and Cauntetons over
the end of the year, William de Bermingham, the
custodian's deputy, was campaigning against them.
He does not appear to have received any payments from
the exchequer for the expedition, but it was large
enough to warrant the bringing of supplies from Meath
to Dublin, and we know that the archbishop of Dublin
provided men and horses at his own expense. It is
not clear whether William achieved any temporary
success, but certainly his expedition was rapidly
followed by another one under the earl of Louth himself.
The clerk of wages was appointed on 12 November for
operations against the O'Nolans and others, and he
was to have £500 for the army going with Louth to
"divers parts of Leinster and Munster against enemies
and rebels". We may surmise that the O'Nolans were
dealt with first, and with effect, for by 27 November
four of their hostages were in Kilkenny castle,
whilst with Patrick son of Richard O'Brennan, their
nearest neighbour. In March 1322 these hostages
were moved to Dublin, where they were kept for some
months. Despite this, the Irish continued to give

and spend £40 on operations in the Leinster,
Munster and Meath marches (P.R.O., Issue roll,
E.101/237/14; R.C.H. p.28 no.31).

Richardson & Sayles (Administration of Ireland, p.
84) omit him, but an assignment was made on Meath
for his fee as "lieutenant" (Mem. roll 15-16 Edw.II,
m.35- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/12, p.771), and this confirms
the official position suggested by his military
activities.

Mem. roll 16-17 Edw.II, m.22- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/13,

Tbid., 15-16 Edw.II, m.6- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/12, p.
583.
trouble, and the government was quite clearly faced with a considerable problem.

In the first half of 1322 Arnold le Poer was engaged in treating with the O'Nolans,\(^{35}\) and later, perhaps early in the following year, Henry Traherne was defending the marches against them.\(^{36}\) In addition, in the autumn of 1322 they are said to have killed Andrew de Bermingham and Nicholas de la Lande.\(^{37}\) It was not until the latter half of 1323 that decisive action was finally taken against them. Between 15 August and 8 September in that year Traherne and some of the de Valles succeeded in killing Henry O'Nolan and in capturing "Makmorkada".\(^{38}\) This must have been the Donald son of "Morwyth Neth", for whose capture Traherne was paid,\(^{39}\) and who had been the other chieftain

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33 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/170, m.47. Only £113-6s-8d seems to have been paid directly by the exchequer (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/237/19). Other sums were assigned (Mem.roll 15-16 Edw.II, m.18- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/12, p.668).


34A P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/19; 238/1.

35 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/1.


37 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 362; Clyn, p.15.

38 Ibid., pp.15-16.

39 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/13; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.33; Mem.roll 17-18 Edw.II, m.4d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/13, p.364. These all confirm that the event was in 1323. R.C.H. p.30 no.5 gives 1322, but this is obviously a mistake.
to give a hostage to Mortimer in 1320. There is no hint that these notable feats were in any way the government's achievement. We do not know what the administration did with MacMurrough, but certainly his capture did not bring an end to the disorders that the MacMurroughs had been causing. The death of Henry O'Nolan does, however, seem to have been important. The O'Nolans, who had been the most persistent troublemakers in the 1319 to 1323 period, ceased for a time to be a major threat to the peace.

For the rest, the government's role under Mortimer's successors seems to have been a limited one. The Dublin mountains were disturbed as usual, but not apparently to the extent that an expedition was needed there. The annals reveal disorders in Meath, Louth and Offaly, but the Irish seem to have been fought exclusively by the local lords. Likewise, in Kilkenny and Tipperary there were troubles, but as much among the Anglo-Irish themselves as between them and the Irish. It was only when Edmund Butler died in 1321, leaving a minor as his heir and his lands in the king's hand, that the government intervened in this area. It seems clear that by Easter 1323 Thomas Butler, custos of the Ormond lands, was finding the situation too serious to control alone. Then the justiciar joined him


41 Clyn, p. 14; R.C.H. p. 26 no. 34.

42 Clyn, p. 14; R.C.H. p. 26 no. 34.
against the O'Carrolls and MacGillapatricks in Ely. O'Carroll and Slieve Bloom. The exchequer defrayed part of the cost of the campaign, but £40 also came from the revenues of the Ormond lands, emphasizing again the responsibility of the local lord for the Irish of his own area. We know nothing of what this expedition achieved, and it appears to have been the only operation against the Irish in the years 1321-4, apart from the expeditions against the O'Nolans which we have already discussed. But shortly after the arrival of John Darcy as justiciar on 1 February 1324 the pressure from the Irish began to provoke a stronger military reaction from the government. The comparative lull, if such it was, had come to an end.

As we have seen, many of the disturbances in the period immediately following the Bruce invasion were the work of the Anglo-Irish rather than the Irish. It is therefore significant that one of Darcy's first important acts was to have the magnates undertake in the parliament of May 1324 to capture felons:


44 For a view of Darcy's career, infected by a good deal of parti pris, see Darcy, Life of John, First Baron Darcy of Knayth, esp. pp.29-78.

45 It must be remembered that the exchequer was still recovering from the effects of the invasion during these years. If it was not paying for campaigns directly in the normal way, we must be even less confident than usual that the surviving evidence is a reliable guide to all the administration's military activities.
of their own family and surname, and their adherents......in the March and all other felons and notorious evildoers, who shall be found and received in their lordships

and to bring them to justice. A series of the most important lords in Ireland then made indentures to this effect with the king.\textsuperscript{46} In fact the disorders among the Anglo-Irish were to spread and become severe during the lengthy period covered by Darcy's many terms of office.

Either shortly before or shortly after this parliament, Darcy was into military action against the O'Byrnes, MacMurroughs, O'Mores and Roches. These were hardly major operations, for the justiciar was paid no more than £22-8s for some twenty-eight days at war.\textsuperscript{47} Nevertheless, the royal service seems to have been called to Tullow for these campaigns, and this would hardly have happened had the justiciar and council not believed the situation to be serious.\textsuperscript{48} That this was so may possibly be confirmed by the fact that the justiciar went back to England late in the summer, presumably to consult with the king. As a result, the


\textsuperscript{47} P.R.O., Iss--ue roll, E.101/238/12; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.33. This may have been associated with operations by the treasurer against the Roches and O'Nolans between 29 May and 17 July (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.34; Cal.Memoranda Roll 1326-7, no.782).

\textsuperscript{48} First receipts reached the exchequer on 17 June (P.R.O., Roll of receipt of service, E.101/238/15). This seems to confirm that the summons was now, and not for the larger expedition which took place in the autumn.
king requested the magnates to be faithful and to believe what Darcy would tell them by word of mouth. He also granted the justiciar 500 marks from the English exchequer, to be carried to Dublin and expended as he saw fit. Darcy, it seems, was in need of financial and moral assistance.

When the justiciar returned in October, he was almost immediately organizing another expedition in the Leinster mountains, chiefly against the O'Byrnes and MacMurroughs. The expenditure of £278 shows that this must have been a full-scale campaign, but few details of it have come down to us. Only the presence of MacMurrough's son, "Janok", in the justiciar's hands as a hostage from 11 November enables us to surmise that Darcy had had some success against the Irish. This was complemented before Christmas when Arnold le Poer, seneschal of Kilkenny, defeated the Roches, who had been in rebellion with the Irish in the spring, and forced them too to give hostages for the peace.

49 C.C.R. 1323-7, p.308. Richardson & Sayles (Administration of Ireland, p.85 n.1), although recording Outlaw as deputy, found no evidence that Darcy had left the country. These facts make it overwhelmingly probable that he had.


51 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/17. Writs of liberate were issued to two clerks for almost the same amounts (R.C.H. p.31 no.80; p.32 no.103), but only Richard of York appears to have been paid. We must presume that, for some unknown reason, he superseded the other clerk before the expedition began.

52 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/19. We should not read too much into this, for there had been hostages in custody in September (R.C.H. p.30 nos.16 & 17).

53 Mem.roll 18 Edw.II, m.9- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/14, pp. 92-3; Clynt, pp.16-17.
Whatever success Darcy may have had, the autumn campaign of 1324 was far from conclusive. By the spring of the next year disorder was again serious. William Comyn, whom we may remember as leader of the Dublin levies in 1316, was scouting in the mountains with a band of men-at-arms, hobelars and foot, and he succeeded in capturing several members of the O'Toole sept and in killing a brother of Hugh Og O'Toole. He and his fellow leaders were rewarded for delivering their captives up at Dublin castle. By May moves were again afoot against the O'Byrnes. The earl of Kildare kept ward at Baltinglass and Duhlavin to the west of the mountains against them, while in the east Newcastle McKynegan was strengthened by the addition of eight archers to its garrison, to combat both the O'Byrnes and the O'Tooles. Darcy did not, however, launch another expedition in Leinster. This seems to have been because he was forced to go south against the Cauntetons and against the Irish of Slievemargy and Thomond. The disturbances caused by the O'Byrnes occupied him on his way south. At Castledermot on 21 May 1325 he wrote to the treasurer at Dublin, explaining that a fight had taken place between Murgh O'Byrne and Hugh Lawless, in which O'Byrne had succeeded in capturing three of Lawless's men. The justiciar had agreed that O'Byrne's son, who was detained in Dublin castle as a hostage, should be released to Hugh Lawless, to enable him to strike a bargain for the return of his own followers. Once O'Byrne signified his agreement, the

56 Ibid. They were kept from 20 May to 16 June.
constable of Dublin castle was to release the hostage. The earl of Kildare met O'Byrne at Baltinglass Abbey, where the Irishman issued his letters patent of agreement, undertaking to deliver up another son (presumably younger and less important) in exchange. On 25 May, now at Kilkenny, Darcy wrote once more to the treasurer informing him that the deal was to go ahead. Hugh Lawless went to Dublin, secured the hostage's release on 29 May, and agreed to restore him to the constable if in the event it proved impossible to reach agreement with O'Byrne.\textsuperscript{57} The cessation of the payments for the hostage's upkeep on 28 May confirms that he was released,\textsuperscript{58} but there is no evidence that O'Byrne provided another hostage to take his place.

This transaction must have been unwelcome to the justiciar, coming as it did just at the time he was leaving Leinster, and also at a time when the O'Byrnes were on the rampage. The presence of a good hostage (and several hostages of the O'Tooles\textsuperscript{59}) in Dublin castle must have provided at least a little security for the keeping of the peace. The affray between O'Byrne and the Lawlesses had led Darcy to deprive the government of a useful check on the Leinster sept.

Meanwhile Darcy was moving southwards, although he does not seem to have engaged in military operations until mid-July, being occupied before this with holding a parliament at Kilkenny, and, apparently without great

\textsuperscript{57} Gilbert, Facsimiles, III, plate XIV. Cf. ibid., II, plate LXXVI, no.3. There is a good translation of these important (French) documents in R.I.A., MS 12 D 13, pp.169-73.

\textsuperscript{58} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/17.

\textsuperscript{59} ibid.
difficulty, taking hostages from the Cauntetons and O’Briens of Thomond. Then, between 15 and 21 July, he led a small expedition against the McGillaparticks. At no time during these operations does he seem to have had more than 24 men-at-arms, 21 nobelars and 25 foot in pay. It seems clear that these troubles in Munster were not on the scale of those which were swiftly to follow.

Already in the autumn and winter of 1325 serious trouble was arising in the south. William son of Richard Butler was killed in Thomond, followers of Maurice fitz Thomas attacked and took Bunratty, and Brian Ban O’Brien captured a large prey in Ossory and Slieve Bloom, in alliance with the English of Ely. Brian Ban was the chief Irish ally of fitz Thomas, and it seems reasonable to assume that there was some link between the last two disturbances. These events were followed by the government’s first intervention against fitz Thomas and his allies. By 13 February 1326 Darcy was setting out for Munster. His aims were to deal with fitz Thomas and the Powers, who were fighting each other, and with the English and Irish adherents of both sides, and also to recapture Bunratty from fitz Thomas. There is no sign that the expedition achieved

60 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/19; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.34d.
61 Clyne, p.17.
62 Analect.Hib., XXIII. 8-9. In the previous year the king had again ordered Bunratty to be resumed from fitz Thomas (Cal.Fine Rolls, 1319-27, p.269).
63 Clyne, p.17.
64 See above, pp.234-5 and Analect.Hib., XXIII. 6,9, 10-12,14-16.
its objects: no payments for Bunratty appear, no hostages are noted, and it was only a few months after this that the first conspiracy to obtain Ireland for fitz Thomas is said to have occurred. But the expedition sets the pattern for the next twenty years: almost every justiciar was forced to make an attempt to suppress the disorder associated with fitz Thomas and his allies.

The remainder of Darcy's first term of office was taken up with an expedition north on the death of the Red Earl of Ulster, when he aimed to take hostages and instal guards in the earldom, and with the related alarm caused by the landing of Robert Bruce there around Easter 1327. The justiciar left Ireland in the early summer and was replaced by the earl of Kildare. Kildare's main military concern was the Leinster mountains. Although there had been no formal expedition in the area since late in 1324, disturbances had continued through 1325 and into 1326 and 1327. In the spring of 1326 Newcastle McKynegan had again been strengthened, while the archbishop of Dublin had been forced to take the dangerous step of making Malmorth O'Toole constable of his castle of Tallaght. Presumably it was thought that O'Toole would be more capable than any English official of keeping his kinsmen at bay. However, this

appointment seems to confirm the disastrous picture of the condition of the archiepiscopal manors of south Dublin given by the inquisitions of 1326. 71 Castlekevin appears to have been thrown down at this same period. 72 Kildare too was employed in Leinster before he became justiciar, 73 while the Lawlesses were rewarded for capturing Gerald son of Dunlaing O'Byrne and his brother, whom the king kept as hostages, and for maintaining five strong houses at Wicklow. 74 It was against this background that the justiciar led an army in Leinster. His purposes seem to have been purely defensive: the army was employed "to stay at ward in the marches". Nothing more emerges about the operation, and we can only date it between the beginning of the Hilary and end of the Trinity exchequer terms of 1327. 75 Whatever Kildare achieved, before his death on 5 April 1328 the situation among the Irish of Leinster had entered a new and more dangerous phase.

The Leinster Irish are said to have elected Donal son of Art MacMurrough as their king, and the annals suggest that this was done with an unaccustomed degree of co-ordination among the septs. 76 This is the first definite sign of the tribes collaborating

72 C.C.R. 1327-30, p. 149.
73 P.R.O., Issue roll, E. 101/239/5.
74 R.C.H. p. 36 no. 93; P.R.O., Issue roll, E. 101/239/5.
75 Ibid.
76 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 365-6. They "collegerunt se, simul".
under the MacMurroughs since the 1290s, and as such it was an important step in the growing disorder near Dublin, although for the moment the trouble was quelled. The story in the annals is corroborated by the records: Donald was "elected anew by the Irish of the parts of Leinster to be their king and captain". The Irish then proceeded to a series of depredations, robberies, arsons and homicides in Leinster. It was left to Outlaw, the chancellor, to deal with this situation—perhaps because Kildare was already mortally sick—but the main credit for the suppression of the rising must be given to Henry Traherne. According to the annals, Henry (who had of course captured Donald son of "Morwyth Neth" five years before) together with Walter de Valle captured Donald son of Art. They are said to have taken their prisoner to Leixlip castle, where they detained him until a reward of £100 was forthcoming from the government. When this sum was paid, the Irishman was taken to Dublin. The records confirm that Donald's captors held out for their reward, but they place the action in county Carlow, not at Leixlip, and this seems more likely. Outlaw is said to have gone several times to Carlow "to treat about the delivery of Donald son of Art MacMurrough, being in the custody of Henry and Walter". It looks very much as if Traherne and de Valle were trying to exact a heavy price for yielding up MacMurrough, and it may be that the absence of a strong justiciar enabled them to adopt this attitude with impunity; such exploits

77 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/176, m.46.
78 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 365-6.
79 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/176, m.46.
were becoming a useful source of profit to the Anglo-Irish of Leinster. But, whatever their subsequent behaviour, Traherne and de Valle had performed an important service for the government in effecting Mac Murrough's capture. During the next year there is little sign of serious trouble in Leinster, and when it did come in 1329 there is no evidence of MacMurrough involvement in it.

When Outlaw became deputy on Kildare's death, he was involved in trying to pacify the quarrels in the south between the de Burghs, Geraldines, de Berminghams and Powers, and he spent the summer of 1328 in Munster. There is no evidence of military involvement against the Irish until Darcy's return to Ireland in May 1329. Then, from July until December, the justiciar was almost continuously at war, and for his campaigns we have the first surviving account of a clerk of wages since the Bruce invasion. Darcy engaged in campaigns against the O'Byrnes (in August and December), against the O'Dempsies and O'Mores (in October), and against the McGeohegans and de Lacys (in November). There were also two journeys to Kilkenny to hold parleys with the southern magnates (July and September-October). These expeditions have been chronicled by Orpen, and it is not proposed to discuss them all in detail here. Nevertheless, enough important evidence survives about the Leinster campaigns to make a full consideration of them worthwhile.

82 Normans, IV, 228-30.
The expeditions to Leinster lasted from 16 to 24 August and from 10 to 18 October respectively. The army used in the first expedition was considerably larger than that used in the second: 83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>men-at-arms</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hobelars</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foot</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The leaders of contingents on both occasions appear to have been the Dublin and Kildare tenants:

- Philip le Bret
- Ellis de Asshebourne
- Maurice Howell
- Gilbert de Moenes
- John Haket
- Reymund Lawless
- Henry Badowe
- John Lawless
- Murghut O'Toole
- Thomas Harold
- Thomas Archbold
- John de Wellesley
- Thomas de Warilowe
- William fitz Eustace
- Macomet de Cruys

They seem to have served in response to a summons to arms in defence of the shire, and to have had with them the number of troops they were obliged to bring on this account as well as those for whom they were paid. 84

The armies were therefore probably a little bigger than the surviving numbers would suggest— and considerably bigger if other tenants served with their obligatory number alone, and hence do not appear on the account at all.

83 Unless otherwise indicated, all details come from the account.

84 See above, p.26, note 98.
On the first occasion Darcy is said to have gone into the mountains on 16 August—the very day from which the clerk's account runs. The expedition was based on the coastal strong-points of Newcastle McKynnegan and Wicklow, and appears to have been supplied by sea. As the account shows, the justiciar had succeeded in enlisting an O'Toole on the side of the government, and, although we do not know how many troops he brought, this may have meant that the O'Byrnes alone had to be faced on this occasion. On 21 August the royal army came face-to-face with the enemy:

"...fuerunt quidam de Laweles interfeci et plures vulnerati et Robertus Locum fuit vulneratus et de Hibernicis meliores fuerunt interfeci et plures vulnerati et ceteri fugerunt. Sed Murkud Obrynne reddidit se obsidem cum filio suo et avunculo et filio avunculi sui. Et ducti fuerunt ad Castrum Dublin. Sed postea liberati fuerunt pro aliis obsidibus, scilicet, melioribus de eorum parenteiae."

This is one of our very few descriptions of an engagement with the Irish, and it is not very informative. It tells us nothing of the tactics employed in the battle, which, however, was hardly more than a skirmish judging from the light casualties suffered by the justiciar's army. It does, however, cast interesting light on the end of the campaign, showing what was liable to lie behind the usual cryptic phrase such as "brought the Irish to the peace". The justiciar

85 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 371.
87 He was to have 10 marks (Mem. roll 3-4 Edw. III, m. 17d—P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/15, pp. 491-2; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/176, m. 46).
88 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 371.
succeeded in capturing the O'Byrne chieftain, but he did not think it advisable to retain him in custody. Instead he used his possession of him to exact other hostages, and then released him under this security.

The simple fact that Darcy had to lead another campaign in the mountains against O'Byrne only four months later must suggest to us that the freeing of Murgh O'Byrne was a mistake—and an obvious error at that. But, lacking evidence, we can only take it on trust that Darcy had good reason for releasing him after the August campaign. It may be that the justiciar believed that his imprisonment would act as a goad rather than a check on his kinsmen, and that the peace would be better served by having him free, but bound by hostages to the government; he might then use his influence to keep his followers in check. The second campaign was preceded by operations against O'More and O'Dempsey, and there is evidence that disorder was spreading in Leinster. On 21 November Henry Traherne was captured by O'Nolan—this must have been sweet revenge for the Irish—and with him was taken Laurence Butler. This provoked the earl of Ormond into action, and he is said to have burned O'Nolan's territory of Fethard on 14 December. 89 This coincides exactly with Darcy's second operations against the O'Byrnes. At this point the justiciar seems to have felt himself unable to cope with the risings, for about 1 January 1330 he ordered Maurice fitz Thomas (now earl of Desmond) to come from Munster "to fight enemies". According to the annals Desmond came bringing with him an army of

89 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 371; Clyn, p.21.
10,000 men, including Brian Ban O'Brien. This number must be a great exaggeration, but we have confirmation that Desmond did come to Leinster with a force large enough to cost £120 in wages during the month he stayed there. The payment of this sum reveals that Darcy was indeed hard pressed on all sides, for Desmond is said to have gone against the O'Nolans, O'Mores and O'Byrnes. All three seats of disturbance were therefore still unpacified. We know nothing of the operations of either the justiciar or the earl against O'Byrne, but Desmond is said to have routed the O'Nolans, who fled and gave hostages to the government. Likewise Desmond forced the O'Mores to the peace and made them too give hostages, and he also recaptured the castle of Lea from the O'Dempseys. It seems clear that the government was rescued by Desmond at a time when it could no longer cope with the Leinster Irish. But these campaigns were no more decisive than usual in the long-term. As we shall see, disorders came thick

90 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 372.
91 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/176, m.46.
92 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 372.
93 Ibid.; Clyn, p.21. Clyn says that O'Dempsey captured Lea Dominica ante festum Mathei apostoli. If this is St. Matthias the day is 18 February 1330 (O'way-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.247). But this does not fit in with known chronology. Desmond came to Leinster about 1 January, and stayed a month; the capture of Lea by the Irish ought to pre-date this. Therefore it is more likely that it is St. Matthew (17 September 1329) and this dating would explain Darcy's expedition in October, when he presumably failed in his own bid to recapture the castle.
and fast in 1331 and 1332, and only the fact that the south became the obvious military priority must have delayed further intervention in the Leinster mountains until the late summer of the latter year.

By 30 June 1330 Outlaw, again lieutenant, was on his way "to Leinster and Munster to expel Breen Obreen and other English and Irish felons". The expedition was provoked by Brian Ban's excesses and by a fresh quarrel between the magnates, and a considerable amount can be added to what has already been published about it. Before the main expedition was launched Outlaw went to Munster "to quieten disputes among the English, and between the English and Irish, and to expedite other business there". This lasted from 14 February until 5 May, and it was probably at this time that the Prior ordered the sheriff of Limerick to seize Brian Ban's horses and cattle, only to have Desmond intervene to enforce their restoration. Then on 24 May Desmond and other Anglo-Irish are said to have aided Brian Ban during one of his raids. Outlaw's inspection of the area and it sequels must have convinced him that strong action was necessary, and accordingly, in a parliament at Kilkenny attended by the archbishop of Dublin, the earls of Ulster and Ormond, William de Bermingham and Walter de Burgh, the decision to mount an expedition.

95 See Sayles in Gwynn Studies, pp. 210; Orpen, Normans, IV. 232-3; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 247.
96 Mem. roll 3-4 Edw. III, mm. 33, 36- P.R.O. I., R.C. 8/15, pp. 584, 604-5. Cost (£100) to be borne by the great new custom.
seems to have been taken. The royal service was called to Athassel, which Brian Ban had recently burned, and the first receipts came in in this Trinity term. To help support the cost of the expedition the southern shires were to deliver all their debts to the clerk of wages, and the payment of £660 to him from the exchequer confirms that this was as serious a campaign as had been mounted since the Bruce invasion.

From 2 to 30 July the army was said to be "to Limerick, Clonmel and elsewhere in Munster" against Brian Ban and his adherents. It was made up thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men-at arms</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outlaw</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archbp. of</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clerk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The leaders of the archbishop's contingents were, as we might expect, Dublin tenants, including Lawlesses

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98 Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.211; Analect. Hib., XXIII. 15-16.
99 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 373; Clyn, p.21.
101 P.R.O., Roll of receipt of service, E.101/239/7. Total here only £25-17s, plus £55-3s-8d on P.R.O., Receipt rolls, E.101/239/23; 240/4.
and Howels from the mountains.\footnote{104} It does not seem that this expedition achieved very much. Outlaw succeeded in taking inquisitions against Desmond, but we hear of no military success against Brian Ban O' Brien. Clyn appears to describe events on the expedition without mentioning Outlaw's presence, and what he reveals confirms the impression that little of note was accomplished. He says that the earl of Ulster collected his Ulster and Connacht army, and that James Butler (the earl of Ormond) "led his army against Brian O' Brien".\footnote{105} The expedition was "without great success or great damage, great shame or great honour".\footnote{106} However, Bunratty seems to have been reached and occupied, for Arnold Outlaw was established there with a garrison of eleven men-at-arms and forty-eight foot from 31 July until 20 August.\footnote{107}

Events in August and September were more dramatic. The main army seems to have been disbanded on 30 July.


\footnote{105}{This is said to have taken place on "the vigil of the vigil of the blessed Alexis the confessor". This is obscure, but the following Wednesday was "the vigil of the vigil of the blessed Margaret the virgin" - that is 18 July, and therefore during the time of the justiciar's campaign. It seems clear that in the parliament which preceded these events the archbishop must have agreed to bring troops at the king's wages, while the two earls undertook to come at their own expense, perhaps in response to the summons of the royal service. Could the summons have been quanto potencius poteritis? Certainly, as we have seen, the cash receipts from the service were unusually small.}

\footnote{106}{Clyn, pp.21-2.}

and from then until 3 September Outlaw is said to have been "at Limerick, Clonmel, Cashel etc.", accompanied by the earl of Ulster with troops which cost £121-13s-2d in wages. Desmond, against whom the justiciar now seems to have turned, surrendered, was imprisoned, and then agreed to be before the deputy justiciar on 23 August. He changed his mind and escaped. Meanwhile the earl of Ulster was also arrested, apparently because of the ravaging of Desmond's lands by Wâåter de Burgh.109 These events are not directly our concern, but they demonstrate that in Munster as in Leinster the years 1329-30 saw events taking on a very threatening aspect. Any intervention against Brian Ban O'Brien was bound to involve the earl of Desmond, and if the justiciar employed the other important magnates in the south, he could not avoid becoming involved in their own quarrels with Desmond. Just as the widespread Leinster troubles of 1329 defeated Darcy, the ramifications of the Munster quarrels proved beyond Outlaw in 1330.

It seems clear that after a period of relative calm in 1318-24, the years 1324-30 saw an intensification of Irish and Anglo-Irish pressure on the Dublin administration. The problem of the unruly southern magnates, headed by Desmond, and their Irish allies had become serious during this period. In Leinster the O'Byrnes, MacMurroughs, O'Nolans and O'Mores were once more in a

state of semi-permanent insurrection, as they had been in the years 1306-13. The Irish situation seems now to have forced itself upon Edward III's attention, and the king instigated new measures to bring the lordship under control.

Anthony Lucy was appointed justiciar on 27 February 1331, and at the same time a series of events testifies to Edward's determination to combat the disorder in Ireland. The king sent to Ireland a group of Ordinances enacted at Westminster specifically for the Irish lordship. They show an unusual concern with questions of defence and the details of relations with the Irish: alone among fourteenth century legislation these Ordinances contain clauses referring to the important matters of hostages and fines. Not only were these Ordinances sent from England, but in addition the king himself began to make plans for an expedition to the lordship. In the English parliament of Michaelmas 1331 it was agreed that Edward should go to Ireland as soon as he could, and in the meantime lords owning lands in Ireland were to go to their lands with men-at-arms to assist the justiciar. A search was to be made in the chancery and treasury to find out what had formerly been done to remedy the state of Ireland and to receive the Irish into the peace, for the king wished decisions to be taken in future on the basis of good information. In the summer of 1332 preparations were actually going ahead for Edward's

110 C.P.R. 1330-4, p.83. For his powers cf. p.220.
112 Rot.Parl., II. 61. The consequent orders to the magnates are on C.C.R. 1330-3, p.400.
expedition. Purveyance was ordered and under way in Ireland, and orders to gather 3,060 English troops had been issued. But, because of the Scottish threat, the whole project was called off in the very parliament that had been summoned to mark its beginning. Edward never in the end came to Ireland, and no serious expedition was sent there from England until 1361.

We have spent some time discussing the preparations for an event which did not take place. This is because it has an importance in the context of Lucy's justiciarship. The period from September 1331, when Edward's expedition was decided upon, until September 1332 when it was called off, coincides with the period of Lucy's rule in Ireland. Lucy was more active, more ruthless and more effective against the Irish and the Anglo-Irish than were his predecessors. When discussing his actions it is necessary to remember that they took place under the shadow of the imminent arrival of the king.

We know more about Lucy's activities than about those of any former justiciar, and much of the information about his military operations, and indeed his movements, lies on the Memoranda and Issue rolls and has not been used previously in published work. It is therefore worthwhile following his actions closely and discussing them at greater length than those of Darcy and his lieutenants. Lucy's justiciarship marked the

115 Rot.Parl., II. 66; C.P.R. 1330-4, p.359.
the most serious confrontation so far with the Desmond menace, and it saw also the largest expedition to Leinster since before the time of Bruce.

Lucy acted from June 1331, and by July he was already taking measures against Desmond. He called a parliament to Dublin for 1 July, and adjourned it to Kilkenny. There he is said to have taken Desmond's submission, only to capture and imprison him fifteen days later. The justiciar had set out for the Kilkenny meeting of parliament on 25 July, taking quite a large number of troops with him:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chancellor</td>
<td>&quot;many men-at-arms&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retinues</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyssagh O'More</td>
<td>&quot;one company of hobelars&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>104+</strong></td>
<td><strong>93+</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>197+</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This force contained as many men-at-arms as many a large army, and Lucy was certainly going to the parliament prepared for any eventuality. The parliament was to meet on 1 August, and here Desmond is said to have submitted. But it can be shown from the paymaster's account that things did not happen quite so simply. John of Balscott was absent from Lucy's army

116 See Sayles in Gwynn Studies, pp.212-3; Orpen, Normans, IV. 235; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.248.

117 Mem. roll 5-6 Edw. III, m.36- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/16, pp.300-6. All other details, except where specified, come from this account.

118 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 375; Clynn, p.23. See Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.213.
between 31 July and 4 August "going from Kilkenny to Tipperary to parley with Desmond". Significantly, on the day Balscott returned from this mission the army began to disband, most of the contingents going out of pay on 4 or 5 August. Thus, despite the rumours that Desmond had planned to capture Lucy, the clerk's mission seems to have been successful.

From 5 August until 7 October the justiciar remained in the south with a smaller force, led by himself, the chancellor, treasurer and paymaster, and containing perhaps 50 to 60 men-at-arms and 30 hobelars. During this period Desmond was captured at Limerick and taken to Dublin. The cause of this apparent volte face by Lucy has been explained by Professor Sayles: Lucy had gone to Limerick, and arrangements had been made for Brian Ban O'Brien to come to him to discuss terms of peace. On 15 August Desmond intercepted Brian, persuading him to turn back from Limerick and not to come to terms. Brian then began to commit outrages, having been advised by the earl that he could force better terms from the justiciar by doing so. The paymaster's account confirms this description of events which was given by jurors on a later inquisition. Between 4 September and Michaelmas Lucy established Maurice de Rocheford in the ward of Any to resist Brian and his allies, and it seems that the Irishman had taken Desmond's advice to heart. Desmond was captured on the day after he is said to have counselled O'Brien, and

120 Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.213; Analect.Hib., XXIII. 14.
he was taken to Dublin castle on 7 October—the day the account shows the expedition to have ended.\footnote{Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.213.}

Desmond was kept in prison until 1333, and it remained to be seen what effect his arrest would have on his followers in the south. When Lucy was taking inquisitions on 23 March 1332 at Limerick, the jurors revealed a dramatic story of Desmond's conspiracy to conquer Ireland, and strongly advised the justiciar to keep him in custody.\footnote{Analect. Hib., XXIII. 12-13.} If there is truth in this tale, the conspiracy must obviously have pre-dated Desmond's capture on 16 August 1331. According to the jurors Desmond was to have Munster and Meath and to be king of Ireland, Henry de Mandeville was to have Ulster, William de Bermingham, Leinster, and Walter de Burgh, Connacht. The justiciar's actions after he returned from the south seem to confirm such a conspiracy. Henry de Mandeville was captured in September 1331,\footnote{Chart. St. Mary's, II. 376; C.C.R. 1330-2, p.410.} and this was followed by an expedition to the north which has not hitherto come to light. Between 8 October 1331 and 16 January 1332 Lucy was "in the parts of Uriel and Ards", with twenty-three men-at-arms beyond his statutory twenty.\footnote{P.R.O., Issuem roll, E.101/239/24; Pipe roll, E.372/179, m.46.} It seems reasonable to conjecture that he was engaged in restoring order in the area where de Mandeville's territory touched the southern shires. Then in February 1332 the justiciar captured William de Bermingham, the third alleged conspirator, at Clonmel.\footnote{Chart. St. Mary's, II. 376; Clym, p.23.}
There remained Walter de Burgh, and he was brutally dealt with by the earl of Ulster. There is evidence which may suggest that de Burgh had indeed been involved in a conspiracy. According to the annals "the forces of all Connacht, both Gall and Gael, were collected by MacWilliam (i.e., de Burgh) after this, to seize the kingship of Connacht for himself". This bid to take the sovereignty of Connacht took place in 1330, and it was serious enough to make MacDermot, who had begun by supporting de Burgh against O'Connor, take fright and team up with the other Irishman against de Burgh. This could well tie in with the agreement of the four plotters that de Burgh should have Connacht. But, whatever the truth about these machinations, Lucy had acted with great speed and decision, and his achievement was all the more remarkable when we remember that as yet he had not had recourse to a full-scale army. This must put Desmond and his fellows in perspective, although the problem of Desmond's Irish adherents was not to prove so tractable. Like Outlaw in 1330, Lucy does not seem to have dealt with Brian Ban O'Brien.

After his return from the north the justiciar, as we have seen, went back to Munster to take inquisitions and arrest de Bermingham. Again, although formally he had an army and an official paymaster with him, his troops never rose to more than 50-odd men-at-arms and 20 hobelars. The justiciar apparently needed a

126 Chart St. Mary's, II. 376; AC, 1332.
127 AC, 1330.
heavy bodyguard, but did not expect to have to fight seriously. Payments for this expedition ceased on 2 May, and on the next day they began again when Lucy at last had time to turn to the problem of the Leinster mountains.

During the whole period the justiciar was occupied in Munster the Leinster mountains seem to have been more than usually disturbed. The disorders were of the normal sort, but they succeeded each other without intermission, both on the immediate borders of Dublin and in Wexford and Carlow. In the first half of April 1331 there was a successful expedition by the men of Wexford against MacMurrough and O'Byrne. On 21 April the O'Tooles took Arklow, and then came and robbed the archbishop at Tallaght, killing Richard White and other English. Worse followed. It seems that news of this reached Dublin, and Philip le Bret, Maurice fitz Gerald and other tenants tried to resist the Irish, only to be killed per insidias by O'Toole in Coillagh. Then William de Bermingham is said to have led an army against the Irish, with some success, until he was "impeded by their false promises". At this point Lucy arrived as justiciar. Ferns was taken by the Irish in August, and, possibly early in 1332, Freignestown in Wicklow was pillaged. Things were so bad that the archbishop of Dublin obtained a bull of

129 Clyn, p. 22 (15 April); Chart. St. Mary's, II. 374 (9 April). These read like accounts of the same incident.

130 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 374.

131 Ibid.; Clyn, p. 22. Coillagh is in bar. of Upper Talbotstown, co. Wicklow.

132 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 374-5. Could this possibly be over
excommunication from the Pope against the Leinster septs, but this they ignored and proceeded to worse escapades than before. Wexford was overrun, some burgesses were killed, while those who tried to escape were drowned in the river Slaney.\textsuperscript{134}

Lucy was of course in no position to deal with this situation in 1331-2, and the evidence suggests that attempts were made to calm the Irish by negotiation. Brother Richard McCormegan seems to have been used as an intermediary between the government and unspecified Irish just before Lucy's arrival.\textsuperscript{135} He had also been entrusted with the duty of going into the mountains to execute the Pope's bull: we find him, in the first half of 1332, going "to pronounce sentence of excommunication upon O'Toole himself and his allies, enemies and rebels of the king".\textsuperscript{136} This had been preceded by attempts to mediate, for which Lucy ordered that Brother Richard be paid a series of small sums. He had been sent "to O'Toole and others of his name to treat and talk with them concerning certain business ordered on behalf of the justiciar".\textsuperscript{137} The other Leinster Irish had also apparently been approached. In

\begin{flushleft}
connected with the agreement of the conspirators that de Bermingnam should have Leinster?
133 Chart St. Mary's, II. 376.
134 Chart St. Mary's, II. 376-7.
136 Ibid., E.101/239/24.
137 Ibid., E.101/239/22.
\end{flushleft}
the Michaelmas term of 1331 both MacMurrough and O'Byrne gave hostages, and we should probably connect this with the resumption of the payment of MacMurrough's fee "which he ought annually to receive from the king for good service done to the king". It is hard to reconcile these superficial good relations with and approaches to the Irish with the record of destruction in the annals, and we can only assume that the government, fully occupied elsewhere, was adopting a conciliatory attitude. Clearly the negotiations, exaction of hostages, excommunication, and payment of MacMurrough's fee were not having the desired effect.

By 3 May 1332, however, Lucy was ready to take military action in Leinster. The evidence of the annals for the ensuing campaign could hardly be briefer: the justiciar collected an army on the morrow of Trinity, repaired and renewed the castle of Clonmore, and then in principio autumpni recaptured Arklow from the Irish "with the help of the English of the land", and rebuilt it too. The date of the capture of Clonmore is 15 June, and that coincides with the time when Lucy's army was at its strongest; we may assume that between 3 May and 15 June the justiciar was surveying the situation and making preparations. The army began to come together on 12 June, and began to go out of pay on 25th. From 29th until the close of the account on 4 August Lucy had once more only a small posse with him. When he went 138 Mem. roll 5-6 Edw. III, m. 4d- P.R.O. I., R.C. 8/16, pp. 26-7.
140 Clym, p. 24; Chart. St. Mary's, II. 377.
against Arklow between 5 and 24 August he never had more than a posse, but we must assume that the "English of the land" provided all the troops that were necessary. We may suspect that the justiciar's success at Clonmore made the levies all the more willing to join him. On the crucial dates his army consisted of the following troops:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 June</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>1516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>1521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 August</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And so, when the justiciar went against Clonmore, he brought with him what was by Irish standards a very large paid force. There is evidence too which suggests that the clerk's account, from which the above numbers come, does not give all the details of the troops engaged. We hear of the presence of the sheriff of Waterford, and this makes it probable that county forces had been called from far afield. The presence of other troops serving at Clonmore at their own costs is also suggested by the arrangements which Lucy made for guarding the surrounding countryside.

Clonmore is on the south-western border of the Leinster mountains, on the confines of the modern counties Carlow and Wexford. To protect the area just to the south of Dublin a levy was made of two shillings

on the ploughland:

for the sustenance of the men in the custody of Tallaght, for the conservation of the peace, to repress the malice and rebellion of the Irish of the mountains of Leinster, intending to invade the lands of the king's faithful people.

Relieved of this levy were firstly those actually serving in Lucy's army, secondly those actually keeping guard at Tallaght, and thirdly lands in the march. Two collectors were appointed, under whose supervision the sheriff was to raise the money, and then the collectors had the power to expend it on the king's behalf. The exemption of the Dublin tenants serving with Lucy suggests that they were serving at their own costs, and thereby fulfilling whatever obligations they had, and that the justiciar's army was therefore somewhat larger than the paymaster's account reveals.

The ward at Tallaght would protect the Dublin manors against the Irish when the fighting men were absent. Another ward was similarly employed at Ballymore, in order to protect Kildare. There William fitz Eustace kept 40 hobelars and 100 foot, at the government's cost, between 15 and 26 June. The ward was said to have been established specifically because "the justiciar has gone in the king's service to Clonmore to conquer the castle there from felons". Lucy therefore made arrangements for protecting the

145 Just.roll 6-7 Edw.III, m.13- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/17, pp.375-6; P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/239/24,29. He was to have £50-10s, but only £20-10s seems to have been paid him from the exchequer.
cultivated aland in the rear of his campaigning area when he set out for south Leinster.

As we have seen, all of the Leinster septs- O'Tooles, O'Byrnes and MacMurroughs- were in revolt in 1331-2. It was the O'Tooles who were said to have captured Arklow. The surviving evidence, however, shows that Lucy's operations were, both at Clonmore and Arklow, against the O'Byrnes. 146 Although we hear of no moves against the other two septs, nor do any of their members appear to have been enlisted on the government side. The only Irishman who appears with the justiciar is Lyssagh O'More, who had also served with him in Thomond in the previous year. O'More brought the very large contingent of 4 men-at-arms, 217 hobelars and 284 foot, and so constituted a welcome accession of strength. 147

Despite the information we have about the army and the organization of the campaign, the evidence of what actually happened on it is unsatisfactory as always. There was some fighting, as the loss of horses testifies, 148 and both castles were recaptured. In the Trinity term of 1332 Clonmore joined the list of castles maintained by the exchequer, 149 and at Michaelmas

149 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/24; Mem.roll 5-6 Edw.III, m.48d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/16, p.400. A clerk conveyed 80 lbs. of silver and barrels of flour to pay the garrison's wages there during the time of the account (Pipe roll 6 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 761, p.37).
Arklow also appeared on it. Significantly too, the leader of the O'Byrnes was again captured, as he had been in 1329. This was effected by two members of the Lawless family, men of the mountains who would be familiar with the habits and lairs of the Irish. Unfortunately we do not know whether Murgh was retained in custody on this occasion, as he had not been in 1329— one of the Ordinances of 1331 had ordered that hostages were henceforth to be kept at their own costs, and so payments for their upkeep no longer regularly appear on the issue rolls. The expedition must be accounted a major success, though with the usual proviso that its achievements were not likely to be long lasting.

The end of the campaign seems to have been followed by a process of pacification. We have seen that Donal son of Art MacMurrough received his fee before the expedition; after the expedition he was again being paid, and in terms which suggest that he had rebelled in the meantime. He received £10 "for good service done and to be done in the future", and, at Lucy's order, John de Oxenford delivered a robe worth 18 shillings to him, a "former enemy and rebel of the king, when he gave himself to the king's obedience". Gerald son of Dunlaing O'Byrne also received forty shillings for "good service"— could he have been helping the justiciar against his kinsman Murgh? At any rate, Geràd

was in the future to occupy an anomalous position, and it may be that he was a rival of the leader of the O'Byrnes, or perhaps the chieftain of a different branch.\textsuperscript{153} We lack the background necessary to evaluate these payments, and we can only suggest that they were the overt sign of the settlement which followed the justiciar's successful strong action against the Leinster Irish.

Lucy had now spent more than a year on a war footing, and had achieved much in that time: the Anglo-Irish rebels had been roughly dealt with, and the Leinster septs had now been duly chastised. But even at this point the justiciar was not able to rest easy. The southern expeditions of 1331-2 had not solved the problem of Desmond's Irish allies. Brian Ban and MacNamara had apparently been parties to the great conspiracy,\textsuperscript{154} and during the time of the Clonmore and Arklow expeditions they had once more taken Bunratty,\textsuperscript{155} so confirming the dread warning against MacNamara given by the jurors of Limerick in the spring.\textsuperscript{156} Seven days

\textsuperscript{153} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/29. Malmorth O'Conor of Offaly was also paid for operations against his own kinsmen, but this does not seem to have been connected with these campaigns. By the 16th century there were two clearly distinguished branches of the O'Byrnes, the Crioch Branach and the Gabhal Raghnaill (Price, "The Byrnes' Country in the 16th. century", \textit{R.S.A.I. Journ.}, LXIII (1933), p.224).

\textsuperscript{154} Analect.\textit{Hib.}, XXIII. 12-13.

\textsuperscript{155} Clynp. p.24; Chart.\textit{St. Mary's}, II. 377.

\textsuperscript{156} Analect.\textit{Hib.}, XXIII. 13.
before the official end of the Arklow expedition a parliament was held at Dublin, where it was decided to summon the royal service to Limerick for 5 October, to "expel certain Irish felons of those parts, who have risen in hostile manner against the king". The immediate emergency had been met by placing Maurice de Rocheford once more in the ward of Any, where he was on 17 August, against Brian Ban. Lucy himself set out for Munster on 9 September, and there he stayed until 15 November. No proper army seems to have been collected at the king's wages: the justiciar took no more than a small personal retinue with him, varying between 26 men-at-arms and 36 hobelars and 38 men-at-arms and 38 hobelars.

The explanation of the absence of the normal paid army seems to be that the conflict with Brian Ban O'Brien was again fought by the great magnates, serving on the borders of their own areas at their own expense. First of all there is evidence that royal service was done in person both by some Dublin tenants and by the Leinster liberties, led by their seneschals. How important this personal service was we do not know. More significantly, although the annals do not mention Lucy, they refer to important events "after All Saints"

157 Parliaments & Councils, no. 9. Receipt rolls show only £61-13s coming in (P.R.O., E.101/239/28; 240/9), but they are not complete, and also some personal service was done (note 160 below).

158 Parliaments & Councils, no. 11.


160 See above, pp. 24-5.
(1 November) when the earl of Ormond, Geraldines and de Burghs are said, with the help of the common people, to have made war against Brian O'Brien, and to have killed and taken great preys from the Irish. Since the expedition did not officially end until 15 November, these events must surely have been connected with it. Either it is another example of the annals mentioning the important magnates and omitting to refer to the justiciar's presence, or else the attack on Brian Ban occurred shortly after Lucy had left the area. If many tenants answered the summons to royal service in person, if the magnates served in defence of their own lordships, and if the "common people" joined the army at their own costs, the absence of the customary paid force would be explained. It seems, therefore, that Lucy's 1332 expedition against Brian Ban was a success, even if the justiciar's own part in the proceedings is obscure.

Lucy had been recalled to England by a writ issued on 30 September, but it was November before this news reached Ireland, and the justiciar did not give up office formally until 3 December. His justiciarship had been quite exceptionally active and successful. He broke up the dangerous conspiracy of the magnates, kept Desmond in custody, defeated the Leinster Irish, restoring two important castles, penetrated to the

161 Clyn, p.24.
162 For the latter view see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.250.
163 See Orpen, Normans, IV. 238.
164 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 377. If the news came to Lucy in Munster he could well have left the campaign to Ormond and the others.
borders of Ulster, and ended up by organizing a successful campaign against Brian Ban. Admittedly there is an unusual amount of surviving evidence concerning his expeditions, but their duration and the absence of gaps between them does not lie. It might be thought that the justiciar was foolhardy in his harsh treatment of the magnates and their allies, and that he ought to have realized that the government would eventually have to come to terms with Desmond unless it somehow got the power and money to extend its operations against English and Irish rebels throughout most of the country in the way it had done before Wogan's time. This leaves king Edward's planned expedition out of account; as was pointed out at the beginning, the whole of Lucy's justiciarship was acted out in the expectation of the king's arrival in Ireland in September or October 1332. Lucy's recall coincides with the king's decision not to come to Ireland, and, indeed, the former justiciar was soon back serving with his master on the northern march. The recall of Lucy and the abandonment of the expedition to Ireland were followed by a return to normal in the lordship. Desmond was soon released, and the government quickly fell back into its old ways; caught up in the sporadic, small scale warfare on the Irish marches. Lucy's justiciarship was a break in the normal pattern of warfare in Ireland: the government had acted ruthlessly and had temporarily broken free. Even had Lucy remained in Ireland, it may be doubted whether, given the administration's slender resources and the depth of the problems it faced, his energetic policies would have been sustained over a long period.

165 C.P.R. 1330-4, p.415.
The government under pressure (II)  
1332-1349

The strong action of Lucy's justiciarship was followed by a return to normal; warfare once more became intermittent and on a smaller scale. Lucy's energetic rule had in fact changed nothing, and this absence of change is immediately seen. Darcy returned as justiciar early in 1333, and his first military operation was against the Powers and against Brian Ban O'Brien, who was obviously far from subdued by Lucy's last campaign. A major expedition south seems to have been planned, for the clerk of wages was to have £500 to pay a "multitude" of armed men going to Munster with the justiciar.\(^1\) In addition, the earl of Ormond, who had been largely responsible for the success against Brian Ban late in 1332, was paid for "invading Brian O'Brien and his allies, the king's enemies, who rose to war and still do rise against the king".\(^2\) Plainly Brian Ban was a major threat, and another expedition was badly needed. In the event the campaign was much shorter and more limited in size than had been originally intended. It lasted merely from 1 to 8 May, and at its largest extent the royal army included only 53 men-at-arms, 36 hobelars and 2 foot.\(^3\)

1 Just. roll 7 Edw.III, m.20d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/17, pp.431-3.
3 43rd Rep. D.K., pp.56-7. This shows a cost of £25-11s-4d, but the clerk received £100 (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/29).
The explanation of this seems to be that there was an outbreak of trouble in Leinster which forced the justiciar to cut the southern expedition short and return to Offaly. However, it does appear that the short foray south had one important result: it convinced Darcy that the earl of Desmond should be released. On 17 May, back at Dublin, Desmond was freed from prison under heavy sureties. It is tempting to speculate that Darcy felt that a released and chastened Desmond was the only means of preserving order in the south. And, even if this hope was misplaced, the earl himself does not seem to have been much trouble until about 1339.

Some four days after the Munster campaign ended Darcy was going against the O'Conors of Offaly. A military summons was issued to the town of Castledermot for 17 May, and by 12 May the justiciar was at Rathangan, in the campaigning area. We know very little about the expedition: the O'Conors are said to have lost a great prey to the de Berminghams, while Darcy cut a pass at "Ethergouill" in Offaly against them. It may be that the prey taken by the de Berminghams was not an independent act but part of the official campaign, for Richard de Bermingham received compensation from the Dublin exchequer for a horse lost in fighting in Carbury. We also hear that Robert

4 Parliaments & Councils, no.12.
7 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 378.
Power, a clerk, went to Carbury to negotiate "to con-
form divers English and Irish of those same parts, who
intended to rise to war, to the king's peace". It
seems likely, therefore, that the war against the
O'Conors followed the usual pattern of a punitive
raid, combined with negotiations (possibly with
potential allies of the O'Conors) for the peace. As
far as we can judge, the operation was successful. The
payment for this campaign against the O'Conors links
it with one against the MacMurroughs, but of operations
against the latter sept we know nothing. Anyway, this
does not necessarily suggest that the two septs were
in alliance—that would have been a serious development—but merely that some operations took place against
MacMurrough within the period covered by the paymaster's
account.

Within a short time of taking office Darcy had thus
been faced with disorders in both Leinster and Munster.
This sets the pattern for the rest of the period:
rapid campaigns in both provinces, as if the justiciars
were desperately trying to keep each under control,
not daring to devote too much time to one lest dis-
order should get a grip on the other.

Darcy now led an expedition to Scotland, and
during his absence Thomas de Burgh acted as lieutenant.

9 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/30; Just.roll 6-7
Edw.III, m.30d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/17, pp.511-12.
10 P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/239/29; 240/1. The
account itself does not survive.
11 See Nicholson, "An Irish expedition to Scotland in
1375", I.H.S., XIII (1963), pp.197-211. It turned
aside to deal (apparently successfully) with the
De Burgh seems to have deliberately tried to keep the Irish under control by negotiation, and his term of office is dominated by journeys to parley with the Irish in different parts of the lordship. Apparently before Darcy actually left the country, de Burgh (described as treasurer) went four times to treat with the great lords of Ulster and Louth. This was presumably an aftermath of the Brown Earl's murder in June 1333. Then during his actual term of office he went to Waterford to parley with the Bowers; to Kells in Meath "to treat with O'Reilly and other Irish of his name"; to Ballymore to treat with O'Toole in the same way; and to Athy to treat with O'More and others, who had actually risen to war. At the same period, Outlaw, the chancellor, was treating in Kildare, Carlow, Tipperary, Kilkenny, Waterford and Limerick, and he also went to Carlingford. In addition, O'Hanlon was persuaded to come to Dublin and to discuss "arduous business" there. There is no dign of an attempt to

12 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/179, m.46.
13 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/1. These parleys cannot be accurately dated. One might possibly be connected with the murder of Murguth son of Nicholas O'Toole on 11 June (Chart. St. Mary's, II. 379; Clyn, p.25), and another with O'More's killing of Geoffrey de Freigne on 2 October (Clyn, p.25).
14 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/1.
15 Ibid. O'Hanlon had, apparently in 1331, recognized that he held his land of the earl of Ulster (B.M., Add. MS 6041, f.104).
take any stronger action against these Irish and Anglo-Irish, and it seems likely that de Burgh was under orders merely to try to hold the fort while Darcy and many of the tenants were out of the country.

The impression that de Burgh was pursuing a conciliatory policy is confirmed by events when he went to Munster in the early autumn. The expedition was not one of war- its aim is said to have been "to expedite the king's affairs". True, hostages had captured Limerick and Nenagh castles, where they were incarcerated, but this situation had already been dealt with by the local communities, and, although de Burgh reached Limerick, there is no evidence that he was there for warlike reasons. On 1 September at Cork, Donald Carbragh MacCarthy came before the deputy justiciar, asking to have English law and the king's protection for himself and his "eraght". He promised to answer at law and to "be attendant in all things". De Burgh granted his petition, and accepted a promise to behave well towards the king, his heirs, ministers and subjects. On 12 September at Limerick, Dermot O'Dowyr asked for pardon of all trespasses against the peace until a day to be named, and for English law. He was granted a charter to last until the next parliament, swore he would be answerable in the king's court, and had "the hair of his culan cut that he might

16 P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/239/29; 240/1.
17 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 378.
18 Just. roll 7 Edw. III, m. 41- P.R.O.T., R.C.8/18, pp. 59-60.
hold English law". These events again stress that de Burgh was concerned with keeping the peace with as little trouble as possible during the justiciar's absence. MacCarthy rose to war in the following year, and Darcy had to mount an expedition against him: his promises were certainly of little value.

Darcy resumed office at the beginning of 1334, and his first expedition was yet another one to Munster. It cost £192-19s-2d and was therefore not negligible, but its exact date and purpose have not come down to us. There is no evidence of fighting during it. In August it again became necessary to organize another campaign in Leinster because of a rebellion by the O'Byrnes and O'Tooles. The disorder seems to have spread over a wide area of the mountains, for wards were established both at Newcastle McKynegan to the east, and at Dunlavin to the west, where John de Wellesley was keeping guard late in July. On 11 August Darcy was said to be going against the rebels,
and wine was to be sent to the garrison of Newcastle. Unfortunately the absence of a paymaster's account and of information in the annals makes it impossible to follow the course of this campaign, but we do know something of the strategy adopted by the justiciar. Darcy succeeded in enlisting both MacMurrough and one of the O'Byrnes on the government's side. Donald son of Art MacMurrough was rewarded "for good and laudable service....expelling and attacking those of the progeny of the O'Tooles and O'Byrnes in the parts of Leinster", while Gerald son of Dunlaing O'Byrne was paid for joining the government side in "the king's war against those of the name of O'Byrne and O'Toole and in fighting certain Irish of the mountains of Leinster, felons". This is clear evidence of the government's ability to use the mountain septs, and even different members of the same sept, against one another. Obviously the political struggles in Leinster were far from a simple matter of English against Irish. On the analogy of Connacht and Thomond, we must conclude that the Irish engaged in wars among themselves of which we know nothing, and that, if Irish sources from the Leinster area had survived, they would allow us to connect the support of certain Irish for the government with the internecine feuds of the Irish themselves. Darcy also seems to have had the help of certain Anglo-Irish of the mountains, for we find Maurice Howell being rewarded for the capture of

23 Close roll 8 Edw. III- N.L.I., MS 2, f. 40 (R.C.H. p.37 no. 8). The printed Calendar gives 5 August, not 11 August.

three O'Tooles, whom the government kept as hostages for the peace.\(^{25}\) All-in-all, therefore, this rising of 1334 was dealt with in the accustomed manner: wards to protect the neighbouring areas, a campaign, and the employment of Irish on the government side.

By late in August Darcy was being called once more to Munster, against both Donald Carbragh Mac Carthy, who was supported by MacDermot, and Brian Ban, who was in alliance with MacNamara. The expedition began on 24 August,\(^{26}\) and the troops employed were certainly not adequate for a major war, Darcy having with him only 16 men-at-arms, 26 hobelars and 36 foot.\(^{27}\) The expedition seems to have been called forth by MacCarthy's capture of David de Barry, lord of Oileathan, and slaughter of many of his men—this had happened between 16 July and 1 August.\(^{28}\) Darcy seems, therefore, to have been setting out to settle a quarrel which was only indirectly an act of war against the king. In the event MacCarthy came to the peace without fighting: the bishop of Cork is said to have "conformed Donald O'Carbragh MacCarthy and other Irish of Cork to the peace".\(^{29}\) This would help to explain why the justiciar's army never grew to any great size. We hear nothing of operations against Brian Ban and MacNamara, but again this may have been


\(^{26}\) Mem. roll 8-9 Edw.III, m.4d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/18, pp.296-8 is the account. Writs of liberate are om Close roll 8 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, ff.41-2 (R.C.H. p.38 no.21, p.39 no.93).

\(^{27}\) The clerk received £128 (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/180, m.45).

because strong measures did not prove necessary. The "Galls and Gaels of Connacht" are said to have gone against MacNamara, taking hostages and submission from him. This is hardly a disguised reference to the justiciar's expedition, but it suggests that MacNamara at least may have been chastened by other means before Darcy arrived in Thomond.

Whatever happened on this expedition, by October at the latest the justiciar was once more engaged in the Leinster mountains. The clerk's account ends on 3 November, but it reveals nothing of what had taken place—Darcy had still only the small force that he had had in Munster. However, the presence of the sheriff of Dublin suggests that the operations may have taken place with the help of the shire levies, and this could explain the smallness of the paid army. At any rate, Darcy succeeded once more in splitting the Irish: on 13 November Donald son of Art Mac Murrough was to have £40 "both for his great labours and expenses in repressing rebels, and for the capture of Philip son of Morghit O'Byrne, felon". Nevertheless the mountains remained disturbed and it was only a matter of three months Darcy was once more into action against the O'Byrnes.

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30 AC, 1334.

31 Mem. roll 8-9 Edw. III, m.4d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/18, pp.296-8.

32 Ibid., m.19d- pp.422-3.

33 Close roll 8 Edw. III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.46 (R.C.H. p.38 no.37). That the campaign was against O'Byrne is confirmed by ibid.- f.48 (p.39 no.70).
Early in December the justiciar led an expedition into Meath against O'Reilly, but we know nothing of what he did. After this de Burgh was again lieutenant for a brief period, leading an army against English and Irish felons in Ulster, which was obviously still disturbed after the earl's death, and organizing treating with Edmund de Burgh. But on 19 January 1335 Darcy began to act again, and almost immediately had to turn his attention to the problem of the Leinster mountains. As early as 4 February we find Ellis of Asshebourne being rewarded for treating and fighting in Leinster, and it was presumably about this time that Darcy was going against the O'Conors, "O'Krnys", O'Byrnes and O'Tooles. We know nothing of an expedition in Offaly, and nothing of the course of the campaign in the mountains, but what seem to be the terms on which it was settled have fortunately survived. On 1 March 1335:

at Newcastle McKynegan came Ellis de Assheburne knight, Robert Lawless, Gerald son of Dunlaing O'Byrne and Philip son of Dermot McCormyn, with others, to the lord John Darcy, justiciar of Ireland, in the presence of the venerable father Alexander, by God's grace archbishop of Dublin, and other faithful of the lord

34 Close roll 8 Edw. III- N.L.I., MS 2, f. 54 (R.C.H. p. 39 no. 65).
37 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/180, m. 45.
38 Just. roll 9 Edw. III- Genealogical Office, MS 191, p. 58. This is a very garbled Latin text.
king of the marches of Leinster, who said that, by the licence and mandate of the said justiciar (a parley took place with?)* Murgh (MS "McWyth") Obryn, captain of the Obrynnes, and certain others of the same progeny. The said Murgh and his adherents obliged themselves to the said justiciar in this way: that is that the said Murgh* the grace and mercy of the lord king, offering that he would, with his wife, children and adherents, stay at Kilmartin or Wicklow at command of the said justiciar, and that he and the said Gerald would answer for all trespasses against the English of the march done by the rest of their progeny, from Wicklow to Dublin, and would daily fight the said rebels until they came wholly within the king's peace, and would obey him and his ministers as is fitting, and from all of their said progeny having a family they would take one hostage.

* lacuna in MS

The only other information which we have about the campaign is that two O'Byrnes (Dunlaing and Richard) had been captured by Matthew Lawless, and that Gerald son of Dunlaing O'Byrne had been granted forty shillings for his services against the Leinster Irish. It looks as if this document followed the forcing of Murgh O'Byrne to the peace: Murgh was now being compelled to chastise his followers, to aid the justiciar against any remaining rebels, to make amends for damage done, and to give hostages for the peace, making his followers do likewise. The role of Gerald son of Dunlaing appears to be ambivalent. On the one hand he is once more in the pay of the English, and yet he is acting as an intermediary with Murgh, the captain

40 Just. roll 9 Edw. III- Genealogical Office, MS 191, pp. 57-8.
of the O'Byrnes, and also agreeing to enforce the peace and take hostages from his followers in the same manner as Murgh. The whole incident is interesting in showing the importance of the chief of the Irisn, and the value which the government believed to lie in placing him in a position where he had to agree to control his lineage.

At this point Darcy was engaged in a second, much larger, expedition to Scotland, on which he managed to bring Donald son of Art MacMurrough. During the justiciar's absence Roger Outlaw was deputy, and his one expedition of war was to Ulster, which was still far from securely in the king's hand. MacCartan seems to have been the main Irish enemy: in 1334 Henry de Mandeville had received a reward for treating with him and other Irish, and now Henry joined Outlaw and attacked MacCartan in the deputy's company. The escheator was with Outlaw, and this may suggest that he could not operate effectively in the earldom without military aid. Although we know no more about the expedition, the expenditure of £261-10s-4d suggests that it was no mean one.

Apart from this, Outlaw's main occupation was parleying, and it seems likely that, like de Burgh in

42 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/5.
45 Ibid.; P.R.O., Pipe rolls, E.372/180, m.45; 182, m.48.
1333, he regarded his main task as keeping order with the minimum expense and risk during Darcy's absence. Outlaw's acts during his period in office are indeed very reminiscent of de Burgh's. He is credited with going to Ulster to treat with O'Neill, MacCartan and others; to Leinster to treat with O'More, O'Dempsey, O'Conor and also O'Toole and MacMurrough; and to Meath to treat with O'Reilly. They had all risen to war, and Outlaw wished to talk with them about "those things that pertain to the conservation of the peace". Other negotiations too seem to date from around this time: the deputy went to Kells in Fethard to treat with O'Byrne, while the seneschal of Wexford was rewarded for "pacifying discords" between English and Irish.

Thus the years from 1332 to 1335 have war in Leinster and Munster as a constant theme. While Darcy was within Ireland he led expeditions in both areas, but unfortunately it is not possible to say what strength most of these armies had- though we are left with the impression that they were not very large. When Darcy was out of the lordship his deputies seem to have adopted a more conciliatory line with the Irish: it is hardly a coincidence that most of the evidence for parleys comes from the periods of the rule of de Burgh and Outlaw.

46 It is not clear whether this was separate from the positive expedition, but the fact that Outlaw was paid for it, when a clerk had received the wages for the campaign, suggests that it was.
When Darcy returned to Ireland once more, the sporadic warfare in the Leinster and Munster marches continued. Between the Easter term of 1336 and the Hilary term of 1337 the justiciar was extremely active militarily, though not on a very large scale. The absence of Memoranda and Pipe roll evidence, and the gap in the Dublin annalist's account of events, leaves us only with the barest and most superficial information about Darcy's campaigns. It does not therefore seem worthwhile to attempt to piece the surviving fragments together. One or two points may, however, be made about the warfare in this period. There are signs of a conspiracy among the Leinster Irish in the summer of 1336. O'More is said to have "incited all the Irish of Munster and Leinster to war, by persuasion, promises and gifts", and this is supported by what we know of Darcy's operations. We find him fighting MacMurrough, O'More, O’Nolan, O’Byrne and the O’ Byrne of the Duffry, and the situation seems to have been serious enough to cause the earl of Ormond to bring troops from Munster to Leinster to help the justiciar. There was certainly a greater emergency than usual, and the impression is left that Darcy was facing continuous rather than intermittent troubles in Leinster. In the autumn he went once again against Brian Ban and Mac Namara, but by 20 October he was yet again fighting...

50 The campaigns are listed, as far as is possible, in Appendix IV.
51 Clyn, p.27.
52 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/13; Clyn, p.27.
54 R.C.H. p.20 no.10; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/182, m.48.
in Leinster against O'Byrnes and O'Tooles. It is probably unreal to try to draw distinctions between the different Leinster campaigns of this year.

Darcy was replaced by Outlaw on 15 November 1336, and the new governor seems to have opened negotiations which resulted in the detachment of MacMurrough at least from the Leinster rebels. We do not know why Donald had rebelled in 1336 after having served the government both in Ireland and in Scotland in 1334-5. On 19 December it was recorded that Outlaw had entered into an agreement with him to pay him his eighty marks "which we granted him each year, to expedite certain affairs concerning us". An indenture was drawn up and delivered to the exchequer, but we have no evidence that MacMurrough received more than his first instalment of twenty marks. The common rebellion of all the Leinster septs had thus been ended, and there does seem to have been a respite after the beginning of 1337, although we hear of an expedition by the earl of Ormond against the O'Byrnes in his manor of Arklow. Even in the serious situation which arose in 1336, certain of the Irish still seem to have served the government. When Clyn tells of the general rising sparked off by O'More, he mentions that Scanlan Mc

56 Close roll 10 Edw. III- P.R.O.I., Ferguson Coll., I, f.161 (R.C.H. p.20 no.26); P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/13. The fee presents a problem for we cannot be sure that it was not paid from the revenues of Carlow or Wexford.
57 Clyn, p.28.
Gillapatrick and Henry O'Ryan "took the part of the English and of the peace".\(^{58}\) We also know that Darcy went to treat with a whole series of Irish, including O'Conor of Offaly, O'Dempsey, McGeohegan and the O'Tooles and O'Byrnes themselves.\(^{59}\) He managed to enlist O'Dempsey on his side, for after the campaigns against O'More and his allies O'Dempsey was to be rewarded for "going to expel Lysaght O'More, Irishman, and his accomplices......and also other Irish felons and enemies, who at that time similarly rose in hostile manner to war against us".\(^{60}\) It seems that, except when an exceptionally active justiciar was in Ireland, employment of Irish by the government was becoming a necessity rather than a useful accretion of strength, indicative of no more than prudence and passing difficulties. Skill in using the Leinster septs against one another was one of the most necessary qualities a justiciar must possess. The threat of a united front among the Irish, which we have already seen in 1328, was a serious one, although it was not to develop fully until the 1350s. For this reason the events of 1336 were ominous for the future.

In 1337 the king appointed John Charlton justiciar, and for the first time since 1319 the justiciar had military aid from England. Charlton was to be supplied

\(^{58}\) Clyn, p.27.

\(^{59}\) The original decision to parley also named O'More, (Just.roll 10 Edw.III- Genealogical Office, MS 191, p.46) but he was omitted from the writ of liberate and the actual payment (R.C.H. p.20 no.17; P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/13).

\(^{60}\) Close roll 10 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.92. The entry is not in the printed Calendar.
with 200 Welsh foot, although it seems that only 143, with a centurion and seven vintenars, actually came to Ireland. Charlton stayed for no more than nine months, and his sole military campaign seems to have been one against the O'Byrnes in the spring of 1338. A ward was kept at Newcastle McKynegan between 16 February and 5 April, but it never rose above five men-at-arms and eight or ten hobelars, some of whom seem to have been entertained to dinner by the prior of Holy Trinity. By 7 March a small expedition was under way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lenfant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fynnok O'Toole</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanlan McGillapatrick</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert fitz Maurice</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 107

Added to these would presumably have been Charlton's 151 Welsh, together with the normal twenty men-at-arms. There may also, of course, have been levies serving with the justiciar, and we do know that the prior of Holy Trinity supplied men for a muster at Kill o' the Grange, apparently for the purpose of guarding the area. This ward was maintained from 15 March at least until 30th. But nevertheless it seems

61 C.C.R. 1337-9, pp.169-70.
63 Ibid., m.35- pp.237-8.
64 Account Roll of Holy Trinity, p.9.
65 Mem. roll 12-13 Edw. III, m. 4d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/21, pp.28-30. The exchequer managed part payment only.
unlikely that the campaign was a major one. It is interesting to note that O'Toole had been engaged to fight O'Byrne, and that McGillapatick, one of the few Irish to remain loyal in 1336, was still serving the government.

Soon after this expedition Charlton was removed from the justiciarship and replaced by his brother Thomas, the bishop of Hereford. Hereford remained in office until 1340, and his justiciarship shows a continuing concern with the problem of Leinster. The period of the bishop's rule also adds a new dimension to the problem, for Hereford found the Irish exchequer's resources quite inadequate to support the necessary warfare, and he was reduced to paying for many of his military operations himself. These years bring forcibly home to us the extreme difficulties under which the justiciars of the period were labouring. In themselves Hereford's expeditions are not remarkable, and the evidence which survives is not very informative, but we must look at them briefly to show how the justiciar managed to cope with his difficulties.

66 Account Roll of Holy Trinity, pp.12-13,18. The prior also paid small sums to hobelars going against the O'Byrnes, and gave 2s to Fynnok O'Toole (pp.17,20), but it is not certain that this was at the same time as the expedition.

67 Richardson & Sayles, "Irish Revenue, 1278-1384", R.I.A. Proc., LXII (1962), C, p.100 shows that receipts between 15 October 1337 and 12 August 1339 were only £2,351, and those between 12 August 1339 and 29 September 1341 £2,686. The revenue was thus down to about £1,200 a year. It then began to recover slightly with £3,225 being received between 29 September 1341 and 5 May 1343.
By 10 August the bishop was leading another expedition in Leinster against the O'Byrnes, who must not have been subdued by his brother's campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon f'Richard</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert f'Maurice</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 137 252 : 464

We know nothing of what happened on the expedition, but it is clear from the account that the exchequer was already failing to meet its obligations. The wages of the bishop, treasurer, Simon and the clerk of wages were met in full, coming to £141-2s, but Robert received only £3-6s-8d, just a fraction of the sum due for this largest contingent. Simon and Robert went out of pay on 30 and 31 August, while the two officials continued at war until 18 September.

The next expedition reveals the situation going from bad to worse. Between 6 November 1338 and 9 February 1339 Hereford was in Munster, against the Powers and other English and Irish rebels. The campaign has left no trace on the Issue roll or treasurer's account because Hereford met the cost himself. He forwarded £187-4s. as a prest to Robert fitz Robert, who acted as clerk for the 7 men-at-arms, 54 hobelars and 24 foot who formed the royal army. Despite this, the

68 That it was against O'Byrne is shown by Mem. roll 12-13 Edw. III, m. 40- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/21, p.262.

69 Ibid., 131-4 Edw. III, m. 45- R.C.8/22, pp.63-6. The clerk eventually received £145-5s-4d (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/184, m.49).
bishop seems to have achieved his purposes, imprisoning Eustace and John le Poer in Dublin, and apparently compelling many of the family to make fine for the peace. Then in the summer of 1339 Hereford led a small expedition against the Irish of Meath, and once more he defrayed his own expenses.

The straits of the Irish government seem now to have reached the ears of the king. The treasurer was excused coming to Westminster to account "because the king has ordered certain affairs for the repulse of the Irish rebels who strive to invade and destroy the lands of the king and his lieges in those parts...". At the same time Hereford's fee was to be given absolute priority on the Irish revenue "in consideration of his expenses both in preserving peace and in repelling the king's Irish enemies". Arrangements were set in train for the levying and departure of 200 archers and armed horsemen for Ireland, but there is no evidence that they ever reached the lordship.

70 The bishop's claims for expenses are on Mem. roll 13-14 Edw.III, m.53d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/22, pp.113-9 and P.R.O., C.47/10/19/19.
71 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 381.
72 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/240/15.
74 C.C.R. 1339-41, p.244.
75 Ibid., p.169.
76 C.P.R. 1338-40, pp.355-6. It is possible that the king had the French as well as the Irish in mind: the wording is ambiguous (cf. above, p.19 n.68).
Despite this it does not seem that any financial help was forthcoming, and the bishop continued to bear the burden of his military expenses. He spent the early autumn of 1339 fighting the MacMurroughs, O'Nolans, O'Mores, O'Dempsies, O'Conors and other Irish in Leinster. But since he employed only 79 troops during the last fortnight of August, and 173 during September, it is hard to see how the paid army can have made any great impression on the Irish. However, the sheriff of Kildare served with Hereford, and it may be that he was being forced to rely more than usual on the local levies. Support for this contention comes from the next year, when the bishop led no more than nineteen men against the MacMurroughs and O'Nolans, and yet is said to have taken a huge prey of various sorts of animals "such as had not been seen in the parts of Leinster". The explanation of this success is that the prey was taken "with the aid of the English of the land". The simple fact was that Hereford could not afford to mount expeditions in the normal manner. He was reduced to employing a small extra force at his own expense, and then relying on what help he could get from the local tenants.

There are not enough details surviving about Hereford's campaigns to make an attempt to reconstruct them worthwhile. He seems to have had some success.

78 Ibid., m.3- pp.346-7.
79 Ibid., m.53d- pp.113-9.
80 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 382.
in keeping members of the Leinster septs on his side. Taig O'Byrne was rewarded for attacking MacMurrough, and, presumably at another time, Donald son of Art MacMurrough was himself paid "for good service done to the king".\textsuperscript{81} The general impression is that the bishop had done well under the most adverse circumstances.

Hereford was succeeded by Outlaw, who acted from April 1340 until January 1341, when Bicknor became custos until May. Both these deputies were faced by continuing disturbances in Leinster, in which the MacMurroughs appear to have been ring-leaders. Outlaw, as he had done on previous occasions, concentrated on attempting to pacify the Irish: parleying with O'Reilly in Meath, and with the Leinster septs, and also going on a peace-making expedition to Ulster.\textsuperscript{82}

In August 1340 MacMurrough and O'Nolan attacked Gowran, but Outlaw does not seem to have taken strong action against them. The only expedition during this period appears to have been a small one against the O'Mores, which cost no more than £18-13s-4d.\textsuperscript{84} Thus when Bicknor became lieutenant the MacMurroughs were still unsubdued, and he had to set about organizing a campaign against them. Before 17 April he went to\textsuperscript{80} against both MacMurrough and O'Nolan. The financial situation seems still to have been bad since the exchequer failed to honour the writ of liberate

\textsuperscript{81} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/18 (Aug, 1339 to Trin. 1341). The wording makes it clear that Taig's payment was within Hereford's term, and the fact that MacMurrough was in rebellion in 1340-1 makes it likely that his was too.


\textsuperscript{83} Clyn, p.29.
for the wages on the campaign, and they had to be paid by an assignment on the revenues of Meath. Bicknor must have had some success, for on 1 June Ralph Meiler gave a recognizance for no less than £500 that he would deliver Henry son of John O'Nolan to the lieutenant before 17 June. He was to do this because Henry was legally a hostage forfeit to the crown, and this suggests that he must have been captured during the campaign. If this was the Henry son of John who had been captain of the O'Nolans for many years, Bicknor could certainly be contented with his achievements.

Despite this apparent happy ending to the lieutenant's campaign, John Morice, the next justiciar, was almost immediately leading another expedition against the same Irish in the same area. He employed an army from August until October, but it seems likely that the main expedition did not take place until 10 September, the day on which the royal service was to come to Castledermot. Morice seems to have led attacks on

86 Ibid., m.18d- pp.308-10.
87 47th.Rep.D.K., p.64. This gives the leaders' names, but no details of their troops; there were no Irish amongst them.
88 P.R.O., Roll of receipt of service, E.101/241/13. The comparatively large total of £214-10s was received between the proclamation and Michaelmas 1342. Dublin, Kildare, Kilkenny, Meath, the liberty of Trim, Wexford, Louth and Limerick paid (see also above, p.29).
on MacMurrough and O’Nolan in the areas of __________ and Kilbaylet (county Wicklow), where various horses were lost in the fighting. 89 Again we know almost nothing about the campaign, but its result seems to have been success: after being in almost continuous rebellion during 1339, 1340 and 1341 the MacMurroughs were brought back to the government side, and served with Morice in his next Leinster campaign in 1342.

From 16 January to 18 May 1342 the justiciar was conducting operations in Meath. He is said to have gone to Mullingar against O’Melaghlín, Shinnagh, Mc Geohegan, O’Farrell and the “O’rinniz of Brewyn”. The army was of moderate size, and varied as follows: 90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Hobelars</th>
<th>Archers</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 January</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also some other troops whom the justiciar paid directly, not through the clerk. Their dates of service we do not know. John de Clinton came from Louth with ten archers and ten foot for two days, while John Drake and Thomas de Walton came from Louth and Lough Sewdy respectively, each with sixty hobelars for two days. 91

91 P.R.O., E.101/241/13 (Morice’s own claim for expenses).
If the payments on the Issue roll are to be taken at their face-value, Morice did not engage in one campaign against all the named Irish, but dealt with the septs individually. £50 was paid "to expel O'Melaghlin"; £50 "to recapture Athlone from O'Melaghlin"; £50 to fight the O'Farrells and "Obrinniz", and another £50 to deal with McGeohegan. It seems, therefore, that the justiciar was not faced by a coalition, but by separate, if related, disorders. Against Mc Geohegan and the "Obrinniz" he seems to have had some success. McGeohegan was forced to make fine for 200 cows, and two members of the sept were killed: the Meath baronies owed head-money for Maurice Mc Geohegan, while the annals tell us that Conor Mc Geohegan was "slain by the English" in this year. The "Obrinniz" also made fine for the peace, although the horses which they produced in payment proved to be "too feeble", and not worth their apparent value, as the unfortunate clerk who levied them found to his cost. We have no similar details of success against O'Melaghlin or O'Farrell, and later claims (in 1349) that there had been no castle at Athlone for eleven years suggests that the operations against the two septs in that area did not achieve their object.

94 Ibid., p.32.
95 AN; AFM, 1342.
96 54th Rep. D.K., p.34.
97 See above, pp.65-6.
Nevertheless, Morice conducted the first serious and prolonged campaign in Meath for many years and came out with some credit, and we know that military successes against some of the Irish were not his sole achievement in the area. 98

The summer of 1342 saw more trouble in Leinster. The end of the 1341 campaign seems to have allowed some nine months peace, but by July 1342 the O'Byrnes were at war. On this occasion, however, the Mac Murroughs and O'Tooles were firmly on the side of the government. The campaign lasted from 16 July to 4 September, and the army fluctuated markedly: 99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Hobelars</th>
<th>Archers</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>22 July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 August</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 August</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The army was doubly augmented: once more Morice paid certain tenants himself, though we know only that they brought a "huge multitude" of armed men; 100 in addition there seems to have been a summons of the Leinster tenants to Newcastle McKynegan "with horses and arms"

98 He also arrested Richard Tuyt (P.R.O., E.101/241/13).


100 P.R.O., E.101/241/13- though the cost was only £4.
for Simon fitz Richard was excused for not turning up since he was in England at the time of the summons. Thus, though the paid army was only of medium size by Irish standards, there must have been many more men than the maximum of 501 shown on the account.

Moriertagh MacMurrough and Cathal O'Toole both brought contingents to the army—of 23 hobelars and 33 foot and of seven hobelars respectively. We also know that Donald son of Art MacMurrough also served, and possibly with quite a large contingent since his wages amounted to £16-10s-8d. Morice had therefore taken a useful first step towards defeating the O'Byrnes by enlisting both their most important Irish neighbours against them. Unfortunately, as so often, the events of the campaign itself are a mystery. No evidence of fines paid or hostages given exists to indicate that Morice's expedition was a success. All we know is that one part of the campaign was aimed at Newcastle and another at Wicklow. But circumstantial evidence may suggest that Morice completed the pacification of Leinster by bringing the O'Byrnes as well as the MacMurroughs within the peace: from the end of this expedition in September 1342 until July 1344.

102 Mem. roll 16-17 Edw.III, mm.3d,7d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/22, pp.189,228-9.
103 One reference speaks of a campaign against O'Tooles as well as O'Byrnes, but this may well refer to earlier operations (Mem. roll 16-17 Edw.III, m.3- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/22, pp.185-6); the rest of the evidence mentions only O'Byrnes (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/241/6; 53rd. Rep. D.K., pp.44-5).
there was, as far as we know, no expedition to Leinster—
or at least no expedition which involved payments from
the exchequer. This was as long a gap as there
had been since 1324, and its cause is impossible to
determine. Indeed from September 1342 until 1350,
Ufford’s 1344 campaign was the only major one directed
against the Irish in the mountains south of Dublin.
At some time between October 1341 and May 1343 Taig
O’Byrne and Gerald son of Dunlaing were paid for their
good service, but there is no sign of any especially
widespread granting of fees to the Irish that might
explain their quiescence.

After nearly two years of this unaccustomed semi-
peace in the mountains, Ralph of Ufford came to Ireland
as justiciar in July 1344. For the first time since
1332 there was a justiciar determined to apply a firm
remedy to the problems of disorder in Ireland. Ufford
brought no new answers, but, like Lucy, he mounted
comparatively large and long-lasting military expedi-
tions, and had military success in Ulster and Munster as
well as in Leinster. The new justiciar had 40 men-at-
arms and 200 archers from England, and these remained
with him throughout his two years of office, providing
an experienced nucleus around which the lordship’s
army could grow. There is evidence that the king was

104 There seems to have been a summons of tenants to
Castlekevin in 1343 (Mem.rol 18-19 Edw.III, m.37-
P.R.O.I., R.C.8/23, p.351). It had been overrun
by the Irish (Clyn, p.30).
106 For details see above, pp.16-18.
conscious of the Irish threat and the inadequacy of border defence at this time, and Ufford was to inaugurate a programme of surveying and re-granting lands which were waste and overrun. 107 Within a week of his arrival the new justiciar was setting out to try to put the lordship to rights.

From 15 July 1344 until February 1345 Ufford was "in Dublin in time of peace and in Munster and Leinster in time of war". In fact the first period of peace seems to have lasted only until 22 July, and by 23rd. Ufford was setting out for Munster and Leinster. 108 The peace of the latter province was disturbed and before setting out Ufford had ordered the seneschals of Kildare, Kilkenny and Wexford, and the sheriff of Carlow, to proclaim that no-one was to supply victuals, horses or arms to the O'Byrnes, O'Tooles, MacMurroughs and O'Nolans, who had all evidently risen to war. The shires were also to keep one peace and one war towards the Irish, so that if one of them was attacked the others were to come to its aid. 109 It seems, however, that Munster was the justiciar's first aim. On 24 October he wrote to the king describing what he had done since arriving in Ireland: 110

"...a mon arryval jeo trouay le terre en tiel trouble auxi bien par outrag-eouses reautes des Engleys que ne se

110 P.R.O., S.C.1/56/7."
renderont mie obeisant a la court com par guerre des Irreys qe tous jours gaytent leur poyn a surqueir les Engleys et (....) tout le mal qils poount al entencion de eux enfièbler de poair et qe ils les puissent enchaser de la terre, et a ceo pourront avenir qe dieu defent. Et a ceo par assent de vestre conseil deinz les viij jour apres mon dist arryvail jeo pris mon chemyn deinz les parties de Mounester ou il y avoyt plus grand mestier a cele heure par nyent soeffrables grevaunces qe estoient faites en le countee de Cork et enyron a grant poerte et damage de vous, sire, et a la nyentissement de vestre people, quele ryotes souint au les estaunches, dieux eut soyt (....) et de illeqes jeo reyvynche par les parties de Leynester entre les Irreys qe furent a cele heure molt augresses affays le mal et le fyent de jour enautre mes ils ne se portent mie si haut or com ils fyent.....

Ufford's own description of his actions is borne out by the records, though exact details of his movements are lacking. By 18 July he had 40 men-at-arms, 126 mounted archers and 81 foot archers in his retinue, and between 2 and 17 August he was taking inquisitions at Cork and Youghal, mainly concerned with Desmond's activities. There is no sign, however, of any fighting in Munster, and between 13 September and 2 October he was back in the Kilkenny area. By 20 September he had taken a considerable number of extra troops into pay. Oliver de la Freigne had joined him with 18 men-at-arms, 56 hobelars and 12 foot, while

Fulke de la Freigne brought 31 men-at-arms, 110 hobelarls and 216 foot. Thus, together with his own retinue of 237 men, Ufford had a total of 443 men with him.\textsuperscript{113} It seems to have been at this time that the justiciar went into action against the Irish of Leinster. We hear of persons serving with him against MacMurrough, O'Nolan and O'Byrne,\textsuperscript{114} and the evidence suggests that the expedition was a success. Ufford is said to have burned the lands of MacMurrough in Hy-Kinsella, and to have destroyed the corn of the Irish of the countryside, forcing them to give hostages for the peace.\textsuperscript{115} This description would fit the operations of September-October 1344, when the corn would have been recently harvested. Fighting clearly took place, for we know that the members of the justiciar's retinue alone lost twelve horses against MacMurrough and two against O'Byrne.\textsuperscript{116} The statement about the taking of hostages is possibly borne out by the fact that there were three MacMurrough hostages in the custody of the community of New Ross in January 1346, although it is not, of course, possible to be certain that they were the ones taken late in 1344.\textsuperscript{117} Ufford's letter to the

\textsuperscript{113} Mem.roll 19-20 Edw.III, m.17- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/23, pp.522,531.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., m.3- p.443; ibid., 18-19 Edw.III, m.10d R.C.8/23, pp.89-90; \textsuperscript{54th.Rep.D.K.}, p.60; R.C.H. p.48 no.153.

\textsuperscript{115} Clun, p.30.

\textsuperscript{116} P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.

\textsuperscript{117} Just.roll 19 Edw.III- Genealogical Office, MS 191, p.307.
king was written from Dublin on 24 October, and so by that date the military operations in Leinster had taken place. They were followed by the placing of 42 kern in Newcastle McKynegan between 9 November and 10 December against the Irish. 118

Within four months of his arrival Ufford had attempted to bring the situation in Munster under control. He had seen  for himself the disorder there and had begun to build up a dossier against Desmond. He had then proceeded to deal effectively with the Irish of Leinster. In November and December 1344 he was at Drogheda, presumably considering and planning action in Ulster.

Ufford had married Matilda, the widow of the Brown Earl, and he thus had a personal interest in Ulster. In a way his appointment to the justiciarship is a precursor of that of Clarence and of the Mortimers: the king realised that a justiciar with his own interests at stake in Ireland would be a more willing and energetic governor. 119 Matilda was entitled to extensive dower lands in Ulster, but since her first husband's death had been unable to take profit from them, and had been persistently petitioning the king for compensation. 120 Among the parts of her dower

120 E.g., C.C.R. 1333-7, pp.256-7; C.P.R. 1338-40, pp.21,305.
which could not be received were services of the Irish: O'Cahan, O'Neill (both Henry and Hugh), Maguire, O'Hanlon, MacCartan, McGilmurry and O'Flynn. \(^{121}\) It was natural that Ufford should take action to secure his wife's dower and that that action would naturally involve strong action against the Irish. Ufford's campaign seems to have been the first really serious attempt to bring the region under royal control since 1333. Shortly after Ufford's arrival in Ireland he was empowered by the king "to place a certain number of men commonly called in that land 'le bonaght' in the county of Ulster for the defence and peace of those parts, as used to be done in the times of the late earls of Ulster". \(^{122}\) It seems clear that the king expected Ufford to take steps to remedy the situation in the north: the bonnacht was a permanent body of mercenaries which acted as a sort of police force in the earldom. \(^{123}\)

By 27 February at the latest the justiciar was heading north. On that day his retinue of 40 men-at-arms, 90 mounted archers and 24 foot archers was joined by John de Clinton with 24 men-at-arms and 12 hobelars, and by "McCuly hibernicus" with 100 "foot of kern".

\(^{121}\) C.C.R. 1333–7, pp.248–50. The names are garbled in the Calendar.

\(^{122}\) C.P.R. 1343–5, p.239.

\(^{123}\) See Curtis, "The Bonnacht of Ulster", Hermathena, XXI (1931), esp. pp.92,103. There seems to be some confusion between the bonnacht and the military service owed by the Irish to the earl of Ulster: the subject needs close study. From the king's point of view, it may be significant that Lionel had married Elizabeth de Burgh on 9 Sept. 1342.
Clinton stayed with him until 30 April and "McCuly" until 26 March. According to the annals, Ufford did not enter the earldom until March, and it seems that these troops must have joined him in anticipation of the campaign. The justiciar attempted to enter Ulster through the notorious pass of "Humberdoylan" or Moiry, but was overthrown by MacCartan, who killed some of his men and despoiled him of "bread, money, silver vessels, and horses". This story as given in the annals is strikingly borne out by the record evidence. Ufford and his men are said to have lost twenty-nine horses, seven sumpters, eighteen carts and wagons, and £100 worth of harness and coined money in the pass, and they clearly suffered a heavy reverse. MacCartan took his self-appointed position of "keeper of the pass of Indulan" very seriously indeed.

Ufford and his army, having been thus repulsed, seem to have called on the people of Louth to aid them. With their help the justiciar succeeded in repairing the pass and making it negotiable, expelling Thomas MacCartan and passing through into Ulster.

125 See above, pp.200-01.
126 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 385.
127 P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.
128 In the 1350s he exacted a shilling a time for safe-conduct through the pass (P.R.O., S.C.6/1239/32,33; see above, pp.200-01).
129 Clyn, p.30; Chart. St. Mary's, II. 385. For the MacCartans see Orpen, "The earldom of Ulster", R.S. A.I. Journ., XLIV (1914), pp.53.
was not content to see MacCartan escape, and he proclaimed that there was to be a reward of £100 if he were taken alive and £40 if dead. He left Andrew de Guildford, one of his men-at-arms, as keeper of the area, and Andrew succeeded in capturing the Irishman and having him hanged either in 1346 or 1347. Thomas had apparently foolishly returned to his patrimony, not allowing for the strength of Andrew and his men. There must have been a stiff fight, for Andrew claimed that he had lost 30 men and horses and armour to the value of £100, but, despite his exertions, he did not receive his reward until 1348, and then only in the form of an assignment on the revenues of Waterford.

What Ufford did when he arrived in Ulster we do not know in detail. The seneschal of Ulster joined him, but it does not seem that there was much fighting, for only three horses were lost in the earldom. The annals say simply that he replaced Henry O'Neill with Hugh O'Neill and "thus he returned with praise and

130 C.P.R. 1343-5, pp.244-5; P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.
131 A.Clon. (1346); AC; AU (1347).
132 Rot.Parl., II. 211-12.
134 Ibid., 18-19 Edw.III, m.24- R.C.8/23, p.175.
135 P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.

See Sayles in Irish Studies, pp.217-20 for all this.

Desmond was paying the rent of these lands in 1342 (P.R.O., Receipt roll, S.101/241/7).


Sayles in Irish Studies, p.92.
in triumph". It seems likely that the success in
the Moiry pass, and the fact that the seneschal had
joined the justiciar, overawed the Irish and Anglo-
Irish of Ulster, making them come to terms with Ufford
without fighting.

The justiciar's retinue remained stable at 40 men-
at-arms, 104-106 mounted archers and 28 foot archers
between 21 March and 10 May. On 21 May it fell to
40, 63 and 15 respectively, and this probably coincides
with Ufford's return from the successful northern ex-
pedition. In June, however, it was once more
necessary to take action against the earl of Desmond,
who had been creating trouble in the south between 1343
and 1345. In February 1345 the earl had tried to call
an illegal assembly of the magnates to Callan, and now
in June he failed to attend a parliament at Kilkenny.

Desmond had been removed from the custodianship of the
Ormond lands, and in his anger had started to attack
Tipperary. Thomas Butler had recovered Nenagh from
him in 1344, and now the earl entered the Butler
lordship, ravaging Ely and Ormond and attacking Nenagh.

A rental of Ely made in this summer shows the seriousness
of the position— as well as the attacks of O'Carroll,
McGillapatrick and Brian Ban, the "army of the earl of Desmond" is held responsible for a massive decline in rents.¹⁴²

Ufford decided to undertake a major operation in the south to combat this disorder, and he set out on 24 June "without, however, the assent of the greatest of the land."¹⁴³ The expedition was closely planned in advance. Writs were sent ahead to the sheriffs and seneschals of the counties and liberties through which the army was to pass, ordering them to buy supplies. The seneschal and the sheriff of the cross of Kildare were to have supplies at Naas on 27 June, the sheriff of Carlow at Carlow on 28th., the seneschal and sheriff of the cross of Kilkenny at Jerpoint on 29th., and the sheriff and mayor of Waterford at Waterford on 2 July.¹⁴⁴ The clerk's account begins on 27 June, when the justiciar had a retinue of 40 men-at-arms, 52 mounted and 22 foot archers with him.¹⁴⁵ By 2 July Ufford was in Tipperary (the planned itinerary had evidently gone awry), and there he was attacked and chased to Ballybothy by a series of the followers of the earl of Desmond, including Cormac MacCarthy and O'Conor of Kerry, as well as de Burghs, de Mandevilles, Cogans, St.Aubyns and Powers. The malefactors are then said to have rejoined the earl at Kingswood in Waterford.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Cal.Ormond Deeds, II. 226-7. I am indebted to Dr Adrian Empey for drawing my attention to the connection between all these events.


¹⁴⁴ Mem.roll 18-19 Edw.III, m.5d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/23, pp.43-6. The southern shires were also to provide supplies, and to deliver all debts to the clerk of over
Ufford had now seen just how serious and determined the opposition to his authority was, and, although some troops had joined him before the attack took place, it was after 2 July that a proper army began to gather: 147

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
<th>Men-at-Arms</th>
<th>Hobelars</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Richard de la Sale</td>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Bermingham</td>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Burton</td>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Wellesley</td>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacMurrough</td>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5 (?)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulke de la Freigne</td>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver de la Freigne</td>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'More of Leix</td>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ufford</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals at 7 July:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>444</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total: 1,002

Ufford now moved on to Cashel, where he was on 14 July. There he issued a general summons to arms, proclaiming that all lieges, of whatever status, should join him there to follow the king's banner and do whatever was

wages (ibid., mm.6d,43- pp.52-4,390-2). See also above, p.58.


146 Analect.Hib., XXIII. 26; Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.221.

147 Mem.roll 19-20 Edw.III, mm.16,16d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/23, pp.501-8,515. The figure for MacMurrough's hobelars is not clear, and a little of the membrane may have been lost (it is impossible to be certain from the R.C. Calendar).
demanded of them. This is apparently a community summons to arms in defence of the land, and quite separate from the royal service which Ufford proclaimed at Moydeshel about this time. Writs must have gone to the neighbouring sheriffs, for we know that the sheriff of was ordered to attend the justiciar with horses and arms. Ufford had therefore collected a strong force to deal with Desmond and his allies.

The rebels were still at Clonmel and Kingswood, and on 19 July they are said to have robbed Ellis Burdon at Ballybrennan. However, by 29 July Ufford was in possession of Clonmel, and was taking an inquisition there. By 22 August he had reached Buttevant in Cork. Throughout August the earl and his men were committing outrages in county Cork, but Ufford's movements suggest that they were now retreating and that Desmond was not organizing any really firm resistance to the royal army. By October Ufford was moving on into Kerry, whither Desmond seems to have fled as his supporters scattered.

148 Analect.Hib., XXIII. 26; Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.221. Sayles says 7 July, but this is a slip. See also above, p.46 for this summons.
149 Cf. Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.262 note 32.
150 Hore, Wexford (Tintern &c.), p.159. Above, p.46.
152 Ibid., pp.27,38.
153 Sayles in Gwynn Studies, p.222.
154 Ibid., pp.222-3.
seems to have shipped troops from Cork and Waterford, and to have pursued Eustace le Poer and William Grant right to Castle Island, where he charged them to surrender. They refused, and when Ufford approached the castle with the royal standard "to subdue them in the king's name" they rose against the standard, and the justiciar had to take the castle by force. In it was also Jordan Coterel, the earl of Desmond's seneschal. The rebellious knights were immediately sentenced to death on the testimony of a jury of the neighbourhood, and the sentence was quickly carried out: they were drawn, hanged, their intestines burnt, and quartered, their limbs being dispatched to various parts of the country. This occurred on 21 October, and seems to mark the real end of the rebellion, though the earl himself had not yet been captured. By this date Ufford had a very large army indeed in pay, and had clearly gathered up much local support against Desmond:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ufford</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72*</td>
<td>14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulke de la Freigne</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver de la Freigne</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'More</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Bermingham</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Wellesley</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Butler</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

155 Just. roll 19 Edw. III- Genealogical Office, MS 591, p. 311; above, p. 46.
156 Cal. Gormanstown Reg., pp. 188-9; Clyn, pp. 31-2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men-at-arms</th>
<th>Hobelars</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MacMurrough</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lenfant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Burgh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiler F'Richard de Burgh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund de Burgh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund F'Henry de Burgh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermot O'Brien</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacNamara</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Birmingham</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David de Caunteton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Bentham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William of Sudbury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- *mounted or foot archers

It is of great interest to see that Dermot O'Brien, Brian Ban's rival for Thomond, had gone over to the justiciar, as had MacNamara. Two of the most important Irish leaders of the south were thus not supporting Desmond. The presence of so many southern Anglo-Irish is also of interest, confirming that Desmond's support, even within his own area, was far from unanimous.

Perhaps more and more men went over to the justiciar's side as it became plain that Desmond and his allies could not withstand the royal army. We do know that Robert de Barry and Philip de Prendergast "took the side of the king and the justiciar against their kindred" and were killed by MacDermot for their pains. It

158 Clyne, p.31.
may be that MacDermot (that is Dermot MacCarthy of Muskerry who was to be a persistent thorn in the government's side) was one of the last of the southern rebels to hold out, for a commission to treat with him was issued as late as 4 February 1346.\textsuperscript{159}

The military operations seem to have drawn to a close in the early winter of 1345, although Walter de Bermingham kept ward against the Irish in Tipperary until 24 December.\textsuperscript{160} By 13 January the justiciar's army had all gone out of pay, leaving him with a retinue of only 40 men-at-arms, 70 mounted and 2 foot archers.\textsuperscript{161} Ufford seems to have devoted himself to taking the by now traditional measures for securing the peace of the south. By the Hilary and Easter terms of 1346 the community of Kerry was paying a fine to have a charter of peace, and receipts were already coming in from the lands of Desmond, who had, of course, forfeited. Long lists of southern Anglo-Irish were also paying for charters of peace.\textsuperscript{162} In January 1346 the justiciar set about taking hostages from Desmond's supporters and the other southern lords, Irish and Anglo-Irish alike. Hostages were exacted from the families of de Burgh, fitz Maurice, Husee, Cantilupe, Lengleys, fitz Gilbert, Cadogan, fitz Peter, Fanyn, de Valle, Roche and Daundon, and from O'Kennedy, O'Conor of Kerry, O'Duffyr, O'Donegan, MacNamara,

\textsuperscript{159} Pat. roll 19-20 Edw. III- N.L.I., MS 2, f. 164 (R.C.H. p.49 no.32).

\textsuperscript{160} Mem. roll 19-20 Edw. III, m. 16- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/23, p. 506.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., m.16- p.501.

\textsuperscript{162} P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/241/14.
Brian Ban O'Brien and O'Brien (Dermot?). They were delivered to the king's marshal and to the local authorities of Cork and Limerick for safe-custody. It is clear from the list of names that Ufford's campaign was a major success, and that his achievement in the south was even more striking than his achievement in Ulster. Although Munster was to be far from quiet in succeeding years, the earl of Desmond was no longer a serious threat to the government, nor was he the rallying-point for Irish and Anglo-Irish discontent as he had been in the past.

Ufford had achieved much: an expedition to Ulster and king-making there, success against the Leinster Irish, the final scattering of Desmond and his associates, and also penetration to the Connacht border. Perhaps the justiciar's success brings the normal disorder into focus- in the short-term at least the military problems were not insumountable. Expeditions a little longer and stronger than normal could have beneficial results, and Desmond's alliances fell apart at the application of firm pressure. Nevertheless, Ufford, like Lucy, had mounted expeditions of a strength and cost which were beyond the scope of the usual justiciars. He had spent £3,576-0s-5d on military operations in less than two years, while the revenue amounted to no more than £5,733 between Michaelmas 1344 and Michaelmas 1346 (six months after the justiciar's

164 For this, which cannot be dated, see P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.
165 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/191, m.42; Issue roll, E.101/241/12.
The problems remained, and were not amenable to a simple military solution. Ufford's justiciarship perhaps marks the maximum that could be achieved by the old policies. The justiciars had to deal with social, economic and cultural problems of great complexity, on which the taking of hostages, destruction of Irish crops, and breaking up of the system of alliances of one over-mighty subject could have only a marginal effect. The time was approaching when some sort of new departure would be necessary to cope with the military problem alone.

For the moment, however, Ufford's work does seem to have had its effect. Walter de Bermingham, who eventually succeeded him as justiciar in June 1346, was active militarily, but not, apparently, in the usual areas. He fought in Leix, Meath and Tipperary/Kilkenny, but not, as far as we know, in Leinster, nor did he need to thrust any deeper into Munster until the late summer of 1348. Upon Ufford's death the nucleus of English troops went out of pay, and there were some weeks of vacillation and uncertainty before de Bermingham succeeded him. These weeks saw disorder, and letters from John Morice to the king confirm that there was a direct link between this disorder and the absence of a strong justiciar. De Bermingham was not, it seems, provided with English troops, but he was allowed to maintain ten men-at-arms and fifty archers in Ireland "for as long as he is justiciar and war shall


remain". These troops were maintained throughout his period in office, and, although their number was small, they probably allowed the justiciar to engage in peace-making and parleying operations without having to resort to the full machinery of war to provide himself with a suitable bodyguard. 168

The new justiciar's first task was to do something about the Irish of Leix and Offaly, who had captured the castles of Ley, Kilmehide and Ballylehan in May. 169 In preparation a tractatus was held in Kilkenny on 16 October, where a subsidy of two shillings on the ploughland was granted against O'More and his allies, while a tenth was granted by the clergy. 170 The campaign got under way in November led by the justiciar and the earl of Kildare. The Dublin annalists talks of a mighty struggle: the English invaded "spoiling, killing and burning", while O'More with "many thousand Irish strongly and pertinaciously resisted them". Eventually the Irish were forced to submit to the royal grace and to the earl of Kildare. 171 This account is,


169 For disorders at this time see Chart.St.Mary's, II. 389; Clyn, pp.32-3; AC, 1346.

170 Just.roll 21 Edw.III- Genealogical Office, MS 192, pp.3-4,59; Betham, Early Parliaments of Ireland, pp. 292-4. See Richardson & Sayles, Irish Parliament, p.112. £461-11s-6d came in between Michaelmas 1346 and Michaelmas 1347 (P.R.O., Roll of receipt of subsidy, E.101/241/10) and arrears of £37-7s-4½d during the next year (P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/241/14). A general subsidy was more productive than a royal service would have been.

171 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 389-90.
however, modified by Clyn, who says merely that the justiciar and earl "invaded and burned, but yet killed few men". Unfortunately no account survives which would enable us to see what size the expedition was, but it must have been moderately large since the clerk of wages received £220. The statement in the annals that the campaign was a success is borne out by the terms of peace which were agreed between O'More and the justiciar. Conyll O'More, chief of his sept, came to Athy and admitted his crimes. He undertook to pay the large fine of 1,000 cows. Fifty were to be delivered immediately, fifty at Easter 1347, fifty at St. John the Baptist and fifty at Michaelmas. The remaining 800 were "put in respect", dependent on his future good behaviour. Conyll acknowledged himself to be the king's liegeman and also that he held all his lands in Leix of Roger Mortimer's manor of Dunamase. He promised to repair the castle of Kilmehide (which he had of course destroyed) between the time of the submission and St. John, and that he would aid the king and his ministers with all his strength to fight rebels in his own marches. He would also go with the justiciar, bringing his troops, at the king's expense "to any exterior parts". He agreed to give compensation to the people of Kildare, Kilkenny and Carlow for damages he had

172 Clyn, p.33.
174 Just. roll, Hil. 21 Edw.III- Genealogical Office, MS 192, pp.53-5.
done, and also agreed not to occupy any lands of the English against their will. He would hold his brothers and "iraght" to this undertaking also. His idlemen were not to be permitted to seek victuals among the English. O'More gave his son Richard as a hostage until such time as he delivered other sons of himself and of David and Shaan O'More (his brothers?). This temporary hostage was given to John son of John de Wellesley, who was to produce him whenever the king wished, under the penalty of his own body (**corpus pro corpore**). Conyll submitted himself to the ecclesiastical censures of the bishops of Kildare and Leighlen in the event that he contravened the agreement.

This agreement between the king and O'More is our fullest statement yet of all that was important to the Irish government: that the Irish should recognize the lordship both of the king and of their immediate lord; that they should cease their extension into English areas, and that they should stop their exactions from English tenants who were within their power. The leader of the sept was to be used once more to control his followers, while his defeat was, as usual, marked by the exaction of fines and hostages. The fact that hostages were taken from other members of the family suggests that O'More's authority over them was thought to be uncertain. On the surface O'More's threatened coercion by ecclesiastical censures represents no coercion at all, but we must remember that such censures were never effective without the backing of the secular arm and that this clause really embodies the promise of further military action by the government.
should the Irishman fail to hold to his undertakings. The degree to which the terms of this agreement were adhered to is hard to determine. In the Trinity term of 1347 ten cows were received from O'More "of a certain fine of the same O'More". None are noted before or after this time, but this may have little significance since such cows, coming in normally through the sheriff, would only be noted on the Pipe roll and not on the Receipt roll. There is some other evidence that the terms of the agreement did have some influence. In 1348 O'More was killed by his brothers, and the English of Ossory are said to have risen in favour of his son, Rory. It will also be seen that Rory and his brother Feruo were the most loyal of the Leinster Irish during the 1350s: almost alone among those who received fees, the O'Mores did not rebel against de Bermingham's successor, Rokeby. It looks as if the terms of peace agreed at Athy in 1347 were not completely a dead letter.

Between this campaign against O'More and 27 November 1347, de Bermingham went with his retinue against the O'Kennedys and O'Carrolls, and, according to the scant record we have from the writ of liberate, even came face-to-face with Brian Ban O'Brien. The

175 See, e.g., Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, pp.19-20.
176 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/241/14. At the same time 30 were received from Donal MacMurrough.
177 Clyn, p.37.
178 See below, pp.335-68. (Exhibit briefly towards the end of Rokeby's term).
O'Kennedys, O'Carrolls and their neighbours the Mac Gillapatricks had been giving trouble for some time. In May 1346 MacGillapatrick is said to have violated the relics of St. Canice, and later there had been struggles between these septs and the de Freignes. No force beyond the justiciar's retinue came into the king's pay, and so we know almost nothing about the expedition. Subsequent events, however, show that it can have had little effect. Around Christmas time in 1347:

Donald, son of Philip, O'Kennedy, making a conspiracy with the Irish of Munster, Connacht, Meath and Leinster, burned and spoiled the town of Nenagh, and the whole countryside, and all the castles of Ormond, except for Nenagh. In 1348 he and his chief men are said to have been captured by the Purcells, and then he and Brian Ban's son were judicially hanged and drawn at Thurles. Such a procedure would have involved the handing of the felons over to the government, and evidence of this transaction has survived. De Bermingham had to pay Hugh Purcell the large sum of £80 to persuade him to turn O'Kennedy over. £20 of a fine for trespass

180 Clyn, pp. 32-3.
181 That there was fighting is suggested by compensation for the loss of a horse (P.R.O., E. 101/241/13; Mem. roll 21-2 Edw. III, m. 7d- P.R.O. I., R.C.8/24, p. 63).
182 Clyn, p. 34; Chart. St. Mary's, II. 390.
183 Clyn, p. 34.
184 P.R.O., Issue roll, E. 101/241/16. There is a problem here. The records seem to suggest that de Bermingham led a second expedition in the summer of 1348 (Analect. Hib., II. 210-11; Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 267). We cannot be certain about this. The
by Rory O'Kennedy came into the exchequer on 5 July 1348, and this may represent a further reward to the government from the strenuous efforts of the Purcells.

After de Barmingham's absence in England, which ended in April 1348, he was engaged in a campaign against McGeoghegan, O'Melaghlin, Shinnagh and Mc Coghlan in Meath. The records assign this campaign firmly to July 1348, and mention no campaign in Meath in 1349. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the details of fighting in Meath given in certain Irish annals under July 1349 really belong to July of the previous year.

It seems that the government was now once more in serious financial difficulties—possibly because of the beginning of the plague. The campaign cost 100 marks, and this sum was raised as a loan from two individuals and from certain towns. For most of the expedition no account survives, but we have the recital in the writ is exactly the same as that for the first payment for the retinue, ending on 27 November 1347. It seems more likely that the recital has passed into common form than that there were two campaigns against the same Irish in the same places.

185 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/241/17.
186 C.C.R. 1346-2, p.413; C.P.R. 1348-50, p.42.
188 Mem.roll 23-4 Edw.III, m.1- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/25, pp. 1-2; P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/241/16. The clerk who received this sum died (of the plague?) before the end of the campaign. Only the account of his successor has survived.
figures of the troops employed for 27-9 July. On 27-8 de Bermingham had with him 12 men-at-arms, 31 hobelars and 108 foot and archers, including his permanent retinue. On 29th. he had only his retinue and 75 extra foot. Since this was only the tail-end of the campaign, these figures may represent much less than the full army.

According to the annals, the expedition was a notable success: "a great defeat was given by the lord justiciar and the English of Meath to O'Melaghlin and the Irish of Meath, in which many of their chieftains were slain". Elsewhere the main battle is assigned to 20 July, and among those slain are specified three McCoghlan's. Since McGeohegan alone is mentioned in the account covering the last three days of the expedition, it seems likely that the other Irish were defeated on 20 July, and that for the next ten days de Bermingham was busy with a smaller force trying to track down the recalcitrant McGeohegans. But despite the successes mentioned in the annals, this expedition does not seem to have pacified Meath for any length of time. Before January 1349 Peter de Boys was ordered to go to treat with O'Reilly, McGeohegan and O'Farrell for the peace. He parleyed three times with O'Reilly and twice with the other two Irishmen. On

190 AFM, 1349.
192 McGeohegan had been accepted into the king's protection as his man as recently as July 1346 (R.C.H. p. 53 no. 91).
his expedition he brought no less than eight men-at-arms and eighty hobelars, which demonstrates that conditions in Meath must have been very dangerous indeed. 193

Soon after the end of these operations in Meath the justiciar was called south, and he spent the whole period from 6 August 1348 until 5 February 1349 officially at war against MacDermot. Very little trace of this campaign has survived in the printed sources, and its existence has only recently been noted. 194 For the expedition the royal service was called to Mallow for 1 August. 195 Since the service required forty days notice, the campaign must have been decided upon before de Bermingham went to Meath. Naturally the justiciar did not employ a large army throughout the six months of the campaign, and the surviving accounts suggest that military operations were confined to late August and September:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>men-at-arms</th>
<th>hobelars/foot</th>
<th>mt.archers/foot</th>
<th>total archers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>6 August</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 September</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

193 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw. III, m. 15d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/24, pp. 489-90. He also treated in Connacht.

194 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 267.


196 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw. III, m. 12d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/24, pp. 458-64.
Mid-October marked the paying-off of the bulk of the army, and after that date only James Cantwell and some officials remained, apart from the justiciar's permanent retinue.

Unfortunately we know nothing at all of what happened on this expedition—though MacDermot was far from chastened since he was the main enemy in Munster of de Bermingham's successors. However, the justiciar did succeed in bringing a significant number of the Irish of the south over to his side. From the beginning he had with him "Odony McDonnyld", who had served him in Meath, and who may have been the captain of a mercenary band and of Scottish extraction. Also with him from the commencement of the campaign was a certain "Conhur Ocheneys", who is obscure. But after the campaign began several important Irish of Munster joined the royal army:

197 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw. III, m. 31- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/24, pp. 584-9. N.L.I., MS 761, pp. 139-40 has a text from the Pipe roll. The figures often do not agree, but, since the Record Commission clerks are on balance more reliable than Betham (whose main interest was, of course, names), I have followed them.

198 And O'Donegan with 80 foot between 9 and 14 November and with smaller numbers until 11 January.

199 See above, pp. 9-10.

200 Mem. roll 22-3 Edw. III, m. 12d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/24, pp. 458-64.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Hobelars/foot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odony McDonnyld</td>
<td>6 August</td>
<td>1 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conhur Oheneys</td>
<td>6 August</td>
<td>1 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacBrien of Natherlagh</td>
<td>26 August</td>
<td>18 65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coronato MacCarthy Ocarbragh</td>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>1 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacCarthy Ocarbragh</td>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>5 80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish contingents, 1 September</td>
<td>26 241</td>
<td></td>
<td>total:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
peaceful people remained quiet and culture flourished". But obviously this cannot be the whole explanation, and we must suspect that there was some unknown factor operating within the Irish areas themselves. What is certain is that this peace did not long survive de Bermingham's supersession by Rokeby. The new justiciary, his deputies and successors were to be faced with disturbances in Leinster on a larger scale than ever before.

201. Clyne, p. 35. There were, of course, troubles in Leinster in these years. See, e.g., P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/241/12; Writs of liberate, E.101/241/13; Hore, Wexford (Ferns &c.), p. 12.
In 1349, after a three year gap, an English justiciar was once more appointed in Ireland. This was Thomas of Rokeby, an old servant of the crown, who had long been active on the northern march. During his terms of office (1349-55 and 1356-7) Rokeby had to face all the old problems which bedevilled the Irish lordship, and in an intense form. It cannot be said that he provided any new answers to those problems, but he seems to have applied the normal palliatives with more than normal skill: especially in Leinster he combined military measures cleverly with negotiation and pacification. To some extent Rokeby contrived to disguise the severity of the ills which afflicted Ireland. During his absence in 1355-6 and after his death in 1357 the inability of the Irish government to cope with the incessant Irish risings was made manifest.

As we have just seen, the 1340s had not been without their hopeful signs: the success of Ufford's firm measures, and the quiescence (for whatever reason) of the Leinster septs. Added to this, the financial stringency, which had threatened to cripple the government completely in the late thirties, had relaxed just enough to allow the occasional respectable campaign to be contemplated. The 1350s, on the other hand, present a picture of almost unrelieved gloom. Throughout this
study we have disclaimed all intention of attempting to account for the fluctuations of the Irish threat. It has been taken as a "given factor", and only the government's reaction to it has concerned us. It is impossible, however, to pass from the forties to the fifties without a brief mention of the plague, for, although we are still appallingly ignorant of its precise effects in Ireland, it is the obvious and most likely cause of the sudden deterioration of the government's position.

Until the copious financial evidence is systematically investigated, all that can confidently be said about the Black Death in Ireland has been said by Fr. Gwynn and Professor Otway-Ruthven. The first point, and it is well-attested, is that the Irish were less badly affected than the English: the plague attacked first those in the sea-ports, and most strongly those living at close quarters in the towns. The English chronicler Geoffrey the Baker describes the situation vividly. The plague spread into England, Scotland and Wales:

et tandem ad Iberniam quasi vellificans, Anglicos ibidem habitantes in magno numero prostravit, set puros Hibernicos in montibus et superioribus partibus degentes fere non tetigit, usque ad annum Christi 1357 quo inopinat ipsos passim et terribiliter delevit. 2


2 Chronicon Galfridi le Baker, p.100.
The second point is that remissions of farms and other dues "because of the pestilence" show that the plague had had a deleterious effect on widespread English areas. That this was so is strikingly borne out by an order issued on 14 July 1362 commanding a reassessment of all rents, both on the royal demesnes and other lands in Ireland. The land was said to be "largely destroyed and waste both by pestilence and mortality, and by the attacks of Irish felons and enemies". Acres assessed at 16d were henceforth to pay 12d, those assessed at 12d to pay 8d, those assessed at 10d to pay 7d, and those assessed at 8d to pay 6d. All officers were to have appropriate allowances. It is significant that the ravages of the Black Death are mentioned in the same breath as Irish attacks. Obviously mortality on the manors, with land going out of cultivation, would leave the way open for heavier Irish incursions. Similarly, if the plague affected the English more than the Irish (and common sense as well as the evidence suggests that it would have done so), the effects of this partiality do not need to be spelt out. Little more can usefully be said. Our lack of knowledge about the pestilence should not lead us to dismiss it as a cause of the increasing weight of

Mem. roll 38-9 Edw. III, m. 39d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/27, pp.679-81. Richardson & Sayles show (R.I.A. Proc., LXII, C, pp.94,96-8,100) that the revenue as a whole did not decline in the years 1346-61. Indeed it recovered slightly on 1337-46. My own impression is that an analysis of the Receipt rolls would show a decline in farms, rents and the like, but that this was counterbalanced by receipts from other sources- and in particular, taxation. But this is no more than an impression.
Irish pressure on the shires. The onus of proof must rest on those who would minimize its effects.

Rokeby received only modest military aid from England. He had to begin with 20 men-at-arms and 40 mounted archers, but, after the first quarter, this was to fall to 20 men-at-arms and 20 archers, with more in emergency for one expedition only. By November 1350 he was to maintain only 10 men-at-arms and 20 archers. When the justiciar returned in 1356 he was allowed 19 men-at-arms and 60 archers. His appointment was certainly no landmark in the introduction of English troops into Ireland—both Charlton and Ufford had had considerably heavier support in recent years.

The first year of Rokeby's justiciarship is not well documented. If the Issue roll is to be trusted, the justiciar had crossed swords with the Irish and Anglo-Irish in counties Dublin, Kildare, Carlow, Kilkenny, Waterford, Tipperary, Cork, Limerick and Louth before 15 September 1350. In the absence of a clerk's account these expeditions cannot be exactly dated. Their cost was £555-6s-8d, which suggests—as does the

4 For references see above, p. 19.


7 Rokeby's movements, as far as the evidence allows, are worked out by Professor Otway-Ruthven (in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 47-8). This valuable article makes use of the Memoranda roll evidence, and I have made much use of it throughout this chapter.
loss of seventeen horses\textsuperscript{8} that, though not very large expeditions, these were more than mere armed patrols.\textsuperscript{9} Among the Irish mentioned were, as we should expect, the O'Byrnes, O'Tooles and O'Nolans. The Leinster Irish appear to have caused enough trouble to provoke separate expeditions on their own account. There were disorders affecting the archbishop's lands at Coillagh,\textsuperscript{10} and, before 17 July 1350, the royal service was called to Wicklow.\textsuperscript{11} There were operations there against the O'Byrnes, and also an expedition to check the O'Nolans, who had invaded \textsuperscript{12} and burned the towns of Kilbaylet and Killergy. These expeditions seem to have been in the late summer, for between 20 August and 4 September a force under the earl of Ormond came from Munster to join the justiciar.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{8} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/2; \textit{Analect. Hibern.}, II. 220.

\textsuperscript{9} The figure is clear on P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/196, m.28. Assignments of over £550 were ordered on the southern shires (Mem. roll 23-4 Edw. III, m.16-P.R.O.I., R.C.8/25, p.112). It is not clear whether this is to be indentified with the "payment" from the exchequer, or is additional to it.

\textsuperscript{10} Mem. roll 28-9 Edw. III, m.6- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/26, pp. 555-7.

\textsuperscript{11} This was the day the first receipts came in (P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/241/20). Total recorded (certainly incomplete) is £132-3s-4d (Receipts rolls, E.101/241/20; 242/7,12,13).

\textsuperscript{12} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/2. The clerk received £207-13s-4d.

\textsuperscript{13} P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/242/2,11; Mem. roll 25-6 Edw. III, m.8d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/25, pp.363-4. He brought 18 men-at-arms, 60 hobelars and 60 foot, at a cost of £83-9s-4d.
Rokeby lost horses both at Wicklow and in the Carlow march, but the only hint of success is the presence of an O'Nolan and a MacMurrough hostage in custody in the following year.

However, at some time during 1350, the O'Byrnes came before Rokeby and chose their leader in his presence. Unfortunately we have no date for this event, and so we do not know whether it preceded or succeeded the military operations against the sept. Nor, indeed, have the details of the election come down to us, and we can only speculate that they were similar to those when a captain of the Harolds was chosen on 23 April. Walter Harold was elected "captain of the progeny of the Harolds" in the justiciar's presence, by electors who were mainly of his own name, but included some Archbolds, Howels, Lawlesses and Walshes as well. The inclusion of these others seems to suggest that the "captaincy" was over a defined territorial unit, within which these other Anglo-Irish happened to live. Walter took an oath to bear himself well and peacefully, to capture any malefactors of his name and to render them up at Dublin castle. The document then merely says that John O'Byrne and Matthew Archbold were elected captains of their families "in the same manner the year". Though interesting, these transactions...
are of limited significance in themselves. True, the choice of leaders in the justiciar's presence is, as far as we know, new, but the obligations imposed upon them (assuming that the details of the O'Byrne transaction were the same as the Harold one) are far from unprecedented. A similar situation had developed in the case of the Lawless family as long ago as 1316, and the terms are much the same as those imposed by Darcy on an earlier O'Byrne in 1335. What is important in the present context is to try to fit the election of John O'Byrne into the political and military situation of 1350. Curtis, upon failing to find "John" O'Byrne in the pedigrees, decided that John was an obscurer O'Byrne, trying to "bid for government support". We may be a little more sceptical about the value of the pedigrees (for, as we shall see, John was clearly captain of the O'Byrnes a little later on), but this seems to be a reasonable hypothesis. The emphasis should, however, be changed somewhat. That a captain of the O'Byrnes should be chosen before the justiciar, and that he should accept obligations to the Irish government, was in key with the rest of Rokeby's policy. We should stress that the justiciar was trying to make use of the Irishman, as well as vice versa.

That this was so is confirmed by the appearance of payments to the Leinster Irish on the Issue rolls

17 See above, pp. 82 (the response to Lawless's petition was that he should chastise his own followers) and 289-90.

late in 1350 and in 1351. Such payments were not new of course, but Rokeby seems to have paid "fees" and made gifts on a larger scale than previous justiciars. Earlier payments appear briefly on the rolls and then cease again, as if called forth by some particular emergency. The payments which appear in 1350-1 persist in a much more stable manner. They suggest strongly that, very soon after his arrival, Rokeby was trying to build up a political system in Leinster. Taken together with the election of John O'Byrne, it seems that the new justiciar was trying to achieve a stability in the mountains by using the Irish (and Anglo-Irish) to preserve order. Diplomacy was, at least in part, to replace force.

From Michaelmas 1350 (almost immediately after the O'Byrne campaign) Hugh O'Toole appears in receipt of:

his fee......to make stay with the lord king and faithfully serve him, and to set out with the justiciar against other Irish, rebels of the said lord king, with his Irish force.

His fee was ten marks a year. From the same date Rory O'More received the same sum in return for the same duties. On 8 January 1351 Gilpatrick O'Byrne came into pay at five marks on exactly the same terms. 19 At Michaelmas O'Molmoy of Meath, who had been employed by Ufford, 20 received ten marks and promised the same.

19 It is not clear who Gilpatrick was. At times like this proper genealogies, using both Gaelic and record sources, would be illuminating.

20 P.R.O., C.47/87/2, no.7.
services. On the same roll two *dona* also appear: to Murchertagh MacMurrough "for good service....and for great labours, mises and expenses which he made and still makes to resist the malice of the O'Nolans and the O'Byrnes of the Duffry.....in the parts of Carlow and Wexford", and to "Comisio" O'More "who in the last war between the justiciar of Ireland and O'Byrne and his accomplices, former rebels of the said lord king, gave service by retaining in the company of the afore-said justiciar an armed force to expel the rebels". Murchertagh was given £4, and a further £5 at Michaelmas 1351, while Comisio received forty shillings.21

By 1351, therefore, Rokeby had, we may assume, defeated the O'Byrnes and either installed his own candidate as their leader or forced their leader to terms, and he had enlisted another O'Byrne as well as O'Toole, MacMurrough and two O'Mores in the king's service. It is obvious that the justiciar's negotiations with the Irish were being blessed with success; he already had a formidable number of Leinster leaders beholden to the government. Fees were plainly to play an increasing role in Leinster war and politics. But it remained to be seen what value the Irish would give for their money.

Rokeby's movements during 1351 and 1352 have been traced by Professor Otway-Ruthven.22 There were small

campaigns against O'Neill in Louth and McGillapatrick in Ossory. The Ordinances of 1351 were promulgated at Kilkenny. The justiciar then went southwards early in 1352, and following that paid a short visit to England. He came back in June, and then devoted himself to preparing a large-scale expedition of war in the south. During his absence the lieutenant had had to order the sheriffs of Cork and Kilkenny to stay in their counties pro defensione populi and not to come to the exchequer, and it seems clear that an expedition in the south was badly needed.

Most of the evidence about the ensuing campaign has been set out by Professor Otway-Ruthven, but the importance of the expedition for the view it gives us of Rokeby's aims in the south may excuse some repetition. All the documents show that the expedition was aimed against MacDermot (i.e. Dermot MacCarthy of Muskerry) and MacNamara. The campaign was, at least in the short-term, successful: Rokeby is said to have "with his banner, subjugated to himself Munster and Thomond, and their kings, that is MacDermot and MacNamara ("Mc Kilmar"), and the castle of Bunratty was restored".

23 Mem. roll 25-6 Edw.III, mm.29,29d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/25, pp.602-3,605. In September 1351 the bishop of Cloyne was given power to treat- and to grant pardons, a very serious step (C.P.R. 1350-4, p.141). Rokeby himself had been writing to the king about the occupation of this diocese by the Irish and mendicants (P.R.O., S.C.1/38/29).

24 R.S.A.I.Journ., XCVII. 50-1.

25 Fitzmaurice & Little, Franciscan Province of Ireland, p.144 (citing annals in B.M., MS Vesp. B. XI, f.127v).

We shall see in a moment how the justiciar managed to achieve this.

The clerk's account covers the whole period from 4 September 1352 until 22 September 1353, but after the end of January 1353 the justiciar had with him only a posse, and the actual fighting must have been at an end. Even during the period of the main operations the army never grew to any great size—it was, for example, little more than a third of the size of Ufford's 1345 force. As usual, its fluctuations were marked:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>men-at -arms</th>
<th>mounted archers</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Oct.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers were augmented by Rokeby's household, by 172 men retained for half a year at the expense of the citizens of Cork, and possibly by the shire levies, who were presumably summoned when the fighting was in their areas. Rokeby, John de Troy and Thomas of Alberton, the clerk of wages, were the members of the administration present. For the rest, the army was mainly composed of the Anglo-Irish and Irish of the south, with their followers. Powers, Cauntetons, St. Aubyns, Fulke de Dene, Oliver Howell, Robert Haket, William son of Andrew and Walter "Carragh" de Bermingham brought contingents. Rokeby brought MacMurrough and 26 Mem. roll 28-9 Edw. III, m. 26- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/27, pp. 657-73.

"Murgh Conwhirson" with him from Leinster, which suggests that his agreements with the Leinster Irish were bearing some fruit. He was also joined by many of the southern Irish during the course of the campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>-arm</th>
<th>hobelars</th>
<th>foot</th>
<th>dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MacBrien of Natherlagh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11 De-11 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11-25 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermot O'Hehir</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23 No-25 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald MacCarthy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16 De-31 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Cormok</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20 De-25 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacCarthy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>18-25 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cormok Fynne Carbragh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>18 Au-27 Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCraygh O' Kennedy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>18-25 Ja</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It looks very much as if the justiciar had had initial successes against Dermot MacCarthy and MacNamara, and that it was this that brought other southern Irish to join him: certainly they did not come to the army until comparatively late in the campaign.

That this was so is confirmed by other evidence. From the statements of jurors in 1368\(^28\) we know that Rokeby cleared MacDermot from the valley of the Lea.\(^29\) He then ordered all men who owned the lands that he had so recovered to return to them and defend them within forty days. Part of the territory recovered by Rokeby was the land "which Ralph Gynys held". It was wasted by the Irish, and Ralph failed to return to it within the time-limit set. Rokeby therefore granted the

\(^29\) See Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 50.
castle of "Gynes" to John Lumbard, sheriff of Cork, who had helped him recover it.\textsuperscript{30} This must have taken place by 14 December 1352, for from that date nine mounted archers were installed in the castle to guard it.\textsuperscript{31} It seems from this that the major attack on MacDermot had taken place by this date, and that the Irish, mainly coming into pay in mid-December, were helping the justiciar to follow up his victory. Among those whom we have seen joining the army was Cormac MacCarthy, and on 1 February 1353 Cormac was rewarded for his service. He was said to have pursued MacDermot and his men "who were expelled from their patria" with all his strength, in the company of the justiciar, and he received a grant of lands in Muskerry.\textsuperscript{32} The later course of the campaign cannot be discovered, but it seems that Rokeby and his Irish auxiliaries may have continued north and west against MacNamara, and that it was now that Bunratty was rebuilt.\textsuperscript{33} It is possible that MacDermot had fled in that direction.

An interesting view of Rokeby's policy can be gained from all this. He aimed to chase MacDermot out of lands which he had illegally occupied and to make sure that these were defended against him thereafter. The original owners were given an opportunity to have them back, but, if they did not return (and forty days

\textsuperscript{30} Just.\textsuperscript{roll} 42 Edw.III- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/29, pp.716-30. The grant is in C.P.R. \textsuperscript{1354-8}, pp.370-1. The sheriff's presence may suggest that of the shire levies.

\textsuperscript{31} Mem.\textsuperscript{roll} 28-9 Edw.III, m.26- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/26, p.667.

\textsuperscript{32} N.L.I., MS 761, pp.210-11 (from Pipe \textsuperscript{roll}, R.C. no.64)

\textsuperscript{33} See Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I.\textsuperscript{Journ.}, XCVII. 50.
gave those resident in England no time to do so), others, who could see to their defence, were to have them. This obviously did not work smoothly. In Clarence's time and afterwards there were disputes about ownership, and revelations that MacDermot had in fact re-occupied some of the lands between Rokeby's time and Clarence's. As in Leinster, Rokeby was prepared to back one Irishman against another. His grant of lands to Cormac MacCarth was for a small service and monthly suit at the county of Cork. If Cormac or his followers trespassed against the king's faithful people they were to give amends to the sheriff of keepers of the peace within four months or lose their lands. As ever, the Irish had little love for one another, and Cormac was as likely as any English tenant to keep MacDermot out.

The justiciar remained in the south with a small posse until 22 September 1353. As well as making war he aimed to enforce a general restoration of order throughout the area. He compelled members of the Lees, de Valle, Graas, Power, Blauncheville, Carew and Roche families to make fine for the peace, and he also levied debts from the Cogans, Barrys, de Courcys and the Powers. These measures are similar to those enforced by, for example, Mortimer and Ufford, and the impression is left of an operation that was more than usually decisive. It may well have been this that inspired the citizens

35 N.L.I., MS 761, pp.210-11.
36 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/243/1.
of Cork to request that Rokeby be sent back to Ireland when he was temporarily superseded in 1355. They saw that he had "laboured much for the peace", and that "to consolidate his labours, he built divers castles in the marches". This was a notable tribute—the more so since Rokeby had levied a subsidy on the mayor and citizens for the re-building of Gynes. The justiciar's operations in the south seem, therefore, to have been widespread and successful, but, as ever, their success was rather impermanent.

Rokeby had spent a full year in Munster, which is remarkable when we remember the hasty to-ing and fro-ing of the justiciars during parts of the 1330s and 1340s. It seems as if his political system in Leinster had indeed secured some measure of calm there between 1351 and 1353. The justiciar continued on his chosen path. We hear of rounds of parleys (which cannot be dated precisely) with O'Conor of Offaly, O'Reilly, O'Farrell and McGeohegan. O'Reilly we know came to meet the justiciar at Kells in Meath, in order to negotiate concerning his retention to the king, and we are told that Rokeby's various treatings were aimed at bringing the Irish to the peace "in as subtle a manner as it could be managed". He was not anxious to waste his slender substance on fruitless expeditions.

38 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/243/1.
40 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/197, m.26. This elaborates more than the Issue roll—was the treasurer justifying his expenditure at Westminster?
Immediately upon the justiciar's return from the south his Leinster policy came under strain. In the Michaelmas term of 1352 O'Byrne (presumably John), Gilpatrick O'Byrne, Murchertagh MacMurrough, Rory O'More and Hugh O'Toole were all in pay as they had been in 1350-1. Between Easter 1352 and Hilary 1353 O'Byrne had received an extra five marks "in aid of his expenses in performing an arduous piece of business, with which he was burdened by the king's council, intimately concerning the lord king and his peace". O'More received £10 "for capturing from O'Conor, a powerful Irishman, former enemy and rebel of the king, one worthy hostage for the peace of the land of Ireland, delivered to the justiciar in the name of the lord king". There can be little doubt, therefore, that the justiciar's policy had been working—especially when we remember that he succeeded in bringing Mac Murrough all the way to county Cork to fight for him. This happy situation came to an end with the rebellion of O'Byrne, against whom a campaign was being prepared by 26 September 1353. The outbreak of trouble seems to have taken place in July and August, and we find wards and extra garrisons being placed at Wicklow, Newcastle McKynegan and Ballymore during these months. The ward at Ballymore was "to safeguard the neighbouring parts of counties Dublin and Kildare against the hostile invasions of O'Byrne and of other Irish, his
The defection of O'Byrne made it all the more important that Rokeby's other stipendiaries should not desert the government side. It is therefore highly significant that we see O'More on 13 September (just before the campaign began) being granted the custody of the manor of Kilmehide in Carlow for his good service "in warlike and other acts against enemies". The date of this grant—after the O'Byrne outbreak and before the expedition—must lead us to conclude that it was a bribe to make certain of O'More's fidelity.

In the event O'More brought 4 men-at-arms, 68 hobelars and 108 foot to the justiciar's army, while Hugh O'Toole also remained loyal and supplied 2 men-at-arms, 15 hobelars and 4 foot. Hugh also received a reward of £8-13-4d in addition to his fee and wages of war, for defending the people "against the hostile invasions of O'Byrne and his Irish accomplices during the time of the war there". The payment of this sum actually describes O'Toole as "former custos of the parts of the marches of counties Dublin and Kildare", which shows just how far Rokeby's reliance on the Irish had gone. The terminology is that which would be used of a government official, and the justiciar obviously attached the highest importance to keeping groups of the Leinster Irish on his side. The rest of

43 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/243/3. Oliver fitz Eustace was in charge at Ballymore, Maurice Keting and then Edmund Lawless at Wicklow, John de Bermingham and then Hugh Lawless at Newcastle Mc Kynegan.

the army was in the main made up of the retinues of William son of Andrew de Bermingham (13 men-at-arms, 168 hobelars and 278 foot), the earl of Ormond (9 men-at-arms, 71 hobelars and 130 foot), and "McCrych" O'Kennedy (14 hobelars and 84 foot). It is most unfortunate that the account gives the dates of service for Ormond's troops alone- 26 September to 15 October- but it may be that all the retinues served for the same length of time. If they did so, the force would have amounted to more than 1,000 men. 46

As usual, the course of the campaign is unknown, but it was certainly a success. On 22 March 1354 ninety-two cows were received from O'Byrne "in part payment of 100 cows of a certain fine which the same O'Byrne made with the king". 47 The O'Byrne rebellion was naturally marked on the feoda Hibernicorum section of the Issue roll. For Michaelmas 1353 O'Toole, O'More and Murchertagh MacMurrough all received their regular payments, but O'Byrne and Gilpatrick O'Byrne received nothing after Easter. 48


46 Mem. roll 27-8 Edw. III, m. 10- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/26, pp. 349-53. Ormond is the first leader listed, and, if all the dates were the same, the clerk (of the R.C.?) may well have failed to repeat them against each leader. The wages on the account add up to £165-14s-9d, and the clerk received £163-3s-8d, said to be of £200 granted him (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/243/3). That the campaign was no longer than the time of Ormond's service is confirmed by the fact that the clerk was paid for 19 days only.

47 P.R.O., Receipt roll, E.101/243/1. The cows were valued at 2s-4d each.

The O'Byrne rebellion was only the beginning of the collapse of Rokeby's political scheme in Leinster. In the first half of 1354 MacMurrough is said to have mounted a general conspiracy against the government. He set himself up as "king or prince of Leinster", and this despite the peace made between him and the justiciar, which he had sworn to keep. The "peace" presumably refers to his long retention by Rokeby (or some agreement of which his fee was the overt sign). Mac Murrough conspired with "certain great and powerful Irish" to overrun the loyal land, and to "destroy the said land of the king and his dominium". Rokeby offered a reward for MacMurrough's capture; Patrick de la Freigne effected it, and received the large sum of £80 for doing so. 49 MacMurrough was incarcerated in Dublin castle from 27 April until 19 August at least "for divers frespasses and felonies done by (him) against the peace of the lord king in his land of Ireland". 50 He was guarded by Peter de Okebourne, and a payment to Peter repeats that MacMurrough had held himself to be "prince of the Irish of Leinster" and that his imprisonment was for "the greater tranquillity of the peace". 51 As in 1328, the government could not but view with alarm any attempt to restore the Leinster kingship. Such a move implied the recognition of Mac Murrough leadership by the other septs—a recipe for serious trouble south of Dublin.


50 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/243/6; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/204, m.36 gives the dates; Analect.Hib., II. 234 (headed just "anno 28 E.").

Although the ring-leader was thus imprisoned, it remained for Rokeby to deal with his allies. The justiciar sent Alexander Lawless among the MacMurroughs to treat for the peace, while he himself concentrated on trying to detach the other Irish. He recorded that the Irish had agreed to rise, each in his march, at the same time. He had met some of them and given them "both money and clothes and other precious goods that they would hold themselves at peace and obedience to the said lord king, while he attacked the other rebellious Irish war-mongers". He claimed that he had thus been engaged in more arduous negotiations than was previously accustomed, and the king's ministers agreed that he had spent £200 and more. But of this they agreed to grant him only 100 marks. Once more Rokeby can be seen bargaining rather than fighting, and it is in this context that the king's earlier worries about the too-easy granting of pardons may possibly be seen. But although some of the Irish had been bought away from the rebels, it was still necessary to organize an expedition of war.

O'Byrne remained recalcitrant, and purveyance for a campaign against him was under way by 1 September. The

53 Ibid.; Analect.Hib. 15, II. 204-5. It is not impossible that the council thought that the justiciar's conciliatory attitude had gone too far; this might explain his removal from office in 1355.
54 C.C.R. 1349-54, p.293.
clerk of wages was acting from 10 September. 56 Rokeby employed the largest army (to the best of our knowledge) in Leinster since the time of Lucy, the paid troops being augmented by forces from Wexford and Kilkenny. 57

The army was made up as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men-at-arm</th>
<th>mounted</th>
<th>armed or foot</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>arms</td>
<td>archers</td>
<td>unarmed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hobelars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 30 Sep. | 20 | 18 | 301 | 668 | 1007 |
| 21 Oct. | 60 | 22 | 399 | 641 | 1122 |

By 31 October it had gone out of pay.

The campaign was based on Wicklow, for it was to there that the men-at-arms maintained by the communities were to be brought. A posse was sent to Dublin to bring supplies of money to Wicklow, and stores were also sent thither by sea. The expedition seems to have begun with an engagement between the justiciar and O'Byrne and his allies, in which many of the royal army were seriously wounded and forced to go home. This left Rokeby in a perilous position, for the weakening of the army seems to have persuaded more Irish to go over to O'Byrne's side. The justiciar therefore sent letters and messengers to the mayor and community of Dublin, asking them to send

56 His account is on Mem. roll 29-30 Edw. III, mm. 23-24d-P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/27, pp. 146-70. There are some slight gaps in it—especially in the dates of service of individual contingents. Except when otherwise noted, all further details are from this account.

57 And by forces from Waterford whose numbers we do not know: see Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 51-2 for details. Dublin tenants "at the wages of the county" appear on the account as being paid from 18 October. It seems likely that their period of service at the shire's expense was up (39 days from 10 Sept.), and that Rokeby had then taken them into pay. This seems to be the only explanation of this apparent contradiction.
reinforcements as quickly as possible. Almost the whole posse of the city responded to the appeal and stayed with the justiciar at their own costs.\textsuperscript{58} That the campaign had indeed got into difficulties is confirmed by other sources. Rokeby lacked archers and ordered John Serjant to choose suitable ones in Dublin and its environs and to come with them to Wicklow as quickly as he could. The lack of leaders and fighting men also persuaded Geoffrey Folejambe to join the justiciar, while three other warriors led a strenuous attack on the Irish in order to rescue English who were in grave danger of being killed.\textsuperscript{59} It may also be significant that Ormond's large retinue joined the army as late as 21 October—there are other examples of his coming "from Munster to Leinster" when grave danger threatened in the mountains. But, although the campaign got into difficulties, it does seem to have been successful in the end. The Dublin citizens were rewarded for their service, and after they joined the royal army it is said to have "repressed the audacity of the Irish", killed many of them, and returned to Dublin with peace restored.\textsuperscript{58}

Apart from the good service of the citizens, the ultimate success of the expedition may partly be accounted for by the fact that, even at this pass, Rokeby had


\textsuperscript{59} P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/243/6. Serjant led his men well in the van of the army and got 10 marks for his wages and losses. Folejambe got 20 marks and the other three had 100s for their losses of armour.
still managed to divide the Irish. Not only had he broken up the general conspiracy by his gifts, he had also succeeded in enlisting Irish on his side. A Dermot MacMurrough served, though with a small force, and so did a certain "Murgith Manessone". The Anglo-Irish of the mountains—Lawlesses, Archbolds, Harolds and fitz Eustaces—also supported the government, which was by no means a foregone conclusion.

During all this we must assume that MacMurrough himself was still in prison in Dublin. But between 21 and 26 October, the Marshal was employed in conveying him from Dublin castle to Wicklow. It has been suggested that MacMurrough was being brought to the area because "evidently his release was being made a condition of peace". However, the Irish annals, in a rare nod towards the affairs of Leinster, tell us that "MacMurchada was torn asunder (i.e. drawn) by the Foreigners, through which a great war occurred between Foreigners and Gaidhel". We must accept the evidence of the annals and suggest that MacMurrough was taken to Wicklow, not to be released as part of a peace-settlement, but to be executed as an example to his recalcitrant allies. His death seems to be confirmed by the disappearance of Murchertach MacMurrough from the stage.

60 "Dermot Lamh-Derg" was king of Leinster in 1361-8 (Curtis, Medieval Ireland, p.394).

61 Perhaps this was a disgruntled son of Manus O'Byrne, the hostage of 1325 (see above, pp.248-9).

62 Recorded payments for his upkeep end on 19 August (above, p.353).

63 By Professor Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 52.

64 AC, 1354.
at this point: when Rokeby next enlisted a MacMurrough in the king's service, it was Art, son of Murchertach. However, events are far from clear. The claim of the annals that the execution of MacMurrough provoked a "great war" does not appear to be true, at least in the short-term. What followed was a temporary peace, with the Dublin troops returning to the city "peace having been restored". By diplomacy and a determined campaign Rokeby had broken up a very serious Irish resurgence in Leinster. But the O'Byrnes were far from properly pacified, and a "great war" did ensue in Leinster from 1355 onwards.

Rokeby's system of alliances with the Leinster Irish now lay in ruins. The O'Byrnes had, of course, long left his payroll, and MacMurrough naturally received nothing after Easter 1353. Rory O'More died in 1354, and only Hugh O'Toole was in the government's pay at Easter and Michalemas 1354 and Easter and Michalemas 1355.

The justiciari's movements in late 1354 and early 1355 took him to many parts of the country. While in the south he ordered the release of the hostages of MacCarthy and O'Mahon to their principals, and secured the delivery of hostages taken by MacNamara. All this

65 Below, p.365.
67 AC, 1354.
again suggests successful negotiations. By April 1355, however, the justiciar was once more coming to Dublin to deal with a renewed threat from O'Byrne.\textsuperscript{70}

In this situation it must have become obvious to the justiciar and council that new measures were necessary, and an attempt was made to contain the Irish by instituting a ring of wards and strongholds around the mountains. These measures took two forms: defences paid for by the exchequer, and a series of wards established on a basis of popular obligation. We have already seen the institutional significance of the latter measures,\textsuperscript{71} and it must suffice to say that wards were established (or at least were repeatedly ordered to be kept) at Bray and Tallaght in county Dublin and at Ballymore and three other locations in county Kildare.\textsuperscript{72}

In addition to this, beginning in April 1355 and continuing into Clarence's time,\textsuperscript{73} permanent defences were established by the administration at various points on the coastal side of the mountains and in the Vale of Dublin. Between 1355 and 1357 there were wards at Newcastle McKynegan, Kilmartin, Killoughter, Wicklow, Tallaght, Saggart, Balyteny (Powerscourt), Carrickmines, Bray, Glenmore,\textsuperscript{74} Killiney, Ballycorus and Jamestown.

\textsuperscript{70} For his movements see Otway-Ruthven in \textit{R.S.A.I. Journ.}, XCVII. 53.

\textsuperscript{71} Above, pp.72-4.

\textsuperscript{72} For these and those in Dublin, see the map.

\textsuperscript{73} See, e.g., P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/10.

\textsuperscript{74} "G\textsuperscript{\textae}ynoure" : probably Glenmore Castle in the Devil's Glen, near Kilmartin and Killoughter.
LEINSTER WARDS
1355-6

1 TALLAGHT
2 SAGGART
3 KILTEEL
4 RATHMORE
5 BALLYMORE
6 GRANEY
7 WICKLOW
8 GLENMORE
9 KILLOUGHER
10 KILMARTIN
11 NEWCASTLE M.S.K.
12 BALLYCUNN
13 BRAY
14 BALLYCORUS
15 JAMESTOWN
16 CARRICKMOR
17 KILLINEY
A clerk was appointed to pay the men at ward, and the administrative machinery remained in permanent existence, although all these places were not warded continuously. The clerks' accounts show that these fortresses, when in use, were defended by small forces of some ten to twenty hobelars, foot or archers, occasionally rising to fifty or more. 75 The clerks were in addition responsible for paying various English and Irish for killing or burning out the enemy, and for acting as messengers, negotiators or watchmen. They also bought supplies, arms and even stones for construction-work. This, added to the use of the term "fortalices and wards" in the heading of the accounts, suggests that, where castles did not already exist, rough ramparts may have been specially built. And, indeed, the remains of such a fortification have been identified at Kilmartin. 76 Though wards were far from new, the year 1355 seems to mark their erection into a major item of policy. Only in the 1270s had they been established in comparable numbers, and then, to the best of our knowledge, they had not been maintained so consistently, nor had such detailed administrative arrangements been made for their support. This closely articulated defensive system is a testimony to the increasing gravity of the Irish pressure in Leinster, and to the breakdown of the justiciar's political arrangements there in 1353-5: even

75 Mem.roll 29-30 Edw.III, m.27; 32-3 Edw.III, m.7-P.R.O.I., R.C.8/27, pp.185-95; 343-51.
in the troubles of Wogan's last years, warding on this wide scale had not been thought necessary. In 1355-6 the paid wards cost £549-10s-1ld; 77 their institution was not a step to be taken lightly.

These measures were adopted by Rokeby at the same time as he was organizing a fresh campaign in Leinster. The royal service was called to Newcastle McKynegan because "the Irish rebels of the parts of Leinster, gathering together a huge multitude of other Irish, are intending to invade the king's faithful people there". 78 The service was proclaimed on 20 April, and was to come to Newcastle on 8 June. It seems, however, that the military operations were over by that date, and that Rokeby fought not the O'Byrnes but the O'Nolans. It may be that the O'Byrnes were brought to the peace before the expedition took place, for we find "John O'Byrne, chaplain" being paid for "his negotiations, ordered by the said council, for the reformation of the peace between the faithful people of the lord king and the O'Byrnes and other adversaries". 79 This cannot be precisely dated, but it is striking that on 24 April, the day on which operations against the O'Nolans began, 80

80 Mem.roll 28-9 Edw.III, m.27- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/26, pp.673-5. I have been unable to find any evidence that the April-5 May section of this account refers to operations against O'Byrne, and only the second section to O'Nolan (cf. Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 52).
Adam Dodyng of Ballymore and twenty-four companions were rewarded for stealing by night into the fortresses of the O'Byrnes. They had proceeded the next day to attack "certain of the most powerful of them", killing one, lethally wounding a second, and bringing a captive first to Ballymore and then to Dublin. We may wonder if this exploit and the good offices of the chaplain did manage to bring the O'Byrnes temporarily to heel without the expedition taking place. At any rate, in April and May the justiciar was leading a small force against the O'Nolans. At its maximum, on 28 May, his army numbered 235 men, and probably more, but it was out of pay by 5 June, and nothing at all is known of the campaign. There is no sign of military operations at the time the royal service was due, and we can only assume that the immediate crisis was at an end.

Rokeby was back at Dublin on 16 June, and he proceeded to strengthen the Leinster defences still further by entering into an agreement with O'Toole—apparently the only leader of the Leinster Irish actively supporting the government by this time. From 22 June, for forty days, O'Toole was to maintain twenty hobelars and forty armed foot to defend the English from Tallaght towards the Windgates against O'Byrne. His brother John was to

82 AC, 1355 says that the "Galls of Dublin were defeated by the Leinster Gaels". It is hard to fit this into what we know of the chronology of 1355, and it might refer to the crisis of the previous year.
defend the English in the area of Imaal, while Caan, his chaplain, was to scout and inform the justiciar and council of the enemies' plans and ways of access. Since Hugh himself was to be established at Halyteny, and to range to Tallaght, and his brother was to be in charge on the other side of the mountains, the O'Tooles were having considerable trust reposed in them. 84 We know that they must have fulfilled their obligations, for the cash they were to have was actually paid over, and John de Preston received £1 for arraying the Irish troops. 85 These arrangements show that no really firm peace can have been arrived at with O'Byrne. It is also the last success of Rokeby's policy of paying fees to the Irish, which had begun in 1350. Disorders continued after the justiciar's temporary withdrawal from office on 9 August 1355, and the next outbreak was to include O'Toole as well.

Rokeby did not return to Ireland until October 1356, and in his place acted first the earl of Desmond and then the earl of Kildare. Both were taken up with the Leinster situation. Before Desmond arrived from the south to take over, Kildare was treating with O'Byrne and other Irish who were "invading on all sides", and he seems to have wished to grant them truces for a certain time. Kildare also went against O'More and O'Brennan. 86

Desmond immediately began to prepare an expedition in Leinster, but died before it got under way. Kildare then became justiciar, and proceeded to the rescue of Saggart with 148 men. In June a subsidy of two shillings on the carucate was granted, significantly against both O'Byrne and O'Toole, and, apparently about this time, an O'Toole chaplain and the archdeacon of Clondalkin were both employed to negotiate with the Irish. Kildare organized an expedition against both the nearer septs, and the earl of Ormond was called "with a huge multitude of armed men, nobelars, archers and foot to county Carlow". It seems that a really severe crisis had developed in Leinster, and that Kildare had not been exaggerating when he described it as an invasion "on all sides".

When Rokeby returned, he set off first for Munster "to pacify various English nations", and he induced the communities of the southern counties to grant local subsidies for defence. However, the turn of the year saw him make a determined effort to tackle the Leinster problem, which, as we have seen, had grown more acute.

87 R.C.H. p.58 no.171 (appointment of a paymaster).
89 Ibid., m.19d- pp.132-3.
91 Ibid.
92 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1.
93 For this and details of the justiciar's movements, see Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I.Journ., XCVII. 54.
during his absence. He mounted a campaign which began on 9 February 1357 and lasted into April, the month of Rokeby's death. Something over 1,000 men appear to have been employed. Details of the campaign itself are absent, but the political events surrounding it are full of interest. The expedition was aimed against the O'Tooles, O'Byrnes, O'Nolans and their accomplices, and the justiciar set about his task in his by now accustomed way. He managed once more to enlist many of the Leinster Irish on his side. We find Feruo O'More, Art Kavenagh, Donal Revagh and Henry "Oryn" (O'Ryan?) receiving payments direct from the exchequer for fighting in the war. O'More was more often than not loyal; after Rory's death in 1354 we find Feruo asking for the restoration of hostages which Rory had deposited with the government for safe-keeping. The winning over of the MacMurroughs is, however, more surprising. Art had plainly been brought over since Murchertach's death in 1354- a payment on the Issue roll is worth quoting at length:

\[\text{to Art McMoriartagh Kavenagh and master John the Notary; since the same Art has been created MacMurrough (in McMourgh...}\]

94 Mem. roll 31-2 Edw. III, m. 12- P.R. O. I., R.C. 8/27, pp. 265-8. The text is unsatisfactory, many of the dates having been omitted. If we add the numbers of each retinue the first time it appears, the total is 1,280 men. No Irish leaders appear on the account. The cost was £93-14s-8d (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1).

95 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1.

96 Just. roll, Mich. 29 Edw. III- Genealogical Office, MS 192, p. 112.
creatus extitit) by the justiciar and council, and by indentures drawn up between the lord king and his court and the same MacMurrough, to the effect that he will well and faithfully serve the lord king against all other English or Irish with all his power.

Art agreed to remit the forty marks which he and his ancestors had annually received from the treasury, and in return the government paid him £12 and delivered a mark to the notary. It seems that Rokeby had rapidly set about restoring good relations with the MacMurroughs as an essential first step towards coping with the other Irish.

In dealing with the enemies on the campaign Rokeby used his normal mixture of harsh measures and negotiations. Richard Butler and Thomas Blackburn burned houses in the O'Toole country, and killed "Shanne Tagesone" O'Toole. Adam Beg burned dwellings "within the fortresses of Hugh, captain of the O'Tooles", while Patrick de la Freigne brought captured Irish to Dublin. Other exploits took place about the time of the campaign: houses of both O'Byrnes and O'Tooles were burned; several groups of O'Tooles were killed and their heads brought before the council; a prey taken by the O'Tooles at Saggart was recaptured; the bishop of Ferns retrieved the castle of Ferns from the Irish. Further south, the O'Byrnes of the Duffry were also at war, but their captain was killed by Thomas de Astley, and his head brought to the council. At the same time, having led an expedition, and having rewarded these exploits, Rokeby initiated negotiations for the

97 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1. The remission of the forty marks is the first hint that Mac Murrough regarded the fee as his by right.
peace. Three clerks were engaged in drawing up indentures with O'Byrne "concerning the observation of the reformation of the peace". Not only this, once Rokeby had forced the O'Byrnes (and, seemingly, the O'Tooles) to the peace, he made use of them to help restore peace with the O'Byrnes of the Duffry. Payments were made to John, son of Taig O'Byrne, captain of the O'Byrnes, and Hugh O'Toole, captain of the O'Tooles, who, peace having been confirmed between the lord king and themselves, came from distant parts with divers men to treat with the said justiciar and council about the confirmation and rendering of the O'Byrnes of the Duffry to the peace. 99

It is impossible in the light of this latest evidence to deny Rokeby exceptional skill as a negotiator. He enlisted MacMurrough against the other Leinster Irish despite his father's late rebellion and death. He seems to have straightforwardly fought O'Nolan. He instituted operations against O'Byrne and O'Toole, eventually compelled them, too, to the peace, and, in the end, used them to bring the outstanding rebels within the fold. Perhaps the 1357 campaign had little long-term effect, but in its execution it was masterly: it brought to an end three years of general disorder in the mountains. In 1352 Rokeby had O'More, O'Toole, O'Byrne and MacMurrough on his pay-roll. All of them, even briefly O'More, defected between 1353 and

98 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1; Hore, Wexford (Ferns &c.), p.13.

99 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1.
1356, and the justiciar's absence in 1355-6 was the signal for chaos. But between October 1356 and his death in April 1357 Rokeby had re-built and successfully used his old policy of alliances with the Irish.

Occurring at this point in time Rokeby's death was unfortunate. He had succeeded in exerting some degree of control in Leinster (though, of course, this would hardly have been lasting), and his death was the signal for a complete relapse in the area. The history of the years from 1357 to 1361 is more than usually dreary. Disorder follows disorder, and one is left with the impression that the administration was failing to cope with the situation. This impression of chaos may partly be caused by the survival of full chancery rolls for these years, but it is certainly hard to trace clear and sustained military operations by Rokeby's successor, Amaury de St.Amand. These years have recently been studied in detail, and it is not proposed to provide a full narrative here; we shall merely attempt to draw attention to the main features of the period in so far as they affect our theme.

St.Amand did not arrive until November 1357, and in the meantime the government was certainly unsatisfactory, although what measures we can trace show a continuing concern with Leinster. At the turn of the

100 By Professor Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I.Journ., XCVII. 54-9.
101 Ibid., pp.54-5.
102 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1.
year the situation there was still unsettled, but the new justiciar set off for Munster, where he seems to have been during the spring and early summer. During his stay in the south St. Amand's attention was continually drawn to the Leinster troubles. By the time he reached Cork, Art MacMurrough and Donal Revagh (Domnall Rua), who had been serving with Rokeby a year before, had risen to war, and, together with the O'Byrnes, had begun to wreak havoc. On two occasions Nicholas Fauconberg, a royal valet, had to be sent back from Munster to Leinster to treat for the peace. At the same time John de Troy, who had also accompanied the justiciar to Munster, was sent back to parley. Between March and June he talked with O'More at Athy, and also with Thomas Butler at Tullow "concerning certain prisoners of the O'Byrnes". In July he was supervising the keepers of the peace, and seeing to the munitioning of the permanent wards which were still being maintained in the Leinster marches, and to the rescue of one of the castles which had been besieged. The size of the posses Troy brought on these journeys—58 men on the first, and 80 on the second—seems to confirm that there was grave disorder in the area.
By mid-July St. Amand had returned, and widespread measures were being taken for the defence of Leinster against O'More. At some point O'More heavily defeated the "Galls of Dublin", and in late September and early October the justiciar was at Athy for a further parley with him. There is no sign of a formal expedition—the justiciar relied on grants of troops by the community of Kildare—but in November St. Amand did gather together an army. By now he was faced with a general emergency. O'Byrne, O'Toole, MacMurrough and O'Nolan were all in rebellion, and troubles were rife both in the Dublin area and further south, around Carlow.

The paid army was augmented by grants of troops and supplies by Dublin, Kilkenny, Wexford and Kildare. St. Amand can be shown to have gone to Naas, Castledermot and Imaal between 24 and 30 November, and this coincides with the time when the earl of Ormond joined his army with 632 men. It seems, therefore, that the first part of the campaign consisted of an attack on the O'Tooles and O'Byrnes. However, on 16 December the justiciar was leaving the Kildare area—still unpacified and in charge of wards—and going southwards. He may have had some success in breaking up the trouble in south Leinster, for in January Donald son of John

108 For all this see Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 56.


110 R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 56.


O'Nolan joined the army, but on 22 of the month commissioners were being appointed to treat with the leaders of the Irish and to take truces, and it seems that the operations were being brought to a hasty close. Whatever success was obtained seems to have been obtained by Ormond, who was paid £30 "for his mises and expenses about the conveying of John O'Byrne, captain of the O'Byrnes, former enemies and rebels of the king, to the justiciar at Carlow, with others of his race".

January 1359 saw a parliament at Kilkenny, which decided to acquaint the king with the state of Ireland and also granted a subsidy against MacMurrough, and this was followed by St. Amand's supersession by Ormond. St. Amand had been by no means as successful as Rokeby. The Leinster problem gives the impression of getting completely out of hand, and there is little trace of the good relations with the Irish that Rokeby had struggled to establish. It is possible that one reason for St. Amand's failure to cope was financial. His warfare was, as we have seen, mainly supported by local subsidies—though here again the survival of the evidence for such support may leave a slightly false impression of novelty. What is certain is that St. Amand's retinue of 40 men-at-arms and 100 archers was eating up the normal revenue so rapidly that little would be left for the employment of extra troops. Between February 1358

114 R.C.H. p. 76 no. 129.
115 P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/204, m. 41. This cannot, however, be exactly dated.
and February 1359 this force received no less than £1,142-11s-4d in wages, in part payment of £1,516-13s-4d. The average annual revenue of the lordship between 1346 and 1361 was only £2,160. When St. Amand took office, he promised in his indenture with the king "to do the best he could to govern the land of Ireland". In the light of this financial evidence alone, it is not much wonder that his best proved far from good enough.

Ormond was immediately faced by the Leinster problem, which occupied him throughout and beyond 1359. Two days after his appointment he spoke of "confederations made between the Irish of Leinster and elsewhere, that each Irish captain should move to war at a certain time.....", and this seems to be borne out by the bewildering troubles to which St. Amand had been subjected. Ormond seems to have begun by establishing a series of wards in the marches against MacMurrough: at Gowran, Leighlen and other places on the vital pass south which MacMurrough threatened. Full details of these measures have not survived, but the wards seem to have been maintained in March and April, while Ormond led an army against MacMurrough and O'Ryan during the same period. Many other pieces of evidence have survived showing the threat that MacMurrough was

118 See Richardson & Sayles in R.I.A.Proc., LXII, C, p.94.
119 P.R.O., Indenture of war, E.101/68/4, no.77.
121 R.I.A., MS 12 D 10, p.167; N.L.I., MS 761, pp.202-3 (from the Pipe roll). Neither of these versions of the clerk's account is complete.
posing. The emergence of a serious threat to the Barrow valley is one of the most serious developments of the mid-fourteenth century. It had had to be defended before, but now its survival was a matter of real concern. The journey to Dublin from the south was long and dangerous. In 1343, for example, the mayor and bailiffs of Cork had been permitted to render their account only once a year, and that by proxy. As early as the justiciarship of Ufford the moving of the seat of government from Dublin to a more "convenient" place had been mooted. On the appointment of Walter de Bermingham in 1346, the moving of the administration had again been contemplated. Dublin had become cut off from the rest of the country. The move was eventually made under Clarence—significantly to Carlow, on the route to the south. In that sense Carlow was more suitable, but it was itself under heavy attack by the Irish, and the situation of the exchequer and common bench there was even less satisfactory. The danger in south-west Leinster was adding another to those already faced by the over-stretched administration.

It does seem, however, that a temporary settlement was arrived at in 1359. During March John de Carew was

124 C.P.R. 1343-5, p. 27.
125 C.C.R. 1343-6, p. 672.
126 Ibid., 1346-9, p. 78.
127 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p. 287.
treating with Donal MacMurrough, 128 and by 28 May
hostages of MacMurrough, O'More and "Maurice Boy",
given to the king for the peace, were in Carlow
castle. 129 But this peace, if such it was, was of
short duration. By July Ormond was again going against
MacMurrough, and further north the O'Byrnes and O'Toole
also needed his attention. During this summer wards
were established at Crumlin, Saggart, Ballyteny, Donny-
brook and Tallaght, 130 and it is quite clear that the
threat was reaching perilously close to Dublin itself.
In July the justiciar led an expedition at Carrickmines
against O'Toole, and this was the prelude to a full-
scale attack on MacMurrough and O'More in Leix. 131 We
do not know the result of the conflict there, but there
seems to have been heavy fighting: Nicholas Power and
thirty-two of his men were wounded and their horses
killed, while the justiciar succeeded in taking some
prisoners. 132

129 R.C.H. p.78 no.53.
542-3; 37-8 Edw.III, m.13- R.C.8/28, pp.359-60;
P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/244/2, 6.
478,487 (sic- faulty pagination). A remarkable mis-
conception has arisen here. One source (P.R.O.,
Issue roll, E.101/244/2) has "in ultimo conflictu in
parte de Leys habito". Either Gerrard or Charles
McNeill read "Leys hto" as "Lens hilo", and McNeill
speculated that the original had "Censhilo" or Hy-
Kinsella (Analect.Hib., II. 245-6). This error has
given us campaigns in both Leix and Hy-Kinsella
(Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 57).
132 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/2; Analect.Hib., II.
245-6.
The campaign had obviously not been conclusive, for in August and September Ormond was still at war against "Art Kavenagh, traitor of the lord king". For 1360 and 1361 it is impossible to work out an adequate chronology, but it is plain that the peace of Leinster was still disturbed and that Ormond was still fighting. Our difficulties are partly caused by the fact that no clerks' accounts survive for these years, and payments were made direct to the justiciar. He received £158-3s-4d of £1,259-16s-6d "for the last war in Leinster". This suggests that the exchequer was unable to cope with the financial demands of the war, and perhaps even that Ormond had been defraying his own expenses. It is impossible to assess the justiciar's success in these circumstances. We know that he had O'Nolan and O'More serving with him at one stage, and also that ten O'Byrne hostages were in Dublin castle from 19 February to 9 July 1360, but MacMurrough and not O'Byrne was the chief enemy at this time, and there is no indication of the result of Ormond's operations against him.

Much more evidence could be adduced to illuminate the history of these years, but it would still be

133 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/2.
135 P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/6. The enrolled account gives the total spent as £902-9s-7d (P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/207, m.46).
difficult to make them anything but amorphous. This in itself is significant. It is hard to resist the conclusion that there was a striking lack of central control and that the government was plainly inadequate. Rokeby seems to have recognized the limitations of the government's military resources, and to have attempted to work within them. He developed to an unprecedented extent the old art of "divide and rule" among the Leinster Irish; more than that, he tried to secure peace by retaining all the important Leinster leaders to the king. Despite the disastrous collapse of his network— with the defection of even O'Toole and O'More in 1355-6— it worked up to a point. Some of the Leinster septs were with the justiciar in all his campaigns; only in his absence did they universally rise against the government. By a skilful mixture of strong measures and diplomacy Rokeby pacified Leinster again in the short time left to him in 1357. It seems clear that the Irish were ready to take advantage of any weakness of the government: we might perhaps see O'Toole changing hastily to the winning (Irish) side in 1355-6, and changing hastily back again when Rokeby applied renewed force in 1357.

But this policy of Rokeby's demonstrates by its very existence on such a vast scale the seriousness of the situation. It had limited success, and shows that the old methods, even when employed with intelligence, were fast becoming utterly inadequate. There can be

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138 For what evidence survives about other areas at this period, including a small expedition to Munster in spring 1360, see Otway-Ruthven in R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVII. 58-9.
little doubt that Rokeby's successors were his inferiors in ability, and it is probable that their very weakness ensured that there would be a strong combination of Irish against them. During 1357 to 1361 the government was under heavier pressure in Leinster than at any time during our period; it was not a matter of frequent expeditions, but rather a situation of continuous insurrection, in which the government was hamstrung by inadequate financial resources.139

1361 marks the beginning of a new era. From 1361 until the deposition of Richard II in 1399 the principle that a large proportion of Ireland's military budget should be provided from England was force majeure accepted by the king. With the 1350s ends the long story of the attempts of the Irish government to meet the Irish threat from purely Irish resources, and here our narrative must also end. However, it is necessary at this point to ask whether the sending of Clarence's army in 1361 was the direct result of the state of Ireland in the 1350s. Can we take the disorders of 1357-61 and then say "ergo Clarence"?

The great council of 1360 thought that a new beginning, with strong support from England, was urgently necessary. The old ills of absenteeism were emphasized to the king. The petitioners went on to say that the great lords of Ireland were weakened by the plague to such an extent that they could not defend their lands

139 In this context the old story of Rokeby's swearing to eat of wooden plates and pay well for his victuals is apposite enough to be true (See, e.g., Gilbert, Viceroys, p.206).
without the justiciar's help— and one man could certainly not do all that was necessary to help them. The treasury was empty because the justiciar was so taken up with war that he could not hold pleas nor take the king's profits, and this in its turn lessened his ability to make war. The Irish were rising "d'un assent et covyn" because of the government's weakness, and a general conquest was about to be made by them. They specifically asked for a "bone chiefteyn suffisant, estoffes et efforcez de gentz ettresore" to be sent from England.\(^{140}\) We have seen that in 1354 Rokeby suffered from a crippling lack of troops, which could well have been exacerbated by the plague.\(^{141}\) We have also seen that St. Amand and Ormond were in financial difficulties, and that this seems to have coincided with less effective measures against the Irish.\(^{142}\) In 1354 Rokeby spoke of the rising of the Irish leaders "each in his march at the same time", and this claim was repeated by Ormond in 1359.\(^{143}\) It seems, therefore, that the petitions of 1360 were laying the truth before the king. There can be no doubt at all that the presence of Clarence, with English men and money, was desperately needed in Ireland.

Yet Clarence was only sent, we may suspect, because the time was ripe in England as well as in Ireland; the French war had temporarily ended, and Lionel himself

\(^{140}\) Parliaments & Councils, pp.19-22.
\(^{141}\) Above, pp.355-6.
\(^{142}\) Above, pp.371-2, 375.
\(^{143}\) Above, pp.354, 372.
had interests in Ireland which would make him more willing to go there. 144 When Lionel came he did not bring with him a strikingly large number of troops: his army amounted to some 800 men. This is considerably more than the largest retinue previously employed in Ireland (Ufford's 240), but the important point is that the English exchequer, not the Irish, was to bear the cost. 145 If we turn back to 1331-2 when king Edward himself had prepared an expedition, we shall see that he arranged for more than 3,000 men to accompany him. 146 If an English army was badly needed in 1361, the time had evidently been ripe for one thirty years before.

This must be the conclusion to be drawn from our study of the years 1318-1361. The problems with which the Irish government struggled were ones which it had not the resources to solve. Some sort of new departure was chronically needed throughout the period; without it the Dublin government could only fight a losing battle, sinking ever deeper into the morass which the endemic warfare of both Irish and Anglo-Irish created. To decide whether the 1350s were much worse than the 1320s, 1330s or 1340s involves the weighing of imponderables, but the general impression left by our study of the period is that they were worse—no longer could an Ufford check the disorder by a tour de force. The new era which opened so modestly in 1361 was opening many decades too late.

144 For the background see Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 284-6.

145 P.R.O., Paymaster's account, E.101/28/21, ff. 4v, 5v, 6, 6v, 7, 8v (I owe this reference to Dr. J. F. Lydon).

146 See above, p. 264.
Chapter IX

The regulation of relations with the Irish

This study is concerned specifically with the relations between the Dublin government and the Irish, but throughout it we have tried to emphasize the limitations of the government's role, and in particular to point out the overwhelming importance of the great lordships: "we are dealing not with one power-centre or with one community, but with many, and the political relations between them were often not much closer than those between the European states of the nineteenth century". But even within its restricted and fluctuating sphere of influence, it will be obvious that the government's direct military impact was limited. As Curtis long-ago pointed out, "the native victories were won by single chiefs or confederacies of chiefs in hundreds of local battles". The reverse side of that coin is of course that the Irish would have to be resisted locally. Indeed one could argue, despite the apparent paradox, that the smaller the community the more important its reaction to the Irish would be. The struggle to preserve the "English land"

2 Medieval Ireland (2nd.ed.), p.213.
and all that it implied was fought at the level of shire, barony, manor and vill. It would be won or lost there.

Vital and fascinating as they are, relations between English and Irish at local level are not part of our theme, except in one respect. The Irish government was not careless of these matters; it was fully aware of the importance of local defence, and of controlling relations between the two communities. These tasks the government undertook, employing a judicious mixture of the carrot and the stick. It need hardly be said that the administration did not mount military expeditions by choice, but only after other measures had failed; it would do so when the local communities had proved incapable of coping with the Irish (or unwilling to do so), and when its own efforts at pacification had proved unsuccessful. That the government devoted considerable energy to negotiating with the Irish will have been obvious from preceding chapters, but this need not detain us now. It also took measures to ensure that the point where central peace-making was necessary was not reached, enforcing legislation designed to control fraternization between the faithful people of the shires and the Irish enemies, and also establishing machinery at local level for negotiating with them and for resisting them by force whenever necessary. In this chapter we shall look first at the rules which governed intercourse with the Irish, and then at the expedients the administration adopted to control matters of peace

3 To speak of "two communities" is, of course, an over-simplification.
and war without direct intervention, and to prevent local war from degenerating into private war.

Any discussion of these subjects involves a preliminary distinction between those Irish who were within the king's peace and those who were outside it. If an Irishman were within the peace, whatever his legal disabilities may have been, there was nothing to stop him living in a normal manner side-by-side with the English tenants. They in their turn would incur no disfavour for entering into social and commercial relations with him. When the king granted "tuition of his peace" to an Irish chieftain, that chieftain was under the royal protection. In 1297 the king insisted that such Irish should be respected, and that they should not be provoked by English attacks on them. The rights of these Irish within the king's peace were defended in the royal courts: on several occasions we find justices trying to bring to book violators of peace granted by the king. For example, in 1297 itself a prosecution for robbery turned on the question whether O'Conor of Offaly was at peace when Robert Typer took forty-two cows from him. On another occasion, after a robbery committed against the O'Reillys had provoked them to rise to war, the English instigators of the

4 This is not a matter that can be discussed here. For a recent view of the subject, and a guide to earlier writings on it, see Hand, English Law in Ireland, chapter X.
6 C.J.R. 1295-1303, p.197.
trouble were only pardoned because the crime took place five days before O'Reilly's letters of pardon were publicly read, and before O'Reilly himself had received a copy.  

These cases in themselves imply that when an Irishman was outside the king's peace robbery against him was no crime. This was so, and the loyal tenants were allowed to have no intercourse with such Irish, other than their duty of pursuing, chastising and slaying them. This is of no great significance in itself: all we are saying is that the Irish felon or enemy was in the same position as the English outlaw, whether in England or Ireland. The situation in Ireland was, however, different in one vital respect. In England the outlaws formed a comparatively small proportion of the rural population; in normal conditions the enforcement of regulations forbidding fraternization with them would cause little hardship. But it is obvious that in Ireland, where large numbers of the Irish and Anglo-Irish inhabitants of the march areas and beyond were liable to be outlawed felons, a problem of major proportions confronted the loyal inhabitants of the shires and the government that was supposed to protect them. The strict rules which forbade relations with outlaws imposed a heavy burden on the tenants. This was especially so when it is remembered that many of the most important inhabitants of the march were almost permanently outside the king's peace.

The importance of preventing fraternization is obvious. It would be tempting for the English tenants to join in Irish crimes, and sometimes difficult for them to avoid being unwilling accessories. And it was only a step from this sort of disorder to a situation where central military intervention might be called for. At the highest level, we have seen the network of alliances which the first earl of Desmond built up, and the prolonged problem this posed to the administration. On a lower level trouble was frequent.

We hear of oaths being made between English and Irish for the breaking of the peace, of English acting as spies for the Irish of Leinster, to discover the whereabouts of goods and animals worth plundering, of English lords procuring Irish to help them in their crimes, of retinues of malefactors made up of both English and Irish, of "confederations, conventions and illicit conventicles.....to rise in hostile manner for the perpetrating of various evils against the king's faithful people". Examples could be multiplied, but the lesson is clear: relations with Irish and Anglo-Irish felons must be prevented before they led to a situation such as that in 1308-9 when the Cauntetons allied with the O'Byrnes to produce a prolonged and dangerous rising.

8 Above, chapters VI & VII passim.
10 C.J.R. 1308-14, p.164.
11 Ibid., pp.14-16.
12 Just .roll 8-9 Edw.II, m.2- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.5-7.
13 R.C.H. p.35 no.60.
14 See above, pp.180-3.
First and most simply, it was forbidden to enter into social relations with the Irish outside the peace, or to "receive" them. As early as 1277 there is an example of an English tenant being prosecuted for inviting Art MacMurrough to "run upon his lands and eat with him", but, as we have seen in another context, the jury testified that Art was at peace at the time of the invitation, and the tenant went quit. In 1278 the earliest surviving Irish parliamentary legislation included a measure against receivers of felons. An example of the serious nature receiving could take can be seen in 1306: Thomas Myagh was accused of meeting Donal O'Folan on the mountains of Sliefo in Tipperary, and of accepting part of a prey from him in return for feeding him, while Nicholas Leynagh, who actually seems to have been a serjeant of the king, was found guilty of sending one of his serving men home to prepare dinner for Donal. There are many other instances of receiving, most of them not as touching as this one. Sometimes a community and not an individual would be held responsible: for instance, in 1304 the whole community of the Vale of Dublin was charged with ten marks of fine for receiving Maurice McCormegan, "whereof a fourth part is to fall on Cromelyn and the suburbs of Dublin near St. Patrick's where he was received".

16 Richardson & Sayles, Irish Parliament, p.293.
In the Ordinances of 1351 severe penalties were laid down for such crimes—receivers of felons were to be imprisoned without mainprise, and this was to happen even before the felons themselves had been attainted. 19

Straightforward and necessary as they were, these regulations against receiving the Irish could cause hardship, and could be very difficult to enforce. The condition of Ireland meant that tenants were frequently placed in a position where they could not avoid offering sustenance or hospitality to felons. In 1317 we find a seneschal at Natherlagh pleading that he had received Donal McBren through fear and against his will, and being permitted to make fine for the offence. 20

The sort of situation that could arise is perhaps best illustrated by the case of the abbey of Duiske. The abbot was accused of receiving Irish who had been responsible for depredations in Leinster: "said enemies pursuing his lieges in his peace are oft times received in the abbey and are nourished therefrom, although against the will of the abbot". That they were in fact unwillingly received is substantiated by the fact that the felons are said to have included some who had injured the abbot and his church. Because the abbey was "in the front of the Irish enemies" (it was, in fact, in the Barrow valley), and since loyal people had also often used it as a refuge, the abbot was pardoned a fine. 21

We may imagine the abbot being besieged by demands for sanctuary in times of disturbance, possibly by both sides, and being unable to refuse entry to the Irish felons for fear that they would do worse damage to his church's property than they had done already. These and other cases suggest that the administration, familiar with the conditions, acted with considerable common-sense and reasonableness in matters of this kind.

Naturally, strict measures were taken to stop commercial intercourse with the Irish. Trading with felons was completely forbidden, and the more so when it involved providing robber bands with victuals, horses or arms. We find prosecutions for sending supplies to the Irish of Leinster as early as the 1270s, and specific legislation against this practice was enacted in 1310, when anyone providing English or Irish felons with provisions was himself to be held as a felon, and pursued and cut down if he would not come within the peace. Such regulations were a natural accompaniment of a state of war, and were particularly important since one of the chief aims of medieval warfare was to destroy the means by which the enemy could support itself. If supplies were allowed through to the Irish, the government would lose one of its most important

24 For this aspect of war, see Hewitt, Organization of War, esp. pp.93-117. Cf. measures to stop supplies reaching the Scots both inside and outside Ireland: Mem.roll 9 Edw.II, mm.39-40d- R.I.A., MS 12 D 8, p. 411; Cal. Chancery Warrants 1244-1326, pp.335-6; Foedera, II, i. 339.
weapons against them; if they got through actually during an expedition of war, it would be doubly disastrous.

The difference between the Irish inside and outside the peace in this context is well illustrated by a document dating from 1393. A citizen of Dublin had sold, on credit, a large amount of merchandise to Gerald O'Byrne, during a time when Gerald had been at peace and in the government's pay. O'Byrne, now apparently outside the peace, would not discharge his debts, and the merchant petitioned for permission to sell a barge of his to the Irishman, arguing that if he did not do so there would be no hope of recovering the cost of the earlier transaction.  

On particular occasions, persons would be specifically assigned to ensure that provisions did not get through to the Irish. For example, in 1358 the justiciar ordered the sheriffs of Kildare, Kilkenny, Carlow and Wexford to proclaim publicly that no-one was to sell horses, arms or victuals to Art Kavenagh MacMurrough or to Domnall Rua on pain of forfeiture of everything they possessed. Breakers of this order were to be arrested and imprisoned until the king ordered otherwise. Vehicles carrying goods to the Irish would also be liable to arrest. The seriousness with which this

27 Council in Ireland, pp.159-61.
offence was regarded is illustrated by the ordinance of 1351 which laid down that contraveners of the regulations against it were to be regarded as traitors and punished accordingly. 28

Difficult as it must have been to resist offering hospitality and selling supplies to hostile Irish, these were minor restrictions compared to other rules which governed relations with those who were outside the peace. One of the main purposes of Irish raids was robbery. In a situation where robbery and the taking of preys were an established fact of life, the forbidding of all negotiations between the loyal tenants and their outlawed neighbours was a heavy burden. Not only were the faithful people unable to bargain with the Irish for the return of their goods, but also those goods, if recovered, belonged to the king as "felons' goods" and not to those who had originally lost them. 29 The Irish situation made this rule an exceptionally harsh one— to take just one example, the men of Saggart complained in 1277 of having lost to the Irish two-thousand six-hundred sheep, two-hundred cows, sixty afers, one-hundred pigs and twenty-four goats. 30 Such losses—even if petitions tend to exaggerate them—without hope of recovery must have been a major grievance. One result was that regulations forbidding treating for the return of stolen goods tended often to be ignored. In 1306 the Ketings

29 For felons' goods see Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, II. 466-7; Holdsworth, History of England, III. 329. These and similar matters are discussed in Hand, English Law in Ireland, passim, and esp. p.34.
30 P.R.O., S.C.1/20/200. See also above, pp.79-80.
took a prey from Donal McBren. Donal sent messengers to bargain for restitution. None was forthcoming, and so Donal stole horses in revenge. Then agreement was made for a mutual restoration. The Ketings broke their pledge and stole one-hundred more cows. In return for this Donal and his men came to Offath, robbed the Ketings of one-hundred and sixty sheep, and committed arson. Clearly the Ketings were far from innocent parties, but the case shows the sort of conditions in which the government had to try to enforce its regulations. This self-destructive system of mutual distresses was a key element of what Archbishop fitz Ralph later vividly described as "lex marchie, sive dyaboli". But some such development was unavoidable in conditions where the government was unable to make its justice effective (or sometimes even available).

It is little wonder that the king seems to have realised that the rule governing stolen goods could be too hard. As early as 1292 the bishop of Ossory, who had suffered great losses, was granted a special exemption: he was permitted to treat with the Irish to have amends, and to take an individual truce with them. We find the abbot of St. Mary's by Dublin also being pardoned for negotiating without a licence because his losses had been heavy. No doubt in areas where the government's authority was strong some control could be kept over these matters— for instance a certain John Lyvet had

31 Eyre of Tipperary, 33-4 Edw.I, m.45- P.R.O.I., Cal., pp.63-5.
33 C.D.I. 1285-92, no.1068.
34 Chart. St. Mary's, I. 275.
treated with the Irish of the Leinster mountains for the return of his horses, but had then thought it prudent to dispose of the animals "on account of the danger.... from the king's court for treating with felons\footnote{C.J.R. 1295-1303, pp.368-9.} - but outside these areas laxness must have prevailed, and the Tipperary troubles between the Ketings and McBrens were certainly far from unique.

Important as they were, all these matters were only peripheral to the central question of treating with the Irish for the peace. This was the most vital aspect of relations which the government had to control. The need for hard and fast rules for treating for the peace is obvious, but we may examine some of the problems by considering the legislation of 1297, which attempted to provide answers to them. It laid down regulations and gave reasons for their enactment. The Irish, it seems, were in the habit of having truces with certain of the English for a set time, during which they proceeded to attack other English who were not included in the truce. They then often felt free to turn against those "whose friends they had before pretended to be, and destroy and burn their forcelets and manors". No-one henceforth was to enter into such an individual truce; truces were to be "universal and equal towards all, none of the lieges being excepted or left out". Breakers of the statute were to be held to be as guilty as the Irish, and were to be compelled to restore to their neighbours a proportion of the property which they had lost.\footnote{Stat.Ire.,John-Hen.V, pp.204-5.} When official truces were taken, they were to be respected by all, since, when they were not, the Irish were aroused to war and attacked indiscriminately those who had
provoked them and those who had remained at peace. 37 Associated with these measures, it was necessary to insist that everyone in a locality rose to the hue and cry, rather than "exulting in the ruin of their neighbours", and that when the justiciar was far away and unable to deal with serious disturbances, all should fight the Irish as long as was necessary at their own expense. To solve the problem of command in the justiciar's absence, two magnates were to be appointed in each county with power to negotiate with the Irish and to grant truces for a limited period. 38 These problems, basically of co-ordination of effort in times of disturbance, remained the same throughout the fourteenth century, and the government's policy for dealing with them, though it developed from year to year, varied little in nature from that adopted in 1297. It was essential that the people should be obliged to fight the local Irish, but it was also vital that such local wars should be controlled either by the local officers or by special commissioners appointed to command and to treat. Self-help was essential, but it must be tempered by order.

The power to treat for the peace was entrusted to individuals by commission throughout the fourteenth century, and we may look briefly at the nature of these commissions before turning to the more permanent arrangements. Commissions can be divided very roughly in two ways. First, we need to distinguish commissions which

were for the individual's own benefit from those which were for the general benefit. The first sort might allow him to receive his own Irish tenants or avowry-men into the king's peace, or to treat for the return of his stolen goods in the manner described above. Into the second category would fall those designed to save a local community from ravaging. Within the second category, which is the one that concerns us here, there were commissions to treat with named Irishmen, who had already risen to war, to "conform them to the peace", and commissions giving their recipients a more general power to negotiate with all the Irish of a specified area, sometimes with a time-limit and sometimes not.

In addition there were, of course, more straightforward negotiations by central officials or agents of the central government (often clerks), but we have seen many examples of these direct negotiations in the narrative chapters.

Ecclesiastics were often entrusted with commissions to treat for the peace, and in using them the Dublin government was according well with native Irish practice. In between the areas of war in Gaelic Ireland were many sanctuaries, and Irish churchmen often acted as negotiators of settlements between the native rulers.

41 E.g., R.C.H. p.43 no.19.
42 See Binchy, "Secular Institutions" in Early Irish Society, ed. Dillon, p.64.
43 For an example see Orpen, Normans, I. 47, n.1.
Perhaps the most striking example of ecclesiastical treating is provided by the archbishops of Armagh. Their diocese inter Anglos was constantly threatened by the Irish of the borders of Ulster, and what authority the king possessed in that region was often exercised through the archbishop. For example, Richard fitz Ralph, archbishop in the mid-fourteenth century, was given a general warrant from England "together with any of the sheriffs who will be present when summoned, to make peace between any men, English or Irish, throughout the land of Ireland, opposing the king and his faithful people and the said Richard". Richard was later specially commissioned to go to treat with Hugh O'Neill, who was threatening Dundalk, because the justiciar was engaged against the O'Byrnes and could not come north. Later we find the archbishops being permitted to cross diocesan boundaries in order to treat, and in 1373 the archbishop appears to have been instrumental in arranging a peace between the justiciar, the de Verdons and the sheriff of Louth on one side, and McGuiness, MacMahon "and McDoundyll captain of the Scots dwelling in Ulster" on the other. The archbishop of Armagh was in an exceptional position, but other bishops too frequently received commissions to treat. This seems to have been


46 Register of John Swayne, p.50 (1427).

particularly the case in the south, where the bishops of Cork, Limerick, Lismore and Leighlen often received commissions. On one occasion at least we know that such a commission must have borne fruit: in 1335 the bishop of Cork was rewarded for good service, which included "the conforming of Donal Carbragh MacCarthy and other Irish of county Cork to the peace".

Ecclesiastics were, of course, only one of many sorts of persons who could be authorized to treat. Commissions were frequently issued to lay individuals, to groups of individuals, to the members of families, or even to the communities of towns, to allow them to bargain with the Irish among whom they lived. Any treating without a royal commission was a trespass, and would need an official pardon. When a truce was broken, a further commission could be issued for an inquiry into the matter, and for the arrest of those found guilty of the offence.

Lords of the greater Irish liberties seem to have been able to have truces with the Irish, as long as the king was not actually riding to war against them at the time—this at any rate was the view expressed in a memorandum prepared for the lord of the liberty of Meath in the thirteenth century. Certainly there is no doubt

48 E.g., R.C.H. p.6 no.46; p.50 no.1; p.56 no.41; p.74 no.56. Cf. p.22 no.36 for a commission to many Ulster churchmen.
49 Ibid., p.40 no.116.
50 E.g., C.D.I. 1285-92, no.1103; Pat. roll 13 Edw.II-P.R.O.I., Ferguson Coll., I, f.154 (R.C.H. p.27 no.72); Pat. roll 20 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.186 (R.C.H. p.50 no.3); R.C.H. p.26 no.7; p.58 no.172; Pat. roll 19-20 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.182 (R.C.H. p.49 no.64).
that lords of liberties could grant peace to felons within their liberties for crimes committed within their jurisdiction. In 1293 William de Vescy even tried to insist that a royal pardon was of no force within his liberty of Kildare. The king did not deny de Vescy's own right to pardon, but he asserted the doctrine that "the king's peace overrides all others", and insisted that it be of force within liberties as without. 54 All this can be set beside the statutes which forbade anyone to issue letters of pardon, but which excepted not only the king, but also lords of the greater liberties, from this restriction. 55

It was particularly important that any negotiations with the Irish should take account of the interests of the whole community— as it was put at the time, nobody was to be "prejudiced". We hear of discontent caused when a royal official came in and granted peace to an Irishman without ensuring that compensation was forthcoming for the destruction he had done in the neighbourhood. In the late thirteenth century, the prior of the Hospital was accused by William de Barry and Gilbert le Waleys of admitting Donal Og MacCarthy to the peace in

51 R.C.H. p.27 no.58.
52 Pat.roll 11 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.96-d (R.C.H. p.42 no.6).
this way, and the justiciar himself was accused of doing the like in 1293. In the fourteenth century an attempt was made to overcome this problem by including a clause in commissions to the effect that treating was not to be prejudicial to the people, or by specifically ordering the commissioners to arrange the amends which were to be made for injuries and damage done. In 1342 the king himself insisted that no peace should be made which would prejudice tenants by leaving their lands in the hands of the Irish who had invaded them.

About the organization of parleys we know less than we could wish. From the evidence of the Armagh registers, it looks as if they were normally arranged by letter: we find the archbishop writing to the local Irish and making arrangements to meet them at specified places. Evidence from 1392 shows that the government had arranged in advance to meet MacMurrough on a certain day at a certain place. On occasion the Irish would fail to turn up, and the negotiator would have to wait until they did condescend to arrive. We are not always informed of the place where the parley was to be, but it

57 Rotuli Parliamentorum Hactenus Inediti, pp.35-6.
59 R.C.H. p.56 no.41.
is possible that traditional meeting-places grew up: for example, there is more than one instance of treating with O'More at Athy, while meetings with O'Reilly seem to have taken place at Kells in Meath.

The attempt to provide for and control peace-negotiations by the issuing of individual commissions to treat could only be a palliative. Some more permanent arrangement was obviously necessary. The sheriff could not possibly be expected to undertake (or at least to undertake with success) this and all his other responsibilities— and indeed the sheriff himself appears to have needed a special commission to allow him to negotiate. During the fourteenth century an answer was found to this problem, though how effective it was in practice we do not know. Gradually peace negotiations were entrusted to the keepers of the peace. At the same time the keepers were made responsible for assessing the people to arms, arraying them, and leading them when necessary against internal enemies. The root of the office may well be the statute of 1297 that laid down that there were to be two magnates in every shire, with the power to wage war and to take truces in the justiciar's absence. Unfortunately evidence is so scarce

64 E.g., Just. roll 21 Edw. III— Genealogical Office, MS 192, pp. 53-5; P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/2.
67 For the early history of the office, see also my "Judicial powers of the medieval Irish keepers of the peace", Irish Jurist, n.s., II (1967), pp. 308-10.
in subsequent years that it is impossible to say how far this enactment was put into effect, or to trace a firm link between these local military commanders and the later keepers of the peace.

At first the office of keeper was an ad hoc one, and it is not until 1345-6 that we find their commissions appearing in numbers on the Patent roll. In these years they were appointed in many parts of the lordship, probably as part of Ufford's strong measures to combat disorder. It may be that the survival of this particular roll gives an unwarranted impression of novelty, but it is tempting to conclude that it was Ufford's series of appointments that established the office on a secure footing. Certainly by the time of the 1351 Ordinances the keepers had an established position in the Irish shires. There were to be four in each county, and local matters of peace and war were to be under their control.

During the first half of the fourteenth century there are examples of the keepers of the peace being

69 See Frame in Irish Jurist, n.s., II. 309.

70 R.C.H. p.50 no.82 (Carlow); p.52 no.52 (Cork); p.53 no.93 (Dublin); p.52 no.50 (Kerry); p.50 nos.80-1 (Kildare); p.50 no.2 (Limerick); p.50 no.3 (Meath); p.54 no.146 (Wexford). Supervisors of the keepers were appointed in Waterford, Kerry, Limerick and Cork (p.51 no.23; p.52 nos.51-2).

71 Stat.Jire.,John-Hen.V, pp.378-89. The sheriffs were associated with them in many of their duties; they are best seen as a reinforcement of the military and police functions of the sheriff. For a particularly full commission, exemplifying many of their typical duties, see Pat.roll 5 Hen.IV- N.L.I., MS 4, f.112 (R.C.H. p.178 no.77a).
granted or exercising the power to negotiate,\(^\text{72}\) but it is not until 1351 that we know definitely that treating was a regular part of their normal function. In that year it was laid down that no-one was to parley except by permission of the central government, or in the presence of the keepers of the peace or sheriff, who were to see "that such parley or intercourse be for general and not for individual profit".\(^\text{73}\) In another clause of the Ordinances the justiciar, keepers of the peace and sheriffs are mentioned as being accustomed to make peaces, and it seems clear that by 1351 they were the only persons allowed to do so without special licence.\(^\text{74}\) Recognized machinery had thus been established, available in every shire to calm down trouble immediately it arose. Individual commissions to treat were still frequently issued, but it is interesting to see that the commissioners were often now associated with the permanent officials. For instance, when the bishop of Leighlen was given a commission to treat in 1355, the sheriff and keepers of the peace in Carlow were joined with him,\(^\text{75}\) and in 1358 the bishop of Killaloe was restricted by the need for the presence of "the sheriff or any custos pacis there, or any faithful man among our greater lieges".\(^\text{76}\)

\(^\text{72}\) E.g., Just. roll 8-9 Edw. II, m.6- P.R.O.I., Cal., p. 31; C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.237-9; Pat. roll 20 Edw. III-N.L.I., MS 2, f.186 (R.C.H. p.50 no.3).


\(^\text{74}\) Ibid., pp.386-9.

\(^\text{75}\) R.C.H. p.56 no.41. Cf. p.74 no.75.

\(^\text{76}\) Pat. roll 32 Edw. III-N.L.I., MS 3, f.22 (R.C.H. p. 75 no.87). Cf. ibid., f.36 (p.73 no.37).
The way in which the custos pacis had moved to the centre of the local military stage is further shown by the fact that the duty of preventing supplies from reaching the Irish also began to be assigned to him. Once more he was taking over a function formerly exercised in a more haphazard fashion by specially assigned commissioners. For example, in 1375 the Wexford keepers of the peace were to "supervise and make diligent scrutiny lest victuals, horses and arms are taken to any Irish who do not continue at peace, and to find those who thus take such things, capture and hold them in prison, together with the victuals etc. as aforesaid, and also their boats if they are taken by water". 77

There was, of course, the more positive side of local military operations also. We have seen the duty of the populace to attend the justiciar with horses and arms in war, and to be available for the establishment of wards in the marches. 78 The tenants had also to be prepared to join the military authorities of the county in pursuing Irish and Anglo-Irish evil-doers within its boundaries. This duty is probably best seen as an extension of the obligation to raise "cry and hue, blowing horns, and also urging the country and people (against them) according to the custom of the land". 79 Various statutes sought to ensure that such measures should be co-ordinated by insisting that counties should aid each other when need be, and that the authorities of shire and liberty could make pursuit of felons into each other's jurisdictions without hindrance. 80

78 Above, pp.39-41,70-4.
was the natural leader of the county forces in local operations—his military duties were really an extension of his police authority, which he exercised with the help of the posse comitatus. On many occasions we can see the sheriff or seneschal involved in such local military operations, though most of the evidence is indirect—for example, sheriffs could require pardons for being unable to come to the exchequer to account because they were actively engaged in warfare within their counties. However, in 1374 we find the sheriff of Louth gathering the posse of his county, and going to the marches against Magennis.

By the middle of the fourteenth century, the sheriff could normally expect to have the assistance of the keepers of the peace. For instance, the sheriff of Cork, and later the sheriff of Limerick, excused themselves for failing to turn up at the exchequer and for instead remaining within their shires, by saying that they had done so on the advice of the keepers of the peace and other local magnates. Unfortunately the military operations of the keepers were not such as to concern

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79 Contemporary Narrative of Proceedings against Dame Alice Kyteler, ed. Wright, p.6.


82 Dowdall Deeds, no.257.

the Dublin exchequer, and this means that we are largely bereft of information which shows the keeper in action. However, in 1360 we hear of a certain Thomas Smothe, who was pardoned an amercement for not coming to the exchequer. He was instead sitting with a group of armed men at Donnybrook "ready with those men to go with those of the city of Dublin and with our keepers of the peace in the said county or other marchers to repel hostile invasions of the Irish of the parts of Leinster". That the keepers and their men would be expected to conduct serious operations is confirmed by a petition from John son of Nicholas Lumbard, keeper in Kilkenny in 1392. He had attacked MacMurrough himself in the course of "discharging the said office", and had, he said, beheaded ten of his men. The justiciar and council considered that he deserved a reward for his pains.

As well as this system of rules and machinery for enforcing them, there were other ways in which the government tried to control the loyal population; it coerced and it cajoled. Perhaps the greatest single enemy of effective resistance to the Irish was the simple one of depopulation. It has been said of England that "it is on holding the population where it should be that the defence of the realm- and incidentally the use and cultivation of fertile tracts of land- depends". But this

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84 That is, of course, their military duties. Amercements would have to be returned there (Irish Jurist, n.s., II. 318).
86 Council in Ireland, pp.6-8.
87 Hewitt, Organization of War, p.10.
problem was bound to be much greater in Ireland. We find the king urging that all waste lands should be taken, not so much for his profit, but that they might be defended, for their defence was crucial to that of neighbouring areas. In 1328, for example, Darcy was empowered to make grants of waste in mortmain to prelates "on condition they cause them to be settled and inhabited for the strengthening of their marches against the attacks of the Irish". This general power can be paralleled by grants of land to lay individuals on very easy terms in an effort to provide for their defence. For example, on 29 September 1332 Ellis of Asshebourne was granted 760 acres of land in Leinster. It was worth £6-15s-0d in time of peace, but when it was extended it was found to be "wasted by invasions of Irish rebels". The place-names in the grant have been identified as the modern Killininny, Bohernabreena, Oldcourt, Oldbawn, Kiltalown and Ballymane: that is, an area lying to the south of Tallaght, in a belt across the lower reaches of the Dodder valley. When Ellis got the grant he was to pay the £6-15s-0d a year, but he soon found that "he cannot receive anything from (the lands) or answer for them, unless a fort be built therein to repel the Irish". The farm was allowed to him, and after paying £10-2s-6d he was freed of all rent for seven years. Later these

88 C.P.R. 1327-30, p.315.
89 Cal. Fine Rolls 1327-37, pp.331,449.
same lands were granted to Robert Holywood, and he too was relieved of the farm after he had repaired a stone house in the area. Even more striking were the inducements that were offered to Geoffrey Cromp, who in 1334 was granted all lands and tenements in Bray for twenty years at a rent of £7-1s-8½d a year. Because the land was in the march and little could be received from it, he was freed of rent for two years to help him repair the castle of "Rokelescourt". Then in 1340 the freedom from rent was extended for seven years beyond the original two, and then for yet another seven.

Geoffrey was not only freed of his own rent, but also allowed to pay his predecessor's debts in small instalments, and he was also relieved of the duty of answering for the royal service of Wicklow, proclaimed in 1350.

The government was therefore eager to lend what encouragement it could to anyone who was willing to take uninhabited lands. It would offer very favourable terms and give what assistance it could to any tenant willing to construct defences—presumably an essential if men were to be attracted to the land. We may doubt whether

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94 C.P.R. 1338-40, p. 63.
95 Mem. roll 32-3 Edw. III, m. 29d- P.R.O., R.C. 8/27, pp. 474-7. This speaks of free tenants in the manor "if there be any".
such a policy bore much fruit. More important and more famous were the government's efforts to compel owners of march lands to defend them. The motives of this were similar. Tenants who resided comfortably in the land of peace, whether in Ireland or England, drawing off what rents they could, were a danger to the lordship and in particular a menace to their neighbours. It is in this light that the "absentee" problem must be seen—it has too often in the past been obscured by concentration on the political consequences of the return of great lords from England. At root, it mattered not where the absentee had gone; the important point was that lands had been left undefended. This was clearly the motivation of the 1297 legislation, and of many of the fourteenth century orders to landholders to return, or to leave a satisfactory proportion of their lands as a whole in the hands of their bailiffs, so that they would have the wherewithal to resist the Irish. To the king, the problem was the same in nature whether the lord was small or great, and whether he was residing in England or in the Irish land of peace. It is a concern for defence that we should see, for example, in 1338, when the king commanded that "all having castles, fortalice or lands there (should) stay upon the safekeeping of the same or put sufficient persons in their place to guard them...". Here the king was thinking

of English lords who failed to spend their Irish revenues in their Irish lands, but he could take a similar attitude to "internal" absentees. In Meath in 1346 the keepers of the peace were ordered to compel Irish marchers to reside in their marches, and in 1375 the Dublin keepers were to "have called over the names of each and every of those persons of the said county who ought to be resident in the said marches, and heavily to amerce all those who refuse to appear and abide therein". Indeed the king could regard lands as having been granted for the defence of the march. In 1346 he ordered Walter de Bermingham to inquire into the conduct of tenants, and to discover which of the lands granted had been occupied by the Irish, and which tenants had "withdrawn therefrom on account of the destruction and poverty that came upon them, so that the lands of the marches are occupied by the said Irish to the no small damage of the king and danger of that land". As devastation spread, the less easy it was to defend what cultivated land remained. Those who had obligations must be compelled to fulfil them, but if this was no longer possible, inducements would be offered to anyone else who was willing to take the risk of accepting waste land from the king. The possibility of disaster could be openly admitted. A grant of the manor of Dundrum, county Dublin, in 1359 contained the clause, "if the manor be destroyed by rebels against the

99 Pat. roll 20 Edw. III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.186 (R.C.H. p.50 no.3).


101 C.C.R. 1346-9, p.77.
will of the lessee, he shall be freed of rent until again able to take the profits". 102

There were many other blandishments that the government could offer in order to encourage men to do their duty. This will have been plain from the narrative, and there is no need to spell it out through further examples. To begin with, there was "head-money", a levy on the community which was given as a reward to the slayer of an Irish felon whose head had been "proclaimed". Then there were straightforward rewards paid by the exchequer for all sorts of exploits: for killing or capturing Irish, for spying, for bearing oneself especially well in warfare, and sometimes even for particularly successful treating. These rewards or dona increase markedly as the fourteenth century progresses, and they form an ever-lengthening section on the Issue roll. 103

All these various restrictions and encouragements would not, of course, be equally effective in every area. Where the English population remained strong and the government remained close at hand (the two things did not automatically go together) they could be effective in keeping those within and outside the peace apart. But where the government's authority was in any case weak- in areas sparsely populated or where the royal authority had ceased to penetrate- the English population would be in no position to turn down the protection of the local Irish or Anglo-Irish magnates, in return for


103 See, e.g., the Issue rolls listed in Richardson & Sayles, Administration of Ireland, pp. 205-6.
the dubious benefits of being within the law and under
the technical protection of the remote Dublin administra-
tion. This must be the first conclusion of any
study of the government's involvement in relations
between the faithful and the felons.

The second conclusion is not one that can be
worked out at length. But in examining attempts to
control relations with the Irish at this simple, practical
and rather obvious level, we have been sketching some
of the background to the well known and controversial
legislation of the Irish lordship. It is in this context
that the notorious statutes keeping the "two races"
apart need to be seen. For example, one of the
Ordinances of 1351, forbidding fosterage, commands "that
no English person make any manner of alliance with
the English or Irish enemies of our lord the king, by
marriage, fostering of their children or in any other
manner....". The aim is not to prevent fraternis-
ation with the Irish as such, but with outlaws and
enemies, whether English or Irish. Again, the Ordinance
forbidding the march or Brehon law specifically
forbids it because it gives rise to the taking of pledges
and distresses between the parties "whereby the king's
people may be troubled". In the light of, to take
one example, the riotous mutual plundering that went on
between the Ketings and Donal McBren this enactment
makes immediate sense, and loses any more sinister im-

104 These matters are further discussed below, pp. 426-31.
106 Ibid., pp. 388-91.
plications. This is not the place to attempt to work out the exact significance of the Statutes of Kilkenny or of other fourteenth century Irish legislation, but it may be said that such legislation will never be understood except through a comprehension of the need to keep the loyal population from fraternization with those against the king's peace, and of the sort of measures the Irish government employed to achieve that end. 107

107 The king normally gave his reasons for legislating. We have just seen that in two cases his reasons were straightforward, and fit the facts as we have seen them. The narrative has shown that chaplains were frequently used as spies and bearers of intelligence, and this casts light on other enactments. The whole body of "anti-Irish" legislation deserves a close reading, in the background of all the other evidence. Ireland was, after all, in continua guerra.
Chapter X

The Dublin government and Gaelic Ireland

In previous chapters we have examined the Irish government's military resources, traced its actions against the Irish from 1272 to 1361, and discussed the steps it took to ensure that the English tenants fulfilled their obligation to resist the enemy. This final chapter will try both to draw some more general conclusions from what has gone before, and to elaborate a little on points that seem particularly important.

I

There are two aspects to the government's relations with the Irish, and it is necessary to distinguish sharply between them. Theoretically the king's peace extended throughout Ireland. Edward I's courts put the position forcefully in 1293: "pax regis concessa locum tenere debet tam infra libertatem quam extra"; if the peace were granted to anyone, then "pax illa stabilis erit et ei valeret per totam Hiberniam". Thus legislation applied to the whole lordship, and the rules governing the relations of the English with the Irish emanated from Dublin; we have seen something of these matters in the last chapter. On the other hand, it is obvious that the government's practical role in

1 Rotuli Parliamentorum Hactenus Inediti, pp.37-8.
2 Ibid., pp.44-5.
peace-keeping and the making of war was a circumscribed one. Partly this was because the government had not the power to act effectively in many areas—the neglect of Connacht and its castles in the fourteenth century is a clear example—but it also sprang in part from the nature of the Irish lordship.

The shire organization grew rapidly in the thirteenth century, and at the end of the century Edward I was anxious in Ireland as in England to take what lands he could into his own hand. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to equate the Dublin government's position in Ireland with that of the English government in England. On a legal and constitutional level alone, a very large proportion of the area of Ireland was covered by great liberties. In the context of relations with the Irish, this was significant. In Kildare, for example, William de Vescy was plainly concerned about his power to pardon from this point of view, and Geoffrey de Geneville in Meath had pondered deeply on his right to take private truces with the Irish, having a memorandum drawn up comparing the position in Ireland with that in the Welsh marcher lordships. Geoffrey also had his own tariff of military obligation, and his own rules for the disposal of preys taken in the march.

3 See above, pp.148-52.
5 Rotuli Parliamentorum Hactenus Inediti, pp.44-5. See also above, p.112.
Presumably as a deliberate policy, great liberties such as Tipperary and Kerry were created during our period. If we set aside the legal position (whose political significance requires much elucidation), and speak more loosely of great lordships rather than great liberties, it is obvious that normally relations with the local Irish were the affair of the lord. This can be seen clearly in Ulster, in the Ormond lands, in Kildare, in Thomond, and examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely. There is also evidence that the lords' relationships with their Irish were following a similar pattern to those we have seen in

7 Our knowledge of the later liberties remains very limited. See Quinn, "Anglo-Irish local government, 1485-1534", I.H.S., I (1939), pp.363-81 for some idea of their extent and significance.

8 Dr Hand has wisely remarked in discussing the Red Earl that "the strength of his position was as much political and geographical as legal" (English Law in Ireland, p.123). But the exact weight to be given to theory and practical circumstance remains to be determined.

9 E.g., Orpen, "Earldom of Ulster", R.S.A.I. Journ., XLV (1915), p.141. Documents illustrating the relationships are to be found in Historical MSS Comm., De L'Isle & Dudley MSS, I. 31-3; B.M., MS Add. 6041, ff.103a-104b.

10 See, e.g., Cal. Ormond Deeds, I. no.682; II, nos. 22,34-36,38,46. Cf. above, pp.244-5, where a rare expedition in the area coincides with a Butler minority.

11 E.g., Red Book of Kildare, nos.76,139,166-9. John fitz Thomas called the Irish of Offaly "his" Irish (Rotuli Parliamentorum Hacvenus Inediti, pp.44-5).

12 See above, pp.114-6.
the case of the Dublin government. In the 1350s
written retainers and agreements of all sorts were
common throughout the Irish lordship. In dealing
with the local Irish by negotiation and war these lords
were in no way regarded as usurping the government's
authority. On the contrary, they were sharers in a
common burden which the government was only too anxious
to see spread. The insistence on the return of
absentees, which has been emphasized in the context of
defence, shows this clearly. It is striking that when
Edward III planned to come to Ireland in 1331-2 he
insisted that the great lords resident in England
should also send troops. The order was couched in a
revealing form: "men, horse and foot shall be sent to
Ireland both by the king and by others who have lands
there to recover". If the lord of Ireland were coming
to shoulder his responsibilities, then other lords must
shoulder theirs too. In Ireland, the situation was
seen in a similar light. The great council of 1360
explained to the king that there had been "various great
lords who were accustomed to maintain the marches in

13 These developments are discussed in Otway-Ruthven,
*Medieval Ireland*, pp.272-6. To take one example of
this parallel development, in 1358 Ormond brought
O'Kennedy to Leinster to serve the king; afterwards
he rewarded him, just as Rokeby was rewarding Irish
directly employed (Cal. Ormond Deeds, II, no. 48).


15 C.C.R. 1330-3, p. 400. For the return of absentees
surrounding Clarence's expedition in 1361 see
the absence of your justiciar". Now they have been so weakened by a series of calamities that they cannot defend themselves "without the presence of your said justiciar, which thing a single person......can in no wise do in so large a land". 16 We have also seen how Wogan was far from reluctant to pass the responsibility of resisting the Irish to the magnates wherever this could be done safely. 17

It follows from all this that when we say that the government was faced by a "frontier problem" we must not envisage it trying to hold a physical frontier throughout Ireland- though it may have legislated in an attempt to hold a metaphorical one. The Dublin administration only tried to do a limited amount and even here its performance fell far short of its intentions. All along the government was only one power among many; its problems and attempted solutions were not unique. Indeed it is probably more illuminating to think of Ireland not as one lordship, but as composed of many lordships.

Since it is the government's practical position that chiefly concerns us, we have had to lay considerable stress on the geographical limitations of its effective authority: plainly before its relations with the Irish can be usefully discussed, it is necessary to discover which Irish it had relations with. Patterns have emerged in each area, though they are clearer in the south-east,

16 Parliaments & Councils, p.20.
17 Above, chapter III passim.
north and west than in the midlands and the south. In the south-east the government was involved with the Irish throughout our period. There difficult terrain marched with the king's traditional interests. Dublin was the seat of government; to the south of the city were the manors of the royal demesne, and also archiepiscopal lands which were not infrequently in the king's hand; towns and castles lay in the fertile strip of land between the mountains and the sea; on the other side of the mountains lay the settled Barrow valley, whose defence was crucial if Leinster were not to be cut off from Munster. It is not surprising that warfare and strenuous attempts to prevent it were constant here, and that the central government played the chief role in them.

In every sense Ulster lay at the opposite extreme. It was remote, and for most of our period geography was reinforced by the power, prestige and franchisal rights of the de Burgh earls. In the mid-thirteenth century Ulster had been in the Lord Edward's hands, and at that time relations with the Irish had been conducted on his behalf: we know, for instance, that he retained Aedh Buidhe O'Neill "for keeping peace in the marches" in 1261-2. However, once the earldom was granted to Walter de Burgh such direct relationships ceased, and from 1264 to 1326 the justiciar seems to have gone north only twice. On the death of earl Walter in 1271, James of Audley made a journey to take

18 These matters are discussed above, pp.79-84, 159-60, 372-3.
the liberty into the king's hand, and gave "robes, furs and saddles (to) Oneel, Macholan and other Irishmen coming to the king's peace and remaining with the justiciar". In 1291 William de Vescy led an army into the northern province, but, very significantly, he shared command with the Red Earl himself, and it is likely that the campaign was undertaken at the latter's request. Even at the time of the Bruce invasion the royal army did not go further north than county Louth. During the minorities that followed the deaths of the Red Earl in 1326 and the Brown Earl in 1333 we have seen that the government did make some attempt to assert itself in Ulster, but with very little effect. It is clear, for instance, that the services of the Irish, which formed part of the dower of Ralph of Ufford's wife, were gone beyond recall. And by the 1350s it appears to have been impossible for Elizabeth de Clare's bailiffs to move around the earldom without paying protection money to Irish such as Mac Quillan and MacCartan. Above all, the government's prior commitments in other areas and its sheer lack of

21 Chart.St.Mary's, II. 320.
22 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, p.226 for the suggestion that the Red Earl was fearful for his liberty at this time.
23 There were expeditions in 1326,1333,1334-5,1335, 1345 (see the list of expeditions in Appendix IV, and chapters VI-VII above).
24 Above, pp.311-12.
resources must have made effective action in Ulster well-nigh impossible.

Connacht saw many expeditions between 1272 and 1304, but all along it seems that to the government "Connacht" was co-terminous with the king's interests in Connacht: the Cantreds and the three great castles. Protecting Athlone, Roecomon and Randown, and attempting to keep O'Conor to the terms of his successive leases were the limits, by and large, of the justiciars' ambitions. 26 We have seen a definite attempt by Wogan to extricate the government even from this degree of involvement, and to pass responsibility to the de Burghs. Indeed it was thought that Sil-Murray was not worth the cost involved in retaining it, and that the Red Earl was "better able to chastise the Irish than another". 27 Serious government involvement in Connacht ended before the Bruce invasion, and circumstances after the invasion did not permit it to be resumed. 28

The situation in the midlands was more complicated. In west Leinster the break-up of the Marshal inheritance (and the absence of the de Vescys in Kildare and the Mortimers in Leix) meant that the government had to fight in those areas with regularity between 1272 and 1295. 29 Wogan's time saw an attempt made to counter the Irish of Offaly with fitz Thomas and de Bermingham rather than directly as in the past. Its success was limited. 30 Meath was intermittently a problem. The

26 Above, pp.95-105.
27 Above, pp.141-2.
28 Above, pp.139-52.
29 Above, pp.105-13.
30 Above, pp.124-38.
Irish of the western part of the county could threaten the Connacht castles, and in the 1280s there was a dangerous tendency to join forces with the Irish of Offaly.\(^{31}\) After the time of Bruce there were occasional expeditions in all these areas, but they took a clear second place to the Leinster mountains.\(^{32}\) By the end of our period the O'Conors and O'Dempsies seem to have been out of control,\(^{33}\) and O'More, who had more often been loyal than not in the 1340s and early 1350s, joined MacMurrough to create a dangerous alliance between 1357 and 1361.\(^{34}\)

The government's attitude to the southern Irish varied with circumstances. Thomond required considerable commitment up to 1276, when it was granted to Thomas de Clare. On the whole, after this the de Clare lordship and the strong Geraldine power to the south of it removed the need for heavy direct involvement in these regions.\(^{35}\) Wogan's military role there was small, and his attempts to quell the disorders that arose after 1306 were not successful; indeed the government's influence was shown to be weak.\(^{36}\) After the Bruce invasion the situation was very different, and the government was perpetually forced to take strong measures against the Irish and the Anglo-Irish alike.\(^{37}\) Although

\(^{31}\) Above, pp.102,107-8.

\(^{32}\) 1329 (Offaly & Meath); 1333 (Offaly); 1334 (Meath); 1335 (Offaly); 1339 (Meath); 1342 (Meath); 1346 (Offaly); 1348 (Meath); 1359 (Leix). For details see Appendix IV & chapters VI-VIII above.


\(^{34}\) Above, pp.368-74.

\(^{35}\) Above, pp.113-7.
the earl of Desmond is the most notable figure in these disorders, we have seen that the government at a pinch could deal with him, and that it was the problem of his Irish adherents that was really intractable. Brian Ban O'Brien was the chief of these. After Ufford's final crushing of the Desmond menace in 1345-6, Dermot MacCarthy of Muskerry emerged as the chief threat in the south. We have already argued that it was the extinction of the power of the de Clares at Disert O'Dea in 1318 that was chiefly responsible for the instability of the south.\(^{38}\) This was compounded by Desmond's unreliability. Had his interests and those of the government been identical, we need not doubt that the justiciars would have been content to leave the southern septs to him. Instead there was a need to divert energies and resources to the south throughout the years from 1318 to 1361, and this added burden went far towards making the government's position untenable.

The factors which determined the course of the government's relations with the Irish were infinitely complex. Often sheer weakness prevented firm action.

36 Above, pp.152-5.
37 There were expeditions (apart from the frequent journeys to negotiate) in 1320, 1321-2, 1325, 1326, 1328, 1330, 1331, 1332 (twice), 1333, 1334 (twice), 1336, 1338-9, 1344, 1345-6, 1348-9, 1350, 1351, 1352-3, 1360. See Appendix IV and chapters VI-VIII above.
38 For this, and for a discussion of Desmond's possible motivation, see above, pp.234-7.
But this was not always the case, and we must not see the restricted and fluctuating area of intervention in our period as a fall from some earlier perfection. Many other considerations were involved, not least other people's rights and duties, together with the hazards of minority, escheat and absenteeism.

II

Given that we should not expect too much of the government, it is necessary to ask what was the nature of the problem it faced—always remembering that it was not a problem faced by the government alone. In outline, the situation in later medieval Ireland as depicted by successive generations of historians has changed remarkably little. There is broad agreement on a diagnosis of the lordship's ills, though it must be admitted that we are still forced to fall back on generalizations, almost every one of which awaits a detailed testing. The conquest of Ireland had never been completed, and in every region enclaves of Irish existed, weakly or only nominally under English control. They also tended to occupy what was, militarily speaking, the most difficult countryside. In the areas where the government undertook a direct military commitment it had to try to hold, or have held, the frontier against these Irish. A whole series of familiar ills made it impossible for the frontier to be held during our period: royal "bleeding" of the lordship, absenteeism (virtually the same thing in microcosm), "degeneracy", the end of the period of expansion all over Europe, the Black Death. It is fruitless to seek to separate causes and effects; the various phenomena reinforced each other.39
For instance, absenteeism and the associated siphoning-off of local resources made defence the more difficult. Such lack of protection for its part would lead local people to take steps to protect themselves in the only ways they knew how, thus sinking, as the government saw it, into degeneracy and the "love-days" and mutual reprisals that constituted the law of the March.  

It is obvious that a problem with as many facets as this would not be amenable merely to a military "solution". In Tudor and Stuart times a partial answer was found in English armies and plantation. But in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, even had the English kings had the will to undertake a military conquest, other commitments would have prevented them, just as Edward III's tentative move in that direction was stifled in 1332. The very temporary impact of Richard II's large army in 1394-5 shows how massive and tenacious any reconquest would have had to be. There seems to have been no thought of transferring population to Ireland in our period, though we have seen that the king was anxious that waste lands should be taken, and was prepared to make grants on easy terms to encourage this. Nor is there evidence of any spontaneous movement of people to Ireland. After the Black Death


41 Above, pp.403-6.
any movement of population was liable to be the other way. Men-at-arms were said to be leaving the country, and later exemptions from orders to return to Ireland show that men of all sorts had made their way across the Irish Sea, no doubt to take advantage of the favourable wages and conditions that obtained in England. Absenteeism was not a purely upper-class disease.

All these circumstances are obvious and familiar; they only bear repeating because they form the essential background to the Dublin government's position. The government could not hope for any dramatic injection of men, troops or money. It had to address itself to its tasks with the resources that were to hand. These resources were inadequate, and the need to adjust ends to means must have been one of the earliest and most galling lessons to be learnt by any conscientious justiciar arriving from England.

In Wogan's time the Irish revenue averaged some £5,000 to £6,000 a year, and these figures obscure the fact that there was a steep decline at the very beginning of Edward II's reign. Between 1296 and 1311 more than £21,000 in cash was withdrawn from Ireland to

42 Above, p.3 n.6.
43 There are something over 500 names in C.P.R. 1391-6, pp.451-65,468-9,471,486. For further comment on these matters see Lydon in Topic 13, pp.14-16.
44 Occasionally there was some help from England (e.g., above, p.14 n.51, p.247), but equally there were Scottish expeditions to be paid for in 1333 and 1335 (Nicholson, "An Irish expedition to Scotland, 1335", I.H.S., XIII (1963), pp.197-211).
the king's use. This figure does not include money used to finance expeditionary forces and to buy supplies for the Scottish and continental wars. If we take this extra expenditure into account, "on an average nearly one half of the total recorded expenditure of the Irish exchequer during the period of the Scottish wars went on those same wars". The effective Irish revenue was therefore something like £2,500 to £3,000. Between 1315 and 1361 the annual average revenue was under £2,500, and between 1337 and 1346 it was well below £2,000. In other words, the revenue was less than it had been before 1307, even after the king's withdrawals had been subtracted.

Even if our understanding of the revenue remains rough and ready, we can still draw important conclusions from these figures. It has already been suggested that a comparison between the strategical problems in Leinster and those in North Wales is not entirely fanciful, despite some disparity in scale. In Wales Edward I soon found that a prolonged campaign was necessary, and he crushed Welsh resistance by fighting such a campaign in 1282-3, with no let-up even in the winter months. It cost him £98,421. The Irish government was never able to concentrate its attention

47 Ibid., p.42.
49 Above, pp.82-3.
50 Morris, Welsh Wars, pp.149-95.
51 Ibid., p.197.
on one area. But even if it had been able to tackle the Leinster problem with single-mindedness, it could not have organized anything on a remotely comparable scale. At best a justiciar like Lucy or Ufford might raise a paid army of 1,000 to 2,000 men, but it was quite another matter to keep even this number of men in pay for any length of time. At an average wage of fourpence each a day, 1,000 men would have cost £1,000—nearly half the annual revenue— in as little as sixty days. Lengthy employment of a small number of men, or very brief employment of a modest army was all the administration could manage. The other mainstay of Edward I's Welsh policy—massive castle-building succeeded by continuous adequate garrisoning—was equally out of the question. No doubt the Irish justiciars would have dearly loved to institute some such policy, but Rokeby's ring of weakly-manned "fortresses and wards" was the best they could do. And it swallowed up nearly a quarter of the annual revenue.52 Even operating on the limited level usual in fourteenth century Ireland, the government could find its resources failing: this problem is particularly noticeable in the late 1330s and early 1340s, and it recurred at the end of our period.53

Money, therefore, was lacking. There was an acute disparity between the tasks to be attempted, and the finances available for attempting them. Was the administration faced with a comparable shortage of manpower? This is not an easy question to answer. It seems

52 Above, pp.359-61.

fairly clear that there was a shortage of population, with land chasing men rather than the reverse, but this tells us nothing about the more limited matter of the availability of troops to the government. It in itself is complex enough. First of all, the administration could only raise as many troops as it could pay for, and shortage of money was bound to mean shortage of men. Presumably if the government had been able to offer better prospects of payment and better opportunities of gain, more men might have been found to serve the king. The difficulty is that we cannot separate this problem from wider questions of the government's authority and, almost, its credibility. The obscurity of these matters is matched by their importance, and some attempt must be made to analyse them, even if we can do no more than weigh possibilities and probabilities.

There was an undoubted link between the success of the government and the amount of support it could expect to have. Over the period as a whole, we have shown that the government was losing ground in its efforts to preserve the physical frontier (although the curve of its success fluctuated rather than going smoothly downwards). We should not expect an enthusiastic response to the commands of an ailing authority. There is enough evidence to suggest that such a reading of the situation is near the truth. Disorder and Irish risings coincided with the confusion that followed Ufford's death in 1346, abating when Walter de Bermingham was securely established as justiciar. When Ufford

54 See Otway-Ruthven, "The character of Norman settlement in Ireland", Historical Studies, V. 77.
55 Above, p.323.
himself had gone south against Desmond and his allies in 1345, he had been met at first by resistance. But when his determination became clear, the magnates started to go over to his side and his drive against the rebels seems to have snowballed. 56 There are parallel examples of the southern Anglo-Irish and Irish flocking to the government's side as it became clear that it was gaining the ascendancy. 57 Conversely, we have a frank statement that Rokeby's defeat at Wicklow in 1354 caused more and more Irish to side with O'Byrne. 58 The general point is obvious: the growing weakness of the government must have created the conditions for its weakness to increase still further. 59 This is no more than common-sense.

There is another facet to the government's relations with the men on whom it was dependent for military support. Like any other medieval government, the Dublin administration relied heavily on its reservoir of patronage. We have already commented on the growth of dona on the Issue rolls in the latter part of our period. Men expected to receive rewards for all sorts of exploits (many of which were technically no more than their duty). 60 In 1328 the captors of Donal son of Art

56 Above, pp.316-22.
57 E.g. in 1352-3 (above, p.346).
58 Above, p.355.
59 Likewise the financial problems were plainly linked to the strength or otherwise of the government's collecting power.
60 Above, p.408.
MacMurrough, who had assumed the Leinster kingship, refused to give their prisoner up to the government until they had persuaded the exchequer to part with £100 and compelled the deputy justiciar to make several journeys to parley with them. In 1348 the justiciar had to pay the Purcells £80 to induce them to hand O'Kennedy over. In relation to the Irish revenue these sums were large indeed. We know little as yet of the government's use of grants of land and privileges, but the value of this vital instrument of policy too cannot but have been limited by the general uncertainty of its authority. Certainly Rokeby's attempts to re-grant lands in the Lea Valley proved abortive. It has been said that
to be able to give was the first law of political life, and there was a close connection between this and the most important function of medieval government, the dispensing of justice. If the distribution of benefits was essential to the survival of a government, the dispensing of justice was necessary for the growth of its influence.

The two things were intimately related. The frightening inability of the administration to enforce the judgements of its courts is an overt sign of its lack of authority, which in its turn must have discouraged men from

61 Above, pp.253-4.
62 Above, p.328.
63 Above, pp.347-8.
64 Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, p.112. For the analysis of a practical example, cf. his "King Henry I" reprinted in Medieval Humanism and other Studies, pp.206-33.
incautiously lending the justiciar their support. 65

Thus the government lacked money, and this, combined with less immediately tangible factors, must have deprived it of man-power. The royal service and the shire levies provide more precise touch-stones of the government's authority, and their role substantiates the pattern we have been describing. The royal service was summoned more frequently before 1315 than after it, but in the earlier period it was often granted to individuals and was not necessarily associated with a government expedition. 66 After the Bruce wars, the government seems to have been able to summon the service only in an attested military emergency. It was summoned only ten times between 1318 and 1361. 67 Furthermore, this represents a summons of the knights' fees for only a fraction of the total number of royal expeditions during these forty-odd years. It seems likely that this reduction in frequency was not of the government's choosing; the magnates undoubtedly opposed the grant of the service to the Red Earl, who wished to have it in order to re-establish himself in Ulster after the Bruce wars. 68 We have also seen that the collection of

65 Some aspects of this are discussed in Hand, English Law in Ireland, chapter II. Cf. Common pleas 9-10 Edw. III, mm. 10, 37, 72, 84, 87d, 88, 101, 103, 118, 120, 137-P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/19, pp. 46-7, 50-1, 57, 245, 476-7, 561-2; 8/20, pp. 20-1, 24-6, 129-30, 145, 281-2, 296, 437 for the impossibility of finding malefactors in many counties and the disruption of judicial process by war.

66 The service is discussed above, pp. 20-31.

67 See Otway-Ruthven, "Royal service in Ireland", R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII (1968), p. 44.

68 See Otway-Ruthven, Medieval Ireland, pp. 240-1.
the service was tardy, and that the total it raised was well short of what it should have been.

The shire levies are more important, for in their performance of the popular military obligation the generality of tenants would reveal their attitude towards the government as it were in institutional form. Would they follow the king's banner? Obviously the answer to this question would depend on local conditions and many other factors. But if Archbishop Sandford's claim that he had raised 100 horses and 4,500 men against O'Melaghlin in 1289 was true, the potential strength of such levies was great. We have seen that the levies can be detected in action with some frequency, although they have left few obvious traces on the records. The local men might join the justiciar and perform valuable service: in 1339 when Hereford was struggling under financial difficulties which made it impossible to raise a full-scale paid army, he had success against the Leinster Irish at the head of the local tenants, and in 1345 it was the men of Louth who enabled Ufford to traverse the pass of Humberdoylan after his army had been defeated there. But we must suspect that the position of the local tenants was not always easy. Apart from anything else, they would have to live in the area after the royal army had withdrawn, and would have to balance the dangers arising from serving the king half-heartedly against what they might

69 Above, p.44.
71 Above, p.300.
72 Above, p.313.
see as their own long-term interests. They could prove recalcitrant. Even at the time of great crisis, when the Leinster Irish took the opportunity of the Bruce invasion to treaten the Vale and the city of Dublin, repeated peremptory orders were necessary to stir the population to action. We have also seen the determination and ingenuity with which the Dublin and Kildare tenants obstructed Rokeby's attempts to establish them in wards at another time of crisis in 1355-6. The government could not rely on the willingness of the local men to fulfil their military obligations. The keepers of the peace had the power to amerce the recalcitrant on the spot, and to expend the money on their own authority to hire substitutes. There can be no doubt that they needed it.

Every one of these questions resists a simple answer, and draws us on into asking further questions—about the revenue, about the ability of the administration to exercise its authority in different areas, about men's attitudes and the circumstances that helped to condition them. On a purely financial level we can say that resources were inadequate; the Irish revenue was pitifully small. The financial inadequacy was partly caused by, and partly caused, other weaknesses. Perhaps the most important result was the absence of a loyal

73 Above, pp.70-72.
74 Above, pp.72-4.
population, who could look with confidence to the government for protection and favour, and who could in return be expected to turn out with alacrity to serve the king's interests and their own.

III

Since there was no possibility of mustering the force, population and financial resources necessary to institute a solution of the problem on Tudor and Stuart lines, the government had to live with it. On a military level this meant getting sucked into a never-ending series of negotiations and expeditions. There was not the means of delivering a killing-blow at the Irish, even in Leinster, and this meant that the government had to make war virtually on Irish terms. Too often it was reacting to events rather than controlling them.

The country, the terrain, the climate, the seasons, the situation were nearly always used to advantage by the Irish soldier; and so it was said by English officers that "we shall not fight but when they list; and when they list we shall and must fight". 76

The situation in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was not quite comparable: the Irish were being fought with armies raised in Ireland, and themselves containing Irish contingents, but the quotation is still apposite. Expeditions were generally only organized when they had to be organized. Resources did not permit spontaneous attacks on the Irish. And although the two sides fought

with troops whose similarities were more striking than their differences, the advantages were mostly on the Irish side. They were in the position of having to defend difficult countryside, while the government had the much more awkward task of attacking it. Irish raids required a response. Raids were frequent and the government's response was rarely strong enough to have more than a temporary effect. It is no more than a slight exaggeration to say that the administration was in danger of becoming only one more protagonist in the essentially Irish pattern of border warfare.77

The normal result of a successful expedition was to force the Irish to the peace, and compel them to submit. The submitting chieftain or chieftains would typically undertake to keep the peace, and to keep their followers under control.78 What did all this signify? We have already touched on an important point when discussing the submission of O'More in 1347: ultimately coercion was the only way of ensuring that such a settlement would take effect.79 What power of coercion did the government have? In the end only military force, and so in a strange way one military expedition implied another. In all this the government found itself reflecting the position in native Irish society, where submission had to be exacted and overlordship asserted time and time again. For instance, in 1259 Conor O'Brien's urrachts were said to be "puffed up with increase of gear and goods consequent on their not having for now a long time

77 Expeditions are discussed below, pp.441-9.
78 E.g., above, pp.94-5,289-91,325-7.
79 Above, pp.326-7.
been harried or preyed". 80 Within the restricted area where the government took direct military action, the Irish forced it to harry and prey with regularity.

The other sanctions available to the government were those available to Irish over-kings: it could exact hostages and impose fines. Nothing suggests that these measures were of more than marginal value. We have seen hostages being taken more or less every time the government had a military success. 81 The government would be concerned to find what it called a hostage "valid for the peace of Ireland". 82 In other words he would have to be important enough to act as a restraining agent on his principal. Obviously there was little point in taking an obscure member of the family, or, even less, an uncle, brother, nephew or cousin, who might be the chieftain's rival or the son of his rival. For this reason hostages tended to be chieftains' sons, and as an additional safe-guard hostages might be taken from other important members of the sept as well as from the chieftain himself. 83 Whatever symbolic value the hostage

80 Caithreim Thoirdealbhaigh, II. 4-5.
81 Of course to the Irish the giving of a hostage was peculiarly the sign of submission and acceptance of overlordship (e.g., AC, 1286, 1291). The Normans were aware of their importance from the earliest days of the Conquest (e.g., Irish Historical Docs., p.23).
83 Above, p.326. In 1335 O'Byrne himself agreed to take hostages from his followers when submitting (above, p.290). Clearly the question of who should be taken was one of great moment for both sides. In 1295 O'Toole would surrender one of his sons, but not the elder (C.J.R. 1295-1302, p.61). In 1325 O'Byrne was willing to give up one son in return for the release of another, when he had put himself in a strong bargaining-position by capturing English prisoners (above, pp.248-9). See Just.roll 8-9 Edw.II,
had, once he was taken his value was no more or less than that of any hostage. In holding him the government was involving itself in a game of bluff—if it killed him, it destroyed whatever hold it had over his principal. There is no evidence at all for the execution of hostages by the government, and we can only conclude that it did not proceed to extremes. The nearest we come to it is the apparent killing of MacMurrough at Wicklow in 1354, though he was technically a prisoner, not a hostage. His death certainly did not make for peace. The case is somewhat different, but the fact that the murder of the O'Conors of Offaly likewise served to provoke trouble rather than putting an end to it is instructive. The government's normal caution in these matters does not seem to have been rewarded by any appreciable return. For instance, hostages of the Leinster septs were continually in the government's hands, and yet risings occurred almost annually. We must suspect that the Irish knew that the government was bluffing and were prepared to call its bluff.

84 This is also suggested by the fact that in 1331 the king tried to insist that in future the law should be put into effect against hostages (Stat.Ire., John-Hen.V, pp.324-5). In native society forfeited hostages were not necessarily killed, but formed a distinct class, kept in chains (Crith Gablach, p.96).

85 Above, pp.357-9.

86 Above, pp.128-36.
As an instrument of policy, the fine's value was equally limited. To the government it represented first of all, no doubt, a simple penalty. It also had the character of reparation: the submission of the Leinster septs in 1295 included the clause "and for depredations done by them, they shall give to the king 600 cows, for payment of which they shall give on the same Sunday sufficient pledges". There was a third aspect to it too. Since fines were normally paid in instalments over a period, it also represented a safeguard: for instance, we have seen that O'More made fine for 1,000 cows in 1347; he was to deliver 200 in batches of fifty on named days, while the remaining 800 were as it were "suspended", dependent on his good behaviour.

As far as the Irish were concerned, the fine probably appeared equivalent to the tribute which the under-king paid to his successful over-king, though the link is not as clear as that between hostages and submission. It was one thing to force the Irish to undertake to pay a fine, and perhaps to levy part of it at once in the flush of victory, but it was quite another to keep them

87 C.J.R. 1295-1303, p.61. Pledges such as these were frequently exacted, and were "hostages for money" as distinct from "hostages for the peace" (see above, pp.110,115-6 for the distinction). This reparation was different from the arrangement of amends between the Irish and their neighbours, which is the subject of a separate clause. Cf. C.J.R. 1308-14, pp.2-3.

88 Above, pp.325-7.

89 See generally Binchy, "Secular institutions" in Early Irish Society, ed. Dillon, pp.54,59. The element of reparation must also have been familiar from the Irish errech payment, by which a chieftain levied the costs of his expedition on conquered territory (Crith Gablach, p.87).
to their agreement. The only effective sanction was a fresh expedition; again it came back to physical force. In the absence of an adequate run of Pipe roll evidence, it is impossible to make any sort of statistical analysis of the frequency or otherwise with which the Irish paid their fines. Fines could be discharged in full, and they were very frequently discharged in part, as we have often seen in the course of the narrative. But equally fines could lie on the rolls for a very large number of years. To take just one example, the fine agreed by the O'Tooles and O'Byrnes after the 1274-7 rebellion remained unpaid throughout the rest of Edward I's reign and into that of Edward II.

The case of the fine is symbolic of the government's comparative impotence. It was trapped, starved of resources, in endless, indecisive warfare. Between 1306 and 1311, for example, there was expedition after expedition against the O'Byrnes. In 1312 the Irish council looked back over the history of the previous six years. They pondered the fact that the Irish had often had the king's peace and had given assurances that they would deliver hostages and pay fines in return for it. They had not done so, and were "occupying the land as if conquerors". But even then the council could find no answer other than a particularly expensive
and lengthy expedition. The situation had a logic of its own, and it is not unreasonable to detect a feeling of intense frustration behind the statements of the council of 1312. O'Byrne and his fellow chieftains must have been well aware of the limits of the government's effectiveness.

IV

Within all the various restrictions that we have been discussing, the Dublin government adopted certain well-worn methods in order to cope with its problems. First of all it attempted, ineffectively, to deal with them near the root by laying down rules for the conduct of relations with the Irish, and by exhorting the tenants to resist them locally. Here the government was flying in the face of all sorts of opposing trends, against which statutes and fulminations could not be expected to prevail. It is clear what the government was trying to do, but with hindsight we can see that it had little hope of succeeding.93 It tried to regulate the relations of the local communities with the enemy, and to prevent the worst excesses of self-help by providing official machinery at local level for conducting the inevitable negotiations, and for controlling warfare if it did arise. The administration issued licences to treat, and eventually established permanent keepers of the peace in each county, under whom matters of peace and war were centralized. It attempted by the same devices to keep all men to their duty of bearing arms,94 and it continually prodded them into mounting defensive operations,

93 See generally chapter IX above, passim.
94 Above, pp. 39-41.
even on occasion using the general military obligation to provide the forces necessary to garrison a castle in times of disturbance.\textsuperscript{95} We have already discussed in another context the varied pressures the local communities would be subjected to, and the difficulty the government sometimes found in trying to insist that they fulfilled their obligations.\textsuperscript{96} Equally we have seen individual examples of success: local truces negotiated by a community; tenants prepared and ready to go with the keepers of the peace against the Irish; keepers claiming rewards for losses sustained in sharp engagements with the enemy.\textsuperscript{97} Circumstances must have been infinitely varied. We know that Archbishop fitz Ralph thought the English of Louth hard-headed to a fault in their attitude to the Irish, particularly in exploiting their legal superiority in a way he thought incompatible with God's law.\textsuperscript{98} It is unlikely that the communities of Kerry and Limerick were in a position to behave in such a cavalier manner, and certainly men on the fringes of the Leinster mountains were less confident.\textsuperscript{99} It is impossible to come to any conclusion

\textsuperscript{95} C.P.R. 1354–8, pp.370-1.
\textsuperscript{96} Above, pp.426-31.
\textsuperscript{97} Above, pp.400,403.
\textsuperscript{98} See Gwynn, "The Black Death in Ireland", Studies, XXIV (1931), pp.31,36-7; "Archbishop fitz Ralph and George of Hungary", \textit{ibid.}, pp.564-5; "Richard fitz Ralph, Archbishop of Armagn", \textit{ibid.}, XXV (1932), pp.90-3. Fr. Gwynn's impression of the strength of the English community in Louth even after the Black Death is confirmed by the comparative lack of military intervention there. It was in Louth too that we have seen the king stepping in to protect Irish to whom his peace had been granted (above, pp.382-3).
\textsuperscript{99} E.g., above, pp.164-5.
about the government's success or failure in keeping the communities to their duty that would apply to the whole lordship. But it is plain that the efforts which were made locally were not enough. The retreat of the frontier, the spread of waste lands, the growing "degeneracy" all testify to the inadequacy of resistance on a strictly legal basis.

When the point was reached where central intervention could no longer be avoided, the government did not rush headlong to arms. It can often be shown to have first investigated the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. The justiciar, chancellor, treasurer and lesser officials, as well as specially commissioned individuals, were accustomed to go to treat with the Irish, to try to bring them within the peace. Unfortunately, although the evidence about parleys is voluminous, it is singularly uninformative, consisting normally of cryptic payments or brief commissions. On some occasions, however, we do hear that a parley was successful. Both Archbishop Sandford and William de Vescy managed to stave off incipient rebellions by MacCarthy. De Vescy made controversial concessions to the Irishman, and there was always the danger of parleys such as these degenerating into plain bribery. For instance, we have seen how Rokeby detached certain of the Leinster chieftains from MacMurrough and O'Byrne by tempting them with a series of precious gifts. The fact that the justiciars

100 We cannot assume that the fact of a "parley" implies that the Irishman involved had risen to war; the justiciar might merely be making an arrangement with a friendly chieftain (e.g., above, p.349).

101 Above, pp.115-6.

102 Above, p.354.
continually used negotiations as an instrument of policy suggests that they saw them as of value. Sometimes, no doubt, the threat of force would be enough, and the Irish could be brought to heel by a skilled negotiator; the recurrent term "arduous negotiations" may have been more than a piece of empty phraseology. In part parleys must have been forced upon them by circumstances— their lack of resources meant that expeditions could not be undertaken lightly. It is particularly noticeable that deputies left behind by justiciars who had gone to England or Scotland were likely to fall back on negotiations.103 Parleys would also be used to hold off a threat in one area, while a justiciar concentrated his military attention on another. For example, when the situation in Leinster was very serious in the late 1350s, St. Amand, then in Munster, had several times to send agents back to attempt to hold the Leinster Irish at bay.104

However, it would be misleading to think of parleys as a straight alternative to an expedition. Since there was no possibility of "destroying" the enemy, and a submission was the normal end of an expedition, campaigns had to consist of a blend of force and conciliation. At a certain point fighting would have to give way to negotiating, and pursuing a campaign beyond such a point can have held few advantages for the administration. On more than one occasion we have seen campaigns brought to an end at a very early stage, apparently because the Irish had been convinced that it was better to come to

103 Above, pp.282-5.
The key moment would be when the Irish leader was willing to give undertakings to the government. In 1334-5 Darcy conducted a series of confused campaigns in Leinster. This pressure persuaded O'Byrne that it was time to give way, and a parley was held early in 1335. The most notable feature of the ensuing settlement was O'Byrne's agreement to curb his own followers, and indeed to fight them if they would not come within the peace. Six years earlier, O'Byrne had given himself up as a hostage after an expedition, but the government preferred to release him in return for other hostages. It is likely that when the Irishman was not actually in rebellion he appeared to the government to be a source of stability rather than disorder. Everything suggests that the justiciars saw their best hope of preserving order to lie in making the leaders of the Irish serve their own ends. Campaigns created a situation where the government could negotiate from a position of strength. Fighting and talking were two sides of the one coin.

If parleys and expeditions must be considered together, so too must "offensive" and "defensive" operations. The king had comparatively few castles in Ireland, and the three Connacht fortresses declined in importance as intervention in Connacht ceased. In Leinster, Newcastle McKynegan, and other castles such as Castlekevin, Wicklow, Clonmore or Balyteny which were

105 E.g., above, p.287 & pp.361-2.
106 Above, pp.289-91.
107 Above, pp.256-7.
from time to time maintained by the exchequer, tended to come into their own at the time of a military expedition. Apart from then, their role is hard to determine. Their garrisons must have been small, and there was no question of a network of castles capable of containing or even blockading the Irish. But when disturbances occurred, the government's first move was to strengthen the garrisons of its castles, and perhaps to establish a more widespread ward, centred on one or two of them. Then, when an army had been gathered together, Newcastle, Castlekevin or Wicklow often served as the base for operations. The royal service might be summoned to one of the castles, and, if the castle was near the coast, provisions could be transported to it by sea. We may suspect that the need for such bases in traditional areas of disturbance was the chief reason why a permanent presence was maintained in them. They were also in a sense the overt sign of the king's authority, and they provided any official coming to treat, or hopefully, to collect fines or receive hostages with a firm point to conduct his business from. They also no doubt provided some protection for the manors in their immediate vicinity, served as a refuge for those tenants fortunate enough to live near them, and could serve as a temporary prison where captives or hostages could be kept.

We have said that an expedition aimed to force the Irish to submit. How did it go about doing so? Here

108 See generally above, pp.61-6.
109 E.g., above, pp.94,170-1,216,285.
110 See above, pp.56,58-9,162,256,361.
our evidence is more than normally inadequate, and we can only generalize from the few occasions when we are permitted to catch a glimpse of strategy (tactics, it should be said, remain a firmly closed book). Methods must have varied from area to area according to the terrain. Unfortunately the nature of campaigns in Munster or Meath is impenetrably obscure, and it is only of those in Leinster that we can say anything useful about the government's techniques.

First of all, there were straightforward engagements with the enemy. In 1274 and 1276, for example, government armies were defeated in the Wicklow glens. The same thing happened to Wogan in Glenmalure in 1308. Rokeby got the worst of a clash with the Irish near Wicklow in 1354. In 1329, on the other hand, a successful battle against the Irish induced O'Byrne to give himself up. However, the evidence suggests that the government's strategy normally involved something more complicated than a simple raiding-party, and that we should not think in terms of concentrated clashes on a definable "battle-field".

Time and again we have seen the establishment of "wards" or custodies. When an individual ward was set up, or when wards were maintained locally and for an extended period, we must presume that their main purpose was defensive (though even an individual "session" under

111 *Clyn*, p.9; *Chart.St.Mary's*, II. 318; *A.Clon.*, 1276.
112 Above, p.174.
113 Above, pp.355-6.
114 Above, pp.256-7.
the command of a keeper of the peace might include positive assaults on the Irish\textsuperscript{115}). However, the setting up of wards at the time of a campaign was often not just an adjunct to the "expedition", but was an integral part of it. Any distinction between attack and defence is meaningless. Within our period the sources rarely bring us very close to campaigns; narratives are almost non-existent. But evidence from the 1390s helps to illuminate the earlier period. At the time of Richard II's first expedition to Ireland some unknown member of the king's forces wrote a letter to his lord describing a campaign in Leinster:\textsuperscript{116}

\ldots our very redoubted lord and king did set certain garrisons ("gardes" or wards) very cunningly, as it seemed to me, your poor subject, round about the Irish enemies. That is to say, the Earl of Rutland, and with him the Lord de B(eaumont?), with certain men-at-arms and archers, in one post; the Earl Marshal, with certain men-at-arms and archers, in another post, very near the woods of G(arrowkill?) and L(everough?), where Mac Murrough has his dwelling; and T. of Holland and with him the Lord de Percy, well supported with men-at-arms and archers, in the third post: all of whom have nobly made their utmost endeavour to harass the above-said enemies, in which matter and business the Earl of Rutland wrought well and valiantly, for he remained there continuously, keeping his post, and rode against the enemy and fought many gallant encounters with them, to his great honour; and, above all, the Earl Marshal, in the same way, being posted nearer to the enemy, had several fine encounters with them, in one of which he slew many of the people of the said MacMurrough, and burned around E.

\textsuperscript{115} Hore, \textit{Wexford} (Wexford, Taghmon & Harperstown), p. 419.

nine villages, and preyed of his cattle up to the number of 8,000.

King Richard's own description of events shows that military action brought MacMurrough and the other Leinster chieftains to submission in a predictable way. If we approach the evidence of the earlier record sources with these descriptions in mind, it becomes clear that Richard and his commanders were employing methods sanctioned by at least a century of constant use. The campaign of Edmund Butler in 1312-3 is the only one for which we have remotely comparable evidence. It was a large one, costing more than £1,000, and it consisted of disposing wards at Clonmore, Arklow, Wicklow and Ferns, employing MacMurrough on a roving commission, and of launching an attack under the justiciar himself some weeks after these arrangements had begun. Normally our evidence is more circumstantial, but again and again we hear of the establishment of such wards in the context of a campaign. To take two examples only, the Leinster expedition of 1294-5 saw wards set up at Ballymore, in the Vale of Dublin, and at Glenmalure, Castlekevin and Newcastle McKynegan, while the campaign against MacMurrough in 1359 involved the establishment of "posts" in the Leighlen area, thus providing a precise precedent for King Richard's measures thirty-five years later. The most likely explanation of the government's adoption of this form of campaign is the

118 Above, pp.186-9.
119 Above, pp.93-4.
120 Above, p.372.
difficulty of bringing the Irish to battle. Surrounding their territory and worrying at them from several sides at once was more likely to compel them to submit than an effort to defeat them at one particular point; the latter could all-too-easily turn into a frustrating game of hide-and-seek. We frequently hear of wards established in other areas— in Offaly and Ossory for example— but whether this type of campaign would have worked in less constricted countryside is another matter. Leinster was particularly well suited to this form of warfare. The Irish there were hemmed in by English settlements at the best of times. In the southwest the government repeatedly failed to come to grips with the Irish in the fourteenth century. There it was faced with a more extensive area, and one without such a strong English population. Brian Ban O'Brien must have been a much more elusive enemy than MacMurrough or O'Byrne.

Describing Butler's victory in 1313 the Dublin annalist speaks of him as having "besieged" the O'Byrnes in Glenmalure. This, when set in the context of continual wards, raises an important question: were conditions necessarily favourable to the Irish, or was the government able to put economic pressure on them? We have noted more than one occasion when the chronicles speak of the destruction of Irish crops. We have also seen the importance the government attached to

121 E.g., above, pp.109,127-8.
122 Chart. St. Mary's, II. 341.
123 Cf. above, p.432.
124 Above, pp.163-4 (1302), 310 (1344).
preventing supplies from reaching them. Unfortunately, lack of convincing evidence combines with our ignorance of the Irish economy in general to make it impossible to give a definite answer to this question. Destruction of the enemy's livelihood has been seen as the chief weapon of fourteenth century warfare. In France English armies ravaged and burned in order to convince local communities that their allegiance would be better given to King Edward than to King Philip or King John. No doubt in Ireland keeping supplies away from the enemy, burning and trampling their corn, preying their cattle, were seen by the Dublin government as instruments for forcing them towards submission. However, it does not seem that surrounding them with wards was specifically aimed at reducing them by blockade—although this may well have been one of the results of such a strategy. Leinster campaigns do not appear to follow any significant seasonal pattern. Fighting was comparatively rare between December and March, but that is only what we should expect. Expeditions occurred indiscriminately between April and November, and nothing suggests that the government concentrated on a particular period of the year when the enemy was thought to be most vulnerable. We can only

125 Above, pp. 387-9.
126 See Hewitt, Organization of War, pp. 93-118.
127 See the list of campaigns in Appendix IV. There was a tendency for Leinster campaigns to get underway in August and September, and it could be that this was in response to increased raiding-activity on the part of the Irish around harvest-time. But it is more likely that the English tenants were simply more readily available for war once they had got their crops in.
say that the government employed the ordinary harass-
ments and took the normal precautions. There is no
clear evidence that it conceived any broader strategy
designed to exploit economic conditions.

V

The government struggled against the Irish with
persistence, in the ways we have been outlining. It
was not overwhelmed, although by the very end of our
period it seemed to some that disaster was at hand. 128
Retreat never turned into rout because of the character
of the opposition the administration faced, and the
techniques the justiciars developed for turning its
weaknesses to account.

To say that the government was faced by no coherent
enemy is a platitude, but it is all-important. Irish
society lacked an overall political authority, and the
nature of the society, based as it was on a cultural
homogeneity and reverence for a common law, meant that
it could survive without it. 129 It did so even after
it was confronted by a society of a different nature in
the twelfth century. The Norman conquest put an end to
what gropings there had been towards a kingship of a
more modern sort. The settlement of the invaders must
have served to reinforce the political fragmentation
that already existed: the mere presence of physical
settlements helped to strengthen natural boundaries, and
to increase the isolation of Irish of different regions.

128 This was the burden of the message of the Great
Council of 1360 (Parliaments & Councils, no.16).
129 See the important discussion in Warren, "The inter-
For example, not until the very end of our period does O'More seem to have joined up with MacMurrough; the populated and heavily defended Barrow valley served to keep the septs apart. As far as political fragmentation is concerned we have, in a sense, used the Bruce invasion as a test case.\(^{130}\) On the one hand it proved impossible to create a united front in Ireland, but on the other hand it is clear that this was not because of any absence of strong, widely-shared feelings of resentment and opposition. The Remonstrance may be shrill in tone, but it is significant that the Irish thought in its terms at all, and that Bruce and his Ulster allies hoped that it would strike a chord in different parts of Ireland. There was an intense feeling of distinctness and injustice (the root injustice was of course dispossession). Even Eoghan O'Madden of Ui Maine, a supporter of the Red Earl and an enemy of Bruce and the Ulstermen, could welcome a charter of English law by saying that:

The following is an additional part of the remuneration of Eoghan from his chief lords, namely that Eoghan and his heirs should have equal nobility with them and their heirs, while the particular decision of those English lords had been this on their Gaels, namely that the Gael should be made ignoble though a landholder and that the Saxon was noble, though without rearing and lands; until Eoghan obtained an abrogation of the decision from the Barons.\(^{131}\)

As is well known, English and Irish were outwardly dis-

\(^{130}\) Above, chapter V, passim.

\(^{131}\) Tribes & Customs of Hy-Many, pp.141-2. The grant of English law (at the Earl's request) is to be found in R.C.H. p.28 no.93 (14 June 1320).
tistinguishable by appearance. In 1297 the wearing of Irish dress and the **culan** by the English was forbidden, because it confused legal processes,¹³² and in 1333 a grant of English law to Dermot O'Dwyer involved him in removing the offending hair-piece.¹³³ The cleavage was clear and deep, but the economic and cultural oneness of the Irish could not be reflected in political and military organization. The attempts to revive the High Kingship, which were emphasized by Eoin MacNeill,¹³⁴ stand out almost as antiquarian aberrations, though they were informed with enough common-sense to realise that only an outsider had any hope of mobilizing broadly-based support.

Fears of a united front can have troubled the government little. But not only was no general unity possible, it is equally plain from all we have said that unanimity within any one area was rarely attainable. Even below this level, it was a fortunate chieftain who did not possess at least one serious rival within his own sept: what we have said of Connacht or of Thomond may serve as sufficient evidence of this.¹³⁵ These circumstances presented the government both with opportunities and with disadvantages. On the credit side, it had no concerted opposition to fight, and it could exploit divisions among the Irish. On the debit side, this meant that the administration was faced with perpetual disorders: scattered, unco-ordinated, unpredictable (though in

¹³³ Parliaments & Councils, no.13.
¹³⁴ See Phases of Irish History, esp. pp.328-34.
¹³⁵ E.g., above, pp.95-105,139-47,153-5.
another sense all too predictable). The defeat of one chieftain had little effect on another. Politically and militarily as well as economically, the Irish were less vulnerable because there was less to be destroyed. In this sense too the government's expeditions were only pecking at the surface of the problem.

The government manipulated the Irish divisions with some adroitness. This was policy, not just a response to individual opportunities. We have seen the justiciar in 1307 granting O'Toole lands to O'Byrne, and having it recorded on the rolls that the purpose of the action was to "move dissension" between the septs.136 The Irish saw through such policies. In the words of O'Neill at the time of the Bruce invasion, the English:

> by foxlike fraud and deceit promote their own interests by disseminating quarrels and intestine feuds among us, so that we, being weakened by wounding one another, may easily yield ourselves a prey to them. 137

It was quite another matter to do anything about it, for the policy was based on a sure appreciation of the weaknesses inherent in the Irish political structure. It would be strange of the government had not adopted a policy of "divide and rule"; there was fertile ground for the sowing of dissension.

This is only the negative side of such manipulation. It would be a rare campaign which did not see some of the Irish of any given locality on the government's side.

136 Above, p.171.

Right at the beginning of our period, the justiciars were taking steps to enlist O'Dempsey and O'Hanlon. One of the earliest accounts of a clerk of wages that survives (1309) shows an O'Toole in pay during a Leinster expedition, and this sets the pattern for campaigns in that area over the next fifty years. When, after the Bruce invasion, the justiciars regularly intervened in the south, they generally found themselves joined by certain of the Munster chieftains: this was the case, for instance, in 1345, 1348-9 and 1352-3. It would be otiose to multiply examples.

The military help the Irish could provide was not negligible. Many chieftains could raise forces of 100 men (and we may remember that Irish armies rarely consisted of more than 1,000 paid troops). O'More of Leix in 1332 brought no less than 505 men to Lucy's army, though admittedly this number is exceptionally large.

The percentage of Irish, or rather of troops under Irish leaders, serving in certain armies on certain days is instructive:

139 Above, p.179.
140 Above, pp.320,332-3,345-7.
141 I have included some tentative remarks on the military nature and strength of the government's opponents as Appendix II, below.
142 Above, p.274.
143 The following table is based on Mem.roll 12-13 Edw. III, m.4d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/21, pp.28-30; 19-20 Edw. III, mm.16-d- R.C.8/23, pp.496-516; 22-3 Edw.III, m. 12d.- R.C.8/24, pp.456-64; 27-8 Edw.III, m.10- R.C. 8/26, pp.349-53. I have excluded any permanent retinue from calculations. I have admittedly chosen occasions when a fair proportion of Irish were in pay—this was not always the case. Conversely they could form almost the whole of an army (above, pp. 175-7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>7.3.1338</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munster</td>
<td>7.7.1345</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.10.1345</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.9.1348</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>26.9.1353</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerically, therefore, Irish auxiliaries were well-worth having. It is impossible to estimate the quality of the troops the chieftains brought, but we can safely say that they would be as good as those of the government's Irish opponents. Inducing the Irish to serve was clearly important. In 1416 a letter was sent to England in support of the lieutenant, John Talbot. It records how he went against one chieftain after another, fighting each of them and compelling them to serve him against the next:

....he caused in many places every Irish enimie to serve upon the other, which thinge has not been seene by longe tyme in theise partes until the coming of your Leuietenant aforsayd.

Talbot's supporters evidently were confident that in retailing these proceedings they were recommending him highly to the English government.\(^{144}\) Willingness to serve the king against other rebels was an important clause in O'More's submission of 1347,\(^ {145}\) and it was to be a major element in Richard II's handling of the Leinster chieftains in 1394-5.\(^ {146}\) We have seen clear evidence that not only were septs willing to serve against other neighbouring septs, but also that different


\(^{145}\) Above, p.325.

\(^{146}\) See esp. Curtis, Richard II in Ireland, pp.80-5.
members of the same sept might on occasion join the royal army. The employment of Gerald son of Dunlaing O'Byrne, \(^{147}\) and the fact that Dermot O'Brien went with Ufford against Desmond and Brian Ban, \(^{148}\) may serve as representative examples.

The question of how far a situation like this was really a source of strength to the government is a difficult one to answer. The mention of rivals inside and outside the sept serving with the administration should put us on our guard at once. They would serve only when it suited them. There is no reason to suppose that the Irish served the government any more selflessly than they served Edward Bruce. Describing the Irish behaviour at Fochart, Archdeacon Barbour put the following words into their mouths:

> For our maner is of this land  
> To follow and ficht, and ficht fleand,  
> And nocht till stand in plane melle  
> Quhill the ta part discumfit be. \(^{149}\)

In plain words, we look out for ourselves, and do not commit ourselves in the open until we know how it's going to go. In 1352 we may discern behaviour not unlike that alleged to have occurred at Fochart, when many of the southern Irish appear to have gone over to Rokeby late in the campaign, when it must have become clear that victory was going to lie with the royal army. \(^{150}\)

147 Above, pp.286,289-91.  
148 Above, p.320.  
149 For discussion of this passage see Orpen, Normans, IV. 201 and Dunlop, "Some notes on Harbour's Bruce", Essays presented to T.F. Tout, p.288.  
150 Above, p.346.
No doubt such an attitude would extend to relations with the English in general, but it should not be condemned. Looking out for their own interests and those of their septs was "patriotism" in a real sense. And the more skilfully a leader played his hand, the better both for him and his "nation". That he would do it clear-sightedly, and with a necessary cynicism, we need not doubt. Whatever else the Irish were, they were not blind; they did not live in a fool's paradise:

In the foreigners'poems we promise that the Irish shall be driven from Ireland; in the Irishmen's poems we promise that the foreigners shall be routed across the sea. 151

The limitations of the policy of sowing dissension and employing the Irish can be clearly seen in Rokeby's justiciarship. Rokeby attached almost all the Leinster septs to the government by paying them fees. When the time seemed ripe, every one of the Irish leaders so retained broke out in rebellion. O'Toole, the weakest, and O'More, perhaps the most loyal, held their hand until the justiciar was out of the country. MacMurrough and O'Byrne were more daring. Rokeby's return and a renewed campaign brought some of them to heel in 1356-7, but not for long.152 The truth is of course that here too the government's success would depend on its general authority. It could, within limits, create the circum-

151 See Greene, "The professional poets" in Seven Centuries of Irish Learning, ed. O Cúiv, p.47. Cf. "a sovereignty they never get we promise to the Gael in our odes; you need pay no attention to this, it is our custom" (O Cúiv, "Literary creation and the Irish historical tradition", Procs. of the British Academy, XLIX (1963), p.257).

152 See above, chapter VIII, passim.
stances that helped to determine the chieftains' reactions. Nor must we forget that they could have their problems too. If MacCarthy is to be believed, he had good reason for not coming to submit to Richard II early in 1395:

considering that at present in the parts of county Cork I have been labouring at a certain parley with a kinsman of mine, knowing nothing of the matter moved against me by the Earl of Ormond on the part of your Majesty, by reason of which I am not able to set forth to your presence so suddenly without great danger to my country, but, God permitting, when you shall have approached the parts of Munster, with a joyful mind and without delay will I come to you..... 153

It is probably significant that in the later part of our period, when the government's authority was ebbing fast, hints of co-operation among the Leinster Irish can be found. It was becoming clear, perhaps, that alliances among themselves against the government were likely to be more advantageous than alliances with the government against each other; though there would always be individual chieftains to pack the other side. There were attempts to restore the Leinster kingship in 1328 and 1354. 154 In 1336 O'More is said to have tried to organise a general uprising. 155 In 1354 and 1359 we hear of pacts aimed at producing disturbances on different marches at the same time. 156 Fees, gifts and retainers, which reached their peak under

154 Above, pp.252-4,353.
155 Above, p.293.
Rokeby, were a sign of weakness rather than strength, though they are also a sign that Irish confederations were fragile. The situation was gradually changing in favour of the Irish. But the government's weakness, and the nature of Irish society, ensured that there could be no sudden turn-around in the fortunes of either side. There was always an element of stalemate.

VI

The relations between the Dublin government and Gaelic Ireland are complex because the history of Ireland itself is complex. It is impossible, in fact, to discuss the subject in terms of two simple "sides". The government occupied an anomalous position. With the Irish of much of the country it rarely had direct relations at all; some of these were out of reach of English authority, and others would normally be dealt with by the great lords. Behind the government's back was the English government, stickling for legality. Confronting it were individuals and communities of the most varied complexion; and it had no choice but to work through them, as in England "in the last resort the governed were also governors". Even on a purely military level, it was not a straight clash between two

157 Cf. the interesting discussion in Beckett, The Study of Irish History, pp.7-17.

158 For instance in 1331 the king tried to insist that fines of the Irish should be taken in money (Stat. Ire., John-Hen.V, pp.326-7). As we have seen, all the subsequent evidence shows that this order changed nothing; it could hardly be expected to.

159 Holt, Magna Carta, p.41. Ireland was in continua guerra, and the council maintained that the justiciar needed the power to pardon since the great lords were always committing crimes because of the conditions. If pardons were denied them, their loyalty over
different societies. A large proportion of the leaders of military contingents were likely to be Irish, and the troops the great lords brought to the armies would be partly Irish too. And how exactly do we place "Walter Carragh de Bermingham, captain of kern"? The government was trying to keep the peace with the Irish and to chastise them where necessary, but in order to do so it had to use the imperfect instruments that were to hand. The opposition for its part often consisted of alliances between Irish and Anglo-Irish.

The overall pattern of the period is one of retreat, deterioration, declining effectiveness. But this was caused by many interlocking factors, and it does not follow that the government was suffering from "defeats" in its day-to-day relations with the Irish. In terms of individual campaigns the government was more often successful than not; the trouble was that its success on an immediate military level was of very limited significance. The administration was only one power among many; its difficulties were not understood in England (or perhaps they were disregarded) until it was too late; in many ways its weakness fed upon itself; the Irish presented problems that any government would have found extremely difficult to solve in the circumstances of the fourteenth century, let alone a government suffering from the handicaps that afflicted the Dublin

could not be counted on (Mem. roll 24-5 Edw. III, m. 11- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/25, pp.230-4).

160 See above, p.34.
administration. Perhaps the heart of the matter is that the government was faced by a situation on which, for a variety of reasons, it could only have a marginal influence. The justiciars could negotiate, they could fight and they could urge other people to fight too. But when all was said and done, little would have changed. Looking back, the Irish advance, both physical and in the minds of the English, appears almost unavoidable, and this lends an air of futility to the government's actions. The justiciars had little choice but to follow the policies they did. Many of them showed energy, some of them showed considerable diplomatic skill, and almost all of them displayed doggedness. They might win battles, but they were losing the war, and they were losing the peace.
APPENDIXES

In the vague records from a rendezvous with Henry as to strategy, the part of the game where Henry was retained for Henry's situation, born in relief to a private
capacity and to know an incident to another Henry's
fidelity to the king, it began to serve him, that Henry's
entry or assign, being of this sort was to undertake the

See above, op. 101, 12.

It cannot please, H.v. 15, 20, p. 26 P.R.O.I., R.G.
It looks as if the R.O. gives begun with the intention
of producing a full transcript. This was afterwards
heavily cancelled and crossed, probably either by
himself or of a superior, in order to make a possibly
calculated version.
Appendix I

Additional note on the justiciar's household and retinue

We have seen that the justiciars were bound by the terms of their appointment to maintain nineteen or twenty men-at-arms on their fee during their period of office. Unfortunately the nature of the surviving evidence means that we know very little about this military household.\(^1\) However, from Wogan's time there date two contracts, by which the justiciar retains Anglo-Irish leaders to himself, while they in turn agree to serve him with what troops they can raise, whenever summoned. We may examine these documents in some detail, before attempting to decide what they tell us about the household.

In 1306 Wogan entered into an indenture with Henry de la Roche, the lord of the Rower.\(^2\) Henry was retained for Wogan's life-time, both to Wogan in a private capacity and to Wogan as justiciar, saving Henry's fealty to the king. If Wogan survived him, then Henry's heir or assign, being of full age, was to undertake the

\(^1\) See above, pp. 10-13.

\(^2\) Common pleas, Hil. 34 Edw.I, m.21d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 7/11, pp. 435-8. The (French) text is sadly defective. It looks as if the R.C. clerk began with the intention of producing a full transcript. This was afterwards heavily cancelled and altered, probably either by himself or by a superior, in order to make a passable calendared version.
service to the justiciar or his deputy. Henry promised for himself and his heir not to be retained by anyone else. Henry and his esquire were to have the same wages and expenses as Wogan's other esquires. Henry would take up knightly arms at Wogan's wish and expense, and then he and his esquire would have appropriate allowances. Henry then agreed to come to Wogan with men-at-arms whenever summoned.

Our knowledge of the second indenture comes only from a summary recognizance enrolled on the Patent roll, but at least what details we have of it are preserved in a more reliable form. It dates from 1310. In it, John son of William Butler undertook in similar manner to serve the justiciar. He too was to serve for the term of Wogan's life as a member of his household, retinue and table, receiving clothing and wages from his lord. He was to serve him with horses and arms whenever reasonably summoned, bringing as large an armed force as he could manage. He and his men-at-arms were to receive the standard wage of twelvepence a day, together with bouche en court, and sixpence for the fodder of their horses, unless they were actually on expedition and in a place and at a time of year where foraging was possible.

Apart from the fact that these documents do not lay down a precise number of troops to be brought, they are typical of long-term indentures of service, such as the

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3 R.C.H. p.16 no.57. Gilbert seems to have been aware of the originals of such documents, although he did not connect them with the household (Viceroys, pp. 120-1). It may be more than chance that both date from February- the time of year when the justiciar might well be turning his attention to military matters after the winter.
king had with men whom he attached to his English household. It seems most unlikely that the Irish justiciar's household was a static body of nineteen or twenty men-at-arms in permanent residence. The whole value of a household lay in its ability to expand when necessary, in order to form the nucleus of the royal army. Thirteenth century evidence from Ireland suggests that this had been the case then. When Irish troops went to serve in the Lord Edward's Welsh expedition of 1257, among them were bodies described as *satellites de familia*. Dr Lydon has concluded that the phrase means that, in all probability, they were attached to the Lord Edward's household in Wales, but he does not rule out the possibility that it represents the expanded household of the Irish justiciar. However that may be, he has also pointed to the existence in 1231 of men retained *de familia regis in Hibernia*, at an annual fee, and whom King Henry III accused of not fulfilling their obligation to see to the keeping of the peace in Ireland as they should have done. These must almost certainly represent precursors of the contracted leaders whom we have been discussing.


5 Cf. above, p.13 where I pointed out that twenty men-at-arms at 12d each a day would have accounted for £365 of the justiciar's £500 annual fee.


7 This is interesting in supporting the belief of some historians that the only new thing about contract service was that the contracts were written over
It seems likely that these contracted troops went to form a section of the army that we have not yet discussed: on the typical paymaster's account, the justiciar is shown bringing a retinue to the army just like the other leaders.\(^8\) For instance, we have seen that in 1306 Wogan had with him a retinue that cost £143-16s-11\(\frac{2}{3}\)d in wages, and that in 1309 Gaveston brought £120-15s-1d worth of troops.\(^9\) This sets the pattern for the rest of our period.\(^10\)

At this point, one very difficult question arises. If we identify the justiciar's contingent in any army with the troops raised in this way, then the conclusion follows that they were paid by the exchequer, and were not supported from the justiciar's fee. This means that we must either say that these contracted leaders were _additional_ to the mandatory household, or that the justiciar would be responsible for the wages of the leader alone, and that the exchequer would take the responsibility for any troops that he brought with him. There does not seem to be any evidence that would enable us to come to a firm conclusion one way or the other. But it seems fair to say that the question is only of marginal importance. The crucial point is not whether Henry de la Roche and John son of William Butler

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8 A retinue, that is, distinct from any force a justiciar was permitted to keep in permanent pay by the terms of his appointment (see above, pp.13-20).

9 Above, pp.166,179.

10 See, e.g., Mem.roll 22-3 Edw.III, m.12d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/24, pp.456-64.
are to be identified as two of the justiciar's twenty men-at-arms, but the simple fact that they were retained of the household, in whatever capacity, and that their retention shows the Irish household to have been designed to expand when necessary in the typical fourteenth century fashion.

1 See note. "Henry VIII's Irish forces in Scotland", Irish Sword, XII (1957-6), 466.
Appendix II

Some notes and queries on the government's Irish opponents

The technicalities of native Irish military organization must be left to others, wiser in these matters. However, it will be plain from the text that the records of the Dublin government contain a considerable richness of almost completely neglected evidence concerning the armed forces of the Irish chieftains. It is to be hoped that these sources will eventually be exploited by Gaelic scholars. What follows claims to be no more than a very tentative attempt to draw some general conclusions and to ask some relevant questions.

The troops brought by the Irish chieftains to serve the justiciar consisted of hobelars and foot. Their leaders might on occasion be counted as men-at-arms. Presumably the hobelars who served in Irish contingents were the same in nature as those who came with the Anglo-Irish magnates, or who served the king in Scotland. They have been discussed above. The foot are, we must suppose, to be identified with kern. In the sixteenth century, kern were armed with darts and short bows, and there is no reason to doubt that this was the case in the fourteenth century too. If the bows in use in Ireland were of this sort, it would serve to reinforce

1 PP.3-5.
our earlier conclusions about the absence of "archers" proper, in the sense of long-bow men, from Irish armies before the 1330s, and their relative scarcity even after that time.\(^3\)

It is pertinent to note in the context of the native Irish contingents that there is nowhere a whisper of a galloglass, at least \textit{eo nomine}. By the early sixteenth century "batayles" of galloglass had spread throughout the southern provinces.\(^4\) There is little evidence that they had done so before the end of our period. We surely must be led to question the assumption that these Scottish mercenaries played a significant role in the "Irish rally", and to wonder what evidence there is for their diffusion and importance in the fourteenth century.\(^5\) Apart from anything else, the government was never slow to employ any instrument it thought might prove useful, and we have seen only one doubtful hint that it may have once used a band of galloglass.\(^6\)

\(^3\) Above, pp.6-9.

\(^4\) See, e.g., Price, "Armed forces of the Irish chiefs in the early 16th. century", \textit{R.S.A.I.Journ.}, LXII (1932), pp.201-7. One would expect galloglass to have been distinguished in some way on the accounts—perhaps as \textit{Scotici} (cf. above, p.198 & n.5).

\(^5\) Cf. Hayes-McCoy, \textit{Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland}, pp.6-30, which remains disconcertingly vague (e.g., at p.24, "at all events the galloglach came, and, having come, they moved southwards" \textdagger)

\(^6\) Above, pp.9-10. The emphasis on galloglass seems in part to spring from an understandable, but rather perverse, reluctance to admit that the Irish might have learned something from the Normans. But the Irish recovery and the shrinkage of the lordship can be explained quite satisfactorily without resorting to any Scottish \textit{deus ex machina}. For some important comments on Norman military influence on the Irish
How many troops could the Irish put into the field? Here again the evidence of the paymaster's accounts might prove of value, though we cannot of course assume that the number of men a chieftain brought to serve the justiciar necessarily represented the full military strength of his "nation". For instance, in 1332 O'More provided over 500 troops, but on other occasions his contribution was much smaller. However, there is no reason to doubt the general impression left by the accounts that the forces available to chieftains would be measured in scores and hundreds rather than in thousands. This was certainly the case in the sixteenth century, and some of the figures for the military strength of Irish leaders then are not too far removed from the sort of numbers they brought to the royal armies in the fourteenth century. If this is so, it follows that the government was not opposed by forces strikingly larger than it itself could mobilize. This at least would be true as long as any major alliance among the Irish was avoided— and we have seen that the administration did its level best to abviate such a threat.


7 Figures are to be found in the narrative passim.

The relatively limited resources of the Irish chiefs presumably sprang from the well-known fact that the unfree classes were excluded from military service— at least until the time of Shane O'Neill. It has been estimated that the unfree in Wexford in the early seventeenth century comprised four-fifths of the population of the Irish districts. If this calculation is accurate, and has any general relevance, then the adult male freeholder, of military capacity, must have been a scarce and valuable commodity. Whether the unfree population could be expected to stand to in the event of an attack on their territory is obscure, but the evidence suggests that bearing arms was a closely guarded privilege.

These facts suggest a further point, which could be of incalculable significance for the history of the lordship itself. Unfree Irish (the betaghs) formed a very high proportion of the population of many manors. Since resistance to the Irish depended at root on the strength and disposition of the local population, the unwarlike (and, of course, Irish) character of people within the English areas must have helped to undermine the ability of those areas to resist. We have seen that


10 Butler, Gleanings from Irish History, app. C, p. 302.

11 Refs. as in note 9.

12 See Otway-Ruthven, "Character of Norman Settlement in Ireland", Historical Studies, V. 79-84.
the government tried to assess betagh's to arms.\textsuperscript{13} What success it had, we do not know. But certainly the flight of such tenants before Irish attacks was a constant refrain,\textsuperscript{14} and it seems likely that, when the moment was right, they would transfer their services to the local Irish.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{enumerate}
  \item See above, p. 41.
  \item See, e.g., P.R.O.I., Mem. roll 3 Edw. II, m. 45.
\end{enumerate}
Appendix III

Illustrative Documents

Because of the limitations imposed by the conventional type-face, I have thought it best to give figures in Arabic numerals.

I

Recognition by John son of William Butler of an agreement of retinue between himself and the justiciar, dated 1 February 1310.

Johannes filius Willelmi le Botiller de comitatu Waterford' recognoscit ut factum suum quoddam scriptum (Gallico sermone exaratum) datum 1 Februarii proximo preterito per quod notum factum omnibus se mercede conductum esse a domino Johanne Wogan ad subsistendum cum ipso de retinencia et ad domicilium mensam vestimenta et vadia dicti Johannis Wogan, sicut ceteri valecti ejus, ad totam vitam dicti Johannis Wogan ad serviendum ipsi cum equis et armis ubicumque preceperit in Hibernia contra omnes homines qui vivere aut mori poterint, salva fide sua erga dominum Regem; ita quod, quocumque tempore rationabiliter premunitus fuerit, veniet ei in auxilium una cum vi armata quam poterit maxima, et cum ipso ad ipsius voluntatem remanebit, percipiendo per diem pro qualibet equo cooperto quem secum duxerit 12d una cum 'bouche en court' pro se et hominibus ad arma de comitatu suo, et 6d pro feno, avena &c. nisi fuerit in loco guerre & tempore anni quo homines pabulari poterint; adque omnia facienda obligat se in £200.

(R.C.H. p.16 no.57)

II

Documents concerning the royal service of Carrickfergus, 1311

A. Writ ordering the treasurer and barons of the exchequer to compel sheriffs and seneschals to levy the service in money
Edwardus Rex Thesaurario et Baronibus suis de scaccario Dublin' salutem. Cum nuper precepimus omnibus vicecomitibus et seneschallis terram nostram Hibernie quod servicium nostrum proclamatum apud Cragfergus in crastino sancti Johannis Baptiste proximo futuro in pecunia numerata et liberari faciant Nicholao de Balsecote cancellario de scaccario Dublin', mandamus quod predictos vicecomites et senescallos sub modo et forma quibus melius videritis expedire ad commodum nostrum com- pellatis ad predictam pecuniam sine dilatione levandam, ita quod predicto Nicholao liberetur custodiendum donec alid inde mandaverimus. Teste Johanne Wogan &c.

(Mem.roll 4-5 Edw.II, m.36- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/5, pp.531-2)

B. Order to the sheriff of Dublin to levy the service, to the use of the earl of Ulster

Dublin'- mandatum vicecomiti sicut alias quod cum nuper proclamatum fuit quod omnes illi qui servicium facere debent Regi essent apud Cragfergus in crastino sancti Johannis Baptiste proximo preterito cum equis &c. ad faciendum Regi servicium predictum prout eis tunc dicretur plenius ex parte Regis et jam ordinatum fuit quod servicium illud levaretur in pecunia numerata in subsidium Ricardi de Burgo comitis Ultonie pro Hibernicis felonibus in partibus suis expugnandis ad melioracionem pacis terre Hibernie, mandatum eodem vicecomiti sicut alias quod servicium illud levari faciat in pecunia numerata, viz. Nicholao de Balsecote &c. ad opus dicti comitis custodiendum.

(Mem.roll 4-5 Edw.II, m.62- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/5, p.762)

III

Writ to sheriff of Dublin, summoning royal service to Newcastle McKynegan for 1 June 1355

Rex vicecomiti Dublin' salutem. Quia diversi Hibernici parcium Lagenie et aliunde, inimici ac rebelles nostri, aggregata sibi ingenti multitudine aliorum Hibernicorum, partes predictas et fidelem populum nostrum invadere et destruere minantur, et mala inferre indies graviora nisi eorum malicia ob- vietur, nos verum, rebellionem Dei adjutorio reprimere
cuptentes, et eo pretextu servicium nostrum regale per totam terram nostram Hibernie proclamari volentes, prout per Justiciarium nostrum Hibernie et alios de consilio nostro ordinatum est et concordatum, tibi precepmimus quod per totam ballivam tuam, diebus et locis quibus melius expedire videris, publice ex parte nostra proclamari facias quod omnes illi qui huiusmodi servicium nobis pro terris et tenementis suis, que de nobis pro huiusmodi serviciis tenent in dicta terra nostra, sint ad Novum Castrum de MacKyngan die Lune in crastino sancte Trinitatis proximo futuro, unusquisque videlicet cum equis et armis ac decenti apparatu juxta servicium suum ad profiscendum cum dicto Justiciario contra ipsos hostes ad eorum refrenatam audaciam (sic) favente Deo conferendam; vel quod quilibet qui huiusmodi servicium nobis facere tonvatur*, si in propria persona prout ad ipsum pertinet ibidem interesse non poterit, habeat denarios nobis pro servicio predicto debitos ad scaccarium nostrum Dublin' ante diem predictum Thesaurario et camerariis nostris ibidem liberandos, cum quibus alios homines ad arma loco ipsorum non venientium providere faciamus pro obsequio nostro predicto; et habeas tunc apud dictum castrum nomina eorum de balliva tua qui huiusmodi servicium nobis facere tonvatur* et hoc breve. Teste Thoma de Rokeby Justiciario nostro apud Dublin' 20 die Aprilis anno regni nostri 29.

per ipsum Justiciarium et Consilium.

* MS apparently sic.

(Close roll 29-30 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.237)

IV

Roll of receipt of the royal service of Loughsewdy, proclaimed Michaelmas term, 1307

Rotulus recepte de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedi in termino sancti Michaelis anno regni Regis Edwardi (i.e., Edward II) primo, tempore Ricardi de Bereford thesaurarii Hibernie.

Kilkenny': De servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy £44-8s-0½d per Johannem Druill custodem libertatis Kilk'

Weys': De servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy £40 per Mauricium de Rupeforti custodem libertatis Weys'

[Excerpt from the Close Roll 29-30 Edw. III, N.L.I., MS 2, f.237]
Uriel: De Benedicto le Haubergh vicecomite £6-11s de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy

Kildar': De eodem servicio £14-7s per Hugonem Canoun vicecomitem

Summa recepte huius termini £105-6s-0d

In termino sancti Hillarii anno Regni Regis Edwardi primo

Uriel: De Benedicto le Haubergh vicecomite £9 de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy per priorem de Dondalk

Trym: De servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy £50 per Galfridum de Genevill

Dublin': De Coulok et membris suis de servicio de Loxheuedy 50s per Theobaldum de Verdon

De Grathclagh de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 20s per Ricardum de Cruis

De Nal de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 20s per Robertum Chunewel

De Houethe de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 40s per Adam de Houeth

Dublin': De servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 16s per Eustachium de Rupe

De Baligriffin de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 20s per Willelmum de Galbarry

De Stathlargan de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 20s per Willelmum Haket

De Balirothery de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 20s per Dionisium Costantyn

De Blundeleston de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy 5s per Nicholaum de Eggefeld

Cath': De Ade le Bretton vicecomite £27-13s de servicio proclamato apud Loxheuedy

Dublin': De Willelmo Bagot 40s de eodem servicio pro Dondrom

De Archiepiscopo Dublin' 15s de eodem servicio per tenentes de Coylagh

De Baligorman 20s de eodem servicio per Almaricum de Sancto Amando
Cork': De Willelmo de Caunteton vicecomite £45 de eodem servicio per Hamonem le Gascoun

Dublin': De Coulok et membris suis 40s de eodem servicio per Theobaldum de Verdon
De Archiepiscopo Dublin' 15s de eodem servicio per tenentes de Coylagh

Connac': De Ricardo de Burgo comite Ultonie £53 de eodem servicio
Summa huius termini sancti Hillarii £201-14s
Summa recepte serviciorum predictorum tempore Ricardi de Bereford thesaurarii £307-0s-0½d
(P.R.O., E.101/235/6)

Order concerning view of arms in Leixlip and Okethy, 1311-12

Kildar': mandatum vicecomiti quod non distingat burgenses firmarios et betagios Regis maneriorum de Saltu Salmonis et Okethy ad visum armorum suorum coram eo faciendum aliter quam ipsi temporibus Radulphi Pipard domini dicti manerii de Saltu Salmonis et Henrici de Rocheford domini dicti manerii de Okethy facere consueverunt.

(Mem. roll 5 Edw.II, m.27- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/6, p.186)

Concerning the summons of the shire levies of county Meath before the justiciar and keepers of the peace, c.1342. (The text of this document appears to be corrupt)

Mid': Cum nuper proclamatum fuisset per prefatum Justiciarium et consilium Domini Regis quod omnes et singuli homines comitatus Midie ad equos ad* arma hobellarios et pedites coram Justiciario (et) custodibus pacis comitatus predicti assessi essent coram dicto Justiciario hic ad hunc diem cum eorum equis et armis a ssessi fuerint et arraiati ad tractandum et parliamentandum cum Offerwill et aliiis complicibus suis super reformacione pacis Domini Regis, et ulterius faciendum (et) percipiendum quod
eis ex parte Domini Regis per preceptum Justiciarii tunc esset injungendum. (Followed by a long list of tenants in the county).

* recte 'et'?

(N.L.I., MS 13, pp.339-41; T.C.D., MS F.1.15, pp.449-52. See above, p.43)

VII

Cases concerning agreements of retinue between Cork tenants, 1317-8

Cork: David filius Alexandri de Rupe queritur de Roberto filio Gregorii de Caunteton quod eo detinet £40 quas ei debet et unde queritur quod dictus Robertus apud Castellton' per litteras suas patentes ............morabatur cum ipso Davide ad suscipiendum de eo arma militaria ad voluntatem ipsius Davidis cum inde fuerit per ipsum Davidem rationabiliter pre-munitus, quod si idem Robertus non fecerit, tenetur eidem Davidi per dictas litteras suas in £40, et inde profert litteras ipsius Roberti que hoc testantur; judicium quod dictus David recuperabit inde versus dictum Robertum dictas £40, et dictus Robertus in misericordia pro injusta detencione.

Ibidem: convictum est per juratum quem dicte partes se posuere quod dictus Robertus non potuit ivisse cum dicto Davide cum posse armato ad partes de Glendelory sicut eidem Davidi obligatus fuit sine magno periculo corporis sue propter inimicitia habita inter ipsum Robertum et alios de cohonime des Rocheyns qui ad dictas partes tunc tempore prefecturi fuerint in exercitu Regis pro Hibernicis felonibus Regis parcium illarum debellandis; ideo judicium quod dictus David nil cepit inde per querelam suam, set sit in misericordia pro falso clamore.

Ibidem: David filius Alexandri de Rupe queritur de Patricio filio Roberti de Caunteton quod eo detinet 40 marcas quas ei debet unde queritur quod dictus Patricius anno (regnii) Regis patris Regis nunc 24 apud Glennore per litteras suas patentes obligavit se ad serviendum eidem Davidi in f........ armor' per totam terram Hibernie ad voluntatem ipsius Davidis quando-cumque fuerit per ipsum requisitus, et inde profert litteras suas que hoc testantur, et unde idem David die quo ipse mandavit dicto Patricio apud Glennor quod
ipse veniret cum eo in comitiva Edmundi le Botiller justiciarii Hibernie ad expugnandum Hibernicos felones Regis de montanis Lagenie, idem Patricius cum dicto Davide venire non curavit &c.; judicium quod dictus David recuperabit versus dictum Patricium dictas 40 marcas et idem Patricius in misericordia pro injusta detencione.

(Just. roll 11 Edw. II (R.C. no.115), m.20- P.R.O.I., R.C.7/12, pp.145-7)

VIII

Commission of a clerk of wages, 1334


per billam Justiciarii

(Close (sic) roll 8 Edw. III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.42)

IX

Concerning the account of a receiver of victuals, 1312-13

Memorandum quod venit hic Robertus de Burton vicarius Ecclesie Novi Castri Mcynegan nuper receptor victualium Regis apud Novum Castrum Mcynegan tempore Petri de Gavaston dudum comitis Cornubie tenentis locum Regis in Hibernia et recognovit quod ipse receptit de Reginaldo Irpe provisore victualium Regis assignato apud Drogheda 66 libratas 9 solidatas et 2 deneratas
victualium que idem Reginaldus misit ad predictum Robertum apud predictum Novum Castrum Mcynegan, ut in pane vino cervisie frumento mixtillion brasia et farina sicut continetur in quodam rotulo de particulis quem idem Reginaldus inde protrulit in scaccario hic &c. super compotum suum inde redditum &c. Et super hoc idem Robertus manupepit prefatum Reginaldum super premissa acqietare versus Regem &c.

(Mem. roll 6-7 Edw.III m.39- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/7, pp.436-7)

Appointment of purveyors in Kildare, 1358

Rex dilectis suis vicecomiti Kildarie et Johanni Siward et Patricio de Okebourn salutem. Cum nuper ordinavimus centum cranocos frumenti et centum cranocos avenarum in comitatu Kildarie ad opus nostrum pro manutenencia guarrantum nostrarum in partibus Lagenie pro denariis nostris capi et provideri et provisoribus victualium nostrorum liberari, assignavimus vos conjunctim et divisim ad blada et victualia que pro sustenacione exercitus nostri necessaria fuerint ubi ad minus dampnum populi nostri capi poterunt tam infra libertates quam extra (bonis virorum ecclesiasticorum et feodis ecclesie duntaxat exceptis) capienda et providenda in forma predicta, et ad tallias illis quibus huiusmodi victualia caperitis, si defectum pecunie habueritis, faciendas, quas quidem tallias in Thesauraria nostra Hibernie liberandas, et creditoribus nostris huiusmodi de summis pro victualibus sic ab eis captis debitam satisfaccionem habere faciemus; et ad cariagia pro eisdem victualibus similiter capienda, et ad eadem victualia cum sic capta fuerint proovisori victualium nostrorum per indenturam inter vos et ipsum modo debito conficiendam liberanda. Et ideo vobis mandamus quod circa premissa cum omni festinacione et diligentia intenditis in forma predicta. Damus autem majoribus ballivis et aliis ministris nostris ac omnibus aliis quorum interest tenore presentium in mandatis quod vobis in executione premissorum pareant et intendant prout eis scire faceretis ex parte nostra. In cuius &c. Teste Almarico Justiciario nostro apud Dublin' 26 die Septembris.

per ipsum Justiciarium et consilium.

(Close roll 32 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 3, f.37)
XI

Agreement concerning the keeping of Castl kevin, 1299

Dublin': Symon Lacheles cognovit quod super forifactura omnium bonorum terrarum et tenementorum suorum quod (sic) fideliter custodiatur ad opus Regis castrum Keyvini sibi traditum per totum Regis consilium in Hibernia pro £40 argenti per annum. Ita tamen quod si contingat communem guerarum oriri in partibus illis vel quod idem castrum obsessum sit quod tunc Rex auxiliaum faciet eodem Symoni ad predictum castrum deliberandum. Concessit eiam idem Symon quod nulli deliberabit predictum castrum nisi Regi, et predictum castrum fuit traditum predicto Symoni custodiendum die dominica in festo invencionis Sancte Crucis anno Regni Regis nunc 27.

(Common pleas, Easter 27 Edw. I, m.81- P.R.O.I., R.C.7/6, p.6; also at p.206)

XII

Commission of inquiry into the state of Newcastle McKynegan, 1310-11

Commissio pro Roberto de Burton et Hugone Laweles

Memorandum quod 13 Februarii anno predicto per ipsum Thesaurarium fuit commissio pro Roberto de Burton, vicario Ecclesie Novi Castri de McKynegan et Hugone Laweles ad inquirendum &c. quotet cuiusmodi custas et misas Walterus Haket, constabularius castrorum predicti, posuit circa emendacionem et reparationem eodem castri domorum et aliarum rerum in eodem castrum existencium a tempore quo idem Walterus habuit inde custodiam ex commissione Regis et (ad quem valorem?)* se extendunt per totum tempus predictum et ad quod commodum Regis, et ad inquirendum quot et ciusmodi vastum et destruccionem idem Walterus fecit in dominicis Regis et boscis Regis ibidem, et ciusmodi decasus ibidem acciderit a tempore Johannis de Stratton qui dictum castrum tenuit nuper ex commissione Regis, et per cius defectum et qua de causa et qualiter et quo modo et ad quod damnum et ad quam summam huiusmodi decasus se extendit. Et si idem Walterus tenuit ibidem pro garnestura Castri predicti tot homines ad arma, pedites defensabiles, tam super
feodum suum quod a nobis percepit per annum pro custodia eiusdem castri, quam super vadia que a nobis percepit ultra predictum feodum suum pro garnestura eiusdem castri, quot ibidem tenere debutit, et si continue eos tenuit ibidem. Et quot et cuiusmodi defectus nunc sunt in predicto castro, qui celeri indigent emendacione et reparacione, et de quota pecunie summa emendari poterunt.

Et super how mandatum est vicecomiti Dublin quod ad certum diem quo predicti Robertus et Hugo ei inde sciri facient coram eis ibidem tot et tales per quos &c. Et qui predictum Walterum &cc. ad inquirendum super premissorum veritatem &c.

(Mem.roll 4-5 Edw. II, m. 25d–P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/5, pp. 424-6)

Arrangements for supplying Newcastle McKynegan, 1315-6

Memorandum quod per Thesaurarium facta fuit commissio pro Johanne filio Simonis constabulario Novi Castri McKynegan in forma que sequitur: Rex &c. omnibus ad quos &c. Quia pro rebellione Hibernicorum de montanis Lagenie felonum et inimicorum nostrorum reprimenda volumus quod castrum nostrum de Mcynegan frumento brasia avena et alius victualibus necessariis sufficienter instauretur et munniatur cum omni festinatione, assignavimus Johannem filium Simonis constabulario castri predicti vel eius locum tenement una cum receptore reddituum et firmarum nostrorum et Ballivis nostris ibidem ad providendum ad opus nostrum in predicta villa de Mcynegan et partibus adjacentibus frumentum, brasiam, avenam, farinam, carnes et alia victualia et utensilia necessaria pro municone castri predicti per rationabilem forum et certum precium inter ipsos et homines a quibus ea ceperint inde faciendum et per dividendas dictorum victualium et utensilium certum valorem continentes hinc inde inter eos similiter hominibus predictis conficiendas, per quas de eisdem victualibus et utensilibus nos debitas solutiones fieri volumus de exitibus predicti manerii de Mcynegan.

(Mem.roll 9 Edw. II, m. 10d–P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/10, pp. 460-1)
Concerning a levy for wards in the marches, c. 1281

Dublin': Preceptum fuit vicecomite (recit' quod ex parte Christiane de Marisēis Regi nuper fuerat intimatum quod seneschallus et ballivi libertatis Kildarie pluries hoc anno de precepto Capitalis Justiciarii Regis in Hibernia provideri facerent quod certa pecunia quantitas assideretur de singulis carucatis terre ad certas custodias statuendas contra incursum inimicorum et oacis eidem provisioni seneschallus et ballivi ac tenentes dicte Christiane ibidem prestitere assensum, sed quod idem seneschallus et ballivi postmodum sine precepto Regis certum tallagium super terras dicte Christiane facere, unde Rex dedit in mandatis quod desisterent, qui nichilominus per radios dictos aDud Dublin' &c. et quia testificatum est quod dicti seneschallus et ballivi, scilicet Robertus de Pladebury, Johannes de Kildare et Ricardus de Penkeston, vicecomes Kildarie, pendentem placito isto in curia, distrinxisse dictam Christianan et tenentes suos 10 marcas et amplius extorquendo ratione dicti tallagii, preceptum est vicecomiti quod averia et 10 marca restituir faciat et ponat per vadios dictos seneschallum et ballivos quod essent apud Dublin' &c. et quia testificatum est quod dicti seneschallus et ballivi, scilicet Robertus de Pladebury, Johannes de Kildare et Ricardus de Penkeston, vicecomes Kildarie, pendentem placito isto in curia, distrinxisse dictam Christianan et tenentes suos 10 marcas et amplius extorquendo ratione dicti tallagii, preceptum est vicecomiti quod averia et 10 marca restituir faciat et ponat per vadios dictos seneschallum et ballivos quod essent apud Dublin'.

(Common pleas, 9 Edw.I, m.5d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 7/2, pp.119-20)

Payment for wards in the marches, 1327

Thome Smoche clerico domini Regis assignato pro vadiis Willelmi de Bermyngham, Henrici filii Otuelis de Cruys et aliorum hominum ad arma hobellariorum et peditum secum et in comitiva Thome filii Johannis comitis Kyldarie Justiciarii domini Regis Hibernie comorandis in custodia marchie Lagenie ad reprimendam maliciam et rebellionem Hibernicorum felonum et inimicorum Domini Regis parcium illarum: £124-8s-0d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/5)
XVI

Documents concerning the murder of Murchertach and Art MacMurrough at Arklow, 1282

A. Letter from Roger Bigod to Edward I, c. 1280

Magnifico et excellentissimo principi domino suo si placet Domino Edwardo dei gratia illustri regi Anglie domino Hibernie et Duci Aquitanie suus in omnibus devotus et fidelis R. Bigod comes Norff' et marescallus Anglie se et debitum cum honore famulatum. Cum ad partes Hibernie de licentia vestra super accesserimus ibidem quosdam consanguineos nostros, prout nobis dicebatur, invenimus, videlicet Moriardach et Art Mcmoruth fratrem suum et quosdam eorum familiares, qui tempore guerre in Hibernia paci vestre se non obtemporantes Justiciario vestro et alius fidelibus vestris se rebelles exhibebant; et dominus R. de Ufford Justiciarius vester et alii de consilio vestro ante nostram applicationem in Hibernia ad pacem vestram eosdem per litteras sigilli vestri (sic) Hibernie signatas admiserant, quod quidem predictus dominus R. litteris suis nobis significavit et deinde oretenus referebat nobis ex parte vestra monendo et consulendo quod prefatos M. et A. et sus familiares curialiter tractaremus ne oer ipsos aliqua perturbatio pacis vestre machinaretur; quod propter honorem vestrum et utilitatem publicam et pacem totius Hibernie fovendam in quantum potuimus hactenus ex-plenimus. Et ad (ulteriorem?) securitatem pacis predicte terre si placearet dominationi vestre ipsos nobiscum in reditu nostro ad partes Anglie ducere proponimus, unde si vestre sedit voluntati quod predicti M. et A. sic venire possint et secure redire cum voluerint placeat excellencie vestre precipere quod littere vestre patentes sigillo vestro signate super salvo eorum eventu et reeditu m nobis per presencium portitorem transmittantur. Valeat excellentissima dominatio vestra per tempore longiora.

(P.R.O., Anc.Corr., S.C.1/15/64)

B. From Marleburgh's Chronicle

MCCLXXXII: Henricus Penqueyt apud Arclowe occidit Muriertagh et Art Mcmoruth

(Bibliotheque de Troyes, MS 1,316, f.43)
C. Complaints against the Justiciari

i. Item proponi contra eundem quod percepit de quatuor comitatibus Lagenie pro capittibus Morhurtach et Art Macmurgwych £300 quibus solvit Henrico Pencoyt quandam porctonem pecunie predicte pro voluntate sua et residuum retinuit ad opus suum.

ii. De autre part la ou Art Mak Morghoche e Morardag sun frere avarent este de gerre e furent tenuz e receus a la pes le Rey par consail de tote la terre e fust crie par tut ke nul home ne lur fuyst mal ne damage, vynt la Justice de Irelaunde a Henri de (...k.y..)* e a son frere, en queus meymes ceus Art Mak Morghothe e son frere se affiant plus ke en nus autres genz du pais, e fust un covenant a eus ke ils les de(........)+ ocyr pur deus cenz mars, les queus il les dona; e eus issi le firent tant come ils furent a la pes; e pus vint la Justice apres lur mort e fist ses enquestes e les ajuga a felons; e pus par encheson de lur mort demaunda de les genz de Laynester cynk cenz mars ou eus rens ne deveyent ne rens ne avarent promis (...............)**ocir les descome ils furent a la pes, e fist lever les deners en contre la volente de ceus du pays dount le pays est destrut e maumys.

D. Translation of complaint no. ii.

Furthermore whereas Art MacMurrough and Murchertach his brother had been at war, and were held and received to the king's peace by counsel of all the land, and it was proclaimed all about that no man was to do them ill or hurt, the justiciar of Ireland came to Henry de (Pencoit?) and his brother, to whom the same Art MacMurrough and his brother trusted more than to anyone else of the land, and made a covenant with them that they would murder them (or "have them murdered") in return for 200 marks which he gave them; and they did so, even though they were within the peace; and then came the justiciar after their death, and took his inquisitions and adjudged them felons; and then by reason of their death he demanded from the people of Leinster 500 marks, which they in no wise owed nor had promised (since they were?) killed while they were within the peace, and he had the money levied against the will of the people of the land, through which the land is destroyed and harmed.
XVII

Writ of liberate to Peter de Bermingham for the heads of the O'Conors of Offaly, 1305

Edwardus dei gratia Rex Anglie Dominus Hibernie et Dux Acquitania Thesaurario et camerariis suis de scaccario Dublin' salutem. Liberate de thesauro nostro directo et fidei nostro Petro de Bermengeham £100 que ei concessse fuerunt per Justiciarium et consilium nostrum hibernie de assensu dilectorum et fidelium nostrorum Ricardi de Burgo comitis Ultonie et Galfridi de Genville pro hibernicis de Offalya de parentela de Oconoghors felonibus nostris expugnandis et pro capitateis eiusdem progeniei decapitandis, qui iam misit apud Dublin' capita Moriardgh et Malmorth Oconoghors capitaneorum predicte progeniei et eciam sexdecim capita allorum de ea progenie et complicum suorum. Teste Johanne Wogan Justiciario nostro Hibernie apud Dublin' secundo die Julii anno regni nostri tricesimo tercio.

(P.R.O., E.101/233/23)

XVIII

Evidence of conditions in Leinster before the Bruce invasion

A. Pardon of fine for failure to attend parliament, 1312-13

Edwardus Rex Thesaurario et Baronibus &c. Sciatis quod pardonamivimus Mauricio Episcopo Leighlin' £40 ad quas amerciatus fuit quia non venit ad parliamentum nostrum Dublin' sicut summonitus fuit, ad quem diem fuit per preceptum nostrum in Slefmary ad parliamentandum cum Hibernicis parcium illarum sicut ex testimonio fidedignorum accepisimus; mandamus quod predictas £40 a rotulis nostris extrahi et ipsum Episcopum inde quietum esse faciatis. Teste Edmundo le Botiller &c.

(Mem. roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.3- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/7, p.16)

B. Failure of sheriff of Kildare to levy the king's debts, 1312-13

Memorandum quod audita petitione Davidis le Maryner nuper vicecomitis Kildarie supplicantis Justiciario Cancellario Thesaurario et aliis de consilio Regis quod
ipse rationabile habere possit installamentum ad scaccarium hic de £200 in quibus Regi tenetur ad idem acaccarium de arreragiis compoti sui de tempore quo fuit vicecomes comitatus predicti pro eo quod testatum est coram Justiciario Cancellario Thesaurario et aliis de dicto consilio quod magna pars debiti predicti est de onere ipsius Davidis et levari non potest pro eo maxime quod illi pro quibus ipse se oneravit versus Regem super compotum suum tempore Ricardi de Bereford hic redditum fere omnes obierunt et nullos habent heredes terrarum seu tenementorum unde &c. et residui debitores eiusdem oneris sui in tantum depauperentur et opprimuntur ad presens per Hibernicos parcium illarum felones Regis &c. quod ad huiusmodi debitorum suorum soluciones non sufficiunt; habita consideratione quod tota patria adjacens utrobique terris predicti Davidis in comitatu predicto quamplurimum deterioraretur et debilitaretur, si idem David per festinam levacionem debiti predicti depauperetur seu opprimatur propter continuam resistenciam quam ipse temporibus elapsis fecit et adhuc de die in diem facit, concordatatum est per consilium Regis quod predictus David de debito predicto solvat hic de anno in annum quousque &c.

(Mem.roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.25d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/7, p.216)

C. Failure of Saggart tenant to pay his debts to the king, 1312-13

Dublin': Memorandum quod per ipsum Thesaurarium et Barones, considerantes statum Ricardi Landhary de Tassagard qui omnino depauperatur et opprimitur occasione roberii et combustionis quos Hibernici de montanis Lagenie felones domini Regis nuper fecerunt in villa predicta, concessum est ei quod de 6 marcis quas Regi debet de arreragiis firme sue &c. solvat hic per annum unam marcam per equales porciones, quousque &c. per securitatem vicecomitis inde inveniendam.

(Mem.roll 6-7 Edw.II, m.23d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/7, p.198)

D. Remission of the rent of Fennagh, 1311-12

Audita petitio Thome le Botiller firmarii Regis de manerio de Fynnagh supplicantis Thesaurario et Baronibus huius scaccarii et aliis de consilio
Regis in hac terra, quod cum ipse teneat de Rege manerium predictum per extentam 50 marcarum annuatim ad scaccarium hic reddendam quamdiu &c. et jam per guerram Hibernicorum des 0brennes et les Onolans magna pars tenementorum predictorum vasta jacet et inculta, et liber* tenentes et betagii eiusdem manerii per eosdem Hibernicos robiati sunt et depredati, ita quod idem Thoma extentam predictam plenarie percipere non potest ibidem; quod prefati Justiciarius Thesaurarius et Barones et ceteri de consilio Regis predicto eidem Thome remittere velint redditum eiusdem manerii de termino scaccarii Michaelis proximo preterito qui se extendit ad 25 marcas, prefati Justiciarius Thesaurarius et Barones et alii de consilio Regis habito super premissis tractatu et habito respectu ad bonum servicium quod idem Thoma Regi impendit in guerra ipsius Regis de montanis Lagenie in autumpno proximo preterito et similiter ad destrucucionem et depredacionem in predicto manerio factum, ordinaverunt quod predicte 25 marce eidem Thome allocentur in compoto suo de manerio predicto.

* MS "nomin' "

(Mem.roll 5 Edw.II, m.10d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/6, pp.83-4)

XIX

Documents concerning the government's relations with MacMurrough in 1310-13

A. Order concerning his holding of the manor of Courtown

Weis': Mandatum senescallo quod non impediat Mauricium Mcmurhuth quominus ipse tenere non possit manerium de Corton quod tenet ad voluntatem Regis, dummodo idem Mauricius homines et tenentes Regis ibidem indebite non gravaverit.

(Mem.roll 5 Edw.II, m.53- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/6, p.309)

B. Service against the O'Byrnes

Edwardus &c. Thesaurario &c. Dublin', allocate Waltero Wogan senescallo libertatis Weysford' super compotum suum ad scaccarium predictum redditum &c.
viginti librarum quas liberavit Mauricio Kevenagh McMurch pro bono servicio (quod) idem Mauricius nobis fecit &c. et £26-13s-4d quos liberavit eidem Mauricio pro subsidio suo nobis impendendo ad resistendum maliciis hibernicorum de parentela des Obrynnnes contra pacem existencium et eciam pro expensis &c. Teste Edmund le Botiller custode Hibernie apud Dublin', 27 die Aprilis anno regni nostri 7.

(Mem. roll 7-8 Edw. II, m. 41- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/9, p. 325)

C. Service against unspecified Irish


(Ibid., m. 41- p. 326)

D. Arrears of annual fee

Memorandum quod 26 die Julii anno predicto per Thesaurarium mandatum fuit senescal libertatis Weysford' quod habere factum Mauricio McMurgh 20 marcas que ei arretro sunt de 40 marcas quas Rex ei concessit ei (sic) pro conservacione pacis &c. per annum &c.

(Ibid., m. 65d- p. 549)

XX

Employment of O'Toole as constable of Tallaght, 1325-6

Malmorth Otothel: per custodem mandatum est Edwardo de Bodenham et Ade Tuyt receptoribus redditus manerii de Swerdes quod solvere faciant Malmorth Otothel constabulario de Tavelagh £7-4s-0d pro feodo suo a 20 die Januarii anno regni Regis nunc 19 ad 29 diem Septembris proximo sequentem, capienga per septimaniam 4s.

(Mem. roll 19 Edw. II, m. 38d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/14, p. 842)
XXI

Reward for capturing MacMurrough, 1328

Et Henrico de Traherne et Walerto de Valle pro capcione Dovenaldi filii Art Mcmurghuth Hibernici inimici et felonis Regis qui ceteris Hibernici parcium Lagenie electus est de novo in Regem et capitaneum eorundem, et qui cum eisdem Hibercnis felonibus Domini Regis diversas depredaciones robberias incendias homicidias et alia mala quam-plurima in partibus predictis perpetravit: £110

(P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/176, m.46)

XXII

Pronouncement of sentence of excommunication against O'Toole, 1331-2

Fratri Ricardo McCormegan pro expensis suis eundo versus Otothel ad pronunciandam sentenciam excommunicacionis contra ipsum Otothel et complices suos inimicos et rebelles Regis pronunciata: 6s 8d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/24)

XXIII

Redemption of an English prisoner, 1331-2

Thome de Warilowe de dono Domini Regis in recompensacionem misarum et expensarum per ipsum in servicio Regis sepius appositarum, et eciam in auxilium redempcionis sue facte in Otothill tempore quo per dictum Otothill in servicio Domini Regis captus fuit; £20

(Ibid.)

XXIV

O'Conor of Offaly serves against his own sept, 1332-3

Malmorth Ocongrth de dono Regis tam pro bono servicio suo multipliciter Regi impenso quam pro equis et armaturis suis nuper in servicio Regis amissis in partibus de Carbury in expugnando les
Oconghres de Offaly in dictis partibus de Carbery qui nuper contra Regem hostiliter de guerra insurrexerunt: £6-6s-8d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/29)

XXV

Payment to MacMurrough for services rendered, 1334

Rex thesaurario vel ejus locum tenenti et camerariis nostris de Scaccario nostro Dublin' salutem. Quia concordatum est (et) concessum per Justiciarium nostrum Hibernie et consilium nostrum ibidem quod Dovenaldus filius Arthuri MacMorghyt habeat de dono nostro quadraginta libras tam pro magnis laboribus misis et expensis suis quos fecit ad maliciam Hibernicorum inimicorum et rebellium nostrorum reprimendum quam pro capcione Philippi filii Morghtoo O Brynn felonis nostri per ipsum Dovenaldum capti, vobis mandamus quod prefato Dovenaldo predictas quadraginta libras de Thesauro nostro occasione supradicta liberetis. Teste Johanne Darcy Justiciario &c. apud Dublin' 13 die Novembris anno octavo.

per billam ipsius Justiciarii

(Close roll 8 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.46)

XXVI

Payment to MacMurrough for serving against O'Tooles and O'Byrnes, 1334

Dovenaldo Art McMurgh quas dominus Rex ei concessit pro bono et laudabili servicio suo Domino Regi impenso in expugnando et gravando illos de progenie des Otothels et Obrynnes de partibus Lagenie qui contra Regem hostiliter de guerra insurrexerunt; in partem solucionis 20 marcarum: £6-13s-4d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/5)

XXVII

Payment to Gerald O'Byrne for serving against his own sept and the O'Tooles, 1334

Geraldo Donlyngsone Obrynne de dono Domini Regis
pro bono et laudabili servicio suo eidem domino Regi impenso in guerra super illos de cognomine des Obrynnes et Otothels: 46s 8d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/5)

XXVIII

Payments for official parleys, 1335-6

Fratri Rogero Outlawe priori &c. pro laboribus suis misis et expensis non modicis ac eciam jacturis quos ipse apposuit et sustinuit in servicio Regis in partibus Ultonie ad tractandum et parliamentandum cum Oneel McCartan et aliis Hibernicis eorundem parcium, necnon ad tractandum et parliamentandum per diversas vices cum Omorthe Odymys Oconeghur Otothell Mcmurgh et Oraylly felonibus et inimicis Regis qui in suis partibus sepius contra ipsum Regem insurrexerunt de guerra super hiis que spectant ad conservacionem pacis dicti Domini Regis: £66-13s-4d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/10)

XXIX

Order for payment to O'Dempsey for service against O'More, 1336

Edwardus &c. Thesaurario et Baronibus suis de scaccario Dublinie salutem. Quia per Justiciarium nostrum Hibernie et consilium nostrum ibidem concessimus O Dymsy, qui in obsequium nostrum in comitiva dilecti et fidelis nostri Johannis Darcy Justiciarii nostri Hiberniae profectus est ad expugnandum Lyssagh O Morthe Hibernicum et complicis suos qui contra nos hostiliter de guerra insurrexerunt, necnon et alios Hibernicos felones et inimicos nostros qui tunc contra nos hostiliter de guerra similiter insurrexerunt decem libras in recompensacionem misarum et expensarum suarum quas ipse apposuit in servicio nostro predicto; vobis mandamus quod predictas decem libras eidem O Dymesy occasione permissa sine dilatione habere faciatis. Teste Johanne Darcy justiciario nostro Hibernie 20 die Novembris anno Regni nostri 10.

(Close roll 10 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.92)
XXX

Permanent retainer of O'Toole, 1350-1

Odoni Otothill hibernico de feodo suo i0
marcarum per annum videlicet de terminis Michaelis
anno Regni Regis supradicti 24 et Pasche et Michaelis
anno eiusdem Regis 25 ad morandum cum Domino Rege
et ei fideliter obsequendum et contra alios
Hibernicos dicto Domino Regi rebelles cum justiciario
suo Hibernie potenter proficiscendum: £10

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/11)

XXXI

Permanent retainer of O'More, 1350-1

Rorico Omorth hibernico de feodo suo i0
marcarum per annum videlicet de terminis Michaelis
anno Regni Regis supradicti 24 et Pasche anno eiusdem
Regis 25 ad morandum cum Domino Rege et ei fideliter
obsequendum et contra alios hibernicos dicto Domino
Regi rebelles cum Justiciario suo Hibernie potenter
proficiscendum: £6-13s-4d

(Ibid.)

XXXII

Payment to O'Reilly for coming to a parley, 1352-3

Orailly capitaneeo hibernicorum Brefenne in
Midia quos Dominus Rex ei concessit de dono suo pro
misis et expensis quos apposuit (veniendo ad dictum
Justiciarium pro quodam tractatu &c. super retenciam
ipsius Orailly versus Regem)* circa tractatum cum
Thoma de Rokeby Justiciario Hibernie apud Kenlys in
Midia: 109s

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/14; * from P.R.O.,
Pipe roll, E.372/197, m.26d)

XXXIII

Payment to O'More for taking a hostage from O'
Conor of Offaly, 1352-3

Omorthe de Leys quas Dominus Rex ei concessit
pro misis et expensis suis in capiendo de Oconghwir
hibernico potenti nuper inimico et rebelle Domini Regis unum obsidem pro pace terre Hibernie validum Justiciario Hibernie nomine Domini Regis liberatum: £10

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/14)

XXXIV

Chaplains acting as messengers to and negotiating with the O'Tooles and O'Byrnes, 1355-6

Johanni Obryn capellano quos Dominus Rex ex deliberatione consilii sui Hibernie concessit pro negociis suis per dictum consilium injunctis pro reformacione pacis inter fidelem populum Domini Regis et les Bryns et alios adversarios dicti Domini Regis juxta ordinacionem consilii dicti Domini Regis: 26s 8d

(P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/243/9)

XXXV

Grant of a manor to O'More for good service, 1353-4

Edwardus dei gratia Rex &c. Thesaurario et Baronibus suis. Impensa nobis per dilectum nobis Rodericum Omorth tam in actibus bellicos quam alias contra hostes laboriosa obsequia actendentes, 13 die Septembris proximo preterito comiserimus ei custodiam manerii nostri de Ky1mahyde in comitatu Catherlagh' in manu nostra per forisfacturam Eustachii le Poer existencii habenda quamdiu placuerit. Ita quod idem Rodericus manerium illud cum pertinenciis ad opus nostrum custodiat, nec vastum seu destruccionem in domibus boscis gardinis ejusdem manerii faciat, reddeno nobis annuatim extentam inde factam......

(Mem. roll 27-8 Edw. III, m.23- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/26, pp.472-4)
XXXVI

Writ of liberate to O'Toole, staying at ward, 1355

Rex thesaurario et camerariis suis de scaccario suo Dublin' salutem. Cum inter dilectum et fidelem nostrum Thomam de Rokeby Justiciarium nostrum Hibernie ceterosque de consilio nostro ibidem ac Odonem Otothil conventum existat quod idem Otothil in partibus de Balytyn cum viginti hobellariis et quadraginta peditibus armatis et arraiatis moram faciet per quadraginta dies a die lune proximo post festum translationis Sancti Edwardi Regis proximo incipiente, et marchias Anglicorum et ipsos Anglicos et villam de Tavelagh versus le Wyndegaties ac potentia aliorum de nacione sua quos ad se attrahere poterit, contra hostiles invasiones de O Bryns et nacionis sue ac aliorum complicum suorum hostium nostrorum de guerra contra Anglicos existencium, defendet pro viribus et salvabit. Et percipiet quotidie quod pro vadiis dicitum viginti hobelariorum et quadraginta peditum tresdecim solidos et quatuor denarios, videlicet quatuor denarios pro homelario et duos denarios pro pedite per diem, et pro vadiis et expensis propriis et pro hominibus suis et aliis Hibernicis sibi adherentibus ad se invicem donis interventientibus recolligendis decem marcas; et pro Johanne fratre eiusdem Otothill in partibus de Omayl pro defensione et salvacione Anglicorum versus easdem partes commorante quadraginta solidos, et pro Johanne le Prestesson arraiatore hominum eiusdem Otothill pro labore suo viginti solidos, et pro Caan capellano ipsius Otothill ad explorandum et certificandum Justiciario et consilio nostris de ipsorum hostium proposito et accesibus, ut (eisdem hostibus consultuis negistatur)*, deputato sex solidos et octo denarios; et ideo vobis mandamus quod eidem Otothil dictas quinquaginta et quinque marcas videlicet summam ipsius et vadia hominum suorum contingentis particulariter prout concordatum extitit de Thesauro nostro liberetis. Teste Thoma de Rokeby justiciario nostro apud Dublin' 16 die Januarii.

per ipsum Justiciario et totum consilium

(Close roll 29-30 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 2, f.261)

* MS apparently sic
XXXVII

Order to the sheriff of Kildare to prevent supplies reaching the MacMurroughs, 1358

Rex vicecomiti Kildarie salutem; quia Arthurus Kevenagh Macmwrgh et Dovenaldus Revagh cum illis de iraghto suo et aliis complicibus suis jam de guerra insurrexerunt, homicidia depredationes et alia mala quamplurima super fidelem populum nostrum in partibus Lagenie pro viribus indies perpetrando, tibi preceprimus quod in balliva tua tam infra libertates quam extra diebus et locis quibus expedire videris publice ex parte nostra proclamari facias ne quis sub forisfactura omnium que nobis forisfacere poterit predictis Arthuro MacMurgh Dovenaldo vel suis seu sibi adherentibus equos armaturas seu victualia aliqua vendat ministrari seu mitti faciat quoquo modo. Et si quos contra hanc proclamationem nostram contrariantes vel delinquentes inveneris ipsos sine dilatone capi et in prisoana nostra salve et secure custodiri facias quousque aliter a nobis inde habueris in mandatis. Teste Almarico de Sancto Amando justiciario &c. apud Cork' octavo die Maii anno Regni nostri tricesimo secundo.

per ipsum justiciarium et consilium

Consimilia brevia diriguntur vicecomitibus Kilkennie Catherlough et Weys' sub eisdem testimonlo et data.

(Close roll 32 Edw.III- N.L.I., MS 3, f.11)

XXXVIII

Rescue of a prey taken by the Irish at Saggart, 1358-9

Willelmo filio Ricardi filii Willelmi et Waltero Harold pro bonis serviciis et laboribus suis in partibus de Tassagard Regi impensis recussendo quamdam predam per quosdam Hibernicos Oorynnes et OToles inimicos Regis ab hominibus Regis in partibus predictis captam et interficiendo plures de inimicos predictis: 100s

(P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/204, m.41)
Appendix IV

Military expeditions, 1295-1361

The following list needs some explanation. It begins in 1295 because the evidence for 1272-1295 does not permit a useful list to be constructed—precise dating is impossible, nor can we estimate the cost of most expeditions. Then, although an "expedition of war" normally implies a clerk of wages, I have included some operations for which the justiciar was paid directly, and which appear to have been more than mere patrols. I have given a figure for expenses where possible, but it must be emphasized that a) these figures give no impression of overall military expenditure—in addition to these sums, there were heavy outgoings on castles, wards and payments to English and Irish individuals for good service or for losses incurred, and b) that the evidence often shows discrepancies (e.g., between the Issue roll payment and the clerk's account on the Pipe roll). In such cases I have given the largest reliable figure (figures from warrants for issue or from writs of liberate are obviously not reliable, since they give no guide to actual expenditure). Finally, although reasonable care has naturally been taken, I cannot claim that the figures are precise or definitive—the problems involved in constructing such a list are innumerable. But I trust that the list gives a fair impression of the expenditure on expeditions themselves.

Many of the clerks listed below may be traced in Richardson & Sayles's, Administration of Ireland and in Lawlor's, Fasti of St. Patrick's. "R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII" refers to Professor Otway-Ruthven's "Royal service in Ireland", where the royal services of the period are listed.

I give the date and general area of the expedition, followed by the name of the commanding justiciar, the name of the clerk of wages, the assembly point of the royal service (where appropriate), the cost, and then the sources on which the information is based.
1297. (after 29 Sep)  
justiciar: John Wogan  
clerk: John Marshal  
service: Castlecomer  
cost: £157-6s-4½d  


1298 (11-27 Feb)  
justiciar: John Wogan  
clerk: John Marshal  
cost: £117-17s-7½d  


1299-1300  
justiciar: John Wogan  
clerk: Nicholas de Hemenhale  
cost: £60  

P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/150, m.40.

1302 (18 Jan.-14 Mar)  
keeper: William Ross  
clerk: Nigel de Peniston  
service: Newcastle McKynegan  
cost: £377-4s-4d  


1302 (betw. 30 Jun & 29 Sep)  
keeper: Maurice de Rocheford  


1303-4 (Oct-Jan)  
justiciar: John Wogan  
service: Kilkenny  

1304 (spring)

justiciar: John Wogan
clerk: John de Markham
cost: £76-12s-0d

C.D.I. 1302-07, no. 303; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/150, m. 40.

1306 (23 May-23 Oct)

justiciar: John Wogan
clerk: John de Hotham
service: Ballymore
cost: £2,114-4s-10½d


1308 (20 May-18 Jul)

justiciar: John Wogan
clerk: John de Dene
cost: £64-8s-6d


1308 (23 Oct-18 Nov)

keeper: William de Burgh
clerk: Philip de Stanton
cost: £285-11s-4d


1308 (Apr-Jun)

lieutenant: Peter de Gaveston
clerk: John de Hotham
service: Castlekevin
cost: £834-1s-2½d

1309 (c. May-Nov)  
Leinster

justiciar: John Wogan  
clerks: Henry de Haleford & John Warre  
cost: £453-6s-8d


1311 (summer)  
Leinster

justiciar: John Wogan  
clerk: Nicholas de Balscott  
cost: £521-3s-4d

P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31.

1312  
Louth

justiciar: John Wogan  
clerk: Philip de Stanton  
cost: £306-11s-4½d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/3

1312-3 (10 Sep-23 Jun)  
Leinster

keeper: Edmund Butler  
clerk: John de Dene  
cost: £1,076-17s-10d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/236/6; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.31.

1315 (Jul-Aug)  
Louth

justiciar: Edmund Butler  
clerk: Nicholas de Balscott  
service: Greencastle  
cost: £3,668-14s-8½d

P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25. Totals on Issue rolls, E.101/237/2, 4, 5, 8 & 9 come to £3,678-14s-4d.  
R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII. 43.

1315-6 (Dec-Feb)  
Skerries

justiciar: Edmund Butler

No clerk seems to have been appointed. Wages were met by assignment (see above, pp.211-13)
1316 (Sep?)

Leinster

justiciar: Edmund Butler
clerk: Adam de la Mare
cost: £77-11s-3d


1316

Munster

justiciar: Edmund Butler
cost: £66-13s-4d


1317 (24 Feb-19 Apr)

Munster

justiciar: Edmund Butler
clerk: John de Patrickschurch
cost: £458-19s-6d


1317 (Aug-Oct)

Leinster

lieutenant: Roger Mortimer
clerk: Richard of York
cost: £208-2s-9d

P.R.O., Issue rolls, E.101/237/8,9,12,14; Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25.

1317-20 (3 Jul-15 May)

divers parts

lieutenant & keeper: Roger Mortimer
cost: £1,931-15s-1½d

P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/166, m.25. Direct payments were made to the lieutenant, and individual expeditions cannot be distinguished. For other details of Mortimer's finances, see above, p.14, notes 51 & 53.
1320 (c. May)  

justiciar: Roger Mortimer  
clerks: Henry de Thrapston and Thomas de Warilowe  

1320 (May-Aug)  

justiciar: Roger Mortimer  
clerks: Henry de Thrapston and Thomas de Warilowe  
cost: £450-18s-3½d  
P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/237/12; Pipe roll, E.372/166, m. 25.

1321 (late in year)  

keeper: William de Bermingham  

1321-2 (2 Nov-14 Jan)  

justiciar: John de Bermingham  
clerk: John Balle  
cost: £113-6s-8d  

1323 (after Easter)  

justiciar: John de Bermingham  
cost: £66-13s-4d  
P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/13; Mem. roll 19 Edw.II, m. 1(A)d- P.R.O.I., R.C. 8/14, p. 603 (includes payment to the keeper of the Ormond lands).
1324 (May-Jul)  
Leinster

justiciar: John Darcy  
service: Tullow  
cost: £123-13s-0d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/12; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.33,34 (includes payment to the treasurer with Darcy); R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII, 44.

1324 (Oct-Nov)  
Leinster

justiciar: John Darcy  
clerks: Richard of York and John of Castle Godric  
cost: £278-6s-4d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/17 - only Richard was actually paid, though both received writs of liberate (R.C.H. p.31 no.80, p.32 no.103).

1325 (18 May-26 Sep)  
Leinster, Slieveemargy and Thomond

justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: Herbert de Sutton  
cost: £157-16s-4d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/238/19; Pipe roll, E.372/171, m.34d.

1326 (c Feb)  
Munster

justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: Henry de Thrapston  
cost: £156-17s-0d


1326 (c Aug)  
Ulster

justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: Henry de Thrapston  
cost: £66-13s-4d

1327 (Aug?)  
justiciar: Earl of Kildare  
cost: £124-8s-0d  
P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/5  

1328 (3 Jun-6 Aug)  
keeper: Roger Outlaw  
clerk: Hugh de Passington  
cost: £67-5s-0d  
P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/176, m.46.  

1329 (6-14 Jul)  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £10  

1329 (16-24 Aug)  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £83-1s-0d  

1329 (22 Sep-22 Oct)  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £36-7s-6d  

1329 (28-31 Oct)  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £18-4s-2d  

1329 (10-22 Nov)  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £101-12s-0d  

1329 (10-18 Dec)  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £65-5s-0d  

1330 (2 Jul-3 Sep)  

Munster  

keeper: Roger Outlaw  
clerk: Thomas de Warilowe  
service: Athassel  
cost: £660-7s-6½d  


1331 (25 Jul-7 Oct)  

Munster  

justiciar: Anthony Lucy  
clerk: John de la Bataille  
cost: £294-5s-4d  


1331-2 (8 Oct-16 Jan)  

Louth & the Ards  

justiciar: Anthony Lucy  
cost: £80  

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/239/24; Pipe roll, E.372/179, m.46.

1332 (20 Jan-2 May)  

Munster  

justiciar: Anthony Lucy  
clerk: John de Balscott  
cost: £226-5s-6d  


1332 (3 May-24 Aug)  

Leinster  

justiciar: Anthony Lucy  
clerk: John de Balscott  
cost: £706-8s-8d  

1332 (9 Sep-15 Nov)  

**Thomond**

**Justiciar:** Anthony Lucy  
**Clerk:** Thomas de Dent  
**Service:** Limerick  
**Cost:** £196-12s-10d


1333 (1-8 May)  

**Munster**

**Justiciar:** John Darcy  
**Clerk:** John de la Bataille  
**Cost:** £100


1333 (c 17 May)  

**Leinster**

**Justiciar:** John Darcy  
**Clerk:** John de la Bataille  
**Cost:** £70-0s-5d


1333 (summer)  

**Ulster**

**Justiciar:** John Darcy  

On the way to Scotland (Chart.St.Mary's, II. 378-9; P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/1).

1334 (before Sep)  

**Munster**

**Justiciar:** John Darcy  
**Clerk:** John de Charlton  
**Cost:** £192-19s-2d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/5; Pipe roll, E.372/180, m.45.

1334 (Aug)  

**Leinster**

**Justiciar:** John Darcy  
**Clerk:** John de Fynchedene  
**Cost:** £134-1s-8d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/240/5.
1334 (24 Aug-3 Nov)  
Munster and Leinster  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de la Bataille  
cost: £128

Mem. roll 8-9 Edw. III, m. 4d- P.R.O., R.C. 8/18, pp. 296-8; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/180, m. 45. But Richardson & Sayles (Administration of Ireland, p. 86) show Darcy leaving office on 19 Oct.

1334  
Meath  
justiciar: John Darcy  
R.C.H. p. 39 no. 65.

1334-5 (betw. 19 Oct & 19 Jan)  
Ulster  
keeper: Thomas de Burgh  
cost: £100


1335 (c Feb-Apr)  
Leinster & Offaly  
justiciar: John Darcy  
clerk: John de Fynchedene  
cost: £208-16s-11d

P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/180, m. 45.

1335 (betw. 19 Apr & 26 Jun)  
Ulster  
keeper: Roger Outlaw  
clerk: William de Trykyngham  
cost: £261-10s-4d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E. 101/240/10; Pipe rolls, E. 372/180, m. 45; 182, m. 48.

The expeditions which follow all belong to Darcy's 18 Sep 1335 to 14 Nov 1336, period of office, and are recorded on the Issue roll which begins at Easter 1336. It is impossible to date them precisely with any confidence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Justiciar</th>
<th>Clerk</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>John Darcy</td>
<td>John of Evesham &amp; Thomas le Aumoner</td>
<td>£258-6s-8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Leinster and Munster</td>
<td>John Darcy</td>
<td>Simon de Leggeston</td>
<td>£75-9s-10d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>John Darcy</td>
<td>Simon de Leggeston</td>
<td>£44-15s-2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Munster</td>
<td>John Darcy</td>
<td>Simon de Leggeston</td>
<td>£107-14s-7d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>John Darcy</td>
<td>Nicholas of Newcastle</td>
<td>£20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For one of these expeditions the royal service was called to Kilkenny (P.S.A.I.Journ., XCVIII. 44).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Justiciar</th>
<th>Clerk</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1338</td>
<td>Leinster</td>
<td>John of Charlton</td>
<td>William of Aston</td>
<td>£21-11s-10d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mem. roll 12-13 Edw.III, m.4d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/21, pp. 28-30 (part payment only). On P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/184, m.49 the sum is included with money paid to the justiciar's permanent retinue.
1338 (10 Aug-18 Sep) Leinster
justiciar: Thomas, bishop of Hereford
clerk: Robert de Salkeld
cost: £145-5s-4d
Mem. roll 13-14 Edw. III, m. 45- P.R.O. I., R.C. 8/22, pp. 63-6; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E. 372/184, m. 49 (in part payment only).

1338-9 (6 Nov-9 Feb) Munster
justiciar: Thomas, bishop of Hereford
clerk: Robert fitz Robert
cost: £187-4s-0d
Mem. roll 13-14 Edw. III, m. 53d- P.R.O. I., R.C. 8/22, pp. 113-9 (sum received as prest from justiciar).

1339 (25 Jun-11 Jul) Meath
justiciar: Thomas, bishop of Hereford
clerk: Robert fitz Robert
cost: £19-11s-0d
Ibid. (Again a prest from justiciar).

1339 (16-28 Aug & 3-29 Sep) Leinster
justiciar: Thomas, bishop of Hereford
clerk: Robert fitz Robert
cost: £97-13s-0d
Ibid. (Again a prest; there is a certificate of sums owed to Hereford in P.R.O., C. 47/10/19/19).

1340 (1-22 Mar) Leinster
justiciar: Thomas, bishop of Hereford
clerk: Robert fitz Robert
cost: £22
Ibid. (Another prest).

1340-1 (betw. 8 Apr & 8 Jan) Leinster
keeper: Roger Outlaw
clerk: Thomas Overey
cost: £18s-13s-4d
1341 (bef. 17 Apr)  
Leinster

keeper: Alexander Bicknor  
cost: £40  

1341 (2 Aug-2 Oct)  
Leinster

justiciar: John Morice  
clerk: John de Balscott  
service: Castledermot  
cost: £158-2s-8d  

1342 (16 Jan-18 May)  
Meath

justiciar: John Morice  
clerk: Robert fitz Robert  
cost: £206-3s-0d  

1342 (16 Jul-4 Sep)  
Leinster

justiciar: John Morice  
clerk: Thomas de Quixhill  
cost: £76-10s-10d  

1344-5 (15 Jul-26 Jun)  
Leinster, Munster and Ulster

justiciar: Ralph of Ufford  
clerk: John de Troy  
cost: see below  
1345-6 (27 Jun-22 Jan)  
**Munster & Kerry**

- *justiciar:* Ralph of Ufford  
- *clerk:* John de Troy  
- *service:* Moydeshell  
- *cost:* £3,576-0s-5d (including previous expeditions)

Mem. roll 19-20 Edw.III, m.16-d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/22, pp.496-516; P.R.O., Pipe roll, E.372/191, m.42. For details of these campaigns see above, pp.307-23.

1346 (c Nov)  
**Leix & Offaly**

- *justiciar:* William de Bermingham  
- *clerk:* Thomas Peek  
- *cost:* £220

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/241/12; Pipe roll, E.372/197, m.46.

1347 (bef. 27 Nov)  
**Ely O’Carroll**

- *justiciar:* William de Bermingham  
- *clerk:* William de Bermingham  
- *cost:* £66-13s-4d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/241/13 (with retinue only?)

1348 (Jul)  
**Meath**

- *justiciar:* William de Bermingham  
- *clerk:* Robert de Salkeld & Henry de Queye  
- *cost:* £66-13s-4d


1348-9 (6 Aug-5 Feb)  
**Munster**

- *justiciar:* William de Bermingham  
- *clerk:* Henry de Queye and Thomas de Boys  
- *service:* Mallow  
- *cost:* £338-18s-3½d

Mem. roll 22-3 Edw.III, mm.12d,31- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/24, pp.458-64,584-9; R.S.A.I.Journ., XCVIII. 44.
1350 (betw. 20 Jan & 15 Sep)  
Leinster & Munster  
justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby  
clerk: apparently none  
cost: £555-6s-8d  
P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/2; Pipe roll, E.372/196, m.28.

1350  
Louth  
justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby  
clerk: William Dofy  
cost: £67-12s-0d  

1350 (c. Jul)  
Leinster  
justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby  
clerk: William Dofy  
cost: £114-3s-4d  
P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/242/2; R.S.A.I. Journ., XCVIII. 44.

1350 (Aug-Sep)  
Leinster  
justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby  
clerk: William Dofy  
cost: £93  

1351  
Louth  
justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby  
clerk: Thomas of Alberton  
cost: £30-6s-0d  
1351 (28 Jul-6 Aug)  
**Ossory**

| justiciar: | Thomas of Rokeby |
| clerk:     | Thomas of Alberton |
| cost:      | £91-8s-0d |


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1351  

**Munster**

| justiciar: | Thomas of Rokeby |
| clerk:     | Thomas of Alberton |
| cost:      | £81-18s-0d |


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1352-3 (4 Sep-22 Sep)  

**Munster**

| justiciar: | Thomas of Rokeby |
| clerk:     | Thomas of Alberton |
| cost:      | £470-18s-5d |

P.R.O., Issue roll, E. 101/243/3; Pipe roll, E. 372/197, m. 19d; Mem. roll 28-9 Edw. III, m. 26- P.R.O. I., R.C. 8/26, pp. 657-73 (the wages on this account add up to £764-0s-9d).

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1353 (c26 Sep-15 Oct)  

**Leinster**

| justiciar: | Thomas of Rokeby |
| clerk:     | Peter de Okebourne |
| cost:      | £163-3s-8d |


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1354 (10 Sep-31 Oct)  

**Leinster**

| justiciar: | Thomas of Rokeby |
| clerk:     | Thomas of Quixhill |
| cost:      | £412-15s-6d |

1355 (4 Mar-5 Jun) Leinster

justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby
clerk: Thomas of Alberton
cost: £53-10s-10d
service: Newcastle McKynegan

Journ., XCVIII. 44.

1355-6 Leinster

justiciar: Earl of Kildare
clerk: Roger de Wyche
cost: £11


1357 (9 Feb-19 Apr) Leinster

justiciar: Thomas of Rokeby
clerk: William Forde
cost: £93-14s-8d


1357 Leinster

keeper: John of Bolton
clerk: John Scrope
cost: £34-3s-6d

P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/244/1.

1358-9 (2 Nov-7 Feb) Leinster

justiciar: Amaury de St.Amand
clerks: William Forde & John Scrope
cost: £305-13s-1½d

P.R.O., Pipe roll, £.372/204, m.41; Mem. roll 32-3
Edw. III, m.13d- P.R.O.I., R.C.8/27, pp.388-93 (Forde's account alone, total £121-10s-1ld).
1359 (Mar-Apr) Leinster
justiciar: Earl of Ormond
clerk: Roger Ewyas
cost: £109-12s-8d

Pipe roll (36?) Edw.III- R.I.A., MS 12 D 10, p.167;
N.L.I., MS 761, pp.202-3.

1359 (4-15 Jul) Leinster
justiciar: Earl of Ormond
clerk: Thomas of Quixhill
cost: £61-16s-0d

478 & 487 (faulty pagination). This expedition and
the last were probably paid from part of a sum of
£335-7s-8d granted to Ormond for going against "various
Irish rebels and enemies" (P.R.O., Issue roll, E.101/
244/2). Liberates were issued to the clerks for £133-
6s-8d and £500 respectively (R.C.H. p.79 nos.105,109)
but they received respectively only £73-12s-8d and
£261-15s.

1360 (6 Apr-9 May) Munster
justiciar: Earl of Ormond
clerk: Walter Russell
cost: £63-16s-0d

57-8.

1360-1 Leinster
justiciar: Earl of Ormond
cost: £158-3s-4\4d

This was of a sum of £1,259-16s-6d granted to Ormond
for the "last war in Leinster" (P.R.O., Issue roll,
E.101/244/6). From 1359 onwards the normal administr-
ative machinery appears to have partially broken down.
Block grants were made to the justiciar, and warfare
was also being financed by local subsidies on a large
scale; individual campaigns are hard to trace. (See
Otway-Ruthven, "Ireland in the 1350s", R.S.A.I. Journ.,
XCVII (1967), pp.55-9 for the confusion of these
years).
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A. Manuscript material

Original rolls: Justiciary rolls 6th and 11th Edward I.
Dublin

Genealogical Office, Dublin Castle

MSS 190-192: Sir William Betham's Extracts from the Justiciary rolls (19th. century)

This contains Justiciary rolls, some Justiciary rolls and rolls of justices itinerant.

National Library of Ireland

MSS 2-4: Walter Harris's Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis, vols. II-IV (18th. century).

This is chiefly of value for transcripts from the lost Irish Chancery rolls.

MS 13: King-Harris Collectanea de Rebus Monasticis Hibernie, forming vol. XIII of the above.

These volumes of the Collectanea are inadequately described by Charles McNeill in Analect.Hib., VI. 343-62 and 397-402.

MSS 760-1: Sir William Betham's Extracts from the Pipe rolls (19th. century).

For the Pipe rolls, see the "Catalogue of Pipe rolls" in the Appendixes to 35th.-39th., 42nd.-45th., 47th., 53rd. & 54th. Reps. D.K.

Public Record Office of Ireland

The surviving material in the P.R.O. I. consists almost entirely of judicial records and Memoranda roll evidence. The judicial material here and elsewhere for the period up to 1324 is fully listed by Dr. Hand in his English Law in Ireland, pp. 226-9, 241-3, 247-8.
Dr. Lydon has compiled an exhaustive list of the surviving Memoranda roll material in "Survey of the Memoranda Rolls of the Irish Exchequer, 1294-1509", Analect.Hib., XXIII. The rolls for the period up to 1361 are listed at pp. 77-97.

i. Original rolls: Justiciary rolls 6-7 and 11 Edward II
    Memoranda rolls 3 and 13-14 Edward II

ii. Calendars prepared for the Irish Record Commission (19th. century):
    This contains Justiciary rolls, rolls of the Dublin Bench and rolls of Justices Itinerant.

    R.C.8/1-29: "Calendar of Memoranda Rolls", vols. I-XXIX.
    This contains, as well as Memoranda rolls, some Justiciary rolls and rolls of the Dublin Bench (a detailed list of contents is available in typescript in the P.R.O.I.)

iii. MS transcripts and calendars prepared by the officers of the P.R.O.I. (chiefly early 20th. century):
    English Calendar (unbound) of Justiciary rolls 7-12 Edward II (the earlier sections of this have already been published in C.J.R.)
    Transcripts of Justiciary rolls 6-7 and 11 Edward II
    Partial transcript and partial English Calendar of the Eyre of Tipperary, 33-4 Edward I
    English Calendar (unbound) of Memoranda rolls 22-3 and 31-5 Edward I, and 1 and 3 Edward II
iv. Other documents:

J.F. Ferguson Collection, vol. I (19th century)
Extracts and notes, chiefly from the Memoranda and Chancery rolls

Lodge MSS, vols. entitled "Irish chiefs (articles with, denizations &c)" and "Enrolments (Miscellaneous)" (18th century)
Extracts and notes, mainly from the Chancery rolls.

M. 2551: Molyneux Collection (17th century)
Extracts, chiefly from the Memoranda rolls

Royal Irish Academy

MSS 12 D 8-14: J.F. Ferguson's Extracts from the Memoranda rolls (19th century)

MS 12 D 10: J.F. Ferguson's Extracts from the Pipe rolls (19th century)

Trinity College, Dublin

MS F.1.15: King-Harris Collectanea de Rebus Monasticis Hibernie (another copy: see under National Library of Ireland)

MS T.4.1: Reeves's transcript of Archbishop Sweteman's Register (19th century)

London

British Museum

Add. MSS 4790 and 6041
The Irish Issue and Receipt rolls in this category are fully listed by Mr. Richardson and Professor Sayles in their *Administration of Ireland*, pp.199-216. For the subsidiary documents see the appropriate P.R.O., List. I have used the documents E.101/230/1 to 244/10 passim. Apart from the Irish material, I have made use of E.101/19/16 (paymaster's account), 309/19 (king's messenger's account) and 68/4/77 (indenture of war).

For the Irish treasurers' accounts, see Richardson & Sayles, *Administration of Ireland*, pp.217-20.

See *Ancient Correspondence*

See *Ministers' Accounts*

See *Ancient Petitions*

*Chronicle of Henry of Marleburgh*
B. Printed material

Note: I have thought it best not to adopt the conventional distinction between "printed sources" and "secondary works": too many works fall into both categories, and many of the older writings are only of value for the documents or references to documents that they contain.

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Addendum:
