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AMERICAN OPINION ON THE IRISH QUESTION

1910-1923

by

F.M. Carroll, M.A.

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor in Philosophy

of the University of Dublin
I declare that this thesis has never before been submitted as an exercise for a degree at Trinity College, Dublin, or at any other university, and I also declare that it is entirely my own work except for such suggestions as have been made to me by my supervisor Dr R.B. McDowell.

F. M. Carroll
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AARIR</td>
<td>American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic</td>
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<td>AOH</td>
<td>Ancient Order of Hibernians</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.M.</td>
<td>British Museum, London</td>
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<td>Bodl.</td>
<td>Bodleian Library, Oxford</td>
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<td>C.S.M.</td>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOIF</td>
<td>Friends of Irish Freedom</td>
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<td>GA</td>
<td>Gaelic American</td>
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<td>I.S.H.</td>
<td>Irish Historical Studies</td>
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<td>IPL</td>
<td>Irish Progressive League</td>
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<td>IRB</td>
<td>Irish Republican Brotherhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>L.C.</td>
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<td>Lit. Dig.</td>
<td>Literary Digest</td>
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<td>N.A.</td>
<td>National Archives, Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.L.I.</td>
<td>National Library of Ireland, Dublin</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.Y.T.</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.R.O.</td>
<td>Public Record Office, London</td>
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<td>UIL</td>
<td>United Irish League</td>
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This thesis attempts to define the diverse views held on the Irish question by both Irish-Americans and native Americans from 1910 to 1923, and, in so far as possible, to show how these various opinions influenced the revolution in Ireland and shaped the policies of the American and British governments. It may rightly be asked if it is possible to deal in a meaningful way with opinion in so large and heterogeneous a nation as America. Because several distinct groups within the American community were exceptionally conscious of Irish nationalist aspirations and the role played by Ireland in Anglo-American relations this is not an unrealistic proposal; it is upon these groups, rather than the whole of American society, that this study has been focused. Indeed the Irish-American nationalists (constitutional and revolutionary, and later, republican and pro-Free State), the native Americans (sympathetic and hostile), and the United States government (the several Presidential administrations, the State Department, and the Congress) can be isolated and analysed, and from the documents now available some conclusions and generalizations can be drawn on the degree to which the views of any one of these groups influenced Irish affairs. In attempting to define the various bodies of American opinion considerable emphasis is given to Irish-American nationalism and nationalist organizations and to xenophobic and nativist feelings among native Americans; it should be noted that this thesis is not specifically a study of these problems, although from time to time it has been necessary to examine them at some length in
order to explain how Irish-American attitudes were translated into political activity or how native Americans reacted to such ethnic nationalism within the United States.

Abbreviations, capitalization, and documentation have been patterned, in so far as it has been possible to do so, after the suggestions set forth in several issues of Irish Historical Studies, although certain exceptions have been made, especially in footnote citations for manuscript material where the spelling, punctuation, and coding of the depository have been used.

The writer regrets that he was unable to use several collections of important papers which might have been of assistance to him. Permission to use the Cohalan Papers at the American Irish Historical Society could not be obtained because they were in the process of being rearranged by the Cohalan family, and a number of State Department documents dealing with Irish-American nationalist activity has been withdrawn from circulation at the National Archives. It should also be mentioned that parts of this thesis, especially sections of Chapter I, appeared in somewhat altered form in a paper read before the American Committee for Irish Studies in May 1968 at the State University of New York at Cortland.

F.M. Carroll
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I should like to express my debt to the many people who assisted me in my research. Particularly helpful and resourceful were the staffs of the National Library of Ireland, the Library of Congress, the Public Record Office (London), and the National Archives. I specifically wish to thank Mr George C. Lodge, Director of the Division of International Activities, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, for permission to use the Henry Cabot Lodge Papers; the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress for obtaining permission for me to use the Charles Evans Hughes Papers; Dr Carlton C. Qualey, Chairman of the Department of History, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota; Dr Joseph P. Starr, Department of History, Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh; and Dr Robert E. Rhodes, Department of English, State University of New York at Cortland.

I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Dr R.B. McDowell, for his patient guidance of my research and for his generous assistance to me within the profession.

F. M. Carroll
The Irish question, or the unresolved problem of how Ireland should be governed, became a public issue in the United States during the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, the discussion of Ireland became a feature of both domestic politics and diplomatic relations, and it was effectively kept before the American people for a longer time, and perhaps on a grander scale, than any ethnic nationalist movement in the United States before or since. The attitudes of Irish-Americans and native Americans formed the two significant bodies of opinion on the Irish question, although the former was the more well organized, sustained, and important. The Irish migration to the United States reached its peak from 1870 to 1890 when the number of Irish-born Americans averaged over 1,850,000, and by 1900 there were 4,826,904 Americans either born in

1 The term Irish-American is generally accepted as referring to the Catholic Irish who immigrated to the United States in large numbers during the nineteenth century; they formed an ethnic group which only in the twentieth century began to emerge prominently in social and economic areas of American life. Protestant Irishmen from Ulster were known in the United States by all but the most pedantic as Scotch Irish, and they were more closely identified with the native Americans than with the Irish-Americans, although exceptions could always be found. The term native American is used here to refer to those white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestants who seemed to dominate social and economic life in America during the nineteenth century.
Ireland or with Irish parents. However the Census Bureau did not account for the third or fourth generation Irish-Americans who were estimated to number at least 20,000,000 by the Irish-American leaders who claimed to speak on their behalf. Thus, although a minority in the country, Americans of Irish descent may have represented nearly 19% of the entire population by 1920, and they were a very remarkable and powerful element of American society. As an ethnic group, the Irish-Americans seemed unanimous in their support of some kind of self-government for Ireland, although they often disagreed vigorously over the form such self-government should take, home rule within the Empire or independence, and the method through which it should be achieved, constitutional reform or revolutionary action. Professor Lyons has argued that it is mistaken to see these political positions as separate movements, and in fact when circumstances and personalities permitted they coalesced, but broadly speaking these positions represented the

1The Irish-Americans were the first wave of the great European migration to the United States in the nineteenth century; in 1850 while numbering only 961,719 the Irish immigrants accounted for 42.8% of the foreign born in the country. Irish immigration was eventually exceeded by the larger number of arrivals from Germany and other countries, but as late as 1920 there were 4,136,395 Americans born in Ireland or with Irish parents. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth census of the United States taken in the year 1910 (Washington, 1911), i, p. 24, and Fourteenth census of the United States taken in the year 1920 (Washington, 1922), ii, pp 29, 695, and 897. See also A. Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minneapolis, 1958), passim.

2It is impossible to determine the exact number of Irish-Americans (including the third and fourth generations) but the nationalist leaders in the United States seemed to agree that the figure was 20,000,000. See Peter Golden to Congressmen, 18 April 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MSS 13,141, folder II), Frank P. Walsh and E.F. Dunne to Joseph E. Grew, 2 June 1919 (New York Public Library, Walsh Papers, box 124), and Judge Daniel F. Cohalan speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 30 August 1919, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty of peace with Germany (Senate doc. no. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session) 1919, pp 787-944.
two poles of Irish-American nationalism. Native Americans held no common agreement about the virtues of Irish self-government, and of course they had none of the compelling emotional involvement of the Irish-Americans. Favourable opinion often tended to be either an abstract expression of sympathy for a people whose national aspirations were unfulfilled or a rather shrewdly calculated gesture made in the hope of influencing affairs in America. In fact the weakness of favourable native American opinion was that it had no organizational life of its own, often merely supplementing Irish-American nationalism during specific moments of agitation, and it is therefore difficult to assess. Unfavourable native American opinion was more complex and long-lasting, and was based on religious and racial antagonisms as well as anti-immigrant sentiments.

(1)

Conditions in Ireland during the 1840s changed the pattern of Irish immigration to the United States, and gave rise to a different attitude on the part of the post-famine immigrants to the political and social situation in Ireland. Irish-American organizations, and of course Irish-Americans, can be traced back to the period of the American Revolution, but their functions were generally social and benevolent rather than nationalistic. In 1840 the Friends of Ireland Society was founded in Boston, and from 1841 it attempted to keep close

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ties with Daniel O'Connell's Dublin Loyal Association. Branches of the Friends of Ireland were established in the Boston suburbs, and later along the eastern seaboard, and regular meetings were held where Irish politics were discussed and money raised to assist O'Connell. The organization worked to shape public opinion on the Irish situation and it provided an outlet for Irish nationalist sentiment. By 1842 a convention of all affiliated branches was held in Philadelphia, and the following year a Central Directory was established in New York to coordinate activities and to manage the newly founded National Fund for Ireland. With O'Connell's failure at Clontarf in 1843 the fortunes of the Friends of Ireland Society declined.

Oscar Handlin indicated that although many of the Boston Irish, at least, continued to support O'Connell, the readers of Thomas D'Arcy McGee's Boston Pilot were increasingly won over to the Young Ireland movement. As the views of the Young Ireland movement spread during the middle 1840s the Irish community in the United States split into two factions. However, when McGee left Boston for Ireland the influence of his paper declined in favour of the leadership of the Boston Catholic Observer, edited by the celebrated Boston Brahmin convert, Orestes A. Bronson, who was not an Irish nationalist.

When the results of the famine became fully understood in the United States, the old Friends of Ireland Society was re-organized to form the Confederation of the United Friends of Ireland. The Confederation, functioning with the blessings of the Catholic Church, started

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2Ibid.
3Ibid., pp 173-74.
successful campaigns to raise money for Ireland. The question of whether or not to resort to physical force was an obstacle to complete co-operation, but nonetheless meetings were held in Boston and New York during the summer of 1848 to protest against conditions in Ireland. After John Mitchel was tried and sent to Van Diemen's Land in May, a group of Irish-American labourers and artisans, calling themselves the Irish Republican Union, met at the Shakespeare Hotel in New York and condemned the action of the British government. Reports of some kind of rebellion in Ireland in August of 1848 aroused the Confederation to make a dramatic appeal for immediate contributions. Money was sent to Robert Emmet in care of the New York Tribune. Many native Americans, such as the distinguished liberal editor of the Tribune Horace Greeley, sent contributions for the rebellion; even Bishop John Hughes sent $500 to the fund.

With the arrival of the news that the attempted rebellion of the Young Irelanders had been a fiasco, and that the tide was turning throughout Europe in favour of conservatism, the revolutionary impulse among the Irish-Americans collapsed also. The funds collected in 1848 were held by the Confederation until 1857 when they were returned to the subscribers. Bishop Hughes was so embarrassed by his gift of $500 that he asked that it be donated to a group of nuns to provide assistance to Irish immigrant girls in New York. McGee, who returned to the United States to start a second newspaper, significantly called

1 The Society was so successful that the Foreign Office instructed the British Minister in Washington to protest to the United States government. Handlin, Boston's immigrants, p. 153.


3 Handlin, op. cit., p. 153.
The Nation, found the climate so uncongenial, due to the opposition from the hierarchy, that he abandoned his project and went to Canada. Bishop Hughes was completely disillusioned with McGee's kind of nationalism, and henceforth he devoted his attention to the founding of the Irish Emigrant Aid Society, which attempted to fill the needs of the vast numbers of people who were arriving from Ireland. But by the end of the 1850s even the Irish Emigrant Aid Society had developed into a nationalist orientated organization. Although the revolution of 1848 was a failure, it had demonstrated that public opinion could be aroused and money could be raised to support Irish nationalism. Despite the stand taken by the Church, many native Americans, as well as Irish-Americans, supported the movement and protested against the sentences given to the Young Irelanders by the British courts.

In 1856 Joseph Denieffe, a member of the Irish Emigrant Aid Society, disillusioned by the success of the nativist Know-Nothing party in the United States, left America to go back to Ireland. In Ireland he was contacted by James Stephens who had just returned from France. Stephens and several others sent Denieffe back to the United States to raise money from among his friends in the society. He was able to return to Ireland later with funds adequate to enable Stephens to begin organizing the Irish Republican Brotherhood, known as the IRB, by St.


3 John Devoy records that many of the Young Ireland refugees in New York joined the Irish Emigrant Aid Society. They hoped to obtain assistance from Russia, engaged in the Crimean war, in order to equip another rebellion, but John Mitchel's discussions with Baron Stoeckl, Russian Minister to the United States, were not fruitful. J. Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel (New York, 1929), p. 18. See also Gibson, op. cit., p. 68.
Patrick's Day, 1858. The Fenian movement was thus launched in Ireland and was soon to be carried to the United States. The Fenian movement set the temper of revolutionary Irish-American nationalism from 1860 until at least 1922, and the continuity of men and ideas could be traced in such figures as John Devoy, Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa, Thomas Clarke, and others. In the United States the potential strength of the movement was made possible by the coincidence of the American Civil War. Florence E. Gibson has suggested that both the critics of the United States government and the Fenians themselves felt that American officials encouraged the movement because it stimulated enlistments in the Union Army from the Irish-American community. Stephens was given official permission to visit both Union and Confederate armies in 1864 to recruit among the troops for some future time when his Fenians would fight against the British. One historian, John Rutherford, asserted that there had been a secret agreement with Secretary of War Stanton to provide material aid to the Fenians once they had taken to the field.


5. Devoy, op. cit., p. 47.

6. Cited in Gibson, op. cit., pp 177-78; also see pp 174-77. There is some speculation about the seriousness of the United States government in encouraging the Fenian plans during and after the war. Certainly the government wanted to press upon the British the full implications of their encouragement of the Confederacy by allowing the C.S.S.
Stephens had planned to make 1865 the "year of action," but that year the Fenian organization in America split into two factions, when its leader, Colonel John O'Mahony, failed to hold the movement together. Many within the movement felt that they could be most successful by invading Canada in order to provoke a large-scale Anglo-American war, during which not only would Ireland be freed but Britain would also be crushed. But as Devoy suggested, Stephens lost his nerve and postponed the 1865 military operations until, as he hoped, the American factions could be re-united. However in the United States both groups began planning invasions of Canada. In April of 1866 O'Mahony sailed for Campo Bello, a Canadian island just off the Maine coast, in a ship laden with men and arms; but before a landing could be made they were arrested by the United States Navy and taken back to American waters. A month later, 31 May 1866, General John O'Neil led his 600 men across the Canadian frontier near Buffalo, New York. After the initial success of capturing Fort Erie, Ontario, O'Neil and his men were driven back by Canadian forces. Upon recrossing the frontier, O'Neil and his men were arrested by United States troops, and on 5 June President Johnson issued a statement of neutrality and stated that the Fenian action had violated international law. The President received widespread criticism for intervention in Alabama and the Laird rams to be built in British shipyards. American support for the Fenians demonstrated that supplying aid to rebels was a two way business, and even after the war the spectre of governmental support for the Fenians worked to keep diplomatic pressure on the British to pay the damage claims for United States shipping lost because of the Alabama.

1Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, pp 55-56 and 270.

2Gibson, Attitudes of the New York Irish, pp 182-83.
ing either so late or at all. ¹ A third Fenian attempt to invade
Canada, again led by General O’Neil, was made on 23 May 1870 when,
contrary to the direct orders of President Grant, a large group of men
were assembled at St Albans, Vermont, to cross the frontier into Can-
da. O’Neil was arrested by a United States Marshall just after he
had finished his battle speech and the Fenians were left without their
commander. These failures gained for the Fenians almost universal
public repudiation, and cost the Irish-American community enormous
amounts of wasted time and money. As the Harper’s Weekly wrote short-
ly after the St Albans fiasco, it was the Irish themselves, who gave
up their jobs to enter the Fenian army, who suffered most from these
expeditions.²

The Fenian movement in Ireland suffered from difficulties also.
Stephens’s men, forced prematurely into rebellion in early 1867, were
easily suppressed. Co-ordination of operations between Ireland and
the United States was so bad that the American Fenians learned of the
rising from the newspapers. Colonel O’Mahony collected his forces and
fitted out a ship, Erin’s Hope, which sailed for Ireland in mid-April
1867 with 8,000 rifles and some 40 officers. When they arrived off
Sligo Bay on 20 May they were informed that the rising had been put

¹According to T.M. Beach, who supposedly attended an interview
with the President in 1868, Johnson told O’Neil that he had acted
with great reluctance and then only when it was obvious that the in-
vasion had failed. T.M. Beach /Major Henri LeCaron, pseud./, Twenty-
five years in the secret service (London, 1893), p. 59. See also
Gibson, Attitudes of the New York Irish, pp 182-87.

²The invasion was also crippled by the failure of supporting
units, which were to make separate crossings on the border, to make
their appearance. The chaos and poor planning was such that many
men had to wire back to "Boss" Tweed in New York in order to get re-
turn train tickets. Gibson, op. cit. pp 203-05.
down two months earlier. The split within the American wing of the brotherhood was seen by many as the reason for the failures of the movement on both sides of the Atlantic. A meeting was therefore scheduled for Manchester in the autumn of 1868 under the leadership of Colonel Thomas J. Kelly to re-unite the several factions. But the Manchester police arrested Kelly and William Deasy, thus upsetting the plans. In the process of rescuing the two leaders a policeman was killed and five other Fenians were captured and tried. Sentiment in the United States demanded the release of the two Americans among those apprehended, Edward O'Meagher Condon and Michael O'Brien, and Secretary of State Charles Seward requested the American Minister to England, the dour old Charles Francis Adams, to appeal on their behalf. Adams was able to procure a release for Condon, but could do nothing for O'Brien. Americans were shocked by the death sentences, and even the New York Times questioned the justice of the executions.²

The operational and organizational failures of the Fenian brotherhood had severely damaged the movement's prestige; the Manchester incident seemed to show that even efforts to salvage the organization were doomed.³ In 1868 Jerome J. Collins, Colonel Ricard O'Sullivan Burke,

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1 Several of the officers went ashore, later to be arrested, and the ship sailed back to America. Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, pp 235-36.

²See C.C. Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom 1866-1922 (New York, 1957), pp 38-39; and A. Glynn, High upon the gallows tree (Tralee, 1967), passim.

³Devoy, op. cit., p. 239; Tansill, op. cit., p. 41. Actually the Fenian brotherhood itself continued into the 1880s. The last Fenian convention was held in 1885 and the brotherhood was dissolved the following year. D'Arcy, The Fenian movement in the United States 1858-1886, pp 406-08.
and Colonel Kelly drew together several groups of Fenians and New York politicians to form the United Brotherhood. The following year the Clan-na-Gael, which incorporated the United Brotherhood, was founded, and by 1871 was flourishing under the leadership of John Devoy and Dr William Carroll. In order to avoid the errors of the Fenians the Clan became a secret and oath-bound society, its rituals borrowed liberally from the Freemasons, and its executive broadened in order to avoid the problems that Stephens's absolute power had created. Cloaking itself in mystery and secrecy, proclaiming fierce Irish-American nationalism, the Clan provided a haven to Irish-Americans who saw in Ireland's political situation the reasons for their own frustrated ambitions.  

The reconstruction of the Irish-American nationalist movement through the Clan seemed to be initially successful, as the first large enterprise undertaken was completed without disaster. Prodded by John Devoy, the Clan with some misgivings borrowed the money to send a ship out to Australia in 1876 to rescue six Fenian prisoners there. The project proved to be an exciting and successful adventure, and was in fact the first real triumph of the Irish-American revolutionaries. Perhaps equally important was the fact that it provided the nationalist movement in America with the first truly favourable publicity.  

But the year was not an unqualified success. The efforts of the Clan

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2Devoy, *Recollections of an Irish rebel*, pp 251-60.
to work out an alliance with the Russians came to a humiliating end when the Russian Minister asserted that the presence of Irish members in Parliament was evidence that there was no real anti-British nationalist feeling in Ireland. Dr Carroll failed also in his attempts to call a mobilization of five to ten thousand Irish-Americans for an invasion of Ireland. The Clan commissioned the Irish-born John P. Holland to begin work on a submarine to form the nucleus of an Irish-American navy which would destroy British sea power, although the Clan derived no benefit from it. It was clear, however, that none of these projects moved Ireland closer to independence.

By the mid-1870s the Clan leadership, perhaps discouraged by its inability to liberate Ireland, began discussing the possibility of winning political offices in Ireland for nationalist purposes. In late 1877 first James J. O'Kelly and then Dr William Carroll held satisfactory talks with Parnell. Carroll had several cordial meetings with Parnell, and he reported that the parliamentary leader favoured Irish independence when the people seemed ready to demand it. This satisfied Devoy, at least, that Clan co-operation with the parliamentarians might be possible. The following year Michael Davitt, after release from prison, came to the United States where he discussed the question of land reform with Devoy, O'Kelly, Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa,

1Brown, Ir.-Amer. nationalism, pp 66-67. Holland's submarine was not as fantastic as it appeared. After testing several designs and spending large sums of Clan money, Holland developed a craft which, though small, had military capabilities.


Patrick Ford, and John Boyle O'Reilly. Davitt was encouraged to undertake a speaking tour of the United States to talk about land reform and Irish politics; privately he worked to strengthen the Clan throughout the country. While Davitt was in the western United States, Devoy over-reacted to the news of Parnell's struggle for re-election as president of the Home Rule Confederation, contrary to Isaac Butt's wishes, and he committed the Clan to action, perhaps somewhat mistakenly, by cabling Parnell the conditions under which the Americans would support him.¹ By December the uneasy coalition between the Clan and the Irish Parliamentary party was announced as the New Departure in a public letter by Devoy. Early in the following year, 1879, Devoy met in France with the supreme council of the IRB and with Parnell. Precisely what was agreed upon at the several meetings is still difficult to ascertain, but it would appear that Devoy was able to establish a working relationship with Parnell although the IRB remained sceptical.²

There were, of course, many problems inherent in a program of cooperation between revolutionaries and parliamentarians, as the IRB hesitation showed. Many Irish-Americans who were part of the Fenian

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¹The cable, sent on 25 October 1878, was to be given to Parnell subject to the approval of Charles Kickham, the leader of the IRB. It is not certain whether the cable was ever delivered to Parnell, although its subsequent publication in the newspapers made him fully aware of its contents in any case.

²For two versions see Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, pp 284-85; and Davitt, The fall of feudalism in Ireland (New York, 1904), p. 125. For interpretations see also Cronne et. al. (ed.), Essays in honour of James Eadie Todd, pp 320-25; Brown, Jr. Amer. nationalism, pp 91-93; Gibson, Attitudes of the New York Irish, pp 330-31; and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 53-55.
tradition were cynical about the likelihood of parliamentary success without fatal compromise and corruption. It was Devoy's hardheaded practicality, rather than Davitt's land reform schemes, that won such support as there was. ¹ Patrick Ford, for example, had been urging guerilla warfare through his paper, the Irish World, since 1875 and in 1876 he had begun collecting money for O'Donovan Rossa's Skirmishing Fund; to change tactics involved some embarrassment.² When, through Devoy's efforts the Skirmishing Fund was changed to the National Fund, in order to provide Davitt with immediate financial backing, O'Donovan Rossa and his followers were not altogether pleased.³

The Land League was the means through which the policy of the New Departure could be implemented. The agricultural depression of 1877-1879 and the famine that followed created the conditions in rural Ireland which necessitated some kind of land reforms. The Irish Land League grew out of the events which followed a mass demonstration near Irishtown in County Mayo in April 1879 after a very bad winter. With the league established in Ireland, Parnell and John Dillon sailed for America in late 1879 where they travelled extensively through the country raising substantial amounts of money.⁴ The Clan did not conspicuously take part in the tour, but Clan members surrounded Parnell and


³Davitt, The fall of feudalism, p. 189.

⁴Parnell and Dillon collected £10,000 for the league and £50,000 for famine relief. See Davitt, pp 200-10; Cronne et. al., op. cit., pp 325-28; Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 57; and F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon: a biography (London, 1968), pp 34-36.
Dillon and sat on the speaker's platforms with them. The visits of Parnell and Dillon, and earlier Davitt, considerably strengthened the Clan and gave it a degree of respectability that both it and the Fenians had previously lacked. Parnell's trip made a considerable impression on native Americans also. The Irish leader was invited to address the House of Representatives on the land question, and he was President Hayes's guest of honour at a reception at the White House, which conferred both dignity and official approval on the Irish movement. The funds raised by Parnell and Dillon and the co-operation of the Irish World gave the Irish Land League considerable support. Dillon stayed behind in the United States to organize the American Land League when Parnell returned to Ireland in March 1880 for the general election, and with the assistance of Davitt the first convention, which pledged itself to fight for land reform in Ireland, was held in New York in May. Permanent administrative offices were opened in New York by Miss Anna Parnell, Mr Bacon, and Devoy. The American league became a large, successful, and furthermore respectable organization that was backed by almost all factions of the Irish-American community—the Irish World, the Boston Pilot, the Irish Catholic Benevolent Union (the largest Irish society in America), the Ancient Order

1Davitt, The fall of feudalism, p. 126.

2J.H. Parnell, Charles Stewart Parnell (New York, 1914), p. 204; Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 56-57.

3Davitt, op. cit., p. 126.

4Davitt said that the league raised £10,000 in 1880 for assistance of evicted tenants, Lyons suggests it was much more. Ibid., pp 209-10 and 263; Lyons, Dillon, p. 35.
of Hibernians, as well as the Clan-na-Gael. But this unity was short-lived; after Parnell's arrest, 1881-82, the league supporters in America split into three distinct groups. John Boyle O'Reilly, Patrick Collins, and Dr Connaty wanted to send aid directly to Ireland as Parnell had requested; Patrick Ford wanted his readers to send their money to the Irish World to be forwarded to Ireland under his direction; and John Devoy felt that the Clan should handle the funds. These divisions worked to create dissension and weaken the movement as a whole. Parnell's release from prison in May of 1882, bringing with it the Kilmainham Treaty and the dissolution of the Irish Land League, created more sources of conflict.

The decade of the 1880s witnessed the momentary union of both Irish-American nationalism and native American politics, as Irish-Americans sought political power in the United States and the native American politicians actively solicited the support of the Irish voting block. In part, of course, the excited activity of the Irish-Americans during the decade was simply the reflection of even greater nationalistic agitation in Ireland, but it was also part of an immediate struggle for power, by means of which the Irish-Americans hoped to improve their lot in the United States and also to utilize the machinery of the United States government to challenge British power in Ireland. For their part, American politicians found that by the late 1870s the two major parties were reaching nearly equal strength through-

1 Sister Donohoe, The Irish Catholic benevolent union, p. 207; J. Devoy, The Irish Land League (New York, 1882), pp 74-75; and Davitt, The fall of feudalism, p. 252.

2 O'Reilly and the Parnellites published their views in the Boston Pilot and the Irish American; Ford published his views in the Irish World; and Devoy started the short-lived paper, the Irish Nation, to promote his arguments. See Davitt, op. cit., pp 257-58; and Gibson, Attitudes of the New York Irish, p. 336.
out the country. Since as early as the 1830s the Irish-Americans had tended to support the Democratic party, however a successful appeal by the Republicans to the Irish-American community would produce a solid block of votes which might insure the hegemony of their party for another twenty years in the face of growing post-Civil War Democratic party strength.\(^1\) Thomas N. Brown suggests that the politics were in a state of "unstable equilibrium," and that if the Irish-Americans could be welded into a disciplined, independent voting block they could swing the balance in the country and thus determine victory or defeat for the two major parties.\(^2\)

The man who sought to be an American Parnell in order to create and control the Irish-American vote was Alexander Sullivan, a ruthless, ambitious Chicago lawyer.\(^3\) Sullivan began working in the 1870s to assert himself as a national leader and then in the 1880s brought several of the most important Irish-American organizations under his single control. In 1881 Sullivan was elected chairman of the executive bureau of the Clan-na-Gael, whereupon he immediately introduced organizational changes in the Clan hierarchy which placed decisive power solely in his hands.\(^4\) In 1883 Sullivan was, through well placed Clan

\(^1\) Prior to the American Civil War the Democratic party had split into several factions over the questions of slavery and sectionalism. The war ended with the Republican party as the dominant political force in the country, but the election of 1876 demonstrated that the Democrats had so rebuilt their organization that the Republicans remained in office only by highly questionable methods.

\(^2\) For a full exposition of this situation see Brown, *Ir.-Amer. nationalism*, pp 135-36 and 159.

\(^3\) See Ibid., p. xvi; and McEnnis, *The Clan-na-Gael and the murder of Dr Cronin*, pp 140-46.

\(^4\) Beach, *Twenty-five years in the secret service*, pp 190-92. Sullivan also reinstituted the campaigns of dynamite terrorism which discredited the Irish movement in the eyes of native Americans.
pressure, elected president of the newly formed American National League, which put him in control of large sums of money and made him the spokesman for a much larger and heterogeneous body than was to be found in the Clan.¹ Through committee packing, Sullivan controlled the Ancient Order of Hibernians by the mid-1880s, and it, like the league, had large sums of money and was broadly based throughout the Irish-American community. To broaden the AOH still further Sullivan challenged the existing leadership of the Board of Erin in Ireland and modified the entrance requirements to include more people.² By these several manoeuvres Sullivan emerged by the mid-1880s as the leader and principal spokesman for the largest block of organized Irish-Americans.

The leaders of the two major political parties lost little time attempting to turn the situation to their advantage. The Democrats, who since the Jacksonian era had provided a political home for the Irish-Americans, worked to hold their Irish-American political machines together, while the Republicans laboured to win support from the Irish-American community. Sullivan, who had Republican affiliations and had been given a post office appointment under President Grant, understood fully the opportunities that the party provided. He worked with Republican party leader James G. Blaine to secure patronage for Irish-Americans in order to build up a body of Republican sympathizers. The most notable of the "Blaine Irishmen" appointments was that of Sullivan.

¹ Sullivan resigned as president of the Irish National League in 1884 in order to campaign for Blaine, and he had Patrick Egan elected president. Through Egan, Sullivan still dominated the league. See Brown, Ir.-Amer. nationalism, pp 135, 141, 151-57; and Beach, Twenty-five years in the secret service, p. 227.

² By 1883, with its membership still growing, the AOH had 60,000 members and over $1,000,000 in its treasury. T.F. McGrath, History of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (Cleveland, 1898), pp 58, 80-81.
van's friend Patrick Egan, the former Irish National League treasurer, as United States Minister to Chile. The Republicans were less successful in securing the election of Irish-American candidates to office. On the other hand, the presence of Vice-President Thomas A. Hendricks as chairman of a National League meeting in Indianapolis in September of 1885 is perhaps an outstanding example of the efforts of the national Democratic leaders to retain Irish-Americans within the Democratic party.

The crucial test of the ability of the Irish-Americans to determine the results of an election came in 1884. Late in the campaign Blaine's carefully nurtured Irish-American supporters in New York were angered by a Presbyterian minister's statement to Blaine, which he failed to repudiate, that the Democrats were the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion." Many New York Irish Catholics, offended by the slur of rum and romanism, went back to the Democratic party which may have helped Blaine lose the state of New York and, thereby, the election. However, four years later the Republicans successfully defeated President Grover Cleveland, and the Sackville West incident


2The actions of both the Senate and President Cleveland in dealing with the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty further illustrate this point. Gibson, op. cit., 412-14; Brown, op. cit., p. 165; and T.A. Bailey, *Diplomatic history of the American people* (New York, 1942), p. 440.
probably contributed to their victory. Cleveland, during the end of his second term of office, presumably used the somewhat artificially created Venezuela boundary crisis of 1893 as a means of holding Anglo-phobe Irish-Americans within the Democratic party. Sullivan failed to weld the Irish in America into a new Irish Parliamentary party, and this failure is perhaps understandable given the multiplicity of external social, economic, as well as political forces at work in the Irish-American community. Nevertheless, Sullivan's ambition and his failure were largely responsible for the collapse of the Irish-American nationalist movement by the 1890s.

The first organization to break under Sullivan's control was the Clan-na-Gael. In 1883, contrary to the Clan constitution, Sullivan did not hold the annual convention, but postponed it for a year. This and Sullivan's earlier executive re-organizations so provoked Devoy and his followers that they formed the United Brotherhood and left Sullivan in control of a faction called the Triangle. This caused great alarm within the Clan and charges and allegations were made. Sullivan, in an attempt to forestall his critics, burned the account books under the excuse of protecting the organization from spies. In 1885 he had Dr Philip H. Cronin, his Chicago neighbour and leading opponent, expelled from the Clan; Dr Cronin simply joined Devoy's

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1 Brown disagrees with the standard interpretation of the influence of the Irish vote in the 1884 and 1888 elections. Brown suggests, rather, that, "Cleveland's share of the Irish vote in New York and Massachusetts was greater in 1888, when it is presumed Lord Sackville's stupidity turned the Irish against him, than in 1884, when Reverend Samuel Burchard's blunder is thought to have won him Irish votes. Very likely neither of these celebrated events had much effect on the outcome of the campaigns." Brown, Ir.-Amer. nationalism, p. 143. See also P. Ford, "The Irish vote in the pending presidential election," The North Atlantic Review, cxlvii (1888), pp 185-90.
United Brotherhood. Efforts were made to re-unite the Clan and by 1838 it was proposed that a trial committee would hear and decide the claims of both sides. The committee postponed action because of the investigations of the Parnell Commission. The Parnell Commission, of course, revealed that Major Henri LeCaron, a high official in the Triangle who had been sworn into the Clan by Sullivan, was really a British spy who had been responsible for a series of disasters. Devoy seemed vindicated and through Dr Cronin, who was a member of the trial committee, Devoy accused the Triangle of misappropriating Clan funds, of sponsoring ill-fated dynamite missions, of failing to provide for the families of dynamite saboteurs, and of allowing a British spy to penetrate successfully the highest levels of the organization. By a vote of 6 to 2 the trial committee found in favour of Sullivan, but Cronin nevertheless published and distributed a damning minority report. This was too much for the Triangle and on 4 May 1889 Dr Cronin was murdered. In the sensational court trial that followed four men were convicted of murder, and although Sullivan was arrested and charged, insufficient evidence prevented his being successfully prosecuted. The scandals of the Cronin murder and Major LeCaron, the allegations of graft and corruption within the Clan leadership, as well as

1 Beach, Twenty-five years in the secret service, pp 219-26; and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 77.

2 Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, p. 346.

3 Beach, op. cit., pp 294-98; Ryan, The phoenix flame, pp 209-10; Tansill, op. cit., p. 78.

the public outcry against dynamite terrorism all worked to split and repudiate the Clan for at least a decade.

Though less spectacular in its internecine struggles than the Clan, the AOH was also pulled apart under Sullivan's regime. Founded in the United States as early as 1836 to promote friendship, Christian charity, and Irish ties, the AOH had by the late nineteenth century acquired Irish nationalist and political interests as well.¹ Sullivan's attempts to remove the society from the control of the Board of Erin in Ireland and to broaden the membership had divided the entire organization into two brawling factions. By 1886 these two factions were functioning as the AOH Board of Erin, which maintained the previous ties with Ireland, and the AOH American Board, which was dominated by Sullivan.² When the Clan-na-Gael scandals were made public Sullivan was repudiated by the AOH, but the damage to the organization had already been done. A re-union of the two groups was not possible until late in 1897 under the new name of the United Ancient Order of Hibernians.³

The dissolution of the American National League destroyed the third of the leading Irish-American organizations. The League's collapse was due more to the fall of Parnell and the political in-group fighting in Ireland than through the machinations of Alexander Sullivan or Patrick Egan, both of whom had passed out of immediate control of the organization by the 1890s.⁴ The consequences of the disinteg-

¹ McGrath, History of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, p. 54.
² Ibid., pp 80-81.
rations of the American National League, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the Clan-na-Gael as united elements in the nationalist movement, all within a few years of each other, was a disaster to the Irish-American nationalists equivalent to the importance of the fall of Parnell to the nationalists in Ireland.

The failure of the Irish in America to form disciplined voting blocks without allegiance to either major political party had considerable significance in the role Irish-Americans would play in party activity. Throughout the 1880s direct appeals had been made for Irish-American support on a national level in the presidential elections. James G. Blaine, as has been seen, had tried to bring the Irish-Americans into the Republican camp throughout the 1880s, while on the other hand, Grover Cleveland had "twisted the lion's tail" on several occasions in order to hold the Irish within the Democratic party.

However, during the next fifteen years McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft could afford to ignore the Irish-Americans as a voting block, during their terms of office, and instead work to cultivate harmonious relations with Great Britain.1 Nevertheless, the Irish did exercise a certain power in Congress where a politician's views on Ireland or England might be determined by local Irish-American constituencies. Thus in the Senate the Olney-Pauncefote Convention of 1897, the Anglo-American arbitration treaty of 1904-05, and the Bryce arbitration treaty of 1911-12 were defeated in large part because of Irish-American pressure. The opportunity for Irish-American control of national American politics, however, had passed, and the next two decades would see the Irish-American nationalists working principally to rebuild

1Although by 1912 in considerably changed circumstances both Taft and Roosevelt made direct appeals for Irish-American support.
organizations after the calamities of the 1880s.

Although the disaster was general it was not, in the long run, irreparable. Previously Irish-American nationalism manifested itself in the form of revolutionary attempts alternating with parliamentary efforts. While the 1880s witnessed the co-operation of these two elements of the movement, the 1890s was presented with a growing rivalry between the revolutionary and parliamentary groups. And henceforth each faction would not only have to struggle against the British government but against its opposite number as well. Devoy, who had backed Parnell until the end, regarded the Irish Parliamentary party as an almost greater enemy than the British, while the home rule supporters found Devoy, the Clan, and the IRB an irresponsible body which threatened to upset their delicate political tactics.

The first organization to rebuild itself was the American wing of the Irish Parliamentary party, which by May of 1891 had established the Irish National Federation of America. The federation was led by Dr Thomas Addis Emmet, the grand-nephew of Robert Emmet and a physician of international distinction, and its functions were similar to the league it replaced—to mold opinion in America in favour of Irish self-government and to raise money for the Irish party. By 1893 the federation was able to hold large rallies to demonstrate support in America for the approaching fight in Parliament over the new Home Rule Bill. Dr Emmet was able to solicit the favourable comments and attendance of a number of state governors, records of which were all sent to Glad-

1Dr Emmet had spoken out violently against Parnell shortly after the split, and as president of the federation he circulated letters condemning Parnell as having betrayed the Irish people and stolen their money. T.A. Emmet, Incidents of my life (New York, 1911), pp 282-89.
stone as an indication of American sympathy for the Irish cause, and John Dillon's appeal for $150,000 to finance the 1893 election in Ireland was quickly met. But the peak had been reached; the defeat of the Home Rule Bill, the continued disunity in the Irish party, and the Tweedmouth scandal crippled the federation in America. After 1895 the national office in New York just barely remained open, in spite of Dr Emmet's valiant efforts—it was in a state of "suspended animation," as he said. Even public lectures on Irish topics failed to maintain interest, so when the national secretary, Joseph P. Ryan, died in 1900 the office closed.

With the reunion in 1900 of the largest factions of the Irish Parliamentary party under John Redmond, organized support within the United States grew quickly. The United Irish League of America was founded to replace the defunct federation, and with publicity from the Irish World branches sprang up first in the New York area and then throughout the country. By 1901 the league had the endorsement

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1Emmet, Incidents of my life, pp 282-89.
2The federation's operating funds rose sharply with the prospect of home rule and then fell off dramatically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funds</th>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
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<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>39,727.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>33,227.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
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Dr Emmet felt that if the Irish party had been able to unite, the federation could have supplied them with at least $50,000 a year. Emmet, op. cit., pp 290-94, 303-14, and 428-29. F.S.L. Lyons confirms that the Irish Parliamentary party suffered greatly from a lack of funds during the decade of the 1890s and that by 1900 almost nothing came from the United States. F.S.L. Lyons, The Irish parliamentary party (London, 1951), pp 202, 213, and 216.

3See Davitt, The fall of feudalism, p. 696. Dr Emmet regretted that much of the reorganization had been done without the consultation of old federation members, but he co-operated as best he could by turning over the books and records of the federation to the officers of the United Irish League of America. Emmet, op. cit., pp 341-42 and 434-35.
and promise of financial support of the United Irish Societies, a body which co-ordinated activities for small Irish-American clubs throughout the country. Later in 1901 Redmond and Joseph Devlin toured the country to stimulate interest in home rule, and as a result the United Irish League was able to create a national organization with centres in many major American cities. A national convention was held in Boston in October of 1902 with Redmond, Dillon, and Edward Blake as guest speakers and it was attended by over 700 delegates from throughout the United States and Canada. The Irish leaders later undertook a fund-raising tour throughout the country and collected some $100,000. While all of this appeared promising, the league was soon surrounded by scandal as funds destined for Ireland failed to arrive there. When an auditing committee investigated the account books of the New York Municipal Council, which processed all funds from the league branches in the New York area, two conflicting reports were produced. Although the national headquarters supported the report favouring the Municipal Council the damage was done. The momentum of the league slipped in the middle years of the first decade of the century, and in fact did not pick up again until after 1910 when home rule appeared to be an immediate prospect.

The discredited and strife-ridden factions of the Clan-na-Gael were unable to resolve their difficulties until near the end of the decade, and until they did the Clan was incapable of exerting signif-

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2For a full account of this episode see "The case of the Erin's Hope Branch against the New York Municipal Council of the United Irish League of America," (1904).
icant influence in the United States. The Triangle seemed to be the stronger of the two factions in spite of the charges made against it. Alexander Sullivan was succeeded by William Lyman who held their organization together from the Chicago headquarters. But the Triangle was diverted from effectively forwarding the Irish cause. Even Maude Gonne, who was an admirer of Sullivan and the Triangle, was distressed by how much money the Clan spent on local functions and how little found its way to Ireland to carry on the revolutionary work there. Devoy's years of waiting finally bore fruit in 1899 when Lyman was expelled from the Clan at the Triangle's convention in Buffalo. Lyman proved to be the last major obstacle for a reunion. The Clan was reunited the following year, 1900, at a joint convention of the two factions at Atlantic City. John Devoy, Daniel F. Cohalan, Joseph McGarrity, and John T. Keating emerged as the dominant figures, and they quickly committed the society to a "physical force" policy. In 1903 Devoy and his supporters founded the Gaelic American, through which the Clan was able to mount a weekly campaign against home rule, the Irish Parliamentary party, and the British Empire.

Having broken with Redmond and the Irish politicians the Clan was left to promote a revolutionary policy during a period when no great reforms were taking place in Ireland and no revolution was possible. Its immediate and natural reaction was to fight the British

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1 Ryan, The phoenix flame, p. 278.
Empire in America by opposing the Boer war and by urging the Senate to resist the Anglo-American treaties of 1900, 1904-05, and 1911-12.\(^1\)

The policy of the Clan in regard to Ireland was to support those organizations which grew up largely during the 1890s in the wake of the collapse of the Parliamentary party following the Parnell divorce crisis. Clan money was found to support Arthur Griffith’s newspaper, *United Irishmen*, and by 1906 Bulmer Hobson, who was co-operating with Griffith in Ireland, was invited by Devoy to come to the United States to lecture on the Sinn Fein movement; he was told that the three similar small organizations in Ireland should amalgamate.\(^2\) The Gaelic League also functioned in the United States from 1899 onwards, and through the efforts of Diarmuid Lynch the League won the support of Daniel F. Cohalan and the Clan in 1903.\(^3\) Under the sponsorship of John Quinn and Cohalan, Douglas Hyde toured the United States in 1905-06 lecturing on the Gaelic League; Clan endorsement of the League was clear in a circular published during Hyde’s visit which said, “The work of the Gaelic League is in line with the objects of the Clan na Gael. It is preparing the mind of the country for the supreme effort.

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\(^1\)Efforts to defeat the ratification of the first treaty resulted in the founding of the *Gaelic American* as an organ under the control of the Clan; efforts to defeat the second treaty successfully brought Irish-American and German-American groups into co-operative action for the first time and turned the thinking of some nationalist leaders towards Germany as a new factor in the Irish situation. Ryan, *The phoenix flame*, pp 279-80, and Devoy’s *post-bag*, ii, p. 330.

\(^2\)GA., 16 Feb. 1907. The three organizations were the Cumann na Gaedheal, the National Council, and the Dungannon Clubs; they were amalgamated to form the Sinn Fein League. B. Hobson, *Ireland yesterday and tomorrow* (Tralee, 1968), p. 12. Maud Gonne MacBréide collected £1,000 in 1896 and again in 1901 for Griffith’s newspaper largely from Clan sources. MacBréide, *A servant of the queen*, pp 192-93; Tan-sill, *America and the fight for Irish freedom*, pp 122-24; and Hobson, op. cit., pp 10 and 12.

which will lead to the final triumph of the Gael." Many of the same people—Quinn, Cohalan, W. Bourke Cockran and others—assisted in the tours of W. B. Yeats and other members of the Irish literary movement. However, all of these activities, while perhaps fruitful in the long run, were at the time a most indirect means of forwarding a revolutionary policy in Ireland. Perhaps the most important contribution of the Clan to the possible revolution in Ireland was the continued financial support of about £1000 a year to the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the regular attendance of IRB representatives at the annual Clan conventions. The introduction of such people as Thomas J. Clarke, Dr Patrick McCartan, and to a degree Diarmuid Lynch to the IRB also contributed greatly to the subsequent rejuvenation of that organization.

Native American attitudes on the Irish question during the nineteenth century turned on a more fundamental issue than did those of Irish-Americans. Native Americans approached the problem by asking


3 Hobson, Ireland yesterday and tomorrow, pp 37-38.

whether Irish self-government would be desirable or not, and substantial bodies of opinion developed supporting both positions. Of the two, the hostile opinion was more organized and long-lasting, and for the historian more accessible and easily recorded. But this is not to say that the Irish cause did not have friends among the native Americans. The American nation was itself an expression of democratic nationalism and it was regarded as a monument to the principles of federal home rule. American antipathy towards the British monarchy and aristocracy, and towards colonialism and some forms of imperialism, were part of a long tradition of anti-British feeling in the United States that went back to the War of Independence and George III. Thus many Americans were naturally predisposed to support any nationalist movement such as that in Ireland. Furthermore, native American sympathy for the Irish cause was often motivated by very practical reasons. Some native American public figures made quite insincere statements about Irish nationalism merely in the hope of recruiting Irish-American political support, while others looked genuinely for a solution to the Irish question in a desire to help create more harmonious Anglo-American relations or to eliminate the causes of aggressive Irish-American nationalism in domestic affairs. In any case in times of opportunity or crisis, such as the periods of the Young Ireland movement or the Fenian movement or the land war, prominent native Americans from George Washington to Horace Greeley and Rutherford B. Hayes to Theodore Roosevelt enthusiastically endorsed and supported the Irish cause.¹ Unfortunately, however, for the Irish movement favourable native American opinion was not organized to the

¹ See the several specific examples in the preceding pages.
same extent as either hostile opinion or Irish-American opinion. Those liberal or reform-minded Americans who were the driving force of the anti-slavery, the temperance, the women's suffrage, or the anti-imperialist agitation were not moved to marshal their energies in a campaign for Irish self-government largely because Ireland was too far away and the many social problems at home were all too close. Not until the 1920s were there Irish nationalist organizations which enlisted the support of large numbers of native Americans. The result was that in the nineteenth century no large body of pro-Irish sentiment was developed by native American organizations in an institutional manner. Favourable native American opinion found its expression in editorials and from speaker's platforms at moments of crisis, but often as an adjunct to more organized Irish-American activity.

During the 1880s the home rule movement had become moderately attractive to conservative native Americans, and by the opening of the twentieth century Irish home rule began to fit, albeit rather uncomfortably at first, into the racist and imperialist views of the day. Normally the Irish were not meant to be included in the term "English-speaking peoples," just as when the Aryan race or northern European race was referred to they were not intended to include the Celts of Ireland. But change and compromise were coming, perhaps prompted by the growing threat of southern and eastern European immigrants in the United States. During the 1880s Leverett Saltonstall, scion of Boston

1The term institutional is meant here to imply self-perpetuating societies with regular meetings, national officers, a central headquarters, fund drives, and publications.

2The implications of racial thinking on American views on the Irish question will be discussed more fully later.
aristocracy, had said that home rule would so resolve the Irish question as to allow the Irish and Anglo-Saxons to become the "great American race."¹ By 1890 James K. Hosmer, in arguing for solidarity within the English-speaking world, called for autonomy for Ireland within the empire.² Thirteen years later John R. Dos Passos saw in the union of Great Britain and the United States the perfect solution to both the Irish question and Canadian-American relations, as he asked, "And will not the alleged grievances of the Irish roll away and disappear... before common citizenship?"³ The idea of the incorporation of the Irish into the English-speaking world was finally articulated by the Columbia University historian George Louis Beer, who also argued on behalf of an Anglo-American union. Beer did recognize that ancient wrongs prevented good Anglo-Irish relations even in 1917, but he felt that a broader English-speaking community founded on mutual interests, a common language, and a common political tradition would satisfy Irish aspirations.⁴ By 1920 Seth K. Humphrey included the Irish as full members of the great northern European races, who he saw pitted against the southern and eastern Europeans and the Africans and Asians.⁵ Through this process the question of Irish self-government was gradually accepted by many native Americans, although more perhaps as a means to a greater end than as a virtue in itself.

¹Brown, Ir.-Amer. nationalism, p. 165.
⁵See S.K. Humphrey, The racial prospect (New York, 1920), passim.
The unfavourable opinions that many native Americans held on the Irish question were in large part conditioned by at least three factors. Two of these factors, religious bias and racial bias, were a part of the intellectual and cultural climate of opinion in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The third factor can be described as the impact made on native Americans by the Irish immigrants themselves.¹

Native Americans during the nineteenth century clearly regarded the United States as a Protestant country. That the American religious heritage had its origins principally in one of the radical wings of the Protestant Reformation helps to explain this predisposition. Certainly the momentum of this element of the Protestant Reformation had largely spent itself by the beginning of the twentieth century, but nevertheless Americans still tended to perceive their country from a distinctly Protestant bias. In these circumstances the Catholic Church, made up to a great extent by the Irish and German immigrants of the post-1840 period, was a hostile and foreign body in the United States which threatened the essential American way of life. The Latin service, the priesthood, the monastic orders, the hierarchy, and the Pope were all alien to the notions of religion held by the congregation orientated Calvinists of the east coast and middle western United States. Catholicism was seen as superstitious, idolatrous, authoritarian, and institutional; in short the Catholic Church smacked of those very evils of Europe from which Americans had attempted to escape.

Native Americans responded vigorously to what they regarded as the grave threat which they felt the Church presented to their religious

¹J. Higham, Strangers in the land (New York, 1963), pp xii-xiii; Brown, Ir.-Amer. nationalism, p. 23.
and political freedoms by founding anti-Catholic societies and newspapers which spread warnings of the dangers presented by the growth of Irish and German Catholic immigrant groups.\(^1\) Publications such as the New York *Protestant*, The *Wide Awake* and the *Spirit of Washington*, the *Commonwealth*, and the *Worcester Spy* worked to keep Americans alerted to the constant threat. The lurid volume, *Awful disclosures of Maria Monk*, published in 1836 confirmed the worst fears of suspicious Protestants about the evils of the Catholic clergy and the monastic life.\(^2\) By the late 1840s the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, organized in New York to oppose the further immigration of Irish and German Catholics, had a rapid growth in northern cities. In 1854 the group was organized nationally as the American party, or as it is remembered the Know-Nothing party, the principle objective of which was to keep Catholics and foreigners out of public office and in a subordinate social position. All of these efforts were not soon without result. In 1829 Irish Catholics were stoned in Boston, in 1834 the Ursuline Convent at Charlestown was burned, in 1844 riots took place in Philadelphia. Throughout the decade of the 1850s major clashes between the Know-Nothings and the Irish took place in Philadelphia, Chelsea, Newark, Baltimore, Brooklyn, St Louis and other cities.\(^3\) By the end of the 1850s this wave of nativism died down,

\(^1\) *The Christian alliance and family visitor* was founded in order "to promote the union of Christians against Popery," and the *American Protestant vindicator* asserted that the Pope was likely to move his throne to the United States because the Vatican was displeased with revolutionary Italy. See Handlin, *Boston’s immigrants*, p. 182; Wittke, *The Irish in America*, p. 119.


\(^3\) Wittke, op. cit., pp 119-20.
the Know-Nothing party collapsed, and the country became preoccupied by the more serious crisis over slavery and sectionalism which culminated in the American Civil War.

A similar kind of anti-Catholic movement flourished in the 1880s, once again in response to the supposed threat of Catholic immigrants. The American Protective Association was started in 1887 ostensibly to protect the public school system from the encroachments of Church dominated Catholic schools. Although the American Protective Association was dead by 1911 it found widespread appeal during the 1890s. Thomas Nast's provocative anti-Catholic and anti-Irish cartoons dramatically illustrated the fear and hostility of native Americans. In spite of increasingly open-minded attitudes towards Catholicism throughout most of the United States, anti-Catholic organizations continued to prosper until well into the twentieth century.\(^1\)

The second major bias which worked to shape the attitudes of native Americans on the Irish question was the notion of Anglo-Saxon superiority. The common Anglo-Saxon and Protestant origins of the upper middle-class, or establishment, in the United States of the late nineteenth century served to create an atmosphere of exclusiveness among the well-to-do and educated elements of American society and a feeling of community with their counterparts in Great Britain. The success of American and British political institutions, as well as the magnitude of the British Empire, served to convince many

\(^1\)See Higham, Strangers in the land, pp 5-9, 28-31, 77-87; A. B. Paine, Thomas Nast, his period and his pictures (New York, 1904), pp 151, 163, and 191. See also J. C. Vinson, Thomas Nast, political cartoonist (Athens, 1967), passim.
Americans of the innate superiority of the Anglo-Saxon, or more popularly the English-speaking, peoples. These views were reinforced by popular social Darwinist theories with their comforting conclusions that social, economic, and political ascendancy was justified by the process of the survival of the fittest. While not all Americans agreed with these Anglo-Saxon and social Darwinist ideas, many respectable members of the upper middle-class thought it quite obvious that it was the English-speaking people who were the most industrious, the most wealthy, the most powerful, and the most enlightened people in the world.¹

It was with a great sense of mission and responsibility that native American thinkers accepted the burden of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. "God has not been preparing the English-Speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration," Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana told the United States Senate in January of 1900. "He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns... He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savages and senile peoples."² Similarly John R. Dos Passos, a leading spokesman for an Anglo-American union, found in the Anglo-Saxon world a force powerful enough to "spread Christianity and civilisation everywhere," and to bring commerce with it as well.³ Thoughtful historians

¹For a general discussion see Higham, Strangers in the Land and R. Hofstader, Social Darwinism in America (Boston, 1955), passim.

²Cited in C.G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive era (Boston, 1932), p. 121.

such as Woodrow Wilson isolated in the Anglo-Saxons the origins of
democratic political capacity. Wilson wrote in 1889 that, "The Eng-
lish alone have approached popular institutions through habit," while
other nations had rather unsuccessfully adopted the forms of self-
government.\(^1\) Frederick Jesup Stimson asserted that representative
government was "the one invention that is peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon
people," although they had also developed the concept of "personal
liberty."\(^2\) However, Homer Lea, a soldier of fortune and military
theorist, pulled all these ideas together by suggesting that, "the
Saxon is more capable of self-government than many other races hold-
ing sovereignty over themselves or imposing it upon others..."\(^3\) Thus
the Anglo-Saxon people were, paradoxically, the most democratic of the
world's people and at the same time the most fit to rule.

The Irish, or Celts, were consistently ranked well below the Ang-
lo-Saxons on the scale of political, economic, and social aptitudes,
and Ireland's problems were seen as evidence of Ireland's innate incap-
acity. The root of the Irish problem, many Americans felt, was the
Celtic temperament. "The psychology of the Celt is, if anything, still
more unpoltical than that of the Greek and the Slav," wrote the dist-
inguished political scientist John W. Burgess in 1890. The Celts had
developed a "great religion" and a "powerful priesthood," but their
political innovation had been exhausted at the clan level, thus depriv-
ing them of the means of asserting themselves against foreign invaders.\(^4\)

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\(^4\)J.W. Burgess, *Political science and comparative constitutional law* (Boston, 1890), i, p. 33.
Likewise George Edward Woodberry found the Celtic genius to encompass "mystery, twilight, supernatural fantasy, lamentation, tragic disaster...," rather than political qualities, and George Templeton Strong confided to his diary that "Our Celtic fellow citizens are almost as remote from us in temperament and constitution as the Chinese."\(^1\) The sociologist and reformer, E.A. Ross, who divided Europeans into two racial groups, the Aryans and the Celto-Slavs, concluded that the Celts had "neither the temperament nor the training to make a success of popular government."\(^2\) In the minds of many leading native Americans, those political principles, so early understood by the Anglo-Saxons, remained incomprehensible to the Irish because of their mystical and unpolitical temperament.\(^3\)

The factor which often seemed to work as a catalyst in combining the religious and racial bias of the native Americans was the physical presence of large numbers of Irishmen in America.\(^4\) To native Americans, every Irish immigrant was a virtual ambassador from Ireland. The physical presence of these large groups of alien people, poorly

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\(^3\) It should also be pointed out that the Irish-Americans used similar racial arguments to prove the virtues of their ethnic group. Oscar Handlin quotes Dr John McEleran, who wrote articles for the Boston *Pilot* between 1856 and 1857 of a highly racist nature. "The divine spark of genius radiates from the Celtic centre of the world...," McEleran wrote. The Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the ancient Irish all revealed "the natural tendency of the pure Celtic race, uncontaminated by Gothic bestiality or eastern sensuality." See Handlin, *Boston's immigrants*, pp 144-45.

\(^4\) Native Americans were able to form relatively objective opinions about such countries as Belgium and Switzerland, which were largely Catholic and non-Anglo-Saxon, but which were also without large groups of immigrants in the United States.
educated, economically destitute, unprepared for urban living, and exploited by landlords, employers, and politicians, created enormous social problems unlike anything experienced in the United States previously. Rightly or wrongly, native Americans were often alarmed by the prospect of their cities transformed into Irish ghettos, and they found their religious and racial notions of Ireland confirmed by the countless examples of Irish-American ignorance, poverty, drunkenness, violence, and corruption. E.A. Ross, whose views on the Irish were by no means based on a profound dislike, found that while "the Hibernian domination has given our cities genial officials, brave policemen, and gallant fire fighters," it had also destroyed honest and efficient local government.¹ The spectacle of Irish-American nationalism, which included the Fenian invasions of Canada, the dynamite missions to London, the Cronin murder, and the crass vulgar scandals involving the misappropriation of funds and the struggle for power, reinforced the view that the Irish people could not be trusted with, and were not capable of, mastering self-government.²

These several factors which coloured the unfavourable views of native Americans towards the Irish question probably reached their most complete articulation in the writings of the socially prominent New York sportsman, geographer, ethnologist, Madison Grant. Grant's popular book, The passing of the great race, which went through several editions from 1916 when it was first published until 1926, told of the destruction of the great Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races through

¹Cited in Wittke, The Irish in America, p. 103.
²John Dillon's reaction to Irish-American politics seems to have been remarkably similar to that of many native Americans. See Lyons, Dillon, p. 70.
disastrous fratricidal wars and intermarriage with inferior breeds such as the Celts, the Alpines, and the Mediterraneans. Accepting fully the religious and racial biases, more typical of the nineteenth century, and perceiving the Irish in Ireland through his contact with them in the United States, Grant could write that, "An independent Ireland worked out on a Tammany model is not a pleasing prospect," fully confident that any system of self-government in Ireland must inevitably reproduce the pattern of Irish-American politics in his own New York City. In fact Grant could brush aside the claims of Irish nationalism, as well as the notions of the right to self-determination, which were becoming increasingly popular in the United States during this period, by his conclusion that "the Irish National movement centres chiefly around religion, reinforced by myths of ancient grandeur."

Of course there were native Americans who opposed Irish self-government for reasons quite independent of religion, race, or contact with Irish-Americans. A.T. Mahan, the influential naval theorist, quite vigorously opposed Irish self-government because he saw it as a grave threat to England's naval defences, and Homer Lea resisted Irish nationalism because he believed that only unitary empires had the organizational and administrative strength to survive. But organized and systematic objections to Irish nationalism could generally be traced to at least one of three factors, if not, as in the case of Madison Grant, all three.

1 M. Grant, The passing of the great race (New York, 1926), p. 59.
2 Ibid., pp 57-58; see also pp xii, 63-64, 108, and 202-03.
3 A.T. Mahan, Retrospect & prospect: studies in international relations naval and political (London, 1902), pp 100-01 and 127-28; and Lea, The day of the Saxon, pp 130-34.
The ten years from 1900 to 1910 witnessed the reorganization of both the constitutional and revolutionary Irish nationalist movements in the United States. Neither was particularly strong, in spite of the potential which was realized between 1910 and 1916, although at the outset the constitutional movement embraced the larger number of both Irish-American and native American sympathizers. In large part the momentum of both nationalist movements had been weakened by reforms which improved the economic, agricultural, and social life in Ireland. Furthermore the Conservative and even the Liberal governments had been strong enough themselves to resist appeals for home rule and to make revolution in Ireland out of the question. During the period from 1910 to 1916 the fortunes of Irish nationalism took a dramatic turn: the home rule or constitutional movement developed fully to a climax and in the minds of many seemed to end the Irish question with a satisfactory nationalist solution; the physical force or revolutionary movement, weakened initially by the apparent success of home rule, found in the discontent of the Ulster Unionists and in the frustrations imposed by World War I the process through which their own concept of nationalism could be resurrected. In the United States both Irish-American and native American opinion, while a mere shadow of what it would be after the rebellion in 1916 and again after World War I, focused on the Irish question as it had not been done since the high water mark of the Parnell period. 1910 saw the beginning of the last and greatest phase of American opinion on the Irish question.
Constitutional Irish-American nationalists recognized immediately the promising implications of the results of the British elections of January 1910. The Liberals held a margin of only two votes over the Unionists in the House of Commons; the Irish Parliamentary party with 70 seats seemed in a position to make or unmake any government, regardless of the 40 Labour and 11 Independent Nationalists (O'Brien-Healy group). Home rule leaders in America, such as Michael J. Ryan, Alexander Sullivan, and Patrick Egan sent their optimistic congratulations. Egan and Sullivan assured Redmond that he was in a strong position, and Ryan wrote confidently that "things are better here than I have known them since the organization of the League."

Ryan speculated further that in the event of another election, which came in December, the party "could safely count upon a fairly generous remittance from this side." Native Americans also observed the improved prospects of home rule. The New York Times said it was sure that the fullest possible measure of home rule within the Union would be in the best interests of Great Britain. When Asquith attempted to delay the reform of the House of Lords the New York Times praised Redmond's "nerve and his power" in forcing the government to "transform it [the House of Lords] into a practically powerless body." By May the paper argued that some kind of compromise was necessary because the government did not have a sufficient mandate from the English people.


3 Ibid., 2 March 1910.
to undertake such a fundamental change in the constitution. The Literary Digest, more cautious and sceptical, thought that an alli-

ance between the Liberals and the Irish party might destroy Asquith as it had Gladstone, and it intimated that Asquith might not be alto-

gether serious in supporting home rule. However, such papers as the New York American continued to see Irish self-government as imminent.

Despite the apparent strength of the Parliamentary party seen in the opening months of 1910, there was some concern among both Irish and native Americans about the threat presented by the Healy and O'Brien group, which held 11 Irish seats. Michael J. Ryan saw these factions as a greater problem in the United States, where Irish dis-
unity was often exaggerated. "The evil about Healy and O'Brien," Ryan wrote to Redmond, "is not the harm that they may do in Ireland or Great Britain, but their every objectionable utterance is heralded here as evidence of dissension..." Ryan's suggestion to amalgamate all the Irish societies in the United States into a "federation" which would smother small splinter groups under the weight of the majority was not well received by his fellow officers of the UIL, although the problem of factions was recognized. The New York Times regarded the Healy and O'Brien Members of Parliament as a grave danger to the Liberal-Irish coalition, which it felt was already strained by the government's tax proposals, and by November the Literary Digest had also

1 N.Y.T., 16 May 1910.


drawn attention to the dangers that these splinter groups posed.¹

Even after the Independent Nationalists were reduced to eight by the December election Whitelaw Reid, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, saw them as a grave threat to Irish unity because, he was confident, they were certain to vote with the Unionists on any Irish measure.²

Nonetheless, it was into a generally favourable and optimistic climate in the United States that Redmond and Devlin travelled in September of 1910 to raise money with which to fight the anticipated election. T.P. O'Connor had made a fund-raising tour of the United States the year before with sometimes discouraging results, but in the autumn of 1910 the leaders of the Irish party were warmly received by both native and Irish-Americans who were enthusiastic about the party and the home rule program. Within a month's time Redmond and Devlin, as well as O'Connor who was touring Canada, were able to return to Ireland with $100,000 for the election fund.³ The results of the December election were eminently satisfactory to the party which still held the balance of votes in the House of Commons, and in fact strengthened its position at the expense of the Independent Nationalists.

²Reid to Philander C. Knox, 21 Dec. 1910 (L.C., Knox Papers, AcDR H-7, Information series B).
There were, however, political problems which Irish nationalists, in both America and Ireland, seemed willing to ignore or disregard. There was the discomforting fact which Whitelaw Reid pointed out to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, that the British people were complacently satisfied with the party symmetry determined by the January elections. "Certainly this gives him Asquith no new mandate and no increased power," with which to reform the House of Lords or enact home rule, the Ambassador observed. Furthermore, he saw clearly what few others recognized as early as 1910—that the Ulster Unionists were willing to risk violence in order to resist home rule. "Still," he said, admitting that Irishmen sometimes exaggerated, "I have been a good deal impressed by the earnest talk of some of the North of Ireland people, who do not deny the fact that they have been taking pains for months past to arm themselves and declare that they intend to meet any demand to set up a Dublin Parliament over them, by an organized armed force." Reid's concern would have seemed unwarranted by most interested Americans in 1910. The New York Times, for example, concluded that the protests of the Ulster Unionists, "were a pretty discreditable piece of party trickery," to be linked with complaints about American money at Westminster, but not to be taken seriously.

The improved prospects of home rule at Parliament and the corresponding growth of the United Irish League in America were fully understood by American politicians. Although the Republican party had won the election of 1908 the Democratic party candidate received an ominously large percentage (45%) of the vote, thereby encouraging the

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Republicans to look for new sources of support which would allow them to hold their majority and rob the Democrats of their growing strength. It was perhaps with a calculated home of winning the sympathy of the traditionally Democratic Irish-Americans that President William Howard Taft accepted an invitation to attend the St Patrick's Day celebration of the Irish Fellowship Club, a society of highly successful and respectable Chicago Irish-Americans. For the moderate Irish-American nationalists Taft's presence at the celebrations on 17 March 1910 represented official recognition equivalent to the reception given Parnell by President Hayes in 1880 and a return to a position of public importance. Alexander Sullivan explained to President Taft himself, and later to John Redmond, the importance of the event and the extent to which it demonstrated to both America and Britain, "his Taft's respect for our race and his confidence in us."1 Patrick Egan was also quick to elaborate on the significance of Taft's endorsement of the Irish movement and cautioned Redmond that the meeting could be carefully exploited later if the State Department were not aroused by too much advanced publicity.2 Even before St Patrick's Day Egan was working to win the support of former President Theodore Roosevelt for the home rule movement. Egan warned Redmond that Roosevelt, travelling through Europe on the way home from his celebrated hunting trip to Africa, should not be left entirely to the British as he passed through England. Egan suggested that official invitations from the Lord Mayor of Dublin should be extended to welcome the former President to Ireland. "Such a reception would be universally appreciated as a

1Sullivan to Redmond, 8 Feb. 1910 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
2Egan to Redmond, 18 Feb. 1910 (Ibid.).
compliment to America," Egan wrote, "and should greatly help our cause—which even already is becoming fashionable."\(^1\) Roosevelt did not go to Dublin, although on 1 June 1910 he did have lunch at Westminster with Redmond, T.P. O'Connor, and several other Irish members.\(^2\) For the first time since the 1880s Irish-Americans merited the attention of national political figures.

President Taft made a second and potentially more dramatic attempt to win Irish-American support in 1911-12 when he responded to public sentiment in favour of a release for Luke Dillon, an Irish-American imprisoned by the Canadian government for his attempt to blow up the Welland Canal in 1900. Successful efforts by the administration to persuade the Canadians to release Dillon would appeal directly to the Irish-American voting block and especially to the revolutionary nationalists. As John T. Keating, one of the important members of the Clan, wrote to John Devoy, "Taft must do something to please somebody and the Anglo Americans are his only friends now."\(^3\) From the autumn of 1911 until the late summer of 1912 Taft struggled with both the British and Canadian governments to secure Dillon's release, but without success.\(^4\) Whether or not the release of Dillon

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\(^1\)Egan to Redmond, 1 March 1910 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).


\(^3\)Keating to Devoy, 18 Dec. 1911 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box J-L).

\(^4\)For details of Taft's instructions to the State Department to pursue this matter through the British Foreign Office, the Canadian representatives at the coronation of George V, and the Canadian government directly, see (N.A., 342.112D58/19, -/20, -/21, -/22, and -/32, box 4106); A.J. Ward, "America and the Irish problem, 1899-1921," I.H.S., xvi, no. 61 (March 1968), p. 72; and A.J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, 1899-1921 (London, 1969), pp 63, 67-68.
would have effectively repaired Taft's desperate political fortunes by winning the Irish vote for the Republican party is a matter of some speculation, but what seems to emerge is the apparent rehabilitation of Irish-Americans and the Irish question as a factor in national American politics.

In the election of 1912 Woodrow Wilson, the priggish reform governor of New Jersey and former president of Princeton University, held the Irish vote within the Democratic party, in spite of the earlier efforts of both Taft and Roosevelt to prove themselves friendly to the Irish cause and attractive to Irish-American voters. How much either Ireland or the Irish-Americans benefited from the new administration has been a source of some controversy. Certainly Wilson seemed cooler to Irish-American politicians, as the British Ambassador noted, than either Taft or Roosevelt, if not to the concept of Irish nationalism. Wilson did retain Maurice Francis Egan, T. St John Gaffney, and Nelson O'Shaughnessey in the Consular Service and made Joseph P. Tumulty his private secretary, but there were no conspicuous

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1Spring Rice recognized that Wilson was not comfortable with Irish-Americans and Tammany machine politicians, especially when the two were found in the same person, and he observed that Wilson had surrounded himself largely with fellow Presbyterians rather than Catholics as the composition of his party might have suggested. In fact Spring Rice seemed to hope that possible anti-Catholic biases on the part of Wilson and his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, would discourage the government from taking a position on Ireland. Furthermore, Spring Rice thought that the Protestant predisposition of the majority of the American people would move American opinion in favour of Ulster in the event of any Catholic-Protestant strife in Ireland. C. Spring Rice to Grey, 30 March 1914 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/84).
Irish-American nationalists among his appointments or his confidants. Tumulty did not actually promote the Irish question, although he tended to keep Irish matters before the President. In his memoirs Tumulty recorded that Wilson was honestly concerned about Irish self-government. On 10 October 1910, while campaigning for the office of governor of New Jersey, Wilson said that Great Britain would be wise to create a federation that would permit the expression of the national aspirations of the Irish, Welsh, and Scots. "This voice that has been crying in Ireland," Wilson said, "this voice for Home Rule, is a voice which is now supported by the opinion of the world...." While President, however, Wilson was inhibited by diplomatic protocol from speaking out publicly about Ireland, although as Tumulty rightly acknowledged Wilson privately urged upon many of the Englishmen he met the necessity of resolving the Irish question. But Wilson, who told Tumulty "there never can be real comradeship between America and England until this Irish issue is definitely settled and out of the way," often seemed motivated by a desire to improve Anglo-American relations.

1M.F. Egan, Memoirs of a happy life (London, 1924), passim, and T. St J. Gaffney, Breaking the silence (New York, 1930), passim. Wilson was severely criticized by many Protestants for making the Jesuit trained Tumulty his secretary; it was alleged that Tumulty held back correspondence dealing with Protestant affairs and promoted Catholic interests. Wilson publicly defended Tumulty, but he received a large amount of anti-Irish and anti-Catholic mail on the issue, which may have given him second thoughts about publicly endorsing Irish matters in subsequent years. (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, box 61, Roman Catholic Affairs).

2Carefully accessible to moderate nationalists, Wilson was clearly unsympathetic, in spite of his Presbyterian and Scotch-Irish background, towards the defiant Ulster Unionists, with whom he avoided contact altogether. J. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him (Garden City, 1921), pp 392-97.
rather than by a concern for Irish nationalism. Wilson's attitude towards Ireland was characterized by careful correctness.

As Americans increasingly considered the question of Irish self-government within the British Empire they not unsurprisingly put forth federal solutions drawn from their own political experience. As shown in chapter one, native Americans, and especially those who hoped for some kind of Anglo-American union, saw a federal Empire where Ireland could have its proper place as the solution not only to the Irish question but the problem of world stability as well. Early in his political career Woodrow Wilson supported the ideal of a federal solution to the Irish problem. Similarly an American friend of the Rev Canon James Owen Hannay wrote that the world was alive with the ideas of the "Rights of Man" and that an intellectual revolution was under way. Quite sceptical about Redmond's ability, he told Hannay that "liberty" for Ireland could best be achieved "in a Federal Union between the divisions of the United Kingdom...." The Irish-American leader Congressman W. Bourke Cockran maintained a private correspondence with Moreton Frewen on the topic of a federal solution to the Irish question, although as Alan J. Ward has suggested, these schemes had the public backing of no Irish-American leaders—even Cockran.

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1 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, p. 395.
3 L.S.W.T. to Hannay, Jan. 1911 (T.C.D., Hannay Papers).
4 See A.J. Ward, "Frewen's Anglo-American campaign for federalism, 1910-21," I.H.S., xv, no. 59 (March 1967), pp 256-75; (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 16); and L.C., Frewen Papers). Cockram and Frewen were related to each other through marriage.
However in spite of the indigenous appeal that federalism had for many Americans there was some intelligent disagreement also. The New York Times, commenting on federalist proposals, stated that the rapid movement of the United States towards centralization was evidence that federalism was not always suitable for complex government. The problems of the empire, the paper said, were too diverse to be successfully dealt with in an imperial federation. In fact the paper thought its only virtue was that any solution to the Irish question was worthwhile if it improved Anglo-American relations. 1

This view of the New York Times that any solution of the Irish question was desirable if it improved Anglo-American diplomatic relations, or even American domestic politics, was held by many native Americans and indeed it occasionally provided the sole source of their interest in Irish nationalism. Early in 1911 Theodore Roosevelt, always a warm supporter of home rule, wrote to T. F. Gill of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction in Dublin, "as I have repeatedly said, I believe that the grant of Home Rule to Ireland would be of very great importance in removing one source of friction between the United States and Great Britain." 2 Woodrow Wilson expressed the same kind of concern about the unresolved Irish question as an obstacle to harmonious Anglo-American relations. 3 Native Americans also hoped that home rule would work to weaken the Irish-Amer-

1 N.Y.T., 31 July 1910.


Two years later Roosevelt wrote much the same thing to John Redmond and Arthur Hamilton Lee, Ibid., p. 740.

3 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, p. 395.
ican political block at home by robbing it of its greatest issue.

"The effect of this ~home rule7 upon our own relations to the reborn Empire would be happy if only because of the pacification of the Irish Americans..." the New York Times said. Even Roosevelt, although he phrased it very discreetly, saw that the long standing Irish question was one reason why the Irish had not assimilated fully into American society. A friend of Canon Hannay put it more bluntly; referring to Mayor John F. "Honey-Fitz" Fitzgerald and Congressman James "Boss" Curley, both of his native Boston, he wrote, "I do wish some form of Home Rule could rid us of this group." Throughout the next ten years many other native Americans felt the same way.

Home rule made little progress in Parliament during 1911, and in fact the Home Rule Bill was not introduced in the House of Commons until 11 April 1912. However, from early 1912 on speculation began as to when the British government would act and what the prospects of home rule would be under the new constitutional arrangements regarding the House of Lords. In the eyes of the press Ulster presented an obstacle, although the New York Times observed that not all of Ulster was anti-home rule by any means; however the fact that there was no real violence done when Churchill spoke on home rule in Belfast convinced many that the Ulster resistance movement was entirely bluff.

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1 N.Y.T., 31 July 1910.
3 L.S.W.T. to Hannay, Jan. 1911 (T.C.D., Hannay Papers).
With Asquith's introduction of the Home Rule Bill on 11 April 1912, Redmond's supporters in America cabled their congratulations to Redmond on the "marvelous success" of the movement and expressed their confidence in the bill. ¹ Bourke Cockran wrote Redmond shortly afterwards extending good wishes and assuring the Irish leader that the destiny of the Irish race was in good hands with him. ² It was recognized, however, that not all Irishmen in America and Ireland were pleased with the bill; in fact one group of Irish-Americans urged Redmond to reject the measure because it offered Ireland merely "sham autonomy," the Clan-na-Gael and the Independent Nationalists presenting the major threat. ³ After the National Convention in Dublin in the spring and the second reading of the bill, substantial Irish support was acknowledged; Judge Martin J. Keogh of New York sent Redmond his congratulations on 27 May and gave the assurance that, "you have the race at home and abroad solidly, sincerely, and almost unanimously with you." ⁴

As the home rule movement prospered during 1912 the Ulster Unionists correspondingly became more serious and outspoken in their determination to resist. The New York Times had not been moved by "Ulsteria"

¹ The cable, which was also published in the press, was signed by 15 prominent Irish-Americans, including James A. O'Gorman, Martin J. Keogh, John D. Crimmins, John Quinn, William J. Gaynor, Morgan J. O'Brien, W. Bourke Cockran, and William McAdoo. 12 April 1912 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 18). Also see the New York Sun, 12 April 1912.

² Cockran to Redmond, 13 April 1912 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 18).

³ "The bill does not seem to be particularly satisfying to either Nationalist or Unionist," Lit. Dig., xlv, no. 17 (27 April 1912), p. 877, and xlv, no. 18 (4 May 1912), p. 927. See also Lyons, Dillon, p. 328.

in January of 1912, and indeed went so far as to call attention to nationalist sympathy in the north of Ireland, but by July the paper began to change its opinion towards the Unionist claims, arguing that the concept of home rule, if applicable to the south of Ireland, could be applied to Ulster as well. "It is not easy to see why Ulster should be denied the degree of independence claimed for the people of Ireland, simply because they wish to use that independence to remain in the British Union, with their rights and powers as British subjects unimpaired." The Literary Digest, which had been reluctant to commit itself to home rule, took the Unionist leaders seriously from the first and was outspoken in explaining the conflict in terms of Catholic-Protestant hostilities and ethnic incompatibilities. "When we look calmly into the Ulster problem," the Digest wrote, "we find the antagonism between the Home Rulers and Unionism in Ireland is deeply rooted. It is both racial and religious." This view of the Ulster situation reflected two of the principle biases of middle-class native Americans.

The third reading of the Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons aroused another flurry of congratulations and good wishes from the United States. Congressman Goodwin of Arkansas introduced a resolu-

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1 N.Y.T., 22 July 1912. In September the New York Times asserted further that if the Irish nationalists had the right to leave the British system the Unionist minority in the north had the right to remain with Great Britain; nonetheless the paper condemned the tactics of the Unionists by saying that it was "good politics" but "poor patriotism" to disrupt the country by "arousing religious and sectarian passions that have always been the plague of Ireland...." Ibid., 14 Sept. and 29 Sept. 1912.


3 See Judge Keogh to Redmond, 5 Feb. 1913 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
tion on 17 January 1913 "congratulating the people of Ireland on the passage of an Irish home rule bill," although the resolution was never returned from the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The editor of the Irish World, Patrick Ford, sent appeals to several American public figures soliciting their favourable comments on "the heroic fight the people of Ireland are making for the American principle of self government," for eventual publication in his paper. The most important reply came from the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who answered, "You are right in assuming that I am in sympathy with the fight that is being made to secure Home Rule for Ireland." Bryan added that he was pleased with the progress of the bill and felt that it was a just settlement in the interests of both the Irish and English peoples. The newspapers, which a few months earlier had speculated that the government might fall, saw the 110-vote majority for the bill as a great triumph for the Liberal-Labour-Irish coalition, and they regarded the Irish Parliamentary party victory of David C. Hogg in Derry, as Bryan had also noted, as a vindication of the home rule movement. When the Home Rule Bill was re-introduced in the House of Commons on 9 June 1913, after its rejection by Lords in January, this cycle was to a large extent repeated. Redmond read to the House of Commons a letter to him from Theodore Roosevelt which said that the Home Rule Bill was a just settlement that, "bids fair to establish

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2 See Ford to Roosevelt, 23 Jan. 1913 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers, series I/box 239).

3 Bryan to Ford, 7 Feb. 1913 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers), also see footnote 1, p. 48 above.

good will amongst the English-speaking people," and he, like Bryan earlier in the year, stated that, "the measure is as much in the interest of Great Britain as it is of Ireland."¹

In the face of these warm comments there was some dissatisfaction or cynicism, even among the moderate constitutionalists. Bourke Cockran wrote uncomfortably to Moreton Frewen, "The indifference of the country Ireland to the Home Rule debate seems to me very significant." Cockran, along with some others, saw a certain lack of reality about the whole proceedings—a home rule measure which gave less than full autonomy to the Irish people and which was resisted by an anachronistic House of Lords in the face of a strong government majority.² This indifference had been noted by others as well. Some months earlier the New York Times said, "The issue is not nearly so 'live' as it has been," and the Living Age news magazine quoted a Tipperary farmer, in stage Irishman fashion, as saying, "Ah well, now, we're not greatly minding one way or the other," although he presumably admitted that this could not be said publicly.³ In order to keep support for home rule in America from melting away in apathy the Irish Press Agency in England had leaflets printed during 1913 which illustrated Ireland's political, economic, and moral capacities for self-government; these

¹Roosevelt to Redmond, n.d., Roosevelt letters, vii, p. 740, and Hansard 5 (commons), ii11, col. 1487. The letter was read in Parliament on 10 June 1913 but may have been written earlier. Roosevelt later defended his letter to his friend Arthur Hamilton Lee by saying that it had been prompted by Lord Bryce and that he felt that the removal of reluctant Irish members from Parliament would strengthen rather than weaken it. Roosevelt to Lee, 7 July 1913, Roosevelt, Roosevelt letters, op. cit.


leaflets were distributed in America by the United Irish League to sustain interest in the home rule movement.¹

Increasingly throughout 1913 American newspapers focused their attention on the activities of the Unionists rather than on the progress of the Home Rule Bill. The New York Times viewed the Unionists and the Ulster Volunteers as essentially political rather than military, saying, "it is not likely that 'military tactics' will be resorted to," and later, "The indications that the whole Ulster situation is a species of political bluff...grow plainer from day to day."² On the other hand the paper increasingly challenged the legitimacy of Asquith's policy because, it said, the British electorate had never specifically approved the Home Rule Bill as then drafted.³ In a sense the paper saw no way out of the dilemma, but it kept hoping that some kind of compromise—compromise being the genius of British politics—would be worked out for Ireland.⁴ Surprisingly the Living Age concluded that there was no real problem in Ireland; a business-like conference between the leaders of Belfast and Dublin, it was observed, could save the situation and allow reason to prevail over the seventeenth century religious antagonisms.⁵ The Literary Digest found the Ulster situation to be more potentially dangerous, and noted in greater detail the growth of the Ulster Volunteer force and the support it received

¹See Catholic University of America Archives, Fenian Materials, box 3.
²The New York Times found itself maintaining a very awkward position: having previously endorsed home rule and discounted Ulster resistance, the paper now approved of some option for Ulster exclusion. N.Y.T., 10 June and 28 Sept. 1913.
³Ibid., 17 July 1913.
⁴Ibid., 21 Sept. 1913 and 12 Feb. 1914.
from highly-placed peers and army officers. Actually American newspapers seemed slow to discuss either the Ulster or later the Irish Volunteers, in part because they did not take them seriously but also perhaps because they did not want to aggravate an already sensitive topic.

Before the Home Rule Bill was given its second reading on its final circuit, Michael J. Jordan, secretary of the UIL, asked prominent American politicians for favourable comments which would be cabled to Redmond and printed in the Irish World, however it was difficult to generate the enthusiasm of two years before. On 9 March 1914 the bill was given its second reading and Asquith offered the Unionists the compromise of the exclusion of Ulster, on the basis of county options, for a period of six years (during which time there would be another general election, perhaps on the issue of home rule). Carson rejected the proposals but he pointed out, what all acknowledged, that the principle of exclusion had been recognized. For the New York Times this recognition was a great step forward because it took account of Ulster militancy and also allowed the electorate another opportunity to speak on the matter. Charles McCarthy, the political theorist of the American Progressive movement, wrote his friend Sir Horace Plunkett to comment favourably on this spirit of compromise, which he wrongly attributed to Plunkett's influence—Plunkett favoured


2See Jordan to John Purroy Mitchel (Mayor of New York), 5 March 1914 (L.C., Mitchel Papers, box 6).

3N.Y.T., 11 March 1914.
inclusion for six years rather than exclusion.1 The historian and Massachusetts politician, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, explained to Moreton Frewen that the principle of exclusion was perfectly sound. "I believe and always have believed in Home Rule for Ireland," Lodge wrote, but he said, "I also believe in Home Rule for Ulster." Confessing his preference for American state federalism, Lodge defended home rule within home rule by the story of the separation of Massachusetts and Maine. "If you are going to have home rule and local self-government," Lodge said, "it must be applied fairly to all."2

To Irish-Americans, even very moderate home rulers like W. Bourke Cockran and John Quinn, the proposal of the temporary exclusion of Ulster seemed like a calamitous concession rather than a wise compromise. On 25 March Cockran sent the first of several worried letters to Frewen specifically discussing the proposed exclusion of Ulster. He was appalled that, "A proposal that the Island be dismembered has not only been considered, but actually accepted by the Irish Nationalist party." This blow caused irreparable damage to Irish nationalism, Cockran said, because it was authorized by those Irishmen, "acknowledged to be leaders." Irish-Americans, Cockran insisted, had been "shocked beyond expression," and in New York large meetings had been held to protest against the "dismemberment of the Island."3 In his disillusion with the home rule leaders, Cockran could only admire the Ulster Unionists who at least seemed willing to fight for what they

1 McCarthy to Plunkett, ca. March 1914 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 14).
2 Lodge to Frewen, 25 March 1914 (L.C., Frewen Papers, box 42).
3 It is significant that Cockran did not mention the more spectacular Curragh affair which then held the attention of native Americans. Cockran to Frewen, 25 March 1914 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 16).
believed. "I don't think there is a Catholic in any of the four Provinces who does not feel keen admiration for the manner in which these men of the North have made the Government which is supposed to rule them, treat with them—actually capitulate to them," he wrote to Frewen on 19 May. 1 Similarly John Quinn found himself infuriated with the Irish Parliamentary party and the Liberal government, while grudgingly admiring the Unionists with which he violently disagreed on principle. "I regard English politics and even Irish politics, outside of those few Protestants of the North, as simply beneath contempt, weak, flabby, cowardly," he wrote to George Russell on 2 July. Quinn hoped that people like Russell, Plunkett, Hyde, Yeats, and O'Grady would unite Ireland and make it prosper in defiance of the politicians. 2

Perhaps Cockran was typical of an increasing number of Irish-Americans when he told Frewen, "If a revolt [against Redmond] were started in Ireland, I think the Irish in America would support it to a man." 3 Certainly Cockran seemed to anticipate the Irish-American reaction to the Parliamentary party after the beginning of World War I and again after the Easter Week rebellion.

To native Americans the Curragh incident overshadowed the subtle complaints of more involved Irish-Americans. The Literary Digest said bluntly, "The old question of who shall rule Great Britain—royalty,

1Cockran revealed his essential moderation by telling Frewen that although he knew of no instance where a people of different religions and ethnic origins had been separated and then reunited into one nation, "if the only alternative to partition of the Island be subjugation of one section to the other, I should hesitate long before approving either course." Cockran to Frewen, 19 May 1914 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 16).

2Reid, The man from New York, p. 185.

3Cockran to Frewen, 25 March 1914 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 16).
aristocracy, or democracy—is reopened by the revolt and resignation of army officers ordered to duty in Ulster, and their reinstatement by the King's influence." As for home rule in all of Ireland, the Digest observed, "the attempt to coerce Ulster, if there was one, is at a stand still....Naturally the Unionists are exultant." The New York Times saw the crisis as the result of the government's failure to manage events. Asquith had had two choices, the paper felt: he could have coerced Ulster without concessions or he could have made concessions and excluded Ulster; he failed to do either. Increasingly critical of the Asquith government, the New York Times noted "weakness in the speeches of the Secretary of War and the Prime Minister," in their explanation of the incident. Nonetheless during the next few days the paper suggested that the policy of not forcing the issue was gaining time, "and time makes for peace." By 29 March the paper felt once again that home rule was certain and that Ulster was bluffing. A. Lawrence Lowell, the president of Harvard University, saw in the Curragh incident an indication that the government rather than Ulster was bluffing and that Asquith would not force the home rule question. "I surmise," Lowell said to Lord Bryce on 22 May, "that the Government has made up its mind that Ulster cannot be made to submit to Home Rule by force, and that some concessions must be made to conciliate Ulster; or, at least, the Conservatives." Still

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1 Lit. Dig., xlvii, no. 14 (4 April 1914), pp 747-48 and no. 15 (11 April 1914), pp 813-14. The Digest also made the point that because of their prosperity the Irish people were really not interested in home rule anyway; the Liberal government was simply determined to stay in power through Irish votes and the Conservatives were intent on using Ireland as a means of throwing the government out. Lit. Dig., xlvii, no. 25 (20 June 1914), p. 1477.

2 N.Y.T., 24, 25, and 29 March 1914.
Lowell did not rule out the possibility of a civil war and he asked Bryce if the government had not erred by appearing to make the first move in reinforcing Ulster. ¹

Perhaps some of the most remarkable opinions on the Ulster situation were to be found in the reactions of the American ambassadors to Great Britain and Germany and of President Wilson himself. Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in London, candidly admitted to President Wilson that, "If I were an Ulsterman, I fear I, too, should object to being bound to the body of Dublin," although he considered the Liberal-Conservative political struggle to be more important than home rule, Ulster or the Curragh incident and to be the real crux of the problem. "The Conservatives have used Ulster and its Army as a club," Page wrote, "to drive the Liberals out of power; and they have gone to the very brink of civil war. They don't really care about Ulster. I doubt whether they care much about Home Rule." What was really behind the Unionist resistance to the Liberal-Irish coalition, Page believed, was the whole Liberal program. "It's the Lloyd George programme that infuriates them, and Ulster and anti-Home Rule are mere weapons to stop the general Liberal revolution, if they can...."²

The American Ambassador to Germany, James W. Gerard, took a much less serious or even analytical view of the Irish crisis. "The raising of the Ulster army by Sir Edward Carson," was, he wrote several years later, "one of the most gigantic political bluffs in all history,"

¹Lowell to Bryce, 22 May 1914, and Bryce to Lowell, 17 June 1914, (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol 8, fol 49 and vol 22, fol 255-56).
²Page to Wilson, 1 May 1914 (Harvard University Library, Page Papers, bms Am 1090,1/35).
and he dismissed it easily by insisting that it "had no more revolut-

ionary or military significance than a torch-light parade during one
of our presidential campaigns..."1 President Wilson presumably re-
graded the situation more soberly, and perhaps saw more clearly the
fundamental threat that the Ulster movement posed to the institutions
of democratic government. According to Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson said
of Carson, "I would show this rebel whether he would recognize the
authority of the Government or flaunt it. He ought to be hanged for
treason." Wilson felt that if Asquith did not act "firmly" the "un-
rest and rebellion in Ireland will spread..." but that the strong
assertion of the government's legitimate power "would force a settle-
ment of the Irish question right now." Wilson was certain that Andrew
Jackson could have dealt with the situation.2

Although the growing tension in Ireland, superimposed upon the
Ulster exclusion scheme and the Curragh incident, were the first of
several blows for many of the moderate Irish-American nationalists, a
certain optimism persisted among native Americans who felt that some
kind of satisfactory compromise would most certainly be worked out.
By July the new factor of the Irish Volunteers was recognized, but not
fully understood. But the news of the gun-running at Howth and the
firing of British troops at a Dublin crowd on 26 July was greeted with
alarm by the New York Times in headlines, second in size only to the
news from Eastern Europe, "BRITISH TROOPS SHED FIRST BLOOD IN ULSTER

1 J. W. Gerard, My four years in Germany (New York, 1917), p. 100.
2 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, p. 397.
The papers condemned the Asquith government for allowing such a dangerous predicament to develop. At that point, of course, World War I intervened and the attention of American newspapers was largely turned away from Ireland by the events of epic dimension taking place in Europe; Irish politics were not analyzed in detail again until the Easter rebellion.

(11)

The rising power and prestige of the Irish Parliamentary party, following the elections of 1910, underscored the comparative decline of the revolutionary Irish nationalists both at home and in America. The interval between 1900 and 1910, while also one of reconstruction, was a period of anxious waiting for an opportune moment in which to initiate a revolutionary program in Ireland. The Clan-na-Gael did not abdicate its role of revolutionary leadership among the Irish-Americans, and even among the IRB, but it was forced into a relatively passive position as constitutionalism prospered and living conditions in Ireland slowly improved. The beginning of 1910 found the Clan leaders still waiting for some kind of disaster which would defeat the Liberal government or separate the Liberals from the Irish Parliamentary party. This anxious hope that something might develop is seen in the letter of John T. Ryan, a leading Clan figure and lawyer from Buffalo, who wrote John Devoy on the eve of the January election in 1910:

If the results show Conservative gains to such an extent as to forecast the defeat of the Liberals,

1N.Y.T., 27 and 26 May, 11 and 27 July 1914.
2Ibid., 29 July 1914.
The results of the election were not so obliging; the Conservatives did indeed make such gains as to weaken the Liberals, but of course this only served to strengthen the power of the Irish Parliamentary party.

The Clan's problems were a mixture of membership, money, and policy, all of which were inter-related. Being oath-bound and semi-secret the Clan could not make the broadly-based appeal for members of the UIL or the AOH. Thus, money, most easily raised from members, became difficult to obtain, and indeed, while this situation improved in 1914, the Clan still did not have the operating revenues it wanted by as late as 1916.2 The most immediately important problem however was the creation of a viable program of action which could compete with the increasingly successful home rule program; without a strongly competitive program there would be no new members or money. The desperation of the situation was recognized by both Devoy and John T. Keating, two of the three members of the Revolutionary Directory.

"Nearly ten years of struggle," Keating wrote Devoy on 22 January 1910, "and we are reaching what seems to be the end." They agreed that continued anxious waiting would destroy the Clan. "You have stated the case very plainly 'another period of mere negative policy' seems to be before us 'and will kill us if too much prolonged.' Worst

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1Ryan to Devoy, 14 Jan. 1910 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box RU-S).
2Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, p. 393.
of all I can see no alternative within our reach."¹ By 1913 this crisis had still not been overcome. The practice of rejecting the parliamentary solutions while waiting for better times allowed the revolutionary concept of Irish nationalism to drift into obscurity. Dr William Carroll, the old Fenian and Clan leader from Philadelphia, bitterly illuminated the results of this policy to Devoy on 7 February 1913:

The dark side of the prospect here and oversea is not so much what Lloyd George, Redmond and Michael J. Ryan propose, but the fact that there and here the Irish people accept and applaud their betrayal of everything national they once professed to advocate.²

Perhaps in recognition of the undeniable strength and popularity of the prospect of immediate home rule, the Clan in March 1913 began shifting its policy to one of partial compromise. While continuing to condemn home rule as, "a fraud and a cheat," the Clan published in a circular that it had no objection to the Irish people "making whatever use they can" of it.³

In this situation the Clan and the revolutionary Irish-Americans turned to several activities which they hoped might weaken the constitutional nationalists or the British Empire. Throughout the late nineteenth century the Irish-Americans had been instrumental in obstructing

¹Keating to Devoy, 22 Jan. 1910 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box J-L). Also see Keating to Devoy, 11 Nov. 1911, for suggestions as to how to maintain control of the Clan and keep up interest. (Ibid.).

²Carroll to Devoy, 7 Feb. 1913, Devoy’s post-bag, 11, pp 403-04.

³Clan-na-Gael circular, March 1913 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box U. B.). One of the major arguments of the circular was that Redmond had no right to say that home rule would be the final settlement of the Irish question, another was that Redmond was wrong in claiming that home rule would permit an Anglo-American rapprochement.
any complete rapprochement between Great Britain and the United States, and during the early twentieth century the revolutionary Irish-Americans rather tentatively joined forces with German-Americans to defeat efforts to establish harmonious Anglo-American relations. The Clan threw itself into the task of defeating the Anglo-American arbitration treaty which came before the United States Senate during 1911 and 1912, and by 11 August 1911 Irish activity was so great that Keating reported to Devoy that in the Chicago area, "all our energies were being used to defeat the treaty,"¹ Such work was perfectly suited to the vigorous anglophobe rhetoric of the Clan which launched a letter campaign to members of Congress urging the defeat of the treaty because of its threat to America's freedom of action; Devoy also distributed to all the Senators reprinted pages from Ambassador Bryce's book, American commonwealth, showing his critical view of the Senate's control of foreign affairs. The Senate killed the treaty by so amending it that President Taft refused to sign it, and while they had amended it ostensibly to protect America's

¹Keating to Devoy, 11 Aug. 1911 and 23 May 1911, and "Petition of the United German-American and United Irish-American Societies of New York to the United States Senate," 20 May 1911 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box J-L and box James Larkin). The new British Ambassador was quick to observe the potential of extended Irish-German co-operation in America: "An alliance between Irish and German votes would be a most serious factor in a presidential election and no presidential candidate can afford to ignore it." C. Spring Rice, Memorandum on "Arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain," (P.R.O., F.O. 800/83).
vital interest, it was felt that the Irish and Germans had encouraged them.¹

Less successful was the Clan's attempt to defend legislation exempting American merchant ships from the tolls paid for use of the Panama Canal. This law, passed by Congress in 1912 and endorsed by the Democratic party, was found to be in violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901) between Great Britain and the United States wherein America agreed not to take unfair advantage of her control of the canal. Led by Senator James A. O'Gorman of New York and backed by the Clan, indignant Irish-Americans argued at large public meetings and in petitions sent to Congress that because America had built the canal American ships should be given free passage, that to charge American ships would put them at a disadvantage to British ships, and that any compromise on the question was "truckling" to Great Britain.² Although Congress was treated to many violent speeches by Irish, German, and Tammany hall politicians, both houses passed the administration's measure in early 1914 making the tolls for American ships equal to those of other nations.³ The defeat of Irish-American efforts in this inst-


ance prompted Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Britain's nervous, Anglo-Irish Ambassador in Washington, to observe that the political strength of the Irish in America was declining. "The Irish vote is not as well organized or as important as it was," he wrote to Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's secretary, "mainly because the immigration has slackened and the Irishman becomes an American after two generations"; in fact he had noted earlier that the Jewish-Americans were much more powerful.¹

A few weeks later, after the Curragh incident, Spring Rice reported more cautiously that the unresolved Irish question gave American Anglophobes a convenient basis for their hostility. "What I think we ought not to lose sight of," he said to Tyrrell, "is that speaking generally an unfriendly feeling exists in this country against England, that a great interest is excited by Irish affairs, and that American unfriendliness to England may and most probably will have serious results should affairs in Ireland become worse."²

Co-operation between the Irish revolutionaries in America and the German-Americans was the logical by-product of the naval crises of the early twentieth century and of the growing rivalry between Great Britain and Germany. Groups of Germans and Irish had worked together to defeat the Anglo-American arbitration treaties; moreover in the face of deteriorating Anglo-German relations the Irish revolutionaries increasingly looked to Germany as that European power, replacing the historical roles of Spain, France, and more recently Russia, which might

¹Spring Rice to Tyrrell, 17 Feb. 1914 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/84), and Spring Rice to Tyrrell, 27 Jan. 1914, The letters and friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, ed. S. Gwynn (London, 1929), ii, p. 201 (hereafter referred to as Spring Rice letters).
²Spring Rice to Tyrrell, 30 March 1914 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/84).
best secure Irish independence from Great Britain. Irish-American newspapers, led by Devoy's Gaelic American, speculated cheerfully about the possibility of Germany's destruction of Britain's world position and the implications that such German victory would have for Ireland.¹ When the Cunard and White Star steamship lines declared that Queenstown harbour was not safe for their ships, Irish-Americans rallied behind Sir Roger Casement's efforts to make Queenstown a regular port-of-call for the German Hamburg-Amerika line. Such a move would not only snub the British lines and open Ireland for German investment, but it would also work to re-integrate Ireland into the European continent, by-passing the British Isles. Irish-American reaction to the final German decision not to send a ship to Ireland perhaps because of British diplomatic pressure gave rise to particularly bitter outcries.²

Still another area in which the revolutionary Irish-Americans worked was helping to support some of the small nationalist groups which had grown up in Ireland since 1890 outside the Irish Parliamentary party. The Clan found the Gaelic League a useful medium of expression for revolutionary ideas both in the United States and Ireland, and in fact in 1911 the Gaelic League and the Clan worked so closely together that Devoy complained, "The time of our men is constantly

¹ For example, "We Irish in America would be glad to hear that England had suffered defeat and disaster at the hands of Germany." Chicago Citizen, 7 Jan. 1911, cited in Cambrey, Irish affairs and the home rule question, p. 134; and R.M. Henry, The evolution of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1920), p. 160. Also see U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, Hearings on the National German American Alliance, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, pp 63 and 126-27.

taken up with raising money for the League, to the neglect of our own work." The joint membership of many of the revolutionary leaders, such as Bulmer Hobson and Diarmuid Lynch, in the Gaelic League, the Gaelic Athletic Association, Sinn Fein, and other nationalist organizations made close relations natural. In late February 1914 Lynch and Thomas Ashe began a successful tour in the United States with the support and co-operation of the Clan to raise money for the league in Ireland; Lynch was also carrying out a mission for the IRB and Daniel F. Cohalan, then a New York Supreme Court Judge and an important Clan leader, presided at one of their important meetings at the Gaelic League headquarters in New York. Bulmer Hobson provided Patrick H. Pearse with introductions to Devoy and Judge Cohalan when Pearse travelled to the United States in 1913-14 to raise money for St Enda's College; Pearse established important contacts with Clan leaders in various parts of the country. Hobson himself came to America in January 1914 to bring Devoy a memorandum on the situation in Ireland to be presented to the German Ambassador; while in the United States Hobson spoke at Clan-sponsored meetings, sometimes accompanying Pearse.

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1 Devoy to Cohalan, 29 Nov. 1911; Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 125-26; Lynch, The IRB and the 1916 insurrection, p. 19.

2 GeÁE, 7 March and 18 April 1914; Lynch, op. cit., p. 24. Some home rulers such as W. Bourke Cockran, Judge Martin J. Keogh, and John Quinn were also important in American Gaelic League circles, but the home rule movement was not as concerned with these kinds of cultural affairs as the Clan. See also Dr William Carroll to Devoy, Devoy's post-bag, 11, pp 403-04; American Committee of the Gaelic League of Ireland to Theodore Roosevelt, 19 April 1913 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers, series I/box 247); Reid, The man from New York, pp 109-110.

benefit Ireland, such as the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Irish Industrial Development Societies and Sir Horace Plunkett’s rural co-operative movement. It eventually turned away from Sinn Fein, after the adoption of Griffith’s “Hungarian Analogy,” and, as a result of the American tour of the Abbey Players, with their productions of Synge’s “Playboy of the Western World” and other controversial plays, the Clan was less enthusiastic about the Irish literary movement.

According to J.B. Yeats, Devoy himself attacked one Irish play by standing up during the performance and shouting, “Son of a b-tch, that’s not Irish!”; both Yeats and John Quinn agreed that Devoy was an “old fool.”

These various activities— influencing American foreign policy, creating a working relationship with the German-Americans, and supporting small Irish organizations—had some moderate success. Indeed it may be said that such organizations as the Gaelic League and Sinn Fein did in fact create a climate in Ireland in which a revolution could take place, although the German-Irish alliance in America was not effective until the war. On the other hand, in spite of the defeated arbitration treaties Clan attempts to direct American foreign policy failed to prevent the United States from drifting into closer co-operation and eventually into joint participation in the war. In fact these efforts may well have been counter-productive—alienating native Americans who might have been sympathetic, but who felt the normal

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course of American foreign policy was being obstructed. None of these activities directly forwarded the revolutionary movement, as the Clan leaders were painfully aware. This declining situation seems to have been very much altered by the creation in Ireland of the Irish Volunteers, and of course still more so by the complicated situation in Ireland growing out of the beginning of World War I.

The founding of the Irish Volunteers on 25 November 1913 seemed to find the leaders of the revolutionary Irish-Americans unprepared, and even the presence in the United States in early 1914 of Patrick H. Pearse and Bulmer Hobson failed to stimulate the Clan to immediate action. The *Gaelic American* published favourable editorials on the Volunteers as early as 3 January and also printed news and information about developments in Ireland, but no action seems to have been taken. In April 1914 The O'Rahilly made a direct appeal to Devoy for assistance, explaining the great potential of the situation in Ireland and the need for money from friends in America to exploit it. "If the sincere Irish in America will not help us in this situation," he said, "they will have neglected the greatest opportunity of a century." O'Rahilly's letter prompted a discussion among the Irish-American leaders as to what should be done, however caution rather than opportunism characterized their reactions. Patrick O'Mara, a New Jersey Clan leader, thought the Irish Volunteers would be under-financed, weakly imitative, victimized by both the British army and the

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1See Page letters, ii, p. 267.


3The O'Rahilly to Devoy, 6 April 1914, *Devoy's post-bag*, ii, p. 426; Tansill, *America and the fight for Irish freedom*, p. 158.
Ulster Volunteers, and that they would obscure the real issue of independence by quarreling with the Orangemen.\(^1\) John T. Ryan wrote Devoy from Buffalo that he had some reservations about the members of the provisional committee, though he did feel, "The movement is of a character that should be encouraged..."\(^2\) The old Fenian, Colonel Ricard O'Sullivan Burke, was the most enthusiastic; although his principle argument was that the Clan should not allow any other Irish-American organization to become the source of American support.\(^3\)

Months continued to go by and the Irish-American leaders still did not make a move to give any direct assistance, despite their talk. Perhaps in this instance Irish-Americans in general were more aggressive than their leaders. In any case the frustration and anger at the slowness of the organization to respond can be seen in the letter of a Philadelphia district Clan secretary who wrote to James Reidy, Devoy's assistant at the *Gaelic American*:

> The organization in this dist. feel very much aggrieved at the indifference displayed by the organization in this Country to the exhortations of our brothers in Ireland to supply them with arms to defend their country. It was the consensus of opinion at the meeting that we sell the Irish-American Club and send the proceeds to the men who are willing to do something that will redound to the credit of Irish Nationalists through out the Universe. It was stated by some of the brothers, that if something is not done, and done immediately, the best thing our organization could do, is to disband and let some body of men take our place who are competent of taking advantage of such a

\(^1\)O'Mara to Devoy, 1 May 1914, *Devoy's post-bag*, ii, p. 433.


condition of affairs as that which exists in Ireland today.

The district threatened to "act" on its own if the executive of the Clan did not respond to its demands. Effective action was taken by 6 June 1914 when a large meeting was called in New York, drawing participants from as far west as the Dakotas, for the purpose of creating the American Provisional Committee, Irish National Volunteers; they elected Joseph McGarrity, General Denis F. Collins, Denis A. Spellissy, and Patrick J. Griffin and established the American Volunteer Fund to buy weapons for Ireland.

Before much work could be done in the United States, however, Redmond forced his nominees upon the provisional committee in Dublin; this threw many revolutionary Irish-Americans into considerable confusion. Judge O'Neill Ryan of St Louis lamented to Devoy, "I do not know where 'we are at' on this Volunteer question." It appeared to him and to many other Irish leaders that the revolutionaries in Ireland had lost control of the Volunteers and that Redmond would now be able to divert into the Parliamentary party the funds intended to arm the Volunteers. Ryan further complained, "we will be co-operating with the U.I.L..." which was most unpalatable to physical force people after a generation of vituperation. Notwithstanding their doubts about

1 F. Tobin to Reidy, 19 May 1914 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box T-Z).

2 G.A., 6 June 1914. It should be noted, however, that by June more than six months had passed since the founding of the Volunteers in Dublin. Ward suggests that the creation of the Ulster Volunteers in 1911 saved revolutionary nationalism, but in the United States the prospects and the activities of the Irish-American revolutionaries did not begin to improve significantly until well after the Irish Volunteers had been started in 1913-14. See Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, p. 70.

3 Ryan to Devoy, 30 June 1914, Devoy's post-bag, ii, p. 453.
the reliability of any organization associated with Redmond, the committee in New York cabled Eoin MacNeill $5000 on 24 June. On 5 July they re-assembled to make their committee permanent (rather than provisional) and to send a cable of assurance to MacNeill; they also sent a very frank cable to Redmond in which they sceptically asked how he could apply to America for arms when he had approved of the British ban on arms importation into Ireland. Perhaps most surprisingly, given the fact that McGarrity was the chairman of the committee and the first signator of the cable, they counselled Redmond to demand the implementation of home rule ("such as it is") to all of Ireland and to make "any concession to Ulster Protestants which would allay their distrust of an Irish national government...." Thus while obviously not pleased by the situation, the committee revealed its willingness to continue its work with the Volunteers, and they revealed also a degree of moderation that is not generally ascribed to such militants as McGarrity.  

Moderation aside, many of the revolutionaries were outraged that the Provisional Committee in Dublin had capitulated to Redmond. Devoy sent an acrimonious letter to Bulmer Hobson on 3 July stating that by voting for the Parliamentary nominees he had weakened the movement in Ireland and America by allowing new factions to develop. Hobson's vote to accept the Redmond candidates, Devoy wrote, "places us and you on utterly divergent lines of action...." Hobson was dropped as a

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1 Minutes of a meeting of the American Volunteer Fund Committee, 5 July 1914 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box Misc.); Cable from the American Volunteer Fund Committee to Redmond, 6 July 1914 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers); B. Hobson, A short history of the Irish Volunteers (Dublin, 1918), pp 130-31. This degree of moderation, while perhaps surprising, is not inconsistent with the sentiments of the Clan circular of March 1913 discussed earlier in this chapter (see above, p. 66).

2 Devoy to Hobson, 3 July 1914, Devoy's post-bag, ii, p. 458.
correspondent in Ireland for the Gaelic American, despite his own defence. It was the arguments of Sir Roger Casement, who had arrived in the United States on 20 July to raise money for the Volunteers, that finally convinced the Clan leaders of the expediency of the compromise. As Casement wrote to Mrs Alice Stopford Green shortly after his arrival, "I think I've put it straight now -- Devoy admits a change of view..." But the frustration of the revolutionaries was still apparent as illustrated by Peter Golden's poem "Send Us, O God! The Revolution." The Supreme Council of the IRB had never reconciled itself to the compromise of MacNeill, Hobson, Casement and others, and they sent Dr Patrick McCartan on a mission to the Clan leaders in America to argue their point of view. That McCartan did not arrive in America until after the Howth gun-running, for which Casement claimed and received full credit among the Irish-American leaders, diminished the force of the Supreme Council's protests.

Meanwhile the worst fears of the revolutionaries seemed confirmed when Michael J. Ryan of the UIL, acting on Redmond's instructions, announced the creation of a new fund-raising drive for the Volunteers, advertised and carried out through the pages of the Irish World. On 16 July a UIL national committee meeting was held in New York and $10,000 were raised and sent to Redmond, $100,000 were pledged, and a goal of $1,000,000 was declared. The revolutionary Irish-Americans

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1 Casement to Mrs Green, 26 July 1914 (N. L. I., A. S. Green Papers, MSS 19464/10); Devoy's post-bag, 11, p. 463; and Hobson, Ireland yesterday and tomorrow, p. 53.

2 G. A., 11 July 1914.

3 Extracts from the papers of the late Dr Patrick McCartan," Part Two, Clogher Rec., v, no. 2 (1964), p. 189; Casement to Cockran, 27 July 1914 (N. Y. P. L., Cockran Papers, box 17).

felt that the UIL fund was established to rival the American Volunteer Fund, with the aim of diminishing the amount of money which could be collected in America to obtain weapons. They further maintained that money sent to the UIL fund would go into the coffers of the Irish Parliamentary party and not go for arms. Within two weeks a campaign was launched by the UIL and the AOH through the Irish World and by the circulation of pledge forms. The fact that these forms—including letters of appeal from Michael J. Ryan, president of the UIL, and James J. Regan, the outgoing president of the AOH—indicated that the contribution would be sent to "the Irish Parliamentary Fund" confirmed their suspicions in the belief that the money would simply go to Redmond and not to purchase rifles.  

Casement, who had counselled compromise with Redmond, shrewdly warned his American friends to "Please remember that money sent to Redmond for arming Volunteers is money in doubt."  

Although the revolutionaries saw the efforts of the UIL to raise money for the Volunteers as an insidious plan to spread confusion among the serious nationalists in America, the immediate contributions of the constitutional Irish-Americans were deceivingly successful to outside observers. Because of the relative positions of the Clan and the UIL the latter were far better prepared to undertake a national campaign to raise money across the country. Furthermore, the UIL attrac—

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1 See Irish Volunteer Fund circular, ca. 23 July 1914 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box Misc.) and Robert E. Ford, circular letter, 28 July 1914 (Ibid., box E-J); and Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, p. 393.

ted the support of such moderate groups as the AOH which might not have followed the Clan's leadership. The American press tended to see Redmond as giving strength to a previously weak organization. The new Volunteers with Redmond's patronage were regarded by the New York Times as a serious force and every bit as intransigent as the Ulster Volunteers. The Literary Digest saw Redmond's joining the Volunteers as another ominous step in the deteriorating situation in Ireland; later it suggested that neither force need be taken altogether seriously, but clearly it was concerned. Certainly the British Embassy found this new situation potentially dangerous. Reports were sent back to the Foreign Office throughout late June and July showing a

1 The participation of the AOH was not then altogether surprising, as it had become increasingly politically orientated (and would become more so under the leadership of Joseph A. McLaughlin). While its present president James J. Regan pledged the support of the organization to Redmond, Sir Roger Casement, who attended the national convention in Norfolk in late July, observed that "all here without exception almost are against Redmond's surrender to Ulster and a very little thing now would rent the Party irrecoverably with the Irish in America." Devoy, he said, "speaks for the prob [sic] majority I think--& it is absurd for Redmond to claim that he has the Irish here behind him." Casement to Mrs Green, 26 July 1914 (N.L.I., A.S. Green Papers, MSS 10,464/10).

2 N.Y.T., 11 July 1914.

3 Lit. Dig., xlix, no. 2 (11 July 1914), pp 53-54, and no. 3 (18 July 1914), p. 98.

4 As early as 30 December 1913 Spring Rice had pointed out to Grey that if there were civil conflict in Ireland the Irish-Americans would be quick to respond to it. At the height of the Curragh incident he again warned that, "Should there be fighting in Ireland men and guns will almost certainly be sent from America." Grey seemed muddled by this information and could not figure out "to whom the men & guns will be sent." No instructions were sent to Spring Rice, but he was told that if fighting did indeed break out in Ireland his request for instructions "will be born in mind." C. Spring Rice to Grey, 30 Dec. 1913 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/83) and C. Spring Rice to F.O., 26 March 1914 (see also Minute of the same date), and Tyrrell to Spring Rice, 28 March 1914 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/84).
marked increase in activity among the Irish community. The Pennsylvania Federation of Irish County Societies endorsed Redmond, the party and the Irish Volunteers; the Philadelphia AOH collected $4000 for the Volunteers to be added to the $5000 they had already collected; Michael J. Ryan announced that the UIL planned to raise a million dollars. This activity called for some reconsideration of the strength of the Irish-American organizations by the Foreign Office. Lord Eustace Percy noted that "This shows that when the occasion is sensational enough funds can still be raised in America for Ireland," although he did admit that it did not seem to amount to as much money as in previous years.

The object of Casement's trip to the United States in July had been to obtain assistance for the Volunteers and to explain the compromise with Redmond. While he worked to raise money, he candidly declared that what he wanted were rifles and men rather than cash; as for Redmond, he cautioned that there could be no trust but that temporary co-operation was necessary. This policy was vindicated by the success of the gun-running at Howth Harbour on 26 July. It was a bold step that few Irish nationalists, regardless of their precise sentiments, could fail to support. Devoy told Casement that it was "the greatest deed done in Ireland for 100 years." It made the Volun-

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1 See the growing British concern as registered in the following dispatches: Colville Barclay to F.O., 5 July 1914 and 20 July 1914 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2187) and R.L. Nosworthy to Grey, 13 July 1914 (P.R. O., F.O. 371/2185).

2 Minute by Percy, 15 July 1914, on Colville Barclay to F.O., 5 July 1914 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2187).

3 Casement to Devoy, 21 July 1914, Devoy's post-bag, 11, p. 463; Casement to Cockran, 27 July 1914 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 17).

4 Casement to Mrs Green, 29 July 1914 (N.L.I., A.S. Green Papers, MSS 10,464/10).
teers, whatever the composition of the Provisional Committee, a serious and popular organization among the American Irish. Casement's knighthood, reputation, and religion were exceptional for an Irish leader and perhaps because of this he managed to attract the support of many moderate Irish-Americans for the Volunteers. In New York he stayed with John Quinn, who had access to many levels of public life; and Quinn also arranged for W. Bourke Cockran to go to the national convention of the AOH in Norfolk with Casement, where the two made well received speeches on the Volunteers. Through the efforts of the Clan, Casement addressed meetings in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, and New York.

If the Irish-Americans needed anything to stimulate their support for the Volunteer movement the shooting by British troops into the crowds at Bachelor's Walk, Dublin, provided it. Large public meetings were held in many Irish-American centres to denounce the incident; in Philadelphia Devoy and Casement were among the principle speakers at a protest meeting. To many Irish-Americans the shootings were simply one more point in a seven-hundred-year-old argument against British

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1 It also coincided with the maturation of the various fund raising activities in the United States so that $5000 was cabled to Mac Neill the following day. Hobson has said that the Volunteers never lacked money after Howth. Hobson, A short history of the Irish Volunteers, p. 65.

2 Casement won Quinn's support for the Volunteers and Quinn in turn wrote to Mayor John Purroy Mitchel, the grandson of the Young Irelander John Mitchel, "In view of the open arming and treason of Ulster...The only hope [for home rule] is the arming of the National Volunteers." Quinn to Mitchel, 31 July 1914 (L.C., Mitchel Papers, box 7).

3 Casement to Mrs Green, 26 July 1914 (N.L.I., A.S. Green Papers, MSS 10,464/10); Reid, The man from New York, pp 187-89. After the war started Quinn, whose sentiments became violently anti-German, broke with Casement.

4 Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, pp 416-17.
rule in Ireland. "The blood of these murdered people," the Gaelic
American wrote, "is the price that Ireland pays for victory in the
first skirmish in a war for National Independence which must be fou-
ght to the finish." The Irish people and their kin in America would
not forget this "wanton butchery," the paper went on, even in the
moment of joy at having successfully landed German rifles.¹ The
Irish World, of course, condemned it also, and compared this "massa-
cre" with the Boston Massacre; the issues of liberty and independence
were the same as those of the American revolution.² Such native Amer-
ican papers as the New York Times were shocked by the shootings:
"The first blood has been shed by British soldiers, who fired not on
the rebels of the North, but on the loyal upholders of Irish Home
Rule, who following the example of Ulster, were providing themselves
with arms in case of an emergency." In comparison with the British
government's reaction to the Curragh incident, the Larne gun-running,
and the inflammatory statements of Carson and his followers, the Bach-
elor's Walk shootings appeared to both native Americans and Irish-
Americans as foolish, incompetent, and patently unjust.³ But the grow-
ing war crisis in Europe diverted the attention of American newspapers
from further comment or speculation on the events at Howth and Dublin.

¹G.B., 1 Aug. 1914.
²Irish World, 1 Aug. 1914.
³N.Y.T., 29 July 1914.
World War I drew British attention away from the Irish crisis; civil war in 1914 was avoided, and superficially it seemed as though the war crisis had created unity in Ireland and England. Parliament appeared to satisfy the Unionists by maintaining the status quo. And indeed some in the government were moved to support the passage of the bill expressly because of the favourable effect it might have in the United States. ¹ While the passage of home rule was a gesture, unconvincing to the cynical, it did allow people to believe what they chose, and its effects were not without some force in America where many people henceforth spoke of home rule as an accomplished fact.

Redmond's efforts to demonstrate the loyalty of the nationalists and the unity of the United Kingdom actually resulted in bringing into the open the issue of Ireland's relationship with England and the Empire. Redmond, as well as Parnell before him, had often been able to give diverse impressions to various audiences about the nature of the British connection after the enactment of home rule. The circumstances of the war, however, forced Redmond to define this relationship immediately by aligning Ireland with England. Thus it became increasingly clear to Irish-Americans—certainly it became clear to the leaders of the moderate groups like the UIL—that the relationship was far closer in-

¹ Asquith reported to the king that in the Cabinet meetings to decide to pass the Home Rule Bill, "Sir E. Grey laid especial stress, in view of the situation in the United States, upon the necessity at the earliest foreseeable date of putting the Irish Bill on the Statute Book, though not into immediate operation." Minutes of Cabinet meeting "Thursday and yesterday," 12 Sept. 1914 (P.R.O., CAB. 41/35/43).
deed than had been imagined. Redmond's loyalty to the hated British Empire seemed to many to be a betrayal of the ideals of Irish nationality. In retrospect, the passage of the Home Rule Bill was no resolution of the Irish question, as many in America hoped, rather it was the beginning of the gradual decline of constitutionalism in Ireland and America.

As native Americans became largely preoccupied with the course of the war, the Irish question diminished in importance. Such comment as there was concentrated on the surprising degree to which Ireland and loyally supported Great Britain. The extent to which the passions that had created the civil war tensions in Ireland were directed towards the war with Germany was regarded as amazing. The New York Times noted shortly after the war had begun that British fears that "the union of the kingdom would be imperiled and its strength for defense impaired," by Irish home rule were completely unfounded; in fact, "the Irish, without distinction of party, section, or religion, were absolutely united and were all equally loyal to the national cause."¹ The Philadelphia North American said it now seemed incredible that British Tories could have believed, "that Irishmen were disloyal...and that self-government would alienate them from the empire."² The New York Herald thought that the Irish were given an opportunity to prove their good faith to the British and that if they kept Redmond's promises they would certainly do so.³ Theodore Roosevelt, writ-

¹N.Y.T., 12 Aug. 1914.
²The war from this side (Philadelphia, 1915), i, p. 163 (this book was made up of editorials from the Philadelphia North American; the editorial quoted was published on 24 Sept. 1914).
³N.Y. Herald, 18 Sept. 1914.
ing to his friend Arthur Hamilton Lee, said, "the attitude of the Irish in this business, the war has been fine, and of good omen to the British Empire."¹ Irishmen were reported by the Literary Digest as enthusiastic in support of Redmond and the war effort; the magazine pointed out that the Irish accepted the temporary postponement of home rule, but that they regarded home rule as a fact.²

But it was precisely Redmond’s degree of loyalty to Great Britain that many Irish-Americans found difficult to accept and which cost the Irish Parliamentary party the support of the two pillars of his strength in the United States—the Irish World and the UIL. The Irish World began to waver as early as mid-August when Redmond and Devlin held talks with Lord Kitchener, Secretary for War, about how the Irish Volunteers could be incorporated into the British army. The paper recognized the magnitude of the war, but it refused to accept the notion that the war, which it saw as one of continental rivalries, in any way affected Ireland’s vital interests. For Redmond and Devlin to "fritter away any part of her military resources by going to England’s defence would be treason of the blackest kind," the Irish World thus concluded.³ This growing discomfort over Redmond’s attitude was not forgotten in the joy of royal assent to the Home Rule Bill on 18 September. Although the paper excitedly announc-

¹Roosevelt to Lee, 22 Aug. 1914, Roosevelt letters, vii, p. 812.

²Lit. Dig., xlii, no. 15 (10 Oct. 1914), p. 678. Some native Americans saw the German inclination to go to war as an attempt to take advantage of the crisis situation in Ireland, which should have prevented effective British action on the continent. See E.F. Baldwin, The world war (New York, 1914), p. 177; A. Bullard, The diplomacy of the great war (New York, 1916), p. 160; Gerard, My four years in Germany, pp. 100-01; A. Lawrence Lowell to Sir Horace Plunkett, 10 Sept. 1914 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers); and Reid, The man from New York, p. 186.

³Irish World, 15 and 22 Aug. 1914.
ced "The accursed Union... ended" and "Home Rule is come at last," it also warned that, "there has arisen a crisis in Irish affairs...," which centred on the question of Irishmen in the British army. Home rule had not been purchased at the price of support during the war, but was merely the grudging restoration of Ireland's natural rights. Ireland, the paper felt, had no obligation to fight for England and Redmond had no power from the Irish people to act as a British recruiting agent. 1 After Redmond's famous speech at Woodenbridge on 20 September the Irish World published a long editorial which attacked the speech line by line challenging Redmond's right to ask Irishmen to fight for England. Irish-Americans had contributed to the Volunteers to give Ireland a means of defending herself against those who would deprive her of her rights, not to train Irishmen in arms so that they could better serve England's interests in a continental war. Breaking with Redmond on this issue, the Irish World wrote, "we must part company with him when he asks the Irish Volunteers to help his recruiting campaign for the British army." 2 For the next several weeks the paper published anti-recruiting editorials and the letters of local Irish-American leaders who supported the paper in breaking with Redmond and in condemning the British for their part in the war. 3

The national president of the UIL, Michael J. Ryan, also objected to Redmond's decision to lead Ireland in supporting the war effort.

On the eve of the king's assent to the Home Rule Bill Redmond wrote

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1 Irish World, 26 Sept. and 3 Oct. 1914.
2 Ibid., 10 Oct. 1914.
3 See Ibid., 17 and 31 Oct. and 7 Nov. 1914.
to Ryan to explain the importance for the Irish Volunteers to gain military experience at least equivalent to that of the Ulster Volunteers, but this was not an argument destined to win much support among the Irish in America.¹ Ryan replied in early October that in his opinion the function of the UIL was through. "Home Rule has been placed upon the Statute Book, and the work of the League in America can end in honour. Our suggestion would be that you authorize its termination here...," and he strongly implied that if the League were to continue he and several other officers would have to be replaced. While Ryan categorically condemned Redmond's enemies in Ireland and America, "who talk of revolution and do nothing else," he thought that it was mistaken to ask for assistance from Irish-Americans that would "even indirectly aid England."² Ryan's disagreement with Redmond was augmented in the pages of the Irish World which published nearly fifteen letters a week from UIL and AOH leaders throughout the country opposing Redmond's efforts to support the war.

It would be mistaken, however, to say that Redmond was without friends in the United States. Patrick Egan, the business manager of the Irish World, resigned in protest over the paper's new policy and he attempted to defend Redmond through a letter to the paper.³ He also suggested to Redmond that with some financial assistance he could keep the UIL affairs before the American press. Furthermore, he recommended that Ryan be replaced as president of the UIL at the forthcoming convention by Dr John G. Coyle, a leader of the New York Munici-

¹Redmond to Ryan, 17 Sept. 1914, Gwynn, Redmond, pp 416-17.
pal Council of the UIL. By late October William Dillon, the ex-
patriot brother of John Dillon and a lawyer for the city of Chicago,
and P.T. Barry, a prominent Chicago Irish-American, attempted to show
that the Parliamentary party still had considerable strength in Amer-
ica by drafting a cable, to be signed by leading Irish-Americans,
states an appreciation of Redmond’s actions in supporting the Brit-
ish government. The cable was to acknowledge that Redmond and the
party had given Britain a "solemn promise that, if the Home Rule bill
were placed on the statute book, the Irish people would accept it as
a settlement of the old quarrel, and would loyally support England in
the present war." Dillon appealed to several noted Irish-Americans,
among them W. Bourke Cockran. But Cockran, who had misgivings about
the judgment of the Irish leaders since their willingness to consider
the exclusion of Ulster from home rule, was not enthusiastic and said
it was news to him that the Irish people were pledged to unqualified
support for Great Britain in the war. The cable was not sent, as the
objections to it in New York and Chicago were too great; many Irish-
Americans felt that it would stir up animosity between the Irish and
the Germans in the United States, that it would be a breach of Amer-
ican neutrality to support one faction of the belligerents, and that
it would be an invitation to those Irish in America who had formed an

1 See Gwynn, Redmond, p. 420; and Egan to Redmond, 12 Oct. and 20

2 Dillon to Cockran, 22 Oct. 1914, and Dillon to Cockran, 10 Nov.
1914 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 18). Arguing with Cockran some
weeks later Dillon made the telling point, "If the promise to be loyal
to the Empire does not imply the promise to help the Empire in such a
war as this, it means practically nothing." Dillon to Cockran, 23 Nov.
1914 (Ibid.). Also see P.T. Barry to Redmond, 31 Oct. 1914 (N.L.I.,
Redmond Papers).
alliance with the Germans to openly incite rebellion in Ireland. 1

Dillon regretted that a great opportunity had been lost for the loyal
Redmond forces to make their views public. 2 The erosion had begun.

Redmond, however, was not anxious to force any issues with the
leadership of the UIL in America. By October and November people
still expected a short war in Europe; if this expectation were borne
out the fissures in the moderate Irish-American organization might
easily be plastered over, and the large body of home rule support
which had existed in July might be maintained. Redmond had no desire,
therefore, to see the league split or the leadership shifted. Consequent-
ly, Redmond was, according to his biographer Gwynn, quite relieved
when the national officers agreed to continue to serve and when
the national convention, scheduled for December, was indefinitely
postponed. 3 There was, however, a recognition of the awkwardness of
the situation and a resignation that there was little the American
home rulers could do. As T.B. Fitzpatrick, the national treasurer,
wrote in early March 1915,

I know you are conversant in the manner in which
the European war has interfered with any real
activity on the part of the UIL in its ordin-
ary routine of work in this country. The condi-
tions simply impose the practice of waiting, for
the time being, and wait I believe we must until
the attention of the world is somewhat released

1 Dillon to Captain J. O'D. Storen, 8 Nov. 1914 (N.Y.P.L., Cock-
ran Papers, box 18).

2 See Dillon to Cockran, 10 Nov. 1914 (Ibid.). John T. Keating,
the Chicago Clan leader, was confident that Dillon's cable would,
"split the old party irreparably." Keating to Devoy, 7 Nov. 1914,
Devoy's post-bag, 11, p. 469.

3 Gwynn, Redmond, pp 417-19; and S. Leslie, The Irish issue in its
from the war tension in which it is held today.\footnote{Fitzpatrick to Redmond, 5 March 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).}

But mere waiting meant that the initiative was allowed to slip from the hands of moderates into the hands of the impatient revolutionaries.

Redmond's friends refused to remain altogether passive in the face of the unrest among many of the Irish-Americans. The Irish World had not turned over to the UIL all of the funds it was in the process of collecting when the split with Redmond occurred. Dr Coyle of New York had threatened to open legal proceedings to recover the money, but was able to intimidate the Fords sufficiently to recover $5000 without going to court.\footnote{Dr Coyle to Redmond, 11 Dec. 1914 (Ibid.).} Further efforts were made, especially by the New York Irish-Americans, to keep the UIL functioning and to contradict publicly the growing assumption that all Irishmen in America were pro-German. The New York Municipal Council of the UIL held a convention on 15 December, in spite of the postponement of the national convention, which was well attended but carefully dominated by such friends of Redmond as Stephen McFarland, Dr Coyle, Egan, and the national treasurer Fitzpatrick. The convention was held, Dr Coyle reported to Redmond, "because the noise and clamor made by the Irish-German groups were quite capable of making the American public think that all the Irish were pro-German and anti-Redmond." They sent a cablegram of support to Redmond, denied claims of the Irish-German group to speak for the Irish-American community, and condemned James Larkin and Cornelius Lehane who had been describing Irish socialist
activities on speaking tours.

Redmond also received personal assurances that the Irish in America were still loyal to him and the party. P.T. Barry was confident that "the bulk of our people here are with you and will be to the last." The UIL treasurer wrote, "With the rank and file of those who have aided the United Irish League in this country there is, I am satisfied, no defection," and he said also that Redmond and the party were trusted to guard carefully Ireland's interests in the present situation.

Much of the criticism of the party was not from new sources, Michael J. Dordon, of the New York UIL, told Redmond. "All of those who have been hostile to us at all times are simply finding increased opportunities at the present moment to vent their spleen."

The actual strength of Redmond's support in the United States during late 1914 and 1915 is impossible to estimate accurately. Even before the war Casement thought that Redmond's claims for loyalty among the Irish-Americans were exaggerated, as has been shown earlier. However in late December of 1914 John Quinn told Sir Horace Plunkett that the defection of the Irish-Americans was not very large. Quinn, Plunkett recorded in his diary, felt that "their anti-British influence is

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3 Fitzpatrick to Redmond, 15 Dec. 1914 (Ibid.).

4 Jordan to Redmond, 31 Dec. 1914 (Ibid.). See also Patrick Egan's statement that the loss of the Irish World was not as bad as it seemed because "A large number of the old timers of the League have ceased to read the Irish World..." Egan to Redmond, 24 Nov. 1914 (Ibid.).
now inconsiderable," and Quinn was not contradicted by W. Bourke Cockran, a recognized Irish-American leader who was also present. This was essentially the same view that Lord Bryce's American friends expressed. In late March 1915 A.E. Pillsbury told Bryce how little impression the German propaganda had made on the Irish in his own Boston, confirming Bryce's own view that the passing into law of home rule had had a very favourable effect upon opinion in the U.S. as well as in Ireland...." Almost a year later another friend, Lloyd B. Sanderson of New York, wrote Bryce that Irish and German politicians would make anglophobe statements but that there would be "no real antagonistic sentiment...." That Patrick Egan would call John Devoy a "sleepless demon" is not surprising, but the unsolicited letter of John J. Manning to Devoy which called the old Fenian "a rank faker, a foul mouthed rat who is in the pay of the Kaisers agents in this country" and referred to Redmond as "a gentleman, a man of honor, a statesman," is perhaps an indication that at least some of the Irish-Americans resented and resisted the new inroads made by the Clan. Native American newspapers seemed confused by the new Irish situation, at least to the extent that they considered the Irish question at all after the beginning of the war. In December 1914 the Literary Digest did note, however, that there was a contradiction between the pro-Ally sentiments of the Irish in Ireland and the pro-German sentiments of

19 Dec. 1914, Diary (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).


Sanderson to Lord Bryce, 3 March 1916 (Ibid., vol 18, fol 99-100).

Egan to T.J. Hanna, 2 March 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers); and Manning to Devoy, ca. 23 Aug. 1915 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box M).
some of the Irish in America. In late July 1915 the Digest again puzzled over the contradiction of the conspicuous V.C.s with the failure of recruiting in Ireland. The Philadelphia North American, in reply to a letter from a German-American reader, asserted that Redmond, not the late O'Donovan Rossa, still characterized the Irish people.

Nevertheless the difficulties of the UIL were soon to be dramatized by the controversy over the attempts to close the national headquarters office in Boston. Michael J. Jordan, the national secretary, had promised Redmond at the end of 1914 that "our organization will be preserved here until such time as you consider there is no longer any need for it." Thus when Michael J. Ryan and T.B. Fitzpatrick, the national president and treasurer respectively, suggested that the national headquarters be closed down, Jordan objected. He immediately asked Redmond to demand that the office be maintained, pointing out that its closing would kill the organization permanently and would make a great triumph for the enemies of home rule. Jordan was supported by Patrick Egan who asserted that Ryan's continued relations with the Irish World, not to mention his pro-German statements, "show that his main object was to quietly chloroform the League, and put it out of existence...," and the closing of the office would serve as "a

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2 Ibid., li, no. 5 (31 July 1915), p. 201.
5 Jordan to Redmond, 25 Feb. 1915 (Ibid.).
trump card for all the enemies of our cause from Bonar Law and Carson to John Devoy and the Fords.\textsuperscript{1} Redmond's request to keep the office open did not end the matter. Fitzpatrick wrote to Redmond that because of the policy of waiting for the end of the war there was no point in spending $1500 a year for an office and a stenographer. He also made clear to Jordan that the office would close on 13 March as scheduled and that he would resign if it were kept open.\textsuperscript{2}

The New York Municipal Council of the UIL agreed with Jordan and Egan that the closing of the office would be disastrous. It was argued that there was a certain illegality in two officers making such an important decision without the approval or knowledge of the national executive committee or the members of the league.\textsuperscript{3} Ryan replied that the council was "in ignorance of the facts," that this step had not been taken arbitrarily but that it was part of a program of cutting expenses. He and Fitzpatrick agreed to have the clerical work of the UIL done in their own offices for the time being, and Ryan suggested rather facetiously that if the Municipal Council were so anxious to keep the office open they could raise the money themselves rather than depleting the league funds.\textsuperscript{4} After a passionate and bitter meeting, the Municipal Council decided they would pay the expenses until more permanent arrangements could be worked out. Jordan was telegraphed on 12 March, the day before the office was to close, that

\textsuperscript{1}Egan to Jordan, 27 Feb. 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

\textsuperscript{2}Fitzpatrick to Redmond, 5 March 1915, and Jordan to Egan, 5 March 1915 (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{3}National Executive Committee to Ryan, 6 March 1915 (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{4}Ryan to Stephen McFarland, 9 March 1915 (Ibid.).
they would guarantee expenses until July 1915. ¹ The situation was finally resolved the following month when arrangements were made with the Catholic Federation of the Archdiocese of Boston to share the office and thus reduce the expenses by half. ²

Ryan and Fitzpatrick had sound reasons for wanting to close the office; since the beginning of the war no attempts had been made to raise money for the league in the United States and with no active program to promote, there was no need, they thought, for the expense of maintaining an office and a full-time stenographer. ³ But there were more considerations than merely conserving financial resources. The constitutional Irish-American nationalists were coming under increasing pressure from their revolutionary counterparts for the leadership of the Irish community in the United States. As Dr John G. Coyle of New York outlined to Redmond:

In New York we have felt that the contemplated closing of the Boston office would be heralded far and wide as the practical ending of the League. There is so much anti-English sentiment cultivated by the professional 'Irish' politician here, and readily responded to by the ordinary man of Irish blood, nurtured in hatred of Great Britain, that the closing of the office, following the turnover of the Irish World, the attitude of the National President and other officers of the A.O.H., following the postponement of the Convention last fall, and following the pronouncements of Mr. Ryan in his untimely and regrettable attacks upon France, Great Britain and Belgium of several months ago, would, we

¹ McFarland and R.J. Waddell to Jordan, 12 March 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

² Jordan to Redmond, 9 April 1915 (Ibid.).

³ The first attempt to curtail expenses had come some time earlier with the suspension of the UIL Bulletin. Ryan to McFarland, 9 March 1915 (Ibid.).
felt, be widely announced as the ending of the League, the collapse of the Home Rule movement, and would, in general, be a disaster.¹

Coyle's description of the pressures on the home rule movement by mid-winter 1915 were probably accurate, but it may well have been that the "disaster" of which he spoke, had already struck in spite of the resolves and good intentions of the Municipal Council.² Certainly these arguments within the UIL weakened the movement despite Redmond's efforts to avoid open conflict.³

In order to express to the UIL leaders his desire to maintain the status quo with as little controversy as possible and to discern the situation, Redmond sent Alderman Daniel Boyle, M.P., on a short American tour in May 1915. Boyle travelled to the major Irish-American centres east of Chicago, but talked principally with those UIL leaders who had been involved in the controversy over the Boston office. Boyle reported that the leaders nominally agreed with Redmond's desire to preserve the status quo and not force differences into the open, but he found also that relations among the national officers were very strained. Nonetheless, he was told by Fitzpatrick that the favourable opinion in Boston on Redmond was improving and that pro-German sympathy was not very widespread.⁴ Ryan, in spite of his pro-German sympathies, which he himself confessed to Boyle were not representative of Irish-American opinion, would do nothing to damage

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¹Coyle to Redmond, 5 April 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
²Egan to T.J. Hanna, 9 March 1915 (Ibid.).
³For a detailed description of the fight in New York see the report of R.J. Waddell, secretary of the Municipal Council, to J.P. Gaynor, 16 March 1915 (Ibid.).
⁴Boyle to Redmond, 3 May 1915 (Ibid.).
the league or the prospects of home rule and in fact said publicly at
a dinner for Boyle that he was willing to stand by Redmond whenever
he was called.\textsuperscript{1} In fact Boyle found Ryan’s views similar to Redmond’s,
and he disregarded Egan’s conspiritorial view of the national officers
and especially Egan’s allegations of Ryan’s collusion with the Fords
in the defection of the \textit{Irish World}.\textsuperscript{2} It would appear that Boyle was
more sanguine than circumstances warranted, and this, along with Red-
mond’s loyalty to Ryan, which Shane Leslie later noted, led to a con-
tinued deterioration of the position of the home rule forces.\textsuperscript{3}

The creation of the Coalition Cabinet in late May 1915 further
strained Irish-American feeling about the good faith of the British
government. Although Redmond could not join the cabinet because of
the nature of Irish nationalist politics, Carson did become a member
as did several other Unionists who had been conspicuously anti-national-
ist before the war. The imbalance of the situation was immediately
apparent both in Ireland and America.\textsuperscript{4} The crisis over the nomination
of J.H. Campbell as Lord Chancellor seemed so threatening that Lord
Eustace Percy, a Conservative and a shrewd observer of American aff-
airs, in the Foreign Office, warned A.J. Balfour, newly appointed
First Lord of the Admiralty, against any ill-considered appointments
of Irish Unionists because of the delicate nature of the Irish-Ameri-
can situation. At the beginning of the war many "responsible" Irish-

\textsuperscript{1}Boyle to Redmond, 6 May 1915, and Boyle to Redmond, 14 May 1915
(N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

\textsuperscript{2}Boyle to Redmond, 14 May 1915 (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{3}Leslie, \textit{The Irish issue in its American aspect}, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{4}See Gwynn, \textit{Redmond}, pp 432-33; and Theodore Roosevelt to Redmond,
1 June 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
Americans had supported Redmond's decision on the war or had supported Wilson's appeal for neutrality. The postponement of home rule "shook them a little," Percy said. "The Coalition Government will inevitably shake them much more." If these Irish-Americans who had backed Redmond or who had remained neutral were to become too disillusioned they might "come off the fence," and join with the revolutionary Irish and the Germans in keeping America out of the war and obstructing the production of munitions. The situation, Percy concluded, "is really dangerous," and he warned Balfour that the party leaders should consider "tactics" which would not further alienate moderate Irish nationalists in the United States.1 Certainly the coalition government invited increased cynicism from Irish nationalists in America and Ireland.2

Many American moderates felt that the home rule cause suffered from the loss of a sympathetic newspaper. The defection of the Irish World was of genuine importance because it meant that favourable home rule news was not distributed and was replaced by the consistently hostile views of the Gaelic American and then the Irish World. Furthermore, by late 1914 the Chicago Tribune, which had regularly published articles by T.P. O'Connor, terminated their contract with him; he later wrote for an American news syndicate but in the meantime, another link had been broken.3 As early as autumn 1914 suggestions were made

1 Lord Eustace Percy to A.J. Balfour, 6 June 1915 (B.M., Balfour Papers, Add. MSS 49748, vol lxvi).
2 Gwynn, Redmond, p. 433.
to Redmond that several things could be done. Patrick Egan first said that for $25 a month he could keep home rule information before the American press, but by December he wrote to Redmond's secretary that what was needed was a newspaper. Others noticed as well:

Edward J. Gallagher, editor of the Lowell Sun, told Redmond that there was a need to revive the old UIL Bulletin in order to respond to the German influence, and Michael J. Jordan, whose views of the problem of trying to hold together the organization without favourable newspaper coverage were similar to those of Egan and Gallagher, suggested that the Sacred Heart Review might be developed as a home rule paper. Temporarily, Jordan thought articles from the Dublin Freeman's Journal might be reprinted and distributed in the United States. At almost the same time William Dillon cautiously inquired of W. Bourke Cockran about the advisability of starting a newspaper to publish the home rule position, although he also queried whether such a publication would be a breach of the neutrality that President Wilson had requested. By spring Egan was fearful that Patrick Ford, who had broken with his brother Robert of the Irish World, might start a home rule paper backed by Lord Northcliffe, outside the control of the loyal UIL members.

In the autumn of 1915 Redmond was roused to send Alderman Boyle back to the United States for the purpose of raising money for a news-

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1 With $10,000 cash and $5000 later Egan felt he could start a newspaper in the United States which would give both the league and the party full support. Egan to Redmond, 20 Oct. 1914, and Egan to T.J. Hanna, 12 Dec. 1914 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

2 Gallagher to Redmond, 2 Dec. 1914, and Jordan to Redmond, 31 Dec. 1914 (Ibid.).


4 Egan to T.J. Hanna, 7 May 1915 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
paper sympathetic to the home rule cause and the policy of the party.

Redmond suggested,

that you ask our leading supporters to provide a moderate sum of money which would be required to start an Irish American weekly paper, produced in high class style, to give the true facts, week by week, with reference to the war, and more particularly, with reference to events in Ireland.

Redmond was certain that such a paper would find a large reading public among the loyal members of the UIL, and would in effect take up Irish affairs where they had been left off in August 1914. If leading Irish-Americans could be convinced that this financial aid might be the "last and crowning service" to be asked of them it would go far in countering the effect of the anti-Redmond papers which, it was then widely believed, were being distributed free across the country by German money.¹ Boyle came to the United States and raised money so that, by early 1916, a small paper, *Ireland*, was founded. It was edited by J.C. Walsh and assisted by Shane Leslie; following Redmond's suggestion, it was produced in a "high class style," in the hope of appealing to a more respectable class of Irish-Americans than had previous Irish papers in the United States.² By March 1916 Leslie was able to report to Redmond that the paper had the approval of Cardinal Gibbons who had agreed to write an article for it. "In the growing success of that paper," Leslie confidently asserted, "you will be able to measure some of the influence and sympathy you still command

²Leslie, *The Irish issue in its American aspect*, pp 181-82.
But the task of rebuilding the position of the constitutional Irish-American nationalists in the United States, after nearly a year and a half of inaction, would take some time, as Leslie himself admitted. Furthermore, the paper, in setting out to be the vehicle of moderate opinion appealing to a sophisticated audience, fell between several stools; it took the unspectacular middle way by supporting Redmond, home rule and Irish participation in the war and by opposing Germany in the war and revolutionary tactics in Ireland. Within a few months of the first publication of Ireland the Easter rebellion drastically altered the Irish political situation and badly compromised the prospects of the constitutional nationalists in cultivating a body of moderate, pro-Ally opinion among the community of Irish-Americans.

(iv)

The coincidence of World War I presented the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists with the opportunity to reap the fruits of their labours during the preceding twenty-five years. Through difficult and discouraging times the Clan had struggled to keep alive the values

1Leslie to Redmond, 2 March 1916 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

2Leslie to Redmond, 6 March 1916 (Ibid.).

3Although there was some feeling among the embassy staff in Washington that Ireland was "too neutral to be of any great value, either to the Allied or even to the Nationalist cause," both Spring Rice and the Foreign Office were delighted by the progress that it seemed to make. Their feelings were that more might be done immediately. Memorandum from the British Embassy, Washington (and Minutes) to F.O., 10 March 1916, and Memorandum from the British Embassy, Washington (and Minutes), 27 March 1916 (F.O. 371/2793). Efforts to create enthusiasm for the war among the Irish-Americans through the publication of books on the exploits of Irish troops were probably not successful. See M. MacDonagh, The Irish at the front (London, 1916) and The Irish on the Somme (London, 1917), both with introductions by John Redmond.
of revolutionary nationalism in Ireland and America, had worked to create common interests with the German-American pressure groups, and had plotted to prevent the United States from establishing closer relations—not to mention an alliance—with Great Britain. After August 1914 events began to work in favour of the revolutionary nationalists: the United States did not join England in the war but declared its neutrality, the German-Americans and the German government were willing to support Irish independence, and the revolutionary factions in Ireland soon broke with Redmond. The revolutionary Irish-American nationalists had only to encourage the growing cynicism of the Irish community in the United States about British good faith towards Ireland and Redmond's competence as an Irish nationalist leader. This was accomplished, in the absence of any effective contradiction from the UIL, through continual public meetings, joint activities with the German-American societies, the publication of anti-British and anti-war propaganda, and finally through the founding of a broadly-based revolutionary nationalist organization.

Events moved very swiftly after the war broke out; initially the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists had two immediate objectives: to dissociate themselves once again from Redmond, and to expand their relationship with the organized German-Americans. Large public meetings were held under the auspices of the Clan-na-Gaels, the United Irish-American Societies, and other anti-home rule organizations. At Celtic Park in New York on 9 August some 10,000 Irish-Americans gathered to hear speeches repudiating Redmond's action regarding the war and denouncing the Parliamentary party; cheers were given for the Kaiser
and German flags were carried by marching units.\(^1\) John Devoy and Jeremiah A. O'Leary addressed a German meeting in Newark, on 14 August, attended by both Irish- and German-Americans, where Irish-German sentiments were expressed.\(^2\) On 20 August a New York German meeting vowed itself to an alliance of Germany, Austria, and Ireland; and the following day in Philadelphia Irish-Americans condemned Redmond's pledge to defend Ireland from foreign invaders.\(^3\) On 5 September a meeting of St Louis Irish-Americans repudiated Redmond's leadership; and Germans attended and German and Polish dancers participated in an Irish-American fair at Philadelphia on the 7th, to raise money for the Irish Volunteers. The United Irish-American Societies of New York declared that "Redmond is a British Imperialist and not an Irish Nationalist;" they promised to encourage Irish-German relations, to fight British recruiting in Ireland, and to oppose American participation in the war.\(^4\) The national convention of the Clan-na-Gael, meeting in Atlantic City on 27 September, not only repudiated Redmond, but said that "Ireland must purge herself of the shame and disgrace of Redmond's treason..." and it also echoed a viewpoint recently expressed in the *Gaelic American*, that Ireland's best interests would be served "by England's defeat in this war.\(^5\) The New York Committee of the Irish National Volunteer Fund held a large public meeting on 9 October to protest against Redmond's treason and to ratify the Irish-German alli-

\(^{\text{1}}\) *G.A.*, 15 Aug. 1914.
\(^{\text{2}}\) Ibid., 22 Aug. 1914.
\(^{\text{3}}\) Ibid., 29 Aug. 1914.
\(^{\text{4}}\) Ibid., 12 Sept. 1914.
\(^{\text{5}}\) Ibid., 3 Oct. 1914.
ance resolution proposed by Jeremiah A. O'Leary; this resolution attempted to define the proper position for Irish-Americans in the new situation: they were to be pro-Irish, pro-American, pro-German, but anti-British.¹

Similar meetings, devoted to expressions of sympathy for the Germans in the war or to protest against Redmond and home rule in Ireland or to denunciations of British imperialism and militarism continued at the rate of several a week until the United States entered the war in April 1917. These meetings took place in Irish and German centres throughout the country, although they were largely centred in the major Irish communities of the eastern seaboard. In 1915 and 1916 the emphasis of the meetings shifted slightly to include demands that the United States not sell arms or make loans to the Allies and that the United States maintain its foreign policy on the non-interventionist course set by Washington and Jefferson to avoid entangling alliances and European squabbles.²

Redmond's speech at Woodenbridge marked a turning point. Not only did the Gaelic American rejoice at the news from The O'Rahilly that the original Irish Volunteers founded by O'Neill had broken from Redmond's National Volunteers, but the Clan-na-Gael promised to work for their support in America.³ Furthermore the speech not only cost Redmond the support of the Irish World, but it drove many leading


²These meetings took place every week in some part of the country and were sponsored either by the large national organizations or by local groups; in either case they were fully reported in the Irish-American press. For specific instances see G.A., 7 Nov. and 12 Dec. 1914; 30 Jan., 13 March, 12 June, 31 July, 28 Aug., and 2 Oct. 1915.

Irish-Americans away from constitutionalism. Dr Gertrude Kelly, prominent in New York league affairs, protested against Redmond's action, and former mayor of Syracuse James K. McGuire resigned from the league. Michael J. Ryan, who refused to say anything against Redmond in public, was reported gleefully in the Gaelic American as supporting Germany in the war at a large Philadelphia meeting; and W. Bourke Cockran let it be known that he disagreed with Redmond and that he had not attended any of the recent meetings of the national executive committee of the UIL of which he was a member. The new national president of the AOH, Joseph McLaughlin, published a letter in the National Hibernian repudiating Redmond's leadership of the Irish nationalist movement. Certainly Redmond's speech had a demoralizing effect on the rank and file, as well as on the leaders. Maurice Donnelly, of Indianapolis, pointed out to both Joseph McGarrity and W. Bourke Cockran that "Some of the best men who were with Redmond heretofore, are absolutely disgusted." In the opinion of Sir Roger Casement the physical force people had effectively attracted most of the Irish-Americans; "fully 85% of them," he wrote to Mrs Alice Stopford Green, were "dead against Redmond." The defection of these Irish-Americans was welcomed by the Clan which laboured to fill the vacuum created by the UIL's policy of waiting for the end of the war.

2Ibid., 31 Oct. 1914.
3Cited in Ibid., 7 Nov. 1914.
There seems to have been some reluctance among Irish-Americans to join forces with the Germans in the United States, with whom there was a history of more bad feeling than co-operation. Even John T. Keating indicated that there was some hesitation in the Chicago Clan organization to move too quickly, but within a few months, and especially after Redmond's recruiting activities, these misgivings diminished.¹ Eight out of ten Irish-Americans were "for Germany & against the Crown," Casement told Mrs Green on 14 September, and he further mentioned that the "good will between Irishmen & Germans in this country has become fact & sure & will bear fruit."² Almost a month later Casement assured Mrs Green that the Irish and the Germans would hold the United States out of the war by forming a new political party to keep the country American and democratic rather than pro-British and imperialistic.³

In addition to these overt attempts to shape opinion through large public meetings, the revolutionary leaders in the United States took direct steps to implement a revolutionary policy through co-operation with the German government. Shortly after the opening of the war, a special committee of the Clan-na-Gael met with the German Ambassador, Count Johann von Bernstorff, and members of his staff, at a reception in the German Club in New York. The committee told the ambassador that their revolutionary counterparts in Ireland in-

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¹Keating to Devoy, 7 Aug. and 7 Nov. 1914, Devoy's post-bag, 11, pp 465 and 469.

²Casement to Mrs Green, 14 Sept. 1914 (N.L.I., A.S. Green Papers, MSS 10,464/10).

³Casement to Mrs Green, 11 Oct. 1914 (Ibid.).
tended during the course of the war to free Ireland from Great Brit-
ain by force of arms, but that at the moment there were few weapons
in Ireland and almost no trained officers. They told von Bernstorff
that it would be in Germany's interest to promote such a rebellion in
Ireland, by simply providing some arms and officers, because it would
weaken Britain and divert troops from France. 1 Von Bernstorff seemed
interested and, in fact, on 25 September 1914 cabled the German For-
eign Office that if in their opinion there was no possibility of
reaching some accommodation with the British, "I recommend falling in
with Irish wishes...." 2 Sir Roger Casement drafted a letter to the
Kaiser on behalf of the Clan, outlining the Irish situation, and pub-
lished a similar letter in both the American and Irish press. 3 Case-
ment reported to Mrs Green, "We have made a pact of friendship here
in America—if Ireland at home will only keep to her own green fields,
attend to her own business, keep her volunteers in Ireland...." 4 Of
course, Casement also negotiated, through the German embassy, his own
clandestine mission to create an Irish brigade from among German pris-
oners; subsequent news of the brigade and of the attempts by the Brit-
ish Consul in Christiania to capture Casement were fully publicized in
the Gaelic American. 5

The Clan as well as the Germans attempted to manipulate the

1 Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, p. 403.
2 Documents relative to the Sinn Fein movement [Cmd 1108], xx1x, 429, p. 3.
3 Devoy, op. cit., pp 404-06; Reid, The man from New York, pp 188-
89; Gwynn, The life and death of Roger Casement, pp 251-52.
4 Casement to Mrs Green, 11 Oct. 1914 (N.L.I., A.S. Green Papers,
MSS 10,464/10).
5 See Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, pp 75-76.
labor situation in the United States. The arrival of James Larkin in America in November 1914 presented both the Clan and the Socialists with a dynamic, popular, and persuasive figure who travelled throughout much of the country on behalf of those organizations attacking Redmond and home rule and preaching revolutionary Irish nationalism and socialism. Although Larkin and Devoy did not agree on socialism, their views on many Irish matters—especially Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary party—were similar enough to allow them to join forces. Larkin, who opposed the war for socialist reasons, worked to create labour strife among Irish-American workers in the munitions industry and among the stevedores loading ships bound for Allied ports; in fact he was offered a regular salary from the German agent Captain Carl Boy-Ed, which he turned down.  

1 Captain Franz von Rintelen, independent of the German Embassy staff, recruited Irish-American labourers to place bombs on freighters carrying munitions to Britain and paid Irish-American dock-workers, handling explosives, to strike for higher pay.  

As a result of these several Irish-German activities, projects

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1 Larkin, James Larkin, pp 187-94. Larkin was bitterly resented by the UIL. Dr John G. Coyle told Redmond that Larkin received "practically no attention here," although he was clearly concerned; Coyle thought that the Clan and the Socialists were unlikely to sponsor Larkin and that the money must be coming from either the Germans or the Unionists. Coyle to Redmond, 18 Dec. 1914 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers). In the opinion of the British Consul-General in Boston, Larkin was making "seditious" speeches and was a danger. Leay to Grey, 1 March 1915 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2585). Casement opposed Larkin also and attempted from Germany to warn Devoy that "Support of Larkin entails loss of sympathy in many quarters of Ireland." Documents relative to the Sinn Fein movement, p. 6.

were undertaken to open direct communication with Ireland and Germany. Dr Patrick McCartan was sent back to Ireland in early September with £2000 for the IRB and with information and documents for Tom Clarke and the Supreme Council about Clan conversations with the Germans and about Casement's plans to create an Irish brigade in Germany. Diarmuid Lynch remained in America as the representative of the IRB to attend the national convention of the Clan-na-Gael on 27 September at Atlantic City where he met officially with the Revolutionary Directory (Devoy, Keating, and McGarrity) and with the Committee on Foreign Relations. The people with whom he spoke continued to place their confidence in the Irish organization and sent Lynch back to Ireland in early November with £2000 for the IRB, although they were alarmed to learn that the IRB numbered only about 2000 members. Messages were sent to Germany, elaborating on the talks with von Bernstorff, through Michael Francis Doyle, a Philadelphia lawyer going to Holland for the Department of State and through John Kenny, who presented documents to the Chancellor and then returned to the United States by way of Ireland where he informed Tom Clarke of the details on the Irish-German collaboration. The following year communications with the IRB were maintained through Sean T. O'Kelly and Dr McCartan who were sent as envoys to work on plans with the Clan for an alliance with Germany, to explain the position of the Supreme Council, and to

1 "Extracts from the papers of the late Dr Patrick McCartan," Part Two, Clogher Rec., v, no. 2 (1964), pp 190-91.
3 Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, p. 404.
bring important information back to Ireland. Regular communications and the transportation of funds were carried by Tommy O'Connor who served as an IRB messenger while working on a British White Star passenger ship.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Irish element in the United States initiated a campaign to influence American opinion in favour of Irish independence or at least in opposition to Great Britain and the war. This campaign was undertaken because of the feeling that the American press was generally pro-British and that the British government was spending enormous amounts on propaganda to win neutral American support for their side in the war. Some Irish pamphlets were distributed in the United States: the Bodestown series and Tracts for the times were given considerable circulation, especially Pearse's "From a hermitage" and "Ghosts" and The O'Rahilly's "The secret history of the Irish Volunteers." Casement had several of his newspaper articles collected and published in 1915 as a pamphlet, "The crime against Europe: a possible outcome of the war of 1914." Such items by Shaemus O'Sheel (published under the name of "An Irish-American") as "The catechism of Balaam, Jr." and "A trip through head-line land" were published in 1915 and used Ireland as an example of

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2Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, p. 459.
3P.H. Pearse, "From a hermitage," Bodestown series, no. 2 (Dublin, 1915); P.H. Pearse, "Ghosts," Tracts for the times, no. 10 (Dublin, 1916); and The O'Rahilly, "The secret history of the Irish Volunteers," Tracts for the times, no. 3 (Dublin, 1915).
4Sir R. Casement, "The crime against Europe: a possible outcome of the war of 1914" (Philadelphia, 1915).
British misrule and attacked British diplomacy as the cause of the war. Jeremiah A. O'Leary directed the American Truth Society, the most Irish-oriented of several anti-British organizations to spring up in America in 1915, which carried on a bitter campaign against Great Britain and in favour of the Germans. It published "The revelations of an American citizen in the British army," by Daniel A. Wallace, an account of an American who was tricked into joining the British army, where was treated very badly, sent to France and Turkey, and finally rescued by the American Consul in Alexandria. O'Leary himself published such volumes as "The conquest of the United States," which complained of British propaganda in America, and "The fable of John Bull" which cast Britain as the villain in American history.

Such books as Frank Koester's The lies of the Allies (with an introduction by O'Leary), Edward A. Steiner's The confession of a hyphenated American, and S. Ivor Stephen's (Stephen Ivor Szinnyey, pseud.) Neutrality all attacked Great Britain in the war and touched on Ireland in some way to show the hypocrisy of Britain's defence of small nations, of the impartiality of the Irish-American press, or

1 An Irish-American Shaemus O'Sheel, "The catechism of Balaam, Jr.," (New York, 1915); and by the author of "The catechism of Balaam, Jr," Shaemus O'Sheel, A trip through headline land" (New York, 1915). "The catechism of Balaam, Jr." was estimated to have had a circulation of 300,000 copies and to have been translated into several languages. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, Hearings on brewing and liquor interests and German propaganda, 65th Congress, 3rd Session (Washington, 1919), p. 1426.


the effect of the Irish question on American life.¹ British versus German imperialism, published anonymously, attempted to show how British imperialism as seen in Ireland’s case was crushing and centralized while the German empire was liberal and federal in nature.²

Two of the most widely read books which dealt with Ireland were those written by the former mayor of Syracuse, New York, James K. McGuire, The King, the Kaiser and Irish freedom and What could Germany do for Ireland?; McGuire promoted sympathy for Germany among the Irish-Americans and argued that an Irish-German alliance would guarantee successful independence from Great Britain.³ In spite of these and other similar attempts to woo public opinion in the United States, T. St John Gaffney, former American Consul in Munich, returned to find that “Popular opinion had become demoralized under the influence of a press corrupted by the munitions traffic and the financial interests which had already begun to realize the gigantic profits to be made out of the war.”⁴ In short, the climate of opinion in the United States in late 1915 was pro-Ally, although many Irish-Americans had joined ranks in the German cause.

It seems clear that by the end of that year a large segment of the Irish-American community had been drawn to revolutionary and pro-German ideas, rejecting their earlier constitutional and British home


²British versus German imperialism (New York, ca. 1915).


⁴Gaffney, Breaking the silence, p. 144.
rule notions. This sentiment was still largely unorganized, although it certainly had ample publicity from the Gaelic American and the Irish World, and it was of course very much nurtured by the Clan-na-Gael. The Clan, however, was a relatively small secret organization, and the Irish-American press, while it reached a large audience, was not a systematic means of marshalling popular feelings. What was needed was a new Irish nationalist organization, with an unmistakable mandate to speak for the Irish in America in order to refute any allegations that most of the Irish-Americans were still loyal to Redmond and home rule. After some discussion within the Clan leadership the decision was made to hold an Irish Race Convention in New York on 4 and 5 March 1916. Over the signature of 350 well-known Irish-American leaders an invitation was sent out on 8 February inviting some 2300 reliable Irish-Americans from all parts of the United States to attend. It stated the general purposes of the convention and those invited were expected to sign their names in agreement before they were permitted to attend. As Joseph McLaughlin, Congressman from New Jersey, president of the AOH, and managing editor of the National Hibernian, told Devoy, "Rest assured, I am strongly opposed to admitting any but those whose sentiments are in accord with ours. The Convention will neither be the time nor the place to argue who is right, or who is wrong. We're

1McGinn to Devoy, 12 Oct. 1915, Devoy's post-bag, 11, pp 480-81; Documents relative to the Sinn Fein movement, p. 9; and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 188.

2The convention probably was not as representative of all Irish-Americans as was claimed. GaA, 11 March 1916; and J.J. Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, (Dublin, 1924), p. 228.
right, and let the other fellows keep away."

The convention founded the Friends of Irish Freedom, which for the next decade served as one of the leading broadly-based, revolutionary Irish-American organizations, whose objective was the fostering of "Any movement that will tend to bring about the National Independence of Ireland."\(^1\) Victor Herbert, the composer and grandson of Samuel Lover, was elected president, Thomas Hughes Kelly, treasurer, and John D. Moore, secretary; as Tansill has pointed out, the organization was dominated by the Clan, and in fact it could be said that the FOIF was the popular and national auxiliary of the Clan.\(^3\) It was not oath-bound, did not take up clandestine activities, and it did allow women members; it in fact made considerable efforts to include as many members as possible, even to the extent of providing for "associate" membership for small groups which preferred to maintain their affiliation with some other organization. The work of creating local chapters and raising of funds began at once.\(^4\) The convention also made a Declaration of Principles and Policy which included demands that America's rights be preserved against Great Britain, that Irishmen not be expected to fight for England, that Ireland be made independent, and be guaranteed a voice in the making of peace at the end.

\(^1\)McLaughlin to Devoy, 21 Feb. 1916 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box M); and Appeal re Irish Race Convention, 1916 (Ibid., box Misc.).

\(^2\)Cited in Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 1 89.\(^8\)

\(^3\)Ibid.; and Documents relative to the Sinn Fein movement, p. 9. All of the national officers were Clan members, 15 of the 17 members of the executive committee were members of the Clan.

\(^4\)G.A., 1 April 1916.
of the war.\textsuperscript{1} Though the coming rebellion was, according to Devoy, known only to four men in the United States, in retrospect it seems clear that the convention and the creation of the FOIF were attempts to prepare the Irish-American public for the rising. Certainly on the strength of the mandate given by the convention, constitutionalism was publicly rejected and a new basis was laid for revolutionary agitation.

Although the Irish Race Convention was applauded by such Irish-American newspapers as the Irish World and the Gaelic American, as well as the New York Evening Mail and William Randolph Hearst’s paper the New York American, it was not without its critics. The new Redmondite paper Ireland of course thought that the convention was ill-advised and had been the blatant tool of the Germans inasmuch as it had opposed the policies of all except Germany, and "It was hostile to the people of Ireland whose deliberate policy was deliberately condemned."\textsuperscript{2} The New York Herald observed on the second day of the convention that it was understandable that some Irishmen could be lured by the Germans into thinking that "Prussian rule would benefit Ireland, but that any sane Irishman should believe such nonsense is incredible."\textsuperscript{3} The Irish people were united behind Redmond in support of the war, maintained the Brooklyn Citizen, and the convention was "at variance with Ireland's elected representatives."\textsuperscript{4} The New

\textsuperscript{1} Devoy, Recollections of an Irish rebel, pp 451-57; G.A., 11 March 1916.

\textsuperscript{2} Lit. Dig., 111, no. 12 (18 March 1916), p. 703. Also see Leslie to Redmond, 6 March 1916 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

\textsuperscript{3} New York Herald, 5 March 1916.

\textsuperscript{4} Brooklyn Citizen, 6 March 1916.
York Tribune said that the convention was a "clownish performance" and that most Irishmen were "humiliated" by this "impudent set of upstarts who have no authority whatever to express the sentiments of Irishmen at home." The Literary Digest condemned the convention as an embarrassment to American foreign policy at a critical moment and it quoted Supreme Court Justice John Ford, who refused to attend, because he was "so fully occupied just now trying to be a faithful American citizen" that he had "no time for consideration of the fortunes of any other country, except to sympathize with the unfortunate peoples afflicted by the unspeakable horrors of the European War." Needless to say the convention was of some concern to the British Embassy which sent a full report to London, including news clippings and documents, but the Foreign Office offered no proposals for coping with the situation. As Robert Sperling suggested in a Minute on 24 March 1916, "When Sinn Feiners are allowed to 'practice street fighting' in Irish towns we can hardly be surprised at proceedings of this sort in the U.S."

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2Ibid., p. 703.
3Memorandum from Washington to F.O., 10 March 1916 and Minutes (F.R.O., F.O. 371/2793).
CHAPTER III

1916 AND ITS AFTERMATH

1916-1917

The Irish rebellion in 1916 caught the American public very much by surprise, as it did almost everyone else, despite the conspicuous activity in early 1916 of the revolutionary Irish-Americans and their co-operation with the German-Americans. Americans in general had been preoccupied with the growing crisis between Mexico and the United States and with the war in Europe—specifically with the exchange of diplomatic notes between Germany and the Wilson administration over the Sussex affair and also with the battle of Verdun. Home Rule and Ulster, which had aroused considerable interest in 1914, had been ignored once Ireland seemed to rally behind the war effort and once the crisis of civil war was averted. Although there were exceptions, native American opinion was predictable enough: it disliked the rebellion but tended to be shocked by the subsequent executions and disgusted by the British government’s blunderings with home rule, Casement’s execution, and the Irish-American relief efforts. Irish-American opinion of course was more involved, intense, and sustained, and although there was great diversity among the Irish-Americans they shared a perspective on the Irish question that native Americans did not. Nevertheless from at least May until August there was a general agreement within the country about the heavy-handedness of the British. This temporary coalition of several elements in American society during 1916 posed a serious threat which Spring Rice and the Wilson government, for different reasons, recognized, even if the British government did not. The result was that opinion on the Irish question
had reached such an intensity that it could no longer be ignored or forgotten.

(1)

The first reports of any disturbances in Ireland to reach the United States were published in the Tuesday, 25 April 1916, newspapers noting very briefly that Sir Roger Casement, who had gone from Germany to Ireland in a submarine, had been captured and that a ship carrying arms had been sunk. Papers which went to press later on Tuesday, such as the Chicago Tribune, published slightly larger and more speculative articles, although these contained little more information. In fact it appears that so little information reached the United States by the regular channels that the Christian Science Monitor speculated on the following day that the cable linking England and America might have been cut. Nonetheless on Wednesday sufficient details had arrived to enable the Washington Post to report that fighting had broken out in Dublin between elements of the "Sinn Fein Society" and government troops and that serious fighting had centred on Stephen's Green and the General Post Office.


2Chicago Tribune, 25 April 1916. The Tribune published leaders reading, "FOIL GERMAN-IRISH PLOT," and suggested that Ireland might have been invaded and in a state of rebellion.

3C.S.M., 26 April 1916. American newspapers were further hamp- ered in obtaining news about the rising in Dublin because they had no correspondents there and had to send their London reporters to Ireland especially; the first travelled with the Irish Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell on a British destroyer and arrived in Dublin on Saturday, 29 April, cabling articles which appeared in the American press on Monday, 1 May. See C.S.M., 1 May 1916.

4Washington Post, 26 April 1916.
ence Monitor commented that the disturbances were "little more than a riot," and the New York World ran a leader: "UPRISING IN DUBLIN QUELLED: IRELAND ELSEWHERE IS QUIET."\(^1\) The deduction seemed to be that Casement had come to Ireland to lead a rebellion, but that he had been captured and an abortive insurrection in Dublin had been successfully suppressed by British forces. By the end of the week American newspapers were able to print considerably fuller stories of what had taken place in Ireland, and some at least admitted that the rebellion was larger than was first reported.\(^2\) Meanwhile, however, in lieu of more concrete information, the New York World published an article on Casement written in Berlin by the German-American newspaperman Franz Hugo Krebs (dated 18 March) while the Washington Post had several short biographical sketches of some of the known leaders and an analysis of the rebellion by Padraic Colum.\(^3\) The Chicago Tribune published interviews with leading Chicago Irish-Americans, most

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\(^1\)C. S. M., 26 April 1916; and New York World, 26 April 1916.

\(^2\)Washington Post, 28 April 1916.

\(^3\)New York World, 26 April 1916; and Washington Post, 30 April 1916.
of whom condemned the rising as a betrayal.\(^1\)

Initially the major American newspapers denounced the rising outright in their editorials. Casement was regarded as the leader of the rebellion and he along with the Germans and Irish-Americans was blamed for all the troubles it brought.\(^2\) While the New York Times and the Washington Post thought Casement was mad, they agreed with the New York World that there was some irony in the situation—that Casement's treason was not terribly different from that of Carson, then a member of the government, or General Sir John French, commander-in-chief in Ireland.\(^3\) The rebellion itself was both foolish and

\(^1\) Chicago Tribune, 26 April 1916, and Boston Transcript, cited in Lit. Dig., lli, no. 19 (6 May 1916), pp 1263-64. Two very interesting and helpful articles have recently been published which work to analyse the American reaction to the rebellion in 1916: D.M. Tucker, "Some American responses to the Easter rebellion, 1916," The Historian, xxix (Aug. 1967), pp 605-18, and O.D. Edwards, "American aspects of the Rising," and "Appendix II: press reaction to the Rising in general," O.D. Edwards and F. Pyle (eds.), 1916 the Easter Rising (London, 1968). Tucker's article is based on newspapers and journals and is very helpful for his analysis of the views of such journals as the Masses, the New Republic and the Nation; his classification of various newspapers as "liberal" or "anglophile," while perhaps valid for their policy on the war, seems a bit arbitrary when applied to the Irish rebellion. In noting the attempts to support or oppose the Irish rebellion by historical analogies with the American Revolution and the American Civil War, Tucker has raised a theme which was even more fully discussed after the war. Edwards's essay is more far-reaching; he attempts to put Irish-American nationalism into a historical context as well as to show what impact the rising had on American domestic and foreign affairs. To do this he relies not only on published materials, but also on previously untouched consular reports in the National Archives. "Appendix II" illustrates some of the confusion in the American press as to what had happened during the rising.

\(^2\) New York World, 26 and 30 April 1916; N.Y.T., 2 May 1916; and C.S.M., 2 May 1916.

\(^3\) N.Y.T., 26 April and 3 May 1916; Washington Post, 26 April 1916; and New York World, 27 April 1916.
futile, wrote the Chicago Tribune and the New York World; it weakened John Redmond as the Phoenix Park murders had Parnell and it played into the hands of the Tories and Unionists, noted the Christian Science Monitor and the New York World.¹ The New York Times, although occasionally revealing considerable insight into the situation, did tend to resort to the ethnic bias by suggesting that it was in an Irishman's character to rebel for an ideal even if he had the substance, home rule; indeed the Irish rebels were "like forward children, causing untold annoyance to others, but themselves suffering the heavier penalties of misbehavior."² Broadly speaking the American papers regarded the rising as foolish and misguided (in large part inspired by the Germans and the contemptible Irish-American revolutionaries safe in the United States) and they hoped that, in view of the conspicuous loyalty of the majority in Ireland, the British government would heed the lessons of South Africa and deal with both Ireland and the rebels in a lenient and generous manner.³ The liberal journals, like the New Republic and the Nation, opposed the rising and thought it senseless, but were bitter in their condemnation of the

¹New York World, 26 April 1916; Chicago Tribune, 2 May 1916; and C.S.M., 2 May 1916.

²N.Y.T., 29 April and 2 May 1916; in this view they were joined in part by the C.S.M., 29 April 1916.

British for provoking the Irish into rebellion.¹

News of the executions of the leaders of the rebellion and several innocent people provoked strong criticism of the British government by many of the editors of American newspapers which were often regarded as anglophile in policy. Perhaps one of the most critical was the New York World which first commented that the executions served "no good purpose" and just created bitterness in Ireland.² As the executions continued the World appealed to the government to follow Redmond's advice at Westminster and expressed the hope that the "flurry of British frightfulness is over"; the following day the editors said the rebels should be treated as belligerents as the United States had done during the Civil War and the British in the Boer War.³

The next week the World was even more scathing:

If even now we can be sure what has happened, sixteen men have been killed in cold blood for deeds like those that were forgiven De Wet. One was slain for 'murder' which calls for public trial /Thomas Kent/. The shooting of another seems to Mr. Asquith himself 'an inexcusable act' /Skeffington/. Are there to be more? Are the 'rivers of blood' at last damned?⁴


² New York World, 6 May 1916.

³ Ibid., 9 and 10 May 1916.

The Washington Post came out strongly against the executions from the
beginning, arguing that,

It is no exaggeration to say that a shock
went around the civilized world when it was
learned that Patrick H. Pearse and the
other leaders of the Irish revolt had been
tried by drumhead court-martial, found
guilty and sentenced in a trice and shot
at sunrise against a wall of Dublin castle.

Such action was "hasty, ill-considered and unstatesmanlike," especi-
ally when compared to the action taken against Carson or the Boer
leaders or even Colonel Arthur Lynch, and it would be a source of fut-
ure acrimony. 1 The Chicago Tribune asserted that the British were
within their legal rights in the executions but that they were mis-
taken to carry out the penalties; really, it said, the rebellion was
not as dangerous as the recent labour strikes. 2 The New York Times
and the Des Moines Capital seemed to agree that there was little else
the British could do but it was certain that the executions would
create martyrs and win undeserved sympathy. 3 Even the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, certainly one of the American newspapers least sympathe-
tic to the rebellion, thought that the executions were ill-advised
because the Irish temperament—unrealistic and provincial at best—
would never understand and would subsequently romanticise the rebel-

1 Washington Post, 7 May 1916.
2 Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1916.
3 N.Y.T., 4 May 1916; and Des Moines Capital, cited in the Chicago
Tribune, 11 May 1916.
lion it currently deplored. ¹

The private opinion of native Americans, although less systematic than the press, followed a similar pattern: unsympathetic to the rebellion but startled by the executions. J.H. Kellogg, a close correspondent of Sir Horace Plunkett, wrote on 27 April that he was "shocked" to learn of the rebellion and thought it pitiful that "so many people should be willing to accept the guidance of an insane leader [case]."² Charles McCarthy expressed his "extreme regret" to Plunkett about the rising and said that he had first concluded that it was the work of Larkin's followers but understood now that there was "a literati element to it." McCarthy commented on the executions, however, that,

> at the present time there is a great indignation all over America at the killing of so many of the men who are in the rebellion. America, in general, looks upon them as misguided men, and of course you know we have certain traditions here which come down from our own rebellion. Everyone in this country has been glad that Jefferson Davis and other

¹C.S.M., 6, 13, and 26 May 1916. The Monitor seemed irresistibly drawn to discussing the rebellion, and in fact on 16 May 1916 published a fairly comprehensive summary of the rising, complete with facsimile reproductions of the Proclamation and the proposed postage stamps for the republic. C.S.M., 16 May 1916. The Literary Digest noted the unanimity of American editors in disapproving of the executions as well as the rising. Lit. Dig., lili, no. 20 (13 May 1916), p. 1355. Later in the summer, after first impressions had already been made, the July issue of the radical journal the Masses featured articles by Louise Bryant, James Larkin, and the editor Arturo Giovannitti praising and explaining the rebellion. See Tucker, "Some American responses to the Easter rebellion, 1916," The Historian, xxix (Aug. 1967), pp 607-09. By November the liberal pacifist Roland Hugins, in a book discussing the termination of the war, wrote that British greed and hypocrisy had driven Ireland into revolt and that England had robbed Ireland of her "economic and political liberty." R. Hugins, The possible peace (New York, 1916), p. 156.

²J.H. Kellogg to Plunkett, 27 April and 21 May 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).
leaders of the rebellion were not killed.  

Plunkett was told by A. Lawrence Lowell that the rising was a "tragedy" and that Americans could not understand how the British government could have been so ill-informed as to allow it to take place. Both in May and again in July Lowell lamented the executions, "To us here it seems that the executions of the Sinn Feiners after surrender was a mistake." Nicholas Murray Butler, the Columbia University don, thought it incomprehensible that the rebels were able to obtain support from German and American sources seemingly without the knowledge of the government; Butler wrote Lord Bryce that the rebellion was "deplorable" and that he was "only too grateful that it was so speedily suppressed." Bryce was also told by Seth Low, the New York educator and reformer, who was "distressed" by the rebellion, that his Irish-American informants told him that while the executions had "disturbed" many Irishmen in New York the vast majority still supported Redmond and home rule. Few were as optimistic as this, although Willard Straight, patron of the New Republic magazine and former advisor for the State Department, told Bryce that by 21 June the "general public" had been distracted by the presidential election in America. Straight commented that in May the executions had excited a considerable amount of criticism; his cautious analysis was that Americans thought "your

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1 McCarthy to Plunkett, 10 May 1916 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, KU, box 27).

2 Lowell to Plunkett, 13 May and 5 July 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

3 Butler to Bryce, 13 May 1916 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 3, fol. 262).

4 Low to Bryce, 20 May 1916 (Ibid., vol. 7, fol. 331).
authorities had endeavoured to make up for past weakness and incompetence by sudden and unnecessary severity." But Bryce was further assured by one friend that intelligent Americans were supporting England in spite of the Irish question because Great Britain was fighting America's battle in Europe. Moreton Frewen was told that, "The last Irish outbreak has alienated the sympathies of many people here from the Irish cause." One of the most moving expressions of private concern was the letter of William Dean Howells, then aging but still one of the leading literary figures in America, to the New York Nation. Howells thought that the executions were acts of "vengeance" which dramatized England's failure in Ireland and undermined the great cause Britain served in the war. In New York the poet Eleanor Rogers Cox organized a "Poets's Meeting" in Central Park to express sympathy for Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett; it was a successful event which drew the participation of Edwin Markham, Margaret Widdemer, Louis Undermeyer, and many others who recited poems in memory of the Irish leaders.

The role of Germany in the rebellion was an explosive issue to native Americans who were predisposed to support the Allies in the war and feared German intrigue in the United States and Mexico. The New

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1 Straight to Bryce, 21 June 1916 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 19, fol. 155).
2 Dr W.T. Sullivan to Bryce, 7 July 1916 (Ibid., fol. 194).
3 R.M. Stuart Wortley to Frewen, 2 May 1916 (L.C., Frewen Papers, box 46).
4 New York Nation, 18 May 1916.
5 J. Kilmer, Poems, essays and letters, ed. R.C. Holliday (New York, 1918), i, p. 77.
York World had observed that "An Irish rebellion, made in Germany, is not likely to get very far," certainly not among native Americans. Several newspapers had damned the Germans for assisting the Irish rebels in their folly. Bainbridge Colby, the New York liberal and future Secretary of State, was willing to speak publicly in support of the Irish rebellion, but he disengaged himself from Irish-American organizations when he became suspicious of Irish-German collusion in New York protest meetings. Other native Americans hoped to use the Irish rebellion as a weapon with which to weaken the German movement in the United States. By sheer chance the American journalist and author Arthur Bullard was the guest of Sir Horace Plunkett in Dublin during the rebellion. Upon returning to London Bullard, with the assistance of Sir Basil H. Thompson of Scotland Yard, wrote to both E.M. House and Plunkett outlining a plan to reveal how the Germans had "cynically fooled the Irish" by using the rebellion as a trick to "divert to Ireland British troops which would otherwise have gone to Flanders." Casement's confession to Thompson that the Germans had "let him down" led Bullard and Thompson to believe that the Irish had

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2 See Colby to Judge D.F. Cohalan, 20 May 1916 (L.C., Colby Papers, box 2).

expected greater German assistance. "If the Clan-na-Gael could be convinced that the Germans had tricked them this partnership Irish and German would be destroyed," Bullard told House; they also felt that this might prove to be the key to German intrigue in Mexico and India as well. Plunkett joined in enthusiastically, writing letters to his American friends and talking with military leaders in Dublin. The project, though inconclusive, was an indication of the hostility with which some Americans viewed Irish-German co-operation.

Perhaps more important than these comments by leading native Americans were the views of E.M. House and Theodore Roosevelt, who were closer to those in power. House, President Wilson's confidential advisor on foreign affairs, had written to Plunkett on 25 April, although presumably before he learned of the rising, that he had been talking with Lloyd George in early 1916 about the Irish question and had been assured that Lloyd George was "earnestly trying to work out some solution." The Irish question "has now become," House noted significantly, "almost as much of a political issue in America as in England." A month and a half after the rising, on 16 June, House made a more cautious observation at the request of Plunkett:

1 Thompson to Plunkett, 1 May 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

2 Bullard to House, 1 May 1916 (Bodl., Nathan Papers, vol. 477); and Bullard to Plunkett, 1 May 1916 (Plunkett Papers, op. cit.).

3 Plunkett diary, 4, 7, and 13 May 1916 (Ibid.).

4 Shane Leslie suggested much the same kind of plan to Redmond, hoping that proof of a German betrayal would work to discredit the revolutionaries in the United States and move sympathy to the constitutionalists. Leslie to Redmond, 16 May 1916 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

5 House to Plunkett, 25 April 1916 (Plunkett Papers, op. cit.).
The rebellion and its consequences have not made as deep an impression here as they would have otherwise have made if there were not so many momentous events happening from day to day. I think, though, in more peaceful times it may come back to haunt us.¹

Certainly this analysis hardly confirms his earlier view, although it was perhaps tempered by House's awareness of the certainty that Plunkett would show the letter to political leaders in London as an indication of Wilson's sentiments. Theodore Roosevelt, then out of power but by no means without influence, instructed his friend Arthur Hamilton Lee, then parliamentary secretary to Lloyd George, to tell the minister that because of the activities of Carson and the Ulster Unionists in 1914, "I wish your people had not shot the leaders of the Irish rebels after they surrendered."² He agreed that it was imperative that the rebellion be put down, but as he wrote to Plunkett a month later,

"...it seemed to me that the extreme leniency with which Carson and the Ulster Unionists had been treated two years previously made it impossible to justify the extreme difference of treatment in the two cases, by the far less dissimilarity of offence."³

Clearly the British handling of the rising was a trial to its American friends, although this seems not to have influenced British policy.

Quite by accident the United States government became partially involved in the affair.

¹House to Plunkett, 16 June 1916, see also Plunkett to House, 25 and 29 May 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).


³Roosevelt to Plunkett, 9 July 1916 (Plunkett Papers, op. cit.); see also Plunkett to Roosevelt, 27 June 1916 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers, series 1/box 304).
involved in one aspect of the rising, and although its intentions, or those of President Wilson cannot be precisely defined, it did not initiate action to betray the rebellion as was alleged then and subsequently. On 18 April 1916 the United States Secret Service raided the private offices in New York of Captain Wolf von Igel, a member of the German Embassy staff, because he was suspected of carrying out espionage activities related to the war. Among the papers found in von Igel's possession were eight documents which gave quite detailed information about the time and place of the Irish rebellion and the shipment of arms from Germany and which mentioned the names of John Devoy and Judge Cohalan. Descriptions of the raid were published, filling the newspapers for several days, although the substance of the seized documents was not released. On Tuesday, 25 April, four days after the German ship Aud had been intercepted by the British navy off Fenit, Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in London, cabled the Secretary of State to ask on behalf of the British for copies of those documents that related to Ireland.

The Admiralty have received information that among the papers of Von Igel are a number dealing with the proposed smuggling of arms.

1 In the G.A., 29 April 1916, Devoy said that there had been no Irish informers or British spies to give away the information about the German arms ship "but that deficiency was supplied by the Washington Government...." See also G.A., 27 May 1916. This assertion was repeated in Devoy's Recollections of an Irish rebel, pp 465-71, and again in Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 193-94. Also see Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, pp 107-10.

2 Thomas W. Gregory, Attorney General, to Secretary of State, 21 April 1916 (N.A., WOLF VON IGEL CASE, 701.6211/307½).

3 In fact Spring Rice complained to Grey on 28 April that the "United States authorities have not issued any account of the nature of the documents seized in von Igel's apartment." Spring Rice to Grey, 28 April 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2851).
into Ireland and with an insurrectionary movement in Ireland. Admiralty would be grateful if photographic copies of these documents might be given to the British Naval Attache at Washington.

One week later, 1 May 1916, Secretary Lansing cabled Page that the "Charge has been made that this Government has already given information in regard to these papers," and he added that he did "not believe anything of any value has been discovered here," although he said the department would consider Page's request. Thus whatever the British government knew about the rebellion in Ireland, and clearly it had some advance knowledge, the information came from British intelligence sources and not from the United States government.

The American government was anxious about the extent to which Irish-American revolutionaries might have violated the neutrality laws in the planning of the rebellion. Spring Rice was informed by the Department of State that in the view of the government American participation had been minimal. Although money had been collected for clearly revolutionary purposes, the actual planning of the rising had been done in Ireland and Germany, and in fact few Irish-Americans could have known about it. The report of Wesley Frost, United States Consul in Cork, in October tended to confirm this early conclusion.


2Lansing to American Embassy, London, 1 May 1916 (Ibid.). Tumult telephoned Lansing on Thursday, 27 April, saying that the government had been accused of informing the British of the plans of the Irish revolutionaries. See Desk diary, 27 April 1916 (L.C., Lansing Papers).

3See Spring Rice to Grey, 28 April 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2851), Spring Rice to Grey, cable, 19 May 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/86), and Spring Rice to Grey, 19 May 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2795).
Indeed Frost suggested that the complaints about American money financing the rising were "absurdly unjustified."\(^1\) The American government did not want to find itself open to charges similar to those which had been made against Britain during the Civil War.

Congress was more willing to comment publicly on the rising than was the Wilson administration. Although events in Ireland were first mentioned in the Senate as early as 5 May 1916, steps were not taken until 12 May when Congressman Leonidas C. Dyer of Missouri introduced a resolution asking that the British government treat the rebels as "prisoners of war" and not as "criminals."\(^2\) Four days later Congressman Jeff McLenmore of Texas made a bellicose speech in Congress supporting the rising as well as the Irish alliance with Germany and condemning British rule in Ireland and Americans who approved of it.\(^3\)

On 17 May 1916 in the Senate, William E. Borah of Idaho condemned the British executions; he said that because of the precedents against "arbitrary power" he had learned with regret of "these midnight judgments of the court-martial sitting at Dublin." Such actions were out of character for the British and would cause a strong reaction.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Frost to Secretary of State, October 1916 (N.A., 841.00/32, roll 6).

\(^2\)H. Res. 235, 12 May 1916, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, p. 7899; see also Ibid., p. 7439. Two more resolutions appealing to the British government to exercise restraint with the Irish prisoners were introduced in the House by Thomas Gallivan of Chicago (H. Res. 244) and Murray Hulbert of New York (H. Res. 245). All three resolutions were sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee which did not report any of them; nonetheless, their introduction was an indication of the sentiments of the Congress and the popular pressures put upon it. Ibid., pp 8358 and 8427.

\(^3\)16 May 1916, Congressional Record, Appendix to, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 54, p. 959.

Later in the day Senator John W. Kern of Indiana introduced a resolution which asked that the Secretary of State inquire into the cases of American citizens caught in Ireland during the rebellion and that American interests generally be looked after. The resolution was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then sent by chairman William J. Stone to the White House and the State Department for an opinion. Frank L. Polk, Counselor of the State Department, discussed the resolution with President Wilson and reported back to Stone that Wilson "did not think there was any particular objection to it," although Polk added that both he and the President felt that there was really no need to pass it at all. The resolution was returned to the Senate with a favourable report from the committee and on 2 June, a date well past the time of effective action, the resolution was unanimously adopted. Wilson sent to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State on the circumstances of American citizens in Ireland in accordance with the Kern resolution.

Meanwhile the Congress, the administration, and the consular service had been working to see that due process of law was applied to Americans involved in the rebellion. Personal appeals were directed

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1S. Res. 196, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, pp 8140-41. Two days after the Kern resolution had been introduced Senator James E. Martine of New Jersey told the Senate that he opposed the methods England had used to suppress the rising and said that the execution of cripples and wounded men made British claims in the war seem hypocritical. 19 May 1916, Ibid., p. 8316.

2Polk to Stone, 27 May 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 133).

31 and 2 June 1916, Congressional Record, op. cit., pp 9026-27 and 9150. Also see 1 June 1916, Hansard 5 (commons), lxxxii, col. 2932.

413 June 1916, Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 9482.
to both the President and the Department of State on behalf of John J. Kilgallon and Jeremiah ÓDiarmuid Ó C. Lynch, with the result that some initiative was taken by the government to inquire about these two men.¹ According to the Washington Post, Wilson, through a request by Senator James O'Gorman of New York, instructed Lansing to cable Page "to make representations in behalf of Lynch in order to save his life, pending an investigation of the facts in his case by the American government."² In Dublin, the United States Consul, Edward L. Adams, intervened or inquired about the fate of Kilgannon, Lynch, and Edward ÓEamon de Valera, all of whom had American connections which merited American interest if not actual protection (Kilgallon and Lynch were American citizens while de Valera had been born in the United States). By the time Adams talked with the authorities in Dublin about Kilgallon he had been sent to prison in England, but the Consul was instrumental in reversing the death sentence of the court martial in the cases of both de Valera and Lynch.³

Irish-American reactions to the rising, while perhaps less detached or objective than those of native Americans, were also more complex because of the divisions between the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries. The rising was a grievous, although not mortal, blow

¹See Polk to William Rasquin, Jr., 10 May 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 133).

²Washington Post, 19 May 1916, and editorial "The case of Jeremiah Lynch," Ibid., 20 May 1916. The appeal to Wilson was made the evening after the Kern resolution was introduced in the Senate.

to the constitutional Irish-American nationalists which drove home the full implications of the contradictions of the Redmondite position. Ironically the constitutionalists were among the first in the United States to register any opinion on the insurrection when several leading Chicago Irish-Americans were interviewed by enterprising reporters from the Chicago Tribune for the Wednesday, 26 April, edition of the papers. P.T. Barry, president of the Irish Fellowship Club, said that the rising was not an Irish rebellion at all, that the Irish people were loyal to the Allies, and he said a bit unfairly that Casement had never supported Irish nationalism until he lost his job in the Consular Service. Charles ffrench, a former president of the club, said that the rising was the worst form of folly and that he had always disliked Casement, the supposed leader. William Dillon, the brother of the parliamentarian James Dillon, who would in a few days come close to championing the rebels in Westminster, said surprisingly that the rising would not amount to very much. Only one Irish-American interviewed supported the rising. In various Irish-American centres the United Irish League met to denounce the rising and make expressions of support for the policy of John Redmond. In New York a meeting held on Friday, 28 April was led by Stephen McFarland, John J. O'Connell, Dr John J. Coyle, and Patrick Egan, who, after ejecting three disruptive supporters of the rebellion, declared themselves

1 Lord Eustace Percy, who was in the United States during the rising, later wrote that the rebellion was no more welcome to moderate Irish-American nationalists than to the British government. Lord E. Percy, Some memories (London, 1958), p. 50.

2 Chicago Tribune, 26 April 1916. These interviews were later syndicated and published in several other newspapers. See the Boston Transcript, cited in Lit. Dig., lxi, no. 19 (6 May 1916), pp 1263-64.
opposed to the rising and the elements who created it and in favour of Redmond, home rule and President Wilson. Resolutions were passed, That this meeting express its unqualified sorrow and amazement at the unpardonable wrong now being perpetrated against the whole people of Ireland by the present insane attempt at insurrection—a futile effort instigated solely by the unscrupulous agents of foreign intrigue—participated in by a group of unreasoning enthusiasts, combined with a rank and file made up largely of communistic disciples of the unspeakable Jim Larkin and financed by foreign funds.¹

The UIL in Boston sent Redmond a cable expressing their confidence in him and assuring him of the loyal sentiments of the Boston Irish for the party.² In Dorchester, Massachusetts, Judge Thomas P. Riley spoke out in enthusiastic support of Redmond at a public meeting; Redmond and not the Sinn Feiners spoke for Ireland.³ Even Cardinal Gibbons expressed his disapproval of the rising to the British Ambassador: "At the present he said that all respectable Irishmen condemned the revolt in unqualified terms, but there was a danger of 'manufacturing martyrs' for American use."⁴ John Quinn, certainly a moderate without any organizational connections wrote on 1 May to his friend the writer Joseph Conrad that he had been "disgusted and depressed by the horrible fiasco in Ireland...." Quinn thought that if anything the rebellion typified the worst aspects of Irish romanticism and the

¹New York World, 29 April 1916.
²Among those participating were Michael J. Jordan and T.B. Fitzpatrick. C.S.M., 2 May 1916.
³Ibid., 3 May 1916.
⁴Spring Rice to Grey, 4 May 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/86).
"refusal to face facts," nonetheless he sent his friends gift copies of Pearse's writings. 1

The executions of the leaders of the rebellion caught the Irish-American moderates off guard. Stephen McFarland cabled Redmond on 4 May that the "Irish in America contrasting execution of Dublin leaders with treatment in Ulster and South Africa are revolted by this sign of reversion to savage repression." 2 The constitutionalist weekly Ireland tried to explain the difficulty of the new situation. It questioned the necessity of the executions and said that they would be interpreted as a racial outburst by the British. More importantly, however, Ireland said that while Irishmen had committed themselves to the home rule policies of the pre-war government, "no Irishman has wholly renounced the idea of being willing to fight for freedom if pushed to the extremity. The rashness of the idealists who have done this thing does not impair the universal sympathy of their ideal..." 3

On 15 May Ryan sent a gloomy cablegram to Redmond implying that Redmond was undone.

Irish executions have alienated every American friend and caused resurgence of ancient enmities. Your life work destroyed by English brutality. Opinion widespread that promise or Home Rule was mockery. 4

Shane Leslie wrote from the home of W. Bourke Cockran to Redmond the following day of the deterioration of the prospects for moderate policy:

1Reid, The man from New York, pp 232-33.
2McFarland to Redmond, 4 May 1916 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
4Ryan to Redmond, 15 May 1916 (Redmond Papers, op. cit.).
The present wave of fury sweeping through Irish America originated with the executions and not with the rising. The rising only called out sympathy for you, except in a small circle. The executions enabled that circle to spread their ripple further than they had hoped or dreamed.1

Leslie said that Irish-Americans who had taken the news of the rising quite calmly had become "hysterical" during the extended executions, and he concluded that until Redmond was "in charge of a provisional Government, Irish America would prove intractable to all except German agents."2 A few days later he wrote that the situation was even more "desperate."3 P.T. Barry said much the same thing; the rebellion won condemnation, the executions sympathy, even among the native Americans. Despite the large meetings held by Devoy and his followers, Barry like Leslie felt that the whole thing would "blow over" if the British government resolved the Irish question, and he urged that the "final settlement should not be longer delayed."4 The only effective defender of Redmond's policies and home rule after the executions seemed to be Lawrence Godkin, a New York lawyer whose Irish-American father had edited the Evening Post, who told the American Rights Committee (meeting in Carnegie Hall on 19 May to condemn the sinking of the Lusitania) that Redmond was correct on the issue of Irish participation in the war; Godkin spoke out because he thought there "ought to be some expression of the point of view of the right-minded Irish of this

1Leslie to Redmond, 16 May 1916 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
2Ibid.
3Leslie to Redmond, 20 May 1916 (Ibid.).
4Barry to Redmond, 25 May 1916 (Ibid.).
country—who were many,"\(^1\) Joyce Kilmer, a romantic, second generation Irish-American, wrote several poems for the Central Park Poets's Meeting in which he exalted the notions of freedom for which the Irish rebels had died.

Lord Byron and Shelley and Plunkett, McDonough and Hunt and Pearse
See now how their hatred of tyrants
Was so insistently fierce.

Kilmer, who asserted that romantic Ireland was not dead as Yeats had written, also praised the English libertarian tradition.\(^2\) But even moderate Irish-Americans like Kilmer and Godkin were then joining with Irish revolutionary nationalists.

The revolutionary Irish-American nationalists, while no doubt more closely concerned with the events in Ireland, did not successfully make a public impression until the end of Easter Week. The *Gaelic American* arrived on the newsstands on Saturday, 29 April, but it gave a report of events in Ireland that differed considerably from the accounts in the large daily newspapers. Devoy, clearly writing without any detailed information from Ireland wrote in fairly general terms what he thought was happening according to the original plans: the Irish Volunteers had started an insurrection on Saturday and Sunday, a cypher message told Devoy, and Ireland was "fighting gallantly for her Independence." The British censor and the slave-minded American newspapers had misrepresented and minimized the significance of this major event by asserting that the rising was a "riot" started by

\(^1\) Godkin to Plunkett, 5 July 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

\(^2\) See "Easter Week" and also "Apology." Kilmer, *Poems, essays and letters*, i, pp 131-32 and 163-64.
the "Sinn Feiners." Ireland had changed the war situation by becoming one of the "belligerents" and by disproving England's claim to be fighting for the rights of small nations. Ireland's position, the Gaelic American wrote confidently, was good although the betrayal to the British of the von Igel papers by the Wilson government deprived the rebellion in the west of the arms necessary to spread the rising throughout the island. The paper denied that the rising was planned in Germany, although German help had been requested and the Germans had complied. The Irish World saw the rising in much the same context. Picking up the issue over which the paper had broken with Redmond, it stated the rebellion showed that "loyalty to the British Government is not so universal in Ireland as Mr John Redmond and his fellow recruiting-sergeants would have us believe." For the Irish World the rebellion had redeemed Ireland's soul and had asserted Ireland's nationality in the eyes of the world. On the following day, Sunday 30 April, large meetings were held in several cities on the east coast supporting the rising. In New York the United Irish Societies, a Clan-dominated organization, held a large public meeting at the Cohan theatre under the chairmanship of Denis A. Spellissy and Judge John Jerome Rooney. The crowd consisted of Germans as well as Irish-Americans and together they denounced Redmond and England while cheering Ireland, Casement, and the Central Powers. A band played "Deutschland Uber Alles" and "The Watch on the Rhine" as well as several Irish and Amer-

1GAA, 29 April 1916.

2Irish World, 29 April 1916.
The speakers emphasized the "Americanism" of the meeting, the similarity of the Irish rebellion to the American Revolution, and demanded American support for Ireland; resolutions were passed pledging sympathy for the rebellion and praising the Irish efforts while also cursing England and thanking Germany. Similar meetings were held in the Boston area by the Gaelic School Society and by the Friends of Irish Freedom, and in Pittsfield Judge Cohalan and John F. Kelly led a separate rally. Dr Gertrude B. Kelly, the New York president of the Cumann na M'Ball, told reporters of the New York World that there were 100,000 American volunteers ready to fight for Ireland, and Devoy's newspaper said there were 500,000 who would be led by German officers.

When it was clear that the British had successfully crushed the rebellion, but before the impact of the executions had made itself felt, and most recorded reactions to the rising asserted that it was a most foolish and mischievous attempt, the Gaelic American published a vigorous defence insisting on the wisdom of the whole affair. Although Redmond had got the Home Rule Bill "on the statute books" the Gaelic American argued that there was little chance of its actual enactment. Furthermore, the soldiers that Redmond recruited for the British army to fight in Europe were men lost to Ireland. On the other hand, the paper went on to say, the few men who fought in the rebellion, and the fewer who were killed, asserted the nationality of Ireland more effectively than anyone in recent years. The rebellion "notified the

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1 GaA, 29 April and 6 May 1916; and C.S.N., 1 May 1916. See also a handbill dated 30 April 1916 announcing the mass meeting (P.R.O., F. O., 371/2793), and Edwards in Edwards and Pyle (ed.), 1916 the Easter Rising, p. 159.

2 New York World, 2 May 1916; and GaA, 6 May 1916.
world that Ireland still demands National Independence and that her young men are ready to give their lives for it," the Gaelic American proclaimed. The lives lost were not squandered: "It was a small price to pay for the advantage gained." Although the Irish people had suffered a momentary reversal, there would be another rebellion on the verge of England's collapse, which through the alliance with the Germans would be complete and successful.¹

The news of the continued executions evoked a more outraged burst of protest from the revolutionary Irish-Americans than they had made previously. On 6 May the Gaelic American called the executions simple "murders" and promised that before the war was over Irishmen would court-martial British officers and execute them; the following week it bore down fully on the "Military Massacre in Dublin."² Meetings were held in various parts of the country on 8 May under the direction of Clan and FOIF leaders. Judges Cohalan and Rooney and Francis S. Clark presided at a meeting in Philadelphia where Cohalan explained the importance of the rising, Rooney attacked Redmond and praised the executed leaders, and Joseph McGarrity appealed for funds ($5000 were collected). In Boston the Clan sponsored pledges to support Ireland to the end of its struggle; Robert Sturn, president of the German Alliance, spoke at the meeting along with John Devoy and William Larkin. Former Congressman Joseph F. O'Connell told a meeting in Springfield that it was better for Irishmen to die by the thousands fighting for independence in Ireland than to be killed in Flanders fight-

¹Several editorials, G.A., 6 May 1916.

²Ibid., 6 and 13 May 1916. The G.A. also claimed that John Redmond had applauded the executions in Parliament.
In San Francisco Father Peter C. Yorke presided over a mass meeting addressed by John J. Cox, the state president of the AOH, and Major Lawrence O'Toole; resolutions condemning the executions as contrary to the laws of warfare and humanity were sent to President Wilson asking that the United States protest then as it had during the Armenian massacres. That the executions would jolt many Irishmen into a new appreciation of the concept of nationalism was not lost on revolutionary American leaders. Joseph McGarrity, better known as a leader of the Clan-na-Gael than as a poet, wrote after the executions,

See her evil hand once more
Hang on a tree such gallant fruit,
See the sacred tree has bore
A seed that's found a lasting root.

The dead men, McGarrity foresaw, would create a new spirit in Ireland.

Probably the largest and most important mass meeting condemning the executions was that held in Carnegie Hall in New York on Sunday evening 14 May. Several thousands stood outside while Justice Edward J. Gavegan, W. Bourke Cockran, Father Francis P. Duffy, Bainbridge Colby and several others addressed the 5000 people in the audience. Perhaps the most significant speaker was Bainbridge Colby who said that British rule in Ireland was based on ancient conquests and was every bit as bad as German rule in Belgium; Britain's treatment of the rebel

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1 See full reports in C.A., 13 May 1916.

2 See A.C. Ross, British Consul in San Francisco, to Foreign Secretary, 11 May 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2793). Resolutions were also introduced in the Massachusetts House of Representatives demanding that there be no more executions of Irish prisoners. Frederick P. Leay, British Consul in Boston, to Spring Rice, 10 May 1916 (Ibid.).

leaders betrayed her position as the defender of small nationalities. 1 Cockran said Ireland demanded and deserved "her own sovereignty," and Father Duffy observed that "England's friends were sickened" by the executions and he pointed out that had the rising taken place in Warsaw the British would have been the first to applaud it and the first to protest against the executions. Michael J. Ryan of the UIL telegraphed his support to the meeting and asked to join "in denouncing the latest evidence of British barbarity." 2 Resolutions were passed condemning the executions, demanding that the present government in Ireland be changed, and damning the British government for allowing Sir Edward Carson and his followers to rebel without punishment. 3 Although the meeting was dominated by revolutionaries, leaders of the FOIF, if not actually the Clan, it had attracted sincere constitutionalists and interested native Americans; because of this the separatist tone of the meeting was a telling indication of an important shift in Irish-American thinking. As Shane Leslie wrote in 1917, after the executions the Irish "remembered Robert Emmet and knew where they stood." 4 Perhaps not since the 1880s were the two nationalist elements in America so close together.

1 Shortly after this meeting Colby turned down an offer from Judge Cohalan to join an Irish committee because he feared that the Irish question was becoming "confused in the public mind" with the German position in the war. Colby said he had great sympathy for the Irish cause, and that he would do what he could for Ireland, but he would not be identified with the German propagandists in America. Colby to Cohalan, 20 May 1916 (L.C., Colby Papers, box 2).


3 G.A., 20 May 1916; and Edwards in Edwards and Pyle (ed.), 1916 the Easter Rising, p. 159. Subsequent meetings were held in Lowell, Westfield, New Haven, Providence, Rochester, Hoboken, Chicago, and again in New York, although they were increasingly concerned with raising relief funds.

4 Leslie, The Irish issue in its American aspect, pp 188 and 190-91.
By early summer the powerful effect of the rising and the executions had begun to diminish; American editors turned increasingly to American domestic affairs and to the international situation, and even the Gaelic American featured headlines dealing with American political news by 24 June. Nonetheless, the Irish question was kept before the American public until early autumn because of three simultaneous activities: the British government's new home rule proposals, the trial and execution of Sir Roger Casement, and the relief operations financed and partially administered by Irish-Americans. Great Britain had lost good will through the handling of the Irish rebellion, and in fact the whole list of failures, hesitations, and mistakes of the past few years coloured the view of many observers of the Irish situation.

On 25 May 1916 Asquith announced that Lloyd George would attempt to settle the Irish crisis. Although American newspaper editors felt an urgency in resolving the situation few had confidence in the strength of the Asquith government to deal boldly with the situation. The New York World, which on 17 May had suggested that home rule be implemented immediately, was on 26 May sceptical of the government's ability to act and of the good intentions of Carson and the Unionists. The World said that Carson was still master of the Irish crisis and that he had "once before plotted rebellion and intimidated the Government by threats of forcible resistance." The Christian Science Monitor thought that Lloyd George had great ability, but questioned whether he could get Redmond, Carson, and O'Brien to agree on any

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1New York World, 26 May 1916.
meaningful home rule program.¹ When the home rule proposals were made public in early June the New York World lamented that they represented one of those typical British compromises which "satisfy no one and settle nothing"; in fact they meant "a continuance for years to come of dangerous agitation."² Nonetheless the World praised Redmond and Devlin for making statesmanlike sacrifices.³ In early July the New York Times was moderately optimistic about what Lloyd George had accomplished, although it was concerned that earlier the "Asquith Ministry bungled the home rule matter," and the paper was not so certain that it would not do so again.⁴ A few days later the New York Times said that any solution of the home rule question which excluded part of Ulster was not a complete settlement at all, and would lead to further complications.⁵ When it became clear in late July that there had been a fundamental misunderstanding about the position of Ulster in the proposals, and that the prospects for any kind of settlement had been jeopardized, the American press reacted bitterly.⁶ Lord Lansdowne was condemned for rocking the boat, the Irish Nationalists for not agreeing to the permanent exclusion of Ulster on a temporary basis; as the New York Times argued in an extremely facile way, "There can be no permanence in an avowedly temporary arrangement." Indeed it

¹C.S.M., 26 May 1916.
²New York World, 14 June 1916.
³Ibid., 25 June 1916.
⁴N.Y.T., 7 July 1916.
⁵Ibid., 11 July 1916.
felt that the home rulers should take Carson's advice of accepting the exclusion of Ulster but winning it back with exemplary good government.\(^1\) The New York World condemned the Asquith government for being guilty of either "trickery" or "muddling," and concluded that the government had to choose between its friends or its enemies, the Irish party or the Unionists.\(^2\) The Literary Digest also attacked the government for not dealing quickly or firmly: "The extraordinary vacillation of the British Government in dealing with the Irish question is one of the most curious political puzzles of modern times."\(^3\)

Of the Irish-Americans, perhaps diverted by the Casement trial and the relief fund activities, the Gaelic American expressed the most consistent opinion on the Lloyd George proposals; predictably, it attacked Redmond as a "traitor" to Ireland and the proposals as a worthless "emergency war measure." When the efforts failed the Gaelic American said the failure was evidence of Redmond's incompetence; only the rising would save Ireland.\(^4\)

While the home rule proposals were being discussed, attention in the United States was focused much more intensely on the fate of Sir Roger Casement and the prisoners arrested in the wake of the rising. Casement had received disproportionate newspaper attention in the

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\(^1\) \textit{N.Y.T.}, 25, 26, and 31 July 1916. Roland G. Usher, the author of several popular books on international relations, wrote a feature article for the magazine section of the New York Times, 6 Aug. 1916. Usher argued that the Redmond refusal to accept diminished representation in Westminster was unreasonable because it was not fair for the Irish to have their own local government and still dominate the House of Commons. R.G. Usher, "The plight of home rule," magazine section, \textit{N.Y.T.}, 6 Aug. 1916.


\(^3\) \textit{Lit. Dig.}, liii, no. 8 (19 Aug. 1916), p. 399.

early days of the rising, perhaps as much because more was known about him in America, through his humanitarian efforts in Africa and South America, than because he was regarded as the leader of the rebellion. The irony of Casement's position was continually mentioned by the press which saw little actual difference between the acts of Carson and his followers before August 1914 and Casement's after 1914; they also agreed that he was insane. The press felt that Casement should not be executed, in spite of the results of his trial. The Christian Science Monitor, which was still one of the strongest critics of the rising, argued that a live fool was better for the British government than a dead hero. The New York Times and the New York Evening Mail seemed to agree that his execution would stimulate unrest and needlessly make him a martyr. Native Americans differed privately on what should be done about Casement. A. Lawrence Lowell thought that Casement's excellent earlier service to Britain and to humanity ought not be forgotten in spite of the seriousness of the charges against him; nonetheless Lowell feared that the Irish-Americans would think that if he were spared it would be "because he is a Protestant." Willard Straight hoped that the Casement trial would be handled in such a way as to not "open up sores which are now healing."

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4. Lowell to Plunkett, 5 July 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).
although he did not suggest mercy. On the other hand, Theodore Roosevelt, who thought the Dublin leaders should have been spared, felt that Casement could not be excused from the penalties of his treason. The New Haven schoolmaster George L. Fox also thought Casement should be executed and attacked him violently in a pamphlet.

President Wilson became the object of an intense campaign on the part of both Irish-Americans and native Americans to enlist the support of the United States government in an appeal for clemency for Casement and the remaining prisoners arrested in the wake of the rising. A large number of appeals and petitions were sent to Wilson and to members of Congress asking that the government do something. One such group was the Knights of St Patrick from San Francisco which requested Wilson to use his good offices to influence the British government to exercise clemency towards the Irish prisoners. They asserted that every people had the "divine right of revolution" and that Americans of an earlier generation had done what the Irish had done during the rising and that they ought to be regarded in similar terms. They asked that secret trials and executions be stopped and civil law re-established, and they referred to earlier instances when the American government had sent appeals on behalf of LaFayette, Koss...

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1 Straight to Lord Bryce, 21 June 1916 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 19, fol. 155).
3 G.L. Fox, "Roger Casement and John Redmond" (n.p., 1916).
They also sent a copy of the letter to their Senator, James D. Phelan, who wrote to Wilson endorsing their appeal and had a copy of their letter read into the Congressional Record. Wilson's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, asked Frank L. Polk what the President could do, and he was informed that, although the State Department had protected American citizens who were involved, as to the fate of Irish subjects the American government "would not be in a position to make any protest." Tumulty, undiscouraged, wrote back to Polk that he would like to discuss the letter with him as soon as possible; conscious of the political effect of such letters on Irish-American voters, Tumulty replied, "There is so much dynamite in it the appeal on behalf of the prisoners that we ought to proceed with care." After an interval of about a month Wilson sent a reply to the Knights of St. Patrick in regard to Irish prisoners in which he said, "I have done everything, so far as representations go, to provide for their humane and just treatment." Wilson wrote also, "My natural sympathies are with men struggling for freedom, and concerning whose sincerity as patriots, seeking solely the welfare of their country, can not be questioned." It cannot be known how specific-

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2 Phelan to Wilson, 22 May 1916 (Ibid.). Phelan also sent Wilson copies of similar letters from the County Clare Association of California and the Ladies Auxiliary of the AOH, Los Angeles, 22 May 1916, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, p. 8454.

3 Tumulty to Polk, 2 June 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 134); and Polk to Tumulty, 3 June 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3152, box 520).

4 Tumulty to Polk, 9 June 1916 (Polk Papers, op. cit., file 136).

5 Wilson to Troy, 7 July 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.). See also Troy to Phelan, 23 June 1916, and Phelan to Tumulty, 28 June 1916 (Ibid.).
ally Wilson was referring to Irishmen struggling for freedom or men in general, nor can it be known the extent to which this statement with its strong pro-Irish implications, was motivated by purely political reasons; certainly it manifests as much warmth for the Irish cause as his statements in his early career. To deal with more pressing appeals from powerful sources—such as the telegram from Congressmen London of New York, Carey of Wisconsin, Ligoe and Dyer of Missouri, Gallivan of Massachusetts, Roddenberg of Illinois, and Keating of Colorado—Tumulty drafted a non-committal form letter which said Wilson would "seek the earliest opportunity to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State," and that he would give the matter "the consideration its great importance merits."2

The support of President Wilson and the government was also sought by Michael Francis Doyle who as an American was to assist at Casement's trial in London. Doyle, a Philadelphia lawyer with a reputation in labour law and Democratic party politics, cabled Tumulty on 28 April asking for an interview with him in order to discuss the request of Mrs Agnes Newman, Casement's widowed sister living in the United States, that he assist in Casement's defence. In a letter the following day Doyle told Tumulty that he wanted Wilson to understand what he

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1See above, Chapter II, p. 49, and Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, p. 396. Certainly Wilson's view of Ireland as suggested in his letter to Troy seems far different than that ascribed to him by Tansill. Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 213 and 219-20.

2Tumulty to Meyer London, ca. 30 June 1916, and memorandum by Joseph Tumulty, ca. summer 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 30 85, box 520). Wilson received appeals from July through early August from all sectors of the public to intervene on Casement's behalf. See for example, James A. Hamill (Congressman from New Jersey) to Wilson, 1 July 1916, "David Roger Casement," a poem by Anne Throop Craig sent to Wilson, 1 July 1916, and Arturo Giovannitti (editor of the Masses magazine) to Wilson, 2 Aug. 1916 (Ibid.).
hoped to do at the trial and that he did not want to embarrass the administration.\(^1\) Tumulty sought the advice of the State Department and was cautioned by L.H. Woolsey, Assistant Solicitor of the department that the United States would have no authority to use its offices on behalf of a British subject charged by his own government.\(^2\) Simultaneously Mrs Newman wrote to President Wilson asking his help in view of Casement's work in Africa and South America.\(^3\) Wilson, however, refused to be drawn out by either Mrs Newman or Doyle. "We have no choice in a matter of this sort," he told Tumulty. "It is absolutely necessary to say that I could take no action of any kind regarding it."\(^4\) However, while Wilson himself was unwilling to speak for Casement...
ment either publicly or privately, the State Department did agree to
secure the nominal co-operation of Ambassador Page in London. Frank
L. Polk wrote Doyle, "I regret that we cannot write to the British
Foreign Office," and he assured him, "Mr. Page undoubtedly will noti-
fy the authorities of your relation to the case." 1 This was not the
kind of government assistance Doyle wanted.

Doyle proceeded on Casement's defence as if he had the full en-
dorsement of the administration and he told British authorities of his
"acquaintance with President Wilson and other circumstances tending to
give him influence in the United States." In fact Doyle went so far
as to "imply that if he were given full facilities here he might exer-
cise an influence in the United States favourable to the action of the
British Government." 2 Doyle was certainly bluffing about his intimacy
with the Wilson government, but his posture was credible enough to move
Grey to request Sir Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary, to allow Doyle
to join George Gavan Duffy in preparing the brief for Casement's de-
fence. 3 Furthermore Doyle was recognizably in a position to influence
public opinion if he were later to spread stories that Casement "had
not been allowed full facilities for preparing his defence." Grey con-
cluded that were any such statements made in the United States, "the
effect will be very undesirable." 4 Doyle's contribution to the case
was probably minimal, although he claimed to have more contact with

1 Polk to Doyle, 31 May 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers,
drawer 77, file 134). See also Doyle to Tumulty, 30 May 1916, Doyle
to Polk, 30 May 1916, and Polk to Tumulty, 2 June 1916 (L.C., Wilson
Papers, file VI, no. 3085, box 520).

2 Memorandum account of interview with Doyle, 17 June 1916 (P.R.O.,
F.O. 800/86).

3 Grey to Samuel, 16 June 1916 (Ibid., 800/112).

4 Ibid.
Casement than either Duffy or Sergeant A. M. Sullivan (it was Doyle who told Casement of circulation of passages of a diary, allegedly written by him, in order to dampen public support), inasmuch as Sullivan's brief depended on points of English law. Later, it was Doyle's idea to go to Germany to obtain new evidence to prove Casement's innocence.¹

When Casement was found guilty and sentenced, 29 April, efforts were renewed in the United States to wring some support or favourable comment from Wilson. On 30 April, a Boston lawyer Josiah Quincy asked Tumulty to talk with Franz Hugo Krebs, a journalist, who since the war had been in Germany several times where he knew Casement.² Tumulty agreed to see Krebs on 3 July and not only introduced him to Frank L. Polk but also arranged for him to talk with President Wilson as well. Krebs later recorded in a memorandum that all three were very well informed about Casement and that Wilson was particularly interested to learn about Casement's mental condition when Krebs had last seen him in February. Krebs wrote that while Wilson had given him "a most sympathetic hearing" he recorded no opinion about Casement; Krebs also surmised that although the United States government would make no statements in the matter, "indirectly and unofficially" the British were aware of the interest of the administration.³ In fact, shortly after the sentencing in London the Department of State cabled a person-

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²Quincy to Tumulty, 30 June 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).

³Franz H. Krebs, Memorandum of a meeting with President Wilson, 7 July 1916 (Ibid.).
al message from Mrs Newman to Casement. Page, however, was unwilling to allow any message to Casement to pass through American diplomatic channels. In a letter circulated among the White House and State Department staffs, Page stiffly recorded that "Not only does Casement, a British subject, stand convicted of treason but I am privately informed that much information about him of an unspeakably filthy character was withheld from publicity." He suggested that the cable be delivered to Doyle who could see that it reached Casement without its passing through government hands. "If all the facts about Casement ever become public," Page warned finally, "it will be well that our Government had nothing to do with him or his case even indirectly." Doyle was quick to write Tumulty describing the unfairness of the British government in not allowing any evidence from Germany and in circulating stories which defamed Casement's character. Doyle argued quite correctly that Casement had been on trial for treason and nothing else. Both Redmond and Northcliffe, Doyle said, had told him that a word to the British government from Wilson would save Casement. When shown this and later requests from Doyle, however, Wilson replied to Tumulty, "It would be inexcusable for me to touch this. It would involve serious international embarrassment." Wilson thus refused to

1 Lansing to Page, 1 July 1916 (N.A., 841.00/17a, roll 6).

2 Page to Sec of State, 3 July 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 135). The letter was seen by at least Wilson, Lansing, Polk, and Tumulty. Ward has quite rightly concluded that the so-called black diaries had little effect in the United States, except perhaps to further discredit the British government. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, p. 123.

3 Doyle to Tumulty, 6 and 19 July 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3085, box 520).

4 Tumulty to Wilson, 20 July 1916, and Wilson to Tumulty, 20 July 1916 (Ibid.).
be drawn into the Casement matter, and, as Ward has suggested, he had solid diplomatic reasons for not doing so.¹

Congress, on the other hand, was much more willing to debate the merits of the rising, Casement and the prisoners, and indeed by the conclusion of Casement’s trial in late June several Irish resolutions had been introduced in both houses and the Irish crisis had been repeatedly discussed. These gestures became considerably more meaningful on 30 June, the day after Casement’s sentencing, when Senator James E. Martine of New Jersey introduced a resolution which proposed that President Wilson ask the British government for “a stay of execution of said sentence that sentence passed on Casement,” in order that new facts may be introduced.”² The resolution was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration, over the objections of Senator Martine who demanded that it be adopted immediately because he feared that otherwise it would “sleep the sleep of the righteous and just never come out of committee.”³ Martine was assured that the committee would deal promptly with the resolution; however, after being told by the chairman two weeks later that the committee had decided not to report the resolution at all, Martine moved that the committee be discharged of his resolution. The Senator argued that British public opinion had discouraged the American government from executing Jefferson Davis after the Civil War and that in this instance, through

¹Ward has shown that Wilson similarly refused to intervene in the executions of nationalist leaders in Central Europe. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, p. 116; and Ward, “America and the Irish problem, 1899-1921,” I.H.S., xvi, no. 61 (March 1968), p. 79.

²Senator Martine also referred to the court procedure as a “so-called trial.” S. Res. 223, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, pp 10251-52.

³Ibid.
the "kindly intercession" of the President, America could similarly speak for humanity in the Casement matter.¹

At the request of the committee chairman, Senator William J. Stone, Martine agreed to postpone the vote on the resolution until the following day, but when there was no further response he restated his motion in the Senate on 22 July.² Again Senator Stone said that the committee voted not to report the resolution noting that the committee had agreed that the language of the appeal "would be offensive to the Government of Great Britain" and that it "would not tend to promote the end it sought to be accomplished." The Department of State had already transmitted an appeal from Mrs Newman to the British government and had intervened to save the lives of Americans involved in the rising; the department had in addition been informed "that official representations to the British Government touching on this case would not be received in a kindly spirit."³ Senators Nelson, Borah, and Williams all objected to the resolution as did Senator James D. Phelan who introduced a more mildly worded resolution which asked for "clemency in the treatment of Irish political prisoners"; this prompted Martine to introduce also a less provocative resolution.⁴ Debate


² 19 and 22 July 1916, Ibid., pp 11305 and 11429.

³ Ibid., p. 11429.

⁴ S. Res. 236 and S. Res. 237, Ibid., pp 11430-34. Also see C. S. M., 24 July 1916. Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, who was later to become the spokesman for those Americans who opposed Irish nationalist claims, was warmly supported in his objections to the resolution by many who saw in the Irish rebellion and in the Casement issue the long-standing religious question of "Protestantism or pope-ry." See Elijah E. Knott to Williams, 25 July 1916, and John H. Cowles (Secretary General of Scottish Rite Masons, Southern Jurisdiction) to Williams, 2 Aug. 1916 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 18).
erupted in the Senate again on 25 July when Senator Martine argued that it was important to include Casement's name in the resolution inasmuch as he was the only Irish prisoner in any immediate danger. The Foreign Relations Committee considered the resolutions the following day, but again they felt it "inexpedient" to recommend the adoption of any of them.

The issue was not closed however; on Saturday, 29 July, after the Casement resolutions had been brought into discussion on the Senate floor by chairman Stone, Senator Key Pittman said that a minority of the committee felt that once the resolutions had been introduced some version should be adopted. Pittman therefore proposed a minority report in the form of a resolution which said that "the Senate expressed the hope that the British Government may exercise clemency in the treatment of Irish political prisoners, and that President Wilson be requested to transmit this resolution to that Government." Martine scoffed at the cautious phrasing of the resolution and said that the United States Senate was quivering before the prospect of a growl from the British lion. Senator Pomerene replied that he hoped Casement would be spared, but he added pointedly,

While seeking to secure clemency, Senators on the floor insist all the while upon twisting the lion's tail. How much do we expect to gain by this? 'Not everyone who cries unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter the kingdom of heaven,'

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1 Martine was supported by Senators Ashurst, O'Gorman, and Sterling and opposed by Williams and Pomerene. 25 July 1916, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, pp 11519-26.


3 The minority of the committee consisted of Pittman, O'Gorman, and chairman Stone. Stone told the Senate that "from practically every point of view, and especially from the point of view of Sir Roger Casement, the whole proceeding has been a mistake." The report became S. Res. 241. 29 July 1916, Ibid., pp 11770-73.
and it is not everyone who professes friendship for Sir Roger Casement who is doing him a real act of kindness.1

This was much the same view as that of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a leading member of the committee who had voted against the resolutions. He felt it would not accomplish its objective and "would do harm to the very purpose we all had at heart." Lodge said he had been working on Casement's behalf through private channels, as indeed he had. Finally, the Senate voted to adopt the resolution, just proposed by Senator Pittman, by a margin of 49 to 19 (with 30 abstaining from voting).2

The results of the Senate appeal were unspectacular and indeed somewhat anticlimactic. The official copy of the resolution was sent from the White House to the Department of State at 11 a.m. on 2 August and was cabled to the London embassy by 1 p.m.3 Because of the time difference between London and Washington the cable was not ready for delivery until the morning of 3 August, the day Casement was to be executed.4 In the absence of Page, the Chargé d'Affaires, Irwin B. Laughlin, took the resolution to the Foreign Office, and in as discreet a manner possible presented a copy to Grey. Unfortunately, how-


2Of the several Senators who spoke against the resolutions all, even Williams, expressed the confidence or the hope that the British government would not execute Casement. Ibid., pp 11773-83.

3See Polk to Page, nos. 3606 and 3608, 2 Aug. 1916, 841.00/20 and -/20a, U.S. State Department, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1916, supplement, pp 870-71 (series hereafter referred to as Foreign relations). See also Polk to Tumulty, 2 Aug. 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3085, box 520).

4The cable arrived in London at about midnight, after the embassy had closed. After decoding the following day, it was ready for delivery to the Foreign Office by 10 a.m. London time.
ever, this was done either at the same time or slightly after Case-
ment was to be hanged, rendering the appeal, technically at least,
useless.¹ This delay would later create considerable animosity in
American domestic politics during the 1916 election although it in no
way diminished the significance of the Senate's action. Thanks to
Spring Rice and the newspapers the British government was fully infor-
med about the resolution and had already taken it into consideration
in reaching their decision about Casement; in fact it was Grey who
actually raised the issue in his conversation with Laughlin.² The
British government made no direct reply to either the State Department
or the Senate, however, unofficially Grey with Cabinet approval did
write to E.M. House on 28 August to say that "We are not favourably
impressed by the action of the Senate in having passed a resolution
about the Irish prisoners, though they have taken no notice of out-
rages in Belgium and massacres of Armenians."³ This was certainly the
impression the British gave to the American public, but fortunately
for Anglo-American relations these views were not publicly expressed.

¹For a full account see Page letters, ii, pp 167-68, and also
Laughlin to Lansing, 3 Aug. 1916, 841.00/21, Foreign relations, 1916,
supplement, p. 871.

²Grey seemed reluctant to understand either the significance or
the content of the Senate resolution. In a memorandum on the resolut-
ion he noted that Wilson had sent it without instructions and that the
text referred only to "political prisoners" which Casement was not.
See Memorandum from Grey of Fallodon, Aug. 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/27
98); and Cabinet papers, 5 Aug. 1916 (P.R.O., CAB. 37/153).

³Cabinet papers, 24 Aug. 1916 (P.R.O., CAB. 37/154/20). Grey to
House, 28 Aug. 1916, The intimate papers of Colonel House, ed. C. Sey-
mour (Boston, 1926), ii, pp 317-18 (hereafter referred to as House,
intimate papers). Laughlin reported back to the State Department that
the resolution had been delivered. Grey, he said, "did not promise an
answer but said he would communicate the Senate's resolution to the
Prime Minister and probably lay it before the Cabinet." Laughlin to
Lansing, 3 Aug. 1916, 841.00/21, Foreign relations, op. cit. Also see
26 Oct. 1916, Hansard 5 (commons), lxxxvi, cols 1269 and 1354.
Private efforts were also made directly to the British government to try to save Casement's life. In early May several people, including Cardinal Gibbons, expressed to Spring Rice the hope that Casement would be spared. As the date of the execution approached more concerted efforts were made. John Quinn, working with James Byrne, William D. Guthrie and former United States Attorney General George D. Wickersham, drafted a cable for Sir Edward Grey asking that the British government exercise "clemency" in dealing with Casement; the cable was signed and sent to Grey by twenty-five distinguished Americans including ten lawyers, four editors, a former Cabinet member, a New York State Supreme Court Justice, a former consular officer in England, a Columbia University professor, a leading American artist, and a corporation executive. Spring Rice was fully informed and indeed sent all the background information to Grey, pointing out that the signators were "important men all pro-Ally." In addition, several groups of American Negroes asked that Casement's services to humanity be taken into consideration. Perhaps more important was the pri-

1 Spring Rice to Grey, 2 and 4 May and 4 July 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/86).
2 See Reid, The man from New York, p. 235; Spring Rice to Grey, 26 and 29 July 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/86); Quinn to Spring Rice, 27 July 1916, and Spring Rice to Grey, 28 July 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2798); and Quinn et al. to Grey, 28 July 1916 (P.R.O., CAB. 37/152/32). The list of signators included Quinn, Byrne, Guthrie, Wickersham, John D. Crimmins, Frank Crowninshield, Arthur B. Davies, Allen Dawson, Judge Victor J. Dowling, Professor Frank H. Giddings, Lawrence Godkin, Frederick J. Gregg, Fairfax Landstreet, Howard Mansfield, Colonel Robert Grier Monroe, George F. Parker, and others. Also see Miss Georgiana Harriman Owen (New York Young Patriots's League) to Spring Rice, 30 July 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2798).
3 See I.B.W. Bennett (president of Negro Fellowship League, Chicago) to the King of England, 14 July 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2798); and Bryce to Lloyd George, 1 Aug. 1916 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, E 2/5/1).
vate appeal from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge who, noting that the Case-
ment resolution was before the Senate, told Grey that it would be a
mistake to execute Casement, that England's enemies hoped he would be
executed while her friends hoped he would be spared. Finally, on
the eve of the execution, Spring Rice cabled Grey to "suggest that as
a personal favour to President Wilson Casement may be reprieved with
the understanding that we may count on him on behalf of our prison-
ers." Such a reprieve, Spring Rice advised, would assist Wilson in
dealing with his own party and put him in debt to the British. But
these appeals, like that of the Senate, were without effect. On 2
August the Cabinet made its final decision that Casement must be hang-
ed despite "the urgent appeals for mercy from authoritative & friendly
quarters in the United States...." Page had already been given that
impression from Asquith himself the previous day and Spring Rice told
Polk of the decision on the evening of 2 August.

Casement's execution created a profound impression in the United

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1Lodge to Grey in cable from Spring Rice to Grey, 29 July 1916,
and Grey to Spring Rice, 2 Aug. 1916. Grey instructed Spring Rice to
tell Senator Lodge that his "friendly message about Casement" was app-
reciated and considered by the government but that no reprieve could
be granted because of the seriousness of Casement's acts. Also see
minutes of Cabinet meeting, 2 Aug. 1916 (P.R.O., CAB, 41/37/29).

Spring Rice cabled again the next day to say that he had been inform-
ed by Frank L. Polk that Wilson had not desired that any appeals be
made in his name. Spring Rice to Grey, 3 Aug. 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/
86). The Foreign Office was not pleased at such a suggestion from
Spring Rice.

3Minutes of Cabinet meeting, 2 Aug. 1916, sent to king (P.R.O.,
CAB, 41/37/29).

4Memorandum of conversation between Page and Asquith, 1 Aug. 1916,
763.72/13495, Foreign relations, 1916, supplement, p. 45. See also
Page letters, ii, p. 168; R. Jenkins, Asquith (London, 1964), pp 452-
54; and Polk to Lansing, 3 Aug. 1916 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 20).
States. Newspapers which had been critical of him earlier seemed to moderate their indictments; the Washington Post thought the execution was a "colossal blunder," and the New York World linked the execution to the failure of the home rule proposals and also called it a "blunder."\(^1\) The Chicago Tribune, condemning the "Tory English mind" that attempted to rule in Ireland, said that British policy was responsible for Casement's action; "England made him; England unmade him."\(^2\) The Gaelic American of course deplored the execution, but pointed out its irony, inasmuch as from the information that it had Casement had come to Ireland to stop the rising.\(^3\) Perhaps the most outraged, and the most effective, comment came from John Quinn in an essay for the magazine section of the Sunday New York Times, 13 August. Quinn conceded Casement's probable legal guilt, but he stressed as several other newspapers had attempted to do, the extenuating circumstances and ironies of Casement's situation—Casement's humanitarian achievements, British generosity in dealing with South African rebels, Unionist treason and flirtations with Germany, the failure of the government to implement home rule fairly won in Parliament, and the reward for Ulster treason with Cabinet posts. "Fair-minded people," Quinn wrote,

> generally feel that the motives which actuated Casement were the thing by which he should be judged. However technically his offense may be phrased, his actual offense, if any, was that he put the cause of Ireland before that of England or even the Allies.\(^4\)

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\(^2\)Chicago Tribune, 4 Aug. 1916.

\(^3\)G.A., 12 Aug. 1916.

\(^4\)J. Quinn, "Roger Casement, Martyr: some notes for a chapter of history by a friend whose guest he was when the war broke out," magazine section, N.Y.T., 13 Aug. 1916, pp 1-4.
Quinn's article was reprinted in the Philadelphia Ledger and the Boston Herald and made a forceful impact on American readers from James Byrne to Senator Oscar W. Underwood.¹

One immediate result of the rising and the executions was a dedicated commitment on the part of Irish-Americans to extend relief assistance to the Irish people.² As early as 12 May, the famous Irish singer John McCormick was writing to the leaders of New York public life, such as Mayor Mitchel, soliciting their assistance and patronage in a benefit concert he had arranged to give for the cause of Irish relief. The financier and art collector Otto H. Kahn donated the use of the Century Theatre; Cardinal Farley of New York and the Lord Mayor of Dublin agreed to act as patrons. "Apart from whatever may be our individual opinions regarding the recent rebellion in Dublin," McCormick told his potential contributors, "the heart of every man with a drop of Irish blood in his veins, goes out in deep sympathy to the families and relatives of those who lost their lives...." Furthermore, he said, the rising had caused great suffering through the loss of income and the destruction of property.³ The concert, held 23 May, was a success (between $8000 and $9000 were raised and cabled to Ireland) and drew the attendance of Miss Margaret Wilson, the Pres-

¹Quinn's temper was calmed a bit by his friend Spring Rice and by Captain Guy Gaunt, but he remained indignant at the British use of materials which compromised Casement's reputation. Reid, The man from New York, pp 236-39.

²In May Joseph McGarrity considered sending a "Green Cross Ship" with relief supplies to Ireland, as he did again in 1921, but he did not do so. Secret Report, Internal Conditions, Neutral Countries, Philadelphia, 22 May 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2793).

³See John McCormick to John Purroy Mitchel, 12 May 1916 (L.C., Mitchel Papers, box 10). Box seats sold for $100 and $200 a piece. Reid, op. cit., p. 277.
ident's daughter, and E.M. House. Other efforts were also under way. On 20 May the Irish Relief Fund Committee was established in New York with Cardinals Farley, Gibbon and O'Connell and Archbishop Walsh of Dublin as honorary officers, Dr Thomas Addis Emmet, president, George G. Gillespie, chairman, Thomas Hughes Kelly, treasurer, and John D. Moore, secretary. An appeal for funds was announced because, the announcement went on, the economic life of the country had been paralyzed by the fighting and by the military rule that followed. While certainly a gross exaggeration of the condition of Ireland, if not parts of Dublin, this appeal had its effect: a large fund-raising concert was held on 27 May in Carnegie Hall; Victor Herbert donated the services of his band, several people sang, Padraic Colum read some poems, and various German-Americans contributed.

Supported by the Irish-American newspapers the Fund Committee was able to direct its appeals to a large audience and to attach their cause to other activities. By the end of June a national organization was assembled to collect money for Irish relief throughout the United States. Peter Golden, a poet and Gaelic singer well known in Irish-American circles, was recruited to travel throughout the country telling of the "pressing and urgent need for assistance" which had been created by the rising. Simultaneously, formal appeals for funds, refer-

1N.Y.T., 24 May 1916.
2G.A., 27 May and 10 June 1916.
3Ibid., 3 and 17 June 1916.
4Funds were also raised at political meetings and at the activities of Irish-American societies.
5John D. Moore to Golden, 28 June 1916 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141).
ring to the "unspeakable want and distress" that existed in Ireland, were published by the committee in the Irish-American press. By mid-July $100,000 had been raised by the committee. Ironically, at approximately the same time Robert J. Waddell of the United Irish League wrote to Redmond to ask if there were any need for relief money in Ireland. The UIL, he said, had refrained from taking any initiative in the matter on the assumption that they would have been instructed by the party had Redmond so desired. Regardless of the situation in Ireland the call for relief funds made a powerful impression on moderate nationalists in the United States, which the UIL might possibly have been able to exploit. On 8 July, John Archdeacon Murphy of Buffalo and John Gill of New York sailed for Ireland, representing the committee, with a substantial amount of money with which to begin relief operations. Once established they were able to effect an amalgamation of the Irish National Aid Association and the Irish Volunteer Dependents's Fund, which created conditions that allowed for the rational distribution of relief funds.

Thomas Hughes Kelly, treasurer of the committee and a New York banker, and Joseph Smith, a Massachusetts journalist and labour leader, were to have followed Murphy and Gill to Ireland a week later with

1G.A., 24 June 1916.
2Ibid., 29 July 1916.
4The former organization was dominated by the parliamentarians and the latter by the people who supported the Volunteers and the rising; the two Americans persuaded several of the trustees who had publicly repudiated the rising to resign, thus allowing the merger of their limited resources. Murphy and Gill also obtained the authorization of General Maxwell to carry out their plans. K. O'Doherty, Assignment America: De Valera's mission to the United States (New York, 1957), pp 22-23.
a second installment of money; however they were stopped in Liverpool
by British authorities and denied permission to proceed to Dublin.
Before any of the committee had left the United States they had under-
stood from the British Ambassador that there would be no objection to
their travelling to Ireland; indeed Spring Rice had advised Grey, "I
think we might adopt a benevolent attitude towards the distribution
of funds for the sufferers by the revolt," in the hope that it would
appease moderate Irish-Americans.  
Furthermore they were armed with
a letter of introduction from Secretary of State Lansing to Ambassador
Page in London; this letter was immediately put to use in the hope
that it would open some doors. On 26 July, Frank L. Polk, then Act-
ing Secretary of State, instructed Page to request the British govern-
ment to reconsider its decision to prevent Kelly and Smith from going
to Ireland. They were "very prominent in Catholic circles," Polk cab-
led, and not politicians; Spring Rice was writing to his government
and Polk hoped Page would also "do everything possible to assist these
persons." Page was not inclined to meddle in any Irish affairs. He
reported that the British had no objection to Kelly personally, alth-
ough they disliked the idea of foreigners distributing money in unset-
tled areas of Ireland, but they regarded Smith as a Sinn Fein "agita-

1 Spring Rice to Grey, 9 June and 21 July 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/86). By 1 August Spring Rice warned against allowing Irish-Americans to go to Ireland for ostensibly philanthropic activities. Spring Rice to F.O., 1 Aug. 1916 (P.R.O., CAB. 37/157/7).

2 Polk to American Embassy, London, 26 July 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 133).
tor" and "an agent of the German Government."

Tumulty assured several Irish-American leaders that the President himself had instructed Polk to take up the matter with both Page and Spring Rice and that the government had done all it could. While this effort was not sufficient to John D. Moore, who demanded that the State Department get the matter settled without further delay, Cardinal Farley, two days later, wrote a gracious letter to Wilson thanking him for his efforts and assuring him that Kelly and his friends "will be pleased to learn how deeply you have interested yourself in his case."

Americans who had contributed to the fund which Kelly and Smith were to distribute were outraged at the capriciousness of British action. The Gaelic American claimed, perhaps correctly, that this "personal insult" had won the sympathy of many Irish-Americans who had previously been indifferent to the revolutionary cause, and that furthermore British policy stimulated financial contributions. When Murphy and Gill returned to the United States in late August they further promoted anti-British feeling by their reports of conditions in Ireland and the growth of nationalist feelings. Indeed, Murphy reported that he had never seen "so much misery and destitution"

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1. Page to Sec of State, 28 July 1916 (N.A., 341.112k29/66, box 3972). See also the American Chargé's report to the Secretary of State on the British government's view of Murphy, Gill, and the whole relief question. Laughlin to Sec of State, 23 Aug. 1916 (Ibid.). In late September B.H. Thompson of Scotland Yard commented that Gill was "merely a Sinn Fein in disguise"; he thought that in the future no similar relief funds should be allowed in Ireland. Thompson to Campbell, 28 Sept. 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2795).


3. Moore to Wilson, 1 Aug. 1916 (N.A., 341.112k29/73, box 3972), and Cardinal Farley to Wilson, 3 Aug. 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).

and that both the government and Unionist businessmen had conspired to create such dire social and economic conditions in Ireland as to "force recruiting among Irish men into the British army by the starvation process." By early 1917 the Foreign Office was still attempting to deal with the appeals of the Irish Relief Fund. The British were thus embarrassed by the contradictions of a policy which on the one hand admitted suffering of such dimensions as to need large scale relief operations (in the minds of Irish-Americans as great as those in Belgium or Armenia) and on the other hand arbitrarily refused to permit certain members of the relief committee to carry out their functions.

(iii)

From the autumn of 1916 until America's entrance into World War I in the spring of 1917 American interest in Ireland expressed itself principally through the presidential election campaign of 1916 and in the reception provided for Irish exiles who made their way to the United States; to a lesser extent the continued appeals for the Irish relief fund and Redmond's attempt to invite the intervention of President Wilson in a settlement of the Irish question also kept nationalist concerns before the public. By all rights the election should not have been clouded by issues concerning Ireland at all; as has been

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2 Cardinal Farley had in a circular referred to the "unspeakable want and distress" in Ireland as the result of the suppression of the rising, and the Foreign Office was at a loss as to how to refute such statements effectively. Minutes on Irish Relief Fund in Chicago, 1 Jan. 1917 (F.R.O., F.O. 371/3063).
shown earlier the Democratic party had traditionally been the political home for the Irish in America and Wilson should normally have commanded their loyalty without much question, in his efforts to secure a second term of office. There were however several disconcerting facts which tended to challenge these normal assumptions. Since the outbreak of the war there had been a growing feeling, at least among the Irish-American leaders, that Wilson's neutrality policies were definitely pro-British; Wilson's Mexican policy, at its low point during the second half of 1916, annoyed Catholics generally. During the summer Wilson had spoken out against the increasing influence of "hyphenate" groups, such as Irish-Americans or German-Americans, and furthermore, many Irish-Americans resented Wilson's refusal to make a public declaration about the rising, the executions, or Casement's hanging when it was felt that any statement by him would be of some force in determining British policy.\(^1\) On the other hand the Wilson administration had not been indifferent to the Irish situation. There had been White House intervention concerning prisoners in Ireland of American nationality; the State Department cables had been used by Casement's American lawyer and by his sister; moreover Wilson had used his influence to persuade the British government to allow Kelly and Smith to carry out their relief operations. William M. Leary, Jr., has also suggested that Wilson had appealed to the Irish-American labourers with his reform legislation and that the Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, had little to offer the Irish-Americans on either

\(^1\)Rev Edward Flannery to Tumulty, 10 Aug. and 24 Aug. 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file IV, no. 61, box 81). Plans were discussed among Democratic party stalwarts to hold the Irish-Americans within the party during the election, but Wilson had to juggle many factions and these plans proved to be impossible to carry out.
the Irish or the war question.1

By the end of the Casement affair, Wilson, especially because he had made no direct appeal himself, was vulnerable to the criticism that he had deliberately delayed the sending of the Senate resolution until it was too late to save Casement. The fact that the resolution had not reached the Foreign Office until it was too late was revealed on 3 August when Lord Cecil, in explaining why the government had carried out the execution, mentioned that no appeal had been received by the British government from the State Department. This information, subsequently published in American papers, brought an immediate protest from such people as Senator Phelan who angrily told Tumulty that he had vigorously supported the resolution "for the purpose of doing some good..."2 Representative Peter F. Tague of Boston introduced a resolution in Congress calling for a committee to "investigate the delay in delivery of certain cablegrams"—namely the Senate resolution.3 The chairman of the executive committee of the FOIF, James K. McGuire, also wrote to the White House condemning the delay.4 Tumulty referred


3This resolution was never reported by the Committee on Rules, but it did indicate the sentiment in the House. 9 Aug. 1916, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, p. 12405.

these inquiries to Polk at the State Department for an explanation; Polk, however, replied that "there was no delay in this Department," and suggested that there was no effective statement that he could make about the matter.¹

The matter was not allowed to drop, however, because of the growing tensions about the election. In late August Lansing received inquiries from Senator Henry F. Ashurst, and Tumulty a letter from Michael Francis Doyle, asking what reply the British government had made to the Senate appeal.² Lansing repeated Polk's observations that the State Department had expedited matters and that the British had sent no reply.³ This in no way solved the delicate political situation of the moment, so Tumulty asked for an explanation of the Casement resolution difficulty "which in diplomatic language would set forth our position with regard to this case" and which would also emphasize what the administration had done for the Irish; Lansing refused to

¹Tumulty to Polk, 7 Aug. 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 136); and Polk to Tumulty, 7 Aug. 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3085, box 520). Polk also wrote a detailed memorandum which outlined the Department's role in the handling of the Senate resolution. Polk suggested that he understood the delay to have been caused by "some hesitation about sending the resolution," originating in the White House. "Memorandum on Casement Resolution," by Frank L. Polk, 17 Aug. 1916 (N.A., 841.00/23½, roll 6). In his analysis of the situation William N. Leary, Jr., suggests that the delay was probably caused by "administrative incompetence" rather than through any deliberate calculation. Leary, "Woodrow Wilson, Irish Americans, and the election of 1916," Jn. Amer. Hist., 11v (June 1967), p. 62.

²Ashurst wrote on behalf of several people including John D. Moore, the national secretary of the FOIF. Ashurst to Lansing, 25 Aug. 1916 (N.A., 841.00/26, roll 6). Memorandum on letter from M.F. Doyle, 28 Aug. 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).

³Lansing to Tumulty, 2 Sept. 1916 (Ibid.).
comment until Polk returned from his vacation. In the meantime Doyle again appealed to Tumulty to provide him with information which would exonerate the Wilson administration, warning that the Republican national committee was attempting to persuade Casement's sister, Mrs Newman, to state publicly that earlier delivery of the resolution would have saved her brother. To these appeals the Secretary replied that Tumulty already had all the facts in the case and that he himself could not make an "incorrect statement" about it. When Polk returned to Washington he drafted a letter for Tumulty which attempted to save the situation by drawing attention to his conversations with Spring Rice before the execution which showed that the British government had been fully informed about the Senate appeal through its representative and that they had nonetheless made the decision to hang Casement regardless. After some discussion between the two, a press release to this effect was drafted thus avoiding too precise an account of the time schedule of the Casement resolution. A suitable letter was sent to Doyle to help support the Democratic party in the face of its Irish-American opponents and was later released to the press.

1 Tumulty to Lansing, 7 Sept. 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3085, box 520); and Lansing to Tumulty, 16 Sept. 1916 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 21).

2 Memorandum on letter from N.F. Doyle, 29 Sept. 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.); also see Lansing Papers, op. cit.

3 Lansing to Tumulty, 2 Oct. 1916 (Ibid.). Tumulty was indignant at the thought that he had asked Lansing to make an "incorrect statement" but he did want some official announcement which would relieve the pressure on the White House. Tumulty to Lansing, 3 Oct. 1916 (Ibid.).

4 See Polk to Tumulty, 5, 6, and 12 Oct. 1916, and Tumulty to Polk, 11 Oct. 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.), and press release by Polk, 9 Oct. 1916 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 137).

5 Tumulty to Doyle, 14 Oct. 1916 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).
self had the letter sent to both Ireland and the Irish World, and other newspapers published it as well.¹

While the Casement resolution crisis was being met, the administration was beset by other Irish-American attacks as well. The Irish World and the Gaelic American became increasingly hostile to Wilson during the election campaign, and such Clan-na-Gael leaders as Devoy and Cohalan were outspoken in their criticism of the President.² The Republican presidential candidate, Hughes, had encouraged the impression that he was sympathetic to the Irish and German causes in order to win the "hyphenate" vote away from the Democratic party. Wilson met this challenge by his response to a telegram on 29 September from Jeremiah A. O'Leary, a well-known New York Irish-American and anglophobe (O'Leary was the president of the American Truth Society and editor of the anti-British publication Bull). O'Leary wrote to Wilson, "Your foreign policies, your failure to secure compliance with all American rights, your leniency with the British Empire, your approval of war loans, the ammunition traffic, are issues in this campaign." According to O'Leary, the victory of Congressman William S. Bennet of New York and Senator James E. Martine of New Jersey who opposed Wilson's policies in the primary elections was a repudiation of the administration by the Irish-American voters. "When, sir," O'Leary concluded, "will you respond to these evidences of popular disapproval of your policies by action?"³ Wilson responded immediately and vigor-

¹Doyle to Tumulty, 18 Oct. 1916 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3085, box 520).
³N.Y.T., 30 Sept. 1916.
ously, by reading his reply to O'Leary in a press conference that
same day,

Your telegram received. I would feel deeply
mortified to have you or anybody like you
vote for me. Since you have access to many
disloyal Americans and I have not, I will
ask you to convey this message to them.¹

As O'Leary later pointed out, this reply was a personal attack which
avoided the issues, but it said by implication what a great many Amer-
icans were glad to hear. In fact the telegram was felt by Tumulty and
House to be the turning point in the election campaign.² Many of the
leading eastern newspapers and even several Republican papers strongly
supported Wilson's repudiation of any election support from what were
understood to be pro-German groups in the United States.³ Even the
liberal journals, which might have been expected to demand a fuller
argument from Wilson, commended the President's rejection of O'Leary

¹N.Y.T., 30 Sept. 1916; and J.A. O'Leary, My political trial and
experiences (New York, 1919), p. 46.

²Tumulty says in his memoirs that the campaign improved consider-
ably from that point on, and Link records that E.M. House told the
French Ambassador that the O'Leary telegram had been one of the decis-
ive elements in the election. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him,
p. 214; and Link, Wilson: campaigns for progressivism and peace, 1916-
1917, p. 105.

³See the New York World, New York Evening Post, Brooklyn Citizen,
Brooklyn Standard Union, Philadelphia Record, Chicago Journal, Chicago
Herald, and Springfield Republican, cited in Lit. Dig., liii, no. 16
and other "disloyal Americans."¹

The results of the election were a narrow victory for Wilson. Of the nine states with large Irish-American populations, only two—California and Ohio—went for Wilson.² The Gaelic American claimed, and apparently Wilson believed, that the Irish-American vote in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, and Connecticut had been against him.³ William N. Leary, Jr., has argued convincingly that as far as can be calculated the Irish in America did tend to vote for Wilson and the Democratic party rather than for Hughes, and indeed despite his repudiation of "disloyal Americans" Wilson probably won the German-American vote and the "hyphenate" vote generally.⁴

¹See the Nation, 5 Oct. 1916, p. 312, and the New Republic, 7 Oct. 1916, p. 233. In late October the press was informed by Democratic party leaders that Hughes had met secretly with O'Leary and Cohalan, allegedly to make a deal for Irish-American and German-American votes. Shortly thereafter Hughes admitted that he had met with a committee of the American Independence Conference, which had been chaired by O'Leary and whose spokesman was Judge Cohalan, but Hughes said it was just one of many such groups to whom he had talked. On 24 October he told reporters, "It is hardly necessary for me to say that, if I am elected, we shall have an exclusively American policy in the service of American interests. We have no secret understandings, no unstated purposes." N.Y.T., 23, 24, and 25 Oct. 1916. Edward A. Steiner's book published in December 1916 condemned both the Irish-Americans and German-Americans for attempting to make their ethnic problems issues in domestic American politics. E.A. Steiner, Nationalizing America (New York, 1916), pp 224-25.

²In California the Irish-American vote probably went for Wilson. See for example Father Peter C. Yorke to Devoy, 23 Nov. 1916 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box T-Z).


The several states listed above were traditionally won by the Republicans, rather than the Democrats but Wilson may not have accepted that fact.

Meanwhile by mid-October the Irish-Americans in New York opened an Irish Bazaar to raise more money for relief operations. The bazaar was significant because it represented the continued effort on the part of revolutionary nationalists to keep the emotions of Irish-Americans at the high pitch of the previous summer and because it involved the active participation in Irish-American life of the first of the new exiles to arrive in the United States in the wake of the rising. The bazaar ran for three weeks and was considered to be a great success. It was opened by Nora Connolly, the daughter of James Connolly, who raised the republican flag, and it featured Irish art works (some paintings by Constance Markievicz and a statue of Emmet by Jerome Connor) and handicrafts; Mrs Agnes Newman, Casement's sister, ran a booth which drew large crowds of people. Significantly, one of the principle exhibitions was one of the submarines invented by the Irish-American John P. Holland, which must have pleased the Germans. German-Americans participated actively to promote good will and cement their alliance with the Irish by operating booths and making conspicuous purchases. In Chicago a tag-day was used, among other activities, to raise funds for Irish relief. How much money was collected by all

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1 See Colonel Ricard O'Sullivan Burke to Devoy, 6 Dec. 1916, Devoy's post-bag, ii, p. 517.
2 GA., 14 Oct. 1916.
3 Burke to Devoy, 6 Dec. 1916, Devoy's post-bag, op. cit.
these measures is not certain, but by August at least the Gaelic American reported that some $140,000 had been sent to Ireland. Renewed efforts were made on the part of the Department of State and the White House to persuade the British government to allow selected Irish-Americans to travel to Ireland to distribute these funds, but the British, having burned their fingers with both Murphy and Gill as well as Kelly and Smith, refused to permit any Americans, no matter how highly recommended, to carry out such a mission.  

The appearance of Nora Connolly at the bazaar, although contrary to the understanding worked out by Sir Horace Plunkett with the military in Dublin permitting Connolly's family to go to America, marked the first of a number of refugees from Ireland. Outstanding among these people were Nora Connolly herself, Margaret Skinnider, Mrs Hanna Sheehy Skeffington, Liam Mellows, Captain Robert Monteith, and some time later, Dr Patrick McCartan and Diarmuid Lynch; indeed, according to Captain Monteith in New York they formed the "Easter Week Exiles Association." Once in America many of these refugees joined forces

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2 Tumulty to Lansing, 21 Sept. 1916, Lansing to AM EMBASSY, 30 Sept. 1916, Lansing to Tumulty, 28 Sept. 1916, and Victor Wellesley (for the Foreign Office) to Page, 1 Nov. 1916 (N.A., 341d11/1 and −/2, box 4094); also see Spring Rice to Grey, 14 Sept. 1916, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to F.O., 3 Oct. 1916, and F.O. to Spring Rice, 9 Oct. 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/2795). On 26 December 1916, Spring Rice was able to report to A.J. Balfour, the new Foreign Secretary, that the State Department had refused to give a passport to Miss Ruth Marie Russell, who hoped to go to Ireland to do relief work, perhaps indicating a shift, as a result of the elections, from support to obstruction. Spring Rice to Balfour, 26 Dec. 1916 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3070).

3 See Plunkett to James Byrne, 14 June 1916 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

4 Lynch was technically an American citizen but had taken part in the rising. R. Monteith, Casement's last adventure (Dublin, 1953), p. 238.
with the Clan-na-Gael and the Friends of Irish Freedom and they were warmly received by such Irish expatriots as Padraic and Mary Colum, Peter Golden, James Larkin, and Cornelius Lehane. Almost all of them worked in some way to forward the revolutionary Irish nationalist cause: Monteith and Mellows went on speaking tours (Mellows in fact accompanied the old saboteur Luke Dillon travelling throughout the east coast as an "organizer" for the Clan), Margaret Skinnider and Nora Connolly lectured and published books (Doing my bit for Ireland in June 1917, and The unbroken tradition in 1918 respectively), Lynch became the national secretary of the FOIF and Dr McCartan attempted to serve as Irish Envoy to the United States throughout 1917 and 1918.1 The Colums had already contributed substantially to a book of short portraits of the leaders of the rising (The Irish rebellion of 1916 and its martyrs), as well as their articles for the American press, and they would join Peter Golden in the autumn of 1917 in creating the Irish Progressive League (Golden was then prominent in the Irish Relief Fund organization); Larkin and Lehane were working among the Irish-American labourers.2

Perhaps the most effective propagandist of these exiles was Mrs Sheehy Skeffington. Americans had learned about the murder of her


husband through the newspaper reports of the summer, but her trip to
the United States in December brought the whole matter up once again.
Her illegal arrival with her small son was an event reported by the
major American dailies and the Irish-American newspapers; she told
the New York Times that she had come to inform the American people
about the methods of British rule in Ireland. This she proceeded to
do in a long speaking tour of the United States wherein she delivered
a lecture entitled, "British militarism as I have known it." The fact
that she had been forbidden to leave the British Isles and had escaped
with her seven-year-old son, in addition to the actual story of her
husband's demise, made her an appealing figure who could win sympathy
and support in quarters where other more typical Irish refugees could
not. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington held a successful meeting at Carnegie
Hall in New York on 6 January 1917; her lecture was presided over by
Bainbridge Colby and her speech enthusiastically received. She also
met with E.M. House and Theodore Roosevelt and told them of conditions
in Dublin during the rising and of her own experiences. Roosevelt,
true to his limitless interests and sense of fair-play, asked Mrs She-
ey Skeffington to write up what she had told him, after which he him-
self wrote to Sir Francis Fletcher Vane, a participant in the Skeffing-

1 N.Y.T., 20 Dec. 1916. Shane Leslie felt that she was the most
damaging of the Irish refugees because of the strength of her complai-
nts against the British government. Leslie, The Irish issue in its
American aspect, p. 184. Sperling observed, "We could hardly have
done worse than decide to keep her in Ireland & then let her escape."
Minutes on Mrs H. Sheehy Skeffington, 17 Feb. 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/
3071).

2 For her own account see H. Sheehy Skeffington, "Impressions of
Sinn Fein in America" (Dublin, 1919), and also see Sir F. Vane, Agin

3 N.Y.T., 7 Jan. 1917.
ton affair, to ask if what he had been told was true.¹ During the
year and a half that Mrs Sheehy Skeffington was in the United States
she travelled across the country speaking at universities, civic
groups, women's societies, Irish-American, pacifist and suffragette
meetings; she was especially effective because she went beyond merely
Irish groups. Once America entered the war her relationships with
socialists, pacifists, feminists, and Irish revolutionaries—in short
those Americans who opposed the war—partially compromised her posi-
tion and appeal.²

Throughout the winter and spring of 1917, while the United States
was moving closer to war with Germany, the Irish question was reaching
a new crisis at Westminster. In the House of Commons on 9 March 1917
T.P. O'Connor moved that home rule be extended to Ireland immediately,

¹Roosevelt to Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, 18 Jan. 1917 and Roosevelt
to Sir Francis Fletcher Vane, 18 Jan. 1917 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers,
series 3A/vol. 101). Roosevelt told Vane that he held no brief for
Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, "except that I have unhesitatingly condemned
the Germans for the atrocities they have committed; and as I have al-
ways announced that I should just as equally condemn atrocities of
like character committed by the Allies, I do not feel at liberty to
refuse Mrs Skeffington's request that I satisfy myself as to the truth
of her statements." He wrote that he did not want to undermine
the position of the Allies because he believed the Germans had committed
worse deeds, but he wanted to know. Because of the nature of the let-
ter, Roosevelt took the precaution of sending it to Vane in care of
the American Ambassador in London. With a smallness that characteri-
zed some of the least admirable features of the Wilson administration,
Page turned the letter over to Balfour, who had it copied and was able
to take steps to see that it could not be answered, before delivering
it to Vane. Roosevelt eventually got a reply from Vane which said
that Mrs Sheehy Skeffington's statements were largely true. Roose-
velt to Page, 18 Jan. 1917, Page to Roosevelt, 15 March 1917, and Vane
to Roosevelt, 29 May 1917 (Ibid. and series I/box 337); Roosevelt to
Vane, 18 Jan. 1917, and Vane to Roosevelt (letter stopped by the For-
ign Office), 20 March 1917 (F.R.O., F.O. 800/211).

²See Sheehy Skeffington, "Impressions of Sinn Fein in America."
and after a bitter debate, when it was clear that home rule to the whole island was not to be carried, Redmond and many of the Irish Nationalists stalked out of the House. The following day they issued a manifesto declaring their position and appealing to the colonial premiers and also to President Wilson to intervene and resolve the Irish question fairly. The reception of these remarks in America was not favourable. The New York Times thought that the Irish members had a just grievance, but that this outburst was futile and could only create difficulties for the Lloyd George government. The Christian Science Monitor, while first saying coldly that the southern Irish could have home rule any time they wanted it if they did not insist on coercing Ulster, later suggested that the government might have to make some accomodations. The Springfield Republican thought that Redmond's appeal was a mistake, "managed and timed as if Herr Zimmermann had arranged it." The St Louis Republic was concerned that the Irish members might break up the government; and contrary to its editorial procedure the Literary Digest observed that none of Ireland's many

1They may well have been encouraged to appeal to the United States by reports from Shane Leslie, Michael J. Jordan, and Richard McGhee that Redmond's following in America was as large and loyal as ever, albeit demoralized by the events of 1916 and very poorly organized. See Leslie to Redmond, 10 Nov. 1916, Jordan to Redmond, 29 Nov. and McGhee to Redmond, 10 Jan. 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers). Broderick in the British Embassy was less optimistic in his report to the Foreign Office. He stated that the UIL had "practically passed out of existence," and that Redmond himself could not make a successful tour of the United States under the existing conditions. J. Joyce Broderick, Memorandum on Irish-Americans, 19 Jan. 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3071).

2N.Y.T., 9 March 1917.

3C.S.M., 9 and 15 March 1917.

4This was no compliment in the context of the Zimmermann telegrams. Springfield Republican, cited in Lit. Dig., liv, no. 12 (24 March 1917) p. 805.
appeals to America had ever come at "so ominous a moment...." For understandably different reasons the leading Irish-American papers also scorned Redmond's appeal. The Irish World said that Redmond's position had been steadily declining since his first recruiting speech and that his current treatment by Lloyd George was evidence of British regard for him. This was just another public gesture, the Gaelic American declared; Redmond did not have Ireland's interests in mind at all. Ireland, the home rule weekly, supported Redmond's appeal, however, suggesting that with England looking for an ally in the United States a body of organized Irish-Americans might be in a position to dictate terms to England that would be better than those Redmond could himself obtain from Lloyd George; conditions had never been so good for agreement between Irishmen.

Shane Leslie, one of the editors of Ireland, wrote to Redmond on 9 March suggesting that the appeal should find many supporters in the United States; he planned to enlist the support of the American Cardinals, but he also feared that it would be difficult to exert much pressure on the United States government because there was no strong moderate organization (the United Irish League being almost moribund) to capitalize on such a situation. A few weeks later he wrote again that the lack of a reliable organization prevented the Irish-Americans from doing anything genuinely effective in Washington, but that the

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2Irish World, cited in Ibid., p. 806.

3Gaelic American, cited in Ibid.

4Ireland, cited in Ibid.

5Leslie to Redmond, 9 March 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).
situation was improving for the moderates. "The extremists have long shot their bolt," he said; "The moderates have certainly a game to play if the pieces on the board can be reached."\(^1\) Certainly there was some basis for Leslie's optimism. Dr John C. Glennon, Archbishop of St Louis, sent Redmond a copy of a speech he had made and several resolutions passed by Irish-American groups which expressed the hopes of both Irish-Americans and native Americans that a moderate home rule bill would be implemented.\(^2\) The next few months saw what pressures moderate Irish-American nationalists could exert on both the American and the British governments.

Throughout the winter and early spring of 1917 conditions changed rapidly in the United States. The summer and autumn of 1916 provided the last opportunity for the revolutionary Irish-Americans until well into 1919. With America about to enter the war against Germany the alliance between the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans which since 1914 had seemed so formidable and so filled with potential for Ireland suddenly became an enormous liability. President Wilson's violent repudiation of Jeremiah A. O'Leary was a harbinger of events to come, not only for O'Leary, but to a great extent for the whole revolutionary wing of the Irish nationalist movement in the United States which O'Leary represented. The moderates who had seemed badly weakened by the rising and the executions appeared to have another opportunity because of the restrictions that the war imposed on America. The Irish question took on a new dimension in America in no small part because of the obligations of self-determination that Americans incorporated into their war goals.

\(^1\)Leslie to Redmond, 15 March 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

\(^2\)Archbishop Glennon to Redmond, 30 March 1917 (Ibid.)
CHAPTER IV

IRELAND AND THE AMERICAN WAR CRISIS

1917-1918

America's entrance into the war gave the Irish question a new significance for Anglo-American relations. For the first time President Wilson and the Secretary of State requested the British government, albeit cautiously, to resolve the Irish situation. Furthermore, Congress, always pro-Irish in its expressions, then held the power to supply Britain's needs in the war. As a result, United States approval of British policy in Ireland became crucially important. For Irish-Americans the entrance of the United States into the war had profound implications also. To the constitutionalists it meant the slim chance that the necessities of Anglo-American co-operation in the war might prove to be the means through which home rule could be enacted. To the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists United States participation in the conflict marked the collapse of a policy which hoped to link Ireland with a possible German victory in the war. But the position of the constitutionalists, which might have been salvaged by the Irish Convention was turned upside down by the conscription crisis; the constitutional movement disintegrated while the revolutionaries were heartened and driven together, despite their harassment by the government. The war crisis shaped the character of the Irish struggle in America for the next four years, in large part determining both the arguments in favour of Ireland and those against.

(1)

The United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. Wilson's policy of neutrality, his desire to allow Americans to travel
freely and to trade with whom they pleased, and his ambition of being
the mediator between the warring parties, were defeated with the re-
sumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in early
1917. During February and March, while the United States government
waited for the Germans to commence sinking American ships, steps were
taken in the United States and Great Britain to discuss those problems
which obstructed closer relations between the two countries. E.M.
House and Sir William Wiseman, a British intelligence officer assigned
to work directly with House, prepared a memorandum on Anglo-American
relations to be presented at the British Empire Conference, meeting in
London in March. The Irish question was an important item discussed,
and it was asserted to be "one of the greatest obstacles to a good
understanding" between Britain and the United States. The memorandum
went on to state,

The Unionist side of the question is little under-
stood and never presented. The only arguments
heard are the stock-in-trade of the discontented
Nationalists. There are, however, many reason-
able and intelligent Americans of Irish extraction
who feel very strongly on this subject, and who
might be persuaded to lend their assistance with
all honesty to the settlement of this question at
the end of the war. Sensible opinion in the States
would not expect the British to listen to Irish-
men of the type of Devoy and Jeremiah A. O'Leary;
but the movement is given its greatest strength by
the fact that reasonable honest citizens of the
type of John Quinn feel so strongly about it.

This analysis of both the Irish political situation and of the several
groups of Irish-Americans was given added significance by House's com-

1The United States government was informed of the German decision
on 31 January and diplomatic relations were broken on 3 February.

2For a full description of this House-Wiseman relationship see A.

3Relations between the United States and Great Britain, 8 March
1917 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Wiseman, Sir Wm.).
ment that President Wilson "had read it and thought it a just statement." This modest endorsement by Wilson was important not only because it represented a fairly sound understanding of the complexities of the Irish situation but also because Wilson was at the time attempting to keep his involvement with Allied powers at a bare minimum.

Within a few days after the United States went to war, however, Wilson took further steps to inform the British government of the importance of the Irish question to harmonious relations between the two countries and for the successful prosecution of the war. Lansing was instructed on 10 April to inform Page in London to tell Lloyd George confidentially that, "the only circumstance which seems now to stand in the way of an absolutely cordial cooperation with Great Britain by practically all Americans who are not influenced by ties of blood directly associating them with Germany is the failure so far to find a satisfactory method of self-government for Ireland." Wilson noted that the Irish question had been a matter of some concern among Congressmen before voting for war and he felt that Americans generally would more willingly support the alliance with Britain if they were confident that self-government for Ireland were implemented. Actually Wilson saw Ireland as an embarrassment to the Allied powers and he asked that Page tell Lloyd George that, "if a way could be found now to grant Ireland what she has so often been promised, it would be felt that the real programme of government by the consent of the governed

\[1\] Relations between the United States and Great Britain, 8 March 1917 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Wiseman, Sir Wm,).

\[2\] Wilson to Lansing, 10 April 1917, 84d.00/103\%, Foreign relations, the Lansing papers, 1914-1920, 11, pp 4-5; and Page letters, 11, pp 255-56.
had been adopted everywhere in the anti-Prussian world."¹ In short Wilson saw Ireland as the one area in Europe outside the Austrian-German territories which was deprived of democratic government.

Page replied on 18 April that he had talked with Lloyd George, who understood perfectly and was "glad that the President had instructed me to bring the subject up."² But Lloyd George's answer to the President's request was the suggestion that Wilson himself talk with A.J. Balfour, due to arrive shortly in the United States. Balfour was then the Foreign Secretary, but he was also a leader of the English Unionist party, and the Prime Minister felt that if Wilson could convince him of the importance of the Irish question in America it would be of great assistance in winning the support of the Unionists in England for the implementation of home rule.³ Lloyd George poured out to Page that he was trying to settle the Irish question but the Ulster leaders had been implacable.⁴ Page reported that he would attempt to point out the importance of a settlement to other members of the government when the opportunities presented themselves.⁵ Wilson was advised to talk with Balfour about the Irish question by several other

¹Wilson to Lansing, 10 April 1917, 841d,00/103¾, Foreign relations, the Lansing papers, 1914-1920, ii, p. 5. The recent Russian revolution had eliminated the other embarrassment of a non-democratic government.

²Page to Sec of State, 18 April 1917 (N.A., 841d,00/106, roll 214).

³Ibid.

⁴Page to Wilson, 4 May 1917, Page letters, ii, pp 259-60; Page to Wilson, 4 May 1916 (Harvard University Library, Page Papers, bms Am 1090.1/35).

⁵Ibid.
people as well as Lloyd George. Through the press Lord Northcliffe claimed that "the happiness of Ireland is entirely in the hands of Mr Balfour and the British mission to the United States." Wilson was also receiving private appeals from Americans asking that he impress upon the British delegation the importance of a settlement of the Irish situation as an act of good faith to the Allied cause.

The Balfour mission was one of three official delegations from the Allied Powers sent to the United States to confer with the government about the successful integration of resources in the war effort. Balfour was also instructed to learn for himself the importance of the Irish question in America; indeed it had been understood by Spring Rice that Balfour would be confronted with the Irish question on his mission to America, and he proceeded to draft a memorandum for the Foreign Office which attempted to anticipate the several issues that

1Sydney Brooks, the English journalist, paid his respects to Wilson before returning home and also suggested that the President discuss the Irish question with Balfour, impressing upon him the bad feeling which Ireland caused and the obstruction that Ireland presented to Anglo-American co-operation. Brooks to Wilson, n.d., and Tumulty to Wilson, 20 April 1917 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 2); and also Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, pp 398-99. Wilson replied to Tumulty, "Confidentially (for I beg that you will be careful not to speak of or intimate this), I have been doing a number of things about this which I hope may bear fruit." Ibid., p. 399.

2See for example, Archbishop Christie (of Oregon), et al., to Wilson, 24 April 1917 (N.A., 841.00/41, roll 6), John D. Crimmings to Wilson, 28 April 1917 (Tumulty Papers, op. cit.), J.F. Waters (San Francisco FOIF) to Wilson, 4 May 1917, and Charles P. Olwell (president of New Jersey AOH) to Wilson, 17 May 1917 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).
would come under discussion. 1 In the Ambassador's view,

The Irish question is one which is at the root of most of our troubles with the United States. The fact that the Irish question is still unsettled is continually quoted against us, as a proof that it is not wholly true that the fight is one for the sanctity of engagements or the independence of small nations. 2

Spring Rice was certain that at the least Wilson would have to make some demands to satisfy the Irish-Americans in his party, and that the success of Balfour's mission would to some extent depend on how convincingly he could talk about a solution to the Irish problem. 3 The Secretary of State, whom Tumulty had personally informed of the importance of the Irish question, presented the problem forcefully at a private conference with Balfour and Sir Eric Drummond on 6 May. 4

After telling Balfour that one of the reasons the American people had greater sympathy for the French than for the British was the failure of the British government to satisfy Irish national aspirations, Lansing further said that the British government's inability "to respond to the intense longing of the Irish for the freedom of Ireland from

1 Cabinet minutes, dated 10 April 1917, suggest the instructions with which Balfour left London. "Mr Balfour undertook to make special enquiry, and to telegraph the War Cabinet, as to the importance of the Irish Question in connection with our relations with the United States of America." War Cabinet 116 (min. 23), 10 April 1917 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/2); and also F.O. Memorandum, London, 10 April 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/208). Lloyd George quotes the same words in his description of the several objectives of the mission. See D. Lloyd George, War memoirs of David Lloyd George (London, 1933), iii, pp 1679-80.

2 Memorandum, 13 April 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/208).

3 Ibid., and Spring Rice to Lord Cecil, 13 April 1917, Spring Rice letters, ii, pp 392-93. See also Spring Rice to F.O., 13 April 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/242).

4 Tumulty to Lansing, 19 April 1917 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 26); Tumulty to Lansing, 26 April 1917, and Lansing to Tumulty, 28 April 1917 (Ibid., vol. 27); and Tumulty to Lansing, 30 April 1917, and Lansing to Tumulty, 5 May 1917 (N.A., 841.00/41, roll 6).
British rule by conceding to them a measure of independence made thousands of Irish-Americans bitter enemies of Great Britain..."; and Lansing emphasized the point that these circumstances created a "situation with which our government found it difficult to cope."¹ A solution of the Irish problem would end the antagonism of the Irish-Americans and their friends towards Great Britain and it would generally strengthen the war effort in both America and Ireland. Balfour, Lansing wrote later, "promised to lay the matter before his government when he returned to England."² However, in his report to the Cabinet Balfour minimized the importance of the Irish question in America, pointing out that among government officials he had "fewer conversations on it than might have been supposed," and that "The President never referred to it at all; the Secretary of State never referred to it officially."³

Congress, during the opening days of the war, attempted to exert pressure on both the Wilson administration and the British government to deal with the Irish question and to give some expression to the pro-Irish sympathies in the country. Just a little over a week after the declaration of war Congressman Gallagher introduced a resolution


²Ibid.

³Nevertheless he devoted disproportionate space in his report to American opinion on the Irish question and noted that both the Embassy and the State Department limited his freedom to travel in the United States for fear of Irish inspired incidents. Balfour to Lloyd George, 23 June 1917 (P.R.O., CAB. 1/25/5). On 30 April Lord Robert Cecil asked if Wilson had broached the Irish problem and Balfour replied that no one in the government had mentioned Ireland by that time; Kenneth Young, Balfour's recent biographer, suggests that Wilson did raise the Irish question in conversation but agreed that the implementation of self-government should be left until after the war. Cecil to Spring Rice, 30 April 1917, and Balfour to Cecil, 2 May 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3070); and K. Young, Arthur James Balfour (London, 1963), p. 384.
which advocated a "free government for Ireland and Poland," and on
28 April Congressman Cary introduced a resolution which called for
"the freedom of Ireland."\(^1\) Congressman Mason, who ten days before had
spoken passionately about an Irish republic as the wish of "every
lover of liberty all over the world," introduced a resolution on 14
May, "to declare the liberation of Ireland one of the purposes of the
present war."\(^2\) In late July Congressmen McLaughlin, Kennedy, and Mor-
in each introduced resolutions asking that the issue be terminated
immediately by implementation of dominion status, plebiscite, or home
rule.\(^3\) On 28 April Speaker of the House Champ Clark and 140 Congress-
men signed and sent a cable to Lloyd George asking that the Irish
question be quickly resolved in accordance with President Wilson's
recent pronouncements on self-government and self-determination for
all nations. Congressman Gallivan, who in January had introduced a
resolution saying that Congress acknowledged that there would be no
peace in the world until self-determination was recognized by the
great powers, spoke to the House about the cable and said that the sol-
ution to the Irish problem was "to put the home rule bill into opera-
tion at once, even persuading or compelling a few counties that oppose

\(^1\) H. Res. 49, 13 April 1917, Congressional Record, 65th Congress,
1st Session, vol. 55, p. 663, and H.J. Res. 71, 28 April 1917, Ibid.,
p. 1558. Efforts by Cary to have his resolution brought back from
committee failed. 16 May 1917, Ibid., p. 2424. Sir Horace Plunkett
and Congressman Medill McCormick collaborated in the drafting of the
Gallagher resolution. Plunkett diary, 28 April 1917 (Plunkett Found-
ation, Plunkett Papers).

\(^2\) H.J. Res. 88, 14 May 1917, Congressional Record, op. cit., p.
2305. See also, 4 May 1917, Congressional Record, Appendix to, 65th

129, 26 July 1917, Congressional Record, op. cit., pp 5474 and 5532-33.
None of these resolutions ever emerged from the Foreign Affairs Comm-
ittee to reach a vote in the House, but their introduction was still
of some importance.
it to yield to the will of the majority."1 Ireland could be won over if the British government were strong enough to act firmly and immediately.2 In addition to these efforts a substantial number of Senators and Representatives made speeches on the Irish question or had petitions and memorials from their constituents printed in the Congressional Record. But Congress with the support of the Irish-American members also asked Balfour to address them; significantly perhaps he was the first foreigner since Parnell to do so.3

To be sure constitutional Irish-American nationalists saw America's entry into the war as an opportunity which could be turned to Ireland's advantage. Perhaps as their price for full participation in the war effort Ireland might be given some form of immediate self-government in a British gesture to cement harmonious Anglo-American relations. Certainly, as Shane Leslie had told Redmond in March, the

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2Both Congressmen Mason and McLaughlin signed the cable, although seven days later one asked for independence and the other for a republic in the course of their speeches; very probably they would have gladly accepted anything concrete as an adequate settlement. 4 May 1917, Ibid., pp 151-52 and 158-59. For Gallivan's resolution (H. Res. 479) see 30 Jan. 1917, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 54, p. 2296.

3For comment see War memoirs of David Lloyd George, iii, p. 1685.
moderates had "a game to play." Among the first efforts to investigate American opinion was that initiated by the British newspaper tycoon Lord Northcliffe, who appealed through the New York World for the views of influential Americans on the importance of the Irish question on the new war situation. Through his representatives in New York and Washington, W.F. Bullock and Arthur Willert, and the assistance of John Quinn and Shane Leslie, Northcliffe solicited letters on the Irish question from highly placed Americans to be published in the New York World and The Times of London in the hope of moving the British government to implement some kind of home rule in Ireland.

Such distinguished native Americans as Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft responded that an immediate settlement which would place Ireland in a relationship to Westminster similar to that of the state of Maine to Washington was important for a successful prosecution of

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1Leslie to Redmond, 15 March 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

Most Irish-Americans threw themselves into the war without reservation, regardless of the Irish situation. John Quinn, who loved the French and hated the Germans, was no doubt exceptional; but Joyce Kilmer, who had written rhapsodic poems about the rebellion in 1916, joined the 69th New York regiment (the Irish-American "fighting 69th") and was killed during the last days of the war. His war poems were more Irish-American than Irish in their sentiments. See "When the Sixty-Ninth comes back," Kilmer, Poems, essays and letters, p. 110; Reid, The man from New York, p. 400. Perhaps the immediate pledge of support by the Irish-American Catholic Cardinals helped turn nationalist opinion. See S. Leslie, Long shadows (London, 1966), p. 190. In fact, Lowell, president of Harvard, observed that the effect of the Irish question on Irish-American participation in the war was "slightly exaggerated." See Plunkett diary, 27 April 1917 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

Several outstanding Irish-Americans also contributed statements, which, although perhaps more attentive to the details of home rule, were essentially similar to the suggestions of Roosevelt and Taft. Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore favoured immediate home rule but emphasized the importance of a unified Ireland with guarantees and concessions for minorities and interest groups. "Ireland cannot be sacrificed to a few counties in Ulster," the Cardinal wrote, but, "These few counties cannot be sacrificed to the rest of Ireland." Mayor John Purroy Mitchel of New York hoped that home rule would be implemented but that it not be on the basis of "county options" which the government had just suggested. New York Supreme Court Judge Victor J. Dowling thought that Ireland was the test of England's war aims, as did John F. ("Honey Fitz") Fitzgerald, the former mayor of Boston. Colonel Robert Temple Emmet and Robert E. Dowling, former chairman of the State Workman's Compensation Commission, both wrote

1 See The Times, 26 April 1917. Quinn arranged for Roosevelt to write and supplied him with detailed information on Ireland and the recent activities of home rule sympathizers. Memorandum on Irish home rule, by John Quinn, 24 April 1917 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers, series I/box 330). In late 1917 Roosevelt not only stated again that he thought the Irish should be given home rule within the Empire, but he also attacked those Irish-Americans "whose blind hatred of England makes them disloyal to America...." T. Roosevelt, The foes of our own household (New York, 1917), pp 29 and 61. Through his father-in-law, Leslie obtained the comment of Taft. Leslie, Long Shadows, p. 192. Other contributors were Dr Charles W. Eliot, Dr Nicholas Murray Butler, Alton B. Parker, Ambassador James W. Gerard, and Colonel George Harvey. A federal solution to the Irish question was proposed in a privately printed pamphlet: F.S. Oliver, "The Irish question, federation or secession" (New York, 1917).

2 The Times, op. cit. The letter was drafted by the Cardinal's secretary, Monsignor Sigourney Fay, a close friend of Leslie. Leslie, op. cit., p. 197.

3 The Times, op. cit.

4 Ibid., 27 April 1917.
that minority rights in Ireland could be protected by constitutional guarantees. Archbishop Ireland of St Paul said that Great Britain needed Ireland's support in the war but would get it only by extending home rule; once this was done American support would be more enthusiastic also. The effect of these letters, both in England and in America, was to re-emphasize the importance of the Irish question to the creation of a working alliance between Britain and the United States, and to demonstrate the rather remarkable agreement among important and influential native and Irish-Americans on the merits of immediate home rule for an undivided Ireland, for political and ideological reasons.

Moderate Irish-Americans began working to encourage the best possible terms for a home rule settlement—one which would pacify nationalists and also make Ireland a willing partner in the war. Twenty-seven distinguished Irish-Americans cabled Redmond on 22 April saying that the partition of Ulster or exclusion by county options would not be an acceptable settlement in either America or Ireland. "Americans refuse to believe," they asserted, "that every legitimate right of a minority cannot be made absolutely secure, as in this country, without impairing in any way the unity of the Irish nation." And to make the point about the war they closed by saying, "No settlement of the Irish question will be final unless it is based upon that justice which this

1 The Times, 27 April 1917.
2 Ibid., 1 May 1917.
3 While these letters received the enthusiastic support of Lord Bryce and the American correspondent of The Times, they were not universally welcomed. Professor W. Alison Phillips of Trinity College, Dublin, thought the letters showed how poorly Americans understood the Irish situation: the Irish were full partners in the United Kingdom; on the other hand Americans had been most unwilling to allow the southern states to secede in 1860. Ibid., 30 April 1917. The editors tended to agree with Phillips. Ibid., 25, 26, and 27 April and 2 May 1917.
country has entered the war to make universal."\(^1\) At the same time a similar group of Irish-Americans, this time inspired by John Quinn who had learned in "high official quarters" that an appeal would be welcomed by the British government, sent a cable to Lloyd George emphasizing the importance of a satisfactory early resolution of the Irish question because of its vital relationship to the war effort.\(^2\)

The national executive committee of the UIL met in Washington on 3 May to plan strategy and to cable support and encouragement to Redmond.\(^3\)

Several days later M.J. Jordan wrote Redmond telling him of the enthusiasm and determination of the meeting. Furthermore, he found Ireland and home rule the main topic of conversation in Washington; he was told by someone of authority that President Wilson was "straining every nerve to see that the Home Rule Bill goes into effect."\(^4\)

John Quinn, Shane Leslie, and Judges Keogh, O'Brien, and Dowling also cabled Redmond telling him that they had been in consultation with Plunkett and that they thought Redmond could profit by discussing the attitude of Americans and the new prospects of home rule with him.\(^5\)

All of these appeals, resolutions, and public declarations were

\(^1\)Joseph Brennon, et al., to Redmond, 22 April 1917, cited in Memorandum on Irish home rule, by John Quinn, 24 April 1917 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers, series I/box 330). The signators included John D. Crimmins, W. Bourke Cockran, Colonel Emmet, Lawrence Godkin, John Quinn, and Judges Keogh and Dowling.

\(^2\)John Quinn, Notes on recent American opinion and action on the Irish home rule question, 2 June 1917 (N.L.I., Quinn Papers, MS 1751), also to be found in the Plunkett Papers.

\(^3\)C.S.M., 4 May 1917; and Michael J. Ryan to Redmond, 28 April 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

\(^4\)Jordan to Redmond, 7 May 1917 (Ibid.). Redmond's response was to cable for financial support. See circular letter from Redmond, 11 May 1917 (Ibid.).

\(^5\)O'Brien, et al., to Redmond, 11 May 1917 (Ibid.).
designed to exert such pressure on the British and American governments that home rule would be put into operation immediately. To those Irish-Americans as impatient as John Quinn the efficient way to get things done was to work personally at the highest possible level. Thus when Plunkett and Leslie, equally impatient Irishmen, explored the possibility of a delegation of Irish-Americans meeting with Balfour to explain the importance of the Irish question in the United States, Quinn was anxious to organize such a group. On 24 April Plunkett met with Balfour and advised him of the extreme importance of a quick resolution of the Irish question for the establishment of harmonious Anglo-American war co-operation. Balfour, Plunkett wrote in his diary, agreed that this was true, and at Plunkett's suggestion, agreed also to see any small group of Irish-Americans that Plunkett might recommend to him. The following day Plunkett talked with Quinn and House and wrote to Balfour that he thought his own solution to the Irish question would be most appealing to American opinion. Quinn organized a delegation made up of himself, New York Supreme Court Judge Morgan J. O'Brien, Colonel Robert Temple Emmet, Lawrence Godkin, and John F. Fitzgerald. Quinn explained to Theodore Roosevelt that Emmet and Godkin represented Protestant Irish-Americans and the rest moderate Catholic opinion, and that America's entry in the war prov-

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1 Plunkett went to Washington to see Balfour, and there he worked with Leslie to draft an article for the New York World which promoted the idea of Irish-American leaders meeting with Balfour to work out some kind of solution to the Irish question. Plunkett was also in close communication with House and Spring Rice, and Leslie was with Tumulty and Spring Rice; thus they were able to operate in such a way as to keep British and American officials informed of their activities. Plunkett diary, 19 April 1917 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers); and Leslie, Long shadows, pp 190-91.

2 Plunkett diary, 25 April 1917 (Plunkett Papers, op. cit.).
Quinn pointed out that the deputation did not want to "embarrass" Balfour or to brow-beat him, but rather to have, an earnest talk with him to try to impress upon him the fact the way to take the wind out of the sails of the irreconcilables, the way to put them out of business, is to have Home Rule be given to an undivided Ireland. That will settle the Irish question, and it is the only thing that can settle it.

The meeting was held in Washington on 4 May and lasted for two hours. The delegation told Balfour that Americans felt that Ireland had won home rule constitutionally and in all fairness should not be denied this measure of self-government. Partition would be as unacceptable in America as in Ireland; such a concession to Carson would be considered a "betrayal" and would, like much of Britain's current Irish policy, play into the hands of extremists. On the contrary, a generous policy would be welcomed and endorsed in both Ireland and America by all right-thinking people. The Ulster Unionists would have to compromise for the good of the majority and for the war effort; they could be protected by adequate written guarantees and they could look forward to good government, not Tammany Hall politics, with the southern Irish. The delegates spoke out because they felt the Irish question had become an American political issue and because the continued instability in Ireland was as much a danger to America as it was...
to Britain and the war effort, because of the collusion between revolutionary Irish-Americans and German-Americans. Balfour agreed that the Irish question was a source of irritation in the relations between America and Britain, and that it was also a source of exasperation to Englishmen. He wanted to make clear that Ireland was already free and that in fact because of the land acts, the Catholic university, and the absence of conscription, Irishmen might be said to have more rights than Englishmen; a great deal had changed in Ireland in the past hundred years. The real problem, Balfour said, was in obtaining a settlement which would be satisfactory to all parties in Ireland; the fears of the Ulstermen were real and had to be respected, and to force them out of the United Kingdom would not be acceptable. In closing he said he thought a solution was imminent—that the postponement of debates on Ireland in Commons was an indication that Redmond and Lloyd George were probably having discussions. Furthermore, Balfour promised to report faithfully the views that the deputation had put before him. Balfour cabled Lloyd George the following day that he had met with a deputation of Irish-Americans "of high standing," and that they had in very moderate terms emphasized how much an Irish settlement would "promote unity in the United States." He said that the group had supported Plunkett's proposals and rejected any scheme of partition, although Shane Leslie had told him confidentially that should partition be the only means to a settlement, "a considerable portion of Irish moderate opinion here would

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1 John Quinn, Notes of recent American opinion and action on the Irish home rule question, 2 June 1917 (N.L.I., Quinn Papers, MS 1751) and also Plunkett Papers. Also see Leslie, The Irish issue in its American aspect, pp 200-01.

2 Transcript of the Irish deputation's visit with A.J. Balfour, 4 May 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/208).
rally to it." Balfour endorsed the view of the delegation that the Irish question was "the only difficulty we have to face here and its settlement would no doubt greatly facilitate the vigorous and lasting co-operation of United States Government in the war." A day later Secretary of State Lansing told Balfour much the same thing.

The effect of the meeting with Balfour was felt quickly in the United States. The members of the delegation were pleased. Godkin told Plunkett—whose scheme for home rule he had promoted—that Balfour had been "delightful," and Quinn also reported that the meeting had been "very satisfactory." In fact Quinn was told by Spring Rice and General G.T.M. Bridges, Balfour's aide, how convincing they had been. Plunkett himself understood from Leslie that the meeting "did great good." Some time later Leslie wrote to Mrs Alice Stopford Green that part of the good that had come from the meeting had been brought about by Balfour's cordial reception of the Irish-Americans and also because the meeting had acted as a "lightning conductor to Irish feeling in New York." Thus whatever the effect of the meeting whatever the effect of the meeting

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1 Balfour to P.M., 5 May 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3070). At a later date Balfour talked with a second delegation of Irish-Americans who told him much the same thing. Balfour to Lloyd George, 23 June 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 1/25/3).

2 Godkin to Plunkett, n.d., and Quinn to Plunkett, 19 June 1917 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers). Godkin had been pleased that Balfour promised to report the views expressed in the meeting to his government.

3 Reid, The man from New York, p. 329.


5 Leslie to Mrs A.S. Green, 22 May 1917 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5581).
on British policy, its immediate result was to assist in smoothing American opinion on Ireland.¹

In the meantime, however, the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists found themselves on the defensive, having fought American intervention right up to the declaration of war on 6 April 1917.² The war meant the end of the German-Irish alliance in America and the collapse of the policy of the past four years. A new program had to be created which would still promote revolutionary separatism for Ireland but which would not jeopardize the security of the United States. On 8 April, two days after the country went to war, Judge Cohalan told Irish-Americans at a large meeting in Carnegie Hall to be loyal Americans during the war, but also to hold the United States to its war aims so that Ireland would be included among the nations to be given freedom.³ By the end of the month these sentiments became the official

¹The supreme grand deputy of the Loyal Orange Institution of Iowa protested to Spring Rice about the authority of any group of Irish-Americans to voice the sentiments of America on the Irish situation or to imply the approval of the American government for home rule. Charles F. Fulham to Spring Rice, 16 May 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3070).

²See G.A., Feb. to April 1917. The Gaelic American opposed the break in diplomatic relations with Germany and the attempts of the government to prepare the country for war, and the FOIF held large meetings throughout the country in support of those Congressmen who opposed Wilson's Armed Merchantmen Act and the Overman Espionage Bill. In fact the paper was severely criticized for publishing protests against the war after Congress had passed Wilson's declaration, a point which Devoy justified because the weekly newspaper had been printed several days before it was sold. Ibid., 7 and 14 April 1917. As Pat Mullen, the author of The man of Aran, later wrote, no Irishmen in America wanted to fight Germany; they wanted to fight England if anyone. P. Mullen, Come another day (London, 1940), p. 225.

³G.A., 14 April 1917. A telegram prepared by Judges Edward J. Gavegan, John W. Goff, and John Jerome Rooney, was sent to Wilson, Vice President Marshall, and House Speaker Champ Clark, pledging support for the war, praising the Irish rebels of 1916, and asking Wilson to speak out for justice and independence for Ireland. Ibid., and 10 April 1917, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 55, p. 508.
policy of the revolutionaries. A Clan-na-Gael circular sent to officers and members, 28 April 1917, instructed that "the efforts of the Organization shall be devoted to securing intervention by the United States in favour of the National Independence of Ireland." The letter carefully explained the delicacy of the situation but insisted on the correctness of the Clan position:

That work is entirely within the law and consistent with loyalty to the United States, in which we yield to no class of citizens in this Republic, to which our race has rendered valiant service in every crisis of its history from the Revolution to the present day. Our previous activities were always perfectly legal and legitimate, and we have never violated American law, in letter or spirit. But the new situation developed by the entry of the United States into the European war renders necessary the adoption of new methods for the achievement of the same object—the complete emancipation of the land of our fathers.¹

Although clearly alarmed, the Clan suggested that work begin immediately to undertake a national campaign to hold the Wilson administration and the British government to the pious pronouncements about the rights of small nations. The Gaelic American, which grudgingly reconciled itself to the war, emphasized this point also, but further argued that the war situation was such that America had the power to compel Britain to grant independence to Ireland because American troops were about to win the war for the British.²

Thus the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists began a campaign which was to continue through 1919. The United Irish Societies of Chicago demanded Irish representation at the peace conference and a congressional pronouncement on Irish autonomy from Illinois Senator

¹Circular letter to Clan officers and members, 28 April 1918 (N. L., Devoy Papers, box U.B.).

²See G.A. during April and May 1917, especially 21 and 28 April 1917.
J. Hamilton Lewis; the San Francisco FOIF cabled President Wilson that Ireland must have "complete separation" from Britain and that home rule would not suffice; Congressman McLaughlin, who was also national president of the AOH, told Congress that his organization asked Wilson to secure Irish independence and the country to support Ireland at the peace conference; constituents of the Washington Senator Wesley J. Jones sent resolutions calling for Irish independence.¹ Seamas MacManus published a thick little paper-covered volume, Ireland's case, which gave a long nativist history of Ireland and argued for complete independence.² The revolutionaries expressed contempt for the efforts of moderates to bring home rule into force, labeling such proposals as attempts to keep Ireland tied to British control. The publication of Tumulty's reply to John D. Crimmins, which said that Wilson showed sympathy for Ireland's claim for "home rule," brought a strong protest to the White House from the national secretary of the FOIF.³ The Gaelic American and the Irish World attacked the Balfour mission, upon which the government and the moderates placed so much hope. Devoy's paper said that British insincerity about the war and small nations could be seen in the choice of Balfour to lead the mission to America; Balfour was one of the "dyed-in-the-wool Tories," one of the "Big Chiefs of the


²S. MacManus, Ireland's case (New York, 1917). The book went through at least seventeen editions, sold over 70,000 copies, and indeed was still in print several years later.

³See Tumulty to Crimmins, 5 May 1917 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 2), and John D. Moore to Wilson, 12 May 1917 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.). Wilson was advised to look at the results of the Roscommon and Longford elections and not listen to men with Irish-sounding names who said Ireland would settle for something less than independence.
Oligarchy" which held millions of people in oppression across the world.¹ The Gaelic American condemned the delegation led by John Quinn to see Balfour also, and said that they had authority to speak only for John Quinn.²

During the twelve months after the United States entered the war the Irish question steadily declined in importance as both native Americans and Irish-Americans were diverted by the new demands made upon them. As a result, the Irish Convention, the creation of which American opinion was in part responsible, aroused surprisingly little interest, given the fears of British and American political leaders in April and May 1917, and all the more so because of the degree to which the survival of the moderate nationalist movement in the United States depended on a successful Irish settlement.³ Many Americans were pleased at the selection of Sir Horace Plunkett as chairman and regarded


³As Ward has noted the British government considered some kind of convention in March before the United States entered the war. See Ward, "America and the Irish problem, 1899–1921," I.H.S., xvi, no. 61 (March 1968), p. 81; and War Cabinet 101, 22 March 1917 (F.R.O., CAB, 23/2). Plunkett later confessed in a short essay that Lloyd George, "having to consider the unsettled Irish Question as a factor in America's attitude to the British...turned his mind again in search for a settlement." Sir H. Plunkett, "Ireland's problems," These eventful years, the twentieth century in the making (London, 1924), 1, p. 519. Certainly Americans could find the analogy between the Irish Convention and their own Constitutional Convention of 1787 if they so chose.
this as a good omen; however, the newspapers inasmuch as they discussed it at all remained somewhat sceptical about the possible prospects of a settlement. President Wilson was himself particularly interested in the convention and went so far as to open correspondence with Plunkett through E.M. House, ignoring Ambassador Page in London who was often unreliable in reporting the intricacies of the Irish situation.\(^1\)

And indeed in February when the convention seemed in America to have lost its momentum Wilson let it be known to the British Ambassador that he regarded the unresolved Irish question as "a millstone" around his neck.\(^2\)

The apparent lack of interest of Americans in the Irish Convention was noted by many, and elaborate steps were taken to make the public more aware of the efforts being made and the dimensions of the

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\(^2\) Page had reported that the chances for a settlement were slim because "the Catholic bishops and priests really do not want home rule," and that the Irish politicians were not anxious to see the Irish question resolved either. Page to Sec of State, 19 May 1917 (N.A., 841.00/42, roll 6); and Page to Wilson, 22 June 1917 (Harvard University Library, Page Papers, bms Am 1090,1/35). See also Plunkett Diary, 2 Aug. 1917, Plunkett to Balfour, 3 Aug. 1917, Balfour to Plunkett, 26 Sept. 1917 (Plunkett Papers, op. cit.); Wiseman to House, 3 Aug. 1917, and Memorandum from Plunkett to Wiseman, 11 Aug. 1917 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Wiseman, Sir Wm., 45). Plunkett also corresponded with Leslie in the hope of keeping the American Catholic hierarchy and Tumulty informed. The final report of the convention was given to Wilson by Lord Reading on 8 May 1918. Reading to Tumulty, 8 May 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

\(^3\) S. Leslie, American wonderland (London, 1936), p. 64; and Willert, The road to safety, p. 91.
Irish problem. John Quinn published a little book in September 1917 entitled *The Irish home-rule convention* which was a composite of the pamphlets by George Russell, "Thoughts for a convention," and Plunkett, "A defence of the convention," along with an introduction of his own and two anonymous chapters drawn heavily on a letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Russell. The book asserted that the British administration in Ireland had been a failure; that the insurrection had been wrong but the suppression of it worse; that the convention offered the only realistic hope of a settlement; and that the war crisis made an immediate settlement imperative. A month later Shane Leslie published his *The Irish question in its American aspect* which attempted to analyse the triangular relationship between the United States, Great Britain, and Ireland and the importance of a settlement for normal re-

1See for example T.W. Rolleston to Plunkett, 10 July 1917 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers); and Lord Northcliffe to Prime Minister, 17 July 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3072). In fact Plunkett worked, even before becoming chairman, to see that American observers talked with representative Irishmen about the convention. See Plunkett to Redmond, 19 June 1917, and Plunkett to Karl Walter, 10 Sept. 1917 (Plunkett Papers, op. cit.); and Plunkett to George Gavan Duffy, 23 July 1917 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5581).


lations between the three countries. Plunkett himself took great pains, even before he was selected as chairman, to see that Americans he talked to or corresponded with were given information about the possibilities of the convention.

If the convention did not arouse great interest or support in the United States, it did serve a practical function which many interested observers were quick to notice. The convention appeared as visible proof that the British government was attempting to resolve the Irish question and therefore was working in harmony with the American war aims of self-determination and the rights of small nations. Karl Walter, director of the Reciprocal News Service, told Plunkett that, "While the Irish Convention is sitting the British Government is safeguarded from hostile opinion in America based on the Irish question." By early 1918 British observers in America had come to the same conclusion and they advised the government that the convention should be kept in session as long as possible even if there were no prospects for a settlement because the actual meeting of the convention served as a shield against criticism on the Irish question. The Foreign


3F.E. Smith to P.M., 8 Jan. 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3429); Colville Barclay to F.O., 18 and 19 Jan. 1918, and minutes (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3428).
Office seemed to agree that the deeper the United States got into the war the less likely it was to be concerned about Ireland. When the results of the convention were submitted to the House of Commons the British analysis was borne out: American opinion was largely unperturbed by the failure to implement home rule and by the conscription crisis although the Irish-American reaction was more complex.

The Irish nationalist movement in the United States passed through an extremely critical period during the twelve months between America's entry into the war and the conclusion of the Irish Convention. For the constitutionalists the convention offered something of a reprieve from the disasters of 1916, but a reprieve dependent on the success of the convention. The interest shown by the American and British governments, in April and May of 1917, in pacifying the Irish in America in order to strengthen the war effort, and the general good will fostered by the letters to the New York World and London Times, created an atmosphere which held some promise for the failing UIL—especially if working to solve the Irish question could be seen as congruent with American war aims. Letters by prominent Irish-Americans expressing views on the convention were published in the New York Evening Post, through the efforts of Dr J.M.A. Maloney, a discharged British army medical officer, for the purpose of creating the kind of dialogue similar to those in the New York World several weeks earlier. These letters, however, revealed a wide divergence of opin-

1R. Sperling, minutes on America and the Irish question, 2 Feb. 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3428); and Barclay to Balfour, 4 April 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3430).

2The war situation ended the hope of some UIL members for a German victory, and thereby encouraged a return to constitutional efforts.
Shane Leslie attempted to analyse the Irish-American situation for Redmond, and indeed admitted realistically that feeling was very mixed at the moment, but he was confident that the Irish in America would willingly accept a home rule settlement. Redmond's response was an appeal for money from the leading members of the UIL and prominent Irish-Americans to support the party and to meet the growing election threat posed by the Sinn Fein party. A special meeting of the recipients of Redmond's appeal met in New York and rather than make a flat refusal suggested that an Irish delegation, perhaps led by John Dillon or Joe Devlin, be sent to the United States to join the various other "missions" touring the country for reasons connected with the war.

An Irish mission made up of T.P. O'Connor and Richard Hazleton, one of the promising younger members of the Irish party, was sent to

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1 This series was subsequently reprinted in the G.A., 2 and 9 June 1917. Among those favouring the convention were Father Wynne, Dr Mallowey, Senator O'Gorman, Father Fay, W.J. Guard, Martin Conboy, Dr John G. Coyle, and Judge Peter A. Hendrick; those opposing it were Judge Cohalan, Judge Goff, Dr Thomas Addis Emmet, and Victor Herbert.

2 Leslie to Redmond, 18 May 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers).

3 See circular letter from Redmond, 2 May 1917 (Ibid.).

4 Leslie suggested that in view of the war situation the delegation might include some soldiers, such as Redmond's brother or Captain Stephen Gwynn. Leslie to Redmond, 21 May 1917 (Ibid.). Leslie observed that there was some dialogue between previously antagonistic factions; Judge Cohalan had met with Michael J. Ryan, he said, and in Chicago there was greater unity among the Irish than any time since the Cronin murder in 1889. Leslie to Redmond, ca. May 1917 (Ibid.). But this view was over-optimistic, as Leslie himself later revealed to Mrs Alice Stopford Green. He said about Redmond and the home rule party, "I think everything has been done that was possible from this side to put the Irish Party in a position to retrieve themselves. The British Government have been held up from Washington and told to rehabilitate Redmond." Leslie to Mrs A.S. Green, 22 May 1917 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5581).
America in late June to raise the money needed to keep the party operating and to try to breathe life into the home rule movement in the United States. As Leslie had promised, O'Connor and Hazleton met President Wilson, despite Ambassador Page's disapproval and Wilson's own reluctance to meet them without British Embassy introductions (they were presented by Senator James D. Phelan), although this official endorsement did not launch them on an easy or successful trip. Within a week after the two arrived Leslie reported back to Redmond that unforeseen problems had developed. "The difficulties are chiefly with our own people as I realized when I went to Boston to arrange a visit for the Irish envoys," Leslie said, while informing Redmond that Irish-American hostility was so great that no large public meetings could be held, for fear of disagreeable public demonstrations. By late August Leslie, who had suggested the Irish mission, told Dillon that it might be "wise" for O'Connor to leave "without raising up too many hornets." Even John Quinn, who gave O'Connor what assistance he could, thought the trip "ill-advised" and foredoomed to "failure."

1 Before O'Connor sailed John Dillon suggested that he minimize the war but speak to Wilson's pronouncements about small nations, that he keep away from the British Embassy, and not take England's part in the war. This advice proved difficult to follow, Lyons, Dillon, pp 418-19.

2 Washington Evening Star, 6 July 1917. Also see Page to Wilson, 22 June 1917 (Harvard University Library, Page Papers, bms,Am 1090,1/35) and Tumulty to Wilson, 25 June 1917, and Wilson to Tumulty, n.d. (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 2).

3 Leslie to Redmond, 30 June 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers). In fact there had been incidents at the memorial services in New York for Redmond's brother.


5 Reid, The man from New York, p. 328, and Quinn to Lawrence Godkin, 24 July 1917 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).
O'Connor soon realized that the constitutionalists were diverted by the war, the revolutionaries still implacable, and that he would find little popular support in America. He had hoped that the bitterness of the Irish-Americans towards the Irish Parliamentary party would have diminished after America's entrance into the war, but it had not. Moreover, the argument on which O'Connor and Hazleton attempted to tour the country was too negative to arouse much interest; because of the war they could not make their customary anti-British statements which had always delighted audiences, yet, Hazleton complained to Shane Leslie, "To be for England looks as if we were against Ireland." By early December Hazleton concluded that the Irish-Americans had given way in the United States to the priorities of the war and that the Sinn Feiners were "dropping all Irish work till after the end of the war"; the idea that the entry of America into the war "would bring a great reaction in our favour" had not materialized.

The result in both cases was that there was no money to be found among the grass-roots Irish-Americans. O'Connor wrote to Dillon that, "Most of the money would have to come from native Americans." In fact he

1 As O'Connor told a friend, in addition to the names he was called by the Irish-American press, he was accused of being a millionaire through the sale of Ireland to England. Attacks were directed against him personally through the press and by means of handbills. For an account of O'Connor's ordeal in the United States see Fyfe, T.P. O'Connor, pp 266-70.


3 Hazleton to Redmond, 5 Dec. 1917 (N.L.I., Redmond Papers). O'Connor wrote to Dillon that in spite of the war there had been no movement back to the Parliamentary party, although he was confident that Sinn Fein was through in the United States. Fyfe, op. cit., pp 268 and 271.

4 Ibid., p. 271.
found the National Security League and the Armenian Committee more congenial than the Irish-American organizations and Samuel Insull, a public utilities millionaire originally from England, was his most generous contributor. The situation was clear to Hazleton; everything in America and Ireland hinged on the Irish Convention. If the convention were successful the party could "carry Ireland for a settlement," he thought. If the convention failed the party was through both in America and Ireland and all honest men would have to support Sinn Féin. In the meanwhile, however, Hazleton felt that it was useless to attempt to rebuild the movement in the United States "until England shows she is willing to deliver the goods." Many in America felt by late 1917 and 1918 that only the actual implementation of home rule would show Britain's good faith, and some no longer considered that event likely. Cardinal Gibbons told O'Connor in the autumn of 1917 that he saw no chance for either the convention or the party. "It is reasoned," the Cardinal said, "that, since Ireland has not received, in this crisis of the English Government, the Home Rule which she has been contending for, she has practically no hope in the fut-

1 Fyfe, T. P. O'Connor, pp 268-70; and Hazleton to Redmond, 5 Dec. 1917 (N. L. I., Redmond Papers). Even the former ally of Sir Edward Carson, F. E. Smith, found O'Connor to be a sad and much abused figure in the United States. Sir F. E. Smith, My American visit (London, 1918), pp 70-71. Also see Reading to Lloyd George, 5 May 1918 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 60/2/69).

2 Hazleton to Leslie, 26 Sept. 1917 (N. Y. P. L., Cockran Papers, box 18).
For the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists the twelve months from America's entry into the war until the conscription crisis marked not only the collapse of the 1914-17 policy of a German-Irish alliance, but it also saw the beginning of a period of some persecution by the federal government because of Irish collusion with German agents during the several preceding years. The government in fact employed a dual policy of repression and conciliation in dealing with the Irish extremists in the United States—attempting perhaps to separate nationalist activities which were merely concerned with Irish independence or an Irish republic from nationalist activities which were tied to Germany or to efforts which weakened the British ally or the recruiting drive. In July the United States Attorney in San Francisco, John W. Preston, attempted to suppress Irish meetings. In New York in late August police broke up a FOIF meeting near Herald Square.

1Fyfe, T.P. O'Connor, p. 271. O'Connor remained in the United States until the summer of 1918; upon his return to England he gave a pessimistic report to the House of Commons. In closing O'Connor warned the House, "After the War Americans of Irish blood will still be of Irish blood, and will still open their hearts to the call of the motherland of their race, and I tell you in language that is unmistakable that, unless you reconcile Ireland you will never reconcile the American race of Irish blood, and if you do not reconcile them, you will never have the whole heart and soul of America with you in upholding the peace of the world." 7 Aug. 1918, Hansard 5 (commons), cix, cols 1439-55.

2The result of this retrenchment policy was a diminution of public activity which was perceptible by most close observers of the Irish-American community. See Spring Rice to F.O., 14 June 1917 (P. R.o., F.O. 800/242), and Hazleton to Leslie, 26 Sept. 1917 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 18). As a matter of public policy the Gaelic American attacked the Irish Convention in violent editorials as a trick designed by Lloyd George to discredit the Irish cause, and it also kept up a constant series of denunciations of T.P. O'Connor and Richard Hazleton with such effect that their efforts to raise money and rebuild the fortunes of their party were unsuccessful.

3Fr. Peter C. Yorke to Congressman Julius Kahn (California), 2 July 1917, and FOIF to Kahn, 7 July 1917 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 4095, J.W. Preston).
where England and Mayor Mitchel were condemned; six people, including the sister of the mayor of Boston, were arrested.\(^1\) Patrick McCartan recorded similar instances of police efforts to prevent Jeremiah A. O'Leary's "soap box orators" from making anti-British speeches on behalf of the American Truth Society.\(^2\) John D. Moore, the national secretary of the FOIF was interrogated by Secret Service agents about the finances of his organization, and Mrs Sheehy Skeffington was obstructed in her speaking tour across the United States.\(^3\) Judge Cohalan and Devoy were deeply implicated in German espionage prior to 1916 by the publication of the Wolf von Igel papers in the press on 23 September 1917; the government took no legal action against Cohalan or Devoy but the insinuation was that their activities had been treasonable, although Cohalan successfully fought a libel case on that allegation against the Mail and Express Company of New York.\(^4\) On 10 October the government released additional documents which linked Joseph McGarrity, John T. Keating, and Jeremiah H. O'Leary to possible German sabotage; McGarrity and O'Leary fought back in the papers (Keating having died in 1915) and successfully stated their case.\(^5\) O'Leary's paper, Bull, was

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\(^1\) See K. Walter to Plunkett, 31 Aug. 1917, for a description of the meeting as an anti-English "demonstration" (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

\(^2\) McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 17-18.

\(^3\) Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 234; and Sheehy Skeffington, "Impressions of Sinn Fein in America," passim.

\(^4\) See N.Y.T., 23 Sept. 1917; Tansill, op. cit., pp 236-38; McCartan, op. cit., pp 18-20; Reid, The man from New York, pp 323-25; and also Questions for John A. Connolly, ca. Nov. 1917 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box James Larkin); and F. Strother, Fighting Germany's spies (Garden City, 1918), for facsimiles of some of the von Igel papers.

suppressed on 8 October and, after a chase across the country, he was arrested and prepared for trial; a warrant was put out for the arrest of John T. Ryan, an Irish-American leader from Buffalo, who fled the country. 1 Patrick McCartney and Liam Mellows were arrested and prevented from travelling to Germany and Russia to attempt to gain recognition for Ireland. 2 And, as a final blow, from 19 January 1918 onwards, the United States Post Office refused to allow the Gaelic American, the Irish World, and the Freeman's Journal to pass through the mails. 3

The climate of opinion in the United States had shifted; revolutionary Irish-American nationalists could no longer carry out their plans without regard for the almost hysterical emotions created by the war. When Padraic Colum published a letter in the New Republic protesting against the irrationality of the war fever in America, John Quinn sent him what his biographer called a "bitter and insulting letter," condemning pleas for moderation as essentially pro-German. 4 Senator William H. King wrote to Senator John Sharp Williams on 13 February 1918 that, "The time for hyphenated Americans is over and the cowards and disloyalists in our country have got to be weeded out and held up

1 Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 239; O'Leary, My political trial and experiences, pp 159-468; and a "Wanted" notice for John T. Ryan (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box Misc.). Ryan was born in the United States and was a Spanish-American War veteran as well as a lawyer. He was wanted for "aiding and assisting German spies in New York."

2 McCartney, With DeValera in America, pp 23-28; and Tansill, op. cit., p. 240.

3 GAA, 26 Jan 1918; and T.G. Patten to Devoy, 19 Jan. 1918, and T.F. Murphy to Devoy, 24 Jan. 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box T-Z).

4 See Reid, The man from New York, pp 322-23.
to the execration which they deserve." These sentiments were repeated at the Senate hearings on the National German-American Alliance on 26 February by Senator McCumber of South Dakota who also condemned the "hyphen" in America. As he put it,

The time is past for German-American, Irish-American, Bolshevist-American and every other type of alias citizen. We want no more fooling with those few Irish agitators, reared on traditional hatred, who would line themselves with Germany against our ally, who is doing the real fighting in this war. Whoever attacks Great Britain attacks us, anything calculated to increase her troubles at home is postponing the ultimate victory.²

The Senate hearings revealed that there had been some collusion between the German-American organizations and at least the leaders of some Irish-American organizations, Jeremiah A. O'Leary and Daniel O'Connell of the Independence Union specifically. Gustavus Ohlinger, a lawyer from Toledo who had been associated with the National German-American Alliance, asserted in his testimony that it was "significant" that the alliance between Germany and the Irish rebels, which led to the rebellion in Dublin in 1916, had its corresponding counterpart in the United States in the co-ordination of Irish and German activities to resist the government's policies towards the belligerents.³ Although one witness said that the actual number of Irish-Americans who worked with the Germans, or who even were pro-German was very small, this could not

¹King to Williams, 13 Feb. 1918 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 34).
²C.S.M., 27 Feb. 1918.
undo the damage that had been done to the reputation of the revolutionary movement. The revolutionary nationalists in Ireland were also increasingly condemned. In his book on the current international situation, The world's debate, William Barry called attention to the material and political destruction resulting from the Easter rebellion, and Elmer T. Clark, a journalist who travelled through Ireland after American sailors had been stationed at Queenstown, wrote that he found the attitude of southern Irishmen "impossible, deplorable, and unworthy," and he thought Sinn Fein claims were based on foolish historical arguments and were so impractical that they would reduce Ireland to ruin if implemented.¹

Conciliatory gestures towards the revolutionaries were also made by the government simultaneously with the arrests and intimidations, and in some cases involved the same people. Dr Patrick McCartan, along with Clan and FOIF leaders James K. McGuire and John D. Moore, presented a statement signed by the twenty-six Irish leaders who had just been released from prison in England and a long memorandum to Joseph Tumulty in the White House offices on 23 July, in somewhat the same manner that O'Connor and Hazleton had done less than three weeks earlier. McCartan, who had crossed the Atlantic under false pretenses as a sailor and then jumped ship in New York, could as easily have

been deported as received by President Wilson's secretary. More important, however, was Mrs Sheehy Skeffington's meeting with President Wilson on 11 January 1918. Through the efforts of Shaemus O'Sheel and Bainbridge Colby, then working for the Wilson administration, Mrs Sheehy Skeffington had a short meeting with the President, during which she presented him with a petition and asked him "to consider our claims as a small nation governed without consent." Wilson seemed "courteous" and "interested" and "acknowledged smilingly his Irish blood." Wilson of course made no commitments, but Mrs Sheehy Skeffington told Peter Golden that people had been "stirred" by her visit with the President and that it was "considered a sign of the times & so it is." During the same week Senators Phelan and O'Gorman ceremoniously presented President Wilson a statue of Robert Emmet in the White House, along with a strong plea for Irish self-government. The significance of these various gestures was not altogether clear. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington pointed out to Devoy that, "It is apparently no

1See McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 11-14. Having accepted the two documents from McCartan, Tumulty was advised by Frank Polk at the State Department to simply "file" them and not reply. See Polk to Tumulty, 8 Aug. 1917 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558). However, when the documents were printed in the Congressional Record at the request of Senator Lewis the more uncompromising view of Senator Smoot prevailed and they were removed. 30 July 1917, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 55, p. 5542.

2Only one month earlier Wilson had refused to see an Irish-American delegation led by a Father O'Callaghan. See Tumulty to Wilson, 10 Dec. 1917, and Wilson to Tumulty, 11 Dec. 1917 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).

3Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Devoy, n.d., Devoy's post-bag, 11, p. 519.

4Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Golden, n.d. (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder xi).

5Leslie, American wonderland, p. 62.
trea’son to [the] U.S. to plead for Ireland, otherwise assuredly the President would not receive me or the petition." On the contrary, Wilson may have been trying to give the British government a tacit warning of the dangers for Anglo-American relations if a settlement were not reached.  

Congressional activity tended to encompass both aspects of the President's policy. The anti-Irish and almost xenophobic responses of the Senators investigating the National German-American Alliance certainly typified a desire to stamp out ethnic nationalism as fully as possible. However, at approximately the same time more conciliatory gestures were also being made. On 4 January 1918 Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin introduced a resolution "proposing recognition by the Congress of the United States of the right of Irish independence," and two months later Senator Gallinger proposed that a plebiscite be held in Ireland to allow the Irish people to enjoy "the great principle of self-determination, as interpreted by the President of the United States in his discussion of the fundamental and indispensable conditions of a lasting peace."

Both McCartan and Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, unabashed "Sinn Feiners," were given warm welcomes by politicians and

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1 Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Devoy, n.d., Devoy's Post-bag, ii, p. 520.

2 Leslie, American wonderland, p. 62.

3 H.J. Res. 204, 4 Jan. 1918, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 56, p. 617, and S. Con. Res. 18, 16 March 1918, Ibid., p. 3595. Also see the resolutions introduced in the summer of 1917 which were more in line with the revolutionary rather than the constitutional nationalists, p. 192 above.
civil servants throughout Washington. But of course these individual acts did not compensate for the indictments, suppressions, and insinuations for which the Irish-American nationalists felt the government to be responsible.

In the face of governmental harassments and arrests and growing public hostility, many leaders of the revolutionary Irish-Americans, having exclaimed their loyalty to the United States and identified Ireland's cause with the American war effort, were understandably reluctant to pursue an active policy until the climate began to change. The Irish Race Convention which had been planned for late autumn 1917 was never called; McCartan records that the AOH not only postponed their national convention but they arbitrarily suspended publication of the Hibernian. The consequences of this policy produced a reaction not unlike that which had afflicted the constitutional nationalists in 1914: rather than comply with a de facto suspension of activity for the duration of the war, the more radical elements found new machinery with which to maintain agitation. For the home rulers this had been the gradual erosion of the UIL as members joined the FOIF; for the Clan and the FOIF in 1917 and 1918 a similar pattern of erosion began to develop. The organization which now began to attract revolutionary nationalists was the somewhat left-wing Irish Progressive League, which was organized in the autumn of 1917 and made its first public appearance supporting Morris Hillquit, the socialist can-

1McCartan, With DeValera in America, p. 14. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington met with Speaker of the House Champ Clarke, Senator LaFollette, Congresswoman Rankin, and several Irish-American politicians. See Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Peter Golden, 10 Jan. 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder xi), Sheehy Skeffington, "Impressions of Sinn Fein in America," and Report by Shaemus O'Sheel of his assistance to Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, Jan. 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box Misc.).

2G.A., 1 Sept. 1917; and McCartan, With DeValera in America, p. 39.
Candidacy for mayor of New York. The IPL was open to "all men and women subscribing to the principle of complete independence for Ireland," and at the first meeting it elected Peter Golden, then an assistant to Devoy on the Gaelic American, general secretary, and Mrs Margaret E. Hickey, treasurer. Its initial program was to insist on Irish representation at the peace conference, but stimulated by the indefatigable and fearless Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, the league began a campaign to raise money to establish the Irish National Bureau in Washington through which propaganda about Ireland could be disseminated and through which political pressure could be organized and applied to American politicians in order to place Ireland within the objectives of the war effort. In advance of the Irish National Bureau Mrs Sheehy Skeffington canvassed politicians and lobbied at Congress, making plans to "blacklist" people like Senators Kenyon and McCumber for their anti-Irish statements and complaining bitterly at the failure of

1See bulletin for a mass meeting at Terrace Garden in New York, 25 Oct. 1917 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141). The Irish labor leader James Larkin was in New York when the league was being formed, but he had a low opinion of it and its leaders. Larkin, James Larkin, pp 220-22.

2Minutes of the first meeting of the Irish Progressive League (Golden Papers, op. cit., folder ii). Mrs Sheehy Skeffington and Dr Gertrude B. Kelly also attended the first meeting, and while the former was not an officer or a member of the executive committee, she, along with Golden, Mrs Hickey, and Dr Kelly, tended to dominate the league's activities.

3The IPL later included in its program the establishment of the "Irish Embassy" in Washington with Dr McCartan as Irish Envoy. The financial responsibility for these projects was assumed by the FOIF after the war. See league circular, n.d., appealing for money to establish Miss Katherine Hughes and Padraic Colum in the bureau, and also see "Bulletin of the Irish Progressive League," no. 2 (25 March 1918), (Golden Papers, op. cit.). By early February de Valera asked Dr McCartan to extend the thanks of the Irish people to the league for their efforts to see that the principle of self-determination be applied to Ireland. de Valera to McCartan, 7 Feb. 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box CF-D).
all Irish-Americans to rally behind her efforts.\(^1\) "Most of my support," she told Peter Golden, "has been from suffs [suffragettes\(^2\)], radicals & progressives---& very little from the Irish."\(^2\) On the eve of the conscription crisis Mrs Hickey led a group of thirty-four IPL members from ten cities, and including Padraic Colum and Nora Connolly, to the White House to deliver a petition for Irish independence.\(^3\)

This activity was effective in keeping the Irish revolutionary cause before the public, and especially the government, during a period when the cause was no longer easily promoted with impunity, but it was also a direct challenge to the old leadership of the revolutionary movement in the United States. Indeed, the league was accused of "butting in" by Devoy and Mrs Sheehy Skeffington was warned that she was working with unapproved groups of Irish-Americans.\(^4\) Mrs Sheehy Skeffington's co-operation with the National Women's Party in Washington (a suffragette group) and with socialists and radicals was a matter of grave concern for some Irish-American leaders, and in fact the left-wing tone of the IPL, beginning with its support of the socialist candidate mayor of New York, was resented.\(^5\) Captain Robert Monteith found Devoy and the Clan-na-Gael unwilling to tolerate his independent

\(^1\) Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Golden, 20 March 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141).

\(^2\) Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Golden, n.d. (Ibid.). She said she had to laugh at the "'ultra' patriots," who after her meeting with Wilson could "now safely 'stand behind the President.'"

\(^3\) The deputation was at the White House on 8 April 1918. Mrs Hickey to Tumulty, 9 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

\(^4\) Golden to Devoy, 1 March 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box E-J); and John Kennedy, business manager of the Gaelic American, to Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, 15 Jan. 1918 (Golden Papers, op. cit., folder xi).

\(^5\) See Report by Shaemus O'Sheel of his assistance to Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, Jan. 1918 (Devoy Papers, op. cit., box Misc.).
Irish agitation, and Devoy was not pleased either with the founding in Philadelphia by Joseph McGarrity of the Irish Press, although after eight issues it, like the Gaelic American, was refused by the post office. Upon being criticized by Devoy for "butting in," Golden made a firm defence of his actions and those of the league, pointing out that all too few Irish-Americans were willing to risk anything at that time, although something had to be done if the cause were to be maintained. He later argued that he appreciated Devoy's position because of the war, but that there was among the revolutionary Irish-Americans a "great feeling of dissatisfaction" and the conclusion was that the Gaelic American and the Irish-American leaders were "lying down." Golden thought that they must be firm in their action and constant to their principles; he queried,

"...if the Government would resort to such measures as making arrests etc., would it not be as well to have them do that so that we and the entire world may know where we stand and what all their fine phrases amount to."

To openly court arrest to test the government's sincerity about the national aspirations of small nations was a project upon which the older Irish-American leaders were most reluctant to embark. The league, however, was unintimidated by Devoy, the Clan, or the United States government.

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1 Monteith, Casement's last adventure, pp 230-31; and McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 36-39.
2 Golden to Devoy, 2 March 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box E-J).
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
The attempt of the British government to extend conscription to Ireland in April of 1918 in an effort to meet the manpower problem imposed by the new German offensive provoked a crisis in Ireland and America which ended the uneasy calm that had been the product of the Irish Convention. Actually the American government was consulted in the Cabinet's decision to extend conscription to Ireland. After a warning from Lord Reading, the new British Ambassador, that conscription in Ireland would have a bad effect in America, Balfour cabled House on 2 April outlining the government's problems in increasing conscription in England without introducing it in Ireland as well. Balfour admitted that the government expected "serious disorder and possibly, even, bloodshed," that the troops raised might not be "reliable," and that "priests, Parliament, the Nationalists, and Sinn Feiners will unite to oppose conscription..." These events might be averted by the immediate extension of home rule, but that in turn might cause equal disruption in Ulster. Confessing that he was unable to "guage the exact part that [the] Irish question takes in American politics," Balfour asked that House openly and freely "inform me of your opinion of the policy which I have outlined above and of its effect on the conduct of the war viewed from America..."\(^1\) House showed the letter to President Wilson who replied that conscription in Ireland would "accentuate the whole Irish and Catholic intrigue which has gone hand in hand in some quarters in this country with German intrigue."\(^2\) Thus

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\(^1\)Balfour to House, no. 72, 2 April 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Balfour, Arthur James). For Cabinet discussions of the importance of American opinion on conscription in Ireland, and for the decision to ask House's advice, see War Cabinet 376A (min. 1), 28 March 1918, and War Cabinet 379A (min. 2), 1 April 1918 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/14).

\(^2\)Wilson to House, 3 April 1918 (House Papers, op. cit.).
House responded immediately to Balfour advising that the American government viewed Irish conscription as a source of domestic difficulty which would aggravate the war situation. According to Alan J. Ward, Wiseman later reported Wilson's views in such a way that the British government understood that there would be no objection to conscription if a solution to the Irish question could be worked out immediately.

It became obvious that the British decision to extend conscription to Ireland would have serious repercussions in the United States, and that President Wilson would become the centre of a struggle to save the situation. Among the first to attempt to influence the President were Shane Leslie and Maurice Francis Egan, the former Ambassador to Denmark, both of whom had attended a meeting with the three American Cardinals and several bishops at the Catholic University where there had been grave concern expressed about conscription in Ireland. Egan wrote to Wilson, "If conscription is applied by force—without Home Rule—there will be terrible resistance," and he went on to add, "the effect on the Irish in this country will be bad; it will embarrass the great war movement..." Wilson replied, "I realize the critical significance of the matter to which you call my attention..."

1 House to Balfour, 3 April 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Balfour, Arthur James).
2 See Ward, "America and the Irish problem, 1899-1921," I.H.S., xvi, no. 61 (March 1968), p. 82. Lloyd George's memoirs suggest that the government was cognizant of the dangers that conscription presented both in Ireland and the United States, but that there was simply no alternative if the age limit were to be raised in England. War memoirs of David Lloyd George, v, p. 2668. The Cabinet minutes suggest that Lloyd George did not think that the Irish in the United States would object to the Irish in Ireland being subject to conscription as they were themselves. War Cabinet 385, 6 April 1918 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/6).
3 Egan to Wilson, 10 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 588).
I wish there were some proper way in which I could help to guide matters, but so far, unfortunately, none has opened before me."¹

Certainly Wilson's hint to Balfour through House had not been acted upon.

Later in the month Sir William Wiseman, then in London, attempted to explain the situation to House. The government had had no alternative but it did not "intend to put conscription into operation until the new Home Rule bill is passed, based on Sir Horace Plunkett's report..." Wiseman added that he thought the government's critics could be partially forestalled if President Wilson could make some public statement, "expressing his view along the line that he is glad that Sir Horace Plunkett's conference has recommended a form of Home Rule that H.M. Government intends to legislate accordingly, and feels sure now that her national aspirations have been satisfied Ireland will not fail to do her part with the other democracies."² Wilson, while possibly encouraged that home rule might end the Irish question for all but the most militant, was most unlikely to make the kind of statement suggested by Wiseman, and indeed Wilson scrupulously avoided any public statements about Ireland. In any case, on the following day Wiseman counselled against any statement by the President on the Irish question. He said it was no longer "absolutely certain that H.M. Government will legislate on Sir Horace Plunkett's recommendation," and he further warned that "both sides intend to try to bring him

¹ Wilson to Egan, 12 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 588).

² Wiseman to House, 25 April 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Wiseman, Sir William, 47). Also see War Cabinet 389 (min. 9), 11 April 1918 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/6).
Wiseman confessed to House that he did not know how Wilson could avoid the appeals from various quarters, and he complained that Page was advising the British government "to take strong measures." Letter contained in House to Wilson, 26 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file II, box 166).


Leslie to Reading, 25 April 1918 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.), and Wiseman to House, 25 April 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Wiseman, Sir Wm., 47). Plunkett's first thought was that Wilson might indeed have a role to play in salvaging a situation through the Lord Mayor's trip. Plunkett diary, 21 April 1918 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).
Wilson replied, "It is plain to me that there is no way in which we can head off the Lord Mayor of Dublin, though I think his visit is most unwise from every point of view." The President thought that they would have to deal with O'Neill as best they could when he arrived, and he closed by saying, "If he knew how little he was going to get out of the trip, he would stay at home!" Page was instructed to issue a visa to O'Neill. Lord Mayor O'Neill eventually decided to stay in Dublin rather than submit to Lord French, the new Lord-Lieutenant, the documents he had planned to take to Washington. Certainly the war and conscription in America gave Wilson little alternative in the matter, so that O'Neill's decision to stay home spared all parties a difficult situation.

In order to ascertain the possible effects of the Irish conscription bill, Wilson sent Ray Stannard Baker, then in Europe on a mission to investigate political unrest among the Allies, to Ireland on 29 April. Baker travelled throughout the country talking with such leaders as Plunkett, Russell, Dillon, Devlin, and Gwynn in the south and

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1 Page to Lansing, 24 April 1918, and Lansing to Wilson, 25 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file II, box 166); and William Phillips to Wilson, 3 May 1918 (N.A., 841.00/71, roll 6).

2 Wilson to William Phillips, 4 May 1918 (Ibid., 841.00/71, roll 6). Plunkett understood that the Lord Mayor realized how coolly he would be received in the United States and was in fact, "praying that the passport would be refused." Plunkett to K. Walter, 24 May 1918 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

3 Lansing to Amembassy, London, 6 May 1918 (N.A., 841.00/71, roll 6).

4 Instead the long vellum documents were mailed to Wilson, outlining Ireland's grievances against English rule and the illegality of an English Parliament extending conscription to Ireland contrary to the wishes of Irish political and religious leaders. Laurence O'Neill, Lord Mayor of Dublin, to Wilson, 11 June 1918 (Wilson Papers, op. cit., box 168). Within several weeks a letter from Sir Edward Carson and a group of Ulster Unionists was also sent to Wilson arguing that the southern Irish had no right to resist conscription. Carson, et al., to Wilson, 1 Aug. 1918 (Ibid., box 172).
Sir George Clark and several Ulster leaders in the north. He attended
the famous anti-conscription meeting at Ballaghaderreen, Co. Mayo,
where he saw de Valera and heard the crowd shout, "God save the Kai-
sers."\(^1\) By 16 May he was able to report to the State Department that
the gravity of the situation was appreciated throughout Ireland but
that the British were increasing their troops in Ireland and the Irish
people were certain that the government would attempt to use force.
The Irish leaders were convinced, Baker said, that the enforcement of
conscription would result in "desperate resistance and bloodshed in
southern Ireland, requiring large forces to secure few unwilling
recruits, with the complete paralysis of food production in the
island."\(^2\) Baker thought that it was unlikely that Ireland would ac-
cept any form of home rule proposed by the government while the conscr-
ption issue threatened. Plunkett and Dillon felt that the government
would have to abandon conscription, allow the situation to ease, grant
some kind of self-government, and hope for some voluntary recruiting.
Baker viewed the situation as very dangerous both for the war effort
and for the future of the British Empire.\(^3\)

While Baker's report was being cabled to Washington the British
government was working to enlist the assistance of the United States
government in the arrest of the leaders of Sinn Fein and the suppress-
ton of the anti-conscription movement. Documents showing Irish-
German collusion were sent to the State Department. Ostensibly for

also see Plunkett diary, 26 June 1918 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett
Papers).

\(^2\)"Leaders agree seriousness of situation can scarcely be exagg-
erated." Baker to Polk, contained in a cable from Page to Sec of Sta-
te, 16 May 1918 (N.A., 841.00/80, roll 6).

\(^3\)Ibid., and Baker, op. cit., pp 337-38.
intelligence reasons the British thought it essential that the docu-
ments be released in the United States, rather than in Britain, and
Reading was instructed to use all his influence to see that the docu-
ments got the widest possible publicity.\(^1\) When the documents arrived
at the State Department, however, Lansing was unwilling to comply
with the British request. He told the President that the documents
were "translations of decoded German messages relating to the Sinn
Feiners' intercourse with the German Government through Sinn Fein
agents in this country prior and subsequent to the rebellious out-
break at Dublin at Easter time in 1916."\(^2\) Lansing noted that it
would be advantageous for British security reasons to have the docu-
ments published in America but he regarded it as "impolitic" and ad-
vised against it. "The Irish situation is very delicate," the Secre-
tary told Wilson, "and anything which we might do to aid either side
in the controversy would, I fear, involve us in all sorts of difficul-
ties with the Irish in this country."\(^3\) He was certain that such
action would be "construed as a direct assistance to Great Britain in
the matter of conscription in Ireland," and he was "loath to involve

\(^1\) Walter Long to Reading, 16 May 1918 (B.M., Balfour Papers, Add.
MSS 49741, vol. lix). The following day Reading was also informed
that the Irish were appealing to Wilson and that he should tell the
President that "any views he may express must necessarily greatly in-
fluence the situation." Walter Long to Reading, 17 May 1918 (Ibid.).
Actually the Cabinet had made a decision to arrest de Valera and sev-
eral others seven months before, although the decision was not imple-
mented until after the conscription crisis broke and when Walter Long
had been delegated by the War Cabinet to deal with Ireland. See War
Cabinet 255A, 23 Oct. 1917 (F.R.O., CAB. 23/13) and War Cabinet 408
(min. 11), 10 May 1918 (F.R.O., CAB. 23/6).

\(^2\) Lansing to President, 19 May 1918 (N.A., 841.00/87a, roll 7).

\(^3\) Ibid.
The following day Page was given the President's instructions to inform the British government that the State Department would not release the documents. Reading informed his government that the handling of the whole affair had caused "annoyance" in high circles in Washington, although Lansing had said that the fact that the documents dealt with Irish-German activities before the United States entered the war made it "impossible for them to act." President Wilson had been reluctant to intervene in the conscription crisis to come to the assistance of either the British government or Lord Mayor O'Neill. Indeed Sir William Wiseman reported to Sir Eric Drummond that Wilson told him that he "hoped the Government would not force Conscription without Home Rule." When Wiseman suggested that they were separate problems, Wilson replied that this would not be appreciated throughout the United States. Wilson made it clear that he wished the British government would solve the Irish

1Lansing's comment on the Irish nationalists was, "Without denying that the fundamental idea of the Sinn Feiners has merit, their present willingness to cooperate with the Germans shows a blindness to the great issues to the war and a willingness to sacrifice democracy to their own selfish ends which seems utterly unpardonable." In fact he felt that if the Sinn Feiners assisted Germany the government should help suppress them, but that these documents did not show that. Lansing to President, 19 May 1918 (N.A., 841.00/87a, roll 7).

2Lansing to AMEMBASSY, 20 May 1918 (Ibid.).

3Reading to Long, 20 May 1918, and Reading to _____, 22 May 1918 (B.M., Balfour Papers, Add. MSS 49741, vol. lix). Eventually the British government took the responsibility for the publication of the documents. _____ to Reading, 21 May 1918 (Ibid.).

4Wiseman to Drummond, 3 June 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 800/223). It might be added that at the request of Congressman Tinkham of Boston the State Department inquired after the condition of Eamon de Valera after his arrest on 17 May 1918. See Rev Thomas J. Wheelwright (half-brother of de Valera) to Tinkham, 23 May 1918, William Phillips to Irwin B. Laughlin, 19 June 1918, and Page to Sec of State, 20 July 1918 (N.A., 341d.1121 VALERA, EAMON DE/41 and -/42, and 341.112D491/29, box 4095, jacket no. 2).
question, although he himself felt he could not take part in its solution.

The Irish-American reaction to the conscription crisis was mixed and complex. A number of prominent Irish-Americans from the Boston area, interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor, revealed diverse attitudes towards conscription although they agreed on the necessity of home rule. Former governor of Massachusetts David I. Walsh observed that, "A people that have no rights in time of peace, have no responsibilities in time of war," although once given home rule the Irish would fight for freedom as they had always done; Daniel J. Gallagher, assistant district attorney for Suffolk County, Edward F. McLaughlin, state senator from Boston, Michael J. Jordan, national secretary of the UIL, and John F. Dever of the Charitable Irish Society of Boston all took a cautious and moderate view—that the war must be won, that Ireland must support it, but that England must grant home rule first. On the contrary, some Irish-Americans insisted that to support Sinn Fein in Ireland—with its pro-German and anti-war attitudes—in its efforts to resist conscription was to betray one's loyalty to the United States. Patrick Ford, Jr, denounced the treachery of his brother Robert E. Ford, editor of the Irish World, to Tumulty, exclaiming that "the independence of Ireland would not be worth purchasing

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1See C.S.M., 18 April 1918. The Monitor also published the views of several leaders of the Loyal Orange Institution who thought that if home rule were given it should be preceded by conscription. (Ibid.). Leaders of the Loyal Orange Institution were also writing President Wilson insisting that the Irish question not be allowed to intrude on the war effort. They asked Wilson to continue to reject "the O'Learys" of the Irish community and they assured him that soon those who still "play his game will be as despised as he." George E. Bemister, grand master, and James Jaynes, grand secretary, of the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts, to Wilson, 21 May 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).
by a disloyal act toward the United States. Similarly the editor of the Boston Post, P.J. Lynch, reported to Tumulty his scolding of Seamas MacManus for the latter's continued obsession with Ireland in the midst of the war. Major Eugene F. Kinkead, who later took an active part in Irish-American agitation himself, wrote to President Wilson that the FOIF were expected to be of service to America, rather than disruptive. In San Francisco Garret W. McEnerney, a leading lawyer, speaking at a testimonial dinner for T.P. O'Connor said that support for any movement in Ireland that sought to weaken England was now "treasonable to the people and to the government of this country." Senator Thomas of Colorado reported in the Senate that Irish-American meetings in Chattanooga and St Louis had endorsed conscription for Ireland. Senator Phelan of California attempted to keep the views of home rulers such as O'Connor before both Wilson and Lan-

1Ford to Tumulty, 26 May 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

2Lynch to Tumulty, 22 May 1918 (Ibid.).

3Kinkead to Wilson, 27 May 1918 (Ibid.).

4C.S.M., 20 April 1918. Senator Phelan of California read a message from McEnerney containing similar sentiments to the Senate on 18 April 1918. Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 56, p. 5239. For a vigorous rebuttal see Rev P.C. Yorke, "America and Ireland, an open letter to Mr Garrett W. McEnerty (San Francisco, 1918) published by the FOIF.

518 April 1918, Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 5237.
singing throughout the summer of 1918. More actively moderating influences were to be found in the efforts of Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana who attempted to convince his constituents of the importance of the war effort and the virtues of Irish self-government within the British Empire.

The revolutionary Irish-American nationalists found in conscription, which was resisted by a substantially united Ireland, an issue they could vigorously assault. The Gaelic American, the Irish World, and the Irish Press, though barred from the mails, began immediately to inform the Irish-American community of the infamy of conscription without consent. Through Dr W.J.M.A. Maloney, Joseph McGarrity, and Dr Patrick McCartan articles explaining the Irish point of view were published in the New York Evening Post, the New York Globe, and the Philadelphia Public Ledger. On 4 May some 15,000 Irish-Americans met in Madison Square Garden in New York to hear speeches by Reverend A.A. Berle and Congressmen W. Bourke Cockran and John J. Fitzgerald; Peter Golden sent a telegram to President Wilson on behalf of the meeting asking him to intercede in order to save the Irish people.

1 See O'Connor to Phelan, 13 April 1918, and O'Connor to Tumulty, 26 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558), and Lansing to Wilson, 29 May 1918 (N.A., 841d.00/9A, roll 213). In late June Phelan wrote Wilson that any comment he made on the Irish situation would have a good effect. Wilson replied, "I realize, of course, the critical importance of the whole Irish Question, but I do not think it would be wise for me in any public utterance to attempt to outline a policy for the British Government with regard to Ireland." In this he was holding to his earlier policy, Phelan to Wilson, 29 June 1918, and Wilson to Phelan, 1 July 1918 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).

2 See Gerald F.M. O'Grady to Walsh, 19 July 1918, and Walsh to O'Grady, 30 July 1918 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190).


4 McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 42-43.
from the extermination which would be the result of conscription forced by Britain.\(^1\) Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, then touring the country, spoke out against conscription in Ireland, although she was temporarily incapacitated by her arrest in San Francisco on 28 April.\(^2\) To register an official protest against conscription, Dr McCartan, acting in his capacity as Envoy of the Provisional Government of Ireland, presented a long memorandum to the Department of State, denying the right of the British to draft Irishmen into their army and pointing out both the burden such a cruel device would be on the Irish people and the inconsistency it posed to the war aims of the Allies.\(^3\)

Largely through the efforts of the aggressive leaders of the IPL, the FOIF called an Irish Race Convention, to be held in New York on 18 and 19 May, to endorse President Wilson's war aims, to assert that there was no conceivable way in which the claim for Irish independence could be excluded from the objectives of the war, to state clearly that England would be expected to honour the rights of small nations after the war, and to protest against the anti-Irish campaign being

\(^{1}\) N.Y.T., 5 May 1918; and Peter Golden to Wilson, 4 May 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

\(^{2}\) C.A., 4 May 1918. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington was also prevented by police from addressing a meeting at Providence, Rhode Island. C.S.M., 10 May 1918.

\(^{3}\) See McCartan, *With DeValera in America*, pp 45-46. McCartan said this memorandum had been drafted by Maloney. The IPL printed and circulated a broadsheet entitled "Ireland's attitude on conscription" which argued that conscription was contrary to both the will of the people and the expressions of Ireland's leaders, and Peter Golden had written to a number of American political figures to elicit some word of official approval or sympathy for the resistance movement, although the responses tended to show growing American hostility rather than support. "Ireland's attitude on conscription" (n.p., n.d.); Golden to Congressmen, 18 April 1918, and replies (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii); and Jeremiah Carroll to Senator William E. Borah, 4 May 1918 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 188).
carried on in the United States. The convention was addressed by Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, James Larkin, Dr Patrick McCartan, Diarmuid Lynch, Liam Mellows, Padraic Colum, John Devoy, Judge Cohalan, and several Irish-American leaders; Father Thomas J. Hurton served as chairman. The Very Reverend Peter E. Magennis was elected national president of the FOIF and Diarmuid Lynch, national secretary. Speeches were made supporting self-determination for Ireland, condemning conscription and the alleged German plot, and denouncing England as the "single enemy" of Ireland. A petition was proposed by Judge Goff supporting Ireland's case for independence, and it was later presented to President Wilson's secretary. The convention closed with a careful speech by Judge Cohalan asking the audience "not to lose their

1 FOIF committee on conventions, "To the men and women of the Irish race in America" (New York, 1918). Mrs Sheehy Skeffington and Golden had been consistently disappointed throughout 1917 and 1918 that no convention had been called, and they prodded FOIF leaders to act. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Golden, 9 March 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder xi); and Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to John Devoy, 9 March 1918, Devoy's post-bag, ii, p. 524.

2 This presentation in fact caused some disturbance. Father Hurton had asked to see Wilson; he was refused, but on 21 June he gave the petition to Tumulty, despite Tumulty's comment that "speeches of the most seditious character" had been made at the meeting. Thus the presentation of the petition to Tumulty represented an attempt to accommodate the Irish-American nationalists. The public announcement of this presentation brought an immediate protest from the Intelligence Branch of the War Department which claimed that unless the petition were repudiated it would seriously "embarrass the cause of the Allies." It was however allowed to stand. See Tumulty to Wilson, 24 May 1918, Wilson to Tumulty, 25 May 1918, Tumulty to Wilson, n.d., re Miss Marguerite Maginnis to Wilson, 21 May 1918, and War Department correspondence re news articles in the Washington Post, 22 June 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).
heads," and stressing the importance of "Americanism" during the war.\(^1\) The importance of the 1918 Irish Race Convention was that it rallied the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists around an active program after a very demoralizing year.

Although there was still a reluctance on the part of many to be too bold in advocating the Irish cause, some steps were taken.\(^2\) Under the effective leadership of Diarmuid Lynch the FOIF began to reassert itself more fully in Irish agitation; by late August Mellows wrote to Golden that Lynch "appears to be doing well" at strengthening the organization. The FOIF and the Irish Progressive League kept up their

\(^1\)Full descriptions may be found in The G.A., 25 May 1918, C.S.M., 20 May 1918, J.J. Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald (Dublin, 1924), pp 230-32, McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 46-47, and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 270-74. As a result of his activities connected with the convention and the 4 May meeting in New York, Father Magennis was reprimanded by Cardinal Farley who refused to tolerate such overt political action by the clergy within his archdiocese. Indeed contrary to the allegations of the Christian Science Monitor the hierarchy in the United States made several specific orders to its clergy to cease Irish revolutionary activity. See Lit. Dig., lvii, no. 10 (8 June 1918), p. 30. The British Ambassador noted the Cardinal's rebuke of Father Magennis with some interest, and in fact Reading reported several instances of bishops insisting that their clergy not take part in Irish agitation. Reading to F.O., 22 May 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3488), and 28 and 30 May 1918 and 5 July 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3430); and Spring Rice to Balfour, 21 Dec. 1917 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3428).

\(^2\)For examples of the less than total commitment of many Irish-American leaders, as well as serious rivalry and division within the movement, see the disillusioned letters of Mrs Sheehy Skeffington ("Situation here re. Irish is as everywhere else--timidity & axes to grind! Most of my best help comes from Americans with not a drop of our blood.") and Liam Mellows ("...back again to this maelstrom of bitterness & perversity...Prejudice is rampant--fierce--unbelievable.") to Peter Golden. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Golden, n.d., and 26 April 1918, and Mellows to Golden, 2 and 8 Aug. 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder xi). There are many instances of friction within the revolutionary movement in the United States, several of which have been cited here and earlier, but see also the statement of Francis A. Campbell of the Boston FOIF that Mrs Sheehy Skeffington had "outstayed her usefulness in this country, and the sooner she returns to Ireland the better for the cause." C.S.M., 22 May 1918. In fact she, Nora Connolly, and Margaret Skinnider left together for the British Isles about mid-July 1918. Ibid., 16 July 1918.
campaigns of letters and memorials to politicians. One of the projects begun at the convention was the attempt of Mrs Mary F. McWhorter, president of the Women's Auxiliary of the AOH, to lead a group of Irish-American mothers who had sons in the war to see President Wilson in order to ask him to oppose Irish conscription. Mrs McWhorter's "Mothers's Mission" was successfully put off by the President, although she finally met with Tumulty and presented him with a petition with 600,000 signatures and an eight-page letter reviewing the course of English misrule in Ireland and the injustices of conscription passed by a foreign government. The IPL continued to labour throughout the summer of 1918 to raise money for an information bureau in Washington in order to establish an effective lobby which could bring sustained pressure to bear on the government. By late September, when it was certain that the war was drawing to a close, the Clan-na-Gael held its national conference to draft its future programs; the

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1 See John J. Splain to Tumulty, 10 June 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558), and the publication of a memorial in the Congressional Record by Mr Tague along with his introduction of a resolution in Congress "favouring immediate home rule for Ireland," 12 July 1918, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 56, p. 9051. Also see Katherine Hughes to John Sharp Williams, 3 June 1918 and Marie Nolan to Senator Albert B. Fall, 20 May 1918 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 38). F. O'Donoghue in Lynch, The I.R.B. and the 1916 insurrection, pp 192-93.

2 See Mrs Mary F. McWhorter to Tumulty, 6 June 1918, and Mrs McWhorter to Wilson, 9 July 1918 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.) and Congressional Record, op. cit., pp 9607-09. To give the gesture maximum publicity, Congressman Gallagher described the "Mothers's Mission" in Congress and had the petition and letter printed in the Congressional Record, as did Senator Lewis in the Senate, but only over the objections of Senator King. 18 July 1918, Ibid., p. 9159. Mrs McWhorter later sent Wilson a telegram from the meeting of the Ladies's Auxiliary of the AOH in Atlantic City pledging their support for the war effort and trusting Ireland's interests to his care. Mrs McWhorter to Wilson, 30 July 1918 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).

3 See circulars of the Irish Progressive League (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii).
Clan re-emphasized the determination of the Irish in America to see that Wilson apply to Ireland at the peace conference those principles of self-determination which he had so bravely proclaimed during the war. But the revolutionary nationalist movement still functioned on the edge of the law. In October and November the eminently respectable Jesuit weekly America was barred from the mails by the Postmaster General for the publication of a series of articles on the Irish question by Dr Maloney.

Nearer to home Irish nationalists in the United States found there were really two conscription crises: the more prominent crisis of the British government's attempts to extend conscription to Ireland but a lesser known crisis as well, which was brought about by the measures taken by the United States government to bring into military service the resident nationals of co-belligerent countries. The United States had introduced conscription shortly after it entered the war, and by early 1918 the British and American governments had negotiated a reciprocal agreement whereby aliens either had to return home or submit to the draft in the country in which they were then residing. The FOIF had attempted to defend Irish expatriots living in the United States in 1917 from the normal conscription procedures, but their

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1See Splain, The voice of Ireland, ed. Fitz-Gerald, p. 232.

2See McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 48-54. These articles were reprinted in 1919, W.J.M.A. Maloney, The Irish issue (New York, 1919), and more remarkably as part of the hearings of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Gallagher resolution. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Irish question, Hearings on H.J. Res. 357 (House doc. no. 1832, 65th Congress, 3rd Session), 1919.
position would be less secure from 1918 on.¹ This presented a predi-
cament to political exiles such as Dr McCartan or Liam Mellows, so
McCartan wrote to the Secretary of State on 17 February outlining the
problems of Irish exiles, exempt from conscription in Ireland, who
might be forced to fight in alliance with Great Britain.² Although
Lansing made no comment on the letter, Representative Mason read McCar-
tan's objections in Congress and argued that the conscription of Irish-
men in the United States was wrong, and Congressmen McCormick, Gall-
agher, Mason, McLaughlin, Moran, Kennedy, Cary, and Rankin all attemp-
ted to block the treaty which would make Irishmen in America eligible
for the draft, but were unsuccessful in doing so.³ Although Dr
McCartan wrote letters to Irish nationals living in the United States
telling them that because the Provisional Government of Ireland was
not at war they were exempt from military service in America, by the
late summer of 1918 they had begun to register.⁴ But to make things
as painless as possible it was decreed by the Director of the Draft
in New York, Martin Conboy, that aliens registering for conscription

¹For caustic criticism of these efforts see Congressman Milton H.
Welling to John D. Moore, 20 Sept. 1917 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box
Misc.). It was their comments about Irish nationalism during the de-
bate of this treaty that brought down the wrath of Mrs Sheehy Skeff-
ington on Senators McCumber and Kenyon. Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to
Peter Golden, 20 March 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder
xi).

²McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 33-35 and 252-58.

³21 Feb. 1918, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session,
vol. 56, pp 2482-83; and see C.S.M., 15 and 16 March 1918, and Mrs
Sheehy Skeffington to Devoy, 9 March 1918, Devoy's post-bag, 11, pp
524-25. Actually the British government had agreed to allow the Unit-
ed States the option of not applying the regulations of the treaty to
Irishmen in America if they chose. Thomas F. Logan to Frank L. Polk,
21 Feb. 1918, and L.H. Woolsey to Polk, 2 March 1918 (Yale University
Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 138).

⁴For comments on this activity, see Draft of Irishmen in America,
Sept. 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3488).
could list the Republic of Ireland as their native country if they wished.\footnote{Less than a year earlier Martin Conboy had served as Liam Mellows's defence lawyer on a charge of illegal exit from the United States, after Mellows's unsuccessful attempt to go to Germany and Russia, C.S.M., 25 Oct. 1918. Shane Leslie, who had earlier been in the war as an ambulance driver, registered in September. Leslie, Long Shadows, p. 197.}

American newspapers condemned Irish resistance to conscription outright. The Buffalo Express and the Ohio State Journal felt that Ireland was making a stand at the wrong time over the wrong issue; in the war crisis there could be no room for such domestic problems.\footnote{Buffalo Express and the Ohio State Journal, cited in C.S.M., 24 April 1918.}

American support for Ireland would be greater after the war, said the Kansas City Times, if Ireland accepted conscription and fought.\footnote{Kansas City Times, cited in Ibid.}

The St Louis Post-Dispatch asked why the Irish in the United States had to accept conscription if Irishmen in Ireland did not.\footnote{St Louis Post-Dispatch, cited in Ibid.}

More passionate criticism came from the New York Herald which said that if the Irish did not have the intelligence to understand that the defeat of Britain in the war would mean the subjugation of Ireland they did not have the intelligence to be given home rule.\footnote{New York Herald, cited in Lit. Dig., lvii, no. 4 (27 April 1918), p. 14.}

The New York World carried this argument further by saying, "In lending aid and comfort, for their own mistaken purposes to the enemy of England, they were not restrained by the knowledge that they were lending aid and comfort to the enemy of France and the United States."\footnote{New York World, cited in Ibid., no. 9 (1 June 1918), p. 25.}

The Christian Science Monitor asserted that the Catholic conspiracy was behind the crisis and indeed
pointed to Cardinal Logue in Ireland, Cardinal Begin of Quebec, and Archbishop Mannix of Australia as the sources of resistance to conscription throughout the British Empire. 1 The projected visit of the Lord Mayor of Dublin provoked an equally hostile reaction. The New York Times felt the visit was impudent and that O'Neill would be as welcome in the United States as the "Chief Burgomaster of Berlin." 2 The Christian Science Monitor said that the Lord Mayor was "likely to find Mr. Wilson extremely unsympathetic on the subject of Professor DeValera's German ally." 3 If the Irish did not like conscription they could appeal to their friends in Germany, said the Detroit Free Press. 4 If not general throughout the press there was some sympathy or understanding of the Irish nationalist point of view, but even that in many cases was qualified. The New York Evening Post warned against any attempt to force conscription on the people and lamented that there had not been better communications between the British government and the Irish leaders. 5 The alternative to conscription of allowing Irishmen to volunteer in the American army was suggested by the New York Commercial, and the Chicago Daily News thought that opposition to conscription was not necessarily opposition to the war. 6 The Brooklyn Eagle, however, questioned whether there was anything to the German

1 C.S.M., 11 April 1918, 19 and 25 April 1918.
3 Ibid., 16 May 1918.
4 Detroit Free Press, cited in Ibid., 25 April 1918. Also see the Boston Herald and Journal, 4 and 11 Feb. 1918.
plot or if it were all just talk.¹

The attitude of native Americans to the rejection of conscription by the Irish was inevitable in the context of the war; certainly the tensions and the psychology of the war made objective considerations of the peculiarities of the Irish situation difficult for those Americans without a detailed knowledge of the circumstances. On 18 April Peter Golden wrote to a number of Senators and Representatives telling them that the conscription bill had been passed "without asking the consent of a single Irish man or woman," and noting that such an act was contrary to the principles for which President Wilson had said the United States was fighting; he did not think the Congressmen would allow the country to become a "partner in such infamy as the English Government seems determined to carry out in Ireland."² The replies were in large part indignant and self-righteous. Senator King of Utah, who had attacked the Irish earlier in the Senate, said that the United States was fighting for "liberty and civilization" and that if Golden was "trying to stir up rebellion in Ireland you are an enemy to this Country and to civilization"; he thought the IPL ought to disband and its members "learn something of Americanism and their duty to America."³ Senator Gronna of North Dakota answered that Americans had made the supreme sacrifice in joining the war and that everyone must work for victory; after the war there would be "liberty for every

¹Brooklyn Eagle, cited in Lit. Dig., lvii, no. 9 (1 June 1918), p. 25.

²Golden to Congressmen, 18 April 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder 11). The C.S.M. of 18 April 1918 said that the feeling in Washington among Senators and Congressmen was that conscription should be extended to Ireland; public expression like this may have prompted the league to write to individual politicians. C.S.M., 18 April 1918.

³Senator William H. King to Golden, 26 April 1918 (Golden Papers, op. cit.)
nation and every land—for all humanity."¹ Golden did receive some consolation from Congressmen Claypool and Church, both of whom objected to conscription of any kind.² But the situation was more realistically appraised by Congressman LaFollette who said he had noted that President Wilson had not included Ireland in his speeches about the small nations of Europe because Ireland was a part of one of America’s allies in the war; he thought Golden could hardly expect the government to challenge Britain about the conscription of Irishmen when the United States itself was conscripting the former citizens of the Central Powers.³

Private opinion seemed largely to reflect that of the politicians. A group of indignant citizens from Fort Morgan, Colorado, sent a telegram to President Wilson insisting, "All loyal Americans have accepted the draft. Why shouldn't Ireland accept it?" They protested against the Lord Mayor's proposed trip to Washington and asked that he be

¹Senator Asle J. Gronna to Golden, 1 May 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii). Massachusetts Congressman William S. Greene replied that Americans had not been consulted about conscription either and that the United States government could hardly object to the means by which Great Britain raised troops to defend herself. William S. Greene to Golden, 26 April 1918 (Ibid.). Representative Crampton of Michigan said that Golden's suggestion that Irishmen were justified in resisting conscription was "traitorous to our own land"; America, Canada, England, and other countries had accepted conscription, "I can see no objection to Ireland performing its part." Louis C. Crampton to Golden, 30 April 1918 (Ibid.). T.S. Williams, Congressman from Illinois, attacked hyphenate immigrant groups in the United States and said the sooner they abandoned their ethnic ties the better it would be for America; in the meantime he found "the attitude of the Irish people" on the war crisis to be "very disappointing...." T.S. Williams to Golden, 30 April 1918 (Ibid.).

²H.C. Claypool to Golden, 27 April 1918, and Denver S. Church to Golden, 4 May 1918 (Ibid.).

³William L. LaFollette to Golden, 1 May 1918 (Ibid.).
denied permission to enter the United States. That a shift in American opinion was taking place was certain. Charles McCarthy commented to Plunkett that there was a reversion to the nativist, anti-Irish and anti-Catholic passions of the nineteenth century.

I find that there is a great anger in America against the Irish, and many old class prejudices are being aroused. There is a good deal of an anti-Catholic movement [sic], as I judge it, based upon the idea that priests are dictating policies in Ireland. I do hope that something can be done to bring them into the war very soon.2

Indeed, the rising white Anglo-Saxon Protestant hostility that McCarthy observed was to help shape native American attitudes towards Ireland for the next few years.3 Shane Leslie reported to John Dillon that the arrests and the German plot had been very damaging to the American image of Ireland. "The unthinking and, unfortunately, the patriotic American, has swallowed it whole," he regretted to say.4

1 J.F. Weilbright, Elmer E. Weaver, and W.S. Rychman to Wilson, 24 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file II, box 166). The president of Harvard University, A. Lawrence Lowell, thought that through the resistance to conscription Ireland was losing the "sympathy of America," and a friend of Plunkett who was a close observer of the Irish situation commented by August that the patriotic emotion with which the press had embraced the whole war effort "seems to outweigh any traditional sympathy with Ireland," although she admitted that most Americans knew very little of the complexities of the Irish situation. Lowell to Plunkett, 28 May 1918 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers); and Caroline King Cumming to Plunkett, 2 Aug. 1918 (Ibid.). Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi told a correspondent that if Ireland did not begin to help the Allies in the war there would not be anyone willing to support her claims at the peace conference. Williams to T.H. Synon, 5 Sept. 1918 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 40).

2 McCarthy to Plunkett, 9 Sept. 1918 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 37).

3 See for example, G.L. Fox, "Ireland and the Union" (New Haven, 1918), and G.L. Fox, "Sound truth about the Irish question" (New Haven, 1918).

4 Leslie to Dillon, 9 Aug. 1918, cited in Lyons, Dillon, p. 442.
A growing consensus in America held that the Irish were expected to step forward and do their duty to the cause of world freedom just as Americans and others were doing; to argue or object or refuse, either in Ireland or the United States, was treasonable.

To a number of people in the United States and Ireland who shared an interest in the satisfactory resolution of the Irish question the refusal of the Irish people to accept conscription, or after 1916 to volunteer in any great numbers, seemed a disaster which would prejudice Ireland's case either with Great Britain or with the anticipated peace conference. In fact the Irish refusal to join enthusiastically in the war created suspicions in Britain and the United States that Ireland could not be trusted with self-government or that Ireland did not deserve it. To forestall these suspicions and to rehabilitate Ireland in the eyes of the Allied powers, as well as to augment the war effort, several plans were proposed to enable Irishmen to join the American army or for Irish nurses to serve in American hospitals. Such solutions, it was hoped, would utilize Irish manpower but would avoid the psychological impasse of forcing Irishmen to fight "England's war."

The first suggestions were mooted before the conscription crisis when a retired colonel of the 18th Royal Irish Regiment, J. Eustace Jameson, then an organizer of the Territorial Association of Ireland, offered to raise an "Irish American Foreign Legion" in Ireland. Discussions were begun as early as June 1917 with General Pershing's aide-de-camp and were carried on both in England and America with E.M. House and Tumulty. ¹ Colonel Jameson's plans varied, but essentially the

¹J. Eustace Jameson to the aide-de-camp of General J.J. Pershing, 11 June 1917 (L.C., Roosevelt Papers, series I/box 339) and Jameson to Tumulty, 8 Feb. 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).
legion was seen as consisting of both Irishmen and Americans who would train in Ireland and fight under the American flag. Tumulty had Jameson's proposal appraised by several people in the War Department who saw considerable difficulties, but who felt that the British government would have to give its approval before serious consideration could begin.¹ The British government had already considered Jameson's ideas and rejected them; the Army Council decided that no such scheme involving the training of American troops on Irish soil could be approved until the United States government agreed to train troops throughout the United Kingdom; furthermore, it was felt that Jameson "should not be employed for recruiting of any kind in connection with this country."² A similar sort of plan was proposed to Tumulty in June by Charles McCarthy, who was in England on behalf of the government during the summer of 1918. He was invited to Ireland by Lord French, the Lord-Lieutenant, where he developed his idea that if Irishmen could be induced to join Irish-American regiments in the American army or if Irishwomen could be employed to work in American hospitals or if wounded Americans could be sent to Ireland to convalesce, the "bitterly anti-Irish" feeling in the United States might be reversed.³ He discussed his ideas with George Russell and Plunkett, the latter of whom thought that Irishmen in the American army would help to drive the north and south further apart and might in the fut-

¹Benedict Crowell, Acting Secretary of War, to Tumulty, 16 March 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).


³McCarthy to Plunkett, 17 June 1918, and McCarthy to Tumulty, 17 June 1918 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 37).
ure involve the United States in Anglo-Irish quarrels. Back again in the United States, McCarthy sent his recommendations to the Secretary of State, and later E.M. House, who forwarded them to the President. Wilson did not think much of either McCarthy or his recommendations for recruiting Irish troops or Irish nurses. McCarthy's proposals, like those of Colonel Jameson, were allowed to drop. What sort of influence an Irish legion would have had in the war is, of course, impossible to say, but at a time when the United States was assembling Polish and Czechoslovak legions it was not an outlandish idea.

Less complicated or controversial plans were also rejected. Colonel Arthur Murray, Assistant Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Washington, worked out a scheme in early 1918 to have various Irish-American regiments simply land at Cork and march through Ireland on their way to France. While this met the approval of the American War Department and the General Staff, and in fact the Mauretania was scheduled to take the selected regiments, the British government refused

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2Memorandum on Irish conditions, by Charles McCarthy, 12 Sept. 1918 and McCarthy to E.M. House, 4 Oct. 1918 (McCarthy Papers, op. cit., box 37); Lansing to Wilson, 13 Sept. 1918 (N.A., 841D.00/15 A, roll 213); and Wilson to Lansing, 17 Sept. 1918 (N.A., 841D.00/16½, roll 213).

3Shane Leslie suggested an Irish Legion to Tumulty, but later withdrew it. Leslie to Tumulty, 22 April 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558); for public comment on these proposals see Lit., 47, lvii, no. 4 (27 April 1918), pp 13-14, and lviii, no. 4 (27 July 1918), p. 14.
to give its permission. Walter I. Austin of Dorchester, Massachusetts, wrote to Wilson that American troops might be allowed to garrison Ireland, thereby relieving British troops for the front lines. Tumulty, although he told Wilson the letter might be a trick to draw the President out on the Irish question, replied that the suggestion would be brought to Wilson's attention. In late August 1918 Plunkett talked with Lord French about how to deal with the problem, and as a result began work on the idea first raised by Charles McCarthy to get Irish nurses to serve in American hospitals. Plunkett went to France where the American Army Medical Service flatly rejected the offer, but through Lord French he obtained General Pershing's qualified approval. The British government and the Irish Office, however, were concerned that the Irish nurses might use the opportunity to spread anti-British propaganda among the American troops. The war ended with Ireland still unwilling to participate and with a degree of anti-Irish feeling in the United States.

1For the full story see Murray, At close quarters, pp 81-84, and also B.B. White to F.O., 15 Jan. 1918, and Colville Barclay to F.O., 25 Jan. 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3488). Also see Lord Dunraven to A. Bonar Law, ca. summer 1918 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 30/2/16). The suggestion of the British General, H.H.L. Malcolm, that Pershing be allowed to quarter and train his troops in Ireland was given no reply. Malcolm to House, 22 Aug. 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Malcolm, Gen. H.H.L.).

2See Austin to Wilson, 18 June 1917 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).


CHAPTER V

IRELAND AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

1919

The peace conference was the final phase of the war crisis, and the Irish-American nationalists understood full well, as did many similar nationalist groups in the United States, that if their goals were to be achieved at all it would have to be through the machinery of the conference. Not surprisingly President Wilson, who of the leaders of the Allied powers had been the foremost spokesman for the principle of self-determination, became the focal point of the Irish nationalist movement, along with many other nationalist movements as well. In the United States enormous efforts—direct and indirect, congressional and diplomatic, public and private—were expended to win Wilson's open support at the conference for the Irish cause as it had been won for the Polish nationalist movement. The President's reluctance to challenge the British openly on the Irish issue, but rather to work unofficially or rely on the League of Nations to solve the Irish and other problems, sharpened antagonisms between Wilson and the Irish-American leaders which pre-dated the war. Even before the details of the league and the Versailles Treaty were fully announced the

1See for example Wilson's famous speech to the Washington diplomatic corps on 4 July 1918 at Washington's tomb at Mount Vernon, Virginia, that after the war, "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, must be upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned." A day of dedication: the essential writings of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Albert Fried (New York, 1965), p. 329.

reaction, bitter and destructive, had begun. The Irish-American nationalist leaders joined forces with Wilson's opponents in the Senate and throughout the country to co-operate in a campaign presumably to save the United States and Ireland as well from the pitfalls of the league. These activities, carried out on blatantly ethnic lines, provoked a reaction of their own among native Americans who felt that the interests of the United States were being subordinated to those of foreign interests.

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The end of the war allowed the Irish-American nationalists to resume their energetic efforts in promoting the Irish cause without the stigma of weakening the war effort or the insinuation that they were disloyal to the United States. President Wilson's idealistic pronouncements during the war had encouraged them to view the peace conference as a meeting of the great powers to create a new world order rather than as a diplomatic meeting of the Allied victors to draft a peace treaty for the defeated countries. Thus their primary object was to enlist the support of President Wilson in making Irish self-determination one of the items of the Paris peace conference, and indeed throughout most of 1919 Wilson was at the centre of Irish-American agitation. In addition to presenting direct personal appeals to the President, the Irish-American nationalist leaders worked to create nation-wide agitation, which would induce Wilson to lend his support to Ireland, and to carry out part of this goal they made substantial efforts to enlist congressional support to attempt to force the President to intercede for Ireland. However to do all these things systematically the nationalist movement in the United States, having suffered a considerable blow during the war, had to be rebuilt and
new funds raised. Appeals directly to Wilson and other leading politicians began almost within hours of the armistice. As the result of a mass meeting held by the IPL in New York on 12 November 1918 to demand that the United States recognize the Irish republic and to protest against the imprisonment in Britain of Sinn Fein leaders, Padraic Colum attempted to lead a delegation to see President Wilson to make their appeal in person.\(^1\) Congressman Joseph McLaughlin, as national president of the AOH, sent President Wilson resolutions endorsing "self-determination" for Ireland and he urged that the peace conference consider the Irish question.\(^2\) A more successful appeal was sent by Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana who gave Wilson copies of several letters on the Irish question along with one signed by the Lt Governor of Montana and 54 other civic leaders; he also expressed his own view that Britain's home rule policy and capitulation to the Ulster extremists had been "discreditable," and he urged Wilson, once he reached the conference, to "impress upon them [the British government] the necessity for a speedy solution of the question of self-government for Ireland." If Ireland were ignored at the peace conference, Walsh wrote, Anglo-Amer-

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\(^1\) See poster for Irish Progressive League meeting, 12 Nov. 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141), Colum to Tumulty, 14 Nov. 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558), and Irish World, 16 Nov. 1918.

ican relations would be jeopardized by disgruntled Americans.  

President Wilson's attitude after the armistice towards Irish nationalism was still one of sympathy. He replied to Senator Walsh on 3 December 1918, shortly before he left for Paris,

I appreciate the importance of a proper solution of the Irish question and thank you for the suggestions of your letter of yesterday. Until I get on the other side and find my footing in delicate matters of this sort I cannot forecast with any degree of confidence what influence I can exercise, but you may be sure that I shall keep this important interest in mind and shall use my influence at every opportunity to bring about a just and satisfactory solution.  

Wilson also told Bishop Shahan of the Catholic University of America that he would use every opportunity he found to bring about a resolution of the Irish question according to the principles for which the war had been fought. But while sympathetic and willing to make the best of any opportunity that presented itself, Wilson was not, according to Tumulty, willing to imperil the work of the entire conference or Anglo-American co-operation in order to force an Irish settlement.

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1 Walsh to Wilson, 2 Dec. 1918 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). Walsh received a large number of letters and petitions from the AOH, the FOIF, and his constituents asking that he use his influence to secure assistance for Ireland. Bishop Lenihan of Great Falls wrote that America owed Ireland all the assistance that could be rendered because of Irish aid during the American revolution, and he thought Walsh's appeal to Wilson was almost too weak to be helpful. Bishop Lenihan to Walsh, 23 Dec. 1918 (Ibid.). Personal appeals were also directed towards Wilson's confidants and to his rivals, but with the same hope of influencing the President's action in favour of Ireland. See J.B. Cahill to E.M. House, 13 Dec. 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Cahill, James B.), Congressman G.E. Campbell to Tumulty, 24 Dec. 1918 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558), and Mrs Mary Fogarty to Senator W.E. Borah, 12 Nov. 1918 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 188).

2 Wilson to Walsh, 3 Dec. 1918 (Walsh Papers, op. cit.); and Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, p. 410.

3 Wilson to Bishop Shahan, 3 Dec. 1918 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.).
In short, Wilson was not willing, as the Irish-American nationalists increasingly insisted he must be, to make the Irish question the "sine qua non" of the peace conference. In lieu of some immediate British initiative, in which he might give assistance, Wilson saw the League of Nations as the ultimate instrument by which he could induce the British to satisfy Irish aspirations. Largely on this issue Wilson's relations with the Irish-American leaders deteriorated. Actually by late December, perhaps increasingly aware of the many requests that were being put upon the President, Secretary Lansing began to have some misgivings about the implications of Wilson's use of the term "self-determination." Querying its effect on the nationalist movements in Ireland, India, and Egypt, he confided to his diary on 30 December that the phrase was "loaded with dynamite," and that it would "raise hopes which can never be realized," and indeed it was certain to discredit the President. But as Lansing began to perceive, it was too late for second thoughts about self-determination.

As a result of the agitation and demands of the Irish-Americans, as well as an appreciation for the changed circumstances in Ireland after the 1918 election and the sitting of the first Dail, Wilson sent George Creel, formerly head of the War Information Bureau and currently

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2Certainly there were other factors as well, including the animosity between Wilson and Judge Cohalan, but this was an issue on which neither Wilson nor the Irish-American nationalists could or would compromise.

3Lansing diary, 20 and 30 Dec. 1918 (L.C., Lansing Papers), and R. Lansing, The peace negotiations (Boston, 1921), pp 86-87.
Wilson's roving trouble-shooter in Europe, to Ireland to investigate the political situation there. Creel talked with a number of Irish leaders including Collins and Boland, and he found them to be more flexible in their demands than the Irish-Americans. He sent a report to Wilson on 1 March 1919 in which he said that the Sinn Fein victory in Ireland had been extensive except in four Ulster counties. Home rule was "discredited" and a republic was being demanded, although few seriously thought they would get a republic; if the British government gave Ireland dominion status immediately it would be accepted, but if the government delayed, "sentiment in Ireland and America will harden in favor of an Irish republic."\(^1\) He warned of Lloyd George's duplicity in the Irish matter and of the vital importance of a settlement in order for Wilson to placate the aggressive Irish-American nationalists.\(^2\)

Irish-American nationalists exerted large scale efforts to extract from Congress statements expressing sympathy for Irish self-government and instructions to Wilson to raise the Irish matter at the peace conference. In early December 1918 several resolutions were introduced in Congress calling for the assistance of President Wilson and the American delegation at the peace conference in obtaining self-

\(^1\)Creel to Wilson, 1 March 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VIIIA, box 22).

\(^2\)Ibid. Wilson had read the report by at least 20 March, although his reply was so non-committal that it is impossible to say if it altered his judgment in any way. Also see G. Creel, Rebel at large (New York, 1947), pp 216-22, and G. Creel, The war, the world, and Wilson (New York, 1920), p. 202. Wilson also instructed Tumulty to prepare a memorandum on Ireland and whatever commitments he had made to the Irish-Americans. See Tumulty to Wilson, 28 Feb. 1919 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 3). Gelfand's recent study of the American policy planning staff at the peace conference would seem to indicate that Ireland was not seriously considered, although it was the subject of four economic reports. L.E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American preparations for peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven, 1963), p. 361.
determination or independence for Ireland.¹ Resolutions had often
been introduced in Congress dealing with the Irish question, but they
had normally been sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee where they
were forgotten. However, on this occasion public congressional hear-
ings on the Gallagher resolution, asking that the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace present to the conference "the right of Ireland to
freedom, independence, and self-determination," were scheduled by the
committee for 12 and 13 December. Over sixty sympathetic witnesses
from the major Irish-American centres in the country came to testify
in favour of Ireland's claim to self-government. Twelve Congressmen,
three state legislators, several union leaders, two college presid-
ents, and a large number of official representatives of Irish nation-
alist organizations attended.² These witnesses argued that the res-
olution should be adopted because the United States owed Ireland sup-
port in 1918 for the Irish aid during the American revolution of the
1770s, because Allied war declarations to permit suppressed national-
ities governments of their choice should be applied to Ireland, and
because the Ulster question was an artificial one created by the

¹Lundeen (H.J. Res. 354), 2 Dec. 1918, Congressional Record, 65th
Congress, 1st Session, vol. 57, p. 19; McLaughlin (H.J. Res. 355),
Ibid.; Gallagher (H.J. Res. 357), 3 Dec. 1918, Ibid., p. 66; Kennedy
(H.J. Res. 362), 9 Dec. 1918, Ibid., p. 231; and Rankin (H.J. Res.
363), 10 Dec. 1918, Ibid., p. 280. For Senate see Phelan (S.J. Res.
203), 26 Dec. 1918, Ibid., pp 842-43.

²These included Dr Patrick McCartan (Envoy of the Provisional
Government of Ireland), Diarmuid Lynch (secretary of the FOIF), Pad-
raic Colum (for the IFL), John Archdeacon Murphy (representative of
relief operations in Ireland in 1916), Richard F. Dalton (for the
United Irish-American Societies), Mrs Mary McWhorter (president of the
Ladies's Auxiliary of the AOH), and Miss Katherine Hughes (for the
Irish Women's Council of America). R.T. Hanrahan, a Chicago contract-
or and Irish-American nationalist, wrote to James Reidy to say that a
delegation was leaving for Washington to testify; he said they were a
"respectable crowd too." Hanrahan to Reidy, 9 Dec. 1918 (N.L.I.,
Devoy Papers, box E-J).
British. The House committee also received almost 200 letters, telegrams, petitions, memorials, and resolutions, and it accepted from the witnesses large amounts of printed material, including Dr Maloney's "Ireland's plea for freedom" which had caused the Jesuit magazine *America* to be banned from the mails a few months earlier, and an important speech on Ireland by Cardinal O'Connell. All of these items, as well as the testimony given at the hearings, were specially printed as a separate volume by the government as a House document, and 5000 copies were distributed. One hostile witness, George L. Fox, the indefatigable anti-Irish propagandist from New Haven, attempted to refute the assertions of the Irish-Americans, but of the two days hearings he was given only twenty minutes, during which time he was badly baited and badgered by the committee.

By the end of December committee chairman Flood informed Tumulty that the sentiment in the House was so strong as to make the passage of some sort of resolution on the Irish question a certainty. Wilson was not pleased by the prospect of the House expressing an opinion on Ireland, and he told Tumulty that such a measure would be an embarr-

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2U.S. Congress, *The Irish question*, op. cit., pp 58-64. Fox expressed his disgust at the whole proceedings in a letter to J. St L. Strachey; he thought the resolution and the hearings were "the product of the most shameless falsehood, chicanery, blackmail and bull dozing, that one can conceive of." Fox to Strachey, 24 March 1919 (Beaverbrook Library, Strachey Papers, folder 3, 1919-21). Several months later the New York *Times* asserted that these hearings had been the public act which effectively re-activated the revolutionary Irish-Americans after the war. *N.Y.T.*, 2 March 1919.
assent to him. Through the influence of Tumulty at the White House and Polk at the Department of State Gallagher was prevailed upon to change the wording from a claim for "freedom" and "independence" to merely "self-determination." The resolution came before the House during the late evening of 3–4 March, as the session of Congress was drawing to a close. Through the shrewd parliamentary efforts of Congressmen Gallivan, Mann, McLaughlin, and Flood, the resolution was placed in a favourable position on the calendar, well ahead of other more important business. It was supported in debate by many of the same arguments expressed at the committee hearings: America's debt to Ireland, the war aims, and Irish nationality and historical claims. Its opponents said that passage of the resolution would disrupt the unity of the Allies, embarrass Wilson, and meddle in the affairs of Great Britain; Ireland, it was pointed out, was part of an Allied power, not defeated Germany or outcast Russia to whom orders could be given. The resolution was passed by a vote of 216 to 45 in the small hours of the morning as the session closed. But it was passed too

1See Tumulty to Wilson, 31 Dec. 1918, and Wilson to Tumulty, 7 and 30 Jan. 1919 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, boxes 2 and 3). Wilson said, "I frankly dread the effect on British public opinion with which I am daily dealing here of a Home Rule resolution by the House of Representatives and I am afraid that it would be impossible to explain such a resolution here, but I willingly trust your discretion in handling the matter at Washington. It is not a question of sympathy but of international tactics at a very critical period." Wilson to Tumulty, 30 Jan. 1919 (Ibid., box 3).

2See Tumulty to Wilson, 5 Feb. 1919 (Ibid.); and Polk to Lansing, 3 Feb. 1919 (N.A., 841d.00/11a, roll 213). Polk had earlier told Colonel Arthur Murray that some kind of resolution was certain to be passed but that he would use his influence to have it "properly worded." Murray to Reading, Drummond, and Tyrrell, 10 Dec. 1918 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 60/3/3). On 6 February Gallagher introduced a new resolution (H. Con. Res. 67) with the milder wording, and on 11 February chairman Flood submitted his report, amended to support the milder "self-determination." Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, vol. 57, pp 2868 and 3174. Also see O'Grady, The immigrants' influence on Wilson's peace policies, pp 69–70.
late to receive the required action from the Senate. 1 Ward has suggested that Congress regarded the mildly phrased resolution as merely a gesture of sympathy and nothing more. 2

Irish-American nationalists continued to deluge their Congressmen with petitions, memorials, and resolutions demanding that Ireland be given self-determination and that the American government intercede in Paris to see that this was done. Dutiful Senators and Representatives had these items read into the Congressional Record, thus to be distributed across the country. 3 Irish-Americans were also able to extract resolutions from various state legislatures requesting President Wilson to use his good offices at the peace conference to see that

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1 14 March 1919, Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, vol. 57, pp 5026-57. For text of various extended speeches see 3 March 1919, Ibid., Appendix to, pp 239, 240-42, 282-83, 347-48, and 406-10. The success of the Gallagher resolution should not be seen as a clear victory for Irish nationalist sentiments. As much as anything else it represented the co-operation between the Republicans and the Irish-American Congressmen. The latter were certainly anxious for Congress to make some kind of statement about Ireland, but the Republicans were concerned largely with preventing several items of legislative importance from being acted upon before the 65th Congress ended. By this strategem the Republicans forced Wilson to call the new 66th Congress, elected in November with strong Republican majorities in both houses, into session early to deal with this legislation. Normally the new Congress would not have sat until December 1919—well after the period during which Wilson might have successfully presented the peace treaty to the American people without the systematic criticism of the Republican dominated Senate. Indeed while the Gallagher resolution was being debated in the House, the Senate was discussing Lodge's "Round Robin"; thirty-nine Senators signed the declaration that they did not find the League of Nations Covenant acceptable (only thirty-three votes were needed to defeat the treaty). The new 66th Congress not only defeated the treaty, but the Senate also collaborated with the Irish-Americans to pass their own resolution on the Irish question. For a close analysis of these events see T.A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the lost peace (Chicago, 1963).

2 Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, pp 176-77. For illustrations of British annoyance at the activities of Congress see 6 and 11 March 1919, Hansard 5 (commons), cxiii, cols 582-83 and 1055-56.

3 See Congressional Record, op. cit., pp 844-46, 1071-72, 3741, 38 66, 4157-58, 4844, and 4949.
self-determination was applied to Ireland. Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Nevada all sent their official appeals to the President.¹

Irish-American nationalists were by no means idle in the weeks after the armistice. Their immediate task was to rebuild their demoralized organizations to their pre-war strength in order to make the Irish-American ethnic group an effective political pressure group; this they did through a series of spectacular public meetings throughout the country. The first effort to bring the Irish question back into the public mind and to start the local Irish nationalist organizations again working openly and without apology was made by the national council of the FOIF which planned "Self-determination for Ireland week" to be held throughout the country from 8 to 15 December 1918. During the week meetings were held in various cities demanding that the United States support Irish national aspirations.² The largest and most important of these meetings was held in Madison Square Garden in New York on 10 December, and featured as the principle speaker Cardi-


²See Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 232. Of course even before "Self-determination for Ireland week" Irish-American nationalists were attempting to start public agitation. James J. Caniffe wrote to Devoy on behalf of Fr. Peter C. Yorke in San Francisco in late November to say that work had begun there to hold Wilson and the Allies to their war promises about self-determination; the FOIF and the United Irish Societies had already held a successful joint meeting. Caniffe to Devoy, 26 Nov. 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box C-CA).
nal O'Connell of Boston. To an audience of over 25,000 people the Cardinal said that the Allied leaders had told the people that the war had been fought for justice, the rights of small nations, and the right of self-determination. "The war can be justified only by the universal application of those principles," he said. "Let that application begin with Ireland." In saying that Ireland was the test of the sincerity of the Allies, the Cardinal unquestionably spoke for the majority of interested Irish-Americans. What was of importance was that a member of the hierarchy had made such a speech in public; it marked a public shift from the Church's war-time policy of forbidding Irish agitation. The meeting, as did others, passed resolutions which were cabled to President Wilson, then on his way to Paris, asking him to obtain self-determination for Ireland.

News in late December of the significant election victory in Ireland of the Sinn Fein candidates worked as a rationale for further mass meetings in the United States to promote the Irish question. Although there was some division among the nationalist leaders as to how

1 Conflicting accounts of how Cardinal O'Connell came to speak in New York can be found in McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 57-58, and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 277-79. Other major meetings were held in Philadelphia, Brooklyn, San Francisco, New Orleans, and Chicago. Also see Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 232.


3 Seven months earlier Father Magennis was censured by Cardinal Farley for his Irish nationalist activities in New York. Cardinal O'Connell had caused the British Embassy some considerable alarm in November 1918 when he raised the Irish question in his greetings to the English and French bishops in the United States on an official mission. See C. Barclay to F.O. (circulated to the King and the War Cabinet), 10 Nov. 1918 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/3430), and Monsignor A.J. Barnes to Sir E. Drummond, 25 Nov. 1918 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 60/2/75).

the victory should be interpreted, Irish-American nationalists met under the auspices of the Clan-na-Gael in New York on 5 January 1919 and there provided a platform for Dr McCartan to announce that the Irish Republic had separated itself from Great Britain. McCartan also pointed out that the Polish-Americans had sent $8,000,000 to Poland and he asked the Irish-Americans to do the same or better for Ireland. Judge Cohalan avoided mention of an Irish Republic and confined his remarks at the meeting to Irish self-determination as did Liam Mellows. The following evening, 6 January, the IPL held another public meeting in New York where the idea of an Irish Republic was more enthusiastically received. This meeting significantly drew to the platform several native American liberals, Rev Norman Thomas and Dr Lovejoy Elliott among them, who had not previously been associated with the Irish movement.

In late 1918 the Irish-American leaders called the third Irish Race Convention in Philadelphia for 22 and 23 February for the purposes of unifying the Irish community in the United States and demonstrating to American politicians the political significance in America...
of the Irish question, although they disagreed among themselves as to what kind of a nationalist program in Ireland to promote. To make the greatest possible impact on the American public a broad spectrum of opinions was represented among the speakers. In addition to those Irish-American nationalist leaders whose presence might be expected, Michael J. Ryan of the defunct Redmondite UIL was invited to give a major address and several native American politicians, including Senator William E. Borah, Governor Sproul of Pennsylvania, and Mayor Smith of Philadelphia spoke or made introductions. To balance the large number of Catholic clergymen participating, the socialist-President Taft of Philadelphia, Governor Elihu Root of New York, and his Irish-American counterpart, Senator William E. Borah, Governor Sproul of Pennsylvania, and Mayor Smith of Philadelphia spoke or made introductions. To balance the large number of Catholic clergymen participating, the socialist-President Taft of Philadelphia, Governor Elihu Root of New York, and his Irish-American counterpart, Senator William E. Borah, Governor Sproul of Pennsylvania, and Mayor Smith of Philadelphia spoke or made introductions.

The most important guest at the convention was Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, perhaps the leading member of the Catholic hierarchy, who introduced resolutions calling on President Wilson to use his influence to see that Ireland got self-determination and that Ireland's representatives were given a hearing at the peace conference. The convention also created the Irish Victory Fund which was designed to raise over one million dollars for the purpose of financing politics.

1See A.A., 18 Jan. 1919, and Irish World, 4 Jan. 1919. Actually there were growing differences among the leaders of the Clan and the FOIF and the Irish exiles in America over the question of whether a republic existed in Ireland and if so how completely it should be supported from America. Indeed it is still difficult to know just what the forces were behind the convention. See McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 79-81, O'Doherty, Assignment: America, p. 18, and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 296-98.

2See Judge Cohalan to Borah, 18 Feb. 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 194).

3The convention was attended by 5,132 delegates from Irish-American organizations across the country. Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 233.

ical agitation in the United States and Ireland (the exact purpose of
the fund was a source of bitter disagreement when de Valera wanted to
use it to finance the Dail government).\(^1\)

The Irish Race Convention also appointed a delegation to meet
with President Wilson to enlist his direct support in obtaining Irish
self-determination. Wilson was back in the United States in part of
February and March to deal with legislation as the 65th Congress came
to a close, and he was unwilling to see the delegation because of the
shortness of time, in spite of appeals from Senator Walsh and Congress-
woman Rankin.\(^2\) Tumulty finally obtained permission to arrange a meet-
ing in New York on 4 March, after a speech at the Metropolitan Opera
House on the eve of the President’s return to France, but only after
reasserting the President’s earlier assurances to Senator Walsh and
Bishop Shahan and emphasizing the extent to which a refusal to see

\(^{1}\) For a full account of the convention see G.A., 1 and 8 March
1919, and Irish World, 1 March 1919. Splain wrote that the fund was
established to inform the American people about the Irish question,
in detail it was to promote the war aims of self-determination, to
urge the United States to support a republican form of government in
Ireland, to keep the United States out of the League of Nations, and
to see that democratic principles triumphed over British imperialism.
Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, pp 232-34. Also
see McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 81-88, O’Doherty, Assign-
ment: America, pp 18-19 and 35-36, and Tansill, America and the fight
for Irish freedom, pp 298-302. Another important result of the con-
vention was that the FOIF assumed the financial responsibility for
the Irish National Bureau in Washington, which had been started by
the IPL and run by Miss Katherine Hughes. By mid-summer the Boston
lawyer and politician Daniel T. O’Connell had been appointed director.
The achievements of the Irish Progressive League, “The Bulletin of
the Irish Progressive League,” no. 4 (Sept. 1919).

\(^{2}\) See Tumulty to Wilson, 24 Feb. 1919, and Miss Rankin to Wilson,
the delegation would play into the hands of Wilson's opponents. ¹

However at the meeting Wilson was upset by the presence of Judge Cohalan and refused to see the delegation until the judge withdrew; he was further disconcerted to find that the delegation wanted not merely to present him with the resolutions of the convention but to obtain from him some assurance that he would advocate the Irish cause in Paris. ² Wilson did say that he was sympathetic to their feelings about Ireland, but that he was unable to exercise much influence over the domestic policy of other governments, and that he could not be held responsible for any course of action in this regard. ³ The results of the meeting were unfortunate: Wilson had been badly provoked by the Irish-Americans and they, in turn, were disappointed with Wilson's

¹ Tumulty wrote to Wilson, "Regardless of what we may think of Cohalan and his crowd, there is a deep desire on the part of the American people to see the Irish question settled in the only way it can be settled—by the establishment of a Home Rule Parliament in Dublin." Tumulty to Wilson, 28 Feb. 1919, Tumulty to Wilson, 1 March 1919, Tumulty to Wilson, n.d., and Wilson to Tumulty, n.d. (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 3). Before meeting with the delegation Wilson assured Lord Reading that he would not commit himself to raise the Irish question at the peace conference. Reading to F.O., 4 March 1919 (F.R.O., F.O. 371/4245). Wilson was also warned by Cohalan's old foe, John A. Connolly, about the seditious character of those with whom he would meet. Connolly to Wilson, 4 March 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 42).


³ See comments of Judge Goff in N.Y.T., 10 March 1919, and the recollections of Major Kinkead in appendix viii, McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 275-76.
good faith about self-determination. 1

It should be emphasized at this point that not all American opinion on Ireland after the armistice was represented by the struggles of the Irish-American nationalist leaders to win Wilson's advocacy. Fairly divergent views existed in various quarters about what position America should take towards Ireland. One abortive effort to mold American opinion in favor of a moderate solution to the Irish question, along the lines proposed by Sir Horace Plunkett, was led by such people as Dr H.N. MacCracken, president of Vassar College, J. O'Hara Cosgrave, an editor of the New York World, Lt Col G.P. Ahern, secretary of the Army War College, Charles McCarthy, and John Quinn. 2

Although many of the group were of Irish descent they were outside the conventional nationalist movements, and in fact represented a

1 Ray Stannard Baker later wrote that Wilson told him the delegation had been "so insistent...that I had hard work keeping my temper," and David Hunter Miller recorded that Wilson said on his return to Paris that the delegation had made him very "angry" and that his impulse had been to tell them "to go to hell." See Baker, American chronicle, pp 385-86, D.H. Miller, The drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 1, p. 294, and S. Bonsal, Unfinished business (Garden City, 1944), p. 149. Both John J. Splain and Major Eugene F. Kinkead recorded the opinion of the delegation that Wilson would not do anything for Ireland. Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, pp 234-35, and Kinkead in McCartan, With DeValera in America, p. 276. Nonetheless, four days later Major Kinkead sent Wilson a letter pleading with him to consider the results of the recent election in Ireland and apply to Ireland the concept of self-determination which he had enunciated during the war. Kinkead to Wilson, 8 March 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, Sec VIII, box 15). The appeal was a strong personal one inasmuch as Kinkead had been one of a delegation which had asked Wilson to enter politics in 1909.

2 The group also included Chancellor S.B. McCormick, University of Pittsburgh, Professor Henry S. Canby, Yale University, Rev E.A. McAlpin, president of the Presbyterian College Board, Maurice Francis Egan, former Minister to Denmark, and Thomas W. Lamont, a Morgan banking partner. In their early resolutions they stated, "We believe in the adoption of a generous plan of Home Rule, with a united Ireland, incorporated in some federal plan within the United Kingdom." See Memorandum of informal conference held at the Century Club, 2 Nov. 1918, and resolutions, ca. 15 Nov. 1918 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 37).
financially and socially successful element in the Irish-American community which despised the Irish "political bosses," as typified by Judge Cohalan. The group originally assembled before the end of the war to endorse a program supporting home rule; but within three months they had established working committees and raised some money with which to start a publicity campaign, in part co-ordinated with Plunkett’s trip to America in early 1919. Indeed McCarthy had on his own initiative written to House and Lansing in September and more forcefully to Dr Sidney E. Mezes, director of Wilson’s research staff at the peace conference.  

By the end of 1918 the group found itself eclipsed by the resurgence of Irish-American nationalism, and in the long run the appeal of self-determination and the moderate tone of the Irish Race Convention weakened their momentum. In January 1919 there were growing divisions as to whether they should continue to talk in terms of imperial home rule which some felt was a discredited concept or whether they should shift to self-determination which coincided with Wilson’s war-time language. By the end of the month they decid-

1McCarthy to House, 9 Sept. and 4 Oct. 1918 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 37); Lansing to Wilson, 13 Sept. 1918, and Wilson to Lansing, 17 Sept. 1918 (N.A., 841d.00/15A and -/16½, roll 213); and McCarthy to Mezes, 16 and 28 Dec. 1918 (Yale University Library, House Papers, III B, drawer 34, file 48). Wilson disliked and distrusted McCarthy, and he discouraged Lansing, and presumably House as well, from relying on his judgment. Perhaps for this reason the Inquiry devoted very little time to a consideration of the Irish question, despite McCarthy’s correspondence with Dr Mezes.

2McCarthy resented both the convention led by Irish-Americans who had recently been accused of being pro-German and the anti-Irish tone of the Christian Science Monitor. McCarthy to J.S. Cullinan, 27 and 30 Dec. 1918. However Richard Campbell, a successful New York lawyer, gave a very enthusiastic report of the convention. Campbell to McCarthy, 15 and 26 Feb. 1919 (McCarthy Papers, op. cit., boxes 37, 38, and 39).

ed to halt their activities. Cosgrave related to McCarthy that the feeling was that "At this juncture moderation seems out of the game," and that their efforts to promote home rule were out of step with the current popular appeal of self-determination and the more radical trend of events in Ireland and that their movement would appear "moderate and plutocratic." Although they continued to feel that an Irish republic was out of the question, and indeed that self-determination had its pitfalls for a united Ireland, they supported Plunkett and trusted to President Wilson to save the situation.

Other native Americans came to the conclusion that the Irish question had to be resolved for reasons of expediency. Although in January Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk had told Senator Duncan U. Fletcher that Ulster would present an obstacle to any settlement, by mid-March he and Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips confessed to Plunkett that an "immediate settlement" of the Irish situation was necessary to stop the hostility in some sections of the United States that was growing towards the League of Nations. A group of Senators (Peter C. Gerry, David I. Walsh, Key Pittman, John B. Kendrick, and Thomas J. Walsh) wrote Wilson that both the League of Nations and the Democratic party would be badly hurt if the peace conference closed without any progress made on the Irish question.

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1 Cosgrave to McCarthy, 1 Feb. 1919, and also Campbell to McCarthy, 15 Feb. 1919 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, boxes 38 and 39).

2 See McCarthy to Plunkett, 17 Feb. 1919, McCarthy to Campbell, 3 March 1919, and McCarthy to Miss N.E. Murphy, 21 March 1919 (Ibid., box 39).

3 Polk to Fletcher, 7 Jan. 1919 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 139); and Plunkett diary, 15 March 1919 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

4 Gerry, et al., to Wilson, 8 March 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190).
a Democratic state executive chairman, warned Tumulty that the Irish-Americans were threatening the league and defecting from the Democratic party with the possible view to starting an Irish-American party.\(^1\) President Wilson was advised by Thomas L. Chadbourne that, although he had no more interest in Ireland than he did in Poland or Yugoslavia, it was vital for the future of the Democratic party that the peace conference take some steps to deal equitably with Ireland.\(^2\)

But probably few native Americans took the position of Congressman William E. Mason of Illinois who told John Devoy that Irish self-determination was "not an Irish question, it is not an English question, it is purely a question of American honour." Mason reasoned that because both the Germans and the Allies had accepted Wilson's fourteen points the United States was morally obligated to see that the principle was applied equitably all round.\(^3\)

Meanwhile anti-Irish feeling developed in the United States also. On 6, 7, and 9 December 1918, just a few days before the House of Representatives held hearings on the Gallagher resolution the Senate was holding hearings on German propaganda before and during the war. Mr A. Bruce Bielaski, a witness from the Attorney General's office, testified in some detail about such Irish-American nationalists as James K. McGuire, Jeremiah A. O'Leary, and Shaemus O'Sheel; he asserted that they had all worked closely with the Germans, had probably operated on German money, and had hoped, as everyone knew, for Great Britain's

\(^1\)Durbin to Tumulty, 23 April 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

\(^2\)Chadbourne to Wilson, 3 March 1919 (Ibid., file VIII A, box 22).

\(^3\)Mason to Devoy, 27 Dec. 1918 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box M).
defeat in the war.\footnote{\textit{U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, \textit{Brewing and liquor interests and German propaganda}, Hearings pursuant to Senate Res. 307 (65th Congress, 2nd and 3rd Sessions), 1919, pp 1392, 1496-97, 1408-26, 1542-44, and 1577. In fact both Larkin and O'Leary came up for trial in 1919. For details see O'Leary, \textit{My political trial and experiences}, passim, and Larkin, \textit{James Larkin}, pp 237-43. The IPL, which was currently being prevented from holding meetings by the New York police, attempted to raise money for O'Leary's defence. See IPL appeal and Golden to Police Commissioner Enright, 10 Dec. 1918 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii), and G.A., 22 Feb. 1919.} The \textit{Christian Science Monitor} featured a series of articles interviewing distinguished native Americans such as John Bates Clark, Columbia University economist, Dean James B. Lough, New York University, and Allen B. Pond, secretary of the war committee of the Union League Club, who all agreed on the inadvisability of the American delegation raising the Irish question at the peace conference.\footnote{\textit{C.S.M.}, 3, 4, and 9 Dec. 1918.} The Irish-American argument that the United States had gone to war to fight for self-determination was brushed aside by F.L. Warren of Stockbridge, Massachusetts, who told Senator John Sharp Williams that America had entered the war only because it had been threatened by Germany; arguing against the league he said that Irish-American agitation was an example of what could happen when a foreign question became involved in domestic politics.\footnote{Warren to Williams, 10 Feb. 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 44).} And Irving Winslow, national secretary of the Anti-Imperialist league, complained angrily to Senator Williams of the Irish-American pressure on Wilson. "The last blow seems final!," he said of Wilson's meeting with the Irish delegation on 4 March 1919, "How can the President insult our ally—an indepen-
dent nation—by a demand for dismemberment?" The dangers to Protess-
tants in Ireland that a Catholic home rule government would present
were outlined to Wilson in several letters urging him to ignore the
demands of the "Sinn Feiners."2

(ii)

The representatives of the main body of the Irish-American na-
tionalist movement were undeterred by their fruitless meeting with
President Wilson on 4 March. After reconvening, the delegation ap-
pointed a sub-committee of three to go to Paris under the title of
the American Commission on Irish Independence.3 Three distinguished
Irish-Americans, Frank P. Walsh, a Kansas City lawyer, former joint
president of Wilson's War Labour Board, and member of the Industrial
Relations Commission, Edward F. Dunne, a liberal Democrat and former
governor of Illinois, and Michael J. Ryan, the former president of
the UIL of America, were instructed to obtain safe conducts for
de Valera, Griffith, and Count Plunkett (who had been selected by the
Dail to represent Ireland at Paris), alternatively to plead the Irish
case before the peace conference themselves if unable to secure the
safe conducts, and to work for the recognition of the Irish republic

1Winslow to Williams, 19 March 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box
44).

2Four identical letters to Wilson from B.L. Jones, C.J. Fletcher,
J.H. Gribben, and C.B. Smith, 25 March 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers,
file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

3It had been suggested to Diarmuid Lynch in early 1919 by Grif-
fith, Collins, and Brugha that a delegation of Irish-Americans be sent
to Paris to assist Irish representatives in obtaining a hearing at the
at all times. Arriving in France on 11 April the Irish-American delegation was immediately contacted by Sean T. O'Kelly and George Gavan Duffy, Dail envoys to France, and Lincoln Steffens, the American journalist. Through Steffens Walsh met Ray Stannard Baker, then the Director of the Press Bureau for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and the person who received all official correspondence for President Wilson. Baker was cordial and offered to place their correspondence before the President and assist them in arranging an interview with Wilson at such time as they might desire. Walsh also met William C. Bullitt, from the Current Intelligence Department of the commission, who was fully informed about the Race Convention and the unsatisfactory interview between Wilson and the Irish-Americans in New York. Bullitt offered to contact Lloyd George's confidential secretary Philip Kerr and to talk with him about Walsh and his mission, and indeed the following day he reported to Walsh that Kerr had told him that Lloyd George would probably give the Irish delegation passports to come to France, although he would never agree to have them appear before the conference. On the same afternoon Walsh met with E.M. House, one of the five members of the American peace commission, who said he was familiar with the Irish situation through his friend Sir Horace Plunkett, and who made arrangements to meet again in

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1 G.A., 5 April 1919; Irish World, 5 April 1919; Redmond S. Brennan to American Commission on Irish Independence, 31 March 1919, William J. Moran to Walsh, 31 March 1919, and Walsh diary, 17 April 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124); and Notes of an interview of Secretary Lansing with Frank P. Walsh, 6 June 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 43).

2 Walsh diary, 14 April 1919 (Walsh Papers, op. cit.).

3 Walsh diary, 14 and 15 April 1919 (Ibid.).
a few days. On the strength of these successes, and the encouragement of Baker and Bullitt, the Irish-American delegation sent a letter to President Wilson explaining who they represented and the purpose of their mission. "If these gentlemen," they wrote about de Valera, Griffith, and Count Plunkett, "were furnished safe conduct to Paris so that they might present their case, we feel that our mission would be accomplished." They appealed to Wilson to prevail upon Lloyd George and they assured him that in so doing he would win the approval of millions of Americans.

Perhaps as the result of the reports on the situation in Ireland he had received earlier in the month from George Creel and also Sir Horace Plunkett urging the importance of an immediate settlement, Wilson agreed to meet with the Irish-American delegation.

In fact by the time he had returned from the United States Wilson had decided to speak with Lloyd George about the Irish problem. However in his conversation with the Irish-Americans on 17 April he said that officially the only topic which could be discussed at the time was the treaty with Germany, but that once the terms had been reached he proposed to say to Lloyd George that the Irish in America were all united and "intense" over the Irish question and that unless it was settled it would seriously affect British relations with America and

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1Walsh diary, 15 April 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124); and E.F. Dunne in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 223.

2Walsh, et al., to Wilson, 16 April 1919 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Walsh, Frank P.).

3Plunkett to Wilson, 2 March 1919, and Polk to Wilson, 6 March 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VII A, box 22 and Sec. VIII, box 15); and Wilson to Plunkett, 26 March 1919 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

4Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, i, p. 294; and Bonsal, Unfinished business, p. 149.
the Dominions. No doubt Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan would have liked Wilson to have given a more specific commitment, but at least he had assured them that he would raise the Irish question in the near future. Certainly this appeared to be progress after the disagreeable incident at the Metropolitan Opera House meeting a month earlier.

Meanwhile House had talked with Lloyd George and was shortly able to reinforce Bullitt's opinion that the delegates from Ireland would probably be allowed to come to Paris, although they could not appear before the conference. When House had seen Lloyd George he had attempted to demonstrate American interest in the Irish question by showing some resolutions which were typical of those being sent to the peace commissioners by groups in the United States. Through House and Wiseman, arrangements were made for the Irish-Americans to meet Lloyd George, possibly for the purpose of planning an agenda for the Irish delegation. However the business of the peace conference itself caused Lloyd George to postpone twice his meeting with Walsh and the Irish-Americans. In view of these delays it was suggested, by whom is a matter of some disagreement, that the Irish-Americans should make a quick trip to Ireland to examine the situation there for themselves. They were pleased at the opportunity to go to Ireland and in fact had earlier been advised to do so by Judge Cohalan.

1 See Walsh diary, 17 April 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124), and G.A., 26 April 1919.

2 See Thomas Canfield to House, ca. 17 March 1919, and House to Canfield, 21 April 1919 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Canfield, Thomas).
so that on their return they could "enlighten American opinion."\(^1\)

Actually the State Department had anticipated some dangers in precisely this situation and it had therefore restricted the passports for travel exclusively in France; however, when the British government issued them diplomatic visas the State Department felt that the matter was out of their hands.\(^2\)

Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan toured Ireland, in a triumphal procession, but in doing so wrecked the prospects of an Irish delegation going to Paris. They arrived on 3 May and after spending several days meeting with northern nationalist leaders and visiting jails and police barracks, they returned to Dublin on 6 May where they were greeted by a large crowd of people and a parade which took them through the city.

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\(^1\) Cahalan to Walsh, 28 March 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124). The circumstances surrounding the two weeks between the Irish-American delegation's initial contacts with the American authorities and their trip to Ireland are still ambiguous. The papers of the three major participants—Walsh, House, and Lloyd George—are all somewhat contradictory in their accounts. After the delegates returned to Paris, rather hostile notes were sent back and forth. Walsh claimed that House had told him de Valera would be granted safe conduct; House later said he thought de Valera might be granted safe conduct; Lloyd George said that he wanted to talk with Walsh merely to present the English arguments to the delegates. Walsh understood that Lloyd George wanted them to go to Ireland; Lloyd George thought that House wanted them to go; Sir William Wiseman, who arranged their going, thought that Wilson wanted them to go. See American Commission on Irish Independence to Wilson, 20 May 1919 (Ibid.); Lloyd George to House, 9 May 1919, and Notes on conversation between Colonel House and Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan, 23 May 1919 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Lloyd George, David, and III B, drawer 34, file 51); and War Cabinet 567A, 14 May 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/15).

\(^2\) Polk suggested that the exact situation should be described to the press so that it would be understood that "the British have brought all this trouble on themselves by vising their passports for England and Ireland." See Polk, Memorandum respecting passports of Irish-Americans, 15 May 1919 (House Papers, op. cit., III B, drawer 34, file 51); and John W. Davis, American Ambassador to England, to Polk, 16 May 1919 (Yale University Library, Polk Papers, drawer 77, file 133). Also see Lord Reading to F.O., 4 March 1919 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4245).
The Irish-Americans spent ten days in Ireland, during which time they met with Sinn Fein leaders, including de Valera, Griffith, and Plunkett; they were given the freedom of the city of Limerick, attended several civic functions in Dublin, addressed the Dail, and visited Mountjoy Prison. They made several speeches in which they made clear their views on Irish self-governments, described their mission at the peace conference and the unanimous support in America for the Irish cause. These activities caused an explosive reaction in England; the newspapers commented at great length, Bonar Law had to answer questions in Parliament for Lloyd George (and in fact said that Lloyd George would not now meet with the Irish-Americans), even the king asked that Lloyd George obtain from President Wilson some "disavowal of the action of these American Citizens." While the delegation was only half way through their trip Lloyd George wrote to House complaining that he had permitted them to go to Ireland on the understand-

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2. 14 May 1919, Hansard 5 (commons), cxv, col. 1582; Walter Long to Lloyd George, 8 May 1919, and Lord Stamfordham to Lloyd George, 9 May 1919 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 33/2/62). At the War Cabinet meeting on 14 May 1919 the Irish Chief Secretary, Ian Macpherson, said that the Irish-Americans had very much aggravated a delicate situation by their inflammatory speeches and their careless use of their passports, and he saw a direct increase in unrest in Ireland as a result of their visit; Bonar Law decided to announce in Parliament that Lloyd George would not meet with the Irish-Americans back in Paris. War Cabinet 567A, 14 May 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/15). This view was later supported by the American Ambassador to England, John W. Davis. See Davis to Sec of State, 28 May 1919 (N.A., 841d,00/57, roll 213).
ing that they were responsible men who genuinely wanted to investi-

gate the conditions there, but he expressed his dismay, listing the

indiscretions of the Irish-Americans in Ireland, and said that the

British government could not permit such activities.\(^1\) House refused
to take any responsibility for the delegation and said that they had

not asked to go to Ireland but had simply wanted Lloyd George to re-

cieve de Valera, Griffith, and Plunkett in Paris.\(^2\) The Prime Minister
replied that he had been given an altogether different understanding

from both Sir William Wiseman and House and that he proposed to cancel
the scheduled interview with the Irish-Americans.\(^3\)

The result of the trip to Ireland of the Irish-American delegates
on the efforts being made at the peace conference to assist in a set-
ttlement was disastrous. Through the efforts of House and Bullitt,
working with the knowledge and approval of Wilson, Lloyd George had
seemed willing to allow the Sinn Fein delegation to come to Paris.

However, after the reports of the activities of the delegation reached
the newspapers, Parliament, and the Cabinet Lloyd George had no alter-
native but to cease all efforts in that direction. Wilson explained
the situation to an anxious Tumulty:

\(^1\) Lloyd George to House, 9 May 1919 (Yale University Library,
House Papers, Lloyd George, David).

\(^2\) Ibid., and Bonsal, Unfinished business, pp 174-76.

\(^3\) He also said that in view of the present situation he would in-
form the Viceroy in Ireland to take whatever steps "necessary in the
interests of peace and order"; thus when Walsh applied to the military
to visit Westport he found his travel had been restricted. Lloyd
George to House, 10 May 1919 (House Papers, op. cit.). The New York
Times reported that the British authorities were "incensed" at the
delegates and that House would no longer serve as "intermediary" be-

\(N.Y.T.,\) 14 and 15 May 1919.
By our unofficial activity in the matter we had practically cleared the way for the coming of the Irish representatives to Paris when the Irish-American commission went to Ireland and behaved in a way which so inflamed British opinion that the situation has got quite out of hand, and we are utterly at a loss how to act in the matter without involving the government of the United States with the government of Great Britain in a way which might create an actual breach between the two. I made an effort the day before yesterday in this matter which shows, I am afraid, the utter futility of further efforts.\(^1\)

Wilson, who has often been regarded as indifferent if not hostile to the Irish cause, clearly felt that he and the American peace commission had through efforts in an unofficial capacity gone far to making a settlement possible, when the indiscretions of the Irish-American delegation destroyed these efforts and even the possibility for further attempts.\(^2\) When the Irish-Americans returned to Paris they directed new appeals to Secretary Lansing, emphasizing their desire to have the Irish delegation obtain safe conducts, and wrote to Wilson outlining the objectives of their mission and asserting that they under-

\(^1\) Wilson to Tumulty, 9 June 1919 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 3). Given the delicacy of the situation it is difficult to understand what prompted the Irish-Americans to figure so prominently in blatantly nationalistic activities; the previous missions of Ray Stannard Baker and George Creel had demonstrated that Americans could investigate conditions in Ireland, even conferring with nationalist leaders, without calling undue attention to themselves, and of course as representatives of President Wilson they were much more noteworthy. Colonel Bonsal, a military advisor for the American peace commission, related a conversation in which Dunne confessed that their passionate speeches were the result of too much Irish whiskey, although this explanation could hardly cover the entire trip even if true. See Bonsal, Unfinished business, pp 177-78. Ward doubts that Wilson had "cleared the way" for the Irish delegation in any case. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, p. 183.

\(^2\) If Wilson, as Seth Tillman has recently suggested, refused to allow the Irish question to "come to the surface," he had no objection to working on it at another level. S. Tillman, Anglo-American relations at the Paris peace conference of 1919 (Princeton, 1961), p. 200.
stood from House that Lloyd George would grant his permission.\textsuperscript{1} After discussing the matter with Wilson, Lansing replied to Walsh that the unofficial British and American co-operation which had allowed them to travel to Ireland and which had given hopes for securing permission for the Irish delegation to come to Paris was no longer possible. "Certain utterances" had been made by the delegates which had caused "the deepest offence to those persons with whom you were seeking to deal...," Lansing wrote, and in view of these facts new attempts to talk with the British authorities about the delegation from Ireland "would be futile and therefore unwise."\textsuperscript{2}

This rather explicit letter from the Secretary of State should normally have ended the Irish-American mission, and in fact Ryan did leave for the United States on 24 May.\textsuperscript{3} Walsh and Dunne were undeterred and attempted to save the situation by arguing with the American peace commissioners. They talked to House, who explained the damage that had been caused by what had reached the press, but who said he would do what he could for Ireland and that he intended to visit Ireland later in the summer.\textsuperscript{4} The delegation also sent several letters to Lansing arguing very legalistically that Lansing's note did not apply to them. They demanded to know exactly what "utterances" had caused offence and to what "persons," and they protested vigorously that they were not attempting to "deal" with anyone, but rather that

\textsuperscript{1}Lansing sent the letter to Wilson for his recommendations. See Walsh, et al., to Lansing, 17 May 1919, and Walsh, et al., to Wilson, 20 May 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124).

\textsuperscript{2}Lansing to Walsh, 24 May 1919 (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{3}Irish World, 7 June 1919.

\textsuperscript{4}Notes on conversation between House and Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan, 23 May 1919 (Yale University Library, House Papers, III B, drawer 34, file 51).
they merely wanted the three Irish delegates to be assured safe con-
duct from Ireland to Paris in order to address the conference; fail-
ing that they hoped to appeal to the conference themselves. As for
their views on Ireland, these had been known by everyone prior to
their trip and if they gave offence to anyone it was not to the peop-
le of Ireland. But these letters to Lansing, Wilson and even Clem-
enceau were last resort gestures. As Henry White, one of the five
United States peace commissioners, reported to Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, the Irish-Americans had obviously not sought to make their ap-
peal an official concern of the peace commission until after their
private efforts through House had failed.

Walsh and Dunne had one more meeting with both Lansing and Wil-
son. They told Lansing on 6 June that the American peace commission
were obligated as public representatives to give them an interview
because they were in a position to provide information about Ireland
which was vital before a satisfactory peace could be concluded with
Germany and Austria; they also gave Lansing a copy of the report of
their trip to Ireland, which in inflammatory nationalist rhetoric

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1. Walsh to Lansing, 26 and 27 May 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers,
box 124). Walsh and Dunne sent letters to each of the five members
of the American peace commission and they forwarded over thirty cables
from Irish-American organizations to Wilson. Failing to obtain any
favourable response they then requested an interview with the American
peace commission, which was turned down along with the comment that a
discussion of the Irish situation did not fall within the purview of
the American peace commission. See Walsh to Wilson, 26 May 1919,
Walsh and Dunne to J.C. Grew, 29 May 1919, and Walsh and Dunne to
Grew, 2 June 1919 (Ibid.); Walsh to Wilson, 31 May 1919, and Lansing,
Henry White, E.M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss to Wilson, 31
May 1919 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Walsh, Frank P. and
III B, drawer 34, file 49A). These efforts by the Irish-American del-
egation were fully reported in America. See G.A., 7 June 1919.

2. White to Lodge, 29 May 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society,
Lodge Papers, Henry White box).
described what they had seen. President Wilson, though earnestly annoyed with them by late May, met with Walsh and Dunne on 11 June and gave them a very frank interview. He told them that there was little he could do, despite the obvious American sympathy for Ireland, and that no small nation had yet appeared before the conference other than those which had been directly involved in the war. After Walsh attempted to suggest that Wilson would do something for Ireland if he fully appreciated the revolutionary situation which existed there, the President replied,

Now, Walsh, if it is your intention to go back to America and try to put me in bad, I am going to say when I go back that we were well on the way of getting Mr DeValera and his associates over here; we were well on the way, when you made it so difficult by your speeches in Ire-

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1. See Notes of an interview of Secretary Lansing with Frank P. Walsh, 6 June 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 43). The report, copies of which were also sent to members of the British government, the king, and leading London newspapers, was obviously designed to appeal over the heads of diplomats and governments to public opinion, especially in America and Ireland; it was certainly not likely to increase the chances of de Valera, Griffith, or Plunkett going to Paris. The British government was of course troubled by the publication of the report and the Irish Office printed a ten-page refutation of the allegations contained in it. See War Cabinet 579 (min. 4), 13 June 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/10), and G.T. no. 7485, 14 June 1919, Statement of Irish-American delegates (P.R.O., CAB. 24/81), Hansard 5 (commons), cxvii, cols 607-08, and American Commission on Irish Independence [F.P. Walsh and E.F. Dunne], "Report on conditions in Ireland with a demand for investigation by the peace conference" (Paris, 1919).

2. When Ray Stannard Baker told Wilson on 29 May that Walsh and Dunne were in his office every day Wilson replied that he did not know how long he could keep himself from condemning their "miserable mischief-making." "They see nothing," he said, "except their own small interest." Baker, American chronicle, p. 435. Henry White, while not so annoyed with the Irish-Americans, wrote to Senator Lodge that it was "difficult to deal frankly with" them because "they are apt to turn whatever one writes or says to them to the furtherance of their views, irrespective of the facts." White to Lodge, 19 June 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Henry White box). The final meeting between the delegates and Wilson was arranged through the efforts of Tumulty and Admiral Grayson. See Grayson to Tumulty, 13 June 1919 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 3).
land that we could not do it; that it was you gentlemen who kicked over the apple cart.¹

When Walsh and Dunne asked Wilson about the application of his war aims of self-determination to Ireland, and other small nationalities, the President said, "You have touched on the great metaphysical tragedy of to-day," and he as much as confessed, what Lansing had earlier feared, that he had had during the war no real knowledge of the effects of his words on people throughout the world.² All of the problems that Walsh had mentioned could not be solved in the short time of the peace conference, Wilson said; he had not done as much as he had hoped but he had made a beginning.

The interviews with Wilson and Lansing virtually ended the purposeful activities of Walsh and Dunne in Paris, although they continued to write letters, referring threateningly to the support for the Irish cause among powerful groups in the United States.³ John Archdeacon Murphy and L.S. Trigg were sent to Paris on 28 June by the Irish Race Convention committee to continue attempting to force the peace conference to deal with Ireland; Walsh and Dunne returned to the United


²Ibid., pp 837-38. Also see Dunne in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.C. Fitz-Gerald, p. 224.

³Frank P. Walsh who, as a labour lawyer, had strong connections in the American labour movement, obtained a pro-Irish resolution from the powerful American Federation of Labour, which was presented to Lansing. See Walsh to John Fitzpatrick, 12 and 15 June 1919, and Frank Morrison to Walsh, 22 June 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124); Walsh and Dunne to Lansing and the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 20 June 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 43); and Tumulty to Wilson, 21 June 1919 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 3).
Measured by their original objectives, they failed completely—de Valera and his colleagues were not permitted to go to Paris nor were the Irish-Americans themselves allowed to appeal to the peace conference, and their agitation for an Irish republic was hardly effective in realizing that goal among the great powers; indeed they may have obstructed the efforts of the diplomats. Nevertheless they were regarded as a great success by Judge Cohalan, who cabled his congratulations, and by several of the Irish envoys abroad, and in fact the goal of getting the delegation from Ireland to Paris seemed less important than the publicity campaign which the Irish-Americans carried on with great efficiency.\(^2\) Henry White later wrote to Lansing that he had been informed that Sean T. O'Kelly felt that the Irish were satisfied not only with the Irish-American delegation but also with the actions of the members of the American peace commission and that they realized that the Irish question could not come before the conference itself; and he told Senator Lodge that what the

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\(^1\) Back in the United States Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan undertook to relate their experiences in great detail. See Ga.A., 12, 19, and 26 July 1919, and Irish World, 21 June 1919.

\(^2\) O'Hegarty to George Gavan Duffy, 23 May 1919 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5582). From Rome O'Hegarty wrote that Bishop Fogarty and Father O'Flanagan regarded the trip to Ireland as a great "success." Sean T. O'Kelly, Dail envoy in Paris said that the delegation had "done wonders" and had kept the Irish matter before the eyes of the public, the press, and the peace conference; he wanted the thanks of Ireland extended to them for "the untold services they have rendered in this fight." O'Kelly to Devoy, 13 June 1919 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box N-OL). Also see Cohalan to Walsh and Dunne, 3 June 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124).
Irish-American delegation "wanted was publicity for the Irish cause."  

Meanwhile in the United States substantial efforts were also made to induce President Wilson to bring the Irish question before the peace conference. The most effective instrument by which to do this was the United States Congress, which traditionally had been more sympathetic to Ireland and more amenable to the pressures of the Irish-American nationalists than either the presidency or the State Department. Direct assistance came from Senator William E. Borah, a powerful member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who throughout 1919 became, in the words of his biographer, the "linch pin" between the Irish-American nationalists and the irreconcilable Republican Senators who opposed the Versailles Treaty. After consultations with Judge Cohalan, Senator Borah introduced a resolution on 29 May which asked that the American peace commission bring the Irish delegation before the peace conference. The resolution was reported back to the Senate on 5 June, amended in such a way as to avoid mentioning

1White to Lansing, 26 Aug. 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 46); and White to Lodge, 4 Sept. 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Henry White box). Walsh's comment to Griffith that "Ireland was making more noise than all the other small nations combined /in Paris/," would seem to raise questions as to how serious they were in hoping to deal with Lloyd George. 17 June 1919, Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, p. 117.

2See M.C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 158.

3See Cohalan to Borah, 12 and 27 May 1919, and Borah to Cohalan, 14, 23, and 28 May 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 551), and 29 May 1919 (S. Res. 48), Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, p. 393.
a republican government in Ireland. The following day when the resolution came up for a vote, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, moved and carried an amendment to the resolution which expressed "sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of its own choice." In his speech Lodge deplored that the conference had become involved in matters beyond drafting a treaty of peace with Germany which had been its original purpose. From current reports, Lodge told the Senate, the British were attempting to interpret America's Monroe Doctrine in the context of the League of Nations, which Lodge felt they had no right to do, but if they chose to do so the Senate was perfectly free to draft statements about Britain's vital interests. The resolution was passed by a vote of sixty to one (Senator Williams opposing and thirty-five not voting).

The Senate's genuine interest in Irish representation at the peace conference was the subject of discussion several days later during debate on the Knox resolution, designed to limit the activities

1 See Judge Cohalan's objections to the amended form, Cohalan to Borah, 25 June 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 551); 5 June 1919 (S. Report no. 6), Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, pp 671-72. When Senator Borah asked for the immediate consideration of the resolution Senator Williams objected, saying that the resolution was "ill advised and really none of our business." Ibid.

2 6 June 1919, Ibid., p. 729. Lodge justified his actions and the vote of the Senate on the same terms to both Henry White and Lord Bryce. See Lodge to White, 23 June 1919, and Lodge to Lord Bryce, 10 June 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Henry White and Bryce boxes). The Senate resolution asked that the American peace commission "endeavor to secure for Edward DeValera, Arthur Griffiths and Count George Noble Plunkett a hearing before said Peace Conference in order that they may present the cause of Ireland." See also Frank L. Polk to Lansing, 6 June 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 43).

3 Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 729; G.A., 14 June 1919; and Irish World, 14 June 1919.
of the peace conference to simply the treaty with Germany. Senator Thomas pointed out the incongruity of this same group supporting the Knox resolution after almost unanimously passing the Borah resolution the previous week. If the Senate were serious about the representation of small nationalities at the conference why was there not a resolution in favour of Korean independence before the Senate as well as one favouring Ireland. As for Ireland and American war aims, Senator Thomas thundered, "We certainly did not enter this war with the object of securing the independence of the Irish Sinn Fein," whom he accused of not representing Ireland and of being in collusion with the Germans.¹ Several days later both Senators Borah and Phelan attempted to make rebuttals, but Phelan at least was hampered by the fact that he was a member of the same political party as the President.²

The Borah resolution forced the question of the Irish delegates fully into the open. Despite all Tumulty's warnings there was little the President could do to prevent its passage, or to anticipate effectively its objective; as he told Tumulty, "I have tried to help in the Irish matter but the extraordinary indiscretion of the Irish American delegation over here has almost completely blocked everything."³ When the Senate resolution arrived in Paris, Wilson, acting on the advice of the four other American peace commissioners, forwarded it to Clemenceau, president of the peace conference, with a

²25 June 1919, Ibid., pp 1726-30.
³See Tumulty to Wilson, 4 June 1919, Tumulty to Admiral Grayson, 7 June 1919, and Wilson to Tumulty, 7 June 1919 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 3).
minimum of comment; Clemenceau took no action on the resolution. It did of course provide further arguments for Walsh and Dunne in their attempts to force the American peace commissioners to have de Valera brought to Paris. However, if it had ever been possible for the United States to take the initiative in such a way, through the official machinery of the Senate and the peace commission, it was no longer so after the Irish-American delegation had gone to Ireland.2

In terms of practical possibilities in Paris the resolution was an empty gesture, but as Henry White wrote to Lodge, it relieved the peace commission "of any responsibility in the matter."3 The resolution was not without some effects, though. "We have all got new hope and courage as a result of it," Sean T. O'Kelly wrote to Devoy on 13 June, "Even if we are turned down by Wilson—as is not unlikely from most recent happenings—the effect of the Senate resolution will be such, in my opinion, as will secure for our cause an earlier success than most of us could dream of."4 The resolution encouraged the Irish political leaders to believe that they had substantial support from

1Wilson to Lansing, 10 June 1919, and Lansing, White, House, and Bliss to Wilson, 10 June 1919, Wilson to Lansing, 16 June 1919, and American Commission to Negotiate Peace to M. Clemenceau, 16 June 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 43). Also see Minutes of the daily meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, 21 June 1919, 184.00101/93, Foreign relations. Paris peace conference, 1919, p. 242; and also Lansing to President, 3 Oct. 1919 (N.A., 841d.00/52, roll 213); and Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, pp 184-85.

2See Walsh and Dunne to American Commission, 13, 17, 20 June 1919, and J.C. Grew to Walsh, 21 June 1919 (Lansing Papers, op. cit.), Grew to Walsh, 17 June 1919 (N.Y.,P.I., Walsh Papers, box 125), and Minutes of the daily meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, 14 June 1919, 184.00101/88, Foreign relations, op. cit., p. 234.

3White to Lodge, 6 June 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Henry White box).

4O'Kelly to Devoy, 13 June 1919 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box N-OL). For similar views see Art O'Briain to Paris Office, 12 June 1919, and O'Kelly to O'Briain, 15 June 1919 (N.L.I., O'Briain Papers, MS 8422).
America in much the same way as had the visit to Ireland of the Irish-American delegation; the Dail sent its unanimous thanks to the Senate.  

Across the United States there were very mixed feelings about both the Irish-American delegation and the Borah resolution in the Senate. The Literary Digest commented on the delegation's trip to Ireland with some amazement, but registered no opinions from American newspapers. Charles McCarthy, an interested observer, warned Plunkett that Frank P. Walsh was "a pretty dangerous individual...." Senator Borah was reminded by a Chicago businessman that the Republican party was made up of Irishmen of the "McKinley breed" not the "Dunnes and Cohalans and Ryans...," and further that Americans supported "the Irish who were loyal and not with the skulking, traitorous, draft-resisting Sinn Fein." The secretary-general of the Masons in the southern United States told Senator Williams that America had gone too far in interfering in the Irish question, and he argued that an Irish Catholic government would persecute the Protestants in Ireland the way the Catholics in Poland were currently persecuting the Jews. Another correspondent from Chicago also warned Williams of the "Catholic intrigue" and said the Irish-American

17 June 1919, Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, pp 113-14.


3McCarthy to Plunkett, 4 April 1919 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

4John E. McEldowney to Borah, 7 June 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 550).

5John H. Cowles to Williams, 6 June 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 45).
delegation went abroad "as Roman Catholics camouflaging as Americans." German and Irish collusion during the war was also a source of great hostility among many Americans, whose passions had not sufficiently cooled to allow them to regard with equanimity the apparent Senate support for Sinn Fein Ireland. Former Attorney General George W. Wickersham, who had spoken out several times on the necessity of a settlement of the Irish question, thought that the Senate resolution was subversive and disgusting. But the criticisms of some native Americans aside, the delegation and the resolution had substantial support.

(iii)

When it became clear that the peace conference was not going to take up the Irish question the leaders of the Irish-American nationalist organizations turned the energies and resources of their movement, with some personal malice for their sufferings during the war, against President Wilson and his foreign policy. This was a step taken not without some cost, especially to those Irish-Americans who had loyalties either to Wilson or to the Democratic party, but it also held the elements of a possible alliance with the Republicans in the 1920 elections. Indeed the Irish-American nationalists had taken a public

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1 W. Weishaar to Williams, 7 June 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 45).

2 For examples see Milledge L. Bonham to Williams, 7 June 1919, and Richard Zerega to Williams, 11 June 1919 (Ibid.).


4 For an indication of the support see the attacks on Senator Williams because of his vote against the Borah resolution. (Williams Papers, op. cit., boxes 45 and 46).

5 O'Grady, The immigrants' influence on Wilson peace policies, pp 76-77.
position on the League of Nations as early as the Irish Race Convention in February, when they said that they would oppose any treaty which did not safeguard what they felt to be America's interests. As early as March and April 1919 the energies of the nationalist organizations were directed towards an attack on the league as a threat to American freedom, as an Anglo-American alliance, and as a device for strangling the Irish revolutionary movement by excluding the possibility of outside assistance. Large meetings were sponsored throughout the country by the FOIF, the IPL, Irish Self-Determination clubs, and countless local Irish-American organizations for the purpose of demonstrating the dangers that the league posed to both the United States and Ireland. In early April Edward F. McSwiney, a successful Boston lawyer and former chairman of the Boston Board of Port Directors, counselled Judge Cohalan about the tactics for a nation-wide campaign, advising the necessity of enlisting the support of successful and respectable Irish-Americans, of circulating anti-British propaganda in non-Irish newspapers, and of establishing a mailing list of at least 20,000 Irish sympathizers to whom appeals and information could be sent. By mid-summer the FOIF was fully embarked on just such a program, financed by the Irish Victory Fund, and on a somewhat smaller scale so was the IPL.

The possible success of the drive to link the Irish question


2 See McSwiney to Cohalan, 2 April 1919 (N. L. I., Devoy Papers, box M).

with the league issue depended upon the extent to which the Irish-American nationalists were able to join forces with other elements in American society which also opposed the league. In this they were particularly fortunate, for although the league had many supporters in the United States it had many powerful opponents as well, especially among the Republican majority in the Senate. The most outstanding of these Senate opponents was Senator Borah who had indicated his interest in Ireland as early as November 1918 but who also found in the Irish-American objections to the league a useful argument in his own fight against the treaty.¹ During the spring and summer Borah consulted with Judge Cohalan in co-ordinating Irish-American and anti-league activities, and Cohalan provided the Senator with access to the Irish-American leaders.² Borah spoke frequently before large Irish-American audiences and told them how the League of Nations would permanently establish British rule in Ireland.³ The views of the Senator on the league and Irish nationalism were probably most completely summarized in his telegram to a large Irish-American meeting in Portland, Oregon, on 1 June 1919:

The right of self determination which we were assured was involved in this war is wholly excluded from the League Covenant....There is no method, no

¹See Borah to Mrs Fogarty, 20 Nov. 1918 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 188). The causes of the hostility of the Republican Senators to Wilson and the treaty do not fall within the scope of this thesis, although they obviously have considerable bearing on the alliance between the Irish-Americans and the Senators. For a complete analysis see T.A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the great betrayal (Chicago, 1963), passim, and McKenna, Borah, pp 283-84.

²Cohalan-Borah correspondence, May through Sept. 1919 (Borah Papers, op. cit., box 551); and McKenna, op. cit., p. 158.

³See Irish Self-Determination Club, Omaha, to Borah, 2 March 1919, Harry Cunningham, et al., to Borah, 2 March 1919, John V. Sullivan to Borah, 8 March 1919, and Joseph McCaffery and James J. Murphy to Borah, 26 March 1919 (Borah Papers, op. cit.).
means by which a subject people struggling for their liberties can ever be heard. The denial of a hearing to the representatives of Ireland discloses in an unmistakable way that the principle of self determination had been rejected by the framers of the League. The League created an autocracy based upon the combined military power of five great nations. Under Article ten this military force is to be used to hold intact the territorial boundaries of the members of the autocracy. This not only means the subjection of all small nations to the dictation of the autocracy but it means the use of the man power of the United States to settle the territorial disputes and dynastic quarrels of Europe. The scheme is un-American, unjust to small nations and instead of being a league for peace is a league to promote war. As we love American independence, as we believe in the freedom of the Irish people, as we believe in liberty everywhere let us fight it.¹

Here Borah outlined all of the growing fears of the Irish-Americans about the dangerous effects of the league on both Ireland and the United States. Senator Lodge of Massachusetts was also willing to use the Irish question to fight the league and the treaty, as indeed his amendment to the Borah resolution in June indicated. He observed to Henry White that the Irish-Americans were "bitterly opposed to the League," and he felt that their antagonism towards Wilson was not altogether unjustified.² By late July Lodge observed to the chairman of the Massachusetts Republican finance committee that the Irish-Americans were irrevocably "against Wilson and the League," and he recommended that the Republicans exploit this sentiment among the traditionally Democratic Irish-Americans in Massachusetts.³ And Lodge

¹Borah to Smith, 31 May 1919 (punctuation changed from telegram form), and also Borah to Thomas Mannix, 29 March 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 551).

²Lodge to White, 2 July 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Henry White box). Lodge also argued with White that the Irish-American delegates "were not allowed to present their case as they should have been permitted to present it." Lodge to White, 2 Oct. 1919 (Ibid.).

³Lodge to John W. Weeks, 31 July 1919 (Ibid., Peace, League, Political box).
himself assured a Massachusetts state senator that "under Article 10 Americans would be prevented from giving the same kind of aid to Ireland as that which France gave to America in the Revolution...," unless the United States were willing to go to war with all the members of the league.¹

The combined efforts of the Irish-American leaders and the Republican Senators against the League of Nations reached a high point when, through the work of Cohalan and Borah, Lodge's Senate Foreign Relations Committee allowed Irish-Americans to testify at the hearings on the peace treaty. In early July Judge Cohalan wrote to Senator Borah that there were a large number of Americans who would like to testify before the committee in regard to several causes, the Irish among them; Borah encouraged Cohalan to have these people demand from their Senators that public hearings be held, and as a result the committee listened patiently to many nationalist, ethnic, and lobby groups who had grievances related to the treaty.² On 30 August 115 Irish-Americans appeared before the committee with Judge Cohalan as their spokesman. The judge said that he and his colleagues spoke for the 20,000,000 Americans of Irish descent who desired to see Ireland free; he told the committee that he opposed the treaty and the league because it was not in America's best interests to guarantee the status quo in Ireland and the rest of the world. Cohalan said further that an Ireland independent from Great Britain and friendly to the United States was the key to the North Atlantic and was vital to maintain the freedom of the seas and the all-important commercial freedom which

¹Lodge to John J. Walsh, 14 Aug. 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Peace, League, Political box).

²Cohalan to Borah, 11 July 1919, and Borah to Cohalan, 14 July 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 551).
would allow the United States to continue to grow in the face of British trade rivalry.\footnote{U.S. Congress, Treaty of peace with Germany, pp 757-903. Many of Cohalan's arguments were also developed in his pamphlet published by the FOIF. D.F. Cohalan, "Freedom of the seas" (New York, 1919).} Frank P. Walsh, Edward F. Dunne, and Michael J. Ryan told of their frustrations in attempting to deal with the American and British peace commissions to bring the Irish delegation to Paris and the deplorable conditions they found in Ireland, and indeed, Walsh said he had gone to Paris fully supporting Wilson and the league but that he had become convinced that the Allied statesmen had no intention of fulfilling their war promises.\footnote{Treaty of peace with Germany, op. cit., pp 795-864. Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan submitted to the committee copies of their correspondence with the American, British, and French peace commissions, and gave detailed memoranda of their conversations with Wilson and others. Also see F.P. Walsh, "Impressions of Ireland," Nation, cviii (7 June 1919), p. 907.} John Archdeacon Murphy gave a brief account of his experiences with the peace commissioners in Paris, W.W. McDowell, the Lt Governor of Montana, and Daniel C. O'Flaherty, a Protestant Irish-American from Virginia, both spoke of America's great sympathy and interest in Irish freedom, and Congressman W. Bourke Cockran gave a history of Ireland and expounded on the obligations of the United States to Ireland.\footnote{Treaty of peace with Germany, op. cit., pp 865-903; and also G.A., 6 and 13 Sept. 1919. Irish-American nationalists also assisted in the testimony of other dissatisfied minority groups. See Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, p. 198. Senator Williams told Lodge that in fairness the committee should also be willing to hear testimony from Ulster Unionists. Williams to Lodge, 2 Sept. 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 47).}

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The Senators told witnesses, Frank P. Walsh later recalled, that they were sympathetic to the Irish cause and that the Irish-American nationalists were of such great assistance that but for them the

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league would have been quickly accepted. The committee published, along with the actual hearings, all of the written materials submitted (many of the 115 witnesses carried petitions, resolutions, or statements), most importantly, the correspondence between Walsh, Dunne, Ryan and the American, British, and French peace commissions, which revealed Walsh's pleading inquiries and the commissioners's cold business-like replies, but rather unfairly omitted any mention of the very important efforts that had been made by Wilson, House, and Lansing on behalf of the Irish delegation. In fact to give these letters faster and wider publicity and circulation, Senator Brandegee also had them printed in the Congressional Record. Through Daniel T. O'Connell, director of the Irish National Bureau in Washington, at least 75,000 copies of the committee hearings were mailed out, and by 11 November O'Connell asked Borah for 5,000 copies with his frank which would allow the Bureau to address them to receptive readers at public expense. The testimony of the Irish-Americans and the subsequent publication of their correspondence had its effect on public opinion and influenced the growing hostility towards the league. As Lodge wrote to Henry White, who tended to dismiss Walsh's complaints against the commission, "I assure you that these are not men whose testimony can be whistled down by the wind whatever you may feel about


3O'Connell to Borah, 13 Nov. 1919, and John B. Sullivan to Borah, 30 Sept. 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, boxes 550 and 551).
The Irish-American nationalist organizations attacked the League of Nations by showing how it threatened Ireland's national aspirations. The FOIF, the largest of these organizations, published a series of broadsheets and pamphlets from its national office. "The League of Nations and the rights of small nations," which came out in April 1919 was among the first FOIF attacks and after the peace conference was over, Edward F. Dunne's "What Dunne saw in Ireland" gave in pamphlet form much of his testimony before the Senate committee, as did the "Statement of Hon. Daniel F. Cohalan." The FOIF also published "Official documents from Ireland, including 'Ireland's case for independence' adopted by Dail Eireann for presentation to the peace conference," which presented all the unsuccessful Irish correspondence to the American, British and French peace commissions.

Edward F. McSweeney's "Ireland is an American question" argued that the league was an instrument of British oppression and that it was designed to insure British domination of the sea. The FOIF also financed the Irish National Bureau in Washington, D.C., which published a

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1 Lodge to White, 2 Oct. 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Henry White box).


3 "Official documents from Ireland, including 'Ireland's case for independence' adopted by Dail Eireann for presentation to the peace conference" (New York, 1919).

4 E.F. McSweeney, "Ireland is an American question" (New York, 1919). Tansill has asserted that such pamphlets as "The Irish republic can pay its way" and Edward F. McSweeney's "America first" reached a circulation of 700,000 and 100,000 copies respectively. Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 332. Ward suggests that the FOIF may have spent nearly $750,000 of the Irish Victory Fund on anti-league efforts. Ward, "America and the Irish problem, 1899-1921," I.H.S., xvi, no. 61 (March 1968), p. 87.
weekly "News letter," which contained short articles suitable for reprinting, and a one or two page press release, the "Weekly News Bulletin," which was circulated to newspaper reporters; both items were sent to politicians in Washington. The American Commission on Irish Independence, which did not disband after returning to the United States, printed such occasional leaflets as "America's appeal to Ireland" which referred to an address by the first Continental Congress to the Irish Parliament in 1775. The IPL, which in addition to its regular bulletin, published anonymously a series of pamphlets which attacked the league, described in vivid statistics the territorial expansion of the British Empire as a result of the war, and bemoaned the loss to the United States and gain to the Allies that the war had been. The IPL also attracted to the Irish fight against the league a number of native American liberals.

Individual Irish-Americans and others also made private efforts to promote the Irish cause, often at the expense of the League of Nations. Judge Edward J. Gavegan wrote an important article for the New York American, "Every race saved from bondage except the Irish," which said that America and Britain must work closely together for world

1"America's appeal to Ireland" (Chicago, n.d.).

2See "That traitorous League of Nations" (New York, 1919), "The lion's share" (New York, 1919), "Profit and loss in peace making" (New York, 1919), "Revolution and co-operation" (New York, 1919), and "Defeat to all Democrats" (New York, 1919).

peace but that Irish freedom had to come first. A book describing the efforts to bring the Irish delegation before the peace conference, *The invincible Irish*, was written by J.C. Walsh, then with the Jesuit weekly *America*, who had travelled to Ireland and France in 1919. A Hearst newspaper writer, Philip Francis, published *The poison in America's cup*, which was wild anglophobe propaganda directed specifically at the Irish-American public. Perhaps one of the most effective of all publications during the league debate was "The re-conquest of America," written by Dr W.J.M.A. Maloney, but published anonymously and over the imprint of a fictitious press. Supposedly a letter from Sir William Wiseman to Lloyd George, the pamphlet described the progress that had been made, and the work yet to be done, in bringing the United States back into the empire; it cleverly portrayed Wilson as the weak willed tool of British influences and the Irish and Germans as those most resistant to British designs. The pamphlet was reprinted several times and also reproduced in several newspapers and liberal journals. An exception was George Creel, one of the more unlikely Irish apologists, who in February had served as Wilson's special agent in Ireland. By the summer of 1919 he had written a series of nationalist articles on Ireland which were later published as a book; in fact Creel found

1 New York *American*, 16 March 1919.
3 P. Francis, *The poison in America's cup* (New York, 1919).
4 "The re-conquest of America" (New York, 1919).
himself asked to speak at IPL functions.¹

Irish-American obstruction of Wilson and the league placed
great stresses on many old Democratic party loyalties, and substantial
efforts were made by Democrats either to disentangle the Irish ques-
tion from the league and the treaty or to demonstrate how the league
could most effectively provide Ireland with certain kinds of outside
assistance. As early as April 1919 one Senator told Tumulty, "The
League of Nations is the only way by which Ireland should be able to
expect a very prompt settlement of her desire for self-government."²
Wilson himself replied to one of Tumulty's many requests on behalf of
Ireland by saying, "I firmly believe when the League of Nations is
once organized it will afford a forum not now available for bringing
the opinion of the world and of the United States in particular to
bear on just such problems."³ For diplomatic reasons, Wilson was
unwilling to voice this opinion in public; however, by late August
even the Secretary of State was asking Wilson for some statement of
opinion which could be used to answer the volumes of letters on the

¹G. Creel, Ireland's fight for freedom: setting forth the high
lights of Irish history (New York, 1919). See Golden to Creel, 14
June 1919 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii). Creel's
book was first serialized in the New York Sunday American, July-Aug.
1919. In spite of his interest in Ireland, Creel supported Wilson
and the league and criticized several Irish-American leaders, which
won him the enmity of the Gaelic American. G.A., 16 Aug. 1919, and
Leslie's Weekly, 2 Aug. 1919. The inability of the Clan leaders to
recognize the importance of Creel's book for the Irish movement was a
source of some despair to Frank P. Walsh. Walsh to Sean T. O'Kelly,

²To Tumulty, 7 April 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI,
no. 3926, box 558).

³Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, p. 404.
Irish question directed to the department. During his ill-fated speaking tour across the United States in September, when the President attempted to bring the league and treaty issues directly to the people, he was ready to use these arguments to forestall his critics.

On 17 September Wilson answered questions put to him by the San Francisco Labour Council, which asked why Ireland had not been heard at the peace conference and where the President stood on self-determination for Ireland. Wilson's replies were that the conference "had no jurisdiction over any question of that sort which did not affect territories which belonged to the defeated empires." And he went on to answer the second question,

My position on the subject of Self-Determination for Ireland is expressed in Article XI of the Covenant, in which I may say I was particularly interested because it seemed to me necessary for the peace and freedom of the world that a forum be created to which all peoples could bring any matter which was likely to affect the peace and

1See Office of the Secretary, Department of State, to Wilson, 22 Aug. 1919 (L.C., Lansing Papers, vol. 45). The friends of the league felt that Wilson should emphasize precisely this point, that the league could help Ireland, in order to win back Irish-American support. See Dr Joseph Hugh McGready to Wilson, 5 Sept. 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558); William Scallon to Walsh, 18 Sept. 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190); Senator James Hamilton Lewis to American Commission on Irish Independence, 20 Sept. 1919, and Frank P. Walsh to Lewis, 24 Sept. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124); and Charles McCarthy to Joseph F. O'Connell, 26 Aug. 1919 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 40).
freedom of the world.\(^1\)

But a week later in Colorado Wilson suffered a physical collapse, followed by a stroke, which effectively removed him from the league fight. The immediate result was that the President was never able to develop convincingly the arguments which might have countered the anti-league propaganda of his Irish-American enemies.

Loyal Democrats were willing to point out the ways in which the league could be used to assist Ireland and to accuse their Republican adversaries of duplicity in their newly found pro-Irish sympathies. Shortly after the Borah resolution had been passed Senator Phelan interrupted an important debate to point out that Article X of the League Covenant posed no threat to Irish aspirations. Irish independence might be achieved by three ways: mutual agreement with Britain, successful revolution, or intervention by an outside power. Article X blocked only the third means, he said, which had failed to be a practical policy with Spain, France, or most recently Germany as the intervening power, and Phelan also reminded the Senate that in 1916 when they could have done something for Ireland only eight Republicans had

\(^1\) G.A., 27 Sept. 1919. The Gaelic American denied Wilson's interest and said that without British agreement the United States could never raise the Irish question in the league. Wilson's friends saw his statements as the beginning of the long awaited rebuttal of the violent Irish-American critics. William Scallon to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 18 Sept. 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, box 190). Frank P. Walsh wrote to Wilson immediately after the interview asking for a clearer statement as to whether Wilson favoured applying the principle of self-determination to Ireland; no answer was received. Walsh to Wilson, 17 and 19 Sept. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124). Also see Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I know him, pp 405-07, and Gerson, The hyphenate in recent American politics and diplomacy, p. 83. For a description of Clan activities during Wilson's tour see Viereck, Spreading germs of hate, p. 227.
had supported the resolution asking for clemency for Irish prisoners.¹ When Borah later attacked Phelan's three ways in which Ireland could obtain her independence, Senator Thomas J. Walsh interrupted to ask if "the Senator from Idaho is contemplating aid by this Government to the Irish people." Borah, caught in the logical conclusion of his own argument, had to reply that if Walsh meant military aid he did not, but he felt that America should give Ireland all the moral support possible and that no American troops should be used to suppress an Irish insurrection.² Senator Walsh was approached by Michael Francis Doyle, who thought that Wilson had alienated the Irish-American public and not provided much encouragement to his Irish-American friends, to meet together with Senator Phelan and Doyle to plan some strategy to counter the opposition.³ Actually Walsh had already conferred with Wilson some time earlier, and his plan was to introduce a resolution in the Senate committing the United States to immediate action on the Irish question as soon as the country entered the League.⁴ Walsh introduced this resolution on 17 October, but it was

¹Of the eight, he pointed out, six were "Progressives." 26 June 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, pp 1787-88.

²30 June 1919, Ibid., pp 2077-80. Walsh also accused Borah and the irreconcilable Republicans of using Ireland to obscure the real issues, and that their inconsistency was revealed in their contradictory demands that the United States keep out of European quarrels while at the same time insisting that the United States would be prevented by the league from assisting Ireland's struggle for independence. 28 July 1919, Ibid., pp 3323-28. Walsh was supported in this argument by the former governor of Montana, A.E. Spriggs to Walsh, 31 July 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). These arguments were promptly repudiated by Irish-Americans. D.D. Murphy to Borah, 1 July 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 551).

³Doyle to Walsh, 4 Sept. 1919 (Walsh Papers, op. cit.).

⁴Walsh to Wilson, 17 July 1919 (Ibid.).
called an unconvincing trick to win back Irish-American support by Senator Poindexter, and Lodge not only had the resolution tabled but two days later also read to the Senate a letter from the director of the Irish National Bureau which stated that the FOIF and all 20,000,000 Irish-Americans opposed the resolution. Walsh himself confessed to friends that the measure did not have much support, and in fact it never came up for a vote.

The intrusion of the Irish question in the national debate on the league and the treaty was a source of some considerable anguish to a number of native Americans. In the Senate a protest was registered by John Sharp Williams, who on 16 October assailed the Irish-Americans, saying that those in the Senate who tied "Americanism" to the league issue were really talking about "pro-Germanism, Irish-Americanism, Magyar-Americanism, and Austrian-Americanism." Williams raised the prospect of all the Americans of English, Welsh, and Scottish descent banding together to promote a policy solely for the benefit of Great Britain, and indeed he went on to argue that the basic concepts of freedom and liberty, as known in America, had their

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2See Walsh to Mrs A.E. Spriggs, 25 Nov. 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). Adler has suggested that by joining forces with the irreconcilable Republicans the Irish-American nationalist leaders made the chance for any compromise worked out by Republican and Democratic moderates, such as Senator Walsh, quite impossible. Adler, The isolationist impulse, p. 84. Duff has concluded that after June 1919 Senators Walsh and Phelan were the only Irish-American politicians still supporting Wilson. Duff, "The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans," Jn. Amer. Hist., lv (Dec. 1968), p. 598.
origins in England.¹ Williams was warmly supported by many upper middle-class native Americans, who applauded his comments as they had approved of his single vote against the Borah resolution. The president of Randolph-Macon College in Virginia, a state senator from Iowa, an assistant treasurer of the St Louis United States Sub-Treasury, the president of the Philadelphia Protestant Federation, and many others wrote Williams their approval along with the suggestion that Anglo-Saxon and Protestant England and America must stand together.² Williams privately apologized to Phelan for anything that he said about the Irish to which the Senator might have taken offence, but two days later when Senator Hitchcock had AOH resolutions placed in the Congressional Record Williams demanded the printing of some resolutions from the Near East Relief Society asking that the American government attempt to do something about the fate of nearly 100,000 Christian and Jewish women still kept in harems in areas which were formerly parts of the Ottoman Empire.³ Williams's attempts to contrast injustices in the Near East with injustice in Ireland fell upon predictably deaf ears among the Irish-Americans and their friends in

¹16 Oct. 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, pp 7005-07. Senator Phelan responded to Williams that all of the blessings of Anglo-Saxon liberty about which Williams had talked so glowingly had not yet reached across the Irish Sea. Ibid. Lodge recognized in Williams's speech further ammunition which the Republicans could use in their campaign to lure the Irish vote into their own camp. See Lodge to John L. Weeks, 17 Oct. 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Peace, League, Political box).


³Williams to Phelan, 17 Oct. 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 48), and 18 Oct. 1919, Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 7107.
The treaty of peace with Germany, which incorporated the League of Nations, came before the Senate for a vote on 19 November 1919. After three votes, two with the Lodge reservations and one with no reservations, the treaty was defeated. Cohalan quickly cabled Senator Borah, "Heartiest congratulations. Greatest victory for country and liberty since Revolution largely due to you." The Senator returned his thanks to Cohalan and said, "You have rendered in this fight a service which no other man has rendered or could have rendered," which given the size and strength of the FOIF which Cohalan dominated was certainly true. The *Gaelic American* registered its approval with the large headline: "SENATE'S ACTION A SPLENDID VINDICATION OF AMERICANISM," and reproduced broadsheets published by the Irish Victory Fund under the auspices of the FOIF. Because of the sentiment in the country the Senate voted on the treaty in March 1920 for a fourth time. On 17 March, the day before the treaty would come up for a vote, Senator Gerry of Rhode Island introduced a reservation to the treaty which contained something of the spirit of Senator Walsh's earlier resolution, which stated that in accepting the treaty the United States would re-affirm its commitments to the principles of

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1 Some pamphlet writing was done by those who rejected the Irish-American nationalists's arguments against the league. See J.A. Connolly, "The still vexed Irish question" (n.p., n.d.), and "The elements arrayed against the R.C. Irish" (n.p., n.d.). Their effect was probably negligible.


3 Cohalan to Borah, 19 Nov. 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 551).

4 Borah to Cohalan, 22 Nov. 1919 (Ibid.).

5 *G.A.*, 29 Nov. 1919; and also *Irish World*, 6 Dec. 1919.
self-determination and its sympathy for "the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice." It further suggested that as soon as Ireland obtained its independence it should be quickly admitted into the league.¹ When the Gerry reservation was debated the following day Senators Thomas, Williams, and Kellogg attempted to include also Korean and African independence, which they said was valid if the Senate were really interested in matters of principle rather than Irish votes. Thomas insisted that Hitchcock, one of the Gerry reservation supporters, was unlikely to vote for the treaty under any conditions and that this was an attempt to obscure the real issues. The reservation was carried by a vote of 38 to 36, with Fletcher, Kellogg, Lodge, Harding, and Williams among those opposing it.² The treaty was defeated later that same day by a vote of 49 to 35.³ As Senator Borah had acknowledged, the Irish-Americans had been instrumental in assisting to defeat the league and the treaty, although it is to be remembered that they shared the responsibility

¹17 March 1920, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 59, p. 4457. There had been some discussion between Borah and the Irish-American leaders about an Irish reservation as early as July 1919. See Rossa F. Downing to Cohalan, 24 July 1919 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box J-L).

²18 March 1920, Congressional Record, op. cit., pp 4499-507 and 4522.

³Senator Harding later justified his vote against the reservation to Frank P. Walsh by pointing out that sixteen of those who had voted for it also voted against the treaty with the other reservations. Harding to Walsh, 24 March 1920 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124). For an indignant reaction to the Gerry reservation see Moorfield Storey to Lord Bryce, 22 March 1920 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 10, fol. 132-33).
with many other groups in the United States as well. If it was a "victory" as Judge Cohalan had said, it was a negative one; Irish independence was still a long way off.

In retrospect the anti-league agitation of the Irish-Americans seems particularly irresponsible, especially inasmuch as American abstention did not crush the league, weaken the Irish nationalist movement or even prevent Ireland from later taking a conspicuously active part in its activities. Nonetheless, the Irish had genuine fears about the league and Article X. As early as April 1919 the Dail had expressed the view that the league must conform to the notions of self-determination and the rights of small nations, and very shortly after his arrival in the United States de Valera openly opposed the league with Article X. Later in Ireland, the defeat of

1 In answer to the question, to what extent were the Irish-Americans responsible for the defeat of the treaty, Ward asserts that in 1919, as with the arbitration treaties, the Irish were only successful in obstructing the treaty ratification in the Senate to the degree that their interests coincided with the interests of a powerful group in the Senate. In this case a significant number of Republicans felt that American sovereignty, the prerogatives of the Senate, and the future of their party were at stake. In the case of the Versailles Treaty the Irish were also joined by disgruntled ethnic groups from Eastern and Southern Europe and from Asia. See Ward, "America and the Irish problem, 1899-1921," I.H.S., xvi, no. 61 (March 1968), pp 95-96, and Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, pp 187, 198, and 213.

2 12 April 1919, Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, pp 72-76; N.Y.T., 14 July 1919. Maxwell has shown that de Valera did not oppose the league in theory, but he quickly joined in the league fight in the United States, no doubt thereby influencing a good number of Irish-Americans. Maxwell, "Irish-Americans and the fight for treaty ratification," Public Opinion Quarterly, xxii, no. 4 (Winter 1967-68), p. 631. De Valera reported to the Dail shortly after his arrival in America that the league probably would not be ratified, and when he gave his report to the Dail upon his return to Ireland he listed the defeat of the League of Nations first among the objectives of his mission. 19 Aug. 1919, Dail Eireann, op. cit., p. 141, and 25 Jan. 1921, Ibid., p. 250.
the league, and especially the passage of the Gerry reservation, were seen as an indication of Irish-American influence in American politics. Griffith told the Dail on 29 June 1920, "Were it not for Mr de Valera’s work in the United States of America there was little doubt that with some amendments, the Peace Treaty, including article 10, would have been carried," and he affirmed a view expressed by Harry Boland that "the Gerry reservation written into the Peace Treaty made it quite clear that the League of Nations could only be adopted with Ireland as a consenting party, and the writing in of that reservation had made the Irish question an International question which could not be settled without the assent of America." Griffith’s assertions illustrated the extent to which Irish nationalists misunderstood the political situation in the United States and the extent to which America would allow its foreign policy to be shaped to serve Ireland’s interests.

129 June 1920, Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, p. 170.
The Irish movement in the United States reached its high point in the years from 1919 to 1921. Shortly after the spectacular success of the Borah resolution, Eamon de Valera, the President of Dail Eireann and the only surviving commandant of the 1916 rebellion, undertook a mission to America which was bound to contribute to the new aggressiveness of Irish-American nationalism after World War I.\(^1\) However, de Valera's nineteen month mission to raise money and obtain recognition had its own set of problems, for while the Irish President was an important agent for publicizing the Irish cause and for drawing new support from among the Irish-American population, his presence complicated the already fragile relationships within the leadership circles. Eventually, even the single objective of Irish independence could not hold the Irish-American nationalist movement together, and during the summer and autumn of 1920, when agitation might have been expected to be at its peak, the nationalist organizations were divided and quarrelling. Nevertheless, by extraordinarily imaginative devices the Irish cause was kept before the American public despite these divisions. But to be sure these achievements were not made without some cost, for by at least 1920 a substantial body of organized anti-Irish opinion had developed as a reaction against the nationalist clamour. Indeed, it was a commentary on the exceptional vigour of the Irish-

\(^1\)Once in the United States, de Valera was persuaded to style himself as President of the Irish Republic. McCartan, *With DeValera in America*, pp 138-40.
American community that the nationalist movement succeeded as it did under these conditions.

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Eamon de Valera made his first public appearance in the United States on 23 June 1919 when he held a reception at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. Then, and more explicitly the following day at a press conference, de Valera told newspaper reporters that the objectives of his mission to America were to obtain a loan of about $5,000,000 and to secure the recognition of the Irish Republic. A week later de Valera began the first of several speaking tours across the United States, wherein he was honoured and feted by both public officials and private citizens; de Valera spoke before state legislatures, conferred with governors, was given the freedom of several cities, and received two honorary doctorates; as always, he addressed large public audiences, describing the iniquities of British rule in Ireland, the inherent right of Ireland to be free, and from at least mid-July criticizing the League of Nations, should it make no provis-

1 De Valera, like McCartan, travelled to the United States disguised as a seaman and left his ship in New York; he had been in the United States about two weeks, visiting his mother and conferring with Joseph McGarrity before making his public appearance on 23 June. His mission to the United States has been fully described in O'Doherty, Assignment: America, and McCartan, With DeValera in America; chapters have been devoted to the trip in Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, pp 214-36; Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 340-96; M. J. MacManus, Eamon de Valera: a biography (Dublin, 1962), pp 87-108; M. Bromage, DeValera and the march of a nation (London, 1956), pp 90-107; and D. Gwynn, DeValera (London, 1933), pp 79-114.

2 N.Y.T., 21, 23, 24 and 25 June 1919.
The turn of the Irish cause for Ireland. It was a spectacular performance which marked the beginning of a crucial episode in the Irish nationalist movement in the United States, and perhaps de Valera's travels throughout America more than any event since the 1916 rebellion dramatized for the American people the dimensions of the Irish struggle. In fact de Valera was such an effective publicist and agitator that the British government decided that he must be prevented from returning to Ireland.

These tours were extremely important in publicizing the Irish cause and in the minds of many were reminiscent of the American sojourns in 1917-18 of Ignace Jan Paderewski and Thomas Garrigue Masaryk labouring to obtain American assistance for Poland and Czechoslovakia. In so far as his mission in the United States captured the idealistic imagination of the American people, de Valera's nineteen months in the country were overwhelmingly successful. For example James E. Murray reported to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, "The enthusiasm manifested by the people of Butte on that occasion de Valera's address to 10,000 people in Butte, Montana, on 25 July 1919 was the

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1 He left New York on 29 June, addressing crowds of people from 17,000 to 40,000 in major cities along the eastern seaboard and then made a quick trip out to the west coast, stopping in the principal Irish-American centres. Beginning in early October, in connection with the bond-certificate drive, he toured some 59 cities largely in the western and southern parts of the country during a two and a half month period; it was a formidable undertaking. See for example O'Doherty, Assignment: America, pp 10, 48-49, and 51-59, and De Valera itinerary, ca. Sept. 1919 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, unmarked box). For daily accounts see N.Y.T., June-Dec. 1919 or C.A., June-Dec. 1919.

2 War Cabinet 624 (min. 3), 25 Sept. 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/12).

3 For a discussion of the strategy to present the Irish case most effectively, see Willard Delue to Daniel F. Cohalan, 26 Jan. 1920 (N.L.I., Delue Papers, MS 8534).
most marvelous I have ever witnessed. ..." Frank P. Walsh sent an enthusiastic report to Sean T. O'Kelly that de Valera had spoken before the governors and legislatures of Maryland and Delaware, and he said he had "no idea that the cause could make the headway which it has in this country." Even de Valera's critics were forced to concede the popular acclaim that was given him. George W. Wickersham, a strong home ruler, complained that it was "heartsickening" that the Irish leader "had receptions in the principal cities of the country, such were given to Joffre and Viviani and Balfour, when they were here in the spring of 1917"; and the Boston lawyer Moorfield Storey thought it "very disquieting" that in Cleveland "The Irish were received with great enthusiasm, while the King and Queen of Belgium received little notice." The few occasions on which public officials refused to extend full acknowledgment to Ireland or de Valera—the mayor of Baltimore introducing him as a "stranger" and the governor of Virginia introducing him as a "visitor" rather than as the President of the Irish Republic or the mayor of Philadelphia refused. 

1On the same occasion de Valera also addressed the state legislature, spoke at a public meeting presided over by the governor on the steps of the capitol building, and placed a wreath on a memorial to Thomas Francis Meagher. See Murry to Walsh, 30 July 1919, and A.E. Spriggs to Walsh, 31 July 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, box 190). For similar accounts see Judge Kickham Scanlon to Borah, 25 July 1919 (L.C., Borah Papers, box 550); Mary Colum to Golden, Aug. 1919 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141); Frank P. Walsh to Sean T. O'Kelly, 9 and 11 July 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124).

2Walsh to O'Kelly, 2 April 1920 (Ibid., box 125). Indeed questions were asked in Parliament if the cordial receptions accorded de Valera by the governors and legislatures of various states in America did not constitute "unfriendly acts" towards Great Britain. Bonar Law replied that these gestures were not representative of American feeling. 6 May 1920, Hansard 5 (commons), cxxviii, col. 2216.

ing to discuss the Irish question with him—merely served to under-
score the frequency with which the mission was cordially received.¹

The Irish-American newspapers were of course wildly enthusiastic in
their support of the Irish mission, although within eight months's
time the Gaelic American was openly criticizing de Valera and several
other Irish nationalists in the United States.² The editorial opinion
of native American newspapers varied from the hostility of the Chris-
tian Science Monitor to the warmth of the Chicago Tribune.³

De Valera began work immediately to float a loan to provide rev-
enue for financing the Dail government.⁴ The idea of an American
loan had first been seriously proposed by Frank P. Walsh, Edward F.

¹See N.Y.T., 26 and 27 Aug. 1919, and John Blair MacAfee to Lord
Bryce, 29 March 1919 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 16, fols 147-48). In
fact both the State Department and the British Embassy were concerned
about the diplomatic implications of de Valera's stay in the United
States. In December of 1919 the Attorney General advised Lansing that
de Valera had been carefully observed by his department but had not
broken any laws; the British felt they were safer in not protesting
about de Valera's activities as long as the American government made
no move in any way to recognize him or the Irish Republic. A. Mitch-
ell Palmer to Sec of State, 4 Dec. 1919 (N.A., 841d.00/I03, roll 214);
Wiseman to Sir Ian Malcolm, 1 July 1919, and Lindsay to F.O., 14 July
1919 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 46/1/9). Certainly
the confidence of nationalist leaders in Ireland was very much streng-
thened by the reports they received about the enthusiastic welcome
given to de Valera by the American people. See 19 Aug. 1919, Dail
Eireann proc. 1919-21, pp 139 and 141; R. Brennan, Propaganda Report,
Ard Chomhairle of Sinn Fein, 21 Aug. 1919 (N.L.I., Barton Papers, MS
8786); H. Sheehy Skeffington and T. Kelly, Report on twelfth annual
Ard-Fheis Sinn Fein, 16 Oct. 1919, Reports of officers and directors, Ard-Fheis
Sinn Fein, 16 Oct. 1919, and R. Brennan, Report of Director of Propag-
anda, ca. Oct. 1919 (Ibid.).


³C.S.M., 24 and 25 June 1919; and Chicago Tribune, 15 July 1919.
For a résumé of press attitudes see Lit. Dig., 1xli, no. 2 (12 July

⁴In de Valera's words to raise money for the "full administration
of the Government of Ireland." N.Y.T., 25 June 1919. The loan was
thought by some to be the most important of the several nationalist
ambitions. James E. Deery to Golden, 31 Jan. 1920 (N.L.I., Golden Pa-
pers, MS 13,141).
Dunne, and Michael J. Ryan in their discussions with Irish leaders during their trip to Ireland in May 1919. However, when shortly after his arrival de Valera specifically suggested to a group of Irish-American leaders that the loan be made through the sale of "bonds" in the name of the Republic of Ireland he was told that such a transaction by an unrecognized government would be illegal in the United States. But to maintain the apparatus of a de facto government it was important to raise the money in the accepted language of international finance. A satisfactory compromise was achieved with "bond-certificates" which were not actually "bonds," and thereby were within the law, but which was close enough in terminology to be thought of as

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2 A controversy arose as to whether the Irish Victory Fund should have been sent to Ireland. Aside from the fact that the fund was not a loan and that it was a fairly small amount ($1,005,080), it was clearly raised with the object in mind of carrying out agitation, perhaps in both the United States and Ireland, but not to provide the operating revenue for an Irish government. The fund was used to finance de Valera's mission in the United States, to pay the expenses of the American Commission for Irish Independence, for grants to the bond-certificate drive, and for grants to Ireland and the Irish mission in Paris. The Irish Victory Fund was closed in August 1919. See Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 347-48, McCartan, With De Valera in America, pp 143-45, and O'Doherty, op. cit., pp 63-64.
such. De Valera and others stated that the bond-certificates were not to be considered financial investments, and Walsh gave specific instructions to the state chairmen that the term bond should never be used to mean bond-certificate, but the difference was not discernible to a public who had only a year before seen the United States government raising money by the sale of "Liberty Bonds."2

To sell the bond-certificates a national campaign was planned, under the responsibility of the American Commission for Irish Independence (Frank P. Walsh, Edward F. Dunne, and Michael J. Ryan) with James O'Mara, a Limerick businessman and, along with de Valera and

1The prospectus, issued in early October, said that a quota of $10,000,000 of bond-certificates would be sold in several denominations and that they could be exchanged at par value for gold bonds, which would ultimately return 5% interest, "one month after the Republic has received international recognition." Prospectus of the first issue of bond-certificates authorized by Dail Eireann, the elected congress of the Irish people. The prospectus stated that the purpose of the loan was "to finance the Elected Government of the Republic in projects of National Reconstruction and for such other purposes as the Government may decide." (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, unmarked box). The Dail originally authorized a loan of $1,250,000, however after de Valera appraised the situation in America this amount was increased to $25,000,000; of the amount authorized $10,000,000 (rather than the earlier $5,000,000) was selected as a practical goal in the hope of raising at least half that amount. See O'Doherty, Assignment: America, pp 40-41; Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, pp 132-34, 139, and 150; and Dail Eireann decree no. 12, 20 Aug. 1919, fifth session, 1919, second day (N.L.I., O'Briain Papers, MS 8429).

2De Valera said that he hoped to draw money "only from those who seek to serve a good cause, not from those who want immediate pecuniary profit," and W. Bourke Cockran said, "I do not mean that these bonds will be bought as commercial investments." De Valera to Walsh, Sept. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124); N.Y.T., 11 Jan. 1920; and Walsh to all state and city chairmen, 8 Dec. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 17). The failure of the public to understand the financial risks of the Irish bond-certificates is illustrated by a letter to President Wilson asking if the money raised would purchase Ireland's independence, and if not whether there would be any way for the purchasers to get their money back or would it be considered "donated to Ireland and her cause." Joseph V. O'Connor to Wilson, 24 Jan. 1920, and Alvey A. Adee (2nd Assistant Secretary of State) to O'Connor, 12 Feb. 1920 (N.A., 841d.51/5, roll 243).
Bishop Fogarty, a trustee of the Dail Eireann funds, to direct the project. The campaign was very loosely organized; state and city chairmen were appointed from the headquarters in New York, but they then had complete control of the sales in their districts. Frank P. Walsh advised the chairmen to work with the existing Irish-American societies in their areas—the AOH, the FOIF, the Knights of Columbus, or even the clergy—in order to save time and avoid duplication. Although the actual selling did not begin until 17 January 1920 the publicity campaign was started in August with de Valera's tours. Accompanied by McCartan, Boland, Sean Nunan, James O'Mara, and others, de Valera devoted much of his energy to seeing that all of the communities which he visited had some plans for selling the bond-certificates before the entourage moved on, and in the process he obtained as far as he could the endorsement of local civic officials and the clergy. In New York de Valera sold the first bond-certificate to


2 Walsh also recommended that the chairmen attempt to consolidate the Irish-American organizations for the sake of the bond-certificate drive, although this was not particularly successful. See Boland to Cockran, 20 Nov. 1919, and Instructions on organization for Irish bond-certificate campaign, n.d., and Frank P. Walsh to all state and city chairmen, 8 Dec. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 17). Eventually O'Mara and his staff encouraged the sale of many bond-certificates in small denominations rather than the sale of large bond-certificates to a few people. Lavelle, op. cit., p. 153.

Mayor Hylan, and was given the freedom of the city in return, while
40,000 canvassers began their assignments. De Valera was also in-
vited to Albany as the guest of Governor Alfred E. Smith when the
state assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the bond-certificate
drive. Altogether $5,123,640 were raised by the sale of the bond-
certificates and more than half of that amount was brought to Ireland
for the use of the Dail government.¹

Despite its obvious success, the bond-certificate campaign was
not without its corresponding difficulties also. Many of these prob-
lems were within the nationalist movement in America. John J. Splain,
chairman of the campaign in Connecticut, complained to W. Bourke Cock-
ran that it was "hard to get our people enthused in this matter," and
that he got "poor co-operation" from both the Irishmen and the Irish-
Americans directing the campaign.² The same complaint was made by Dr
W. Patrick Slattery, the Iowa state chairman, who was "disappointed
and disgusted" with the lack of interest shown by Irish-Americans in
the bond-certificate campaign.³ The national president of the AOH

¹Irish World, 17, 24, and 31 Jan. 1920; N.Y.T., 12, 19, 20, and
22 Jan. 1920; Lit. Dig., lxiv, no. 6 (7 Feb. 1920), p. 16. Irish
leaders such as de Valera, Mellows, Boland, O'Mara, Walsh, Cockran,
Cohalan, Devoy, Golden, and Monteith travelled throughout the country
to stimulate interest. See O'Doherty, Assignment: America, pp 66-67,
and 107; Lavelle, O'Mara, p. 153; Monteith, Casement's last adventure,
pp 239-40; and John J. Splain to Cockran, 17 Feb. 1920 (N.Y.P.L.,
Cockran Papers, box 17). The remainder of the money raised by the
sale of the bond-certificates stayed in United States banks and became
the subject of several long litigations which were not settled until

²Splain felt that Cohalan should have been put in charge of the
bond-certificate campaign—that those directing it did not appreciate
the problems involved. Splain to Cockran, 17 Feb. 1920 (Cockran Papi-
ers, op. cit.); and Splain to Walsh, 17 Sept. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh
Papers, box 124). Also see Tommy O'Connor to Devoy, 15 Aug. 1919,

³Dr W. Patrick Slattery to Walsh, 3 Jan. 1921 (Walsh Papers, op.
cit., box 127).
and the chairman of the campaign in Indiana, James E. Deery, wrote to Peter Golden that the Indianapolis chairman had resigned less than two weeks after the drive began and he had not been able to find a replacement; of those whom Deery asked, "they all appear to be interested, but they refuse to take any active part because so and so is taking an active part"; Golden himself was having trouble organizing support in Cincinnati.\(^1\) The near illegality of the whole bond-certificate sale carried with it some danger of government restriction. A Boston publisher and bookseller wrote to President Wilson to ask if the government had given tacit approval to the Irish bond-certificates by allowing them to be exchanged at par value for Liberty Bonds; Walsh was eventually sent a stern note from the Secretary of the Treasury warning that such practices must stop.\(^2\) The feeling in the State Department was that the administration was allowing an outrageous situation to develop. "To close our eyes and do nothing to prevent our territory being used to further rebellion against a friendly nation is not very creditable to our Government and makes us morally responsible for the situation in Ireland today," wrote one Foreign

\(^1\)Deery to Peter Golden, 31 Jan. 1920, and Golden to Frank P. Walsh, 5 Feb. 1920 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141). One friend of Golden's, very distressed at the lack of support that the Irish-American community gave the drive, concluded that they were "permanently lost to Ireland." Kiely to Golden, 14 Feb. 1920 (Ibid.). The failure of the Irish-Americans, and especially those with means, to support the bond-certificate campaign became a common complaint. John D. Moore to Cockran, 9 Feb. 1920 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 17).

Service officer. Senator John Sharp Williams felt that the sale of the bond-certificates was clearly illegal and that de Valera, Walsh, Dunne, and Ryan were "indictable under the United States statute for 'setting on foot missions of military enterprise against the dominions of a foreign state at peace with the United States,'" but he lamented that it would be impossible to get a conviction because of the Irish sympathy in the country. The Wall Street Journal, the leading financial newspaper in the United States, agreed with Senator Williams that the sale of the bond-certificates was contrary to international law, and that Britain's failure to protest did not make it less so; the paper pointed out that purchasers could not be given a valid pledge of a return, although it concluded disparagingly that they were mainly bought by "Irish domestic servants, and others of like or lower standards of intelligence."

The campaign by de Valera and the Irish-American nationalists to obtain American diplomatic recognition for the Irish Republic was far less successful than the bond-certificate drive. Rather unsystematic agitation for some kind of acknowledgment of an Irish Republic had

1Memorandum from O.L.M. to Albert re Joseph V. O'Connor to Wilson, 24 Jan. 1920 (N.A., 841d.51/5, roll 243). Horatio Bottomley asked in Parliament if the government knew about, or was doing anything about, the Irish efforts in the United States to raise money; government spokesmen gave very glib answers. 23 Feb. 1919, Hansard 5 (commons), cxxv, col. 1291, and 6 May 1919, Ibid., cxxviii, col. 2215.

2Williams to P.B. Forsyth, 29 Jan. 1920 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 50).

been under way since at least the Irish election in 1918. However with de Valera's arrival in the United States in June 1919 recognition became a declared objective of the Irish-American nationalist movement, and de Valera and his entourage, as well as the American Commission for Irish Independence and the Irish bond-certificate sales staff, promoted the idea of the existing and functioning republic and the importance of American diplomatic recognition. Because efforts to extract open support from Wilson at the peace conference had failed, and because throughout part of 1919 and 1920 Wilson was incapacitated by his stroke, the Irish nationalists turned their attention towards Congress, in order to obtain recognition for Ireland. In late May 1919 Congressman Mason introduced a bill to appropriate funds for the "salaries of a minister and consuls to the republic of

1Both McCartan and Tansill give their versions of the tangled policy in regard to the "Irish Republic" during the first half of 1919; McCartan refused to participate in the Irish Race Convention because no acknowledgment of the republic was planned, on the other hand precisely for this reason such moderates as Cardinal Gibbons were persuaded to take part. When an active campaign for recognition of a republic was undertaken some moderates withdrew and attempted to work with dominion status plans while others thought the efforts futile but refused to oppose them. McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 70-88; and Tansill, America and the fight for Irish Freedom, pp 288-306. See Charles McCarthy to J.S. Cullinan, 24 June 1919, McCarthy to Joseph F. O'Connell, 7 Feb. 1920, and John Quinn to McCarthy, 6 March 1920 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, boxes 39, 40, and 41)

2N.Y.T., 24 June 1919; Frank P. Walsh to W. Bourke Cockran, 13 March 1920 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 17). On his several tours de Valera made specific appeals for American recognition of Ireland, and on a local level he was often successful. An interesting example was the Montana legislature which passed a resolution asking that Congress demand that the President extend recognition to Ireland; the President however was also informed that the Montana legislators voted for the resolution because "we knew it could cut no figure anyhow." See to Wilson, 11 Aug. 1919 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3920, box 558); resolution of the House and Senate of Montana, 12 Aug. 1919 (N.A., 841d,00/89, roll 214); and 14 Oct. 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, p. 6859.
Ireland. If the House acted favourably on such a resolution it would amount to congressional recognition of Ireland, although only the President could actually appoint the minister and consuls whose salaries had been provided. The House Foreign Affairs Committee held public hearings on the bill, on 12 and 13 December, where a delegation led by Mason, Judge Cohalan, and Frank P. Walsh argued that there were precedents for congressional recognition, that a de facto government had been functioning in Ireland since 1918, and that America was obliged to see that Ireland got independence because of Wilson's pledges during the war. The hearings were followed by extensive efforts by Irish-American nationalists to obtain support for the resolution in the House, Senate and administration. But despite the agitation


2 Among the other pro-Irish witnesses were Lindsay Crawford, John E. Milholland, Mary F. McWhorter, James K. McGuire, Major Eugene F. Kinkead, W. Bourke Cockran, Fr. F.X. McCabe, Daniel T. O'Connell, Shaemus O'Sheel, Katherine Hughes, Joseph McGarrity, and John J. Splain. For these hearings George L. Fox organized an anti-Irish delegation, largely of Protestant clergymen, who argued that no Irish Republic existed and that the Irish question was a British domestic problem. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H. Res. 3404, To provide for the salaries of a minister and consuls to the Republic of Ireland, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 1920, pp 4-16, 17-40, 40-59.

3 For examples of the support for the resolution see Irish World, 7 and 21 Feb. and 10 April 1920; Sean O'Kelly to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, ca. late 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Peace, League, Political box); John J. Caplis to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 19 March 1919, and Bishop Lenihan to Senator Walsh, 13 May 1919 (L.C., Walsh Papers, box 190). Frank P. Walsh asked that all workers in the bond-certificate campaign solicit the support of their congressmen for the resolution; even President Wilson got over 30 cables in a few days. Frank P. Walsh to W. Bourke Cockran, 13 March 1920 and 2 April 1919 (N.Y.F.L., Cockran Papers, box 17); and cables to Wilson, 17-25 March 1920 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 559). Also see speech by Congressman Sherwood, 5 Jan. 1920, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 59, pp 1058-60.
in its favour the bill was not reported by the committee. In May, towards the close of the session, Congressman Mason discussed the situation with de Valera, Cohalan and several other Irish-American and political leaders, and a new resolution was drafted expressing sympathy for "the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice." This resolution found no favour from the committee either, and Mason's attempt to rally support in the House by introducing a flurry of Irish resolutions failed to produce any results. The congressional session ended without the House voting on any of the resolutions. Nonetheless Congress did take some unofficial action in the form of a letter drafted by Peter F. Tague of Massachusetts and signed by nearly 100 fellow Congressmen protesting to Lloyd George against the imprisonment of Irishmen without trial.

In fact there was a substantial amount of opposition to the Mason resolution among native Americans. See for example E.R. Wright to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, 16 Oct. 1919, Lodge to Wright, 18 Oct. 1919, Lodge to Rev Samuel P. Nobbs, 16 Dec. 1919, Rev Harry Foster Burns to Lodge, 27 May 1920, and Lodge to Rev Burns, 30 May 1920 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Peace, League, Political, I-Z box and box A-G 1920); Edmond M. Mills to President Wilson, 7 May 1920 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 550); Alexander Gordon to Senator John Sharp Williams, 27 May 1920 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 52).

For the several versions of how the original resolution was changed, see: McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 184-88; Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 353-58; and O'Doherty, Assignment; America, pp 86-88. Also see Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 59, pp 6669, 7127, 7325, 7712, 7767, 7957, 8680, 9292-95, and 9349-50; and Irish World, 29 May and 5 June 1920. Senator Walsh thought the House would never vote on the resolution. Walsh to Bishop Lenihan, 21 May 1920 (L.C., Walsh Papers, box 190). The IPL protested against the new Mason resolution, which it felt was not as strongly worded as the Gerry Reservation added to the peace treaty several months earlier. 31 May 1920, IPL resolutions (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii).

After some discussion Lloyd George decided to make no reply to the letter. See Sir A. Geddes to Lord Curzon, 5 May 1920, and minutes, and F.O. to Geddes, 20 May 1920 (P.R.O., F.o. 371/4550); Peter F. Tague, et al., to Bainbridge Colby, 15 April 1920 (N.A., 841d.00/192, roll 215); and Lit. Dig., lxv, no. 8 (22 May 1920), p. 20.
The question of American recognition was also raised through protests about the British representation in Washington. When Sir Auckland Geddes arrived to assume his responsibilities as British Ambassador an attempt was made to insist that he did not represent the Irish Republic. On 29 April 1920 de Valera cabled President Wilson from Augusta, Georgia, to assert that Geddes had not been sent by the Irish government and did not speak for the Irish people. Through the organization of Dr Maloney a group of women picketed the British Embassy, carrying signs insisting that the United States could no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Great Britain while outrages, specifically the shooting of Lord Mayor MacCurtain, were being perpetrated in the Irish Republic. The pickets were involved in a scuffle with pro-British Washington ladies and arrested by the police. Upon their release on bail the pro-Irish women proceeded to picket the White House and the State Department offices, carrying signs with among other slogans quotations from speeches by Bainbridge Colby, the new Secretary of State, which he had made after the 1916 rebellion. These activities, while affording the Irish movement some publicity, and asserting the claims of the republic, attempted to force recognition in areas which were well defined by custom and law; Wilson could hardly have been expected to refuse Geddes's credentials and picketing the British Embassy violated the standard obligation of a host.

1De Valera to Wilson, 29 April 1920, and Tumulty to Bainbridge Colby, 29 April 1920 (N.A., 701.4111/336, box 6296), and Frank P. Walsh to George Gavan Duffy, 21 April 1920 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5582).
country protecting diplomatic envoys from insults or threats. Of course a large number of books and pamphlets were published advocating the recognition policy. The FOIF published such pamphlets as "Ireland and secession, an answer to Lloyd George," by Thomas H. Mahony and "English atrocities in Ireland," by Katherine Hughes. John X. Regan's What made Ireland Sinn Fein and Mahony's "Similarities between the American and Irish revolutions" were private attempts to assist Irish recognition.

1 See Memorandum on picketing of the British Embassy by sympathizers with the so-called Irish Republic, by the Office of the Solicitor, Department of State, 3 April 1920, and Memorandum on Irish pickets, by Chief Special Agent, Department of State, 16 April 1920 (N.A., 701. 411/377, box 6296); R.C. Lindsey to Curzon, 8 April 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4550); McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 176-81; and Irish World, 10 and 17 April 1920. The pickets, some of whom were Irish-American and some of whom belonged to the American Women's Pickets, were brought to Washington by Maloney but although financed through the Irish World they did not work very well with the Irish nationalist movement; Mrs Gertrude Corless, the leader of the American Women's Pickets, resented the attempts of Harry Boland to give her instructions and assignments. Mrs Corless to Mrs Peter Golden, 24 Aug. 1920 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder vi). The conservative Irish-American leadership tended to dislike women pickets because they included a large mixture of socialists and liberal thinkers. See Memorandum for E.F. McSweeney by Tom Phelan, 14 May 1920 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box M).

2 T.H. Mahony, "Ireland and secession, an answer to Lloyd George" (New York, 1920); and K. Hughes, "English atrocities in Ireland" (New York, 1920). Also see L. Crawford, "The problem of Ulster" (New York, n.d.); "In darkest Ulster" (New York, n.d.); E.F. McSweeney, "America first: dedicated to the teachers and students in the schools and colleges of America" (Boston, n.d.); E.F. McSweeney, "De-Americanizing young America: poisoning the sources of our national history and traditions" (n.p., 1920); "Ireland and British misrule: Lloyd George's insincerity" (Washington, 1920); W. McCormick, "Irish Republican arbitration courts" (Washington, 1920); W. McCormick, "Irish electors again proclaim the Republic" (Washington, 1920); and "Ireland under English intrigue" (Washington, 1920).

3 J.X. Regan, What made Ireland Sinn Fein (Boston, 1921); T.H. Mahony, "Similarities between the American and Irish revolutions" (New York, 1921). For three interesting suggestions for moderate solutions see T.C. Johnson, The Irish tangle and a way out (New York, 1920); P.W. Wilson, The Irish case before the court of public opinion (New York, 1920); and F. Weigle, "Ireland as it is today" (n.p., 1920).
By the early summer of 1920, and certainly after the end of the congressional session, the most promising means of obtaining American recognition of Ireland was by persuading the American political parties to adopt an Irish plank in their platforms for the 1920 presidential election. Actually in years past both parties had passed resolutions on the Irish question (the Democrats in 1888 and both parties in 1892), although they had been merely expressions of sympathy rather than promises of future policy.¹ Agitation began well before the conventions to encourage individual politicians to support an Irish plank, although by the time of the Republican convention there were such divisions within the nationalist movement that both de Valera and Judge Cohalan led delegations to Chicago to work for the acceptance of their own planks.² Presumably Cohalan felt that because the Mason resolution had not been acted upon by the Republican dominated House of Representatives those same people gathered at Chicago would not endorse a resolution calling for recognition of the Irish Republic, so he favoured a statement in support of simple self-determination for Ireland.³ De Valera had his supporters propose a resolution calling for the recognition of "the elected government of the Republic of Ireland."⁴ The Republican resolutions committee voted to accept Cohalan's proposal, but de Valera's public repudiation of it caused


²See Irish Committee to Henry Cabot Lodge, 1 June 1920 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, box H-0).

³Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 373-75.

⁴McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 192-95.
them to drop an Irish plank altogether. De Valera next went to the Democratic convention in San Francisco in late June, where he was unable to get the Democratic platform committee to accept either a recognition, or later a compromise, plank. Thus neither major party adopted the Irish nationalist cause as part of its official program, although despite the failure to secure any endorsement such perennial optimists as Frank P. Walsh observed that great progress towards recognition was being made and that "the public demonstration there in Chicago was worth, to my mind, even more than the strongest plank that could have been drawn and put in the Republican platform." On the contrary, the American Consul in Dublin reported to the State Department that news of the failure of the Republican party to endorse a plank supporting the Irish cause "came as a shock to Sinn Feiners in Ireland," even though efforts were now being made to show that it was

1 Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 376-79; McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 195-200. Several very partisan and contradictory accounts of this episode have been written; complete answers to the several questions about what happened, much less why, will have to wait until the private papers of such figures as Cohalan and de Valera are made accessible.

2 Tansill, op. cit., pp 380-83; and Statement by de Valera, ca. summer 1920 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder II).

3 The Labour party and several state conventions of the Democrats and Republicans passed resolutions but the Irish question did not officially become part of the presidential campaign. See Frank P. Walsh to Sean T. O'Kelly, 5 Aug. 1920 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 126). Walsh had earlier told George Gavan Duffy that the Republicans had attempted to "pussy foot" with the Irish, but that de Valera had stood firmly for a pledge of recognition or nothing. Walsh to Duffy, 15 June 1920 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5582).
the best policy not to identify too closely with either party.

(11)

By the summer of 1920 the Irish movement in America suffered from serious internal tensions which could no longer be concealed. The split in the nationalist movement caused the breakdown of the uneasy coalition of active Irish-Americans, which effectively crippled agitation for months. This split has often been analysed simply in terms of the incompatible or perverse personalities of Devoy, Cohalan, or de Valera. No doubt these leaders were difficult men who were jealous of their prerogatives, over-sensitive to criticism, and accustomed to being obeyed. But although the antecedents of the split could be traced back as early as 1914 the pattern was clearer in 1918 when the IFL and Mrs Sheehy Skeffington challenged the Clan and the FOIF through

1F.T.F. Dumont to Sec of State, 15 June 1920 (N.A., 841d.00/209, roll 216); and Charles McCarthy to Sir Horace Plunkett, 14 June 1920 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 41). Bayard Henry, with some evident pleasure, reported to Lord Bryce that "de Valera was thrown out of each Convention." Henry to Bryce, 6 July 1920 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 6, fol. 225). Despite the diminishing likelihood of effective pressure to force the government to recognize Ireland by October 1920, Fred K. Nielsen, Solicitor of the State Department, outlined for the Secretary the conditions for recognition of rebellious nations. His conclusion was that by all standards of international law no "state of war" existed in Ireland and the Republican government could not be regarded as a belligerent power. "Obviously Ireland has not established its independence to such an extent as to justify her recognition by this government..." Nielsen to Sec of State, 5 Oct. 1920 (L.C., Nielsen Papers, box 4).

2MacManus, Eamon de Valera, pp 105-08; Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 341-44; Splain in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, pp 242-54; and Rt Rev M.J. Gallagher, "Statement dealing with matters which arose out of the visit to the United States of America of the Hon. Eamon de Valera" (n.p., 1921). See the often cited passage from a letter from de Valera to Griffith, "The trouble is purely one of personalities," and "big as the country is, it was not big enough to hold the Judge and myself." Beasalai, Michael Collins and the making of a new Ireland, ii, pp 4-7.
their continued activity during the war. By 1919 a large number of Clan and FOIF leaders had become convinced that the straightest path to Irish independence lay through American politics and diplomacy; de Valera and others favoured a more direct policy of subsidizing the Irish revolution, with the Irish-Americans serving as overseas auxiliaries directed from Ireland. Thus a conflict of principle developed when attempts were made to divert the resources controlled by the Irish-American leaders away from their propaganda efforts in the United States and towards the financing of the revolution in Ireland. In these circumstances the overbearing and dogmatic qualities of the leaders themselves aggravated and burdened the broadly based movement which was already strained by diversity.

The first major source of irritation had been the bond-certificate drive, although the leaders of the FOIF had voluntarily agreed to curtail the Irish Freedom Fund drive and had made available considerable sums of money in order to give the bond-certificate drive and de Valera sufficient cash with which to carry out a national campaign. However there were difficulties that most of the leaders seemed to recognize. John J. Splain wrote to Walsh that de Valera's demands obstructed the bond-certificate work, and the action of de Valera and his entourage in Portland, Oregon, led to the resignation of Thomas

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1 See for example the very cool exchange of correspondence between Judge Cohalan and Peter Golden. Cohalan to Golden, 13 and 17 March 1919, and Golden to Cohalan, 15 March 1919 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141); and Dr Maloney's observation about that "ubiquitous four flusher Cohalan..." Maloney to Oswald Garrison Villard, 2 May 1919 (Harvard University Library, Villard Papers, bms Am 1323, vol. 1878).

2 These positions are carefully defined by Bishop Gallagher in his pamphlet, "Statements dealing with matters which arose out of the visit to the United States of America of the Hon. Eamon de Valera."
Walsh himself admitted the tensions in the movement, and indeed used the conflicts as an argument for personal sacrifice for the Irish cause; Walsh explained to Sean T. O'Kelly, "The position which I am taking is, that we are trying to aid Ireland, not tell her what to do, and that her chosen leader is De Valera, and that he, finally, must decide every question." This proved difficult advice to follow, however, when de Valera acted without consulting the Irish-American leaders and when he made decisions about matters which were as much American as they were Irish.

A crisis was reached in early February 1920 when de Valera gave an interview to the Westminster Gazette and the New York Globe, in which he said that Britain could give Ireland independence and still protect its security by implementing a policy similar to America's Monroe Doctrine. The United States, de Valera argued, had permitted Cuba to be independent, although through the Platt amendment it had taken care to guarantee that Cuba could never become a base of attack against the United States nor be dominated by another power. To be sure Cuba was technically sovereign and independent but it had become politically unstable and dominated by the United States, and as such it provided an unsuitable model for future Anglo-Irish relations.

The analogy was suggested by de Valera in the hope of stimulating a

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1 Splain complained of de Valera that "He doesn't know America, and apparently some of those who are directing him don't know America...," and he stated that the campaign would be going better if Judge Cohalan's suggestions had been followed. Splain to Walsh, 17 Sept. 1919 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 124). Walsh confessed to a friend of Mannix that a terrible mistake had been made in Portland. Mannix to Walsh, 6 Nov. 1919, and Walsh to James Robertson, 5 Dec. 1919 (Ibid.).

2 Walsh to Edward F. Dunne, 12 Aug. 1919, and Walsh to O'Kelly, 17 Sept. 1919 (Ibid.).
dialogue between the British government and the Irish leaders, but its effect was to create the impression in the United States and Ireland that de Valera was willing to accept as a solution to the Irish question something far less than an independent republic. To a great many Irish-Americans, already piqued at de Valera's attempts to dominate their organizations, the interview caused a bitter outcry, and even de Valera's strongest supporters thought that the interview had dangerous implications. For over a month the editorials of the Gaelic American denounced de Valera for attempting to subvert Ireland's independence and sovereignty arguing that an arrangement between Ireland and Britain similar to the Platt amendment would be disastrous. Some thought that the split would take place then as a result of Devoy's editorials. Dr Maloney was "alarmed lest the gang knife de Valera," and Mrs Golden lamented, "Of course we've known the split would come but too bad it had to come

1Certainly this was the editorial view of the Globe. See Irish World, 14 Feb. 1920, and McCartan, With DeValera in America, p. 151. Later in the debates on the Treaty James Burke told the Dail, "We started down the slippery slopes when the President agreed to accept a relation between Ireland and England similar to that between Cuba and the United States," 4 Jan. 1922, Iris dhail Eireann, tuairisc ofigiuil, dleisboireacht ar an gconradh idir Eire agus Sasana do signigh-headh 18 Londain ar an 6adh la de mhi na Nolag 1921; official report, debate on the treaty between Great Britain and Ireland signed in London on the 6th December 1921 (Dublin, n.d.), p. 257.

2Dr Maloney thought de Valera's statements a serious compromise and Mrs Golden wrote her husband, "indeed it seems to me nothing short of a calamity that de V. should have said it just at this time...." McGarrity disagreed with the interview, but thought that it might teach de Valera to be more careful. Mrs Golden to Golden, 16 Feb. 1920 (N.L. I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder vi), and McCartan, op. cit., pp 150-52.

3G.A., 21 Feb. 1920. Devoy stated that his comments were "mild, fair and friendly criticism," although the general tone of the Gaelic American was so extreme as to make any comment seem like an attack. G.A., 12 March 1920. Also see Kiely to Peter Golden, 14 Feb. 1920 (Golden Papers, op. cit., folder iv).
during the bonds."¹ On 20 February 1920 de Valera appealed to Judge Cohalan to stop the attacks against him in the Gaelic American, however the judge replied that he did not control the policy of that newspaper, although he agreed with its assertions that the Cuban analogy which de Valera had used had seemed contrary to the expressed desires of the Irish people.² What Cohalan did was call a meeting of nearly one hundred leading Irish-Americans in New York on 19 March ostensibly for the purpose of preventing a split in the nationalist movement. Apparently it was hoped that these leaders would agree to ask de Valera to return to Ireland and leave the handling of the agitation in America to the Irish-Americans. However, through the efforts of Joseph McGarrity, de Valera was brought to the meeting where he defended himself against the charges of Cohalan by asserting that the judge and Devoy had hoped to destroy him. After ten hours the meeting closed with a not very successful attempt to reconcile differences.³

The tension within the Irish-American nationalist movement was not allowed to diminish. Within a month's time James O'Mara, acting as one of the trustees of the Dail loan, demanded that the money raised through the Irish Victory Fund be turned over to the Dail government.

¹Mrs Golden was not certain if the IPL would join in the St Patrick's Day parade because Judge Cohalan was to be the Grand Marshall. Mrs Golden to Peter Golden, 16 Feb. 1920 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder vi).


³Both Tansill and McCartan have vivid descriptions of this so-called "trial" of de Valera. Tansill, op. cit., pp 65-68; McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 160-69.
ment. The national council of the FOIF refused to do this, saying that the money would be used for its intended purpose—that being, roughly, to educate public opinion and to maintain agitation in America and Ireland, but not to provide revenue for an Irish government.

If this direct challenge to the leadership of the FOIF had not been enough, the misadventures of the Irish delegations at the American political conventions in June 1920 forced the divisions into public view again, and as a result de Valera decided that the FOIF required "immediate and thorough" reorganization; he told the Illinois state council of the FOIF that they should make their organization "as widely democratic as possible," with all officers and committees elected rather than appointed. The summary expulsion in July of the IPL, which included many of de Valera's strongest supporters, from associate membership of the FOIF augmented the growing hostility within the movement and laid the FOIF leaders open to the charge of autocratic practices. De Valera appealed in a public letter to the recently elected president of the FOIF, Bishop Gallagher of Detroit, to call an Irish Race Convention in the autumn in order to restore confidence in the organization and provide the machinery through which

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1 An illuminating illustration of the depth of the divisions within the nationalist movement is Diarmuid Lynch's resignation from the Dail as a result of his disagreement with de Valera's concept of what should be done in the United States. See Lynch's letters to the Dail and to his constituents dated 19 July 1920. Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, pp 188-90.

2 Statement by de Valera, ca. summer 1920, and de Valera to Illinois state council, FOIF, 16 June 1920 (N.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder iii). The Irish World began steady criticism of Cohalan and Devoy after the political conventions. Irish World, 3 July 1920.

3 See Diarmuid Lynch to Peter Golden, 26 July 1920, Helen Golden to Diarmuid Lynch, 6 Aug. 1920, and a circular letter from Helen Golden to newspapers and FOIF branches throughout the country, 10 Aug. 1920 (Golden Papers, op. cit., folder ii).
differences could be worked out "by the will of the majority of the members" rather than by "arbitrary suspensions and expulsions by the Executive..."; the bishop turned de Valera down.\(^1\) Failing to obtain a race convention, where broad popular support could have been developed for whatever changes de Valera requested, he submitted to Bishop Gallagher a series of amendments to the constitution of the FOIF for consideration at the national council meeting in New York on 17 September. However, once again his attempts to force changes upon the FOIF that would weaken the control of its present leaders were unsuccessful; in an emotional meeting, in some ways not unlike the so-called "trial" of de Valera in March, the new proposals were defeated and de Valera left the meeting in the company of his supporters.\(^2\)

In addition to efforts made by the Irish leaders in America to obtain the unqualified support of the Irish-American leaders, attempts were also made from Ireland to end the difficulties. Sean T. O'Kelly cabled John Devoy after the Republican party convention to "end effectively the infamous allegations against president de Valera" because it was weakening the movement at home and abroad.\(^3\) The situation was also discussed with some alarm in the Dail, which of course

\(^1\)De Valera to Bishop Gallagher, 6 Aug. 1920 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 126). Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, pp 386-88; and Notes for proposed call to Chicago Convention (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder ii). For the bishop's version of these events see Gallagher, "Statement dealing with matters which arose out of the visit to the United States of America of the Hon. Eamon de Valera."


\(^3\)O'Kelly to Devoy, 24 June 1920 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box N-0L).
defined the problem in de Valera's terms. During the late summer of 1920 Harry Boland, then Irish Envoy to the United States, was able to work out a pledge of co-operation from the Clan-na-Gael, but when the editorial policy of the Gaelic American seemed impervious to change, Boland, acting on the authority of the Supreme Council of the IRB, severed the connection between the Clan and the Brotherhood on 22 October. Several weeks later at a meeting of the Clan executive Devoy, John A. McGarry, John Archdeacon Murphy, Joseph Liddy, and Michael McGrail defended the Clan's policy and denounced Boland's action against the objections of Joseph McGarrity and Hugh Montague. As a result of the meeting McGarrity and Montague declared their antagonists on the executive expelled from the Clan, and Luke Dillon, whom they appointed treasurer of the "reorganized" Clan-na-Gael, sent out letters to all known Clan members asking that they give their allegiance to the new leaders. Although the reorganized Clan made some progress in Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Chicago, Devoy tended to hold the loyalties of a majority of the Clan members, especially in New York, the Clan's main source of strength.

De Valera next took the remarkable step of circumventing Cohalan

1 Count Plunkett told the Dail on 6 August 1920 that there was a "dispute between certain people in America and the President. These people thought that they in America had a right to dictate the policy of the Republic. The President naturally held a different view.... The trouble was now practically over. The President was sure of his ground, and the greater volume of Irish opinion in the United States had rallied to his support." Dail Eireann proc. 1919-21, p. 195. Also see Irish World, 10 July and 28 Aug. 1920.


and Devoy by creating his own Irish-American organization. On 9
November he sent telegrams to over one hundred Irish-Americans asking
them if they could come to Washington for a conference to plan a na-
tional campaign to "secure official recognition for the Irish Republic...."1 De Valera told the people who assembled at the meeting on
16 November that he had hesitated to form a new organization, hoping
that the existing ones would give him their assistance, but his hopes
had been "shattered" on the eve of the national elections and he now
called on them to form a new, open, and democratic partnership to
support the Irish cause.2 The American Association for the Recogni-
tion of the Irish Republic was created at the conference and Edward L.
Doheny, the California oil millionaire who had sponsored de Valera's
minority report at the Democratic national convention in June, was
made national president.3 For the next several months the energies of
the two Irish-American organizations were devoted to internal prob-
lems—the FOIF and the Clan to maintain what strength and enrolment as
they could, and the AARIR to create a system of state and local bran-

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1Lavelle, O'Mara, p. 182. At least some welcomed the open break
with the leaders of the FOIF. Mrs Peter Golden wrote in August, "I am
convinced that whatever the cost the most important thing at this time
is to give Dan /Coahan/ the knock-out blow. He must GO and what ever
the I.P.L. can do to hasten his going I feel it is our duty to do."
Mrs Peter Golden to M.E. Hickey, 11 Aug. 1920, and Mrs M.E. Hickey to
Also see Sinn Feiner, 16 Oct. 1920.

2Irish World, 27 Nov. 1920; and Lavelle, op. cit., pp 184-85.

3See R.S. Downing, "A report" (n.p., 1920) which described the
obstructionist tactics of the FOIF leaders and the need for a new or-
ganization, and Report of first annual state convention, Montana
AARIR, 12 Feb. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). The Gael-
ic American called Doheny the "Chief of English oil interests in Mex-
ico." G.A., 27 Nov. 1920. The Foreign Office made the connection
between Doheny's oil interests in Mexico and the British government
also, and they suggested that the Admiralty reconsider its contracts
with him. Lindsay to Curzon, 27 March 1920, and minutes, 13 April
1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4550).
ches throughout the country. Diarmuid Lynch, national secretary of the FOIF, wrote to all the regular and associate branches accusing de Valera of using a "flying squadron" to destroy the smooth running organization which five months earlier had the enemies of America and Ireland "on the run" and outlining the extent to which the FOIF and the Irish Victory Fund had not only financed the whole movement in the United States but had also subsidized de Valera's mission and the bond-certificate drive; the Gaelic American lashed out at de Valera, saying that his amendments to the FOIF constitution would have ruined it and that expulsion of the Clan was outrageous—"No better work for Ireland was ever done in living memory and yet those who did it are treated as enemies of Ireland." The AARIR, using some of the bond-certificate money and campaign workers, and the members of the IPL, began creating their new organization—they established a national headquarters in Washington, created the Benjamin Franklin Bureau in Chicago, elected Peter Golden national secretary, and undertook a

1Diarmuid Lynch to FOIF, 7 Oct. and 19 Nov. 1919 (Catholic University of America Archives, Shahan Papers); and GA, 16 Oct. and 30 Oct. 1919. See also Ibid., 27 Nov. and 18 Dec. 1919. FOIF numbers shrank from 100,749 regular members and 174,281 associates down to a mere 20,000. O'Donoghue in Lynch, The I.R.B. and the 1916 insurrection, p. 241. De Valera on one occasion told the Dail that the AARIR numbered over a half million and on another 800,000, although these estimates seem overly optimistic. 10 May 1921, Dail Eireann proc., 1919-21, p. 288; and 2 March 1922, Dail Eireann, tuairisc oifigiúil (official report) /1921-2/ (Dublin, n.d.), p. 216. The British Embassy in Washington understood that enrolment in the AARIR expanded through a system whereby a member was paid between 25 and 50 cents for every new person he brought into the organization. J. Joyce Broderick to Comptroller General, Department of Overseas Trade, 2 Feb. 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5632). Despite the collapse of the FOIF it held the loyalties of many of the old Irish-American leaders. See the comments of Dr W. Patrick Slattery, state chairman of the Iowa bond-certificate campaign, "As for the choice between Mr Harry Boland and Judge Cohalan, give me Cohalan. The so-called Irish leaders that I have personally met and who were shooting off the hot air during this entire campaign to my mind could not successfully run a ward caucus." Slattery to Frank P. Walsh, 3 Jan. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 127); Montei, Casement's last adventure, pp 240-45; Lavelle, O'Mara, pp 200-02.
pamphlet campaign. A large convention was called on 18 to 20 April 1921 in Chicago where the national character of the organization was fully established; such Irish-American leaders as Rossa F. Downing, Judge John Goff, and Father Peter C. Yorke figured prominently. The convention was a success, although requests made by de Valera for new fund raising projects without prior consultation with either O'Mara or Boland created some bad feeling. De Valera, however, had in December 1920 slipped secretly back to Ireland.

De Valera's objective in founding an organization under the control of the Irish leaders was understandable enough, although why he chose to direct the AARIR irrevocably towards recognition of an Irish Republic is less clear. As McCartan and several others have observed, by November of 1920 it was no longer possible to hope for official acknowledgment or recognition of the Irish Republic. Nonetheless the AARIR expended great energy in promoting the idea of American

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1See Golden to Mrs Golden, 20 April 1921 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder i); and Irish World, 11 and 18 Dec. 1920. Frank P. Walsh reported to George Gavan Duffy that the AARIR was growing quickly throughout the country, and indeed, "the Irish effort is going along better in America than at any time within its history." Walsh to Duffy, 1 Feb. 1921 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5528).

2For a full report of the convention by Jeremiah A. O'Leary see Sinn Feiner, 30 April 1921; and by Harry Boland see 17 Aug. 1921, Dail Eireann rep. 1921-2, pp 17-18. Also see Lavelle, O'Mara, pp 242-44 and 237-38.

3By late 1920 both the British and American governments were becoming concerned about de Valera's unimpeded revolutionary activity. See Memorandum of conversation between Mr Norman H. Davis and the British Ambassador, 14 Dec. 1920 (N.A., 841d.00/686, roll 221); Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 28 Nov. 1920, and minutes, Geddes to F.O., 30 Nov. 1920, and F.O. to Geddes, 4 Dec. 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4554, -/4575); and 8 Dec. 1920, Hansard 5 (commons), cxxxv, col. 2081.

recognition. Dr Maloney published an intriguing pamphlet in which he argued that the Senate had already extended recognition to Ireland in its resolution in June 1919 asking that the peace conference give a hearing to the Irish delegation.\(^1\) The anonymous pamphlet "We must recognize the Irish Republic" said that the United States owed support and recognition to Ireland and that the Irish cause and the American cause were identical.\(^2\) Other pamphlets emphasized the republican character of the new Ireland. The testimony of Mary MacSwiney before the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland was reprinted, and explained the creation of the present republic; Mrs Alice Stopford Green's "The Irish Republican Army" asserted that the function of the IRA, one of the finest fighting bodies in the world, was to protect the republic and allow its institutions to continue functioning throughout Ireland.\(^3\) None of this moved the United States towards recognition, however, and indeed as de Valera himself confessed to the Dail when he returned to Ireland, "If I were President of the United States myself...I could not, and would not, recognise Ireland as a Republic."\(^4\) By the spring of 1921 Major Kinkead admitted, "we will have great difficulty" securing the passage by Congress of any

\(^1\)W. J. M. A. Maloney, "The recognised Irish Republic" (New York, n.d.).

\(^2\)"We must recognize the Irish Republic" (Los Angeles, n.d.).

\(^3\)M. MacSwiney, "The background of the Irish Republic" (Chicago, n.d.); and A. S. Green, "The Irish Republican Army" (Washington, n.d.).

measure which would extend recognition to Ireland, although Frank P. Walsh suggested to James O'Mara that the AARIR was then strong enough to "bring organized pressure to bear on the newspapers throughout the country" in order to broaden the campaign for the Irish cause.  

Meanwhile, of course, valuable time had been lost during the bickering between the rival factions in America. Efforts were made to deal with the very important events which were taking place in Ireland and the United States, but they met with little success. The hunger strike of Lord Mayor Terence MacSwiney drew appeals to the American government from diverse sources. Secretary of State Colby was willing to consider making an unofficial appeal to the British Embassy and to listen patiently to Frank P. Walsh, James K. McGuire, and Daniel C. O'Flaherty (the Under Secretary of State had already told Cardinal O'Connell that the government had no legal grounds for intervention in MacSwiney's case), but the tired and sick Wilson lashed out at a rather tactless telegram to him by telling Tumulty, "This is more than futile; it is grossly impertinent."  

1 Walsh to O'Mara, 4 May 1921, and Kinkead to Walsh, 2 May 1921, and also Basil M. Manly to Walsh, 7 July 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 110); and James E. Murray to Congressman Carl Riddick, 5 May 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190).

was another source of frustration; the Irish-Americans, having laboured diligently for months to destroy Wilson and the Democratic party, found that Senator Warren G. Harding regarded Ireland as a British domestic problem. Appeals to Wilson from James M. Cox, the Democratic candidate, to give some assistance by making a public statement about the ways the League of Nations could serve Ireland fell upon deaf ears; in all truthfulness, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, wrote his friend Colonel Arthur Murray, "I wish to goodness you could find some way of taking it [the Irish question] out of our campaign over here!" But the Republican majority was so large that it was unlikely that the Irish-American vote had much influence one way or another. Several other independent projects by Irish-American groups proved to be fiascos—boycotting British manufactured goods, causing labour strikes among workers servicing British steamships, and the efforts of the Irish "Consul" in New York "prohibiting" American commerce with Ireland through British ports—and they led to lawsuits, angry letters, and

1 Peter Golden to Harding, ca. summer 1920 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder i-c); Sinn Feiner, 30 Oct. 1920; and Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American relations, p. 222.

2 Cox to Tumulty, 10 Oct. 1920 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 4); and Roosevelt to Murray, 9 Oct. 1920 in Murray, At close quarters, p. 90. Also see C.A. Price to Senator John Sharp Williams, 30 Sept. 1920 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 53); Michael Francis Doyle to Tumulty, 1 Nov. 1920 and W.L. Hill to George White, 9 Oct. 1920 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 558).

3 For a good analysis of the importance of the Irish question in the 1920 presidential election see Ward, op. cit., pp 220-24; and also Gerson, The hyphenate in recent American politics and diplomacy, pp 105-06.
the possibility of government action. And with the opening of the
new Congress in April 1921 numerous resolutions were introduced in
both houses asking for recognition of an Irish Republic, or express-
ing concern over conditions in Ireland; however, in spite of several
impassioned speeches by Senators LaFollette, Borah, and Norris, no
hearings were held on any of them and none were reported from the
committees. 2

(iii)

While the Irish and Irish-American leaders were struggling for
control of the nationalist movement in the United States, new avenues
were explored to maintain agitation and, in so far as possible, to
enlist the support and participation of native Americans. Several

1 Miss Leonora O'Reilly to Frank P. Walsh, 28 May 1921, Timothy
Healy (American Federation of Labour) to Frank P. Walsh, 17 June 1921
and Thomas F. O'Flaherty to Walsh, 24 June 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Pap-
ers, box 110); H.S. Chapee to Department of State, 6 July 1921 (N.A.,
841d.00/385, roll 218); S.S. Baltic strike hand-bill (N.L.I., Golden
Papers, MS 13,141, folder vi); and Gallagher, "Statement dealing with
matters which arose out of the visit to the United States of America
of the Hon. Eamon de Valera," For a list of the activities of merely
the Washington, D.C., Irish-Americans see R.S. Downing in The voice
of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, pp 216-17.

2 Mason (H.R. 117, H. Con. Res. 4 and 5, H. Res. 26), Burke (H.J.
Res. 1), and Kindred (H. Res. 21), 11 April 1921, Congressional Rec-
ord, 67th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 61, pp 89, 99-101; Ryan (H.J.
Res. 89), 27 April 1921, Ibid., p. 742; O'Brien (H.J. Res. 96), Ibid.,
p. 896. For Senate activity see LaFollette (S.J. Res. 1), 12 April
1921 and speeches 25 and 24 April 1921, Ibid., pp 152, 637-51; Norris
(S.J. Res. 27), 16 April 1921 and speeches, 20 and 21 June 1921, Ibid.,
pp 2759, 2803, and 2809-10. Also see Ibid., pp 899, 1144, 1403, 1721,
2123, 2256, and 2366. Secretary of State Hughes, while uneasy about
the possibility that one of the resolutions might be enacted, told the
British Chargé d'Affaires that the resolutions would probably be debat-
ed in Congress but not passed, and that the resolutions had been intro-
duced out of congressional disapproval of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Memorandum of interview with British Ambassador, 23 June 1921 (L.C.,
Hughes Papers, file 76(a), Gt. Brit., box 175); and 741.9411/140 b,
Foreign relations, 1921, ii, pp 314-16.
projects were undertaken, the most notable being the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland and the American Commission for Relief in Ireland, both the inventions of the fertile mind of Dr W. J. M. A. Maloney. The first project was carried out through the co-operation of Oswald Garrison Villard, the editor of the liberal New York Nation and relation by marriage to Maloney. Villard agreed to send out invitations to every Senator and state governor and a large list of distinguished Americans to form the Committee of One Hundred which would assume the power to appoint a small commission of several members to investigate the violent political situation in Ireland. De Valera himself was sceptical, but when assured by Maloney that "the Commission is merely a mask to place the Irish case before the tribunal of the civilized world," although hostile witnesses would be included to maintain a degree of objectivity, he agreed. By early October some 130 people had responded and were able to meet and select the eight member commission: chairman L. Hollingsworth Woods, a New York lawyer active in liberal causes and a member of the Society of Friends; vice-chairman Dr Frederick E. Howe, a New York lawyer and former international affairs expert for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; Jane Addams, the Chicago social worker; Rev Norman Thomas, the socialist Presbyterian minister and editor of World Tomorrow; James Maurer, Pennsylvania labour leader; Major Oliver Newman, soldier and journalist; Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts; and Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska. The commission was a very distinguished one, although its decidedly liberal membership made it suspect in some

quarters. 1

The commission disengaged itself from the Nation as soon as
money, raised by subscription through the magazine, permitted them to
do so, and they opened offices in Washington, D.C., at the Hotel
LaFayette. 2  Its objectives, as vice-chairman Frederick C. Howe said
later at the first public session, were "to learn as nearly as poss-

The Committee of One Hundred was extremely impressive also:
eleven United States Senators, six state governors, several mayors
and Congressmen, ten professors or university administrators, and a
substantial list of editors, labour leaders, social workers, liberal
journalists, and clergymen of all faiths. Among the most notable
were Morris Hillquit, W. Randolph Hearst, Owen R. Lovejoy, Amos Pin-
chot, William Allen White, Dr W.E.B. Du Bois, and Miss Abby Scott
Baker. Committee of One Hundred, List of members, 23 Sept. 1920, and
second list of members, 5 Oct. 1920 (Harvard University Library, Vil-
indignantly refused the invitation to serve on the Committee of One
352. A staff was also appointed for the commission: Dr William
MacDonald, former professor at Brown University and editor of the Na-
tion was made secretary, Royal W. France served as treasurer for both
the committee and the commission, Albert Coyle transcribed the hear-
ings, and Harold Kellock dealt with publicity. McCartan, With DeVal-
era in America, pp 213, 222, 235-37.

Actually Howe wanted the commission to send a delegation to Ire-
land to investigate conditions in person, however such plans did not
materialize because of internal disagreements and the objections of
the British government. Arthur Gleason, the author of Inside the
British Isles and one of the projected delegation, complained to Vil-
lard that its composition was too "idealistic" and not sufficiently
business or law orientated. Howe to Villard, Nov. 1920, and Gleason
to Villard, 24 Nov. 1920 (Villard Papers, op. cit.). Sir Hamar Green-
wood, Irish Chief Secretary, dismissed the idea outright, noting that
the government had prevented Archbishop Mannix from entering Ireland
and he was a British subject. See minutes on cable from Sir A. Ged-
des to F.O., 26 Nov. 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4554); MacDonald to Ged-
des, 24 Nov. 1920, and Craigie to MacDonald, 8 Dec. 1920, American
Commission on Conditions in Ireland: interim report (Chicago, 1921),
pp 122-25. This refusal to permit Americans to travel in Ireland pro-
voked a protest from Senators Norris, France, LaFollette, Ransdell,
Gronna, Chamberlain, Fletcher, Shields, Thomas J. Walsh, and David I.
Walsh, although the Department of State was compelled to admit that
the British had the right to control the movement of foreigners in and
out of their territories. See Senators George W. Norris, et al., to
Bainbridge Colby, 15 Dec. 1920, and Senator Thomas J. Walsh to Norman
H. Davis, 14 Jan. 1921 (N.A., 841.00/265 and -/285, rolls 217 and 218);
and Norman H. Davis to each Senator, 11 Jan. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers,
file B, box 190).
ible just what the conditions in Ireland are and what has brought them about. It plans to conduct a series of public hearings in Washington. It will hear witnesses who present themselves representing English and Irish opinion.1 Invitations were to be extended to people in Ireland who had figured in the reprisals by the British forces, and British government authorities were asked to send representatives; from the testimony of these witnesses the commission would attempt to determine what was happening in Ireland and who was responsible. The British government, of course, was not pleased with the prospect of Americans passing judgment on their attempts to suppress rebellion in Ireland. Geddes informed the Foreign Office that the project was "obviously designed to embarrass us as naturally no evidence can be forthcoming from this side," and he thought anyone attempting to present the British argument should be discouraged because it could not be done effectively in the circumstances; nonetheless he felt it would be a mistake to prevent people such as Mrs MacSwiney from leaving Ireland because that would be more damaging than her testimony.2 Dr William MacDonald, secretary of the commission, was informed that the British government would not actively assist the commission but that it would not withhold passports from those attempting to give testimony.3

The hearings themselves were extremely effective in providing a means of informing the American public of British outrages in Ireland,

3See F.O. to Geddes, 7 Oct. 1920 (Ibid.); and R.L. Craigie to MacDonald, 11 Oct. 1920, American Commission on Conditions in Ireland: interim report, p. 120.
although the thirty-eight witnesses, as had been anticipated, were in large part either participants in the Irish nationalist movement or openly sympathetic to it. The first session of hearings took place on 18 and 19 November 1920 in Washington. Denis Morgan, chairman of the Urban Council of Thurles and John Derham, town councillor of Balbriggan, both addressed the commission and told of atrocities committed in their communities by the Crown forces; Morgan related how the Black and Tans had subjected himself and his family to great personal danger and how his home and public house had been burned because of his alleged Sinn Fein sympathies; Derham described the British reprisals in Balbriggan which resulted in the destruction of a section of that village. Francis Hackett, a writer for the New Republic and the author of Ireland: a study in nationalism, and his wife Signe Toksvig, gave grim reports about the conditions in Ireland they had observed; and three other Americans gave reports of unpleasant encounters with British authorities in Ireland while visiting relatives. The second set of hearings on 8, 9, and 10 December, was even more spectacular, featuring the widow and the sister of Terence MacSwiney who told of the long vigil maintained by the former Lord Mayor; four former members of the Royal Irish Constabulary gave lurid tales of how the Constabulary had become increasingly alienated by the practices of the uncontrollable Cadets and Auxiliaries; these particular hearings were dramatically underscored by the burning of sections of downtown Cork two days later. Subsequent hearings held in late December 1920 and January 1921 included among the witnesses Laurence Ginnell, a former member of Parliament and then member of the Dail; the sisters of former Lord Mayor MacCurtain of Cork; two representatives of the British branch of the Women's International League; Louise Bennett, secretary
of the Irish branch of the Women's International League; J.L. Faw-sitt, Consul-General of the Irish Republic in New York; and Donal O'Callaghan, the Lord Mayor of Cork. All this testimony, fully cov-
ered by newspaper reporters, was important in keeping the nationalist
point of view before the American public during a time when faction-
alism within the Irish-American nationalist movement had destroyed
the normal machinery for propaganda and agitation.²

In other ways the commission was less successful. Criticism was
leveled at it by native Americans because the witnesses were over-
whelmingly nationalist in their sympathies and, for this reason, sev-

¹See Evidence on Conditions in Ireland, ed. A. Coyle. On attemp-
ting to enter the United States at Newport News, Virginia, O'Callaghan
was stopped by immigration authorities because he had no passport.
His subsequent statements denied his entry into the United States as
a political refugee, but he was finally accepted as a "seaman" which
he was not; but such a classification permitted him to spend some time
in America, during which he gave his testimony before the commission,
ostaensibly while he searched for a new ship. For details of the argu-
ments between the State Department and the Labour Department, as well
as the State Department's attempts to explain the situation to the
British Chargé d'Affaires see Memorandum of conversation between Mr
Craige and Norman H. Davis, 31 Jan. 1921 (L.C., Davis Papers, box 9);
and Memorandum dealing with Lord Mayor O'Callaghan by R.W. Flourney,
25 March 1921, and Fred K. Nielsen to Sec of State, 29 March 1921
(L.C., Nielsen Papers, box 5). The British Foreign Office felt that
the irresponsibility of the United States government in allowing the
commission to hold its sessions was finally catching up with them.

²See McCartan, With DeValera in America, pp 215-16 and 221-23.
Frederick T.F. Dumont, the American Consul in Dublin, told the State
Department that the commission could not be relied upon to present
objective information; that because the revolutionary activities were
secret no knowledge of them could be effectively presented, only the
British reactions to them; and he called attention to the fact that
Senator Fletcher of Florida, one of the Committee of One Hundred, was
likely to be influenced by his son-in-law Lionel Smith-Gordon who di-
rected the Sinn Fein land bank, and that in America Irish revolutionary
interests had joined forces with anti-British oil interests. Dumont
to Sec of State, 12 Nov. 1920 and 28 Jan. 1921 (N.A., 841d., 00/259 and
=314, rolls 217 and 218).
eral members of the Committee of One Hundred later resigned. The Gaelic American also opposed the commission as a device to divert Irish-American attention away from the split in the movement, although it later supported the report. But there were other problems as well; the commission moved slowly, holding hearings over three months. Its Interim report, which described what the commission was attempting to do and talked generally about the British terror campaign, was not published until March 1921, and the final volume, Evidence on conditions in Ireland did not appear until July 1921, almost too late to be of propaganda value. Even Villard confessed, "Our report had a much better reception in England than it did here." Furthermore, the fact that the Benjamin Franklin Bureau distributed free copies of

1W.A. Neilson, president of Smith College, told Villard that he felt obliged to resign because he was convinced there would not be "a fair distribution of witnesses." See Neilson to Villard, 30 Nov. 1920 (Harvard University Library, Villard Papers, bms Am 1321, vol. 1878); Charles Noble Gregory to Lord Bryce, 13 Jan. 1921 and Moorfield Storey to Lord Bryce, 6 April 1921 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 14, fol. 69); Senator John Sharp Williams to Demarest Lloyd, 18 Oct. 1920, and Lloyd to Williams, 22 Oct. 1920 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 53).

2G.A., 2 Oct. 1920 and 9 April 1921; and also Irish World, 2 Oct. 1920.

3The testimony was also printed in the Nation, and at the request of Hollingsworth Wood a large number of copies was published, which subsequently Villard was unable to sell; indeed by 1921 Villard was generally dissatisfied with the work and the attitude of the commission. See Villard to Wood, 20 and 26 Jan., and 25 March 1921, Wood to Villard, 21 Jan. 1921, and Villard to Norman Thomas, 29 March 1921 (Harvard University Library, Villard Papers, bms Am 1323, vol. 1878). McCartan has suggested that these volumes were written by Dr Maloney. McCartan, With de Valera in America, pp 235-36.

4Villard to George A. Dunning, 13 April (Villard Papers, op. cit.); McCartan in fact called special attention to the success the reports did have in Europe. McCartan, op. cit., pp 236-37. Also see Albert Coyle to Art O'Brien, 14 May 1921 and Art O'Brien to de Valera, 31 March 1921 (N.L.I., O'Brien Papers, MS 8429).
both volumes created financial problems for the commission. 1 By May
the chairman of the commission told Frank P. Walsh, "altogether the
three main movers in this enterprise are feeling pretty unhappy." 2

Relief operations were another avenue of agitation which could
be maintained despite the divisions in the nationalist movement. Of
course relief efforts had been made in 1916, although they had been
an almost exclusively Irish-American enterprise. In 1920, in part
because of the publicity work of the American Commission on Condi-
tions in Ireland, but to no small degree because of the dimensions of
the reprisals themselves, much larger and more ambitious projects
were proposed. Attempts were first made during the autumn of 1920 to
secure the assistance of the American Red Cross in sending aid to Ire-
land, however, with the burning of parts of Cork on 12 December an
appeal was received directly from Lord Mayor O'Callaghan. 3 Dr Living-
stone Farrand, national director, sensitive to the political implica-
tions of relief in Ireland, consulted with the Department of State,
the British Embassy, and the British Red Cross. 4 On the strength of
the report from the British director, that no one was homeless as a

1The commission was hard pressed to repay a loan of $10,000 to
Dr Maloney and had fairly substantial printing costs. McCartan says
that James O'Mara provided some of the money to meet publishing ex-

2L. Hollingsworth Wood to Walsh, 18 and 21 May 1921 (N.Y.P.L.,
Walsh Papers, box 110).

3Lord Mayor O'Callaghan to American Red Cross, 16 Dec. 1920, Dr
Farrand to O'Callaghan, 16 Dec. 1920 (N.A., 841d.48/5, roll 241).
Various appeals to the American Red Cross during the autumn had been
a source of concern to Sir Auckland Geddes and the Foreign Office who
regarded these efforts as motivated purely for the sake of propaga-
da. Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 12 Nov. 1920, and minutes, and F.O. to

4See Norman H. Davis to President, 15 Dec. 1920 (N.A., 841d.48/
-a, roll 241).
result of the destruction although eventually jobs would be affected, the American Red Cross informed people such as Mrs Peter Golden that they felt no action could be taken. Appeals directly to the Secretary of State for advice about the distribution of clothing and assistance were turned aside with the suggestion that the Irish Red Cross might be willing to help. Although these attempts to secure the intervention of the Red Cross failed, private efforts such as that of Mrs Seamus O'Doherty, then in the United States, were successful. Through the Irish-American Club of Philadelphia Mrs O'Doherty was able to send the S.S. Honolulu to Cork in late December loaded with 1,700 tons of food and clothing.

A more spectacular private effort undertaken by Dr Maloney was also successful, although initially his attempts among friends in New York to create interest in sending a relief ship to Ireland had not been very promising. Through the influence of Richard Campbell and Senator David I. Walsh, Maloney enlisted the aid and financial resources of Edward L. Doheny, the California oil millionaire who had recently been appointed national president of the AARIR; Doheny wrote a cheque for $10,000 and agreed to underwrite the whole $247,000 if necessary. Maloney attempted again to win support for his project by hold-

1 Memorandum by Sir Arthur Stanley (director of the joint committee of the British Red Cross and the Knights of St John of Jerusalem) to F.O., 29 Dec. 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4613); and American Red Cross to Mrs Peter Golden, 30 Dec. 1920 (N.I.A., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder 11). Mrs Golden was in no way satisfied with the reply and sent a sharply worded letter asking about Red Cross aid in Cuba, Belgium, and Siberia. Mrs Golden to American Red Cross, 1 Jan., 1921 (Ibid.).


3 McCartan, With DeValera in America, p. 224; and Irish World, 1 Jan. 1921.
ing a luncheon meeting in New York, but five days before the meeting sections of Cork were burned by the British forces. Armed with this news and a cable appealing for aid from James G. Douglas, a leading member of the Dublin Society of Friends, Maloney changed his plans to create a national organization to co-ordinate and direct relief to Ireland; these new proposals were enthusiastically accepted by the guests at the luncheon, who formed themselves into the executive committee of the American Committee for Relief in Ireland. This committee, which included twenty-three distinguished Irish-Americans, began work to make a national appeal for funds and create a broadly based organization to collect them; Doheny advanced the committee $250,000 which enabled them to begin work then and to cable $25,000 to Douglas immediately.

Maloney also suggested that a delegation be sent by the American Committee for Relief in Ireland to investigate the conditions in Ireland and to confer with people there as to how relief operations could be most effectively handled. A group of eight men, several members of the Society of Friends with prior experience in European relief opera-


tions, was appointed and left in late January for England and Ireland where they immediately began talks with Friends relief committees in both countries. 1 After securing permission to travel throughout Ireland from General Macready, on the condition that their relief work would be "non-political" and carried out in an "impartial spirit," the delegation proceeded to make a nearly two month inspection tour of the country, visiting ninety-five towns, villages and creameries which had been destroyed or damaged by the British forces. 2 From their own observations and from conversations with people in the distressed areas, as well as from the advice of relief organizations in Ireland, the delegation compiled a report for the American Committee for Relief in Ireland from which estimates of the type and amount of relief necessary were calculated. A close relationship was quickly established between the delegation and James G. Douglas of the Irish White Cross Society, and indeed the decision was made to carry out the relief

1 The group was led by Clement J. France, former executive secretary of the Port of Seattle and brother of Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland, and included R. Barclay Spicer, former head of the Friends Service Committee to Baltic States, Oren B. Wilber, a dairy and creamery owner, William Price, an architect, Philip W. Furnas, a housing expert who had served two years with the Friends Relief Unit in France, John C. Barker, an agricultural reconstruction expert who had been with the Friends Relief Unit in France, Walter C. Longstreth, a lawyer and settlement worker, and as secretary, Samuel Duff McCoy, an author and journalist who had served with the American Red Cross. See American Committee for Relief in Ireland broadsheet, 30 Jan. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190), and Richard Campbell to Bainbridge Colby, 12 Jan. 1921 (N.A., 841d.48/3, roll 241). Furnas had earlier testified before the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland; and in fact the British observed that France was the brother of the Senator, "one of our most active enemies." Hadow, 23 Feb. 1921, minutes to American Relief in Ireland, 17 Feb. 1921 (F.R.O., F.O. 371/6542). Also see Minutes on Committee on Ireland, 8 Feb. 1921, Minutes of Advisory Committee meeting, 14 Feb. 1921, and S. Graveson to F.H. Pollard, 14 Feb. 1921 (Friends Historical Library, Dublin, Relief Work Papers, 1916-21).

through that society rather than attempt to administrate it them-
selves.

Meanwhile in the United States the committee began work to raise
the money to finance the relief projects. On the advice of Herbert
Hoover, Captain John F. Lucey, who had worked with Hoover in Belgian
relief, was placed in charge of the fund drive and James A. Healy was
made assistant secretary of the executive committee. A large nat-
ional council was created with 134 members, many of them native Amer-
icans, and a list of dignitaries as honorary vice-chairmen, including
eighteen state governors, three former cabinet members, as well as
labour leaders, social workers, philanthropists and editors; although
the membership of the national council was heavily Irish-American, the
number of native Americans was significant. Furthermore letters of

1American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross,
Report, pp 57-58; Report of the Irish White Cross to 31st August, 1922,
ed. W.J. Williams (Dublin, 1922), pp 39-40; and Minutes of meeting of
the Advisory Committee, 14 Feb. 1921 (Friends Historical Society, Dub-

2Herbert Hoover to Sec of State, 11 March 1921 (N.A., 841d.48/7,
roll 214); McCartan, With DeValera in America, p. 228; and Richard
Campbell to Thomas J. Walsh, 25 Feb. 1921, and Lucey to Morgan J.

W.J. Williams, pp 17-18. Work began as early as January to publicize
the need for relief work in Ireland, and in this regard the hearings
of the American Commission for Conditions in Ireland were important.
Richard Campbell, although anxious to get under way before the public
was diverted by other Irish-American organizations, told Senator Thom-
as J. Walsh that funds were coming in almost unsolicited. Campbell to
Walsh, 8 and 11 Jan. 1921 (Walsh Papers, op. cit.). Campbell's fear
that other relief groups might weaken their own appeal was well taken;
the British consul in New York reported that there were several relief
groups marching in the St Patrick’s Day parade. Gloster Armstrong to
Lord Curzon, 18 March 1921 (P.R.O., F.30, 371/5644). Frank P. Walsh
observed with characteristic optimism, "Relief meetings are being held
all over the country, non-political and non-sectarian, every one of
which turns into a splendid demonstration for the Republic, and a
fierce demand for its recognition by our country." Walsh to George
Gavan Duffy, 1 Feb. 1921 (N.L.I., Duffy Papers, MS 5582).
endorsement were solicited from such public figures as Vice-President Calvin Coolidge, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Secretary of War J. Wingate Weeks, former Secretary of the Treasury William G. MacAdoo, former head of the war industries board Bernard Baruch, former Ambassador to Germany James W. Gerard, and many others. By far the most significant letter came from President Warren G. Harding, who wished the committee "the fullest measure of success"; he told Judge Morgan J. O'Brien,

The people of America never will be deaf to the call for relief in behalf of suffering humanity, and the knowledge of distress in Ireland makes quick and deep appeal to the more fortunate of our own land where so many of our citizens trace kinship to the Emerald Isle.

Armed with this official endorsement the committee began its national appeal on 17 March, issuing "A summons to service" to all Americans and asserting that the people of Ireland were then suffering more than had the people of Belgium. "We are not concerned," it said further, "with the causes of this suffering, our appeal is solely humanitarian, absolutely non-sectarian, and strictly non-political." They estimated that ten million dollars were needed quickly and that only the American people could provide the money. The public appeal enlisted the support of such celebrities as John McCormick who gave three benefit concerts to raise money, in addition to the assistance of the Catholic Church

1American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross, Report, pp 6 and 38-39, and a letter of thanks from L. O'Neill, Lord Mayor of Dublin, to President Harding, 29 March 1921 (NA, 841d.48/17, roll 241). For protest see E.M. McFadden (International Protestant League) to Harding, 5 April 1921 (NA, 841d.48/20, roll 241). Also see James J. Phelan to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, 27 March 1921 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, box H-Z); and 7 and 21 April 1921, Hansard 5 (commons), cxl, cols 461-62, 465-66, and 2051-54.

2American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross, Report, p. 50; and "The need for relief in Ireland" (New York, ca. 1921).
and various Irish-American organizations. Geddes sent home anxious reports that the committee had raised two million dollars and had pledges for three million more. Actually the committee raised the impressive sum of $5,223,497, most of which was sent to Ireland through James G. Douglas and the Irish White Cross Society.

The very success of the American Committee for Relief in Ireland created diplomatic problems for the British and American governments. Indeed a very complicated situation had developed. The endorsement of the relief movement by President Harding and others had appeared to lend the approval of the government and in fact, along with widespread reports of destitution in Ireland, it had stimulated contributions. When Samuel Duff McCoy, secretary to the delegation sent to Ireland, returned to the United States in late April he conferred

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1 American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross, Report, pp 40-41. For a vivid description of fund raising efforts in the United States see "White Cross News," n.d. (N.L.I., Moore Papers, MS 10,558). Even the Red Cross, which had earlier felt that conditions in Ireland did not warrant its intervention, contributed $100,000. Memorandum of conversation between Mr Persons and Dr Bicknell of the Red Cross and the 3rd Assistant Secretary of State, 28 March 1921 (N.A., 841d.48/19, roll 241). Despite the interest and participation of Irish and English Quakers the committee was unable to elicit any support from the American Friends, who not only refused to participate in the project but who also resented the specific mention of Quaker participants in the delegation sent to Ireland with its implication that the delegation was in some way authorized by the American Friends Service Committee. Even direct appeals from Samuel Graveson failed to win any support. Wilber K. Thomas (executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee) to Department of State, 8 Feb. 1921, and Herbert Hoover to Sec of State, 11 March 1921 (N.A., 841d.48/3 and -/7, roll 241); S. Graveson to Rufus M. Jones (chairman of the American Friends Service Committee), 30 March 1921, and Jones to Graveson, 19 April 1921 (Friends Historical Library, Dublin, Relief Work Papers, 1916-21); and American Committee for Relief in Ireland broadsheet, 30 Jan. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190).

2 Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 5 May 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5663).

3 American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross, Report, pp 45-47. Also see S.D. McCoy, "Distress in Ireland" (New York, 1921); "The need for relief in Ireland"; and M. Curti, American philanthropy abroad: a history (New Brunswick, 1963), p. 302.
with G. Howland Shaw, the State Department's director of western European affairs, explaining that the British military authorities in Ireland had first said they would permit non-partisan relief to be distributed, but that when the delegation decided to work through the Irish White Cross Society which was in operation before they arrived, the British broke their agreement. As an alternative, McCoy suggested that the administration of the relief funds be assumed by the Department of State as had been done in Belgium during the war, since he thought the department was certain to become involved anyway. ¹ Sir Auckland Geddes learned of these proposals informally and sent a worried dispatch to the Foreign Office analysing the situation as one fraught with danger. An open rejection, Geddes thought, would cause Congress to pass a resolution in favour of recognition of an Irish Republic which might result in the resignation of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and his replacement by former Senator Albert B. Fall, then Secretary of the Interior, a leader of the anti-British western oil interests. ² The Foreign Office was genuinely alarmed, and Lord Curzon, with the approval of the Cabinet, drafted a cable to Geddes that the British government could in no way accept the suggestion that the Department of State assume the administration of, or the

¹Memorandum of conversation with Samuel Duff McCoy and G. Howland Shaw, 21 April 1921, and Memorandum on Irish relief by G. Howland Shaw for Sec of State, 29 April 1921 (N.A., 841d.48/35 and -/38, roll 241); and F.T.F. Dumont to Sec of State, 22 March 1921 (Ibid., 841d.00/339, roll 218).

²Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 5 May 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5663).
responsibility for, relief in Ireland. Geddes informed Secretary Hughes that the suggestions of the American committee were "entirely unacceptable" although Hughes hoped that the British government would be able to accommodate some kind of relief operation in Ireland in order to forestall the indignant public outburst which was certain to follow a flat rejection of any kind of Irish relief. Indeed Geddes recommended some sort of compromise, perhaps with the British Red Cross doing the relief work, and he was supported in this by Sir William Tyrrell, but the government was adamant in its refusal.

The discomfort of the State Department and the American government in addition to that caused by the endorsement of Harding and members of his cabinet was made all the greater by the reports it began to receive from the United States Consul in Dublin, Frederick T.F. Dumont. Just a few days before Harding wrote his letter, Dumont sent the department a report in which he questioned the objectivity of the

1 Curzon wrote that the "American proposal is in the main political in character, constitutes an unwarrantable interference with the Government of a foreign State, would be indignantly rejected had it been made in analogous circumstances to the American Government, and ought to be firmly though politely refused." Curzon to Geddes, ca. 9 May 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5663); C.P. 2921, Curzon to Cabinet, "Ireland and America," 9 May 1921 (P.R.O., CAB. 24/123); C. 36/21(4), 10 May 1921 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/25); and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, ed. Sir C.E. Callwell (London, 1927), 11, p. 289. Interestingly enough, the British were not convinced that the relief funds would be used for revolutionary purposes until late June. See B.H. Thompson (Scotland Yard) to H.J. Seymour, 27 June 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5663).

2 Memorandum of interview with the British Ambassador, 23 May 1921 (L.C., Hughes Papers, file 76(b) Gt. Brit., box 175).

3 Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 25 May 1921, and minutes, and F.O. to Geddes, 6 June 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5663). Despite the government's decision to prohibit American relief operations in Ireland the committee maintained Clement J. France as its agent and sent money to James G. Douglas in instalments of from $35,000 to $55,000 three or four times a month; these remittances stopped from 8 July to 8 September when they were resumed until 28 June 1922. American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross, Report, pp 39-40 and 45-46.
Irish White Cross people with whom the American delegation had conferred. He asserted that there was no widespread distress in Ireland, and in fact the cargo of the relief ship *S.S. Honolulu*, which had arrived in mid-January, had been stored in Cork and not distributed. These observations were shown to Hughes and President Harding, and a request for more information was sent to the Dublin, Cork, and Belfast consulates. Dumont's subsequent reports were equally disquieting to the department, and they provided substantial evidence that, as the British authorities had insisted, there was little economic distress in Ireland as a result of the rebellion and that indeed Ireland was probably more prosperous than ever before. Furthermore, Dumont said of the American relief funds, "It can be stated with confidence that they are to be used to relieve the Treasury of Sinn Fein, and permitting it to devote its funds entirely to the forwarding of the revolutionary movement in Ireland." This bold assertion, that American relief money might be used to subsidize the families of those fight-

1 Dumont said that 2,000 bags of flour which had been sent for relief purposes had eventually been sold to a Cork baker. Dumont to Sec of State, 22 March 1921 (N.A., 841d.00/339, roll 218). He further noted that one of the American delegation would be returning to the United States in order to obtain the assistance of the department in expanding their activities in Ireland, which of course was the purpose of Samuel Duff McCoy's interview with G. Howland Shaw. Ibid.

2 No doubt the department was not comforted with Shaw's information that Hoover had withdrawn his support and that Captain Lucey had resigned as director of the relief fund because of the growing anti-British tone of the proceedings. G. Howland Shaw to Sec of State, 15 April 1921, and Warren G. Harding to Sec of State, 20 April 1921 (N.A., 841d.00/339 and -/392, roll 218). Wilbur J. Carr to Dumont, Mason Mitchell, and William F. Kent, 11 April 1921 (Ibid., 841d.48/22a, b, and c, roll 241).

3 Dumont to Sec of State, 23 April 1921 (Ibid., 841d.00/351, roll 218); and Dumont to Sec of State, 17 May 1921 (Ibid., 841d.48/27, roll 241). To substantiate his argument that Ireland was more prosperous than before, Dumont cited the statistics of Joint Stock Banks, Post Office Savings, and Trustee Savings; he listed the increase in interest paid on British Government Bonds; and he said that 1919 had seen the highest marriage rate recorded in Ireland. Ibid.
ing the British and thus relieving the Dail of that responsibility, was received with grave concern by the department, and Secretary Hughes himself asked Dumont to "send all specific information which you may be able to obtain as to the introduction of American funds into Ireland, particularly when, in your opinion, these funds are to be used for the purposes of the Republican Army." The State Department's dilemma was solved only by the implementation of the truce on 11 July 1921.

Closely allied to the State Department's worries about the use of relief funds for revolutionary purposes was the fear that weapons might be sent from the United States to supply the Irish Republican Army. There had been rumours of arms shipments from America as early as January and May of 1920 although by the end of the year British intelligence sources failed to trace any substantial number of weapons to the United States. However, by early June of 1921 the report of the Irish Chief Secretary to Lord Curzon that information had been acquired suggesting that the Irish Republican Army was in possession of a number of machine guns caused some genuine anxiety.

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1 Dumont to Sec of State, 9 June 1921, and Hughes to Dumont, 11 July 1921 (N.A., 841d.00/381, roll 218). Dumont's allegations that the relief funds were being used for revolutionary purposes cannot be seriously refuted until more data is made available, especially about the operation and finances of the Dail government; the fairly elaborate and detailed report published by the Irish White Cross Society, a year and a half after the funds would have been most useful to the Irish Republic, suggests that he may have been unduly sceptical of the motives of people like Douglas and a bit indifferent to dislocation caused by the fighting; of course this is not to say that none of the money found its way into the hands of the revolutionaries or their dependents. See Report of the Irish White Cross to 31st August, 1922, ed. W.J. Williams, appendix D., pp 125-40.

2 See Davis to Sec of State, 27 and 30 Jan. 1920 (N.A., 841.00/123 and -/125, roll 214); Director of Naval Intelligence to F.O., 30 Aug. 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4551); and Col. A.C. Carter (Scotland Yard) to C.J. Phillips (Foreign Office), 17 Dec. 1920 (Ibid., F.O. 371/4555).
in the State Department. The fortuitous discovery, several days later, of 495 machine guns, with ammunition, on board the coal ship S.S. East Side, destined to sail to Ireland, seemed to offer conclusive proof that arms traffic between the United States and Ireland existed. The Under Secretary of State asked the Secretary of the Treasury to be kept informed of the details of this and any similar arms seizures, and Hughes had an uncomfortable interview with Geddes wherein the Ambassador noted the dangers of the situation and Hughes was able to defend himself only by asking for specific details about the arms shipments to which Geddes had alluded. With the acquisition of Dumont's observations on the use of the relief fund simultaneously with the discovery of the machine guns on the S.S. East Side and the possibility of a congressional resolution recognizing the Irish Republic, the State Department found itself, and the state of Anglo-American relations on the eve of the truce, in an extremely difficult situation.

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Perhaps inevitably the extensive and prolonged Irish agitation in the United States from 1919 through 1921 provoked a hostile reaction from many native Americans. Antagonism towards immigrant groups and Catholics was always close to the surface in American life, as

1 Sir H. Greenwood to Curzon, 2 June 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5655); George Harvey (American Ambassador in London) to Sec of State, 3 and 20 June 1921, and Hughes to Harvey, 18 June 1921 (N.A., 841d.00/360 and -/370, roll 218). Also see G. Armstrong to Curzon, 10 June 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5655).

2 British Embassy to Charles Evans Hughes, 17 June 1921, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Sec of State, 20 June 1921, and Henry P. Fletcher to Sec of Treasury, 1 July 1921 (N.A., 841d.00/379 and -/2372, roll 218); Memorandum of interview with the British Ambassador, 29 June and 28 July 1921 (L.C., Hughes Papers, file 76(a), Gt. Brit., box 175). For outraged comments see C.S.M., 18 June 1921.
has been shown in earlier chapters, but by the 1920s the nativist and xenophobic tendencies which had been stimulated by World War I, the Russian revolution, the peace treaty, and probably the activities of de Valera and the Irish-Americans, gave rise to a degree of anti-Irish sentiment in the United States which went well beyond the occasional speech by Senator Williams or pamphlet by George L. Fox. Organized resistance to the de Valera mission, the bond-certificate drive, and the FOIF first centred on a delegation of Ulster Protestants led by William J. Coote, M.P. for South Tyrone, who arrived in the United States in November 1919 to make a tour of the country presenting the Unionist arguments. Speaking from the pulpits of large Protestant churches throughout the country, the six accompanying clergymen and Coote outlined the dangers presented by Irish nationalism to the Protestant minority and the degree to which the Catholic hierarchy dominated the people. ¹ They published, and distributed where they visited, a small pamphlet, "Facts about Ireland for the consideration of American citizens," which attempted to refute the nationalist propaganda by asserting that Ireland had never been a nation in the modern sense, that it was not oppressed or over-taxed, and that the Sinn Fein movement was responsible for whatever lawlessness or disorder that existed; an independent Ireland, it said, would only unleash religious strife. ² Irish nationalists often played into Coote's hands as when they disrupted him at Grace Methodist Episcopal Church in New York by shouting "Up the Irish Republic" and "Long live de Valera"; Coote could effectively make the point that the Unionists

¹See N.Y.T., 23 Nov., 5 and 15 Dec. 1919.
²Delegates of the Protestant Churches of Ireland, "Facts about Ireland for the consideration of American citizens" (New York, n.d.).
were attempting to save Ireland from people like that.¹

Encouraged by Coote's mission, a number of Boston anglophiles founded the Loyal Coalition for the purpose of preserving the close and friendly Anglo-American relations that had existed during the war and that were presently being threatened by the Irish ferment in the United States. Led by Demarest Lloyd, the son of the Wisconsin Progressive Henry Demarest Lloyd, and Randolph Wellford Smith, the Loyal Coalition traded heavily on native American racial and religious biases and on the recent fear of Irish collusion with German and Soviet agents. Their first project was a series of public lectures on Anglo-American topics by such distinguished speakers as former president Eliot of Harvard, Moorfield Storey, William Roscoe Thayer, George Haven Putnam, Admiral William Snowdon Sims, and Captain Arthur E. Runnells, of the Canadian Intelligence Service.² In addition to a newspaper campaign in New England, the Coalition attempted to warn the government directly of the Irish menace. Lloyd advised Secretary Colby that the State Department should ignore the "Irish American influences attempting to precipitate a diplomatic controversy with Great Britain over the treatment by the British Government of disturb-

¹Both de Valera and the Protestant Friends of Ireland (a branch of the FOIF) repudiated the incident but the damage had been done. N.Y.T., 29 and 30 Dec. 1919. Also see The Sacramento Church Federation to the Associated Press, 21 Feb. 1920 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 14, fol. 153), and Lit. Dig., lxiv, no. 10 (6 March 1920), pp 36-37. Moorfield Storey wrote to Lord Bryce that he approved of the Ulster delegation but he thought that it was too clerical in composition, and that people who could talk economics and politics would be more effective. Storey to Bryce, 22 Dec. 1919 (Bryce Papers, op. cit., vol. 10, fol. 113-14).

²See Demarest Lloyd and Randolph Wellford Smith to Senator John Sharp Williams, 9 April 1920, Smith to Williams, 10 May 1920, Lloyd to Williams, 29 Jan. 1921 (L.C., Williams Papers, boxes 51, 52, 53); Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, bi-monthly Consular reports, March-April 1920 (F.R.O., F.O. 371/4596); Denis McCarthy in O'Grady, The immigrants' influence on Wilson's peace policies, pp 91-97; and Sinn Feiner, 19 March and 2 April 1921.
ers of the peace in the south and west of Ireland.\textsuperscript{1} They also sent complaints to Washington protesting about the various Irish resolutions before Congress in 1920 and 1921, suggesting that the House "confine their attention to American problems."\textsuperscript{2} Members of the Coalition travelled to Chicago and San Francisco to fight the inclusion of an Irish plank in the party platforms, and they struggled throughout the election campaign to keep the candidates from making statements on the Irish question.\textsuperscript{3} They also denounced the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland as "Mr Villard's meddling," but they promised Senator Williams that they intended "to see that the truth is known...."\textsuperscript{4} These protests were not made without some personal cost, however, and the Coalition was attacked collectively and individually; in the House of Representatives Congressman Gallivan said they were "distinctly a treasonable, secret, anti-American body of American and provincial Tories, Britishers of a sort, and other alien-minded conspirators, officered by some cranks and a few criminals, and

\textsuperscript{1}Demarest Lloyd to Colby, 17 April 1920 (N.A., 841d. 00/177, roll 215).

\textsuperscript{2}Loyal Coalition to Wilson, 3 June 1920 (L.C., Wilson Papers, file VI, no. 3926, box 559); and Lloyd to Williams, 10 and 22 June 1921, and Williams to Lloyd, 13 June 1921 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 55).

\textsuperscript{3}Lloyd and Smith to Wilson, 23 May 1920 (N.A., 841d. 01/7, roll 224); Lloyd to Wilson, 30 June 1920 (Wilson Papers, op. cit.); Lloyd to Wilson, 21 Oct. 1920 (L.C., Tumulty Papers, box 4); and Maurice Peterson (for Sir A. Geddes) to Curzon, Consular reports, May-June, 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4596).

\textsuperscript{4}Lloyd to Williams, 8 and 22 Oct. 1920, and Williams to Lloyd, 18 Oct. 1920 (Williams Papers, op. cit., box 53).
financed by anti-American sources.1

Native Americans were often disturbed by the violence of the Irish-American demonstrations. Irish political rhetoric and action had always been fairly extreme, but when directed at American Presidents or war heroes it produced a vehement reaction. Hearing Irish-Americans "applauding de Valera and hissing our President made millions of us rage...", wrote one disgruntled New Yorker, but he spoke for many others.2 A striking instance of the tendency for Irish-Americans to create bad feeling for Ireland by their obnoxious behaviour was the habit of destroying the Union Jack when found in a display of the flags of the Allies, which decorated many buildings for several years after the war.3 Irish-Americans not only threatened the close relations between Great Britain and the United States; many

1 5 June 1920, Congressional Record, Appendix to, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 59, pp 9349-50; George A. Dunning to Oswald Garrison Villard, 10 April 1921 (Harvard University Library, Villard Papers, bms Am 1323, vol. 1878); and Sinn Feiner, 5 Feb. 1921. The Loyal Coalition was supported in its anti-Irish activities by several other American organizations—the Ulster League of North America, the Anti-Imperialist League, the Loyal Orange Order, the British-American League, the Masons—although none of the others seemed to have the anti-Irish campaign as their sole purpose.

2 T. J. Rousseau to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 22 July 1921, and J. W. Hamilton to Walsh, 23 July 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190); and M. D. Wilson to Senator John Sharp Williams, 2 Dec. 1919 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 49); E. R. Wright (Cleveland Ministers's Union) to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, 16 Oct. 1919, Lodge to Wright, 18 Oct. 1919 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Peace, League, Political, I-Z box).

3 This happened with some frequency in 1920 in New York, partly as a reaction to the death of Lord Mayor MacSwiney, but it created hostile feelings among native Americans, many of whom felt that an attack against one of the Allies was also an attack against the United States. A violent incident took place when 5,000 mourners, leaving a service for MacSwiney, stormed the Union League Club breaking windows and damaging the facade, in an attempt to get the British flag down. See N.Y.T., 8, 10, 11, 13, 26, 27, and 28 Nov. 1920; and Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 28 Nov. 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4554). R.C. Lindsay to Curzon, 9 June 1919 (Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers, F 46/1/8).
Irish sympathizers made no attempt to disguise the fact that they wanted war with England. Congressman Gallivan had told the House of Representatives that Britain had "no right to object" to American assistance to Ireland, and Judge Cohalan answered "yes" to the question of Congressman Connolly as to whether he would support war with Britain to secure Irish freedom. Senator Williams, who insisted that he had always supported Irish home rule, deeply resented the recent efforts of the Irish-Americans to use the United States as "a cat's paw to pull Irish chestnuts out of the fire." Amory Blaine, the hero of F. Scott Fitzgerald's popular novel This side of paradise, agreed with a friend about the lack of dignity of the Irish Republic because the Irish-Americans in the reception committee rode through the town with "their arms around the President," and George Babbitt, the central figure of Sinclair Lewis's book, approved of a newspaper account of a meeting which "demanded that this Mick agitator, this fellow DeValera, be deported," claiming that all of the trouble-makers in America were being paid with German gold and that the United States had no business meddling in Irish affairs.

Ireland and Irish agitation also became the subject of a series

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13 Aug. 1919, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 58, p. 3852; 12 Dec. 1919, U.S. Congress, To provide for the salaries of a minister and consuls to the Republic of Ireland, pp 18-40; and also, "Are you ready for the test?" an editorial advocating war with England for Irish independence, Chicago Tribune, 15 July 1919. Also see E.P. Joyce, "Recognition of Ireland, not war with Britain," America, 30 April 1921.


of books and pamphlets which challenged the idea of Irish nationalism and often attacked the role of Irish-Americans in American politics. One of the most thoughtful volumes was Ireland and England, a study of Anglo-Irish relations by Edward Raymond Turner, a history professor at the University of Michigan. Turner argued that Irish independence would not be wise for either Ireland or Britain, although the English desire to do justice to Ireland could be most successfully accomplished through some scheme of home rule. A more popular book, also destined to be more controversial, was A straight deal or the ancient grudge by the celebrated author of The Virginian and friend of Theodore Roosevelt, Owen Wister. Wister talked about the importance of maintaining close Anglo-American solidarity and he struck out at the historical arguments of the Irish in claiming American support in their rebellion. If America owed support to any Irishman, Wister said, it was to the "Orange" Irish who aided in the founding of the republic and not to the "Green" Irish who had given America the Civil War draft riots, Tammany Hall politics, the Molly Maguires, and who had assaulted United States sailors in Queenstown in 1918.

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2O. Wister, A straight deal or the ancient grudge (New York, 1920). Wister's book was violently denounced by Edward F. McSweeney in his pamphlet "The super-hyphenate—the Anglo-Saxon American" (n.p., n.d.); McSweeney said that Wister was working for an Anglo-American union, fomenting a hatred of Germany, and attempting to destroy American patriotism and nationalism as manifested by the Irish-Americans. D.T. O'Connell, "Owen Wister, advocate of racial hatred" (Washington, 1920). For an interesting attempt to prove the positive contribution of the Irish in American history and explode the "Scotch-Irish myth" see M.J. O'Brien, A hidden phase of American history, Ireland's part in America's struggle for liberty (New York, 1919); and J.X. Regan, Ireland and the Presidents of the United States (Boston, 1921).
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An exchange of letters between Moorfield Storey and Michael J. Jordan in the Boston Herald discussing the attempts of the Irish-Americans to force the Irish question into American foreign relations was reprinted as a small pamphlet, as were several short articles by George L. Fox; through his writings and testimony at congressional hearings Fox had become known as an anti-Irish spokesman, but the publication of "Light on the Irish question," "More light on the Irish question," "Lest we forget how disloyal the Irish Sinn Fein Roman Catholics were and are" and "Poisoning the wells" established his reputation. Two books which made some impression in the United States, but which were written abroad, were R.C. Escouflaire's *Ireland an enemy of the Allies?*, which spoke of Ireland's treacherous relations with the Germans during the war, and Richard Dawson's *Red terror and green*, which told of Ireland's post-war relations with the unspeakable Bolsheviks. All of these books questioned the merits of Irish nationalism, often


2M. Storey and M.J. Jordan, "Americans of Irish lineage: their duties and their aims" (Boston, n.d.). G.L. Fox, "Light on the Irish question" (New Haven, n.d.), "More light on the Irish question" (New Haven, n.d.), "Lest we forget how disloyal the Irish Sinn Fein Roman Catholics were and are" (New Haven, n.d.), and "Poisoning the wells" (New Haven, n.d.). The British Foreign Office took Fox quite seriously, as they did several other Americans, such as James Witherow, and they were anxious to assist him in finding new material for his writings when he travelled to England in 1921. See G. Armstrong to F.O., 14 July 1920 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4551); and James Witherow to Sir A. Geddes, 4 Dec. 1920, and minutes (P.R.O., F.O. 371/4555). Also see "Preaching revolutions right under our noses," *The Masonic Observer*, 25 June 1921.

because of Anglo-American sympathy, anti-Catholic feeling, or simply 
a distrust of the Irish, whether in American politics or in the world 
war.

These anti-Irish feelings among native Americans eventually foc-
used on the controversy surrounding a speech in London on 7 June 1921 
by Rear-Admiral William Snowdon Sims. Actually Sims had earlier incur-
red the wrath of the Irish-American nationalists when he published his 
war memoirs, The victory at sea, where he devoted several pages to the 
Irish, discussing the collaboration between the Sinn Fein and the 
Germans and the attacks of Sinn Fein Irishmen on American sailors in 
Queenstown. 1 But Sims also added,

During the nearly two years which the American 
naval force spent in Europe only one element in 
the population showed them any hostility or even 
unfriendliness. At the moment when these lines 
are being written a delegation claiming to repres-
ent the 'Irish Republic' is touring the United 
States, asking Americans to extend their sympathy 
and contribute money toward the realization of 
their project.... But it seems that now when this 
same brotherhood is attempting to stir up hatred 
in this country against our Allies in the war, 
there is a certain pertinence in informing Amer-
icans just what kind of treatment their brave sail-

1 W. S. Sims, The victory at sea (Garden City, 1919). Sims wrote, 
"The members of this organization [Sinn Fein] were not only openly 
disloyal; they were openly pro-German. They were not even neutral; 
they were working day and night for a German victory, for in their 
misguided minds a German victory signified an Irish Republic. It was 
no secret that the Sinn Feiners were sending information to Germany 
and constantly laying plots to interfere with the British and American 
navies." Ibid., pp 83-84. Sims gave several examples of Irish "Sinn 
Feiners" outnumbering and assaulting American sailors, and of Irish 
priests denouncing American naval officers. Ibid., pp 84-85. The bad 
feeling in Cork and Queenstown between the United States Navy and the 
local people was well known to many American observers. See Roosevelt 
letters, viii, p. 1403; Clark, Social studies of the war, pp 49-50; 
Baker, American chronicle, p. 324; Charles McCarthy, Memorandum on 
Irish conditions, 12 Sept. 1918 (Wisconsin State Historical Society, 
McCarthy Papers, MSS KU, box 37); Josephus Daniels to Peter A. Meagher, 
19 March 1918 (N.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141).
ors met with at the hands of the Sinn Fein in Ireland.  

These allegations that the nationalists in Ireland had collaborated with the Germans, had beaten American sailors, and were now attempting to destroy the war-time alliance ran directly counter to the arguments of the Irish-American nationalists that the United States owed a long and great debt to Ireland which could only be paid by full support in Ireland’s struggle for independence. In fact the Irish-Americans struck back at Sims denying that there was extensive Irish-German collusion or that Irishmen treated American seamen with anything but open cordiality, and they labelled Admiral Sims as an un-American slave-minded tool of the British.

Thus when Sims told the English-Speaking Union in London in 1921 that the Sinn Fein movement had "the blood of British and American boys on their hands" and that the Irish-American nationalists were "none of them Americans at all," but like zebras "either black horses with white stripes or white horses with black stripes," although they were actually "jackasses" with votes, it was followed by an explosion of Irish-American anger in the United States. 

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1 Sims, The victory at sea, p. 83.

2 E. F. McSweeney, "Ireland is an American question" (New York, 1919); and "Ireland's part in the world's war" (Chicago, n.d.).

3 "The truth about Ireland in the Great War: an analysis of Admiral Sims' unfair attack on the Irish people" (Washington, 1919); and "The Irish mess and an attack on the U.S. Navy" (Boston, 1919).

4 C.S.M., 9 June 1921. The situation was complicated by the fact that Ambassador George Harvey had called for closer Anglo-American relations at a Pilgrims's Day address in London a few weeks earlier, and after his speech Sims had said he stood by everything he had said; Sims was something of the Navy's bad boy and had been reprimanded by President Taft in 1910 when he said the American navy would come to the aid of the British whenever the necessity arose, and he was currently under investigation because of critical statements he had made about the navy and former Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. G.A., 18 June 1921.
assailed Sims, calling him "a bumptious, swaggering fellow, without intellect or ordinary common sense, who owed his promotion to favoritism and newspaper puffery," and the Sinn Feiner called him "Jackass" Sims. The AARIR sent a circular letter to the Navy Department and Congress protesting against Sims's comments on the Irish. Senator Medill McCormick protested to Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, and Senators Reed and Norris deplored Sims's statements; Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi introduced a resolution to have Sims's remarks investigated by the Naval Affairs Committee; Congressmen Kindred and Gallivan introduced similar resolutions in the House; and Congressman Manley said confidently that President Harding would have to repudiate the admiral. Sims cut short his visit to England and returned to the United States, to be greeted in New York by rival groups of supporters and opponents, and he was given a mild rebuke by Secretary Denby and a pleasant chat with President Harding. The matter should

1G.A., 18 and 25 June 1921; and Sinn Feiner, 25 June 1921.
3G.A., 18 June 1921; and C.S.M., 10, 11, and 13 June 1921. In all, six resolutions were introduced in Congress dealing with Sims although none of them came up for a vote.
4Major Michael J. Kelly planned to greet Sims upon his return with an "ironic" declaration containing a list of 1,000 Irish-American war dead; support for Sims was created by the Allied Loyalty League and Frank A. Vanderlip, Casper Whitney, Hamilton Holt, and Demarest Lloyd who also had a delegation waiting for Sims at the pier in New York. In Chicago a Committee of One Thousand was founded and across the country Protestant clergymen gave their support. The rector of Grace Methodist Episcopal Church in New York said, "He stood on the bridge, with that immortal fleet which combed the North Sea for the cowardly assassins of the deep, while certain vociferous groups [the Irish] were, as he declares, giving aid and comfort to the butchers of Berlin..." G.A., 2 July 1921; and C.S.M., 14, 21, 22, and 23 June 1921; Lit. Dig., lxix, no. 13 (25 June 1921), pp 7-9 and 18. For private opinion in support of Sims see the correspondence to Senator Williams, June and July 1921 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 55).
have been allowed to drop, but on 20 July Senator Thomas J. Walsh
told the Senate that he could not understand why the sympathy for the
Irish question "seems to suffer from a widespread neglect, if not a
positively hostile sentiment." The public was "deaf," he said, to
Ireland's appeals and to the Black and Tan reprisals, and he concluded
the reason was due "in no small part to the charge repeatedly made by
Admiral Sims that the Irish were disloyal during the war"; Sims had
given the impression that through their collusion with the Germans the
Irish had prolonged the war and caused American deaths. Walsh said
that these charges were without basis but that their propagation had
unfairly crippled American support for the Irish cause.\(^1\)

Although
Walsh was warmly supported by many Irish-Americans in these state-
ments, the Christian Science Monitor seized on the speech as a confes-
sion by an Irish-American leader that the Irish cause did not in fact
have the national support that had often been claimed for it.\(^2\)

It was certainly incorrect to say that America had been altogether
"deaf" to the Irish cause or that Ireland had never gained any wide-
spread support throughout the country, as was perfectly clear from the

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\(^1\) 20 July 1921, Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session,
vol. 61, p. 4114; Walsh to Josephus Daniels, 11 Feb. 1921, Daniels to
Walsh, 12 Feb. 1921, and Walsh to Edwin Denby, 13 July 1921 (L.C.,
Walsh Papers, file B, box 190).

\(^2\) The Monitor said this was "the first occasion when a member of
the Irish bloc admitted without equivocation what had become apparent
to other senators, namely, that that body and the country had reached
the state of utter boredom and complete impatience with the perennial
tirades on the Irish question." C.S.M., 21 July 1921. Major Eugene
F. Kinkead, vice-president of the AARIR, expressed his complete endor-
sement of Walsh's speech about Sims and the attitude of the country.
Kinkead to Walsh, 25 July 1921 (Walsh Papers, op. cit.). For other
examples see Miss Lenore Allen to Walsh, 21 July 1921, and John B.
O'Donnell to Walsh, 10 Aug. 1921 (Ibid.). Walsh's letters also re-
veal a substantial amount of opposition to the Irish movement. See
J.W. Hamilton to Walsh, 23 July 1921, T.J. Rousseau to Walsh, 22 July
1921, and Julian Street to Walsh, 21 July 1921 (Ibid.).
effective nationalist agitation throughout the United States since 1918, but it was becoming noticeable that a point of diminishing returns had been reached and that increasingly Americans were being alienated by this activity as well as won over in support. Moorfield Storey had seen the situation of many native Americans as early as April when he wrote to Lord Bryce suggesting that the British policy of repressing Irish nationalists was misguided. "Here the experiment of giving the Sinn Feiners ample rope is having the usual salutary result. They have stimulated an intense feeling against themselves, and at least two vigorous societies have been formed in Boston to counteract their propaganda."¹ When the truce came in July 1921 it found the Irish cause in America meeting opposition as well as support.

¹Storey to Bryce, 6 April 1921 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 10, fols 170-71).
With the truce in 1921 American opinion reflected the shift from military to political attempts to resolve the Irish question. British efforts between 1919 and 1921 to enact new legislation providing a modest form of Irish self-government in the north and the south had been generally ignored by nationalist sympathizers whose demands had exceeded these government proposals. However both Irish-Americans and native Americans regarded the truce and peace negotiations as evidence of Britain's willingness to grant to Ireland the degree of sovereignty which the nationalists had claimed. News of the Treaty and the creation of the Irish Free State hastened this belief that the struggle was over and that Ireland was free. The civil war won little support in the United States, despite the efforts of republican propagandists, and in fact the civil war was almost as great a source of disillusionment to many Irish-Americans who had dreamed of a happy and prosperous Ireland freed from Britain's grip as it was a source of satisfaction to some native Americans who regarded it as proof of the deficiencies of the Irish character.

For British sensitivity to American and dominion opinion in the drafting of new Irish home rule legislation in 1919 see Cabinet minutes. War Cabinet 628(4), 7 Oct. 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/12); C.P. 56, 4 Nov. 1919, First report of the Cabinet committee on the Irish question (P.R.O., CAB. 24/92); Cabinet meeting 5/19(2), 11 Nov. 1919, Cabinet meeting 12/19(10), 10 Dec. 1919, Cabinet meeting 16/19(9), 10 Dec. 1919 (P.R.O., CAB. 23/18).
Irish-American nationalist agitation fell off sharply as the result of the truce between British and Irish forces on 11 July 1921. The truce was regarded as an admission of defeat by the British after the success of the Sinn Fein candidates in the Irish election of 1921 and the burning of the Custom House in Dublin, in much the same way that most Americans regarded the Armistice as the surrender of the Germans in 1918. Even during the preliminary talks the *Sinn Feiner* featured headlines, "IRISH REPUBLIC TRIUMPHS BRITAIN MOVES FOR PEACE."¹ For most Irish-American leaders, who may have had a clearer understanding of the delicacy of the situation, the truce imposed a degree of restraint that they had previously never found necessary or desirable, with the result that during the summer of 1921 there was a marked lull in nationalist activities.² The *Gaelic American* continued to warn its readers that de Valera was about to betray the Irish Republic for some kind of home rule or dominion status, but neither the Clan, which held a highly secret convention in Boston on 4 and 5 July, nor the FOIF, which directed its energies towards creating an anti-British foreign policy, initiated any major programs during the remainder of

¹ *Sinn Feiner*, 9 July 1921.

² See British observations of this shift in policy in a cable from Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 29 Nov. 1921 (F.O., F.O. 371/5633).
1921. The AARIR was not much more active in stimulating agitation, although it too called for congressional action to force Britain to pay her debts to the United States and warned of British development of air and naval stations in Ireland which it was felt could only be used against the United States. In the circumstances surrounding the talks between de Valera and Lloyd George even the most innocent gestures of good will could be misinterpreted. W. Bourke Cockran introduced a resolution in Congress which expressed a desire that the negotiations lead to a "complete reconciliation" between the "English Government and the Irish people." He was given a stern scolding by Miss Mary MacSwiney, still in the United States, for weakening the Irish negotiating position by not referring to the Irish government. Perhaps to avoid exactly these problems none of the resolutions introduced during the spring, and which had given the State Department such

1G.A., 26 Feb., 14 May, 2, 9, and 23 July, 8 and 15 Oct. 1921. The Clan took great precautions to see that no uninvited members of the "reorganized Clan" were able to disrupt their meeting. Ibid., 17 July 1921; and Secret letter to delegates to Clan convention in Boston on 4 July 1921, n.d. (N.L., Devoy Papers, box Misc.). The FOIF struggled to gain congressional support to make the British pay their war debts (or alternatively surrender Canada or the West Indies), to exempt American ships from paying tolls at the Panama Canal (a long standing Irish-American grievance), and to discourage any compromise with the British at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference. See Diarmuid Lynch to members of the Senate, 9 Aug. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190); Thomas McGrath to Senator John Sharp Williams, 30 Oct. 1921 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 56); Diarmuid Lynch to FOIF branches, 13 Sept. 1921 (Catholic University of America Archives, Shanahan Papers); and FOIF circular letter, 3 Dec. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 111).

2Ironically the notion that Ireland was the military "key to the North Atlantic" had always been one of Judge Cohalan's major arguments. See John McBarron to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 24 Sept. 1921, and Butte, Montana, AARIR to President Harding, 24 Sept. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190).

concern, were pressed and no new resolutions were introduced until late autumn when it was felt that they might strengthen the hand of the Irish negotiators in London.  

There was a mixture of optimism and caution among the Irish-American leaders. Even before the truce was declared Basil M. Manly commented to Frank P. Walsh that de Valera was negotiating with the British government "in magnificent style" and that Ireland was in a favourable position. Walsh himself observed that he found "the Irish spirit very enthusiastic in America." Senator Thomas J. Walsh was confident that "through the statesmanlike efforts of President DevaIera and his able associates a solution of their troubles... is at hand." Senator LaFollette introduced a resolution in the Senate on 22 November which expressed the hope that the negotiations might end in peace for Britain and Ireland, but this resolution was worked out before hand by several of the Irish-American leaders and politicians. 

1 Senator LaFollette introduced a resolution in the Senate on 22 November which expressed the hope that the negotiations might end in peace for Britain and Ireland, but this resolution was worked out before hand by several of the Irish-American leaders and politicians. 22 Nov. 1921 (S. Res. 173), Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 61, p. 8117; Frank P. Walsh to Rev Michael O'Flanagan, 15 Nov. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 111); and Basil M. Manly to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 19 Nov. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). On the very day that the Treaty was signed Senator Thomas J. Walsh read to the Senate the resolution passed during the summer by the Dáil expressing gratitude to the people of the United States for their support for the first Dáil loan; this was unsuccessfully resisted by Senator Watson of Georgia who thought that such an acknowledgment might make the United States liable to claims by the British similar to the American Alabama claims. 6 Dec. 1921, Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 62, p. 34; and 17 Aug. 1921, Dáil Eireann rep. 1921-2, pp 25-26.

2 Manly to Walsh, 7 July 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 110).

3 Walsh to J.H. Daly, 4 Oct. 1921, Walsh to Joseph Scott, 19 Oct. 1921 (Ibid., box 111); and Walsh to Art O'Brien, 4 Oct. 1921 (N.L.I., O'Brien Papers, MS 8427). Also see F.P. Walsh, "Ireland at truce," Nation, cxiii (12 Oct. 1921), pp 393-94.

the Irish White Cross Society and Clement J. France (the agent of the American Committee for Relief in Ireland) felt that there was a possibility of a resumption of hostilities in Ireland, which would result in a blockade of money and supplies into the country; they thus requested that relief funds be sent once again. The committee in the United States complied at once, and the sum of $472,062 was sent off on 2 September to be followed by weekly remittances similar to those forwarded prior to the truce.

In October the agitation was vigorously resumed through a second bond-certificate drive in the hope of raising money against a possible breakdown of the Anglo-Irish negotiations, which had just opened, and of strengthening the bargaining position of the Irish delegation in London. Stephen O'Mara had been sent to the United States to replace his brother James in order to direct the second Dail external loan which had been authorized for the amount of $20,000,000. Despite the fact that this amount was twice that of the first loan, the campaign,


2American Committee for Relief in Ireland and Irish White Cross, Report, pp. 45-46.

3Assuring one friend that Ireland's claims were not impossible, Frank P. Walsh wrote, "We must keep up the fight in this country, demand, in the loudest tones possible, the absolute independence of Ireland." Walsh to Joseph Scott, 19 Oct. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 111).

4The United States Consul in Dublin, who witnessed the signing of the documents giving O'Mara power of attorney for de Valera, warned the Department of State that the Irish nationalists were probably preparing to transfer their American funds to Ireland. Dumont to Sec of State, 21 June 1921 (N.A., 841d,51/9, roll 243).
which opened on 15 October, was limited to Washington, D.C., and Illinois.\(^1\) Departing from the policy of ambiguous references to the uses for the money, O'Mara stated that the money would be used to resist aggression and to support the Dail government.\(^2\) In late October he explained to his Washington chairman, A.J. Barrett, how vital it was that the campaign be successful there, in part because of the British presence at the Washington naval disarmament talks. "Failure here will be quickly registered at Downing Street where the Irish Peace Conference sits," O'Mara wrote; "News of success will as quickly be borne there." O'Mara instructed Barrett to seek the support of the wealthy Irish-Americans throughout the country and make it clear to them "that one dollar now is of more importance and will be far more highly appreciated than ten times that amount when Ireland is free."\(^3\) Having restricted themselves to merely Washington and Illinois, and operating without the support of the Clan or the FOIF, the chances of the second bond-certificate drive were not very promising; nonetheless Frank P. Walsh felt that the possibilities were unlimited and wrote that the Irish in America could "raise fifty million dollars almost as easily as they raised the eleven million\(^4\) during the first loan and relief campaign\(^5\)," and Michael Collins later told the Dail that the

\(^1\) 26 Aug. 1921, Dail Eireann rep. 1921-2, pp 84-85; and 7 Jan. 1922, Dail Eireann treaty deb., pp 302-03.

\(^2\) Stephen M. O'Mara, circular letter, autumn 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Cockran Papers, box 17). See the British Consular reports for growing concern about the reported use of money raised by Irish-American groups. Maurice Peterson to Curzon, 31 Aug. 1921 (F.R.O., F.O. 371/5633). As the bond-certificate drive appeared to get under way, the British Embassy grew increasingly anxious over the amount of money being sent to Ireland, although the Foreign Office itself seemed to feel that it was really too late to make any kind of meaningful protest to the United States government. Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 7 Nov. 1921, and minutes (Ibid.).

\(^3\) O'Mara to Barrett, 31 Oct. 1921 (Cockran Papers, op. cit.).
peace negotiators in London had been assured that Irish-Americans could supply "a million dollars a month," in the event that war was resumed. With the report of the signing of the Treaty in London, the bond-certificate campaign was called off with over a half a million dollars collected.

The signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in London on 6 December 1921 was as momentous an event for the Irish-Americans as it was for the Irish at home. Similarly it was regarded as an acceptable settlement, although it offered something less than a republic and it made provisions for the exclusion of parts of Ulster. An important meeting of wealthy Irish-Americans, AARIR leaders, and sympathetic politicians was held in Washington on 8 December originally for the purpose of exploring methods of continuing support for Ireland should negotiations fail. The meeting was significant because a number of prominent leaders, such as Bishop Shahan and W. Bourke Cockran, spoke out in favour of the Treaty. Senator Thomas J. Walsh observed that, "it was the unanimous opinion that the agreement brought substantial

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1 Walsh to Patrick Lydon, 20 Oct. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 111); and 19 Dec. 1921, Dail Eireann treaty deb., p. 35.

2 $30,000 were raised in Washington and $552,000 in Illinois; other areas brought the amount up to $622,720. 7 Jan. 1922, Dail Eireann treaty deb., pp 303 and 335; R.F. Downing in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.C. Fitz-Gerald, p. 221; and Lynch, The I.R.B. and the 1916 insurrection, p. 216. Harry Boland, then Dail envoy to the United States, and O'Mara also planned a large meeting and dinner for sympathetic members of Congress where plans could be discussed to decide "what action, if any, can now be taken to bring the cause of Ireland once more to the front during this historic time." O'Mara to Frank P. Walsh, 29 Oct. 1921 (Walsh Papers, op. cit.).

3 The actual title of the document signed was "Articles of agreement for a treaty between Great Britain and Ireland," but it has been known generally as the Anglo-Irish Treaty.

4 See resolutions from the Catholic Order of Foresters to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 12 Dec. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, Legislation file, box 272).
freedom to Ireland and ought to be accepted," and he told several people that Irish-Americans should not encourage the rejection of the Treaty while they remained safe in the United States. Boland and O'Mara also spoke, and although they were critical it was understood by several observers that they did not oppose the Treaty, and indeed they used the occasion to call off the second bond-certificate campaign.

Many of the national leaders of the AARIR also quickly endorsed the Treaty. Edward L. Doheny, the national president, said that the way was now cleared for harmonious Anglo-American relations, and one of the vice-presidents said he was "delighted with the result of the Irish peace negotiations..." Even the knowledge of de Valera's disapproval of the Treaty did not deter the leaders of the AARIR. The state directorate met in Washington on 14 December and declared its "neutrality" in regard to the evident disagreement within the Dail and the government, but several days later the national executive met and

1 Walsh to James B. McCavin, 12 Dec. 1921 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). The Senator said much the same thing to several other people as well.

2 For descriptions of the meeting see H.W. Nevinson, Last changes, last chances (London, 1928), pp 119-200, and Downing in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 221. Boland later explained to the Dail that he had made favourable statements when he heard that the Treaty had been signed because he was certain that the Cabinet's minimum terms had been accepted, however he spoke out against it when he read the terms himself. 7 Jan. 1922, Dail Eireann treaty deb., pp 334-35.

3 Cited in Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 436. Doheny's satisfaction with the Treaty was noted by the British Embassy as early as 8 December when Geddes reported to the Foreign Office that he was attempting to take credit for creating the conditions which made it possible. Sir A. Geddes to F.O., 8 Dec. 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5715). It was also observed that since the signing of the Treaty James Farrell, the president of the United States Steel corporation, who was regarded as having "strong Sinn Fein sympathies," spoke at a luncheon for Balfour. Also see Major Eugene F. Kinkead to James O'Mara, 17 Jan. 1922, cited in Lavelle, O'Mara, p. 277.
sent a cable to "congratulate the government and the people of the Republic of Ireland on the magnificent struggle they have made for liberty and on the great progress they have already made towards its achievement." It was clearly a hint to accept what was already at hand. Frank P. Walsh probably spoke for many when he confessed that although he had reservations about the Treaty, he thought it was a "big step forward" and that "it puts mighty weapons in our hands for the final consummation of Ireland's complete independence."  

However, despite this initial endorsement of the Treaty by many of its leaders, the AARIR soon found itself badly divided. Even before the meeting of the national executive, a memorandum was drawn up outlining the reasons for keeping the organization functioning. On 4 February 1922 members of the national executive met again, but with fewer than twenty members present and in New York rather than at the national headquarters in Washington; they reversed their earlier position and extended their support to de Valera and the maintenance of the Irish Republic. An Irish Republic Defence Fund was created and, according to Rossa F. Downing, all members of the AARIR were expected

1Minutes of the national executive of the AARIR, 17 Dec. 1921 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder v); and Downing in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 221.


3Memorandum—why AARIR should be maintained, and Basil Manly to Thomas W. Lyons (national secretary), 14 Dec. 1921 (Ibid., box 111).
to contribute or were expelled. Many opposed this policy which ran directly counter to the decision of the Dail to accept the Treaty, with the inevitable result that the leadership slipped into the hands of the more dogmatic republicans and the membership quickly shrank.

In fact within several days of this major policy-making meeting Doheny announced that he had not been informed of it and that because of the Dail's acceptance of the Treaty and the creation of the Irish Free State he found himself the president of an organization whose goals had been accomplished. An angry national secretary protested to Doheny immediately disputing the appropriateness of his continuing in office, considering his views. Many of the members of the AARIR opposed the change in policy of the national executive and the tactics used to accomplish it. By mid-March Frank P. Walsh informed Stephen M. O'Mara that the organization was "absolutely shot to pieces," and Downing later substantiated this by commenting that the membership had declined to a mere 75,000. The Irish World, which since the split in the Irish movement in 1920 had been the organ of the AARIR, rejected the Treaty

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1 Downing in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, pp 221-22. Also see Thomas W. Lyons to President Harding and members of Congress, 13 Feb. 1922 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 58). The members of the state directorate who had been expelled for refusing to contribute to the Irish Republic Defence Fund appealed to the national executive for reinstatement at the May conference, but the appeal was rejected. See Appeal of state directorate to the national executive, AARIR, ca. May 1922 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box Misc.).

2 N.Y.T., 14 Feb. 1922.

3 Thomas W. Lyons to Edward L. Doheny, 15 Feb. 1922 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141, folder v). Henceforth Doheny's money went to Sir Horace Plunkett and his Irish schemes.

4 Walsh to O'Mara, 17 March 1922, and also Walsh to Harry Boland, 12 Feb. 1922 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 115); and Downing in The voice of Ireland, ed. W.G. Fitz-Gerald, p. 222. Captain Monteith said that the organization had decreased from over a million members to almost nothing, and that he was dismissed as an organizer. Monteith, Casement's last adventure, pp 248-49.
from the first; it denounced the Treaty in bitter terms, calling it "the Treaty of surrender," and after news of its acceptance by the Dail, announcing that the "Irish Republic still lives." The Irish World became an uncompromising spokesman for the republican position in the United States, and started a slanderous campaign against the supporters of the Treaty and the Irish Free State.

The reactions of the FOIF and the Clan to the Treaty followed a different pattern. Diarmuid Lynch of the FOIF, Laurence J. Rice of the Clan, and Judge Cohalan all issued immediate protests about its provisions, especially those dealing with the Crown and British defence precautions. The Gaelic American announced that the Irish delegation had brought back mere "Home Rule within the Empire." Holding its national convention on 10 and 11 December the FOIF issued a statement which said clearly that the organization did not endorse the Treaty or the Irish Free State, that their opinion had not been asked, and that they regarded any Irish acceptance of the Treaty as a choice made under duress; they proclaimed that "a free and independent Republic, separated from the Empire...is the only solution of the Irish

1 Irish World, 10, 17, and 31 Dec. 1921, and 7 and 14 Jan. 1922.
2 Cited in Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 437.
3 G.A., 10 Dec. 1921.
national problem.1 However John J. Splain recorded that most of the members of the convention felt that the dominion status offered in the Treaty was all that could then be extracted from Britain because de Valera's actions in the United States during 1920 had compromised the position of the republic.2 While condemning the Treaty, the Gaelic American attacked de Valera for objecting to it because his compromises and blunderings had made it inevitable; by January the paper was beginning to support the Irish Free State and those in the Dail who voted with the majority.3 By mid-February Devoy wrote to Michael Collins that "our best men here, under the existing conditions, favour giving the 'Free State' a chance to do what it can for Ireland," and he went on to condemn de Valera's presumed loyalty to a republic which he him-

1Lynch, The I.R.B. and the 1916 insurrection, pp 214-15. The national convention of the FOIF was as much concerned with drafting an anti-British foreign policy for the United States as it was with the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Indirectly this was of some use to the Irish cause inasmuch as when they attempted to organize resistance in the Senate to the Four Power Naval Treaty they provoked Senator Williams to make another of his anti-Irish speeches in the Senate. The reactions of both Williams's anglophile supporters and his anglophobe Irish-American opponents was predictable, but it mercifully drew the attention of the Irish-Americans away from the deteriorating events in Ireland and towards a more satisfying target. See 14 and 15 March 1922, Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 62, pp 3855 and 3907-10; and correspondence regarding Williams's statements on Irish-Americans, 14-31 March 1922 (L.C., Williams Papers, boxes 58-59); and "Declaration of principles" by the national council of the FOIF, 10 and 11 Dec., 1921 (Catholic University of America Archives, Shahan Papers).


3G.A., 17, 24, and 31 Dec., 1921 and 21 Jan., 1922. The Gaelic American argued that de Valera was a charlatan quibbling about meaningless terms and that he had probably worked out the dominion solution with Lloyd George during the summer but was attempting now to escape the responsibility for it.
Increasingly the Gaelic American asserted that de Valera's republican followers had been duped and deluded, and that de Valera was encouraging civil war. On 28 March 1922 the national council of the FOIF published a statement on the conditions in Ireland, blaming de Valera for the disunity there and giving its support to the Irish Free State, through which "very material advantages can be gained for Ireland."

During this crisis in Ireland and the United States over the acceptance of the Treaty, the American Committee for Relief in Ireland, which had no ideological commitments to a republic at all, quickly exercised its influence in defence of the Treaty and social stability in Ireland. As soon as the terms of the Treaty were published in the United States the executive committee cabled its congratulations to de Valera and the Dail, adding that the American people "earnestly hope for the ratification of the treaty by Dail Eireann..." Within two weeks Clement J. France reported the nature of the growing divisions within the Irish government and the important position that the United States could play in the situation. The position of the Irish Free State could be vastly strengthened by the immediate establishment of a


2 Ga., 4 March and 22 April 1922.

3 Ibid., 18 March and 8 April 1922; and Declaration on the political situation in Ireland adopted by the national council of the FOIF, 28 March 1922 (Catholic University of America Archives, Shahan Papers). The FOIF declaration argued that "The British soldiers can be got out of the country; the British controlled Police can be cleared out of the barracks; the economic and educational situation can be vastly improved. Then when the Irish people again decide upon absolute separation from England, a united Race abroad can swing world sentiment against a foreign invasion of Ireland. Thus the aim of our organization with regard to Ireland will be fulfilled."

4 Monteith, Casement's last adventure, pp 246-47.
Consul General in Dublin, with "broad powers" and a sympathy for "Irish National aspirations," and by the development of strong commercial ties with the United States. Nearly a month later France and James G. Douglas outlined another plan by which the committee could support the Irish Free State, which they suggested had the approval of the "great majority of the Irish people." They proposed that the money which was currently being given to individuals suffering distress should be diverted into creating jobs in order to insure social and economic stability. "If the people of Ireland find themselves getting back to work, the Irish Government will hold the great majority which now is in its favor. It might lose that majority if the present stagnation in agriculture and industrial pursuits continues." By this means the committee was able to help stabilize the situation in Ireland. Sir Horace Plunkett, who through Lawrence Godkin met

1 France to Wm. J.A. Maloney, 20 Dec. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 112). By early February Congressman Rainey of Illinois introduced a resolution to appoint an ambassador to the Irish Free State, and shortly thereafter Sir Horace Plunkett noted in his diary conversations with several members of the executive committee about serious financial investment in Ireland; Frank P. Walsh was approached by one of the editors of Bankers Home Magazine about the development of American banking interests in Ireland. 3 Feb. 1922 (H.J. Res. 265). Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 62, p. 2143; Plunkett diary, 8 Feb. 1922 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers); and George A. Carroll to Walsh, 20 Dec. 1921 (N.Y.P.L., box 111).

2 France and Douglas to Morgan J. O'Brien and Richard Campbell, 19 Jan. 1922 (L.C., Walsh Papers, file B, box 190). The implication of this assertion by France and Campbell served to reinforce the conclusions of the American Consul in Dublin, F.T.F. Dumont, that the money from the American Committee for Relief in Ireland was assisting the Irish nationalists either to fight or to resist the British government. See F.T.F. Dumont to Sec of State, 23 April 1921 (N.A., 841d.00/351, roll 218).

3 When proposals were made in the Dail to appropriate funds for relief, to compensate for the shift in policy by the American committee, they were objected to by Boland and other members of the anti-Treaty party on the grounds that the American money should be used. 18 May 1922, Dail Eireann rep. 1921-2, pp 446-55.
with the members of the executive committee, observed that their attitude was "sympathy with the Collins Griffith party as they presumably had the majority of people at their backs and a readiness to help Ireland financially..." Indeed in the mind of Captain Monteith, the Irish Republic was betrayed by American monied and capitalist interests who wanted to stop the revolution to permit American investment in and exploitation of the new Irish state.2

Meanwhile the growing disunity among the nationalist leaders in Ireland was dramatically revealed to the Irish in America in the form of two rival delegations sent to tour the United States on behalf of their respective factions. James O'Mara, Piaras Beaslai, and Sean MacCailite (and later Denis McCullough) were sent by the Provisional government with instructions "to get in touch with political and other circles likely to be useful in this country," in short to win support among the Irish-Americans for the Treaty and the Irish Free State.3 Arriving on the same ship were Austin Stack and J.J. O'Kelly (followed shortly by Countess Markievicz and the sister of Kevin Barry), representing the anti-Treaty faction, whose purpose it was to raise money for the coming election in order to fight the Treaty supporters and to marshall republican sympathy among the Irish-Americans.4 A committee

1Plunkett diary, 8 Feb. 1922 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

2Monteith, Casement's last adventure, pp 248-49. This is an intriguing interpretation of American activity and interest in Ireland, but it does not explain how the capitalist Irish-Americans became involved in the first place or how they gained such a powerful position.

3Michael Collins to James O'Mara, 28 Feb. 1922, cited in Lavelle, O'Mara, p. 278.

4For descriptions of their arrival in New York on St Patrick's Day see Irish World, 23 March 1922; G.A., 25 March 1922; and N.Y.T., 18 March 1922.
of the AARIR protested to Collins and de Valera that such a display of disunity would "prove disastrous here," and they offered to divide equally all money which Irish-Americans themselves raised for the Irish election. ¹ However neither side could afford to call back their delegations. Harry Boland had written to Frank P. Walsh in late February, "We will require the support of all friends of the Republic in America now more than ever...and we will need a great deal of money to enable us to successfully place our case before [the Irish people] in the coming election; the pro-Treaty forces needed no money but they wanted American support nonetheless. ² Thus both groups began tours across the country denouncing their opponents in Ireland with all the malice and vituperation that had previously been reserved for the British government; Stack and O'Kelly opened republican offices in New York and announced the creation of an election campaign fund; and O'Mara worked to cement an alliance with the FOIF and the disaffected members of the AARIR in favour of the Treaty as an immediate, albeit temporary, solution to the Irish problem. ³ The result of this spectacle, made all the more serious by the assertions of the Gaelic American that de Valera


² Boland to Walsh, 28 Feb. 1922 (Ibid.).

³ Irish World, 1 and 15 April, 6, 13, and 20 May 1922; G.A., 25 March and 8 April 1922. For descriptions of the tours of the two delegations see Lavelle, O'Mara, pp 279-80 and 293-94; A. Marreco, The rebel countess: the life and times of Constance Markievicz (London, 1969), pp 269-76; J. Van Voris, Constance Markievicz: in the cause of Ireland (Amherst, 1967), pp 310-12. A small crisis arose when it was feared that the bond-certificate money in the United States might be withdrawn by agents of the two anti-Treaty trustees (de Valera or S. O'Mara), but an agreement was worked out whereby neither side would use the funds. See Michael Collins to Frank P. Walsh, 12 April 1922, and Memorandum of conversation between Walsh and Stephen O'Mara, 1 May 1922 (Walsh Papers, op. cit., boxes 112 and 115).
was encouraging civil war in Ireland, and by the Irish World that Griffith and Collins were traitors, was extremely demoralizing to the Irish-American community. But de Valera got the money for his election campaign, and Collins and Griffith got the support of Devoy and Judge Cohalan.

Very shortly events in Ireland were to surpass even this. The results of the June election were a clear majority for the Irish Free State, which superficially at least weakened the ideological position of the republicans in the eyes of Americans. The Gaelic American, which had been predicting de Valera's collapse, jubilantly published the headlines "DeVALERA DECISIVELY BEATEN," and claimed that "Routed in elections he seeks by Mexican methods to overcome the decision of the people by force...." The shelling of the Four Courts and the subsequent outbreak of civil war in Ireland were calamitous to Irish-American morale; shocked observers who had followed Irish affairs for years were bewildered as the Irish leaders, many of whom had travelled in America and were known to Irish-Americans, were slowly killed: Griffith and later Ginnell from overwork; Collins, Boland, and Brugha in action; Mellows, Childers, and O'Connor by reprisals. John Quinn wrote to Douglas Hyde in disgust, "I would not shed the blood of a single Irish wolf-hound for the difference between a republic and a free state." Archbishop Curley of Baltimore returned from a trip to Ireland to announce that "de Valera is the Fancho Villa of Ireland," and Bishop Turner of Buffalo stated that ninety percent of the Irish people sup-

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1 GaA, 22 April and 6 May 1922; and Irish World, 7 and 14 Jan. and 20 May 1922. Beginning in May the Irish World almost always referred to the Irish Free State as the "Freak State."

2 GaA, 8 July 1922.

ported the Irish Free State. On 29 September the national council of the FOIF met to denounce the civil war with "horror and dismay," asserting that it was "a crime against Ireland and an outrage on the spirit of true democracy." While some Irish-American supporters of the Free State balked at the government's final policy of executing republican prisoners, the Gaelic American never flinched.

The republicans in Ireland realized that despite their control of the AARIR, their claim to the sympathies of the Irish-American community was no longer strong. They were, of course, stoutly defended by the Irish World, which denied the significance of the June elections because the so-called Independent candidates were merely anti-republicans in disguise; when fighting broke out it described the Irish government as an "illegal junta" created by the British and the Free State army as "hirelings," and later as "Green and Tans." Nevertheless, a series of republican delegations were sent to the United States...

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1 G.A., 30 Sept. 1922; and Gloster Armstrong to the Foreign Secretary, 11 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/7266). Archbishop Curley wrote privately, "it makes the heart of an Irishman bleed to see the senseless stupidity of the De Valera people who seem to be bent on murder and destruction and on nothing else." Archbishop Curley to Matthew Cummings, 2 Feb. 1923, cited in Tansill, America and the fight for Irish freedom, p. 440. For an indignant protest against the Archbishop's comments see Fr. J.B. Kelly to Laurence Ginnell, 17 Jan. 1923 (N.L.I., O'Briain Papers, NS 8422).


4 Irish World, 15 and 29 July and 25 Nov. 1922. Indeed the British Consul in New York felt that but for the Irish World, de Valera would have little support in America. Gloster Armstrong to the Foreign Secretary, 2 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/7266).
to raise money to finance resistance in Ireland and to rally support. Mrs Muriel MacSwiney and later Mrs Hannah Sheehy Skeffington toured
the country in an attempt to create an Irish Republican Soldiers and
Prisoners Dependents's Fund, and with Judge John W. Goff as chairman
and Frank P. Walsh as vice-chairman, they travelled throughout the
country and raised a substantial amount of money.¹ J.J. O'Kelly and
Thomas O'Doherty were sent to the United States in the autumn to con-
tinue the work of the Stack-O'Kelly-Markievicz mission of the previous
spring, although even de Valera seemed to have little confidence in
their possible success in winning assistance from Irish-Americans on
a national level.²

The reprisals carried out by the Free State forces in late 1922
created a moderate response in favour of the republicans which Laur-
ence Ginnell, the new republican envoy to America, and John F. Finerty,
the new president of the AARIR, were able to exploit.³ Even so Irish-
American attempts to get Congress to pass resolutions deploiring the
reprisals or extending recognition to the republican government stood
no possible chance of success, and in fact Basil M. Manly advised
Frank P. Walsh against any organized agitation in Congress because it
would reveal clearly how weak the republican cause was in the United

¹Irish World, 23 Sept. 1922 and 5 May 1923; Draft of circular
letter, 21 Sept. 1922, Mrs Sheehy Skeffington to Walsh, 31 Oct. 1922,
and Walsh to Mrs Sheehy Skeffington, 3 Nov. 1922 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Pap-
ers, box 112).

²De Valera to Joseph McGarrity, 10 Sept. 1922, cited in S. Cro-
nin, "The Fenian tradition," Irish Times, 25 April 1969. Also see
J.J. O'Kelly, "The case for upholding the Irish Republic" (New York,
n.d.).

³Finerty's position as legal advisor for the United States Rail-
road Administration, an agency of the federal government, was a matter
of some concern to the British Foreign Office. Gloster Armstrong to
Foreign Secretary, 22 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/7266).
States. However, republican propaganda was distributed through the newly founded "Irish Legation Circular" which Ginnell directed, and Finerty used his able administrative talents to rejuvenate the ailing AARIR. Optimistic reports were sent back to Ireland about raising money for the republican cause among the Irish-Americans, but it soon became clear to Ginnell that even the present leadership of the AARIR was very badly divided, and a conference of the national leaders in early March failed to obtain encouragement for a new bond-certificate campaign. Ginnell's death in April 1923 and the declining fortunes of the republicans in Ireland prevented the effective rebuilding of a national organization.

The civil war in Ireland came slowly and inconclusively to a close in the spring of 1923, as more and more republican army leaders were killed or captured and, finally, as de Valera and Frank Aiken issued orders to cease operations and to hide weapons. The Irish

1 John McCann to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 27 Nov. 1922, Walsh to McCann, 18 Dec. 1922, Mrs Margaret Walsh to Walsh, 30 Jan. 1923, and Mrs Walsh to Walsh, 13 Feb. 1923 (L.C., Walsh Papers, Legislative file, box 272); and Basil M. Manly to Frank P. Walsh, 14 Dec. 1922 (N.Y.P.L., Walsh Papers, box 112).

2 See for example "Irish Legation Circular," no. 1 (1 Jan. 1923), and also Ginnell to de Valera, 6 Jan. 1923 (N.L.I., O'Briain Papers, MS 8422).

3 See Ginnell to de Valera, 6 and 19 Jan. and Feb. 1923, Ginnell to Art O'Briain, 9 Feb. and 2 March 1923, Austin J. Ford (of the Irish World) to Art O'Briain, 3 Jan. 1923, and Message from the AARIR to Ireland, ca. 1 March 1923 (O'Briain Papers, op. cit., MSS 8422 and 8428); and "Irish Legation Circular," no. 6 (12 April 1923).

4 The republican cause found some support in pamphlets and books. See R. Mason, "Rebel Ireland" (San Francisco, 1923); Rev A.W. Allen, "Briefs for Irish independence" (Chicago, 1923); and J. Jones, Eighteen months with the republicans in Ireland (Brooklyn, 1921). Mason had been in Ireland during the civil war and came back convinced that de Valera was right; Rev Allen was an Episcopal clergyman with strong republican and anti-British sympathies; and Jones's book, probably published after the Treaty was signed, supported a republic vigorously.
World, which in March had assured its readers that the Free State was on the brink of collapse, refused to admit that the republicans had been defeated and emphasized that de Valera had merely ordered a "cease fire" not a surrender. 1 The Gaelic American was contemptuous of de Valera's efforts to negotiate and it fully supported the Cosgrave government in its refusal to compromise or deal leniently with the republicans. 2 The arrest of de Valera, who came out of hiding to campaign in the election of August 1923, aroused appeals from diverse sources across the United States for American intervention to ask that his life be spared. 3 Senator Thomas J. Walsh spoke to both Secretary of State Hughes and President Coolidge about an American protest against his possible execution, and large public meetings were held in New York. 4 These appeals were broadened early in 1924 to ask that clemency be obtained for all Irish political prisoners, and in

1Irish World, 9 June 1923.

2G.A., 5 May and 16 June 1923. The Gaelic American was by 1923 devoting much more space to Anglo-American relations and the growing foreign policy of the Irish Free State than to the civil war.

3De Valera's mother appealed to the President for her son on the grounds that he was an "American born Citizen." Mrs Catherine T. Wheewright to President Coolidge, 22 Sept. 1923 (N.A., 841d.00/618, box 4095). Also see Senator M.N. Neely to Sec of State, 27 Sept. 1923, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to Sec of State, 4 Oct. 1923, Senator B.K. Wheeler to President Coolidge, 5 Oct. 1923, Governor Joseph M. Dixon to President Coolidge, 12 Oct. 1923, Senator Thomas J. Walsh to Charles Evans Hughes, 22 Feb. 1924, Senator David I. Walsh to Hughes, 23 Feb. 1924, and Congressman Samuel Dickstein to Sec of State, 4 April 1924 (N.A., 341D.1121 VALERA, EAMON DE /46-59, box 4095).

4James Hamill, et al., to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 10 Oct. 1923, and Walsh to James Hamill, 10 Oct. 1923 (L.C., Walsh Papers, box 272).
fact one resolution to that effect was even introduced in Congress.¹

But these efforts compared badly with the spectacular national agita-
tion which had been aroused over the 1916 prisoners or the hunger
strike of Terence MacSwiney in 1920. In 1924 prominent Americans
such as Mayor John H. Hylan of New York, Governor Channing H. Cox of
Massachusetts, and Archbishop Curley of Baltimore extended congratula-
tions and hopes for success to the Irish Free State.² Indeed almost
as an anti-climax in October of 1924, without any national agitation
or petitions, without congressional resolutions or public hearings,
the United States government extended diplomatic recognition to the
Irish Free State. Scrupulously observing diplomatic protocol the
British Ambassador expressed the wish of his government to have the
relations between the United States and the Irish Free State carried
out directly through an Irish minister; on 7 October 1924 Dr Timothy
A. Smiddy presented his credentials to President Coolidge. Recogni-
tion did not end the Irish question in America, but it did symbolize

¹Despite his arguments that de Valera's life should be spared, Senator Walsh refused to participate in any activities to obtain his release from prison. Austin J. Ford to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, 31 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1923, Walsh to Ford, 1 and 12 Nov. 1923, Rev M.J. Hannan to Walsh, 14 Nov. 1923, and Walsh to Rev Hannan, 16 Nov. 1923 (L.C., Walsh Papers, box 272); 7 Jan. 1924 (H.J. Res. 125), Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 65, p. 679; Peter F. Tague to Willard DeLue, 24 March 1924 (N.L.I., DeLue Papers, MS 8534); and Michael J. Kelly to New York State council AARIR officers, 8 April 1924 (N.L.I., Golden Papers, MS 13,141).

the closing of the last great phase of American opinion on Ireland.  

Irish-American ethnic identity and even some forms of Irish-American nationalism continued for several more decades, but the Irish question never again became the burning issue in American life that it had been between 1910 and 1923.  By 1927 the bitter animosities within the Irish-American community which grew out of the split in 1920 and the divisions over the civil war diminished enough to permit a reconciliation between Major Kinkead, a former vice president of the AARIR, and Devoy and Judge Cohalan. By 1934 Cohalan had sufficiently put the turmoil of the Wilson era behind him to be on socially cordial terms with Wilson's old foreign affairs advisor, E.M. House.  

1Esme Howard to Sec of State, 24 June 1924, and Sec of State to the British Ambassador, 28 June 1924, 701.4111/487, and C.P. Slemp (secretary to the President) to Sec of State, 7 Oct. 1924, 701.41d11/18, Foreign relations, 1924, ii, pp 246-48. The Irish-American nationalist organizations continued to function on a much reduced scale for another decade. The AARIR eventually broke with de Valera when he entered the Free State Dail. The FOIF survived into the 1930s in large part because of its interest in the bond-certificate litigation. As a result of first an injunction and then a claim against the $2,500,000 in American banks by the Free State government in 1922, a long legal struggle ensued over the rightful owners of the money. The New York courts finally decided that neither the Free State nor de Valera's republican government was entitled to the money, and it was returned to its subscribers. The FOIF, which claimed a portion of the money, was sued unsuccessfully by the leaders of the "reorganized" Clan-na-Gael. See Lynch, The I.R.B. and the 1916 insurrection, pp 216-18; Macardle, The Irish Republic, pp 986-87; and S. Cronin, "The Fenian tradition," Irish Times, 29 April 1969.  

2The failure of Irish-American politicians in the years since World War II to find any support in Congress or from the American people for their resolutions protesting the partition of Northern Ireland illustrates this point.  

3See Kinkead to Devoy, 13 Feb. 1927 (N.L.I., Devoy Papers, box J-L), and House to Cohalan, 1 Feb. 1934 (Yale University Library, House Papers, Cohalan, Daniel F). Devoy and Dr McCartan also resumed correspondence in 1927 regarding the participation of the Irish Free State in Commonwealth affairs, but it was more serious than cordial. See Devoy to McCartan, 14 April 1927, and Devoy to Colonel Maurice Moore, 11 May 1927 (N.L.I., Moore-Devoypapers, MS 5500).
But for all except the very few, Ireland was left to go its own way.  

(11)

The reaction of native Americans to the truce and the Treaty was not unlike that of the great majority of Irish-Americans, except perhaps that the indifference came more rapidly. Increasingly insensitive to the Irish question during 1921, as Senator Walsh had complained in the Senate, many native Americans also equated the truce with an Irish triumph, or at least an end to the Irish question. A. Lawrence Lowell, who had followed events in Ireland closely, felt that the negotiations would produce a settlement because, "It is inconceivable that either the British Government or Sinn Fein should not accept almost anything rather than return to the previous condition of violence." When the Treaty was signed the British government was congratulated by such diverse sources as former Ambassador John W. Davis and the Rotary Club of Orange, New Jersey. Even Harry Boland, who voted against the Treaty himself, admitted to the Dail that "the great public opinion of America is on the side of this Treaty." Americans failed to appreciate the arguments over the oath and the relationship of Ireland to the empire, and they were distressed by the growing disharmony among the Irish leaders. "Yes, we are pleased with the promise of an Irish settlement which the conference at London offered," wrote the former

1 Of course the very few included the uncompromising republicans, many of whom were among those released from prison by the Free State and found their way to the United States.


3 Davis to Lloyd George, 7 Dec. 1921, and the Orange, New Jersey, Rotary Club to King George V, 9 Dec. 1921 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/5715).

47 Jan. 1922, Dail Eireann treaty deb., p. 303.
president of Harvard, Charles W. Eliot, "but we have been disappointed at the long delay in accepting it on the part of the Sinn Feiners." One native American from Trenton, New Jersey, wrote to Senator Williams, "I most sincerely and profoundly rejoice that there is now a project (if hate does not get the better of reason) that Ireland may win practical independence and a chance to work out her own salvation in her own way." This may have been a superficial comment on the complexities of the Irish situation but it reflected the sentiments of many Americans. Furthermore by the spring of 1922 Americans who were interested in such foreign problems as the Irish question, found their attention being drawn to newer issues like the Greco-Turkish war and Japanese expansion. Native American newspapers overwhelmingly supported the Treaty as a fair settlement of the Irish question.

The outbreak of civil war in southern Ireland and sectarian strife in the north did not encourage confidence among native Americans about the capacity of the Irish for self-government. In response to inquiries from Senator Newberry about the fate of Catholics in Belfast, Secretary of State Hughes commented that "Conditions are of course deplorable both in Dublin and in Belfast, but as you know, both the north and the south of Ireland have at the present time their own Governments," although he confessed that neither government was "able as yet

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1 Eliot to Lord Bryce, 7 Jan. 1922 (Bodl., Bryce Papers, vol. 1, fol. 180). Eliot also expressed indignation at the "foolishness" of some Irish-Americans who were encouraging the Dail to reject the Treaty.

2 William Richie to Senator John Sharp Williams, 16 March 1922 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 58).

3 For press surveys see Lit. Dig., lxxi, no. 12 (17 Dec. 1921), pp 5-8, and lxxii, no. 3 (21 Jan. 1922), pp 5-7; and New York Herald, 7 Dec. 1921.
to assure safety to the people..." But even while the civil war
and the reprisals were at their worst, not all native Americans were
discouraged. President Harding told Plunkett on 15 January 1923, "If
only peace came, I tell you Sir Horace Ireland would be the richest
country in the world with her glorious climate and soil." Nonetheless there was a growing impatience with the continuation of fighting
in Ireland and Irish-American clamour in the United States. The State
Department now only refused to intervene on behalf of de Valera and
the republican prisoners in 1923 and 1924, but in response to Senator
Walsh's direct comparison of American treatment of the confederate
president Jefferson Davis after the Civil War with de Valera's arrest
and possible execution in late 1923, Secretary Hughes replied coldly
that Davis "had not for a year or two carried on guerilla warfare and
tried to murder officers of the American Government." In short,
Americans had little interest in the intricacies of Irishmen fighting
among themselves.

To be sure the Treaty gave the anti-Irish elements in the United
States no pleasure, unless perhaps to the extent that it resulted in
civil war in Ireland and confirmed their beliefs about the Irish char-
acter. Predictably, George L. Fox warned of the great danger of the
possibility of Ulster under a Catholic government and asserted that a

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1 Senator Truman H. Newberry to Charles Evans Hughes, 5 July 1922,
and Hughes to Newberry, 10 July 1922 (N.A., 841d, 00/51, roll 219).

2 Plunkett diary, 15 Jan. 1923 (Plunkett Foundation, Plunkett Papers).

3 Memorandum of conversation between Senator Thomas J. Walsh and
Secretary of State Hughes, 6 Oct. 1923 (N.A., 341D.1121 VALERA, EAMON
DE /49, box 4095). This impatience was also revealed in the press.
See New York Herald, 1 July, 9, 13, 23, 24 and 25 Aug. 1922; C.S.M.,
1 and 5 July, 22 and 26 Aug. 1922; and Lit. Dig., lxxiv, no. 3 (15
Free State, a dominion, or a republic "all mean the same thing."¹

As early as 10 December 1921 the disagreement over the terms of the Treaty provided the opportunity to refer to "Ire-Land" and to joke about Irish "factions" and the probability that once the Anglo-Irish conflict settled down the Irish would "begin fighting again over their 'peace.'"² Such books as Andrew Gerrie's Ireland's woes and Britain's wiles, published in July of 1922, placed the responsibility for Ireland's difficulties square on the Irish, pointing out their predisposition to factionalism and their destructive refusal to compromise as the source of Ireland's difficulty; in July of 1922, with the shelling

¹Fox to J., St Loe Strachey, 12 Dec. 1921 (Beaverbrook Library, Strachey Papers, folder 3, 1919-21).

²A "Scotch-Irishman" to Senator John Sharp Williams, 10 Dec. 1921 (L.C., Williams Papers, box 57). For another example of the refusal to take the Irish situation seriously see Congressman Henry W. Elliot's account of an editorial from the Omaha Morning World-Herald. "Ain't they satisfied yet?" I ask. "What are they quarrelin' about now?" "Now?" repeats Cookey in a daze. "Oh yes, why, they're quarrelin' now over the question whether these assassinations was murder or only killin's. By golly, Hep, it's real sad; there was 2 of the finest young Presidents of Ireland since de Valera's resignation was handed in a fortnight ago and he went out on his own hook as a free shelley." "I see where this paper that you brought home says Cosgrave was elected President," says I. "Well he's president o' the Delerium," Cookey says. "You see it was this way, General Dick Mulcahy gets up and says 'I make a motion we elect Bill Cosgrave President o' this Delerium,' 'I second that motion,' says John McNeil, the new professor in Dublin. Well the motion was carried unanimous—42 to 41, that's unanimous in that country—and the new President proceeds to appoint his cabinet. First off the bat he makes General Mulcahy minister of defence. 'It was his motion put me here,' says the President, 'therefore let him stand between me and the Irish.' Next he announces he makes Jack McNeil minister of education. 'Jack, he knowed enouf to second the right motion at the right time—let him be county sup'rentendent for Ireland.' In the Emerald Isle when you join up with the gov'ment you become a minister whether you like it or not." Elliot to Senator John Sharp Williams, 12 Nov. 1922 (Ibid., box 60).
of the Four Courts, this was a difficult argument to refute. Indeed the observation made in 1916 by Madison Grant in his book *The passing of the great race*, the fourth edition of which went through six printings between 1920 and 1924, that "An independent Ireland worked out on a Tammany model is not a pleasing prospect," seemed to have been borne out in the cruelties of the civil war.²

(iii)

The Irish question was an important issue in American public life for nearly two decades during the early twentieth century. Predictably Americans of Irish descent were the most concerned, informed, and opinionated on the Irish situation in the United States. But there were also important divisions within the Irish-American community over the forms of Irish nationalism and the kind of political system they hoped to see established. As the prospects for home rule brightened under Redmond and the Asquith government from 1910 onwards, the great majority of Irish-Americans gave their support to the Irish Parliamentary party and the concept of a Dublin government subordinate to Westminster. Home rule, however, while badly weakened by Unionist intransigence in 1914 and by the 1916 rebellion, was perhaps more than anything else a casualty of World War I. The decline of Irish-American support for Redmond and the UIL can be linked specifically to British postponements of the implementation of self-government in Ireland in 1914, in 1916, and again in 1918; perhaps nothing illustrates this

¹A. Gerrie, *Ireland's woes and Britain's wiles* (Boston, 1922). Gerrie also said, "There is no conception of peace or freedom in the thought of a Sinn Fein Irishman any more than in that of a Prussian..." Ibid., pp 7-8. See also C.S. Burr, *America's racial heritage: an account of the diffusion of ancestral stocks in the United States during three centuries of national expansion and a discussion of its significance* (New York, 1922), pp 16 and 221.

²Grant, *The passing of the great race*, p. 59.
better than the unsuccessful attempts of Irish-American moderates in 1919. Certainly revolutionary Irish-American nationalism represented a small body of opinion until the European war created new circumstances which they were able to exploit, although by 1917 American war priorities imposed obvious restrictions on their freedom to create an anti-British policy of revolutionary Irish nationalism. Clearly by 1919 as the result of the British failure to implement home rule, the 1916 rebellion, and, of perhaps incalculable importance, the Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination during the war, Irish-Americans seemed unanimous in their support of some form of separation from Great Britain; they were further inspired by the creation of modern Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia as well as by the ideals of the revolutionary Irish-American nationalists. The visit to the United States by de Valera in 1919 and 1920 rallied Irish-American opinion behind the concept of Irish independence, and started in motion various projects to raise money and carry out agitation on several fronts. Irish-American unanimity on the principle of separation survived even the disastrous split in the movement in 1920, as both factions claimed unqualified devotion to the principle of independence. For most Irish-Americans the Treaty and the Irish Free State provided a satisfactory degree of independence, if not actually a republic, and only the most dedicated and doctrinaire republican idealogues refused to accept this.

Native American opinion on the Irish question, unlike Irish-American, started from no common agreement on the virtue of Irish self-government. Nevertheless, substantial numbers of native Americans warmly supported Irish nationalist claims. Indeed every President from Taft to Coolidge could be found to have made statements, both public and private, in favour of Irish self-government, and they were
joined in this, particularly at moments of great importance in the Irish nationalist movement, by many Americans whose sentiments could not have been designed to win votes. Native Americans supported Ireland for ideological reasons: because they were democrats or federalists and felt that every people had a right to the government of their own choice, because they included Ireland's claims for nationhood among the obligations of the war aims, or because of anglophobic and anti-imperialist convictions. Others favoured Irish self-government for more practical reasons in the hope that its realization would relieve American domestic politics of the raison d'être of militant Irish-American nationalism or that it would allow the United States to develop cordial diplomatic relations with Great Britain. These views were not institutionalized in organizations, as was Irish-American opinion, with the result that they appeared fragmentary and disorganized and tied to specific incidents affecting the nationalist cause. But the opinion of these native Americans was no less important for that, because they represented a degree of power, influence, wealth, and respectability that was often lacking in the Irish-Americans. Of course a great many native Americans opposed Irish nationalism, often for reasons of religious, racial, or anti-immigrant feelings, and during and after the war for reasons of pro-British sympathy. To a large extent also, anti-Irish feeling in the United States was a direct reaction to Irish-American agitation and corresponded in intensity to the periods of most blatant Irish-American nationalism.

The cumulative effect of this body of opinion on the Irish question was not without some importance to the eventual resolution of Ireland's national aspirations. Although the United States government was obviously susceptible to the political pressure which the Irish-
Americans were able to exert, in their hope of making American for-
eign policy an instrument of Irish nationalist ambitions, no adminis-
tration was willing to allow the country's vital interests to be in-
fluenced by Irish-American demands. Thus the government entered World
War I on the side of the Allied Powers, refused to demand that Britain
grant independence to Ireland as the sine qua non of participation in
the war and the peace, and refused to extend diplomatic recognition to
the Dail government. Within the confines of a broader policy of
friendly relations with Britain, however, the United States government
was willing to use its influence on behalf of prisoners in 1916, to
encourage a settlement in 1917, to promote Anglo-Irish talks in 1919,
and to assist in relief operations in Ireland in 1916 and 1921. The
Irish-Americans had only moderate success in extracting assistance
from Congress, which, although willing to provide a national platform
for Irish agitation, was not prepared to take decisive action except
when its objectives coincided with those of the Irish-Americans, as in
the defeat of the arbitration treaties and the Versailles Treaty. In
fact the nationalist leaders themselves were partially responsible for
the failure of the Irish to utilize the peace conference for anything
but propaganda purposes and for the failure of either political party
to endorse the Irish cause in the presidential election campaign of
1920.

To an extent American opinion on the Irish question was more im-
portant to the British government than to the American. Because of
the insecurity of Britain's position during the war and in the 1920s,
American opinion on the Irish and other questions became a factor to
be carefully considered by the British government. In September 1914,
in May 1917, and again in late 1919 and 1920 the Cabinet justified
their attempts to deal with Ireland in the hope of placating American and dominion opinion. By the spring of 1921 the British government was presented with problems of enormous pro-Irish agitation (to a degree involving the American government), of growing Anglo-American naval rivalry, and of certain financial dependence on the United States. The anxious reports of British diplomats in Washington showed that there was the possibility of congressional recognition of the Dail government and of private assistance to Ireland in the form of weapons and more money. These were all elements encouraging the British to make some accommodation with the Dail government, although they were not forced to capitulate (for example, despite renewed agitation and fund raising in November 1921 by the Irish-Americans, the British government remained firm in the limits of what they would concede to the Irish delegation in London).

Possibly American opinion was most important in influencing the nationalist movement in Ireland itself. Money raised in the United States kept both the constitutional and the revolutionary movements alive in Ireland even when their policies seemed quite impractical, and of course after the war the Irish Victory Fund, the bond-certificate drives, and the relief efforts alone raised over twelve million dollars (and there were many private funds and remittances as well). Particularly important, however, as a consideration by the Irish leaders in increasing their demands from local autonomy to republican independence was the prospect of large scale assistance or intervention from the United States. Nationalist leaders in Ireland were probably mistaken in their estimations of the importance of the visit of the Irish-American delegation to the peace conference in 1919, in the Borah resolution, in the defeat of the Versailles Treaty, and in
the enthusiastic reception given de Valera in the United States, but that mistake seems to have given them sufficient confidence to make a bolder struggle against Great Britain. Certainly American opinion made feasible a far stronger kind of nationalism in Ireland than would otherwise have been possible.
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