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THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND
C. 1540 - 1583
PART 3
PART III: POLITICS
A mere glance at the course of relations between the crown and the great Anglo-Norman houses in the period under study may appear to make any detailed analysis of the administration's deficiencies redundant. It may seem unnecessary to impute such significance to the internal weaknesses of English political and governmental structures when the sources of the feudal magnates' conflict with the government appear to be so obvious: the crown's commitment to the utter abolition of a host of feudal and bastard feudal practices which the magnates were equally determined to defend, made a head-on collision inevitable. The bare factual record would seem to lend incontrovertible support to this simple conclusion. Between 1560 and 1580, each of the four Anglo-Norman earls either openly rebelled or were guilty of serious collusion with actual rebels. Ormond was best behaved; but even his record was not without blemish. Throughout the period, in his dealings with the earl of Desmond in the 1560s and with Sir Barnaby Fitzpatrick in the 1570s, he showed a marked propensity to settle his own disputes without recourse to law by means of feudal warfare. His loyalty was even more seriously in doubt during the early months of his brothers' rebellion in 1569, when his inaction and special pleading did much to damage his reputation at Whitehall. On three separate occasions between 1561 and 1582 the earl of Kildare was summoned to court, each time to undergo examination upon allegations of treason, each time with greater justification. Clanrickard was believed to have connived at, and even to have
provoked the two major rebellions of his sons in the 1570s. In 1579 he confessed himself guilty of treason and escaped a traitor's death only by a royal pardon. The stormy career of the last earl of Desmond from his first clash with Ormond in 1560 to his ultimate rebellion in 1579 is well-known.

The most obvious and most frequently advanced explanation of these chronic disturbances places the burden of blame upon the magnates themselves. The great lords, it is said, were so dependent upon their powers of extortion that the prospect of their abolition was intolerable to them. Thus, their promises of conformity to the new regime were at heart insincere, a thin disguise of their fixed determination to resist any encroachment of their traditional powers by all possible means. ¹ Like most obvious explanations, this interpretation contains an important element of truth. Clearly, the more dependent they were upon the practices of bastard feudalism for the maintenance of their local power, the more difficult it was for the magnates to respond positively and successfully to the new demands of the crown. There is an indisputable geographical fact that the two western earls, who were most deeply steeped in the ways of "coyne and livery", were the most turbulent and unstable, and ultimately the least successful in their attempt to adapt to the new conditions. Yet such indications notwithstanding, the easy equation of a commitment to feudalism with an inevitable tendency towards rebellion is deceptive in its simplicity. Its silent assumptions are too rigid, its readily reached conclusions too determinist.

The great lords, of course, were quite wary of recklessly surrendering their old feudal powers, but the extent of their attachment to "coyne and livery" should not be exaggerated. Not
all of the magnates were dependent upon "coyne", and none of those who were profitted greatly from it. Kildare had surrendered all his feudal powers upon his return from exile. He continued to have recourse to physical intimidation in order to sustain his influence within his locality, and employed a number of retainers, usually with the foreknowledge and consent of the government, for this purpose. But large portions of the Kildare revenues had for long been realised as fixed cash payments, and the earl's rental had been further regularised through the crown's leasing of large tracts of his demesne land to Palesmen in the years after 1534.2 The commutation of the Butlers' feudal services for a fixed payment was already sufficiently advanced for the earl of Ormond to surrender his feudal powers voluntarily in 1564.3 Commutations of service were common in Desmond and there is evidence that it was also in operation in Clanrickard.4

The reasons for this internal decay of "coyne and livery" are not hard to find. As a system of estate management, it was highly uneconomic.5 The maintenance of large groups of purely military retainers was wasteful both of men and material. It created no surplus wealth and was dependent for its success upon the most thorough exploitation of the resources available to it from year to year. The fortunes of those magnates who depended most heavily upon it were in a permanently precarious condition. These economic deficiencies in the system were exacerbated by its political weaknesses. Desmond and Clanrickard encountered regular opposition in their attempts to exact their services. The inevitable disorders which accompanied their efforts aroused the unfavourable attention of the Dublin administration, and government intervention almost invariably supported those upon whom they had made their
demands. The western earls were, thus, placed in an exceedingly difficult predicament. The more they attempted to preserve their local status, the more their credit with the government declined; the more they worked to earn the good-will of the crown, the less they could afford to maintain their old ways at home. Though both tried, neither managed to extricate himself successfully from this dilemma, and their failure is reflected both in their declining political capital and in their deteriorating economic and political status at home. As his conflicts with the government increased in the 1570s, Clanrickard claimed that the chief cause of his lordship's instability was its poverty. Desmond made similar claims to indigence, and even as early as 1566 Sidney was afraid that the earl's desperate financial position would drive him to rebellion. Desmond's circumstances were indeed unhealthy; in 1568 it was estimated that he normally realised less than one-eighth of his potential annual revenue.

Seen in this light, the two earls' occasional declarations of their willingness to surrender their old ways in favour of an alternative means of maintaining their status appear to be something more than disingenuous. Some form of adequate commutation made good sense. Their real attachment to the system of "coyne and livery" was defensive and conditional. They regarded their large private armies as necessary weapons of deterrence, without which they would be left defenceless against the assaults of their factional enemies, powerless over the insubordination of their inferiors. Where any great lord continued to have resort to retainers, all must needs have them or suffer eclipse. No one could afford to surrender them unilaterally. This argument from fear was the one most commonly advanced by the magnates in defence
of their persistent use of "coyne and livery": Desmond and Ormond both excused their maintenance of private armies in terms of their mutual distrust; neither was willing to concede a military superiority to the other.\(^8\) Clanrickard argued that it was necessary for the preservation of order in the west until a more formal policing system could be established.\(^9\) Its sudden removal, he suggested, would only stimulate the ambitions of men of lesser power and lighter allegiance whom the earls now kept under control. When Desmond was at length persuaded to assent to the abolition of "coyne" in 1574, he gave voice to what was but a commonly shared anxiety: "I do hope that my agreement and easy consent to reduce those parts to English government should not extend so far as to my destruction, so that Her Majesty will think it reasonable either to suspend the execution of that part ... or else make it general to all others to lay away weapons at me".\(^10\) The magnates would be willing to disarm if they could be assured that their political and social standing would not be endangered by their martial vulnerability.

The long term inefficiency of "coyne and livery", its damaging political side-effects and the conditional nature of the magnates' attachment to it, combined to leave more than enough leeway for some kind of an accommodation to be reached with the lords if the government had had a mind to; and it is clear that the government did.

There is no evidence to suggest that the systematic destruction of the great Anglo-Norman houses was ever envisaged to be part of official English policy in Ireland. On the contrary, the hope was frequently expressed that the great lords would, after due preparation, provide the necessary leverage for a revival of English
rule, throughout the island. "Reformation and not damnation", it has been shown, was the original Henrician policy towards the crown's overmighty Irish subjects, and despite the unanticipated and unwanted outburst of the Kildare rebellion, this continued to be the orthodox Tudor attitude. After 1558 Kildare, Ormond, Desmond and Clanrickard were all appointed members of the Irish council. Each was appointed to important government commissions, and each received personal assurances from Elizabeth of her continuing good-will. In practice, the queen maintained a deliberately tolerant attitude to the magnates' conduct. She showed a willingness to overlook their occasional misdemeanours and even to forgive their more serious challenges to her authority. Each of the noble houses was permitted at least one serious denial of the Dublin administration's authority, and most got away with a good deal more. If Elizabeth was concerned to impose a greater restraint upon her powerful subjects, she was by no means desirous to destroy them.

The queen's ministers, for the most part, shared her outlook. Almost all were agreed that bastard feudalism should be abolished as soon as possible, but opinions differed as to when and to how abolition was to be accomplished. Sidney was, perhaps, the most uncompromising in principle, but despite his fulminations against the system, he displayed a practical willingness to tolerate its continued exploitation by friends and foes alike. Sussex, as we have seen, was much more moderate and gradualist in his views. Secretary Cecil was concerned that the government should not overreact to the occasional "peccadilloes" of the great lords, and even his more aggressive successor, Walsingham, recognised the necessity of discounting their unruly habits. As late as 1578, open debate
amongst the privy councillors revealed that the government's views on the question of imminent abolition were still undetermined.  

Nothing better illustrates the Elizabethan government's genuine desire to reach a peaceful understanding with the great lords than the instrument which it adopted as the chief means of regaining control over the outlying regions of the Irish kingdom: the provincial presidency. The original presidency was never conceived of as an instrument of aggression against the magnates. On the contrary, the lords were to be granted a seat on the council itself, and other counsellors known to be partial towards them were to be co-opted when it was thought suitable. The president's total retinue of fifty troops, several of whom were non-serving officers, was minute in relation to the resources available to the magnates, and was intended to act only as an honorary guard, or to protect the president from ambush and casual assault. In times of crisis forces were to be raised by the lords themselves to serve as the president's military arm. Unlike his counterparts in Wales and in the north of England, the president in provincial Ireland was to be authorised to execute martial law, but the occasions upon which he might legitimately do so were severly restricted. At no time was it to be applied to persons holding property or goods valued at forty shillings or more. Finally, presidents were admonished to avoid burdening the country unnecessarily lest they should appear to be equal in their oppressions to those they had come to bridle. The presidents would make substantial inroads upon the local autonomy of the great lords, but they could hardly be said to have threatened the magnates' political influence, still less to have posed a fatal challenge to their very existence.
This "classic" presidential model, of course, was given little chance to take root in the provinces, and was replaced by a far more martial and coercive instrument of government. But even the "composition" presidencies introduced into Ireland by Sidney in the late 1570s were, as we have seen, intended not to destroy the lords, but to stabilise their position within the realm. The magnates were to be fairly compensated for the surrender of their feudal dues, and they were to receive thereafter the support of the president in the collection of their legally recognised rents. Composition, no doubt, entailed some loss of noble freedom and some loss of potential income, but given the chronic uncertainty of their informal revenues, the cost of their collection and their long-term tendency towards decline, the new stability would seem to have offered a sufficient compensation. In Desmond's case, at any rate, composition promised to double his average real earnings. 17

The suggestion that the moderation and adaptability of both the crown and the magnates offered the possibility of the peaceful resolution of their difference which was never realised in actuality may yet seem to savour of special pleading. The correlation between the establishment of presidencies and the outbreak of rebellions seems just too high to be ignored: each time a president was introduced, rebellion followed. But even here, a simple causal relationship should not be too hastily assumed. Desmond co-existed happily with the first English officer to exercise the powers of a president in his lordship for almost a year. 18

Though he was resolutely opposed to St. Leger's appointment, Ormond welcomed his successor as president, Sir John Perrot, and sought to have his term of office renewed. 19 Even Clanrickard's initial response to the appointment of Fitton was sufficient to convince
the president's chief justice of his genuine good-will. On the other hand, not every outbreak of rebellion can be readily accounted for by the appearance of a president. Though Ormond felt threatened by Sidney's choice of St. Leger, he did not resort to violence; when his brothers did rebel, it was in reaction to a very different threat from Sir Peter Carew. James Fitzmaurice, the Butlers' erstwhile Geraldine ally, rose out only after St. Leger had been withdrawn from Munster and before any successor had been chosen to replace him. Desmond's own rebellion in 1579 occurred long after he had established a friendly relationship with President Drury. Finally, Kildare, the most consistently mistrusted of all the Irish earls, never had a president to contend with at all. Such inconsistencies pose a puzzle. Yet an underlying unity can be discovered beneath the varied responses of Desmond, Ormond and Clanrickard to the presidencies, and the suspicious conduct of the earl of Kildare.

The great earls were not isolated, anachronistic types, feudal magnates whose very existence was almost by definition incompatible with the aims of a centralising monarchy. They interacted amongst themselves and amongst others of their kind in a world of which the monarch and the monarch's court was the very fulcrum. Each was either a leader or a leading figure within one of the great Irish factional connections which depended for its sustenance and growth upon continued access to influence at the royal court. Influence with the dominant court faction meant influence with its adherents within the Irish administration, and as often as not, influence with the deputy himself. Its advantages were immeasurable. It provided the opportunity for the satisfactory conclusion of long-standing litigation and for the settlement of old scores. It enabled the
favoured faction to carry complaints against its enemies with conviction, and to perpetrate its own excesses with impunity. It brought with it a stability and a promise of future success which enabled the faction's leaders to strengthen their authority over their followers and to swell their ranks with hopeful recruits. Precisely the opposite consequences, however, were entailed by a failure to gain access to power. Prolonged exclusion from influence at court carried with it the dual dangers of external assault and internal decay which together threatened the unlucky faction with ultimate dissolution. The extremes of success and defeat entailed by the politics of faction produced imperatives far more urgent and far more compelling than any fears generated by the crown's general desire to see "coyne and livery" abolished.

It was the immediately relevant calculus of factionalism rather than any other long-term consideration that conditioned the responses of the great lords to the initiatives of the crown. Thus, Desmond at first accepted the presidency because he already knew and had confidence in the presidential nominee and the man who had appointed him, while Ormond and Clanrickard reacted with hostility to presidencies because of their mutual distrust of the man who introduced them, Sir Henry Sidney. To them the presidencies' threat lay not in the nature of the office, but in the character and allegiance of the man who was to discharge its responsibilities. They doubted, that is to say, the official claim that each president would be "a special person by birth indifferent and free from all partiality towards the people of the country". The magnates' response to presidents, in other words, simply reflected their degree of confidence in the good will of the chief governor. Their attitude sprang from no outdated attachment to an outmoded and
wasteful system, but rather from a recognition that the governors of Ireland were not the indifferent arbiters of power that they purported to be, but were also creatures of the same political mechanism under which they themselves had been accustomed to operate: faction.

The factional attachments of the English governors was a factor of crucial importance in determining their relations with the Irish lords, but it was not of necessity nefarious. In at least two alternative ways, indeed, it held out the prospect of an eventual resolution of the government's difficulties. On the one hand, the long and successful tenure of office of one faction's ally could wreak such deleterious effects upon the opposing faction that it would soon grow weak and might eventually wither away. This was a process which Sussex believed would be stimulated by his exclusive patronage of the Butlers; it was one which was actually in operation under St. Leger. On the other hand, an alternating series of short and unsuccessful deputyships which shared influence over the office evenly between the two groups might have allowed a number of mutually respected conventions of competition to emerge and thus lent a rough and ready stability to the rivalry. Either of these situations might have been generated by any simple form of the interfactional alliances considered in Chapter II; but after 1556 the situation became much more complicated.

After 1556 the governors were not just aligned to the great court factions, they were also committed to the execution of specific programmes of policy whose implications were not necessarily compatible with, and might well be hostile towards, the interests of their Irish allies. And as the programmatic
commitments of the governors advanced, so the demands of their dual role became increasingly difficult to meet. Their ability to tailor the actions of the government to the requirements of their Irish allies deteriorated seriously. Moreover, even when they sought to help their friends, the intrinsic weaknesses and vulnerabilities of their position left these programmatic governors unable to project an image of permanence and stability sufficient to encourage their Irish allies and discourage their enemies. This increasing unwillingness and increasing inability on the part of the governors either to adequately reward their Irish friends or to sufficiently suppress their Irish foes was the key element in determining the course of relations between the crown and the Irish magnates in the years after 1556. Its ill-effects had already begun to become apparent under Sussex, but as with so much else, they came to fruition under Sidney.

(ii)

In one sense, the outcome of the factional competition between the Butlers and the Geraldines, was almost pre-determined by the change of government that occurred in 1556. The exposure of the pro-Geraldine St. Leger as an indolent and corrupt minister, and his replacement by an energetic young reformer who was known to be favourable to the Butlers, tended to re-inforce the deeply rooted Tudor suspicion that the Geraldines were the most untrustworthy of the great Irish lords and the Butlers the most loyal. The new governor, at any rate, did his best to confirm the impression. While he did his utmost to exclude the earl of Kildare from influence, Sussex took pains to substantially increase Ormond's
participation in government. Ormond was several times appointed to commissions of peace for the provinces of Munster and Leinster. He was authorised to use martial law within the counties of his own lordship, and he was twice made a commissioner for ecclesiastical causes. The earl came to prominence as a councillor; his attendance at council meetings increased, and in 1559 he was appointed lord treasurer and thereby allowed to take precedence at the board over Kildare as the highest peer in the realm. With service came reward. First and most important, Ormond secured in 1557 the confirmation of his palatine liberty in Tipperary and regained the prize-wine of Youghal and Kinsale which his father had enjoyed. New grants of large monastic properties were granted to him; several of his existing leases were renewed on the most generous terms. But more important was the less tangible political influence which Ormond won under Sussex. The lieutenant determined a longstanding dispute with the Fitzpatricks of Upper-Ossory in the earl's favour, and sided unhesitantly with Ormond in his territorial and jurisdictional disputes with the earl of Desmond. In 1560, when special commissioners actually determined a boundary dispute in Desmond's favour, Sussex had the case referred to London in order to have the judgement reversed. As the Butler-Desmond feud intensified in the early 1560s, Sussex remained steadfast in his support for Ormond.

The benefits won through the Sussex connection were not, however, limited to the interests of the earl himself. Ormond's brothers and his uncle, the Viscount Mountgarret, were appointed to positions of executive responsibility and received the customary favours in return. But the connection's most important linkage went far beyond the Butler family. The historical association
of the Butlers with the Burkes of Clanrickard had only recently been revived first by the elevation of Ulick Burke, a grandson of the 7th earl of Ormond, to the peerage as earl of Clanrickard, and later by the Butlers' unwavering support to Ulick's heir, Richard, in his attempts to assert his authority in Clanrickard in troublesome times following his father's death in 1544. By 1556 Richard's position was secure, and the alliance between the Burkes of Clanrickard and the Butlers of Ormond was fixed. Thus, when the new governor chose to patronise the Butlers, he also acquired natural allies west of the Shannon at the same time. Sussex took the earl's son, Ulick, into his own household service. He reported uncritically of Clanrickard's actions in Connaught, and recommended the earl's services for reward. Under Sussex's patronage, Clanrickard's disputed succession to the earldom was confirmed by letters patent, a large number of crown lands were leased to him, and his most ambitious suit was consented to: he was appointed captain of all Connaught. Not surprisingly, Clanrickard was a loyal supporter of the crown throughout Sussex's period in office, ready to supply troops and victuals whenever they were requested and to offer his services on any occasion in the support of the Dublin government. In the same way, Clanrickard's chief Gaelic ally, Conor O'Brien, the highly insecure earl of Thomond experienced similar benefits from a viceroy determined to preserve him from the attacks of his own kinsmen, and responded with equal demonstrations of loyalty. Under Sussex, the commitment of the Butlers, the Galway Burkes and the O'Brien followers of the earl of Thomond to English rule in Ireland, was as unshakable as their good fortune.
Sussex had few qualms about his blatant alliance with the self-interested Butler group. He was fully aware of the faction-ridden environment in which he worked and was fully confident of his ability to exploit its ramifications in his own interests. Under his tutelage, the Butler faction was to form the nucleus of the loyal subjects of the crown in Ireland; their Geraldine opponents were to be gradually reduced to impotence and despair by sheer political malnutrition. The lower members of the group would transfer their allegiance either to the Butlers or to the government itself. Its leaders, deprived of their power-base, would be forced either to acquiesce in the government's will or to engage in a futile display of resistance. A timely offer to Kildare of lands in England, "of like value or better", than his Irish holdings would, Sussex believed, pre-empt even this last possibility. The danger to the state would be defused, and factions would reign no more.33

Yet Sussex greatly exaggerated his ability to use faction to serve his own ends, and underrated his own vulnerability to factional intrigue in England itself. His over-confidence allowed him to oversimplify the options available to the Geraldines in face of his assault. The stark alternatives of rebellion or acquiescence were not the only ones open to them: there remained subversion. By cooperating with Sussex's enemies at court in the general campaign to undermine the lieutenant's government, the Geraldines succeeded not only in forestalling his attacks, but in securing his total defeat. The combined campaign of disobedience and slander which the Geraldine-Dudley alliance mounted against him proved to be far more powerful than his understanding with the Butlers. Sussex was not only the grand manipulator of faction, he was also its victim.
Inevitably, the coming of Sidney as deputy irrevocably changed the fortunes of the Butlers. Yet to begin with, the group seemed to adapt to the unfavourable conditions with impressive ease. Ormond remained at court, and used his personal influence with the queen to limit Sidney's encroachments upon his faction's interests. The earl's success in securing Sir Warham St. Leger's dismissal from office in Munster left an indelible mark upon Sidney. Thereafter, the deputy treated Ormond with a pained and formal respect. Overt differences between the two were rare, and though Sidney's own memoirs clearly reveal the extent to which his initial defeat rankled throughout his career, the deputy dutifully responded to Ormond's requests and complaints in all public affairs. But there were clear limits to Ormond's independent influence at court. The failure and ultimate dissolution of the Norfolk-Sussex group with whom he was most closely associated between 1567 and 1569 restricted him to the exercise of a purely negative and self-protective role in the determination of events. He was unable to make any positive contribution to the formulation of policy. More important, he was unable to prevent the reappointment of his arch-enemy, Sidney, and his adherents once the deputy had presented a new programme for the government of Ireland. Most important of all, he was unable to secure the exclusion of an integral part of that programme: the enterprise of Sir Peter Carew.

The Butler response to Sidney's new programme of 1568-69 was at first well orchestrated. While the earl remained in his accustomed position of favour at court, Butler resistance in the Irish parliament was lead by Mountgarret in the Lords and in the Commons by Ormond's brother, Sir Edward, and his attorney, Sir
Christopher Barnewall, who had been canvassed as the "popular" candidate for the speakership. But the plan soon went badly awry. The Butler group could do little to halt the progress of Sidney's legislation, and at the end of the first session, Sir Edward withdrew from the parliament and together with his brothers, Edmund and Piers, joined in alliance with the rebel Geraldine, James Fitzmaurice. Confronted with the disastrous news of a Butler rebellion against the rightful representative of the crown, Ormond hesitated. It is possible that he hoped that the scandal of provocation would in itself be sufficient to ruin Sidney. But if this was his strategy, he miscalculated. The extent of the rebellion and the fear of foreign intervention were enough to commit the English council to a unanimous support of the man charged with its suppression. For the moment, all criticism of Sidney was laid aside, and those who were laggard in their support of his efforts became suspect. Ormond's inaction, in particular, became the target of critical comment at court. He was sharply commanded to look to his responsibilities.

Ormond's misjudgement of the political climate at court was a disappointing indication of the limited nature of his influence over the government of Ireland. But the consequences of his overconfidence were much more damaging in Ireland. There, his continuing absence and the apparently free-hand given to Sidney and Carew seriously alarmed his dependents. The rumour spread that the earl had been put to death and that Sidney had been ordered to undertake the re-conquest of all Ireland. Fear of their mutual extinction closed old wounds between the Butlers and the Desmond Fitzgeralds, and by the end of 1569, the alliance between Fitzmaurice and Ormond's brothers was bound fast. Sir Edmund's decision to join in confederacy with Fitzmaurice not only served to bring out the majority of
the Butlers in rebellion, it also carried major implications for Butler allies west of the Shannon. Sidney's purpose to appoint a president in Connaught in 1569 aroused anxieties similar to those he had stirred up in Munster in 1566. But the Butler rebellion and the apparent impotence of the earl of Ormond's greatly exacerbated fears of the earls of Clanrickard and Thomond. Thus, by the time Sidney's president, Sir Edward Fitton, actually arrived in Connaught, the province was already fraught with an explosive tension of which the inexperienced president was quite unaware.

Ormond too, when he returned to Ireland in the autumn of 1569, was dangerously unaware of the ramifications which the Butler resistance to Sidney had acquired. He read the situation merely as an expression of the traditional Butler animosity towards Sidney that had grown strangely out of hand. Sidney had for once got the better of his family and so they had impulsively overreacted. His task, it seemed, was simply to bring about the rapid pacification of his brethren through his own personal assurances, and on the basis of this peace, easily and cheaply bought, to lay the blame for the whole unnecessary disturbance upon the overreaching lord deputy. At first Ormond's strategy seemed to succeed. Ormond secured an early meeting with his brethren, soothed their fears and persuaded them to submit. He reported his success to the queen in a highly indignant tone. Nothing, he argued, had prevented the Butlers from making an earlier submission other than their deep and well-founded suspicions of the deputy. The root cause of all the trouble lay in Sidney's harsh dealings with his family which had eventually goaded loyal subjects beyond endurance. Sidney was still determined to do himself and his family "any disgrace and discredit he can." Ormond appealed to the queen to
prevent the deputy from doing his worst. The earl's allegations were supplemented by the protestations of the newly reconciled Sir Edmund Butler. He wrote to Cecil detailing the indignities to which Sidney had submitted him in the months before his rebellion. His formal supplication for pardon was little less than an indictment of the malicious conduct of Sidney and Carew. It concluded with a request that the queen would direct her command "to the lord deputy, Sir Peter Carew and others that they or any of them shall deal with your supplicant nor sue nor trouble him for his lands or goods in any other sort ... than by the ordinary course and order of Your Majesty's common law of Your Highness's ... realm of Ireland."42

The Butler's allegation that their rebellion had been provoked by malice and greed, was sufficiently persuasive to alarm Sir Peter Carew, but Sidney remained unmoved. He received Sir Edmund's submission coldly, publicly rebuking him for the outrages committed by his followers. He had the indictment of the earl's brothers for high treason proclaimed, abrogated Ormond's safe-conduct and ordered their immediate arrest.43 Against all this, Ormond was unable to intervene. Sidney's treatment of Sir Edmund greatly alarmed his brother Edward who had not yet honoured his pledge to come in, and it confirmed many of the Butlers in the wisdom of their initial response. Ormond's moderate tactics seemed futile; the only way to deal with their old enemy was by open rebellion. Now in command of all the Butler rebels, Edward threatened to wreak his revenge on any Englishman who came his way and re-opened the alliance with Fitzmaurice. The loss of his brother's confidence was a serious blow to Ormond's hopes, but his apparent failure in his own country provoked even more damaging reactions in the west.
The earl of Thomond took the Butler protestations of malice at their face value and interpreted Ormond's frustration as the intended result of a concerted attack upon the Butlers and their adherents. He adopted, consequently, a highly suspicious attitude towards President Fitton, refusing to meet with him and denying his men vital supplies of food. In January 1570 he openly defied the president's authority in his lordship. Clanrickard at first, held aloof from such hasty action, but his son John lent support to Thomond's insurrection and Fitton was convinced that he did so with the connivance of his father. In the spring of 1570 almost the entire Butler interest seemed to be in a state of rebellion against the government of the realm. The fundamental disposition of the group had never before been so much in question.

Ormond acted as quickly as possible to salvage the situation. He undertook the hunt for his outlawed brothers personally, and having captured them, handed them over to Sidney unconditionally. This time the Butlers were unambiguously contrite. They acknowledged all guilt for the rebellion "which neither we mean nor indeed can justify or defend by any colour". They pleaded humbly for mercy. Ormond was prepared to offer Sidney this diplomatic victory. He was even willing to openly proclaim his friendship with the deputy and to withdraw the aspersions he had earlier cast upon him. For by now the earl was determined to attain a far more pressing objective: on the day after the formal submission of his brothers the earl was granted an open commission to lead an expedition into Thomond against the rebels. Sidney made the appointment grudgingly, but under the circumstances he had little choice. Thomond's rebellion was a further embarrassment to an already harassed deputy, and with his own meagre resources
already over-stretched by the disturbances in Munster, he could hardly afford to ignore Ormond's offer to suppress the rebellion rapidly at his own cost. Ormond made the most of his opportunity, and within weeks, he had brought the troubled earl of Thomond to submission. His success in salvaging the fortunes of his family and in gaining the government's commission in Thomond strengthened the resolve of the wavering Clanrickard. By early 1571 he had patched up his differences with Fitton and joined with the president in suppressing his own sons' disorders. By that time too, Sidney had made up his mind to leave Ireland, and Sir William Fitzwilliam, a client of Sussex's and a good friend to the earl of Ormond, had been selected as chief governor in his stead. The Butler group seemed to have confronted its most deadly challenge and to have survived it.

Yet the apparent Butler triumph was defective in a number of important respects. Though they had successfully escaped the worst consequences of their actions, the experience of direct confrontation with the government had left the Butlers and their adherents with serious internal scars. At best, it left them deeply distrustful: despite repeated efforts to have his brothers' proclamation as rebels annulled, Sir Edmund and Sir Edward remained technically outlawed, their right of succession to the childless earl indefinitely suspended. At worst, it encouraged their contempt for the process of English government of whose beneficience they were no longer confident. Ormond was unable to suppress his brothers persistent exaction of "coyne and livery", or their private feuds with the O'Mores, the O'Carrolls and the Fitzpatricks. Their excesses remained a continuing embarrassment to him at court. He could exercise even less restraint over his allies in the west. Thomond remained unreconciled, and within weeks after
his submission to Ormond, he fled to France, hoping rather
naively to organise an invasion. His cool reception at the French
court persuaded him of the error of his ways, and before long,
Thomond was at the door of the English ambassador in Paris,
pleading for forgiveness and offering submission on any terms.
The earl posed no real threat to the government, and the privy
council was willing to allow of his reinstatement under terms.
But the entire affair did little to bolster confidence in the
large claims which Ormond had made for his contribution of the
Butlers to English government in Ireland.  

Far more damaging, however, than the ultimately harmless
adventures of the earl of Thomond, was the continuation of serious
disorders in Galway. Despite Clanrickard's cooperation with
Fitton against the rebels in his own country, relations between
the earl and the president remained cool. Fitton continued to
suspect Clanrickard of complicity in his sons' actions, and began
compiling evidence to show that the earl's ostensible cooperation
with the government had been undertaken only with the foreknowledge
and consent of the rebels. Clanrickard deeply resented these
investigations, and Fitton's selection of a notorious opponent of
the earl to be sherrif in Galway only added fuel to his rising
anger. But besides these deliberate harassments, Fitton
inadvertently provoked much animosity through the billeting of his
troops upon the country. Thus, early in 1572, when Clanrickard
refused to support the reinforcements which Fitton had had
imported to quash the rebels, the country followed his example,
and the troops were forced to withdraw. Fitton confronted the
earl's challenge as directly as possible. In less than a year
he had Clanrickard arraigned twice before the Dublin council
charged with responsibility for the outrages of his sons, and on the second occasion, the president insisted upon the earl's arrest.\textsuperscript{53} Fitton went too far. His temerity provoked a serious dispute with the partisan Fitzwilliam which in turn resulted in the temporary suspension of his authority in Connaught in the autumn of 1572. For the time being, Clanrickard and his sons were to be left to themselves.\textsuperscript{54}

But a final weakness in the Butler phalanx remained. Their success against Sidney was due less to their own independent power than to the fact that the deputy himself had been willing to accept Ormond's highly conciliatory overtures and had been prepared for reasons of his own to leave the government of Ireland in the hands of a Butler partisan. The Butlers, in other words, had not defeated Sidney, they had merely survived him. Thus their ability to exert a positive influence over Irish policy remained as limited as it had been when Sidney first took office. They were unable to stifle Sidney's critical voice as an adviser on Ireland, they were unable also to forestall the return of Fitton as commissioner in Connaught in 1573, and they were unable to prevent Sidney's resumption of office for the third time once he had set his mind to it.

Sidney's return late in 1575 convinced the Butler group of the need for conciliation. Ormond was dutifully welcoming, and his deeply disappointed brethren preserved at least the outward show of humility.\textsuperscript{55} Even the Clanrickards showed a willingness to make peace with the deputy. Despite the recurrence of disputes with Fitton, the Mac an Iarlas came to Sidney on his tour of Connaught early in 1576 and submitted.\textsuperscript{56} Sidney, however, was not to be assuaged by gesture. The Burkes, he believed, had enjoyed too much liberty in his absence. Their treatment of Fitton and of
Sidney's Irish friends in Galway and Athenry was not to be so lightly forgiven. Thus the deputy's response to their overture was an angry one. He stormed at them, rebuked them sharply for their spoiling of Athenry, and substantially increased the fines of restitution which the more lenient Fitzwilliam had set on them. Ignoring their pleas of safe-conduct, Sidney treated the Mac an Iarlas now as he had treated the Butler brothers, six years before: he placed them under arrest and brought them back with him to Dublin. All this was too much for the Burkes. Here was the old antagonist of the Butlers come again to wreak his malice upon their weakest members. Their natural reaction was to behave as Ormond's brothers had acted when they had felt themselves helpless in front of Sidney's power. They escaped from Dublin, and on making their way across the Shannon, proclaimed their rebellion against Sidney with a dramatic gesture of defiance. Once again, an important segment of the Butler group had gone beyond the control of the earl of Ormond and was in open opposition to the government of the realm.57

Sidney responded to their challenge with ruthless determination. "This late trouble", he announced, "hath given the queen a greater foothold in Connaught these three hundred years".58 To give point to his assertions Sidney returned to Clanrickard in July 1576 and summarily arrested the earl on the charge of complicity in the treasonable actions of his sons. His actions made demonstrable what the Burkes had long maintained: that Sidney was intent not merely on the reduction of the province to civility, but upon the complete destruction of the house of Clanrickard. He wanted the work accomplished, moreover, in the most ostentatious manner possible. Clanrickard was to be tried on a lengthy list of charges
before the Irish council, or, if necessary, by "a common jury of persons". Sidney, Lord Chancellor Gerrard and the new president in Connaught, Nicholas Malby, pressed the London government repeatedly for permission to proceed against the earl in Dublin. Sidney wrote to Walsingham to have the government's case examined by the highest legal opinion in England, seeking to close any loop-holes through which Clanrickard might escape. He urged the secretary to use all the influence at his disposal to maintain the queen in a resolution to bring the earl to justice.

Though it was not entirely uninfluenced by plain malice, Sidney's quest for Clanrickard's blood was motivated by far more general considerations. His aim remained as it had been in 1565: to attain a mastery over the great lords whose factional alignments had left them disposed to assume a hostile attitude towards his government. Originally, Sidney seemed to believe, like Sussex, that his end might be achieved without resort to violence, but experience had led him gradually towards an opposite opinion. His encounter with Ormond, on the one hand, had clearly revealed the limits of his power over his antagonists as long as they remained within the confines of the law. Yet on the other hand, he had learned that many of the Butlers and their adherents in Connaught were strongly susceptible to provocation and could easily be induced into illegal and violent actions which their prudent and diplomatic leader found increasingly difficult to excuse or justify. Now this latest rebellion of the Burkes offered a unique opportunity to Sidney to demonstrate conclusively that the Butler group, the protestations of the earl of Ormond notwithstanding, were a profoundly undependable element in the Irish polity. In the face of incontrovertible evidence of the treason of the Mac an Iarlas and
the complicity of their father, it would be impossible for Ormond to rally to their defence as he had done for them and for others in the past. And his failure to preserve his most important allies in the west would be a blow not only to the earl's prestige, but to the actual power-base of the Butler group as a whole. Whether Clanrickard was technically guilty or not of the charge of treason was not of primary importance, Sidney's chief concern was that one whose continuing disregard of the deputy's authority had been sheltered by the great Butler influence should be rigorously punished for his insolence. The deadly assault on Clanrickard, thus, was not an administrative necessity, but a political challenge to the Butler group as a whole, a revision of Sussex's original strategy against the Geraldines in a much more ruthless and much more violent form.

Sidney's very haste, however, to secure an exemplary judgement against Clanrickard severely weakened his case. His repeated requests to have the earl tried at Dublin were ignored, and in the end, the privy council decided to have the hearing transferred to London. It was not until early 1579 that the crown's law officers were ordered to commence the preparation of charges against Clanrickard, and at the same time the earl was invited to prepare his own defence and to present a full account of his good services to the crown in times past. Clanrickard readily confessed the rashness and ingratitude of his conduct and he was bound by recognisance to remain in London. But the charge of treason which had menaced him for over two years was abandoned. By this time too, Sidney's hour had passed, his hopes of subordinating the Butler interest to his own will lost in the collapse of his general plan for the reform of all Ireland.
This was a highly inconclusive end to Sidney's Irish service. In spite of his three periods in office, the deputy had failed to curb the power of his Butler opponents either by a gradual erosion of their credibility, or by an overt attack upon them. Yet each of his various failures shared a common underlying cause. On each occasion the opportunity of dealing decisively with the Butlers had come within his grasp, and on each occasion was forfeited by the extrinsic demands and intrinsic weaknesses of his own self-imposed programme. The Butlers, then, had escaped through Sidney's own deficiencies, but they had not emerged from the ordeal unscathed. The group from whom Sussex had expected so much at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign appeared in 1579 to be dangerously estranged from the Irish government. The experience of the intervening period had left Ormond and his brothers deeply disenchanted with the processes of English government in Ireland. Though they had been spared the worst consequences of their subjection to an unfavourable governor, they remained yet unable to secure the permanent presence of more friendly figures in high office. They had been no more able to maintain Sussex and Fitzwilliam in power than they had been able to prevent Sidney's reappointments. Their confidence, therefore, in the fickle and treacherous office of chief governor deteriorated seriously throughout the period. They tended increasingly to seek their security in the negative, inhibiting, but none the less protective personal influence of the courtier earl, and in the consolidation of their power within the locality. In either case, the reformist policy programmes of the Dublin governor were irrelevant and unwelcome to the Butlers. The alienation of Ormond's western allies from the Dublin administration was made
manifest in a much more direct way: rebellion. Since 1570 the resort to force of arms had become the typical response of the Clanrickard Burkes to Sidney's attempts to govern them. But increasingly, they displayed an alarming tendency to remain in rebellion after the immediate threat from Sidney had passed. Neither Fitzwilliam nor Clanrickard was able to curtail the activities of the Mac an Iarlas during Sidney's and Fitton's absence, and after Sidney's withdrawal in 1578, when Drury succeeded in mollifying much of the resentment against the general composition plan elsewhere, the Burkes remained irreconcilable, locked in a vicious war with President Malby. Sussex's early hopes that the house of Clanrickard would be the medium through which the benefits of English government would be re-introduced into Connaught, seemed to have been entirely dispelled by his successor's failure either to control his factional opponents or to carry out his chosen programme in government regardless of their opposition. But the damage done by Sidney's methods of government went further than the alienation of the powerful and hitherto loyal Butler group. The same determination to place the considerations of his chosen programme above all others, and the same radical instability which his programmatic commitment entailed produced even more direful consequences for the deputy's erstwhile Irish allies, the Geraldines.
To begin with, the Geraldines seemed to inherit under Sidney the same position of influence which the Butlers had enjoyed under Sussex. Lord Justice Arnold had greatly rewarded the earl of Kildare for his services in the Dudley interest. The earl became one of Arnold's closest political counsellors and was granted extensive responsibility for the government of Leinster and the midland plantations. Sidney retained Kildare in the authoritative positions he had come to enjoy under Arnold. He professed to find the earl's service indispensable, and his repeated recommendations did much to sustain Kildare's reputation at court. Sidney also proffered more tangible rewards, granting Kildare the extensive manor of Geashill in Offaly along with several other lesser leases. No sign of discontent was expressed by either side during Sidney's first tour of duty, and when Sidney departed for England in July 1567, Kildare accompanied him to court. The two men also returned to Ireland in August 1568, and a bill granting Kildare's long desired suit for the restoration in blood of his house, was included in the deputy's parliamentary programme. The bill, which became an act in 1569, guaranteed the descent of the earldom to the nearest eligible Geraldine heir, regardless of the conduct of the current incumbent and his immediate family. It was an act of faith in the future loyalty of the house of Kildare, and as if to confirm its confidence, Kildare rendered Sidney valuable service in the Munster rebellion of 1569-71.

But from the beginning the Geraldine alliance with Sidney was faulty. Sidney's own struggle for office made his character references dubious. His recommendation of Kildare's suits never
carried the same confidence which Sussex's prestige had brought to Ormond's, and as a result the favours he won for Kildare were flawed. His request to have the earl raised to the order of Garter was refused. Kildare's land suits were rigorously examined and qualified. In spite of Sidney's eulogies, damaging allegations about the earl's personal abuse of his official powers were received and entertained at court. Even the act of 1569 was soured by reservations. It was not after all, a complete restoration of the status quo ante 1537. The act of attainder passed in that year remained unrepealed; it had simply been superseded by a further act of parliament which could be reversed in the normal way. By the close of Sidney's second period in Ireland, then, it is not surprising that a strain in relations between the deputy and the earl was beginning to become apparent. By then, Kildare had become less active in the government and less willing to deal directly with Sidney in his private affairs. Kildare's withdrawal, however, was not simply a matter of aristocratic pique, a symptom of his annoyance with Sidney's inadequate munificence; for the deputy was a disappointing ally in a much more positive way.

Despite his early willingness to distribute political and social patronage to his Irish allies in the traditional manner, Sidney himself had grown cold. His references to Kildare's service, his recommendations for the earl's reward grew more rare as the demands of the programme he had presented in England increased. Sidney's second heterogeneous programme of government did not pose such an immediate danger to Kildare as it did to Ormond, but its long term implications were almost equally alarming. The deputy's willingness to give prior consideration to the claims
of a number of adventurers who came to Ireland to seek their fortune constituted a serious challenge to Geraldine influence with the governor. His justification of claims such as Carew's on strictly legal grounds, implied a willingness to expose his friends as well as his foes to similar dangers in the future. But most immediately alarming to Sidney's Irish friends was the ease with which he was prepared to abandon them altogether once he had decided that his programme was a failure. Though he made a strenuous effort on the point of his departure to assure his friends that he would continue to use his influence on their behalf when he had returned to England, nothing was so indicative to the Geraldines of Sidney's fundamental indifference to their cause than his willingness to surrender the government into the hands of the Butler partisan, Sir William Fitzwilliam.

Sidney's assent to his replacement by a viceroy from whom Kildare could expect little favour convinced the earl of the futility of the factional game which had hitherto consumed so much of his energy. Disillusioned, Kildare determined in the early 1570s "to make my own way". He grew introvert, devoting his time to more covert and more dubious means of consolidating his power within his locality. His new strategy was launched with an ominous sign. Some time in 1571 he removed from his comfortable residence at Maynooth to occupy more spartan quarters in his castles at Rathangan and Kilkea. He undertook extensive renovations at Kilkea. In the main hall of the castle he built a large and imposing fireplace and on it had inscribed the old feudal war-cry of the Geraldines, "Cromaboo". Kildare was intent upon more than defiant gestures. Though deprived of the right to enjoy "coyne and livery" in his own lordship, he converted a group of landless
mercenary drawn from the gaelicised Keatings whom he had been
given authority over for government service, into a small private
army of his own. The earl also used his official dealings with
the O'Byrnes, the O'Mores and the O'Conors to strengthen his own
personal ties with their respective chieftains. Hugh Mac Shane
O'Byrne and Rory Oge O'More, the chief scourages of the Pale, paid
frequent visits to Kildare, and tailored their activities to his
interests. Kildare used these means to strengthen his authority in
Leinster through sheer intimidation. Clansmen who refused the
earl's good-lordship were visited by raids perpetrated by his out-
law bands, those who accepted it were left unharmed. Similar tactics
were employed against the earl's tenant's in Co. Kildare, many of
whom were Palesmen who had settled in the region during the
Geraldine exile. Since his return they had lived in constant
tension with Kildare, and it was they who supplied the most
damaging material to the earl's detractors during the struggles
of the 1560s. The earl was anxious to guard against the recurrence
of such subversion, and he planned to use his kerne to intimidate
his tenants into acquiescence.

It was one of these Pale settlers, John Alen, a nephew of the
late lord chancellor who had come to inherit his manor at St.
Wolstan's, who drew the attention of the Dublin administration to
the earl's proceedings early in 1574. This time, however, the
Palesmen's allegations were more serious than ever, more serious
even than the evidence they produced could justify. Kildare's
actions, no doubt, were highly illegal, but they were hardly
directed at the overthrow of the central government. The earl's
concern was purely local; he sought to gain privately the provincial
power and influence which had been denied to him through public
office. Alen's charges were much more extreme. The earl, he asserted, was intent on nothing less than the subversion of the entire commonwealth. He was surrounded by a group of papist traitors who assured him of foreign aid should he rise out against the queen, and his clansmen awaited impatiently the rebellion in which Kildare "would kill all the English churls or drive them to the sea". On receipt of such grave allegations Elizabeth and her council ordered Kildare's immediate arrest and his transmission to London for further examination. Between September 1575 and December 1576, Kildare and the several witnesses named in Alen's case were questioned about a lengthy list of formal charges made against the earl. A number of witnesses, including Kildare's chief steward and his attorney, were held under arrest, and for a time the earl's position looked extremely serious. Nothing was revealed, however, either by Kildare or by the numerous witnesses, to substantiate Alen's most serious allegations, and so the council at length decided to let the enquiry drop. Some influential friends at court, moreover, seemed to have intervened on his behalf, for in September 1575 he attended court in the company of Leicester's close associate Sir Nicholas Bacon, and was graciously received. He returned to Ireland in 1578.

Kildare survived, like Ormond, largely through the crown's continuing tolerance of the moderate illegalities of its nobility. Yet the fact that the leading peer of the realm could readily be brought so near to destruction was a telling commentary on the weakness of the Geraldine group and the futility of Kildare's policy of local retrenchment. The entire affair left the earl in a distressing position. He was, on the one hand, without sufficient favour or credit at court which would allow him to
exert a significant political influence in Ireland in an official and peaceful fashion. But, on the other hand, it was now clear that it would be impossible for him to establish such an influence through any informal or extra-legal way. Deserted by former friends who no longer had an interest in the factional rivalries which had brought him to favour before, surrounded by enemies who would make the most of any indiscretions, Kildare seemed destined for political impotence. There were, however, some consolations within this gloomy picture. If the earl would relapse into a pliant and unassertive role, he could expect to end his days peacefully and to bequeath his title and his lands to his successor. For the queen had made it clear that she did not seek his ruin. Again, such a withdrawal from active political life would not necessarily prove disastrous to the earl's local position. His local enemies had not the capability of destroying him by their own independent efforts, and the kerne whom he was now to abandon could do him little hurt either. These were shabby consolations for an earl of Kildare. But they were not negligible: his cousin in Desmond, who had tasted of Sidney's disillusion in an even more bitter draught, was without them both.

For the Desmond Geraldines the realisation of Sidney's limited commitment to their welfare, came early and suddenly. The collapse of Sidney's attempt to install a sympathetic president in Munster, his forced arrest of Desmond himself and his failure to maintain Desmond's brother, John, in a position of official authority in the lordship were damning admissions of the deputy's inability to help his friends when they needed him most. They were a clear sign that the factional alliance with the Dudley in which they had invested so much was ultimately worthless. The
Desmond Geraldines were now allyless, defenceless against the attacks which might be made upon them by their numerous local enemies and by the Butlers in particular. The effect of this reversal upon Desmond himself was devastating. His apparent betrayal and his subsequent seven years imprisonment rendered the already psychologically unstable earl deeply mistrustful of the crown's intentions. It led him to exaggerate the nature of the challenge which the government presented, to see hidden threats even when none were made to him. It left him incapable of thinking and acting coolly in his own interests as a peer of the realm. 79

But the impact of Sidney's desertion extended far beyond its effect upon the personality of the earl. The exposure of the Geraldines' friendlessness gave a wonderful encouragement to their subordinates and to their independent enemies to improve their own standing within the province at the expense of the house of Desmond. Sir Maurice Fitzgerald of the Decies, Sir Cormac MacCarthy of Muskerry and the Lords Barry and Roche successfully renounced all obligations to the Desmond lordship and their autonomy was recognised by the government. 80 Lesser tenants of the earl manifested their independence in a less demonstrative but hardly less effective way: during his years of imprisonment, Desmond's revenues plummetted. 81 More serious, however, than Desmond's loss of mastery over his underlings and enemies was his loss of authority over his own adherents. In his absence and in the absence of his brother, the mantle of leadership within the lordship devolved upon the chief professional military retainer of the Geraldines, James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald. Fitzmaurice asserted his undisputed authority over the stricken Geraldines by the simple
evocation of \textit{la patrie en danger}. The fate of the earl, he claimed, was the inevitable result of Desmond's weakness and his naive acquiescence in the aggressive encroachments of the English government. The only way in which the Geraldines could now preserve their country was through an all out attack upon the English and their supporters in Munster. With this appeal, Fitzmaurice marshalled sufficient support amongst the Geraldines to plunge Munster into a rebellion that was at first spectacularly successful and even on the point of its suppression continued to enjoy the sympathy of the non-combatant population. Moreover, despite the ruthlessness of the government's campaign, Fitzmaurice not only survived, but actually enhanced his prestige within the province. President Perrot, who had great confidence in Fitzmaurice's future, pronounced him to be "a second St. Paul", and believed he would be a great influence in establishing the authority of English law and order in the province.\footnote{82}

But Fitzmaurice was not to be reconciled. He had established his immense personal authority only by leading the Geraldines to the point of the most radical opposition to English government in general. By attacking Sir Warham St. Leger's farm at Kerricurrihy and the farms of neighbouring Englishmen, he renounced any further intention of courting English allies. His religious demonstrations outside Youghal, his public appeals for foreign intervention and his ostentatious resumption of old feudal and even Gaelic practices were all eloquent declarations of his intent to have no further truck with the gradualist processes of integration which the Geraldines had been subjected to under the rule of the last two earls.\footnote{83}
Thus when Desmond was at last returned to Ireland in 1574, he found himself in a position of acute difficulty. Though he was genuinely anxious to reach a permanent accommodation with the crown which would save him from a recurrence of the events of 1566, it was none the less imperative for him to re-establish his authority over the discontented elements of his sprawling lordship. Yet since it was Fitzmaurice who in the intervening years had determined the mode by which the assertion of traditional Geraldine authority should be made, the earl had little choice but to upstage his cousin in spectacular displays of feudal independence. Desmond's dilemma became apparent immediately upon his return home. On being presented by Fitzwilliam with a set of conditions designed to guarantee his future conformity, the earl turned stubborn. He refused to commit himself to anything further than the promises of good behaviour which he had made in England, and when Fitzwilliam attempted to coerce him, he escaped from Dublin and renounced all obedience to the deputy. His defiance of Fitzwilliam was accompanied by all the trappings of a traditional Anglo-Norman revolt. He and his countess donned Gaelic costume. Government-occupied castles were retaken, and Englishmen captured within them were paraded around the lordship. But there was, as government officials noted, a marked contrast between Desmond's public braggadocio and the appeasing and often obsequious tone of his communications to the council in Dublin. For all his bluster Desmond had killed not a single Englishman, nor had he engaged in any actions that might reasonably be construed as treasonable. The earl's apparently incongruous behaviour is easy enough to interpret. Bereft of any dependable English allies, compelled to rely on violent and radical supporters as the only
means of re-establishing his power in Munster. He was trying, not very successfully, to play both sides against the middle.

In the event, Desmond was rescued from his difficulties by no clever stratagem of his own, but by the liberal toleration of the crown. Though Desmond had defied Fitzwilliam and violated his obligations to the queen herself, Elizabeth and her councillors were anxious to ensure that Desmond was not forced into desperate action through other men's malice. Suspicious of Fitzwilliam's well-known animosity and Perrot's newly expressed jealousy towards the returned earl, Elizabeth moved now to correct the balance in Desmond's favour, as she had once altered it greatly to his detriment in 1566. Thus the Geraldine allegation that Desmond had been unfairly treated by Fitzwilliam was received with a sympathy similar to that with which Ormond's charges against Sidney had been heard. Fitzwilliam was restrained from acting against the earl, and, consecutively, Sir Edward Fitzgerald, Kildare's brother and an influential courtier in his own right, the earl of Essex and Kildare himself were sent to convince Desmond of the crown's sincere intentions towards him. In the end they persuaded him to submit to Fitzwilliam. 85

Desmond's salvation at the point of his destruction served at least to show that, as in the case of Kildare, the crown was not bent upon his ruin and was indeed willing to allow him a generous room for manoeuvre. But Elizabeth's concern for Geraldine welfare was predicated on nothing more positive than a conservative impulse to maintain a balance between traditional factional rivals, and extended to nothing further than a preventive and moderating intervention when a crisis seemed to have arisen. It did not imply that a policy generally favourable to the Geraldine interest would
henceforth be adopted by the government, nor that a governor would be specially chosen because of his friendship for them. In matters of policy the old priorities of economy and efficiency continued to prevail. Thus when Sidney returned to Ireland in 1575, he came not as a friend of the Geraldines, but as a man with a general programme of reform which promised to meet all the requirements of the crown.

Sidney, in fact, was willing enough to be personally sympathetic to Desmond and on his tour of Munster early in 1576, declared himself to be fully satisfied with the earl's demeanour. He also took some practical precautions to bolster Desmond's local position. Desmond was now included upon the new presidential council while his old opponents, the earls of Thomond and Clancar, who had occupied positions under Perrot were removed. The bishops of Waterford, Cork and Limerick were also dropped while the only ecclesiastic to be retained, the archbishop of Cashel, was known to be sympathetic to the earl. Three of the six lay councillors nominated had some personal connection with Desmond. But Sidney's new programme left little room for personal favouritism. He was determined to extract a satisfactory composition from the province, and he was not about to allow Desmond's fragile loyalty to prevent him from doing so with all speed. He was, moreover, no longer concerned about the selection of a suitable candidate for the office of president. The choice was left with Walsingham, and the man sent, Sir William Drury, had no previous experience of Ireland, no connection with the Geraldines, and was certainly no friend of the earl of Leicester. But Sidney accepted him gladly none the less.
Though it entailed genuine advantages for Desmond both financially and politically, the plan of composition in the short term tended only to recreate the critical circumstances from which Desmond had only barely escaped in 1574. The presence of a new and unfriendly president who was attempting to extract an entirely new and arbitrary tax from the province by means of intimidation posed a serious challenge to the earl's shaky local prestige. Drury's forceful proceedings inevitably provoked a fierce opposition, and Desmond was compelled to place himself at its head.

Within months of Drury's arrival relations between the president and the earl had become seriously strained. Desmond joined in the general refusal to yield Drury his supplies, and he wrote to the privy council representing the province's grievances against the president. Tension between the two powers continued to mount, and when Drury held sessions within the earl's palatine liberty at Tralee in July 1577, Desmond was within an ace of coming into open conflict with the president. Gradually, however, Drury's appreciation of the gravity of the situation and Desmond's of the personal benefits that would accrue to him under Sidney's scheme began to exercise a moderating influence. In January 1578, under Sidney's auspices, the earl and the president were formally reconciled, and thereafter, relations between the two improved greatly. By the time Drury succeeded Sidney as governor, he was on terms of genuine friendship with the earl. From Drury, Desmond received more praise and more recommendations for reward than he had ever enjoyed from Sidney, and the earl responded to such encouragement enthusiastically: by the end of the year he had assented to the commutation of all his rents and services into a fixed cash rental of £2,000 p.a.
But the composition scheme which seemed to reunite Desmond to the crown under the good offices of his new found ally in government did little to heal deeper scars inflicted by the Geraldines' factional defeat. Instead, Desmond's personal salvation through the plan of composition tended only to make things worse. The new plan brought no comfort to Desmond's old opponents who had benefitted so much from his years in eclipse. To some, who were now compelled to pay a commuted rent which they had renounced, it amounted to little less than a betrayal on the part of the government of their long-expressed aspirations for autonomy. To those who were forced to pay a novel rent to the crown, it was a substantial material burden. To all who were confronted with the prospect of a gloomy future under the shadow of the newly rehabilitated and stabilised house of Desmond, it constituted a disastrous political reversal. But to Desmond's former friends, to old feudal retainers like Fitzmaurice, whose position within the lordship had been greatly strengthened by Desmond's estrangement from the crown, the new reconciliation spelled an immediate loss of status. Fitzmaurice read the signs early. Disillusioned by Desmond's unwillingness to continue in radical opposition to the crown, he and his lieutenants took sail for France early in 1576, there to seek aid for the renewal of his holy war. For the majority of the swordsmen who remained, however, there was no choice but to turn their hands to the plough, or to run the risk of being cut down as mere vagrants by the president or even by the earl himself. They looked sullenly for Fitzmaurcie's return.

The disenchantment both of Desmond's enemies and his friends with the new settlement was uniquely experienced by the earl's own brother, Sir John. Even as they abandoned Desmond under intense
Pressure from the crown, Sidney and the Leicester group had continued to hold out much hope for Sir John. Sir John was more intelligent, more stable, more adaptable than his elder brother. In the light of Desmond's sheer incorrigibility, it seemed obvious that the future of the Geraldines lay in the hands of Sir John. Thus it was Sir John whom Sidney wished to leave as commissioner in Munster after his arrest of Desmond; Sir John, who was to lead St. Leger in his colonisation project in Munster; Sir John who was to be returned to Munster in place of the earl in the early 1570s. Sidney at all times spoke well of Sir John. He made light of his reckless conduct and even secured an early release for Sir John from jail when his treasonable dealings with the Mac an Iarlas had landed him there in 1576. Even in 1583, Sidney regarded the government's failure to co-opt Sir John as a servant of the crown as one of the greatest blunders of the reign.

But for all their good-will, Sidney and his associates achieved little of substance for Sir John. The pretensions, the plots, the ambitions they stirred within him came all in the end to nothing, and in the mid-1570s John was confronted by the growing realisation that the great promise which his early career had shown would never be fulfilled. His half-idiot elder brother seemed actually to have muddled through. And as Desmond's male heir grew steadily into a healthy boyhood, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Sir John would ever again be permitted a significant role in the governance of the lordship. But Desmond's success meant more than the failure of his brother's future hopes, the record of his past infidelities to the earl's cause returned immediately to plague him. Sir John found himself excluded from the councils and the favour of the earl; he was even lucky to be
allowed the small piece of property which Elizabeth had secured for him within the lordship. It was at this time, therefore, that, like that other botched career of Sidney's administration, Thomas Stucley, Sir John changed sides unequivocally. He began to intrigue with the Burkes in Clanrickard and to communicate with Fitzmaurice in France. He made serious efforts to detach his younger brother, Sir James, from the earl and to arouse opposition to the earl amongst the Geraldines. But the progress of detente between Desmond and Drury made such a radical reaction seem increasingly futile. By the end of 1578 Sir John could do little more than wait like the old swordsmen for Fitzmaurice to return.

(iv)

In 1579 the forces that had been gathering about him exploded under Desmond's thinly-laid crust of stability and engulfed his house. In July Fitzmaurice returned with a small expeditionary force proclaiming holy war. The swordsmen of the lordship rallied to him, and almost immediately Desmond was left militarily powerless. By September he could count on little more than his own household staff. In the meantime, Desmond's old enemies did nothing. Some, like Clancar and Lord Barry, secretly encouraged the rebels, others, like Mac Carthy of Muskerry, merely allowed them safe passage through their territories. None lifted a finger to support Desmond against them. In August Sir John acted. On the night of the second, he and Sir James murdered Sir Henry Davells, the English official who had been sent to liase with Desmond. Their act at once committed them irrevocably to rebellion and cut short the policy of ambiguous inaction by which Desmond
hoped that, as in 1574, he might yet regain control of the situation. Jubilant rebels and outraged government officials now demanded that the earl act decisively, and as the Desmond's room for manoeuvre thus narrowed precipitately, one further factor intervened to close the trap on him altogether. In September fatal illness forced Drury, who had long extended a patient tolerance to the earl's indecision, to resign responsibility for the crisis in Munster to Sir Nicholas Malby. Malby did not share Drury's disposition. He showed little understanding of, or sympathy with, the delicacy of Desmond's situation. He wrote to the earl, demanding that he immediately reconnoitre the government forces for joint action against the rebels. He invaded the lordship billeting his troops upon Desmond's tenants and treating the inhabitants as potential rebels. Desmond reacted sharply against this coercion. He refused to join Malby or even to talk with him. Malby's last messenger was greeted by a musket shot from Desmond's chief house at Askeaton.

Malby's tactics, however, were not simply a matter of personality. His haste to force Desmond to extremity was motivated by the same considerations by which Sidney had inadvertently driven the Geraldines to desperation before: Malby had a programme. He aimed to introduce in Munster the same ruthless military rule by which he was now successfully establishing his authority in Connaught. He had succeeded so well in Connaught because of the absence of the earl of Clanrickard, he needed to be rid of the earl of Desmond for his plan to work in Munster. His aim, in fact, amounted to nothing less than the establishment of a semi-autonomous military government in the entire west of Ireland. He offered to take responsibility for the maintenance of order and security in
the region, and in return sought to have all its composition
revenues paid directly to him. It was with these ambitions in
mind that Malby marched into Desmond, sought to represent
the earl as a covert rebel, and, at length, secured the earl's
proclamation as a rebel on November 2nd. His actions made a
fitting conclusion to the twenty years suffering of the
Geraldines at the hands of governors whose programmatic commitments
took precedence over all other considerations.

The crisis of the Desmond rebellion irrevocably altered the
political disposition of the remaining Anglo-Norman houses; almost
at once it changed decisively both the way in which they related to
the central government and the way in which they related to one
another. It was in almost every case a change for the worst.
Ironically, only for the weakest of their number did it bring some
benefit.

For the Clanrickard Burkes, the insurrection of the Geraldines
brought a sudden and unexpected relief. Hard pressed by the
ruthless Malby during the winter of 1578-9, the Mac an Iarlas, who
had for long teetered on the edge of total extinction, found them-
selves the objects of much more conciliatory overtures from their
governor once Desmond had been proclaimed. The fear that contagion
from Munster would rapidly undermine the position of influence he
had only recently created for himself in the province forced Malby
to abandon the uncompromising attitude which he had hitherto
adopted towards the rebels. He began to play fast and loose with
the earl's sons, exploiting their mutual suspicions and their common
desire to be pardoned for their rebellion. His anxiety to shore up
his own position led him to recommend that both be received to
mercy on generous terms and eventually to request that the old
earl himself be released from his enforced exile so that he might re-establish order within his lordship. When Clanrickard finally returned to Connaught in 1582, Malby extended a cautious welcome to him, and when the earl died in April 1583, Malby hastened to extend recognition to his eldest son, Ulick, as the earl's legitimate successor. Under Ulick Burke, the Clanrickards were brought at last to peace.

But the impact of the Munster conflagration upon the Burkes, was somewhat more complex. Their cessation from rebellion did not entail the revival of their old relationship with the crown, or with the administration in Dublin: still less did it imply the independent reconstruction of their factional alliance with the Butlers. They had been rehabilitated, rather, in a most specific manner. Established and sustained by a man anxious to preserve his own position as a quasi-autonomous governor and tax-collector within the province, their new legitimacy was founded not upon their willingness to serve the general interests of the government, but upon their responsiveness to the will of Sir Nicholas Malby. In peace as in war, then, the province of Connaught remained in the early 1580s as independent of the control of the central administration as it had been thirty years before. Sussex's hopes that the house of Clanrickard would provide the basis of stable and loyal governance in the province had never materialised. Instead, through his own inability to sustain them and his successor's equal inability either to subdue or to destroy them, the Clanrickards had survived within a new hybrid regime over which the central government had no control.
Desmond's rebellion saved the Burkes, at least, and allowed them to regain a significant provincial influence which had well-nigh been lost. But it brought no similar consolation to the other great houses. The proclamation of his traditional factional rival and his own appointment as military governor in Munster in December 1579 may appear to have fulfilled one of the earl of Ormond's deepest ambitions. But the circumstances of his apparent triumph were very different from those of his old feudal conflicts with the Geraldines in times past. For Ormond, too, had had his own vulnerabilities exposed in the previous decade. He had not destroyed Sidney in 1578 any more than he had ruined him in 1571. In both cases, Sidney's failure had been an intrinsic one brought on by the over-arching claims of his own programme rather than by the extraneous strength of his enemies. Despite his lack of positive achievement he had at least shown that a governor's independence of, or opposition to, the Butlers was not necessarily fatal. Thus the men who succeeded the deputy after 1578 did not hasten to make their peace with Ormond. Some, like Lord Justice Drury, explored the possibility of greater cooperation with the Geraldines, but others, like Malby, attempted to carve out for themselves a special place within the factional structure and still others, like the newly appointed vice treasurer; Sir Henry Wallop, the new Secretary, Geoffrey Fenton, and the influential privy councillor, Sir Edward Waterhouse, attempted to establish a position independent of and inimical to all factions. None of these tendencies were pleasing to Ormond, and the latter two were greatly accelerated by the crisis provoked by Desmond's rebellion.
Ormond, therefore, took no joy in Desmond's misfortunes. He attempted at first to rescue the earl from the brink, and when Desmond was irretrievable, he sought again, as he had done in the early 1570s, to bring the rebellion to an early and relatively bloodless close. But now the earl's position was immeasurably more difficult. His strategy was deeply suspected by the new viceroy, Lord Grey, and by the new administrators, Wallop, Fenton and Waterhouse. As the rebellion persisted unabated, their hostility towards the earl mounted. By the middle of 1580 they had launched a campaign to unseat them. They set about breaking his general political influence in Ireland by bombarding his friends with hostile criticism and receiving his known enemies, like Sir Barnaby Fitzpatrick, to favour. They encouraged his military subordinates to behave contumaciously: when Thomas Masterson, the seneschal of Wexford, ambushed and killed a group of the Kavanaghs who had been received under Ormond's protection, he was protected by the council against the earl's demands for retribution. They charged him with inaction and alleged that he had prolonged the campaign unnecessarily by showing too much clemency to those in rebellion. The campaign of vilification continued until, in the late spring of 1581, bolstered by Ormond's failure to end the rebellion, their demands were at last acceded to at Westminster and Ormond was removed from his post.

Ormond, however, fought back. He accepted his dismissal gracefully, answered the most serious of the allegations made against him, and refused to enter into recriminations. His reputation recovered steadily as his successors in Munster failed to produce any better results, and in January 1583 he was reappointed governor in time to preside over the end of Geraldine
resistance. But despite his apparent success, his recovery was far from complete. The group who had sought his disgrace had been temporarily discomfited, but they remained a formidable threat to the earl, their ability to influence the routine decisions of government largely undamaged, their profound hostility towards Ormond undiminished.

Quite as important as these ominous forebodings for the future were the more general lessons which the Butlers had absorbed from the recent past. Having been induced to identify their interests with those of the state, they were repeatedly forced to acquiesce in the appointment of governors who were either overtly or tacitly inimical to them and who had made successive gains against them. A gap appeared between their loyalist pretensions and the practical implications of obedience to the representative of the crown which increasingly produced an uncomfortable dislocation at the top of the group and an even more dangerous instability within its lower branches. The events of the 1560s and 1570s, in sum, tended to cast doubt upon the Butlers' conventional assumption that they were the natural allies or the ancillary instruments of the royal administration in Ireland. And with the power of their old factional rivals, whose very enmity had lent credence to the claims to a superior loyalty, now forever broken, they survived into the 1580s to confront a new opposition, centred on Dublin, with sources of power and influence far more challenging than any presented by the Geraldines.

Kildare's experience during the crisis of 1579-83 was even worse, though at its beginning he seemed poised to profit from it under the patronage of Lord Justice Drury. Like Desmond, Kildare had also enjoyed a brief return to power and influence under Drury.
He had smoothed Drury's difficulties with the community of the Pale, and after that became a close counsellor of the justice. When Fitzmaurice landed, Kildare travelled to Munster with Drury and made a good impression, making no "show to pity name or kindred in the cause". Drury appointed him to guard the Pale with a force of over 600 men. But Drury's death precipitated a serious decline in Kildare's credit in Dublin. Grey, Wallop, Waterhouse and Fenton, the same group who had attacked Ormond, turned their attention early to Kildare and applied the very same tactics in their attempt to displace him. He was treated contumaciously. His opposition to the appointment of Robert Dillon, a member of a family traditionally hostile to the Kildares, as chief justice of the common pleas was ignored. His military subordinate, Henry Harrington, seized one of Kildare's retainers in one of Kildare's own houses and hanged him summarily as a felon without reproof. More seriously, a subtle campaign of detraction was mounted against the earl's capabilities of a military commander. Treasurer Wallop and Secretary complained frequently of Kildare's inaction. Wallop charged him with profiteering and with deliberate idleness, and Sir William Gerrard echoed his allegations. Kildare was clearly unnerved by the slanders. "I find such impediments here to bring my device to fruition", he complained to Walsingham, "maintained by some who disdain my charge and cannot broach to have anything prosper ... wherein I have to deal." "All you Englishmen are joined in one", he was reported to have exclaimed in anger, "and an Irishman can have no right or justice at your hands". It was under these pressures that Kildare looked to the Baltinglas conspiracy as a means of upstaging his opponents within the administration.
The Baltinglas conspiracy was not the first sign of a grand Geraldine alliance to come to the aid of the Desmonds. It was almost wholly the initiative of the Viscount Baltinglas himself, and of a few of his friends amongst the Nugents of Westmeath. Their motives were almost entirely religious: Baltinglas, who had had the benefit of a continental education, had already been in trouble with the government due to an extravagant display of recusancy, and his closest followers were themselves committed to the re-establishment of the old religion. But the plot inevitably acquired some secular ramifications. The O'Byrnes took opportunity of this latest stir to resume their favourite occupation of harassing the borders of the Pale. William Nugent, brother of Baron Delvin, joined in the hope of persuading his brother to assume a more aggressive attitude towards the demands of the government, and several of the bastard Geraldines attached themselves to Baltinglas to exert a similar influence upon Kildare. These were not inconsiderable pressures and there is no doubt that the earl felt it necessary to respond to them, but there was never any real chance that Kildare would join Baltinglas in rebellion. Subsequent investigation failed to unearth any evidence of collusion on the earl's part, and it is probable that his characterisation of Baltinglas as "a simple man without wisdom, judgement or any other qualification meet to embrace such an enterprise" expressed his true opinion. Even the Dublin government came to accept that Kildare had never any intention of aiding Baltinglas; Wallop finally concluded that he had encouraged the viscount simply for the opportunity of acquiring his lands. Wallop, perhaps, was over-cynical, but it is clear none the less that Baltinglas's enterprise offered Kildare a unique opportunity to overcome his increasing difficulties.
Since the outbreak of the Desmond rebellion, rumours of a major rising in the Pale had become rife in Dublin. Wallop and Secretary Fenton were convinced of its imminence and even experienced observers like Malby and Viscount Gormanston, thought it probable. "Religion will carry men very far", wrote the latter, "and how men are that way determined is not unknown". In July 1580, as the atmosphere within the administration came close to panic, Kildare moved to exploit his foreknowledge of the plans of Baltinglas and his small band of desperadoes. On the evening of the 4th, while on a routine patrol of the border of the Pale, he approached his fellow commissioner, Archbishop Loftus, in an exceedingly melodramatic manner: "My lord I can tell you news. The Viscount Baltinglas with many other papists here are conspired together and intend presently to rebel. The first exploit they will do is to kill you and me, you for the evil they bear to your religion and me for that I being taken away then ... here is no one that can make head against them". Kildare then counselled the archbishop to remain silent until the earl himself had fully investigated the affair and reported once more. Why he should have in the first place disclosed such terrifying news and then sought to have persuaded Loftus from taking any immediate action upon it may seem strange, but Kildare's true motivation is to be found in the last phrase quoted. The earl was simply anxious to assert his crucial importance as a protector of the Pale and as a moderator of the Palesmen. He merely wished to rehearse, that is, the role which he had constantly sought to play in the politics of the Pale and of which the administrators were currently attempting to deprive him. That the actual conspiracy was by no means as substantial as Kildare sought to portray it, was only a further reason why he should have attempted to delay the
government's response: he needed time to allow the conspiracy to gather momentum and to allow the full impact of his revelations to take effect at Dublin. The earl would thereby have retained the initiative, and either by suppressing or defusing the rebellion would be in a position to claim the entire credit for himself. His critics would be silenced, and he would win the position of high political influence he had long craved and had almost attained under Drury.

In the upshot, however, the whole plan misfired. Loftus was suspicious of such an extraordinary overture, and his suspicions deepened when he learned soon after that the earl and the viscount had been in secret communication some time before Kildare's revelation. Thus Kildare's carefully contrived melodrama degenerated into farce. The government began to collect substantial evidence concerning the earl's awareness of the conspirators' preparations, and in little more than a month after his words with Loftus, Kildare was relieved of his duties, arrested and sent to England to await trial in the Tower. He remained there until released through clemency in 1585, the year of his death.

Kildare's was a strangely misconceived and clumsily executed plan. Yet his willingness to go to such lengths is a measure of the desperate position which he believed himself to occupy. Like Sir John of Desmond, he too, after years of cooperation and collusion with one governmental group, had found himself without any secure access to power. Sidney who had used him, had proved incapable of rewarding him. Thus deprived of the chief means by which he hoped to establish the political influence of his house, Kildare had drifted from a sullen and dangerous introversion to a promiscuous dependence upon whoever would patronise him until
finally he was reduced to this ultimate claim to attention. He was yet another of the loose ends of the programmatic governors, exploited and finally alienated because they lacked the capacity either to treat him with impartiality or to reward him for the special services they had once expected of him.

(v)

By the end of the Desmond rebellion each of the great Anglo-Norman houses had been fatally alienated from the government of their sovereign liege. There had been no winners in this grand factional competition, only losers to a greater or lesser degree. The Geraldines had come off worst. The house of Desmond was destroyed forever, the house of Kildare was in deep disgrace. The Butler connection with its initial advantages, suffered less. But the Butlers themselves had had their confidence in the royal government deeply shaken and were now openly hostile towards those who held permanent positions within the Dublin administration. While the Burkes, under the tutelage of their provincial governor, were now entirely indifferent to the concerns of Dublin. The cumulative effect of all these individual experiences was to render obsolete the key factor which had traditionally governed relations between the great houses. Ties of family, clientage and faction continued, of course, to motivate the Butlers and the surviving Geraldines, but since the possibility of winning a dominant influence over the instruments of government was no longer available to either side, the urgency of their factional rivalry was greatly abated. There was no positive incentive for rivalry; and increasingly, as they faced a mutual threat from an impervious
Dublin administration, both sides were possessed of strong negative reasons for assuming a common sense of identity.

This emerging reconfiguration of the Anglo-Normans was a unique, if wholly inadvertent, product of the policies of Sussex and Sidney. By failing in their attempts either to exploit or suppress factionalism and by abandoning their attempts mid-way, leaving the factions only half-absorbed or half-subdued, they had destroyed what functional stability the factional system enjoyed and left the great houses agitated and insecure, a prey to internal contention and overt rebellion.

The administrators in Dublin in the early 1580s, however, preferred not to see the chronic rebelliousness, secret stratagems and sullen hostility with which they were confronted as the results of artificially imposed pressures. For them, these were the natural characteristics of the old feudal groups which had been obscured only by deception and naivety. The conduct of Sussex and Sidney, therefore, did not necessarily precipitate a crisis: they merely forced into the open the inherent disloyalty of the feudal lords. The magnates, it could now be plainly seen, were so addicted to the use of "coyne and livery" that they would betray their sovereign rather than abandon it. This determinist perception of the situation was immensely comforting to men in their situation. It greatly simplified the task of explaining what had gone wrong in the years after 1556: nothing had, a natural process had merely worked itself out. It exonerated the English governors from any charge of reckless provocation: Sussex and Sidney had simply brought matters to a head. Finally, it provided the new administrators with an easy guideline to follow in all future relations with the magnates: none of them were to be trusted.
Not surprisingly, such analysis became orthodox thinking in administrative circles in the 1580s. But for all its desirability it could never have been realistically sustained were it not apparently confirmed by events far closer to the immediate experience of the administrators within the Pale itself. There, the apparently least degenerate segment of the Anglo-Norman community had, despite repeated professions of its genuine loyalty, consistently opposed and undermined the representatives of the crown sent to govern them. Time and again they had defied the viceroy's instructions, slandered him and appealed to have him dismissed; and some, in the midst of the Desmond crisis, had even conspired at rebellion. When even the most English of the Anglo-Normans could act so treacherously, who in Ireland might be trusted?
CHAPTER 7

The Government and the Palesmen.

The gradual estrangement of the community of the Pale from the Dublin administration in the latter part of the sixteenth century has never been satisfactorily explained. Yet the main outlines of the process are clear enough. The Palesmen who had willingly embraced the Henrician Reformation, who had rejoiced in the constitutional changes of 1541 and whose most articulate spokesmen had repeatedly urged the planting of more Englishmen in the island, began to show serious dissatisfaction almost as soon as the effects of increased governmental activity began to make themselves felt. The earliest signs of dissent appeared in the mid-1550s when Sussex and his associates began to complain of the Palesmen's recalcitrance. But resentment became much more overt in the early 1560s when widespread opposition within the Pale was a source of severe embarrassment to the lieutenant and played a major role in the eventual collapse of his administration. Sidney encountered resistance in the late 1560s and most importantly in the late 1570s when the Palesmen's refusal to accept his composition scheme was a major factor in his downfall. In the early 1580s the conduct of Lord Grey's administration was a source of major discontent within the Pale, and at this time also, a number of Palesmen, led by the young Viscount Baltinglas carried opposition to the government to the point of plotting treason and rebellion.

This last event - Baltinglas's rising and the associated conspiracy of several young men gathered around William Nugent, the baron of Delvin's brother, has come to occupy a place of exaggerated importance in historical interpretation. There has been a tendency
to read history backwards from this point, to espy the roots of this rebellion in the events of the previous two decades and to attribute to the Palesmen as a whole, the motivations of the rebels of 1580. The impulse behind Baltinglas and most of those who followed Nugent was clear: they deeply resented the official religion of the state and were determined to reassert a new and militant catholicism in opposition to it. Here was a definite anticipation of the aggressive counter-reformation which was soon to make its appearance in Ireland. Yet the extent to which the rebels' aims were widely shared amongst the Palesmen must remain in doubt. Baltinglas and his fellow conspirators constituted but a tiny minority whose fame or notoriety was due to the radical, rather than the representative, character of their actions. They were, for the most part, the younger sons of lower gentry or merchant families who had studied at the universities or at the inns of court. Their conspiracies were hatched in England and until very late aimed at nothing more ambitious than securing the release from the Tower of the catholic archbishop of Armagh, Richard Creagh. Baltinglas’s action was precipitated by unrealistic hopes of the Desmond rebellion. It was made possible in the first place only because certain Gaelic clans in Wicklow and the Geraldine group wished to exploit it for their own interests. But it was unplanned and wholly underequipped: it was easily and ruthlessly repressed by the government. In its wake, the government executed over eighty young Palesmen, some of whom were only most loosely associated with the conspiracy. But their harsh treatment aroused little sympathy amongst their elders. Even those who were vigorous in their complaints about other aspects of Lord Deputy Grey’s conduct disassociated themselves entirely from the conspirators’ cause.
For most Palesmen, Baltinglas's reaction to the government's religious policy must have appeared to have been much too radical, for up to 1580, at any rate, the enforcement of the reformation within the Pale had been extremely lax. Though the foundations of the Elizabethan religious settlement were formally laid down in the parliament of 1560 and though the machinery of its enforcement had been established soon afterwards, very little was done to bring the changes into effect. Sussex and Sidney were both too preoccupied with the more secular aspects of their programmes to bother over-much with religion, and when they did give some attention to the problem, they appeared to believe that the country could be induced to accept the new regulations gradually, through sheer familiarity. The fact that as late as 1569 Edmund Campion, the dangerous intellectual dissident, could be lodged consecutively in the houses of the speaker and the leader of the opposition of the Irish commons under the protective eye of the viceroy, is a curious indication of the lack of urgency with which the reformation was pursued by the government. Even after Elizabeth's excommunication in 1570 the level of tension remained low. Known recusants continued to occupy high places within the administration or to enjoy the patronage of government officials. As late as 1578, James Eustace, the future Viscount Baltinglas, was excused for his ostentatious refusal to attend at public worship with no more than a rebuke from the deputy. Though there must have been some difficult and embarrassing moments for both governors and subjects during this period, the issue was not pressed sufficiently by either side to constitute a real source of antagonism.
It is possible, of course, that the rebellion was an early symptom of deeper and hitherto unexpressed currents within the Pale. It has been suggested by a number of recent historians that by the 1580s the Palesmen had become alienated from the English government for reasons that were fundamentally ideological. By retaining an outmoded humanist confidence in the efficacy of education, the Palesmen remained committed to the conciliatory and gradualist policies of the early 1540s and were, therefore, insensible to the more pessimistic and coercive social analyses which had become current in England in the meantime. Under Elizabeth they found themselves confronted with a new set of governors who had little confidence in their conciliatory prescriptions and who were convinced that the forceful uprooting of the island's institutions and inhabitants was the necessary prerequisite to the construction of the ideal society. To the Palesmen such an outlook was anathema, but the governors simply read their failure to accept this analysis as an indication of the Palesmen's own degeneracy. They began to note several unsatisfactory features within the Pale itself, and to apply their own radical solutions to them. The Palesmen responded by reaffirming their uniqueness in a more extreme form than ever. They began to see themselves as culturally distinct from the English and to look with greater sympathy towards the other native inhabitants, the Gaelic Irish, with whom they had been joined in hopeful union in 1541. Thus a new Anglo-Irish nationalism could be seen to emerge, expressed first in the continental writings of Richard Stanihurst and in the exile poetry of William Nugent and even, if in a more subtle manner, in the speech of the Palesman, Sir Nicholas Walsh, in the parliament of 1586.
Such an argument goes some way towards providing a broader intellectual context for Baltinglas's revolt. But it is beset with difficulty. The attitude of the governors in the early Elizabethan period was by no means as harsh or as radical in its intentions as the argument assumes; conversely, not every articulate Palesman was as committed to the conciliatory recommendations of renaissance humanism as is supposed. Moreover it is unlikely that many Palesmen were possessed of such acute intellectual sensitivity to their environment. Finally, the plant of separatism whose roots are deemed to have been discovered in this period was certainly a long time growing, for there exists, as Dr Clarke has amply demonstrated, a significant interpretative gap between the Anglo-Irish nationalism espied by historians in the later sixteenth century, and "the narrow sectarianism typical of old English political objectives in the early seventeenth century". 8

Few of the characteristics, indeed, of old English political agitation are to be found in the conduct of Baltinglas's group or in the intellectual currents which accompanied it. The old English were catholics, to be sure. Yet they insisted that their religious disposition was politically innocent and that it exerted no influence over their loyalty. Their assertions of loyalty were, of course, emphatic. But in practice also, the strategy to which they most commonly had recourse in defence of their interests was quite conservative. They favoured neither subversion nor violent resistance, but a direct appeal to their sovereign. Their modes of representation were also conventional: they raised petitions, delegated agents to present their case at court and submitted their grievances in a humble and most specific manner as loyal but privileged subjects of their monarch. In almost every
respect, therefore, the political disposition of the old English closely resembled the thoroughly conservative attitude that has been associated with the "country" opposition of early seventeenth century England. In every respect, that is, but their religion which, on the basis of rigorous deduction, could show them to be the most dangerous of subversives. The old English were severely embarrassed by such an analysis. They attempted to evade and to deny it, and their campaigning was in large part designed to preempt it. It is significant, however, that in their efforts to do so they resorted consistently to intellectual justifications and practical strategies that were genuinely conservative in character. They showed both in word and deed a clear awareness of their status as loyal subjects of the crown who were possessed of the right to seek redress for their grievances in the conventional manner long before the painful issue of their recusancy was forced upon them. Politically, at least, they were countrymen before they were catholic.

The roots of this country-style opposition cannot, therefore, be traced to anterior religious dissent; but neither can it be satisfactorily accounted for by a number of particular secular issues which have sometimes been suggested as alternative sources of the Palesmen's resentment. Thus the importance of the Palesmen's displacement from government office should not be overstated. After 1556, it is true, Palesmen were never again to serve as lord justice, lord chancellor, or vice-treasurer. Their representation on the council decreased and their hold over the higher offices in the exchequer and the law courts was diminished. But the process of erosion was extremely gradual: in 1541, Palesmen held just under 75% of the offices in the civil establishment; by 1556 their hold had
been reduced to 66\%, but by 1580 they still held on to over 50\%. ¹⁰ Moreover, while their general participation in the administration fell, the political influence of individual Palesmen remained strong. Sir Thomas Cusack just failed to be appointed chancellor for a second time in 1565, and he remained one of the most influential counsellors of state until his death in 1571. Chief Justice Sir John Plunket and Solicitor James Dowdall rose to prominence under Sussex and retained their authority after his departure. ¹¹ Nicholas White rose rapidly to high office under Cecil's patronage in the late 1560s and remained an extremely important figure within the administration until the 1590s. ¹² Luke Dillon became attorney general under Sidney and rose to be chief baron through the viceroy's influence in 1570. His influence in the council continued to grow throughout the 1570s and in 1581, for his service in uncovering the Nugent conspiracy, he was proposed consecutively for the posts of chancellor and lord chief justice. Dillon demurred on both occasions, but he used his influence to further the careers of his family. His cousin, Robert, was appointed chief justice of the common pleas. Another cousin, Thomas, was made chief justice in Connaught, and a third, Nathaniel, became the first Palesman to be appointed clerk of the Irish council. ¹³ The Dillons' experience was exceptional, but it was by no means unique: other Pale families like the Fitzsimons and the Barnwalls continued to enjoy access to office throughout the century. But even had the displacement been more acute, the number of Palesmen involved would not have been significant. On the far more important level of local government, new English influence was hardly felt at all. Of the seventy men known to have been sheriffs in the five shires of the Pale between 1557 and 1580, only seven were English. ¹⁴
Palesmen continued to predominate on local commissions of peace and martial law. Even the hated purveyors and subsidy collectors were native born.  

Similarly, English acquisition of private property within the Pale was not a general source of grievance. Englishmen received a greater share than the Palesmen of lands redistributed by the crown after the dissolution of the monasteries, but the disproportion was not significant and there is no evidence that it was the cause of annoyance amongst local community. On the contrary, some of the greatest speculators in monastic properties, men like Walter Peppard, John Parker and Francis Agard, were often defenders of and spokesmen for the interests of the Pale at large. The one partial exception to this generally amicable picture was Sir Peter Carew's claim to the title of lands held by Sir Christopher Cheevers in Meath in 1568. But even this dispute was quickly resolved by Sir Thomas Cusack to the satisfaction of both sides: Carew waived the claim, Cheevers kept the lands and the issue was never again raised.

The grievance which stirred the Palesmen to such general and such frequent displays of discontent with the government as the century wore on was much more pervasive, much more oppressive and much less remediable than any considered so far: increasingly, the Palesmen became estranged from the government they had once welcomed because of the sheer material burden which the maintenance of that government imposed upon them. More than faith or ideas, more than competition for land or for office, it was this practical and fundamentally economic resentment which inspired every agitation against the government organised within the Pale until 1580. When the Palesmen complained against Sussex in the 1550s and 1560s, it was not because they opposed his policy towards Shane
O'Neill, but because they deeply disliked the demands which he made upon them in order to carry it out. When they rejected Sidney's composition plan, it was not because they wished to destroy his government, but because they were opposed to the idea of allowing the government a permanent and non-parliamentary tax over themselves and their posterity. When they defied Lord Deputy Grey, it was not because they supported Fitzmaurice and the pope, but because they abhorred his attempt to make them bear the brunt of the costs of the war.

The Palesmen's complaint with the cost of sustaining an enlarged administrative establishment was not only the chief source of their opposition to the government, it was also the key factor in their own interpretation of recent history. It was, if so grandiose a term might be applied, a formative element of their ideology. Thus, when Palesmen came to assess the significance of the viceroyalty of the earl of Surrey, it was not his contribution towards the formulation of an official Irish policy that they chose to emphasise, but his lenience: "He ... rendered to all men whom he charged or bought anything of, rather above the market than equal or under it ... He would say often that he would eat grasses and drink water rather than be at a banquet with the heavy heart and curse of the poor". In the same way, St. Leger was remembered not as the architect of surrender and regrant, but as a man "very well liked, were it not that in his time he began to assess the Pale with certain new impositions, not so profitable (as it was thought) to the governor as it was noysome to the subjects". A comparative nonentity like Sir Francis Brian, on the other hand, was, according to Campion's account, "praised over all his predecessors and successors within memory" because he was "very zealous and
The warlike Sir Edward Bellingham was beloved as "a true payer of all men (who) never took anything but what he paid for". But the equally energetic Sussex "was so evil beloved with those of the realm (because) he so used them without pay, for there was such cesses ... with other great charges, impositions which sore charged the country". Sir Nicholas Arnold was held to have resided "too short a while" as lord justice because of "his upright and reasonable provision of his household cares". But Sir Henry Sidney, who was once immensely popular with the Palesmen, aroused their increasing antagonism "because he was not behind in cesses and did not ... relieve the poor commons' charge, but as his predecessors did ... so did he continue ... which made waste of a great part of the English Pale".

Though it has often been noted by historians this chronic grievance over what the Palesmen termed collectively as "the cess" has never been systematically examined. Yet it is of central importance to an assessment of the Palesmen's true disposition towards the government to know just how burdensome the cess actually was, whether it could be truly related to the conduct of specific governors and whether it was sufficiently severe to justify the defiance with which the Palesmen as a whole opposed a government to whose sovereign authority they yet claimed to be loyal.

Asked to explain cess by his queen, Sidney defined purveyance. "Cess", he wrote, "is nothing else but a prerogative of the prince and an agreement and consent of the nobility and council to impose upon the country a certain proportion of victuals of all kinds to be delivered at a reasonable rate as is commonly termed the queen's price". Yet the term "purveyance" was rarely employed by
contemporaries to account for their complaint, for the burden of supply actually imposed upon the country was the product of a much more general series of demands than the single prerogative tax. Since the thirteenth century, the collection of purveyance in England had been subjected to a number of statutory restrictions on the supply of the royal household. The amount to be taken up, the time of year when supplies were to be collected and the mode in which they were to be collected were each at some time made subject to parliamentary supervision. Similarly, the restriction of purveyance to the royal household only was made explicit: the royal army and the warders of crown castles were expected to make their own arrangements for supply. In practice, however, royal purveyors continued to evade these proscriptions on occasion right up to the reign of Queen Elizabeth. But excesses were almost always vigorously opposed by the crown's English subjects and were quite clearly on the decline.

In Ireland, however, the process seemed to occur in reverse as the English presence increased. Under Sussex and Sidney, the prerogative right of the crown was given the widest possible definition. It was extended to cover not only the supply of the household of the sovereign's surrogate, the viceroy, a legally problematic issue in itself. It was also used to impose upon the country the obligation of victualling and billeting the entire military establishment in Ireland the whole year round. This was so liberal an extension of the crown's right to take up supplies that even the administration hesitated to call it simply purveyance. But for the countrymen the issue was entirely clear. To them the burden was no mere extension of the prerogative, but a novel and wholly illegitimate imposition extorted from them without consent.
by the sheer force of the government, and so they accorded to it the same term normally used to denote any levy laid by a great lord upon his subordinates. They called it "the cess". 27

A second confusion - an historical one - is also suggestive: no one knew exactly when cessing began. For some Palesmen their grievance originated with Sussex only, others believed it had begun with Bellingham and the majority tended to trace the roots of the trouble to St. Leger. The government, on the other hand, insisted that the essential elements of cess had been practised by the crown's representative since time immemorial. In the late 1570s Lord Chancellor Gerrard extracted a series of precedents from ancient chancery records which, he claimed, demonstrated that each of Sussex's and Sidney's practices had been anticipated some time in the past without any signs of opposition within the Pale. 28 His arguments were quite arcane even then and can hardly be satisfactorily tested now. But the Palesmen's uncertainty of the origin of their grievance none the less indicates that the government's extension of its demands was a gradual and almost imperceptible process and that the Palesmen only began to react against the cess when the burden of maintaining the supply began to pinch. In retrospect, that is to say, there seemed to the Palesmen to have been a point earlier in the century when quantitative change became qualitative, when an occasional expedient which they accepted as necessary and inevitable was converted into a major threat to their liberties.

On one point, Gerrard and the government were quite correct. The presence of an English governor in Ireland always entailed some obligation on the part of the country to supply his needs. But the obligation was never clearly understood to be that of purveyance. In theory, at least, the laymen of soldiers from England obviated
the need to exert the prerogative. A certain portion of the soldier's wage was allocated for food, and the soldier was expected to pay his way without unduly troubling himself or the country through which he passed. The problem of actually finding provisions was to be met in one of three ways. The supply of the lord deputy's household and band was the responsibility of "cators", independent operators who took the job on contract and made profits by bargaining for prices in the market place. A similar role was to be played by the warders of the crown forts for the bands under their command. But by far the most common means of ensuring the supply of soldiers was through billeting. Though it was rarely employed in England, the absence of sufficient garrison wards on the borders of the Pale made billeting logistically necessary in Ireland. The practice was first formalised by Sir Edward Poynings in the parliament of 1495 and daily boarding charges were fixed at the same time. Each soldier was to pay 1½d. for himself, 1d. for his servant and 1d. for every horse he had with him. Poynings's rates remained unchanged down to the mid-1550s. Together these three methods were believed to be adequate to meet the soldiers' needs in normal times; when extraordinary occasions arose, it was expected that the principle underlying each could be extended without incurring serious difficulty.

The system, of course, was inherently trouble-prone, and trouble arose periodically. Surrey, who assumed office in a time of scarcity, soon became aware of rising tension between the soldiers and the countrymen and sought to have the soldiers' wages increased. Lord Leonard Grey provoked some discontent amongst the Palesmen, but the fact that their complaints were cited against him at his trial is an indication that his conduct was regarded as extraordinary.
Despite the appearance of occasional complaints, however, several factors tended to mitigate the severity of the problem. The standing garrison in the early days of English intervention was generally small: it rarely exceeded 500 and was often less. Extended periods of high martial activity were exceptional and for the most part the army was concerned with the defence of the Pale. Though short-term price fluctuations occurred, serious inflationary influences had not yet attacked the market. There were, moreover, some positive compensations for the burden. The presence of a professional army reduced the responsibilities of the local militia. As attendance on hostings declined, the assessment of scutage disappeared altogether: it was last levied in 1531. As long as the garrison remained moderate in size and relatively inactive, therefore, the obligation to supply it was at worst only mildly burdensome.

Ironically, it was during St. Leger's era of good-feelings, that the first significant changes occurred. Possibly because the constitutional changes of 1541 made his role as representative of the sovereign more emphatic, St. Leger began to take up provisions for his household at prices fixed independently of the market. The alteration seems to have aroused little contemporary comment, but general satisfaction with the deputy's mild way of government was probably sufficient to hold any displeasure in check. But St. Leger was also responsible for a further innovation which, although it appeared innocuous enough at the outset, was to have serious implications for the future. From the early 1540s he began to convert the obligation to attend on general hostings into a cash payment. His action was not entirely unprecedented; some anticipations could be found in the early years of the century. But
under St. Leger, conversion became regular and systematic. To begin with, the change aroused little antagonism. The government, arguably, was simply making the best use of the obligations due to it and many Palesmen were more than willing to enter into the exchange. But the implications of conversion were grave. The general hosting, it seemed to indicate, was no longer simply a feudal obligation of circumstance. It was a simple tax due to the crown by the country whose form and content could be altered with the needs of the government.

This implication was first made concrete by Sir Edward Bellingham. On arrival, Bellingham summoned a general hosting and immediately had some of it converted into money. In the following year, he took the carriages due for a hosting by counties Dublin and Meath and sent them separately to help in the construction of the new forts in Leix and Offaly. At the same time, he ordered provisions for the forts to be cessed upon the baronies in lieu of the service due upon a hosting. From cash to supplies, it seemed a simple progression. But this time, the innovation did not go unnoticed. The mayors of Dublin and Drogheda resisted and Bellingham had much difficulty in getting supplies from the country at large. Bellingham defended his actions stoutly in terms of the royal prerogative. "The King's majesty hath an aid absolute", he told the recalcitrant mayors, "which is committed, in part, to me his deputy". But it was highly uncertain that the obligation to supply the King's household could be stretched to apply to a full military establishment. What made such an argument plausible in the Irish context, however, was the malleability which the community's military obligations had already been shown to have.
If the government had the right to levy money in lieu of military service, why could it not also take up supplies provided it was willing to pay for them? By these means the acknowledged obligations of the community became fused with the prerogative rights of the crown, and the upshot was a significant, if dubious, increase in government power over its subjects.

Bellingham had his way and his practice was emulated by Croft in 1551. Their actions certainly offered precedents for the future, but in both cases the impact of the innovation was neither serious nor continuous enough to be regarded as ominous. Bellingham had called a cess in pursuit of a short-term aim that was almost universally popular: the defence of the midlands plantation. Croft had used it to furnish a vital punitive raid against the Gaelic borderers of the north. Bellingham, moreover, was meticulous in matters of payment. His prices were close to the prevailing market and he was willing to adjust them when the occasion demanded. He paid the country punctually and he took personal responsibility for the debts he incurred. Nothing in his behaviour indicated that he regarded the cess as anything more than an extraordinary expedient. Most important of all, he conceded that the country had the right of consultation in the matter.

After 1551, under Crofts and St. Leger, the country enjoyed a breathing space. No further general assessments were raised and the level of military action remained low. Precedents for the extension of government power and their theoretical justification had already been clearly established, but the need for their revitalisation and exploitation only became evident when a new style of administration, committed to the execution of explicit programmes in a short period of time through energetic and forceful enterprise, succeeded St. Leger in 1556.
The causes of the "programmatic" governments' dependence on cess were multiple. First, the sheer size of the military establishment increased substantially under their charge. Under Sussex the average strength of the standing army was quadrupled to 2,000 men. Sidney increased the garrison to 3,000 during the first campaign against Shane O'Neill and employed an equal number to repress the rebellions of 1569-71. In the later 1570s, he believed he was cheese-paring when he promised to make do with a force of just under 1,800. By comparison with contemporary continental armies, the size of the Irish establishment may appear small. But these figures in themselves are deceptive. Inevitably, the garrison had its quota of parasites with whom the soldiers' supplies were shared. The maintenance of women and boys as sources of diversion amongst the soldiery was prohibited, but the rule was impossible to enforce and was winked at in practice by the highest authorities. Horsemen, who normally accounted for more than a third of the establishment, were allowed supplies for one servant and two horses each. Any official figure, then, needs to be increased by at least a factor of three before a realistic impression of the mouths to be fed by the country can be gained.

The demands of the new governments were not only higher, they were also more frequent. Bellingham had cessed only once and Croft once: both had done so to meet extraordinary needs. Sussex's and Sidney's demands, however, were continuous and unrelieved. The following table gives some indication of the burden which both men imposed on the country in pursuit of their ambitions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>WHEAT (PECKS.)</th>
<th>BEER MALT</th>
<th>OAT MALT</th>
<th>BEEVES</th>
<th>OATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1556</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1557</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1558</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1559</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1561</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1563</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1566</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures, it is important to emphasise, represent only the general cesses extracted from the country to furnish particular campaigns. They are exclusive of the routine charge incurred when the army was stationed in the forts or billeted upon the country. Even then they are incomplete. Fitzwilliam, we know from other sources, imposed a general levy, but no figures have survived. There is no entry of the cess of 1569 in the privy council's register though the resentment it provoked in the country is adequately documented.

A third element introduced into the situation by the programmatic governors was the high degree of pressure they applied in order to secure the collection and transportation of supplies. Such force was necessary. Since they were bound to the crown by a
schedule and budget of their own making, delay in the provisioning of the army was more than a mere nuisance and could well be politically fatal. They were, consequently, highly sensitive to opposition. Where Bellingham merely rebuked uncooperative mayors, Sidney arrested them. A lawyer who challenged Sussex's interpretation of the prerogative was promptly put behind bars. A government official who leaked information on the cesses was dismissed. Commissions of destraint were issued to the cessors and goods confiscated for non-payment were sold publicly in the market. When the law students of 1562 presented their complaints against Sussex at court, the lieutenant began proceedings against their promoters in the Pale with a view to exacting crippling fines. Sidney threatened the whole landowning community with fines in 1577, and in several cases he actually carried out the threat.

But despite this coercion and despite their genuine charge, the general cesses were never the chief source of discontent amongst the countrymen. The Palesmen frequently expressed their willingness to tolerate such occasional demands if they might be relieved of a more grievous and more chronic aspect of the cess: billeting.

Sussex, it is true, raised the rates which soldiers were required to pay their hosts and laid down detailed terms of boarding which conveyed the impression of scrupulous fairness. The soldiers were to be placed on the country at the rate of two to every ploughland. For lodging and for one daily meal, each would pay two shillings per week, and if he were a horseman, seven pence for his servant and seven pence for each horse. These rates, however, merely reflected the price rise of half a century which had already been acknowledged in the soldiers' wages. In real terms, they were grossly inadequate. A horse that was allowed twelve sheaves of
oats a day would consume a whole peck in eight days. A mere eight pence, therefore, was paid by the soldier for supplies that would cost him sixteen pence on the general cess and might fetch up to ten shillings on the open market. In the same way, the soldiers' daily upkeep cost far more than the sum officially allowed for it. Everywhere in the sixteenth century, soldiers' diets seem to have been far superior to the normal daily intake of civilians of similar social status. But in Ireland in the 1570s, the rates set by the army were unusually high. Each day the soldier was entitled to receive 2½ lbs. of beef, 24 ozs. of wheat bread and 4½ pints of beer. The allocation of "achates", i.e. milk, butter and eggs, was left unestimated, but it was clearly intended that the soldier should have these according to his needs. Discounting the additional extortion which inevitably occurred, these rates of themselves amounted to a significant drain on the country's food supply. By correlating the allowed rates of consumption with prevailing market prices, we can arrive at some minimum estimate of the real cost of billeting to the community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount per month</th>
<th>Cess Prices</th>
<th>Market prices</th>
<th>Billeting rates per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat 1 peck</td>
<td>6/8 s d</td>
<td>12s</td>
<td>8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer malt 1 peck</td>
<td>6/8 s d</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oat malt 1 peck</td>
<td>4s</td>
<td>8s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeves 1/2 beef</td>
<td>3s</td>
<td>7s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20/4 s 37s 8s
Every soldier, then, was subsidised by the country by a sum of not less than twenty nine shillings a month. The figures, moreover, are accurate only in so far as market prices remained normal and the soldiers were content to take no more than their due. But as Sidney conceded, "soldiers be no angels". Allegations of abuse and extortion were made with such frequency and with such vehemence that no governor felt able to deny them out of hand. Detailed evidence of the relations between ordinary troops and ordinary civilians is naturally rare. But it seems clear that conflict was quite common. In 1558 Archbishop Dowdall condemned the unruly behaviour of the soldiers and Sidney in reply admitted that serious clashes had actually taken place. The students of 1561 produced evidence of one case of murder and theft as a representative sample of many more which they promised to document on demand. An anonymous book of complaints, attributed to the former government official John Parker, recounted further instances of violence. Several government officers admitted the truth of such charges. Commissioners Wrothe and Arnold openly accepted their validity and even Sussex himself, though denying any responsibility, conceded that misdemeanours may have occurred. But Sidney was more explicit than any. "The soldiers", he said, "are so beggarly as it would abhor a general to look upon them and yet many so insolent as they be intolerable to the people and be so rooted in insolence and rudeness as there is no hope of any to amend them".

Despite such expressions of regret, however, the possibility of extortion was an essential part of the entire supply system. In times of scarcity and of high prices the soldier lodger would continue to demand his normal allowance. The hard pressed government
could not increase his wages and so he would lay his pressure on the point of least resistance, the husbandman. The government thus avoided the shock of abnormal conditions and the country absorbed it whole. In this predicament the poorer countrymen were left with only two alternatives. The worst off simply deserted their holdings. Some migrated beyond the Pale and some took to the roads as beggars. It is impossible to estimate the numbers forced to this extremity, but there is evidence that a significant area of land within the Pale was let go waste at this time through desertion.61 Less desperate farmers attempted to save their holdings by buying the soldiers off. The going rate for such "compositions" in the 1560s was around sixteen pence per day or forty shillings per month—a figure which tends to confirm the minimum estimate of the real costs of billeting given above.62 Even then, of course, it was unlikely that the soldier could be bought off altogether. The government's attitude towards such deals was nice in the extreme. The soldiers were strictly forbidden to take money from their hosts, but when the offers were seen to be freely made by the countrymen themselves, the government saw little to prevent the soldiers from accepting them. The belief that such a distinction could be maintained in times of dearth was at best a comforting fantasy.63

The most overt and therefore the most recorded cases of intimidation took place when the soldiers were on the move. The temporary nature of their stay and their virtual anonymity gave the troopers ample opportunity to exercise their talent for extortion. And they did so frequently. Sometimes they engaged in quite elaborate fraud. Countrymen would be informed unofficially of the commanding officer's intention to billet his force in their townland overnight. Compositions would be hastily collected from the
frightened community, and then, before dusk, the soldiers would
march off to be bedded down elsewhere. 64 Usually, however, the
expropriation was more direct. Once settled in an area the
soldiers simply took what they wanted without regard to the
scrupulous rates which their captain would conscientiously dole out
on the morning of their departure. Not surprisingly, it was on
these occasions that the most serious riots occurred. Some idea of
the spoils taken in this manner may be gleaned from the charges
brought by the elder Viscount Baltinglas against Marshal Bagenal
who lodged at his seat of residence one night in 1578. Baltinglas
accused the troops of spoiling his tenants of goods to the value of
£200 and of taking away enough cattle to keep the band supplied with
beef for over two months. 65 Even accounting for exaggeration - and
Baltinglas, it should be noted, provided a detailed affidavit -
the takings of one night’s stay were certainly enormous. The Dublin
administration denied the charges. The case was opened and the
record survives only because the elder Baltinglas retained sufficient
influence to have his claims considered by the English privy council.

The Irish administration’s unresponsive attitude to this and
to other complaints made to it is understandable, since the viceroy
himself was amongst the most oppressive of military predators. He
toured the Pale regularly, staying in the chief houses of each
shire and billeting his troops on the surrounding countryside. The
visitations, arguably, were part of his official duties. But strong
economic motives were also at work, for the perambulation allowed him
to keep for other uses the supplies which were taken up for his
household at Kilmainham. Such reasoning is clearly present in a
typical itinerary planned for Sussex in 1556: “Your lordship might
... ride to Trim and there sojourn two nights, as long or longer at
Athboy and from there you might ride to Kells and thence to the bishop of Meath and to Navan where your lordship might tarry for four nights, a night at Slane with my lord and thence, as to your lord thinketh best, having care for bread and drink, Drogheda is better far than Dublin for Lent and reserve Kilmainham for May and June". 66

The practice of supplying the viceroy's household through cess appears to have fallen into desuetude in the latter days of St. Leger, but Sussex revived the custom with a vengeance. 67 In one year alone the earl, who evidently believed in maintaining himself in the style to which he had been accustomed, cessed almost 35,000 pecks of grain, 700 beeves and 200 muttons for his own use. 68 Sidney, whose gastronomic capabilities were a by-word in the Pale, took over 740 pecks of grain and 3,000 animals in 1567 alone. 69 Between September 1568 and March 1569 his butcher slaughtered over 10,000 animals for his master's use. 70 In the later 1570s Sidney showed no inclination to curtail his consumption. Each year he took over 2,200 pecks of grain and 7,500 beasts. 71 It is possible to compute the cost of the viceroy's demands to the country by a comparison with market prices similar to that attempted above. But even this figure would be an underestimation. The viceroy's cess was collected by special purveyors or "cators" who made their own profits on the country by extortion, under-pricing and over-levying. The cators reputation was notorious in the country and even the deputies shared in the general opinion. "Albeit I found some more honester than others, Sidney once disarmingly conceded, "yet amongst them all never a perfect honest man". 72
The remaining areas in which the soldiers were deployed, the castles and wards which dotted the perimeter of the Pale, also provided ample opportunity for illicit gain to those who assumed the responsibility for their supply. Again, a scrupulous administrative system had been worked out in theory. A monthly estimate of the needs of the fort which took into account probable losses and wastage during this period was calculated, and the commander was authorised to assess this amount on the surrounding country at normal government prices. In appearance this system was less open to abuse than individual billeting, but the potential for profiteering remained great. Here, however, it was the captains who stood to gain most. They cheated their own soldiers, thinning their bread and watering their beer. But they made even greater profits at the expense of the country. The number of men in service in any particular fort was held to be a military secret, a necessary precaution against Gaelic raiders. But it was also an excellent opportunity to perpetrate fraud. Though the garrisons were invariably under strength, the captains assessed supplies for a full complement and nicely calculated the generous wastage allowances on those terms too. This was the single most profitable abuse. In 1565 Sir Henry Radcliffe was checked over £5,600 and Nicholas Heron over £1,000 on its count alone. But several other perquisites remained available to these soldier-victuallers. The beeves cessed on the country were taken up live and no rebate was given for offal. Since the hides alone were worth twice the price paid for each beast, every transaction resulted in a handsome profit for the captain. Further gains might be made by using the carriages and horses which had transported the cess for private purposes, by using cessed labour in the same way and by taking up
non-enumerated goods under the guise of genuine scarcity. But the most commonly practiced abuse was simply the captains' refusal to pay up. In part, this was due to a real shortage of funds. But their hold over the community enabled the captains to convert this apparent weakness into a means of driving harder bargains with the husbandmen who were prepared to accept lower prices in return for immediate payment. Such extortion was, moreover, self-protecting, since the plethora of informal agreements made impossible any attempt to estimate the true extent of the debt due to the country.

When the multiple aspects of the cess are considered in this fashion, the severe strain it placed upon the community as a whole becomes evident. The Palesmen at all times insisted that the burden under which they laboured was a cumulative one and that reductions in one area only resulted in increases in others. It is exceedingly difficult to attempt to quantify the precise cost of the cess to the country in any one year. Conflicting estimates abound, based upon strikingly different and irreconcilable sets of statistics presented by the government and the community in the course of the debate. For the particularly critical year of 1561, however, sufficient independent evidence exists to allow some effort at an impartial assessment. Such an estimate can make no pretense to total accuracy. No body of evidence is entirely reliable and it will inevitably neglect a number of variables. But since it must entirely discount the massive amount of informal extortion that took place, it can confidently be said to be conservative.

In 1561, in order to further his campaign against O'Neill, Sussex substantially increased the size of the garrison: for the six-month campaigning season of the year, it stood at 2,500 men. To maintain his grand army on the march, Sussex was forced to exact
a heavy general cess from the Pale which together with the annual cess which he took up for the supply of his own household, amounted to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wheat and Beer Malt</th>
<th>Oat Malt</th>
<th>Beeves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,288 (pks)</td>
<td>3,846 (pks)</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was a year of unusual dearth in the Pale and prices in the market were unusually high:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wheat and Beer Malt</th>
<th>Oat Malt</th>
<th>Beeves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£ 1.00 per pk.</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>22s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prices paid to the country by the cessors were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wheat and Beer Malt</th>
<th>Oat Malt</th>
<th>Beeves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4s. per pk.</td>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>8s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cost to the country may be estimated as follows:

\[
\frac{5288 \times 16}{20} + \frac{3846 \times 118}{12 \times 20} + \frac{2040 \times 14}{20} = 4230.4 + 1890.95 + 1428 = £7549.35
\]

The campaign season lasted for six months only. Almost 1,000 soldiers were discharged and left to forage for themselves. Of the remaining 1,500, 300 were kerne who were not normally billeted on the country and 100 were men of the viceroy's band whose supplies had been collected in his household cess. There were, therefore, some 1,100 men who had to be maintained by the country for all or part of the year. 324 men were lodged in the
forts of Maryborough, Philipstown, Athlone, Carlow and Monasterevan all year round. Each was allowed, according to Sussex, \( \frac{1}{2} \) peck of wheat and 1 peck malt per month for their supply and was expected to pay 5s. per month (2d per day) to the country. Their charge upon the country amounted therefore, to:

\[
\text{\£} \left( \frac{324 \times 1 \times 1 \times 12}{2} + \frac{324 \times 5 \times 12}{8} \right) - \left( \frac{324 \times 5 \times 12}{20} \right)
\]

\[= \text{\£3402}\]

The remaining 776 troops may be assumed to have been billeted on the country only for the six months outside of the campaigning season. They paid 8s. per month for their keep and if they may be assumed to have eaten no less than their fellows in the forts, their cost may be thus calculated:

\[
\text{\£} \left( \frac{776 \times 3 \times 1}{8} + \frac{776 \times 6 \times 5}{20} \right) - \frac{776 \times 8 \times 6}{20}
\]

\[= (2328 + 2910 - 1862)\]

\[= \text{\£3376}\]

Fully 260 of these 776 were horsemen, equipped with two horses each and entitled to \( \frac{1}{8} \) peck per day for each horse in return for 1d per day. In 1561, the market price for oats was 10s per peck. So the upkeep of 520 horses for six months may be estimated:

\[
\text{\£} \left( \frac{520 \times 1 \times 30 \times 6}{8 \times 2} - \frac{520 \times 1 \times 30 \times 6}{12 \times 20} \right) = \text{\£5460}
\]

Finally, each of the horsemen had one horseboy who, since he paid half of the soldier's rate for his upkeep, may be taken to have consumed at least half the amount:
The sum total of the charge of the cess is £20,957.

The total is exclusive both of the inevitable extortions of the soldiery and of numerous other charges on the country for the provision of "acates" (i.e. poultry, eggs, etc.).

1561, everybody agreed, was an unusually bad year. Market prices were not normally so high and the demands of the government were often less severe. Yet this minimum estimate gives at least some impression of how onerous the upkeep of the army could be in times of dearth.

The oppressiveness of this burden is increased, moreover, when the limited fertility of the farm lands of the Pale are considered. The region was generally agreed to contain no more than 86,400 arable acres at this time in which the average yield was at most seven pecks per acre and may have been much less. That the cess imposed a major strain on the country's food supplies is made evident by the emergency measures which the government was frequently compelled to enforce in order to maintain its supply. In 1557, Sussex was forced to prohibit the export of grain from the Pale into Gaelic areas and abroad. The ban was re-imposed in 1561 and remained in force to some degree throughout the decade. Sidney attempted to reintroduce it during his last deputyship and complained of the recklessness of evasion. The danger of scarcity was ever-present within the Pale.
The genuine incapacity of the country was implicitly acknowledged by the viceroys themselves, in the several efforts which they made to alleviate the burden of the cess through reforms or to find some alternative means of supply. From 1556 onward every governor made some gesture in either direction. Sussex issued a public warning to the soldiers against extortion and ordered the captains to increase their vigilance. In response to the Palesmen's allegations, he established a commission of inquiry and authorised the plaintiffs to collect evidence in support of their charges. He also made some positive attempts at reform. He had weights and measures standardised to prevent evasion and peculation on the part of the cessors. He resumed dormant corn clauses on crown leases and gained some 900 pecks for the household thereby. He proposed to extend the scheme to all crown properties if the countrymen would give their consent to a general resumption. But the Palesmen showed no enthusiasm and the plan fell through.

Sidney continued and improved upon Sussex's exploitation of the corn leases. Between 1568 and 1570, he took more than 4,000 pecks by this means and he collected similar amounts in his last period of service. But the ameliorative value of this reform was not generally felt. The deputies tended to regard the surplus as an essential source of revenue. So instead of distributing it amongst the bands, they chose to resell it on the open market. Sussex denied that he had made any significant gains by these sales. But Sidney, we know, certainly enjoyed the profits. Of 1,900 pecks raised in this manner in 1575, he put a mere 200 to his own use and had the remainder converted into cash. The resumption of the corn leases undoubtedly reduced the burden of the household cess - in 1576, it accounted for over 51% of the entire intake - but owing to
the governors' unwillingness to forego the perquisites of their office, it had little effect on the general charge of the whole garrison.

On this larger question, Sussex made no progress. But Sidney had more enterprising ideas. In 1566 he had the foot soldiers removed from the country and garrisoned in the border towns. There they continued to be supplied by cess, but Sidney hoped that such concentration would reduce the opportunities for extortion. He also planned to remove the horsemen from the ordinary husbandmen and place them on the larger manors of the Pale. Again, the whole country was to be contributory to their upkeep, but the level of abuse was expected to fall. The plan, however, was unpopular with the larger landholders and was never put into operation.

Sidney made two separate efforts to obviate the need for cess altogether. In 1566 he proposed that the currency exchange rate between England and Ireland (£1 6s. 8d. = 11 6s. 8d.) was sufficiently favourable to compensate any losses that might be incurred if the government itself assumed the responsibility of provisioning the Irish garrison. The idea was simple: supplies bought at judicious prices in England, could be transported and retailed to the soldiers for Irish money without loss to either party. The soldiers would rest content with the purchasing power of the relatively inferior Irish coin, while the 33% discount allowed to the English treasury by paying them in this money, would be sufficient to defray the costs and losses of transportation. Sidney convinced the English privy council of the efficacy of this plan and his campaign against O'Neill was almost entirely provisioned by supplies from England. But the scheme developed insurmountable problems. Supplies were constantly late in arriving, entire ship-
ments were lost and deficiencies in quality and quantity were frequent. The system revolved around Secretary Cecil and it placed an intolerable strain upon him. The amount of his time and energy which it consumed was sufficient to ensure its early demise, but Sidney, in any case, had badly underestimated the costs involved and the exchange rate was insufficient to compensate for the losses. By the middle of 1567, the government had spent £22,800 without a rebate. \(^{100}\) The plan had plunged the Treasury and Sidney into debt; it had stretched the Tudor administrative machine beyond its capabilities.

On his return to Ireland in 1568, Sidney made a second attempt to overcome his difficulties with supply by resurrecting an older and somewhat discredited means of provisioning, the victualling contract. Thomas Might, the man who was awarded the contract, had served under Sidney before and had conducted some minor victualling enterprises in Ireland on his own account. But he had never undertaken so ambitious a charge as the supply of a whole army. From Michaelmas 1568 he was entrusted with the provisioning of a minimum of 1,000 men for a year. \(^{101}\) The government drove a hard bargain. The number to be supplied and the duration of the contract was left at the pleasure of the crown and could be increased or reduced without any change in the original rates struck. These rates, moreover, left little margin for error. Might was to be paid £3,000 p.a. in three equal instalments. He was to purchase grain in the markets of the Pale and could cess beeves amongst the loyal Irishry. He could import supplies only by permission of the deputy. A precise diet was laid down for each soldier and Might was to submit to a bi-monthly inspection to see that the allocations were being honoured. The
careful clauses in his contract, however, were entirely irrelevant to the realities of the situation in which Might soon found himself. Having purchased his first supplies with his own cash, the contractor was left short on the very first instalments due to him by the crown and very soon ran into debt. He was unlucky too with market prices, and by the time further credit reached him, he was provisioning the army at a heavy loss. Within a year, Might was forced to surrender his contract to Thomas Sackford, another former servant of Sidney, but Sackford did no better. Prices fell, but not far enough and it was generally accepted that Sackford was not competent enough to take advantage of the improvement. By the end of 1569, the soldiers were critically short of supplies, Sidney was forced to recommence cessing and Sackford was steeped in debts from which he would never recover.

Sidney's successor, Fitzwilliam, made a further effort to alleviate the country's burden without increasing the costs of government. Early in 1573, he proposed to the Palesmen that he would withdraw the garrison to the forts on the borders and assume the responsibility of victualling the soldiers himself if they would waive forever the large debt already due to them by the crown for the supply of provisions. The offer was accepted in principle by the nobility of the Pale who undertook to estimate and to negotiate the remission of the debt. Fitzwilliam's superiors also gave their approval and promised to supply him with the necessary treasure to manage independently of the country for a period of three years. But serious difficulties very soon began to make themselves apparent. The strain of being both chief governor and chief victualler began to tell early on the deputy. He found it increasingly difficult to maintain a steady flow of supplies to
the soldiers or to prevent their depredations when shortages arose. Prices, too, turned against him, rising steadily throughout 1573 and 1574. And there was one further problem. From the outset, Fitzwilliam realised that the success of his scheme depended upon the maintenance of an adequate and regular flow of treasure from England. The amount he demanded was not exorbitant - he believed he could make do with £5,000 p.a. - but the availability of a store of money which might be drawn on at favourable times of purchase was essential to the financial health of the plan.

Fitzwilliam badgered the privy council about the necessity of keeping his treasury topped up, and for a time his appeals were answered. But inevitably, payments began to fall behind. He was forced to seek credit and by early 1574 he was £6,000 in debt. Fitzwilliam literally begged for treasure, but it came only slowly, and when it did it was tied up by the vice-treasurer, Fitton, who claimed that he had no authority to disburse it for the deputy's needs. Tempers began to rise in the Pale. By the end of the year the countrymen were refusing to supply the deputy with any provisions and had begun to make manifest their dissatisfaction with the deal that had been made on their behalf. Records of the soldiers' debt upon which Fitzwilliam was dependent to demonstrate his savings to Westminster were not forthcoming, and the viceroy could do nothing to penetrate the country's conspiracy of silence.

Without supplies, treasure or promise of success, he turned desperately to a victualler who promptly defaulted on his contract, leaving the deputy "at his wit's end". Only an emergency injection of treasure saved Fitzwilliam's administration from complete collapse.
These attempts to ameliorate the burden of the cess—government victualling, private victualling, even the efforts to reform and discipline the soldiery—were each dependent for their success on regular and consistent subvention from England; and each of them failed through the central administration's chronic propensity to default. The demands they made upon the secretariat and its administrative machine were simply too great and too continuous to be sustained. More importantly, the costs which they incurred were prohibitive. The extra spending which they involved was not to be expected from a government which did not even honour the minimal obligations of the cess. Despite the extremely low prices which the government paid for provisions in Ireland through the cess, large proportions of the acknowledged debt remained unpaid. In the seven baronies of Meath alone, the amount due for billeting between 1564 and 1571 amounted to over £6,300. If the burden was equally apportioned throughout the Pale, as it was supposed to be, then the entire debt due by the government must have been in the region of £19,000. Government officers recognised that the crown's unwillingness to pay up at all was amongst the chief sources of the persistent tension between the army and the community. "If the country were well paid", wrote Auditor Jenyson, "they would willingly pay all they do, yea even more".

The viceroy's inability to find an effective means of diminishing or dispensing with the cess highlights the underlying weaknesses of their situation. Their failure can be attributed to no lack of concern or effort on their part, rather its source lay beyond their grasp in the governmental structures of Westminster and it arose, ironically, from the very attitude that had promoted their style of administration in the first place. A government,
that is to say, which was unwilling or unable to formulate and administer a consistent line of policy directly from England, was equally incapable of catering to the vital logistical needs of the semi-autonomous agents it had chosen to execute policy for it. Moreover, this very delegation of responsibility tended to reduce even further, the deputies' chances of maintaining adequate sources of supply. Deprived of ready and continuous access to influence, they were compelled to rely on the advocacy of secretaries and friendly councillors whose concern with Irish affairs was necessarily haphazard and half-hearted. Thus, the problem of supplying Ireland drifted inevitably to the lower end of the council's list of priorities. The reformist efforts of the viceroys' were wasted, victuallers ruined and the country driven to desperation by the oppressions of a beggared soldiery.

But the viceroys were by no means innocent of the sufferings of the countryside. Political careerists, they had willingly accepted, indeed hoped to take advantage of, the limitations of the Westminster government. It was the central government's weakness which gave them the apparent freedom to make glorious careers for themselves in Ireland and important political gains for their friends at court. They were, therefore, content to accept the less fortunate by-products of administrative laxity and hoped to find some ad hoc methods of coping with them as they arose. While all else failed, the cess remained supreme amongst expedients. They turned towards it compulsively as the best means of solving their logistical difficulties because it was cheap, relatively efficient and most of all, because it was of fixed and estimable cost. Cess prices made stable and predictable the most uncertain of variables, the food supply. They seemed to underpin the entire programme of
action which the governors set for themselves. Thus, when all other alternatives proved unworkable, they had little choice but to return to it. Their continued exploitation of so valuable an asset, however, depended upon the governors' ability to honour the terms of their own enforced agreements by paying their bills regularly, by keeping the soldiers waged and well governed and by responding to the genuine needs of the country in times of difficulty. Yet it was at this crucial point that they lost control over the whole system. They could not guarantee the soldiers' wages; they could not prevent their extortions. They could not pay their own debts and ultimately they could not respond to the country's legitimate grievances even when they wished to. Ironically, therefore, the governments which were most dependent upon the supply of the country were the least equipped to ensure its efficient and equitable administration. It was this deeply paradoxical relationship that determined the character of the Palesmen's opposition to the cess.

Particular expressions of this opposition from within the Pale have been noted earlier. The discussion here will be concerned with its more general characteristics, with its form of organisation, its tactics, its aims and its sense of direction. Each was determined by the nature of the grievance itself. The cess was a general levy, collected systematically throughout the country. The opposition, too, became general and countrywide, easily transcending geographical and factional barriers. Meath, the most fertile and the most heavily cessed of all counties was usually the centre of resistance. The earliest leaders of opposition, Sir Christopher Cheevers, Barnaby Scurlock and William Bermingham, were Meathmen. But resistance to the cess occurred in every shire and each had its own local organisers. Similarly, the opposition transcended
traditional lines of faction. The governors, daunted by such a
general display of defiance, liked to argue that it was the work of
one of their great noble adversaries, Ormond or Kildare. The earls,
it is true, attempted to exploit the governors' difficulties with
the country in their own interests and used their influence in
support of the countrymen. But neither was capable of control-
ling the issue or of adapting it to their needs. Ormond was unable
to silence the country's complaints against his friend Sussex:
Kildare could do little to help Sidney. The cess was politically
useful to them only so long as they joined with the country in
opposing it. Amongst the Palesmen themselves, all traditional
rivals, the Prestons and the Eustaces, the Dillons and the Nugents,
were united in complaining against a common grievance.

The Palesmen vehemently denied any allegations of an ulterior
motivation behind their actions. William Bermingham, the most
radical of Sussex's critics, denied any association with Kildare's
larger political ambitions, and it is clear that he had no wish to
see English deputies withdrawn from Ireland. The students of
1561 declared their intent "to live no longer in Ireland than an
English governor whose government shall not depart from the laws of
England shall govern there - God is our judge", and they were care-
ful to include a round denunciation of Kildare's doings amongst
their general petition for redress. Their normally more reticent
elders were equally emphatic:- "We protest before God", they
declared, "we would choose no Irishman, for our choice must lie
between the earls of Kildare and Ormond whom neither (though they
both be noblemen and ready to serve) ... should seem fit to us to
have government in this realm, and if they were as wise as Solomon
were and yet should burden the Pale with kerne and galloglass, we
could not bear their government so far is our nature from the
nature of the mere Irish and such mutual hate ... is there between
us". John Alen, nephew of the former lord chancellor and heir
to St. Wolstan's, was consecutively a leader of the opposition to
the cess in his shire and the government's chief witness for a
number of serious allegations made against Kildare.

Agitation against the cess was not the product of factional
intrigue; but neither was it the result of social tensions within
the community of the Pale itself. The chief spokesmen of the
country did not belong to the very highest ranks of Pale society,
but they were by no means insignificant. Sir Christopher Cheevers
and Richard Netterville were both substantial landholders.
Netterville, Scurlock and Burnell were well accredited and highly
respected lawyers. Scurlock, a former attorney general, was
occasionally employed by the government as a circuit court judge.
Burnell's abilities were widely recognised. He was attorney to the
earl of Kildare and was later, despite his recusancy, made a justice
of the common pleas. William Bermingham who led the opposition
to Sussex in 1562-3, was certainly no Jack Cade. He was thought by
the privy council itself to be sufficiently responsible to act as
an auditor of the army's accounts and to offer advice on the highest
affairs of state. Later in the 1560s he was proposed to be chief
sergeant of his own county. His son, Patrick, who assumed his
father's role in the early 1580s was also a prominent figure in
the community. He served as a commissioner for musters in 1579 and was
deemed able to pay a fine of £40 for his part in the agitation against
Sidney in the previous year. The nobility of the Pale were
generally more discreet in their displays of resistance. But the
success of the entire movement, as the government fully realised,
was dependent upon their whole-hearted support. When pressed, as in 1561 or again in 1577, they came out to a man in favour of the agitators. Both in terms of its universality, therefore, and in terms of its conservative leadership and loyalist assertions, the agitation against the cess may indeed be labelled, as contemporaries themselves referred to it, as "the country cause".

Widespread discontent with the cess, however, was made practically effective in face of severe government repression only through the sophisticated organisation of the opposition's leadership. The cess was systematic; so too were the tactics employed to oppose it. The chief instrument used by the countrymen in each major clash with the government was the general strike. With little advance notice, the administration was confronted with an almost complete refusal on the part of the country to yield up the supplies that had been demanded of it. Cesses for the governor's house and for the forts were left unanswered, general levies were inadequately met and clashes between the billeted soldiers and the civilians multiplied. The effectiveness of the strike was startling. It ruined Sussex in 1563 and reduced Fitzwilliam and Sidney to desperate straits in turn. Once in action, the strike was justified and publicised by means of a country-wide petition. The Palesmen's petitions followed a pattern. They were usually short: a brief and general statement in justification being taken was followed by a florid protestation of loyalty to the crown. The most impressive feature of the petitions, however, was not their substance, but the list of signatures attached to them. The lists were quite long, containing on average the names of over twenty substantial landholders. More important, they were representative. The names of the leading families in each shire were carefully laid out and grouped together.
in order to display the unity of the opposition. The names of newly settled Englishmen were especially sought out. In 1562, the presentation of an individual book of complaints by an Englishman who claimed to have had twenty years' experience of service in Ireland, was a particularly powerful weapon to the Palesmen who were registering their complaints against Sussex at this time.\textsuperscript{126} Printed matter may also have been disseminated to broadcast and sustain the resistance. We know of at least one piece of doggerel against the cess, "Tom Troth", because of the annoyance which its popularity caused to Sidney during the parliament of 1569-71.\textsuperscript{127}

The orchestration of strikes and the circulation of petitions and pamphlets was clearly the work of some organisational core whose very efficiency has left their mode of operation obscure. But some indication of their work may be glimpsed from time to time within the records. Crucial preliminary meetings were sometimes held at the baron of Delvin's residence, or Viscount Gormanston's house in Meath or in Dublin during term time. From there, delegates were chosen to traverse the country, collecting information, securing allegiance and gathering signatures for the petition. The agents were carefully selected, sometimes in terms of class: "There be three gentlemen", Fitzwilliam noted in 1561, "chiefly appointed for the following and setting forth of such complaints as are sent over, and have assigned to them who they shall work with in getting consent of hands. For the nobility and the best sort of the gentry is one Sir Christopher Cheevers, for the second sort and chief husbandmen is Barnewall of Stackallen, for the cities and good towns a lawyer called Barnaby Scurlock. All three are of good credit amongst their own countrymen, God would they were as void of malice".\textsuperscript{128} Sometimes, only one organiser was
chosen, as was William Bermingham in 1562, or his son Patrick in 1581. But most commonly three men were selected to do the country's work.

These "commonwealth men", as they were referred to, were responsible not only for the organisation and propagation of resistance within the Pale, they were charged also with the execution of the country's most important opposition strategy, the presentation of its grievances at court. The practice of appealing over the governors' heads to the court and the privy council emerged as early as the first resistance to the cess. Archbishop Dowdall, the most prestigious Anglo-Irishman of his day, had gone to London as the unofficial spokesman of his country against Sussex in 1558, and in 1562 the law students used what they believed to be their special position to appeal directly with the queen without first registering their complaints with the viceroy. Thus far, however, the practice was uncoordinated. When Dowdall died, the opposition collapsed and the students were silenced by their arrest.

Systematic organisation began with the country's response to the students' fate, with the mobilisation of petitions in their support and with the preparation of William Bermingham's single-handed mission to court. Before presenting his case in London, Bermingham toured the Pale gaining support and gathering evidence and raising a subsidy from the countrymen to sustain him in his attendance at Whitehall. Bermingham was the first fully accredited country agent. A similar tactic was employed by the country in the early 1570s. In their resistance to Fitzwilliam, the nobility and gentry of Meath circulated a petition around the Pale, seeking financial support for the despatch of three delegates
to England. Using the very territorial divisions on which the cess itself was rated; these unofficial commissioners levied a small fixed charge on the countrymen as part of their allegiance to the cause. The great success of the collection seriously alarmed the government. "Our late reformers of the commonweal" one official noted, "are making their provision by a general cess amongst themselves which by report cometh to £1,000 and upwards". 131

The very strength of the movement made the governors see covert opposition everywhere, even on the council itself. "Secret conventicles" were common and "preaching in open pulpits by the appointed preachers for the commonweal who under colour of correction spare not to inveigh against the state itself". 132

The crisis subsided temporarily, but this was the quality of the opposition which Sidney faced when he attempted to impose his plan for composition upon the country.

The speed and effectiveness with which resistance to the scheme was organised, took the newly appointed deputy completely by surprise. He was taken aback by the steadfastness of the Palesmen's collective action, their refusal to accept a compromise and their determination to carry the case to the arena towards which they had for some time looked for redress. Though he recovered his nerve and succeeded in coercing the Pale into obedience for a time, he was ultimately defeated by those shrewd and experienced agents who displayed a remarkable ability to conduct the case in unfavourable conditions and to present convincing alternative arguments to the vicerey's claims. 133

Sidney's defeat at court consolidated the position of Netterville and Burnell as the chief representatives of the country. They were granted plenipotentiary powers by their countrymen in
negotiating with Sidney's successors and remained decisive in
determining the country's attitude towards subsequent government
proposals. In 1581 Treasurer Wallop explicitly conceded their
power when he argued that no settlement favourable to the govern-
ment would be wrung from the country until the two lawyers had
been removed from the scene. During the resurgence of agitation
against the cess in the early 1580s, however, they remained in the
background allowing new men to make the running. This time
Patrick Bermingham was delegated to coordinate resistance within
the Pale and the task of presenting the country's grievance at
court was left to his cousin, Gerald Aylmer, a young lawyer who
was already there as a retainer of the earl of Sussex. Throughout the 1580s Netterville and Burnell, Bermingham and Aylmer
acted in unison as the organising core of the country opposition.

Of itself, therefore, and independent of any other
influence, the cess did much to determine the political development
of the Pale in the first twenty-five years of Elizabeth's reign.
Its charge was sufficiently onerous and sufficiently widespread to
provide a unifying grievance to the community which transcended
all factional and territorial distinctions. Furthermore, the
recognition that the Dublin administration was powerless to prevent
its own worst abuses in the matter of cess, that it was, indeed,
ultimately dependent upon them, transformed dissatisfaction with a
single aspect of executive action into a profound disillusion with
the character of the Dublin government in general. Gradually,
therefore, a new awareness of the Pale as a unique political
entity with particular problems of its own began to dawn. Older
perceptions of the Pale as the last outpost of English civility or
as the platform for a revival of English government in Ireland began
to fade, and a new understanding of the region as a distinct zone, threatened on the one hand by the incursions of the lawless Irish, and on the other hand by the oppression of an irresponsible government, began to take root.

Finally, the appreciation that the source of their troubles lay not ultimately with the viceroys, but with the government in London which sent them hither, provided the Palesmen with a new strategy to accompany their new sense of identity. They counted less and less upon the expression of their grievances to the viceroys and more upon a direct presentation of their plight to their sovereign in England. The students of 1561 made their complaints without any prior application to Dublin. William Bermingham did the same. In 1574, agents prepared to go to London without even opening talks with Fitzwilliam; in 1577, they actually did so. Each time they did, moreover, they returned with some sense of achievement. Though initially imprisoned, the students were soon released and the inquiry for which they pleaded was established. William Bermingham's proposals became official government policy for a time, and those of Burnell in 1577 formed the basis of the government's offer on the cess. In 1585 the Palesmen negotiated a final agreement on the cess in England having rejected out of hand, Lord Deputy Perrot's proposals on the matter.

The Palesmen's success at court was in large part due to the highly orthodox and conservative terms in which they defended their position. They insisted at all times that by attacking their governors' authority in this indirect fashion, they were implicitly acknowledging their genuine loyalty to their sovereign. By complaining directly to the queen and by sending agents to court they were, they claimed, simply underlining their true constitutional relation-
ship with their monarch, not abusing it. This argument was emphasised by the students in 1562, and by their elders who petitioned on their behalf and it was reiterated by Netterville and Burnell in 1577. But it was, perhaps, most pithily expressed by Sir Nicholas White, the Palesmen's closest sympathiser on the Irish council. Writing to Burghley in 1577, he urged the treasurer to make "some difference between complaining and disobedience. The lords and gentlemen who feel themselves aggrieved with the greatness of the cess contrary to the laws imagined that to complain was the very gate of obedience through which they must enter with humble petition of redress to their sovereign and prince under whose only will and sentence ... the one (the people) and the other (the viceroy) stand".

This line of defence was nicely calculated to appeal to the sensibilities of Elizabeth and her councillors. Though she was quite sensitive to any threats to the prerogative, Elizabeth was equally concerned to avoid appearing oppressive to natural subjects. By the late 1570s the misbehaviour of the soldiers in Ireland had become something of a scandal in England. Even that brassy chauvinist, Thomas Churchyard, publicly compared "the misery of Ireland" with the sufferings of the oppressed in Spanish Flanders: the parallel was far from flattering to the English government. But the issue was more than a source of embarrassment. Well attested allegations of abuses in Ireland posed a serious challenge to the conservative assumptions of good lordship on which Tudor sovereignty rested. The queen and her councillors freely acknowledged their responsibility to inquire into such charges and the loyalist protestations of the Palesmen persuaded them on each occasion of the need to take action. On another level, however,
the grievances of palpably loyal subjects provided the central
government with one of the most dependable checks on the semi-
autonomous administrations which they had allowed to operate in
Ireland. Thus the crown's occasional interventions on behalf of the
Palesmen was also prompted by a quite practical desire to ensure
that it was getting good value for money.

The cess, the Pale's struggle against it and the overall
success of appeals to the crown were, therefore, of fundamental
importance in determining the future political identity of the
Palesmen. They were the crown's true subjects in Ireland:
steadfast in their loyalty to their sovereign, but unafraid to
complain directly of abuses committed in his name. English and
loyal, they none the less began to withdraw from the interaction
and collaboration with their own administration in Ireland and to
define themselves both politically and culturally against the new
English administrators who came to serve in Ireland. And in its
early stages their withdrawal was encouraged and reinforced by the
central government which aided and abetted their resistance to
unpopular officials which it continued to despatch to rule over
them.

The stability of the Palesmen's new political identity was
underwritten by the support of the crown, but that support itself
was highly precarious. Elizabeth always reacted strongly to
allegations that the Palesmen would impugn her prerogative, but her
anger with the Palesmen on these occasions, was soon revealed to be
the result of misunderstanding and misrepresentation. It subsided
when it was made clear that the Palesmen were not opposed to the
prerogative in principle, but to its practical abuse in Ireland.
This assurance was normally sufficient to satisfy Elizabeth. The
viceroys, however, frustrated by their continuing worstings at the hands of the Palesmen, came to enunciate a much broader interpretation of the prerogative than was current in either Ireland or England. They began, that is, to conceive of the prerogative, not merely as the collection of specific or extraordinary powers traditionally enjoyed by the crown, but as something abstract, amorphous and unlimited. The assertion of this attitude was neither sudden or unequivocal. Bellingham had employed the prerogative to justify a wide range of demands in times of necessity, but he had conceded that consultation might occur with representatives of the country to determine if such necessity actually existed. Sussex took the case further by insisting that the question of necessity was a strategic issue which could be determined only by a military governor. But he himself shied away from basing his demands on the prerogative alone. Characteristically, the clearest expression of this new view came from Sidney. For long, he too, had remained cautious in his attitude. His defence of the cess to the parliament of 1569-71 had been couched in the conventional language of good-lordship. The garrison, he pleaded, was there to protect the community. The price paid in the cess was well worth the gains of peace and prosperity brought by the military presence. In the later 1570s, however, Sidney abandoned these moderate positions. The prerogative, he told the English privy council, was more than a personal attribute of the monarch. It was an administrative tool which could and should be exploited and expanded to improve the revenues and increase the power of the government. Sir Philip, who presented his father's case at court, put the point quite bluntly. The lawyers' quibbles over the constitutional legitimacy of the cess or its enforced composition, he declared, were
irrelevant. The levy, or its money value, was clearly needed by the English governor in Ireland and therefore he must have it: "id maxime justum quod maxime convenit reipublicae". These sentiments were expressed in secret to the council, but Sidney was not averse to making his views plain to the countrymen themselves. To the recalcitrant citizens of Waterford he delivered a scathing rebuke: "Do not you whom God had delivered on several occasions, think that your doing and committing wickedness shall escape his judgement ... beware and humble yourselves in all dutifulness and obedience to his prince. Examine not his authority, neither decipher his power. Compare not your principles with his authority, neither dispute your liberties with his prerogative. For notwithstanding these principles, grants and liberties be great, yet they cannot abate or impugn the least part of your princes prerogative which is so great as nothing can be greater".

These were assertions of a markedly radical character, too radical indeed for the queen and most of her council. As long as the particular issue dividing the governor and the community remained in the eyes of the crown, a relatively moderate one, such an extreme response seemed unwarranted. Sidney's declamations, for the time being, went unheeded. But the argument he enunciated would soon prove to be a powerful instrument in persuading the crown towards more coercive and oppressive courses of action when the issue estranging the Palesmen from government policy was far more politically explosive than the cess, their recusancy. In the meantime, however, the new viewpoint had immediate relevance for every English official in Ireland who, like Sidney, found himself confronted by an indifferent, sometimes hostile and always formidable community. It provided these embattled administrators with the basis
of a new esprit de corps. It gave them a new justification for
treating the Palesmen with disdain and their more powerful Anglo-
Norman relations with outright distrust. Most importantly of all,
it provided at least some explanation for an otherwise inexplicable
phenomenon: the failure of government to make any progress
whatsoever, amongst the Gaelic Irish.
CHAPTER VIII

The Government and the Gaelic Irish

The English approach to Gaelic Ireland had been conditioned from the very outset by the analysis of the nature of Gaelic society which emanated from the Pale in the early decades of the century. That analysis, it will be recalled, was simple and optimistic in its assumptions and highly eclectic in its prescriptions. Despite important ethnic differences, the counsellors of the Pale had argued, Gaelic and Anglo-Norman lordships had succumbed to a common evil which allowed them both to be treated as a single diseased political entity. The pervasive affliction of Ireland was lawlessness and it could be cured simply by the gradual but systematic application of English law first amongst the Anglo-Normans and ultimately amongst the Gaelic clans. The means by which law might be imposed were varied. It could be applied by inducement or by force, by exclusive colonisation or by diplomatic assimilation: it all depended upon which was the most feasible and most reliable way in any given circumstance. The pragmatism and flexibility of this outlook secured its ready adoption by English governors. From almost the very beginning, government policy towards the Gaelic lordships was characterised by a judicious blend of coercion and conciliation. Long-term policies of acclimatising the Irish in the ways of English law were occasionally punctuated by punitive campaigns: limited colonising projects were launched within the general undertaking to assimilate Gaelic Ireland peacefully in the spirit of the kingship act of 1541.

By the early 1580s, however, its eclecticism and opportunism notwithstanding, the policy had been plainly revealed to be a
failure. The Gaelic Irish had been made no more civil, indeed they appeared to be more rebellious than ever. By then a simple and gratifying explanation for the disheartening phenomenon had become available for those who wished to use it. Since the Anglo-Normans of the Pale had shown themselves to be a most treacherous group in times of crisis, it was clear that no trust could be placed in their political advice. Such a repudiation of the Palesmen's analysis entailed a radical break with all past policies. It was made possible only by the shock of the Desmond rebellion and by the upheavals which followed upon it in the Pale and elsewhere. But before the onset of that great simplifying agency, the most common response to the failure of English law to make any progress in Gaelic areas either by coercion or persuasion, was one of utter bewilderment: "There lies some mystery in this universal rebellious disposition", exclaimed Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam in 1572, with an exasperation that was by then familiar to men in his office, "which God for mercy sake grant not only to be revealed, but to be provided for". Simple confusion was the most natural of initial reactions, for the process of failure yielded no critical explanatory factor nor any crucial point of change which might have allowed of easy analysis. Instead, both colonisation and surrender and regrant, the two quite opposite modes employed for the assimilation of Gaelic Ireland, displayed the same common features of decay. Everywhere, that is, amongst English colonies and newly recognised lordships, under English captains and under Gaelic chieftains, the attempt to establish English law succumbed gradually but inexorably to the pervasive and apparently ineradicable disease of gaelicisation. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the course of this degeneration before the hardened attitudes of the 1580s made any further analysis redundant.
(i) Colonisation

One important feature of sixteenth-century schemes for colonisation in Ireland, insufficiently remarked upon by historians, is the strong conservative tendency which they displayed. The source from which colonising proposals emanated and the area selected for colonisation certainly changed over the decades. The form in which the proposals were presented and the arguments advanced in their support were not always the same. Yet on a number of key issues, those who wrote in favour of colonising enterprise between 1515 and the mid 1570s shared a surprising degree of agreement.

Almost everyone was agreed, for instance, that any plantation experiment would be strictly delimited in extent. The typical colony would be formed around the nucleus of a single, heavily fortified site. The establishment of an interlocking chain of such military "nuclear" colonies might be envisaged, but the total absorption of the territory between the individual garrisons within the plantation system, and the success or failure of the plantation, continued to be judged in highly discrete fashion, in terms of the individual fates of its most basic elements. Only very rarely in this period (the exceptions will be discussed below) was the wholesale reconstruction of vast tracts of Irish land under a centrally planned and administered grid system considered. The strategy which was to acquire increasing authority in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries remained, for the most part, an unexplored option in the years before 1579.3
The classic exposition of the prevailing conservative outlook was to be found in Baron Finglas's very well distributed and highly influential "Breviate", which was produced in its definitive official form in the early 1530s. In his treatise, Finglas argued that the fortifications established during the previous attempt at conquest and which now lay derelict throughout the country should be renovated and returned to their original purpose. He estimated that there were some 500 of such "castles and piles" which could still be made to form the basis of new settlements. This strategy, he recommended should first be put into operation in south-east Leinster in the mountainous regions occupied by the O'Byrnes, the O'Tooles and the Kavanaghs. The castles there and the lands attached to them were to be granted away by the king at knight service only, but the grantees in return were to be required to spend 300 marks a year on the defence of their holdings until the settlement had been successfully established. The grants were to be made to military men of some experience, "and such as have no great possessions in England so that they shall not have an eye to return to England, for such like have been the great decay of this land".

Finglas was not the first to promote the nuclear garrison strategy. The author of an anonymous treatise of 1515 also recommended the planting of Englishmen in small settlements in Leinster and along the north-east coastline. The Palesman, Thomas Bathe, writing in 1528 had similar ideas. But it was Finglas who made explicit the assumptions upon which the earlier proposals were made. In the elaborate historical preface to his recommendations, he made it clear that the precedent which he regarded as the model of a successful colonising enterprise was the original
Anglo-Norman conquest of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

In the decade after they had been presented at court, Finglas’s views, sometimes made more elaborate, sometimes modified, formed the backbone of almost every policy memorandum prepared on the subject. A major memorial "for the winning of Leinster", presented to King Henry by the Irish council in 1537, offered only an extended treatment of the ideas contained in the "Breviate", and the several independent projects devised by Robert and Walter Cowley in the same period, displayed a close acquaintance with Finglas’s work. Even Sir Anthony St. Leger, while commissioner in Ireland in 1537-8, echoed Finglas’s views. In the 1540s the colonisers' focus of attention shifted gradually from the Leinster chain towards the midland territories occupied by the notoriously troublesome O’Mores and O’Conors. Walter Cowley was amongst the first to make this change of direction, and it was he who acted as leading counsellor to Sir Edward Bellingham during his campaign in the midlands. But Cowley’s proposed strategy was essentially the same as that which had hitherto been recommended for Leinster. He listed the major fortifications in the area and urged that experienced soldiers be appointed to each on the usual generous terms. The one novel element in Cowley’s scheme, his suggestion that the grants of land to be issued should be relatively large, did not pass without severe criticism from fellow colonisers, and the early failure of initial attempts founded on his proposals seemed to prove his critics right. But renewed propositions to plant in Leix-Offaly in the 1550s showed little divergence from the classical pattern. Edward Walsh, despite his strictures on Cowley’s ideas and the practical efforts that had been founded upon them, urged the revival of the nuclear garrison plan as did the more
immediately influential counsellor, Sir John Alen.  

Sussex's mentor in 1556, Alen also withdrew from Cowley's larger ambitions. It was well, he advised, to attempt only what could be held. Beyond this, however, Cowley and Alen were at one in their mutual acceptance of the garrison model. Alen recommended the establishment of a "few towns well-placed, moderately inhabited, industriously occupied ... justly by laws governed ... and to every town a head gentleman to hold of the Queen and the others to hold of him". 

Alen selected twelve sites for such towns which were to form an interlocking defence line to protect the interior plantation from attack. The chief settlers were to be military men, preferably English. The terms of their leases were to be generous and their grants were to be speedily confirmed against all challenge by act of parliament. With little modification, Alen's memorandum served as the blueprint for the plantation which Sussex was to attempt to establish in the midlands.

Sussex's lack of success in Leix-Offaly did not, however, seriously call into question the assumptions and methods of the classical theory. Indeed, even the earliest critics of the midlands failure produced in their own proposals a strategy that was highly compatible with the original model. William Piers, in his project of 1565, envisaged the construction of a series of fortified towns along the north-east coast in a manner strongly reminiscent of the proposal of 1515. 

Jerome Brett and his associates who sued in 1568 for "the fishing of south and south-east coasts" and an undetermined amount of land around the town of Baltimore were pioneering into hitherto unexplored areas of opportunity, but their proposed form of organisation was quite conventional. 

Similarly, Sir Thomas Smith's ill-fated attempt
to establish a colony in the Ards was, despite the novel ways in which it was justified and publicised, quite conservative in its structure: for this too was planned to be an isolated outpost in hostile territory.  

The conventional colonising strategy of the century, however, reached its culmination in the earl of Essex's ambitious enterprise in Clandeboy in 1573. After expelling the Scots from the region, Essex planned to establish the traditional fortifications along the coast to ensure that they would never return. Adventurers who had attached themselves to the earl would be placed in command of the new forts and would receive their own reward in the large tracts of confiscated land which were to be annexed to each fort. Essex himself, was granted unusually extensive martial and civil powers. Appointed by patent as "principal governor and captain general in the north parts of Ireland", he was given control over all offices of state, including the law offices, he was granted a general commission of _oyer et determiner_ and was allowed to prosecute martial law and to make war by all manner of means against the queen's enemies. In Essex's enterprise, the model which had inspired colonising projects in the previous fifty years attained its closest approximation in reality. The earl came to Ireland, that is, not as some modern "conquistador", but in the most traditional guise of the Norman overlord come to establish peace and order by force of hand and to exact his due reward in return.  

The project writers' attachment to the model of the earlier conquest was not simply due to historical reverence. The Norman colonisation remained relevant because it had been undertaken in conditions which continued to operate in the sixteenth century.
As no central government machine had evolved since to oversee the planting of large numbers of men in extensive areas, would-be colonisers were severely restricted in their resources. Their scale of operations was necessarily limited; persistent problems dictated conservative solutions. In the same way, a common understanding of the insurmountable limitations within which they worked produced a general agreement amongst the strategists in their attitude towards the indigenous population of the areas selected for planting. Because they accepted the conventional view that England was a gravely underpopulated country, the writers recognised from the beginning that no exclusively immigrant plantation would be feasible and that natives would have to be admitted into the settlement in one guise or another. Fearing that it might be dangerous "to depeople the land of England," Finglas argued that the new settlements "may be well inhabited with Irish inhabitants as it was at the conquest, for they be not better labourers nor earthtillers than the poor commons of Ireland ... and they soon will be brought to good frame if they be kept under a law". This ambiguous reformative/exploitative attitude towards the native population was shared by almost every writer who came after Finglas. Walter Cowley believed that after the natives had been defeated and dispossessed by Bellingham, they might then be induced "to inhabit and to fall to husbandry" in the new colonies. Captain Piers also recognised that the success of a colony depended on the availability of a native work-force and the cooperation of the most powerful native chieftains; only the Scots were to be excluded from his enterprise. Ironically, in view of his subsequent conduct, Essex declared upon his arrival in Ulster, that his intentions towards the Gaelic Irish were benevolent and conciliatory. Elizabeth
had assented to his enterprise on the understanding that he
"should have consideration there which she thought had become her
disobedient subjects rather because they had not been defended
from the force of the Scots than for any other cause." His enter-
prise, the earl claimed, was "grounded upon Her Majesty's commiser-
ation with the natural-born subjects of this province over whom
the Scots did tyrannise". 19

This element of paradox in the writings of those who at once
sought to use the native Irish as hewers of wood and drawers of
water and promised none the less to reform and improve them is to
some extent resolved in the writings of Sir Thomas Smith and the
Irishman to whom he was greatly indebted for his ideas on colon-
isation, Rowland White. 20 For Smith and particularly for White,
the purpose of the nuclear colony was to be exemplary. It was to
stand as a model environment whose internal prosperity and content-
ment would induce the Gaelic septs outside to emulate its success.
By definition, of course, this success had to be attained without
any dependence upon or intercourse with the surrounding country-
side. Englishmen, therefore, were to predominate in the colony,
and only those Irish who were willing to forsake their old ways
and to cooperate unreservedly in the building of a new community
were to be admitted within it. White and Smith were realistic
enough to perceive that only those who suffered most from the
exaction of the Gaelic system, the very lowest ranks of Gaelic
society would be willing to make that pledge, and it was from
these groups that they expected to make their recruits. Naturally,
these churls would not receive any elevation in social status
simply by virtue of their inclusion in the new settlement, but
they would now be enabled to carry out the rightful functions of
their station free from the violence and extortion that had brought unnecessary poverty and wretchedness upon them. "The husbandman", wrote Smith, "shall have his land to occupy upon such easy conditions as shall be thought meet and will not be oppressed by coyne and livery ... but contrarywise defended to the uttermost that he may be as rich as he will". 21 "It is neither sought to expel or destroy the Irish race", he concluded, "but to keep them in order, in virtuous labour and in justice, and to teach them English laws and civility". 22 White and Smith both believed that the local Gaelic lords would soon recognise the advantages of the colonists' way of life and looked for the establishment of friendly relations with the chieftains as soon as their colonies' self-sufficiency had been safely established. Though White and Smith were amongst the first to develop this argument systematically, it was this implicit confidence in the exemplary value of the nuclear colony that enabled several counsellors like Bathe, Cowley, the author of the tract of 1515 and White himself, to argue strenuously for plantation projects while at the same time urging the pursuit of a generally conciliatory policy toward the Gaelic Irish without any sense of contradiction. They regarded both as complementary not as mutually exclusive means towards an agreed end.

Within this prevailing conservative consensus, however, some deviations may be discerned. There were the occasional acid fulminations of frustrated administrators who would have been pleased to see the entire native population extirpated root and branch. Such a simple psychological response was to have important implications in the years after 1580, but in the years before it does not occur with sufficient consistency to be read as more than
bad-tempered chagrin. Much more serious was the project advanced by Sir Warham St. Leger and his associates for Munster in 1569.23 Writing at a time when most of the province was in arms against the crown, the adventurers petitioned to be granted the lands of Clancarty, O'Callaghan, the two O'Sullivans and MacDonagh. All of these had been proclaimed rebels, but the petitioners sought not merely to obtain their titles, but the lands "of all their followers and confederates within the province" 24 Such inclusiveness would have given them ownership of much of west-Cork and south-Kerry. The petitioners, moreover, were determined to meet the labour supply problem head on. They proposed to expel the entire native population from the confiscated areas and to plant some 3,000 English immigrants in their place. This was a clear anticipation of later attempts at extensive plantation that would be launched in Munster after the Desmond rebellion. Indeed, the very audacity and ambition of the scheme provoked much misgivings amongst Elizabeth's cautious privy councillors. After some discussion by the council, the project was found to contain "so many difficulties" as to rule out an early decision.25 It was shelved, and Clancarty and his followers were pardoned in 1571.26 Yet even this scheme was not without its conservative elements. It was by no means wholly exclusive to English adventurers, for the petitioners were anxious that grants should also be made to "such of Ireland birth as are descended from the English nation".27 Significantly, Desmond, the region from which rebellion had first emanated, was exempted from the confiscation. The earl himself was sympathetic to the enterprise and his brother, Sir John, was to be given a leading role in launching the plantation. Thus, even here the idea of reviving and extending the old Anglo-Norman conquest remained implicit.28
The petitioners of 1569 shared one further common characteristic with the conservative majority: their offers were couched in terms that were generally critical of any previous attempts that had been made at founding a colony. Since no government effort had actually succeeded in keeping the rebellious Irish in their place, St. Leger and Brett tended to argue, private enterprise should be permitted to try its hand. It was this critical undertone which lent to their case an impression of originality greater than was actually justified by their intentions. In the same way, however, the arguments of their more conservative predecessors had been formulated in opposition to what they believed to be the inadequacies of the government's policies. Finglas and Bathe complained about the government's inaction. Walsh declaimed against the over-ambitious aims of St. Leger and Croft. Piers discounted Sussex's scheme in the midlands as unrealistic. Rowland White did likewise, but he also complained bitterly against the activities of Captain Piers. Sir Thomas Smith believed that the entire colonising enterprise was in desperate need of invigoration. The concomitant of a sound theoretical conservatism, it appears, was a harsh practical criticism.

Emphasis has been given here to two generally neglected aspects of sixteenth-century colonising theory because together they combine to demonstrate the degree to which the actual process of colonisation had diverged from the strategic prescriptions. The critical exhortations of the project promoters clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the record of practical achievement. But the persistence of the old conservative model within their own propositions also reveals their assumption that the orthodox strategy had never actually been put into operation. Something had gone wrong,
they seemed to suggest, between the level of conceptualisation and the level of execution. Seen in this way the very fertility of colonising projects in the mid sixteenth-century may be understood less as the result of pure intellectual development than as the reflection of a practical and apparently insurmountable regress.

Innovations had certainly taken place in the process of colonisation between the late 1540s and the early 1570s. But the changes that had occurred concerned not the internal character of the colonies, but rather the way in which the attempt was made to establish them. The phases through which colonising practice passed were closely determined by the general character of the administration under which colonial projects were undertaken. St. Leger and Croft, for instance, both attempted to incorporate colonising activity within their general policy of collaboration with the gentry of the Pale by promoting the independent project for the midlands advanced by a group of Palesmen and by granting extensive leases to Palesmen once the official government plantation had begun. Similarly, Sussex's attempt to establish a tightly organised military plantation in Leix-Offaly was intimately related to his highly exclusive style of government. Sidney, too, emulated Sussex's example by placing his own military subordinates in positions of strategic importance in the midlands. But as his own control over the chief governorship loosened, and as he found himself compelled to compete for office on the basis of political promises, he showed himself to be increasingly disposed to accept and favour lesser individual enterprises in colonisation. The period when Sidney himself was forced to compete for office by tendering a contract was the same one in which a spate of colonising experiments were farmed out to independent adventurers.
Each of these different approaches to the practical problem of establishing a plantation shared one common fate: they were all failures. The inaction and passivity which were essential to St. Leger's political style took their toll upon the Palesmen's efforts in the midlands. Once challenged by the clansmen, the deputy was unable to give the necessary military support to the planters, and the Palesmen's fragile effort was very soon overwhelmed. St. Leger's failure was total, but its ramifications were not particularly significant. The extent of his commitment to the plantation in Leix-Offaly was strictly limited, and defeat there did not seriously damage the image of his administration in Ireland. The loss of a colony, like the collapse of an early surrender and regrant arrangement, could be easily absorbed by his patient and cautious style of government. Because their attitude to the government at large, however, was so different, the failures of St. Leger's successors in the field of colonisation were far more grave.

In the first place, they attempted much more, not because they gave any special priority to colonisation, but because they were anxious to be as active as possible in all fields of policy. And because their range of experimentation was so wide, much more could - and much did - go badly wrong for them. The failure of Sussex's grand enterprise in the midlands was much more inglorious and much more expensive for his government than St. Leger's limited involvement had been. The losses of Sidney's period were less spectacular, but they were more frequent and, as the cases of Smith, Essex and the Chattertons in the Fews witness, more total. When things went wrong for them moreover, neither Sussex nor Sidney could resort to St. Leger's indifferent disengagement. Their emphatic commitment to programmatic pledges made it imperative
for them to attempt to salvage something from the loss at no matter what cost. They were under heavy pressure, that is, to accept and even to defend whatever remained as a genuine achievement of their intent. Yet because the fabric of their entire government was seriously weakened by losses on any front, the greater the loss they incurred, the less they were capable of controlling or adapting to its consequences. The deterioration of their control over each project as it failed to realise its original intent thus allowed a situation to arise within the areas of failed endeavour which was altogether beyond their expectations. In some areas, as in the Ards and the Fews, the extent of the failure was so great as to leave no after effects, good or ill; but elsewhere from amidst the ruins of a failed colonial enterprise, hybrid settlements emerged which were wholly indifferent to the aims for which colonisation had originally been attempted. Sir Nicholas Bagenal's settlement at Newry was one such hybrid.

Bagenal had originally been granted the extensive possessions of the college at Newry on extremely generous terms in 1550. The intentions of the grant were highly traditional: Bagenal was to establish a fortified military colony which was to serve "for the reduction of those rude and savage quarters to better rule and obedience ... (so) that through his occasion and honest proceedings the inhabitants of those parts will the sooner incline to civility and obedience to the King". To begin with, however, Bagenal showed little enthusiasm either for the military or the exemplary aspects of his charge and when Sussex's disfavour resulted in his dismissal as marshal, he sought to be rid of the property altogether. Upon his reappointment to office under Sidney, however, Bagenal returned to Newry with renewed enthusiasm. He defended
himself there with increasing success against the incursions of Turlough Luineach O'Neill and his allies, and before long was able to mount retaliatory raids of his own. He formed a close alliance with Hugh O'Neill, the baron of Dungannon, and worked tirelessly to detach the O'Neill vassal clans from Turlough by diplomatic means. But increasingly Bagenal grasped the necessity of reaching a permanent settlement with Turlough for the establishment of political stability in Ulster, and in the late 1570s he made strenuous efforts to persuade the English privy council to accept his views. By 1586, as lord governor of Ulster, he could recommend no better strategy for the province than the continuation of the policy of containment which he had pursued since his return to Ulster in the mid 1560s.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Bagenal was no favourer of thorough-going colonising schemes. He was indifferent to Smith, and towards Essex he was positively hostile. His despatches to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam did sterling service to the equally unenthusiastic viceroy by providing him with expert local opinion on the inadvisability of such provocative and risky undertakings. In the meantime, his own undertaking at the Newry prospered. By 1575, the property which he had acquired for the meagre annual rent of £30.11s.8d. was estimated to be worth some £1,640 p.a. and was believed to enjoy an even greater potential. But the estate which he had constructed for himself was hardly the shining outpost of English civility which the Edwardian privy council had anticipated. His property was leased out in large lots and his greatest tenants were Gaelic Irishmen. The large tenancies were undoubtedly sub-let in turn, but Bagenal made no conditions as to the way in which they were to be leased. Within the castle and town
of Newry native Irish and new English rubbed shoulders on equal terms as soldiers and as tenants, and there was no discrimination in rents. Clearly, Bagenal had no personal interest in fulfilling the costly and unrewarding reformative obligations which the Edwardian government had imposed upon him. But successive Dublin governors, unable to replace him by someone better, were more than willing to claim his personal survival in Ulster as some sort of achievement for their government. Bagenal ended his career as he had begun it. From his early service as a mercenary to Conn O'Neill until his death as lord governor, he remained a self-interested, ambivalent go-between, occupying a twilight zone between Gaelic and English polities, concerned primarily with the defence and extension of his own interests and indifferent to the success or failure of classical colonising theory.

Throughout his career in Ireland, Bagenal hardly changed, but his close neighbour in Clandeboy, William Piers, did. Once amongst the strongest advocates of extensive English settlement in the north-east, Piers began to change his mind in the late 1560s and to exploit the immediate possibilities of his situation. He used his solid fortification at Carrickfergus as a base from which to impose his demands upon the surrounding countryside. He did not discriminate in his extortions. The Scots and some of the O'Neills of Clandeboy were his chief prey, but he was the bane of Rowland White's life and eventually put an end to White's little colony at the Dufferin. On the other hand Piers entered a close alliance with the most powerful Irish chieftain of the region, Sir Brian Mac Phelim O'Neill. Sir Brian tolerated Piers' extortionate operations from Carrickfergus while Piers in return left Sir Brian unmolested and used what influence he had to secure his
recognition as legitimate ruler of the clans of Clandeboy in the eyes of the government. Piers continued to report O'Neill's good service and to recommend him for reward into the early 1570s until he found himself at odds with official government policy. Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, who believed that Piers had once planned to murder him, was highly disapproving of the captain's dealings with the clansmen. But it was the earl of Essex who almost ruined Piers' career. Convinced that Piers had given Sir Brian vital information about his weaknesses and intentions, Essex had the captain arrested and at one point seriously contemplated his execution. With Sidney's return in 1575, however, Piers' career soon recovered. Under Sidney's auspices, Piers renewed the tactics which had got him into so much trouble with Essex, forming a new alliance with the remaining strong-man of Clandeboy, Brian Mac Fertagh O'Neill. Like Bagenal, with whom he retained close links, Piers also became aware of the desirability of a genuine reconciliation with Turlough Luineach, and he himself drafted a generous settlement which gave O'Neill control over several vassal clans. The extent to which he had absorbed his experience in Ulster may be measured by the difference between the original colonising "project" of 1565 and the final "plat" drafted by this old promoter sometime in 1580. Piers was still intent upon the expulsion of the Scots. But now although a small group of Englishmen were to play an important supervisory role, Turlough Luineach and the Clandeboy Irish under Brian Mac Fertagh were expected to play a major role in the enterprise. This was to be a joint adventure in conquest: no internal social arrangements were proposed, no reformative intentions were expressed. Thus far had Piers' colonising theory advanced.
It would have been of little consolation to Piers, who had suffered politically and financially from his conflict with Essex, that the earl soon came to accept the underlying logic of his mode of operation. As Essex's own enterprise in Clandeboy became bogged down, as his expenses mounted and his allies deserted, the earl began to seek out other less ambitious ways of establishing himself in Ulster. Increasingly, he became less concerned with the expulsion of the Scots or even with the institution of any plantation in the area, and sued instead for a large portion of Farney where he planned to construct a private place of residence for himself amongst the clansmen. His change of direction was heralded by a marked change of tactics. The reformist claims of his earlier proclamations were forgotten; now sudden and spectacular violence became his chief mode of operation, and it proved rather effective. The murder of Sir Brian Mac Phelim along with the majority of his followers startled Clandeboy and left the area temporarily without a Gaelic leader of any significant force or influence. An even more vicious attack upon the MacDonnells almost banished them from the north-east altogether, and in the autumn of 1574, when he moved to Farney, Essex launched the largest punitive campaign ever conducted against Turlough Luineach in Tyrone. But the ends to which this new ruthlessness were directed were strikingly moderate. Almost immediately after the massacre of Sir Brian Mac Phelim, Essex offered the leadership of the entire territory to a successor of his own choosing, Brian Mac Fertagh. He was willing also to make generous terms to Sorley Boy Mac Donnell on the basis of a personal submission. And early in 1575 he entered into a treaty with Turlough Luineach which the Dublin administration thought to be far too liberal. But Essex himself
was unconcerned by the precise terms of his treaties. What mattered in all cases was that these were personal arrangements depended for their validity on the continuance of good relations between the earl and the other party. Essex once hoped that these peaces would form the basis of his suit for the viceroyalty until he was outbid for the office by Sidney. But despite the Leicester group's enthusiasm for the earlier colonising enterprise, Sidney was more than willing to endorse Essex's reorientation and to propose him as lord president of Ulster. Whatever his title, however, the reality of Essex's newly established position in Ulster would remain the same. At the time of his sudden and early death in 1576, the earl seemed poised for ready absorption into the bastard feudal environment of Gaelic Ulster.

The gradual submergence of a plantation effort under the predominant pressures of the surrounding environment which has been traced in the above instances is most apparent in the largest colonising enterprise launched by the crown in the mid-sixteenth century: the plantation of Leix-Offaly. There, the ordered settlement which Sussex claimed to have instituted never existed in reality. The area had never been at rest; instead a continuous guerrilla war was waged between the native clansmen and the settlers which sometimes exploded in eruptions of ferocious violence. A major insurrection in 1564-5 almost razed the plantation, and though the settlers succeeded in rooting out the strongest pockets of resistance, the colony remained vulnerable to damaging raids throughout the decade. In 1573 serious rebellion broke out again in Leix and in the following year spread to Offaly under the leadership of Rory Oge O'More, grandson of Callough O'More, the chief of the clan who had been executed under questionable
circumstances in 1557. Between 1573 and 1576 Rory, in alliance with
groups of the O'Connors, wreaked havoc in both counties. A ruthless
campaign of attrition waged by the government gradually eroded
Rory's support, but the rebellion continued to smoulder until
1578 when Rory himself was captured and killed by Sir Barnaby
Fitzpatrick. 47

Chronic warfare left the plantation exhausted. In 1574 one
of the greatest planters in Offaly believed his country to be in
a worse state than it ever had been since the beginning of the
plantation and gloomily predicted the utter extinction of the
entire settlement. 48 Even after the suppression of Rory's
rebellion, the settlers declared that the country had been left so
utterly waste by his spoiling"and brought into such poverty that
they could never recover themselves": 49

There were, however, other consequences to Sussex's failure
to maintain control over his carefully planned experiment in the
midlands. First, the settlement ceased to grow. In 1564 there
were eighty-eight grantees in the combined territories with some
two hundred and sixty-two soldier-tenants. Under Sussex's scheme,
the numbers of freeholders and tenants was expected to increase
rapidly, but by 1571 the number in both cases had actually fallen
marginally. This stagnation was accompanied by a strong tendency
for land to become concentrated in the hands of a few large owners.

By 1570 Elizabeth was sufficiently alarmed by developments to warn
Sidney "to have good regard that the inhabitants there (Leix-Offaly)
do not engross many farms unto few hands", but by then the process
was already far advanced. 51 By 1571 the Cosbys had increased their
holdings in Leix from 2,000 acres in 1562 to 4,200 acres. In the
same period, the Colleys almost trebled their holdings in Offaly.
The earl of Kildare had come to acquire some 5,400 acres in the plantation by 1571 while the Gaelic Irishman, Owen Mac Hugh O'Dempsey, who had been granted only a modest holding at the outset, enjoyed an estate of more than 3,300 acres by the same time. The process of concentration was to continue in the 1570s when late arrivals like Robert Harpole grew to rival the great by displacing lesser settlers.

Engrossment was accompanied by a rising demand for a revision of the terms on which the original grants had been made. The planters sought to have their tenures converted from fee-tail to fee-simple not only because the greater freedom of conveyance allowed thereby would facilitate the process of engrossment, but because their responsibility for the early decay of the plantation's objectives would be greatly lessened. It was, indeed, the government's fear that such enlargements would accelerate the return of the native Irish as freeholders in officially proscribed areas that determined its unfriendly response to the request. But by the early 1570s the extent of Gaelic infiltration into hitherto prohibited areas was already very great. Native labourers had never been excluded from the English and Anglo-Norman zones of the settlement, but in the original scheme their numbers were to be strictly limited. By the early 1560s, however, a notable relaxation had occurred: the grants then issued specifically prohibited subinfeudation only to such Irish "as have estate of inheritance within King's County and Queen's County". Native tenants were admitted in large numbers in the restricted zones, however, throughout the 1560s and protected from the full force of law by their own needy landlords. Native Irishmen, like Sir Barnaby Fitzpatrick and Owen Mac Hugh O'Dempsey, moreover, attained positions
of major importance in the governance of the plantation. Under Sidney, Fitzpatrick became lieutenant of Leix, thus enjoying a title which Sussex had once specifically reserved for his own brother. O'Dempsey was recognised by the government as one of the greatest defenders of the plantation in Offaly, and for a time, under Fitzwilliam's recommendation, the crown seriously considered granting him the lordship of Galin in the west of the county on condition that he banish the outlawed O'Connors and establish an independent colony of his own there in the classical style.

That the idea of granting such autonomous powers to a Gaelic Irishman should be seriously considered as late as 1573, is a striking indication of the extent to which the plantation had diverged from the objectives which Sussex had laid down.

Engrossment and the infiltration of Gaelic freeholders and tenants, however, led to an even more serious source of decay within the plantation. The few who grew great in these circumstances did so by adopting the political and social mores of the clansmen who surrounded them. Kildare's use of Gaelic kerne over whom he had been given charge by the government for his own personal and quite illegal purposes has already been noticed. But his neighbours in the plantation were hardly more restrained. Sir Francis Cosby, Fitzpatrick, O'Dempsey, Henry Colley, the government's chief officer in Offaly, and his successor, Edward More, all extended their patronage to delinquent septs of the O'Mores and O'Connors for their own purposes and ignored the clansmen's disorders and flagrant disregard of English law. When a personal feud broke out between Fitzpatrick and More, both set about retaining additional kerne without any regard for the welfare of the country, "the Lieutenant retaining one sort of the O'Connors and Mr. More
another so as through their overthwart (sic) dealings the country is utterly spoilt and become waste for the most part, and the rebels enabled thereby". Cosby and O'Dempsey also employed kerne to their own purposes. O'Dempsey made much use of some septs of the O'Mores in a feud with the O'Mollos and as a means of foisting a protection racket upon the smaller freeholders of Leix. Cosby alleged that O'Dempsey was intent upon driving the settlers to ruin. Despite his indignation, however, Cosby himself closely emulated O'Dempsey's practices. For he too was notorious as "a great devourer of Englishmen", and he too formed an alliance with a leading sept of the O'Mores in order to serve his purposes. From the late 1560s, Cosby had been a friend and protector to Rory Oge O'More "until he had grown out into a great, great force in Leix". His friendship with Rory not only gave Cosby's own property immunity from attack, but also enabled him to mount awesome pressure upon his neighbours. On at least one occasion, Cosby's attempts to intimidate lesser freeholders led him into serious trouble with the privy council. Rory's defiance in 1573, however, severed this particular alliance for good: after this it was war to the death on both sides.

Yet even the highly energetic response of Cosby and his fellow grandees to Rory's rebellion tended only to confirm the degree to which they had adopted Gaelic modes of politics. As the rebellion dragged on, both the grandees and the lesser freeholders came to agree that their mutual security could be guaranteed only by the utter extirpation of all the landless septs in the plantation. In 1576 a number of Offaly planters, some of whom were themselves Gaelic Irishmen, proposed the most ruthless of strategies for dealing with the chronic troubles of the area. The clansmen, they
urged should be driven to "straight corners in the county and there cut short by those appointed to go there". Cosby and the other most powerful planters had already endorsed the proposition. The ruthless war of retribution they waged against Rory and any who would offer him succour was intended to stamp out any potential pockets of resistance for ever. Even Rory's own death did not curb their rage: they were determined to pre-empt the possibility of his mantle descending upon a successor. To that end, sometime in 1578, Cosby and Robert Harpole summoned Lysagh Mac Conall, the remaining leader of the O'Nores, and several septs of the clan to a meeting at Mullaghmast on the borders of Kildare. The ostensible reason for the meeting was the settlement of all disputes outstanding upon the death of Rory Oge, but "as they entered in that place, they were surrounded on every side by four lines of soldiers and cavalry who proceeded to shoot and slaughter them without mercy"; few escaped. The violence heralded no positive programme of reform. Like Essex's in Ulster, these killings were merely a fearful retribution upon insolent subordinates who had attempted to withstand the ruling powers. After this, Cosby could look for his due respect amongst the natives and the settlers alike.

The massacre at Mullaghmast was a spectacular demonstration of the failure of any reformative or regenerative objectives which the original project to plant in the midlands may have had. Yet it was also the almost inevitable consequence of a process that had begun years before. The motives behind the leading planters' ready adaptation to the Gaelic environment were mixed. In part, their conversion had been dictated simply by sheer expediency: having been deserted by a government incapable of fulfilling its obligations, they had little other way of surviving. Yet their reaction was also
greatly determined by their realisation that the Gaelic ways were the surest avenue to power and to profit. The "very sweetness" of the Gaelic system, as Tremayne put it, offered an opportunity to *arrivistes* like Cosby, Moore, Bagenal and Piers, an opportunity for wealth and power which they could never have secured had they fulfilled their duties strictly as officers of the crown. Thus, the increasing loss of control over the process of colonisation which occurred at a time when so many colonising projects had been set in motion resulted not only in the failure of attempts to establish English laws and customs in Ireland by way of example, but in an intensification of Gaelic modes of political action. In this sense, the colonisers increasing willingness to resort to ruthless violence in order to defend their positions, marked no revulsion from their acquiescence in gaelicisation, but yet another phase in the very same process. To massacre on a hitherto unprecedented scale was simply to outdo the Irish at their own game. In the midlands as in Ulster, the would-be planters did not transcend the violence of the Gaelic system, they merely compounded it.

The collapse of the general enterprise in colonisation, however, should not of itself have been a source of confusion. Had it occurred in isolation, Tudor statesmen would have been more capable of formulating some pragmatic and effective remedy. Genuine bewilderment arose only when the very same process occurred and the very same results ensued from a strategy that was both in conception and technique radically different from colonisation, the policy of "surrender and regrant".
By the early 1550s St. Leger's policy of surrender and regrant had undergone a significant transformation. The hurried formal agreements, the passing of patents, the visits to court and the rapid endowment of titles had long since been abandoned and had been replaced by a series of \textit{ad hoc} treaties securing short-term understandings, but deferring permanent settlement. The changes marked a recognition of the inapplicability of the original, over-schematic approach, and were a response to the serious problems which it had encountered. But they did not constitute a withdrawal from the ultimate aspirations of the policy. Expressions of complete disillusion with a policy of conciliation were rare and few influential figures in government subscribed to them. St. Leger and particularly Sir James Croft had both been given the opportunity of adopting a more aggressive strategy, and both had rejected it. Their willingness to serve in office in Ireland with the most meagre resources was in itself an indication of their belief that the least war-like policy was also the most promising one. Neither had repudiated the hopes of surrender and regrant, but both had, in the light of a formidable experience, severely revised their understanding of the means by which such hopes might be realised.

Despite their criticisms of their predecessors, moreover, neither Sussex nor Sidney contemplated the abandonment of surrender and regrant as a central government policy. The chief aim of his policy towards the Gaelic Irish, Sussex professed, was to ensure that "every possessed of the captaincy of his nation should be induced to leave that tenure and to take the same from the prince
to him and his heir male".\textsuperscript{66} In 1565 Sidney's declared aim was no different: the "Irish captains should be induced as they have heretofore offered to take estates of their land by way of inheritance to them and to their heirs male".\textsuperscript{67} Both men also adopted the traditional techniques of establishing preliminary relations with the Irish captains. Like Grey and St. Leger before them, they made frequent and extensive tours of the provinces with the intent of impressing the Gaelic lords with their power and authority. Sussex had plans to bring his parliament of 1556 to Limerick in order to allow the Munster Irish to participate and Sidney sought to gain the attendance of as many Gaelic captains as possible at his projected parliament of 1566.\textsuperscript{68} These, admittedly, were unrealised ambitions. But the practical achievements of both men elsewhere were by no means insignificant.

Sussex's and Sidney's shared antagonism towards Shane O'Neill, Sussex's deep misliking for Desmond, Sidney's for Thomond, have given rise to the false impression that neither was in sympathy with the general conciliatory spirit embodied in surrender and regrant. Other, it is hoped more plausible, explanations have already been offered to account for these particular cases, but no matter how they are to be interpreted, they have unnecessarily distracted attention from a far larger number of lesser instances in which the ends of surrender and regrant were enthusiastically pursued by both governors. Sussex, for instance, was particularly anxious to establish a peaceful settlement with MacCarthy More whom he considered to be one of the most powerful and yet friendly men in Munster, and one "very desirous" to have his estates confirmed to him by surrender. Sussex knighted MacCarthy in 1558 and repeatedly urged Elizabeth to raise him to the peerage, until at
length, the captain completed the formal process of surrender at Westminster in 1565 and had the title, earl of Clancar, conferred upon him. Sussex also secured similar surrenders in Munster from O'Sullivan Beare and MacCarthy of Muskerry. But his main interest lay in Ulster. He was quick to renew relations which St. Leger had already established with the lesser captains of the province who sought to be free of pressure from the O'Neills.

Early in his first term of office, Sussex toured the province outside Tyrone, settling what disputes had arisen amongst the captains and confirming the arrangements they had made with St. Leger. Before he departed he had gained their assent to attend upon hostings and to supply victuals to the government's troops on campaign. Typically, Sussex exaggerated the importance of these initial agreements. Yet they proved to be more resistant of pressure from Tyrone than might have been expected. The services he had demanded continued to be erratically acknowledged by the captains and Sussex was able to preserve tenuous diplomatic links with most of their number throughout his period in office.

Even his least successful liaison with the MacMahons of Fermanagh was not without some result. MacMahon promised allegiance only if Sussex would "kill none of his people", and the lieutenant was once compelled to spoil the territory in order to prevent the captains' withdrawal to O'Neill. But throughout, MacMahon yielded up supplies and paid a fitful attendance upon hostings against Shane, and Sussex conveyed the conventional recommendations of his service to the queen. Matters were better with the O'Reilly's. In 1558 Sussex arbitrated a series of disputes between the chief and the borderers of the Pale. He convinced O'Reilly of the crown's good-will and induced him to join
in the alliance against O'Neill. O'Reilly maintained a regular correspondence with Sussex throughout his viceroyalty, and provided the support he had promised. Sussex on his part, placed an exceptional confidence in the chieftain, reporting his good service to the privy council and recommending that he be created earl of the Brenny. O'Reilly, he argued, was already so civil and so bound to the government, that no president or intermediary official would be required to monitor his activities for the crown: he should be allowed deal directly with the chief governor. Sussex, however, established his closest personal relations with a lesser chief who had attained an unusually high degree of formal education, Shane Maguire. Maguire's extant personal correspondence with the lieutenant and with Lady Sussex displays a grace and a mannered familiarity that is remarkable for the time. He was Sussex's chief native confidant in Ulster, and the lieutenant was particularly anxious to have him confirmed in his title and elevated to the peerage. Less intimate, but more strategically important, was Sussex's alliance with Callough O'Donnell. Callough was less attractive and more insecure in his own territory than most of the other Ulster chieftains with whom Sussex dealt. But his claims to succeed to his father's title were undeniable, and Sussex was determined to complete the process of assimilation begun years previously with Manus even to the point of concluding a formal, if rapid, surrender of Tyrconnell at a time when the unfortunate Callough had little authority left in his territory to offer up.

As in every other sphere, Sidney did not depart from Sussex's practice; he simply did more. On his first tour of Connaught he received the assent of several lesser chieftains to preliminary demands similar to those which Sussex had placed upon the Ulster Irish.
Like Sussex, he was confident that these initial arrangements would in time give way to the more formal processes of surrender and regrant, since many of the captains, like O’Hara, had fallen "in such love of Englishmen and English government as he vowed to go into England and to behold the majesty of our sovereign". In 1567 not only O’Hara, but O’Conor Sligo and the son and heir of O’Reilly departed with Sidney to conclude formal surrenders at court. In his second tour of duty, Sidney entered into further preliminary arrangements with the O’Rourkes and the MacGeoghans, and formally partitioned the Annaley amongst the feuding O’Farrells in much the same way as St. Leger had attempted to impose an orderly settlement upon the O’Tooles.

It has often been suggested that such general encouragement of the lesser chieftains was no more than a machiavellian attempt to undermine the power of the great lords. But the degree to which these exercises deviated from the original purposes of surrender and regrant should not be exaggerated. The eventual release of the urrithe from the great Gaelic overlords had been clearly envisaged by St. Leger and Cusack, even though they could see no adequate means of accomplishing the work at once. Alternatively, Sussex and Sidney were realistic enough to accept that some form of compensation would have to be paid to the great lords for their loss of authority. Sidney’s composition scheme clearly made room for such accommodations. This strategic orientation, then, appeared to originate with Sussex and Sidney only because they employed it on a large scale. In this as in everything else, they were simply more energetic and audacious, deeming to be immediately feasible what their predecessors had merely regarded as desirable.
The governors' attitude towards the great lords, in any case, was hardly one of unrelieved hostility. Sussex's determination to defend St. Leger's politically unrealistic settlement in Thomond has already been noticed, and his successor was equally capable of extending remarkable generosity to the powerful. The terms offered to Turlough Luineach O'Neill in 1567 were, given the circumstances of Shane O'Neill's demise, surprisingly moderate. Turlough was to be made a baron and his captaincy over the clansmen of Tyrone was to be formally recognised by the government. The Urrithe and the O'Neills of Clandeboy were to be excepted from his rule. But even with these conditions the offers extended to Turlough were strikingly similar to those accepted by Con O'Neill in 1542. Sidney's plans for Turlough, as we have seen, were forestalled by events in England. But though he never achieved his aim, and though at times he seemed willing to abandon it, the establishment of Turlough as a stable power in Ulster remained central to Sidney's policy for the north. Even in 1575, after innumerable indications of Turlough's instability and undependability, Sidney was still hopeful that a permanent settlement could be reached. He persuaded Turlough to withdraw the inflated demands he had made upon Essex and to petition for a renewal of the 1567 terms. Sidney promoted the suit enthusiastically, recommending that Turlough be made earl of Clanconnell and that his sons be made barons "of some one place". In 1578 Sidney renewed his promise to secure a satisfactory settlement for Turlough, and before he left Ireland the patents making Turlough an earl and a baron had already been drawn up.

Neither in theory nor in practice, then, did Sussex or Sidney abandon the policy of surrender and regrant. It remained for both,
as it had been for St. Leger, the essential part of a programme of reform in Gaelic Ireland in which colonisation could play only a limited role. But if the change in government after 1556 involved no basic change in policy, the novel pressures placed upon these short-term administrations committed to specific programmes of action seriously influenced the way in which the policy was to be implemented. Neither Sussex nor Sidney could afford the leisurely approach required by St. Leger's revised version. Their terms of service precluded the possibility of allowing final settlements to emerge slowly from within: they had to be imposed quickly from without. This imperative for tangible results, hastily achieved, exercised its evil influence on two levels. In general political terms, it added extraneous considerations to the policy which re-imposed the rigidity that St. Leger's revisions had attempted to overcome. The achievements of the new governors had to be expressed in undeniably concrete ways, through legitimate lineages safely established or through revenues saved or gained; the quieter success of a developing process well supervised was not enough. Much more was promised, much more was undertaken, and so, as in the case of colonisation, much more was placed at risk. The rush towards stability, moreover, produced a second, extremely thorny administrative problem. How were those areas of operation which did not lend themselves easily to rapid assimilation to be contained within the general ambit of government control, to prevent them from degenerating into the chaos of factional strife which had been St. Leger's sorry experience?

The first of these difficulties was the most obvious, but perhaps, the least grave. Sussex's anxiety to defend what he believed to be a pre-existing legal and juridical framework led
him to adopt an inflexible attitude which was altogether out of place in Thomond and Tyrone. The circumstances of Sidney's appointment allowed him to be more detached in these matters of succession, yet in assuming office he too had incurred external obligations which imposed an equal incubus upon surrender and regrant. In promising to govern Ireland not only more efficiently, but also more economically than Sussex, Sidney was compelled to look upon surrender and regrant both as a way of producing political stability and as a means of raising a new revenue. The idea that surrender and regrant could be financially profitable was not new. St. Leger and Sussex both believed that a substantial rental might eventually be raised from the recognised lordships. Sussex had computed detailed estimates of the potential gains and had even begun to collect a fractional proportion of the sum. But Sidney set out with the clear intention of realising Sussex's projections. Far from being a late stage in the entire process, the collection of a rent, he argued, should be the very first. In his preliminary negotiations with the Irish chiefs he made it clear that he regarded the payment of a fixed sum of money was an essential pre-condition to any further diplomatic progress. No advance would be made if the chiefs reneged upon their financial obligations. By 1571, however, Sidney had received only some £593 in such payments and even this small sum was highly uncertain. Sidney's anxiety to turn a profit had apparently made many of the chieftains wary of entering into formal relations with the crown. When money became a leading consideration, they began to have second thoughts about the advantages of surrender and regrant.

This emerging distrust, however, was of secondary importance. For Sidney as for Sussex, the most immediate and most serious problem
to be confronted was administrative. The intense pressure which they placed upon the process of assimilation created the need for some intermediate and short-term agency which would retain the chiefs in compliance with their initial obligations, or at least maintain some semblance of order within the unreconstructed lordships. The solution happened on by both men was the same, and it was not, in conception at any rate, novel: the seneschal system.

Originally denoting one who was a chief in the household of a feudal lord, the office of seneschal gradually acquired larger administrative and political responsibilities. In late medieval Ireland, the seneschal was the title normally given to the chief administrative officer of the great palatine liberties. In the early sixteenth century, the Dublin administration seems to have assumed the responsibility of appointing seneschals in liberties which were no longer under the direct control of the feudal lord. To begin with, the procedure was innocuous: local families, like the Synnotts in Wexford, or the Savages in the Ards, continued to occupy the office under the crown as they had done under their lord. The Act of Absentees, however, passed in the parliament of 1536, granted the crown full title to the abandoned seignories, and paved the way for major change. In 1553 the appointment of Francis Agard as seneschal in Wexford, marked the first occasion when a government servitor was preferred over a local figure for the office. The transfer to the state of the feudal powers enjoyed by seneschal was of immense potential significance, but it was not until Sussex came to Ireland that the larger possibilities of the office were explored.
Apart from his diplomacy, St. Leger's other means of dealing with the threat posed to the Pale by the Gaelic Irish had been traditional: the maintenance of a number of border outposts under the command of military captains. The system was entirely defensive. The captains' chief responsibility was to protect the Pale from raids and to prevent those raids when possible by preemptive action of their own. No sustained intervention in the politics of the local clans was undertaken. The system, moreover, did not work well. By mid-century several of the wards were abandoned and some, like Dungarvan and Wicklow, were in the hands of local families. St. Leger made some attempt to reassert the government's authority in the Leinster area, but only one of his appointees, Brian Jones at Carlow, remained after his departure.  

It was Sussex who instituted genuine reform. As an extension of his plan to refortify Bellingham's forts in the midlands, Sussex also undertook the reconstruction of the wards of the Leinster chain. He rebuilt Ferns, Leighlin and Athlone, and placed men of his own appointment in each. He renewed Agard's appointment in Wexford and removed Dungarvan from the Walshes. Sussex also greatly extended the powers and responsibilities of the new warders. Now they were charged with supervising and even ruling, amongst the septs against whom they had hitherto merely waged preventive war. Jacques Wingfield, the constable of Dublin Castle, was given special responsibility for the country of the O'Byrnes. Nicholas Heron at Leighlin, was charged with "the keeping of the Kavanaghs". Seneschal Agard was made constable at Ferns and given similar responsibility over certain septs of the same clan. The new constables were issued with impressive commissions of peace and array. They were allowed billet and victual their men at
their discretion. They were empowered to imprison, fine and "to prosecute by fire and sword those enemies and rebels who should attempt any evil against the crown". In addition, they were made responsible for the fulfilment of any military or financial obligations which the Gaelic chiefs may have entered into. They were given command of Gaelic contingents from their areas upon general hostings, and empowered to exercise martial law over the conscripted clansmen. By the time he left Ireland, Sussex's revitalised constables had been firmly established in Leinster. He was proud of his achievement and recommended its extension throughout the rest of the country. 93

Sidney took the advice. On his first tour of Leinster, he confirmed Heron in his position, appointed Robert Pipho over the septs of west-Wicklow, replaced Wingfield by Agard as controller of the O'Byrnes and recommended Stucley for Agard's place in Wexford. Sidney also made one further advance. He confirmed the constables in the enlarged powers which Sussex had bestowed upon them by extending to some of them the other title enjoyed by the constable at Wexford: he called them seneschals. 94

In the years following 1566, the seneschal system was gradually extended throughout the country and the powers of the office were formally ratified. Seneschals were appointed in Westmeath, in Clare and in Galway. They were made responsible for the payment of all new rents and services and were required to oversee the conversion of Gaelic military service, or "bonnaught", into a cash payment. They were authorised to undertake the "booking" of the clansmen and were held responsible for the apprehension of proclaimed rebels and outlaws in their territories through the use of martial law. Yet the exemplary and educative
purposes which characterised the presidential idea were absent from their brief. They were under no injunction to observe the procedures of common law when possible: their task was simply to maintain order and raise a revenue by whatever means they might. The appointment of seneschals, of course, marked no deliberate withdrawal from the assimilative objectives represented by a presidency. The office was regarded as a temporary expedient. Seneschals were intended to stabilise the lordship during the delicate opening phases of its contact with English government. As the lordship gradually became more accustomed to the ways of English governance, the seneschalship was expected to wither away and to be replaced by the conventional sheriff. Reality, however, was to belie these hopes. The presence of English government officials amidst the Gaelic lordships was in time expected to exercise a powerful cultural influence over the clansmen, but the process worked in reverse.  

The Englishmen who filled the post of seneschal were a varied group. They had not all come to Ireland at the same time and they were not all connected with the same affinity. Some, like Francis Agard, Francis Cosby and Nicholas Heron had been servitors in Ireland before Sussex's arrival; others like Henry Stafford and Henry Radcliffe, left with him; others again, like Robert Pipho and Henry Harrington came to Ireland with Sidney and remained long after him. But they did have some characteristics in common. All of them were men of some previous military experience and at least three are known to have served in King Henry's expeditionary force at Boulogne. They had little expertise in civil law: only one of their number, Nicholas White had any legal training and his short tenure of the office was a clear
indication that such skills were unpopular and redundant. They displayed little enthusiasm for religious reform. Only one, Francis Agard, was noted to be a furtherer of the church and at least two others were alleged to be papists. But most were indifferent, preferring, like the constable of Dungarvan, to surround themselves with men who enjoyed the company of "a hawk, a whore and a hound" to men who read their bibles. Some, like Cosby and Agard, were related by blood before they came to Ireland, but many more established such connections by marriage. Robert Harpole's son and heir married Henry Davell's daughter, and another Harpole son married Francis Cosby's daughter. Cosby's eldest son reciprocated by marrying Harpole's daughter. Another of Cosby's daughters married into Sir Henry Sidney's family, while Henry Harrington became Sidney's son-in-law. Mary Agard was betrothed to Sir Warham St. Leger. A son of Nicholas Heron married a daughter of Marshal Bagena! Through these interlinkages and connections with influential figures in Irish government, the seneschals established themselves collectively as part of a national power elite.

Interaction amongst the seneschals, however, was not always harmonious. Harpole, the constable at Carlow, greatly distrusted Robert Pipho, the seneschal of west-Wicklow. Thomas Masterson, the seneschal of Wexford quarrelled first with Henry Davell's at Dungarvan and later with Harrington, the seneschal of the O'Byrnes. Harrington collided seriously with the earl of Kildare and Masterson carried on a long feud with the wealthy English settlers in Wexford, the Colcoughs. Thus, though they may be seen to have formed a coherent social group, the English seneschals did not constitute a unified administrative corps with a common esprit.
The characteristics they shared were those of personal background and a common personal interest in the future; they bore little relation to the general purposes of the government. As such, they gave expression to their similarities and to their disagreements with equal disregard for the concerns of those who appointed them.

As might be expected, then, their execution of their responsibilities was erratic and negligent. Their wards were at all times inadequately furnished. Robert Harpole, it was alleged, kept no more than half of the assigned complement of troops at Leighlin Bridge. Despite Sussex’s efforts, the fort there was declared by a survey of 1574 to be almost beyond repair. Dungarvan was noted by Sidney in 1576 to be in dire need of repair; by 1581, Ferns was an abandoned ruin. This general decay, however, was by no means a symptom of a general apathy for even as they allowed their official residences to fall into desuetude, the seneschals were busy acquiring extensive personal holdings in the areas under their authority.

Similarly, the seneschals had no qualms in departing even from the loose guidelines that had been laid down for their conduct. Their mode of operation within their jurisdiction was highly irregular. Their sessions and the laws applied in them were dubious: pledges and restitutions were accepted, open pardons were frequently granted. They took bribes and exacted perquisites. They became immersed in the prevailing factionalism, making alliance with certain septs in their areas and sometimes taking their allies into formal government service. Few, however, went so far, as Pipho, who married into the chief sept of the O’Byrnes. Their governmental responsibilities were soon blurred by these informal
alliances. Complaints of the despoiled were ignored, known outlaws were sheltered, witnesses intimidated and the country was not infrequently left a prey to the extortions of the seneschal's favoured group. Along with the abandonment of any pretence at impartiality came a habit of resorting at will to extravagant and unwarranted violence. When Henry Harrington wanted to rid his territory of the troublesome Lucas O'Toole, he travelled to Dublin, raided a tavern in which O'Toole was lodging and had him hanged peremptorily before morning: there was no indictment, no warrant and no trial. In 1580 when Thomas Masterson grew exasperated with the unruliness of one of the septs of the Kavanaghs, he laid ambush for them and slaughtered over sixty. Harrington laid a similar plot for Fiagh Mac Hugh O'Byrne, but without success. Later in the 1580s, Dudley Bagenal, then seneschal at Ferns, repeated Mastersons exploit against the Kavanaghs with like results. Massacre is an impressive way to assert authority. But as in the case of degenerate colonisation, the readiness of the seneschals to employ violence against any resistance they encountered did not result in any significant advance for English law and order in the Gaelic areas under their charge. During the regimes of Stucley and Masterson, Wexford remained in a state of almost continual disorder. Serious disturbances erupted in 1579 which were quelled not by the seneschal, but by a special commission appointed from Dublin. Throughout the 1570s, intermittent warfare continued between the settlers and the Kavanaghs, and though Sidney sought to make the best of Masterson's service, he was forced to make a personal intervention into the affairs of the country in 1577. In 1579 Drury was less concerned to protect the seneschal's reputation. The entire responsibility for the waste state of the
country, he declared, lay entirely with Masterson. Lord Deputy Grey confirmed Drury's poor opinion. By his negligence, extortion and corruption, Masterson, he believed, had alienated more loyal subjects than he had won by his severity. He had the seneschal dismissed from office and placed under arrest. But the disgrace was only temporary, and Masterson was soon permitted to resume his office unhampered by further scrupulous interference from Dublin.

The countries of the O'Tooles and the O'Byrnes proved even less susceptible to progress. Despite Brian O'Toole's experience as a sheriff, despite repeated requests from the O'Byrnes that they might undergo the process of surrender and regrant, and despite the fact that both areas were believed to be ripe for full absorption into the Pale in the early 1560s, no progress was made under either Sussex or Sidney. The lack of success was due in good part to the conduct of the seneschal, Francis Agard, who, it was said, was too prone to leave the Irish to their own devices. Agard's successor, Harrington, was also accused of diffidence, but a mere insouciance was not the underlying cause of their laxity. Both men remained on close terms with the powerful sept of Hugh Mac Shane O'Byrne who engaged in a long-standing succession dispute with the lesser septs of the clan. Agard retained a remarkable personal control over the otherwise ungovernable Hugh, and on most occasions was able to bring him and his allies amongst the O'Tooles to order when required without force. After an early and difficult period of adjustment, Harrington too came to enjoy a similar understanding with Hugh's son and heir, Fiagh. Rather than attempting to suppress the dispute between Hugh and his rivals, the seneschals aided and abetted its progress, for its continuance allowed them to assume a position of power and influence amongst the
clansmen which would otherwise have been impossible. Not as the agents of English law, but simply as third parties in the configuration of Gaelic factional politics, they became sought after, feared and honoured, and came to acquire also the material benefits that were inevitably attached to so fortunate a place. They could have no interest in seeing their special position suddenly undermined by the assimilation into the Pale. All the incentives were on the side of leaving things as they were.

Agard's and Harrington's experience amongst the O'Byrnes serves to illuminate the general position occupied by the English seneschals throughout the Gaelic territories. The Gaelic practices of restitution and compensation were not only the easiest legal procedures to adopt, they were also the most lucrative. The Gaelic system's ready acceptance of naked violence not only offered an easy escape from frustration, but provided also an attractively simple avenue to great personal power. Finally, the perquisites available to them as brokers within the Gaelic polity were considerably more remunerative than those enjoyed by orthodox executives within the English administration. By the early 1580s, the seneschals had begun to explicitly justify their behaviour. Harrington conceded that he operated a protection system and accepted restitutions, yet he asserted that this was the way he had come to command respect amongst the natives. In view of the influence he had begun to assert over Fiagh Mac Hugh, his was a strong case.

The seneschals' real power, then, was predicated upon their continuing willingness to ignore or to pardon a certain level of violence. Raids upon other rival septs or upon their allies, an inordinate incidence of highway robbery and the chronic extortion of
coyne and livery was the price which Agard and Harrington paid for their alliance with the dominant sept of the O'Byrnes. Within this alliance, moreover, a continuous process of bargaining went on in which each side measured the extent of its power over the other. The occasional massacres formed part of this pattern, but at times it could result in serious embarrassment for the seneschals themselves, as when Hugh Mac Shane raided Dublin itself and Fiagh visited a punishing raid upon Seneschal Masterson. The net result of all this interaction, however, was simply to accentuate the chronic lawlessness with some spectacular displays of violence. The price of the seneschals' survival was the death of the government's aims. Yet the more the chief governors pressed those aims, the more they were compelled to recruit and to depend upon these semi-autonomous regional agents. Because he was desperate to find some means of keeping the Leinster Irish in some semblance of order and yielding some token of the great revenues he promised for the future while he set about the more ambitious objectives of his programmes, Sidney was more than willing to leave Agard and Harrington to their own devices as long as they met these minimum requirements. For the same reason, Sidney greatly preferred the unscrupulous, but effective Thomas Stucley as seneschal in Wexford to the conscientious civil lawyer Nicholas White. And for this reason also, he welcomed unreservedly the unsolicited appearance in Ireland of one of the most ambitious would-be seneschals, Sir Peter Carew.

After his ostentatious waiver of his claim to the land occupied by Sir Christopher Cheevers, Carew proceeded immediately with his suit against the Kavanaghs. The clansmen's defence was so weak that it was regarded as no plea at all, and on 1st of June
In 1569, Carew was granted full title to the barony of Idrone, "as of his lawful and ancient inheritance". Sidney had even larger plans for Carew. After his failure to have Stucley's appointment as seneschal in Wexford ratified by the queen, Sidney had deliberately kept the constableship at Leighlin vacant though the new seneschal, White, had nominal title to it. But in February 1569 he placed Carew unofficially in the fort, and immediately thereafter Carew petitioned to have his appointment as constable confirmed. White objected and Carew remained unrecognised, but as with Stucley, Sidney continued to invest Carew with the reality of the seneschal's powers. In March he was joined with the sheriff of Carlow on a commission which empowered him "to prosecute suppress vanquish and utterly destroy all enemies, rebels and traitors by fire and sword and by all politic means that shall seem best to their discretion." He was authorised to cess, to billet, to conscript men for service and to negotiate agreements with whom he thought fit. Carew quickly adapted to his semi-official role - he did Sidney good service in defending the country against the attacks of the rebel Butlers - but he was primarily concerned to use his new position as a means of stabilising his relations with his Gaelic tenants in Idrone. Whatever hostility the Kavanaghs may have felt towards the interloper at the outset was soon dissipated by Carew's judicious mixture of coercion and flamboyant good-lordship. After some early disputes he quietly confirmed the chief members of the clan as freeholders and granted easy leases to the remaining groups. He kept a house at Leighlin "which was so liberal and bountiful as none (was) like unto him in that country". He extended a full pardon to all who had first resisted him. By the early 1570s the Kavanaghs had grown accustomed to their new overlord and his greatest opponent, Brian
Mac Cahir Kavanagh, had taken to English language and dress under Carew's friendly tutelage. It was even said that Carew's success with the Kavanaghs had encouraged other clans to seek his lordship. Carew himself readily assumed the role of a gaelicised overlord. He became immersed in the traditional feud between the Kavanaghs and the Wexfordmen. He refused to deliver persons indicted for theft in Wexford and quarrelled seriously with Seneschal Masterson. He became the leading opponent of the government's attempts to impose cess in Carlow. He complained strongly against the exactions of Harpole's troops, and offered to enter into a composition arrangement for his territory similar to those being made with the seneschals by Gaelic chiefs elsewhere. Carew was so pleased with his experiment in Idrone, that he hoped to repeat it in some other lands in Cork in which he held a similar claim. But Fitzwilliam, the governor to whom he made the suit, shared none of Sidney's programmatic imperatives, nor were the lands which he sought of much strategic import, and so his plans on this occasion came to nothing.

The early deviation of seneschals and constables, like Agard, Harrington, Masterson and Carew, their rapid accommodation to the prevailing modes of Gaelic politics inevitably attracted critical attention. One of the most critical observers of the process was himself a former, though somewhat exceptional, seneschal, Sir Nicholas White. In his time, White had occasion to attack most of the seneschals individually, but his strictures on the system were general. "I wish the country were more governed by law than by discretion", he wrote to Burghley in 1574. The seneschals, he warned the treasurer, had been corrupted by the wide powers allowed them. For the most part, they made no attempt to reform the worst abuses.
of the Gaelic Irish and when they did assert their authority, it was only through the most brutal violence, "which will sooner consume away the people than alter their way of life". Burghley, he urged, should persuade the queen by all possible means "not to suffer the martial government of her countries here to be committed to those who cannot govern themselves but seek to make quarrell with her people, delivering them injustice instead of justice and causing their own will to be holden for laws". White, who had himself been displaced from the seneschalship of Wexford in favour of a military man, was undoubtedly a spokesman for the Anglo-Irish administrative group which felt particularly threatened by these powerful and irresponsible interlopers. But similar criticisms were voiced against the system by Englishmen of very different dispositions. Sir Henry Wallop, no lover of the Gaelic Irish, nor of the Anglo-Irish administrators, agreed that the seneschals were wasteful and corrupt. He was deeply mistrustful of both Masterson and Harrington and sought repeatedly to have them removed from office. Writing from afar, Sir James Croft regarded the appointment of these military men to places of responsibility within the Gaelic territories as the outstanding cause of the natives' continuing distrust of the government's intentions. Sir John Perrot believed that the seneschals' independent exploitation of "coyne and livery" had severely retarded the progress of English law in Ireland and recommended that they should be allowed to take up supplies only with the prior permission of the viceroy. But perhaps the most consistent critic of the system was Edmund Tremayne. In his series of memoranda he emphasised repeatedly, that his objections to this form of government were not limited to the evils it visited upon the native Irish, but extended also to the corrosive
effects which it exerted upon those Englishmen who had taken up places of government amongst the Irishry. The new officers, Tremayne perceived, had so rapidly accommodated themselves to the Gaelic environment "as we have ... for the most part become as Irish as the rest". He concluded that progress could be made in the Gaelic areas only when the demands which the government made upon the community were equitably rated and systematically imposed by the central authority, and when no favour was given to any, English or Irish, above the law.

These were acute observations in so far as they went, but they were none the less conceived upon a very narrow basis. English law had failed to progress, the seneschals had become immersed in Gaelic politics not simply because some people were negligent and some people were corrupt, but because the chief governors themselves, acting under the constraints of their own declared programmes, had unwittingly determined that it should be so. It was, therefore, an irony, but an irony that reflected the underlying paradox of the governmental structure, that Sidney, the man to whom Tremayne addressed his arguments, should, through the failure of his own over-arching ambitions, have been responsible for the establishment of the chief example of the type against whom Tremayne had railed: Sir Nicholas Malby, the governor of Connaught.

In 1576 few men had such experience of service in Ireland than Nicholas Malby. He had first come to Ireland in Sussex's retinue in 1556, and though he left the country in the early 1560s, he returned again in 1567 to be joined with William Piers as joint constable at Carrickfergus. At Carrickfergus his chief responsibility was to stem the flow of the Scots into the north-east
and to defend small pockets of English settlement from despoilment by the Gaelic Irish. It was a task he performed effectively and ruthlessly: "Neither love nor reward", he declared, "will bring the north to obedience, it must be the sword which they will be easily brought unto." Malby soon acquired a reputation for harsh and forceful dealing that commanded the respect of the Scots and the Irish; even Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam was afraid of him. He dabbled somewhat in colonisation and once offered his own version of the traditional plan to settle the north-east coastline with a number of fortified places in order to create a bulwark against the Scots. In 1571 he received a grant of MacCartan's Country in County Down on condition that he establish an immigrant settlement there before the end of the decade. He seems, however, to have made no attempt at all to fulfil his obligations, and by 1576 he was at court petitioning to be released from the grant. It was while he was at court that he came to the attention of Secretary Walsingham as a possible candidate for presidential office in Sidney's new composition government. Malby's appointment was delayed, however, and by the time he arrived in Connaught to take up his duties, the province was already in rebellion.

The Clanrickard rebellion which destroyed Sidney's attempt to enforce his centrally controlled composition laid the foundation for the formidable, semi-autonomous position which Malby was to establish for himself in Connaught. By the end of 1577 he had managed to get the military situation under control and had begun the process of converting the president's cesses into a fixed rent. He had established informal relations with the officially outlawed Burkes and had made firmer connections with the lesser families of Clanrickard and with the O'Kelly's and O'Flaherty's of West Connaught.
By the middle of 1578 he was extracting a small, but steady revenue from the province and could realistically promise greater gains in the future. Thus, when the privy council chose to jettison Sidney's plan in favour of Gerrard's, they decided to make a singular exception of the president of Connaught. Malby was now to be appointed Governor of the province by letters patent. He was to be given entirely autonomous charge of the administration of law and order in Connaught and of the collection of its revenues. No sheriff was to be appointed without his recommendation and he was to be responsible for the upkeep of all civil and military offices. The costs of the Connaught administration were to be met entirely from the composition money, and Malby was to pay the surplus, "if any be", into the exchequer. No provision was made, however, for the regular inspection of his accounting procedures. In the following year, Malby's jurisdiction was extended southward into Thomond and northward towards the ancient boundaries of Connaught against Ulster.

These formal instructions, however, merely gave official sanction to a campaign of personal aggrandisement which Malby had already set in motion throughout the province. As soon as he had asserted his authority in Clanrickard, he marched northward, gradually establishing relations with the Gaelic clans of Lower Connaught. He negotiated agreements with O'Conor Roe and Mac Dermot, carefully encircling the other major power of his jurisdiction, the degenerate Anglo-Norman, Mac William Burke. In the winter of 1577-8 he entered O'Conor Sligo's country, expelling O'Donnell who had recently revived a claim to suzerainty, and forcing O'Conor to enter into a composition and to recognise an English sheriff. Next, he invaded O'Rourke, "the proudest man this day living on earth"
and received his submission. Finally, he returned to the lordship of Macwilliam, exploiting a succession struggle that was currently raging there by compelling the most powerful claimant for the lordship, Richard "an Iarann" to recognise his right to determine the issue.  

By the outbreak of the Desmond rebellion Malby could boast that his province was so peaceful that he could leave it unguarded to attend to the Munster rebels with a force of 600 levied upon the country. The boast, it is true, was somewhat exaggerated, for as the rebellion dragged on, discontent in his own province began to make itself apparent. But the trouble was in all cases temporary, traditional displays of insubordination against an absent ruler which disappeared almost immediately upon his return. Subsequent absences heralded no further opposition; when he returned from a visit to court early in 1583, Malby himself was overwhelmed by the reception he received from the clansmen. His sudden death on March 4, 1584 was said to have been genuinely mourned by the Irish and in a peculiar way his memory was enshrined: "There came not to Connaught a better gentlemen of the foreigners than he, and he placed all Connaught under bondage".  

Malby himself was the first to reflect upon the curious nature of his success in Gaelic Ireland. "I did think myself before the province of Connaught was committed unto me I could very well have judged of Ireland government", he wrote to Burghley, "but I assure your honour that I was but a novice in the very department of government which I have I think always attained unto", but now the "imitation of the Irishman's policy hath won unto me that advantage over them as now they find I am a good schoolmaster over them in their own art that they are contented to be in such obedience in every way as I must assure your honour that for general
obedience and commodity ... this province is now the best in the land". 133 "The Irishman hath taught me to try him with his own law", Malby proudly declared. 134 The rules he believed he had absorbed were those of "direct dealing" or sheer brute force, and though he needed to make little personal adjustment to this environment, Malby was clearly surprised by the degree to which his resort to such methods increased his standing amongst the Irish.

Malby certainly demonstrated a readiness to indulge in fierce and sometimes redundant violence from the outset. He made it clear at the beginning that he wanted the old earl of Clanrickard dead by fair means or foul, and he contemplated with equanimity the prospect of liquidating his entire kinship group. In 1578 he received O'Rourke's submission by besieging his chief castle and slaughtering all within, women and children, without quarter. When he attacked Richard "an I arann" he brought him to heel by a scorched earth policy that left miles of countryside barren. When at last the tanist surrendered, he and the remnants of his followers were left for days without food or shelter on an isolated island before Malby relented, "whereby he suffered great misery by hunger and a hundred of his people died". In war against O'Donnell, Malby gave no quarter, slaughtering all who would not pay obeisance to him without consideration. Malby justified his terrorist tactics at length. They enabled him, he argued, to treat with the clansmen on their own terms, they won for him a respect that he would never otherwise have enjoyed, and in the long run, he calculated they saved more lives than they cost. It is impossible to tell. 135

But there were other aspects of Malby's adaptation to Gaelic folkways which he was far less eager to publicise, still less to attempt to justify. Despite the formal appearance of his composition
arrangements, Malby's rule remained highly arbitrary. He never abandoned "coyne and livery". He retained a large army of up to eight hundred men which he billeted when he wished upon the country. He governed always by martial law and issued commissions to his subordinates without application to the central government. He shielded his special servants by general pardons; charges against them were quashed or simply ignored. Uncompliant sheriffs were dismissed, arrests were made and prisoners retained entirely at his discretion. The governor, however, was sufficiently sensitive to the delicacy of his position to recognise the need to make more positive adaptations to his alien environment. He established personal ties with O'Madden, O'Flaherty, and the elder Mac William. He was even on good terms with the famous Grace O'Malley. It was these clans who formed the body of his personal army, and in return Malby issued them with protections and pardons when necessary. He was, indeed, so free in his dispersal of pardons and safe-conducts to favoured groups, that they were said to be on sale to the highest bidder. His arbitration of disputes and assessment of fines were also made subject to considerations of favour and paid little heed to the requirements of formal procedure. Despite his frequent declamations against popery, Malby showed little practical enthusiasm for the reformation. During his regime some twelve monasteries "stuffed with friars" enjoyed his protection. He recommended clerics of dubious allegiance to vacant benefices and he negotiated with papal appointees to episcopal sees. Malby accepted restitution for crimes against his property and fostered out his children amongst the natives. Most important of all, he attempted to establish himself and his family as major independent landholders in the province. He gained a grant and refurbished the fortress
town of Roscommon and began to extend his holdings by acquiring monastic sites in the surrounding countryside. His greed for land was such that it was given out that he would allow no grants of property to be made to others anywhere near his own settlement. Malby also undertook the construction of a second grand residence at Meleck in O'Madden's country, and he sought to have both of his holdings granted to him and his heirs in tail.  

This deep personal involvement in the political and social affairs of Gaelic Connaught inevitably made Malby a highly undependable servant of the crown whose reports and recommendations were influenced less by the long-term objectives of the central government than by his own immediate and local interests. Thus, in his correspondence with London and Dublin, Malby displayed a most brazen changeability. O'Conor Sligo, once one of the most dangerous of the queen's enemies, became one of the soundest men in the province, and Richard "an Iarann", whom Malby had so relentlessly pursued, became the legitimate successor to Mac William, whose title Malby was ready to defend against all challenges. The clearest indication of the governor's flexibility may be seen in his relations with the Mac an Iarlas. Though once eager for both their heads, Malby began to manoeuvre between the two sons, recommending one and then the other for the favour of the crown, while at the same time negotiating with both in order to preserve his own position. He gave them protections; they gave him castles. He ceased to pursue them; they desisted from attacking his allies. He offered them pardons; they promised him their allegiance. In the end, he negotiated a peace with them that, during Malby's lifetime at least, seemed to satisfy both.
Malby eventually over-reached himself. Not content with Thomond and Sligo, he sought to extend his jurisdiction over Munster and Ulster, and presented the privy councils with detailed propositions for both. But the council rejected these ambitious projects, and Malby indeed was summoned to answer serious charges preferred against his conduct in Connaught. Like Masterson's and Harrington's, however, his discomfiture was short-lived. He had, after all, delivered the promised revenues and had kept a peace of his own in the province. Their loss of control over their agent may have been irretrievable, but the cost of dismissing and replacing him was unthinkable: the council sent him back to Connaught with his powers undiminished. He died there in the full exercise of his office.

The inevitable corollary of the gaelicisation of English government officials in Gaelic localities was the gradual co-option of existing Gaelic chieftains within the ranks of English regional administration. Neither Sussex nor Sidney had attempted to restrict appointment to positions of governmental authority within the Gaelic areas to Englishmen alone. Both had recognised the necessity of confirming the existing powers in certain localities by de facto recognitions of their positions as "captains" under certain conditions. Recognised captains, according to Sussex, were to undertake the booking of their subjects. They were to attend upon hostings, they were to pay for the support of a certain number of galloglas, they were to supply a fixed number of beeves to the viceroy's army. In time they were to be expected to apply English law to all felonies committed and to all cases relating to property. In practice, however, under Sussex the procedure remained informal, and the demands he made upon the
recognised captains were determined by his campaign against O'Neill. But
in the late 1560s, Sidney deliberately embarked upon an extension
of the practice. Included in the legislation of 1569 was an act
decreeing that "no captain dwelling within any of the shire-
grounds of the realm should from henceforth assume or take upon
himself the authority or name of captain or ruler ... except such
as have or shall have the same by letters patent". Grants of
captaincies made immediately after the act made explicit reference
to its terms. As Sussex had recommended, the captains were
recognised not merely as Gaelic leaders, but as crown servants.
Thus Brian O'Rourke was confirmed as captain and simultaneously
appointed as sheriff of his country. Elsewhere, however, Sidney
was conscious that so conventional a title was inappropriate to
the conditions of the Gaelic lordship, and so he conferred upon
the Gaelic captains the title he had already given to English
officials in similar circumstances; he made them seneschals.
Whatever long-term implications they may have been designed to carry,
the new titles of sheriff or seneschal made little immediate
difference to the chieftain's position. His patent confirmed
him in the services he was accustomed to exact upon his subjects.
The subordinate crown officers he was obliged to appoint were to
remain under his control as servants of his own household; there
was no suggestion that they should be any more independent than
his traditional lieutenants. Finally, no means was provided to
ensure that the new co-opted officers would be any more dependable
than the old chieftains had been. For this the governor who
appointed them could rely on nothing more than personal connection.
Sidney, indeed, displayed a remarkable facility for establishing a personal relationship with influential figures in Gaelic Ireland. His "gossiprick" with Shane O'Neill and the strong influence he exercised over Desmond, are the best known instances of this talent, but he also applied it at less exalted levels. The key, for example, to his success in persuading MacGeoghan to accept a reorganisation of his territory in accordance with English tenurial systems lay in his personal friendship with the chieftain's eldest son, Ross. Ross Mac Geoghan was a man of some education and experience: he could write English fluently while his father and his brother left only their mark, and he had served as an officer in, and a purveyor to, the crown's army since the early days of Sussex's administration. He had been on friendly terms with Sidney from the same time, and when the latter was appointed deputy, he received a generous grant of crown lands and an unusual appointment as sheriff of Westmeath at his hands. In 1571 Sidney accepted Ross's usurpation of his father's place as chief of the Mac Geoghans without scruple, and appointed him seneschal of the territory in order to bolster his position. Sidney's favour, however, proved to be little better than a liability to Ross. In 1572 he was compelled by his people to yield up his seneschalship to his father, and thereafter he coexisted in constant mistrust of his own family until, at length, in 1580 he was murdered by his brother Brian, at the instigation, it was said, of his father. Nothing changed: the new title of seneschal which Mac Geoghan acquired from his son was merely old captain writ large. A change of nomenclature had done little more than compound an existing problem.
Sidney's personal influence with the Fitzpatrick's of Upper-Ossory was a little more successful. Once again, his connection with the clan was through the son and heir of the existing chieftain, Sir Barnaby. In 1554 Sir Barnaby returned to Ireland to a situation far different to that to which he had been accustomed at the court of King Edward. He found himself estranged from his own people and his father, but he quickly attached himself to the Dublin administration. Like Ross MacGeoghan he supplied the government with men and supplies and received the customary favours in return. In 1560 he was knighted by Sidney and thereafter was regarded by the government as its chief agent in Upper-Ossory. In 1569 Sidney officially recognised his deposition of his father and confirmed him in the captaincy of his people. In 1576 he was knighted by Sidney and thereafter was regarded by the government as its chief agent in Upper-Ossory. In 1569 Sidney officially recognised his deposition of his father and confirmed him in the captaincy of his people. In 1576 he made him lieutenant of the queen's and king's Counties, a title held by none since Sussex's brother, Henry Radcliffe.

The only surviving son of Fitzpatrick's first marriage, Sir Barnaby, unlike Ross MacGeoghan, had to suffer no direct threat to his succession. But he none the less confronted a grave challenge from his step mother's family, the O'Carrolls, who were determined to preserve their newly gained influence in Upper-Ossory. His troubles were further increased by the interference of the earl of Ormond who claimed rights of jurisdiction in the lordship. After Sidney's departure in 1571 tension mounted between Sir Barnaby and the Butlers. Sir Barnaby felt it necessary to expel his father and the O'Carrolls who surrounded him from the lordship and to propagate the elaborate rumour that his step-mother was plotting the destruction of the Fitzpatricks by witchcraft. When the Graces, the earl of Ormond's chief henchmen, kidnapped his wife and children and "held them in most miserable captivity and like to die", 155
Sir Barnaby, however, was compelled to resort to more desperate measures in order to survive. He made new allies amongst some of the discontented O'Carrolls, and even hired some of the mercenary Graces. He gave succour to the refugees from the Munster rebellion of 1569-72 and encouraged their attacks on the treacherous Butlers. Ormond was so alarmed by Sir Barnaby's recovery that he secured the queen's intervention on his behalf: she wrote to Fitzwilliam, ordering Fitzpatrick's arrest. Fitzwilliam managed to patch up a temporary truce between the two lords, but by the time of Sidney's return in 1575 open war had again broken out. Sidney's reappointment and his father's death in the following year, greatly bolstered Fitzpatrick's position. For the time being, at any rate, the threat from the Butlers had passed.  

Sir Barnaby's survival, however, did little to further the goal of anglicisation within his lordship. Despite his official title, he made no attempt to establish the instruments of English administration in his country, and after Sidney's departure he resumed the old feud with the Butlers. On the outbreak of the Desmond rebellion, it was alleged that he once again gave protection to rebels on the outskirts of his territories. Charges of his collusion mounted until at length he was placed under arrest.  

As in so many cases, however, his disgrace was temporary: the Dublin administrators decided that his faults were of lesser significance than his service as a foil to the over-powerful earl of Ormond, and he was soon released. He died in his lordship shortly afterwards and was succeeded by his half-brother Florence, who had spent most of his previous career on the wrong side of the administration. Florence was fully supported by the government, but he too took no steps to further the cause of anglicisation. The country
remained unshired until 1602. The cases of MacGeoghan and Fitzpatrick served to illustrate the hopelessness of personal connections as a means of extending English government in Ireland and produced yet further examples of a process that was fast becoming a general rule: that recognised government agents in Gaelic areas either accommodated themselves rapidly to the prevailing social and political norms, or did not survive at all. This disappointment of personal promise which was merely regrettable in the midlands, however, was to have disastrous consequences in the most troublesome of provinces, Gaelic Ulster.

In spite of all Sidney's efforts to reach a final settlement with him, Turlough Luineach O'Neill remained a difficult man to deal with. He clung tenaciously to the urrithe and seemed prepared to resort to any means in order to retain them. It was indeed their continuing distrust of his intentions that persuaded the privy council to defer ratification of Sidney's treaty with him. As late as 1580 they had taken no decision on the issue. Turlough took advantage of the crisis in Munster to increase his demands upon the government. He sued now to be granted the military and political control of all Ulster, "as it were by some commission of lieutenancy". He pledged in return to keep the province in general quiet and to yield an annual revenue of £3,000 to the exchequer. In short, he sought to be allowed take all Ulster to farm in much the same way as Connaught had been granted to Sir Nicholas Malby. Turlough remained much too untrustworthy for the council to accept his offers. But the attractiveness of his proposal, coupled with their awareness of Turlough's profound instability, prompted the councillors to look with increasing favour towards his most promising and rather more dependable rival for power in the province, the baron of Dungannon.
Few men wholly trusted Hugh O'Neill. His dual origin made him suspect both to the government and to his own countrymen. But the baron did engage the support of a number of influential friends. Sidney, with whom he spent most of his early life, was the most important. It was Sidney who established him securely in his inheritance late in 1568 and who made the earliest recommendation that he be created earl of Tyrone. He never lost confidence in the baron's promise. Further support came from Essex, who regarded him as the most dependable man in Ulster, and he was also befriended by Malby and, on most occasions, by Bagenal. Until 1579, however, everyone regarded Dungannon's role as secondary, a useful check against Turlough Luineach. It was the Desmond rebellion which allowed him to improve his standing with the government. Lord Deputy Grey was greatly impressed by his service in Munster and through his influence, Dungannon's military responsibilities in the north were greatly extended. He was joined with Marshal Bagenal in a commission to protect the Pale from attacks from Ulster and was empowered to use martial law through the province. It was at this time that the possibility of appointing Dungannon to permanent government office was first mooted, and thereafter the idea gained ground. Sir John Perrot wanted him made "Lieutenant of Ulster" with an extensive commission for the governance of the province. Originally, Perrot had hoped to divide responsibility for Ulster more evenly between Dungannon, Turlough Luineach and Marshall Bagenal. But time and the government's pressing needs were on the baron's side. Turlough was becoming too undependable and too insecure in his own lands; Bagenal was becoming too old and too weak. Gradually, but inevitably, therefore, Perrot turned to Dungannon. In 1585, on the deputy's
recommendation, he was created earl of Tyrone, his extensive governmental responsibilities in the province were renewed, and the _urrithe_ to which he laid claim were left to him too. 166
EPILOGUE
"Me thinks it is now out of season to make any ... discourse of a general reformation", Sir Henry Sidney, September 1580.

"It is vain to speak of planting of laws or plotting of policies till (the Irish) be altogether subdued", Edmund Spencer. ¹

Between the mid-1550s and the mid-1580s, the record of Tudor government in Ireland was exceedingly dismal. In every area of policy the results of every particular endeavour had been grievously disappointing. For all the expenditure of treasure, thought and blood on the island, the ideal of bringing English civility to Ireland remained as far as ever from realisation. If anything, the situation confronted by the government had seriously deteriorated. Far from being made more accustomed to the ways of English law, the Gaelic Irish had themselves induced Englishmen to emulate their ways, and had become inured to English administrators and colonisers as yet another species of gaill which might be treated in the time-honoured manner. The early belief that the clansmen might be won over to English political culture simply because of its objective superiority was now revealed to be hopeless. Equally anachronistic, was the belief that the old Anglo-Norman families would be in the vanguard of a revived conquest, for it soon became clear as the campaign got under way that the new English regime was quite incapable of absorbing them. But the deepest disappointment arose in the English Pale where the community which was expected to lend whole-hearted support to the
revival of English government had mysteriously turned sour and disassociated themselves from the efforts of their governors.

It is arguable that the attempt to make a little England out of Ireland was doomed from the outset. But there can be no doubt that the extent of the Tudor failure was greatly increased by the administrative strategies which were adopted to attain the objective. It was the urgent programmatic imperatives of Sussex and Sidney which compelled them to abandon the gradual processes of acclimatisation through which their predecessors had worked for the winning of Gaelic Ireland and to allow vast areas of Gaelic lawlessness to flourish untended. The same concern with their explicit programmes forced them to exploit the factional divisions of the Anglo-Normans, but left them unable to establish a satisfactory control either over their allies or their opponents. And finally, it was the cost and inflexibility of their programmes which made it necessary for them to impose an intolerable burden on the Pale that at length convinced the Palesmen that their governors had come rather to oppress than to defend them.

The perception that the difficulties encountered by Tudor Irish policy could be traced to the character of the administrations which were chosen to implement it was expressed in a variety of ways in the 1560s and 1570s. It appeared in the later writings of Edward Walshe, in the disillusioned commentaries of Sir Nicholas White and in the more detached reviews of Sir James Croft. And for a brief period it gained official recognition in the new government establishment set up on Chancellor Gerrard's advice in the summer of 1578. But the practical relevance of such an understanding was quite limited. Neither Walsh nor Croft, nor even White, was in a position to exert a guiding influence over
government policy, and even if they were, their criticisms had little to offer in the way of a positive alternative. Similarly, the establishment of 1578 was a simply reactionary one. Having discovered what had gone wrong under Sussex and Sidney, it sought merely to go back before their time: its model was the plan formulated, but never enforced, by Sir William Skeffington in 1531. This intellectual poverty is understandable: had they pressed further, the critics would soon have encountered awkward questions about the value of the English political and legal system as a bulwark against encroaching anarchy. But before these doubts and uncertainties could be a source of genuine anxiety, they were mercifully dispelled by the general crisis which exploded upon Fitzmaurice's Spanish invasion and the rebellion of the Desmonds.

The Desmond rebellion was a wonderfully simplifying agency. It distracted attention from murky introspections about governmental deficiency and the inherent limitations of English law, and focused it, instead, on the palpable rebelliousness and treachery of the Irish. This change of emphasis was of immense importance: in any subsequent reflections upon the failure of previous English attempts in Ireland, it became less important to examine the weaknesses of government policy than to explain the apparent incorrigibility of the Irish. Such a re-orientation did not automatically produce a new consensus on future policy in Ireland. It tended, on the whole, to justify a much harsher attitude towards the unreformed Irishry, but it could also sustain a naive assurance that just a little more energy and a little more firmness would make Ireland quite governable. This latter view was clearly embodied by the first viceroy to assume office in Ireland after the Desmond rebellion, Sir John Perrot.
Perrot was in many ways, the apotheosis of the programmatic governor. Having badgered the privy council throughout the 1570s with proposals for the better government of Ireland, he was finally invited in 1581 to present a plan for the final settlement of Ireland after the rebellions had been suppressed. Though it contained some minor originalities, Perrot's programme was strikingly similar both in form and in content with those which had gone before. He presented a detailed list of costs and gave a firm and favourable prediction of revenues to be gained. He committed himself to a limited time-table. His proposed methods of organisation were also familiar. Like Sussex, he sought to establish a centrally controlled and disciplined group of administrative subordinates and proposed to bring over a completely new set of officers to serve under him. Like Sidney, he undertook to supervise the implementation of a wide range of policies, but planned to unite the diverse aspects of his programme in one parliamentary package. Like his predecessors, he isolated some outstanding problems of governance for his own special attention. He would expel the Scots from the north-east and make a final settlement in Ulster. He would end the rebellion in Munster and launch a large English plantation on the attained lands. But the central element of his programme was the same as that which Sidney had attempted to implement in 1575. He proposed to negotiate and to establish a general composition for cess throughout the land. Once appointed, Perrot began his work with the energy characteristic of men of his type. He perambulated the country, establishing his composition presidents (Norris in Munster and Bingham in Connaught) and leading a major expedition against the Scots. Characteristically also, he trumpeted his actions loudly, promising an early and permanent
success in all his undertakings.  

But Perrot epitomised the programmatic style in more negative ways also. His promises notwithstanding, all his hastily executed work came to nothing. The Scots side-stepped his onset, and when he had withdrawn from the province, they returned as they had done after Sussex and began to regain the territory he had temporarily snatched from them. In Connaught, the attempt to impose a new composition upon Malby’s old one provoked the Mayo Burkes and the surrounding Gaelic clans to renewed rebellion. In Munster, the plans for colonisation advanced only slowly and no progress was made with the composition. The Palesmen rejected Perrot’s offers on the cess and travelled to court to negotiate a settlement of their own. The earl of Ormond who had at first welcomed Perrot’s appointment, grew estranged, and began to employ his traditional court-centred tactics against him. Within a year of his appointment, in short, Perrot suffered a particularly concentrated dose of all the obstructions and frustrations which Sussex and Sidney had encountered in times past. But the early combination of these opposing forces, and Perrot’s collapse under them, made it clear that whatever the viceroy himself might think, the problem of governing Ireland had undergone a crucial mutation: the methods by which Sussex and Sidney had operated were now obsolete.

The one outstandingly novel element in the deputy’s brace of troubles underlined this change. Throughout their trials, Sussex and Sidney had at least enjoyed the loyalty of their own administrative subordinates, but Perrot very soon lost the confidence of his own colleagues in government. He quarrelled first with Chancellor Loftus and Treasurer Wallop, and one by one he made
enemies of Secretary Fenton, Marshal Bagenal, President Norris and President Bingham, until he could depend upon only a small group of native counsellors. Perrot's virtual isolation in Dublin Castle may be partially explained in terms of his abrasive personality, but one deeper factor united all his colleagues' complaints against the viceroy's conduct. His authoritarian and highly individualistic style of government, they asserted, was irresponsible and wasteful. He was pursuing his private ambitions against the best interests of the crown. Perrot's personality, no doubt, intensified the grievance of his subordinates, but the fact that such a general opposition should have been provoked in the first place by a style of government that was essentially the same as Sussex's and Sidney's indicated that an important change of outlook had occurred amongst the Dublin administrators. Ireland, they seemed to suggest, was no longer amenable to this government through individual enterprise, for its manifold problems did not yield themselves to ready solution by such simple means.

Even those who continued to believe that Ireland might be subdued through one centrally-controlled policy rejected Perrot's entrepreneurial style in favour of far more ambitious and radical programmes. Edmund Spenser, Richard Beacon and Sir William Herbert argued that Ireland could be saved from Gaelic anarchy only by a massive increase in direct English intervention in the country. A large army of conquest was to be despatched to suppress all rebels and keep the populace subdued. Large scale plantations were to be established in each of the provinces. And the native inhabitants were to be firmly policed: Spenser wanted them transplanted from one province to another, Beacon recommended that they be placed in ghettos within their own provinces and all three were agreed that a
new English Settler elite should be placed over them as their local governors.

These appeals for a radical approach were the products of much more than a renewed English interest in colonising Irish land. Each author rather expressed a genuine intellectual concern to come to terms with the most pressing problem raised by the Tudor experience in Ireland: why had English law failed to take root in the island, why, after so much effort, had their demonstrably superior civilisation failed to improve the Irishry? The case of Ireland raised an awkward challenge to humanist assumptions about the reformability of mankind on which they had been educated.

Thus, it is not surprising, that in their attempts to understand this disquieting phenomenon, they paid an exceptional attention to the writings of a man who had already faced up to the unreality of early renaissance political theory and who had thought his way through to a more satisfactory position, Niccolo Machiavelli.

In *The Prince* and more extensively, in *The Discourses*, Machiavelli introduced a distinction between commonwealths that were sufficiently healthy to be reformed and peacefully governed by good laws, and those whose descent into anarchy was so advanced that no set of laws on its own was capable of saving them. For these only the strong medicine of coercion and even tyranny could be of use. In the course of his writings he suggested a number of ways in which the degenerate commonwealth could be coerced into health amongst which were included the maintenance of a standing army, the firm regimentation of the populace and the establishment of colonies. But more important than any specific recommendation, Machiavelli presented a justification in terms of a higher political morality for the use of any instruments of coercion that would produce peace and order out of chaos.
To intelligent Englishmen, mystified by the apparent intractability of the Irish problem, Machiavelli's arguments were immensely comforting. They not only explained the failure of English law in terms that exonerated English government from any fault, they also morally justified the abandonment of the now discredited policy of gradualist assimilation and the adoption of the most ruthless alternatives. Spenser, the most radical of the three, explicitly defended the massacre of the Spaniards at Smerwick not simply in terms of its exemplary value, but also as a useful step towards the more rapid attainment of English supremacy, a morally superior end in itself. Herbert, the least Machiavellian of the group, still hoped that the new English regime might be enforced with the minimum of coercion, but if ultimately it could not be, he unequivocally admitted the moral right of the prince to extirpate all the degenerate. More important than these extreme instances, however, the writings of all three tended to suggest that in any future policy towards Ireland, the crown might ethically dispense with the confining procedures of English law and enforce its will upon the country by whatever means were available, no matter how bloody. Expediency and ruthlessness were given moral sanction.

Machiavelli was a useful support to intellectuals seeking some theoretical consistency. But their own propositions were, in political terms, quite unrealistic. The Elizabethan government had neither the time nor the treasure for such costly undertakings: Spenser, Beacon and Herbert were ignored. But few men, in any case, cared to analyse the Tudor failure in so rigorous a manner. Most administrators experienced their ineffectiveness personally and at the level of emotion only. Thus, the most common response to the stubborn irreducibility of the Irish problem was one of
angry frustration. Gradually, men came to see Ireland's chronic rebelliousness as something over which they had no control, something mysterious, peculiar to the island and its inhabitants. Guesses at the mystery were varied. For some, it could be explained in terms of religion, for others in terms of race or climate. Some regarded it as the fruits of divine providence, others merely as the work of the devil. But more important than the provenance of these various explanations was the overwhelming determinism which they all shared. Because the Irish problem was intractable, there was nothing substantive that anyone could do about it, except to wait on events and to hit out hard whenever the opportunity arose.

Perrot succumbed early to such resignation. Barely fifteen months after his arrival, he abandoned his programme and sued for recall. His revocation was delayed and as he waited, his government lost all consistency. His attitude towards the Palesmen in the matter of cess was erratic. In Ulster, he conceded to almost all of Tyrone's demands, but he seized the son and heir of the loyal O'Donnell as a hostage when the chance presented itself. In Munster, he did nothing at all, allowing the undertakers to go their own way. Yet despite the inactivity and the pressures mounting behind him, Perrot ended his service on a reasonably respectable note. His successor Fitzwilliam, well seasoned in the governance of Ireland, congratulated him on keeping the country mostly at peace and declared himself happy if he might do half so well. He brought with him no great plans for reform, but he displayed also, the capacity to act ruthlessly, even viciously, when the opportunity arose. And beneath the viceroys, the seneschals and the planters, untrammelled by any master plan, continued to operate quite happily.
in the lawless regions beyond the Pale.

The abandonment of programmes and the retreat to opportunism, inaction and occasional violence was, in part, a symptom of despair. Yet the psychological advantages of the reaction were considerable. It soothed the pain of the failure of dearly-held plans and it removed the odious responsibility for the failure from the shoulders of the governors to the shoulders of those who were governed: if English civility had failed to make progress in Ireland, it was not because it was inadequate or because its instruments of propagation were deficient, but because the Irish were incapable of rising to it. And finally, it rendered respectable as policy the nervous confusion that came in the wake of the collapse of all rational programmes. An indiscriminate violence which had been rejected at the outset as a systematic programme of action came at length to be accepted, half-consciously and unsystematically, by Englishmen as the best policy for Ireland, simply because there was nothing else for it.
Notes to Introduction


5. In addition to the works of Quinn and Canny cited in notes 3 and 4, see Brendan Bradshaw, "The Elizabethans and the Irish", Studies, lxvi (1977), pp 38-50 and The Irish constitutional revolution of the sixteenth century (Cambridge, 1979).


Agnes Conway, Henry VII's relations with Scotland and Ireland (London, 1932).


The terminology is Prof. Quinn's, but similar dichotomies have been employed by Prof. Canny and Fr Bradshaw.

For a thorough discussion of the content and implications of the constitutional changes of 1541, see Brendan Bradshaw, The Irish constitutional revolution of the sixteenth century, op cit. I am extremely grateful to Fr Bradshaw for allowing me to use his study while in the form of a Ph.D., and for several illuminating discussions on the matter thereafter.


The most detailed and dependable narrative account remains Richard Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, 3 vols. (London, 1885-90).

The figures in the above paragraph, are derived from "Account of Sir William Brabazon - treasurer of Ireland 33 Henry VIII to 1 Ed. VI", P.R.O., S.P. 65/5/3, "Yearly charges in Ireland 33 Henry VIII to 3 Mary I", B.L., Add Mss. 4767 f 160, "Account of Sir William Fitzwilliam, treasurer of Ireland, 1559-1569", N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish), no. 48, "Burghley's account


19. Allen to Cecil, 16 Dec. 1558, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/7; Cusack to Cecil, 16 March 1569, ibid., 27/45; White to Burghley, 23 Dec. 1581, ibid., 87/59; Fitton to Privy Council, 29 Oct. 1571, ibid., 34/27 and to Burghley, 6 Sept. 1572, ibid., 37/52.


Notes to Chapter I


2. Tudor royal proclamations, (ed. P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larkin, Newhaven, 1964-9), iii, pp 200-202. At mid-century, the Edwardian privy council made a similar disclaimer for different reasons: "The attempt to make a thorough conquest cannot be without many dangers and perils and if it should not take full effect, it might be both dishonorable and also force the inhabitants to tie closer together and to seek the aid of foreign princes", "Certain considerations touching Ireland", Jan. 1553, P.R.O., S.P. 61/4/75.


4. For short biographies of one particularly influential group, the lawyers, see F. E. Ball, The Judges in Ireland, 1172-1921, vol. i, passim.

5. For contemporary descriptions of the Pale, see Richard Stanihurst, "Description of Ireland", in R. Holinshed, Chronicles (London, 1808, ed.), VI, and his De rebus in Hiberniae gestis (Antwerp, 1584); Fynes Moryson, "On the commonwealth of Ireland", in Shakespeare's Europe, ed. C. Hughes (London, 1903); Constantia Maxwell, Irish history from contemporary sources (London, 1923), pp 354-76, 382-91; for a brief summary of the character of the Pale see N. P. Canny, The formation of the Old English elite in Ireland, (O'Donnell lecture, 1975), pp 2-12.


The records of the Genealogical Office (Dublin) provide ample evidence of familial relationship amongst the Palesmen. See, for example, genealogies of the Daltons (G.O. Ms.162, pp 156-61), the Darcys, (ibid., pp 66-9), the Nugents (G.O. Ms.179, pp 278-82) and the Dillons, (G.O. Ms.172, pp 52-91). The genealogical history of a typical Pale family is comprehensively traced in S. B. Barnewall, "The Family of Barnewall in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries", The Irish Genealogist, vol. 3, (1956-67), nos. 4-8.

Sir Christopher Barnewall was attorney for the earl of Ormond; his nephew Mark Barnewall was attorney for the earl of Clanrickard. The prominent Palesman, Henry Burnell, was attorney to the earl of Kildare.

"A treatise of Patrick Finglas, c. 1533", P.R.O., S.P. 60/2/7; a printed version of the "Breviate" with some later additions and corruptions may be found in W. Harris (ed.), Hibernica, vol. i (Dublin, 1747).


"A discourse of the cause of the evil state of Ireland, c. 1528", B.L., Lansdowne, Mss. 159 ff 2-14.


27. Annals of Loch Ce, sub anno 1543.

28. See, for example, his memoir of services composed in March 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/66/4.

29. Amongst the most illuminating contributions to an understanding of Gaelic Ireland are K. W. Nicholls, Gaelic and gaelicised Ireland in the later middle ages (Dublin, 1972), Land, law and society in sixteenth century Ireland (O'Donnell lecture, 1977); D. O'Corrain, Ireland before the Normans (Dublin, 1972); M. K. Simms, Gaelic lordships in Ulster in the later middle ages, unpub. (Dublin University, Ph.D., 1976).


32. Tremayne's "Notes ... for the reformation of Ireland", c. 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/66; for a general collection of similar views see D. B. Quinn, The Elizabethans and the Irish, ch. 4 and N. P. Canny, The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland, ch. 6.

33. Fitton to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/42/74.
34. Most recently by N. P. Canny, in "The ideology of English colonisation: from Ireland to America", William and Mary Quarterly, xxx (1973), pp 575-98 and The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland.

35. Bradshaw, The Irish constitutional revolution, pp 40-2; for Tremayne's proposals see ch. 5, below.

36. The classic expositions of the view that the absence of law was the fundamental source of the problems of Ireland are Richard Beacon, Solon his follie (Oxford, 1594), Edmund Spencer, A view of the present state of Ireland, ed. W. L. Renwick (Oxford, 1970) and Sir John Davies, A discovery of the true causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued (London, 1612), but a similar outlook pervaded the more casual and routine interpretations of working administrators.


39. "Notes collected at the request of a friend ... going over into Ireland", c.1588, N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss. (Irish), no. 68.

40. A similar argument has been made using different evidence by Bradshaw, Irish constitutional revolution, pp 21-9.

1. Ireland’s constitutional relationship to England was once a matter of heated dispute between two major American historians, but the debate appears to have been resolved as outlined above. See C. H. McIlwain, The high court of parliament and its supremacy (New Haven, 1910) and R. L. Schuyler, Parliament and the British Empire (New York, 1929); Harvey Wheeler, "Calvin’s case and the McIlwain-Schuyler debate", American Historical Review, LXI (1955-6), pp 587-97, and A. F. McC. Fadden, "1066, 1776 and all that" in Perspectives of Empire, ed. J. E. Flint and G. Williams (London, 1973), pp 9-26.


4. See the king’s observations on Irish affairs in The Chronicle and political papers of King Edward VI, ed. W. K. Jordan (London, 1966), passim.


7. Penry Williams, The Tudor regime, pp 27-33; C. R. Elton, "Tudor government: the points of contact, ii, the council", T.R.H.S., 5th series, no. 25, (1975), pp 195-211; D. E. Hoak, The king’s council in the reign of Edward VI; M. B. Pulman, The Elizabethan privy council in the 1570s. Select committees on Irish affairs were set up in 1565, 1567-8, 1574-5, but there is no evidence of any permanent sub-committee.

8. See, for example, Winchester to , 4 April, 20 May 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/20/61, 86.


13. Cecil's file has now been dispersed. It may, however, be reconstituted from B.L., Add. Mss., 4767, Lansdowne Mss., 102, 159, P.R.O. Transcripts, T 31/16/70 as well as from the several items scattered throughout the state papers and the Salisbury collection at Hatfield House.


17. The bulk of Walsingham's Irish file is contained in B. L., Cotton Mss., Titus B XII.

18. F. M. G. Evans, The principal secretary of state (Manchester, 1923), Conyers Read, Mr Secretary Cecil (London, 1955) and Mr Secretary Walsingham and the policy of Queen Elizabeth, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1925).


22. See Walsingham to Fitzwilliam, 18 Aug. 1574: "for it is hard for us here to prescribe what is ... to be done there ... when those who can best judge of these causes bear no sway", Bodl., Carte Mss., 56/492.


32. Sidney to Cecil, 3 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/41

33. See ch. VII, below.


35. A.P.C., (1554-6), 20 Sep. 1555, p. 182; Order of privy council, 8 May 1554, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/5, see ch. III below.


37. Sir Thomas Cusack was acting chancellor in 1565-6; Sir Nicholas White was keeper of the seal in 1579-81; Sir Luke Dillon rejected the office in 1581.


39. In 1579, Lord Justice Drury ordered the reconstitution of the state archives "now all in a heap" in Bermingham Tower to be commenced, but the instruction does not appear to have been carried out, Annals of Dudley Loftus, s.a., Marsh's Library, Ms. 211.


42. For a contemporary account of the affair, see T.C.D., Ms. 842.
43. Gerrard to Walsingham, 5 July 1579, 5 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/67/22, 73/9; Wallop to Walsingham, 6 Jan. 1581, ibid. 80/1.


45. Wood, op. cit.; Pelham to Walsingham, 14 July 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/74/28.


49. Philip Wilson, The beginnings of modern Ireland (Dublin 1912), N. P. Canny, The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland, ch. 3: chs. 3-5 below.

50. On Walsh and White respectively, see introductions by Quinn and Canny to their respective treatises, I.H.S., V, (1947), pp 303-14, XX (1977), pp 439-45: for Tremayne, see D. N. B., s.v.


53. D.N.B., s.v.; F. E. Ball, History of Dublin, pt. IV, pp 23-8. See, for example, Cecil to Sidney, 11 Feb. 1568 and to White 15 April, 6 June 1569, B. L., Lansdowne MSS., 102, nos., 73, 77, 78.

55. The residences of Chancellor Allen at St. Wolston's and Archbishop Loftus at Tallaght, were both raided with loss of life, Chancellor Gerrard and Secretary Fenton were burgled.


58. In addition to sources cited in n.50 above, see Cusack to Cecil, 17 April 1564, Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 22 Nov. 1564, 1 Jan. 1565, Elizabeth to Sidney, 6 July 1566, Cusack to Cecil, 16 March 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/10/51, 11/109, 12/4, 21/49, 27/45.


67. Lord Leonard Grey and Sir John Perrot, respectively.

68. Medical report on Sir Henry Sidney, Feb. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 15/14/6.
69. Caesar Adelarius (physician) to Cecil, June 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/17.

70. "Account of Bellingham's debt", c. 1549, P.R.O., E101/520/1; Croft's "Autobiography", loc. cit: Lady Drury to Walsingham, 8, 24 Nov. 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/70/9, 21.


72. Tremayne to Fitzwilliam, 19 May 1574, Bodl., Carte Mss, 56/402.

Notes to Chapter III

1. For particularly colourful portraits of the "perfidious St. Leger", see P. L. O'Toole, History of the Clan O'Toole (Dublin, 1890), pp 238-74; D. J. Taaffe, An impartial history of Ireland (Dublin, 1809-11), vol. i, pp 335-54; James Frost, The history and topography of the county of Clare (Dublin, 1893), pp 234-8.


4. St. Leger and council to Henry VIII, 7 Dec. 1542, 15 May 1543, P.R.O., S.P. 60/10/86, 11/8; "Articles devised by lord deputy and council", Jan. 1544, ibid., 11/35; for a detailed, if biased, account, see O'Toole, op. cit., pp 266-75.


15. Croft to Privy council, 29 Sept. 1551, P.R.O., S.P. 61/3/53-4; Edward VI to Croft, Nov. 1551, ibid., 3/73.

16. Lyons, loc. cir., ch. 3: Conn O'Neill to Privy Council, 10 April 1552, P.R.O., S.P. 61/4/34; A.F.M., s.a. 1551.


19. For the O'Tooles, see fiant printed in full in O'Toole, op. cit., pp 258-63; for the Kavanagh's, Hore, op. cit., p.91 and Cal. Pat. Rolls (Ireland), Henry VIII to Eliz., p. 342; for the O'Briens, ibid., pp 86-7.

20. See references cited in n.19 above.


27. Shane O'Neill to Elizabeth, 8 Feb.1561, P.R.O., S.P. 63/3/14.

28. R. Dunlop, "The plantation of Leix-Offaly" E.H.R., vi, (1891), p. 64; "Remembrances for Ireland", July 1550, P.R.O., S.P. 61/2/55. Many of St Leger's closest associates were among those who petitioned to be allowed plant in the midlands in 1550, see "Offers of Gerald Aylmer, et. al.", ibid., 2/69.


31. "Arrearages on Brabazon's account" 1548, shows St. Leger to be in possession of some monastic lands in Limerick, P.R.O. S.P. 65/5/1.
32. Cusack to Privy Council, ? Sept. 1541, P.R.O., S.P. 60/10/38.


34. Luttrell to commissioners, 1537, S.P. Henry VIII, ii, pp 502-10. Luttrell served on commissions of inquiry in monastic property (1541), wards (1548) and on a diplomatic mission in Munster (1551).


37. Alen's "Answer to St. Leger", c. August, 1546, P.R.O., S.P. 60/12/46.

38. E.g. the two Cowleys, Edward Walshe seems also to have grown disillusioned with St. Leger at this time, see "A detection of errors", B. L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XII, no. 48.


40. Agard to Cromwell, 15 May 1535, P.R.O., S.P. 60/2/44; Grey to same, 31 Oct. 1536, 24 Nov, 9 Feb, 1537, 26 May 1539, L. & P. Henry VIII, xi, nos. 933, 1157, xii, no. 382, xiv, no. 1027, R. Cowley to Norfolk, 6 July 1540, ibid., xv, no. 849.


47. Grey to Cromwell, 24 Nov. 1536, L. & P. Henry VIII, xi, no. 1157; R. Cowley to Norfolk, 6 July 1540, ibid., xv, no. 849.


49. Cowley to Cromwell, 10 June 1536, L. & P. Henry VIII, x, no. 1112; Grey to Cromwell, 24 June, ibid., no. 1195; Robert ap Powell to Cromwell, c. June 1536, xi, no. 2.


52. Privy Council to St. Leger and council, 25 March 1541, L. & P. Henry VIII, xvi, no. 655; Henry VIII to St. Leger and council, 5 March 1543, ibid., xviii, pt. i, no. 245; St. Leger and council to Henry VIII, 15 May 1543, ibid., no. 553.

53. The credulity of the auditor, Richard Brasier, aroused the suspicion of the privy council. His willingness to accept Brabazon's word was not, perhaps, unconnected with the fact that he secured two profitable leases of crown lands during his stay in Ireland. Brasier to Somerset, 14 Nov. 1548, P.R.O., S.P. 61/1/122; "Answer from Mr Brasier to the articles of account found faulty", S.P. 66, Case A, no. 4; Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 8, app. 9, flans 319, 613.


58. Walter Cowley, the first surveyor general, was appointed in 1548, but he held the post for the specific purpose of surveying the confiscated lands of Leix and Offaly, a task which he performed most inexpertly (see D. G. White, Tudor plantations in Ireland to 1571, unpub. Ph.D., Dublin University, 1967, ch. 8). His successor, Michael Fitzwilliam, attempted unsuccessfully to be more effective: Croft and council to Privy Council, 2 Dec. 1552, P.R.O., S.P. 61/4/65 and enclosure. The account of exchequer practices is derived from the Browne-Rouse report, note 57 above.
59. White, "Extents" loc. cit.; "Survey of Geraldine attainder", loc. cit. The preliminary nature of the surveys is obvious from the frequency with which land recently believed to be of substantial value is accounted in the estimates as "nil" because they have been allowed go to waste, see, for instance, White, p. 148. On the process of dissolution and distribution generally, see Brendan Bradshaw, The dissolution of the religious orders in Ireland under Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1974).


61. Croft and council to Privy council, 2 Dec. 1552, loc. cit.

62. Lodge's Peerage of Ireland, i, pp 266-8.

63. This and all subsequent differentials have been derived from a comparison of the valuations contained in the surveys with the rents fixed in the fiants and patents. Entire monastic properties were rarely granted away in one lease. I have, therefore, checked the specific lands listed in a lease against each extent in detail, and estimated the real value of the lease on this basis. For Mellifont, see Rep. D.K.P.R.I. 7, app. 10, fiant 254 and White, op. cit. pp 212-22.


70. Draycott's rectitude is surprising, but the fact that his leases were issued at the proper value tends to underline the peculation that was going on around him. Rep. D.K.P.R.I. 7, app. 10, fiant 450, rep. 8, app. 9, fiants 34, 106, 731, 906.


73. Bradshaw, "The dissolution" op. cit., ch. 5.

74. White, pp 1-24; Grey to Popley, 12 Aug. 1539, P.R.O., S.P. 60/8/25; Brabazon to Cromwell, 16 Feb. 1540, ibid., 9/11.

76. Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 8, app. 9, fiants 643, 728; White, pp 374-5.

77. Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 7, app. 10, fiant 464; "Geraldine survey", P.R.O., S.P. 65/3/2: I have been unable to trace all the lands listed in the fiant within the survey. In cases of lands recently wasted, I have discounted the surveyors' estimate of its potential and accepted their current valuation, nil. This is, therefore, a conservative computation.


81. P.R.O.I., Record commissioners transcripts of patent rolls, R.C. 1/1-6, nos 41-56. The monastery was first granted to Cusack's agents and then transferred to him, Cal. Pat. Rolls (Ireland) Henry VIII to Eliz., p. 123.

82. White, pp 53, 87, 298, 321, 370.


84. Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 7, app. 10, fiant 370; White, pp 207-8. The priory was not valued by the surveyors, but other sources indicate that the property was worth rather more than Parker's purchase price, N.B. White (ed.), Irish episcopal and monastic deeds (I.M.C., 1936), p. 283.


86. Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 7, app. 10, fiant 465; the annual value of the manor was assessed as £15.13s.1d.; twenty years purchase should, therefore, have been £313.


92. John Parker and Agard's son, Francis, were regarded by the Palesmen as their most effective defenders within the administration, during their conflicts with the government in the 1560s; Palesmen's "Petition to Sir Nicholas Arnold, c. Dec. 1562", B.L., Add. Mss, 40,061 ff 35-44; Parker to Elizabeth and Privy council, 3 May 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/3-4. "Book of Howth", Cal. Carew Mss, vol. v, p. 216.

93. Philip Wilson, The beginnings of modern Ireland, chs 4-5.

94. For St. Leger's own exposition of this strategy, see his "Answers to Alen's accusations", Aug. 1546, P.R.O., S.P. 60/12/46, L. & P. Henry VIII, xxii, pt. i, 917.


97. For Nugents of Delvin, see Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 7, app. 10, fiants 488, 554; 8, app. 7, fiant 1056; for Berminghams of Carbery, see Rep. 7, app. 10, fiant no. 197.


99. Alen's "Charges" against St. Leger, c. Aug. 1546, P.R.O., S.P. 60/12/42, 47; Alen and Aylmer to Henry VIII, Jan. 1546, ibid., 12/34.

100. St. Leger's "Reply", c. August 1546, ibid., 12/46.

101. Chancellor Alen's later claim to have received no more than nine and a half acres of crown lands, was clearly spurious. (Alen to Paget, 21 April 1549, to Cecil, 5 April 1551, P.R.O., S.P. 61/2/32, 3/19). He received a grant in perpetuity of St. Wolstan's for £10 while its real value was assessed to be £30 p.a. (Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 7, app. 10, fiant 57; White, p. 176). Cowley held leases to the sum of £19.4s.6d. under the survey value (Rep. D.K.P.R.I., 7, app. 10, fiants 151, 155, 175, 349; White, pp 184, 60, 64, 178-80, 43). For Ormond's gains, see Bradshaw, Dissolution, pp 195-6.

102. Cf. St. Leger's reply to Alen and Alen's rejoinder, c. Aug. 1546, P.R.O., S.P. 60/12/46, 47.


105. Stanihurst, loc. cit. p. 318; W. Roberts, "Genealogical history of the Butlers", T.C.D. MSS, 669; Ware, Annales, p. 175; Countess of Ormond to Somerset, (March 1547, P.R.O., S.P. 61/1/1.

106. Peter Clark, English provincial society, pp 70, 86, 128, 130.

107. On St. Leger's diplomatic service, see D.N.B., s.v.

108. Privy council to Bellingham, 6 Jan. 1549, P.R.O., S.P. 61/2/3; Brian Jones to Bellingham, 22 Feb. 1549, ibid., no. 21; "Examination of St. Leger's debts", P.R.O., E. 101/248/22.

109. Wilson, The beginnings of modern Ireland, ch. 4: see Bellingham's correspondence with several Gaelic chieftains in 1548-9, P.R.O., S.P. 61/1/134, 137, 138, 144, 146, 147, 153, 164, 167-8, 2/2; see also Cowley to Bellingham, 29 June 1549, ibid., 2/49.

110. St. Leger and Croft to Privy Council, 20 May 1551, P.R.O., S.P. 61/3/25; Croft to Warwick, ibid., no. 27; "Instructions to Sir James Croft", May 1551, ibid., no. 32, Cusack to Warwick, 27 Sept., ibid., no. 52, Croft's "Instructions to Thomas Wood", 29 Sept., ibid., no. 54, Croft to Cecil, 22 Dec. ibid., no. 79.


113. Hatfield House, Cecil MSS, 151/60-1; S. Haynes, Letters of state in the reigns of King Edward ... Queen Elizabeth, pp 141-2; Privy council to Croft, 29 Nov. 1552, H.N.C., Salisbury MSS, i, p. 104.


117. A.P.C., (1554-6), 28 March, 6 May 1554, pp 4, 5, 18; "Order of Irish council, 8 May, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/5.


121. Commission to Fitzwilliam, loc. cit.


123. St. Leger to Petre, 18 Dec. 1555, c. April 1556, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/8 and enclosure and no. 10; St. Leger to Privy Council, 31 May 1556, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XI, no. 239.


126. G. Hill, The MacDonnells of Antrim, (Belfast, 1873), chs 2-3; Dr Wooton to Privy Council, 4 Nov. 1553; Queen Mary to Dr Wooton, 26 Feb. 1554, Cal. S.P., Foreign, (1553-8), pp 23-4, 213.


130. Ibid., p. 337.


135. D.N.B., s.v.; C. P. Hampson, The book of the Radcliffes, draws attention to the families' debts.


138. I have been unable to trace any record of divorce proceedings, but see Lords' Journals, i, pp 449-500; Northumberland to Lord Darcy, 30 May 1552, P.R.O., S.P. 10/14/33; Winchester to Cecil, 23 June 1559, ibid., 12/4/58. The phrase quoted is from Sussex's will quoted in G.E.C., Complete Peerage (rev. ed.), xii, pt. (i), p. 521.

139. For the suggestion that St. Leger was cool toward the Marian reaction, see Campion, Historie of Ireland, (ed. Vossen) pp 135-6.

140. "A present remedy for ... the North", "Notes for remembrance of Radcliffe", c. April 1556, loc. cit.; "Instructions" to Fitzwalter, April 1556, (a) Lambeth Mss, 628/53-63; (b) B. L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XI, no. 241.
1. Fitzwalter to Mary, 2 Jan. 1557, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/22, and enclosures; "Articles ... to be explained to the Queen", 15 April, ibid., no. 31: "Articles touching the state of Ireland", May 27, ibid., 38.


4. Ibid., f. 274.


6. They begin at f. 17.

7. Sussex to Fitzwilliam, 14 Dec. 1571, Carte Mss, 57/190-1.

8. Same to same, 6 April 1572, Carte Mss, 57/357-8.

9. Ibid., see also same to same, 24 Aug. 1572, Carte Mss, 57/410-11, Jan. 8, 1574, Carte Mss, 56/284, 22 May 1574, Carte Mss, 56/420.


11. Good examples of the conventional view of Sussex can be found in Lavigwel, Ireland Under the Tudors, vol. ii, chs xix-xxi and in R. Dunlop's sketch in D.N.B., sub Radcliffe, Thomas.

12. "Original accounts of the viceroy's progresses in 1556, 1557, 1558, and 1563 have been collected together in T.C.D. Ms 581; other copies in Lambeth Mss, 621, calendared in Cal. Carew Mss (1515-74), pp 257-62, 265-9; 274-8, 349-51.


14. Sussex imposed a similar interpretation on events in the preamble to the act establishing Leix and Offaly as shires, see White, Tudor Plantations, i, pp 384-6.


16. "Brief memorial of service, P.R.O., S.P. 63/19/83.
17. "Articles ... to be explained to the queen", 15 April 1557, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/31.

18. Sussex to Sec. Boxoll, 26 April 1558, P.R.O., S.P. 62/2/37; for other expressions of the same style during the Marian period, see Fitzwalter to Mary, 2 Jan 1557, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/22. Sussex to Mary, Sept. 2 1558, ibid., 2/69.


22. "The earl of Sussex's opinion", Sept. 11, 1560, loc. cit., f. 280; the labyrinthine metaphor was commonly adopted by Sussex, see Sussex to Cecil, 3 Nov. 1561, P.R.O., S.P. 63/4/66 and same to same, 4 Dec. 1562, ibid., 7/53.


25. For an early treatise by White, critical of Sussex's government, see "Book of the waste and decay of the English Pale", P.R.O., S.P. 62/2/77. My attribution to White of these unsigned notes is based upon the recurrence of identical passages in White's later books, see P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/72-3.


27. Ibid., nos 16, 20, 21.

28. Ibid., nos 23, 24, the attribution to James Barnewall is tentative. The writer was clearly experienced in matters of law and routine government administration. He makes frequent mention of the special suits of one Patrick Barnewall. James Barnewall was appointed attorney-general on Sussex's recommendation around the time the papers were drafted.

29. Lib. Mun., vol. i, p5. (ii), p. 43. Rouse had delegated the office to deputies since March 1554, see ch. iii note 118.


34. Ibid., p. 30; Ball, The Judges in Ireland, vol. i, p. 196.
36. Sussex's "Instructions", 16 July 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/60; Fitzwilliam to Sussex, 15 March, B. L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII no. 3.
39. Sussex's "Instructions", 28 April 1556, Lambeth Mss, 628/63-73. Croft was auditor in 1560, Croft to Cecil, 21 Nov. 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/104.
47. For several commissions of a military and civilian nature on which they served, see Reps. D.K.P.R.I., 9-11, apps passim.
56. Fitzwilliam Accounts, pp 54-70.
58. Lambeth Mss, 614/279; Lambeth Mss, 609/22.
59. "Book of receipts", loc. cit. gives a total of £32,460 st.
60. Lambeth Mss, 628/108.
63. Ibid., pp 81-90.
64. Sussex's "Instructions", 28 April 1556, Lambeth Mss, 628/63-73.
65. B.L., Add. Mss, 4767, ff 84-6, 106-7, 127.
71. Challis, p. 113.
72. Ibid. pp 113-4.

73. Ibid., pp 111-2.


76. On purveyance generally, see A. Woodworth, Purveyance for the royal household under Queen Elizabeth, Trans. Am. Phil. Soc., new series, xxxv, (1945); S. G. Ellis, "Taxation and defence in late medieval Ireland", (forthcoming); the issue is discussed in more detail in ch. VII below.

77. Alen's "Advice", c. April 1556, B.L. Lansdowne Mss, 159, no. 3; Sussex's "Instructions", April 1556, B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XI, no. 241.

78. Calculated from John Challoner's collection of data from the council books relating to cess, P.R.O., Ms 2753; a similar but not identical collection is in B.L. Add. Ms., 4763 f. 106 ff.

79. Ch. VII below.

80. Proclamation of 27 March 1557, H.M.C., Halliday Mss, p. 33.

81. Mary to Sussex, 13 May 1557, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XI, no. 243.

82. Sussex's "Instructions", 16 July 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/60; Fitzwilliam to Sussex, 15 March 1560, B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII, no. 3.

83. Sidney to Privy council, 8 Feb. 1558, P.R.O., S.P. 62/2/10, and to Sussex, 7 April, ibid., 2/32 enclosure i.


85. Walsh to Cecil, 23 Aug. 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/71; White's "Book of decay of ... Pale", c. 1558, ibid., 62/2/77.


88. Dowdall to Heath, 17 Nov. 1557, loc. cit.

89. "Declaration of ... Desmond's chaplin", loc. cit.


95. Fitzwilliam to Sussex and to Cecil, 15 March 1559, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII, no. 7, P.R.O., S.P. 63/2/9; Piers to Sidney, 15 Feb. 1558, loc. cit.


97. Elizabeth to Sussex, 15, 21 Aug 1560, P.R.O., S.P. 63/2/30-1.


99. Sussex's "Instructions", May 1556, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XI, no. 241; "Orders for Leix", c. Dec. 1556, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/19-21 and for Offaly, P.R.O., S.P. 63/7/62 placed c. Dec. 1562, but probably of the same date as the other three documents.

100. For the captains and their allotments, see White, op. cit., vol. i, p. 378, and vol. ii, ch. 12.


105. White, vol. i, p. 422.
106. Ibid., vol. i, ch. 10, passim.

107. Articles sent by Mary and Sussex's opinion, 2 Jan. 1557, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/22, (i), (ii), "Articles to be declared to the Queen", 15 April 1557, ibid., 1/31.


110. Sussex's "Instructions", 16 July 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/60.

111. See ch. 8, below.

112. Sussex's "Memorial", April 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/101, see ch. 8, below.

113. Sussex to Boxoll, 26 April 1558, P.R.O., S.P. 62/2/37.

114. See ch. 3 above.


117. Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 29 April 1560, P.R.O., S.P. 63/2/12 and 4 May 1561, ibid., 3/60; Sussex to Cecil, 1 March 1563, ibid., 8/13; A.F.M. sub anno 1560, 1562.

118. The only scholarly biography, however, remains unpublished, T. B. Lyons, "Shane O'Neill: a biography", M.A. thesis (U.C.C. 1948); see also, James Hogan, "Shane O'Neill comes to the court of Elizabeth", in Féilscribhinn Tórna, ed. S. Pender (Cork 1947) pp 154-72.

119. Brian, his eldest son, remained in the area of Armagh where he was supported by the garrison which Sussex established in the city. Young Hugh, it appears, was withdrawn from the region in 1559 by Sidney, and was lodged in Dublin as a ward of the crown, see T.C.D. Ms. 1087, ff 15-17.


121. Sussex's "Instructions", 16 July 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/60.


123. Sussex's "Instructions", July 16, 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/60.


126. For an account of these campaigns by a military historian, see C. Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, ch. 6.


128. Cecil to Throckmorton, 10 May 1561, B.L., Add. Mss, 35830, no. 33.

129. J. Hogan, "Shane O'Neill comes to the court of Elizabeth", in S. Pender ed. Féilscribhinn Tórna, pp 154-72; Shane to Dudley, 2 Nov. P.R.O., S.P. 63/7/40.

130. Sir Oliver Plunkett et al. to Dudley, 27 May 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/13. One of the signatories of the students' book, Richard Netterville was already known to be one of Dudley's retainers, Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 25 March 1561, P.R.O., S.P. 63/3/41.


132. Sussex's "Interrogatories" and students' "Answers", c. 21 March 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/52-56, 58; Sir Oliver Plunkett, et al. to Elizabeth, 27 May 1562, ibid., 6/12; "Examination of matters relating to cess", 26 Nov. 1562, B.L., Add. Mss, 40,061, no. 6, ff 43.

133. Sussex's replies to students, c. 21 March 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/55-57.

134. "Answer made by one Barnewall to Sir Nicholas Bacon", c. Easter 1562, B.L., Add. Mss, 40,061, no. 5.

135. Sir Oliver Plunkett et al. to Dudley, 27 May 1562, loc. cit.

136. Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 13 June 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/24; Bermingham's "Interrogatories", 21 June, ibid., no. 28; Arnold to Cecil, 13 Aug., ibid., no. 67 and enclosure.

137. "Instructions to Arnold", 7 July 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/49; Bermingham to Northampton, 16 July, ibid., no. 53.


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141. "Relation of matters between Sussex and Arnold", c. Nov. 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/7/59 and enclosure.


144. Sussex to Cecil, 6, 31 March 1563, P.R.O., S.P. 63/8/15, 25.


149. "Cusack's requests", 16 Jan., 22 March, 17 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/10/9, 38, 51; Cusack to Dudley, 9 June, 1564, ibid., 11/3.

150. Arnold to Kildare, 5 Aug. 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/55; Radcliffe to Cecil, 31 Jan. 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/12/24; Fitzwilliam to Sussex and Cecil, 12, 13 July 1565, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII, no. 46 (xiii), P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/14.

151. Elizabeth to Sussex, 9 Nov. 1563, P.R.O., S.P. 63/9/57.


154. Arnold and Wrothe to Privy Council, 7 April 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/10/16; Captains' "Memorials", 29 June, ibid., 11/16; Bermingham to Privy council, 24 Feb. 1565, ibid., 12/36; Dix to Cecil, 16 July, ibid., 11/33; 22 Nov. ibid., no. 105. Fitzwilliam did not deliver his account for inspection until July 1565, Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 13 July, Dix to Cecil, 14 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/14, 33.

Dix to Cecil, 22 Nov. loc. cit., 17 Jan., 13 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/12/14, 13/12.

"Articles against Arnold" and his "Answers", Aug. 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/18/82-3.

Sidney to Privy Council, 30 May 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/68. Curiously, the chief deponent here had the same name as Sussex's witness for the Geraldine conspiracy, Robert Adams.

Bagwell, Tudors, ii, p. 79.

Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 19 Oct. 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/94; Privy council to Kildare, 22 June, 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/13/68; Oliver Sutton's "Articles", Dec. 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/15/54.

Arnold to Thomond, 2 July, to Pembroke, 3 July 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/20, 21.

"Articles against Arnold" and his "Answer", Aug. 1566, loc. cit.


Ibid.

Cusack to Cecil, 22 March 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/10/38, to Privy Council, 8 June, ibid., 11/1, enclosing abstract of points of difference.

Privy council to Cusack, 2 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/10/42.

Ibid., Elizabeth to Cusack, 24 June, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/15.

O'Neill to Privy Council, 8 August, 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/76.

For an account, see G. A. Hayes McCoy, Irish battles, ch. v.

Notes to Chapter V

1. Fitzwilliam to Sussex, 1 April 1565, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII, no. 46, Sidney's "memoranda", 20, 25 May, P.R.O., S.P. 63/13/45-6, 49.


5. Compare draft instructions of July 4 (P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/2) with formal instructions of Oct. 5 (P.R.O., S.P. 63/15/4/2).

6. Sidney to Leicester, 13 Dec. 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 15/12/87, "There may be fairer semblances between yours and others but trust not before trial for in such trust is often treason".

7. Sidney to Leicester, 1 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/35 and to Privy council, 13 April, ibid., 17/8; Rep. D.K.P.R.I. 11, flants 741, 823-4, Sidney to Privy Council, 12 Dec. 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/19/71.

8. Cusack to Cecil, 7 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/48: Sidney to Privy Council, 15 April, ibid., 17/13; to Cecil, 18 Nov., ibid. 19/51.


10. Sidney's "Opinion" upon his instructions, 4 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/3; "Remembrances for Ireland", July, ibid., no. 10.


13. H.M.C. De Lisle and Dudley Mss. vol. i, pp 389 ff, compare with army lists in Fitzwilliam Accounts, e.g., pp 54-59.

14. "A particular instruction", July 9, loc. cit., Sussex to Queen, 23 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/65: Queen to Sidney, 11 June 1567, Sidney State papers (I.M.C., 1966), no. 41 (26), p. 69; Bagenal was not keen to resume the office and Sidney sought without success to have it granted to Thomas Stucley, Sidney to Cecil, 7 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/52.
15. Privy Council to Sidney, 18 Feb. 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/28; for Wingfield's desertion of Sussex and the phrase quoted in the text, see Fitzwilliam to Sussex, 12 July 1565, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII, no. 46.


17. "Advertisement out of Ireland", 3 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/43; Sussex to Elizabeth, 23 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/65 in H.M.C., De Lisle and Dudley Mss, vol. i, p. 389 ff.

18. Ibid., pp 391 ff; Sidney and council to Privy council, 13, 15 April 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/8, 13.

19. First draft, 2 July 1565, second draft, 5 October, P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/2, 15/4.


23. Ibid.

24. Piers' "Project", c. 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/9/83, I follow D. G. White in dating the project somewhat later than was listed in the calendar.


27. Sussex's "Instructions" 19 July 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/57-9, R. D. Edwards, Church and State in Tudor Ireland, pp 177-86.


29. For a different view, see N. P. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, passim, esp. ch. 3, "A new departure", from which the phrase quoted is taken.

30. Sir Oliver Plunkett, et al. to Elizabeth, 27 May 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/12.

31. Cecil to Smith, 3 June 1565, B.L., Lansdowne Mss, 102, no. 61; "A particular instruction to Sidney", 9 July 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/8; Sussex's "Notes", Feb. 1559, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/13.

33. For the dates of his several appointments, see Powicke (ed.), *Handbook of British Chron.* p. 157.

34. Sussex's "Notes", Feb. 1559, loc. cit.

35. Sidney's "Memorial", 12 Feb. 1561, P.R.O., S.P. 63/3/18; Sidney's "Opinion on Shane O'Neill", 11 April 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/78.

36. "Book containing the rate ... of fees and wages", 5 Oct. 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/15/5. Information was procured covertly for Sidney by Jenyson and Wingfield, see Jenyson's "Brief Declaration", c. April 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/13/16 and Fitzwilliam to Sussex, 12 July 1565, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII, no. 46.

37. "State of the army in Feb. 1563"; P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/31; Sidney's proposed garrison, 15 July 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/19.

38. Sidney to Cecil, 17 April 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/14, 15.

39. For a succinct statement of Sidney's personal attitude toward his brief in Ireland, see Sidney to Leicester, 1 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/35.

40. Sidney to Cecil, 17 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/15; "Memorial" for Knollys, ibid., no. 20, Knollys to Cecil, 19 May, ibid., no. 56.

41. Cecil to Sidney, 18 May 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/54; Elizabeth to Sidney, 15 June, P.R.O., S.P. 63/18/17; Cecil to Sidney, 24 June, ibid., no. 27; Elizabeth to Sidney, 8 July ibid., no. 46.


44. "Notes of further supply ", May 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/20/79; "Memoranda of lord deputy", 12 May, ibid., no. 87; Winchester to Cecil, 29 May, ibid., no. 96; "Declaration of the charges to be sustained in Ireland", 6 June 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/2/5.


46. Sidney to Cecil, 9 June 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/18/8; Elizabeth to Sidney, 20 Oct., ibid., 19/24.

47. Cecil to Sidney, 10 July 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/58.

48. Sidney to Cecil, 4 March 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/20/41; Sidney's "Memorandum", 12 May, ibid., no. 87.

Sidney to Cecil, 24 Nov. 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/15/51 and Eliz. to Sidney, 6 July 1567, Sid. S.P., no. 42. Sidney to Cecil, 23 April 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/31, Brady was known to be a protege of Leicester, Fitzwilliam to Sussex, 31 Jan. 1566, B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus, B XIII, no. 46, reporting information conveyed by Archbishop Loftus.

Sidney to Privy council, 13 April, 30 May 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/8, 68.

Sidney to Leicester, 1 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/52, 17 April, ibid., 17/15, Cecil to Sidney, 27 March, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/67, Eliz. to Sidney, 28 March, Sid. S.P., no. 12.


Sidney to Cecil, 7 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/47, 17 April, ibid., 17/15, Cecil to Sidney, 27 March, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/67; Eliz. to Sidney, 31 May, Sid. S.P., no. 13.

Sidney to council, 15 April 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/13, to Cecil, 17 April, ibid., no. 14; for an account of the general division at court in this period, see C. Read, Mr Secretary Cecil, ch. xvi.


Sidney to Privy council, 11 July 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/18/54.

Sidney to Privy Council, 18, 30 May 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/55, 68; to Cecil, 3 June 1566, ibid., 18/1; Cecil to Sidney, 16, 24 June, ibid., May 19, 27; Eliz. to Sidney, 5 July, Sid. S.P., no. 21.

Sidney to Privy council, 11 July 1566, loc. cit.


Ibid.

St. Leger to Cecil, 6 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/47; St. Leger to Sidney, 3 July 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/18/54 enclosure (i). It is clear from Fitzwilliam's account that a presidential council in Munster actually functioned under St. Leger between January and December 1566, N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish), no. 47.


Eliz. to Sidney, 14 May 1566, loc. cit.
65. Sidney and council to Privy Council, 13 April, 11 July 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/8, 18/54; and to Leicester, 19 Aug. Collins, vol. i, pp 15-17.


67. Sidney to Privy council, 18 May 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/55.

68. Ibid., or less felicitously "My counsel is that the governor's continuance here and countinage there be concurrent and correlative", Sidney to Leicester, 28 June, Collins, vol. i, pp 14-15.


70. Sidney to Cecil, 18 Jan. loc. cit.


74. Eliz. to Sidney, 23 April, 24 May 1567, Sid. S.P. nos 34, 37, the quotation is from no. 37.

75. Eliz. to Sidney, 24 May 1567, loc. cit.


77. Sidney to Leicester, 5 Sept., H.M.C. Pepys Mss, p. 90.

78. Ibid.


80. Fitzwilliam to Henry Fitzwilliam, 11 June 1567, N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss, (Correspondence), no. 27. I have given this detailed account because it is based upon a source hitherto, so far as I know, unknown, and because it differs significantly from the traditional story.

82. Winchester to Sidney, 1 July 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/41; Eliz. to Sidney, 11 July, Sid. S.P., no. 42. Cecil to Sidney, 22 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/70.

83. Memoranda of Sidney's propositions, June, July 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/20, 48.


85. Eliz. to Sidney paraphrasing Sidney's advice by Francis Agard, 6 July 1567, Sid. S.P., no. 42.

86. Winchester to Sidney, 20 June, 1 July, 10 Aug., P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/24, 40, 73.

87. Cecil to Sidney, 6 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/50.

88. Eliz. to Sidney, 22 July, Sid. S.P., no. 44.


90. Danyell to Cecil, 5 Oct., P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/1; "Rental of Ulster", 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/66, "Notes for Mr Secretary", July 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/15/14.

91. St. Leger remained on full salary as president, without a council until 15 Aug., N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish) no. 47.


96. Eliz. to Sidney, 22 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/65; to Lords Justice, 10 Dec., ibid., 22/37.

97. This paragraph is based on a full account by Sidney's physician, c. Feb. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 15/14/6.

98. Winchester to Sidney, 24 June 1567, 1 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/24/28, 41, Winchester's "Opinion", June, ibid., no. 33 enclosure (i).

100. Cecil's "Memorial", Nov. 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/34.

101. Thornton to Cecil renewing his suit for Island Magee, 2 July 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/25/19.


103. "Device for the plantation of Ireland with Englishmen", Jan. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/26; "Demands of Sir Warham St. Leger et al. for the fishing of the South", C. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/26/81; for the general background to these colonisation projects, see N. P. Canny, The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland, ch. 4.


106. Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 17 Jan. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/11 and enclosures (i - iv), and 22 Jan., ibid., no. 15; Lords Justice council to Eliz., 23 Jan., 26 Jan., 8 Feb., ibid., nos 16, 20 and enclosures, 32 and enclosures.

107. Lords Justice to Eliz., 23 Jan., loc. cit.; Bagenal to Lords Justice, 20 March, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/74 enclosure viii; Lords Justice to Cecil, 23 March, ibid., no. 75.

108. Sidney's "Instructions", final draft, 21 July 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/25/50.


111. For an analysis, see Treadwell, art. cit.

112. Davies's Speaker's address to parliament in 1613, H. Morley (ed.) Ireland under Elizabeth, p. 400.
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114. Abstract of bills, P.R.O., S.P. 63/27/12, nos 15, 27, 29.


119. Carew to Cecil, 26 Dec., P.R.O., S.P. 63/26/59; Wingfield to Cecil, 12 Nov., ibid., no. 22.


121. Sidney to Cecil, 30 Nov., loc. cit.


129. La Mothe Fenelon, *Correspondence*, vol. i, pp 142, 452; Cecil to Sidney, 6 Jan. 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/27/2.

130. Lords Justice to Eliz., 23 March 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/74. Thomas Lord Fitzmaurice to Lords Justice, 6 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/25/45 enclosure ix, Piers Walshe to Lords Justice, 11 Sept., P.R.O., S.P. 63/26/4, enclosure vii; Desmond to Fitzmaurice, 18 Nov., ibid., nos 35, 42, to other


132. Cecil to Sidney, 3 Sept., 5 Nov. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/25/75, 26/14; Pollard to Cecil, 13 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/11, see also sketch of Pollard in D.N.B.

133. Sidney to Cecil, 8 Nov. 1570, Haynes, pp 622-3.


136. Might to Cecil, 30 June, P.R.O., S.P. 63/28/20; White to Cecil, 10 March, 10 June, P.R.O., S.P. 63/27/44, 28/24.

137. White to Cecil, 10 March, loc. cit.; Sidney to Cecil, 25 Nov., 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/81.


143. "The state of the garrisons in Ireland", March 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/31/46.

144. "Account of debts", March 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/31/47.


147. Sidney to Cecil, 25 Nov. 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/81, to Privy Council, 4 May 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/50; La Mothe Fenelon, Correspondence, vol. iv, p. 70.


149. La Mothe Fenelon, Correspondence, vol. v, p. 162.


152. Rokeby to Cecil, 4 Jan. 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/4; Fitton to Cecil, 15 April, ibid., no. 43.

153. Fitton to Sidney, 22 Feb. 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/15: "Information against the earl of Thomond", 7 Nov., ibid., no. 91.


155. Fitton to Cecil, 15 April, 27 Aug., P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/43, 80.

156. Fitton to Cecil, 15 April, loc. cit.

157. Rokeby to Cecil, 15 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/44.

158. Fitton to Cecil, 15 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/44; same to same, 27 Aug., including his "division of Connaught", P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/80 and 81.


160. "A discourse for the Reformation ... of Munster", Feb. 1574, B.L. Add. Ms. 48015 ff 378 ff to second copy in Add Ms. 48017f. 136 ff; another "Discourse" c. 1573, B.L. Add. Mss, 4763 ff 343ff.

161. Tremayne to Cecil, 12 April 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/42, and 23 July, ibid., no. 71, and 20 Feb. 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/31/15. On Tremayne generally, see sketch in D.N.B.

162. This summary of Tremayne's views is based upon his several memoranda scattered in the state papers and elsewhere: see P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/nos 66-6, 35/21; B.L. Add. Mss, 48015 ff 274-279; B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XII, ff 357 - 60.
164. B.L., Add Mss, 48015 f. 274.
166. P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/64.
167. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
172. Ibid.
175. B.L., Add. Mss, 48015, f. 276.
176. La Mothe Fenelon, Correspondence, vol. v, p. 268; Jenyson to Sidney, 2 Jan. 1572, Bodl., Carte Mss, 57/305-6; Fitzwilliam to Mildmay, 26 March 1572, Carte Mss, 57/337-8.
177. For a general account of Fitzwilliam's first viceroyalty, see Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, vol. 2, chs. xxix-xxxii.
179. Fitzwilliam to Mildmay, 26 March 1572, Bodl. Carte Mss 57/337-8; Essex to Fitzwilliam, 14 Sept. 1573, ibid., 56/189; Burghley to Fitzwilliam, 7 Oct. 1573, ibid., 56/212; Smith to Fitzwilliam, 26 Jan. 1574, ibid., 56/279; Burghley to Fitzwilliam, 5 Feb., 20 June 1574, ibid., 55/130-1, 56/447.
181. See Fitzwilliam's notes on R. Pavy to P. Green, 10 July 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/47/5; "Articles to be considered", 30 May 1574, ibid., 45/40; Fitzwilliam replies, 7 Jan. 1575, ibid., 49/15; Burghley to Fitzwilliam, 20 July 1574, Bodl., Carte Mss, 56/486.
182. Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 25 March, 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/45/26; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 2 Jan. 1575, ibid., 49/3.
183. Sidney's "Opinion" on Essex's affairs, May 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/40/60.

184. Essex to Burghley, 12 April 1576, B.L. Harleian Mss, 6992, no. 14.


188. Ibid.


191. Sidney's "Instructions", loc. cit.; Eliz. to Sidney, 28 Sept. 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 12/45/90; Sidney to Privy Council, 27 April 1576, ibid., 63/55/34.

192. "Memoranda of cess for the deputy", Sept. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/59/23; I have added the deputy's household cess to the general cess demanded, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/12; for a general account, see "Notes of Lord Chancellor Gerrard", Anal Hib., no. 2, pp 129ff.


195. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 Jan. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/5; the figure of £9 is corroborated by the Palesmen, Lambeth Mss, 628/151.


197. Annals of Dudley Loftus, Marsh's Lib., Ms 211, sub. anno; Sidney to Privy Council, 28 Sept. 1575, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B X f. 5.


200. Sidney to Burghley, 13 March 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/27 and enclosure.
201. "Petition ... of the Pale", Lambeth Mss, 628/121. Gerrard to Burghley, 15 Nov. loc. cit.


206. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 April, 15 June 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/34, 58.

207. See in particular his treatise in B.L., Add. Mss, 48015 ff and P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/66.

208. Sidney to Privy Council, 28 Sept. 1575, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B X, no. 1, f.5.

209. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/34; to Walsingham 27 April, ibid., no. 37 enclosing Alford's survey; "Book of arrearages in Connaught", July 1576, H.M.C., De Lisle and Dudley Mss, 11, pp 42-4.


211. Clanrickard to Elizabeth and Council, 25 May 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/48-9 and enclosure 49 (i); Clanrickard to Fitzwilliam, and to Ormond, 25 May, 28 June, ibid., nos 54, 70.


213. Sidney to Walsingham, 15 Nov. 1575; 5 March 1577, B.L., Cotton Mss Titus B X no. 1, f.9; to Privy Council, 27 Jan. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/5.


218. Sidney to Walsingham, 4 Feb. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/3; same to Privy Council, 17 March, ibid., no. 39; to Eliz. 20 May, ibid., 58/29; to Walsingham, 15 May, B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B X, no. 1, f.61; "Instructions to Waterhouse", loc. cit., "Instructions to Gerrard", Collins, vol. i, pp 22-5; Philip Sidney, "Discourse on Ireland", c. June 1577, B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XII, ff 557-59; the constitutional implications of the controversy are discussed in ch. vii, below.


220. "Instructions to Waterhouse", loc. cit., p. 56.

221. Sidney to Eliz., 20 May 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/58/29.

222. Walsingham to Eliz., 15 April 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/58/3.

223. Eliz. to Sidney, 14 May 1577, ibid., 58/20; Privy Council to Sidney, 14 May, ibid., no. 21.


231. The following account is based upon several expressions of Gerrard's opinions in Anal. Hib. 2, pp 93-8, 183-7; "Observations on the government or Ireland", P.R.O., S.P. 63/60/20; "Remembrances for Ireland", ibid., no. 33; "Notes for the reformation of Ireland", B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XII no. 82.

233. See in particular, his "Observations", loc. cit.


238. Gerrard to Walsingham, 8 Feb. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/16.

239. Gerrard to Walsingham, 8 Feb. ibid., no. 18.


1. The myth of the unregenerate "over-mighty subject" has been largely dispelled in English historiography by the work of MacFarlane and Lander, but it remains strong in Irish historiography. For recent examples, see N. P. Canny, The Elizabethans and the Irish, chs 5-7 and G. A. Hayes McCoy, "The completion of the Tudor conquest and the advance of the counter reformation", in Moody, Martin and Byrne, eds., A new history of Ireland, iii, pp 99-110.


7. Sidney to Privy Council, 11 July 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/18/54; "Extract of such yearly rents as the earl of Desmond ought to have", c. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/74.

8. Ormond to Cecil, 22 Nov. 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/108; Ormond's "opinion", c. 1574, ibid., 48/70, enclosure (i); Sidney to Privy Council, 1 July 1566, loc. cit.; Desmond to Sidney, 6 July, ibid., enclosure (ii).


11. See the persuasive interpretation of B. Bradshaw, "Cromwellian reform and the origins of the Kildare rebellion", T.R.H.S., 5th series (27) 1977, pp 69-93, phrase quoted is on p.80; see also S. G. Ellis, "Tudor policy" and the Kildare ascendancy", I.H.S., xx (1977) pp 235-7.

13. Ch. IV above.

14. Cecil to Challoner, 8 June 1562, Cal. S.P. Foreign (1562), p. 83; Walsingham to Burghley, 26-7 July 1574, B.L. Harleian Mss, 6991, nos 47-8; Walsingham to Drury, 14 June 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/67/4.


17. See ch. V above; the fixed annual revenue of £2,000 which Desmond accepted in 1579 was about twice the figure estimated to be his optimum annual income in 1568, "Extent of Desmond's revenues", c. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/74; Gerrard to Burghley, 3 Jan. 1579, ibid., 65/3.

18. Fitzwilliam's account, 1559-69, shows that St. Leger served with the entertainment and retinue of a president throughout 1566, despite his failure to obtain a formal patent, N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish) no. 47; see also St. Leger to Leicester, 6 March 1566, to Sidney, 3 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/47 ff/54 (i).

19. Ormond to Cecil, 5 March 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/27; Ormond to Heneage, 4 Feb. 1571, N.L.I., Ms. 2301, ff 37-8; Ormond to Burghley enclosing his "Opinion on Ireland", 8 Dec. 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/48/70, 70 (i).


21. The prescription was included in all presidential instructions, see note 16 above.


23. Reps. D.K.P.R.I., 9, app. 4, fiants 181, 214, 11 app. 1, fiants 183, 263, 469, 542, 666; appointment to the lord treasurership, ibid., fiant 133.


25. Irish council book, H.M.C., Haliday Mss pp 4-5; Sussex's "Memorial", May 1560, P.R.O., S.P. 63/2/20; Sussex's "Relation of the state of Ireland", 1562, ibid., 5/101; Philip and Mary to Ormond, 13 May 1557, H.M.C., Ormond Mss, vol. I, p. 4.


33. See his analysis of faction in his "Opinion", 1560, Lambeth Mss, 614/271 ff, the quotation is on f. 274.

34. Contrast Sidney to Ormond, 4 May 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/50 enclosure (iii) and 22 Sept 1576, Collins (i), p. 390 with his private attitude toward the earl at these times as expressed in the "Memoirs", loc. cit.

35. W. MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, chs 7-13, N. Williams, Thomas Howard 4th duke of Norfolk, chs 8-10.


37. For a recent account of the Butler participation in the 1569 rebellion, see Canny, Elizabethan Conquest, op. cit., ch.7.

38. La Mothe Fenelon, Correspondence, vol. ii, pp 142, 201 and 240.


40. Canny, op. cit., ch. 7.

41. Ormond to Cecil, 28 Aug. 1569, 7 Sept., 10, 27 Oct. P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/47, 60, 66, 75, the phrase quoted is from the last letter.
42. Edmund Butler to Ormond, 24 Aug., P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/47(i) to Cecil, 6 Sept. ibid., no. 59, Ormond's "Report" of Sir Edmund's conduct, 7 Sept., ibid., no. 60 (i); "Supplication of Sir Edmund", ibid., enclosure (iii), the phrase quoted is from the supplication.


44. Gilbert to Cecil, 13 Nov. 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/82; Rokey to Cecil, 4 Jan. 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/4; White to Cecil, 9 Feb., ibid., no. 12; Fitton to Cecil, 22 Feb., ibid., no. 15.

45. Fitton to Cecil, 22 Feb., loc. cit.; Rokey to Cecil, 15 April, ibid., no. 44.

46. "Submission of Edmund and Piers Butler", 28 Feb., ibid., no. 19; Wyse to Cecil, 4 March; Ormond to Cecil, 5 March, ibid., nos 25, 27.

47. "Commission and Instructions", 1 March ibid., no. 23.

48. Ormond to Cecil, 3rd July 1570, ibid., no. 67, to Heneage, 4 July, ibid., no. 68; to Cecil, 7 Dec., ibid., no. 96; Fitton to Burghley, 20 May 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/39; to Irish council, 9 March 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/31/33 (ii).

49. Though pardoned in 1573, Cal. Pat. Rolls (Ireland) Eliz. p. 640, Ormond's brothers remained unrestored and when the earl died (1614) leaving no living male heir, the title descended upon his nephew, Sir Walter Butler of Kilcash, G.E.C., Complete Peerage, x, pp 146-8; see also W. Roberts, "Genealogical History of the Butlers", T.C.D., Ms. 842.


52. Fitzwilliam and council to Eliz., 22 May 1572, P.R.O., S.P. 63/42/41 and enclosure (i); Fitton to Burghley, 20 May 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/39.

53. Fitton to Burghley, 21 April 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/13; Fitzwilliam and council to Eliz., 27 May loc. cit.; Fitton to Eliz. 15 April 1572, P.R.O., S.P. 63/36/2; "Order committing Clanrickard", 22 July, ibid., 37/12; Eliz. to Fitzwilliam, 5 Aug. ibid., 37/23; Privy Council to Fitzwilliam, 22 Aug., Bodl. Carte Mss 57/403.
54. Fitton to Burghley, 6, 9 Sept. 1572, P.R.O., S.P. 63/37/52; Weston to Burghley, 20 Oct., ibid., 38/16.
56. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 April 1576, ibid., 55/34.
57. Ibid., "The arrearages of Connaught", c. April 1576, H.M.C. De Lisle and Dudley Mss, vol. ii, pp 42-4; White to Burghley, 27 June 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/68; Clanrickard's "Petition" 25 May, ibid., no. 49 (i).
59. Sidney to Privy Council, 22 Jan. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/5; same to Walsingham, 4 Feb., ibid., no. 13; to Privy Council, 17 March, no. 39 and enclosures; to Leicester, 19 May, Lambeth Mss, 607/26.
62. Malby to Walsingham, 12 April 1578, P.R.O., S.P. 63/60/37; 3 May, ibid., no. 55; to Burghley, 26 July, ibid., 61/41, enclosing "Note of his services".
63. Commission to Kildare, 4 Aug. 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/11/55; George Stanley to Cecil, 13 July 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/14/17; Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 11, app. 1, fiants 54, 721, 823.
64. Sidney to Leicester, 1 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/35, to Eliz. and Privy Council, 22 Nov. P.R.O., S.P. 63/19/55; to Eliz., 12 Dec. ibid., no. 71; to queen, 20 April 1567 P.R.O., S.P. 63/20/66.
67. Countess of Kildare's answer to Privy Council's orders, c. 1565, P.R.O., S.P. 63/1/93; and B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B XI, f247; Cecil to Sidney, 10 July 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/58, Eliz. to Sidney, 30 Aug. 1568, 17 May 1570, Sid. S.P. nos 55, 75.
68. Allegations of Oliver Sutton were heard in 1565 and 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/85 and 24/6.
72. Phrase attributed to Kildare by his servant, James Keating, P.R.O., S.P. 63/51/42 (i).
76. See charges of Alen and Richard Fitzgerald, 10 Feb. 1575; P.R.O., S.P. 63/49/59, 61; Robert Keating, 25 May 1575, ibid., 51/42, enclosure (iii) and Hubert Mc Thomas, 6 July 1575, 52/48 enclosure (xiv) from which the phrase is quoted. For an account of a genuine, if highly unrealistic, foreign plot within Kildare's household with which the earl himself had no connection, see Colm Lennon, "Richard Stanihurst", M.A. thesis, U.C.D. (1975) pp 40-1.
77. Burghley et al. to Fitzwilliam, 9 April 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/50/52; for the examination, see note 76 above; Walsingham to Burghley, 9 Sept., 1575, B.L. Harleian Mss, 6992, no. 11; Bacon was a close associate of Leicester, see A. Hassell Smith, County and Court, passim.
78. See ch. V above.
79. Desmond's personal instability was widely recognised; Fitzwilliam to Lady Sussex, 12 Dec. 1567, Bodl. Carte Mss 57/118; Perrot to Burghley, 13 July 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/41/76; Desmond to Eliz., 12 Sept. 1574, ibid., 47/56; Sidney to Privy Council, 20 Feb. 1578, ibid., 60/14; for a recent account of Desmond's history, stressing psychological factors, see Richard Berleth, The Twilight Lords (London, 1979).
80. "Matters to be ordered with Desmond", 20 May, 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/11; Grant to Lord Barry, 12 March 1568, ibid., 23/69; grant to Sir Maurice Fitzgerald, 16 July 1568, ibid., 25/39; Lord Fitzmaurice to Lords Justice, 6 July 1568, ibid., no. 45, enclosure (ix); Carew to Sidney, 12 July 1569, ibid. 29/10; Sidney to Privy Council, 26 Oct. ibid., no. 70.
81. Countess of Desmond to Commissioners, 11 Jan.1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/16, enclosure (i); Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 22 Jan. 1568, Bodl. Carte Mss, 58/225-6; Desmond to Cecil, 26 Sept. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/25/89; same to several Geraldines, 18 Nov. ibid., 26/35-45.
82. Fitzwilliam to Draycott, 8 Feb. 1568, Bodl., Carte Mss, 58/263; same to Leicester, 5 July 1568, ibid., 58/618; Countess Desmond to Desmond, 23 Nov. 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/79; Sidney "Memoir", U.J.A., 1st series, vol. v, pp 96-7; Perrot to Burghley, 12 April 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/40/11; for a military account of the rebellion, see Cyril Falls, Elizabeth's Irish wars, ch. 11.


84. Perrot to Burghley, 30 April, 21 May 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/40/19, 50; "Order for Desmond's release", 8 May 1573, Bodl., Carte Mss, 56/63-4; Desmond to Privy Council enclosing further conditions, 18 May 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/40/39; Fitzwilliam to Eliz. 25 May, 1573, ibid., no. 52; Walshe to Burghley, 30 Nov., 3 Dec. 1573, ibid., 42/88, 43/5; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 5 Dec., ibid., 43/7 and enclosures; Walshe to Fitzwilliam, 21 Dec., ibid., 44/3 enclosure (i).

85. Leicester to Desmond, 18 June 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/41/42; Fitzwilliam et al., to Privy Council, 31 Jan. 1574, ibid., 44/20 and enclosures; Essex to Desmond, 5, 10 June, ibid., 46/52, 57; Fitzwilliam to Burghley 18 July, ibid., 47/23; Fitzwilliam to Eliz., 3, 12 Sept., 1574, ibid., 47/47, 54; Desmond to Fitzwilliam, 1 Aug. ibid., 47/39; Burghley to Fitzwilliam, 23 Sept., Bodl. Carte Mss, 56/514.

86. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/19.

87. Drury's "Instructions", 20 June 1576, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XII, no. 85; the three favourable councillors were Andrew Skydke, James Miagh and Henry Davells.

88. D.N.B., s.v.; Drury was once imprisoned at Leicester's request, MacCaffrey, Shaping of Eliz. regime, p. 74.

89. Drury to Walsingham, 24 Nov. 1576, 24 Feb. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/56/51, 57/27; Drury to Leicester, 8 July 1577, Cal. Carew Mss (1575-88), p. 104; Drury's challenge to Desmond's palatine authority was not as great as has been assumed, for he exercised his right only to try the four pleas (arson, rape, counterfeit and treasure-trove) traditionally reserved to the crown, and he issued notice of a similar intent to hold sessions within Ormond's liberty of Tipperary. See D. M. Kennedy, The presidency of Munster, unpub. M.A. thesis (UCC, 1974).

90. Sidney to Privy Council, 20 Feb. 1578, P.R.O., S.P. 63/60/14.

92. Fitzmaurice to Ormond, 28 Feb. 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/50/21 enclosure (i); Munster commissioners to Fitzwilliam, 20 July 1575, ibid., 52/66 and enclosures; Privy Council to Desmond, 19 Aug. 1575, ibid., 53/15; Sidney to Privy Council, 17 March 1577, ibid., 57/39.

93. John of Desmond to Privy Council, 11 June 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/28/26; same to Leicester, 7 Feb. 1571, ibid., 31/5; same to Burghley, 1 Aug. 1571, ibid., 33/23; Perrot to Fitzwilliam, 22 Aug., 4 Dec. 1571, ibid., 34/4, enclosure (iii), 34/33 enclosure (i); Desmond to Privy Council, 20 Aug. 1571, ibid. 33/36.

94. Sidney bestowed knighthood on Sir John in 1567, "Creation of Knights", Lambeth Mss,621/12; for his emphasis on the baleful consequences of the alienation of Sir John, see "Memoir", U.J.A., 1st series, iii-v, passim.

95. Fitzwilliam to Elizabeth, 25 Nov. 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/48/59.

96. Sidney to Privy Council, 17 March 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/39; Drury to same, 24 April, ibid., 58/4 and to Walsingham, 24 April ibid., no. 5; "Collection of matters against Desmond", 5 Nov. 1579, ibid., 70/5, 6.

97. Malby to Walsingham, 10 Sept. 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/69/17; Waterhouse to Walsingham, 3 Aug. ibid., 68/2.

98. Drury to Walsingham, 23 Aug. 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/68/52; St. Leger to Burghley, 15 Nov., ibid., 70/20; Wallop to Sussex, 28 Nov. ibid., 70/36; St. Leger to Burghley, 29 May 1580, ibid., 73/33; Myagh to Walsingham, 1 June, ibid., 73/41; "Matters against Lord Barry", July 1580, ibid., 74/31 White to Burghley, 22 July, ibid., no. 56.


100. Waterhouse to Walsingham, enclosing Malby's "Plot", 16 Oct. 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/69/63; Malby to Walsingham, 27 Nov., ibid., 70/31; Countess of Desmond to Privy Council, 28 June 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/67; Malby to Walsingham, 24 Oct., ibid., 77/53; Malby's personal ambitions are discussed further in ch.VIII, below.


102. Malby to Walsingham, 8, 10, 12 Dec. 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/70/46, 51, 55; same to ibid., 25 April, 11 June, 1580, ibid., 72/68, 73/52; Malby's request for pardon,ibid., 87/74; Malby to Walsingham, 21 June, 1 Sept. 1582, ibid., 93/37, 95/5.

103. Malby to Walsingham, 10, 14 Sept. 1582, P.R.O., S.P. 63/95/26, 27, 44.
104. Wallop to Walsingham, 19 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/19; Waterhouse to Walsingham, 13 Aug., ibid., 75/37; Wallop to Walsingham, 16 Jan. 1581, ibid., 80/5.

105. Waterhouse to Walsingham, 24 April 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/72/65; Ormond to Walsingham, 21 July, ibid., 74/54.

106. Wallop to Walsingham, 29 Feb. 19 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/71/63, 73/9; Fenton to Burghley, 8 Sept. 1580, ibid., 76/59; Grey to Leicester, 20 March 1581, ibid., 81/36; same to Walsingham, 12 May, ibid., 83/6.

107. Wallop to Walsingham, 6 April 1581, P.R.O., S.P. 63/82/9.


110. Kildare to Walsingham, 5 July 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/67/23; Waterhouse to Walsingham, 20 April 1580, ibid., 72/55; Ball, The Judges in Ireland, i, pp 158-9, 206.

111. Kildare to Walsingham and to Eliz., 3, 4 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/1, 2; Harrington to Burghley and to Walsingham, 7 May, ibid., nos 3, 4.

112. Wallop to Walsingham, 10, 18 Sept. 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/76/22, 45; Gerrard to Burghley, 28 Sept., ibid., 76/65; Wallop and Waterhouse to Walsingham, 4 Nov., ibid., 78/6.

113. Kildare to Walsingham, 3, 4 May 1580, loc. cit.

114. The religious character of the rising is emphasised by David Mathew, The Celtic peoples and renaissance Europe, ch. x.

115. Loftus to Walsingham, 11 Sept. 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/76/26 and enclosures.

116. Baltinglas to Kildare, 22 July 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/74/64, enclosure (i); "Principal matters against Kildare", 23 Dec. 1580, ibid., 79/27.

117. Wallop and Waterhouse to Walsingham, 4 Nov. 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/78/6; Gerrard to Walsingham, 27 Nov., ibid., 78/60; "Loftus's report of Kildare's speeches", 23 Dec., ibid., 79/26, enclosure (i).

118. Gormanston to Gerrard, 28 July 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/75/12, enclosure (ii).


121. For early representative expressions of this viewpoint, see Wallop to Walsingham, 9 Sept. 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/76/2; St. Leger to Burghley, 24 Sept., ibid., no. 56; Stanley to Walsingham, 26 April 1581, ibid., 82/57. Andrew Trollope to Walsingham, 12 Sept., 1581, ibid., 89/39.
Notes to Chapter VII

1. The only modern account of the rising is to be found in David Mathew, The Celtic peoples and renaissance Europe, ch. x.


3. For the activities of the group in the mid 1570's, see H.M.C., Cecil Mss, vol. ii, pp 94-5.

4. Fenton to Burghley, 20 Nov. 1581, and to Walsingham, 23 Nov., enclosing names and property of traitors, P.R.O., S.P. 63/86/72, 80.

5. Edmund Campion, Opuscula, pp 207-9; for a different interpretation of the episode, see Colm Lennon, "Recusancy and the Dublin Stanihursts", Archivium Hibernicum, no. 33 (1975).

6. Archbishop Loftus to Burghley, 11 Sept. 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/76/26 and enclosures i-iii.


10. Calculated from Lascelles, Liberum Munerum Publicorum vol. i, pt. 11; I have expressed the figures as percentages because the number of offices in the establishment varied in this period from 30 to 38 and some offices were left vacant for a period of time.

12. D.N.B., s.v.; see also ch. II above.
14. "List of sheriffs of several counties to c. 1770", G.O., Ms 287.
22. Ibid., pp 200-201.
23. Campion, op. cit., p. 137.
25. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 Jan. 1577 (P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/5); his definition was followed by Hooker in Holinshed, Chronicles (1808 ed.), p. 389.
27. O.E.D., s.l.; though apparently unusual in England, the term was in common enough use in its more general sense in Ireland, e.g. "a cess of labourers" in the earl of Kildare's rental (B.L. Harleian MS, 3756); the ingenious suggestion by H. F. Hore that the word had a peculiarly Irish origin in the Gaelic "cios", (a tax) seems superfluous.
29. Prestwich op. cit. ch. 5; "Device of how the soldiers may be found without cess", c. Feb. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/18 enclosure (iii); Ir. Statutes 10 Hen. VII c. 20


32. S. G. Ellis, "Scutage in late medieval Ireland", unpub. paper.

33. "Extracts from the council books of St. Leger and Crofts", B.L., Add. Mss, 4763, no. 6, ff 229 ff; "Device how the soldiers may be paid without cess", P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/18 (iii), "Estimate of St. Leger's receipts and expenditures", c. 1547, P.R.O., S.P. 60/12/54.


35. Mayor of Drogheda to Sir John Alen, 8 Aug. 1548, P.R.O., S.P. 61/1/55; Bellingham to Mayor of Drogheda, Aug., ibid., no. 57; Bellingham to Mayor of Dublin, Aug. 1548, ibid., no. 67.


39. "Memoranda by Burghley ... on the garrison in Ireland, 1o to 17o Eliz", Jan. 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/49/49.

40. Henry Wise and John Morton to Bellingham, 6 Jan. 1549, P.R.O., S.P. 61/2/4; "Book on the state of the army", 15 March 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/16/57; "Schedule of incompetent persons ... in the bands", March 1566, ibid., no. 61.


43. Fitzwilliam's commissions for the cess, Feb. 1572, Bodl., Carte Mss, 57/107.

44. See footnote 42 above; see also White to Cecil, 10 June 1569 P.R.O., S.P. 63/28/24 and Sidney's speech to parliament in Campion's Historie (ed. Vossen) pp 147-50.

45. White to Cecil 10 June 1569, loc. cit.

46. Sussex to Philip and Mary, 4 April 1557, P.R.O., S.P. 62/1/29.
47. Sidney to Sussex, 10 Jan. 1559, B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XIII no. 12. This was Barnaby Scurllock, the attorney-general.


52. These estimates are derived from the evidence of the law students' book in March 1562, they were not contested by Sussex in his rejoinders, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/51, 57.


56. Sussex to Privy Council, 7 April 1558 enclosing Sidney to Sussex, 20 March, P.R.O., S.P. 62/2/32, enclosure (i).

57. Students' reply to Sussex, 21 March 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/54.


59. Wriothe and Arnold to Privy Council, 16 March 1563, ibid., 10/34; Sussex to Eliz., 24 April 1562, ibid., 8/35.

60. Sidney to Leicester, 1 March 1566, ibid., 16/35.

61. "Students book", loc. cit.; Sidney to Leicester, 1 March 1566, loc. cit. and to Privy Council, 13 April, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/8; for a later instance, see Jenyson to Burghley, 20 Feb. 1582, ibid., 89/38, see also N.P. Canny, "Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone and the changing face of Gaelic Ulster", Studia Hibernica, x (1970) pp 7-35.


63. "Sussex's reply to the students" 21 March 1561, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/57, but see Spenser's lengthy comment in View(ed. Renwick) pp 79-81.

64. "A particular note of the heavy burdens ... on her majesty's subjects", c. Feb. 1577, ibid., 57/18 enclosure ii.
Irish Council to Privy Council, 24 Aug. 1578, including depositions of Baltinglas et al., ibid., 61/57 and enclosures i-ii, Bagenal to Privy Council, 24 Aug. ibid., no. 55.

Sir John Alen's advice to Fitzwalter, c. Dec. 1556, B.L., Lansdowne Mss, 159, no. 3.

"Sussex's reply to the students", 21 March, loc. cit.


Ibid., p. 422.

Ibid., pp 434-8.


Radcliffe's account of the victualling of Maryborough, 1561-4, P.R.O., E.101/532/2; "Vicuallers notes", c. Dec. 1578, P.R.O., S.P. 63/64/13; Fitzwilliam's account for Athlone, 1563-4, N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish) nos 1, 2.


"Students' book", loc. cit.; the students' claim on this matter was repeated in the later 1570s, "A particular note on the heavy burden of the cess", P.R.O., S.P. 63/57/18 enclosure (ii).

Wrothe and Arnold to Privy Council, 7 April 1564, P.R.O., S.P. 63/10/46; Arnold to Cecil, 1 Jan. 1566, ibid., 16/1; Bermingham's "Questions on pay", 23 Sept. 1543, ibid., 9/21; Bermingham to Privy Council, 24 Feb. 1565, ibid., 12/36; Jenyson's "Note on losses sustained in the victualling", 20 April 1565, ibid., 13/16.

"Students' book" and Sussex's "reply", 21 March 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/51, 57.


See notes 42 and 68 above.

Prices given in the "Students' book", loc. cit. and confirmed in the separate petitions from the Pale to Sir Nicholas Arnold, B.L., Add. Mss., 40,061, no. 6, ff 35-40. Sussex did not contest these estimates in any of his replies, but argued merely that they were unusual.
82. "Students' book" and Sussex's replies, 21 March 1562, loc. cit.; there was no disagreement over the official figures.

83. Fitzwilliam Accounts, pp 40-4, 48-54.

84. Estimated from Fitzwilliam Accounts, loc. cit. and Sussex's "replies" to the students, 21 March, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/55, 57.


86. Sussex's "replies", loc. cit.


88. The Irish acre, however, was somewhat larger than the statute acre; figures extracted from Palesmen's petition to Arnold, c. Dec. 1562, B.L., Add. Mss, 40,061, no. 6 and Sussex's "replies" to the students, 21 March, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/57, which gives the average yield per acre; a far lower average yield, however, of 4 pecks per acre, is suggested in Canny, The formation of the old English elite, p. 35.

89. H.M.C. Haliday Mss, pp 20, 108; instances of evasion throughout the 1560s occur in P.R.O.I., Ferguson Mss, memoranda rolls, vol. i, passim.


92. Sussex's "replies" to the students, 21 March 1562, loc. cit.


94. Sussex to Elizabeth, 20 Aug. 1562, ibid., 6/68; Sussex's replies to students, 21 March 1562, loc. cit.


96. Ibid., p. 430.

97. Idem.


99. Sidney to Privy Council, 18 May 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/55.

100. "Note of money to be defrayed in England", 30 Sept. 1567, ibid., 21/97.

102. Might to Cecil, 21 Feb. 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/27/30; Jenyson to same, 23 Feb. ibid., no. 34; Might's "Petition", 5 March 1573, ibid., 39/42.

103. "Articles of agreement with Sackford", March 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/27/58; Sackford to Cecil, 15 July 1570, ibid., 30/70.


106. Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 2 and 25 March 1574, ibid., 45/3,25 enclosure (i).

107. Jenyson to Burghley, 14 July, 17 Aug. 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/47/14, 44.


109. Essex to Burghley, 10 April 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/50/55; Fitzwilliam to Privy Council, 25 May, ibid., 51/41.


112. Sussex's reply to students, c. 21 March 1561, 5/57; Ormond to his agent, ? Aug. 1577, 24 June 1578, Bodl.,Carte Mss 1/22-4.

113. See, for example, the names appended to the petition of 27 May, 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/12-13.


115. Students' rejoinder to Sussex's articles, 21 March, 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/54.

117. Sir Thomas Barnewall, et al. to Elizabeth, 21 Oct. 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/7/31; "Petition ... to be rid of the cess", ? Oct. 1574, ibid., 48/52, enc. 1; Alen's information against Kildare, before Feb. 1575, ibid., 49/59, Alen to Burghley, 10 Aug. 1578, ibid., 61/46.

118. For their respective wills, see P.R.O.I. Chancery Inquisitions (Wexford) R.C. 5/13, pp 164-81 and Exchequer Inquisitions (Dublin and Carlow) vol. i, pp 353-69.


121. Bermingham's "Device of law to proceed with the pay of the army", 23 Sept. 1556, P.R.O., S.P. 63/9/19; "Advice for the government of Ireland", 14 Sept., ibid., no. 27; "Notes on superfluous charges", ? Jan. 1565, ibid., 12/1; "Book ... on Fitzwilliam's account", April 1566, ibid., 17/44; Sidney to Privy Council, 24 June 1570, ibid., 30/56.


124. The phrase first appears in the records in Wallop to Wolingham, 15 Jan. 1583, P.R.O., S.P. 63/99/25, but it is evident from its usage there that it was already widely current in the Pale.


128. Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 29 April 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/98.

129. The label first appears in Sidney, "Memoir", U.J.A., vol. vi, p. 83, but Sidney indicates that it was commonly applied by contemporaries. Similar usages may be found in Symcott to Burghley, 3 Dec. 1574, 10 March 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/48/67, 50/7, see also Canny, The formation of the old English elite, pp 24-6.
130. Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 28 May 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/6/14.

131. Symcott to Burghley, 3 Dec. 1574, loc. cit.

132. Ibid.

133. See ch. V, above.

134. Wallop to Walsingham, 10 Dec. 1581, P.R.O., S.P. 63/87/34.

135. Patrick Bermingham to Richard Plunkett, enclosing commission to collect subsidy, 31 March 1583, P.R.O., S.P. 63/100/61, and enclosure (1); Bermingham to Aylmer, 9 Sept. 1582, ibid., 95/21; on Aylmer, see Sir Fenton Aylmer "Sir Gerald Aylmer, knight and baronet", Kildare Arch. Soc. Jn., xi, (1930-33) pp 367-85.


138. Students reply to Sussex, 21 March 1562, P.R.O., S.P. 63/5/54. Gormanston et al. to Elizabeth, 6 July 1561, ibid., 4/17, Plunkett et al. to Elizabeth, 27 May 1562, ibid., 6/12, "Submission of the gentleman of the Pale", June 1577, Lambeth Mss 628/128; Submission of Netterville and Burnell, June 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/58/42.


140. T. Churchyard, The Misery of Flanders, the unquietness of France ... (London, 1579); see also Burghley's comments in a similar vein, quoted in C. Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, pp 9-10.

141. Report on protest against the cess, 1578, B.L. Cotton Mss, Vespasian F IX 22.


143. Sidney to Walsingham, 15 May 1577, B.L. Cotton Mss, Titus B X, f. 61; "Instructions to Waterhouse", H.M.C. De Lisle and Dudley Mss, pp 55-6; Sidney to Elizabeth, 20 May 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/58/29.


145. Marsh's Library, Ms. 211, Annals of Dudley Loftus, sub anno 1575.
Notes to Chapter VIII

1. See ch. I, above.


4. See ch. I, footnote 13; I have consulted the extended copy submitted to the privy council in the early 1530s, P.R.O., S.P. 60/2/7; several extant copies of the "Breviate" exist amongst the papers of leading statesmen testify to its influences.

5. Ibid., f. 3.


7. "A discourse of the cause of the evil state of Ireland", B.L. Lansdowne Mss.159, no. 1; I have accepted White's plausible attribution of this unsigned tract to Thomas Bathe.


10. Cowley to Bellingham, 24 March 1549, enclosing his "device" for Ireland, P.R.O., S.P. 61/2/25 and enclosure (i).


12. Alen's "Replies to several questions", c. 1556, B.L. Lansdowne Mss.159, no. 3.

13. Pier's "Plot", P.R.O., S.P. 63/9/83. I have followed White in assuming a date later than that attributed of the editor of the Calendar of State Papers.

14. "Note of the demands of Sir W. St. Leger et. al.", c. 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/26/81.


19. Essex to Burghley, 10 Sept. 1573, Devereux lives, vol. i, pp 34-6, see also same to same, 20 July, B.L. Harleian Ms. 6991, f. 23.


22. Smith to Fitzwilliam, 8 Nov. 1572, Bodl., Carte Mss, 57/435, see also Smith to his son, 18 May 1572, Cal. S.P.Foreign 1583 and addenda), p. 490.


28. Sir John of Desmond to Privy Council, 11 June 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/28/26; Desmond to Privy Council, 20 Aug. 1571, ibid., 33/36.

29. White's "Discou~" (ed.) Canny, loc. cit., see also Piers and Malby to Lords Justice, 18 Nov. 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/28 (i).


31. See ch. IV above.

32. See ch. V above.


36. Bagenal to Fitzwilliam, 16 June 1572, P.R.O., S.P. 63/36/48 (i); Bagenal to Walsingham, 15 Sept. 1577, ibid., 59/13; same to same, 28 Nov. 1579, ibid., 70/37; same to same, 3 Nov. 1580, ibid., 78/2.


38. "Brief of Mr Bagenal's patents", c. 1610, B.L. Harleian Mss, 2090.


40. Lords Justice to Eliz., 27 Nov. 1567, enclosing several letters of Piers and Malby, P.R.O., S.P. 63/22/28 and enclosures (i) - (v); White's "memoranda", c. 1568, Hatfield House, Cecil Mss, vol. 201, no. 16; Piers to Weston, 5 Aug. 1569, P.R.O., S.P. 63/29/30; Piers to Eliz. and to Burghley, 6 July 1571, ibid., 33/1-2; Piers to Fitzwilliam, 3 Jan. 1572, ibid., 35/2.

41. Piers to Burghley, 26 Jan. 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/44/17; "Extracts from letters of the earl of Essex, 6 Sept. 1573 to 24 Nov. 1574", ibid., 48/58.

42. Piers to Walsingham, 12, 20 June 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/54, 59; James Dowdall to Piers, 6 Aug. 1580, ibid., 75/20; Piers to Walsingham, 18 Aug., ibid., no. 58; Waterhouse to Walsingham, 25 Jan. 1581, ibid., 80/28; for Piers's "plot", see H.M.C. De Lisle and Dudley Mss, vol. ii, pp 87-91.

43. Essex's "Instructions to Mr Ashton", June 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/52/17.

44. Essex to Fitzwilliam, 14 Nov. 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/48/52 (iii); A.F.M. sub. anno; Essex to Elizabeth, 22, 31 July 1575, ibid., 52/67 and Lives and Letters of the Devereux, vol. i, pp 113-7; Essex to Burghley and to Privy Council, 8 Oct. 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/48/3-4.

45. Waterhouse to Walsingham, 9 July, 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/52/51; Essex to Elizabeth, 22 July, loc. cit.; Essex to Walsingham, 23 July, P.R.O., S.P. 63/52/70 and enclosures; Essex's "Articles with Turlough Luineach", 27 June 1575, ibid., no. 45; Malby to Walsingham, 5 July, ibid., no. 46.
46. Sidney to Elizabeth and to Burghley, 28 Sept. 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/53/29-30; Sidney to Walsingham and to Privy Council, 25 Feb. and 27 April, ibid., 55/20, 34.

47. On the early history of the plantation generally, see R. Dunlop, "The plantation of Leix-Offaly", E.H.R., VI (1891) pp 61-96 and J. O'Hanlon and E. O'Leary, History of the Queen's County, vol. ii, chs XV-XVII.


51. Elizabeth to Sidney, 17 May 1570, Sid. S.P., no. 75.

52. See White, loc. cit., appendices (ii) and (iv).

53. "Memorial for ... Ireland causes", April 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/40; Elizabeth to Sidney, 6 June 1569, Sid. S.P., no. 65.


55. Ibid., 12th Rep., fiant no. 2844.

56. Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 7 April, 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/32/3, "Note of Ireland suits", 1571 (?), ibid., 34/45; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 10 Aug. 1573, Bodl., Carte Mss 56/204.

57. See ch. VI, above.

58. "Complaint of the Offaly freeholders", 1576, P.R.O.I., M 2552; see also Irish Council order, 3 March 1573, Bodl., Carte Mss 56/58.

59. Cosby to Fitzwilliam, 16 Dec. 1573, Bodl., Carte Mss, 56/248; Fitzwilliam to Cosby, 10 Jan. ibid., 56/206.


62. Privy Council to Fitzwilliam, 6 July 1573, Bodl., Carte Mss 56/300-1.


64. For a general account, see O'Hanlon and O'Leary, History of Queen's County, ch. XVI.


72. Sussex and Council to Elizabeth, 16 July 1561, P.R.O., S.P. 63/15/12; Sussex and Council to Privy Council, 26 May 1563, ibid., 8/50; Sussex to P. Mac Rory, 5 Nov. 1562, B.L., Cotton Mss, Vespasian F XII, no. 74.


78. "Indentures with O'Farrells", 11 Feb. 1571, Lambeth Mss, 611/170 and 175.

79. "Memorial delivered by Mr Knight", 15 June 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/20, "Submissions" of Turlough, 18 June 1567, P.R.O., S.P. 63/21/22; "Note of Sidney's letters", 5 July, ibid., no. 48.

80. "Lord Deputy Sidney's requests", 22 Dec. 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/54/22; Turlough Luineach to Elizabeth, 16 Nov., ibid., 53/61; Sidney to Privy Council, 15 June 1576, ibid., S.P. 63/17/8, enclosure (ii).

81. See, for instance, Sidney's "Indentures with O'Farrells", 11 Feb. 1571, Lambeth Mss, 611/170 and 175.

82. "Patent creating Turlough Luineach ... earl of Clanconnell", 10 May 1578, P.R.O., S.P. 63/60/60.


84. Note of revenues received by Sidney, P.R.O., S.P. 63/64/1.


86. Irish Statutes, 28 Henry VIII, c. 3, p. 84.

87. Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 9, app. IV, fiant no. 24; other Englishmen had held the office previously, but they were local landowners, not servants of the crown.

88. For Dungarvan, see Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 8, app. IX, fiant no. 558; Wicklow, ibid., fiant no. 138; H.M.C., De Lisle and Dudley Mss, vol. i, p. 304.


94. Sidney and council to Privy Council, 13 April, 15 April 1566, P.R.O., S.P. 63/17/8 and 13, and 13 (i).

95. Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 11, app. i, fiant nos 1409, 1564; Rep. 12, fiant nos 1618, 2415; see powers conferred upon the Seneschal of the O'Farrells, 11 Feb. 1571, Lambeth Mss 611/170-5; see also "Note on powers of seneschal by R.C. Simington (Kevin), art. cit.

96. Stucley D.N.B., s.v.; Heron L. & P. Henry VIII, xxi (1545) pt. II, p. 79; Carew (Hooker's "Life").

97. White to Cecil, 9 Feb. 1570, P.R.O., S.P. 63/30/12.

98. Gerrard's "Notes on the Irish officers, lawyers, etc.", Oct. 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/56/45-6; the papists were Stuc ley and Wingfield, "Bishop Gardner's true disciple" (see Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 18 June 1573) Bodl., Carte Mss, 56/171-3; see "Charges against the Constable of Dungarvan", 30 Jan. 1569, ibid., 58/775.


101. Examination concerning Harpole, 1 May 1573, Bodl., Carte Mss 56/139, Piplo to Walsingham, 18 July 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/74/47; "Petition ... of Piplo", June 1581, ibid., 83/64; Grey to Walsingham, 7 Jan. 1582, ibid., 88/9; "Submission of Hugh McShane O'Byrne", 1 Oct. 1578, ibid., 63/1; Malby to Walsingham, 24 July 1579, ibid., 67/50; Harrington to Burghley and Walsingham, 7 May 1580, ibid., 73/3-4; Wallop to Walsingham ibid., 81/2.


103. Sidney to Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/55/19; Wallop to Walsingham, 8 June, 1581, ibid., 83/41.
See leases of crown lords given to several of their number in Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 11 and 12, e.g. Masterson, fiants nos 1577, 3294, 3765, 4245; Harpole, fiants nos 533, 612, 808, 1235, 1599, 1600, 2838, 3164, 3173; Harrington fiants nos, 2566, 2599, 2626, 3334.

"Charges against Harpole", 1, 12 May 1573, 26 Oct. 1574, 15 Jan. 1575, Bodl., Carte MSS, 56/139; 57/529; 56/536, 55/133; Malby to Walsingham, 24 July 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/67/53 Wallop to Walsingham, 19 May 1580, ibid., 73/19.

Kildare to Walsingham and to Eliz., 3, 4 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/2; Masterson to Knollys, 23 May 1580, ibid., 73/66(i) and (ii); "Masterson's declaration", April 1580, ibid., 72/1-2; J. P. Prendergast, "The Plantation of the borough of Idrone", Kilkenny and S.E. Ireland Arch. Soc. Jrn., ser. ii, vol. iii, pt. (i), pp 20-44, 69-80.


Drury to Walsingham, 6 March 1579, P.R.O., S.P. 63/66/2; Wallop to Walsingham, 8 June 1581, ibid., 83/41; Grey to Privy Council, 10 July 1581, ibid., 84/12.


Weston to Eliz., 23 March 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/31/33, and Harrington to Burghley, 14 Nov. 1583, loc. cit.

"Examination on plunder of O'Byrnes", 20 May 1574, Bodl., Carte MSS 56/356-8; Sidney to Privy Council, 15 Dec. 1575, P.R.O., S.P. 63/54/17; Harrington to Walsingham, 1 July 1580, ibid., 74/1.


117. Masterson to Fitzwilliam, 27 Jan. 1575, Bodl., Carte Ms 55/166; Carew to Fitzwilliam, 29 Aug. 1572, ibid., 57/399; Carew's "Petition against Cess", 1570 or 1571, Lambeth Mss 605/19-20; Carew's "suits", 1573, ibid., 605/40, 45.


119. On Masterson, see Wallop to Walsingham, 1 March 1581, P.R.O., S.P. 63/81/2 and 8 June, ibid., 83/41; on Harrington, Wallop to Walsingham, 19 May 1580, ibid., 73/19, and 28 Aug. 1581, ibid., 85/27.

120. Treatise by Sir James Croft, c. 1584, N.R.O., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish), no. 68.


122. See ch. V and Tremayne's largest tract n, B.L., Add. Ms 48015, ff 274-79.


125. Malby to Cecil, 19 March 1568, P.R.O., S.P. 63/23/73.


130. See Malby's detailed reports of his proceedings, 10 Nov. 1577, 12 April 1578, 26 July 1578, 8 April 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/59/43-4, ibid., 60/37, 61/41, 41(i), and 72/39.


133. Malby to Walsingham, 12 April 1578, P.R.O., S.P. 63/60/37.

134. Ibid., see also same to same, 3 May, ibid., no. 55.

135. Sidney to Privy Council, 20 Sept. 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/56/31 and 20 April, ibid., 60/42; Malby to Walsingham, 31 May 1579, ibid., 66/68; Malby's "Discourse", 8 April 1580, loc. cit.

136. Malby to Walsingham, 10 Nov. 1577, P.R.O., S.P. 63/59/43 and 29 Feb. 1580, ibid., 71/64 and 23 March 1581, ibid., 81/43; "Note of certain abuses ... of Malby", c. March 1580, ibid., 72/24 and Dec. 1580, ibid., 79/41.

137. Malby's "discourse", 8 April 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/72/39; Malby's "Note" of Connaught hostings, 18 Jan. 1582, ibid., 88/34.

138. "Note of abuses", c. March 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/72/24-5 and Malby's and R. Fowe's replies to such allegations, April 1582, ibid., 81/24 and 40.

139. Abuses and replies, loc. cit. and see Malby to Walsingham, 16 April 1582, forwarding suit of Malachy O'Malone "popish, bishop of Killaloe", P.R.O., S.P. 63/101/29 and (i), and Malby's "Requests", Jan. 1582, ibid., 88/59.

140. See note 138 and also Malby to Burghley, 26 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/28.

141. "Receipt by Clonrickard's agent", 23 June 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/61; Malby to Walsingham, 6 April 1581, P.R.O., S.P. 63/82/12; Malby's "Offers for Roscommon and Meleek", Dec. 1581, ibid., 87/74; his "Requests", Jan. 1582, ibid., 88/59-60; "Notes of ... lands held by Malby", May 1582, ibid., 92/60.

142. Cf. Malby to Walsingham, 10 Nov. 1577 and to Burghley, 8 April 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/59/43 and 72/38; Malby's "Discourse" 8 April 1580 and Malby to Walsingham, 30 April 1583, P.R.O., S.P. 63/72/34 101/46.
143. Cf. Malby to Eliz. 20 Sept. 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/56/34; to Walsingham, 17 March 1577, ibid., 57/40, and 12 April 1578, ibid., 60/37; 10 Aug. 1579, ibid., 68/33; 4 Nov., 12 Dec. ibid., 70/2, 55; "Articles to be observed of Ulick and John Burke", 5 June 1580, ibid., 73/52(i).

144. Malby's "Notes for Connaught", c. 1576, P.R.O., S.P. 63/56/64; Malby to Walsingham, enclosing notes for Munster, 22 Aug. 1579, ibid., 68/47, 46(i); Malby to Walsingham, enclosing his "plot for Ireland", 27 Nov. 1579, ibid., 70/31 and 31(i); Malby's "Plot", 26 Sept. 1579, ibid., 69/63(i).


147. Irish Statutes, 12 Eliz. I, c. 4, p. 367.

148. Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 11, app. fiant no. 1512; see also appointment of McHubert as "chief sergeant" of his county, ibid., no. 1605.


151. Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 11, app. fiant nos 965, 1391, 1833 and 12th Rep., fiant no. 1760; "Note of Ireland suits", c. 1571, P.R.O., S.P. 63/34/45; Fitzwilliam and Council to Elizabeth, 18 Feb. 1573, ibid., 39/27 and enclosures (i) and (ii); Wallop to Walsingham, 9 Sept., 1580, ibid., 76/21.


154. Upper-Ossory to Fitzwilliam, 3 May, Sir Barnaby to Fitzwilliam, 4th May 1573, Bodl., Carte Ms 57/30-3.

155. Fitzpatrick to Sidney, 6 May 1573, P.R.O., S.P. 63/40/27.

156. Elizabeth to Fitzwilliam, 18 May 1574, P.R.O., S.P. 63/46/21; "Names of malefactors ... maintained by Fitzpatrick", ibid., no. 22; Ormond to Fitzwilliam, 16 July 1574, ibid., 47/16; Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 11 Oct. 1574, ibid., 48/7; Sidney to Ormond, 24 June 1576; to H.M.C., De Lisle and Dudley Mss, vol. II, pp 38, 94.
157. Ormond to Walsingham, 28 May 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/73/30 and 30(i), and 28 July, ibid., 74/72; Wallop to Walsingham, 14 Jan. 1581, ibid., 80/5 and 23 April, ibid., 82/47; on Florence Fitzpatrick, see G.E.C., Complete Peerage, vol. xii, pp 187-8; Rep., D.K.P.R.I., 18, app., fiant 6610.


163. Essex to Privy Council, 20 Oct. 1573, ibid., 42/55; Malby to Walsingham, 13 May 1583, ibid., 102/28; Lords Justice to Walsingham, 14 May 1583, ibid., no. 30; Grey to Walsingham, 9 Dec. 1580, P.R.O., S.P. 63/79/5.


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2. Walsh's "A detection of errors", B.L., Cotton Mss, Titus B XII no. 48; White's "Plat" c. 1574, Lambeth Mss 614/165-70; White to Burghley, 23 Dec. 1581, P.R.O., S.P. 63/87/55; Croft's "Discourse for the reformation of Ireland", N.R.o., Fitzwilliam Mss (Irish), no. 68.

3. Perrot's "Plat for Ireland", c. 1581, B.L., Stowe Mss no. 159; other copies B.L., Harleian Mss, 3292, B.L., Sloane Mss, 2200; for previous proposals submitted by Perrot, see P.R.O., S.P. 63/54/39, B.L. Add. Mss 48,015 ff 291-5, "Lambeth Mss 614/254-7; see also Perrot's "Instructions" Dec. 1583, P.R.O., S.P. 63/106/43 and his comments, ibid., 107/37.

4. There is, as yet, no modern treatment of Perrot's viceroyalty, see Bagwell, Tudors, iii, chs xl-xl; D.N.B., s.v.; David Mathew, The Celtic peoples and renaissance Europe, ch. xi; for examples of his self-advertising, see Perrot's "Instructions to Mr Edward Norris", Aug. 1584, Lambeth Mss 632/69-73. Perrot to Privy Council, 15 Sept. 1584, ibid., ff 72-4.

5. Bagwell, Tudors iii, ch. xli; Mathew, op. cit., ch. xi; see also the sympathetic, but anonymous foreign account in R. Rawlinson (ed.) The history of Sir John Perrot, pp 140ff.


7. Spenser, A view of the present state of Ireland ... 1596, ed. W. L. Renwick (Oxford, 1970); Richard Beacon, Solon his follie (Oxford, 1594); Sir William Herbert, Croftus: sive de Hibernia liber, ed. W. E. Buckley (Roxburghe Club, 1887) for the similar, but less developed views of another Tudor intellectual, see H. R. Plomer and T. P. Cross, The life and correspondence of Lodowick Briskett (Chicago, 1927) pp 18-19, 23, 30-1.


13. Rawlinson, Perrot, p. 287; on Fitzwilliam, see Bagwell, Tudors, iii, chs xliii, xliv, esp. pp 201-3.
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1. LATER WORKS

II. Theorizing and Methodological Points
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Synopsis

A. SOURCES: I Manuscript Material

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(iii) Bodleian Library, Oxford.
(iv) British Library, London.
(v) Essex County Record Office, Chelmsford.
(vi) Genealogical Office, Dublin.
(vii) Hatfield House, Hertfordshire.
(viii) Lambeth Palace, London.
(ix) Marsh's Library, Dublin
(x) National Library of Ireland, Dublin.
(xi) Northamptonshire Record Office, Northampton.
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(xiv) Royal Irish Academy, Dublin.
(xv) Trinity College, Dublin.

II Printed Material

(i) Record Publications.
(ii) Publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission.
(iv) Other documentary material.
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B. LATER WORKS: I Published books and articles

II Theses and unpublished papers
A. **SOURCES:**

I. **Manuscript Material**

Except where otherwise stated, the manuscript sources listed here are large collections of miscellaneous letters and papers concerning sixteenth century Ireland. The bulk of this material has been examined on microfilm in the National Library of Ireland or the British Library.

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