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RATIONALITY AND WAR:

The Crisis of the
French Republican Intellectual Project,
1909-1929

Nicholas Bayley

Doctor of Philosophy
1997
RATIONALITY AND WAR:
The Crisis of the French Republican Intellectual Project,
1900 -1920.

Nicholas Bayley

Submitted to the Department of Modern History, Trinity College Dublin,
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
October 1997.
Declaration

This thesis is entirely the result of my own research and has not been submitted to any other university.

Nicholas Bayley

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Summary

This thesis investigates the evolution of republicanism, as articulated by academic republican intellectuals, from 1900 to 1920. With the Dreyfus Affair, the Third Republic had been directly challenged in its core values of justice, democracy and truth. Academic republican intellectuals rose to its defence, not merely in a professional capacity, nor as individuals whose positions of authority could have been endangered, but essentially as articulators of a vision that represented the highest aspirations of humanity. They saw themselves as fulfilling a duty to truth. This truth was incarnated in the Third Republic which necessitated defence of that body against confused irrational alternatives. Because this vision made claims concerning humanity, not just French humanity, it also had international implications. Genuine human progress, it was believed, could be measured by the extent to which governments were prepared to submit to the rule of law and reason. This approach provided a prism through which moral judgements on the international scene could be made. The tensions between this vision and the policies pursued by France generated intense discussion and criticism. These debates are examined through significant individuals, leagues and societies, whose corresponding contribution to the cohesion of the Third Republic is demonstrated.

The First World War burst into this process. Republican intellectuals fought to maintain hegemony of their vision throughout the conflict, with its claim to represent the only valid intellectual and moral response to the war. Although increasingly challenged by other viewpoints, the republican vision retained its mobilising force. It was, therefore, a vital element in sustaining French mobilisation in the war. However, the war made demands on this vision which it was unable to deliver after 1919. Other responses to the war experience, which had been largely contained during the war, could then emerge. This diversity of moral and intellectual interpretation fractured the unity of the republican intellectual project, weakening the credibility of the Third Republic as an embodiment of truth, and initiating the continuing debate about what exactly an intellectual is and what his or her duties are expected to be. In part because of the latter point, analysis of French pro-war intellectuals has been largely neglected, and this thesis tries both to answer the question as to why this has been so and to suggest an approach which enables their full significance to be appreciated.
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ABBREVIATIONS

SEDCG Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre

AN Archives Nationales

BDIC Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine

BN Bibliothèque Nationale

CGT Confédération Générale du Travail

LDH Ligue des droits de l'homme
INTRODUCTION

RATIONAILTY AND WAR

In his book "The Great War and the French People", J.J.Becker asks the question: "Why were the French so ready to make sacrifices in 1914 when they had been so unprepared for them in the past and would manifest even less of a spirit of sacrifice in the future?" (1). This thesis does not attempt to completely answer this question since that would involve a comprehensive investigation of all aspects of French mobilisation. What is contended in this thesis is that by examining the development of the debates, discussions and arguments of republican intellectuals between 1900 and 1920, a clearer, intellectual foundation for this capacity for sacrifice can be discovered, which forms a vital element in understanding broader French endurance through the First World War.

Republican intellectuals are taken to be participants in a tradition of meaning and discourse which interpreted itself as an emergence of the human spirit from ignorance and superstition into the bright light of rationality, justice and human dignity. The concept of emergence and the particular means used to express this, above all the rational application of mental faculties in all fields of human endeavour so as to bring about the natural coherence of all that is best in the human spirit, became a major enterprise for these intellectuals who saw the Republic as the birthplace and means to fruition of this enterprise. The Dreyfus Affair involved a major challenge to this vision, generating new organisations and reviews through which reactions could be debated.

Republican intellectuals were not purely autonomous individuals pronouncing judgement, but participated in a vibrant tradition. As Christophe Prochasson has noted: "Des lieux, des milieux et des réseaux encadrent son activité professionelle et son
engagement politique."(2). It is therefore vital to make a selection of these in order to arrive at the precise processes of intellectual abstraction and application of principles. While socialists differed as to what these processes revealed, and anarcho-syndicalists rejected the Republic as a political vehicle through which their values could be articulated, there was an acceptance that the essential dynamics of social change involved the application of rationality to society through specific principles.

Knowledge was to be gained and applied through a tradition. The term tradition needs to be understood in a dynamic sense. The revolutionary tradition, inspirational for republican intellectuals, was a living tradition, that is: "...an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."(3). Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. Indeed, when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dead or dying. The First World War burst into an all ready existing argument, and the vitality of the republican tradition was partly conditional on its capacity to hold moral and rational allegiance to certain courses of action, despite real pressures towards alternatives.

Republican intellectuals believed that their ideals had been forged in the French Revolution, and that these were being given concrete expression in the Third Republic. The initial problem for the Third Republic after 1870 was to survive, and as a democratic force, part of its faith in its own survival lay in its ability to disseminate ideals by educating or re-educating the population into its project. Education became the means both of reinforcing national identity, and of inculcating a vision of France as being essentially republican. Intellectuals organised initially in education to carry out the tasks of propagating republicanism. Academic intellectuals, precisely because of their political, social and public role as both articulators through internal debate and as disseminators...
through education, played an especially important role, and it is on them that this thesis will focus.

The coherence of the republican vision, its explicit linking together of a range of republican virtues, was succinctly expressed by Alfred Croiset in a lecture to the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales in 1903. Croiset, along with Gustave Lanson, Ernest Lavisse and Charles Seignobos, as members of the faculty of the Sorbonne, was lecturing on recent educational reforms and on their social and political significance. In an address entitled "Les besoins de la démocratie en matière d'éducation.", Croiset argued:

"The idea of the solidarity necessary among citizens of the same country is not only an abstract idea that imposes itself upon reason; it is also the source of a sentiment of mutual love... Education must strive to develop this sentiment....The almost religious love for scientific truth lifts otherwise quite ordinary souls above themselves...this scientific faith, moreover, is essentially republican and democratic...since the republic and democracy must be conceived as a social state in which the progress of all is assured by the free play of thought...And why not add that this republican faith founded on science cannot but be tolerant and pacific."(4). This interdependence generated not only intellectual commitment but a moral sentimentality.

Such a powerful cocktail entailed continuous internal debate on the one hand and active social engagement on the other. In 1898, Emile Durkheim expressed it thus:

"What I mean is that above all, our action must be exerted through books, seminars and popular education. Above all, we must be advisors, educators. It is our function to help our contemporaries know themselves in their ideas and in their feelings, far more than to govern them...It has been said that the mob was not
made to understand the intellectuals and... democracy and its so-called dull-witted
spirit has been blamed for the sort of political indifference scholars and artists
have evinced during the first twenty years of our Third Republic. But the
indifference was ended as soon as a great moral and social problem was posed
before the country."

The republican intellectual was a social being, he had a social function, a political function,
he served a reality accessible to all those willing to use their intellect in the service of right
reason, and equally importantly, as a sentimental educator: "It is our function to help our
contemporaries know themselves in their ideas and in their feelings...".

The tension between stability and change, between the vision of the France of values
and the France of compromise which characterised political reality, necessitated a more
explicit commitment and engagement which brought into existence leagues, reviews and
journals as mediating groups. These provided the linkage between the ideals and the actual
republic, working to forge the latter into the former. They made explicit the implicit
assumptions of republican virtue as conduits of critical and corrective rationality. Faith in
republicanism meant that answers had to lie, as already noted, within that tradition, and
part of one's capacity to carry on had to derive from faith in that tradition. Censorship,
therefore, was an activity which cut at the heart of this enterprise. It excluded not only the
value of free speech, but interfered with the whole process of intellectuals actually being
intellectuals. The attack on censorship, was a permanent on-going necessity.

As well as obvious commitments to republican defence, externally and internally,
republican intellectuals were deeply involved in the search for peace. This expressed itself
internationally in the search for the mechanisms of problem resolution among nation states,
and internally through political ideas such as soldarism (for some intellectuals, in part also
as an attempted response to the notion of class war), through the drive against alcohol and other social abuses, in other words, as a quest for harmony and unity. Before the war, this unity was to be achieved through a battle against the irrational factors in human personal and social life which militated against it. The war, in a paradoxical sense, seemed to provide impetus towards the long sought for internal unity as well as promoting, through victory over Germany, the means to overcome international, irrational factors and so establish a new order. For republican intellectuals the peace could not just be political but had also to be revolutionary.

Socialist intellectuals were often in a state of tension depending on how close they perceived themselves to be to republican abstract idealism: "Le socialisme français est impalpable. Il ne supporte aucune réduction axiomatique et ne se résout à un programme que la mort dans l'âme, tout en s'appuyant sur un ensemble de valeurs morales dont la plupart sont d'ailleurs parties de l'héritage direct de la Révolution française."(7). This demonstrates how the concept of the intellectual as actor was partially defined by and within the republican framework, causing relational and interpretative problems in socialism as to an intellectual's precise role, oscillating between apparent acceptance, and severe criticism within the movement as a whole. The intellectual in syndicalism was perhaps a little more domesticated: "Dans le monde syndical, l'intellectuel n'est ni Dieu ni Diable. Il n'a pas mission à accomplir. Il peut en revanche assumer certaines tâches précises; tenir les comptes d'une Bourse du travail, corriger des articles, animer une coopérative. Il n'est pas perçu comme le théoricien du prolétariat."(8). The interpenetration of the various intellectual milieux is an essential factor in coming to understand the complexities of political and social debate and action therefore, as no intellectual could act either as an individual or as part of a group in an ideological vacuum.
J.G.A. Pocock has drawn attention in another context(9) to the interaction between language and experience, and some of his insights have validity here. Part of the power of republican discourse derived from its flexibility within a range of moral and political poles. There was a national and an international dimension, a moral and a scientific interpretation, national defence and pacifism; and its success as a tradition depended, in part, on the linkages that it provided between major debates and emotions, as well as on how it invested these political events with meaning. "We have reached a point where we can see that each language context betokens a political, social or historical context within which it is itself situated; we are obliged at the same time, however, to acknowledge that each language to some degree selects and prescribes the context within it is to be reorganised."(10).

If this thesis is concerned with the republican intellectual project, it is no less concerned with the Great War. The war placed immense pressure on the interpretative capacities of republican discourse, challenging the very foundations of republican intellectual legitimacy. Increasing numbers of republican intellectuals in their confrontation with the war, had to deal with the difficulty of escaping from an all embracing republican mobilisation for total war, without becoming completely radicalised and marginalised from the republican project. This expressed itself through the attempt to create a language of rational dissent that made sense but which did not lead, back to republican defence. The radical reality of the war and the need to conceptualize a response radicalized the responders in turn and necessitated the formation of a new language from all sides in French intellectual life. How was it possible for a committed republican intellectual to justify continuing an apparently endless slaughter with no clear conclusion in sight? Those who came to see the war as involving senseless bloodshed logically moved in certain
directions to limit or stop the war. Those who did not, those republican intellectuals who continued to invest the war with meaning, were obliged to defend and enlarge their conception of what precisely the war served to achieve. The war brought to white heat all the assumptions of the republican intellectual project, recasting expectations and relationships between the ideal republic and the real republic. Moral decisions had momentous consequences, so that as the significance of the intellectual's role increased in the search for direction, so too did the responsibility to act correctly. Precisely what choices to make produced powerful debates, particularly in 1916 in the shadow of Verdun and the Somme. This needs critical analysis if the continuing capacity of France to mobilise intellectually and morally in the war is to be understood.

One major response, the drive to negotiated peace, required a reply from those committed to the war. This reply, as the co-ordinated propaganda drive of 1917-1918 demonstrated, had to be articulated at all levels so as to defeat the feeling, the emotion that negotiated peace was believed to express. Pacifism became a very complicated virtue in this context. In one sense, republican intellectuals committed to republican defence were right, in that those who purveyed negotiated peace as an option were expressing an option that would have had subversive consequences. "Because he (the historian) perceives language as being formed over time, in response to many external and internal pressures, he does not suppose that the language of the moment simply denotes, reflects or is an effect of the expression of the moment. Rather, it interacts with experience; it supplies the categories, grammar and mentality through which experience has to be reorganised and articulated."(11). The key for republican intellectuals committed to continuing the war was not to allow the feeling of war-weariness to connect subversively to the language of negotiated peace. Their success in this explains, in part, France's continuance in the war,
the taking on of a burden of expectation concerning the peace which would be difficult to satisfy, and the creation of far more precise, antagonistic dividing lines on a greater scale between those who supported the Third Republic as part of the ongoing rational project and those who did not. More precisely formulated therefore, this thesis seeks to answer the question as to how a living tradition, as articulated by a specific group of academic republican intellectuals, continued to impart major vivifying political and social direction to French society. In particular, how did it help to galvanise and carry France through the war, in the face of a radically novel experience which stretched its own assumed rationality to breaking point. In the outcome lay the seeds of its own decline as a project and vision.

Analysis will proceed on three levels. First, academic republican intellectuals, epitomised by people such as Ernest Lavisse, Emile Durkheim, and Ferdinand Buisson (12), have been chosen as the major social group through which to examine and test this hypothesis of a dynamic living tradition. Academic republican intellectuals, as leading specialists in their respective fields, as institutional figures in universities, brought to their discourse an authority unmatched by other participants in intellectual debate. They held deeply respected positions of authority in the Third Republic and were centrally involved in maintaining the Republic and defending it from forces opposed to it. Very often actively involved in the dissemination of republican ideology, they were committed to the Republic, not just as the existing political system, but as a serious moral necessity for human progress. Their existence expresses, par excellence, the need for the republican intellectual project to have committed educators so as to actively integrate republican values into the heart and soul of France. Keeping the real France and the ideal France as close together as possible was for these people invested with a moral and intellectual urgency. How they confronted threats to this, how they were able to continue to validate the republican
intellectual project, had implications for the moral justification of the Third Republic. Not all academic republican intellectuals acted in this manner, so those who actively contributed to debate concerning the values and direction of the Republic are focused on. In fact it was precisely their activity within organisations set up for the purpose of promoting republican ideals that certain republican academic intellectuals emerged as key figures in the republican vision. What these intellectuals bring to the debate therefore is the authority of knowledge and of power in service of the Third Republic, but critically shaped through a vision of how the Republic should be.

Secondly, analysis will proceed through a selection of organisational frameworks in which these major republican intellectuals operated and debated. These are taken as working expressions of the republican tradition and the key republican intellectuals are focussed on precisely through their participation in them. They are not exhaustive, but provide key insights into the progress of the republican dynamic. *Paix par le droit* is an important and usually overlooked review. It had been founded in 1887, and was primarily concerned with promoting international efforts to establish peace, both through the application of law, and through the acceptance of certain values such as those promoted through the republican intellectual project. It represented a broader search for the basis of a permanent international peace (13), but became critically concerned with all aspects of French policy, internal as well as external, which seemed to work against this goal. Founded by Théodore Ruysse(14), it is chosen, not because it was widespread or necessarily influential in itself, but because in its pages was conducted a continuous debate in which major academic intellectuals participated about the application of the republican vision. In other words, what is found in this journal is a demonstration of how the internal logic of a particular vision tended to produce certain moral and intellectual responses
which were applied to social and political dilemmas as they arose. Its value is more emblematic than functional therefore, providing an insight into republican intellectual logic throughout the period 1900 to 1920. The majority republican intellectual response to the war after 1916 adopted a position largely developed in and by this journal many years before. It therefore shows concretely how the war was less dislocating for the republican vision than is often assumed, is a key indicator into why this was so and offers real insights into the reasons for certain developments after the war.

The Ligue des droits de l'homme (LDH) is a vital expression of the republican tradition in action. Founded in 1898, precisely to mobilise republican sentiment and values through a vigorous restatement of the republican project against attack from those opposed to these values, it became a major workshop of discussion and emergence of new ideas in the years following republican victory in the Dreyfus affair. Intellectual activity was social, motivated by a common purpose and belief that an evolutionary tradition needed continual explicit intellectual commitment and debate. The LDH both brought academic intellectuals together and exposed tensions in the ongoing project. Like Paix par le droit, the LDH had as a driving motivation the establishment of republican idealism as political and social reality. Intellectual and moral questions threatening that synthesis had to be confronted and overcome, so that by focusing here we are at the heart of the republican intellectual project.

In order to justify French participation in the war and to mobilise the nation intellectually and morally for continuance in the war, a Comité d'études et de documents was set up in November 1914. While this committee demonstrates one form of republican response to the war, the problems the war posed for the republican project were more searchingly and disconcertingly exposed through the Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre (SEDCG), established in January 1916. Further republican responses
will be investigated in particular through the Association française pour la Société des Nations, founded in 1918. Taken together, these frameworks are crucial sites of republican intellectual mobilisation and remobilisation as republican intellectuals attempted to establish moral and rational validity for their project.

Thirdly, analysis will focus on the larger political context within which republican intellectuals operated. This was critical, since republican values had to assume tangible political form and grapple with a real political environment. This environment was composed of republican politics, which could not depart too far from republican ideals without undermining the project; socialism, which both derived from the republican political project and brought to it potentially alien values of class and social transformation; and right wing nationalism. The relationships and debates between these elements, in particular how they were judged and debated by republican intellectuals, adds further insights into the depth, progress and influence of the republican intellectual project. The war in turn burst into these positions and arguments, challenging all previous political configurations. How far it may have led to their being subverted and in what sense the republican intellectual project adapted to the war is a central question of the thesis.

Using this approach and answering these questions should go some way to show that the ideals of republicanism were more than propaganda or rhetoric, and that the positions adopted were more than a technique for mass mobilisation, although they were certainly used for these purposes. They were also the reaction of a vibrant tradition to a new challenge, and the nature of the action adopted cannot be understood without a comprehension of the cognitive universe through which it was expressed: "Every action is the bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden concepts; every piece of theorising and every expression of belief is a political and moral action."(15). Hopefully, this
interpretative lens will help answer J.-J. Becker's question of why France sustained the stress of war as well as contributing to a re-evaluation of the role of republican intellectuals in the life of the Third Republic from 1900-1920.
Notes


(6) Durkheim E., ibid p.60

(7) Prochasson C., ibid p.20

(8) Prochasson C., ibid p.38


(10) Pocock J.G.A., ibid p.12

(11) Pocock J.G.A., ibid p.28

(12) Some of the academic intellectuals to be focussed on include:
1. **Andler, Charles (1866-1933)**, born in Strasbourg. Maître de conférences at the Sorbonne in 1893 and historian specialising in German history. Published two articles in *L'action nationale* in 1913 warning against the imperialism of German socialism, placing himself in direct opposition to Jaurès, who argued for confidence in German social democracy. Died in Paris.


5. **Buisson, Ferdinand (1841-1932)**, born in Paris. Taught philosophy in Switzerland from 1866 to 1870. Early attraction to international peace initiatives. Took part in the first Congress of peace in Geneva in 1867 and the
second Congress at Lausanne in 1869. Wrote Dictionnaire de pédagogie, becoming Inspecteur général de Instruction publique and director of l'Enseignement in the 1880's. Took the Chair of Pedogogy at the Sorbonne in 1896. Founding member of the Ligue des droits de l'homme and President from 1913 to 1926. Elected as deputy for the Radical party in 1902. Died in Paris.

6. Croiset, Alfred (1845-1923), born in Paris. Member of the Conseil supérieur de l'Instruction publique, organising from 1903 to 1905 enquiries on the reform of teaching, giving conferences on moral education and the inculcation of democracy.


8. Gide, Charles (1847-1932) A renowned economist who held a chair at the Collège de France. He challenged laissez-faire doctrines and was a supporter of feminism, pacifism, anti-alcoholism and consumer's co-operatives.

9. Lavisse, Ernest (1842-1922), born in Paris. Initiated and carried out reforms in the Sorbonne, member of the Académie française, history professor at the Sorbonne and closely involved with Instruction publique, Lavisse was a major authority within the republican intellectual project. Director of L'Histoire de France, of which the first section appeared from 1903 to 1911. The work systematically reconstructed the history of the
Ancien Régime into a preamble to the necessary coming of the Republic and the values of the Republic. The notion that the French Republic was the logical outcome of 20 centuries of history was popularised by the "petit Lavisse", a school textbook first published in 1876 and read by every French school child for generations thereafter. (Cf. esp. Nora P., Lavisse, instituteur national, in Les Lieux de mémoire, 1 La République, (Paris, 1986) pp. 247-289

10. Seignobos, Charles (1854-1952), born in Nantes. History professor at the Sorbonne and close collaborator with Lavisse in L'Histoire de France. Member of the first committee of the Ligue des droits de l'homme


(14) Ruyssen, Théodore (1863-1962), legal philosopher, a specialist on Kant. Taught at the universities of Leipzig and Berlin. Held posts at the university of Aix-Marseille (1904-1906), Dijon (1906-1908) and Bordeaux (1908-1921). Founder and editor of the journal Paix par le droit, and member of the Ligue des droits de l'homme. Major influence on all aspects of French pacifism.

The Republican Intellectual Project, 1900-1914: definition, challenges and response within France.

(i) The academic republican intellectual.

What were the forces that brought the category intellectual into existence and sustained its existence? Needless to say, this is a matter of considerable debate, enlivened by the insights of recent French scholarship. The Dreyfus Affair supplies the key context and all attempts to come to grips with the problem begin there. For Sirinelli and Ory, two preliminary observations seem self-evident: "Qu'on situe cette naissance en 1898, ou un peu avant, le milieu natal est celui d'une polémique"(1). This polemic took a particular form, so linking two concepts to the notion of intellectual, "...ce sont bien ceux de débat et de valeurs"(2).

Debate and values are the two essential hallmarks of an intellectual, but in themselves are not sufficiently precise as defining characteristics. Ory and Sirinelli describe two types of intellectual, the first of which is, as a group, large, social and more precisely professional: "Elle renvoie à la forme même de la pétition de l'Aurore."(3). The second is restrained, ideological and more precisely critical: "Elle renvoie aux commentaires qui ont accompagnés ladite pétition."(4). The first is rather a profession, whereas the second is more a vocation. The authors propose a definition combining the two: "Il ne sera pas l'homme qui pense mais l'homme qui communique une pensée."(5), and his influence will be exercised through petitions, essays, tracts and interpersonally.

The writers go further: "Cette conviction est elle-même sous-tendue par une conception de l'histoire à la fois idéaliste et sociale: les idées mènent le monde, leur force
d'entraînement est liée à l'intensité de la conviction et à la qualité de ceux qui l'exprimaient."(6). In this context, "...l'intellectuel sera donc un homme du culturel, créateur ou médiateur, mis en situation d'homme du politique, producteur ou consommateur d'idéologie."(7).

The authors are led to this position by an important assumption ".aucun consensus ne peut se faire sur la nature des valeurs à défendre, ni même sur la traduction concrète à en donner."(8). As noted, this is a modern notion, and it is dangerous to base interpretations of republican intellectual activities on its presumed truth, since republican intellectuals were at least partially motivated by the belief in the exact opposite, that there were explicit, knowable values, objectively grounded which could be defended in precise ways. The writers are led to conclude: "Il s'agira donc ici non d'histoire des idées, mais d'histoire des sociétés".(9). While not downplaying the history of sociétés, the history of ideas plays a more important part in understanding the activities of republican intellectuals than it is often given credit for. Intellectuals were more than operators or beings operated on, who need to be unmasked by contextual investigation.

In _Sociabilités intellectuelles_(10), where Racine and Trebitsch discuss the themes of "lieux, milieux et réseaux" as methods of approach in intellectual history, the problems of 'sociabilités' are frankly outlined: "Il y a postulat implicite à la réflexion sur les sociabilités qu'il faut tenter d'évacuer, c'est l'idée que les intellectuels s'associeraient, se regrouperaient, s'agiraient ensemble, uniquement en fonction de critères de reconnaissance (interne ou externe) destinés à leur conférer un pouvoir de caractère politique et méta-politique et une célébrité."(11). Explicitly criticising Sirinelli and Ory's thesis, the point is made: "En se limitant à une histoire des formes politiques et des formes de politisation des intellectuels,
on ne trouvera d'explications qu'extérieures au champ, dans une psychologie élémentaire ou une sociologie plus simpliste encore sur les phénomènes de clan, de mafia etc."(12).

It is in part to expand and complement the thesis of Sirinelli and Ory that the possibilities of "lieux, milieux and réseaux" are put forward, and there is no doubt that fruitful research will result from pursuing them into the heart of the intellectual's enterprise. The How and the Where of belief are not all, or necessarily conclusive, however, in the discovery of the What and the Why of belief, as well as the relationships between these factors or the precise effects of different sorts of beliefs within the context of different sorts of crises.

The What and Why have a dynamic, as Durkheim (13) pointed out: "The cult of which he (the intellectual) is at once both object and agent, does not address itself to the particular being which he is and which bears his name, but to the human person wherever it is to be found, and in whatever form it is embodied. Impersonal and anonymous, such an aim, then, soars far above all individual minds and can thus serve them as a rallying point."(14). For Durkheim, the intellectual was both independent of the coercion inherent in all social groupings, devoted to and following the rules of reason, and he was fully committed to the implementation of reason. The unity of intellectuals derived from their vision and provided purpose: "The intellectual is now the truth of all society; he or she stands for the implementation not only of the reason, but also of the moral energy inherent in all human congregations."(15). To be an intellectual, therefore, necessitated socialisation, but nevertheless, socialisation of the intellectuals was the consequence not the cause of their existence.

The emergence of the republican intellectuals, committed to values within and of the Republic, also demonstrated a need to rise above particular groups or elites within the
Republic so that the motivating ideals of the republican project could be sustained and re-energised. This project arose in a context of conflict, and mobilisation was a key dynamic in its self-expression. One of the difficulties of any approach which tries to re-integrate intellectuals into some particular manifestation of conflict within traditional bounds and groups is that it is unclear which groups they could be serving except the one established by their own self-definition.

Once the republican intellectual project established its own operational parameters, then it developed an internal life of its own. It became a 'réseau' in the milieu of the Third Republic, the Republic being in effect the 'lieu' that gave republican intellectuals their existence, and which according to them, necessitated their existence. What has sometimes been missed by commentators is that there is a necessary connection between the Third Republic and its intellectuals. The definition that Sirinelli and Ory, for example, would use, although perfectly functional for the majority of intellectuals in the 20th century, does not allow for the specificity of the republican intellectual. Reason was identified with the republican project, making their activity not just idealistic, but explicitly political as a consequence of the form of their idealism.

Christophe Charle notes the novelty of the precise, virtually defining action of the intellectuals during the Affair:

"Cette pétition (le manifeste dit des Intellectuels) implique en fait trois droits: le droit au scandale (il s'agit d'appuyer l'article diffamatoire de Zola,"J'accuse"), après les échecs de toutes les procédures légales pour faire éclater la vérité), le droit de se liguer pour donner plus de force à sa protestation (les intellectuels ne sont pas des individus singuliers, la notoriété isolée s'efface derrière l'affirmation d'une communauté politique et sociale globale, quelque soit par ailleurs le capital
symbolique de chacun), le droit enfin de revendiquer un pouvoir symbolique tiré de l'accumulation des titres que la plupart des signataires mentionnent à la suite de leur nom."(16).

Charle goes on to claim that these factors were violations of the ordinary social rules according to the anti-Dreyfusards. The right to scandal gave a licence for anarchy, the right to coalition put at stake natural groupings, and the right of symbolic power demonstrated an almost pathological pride. In particular, certain groups took advantage of this type of manifestation: "Les écrivains et les universitaires délaissent les modes officiels ou idéologiques d'intervention et recourent à des moyens nouveaux pour exprimer leurs convictions."(17). These convictions and the need to express them were the engine that drove the creation of the new forms, and care must be taken not to confuse the convictions with the forms.

Charle points out in regard to convictions, that theoretical justifications had certainly contributed to mobilising the two groups of intellectuals(18), but there were not two groups of intellectuals. An intellectual at this time was not a person who made a position rationally accessible, whatever that position might be, but was an exponent of Reason and Truth against unreason and ignorance. Strictly, an intellectual was a republican intellectual therefore on this interpretation, or he was not an intellectual, no matter how far a person's activity might resemble that of a republican intellectual. Content not function was the key, and part of that content involved the assertion of authority to espouse truth over and above particular divisions, an assertion that is truly pathological if being an intellectual is defined functionally. It was precisely this claim that helped infuriate opponents, and which provided the moral urgency of internal debate.
While the internal logic of the republican vision helped to explain why intellectuals came into existence, it does not explain precisely why academic republican intellectuals were so significant or what other forces sustained them apart from purely intellectual conviction. Charle(19) and Ringer draw our attention to other critical socialising and legitimating elements in the construction of the academic republican intellectual. Charle notes the changing position of the French academic throughout the 19th century where, despite coming to enjoy a degree of autonomy and of freedom, they no longer held the status of notables or the influence as individuals that they had had before 1848.(20).

This meant that the academics of the Third Republic could influence the political system only from the outside, as intellectuals, through such means of collective action as the formation of pressure groups, the circulation of group petitions, and the like.(21). Ringer draws a useful contrast with the German situation making the point that the German university professor of the nineteenth century was integrated into his society as a leader of the educated upper middle classes; he could exert his influence as an individual notable, or by directly advising his close colleagues in the monarchical civil service. The French Dreyfusard intellectual, by contrast, challenged the established order from the position of a critical outsider; he could best assert himself politically through the mass tactic of collective protests designed to move the democratic electorate.(22).

Charle insightfully links the elements in the making of the intellectual, beginning with the academic bent where academics, and especially Parisian professors, played a dominant role(23). He notes their numerical significance, so that at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, the teaching staff in Paris made up roughly one fifth of the total number of academics in French higher education(24). This period also witnessed increasing pressure and agitation for reform, based on the spread of the German university model and the
support of science on the part of republican politicians, thus promoting the Sorbonne as an important centre of university reform (25). This helped to build up a collective voice:

"The autonomy acquired by the universities and the lesser interference by the State in the internal life of the faculties transformed the various committees, at the level of the faculty, the university, the Academy of Paris and the Education Ministry into places of university power and discussion, thus strengthening the sentiment of an esprit de corps, encouraging much wider debate, and, in brief, turning the professor from an isolated individual secure in the possession of his chair into a more or less active citizen of a body of scholars who were obliged to voice their opinion upon its future."(26).

All these factors coming together, combined with the internal logic of the republican vision which firmly integrated democracy, rational decision-making and science(27), helped to construct the academic republican intellectual.

The new prestige conferred on the universities by the reforms, combined with the pro-science ideology encouraged by the Republic, and the centralisation of cultural life in Paris, opened up other routes for the academics of the university of Paris to exert influence on both informed and broader public opinion: the writing of works of synthesis, the editing of prestigious collections for publishers, the editing of influential reviews and regular collaboration with them, plus writing for daily newspapers.(28). What was true, therefore, of the republican academics in 1898 who signed the so-called manifesto of the intellectuals believing that their professional values fed more broadly into the values of justice and truth (29), became a hallmark of the academic republican intellectual in action. The rationality of their professional lives was both sustained and guaranteed by the rationality of the Republic, which required professional promotion and defence. Furthermore, the advantages
possessed by the specialised scholar had been specifically argued by Durkheim: "The specialized scholar may contribute results of his research and reflection... and he may also properly speak as a citizen with a particularly firm commitment to human rights - unlike the man of letters who is too easily seduced by an interesting theme."(30).

Martha Hanna(31) discusses the debates within the academic establishment as academic republican intellectuals fought to bring to French scholarship the status they believed it deserved. This they hoped to achieve by establishing institutional autonomy for universities, increasing faculty salaries, and improving the academic standards of all degree programmes. The key point is that from 1880 onwards, intellectuals such as Alphonse Aulard, Alfred Croiset, Ernest Lavisse and Emile Durkheim had been mobilised to propagate their agenda within the French academic world. Support of Dreyfus was most widespread within the academic disciplines most directly affected by and amenable to curricular reform and academic modernisation(32). After the Dreyfus Affair, Liard, Lanson, Andler, Seignobos, and Lavisse dominated the political and administrative institutions responsible for education and their opinions prevailed. This dominance came under renewed attack in 1910, with a series of articles by the pseudonymous "Agathon" (co-authored in fact by Alfred de Tarde and Henri Massis)(33). Agathon charged that scholars at the new Sorbonne, more competent in German than in French, were unable to give students the education they deserved, concluding that modern education had created a crisis of French literacy. Academic republican intellectuals were obliged to remobilise in defence of their academic values, and were heavily engaged in this process right up until the war.

Both internal to their own fields of expertise and more broadly concerning republican values in France and abroad, republican intellectuals were in a state of
mobilisation. The academic republican intellectual thus emerges as a person and as a member of a collectivity particularly worthy of study in understanding the dynamics of the Third Republic, indeed whose existence gives essential insights into the legitimating foundations of the Republic. It is now necessary to focus on some aspects of that activity and to assess its significance.

(ii) *The LDH as a conduit for action.*

As already noted, the word intellectual as a substantive term became current during the Dreyfus Affair. Michel Winock (34) relates how Maurice Paleologue described an animated evening on the 18th of January 1898, where one of the guests declared: "Ce ne sont pas les généraux, ce n'est pas Drumont, ce n'est pas Rochefort......ce sont les Intellectuels qui incarnent aujourd'hui les vraies traditions de la conscience française et de l'esprit français."(35). The Dreyfus Affair had begun as a moral cause concerning the defence of a man unjustly condemned, and passed over into a conflict of ideals, of two different systems of values: "L'un, défendu par les intellectuels, est celui des valeurs universelles (justice, vérité, compassion pour l'innocent châtié); l'autre, défendu par les nationalistes, est celui des valeurs particularistes (la légitime défense de la nation contre ce qui la menace, sous toutes les formes."(36). For republican intellectuals, the values they were defending were valid in all places and at all times, and had been most clearly annunciated in the Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen in 1789.

This had political consequences in that the ideals of the Droits de l'homme underpinned the democratic Republic, gave it meaning and guaranteed its objective legitimacy. To carry this work forward, and further to work for the values expressed in the Droits de l'homme, was the driving force behind the establishment of the LDH: "Par eux,(and for all republican intellectuals) par leur action, par leurs discours, la République
ne pourra plus être réductible à un système de gouvernement comme un autre; elle est
devenue une façon de vivre ensemble dans la Cité, inséparable d'une morale fondée sur la
Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen.**(37).**

At its inaugural meeting on the 20th of February 1898, the LDH stated in its third
article: "Elle fait appel à tous ceux qui, sans distinction de croyance religieuse ou d'opinion
politique, veulent une union sincère entre tous les Français et sont convaincus que toutes
les formes d'arbitraire ou d'intolérance sont une menace de déchirements civils, une menace
à la civilisation et au progrès..."**(38).** Appeal could be made over particular divisions to a
universal truth and justice, and enemies had to be mobilised against.

The nature of the task was defined by Ludovic Trarieux (a former Minister of
Justice) at the first general Assembly of the LDH, held at the Hôtel des Sociétés Savantes:
"Qui nous a rapprochés et groupés? L'idée seule du devoir, à laquelle aucune
préoccupation d'intérêt personnel ne s'est associée. Ce devoir, il se résume d'un mot: c'est
de défendre contre des menaces sourdes de contre-révolution les principes fondamentaux
de la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme, sur lesquels repose depuis cent ans l'égalité de la
patrice."**(39).** This necessitated communication and communicators, hence the presence in
the first Central Committee meeting of seven politicians, thirteen members of the
university, five writers and three from other professions.

The university in particular played an important role not just here but more
generally: "Dans l'ensemble, l'Université, prise à tous degrés, fut la première catégorie
sociale ou professionnelle sur laquelle le dreyfusisme put prendre appui."**(40).** It was not
enough just to express one's conviction but to mobilise public opinion, a permanent feature
of the republican intellectual program. Establishing the linkage between the intellectual
and public power was the driving motivation as well as the implicit conclusion following
The bedrock belief that the mind of humanity, if appealed to, would be found to be in tune
with the highest objective aspirations: "Il marquait sa confiance dans l'avenir, dans la
puissance de la raison, il invitait ses adhérents à devenir la conscience vivante et agissante
du pays."(41).

The LDH was therefore interested in education, which increased conflict with the
Catholic Church, since that institution was not only the source of much anti-republican
intellectual criticism, but the communicator of a range of directly opposing ideals.
Separation of Church and State rose to the top of the republican agenda. The completion of
this imperative, and its consequences after 1906 pushed Catholicism firmly outside the
republican vision. Although not the explicit target of mobilisation after 1906, the Catholic
Church continued to serve as an inspiration and home for many opposed to the
republican project, and indeed the Church was in part forced into this position as a
consequence of its very definite exclusion. The LDH worked to expand popular education,
especially through the extension of public libraries, "...chacun a droit à sa part de science et
de vérité.(42)". The expansion of knowledge was seen as explicitly assisting in creating
and sustaining the LDH's vision of society, in particular against opponents whose
mobilisation could only be based, in this analysis, on ignorance.

One of the LDH's hardest struggles was for civil servant rights. Civil servants had
increased considerably since the beginning of the Republic. The total number of civil
servants was between 415,000 and 800,000 by 1908, depending on whether or not one
counted the armed forces, the local government officials and the tobacconists, who were
almost as numerous.(43). The first civil servant strikes started in 1905 with the police in
Lyon, followed by the junior post office workers in Paris in April 1906, leading to major
conflict in April and May of 1908. This issue became central because it raised the question
of whether, "...fonctionnaires - citizens and employees of the state at the same time - would be permitted to organise so as to challenge collectively the authority of the state."(44). In other words, could the state, whose authority assured democracy, afford to be internally democratic, with a minority perhaps holding the collectivity to ransom? The withholding of certain liberties from its employees seemed therefore justified to the government.

This conclusion was strongly rejected by the LDH which believed firmly in trade union rights for civil servants, especially in this instance given that, "...the fonctionnaires recruited by the Third Republic were hired precisely because of their republican beliefs..."(45) De Pressensé insisted: "Nous avions dès le début déclaré que, chaque fois qu'il s'agirait de ces questions de législation sociale et de protection ouvrière, dans lesquelles éclatent plus que partout ailleurs l'injustice et l'iniquité sociale, nous serions toujours prêts à intervenir, notamment pour prendre la défense du droit syndical."(46).

This was a concrete example of where the Republic in its everyday operation failed to live up to the expectations contained in its ideology, and the LDH, convinced of the soundness of the ideology, applied it critically in these specific circumstances.

The LDH itself was made up of the Central Committee which comprised 36 members and was renewed by a third each year. The Sections controlled the intake of new members but the lists of these had to be submitted to the Central Committee, which also received half of the subscriptions and could discipline Sections who broke the Statutes. There was to be an annual general conference, notice given two months in advance so as to enable any questions, which had to have the support of two thousand signatures at least, to be be put on the order paper which was then fixed by the Central Committee(47).

Membership experienced a slow but steady increase beginning in 1901 with 21,000 and reaching 47,000 by March 1904, while the number of Sections grew from 171 to 300 in
1902, reaching 492 in January 1904. Apart from publishing tracts and brochures, members of the Central Committee gave conferences throughout the country, notably Trarieux, Buisson, de Pressensé and Delpech. A cross-section of the Central Committee in 1902 reveals a range of significant republican intellectual leaders such as E. Bourgeois, professor at the Sorbonne, F. Buisson, senator and leading educationalist, L. Herr, librarian at the Ecole Normale, F. de Pressensé, and C. Richet, G. Séailles and C. Seignobos, professors at the Sorbonne. Because of the assumption that what they stood for rose above particular concerns, Trarieux was able to declare: "Nous ne participons pas aux querelles de groupes, mais nous sommes, au contraire, un terrain d'entente largement ouvert à tous ceux qui professent nos doctrines, et sur lequel après les batailles électorales, on doit signer le traité de paix."(48).

The theme of a peace, following on mobilisation, based on rational foundations, was to prove a constant and important presupposition in the republican project. The theme too of the independence of their ideals from parochial concerns was echoed and reinforced by Francis de Pressensé, who succeeded Trarieux as president at the LDH conference of 1904: "Nous avons su, dès le début, placer au-dessus et en dehors des partis. Quand je dis en dehors et au-dessus, nous avons fait appel exclusivement à l'opinion républicaine. C'est sur le terrain démocratique, sur le terrain de la Révolution que nous y avons fait appel..."(49).

However the year 1905 marked the end of the honeymoon: "En réalité, jamais plus la Ligue ne trouvera auprès du gouvernement un accueil aussi favorable que pendant la période s'étendent de 1900 à 1905."(50). The period of gentle criticism was over as the LDH would be forced to use harsher language and view the whole political scene with a mixture of greater caution and more vigorous questioning. For the period 1900-1905, the
battle had seemed to be clearly between the forces of light, progress, reason and justice incarnated in the democratic Republic, and reactionary, authoritarian tendencies. The future would be a little more complicated, but confidence in what the LDH had set out to accomplish was neither seriously challenged nor indeed seriously questioned in the minds of republican intellectuals until the war. Rather, the emergence of new enemies both made possible and justified continued mobilisation as well as confirming for these intellectuals the validity of their social insight.

Furthermore, the existence of the LDH demonstrated a need for concerned intellectuals to take an active role and the means through which this could be achieved. The LDH enabled its supporters to be both upholders of the system and be able to strive to perfect it. In short, intellectuals could be actively involved in the life of the Third Republic, giving purpose to themselves and vigour to the Republic as it confronted its enemies, but sometimes obliging the enemies of the Republic, indeed the Republic itself, to be seen in particular, prescribed ways.

Under Clemenceau, prime minister from October 1906 to July 1909, much was promised but very little achieved in the way of social legislation, which caused great dissatisfaction among whole sections of society. In April through to May 1907 major conflict erupted between the government and civil servants belonging to trade unions. The army was increasingly introduced to resolve disputes, either to replace absent technicians by military engineers (during the electrician's strike in Paris in March 1907) or more often to maintain order. Serious incidents occurred in the building workers strikes at Draveil on the 2nd of June 1907 where two workers were killed, and at Villeneuve-Saint-George where four were killed and hundreds wounded(51), as the government forcibly repressed strikes. This was not the image of a correctly functioning republican state.
Rather than furthering social harmony, Clemenceau's actions seemed to dramatise social division, in particular in his conflict with the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). The CGT was committed to attaining power by means of a general strike, rejecting any accommodation with the republican state. It had, by the end of 1908, about 700,000 members concentrated in key industrial sectors such as the mines and railways. In its congress of October 1906 at Amiens, "...l'antipatriotisme marié à l'antimilitarisme est devenu la doctrine officielle de la CGT." As such it represented a potentially serious challenge to the republican intellectual project, but the violent manner chosen to deal with strikes instigated by it was unacceptable to the LDH.

Clemenceau's actions were judged by Seignobos the historian in the following way: "Clemenceau, responsable de l'ordre, exposé à l'accusation de laisser la société se dissoudre dans l'anarchie, prenait des mesures de répression et, soit par instinct d'autorité, soit pour montrer qu'une longue carrière d'opposition systématique ne le rendait pas impropre à maintenir l'ordre, il se justifiait par des déclarations hostiles aux socialistes, fauteurs de troubles, et recueillait l'approbation de ses anciens adversaires et les reproches de ses anciens alliés." The LDH, as former allies, formed their response first generally: "La Ligue doit se dresser contre tous les abus du pouvoir et, s'appuyant sur la légalité, lui faire exprimer le maximum de justice; elle défendra ainsi ce qu'il y a eu de plus haut dans la Révolution." This necessitated, as always, raising and organising, "...la conscience publique." The language used expressed the growing pressure on the LDH to respond: "Nous avons en face de nous un certain nombre d'hommes qui ont menti à tout passé et qui ont montré à la France qu'on pouvait arriver au pouvoir, non pas pour réaliser les idées qu'on a toujours défendues, mais pour leur infliger le plus cruel désaveu", and the Lyon
Congress of 1908, "...proteste contre les attentats à la liberté d'opinion, commis par un
gouvernement qui se dit républicain."(58). Under the pressure of political events, the LDH
was beginning to see potential division between a government calling itself republican, and
republican virtue. The firm commitment to the keeping together of these two inter-related
realities called for a high degree of mobilisation, especially with a view, "...de jeter dans la
balance tout le poids de son influence en faveur de l'unité et de la discipline
républicaine."(59).

Internally, civil servant rights continued to be defended, with the Central
Committee lashing the government: "Il déplore une fois de plus de voir un gouvernement,
qui doit son accession au pouvoir aux citoyens qu'il poursuit et révoque avec une inlassable
obstination, méconnaître les principes de liberté, de justice et de tolérance, par la
prédication desquels il avait obtenu la confiance du parti républicain."(60). Support by the
Central Committee for strikes led to severe disagreements within the LDH and several
resignations including Richet, Trarieux and Ratier, a senator, from the Central Committee,
Ratier reasoning that: "Notre association tend de plus en plus à devenir un instrument de
propagande et de combat au profit d'un parti extrême."(61).

This involvement in social conflicts caused growing unease within the LDH so the
Congress of Rennes in 1909 was vitally important in seeking to quell these fears.
Pressensé argued that: "La Déclaration des Droits s'appuie surtout sur la légalité, mais elle
prévoit aussi le droit d'insurrection. D'ailleurs, ce n'est pas de la grève que le Comité
Central a pris la défense, mais bien de la liberté d'opinion"(62), and Buisson argued
strongly in support of action taken in defence of the postal workers strike. The action of
the Central Committee was overwhelmingly supported when put to the vote, thus averting
a potential crisis, not the last in the life of the LDH.
The years 1905-1910 had been difficult for the LDH as it fought to apply republican principles on a number of different fronts, with the precise application of principles within the Republic proving more contentious and time-consuming than any external enemy. The LDH retained its unity (with 80,000 members and 835 sections in 1910), but was severely tested. Four years before the war, its members were battle hardened in the support of principles they believed to be eternally valid. That battle was relentless and intensifying.

Concern at the international situation (to be investigated in the next chapter) was coupled with a constant stream of criticism about the failure to take initiatives to reduce internal disharmony within France. This reflected a methodological tendency to relate these factors to the same cause, namely social and moral inability to apply rational formulae to the problems of human society. De Pressensé spoke out about what he interpreted as a public opinion poisoned, "... par les sophismes du patriotisme professionnel, au point de nous amener au bord d'un abîme, au fond duquel nous roulerions, dans l'abîme d'une grande guerre."

(63). He blamed the Press for encouraging this climate of opinion, "...on amasse les matières combustibles et il suffira désormais d'une étincelle pour que tout prenne feu et que nous assistions à un cataclysme épouvantable"(64), before finally attacking what he saw as the exploiters of patriotism, "...tous leur verbiage sonore et grandiloquent sert purement et simplement à masquer les plus sordides spéculations."(65).

The LDH itself noted a decline in membership after the internal conflicts regarding civil servant rights with only 52,000 members and 656 sections in 1912. This suggested a wider concern felt by some that the LDH was veering too much towards socialism. The major figures of the LDH rejected the charge of being a platform of socialism, but accepted a linkage with socialism in so far as socialism was judged to also express certain ultimate values: "On a dit, déclare Ferdinand Buisson, que la Ligue tournait au socialisme.
Oui, dans la mesure où la conscience humaine devient socialiste." (66). The LDH was not to be assimilated to a party, or to be seen as a mere mouthpiece. As will be argued, part of the socialist project was to inculcate its vision as a matter of moral and rational necessary, and its success in this influenced how far the LDH expressed certain socialist principles. Many members of the LDH were socialists but their commitment can be seen as being given on the condition that socialism be true to values expressed through the Ligue, and provide a valid method for the extension of those values. The precise content of its social and moral vision required in the LDH continuous reflection and reconstruction, and the extent that this might necessitate movement in a socialist direction, was a permanent subject of debate.

For the LDH, many aspects of French government policy were dangerous because they were not grounded on the principles of the republican project, and so weakened France's claim to moral superiority, both internally and against the danger of Germany as an openly militaristic, nationalistic power: "D'ailleurs, ne l'oublions pas, ce n'est pas seulement en France que le virus nationaliste exerçait ses ravages. En d'autres pays, il était encore plus violent; en Allemagne, la démocratie se trouvait encore plus désarmée devant les prétentions de la caste militariste." (67). The LDH saw itself as continuing the republican democratic process of expressing the genuine will of the people of France, and fighting all those forces, in particular the nationalists with their divisive social tactics, the police with their oppressive powers, the ravages of alcoholism, and social and political injustice, which prevented France's acting as it should. A critical spirit and intense loyalty were the hallmarks of a republican intellectual, and this was particularly so in the LDH. Keeping these otherwise disparate elements together and concentrating the energy that resulted, depended on their being directed at different targets, real France and the France of
ideals and the continuing intellectual and moral validity of this distinction. In the face of
determined opposition, resulting both from ignorance and the deliberate pursuit of
destructive alternatives (and not, as being conceptually impossible, any weakness or
problems in its own analysis), the LDH increasingly found the way forward to be through
determined, unrelenting mobilisation. This in turn produced a view of the social and
political situation in language characterised by reference to conflict, betrayal, of
manipulation by enemies, and finally of the necessity of the victory of the values of
republican France. This was a heady mix on the eve of the war, and goes some
considerable way to explaining the preparedness of republican intellectuals for war.

(iii) Interaction and tension with socialism as alternative project

Given the number of socialists who had been Dreyfusards during the Affair, and
the active involvement of socialists in the LDH, some consideration must be given as to the
place of socialism within the republican project. For the period 1900-1914, this
relationship was very intimate, not without tension and sometimes acrimonious(68). Blum
noted in 1902 in his work, Les Congrès ouvriers et socialistes français, "Le développement
du socialisme en France a toujours été arrêté ou accéléré par les progrès et les reculs de
l'idée républicaine en France."(69). Socialism and republicanism represented two different
principles, namely political equality and social justice, which although linked, were not
exactly equivalent.

Socialism was confronted with an existing political and economic order in all
countries which it sought to transform, but in France the particular situation was
complicated in that "..la République était manifestement autre chose que le régime
politique imposé par le capitalisme. Elle était le fruit d'une lutte révolutionnaire séculaire,
dont le souvenir était encore proche, dont l'actualité n'était pas périmée, tout un pan du
conservatisme français continuant de la contester."(70). In other words, the Republic had brought about many of the rights socialists were fighting for, in particular political democracy. How to approach republicanism became therefore a central question for socialists in the implementation of their own project.

During the 1880's, two perspectives on the approach to republicanism among socialists emerged concerning the possibility of social revolution. The first group, the "possibilistes" considered that "...la République était une valeur en soi, qu'elle était le cadre politique adéquat pour assurer les progrès du socialisme. La défense de la République était, dès lors, une nécessité qui ne pouvait être en aucune circonstance récusée."(71). The second group comprised the "révolutionnaires", for whom the Republic "n'était pas un préalable, seule important la réalité de classe. Marquer une confiance dans la République ne pouvait que favoriser les illusions, décourager en tout cas la volonté révolutionnaire dans le prolétariat."(72). These two extreme visions set the terms of debate. They were subsequently enriched and nuanced, but not fundamentally changed, and can be found in socialist controversies, not just up to the War but beyond into the 1930's. The relationship between the Republic and the bourgeoisie, how far hatred of the latter led to opposition to the former, and to what extent the values of the republican intellectual project were 'bourgeois' in themselves has been usefully analysed by François Furet (73). Thoughout: "La recherche d'un point d'équilibre entre l'acception des valeurs et des règles de la République et l'inévitable moment révolutionnaire, qu'impliquait la transformation du régime de la propriété, fut au centre de débat."(74).

These two extreme positions were rejected however where they took the form of republican socialism and revolutionary syndicalism. Alexandre Millerand perfectly represented the first current. While other socialists in the 1890's, such as Jaurès, did not
disagree that socialism and republicanism were different stages in the same evolutionary process, a split occurred with Millerand over the tactics he used, which meant arguing that to give the Republic the social content that it lacked, socialism should accept becoming the left wing of the republican party.

"Du jour où le Parti socialiste prend la figure de parti politique, il s'associe à la bonne et mauvaise fortune du régime dont il ne peut réclamer les avantages et les bénéfices sans en accepter les responsabilités et les charges. Tout en demeurant lui-même, en gardant son aspect original et sa vie personnelle, il est appelé à rentrer en relation et en accord avec les autres partis démocratiques, à prendre sa part dans la gestion des intérêts généraux du pays.... Son devoir est de devenir de plus en plus un parti d'organisation, de gouvernement et, par des moyens pacifiques, sous la loi républicaine, de transformer la doctrine socialiste de formule stérile en réalité vivante." (75).

To be a socialist, it was necessary, before all else, to be a republican.

This assimilative position was not adopted by the socialist movement, nor was the alternative. In defence of the alternative, Hubert Lagardelle argued:

"Si la démocratie suffisait, je serais démocrate et je ne serais pas dans un Congrès socialiste. La démocratie, par les procédés, les moyens d'action qu'elle met en œuvre, est incapable de créer les valeurs nouvelles. Si la démocratie était pleinement suffisante, s'il n'y avait qu'à tirer ses conclusions dernières, pourquoi serions-nous socialistes? Le mouvement syndicaliste, qui est un socialisme ouvrier, a précisément pour but d'apporter des règles de vie, des institutions qui ne ressemblent pas aux institutions du passé." (76).
This too was rejected, above all because it devalued political action, and also because it implied a dissolution of socialist identity, not for the benefit of the Republic, but for the direct action of syndicalism.

The essential debate finally concentrated around three conceptions of the links between socialism and republicanism, personified in three people, Jules Guesde(77), Edouard Vaillant(78) and Jean Jaurès(79). For Guesde and his followers, republican reforms could have no real value since "... rien ne change dans la société et rien ne peut changer aussi longtemps que la propriété capitaliste n'est pas abolie."(80). The only value in the Republic was that it enabled the true language of political struggle, that of class, to emerge. Guesde expanded his position

"Quoique la République, suivant le mot de Thiers, puisse être "le gouvernement qui divise le moins" la bourgeoisie, elle est certes pour nous comme pour Marx le terrain idéal de la révolution par nous poursuivie, mais, pourquoi? Parce qu'elle met en présence les classes dans leur antagonisme collectif et direct, sans que leur lutte nécessaire puisse être faussée par des calculs ou des manoeuvres dynastiques. Et, cette supériorité du régime républicain disparaîtrait si, comme le voudrait Jaurès, du fait même de ce régime existant, le prolétariat devait abandonner sa propre bataille, renoncer à faire sa République à lui pour s'immobiliser dans la défense de la République de ses maîtres; ainsi, entendue et pratiquée, la République deviendrait le pire des gouvernements."(81).

The chief weakness of this position was to go completely against a deeply rooted political culture(82). The rigidity of analysis could not interpret to its own advantage the reality of republican popularity and acceptance.
Edouard Vaillant denied that there was a contradiction between what the Republic had achieved and revolutionary struggle. He advanced the position that: "La République, comme tout progrès, est comprise dans la pensée, dans la conception socialiste; nous sommes a fortiori des républicains comme on n'en trouve pas dans les autres partis se disant républicains, et qui n'étant pas socialistes ne peuvent vouloir l'achèvement de la République."(83). Socialism had an ethical as well as a material base: "De même que le parti socialiste, disait-il, est le seul parti de la classe ouvrière, il est aussi le seul parti de la liberté de l'esprit"(84), which linked it to the Republic to the extent that the Republic shared these values. There was no real question of a disagreement between a bourgeois republic and a socialist republic, just a question of degree of resistance to the bourgeois itself. That republican defence not put socialist identity at stake, it was necessary "...que la SFIO n'ait pas de "lien permanent" avec les partis socialistes avancés de la bourgeoisie."(85). His problem was extremely similar to Millerand however, which was how to continue genuinely to preserve a socialist identity without being submerged by the Republic.

Jean Jaurès reached his position of eminence in socialist thought in part precisely through his ongoing subtlety of analysis of this question. Jaurès had deep links with the Republic. As Rebérioux has demonstrated, Jaurès had had a highly successful republican education: "Après divers prix au concours général, il est reçu premier (for the Ecole normale supérieure) en 1878, devant Bergson: c'est la gloire. Années d'études intenses,..., c'est le moment où la République s'implante."(86). As Rebérioux goes on to show, Jaurès participated widely in republican intellectual life, and was himself a symbol of republican and socialist possibilities and of the tensions that could arise between them. This experience shaped his politics.
In a nutshell, his position was "Ni Guesde ni Millerand", but as he went on to affirm: "Je reconnais que cette politique complexe que j'essaie de formuler dans le parti, politique qui consiste tout ensemble à collaborer avec toute la démocratie, mais à se distinguer d'elle vigoureusement, à pénétrer partiellement dans l'Etat d'aujourd'hui, mais à dominer notre idéal l'Etat d'aujourd'hui, je reconnais que cette politique est complexe, qu'elle est malaisée, qu'elle nous créera à tout moment des difficultés graves."(87). Primarily the Republic had value, and to the extent that it was the product of a revolutionary movement, it was "la forme logique et suprême de la démocratie."(88).

The three interlocking notions of democracy, socialism and republicanism reappear continually in the texts of Jaurès. For Jaurès, "... la République était la forme politique prise par la démocratie, elle-même étant le principe conducteur de la République au socialisme.(89). Universal suffrage and the action of the proletariat were the keys to the socialist future. The Republic was the place which permitted "... de l'action méthodique et forte de la démocratie, de la croissance des nouvelles formes d'organisation dans la société, parti, syndicats, coopératives, de l'érosion du droit de propriété bourgeoise, des changements moraux."(90). The Republic was an essential step on the journey to socialism.

The unity in terms of ultimate aim within socialism opened up the possibility of compromise in 1905, but debate still continued on the question of the preservation of socialist identity. The gap between the Republic and socialism was real, but socialism had taken a definite direction and stance in relation to the Republic, one which had defining consequences for its own project: "Après des années d'hésitation, il s'est construit sur l'entrecroisement de deux dynamiques politiques, révélant, pour l'une, du mouvement ouvrier, pour l'autre, de l'idée républicaine.". There were elements of weakness and strength in this for socialism, weakness in that "... comme l'avait vu lucidement Jaurès, il a
The republican project itself was also deeply enriched by the link in that primary values such as liberty and equality were revitalised, and the institutions of representative democracy were accepted and used by socialists. As shown by the LDH, the link was not without tension from the republican side, particularly on what action to take concerning social conflicts, but there can be no doubt that the calibre and contribution of socialist intellectuals as they entered into the debates of republican life as real participants, enhanced the quality and energy of the republican project.

Socialism existed, therefore, in a situation of ongoing tension, in a continuing need to maintain a political and social space for its own project, "...la part commune existant entre les socialistes et les républicains, particulièrement les radicaux, a entraîné aussi une logique d'opposition pour maintenir la distinction socialiste."(92). Jaurès expressed the vision in terms of conclusion, "Plus le socialisme se confondra dans la Nation (...), plus il sera tenu de marquer sa conception propre."(93). The S.F.I.O. became integrated into the political system to the left again of the radicals, who in a similar way, had pushed the opportunistes to their right. But the socialists did not want simply to replace radicalism on the left, but to represent above all a particular interest of society, the proletariat, despite the presence of syndicalism with its own independent agenda regarding the same proletariat.

These tensions, the apparent fragility of the party, the divisions, the far from complete capacity to represent workers and coupled with a fear of popular disaffection, created an obsession with unity: "L'unité allait devenir le tribunal suprême du socialisme."(94). This need also explains the significance of Jaurès, who was able to
impose a model of what a socialist leader should be, that is, above all a conciliator, capable of uniting ideas, tendencies and different practices, a model made necessary in part through the interpretative demands placed on socialism by the republican project. Jaurès was very much a man of the moment and produced by the moment: "A travers le rôle de Jaurès, une logique politique profonde se mit en place dans le parti français: la division n'était surmontable que par la capacité des principaux dirigeants à faire d'une faiblesse une force. Elle demandait l'existence de chefs charismatiques qui pussent imposer les arbitrages nécessaires." (95). Socialism existed under the pressure of being between two visions and having to express itself without collapsing into one or other alternative.

In the ongoing debate and struggle within the socialist project among socialist intellectuals, what needs to be kept firmly in mind is the fluidity of the different milieux. As Prochasson has noted (96), this absence of a clearly defined boundary constitutes one of the obstacles to the place and role of the intellectuals in the French socialist movement. This fluidity can partly be explained by the interpretative coherence of the republican project which powerfully infiltrated the activities and the assumptions of socialist intellectuals: "Il est en revanche plus licite d'affirmer que les intellectuels socialistes, plus nourris des valeurs républicaines que de doctrines prônant les ruptures sociales, plus proches de l'idée d'unité nationale que de celle de lutte de classes, favorisèrent l'intégration culturelle du mouvement ouvrier." (97). Very importantly therefore: "Leurs interventions politiques ne se fondent pas sur la base d'un sentiment d'appartenance à une classe, mais bien plus sur une émotion assimilable à celle qui fut à l'origine de l'affaire Dreyfus. On ne comprendrait rien à l'histoire intellectuelle du socialisme de cette période si l'on omettait de se référer sans cesse à la matrice dreyfusarde qui contient idéologies et pratiques des intellectuels socialistes du début du XXe siècle." (98). This means that we are dealing with
a programme certainly as intellectually powerful as parts of socialism, that is, the republican project, yet rarely focused on as such, and which concentration on the debates leading up to socialist electoral success in 1914 has tended to obscure.

At one level, French socialism seemed to have found a balance by 1914. Jaurès appeared to have creatively integrated the two inherent fragilities of socialism, the attachment to the republican project and the weakness of the worker movement. However, the preservation of this balance depended on the permanence of the social and political context in which it was established. The war was to radically change this.

If it was true that: "Le socialisme français est impalpable. Il ne supporte aucune réduction axiomatique ne se réduit à un programme que la mort dans l’âme, tout en s'appuyant sur un ensemble de valeurs morales dont la plupart sont d'ailleurs parties de l'héritage direct de la Révolution française" (99), this was not without explicit tension in the socialist movement concerning the propagation of these values. Arguing the Guesdist position, Charles Bonnier and Paul Lafargue published several articles in Le Socialiste and Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine (100) attacking intellectuals. Not only was an intellectual: "Bâtard social, de race impure,... inférieur en dignité au prolétaire comme au capitaliste.", but he was "inférieur en capacité au dernier député du Centre." (101). More than this particular abuse, intellectuals "...sont des arrivistes qui tentent de se créer une situation dans la politique au détriment de ceux qui les écoutent et tous, tant qu’ils sont, entendez-vous, viendront à la classe ouvrière pour se sauver eux-mêmes..." (102).

Effectively for this position, and positions like it, intellectuals had no social place and no role; they were usurpers, pretenders, representing values which they had no right to represent. Essentially, if an intellectual was not a socialist, on what did his authority rest: and if he were a socialist, from where did he derive any special authority?
With the decision not to take the revolutionary syndicalist road from 1907 onwards, the role of intellectuals both inside and outside socialism became a major issue, with a strong undercurrent of anti-intellectualist reaction(103), particularly from those who still favoured revolutionary syndicalism. Given that, for this position, intellectuals could not be reduced to, or understood as, producers, they could only be seen as "parasites"(104). This reflected a general anger with the consequences of post-Dreyfus policies among many Dreyfusards, namely political and social developments, the check of the Universités populaires and the personal and more critical development of individual socialists within the socialist project. There was a consequent loss of hope in an intellectual/worker alliance, and a movement to a more anti-intellectualist specifically worker interpretation among those disillusioned by the lack of real socialist progress.

More particularly as explanation, there had been a "trahison des clercs", or as Péguy described it, a descent from mystique to politique(105). The anger was evident with Victor Méric:

"On sait que MM. les dreyfusards parvenus au pouvoir ont mis un empressement remarquable à lâcher leurs amis de la veille. L'Affaire restera comme la plus éclatante duperie dont puisse s'enorgueillir l'histoire. C'est la trahison la plus complète. Juifs et catholiques, politiciens et littérateurs, soudards et intellectuels-à quelques honorables exceptions près-ont lâché pied. Tous aujourd'hui sont arrivés; tous sont gavés, satisfaits, engraisssés, enrichis. Ce qui a triomphé, c'est leur cause à eux."(106).

These elements of anti-intellectual opposition, which interpreted the role of the intellectual as a sort of poisonous fifth column, showed that, despite the astute theoretical footwork of Jaurès, an unease and tension remained within socialism as to the place and
role of intellectuals, and consequently of the Republic, which republican intellectuals asserted to be the incarnation of a range of values within a tradition, a living tradition, that was not socialist and which claimed authority for a non-socialist perspective. What also needs to be noted here, to be developed later, was the emergence of a language of betrayal as regards intellectuals, which saw them as mouthpieces of decadent ideologies, a view that was to have a significant future in the interpretative analysis of subsequent events.

(iv) The Republic as model and reality.

While the LDH expressed the republican project in a particular and dynamic mode, the Republic itself was broader both, as was obvious, as a political reality, but also as a model with specific social and political implications (107). Fundamentally, republicans adhered to the idea that individuals were born with natural rights which could not be alienated. The Déclaration des droits de l'homme both proclaimed the principle and established the list; liberty, equality before the law, property, security, and resistance to oppression. As such, republicans were hostile to all social formations where liberty and the natural rights of man were limited by the existence of groups which sought to alienate these rights.

This primacy of the individual and his natural rights helped explain therefore the attitude of republicans during the Dreyfus affair. The survival and interests of essential social entities such as the army or the judiciary had to be secondary to the rights of an individual, in this case, Dreyfus. Social harmony involved the proper integration of essential interests.

More precisely, the dreyfusards considered that their adversaries, by their actions, had put themselves outside the republican project: "A partir de 1900, pour être républicain, il faut avoir adhéré aux grands principes du dreyfusisme et à l'idéal des droits de l'homme..."
défendu par les partisans de la révision."(108). This in turn dictated a specific, rational approach to government, which made sense in its own terms, as well as being attractive to parts of the middle classes on economic grounds, namely that: "De l'affaire Dreyfus naît l'idée que le pouvoir constitue un danger naturel pour les droits de l'individu et que le véritable gouvernement républicain est celui qui mettra en place un système politique aussi faible que possible, préservant par là même le fondement des libertés."(109). Yet if abuses were fought against, and catholicism, for example, was excluded as being incompatible with the republican project, what exactly was the social project of the Republic in terms of positive approach and difference?

Perhaps the clearest formulation of the republican social project was contained in Léon Bourgeois's book, Solidarité, published in 1896 (110). Apart from the general tradition of republicanism, Bourgeois had drawn, as sources, on Durkheim's work, De la Division du travail social, as well as Charles Gide's work on economic co-operation, and on a philosopher Alfred Fouille, author of 'La science morale contemporaine'. Trying to find a synthesis between marxism and liberalism, Bourgeois argued that society was governed by a quasi-contract, which united each individual to the community of his or her contemporaries. Each person has inherited the work and achievement of previous generations, and could not live except in the society of other individuals, the consequences being that the double link of society to the life of the individual established a social duty whereby society could demand of each for the benefit of all.

There was a theory of state intervention here, but limited by the urgency of the need owing to each person. Once the social obligation, the social debt, had been paid, the action of the state had to stop, and the individual became free to establish or not to establish their own obligations. This doctrine rejected the marxist idea of class struggle and even the
concept of social class: "Il n'est plus politiquement de bourgeois et d'ouvriers, la Révolution et le suffrage universel ont fait de tous des citoyens et des électeurs et notre doctrine qui vise la fusion des classes et non la division et la lutte des classes est toute dans la pacification par les réformes. C'est une doctrine de fraternité et de solidarité sociale, car on ne fonde rien avec la haine."(111). The doctrine was no less hostile to the central ideas of economic liberalism (112).

Centrally, the importance of private property as a bulwark for individual liberty was promoted: "Le Parti républicain radical et radical-socialiste est résolument attaché au principe de la propriété individuelle dont il ne veut ni commencer ni même préparer la succession."(113). However, even from 1902, the point had been argued even more forcefully, "Il faut avoir le courage de l'affirmer, il ne peut exister de dogme infaillible ni en faveur de la propriété, ni contre la propriété sous la forme actuelle. La propriété privée n'a été et n'est encore qu'une méthode de progrès social et c'est à ce titre que nous la préconisons. Elle est pour nous la garantie la plus sûre de l'activité, de la liberté, de la dignité humaine."(114).

Specifically, this entailed two broad objectives, namely a struggle against capitalism which was a threat for individual liberty in its concentration of wealth. Mines, railways, canals and public utilities should be therefore acquired by the state. Secondly, in the short term, the state should intervene to achieve a number of particular reforms, in practice for the benefit of children, the elderly, the implementation of assurance schemes and so on. In the long term the ideal to attain was the creation in France, thanks to state intervention, of a democracy of small and medium property owners (115). Thus was a political programme derived from the ideals of the republican project.
With varying degrees of application and success, this became the social program of the republican intellectuals. While doubt has been cast on its significance within the Radical Party (116), for republican intellectuals it addressed the social question while keeping this subordinate to the overarching political principles on which their rationality was founded. One of its keynote features was the search for social harmony. This was passionately believed to be attainable by republican intellectuals and explained the rejection of class war on the one hand, and of the unnatural divisions of unbridled capitalism on the other. Society could be rationally and peacefully ordered to the ends for which the fully rational human person was intended. Disunity and disharmony were caused, on this analysis, by a lack of the proper constituents, namely education, property, security, liberty and equality, the building blocks, in other words, of the republican project. This project had a specific application nationally therefore within France, and those who opposed it, opposed not only a particular ideological conception of humanity, but the very possibility of a serious and peaceful social ordering. Trying to determine how far this social vision accorded with the values and analyses of socialism, if only in terms of stepping stones, as well as the relationship between the political and the social, helped generate a part of the friction between the two movements (117), as already outlined.

Its potential within the republican project was not limited to republican intellectuals. While this program politically favoured small property owners, it was not driven by small property owners as a form of manipulated idealism/disguised pragmatism, rather it served to support and sustain small property owners. These in turn gave their allegiance to the Republic as the obvious political structure acting in their defence. The relationship was symbiotic not class driven, its success dependant on its fruitfulness for both elements. It was not without political effect: "De 1881 à 1910, le nombre des patentés
du commerce et de l'industrie passe de 1 900 00 à 2 400 00, alors que la population française ne s'accroît que très lentement."(118). This coupled with the low membership of the revolutionary syndicalist CGT, could go part way to explain the failure of the revolutionary syndicalist program between 1906 and 1910, as the idealist and practical consequences of aspects of the republican project were able to sustain and outlast a direct attack.

While linking into, and to some extent shaping, alternative social structures and belief systems, such as for example socialism or the politics of radicalism, the ideals of the republic produced real expectations which provided a social dynamism in their own right. The expectations of social harmony and unity generated within the republican vision put great hope on these ideals to be made real. Clemenceau's socially divisive tactics concerning the repression of strikes, stirred the hearts and minds of republican intellectuals, particularly as evidenced in the LDH, as these central concerns seemed threatened, necessitating critical action.

For republican intellectuals, in particular for Durkheim who gave this matter some thought, a properly functioning state was a kind of mind. It represented to itself and to its citizens what they all had in common: their rationality. It was, or should be an institution by which society comprehended itself, thereby eradicating the chaotic and senseless drives of the crowd. The less developed state was, "...like a permanent crowd, and everyone knows that the conduct of crowds is based on a total lack of reflection; various pressures circulate there, and the most violent is the one that leads to the act, even when it would be the least reasonable."(119).

The pursuit of class interests, therefore and for example, had to be subordinated to an all encompassing rationality, through which, and only through which, genuine social
peace could ensue. In part, a decision could be judged on the extent to which it produced, or appeared to produce, this social harmony, and republican intellectuals had a permanent authority on which to appeal when submitting specific government or other movement's actions to criticism. The problem for republican intellectuals was that so many decisions and reactions within France seemed to produce disunity, thus necessitating an almost permanent state of mobilisation against the forces of irrationality as they saw them.

The implementation of the republican social project was also complicated by the political mechanisms of the Third Republic which made the systematic application of a programme of social change extremely difficult. Particular interests could block the desire for change as, for example the Senate, which halted the law on pensions for three years from 1907 to 1910, as well as blocking Caillaux's bill introducing income tax. The government found it difficult to exert pressure through the absence of any stable majority and the rapid turnover of ministries(120). These weaknesses were recognised by the Radical Party at the Congress of Pau in 1913, where it attempted to impose on itself greater discipline in parliament, and elected Caillaux, whose attachment to peace and income tax was well known, as leader.

The conflict between republican intellectual aspirations, and the inherent problems in the political system which often worked to thwart or delay the application of these aspirations, helped to explain the sense of frustration felt at the disunity, the social disharmony, the inability to deal with issues such as alcoholism, crime, degeneracy, abortion and population decline which were judged to be sapping the vitality of France. Into this fragmented amalgam of interests and concerns, the desire for unity, for clear purpose, coupled with the perception that it was precisely through the pursuit of their own selfish ends by particular groups that was delaying the emergence of a strong France,
seemed therefore to further confirm the republican intellectual in his project, which was precisely about overcoming irrational divisions. La Ligue Française was formed on the 1st of July 1914 with Lavisse as president, and it expressed as its aim the continuing quest for unity: "La Ligue français fait appel aux Français qui, au-dessus de tous les partis mettent l'amour de la patrie et la volonté de la servir."(121).

The republican intellectual project was in a deep sense a nationalist project. When deciding in what to found the unity of the nation state, a theoretical problem existed, summarised in Vidal de la Blache's Tableau de la géographie de la France of 1903 (122). This was: "...how a fragment of the earth's surface that is neither island nor peninsula, and which cannot properly be considered as a single unit by physical geography, has risen to the state of a political country, and finally became a fatherland(patrie)". The French Revolution had provided the key theoretical tools in which and through which French republican nationalism expressed itself. The Third Republic existed both to promote these values against hostile alternatives and to provide France with a theoretical basis on which its own unity could be justified. This nationalism was founded on the republican intellectual project. Coupled with this was the sense of natural boundaries, stimulated by international conflict, in particular the role of the 1840 dispute over the Rhine, in the development of both French and German nationalist clichés (123).

The loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the forced removal from France of peoples who were French and whose loyalties remained with France was therefore an affront to the democratic ideals at the heart of the republican intellectual project. Not the land, but the loyalties, the heart of the people was what had to be won and remade in the light of republican intellectual values, and this was republican nationalism. This was a project and it was for this reason that the state would use the increasingly powerful machinery for
communicating with their inhabitants, above all the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of the nation and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag.

The fact that it represented an evolving tradition was clearly demonstrated through the existence of another nationalist tradition, that of the Right. This tradition strongly repudiated the claim of the republican intellectual project to express the fullest possibilities of French nationalism. The polemic from the Right partially serves to highlight the historicity and relativity of republicanism as an intellectual construct. The strength of republicanism in uniting its values with French nationalism can therefore be partially evaluated by the success with which opponents were able to challenge this. The Right needs evaluating as a critical counterfactual to republican intellectual claims.

The anti-Dreyfusards located their faith in the army, and in the value of institutions which embodied the 'real' France. France on this interpretation was a social organism whose validity could not be subjugated to the demands of an abstract truth or reason. The Right faced a serious problem when confronting republican intellectuals because it rejected the claims of the intellectual to be a transmitter of transcendental reason requiring general assent and denied a common ground of reason to which appeal could be made.

As Barrès critically noted, an intellectual was an individual who is persuaded that society ought to be founded on logic and who fails to recognise that it, in fact, rests on necessities anterior to and perhaps foreign to individual reason. Barrès himself expressly and logically rejected the designation intellectual since he clearly was not involved in an intellectual project of this type: "Nous ne sommes pas les maîtres des pensées qui naissent en nous. Elles ne viennent pas de notre intelligence. La raison
humaine est enchaînée de telle sorte que nous repassons tous dans les pas de nos prédécesseurs." (125).

The validity of the nationalist right was not premised on logic or reason, and its tendency to violence made sense whenever it rejected doing battle on terms and on ground determined by its opponents, namely that of so-called reasoned debate. When certain members of the Right did do battle intellectually, they were obliged to locate their sources of authority in non-rational, allegedly social givens. Not only that, but on the Right's presuppositions, the republican intellectual was engaged in exactly the same activity, although the fog of supposed rationality hid this fundamental reality. For the intellectual Right, the intellect was just a weapon to be used in the war; it had no intrinsic interpretative power, and certainly could not predetermine commitment to certain social forms. The essential target of the nationalist Right had, therefore, to be not republican intellectuals, but the Republic itself as a partially rationalistic, abstract construction, and this was the direction it took from 1905.

As a negative response to the Republic, the nationalist Right (126) was not to gain a great deal of support, and had difficulty in acquiring a mass following. "Politiquement, dans ces dix dernières années du XIXe siècle, le parti nationaliste apparaît comme une grande force confuse, inlassable dans l'éventail des opinions parlementaires et qui oscille de l'extrême-gauche à l'extrême droite où elle finira par se fixer." (127). Although the Ligue de la Patrie Française, involving Vaugeois, Syveton, Lemaître and Barrès, proved to be a dynamic representative of the anti-Dreyfusard cause and would claim 100,000 members at one point, it quickly collapsed by 1904 from internal troubles and, more seriously, which was to be a chronic problem for the nationalist Right, the lack of substantial popular support.
More support was to come from catholicism, particularly after 1905. This was largely the result of two factions. Firstly, catholicism represented a nationalistic, pre-intellectualist example of the type of social organisation to which allegiance should be given as a constituent element in the construction of an alternative French nationalism; and secondly, and in part as a recognition of the first point by republican intellectuals, the exclusion of catholicism from the republican project. Small though the nationalist Right was always to be throughout 1900-1914, the efforts of Maurras and the Action Française were to raise its profile, although this was in part due as well to the need for republican intellectuals to have clearly defined enemies through which the difficulties of realisation of their project could be explained.

The Action Française began as just one among many nationalist committees, but gained a new energy and direction with the arrival of Charles Maurras. The Ligue d'Action Française was founded in 1905, but two years were to pass before its first congress. It specialised in violence, both through libellous campaigns and in action on the streets, for example during the transfer of Zola's ashes, and in its attacks on university figures such as Thalamas and Andler. Maurras was to successfully graft the fading energy of royalism on to the nationalist leagues, and in the process, to construct a direct repudiation of the Republic. As such, the Ligue sought to expand its support into areas which were similarly hostile to the Republic. From 1908 for a period of two to three years, the Action Française tried to use the mobilise the energy of revolutionary syndicalism, and so appeal to a wider anti-republican current.(128). This met with virtually no success as anarcho-syndicalists had no sympathy with a restored monarchy.

As the major figures in Action Française demonstrated, the movement tended to attract those who were intellectually dissatisfied with the republican project. It represented
at heart an intellectual rejection that could not root itself as a social rejection of
republicanism. Vaugeois had been a radical socialist, Daudet a radical and boulangist,
Bainville was the son of a friend of Péletan, and Maritain was the grandson of Jules Favre.
The Action Française was both an expression of, and an attempt to direct, broader social
and intellectual tension in the Republic:

"Le nationalisme de la génération de 1910 se rattache étroitement, en effet, à tout un
mouvement plus général de pensée et de sentiment, mouvement peu à peu élaboré
dans le contexte moral des premières années du XXe siècle. Il s'agit, dans l'ensemble
d'une violente mise en cause des dogmes intellectuels sur lesquels avaient vécu les
genérations précédents. Contre le rationalisme, le scientisme et le libéralisme
dominants dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, on exalte assez généralement les
valeurs de sentiment, de discipline et d'action. Les influences d'origines les plus
diverses, celles de Bergson, de William James, de Kipling, de Barrès et de la
renaissance catholique, convergent dans une commune sensibilité aux mêmes thèmes
et aux mêmes appels."(129).

The emergence of a new sentimentality, a new vitality, a willingness to see war as a
liberating and creative force were challenging elements to the republican project causing
debates that were to become more and more trenchant, but the very energy of these forces
made them too plastic for the rigidities of Action Française.

More significantly, the weakness of the Action Française demonstrated the strength
of the republican project. Republican intellectuals faced problems on many fronts, but the
Action Française was never a serious challenge. For republican intellectuals, part of the
reason for this derived from the certainty that their convictions expressed a reality against
which Maurras's position could only be taken as archaic and reactionary. Both sides
recognised the incompatibility of their intellectual presuppositions, and their mutual
approach to each other necessitated complete antipathy and rejection, since there existed no
common language of discourse between them; they were incommensurate with each other.
In this, the relationship was to prefigure problems republican intellectuals were to have
during the War in approaches to Germany and German intellectuals.

Although claiming to be nationalist, even here the credentials of the Action
Française were weak; as Agulhon has noted, "Le plus frappant, la première évidence, c'est
la confusion d'images entre République et France, en d'autres termes l'émergence d'une
symbolique nationaliste à partir de symboles républicains."(130). Examples here included
the coq, Marianne and the tricolore, which both portrayed the colour of royalism and
pointed beyond it. Nationalism and the republican project were not opposed forces, and
the Action Française's failure to become an effective popular voice of nationalism further
demonstrated the power of the republican vision to maintain the critical
national/international balance necessary for its own coherence, and its capacity to prevent
others from occupying that space. Serious opportunities for Action Française could only
arise if and when this synthesis were to be severely challenged on its own terms.

The quest for unity, the search for mechanisms to overcome divisions and a clear
commitment to a particular rationality through which this could all be achieved was not,
nor could not, be confined to French internal politics. The republican intellectual project
had equally dynamic international implications which require examination.
Notes


(2) Ibid p.8

(3) Ibid p.9

(4) Ibid p.9

(5) Ibid p.9

(6) Ibid p.10

(7) Ibid p.10

(8) Ibid p.10

(9) Ibid p.11


(11) Ibid p.15

(12) Ibid p.18


(17) Ibid p.97

(18) Ibid p.184


(21) Ringer F., ibid p.219

(22) Ringer F., ibid P.220


(24) Charle C., Academics or Intellectuals? ibid p.96

(25) Charle C., Academics or Intellectuals? ibid p.98

(26) Charle C., Academics or Intellectuals? ibid p.99

(27) Ringer F., ibid p.217

(28) Charle C., Academics or Intellectuals? ibid p.100

(29) Charle C., Academics or Intellectuals? ibid p.103


(36) Winock, ibid p.135

(37) Winock, ibid p.132. Established in February 1898, the LDH was to be closely linked to republican values and to the Third Republic as the repository of these values until just after the First World War. This link was broken in the 1920's so much so that by 1939 the LDH had become a cell of the socialist party. It continues to exist as a pressure group. This body has attracted almost no scholarly interest. The Bulletin Officiel de la ligue des droits de l'homme and the publications of the LDH during the War (S 3374 (10)F BDIC) are the major archival sources. Henri Sée's *L'histoire de la Ligue des droits de l'homme (1898-1926)*, (Paris, 1927) still remains the major published work on this organisation. See also, Charlot J. and M., "Un rassemblement d'intellectuels: la ligue des droits de l'homme. *Revue française de Science Politique*, vol. IX, 4 December 1959. The coming centenary of this body may see a revival of interest.


(39) Sée, ibid p.11

(41) Sée, ibid p.13

(42) Sée, ibid p.32


(45) Wishnia ibid p.11

(46) Bulletin Officiel de la Ligue des droits de l'homme, t.IV p.1592 01-08-1904

(47) Sée, ibid p. 37

(48) Bulletin Officiel, t.1 pp 1ff 01-12-1900

(49) Bulletin Officiel, t.IV pp 502ff 01-05-1904

(50) Sée, ibid p.59


(54) Sée, ibid p.63

(55) Bulletin Officiel, t.V111 p.953 01-10-1908
(57) Bulletin Officiel, t.V11 p.704 01-07-1907
(58) Bulletin Officiel, t.V111 p.1186 01-11-1908
(59) Sée, ibid p.67
(60) Bulletin Officiel, t.V111 p.1538 01-12-1908
(61) Bulletin Officiel, t.1X p.693 01-04-1909
(62) Bulletin Officiel, t.1X p.788 01-04-1909
(63) Sée H., ibid p.136
(64) Sée H., ibid p.136
(65) Sée H., ibid p.136
(66) Bulletin Officiel, t.XIV p.467 01-07-1913
(67) Bulletin Officiel, t.XIII pp 327ff 01-10-1912
(69) Blum Léon, Les Congrès ouvriers et socialistes français,(Paris,1902)
(71) Bergounioux A., ibid p.119
(72) Bergounioux A., ibid p.120
(73) Furet François, Le passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l'idée communiste au Xxe siècle. (Paris,1995), chap.1
(74) Bergounioux A., ibid p.121 and confer, Sadoun M., Mystique et politique: les ressources de la République. Cahier Léon Blum n.19 1986


(80) Guesde Jules, Les Deux Méthodes. (Lille,1902)

(81) 6th International Socialist Conference, Amsterdam,14-20 August 1904 (Brussels,1907) p.201

(82) Bergounioux A., ibid p.124


(84) Howarth J., op. cit. p.95

(85) Bergounioux A., ibid p.125

(86) Rebérioux M., Jaurès, La Parole et l'acte, p.32

(87) French Socialist Party, Congress of Bordeaux, 1903, printed in Revue socialiste, n.221, May 1903, p.551
(88) Speech of Jaurès at the Congress of Amsterdam, text in La Revue Socialiste, n.237, September 1904

(89) Bergounioux A., ibid p.126


(91) Bergounioux A., ibid p.128


(94) Bergounioux A., ibid p.58

(95) Bergounioux A., ibid p.66


(97) Prochasson C., ibid p.91

(98) Prochasson C., ibid p.91

(99) Prochasson C., ibid p.20

(100) Bonnier Charles, Prolétarisés et savants, Le Socialiste, 18/12/1898; and Science et Savants, ibid, 15/01/1899. Lafargue Paul, Les Universités populaires, ibid,11/03/1900, and Le socialisme et les intellectuels, Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine, First Series,05/05/1900, p.23-45

(101) Bonnier Charles, Prolétarisés et savants, op cit.

(102) Police Report 03/03/1900, Prefecture of Police archives (APP),Ba 1527, Conference by Paul Lafargue 01/03/1900 to the Etudiants collectivistes.

(104) Lagardelle Hubert, Les intellectuels et le socialisme ouvrier, Le Mouvement socialiste, 183 and 184, February and March 1907, p.118


24/10/1908,p.5


(109) Berstein S., ibid p.161

(110) Bourgeois Léon (1851-1925) Born in Paris, he was several times a minister in the Third Republic. As Minister for Public Instruction he contributed to the reconstitution of the universities by the regrouping of faculties and to the reorganisation of the secondary school system. He was president of the Conseil in 1895-1896, and was later president of the Chambre des députés and of the Senate. He was a major promoter of the League of Nations of which he became the president in 1919. As a philosopher he contributed an important work, Solidarité, to the articulation of Radical social policy. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in
1920. His life reflected the national and international dynamism of the republican intellectual vision.

(111) Republican Party (radical and radical socialist), Congress of 1902, Speech by Maujan

(112) Republican Party (radical and radical socialist), Congress of Nancy 1907, Point 15 of the Programme du Nancy.

(113) Congress of 1907, ibid

(114) Maujan speech, 1902, ibid


(117) Berstein's analysis, Histoire du parti radical. vol 1; La recherche de l'âge d'or., very much focuses on the tension between the political and the social within the Radical Party

(118) Berstein S., ibid p. 200


(121) Le Temps 1-7-1914

(122) It was designed as the initial volume of the famous multi-volume L'Histoire de la France edited by Ernest Lavisse, a monument to the republican intellectual project. See J.-Y. Guiomar, Le Tableau de la géographie de la France de Vidal de
la Blanche in Pierre Nora (ed.), Les Lieux de Mémoire 11°, La Nation
(Paris, 1986), p569ff


(125) Barrès Maurice, ibid


(129) Girardet ibid p.129

Chapter Two

Debating International Implications within the Project 1900-1914

The republican intellectual project, founded on values that were believed to be universally valid, had application beyond France. If the unfolding of human history involved progress, then the precise content of that progress, its essential elements, could be identified and applied in a manner that made sense of history as a scientific and moral enterprise. France provided in microcosm the definitive pattern of emergence from superstition and unquestioned authority to a democracy based on certain unalienable rights exercised by its citizens. This was a rational development, indeed the only truly rational possibility. France's history had value as a lived experiment of how certain values were in the process of becoming universal, and of how so many social and moral dilemmas could be overcome. Republican intellectuals were particularly strongly represented in the field of history precisely because of the interpretative power this framework brought to the study of history. It was politically potent because it seemed to hold the key not only to the past but to the future.

By definition, these values had universal application. Universal progress could be defined by the degree to which other cultures were imbued with these values. Criticism of aspects of French external policy judged incompatible with these values, or more importantly, the identification of organised centres of resistance to the world embracing rationality of the republican intellectual project, was of vital concern. To what extent alternative systems of values could be altered or persuaded to change was an integral part of republican intellectual debate. While built on the need for the peaceful resolution of
conflict and ambitious in pursuit of this end, the republican intellectual project did not reject war as a possible outcome. What was unacceptable, indeed almost incomprehensible, from a republican intellectual point of view, was that France, or countries infused with the same values, could initiate it. Willingness to actively contemplate war would, on the contrary, be the strongest evidence for the lack of a proper rationality.

How could rationality, and with it peace and justice, best be upheld and served internationally, and what actions could and should be taken against those who seemed to endanger it? The attempt to deal with this question, and the tension over how far both France and other countries should be criticised, generated major discussion and reflection within the republican intellectual tradition.

(i) The LDH involved internationally.

The LDH was in no doubt that republican values not only defined a whole social and political structure of meaning within France, but could be extended: "Nous estimons que, de même que nos ancêtres, quand ils ont brûlé la Déclaration, n'ont pas seulement voulu écrire une charte pour les Français, mais ont prétendu formuler les titres retrouvés de l'humanité tout entière, il nous appartient d'intervenir dans les questions d'injustices internationales."(1). Combined with Buisson's observations during the debate on the Law of Association 1901, where he cited favourably the critical words of de Mun (critical because de Mun was a conservative Catholic): "La Révolution n'est ni un acte, ni un fait: elle est une doctrine politique qui prétend fonder la société sur la volonté de l'homme, au lieu de la fonder sur la volonté de Dieu, qui met la souveraineté de la raison humaine à la place de la loi divine"(2), the LDH encapsulated an extraordinarily powerful moral and intellectual vision of human possibilities. As apostles of the future, the
intellectuals of the LDH had become the new prophets and priests of a world order to be remade in the light of the Revolution.

The Declaration of the Rights of Man had validity in all the world, and thus justified support for oppressed peoples and their causes. This was expressed, in the beginning, through support given to Armenian victims of Turkish massacres, criticism of Rumanian anti-semitism and encouragement for the Boer cause, where Trarieux in a letter to the sections declared: "Si la déclaration ne définit que les conditions de la liberté individuelle, elle s'applique, par identité de raison, à la vie sociale des collectivités."(3).

The principles were established for the possibility and validity of criticism of other great powers, as well as the Franco-Russian Entente, concerning the status of oppressed peoples.

Criticism could be applied directly to French foreign policy. The LDH occupied itself with illegalities and violence of all sorts undergone by the native inhabitants of France's colonies, the French Congo in particular being a cause of concern as well as Tunisia and Algeria(4). France's moral justification for having colonies centred around its civilising mission, so that failure to apply proper republican values called into question its right to proclaim them. In a conference delivered to the Sociétés Savantes on the 11th of February 1909, policies conducted in Indo-China were cited as an example where injustice should lead to constant vigilance, "...pour assurer aux indigènes, victimes d'un régime injuste et barbare, les garanties que la Déclaration accorde à tous les êtres humaines, sans exception."(5). Anti-semitism in Russia was also attacked as was the Franco-Russian alliance, and more generally the LDH demanded "...l'abandon de la diplomatie secrète, l'arbitrage entre les nations, le désarmement progressif."(6). On the question of loans to Russia, a resolution of the Central Committee of the 19th of January 1908 noted prophetically "...ils constituent pour l'avenir la menace d'un inévitable et d'un irréparable
désastre."(7). The demands of republican justice were producing a constant critical commentary.

The international policies of France were a major concern of the LDH in the four years before the war, where they were judged to be dangerous for international peace. The Moroccan crisis of 1911 brought the prospect of war very near, and firmly projected Germany as the dominant threat to French security. The election of Poincaré in January 1912 as Premier, and as President of the Republic in 1913 represented a change from the policies of Caillaux, the former prime minister, who had averted war during the 1911 crisis but at the price of appearing too conciliatory. As Girault has argued, it was really from 1912 onwards that the prospect of war began to seriously emerge(8). Agulhon notes a similar sentiment, claiming that the difference between 1906 and 1912 was that one thought less of taxes and more of the frontier(9). This change was further noted by the sociologist Célestin Bouglé (1870-1940): "L'année 1912 a comme ressuscité la guerre. De ce qui n'était qu'une possibilité menaçante, elle a fait une réalité, la réalité dominante devant laquelle toute pensée s'incline."(10)

The Balkan wars, beginning in October 1912, gave further evidence of international instability and inability to negotiate peacefully. This willingness to fight threatened the peaceful application of the republican intellectual project.

What needs to be noted here is the existence of a language, necessitated by the categories of interpretation used by republican intellectuals, which would be used against them and others who were to support the war. This type of discourse presupposed a correct method of approach to social and political situations as opposed to the manipulations of others who simply used the language of rationality to disguise their own agendas and distort those of their enemies. In the eyes of the members of the LDH, this element of
distortion and manipulation was increasing in the life of France, and this failure in France had international implications: "C'est parce que la France a cru acquérir ce qu'elle appelle une augmentation de puissance au Maroc, et ce que j'appelle, moi, un surcroît de faiblesses, qu'elle a, d'une part, autorisé l'Autriche à s'emparer de la Bosnie, et, d'autre part, l'Italie à se loger dans ce fromage de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrénaique."(11).

This preparedness to see France, through its failures, as having participated in the creation of a climate of opinion favourable to war, was not easily forgotten during the war when the presumed distinction between the France of reality and the France of ideals, accepted here, was also being tested on the battlefields along with so much else. The 1912 Congress of the LDH as a consequence: "...emet le voeu que la France oriente sa politique étrangère vers l'organisation internationale de la paix, en travaillant résolument à la limitation et réduction conventionnelle des armements et à l'établissement d'un système d'arbitrage sérieux..."(12), confirming a direction expressed both by Bourgeois and the editors of the Paix par le droit. The republican vision highlighted rationality both as an end and as a means to achieve specific moral goals which led logically to support of structures which, it was believed, would by their very functioning bring about the desired end. It was only by having these presuppositions that one could seriously believe that peace could be internationally and internally organised.

Another major controversy was generated by the Three Year Law, a debate which powerfully blended internationalism, militarism, politics and public opinion (13). Two factors initiated this controversy, the first being the German military build-up between 1911 and 1913 (14). This action was not primarily directed against France but, as Krumeich has shown, occurred because of the weakening of the Triple Alliance following on Balkan developments and the uncertainties of Italian diplomacy. Nevertheless, it
increased international tension. Secondly, as Becker has argued, an important section of the French military had always opposed the Two Year Law, so that in practice, support for three years of military service had been defended well before the expansion of the German army\(^{(15)}\). These factors came together with the fact that opinion was almost totally convinced that something had to be done for national defence, in terms of military preparation\(^{(16)}\). A vigorous debate helped ensure the passing of the Three Year Law on the 19th of July 1913.

Although rejected by the Central Committee of the LDH on the 2nd of March as being both dangerous and unhelpful\(^{(17)}\), the Three Year Law was discussed in a more moderate fashion in the May Congress of 1913. For Pressensé in particular, as regards the army, "...c'est que l'armée garde un caractère démocratique, qu'elle ne se transforme pas en armée de métier."\(^{(18)}\). The order of the day was finally very carefully worded; "...la Ligue était toute prête à voir adopter, après une étude réfléchie et une démonstration sérieuse, les mesures propres à assurer, dans l'état présent des relations internationales, la défense nationale."\(^{(19)}\). The LDH in other words bound itself to national defence without explicitly commenting on how this was to be done, although the majority of speeches were clearly in favour of two year service and a better organisation of resources.

This debate demonstrated the vigour of the republican intellectual tradition, as the fundamental principle of a France of values and a France that needed defending were always united through republican patriotism. The question was how should the Republic be defended, not should the Republic be defended. The subsequent victory of the left in the elections of 1914, judged to be more in tune with LDH policies, confirmed in the latter's eyes "..la volonté pacifique de la grande majorité du pays."\(^{(20)}\).
Although fiercely critical of aspects of French governmental policy, the LDH was in no doubt as to the essentially peaceful ambitions of France. War as a possibility was certainly conceivable, but could not result from the application of truly republican policies. The one necessity was therefore to promote internationally and internally republican values and defend them when attacked. Internally, this had been done effectively in the Dreyfus affair. Internationally, the same values would require an equally vigorous defence and the LDH demonstrated its willingness to provide this. In a world of uncertainty, containing both the possibility of international peace and efforts to thwart it, and in which the existence of a powerful external enemy necessitated the victory for republican values, the LDH was on a permanent war footing in defence of peace.

(ii) *Paix par le droit* applies principles...

The monthly review, *La Paix par le droit*, edited by Théodore Ruyssen, expressing as it did not only the viewpoint of Ruyssen himself, who was to be a major participant in the LDH, but also of a range of other leading republican figures, offered through its debates and analyses a fascinating insight into the internal mechanics of republican thought when moving from the ideal to the concrete. Through the discussion of implications and particular applications of republican positions, it very often foreshadowed the direction that the republican intellectual project would take, as well as the particular dilemmas to which it was responding, or which were beginning to arise.

For the period 1900-1910, the tone of this review was on the whole very confident about the prospects for a rational re-ordering of international politics. In fact, the review saw itself as a part of a far broader movement towards the application of republican values in all the world. Concerning pacifism, which he was always to argue was completely dependent on the application of republican justice, Ruyssen expounded his position in
December 1899 in an article entitled, "Que doit être le parti pacifique?": "J'estime, par exemple, que l'éducation, la législation ouvrière, militaire, douanière et internationale peuvent converger dans le sens d'une justice et d'une paix croissantes. De même que, dans la science, les efforts des savants qui s'ignoraient, guident et finissent par se rencontrer et s'additionner au plus grand profit du savoir humain. Or, la politique pacifique, telle que je la conçois, doit précisément représenter l'une de ces tendences partielles, mais convergentes.(21). The Paix par le droit had a vision of a new and necessary world order which it believed to be emerging but which still had to be fought for.

This involved notably a continuous discussion of the absurdity of war and a commitment to arbitration to avoid conflict(22). The second of these concerns was not yet common currency within republican intellectual circles, which showed both how early the ideals of this review pre-figured what was to become a major area of debate, and how the logical links in this vision tended, when thought through, to develop in a definite direction.

This confidence as to the direction of the future was further evidenced in another article which summed up the prophetic hopes of Paix par le droit: "Lentement, mais avec une sûreté qui se ne dément pas, la conscience européenne s'éveille."(23). The effect of this was to move towards unity because, as was claimed, Europe needed to be united not for sentimental reasons but out of pure necessity(24). Unity, so important nationally, as evidence of the vitality and viability of the republican project, was also an international expectation in the eyes of Paix par le droit. Just as social harmony was the aim within the Republic, so peace, or international harmony, became a logical necessity in the world if the republican project was to be fully validated.

Therefore, republican intellectuals were asked to confront two fundamental threats, namely social injustice and international injustice(25). Part of the strength of the
republican project lay in its capacity, as made manifest through the reflection of its intellectuals, to both conceptualise the complexities of modern society and attempt to address the problems through the application of its own interpretative dynamic. Particular solutions arose however through a dialectical process whereby problems were confronted with the republican vision, the belief that there was always a particular solution being the bedrock of the republican vision in action.

Alsace-Lorraine posed an obstacle to peace and was recognised as such(26), but this was to be taken as an opportunity to find a solution peacefully. Part of the confidence in this derived from a faith that change in the right direction was happening in Germany: "De plus en plus les hommes d'Etat d'Allemagne et des autres pays alliés se laissent gagner par cette idée qu'il ne saurait plus être question pour les deux alliances de jouer un rôle belliqueux. Conscientes de ce fait, les gouvernements devront nécessairement passer de leur politique négative de paix à des manifestations pacifiques positives dans le sens que nous venons d'indiquer."(27). Germany was not perceived as a serious threat because nothing at this time was perceived as ultimately being capable of bringing about war.

Republican intellectuals were participating in a process: "Notre ambition n'est donc pas de créer mais de fortifier un courant d'idées qui est demeuré longtemps hésitant."(28). This would involve transforming Europe: "... l'organisation de la paix s'achèvera, du moins sur le vieux continent, par la formation d'une union douanière, d'un Zollverein européen plus que jamais indispensable en face du péril américain et du péril jaune."(29). The means to an effective peace were clear. International arbitration had to become the norm, leading governments to resolve as many of their conflicts as possible through a proper system of justice, extending the same principles of conflict resolution that existed within countries guided by the rule of law(30). Apart applying these principles, the review
particularly concerned itself with criticisms of their validity, from whatever source, which justified an ongoing mobilisation in their defence.

It was also characteristic of this review that the utterances contained within it were often couched on the grand scale, in epic language, with touches of the manichean, and an utter conviction of the rightness of the cause. This was a passionate creed in the service of rationalism as genuine social theory.

Ruyssen's understanding of pacifism involved him in a constant defence and explanation of his position as he tried to differentiate it from alternative uses. Pacifism had been linked to the position advocated by Gustave Hervé, which raised the ire of Ruyssen(31).

Hervéism was the name given to a movement revolving around Gustave Hervé. Holder of the agrégation in history, lawyer, very often imprisoned for antimilitarism, Hervé was above all an extreme left-wing socialist (32). To communicate his ideas better, he founded a weekly in 1906, La Guerre sociale, which met with considerable success. In the socialist party a significant current of anti-militarist and anti-patriotic feeling developed around Hervé(33). For Hervé, pacifism represented a rejection of the military and more radically of the nation. This position was incomprehensible to Ruyssen.

Pacifism for Ruyssen was the logical consequence of the application of republican values and was therefore a central republican virtue. Although he always defended this interpretation, it was at variance with the common understanding which linked it to antimilitarism or Hervéism, in other words, to a subversive rejection of the Republic, and so created an unwillingness to accept this designation among republicans. For Ruyssen, this unwillingness could only result from a misunderstanding of the republican vision, and this virtue had to be reclaimed.
Practically, the extension of the republican vision in the world was already judged to be bringing true peace nearer to fruition. Seignobos argued that the chances of war had clearly diminished because governments had been obliged to take into account the feelings of their voters so that in no country where these feelings were considered did the peasants and the workers want a European war. Furthermore, leaders of democratic countries had sons, nephews, parents and other relatives involved in military service and this fact, combined with the extension of the suffrage, had made war a virtual impossibility. If wars like the Russo-Japanese war occurred, it was, on this interpretation, because of the absence of proper democratic mechanisms. Not only was it believed that democratic reforms would succeed, but implicitly there was an assumption that only non-democratic nations could actively seek war.

Coupled with this confidence in the peace fulfilling tendencies of the republican project went a vision of the shape of things to come: "Le développement de l'internationalisme est étroitement lié à ce grand fait social, universel, que les rapports entre hommes de nationalités différentes deviennent chaque jour plus étroits et plus nombreux. (...) Le moment viendra bientôt où les frontières n'existeront pas plus entre les États de l'Europe qu'entre les départements ou les provinces de France." (35). The republican project gave in essence "...une conscience, une âme à l'effort tenté par l'humanité pour réaliser sa plus haute et plus harmonieuse unité." (36). Republican values were shaping the world inexorably.

The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 gave even more stimulation to republican hopes, and in particular here to the Paix par le droit. For those who believed warfare could be regulated by international law, these conferences were a definite step in the right direction (37). This was precisely the inspiration behind Paix par le droit. War itself was
barbaric, the antithesis of the republican virtues of justice and peace. Rationality was at last being brought to bear on one of the oldest of human problems. These conferences of course were only a beginning but the fact that they were taking place at all brought high hopes: "Cette nouveauté, c'est l'abdication par les puissances d'une part de leur souveraineté. (...) Le droit de faire la guerre ne connaissait jusqu'ici d'autre règle que le bon plaisir." (38). Logically and in fact, the notion of an international body to deal with grievances produced nothing but glowing praise, with a rather inflated idea as to its possible effectiveness, "... et voici instituée pour la première fois, une juridiction internationale, obligatoire et permanente. ...c'est la Société des Nations, elle-même, c'est l'humanité envisagée comme une collectivité d'êtres raisonnables, capable de s'imposer elle-même des règles de droit. Ainsi l'humanité qui n'a été longtemps qu'une abstraction, est devenue une réalité concrète vivante." (39). Not only was all this thrilling, as was evident by the tone, but it all made sense. It seemed to spring from the inherent logic of a system of values whose dynamism derived from France.

In September 1909, Paix par le droit merged with the Revue de la paix, edited by Charles Richet, a leading scientist and peace campaigner (40), and both he and Ruyssen became the joint editors of Paix par le droit. Ruyssen, responding to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, noted soberly that once again treaties could be overturned too easily by direct force (41). 1908-1909 were to be the high point of the review's confidence in the possibility of a rational avoidance of war. Thereafter, the international situation made the shape of the future more uncertain. If it was true that the science of peace could only be achieved by the best of men (42), then the mobilisation of these was becoming more urgent in a world proving to be more resistant to the republican project than was first envisaged.
The increase in international tension after 1910 led to further discussions about the nature of pacifism in the *Paix par le droit*. Ruyssen declared that when a people was attacked, it had the right to defend itself militarily. Moreover, the nation attacked had not only the right but the duty to defend itself. A pacifism that denied this was not a real pacifism. Integral pacifism was not a valid option, indeed it distorted the true value of pacifism for Ruyssen.

The republican intellectual was logically committed to national defence as a result of his beliefs. This point cannot be stressed enough given a common view that in 1914 idealism collapsed into nationalism. The possibility of another, perhaps alternative conception of justice was unthinkable. An anonymous German pacifist remarked that: "Les Français ont une conception abstraite et formaliste du droit; nous autres, Allemands, nous en avons une conception matérialiste et historique..., il ne peut pas passer purement et simplement condamnation sur les décisions de l'histoire..., il se croit obligé, au contraire, de les respecter comme des faits accomplis." Such a view could not be seriously considered or entertained by republican intellectuals, whose presuppositions left room for only one consideration of justice, truth and peace, namely their own.

The arrogance of tone which often followed on from this position was attacked by Norman Angell, the leading English pacifist and author of a widely read book concerning the international situation, *The Great Illusion*: "Et plus je discute cette question avec ceux qui ne sont pas convertis à nos idées, plus je suis convaincu que cette attitude inconsciente de supériorité adoptée par les pacifistes- cette présomption que l'effort pacifiste est actionné par un motif plus élevé que l'effort qui anime tout autre contribution à la pensée et à l'oeuvre du monde-est un fait qui enraye énormément le progrès de notre cause." The working model of rationality which vivified the pacifist position for republican
intellectuals made it extremely difficult to confront seriously the obstacles in the way of their project.

By definition, opposing positions lacked rationality, so that once rational debate had been applied and proved ineffective, the only conclusions were to fortify those areas still amenable to rationality. In France, this meant working to extend the power of rationality through the setting up of particular international institutions, and working with elements, in Germany for example, who seemed to share similar assumptions. To this end the Société Française pour l'arbitrage entre nations was established in 1910 with Richet as president. Bourgeois continued to draw praise for his work(48), while bridge building efforts with Germany continued with the establishment of a Comité d'entente franco-allemand in 1912 with Ruyssen, Richet, Buisson and Séailles as leading members.

Despite efforts, the international situation continued to deteriorate, increasing anxiety about war and speculation as to its nature and consequences: "Si la guerre était déchaînée, l'Europe armerait 20 millions de soldats et aménerait 10 millions d'hommes sur les champs de bataille.... Il faudrait un demi-siècle pour réparer les ruines et apaiser les haines. Et vingt millions de familles européennes seraient plongées dans la misère, le deuil et les larmes."(49). Although confident in the forces of rationality, the obvious advances in ideas and forces inimical to their beliefs was slowly obliging Paix par le droit to consider, if only superficially the reasons as to why this was occurring.

Ruyssen in his article,'Coup d'oeil sur 1912', observed: "La violation par l'Autriche du traité de Berlin, la longue affaire marocaine, la guerre italo-turque ont habitué peu à peu nos contemporains à l'immoralité internationale contre laquelle s'exercent nos patients efforts."(50). Rationality and morality were intimately linked in the republican scheme, as were their opposites. The world was becoming more used to violent acts, to actions not
motivated nor pretending to be motivated by idealised notions of peace, reason and justice. Those who believed in these values had, from the time of Dreyfus, always interpreted their situation in terms of struggle, but it was clear the struggle was intensifying.

In a thought he was never again to echo, Ruyssen noted, "quand on voudra chercher des coupables, ce n'est pas seulement à Vienne ou à Budapest, c'est ailleurs aussi, c'est à Berlin, à Petersbourg, à Rome et à Paris qu'il faudra instituer des enquêtes impitoyables."(81). This apparent willingness to see the forces of irrationality in all countries was to be sorely tested during the war.

Furthermore, although determined to prevent war and sincerely opposed to it, the logic of the republican intellectual project, as developed by Ruyssen in his review in particular but expressed more broadly, made war a more likely outcome in a struggle between world views incommensurate with each other. Given that the concept of peace was judged to have meaning only through the acceptance of the rationality of one side, the defence of that rationality became a moral duty, and war, should it occur, became automatically legitimate as the defence of the rationality of peace.

(iii) Socialism's stance

"Un peu d'internationalisme éloigne de la patrie, beaucoup d'internationalisme y ramène."(52). This phrase of Jaurès expressed one of the fundamental contradictions of the S.F.I.O. before 1914, which was what to do in the face of war, and it sprang partially from its intellectual attachment to the republican project. For most of the socialists, there was no opposition between attachment to the nation and internationalist aspirations; in other words they wanted to be patriots and internationalists at the same time.

The heart of the internationalist faith, as held by the republican intellectual as well, was peace, but this element was far more dynamic within socialism(53). The concrete
means to conduct the struggle against war led to division however. The right of the S.F.I.O. rejected the idea of a general strike, the guesdists indicated their reserve, but the will to peace was largely shared so that at the Congress of Bâle, Albert Thomas could declare: "Dans l'Europe du XXe siècle, l'Internationale aura assez de foi et d'autorité pour imposer aux gouvernements capitalistes la paix des peuples."(54). At the same time, the socialists felt deeply French. As with republican intellectuals, this nationalism was based on the real France being the repository of ideals necessary for humanity. France, as the land of the rights of man, had a mission; to take the role of guide so as to bring the world to socialism.

The Guesdists, who had done so much to impose internationalism on French socialism, could write:

"Non, l'internationalisme n'est ni l'abaissement ni le sacrifice de la patrie. Les patries, lorsqu'elles se sont constituées, ont été une première et nécessaire étape vers l'unité humaine à laquelle nous tendons(...). Les socialistes français sont encore patriotes à un autre point de vue et pour d'autres raisons: parce que la France a été dans la paix et est destinée à être, dès maintenant, un des facteurs les plus importants de l'évolution sociale. Nous voulons établir, et nous ne pouvons pas ne pas le vouloir, une France grande et forte, capable de défendre sa République contre les monarchies coalisées et capable de protéger son 1789 ouvrier contre une coalition au moins éventuelle de l'Europe capitaliste.(55).

Although written in 1893, this text reflected the deepest convictions of socialists up to 1914, and was not greatly modified by the rejection of anti-militarism. This tension between the nation and internationalism was found throughout debates which preceded the war, particularly at the time of the Three Year Law. As Vaillant noted in 1913: "C'est le
Jaurès attempted to take into account these diverse tendencies in his book, *L'Armée nouvelle*, in 1910. For Jaurès, people needed to live in community; humanity was too big, too abstract a notion to satisfy this aspiration, and internationalism could not just be an abstraction. Jaurès argued that human unity could only be achieved. "... par la libre fédération de nations autonomes répudiant les entreprises de la force et se soumettant aux règles du droit."(57). For the moment, socialism had to defend the right of each nation to its independence. No social liberation was possible where there was national oppression. Where political democracy did exist, it was necessary to, "...pénétrer les patries autonomes d'esprit internationaliste."(58).

Jaurès believed that France should reform its army, so as to dissuade all aggression, but the idea of national defence was conceived and argued as being perfectly possible and compatible with that of collective security. This conclusion, this ambiguity about what to do in the face of war should the aspirations of internationalism and the need for national defence collide, was inherent in the socialist project before 1914 and goes some way to explaining its paralysis at the beginning of the war.

*(iv) The Republic as model and reality internationally.*

The fundamental beliefs of the republican intellectual project concerning rationality and the possibilities of human reconciliation drew republican intellectuals towards peace movements, in particular towards the need to establish international peace through approved juridical mechanisms. The logic that inspired these peace movements was the same as that behind the republican intellectual project. Although strongly opposed to militarism, French pacifism has always felt the need to defend the achievements of the
French revolution, especially republicanism against foreign attack as well as aristocratic reaction (59). This was true but the link was deeper. For republican intellectuals, peace movements were a symptom both of the validity of the republican intellectual insight and of the hope that an international recognition of its principles could really bring peace and justice. The principles of the republican intellectual project had to be internationalist, and the Republic had an essential role as both repository and inspiration for revolutionary values. How the Republic performed given these expectations and the tensions generated needs investigating.

The advantages of international cooperation were becoming increasingly obvious. An international telegraph union had been created in 1865, a universal postal union in 1878, an international office of public health in 1904 and an international office of public hygiene in 1907. Peace movements and congresses, the first congress being held in Geneva in 1867, sprang up and were inspired by the same logic, namely that international cooperation was now possible if rational people were sufficiently determined to work towards this end (60). This cooperation was to be built on and extended through the application of values inspired in part by the republican intellectual project.

As analysed by Sandi Cooper (61), peace movements increased in activity before the war in France. In 1896-1897, French peace leaders established a national council, the Délégation permante des sociétés françaises de la paix. It held national congresses to discuss unified positions and to provide a forum for peace activists who could not attend international meetings. The first meeting was held in Toulouse in 1902, organised by Ruyssen. Six more were held in 1904, 1905, 1908, 1909, 1911 and 1913, with an average attendance of between 250 to 300 delegates. A special public session at Nîmes in 1904 attracted over 1000 people, and another at Reims in 1909 drew over 1500. The Reims
meeting was endorsed by Lavisse, Monad and Durkheim, as well as sixteen senators, twenty-four deputies, most of the municipal council, and eminent political leaders including Louis Barthou, Léon Bourgeois, Emile Loubet and Stephen Pichon, then minister of foreign affairs. By 1910, France had the largest and most diversified peace movement on the continent.

Roger Chickering notes the same phenomenon (62), remarking that by 1913, there were 28 different societies devoted to popularizing arms limitation and arbitration in France. The linkages with the republican intellectual project are also noted by this author, specifically through Radicalism: "Radicalism and pacifism were closely related phenomenal. Like the peace movement, Radicals advocated the rigorous application of democratic principles, distrusted soldiers, renounced all but defensive wars and called for arms limitation and arbitration of international conflicts."(63). The republican intellectual project both fed into, and was very much synonymous with, a larger moral crusade to set rational limits to international affairs through the application of specific values.

Precisely because these ideals had international implications, it was no accident that the writer of Solidarité was also a prime mover in the search for world peace based on law and the acceptance of the values of the Rights of Man. Bourgeois played an important role in the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, concerning which he expressed his view that law was the key to a durable peace: "C'est l'organisation juridique de la vie internationale qui a été l'objet réel de tous nos travaux. Le désarmement progressif sera la conséquence d'un état de paix plus en plus stable."(64).

The first Hague Conference sat from 18 May to 29 July 1899 with 28 nations represented. Although the conference failed to achieve its primary objective, the limitation on armaments, it did adopt a convention defining the conditions of a state of belligerency
and other customs relating to war on land and sea. A growing perception as to the potential ugliness of modern technology in war was recognised, with the acceptance of three declarations; the first prohibited the use of asphyxiating gases, another prohibited the use of expanding bullets (dum-dums), while the third prohibited the discharge of projectiles as explosives from balloons. These represented efforts to control and civilise the conduct of war. This emerging mentality or sensibility helped reinforce any belief concerning the civilisation, values or rationality of any nation prepared to step beyond these parameters. The concept of an atrocity had the beginnings of a legal definition. Last and most important was the adoption of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, creating the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The Conference of 1907 sat from 15 June to 18 October and was attended by 44 states. Again the proposal for the limitation of armaments failed to gain acceptance. The conference did adopt several conventions relating to such matters as the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land and sea. The prohibition of discharges of explosives and projectiles from balloons was renewed but the other two prohibitions concerning gases and bullets were not, as the interests of perceived military necessity were judged by some nations to override these concerns. The possibility of different values nuancing an understanding of what an atrocity might actually consist in was already a troubling foundation to attempts to 'civilise' war. The final acts of the conference were the unanimous acceptance by the delegates of the principle of compulsory arbitration and the stating of a number of resolutions, the first being that another conference be held in eight years. This established the concept that the best way to handle international problems was through a series of conferences. International co-operation on rational and legal foundations seemed to be making real progress.
But the confidence of this position could not hide the reality of specific international policies pursued for example by Delcassé, whose effects become more evident from 1905 onwards. The new balance of alliances did not alleviate international tension; rather, it produced constant friction. An ongoing problem in the republican vision was made evident, namely how to safeguard the ideal of a pacific, just future when the means to do that involved in part the protection of a specific entity, France, from attack. In responding to this, republican intellectuals tended to be more internationalist as hopes rose and more nationalist as hopes diminished. Bourgeois's efforts expressed a confidence that was not to be repeated until events had moved in a radically different direction.

The precise intellectual problem which this raised was discussed, in the context of pacifism, in 1908 at a meeting involving Durkheim, Buisson, Ruyssen and other republican contributors to debate. After discussion on the claim that, "... le néologisme de pacifisme est à la fois la doctrine et la propagande dont l'objet commun est d'établir entre nations par le moyen du droit une paix durable." (66), the arguments of the 'internationalists' and the 'nationalists' as regards pacifism were discussed. Internationalists found pacifism unhelpful, it was alleged, because peace for them was an inevitable process following on from the disappearance of countries, and because pacifism accepted the need for countries. Nationalists considered pacifism unhelpful, again it was alleged, because they considered wars inevitable, and more seriously because it weakened the Patrie. The participants in the discussion labelled the first position laissez-faire-ist and the second position status-quo-ist. Ruyssen argued that pacifism was neither, that it was something that had to be worked for. Durkheim stated his problem, which was how to decide whether one maintained one's loyalty to the presently existing Patrie, or worked for the coming of a new Patrie. Ruyssen conceded there was some argument among pacifists about this. Durkheim pointed out that
history had nations absorbing nations and that this was unlikely to stop. Parodi, continuing Durkheim's thought, noted "... le conflit entre la Patrie de droit, la Patrie juste, idéale qu'on pourrait aimer et défendre, et la Patrie de fait que l'on tend à présenter comme mauvaise, inique, hostile au peuple... Si la Patrie de fait va contre l'idéal de justice, faut-il la suivre envers et contre tout?"(67). Ruyssen admitted that this could be a serious dilemma, but concluded the essential requirement was to work to ensure the Patrie de fait was in fact a Patrie de droit.

The existence of a potential problem, of an ambiguity at the heart of the republican vision was theoretically recognised however. It was the need to overcome this ambiguity that, in part, generated the incorporatation of nationalist and internationalist tendencies into a coherent, visionary dynamism leading to peace. Faith in the republican project necessitated faith in this ongoing possibility.

This had practical consequences, which at their most general, meant that republican intellectuals remained committed to national defence. A strong army and international alliances were necessary to ensure the survival of France in a world not always in accord with republican aims. Republican intellectuals rejected the nationalism of the nationalists in that it was not founded on the republican project; anti-militarism in that it endangered the republican project; and anti-patriotism in that it rejected the incarnation of the republican project within France.

The passionate debates about militarism and the Three Year Law must be seen in this context. Combatting the power of the military in the belief that this was necessary in the drive for peace was not seen as contradicting the need for national defence, in fact could not have been seen as such. Given these foundations, the difference between republicans opposed to the Three Year Law and those in favour of it could in part be
reduced to perceptions concerning the exact nature of a strong army and how far this was conducive to peace. Within republican intellectual circles, it certainly did not represent a pro-war versus an anti-war sentiment.

It depended, in other words, on how much weight was given to the necessity of protecting France as the protector of republican values, as opposed to promoting the values of France, one of which was peace, by attacking aspects of the French state which did not conform to these values. Of course there were other elements, other interests in the equation, but the above positions were central to the republican project, and meant that disagreement was less fundamental than it often appeared on the surface. Indeed this very debate could be taken as a symptom of the health of the republican project which determined the form of so much discussion.

What was becoming significant was the movement between 1910 to 1914 from a more optimistic to a more pessimistic view regarding the possibility of international peace. After the Hague conferences, it was clearer than ever, in the eyes of republican intellectuals, that for international peace to be a reality, relations between France and Germany would have to change; yet the reality seemed to be that Germany was emerging as more assertive in pursuit of its own ends.

Relations had deteriorated to a point where by 1914 Lavisse could write that direct conversation between France and Germany was impossible(68), leaving the problem of Alsace-Lorraine even more intractable, "...nous sommes torturés, nous la France, par le remords d'avoir laissé tomber l'Alsace entre ces mains maladroites et brutales."(69). He thus predicted a bleak future without victory for the values of republican intellectuals:

"Il est vrai, l'expérience défend que l'on espère en une victoire de la raison et de l'humanité seules; mais l'absurde et l'inhumain finiront par paraître gênants et
onéreux, au point qu'on ne puisse plus les porter. Les intérêts se plaindront; alors, peut-être les oreilles des sourds d'aujourd'hui percevront la voix de la raison et de l'humanité. C'est pourquoi il faut la faire entendre inlassablement. Si non, quelque jour, dans l'amoncellement sans cesse grandira des matières inflammables, le feu prendra; les nations se heurteront les unes contre les autres; quelques-unes seront brisées par le choc; et, sans doute, la Révolution, partout préparée, balayera d'un geste vengeur et juste empereurs et rois, et leurs serviteurs, et cette société qui aura laissé conduire les peuples à de pareilles catastrophes."

In this context, the republican project seemed to have more validity than ever, both in its capacity to provide a meaningful objective and in providing hope, as Lavisse noted concerning La Ligue française which preached confidence and hope(71), hope that was predicated on the victory of its rationalist, universalist assumptions.

Given that, in the eyes of republican intellectuals, there was only one real rationality, progress could only be assessed by the yardstick of others' acceptance of their assumptions, plus a willingness to fight for the concrete manifestation of these values, namely France; "...nous ne serons pas de haineux provocateurs; mais nous pensons que, nulle part, l'union de la force morale et de la force militaire n'est plus nécessaire qu'en France, une des nations les plus menacées."(72). The language of war clearly existed and was used both to define and understand the complexities of life nationally and internationally, thus preparing the ground for republican intellectuals to comprehend the significance of the actual war of 1914.

Republican intellectuals mobilised to articulate a vision in danger as they saw it, and this initial mobilisation around the Dreyfus affair met with apparent success. This
vision had content; it was based on the principles of the Rights of Man which necessitated
continued mobilisation in defence of these principles; it meant continued support and
extension of a particular sort of political entity, the democratic republic; it brought into
being a social project designed both to combat threats to the Republic and to make explicit
the claims of republican unity; and it worked within, and was challenged by, a powerful
alternative vision, that of socialism. This commitment offered both a promise for and an
interpretation of social and political events. Those other visions excluded from its borders,
namely the anti-republican nationalist right and the anarcho-syndicalists, were obliged to
attack the Republic directly and to challenge the right of the republican intellectual to
define reality.

It was for this reason that some of the more powerful critiques and analyses of the
role of the intellectual were to emerge from those causes so much opposed to the
republican intellectual project, those of Maurras and Barrès as well as Georges Sorel.
Sorel identified what he saw as the essential flaw in the project in analysing his own
"prejudices' in the years 1898-1899. "Je confondais ici l'utopie philosophique de la
démocratie, qui a enivré l'âme de nos pères, avec la réalité du régime démocratique, qui est
un gouvernement de démagogues; ceux-ci ont intérêt à célébrer l'utopie afin de dissimuler
aux yeux du peuple la véritable nature de leur activité."(73). Essentially, republican
intellectuals were committed to keeping these ideals together, while their opponents either
believed, like Sorel, that this belief was simply a perverse prejudice, or that the ideals
themselves were hopelessly flawed.

The republican vision from 1900-1910, while beginning in victory, came under
pressure both from within, in terms of some of the policies pursued in the name of the
Republic (particularly by Clemenceau, which had to be criticised as failing to lead the
project to its proper fulfillment, and from without from the already mentioned forces. The republican intellectual, therefore, fulfilled a dual role, that of protector and interpreter of republican values. Despite certain high points of confidence, the international situation from 1910 to 1914, as well as continuing social and political problems inside France, were beginning to provide less hope for the peaceful fulfillment of the project. This led to a particular problem, which was how far did one defend France as the home of values in a world increasingly at odds with those values, and at the same time continue to criticise the Republic itself when it failed to completely embody those values? Furthermore, how did one explain the persistence of genuine problems within France, or, in the absence of dialogue with enemies of the republican project, the manner precisely in which victory was to be achieved?

While deeply convinced therefore, as to the continuing validity of their insight, republican intellectuals were being obliged to confront the deepening difficulties in the way of implementing their vision, and the beginnings of a serious discussion as to what means were legitimate in the attainment of ends. After confronting the vision of the academic republican intellectuals, as articulated through the LDH, as developed in Ruysen's review, as enriched and nuanced by socialism, and as a vital ingredient in the life of the Third Republic, what emerges is a living tradition which clearly gave direction and purpose to a range of articulate, sensitive, highly thoughtful and influential individuals, and which also justified the very existence of the Third Republic as a polity. This vision was opposed to war, but war under certain conditions could be meaningful and justified. Unsurprisingly, the European war which broke out in 1914 was to be a major test.
Notes

(1) Bulletin Officiel de la Ligue des droits de l'homme, t.1V p.872 01-06-1904

(2) Bulletin Officiel, t.111 p.671 01-03-1903


(5) Bulletin Officiel, t.1X p.394 01-03-1909

(6) Sée, ibid p.99

(7) Bulletin Officiel, t.1X p.177 01-02-1909


(10) La Dépêche de Toulouse 1-1-13

(11) Bulletin Officiel, t.XII pp 889ff 01-08-12

(12) Bulletin Officiel, t.XIII p.327 01-10-12


(16) Becker ibid p.247

(17) Bulletin Officiel, t.XIII pp 529ff 01-11-12

(18) Bulletin Officiel, t.XIII p.641 01-05-1913

(19) Bulletin Officiel, t.XIII pp 641ff 01-05-1913

(20) Sée H. ibid p.141

(21) Ruysen T., Que doit être le parti pacifique?, Paix par le droit, 12/1899, p.477

(22) Ruysen T., ibid p.478

(23) Clerget P., Quelques opinions pacifiques, Paix par le droit, 01/1901, p.31

(24) Clerget P., ibid p.32

(25) Ruysen T., Editorial, Paix par le droit, 03/1902, p.11

(26) Ruysen T., ibid p.12

(27) Fried A., Paix par le droit, 08/1902,p.303

(28) Fried A., ibid p.303

(29) Ruysen T., Editorial, Paix par le droit, 08/1902, p.290

(30) Ruysen T., ibid 03/1903, p.128

(31) Le Temps 03/12/1905

(32) Winock M., Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France. (Paris,1982);
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(33) Becker J.-J. and Audoin-Rouzeau op. cit. p.224

(34) Seignobos C., Pas de guerre pour 35 années, Paix par le droit, 01/1906, p.22
(35) Richet Charles, Fables et récits pacifiques, Paix par le droit, 01/1904, p.40
(36) Ruysen T., La philosophie de la paix, Paix par le droit, 01/1904, p.44
(38) Ruysen T., editorial, Paix par le droit, 09/1909, p.312
(39) Ruysen T., ibid, p.312
(40) Richet Charles (1850-1935), professor of medicine at the University of Paris. Winner of the Nobel prize in medicine in 1913. Member of the Ligue des droits de l'homme and like Ruysen, active in efforts to reduce the need for war through debates and writing.
(41) Ruysen T., ibid, 01/1910, p.27
(42) Delpeuch M., La conviction pacifique, Paix par le droit, 12/1910, p.514
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Chapter Three.

1914: the Republican Intellectual Project And the Outbreak of War.

(i) The categories and discourses of mobilisation.

The categories and the cognitive universe of the republican project dominated official reactions to the war (1). The interpretation, the mobilisation, the very capacity to engage in a discourse was predicated on the acceptance and application of the modes of thought of the republican project. While there was undoubtedly a range of motives which informed both the hearts of individuals and the minds of organisations, for example Action Française, as to why they were fighting, the republican project linked France the nation with the France of ideals in a manner which made possible the Union Sacrée, that combination of nationalism and patriotism with the highest ideals of republicanism. No other vision of nationalism had the power to mobilise France to such an extent, and the disappearance of alternatives and only their slow emergence subsequently, was the proof of how far France was integrated into, and identified itself with, the embodiment of a particular vision. This initial mobilisation by republican intellectuals also generated a degree of expectation, an expectation that was motivated in part by the apparent acceptance of republican rhetoric at the start of the war and the changes in society this seemed to produce.

When the crisis blew up with Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia (2), it took opinion some days to become conscious of the gravity of the situation. When war became certain, the dominant sentiment was that peace-loving France had been the victim of unjustified German aggression(3). But the very exuberance of the vocabulary which greeted
the war was evidence of the powerful tensions, of frustrated purpose, in French society, and not only French society (4).

Hervé, who had become an ardent supporter of the war, saw France as, "...a people whom one believed corrupted by individualism, sunk up to its neck in material enjoyments, torn by religious, political, and social hatreds, abandoning without the least recriminations its pleasures, its interests, its rancours and in a moving unanimity flock to arms at the cry the country is in danger."(5). Often this tension had been interpreted as the struggle between a progressive, democratic France, and the so-called forces of reaction, but it also had been generated by uncertainty about exactly how the future would unfold given the divisions and problems facing France as a nation.

Against all this, the war identified the 'others', as Poincaré proclaimed: "Il est aujourd'hui démontré qu'avec une inégalable hypocrisie l'Allemagne a, dès le début, cherché, voulu, préparé la rupture."(6). Despite possible appearances in the past, Germany was alleged to have always pursued this: "Ainsi, jusqu'au bout, l'Allemagne et ses représentants ont audacieusement menti, pour couvrir leur mauvais coup."(7). For once, unity was possible against such perfidy.

Given the German rejection of rationality, as understood by republican intellectuals, which obliged it to wage war in pursuit of its ends, the contrast between the two nations became total. As Bergson put it: "La lutte engagée contre l'Allemagne est la lutte même de la civilisation contre la barbarie, formulée en termes sobres et précis"(8), 'barbarie' not referring to atrocities about which Bergson knew little at this early date, but the state of affairs where true rationality was absent. The intellectual framework, civilisation versus barbarity, emerged as a paradigmatic prism through which to regard the war before atrocities claims appeared. Atrocity claims could later be coherently and powerfully
integrated into this framework, demonstrating the interpretative power of the republican intellectual project in action.

From the French republican intellectual's point of view, the war was a completely rational, almost scientific climax, albeit regrettable, in the ongoing struggle of civilisation against its enemies. Lavisse praised the disciplined, organised mobilisation, the streams becoming a mighty river representing the history of the nation: "Toutes les Frances, France des croisades, France de Bouvines, France de Rocroi, France de Valmy, France d'Austerlitz, France de la fleur de lys et du drapeau blanc, France de l'aigle ou du coq et du drapeau tricolour."(9). This march of history could not be for nothing: "Toutes les fois que la France s'assemble, c'est pour quelque grande oeuvre humaine."(10). More importantly than mere physical force, it was grounded in the certitude of right: "Cette force morale, condition nécessaire de notre action victorieuse achèvera la défaite d'un ennemi..."(11). At this early stage of the war, Lavisse sounded a note of caution, as the significance of what was unfolding had to be safeguarded: "Ne harcelons point de questions indiscrètes ou d'intérogations futiles ceux qui ont la difficile mission de sauver la patrie en conduisant nos troupes à la victoire."(12). As the newspaper Le Temps emphasised, Germany was a determined enemy: "L'Empereur Guillaume a déclaré qu'il résisterait jusqu'au dernier homme et jusqu'au dernier cheval"(13), a commitment that had to be matched by that of France: "Pas un pacifiste (s'il y en a) n'aurait le droit de dire un mot en Allemagne et n'en aurait même la velléité. Nous devrons donc nous défendre à outrance, si nous voulons vivre."(14).

The self confidence and commitment of republican intellectuals was at its clearest when contrasting France at war, whose successful mobilisation could be explained, "...par la précision de leur esprit, leur amour de l'ordre, leur ingéniosité, leur goût pour l'ouvrage
bien faite."(15), and France pre-war. "Mais quel contraste avec la France que nous
paraissions être, tuberculeuse, alcoolique, pornographique, divisée contre elle-même,
incapable de discipline, de sacrifices et de courage, vouée à la servitude."(16). The war
was being justified not only in terms of the need to defeat an irrational enemy, but also
through the national unity it was bringing about, which in its turn, was a sign of the
presence of the very rationality in whose name the war was being fought.

This is not accidental or incidental to a proper understanding of the war. Recent
historiography has focussed on the notion of a war culture'(17). A war culture covers the;
"...ensemble de représentations, d'attitudes, de pratiques, de productions littéraires et
artistiques qui a servi de cadre à l'investissement des populations européennes dans le
conflit."(18). Mobilisation for war was as important culturally and invested with as much
significance as economic and military mobilisation. The effect of this was to bring the war
into the heart of the political, cultural and social debate. The war was 'total' in a newer and
deeper sense than ever before(19). Given this cultural significance, the intellectual moved
to the heart of the national community. Also the language of cultural nationalism
crystallised a definition of the nation as a community whose imagined renewal through the
war would exorcise pre-war fears of cultural decline.(20). The republican intellectual
tradition provided the dominant cultural context, premised at this stage on the assumption
of a short war.

In this early phase, the war brought forth from academic republican intellectuals,
where they were not already mobilised, letters, exhortations and speeches. Given the
common belief that the war was to be of short duration, there was not the time or the need
to produce long, reasoned justifications for the war. Poincaré's speech to both houses of
parliament on the 4th of August 1914, introduced the formula 'of the 'union sacrée',

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expressing the dynamics of the republican intellectual vision. Consequently it is useful both as a statement of the nature of the Union Sacrée, and as a marker against which developments occurring during the war can be compared. As part of the republican tradition, it used precisely the same language and tone as the founding speeches of the LDH.

France had been attacked: "La France vient d'être l'objet d'une aggression brutale et préméditée..."(21). This point cannot be emphasised enough as an initial justification for fighting, and in the light of France always having had "...un sincère amour de la paix..."(22). Why did France exist? It existed to make real the republican intellectual project, that is, only "...dans l'intérêt du progrès et pour le bien de l'humanité."(23). All those who shared the same goals, which by definition could not be purely French, nationalistic goals, were rallying to France: "Et déjà de tous les points du monde civilisé viennent à elle les sympathies et les voeux"(24), for France was fighting not merely for France the nation: "Car elle représente aujourd'hui une fois de plus, devant l'univers, la liberté la justice et la raison."(25). The Union Sacrée was a unity based on the republican intellectual project, combining France the nation with France the abstract ideal. It expressed the hopes of a visionary nationalism, but had built into it all the tensions of the republican project, with expectations greatly enhanced.

Lavisse noted that everyone had to work together for victory, giving generously of time, money and self. All were morally linked: "Toute souffrance non endurée est une dette envers ceux qui l'endurent"(26), and the role of the republican intellectual was to articulate as clearly as possible this resurgent French spirit and combat all that weakened it; the presupposition being of course that this spirit as understood by the republican intellectuals existed and that they had a special relationship to it. The coherence of this
vision meant that notions of the country as physical reality and as moral force were interchangeable, thus determining the form of nationalism in pursuit and defence of a specific vision, as well as providing a specific shape to the interpretation of the war.

Republican dominance was further evidenced at the political level, with limited socialist participation in government (Guesde and Sembat), and none from the Right until the end of 1915 (27). At the government level, the Union sacrée was firmly grounded in the republican vision, such that no other vision had comparable official weight.

As reports of German atrocities began to arrive, these provided further justification for an intellectual framework couched in terms of 'civilisation' versus 'barbarity'. As the German army advanced through Belgium, it brought with it preconceived ideas concerning unofficial civilian resistance. It expected to find, and believed it did find, evidence of 'francs-tireurs', of guerrilla warfare, which justified collective reprisals and pre-emptive terror against civilians, officially co-ordinated and considered legitimate (28).

Opposing invasion myths, in particular the belief that German soldiers cut off the hands of women and children (29), mingled with more solid evidence concerning both the absence of real civilian resistance and, more especially, the harshness of the occupying German army. This powerful cocktail of fact and myth brought to the forefront arguments about the conduct of war, which the republican intellectual project was well used to debating.

The methods of the German army, although considered justified in their eyes, were at variance with moves (in which the republican intellectual project had played a part) to bring war itself under the rule of law. If wars could not be eliminated, at least they could be rendered less barbaric, or so at least had been the intention of movements culminating in the Hague congresses (30), whose protocols all the major powers had signed. German
actions in Belgium violated the letter and the spirit of these accords, actions which provided Allied governments and intellectuals with a legal as well as a moral measure for condemning Germany not just for the war but for the way it was fought(31)

Richet, writing in *Paix par le droit*, launched savage attacks on the German army:

"Des soldats allemands achèvent les blessés, fusillent les civils pour un geste, assassinent les enfants, mettent au devant de leurs troupes des femmes et des vieillards, bombardent sans sommation des villes ouvertes, brutalisent et terrorisent les villages où ils passent, imposent, pour s'enrichir des contributions de guerre énormes, arborent le drapeau blanc pour masquer leurs attaques, tirent sur les parlementaires, emploient des balles dum-dum, et partout se conduisent en sauvages, dignes des Huns"(32).

He held to a distinction between the German people and the German army, "...car nous ne pouvons rendre toute la nation allemande solidaire des crimes que ses officiers et ses soldats veulent commettre."(33). For France, this was a "guerre de légitime défense" against a brutal and savage attack. France's response therefore was justified against such irrational brutality and so full support was given by those republican intellectuals for whom Germany now fully represented all that they were opposed to.

D'Estournelles de Constant attacked the idea that France had been enfeebled by pacifism: "Est-ce donc là le signe d'un affaiblissement du pays ? Notre mobilisation, nos ravitaillements se sont effectués avec la régularité d'un chronomètre."(34). This continued what was to be a long discussion on the nature of pacifism, and who could justifiably use the term.

Even though it was the early stages of the war, many of the issues and problems of the future were starting to emerge in republican intellectual discussion as represented in
Paix par le droit. Ruyssen could envisage real possibilities as a consequence of this war, hopes of unity, of community, of the fulfilment of aspirations of all that was best in the human spirit: "Nous voyons autour de nous surgir à nouveau des rêves que les plus audacieux d'entre nous n'osaient plus concevoir...Et voici qu'une grande espérance semble naitre, ou plutôt, c'est une très vieille espérance, celle des prophètes et des premiers chrétiens, celle de 1792 et de 1848, celle des doctrinaires du Saint-Simonisme et du Positivisme."(35).

There was almost an element of satisfaction with the arrival of the war since it was seen as the means to an end. Although part of this faith still stemmed from a belief in a rapid conclusion to the war, nevertheless it would become an inspiration for continued support for the war.

Ruyssen noted favourably Lavisse's opinion to the effect that: "Après cette guerre, comme après un orage, l'atmosphère se rafraîchira, les poitrines humaines respireront librement. Nous ne serons plus obligés de nous demander chaque année; A quand la guerre?"(36). The war had clarified matters, removed frustrations and opened up as real possibilities the values of republican intellectuals. All this placed an extraordinary burden on the war 'to produce the goods', to fulfil expectations; but the conviction that it would do so explained partially the intellectual commitment and cohesion in the face of it. Ruyssen denied any connection with pamphlets allegedly distributed among Parisians calling for peace, arguing: "Nous estimons que la guerre qui nous est imposée par deux puissances que dominent les castes militaires se trouve être, par la nature de l'agression, une guerre contre le militarisme lui-même, contre les armements, une guerre à la guerre."(37). He further made his position and that of the revue clear by declaring: "C'est pourquoi, convaincus que la cause de la France et de ses alliés est la cause même du droit et de la liberté, nous ne
voulons ni prononcer une parole, ni écrire une ligne, ni esquisser un geste qu'on puisse interpréter comme l'aveu d'un doute ou d'une défaillance."(38).

Pacifism as Ruysen understood it had to support the war because the new world that was to be created could only be founded on justice, and justice could only be brought about by the victory of France. He rejected, as he was constantly obliged to do throughout the war, charges brought against pacifism, as for example Le Temps: "C'est l'erreur qui fut commise de bonne foi par les pacifistes et des apôtres du droit convaincus qu'il suffirait à une grande nation comme la France de déposer les armes et de proclamer sa foi ardente dans la fraternité humaine pour éveiller les mêmes aspirations et inspirer les mêmes résolutions chez toutes les nations."(39).

Charles Gide, professor of political economy at the faculté de droit in Paris and contributor to Bourgeois's ideas on solidarism and economic co-operation, again reiterated the idea: "C'est que la présente guerre devra mettre fin à la guerre."(40), increasing the urgency and the necessity to find effective means to bring this about. A movement in a certain direction, as dictated by republican intellectual logic, present before the war, was beginning to penetrate more forcefully, "...et s'il est certain qu'elle ne pourra être réalisée que par une réconciliation des États d'Europe, pourquoi ne pas le dire?"(41). Republican intellectual nationalism determined a conclusion as broad as its aspirations, and could not be confined to, or be confused with, the nationalism that narrowly promoted the advantages of one country.

During the first few months of war, the activity of the LDH was almost suspended, as a good part of its personnel, including its general secretary, were mobilised. However from November 1914, meetings of the Central Committee recommenced and the Bulletin reappeared in January 1915. On the 10th November, the LDH justified continuing in
action: "Est-ce notre constante volonté de paix qui trouve actuellement sa condamnation dans l'explosion de la guerre actuelle?...Qu'est-ce que l'actuelle conflagration européenne, sinon l'effort suprême pour briser la dictature militaire d'une puissance qui, ayant fait de la guerre son industrie, l'a imposée aux autres peuples sous peine d'asservissement?"(42).

Although the LDH interpreted the war in typical dramatically opposing terms: "Au vrai, ce qui éclate aujourd'hui c'est le duel à mort de deux religions; la religion de la force et la religion du droit"(43), it did not escape criticism from certain quarters: "Mais il faut reconnaître avec la même sincérité que certains éléments prétendant agir au nom de ces principes et de ces doctrines, ont failli jeter le pays dans une voie dangereuse et qu'il a fallu l'instinct profond de la race, le sens merveilleusement précis des réalités qui constitue la base de notre esprit national."(44). This would oblige the LDH to demonstrate how the republican intellectual dynamic could be a constituent element in the base of the national spirit.

The socialists entered the Union Sacrée with alacrity: "C'est de l'avenir de la nation, c'est de la vie de la France qu'il s'agit aujourd'hui. Le Parti n'a pas hésité..."(45), while at the same time proclaiming that it was part of its own spirit that necessitated this: "Il savait qu'à toutes les heures graves, en 1793 comme en 1870, c'était en ces hommes, en ces socialistes, en ces révolutionnaires, que la nation mettait sa confiance."(46). Nevertheless, despite its critique of capitalism and its support of the proletariat, socialist commitment to the Republic which was under attack, linked them with the republican intellectual project in an explicit way, and further demonstrated the power of that vision which had so successfully integrated the workers into the national community.

The assassination of Jaurès on the 31st of July deprived socialism of a central figure through whom to respond to the crisis. Vaillant, although never using the expression
'union sacrée, gave his full support to its principles (47). In L'Humanité on the 11th of September 1914, he wrote: "Question posée (...). Dans cet accord unanime des Français (...), le Parti socialiste n'efface-t-il pas ses traits caractéristiques et ne se confond-t-il pas avec les partis bourgeois dont auparavant il tenait tant à se séparer? Réponse: en luttent pour son indépendance, la France lutte pour la paix du monde, de sorte que devoir patriotique et devoir socialiste se fortifient l'un par l'autre." As for Guesde, he entered the government as noted and stayed in it until December 1916, before illness and old age forced him off the political stage.

In the latter half of 1914, the socialist movement was extremely quiet. As Becker notes, however, many socialists saw no further reason for political activity once war had been declared(48), although this claim does not cover socialists in Paris who were active(49). There was not in fact a single political declaration issued by the CAP (Commission administrative permanente), by the socialist group in parliament or by the editors of L'Humanité between 27 August, when the party published a manifesto, and 25 December when socialist ministers joined the government and released a further statement (50). During the first few months, the most widespread interpretative positions were those which attempted to make some sort of distinction between German militarism and German culture(51), a position to be subverted by the German Intellectuals' Manifesto, generating new tensions.

For socialism would begin a struggle to decide how far its identification with the republican vision, in particular in the Union Sacrée, would enable it to pursue its own ends, and how far the needs of socialism would necessitate a more critical outlook, one that could differentiate it from the direction the republican intellectual vision was to take during the war. At this early point of the war socialism seemed to have blended into the
republican intellectual project, so that, as Horne notes, socialists in parliament proclaimed constantly the association of socialist, republican and national identities(52).

The position adopted by the CGT was an even more dramatic shift from pre-war positions, based firmly on the presumptions of a general strike in the event of war (53). Instead Jouhaux, the general secretary, embraced republican values with particular enthusiasm. On the 4th of August at the funeral of Jaurès, he proclaimed: "Emperors of Germany and Austria-Hungary, Prussian squires and Austrian lords who, through hatred of democracy, desired war, we sound the death knell of your reign."(54). However the elements of a conflict that were soon to grow, began to emerge around Merrheim (55), the secretary of the Metal workers' federation. This expressed itself initially by Merrheim's refusal to move to Bordeaux with Jouhaux as the Germans advanced, preferring to remain in Paris as interim general secretary of the CGT. As Becker notes, he did not deny the need for national defence, but he considered that this need did not justify moving from revolutionary syndicalism to class collaboration that quickly(56). Merrheim's more critical spirit took some time to develop and was not to become an issue until well into 1915.

The integration of what should have been potentially subversive elements into republican defence was further demonstrated by the non-application of the Carnet B provisions. This would have enabled the government to arrest a number of individuals it considered a risk to national security(57). Malvy, the interior minister, despite pressure from Clemenceau, could see no justification for such a move, remaining committed to giving democratic France the maximum liberty compatible with national defence. Republican rhetoric in the service of national defence combining the notions of nation, government and essential human values, had proved its effectiveness in the mobilisation and demonstrated the strength of the republican intellectual vision.
Further proof of the intellectual energy of the republican intellectual project can be demonstrated through an analysis of reactions to the German Intellectuals' Manifesto (58). Ninety-three leading German academics and intellectuals in early October 1914 reacted to the charges laid against Germany by the allies, especially concerning Belgium, by producing a manifesto. Endorsed by scholars and writers as distinguished as Ernst Haeckel, Gerhart Hauptmann, Engelbert Humperdinck, Karl Lamprecht, Friedrich Naumann, Max Planck and Wilhelm Wundt, the manifesto represented all branches of knowledge, from physics and chemistry through art and architecture, and seemed to express the collective opinion of the German intellectual elite.

This Manifesto put its claims before what it called the civilised world, as an act of protest: "En qualité de représentants de la science et de l'art allemands, nous soussignés protestons solennellement devant le monde civilisé contre les mensonges et les calomnies dont nos ennemis tentent de salir la juste et bonne cause de l'Allemagne.". The truth would demonstrate the rightness of Germany's cause and through it lies would be exposed: "C'est contre ces machinations que nous protestons à haute voix: et cette voix est la voix de la vérité." The intellectuals asserted therefore that the values of truth and justice would validate Germany's position. How could they make good this claim?

Each charge was refuted, beginning: "Il n'est pas vrai que l'Allemange ait provoqué cette guerre." Revealed here was a problem in the Manifesto that continued with the other refutations, namely the insistence: "Il n'est pas vrai...", with little or no evidence behind it. The Manifesto claimed: "Il n'est pas vrai que nous ayons violé criminellement la neutralité de la Belgique...", but virtually conceded the opposite by explaining the necessity of action
before Britain or France could respond: "De la part de notre patrie, c'eût été commettre un
suicide que de ne pas prendre les devants."

The problem of different conceptions concerning the conduct of war arose with the
claim that: "Il n'est pas vrai que nos soldats aient porté atteinte à la vie ou aux biens d'un
seul citoyen belge sans y avoir été forcés par la dure nécessité d'une défense légitime."
The German intellectuals gave complete support to their army's actions and justified them
by arguing that, "...la population n'a cessé de tirer traîtreusement sur nos troupes, a mutilé
des blessés et a égorgé des médecins...". They thus left themselves open to any evidence
that might emerge to the contrary (59).

The charge against Germany's style of war was rejected more generally: "Il n'est pas
vrai que nous fassions la guerre au mépris du droit des gens", claiming that the "hordes
russes" were especially brutal. The allies had sullied their cause irrevocably, by inciting
'mongols' and 'negroes' against the white race, shaming the civilised world, so losing any
right, "...de prétendre au rôle de défenseurs de la civilisation européenne.". The argument
seemed to be moving towards a defence of the conduct of war, rather than a justification of
the war itself which was taken for granted.

More significantly, the German intellectuals linked their culture to their army: "Il
n'est pas vrai que la lutte contre ce qu'on appelle notre militarisme ne soit pas dirigée contre
notre culture. Sans notre militarisme, notre civilisation serait anéantie depuis longtemps.
L'armée allemande et le peuple allemand ne font qu'un.". Truth and German culture were
one with the German army. The highest value seemed to be German culture through which
a properly conducted war appeared almost as a virtue. Nothing could be more calculated to
exasperate those committed to the republican intellectual project.
Furthermore, what could possibly explain such aberrant behaviour? Would-be French respondents had to consider the implications of any comparable French action and more importantly, establish the validity of their reaction as a properly intellectual truthful, scientific and responsible response.

Republican intellectuals reacted sharply to this statement by German intellectuals concerning the actions of their government, as did other intellectuals from around the world. English intellectuals replied first (60) in October 1914, followed by the Russians (61), the Academy of Sciences of Portugal in November 1914 (62), teachers, writers, composers, and painters from Spain in 1915 (63), as well as the Americans in 1916 (64). The genre of manifesto had clearly moved from being a purely French reaction (65) to something with international significance and application. As Prochasson has noted, with socialist intellectuals, it expressed a particular relation and interpretation of nationalism:

"Les intellectuels socialistes ayant accepté l'idéologie d'Union Sacrée y virent le signe rassurant que leur cause ne se réduisait pas à la défense chauvine de leur culture nationale. Lorsque la Justice et le Droit se trouvent menacés, les intellectuels ont toujours pour devoir de se lancer, plume en avant, dans l'encrier." (66).

The model of the French response was thus a republican intellectual model, and a proper understanding of it negates the view which sees nationalist feeling among intellectuals as in some way the revenge of the anti-Dreyfusards (67). As outlined in the introduction, it is always necessary to make explicit one's epistemological assumptions. For republican intellectuals there was only one rationality. Rationality, and with it justice, truth and peace could not be the possession of one nationality. Their precisely understood role was to rise above particular interests to represent all that was true to the rational mind.
For them the war clearly represented the militarist, nationalist programme of an undemocratic German government.

Within France, the collected faculties of the nation's universities, responding to an initiative from the University of Paris, issued their own manifesto in rebuttal, as did the faculty of the Institut Catholique. Each of the five classes of the Institut de France repudiated the document, and by mid-1915 had moved to disbar from the ranks of honorary membership any German scholar who had signed the manifesto. Martha Hanna(68) provides a very useful discussion of the debates concerning how a response was to be coordinated and where it was seen to have best effect; but there was no debate concerning the shamefulness of the Manifesto, which was taken as given.

The German Intellectual Manifesto was so much an affront because it denied the essence of what being an intellectual was deemed to mean. How could rationality, truth be particularised? The presence of atrocities made the Manifesto even more offensive, but what needs to kept clear is that even without atrocities, the Manifesto was in itself an intellectual atrocity. Reactions to it should be seen in this light:

"Mais ce qui est le dernier scandale et peut-être le plus grand, c'est le factum signé récemment par les savants et les intellectuels d'outre-Rhin, pour tenter de justifier leur gouvernement, leur diplomatie et leur état-major. Economistes, juristes, physiciens, chimistes, philosophes, artistes les plus éminents et hier encore les plus respectés, les Wundt, les Haeckel, les Hauptmann, les Oswald, les Roentgen, les Liebermann, tous ces hommes ont signé sans rougir un papier qu'on leur a présenté et où s'étalent les mensonges les plus évidents et les plus grossiers."(69).

Likewise: "Cette défaillance des hommes de la pensée est une des choses les plus tristes que l'on puisse imaginer."(70).
"Bêtes, ils le sont plus même que les très sales mais très saints cochons, qui, eux, au moins, grognent, mordent et mangent mais ne commentent point leurs fonctions. Ils le sont plus encore que leur Kaiser lui-même, qui, chaque fois qu'il prend un bain de sang, ne réclame l'assistance que de son Dieu. (...) Que les intellectuels allemands, qui n'ont guère à espérer de l'avenir, aient, au moins, la pudeur de ne point compromettre un passé qui permit à l'Allemagne de briller parmi les peuples civilisés."(71).

The support France was to receive from other intellectuals was perceived to follow from the fundamental insight that truth was above nations. It was this rationality, incarnated in France, that other nations were seen by French intellectuals to be supporting. As noted, we do not share this epistemological assumption as a cultural given, so its motivating force can escape analysis, creating the seemingly curious spectacle of Dreyfusard concerns aligned with the nationalism of the extreme right(72). Sirinelli likewise argues that, for the whole period 1898-1914, there had emerged a fundamental divide in intellectual society between nationalist and universalist intellectuals(73). In fact nationalism may exist not simply as nationalism but as part of a wider vision which provides coherence, a content to nationalism, and it was precisely the perception by the Right, that the Republic could mobilise nationalism through its vision, that excited such virulence. The nation itself, for republican intellectuals was as Lavisse stated, a construction of mind: "La nation consentie, voulue par elle-même."(74). True nationalism was rational.

The modern rejection of an all inclusive rationality leads to a concentration on the search for other motivating factors, social, economic, psychological and so on, which are presumed to lie behind the ideology of rationality. These factors are significant, but to
concentrate on them without understanding or acknowledging the place of a rationality in motivating a vision, a society and a nation obscures the events of 1914. Investigation can move on from approaches which either accept what republican intellectuals said at face value, that the war really was about civilisation versus barbarism (a rare position now), or that, following on from the self evident falseness of this, that what they said and wrote can to all intents and purposes be ignored in the search for a comprehensive understanding of the war. The model already outlined enables us to enter into the discussion from another point of view, to see the intellectual confrontation as being between at least two rationalities.

The rationality of the French republican intellectual had a tradition, was a tradition, which intimately vivified an understanding of the significance of the ongoing role of France in human history. Debates and struggle were a progressive necessity in this tradition, yet these debates had to occur within certain parameters. Quite apart from the context of war, it was the stepping outside these parameters by a figure such as Rolland with his reflection, 'Au Dessus de la Mêlée', that generated such criticism.

Romain Rolland had been professor of art history at the Sorbonne in 1904 and in 1912, but he was better known for his literary achievements before the war, including his novel, 'Jean Christophe', a major work covering ten volumes. The beginning of the war found Rolland in Switzerland, where 'Au-dessus de la mêlée' was published in the Journal de Genève on the 22nd of September (75). In it, after paying homage to "the wonderful French youth", he spelled out how unfortunate war was Europe, how it highlighted the failures of socialism and christianity. Even though the three emperors were the main culprits, every nation had to bear responsibility for imperialism. Finally, the intellectual elite were urged not to commit the crime of "compromising the integrity of its ideals.".
France's initial plight in the war affected him to the extent however that he delayed publication of his article until the immediate danger was over after the battle of the Marne (76). The fact that this article however, challenged the values and vocabulary of republican intellectual mobilisation and implicated all the main parties in the question of war responsibility, drew to Rolland, as the war progressed, those dissatisfied with official interpretations.

Admittedly the criticism this article drew came from many quarters, but as far as republican intellectuals were concerned, Rolland failed to acknowledge the extent to which specific values were grounded in France, thus failing to draw the conclusion that France had to be defended so as to defend these same values. It was not possible to be above the struggle because there was no 'above'. Rolland was too idealist to be a republican intellectual, too prepared to step outside the tradition, too modern, which accounts in part for the sympathy he evokes.

Because rationality was located so specifically within a French historical tradition, there were differences between this rationality in tradition and a German rationality in tradition. The republican intellectual could conceive the possibility of practical action for the public good. As a result, the republican intellectual adhered to an integral conception of progress that was embodied in the concept of civilisation(77). This could have emerged only through a particular history which developed in France. On the other hand, the German experience had been different, so that as a result of particular political developments, the German middle class intellectuals were effectively cut off from the prospect of practical social action. These intellectuals accordingly developed a radical sense of the tension between outward civilisation and inner culture. Thus Kultur came to signify the unfolding of man's intellectual, moral, and artistic creativity, which seemed
more important that outward Zivilisation, and unrelated or even opposed to it (78). Kultur
and Zivilisation as concepts, as rational concepts, had histories, yet were understood as
timeless representations of the real. In other words, what could not be perceived, was that
the different, or given notable similarities, differing cultural, social, and political histories
had produced differing rationalities (79).

In this sense, the First World War can be seen as an ideological war, a war of ideals,
of two rationalities (and of course many other elements). Yet neither side was
intellectually able to judge it in these terms, since given the existence of one rationality and
its assumed grounding in a social form, the other side had to be motivated by pre-rational
concerns. The modern analysis tends to eliminate the rationality of either side, seeing both
as rationalisations, as fictions, and concludes that both sides were motivated by
unconscious, usually unstated, principally nationalist, imperialist designs. This thesis
attempts to give due weight to the rationality of the republican intellectual, albeit in a very
different form from that understood by republican intellectuals themselves, as a sufficiently
coherent and motivating explanation for the behaviour of French republican intellectuals.
In this way, the history of this tradition becomes indispensable to a history of France.

The rationality in tradition approach gives a proper context to the enthusiasm with
which republican intellectuals greeted the war; how the war made sense in the continuing
dynamic of the republican tradition, from 1900 in particular; how fighting the war,
although appealing to the nationalists of the right as well as a range of nuanced imperialist
ambitions, was also comprehensible in the terms in which it was expressed, namely that of
civilisation against barbarism, rationality against irrationality.

Becker identifies the spirit of this vision: "Le combat de la France contre
l'Allemange représentait ainsi beaucoup plus qu'un affrontement entre nations: son sens
profond résidait dans la marche de l'homme vers un nouveau stade de son développement si la France gagnait la guerre; dans la régression de l'humanité tout entière si elle la perdait."(80). The language of the republican intellectual project was visionary, revolutionary and messianic. The full impact can be felt through the speech given by Sarraut, the Ministre de l'Instruction publique, on the occasion of the return to classes in Bordeaux in the autumn of 1914:

"C'est bien, cette fois encore, contre la bête humaine en arrêt d'évolution, c'est contre le Hun des âges abolis, qui a changé d'armure sans changer de conscience, oui, c'est bien contre le vandale resté le même après quinze siècles de progrès humain que, comme le chevalier étincelant de jadis, la choc violent de la civilisation et de la barbarie, la lutte de la lumière et de l'ombre. La horde vile retourne au blasphème impie des clarités. Surtout, c'est au rayonnant génie français qu'insulte sa pire fureur. La haine allemande pour la France est celle de la chose qui rampe contre la chose qui éblouit, la haine du reptile pour l'étoile. Elle hait, dans l'âme française, le reflet le plus pur de la conscience universelle. Elle hait, d'une féroce jalousie, sa science, sa culture, son esprit, son cœur, sa tradition. Sa tradition avant tout! Car elle sait que la France est la Nation-lumière. Elle est la gloire du patrimoine humaine et la seconde patrie de tout homme qui pense. Son domaine est la glèbe élue des moissons dont s'est nourrie la pensée des peuples. Toutes grandes idées qui ont transfiguré l'âme et le visage du monde ont jailli sur son sol. Elle est la terre classique de l'idéalisme, de la chevalerie, de la bonté, de l'altruisme. Elle a éclairé toutes les routes obscures du progrès. Elle a tracé les chemins de toutes les nobles croisades. Son génie, immuable parmi le mouvement des âges et la diversité de l'histoire, obéit
éternellement aux mêmes inspirations de générosité, qu'il aille, à travers la nuit de l'époque médiévale, délivrer la primitive douceur du rêve d'amour et de fraternité enclos aux murs du Saint-Sépulcre, ou qu'il aille, à l'aurore des temps modernes, régénérer le vaste univers en apportant aux multitudes opprimées, dans le Verbe de la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme, la magnifique espérance de l'Evangile du droit nouveau."(81)

This powerful and energetic tradition, in its history after Dreyfus, had confronted political problems in the way of its implementation, and theoretical problems in terms of how the exact relationship between France the nation and the ideal France was expected to function. It had mobilised France for war in 1914. Part of the history of the war years involves seeing to what extent the war provided new challenges to the coherence of the republican vision, how these challenges were responded to within the resources of that tradition, and how far these responses were able to continue the mobilising energy of 1914, to conduct French national identity, counteracting the emergence of alternatives.

Notes


(5) Stromberg R., Redemption By War. The Intellectuals and 1914. (Kansas, 1982) p. 47

(6) Le Temps 03-08-14

(7) Le Temps 03-08-14

(8) Le Temps 09-08-14

(9) Le Temps 10-08-14

(10) Le Temps 10-08-14

(11) Le Temps 10-08-14

(12) Le Temps 10-08-14

(13) Le Temps 20-08-14

(14) Le Temps 20-08-14

(15) Le Temps 23-08-14

(16) Le Temps 23-08-14


(18) Audoin-Rouzeau S., L'Enfant de l'ennemi, 1914-1918, p. 10

(19) The sense and application of this term 'total' are well discussed in the introduction to, Horne J. (ed.), State, Society and Mobilisation in Europe during the First World War. (Cambridge, 1997)

(21) Le Temps 05-08-14

(22) Le Temps 05-08-14

(23) Le Temps 05-08-14

(24) Le Temps 05-08-14

(25) Le Temps 05-08-14

(26) Le Temps 25-10-14


(31) Horne J., Cultural mobilisation and meanings of war: Franco-British perspectives, 1914-1918, ibid p.9

(32) Richet C., Les Représailles. Paix par le droit, 10-09-14

(33) Richet C., ibid

(34) D'Estournelles de Constant, La France et la Guerre. Paix par le droit, 10-09-14

(35) Ruyssen T., La Voie Droite. Paix par le droit, 25-10-14

(36) Le Temps 17-08-14
(37) Ruyssen T., Les Pacifistes et la guerre. Paix par le droit. 15-11-14

(38) Ruyssen T., ibid

(39) Le Temps 11-11-14

(40) Ruyssen T., La Guerre pour la paix. Paix par le droit, 10-02-15

(41) Ruyssen T., ibid

(42) Bulletin Officiel de la Ligue des droits de l'homme. Vol.XV p.5 01-01-15

(43) Le Temps 11-11-14

(44) Le Temps 11-11-14

(45) Le parti socialiste, la guerre et la paix, Toutes les résolutions. (1918), pp110-111

(46) Le parti socialiste, ibid p.111


(51) Prochasson C., ibid p.116


(55) Papayanis N., Alphonse Merrheim: The Emergence of Reformism in Revolutionary Syndicalism, 1871-1925. (The Hague, 1985)


(58) Les Versions allemande et française du manifeste des intellectuels allemands, Bibliothèque nationale 8 M Pièce 4073


(60) L'Humanité 25-10-14

(61) Une protestation des intellectuels russes, L'Humanité, 23-10-14

(62) Réponse portugaise aux intellectuels allemands, L'Humanité, 12-11-14

(63) L'Humanité 05-07-15


(66) Prochasson C., ibid p.117


(68) Hanna M., The Mobilisation of Intellect. French Scholars and Writers during the Great War. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996), chap.3

(69) Cachin M., Les intellectuels allemands. L'Humanité 21-10-14

(70) Cachin M., ibid

(71) Pioch G., Bêtes comme cochons. Les Hommes du Jour, 351, 10-14

(72) Jennings J., ibid p.15


(77) Ringer F., Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective 1890-1920. (Cambridge, 1992) p.77

(78) Ringer F., ibid p.77


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Chapter Four

The Logic Of 1914 Extended And Defended 1915-1916.

The hopes of 1914 became a standard against which mobilisation could be measured: "Jamais, à aucune époque de notre histoire, l'unité morale du pays n'a été aussi complète, aussi profonde, aussi intime qu'au lendemain du jour où elle paraissait le plus tristement compromise." (1). 1914 had demonstrated that a comprehensive moral unity was possible. Yet the question remained as to how this could be sustained, both through the war and into a new world of peace. More significantly, the war itself was beginning to challenge the categories through which it had been viewed. The losses endured by France were horrendous, with 50% of total losses occurring in 1914-1915 (2). This, plus the passing of any illusion as to a quick conclusion to the war and its gradual transformation into a seemingly endless industrialised slaughter, necessitated a more profound mobilisation of French society, if it were to win or even survive the war. Culturally, the categories of mobilisation were still dominated by the values of the republican intellectual project, which through 1915 and into 1916, resulted in a more systematic presentation and justification of the war. The gap between the proclaimed purpose of the war in this period, the orthodox justification, and anxiety about what the war was actually doing, could arise and come into tension precisely because the war had been invested with so much moral significance. Republican intellectuals set the tone by continuing and justifying mobilisation around the highest moral values. This mobilisation has to be assessed before the war itself as a moral challenge, as a potential subverter of these same values, can be explored.
The assumptions of republican intellectuals concerning rationality meant that there was a moral duty to provide sound justifications to the citizens of the Third Republic so as to solidly and validly ground their commitment to France. This essentially was the reason for the production of propaganda. The Republic in itself was, in part, an idealist construction, based on the very best application of the principles of scientifically validated and progressive thought. The war was now a major aspect in the development of that thought, and the justification for it had to become, for the citizens of the Republic, a part of their moral reflection. Propaganda cannot have the modern sense of the term since, it was believed, abstractions had real, specific applications, the function of the republican intellectual being to make these connections clearly. As Lavisse noted: "Il nous faut chercher, par la réflexion, la réalité incontestable qui nous donnera la fermeté d'esprit."(3), since "L'Allemagne... croit aussi fermement que nous à la victoire finale."(4). Propaganda concerned that "réalité incontestable."

The modern study of propaganda began after the First World War and in reaction to the war experience. The modern meaning of the word is itself evidence of the mind shift that has occurred between now and the war period. In the classic of the critical genre concerning propaganda(5), Lasswell stresses either deliberate manipulation or the utter loss of critical focus. What this study brings out, as does earlier work(6) is the problematic nature of propaganda as a category. For republican intellectuals, any German justification for the war was propaganda in the modern sense because it stepped outside what they considered to be the only valid rationality. For them, republican intellectual justification for the war was propaganda in the pre-modern sense, that is, the presentation of a valid case. If republican intellectuals were purely involved in exercise of propaganda in the modern sense (which is what they are generally charged with, not specific distortions of
fact), whose system of values is being applied to reach this conclusion? The republican intellectual would throw down the challenge as to what rationality was being applied which revealed the truth of the war. The war as a challenge to the rationality of any tradition lives on in our culture.

The construction of patriotism for the war continued therefore an integral aspect of the republican vision. As Durkheim had argued in 1905: "Jamais avant ce temps, on ne fut plus vivement préoccupé de transformer en un sentiment réfléchi l'instinct patriotique, et en un culte raisonné et consenti l'amour à demi-conscient que la masse des hommes ressent vaguement pour la patrie"(7); and Buisson in 1909 as regards the role of teachers: "La raison d'être de son autorité, c'est qu'il soit un croyant, un convaincu, un passionné,... à qui l'on a fait enfin un métier à la fois et un devoir de propager cet Evangile laïque."(8).

Academic republican intellectuals, in a real sense, were extending their mobilisation to cover the new demands the war was placing on the republican project, so that: "Le rôle de l'Université, en effet, est de faire que le pays entier sache pourquoi il combat."(9). The integration of republican intellectual reflections on the war into the evolving republican project began early with Lavisse proposing early that intellectuals come together:"...par dessus les intérêts de parti et de clocher...(an obligatory republican intellectual introduction), avec le concours des instituteurs de toutes les écoles publiques et privées...(the traditional means of inculcation), d'enseigner aux masses populaires les droits historiques et la grandeur de la patrie et de maintenir la concorde entre les citoyens."(10). In response to the new needs of the situation, old problems had to be confronted and overcome in a framework of moral urgency, and all the energies of France had to be mobilised in fulfillment of its mission.
In a letter, Pour la vitalité de la France, Lavisse attacked the poison of alcoholism, but: "L'alcoolisme n'est qu'un de nos fléaux. La tuberculose, qui lui est apparentée d'ailleurs, collabore avec lui à l'affaiblissement de la France"(11), a reflection repeated with even more force by Liard: "Il faudra, jusqu'à complet triomphe, défendre la race contre l'alcoolisme, la tuberculose, et l'avarice, lutter contre la dépopulation et le malthusiasme; combattre la misère sociale et l'injustice sociale; assainir la politique, la purger du favoritisme, du parasitisme, de l'esprit de clientèle et de camaraderie..."(12). Politically, and this was a reflection of the republican intellectuals' own work, parliament had to "...travailler à sauvegarder, fortifier, accroître l'énergie française, afin que nous soyons en état de réparer tant de désastres et de ruines, et prêts à l'essor qui suivra la victoire."(13).

The Republic was expected to be united at all levels in its commitment to victory, but the republican intellectual was particularly bound to express rationally and morally the motivation behind the need to fight and win. Moral unity, sufficient to overcome both internal and external enemies, had to be firmly based on the expectation of progress through the republican project. The war produced a dramatic polarisation of the vocabulary of mobilisation, with the rejection of the German alternative being both defined as an integral part of French identity and as a willingness to recognise universal human values.

(i) The rationality of republican defence propagated.

The need for a systematic and organised intellectual response, in particular generated by the German Intellectuals' Manifesto, led to the setting up of the Comité d'études et de documents during November 1914. Under the inspiration of Durkheim and approved by Poincaré himself(14), this committee represented a wartime organisational expression of republican rationality, a conduit for the values of the republican intellectual project at war. The participants provided a solid representation of academic republican
intellectual life with Lavisse of the Académie française as president; Durkheim, professor at the University of Paris, Andler, Denis, Seignobos and Lanson from the University of Paris; Henri Bergson and Emile Boutroux from the Académie française; Joseph Bédier from the Collège de France, Jacques Hadamard from the Académie des Sciences and André Weiss from the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, as members. The central function of this committee was to organise the writing and distribution of tracts and brochures to neutral countries, providing solid reasons for France's need to fight, and the consequences of failure.

The internationalism of the republican intellectual project is clearly evidenced here in the firm belief that the French position could and should be presented to all peoples who were prepared to listen. The war had international and universal implications. It was a world war which, republican intellectuals believed, necessitated French victory so as to ensure the victory of justice and the rationality which made justice possible. France represented this rationality and republican intellectuals would use this same rationality to demonstrate why any rational person should adhere to the French cause. Germany had started the process of justifying their country's actions (15). The world had to be shown why Germany was wrong, politically, morally and rationally.

Academic intellectuals had more time on their hands because of the mobilisation of students (16); additionally, the enormous gravity of the situation sometimes involving their own family, meant that their professional lives could not just carry on as before. With the national survival in jeopardy, with national morale to sustain and foreign support to win, especially in the neutral countries, and with his son and son-in-law and five nephews in the army, Durkheim's found it difficult to concentrate on his teaching (17). Prevented because of their age from direct participation in the war, republican intellectuals felt their distance
from events and wished to participate(18). Bédier and Andler had sons fighting. Lanson had his son killed in 1915. Hadamard had two sons killed in 1915. Intellectual mobilisation gave a direct opportunity to participate in the war.

The Comité d'études et de documents sur la guerre produced ten works, which can be divided into three main categories. The first category consists of works analysing 'pangermanism' and the 'German mentality' such as Durkheim's 'L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout, la mentalité allemande et la guerre'; Andler's 'Le pangermanisme. Ses plans d'expansion allemande dans le monde'; and Lavisse and Andler's 'Pratique et doctrine allemandes de la guerre'. The second category looks at responsibility for the war and includes 'Qui a voulu la guerre? Les origines de la guerre d'après les documents diplomatiques', by Durkheim and Denis; 'La violation de la neutralité belge et luxembourgeoise par l'Allemagne', by Weiss; and '1815-1915, du Congrès de Vienne à la guerre de 1914', by Seignobos. The third category studies German atrocities and actions against international law as set out in the Hague conferences. These tracts include 'Les crimes allemandes d'après des témoignages allemands' and 'Comment l'Allemagne essaie de justifier ses crimes', by Bédier; and 'Comment les Austro-Hongrois ont fait la guerre en Serbie. Observations directes d'un neutre' by Reiss. Lavisse produced a summary of these works published as 'L'Allemagne et la guerre de 1914-1915 d'après les travaux publiés par le Comité d'études et de documents sur la guerre sous la présidence d'Ernest Lavisse. Thiers provides a useful summary of these documents(19), but an analysis of some of them brings out central themes of importance within the republican intellectual project.

In 'L'Allemagne au dessus de tout, la mentalité allemande et la guerre', Durkheim set out to establish exactly why Germany's actions as a nation were immoral: "For morality to us, that is to say, to all civilised nations,(...), has for its primary object the realisation of
humanity, its liberation from the servitudes that belittle it, its growth in loving-kindness and fraternity."(20). In a democratic state, he argued, "...the people and the state are simply two aspects of a single reality. The state is the people awakened to a consciousness of itself, of its needs, and aspirations - a more complete and definite consciousness."(21). France's evolution as a nation had made it morally more superior, on objective moral criteria which Durkheim took for granted existed. In Germany, by contrast, the state had become divorced from a proper morality, so that it had become unnatural:

"There is no state so great that can govern externally against the wishes of its subjects and force them by purely external coercion, to submit to its will. There is no state so great that it is not merged within the vaster system of other states, that does not, in other words, form part of the great human community, and that owes nothing to this. There is a universal conscience and a universal opinion, and it is no more possible to escape the empire of these than to escape that of physical laws."(22).

Germany had stepped outside the parameters of the republican intellectual project, into a moral, spiritual and cultural void, into barbarism.

Durkheim's study, in collaboration with Denis, 'Qui a voulu la guerre?', attempted objectively to analyse this question. A manifesto, like the German Intellectuals' Manifesto, was no longer an appropriate vehicle in which to address such an important problem. A scientific approach was brought to bear:

"In approaching the subject of this study, we must not forget that we are ourselves judge and a party to the debate, since our own country is concerned. We must therefore forewarn ourselves and above all our readers against a possible national parti-pris, however respectable that may be. For this reason, we shall confine
ourselves to providing in the first place an objective and complete account of the
events, without any mixture of evaluation. Only subsequently will we allow
ourselves to draw any conclusions; but at this stage, it will be easy for the reader
to test, by the account that precedes them, the results that we will arrive at."(23).
The arguments Durkheim used and the position he arrived at concerning responsibilities
were assumed to be universally available to those who used rationality as a proper tool.

The documents themselves were designed for easy distribution(24). Coloured
orange, the first headline was always 'Etudes et documents sur la guerre', followed by the
title, then the name of the author and his qualifications. For each brochure, a detailed
chapter plan was given which allowed the reader to see at a glance the general structure of
the document. Each document was sold at what was then a modest price of .50 centimes a
copy. Furthermore, one of the works, 'L'Allemagne et la guerre de 1914-1915', was
distributed free. Although essentially for foreign distribution, a certain percentage did
circulate in France. Thiers has studied the mode of circulation(25), and has drawn up the
following figures. In January 1915, 200,000 copies were sent out of which 49,000 were in
French. In March 1915, 350,000 copies were distributed of which 85,000 were in French,
and in May 1915, 462,000 were distributed of which 118,000 were in French..

Intellectual mobilisation took an even more organised turn in May 1916 when
twelve pamphlets were brought together and published as 'Lettres à tous les français', the
high point of this genre. The failed offensives of 1915, the state of the Russian war effort
and the beginning of the battle of Verdun in early 1916 continued a relentless pressure to
mobilise and mobilise: "L'enjeu est d'importance: la guerre est là avec son cortège
d'atrocités, la guerre toujours et à nouveau barbare, la guerre vis-à-vis de laquelle il faut
savoir se situer."(26). These were not directly published by the Comité d'études et de
documents sur la guerre, but the publishing committee was almost identical(27). These letters were for national distribution, not for neutral countries, and they were never translated. France itself needed, in the eyes of the writers, encouragement and hope if the mobilisation was to continue successfully.

These letters were considered a serious scientific enterprise involving considerable preparation: "Nous avons obtenu ainsi des faits, des chiffres, des documents. Toutes les fois que nous en sentions le besoin, nous sollicitions des éclaircissements. Après ce minutieux travail qui occupa le second semestre de l'an dernier, sûrs de ne rien dire que nous ne puissions, en conscience, tenir pour démontré, nous avons publié les Lettres à tous les français."(28). The purpose was made very clear, "...nous avons espéré donner une assiette solide à l'esprit public."(29). Thinking clearly was important: "Or l'issue d'une guerre si longue et si vaste dépend non de telle ou telle circonstance éphémère, mais de causes permanentes. Ce sont ces causes permanentes que nous nous sommes proposés d'atteindre."(30). The range of dissemination was in keeping with its democratic purpose: "Trois millions d'exemplaires de chacune d'elles ont été distribés"(31), but as always with the republican project, the school was the chief means of propagation: "Nous remercions, en particulier, les instituteurs et les institutrices qui ont été les meilleurs auxiliaires de notre propagande."(32).

Durkheim, in the first letter, noted the difference between this war and former wars, both in terms of the number of nations and the extent of participation by each nation in the War, "...c'est la nation en armes."(33). A capacity to hold out was required: "La victoire ne peut être qu'une oeuvre de longue patience"(34), therefore: "Il faut, si nous voulons vaincre, que nous restions assez maîtres de nos nerfs..."(35). Moral discipline was essential for victory, something all French people were called to be involved in: "L'état moral des
peuples est donc appelé à jouer dans la guerre un rôle de la haute importance."(36). Moral failure, in the climate of war, could have real consequences: "C'est comme si nous soutirions au pays un peu de sa force de résistance."(37). Durkheim noted the importance of confidence: "La victoire n'est possible que quand on espère la victoire"(38) and this confidence was to be based on the research carried out which formed the bulk of the letters.

There were objective reasons for confidence. The letters supplied them. Three moral virtues were essential in this enterprise, "...patience, effort, confiance."(39). The letters performed the task of providing rational content to these moral virtues.

Lavisse, in the second letter, 'La paix que les allemands voudraient faire', went through the claims of the German Intellectuals' Manifesto, exposing them as sinister rationalisations for a crude expansion of German power, in particular into France itself. The anti-virtues which he considered inspired Germany, "...sa folie même, sa folie d'orgueil, ...".(40), could not hope, in the long term, to hold out against the "forces combinées de pays qui s'appellent l'Angleterre, la France, l'Italie, la Russie"(41), so that, "... notre peuple sait, en son sûr instinct, que la guerre que nous fait l'Allemange est une guerre à mort, et il demeure ferme en sa patience, parce qu'il a foi en l'immortalité de la France."(42). The following nine letters compared the forces of Germany and its allies with the forces of France and its allies, concluding in each letter that there were solid reasons for patience, effort and confidence. The last letter by Lavisse used a range of historical examples to show how France had rescued itself from the effects of devastation and concluded confidently that France could do so again. In expressing this, Lavisse proposed and developed themes he had been instrumental in promoting to French school children before the war(43).
The assumption behind these letters, the grounding assumption of the republican intellectual enterprise, was that, reality being one, the rationality needed to grasp it was available to those who wished to think clearly, not influenced by prejudice or false feelings, that minds correctly informed with the best understanding would be in a position to maintain the moral confidence necessary for victory. There was not a range of equally valid moral choices, but one moral choice, founded on and reflecting rationality, which manifested the unity inherent in the republican project, providing moral guidance through the confusion of war. As always, this information would be mediated through teachers on whom rested great expectations, expressed by Sarraut, the minister of education, in 1915: "If there is one teacher in whose existence I cannot believe for even an instant, it is a French teacher who ignores the war and continues with the same lessons and the same routine and at these critical times uses the same old phrases to address his pupils."(44). Teachers were expected to give: "...une grande leçon de solidarité nationale."(45). Lavisse posed the question only to answer it about who, "...a qualité pour parler à ses concitoyens, a le devoir de leur dire, à ceux qui oublient la guerre, qu'ils oublient la patrie, et aux décourageurs, qu'ils sont les auxiliaires de l'ennemi... Or, dans chaque commune de France, un homme a cette qualité, c'est l'instituteur."(46). These made real by their action the republican project, the creation of a solidarity against evil forces, the integration of republican intellectual reflection into the evolving republican project so as to maintain its cohesive dominance.

This was very clear in the document 'L'Allemagne et la guerre de 1914-1915', which brought together the central arguments of the Comité d'études et de documents sur la guerre explicitly for national consumption. Documents once directed outwards for international support were now being redirected internally to boost the population. The
French had to be made aware of the international significance of the struggle. The war concerned what was of deepest value in the human spirit. The allies were fighting for the principles of humanity, of fraternity that republican intellectuals believed were definitively inscribed in men's consciences and which the German doctrine and practice of war had openly violated. Human culture was being threatened, but no people, it was firmly believed, could put back the advance of genuine civilisation(47). This document and its arguments were to become part of national mobilisation. "Nous avons pensé qu'il avait intérêt à mettre ainsi à la disposition des institutuers et des institutrices des documents sur la guerre qu'il leur sera facile d'utiliser dans leurs classes, dans leurs causeries quotidiennes ou dans leurs conférences."(48).

At one level so confident, yet the reality of the pain of war was also present in the writings of Lavisse, reflections that help dispel any notion that Lavisse arrived at his opinions by ignoring the reality of war. Writing at the beginning of 1916, he could not help but note: "Une des marques du temps présent est la décadence ou la ruine d'institutions et d'idées qui semblaient capables de mettre la concorde entre les nations."(49). The effects of the war had been destructive at all levels: "Au total, l'égoïsme des groupes humains s'est exaspéré; les forces morales sont perverties; la raison, impuissante: des violences, des lâchetés, des canailleries, un tas d'horrerors et d'ordures: voilà l'humanité comme elle se montre après qu'elle a vécu des milliers de siècles. Ne vaut-il pas mieux souhaiter que cette année soit pour elle la dernière des dernières?"(50). This evil had to lead somewhere: "Il est impossible que l'abomination même de cette crise ne lui serve pas de leçon. L'excès du mal la contraindra à chercher et à trouver un remède..."(51).
Republican intellectuals such as Lavisse mobilised not only through pamphlets and letters(52). Lavisse presided over the Patronage National des Blessés, and Bergson and Boutroux were among the members of the intellectual community who contributed their time, money and national prestige to its projects. It set itself a basic goal: to provide medical stations at the front with sufficient supplies of iodine, essential medical equipment and X-ray machines. By early 1915, through the efforts of this organisation, essential X-ray facilities were being supplied all along the front to wounded troops(53).

Another major concern was to sustain the morale and support the efforts of former students and colleagues. In October 1914 Louis Liard, then Rector of the University of Paris, proposed to the Conseil de l'Université that faculty members voluntarily contribute the equivalent of one day's salary per month to two separate charitable organisations: the Secours National, a national charity devoted to helping families bereaved and economically distressed by the War, and a comparable Secours Universitaire that would provide material assistance to the families of students, staff and faculty at the front. This was accepted.(54)

Hanna has highlighted the intellectual community's conviction that it constituted an extended family(55). Correspondence between teachers and former students became something of a moral duty. Although the archival evidence is incomplete here, it is clear that Lavisse maintained regular correspondence with former students. This was extended to acting on behalf of normaliens and their families(56), and Lavisse did not hesitate to use his many connections within the government to help advance the careers of former students or protect the interests of their families.

All this kept Lavisse firmly in touch with the war. As well, military regulations required that normaliens serve in the infantry, contributing to horrifying casualty rates, which prompted Lavisse to lobby for a fundamental change in military law. By the spring
of 1915, Lavisse, who kept records detailing the military service of normaliens, recognised the dangers this represented. An interim tally of casualty rates among students and graduates of the Ecole Normale, completed after six months of combat, showed that of the 255 normaliens mobilised since 1914, only 95 were as yet unscathed: 55 were dead; 16 were missing in action; 64 were wounded; and 25 were prisoners of war(57). Concern about this certainly motivated him, but it is also clear from his correspondence that he knew of, and was tormented by, the horrifying nature of service in the infantry as individual students experienced it. By January 1916, Lavissee had been exposed through correspondence to the harsher realities of trench life. An unidentified correspondent suggested that those who enjoyed the comfort and security of civilian life could never imagine the savage, barbarous and primitive conditions of life at the front(58). "A Prayer for Those at the Front (to be said by those who are in the rear)", which appears without attribution among a series of handwritten notes in his private papers, indicates that Lavissee felt the moral burden of his position:

"Pity for all those who each day touch the very depths of human misery, who live each day exposed to the most hideous of deaths, who hold fast without respite, who eat without sating their hunger and drink without satisfying their thirst; who no longer know true rest; who are gnawed at by vermin, tortured by rats, frozen by the cold and damp; and for those who, above all else, live, separated from all who love them, with broken hearts... But most of all, my God, have pity on me; I did not wish to share their suffering and, like Pilate, washed my hands of them.(59)

It is not clear whether Lavissee wrote this prayer himself or copied it, but Lavissee reacted to the moral burden of his knowledge by working to refute being included among the last group of the prayer. One of the ways he did this was to lobby successfully for a
change in the law that required normaliens to serve in the infantry. Action was vital, but so was moral certainty concerning the validity of the end to which action was directed.

Lavisse reached into the rationality of his tradition to find a basis for his hope: "Nous voulons régler par un statut international leurs relations de manière à prévenir les conflits. Nous attendons que la raison humaine recouvrant enfin ses droits, une libre organisation progressive qui fasse concourir les peuples à des fins communes."(60). As a result of the horror of war, republican intellectuals were also coming under pressure to evaluate more carefully and defend more closely what hope in the republican project could mean, and this was to cause some debate and division.

(ii) The rationality of socialist commitment to war.

Socialist intellectuals were also to participate in this process, but through to the end of 1916, their commitment to the war was expressed in similar terms to that of the republican project, aspects of which need investigating. The first two years of the war saw the majority of socialists locked firmly into the Union Sacrée, with a small but growing resistance from 1915 onwards: "Jusqu'en 1917, rien ne parut menacer l'hégémonie qu'exerçait sur le Parti socialiste le discours tenu par la majorité des intellectuels socialistes français: la France républicaine conduisait une guerre juste contre la barbarie; servir la nation était le premier des devoirs, quitte à renoncer un temps à la lutte des classes; l'avant-guerre était une période révolue, balayée par la tourmente."(61). This commitment nourished the republican project, helping to justify its central claims and weakening potential alternative voices. Socialists were urged to think differently and forget the false quarrels of the past(62).

In a direct reflection of the Comité d'études et de documents, a Comité de propagande socialiste pour la défense nationale was established in the summer of
1916, with aims remarkably similar to that of the republican intellectual project. This body, largely energised by a single man, Bourgin, was in fact a pale reflection of the Comité d'études et de documents sur la guerre. Even within socialism, it was marginal to the party as a national organisation. The pamphlets it produced, for example, 'Les socialistes dans la nation et pour la nation', 'Pourquoi nous détestons et pourquoi nous voulons détruire le militarisme allemand', 'Responsabilité', and 'Pourquoi la France fait la guerre', simply reproduced the arguments of the major republican intellectual committee. Bourgin himself made great claims for this body and its work: "Elles sont faites pour une large diffusion, pour laquelle mon éditeur consentirait sans aucune difficulté de larges rabais." However there would seem to be no evidence that they had impact inside or outside the socialist party.

Nevertheless, even its existence demonstrated one more aspect of the power of the republican vision within socialism, how the linkages at the level of assumptions between republican intellectuals and some socialist intellectuals gave a similar content and form to their respective intellectual mobilisation. It needs bearing in mind also that in terms of active membership, the numbers of the socialist party had fallen from 91,000 in July 1914 to only 24,000 in 1916. Socialism was under pressure as never before to establish an approach both to itself and to the war.

More broadly, in referring to these intellectuals and those who grouped themselves around Thomas (who entered government on the 18th May 1915), Prochasson makes the valid point that these intellectuals created for socialism an image of respectability, competence and concern for the national interest. Yet they themselves could have coherently rejected the claim that this... tranchait singulièrement avec leurs pratiques internationales de l'avant-guerre." Prochasson concludes: "On put dès lors
comprendre qu'il était possible d'être socialiste et patriote, ce qui constituait une évolution idéologique de taille."(67), but more than this, it was rather that this development was implicit in their fundamental assumptions that had made possible the Union Sacrée in the first place. Socialism was too amorphous, too linked to the republican intellectual project at this stage, for it to be easy to unpick the international, national, patriotic, and socialist strands within that complex creature, the socialist intellectual, in order to decide where a true socialist response lay.

The war itself, and the growing resistance within the socialist movement to the continuation of the war, led to greater discussion and debate among republican intellectuals especially from 1916 onwards. At one level, the reflections produced by the Comité d'études et de documents were solidly confident, but these were essentially for public consumption, and did not address the precise problems the war was causing for intellectuals themselves. As not merely defenders, but also as articulators of a living tradition, republican intellectuals were obliged to re-think the basis for their commitment to a war whose moral and physical consequences were so ugly. In the situation of war, the precise form that rationality, and through it, meaning and the moral foundations of action should take, had to be re-thought within the terms of the republican tradition. 1916 was therefore a critical period in the history of that tradition.

Notes

(1) Giraud V., Le Miracle français. La Revue des deux mondes, 15-4-15, p.876
(3) Le Temps 1-1-15

(4) Le Temps 1-1-15


(7) Durkheim E., L'Ecole primaire et le patriotisme. Revue des deux mondes, 1-9-05

(8) Buisson F., L'Instituteur et le République. La Grande Revue, 10-11-09

(9) Sarraut A "Pour la rentrée d’octobre 1915: Circulaire du ministre de l'instruction publique et beaux arts à MM les recteurs d’académies, Revue internationale de l'enseignement 69 (1916)

(10) Le Temps 19-11-14

(11) Le Temps 25-1-15


(13) Le Temps 25-1-15

(14) Thiers E., Intellectuels et culture de guerre 1914-1818. L'Exemple du comité d'études et de documents sur la guerre. (DEA, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1996) has been used as the source for details in this analysis. It represents a welcome contribution to republican intellectual history.


(18) Thiers E., op. cit. pp.55-59
(20) Durkheim E., L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout (Paris,1915) p.23
(21) Durkheim E., ibid p.27
(22) Durkheim E., ibid p.29
(23) Durkheim E. and Denis E., Qui a voulu la guerre? Les origines de la guerre d'après les documents diplomatiques (Paris,1915) p.5
(24) Thiers E., op. cit. p.82
(25) Thiers E., ibid. pp. 100-117
(27) Thiers E., op. cit.p.95
(29) Ibid p.15
(30) Ibid p.15
(31) Ibid p.15
(32) Ibid p.16
(33) Ibid p.23
(34) Ibid p.24
(35) Ibid p.25
(36) Ibid p.25
(37) Ibid p.26
(38) Ibid p.28
(39) Ibid p.31
(40) Ibid p.46
(41) Ibid p.46
(42) Ibid p.46
(45) Le Temps 30-1-16
(46) M.G.I.P. 23-9-16
(48) Lavisse E. ibid p.6
(49) Lavisse E., Bonne Année. La Revue de Paris 1-1-16 p.9
(50) Lavisse E., ibid p.11
(51) Lavisse E., ibid p.11
(52) Hanna M., The Mobilisation of Intellect. French Scholars and Writers during the Great War, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996), chap.2
(54) AN AJ/16/2589. Minutes of meeting of the Conseil de l'Université held on 26 October 1914
(55) Hanna M, ibid pp58-62
(56) AN AJ/61/197.
(57) AN AJ/61/197. Ecole Normale Supérieure, correspondence, 10 May 1915

(58) BN NAF, 25170. Papers of Ernest Lavisse, fiche 523, "Lettre-extrait janvier 16."

(59) BN NAF, 25170. Lavisse papers, ff. 520-552

(60) Lavisse E., Bonne Année. La Revue de Paris. 1-1-16 p.11


(62) Prochasson C., ibid p.171

(63) H.B. (Hubert Bourgin?). Le Comité de propagande socialiste pour la défense nationale. L'Humanité, 24-7-16

(64) Letter of Hubert Bourgin to André Lebey, 26-3-15, Fonds André Lebey, OURS


(66) Prochasson C., ibid p.176

(67) Prochasson C., ibid p.176
Chapter Five

Criticisms and Justifications, 1915-1916.

In this chapter, the discussions and debates which developed within the republican intellectual tradition, beginning in 1915 and particularly marked through 1916, will be viewed firstly, in this chapter, through Ruysen's journal whose logic and application of principles normally indicate the subsequent direction of the republican project. Secondly, the SEDCG will be considered as a more open and critical centre of intellectual debate concerning the war, highlighting some of the central problems of the republican intellectual project as a whole. This organisation came into existence directly as a result of the war. It provided therefore a direct focus and a clear conduit and expression of republican intellectual rationality operating under the pressures of war. How did the war confront those intellectuals who were involved in it intellectually and morally? How did the central, unitary conception of rationality and morality cope with the emergence of competing and compelling moral alternatives in response to the war?

(i) *Paix par le droit* develops justifications for the war.

Ruysen continued to insist that his understanding of pacifism, elaborated before the war, was justified, that pacifism, being clearly a virtue, necessarily belonged within the republican project. He was therefore continually obliged to defend his use of this term since he considered the war justified. His reasoning gives insights into how the experience of war could be integrated into the republican vision; indeed in Ruysen's eyes, only the republican vision permitted a proper moral and intellectual approach to the war.
Ruyssen recognised how potential distortions could arise with the term pacifism:
"Jamais, cependant, il n'a été plus à la mode..., et, à passer de plume en plume, il s'use, se
déforme et finit par revêtir les significations les plus imprévues."(1). He attempted
therefore, to give some substance to his claims by quoting the Munich International
Conference for Peace in 1907 where pacifism had been defined as, "...un groupement
d'hommes et de femmes de toutes nationalités qui recherchent les moyens de supprimer la
guerre, d'êler l'ère sans violence et de résoudre par le droit les différends
internationaux."(2). Ruyssen linked pacifism inseparably with justice and since, in his
mind, the just action was to defend oneself against Germany, therefore the true pacifist had
to support this. Republican conceptions of justice and peace were the only valid
conceptions of these virtues, and any attack on them, if these concepts were to live in any
real sense, had to be repelled.

Ruyssen, like Lavisse already quoted, did not arrive at this position by ignoring the
horror of war, indeed the war provided the ultimate lesson on the validity of pacifism:
"Mais voilà tout justement un genre d'argument dont l'atrocité de la guerre actuelle a
dégoûté à jamais les plus acharnés adversaires du pacifisme."(3). Logically, because of its
horror, this war had to be the last: "L'immensité des pertes, l'acharnement d'une moitié des
nations civilisées à détruire en quelques mois, de leurs propres mains, les richesses d'art, de
culture et l'industrie accumulées par le patient labeur des générations, toute cette folie
destructrice accablé de stupeur les plus intrépides théoriciens de la guerre nécessaire ou
providentielle."(4), (i.e. social darwinists and catholics). The war justified the republican
project through its dramatic presentation of the realities that followed the rejection of that
project, with the consequence that: "En un sens, donc, la guerre travaille contre la guerre et
pour la paix telle que nous la voulons."(5).
The horror of war lay in its destructiveness, its waste, its irrational madness. This war was the ultimate proof of the folly of war. This insight not only validated the republican intellectual project which had always argued this, but made its success an urgent necessity. The duty of any properly morally informed person was therefore clear: "Nous irons jusqu'au bout pour que pareille épreuve soit épargnée à nos enfants et aux enfants de nos enfants; nous luttons sans faiblir, parce que nous savons bien que cette guerre est la guerre à la guerre, la guerre du droit et de liberté."(6).

If this conclusion was accepted, and it was based on sound application of republican intellectual principles, then it was difficult, operating within these principles, to be opposed to concluding this war by victory for France. Commitment could be based not on some alleged crude nationalism but on the highest aspirations of the republican ideal, which necessitated a certain approach to the war. The very comprehensiveness of the war, its international complexity, its horror, justified seeing it as something completely other than what had gone before. Peace could not remain, in this context, as merely a worthwhile aspiration, but had to be concretized into a reality for which one could aim.

Ruyssen, as a member of the LDH, believed that this body had a central role to play in the application of republican moral rationality in the new world that had to follow after the war: "La Ligue des droits de l'homme qui demeure l'une des grandes forces morales du temps présent, qui sera, dans la France et l'Europe renouvelée, un puissant facteur de conservation et de progrès à la fois, vient de rappeler en termes éclatants qu'elle reste fidèle à la cause des nationalités souffrantes et de la paix par le droit."(7). It was to be an initiator in the process of republican renewal.

In Ruyssen's view, peace by law, by justice, had to have specific detail, no longer simply a worthwhile aspiration. This necessitated a programme which he believed had to
contain the following points; a recognition and the widest possible application of the principle of nationalities, completion of the juridical work begun by the Hague Conferences and the establishment of a free peaceful league of nations resolved to submit their differences without exception to arbitration and to put their united forces at the service of general peace.(8).

Republican values were being extended beyond a direct incarnation in republican France into a more broadly based body. This body, while centrally deriving its inspiration from France, carried true French republican ideals throughout the world, so that everyone could become a citizen in the republican project, a necessary conclusion in a system claiming to be the only genuine true possibility. Hope for the future dictated the necessity of republican victory in the present.

Paix par le droit was the first republican organ to be convinced by the perception of the absolute need for a Société des nations, but as noted, the idea was not new. Rather it became a logical conclusion of the war itself which made acutely urgent a programme to defeat war. Peace belonged to those who deserved it: "On n'a que la paix qu'on mérite, et la paix juste, sincère, durable n'appartiendra qu'aux peuples qui sauront s'unir pour monter la garde auprès des trésors communs de la civilisation."(9).

Through 1916, as criticism of the war began to mount, Ruyssen was obliged to justify morally his stance. The battles of the Somme and Verdun had not brought the war any nearer conclusion. Becker has argued for the solidity of the connections between the soldiers and the rest of the national community, claiming that any idea of a rupture between the two is an illusion, and for the importance of this link. "Tout le système de représentations des combattants face à la guerre et à son sens, face à la signification de leur propre sacrifice, a dépendu en profondeur de la réalité de cette cohésion nationale...(10).
Republican intellectuals had always seen themselves as fighters in the cause, as deeply linked to the national experience, and as deeply responsible for the continuation of the national cohesion. The losses of men, the manner of their deaths and the frustration at being unable to finish the conflict by the strategies so far advocated however, allowed alternative viewpoints and values to emerge. Ruysen had to argue that republican intellectual values gave the surer direction. Not only would a premature peace leave too much in German control he argued, but morally such a position was judged indefensible because, "...tout serait perdu si les enfants de ceux qui se battent devaient revivre dans dix ans les angoisses que leurs pères ont voulu leur épargner au prix même de leur sang."(11). Premature peace would doom the world to more uncertainty, and in the continuing existence of irrationality and immorality, almost certainly lead to further wars. Victory in this war would lay the foundations for a secure future because sound principles could be applied without compromise.

Ruysen noted favourably the establishment of a group, the SEDCG(12), since, if it was doing what it claimed to be doing, it had to arrive at conclusions similar to his own. Rolland's lofty judgements were indirectly rebuffed. Rationality, indeed the very capacity to conduct a proper civilised human life was at stake. The war demanded engagement, detached, clear-sighted engagement. The survival of universal values depended on one's particular response to a direct threat to those values. More crucially, it was the proper application of those very values that provided a clear direction in the face of war. The republican project could only interpret alternatives as based on faulty reasoning. The right reasoning, founded on moral certainties available to that reasoning, provided a sure direction.
In August 1916, Ruysen repeated the need to found a new world where the values of the old could be finally displaced: "D'autre part, il faut que l'espoir de ceux qui meurent pour fonder un monde meilleur ne soit pas déçu... il faut que l'on en finisse une bonne fois avec les conceptions surannées qui nous ont conduits à la guerre et que tous les belligérants ont plus ou moins perpétuées, secret diplomatique, impérialisme accapareur et aggressif, concurrence ruineuse et stérile des armements."(13). He thus continued a fundamental republican intellectual rallying cry of 1914, where the old ways had to be rejected to make possible the unity necessary for the new.

To this extent, the Republic had to be criticised, so that it could become what it should be. In this spirit, criticism of censorship was carried out, not to weaken the war effort or to suggest defeatism, at least on the part of republican intellectuals, but to keep clearly at the heart of the war the values for which it was being fought. The censorship debate was long and continuous(14). It demonstrated how the paradox of limiting democracy in the war for democracy was felt and lived as a tension. Republican intellectual values were not submerged into the necessity of war, but generated a continuous debate about application. Apart from practical problems of how to actually be effective, the application of censorship had to reach a compromise between a republic at war and a republic of republican values.

Ruysen looked forward to the LDH conference of 1916 as the opportunity for the republican vision to take the initiative with a precise definition of the purposes for which the war was being fought, and to work actively towards the implementation of this vision, so that the fulness of the republican project would be realised in a permanent peace. This conference was therefore of central significance: "C'est qu'en effet, pour la première fois depuis la guerre en dehors du parti socialiste, des hommes appartenant à des fractions
diverses de l'opinion républicaine se réunissaient pour réfléchir en commun sur
l'organisation internationale qui pourra désormais mettre le monde à l'abri d'une nouvelle
catastrophe."(15). Intellectual mobilisation could and would continue.

For Ruyssen, war itself was by definition ugly and this war proved it beyond any
reasonable doubt. However, the possibilities that followed from a republican peace made
pursuing this war necessary to that end. This was a powerful vision, but it was to receive
strong critical attention throughout 1916. If this war were as bad as Ruyssen had argued,
whether it be stopped and if so how, were questions that logically emerged. That the war
could produce a more nuanced debate within the terms of the republican intellectual project
than Ruyssen's solidly argued position would suggest, was evidenced by the life of the
SEDCG.

(ii) Debate within the Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre
(SEDCG.)

This grouping(16), briefly named the Comité d'études historiques et diplomatiques,
was founded on the 23rd January 1916 through a common idea of Matthias Morhardt,
former secretary general of the LDH, the economist Charles Gide, and Michel Alexandre, a
socialist and professor of philosophy at Chaumont until 1916(17). The Central Committee
was made up of nine members: Michel Alexandre; Oscar Bloch, lawyer at the Court of
Appeal, minority socialist and president of the section Monnaie-Odéon of the LDH;
George Demartial, an under secretary at the Ministry of Colonies, formerly heavily
involved in the civil servant question writing 'Le statut des fonctionnaires' in 1907, who
became convinced that responsibility for war lay largely with Russia and was to argue this
passionately; Gustave Dupin, a writer and painter(18), whose son died early in the war,
turning Dupin, a fervent catholic, into a passionate believer in the need for negotiated peace
and a regular correspondant with Romain Rolland; André Le Trocquer, lawyer at the Court of Appeal and socialist; Charles Gide, president of honour, Matthias Morhardt, secretary general of the LDH from 1898 to 1913, editor of Le Temps (President of the Société), and admirer and visitor to Rolland in Switzerland; Severine, an outspoken feminist writer and journalist; and the Marquis de Villeneuve, former deputy of Corsica.

The members of the SEDCG were very diverse. One current was comprised of people such as Brizon (an ardent opponent of the Three Year Law and hard-line minority socialist, who launched persistent attacks on government handling of the War throughout 1916-1917, and one of three French delegates to go to Kienthal), and Mayéras (a minority socialist and opponent of the union sacré), as well as Charles Benoist (minority socialist) and Jacques Mesnil (journalist and art historian who kept up a close correspondance with Rolland throughout the War and who helped have published 'Au dessus de la mêlée' in France). Another current was made up of men such as Charles Seignobos, Victor Basch and Charles Richet whose faith in the spirit of national defence would never be broken.

Among the principal members could be found people such as Marthe Bigot (primary school teacher and secretary general of the Fédération féministe universitaire who was committed to negotiated peace), Edward Robert Dell, (editor in chief of the pacifist revue, Les Nations), Alfred Rosmer (a colleague of Merrheim, arranging the clandestine diffusion of 'Au dessus de la mêlée' in France and then its subsequent publication, who fought for a new socialist international), and Roger Nowina (wounded in 1914 and more seriously in 1915, member of the Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales and activist both in the socialist party and in the LDH). Others included the Belgian lawyer Paul Otlet (secretary of the Office des associations internationales (Brussels) and committed to the resolution of the conflict by means of international law), the Swiss journalist Edmond
Privat, former delegate at the Zimmerwald Conference, and Marie Schappler, an employee from the Commerce Ministry and militant activist in the group Etudiants socialistes révolutionaires. Alphonse Merrheim frequently participated.

If Matthias Morhardt was the principal founder of the SEDCG, apparently having obtained the official protection of Caillaux, the statutes of the SEDCG were largely drawn up under the inspiration of Alexandre and his wife, who acted as secretaries for some months. The principal aim of the SEDCG was to investigate how far each nation was responsible for the outbreak of war through a series of documentary studies. Its headquarters was fixed at Paris. Each meeting (on average one every two weeks) consisted of an analysis of a particular aspect of the war followed by a discussion of this and of other current events of the day. These meetings took place most often at the Ecole des hautes études sociales, and sometimes at the Hotel des Sociétés savantes, the war not having broken Parisian pre-war intellectual geography.

The SEDCG encompassed, therefore a wide range of divergent opinion and tendencies. Three main currents can however be identified, sharing in common a dissatisfaction with the present, with France in the middle of a war which tested all categories, assumptions and perceptions.

Firstly, Merrheim saw the SEDCG as having: "Le but de coopérer à toute recherche et à toute propagande en faveur de la cessation des hostilités". This followed on from his developing position which he had stated at the founding of the Comité d'action internationale pour la paix on the 22nd of November, 1915, which had become the Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales in February, 1916. There he had urged that a search be made for: "Tous les moyens dans le but de faire cesser cette affreuse boucherie et d'arriver à la conclusion de paix". While he would not use precisely this language in
the SEDCG, where participants were at least initially motivated by the intellectual presupposition that, truth being one, a more measured, 'objective' approach would enable all to arrive at it, he was committed to the belief that peace was necessary to stop the butchery, and to create a new world order since the war so clearly demonstrated the corruption of the old. Many republican intellectuals were arguing that the war had to continue so as to inaugurate the new world order. For these, and for people like Merrheim, the war was the painful proof of the need to change, but precisely how, and to what, divided them. Longuet, and Brisson, to name the most prominent, were to develop and passionately defend views similar to Merrheim's in the SEDCG.

Secondly, Basch, Seignobos and Richet were major figures who represented the orthodox republican defence position, and their chief role became one of defence against attacks on this position from other participants. Thirdly, there was a small group who sought simply to 'understand' the war without using it as a means to explain the future.

This latter role was in fact the ostensible purpose of the SEDCG, to study, "...la situation de l'Europe avant le conflict, les origines et sens profondes de la guerre"(24). This entailed looking as well at commercial conflict, Russian and British imperialism and generally at all features of the war in as impartial a manner as possible. This position was just as suspect as the others to the authorities and could be included under the strictures of the police spy, "...les tendances pacifistes s'y manifestant ouvertement"(25), because it challenged major assumptions justifying the war. It threatened the delicate balance at the heart of the republican intellectual project which combined those who believed simply that France should and must win because it represented the cause of justice, and those who believed that the future of values such as liberty, truth and justice were critically bound up with the future of the France that was being defended.
The effect of this third perspective, of this abstract objectivism, was to drive a wedge between the moral values for which France was fighting, namely truth, justice and peace, and the means France had used, and continued to use, in their defence. More fundamentally, it queried whether France itself was the worthy repository of these virtues. Demartial and Gide in their different ways were the chief exponents of this 'abstract' position, although it was extremely difficult to sustain when the desire for meaning, for a purpose to explain the war, became almost overwhelming, accompanied by the moral necessity to take action. The chief attraction for the intellectuals concerned with 'objectivity' was based on the conviction that truth was the most important element regardless of the consequences, even when the results of research showed that official explanations were responding to other agendas. Truth itself became a more fragile concept throughout the life of the SEDCG as the difficulties of stretching it at least three ways became evident. This concern for truth accounts for some of the membership which was otherwise inexplicable to the police spy: "Aussi, doit on s'étonner de voir figuer parmi les noms des sociétaires ceux de Gide, Basch et Seignobos."(26).

The attraction for other intellectuals was that the discussions helped to provide an objective basis for the criticisms they were making of the present situation; for those on the left they expressed feelings about the perfidy of the system and a focus for their anger. For those in the republican mainstream, they provided proof of what had to be avoided or expunged from the otherwise healthy body that was France as it both confirmed itself and prepared to play an active role in the new future. More significantly, these differing tendencies believed their reactions and interpretations to be solidly grounded morally and intellectually. As such, they represented a potentially serious threat to the coherence of the intellectual mobilisation, with consequences beyond that. If republicans could argue that
the war was not just, that it should stop, and this was done in the name of values which were believed to be different from those which would motivate the defence of France, then what had happened to France's moral superiority?

The SEDCG was a debating chamber for a potential crisis in intellectual morale of which its very existence was symptomatic. Fierce discussion occurred on the 5th of March 1916(27) when Demartial argued that England had to be held responsible to a large extent for the war. Gide disagreed, arguing that the Germans had been more aggressive both in policy and in action. In response, Demartial claimed that German diplomacy had been conciliatory. In the face of these assertions, what was required was documentary evidence, but as the members of the SEDCG were to discover, this was difficult to uncover and often when it was, as with the Government official accounts of the July-August diplomatic efforts, it was considered incomplete or, more seriously, lacking in veracity. As Longuet pointed out, even when there was some agreement on casualties, these figures could be used both ways in the debate between those who considered the war justified and those who believed it had to stop. The 'facts' could not determine one specific course of action.

On the 3rd of April, after a critical response to Seignobos's attempt to outline German responsibilities, discussion broadened into a debate about the purpose of the SEDCG, another on-going point of contention. Brisson saw it as "...pour l'Histoire, pour le grand public, par la presse, par le tract, par la brochure, par le livre."(28). Demartial argued that the SEDCG had to become a torch, while Merrheim saw it as a place to provide information on the war which each party then took back to their area of influence, the worst scenario for him being that the nationalist cause might be endorsed. Brisson insisted that truth must be provided, and condemned Durkheim and Denis whom he claimed had to be
responded to. Different expectations were beginning to generate conflicting demands as differing rationalities emerged.

The 16th of April meeting opened with Brisson who, after praising an article by Bertrand Russell, specifically went on to criticise four works; 'La Responsabilités de l'Allemange dans la guerre actuelle', by Durkheim; 'La Guerre', by Denis; 'La Guerre de 1914 et le droit', by Basch and 'La violation des neutralités belges et luxembourgeois', but gave credit to Basch for being more sincere. Basch argued that what needed to be distinguished were immediate causes and remote causes and that part of the problem of explanation stemmed from a problem of method. While it might be true that the Germans did not want war, nevertheless a German war party exploited Austrian hatred for Serbia. Germany had wanted, prepared for, and ultimately declared war. In his opinion, judgement had to be reserved on remote causes, since all Europe could be considered as having contributed. However, it was necessary to condemn the Russian Alliance.

Debate continued on the 29th of April 1916 between Basch, maintaining German responsibility, and Demartial, who considered the allies more responsible, while Longuet pointed to the significance of Poincaré's visit to Russia, and Merrheim stated that France had not done enough to reduce hatred. Basch became increasingly irritated at the "irresponsible" tone of discussion; as noted by the police spy, "M. Basch commence à s'apercevoir qu'il s'est fourvoyé; il eût pu s'en apercevoir plus tôt"(30), and in fact Basch did not return.

This marked the beginning of the departure from the SEDCG of those intellectuals who stood closest to the cause of national defence. They believed in the cause of France and were convinced that an objective analysis could only confirm this cause. Attempts to undermine this conviction could only be interpreted as motivated by other agendas or being
irresponsible. Objectivity not committed to the values of actually fighting for France was an illusion in their eyes, and an unacceptable moral luxury.

Morhardt tried to restate on the 21st of May what he saw as the function of the SEDCG, in response to criticisms levelled at him by Romain Rolland whom he had visited in Switzerland and who had said: "Alors, à quoi sert tout ce beau travail de cabinet? A la délectation tragi-comique de quelque intellectuels?" (31). Morhardt stated that the SEDCG had primarily to offer a mutual education. Perhaps sensitive to the departure of Accambray, the Radical deputy from the Aisne who had denounced the ascendancy of what he considered to be pacifists, Morhardt also felt the need to proclaim his patriotism: "Nous ne sommes pas, chacun le sait, des pacifistes." (32). This position implicitly drew a line between the possible theoretical conclusions of the discussion and specific conduct as regards the war, thus confirming Rolland's criticism at least as regards Morhardt's activities. Moral discussion, driven by the continuous all-bracing reality of war, had to result in action. Truth, as something able to be in the possession of all, yet generating radically differing responses, was rationally and morally incoherent in this analysis.

More promisingly for Morhardt's approach, Gide produced concrete figures comparing military expenditure before the war among the great powers, which seemed to bear out claims of a German military buildup although expenditure increased among all of them. Discussion then followed, with Demartial first attacking the approach of comparing the budgets of centralised France and decentralised Germany and England, as well as not taking into account colonial troops. Merrheim in turn questioned the significance of the figures since, as the costs of weapons production went up, so did expenditure. Against that, and more confusingly, Morhardt noted that metal use had been cut in unnecessary areas, thus reducing prices. After six hours of discussion, what had appeared as genuine
documentary evidence was critically reduced to a shell, as yet again, the lack of hard evidence acceptable to all led debate into assertion and counterassertion.

While Merrheim could note that, in his opinion, what had to be countered was the notion that one side was always right, nevertheless, in the absence of a conceptual, objective apparatus for viewing the war, the reasons for considering one's own position to be in error were less and less persuasive. Consequently, intellectual discussion as a dialectical movement towards truth become more of a dream as the reality of partisan assertion began to emerge. Within their own terms, republican intellectuals had no means to understand this development, except the one deriving from their own rationality which was to judge alternatives as necessarily in some way lacking true rationality.

On the 25th of September, Morhardt again reiterated his belief in the purpose of the SEDCG, that it was, "... purement critique et documentaire, et non de propagande"(33), but this was counter-balanced by the news of government harassment of certain members for whom such a distinction was not valid such as Bloch and Merrheim. These two, and others in the SEDCG who shared their views, believed that action had to follow conviction. If in the course of its deliberations, the SEDCG discovered, or became convinced, of a point of view out of step with official policy, this could not be a purely critical or documentary point. Proper action was the key necessity. For Merrheim and Bloch, this could be the only purpose of the SEDCG.

Demartial returned to battle with his claim that diplomatic efforts before the war had forced Germany, which had not refused reconciliation, into the position of aggressor which it eventually became. Guernut rejected Demartial's position and supported Basch's interpretation as well as arguing that Germany should accept arbitration. Brisson strongly denounced the assumption of total German responsibility; "C'est la thèse du jésuitisme
Assertion and counterassertion increasingly began to characterise the meetings.

Demartial then moved discussion on to the position of parliament at the time of the declaration of war. He had recently attended a conference at the Sorbonne given by Barthélémy, a professor of administrative law, from which he claimed to understand that only parliament could declare war. Looked at seriously, this seemed not to have been the case in 1914 as parliament had been led by events. Demartial tried to draw a distinction between parliament which, quoting Kant, was motivated by the pacifist nature of the republican, democratic ideal, and the actual course of events over which parliament had had little control. Bloch agreed with Demartial, saying that while formalities had been observed, these were in essence only fictions. Moranges in turn disagreed with Bloch, declaring that the process of the declaration of war had been perfectly legal and constitutional. Again discussion foundered on the absence of any hard documentary evidence. Alexandre felt both the need to ask for a time limit to discussion in the absence of anything substantially conclusive, and, to assist real debate, to suggest that a study of newspapers prior to the war be undertaken so as to discover the spirit of coverage.

Frustration at the lack of substantial agreement led discussion in search of the means by which it was hoped consensus could be achieved, i.e. more documentary evidence.

Discussion on the 17th of November involved a full report on the LDH conference in which SEDCG members had participated. Arbitration during the war had been rejected. Bloch considered that there were only two ways to finish the war, "Par l'anéantissement de l'Allemagne" or "par un rapprochement". The first had failed in his opinion. Any debate on this was stopped by an intervention on the Polish question which dominated discussion for the rest of the meeting with no conclusion, as usual.
The major methodological problems and conflicts within the SEDCG went unnoticed by Rolland, who in a letter to the SEDCG, read out on the 27th of November, expressed himself to be, "...en parfaite harmonie de coeur et de pensée avec ceux qui recherchent la vérité et dont les efforts tendent à préparer une Europe-Unie" (35). The assumption of convergence of the two operations, namely the search for truth and preparing a united Europe, was itself significant in that it indicated, as far as Rolland was concerned, that the pursuit of truth could still determine one course of action. The history of the SEDCG demonstrated how difficult this framework of belief was becoming to defend. Understanding the war was a primary motivating drive, but when inexorably coupled with the need for action, produced a paralyzing dilemma between those who believed action had to follow right understanding (difficult to establish), and those who saw the need to act as self-evident and morally prior to, "...la délectation tragi-comique..." (36) of much of the discussion.

Dupin and Alexandre argued the need to react to what they regarded as sophisms such as "la parole est au canon", by having a list of these sophisms drawn up and refuted. It would not appear from the sources that any action was taken on this suggestion. Not only was it difficult to organise the production of documents that members of the SEDCG might think necessary, but the SEDCG had no means of dissemination comparable to that of the Comité d'études et de documents. While the latter point was important, the former was crucial, since the history of the SEDCG demonstrated the lack of intellectual coherence between its founding assumptions (never accepted uncritically by all its members) and any particular course of action. The inability to produce anything as coherent as the 'Lettres à tous les français', where a single focussed rationality had driven the assessment and ordering of evidence, separated the differing moral convictions brought
together in the SEDCG by war. The war and reflection on the war, was transforming and
restructuring the moral and intellectual capacity to react to it.

On the 31st of December 1916, Alexandre argued that the war had involved a
mobilisation of consciences, but that now: "Il est temps de démobiliser nos consciences",
that "un courant d'opinions crée par la presse" was obscuring a clear sighted assessment of
the war. Demartial was drawn to the conclusion "...qu'il peut y avoir conflit entre le
sentiment de la patrie et celui de la vérité."(37). If this were true, where did it leave a
commitment to truth except as an allegiance to totally abstract concepts, lacking both the
actuality and the possibility of embodiment, or creating the need to embody truth
elsewhere. For an increasing number of those who remained in the SEDCG through
1917, the answer lay in a new future: ("C'est du socialisme que cela viendra, nous vous y
aiderons."(38)), and sharper criticisms of all aspects of government war policy. The only
really new note was an announcement concerning La ligue pour une Société des nations,
introduced and defended by Paul Otlet. He grew particularly irritated by what he saw as a
lack of respect for law in general, and for the possibilities of law well grounded; this being
natural given his hopes for international law in the future.

Malvy, the Minister of the Interior, forbade the meeting arranged for July 1917(39),
but the SEDCG was permitted to continue in September. Finally the Prefect of Police
obtained the closure of the SEDCG through the Ministry of the Interior. As Prochasson has
noted in reference to the later 1917 meetings of the SEDCG: "Elle tournait au groupuscule
d'intellectuels pacifistes. Les contradicteurs s'étaient faits rares."(40). This was a rather
different situation from its early days.

In spite of the official ban, the SEDCG held an annual general meeting on the 4th
March, 1918. The continuation of regular meetings was decided after Gide had criticised
how the SEDCG had evolved, causing its suspension. For him, the SEDCG was an "...oeuvre de science historique, de publications documentaires de critique générale impersonnelle" (41). The meetings had deviated from this line, hence: "Je me suis cru, par moments, embarqué dans une galère défaitiste" (42). Stricter procedural rules were established, with meetings to occur on the first Sunday of each month, the executive committee to fix the order of discussion, guests to be nominated, and a register to be signed by all present. Despite this, the tone of discussion did not change as developments had passed beyond the repair of institutional adjustment.

Prochasson sees the SEDCG as resting on a misunderstanding between those who considered it a gathering of objective intellectuals, a sort of laboratory devoid of political colouring, and those who saw it as an instrument of combat against the war and official propaganda, this being essentially a divide between pure intellectuals and militant intellectuals (43). In fact, there had been three fundamental groupings in the life of the SEDCG. First there were those who, while seeking to understand the war, nevertheless never doubted the justice of it, those who could not see a distinction between the Patrie and truth as regards both the validity of the war and the need to continue. Secondly, there were those very small numbers who in a sense attempted to be "au dessus de la mêlée", by trying to understand the war without implications for action. This position became increasingly untenable both through the absence of hard evidence and by the very nature of the war, which demanded so much more by way of a response. Thirdly there were those who entered into a far more sweeping criticism of all aspects of the war, and ultimately of the Republic itself, as central to the problem. The first group left comparatively early, and the history of the Société became the story of how the third group overwhelmed the second group within a structure that presupposed the validity of the second group's project. More
importantly, none of the three groups could see a distinction between objectivity and practice. All three components of the SEDCG had believed firmly that their reactions were grounded in objectivity and that truth dictated a certain response, even if minimally the second group seemed to judge the essential requirement to be to work for more truth in the form of documentary evidence.

The critical role for the Republic was how to respond. Essentially how could its intellectual republican supporters deal with these serious cracks in the republican enterprise, so that the project of republican France could continue to be the unfolding of objective moral progress, and not, as the second group maintained, more often acting against truth and justice, or as the third group maintained, the manipulated plaything of malevolent murderous powers? Although the third response could be dismissed by committed republican intellectuals as serving other agendas, and the second as morally incomplete, the growing pressure for negotiated peace, partially driven and made possible by the logic of the second group, was a concern that had to be dealt with.

The LDH conference of 1916 directly addressed this issue. In doing so, it highlighted even more than the SEDCG, the fragmentation of the moral fabric of the republican vision under the experience of war.

Notes

(1) Ruyssen T., D'un contre-sens et d'un terme nouveau. Paix par le droit, 25-5-15, p.289
(2) Ruyssen T., ibid
(3) Ruyssen T., Après un an. op cit. 25-8-15, p.386
(4) Ruyssen T., ibid p.386
(5) Ruyssen T., ibid p.386
(6) Ruyssen T., ibid p.387
(7) Ruyssen T., ibid p.434
(8) Ruyssen T., Programme minimum. op cit. 25-10-15 p.467
(9) Ruyssen T., ibid p.469
(11) Ruyssen T., Simples questions à quelques pacifistes. op cit 25-3-16 p.74
(12) Ruyssen T., op cit. 25-4-16 p.146
(13) Ruyssen T., Après deux ans. op cit. 25-8-16 p.313
(14) Renouvin P., Les Formes du gouvernement de guerre (Paris, 1925) p.43
(15) Ruyssen T., op cit. 10-11-16 p.505
(16) The Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre (SEDCG), founded on January 23 1916, initially came together in the belief that the truth concerning the origins of the war could be established through the careful study of documentary evidence. It soon became a major debating chamber for different viewpoints concerning the war, with increasing criticism of all aspects of government war policy. After the war, it attacked the attribution of sole responsibility for the war to Germany and engaged in fierce debate with the LDH on this question. From the end of 1919, it held no further meetings. The essential source is CARAN F7 13086(4). Rather like the LDH, it has attracted almost no scholarly interest, but see, Prochasson C., Les intellectuels, le socialisme et la guerre 1900-1938. (Paris, 1993) pp.162-167.

(18) Cf. Ermenonville (Gustave Dupin), La Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre, Clarté, 4,8-11-19.

(19) CARAN, F7 13086 (4) Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre; biographical information is derived from, Maitron J. and Pennetier C., Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français, pt.3 1871-1914; pt.4, 1914-1939 (Paris,1973-77)


(21) Rolland R., ibid p.780

(22) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(23) Merrheim A., Comité d'action internationale 22-11-15

(24) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(25) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(26) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(27) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(28) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(29) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(30) CARAN F7 13349 (4)

(31) Rolland R., ibid p.780

(32) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(33) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(34) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(35) CARAN F7 13086 (4)
(36) Rolland R., ibid p.780

(37) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(38) CARAN F7 13086 (4)

(39) CARAN F7 13086 (4)


(41) CARAN F7 13086

(42) CARAN F7 13086

(43) Prochasson C., ibid p.167

The concept of a Society of Nations was adopted to a certain position in republican intellectual thought, not only for its external political purposes regarding international autonomy, but also through its bringing together, in one concept, the value of republican virtues, creating so that very act a unity which was added the power of its virtues. In other words, it seemed to reasonable persons both in the world and in the republican intellectual project, both proving a necessary rationality and pointing the way to its fulfillment.

A further source material for understanding the logic behind the upholding of the republican intellectual project was provided by a work published by Laplanche in 1954, Pour l'education des parents, des elevees. In this, Laplanche argues that, "L'education est la mission de la nation pour les peuples, l'education et le travail de ce travail est de transmettre '165'.
Chapter Six

The Ligue des Droits de l'homme Conference of 1916

The idea of a Society of Nations was a logical outcome of the application of republican intellectual principles to international realities. Ruyssen had already argued this. Lavisse had begun to move in this direction and it had been a factor in republican intellectual reflection before the war. The power of this concept, combined with the demands of war, lay in its capacity to invest the republican project with expanded meaning and new direction. In the moral complexity of the war, the republican project, as a living tradition, had to draw from its own resources a framework of meaning that integrated the spiritual, moral, intellectual and practical dimensions into an ongoing confirmation of the validity of the project. The very essence of rationality, morality and progress, were placed in doubt by the destructive effects of war.

The concept of a Society of Nations was elevated to a central position in republican intellectual thought, not only for its external practical aspects as regards international harmony, but also through its bringing together, in one concept, of the range of republican virtues, creating in that very act a unity which was itself the proof of its virtue. In other words, it seemed to transcend tensions both in the world and in the republican intellectual project, both proving a unitary rationality and pointing the way to its fulfillment.

A further simple example, demonstrating the logic behind this re-centring of the republican intellectual project, was provided in a pamphlet produced by Lepert in 1916, 'Pour l'abolition des guerres; Aux pacifistes'. In this, Lepert argued that, "l'établissement de la justice entre les peuples me paraît absolument essentielle". In order to achieve
this, "...un grand nombre d'hommes de toutes nuances politiques recherchaient déjà la solution du problème de la suppression des guerres. Ces hommes auxquels on avait donné le nom de ‘pacifistes’."(2), had taken numerous positions since the outbreak of war. Some had taken up arms, some had locked themselves in ivory towers, and yet others had taken the same position as adversaries of yesterday. Lepert saw it as a duty that people not absorbed in immediate national defence had to come up with a way to end the war. The conclusion for Lepert was clear - a Society of Nations. In coming to this, he rejected other propositions such as, the suppression of frontiers(3), or, general disarmament(4), as well as proposals to simply establish an international court of arbitration(5).

The fundamental definition for Lepert was that pacifists detested war, but debate could occur as to how to stop it. He confronted socialism by arguing that the war was not just an effect of capitalism, militarism and imperialism, as wars had always occurred and these explanations did nothing to stop them. The fact was that conflicts happened. This he used as a base to defend pacifism against attacks. Pacifists had never believed people would become so good that war would disappear: "On ne cherche pas des remèdes contre un mal auquel on ne croit pas."(6). The proof of pacifist commitment was that, "...au moment de la mobilisation, les pacifistes de tous les pays ont répondu."(7).

Lepert was clear as to where he believed one's duty lay: "Avec tous ceux qui préfèrent la mort à l'existence dans une servitude irrémédiable, je reconnais que c'est un devoir dans certains cas, d'exposer sa vie pour défendre son droit..."(8). This was the moral basis for Lepert's pacifism and also for his determination to find a just and permanent solution to the problem of war. The Society of Nations was that solution, as it was for Ruyssen and a good many in the LDH as well as a growing conception in the minds of others like Lavisse. Rationality, morality, pacifism and justice were combined into a
powerful argument. The LDH conference involved a critical public testing of this development.

Intellectual mobilisation had to confront criticism that the war itself could not be justified. Could there be a coherent moral justification for continued fighting? Could a better case be put for not continuing to fight? Images of warfare and the values it could arouse were an established, though increasingly debated, part of western culture. By 1916, after two years of war using the most modern industrial and bureaucratic procedures for fighting and the advantages conferred on the defender by this technology, warfare had become something fundamentally challenging and disturbing. Europe was in a state of industrialised siege warfare. It was recognised that the French economy, indeed French society had had to reorganise in order to carry on in this struggle. Yet despite all the immense sacrifice, the conflict seemed no nearer conclusion. Modern technology had created a highly efficient killing machine, thus turning warfare itself into a brutally paradoxical compliment to industrial and national competence.

The battle of Verdun brought all these elements together, industrialised slaughter with no end in sight, as a pivotal challenge to the morality of mobilisation. The French army had been fully exposed to the horror of Verdun: "Presque toute l'armée française connut l'enfer de Verdun, le commandement ayant préféré y faire passer les divisions les unes après les autres."(12), increasing even further, through communication with non-combatants, a knowledge of what the horror of war consisted in. In particular, as men continued to die, more and more French citizens were brought in contact with the harsh consequences of continued fighting, through the loss of family, friends and fellow citizens. What values could survive in this immersion in blood? Was the war itself the ultimate
evil? How could a moral response be structured which addressed the experience of war seriously, an experience that was exceeding any known acceptable limit?

The first session of the LDH conference of 1st to the 3rd of November 1916 opened with a firm commitment to the values of democracy and its implications: "A nos yeux, la démocratie est, par définition, un régime dans lequel tous s'intéressent à la vie de la nation dans son ensemble et dans ses détails"(14). To be democratic, to be interested in the life of the nation required concern with peace in 1916: "Il n'y en a qu'une vraie, c'est la paix organisée de manière à durer, la paix humaine et définitive qu'aucun impérialisme ne pourra briser"(15). This was clearly the highest moral duty, above nations and special interests: "Il faut que l'humanité soit enfin sauvée du retour à la barbarie"(16), a necessary consequence of the failure to apply rationality.

However, the question of war origins could not be properly investigated' "...considérant que l'état de guerre, non seulement par les passions qu'il soulève, mais par les obstacles insurmontables qu'il apporte aux recherches et aux confrontations nécessaires, interdit à tout esprit libre de se former une conviction sérieuse et bien fondée"(17). Thus the experience gained in the SEDCG by some members of the LDH was the foundation for a rejection of the search for origins, at least during the war. The LDH therefore decided, "...de réserver jusqu'à la fin des hostilités son jugement sur les origines et les responsabilités immédiates de la guerre, mais se déclare résolue à faire, quoi qu'il en coûte, comme au temps de l'affaire Dreyfus, la lumière complète sur ces tragiques événements"(18).

There was no expectation or fear expressed in this however, that whatever discovery might emerge, the validity of war in defence of the republican vision would be put in question. That it might have this result, that the results of enquiry could be less in
harmony with republican intellectual assumptions, was a driving force behind the arguments of the abstract intellectuals in, for example, the SEDCG. Indeed, it was this possibility, which Demartial for one considered a certainty, combined with the horror of war, which helped create their position. This position, in turn, enabled its adherents to regard a call for immediate arbitration in a different light.

At the second session, Michel Alexandre took centre stage. At the beginning of the war, Alexandre had been impressed by the union sacrée: "C'est une vie charmante car l'union est profonde entre tous."(19). Not having many students under his charge, he became responsible in his town of Chaumont for, "...des Commissions municipales de ravitaillement et de secours."(20). Alexandre's movement in favour of a negotiated peace grew as a result of a number of factors. These included his long held feelings of admiration for Germany (21), his criticisms of the rear ("Vraiment il est temps de crier 'silence' à tous ces oisifs et plaintifs". (22)), his doubts as to the competence of military chiefs (23), and his own experience with working in a factory making clothes for soldiers (24). By 1916, his letters to his father were filled with commentaries denouncing the, "...boucherie", and "...les sottises officielles dont les journaux sont pleins."(25). His views were further developed by an active participation in the Société d'études documentaires et critiques sur la guerre.

Alexandre proposed immediate arbitration:

"Les gouvernements alliés proclament que s'il faut poursuivre jusqu'au bout la lutte actuelle, c'est uniquement afin qu'à l'avenir les différends ne soient plus tranchés par la violence. Ils attestent ainsi que la force victorieuse quand elle a beaucoup tué n'a encore rien prouvé ni rien résolu.

Mais après avoir reconnu que la guerre n'est qu'une voie de fait, jamais une voie
de Droit, ils repoussent pour le présent conflit toute autre solution qu'une solution par la force. Il y a là une contradiction. Comment les esprits libres ne la voient-ils pas...? On évoque les morts pour les faire protester contre une paix précaire, contre une paix de guerre. Mais, s'il n'y a eu jusqu'ici que des paix précaires, c'est précisément - selon la parole de Proudhon - parce qu'elles n'ont été conquises qu'à la pointe de l'épée. Il n'y aura de paix durable, il n'y aura de vraie paix que celle fondée sur un jugement incontestable et par conséquent sur un arbitrage. Seul l'arbitrage peut, à l'heure actuelle, pacifier réellement l'Europe et la sauver de la ruine. Il faut une paix intégrée à une guerre de héros..."(26).

In this Alexandre was supported by Bloch, Mauranges, Demartial and Séverine.

Alexandre's experience and reflection on the war had led him, and those who supported him, to argue for negotiated peace. The need for negotiated peace however was one interpretation of the war experience, since others (personally affected by wartime casualty levels) came to different conclusions. To take one major republican intellectual example, Durkheim's son was killed on the Bulgarian Front in 1915. Although deeply shaken by this, Durkheim did not advocate negotiated peace; indeed he in no way modified his stance as expressed in his writings already examined (27). This is why it is crucial to investigate the arguments among participants trying to make sense of their experience of war. There was a genuine moral and intellectual debate here, which sprang from the experience of the war but which had much wider implications. Not what republican intellectuals experienced, but how they experienced it, how they were able to interpret their experiences and with what consequences for action, has to be made explicit.

Ruysse attacked Alexandre's position, arguing that the first and essential principle was the founding of the Society of Nations. Buisson supported this: "L'arbitrage intégral
n'est possible que s'il est exercé par la Société des Nations, qui n'existe pas encore."(28).

Ruyssen in both his conviction for the need of a Society of Nations and in his perception that this was indeed the way of progress, linked the desire for this with already existing similar ideas: "Il y a eu déjà deux Internationales qui jouissent, l'une et l'autre, à l'heure présente, d'une assez mauvaise presse; l'Internationale religieuse et l'Internationale socialiste...un avenir reste ouvert à ce que j'appellerai l'Internationale du droit "(29). For Ruyssen, this was the duty and the call of the intellectual, to establish international justice on firm foundations. Richet, fellow editor of Paix par le droit, shared this conviction and grounded it in another conviction: "Je parle ici en mon nom personnel, comme pacifiste"(30).

Pacifism was the driving force which motivated men like Ruyssen and Richet to devote their energies to creating a new world of justice whose instrument would be the Society of Nations. For Richet, pacifism was a heroic notion: "Une trentaine de rêveurs, de philosophes et d'idéalistes, voilà quel était le parti pacifiste"(31), beginning as a spark, but now fanned into a real possibility of fulfillment. Yet much as Richet might have liked to extend the term pacifism, Buisson for one did not take up the offer of being included under its umbrella, yet again demonstrating the ambiguity of the term, and the subsequent mistrust of it. Pacifism was too contaminated with defeatist notions to be easily embraced by republican intellectuals like Buisson.

Bloch, continuing discussion of Alexandre's arbitration proposals, argued for rapprochement between the warring powers, as military victory seemed so unlikely. Séverine made an impassioned plea: "En tous pays, des femmes souffrent, gémissent, tendent les mains, implorantes. Au nom de celles-là, je vous prie de considérer qu'il y a déjà trop de sang de versé, qu'il a en coule chaque jour davantage, qu'il faut sauver cette
Because of the horror now, it seemed that war should stop, yet Vérone (lawyer since 1907 and president of the Ligue française pour le droit des femmes) would argue, as part of the majority republican intellectual response to this belief, that the war had to continue so as to ensure the present sacrifice was not wasted. Nevertheless she could not help observing the irony: "Hélas, nous autres, pacifistes et qui restons, malgré tout, des pacifistes,-à être aujourd'hui ce que vous avez appelé des belliqueux."(33), proving both the pain for some of having to maintain this position, and its power in giving moral coherence to the impact of war. Moch argued for what he believed to be the firm foundations of pacifism: "Ainsi, le pacifisme a pour moi deux faces; préventif, il recherche comment doit être organisée la société de demain, et défensif il veille à assurer la sécurité de la société actuelle, la defense nationale "(34).

That the war was horrible, that too much blood had been spilt, was in fact a point of agreement in this debate. Nobody was arguing that war was a good thing in itself, or even that this war was a good thing. The difference in opinion lay essentially in whether the war could be pursued as a necessary justifiable evil, leading to a future good, or a doubtfully necessary and clearly unjustifiable evil, which should mean working for a negotiated peace now. The frustrations produced by particular aspects of the war - its origins, its ending, the Russian alliance, casualties, and the warfare of attrition could all be admitted within the framework of republican intellectual discussion. Nevertheless the dominant logic emerging from debates was that, horrible though this war was, a failure to bring it to conclusion in a certain precise manner ensuring the impossibility of a repetition, was even more horrible to contemplate.

In the third session, defending the Alexandre proposal, Mauranges could not help attacking what he saw as the comfortable confidence of the Ruyssean position: "Mais
lorsqu'il s'agit d'appliquer la thèse sur laquelle nous sommes tous d'accord, c'est-a-dire
d'appliquer l'arbitrage, les plus fougueux pacifistes d'avant la guerre ne se déclarent plus
partisans de la paix pendant la guerre, les plus fougueux internationalistes ne sont plus
internationalistes"(35). This struck at the heart of the difficulty. If pacifism was linked
with the idea of justice, expressed in the unfolding of the republican vision within the
French nation, then only the triumph of the France in which it was embedded could ensure
its future implementation. If, on the other hand, pacifism was founded on opposition to the
moral horror of war as an absolute value, then a negotiated end to the war had to be sought
as the highest priority.

This second possibility was extraordinarily difficult to grasp and forcefully argue
because it could not be compellingly integrated into the overall framework of republican
intellectual and moral expectations. A negotiated peace was unacceptable if it meant
compromising the Republican values and rationality in whose name the mobilisation had
taken place. All perceived moral values had to be kept in harmony with this, hence the use
of pacifism as a term, by some, to describe the new sensibility which would sweep war
aside. Mauranges argued his best against this: "Au fond, vous semblez douter de la bonne
cause de France en n'acceptant pas l'arbitrage"(36); but it was not the cause of France, but
the strength of the cause of reason and justice, as developed in the republican project, that
doomed the Alexandre proposal.

The argument for negotiated peace demonstrated, however, how the war could give
rise to a credible alternative interpretation of its impact, using a logic and argument that the
majority republican intellectual position could not ignore. This argument was therefore
crucial in the life of the republican intellectual project as a tradition grappled with itself,
neccessitating an explicit reforging and a realignment of values in the face of war. Its
conclusion showed both that republican intellectual rationality was big enough to incorporate even the apparently overwhelming irrationality of war into its vision, and that it could do this convincingly for the majority of those who believed in it. On these newly developed convictions was founded the renewed strength of the republican intellectual union sacrée, which had appeared to be in danger.

Gabriel Séailles (professor philosophy at the Sorbonne and member of the Central Committee of the LDH) went on the offensive against those who attacked this consensus, quoting his report to the Ligue, 'Les conditions d'une paix durable', in which he had argued that peace must be founded on justice plus the principle of nationality. This in turn could only be done by a limitation of state rights under international law, guaranteed by an authority which could impose respect and repress violations.

This necessitated being informed about government decisions, secret diplomacy being abolished, and, foreign affairs being properly controlled by government. The strength of this argument was that it turned old concerns of the LDH into the very conditions that would follow on the establishment of a Society of Nations. This linked into the already existing conclusions of the republican project as regards action, making sense of them in the present and for the future in a way that other alternatives could not.

The first condition, therefore, for all true values now and into the future was the recognition of the need for a Society of Nations. As Buisson argued, "...c'est une continuation du mouvement de la civilisation depuis des siècles."(37). Two essential conditions were judged necessary, "...le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes"(38), and as regards structure of the organisation, a legislative, juridical and executive arm. Finally, and most importantly for the argument in terms of the war itself, the "...Société des Nations n'est possible que par la victoire des Alliés"(39).
Alexandre, in his reply, justified his motion, arguing that the triumph of force was not enough, that what was also required was a triumph of law, operating as it did in a different realm, and which had not been aided by, "...les actes de nos gouvernements 'démocratiques'...", which, "...depuis le début de la guerre ont encore contribué à ébranler notre foi....cette confiance un peu aveugle qu'on appelle l'Union Sacrée."(40). Although supposedly arising from the actual situation,"...nous déposons cette résolution pour tous ceux qui ont senti leur conscience se révolter devant le massacre quotidien."(41).

Hence, the various intellectual interpretations were almost completely contained within the parameters of a particular rationality in tradition. There is no standing ground, no place of enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or other. The war tested the republican tradition. Its unity and coherence were maintained with the rejection of the Alexandre proposal, such that the central committee could proclaim the need to: "Continuer à se battre, tout en réclamant l'arbitrage."(42).

In its resolutions the LDH conference stated clearly that "...de la guerre présente doit naitre, par la victoire des Alliés, un ordre international nouveau."(43). The new order was absolutely conditional on allied victory, a premise that would continue to supply the means to continued debate for some, while victory by traditional means appeared elusive. At this stage however, the resolution was unequivocal: "En conséquence, le Congrès estime que conclure la paix avant qu'il soit possible de l'établir sur bases qu'il a définies, ce serait humilier le droit devant la force et condamner le monde à une prochaine et plus terrible catastrophe."(44).

Henri Guernut (secretary general since 1912) reiterated this point in an article to the Congress of Lyons in April 1917: "La réponse de la Ligue est nette; à présent, il faut se
battre. Conclure prématurément la paix, ce serait humilier le droit devant la force et condamner le monde à une prochaine et plus formidable catastrophe. Ce que nous voulons, c'est une paix durable fondée sur le droit. Cette paix-là, les empires centraux ne nous l'offriront pas. Il reste donc à la conquérir."(45). Thus did the LDH irrevocably ground its faith in progress, justice and human reason on the founding of a Society of Nations.

The discussions and debates of 1915 and 1916, and in particular those of the LDH conference of 1916, demonstrated the development and response of a particular tradition in the face of war. That the war was horrible and had to be responded to was never in doubt. The capacity to react, however, was defined by the interpretative universe, the particular intellectual and moral tradition that informed the respondant. For those who accepted the validity of the republican tradition, not understood as a tradition needless to say but as the very essence of a true rationality, any response had both to provide interpretative categories for attributing meaning to the war and by that very process to re-legitimate the republican project. The initial intellectual mobilisation which produced the Comité d'études et de documents legitimated the war by traditional republican argument, disseminated by traditional republican means. As the tragedy of war deepened, bringing with it greater moral revulsion and more questioning, the conviction emerged among the mainstream of republican intellectuals that the war could only satisfactorily be resolved by the establishment of a Society of Nations, dependent on allied victory. This was the dominant intellectual response of the republican vision to the horror of war, and the case for a negotiated peace, in its judged willingness to leave the future open to irrationality, probable renewed war, and the delay of the fulfillment of the republican project, was seen as its antithesis.
From this point, the capacity to reject this dominant republican vision in favour of a negotiated peace necessitated a rejection of republican intellectual assumptions, specifically that rationality could express itself through a single united course of action, in and through the life and experience of the Third Republic. Alternatives to this vision, in order to substantiate their moral claims had to claim that values were more truly expressed in another social form, for example in a socialism purified of bourgeois baggage, or that reality was to be truly located and worthy of true adherence only as abstract principles. If one operated with these different moral and interpretative sources, then alternative reactions to the war experience and courses of action to take could be intellectually coherent and morally compelling.

Given their own presuppositions about rationality, republican intellectuals were obliged to approach such alternatives as either confused or subversive. The first half of the war until the end of 1916 involved genuine debate and discussion within republican intellectual circles, as it was believed that confusion or lack of clarity could be rectified through the proper application of republican rationality. Once clarity had been introduced, as was believed to have become the case by republican intellectuals after 1916, failure to accept certain conclusions could be judged as subversive in the widest possible sense, since rationality itself seemed to be put in question. This framework of belief would help to radicalise those who believed in other alternatives, putting them further into a position of opposition to the republican project and laying the foundations, from the republican intellectual side, of the breakup of the Union Sacrée.

The republican intellectual project, in its operational methodology, applied agreed principles through debate and discussion to particular problems as they arose. Intellectual mobilisation behind the war did not occur through an elitist censorship or through some
direct governmental repression or manipulation. Mobilisation emerged through the
democratic deliberations of the republican intellectual tradition in action. This, for its
adherents, was a powerful argument for the legitimacy of its conclusions. The process by
which positions were arrived at, and the power of the conclusion itself which took the anti-
war case and incorporated it into the argument for continuing the war, made the republican
intellectual mobilisation a continuing solid and cohesive factor in the French national
effort.

If this was one result of republican intellectual deliberations, another result was the
need to inculcate the idea of a Society of Nations into the broader republican project. The
conference of 1916 provided new insights for republican intellectuals into the moral
validity of the republican project, but the ultimate validity of these insights, and the project,
depended on the dissemination of the intellectual conclusions and their acceptance by the
citizens of the Third Republic. The energy of republican intellectuals, both in promoting
the Society of Nations until the end of the war, and in their more systematic involvement in
the diffusion of propaganda, arose particularly from this need. More and more republican
intellectuals were to work to make the Society of Nations as much a part of the complete
republican project as the other values mentioned by Poincaré in 1914. Given that almost
all major participants in the republican project, not just intellectuals, accepted the need for
war until victory, republican intellectual success in inculcating their conclusions could not
be properly judged until after the war. On that success, however, depended the future of
the republican intellectual project.
Notes

(2) ibid p.4
(3) ibid p.7
(4) ibid p.9
(5) ibid p.10
(6) ibid p.11
(7) ibid p.11
(8) ibid p.12

Furet F., Le passé d'une illusion. (Paris,1995),pp.63-64

(10) Becker J.-J., La France en guerre (Brussels,1988); Duroselle J.B.,
Histoire de la Grande Guerre. La France et les Français 1914-1920,(Paris,1972);
Horne J., Labour At War. France and Britain 1914-1918 (Oxford,1991);


(15) ibid

(16) ibid

(17) ibid

(18) ibid

(19) The archives of Michel Alexandre have been placed in the Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine de Nanterre by his nephew, Jean-Paul Léon. Letter of Alexandre to his father 6th October 1914

(20) Prochasson C., Les intellectuels, le socialisme et la guerre 1900-1938 (Paris, 1993) p. 131

(21) Letter of Alexandre to his father (December 1914?) ibid

(22) Letter of Alexandre to his father (January 1915?) ibid

(23) Letter of Alexandre to his father 1st of May 1915 ibid

(24) Prochasson ibid p. 132

(25) Letter of Alexandre to his father 16th June 1916 ibid

(26) ibid


(28) La Ligue des droits de l'homme. Congrès de 1916 F ibid

(29) ibid

(30) ibid

(31) ibid
(32) Bulletin Officiel de la ligue des droits de l'homme, V.xvii, p.66 01-12-1916

(33) La Ligue des droits de l'homme. Congrès de 1916 ibid

(34) ibid

(35) ibid

(36) ibid

(37) ibid

(38) ibid

(39) ibid

(40) ibid

(41) ibid

(42) ibid

(43) La Paix et la Société des Nations. La Ligue des droits de l'homme, tract n°.3, p.1

(44) ibid

(45) Bulletin Officiel de la ligue des droits de l'homme, V.xvii, p.111 01-05-1917
The period after the vitally important LDH conference of 1916 demonstrated how, despite increasing criticism from emerging opponents with alternative programmes, and the breakup of the Union Sacrée, the republican intellectual project had found sufficient moral reserves within the parameters of its own rationality to galvanise republican intellectuals into a renewed commitment to the preservation of the Third Republic. This entailed fighting the war to ultimate victory in order to establish the Society of Nations as the final guarantee of real peace. The concept of a Society of Nations came to dominate discussion among republican intellectuals, giving the LDH, in particular, new energy and purpose in the fight for values to which it had always been committed, but which were now transformed through the possibilities it was believed the Society of Nations would bring about.

As noted, two important consequences followed. The first was the radicalisation of those who did not accept that this end supplied sufficient justification for continuing the war, forcing many socialists, as they debated the war, to rethink their relationship to the republican project. Secondly, there was the need to implant this moral, progressive advance within the complete republican project, the need to have it accepted.

The republican tradition functioned, in part, as a delicate interrelationship between nationalism and internationalism. The notion of a Society of Nations had moved that balance in an internationalist direction, concretising the republican vision not just in France but in a broader body, and so, it was believed, extending true republicanism, to all the
world, as the original project implied. Yet this had not been an explicit part of the republican vision of 1914, so that a new tension developed in the heart of the republican project. There were, firstly, those who remained committed to the values of France of 1914, a clear example being Clemenceau. There were also those who had accepted as legitimate and necessary the extension the Society of Nations concept brought about as an integral illumination of both the purpose of the war, and as the raison d'être of the republican vision. The war had developed among republican intellectuals the idea of an effectively functioning Society of Nations as an absolutely necessary condition of peace, indeed as the lynchpin of the post-war republican vision. This belief morally helped sustain the republican intellectuals through the despair, the anger and the real opposition the war generated.

Within the parameters of their own rationality, republican intellectuals lacked the capacity to interpret what a failure to accept the Society of Nations as a central republican ideal would mean. That there could be a disjuncture between the republican intellectual project and the republican project was, in other words, a conceptual impossibility. Whether this extended vision could be inculcated as a necessary expression of republicanism had yet to be tested in the political and social reality of the Third Republic at war.

(i) *Paix par le droit* fights for the Society of Nations.

For Ruysse, the Society of Nations was not the only consequence that had to follow on allied victory. In his 'Programme de paix', he laid out a range of conditions, including no secret treaties, treaties ratified by parliament, no dismemberment or annexations, national aspirations respected as far as possible and a court of justice to establish responsibility for war (1), conditions exactly reflecting the concerns of the LDH. All these conditions were judged to be possible within a fully functional Society of
Nations, indeed could not operate without that body to properly supervise their implementation. This idealistic programme committed Ruyssen firmly to national defence, "...et l'on nous rendra cette justice que pas une ligne n'a paru dans cette revue qui pût énerver l'énergie de la défense nationale."(2).

Continued confirmation for the validity of his viewpoint, in Ruyssen's eyes, came from both the first Russian revolution and American entry into the war. The development of American thinking in particular closely paralleled that of the republican intellectual project. Initially, Wilson declared America's aim in the war to be, "...to deliver the free people of the world from the menace and actual power of a vast military establishment...which...secretly planned to dominate the world...which...stopped at no barrier, either of law or mercy, swept a whole continent within the tide of blood."(3). This had been a classic 1914 republican intellectual argument. Later Wilson's position was to evolve into that offered on the 8th of January 1918, in his 'Fourteen Points' speech to Congress, where he expressed his commitment to a Society of Nations. The validity and rationality of the republican intellectual project seemed further confirmed through this independent arrival at similar conclusions by a nation equally committed to democracy and freedom. Rationally it seemed that those who shared the aspirations of the republican vision would be drawn to the side of France in its defence.

Ruyssen noted and happily accepted the distinction between pacifisms argued in Le Figaro (4). "L'une, singulièrement étroite et bornée, consiste à envisager une paix immédiate, sans réparation d'aucune sorte, une paix ne tenant pas compte des ruines accumulées par l'Allemande, ni de sa responsabilité dans la guerre de 1914. L'autre théorie pacifiste, la théorie à forme noble et civilisée, c'est celle qui cherche à faire sortir d'une guerre atroce une paix fortement assise sur la réalité et non sur des chimères. Une tragique
expérience de trois années en a montré au monde entier les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes."(5). Ruyssen argued that this had always been his position, and went on to argue that to make peace the principal aim of all efforts risked sacrificing justice, that is the legitimate aspirations of all those who had already suffered(6). True peace was founded on republican justice.

As one operating within the assumptions of the republican intellectual tradition, Ruyssen was obliged to draw a distinction between his pacifism, the only truly rational one since it derived from the republican intellectual project, and other pacifisms which were confused, no matter what the motives, and implicitly subversive: "Quelles sont les causes de ce malentendu? ..que les pacifistes en sont, en quelque mesure, responsables, pour s'être montrés trop indulgents, trop hospitaliers parfois à l'égard de certaines tendances, respectables dans leur principe, mais fâcheuses dans leurs conséquences."(7). Ruyssen had no doubt that a proper systematic application of values was emerging which would guarantee the future, and that this explained the intellectual dynamism among republican intellectuals in 1917.

This dynamism, when combined with external developments, resulted in the greater willingness of parliament to acknowledge the change. "Il était naturel qu'une guerre, dont on a dit maintes fois qu'elle était avant tout un conflit d'idées, un duel de deux civilisations dû provoquer une explosion de discours. Deux circonstances ont contribué puissamment à délier la bouche des sphinx gouvernementaux: la révolution russe et l'intervention des Etats-Unis dans la guerre."(8). After the vote in favour of a Society of Nations by the Chamber of Deputies in June of 1917, Ruyssen declared what he considered essential for Bourgeois to do as charged with responsibility for investigating the society of nations. Any serious investigation had to prepare arbitration through the adaptation of a constitution
between nations, present this point of view firmly to the government and study the most
effective means to set up the Society of Nations(9).

This confidence concerning what had to be done, a confidence that derived from the
clarity that his vision seemed to bring to events, explained in part the lack of reference or
concern expressed by Ruyssen at the breakup of the Union Sacrée. The extension the
republican intellectual project had undergone meant that for believers such as Ruyssen, the
only real union sacrée had to embrace the values he was fighting for. Those confused or
perverse enough to think otherwise were not needed in the project.

For Ruyssen, the second Russian revolution seemed to add a confusing element(10),
one that turned to anger with the announcement of the Russian armistice: "La Russie
révolutionnaire abandonne la cause de ceux qui luttent pour l'emancipation du monde et
tend la main, par dessus les tranchées, au Kaiser germanique...(11). Apart from this
external difficulty, Ruyssen noted that: "Les alliés ont contre eux, outre le marxisme qui
infeste les socialistes russes, deux adversaires: la faim et le défaut de solidarité
nationale."(12).

Against this second point, the solidly constructed conclusions of the LDH
conference of 1917, examined below, offered for Ruyssen a firm foundation on which he
could declare: "Notre tâche présente et immédiate est de gagner la guerre, et rien ne nous
en détournera que ce ne soit accompli."(13).

Externally America, in particular the visionary Wilson, continued to provide hope
where Russia had failed: "Tandis que la révolution russe, dégénérant en anarchie, trahit la
cause de la civilisation, la saine démocratie d'Outre Mer arrive à la rescousse du droit
menacé."(14). Externally, commitment to republican values could be determined by the
willingness to defend actually existing France as the endangered repository of those values.
America's sanity and Russia's anarchy were determinable through their proximity to the republican intellectual project and to republican defence.

For Ruyssen, the war was revolutionary, a revolutionary opportunity that would emerge through the republican intellectual tradition. This connection with the French Revolution had been made explicitly by the republican intellectual historian and specialist on that subject Albert Mathiez in 1915, in his publication, "La Victoire de l'an II.". A revolution, a rationality, a system of proper moral values had to be defended, as it had been defended at the end of the eighteenth century, but not only defended. True progress, true revolution necessitated the extension of its conclusions. This war continued the French Revolution. It is thus a serious mistake to see these aspirations, these feelings as confined to communists, socialists, minority or otherwise, anarcho-syndicalists or simply those who opposed the war and who sought to discover a framework in which to express this.

The idea of revolution was central to the republican intellectual project, generating force as a moral category and imperative. "D'ailleurs, en même temps qu'un souvenir, la révolution désigne un futur. Chez un peuple qui en a fait une fois l'expérience inoubliable, son emprise est d'une élasticité durable, comme celle d'un tribunal d'appel des injustices du présent."(15). The October revolution was so disturbing precisely because it produced deep echoes among republican intellectuals rooted in a culture impregnated with the inherited values of the French Revolution. Furet(16) discusses the tensions this placed on intellectuals who hitherto had accepted France as the locus of idealism, and who now were challenged by the Russian experience. Using categories intimate to the republican intellectual project, a serious potential alternative to the project could emerge drawing different moral conclusions concerning the war.
The war generated expectations about the future, and consequences about what to do in the present, in all currents of intellectual opinion. The republican intellectual project was soaked in the revolutionary atmosphere and rhetoric: "La seule prophétie qu'on puisse formuler en toute sécurité, c'est que le monde de demain ne ressemblera à celui d'hier ni au point de vue politique, ni peut-être au point de vue social. La Révolution est en marche."(17). Reactions to, and interpretations of, the war were now essential elements in the shape of a revolutionary future. The war had become a moral touchstone.

The duty of any proper intellectual was clear for Ruyssen, which was to separate out from false interpretations the pure republican ideal. This task led to certain conclusions about the war. Thus Henri Barbusse (winner of the Prix Goncourt in 1916 with his novel, Le Feu) argued, as quoted by Ruyssen, that: "Personne ne peut raisonablement prétendre qu'une paix signée aujourd'hui, dans la situation où nous nous trouvons vis-à-vis de la Prusse impérialiste, ne constituerait pas une défaite matérielle et morale aux irrémédiables conséquences."(18).

In Ruyssen's interpretation, the republican intellectual project had become fully international, it was the possession of everyone morally and rationally willing to enter its universe. It offered the only sure hope for the future, and the war made no sense except in terms of that which had to be won in order to create the new world. An implicit, integral element of the republican intellectual project, that rationality was one and coterminous with one type of political expression, that of liberal democracy, had been expanded by the war into a project that necessitated the coming of liberal democracy world-wide, united in a Society of Nations, as the means to end all future wars. True French revolutionary idealism, expressed through a specific political framework, was judged therefore to be the property of any rational person.
Even within this heady vision, Ruyssen was not completely unaffected by the continuing horror of war, (too old for active service, he served for a time as a sort of hospital nurse at Nantes, looking after the wounded(19)), and questions could still touch his heart: "Comment ne pas être épouvanté de la régession économique, intellectuelle, et morale que cette débauche de violence entraîne après elle?". This ugliness occasionally tempered Ruyssen's optimism concerning the future: "Et quand on se pose le moindre problème moral, quand on se demande, par exemple, s'il faut haïr, ou si même, on peut ne pas haïr, on hésite, on chancelle entre l'idéal d'hier, qui décline dans un soir sanglant, et celui qui tarde à se dessiner dans l'aube confuse du prochain avenir."(20). Precisely this perception of the moral ugliness and confusion of war constituted another factor in Ruyssen's, determination for the Society of Nations to succeed, and as 1918 advanced, his journal commented more and more, in fewer and fewer pages as production costs had their effect, on the need for that organisation. "Enfin, dans l'ordre de l'activité privée, sans parler des Sociétés de la Paix dont des moyens d'action ont toujours été très limités, la Société des Nations seule se trouvait de taille à poursuivre une campagne méthodique en faveur de l'institution d'un ordre international capable de garantir la paix."(21).

Ruyssen saw himself as an element in a vision, a vision that seemed to have made some sense of a horrific war, to the extent that such explicit irrationality could be made comprensible, giving both himself and the institutions in which he believed a sense of purpose. For example, the LDH now had a central goal: "Qu'elle intensifie, qu'elle internationalise son action dans cette voie,..."(22), a purpose that, thanks in particular to the Ligue, would revivify France, "...et, grâce à elle, la France reprendra à l'aurore de l'ère nouvelle, son rôle historique de rédemptrice de l'humanité."(23), leading to the Society of Nations as the climax of the republican vision. "Il nous aura suffi d'établir que
The republican vision had, therefore, provided real optimism, and the capacity to keep important intellectuals idealistically motivated in the service of the French nation through four years of a bloody war. It had also made necessary within the terms of this vision certain expectations which had to be fulfilled. The extent to which Ruyscen's faith was replicated within the LDH needs investigating.

(ii) The LDH galvanised anew.

From early 1917 onwards, the increasing tension within France and within the Union Sacrée was also evidenced in the LDH. In the Federation of the Seine conference of the 30th of April 1917, Basch's words of 1915 were recalled: "...pacifistes avant la guerre, nous le sommes encore, et nous avons raison, nous étions aussi des démocrates et nous le sommes toujours." (25). Because of this: "Malgré le respect que nous avions tous pour l'union sacrée, notre devoir est de défendre le régime ainsi que le Parlement qui a su maintenir la paix à l'intérieur pendant trois ans de guerre." (26).

As attacks mounted from the right in particular, many LDH supporters returned to a battle they were familiar with, namely supporting a vigorous parliamentary democracy against reactionary opponents, but now in the charged atmosphere of war. Despite the rise of numerous voices in opposition to the war, and to the manner in which the war was being conducted by the Republic, the LDH remained committed to a just and durable peace (27), insisting that the aims of war be fair and equitable (28), and that the war had to continue. This was reiterated in a circular to the Sections on the 4th June 1917: "Pour les militaristes..."
d'Allemagne - et nul n'en peut évaluer le nombre, - s'ils voyaient poindre chez nous la moindre velléité de paix suggérée par la lassitude, ce serait un encouragement sans prix."(29).

This desire to continue the war did not allay criticism of the government, in fact it increased it, as Basch observed on the 20th of August 1917 at a meeting of the Central Committee where he had, "...l'impression que, depuis quelque temps, nous vivons sous un régime de police insupportable"(30). In opposition to this therefore the LDH continued its attacks, on censorship in particular, and as parliament came under attack, the LDH was drawn more fully into its defence.

For the LDH, the breakup of the Union Sacrée was both inevitable and an advantage in that the Republic could free itself from an increasingly debilitating association with the nationalists of the Right, whose interests were not those of the Republic, and concentrate on what needed to be defended according to republican values: "L'état de siège et ses conséquences, l'interdiction du droit de réunion et la censure sont une menace, et de plus en plus grave, pour les institutions républicaines. La Ligue s'en préoccupe, et, en 1918, s'apercevant que l'Union Sacrée finit par devenir une duperie pour les vrais démocrates, elle s'emploie résolument à la défense républicaine."(31).

Republican defence, for republican intellectuals, meant the defence of the republican intellectual project as embodied in republican France, with consequences in the present and for the future. This was why France was judged worth defending, and no other nationalism, particularly that of the nationalist right with its explicit rejection of the republican project, could provide a properly moral and rational justification for fighting the war.
The LDH conference of the 1st and 2nd of November 1917 continued the developments of the 1916 conference, and the growing and changing expectations as to why precisely the Republic had to be defended. In defence of republican values, Guernut, the secretary general, argued that the LDH had made strict demands on the government: "Soyez les stricts observateurs de la foi jurée et du droit des peuples..."; in fact, "...il n'y aura point de soldats meilleurs que nous; avec le même cœur que nous nous obstinons à sauver la paix, nous soutiendrons la guerre, défendant à la fois notre pays et les espérances de paix qu'il recèle et symbolise..."(32). The LDH had been both loyal to the Republic as it existed and to a vision of the future. Guernut acknowledged the existence of alternative ideas: "Je sais, citoyens, je sais que quelque esprits sont, en toute bonne foi, d'un avis différent."(33), but he was convinced that the popular will of France had not contributed to the outbreak of war since it was suffused with republican values creating, "la volonté pacifique de la France"(34), which had been attacked and required defending.

Guernut reiterated the standard republican intellectual defence of 1914:

"Au-dessus des partis, nous autres idéalistes, - idéologues, comme on nous appelle, - nous plaçons en effet des biens subtils, immatériels, conquis, conservés de haute lutte, aussi réels à nos yeux et plus chers à nos coeurs que les choses solides et palpables: la faculté de penser ce que nous voulons et de dire ce que nous pensons, de diriger nos affaires à notre fantaisie et de ne connaître sous le ciel ni maître ni Dieu. Or, ces biens - la liberté...(and making the essential republican intellectual connection)...ou serait la liberté s'il n'y avait la France...il est bien certain que, la France vaincue, c'était la défaite de la liberté."(35).

However, in the reality of war there had been an enlargement of this vision: "En second lieu nous rêvons - tout à l'heure et demain, ici-même, nous définirons notre rêve - nous
rêvons une société où les nations soient liées entre elles, non par la convoitise ou la peur, mais par la fidélité au serment."(36).

For Guernut, the logic of the republican intellectual project as it unfolded through the war, made sense of an apparent paradox, as it had done for Ruyssen for the same reasons: "Et voilà pourquoi, citoyens, nous les pacifistes, nous les amoureux de la paix, nous sommes entrés résolument dans la guerre pour défendre la Patrie, la liberté et le droit..."(37), thus making sense of pacifism as a republican virtue. Not all pacifists shared these background assumptions and once again the Alexandre proposal of 1916 was put forward and argued, but was defeated much more determinedly, with Buisson noting that: "...l'Allemagne ne veut pas d'arbitrage dans le sens où nous l'entendons."(38).

Finally the Conference ended more convinced than ever of the need for the establishment of a Society of Nations. The Conference resolved that: "...rien ne saurait mieux soutenir le courage des combattants que la conviction de poursuivre à travers la guerre l'abolition de toute guerre..."(39), that this was the only completely valid way to mobilise for final victory, with this aim being accomplished through, "... la victoire des Alliés, non par un traité particulier entre belligérants, qui consacrerait l'oeuvre de la force mais par l'établissement d'une constitution internationale instituant, entre les nations, le même régime que chacune d'elles applique à ses membres: le règlement des litiges, même économiques, par des procédés de droit."(40).

This was a great work in the fullest spirit of the republican intellectual project:

"La guerre, qui a fait tant de mal, aura du moins eu cet effet bienfaisant d'imposer à tous les esprits, qui ne sont pas immuablement attachés au passé, cette conviction que la paix ne saurait plus désormais être abandonnée aux jeux de la diplomatie ni aux hasards de la force; qu'elle peut, qu'elle doit être organisée sur
une base rationnelle par des accords publics (the republican intellectual project in
definition), sous la garantie de sanctions effectives. Elle a mis, en somme, tout le
monde du côté des pacifistes....nous ne risquons plus d'être surpris par la paix
comme nous l'avons été par la guerre."(41).

All progressive moral values were contained here and the task of all committed
republican intellectuals was as it had always been in this tradition: "D'organiser la plus
active propagande en France et dehors de France pour préciser et répandre l'idée d'une
Société des Nations qui libérerait le monde du militarisme, des traités secrets, de la
politique des alliances et contre-alliances, de la surenchère des armements et de la menace
perpétuelle des guerres."(42). This required a Society of Nations with real powers: "Il faut
que, dès sa fondation, la Société des Nations démontre à la fois son autorité morale et sa
puissance matérielle. Que, d'une part, elle se saisisse comme arbitre suprême de toutes les
contestations que la guerre soulève et qu'elle les tranche définitivement en donnant
satisfaction aux peuples dont elle aura reconnu le droit..."(43).

This vision of confidence, of hope, drove LDH members until the end of the war,
leaving no doubt that, for them, the French revolutionary tradition was alive and dynamic.
This tradition, even within the Ligue, had international implications, with the establishment
of new leagues in Portugal, Rumania and Spain in 1917(44), providing more evidence for
its believers of the validity and universality of its insights. More importantly, and
potentially more problematically, the concept of a Society of Nations was judged to be the
culmination of the republican tradition, and there was nothing in the writings produced by
members of the LDH which hinted at any awareness of what a non-fulfillment, or a less
than adequate fulfillment of such expectations could possibly mean within the terms of that
tradition. This makes it particularly important to see how socialism reacted to this evolution of the republican project.

(iii) Socialist responses.

The war equally continued to force the socialist tradition to draw upon its resources in order to furnish a response that made sense in terms of its vision. Being a different cluster of traditions and infused with a different rationality, differing intellectual interpretations of the war emerged. Yet the extent of the proximity of central aspects of the socialist vision to the republican intellectual project precluded a united response, as the existence of three factions, majority, moderate minority, and hard-line anti-war, demonstrated. All three positions based their coherence on an appeal to differing elements of the socialist tradition as confronted by war. If one tendency in the writing of the history of French socialism in the war has been to view it in terms of how it emerged from the Union Sacrée, another perspective pays greater attention to those aspects within socialism which kept it in the Union Sacrée for so long. Ultimately other perspectives did arise, becoming predominant, yet these responses failed to extinguish completely that part of socialism which remained linked to, and vivified by, elements of the republican intellectual project.

Nevertheless, new perspectives occasioned by the war were necessarily more opposed to the republican intellectual project, using a language of rejection that paralleled the earlier rejection of the German Intellectuals' Manifesto. This arose from the same intellectual presuppositions concerning the status of alternatives. The republican intellectual project remained committed to the war. If socialism remained committed to the war, it had to find within itself reasons, perhaps built on, yet other than mere repetitions of, the arguments of the republican intellectual project. The solution for reanimating the
republican intellectual project, although promoting debate within socialism, and indeed partly caused by that debate, was not sufficiently socialist to persuade members of the party to continue in an intellectual union sacrée.

Government actions against workers, secretive official war aims, the refusal to permit a French delegation to go to a proposed international socialist conference at Stockholm in September 1917, the generally oppressive use of government powers, and the continuing agony of the war, all drove debates within socialism in a more critical direction. This directly led to the breaking up of the Union Sacrée, reanimating hope in international socialism as a force to end the War. It also fostered interest in the Russian revolution as part of a more radical response to war. As noted, the term 'revolution' had key significance, especially within socialism. In France it helped link together the republican intellectual project with socialism as part of a radical future which was in the process of remaking the human condition. The Russian revolution both challenged the assumed locus of human progress within the republican tradition and its presumed moral content, with direct effect on its rationality. As Furet has noted: "L'idée républicaine et l'idée socialiste ne sont pas les mêmes, mais elles peuvent cheminer ensemble, pourvu qu'on privilégie le chemin plutôt que l'objectif. Or la victoire de Lénine en octobre marque le triomphe de la conviction inverse, la primauté de l'objectif sur le chemin, la préférence donnée à la révolution sur ce que la rend utile."(46) If the war had generated debates, however, which had moved socialism further from the republican intellectual project, that project still held sufficient attractions to continue serious divisions within socialism, nuancing its capacity to make a real challenge to the republican intellectual project's hegemony during the war, a hegemony that survived the breakup of the Union Sacrée.
The three major divisions that developed in socialism through the war were clear by 1916 as evidenced by three resolutions of the Federation of the Seine in December 1916.

The majority position naturally shared in part the language of classical republican defence in terms of the explanation for the war, as well as its ends. In particular, the majority argued for a peace, "...excluant tout esprit de conquête et d'annexion, rétablissant les droits imprescriptibles des nationalités violées, et organisant les institutions internationales susceptibles d'assurer matériellement le maintien définitif de la paix." (47).

Narrowly nationalistic alternatives were rejected: "La classe ouvrière ne comprendrait pas que, ces conditions réalisées, la guerre pût continuer pour la satisfaction de projects de conquête, d'annexion et de suzeraineté économique, d'où qu'ils puissent venir.". Finally, as an explicit connection with the socialist tradition, the views of workers had to be represented in this: "Il serait alors du plus grand intérêt qu'une réunion de délégués des sections socialistes affiliées à l'Internationale et restées fidèles à ses principes affirme nettement la volonté des travailleurs, en ce qui concerne le contenu de la paix.".

This position, "...estime que l'organisation vigoreuse de la Défense Nationale est la condition essentielle de la réalisation prochaine de la paix..." and, precisely like the republican intellectual project, linked its ideals to actually existing France: "Fidèle à sa conception traditionnelle du patriotisme, estimant que les progrès politiques et le mieux-être de la classe ouvrière, après la guerre, seront liés à la prospérité de la Nation..." (48).

Pre-war rivalry between Mathiez, a socialist, and Aulard, a radical, both the leading historians of the French Revolution, disappeared through a common understanding of the revolutionary significance of the war (49). Mathiez had directly argued that: "...les volontaires de 1792 nous paraîtront(...)les frères du poilu de 1915." (50). Aulard made the direct comparison, claiming that the present war and the French Revolution were: "...le
mème événement"(51). This common understanding helped create and sustain an intellectual and moral basis for continued socialist commitment to national defence. This also meant that any serious moral alternative would be obliged to recast the moral imagery in order to reclaim the revolutionary mantle.

This position, principally articulated and defended in parliament and in L'Humanité by Pierre Renaudel, formerly a close collaborator of Jaurès, dominated the socialist response to the war for the majority of it. Debate continued with the government, and from 1917 onwards, this collaboration with the government was founded on the acceptance of the non-annexation of foreign peoples or lands and the need to secure lasting peace through the proposed Society of Nations(52). It came under increasing pressure from 1917, through its inability to make progress towards ending the war. This gave more force to the minority socialist position which had emerged around Jean Longuet. The moderate minority argued that, given, "...tous les gouvernements ont une part de responsabilité.", the essential task for socialists was, "...de tendre tous ses efforts, vers une paix rapide, juste et durable qui intervienne avant la ruine générale de l'Europe."(53). This, it believed, could be achieved through the actions of socialists in all the warring countries leading to a recall of the Socialist International, as the war had proved the bankruptcy of alternatives. On the 9th April 1916 when this motion was put to the test within the socialist party, it was defeated by 1996 votes to 960, but Longuet continued to mobilise in defence of this position.

Resistance to the war became stronger after the Nivelle offensive(54) of April 1917 failed and, in the rear, the government had to take into account a series of strikes in industries directly involved with the war. Often the workers were not content to ask just for increases in salary, but demanded a cessation of hostilities(55). Experience of war was increasing resistance to continuing fighting, but there was a time lag between the
expression of this protest and recognition of it by political leaders(56). Integration of this experience into political debate forced a clarification in the expression of aims but could not, as already evidenced, bring about a moral unity, re-integrating the national community around one course of action.

The debate between majority and minority socialists operated within the values of the French Revolution as developed by socialism, but argued over which specific stance was the morally more appropriate over the war. The minority position and its growing acceptance within socialism showed how the experience of war was powerful enough to challenge and change fundamental positions. The extent to which these changes used the language and categories of the republican intellectual project gave further evidence of how the war fractured the initial moral unity of the national mobilisation.

The hard line anti-war position, seeing the Republic as part of the problem, demanded the withdrawal of socialists from the government. True peace could only be established on a socialist basis, not in collaboration with capitalist powers, a position which later led to the logical rejection of the highest aspirations of the republican intellectual project: "La fraction du parti socialiste (S.F.I.O.) adhérante à Zimmerwald ne peut donc considérer la Société des Nations, représentées par leurs dirigeants, comme capable d'assurer la paix, la libération des peuples asservis, le triomphe du droit sur la force et, d'une façon générale la solution équitable des problèmes issus du régime capitaliste et de la guerre", since the problem lay in class conflict and oppression. The solution had to lie with socialism: "Seule la société des peuples maîtres de leur destin, c'est-à-dire la société socialiste, peut atteindre ce but."(57).

This radical position was greatly boosted by the Russian revolution. Opposing the war could take on revolutionary significance within a new rationality:"...l'an II a effacé
1789 comme Octobre a effacé Février."

This generated a passionate debate concerning the real revolutionary implications of socialism. As this position, drawing less on republican values and increasingly influenced by events in Russia, developed within socialism, so a language of contempt arose, in particular for intellectuals. If there was one rationality, one valid form of social expression, then those arguing for another, and bringing about the deaths of thousands in the pursuit of it, had to be condemned as part of the problem. This language concerned itself with the unmasking and condemnation of alternatives, in particular those which dared express these alternatives in terms of genuine values and a properly defensible intellectual activity, namely and specifically, intellectuals.

Intellectuals, both socialist and republican, came increasingly under attack. Sébastien Faure, an anarchist who opposed the war, launched an appeal in January 1917 in classic Dreyfusard terms: "Les hommes de ma génération, et même de plus jeunes, n'ont pas oublié le magnifique spectacle que donnèrent, il y a vingt ans, les savants les plus justement renommés et les plus illustres artistes", recalling that the duty of intellectuals was to work "...contre la haine stupide et féroce élevée à la hauteur d'un principe...". This appeal was sent to 329 intellectuals, among whom were many exponents of republican defence, including Aulard, Barbusse, Bergson, France and Gide, and, on the basis of returns received, went on to distinguish, by creating two lists, between what he called the 'intellectuals' and the 'humbles'. The death of the true 'intellectuals' in his opinion left room only for the 'humbles' who were dedicated to the destruction of hate: "Mais maintenant que la voix des uns et des autres s'est tue, c'est aux humbles qu'il est séant d'attribuer la première place, parce qu'ils se sont montrés bien supérieurs aux intellectuels.".

For the minority socialists, the intellectuals had failed in their mission of resistance, creating a harsher language of denunciation, as the war gave graphic evidence of the
ongoing consequences of this intellectual failure. In a conference given at Geneva in July 1917 on "La guerre et les intellectuels", Henri Guilbeaux developed further the theme of the failure of the intellectuals, later concluding: "Ainsi les intellectuels s'exhibent tels qu'ils sont et attestent que leurs connaissances ne leur servent de rien. Les intellectuels, dans leur grande majorité, sont des êtres ignares, vaniteux et lâches.". Their pretensions could be reduced to the narrow concerns of a class: "Les intellectuels, les littérateurs, tout particulièrement, sont les représentants par excellence de la petite bourgeoisie contre-révolutionnaire, cupide, égoïste, froussarde."(61).

Drawing on a range of other examples as well as Guilbeaux, Prochasson notes concerning Guilbeaux: "Non seulement il hérite directement de la violence et de la hauteur anti-intellectuelistes propres au syndicalisme d'action directe, mais il préfigure aussi l'anti-intellectuelisme communiste aux ingrédients souvent identiques."(62). The reason for this is clear. For Guilbeaux and those who thought like him, every major turn in the history of the French worker movement seemed to involve a betrayal by the intellectuals. Betrayal worked as a concept within certain well established assumptions, centrally that there was only one rationality, located in socialism, which gave a definite direction to progress. The extent to which socialist intellectuals seemed not to arrive at certain conclusions, or seemed to derive their authority from other sources, was judged therefore to be evidence of moral depravity. Reasoning and morality were intimately linked in this tradition just as much as in the republican intellectual tradition because the unacknowledged epistemological basis was the same, committing its members to function intellectually along specific lines.

The war confirmed, for the minority socialists, more than ever, that true morality, true rationality and true progress could only derive from a particular application of the socialist vision, and that linkages with other projects automatically disposed those who
made these to dishonesty and cowardice. The language this produced was thus itself part of a tradition, as Prochasson notes: "La faillite des intellectuels durant le premier conflit n'est que l'avatar d'une faillite plus ancienne: celle qui marqua les temps postdreyfusiens."(63). This connection was explicitly affirmed by Louis Bouet, a socialist teacher and leading anti-war advocate:

"Je sais qu'on vit, il y a vingtaine d'années, un nombre imposant d'intellectuels français se lever pour faire éclater la Lumiére et triompher le Droit, comme ils disaient emphatiquement; mais il s'agissait de défendre un des leurs, un privilégie comme eux. Combien de dreyfusards sont demeurés d'ardents champions de la Verité et de la Justice dans tous les milieux où ces grands principes étaient méconnus?... Un Pressensé, un Jaurès, un Zola, un Mirbeau peut-être; mais les autres! Il y a trop à faire, aujourd'hui, voyez-vous, pour remonter le courant. Comme il est agréable et - profitable parfois ! - , même pour un intellectuel, de suivre tranquillement le chemin de l'orthodoxie."(64).

Intellectuals had failed to be what they should be, but the past in the shape of the Dreyfus Affair already supplied an image of what intellectual success and failure was judged to consist in. The frustration and anger produced by the war brought the socialist minority position to the fore therefore, through the failure of alternatives, and with it an historically and epistemologically formed language to describe its opponents in their alleged perfidy. The pervasiveness of the republican intellectual project, both in its power to influence the terms of debate through the Dreyfus model, and in its capacity to draw and hold intellectuals of other projects, critically contributed to the discord within the socialist project, as already noted. The war radically accentuated what was already there. If one effect in socialism was the rejection of that project, this was not the only conclusion. The
action of Albert Thomas and others demonstrated how the republican intellectual project could draw forth varied responses from committed socialist intellectuals which did not entail the necessary rejection of that project.

The war provided real opportunities for the pre-war Thomas network, built originally on the coming together of members of the Ecole normale supérieure and socialism through the Dreyfus Affair. A network of socialists normaliens or sympathisers with the party was constituted at that time around Lucien Herr, Charles Andler and Léon Blum. Thomas was to be a key figure in this grouping(65), helping to maintain its coherence and direction through the rich seam of socialist debate before the war.

The discussions that took place in this network accepted and worked within possibilities judged to be present in the actually existing Republic, creating a more benign view of participation in government: "Une commune formation, nourrie de positivisme, avait fait de ces hommes des socialistes de gouvernement, prêts à prendre les rênes du pouvoir, y songeant même parfois."(66). Real reform, real advances could be achieved through the Republic, accepting elements of the republican intellectual project in that process, and therefore committing its adherents to republican defence as the means to the fulfilment of their socialist aspirations.

The war provided the opportunity, through the need for republican defence, to test the theories of this group: "Les prises de position théoriques d'avant 1914, marquées par un clair souci de réalisme et une volonté affirmée de donner des socialistes l'image d'hommes responsables, firent que Thomas et ses amis purent considérer le conflit mondial comme un champ inattendu où leurs idées pourraient être enfin testées in vivo."(67). Participation in government was a logical step therefore, and the demands of war, the weaknesses in the
republican social project in its capacity to mobilise France, gave Thomas, in particular, opportunities to demonstrate how socialism could work as linked with the Republic.

What Thomas's progress also demonstrated, was the limited nature of the republican social project, both in its capacity to arouse commitment and in providing clear direction through war. Social transformation was not a major concern in the dynamics of republican intellectual discussion, thus putting the weight of future hopes on political transformation, specifically the Society of Nations, and on the conditions necessary for it to work effectively. The republican social project, although in existence, was applied as a means of achieving social harmony, not social transformation. In its form, therefore, it was inherently conservative.

Socialism interpreted revolution as necessarily involving social transformation. Thomas's experience made sense for him of the republican project as a necessary step towards his own socialist project, therefore leading to continued support for the war as criticism mounted through 1917. This vision of Thomas was not powerful enough within the socialist project to prevent the breakup of the Union Sacrée, but it was by no means dead after late 1917 as a factor in socialist discord.

Thomas rejected the Russian revolution in the strongest terms; "...je ne puis me résoudre à admirer, ni même à accepter le bolchevisme. Qu'on le veuille ou non, il symbolise la révolte instinctive et brutale des foules contre la volonté d'organisation dans le cadre de la nation et avec le concours des classes intellectuelles."(68). Thomas was at one with the republican intellectual project in its conviction concerning the ultimate rationality of humanity, a rationality open to application by intellectuals, as insightfully noted by Prochasson in discussing Thomas's network: "Le fondement essentiellement républicain du socialisme normalien ne pouvait d'ailleurs guère conduire Thomas et ses amis à
s'enthousiasmer pour les péripéties de l'Est. Leur foi inébranlable dans l'ordre et la nécessaire éducation du peuple par les intellectuels était incompatible avec l'idéologie révolutionnaire russe."(69).

What had emerged therefore were real ideological differences, based on very real interpretations, expectations and experiences of the war, which were operating within the framework of socialism. In short, a tradition of belief was debating internally in its efforts to overcome the problems generated by the overwhelming experience of war. Precisely because the war could arouse such passionate and differing responses, it made the task of harmonisation difficult, particularly in a framework which was dedicated to the belief in revolutionary unity. The search for this harmonisation was in turn further complicated by being intimately linked with a framework that believed in the same need concerning its conclusions, namely the republican intellectual project.

If the four years of war had brought about an explosion of discourse, debate and acrimony within socialism, this cannot be properly interpreted without explicit reference to the very real effect the republican intellectual project had in terms of acceptance, partial acceptance, or complete rejection by the socialist project in its reactions to the war. The Republic itself, and its reaction to its own intellectual project in turn requires analysis for the period 1917 to 1918, in order to assess properly that which partially conditioned the responses of others.

(iv) *The Society of Nations as ideal*.

The LDH conference of 1916 established the Society of Nations as the key component in the re-vivification of the republican intellectual project. Through it the other values of the republican project could be made applicable to all the world, values that would in turn necessitate and maintain the Society of Nations in existence as the guarantor
of those values. Republican values were never simply principles, they were incarnated in society. The Society of Nations concept made possible the continuation of the republican intellectual project through the war by giving substance therefore to its universalist claims. Although the Society of Nations concept seemed to provide a way to transcend both the internal problems of the republican vision and the moral confusion generated by the war for intellectuals, the future of the republican project demanded its grounding as an integral concept in the minds of republican politicians and citizens.

Although forming a major part of debate and discussion, it was not until 1918 that republican intellectuals really began systematically to promote the Society of Nations as a direct political conclusion to the war. The first league established towards this end, the Ligue pour une Société des Nations, was interesting, both because its founder, Henri Lepert, was a socialist, and because, in January 1917, it was still believed possible to unite a broad range of opinions around a specific conception and action; "...des partis avancés, parti socialistes, parti radical socialiste, loges maçonniques, libre penseurs, la ligue des droits de l'homme..."(70). In reality, as the history of the SEDCG had shown, the war generated such diverse concepts concerning truth and action that such unity in diversity was no longer possible. The Ligue pour une Société des Nations, therefore, never became a major discussion group.

The capacity of the Society of Nations concept to attract believers from outside the explicit republican project however, was demonstrated by Paul Otlet's statement to the Ligue pour une Société des Nations: "Stockholm, c'est l'internationale reconstituée, c'est l'acquiescement sans réticence du socialisme international à la fin de la guerre, c'est la paix socialiste...mais ce n'est pas la paix générale. Il faut pour cela s'adresser simultanément à toutes les opinions qui ne sont pas touchés par les influence socialistes. Ce sera l'oeuvre
d'une autre Conférence, et la Société des Nations peut être appelée à exercer à ce sujet une réelle influence."(71). The Society of Nations could therefore function as either a culmination, or as a necessary step to further transformation, depending on which tradition it was located within, but the central values of the republican project, and France as their incarnation, had to be accepted as prerequisites.

The increasing centrality of the idea of the Society of Nations as a key element in mobilising republican intellectual defence, received its first proper political expression, when the Chamber of Deputies adopted unanimously a motion "...en faveur de l'organisation, dès maintenant préparée, de la société des nations."(72). Intellectually, one effect of the Society of Nations ideal was to help destroy rival responses within republicanism, notably the liberal pacifism of Caillaux. If Caillaux could argue that peace had to arrive, "...à la condition formelle que les principes humains de la Révolution française qui venaient d'être répétés de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique fussent recueillis dans toute l'Europe"(73), the conditions necessary for this made essential the defeat of those factors likely to endanger its success. The Society of Nations ideal logically forced its proponents to promote continuing the war until the conditions for peace existed. Caillaux's alternative left too much unresolved within the republican tradition, and its defeat was in part a consequence of this. The progress of this ideal into the heart of the republican intellectual project was such that by 1918, all shades of republican intellectual opinion were being obliged to respond to it, the clearest example being Lavisse. While continuing to use the language of pre-1916 republican defence: ("Enseignez à vos enfants à aimer la France, la vraie France, et vous leur apprendrez par surcroît à aimer l'humanité...France, humanité ne s'opposent pas l'un à l'autre."(74)), he now extended the aims of both France and humanity. "La France est pacifique", he wrote; "on peut être assuré que l'heure venue,
elle travaillera, de tout son esprit et de tout son coeur, à créer cette Société des Nations dont les représentants à La Haye, présidés par M. Léon Bourgeois, ont ébauché l'esquisse, qui n'a pu être poussée plus loin, parce que l'Allemagne a, d'un coup de coude, fait dévier la main du dessinateur..."(75).

Lavisse's attempt to see the growth of the Society of Nations as a continuation of a logical, progressive advance from pre-war initiatives completely overlooked the effect the war had had in forcing this ideal to the forefront of aims. Lavisse himself, when involved in the publications of the Comité d'études et de documents sur la guerre had made no mention of the Society of Nations, nor had the other contributors. As an historian, he had traced the origin of the idea, but was prevented by his republican intellectual presuppositions, from understanding the processes that led it to emerge as dominant by 1917.

The war had changed the shape of French republican intellectual nationalism, making explicit and necessary what had been implicit in the project, and Lavisse, with other republican intellectuals, was carried along by its logic, which could envisage the future in a new harmony: "De même le traité de paix qui clora cette guerre ne pourra rassembler à aucun des traités précédents. Il faudra que l'acte final prépare, s'il ne peut l'accomplir tout de suite, la réconciliation de l'humanité avec elle-même."(76).

A climax was reached on the 10th of March 1918 with the establishment of the Association Française pour la Société des Nations. This brought together of a range of republican intellectuals, and other individuals sympathetic to aspects of the republican project. These included Buisson, Painlevé, Thomas, Renaudel, Séailles, Gide, Aulard, and Guernut as well as Jouhaux, with Bourgeois as president. It set itself four aims; to propagate the need for a Society of Nations, to study the international problems that posed
obstacles for the implementation of the project, to work with similar minded overseas organisations, and to help the government resolve any domestic difficulties that stood in the way of acceptance of this ideal(77). During discussions, Aulard expressed the growing consensus concerning the status of France and the Society of Nations in relation to one another: "Il a fait voir que la Société des Nations est indispensable à la France. Il aurait pu ajouter que la France est indispensable à la Société des Nations."(78). The vision, so clearly enunciated by Ruyssen, had captured the hearts and minds of republican intellectuals, making explicit and necessary what had been implicit in the vision, and in that process, both creating and extending hopes and expectations for the future.

Lavisse expressed his hopes for the Society of Nations to a group of schoolchildren at the Trocadero: "Quand vous serez arrivés à l'âge d'homme, vous trouverez établie une Société des Nations démocratiques et libres, dont l'objet sera le maintien de la paix; car voici la conclusion inéluctable de cette guerre; substituer à l'anarchie des égoïsmes nationaux, armés pour des luttes sans fin, un ordre fondé sur la justice et le droit et armé pour le défendre."(79). The high tide mark of this faith was reached in the discourse given by Bourgeois on the 10th of November 1918 to the general assembly of the Association Française pour la Société des Nations. Ruyssen, in a commentary on this speech, introduced it in these words: "A cette heure unique dans l'histoire du monde, l'humanité attend dans une sorte de ferveur religieuse l'avènement de la Société des Nations."(80). Bourgeois went on to say: "J'ai dit que cette victoire était définitive. Il faut qu'elle le soit pour que le rêve soit vraiment devenu une réalité. Et pour qu'elle soit définitive, il faut que le monde entier s'organise pour qu'aucun force de violence, qu'aucune retour de barbarie ne puisse détruire le trésor pour la conquête duquel, suivant le mot célèbre, l'humanité a perdu son printemps."(81). The dream required certain steps, a unity based on the virtues of the
republican project which had ensured final victory: "Puissent les gouvernements alliés qui ont assuré l'unité dans l'action militaire et réalisé ainsi les conditions essentielles de la victoire, achever leur œuvre, en fondant la paix perpétuelle dans la Société des Nations."(82).

Buisson, in his turn, presented a report to the LDH conference of 1918 on 'La Constitution immédiate de la Société des Nations', written before the Armistice, which was adopted, while Lavisse could declare: "Un monde nouveau naît dans la douleur. Lui aussi, il entend aller vite: organisation politique, sociale, administrative, scolaire, il entreprend tout à la fois. Ce monde nouveau exige un esprit de renouvellement. Le pays qui ne le sentirait pas en lui périrait."(83).

A vision of France and a vision of the Society of Nations was critically linked in the republican intellectual project so that the significance of one was established through the significance of the other. The values of France would truly become the values of the world: "Le président Wilson a affirmé avec une grande force qu'une véritable Société des Nations ne peut exister qu'entre nations de caractère démocratique."(84). This integrated and embodied the virtues of justice and peace: "Le péril commun a été l'âme commune. A cette âme il faut donner un corps. C'est dans la Société des Nations que le Verbe de Justice et de Paix doit s'incarner."(85). This extension of the vision was therefore a critical factor in any overall assessment of the success and validity of the republican intellectual project, in particular for members of that project.

Thus, in the closing stages of the war, republican intellectuals had discovered and applied visionary possibilities within their own project, which justified continued republican defence, staving off alternative critiques. A broad moral and rational unity within the project was maintained which could justify continuing the war. As intellectuals
of the Republic, their duty was also to inculcate this vision into the hearts and minds of the citizens of the Republic, and their faith in the republican intellectual project in turn helped to explain their willingness and energy in the promotion and dissemulation of more organised and comprehensive propaganda from 1917 onwards.

(v) Changing propaganda.

The state, for particular reasons arising from its political judgement concerning public morale and the need to sustain it, was clearly a major factor in the more organised production of propaganda. As noted, the military crisis caused by the failed Nivelle offensive, the social crisis leading to strikes, and a crisis of morale in the country(86), made the sustaining and invigorating of morale vitally necessary, in order to overcome pressures which might undermine the war effort. This mobilisation, or remobilisation, had to occur through republican intellectuals. However, the involvement of these intellectuals in that campaign was partly driven by their own convictions concerning the war, its significance for them, and their role in explaining that meaning.

If the values the Republic represented, both in pre-1916 thinking in the republican intellectual project, and in the extension which had taken place throughout that year, were ultimately to prevail, the citizens had to be involved in the process of understanding why the Republic had to be victorious. As always with the republican intellectual project, the key means to mobilise and direct opinion lay in education.

This explains the role of the Ligue de l'Enseignement, a long time disseminater of republican values, in the organisation of the Union des Grandes Associations contre la Propagande Ennemie, (U.G.A.C.P.E.). Paul Deschanel, president of this body, called for intellectual mobilisation in the Chamber of Deputies in January 1917(87), and in March 1917, in order to put this into practice, Deschanel, Painlevé, Ribot, and Lavisse as
prominent institutional republican figures, along with forty two constituent organisations, came together to set up the UGACPE.

Initially the UGACPE committed itself to combating any calls for negotiated peace to end the war. The war had to be won. This organisation, arising out of the war, expressed the continuing need within the republican project, to project its rationality through an explicit body. The UGACPE therefore linked the primary school system, that fundamental agent of republican legitimisation, with the leagues and associations which had characterised the development of a more popular politics in France since the 1880s and with the (usually republican) notables who provided their leadership(88). Although not totally comprised of bodies dedicated to the Republic, for example the Ligue des patriotes was represented, it was essentially a republican creation, firmly grounded on republican assumptions, drawing on key features of the political culture of the pre-war Third Republic(89).

Although there was unity concerning what was to be rejected, a negotiated compromise peace, lack of precision about what sort of peace was desired, indicated divisions arising from within the republican project. The literature of the UGACPE was just as likely to stress a Wilsonian vision of the League of Nations as a peace based on territorial security against Germany(90), so that in important ways, the security needed to promote the pre-1916 republican mobilisation vision did not always rest easily with the security judged to be necessary for the post-1916 Society of Nations conclusion.

Evidence for movement in the direction of the Society of Nations ideal was more clear in the establishment of the Ligue Républicaine de défense nationale. Founded in 1917 and later integrated into the UGACPE, it classically rejected a dishonorable peace: "Cette paix honteuse aurait pour conséquences un malaise politique, social, moral,
intolérable et un véritable désastre économique dont les classes ouvrières et paysannes seraient nécessairement les principales victimes."(91). No mention was made of a Society of Nations, yet the ubiquitous Bourgeois was one of its presidents of honour along with Deschanel and Dubrost, and its comité de patronage included Buisson, Aulard and Lavisse. Unsurprisingly therefore, in a pamphlet produced by this body in 1918 called 'Pourquoi la guerre a éclaté: Comment elle doit finir', after reiterating the traditional reasons for continued mobilisation, the Society of Nations was judged to be the necessary conclusion to the war. The question was posed: "Que devra être notre paix victorieuse?", and three responses were given: "le triomphe de la Justice et du Droit; le salut commercial, financier, industriel et la prospérité des nations de l'Entente; la fin des guerres par l'institution d'une Société des Nations."(92).

The pressure of major republican intellectuals, increasingly committed to the Society of Nations, meant that this ideal had to become a factor in propaganda, indeed partly explained the moral commitment to the production of propaganda by republican intellectuals. In other words, the mindset of the producers of propaganda has to be taken into account in any discussion which seeks to explain the existence and use of propaganda, since in part, the need to produce it was both a feature of the republican intellectual in action, as well as the perceived need to mobilise the population. The production of propaganda served as a self-mobilisation for republican intellectuals therefore, and this is vitally important in coming to terms with their enthusiastic involvement in it. The evolution of republican intellectual reflection is, therefore, an significant factor in any analysis of French wartime propaganda.

Awareness that the propaganda drive was the product of other agendas such as this, quite apart from the need to defeat some of the effects of war-weariness, goes some way to
understanding features of resistance in the reception of it. Horne, in dealing with one aspect of this resistance, has noted that another issue blunting the campaigns against war-weariness and pacifism was the complex social morality peculiar to wartime and to the mobilisation process, and the tensions which this generated(93). However this problem was not addressed explicitly, being absent from the literature and reported speeches of the campaigns to boost morale, which remained exhortatory in tone when addressing home-front responsibilities(94). Horne goes on to identify a major reason which was that these questions of wartime social morality were considered sectional and part of the divisiveness of ordinary politics which the UGACPE was trying to rise above(95).

In other words, there were certain realities, in particular the presence of division, of disunity, which were anathema to the republican intellectual project. For believers, these divisions could be overcome, with the consequence that the unity the project was providing through the war need not be endangered by the acknowledgement of social divisions, since they would be resolved through the application of republican rationality. Propaganda was more important for what it enabled its proponents to be and to do than for the minds it may have changed. It was evidence of what it was trying to create, namely the dynamism of a vigorous intellectual unity, centred on the republican tradition, and helping to make it possible.

While directly addressing the thinking of the republican intellectuals involved in the production of propaganda goes some way, as noted, to explaining the nature of that propaganda, personal convictions arising from republican rationality were far from the only factors shaping propaganda production. The amount of propaganda distributed was certainly significant. In the first year of its existence, the UGACPE distributed 5 million tracts and 2 million brochures, postcards and posters, and organised over three thousand
local meetings; and these numbers increased substantially in 1918. Three hundred and sixty propaganda dossiers were circulated every week to all prefects, university rectors, directors of the state educational system, and secretaries of patriotic associations (96). This is evidence, therefore, of great organisation and commitment and certainly a product of real unity concerning the rejection of negotiated peace. Nonetheless it still left open the question of how far the integration of republican reflections into the heart of the republican project had truly penetrated.

(vi) *The extension in the project not grounded.*

There is little evidence to suggest that in reality the Society of Nations ideal was inculcated into the general population as a necessary war aim. The monthly reports compiled by the generals commanding the interior regions of France (97) indicate an apparent absence of popular concern with the diplomatic shape of the post-war order compared to more fundamental preoccupations with beating the enemy or ending the war by negotiation. Of course there were currents that perhaps the generals did not pick up or cared not to see, which raises the question and the difficulties about how public opinion was measured (98). Nevertheless, it was not noted. This absence was hardly surprising since the Society of Nations ideal had only become a major concern of republican intellectuals from 1916 onwards. The fact that it was necessary for those promoting cultural and moral mobilisation is not evidence that it was equally necessary for those for whom the mobilisation was intended. It was not therefore a factor in explaining the adhesion of the citizens of the Third Republic to the project. To that extent, the politicians of the Republic were not obliged to respond to it at a popular level.

What politicians were obliged to respond to were perceived threats to republican defence, as Malvy's defence in the Chamber of Deputies in July 1917 indicated, where he
cited his instruction of June 1916: "Lorsque vous aurez l'impression qu'une réunion projetée peut provoquer des troubles et des désordres, ou affaiblir le moral de nos populations, vous devrez, avant de vous concerter avec l'autorité militaire pour en prononcer l'interdiction, vous mettre en rapport avec les organisateurs, faire appel à leur patriotism et leur conseiller de renoncer à leur projet."(99). This element unified almost all elements of the republican project, but for different reasons.

While there was some sympathy for the Society of Nations ideal, as evidenced by the Chamber of Deputies' vote, the need to appear to respond more vigorously to the problems of military unrest, real or imagined, worker agitation, and the feelings of war-weariness which could connect subversively to thoughts of negotiated peace had to lead to action.

"Le moral de demain dépend donc de l'action future des meneurs et la puissance des moyens dont ils disposent. Leurs auxiliaires les plus actifs dans les derniers troubles ont été les permissionnaires de leurs arguments déterminants: la croyance que la conférence de Stockholm menerait fatalement à une paix que les soldats avaient intérêt à hâter; l'existence d'une révolution à l'intérieur issue des grèves, réprimée de façon sanglante et qui n'avait plus besoin pour triompher que d'un concours modeste de la troupe."(100).

This, as well as vigorous attacks from the Right, led the politicians of the republican project to opt for Clemenceau, as a possible means to energise the project for republican victory.

Clemenceau both represented, and was a response to, a more narrowly nationalistic interpretation of the republican project, an element of that tension that had always existed within the project. His nationalism was firmly based around the values of 1914, and at no
time did he embrace the Society of Nations objective, although he never vigorously
opposed it except where he judged that it lacked the military force to implement its
directives(101). These 1914 republican values were the essential values by which and
through which French mobilisation was maintained through four years of war for the
majority of the members of the republican project, namely its citizens. This repelled
alternatives or fatally weakened them. Becker has noted that because the majority of the
workers, no less than of the nation, continued to believe that it was not in their interest to
lose the war, France remained a long way from following the path Russia had taken in
1917(102). This contributed to the doubts of the leaders of the anti-war movement, in their
lack of confidence(103), as well as, more directly within the project, helping Clemenceau
to destroy political opponents such as Caillaux.

The problem for the republican intellectual project was that these 1914 values,
although remaining an integral part of the project, had not been enough to sustain its
intellectuals after 1916, who had thus extended the project. This extension had been
judged to be vitally necessary, and in the eyes of republican intellectuals had to become an
integral part of the republican project as, on their presuppositions, disembodied principles
were not real principles. Republican intellectuals, working within their presuppositions,
believed that the state had to reflect the universalist values which republican intellectuals
had arrived at through the application of republican rationality. They had to believe in the
unity of their convictions and the state in which and through which these were expressed.

Modern presuppositions, largely ignoring the republican intellectual project,
recognise a unity, but one based on the narrower interests and values of the republican
nationalism of 1914, which the language of the intellectuals is judged, as always but
particularly after 1916, to have disguised with its universalist rhetoric. This is largely the
view of Becker. "What, then, was the real explanation of French steadfastness? Without doubt, it lay in the intellectual, spiritual and political leadership of the people; a near consensus, whether among teachers - except for a very small minority - or clergymen, or writers, existed when it came to the need to defend the country, and even though some writers felt an aversion to heroic and chauvinistic presentations of the war, and described its horrors with great realism, they never questioned the need for French participation."(105). But this was only half true at a critical point.

The strength of the republican project, which was eventually to become a fatal weakness, was based on its capacity to mobilise both the citizens and the majority of its politicians to one version of republicanism, the one identified by Becker, and hold that together with another extended concept, held by its intellectuals. This development had accentuated to an extreme tensions within the project concerning the internationalist tendencies of its nationalism. The crucial difference was that, prior to 1916, these tensions had existed right across the project, whereas now they were dangerously located among the intellectuals of the project on the one hand, and among the people and politicians on the other.

The war had split the project, producing differing concepts of what a republican peace following on from republican victory had to mean. The nature of the project, its presuppositions concerning a unitary rationality, disguised that split while the war continued, thus going some way to explaining the vigour of republican defence through all levels of French society, especially its morally idealistic vigour and flavour. Republican idealism was a real factor in the success of republican defence, since republican nationalism was fundamentally idealist in its dynamic. But the split the war had generated
in the heart of republican idealism, in the heart of the republican project, would be exposed with the peace.
Notes

(1) Ruysen T., Paix par le droit 25-1-17, p.4

(2) Ruysen T., ibid p.12

(3) Quoted in, Lloyd N., How We Went To War. (New York,1918) p.9; see also, Mayer A.J., Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919. (London,1968), p.34

(4) Le Figaro 9-5-17

(5) Ruysen T., ibid 25-6-17 p.229

(6) Ruysen T., ibid p.230

(7) Ruysen T., ibid p.231

(8) Ruysen T., ibid p.250

(9) Ruysen T., ibid 25-8-17 p.320

(10) Ruysen T., ibid 25-11-17 p.385

(11) Ruysen T., ibid 25-12-17 p.435

(12) Ruysen T., ibid p.437

(13) Ruysen T., ibid p.438

(14) Ruysen T., ibid p.438

(15) Ruysen T., ibid 25-1-18 p.28

(16) Ruysen T., ibid p.30

(17) Ruysen T., ibid p.30

(18) Ruysen T., ibid p.30


(20) Ruysen T., ibid 25-8-18 p 207
(21) Ruyssen T., ibid 25-10-18 p.298
(22) Ruyssen T., ibid p.311
(23) Ruyssen T., ibid p.311
(24) Ruyssen T., ibid p.312
(25) Basch V., La guerre de 1914 et le droit (Paris, 1915), p.2
(26) Bulletin Officiel de la Ligue des droits de l'homme, V.xvii p.121 01-05-1917
(27) ibid V.xvi p.70 01-03-1917
(28) ibid V.xvi p.70 01-03-1917
(29) ibid V.xvii p.405 01-06-1917
(30) ibid V.xvii pp 829ff 01-09-1917
(32) La ligue des droits de l'homme, La ligue devant la guerre, tract (4), 1917 p.1
(33) ibid p.2
(34) ibid p.2
(35) ibid p.2
(36) ibid p.2
(37) ibid p.2
(38) ibid Bulletin Officiel de la Ligue des droits de l'homme V.xviii pp 205ff 01-10-1917
(39) La ligue des droits de l'homme, La paix et la société des nations, tract (3), 1917 p.2
(40) ibid p.2
(41) Ruyssen T., ibid 25-11-17 p.386
(42) La paix et la société des nations. ibid p.2
(43) ibid p.2
(44) Sée ibid p.160
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la patrie et la révolution. Paris 1914-1919. (Besançon,1995); Horne J. Labour at War,
(46) Furet F. op cit. p.82
(47) Trois résolutions de la Fédération de la Seine, December 1916 (AN F7 13073)
(48) ibid
(49) Luzzatto S. op. cit. pp 20-36
(51) Aulard A., La paix future d'après la Révolution française et Kant. (Paris,1915)
p.5
(52) Kirby D., War, Peace and Revolution. International Socialism at the Crossroads
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(53) Trois résolutions de la Fédération de la Seine ibid
(55) Rosmer A., Le mouvement ouvrier pendant la première guerre mondiale, vol II
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Prochasson C., ibid p. 123

Prochasson C., ibid p. 125
(68) Thomas's account of his trip to Russia, Démocratie ou bolchevisme, in L'Humanité, 9-11-18

(69) Prochasson C., ibid p.187

(70) AN F7 13416 Relations internationales et la Société des Nations

(71) ibid

(72) ibid


(74) Lavisse E., 1 lettre à une normalienne. Revue de Paris, 12/1917 - 1/1918

(75) Lavisse E., 2 lettre à une normalienne. Revue de Paris, 2/1918

(76) ibid

(77) Association français pour la Société des Nations, Notre Programme. Tract 1 p.7. This tract, plus AN F7 13416, are the only sources that could be found. The dearth of material on organisations such as the LDH and the SEDCG is even starker here with this organisation. No secondary source material exists which systematically discusses Society of Nations idealism either among republican intellectuals or as a cultural and moral category within the Third Republic.

(78) AN F7 13416 ibid

(79) Lavisse E., Discours. Paix par le droit. 10/1918

(80) Bourgeois L., Discours. Paix par le droit. 12/1918

(81) ibid

(82) ibid

(83) Lavisse E., Réflexions pendant la guerre. Revue de Paris, 13/12/18

(85) ibid p.6


(89) ibid p.200

(90) ibid p.203


(92) Ligue Républicaine de Défense Nationale, *Pourquoi la Guerre a éclaté; Comment elle doit finir*. (Paris, 1918)

(93) Horne J., ibid pp.207-208

(94) ibid pp.207-208

(95) ibid pp.207-208

(96) ibid p.207

(97) Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes, 6N 147


(99) *Journal Officiel des débats parlementaires*, 1917, pp 1707-1710
(100) Poincaré R., Au service de la France, Vol. 9, L’année trouble, 1917. (1932) p. 171


(103) ibid p.300

(104) ibid p.326
Chapter Eight


The period 1919 to 1920 was an exceptional time in the history of the Third Republic. On the one hand, the war had been won but at great cost and suffering. On the other hand, after four years and a half years of war, the Republic had to come to terms with the implications of peace. As victors, expectations concerning future possibilities were high, especially among republican intellectuals. Their capacity to mobilise through the war had been predicated on the hopes the implementation of their vision would provide for a new future, hopes which when fulfilled, would vindicate the republican intellectual project, and in that very process, ensure the security of the world through the application of a universal rationality, creating a properly harmonious human community.

The republican intellectual vision contained real expectations which had to be fulfilled politically and socially, and only through that fulfillment could the coherence of the vision be maintained. The problem for the vision was that, because of the split which had developed in the heart of the republican project from 1916 onwards, the vehicle through which these necessary changes would be implemented, that is the political structure of the Third Republic, had not been carried, had not been persuaded, that republican intellectual insights were an existential necessity for republicanism. The implications and consequences of this soon became evident.

(i) Three blows to the republican intellectual project.

Three events during 1919 helped fracture the confidence and ultimately the coherence of the republican intellectual project. That there was a split in the heart of the
project began to emerge first with the less than enthusiastic commitment by the French government to a properly functioning Society of Nations. The suspicion that the Society of Nations concept was perhaps being manipulated for ulterior motives brought about the establishment, in January 1919, of the Ligue française pour la société universelle des nations, with Basch as president. This league criticised aspects of the programme of the earlier Association française pour la Société des Nations, particularly concerning phased membership of the new Society of Nations, which involved taking the allies first, then the friendly neutral countries followed by the non-aligned neutral countries and finally former enemy states(1). Basch argued that it should be open to all democratic aspirants. Also, he criticised the mixture of people in the Association française pour la Société des Nations, which included a cardinal, Jouhaux, and sympathizers with the nationalist right mixed with Renaudel and eminent republican intellectuals(2). This raised serious questions as to their precise reasons for commitment to the concept. In fact, Basch suspected an alternative agenda: "Quelle que soit la bonne volonté de M. Léon Bourgeois, il n'est pas allé plus loin que la conception des alliances élargies, comprenant tout d'abord les Alliés."(3).

Basch's group continued to demand the end of secret diplomacy, something on which the Association française pour la Société des Nations remained silent. Barbusse, as a member of this league, reiterated this: "La ligue réclamera en autre l'abolition immédiate et absolue de toute diplomatie secrète sous quelque forme qu'elle se présente et les moyens pratiques de l'assurer dans l'avenir."(4). Very little is known of this body and there is no mention of it in the sources after May 1919. Nevertheless, its brief existence began a rising stream of concern about the proper implementation of a just, credible and visionary post-war settlement, which would not just re-establish the status-quo.
This theme was also argued by Richet and Ruyssen, in particular what would happen if necessary steps were not taken: "...la déception des peuples sera immense, le désespoir se traduira par d'universelles convulsions d'anarchie, et la guerre sera perdue pour tout le monde."(5). There was a growing nervousness as to the will of political leaders now that victory had been won. Ruyssen observed the difference with Clemenceau whom he quoted speaking to the deputies on the 29th of December 1918: "Il y a dans ce système d'alliances, auquel je ne renonce pas."(6), and Wilson, when speaking in Manchester on the 30th of December 1918: "Si l'avenir ne nous réservait rien qu'une nouvelle tentative de maintenir la stabilité du monde par un équilibre des puissances, les Etats-Unis ne s'y intéresseraient pas."(7). Clemenceau and Wilson, in their persons, dramatised the tension that was rising in the republican vision. Wilson's commitment to the values of the project as developed through the War confirmed, in the eyes of republican intellectual, the universal validity of the project. Clemenceau's reticence concerning the central feature of the project, a Society of Nations, demonstrated how republican values did not necessarily exclude a more nationalistic concern for French security at the expense of Germany(8).

The Treaty of Versailles (9) would expose differing expectations which were already developing and being expressed after victory. If it were true, as Tardieu, one of Clemenceau's advisors claimed, that, "...la guerre étant nationaliste, c'est toutes les forces nationales qu'elle avait mises en jeu."(10), the peace would indicate exactly how the nation would express itself in victory. The debate had begun in apparent unity around republican ideals, as evidenced by Clemenceau's speech to the Chamber of Deputies on the 11th of November 1918, where he had concluded: "Et puis, honneur à nos grands morts(...). Grâce à eux, la France hier soldat de Dieu, aujourd'hui soldat de l'humanité, sera toujours le soldat de l'idéal.". As Duroselle has argued, formulas like this could be used at this date as
such moments are rare in the history of a people(11). Rémont sounds the same note: "11 Novembre: une date dont l'identification n'exige l'adjonction d'aucun millésime. A tous ceux qui l'ont vécue (...) elle rappelle une journée dont ils garderont le souvenir jusqu'à leur dernier souffle."(12). However the war had both accentuated and masked the fragility in this unity. The rhetoric was in the classic republican intellectual mould but beliefs within the project about how best its central values were to be expressed and defended in concrete form now differed substantially. Wilson seemed to be committed to the application of what republican intellectuals considered republican ideals, but the developments within the republican project permitted Clemenceau's more nuanced, less idealistic stance, and through that stance, exposed the fragility and instability now at the heart of the republican intellectual project.

Ruyssen remained optimistic, though cautious; For him, the struggle remained between humanitarian idealism and nationalistic realism(13), though as a thorough-going republican intellectual, truth and progress could only be on one side, and the Republic as the repository of these values, had necessarily to reflect them. A sense of uneasiness continued to build up which finally culminated in strong criticism by the LDH in April 1919 of particular post-war problems. Specifically, censorship had not been lifted, and the Society of Nations was threatened with being reduced to a league of allies, dominated by the great military powers(14). There was no sign of disarmement, nor of open diplomacy, and peace seemed to be being prepared secretly(15). Finally, although there was supposedly respect for the rights of peoples, yet demands for annexation were not countered.

This led to an outburst: "La Ligue ne poursuit aucun intérêt de parti, elle ne veut que servir la République. Elle a toujours refusé de s'associer au dénigrement systématique
du régime parlementaire. Elle sait quels services le gouvernement et le Parlement ont rendus au cours de la guerre. Mais, soucieuse de l'honneur national, convaincue que le véritable intérêt de la France est inséparable de la légalité, de l'ordre démocratique, de la paix et de la justice, elle juge de son devoir d'intervenir."(16). Even more radically, confirming the split and serious republican intellectual disillusion: "Quand les biens pour lesquels tant de sang a été versé sont compromis par ceux mêmes à qui la garde en est confiée, elle se doit d'avertir le pays, et elle lui dénonce l'abdication du parlement devant la dictature du silence, à laquelle la France ne saurait se résigner."(17). These were strong words, passionate words reminiscent of the Dreyfus Affair, and with implications just as serious since a whole vision was at stake.

This represented a substantial change from the confidence that had greeted Wilson on his coming to France on the 13th of December 1918 (18). Wilson was committed to two essential republican intellectual principles, namely the need for a peace of conciliation and a lasting guarantee of peace built on the establishment of the Society of Nations. As noted, he represented in his person and through his ideals the validity of the republican intellectual project as a rationally compelling and necessary vision. Between the idealism of Wilson, and narrow, nationalistic pursuits, no accord was possible(19). Not only were republican intellectual ideals then fully seen as the possession of properly rational people, but their defence and articulation could now take place outside a specifically French context. This was not surprising or unexpected. What was surprising and unexpected was the emergence of the French context as a problem.

The fierce debates concerning national security and reparations (20) exposed the fragility of republican intellectual faith, and the reasons for republican intellectual disquiet and reaction. Disputes about territorial security at the expense of a proper commitment to
international arbitration of potential conflicts, and a policy towards Germany which made
difficult a reconciliation on which future stability could be based, demonstrated the lack of
a common policy based on republican intellectual principles, in a nation supposedly
committed to and grounded on these principles.

Far from enthusiastically supported by Clemenceau, Bourgeois represented the
French position on the Society of Nations at the Peace Conference which debated the
setting up an international army to enforce the organisation's decisions. However, this was
rejected by Britain and America, which left the Society of Nations with only moral
authority. Furthermore, the admission of Germany was postponed to an unspecified date,
so that the Society of Nations looked more like a permanent alliance than a new
international and radical body (21).

Disappointment with the gap between what the Treaty was expected to establish
and what it in fact did establish was also reflected within socialism. Socialists committed
themselves to a Society of Nations, composed not of governments but parliamentary
delegates, according to party strength ('a league of peoples and not a league of
governments') which was confirmed as the indispensible means - for socialists and non-
socialists alike- of securing the world against war(22). In a statement no republican
intellectual would have disagreed with, the Berne International Labour and Socialist
Conference of May 1919 declared: "The League itself was to begin disarmament, engage in
compulsory arbitration of international disputes, and have the power to sanction its
decisions with international forces."(23). The reality of the Society of Nations powers did
not reflect these aspirations. The International Labour Office set up by the Treaty, despite
the work of Jouhaux and Thomas, was considerably limited in scope, confirming the
discrepancy between the ideal and the reality. Before investigating aspects of socialist
responses to these developments, their impact on the republican intellectual project needs further study.

In a letter to the Sections on the 23rd May, the Central Committee of the LDH declared: "La Société des Nations n'est pas l'oeuvre des peuples, comme on l'avait promis; elle n'est pas même l'oeuvre du Parlement; elle est celle des gouvernements et de la diplomatie. C'est tout simplement la Ligue des puissances de l'Entente."(24). The hopes, and capacity to make sense of events through the republican vision were beginning to unravel.

Ruyssen put his finger exactly on the problem: "La Société des Nations n'est pas la vierge sans tâche, fille de la pure idée; elle est le produit hybride de la raison et de la violence, de l'utopie et du réalisme politique."(25). As such, "..il manque encore à ce groupement de nations le parlement international qui en ferait un véritable organisme de droit; il lui manque un code; il lui manque enfin une armée prête à imposer la paix partout où elle serait menacée."(26).

The bitterness felt by Ruyssen was reflected in the dramatic decline in discussion of the Society of Nations in Paix par le droit for over six months, in a journal which had been dominated by the concept. When Ruyssen returned to discussion of the Society of Nations in 1920 it was with a new tone, still some bitterness, but also one of resignation for an imperfect creation, which for him justified continued effort:

"Car le lendemain de la guerre a cruellement déçu les pathétiques espérances nées du désespoir même des nations......les dirigeants de l'Entente (and not only the leaders but also republican intellectuals, as Ruyssen was only too well aware), pour soutenir l'énergie morale des combattants n'ont cessé d'affirmer que l'enjeu du gigantesque duel était la libération des peuples opprimés, la destruction du
militarisme allemand, la fin du régime inhumain, barbare, de la conscription universelle et de la peur armée...Hélas de ce rêve grandiose à la réalité qu'elle chute. Assurément, la ' Société des Nations ' a vu le jour...c'est un triomphe du Droit. Mais combien pâle et imparfaite est encore cette constitution"(27).

Despite this, Ruyssen went on to claim some credit, since imperfect as the Society of Nations was, it was still the climax to thirty years of rational and enthusiastic propaganda(28). He divided his vision into three phases. The first phase, before the war, had concentrated on bringing nations together and working to prevent the coming of war. When this task had failed, a new agenda was required which was to sustain the morale of the country for the victory of justice against unjustified German aggression. This had been done by holding out the hope of a new world which would emerge as a consequence of the Society of Nations. When this in turn failed, Ruyssen's conclusion was to continue the battle, the aim of which was to achieve a real and effective Society of Nations(29).

Ruyssen therefore never entirely lost his faith, but his vision, the republican intellectual project as a means to combine peace and justice, expressing itself through a united, coherent course of action, was in trouble. Ingram discusses Ruyssen's pacifism as it develops in the twenties and thirties, which he calls 'old-style' pacifism(30). What slowly developed alongside Ruyssen's position were alternative views regarding justice, peace and international harmony. In other words, the debates generated by the war continued into the post-war world. There were compelling moral alternatives, for example, integral pacifism. From 1928 onwards, Ruyssen's review was to be riven by internal dissension around this debate, and his position steadily lost credibility(31). The views of Ruyssen did not preclude debate, but to him substantial moral and intellectual disunity was incomprehensible. Whatever the intellectual weight and validity of this position, the war
had undermined its moral persuasiveness, making problematic national and international cohesion around an agreed set of values.

A more direct sense of frustration and bitterness was expressed by the LDH which, in a Central Committee resolution of the 13th of June 1919, stated that the treaty,
"...n'ouvre pas une ère nouvelle; il est un compromis entre le droit des peuples et l'impérialisme, entre la politique de la démocratie et les traditions d'une politique de ruse et de violence."(32). The initial point that a new era had not arrived was a damning statement from a Central Committee that had maintained the unity and conviction of the majority of the LDH throughout the war years in pursuit of precisely that.

For republican intellectuals, the failure to institute a properly functioning Society of Nations left them with no clear direction from within their vision as to how this development was to be interpreted. The question as to why the war had been fought could now be posed with new urgency in their discussion, a development dramatically heightened by the second blow to the republican intellectual project in 1919, the attribution of responsibility for the war completely to German militarism.

From 1916 onwards, there had been a small but very active minority within the LDH which had argued both for immediate arbitration and for an acknowledgement of allied responsibilities for the war. The LDH had concluded that it was not possible to study this effectively during the war, that only afterwards could the question of responsibilities be properly investigated. To claim sole German responsibility for the war made rather a mockery of that, weakening the argument and need for a Society of Nations, since it could be argued that the only problem in 1914 had been German aggression.

Republican intellectuals had always argued that the reasons for international tension had been wider than the actions of Germany. Basch, in 1915, although accepting
Germany's immediate responsibility, also argued that deeper causes had been more complex. A properly functioning Society of Nations was to have ensured the conditions of real peace, which did not lie purely in establishing German guilt, but in removing the conditions that had made German aggression possible.

Into this atmosphere of thwarted ideals, the arguments of intellectuals in the SEDCG such as Demartial re-emerged with renewed force. Commitment to principle and not to its incarnation in an actually existing body, enabled them to argue that France had been following a particularist, nationalist agenda, the proof being the refusal to accept any responsibility for war, so that true justice could not lie in that body, but in the fearless proclamation of the truth in itself. The disconnection of France and truth, and the consequences of this, were to plunge the LDH into acrimonious debate for years to come. The unity that the Central Committee had developed and maintained between a France at war and some of the highest republican principles such as justice, progress and peace now degenerated into increasing bitterness as the fruits of that wartime unity proved so feeble.

Basch pointed out strongly the faults of the treaty as he saw it, attacking above all, the balkanisation of Europe, the defective organisation of the Society of Nations and the manner in which Germany had been stripped of its colonies. All such comments must be seen in the light of the mood of confidence of 1918. Gide also highlighted the high social cost of the war, and the effect of the influenza epidemic. The new era had not dawned. Rather a weakened France was struggling in a world in many ways as dangerous, if not more dangerous, than pre-war Europe.

In this atmosphere of anger, frustration and betrayal, despite the attempts of people like Ruysen to put a bold face on it, the LDH conference of 1920 was charged with a critical and acrimonious spirit, so unlike the passionate conference of 1916 and the
confidence of the 1917 and 1918 conferences. As reported by Ruyssen, the conference was critical of the treaty which was condemned as having been discussed, prepared and concluded in secret, without reference to public opinion. He was especially critical of the Society of Nations which, he claimed, did not conform to democratic wishes(34). The failure resided in its constitution, as the people were not properly represented, in its composition, as many important nations were left out, and in its object since it could only hinder or delay possible war, but not prevent it due to its weak powers of action.

In this atmosphere, the minority of 1916, 1917 and 1918 was able to argue its position more forcefully and persuasively, putting forward a number of new propositions. Bloch proposed a resolution made up of three parts, two of which were central to the concerns of the SEDCG, namely that responsibility did not lie solely with the vanquished, and that a study should be made of the 1914 mobilisation. This was adopted by the conference. In a further motion, Bloch called the Society of Nations a new alliance for capitalism. This view was rejected, but it was agreed that peoples whom the war had divided, should be admitted.

The growing influence of both Clarté, a group of critical socialist intellectuals about which more will be said, and the SEDCG, was evidenced further by the publication in Paix par le droit of an article by Guetant, a member of Clarté, in October, 1920, entitled 'Les Responsibilites de la guerre'. In this, he strongly attacked the notion of French innocence at the outbreak of war. This was the first time an article of this nature had been published in this journal; the reason ostensibly was to provide Ruyssen with an opportunity to reply to what he saw as emerging and dangerous tendencies, but by the same token, it also showed the progress of this type of criticism.
After dismissing the argument, Ruyssen went on to argue: "Il n'est pas indifférent de constater, par cet exemple suggestif, le caractère manifestement tendancieux des efforts tentés dans certains milieux pour réviser le procès qui a abouti, dans l'opinion publique, à la condamnation morale des Empires Centraux coupables d'avoir déchaîné sur le monde l'atroce guerre de 1914." (35). In particular, he singled out the SEDCG: "Cette Société compte des esprits fort distingués dont quelques uns, par une sorte de raffinement morbide dans le scrupule, sont portés à scruter avec une loupe grossissante les torts de leur propre pays et à juger avec indulgence ceux de l'adversaire." (36). This was rather different from the praise given at the foundation of the SEDCG, where Ruyssen had assumed the pursuit of truth would result in the same conclusions as his own. Ruyssen could not see how the concept and content of truth itself had moved into the centre of debate, and so could not understand division except in traditional republican intellectual terms.

Ruyssen also cited one individual, Demartial, and his article in the review Clarté of the 15th of October 1919, concerning which he accused Demartial of being a writer fixedly determined to undermine the truth (37). Ruyssen's position was under pressure as never before and could be said to be losing ground before the new critical onslaughts, with the peace providing the ammunition lacking during the war.

Morhardt, member of both the SEDCG and the LDH initiated the central debate of the 1920's for the Ligue, namely the question of responsibility for starting the war (38), with a letter of the 8th of November 1920. He claimed that France could have done more in 1914 to prevent the outbreak of the conflict, a claim which was rejected by the Central Committee of the LDH as unfounded and unjustified (39). This debate demonstrated how the split in the republican intellectual project had extended into the heart of intellectual
debate itself, fracturing the moral unity of the Ligue in a manner similar to that undergone by the SEDCG. The republican intellectual project had moved into crisis.

To complete a shocking year, the 1919 elections demonstrated the lack of democratic support for the extended republican intellectual vision (40). The people also did not want the brave new world of the republican intellectuals, the people for whom it was believed to have been fought, in whose name the best possibilities of humanity were thought in some way to be realisable. What so many republican intellectuals regarded as a time of ultimate decisions was therefore rejected, in favour of what was judged to be the far less radical and more nationalist concern for some kind of territorial settlement at the expense of Germany(41). How far this concern was from republican intellectual expectations was demonstrated by the enthusiasm with which Barrès greeted the election results: "Après avoir eu la mobilisation militaire d'août 1914, nous avons eu la mobilisation civique de novembre 1919. Et voici une excellente chambre, de beaucoup la meilleure que j'ai connue."(42). How and why this could have happened were questions the republican intellectual project was increasingly unable to answer, drawing on its own interpretative resources.

What exactly was the nature of the crisis? The republican intellectual project was a vision committed to the French nation as the repository of universalist, true ideals, which were rationally accessible to all humanity. It interpreted alternatives as essentially irrational or perverse. It could not interpret itself as one vision among many, but only as the highest expression of human possibilities. Through commitment to this vision, the place of human values and virtues became clearer. Truth, justice and peace made sense in a republican framework. Disembodied, they were unreal; the Republic made them real politically and socially.
The justification for the war was that it pitted these universal values against the narrow, particularist nationalism of Germany, of an irrational tradition, the central function of the republican tradition being its capacity to rise above such morally destructive delusions. This explained the constant reference to being above interests and parties in republican intellectual rhetoric. The project represented truth as such, and this explained the anger expressed against German intellectuals who seemed to make truth particular and national.

Events of 1919 served to mark the failure of the vision both to express what it considered to be essential insights in a world which had just freed itself from the irrationality of German militarism, and to explain satisfactorily in its own terms why this failure had come about. This put the coherence of the vision in jeopardy. Because of the developments of that year, France was open to the criticism that it simply represented another particularity, a purely French, narrow nationalism, disguising that fact behind a universalist rhetoric of republican virtue.

Thus the criticism levelled against German intellectuals could now be levelled against French intellectuals - namely that they were simply servants of a national particularity. In establishing why criticism of this sort was so destructive, the nature of republicanism as a vision, as a model, needs to be brought out. The beginnings of vital work in this direction has been done by Berstein and Rudelle in their edited work, *Le modèle républicain*.

Republicanism, at its very foundation, was about creating a community of virtue, providing a coherent purpose and moral direction for its citizens. The community was therefore to be united in a shared vision of the good of its citizens, which made sense of truth, justice and progress as integrated values(43). As evidenced by Durkheim's work in
particular, it claimed the status of a scientific model. Just as science aimed for the truth above the irrationalities of religion and prejudice, but was nevertheless expressed through a concrete body of institutions with specific procedures, so too was it judged possible to institute in a specific political and social form the search for human moral and rational certitude. Within this framework, values derived their meaning.

Two values can be usefully focussed on to explore this further, namely pacifism and patriotism. The pacifism which Ruyssen defended could not be simply a principle, but had to be an expression of republican virtue. Peace, for republican intellectuals, was an integral part of the republican project. The extent to which the values of the republican project were not implemented meant that there was a permanent possibility of war. War could only be prevented by the extension of republican justice. Where republican justice, the only true means to peace and specifically located in the Third Republic, was attacked, it had to be defended. Pacifism was therefore logically and necessarily involved in republican defence.

While not always choosing to use the word pacifism because of its anti-republican connotations, republican intellectuals derived their commitment from this basis. The crisis in the vision created a problem as to where to locate pacifism, indeed where to locate values at all politically and socially. Where was the ultimate truth of which pacifism, for example, was the manifestation?

Whatever answers that were given to these questions, and the history of the post-war period was suffused with this debate, the Third Republic would never again be able to mobilise pacifists or pacifism in its defence, in the name of republican virtue. This conclusion is supported by the reflections given by intellectuals committed to republican institutions, in the aftermath of defeat in 1940. Léon Blum, Jean Zay (member of the
Radical-Socialist party and minister of education from 1936 to 1939), Edouard Daladier, Marc Bloch (eminent mediaeval historian) and Jean Guichonso (historian and writer) all declare that the Third Republic failed to communicate to new generations a democratic conscience, an attachment to the values of civil society and to the values of progress(44). The values of an unconditional pacifism had instead taken deep root. As regards the troops mobilised in 1940, republican patriotism played little part, as we know with a certain precision thanks to the work of Jacques-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac(45). The breaking of the moral community, of a unitary rationality centred on republicanism, meant that alleged universal moral values could not be used as part of republican mobilisation.

Patriotism reflected the same problem. Patriotism was a virtue founded on attachment primarily to a political and moral community and only secondarily to the government of that community; but it was characteristically exercised in discharging responsibility to, and in, such a government. When, however, the relationship of government to moral community was put in question both by the changed nature of government and the lack of moral consensus in the society concerned, as happened after 1919, it became difficult any longer to have any clear, simple and teachable conception of patriotism. Loyalty to the country, to the personal community- which remained a central virtue- became detached from obedience and commitment to the government that happened to be ruling. The nature of the Republic as a state and a society had changed fundamentally, moving in the modern direction towards being an allegedly morally neutral arena in which debate takes place.

Crucially the Third Republic lost the capacity to mobilise intellectual patriotism in its defence as the one exponent of a true moral and rational community. Evidence for this development comes especially from the writing of Julien Benda. In 1916, Benda officially...
repudiated Rolland's position regarding the war. He argued that individuals who resolved to use scholarship and reason to discredit the claims of German intellectuals and to defend the cause of justice did not need Rolland's condemnation (46). Intellectual mobilisation was legitimate. In 1927, he famously condemned intellectual mobilisation in the War, arguing that intellectuals had betrayed their calling (47). Intellectuals were supposed to objective, critical and non-engaged, not partisan or involved. To be a republican intellectual was, on this understanding, a form of moral failure. The war provided this critique with the evidence to undermine the alleged moral supremacy of the republican intellectual project.

This is not to claim that policies inspired by the republican intellectual project could not have still a real impact. The victory of the Cartel des Gauches in 1924 allowed the pursuit of international policies in line with that project. What is claimed is rather that the moral and intellectual status of such policies as a continuing unfolding of genuine human progress could no longer be taken for granted. The meaning of progress, of values, was now uncertain and debatable. Sirinelli (49) likewise shows how the certainties of the republican project were increasingly undermined by those who had had first hand experience of the war and who sought to grapple with the legacy of that experience in the post-war period. The evidence suggests that the system which had united intellectuals in their search for truth, teachers in their dissemination of that truth, citizens as those receiving that truth, and the Republic as a morally cohesive and authoritative entity capable of articulating that truth, had splintered, and with it the republican intellectual project.

(ii) Aspects of socialist responses to the after-war.

As demonstrated throughout the period under study, one other project, deeply intertwined with the republican intellectual project, yet distinct from it, namely socialism,
drew inspiration and support from many republican values. Socialism after the war continued a vigorous debate between those who rejected the system and values of liberal democracy, those drawn to the Russian model, and those who continued to see real possibilities in the Third Republic for the implementation of the socialist project. The values of republicanism, fractured by the impotence of the republican intellectual project, remained nevertheless values to which certain socialists were deeply committed. Furthermore, perhaps these values could still provide at least part of a basis on which to build that united moral and rational community which the republican intellectual project was no longer capable of providing. The perceived possibilities that existed in the reanimation of the Republic as the means to a properly socialist future provided one context for a vigorous and ultimately divisive debate within socialism.

If it were true that the spirit and practices of dreyfusism not only had never ceased to animate the pacifism of socialist intellectuals, but underwent a resurgence in 1919 and 1920 (50), then in part this energy derived from the need to reintegrate Dreyfusard concerns into a new unity after the breakup of the republican intellectual project. Prochasson also notes that at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, intellectuals either could or could not intervene in terms of their competences and their knowledge. They were in future to be judged according to their level of political conscience which Barbusse called prudently their lucidity. This change confirmed the progression of political values into the intellectual arena (51) a central reason for this again being the need to re-establish a firm basis for intellectual authority.

The history of a movement such as Clarté demonstrated this point clearly. Ideas were important, and action was important: "Nous croyons en la toute-puissance des idées; mais nous croyons aussi qu'elles sont vaines si elles ne s'incarnent pas dans le nombre."
Nous estimons que nos idées, auxquelles nous tenons plus qu'à notre vie, ont besoin pour triompher d'un support agissant."(52), but the question remained as to where these views could be legitimately expressed from. Prochasson concludes that the intellectual was losing his autonomy(53), but this was not the case.

More important for an intellectual than autonomy was the authority to speak. The breakdown of the republican intellectual project, which had been a source of precisely that authority and which in turn had generated real commitment as the war so powerfully demonstrated, had thrown this same authority in doubt, and with it the purpose and status of republican intellectuals. Whether there was a moral and spiritual reality, where it was, and what relationship had intellectuals with it, became urgent questions.

Intellectuals were obliged to rethink and relocate their sources of authority more specifically and necessarily more politically as the very notion and content of truth became divisive among differing rationalities contending for its mantle. How were values to be expressed, and as far as socialism was concerned, to what extent was the movement to embrace or reject republican values, giving these values perhaps new legitimacy within the socialist project, and in that process establishing a necessary political relationship with the Republic? This, as well as more obviously the hopes and fears of the post-war world, was a major source of intellectual debate.

Barbusse and the Clarté project represented one effort to re-establish the republican notion of a moral community and the capacity to speak with authority on a different basis:

"Former l'embryon d'une Internationale de l'Intelligence, rassembler tous ceux qui, épars dans les deux mondes, ont su conserver pendant la guerre leur dignité d'écrivain, et mettre au premier rang ceux qui ont mérité notre reconnaissance par les persécutions et les calomnies; organiser méthodiquement une vie intellectuelle
This project, to reinvigorate the values of internationalism, pacifism and justice, brought together Barbusse, Vaillant-Couturier and Lefebvre to found the review Clarté, which appeared from October 1919, in seven languages and was distributed in nine capitals. The movement Clarté was also established, with the official title, Ligue de solidarité intellectuelle pour le triomphe de la cause internationale. It welcomed not only those who, "...font profession de littérature, l'art ou de science..." but also those who wished, "...penser et vivre d'une façon intelligente, c'est-à-dire vraiment humaine."(56), in other words to establish an intellectual community which could speak with universally valid authority on the human condition.

Although initially vigorous, this attempt to found a specifically intellectual community, whose authority derived from purely intellectual activity pursued in common, failed in its ambitions. Despite attempting to exclude explicitly political activity,(57) any efforts to construct a community in the post-war period, through which authority could be established, necessitated the political dimension. Precisely what the content of this dimension could and should be goes some way to explaining socialist debate and ultimately division, as this project grappled with the legacy of the republican intellectual project.

The divisions brought about by the war within socialism continued after the war. The place of the Russian Revolution in republicanism generated a major tension. The Russian Revolution forced French socialism to return to a choice between revolution and reform, between legality and illegality. The events of 1917 reopened, therefore, the
question of the exact identity of French socialism. The place of the Republic within revolutionary socialism generated another.

One possibility, if the Russian model was rejected, was the revision of aspects of socialist doctrine and the fusion of French socialism and republicanism, in other words to actuate a permanent tendency in French socialism. The French socialist party could then become the party of real reform and government. This tendency had been greatly assisted by the experience of war, where mobilisation had demonstrated the productive possibilities of private property mixed with state control.

This accounted for the debate between Thomas, who represented this position, and Blum who rejected it. As Thomas argued, socialism had to choose: "Ou Wilson ou Lénine, ou la démocratie née de la Révolution française, fortifiée par les luttes de tout un siècle, développée par la grande République des Etats-Unis, ou bien les formes primitives, brutales du fanatisme russe." Blum refused to accept this analysis: "Nous restons des socialistes révolutionnaires. (...) Qui ne souhaiteraient faire l'économie de la Révolution? Mais ce que nous avons toujours dit, c'est que le triomphe définitif du socialisme ne serait probablement obtenu que par un acte révolutionnaire." The notion of revolution was of central importance.

The values of the republican project exercised a major influence in the more fundamental split that occurred in French socialism in 1920. The minority who followed Blum and Faure based their decision on two rejections, that of bolchevism and of a revision of basic doctrine. The rejection of bolchevism was firmly grounded on the acceptance of republican values, of revolution within certain limits already set by the republican intellectual project in terms of means, so that Blum could write against those who opposed his position: "Vous concevez le terrorisme... non plus comme une nécessité vitale pour la
Révolution mais comme un moyen de gouvernement."(63). The values of the republican intellectual project had been relocated within a branch of the socialist project, that which retained the name socialist, to provide part of the basis on which to construct a proper rational and moral socialist community. These values were therefore given a new coherence within the socialist project, which they had lost through the crisis in the republican intellectual project.

This attempt by socialism to inherit the energy that these values had manifested in the life of the Third Republic, in its turn, provided continued moral support for the actually existing Republic after 1920. The capacity of the Third Republic to survive through the 1920's and the 1930's cannot be divorced from the moral commitment to its continuation generated within socialism by its adherence to certain republican values. This in turn meant that the Republic remained the principal means to socialist fulfillment, climaxing in the Popular Front. From 1920 to 1938, moral commitment to the Republic, and to republican values, was made possible largely through its acceptance by socialism, and this was a factor in explaining the continuation of the Third Republic as a form of government through very troubled times.

Nevertheless, as demonstrated, a particularly close unity, a dynamic between the republican intellectual project and the reality of the Third Republic had broken down after 1918, and socialism could not just inherit the complete project. As divisions in socialism had shown, there were many possible ways in which to regard the Republic. Socialism could exist without the Republic in a manner impossible to the republican intellectual project, although it was going to become increasingly difficult for the Republic in practice to exist without socialism. What had passed forever was the unity of vision which had seen the Republic as the proper embodiment of central universal values, united in a
practice, as a political community which was rationally accessible to all those of unprejudiced mind, and with the capacity, therefore, to be a universal community.

If the Republic had always been a battleground of ideas, it had drawn the justification for its existence from the republican intellectual project which had interpreted the Republic as the locus of potential consensus, of truth, of progress, of justice and of peace. Now it had become truly a battleground. The war through which unity had been sought, became the rock on which republican unity was irrevocably broken, turning the Republic into an open ideological battlefield of incommensurate rationalities, battling to remake the Republic in their image.

This initiated a fundamental change in the nature of the Republic as a political and moral entity. Although central concerns of the republican intellectual project such as a properly functioning Society of Nations and reconciliation with Germany to foster international harmony were pursued in the 1920's, in particular from 1924 to 1929 (64), the relation of these concerns to the Republic was different. Before and during the war, the relationship had been organic, so that ideals had their validity confirmed in and through the Republic. After the war, with the breakdown of the project, the relationship between ideals and their application in the Republic became instrumental. Truth, justice and progress became essentially ideals, contested as to their precise content, and the Republic became one of the possible means by which they could perhaps be expressed. The Republic no longer had an explicit, existential link with these ideals and therefore could not operate as a moral source for republican virtue.

If the Republic was to continue, it had to find another basis for its legitimacy. In terms of its old legitimacy through the republican intellectual project, it was the war rather than the Dreyfus Affair which resulted in the mystique very firmly becoming the
Péguy's prognosis was delayed, but ultimately accurate, as an assessment of the republican intellectual project's fate.

Notes

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(57) Prochasson C., ibid p.195


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(60) Bergounioux A., ibid p.84

(61) L'Humanité 09/11/1918

(62) L'Humanité 15/11/1918

An analogy with the concept of individuality. This book can shed light on the arguments of this thesis and serves as an underlying medical history offers a useful perspective on an individual's life. It is a matter of the individual's actions, usually going to a doctor at particular times, that are recorded or that are not recorded as being healthy. This is the shedding of medicines or the following of restrictive dietary regimens, as well as a strong theoretical basis for these actions. Yet precisely an individual's life is to be understood, especially health problems have plagued a major part in that individual's life. A useful aspect of this interpretation must involve the individual's relationship with the individual of the medical model, both in body and in terms of the individual considered. It is true that the individual may decide that they were mistakes. Or again, one may turn to the conclusion of their assessment as to what precisely the individual's effective representation of itself and communities may serve to be seen as diagnosing the reason for a purely psychological subjective aspect. Perhaps, even more radically, after the dedication of a completely alternative approach to health, the value of a proper medical relationship towards the individual's confused presuppositions might be examined.

Nevertheless, and this is the crucial point, a theoretical and social in which the individual participates. This enables some to be made of situations, hopes and fears, both theoretical and practical. It is perhaps perhaps purely pragmatic, acceptance of the medical model by which the individual's life was partially constituted. Acceptance of this point...
Conclusion.

An analogy with the concept of a medical history may both cast further light on the arguments of this thesis and serve as a conclusion. A medical history offers a certain perspective on an individual's life. It offers a rationality for certain actions, namely going to a doctor at particular times, involvement in actions judged to be healing, including the taking of medicines or the following of certain dietary regimes, as well as a strong theoretical basis for these actions. If a particular individual's life is to be understood, especially if health problems have played a major part in that individual's life, a crucial aspect of this interpretation must involve that individual's relationship with the rationality of the medical model, both in itself and in terms of the individual concerned. It is true that the individual may decide that they were mistaken. Or again, others may come to that conclusion in their assessment as to what precisely the individual's actions represented. Belief and commitment may come to be seen as disguising the search for a purely psychological subjective security. Perhaps, even more radically, after the adaptation of a completely alternative approach to health, the claim of a proper medical rationality outside the individual's confused presuppositions might be rejected.

Nevertheless, and this is the crucial point, a rationality did exist, in which the individual participated. This enabled sense to be made of intentions, hopes and fears, both theoretical and actual, through the perhaps purely pragmatic acceptance of the medical model by which the individual's life was partially constructed. Acceptance of this point
does not entail either a commitment to some objective truth of the medical model or to the rejection of any explanatory value even if the model is rejected.

Following from this, two possible and necessary histories ensue. One is that of the medical model itself, its own legitimating bases and changes through time; and another is the acceptance of this rationality by others who need and depend on it. While these two histories are theoretically different, in practice they are intimately related, so that the continuation of the medical model depends on the ongoing creation and affirmation of an efficacious rationality in which individuals can meaningfully participate. Many other elements are involved of course, which also sustain the medical model, but belief in its rationality, and the interpretative power which this offers, are vital both to its long term survival and to our proper understanding of it.

The role of doctors in this model in many ways parallels that of the intellectual in the republican intellectual project. The doctor incarnates in him or herself the rationality of the medical project, just as the republican intellectual incarnated the rationality of the republican intellectual project. Not that either type is the project. The project provides the rationality which gives the authority to speak, to exist.

What the republican intellectual project committed itself to, and what the medical model still largely believes (despite increasing pressure to interpret itself as one rationality among many), was that its project was the only legitimate basis of authority. In this, on its own interpretation, lay precisely its superiority, its capacity to rise above irrational and ultimately immoral division. This central belief has been shown to be have been unsustainable. Nevertheless, the rationality of republican intellectuals, as a means to understand their actions, and in turn as a means of understanding some of the factors influencing real change in the period 1900 to 1920 in France, is neglected at a cost. Too
often, the actions of republican intellectuals have been dismissed or treated with scant respect, judged explicable in terms of other more valid criteria.

In the Third Republic from 1900 to 1920, there were differing and competing rationalities, some intimately linked, some violently opposed to each other. Prochasson, among others, has done valuable work in making more explicit the socialist, intellectual project, and as evidence for the validity of the approach adopted in this work, he has been frequently obliged to refer to the republican intellectual project as a factor in the construction of socialist responses. The problem too often in research is that the Republic, and its major, sustaining intellectual figures are treated only as a background against which the more useful history of socialism, for example, can be written. There simply is no background. The republican intellectual project needs to be brought to the foreground as a major influence on other rationalities, and whose history should be as fully written as that of socialists, or syndicalists or the Right. It is an essential part of the broad history of the period.

The general absence of explicit reference to the republican intellectual project in much historical writing has a number of effects, apart from the general point made and the obvious need to concentrate sources and focuses with something like the energy devoted in the past to other rationalities. The first is that when dealing with academic republican intellectuals, it is not enough, (though it is obviously important), to focus on their institutional power, as does Charle in his study. To do so fails to explain sufficiently an important particularity of the republican academic intellectual, that of his role as upholder of rationality.

In themselves, republican intellectuals reflected the essence of the republican intellectual project, since they embodied the belief that knowledge was one, communicable,
universal, true and in their possession, and that they were the means of its dissemination. It was this which provided their authority to inculcate this project in the hearts and minds of citizens. Institutions reflected and sustained that authority, they did not create it.

Treating republican intellectuals as background explains, too, the lack of proper bibliographies and studies of them. Once the republican intellectual project is moved to the foreground, intellectuals such as Ruyssen, Lavisse or Durkheim acquire, as in this study, a new importance as articulators of a dynamic rationality. One paradox that emerges through this neglect is how propaganda during the war has drawn so much interest, but the mindset of the people who produced it, the changing ideals of their propaganda, has attracted so little. Did they believe what they wrote; how could they have questioned their conclusions; what vehicles of belief, of response were open to republican intellectuals as purveyors of a rationality in war? This thesis aims to show ways in which questions of this nature can be usefully addressed.

Another consequence of neglect of the republican intellectual project is incomprehension of the significance of a group such as the LDH. It was not merely a moralistic pressure group. It was a major workshop where the rationality of the republican intellectual project was applied to ongoing developments in France and the world. It played a part in offering meaning, interpreting the present as linked to the continuing development of a republican revolutionary future. Republican intellectuals believed in the possibility of a real, united rational community, so they worked together to find that unity, to explore the content of that unity which their rationality told them existed. The deliberations of the LDH concerned how the Republic should be the Republic, how it could best embody its own values, and the need to be vigilant against unsound alternatives. This thesis tries to show how this group in particular helped to maintain French republican
intellectual cohesion, and how its reflections, specifically at its conferences, were centrally
important as part of French moral and rational responses to the war. This body deserves
considerably more research than has been the case so far in the history of this period.

The socialist project as outlined in this study was critically influenced by the
republican intellectual project, so that, as noted, a proper history of socialism in France
without continual reference to this fact, flaws any subsequent analysis. Prochasson's work,
with his frequent reference to the ideals and practices of republicanism, reflects this point.
Again, as noted, it is simply a mistake to treat socialism as one of many dynamisms in the
Third Republic with the Republic itself providing the backdrop for various courses of
action. The Republic itself was partially constructed and maintained on an explicit vision,
which in turn influenced all other visions that sought to function within the Third Republic.

This means the Republic must be seen in a new light, and conscious effort made to
free interpretation of the Republic from modern, often unstated, assumptions that see it as
merely the stage for competing power groups. It was clearly to become that, but part of the
history of that development cannot be understood without a proper focus on the theoretical
and practical background from which this modern republic emerged. Very important
therefore are the factors that led to the breakdown in confidence in the republican
intellectual project, permitting the eventual emergence of the type of liberal and pluralistic
democracy of the present day republic. This also includes deepening our understanding of
how the present French intellectual and moral community emerged. This thesis has
attempted to reassess some of the legitimating foundations of the Third Republic, how
these foundations were challenged and changed during and after the war, and why this
occurred within the dynamic of the republican intellectual project.
Republican intellectuals were able to exist and have influence through their model of rationality on which the Republic itself was founded, and this in turn gave them legitimacy for their actions. Republican intellectuals were moral figures responsible for the articulation of a vision which had as its end the creation of a moral community of republican virtue.

Republican intellectuals almost always, therefore, gathered in groups. Sometimes these groups were 'sociétés' where intellectuals discussed aspects of their vision with a view to finding the direction they believed was there to be found. Sometimes they were 'comités' which normally reflected a need to transmit information, the truth, more accurately. Sometimes they were 'ligues' which sought morally to enthuse and intellectually to educate those who wished to participate in a proper rationality. The existence of alternative rationalities, rarely perceived by themselves or others as such, in turn generated similar intellectual structures of association.

In all these rationalities, the fundamental belief in the possibility of true human community founded on right reason or some living tradition judged to be true, obliged intellectuals, or those committed to advancing the goals of a particular rationality, to work together both to reflect and to further implement that unity, within their respective rationalities. The republican intellectual project lived in a state of critical balance between the community of intellectuals and their deliberations, and the community of the Republic which was judged by the project to be legitimate insofar as it reflected republican virtue.

Using the assumptions of the republican intellectual project allows a new clarity concerning the events of 1914 in terms of mobilisation and enthusiasm, particularly among intellectuals. In the period from 1910 onwards, the republican intellectual project had faced increasing difficulties in both implementing its vision of unity and explaining why
these difficulties kept arising. As argued, the war seemed to establish this long sought unity on firmly republican foundations, and against an enemy that represented precisely what the project believed its whole existence was about, namely the defeat of particular, aggressive irrationalities in favour of universal and eternal human values.

It was perfectly possible, indeed irresistibly logical, to mobilise for war in 1914, and real enthusiasm, no matter how nuanced by studies such as that of Becker regarding whole sections of the French population, was overwhelmingly and coherently present in the hearts and minds of republican intellectuals. It is not enough to invoke the term nationalism as an explanation in the same way a zoologist might invoke instinct in the absence of clear insight. Nationalism as a concept needs explicit analysis. Whose nationalism, and why particular sorts of nationalisms were dominant, are vital questions. The decline and subsequent neglect of the republican intellectual project means too often that the criticisms of other projects as regards the alleged motivations of republican intellectuals are taken as the real reasons for mobilisation in 1914, that 1914 represented a particular form of blindness. Among republican intellectuals, it did not. Enthusiasm was based on clear vision, a vision that was ultimately to be undermined; but it is a serious mistake to assume that it existed in 1914 merely as a rhetorical mask hiding some allegedly crude nationalism.

The anger at the German Intellectuals' Manifesto sprang from precisely these concerns. Intellectuals were seen to be supporting the actions of a particular warring nation, against the universal values of peace, truth and justice which it was believed intellectuals worthy of the name had to be committed to. If there was one rationality, there could not be a rational war. One side had to be irrational, and against all the true possibilities of human community. German intellectuals were judged to have betrayed their calling, their mission, thus becoming mere mouthpieces for power. Republican
intellectuals, in their critical discourse, were therefore perfectly familiar with a type of language that would later be used against the republican intellectual project, often by the self-same intellectuals, after the war.

The horror of the war necessarily affected the republican intellectual vision, as it did all aspects of French society. The fullest public expression of the pressures war placed on the project came with the LDH conference of 1916. This conference, building on various intellectual discussions engaged in beforehand, particularly by the SEDCG, sought to re-enthuse republican intellectual mobilisation, and answer serious criticism for the continuation of the war. The conclusions reached at this conference are crucial in understanding why the majority of republican intellectuals remained committed to the war until the end, and why it was morally and intellectually possible to be so committed, despite the force of reasoned opposition and the explicit horror of the war. The central concept which provided the basis for continued intellectual commitment to war was the Society of Nations.

Discussion of this concept was an essential aspect of republican activity from 1916 to 1918, with consequences as regards the aims of war and the very nature of the rationality of which France was the reflection within the republican intellectual project. Again, neglect of the republican intellectual vision means that deliberations by republican intellectuals during this period are almost completely ignored by historians. This has the consequence that no convincing explanation is offered as to how an individual, not blinded by allegedly ideological rhetoric, could be morally and rationally committed to the war. Implicitly and all too frequently, a moral bias can creep in, which presumes that intellectuals who opposed war were somehow more moral, more rational, more human than those who supported the war. This thesis rejects that view.
Finally the approach adopted here makes sense of the feeling of betrayal that emerged so quickly after 1918. Republican intellectuals had no convincing explanation, within the terms of their own rationality, to account for the failure to fully implement the vision after 1918. This meant that with external negative factors defeated, the causes of disillusion had to lie within their vision. This, plus the implications this had for their responsibility during the war in contributing to a mobilisation that after the war could no longer be justified, led to the breakdown of the vision and to a range of intellectuals looking for new meaning. As noted, too much can be made of the mobilising influence of intellectuals during the War. However, as also demonstrated, the intellectual mobilisation served first and foremost to mobilise intellectuals, so that the breakdown of the republican intellectual project in the aftermath of victory precisely disillusioned republican intellectuals.

This disillusionment was a contributing factor to the construction of the modern intellectual, as noted in the introduction. When Benda wrote his critique in 1927, he attacked intellectuals for not being what he argued they should have been. What he overlooked was that the capacity of intellectuals to be Benda intellectuals only became a strong possibility after disillusionment with the republican intellectual project. Intellectuals whom Benda would have admired had existed and argued in the SEDCG and in the LDH, but their arguments had been defeated within a vibrant rationality. The breakdown of that rationality after the war released the arguments adopted by Benda in the 1920's, namely that intellectuals stood committed to abstract principles where truth was located. Intellectuals could become more precisely intellectualist, more cerebral with the purpose of offering criticism of the necessary imperfection that followed any attempt to embody abstract principles in political and social reality. This individualistic and critical
role of the intellectual has become one of the ways to be an intellectual in the twentieth century, but republican intellectuals were not intellectuals in this sense. To judge their success or failure or their significance through this perspective, therefore, is fundamentally flawed.

Another possibility is to see intellectuals as the rationalisers of power. With the breakdown of the republican intellectual project, one possibility open to republican intellectuals was to interpret their actions during the war as having been just that, but, as noted, this normally involved the acceptance of another rationality which provided the insight by which to meaningfully criticise. When Gramsci, who did much to develop this model of intellectual as power rationaliser, formulated his understanding of an intellectual, he did so through the rationality of communism, to which he was committed as the embodiment of truth as much as any republican intellectual had been to the republican project. A vital difference for Gramsci, as opposed to a republican intellectual, however, was that the rationality of communism was held to owe nothing to intellectuals; they did not create it or form it. Therefore the very notion of intellectual was that of someone who, by definition for Gramsci, was involved in rationalising, when he or she claimed to speak with authority. With the recent collapse of the communist project, so attractive to intellectuals in the 1920's and 1930's, at least in terms of a dominant rationality, the very concept of a universal rationality has now been completely undermined, leaving Gramsci's insight but without the authority of the model that legitimated it(1). The coherence which the term intellectual expressed in the early part of this century no longer exists, and the very legitimacy of the word as a useful historical tool of analysis is in question. To use it unaware of its complicated history is to be involved in an exercise of distortion.
Finally, therefore, this thesis attempts to contribute to the debate about our very capacity to write history meaningfully without an explicit acknowledgement of the historical locatedness of our language and concepts. The republican intellectual project has an importance that outlives its own dramatic history, an importance which this thesis begins to explore.

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