Declaration

I declare that this dissertation has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other University and that it is entirely my own work.

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David Landy

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Summary
This thesis examines the recent Jewish Israel-critical movement in the UK, asking how it enables and directs Jewish criticism of Israel, and how the distant and local objects of activism are constructed and affected in this process. I also ask whether the interaction I outline between local contestation and distant issue activism pertains to other distant issue movements (DIMs).

The thesis is situated within the field of social movement studies, using a movement-relevant theory paradigm, which involves directing my research towards the concerns of the social movement I am studying. My methods followed from the grounded theory framework I used and involved a multiple process of data gathering – interviews, participant observation, and documentary analysis. I analysed the data to understand the processes of meaning-making of participants, as well as the empirical events people in this movement are involved in. My methodology also involves feedback to participants within the movement.

This thesis offers a descriptive analysis of this movement, its intellectual roots and routes, situates it within the British Jewish field and examines the problems it faces. I use this movement as a case study in delineating how an overtly political movement deploys and is constrained by the process of identity politics. I apply Bourdieu’s theory of field and habitus to explain the processes of meaning-making in distant issue movements (DIMs), and extend this theory to account for change from below. A purpose of the thesis is to investigate, through the instance of this particular movement, how the tension between the local field of contention, the subjectivity of the actors and the subjectivity of the object of solidarity provides the mechanism to explain the processes of change and contention that distant issue movements are engaged in.

I argue that the movement has succeeded in galvanising Jewish people to question, criticise and oppose Israel, but possibly the movement’s most important effect in the Jewish ethnic field is in loosening the automatic correspondence between Jewishness and Zionism. This thesis argues strongly in favour of the idea of identity contestation structuring knowledge and political projects, with movement goals arrived at in the dialogic process of identity construction with others in the field. While participants speak ‘as Jews’, a more accurate term for their disposition is ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, a disposition rooted in the local process of contention.
I use Bourdieu’s theory of practice to draw together different insights in social movement theory. This theory also offers a way of cutting through the false dichotomies of self-interest and altruism often applied to distant issue movements. The major way I adapt Bourdieu’s ideas is to highlight the salience of multi-field contention and outline a model of actors acting in and influenced by several local and distant fields. I advance the importance of external disruption as a determinant of changes in field contention. This schema of activists being affected by external discourses which they translate to local fields provides a means to explain how counter-hegemonic social movement activists can become carriers of change, while recognising that their actions are constrained by their habitus within the local field.
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I’ve been looking forward to write this section, signal that the thesis is complete and that I can finally properly thank everyone who helped in its completion. Firstly I want to thank my family; my mother and brother for providing much-needed moral support and encouragement. To Kirsti for providing constant reality checks, support and love. And especially thanks to Ruska for putting up with a daddy who was weird and busy.

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Glossary of acronyms and terms

Jewish/British terms

Board of Deputies of British Jews: An organisation established in 1760 as the main representative body for British Jews.

EJJP: European Jews for a Just Peace. A coalition of European Jewish groups established in 2002. JSG, JfJfP and JPUK are affiliated to the coalition.

IJV: Independent Jewish Voices. Organisation set up in 2006 as a counter-balance to the uncritical Zionism of established Jewish institutions in Britain, particularly the Board of Deputies.


Jewdas: Counter-cultural British Jewish group established in 2006.


JNF: Jewish National Fund. An organisation which obtains and develops land in Israel for exclusively Jewish settlement and for parks and forests. It is partly funded by outside donations.

JSG: Jewish Socialist’s Group. Established in 1974, this organisation is influenced by the tradition of secular Jewish radicalism and has engaged in Israel-critical activities.

IJAN: International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network. A recent coalition of anti-Zionist Jewish groups based in the US. A UK affiliate was established in late 2008.

JPUK: Just Peace UK. A group established in 2000 among British Jewish activists to support Palestinian rights. Has since become an internet group.

Orthodox Judaism: A religiously traditional Jewish denomination. In Britain they form a majority of the Jewish population, though are declining.

Progressive Judaism: A Jewish denomination with more liberal beliefs about religious observation. In Britain they are divided into Liberal and Reform affiliations. They form about 30% of British Jews affiliated to a synagogue.

PNUK: Peace Now UK. Small British support group for Peace Now organisation.

PSC: Palestine Solidarity Campaign. A British group supporting political solidarity with Palestinians.
Palestinian terms

ATG: The Alternative Tourism Group, a Bethlehem-based organisation established in 1995 which organises political tours around the West Bank and produces a guidebook to Palestine, among other publications.

Fatah: The largest faction of the PLO. Despite having lost the 2006 PA parliamentary elections to Hamas, Western and Israeli governments recognise it as the legitimate administrators of the PA. Manages the West Bank in cooperation with Israel.

Hamas: Islamist party that won the 2006 PA elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Designated a terrorist organisation and isolated by the West. Manages Gaza.

Nakba: Literally ‘disaster’ or ‘catastrophe’ in Arabic. The Palestinian term for the expulsion of 750-900,000 Palestinians from their lands, as part of the founding of Israel.

Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT): Sometimes called the Occupied Territories. Palestinian land that Israel occupied following the 1967 war, comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

PA: Palestinian Authority. The entity established to administer those parts of the Occupied Territories given partial autonomy under the Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation)

Israeli terms

ICAHD: Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. A Israeli group opposed to the Occupation, advocating full civil rights for Palestinians and supporting selective sanctions of Israel.

Kibbutz: A term for a collective community in Israel, usually a farm and originally founded on left-wing principles. Plural is kibbutzim; people who work on a kibbutz are kibbutzniks.

Meretz: A small left-wing Israeli political party with a support group in the UK.

Peace Now: An NGO in Israel with a support group in the UK. Peace Now supports the exchange of territory in the West Bank in return for peace with Palestinians.

Refusenik: A term for Israelis who refuse to serve in the military.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

It is 2007. In a darkened cinema in North London, about 100 Jews, mostly young, sit and watch a film clip of a 30-year old phone conversation. The clip is from a 1970s American Zionist fundraiser, and the phone call is between Barbara Streisand and the then prime minister of Israel, Golda Meir. The fawning phone conversation ends and Streisand starts singing *Hatikvah*, the Israeli national anthem. The tune is well known to this cinema audience and as soon as it starts I hear a few groans; someone nearby starts a loud conversation. Almost immediately a couple walk in from the wings to the front of the stage; there in front of the screen they start hula-hooping throughout the song. The audience claps, cheers, whistles, and falls about laughing as the strains to Hatikvah end.

What is going on here?

‘Jewla hooping’ is what it is called, one activity in a radical film festival organised by the recently-formed group, Jewdas. It’s a ‘culture-jamming’ activity, challenging a prior cultural understanding to make a political point. Zionism, look at it, it’s ridiculous and out-of-date. In fact, we don’t have to look at it, we can be up there mocking and ignoring it. Looking around, I see a networked group of people engaged in social contention – part of a social movement in other words. There are people from the various British Israel-critical groups and from none, some helping out in organising the day, others advertising their own activities. The question is what brought them together here? And further, what purpose does this event and others such as protests and public meetings have for the participants? Jewdas’s mission is to provide ‘radical voices for the alternative diaspora’, a reimagining of diaspora Jewishness (Jewdas 2009). How and why is this being reimagined by other British Jewish groups as well as Jewdas?

I’m experiencing the Jewla-hooping as an outsider-insider, an Irish academic observing a London Jewish event for a sociology dissertation. But I’m also laughing, joining in with the joke. Beside me, my non-Jewish London friend I’ve brought along sits looking bemused, knowing nothing about Golda Meir or Hatikvah or what’s the point in all this. This is another question; how I understand this event, my status in this movement as an Irish Jew, as an academic, and perhaps most of all, as a fellow activist. And once I understand this movement through its productions and internal conversations, there is the question which my friend, aware of my interest in Palestine put to me, as I explained the cultural context: ‘Ok, but
what’s this got to do with Palestine?’ This is the crucial question - not simply of this event or of this group, but of the whole movement of Israel-critical Jewish activists in Britain – how does the identity contestation of these networked individuals, which I describe as a movement, affect Israel/Palestine. ¹

This question is the pivot of the dissertation. It is how the Israel-critical Jewish movement in the UK enables and directs Jewish criticism of Israel, and how the distant and local objects of activism are constructed and affected in this process. I also ask whether the interaction I outline between local contestation and distant issue activism pertains to other distant issue movements (DIMs) (Rucht 2000). In this chapter I outline my approach to this thesis. I first discuss why I chose to study this particular movement and describe it. Then I ask what is at stake both on the local Jewish field and in relation to Israel/Palestine. I next describe how I study this movement with reference to Bourdieu’s theory of practice, using his models of habitus and field to explain how DIMs operate. I conceptualise DIMs as existing within the triangular tension between local fields, actor habitus, and the habitus of objects of activism. In addition, I present my idea of how field interaction operating through the persona of the social movement actor provides a mechanism for change from below. After discussing my research questions I outline the dissertation structure.

**Movement description**

Most diaspora Jews are supporters of Israel, even if that support is more muted of late (Cohen and Kelman 2007; Kosmin, Lerman, and Goldberg 1997; Liphshiz 2007). By ‘diaspora’ I refer to Jews living outside Israel. The majority of diaspora Jews now live in long established communities in English speaking countries in the West – the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and South Africa, though there are also large concentrations in continental Europe and South America. Support for Israel is certainly hegemonic among the 270,000 Jews in Britain, with all the main communal institutions professing Zionism, or support of Israel. Nevertheless, ever since Israel’s establishment in 1948, there have been diaspora Jews who have opposed

¹ I use the term Israel/Palestine for the territory under Israeli state control. Israel is the term for the state of Israel within its pre-1967 borders (referred to as the Green Line) and thus excluding the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and West Bank which it occupied following the 1967 war. ‘Palestine’ indicates the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The term ‘Israel’ is also a territorial imaginary, which for most Israelis and Zionists include major areas of Jewish settlement in Israel/Palestine, particularly around Jerusalem. It may also refer to all of Israel/Palestine. Likewise, among Palestinians and their supporters the term ‘Palestine’ may encompass all the land under Israeli control, excluding the Golan Heights. While I attempt to stick with the geographical terms, the imaginary role of these terms should be kept in mind when discussing the intentions of actors.
the state, whether from an ideological anti-Zionist standpoint or simply reacting to its treatment of Palestinians. Recently though, this has been transformed from a ‘not in my name’ individual opposition to and withdrawal of support from Israel to ‘not in our name’; a collective attempt to withdraw legitimacy from Israel’s claim to represent Jews and to forge a specifically Jewish collectivity that opposes Israel’s policies. In this dissertation I argue that we can speak for the first time of a diaspora Jewish social movement criticising Israel, using the case of the Anglo-Jewish Israel-critical movement as a significant instance of this trend.

Certainly in Britain, there is a networked group of Jews engaged in political contention with a common and very clearly delineated enemy – Zionists more so than Israel. This network is seeking to re-cognise the Israel/Palestine conflict for Jews and others (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), and there is a commonality of purpose which allows for major disagreements over tactics, such as the boycott campaign. The underlying aim is to challenge Zionist hegemony among their fellow Jews and to challenge Israel, speaking as Jews. The latter is directed at both mainstream and Jewish audiences, and provides support to Palestinians and the Palestine DIM. It is also partly directed towards the Palestine DIM, particularly the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) – informing them and (to a lesser extent) Palestinian people that there are Jews who oppose Israel and demanding they do not conflate the two. Thus these groups operate in two fields, the specific Jewish field and the wider political field. It is this dual process of field contention, I argue in chapter three, that demarcates them as a discrete movement separate both from the Palestine DIM and from purely identitarian Jewish groups.

Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon was the first time a strong diaspora Jewish disenchantment with Israel was articulated, a disenchantment that has grown with each successive war. Since the second intifada (Palestinian uprising) in 2000, diaspora Jewish groups that oppose Israel have sprung up in Canada, Australia, France, Italy, Belgium and even in Germany, and of course many organisations in the US (EJJP 2009; JFP 2007). In England, there is an alphabet soup of groups - Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP), Independent Jewish Voices (IJV), Jews Against Zionism (JAZ), Jews for Boycotting Israeli Goods (J-BIG), Just Peace UK (JPUK), not to mention the older Jewish Socialist Group (JSG). The profusion of groups should not obscure the networked and decentred nature of this activism. Groups undertake

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2 Eyerman and Jamison (1991) talk of social movements as engaged in cognitive praxis, with a prime aim being to advance an alternative cognition of existing practices, or to re-cognise them.

3 By Palestine DIM I mean British groups supporting Palestinians. I use the term PSM or Palestine Solidarity Movement when talking of groups offering political solidarity.
joint activities with Jewish and non-Jewish groups; activists are sometimes not linked to any group, sometimes to several, Jewish and non-Jewish. Thus I study Jewish people active in these groups as well as those involved in the International Solidarity Movement, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and British Committee for Universities for Palestine.

Geographically, I have limited my study to diaspora Jews in Britain who criticise Israel. Although these individuals and groups are networked loosely to other groups in Israel and the diaspora, it’s justifiable to limit the study geographically, because the primary focus of their activity and their strongest links are confined to the UK. I chose this specific group partly because British Jews are accessible research subjects and also because the British-Jewish Israel-critical movement is relatively large and developed. This continuity over time means that statements about the movement can be less tentative than would be the case for an emergent movement, and that this group offers a case-study of a relatively mature Israel-critical movement. It also shares discursive practices with foreign Jewish Israel-critical groups, and indeed provides a template for these groups. This movement then can be seen as a developed example as well as an important constituent part of the growing global Jewish dissent over Israel. I argue that it is possible to generalise about my findings and examine their applicability to other Jewish critics of Israel. In addition, Anglo-Jewish critics of Israel are more than a researchable and significant instance of a general Jewish case. The dynamics of this movement, in particular the relation between identity construction and distant issue activism are (for reasons I discuss in chapter six) overt and very clearly articulated and by being so, they allow me to provide important insights relevant to the dynamics of other DIMs.

I talk about British, rather than English Jewish critics of Israel since their groups are nominally nationwide. At the same time, the English and London-dominated nature of these groups and of British Jewry in general (often referred to as ‘Anglo-Jewry’) should be recognised. According to the 2001 census 96.7% of British Jews live in England, of which two-thirds live in London (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007: 3). Among Jewish Israel-critical groups, the London bias is even more pronounced.

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4 For instance Independent Australian Jewish Voices was founded a month after, and in response to the British group Independent Jewish Voices (http://www.iajv.org/about-us/). US Israel-critical Jews were also influenced by the establishment of IJV (Schalit 2008)
There are some linkages with Israeli and (to a smaller extent) Palestinian organisations and there are efforts to form coalitions – European Jews for Just Peace (EJJP) in Europe, and the more radical International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN, still at the formative stage). Despite these links, most of their efforts are directed at the national level. These groups are composed mainly of liberal/leftist Jews with many participants active in the political field – commonly with the Labour or Liberal parties, and human rights organisations. Their work comprises of organising information meetings, protests, lobbying government and so on. As a rough estimate, there is a small core of 30-70 committed activists, networked with each other, with a wider core of several hundred willing to become active at times of crisis, and able to draw on several thousand open sympathisers.

This Israel-critical diaspora Jewish movement has been somewhat successful in informing ambient society of Jewish opposition to Israel as well as affecting fellow Jews. As new social movement (NSM) theorists would argue, the mere fact of their existence signals success (Melucci 1989); to use Bourdieu’s (1977) terms, they have removed diaspora Jewish support for Israel out of the universe of the undisputed into the universe of opinion, thereby making this support challengeable. The movement has more definite effects too among other Jews, with some mainstream British Jewish opinion beginning to grudgingly respond to the existence of dissent (Bayfield et al 2009). The opposition they have provoked from local Zionist hegemonies can be seen as a response to their success as well as a success in itself; the fact that Zionists need to spend increasing amounts of time condemning fellow Jews for being antisemitic (Julius 2008; Rosenfeld 2006) undermines this key Zionist argument and diverts Zionist resources. Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasise the strength of this movement; it is still a small, marginalised group of people whose claim to speak out as Jews on Israel/Palestine is subjected to constant attack.

This leads to the question of ‘who is a Jew’. Among Jews, Jewish identity is a hotly contested topic, with the Jewish credentials of those who oppose Israel constantly challenged. My definition of Jewish identity is very broad-based, allowing for an identity based on ascription by self. 5 When describing this heterogeneous and sometimes divergent movement, I have used the term ‘Israel-critical diaspora Jewish movement’ or some variant thereof. This term is a minimalistic description, referring to the distinctive aspect of participants, that they

5 Having said that, all my interviewees were halachically Jewish – that is Jewish according to religious law – even though I didn’t select for this. I discuss the implications in chapter six.
are Jews in the diaspora who publicly criticise Israel. To refer to them as Jewish peace activists or justice activists is too vague and subject to misinterpretation. I do not call them Palestinian solidarity activists either. Though some are motivated by solidarity, most draw a line between the purpose of this movement and ‘pure’ solidarity, saying that this movement supports universalist demands for peace and justice rather than solidarity with one side or another. Nevertheless, the term ‘Israel-critical’ has its drawbacks in that it only refers to the negative aspect of movement activism. The positive aspects, whether they are reconstructing an alternative Jewish identity, reaching out to Palestinians and Muslims, or fighting for justice and human rights for Palestinians, are only implied by the definition.

What is at stake? The historicity of this movement

When asking questions of a movement it is easy and above all, researchable to get caught up in processes of local contention and movement mechanics. These processes of contention need to be researched since one argument in the dissertation is how they direct the political imaginaries and the ‘discursive repertoires’ of the movement (Steinberg 1999). However we should not lose sight of the larger picture, what Touraine (1981) calls the ‘historicity’ of the movement; that there is something wider than the subjectivity of the actors at stake in the work that social movements undertake.

This movement operates in two fields. On the one hand it is a distant issue movement (DIM) criticising a state thousands of miles away in sympathy and sometimes solidarity with its victims and internal critics. On the other hand this movement could not be closer to participants’ sense of themselves. For many it is, like feminism, a means of self-liberation, finding a voice to speak up (as a Jew) for values like human rights and justice. As personal liberation it is intensely political, challenging local Zionist hierarchies and reconstituting the notion and practices of diaspora Jewishness. Questions about this activism need to be directed to three interlocking levels – the collectively personal, the local political, and the issue of Israel/Palestine. In this section and the next I examine what is at stake for movement participants on the local and distant fields of contention.

Firstly the local. The Jewish Israel-critical movement reimagines diaspora Jewish identity, an identity which has centred on supporting Israel, especially since the 1967 war (Finkelstein 2003a; Novick 2000). It is this support for Israel - part identity and part ideology - which I
term ‘diaspora Zionism’ or more commonly ‘Zionism’. This communal Zionist praxis allowed increasingly secular and disparate diaspora Jews a way of identifying as Jewish as well as providing the structures and modes of practice that undergirded Jewish communities. It offered diaspora Jews a way of being Jewish and being with Jews (Landy 2005, 2007). However, this binding communal ideology has come at an increasingly high price for diaspora Jews. As Israel faces growing criticism in Europe and the US, diaspora Jewish identity has become ever more defensive – more closed, right-wing and hostile to the outside world (Goldberg 2006; Novick 2000; Rose 2005; Silberstein 2000a). It is also hostile to Jews who criticise Israel. Their actions are commonly attacked for damaging ‘the community’ and even for being antisemitic, and their Jewishness is, as a matter of course, called into question (Alexander and Bogdanor 2006; Julius 2008; Ottolenghi 2005, 2007; Rosenfeld 2006).

Jewish critics of Israel challenge this identity. Against dominant Zionist narratives of increasingly antisemitic host societies attacking Jews by attacking Israel, they offer a counter-narrative of diaspora Jews separate from Israel and bearing the responsibility of criticising it themselves (Butler 2004; Karpf et al. 2008; Polner and Merken 2007; Kushner and Solomon 2003). Such responsibility is occasioned by how Israel claims to speak in their name anyway, and for some it derives from their belief in a Jewish responsibility for Israel. It also stems from a wish to challenge what is seen as a corrosive effect of Zionism on contemporary diaspora Jewish identity, identified also by supporters of Israel (Benbassa and Attias 2004; Pinto 2000). The aim of such diasporism is to oppose what is seen as a closed ethno-nationalism centred around Israel that is currently consuming diaspora Jews and instead to construct an innately heterogeneous Jewish identity open to ambient society, 6 centred on concepts of justice and human rights (Beller 2008; Lerman 2008c, 2009). In reconstructing diaspora Jewish identity they draw upon various traditions in both secular and religious Jewish thought, especially, though not exclusively, diaspora critiques of the Zionist project.

Recalling Habermas’s (1987) comments on social movements being a rational reconstruction of the lifeworld, Jewish Israel-critical groups could be seen as revitalising the normative structures of the Jewish lifeworld currently colonised by out-of-touch Zionist institutions (Landy 2006). As such, these British groups, although attacked by Zionists, are applauded by ambient society. In contemporary Britain where closed ethnic communities are seen as a

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6 I follow David Graham’s use of ‘ambient society’ and ‘ambient population’ in preference to ‘general population’, or ‘host population’, since it ‘emphasises the interrelationship between Jews and the people amongst whom they live’ (Graham 2004: 22).
threat to society and the state (Kundnani 2007), such groups are seen as a means of breaking down the barriers between these communities and ambient society by challenging the power of unrepresentative conservative community leaders who, in the words of Sunny Hundal’s New Generation Network, serve as ‘government sanctioned gate-keepers’ of the community (NGN 2006).

Nevertheless there is more to these groups than letting Jews feel at home in the diaspora. Some Jewish writers and activists critical of Israel are wary about this movement being trapped into focusing primarily on Jewishness (Ellis 2003; Farber 2005, 2006). This is the other pole of activity – Israel/Palestine and the oppression of the Palestinian people. Below I delineate this oppression as well as the support Western governments offer Israel to indicate why people in Britain become active on the issue, and the urgency and importance they accord to this activism.

Israeli policies towards Palestinians are founded on the state’s desire to maintain a Jewish state ruling Israel/Palestine, and can be divided into direct and indirect oppression. By indirect oppression I refer to the majority of Palestinians, the some 5.5 million Palestinian exiles (BADIL 2008) who were either expelled themselves or who are descendents of those expelled in Israel’s ongoing campaign of ethnic cleansing (Benvenisti 2000; Karmi and Cotran 1999; Pappé 2006a). This ethnic cleansing began with the expulsion of 750-900,000 Palestinians in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, an event which Palestinians call the Nakba or catastrophe, and has continued thereafter with another peak following the 1967 war and the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights (Masalha 2003; Pappé 2006b). The majority of these Palestinians live in refugee camps in the Middle East and are denied their right of return, a key political demand of the Palestinian people.

Turning to Palestinians under direct Israeli control, they can be further subdivided into citizens of Israel and those living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza strip) who are subject to military rule. There are 1.45 million Palestinians who are nominal citizens of Israel (CBS 2008a) but who face a raft of discriminatory measures that have intensified in recent years (Cook 2006; Nathan 2005). And finally there are 4 million Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (CIA 2009). Israel’s 42-year old military occupation has grown increasingly oppressive, partially in response to Palestinian uprisings.

7 As one might expect, the notion that there was ethnic cleansing rather than a fortuitous movement of Palestinians is contested by some Israeli historians (Karsh 1997).
but also in order to maintain its some half-million illegal settlers in the West Bank (Gordon 2008). In recent years the Occupied Territories has been further subdivided into the West Bank, ruled by Israel but nominally governed by a Western-supported Fatah administration, and the besieged Gaza strip under the democratically elected Hamas administration. The occupation regime in the West Bank is certainly grim, consisting of hundreds of army checkpoints, ongoing violence against the population including house demolitions and assassinations, destruction of the economy and expansion of illegal Jewish settlements, mass arrests and torture of prisoners (Makdisi 2008). However it is not as harsh as the regime Israel imposes on Gaza, which involves mass killings, destruction of all infrastructure, and starving the population of basic goods and services such as clean water, food, paper and electricity (PCHR 2007, 2008, 2009).

Israeli policies against Palestinians have been theorised as ‘politicide’ or the destruction of Palestinian political and civic society (Kimmerling 2003), and ‘spacio-cide’ or the decoupling of Palestinians from their land in order to facilitate ‘voluntary transfer’ (Hanafi 2009). Such theorists agree that the strategy of Israel is to treat Palestinians as ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998), with no political existence, at best a humanitarian ‘problem’ (Lentin 2008b; Masalha 2003). The EU and Britain actively support Israel, trading arms and granting Israel favourable trade deals under the EU-Israel association agreement, as well as providing assistance to Israel’s academic and cultural institutions. Those who protest Israel’s treatment of Palestinians also protest against their own government’s and the EU’s support for Israel.

This indicates the two main fields this Israel-critical movement operates in - the political field which can be divided between the local political field and the distant issue field, and the Jewish ethnic field. When starting to research those groups within the UK Israel-critical movement such as JfJfP, JSG etc, I had thought there would be a strong dichotomy between ‘supporting the Palestinians’ and ‘healing the Jews’. Yet the promise of these groups is that participants can do both. As Frances, a senior JfJfP member I interviewed said: 8

We do not say we support the Palestinians because that would protect Israel. That’s not why we support the Palestinians. We do say ‘Israelis, don’t you realise that your future depends upon establishing peace with the Palestinians?’ Different people will put that slightly differently, so sometimes that will sound like we’re only doing this to protect the Jews. It’s not my position. As I say, what we say is, ‘we do this because we believe it’s right’. 8

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8 Names of interviewees have been changed to preserve confidentiality.
This raises two questions. Firstly, what does ‘support the Palestinians’ mean – does it mean supporting their struggle or charitable support? In answering this question, I lay out the main repertoires of contention of both this movement and the wider Palestinian DIM, as well as how this movement relates to the Palestine DIM. The second question revolves around the tensions between the distant issue aspect and the closely personal aspects of this movement. Such tensions between the local and distant is shared by other DIMs (Johnston 2003; Waterman 1998). It is the central issue of the dissertation, and so after outlining the practical questions around ‘supporting Palestinians’, I explain how I approach this issue.

I characterise these Jewish Israel-critical groups as being in part attached to a larger DIM supporting Palestinians, the most important component of which is the PSM, stressing political solidarity with Palestinians. However there are other parts of this DIM, such as charity groups like Medical Aid for Palestinians, and human rights organisations such as Amnesty International. The central aim of this DIM is to stop or ameliorate Israeli oppression of Palestinians. This is done in three main ways – support for Israeli dissent, support for Palestinian resistance and capacity to resist, and putting external pressure on the Israeli state. I would invert a customary belief of many in Jewish Israel-critical groups and the Palestine DIM who see hope, not in Palestine but in themselves and in the Israeli microgroups opposing or simply monitoring the occupation. Instead I maintain that supporting internal Israeli dissidence is relatively unimportant. In overthrowing colonial control in places like South Africa the dissidence of the ruling caste has been shown to be a function of external pressure and resistance, rather than a crucial factor of itself (Thörn 2009). In Israel such analysis is supported by the stagnation, smallness and internal political unimportance of these groups.

Turning to the second point, while stressing the centrality of Palestinian resistance for liberation, I don’t adopt a third-worldist viewpoint of unequivocal support for nationalist leaderships in the global south. Neither does the Palestine DIM, partly because the divisions Israel has successfully fostered within the Palestinian polity have meant that there is no unitary nationalist leadership to support. Palestinian divisions and powerlessness vis-à-vis Israel has meant that rather than supporting Palestinian resistance, the international campaign has mainly worked to support the Palestinian capacity to resist Israeli repression. On the directly political side, this involves legitimising the Palestinian right to resist and supporting their struggle. While this is done to an extent by solidarity groups (and even here, violent
resistance is rarely supported), aid organisations and those governed by human rights discourse commonly do not support Palestinian resistance. This is a key division in the DIM. Support for Palestinian society and existence is more widespread. In the context of Israeli attempts to destroy this society, the mere fact of existence as a Palestinian collectivity can be seen as a form of indirect resistance (Hanafi 2009). Thus humanitarian campaigns, cultural events or even tourism in the Occupied Territories, while not directly political, indirectly support Palestinian capacity to resist.

Finally there are efforts to ensure domestic states and civil society put pressure on Israel. The Palestine DIM, especially the PSM part of it, attempts to influence the British government and the EU through protests, petitions and lobbying campaigns. The main means the civil society campaign employs is the BDS strategy (Boycott Divestment Sanctions) against Israel, which has grown in importance since the 2005 *Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions* (Various 2005).

In conclusion, the Palestine DIM has concentrated on indirect support – delegitimising Israeli control and supporting the capacity of Palestinians to resist and exist – as the best available strategy. The PSM element of it increasingly focuses on the boycott campaign. Jewish Israel-critical groups feature straight solidarity elements, and human rights and aid campaigns, as well as solidarity with Israeli dissidents. Thus, all elements of this Palestine DIM activity are represented among Jewish Israel-critical groups, and so any investigation of their activities is, within limits, generalisable beyond these groups.

**Research questions**

Following Bevington and Dixon’s (2005) call to produce movement-relevant theory, my research praxis involves directing my research towards the concerns of the social movement I am studying. This does not mean I engage in an apologia for this diaspora Jewish Israel-critical movement, more that I wish to produce research which will promote critical discussion among activists as well as academics (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005). Although this is a growing movement that has received a reasonable amount of interest, there have been no serious sociological studies of diaspora Jews who oppose Israel. The literature is comprised on the one hand of movement-related productions defending Israel-critical Jews and expounding their positions (Landy 2009), and on the other hand of a plethora of Zionist
attacks on the movement (Rose 2008). Neither provides the movement the degree of analysis necessary for critical self-reflection. By offering a description of this movement, situating it in both Jewish and DIM fields of contention the first aim of this dissertation is to provide such an analysis.

There has been a considerable body of research about identity in social movements, particularly the political effects of identity contestation, which is the subject of my second research question (Bernstein 1997, 2005; Bickford 1997; Cerulo 1997; Gamson 1995; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Melucci 1989, 1996; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). I argue that the process of identity contestation enables actors to criticise Israel, and thereby helps determine their political imaginary. I examine the process of identity formation and pariah reversal and ask what are the advantages and costs that accrue when people deploy their ethnic identity for political contestation (Gamson 1995). While there are considerable advantages in this instance, the downside is equally considerable, with the danger of activism becoming a solipsistic exercise in self-affirmation and of actors losing sight of the subjectivity of Palestinians. Many activists in this movement are aware of this identity trap and I wish to find out how they negotiate the paradoxes of identity contestation. In doing so, I seek to contribute to the literature in this field as well as asking questions of central interest to participants in DIMs.

My third research question asks whether Bourdieu’s schema of practice can be used to provide a mechanism to understand the specific processes of multi-field contention in DIMs. Here I take up Crossley’s (2002, 2003) advice to apply Bourdieu’s thoughts to social movements. Bourdieu’s theory of practice argues that the interaction of habitus (‘systems of durable transposable dispositions’: Bourdieu 1990: 53) and field-specific capital in a field of contention leads to forms of social practice and constitutes these fields. In chapter three I outline the usefulness in applying this practice to a distant issue movement, namely that it provides a framework to study the interaction between the local fields of contention, local actor subjectivities, and the subjectivity of the object of activism.

I further argue that this schema provides a powerful mechanism to understand the production of meaning by DIMs, allowing students of DIMs to move beyond false dichotomies between ‘altruistic’ and ‘self-interested’ movements (Teske 1997). I try to resolve the problem of interest in DIMs by deploying Bourdieu’s insight that each field of contention has its own definitions of interest. From outside the field the specific capital of fields may seem like
disinterest or irrationality, but from within the field, it is logically constituted interest in disinterest (Bourdieu 2000). I explore how Bourdieu’s insight applies to the case of this movement, which sees itself as upholding universal concepts of justice and human rights against those in the ethnic field they are contending with. As opposed to what they see as parochial Zionist ethnocentrism they construct themselves as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’, people whose universal dispositions are Jewish and are rooted in the specific process of contestation in the Jewish field.

Equally interesting is how this process of self-construction as rooted cosmopolitans affects actor interactions with Palestinians. In asking how the various fields of movement activism interact with each other, I ask a question relevant to all DIM activism, whether solidarity movements, human rights groups, or aid agencies, all of whose activism is constructed in the interaction between local identity contestation and distant issue activism (Giugni and Passy 2001; Tarrow 2005). I ask to what extent this self-construction as universal subjects involves a necessary effacement of Palestinian subjectivity in this movement, and whether one can apply this mechanism whereby actors build up their own subjectivity at the expense of the subjectivity of the object of activism to other distant issue movements.

*The fourth research question involves using this instance as a case study to extend Bourdieu’s theory of practice to account for change from below.* Bourdieu has been rightly criticised for failing to provide a mechanism for dominated fractions within fields to achieve change – field transformation within his work appears mainly as repressive change from above (Joppke 1986). While Bourdieu offers a penetrating analysis of strategies of domination, he fails to account for struggles from below for change (Risse 2005). One way of adapting his theory to do so has been provided by Crossley’s idea of ‘radical habitus’, the disposition towards political action engendered in social movements (Crossley 2003). I try to provide another means to adapt it, seeing social movement actors as translators of external field discourse to affect change in the local field of contention. Such a mechanism to achieve field change heightens the importance of the distant issue field, since it is in part the ability to incorporate this alien habitus which provides the impetus for change.

In summary I have set myself several research questions and aims. The first is to provide a descriptive analysis of this movement, useful for both movement activists and those studying (or active in) similar counter-hegemonic groups among ethnic minorities. The second is to use this movement as a case study in delineating how an overtly political movement deploys
and is constrained by the process of identity politics. The third aim is to apply Bourdieu’s theory of field and habitus to explain the processes of meaning-making in distant issue movements. And the fourth is to try to extend this theory to account for change from below. All these questions and aims are interlinked: it is to investigate, through the instance of this particular movement, how the tension between the local field of contention, the subjectivity of the actors and the subjectivity of the object of solidarity provides the mechanism to explain the processes of change and contention that distant issue movements are engaged in.

**Structure of dissertation**

I begin by outlining my methodology and theoretical framework (chapter two and three). I continue with a review of diaspora Jewish arguments against Israel (chapter four) and a description of the movement and its particular background (chapter five). I next move onto analysis; in chapter six I examine the processes of identity construction within this movement, and then ask how this affects political positions and strategies (chapter seven). In chapter eight I relate this process of contention to Palestinians and similar processes in the Palestine DIM. Below I give a more detailed overview of chapters.

In *chapter two* I describe my methods and methodology. I discuss my research design and the mixed methods framework I use to analyse the movement. I then turn to the methodological questions raised by my position as an insider/outsider, both as a Jew and a member of the PSM. I explain how and why I fit my work within the paradigm of movement-relevant research.

In *chapter three* I discuss my theoretical framework – why I view my research subject as a social movement and how I study it. I draw on Bourdieu’s concept of field to argue that it is mainly the process of contesting local fields – political and ethnic - that enables and directs this movement. However, it is interaction with distant fields which provides an important impetus for field transformation.

I examine Jewish criticism of Israel in *chapter four*, since movement members draw upon this criticism in their processes of contention. This literature review focuses on attempts to reimagine diaspora Jewishness as separate from Zionism. I argue that this reworking of Jewish traditions to forge a new identity is a creative but problematic appropriation of past
ideas for present purposes, one which tends to efface the centrality of Palestinian subjectivity in Israel/Palestine.

Chapter five is a description of these groups and their practices, and where they fit in with modern Anglo-Jewry. I explain why I use the term ‘ethnic field’ in preference to ‘community’ in describing British Jewry. In providing a background of the Anglo-Jewish field I focus on the intra-field strains as well as the crisis in relations between diaspora Jews and Israel, since this movement was established in the space this crisis has occasioned.

In chapter six I examine identity construction in the movement and how it affects the goals and outcomes of this movement. I describe how building up a positive identity (collective and individual) is necessary to counteract stigmatisation, and happens through dialogical contestation and conversations with Zionists and others in the Jewish and political fields. I argue that through these contestations, movement members are constructing an identity for themselves as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’.

In chapter seven I discuss how movement goals are arrived at primarily through contending in local terrains of activism. I use the divergent positions actors take on boycotting Israel to examine how their judgement as to the best local terrain of action to affect change centrally affects their political attitudes. While local fields are important in determining strategy and ideology, the subjectivity of Palestinians has some effect. I advance the importance of external disruption as a determinant of changes in field contention.

This discussion is continued in chapter eight where I examine the construction of Palestinian subjectivity both in the PSM and in this movement. I relate this to discussions in tourism and development studies about how Northerners relate to the global south, and argue that the relationship between DIMs and the object of activism is crucial in realising movement aims. My argument is that a disposition that is not focused on the subjectivity of the object of activism hampers actors’ effectiveness as agents for change and makes them more susceptible to the dominant discourses of the local fields they inhabit.

Chapter nine summarises the dissertation, outlines my conclusions, and indicates future research questions.
Chapter 2. Methodology

The letter was in the 22 Jan 2009 edition of the Irish Times, amongst other letters condemning Israel’s attack on Gaza. ‘We are people in Ireland who are Jewish or of Jewish descent’ the letter began, ‘We are appalled by Israel’s slaughter in Gaza.’ It continued with conventional truisms:

it is not anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish to oppose Israel’s action… nothing, but nothing, justifies the massacre of innocent people… peace will only come about through justice for the Palestinian people and through negotiations.

It concluded, ‘We ask people not to claim to speak for us when justifying Israel’s barbarity.’

The signatories were myself (who had organised it) and seven others, including my thesis supervisor. In the following weeks several letters attacked it, several defended it, and then the media refocused, lost interest in Gaza. I posted the letter on the anti-Zionist jews sans frontieres blog and so the vague knowledge was diffused that even in Ireland there are Jews who protest against Israel, which in a small way bolstered and was part of the growing diaspora Jewish revolt against Israel’s oppression of Palestinians. The letter remained as reminder to those who signed it that we had taken a public position; as a useful minor resource for the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign (IPSC), of which I am a member; and as a warning to increasingly strident Irish Zionists not to claim to speak in our name. Our name, as Jews.

This letter was a fruit of my research into Israel-critical Jewish groups in the UK. It emerged from a realisation of the power of criticising Israel as a Jew, (not to mention the understanding of Israel/Palestine I got from my research), a realisation too that I was Jewish and could speak out as a Jew. I mention this story as it shows the interlinking of my academic and activist work, and how both have enabled political engagement, specifically an engagement in expressive and instrumentalist politics similar to those employed by the research subjects in my dissertation. There is a danger with such interlinking, in that involvement as an activist in the research topic may suppress critical thought about it. Yet I argue in this chapter that it is possible to avoid this pitfall while still producing movement-relevant research, which is my methodological paradigm. This paradigm involves neither praising nor burying social movements, but critically analysing their activities in the belief
that an honest appraisal will prove useful to the work of the movement and competencies of participants, as well as be academically valid and theoretically productive.

In this chapter I outline how I do this, the research paradigm and the methodological issues surrounding my own role as insider/outsider. I begin with my methodological framework – the application of grounded theory to a piece of research which is within the critical inquiry tradition. Then I account for my choice to focus on a specific aspect of this social process, my unit of study being ‘opposition to Israel’; the social movement rather than individual activists. Next I talk of the research design and how I used multiple methods to study this movement. I examine each method I deployed – interviews, documentary analysis and participant observation - before turning to how I analyse the data collected. I then turn to the methodological questions raised by my position as an insider/outsider, both as a Jew and as a member of the Palestinian Solidarity Movement. Such questions revolve around how I relate to the subjects of my study, and how my research relates to their social movement and to Palestinians.

**Critical inquiry and grounded theory**

In this section I outline the theoretical resources I used to conduct this study. Conducting a project of engaged research, I was guided by critical inquiry praxis, drawing on Bourdieu as providing the most appropriate theoretical framework to this particular social practice. I briefly discuss this and then move to the methodology I deployed, which was grounded theory. In accordance with grounded theory praxis, I then discuss the processes of theory development and data collection. This provides an introduction to the research methods, which I outline in the next section.

The praxis of critical inquiry is not a specific set of practices but rather a search for ‘emancipatory knowledge, knowledge in the context of action and the search for freedom’ (Crotty 1998: 159). As such it is an evolving hybrid, drawing on whichever methodologies seem appropriate in the unearthing of such knowledge. Critical inquiry fits in with the concept of social movement researcher as a *bricoleur*, that is someone producing a bricolage or ‘a pieced together set of representations that is fitted to the specifics of a complex situation’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 4). Guba and Lincoln link the critical theory tradition with a search for structural and historical insights into social processes and the employment
of dialogic and reflexive methodologies (Guba and Lincoln 2005: 193). Inherent in the process of inquiry is the adoption of a critical (including self-critical) stance towards social processes. Critical inquiry sees the political outcomes of research as central to the research project (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005). This is related to how I consider this social movement as an active knowledge-producing body rather than an inert subject of research.

Critical inquiry also foregrounds reflexive concerns. In conducting engaged scholarship, Van de Ven (2007) recommends adopting an objective ontology and subjective epistemology, or in other words, accepting that while the world does in fact exist independent of our senses, our interpretation of it – including the researcher’s – is socially constructed and subjective, and therefore needs to be examined. As Kincheloe and McLaren write: ‘Research in the critical tradition takes the form of self-conscious criticism – self-conscious in the sense that researchers try to become aware of the ideological imperatives and epistemological presuppositions that inform their research as well as their own subjective, intersubjective and normative reference claims’ (2005: 305).

The set of representations of the social world I have found to particularly suit this particular case and social movements more generally is Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1990), which I discuss in chapter three. I believe that through applying Bourdieu’s approach one can avoid the central problem of social constructionism – the minimalisation of personal agency, and the way that the highlighting of structural constraints can be transformed into social determinism (Calhoun 1995). In this dissertation I seek to foreground the agency of actors, while understanding the structural constraints they work under. This has determined how I read participants’ interviews in that I related people’s ideas and actions to the web of social relations and structures they were involved in, yet not see these ideas as a simple function of these structures.

My specific methodology was the deployment of grounded theory in data collection, theorisation and analysis. In this methodology, the interweaving of data and theory is crucial: grounded theory consists of ‘a set of flexible analytical guidelines that enable researchers to focus their data collection and to build inductive middle–range theories through successive levels of data analysis and conceptual development’ (Charmaz 2005: 507). In grounded theory, theory-driven research is seen as distorting the case being researched, and theoretical ideas are derived from the specific data of the case.
This description of grounded theory should be qualified. Philosophically speaking, theory can’t actually ‘emerge’ from data but must inform the selection of data in the first place, and so the question as to what grounds grounded theory remains. Pidgeon and Henwood (2004) offer a constructivist revision of grounded theory, suggesting that the data should guide rather than limit theorising – the term ‘generation of theory’ rather than ‘discovery of theory’ is a more accurate description of the process. Initially grounded theory tries to avoid defining the research focus – a rhetorical contrast is sometimes made between hypothesis testing and grounded theory development where theories are formed in response to the process of data collection (Charmaz 2000; Pidgeon and Henwood 2004). This also accords with theorists of movement-relevant research and their wariness of treating social movements as a site for hypothesis testing (Bevington and Dixon 2005; Johnston and Goodman 2006).

In this research my theorisation developed in tandem with the data collection, with both influencing each other. I did not enter the study in a state of theoretical naivety, but was guided by what Charmaz calls ‘sensitising concepts’ on the issues this movement was active in (Charmaz 2005: 512). I was also guided by the vague intuition that this movement represented something interesting related to the broader Palestinian solidarity issue. However, I did not start off by identifying this movement as an instance of a hypothesis, but proceeded to use my data about this particular movement to develop a deeper understanding of it and to develop theories relating to solidarity movements and identitarian claims. Below I provide a timeline which talks of the methods that I deployed and how theories were generated during data collection.

My data collecting involved feedback to participants and interwove observation, documentary analysis and interviews over a three year period (2005-8). Initially I mapped the area of study, conducting analysis of material produced by and about Jewish groups, which I combined with online questions, some participant observation and three pilot interviews with movement activists in late 2005. I presented this mapping exercise to a conference in early 2006 (Landy 2006), and relayed this back to my interviewees. These pilot interviews helped shape the research direction. I had originally placed this movement squarely within the area of identity politics, but it was abundantly clear that while interviewees were happy enough to talk about these issues, they also saw themselves as part of a social movement geared towards effecting change in Israel/Palestine. This is why I found it useful to compare this network with other distant issue movements.
My next step was to go on a study tour of Israel/Palestine in October 2006 organised by the Israeli peace group, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD). Such study tours are organised by left-wing Israeli and Palestinian groups to show foreigners the results of Israel’s policy towards Palestinians and to encourage these foreigners to become activists on the issue upon returning home (Landy 2008). The aim of this field trip was to examine how Israel, Palestine and the subjectivity of the participants were represented on these trips, which I have identified as important in forming the understanding of activists in the Palestine DIM, and in British Jewish Israel-critical groups. The study trip promoted a focus on the role of developmentalism and of the distant field in constructing this activism. Furthermore, the data collected on the trip about the discursive construction of Israel and Palestine among non-Jewish solidarity activists allowed me to assess the generalisability of my findings vis-à-vis other distant issue activists.

In summer 2007 I continued my interviews, interviewing sixteen Jewish participants in opposition activities to Israel, and engaging in participant observation of events. I was invited back by the largest group, Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP), to present the results of my research in January 2008, which proved a useful site for dialogue. I conducted a further two interviews in early 2008, after which I felt I had achieved theoretical saturation. Subsequently I have maintained contact with members of the movement, receiving occasional feedback about my work. This brief summary of the research process indicates how it was developed through a deepening understanding of this particular case study. As such the research design fits in with grounded theory case study design.

In defining the specific area of study, the first question was ‘what is my unit of study’. After initial interviews, I decided that it would be less useful to study ‘Israel-critical diaspora Jews’ than ‘Diaspora Jewish opposition to Israel.’ By concentrating on ‘opposition’ rather than ‘critics’ I focus less on the individuals involved and their life histories than on the public discourses produced. However, this statement must be severely qualified – these discourses aren’t produced by free-floating monads, but by individuals embedded in social life, in particular, as I argue in chapter three, embedded in a social movement. Thus the unit of study is the social movement of Jewish activists opposed to Israeli actions (while accepting this movement is heterogeneous and constructed).

Research into the discursive productions of social movements has the advantage of being practicable, since this is public and therefore accessible discourse. Equally conveniently, the
concentration on ‘opposition’, by which I mean publicly expressed opposition, narrows down the area of study. Most British Jews are in some ways critical of Israel’s government (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004; Kosmin, Lerman, and Goldberg 1997), and so my area of study would be potentially vast if I incorporated every instance when Jews criticise Israel. While it is undoubtedly practical to exclude dinner-party grumblings, the question of what ‘opposition’ involves needs further elucidation. I define ‘oppositional activity’ quite loosely, since a social movement cannot be reduced to protests and other public manifestations of political opposition. So I included cultural activities such as the counter-cultural group, Jewdas’s events, as well as identity building events such as the 2003 JifP conference entitled, *Jewish Dilemmas, Jewish Identities*, since they all help build a public consciousness critical of Israel.

I exclude groups like Peace Now UK and other ‘friendly critics’ of Israel – those who *declare* opposition to the occupation and *practice* opposition to public critics of the occupation. While it can be argued that Jewish groups form a continuum, there is no need to profess naivety as to the purpose and political positions of ‘Left Zionists’ (Galili 2006; ha-Cohen 2006; Laor 2004). Even though Left Zionists in Britain nominally oppose the occupation, their actions are often directed against Palestinian solidarity groups, or even against more ‘radical’ Jewish groups, as I discuss in the data analysis chapters. In addition, none of my interviewees saw a commonality of purpose with Left Zionist groups, though many had gone through such groups. In practice this process of exclusion and inclusion means that when studying diaspora Jewish opposition to Israel, I survey two main types of actors – those involved in Jewish groups and those involved in the wider Palestine DIM, with some overlap between the two.

**Methods**

I employed observation, interviews and documentary analysis to study this movement. The multiple methods I used emerged from my epistemological framework, in particular the participant frame of reference which I adopted to study this phenomenon. Such a frame cannot automatically start from the assumption that one method necessarily reveals the social process, instead it uses multiple methods to move towards a more robust approximation of reality (Azevedo 1997). I see my use of multiple methods as complementary rather than triangulative. The idea of methodological triangulation whereby interview data is validated by observation, or documents which act as a benchmark of truth, has been criticised. This is
because such ideas are based upon an image of ‘a single fixed reality that can be known objectively through the use of multiple methods of social research’ (Seale 1999). While the use of multiple methods is no guarantee of validity, as Silverman (2006) says, they can be used to deepen understanding of an area and to ‘complexify’ the data.

In this section I outline which areas each method was used to reveal/construct. In appraising whether my methods are adequate, two issues concerned me. The first was whether the methods give a sufficient insight into the social process I was studying so that I can come to adequately based conclusions about the movement. The second was whether these conclusions can be generalisable outside this small social movement. In other words, issues of internal and external validity.

The first of my methods was participant observation, which I mainly used to corroborate other sources of data, as a means of gathering insights into this network, and to establish my presence with members of the group. The public events I attended consisted of two meetings of groups, a protest, a Chanukah party, and a radical Jewish film festival. 9 Interviews were also sites of participant observation as they often took place in people’s homes, occasionally involving overnight stays, meals, etc. I found little relation between people’s everyday practices and their involvement in this social movement, beyond the unremarkable observations that those who get involved in this distant issue movement are generally well-educated middle class people, with left-wing leanings, bibliophilic tendencies and a certain interest in Jewish culture. While such observations corroborate other empirical studies of DIMs (Rucht 2000) and certainly led me to understand the importance of ‘solidarity’ as a theme, in itself this participant observation produced unexceptional insights.

The one exception to the secondary status of participant observation was my field trip accompanying a study trip to Israel/Palestine. Here participant observation of my fellow study-trippers was my main source of data. However this research block was, in a way, adjacent to my main research focus and is discussed in more detail in chapter eight.

**Interviews**

Interviews were a major source of data collection because of their ability to centre human agency in social movements, allow access to participants other than leaders and, ‘allow

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9 Chanukah or the Festival of Lights is an eight-day Jewish holiday in December that commemorates the rededication of the Temple in Jerusalem after the successful Maccabean revolt in 165 BCE.
scrutiny of meaning, both how activists regard their participation and how they understand their social world’ (Blee and Taylor 2002: 95). Here I outline my sampling procedures and interviewee demographics, before attending to the methodological issues surrounding interviewing and outlining how I analysed my interview material.

I conducted 21 interviews (including three pilot interviews) with activists in Jewish and non-Jewish groups. I tried to compare activists in both types of groups, to see if issues such as identity construction and relationships to Palestinians would be different. My sampling followed from my grounded theory basis. As with other qualitative research, grounded theory uses theoretical sampling, of which Pidgeon and Henwood (2004: 635) outline nine different types. Those I used including theory-based selection (elaborating a theoretical construct), maximum variation sampling, politically important or sensitive cases, stratified purposeful sampling (to illustrate subgroups and facilitate group comparisons) and rich response sampling. Most of these categories can only be identified after initial data analysis, hence the use of pilot interviews and initial document analysis. I concentrated on rich response and stratified purposeful sampling. The former because it provided the most useful and most explanatory data sources, the latter to access the various facets of the movement. I made two central distinctions in stratified purposeful sampling - the type of group the activist was involved in and the level of involvement. On the first point I wished to survey those mainly/exclusively in Jewish groups, those mainly/exclusively in wider ones, and those in both. Secondly, I wished to get people of varying degree of activism, to avoid a common tendency in collecting social movement data to just focus on movement leaders (Blee and Taylor 2002). The interviewee demographics are as follows:

1. **Gender**
   - Male ......................... 10
   - Female....................... 11

2. **Age**
   - 20+  ......................... 2
   - 30+  ......................... 2
   - 40+  ......................... 4
   - 50+  ......................... 4
   - 60+  ......................... 7
   - 70+  ......................... 2

3. **Involvement**
   a. **Type of affiliation**
      - Mainly/exclusively Jewish groups............... 12
Both Jewish and non-Jewish groups ...........6
Mainly/exclusively non-Jewish groups .........3

b. Self-reported level of present-day involvement
Highly involved: .....................................11
Moderately involved: .............................4
Slightly involved: .................................6

While gender was balanced, the age of interviewees seems excessively skewed towards older people – with eight interviewees under 50 and thirteen over 50 years old. This was partly due to the snowballing technique that I used, but from my observations it probably accurately reflects the age demographics of this movement and to an extent, an aging Jewish community. Items 3b and c are a subjective interpretation of my participant’s levels of present-day involvement in activities, by which I meant ‘involved in the last year’ (many of the less active had previously been more involved). In measuring synagogue involvement, I took it to mean more than being a ‘holiday Jew’, going to synagogue for the holy days, to meaning a regular involvement with one’s synagogue. By Jewish communal involvement, I mean involvement in public activities – Jewish Book Week, Hebrew classes and so on – that were not to do with criticising Israel, or directly related to any of the Israel-critical groups.

In all, eighteen interviewees lived in London, and three elsewhere in the country. This figure is even more skewed than that of British Jewry, but may be quite representative of organised Israel-critical Jewish activism, which has found it difficult to establish itself elsewhere in the country. Since I found no significant difference between London-based and non-London based people, or between those London residents who originally came from outside London (four of my sample) and those from the city, I did not expand my sample to include more non-Londoners.

In terms of access, this proved to be a very easy and open group of people to study. Access was helped by the willingness of participants in this network to explain their activism, by my
previous contacts in the field, and by my semi-insider status as a Jewish activist in the Palestinian Solidarity Movement – albeit in Ireland. The fact that over half of my interviews were in people’s homes indicates the hospitality of members and their openness to my research. While access was not a problem, establishing distance was. The danger is that insider status leads to the possibility that the researcher isn’t sufficiently analytical or critical about the research subject, and that the research is less an analysis than a promotion of the movement (Kriesi 1992). This led me to adopt a methodological framework which allowed for some critical distance between activists and me.

**Nature of interviews**

Three of the interviews were unstructured pilot interviews and eighteen were semi-structured interviews of between one and two hours. In negotiating the interview I promised interviewees confidentiality and arranged that the names I use in the thesis would be aliases. I also agreed to feedback the research to interviewees. Seeing interviews as a means of finding out the interviewees’ production of meaning, they examined the relationships between interviewees and the actors in the Israel/Palestine situation in Israel, Palestine, and Britain. I sought to probe for changes through time, and ask for practical evidence of attitudes on each of these cases. I tried to use terminology which seemed neutral to my respondents and to avoid asking leading questions to minimise unnecessary interviewer bias. In doing so I was not trying to deny the constructive capacity of interviews to structure understanding (Holstein and Gubrium 1995). Such techniques were simply to allow interviewees as much discursive space as possible (within the parameters of my queries) to present their own analyses.

In negotiating my relationship with interviewees, I rejected the construction of both researcher and researched as ‘depersonalised participants in the research process’ (Oakley 1981: 37). Oakley, writing from a feminist perspective, criticises such ‘neutrality’ that sees the research process – certainly in interviews – in terms of mechanical data-collection, with interviewees cast as passive question answerers, and interviewers reduced to promoting an essentially false rapport in order to wheedle these answers. She criticises this as a poor means

10 Besides these core interviews, I conducted several interviews in Ireland and Palestine related to the study trip which I discuss in chapter eight, as well as research-related discussions with Palestinians and British Jewish activists.
of gathering information, as well as morally indefensible, in that it adopts ‘a purely exploitative attitude to interviewees as sources of data’ (Oakley 1981: 48).

This is a good point, but since I was to an extent mining for data, I did not try to dissolve distance and become best friends with interviewees. If I did not disavow my activist position nor did I disavow my academic one. Perhaps the closest approximation of our relationship was that of work colleagues, working together in an overtly instrumental fashion, but (hopefully) in the spirit of co-operation and for a more-or-less common goal. I conducted the interview as a dialogical encounter and so I did not avoid questions that interviewees put to me. Below is an example of this type of dialogue with an interviewee who was formerly active, and now wished to find out more about the Palestine DIM:

**Leslie:** What do you think of the – because if there is then one, presumably you think there is a network of people and groups who campaign – what do you think they can do, then? Particularly if that’s swelling in numbers? In fact, I’m not part of it – should I be part of it in fact?

This question came at the end of the interview, and after I answered it and follow-on questions, the interviewee’s response was

**Leslie:** Yeah, maybe I should go and experience that for myself and prove that for myself. I’ve heard enough.

This shows the interviewee using this interview to educate herself about the movement and the reversal of a ‘normal’ interviewer-interviewee relationship. Advocates of empathetic interviewing stress that this may be an important part of the interview process (Fontana and Frey 2005). Such a reversal wasn’t frequent, but did happen in other occasions. While trying to maintain a degree of neutrality, especially on controversial issues such as the boycott, this must be counterbalanced by my embodiment as activist as well as researcher in this process.

**Analysis of interviews**

In analysing interview data, I deployed the grounded theory approach as particularly suited to the recursive spiral needed - among other things - to maintain a dialogical relationship with the movement and people I’m studying. I started by conducting initial in vivo coding of the interviews. I rejected the Straussian method of grounded theory, with its strict methodological steps in coding. I found this method problematic in that it disaggregated the data too much,
not allowing for narratives to emerge. There was also the danger that over-rigorous coding would stifle the process of analysis (Silverman 2003). For this reason I decided against using NVivo or other software to code the data, worried that I would lose thematic coherence and deeper understanding of the movement in an inappropriate attempt to simulate scientific rigour.

Instead I opted for the Glaserian approach to coding data, described as ‘a more meticulous version of preliminary data analysis’ (Grbich 2007: 72). Instead of ‘fracturing the data’ Glaser recommends the constant comparison of incident to incident and also to emerging concepts. So I used open coding, theoretical sampling and constant comparison to find the answers to my research questions. I have been guided by Jennifer Mason’s suggestion (1996) to see the research question as a series of puzzles, and to read back and forth through my transcripts in an attempt to solve these puzzles. Various puzzles that I have tried to solve have included ‘the Jewish community’, war stories and the concept of transformation. In practical terms, I trawled through the interviews asking the what, why, who questions of the text, looking for themes and frames, and also circling narratives to analyse. Then I wrote up theoretical memos, grouping them thematically (Jewish identity, attitude to Palestinians etc). Finally I checked how these themes appear in the written texts, undertaking thematic analysis.

I deployed socio-cultural analysis of stories, which looks at the broader interpretive frameworks people use to make sense of their lives (Grbich 2007: 130). The problem with adopting a purely narrative approach to the data is that these interviews also indexed an external reality, a reality that has been created by the interviewees in the process of social movement activism. It is necessary to study the indexed reality as well as the social narratives. In this I reject Silverman’s proposition that one should make a choice between a ‘realist’ and narrative approach to interview data - treating data as either ‘giving direct access to “experience”’ or as actively constructed “narratives” involving activities that themselves demand analysis’ (Silverman 2003: 346). At times it is important to do both.

Giving an example, ‘war stories’ are common among interviewees. I analyse these stories as means for members to construct their own identities as reasonable, moral, honest, and articulate in contradistinction to Zionists imagined as violent, racist and unreasonable. This is important, but such an analysis cannot address the fact that these subjective opinions have been formed by real events - Zionists, as I describe in chapter six, do attack protestors and
hurl racial abuse at them - and it is important to research these events. To understand the processes in the movement it is necessary to conduct both narrative and realist analysis.

The final issue with concentrating on narratives is the danger of focusing merely on the activists, on their lives and opinions. While analysing narratives is a strong tool to explore the truths of people’s own experience, it remains agnostic on the issue of historical truth (Riessman 1993: 22). This focus on the interviewees’ point of view is of course a necessary bias of all interviews. In order to further research this historical truth, I undertook documentary analysis.

**Documents**

I consulted a wide variety of documents – public statements, articles by and about these groups, internal minutes and discussions from JFJP, and online discussions on web groups and blogs. I sought to obtain both empirical and subjective data from the documents. They helped me understand this movement, and identify its achievements and the forces operating upon it from outside. They also gave me supplementary information about meaning making in the movement, both among activists and relating to the wider world. Below, I outline the documents I studied, what information I sought from them, and how I analysed them.

**Online data**

I had several sources of online data, all of them being sites available to the general public, rather than member-only listservs, thus access was not a problem. The major source was the Just Peace UK (JPUK) site, a general access newsgroup which was set up in November 2000 and quickly established itself as the focal point of online communication among mainly Jewish activists ([JustPeaceUK@yahoogroups.com](mailto:JustPeaceUK@yahoogroups.com)). Other sources included the anti-Zionist jewssansfrontieres blog([http://jewssansfrontieres.blogspot.com/](http://jewssansfrontieres.blogspot.com/)), which serves as an important discussion forum for Jewish critics of Israel, and on which I have posted entries. I have also accessed other blogs and online communications of activists such as randompottins ([http://randompottins.blogspot.com/](http://randompottins.blogspot.com/)) and Tony Greenstein's Blog ([http://azvsas.blogspot.com/](http://azvsas.blogspot.com/)) as well as the Socialist Unity and Jewdas online sites ([www.socialistunity.com/](http://www.socialistunity.com/); [http://www.jewdas.org/](http://www.jewdas.org/)).
One must acknowledge the drawbacks of the data in online communication. Firstly this does not represent THE voice of activists – few people are regularly engaged in these fora, and those who are, are mostly male. Though the largest group is the JPUK newsgroup, even here only a couple of dozen people were commenting at any one time. The majority of comments were sent by only a few members, and the majority of these comments being reposted articles (I analyse this newsgroup in chapter five). Stubbs, in his analysis of a Croatian diaspora newsgroup notes the same pattern of domination by a few men and reposting of articles. This means that the newsgroup was less a pure discussion forum and ‘more like a propaganda wall of unlimited dimensions on which different kinds of notes can be pinned’ (Stubbs 1999: 13.3).

Nevertheless, online data is an incredibly rich source of ‘activist thought in action’, involving unmediated internal conversations among activists. In these conversations activists explain, construct, and expand on their political positions, connect to each other, and construct collective identities through the process of ‘worrying together’ (Stubbs 1999). Often activities undertaken by activists are posted online and so they provide empirical data about activities.

Since I chose not to use content analysis to analyse this data due to the initial unrepresentativeness of the sample, this attempt to elicit major themes was an inexact science. In choosing which data to analyse, I identified common tropes (such as the use of the human rights frame), or repeated concerns of those posting (such as the concentration on the anti-boycott group, Engage, which has subsequently declined). Any analysis on material collected from these sources was analysed in careful conjunction with other data, and used to corroborate and question it.

**Internal documents.**

These texts were ‘chosen’ serendipitously – an interviewee gave me archives of internal JfJP minutes and other correspondence stretching from 2002-7. I subsequently received consent to use these files. These documents provide useful empirical data about the development and activities of the largest of these groups over a five-year period. They provide context to present-day attitudes, allowing me to understand attitudes towards other groups or ideas as the result of ongoing negotiation, rather than as emanating from a singular discursive encounter. Once an action has been agreed on, it can take on the appearance of a unanimous decision. By presenting alternative motions and (highly edited) versions of discussions, these
documents indicate to an extent the multiplicity of voices within a single group in the movement. In my analysis of these texts, I looked mainly for empirical data on how the group operated - the type of activities organised, the relationships established with other groups, and also how this group has developed over the years. I draw on these texts in chapter five when outlining a history of the movement, but also in other chapters when discussing this movement’s relationship with Palestinian and Israeli groups.

**Public communications and activities**

In discussing internal communications and identity building, one sometimes loses sight of the fact that these groups were established to do something and are not just vehicles to enable members to adopt a correct philosophical view on Israel/Palestine. It is essential to examine the texts in which activists communicate with the outside world. These include public letters/petitions, the spate of justifications for Independent Jewish Voices that appeared in the *Guardian* (Various 2007), and publicity for activities such as demonstrations, discussions, concerts etc. I examine these texts primarily for empirical information. These documents are also useful to understand how actors frame their activities and the tactics they use to appeal to other Jews and ambient society.

**Integrating the data: Multiple analysis**

A major issue when analysing information collected using multiple methods is how to integrate the various forms of data. My data can be divided into three main sections. Firstly interviews, secondly ideological discussions on egroups and in magazines and papers about the issues, and thirdly information about what the groups do – from minutes, internal documents, leaflets and online accounts.

Viewing the data collection in terms of the recursive cycle within grounded theory, the initial data (from documents) informed my pilot interviews, which then informed both the written material I judged to be relevant and the main body of my interviews. When undertaking formal analysis I used these interviews as the primary source for thematic coding, since this was material deliberately collected in order to extract the information I’m interested in. After analysing the themes derived from these interviews, I then checked this analysis in relation to
the documents. In trying to understand meanings created by participants, I used the written texts mainly as corroborative material. In some cases – especially in answering questions of historical truth - the documents served as a primary source. From my interviews I was more interested in participants’ accounts of how they experienced this historical truth. I believe this dual-stranded analysis has proved sufficient to answer my major research questions, the first of which was to provide a reasonably accurate description of the movement. By investigating the production of meaning within this movement I can place its discourse within other DIMs and theorise about the process of identity and goal-construction within these movements. I further discuss the criteria I use in assessing research ‘goodness’ in the chapter’s conclusion.

**Reflexivity**

It is tempting to agree with Jayati Lal that in an era of rampant reflexivity, ‘just getting on with it’ may be the most radical action one can take (Lal 1996: 206). However, one can contend with the risk of reflexivity turning into ‘self-reflective isolationism, self-absorption, and impotent texts’ without abandoning it entirely (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1999: 246). I have tried to deal with this danger by examining my own positionality and that of others with regards to how this contributes to and directs the process of knowledge production. In this section I discuss the issue of being an insider/outsider, arguing that perhaps more significant than my positionality as a Jew or insider/outsider to the interviewees considered as individuals is how we related as elements of a social movement.

The categories of insider and outsider can be seen as ‘two extremes on a continuum that represents the reporter’s frame of reference’ (Labaree 2002: 101). In this view, representing insider and outsider status as opposite experiences provides a false dichotomy since we all occupy multiple positions of insiderness and outsiderness – both the researched and researchers (Deutsch 1981). A major problem of viewing ‘insiderness’ as something tangible is that it reifies the insiders, those being researched, as objects unable to reflect critically on the social process they are involved in. The limitations of this approach was evident in my interviews, where the interviewees often took an outside ‘sociological’ perspective to the Jewish community, to England and also the movement they were involved in, while at the same time exhibiting a sense of belonging. This ability to be an outsider was enhanced by the loosely affiliated nature of many of the interviewees. Seeing them as ‘insiders’ to whom I had to gain access, flattens their multiple perspectives. It also distorts our actual relationship as
some sort of smash-and-grab raid between static, passive insiders and a fluid, dynamic outside researcher, a theorisation of the researcher-researched relationship that feminist theorists have long criticised (Reinharz 1983).

Turning to this relationship, recognising the power of the researcher’s identity does not mean that the researcher has perfect freedom to negotiate that identity, or that the power in determining their identity is solely theirs (Henry 2003; Jenkins 1984). My social location in the research process was glaringly obvious, since my respondents were interested in where I was from and what I was doing studying the movement. Unlike Marsha Henry (2003), I didn’t assume that ‘where are you from’ questions were trying to ascertain my authenticity or contest the power relations in the interview, but were reasonable attempts by respondents to understand my vantage point and how much I knew about the issue. Such questions were partly efforts to decipher my own location in the scale of insider/outsider. It is a legitimate question and it seems better to talk of the researcher’s social location ‘continuously moving back and forth between the positional boundaries of insiderness and outsiderness’ (Labaree 2002: 102) than of being an insider, seen as a static status. Equally useful is to see entering the field not as a thing that happens once, but ‘a process of continual negotiation’ (Labaree 2002: 110). It is also better understood as being a process of being ‘let in’ by these groups rather than thinking that the researcher is the only active agent, whose role is to daringly access these groups. This emphasises the power that these self-confident, middle class, educated research participants had in the research process.

While one may dissolve the boundaries between being an insider and outsider, it is still useful to see my multiple positionalities through the perceived benefits of insider status. Insiderness is meant to facilitate access, increase the researcher’s opportunity to access useful data, strengthen the ability to interpret community culture, deepen understanding through reflexivity, and enable the researcher to draw upon shared experiences (Labaree 2002). These advantages might well be broken down into two main categories – the degree the researcher is perceived as an insider by the researched which promotes ease of access, and the degree to which the researcher understands himself to be an insider which promotes understanding. Below I examine these issues with reference to both Jewishness and activist identity.

Taking the first category – the degree the researcher is perceived as an insider by the researched – there is no doubt that my ascribed insider status as a Jew and activist facilitated access. I was not treated as a naïve outsider, but as someone with an interest and to a certain
extent a right to ask questions and conduct research on the issue. This forces me to ask whether I was fooling interviewees with the assumption of a questionable insider status. While I was born Jewish, this identity was of minimal importance before the research began.

On one level there was no deception. I had grown up with a knowledge of the Irish Jewish community, having been to Jewish primary school in Dublin. My estrangement from that community paralleled many others I talked with and allowed us to exchange stories. One could point to a difference, in that some interviewees (but not all) were trying to recreate or return to that identity, whereas I wasn’t. More significant though, I would argue that there was a commonality of interest that did not reside in common assumptions of identity. Giving a parallel example, Janet Finch in researching clergy wives, did not base her justification for her potentially intrusive and exploitative research on the fact that she too was a clergy wife, but on her perceived commonality of interest, arguing that her research reciprocated these expressions of mutual sisterhood (Finch 1984). I would argue that there is a similar commonality between myself and the research subjects. It lies more in the activist field than in ethnic fraternity, and serves to justify a degree of intrusive research as well as a stance of critical solidarity towards the movement.

As for the second category of insiderness – which corresponds to Brubaker and Cooper’s term of ‘self-understanding’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 17), it is tricky to gauge my own understanding and what lay behind it. With some exceptions, I ‘got’ most of the references to Judaism, and to Jewish lifestyle. Some researchers talk of the insights which the researcher’s experiential positionalities allow (Hill Collins 1990). I would be wary of making such claims in this case. Far more important than shared Jewishness were the general or non-Jewish points of contact with research subjects; the experience of middle class urban life, and along with most of my respondents, sharing a left-liberal outlook and interest in politics.

In one important respect I felt a definite gulf between me and my interviewees. This was over the issue of nationality since I am Irish and my research subjects are English, and at times seemed very English to me. While participants may have felt a sense of insider/outsiderness with respect to being English, they certainly did understand me to be Irish, something which created a perhaps mutually welcome sense of distance between us. Such separateness helped me (to an extent) to avoid the trap of failing to make strange and of assuming a priori familiarity with the field.
In talking of any insights achieved through insider status, my position as a fellow social movement activist was more important than any purported ethnic bond. I have engaged with social movement activities all my adult life – in the Green Party, in immigrant organisations and solidarity groups, and now in the IPSC. This positionality enabled deeper understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics of social movements, structured my understanding of this movement, and explains to a large extent why I engaged in movement-relevant research in the first place. Giving one example of how my activist status contributed to the research: the interviews were (to an extent) a conversation among equals, with both having a similar interest in the issue of Israel/Palestine. This was helpful in creating a sense of empathy and understanding – for instance, some of the interviewee ‘coming out’ stories were similar to mine. Such sharing of information and experiences went beyond the overt information-mining aspect of the interview; it derived from our shared position as activists trying to integrate our activism into our lives. In contrast, Jewish back-channel talk never felt so important, either emotionally or cognitively. Thus the insider/outsider vector is further complicated by the fact that as a Jew my ascribed identity was one which I deployed rather than felt. But as an activist the situation was reversed. I felt like an insider, but was overtly an outsider – not belonging to the same groups, or in the same country as the interviewees. To discuss further how this activist identity directed my research, I next engage with methodological concerns about researching social movements.

**Researching social movements**

In this section I examine ethical and epistemological issues around researching social movements. I begin with ethics, arguing that an ethical position on social movements necessitates a level of respect towards the movement as well as individuals within it. I further argue that this involves producing movement-relevant work. I then discuss the epistemological implications of such work, delineating the differences between activist and academic modes of production, and how to bridge the gap in the production of academic research relevant to a social movement. I next talk of how the adoption of a critical perspective provides a limiting guideline to the position of dialogue.

Systems of ethics in social sciences can be seen as means of respecting the subjectivity of subjects of study, with all that implies. Here I examine how this translates to social movements, seen as active knowledge producing bodies rather than a body to be accessed and
dissected. One should of course be cautious in treating movements as bodies, since this reifies diffuse cognitive processes and networks into static concrete things (Benford 1997). Yet at the same time this anthropomorphism can be read as shorthand for two issues - the consciousness of movement participants that they are members of a collectivity, and the social productions and work of this collectivity. If I attack or undermine the movement, it is nonsensical to pretend that I am not attacking the interviewees themselves. Any harm social movement research causes will more likely be on the group than the individual level (Kriesi 1992). But seeing the interviewees as fragile souls to be protected from my blasts of knowledge-based criticism is still an inadequate orientation since it re-establishes a dichotomy between the powerful academic and pitiful objects of study. Hence, I adopted a position of critical respect towards the work the movement does and knowledges it produces, as the most appropriate ethical stance.

In adopting a position of critical respect and indeed support towards this work, undoubtedly there’s an element of ‘going native’ in that friendships with and respect for the individuals involved in the movement have played a part. More significantly, this process is grounded in a deeper understanding of their work, particularly the constraints this movement operates under as well as an appreciation of its effectiveness. The aim then of the thesis is not to conduct an academic evisceration of this movement’s work, but a study that contributes towards participants’ self-understanding and work, which at the same time retaining critical distance.

The difficulty of treading this line were illustrated by an article I wrote about study trips to Palestine (Landy 2008). While I wished to offer critical support to study trips and sent my article to organisers and some participants, some (although not all) of the organisers saw the article as being excessively critical. This might not have been a case of thin-skinned activists, but a genuine fault of the article that they recognised. Two reviews of the book in which the article was highlighted the criticism in the article (Deane 2008; Prestel 2009). While Deane’s account provided a reasonable summary of the article’s criticism, Prestel’s failed to do even that, claiming that the article ‘demonstrates the limits of “good intentions”’ since, ‘Whilst the foreign activists can feel like heroes and yet walk away, the Palestinian tourist guides experience these tours as a disempowering activity’ (Prestel 2009: 128). Since I extensively discuss how Palestinians structure the tours to combat the disempowerment of tourist practices, this is charitably, a partial reading of the article. It is a reading that provides Prestel
a vantage point to attack these and other outside interventions as helping perpetuate the conflict. While I may not be to blame for how this article is interpreted, (and in such a contested field, one may expect hostile interpretations of these groups’ actions), I am nevertheless responsible for what I produce.  

The fact that study trip organisers might well have been right in their assessment of my article indicates the value of knowledge produced in social movements. This leads me to argue that directing my research towards the concerns of the social movement does not simply maintain a correct ethical position, but is also a way of producing theoretically interesting academic research.

**Knowledge production by and about social movements**

Organizers already know about the need for ‘frame alignment’, the value of ‘informal networks’ and the importance of ‘opportunity structures’. They would benefit from studies that provide clues about how to accomplish such alignment, how to tap into such networks and how to identify such opportunities (Flacks 2004: 147).

In talking of social movement research, Cox and Barker list the weaknesses of academic theorising as, ‘the tendency to treat what are, precisely, *movements*, as static “fields”, to embed their understanding in an uncritical acceptance of the givenness of those institutions which movements often set themselves against, and to marginalise the position of the actor’ (2002: 4). The reason that movements are (mis)represented in such a way, Cox and Barker argue, is so that the embodied researcher can come up with generic propositions, necessary to further their career in academia. One can adjoin further reasons why academics have a vested reason to downplay the knowledge-production of movements, such as the power play between researcher and researched, the normativity of the ‘god’s-eye’ view within academia, and the desire by social movement theorists to make their field ‘respectable’ by stressing the rational, structured nature of movements (for more discussion on this: Casas-Cortés, Osterweil, and Powell 2008). Besides specific problems with downgrading the purposive and

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11 Later, I discuss the reception of my other published article on the issue, a review of the productions of movement intellectuals in England and the US over the past few years (Landy 2009). Though as critical as the previous article, this was more productive, being received favourably by movement members and by editors of two of the books under review.
political ideas of actors, it is argued that such analyses fails to theorise the dynamic, dialectical quality of movements – the fact that movements move (Cox and Barker 2002).

This has been an especial critique of American social movement theory, where a progressive narrowing of horizons of the dominant political process theory approach has left such theorists with little to say (Bevington and Dixon 2005). Instead Bevington and Dixon recommend engaging with the knowledge production of social movements to produce theoretically meaningful research. Such engagement is an increasingly common practice in Latin America, influenced by Freirean pedagogic practices (Aparicio and Blaser 2008; Flacks 2004). Bevington and Dixon argue that by locating the issues and questions of most importance to movement participants, academics can produce theoretically fruitful movement-relevant theory.

They cite Piven and Cloward’s (1977) critique of ‘poor people’s movements’ as an example which shows that a critical approach doesn’t negate the movement-relevant character of research, and that such scholarship should not be seen as ‘an uncritical affirmation of movements’ (Bevington and Dixon 2005: 199). Similarly, Johnston and Goodman cite critical research on fair trade initiatives which seeks to develop the ‘implicit, oppositional promise’ of these initiatives (Shreck 2005: 17). As I would characterise the activism I am studying, they describe fair trade as a ‘partial, imperfect, yet significant praxis’ which repays engaged yet critical analysis (Johnston and Goodman 2006: 17). I situate my work within this theoretical position, as critical yet movement-relevant. As mentioned, I am not seeking to produce a sterile critique of the shortcomings of a movement, but research which will serve as a site for productive tension and discussion (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005).

One should not underestimate the difficulty in bridging the gap between academic and activist theorising. In viewing the type of knowledge produced by movements, Cox and Barker (2002) maintain that it derives from their character as bodies in action, rather than static debating fora. The knowledge produced is eminently practical. It may be practical in providing ideological and moral justifications of the movement or in providing strategic and practical proposals – it is always, however, directed towards what Cox and Barker see as the essential feature of movements – their dialogical and developmental nature – a fact which ensures that movement knowledge translates into ‘attempts to find answers to the question “what is to be done?” in situations which they do not fully control’ (2002, 45).
In deciding how to engage with this social movement, seen as an active knowledge producing body, I draw heavily on Johnston and Goodman (2006). They seek to move past the binaries of detached academic knowledge with its disavowed interest versus engaged activist knowledge with its overtly instrumentalist and partial truths, and ask ‘how researchers could strive towards detachment with involvement’ (Johnston and Goodman 2006: 10. Emphasis in original). This critical activism research is founded on the idea that dialogue on the possibilities and limitations of certain forms of activism enables critical reflection by participants and can be seen as part of a theory/practice dialogue between academics and activists. Such dialogue positions both the researcher and researched as active members of a knowledge community.

Johnston and Goodman identify four sites where there is tension between academic and activist forms of knowledge production - epistemology, normativity, methodology, and strategy. Their first proposition relates to epistemology, where they suggest, ‘superseding academic verbalism and unreflective activism to walk forward while questioning’ (Johnston and Goodman 2006: 26). They argue like Bevington and Dixon, for academics to direct theory production towards movements they research and towards the questions they want asked. This is daunting, since it opens up the possibility of fundamental criticism from two sides, academic and activist. Nevertheless it seems that the questions that the social movement wants asked about itself – whether it is doing the work it ought to be doing and whether it is doing it successfully – are useful areas for academic study and I have been guided by this in drawing up my research questions.

Often the strategies of those in movements for change ensure they unwittingly adapt and affirm the current order rather than destabilise it, a critique I make of this movement. Using examples from anti-globalisation movements, Johnston and Goodman suggest that social movements can’t avoid this problem through a priori theorisation but need ongoing theory/practice dialogue to avoid co-optation. Critical evaluation of a movement can produce such a dialogue. An openness to reflection and critique among participants in this movement has enabled a level of dialogue in this research. For instance in a talk I gave, at the invitation of the JHJP chair, to an open meeting of that group in January 2008, I was struck by how positively participants engaged with and were interested in the critique I presented of their activities. This enabled a situation of mutually beneficial feedback. In addition Johnston and Goodman call attention to how case studies of emancipatory social movements nourish a
sense of hope, especially among movements, such as this one, which desire a sense of recognition (2006: 15). This seems to be the case with my research, which appears to have been welcomed by those within the movement. It is the hope that through engaging with the themes relevant to those within this movement and promoting critical reflection, this study in some way promotes the concept of ‘walking forward questioning’.

The second theme Johnston and Goodman present is that of ‘engaging with present-day contexts while generating hope that alternatives (‘other worlds’) are possible’ (2006: 26). As such, this injunction fits within the critical inquiry paradigm and I do take seriously this movement’s efforts to generate alternative futures, and assess these efforts by its own criteria of value.

The third theme is conscientisation or ‘integrating structural analysis with the spark of personal experience’ (Johnston and Goodman 2006: 26). While one can indeed conduct social movement theory without reference to participants’ ideas or feelings – indeed Tilly (2006b) seems to recommend it – an integral aspect of my research is to build on participants’ understandings of themselves. In fact, this third injunction might be more relevant to globalisation studies, a field replete with abstract structural analyses. But in this network, the interest of the activist is most certainly not disavowed, rather it is foregrounded.

Johnston and Goodman’s last injunction is for co-investigation. As such, it fits within the school of Participatory Action Research (PAR), itself influenced by Freire’s proposal to replace a banking model of knowledge creation with a problem solving model (Freire 1993). In the former, knowledge becomes something the researcher has accumulated and can gift to social movement activists, in the latter it is a communal means of advancing effective collective understanding. Following from this, the authors recommend co-investigation as a means to encourage popular intellectualism of which the academic is part and parcel. An example of this sort of collaboration can be seen in Sundberg’s research (2007) on/with HIJOS Vancouver (Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice against Oblivion and Silence) - a group of young South American children of refugees - and their relationship with the North American solidarity movement. However I have not used such co-investigation, or any other version of PAR due to the need to retain critical distance. Below I explain why.

There are firstly practical problems with PAR methodology, such as the vast quantity of work this involves and that while participants were interested in my work, none of them seemed
that interested. Such problems of time management were exacerbated by living in a different country to this social movement. In addition there is a clear tactical problem, complete openness about how I planned to critically evaluate the movement could be misinterpreted. The one time when my request to interview was rejected was because I had previously sent the individual a full copy of my research proposal. I later learnt that he thought I was proposing to attack the movement.

This anecdote illustrates the theoretical problem with using co-investigator methodology or PAR - that this doesn’t allow me to maintain critical distance from this movement. This can be seen in Sundberg’s article; the method allows for a fascinating description of the movement, and does usefully problematise its relationship with North American solidarity activists. However while the paper successfully ‘presents a critical reflection on this moment of transnational solidarity from the perspective of HIJOS members’, it is precisely because it speaks from their perspective that HIJOS itself is not problematised or evaluated (Sundberg 2007: 145). However one goal of my research is to interrogate the unequal and inherently problematic power relations that exist between these Jewish groups and Palestinians. The need to see how power is deployed in these relations justifies taking a measure of critical distance, which appears to preclude a co-investigator methodology.

In addition, the language of co-investigation or PAR obscures the extent to which the academic is the researcher and the activist the researched. In the end no amount of ‘dialogism’ closes this gap. True, some measure of dialogue and ongoing feedback is feasible, both for my work and for the movement. In talking of such dialogue it is important not simply to address ‘the movement’ as if it were a unitary body. Attention must be paid to its heterogeneity. As with all movements there are factions, opponents, and divergent opinions between and within groups. I discuss this further in chapter five and seven when talking of the various groups involved and the split between say, those who support more radical action such as boycott, and those actions more acceptable to the British Jewish field. Once one accepts the movement as being fragmentary, this further problematises the idea of dialogue. Dialogue with whom: the ‘leaders’ of the movement, or with one or other of the movement’s various factions? I see myself as engaging in various levels of dialogue – both public and private – with various elements within the movement, rather than participating in a binary exchange with ‘The movement’. Such a fluid conceptualisation of dialogue captures
not only the multi-faceted nature of the movement, but also the multiple positionalities of the researcher.

To sum up, a key element of my research is to answer questions relevant to the movement, in order to provide an opportunity for critical reflection, and in the end a product to be reflected on. This is a product moreover that has been produced in dialogue with at least some people within the heterogeneous movement I am studying. This way I seek to increase the credibility of the study, as well as to produce a theoretically fruitful piece of research for academics and activists.

**Conclusion**
In this chapter I moved from outlining the broad theoretical framework I use to describing what aspect of this social process I study, and how I research it. In deciding to focus on opposition to Israel, I have sought to give myself a clear and definable field to study. I dealt with the various ways in which I study this movement, defending my multiple methods as best suited to the grounded theory methodology I used. After detailing these methods, I dealt with how I relate to this British network as both Irish Jew and movement activist. The latter position was more important in directing my epistemology and led to me adopting a critical movement-relevant frame of reference.

In using grounded theory to advance social justice studies, Charmaz (2005) recommends that the researcher uses as criteria, the production of research that is credible, original, resonant and useful. Originality needs no explanation, and I believe this methodology enables me to establish insights and produce an analysis of a previously unresearched area. Little has been written on counter-hegemonic contestation within minority ethnic groups. This grounded theory methodology has enabled me to see this contestation as a self-directed social movement with clear political aims, rather than primarily a response to external pressures, or the result of religious or ethnic divisions or ethical disagreements (though these issues of course play a factor in this social process). By using a movement-relevant approach I advance this particular methodology and demonstrate that it can be used to produce theoretically fruitful, critical insights into a social movement. The criteria of credibility and resonance refers to internal and external validity, and in chapter nine I assess whether the methods I deploy have enabled me to fulfil these criteria. The criterion of usefulness refers to the goal
of critical inquiry to have public impact. This needs some discussion, since I intend any usefulness to impact (however slightly) on both the specific movement and the broader Palestinian struggle for liberation.

It is necessary to discuss how I relate this research to Palestinians, and the specific questions I ask about this movement. In talking of how Palestinians figure in my research, I foreground my position as a privileged Western Jewish academic/activist in a solidarity movement that has a problematic power relationship with Palestinians. One of the incidental advantages of my involvement in the IPSC is that I am all too conscious of my disputed positionality, and rarely feel like an academic with a ‘god’s eye’ view of the situation. Yet it’s clearly not enough to pat myself on the back for my heightened consciousness and move on. In this study I’m talking indirectly about Palestinians, rather than (with a few exceptions) with them. If one can criticise Jewish critics of Israel for objectifying Palestinians (chapter eight), am I not doing the same by ignoring them? Am I using Palestinians in the same way I critique others for doing - as objects to be deployed in an argument? Going further: by counterpoising Palestinians to these Jewish groups, am I not in some way claiming to be *representing* Palestinians against the claims of Jewish groups? In later chapters I talk of how structural colonial relations with Palestinians have infected the attitudes of those Western activists trying to change these relations; I need to seriously consider how they have also affected my research praxis.

To answer the last question first, in saying the movement’s attitude towards Palestinians is a point of criticism, I don’t see myself in providing ‘a voice for the voiceless’ (thereby perpetuating any voicelessness). I feel it would be naïve to ignore general critiques of solidarity movements (Goudge 2003; Waterman 1998; Sogge 1996), which some work on solidarity movements seems to do (Keck and Sikkink 1998), or reference this as a place-marker and then move on (Olesen 2005). While not accepting the harshness of some of the criticism – or rather, balancing it with other observations – these powerful critiques offer a rather obvious *a priori* position to start from. I also draw upon Palestinian voices and their criticism of how the discourse of human rights transforms Palestinians into individualised victims to be worked on by outside agencies (Karmi 2005; Zreik 2004). So my position is somewhere between a self-critical solidarity activist, aware that the criticisms of solidarity work has a very real basis in the real-life situations of Palestinians, and an academic drawing upon a theoretical fruitful body of critiques of DIMs.
The first point remains. By concentrating on the social movement and not drawing on Palestinian voices, am I not merely reinforcing the objectification of Palestinians? My methods can be defended on grounds of practicality, that one is limited in a thesis and that most Palestinians don’t know much about these small, new Jewish groups. Yet I would defend this approach in more depth, firstly by reference to the power of western activists vis-à-vis Palestinians. There is a pressing need, in being part of a knowledge community dedicated to change, not merely to focus on the condition of powerlessness but also to conduct research on those in positions of power (Mills 1959), even such relative power that members of a small oppositional social movement possess. Accepting the validity of studying this Jewish social movement, it seems impossible to draw upon Palestinian voices without the foundational claim that by drawing upon these voices, I somehow represent them.

At times I have drawn upon some opinions that some Palestinians have expressed, yet these are elite voices, the opinions of certain Palestinians. I have deliberately not gathered or sought to gather The Voice of The Palestinians, a commodity seen as something to grant me a vantage point to criticise and judge Jewish groups. By refusing to make the claim that I have somehow accessed a Palestinian point of view my own positionality is foregrounded, and my arguments can be evaluated and criticised with reference to the limitations of this position. For there are certainly limitations; as I discuss in the conclusion, the study would have benefitted from a more sustained engagement with the Palestinian point of view, but not simply as supplementary voices.

In the meantime, my position enables me to discuss the large disjuncture between Palestinian claims and what Jewish groups are prepared to do/say (for instance on the right of return). I believe I am able to problematise this movement’s relationship with Palestinians without purporting to represent Palestinians. When talking of movement-relevant research, I refer what is relevant firstly to the people in this movement and secondly to Palestinian concerns. The implicit promise of this movement is that these are not wholly dissimilar criteria.

In the first category comes the questions of effectiveness – have these movements managed to achieve their goals of changing mindsets within British Jewry, and changing popular perceptions about British Jews supporting Israel? Have they managed to establish themselves

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12 I conducted a couple of interviews with Palestinian activists and while they were happy to comment on the wider solidarity movement, they knew little about Jewish solidarity groups in the diaspora – hardly surprising given these groups’ limited size and focus on the Jewish community.
as a sustainable movement capable of providing an attractive home for British Jews and are they changing not merely perceptions, but ‘Jewish identity’ itself? The second category contains more critical questions, yet questions which I argue that many in this movement ask of themselves. In what way has their work encouraged Jewish tribalism? (Gordon 2005) Have they acted as gatekeepers to Palestinian resistance, seeking to determine which actions are acceptable or not? Do they objectify and sideline Palestinian voices? Through the multiple methods I deploy, I ask these questions, examining what activists seek to do in this movement, how they conceive of themselves and this movement, what they actually do, and how these activities affect British Jews, the Palestine DIM in Britain, and Palestinians.
Chapter 3. Social movements and fields of contention

Defining the nature of an object of study is a contingent and somewhat arbitrary process. In reality there are no clear boundaries between movement networking and having a drink with a friend, between speaking out ‘as a Jew’ tactically, and getting into an argument. Nevertheless I believe it is immensely valuable to look at the social processes I am studying in terms of being a social movement, centrally affected by the dynamics of movement contention.

In this chapter I explain why I believe this to be so, what I mean by social movements and how being in a social movement affects the processes of identification and agency of the actors involved, which in turn directs their activities. Rather than thinking of a social movement as a neutral container of opinions, or an inert thing within which critics of Israel gather, I examine it as a process, a productive force whose dynamics shape the ideology and outcomes of diaspora Jewish opposition to Israel.

Firstly, I explain what I mean by a social movement, and why I apply this term to this heterogeneous group of critics. Social movements are not simply a collection of mechanisms (though studying these mechanisms is necessary in order to understand movements), they are a means for the historicity of the actor to evince itself (Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Touraine 1981). I ask what the historicity of these actors is – what is at stake in their activism. At the same time, I don’t advance the idea that these people’s world views and activism exist because of what they are – liberal-type Jews, or good people or whatever, but what they do in their field-specific contexts as social movement actors.

I deploy Bourdieu’s terms field and habitus in response to Nick Crossley’s suggestion (2002, 2003) that Bourdieu can be used to provide a general theory to draw the various strands of social movement theory together. I characterise this movement as both a Distant Issue Movement (DIM) and an identitarian one. Traditionally a division has been placed between movements that look after the actor’s own selfish interests and those concerned with the interests of others (Teske 1997). Using Bourdieu’s notion of field-specific interest (Bourdieu 1990, 1993) I contend that this interest-altruism dichotomy is more apparent than real.
After characterising the Anglo-Jewish Israel-critical movement, I turn to the issue of identity. There are two interrelated issues to identity construction within social movements – firstly local processes of collective identification within the movement, which I argue are crucial in explaining movement activism (Melucci 1989, 1996; Polletta and Jasper 2001). The second is the manipulation of ascribed identity categories, what is commonly known as ‘identity politics’, which I treat as a strategic political position (Bernstein 2005), containing its own problematics (Gamson 1995).

I then examine the processes of meaning-making in social movements and relate them to this movement. Firstly, I look at how social movements frame issues. While frames are useful for understanding the directive processes of activism (Benford and Snow 2000), their drawback is in viewing movement participants exclusively as calculating cognitive actors and failing to see how they are limited and directed by structural constraints (Crossley 2002). I introduce the ideas of the dialogic nature of social movement understanding (Steinberg 1999) and the role of movement narratives in directing activists (Fine 1995; Polletta 2006).

In treating the structural constraints under which movements operate, I recognise the importance of organisations but argue that Bourdieu’s idea of field leads to a more comprehensive theory of practice (Crossley 2002). At the same time Bourdieu’s sometimes excessive structuralism has been criticised as not allowing for the possibility of change from below (Jenkins 2002; Joppke 1986). I deal with this problem by highlighting multi-field contention, and introduce the concept of social movement actors as translators from one field to another.

**Defining social movements**
Definitions, according to Charles Tilly, ‘cannot be true or false, but they can be more or less useful’ (Tilly 1999: 258). Working from this dictum, I examine useful definitions of social movements and apply these definitions to the movement I am studying. I use Cox’s criteria for a theory of social movements, since these criteria are designed to facilitate movement-relevant theory. These ask that the definition has explanatory power for the range of activities involved, that it ‘should offer the possibility of a convincing engagement with participants’ own experiences and understandings’, and that it offers practical purchase on the problems that participants face (Cox 1999: 40).
Tilly’s own definition answers some of these criteria: for Tilly, social movements are ‘a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment’ (WUNC) (Tilly 1999: 257). While WUNC is useful in highlighting how and why social movements constitute themselves as claimants, this definition has two main problems with reference to this movement. Firstly, the primary challenge is to Israeli power holders and to local Zionists, yet this population doesn’t live under Israeli or Zionist jurisdiction; in fact Tilly’s definition fails to account for much transnational activism or local identity contestation. More importantly, by focusing on the mechanisms of contention it fails to acknowledge the importance of investigating the historicity of the movement, or that which is at stake (Touraine 1981). This brings to light the difference between the European school of social movement studies which ‘has been to analyze social movements as carriers of political projects, as historical actors, in contrast to the meso-level American RMT and PPT tradition’ (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 26).

Within the European tradition, Alain Touraine sees social movements as engaging in ‘the social control of historicity in a concrete community’ (1981: 77). Central to Touraine’s concept of social movement is the image of an historical actor, by which he means an actor guided by a plan or call to historicity. It is this awareness by movements that separate them from protest organisations, an awareness that the foundations of society are at stake. Engaging with the historicity of the movement is analytically necessary and accords with Cox’s second criteria for a theory – that it resonates with participant’s experiences.

Cox’s own definition of social movements is as follows:

A social movement is the organisation of multiple forms of materially grounded and locally generated skilled activity around a rationality expressed and organised by (would-be) hegemonic actors, and against the hegemonic projects articulated by other such actors (Cox 1999: 99).

In this definition, Cox draws out the directionality and purpose of movements, as well as the field of contention in which they operate and where they contest other actors’ hegemonic projects, whether or not they themselves are hegemonic. Contestation within fields –

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13 RMT is an acronym for resource mobilization theory and PPT is short for political process theory. Both are based on the idea of movement actors as rational. RMT views movement leaders as entrepreneurs and movements as engaged in the competition for resources. PPT focuses on the political opportunities and constraints within which movement actors work.
especially the Jewish ethnic field – against the hegemonic powers organising that field would be a good way of characterising much of this movement’s activity. Nevertheless, social movements, as this definition recognises, do much more than counter-hegemonic contestation, and should be seen less as oriented around conflict (though this plays a major part of many of their activities) than alternative rationalities to other actors.

Complementary to this definition, Eyerman and Jamison (1991) focus on cognitive praxis, believing that, ‘social movements are actually constituted by the cognitive praxis that is entailed in the articulation of their historical projects’ (1991: 43). By cognitive praxis, they mean ‘both formalised and informal modes of knowledge production within social movements’ (1991: 43). Certainly this particular movement is about much more than fighting for political change in Israel/Palestine. It seeks to reconstitute what it means to be a diaspora Jew in direct contestation to dominant Zionist praxis. This is why I discuss the reimagining of diaspora Jewry and Zionism in chapter four, both because activists draw upon these theories and because their activities are part of this knowledge production. Reality is not only recognised through writings, but also through the repertoire of movement activities (Eyerman and Jamison 1991).

It is important not to overlook structuring mechanisms in movements, the ‘how’ as well as the ‘why’ questions (Melucci 1989). As Eyerman and Jamison say:

> The collective articulation of movement identity can be likened to a process of social learning in which movement organisations act as structuring forces, opening a space in which creative interaction between individuals can take place. At a certain point in time, the interaction takes on a further dimension, as different organisations together carve out an actual societal space, transforming what began as interpersonal interests into interorganisational concerns, that is, from individual into wider social terms. This transition from a formative to an organisational phase, we contend, is what distinguishes social movements from action groups or single-issue protest organisations (1991: 55).

While Touraine sees the difference between protest groups and movements in the latter’s embodiment of historicity, Eyerman and Jamison believe it lies in the more mundane (and more researchable) fact of organisational stability. Melucci offers a synthesised approach, believing continuity to form an essential element of movements and recommends differentiating between a reaction to a crisis (protest group) and the expression of a deep-
seated conflict (movement) (Melucci 1996: 22). The following well-known definition of social movements by Diani centres the ongoing mechanisms of movements.

A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity (Diani 1992: 13).

Diani’s intention in this definition is to map out areas of academic study – specific networks and interactions, the groups and individuals involved, the conflict they are involved in, the collective identity they share and so on (Diani 1992). This definition is more for the benefit of the social movement theorist rather than an accurate description of movements, but nevertheless is useful. It attests to the heterogeneity of movements as networks; they are not to be confused with the constituent groups within the movement (Social Movement Organisations or SMOs) nor are they just the containers of a common ideology. Diani offers two points of unity which allows one to place the label ‘movement’ upon these networked interactions – a shared conflict and a shared identity.

Do such conditions exist for the people and groups I’m studying? Certainly they are connected to each other and in chapter five I outline a network of linkages and alliances. While disagreeing with Diani (and Melucci 1996) that social movements are always about conflict (more than any other element of social life, that is), nevertheless conflict and contestation with local Zionists and Israel is central for this particular movement. However, this conflict is not sufficient to differentiate this network from others in the Palestine DIM. To explain why and how I treat it as separate but linked to the Palestine DIM, I use Bourdieu’s notion of fields later in the chapter. However the chief problem with Diani’s definition is over his concept of ‘shared identity’. Diani is not the only writer who sees identity as the basic building block which explains why social movements exist as stable and definable objects of study. While accepting the importance of identity construction in movements, I draw upon the idea of movements as directive agencies and propose that what they share is ‘purpose’ as well as identity.

To sum up, I have not come up with a definition of social movements to compete with extant definitions. Instead I have drawn from both the European and American tradition of social movement studies since I understand this movement, however internally heterogeneous, as a historical actor engaged in cognitive reimagining. This praxis is situated in local processes of contention and involves actors engaging in identity and political contestation. To examine
their projects, I analyse these processes of contention. Firstly, I explore what differentiates this movement from others – its existence both as a DIM and in local identity contestation - and then discuss identity and meaning-making in movements.

**Distant issue movements**

This movement is simultaneously engaged in distant issue activism and local identity construction. I hesitate to call it a transnational movement however, as its reference publics and organisational structures are primarily nationally based. Nevertheless the processes and problems of transnational activism are relevant to this movement and in the data analysis chapters I draw on analyses of the interaction between Northern groups and the Global South (Johnston 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998), and of the mechanics of cross-border activism (Tarrow 2005; Olesen 2005).

Being involved in both distant and immediate contention appears to present a theoretical problem, since DIMs are characterised as being different to other movements in that their primary concern is seen as the interest of others rather than self-interest (Giugni and Passy 2001; Olesen 2005; Rucht 2000). This approach has been labelled dual-motivation theory, since groups motivated by self interest are seen as different to those whose goals are defined as moral or altruistic (Teske 1997). Below, I examine this altruism/self-interest dichotomy, drawing on Teske to argue the unsatisfactory nature of this division.

Altruistic actions, such as DIMs are supposed to pursue have been defined as actions that only benefit others and not the self, and are performed voluntarily for that purpose with no reward expected (Bar-Tal 1985). A similar definition has been advanced by Melucci in his discussion of altruism (1996: 167). Likewise Passy describes collective altruistic activities as: ‘actions pursued collectively, with a clear political goal of social change, and whose outcomes are to benefit others’ (2001: 7). The immediate problem of such definitions is obvious, since there is never action without interest. The second problem is that what is commonly defined as altruistic action is often not seen as such by activists themselves.

Dealing with the first issue, altruists have been placed in a completely different category to those seen as mobilising for their own collective benefit; altruists are labelled ‘conscience constituents’, useful because of their high level of cultural and social capital, but nevertheless unpredictable and changeable creatures, semi-detached from movements (McCarthy and Zald...
1977). I would argue that at the heart of this altruism/self-interest distinction, there is a depoliticisation process – a refusal to grant activists the right to political analysis. For instance, in the edited collection *Political Altruism*, there is an arbitrariness as to what defines a selfish good; for instance, environmental activism is held to be for one’s own good, whilst political mobilisation – whether fighting fascism in Spain or the example most commonly used, white Northerners helping the struggle for civil rights in the American South - is altruism (Giugni and Passy 2001). Yet all are attempts to fashion one’s own world as better to live in, and in the case of fighting fascism, as safer. In doing so the participants are motivated by political beliefs, but these beliefs are neither phantasmagoric nor altruistic.

In trying to depoliticise activists’ motivations and putting them down instead to disinterested altruism, one can see an academic refusal to grant any substantive meaning to activist ways of constructing the world. This may be because theorists don’t share their beliefs. It may also be because they see this activist theorising as an encroachment on their own domain, believing that it is the role of academics to construct general meanings (Casas-Cortés, Osterweil, and Powell 2008). Yet insisting that political solidarity is altruism ignores the extent to which this is not seen as ‘altruism’ by movement participants. Few, if any, of my interviewees thought they were working exclusively ‘for’ the Palestinians. This is partly because some participants think they’re protecting the Jewish collectivity from antisemitism by promoting peace in the Middle East, or redefining it in a way more congenial to their own beliefs as liberal English people. But such parochial concerns were usually, at most, supplementary reasons for activism. More often participants felt the need to be part of this movement because of their political beliefs. This is not altruism, nor is it usefully theorised as selfishness - it is a specific outcome and instance of their global political consciousness and needs to be examined as such.

While Rucht is one theorist who does allow the importance of purposive political goals for DIM actors, nevertheless he still differentiates between altruistic and self-interested DIMs, where it is only the latter who believe they are part of the same common collectivity (Rucht 2000). Similar, though more useful, is the differentiation between Transnational Solidarity Movements (TSMs) and Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A TSM is built on a scale of concrete linkages deriving from ties such as locality or kinship and possesses a capacity for mass mobilisation, whereas TANs involve a small number of morally committed activists linked together to share ‘values, a common discourse
and dense exchanges of information’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 46). At the heart of this division is the idea that TSMs are motivated by (unproblematised) ethnic-based interest, whereas TANs are motivated by little more than the white man’s burden. This jaundiced view of the division is supported by how Johnston (2003), in his otherwise useful critique of the Zapatista solidarity movement, uses this categorisation to divide solidarity groups into strong and effective TSMs and slightly useless and introverted TANs.

Nathan Teske is dismissive of the altruism/self-interest dichotomy, whether evinced in transnational activism or otherwise. In discussing activist motivations, he mentions how he was struck,

...by the fusion of self-regarding and moral-regarding concerns in activists’ self-understandings. Without seeming to feel any contradiction or tension, activists speak a language rich in references to moral concerns, and, at the same time, a language rich in references to self-interest (Teske 1997: 75 emphasis in original).

I was struck by exactly the same thing in my interviews. Reasons for activism, such as ‘being able to model a way of being in the world for one’s children’ (Teske 1997: 76), which one of my respondents also cited as a prime motivation, can be seen as both self-regarding and altruistic. Such responses need an approach that ‘recognises a complex weave of moral motive and self in politics’ (Teske 1997: 74). It is a recipe for frustration to maintain an either/or dichotomy between altruism and self-interest.

In response, Teske proposes an identity-construction approach to moral motives in politics:

This approach brings to light the ways that politics develop [sic] and expresses the identities of political actors and enables them to become something (or more appropriately, someone) that they otherwise would not have been able to become. The identity construction approach does not construe moral motives as inherently opposed to self-interest as in the dual motivational theory but instead stresses the ways that the construction of one’s very sense of self in politics is itself a moral project (Teske 1997: 74).

While an important insight, it is incomplete, in that it still refers the theorist back to the social movement actor, rather than to the object of activism. While appreciating Teske’s explosion of the altruism/self-interest dichotomy, the fact is that the construction of the self is far from being the only moral project people are engaged in. Their disinterest has wider implications.
A final point: while no interviewee described him/herself as ‘altruistic’, some thought that PSM activists were, and criticised them for this orientation. Altruism, it seems, is for others and about others. One of Teske’s interviewees made the point very powerfully:

David explicitly disavows ‘altruism’ as a motivator for his activism, noting that the word is etymologically traceable to a Latin root meaning “other or ‘alien’, and likening it to a kind of alienation. An altruistic or ‘charity consciousness’ attitude separates the activist from the poor, and, hence, altruism creates a lack of integration or connectedness in antipoverty activism (Teske 1997: 79).

This linking of altruism with others’ motives accords with Bourdieu’s comment about how the field defines itself by defining specific stakes and interests, which are irreducible to the stakes and interests specific to other fields[…] every category of interests implies indifference to other interests, other investments, which are therefore bound to be perceived as absurd, irrational, or sublime and disinterested (Bourdieu 1993: 72).

Thus the term ‘altruism’ can best be understood as a dismissal of those interests which one is uninterested in or unwilling to engage with, whether it is done by movement activists observing different field of activism, or by theorists opposing the competencies of activists to intrude on their own intellectual field. But if this activism is not ‘altruistic’, how then do we understand it? In the final section I argue that Bourdieu’s concept of specific interests within fields, signposted above, offers a satisfying explanation about motivations within DIMs. Firstly however, I have rejected Teske’s identity-construction approach, without fully explaining why. Below, I explain how I understand the role of identity in this movement.

**Identity in movement**

In this section I argue for the importance of examining the mechanisms of identity production within movements, since through this production, actors produce meaning. Identity production is particularly salient for this movement, since one of its aims is the production of an alternative Jewish identity. Thus the process of identity production involves both creating a specific movement identity and deploying and contesting ascribed identity categories. With Bernstein (1997, 2005) I argue that no distinction should be made between ‘identity’ and ‘instrumental’ movements, but rather that identity contention should be seen as a strategic
political goal, like any other. Finally, I explain those issues around identity construction I deal with.

Della Porta and Diani (2006) offer a useful summary of the importance of identity production in movements. Firstly, ‘collective action cannot occur in the absence of a “we” characterised by common traits and specific solidarity’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94). Equally important is a common enemy, an ‘other’ against whom the mobilisation is called, and how identity choices enable movement participants to orientate themselves with regards to neutrals, as well as friends and enemies (Gamson 1992).

Secondly, ‘the presence of feelings of identity and of collective solidarity makes it easier to face the risks and uncertainties related to collective action’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94). The assumption of a common identity enables relations of trust and reciprocity to be established amongst those within its boundaries, creating an esprit de corps for the movement, and is an especially important issue for movements in such a contentious area as this. Such identity construction is as important to sustain individual SMOs as well as broader movements (Caniglia and Carmin 2005). William Gamson views collective identities as involving three embedded layers:

1. Organisational activist identity
2. Movement activist identity
3. Solidary group identity (Gamson 1992: 84)

This is a useful distinction, and I investigate how this activism has affected the collective identities of activists, movement, and to an extent, organisations in the movement.

Thirdly, a sense of collective identity gives the social movement continuity over time and space, sustaining movements through ‘latent’ periods and moments of downturn (Whittier 1997; Melucci 1989). This is what differentiates the effervescent explosion of protest from ongoing operations of groups over decades. For the individual, breaking with past identities and affiliations is much easier if there are new identities available, ones which stress the continuities and the naturalness of movement. Movements need to present themselves as normative continuations of previous identities, in some degree, in order to gain adherents.
This leads to a chicken and egg type question about identity and movements. Namely: ‘To what extent are collective identities constructed in and through protest rather than preceding it?’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285). Although it has been argued that some mobilisations, such as ‘moral shock’ mobilisations, require no prior collective identities or networks (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), most do require some sense of collective identification; one’s prior identity and milieu lead many people to get involved in movements (McAdam 1988; Morris 1992).

However I argue that prior to the sense of collective agency that social movements provide, actors’ sense of identity is diffuse, unfocused and weak. The difference between identity formation pre and post movement involvement can be seen most starkly in the study trip I observed. Initial identity constructs and ties were enough to get people to go on a trip to Palestine, but the real project of building a collective identity opposed to Israeli oppression of Palestinians happened on the trip and was one of the trip’s central purposes. I found a similar though more long-term process happening among movement participants in Britain. As Larana, Johnston and Gusfield write, ‘Individual identities are brought to movement participation and changed in the process’ (1994: 12), with Kiecolt (2000) theorising that the way this happens is that in social movements people bring their self-conception and situated selves into line with an ideal or ‘ought’ self.

People may participle in this Israel-critical movement because they believe they are the sort of people to get involved in this sort of activity. Nevertheless, this initial identification is weak and diffuse. It is the social movement itself that gives form and purpose to this project, even in this movement where the assumption that actors are engaged and directed because of their prior identities has previously been unchallenged, both by those who criticise and those who valorise these identities (Atzmon 2005; Julius 2008; Polner and Merken 2007; Kushner and Solomon 2003). Therefore, I focus on the process of goal and identity construction within the movement in my analysis.

Whatever about the importance of identity production, as anyone who has studied the assumed identities of collectivities can attest, identity is a substance that evaporates when subjected to analysis and, as Bauman wryly suggests, assumes most importance in its absence (Bauman 2000). There is a danger in the term identity operating like phlogiston for 18th century scientists, a substance which is invisible and unmeasurable, yet in the absence of other explanations, is conjured up to account for social facts. This is identity as ‘a sort of
virtual center (*foyer virtuel*) to which we must refer to explain certain things, but without it ever having a real existence’ (Claude Levi-Strauss quoted in Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 9). Nevertheless, I suggest that we can still recognise identity as an important process and series of claims of social movements, providing we don’t reify it as being a quality or *thing* possessed by actors (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Viewing identity as a contested process and political aim of movements helps illuminate their activities, as I discuss below.

Identity construction can be seen as fashioned in social movements through the three interrelated processes of consciousness, negotiation and boundary construction (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Consciousness refers to ‘the interpretive frameworks that emerge from a group’s struggle to define and realise its interests’ (Taylor and Whittier 1992: 111) – usually political consciousness, with emotions being the glue which fixes the new cognitive structure as one’s felt identity. Negotiation highlights the fact that all identity construction is performed as an interactional accomplishment with other actors, while boundary construction and maintenance is an essential aspect of identification (Barth 1969). I use all these concepts in analysing movement identity construction in chapter six.

Identity is also constructed, as with other movement goals, in ongoing dialogue with friends, enemies and reference publics. In discussing the formation of collective actors in social movements, Melucci (1995) also treats collective identity as a process, rather than a quality of pre-defined actors. Regarding collective identity as a negotiated process highlights its active strategic dimension and allows us to see social movements as ‘systems of action’. Moreover they are systems which can be treated as unified empirical actors through the operation of this process of identity (Melucci 1995: 49, 53).

Collective identity is thus a process in which actors produce the common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess their environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of their action. The definition which they formulate are in part the result of negotiated interactions and relationships of influence and in part the fruit of emotional recognition (Melucci 1989: 35).

Identity projects are both constitutive of social movements and are among the aims of these movements. By treating identity as part of a directed ‘system of action’, we can revisit Diani’s 1992 definition of a social movement. This definition works rather well if one replaces ‘collective identity’ with ‘collective purposes’. Rather than differentiate identity and strategy, I treat them both as processes and projects of movements (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Identity is not reducible to strategy, since it requires emotional investment and is never
entirely negotiable and contingent. It is more that identity and strategy inhabit each other, both offering principles for continuity as well as explanations for ideological choice, especially in a movement such as this which has as one of its political aims as well as one of its strategies, the reconstitution of an identity.

This formulation explicitly rejects differentiating between so-called instrumental and identity movements (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995), or differentiating between identity and strategy (Rucht 1988). While Duyvendak and Giugni at least accept that identity movements can act in a strategic manner, they differentiate between subcultural (inner-directed) and countercultural (outer-directed) movements. If one were to draw a line from identity to instrumental movements, on one end of the line would be subcultural movements, moving up to countercultural movements, and then to pure instrumentalist groups. However this line would be more imaginary than real; ‘identity movements’, such as lesbian and gay movements are formed to challenge power structures. Equally, the pure politics end would be emptier than first appears. Even movements commonly associated with political change such as the civil rights movement also had the altering of participant identities as a prime aim (Morris 1992; McAdam 1988). While differentiating between identity and political goals is not convincing for most movements, it becomes downright confusing when talking of Jewish Israel-critical groups, furthering interlinked expressive and instrumental goals. Such a confusing dichotomy illustrates the truth of Bernstein’s comments: ‘Theorists must abandon the essentialist characterisation of social movements as expressive or instrumental because it impairs the study of all social movements’ (1997: 533).

Bernstein and others still largely examine the strategic, instrumental element of identity contestation in terms of how it affects the people deploying the identity category (Bernstein 2005; Gamson 1995; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). For instance, gay groups are seen as political in that they contest the way gays are treated, rather than in contesting broader political goals. However Jewish Israel-critical groups do not contend within the Jewish ethnic field only to change that field, but also to achieve political goals in distant fields. Though investigating the tensions and complementarities between distant issue activism and local identity contestation, this thesis contributes to the theorisation of identity in social movements.

Identity contestation is both a means of enabling change and of restricting it. A major theme in this study is the constraints, the identity traps, as well as the opportunities of contending on
the field of identity. While identity contestation may be strategically useful, by contending in this arena, the type of work one engages in is affected. As Joshua Gamson (1995) points out, fixed identity categories may be the basis for political power, but they are also the basis for oppression. Identity categories based in notions of ‘the Jewish community’ are often retrograde, and work to muffle Israel-critical action and silence the subjectivities of Palestinians.

Gamson, while understanding the logic of strategic essentialism, also advances the logic of trying to queer, or to disrupt the categories of identity. He differentiates between specific movement identity and larger ascribed identity categories, arguing that ‘the destabilisation of collective identity is itself a goal and accomplishment of collective action’ (Gamson 1995: 402-3 Emphasis in original). Nevertheless the dangers of any type of contestation in the field of identity is that actors focus their efforts on these fields to the detriment of activism elsewhere – effort spent on discussing Jewishness is effort not spent trying to affect the situation in Israel/Palestine. In addition there is the problem of actors fighting ‘the Jewish civil war’ becoming institutionalised within the Jewish community. These are issues that some writers on the issue (Ellis 2003; Segal 2002), and more importantly, that many movement participants are acutely aware of. In the following chapters I ask how actors in this DIM negotiate the conundrum of identity politics.

**Mechanisms within social movements**
In the previous section I discussed the salience of identity contestation. I now discuss the mechanisms and constraints that operate on movements, the tools with which I analyse how the movement produces meaning. I begin by examining the framing paradigm, since it is still the most popular explanation for meaning-making in movements. Framing offers a useful but incomplete way to examine how meaning is constructed in movements, and so I next turn to the ideas of dialogic discursive repertoires and of narratives to understand these processes. While these are important in shaping movements, so are structural constraints and opportunities and I also discuss the effects of organisational forms.
Framing

Frame theory is probably still the most common way through which meaning-making in movements is researched (Benford and Snow 2000). Here, I explain frame theory and discuss its uses, before arguing that though useful to explain particular mechanics of meaning-making, it is insufficient to account for it entirely. The attraction of frame analysis is that it provides a language for talking about how activists, seen as conscious and rational actors, engage in struggle. Frames are ‘emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs that inspire meaning and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns’ (Benford 1997: 416). This emphasis on their functionality is one of the chief strengths of frame theory – it enables scholars to assess how actors consciously and actively engage in the contestation of meaning. It stresses the agency of movement actors, viewing them ‘as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 613).

Initially framing seems relevant for a movement such as this which does not conceptualise itself as an expressive location of identity as much as an active agent in social change. For instance, this Israel-critical movement has deployed as a key master frame the ‘rights frame’ (Valocchi 1996) and the ‘injustice frame’. William Gamson (1992) claims that the identification of an injustice is a precondition for movements pushing for social change, adding,

Collective action requires a consciousness of human agents whose policies or practices must be changed and a “we” who will help to bring the change about (Gamson 1992: 8).

In other words, frames need a perception of agency and identity as well as a sense of injustice. Furthermore, through needing an awareness of injustice and targets to be identified as the source of that injustice, framing is necessarily conflictual. Certainly, drawing on a sense of injustice and building up actors’ agency through conflictual framing has been a key mechanism within this movement. Gamson also identifies the need to identify the correct type of adversary:

To sustain collective action, the targets identified by the frame must successfully bridge the abstract and concrete. By connecting broader socio-cultural forces with human agents who are appropriate targets of collective

14 A master frame is a frame sufficiently inclusive, flexible and culturally resonant to serve as an overarching narrative for movements (Benford and Snow 2000)
action, one can get the heat into the cognition. By making sure that the concrete targets are linked to and can affect the broader forces, one can make sure the heat isn’t misdirected in ways that will leave the underlying source of injustice untouched (Gamson 1992: 33).

In this hotly contested field, there is no difficulty in finding adversaries, but a certain amount of controversy about who the key adversary is. Such controversies, or alternative forms of ‘adversarial framing’ and ‘boundary framing’ are common within movements (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994). The several alternatives – Israel, Zionism, local Zionists or Western imperialism - are intimately linked with what is perceived as the solution and who is framed as the subjects of action; diaspora Jews or Palestinians.

The success of framing strategies depends on internal and external factors. Internally frames need to be both credible and relevant to target populations. Externally, frames need to consider and work within the organisation of political forces in the field, and the hegemonic cultures which they both challenge and draw upon. This approach sees movements as ‘both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings’ (Tarrow 1992: 189). Following Marx’s introductory observations in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx 1963), Tarrow (1998) notes how repertoires of contention aren’t unrolled out of whole cloth, nor are they dusted down from cultural attics. They are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibres into collective action frames in confrontation with opponents and elites (Tarrow 1998: 118). This can be seen in the way that Jewish dissidents draw upon prior Jewish writings to justify their present-day reimagining of Jewish identities.

Lastly there’s the issue of the targeted audience, those who Rucht (2004) refers to as the reference groups of a movement. Different frames are used to appeal to different reference groups, and William Gamson (2004) refers to four prime publics that need to be considered: primary constituents who one seeks to mobilise; bystanders and possible supporters, where frames are constructed to garner sympathy; enemies who are framed so as to discredit and demonise them; and finally enemy supporters who the framing seeks to neutralise and render passive.

From the above it would seem that all I need to study the effectiveness and purpose of movements is to study the frames they deploy. Frame analysis does provide useful tools to understand how social movements try to influence public opinion, but it has severe drawbacks. Firstly there is an internal critique of frame theory, noting how it tends towards...
simply providing descriptions and how it often lacks analytical precision, as well as producing analyses biased towards the elites who are seen to create frames (Benford 1997). Such criticism can be dealt with by a ‘must do better’ approach. More significant is the criticism that framing does not ‘do justice to the ideational complexity of movements’ (Crossley 2002). Nick Crossley talks of the ‘lightweight’ feel of frames, and how ‘the notion of frames seems inadequate to explain the depth and richness’ of the connections between groups and their reference publics (Crossley 2002: 142). In explaining why, he argues that frames fail to examine how struggles over meanings are influenced by the pre-existing discursive power of institutional actors. The reason for this failure to engage with structure or with the internal life of the actor is, according to Crossley, the actor model he feels underpins frame theory – rational actors independent of the frames they deploy and thus mysteriously outside the scope of identity and structural constraints. One must query a model of agency which fails to take into account actors’ sense of their selves, and how they are interpellated by the structures of societies in which they participate (Crossley 2002: 65-75).

Framing in this view is based on an excessively voluntarist model of rational social actors able to manipulate discourse at will and does not recognise the extent to which discourse is embedded in conditions of struggle. In their commendable wish to centre the intentionality and rationality of movement actors it is argued that resource mobilisation theorists, which framing is part of, went overboard in the importance they accorded to the conscious decision-making process. Without gainsaying the contention that agents do act rationally, such theories can at best account for specific features of collective action, but not the entirety of the local rationalities of movement actors. Though the language of frame analysis can still be usefully deployed, it must lie within a less voluntarist model of actor choice. Below I examine alternative theories of meaning-making within movements, which stress the embeddedness of actors. On one hand I discuss the narratives and discourses which interpellate them, on the other the structures which channel them.

**Discursive repertoires, narratives and organisational constraints**

Marc Steinberg has advanced the notion of ‘discursive repertoires’ to explain how movement actors construct meaning (Steinberg 1999). Unlike frames, which can be characterised as marketing strategies which materialise fully-formed from the head of social movement entrepreneurs, discursive repertoires emerge in dialogic contention through the process of
struggle within structured settings: ‘Discursive repertoires are strategic, but collective actors are partly captives within the discursive fields that they seek to manipulate’ (Steinberg 1999: 772).

This constructs social actors as embedded in the discourses they are trying to change, opening up questions of power in discourse and the social position of actors. Such a theory gives far more weight to the discourses of the reference groups, particularly the hegemonic reference group. It is for this reason that I examine Zionist discourse among the hegemonic fraction of British Jews, as well as the dialogue between this discourse and participants in this movement. The importance of reference publics attests to the dialogism inherent in the concept of discursive repertoires:

Dialogism offers a specific framework for a more dynamic analysis of collective action discourse contextually keyed to ongoing hegemonic struggle. It focuses attention on the discursive repertoires produced by challengers, how these repertoires often are fashioned through an ongoing interaction with the powerholders' genres, and the continual uncertainties and challenges that these repertoires pose for all involved (Steinberg 1999: 772).

Such dialogism enables us to view the movement in relational terms and provides a key to understanding why people took certain positions on this and other issues. I use this dialogic model to examine how opinions around the BDS (boycott, divestment, sanctions) campaign have formed, for example. Such opinions can best be seen simply as ideas formed in dialogue with hegemonic positions among Jews and the wider world.

An important part of this dialogism is direct conflict with Zionists, which I investigate in chapter six. Equally important however is the broader dialogical contestation with other Jews, and the appropriation of Jewish symbols as a part of this. Roth (2007), in her discussion of dialogism among Chicana feminists in the 1970s, talks of how they combated accusations of selling out to white feminists by excavating the same repository of historical and mythological Latino symbols as Chicano males, refashioning some and disparaging others. A similar dialogical approach to the Jewish field explains why and how Jewish activists engage in a reinterpretation rather than a rejection of Jewish history.

By entering a dialogical relation, participants do not simply appropriate extant discourses, they are inhabited by them. Dialogical contention does not merely open up possibilities of action, it also closes them down and provides a mechanism to understand how identity traps
occur. For instance, the Chicana groups of the 1970s were later criticised for falling into an identity trap through the discourses they had negotiated – the emphasis on ideological indigenousness was seen as having ‘militated against ideological creativity and creative links with other feminisms’, with the wholesale adoption of the family-centred model of male Chicano activism seen as similarly limiting (Roth 2007: 725). In similar way, subsequent Jewish activists have criticised initial campaigners for pandering to the Jewish community. Such critiques also show that dialogic contention does not merely happen between groups and their reference publics but also among the movement itself in a dialectical process of cognitive praxis.

Turning to narratives; meaning-making and identity production are affected by the internal processes of actor narrativising as well as by external dialogic contestation. I attend closely to actor narratives, in part as acknowledgement of the action-directed nature of narratives: ‘Stories guide action[...]people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emploted stories’ (Somers and Gibson 1994: 38). Also significant is the role of narratives in producing identities and developing a coherent collective actor over time (Hall 1999). Wuthnow (1996) in studying small groups in the US believes that storytelling is their dominant mode of discourse and means of conveying information. He argues that storytelling transforms people into communal entities but with their own individuality, or their own stories.

One example of how narratives work can be seen in Gary Fine’s work (1995). Fine sees social movements as places of cultural enactment achieved through narratives and other forms of talk. He breaks down the narrative types used within movements into three primary ones. Horror stories are affronts to the movement actor, galvanising the sense of injustice and prompting involvement. War stories are collective experience with the movement with the account ratifying the experience and allowing the event to be incorporated into the culture of the group. Finally, happy endings are motivational boosts, stories reaffirming the value of the movement in achieving material ends: ‘public activity, these stories assert, is filled with surprises, and collectively these surprises will lead to triumph’ (Fine 1995: 136). While one can take issue once again with the implicit rational actor lurking behind these stories – this schema speaks directly to my data and I use it in my data analysis chapters.

We should acknowledge the efficacy of narratives for social movements but not reduce them to their use-value for narrators, since this would fail to distinguish them from frames. In
Polletta’s (1998) distinction between narratives and frame, narratives are tales – open-ended, incomplete and dynamic. Frames are the morals at the end of these tales – strategic, directed and simple to understand. As Polletta says, the power of narratives derives precisely from their lack of completion, since this provides a sense of dynamic tension and a possibility for the listener to enter into the story (On the ‘brokenness’ of stories, see Wuthnow 1996: 311). While I agree that ‘movement narratives understood as chronicles invested with moral meaning through emplotment are used by activists as a mobilisation tool’ (Polletta 1998: 140), I try not to reduce the emplotted actor to a rational instrumentalist, telling stories simply because they are more ‘effective’ than moralistic frames. It is not just the narrator who tells the stories; the story also constructs the narrator. Polletta’s later work with narratives (2006) engages more closely with how emplotting oneself within extant narratives directs and constrains actors, and may work against the efficacy of movement activism. This is another topic I examine in relation to how narrating themselves as rooted cosmopolitans works to constrain the actions of participants in the movement under study.

In talking of how actors determine what is at stake, it is easy to lose oneself in discussing discourses. One must also bear in mind the role of structure in determining the aims and outcomes of social movements. Were it not for the role of organisations as mobilisers of resources the ‘voluntary commitment of many citizens[…] would end up being temporary or confined to the area of private relationships’ (Ranci 2001: 85 [also McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1990; Staggenborg 1988]). I follow the idea that ‘formal organisations are nodes of dense interaction in a more fluid network of activists who may shift from group to group’ (Clemens and Minkoff 2004: 157). This description perfectly captures the field of organisations I am studying where such movement and multiple belonging is common. The movement is not simply affected by discourses suspended in a network of interactions, but by the organisations which shape many of these interactions and hence movement culture.

Movement organisations should be examined as semi-autonomous variables affecting actors’ outlooks and movement outcomes. Different emotional styles within an organisation, such as a confrontational or consensual style, and different membership rules materially determine the tactics and goals of the groups, and affect what they believe is at stake (Blee and Currier 2005). Taking one organisational feature as example: the desire not to establish ‘manifesto groups’, or groups with a worked-out policy on Israel/Palestine and on diaspora Jews. The preference is for broad platforms with minimum entry requirements, consensual decision-
making and strategies to promote inclusiveness and plurality. This may be due to the newness of the field, or a reaction by activists to leftist ‘manifesto groups’ they’d previously been involved in. It may be a strategy to attract recruits, or because this network-based model is increasingly the dominant form of contentious politics in the new millennium (della Porta 2005). For whatever reason, this organisational form clearly shapes actor involvement, opinions and outcomes.

Of particular interest is the way these organisational forms produce the freedom for activism, while at the same time leading to a level of institutional channelling of protest. The institutionalisation of protest is a trap that those seeking social change often find themselves in. Piven and Cloward (1977, 1992), following Michels (1968 [1915]) argue that in order to change society organised hierarchical groups are needed, but these organisations in turn serve to incorporate members into the society they seek to change and co-opt their protests towards institutional stability. While accepting that goal displacement and institutionalisation happens, other writers disagree that it is somehow an inevitable process for all social movement organisations. Colin Barker (2001b) argues for the importance of the political imaginaries of groups to be taken into account – for instance, revolutionary socialist groups don’t have a tendency to institutionalise. Clemens and Minkoff (2004) agree this process isn’t inevitable but happens through specific causes, mainly institutional channelling and forms of resource dependency. While resource dependency is not an issue within this movement, institutional channelling is especially relevant and is a process I observe with regards to organisations like Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP) trying to carve a niche within Jewish community structures.

In contrast to organisations, I do not consider the issue of networks in much detail. I accept that social networks are strong predictors of participation in social movements and important elements of participation (Kitts 2000; Lichterman 1996). Recent studies have focused on how networks among family and friends affect involvement (Shemtov 2003), with theorists talking about how these informal channels are ‘a primary mode of sharing methods and repertoires’ (McAdam and Rucht 1993). While the salience of such informal networks for participants can’t be gainsaid, in many ways they serve as background music, a more or less

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15 This customarily takes the form of agreement to sign up to a vague and minimalist set of principles (JfJfP platform, IJV platform) and sometimes not even that (Jewdas, J-BIG).
constant element of daily life, which by virtue of their constancy cannot serve as explanation why movements arise when they do, nor the forms they take.

In this way they are analogous to issues such as the class origins of activists. Study after study has shown that activists, especially in DIMs, are disproportionately middle class professionals (Crossley 2002) – specifically, non-socially privileged members of the service class (Ray et al 2003). This is also the case in this movement – yet this tells us next to nothing about the movement itself, why these members have chosen involvement in these particular activities or the effects of these activities. Class is of course salient; when I talk of activists as ‘privileged’ vis-à-vis Palestinians, their middle class position and privileges (such as access to the political field) must be borne in mind, and are related to their racial privileges as white Western subjects. My point is simply that they are no more middle class than other DIM activists, nor are their class origins vastly different to a largely middle-class Jewish community (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007; Schmool 2004). Their middle-classness should be understood as a largely constant element for DIM activists and British Jews, rather than a salient point of differentiation for participants in this movement.

**Bourdieu and social movements**

So far I have shown how social movements cannot be usefully studied simply as identitarian gushings or as pre-planned schemes of rational actors. I have argued in favour of studying the rational instrumentalities of a movement, its dialogue with hegemonic forces, and its internal narratives and organisational constraints. Such an approach seems to be based on a grab-bag of epistemologically divergent viewpoints. In order to provide a coherent model of social action, I follow Crossley (2002) in drawing upon Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Bourdieu, as even his sternest critics admit, ‘is good to think with’ (Jenkins 2002: 12). Though there are genuine problems in applying his theories to understand social movements as agents of change, this section works through these problems in order to provide a theoretical structure for the dissertation.

I first explain Bourdieu’s ideas of habitus and field and how these ideas map onto extant social movement theory, using habitus to explain agency and field to deal with structures within which social movement actors operate. I examine the implications of his theory in relation to this particular movement, arguing that it can overcome the false dichotomies of
Explaining habitus and field

Bourdieu uses the term habitus to explain how social structures are embodied in individuals, defining habitus as:

a system of durable transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as principle which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu 1990: 53).

There are several elements to this definition, the first concerning dispositions which are both durable and generative. By this he refers to the ability of habitus developed in one social sphere – according to Bourdieu, developed during primary socialisation - to generate schemata in different spheres of an individual’s life. Bourdieu observes that aspirations and practices of individuals and groups tend to correspond to the formative conditions of their respective habitus:

What agents judge as “reasonable” or “unreasonable” for people of their station in the social world stems from habitus. Habitus tends to reproduce those actions, perceptions, and attitudes consistent with the conditions under which it was produced (Swartz 1997: 103).

This deep structure ensures that dispositions are transposable from field to field. Dispositions are durable ‘structuring structures’ by virtue of containing external social structures; they are in many ways the internalisation of structures by the individual. This is far from saying that the individual is an automaton out of which these structures speak. Central to Bourdieu’s theories is the generative element to habitus, people as practical strategists attempting to manoeuvre through the structures that have formed them. However these strategies occur at a dispositional level: ‘Actors are not rule followers or norm obeyers but strategic improvisers...
who respond *dispositionally* to the opportunities and constraints offered by various situations’
(Swartz 1997: 100. Emphasis mine)

Bourdieu repeatedly uses the analogy of the games player to explain *habitus*, pointing out that the one who plays the game best is the one who lets the game inhabit her, and who can thereby manipulate it to her advantage (Bourdieu 1998b). In this, Bourdieu distinguishes *habitus* from *habit* – seen as a mechanical and automatic means of reproduction. His perspective on *habitus* is summarised below:

> To put it briefly, the habitus is a product of conditionings which tends to reproduce the objective logic of these conditionings while transforming it. It’s a kind of transforming machine that leads us to reproduce the social conditions of our own production, but in a relatively unpredictable way, in such a way that one cannot move simply and mechanically from knowledge of the conditions of production to knowledge of the products (Bourdieu 1993: 87)

On fields, while Bourdieu is not alone in discussing social relations in terms of ‘fields of organised striving’, his examination of fields is useful in that it stresses their conflictual and relational nature, and the centrality of extra-organisational fields (Martin 2003: 20). For Bourdieu,

> Fields denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital. Fields may be thought of as structured spaces that are organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital (Swartz 1997: 117).

The idea of field conveys the notion that we can view social life in terms of struggle over relatively autonomous field-dependent capital (for instance artistic capital which is not directly transposable to other fields of capital) between the various agents that make up a field. This is encapsulated by Bourdieu’s schema of practice: ‘[(Habitus)(capital)] + field = practice’ (Bourdieu 1984: 101), or in more understandable terms, the interaction of *habitus* and social, cultural or economic capital specific to a field of contention is what explains forms of social practice.

Structure here is the state of power relations amongst those within the field, a state which is subject to continual struggle about the monopoly of legitimate violence (hegemony) and control of the structure of the distribution of field-specific capital. Fields are only weakly
correlated with institutions; or rather fields encapsulate struggles that exist within and outside organisations. These organisations are in turn part of wider fields of struggle, rarely are fields so thoroughly institutionalised that one organisation comprises a field.

Bourdieu understood cultural, social and economic capital to be interlinked. I primarily investigate the circulation and contestation of symbolic or cultural capital of a field, in particular, embodied or incorporated cultural capital, which Swartz describes as ‘the ensemble of cultivated dispositions that are internalized by the individual through socialization and that constitute schemes of appreciation and understanding’ (1997: 76). This is as opposed to objectified (residing in an object), or institutionalised (residing in an institution such as through the credentialisation process of universities) cultural capital. As opposed to these forms, embodied capital is more prominent in power relations which are not overtly capitalist (though it is linked, as Bourdieu’s work on education shows, to the acquisition of other forms of capital), and more pertinent to the particular contestations within this field.

This focus on embodied cultural capital relates to an important way I diverge from Bourdieu. Bourdieu primarily discusses the perpetuation of class differences, while this thesis does not. While class, as noted above, is relevant in positioning social movement actors in relation to Palestinians, it is not so significant within the ethnic field. The capital contended, as I discuss later, remains primarily symbolic, not transposable to economic capital or very much representative of class positions. Having said that, many participants in this movement are members of the service-class – professionals, academics, etc – those who Bourdieu refers to as the dominated fraction of the dominant class. This vantage point manifests itself in the way that critics of communal Zionism also tend to criticize the intellectual sterility of the hegemonic culture within British Jewry. While an interesting point, I would argue that any class contestation is very much a second-level phenomenon (one must bear in mind that participants are also contesting with service-class Zionists), and so primarily concern myself with the symbolic, embodied cultural nature of the capital contended.
The implications of Bourdieu’s theories for social movements
Here, I discuss the applicability of Bourdieu's theory to social movements, focusing on issues raised earlier in the chapter, specifically issues of discursive meaning-making, interest/disinterest in movements, and institutionalisation.

Meaning making
Bourdieu’s work stresses the embodied competence of actors, enabling us to see them as embedded in structures, yet able to consciously manipulate discursive processes. This schema enables theorists to overcome the apparent dichotomies between directive framing and discursive repertoires. Viewing the actor as a skilled games player, her strategies and calculations are of prime importance, while at the same time they are contingent upon the actor being inhabited by the game. The frames that social movement actors deploy resonate because of the ability of the framer to manipulate socially produced discourses, but this ability is in turn dependant on the framer’s embodiment of these discourses (Crossley 2002). To understand why they resonate, we must try to understand the interests of the social audience that they appeal to and analyse these social situations, or in Bourdieu’s term – these fields.

Fields
The notion of field offers a useful means for studying the internal and external relations of a social movement. A field can be seen as a magnetic force-field with poles of attraction and repulsion – ‘a structured space of relations in which the positions of individuals or schools of thought [are] defined in terms of their differential relationship with other participants in the field’ (Lane 2000: 73). In contrast to static notions of structure that are associated with organisations, fields stress the relationality of social activity: ‘to think in terms of field is to think relationally’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96). This echoes Rucht’s comment that social movements can only be understood in relational terms, in terms of alliances and conflicts (Rucht 2004).

Field conflicts are inherently unequal when waged between the capital-rich and capital-poor (or dominant and dominated) in a field, and Bourdieu (1998b) observes how possession of
capital – like possession of chips in a poker game – not only affects one’s position in the game but also how one plays the game. Those in control are inclined to orthodoxy and conservation strategies whereas those least-endowed with capital favour heresy strategies in order to upset the ‘right-thinking right-wing thought that is aimed at restoring the equivalent of silent assent to doxa’ (Bourdieu 1993: 73).

This enables us to see strategies of resistance in the context of the specific social situations of actors within their field. One can see this when Jewish Israel-critical activists, poor in community-specific symbolic capital, link their Israel-critical activism with a ‘heretical’ point of view on the Jewish community, attacking community conservatism. Indeed, ‘the Anglo-Jewish community’ should best be termed the British Jewish field, since this better conveys the processes of contention that exist.

Crossley views movements as fields and in fields. This picture of movements operating in external fields and being themselves fields of contention provides a multidimensional model of movement action. He fully recognises the problem of such multidimensionality, saying that ‘The picture that begins to emerge out of this, of fields within fields, bordering upon further fields, is mind-boggling to say the least.’ He adds,

In the final instance, however, the world of protest simply is that complex, and Bourdieu’s concept of fields, admitting as it does of great fluidity and multidimensionality, is far better placed than any other tool in the sociological kit bag (e.g. ‘system’, ‘apparatus’ [dispositif], ‘institution’, ‘sector’, ‘industry’) for engaging with and doing justice to this empirical complexity (Crossley 2003: 62).

Nevertheless some simplification of this complexity is needed, else we end up with no more than a mapping exercise of a multitude of fields. If we talk about British Israel-critical Jews, their movement field is simultaneously embedded in the Palestine DIM field and the Jewish ethnic field (or in another movement field as well as a non-movement field), both of which exist partly within the ambient political field. In addition its relationship to the distant issue fields of Israelis and Palestinians is far from peripheral and needs to be analysed. Even though these are not the only fields that impinge on this movement, they are the most salient ones and I would argue that this simplified depiction serves as a sufficient model for analysing this movement.
Interest in movements

Earlier I argued that DIMs should not be viewed as altruistic or as merely engaged in identity construction. Here I use Bourdieu’s theory of fields to examine the issues of interest and identity in movements. For Bourdieu, each field has its own definitions of interest and so it is possible for disinterested acts to be carried out in well-constituted fields where disinterest is part of the field’s symbolic capital. From outside the field the symbolic capital each field produces may seem like disinterest or irrationality, but from within the field it is rationally constituted interest in disinterest.

The field of social movements is not exceptional in its focus on disinterest. We occupy multiple fields within which disinterestedness is taught and reproduced, such as societies of honour or the domestic field (Bourdieu 1998b). Thus I argue there is no need to oppose solidarity movements with other ‘self-interested’ movements, still less to try to show solidarity movements are as narrowly self-interested as other elements of social life are supposed to be - a key feature of RMT ever since Olson’s ‘free-rider’ conundrum (Olson 1965). 16 Actors must be understood as genuinely interested in the disinterested actions they pursue. Failing to allow for this forces theorists into asserting that those involved in solidarity are deluding themselves or shamming it – that really they are involved to feel good or to build up their importance in local hierarchies of power. Besides being psychologically unconvincing, such reductionism is inadequate in explaining ongoing involvement in particular social movements. There are many different ways people can feel good about themselves after all, with the selfish benefits of participating in social movements being meagre rewards for the effort of activism.

At the same time, there is no need to be too naive about this process and argue that disinterested motivations, as framed by movement elites, provide the only explanations for activist actions. As I discuss in relation to the deployment of human rights discourse by movement actors, disinterested motivations are a useful discursive tool in contention within the British Jewish field. Filieule (2001) also notes how a disinterested disposition is mobilised for internal social movement contention. When studying charity groups in France, 16 This asks why people get involved in social movements if the goods they produce are collectively available – surely it would make sense for people to become free-riders. To answer this RMT postulates ‘selective incentives’, or non-economic goods that social movements produces such as solidarity and identity, and also asks how movements can pressure members to participate.
he observed the tension between volunteers and paid workers; whereby volunteers stress their disinterestedness in order to compensate for and challenge the latter’s control of resources and information (Filieule 2001). In addition, people occupy multiple fields simultaneously and are not merely motivated by a sense of doing right or of honour.

**Political fields**

I also use field theory by applying the notion of a ‘political field’ to explain the acquisition of competencies by movement actors. Ray and her colleagues posit a political field ‘in which only those endowed with various kinds of capital can participate. Those lacking such resources either feel they are not competent to be active, or become active in ways that are not part of the recognised political field and are hence marginalised’ (2003: 39). The crucial word here is ‘competent’. Noting how those who feel at home in organisations become more available for mobilisation, Ray et al claim that social movements provide resources to certain individuals to integrate them into the political field. I explore this idea when talking about how study trips provide participants with the authority to speak on returning home, and can be seen as a step in integrating people into the political field.

**Institutionalisation**

The final issue concerns institutionalisation. Despite contention between different actors, which Bourdieu feels is a better model for social interaction than the models of consensus and co-optation implicit in institutional modelling, there is ‘an objective complicity which underlies all the antagonisms’ (Bourdieu 1993: 73). This complicity can be summed up by the idea that a fight presupposes agreement about what is worth fighting about.

Those who take part in the struggle help to reproduce the game by helping – more or less completely, depending on the field – to produce belief in the value of the stakes. The new players have to pay an entry fee which consists in recognition of the value of the game (Bourdieu 1993: 74).

While not denying the importance of organisational institutionalisation, this idea goes beyond that. The idea that social movement activists pay a tacit entry stake to the field (Bourdieu termed this ‘illusio’ – the feeling that the field and the symbolic capital produced within it is significant) and are thereby committed to field doxa makes much sense in the weakly
institutionalised field of British Jewry. All fields have their own doxa or a realm of undiscussed and undisputed paradigms. Smaller than this doxa is the realm or universe of opinion, which is itself divided between heterodox and orthodox opinions.

![Diagram: The limits of discourse (Bourdieu 1977: 168)]

Figure 1. The limits of discourse (Bourdieu 1977: 168)

It is not only the discourses of the field that are reproduced by actors contesting it, it is also the silences – that which the field finds unnameable and unsayable, such as Palestinian rights – which are transmitted, however unwillingly or unknowingly by the heterodox within the field. This explains how social movements tend to reproduce dominant discourse even while fighting for change, and is something I track within this movement.

**Actors as agents of transformation (1): Radical habitus**

While Bourdieu effectively addresses institutionalisation within movements, the problem may be that he addresses it too effectively. If institutionalisation is an inevitable outcome of field contestation, what scope is there for achieving effective change? A charge repeatedly levelled at Bourdieu is that he offers no mechanism whereby dominated actors can achieve change within fields (Fowler 1997; Lovell 2000; Risseeuw 2005). In this section and the next, I deal with this issue, outlining two mechanisms by which his theory may work to explain the process of field change, firstly radical habitus and then exogenous transformation from below.

Bourdieu appeared to evince no faith in social movements’ capacity to affect change outside of situations of systemic crisis. Girling (2004) compares Bourdieu to Touraine who sees in social movements a semi-successful means of defragmenting modernity and fulfilling its
democratic, pluralistic promise. For Bourdieu the reproduction of the social order is so embedded in people’s habitus that only a violent rupture in social order appears to be able to change it. As Crossley (2003) points out, Bourdieu's theory of social movement, insofar as he has one, is very similar to the strain and breakdown theories of yore, emphasising objective crisis to force a rethink in the assumptions and habits of everyday life. His theory of crisis is one in which people’s habitus falls out of alignment with their fields, suspending the field illusio and bringing doxic assumptions into discourse, where they can be contested. There is a definite if partial truth here; in the area I am studying the current crisis in the British Jewish field has created opportunities for this particular movement to develop. However crises cannot explain why movements take the forms they do, nor much about their activities. In addition, theories of crisis seem to envision resistance as being intense and short-lived, only during moments of crisis. It fails to explore the existence of enduring movement identities. Crisis may be a necessary but is not a sufficient explanation for movements.

Crossley’s alternative to relying on crises to come along to achieve social change is to advance the concept of a durable ‘radical habitus’. He points out that habitus is not simply a product of stable social conditionings:

They can also be born in periods of change and discontent and can give rise to durable dispositions towards contention and the various forms of know-how and competence necessary to contention (Crossley 2002: 189-90).

One of the tasks and biographical outcomes of most social movements is that the processes of identification within it creates a disposition towards further political action (for instance McAdam 1988). By this disposition, Crossley means not only the belief in political change, but also the ability to manage protest, the skills which any social action requires. This is analogous to the ‘action repertoire’ of social movements which persist through time (Tilly 2004):

I suggest that involvement in movements and protest potentiates acquisition of (1) perceptual-cognitive schemas which dispose agents to question, criticise and distrust political elites and processes, (2) the political know-how to transform this distrust and criticism into action, (3) an ethos which encourages engagement ... and binds a sense of individual meaning and worth to it, (4) a ‘feel’ for protest and organising which allows agents to derive purpose and enjoyment from it, to ‘believe’ in it and to feel ‘at home’ doing it (Crossley 2003: 52).
Crossley argues this habitus is not limited to the narrowly political domain, but serves to structure activist lifestyles and even personal appearance. This links with what social movement theorists have observed about the maintenance of protest milieus outside cycles of contention. While this concept manages to explain how it is possible for movements to persist over time and how it is possible for people to maintain counter-hegemonic positions, there is a danger in over-extending it. I would suggest that the concept is not sufficient to explain the specificities nor successes of movements, since it is unclear why people with ‘radical habitus’ choose this or that movement, or why they are successful in some areas and not others.

Crossley mentions movement-specific habitus, but it seems that this is simply a sub-section of a more radical habitus. There is also the danger that the concept of radical habitus can lead to the idea that those with this disposition are a kind of rent-a-mob – people who protest since they are the kind of people who protest. And yet for movements from below to succeed, they require broader support than those with radical habitus can provide.

More fundamentally, radical habitus does not fully counter Bourdieu’s notion of the inherent complicity between antagonists in a field. Bourdieu’s account of how actors accept field doxa has meant that his thought ‘possesses a fatalistic consequence’ for dominated fractions within fields (Fowler 1997: 4). Terry Lovell contrasts Bourdieu’s take on transformation to the excessively voluntaristic work of Judith Butler (1997) to argue that ‘while Bourdieu's “reflexive sociology” allows for political agency and social change [as opposed to Butler], it is so successful in identifying the embeddedness of agency in institutional practice that there is no denying that it induces at times a strong sense of political paralysis’ (Lovell 2000: 33).

Noting the resistance habitus of dominated fractions is a partial answer to this problem. As Lovell (2000) argues, there is no glovelike fit between habitus and social position. Referring to Rose’s (1983) insight that femininity is never a fully embraced status by women, she makes the point that dominated fractions such as women have the tendency to rebel. In fairness, Bourdieu recognises the objective interest the dominated have in subversion. Nevertheless, if this rebellion is confined to the same field, such localised strategies of resistance by the capital-poor have no chance of success or possibilities of achieving change, merely the chance of mitigating the effect of dominance. As Lovell puts it, there appears to be no strategising in Bourdieu’s concept of strategy, an aphorism that refers to arguments that the lack of conscious deliberation or rational reflexivity in actors’ local strategising leads Bourdieu back to a rigid structuralism (Butler 1999; Jenkins 2002). Similarly Risseeuw
points out that Bourdieu characterises people as ‘strategisers, not strugglers’ and while his theories are excellent for accounting for strategies of domination through time, they fail to account for struggles from below for change (Risseuw 2005: 107).

It is odd that there appears to be no satisfactory mechanism for progressive transformation within Bourdieu’s work, considering that this was something he believed in the possibility of, and worked towards, especially in his later work (Bourdieu 1998a; Bourdieu and Ferguson 1999). And yet these works contain a rejection of neo-liberalism rather than solutions to it. His solution, as such, in these later works is a call to arms to return to the ‘heroic age’ of autonomous artistic and academic fields, since they have ‘a particular interest in the universal’ (Bourdieu 2000: 123). This quixotic call is deeply unsatisfactory, signalling a retreat from his earlier analysis of the elitism and arbitrariness of such field autonomy (Lane 2000: 184).

**Actors as agents of transformation (2): Exogenous change**

I suggest the lacuna can be fixed if we examine the inter-relationships of different fields. A central problem in the deployment of field as a unit of analysis is the subsequent prioritisation of the internal laws and relationships within fields over the exchange between fields. For instance, Bourdieu’s correspondence analysis which mapped the players in a field on a two dimensional axes may have been appropriate for the tightly controlled, clearly bounded French academic field of the 1960s (Bourdieu 1988). However this diagrammatic representation does not provide an adequate conceptualisation of the wider field of power, or social field in France. Not only did this model fail to account for political powers held by politicians, but it was also unable to account for the role of transnational institutions and external sources of power (Lane 2000: 177). And herein lies the problem, while Bourdieu offers an elegant means of researching tightly bounded, highly autonomous fields, what relevance does his theory of practice have on more heteronomous, weaker fields, the multiple social spaces in which in an age of fluid modernity, people are more likely to reside?

Bourdieu declined to come up with a grand theory conceptualising the articulation between fields, citing the question as too difficult (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This reluctance, picked up by both Lane (2000) and Girling (2004) is a major gap, since the way fields affect each other is not a marginal part of his theory. Fields are continually subjected to historical
change, and Bourdieu usually accounts for this change as being a response to external challenge (1990). Jenkins glosses this negatively, saying that this meant that social change for Bourdieu was peripheral and difficult to account for (Jenkins 2002: 89). However, this only holds true if one believes in the integrity of fields, that people’s habitus is confined to one field and that external challenges are occasional and minor.

This seems a deeply flawed set of presumptions about modern society (Bauman 2000, 2003). It is more reasonable to characterise fields as having weak boundaries to alternative fields, of people’s habitus being formed in a multiplicity of fields and therefore of the ‘outside’ being brought into each particular field at a number of levels on a continuous basis. This is not something Bourdieu seems to have considered, arguing that, ‘Once one has accepted the viewpoint that is constitutive of a field one can no longer take an external viewpoint on it’ (Bourdieu 2000: 97). Recalling my positioning of subjects as outsiders and insiders, I would argue that their viewpoints on Israel/Palestine are certainly not bounded by the doxa of one particular field, but that they are able to take outside positions to the fields they inhabit. In this, I doubt they are unique. Hyper-integration of field habitus is of course possible in cases of total institutions like prisons, but rare. What is more common is a situation where ordinary people’s habitus (especially the dominated fractions) are continually out of alignment with the fields they inhabit, due to their inhabiting several separate fields.

Nevertheless the only way in which Bourdieu theorised field interaction is through homology, with more powerful fields impinging upon and structuring weaker fields (a weaker field being one with less autonomy). The weaker the field the more overdetermination. Thus in the weakening academic field, capitalist technocrats have increasing power over universalising academics, a function of academia’s growing heteronomy vis-à-vis a neo-liberal economic field (Bourdieu 1998a). This is undoubtedly one way that fields affect each other, but can hardly be the only way. While I don’t intend to offer a grand theory of field articulation, I suggest here another ‘bottom up’ way, with transformation achievable through the continual intrusion of external field discourses, and social movement actors acting as translators of these external discourses.

In support of this theory, one can find numerous examples of translation practices, and not only by social movement actors. For example Behague et al (2008) discuss how patients contend within the medical field with doctors. They emphasise the importance of other habitus that patients bring into the medical field with them, and how it is the interaction of
these various habitus which effects field transformation: ‘while the health habitus of the patient is one of passivity and compliance, many patients actively use knowledge and power acquired from the habitus of the fields of employment and reproduction to modify the health system habitus’ (Behague et al. 2008: 492).

Danto (1999) gives several other examples of external habitus affecting fields, such as the challenge of Buddhism for classical Chinese philosophy. Buddhism was assimilated into the field through the neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi, thereby effecting field transformation (Danto 1999: 217). This illustrates the importance of the process of translation into the local field. Another example Danto gives is the transformation of the field of modern art where the dominant 1950s abstraction/figuration duality was marginalised by the challenge of Pop Art. Such examples of field change could be multiplied, and importantly, are not changes imposed from above but imported into the field by the heterodox and capital poor of the field. Such accounting of change from below accords with the idea that change in capitalist societies is a process whereby the challenges of the dominated force the dominant in the field to respond (Hardt and Negri 2000).

The figures above sketch the different means of field articulation. Bourdieu’s theory of change from above (figure 2b) presents the image of the dominant field casting a shadow on the dominated, patterning it through homologies. Figure 2a provides an image of fields
intersecting each other. While Crossley (2003) refers to fields being embedded in other fields, it is more useful to see actors’ habitus rather than fields as embedded, and fields interacting and intersecting through the person of the actor. The fields do not intersect at one place but continually through many actors’ different places on each field over a period of time. The image of a loom springs to mind, with its constant passing through of fields, but it is an insufficient image, because the patterning happens on both fields and it is this patterning that is produced rather than a whole cloth. What the constant interaction of fields imprints then, is actor disposition on both fields. This imprinting may be less or more noticeable depending on the rate of exchange between fields, the personal charisma of actors, the nature of the interaction and so on. These imprints form a constantly shifting pattern within fields, and are produced by the intersections of multiple fields, not just, as in the diagram, two.

Does this notion stretch the concept of fields beyond breaking point? The metaphor of fields begins to seem inadequate, based as it is in an image of spatially segregated areas, each with their own irreducible and specific forms of capital. In reality, there is no segregation, only constant interaction between fields. In chapter eight I depict the fields that movement actors are involved in as venn diagrams – semi-autonomous overlapping sets of categories, each set being specific to each individual, yet with certain commonalities from person to person. Yet the internal field-specific logic of action needs to be acknowledged along with the importance of external fields. Even the patterning I speak of is not simply determined by external fields but also informed by a clustering surrounding earlier positions within a field (though allowing for the possibility of drift), based on the dynamics of affinity as well as intra-field contention.

My main argument is that while there may be many means of transformation, one of them is transformation as the successful importation of field-specific discourse to another field. Social movement actors can be seen as carriers of this back-and-forth transference (and transformation) of exogenous discourse, which is never fully exogenous. One can see this in the way that actors in this movement both try to make the Jewish field aware of Palestinian reality and make the Palestine DIM and Palestinian field aware of Jewish reality, promoting pluralism in all fields.

This all sees social movement actors as translators, their success lying in being able to speak the language of the local field, yet not being wholly inhabited by that language to the extent of forgetting the content of the message they feel it is necessary to deliver. Success within the
field depends both on attentiveness to the local field and on adherence to the integrity of the external discourse. Too much concern about the concerns of the field leads to actors being co-opted and institutionalised within the field, internalising its censorship. Over-strident demands that the ‘other’ is heard and that the self-censorship of the field is challenged leads to ‘left-wing infantilism’ and rejection by the field. The way actors walk this tightrope depends on their assessment of the relative importance of various fields, in turn dependent on their habitus and on other forces in the field.

The concept of translation is recognised in work on transnational social movements (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002), with McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) talking of processes of diffusion and brokerage between movements.\(^\text{17}\) Building on this, Roggabond (2007) discusses the strategies of translation from one site to another, talking of movement actors as engaging in reception and reconceptualisation of repertoires. Similarly, Rachel Stern (2005) in her study of translation of rights ideas uses the ideas of indigenisation and adaption of ideologies by activists (indigenisation involves clothing external repertoires in local garb, while adaption involves more fundamental transformation of these repertoires). While this is useful work and I draw upon these concepts in later chapters, these works try to explain the cross-national diffusion of repertoires, while I argue that something far more fundamental is diffused through encounters with external fields. Namely, that actor habitus and field is changed or challenged in the process of translation, as well as in the process of field contention.

DIMs are customarily involved in both distant issues and local contestation, this movement included, and so it clearly makes sense to centre both the encounter with distant and local fields. I advance the idea that it is the interaction between the subjectivity of actors, the local fields of contention, and the distant fields that forms the prime tension in DIMs, illustrated by the diagram below.

\(^{17}\) ‘Diffusion involves transfer of information along established lines of interaction while brokerage entails the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites’ (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 333).
The dual flow of arrows indicates that actors affect and are affected by local and distant fields, and that these affect each other independent of movement actors. In my analysis chapters I seek to track such mutual relations in the case of this movement, and ask whether such mechanisms are generalisable to other DIMs and indeed other social movements.

**Conclusion**

To recap: in this chapter I’ve explained the advantages of studying Jewish Israel-critical British Jews as a social movement, seeing a movement as being a collective engagement in an ongoing, structured cognitive praxis within various fields of contention. All movements require actors to possess a stable sense of collective identity in order to be able to engage in contention, and I centre the process of identity construction in examining this movement’s cognitive praxis. By identity, I mean both the local processes of identity building within the movement and the interlinked, but broader political deployment of the extant identity category of Jewishness. This movement’s overt position between identity contestation and distant issue activism is its distinguishing feature, and I argue that both processes of meaning-making should be analysed through attending to the structural constraints and discursive practices of movements. I argue that the overt struggles over both distant issue activism and identity construction makes this movement an excellent case study with which to examine issues of identity within a DIM, as well as the interrelationship of field struggles.

Following Crossley, I draw on Bourdieu to construct a schema whereby actors influenced by radical habitus are involved in translating external discourse within multiple fields, in order to achieve field change. My central notion is of exogenous transformation of fields from below through social movement actors, who themselves have been transformed by these external
fields and who serve as translators and carriers of external discourse. This allows us to see field interaction as a continual mechanism of change and actors as more than strategisers within bounded fields.

Social movement actors carry both internal and external field habitus. The importance of external fields may be more salient for DIMs than other social movements and may indeed be the prime issue that differentiates DIMs. It is not the presence or absence of altruism, but rather the presence of the interests of others in other fields of contention, within their activism. Characterising this movement, I theorise it as suspended between two fields, the British Jewish field and the field of DIM activism, with both of these fields operating and contending within a political field. I examine the salience of this characterisation in my analysis chapters, and by examining the struggles in and between these particular fields I advance some ideas on how fields interact and influence each other. First, in the next chapter, I explore the theoretical antecedents to this movement.
Chapter 4. Theorising Jewish diaspora identity

For a diasporic identity to be truly radical, to genuinely break from nationalism, we must move beyond the stereoscopic vision of homeland and diaspora, towards theorising a diaspora with no centre, a diaspora with no homeland (Jewdas 2008a)

The above vision of a free-floating post-nationalist diasporic identity, like many other vauntings of diaspora, is an intriguing and attractive proposition. As with any identity it is defined by what it excludes – the idea that Jews have a national homeland and that homeland is Israel. Despite rejecting Zionism’s identitarian claims on Jews, it does so by also using the language of identity, recalling Finlay’s aphorism that identity not ideology is the idiom of modern politics (2004). Perhaps nowhere does this hold truer than when talking of internal Jewish debates, where large swathes of political discussions are underwritten by identity talk. In this chapter I examine the identity debates surrounding this movement.

My main argument is that claimants in this movement often draw on theorisations of diaspora, specifically Jewish ones, to fashion an identity for themselves in contradistinction to the hegemonic Zionist identity among diaspora Jews. ‘Negation of the Diaspora’ is a commonplace of Zionist thought (even, or perhaps especially by Zionists living in the diaspora), it has recently been countered by a reverse process of negation or rejection of Zionism or Israel by diaspora Jews. This process has given rise to what I term a diasporist identity (rather than say, diasporic identity) because of its programmatic political functions. It does not merely derive from revulsion against Israel’s actions, though this element has given the task of identity-construction some urgency. It is also based on increasing Jewish comfort and at-homeness in the diaspora, discussed in chapter five.

By diasporist identity, I mean a Jewish sense of self, forwarded by Jews in the diaspora and often constructed against hegemonic Zionism. ¹⁸ I see diaspora as more than a territorial

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¹⁸There is a semantic issue here. Traditionally, Jews have made a distinction between galut, or exile; and diaspora. Galut is seen as a state of voluntary exile, whereas diaspora represents the involuntary nature of the exile (Gilman 1995). This is further confused, in that for Zionists galut is viewed negatively as being a state of self-hatred that Jews experience because of golah, the practice of living outside Israel (Cohen 1999). To add to the confusion, the modern version of diaspora, as explained in the next section, emphasizes its positive nature and this version is used by some contemporary Jewish writers though not by others. To avoid confusion, I refer to diaspora and diasporism throughout, though acknowledge when authors favour galut and golah.
condition but also an ideological construct which draws on a reading of Jewish history to imbue the term with the aura of authentic Jewishness. Diasporism asserts that the place for Jews is in the diaspora, and more than this, that the qualities of being a diaspora subject are elements of a Jewish identity. These qualities include hybridity, heterogeneity, (usually) universalism, and rejection of nationalism while maintaining a sense of a Jewish collectivity. Diasporism is not necessarily ‘anti-Israel’, although even in its weakest form it argues for a decentring of Israel from diaspora Jewish identities. This diasporist identity, I argue, is not only offered in contradistinction to an image of Israel, but in opposition to an image of the official Jewish community which, in common with most diaspora Jews, remains Zionist. Another qualification should be made; though I refer to diaspora Jews, the ideology/identity I discuss is a production of Ashkenazi (European) Jews drawing on Ashkenazi Jewish traditions in the main. While diasporism acknowledges the alternative culture of Mizrahi (Middle Eastern) Jews, this identity is not derived from their concerns or history.

While accepting that diasporist identity is as unsatisfactory as any other version of identity to analyse lived Jewish situations and that it serves more to obscure than illuminate, it is that very quality which makes such identity claims so useful in ideological argument. Identity is at the same time a hopeless category of analysis and a vital category of practice (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). I begin by discussing identity, treating it as a claim and a process rather than a pre-given quality of participants (Bauman 2000; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). After discussing the problematics of identity in general and diaspora identity in particular, I turn to the specific claims of Jewish diasporism and how it is deployed against Zionism. This diasporism draws on historical antecedents, creatively appropriating past traditions and concepts for present-day concerns. In this spirit I discuss the socialist Jewish tradition and claims for Jewish universalism and heterogeneity, as well as religious Judaism and the valorisation of galut. I then turn to the critique of Zionism which offers a negation of the Zionist negation of the diaspora. Previously, I mentioned Benita Roth’s critique that Chicana feminist practices of drawing on traditions led to an insular sense of identity, and I investigate this problematic with regard to Jewish diasporist identity, specifically asking what place

One further semantic issue. Diasporism is also the artistic manifesto that the Jewish artist, Ron Kitaj has penned, akin to other artistic trends such as surrealism or futurism (Kitaj 2000). Kitaj’s ideas are related, but not the same as the political identity/ideology I discuss here.

19 This does not affect its relevance for British Jewry, since (excluding Israeli expatriates) only a tiny fraction of the British Jewish population is Mizrahi. This is unlike the situation in France or the US which has large Mizrahi populations.
Palestinians have in this identity discourse. I conclude by examining what type of subjects this diasporist ideology creates and the limitations of this discourse.

First, I need to outline how Jewish Israel-critical groups relate to the productions of this theoretical and academic field. As with all field exchange, there is a process of translation to the local rationalities of actors. The interests of those engaged in activism are not necessarily the same as the interests of those involved in theoretical disputation, even when, as is often the case, they are undertaken by the same people. Nevertheless, studying these discursive productions is relevant to my dissertation in the following ways:

1. Diasporist and Israel-critical arguments and discussions do affect the ideas and opinions of British Israel-critical Jews. The literature enables movement participants to redefine the word ‘Jew’, not only so that it includes themselves, but to the chagrin of many Zionists (Julius 2008; Philips 2009), so that it centres around their subjectivities and concerns. This diasporist identity offers British Jews a vantage point and disposition to see Israel and Jewish lives in Britain in a different light to Zionists. While this identity/ideology may derive from alienation from Israel and from security in the diaspora, it also contributes to a disposition that alienates Jews further from the state of Israel, and allows them to imagine alternative Jewish futures.

2. The theoretical arguments outlined in this chapter, and particularly the problematics within these arguments have implications for movement participants. For instance, a particular problematic I examine is that this literature, while often critical of Israel, effaces Palestinian subjectivity. This mirrors similar dynamics happening among Jewish Israel-critical groups who are, however, more successful at combating this effacement. Thus not only the similarities but also the differences between this literature and the practices of social movement participants need to be outlined.

3. The academic and activist fields are in fact not that distant; writers often write as movement intellectuals and thus the productions I discuss are also heavily influenced by movement dynamics (for example Karpf et al. 2008), and in turn are directly related to them.
Identity and diaspora

In this section I discuss the concept of identity (especially ethnic identity) in order to examine the theoretical claims for diaspora. Such claims have been directly used by Jewish writers trying to fashion an open, hybrid, diasporist Jewish identity, against what they see as the static identity claims of the mainstream Jewish community. I first critique the deployment of identity, then discuss criticisms of what I term a ‘diaspora school’ of theorists. These criticisms are relevant to Jewish diasporist thought since they question whether it is possible to construct an open, fluid identity based on the concept of diaspora, and so I next investigate this paradox for Jewish diasporist identity.

The below critique of identity focuses less on how identity in its ‘hard’ form, as a primordial pre-given quality of actors, is insufficient to analyse individual agency. Such concepts of identity, while an important category of practice aren’t widely used in sociological thinking (Jenkins 2008). However the ‘soft’ or ‘weak’ form of identity seeing identity as a real if fluid quality of actors, remains important. It is specifically important for those within diasporist thought and is therefore relevant to Israel-critical Jews. Brubaker and Cooper argue strongly that all forms of identity categorisation offer meaningless categories of analysis. Like the diasporist school, they dismiss the ‘strong’ essentialist form of identity as a reification. But they are no more indulgent about the ‘weak’ postmodern version of identity:

> weak conceptions of identity may be too weak to do useful theoretical work. In their concern to cleanse the term of its theoretically disreputable “hard” connotations, in their insistence that identities are multiple, malleable, fluid, and so on, soft identitarians leave us with a term so infinitely elastic as to be incapable of performing serious analytical work (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 11).

These points are also raised by Bearn (2000). In his deconstruction of identity, Bearn is influenced by Derrida’s discussion of the authenticity of signatures and in particular his idea that what legitimises these signatures is not the thing itself but ‘the police and a tribunal ready to intervene each time that a rule…is invoked in a case involving signatures events or contexts’ (Derrida 1977: 105). Bearn continues:

> Just as…every act of signing is a theatrical act, so every attempt to make oneself an authentic surgeon or authentic Jew will be theatrical, a masquerade of authenticity. Identity, authenticity, is trapped in the theatre of representation. Subjects struggle to represent themselves as a surgeon or dancer or Jew and so can do no more than portray the marks of authenticity.
And as with signatures, it is always the police that arrest every question of identity (Bearn 2000: 328. Emphasis in original).

This evokes Barth’s idea of ethnic identity being a matter of maintaining boundaries, something which necessitates border guards (1969). It raises the issue that invocations of and concern with authentic identity are motivated precisely by the desire to set oneself up as such a guard, examining each claim. It is a power-gambit, whether one is advancing a ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ form of authentic identity. For instance, following Stuart Hall (1990, 1996), Silberstein claims that while processes of identity formation are of course contingent, one can nevertheless achieve ‘temporary closure’ (Silberstein 2000b: 4). But if one, like Silberstein, vaunts the fluidity and contingency of self, why seek these moments of closure? I would argue it is because all moments of closure entail a creation of inside and outside, an exercise of discursive power which summons into being the processes of excommunication and boundary maintenance. This refers back to arguments within social movement theory (Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000), and outside (Bauman 2000; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Calhoun 1994), that identity construction should be understood as a claims-making process that helps create a collectivity. 20

In order to investigate the particular claims-making of diaspora Jews, it is necessary to discuss academic theorisations of diaspora, and so I first examine the 1990s academic valorisation of diaspora which sees fluid identities as a quality – even if only a potential one - of diasporic subjects (Brah 1996; Clifford 1994; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990; Sayyid 2000; Woodward 1997; Cohen 1997). I then turn to the critique of this position which argues that such theorisations don’t accept the real nature of diasporas, grounded more in boundary making than fluidity.

The 1990s ‘diaspora school’ did not analyse diaspora communities in terms of processes that maintain their identity but in terms of the hybridity of their culture, the obviously fractured and the constantly sliding aspects of identities for both individuals and communities. Diasporas are seen as deteritorialised, multilingual, and capable of bridging the gap between global and local identities. In our post-modern world diaspora members are arguably

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20 Having said that, there is a noticeable difference between the generally positive spin social movement theorists put on this process, and the more deconstructive and critical attitudes that those outside the field take to it, possibly because social movement theorists are more likely to approve of the kinds of claims-making that result among their research subjects.
uniquely advantaged in dealing with its identity-shattering nature, and of benefiting from the economic possibilities it opens up (Cohen 1997).

Others make more ambitious claims for diaspora, maintaining that diasporas change and offer alternatives to the rest of society. Avtar Brah (1996) argues that the diasporic experience throws up more open and hybrid forms of identity in a way that enables diaspora communities to make common cause against the racism of the dominant society, while recognising each others’ difference. Diaspora people, it is claimed, have alternative narrations of nations, perceptions of time and space, and multiple identities. According to James Clifford (1994), the diasporic process destabilises the very concept of the nation through diasporic attachments which construct allegiances elsewhere. And so identity becomes more syncretic, something which challenges the nation form as embodying a given national group. Likewise, Sayyid (2000) calls diaspora ‘anti-nation’, claiming that unlike the nation with its homogeneity and boundedness, diaspora suggests heterogeneity and porousness. Nations define ‘home’, whereas diaspora is a concept of homelessness. Unlike the nation where the territory and people are fused, in a diaspora the two are disarticulated. According to Sayyid the diaspora is not the Other of the Nation, but is an anti-nation that interrupts the closure of the nation.

After the vaunting of diaspora possibilities came the inevitable criticism. Phil Cohen was the first to suggest that diaspora in this version is less about actual people and has become, ‘inflated into a full-blown metaphysics of the “transgressive subject” where the diasporic subject has replaced the international proletariat as a site for the projection of revolutionary hopes’ (Cohen 1999: 10). He wryly adds that it seems a bit much for homeless and displaced people to carry the burden of utopian representation. Cohen’s main point, as with other critics (Brubaker 2005; Amit and Rapport 2002) is that such theorisations don’t describe the actual conditions of diasporic subjects. Related to this is the question as to whether the term involves as much closure as it does openness (Anthias 1998). Anthias points out that ‘diaspora’ is at heart an ethnic primordialist concept and in privileging ethnicity and point-of-origin narratives, fails to address class, gender and other differences within the imagined diasporas.

In fact, the retrograde nature of diasporas is recognised by the diaspora school, sometimes by citing the example of the Jewish diaspora (Hall 1990; Gilroy 1997). While Hall’s celebration of diaspora: ‘diaspora experience, as I intend it here, is defined not by essence or purity, but
by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity’ is widely quoted, the passage immediately preceding it is less well-known:

I use the term here metaphorically, not literally: diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return, even if it means pushing other people into the sea. This is the old, the imperialising, the hegemonising form of ethnicity. We have seen the fate of the people of Palestine at the hands of this backward-looking conception of diaspora – and the complicity of the West with it (Hall 1990: 235. Emphasis in original).

Likewise Paul Gilroy recognises diaspora’s link with imperialism and claims ‘if it can be stripped of its more authoritarian associations’ it can be used to understand the new social forms of our time’ (Gilroy 1997: 329). Unfortunately, the likelihood of diaspora being deployed to create some sense of bounded racialised identity must be acknowledged. As Vered Amit concluded, after studying Armenians in London: ‘Primordialism and essentialism are not haphazard or occasional features of the effort to reproduce diasporas as ideological vehicles of identity. They are fundamental to this process’ (Amit and Rapport 2002: 54). I found that the Irish Jewish community relies on similar essentialism to assert its diaspora identity claims (Landy 2005). In fact, I argued that the less a group of people is a community in the traditional sense, the more it is likely to stress such racial properties, drawing on Sartre’s (1976 [1946]) argument that if nothing tangible holds people together then people claim that there must be something intangible, some unseeable essence. This is an issue that does not merely govern Irish Jews; within all diaspora Jewish ‘communities’ in Europe there has been a move towards symbolic ethnicity, which involves highlighting ethnic connections (Alderman 1994; Buckser 2000; Graham 2004).

There is a certain irony then in how some Jewish writers draw on the idea that diaspora provides a home, so to speak, for fluid identities, given that academics use the Jewish diaspora as an exemplar of the retrograde nature of identity claims. The notion of diaspora as linked to a sense of homeland is particular apposite for the Jewish diaspora, given that it is traditionally predicated on a longing for Zion and a belief in a ‘Jewish nation’, and also given how most members of that diaspora adhere to the ethnic nationalism that is Zionism.  

21 While the differences between ethnic ‘German-type’ nationalism and civic ‘French-type’ nationalism, may have receded in these countries (Faist 2007), the derivation of Zionism from a Germanic sense of attachment to blood and soil has informed the attitude of diaspora Zionists. For example, Habib notes the curiosity that her North American Jewish diaspora interviewees use the imagined racially exclusive exemplars of Germany and Italy as ideal types of nations to which Israel should aspire, rather than the more multicultural states of Canada and the US – places where they actually came from (Habib 2004: 264).
Among diasporist Jewish writers, the Boyarin brothers are perhaps unique in not shying away from the implications that in constructing a bounded identity without a territorial claim, it is necessary to possess a sense of difference and kinship inscribed on the body (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993). They argue in favour of such a sense of bounded race-based identity, claiming both that it is typically Jewish and that it offers an important criticism of Christian universalism. They add, somewhat optimistically, that problems only occur when this race-based sense of self is mixed up with territorial domination. Jasmin Habib also posits diaspora belonging and territorial belonging as opposed entities (Habib 2004). However, I believe Habib also errs on the side of optimism when she asserts that Jews have a deterritorialised feeling of belonging and that their diaspora nationalism isn’t guaranteed by a territorial imperative, since (whatever about the past) diaspora Zionism is predicated on the existence of a specifically Jewish state in the Middle East, even if it is unconcerned with its day-to-day constitution.

Other Jewish writers simply ignore the racial, exclusivist nature of diaspora ties. Instead they talk of the fluid, open and dynamic aspects of diaspora identity as if it were a given quality. For example, Shaul Magid uses Edward Said to blithely claim that ‘alterity is an organic byproduct of any diaspora’ (2006: 202). Likewise Silberstein quotes Hall and Gilroy in order to conceive of diasporic identity as contingent, hybrid and fluid (Silberstein 2000b). The reason Silberstein gives for reformulating Jewish identity is to reclaim it from narrow, oppressive and static identity claims, and help create an alternative subjectivity for Jews. Silberstein sees existing Jewish identity talk, concerned with establishing authority and tracing links, as being oppressive and not allowing alternative Jewish possibilities such as anti-Zionism to emerge (Silberstein 2000b). The claim that essentialist Jewish discourse needs to be challenged may be a strong enough reason for many to contest the terrain of identity politics. It may be the ubiquity of identity talk that forces anti-Zionist or liberal Jewish writers to invoke it, in order to be able to communicate with fellow Jews. All identity claims contain a set of ‘disguised demands telling me that if I want to “deserve” recognition within the group, I had better comply with these requirements’ (Solomon 1994: 96). It seems that writers like Silberstein are seeking to use this ubiquitous discourse to establish an alternative set of requirements.

Regarding the ubiquity of identity claims, Charmé argues that all the various forms of Jewishness, ‘invoke “authenticity” as the underlying ideal and as the ultimate legitimizer (or
de-legitimizer) of various positions’ (2000: 133). He divides these claims into descriptive, prescriptive and existential claims for authenticity, noting the link between so-called description and prescription: ‘To designate some aspect of the past as the “authentic tradition” is therefore not a passive discovery of some characteristic of the past but a particular appropriation and legitimization of the past by the present’ (Charmé 2000: 139). However, he himself is trapped in the selfsame theatre of representation, or is constrained by the illusio of the field, positing authentic Jewish authenticity as residing in flux.

Rather, authenticity is not about finding one's ‘true self’ or the ‘real tradition’ but about maintaining an honest view of the process by which we construct the identities and traditions we need to survive. It requires lucidity about the lack of essence or permanent foundation of all identities, and vigilance against the idea that it can be realized (150).

This view of identity is in line with the concept of the ‘non-Jewish Jew’ discussed below, and so even the criticism of authenticity turns into a search for authenticity. It seems that for many Jews, authenticity is in itself something to be striven for, irrespective of what the authentic actually demarcates and who it legitimises and delegitimises. This could arise from the condition of diasporic Jews – actually experienced alterity, even in the mild doses such as Western Jews suffer from, may provoke a rushing into seeking authentic roots. Another suggestion is that, ‘the question of Judaism's essence, or “authentic” Judaism, regularly arises in periods when communal consensus is under attack and when borders between acceptable and unacceptable practices have become unbearably fuzzy’ (Charmé 2000: 138).

Recalling Brubaker and Cooper’s recommendation that even if identity is a worthless category of analysis the process of identification should be studied, we can say that even if this sought-for authenticity is a mirage, the deployment of it says much about the condition of Jewish life and should be examined. As Brubaker argues, ‘As a category of practice, “diaspora” is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilise energies to appeal to loyalties. It is often a category with a strong normative change. It does not so much describe the world as seek to remake it’ (2005: 12). The diasporist identity I discuss below can be viewed as a space clearing exercise deployed against the static identity claims or ‘hard’ primordialist forms of identity deployed by the majority of diaspora Jews. It can also be viewed as a concession; that in order to speak to these other Jews, one needs to speak in the hegemonic language and accept the illusio of the field, which is ethnic identity. Invocations of diaspora are then less a territorial description or even an attempt to
maintain a fictive ethnicity, and more an ideological construction that seeks to guide this ethnicity and claim it from others within this putative ethnic group. As such, it contains all the discursive power, and also all the contradictions that ethnic identity claims involve.

**Diaspora and the attractions of ‘exile’**

Galut can only drag out the disgrace of our people and sustain the existence of a people disfigured in both body and soul - in a word, of a horror. At the very worst it can maintain us in a state of national impurity and breed some sort of outlandish creature in an environment of disintegration of cultures and of darkening spiritual horizons. The result will be something neither Jewish nor Gentile - in any case, not a pure national type. (Jacob Klatzkin, 1921 quoted in Hertzberg 1997: 322-3).\(^{22}\)

It is time to say that America is a better place to be a Jew than Jerusalem. If ever there was a Promised Land, we Jewish Americans are living in it. Here Jews have flourished, not alone in politics and the economy, but in matters of art, culture and learning. Jews feel safe and secure here in ways that they do not and cannot in the State of Israel. And they have found an authentically Jewish voice - their own voice - for their vision of themselves (Neusner 1987).

In this section I examine how diaspora is viewed as a Jewish condition, perhaps the condition of authentic Jewish existence and imbued with qualities of alterity, heterogeneity, hybridity and (usually) universalism. This image is constructed in opposition to a Zionism imagined and experienced as monolithic, monistic, and ghettoised both in space and outlook. I first talk of how the idea of ‘standing and fighting’ in the diaspora is promoted as an authentic and brave Jewish response, as opposed to the implied cowardice of Zionism in trying to find a bolthole (itself a reversal of common Zionist narratives of cowardly diaspora Jews going meekly to their deaths during the Holocaust). I then turn to how religious concepts of exile have been used to portray exile and diaspora in a positive light, and as being normatively Jewish. I then critique the way in which universalism and alterity are claimed as being particular Jewish qualities. Finally I examine the claim that heterogeneity is both a quality of the Jewish community and a specifically Jewish quality – a central element of group and individual identity.

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\(^{22}\) Klatzkin was editor of the main Zionist weekly, Die Welt from 1909 to 1911 and a founder of the Encyclopedia Judaica. He was born in Europe and died in the US in 1948, having never moved to Palestine.
Sometimes in this process of representation, prior Zionist negation of the diaspora is exposed and inverted, sometimes contradictions within Zionism are brought to light, and often religious or Bundist (explained below) valorisation of diaspora is resurrected. Due to discontinuities between pre- and post-Israel Jewish thought and pre- and post-World War II diaspora Jewish life, a clearcut lineage doesn’t exist. Recalling Charmé, I would say that previous criticisms are invoked partly to show that it is authentically Jewish to criticise Israel. However the tendency of many (secular) Jews to draw on themes first mentioned in religious anti-Zionism should not be dismissed as a process of compiling lists of anti-Israel Jews, or attempts to acquire the patina of authenticity. There is a commonality of belief which must be recognised. Israel-critical Jews can use past Jewish opposition to Zionism as narratives to engage with, as well as to place themselves within.

Beginning with narratives that valorise standing in the diaspora over running away to Zion, the political scientist, Sara Roy tells the story of her mother and her aunt, both Holocaust survivors, parting ways; her aunt escaping to Israel, and her mother going to America (Roy 2003). The reason her mother gave for staying in the diaspora was that it was against her principles to live exclusively among Jews, ‘since tolerance, compassion, and justice can’t be practiced or extended when one lives only among one’s own’ (Roy 2003: 171). As a result of this decision, Roy writes, ‘I grew up in a home where Judaism was defined and practiced not as a religion but as a system of ethics and culture. God was present but not central. My first language was Yiddish’ (2003: 172).

Here diaspora Jews are presented as brave and world-directed, proud of their heritage, whereas Israelis are (understandably) narrow, just wanting to flee into a ghetto and negate the past, the Jewish tradition. This narrative is a reversal of the common Zionist one of diaspora Jews cowardly huddling in Europe instead of bravely moving to Zion. Sometimes the Jewish Bund is cited as a historical precedent of brave Jews fighting in the diaspora. The Bund was a secular socialist group founded in 1897 that tried to carve a level of autonomy for an independent Jewish voice within the socialist movement in the Russian Empire. Beset on one side by a growing Zionism and on the other by the Bolsheviks, it declined in the aftermath of the 1905 revolution (Rose 2004). However Bundism has a resonance beyond the fortunes of this fraction of Russian revolutionary politics; it refers to the whole tradition of specifically Jewish left-wing activism throughout Europe and the US. Nowadays this revolutionary disruption of Jewish life and thought, by virtue of its death can be claimed as quintessentially
Jewish, and by virtue of this reclaimed Jewish authenticity can be put to identitarian work by contemporary Jews.

In John Rose’s account, Bundists are presented as proletarian Jews struggling to change their social situation rather than fantasising about escape to Zion, while Zionism is depicted as the collective effervescence of the uneducated lumpenproletariat, desperate for an easy way out (Rose 2004). Although there seems to be little in common between John Rose’s materialistic account of Zionism and Jacqueline Rose’s psychohistory of the movement, in this they agree. She portrays Zionism as unambiguously messianic, a hysterical reaction to difficult times (Rose 2005). Her book can be read in part as a revenge for Zionism’s negation of the diaspora. Here it is Zionism that is negated, treated as a disorder and self-consuming psychopathology, a Pandora’s Box that has released the accumulated repressed anger of diaspora life. Israel is also presented as a place of forgetting where the call to negate the diaspora has involved a ruthless self-mutilation of Jewish roots. In contrast, these azionist roots can be unproblematically celebrated and traced in the diaspora, as in Sara Roy’s proud claim to be brought up in a Yiddish speaking household. Such reclamations serve the argument that authentic and normative Jewishness often has nothing whatsoever to do with Israel, when it is not actively antagonistic towards it.

The argument that Jews and Judaism belong in exile derives from traditional religious thought as well as the condition of Jewish diasporic existence. While most diaspora Jews who oppose Israel do not literally believe that Zionists were acting against God’s will by promoting aliyah (immigration, literally ‘ascent’ to Israel), they have drawn on the reasoning behind such a religious belief. This reasoning treats ‘return’ to Israel as a utopian spiritual demand rather than territorial acquisition, and places authentic Jewish life firmly in galut. The diasporic condition is seen here as the normative condition of Jewishness, rather than as the common Zionist victimhood narrative has it, as an ongoing series of unfortunate events.

Shaul Magid (2006) provides an interesting effort to link the religious conception of Jewish exile with diaspora existence. He draws on present Palestinian and past Jewish theorisations of exile in order to ascribe an ‘exilic’ Jewish experience with positive qualities and enable it to serve as a site of creativity and constructive criticism, both of Israel and of the societies that diaspora Jews live in. Magid portrays exilic subjects as fluid outsiders floating merrily in the play of difference: ‘the exilic margin is a place that holds unique creative promise because it is situated in the destabilizing context of alterity where the danger of an
absolutizing narrative of identity is kept in check’ (2006: 205-6). In this formulation, the attractions of exile are similar to those the ‘diaspora school’ claim for diaspora. 23

[Edward] Said suggested the state of exile (both existential and material) problematizes any absolutizing narrative; all things are relativized through the filter of someone, or something, else. As the host culture continues to seep into the consciousness of one in exile, she sees herself and her surroundings more and more in relation to it. ‘The exilic standpoint tends to see things not simply how they are, but as they have come to be that way’ (Magid 2006: 202 quoting Neusner 1986: 349).

Thus we have a romantic vision of the exile as existentialist hero. But he is also a Jewish existentialist. Magid discusses extensively the Hasidic Grand Rabbi, Shalom Noah Barzofsky and his exalting of exile as the message that Israel carries to the nations. According to Magid, Barzofsky’s theology of exile was as follows:

This conception of exile consists of the following assumptions: that exile is the condition of divine election; that exile is natural, permanent (nitshi), and not circumstantial; and that continuous exile is the condition for redemption—that is, redemption happens in and through exile (Magid 2006: 206).

This might be excellent textual criticism, but it is reasonable to ask why this is done, since such arguments are not immediately relevant to secular Jews. From his comments it is clear that Magid does not share Barzofsky’s theological vision. The use of the Hassidic grand rabbi is best seen as argument by analogy, one that can only work if one presumes a mystical Jewish essence imbuing both Magid, Barzofsky and modern-day diaspora Jews. While it is programmatically useful to assume this kinship if one is, like Magid, offering prescriptions of what ‘the Jewish people’ should do, analytically it is meaningless. A theological valorisation of exile as the best way of serving God does not translate into a useful analysis, even a prescriptive one, of present-day Jewish reality. Jews have of course previously thought about exile – it would be astonishing had they not – but crucially they are not now in exile. The term ‘exile’ is an appropriation from both Jewish history and Palestinian reality. The actual lived experience of Jews, whatever their past, is simply not of living on the margins.

Far more appreciative of the dangers of romanticising and allegorising ‘exile’ is Alan Weaver, who writes about Edward Said and the Mennonite theologian, John Yoder (2003). Weaver makes the crucial point that ‘exile does not simply name a concept but names a

23 Magid rejects the term diaspora. Like others (Aviv and Shneer 2005) he sees ‘diaspora’ as a negative term in Jewish thought, containing the seeds of its own negation.
condition in which millions of people live’ (Weaver 2003: 6). As he writes, ‘Said strenuously objected to any attempt to romanticise exile. “Exile is one of the saddest fates,” he claims. “There has always been an association between the idea of exile and the terrors of being a leper, a social and moral untouchable”’ (Weaver 2003: 5 quoting Said 1994: 35). Magid fails to recognise this point. It is not simply a failure of empathy for Palestinian lives; if one appropriates a term that doesn’t actually describe the condition in which Jews live, then the prescriptive analysis of what these Jews should do is fatally flawed.

In fact, Said allegorises the term ‘exile’ himself, suggesting it is the best state of mind for the intellectual, since it allows him to recognise the contingency of his own existence (Said 1994). There is something very attractive (if slightly disingenuous) about how Said juxtaposes the Zionist and Palestinian condition. ‘Better our wanderings than the horrid, clanging shutters of their return. The open secular element, and not the symmetry of redemption’ (Said 1986: 150). One can see why some Jewish people, wanting to be contingent secular hybrids of postmodernity, aspire to the heroic freedom of the Palestinian exile which Said presents, while ignoring, (perhaps they can only want to appropriate exile by ignoring) the bitter condition that produced that freedom. This is not to say that individual Jews cannot live in a condition of detachment from society. Equally, by identifying with those who experienced discrimination and separateness, such as Jews in previous times, modern-day Jews may be able to strive towards a condition of alterity, of sympathy with marginalised people nowadays. The concept of exile provides a useful rhetorical trope for those Jews.

But rhetoric is not reality; the simple fact is that the Jewish condition nowadays does not automatically lead to detachment and separation, as Neusner among others, claims (Neusner 1986). In reality, most Diaspora Jews don’t think they’re living in exile – neither the expatriate exile which Magid favours, or the Jews of conscience exile of Marc Ellis (2002b, 2003), or even the more existential exile which Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin advocates that Israelis should adopt (Silberstein 1999).

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24 The appropriation of exile may well be productive when Israelis such as Raz-Krakotzkin do so. Israelis who practice solidarity with Palestinians have to learn to live in a racist State that discriminates against Palestinians; diaspora Jews do not face this stark dilemma. Claiming the state of exile (even of internal exile) and valorising it may offer Israeli Jews a working metaphor by which they can exist (as Jews) in constant discomfort in and opposition to their state. It also underlines the fact that many left-wing Israelis become actual exiles.
While some older Jews may have been exiled from the former USSR or Middle Eastern countries, I would argue that talk of sedentary diaspora Jews who have lived generations in the same country as being ‘in exile’ serves as a minimisation of the actual Palestinian condition of exile. Such talk of exile creates a false symmetry of relationships with Israel/Palestine and effaces the differences between symbolic chosen exile and actual forced exile. By ignoring these differences, the language of Jewish ‘exile’ offers ideological fuel to perpetuating actual Palestinian exile. (a. we can live in exile, why can’t they? b. Palestinian rights are contingent on diaspora Jewish ‘rights’). It is significant here that while Ellis, a major proponent of the exilic narrative, wants to incorporate Palestinians into the Jewish story, he still doesn’t want to ‘grant’ them the right of return (Farber 2005). In ignoring Weaver’s (2003) careful distinction between exile as condition and concept, Magid is not alone (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993; Butler 2004; Ellis 2002b; Silberstein 1999). Of course, Jewish writers can claim that this is not an appropriation but a reclamation because of the centrality of exile in pre-Zionist Jewish religious thought. However this claim is dubious. One recalls Finkielkraut’s (1994) condemnation of himself and other post-World War II Jews for building their identity on the appropriation of Jewish suffering that they did not in fact suffer. Nostalgia for actual marginalisation does not imply the condition of marginalisation, if anything the reverse is true.

I do not wish to lay all the flaws of diasporist exalting of exile and diaspora at Magid’s feet. Magid’s central question is to ask why Jews aren’t more creative and critical in the diaspora. This is a worthy question. But a textual appropriation of the term ‘exile’ is no solution. In the end one can’t will a state of being into being simply because the result of being in that state is beneficial. One can see this problem more concretely when considering Jewish claims to universalism.

**Universalist, heterogeneous, and Jewish**

Dig, I'm Jewish. Count Basie's Jewish. Ray Charles is Jewish. Eddie Cantor is goyish... Marine Corps—heavy goyish... If you live in New York or any other big city, you're Jewish. If you live in Butte, Montana, you're going to be goyish even if you're Jewish... Pumpernickel is Jewish and, as you know, white bread is very goyish.... Negroes are all Jews... Irishmen who have
rejected their religion are Jewish... Baton twirling is very goyish (Lenny Bruce quoted in Ollman 2008).  

The idea of Jews as uniquely universalistic subjects is derived from two distinct traditions, the idea of non-Jewish Jews first enunciated by Isaac Deutscher (1968), and the idea that caring about and seeking to heal the world (tikkun olam) is an inherently Jewish characteristic. The melding of these two dispositions has created a powerful though somewhat incoherent narrative about Jews possessing universalistic dispositions by virtue of their historical experience and religious traditions.

The left-wing writer, Isaac Deutscher famously described himself as a Jew but a non-Jewish Jew. He saw himself as part of the tradition of Spinoza, Marx, and Trotsky, saying that the conditions of exile and marginality that these non-Jewish Jews experienced promoted a universalistic outlook. This is because ‘Jews have traditionally lived on the borderlines of various civilisations, religions and national cultures’ (Deutscher 1968: 27). This condition of diasporic existence has lead modern writers to argue that stances of dis-identification and dissidence, as epitomised by Jewish rebels, are quintessentially Jewish (Segal 2005).

This is a problematic assumption. When conceived of by Deutscher, such a disposition was seen as emanating from one’s Jewish condition, but necessarily involving a rejection of its particularist concerns (Deutscher 1968). He was writing as somebody brought up as a rabbi in a strictly Orthodox shtetl (a small Jewish town/village) in Eastern Europe and for him, as for other Eastern European Jews, the flight to universalism was a clear trajectory away from suffocating Orthodox Jewish roots. One wonders what the term ‘non-Jewish Jew’ means devoid of these specific social connotations. At times it appears to be reduced to self-satisfied paradox making: ‘I am pleased to be a Jew because I am not one; and I am not one because I really am one’ (Margolis 1993: 334).

Ollman takes the idea of Jewishness as signifying ‘pleasant aspects of the universal’ to a logical conclusions, and resigns from the Jewish people because of the tribalist crimes committed by Israel in their name (Ollman 2008). He ends his letter of resignation with the above quote from the comedian Lenny Bruce, wherein Jewishness becomes transformed into anything that is hip, alternative and pacifist. Ollman concludes, tongue in cheek:

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25 Goy is Yiddish slang for non-Jew, with pejorative connotations.
To this I would only add, ‘Noam Chomsky, Mordechai Vanunu and Edward Said are Jewish. Elie Wiesel is goyish. So, too, all ‘Jewish’ neo-cons. Socialism and communism are Jewish. Sharon and Zionism are very goyish’. And, who knows, if this reading of Judaism were to take hold, I may one day apply for readmission to the Jewish people.

However, while dis-identification is one trajectory, many modern Jewish writers are travelling in the opposite direction to Deutscher and Ollman, seeing no contradiction in maintaining ethnic attachment, promoting ethnic continuity and yet declaring a love for the universal (Karpf et al. 2008; Polner and Merken 2007). This vision of Jewishness can be criticised as formalising and ritualising the escape from Jewish obscurantism which Deutscher and others were attempting. By replaying this historical trajectory as a fixed identity, it may become less a flight from particularism and more a heritage escape into anachronism. Such criticism may be too harsh though, since this aspect of diasporism, as epitomised in Britain by the Jewish Socialist Group, does not simply seek to speak Yiddish or discuss past battles. According to members of this group, they think it remains useful to engage with a progressive tradition among Jewish people, since the ideas of Bundism are still relevant to modern day concerns. Similarly, Marquesee ends his comments on the debates between the Bund and the Russian left by saying that he has seen such debates ‘re-created and re-worked’ in contemporary leftist debates about identity politics (Marquesee 2008: 15).

Whatever about the relevance of historical Jewish debates, the idea of a specific Jewish universalism leads to the usual contradictions and hidden imperialisms involved when a love for the universal is seen as the property of a specific group (Balibar 1991). Just as the rights of man are held to be a particular French gift to the world, so too is there a specific aspect of the universal which is held to be a Jewish quality – that of justice. The link between Jews and justice has been conceived as part of the prophetic tradition in Judaism and the ancient dictum that Jews were assigned by God to bring light to the nations. It has also been argued that it derives from the Jewish diasporic experience, not simply by academic writers, but as a central claim of Jewish social movements and their participants (IJV 2007; JfJfP 2009).

In a radical break from this consensus, Boyarin and Boyarin (1993) argue that the essence of Judaism and the Jewish diasporic existence emphatically does not lie in this ‘Christian’

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26 Mordechai Vanunu is the Israeli nuclear technician who leaked information about Israel’s nuclear programme and was kidnapped and imprisoned by Israel for doing so. Edward Said was a leading Palestinian intellectual, author of Orientalism. Elie Wiesel is a pillar of the US Jewish establishment, a former concentration camp inmate and writer who is a strong supporter of Israel. Sharon is Ariel Sharon, the general responsible for the 1981 Lebanon War who later became Israeli prime minister.
universalism, declaring that the break between Judaism and Christianity was precisely over this point. They talk of how Paul deprived Jewish ethnic and cultural specificity of any positive value and argue that this Christian denial of difference is still going on, and often internalised by Jews: ‘In this sense the “progressive” idealization of Jew and woman, or more usually, j"ew and Woman, ultimately deprives difference of the right to be different’ (1993: 697). They accept that Deutscher’s path is a perfectly acceptable way of being Jewish, but bemoan the fact that it is seen as the only way of doing so.

For some contemporary critics [...] it seems that the real Jew is the non-Jewish Jew. What does this say about the ‘reality’ of those Jews – most of those who call themselves Jews, of course, are the untheorised, unphilosophical, unspiritualised Jews - who would think the phrase ‘non-Jewish Jew’ to be nonsense? Is it politically correct, that is, ethical, to forget them and to fashion an imaginary dialogue with the other who is, in fact, the already sanctioned, official model of the ‘non-Jewish Jew’ (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 701).

This also indicates that just as Zionism’s claim to represent the Jewish people was initially a prefigurative claim, opposed by the majority of Jews, the claims of universalism and non-Jewish Jews to represent diaspora traditions should be seen as similarly prefigurative and controversial, due to Zionism’s intervening success.

The Boyarins’ attack on the stereotype of non-Jewish Jews serves to underline the main similarity between them and other theorists of diaspora - the claim that heterogeneity is an integral part of being Jewish (Aviv and Shneer 2005; Beller 2008; Magid 2006; Segal 2007; Silberstein 2000a; Benbassa and Attias 2004; Steyn 1999). This does not simply mean that Jewish communities contain a diversity of viewpoints; the claim to heterogeneity goes further and asserts that proper Jews are heterogeneous and hybrid, and implicitly, those Jews who stress only one part of the Jewish experience are somehow lacking, inauthentic.

Both aspects of the claim to heterogeneity, a diverse community and Jewishness as alterity, are used against the claims of Zionism (and often against strictly Orthodox Jews). Claiming that Jews are disparate undermines Israel’s pretensions to represent the interest of all Jews and more immediately challenges local Zionist claims that they are speaking on behalf of a unitary Jewish community. Claiming Jewishness as a site of alterity undermines Zionism’s project to normalise Jews into becoming just like any other (19th century race-obsessed) nation. Both sides of this tactic can be seen in the following extract, where Judith Butler
confronts the president of Harvard, Laurence Summers, who equated criticism of Israel with antisemitism. She writes:

The argument that all Jews have a heartfelt investment in the state of Israel is simply untrue. Some have a heartfelt investment in corned beef sandwiches or in certain Talmudic tales, memories of their grandmother, the taste of borscht, or the echoes of the Yiddish theatre. Some care most about Hebrew songs or religious liturgy and rituals. Some have an investment in historical and cultural archives from Eastern Europe or from the Shoah, or in forms of labor activism that are thoroughly secular, though ‘Jewish’ in a substantively social sense (Butler 2004: 113).

In this claiming of heterogeneity, there seems to be an equivalencing of one listed item with another. The fact is that labour activism or Zionism simply aren’t in the same category as corned beef sandwiches. Nor are these qualities particularly Jewish. This is a resolutely secularist list in which ‘religious liturgy and rituals’ are reduced to another cultural artefact among others, something which reveals how the claim to heterogeneity is also another means of drawing identitarian boundaries. Nevertheless, the claim that Jews are heterogeneous is more than a tactical position that weaves whatever convenient strands from the past to create a case for alternative Jewish subjectivity. One can recognise the importance of the tactical element to the claim, while recognising that like all identity claims, it is genuinely felt. The claim is a way of imagining the whole Jewish experience as inherently plural: ‘diasporic identity is a disaggregated identity. Jewishness disrupts the very categories of identity because it is not national, not genealogical, not religious, but all of these in dialectical tension with one another’ (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 721).

This is a powerful critique of the teleological pretensions of Zionism to provide a resolution of Jewish ‘out of placeness’ by providing them with a national home (Rose 2005). Proponents of a hyphenated Jewish identity do not regard hybrid diasporic existence and identity as problematic, but normal and indeed privileged. While this hybrid identity is sometimes explicitly contrasted with Zionist aims to eliminate differences from Jews (Farber 2006: 9), it is fairly mainstream in the diaspora to declare, ‘Jewish identity has become intrinsically “hyphenic”. This is to say that hyphenation is now the natural condition of Jewish identity’ (Lang 2005: 9). The logical corollary is the argument that those who give up one or other side of the hyphen are ‘less’ than other Jews. As Benbassa and Attias claim, ‘To be Jewish is to be Jewish plus something else’ (2004: 151). The normativity of hybrid Jewish
identities in the diaspora only underlines its usefulness for those constructing an alternative Jewish identity in opposition to Zionism.

Notwithstanding the contradictions inherent in the concept of an open, fluid identity grounded in a diaspora, it is discursively powerful since it provides a better descriptor of the modern Jewish condition than traditional Zionism, mired in narratives of victimhood and denigration of the diaspora. Not that all forms of diasporism leads to anti-Zionism. Most diaspora Jews, even if they reject the fundamental Zionist negation of the diaspora do believe that the diaspora and Israel need each other for continuity. In this form, Zionism is used to build up one’s diaspora community (Kelner et al. 2000), and support for Israel is conditional. As Habib points out, even among supporters, Israel is judged; and notwithstanding considerable self-delusion as to whether Israel actually measures up to these values, the measuring stick is values created in the diaspora of openness and democratic pluralism (Habib 2004: 258).

**Rejecting Zionism, ignoring Palestinians**

Let us not get sentimental here and let us also recognise that besides destroying the future for Palestinians, Israel has also destroyed the past for Jews. We had a magnificent Jewish diaspora culture. But Jewish Arabs were encouraged to despise their language and culture, and they show their shame by refusing to speak or learn their original language. Yiddish was destroyed, violently at times. [...] Now all that remains is an ersatz culture reflected through an ideological prism. Without a history, the people remain rootless. Maybe one day they will become ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ and then the wheel will have come full circle (Message 15411. Just Peace UK list, 30 April, 2005).

The flipside to defending diaspora as the authentic location of Jews and Jewishness is rejecting Israel and Zionism as providing that location. In this section I examine this rejection – how Zionist arguments about diaspora assimilation have been reversed and how Zionism is treated as an assimilationist negation of Jewish values. I conclude by asking where Palestinians exist in this process of identity contention.

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27 Oded (2008) in discussing the growth of mainstream diaspora Jewish funding of Israeli Palestinian groups makes the same point. These funders don’t believe they are ‘helping the enemy’, but contributing to Israeli society, in accordance with their own liberal multicultural values, and incidentally ignoring the often racist values of Israeli society (Golan 2008; Yoaz 2007).
One of the promises of Zionism was to ‘normalise’ the Jews and enable them to become a normal nation among other normal nations. Implicit in this was the demand that the unique characteristics of diaspora Jews and Jewish life would have to be extirpated. Zionism, in other words, was founded on the negation of the diaspora. Here I investigate the cultural template followed in this negation, and the subsequent criticism of this template.

In constructing a Zionist identity in opposition to the diaspora, proponents sought to fashion ‘new Jews’. Diasporist Jews argue that the cultural template used was mainstream Christian civilisation. While no interviewee appeared familiar with Daniel Boyarin’s particularist reading of diaspora identity (and few would agree with it), many were conversant with his discussion of early Zionist negations of the diaspora – how early Zionists extolled the image of a rugged, violent ‘muscle Jew’ in direct opposition to the ‘sissy Jew’ of the ghettos; a pale-skinned, studious and physically fragile ideal of masculinity (Boyarin 1997). Boyarin presents the image of a ‘muscle Jew’ concocted by the early Zionist ideologue, Max Nordeau, as a crude effort to emulate and imitate conventional European Christian codes of maleness, thereby negating a particularly Jewish imagining of masculinity. More generally, Zionist ideology has been presented as a catch-up attempt to mimic the worst of late 19th and early 20th century Christian culture – nationalist, imperialist and influenced by Social Darwinist ideas of survival of the racially fittest (Sternhell 1998).

In seeing Israel as an outcome of a Jewish desire to assimilate, it is suggested that Zionism negated a particularly Jewish way of being in the world. As American author Seth Farber claims, ‘ultimately, Zionism is an assimilation to Christianity in its dominant Western form!’ (Farber 2005: 238). Such statements work as propaganda, not simply academic critique, since linking Zionism with Christianity is a delegitimising argument. It can also be seen as a means of stigma reversal, since the charge of assimilation is regularly levelled at diaspora Jews by Israelis. There is a certain commonality between Jewish diasporists arguing that Zionists are the real assimilationists in order to counter charges of self-hatred and Roth’s description of how Chicana feminists displaced the charge of vendidismo (selling out to Anglos) ‘by arguing that it was masculine traditionalists – los machos – were the real sell-outs to Anglo values’ (2007: 721). They both involve a dialogue with ethnic traditions, the better to challenge the value of currently dominant positions within that tradition’s symbolic universe. Characterising Zionism as being a form of assimilation is mirrored on the more local level where movement members tell narratives of Zionists as having assimilated to parochial
middle-class English norms and rejecting proper cosmopolitan diasporic Jewish standards. Even though those levelling the charge of assimilationism against Zionists are aware of its discursive power, this discourse should not be seen as a simple framing procedure. The charge is genuinely felt and it informs the dispositions and actions of those levelling it. If, for instance, Zionists do not represent Jewish traditions, surely it is incumbent on them to do so, and so critics in the field are drawn into the illusion of ethnic identity.

**Constantinian Judaism vs. Jews of Conscience**

Some time ago I suggested we replace the Torah in the Ark of the Covenant with helicopter gunships. Since military power defines Jewish life, we should be honest about what we worship - power and might. At the most meaningful hour of worship, we bow before that which secures us. Once it was the covenant and the Torah; now it is helicopter gunships and the wall (Ellis 2003: 155).

The term, ‘Constantinian Judaism’ comes from the theologian Marc Ellis (2002a) when describing the Zionisation of Jewish life. This term evokes the turn towards attaining and serving secular state power in Christianity which Zionism, he argues, has done in direct opposition to Judaic tradition and diaspora existence. It suggests that just as Christianity was corrupted by the Constantinian donation into serving the state, Judaism has now become irrevocably corrupted by support of Israel. Ellis is echoing Boyarin’s worries that his rabbinic Judaism is disintegrating:

> It has been said by many Christians that Christianity died at Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Sobibor. I fear – G-d forbid – that my Judaism may be dying at Nablus, Daheishe, Beteen (Beth El) and al-Khalil (Hebron) [places in the West Bank]. The violent actions taken in the name of defence may help some Jewish bodies survive (and even that only dubiously, temporarily, momentarily), but they threaten to empty Jewish existence of all meaning, to make hollow the resistance for two thousand years to being dissolved into the majority (Boyarin 2003: 202-3).

Ellis is no more hopeful; he sees the Jewish covenant as hopelessly divided between pro and anti-statist Jews: ‘Jews of conscience confront Constantinian Judaism and its collusion with power and the state. There is a civil war in the Jewish world that crosses geographic and cultural differences’ (quoted in Farber 2005: 216). Ellis also believes that Jewish dissenters are sucked, however unwittingly, into this Constantinian Judaism. He worries that they are ‘losing the battle they rage while becoming fuel for the continuation and expansion of the
very establishment they fight’ (Ellis 2003: 145). Keenly aware of the dangers of institutionalisation, he fears that Jewish dissenters, seeking to become the next Jewish establishment, will become mummified institutions, sanctified and ignored. As opposed to these Jewish dissenters, Ellis praises those who vacate the field of identity and walk away from this game of serving as the loyal opposition.

Jews in exile refuse the internal debate because it goes nowhere. It does not lead to Palestinian freedom or a significant dealing with Jewish identity. Rejecting the Jewish civil war as a sophisticated game that will never respond to the fundamental questions […] Jews of conscience simply leave (Ellis 2003: 147).

This approaches the idea that only non-Jewish Jews are the real Jews; indeed Ellis speaks of how Jews of conscience testify to the survival of real Judaism ‘without being able to articulate this sensibility in symbol or meaning’, partly because Constantinian and even dissenter Judaism has so compromised religious language, so that ‘the very notion of religiosity[…]is anathema’ (Ellis 2003: 148, 154). It seems strange that a Jewish theologian has moved to a position indistinguishable from the atheist Trotskyist, Isaac Deutscher. What has moved him to this appreciation of the pointlessness of internal Jewish identity debates is an intense awareness of Palestinians. In Ellis’s writings there is a sense of horror that this nice debate over Jewish identity ‘is hashed out over and over again as the displacement, torture and murder of Palestinians continues, even escalates’ (Ellis 2003: 146-7. Emphasis in original).

Ellis refuses the easy road of claiming that Constantinian Judaism is an ‘inauthentic’ import from Christianity. In refusing to suggest that there was an original Jewish diaspora innocence that existed before the creation of the state of Israel, Ellis is undoubtedly right. All collectivities exist within the play of power and compromise with and use whatever state they live under; Jewish diaspora history is no exception. However, here Ellis is in the minority; most writers, both critics and supporters of Israel paint a distinction between a pre-Israel state of diaspora, where Jews had nothing to do with power and the sad (or glorious) state of nowadays, where Jews are, for the first time, enmeshed in the operations of state power (Azria 1998; Beit-Hallahmi 1993; Boyarin and Boyarin 1993; Ottolenghi 2005; Vital 1990; Rabkin 2006).

The idealisation of diaspora as a pre-lapsarian state for the Jewish people crop up time and again in discussions of Israel, equally in a key text of post-Zionism – ‘Original Sins’ (Beit-
Hallahmi 1993), and in an ideological evisceration of post-Zionist claims – ‘Paradise Lost’ (Ottolenghi 2003). Often this idealisation draws upon an Jewish pacifist tradition, which it is argued, was betrayed and rejected by the extolling of violence by early Zionists (Rabkin 2006). One can certainly see this rejection in the words of David Ben Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel: ‘We are not yeshiva students debating the fine points of self-improvement. We are conquerors of the land facing a wall of iron, and we have to break through it’ (quoted in Sternhell 1998: 21). Arguments that draw upon the violence/pacifism dichotomy are discursively powerful since they invoke the immediate repugnance that many Jews, religious and non-religious, feel upon viewing contemporary Israeli violence.

This distinction between Zionism and pre-lapsarian diaspora values is in part a nostalgia for a past that is always imagined as simpler; it is certainly not an ideological construct only maintained by anti-Zionist Jews. Sentiments such as the following are commonplace: ‘Judaism was not primarily shaped in order to meet the requirements of state politics[…]

Judaism was never concerned with political power and state authority precisely because it is a Diaspora construct’ (Azria 1998: 22. emphasis in original). Azria talks of an uneasiness that Jews have with Israel, one that has nothing to do with oppression of Palestinians. When diaspora Jews referred to Israel, they meant a spiritual and mythic centre, not a state; and so she calls ‘the present statehood reality of Israel, a political reality traditionally and historically alien to Judaism’ (1998: 26).

However this idealistic reading of history only tells us so much, it is important to recognise that any Jewish unease with Israel has deepened because of the specifics of contemporary Israeli state practices. Here too critics can excavate antecedents. The names of Ahad Ha’am and Judah Magnes are sometimes invoked in contemporary critiques of Israel. Ahad Ha’am (the *nom de plume* of Asher Ginsberg), an important figure in early Zionist circles also critiqued aspects of Zionism (Ha’am 2003 [1891]). This critique was born out of the shocked realisation on visiting Palestine in the 1890s that, contrary to Zionist propaganda, the country was not actually ‘a land without a people’. Unlike others, he did not ignore this inconvenient fact or seek to reverse it; he assimilated it into his Zionism, arguing against plans to set up an exclusively Jewish state, and in favour instead of a ‘cultural Zionism’. In this cultural Zionism, Israel would become a spiritual centre for Jews, not a Jewish state but a binational entity where Jews and Arabs would live in equality. Judah Magnes, the chancellor and first

28 A yeshiva is a religious school
president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem from 1925 to 1948, took up Ha’am’s ideas. Seeing more clearly the militarisation that accompanied Zionist settlement in Palestine, he tried to establish ‘a pacific international spiritual Zionism’ involving a sharing of the land between Jewish immigrants and indigenous Palestinians (Magnes 2003 [1929]: 18). While the negative attitudes of Ahad Ha’am and Judah Magnes towards the diaspora have been overlooked, their critique of Zionist militarism and its goal of secular state power have served as a useful artefact to those who argue that the problem with Israel isn’t simply a matter of unwise real-estate speculation in 1967, but Zionist ideology and its negation of what is characterised as uniquely diasporic attitudes towards power and violence. 29

While this purity-vs.-power narrative allows Jews to consider their unease with Israel as being authentically Jewish and even perhaps as authentically Zionist (for instance Noam Chomsky, a strong critic of Israel, describes himself as a cultural Zionist), I would argue this disquiet is more immediately derived from watching bulldozers destroy houses than from scrutinising religious texts about diaspora, or past critiques of Zionism. This shows the limitations of such internal Jewish debates, their necessary failure to provide a language in which Jews can acknowledge directly what is happening to Palestinians. As I argue in the following subsection, this language effaces Palestinians from the substantive questions of Israel, when it does not cast them in the actual role of villains.

**What about the Palestinians?**

The natives have been robbed, deprived of their identity and history. They had their homeland pulled out from under them. They have the right to ask why this has befallen them. The answer is that they should not have been a part of the story and have no real relation to it (Beit-Hallahmi 1993: 88).

The above quote indicates the unhappy place that Palestinians have in this internal Jewish debate. They are seen as somehow extraneous to the problem of Israel, a question that revolves around Jewish subjectivities. Beit-Hallahmi rhetorically asks the question: ‘Israelis seem to be haunted by a curse. It is the curse of the original sin against the native Arabs. How can Israel be discussed without recalling the dispossession and exclusion of non-Jews?’

29 An alternative reading could invoke Judah Magnes as a warning example that proves Marc Ellis’s point about dissenter Jews. Magnes was a sincere pacifist who believed that, ‘The slogan, “Jewish state”… is equivalent, in effect, to a declaration of war by the Jews on the Arabs’ and yet he established the Hebrew University, one of the main cultural institutions and legitimators of that state (Quoted in Finkelstein 2003b: 104).
(1993: 216). One answer is that this question can be avoided by discussing Israel in terms of original sin against other Jews, rather than against Palestinians.

One can already see this in the blithely Eurocentric writings of Isaac Deutscher (which also indicates the Ashkenazi nature of this discourse). For Deutscher, trips to Israel in the 1950s and ‘60s gave him the opportunity to replay the Zionist-Bundist debates of his youth, debates which, of course, had nothing to do with Palestinians. The only moral dilemma he saw in Israel was how to reconcile the wonderful kibbutz socialist vision with the warped petty bourgeois rabble who were swamping Israel, the ‘wrecks of concentration camps and…refugees from Arab hatred and revenge’ (Deutscher 1968: 104). For Deutscher, Palestinians were mere vessels of hate and vengeance against the Jewish state; they served the role of barbarians that Israel justly deserved for straying off the European Jewish path of universal freedom. Here, Deutscher is following an illustrious religious tradition where all persecutors of Jews - from the mythical Amalekite tribe onwards - have been seen as ‘God’s scourges’, agents of His will used to bring the disobedient Jewish people back to submission. Viewing Palestinians as an enemy is in a way inherent once the problem with Israel is presented as an internal Jewish problem. For in this narrative, Palestinians are at best an unwanted extra intruding on and hostile to the resolution of important Jewish identity questions.

So an important element of internal Jewish identity talk is the question of what is not said, the effacement of Palestinian subjectivity. The main thrust of this ‘internal critique’ of Zionism is after all not a critique of what it does to others but whether it has been ‘good for the Jews’. As Marc Ellis notes, this attitude and this absence permeates almost all Jewish identity talk. Indeed how could it be otherwise? The European tradition of diaspora Judaism has nothing to say of and nothing to do with Palestinians. It is true that Jews can draw upon a tradition where they lived with Arabs and indeed as Arabs, the Mizrahi experience of diaspora. However, although this experience is referred to by modern English-speaking writers (Marquesee 2008; Rose 2004), it is not fundamental to their construction of identity, nor, as mentioned, to British Jews, and so I have not explored the Mizrahi resolution to these questions. Mention however should be made of the class dimension to this Mizrahi-Ashkenazi division. Ashkenazim are more middle class than Mizrahim, with the Israeli left, (and British diaspora Jewish critics of Israel) coming mainly from a middle-class Ashkenazi
background. Thus Jewish opposition to Israeli treatment of Palestinians is profoundly middle-class and dominated by Western Ashkenazi Jews.

One can see the contemporary limitations to this internal Western identity discourse by examining two recent collections of articles by Jewish critics of Israel, the American *Peace, Justice, and Jews* (Polner and Merken 2007) and the British *A Time to Speak Out* (Karpf et al. 2008). The comments below are based on a published review of these books (Landy 2009).

Taking the American collection first, here the downside of ethnic navel gazing can most clearly be seen. The faintly sanctimonious air adopted against those Jews who ‘ignore others’ legitimate grievances’ (Polner and Merken 2007: xv) does not alter the fact that these ‘others’ are but rarely spoken of. Tellingly the Nakba of 1948 is mentioned only once (Howard 2007). More often it is not acknowledged or even denied (Waskow 2007). It is this historical lie that lies behind the professed non-violence of many of the contributors to this book, for it allows them to equate Palestinian and Israeli violence in the present. Unconsciously recalling Anatole France’s cynicism about both rich and poor facing arrest if they sleep under bridges, here both the dispossessed and the racial elite will be criticised if they use violence to alter the status quo of Israel. This is not to say that the contributors to this book are not interested in transformation, but rather that the transformation they are interested in is that Jews become better, more moral people, so as ‘to be a free nation in our land’, as the title of one contribution (and a line from the Israeli national anthem) has it.

The British collection is more intellectually robust, produced by Independent Jewish Voices, a Jewish Israel-critical group in Britain. While it contains many fascinating vignettes about the experience of opposing local Zionists and Israel, and some fine articles critiquing Israeli practices, there is a quite remarkable absence of Palestinians from this collection (This may be because IJV’s actions are primarily focused on diaspora Jews). They are rarely referred to except as the subjects, or rather the unfortunate helpless objects of a human rights discourse. The troubling and perhaps inevitable absence of Palestinians in this and other collections leads to a (possibly unwitting) reproduction of the central Zionist idea – that Israel/Palestine is all about the Jews (for a similar critique: Gordon 2005). Palestinian absence also means that their concerns and proposals are not addressed as evidenced by the refusal by many writers in the collection to entertain the idea that the problem with Israel goes beyond the occupation regime. While this collection contains no distasteful Nakba denial, there is an equal refusal to address the demands of Palestinians to reverse its effects and return home. It
is significant then that the Palestinian right of return is discussed by those in Jewish Israel-critical groups who, I later argue, feel less entitled to efface Palestinian resistance and subjectivity than these collections would suggest. I argue then that the limitations of Jewish identity talk lies not only in its necessary failure to provide an adequate critique of the situation in Israel/Palestine, but also that it fails to fully express the activities of British Israel-critical Jews. This is somewhat inevitable, since the activities of participants in this social movement are influenced by several fields, and not simply by what is subject for discussion within the Jewish field.

Conclusion. The limits of historical analogy
All attempts at identity building are self-congratulatory to an extent. While at times the urge to puncture the congratulation is irresistible, it is more useful to investigate the image of diasporic Jewishness being built up. In many ways it is a liberatory and attractive identity to aspire towards – fluid and hybrid, grounded less in a sense of victimhood and suffering than in a sense of freedom and future possibility in the diaspora. It highlights morality, pacifism and the love of justice as the entrance fee for this particular club. Although the claim to heterogeneity and universalism can be used as border guards, they are less daunting boundary markers than many other (Jewish) ones. Commitment to democracy, universal values and human rights, respect for the rights of others to be different and the assertion that all this can be reconciled and indeed can flow from traditional Jewish beliefs – there are grimmer ideologies, more closed identities in this world.

This diasporist identity may be a pleasant open one for many middle class western Ashkenazi Jews. It even allows for a form of diasporist Zionism, something which indicates the diffusion of diasporist ideas, even in a mild form. In the form I am interested in however, diasporist ideology takes a more negative version of Israel. All identities have Others they are constructed against and I suggest that the diasporist sense of self is often built up against a view of Israel as a dark, militarised and confined ethnocracy. In this juxtaposition, one final religious image is deployed – that of the Jewish prophetic (Deutscher 1968; Ellis 2002a; Farber 2006; Marquesee 2008; Shatz 2004). This refers to the prophetic tradition of speaking out against one’s own society; the Old Testament being replete with prophets who served as ‘witnesses against social injustice’ (Marquesee 2008: 145). Many secular Jews from Deutscher onwards claim to be speaking in this tradition; for instance, Marquesee devotes a
chapter of his book to these prophets, declaring that someone like Jeremiah would be branded a self-hating Jew if he were alive today (2008: 150). This claim can be seen as yet another creative appropriation of the Jewish past.

Yet it can be taken too far. Seth Farber is especially fond of invoking the return of the Jewish prophetic in his series of interviews (2005), yet this seems to be an unhelpful way of charactering these critics of Israel. Farber’s interviewees weren’t particularly interested in, (and in the case of Norman Finkelstein were actively hostile to) the suggestion that they were motivated by the prophetic tradition, with the single exception of Noam Chomsky. Equally, none of my interviewees spoke of being animated by the prophetic tradition in their actions; in searching for Jewish precedents they linked their ideas much more with the lived historical experiences of European Jews.

It seems that the appropriation of the prophetic tradition is a flag of convenience used to unite disparate people under the title, ‘Jewish’. And herein lies the problem with such diasporist appropriation of Jewish themes. In the first place, the claim that the prophetic tradition animates Jews is an ideological and even racial construct which obscures the real social operations going on when Jews invoke the idea of justice. It is as if one tried to analyse black liberation struggles in terms of how ‘the black people’ are fuelled by their innate primitive sense of natural justice. Such regressive stereotyping appears especially stark when an outsider invokes these arguments; in Cornell West’s treatment of the issue, those Jews who question Israel’s policies (but do not question them too much) are praised as being ‘prophetic Jews’ (West 2004: 118). Here the adjective ‘prophetic’ becomes a way of saying ‘good Jews’. Secondly, talking of reclaiming the Jewish covenant and the biblical prophetic tradition returns critics of Israel to the terrain many seek to avoid, that of the self-regarding Jewish civil war.

This shows the limitations of mapping the concerns of internal Jewish identity talk onto the activities of British Israel-critical Jews. One unfortunate result of Jews-only collections of essays such as the ones reviewed in this chapter, is that they fail to convey that movement participants are involved in coalitions, other groups and so on, or to fully engage with this multi-field activism. Nevertheless the problems raised here, the absence of Palestinians, the appropriation of concepts of exile, exist for Jewish Israel-critical groups too. I deal with both dynamics in the subsequent data-analysis chapters.
Chapter 5. A community of communities? The Anglo-Jewish field and its dissidents

The three week Israeli invasion of Gaza from December 2008 to January 2009 generated a plethora of letters to the British papers, many from Jewish people. One of these letters was sent to the Observer on Sunday January 11th. While the language used was emollient towards Israel, speaking of the love that the writers had towards the country, the message was blunt – Israel should call an immediate ceasefire (Bayfield et al 2009). Coming on the same day the Board of Deputies was holding a demonstration in favour of the war, this was a clear statement of dissent. This made the identities of the letter’s signatories all the more sensational; they were leading figures of the British Jewish establishment, including the heads of the Liberal and Reform congregations, representing some 28% of affiliated Jews.

The response of some within Israel-critical groups was to deride these people for the insipidity of the letter replete as it was with clichés of diaspora love for Israel, and half-truths about the invasion of Gaza. They also accused the authors of shoot-and-cry Zionism: that this was nothing more than ‘a last minute effort to save faces and to gain some moral ground’ (Message 25079, Just Peace UK list, 11 January 2009). However others disagreed. And even if the personal credentials of these signatories could be questioned, this only made the political intervention all the more interesting – that these establishment figures felt it was important to put distance between themselves and Israel and to publicly break with the Board of Deputies. This attests to the unpopularity of Israel’s conduct among many Jews.

This chapter asks what caused this disillusionment and links it with the actions of Jewish Israel-critical groups. In doing so, I describe the background and the main features of the movement I’m studying. The chapter then should be regarded as background analysis – a bridge between background description of the movement and analysis of its actions. I situate this movement in what I call ‘the British Jewish field’, a term I use instead of the more common description: ‘community’. Following Bourdieu, I theorise this as a field of contention, and label it somewhat problematically, an ethnic field.

30 Shoot-and-cry Zionism is an ironic shorthand for Zionists combining ruthless actions with moderate-sounding words. It stems from stories circulated in Zionist circles about Israeli soldiers crying after ‘having to’ kill Arabs.
The chapter opens with this terminological distinction, firstly discussing the problems with the term *community*, and then what I mean by an ethnic field. I next examine the fragmentation of this field, something that has created the opportunity for a specifically Jewish Israel-critical movement to develop, and has helped determine how it has developed. After exploring the political and cultural opportunities afforded to this movement, I examine its constituent groups, giving a broad history of the groups over the last decade, outlining the main issues this movement faces. This is a backgrounder to the analysis of the following chapters where I deal with the movement’s work.

**From community to field**

All communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contacts (and perhaps even these) are imagined (Anderson 1991: xix).

I approach this or any discussion on community with a distinct lack of zest, aware of the multiple, often contradictory definitions of community, GA Hillery famously uncovering 94 versions of community back in 1955 (Hillery 1955). Schmalenbach’s critique of the term, written back in the 1920s is irresistible: ‘the term community has become a catchword used to designate every possible (as well as the most impossible) delusion of the time’ (1977: 64). Nevertheless it is a term impossible to avoid, since it is used so freely to describe British Jews seen, in the present-day, as an ethnic community. Corcoran and Devlin (2007), assessing the myriad uses of community recommend that it be approached contextually, which I do below. Fortunately for such analysis, when talking of ethnic communities the term is commonly used in a specific way – less the Durkheimian sense of community as civic responsibility and more in the traditionalist Tonnies’ sense of community as an small-scale, organic, bounded arena into which members are born, and which is characterised by a sense of naturalness, kinship and the existence of involuntarily ties with each other (Delanty 2003).

While I work within this definitional family, this is not the only way in which community is deployed in the field. Certain diaspora Jewish critics of Israel make a reconstitution and rethinking of Jewish community a central part of their activities, something that often involves talking of communities of practices rather than ethnic communities (Wuthnow 1996; Melucci 1989).
Below, I critique the dominant deployment of ethnic community, arguing that the salient features it is describing – a sense of belonging to a common ethnicity centred around certain institutions – can best be analysed under Bourdieu’s term, ‘field’. The advantage of using the term ‘field’ is that it strips away the mystificatory properties of community, especially how it serves to impose a false unity among those contained within its categorisations. Even though I seek to place the term ‘community’ under erasure, I’m mindful that, “community” is one way of talking about the everyday reality that the human world is, collectively more than the sum of its individual parts’ (Jenkins 2008: 109). Thus I continue to use the term to denote people’s self-understanding of Jewish collectivity, while analysing the contestations under the rubric of ‘field’.

People belong to communities. The key feature of community seems to lie in that word ‘belonging’. Even at its weakest, definitions of community involve invoking a consciousness of mutual connections or simply a sense of belonging (König 1968). It is only when we ask about the collectivity that people are supposed to belong to that confusion is uncovered, since any clear definition involves unjustifiable exclusions or needs to be widened so that the definition lacks any empirical use. As the next section shows, the certainty behind the statement: ‘Jews belong to the Jewish community’ melts away when one investigates the nature of this so-called community.

This is not the question as to whether the Jewish community should be called an ethnic or religious or ethno-religious community. Jewish communities are organised on a very localised, at best national basis, and are increasingly seen as ethnic communities (Webber 1997; Lambert 2008). This is certainly the case in England where, partly in positive response to the categorisations of the British state (Alderman 1994), British Jews are increasingly happy to consider themselves as part of an ethnic community (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007; Schmool 2004) and see their Jewish identity as primarily ethnic (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004).

The confusion of definition lies whether the term ‘ethnic community’ actually refers to social facts or is simply a political claim. Ethnicity itself is another notoriously slippery concept – I am using it here to mean a ‘sense of kinship, group solidarity and common culture’ (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 3). This tripartite division in ethnicity illustrates how it works on the level of personal (especially familial) relationships, on the group political level, and in the realm of ideology and imagined identities.
A longer definition of ethnicity is Schermerhorn’s:

A collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood [...] A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group (Schermerhorn 1978: 12).

This is somewhat problematic since it obscures the ethnicity of the majority population. However the definition is useful in that it points to how so-called ethnic groups are above all ideological constructs, imagined communities whose self-image is constructed to efface their contingent and processual nature (Hall 1996). Vered Amit goes further and argues that the term ethnic community is an empty category which should be seen as an ideological claim: ‘a categorical identity that is premised on various forms of exclusion and construction of otherness’ (Amit and Rapport 2002: 13). This is in line with arguments which see community as primarily being a matter of the construction of symbolic boundaries (Turner 1974; Barth 1969), and as it being an inadequate term to describe the urban modality of life (Sennett 1977). The specific critique of the term ‘ethnic communities’ – that it is little more than a positive label for symbolic ethnicity, refers back to Anthony Cohen’s (1985) argument that ‘community’ is a form of individual consciousness rather than a description of any empirical reality.

While there is an element of truth here, the problem with such accounts of community is that there is an empirical reality of ties and links which is being denied (Delanty 2003: 48). While one should be aware of the ideological claims behind the term community, it does to some extent describe empirical reality. Taking the Jewish field, strong social relationships among members are maintained through various communal events and institutions, and Jews who are not part of these relationships are seen by some as ‘not part of the community’. True, older definitions of community which see community as a group of households in the same area that have strong links of functional interdependencies and which are bound by their need to assure collective survival (Elias 1974) are becoming less relevant as interdependencies have weakened among British Jews (JPR 2000). However, these interdependencies still exist, however weakly, and as in other European countries, the network of interactions centred around local and national communal institutions are a vital part of Jewish social identity. On the local level Jewish communities are structured around synagogue congregations, as well as local newsletters and shops, Jewish day schools and old-age homes etc. On the national level
there are the institutions of the official community – the Board of Deputies that purports to represent British Jews, the office of the Chief Rabbi, Jewish publications and the Jewish Leadership Council among others (discussed later in the chapter). There are also institutionalised events like Jewish Book Week and Limmud (literally ‘study’, an annual conference targeted at younger people). Contesting the Jewish community isn’t then just about contesting a vague sense of identity, but also about contesting the networks of power and patronage that flow through these local and national institutions.

Any problem with the term community is not that it doesn’t describe something real – clearly it does – the networked ties of British Jews to each other and the sense of belonging Jews have to an identity rooted in a collectivity. However, it is an inadequate means of describing this collectivity and sense of identity, one which causes confusion. The confusion surrounding community is not accidental; it flows from the way that community is an ideological word in Marx’s use of the term, allowing dominant members of a collectivity to mystify social relations. This is community as a claim whose most important elements are firstly its ability to construct boundaries against ‘outsiders’, and secondly to normativise existent structures of domination and discursive hegemony within the field. The first element recalls Bauman’s argument of how community is invoked as a security blanket to protect the self from the insecurities of the modern world, serving to create an insular modality of being deeply fearful of ‘others’ (Bauman 2000).

Community is also used to normativise a conservative hierarchy. Nancy Naples gives a dramatic illustration this when analysing rural towns in Iowa (Naples 2003). Most people she talked to, including newcomers, those who left and returned, poorer people, women, those with different views to the mainstream and factory workers, felt like outsiders to their community. She concluded that:

> The idealized construction of what it meant to be a part of the ‘community’ and of who were ‘legitimate’ community members served as both an internalized and externalized means of social control. When someone spoke up to challenge the construction, they were formally silenced or ostracized. Others silenced themselves for fear that they would disrupt the fragile sense of community (Naples 2003: 57).

Such use of community as a form of censorship is applicable to the Jewish community. It seems impossible to use the term without its hidden control functions being invoked. This is a
particular problem when talking of ethnic communities, where the term has been used to silence the powerless within the group, especially women (Patel 1999).

In addition the term is inadequate, when one seeks, as I am doing, to explain and track splits in a collectivity. The implicit assumptions of internal unity, as much as the hiding of hierarchies, is a key problem with the term. This is the case even if an assumption of unity is merely the implicit ideal type, rather than empirical description. While divisions among Jews are acknowledged by sociologists, one must then ask why community is used to group Jews, and indeed a wider argument – if community defines multiple forms of modality (Delanty 2003) then why use the same word to describe different things? The answer seems to be ideological, that the word ‘community’ invests social arrangements with a sense of authenticity and transcendental presence, and symbolises something deserving of consideration and often approval and protection (Mason 2000).

By talking of the Jewish community, splits among Jews are indexed as deviant, something to be deplored rather than celebrated. In an era of growing pluralism and declining everyday religious practices one of the few things that has brought Jews together in the last half century – allowed them to think of themselves and others as part of the Jewish community - has been the practice of Zionism. Small wonder that even moderate critics of Israel have found themselves subject to impassioned attacks – attacks less to protect Israel and more to protect the notion of a diaspora Judaic community whose glue was Zionism (for the case of Ireland: Landy 2005). While critics of Israel represent for some a disruption of the fragile doxa through which the field could be conceived as unitary, there is no need for sociologists to accept the normativity of Zionist claims. It could also be claimed that these critics are renewing the community, which Zionist discourse has brought down a dead end. In addition, critics of Israel can be seen as building up new forms of community among Jewish people, through counter-cultural events and through bringing Jewish dissidents together.

However, by examining their actions under the term ‘community’, we enter into an arid discussion of whether these actions are destroying or rebuilding the Jewish community, a discussion which (possibly deliberately) fails to track or fully grasp what is happening. Rather than using the word community, it may be better to talk of how these groups build up an ‘emplaced sociality’ within the Jewish and ambient field (Pink 2008). By emplaced sociality Pink means the sense of belonging to a group that derives from shared experiences within a specific, usually spatially defined, field. It is important to remember though that any
such emplaced sociality still refers to an imaginary. Whether a local imagined community, a sense of Jewishness or transnational universalism, communities are always communities of the mind (Ray 2005). To analyse what this sense of sociality is emplaced within, I argue below that Bourdieu's concept of field provides a language to conceptualise these contestations and networks, without making a priori assumptions about its authenticity or normativity.

In chapter three I described what I meant by fields. Briefly, a field is an arena within which various forms of capital is contested, with all fields being interpenetrated by the discourses and contestations of other fields. Thus academia is one clearly delineated field, one which exists within the interplay of other fields of contention. Fields maintain a level of semi-autonomy which allows us to investigate their operations, without needing to believe that they are somehow discrete entities.

I have referred to this field as the British Jewish (or Anglo-Jewish) field. But how should I characterise this field? Seeing fields as sites where field-specific cultural capital is exchanged and contested, what exactly is being contested? Recalling the previous definition of ethnicity as the practices and symbols of an imagined collectivity rooted in a common ancestry or tradition, I argue that it is a religiously-linked ethnicity that is being traded and traded on, an embodied cultural capital that extends beyond the cultural into the political and familial arenas – a cultural concept called Jewishness. The delegitimising of institutions and setting up of new institutions and network flows to represent ‘authentic’ Jewishness are all elements of the trading and contestation process. It is this amorphous sense of Jewish ethnicity which invests the involved institutions and networks with meaning.

Crudely one could talk about one side (Zionists) deploying notions of ethnic kinship and Jewish communal belonging to define Jewishness while the non-Zionist side deploys discourses of Jewish morality and (alternative) Jewish history to define and defend their notion of ethnic capital. But as with all civil wars the lines of demarcation are not neat. The claim of critics of Israel to represent Jewish history and morality is hotly contested while on the other hand, as I discuss later, some of these critics place their discourses firmly within community and regard themselves as protecting the local community from the harmful influence of Israel.
This leads to a second issue about ethnic fields – the multilevel forms of contention. An ethnic field structures more than political positions and processes. Naturally I’m interested in the political, but these political processes do not only occur in public fora. Just as ethnic belonging happens on kinship, communal and ideological/imagined levels so does the contestation within these fields – on the family level, on the level of who represents British Jews, and on the abstract level about what and who is really Jewish. This leads to a bewildering cross-cutting of discourses, such as when the writer Linda Grant tried to undercut demands from Independent Jewish Voices (IJV) that Israel behaves in accordance to human rights norms. She did so, not by directly attacking their arguments, but by saying the local and largely Zionist Jewish community – not these fancy intellectuals issuing such demands – were the ones who took care of her dying mother (Grant 2007). On the surface, this argument for choosing one’s mother over justice was a logical non sequiter, but what gave Grant’s argument a degree of emotive power was the specific multilevel form of capital that is contested within ethnic fields.

A third point about fields. While I argue that Israel-critical Jews are contesting the ethnic field, this is not the only field they are involved in nor, for many of them, their prime interest. Referring to their field of activism as being within an ethnic field is then problematic, since some of the respondents clearly were not interested in ‘being Jewish’. However, those involved in Jewish groups (and often those not) were trading on their Jewishness, deploying their ethnicity to undercut the ethnically-based claims of Zionists. One must also ask what the contestation, and often downgrading, of ethnic capital signifies in the wider world. Or, how this field’s contestation affects other fields that this movement is involved in.

To do so, it is necessary to first describe the Jewish field, which I do by focusing on two narratives of the field, that of decline and that of revival. I first talk of how the official community envisions itself, focusing on the growth of ‘cultural ethnicity’ among Jews. I next discuss the fissures within the British Jewish field. Such fissures are of central importance to Jewish Israel-critical groups since they have been thereby given the ‘discursive opportunity’ to establish themselves and develop (Koopmans and Statham 1999). The crisis of traditional Jewish community has given space to a renewal movement of ‘new Jews’ who are interested in the performative cultural ethnicity of Jewishness, separate from and even antagonistic to traditional interpretations of Jewish community (Aviv and Shneer 2005; Cohen and Kelman 2008). Two key trends over the last few decades have been a growing detachment from
Israel, and the nascent creation of a Europeanised and diasporist vision of Jewishness, especially within the self-described liberal and progressive (in a political and often religious sense) streams of Anglo-Jewry. I argue that many critics of Israel see themselves as part of the narrative of revival, placing themselves within a larger liberal wing of diaspora European Jewry. This is a tendency which sees possibilities within EU transnationalism to grow an indigenous self-consciously European Jewish identity separate from both the US and Israel.

No longer ‘the club’. The British Jewish field

‘Polarisation’ has long been a buzz-word within the Anglo-Jewish field; recent analysis of the 2001 census by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) reveals that there is firm demographic grounding behind this concept (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007). While some have tried to paper over these fissures by talking of a ‘community of communities’ (JPR 2000; Lerman 2007b), such terminology where community means one thing in one context and another thing in another, albeit essentially the same context only serves to confuse rather than illuminate the Jewish field.

In view of the heterogeneity of British Jews and the fragmentation of their collectivity, is it meaningful to speak of ‘the Jewish community’? Yes and no. Not if we wish to refer to all Jews living in Britain, but the term remains useful when describing those Jews who have a hegemonic position within the field, those who are seen as, and see themselves as the community. It is useful to examine this hegemonic group in order to establish what dissenters to the community are dissenting from.

Beyond Belonging, a recent survey of ‘moderately engaged’ British Jews commissioned by the UJIA (United Jewish Israel Appeal), is useful in this regard (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004). As with other samples of British Jews there is a level of selection bias which serves to delineate who the hegemonic powers in the Jewish field believe they represent, and what this community is. 31 This is a wealthy, educated, middle-aged group. Median age is 42,

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31 The researchers sent about 4,500 questionnaires out, but only to parents whose children went to Jewish day schools, since they were more likely to fit their criteria. A third of these questionnaires were returned, and one assumes that the ‘less engaged’ were correspondingly less likely to engage in this survey. Of these, a further 500 were rejected as not fulfilling the criteria of ‘moderate engagement’. Through these exclusions, the authors managed to isolate those who communal institutions were seeking to encourage to participate further. Excluded here are not just Jews who are not sufficiently incorporated in these institutions, but also the strictly Orthodox
household income is £55,000 p.a., 60% hold degrees, with a third possessing postgraduate qualifications (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004: 17-18). It is a largely secular group where members belong to synagogues (88% of respondents), but only go there a few times a year. Beyond surveying, the researchers also conducted semi-structured interviews and found that none of those interviewed were troubled by much more than ‘what at best may be called a vague spirituality’ (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004: 34).

Most respondents saw their Jewishness as an ethnic rather than a religious identity, expressing a high level of ethnic identification and practices, such as living in Jewish neighbourhoods. The significant aspect of being Jewish for many Jews was simply a solipsistic sense of being Jewish and being with other Jews. The authors characterise their respondents, somewhat unenthusiastically one senses, as ‘dwellers’ rather than ‘seekers’ (see also Kahn-Harris 2007b). They define these terms as follows: ‘Dwellers are loyal to and content with established modes of religious practice. Seekers search for personal meaning through religious involvement and are less bound to established ways of doing things’ (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004: 58). This seems little more than a scholarly way of expressing disapproval of the comfortable and rather empty sense of ethnic belonging of middle-class British Jews. 32

Any disapproval of diaspora Jewish culture, whether it is insufficiently religious or interesting must be understood as a value judgement rather than a description of a dying community. Jewish social scientists have subtly, and sometimes not-so-subtly, deplored the replacement of religious with a cultural sense of belonging, bestowing on the latter a host of unflattering epithets like ‘pick’n’mix Judaism’ (Graham 2004), ‘dime-store ethnicity’ (Stein and Hill 1977), as well as ‘symbolic ethnicity’ (Gans 1979). The central argument is that this ‘pick’n’mix’ Judaism is a negative development, because it is a weaker way of maintaining continuity and community.

This equation of ethnicity with religious practice illustrates the strictures which the word, ‘community’ places on the sociological imagination. It is also not particularly accurate; the cultural ethnicity exhibited by diaspora Jews may replace religion, but does not do away with the importance of being Jewish for participants (Kivisto and Nefzger 1993). As Buckser

whose fault is being inappropriately Jewish. This is not a criticism of their methodology, since the UJIA survey was not seeking a representative sample of British Jews, but only the moderately engaged. 32 Brook (1989) and Alderman (1998) have earlier made the same points about the emptiness of British Jewish culture, though more forcefully.
points out in the case of Denmark, such ‘lenient’ cultural Judaism has been far more successful than the ‘true path’ demanded by the more strictly Orthodox at maintaining the continuity of an open non-ghettoised group interpenetrated by ambient culture, such as Jews in Europe are (2000: 728-9). Social scientists used to studying communities as spatially contained may be uncomfortable with this fact, and perhaps their discomfort also derives from the discursive authenticity still accorded to Orthodox religious practices within the Jewish field. However discomfort is not analysis.

Likewise, middle class Anglo-Jewish culture may well be stiflingly dull for some young (and old) Jews, but like much bourgeois culture, its vacuity does not prevent it from providing a stable identity. Nevertheless, negative narratives of the Jewish community as declining and dividing are rampant, and to a large extent are supported by data. I next examine the trends within the Jewish field which leads to such narratives before moving onto the ‘renewal’ narratives supported by new trends in the Jewish field.

Narratives of decline and division

There has been a persistent and increasing grumble of complaint that the Chief Rabbinate and the Board of Deputies are unrepresentative and ineffectual. These institutions are being buffeted by the winds of pluralism. (JPR 2000)

Scan the cultural pages of the Jewish Chronicle, and weep (Brook 1989: 413)

With the exception of Germany, the Jewish diaspora in Europe and the US is experiencing demographic contraction. In all Western countries the same patterns of assimilation, exogamy, and a reduced birth rate are leading to an aging and shrinking Jewish population (DellaPergola, Rehun, and Tolts 2005; Wasserstein 1997). In Britain, for example, over half of the Jewish population is over 50 compared with a British average of 33% (Schmool, 2004: xxii). Despite net immigration, British Jewry has declined from over 400,000 mid-twentieth century to less than 300,000 now. As the diagram overleaf shows, the preponderance of London is even more marked now than before, with the collapse of previous Jewish centres such as Leeds and Glasgow, and the severe decline of the numbers of Manchester Jews.
Data from Scotland indicates that this decline is as much due to Jews abandoning their Jewishness as any other reason. There, 24% of those who reported being brought up Jewish did not report they were currently Jewish (Graham 2004: 24). This was somewhat offset by the 12% of Jews who were not born Jewish, indicating whatever the claims about ethnic continuity, that the Jewish field is characterised by joiners and leavers. Yet what has appeared to worry British Jews is less the ‘vanishing diaspora’ thesis of Wasserstein (1997), than the disintegration of their community, to the extent that one can no longer realistically utter the phrase ‘the Jewish community’. There are four trends one can speak of – the collapse of Central Orthodoxy, growing secularisation, demographic divergence, and cultural collapse of community.

Firstly religious practice: the last 50 years has been characterised by a hollowing out of previous hegemonic Central (or mainstream) Orthodoxy. 33 Central Orthodoxy has slumped from a position of complete dominance among British Jewry. While at one stage – between 1921 and 1940 - 98.6 per cent of Jewish marriages took place in their synagogues (JPR 2000), now barely above half of all religiously affiliated Jewish households belong to Central Orthodox synagogues, as the table below shows.

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33 In the often confusing labels attached to various forms of Judaism, I follow the terminology used by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research
Table 1. Membership (households) and relative memberships in all synagogue groups: 1990 and 2005/6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of households 1990</th>
<th>% of all affiliated households 1990</th>
<th>Number of households 2005/6</th>
<th>% of all affiliated households 2005/6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream/Central Orthodox (divided between United and smaller Federation affiliations)</td>
<td>67,300</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>46,330</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive (divided between Reform and Liberal affiliations)</td>
<td>24,430</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23,430</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strictly Orthodox (official name: Union of Orthodox. Also called ultra-Orthodox, Haredi)</td>
<td>5,810</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sephardi</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masorti (conservative)</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>102,030</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>83,860</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Hart and Kafka (2006: 22)

Other surveys confirm this data, showing a rapidly declining synagogue membership among the mainstream Orthodox, increase among the strictly Orthodox, and maintenance among Progressive (Schmool and Cohen 2002). In addition, only 70% of those who identify as Jewish belong to synagogues in the first place, which indicates that far less than 50% of Jews are actually Central Orthodox (Hart and Kafka 2006).

Beyond this polarisation to the left and right, there has been a clear trend towards secularisation, decline in synagogue attendance, and practices of everyday Jewishness especially among younger Jews (JPR 2003; Miller 1996; Miller, Schmool, and Lerman 1996). Miller refers to the type of Jewishness of an earlier generation as ‘behavioural ethnicity’ and contrasts it to a more modern privatised ‘mental ethnicity’ (Miller 2003). This is posed as a problem for Jewish continuity since ‘feeling Jewish’ isn’t considered a sufficient
predicator for continuity. While this model is (as indicated above) deeply questionable, it remains a central part of the narrative of decline.

However, the demographic data accumulated over the last decade speaks strongly of the attenuation of traditional communal structures. There are two aspects to this. Firstly the fact that Jewish people are less likely than the ambient population to live in familial settings and that atomisation and ‘inter-cohabitation’ with non-Jews is increasing (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007). Apart from this disintegration of the familial structure that sustained Jewish life, the second issue is the clear fracturing between sections of the field. The collapse of the traditional family is emphatically not the norm for an important and growing section of the Jewish population – the strictly Orthodox. This group was not simply different from other Jews, but diverging.

The JPR report concludes:

Yet, the Census data present a paradox. While on the one hand they allow us to look at the entire Jewish population as a single group, they reveal that no single group actually exists; rather, it is a collection of multiple subgroups defined in myriad ways. The Census delineates the extent of the variation within this population. Whether one looks at location, age, nationality or any other marker, there is no single ‘Jewish community’ but a complex array of overlapping tiers (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007: 100)

It may be tempting to refer to Jewish communities, rather than ‘the Jewish community’, were it not for the fact that they contend over the same symbolic capital, and except perhaps for the strictly Orthodox, the disaggregation of Anglo-Jewry is mirrored in smaller groupings too.

In addition, one significant section of Jews in Britain are so excluded from Jewish events that they do not even figure in JPR or Board of Deputy surveys of the Jewish population. This is the tens of thousands of Israelis living in Britain, mostly London. While the US has seen a certain ‘Israelification’ of the Jewish field, owing to the half million or more Israelis there, it does not seem a similar process has occurred in Britain yet: a recent survey showed an extraordinarily high degree of alienation, with only 2% of Israelis in London saying that they felt that they belonged to the same community as British Jews (Rocker 2008). Such a finding reflects traditional Israeli disdain for the diaspora, and needs to be taken with a drop of caution. Israelis often interact quite heavily with the Jewish field by trading their cultural capital and through other business contacts. In addition, Israeli expatriate parents are more likely than local Jews to send their children to Jewish day schools and teach in these schools.
Nevertheless the feeling of detachment is real and extends beyond the traditional discomfort secular Israelis abroad feel at taking part in diaspora events centred on the synagogue. As a member of Jewdas admitted to me, very few Israelis go to their alternative cultural events, let alone are involved in organising them.

As feelings of decline and polarisation have grown, so have attacks on the existing institutions of Jewish life, considered as ineffective, unrepresentative and often plain damaging to the health of Jewish life. These attacks are important since they give space for alternatives to develop, and they should be linked to grumblings about the cultural philistinism of Anglo-Jewry, a complaint that goes beyond the thought that Anglo-Jewish culture is not interesting, to embrace the idea that it is somehow not really Jewish.

In terms of institutions, most criticism is vented at the Board of Deputies. Indeed one can almost talk of ‘Attack the Board of Deputies’ as being a popular parlour game among British Jews. This is most entertainingly done in Stephen Brook’s journalistic account of one of their board meetings (Brook 1989: 214-17). In this account a Dickensian picture is painted of the Board as doddery, out-of-touch, figures of fun. Alderman, writing a decade later, praises Brook’s treatment, arguing that the Board was even more irrelevant in the 1990s. He claimed that power has further shifted into the hands of the ‘funding fathers’; a few wealthy benefactors who became the effective bosses of Anglo-Jewry by financially underwriting communal activities (Alderman 1998: 386). In 2003 they formed the Jewish Leadership Council in frustration with the ineffectiveness of the Board of Deputies, creating yet another unrepresentative centralised national Jewish body (Lerman 2008c). Whatever of the irrelevance of the Board of Deputies, in that it purports to speak on behalf of ‘the Jews’ publicly it is a natural target. Criticism of the Board can be seen as a means of staking one’s position in the Anglo Jewish field, with each attack containing a prescription of what the community ought to be like.

British Jews do not content themselves with condemning the institutions of Anglo-Jewry, the very nature of the community has been long subject to attack. One sees the lineaments of this criticism clearly in Stephen Brook’s book The Club. While trying to remain sympathetic, his frustration with British Jewry often breaks out - he damns it for its ‘cautious gentility’, its philistinism, intolerance and self-regarding traits (Brook 1989). Nor is this criticism of communal culture confined to the left – advancing from the right, Geoffrey Alderman
recently nailed his colours to the mast with an article entitled ‘Anglo-Jewry hates intellectuals’ (Alderman 2008).

This is a theme which many of my interviewees referred to, or more dammingly, held as self-evident. Some – descendents of European Jewish refugees from Nazism – didn’t consider themselves connected with the British Jewish community, seen as epitomising the dullness and parochialism of British middle-class values, rather than authentic Jewish ones. These bourgeois self-interested British Jews were summed up with a phrase used by several of my respondents: ‘North London Jews’. This expression was used to sum up the uninteresting, anti-intellectual, parochial culture seen as prevalent among Anglo-Jewry, a culture concerned with status and material goods rather than Jewish values. Such a culture was seen as a reflection of the worst type of middle-class Britishness, and as such this criticism fits very much into a particular criticism of assimilationism – that in trying to emulate the dominant culture, one only succeeds in constructing a parody of it and of oneself (Fanon 1986; Sartre 1976 [1946]). Describing her experience among the middle-class Jewish matrons at Jewish book week, one interviewee said:

I didn’t know that intellectual was a dirty word amongst Jews, and they were using it as a dirty word. They were basically saying, ‘oh we’ve got no time.’ […] I mean they had no respect for learning!

‘No respect for learning!’, among humanistic European Jews is the equivalent of an Orthodox Jew accusing another of eating a ham sandwich in synagogue, and indicates that what one does with such accusations is not simply place oneself as someone with respect for learning, but also as someone Jewish. This is a significant aspect of the ‘philistine’ narrative – that by distancing themselves from this vacuous mainstream culture, narrators were laying claims to a form of Jewish authenticity, (re)claiming the tradition of Jews as cosmopolitan and intellectual.

**Distance, detachment, disillusionment? Anglo-Jewry and Israel**

Turning from growing criticisms of Anglo-Jewish institutions and culture to Israel, the 2004 UJIA survey quoted above notes a high level of attachment of respondents to Israel, combined with disagreement with Israeli policies (Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004: 44, 48). Such divided psyches are not new; Brook in the 1980s paints a picture of the field consisting
of bien-pensent diaspora Jews nobly criticising Israel because they love it so much. However there has been a growing diaspora distancing from Israel. The changing opinions of diaspora Jews on both sides of the Atlantic has been tracked through a slew of surveys and articles over the last decade and more, showing that Jews, especially younger ones, are simply less interested in Israel, associating it increasingly with the Occupation and a modality of being different to their own (Sheffer 1999; Rothenberg 1998; Waxman 1996, 1999; Goldberg 2006; Liphshiz 2007; Schweid 1994; Cohen and Kelman 2007). The key study in Britain was the 1997 postal survey of 2,194 Jews which found that ‘probable trends’ included declining support for Israeli charities, Zionism becoming ideologically irrelevant, Israel as having ‘diminishing centrality’ and being ‘a source of communal division’ – predictions which by-and-large have come to pass (Kosmin, Lerman, and Goldberg 1997: 20).

It is no mystery to explain this development; it is a reflection of the diverging life experiences between diaspora Jews and Israelis, combined with diaspora Jews reflecting the ambient population’s growing disenchantment with Israel. European Jews do not live in ghettos anymore and as Liebman says ‘in no instance does one find patterns of behaviour among Jews that differ markedly from patterns found in the general society’ (Liebman 2003: 343). Similarly, Barry Kosmin (2003) describes British Jewish attitudes to social questions as being essentially mainstream. Zionists may rage that Jewish critics of Israel are ‘in step with the best opinion’ (Julius 2008) but they can’t deny the centrality of being so for diaspora Jewry.

The practical outcome of such distancing has been declining migration and donations to Israel. Migration first: according to Israeli statistics there was a gradual increase of British emigrants to Israel up to the 1980s where it stood at about 700 per annum (CBS 2008b). Though a small figure, this declined even further, a trend which mirrors that of other western European countries, Canada and the US. In the period from 2000, less than 350 British people (presumably Jews) emigrated to Israel per annum.

As for donations, diaspora Zionism has been characterised by ‘the blue box on the mantelpiece’, the blue box being the donation box of the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Putting money in the blue box meant contributing towards the planting of trees and the ‘redemption’ of the land of Israel in an unproblematic way. It meant seeing Israel as a charity and

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34 This is not to deny the JNF’s enthusiastic participation in ethnic cleansing (Abu-Sitta 2005; Pappe 2006b), simply to say that this was not acknowledged as an issue by British Zionists. I have analysed similar practices of donations in the case of Ireland, including publicly gifting JNF trees for barmitzvahs (Landy 2005).
granting the self a connection with the state and the Land of Israel. Such contributions have markedly declined, partly because of the greater need an aging group of people has to provide social services for itself (JPR 2003), but also because Israel is no longer something to be unproblematically supported.

It is important not to exaggerate this distancing, or rather to contextualise it. Zionist institutions can still get thousands of Jews to march in support of Israel and its wars. Yet even here their mobilisation capacities have diminished. In 2002 they were able to organise 30-35,000 people to support the invasion of the West Bank (Josephs 2002). In 2006 they were only able to get 7-10,000 out in defence of invading Lebanon, still a very large figure, but a diminishing one (Evening Standard 2006). And in January 2009, only about 5,000 Zionists were to be found to demonstrate in support of the attack on Gaza (Paul 2009). What is crucial is less the absolute numbers than the decline. And in any case my argument is not that most Jews aren’t ‘really’ Zionist – this would be untrue. It is rather that the segmentation of the field and the growing acceptability of criticising Israel among certain segments of the field has led to a condition whereby Israel-critical Jewish groups can establish themselves.

**Narratives of alternatives and European revival**

This growing disillusion with the traditional poles of Jewish identity, Zionism included, has led to a more recent narrative to that of division and decline, a narrative of European Jewish revival. Here, I look at this narrative of Jewish revival and how it ties in with the anti-Zionist diasporist discourses which influence this movement.

The idea of a Jewish revival – of newly-confident, secular diaspora Jews creating pluralistic spaces of activity through which they can practice their cultural Judaism - is not simply a European conceit. In the US, Cohen and Kelman talk of the growing phenomenon of ‘self-confident, de-institutional, culturally based organizing from record labels, to new forms of

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35 This smaller figure was also partly because the rally was not in Central London, but at a Jewish school in North London.
36 In 2008, some 10-20,000 (official figures 30,000) attended the ‘Salute to Israel’ parade. This does not go against the narrative of declining Zionism, since unlike the previous two marches, it had several factors to encourage turnout - about a year and hundreds of thousands of pounds spent in promoting the event (Barkat 2008), a relatively uncontroversial topic (not ‘Support the bombing of Lebanon’), and a carnival ethos where families were encouraged to attend. That only 10-20,000 participated in this festival of Zionism-lite is yet another sign of vibrant but declining Zionism among Jews.
synagogue, using festivals, books, and films to build a vibrant Jewish life, created by and for young Jews examining identity, community, and meaning on their own terms’ (2008: 4). This trend is significant to my research, because the corollary of many of my respondents’ negativity towards the existing Jewish community was a belief in the possibility of an alternative revival that they were part of. While this was not a universal belief, certainly some of my interviewees were centrally motivated in their actions by an attempt to reconstruct an alternative European Jewish identity.

This Jewish revival may well be more a matter of reclassifying existing practices of cultural ethnicity as ‘Jewish’ rather than a revival of Jewish religious practices (Graham 2004). Nevertheless the reclassifying is significant and one can begin to speak – still very tentatively – of the concept of a pan-European diasporic Jewishness unfolding in tandem with the EU project for a European identity. Such an identity – only possible after 1989 in any case – has had to contend with a dominant US Jewish and Israeli stigmatisation of Europe as the graveyard of the Jews (Pinto 2000).

A European Jewish identity expresses the idea that Jews possess a pan-European Jewish culture and belong in Europe and that, as Stephen Beller’s tongue-in-cheek-article title has it, Europe is good for the Jews (Beller 2008). More than this, the transnational pluralist, democratic structures established through the EU are held to correspond to the Jewish project – that Europe’s liberal pluralism is ‘a Jewish version of the world’ (Beller 2008: 8). Ignoring whether ‘Europe’ (or the Jews) are actually pluralist, the corresponding axiom is that Jews should celebrate their European identity and recalibrate their politics accordingly. Rather than an insular and ‘backward-looking agenda’ concentrating on antisemitism and defence of Israel (Lerman 2008a), they should embrace ‘the new, inclusive and pluralist character of early twenty-first century Europe’ (Beller 2008: 2). Such contemporary European Jewish identity is still at best nascent, expressed by intellectuals urging fellow Jews to think this way while noting sadly that they don’t. Nick Lambert (2008) characterises Jewish community leaders as being stuck in old style ghetto mentalities and Holocaust narratology. Rather than embrace their European identity, they are content, in his phrase, to observe the EU project from an upstairs window. Even those of my interviewees who consider themselves European Jews admitted that this identity has not truly moved onto a practical level.

Nonetheless, a specific concept of European Jewish identity provides Jewish Israel-critical groups with the ability to think of themselves in transnational terms, always an important
aspect of (re)claiming Jewish identity. While most British Jews still exist within the
Anglophone, there have been attempts by Jewish Israel-critical groups, through such engines
as European Jews for a Just Peace (EJJP), and more recently International Jewish Anti-
Zionist Network (IJAN) to create pan-European Jewish institutions in which to operate.
While this movement, like other transnational actors primarily works in the domestic sphere
such transnational vehicles are considered important (Imig and Tarrow 2001). This is partly
due to practical concerns – the importance of the EU for political lobbying – and partly
because narrations about their European-ness can be used to highlight their Jewish
cosmopolitanism as opposed to the parochial (i.e. not particularly Jewish) quality of Zionist
Jews.

Such calls to European identity, like the main thrust of diasporist identity calls, are
necessarily placed in opposition to Zionist identification. Even a supporter of Israel like
Diane Pinto recognises the corrosive effect of Zionism on efforts to build up a transnational
European Jewish identity and argues: ‘Constructing a European Jewish identity implies above
all abolishing the new pecking order within European Jewry’ which gives the highest status
to Zionists (2000: 181). Pinto sees such work as necessitating a re-entry into the ‘lost world
of humanistic European Jewry supposedly killed at Auschwitz’ (2000: 181). While she
portrays such a venture as a ‘major challenge’, for younger Jews, this may be less a challenge
and more a matter of commonsense – of acknowledging their lived realities rather than living
within their grandparents’ fears (Aviv and Shneer 2005).

Beller is even clearer about the contradictions between European Jewish identity claims and
Zionism. He talks of the disjuncture between European pluralism and Israeli reality:

This leaves Jews in the Diaspora, and particularly European Jews, in a
potentially awkward position. Their embrace of and participation in the
pluralist European project might appear to be at odds with their support for
what at time [sic] appears an ethnonational state practicing in often crude
ways the exclusivist logic that was such anathema and a mortal threat to Jews
in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century (Beller 2008: 10).

The concept of European Jewishness can also create a more positive sense of identity than
diaspora Jewishness, since some see the latter term as being tainted by diaspora’s tendency to
stress the primacy of the originary homeland, which in this case means privileging Israeli and
Zionist claims:
Politically and intellectually, we want to move beyond diaspora, a term that implies a single center to the Jewish world, a sense of exile on the part of those Jews who live elsewhere, and homogenous Jewish populations within Israel and outside of it. Rather than refer to Jews as ‘in Israel’ or “in the diaspora” we refer to new Jews as “global” and break down the inherent dichotomy that the Israel/diaspora metaphor maintains (Aviv and Shneer 2005: 30)

While others would accord a more positive spin on the word ‘diaspora’, this is very much a family argument. The central aim of those who valorise diasporic identity and those who prefer to use the term, ‘global Jews’ are the same, to decentre Israel and replace Zionism as a focal point for Jews. This resonates with earlier writings (and antisemitic beliefs) about Jews as ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ (Mosse 1966). This argument has practical purchase among British Jews which I examine in chapter six; here I have tried to show that such challenges to the Jewish establishment are part and parcel of a wider alternative Jewish revival, a project which is itself in tune with growing diaspora distance from Israel and current institutions.

Returning to the overall situation, I have painted a picture of the field where no institutions are hegemonic; far from it, there is widespread disillusion with established Zionist communal structures as evinced by the passionate criticisms of them and the ongoing withdrawal of Jews from ‘communal’ life, as well as efforts to set up new structures. It is a field increasingly subjected to strain and ‘polarisation’, firstly on the religious plane where increasingly secularised Jews forge new structures and practices of Jewishness, while a growing fundamentalist section turns away in a radically different direction. It is also divided politically on the question of Israel since there has been a collapse in consensual support for Zionism. In this fragmentation, increasing numbers of Jews, in concurrence with growing ambient disillusion with Israel, distance themselves from Israel, as shown by surveys and the more practical withdrawal of funding from and migration to Israel. Disenchantment with Israel can also be seen in the attempts to find meaning within a pan-European condition of diaspora Jewish existence.

Against this background, the wonder would be if Jewish groups criticising Israel didn’t exist, rather than having to explain their existence. And yet disillusion and disidentification do not necessarily lead to movements for change but often to withdrawal. This background explains the conditions whereby Jewish criticism of Israel has sprung up; it also, to some degree, anticipates its direction. It does not however, explain its actual origin and the sparks that led
such an opposition to exist. This is what I do in the next section, tracing the most important points of this movement as a background to analysing its workings in the following chapters.

Recent history of Israel-critical Jewish activity in Britain
Below I outline a brief history of the movement from its inception after September 2000 (start of the second intifada) to January 2009 (Israeli re-invasion of Gaza). I first sketch how Jewish Israel-critical groups have developed, then compare the activities of two groups within the movement – Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP) and Jews for Boycotting Israeli Goods (J-BIG). I then examine the major trends, which I identify as processes of diversification, expansion, radicalisation, and institutionalisation of the movement.

In 2000, there was no British Jewish group dedicated to opposing Israel. This was not a Jewish anomaly. Ambient British society was similarly uninvolved, as evidenced by the dormancy of the PSC at the time. The only British Jewish groups in any way critical were the Jewish Socialists’ Group (JSG), much more active on issues related to refugees than the Middle East, and British branches of critical Israeli organisations such as Meretz UK and Peace Now UK (PNUK). These are support groups for Israeli groups, the left-wing Meretz party and the Peace Now organisation, which favours two states and criticises aspects of the Occupation.

The outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000 changed this lack of activity. In direct response, Just Peace UK (JPUK) was set up at a meeting of fourteen activists on 29 October 2000, as an umbrella group of mainly Jewish groups and activists (Message 9, Just Peace UK list, 7 November 2000). Although not nominally Jewish, it had a largely Jewish membership and started organising public meetings, discussions and interventions in the Jewish and wider world. JPUK also included many left-wing Israelis in Britain who, with the subsequent decline of the group, became somewhat less visible in the growing movement.

In early 2002, following a trip to Israel/Palestine organised by Faculty For Israeli-Palestinian Peace (FFIPP), Irene Bruegel returned to England determined to found a group to tackle the issue (Message 3071, Just Peace UK list, 13 February 2002). She did not go through JPUK because she wanted a group more directly engaged with the Jewish community. As one member of JPUK averred in interview, ‘While Just Peace was in full-flow, Irene Bruegel
went on a trip to Palestine, came back, came to a Just Peace meeting, stood up and announced she was going to found another organisation to tackle the Jewish community’. However, there was some disagreement among interviewees about this, with one asserting that when JfJfP was first set up, it was far less interested in appealing to the mainstream Jewish community than it subsequently became.

The group Irene Bruegel established, following a meeting on 17 February 2002, was called Jews for Justice for Palestinians, a name which aroused continuing controversy within the group itself for containing the word ‘Palestinians’ (for instance: JfJfP mailout, 5 September 2003. JfJfP minutes, 16 November 2003). This early controversy over the name and the various efforts to change it in order to appeal to the community indicates that certainly some within JfJfP believed that such an appeal was the group’s main task, and that mentioning Palestinians was a bad tactic in achieving this end. Partly due to Bruegel’s organisational and political skills, JfJfP soon became the largest group in the field, supplanting JPUK. The latter became an internet group with several hundred members, whose main work would be the dissemination of information about events in Britain, and about Israel/Palestine. While there may have been some initial resentment about the new group, JPUK and JfJfP soon began to work together, producing a joint leaflet for a March 2002 vigil and a joint Pesach (Passover) advert for the Jewish Chronicle in April 2002 (http://www.jfjfp.org/archive.htm and message 3561, Just Peace UK list, 24 March 2002). This was followed by work on a number of other projects, including a refusenik speaking tour in late 2002.  

JfJfP also worked in occasional association with JSG, which was becoming more active on the issue in response to a worsening of the Occupation regime after the Israeli re-invasion of the West Bank in April 2002. JSG, oriented around Yiddish culture and traditional Jewish leftism, continued to host debates and attend protests on Israel/Palestine throughout this period. Another partner for JfJfP has been Joint Action for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (JAIPP), a small dialogue group established in 2001, which also engages in joint lobbying and public meetings. On the other hand, leftist Zionist groups such as PNUK and Meretz UK refused to work with the new groups (JfJfP AGM report, April 2004-5). Paul Usiskin (later to focus on opposing the Boycott Israel campaign) had taken control of PNUK and, in tandem with its parent body in Israel, began shifting PNUK to the right and stressing its Zionism as the

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37 Refuseniks are Israeli Jews, usually male and Ashkenazi, who refuse to serve in the Israeli army for political reasons. Some are jailed and all face subsequent ostracism by many Israeli institutions. Their relation to this movement is discussed in chapter seven.
second intifada gathered pace. PNUK’s refusal to work with JfJfP indicates how this organisation, like JPUK, faced initial rejection by even the liberal elements of the official community. On the other hand this unabashed communal Zionism assisted JfJfP growth. The large pro-Israel rally organised by the Board of Deputies on 6 May 2002 in support of Israel’s invasion of the West Bank was cited by several interviewees as a catalyst that galvanised them into becoming involved in opposing Zionism.

JfJfP’s aims - shared by all the groups I am studying – were to encourage Jewish people to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict orientated around justice for Palestinians, and to get ambient society to recognise and support Jewish and Israeli opposition to Israel’s policies. Breaking the facile link between Israel and Jews served the dual purpose of helping undermine pro-Israel propaganda and challenging antisemitic tendencies in society - particular any within the Palestine DIM. The refusenik tours that JfJfP organised throughout 2002-4 encapsulated all aspects of their philosophy. Through these tours they promoted and fundraised for Israeli left groups 38, showed the wider world that Israelis and Jews were active in opposing the occupation, and (with limited success) tried to direct these speaking engagements towards other Jews through trying to arrange refuseniks to talk in synagogues (JfJfP mailout, 24 October 2004).

On the more radical front, the small group Jews Against Zionism (JAZ) was formed in this period by long-established anti-Zionists. Offering a more fundamental critique of Israel, this group organised some activities and meetings on the same principle of informing the world of the existence and relevance of secular anti-Zionism, and issuing a challenge to Israel and Zionist claims to represent ‘the Jews’ (http://www.freewebs.com/jewsagainstzionism/index.htm). However, ideological quarrels and discussions took up much of their time and led to a form of activist purism which hampered their activities and outreach work.

From 2005 or 2006 there was a downturn in activism as a result of the length of the conflict, the slow consolidation of the re-militarised occupation regime in the West Bank, and the emergence of Hamas as the most popular party in the Occupied Territories. 39 This, again,

38 Refusenik groups fundraised for included Yesh Gvul (JfJfP Minutes 8 December 2002), and the ‘Refusenik Hardship Fund’ (JfJfP mailouts 14 March 2004 and 19 April 2004)
39 In January 2006, Hamas was victorious in the parliamentary elections for the Palestinian Authority, nominal representative of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, winning 76 of the 132 seats in the chamber, while Fatah won 43.
was a general development, not specific to Jewish groups. The emergence of Hamas had a two-fold effect; firstly alienating the mainly secular left-liberal activists involved in these groups. Secondly the developing Palestinian civil war which resulted from Fatah, Israel and the West’s refusal to accept Hamas’s democratic mandate further disenchanted and confused activists. One can trace the decline of activism by comparing the new signatories of the JfJfP founding statement throughout this period.

Table 2. JfJfP signatories. 2002-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New JfJfP signatories</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>c450-500</td>
<td>Extrapolated in 2007 from total signatories. Since some signatories have died and others have signed off, the actual number can’t be precisely estimated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>136 in last three months – after a successful recruitment drive to bring the number of signatories over 1,000. This illustrates the organisational culture within the group, its focus on building itself up and setting realistic targets to fulfill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>40 in first three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>121 in July and August. The invasion of Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Spread throughout the year – i.e. not in response to Gaza invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Till June 2009</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>123 in January. The invasion of Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SIGNATORIES end June 2009</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from [http://www.jfjfp.org/signatories.htm](http://www.jfjfp.org/signatories.htm) and [http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=391](http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=391)

As one can see from the spike in signatories in the above table, the Lebanon war in July 2006, combined with a pro-war Zionist demonstration in North London, provoked a fresh upsurge in activism. However, unlike 2002, JfJfP was not so well-positioned to capitalise on the outrage against the war and was criticised from both right and left. While JfJfP had succeeded largely in its mission to get Jewish opposition to the war acknowledged in the Palestine DIM, it had proved less successful in ‘outreach’ work to the community, either in attracting new members or becoming accepted by them, and was considered by some to have been too compromised by its growing links with pro-Palestinian activists. For instance its statement on
the Lebanon war was (perhaps deliberately) misunderstood to mean that JfJfP found antisemitism understandable. 40

Events in 2007 worked to weaken JfJfP’s dominance and at the same time to broaden the movement field. This feeling that existing groups failed to reach out to mainstream Jews - a reason, one should recall, behind JfJfP’s founding - was also behind the founding of the new group Independent Jewish Voices (IJV) in February 2007. This was established as a reaction to the war in Lebanon, and more particularly, as Jacqueline Rose declared, a reaction to Prime Minister’s Olmert’s declaration that this was ‘a war fought by all the Jews’ (Rose 2007). Its origins could not have been more auspicious – possessing a leadership of prominent and articulate British Jews and in receipt of a vast amount of media coverage, it garnered impressive initial interest. 41 IJV’s main purpose was more to establish that many British Jews disagreed with established communal Zionism than to be directly involved in the situation of Israel/Palestine.

However, the group failed to establish much traction and soon ran into the same problems as JfJfP – failing to reach out to the community and being perceived as one-sided. This led some to abandon this initiative at the first hurdle (Kahn-Harris 2007a). In addition, the leading members of IJV, either lacking the skills or simply unwilling to engage in political organising to the same extent as JfJfP, did surprisingly little in their first year of operation. IJV organised some public meetings on innocuous topics such as ‘Israel, the Occupied Territories & International Law’, and wrote several articles, but did little else (http://jewishvoices.squarespace.com/intlaw/). In 2008 IJV increased activities, publishing a book (Karpf et al. 2008), and competing on the same terrain of activities as other Israel-critical groups by taking part in protests and public criticism of Israel. By June 2009, IJV’s statement had 634 signatories, a number which included some overlap with other groups. 42

Perhaps more interesting than the formation of this other national group to represent Israel-critical Jews was the establishment of Jewdas and Jews for Boycotting Israeli Goods. The former group is not a direct Israel-critical one, but rather a radical cultural


41 For instance there were no fewer than 23 (mostly favourable) articles about the group at the Comment is Free site in the Guardian (Various 2007). For a fairly comprehensive list of the coverage the group has received: http://jewishvoices.squarespace.com/coverage/

42 For instance, in July 2009, of the first 100 IJV signatories, listed alphabetically, 37 of them are also JfJfP signatories. http://jewishvoices.squarespace.com/signatories/ and http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=9
organisation/movement, whose slogan is ‘radical voices for the alternative diaspora’ (http://www.jewdas.org/). Its first event was in March 2006 where it organised a PunkPurim, and since then has organised many alternative cultural events in London which include a dose of Israel-critical activity and commentary. Its events and website use satire and cultural commentary to offer an alternative to what its organisers see as the established hypocrisies of the community, whether they be the desire to ‘pass’ as non-Jews, or the unequivocal support for Israel. Jewdas’s actions are centrally situated within the Jewish revival and diasporist narratives, with criticism of Israel and the promotion of an alternative diasporist identity being a growing thread in its productions (Jewdas 2008b, 2008a; ‘Trotsky’ 2008). Its most audacious and controversial action to date was in January 2009 when it distributed a mass email, purportedly from the Board of Deputies that sowed confusion among British Jews by declaring the upcoming pro-Gaza war rally to be cancelled and that the Board of Deputies would instead issue calls for a ceasefire (BBC 2009). Jewdas’s culture-jamming activities may be the most successful attempt at bringing criticism home to the community, partly because it is not constituted as a bloc with a fixed attackable manifesto and partly because it stays firmly within the Jewish sphere rather than seeking to represent Jews to the outside world.

Equally radical, but more overtly political is Jews for Boycotting Israeli Goods (J-BIG), established in the same month as IJV, February 2007. To some extent a breakaway from JfJfP, it was set up by activists who had grown impatient with what they perceived as the latter’s stagnation due to its wish to maintain consensus among members. J-BIG was soon joined by members of JAZ and other non-aligned activists. Stressing on-the-streets type of action, it focused on marches and pickets rather than public meetings and lobbying and has grown rapidly. Below I review the type of work it does and compare it with JfJfP, which remains the largest group within the field.

The most recent group is the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN), whose establishment was heralded by a public meeting in London on 24 October 2008 (IJAN 2008). By origins a US group and with ambitions to establish itself across Europe, its first outing in England was in the protests against the invasion of Gaza in January 2009, although members have been active within other groups as well. In terms of activism, IJAN wishes to become

43 Purim is a Jewish festival celebrating the deliverance of Jews in the ancient Persian empire from a plot to kill them.
involved in the boycott campaign, but more generally to set itself up as an anti-Zionist pole of Jewish resistance to Israel as an alternative to the existing centre of Israel-critical activity around JFJP and IJV (and in a European context, European Jews for a Just Peace).

Two groups compared: JFJP and J-BIG
This historical overview illustrates how these groups have evolved and their positions, but not what they do on a day-to-day basis. To do so I take the groups JFJP and J-BIG as example. These are active groups that have a lot in common, most notably sharing an overlap in membership, as well as similar broad aims. However, there are clear strategic and tactical differences which led to the formation of two separate groups. By investigating the activities of the two groups we can see a wide range of strategies and actions deployed by those within the movement.

Taking JFJP first, I assess its activities by examining its archives over the last seven years: both minutes and their online archive at http://www.jffp.org/archive.htm. Though the online archive is incomplete and only hints at the full range of its activities, it remains a useful thumbnail sketch of the type of activities the group undertakes. The archive reveals an impressive quantity, quality and diversity of activity, with 40 public actions listed between 2002 and January 2009. A large part of these activities, as with other groups is the straightforward support for other actions that support Palestinians, indicating how it has been unconsciously influenced by Palestine DIM discourse. In the early years of JFJP there were lively arguments as to whether it would be in any way involved in Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) actions, with some members expressing extreme hostility to PSC (for example: JFJP mailout 17 May 2003), something that has largely died down in recent years. The activists’ growing comfort in taking part in some PSC actions does not indicate unconditional approval of the PSC, but rather growing comfort at opposing Israel, and perhaps a sense that they are now autonomous enough from the PSC to be comfortable about associating with it.

Collaboration with British-based, Israeli and Palestinian groups is important. Of the 40 listed activities, JFJP only carried out 15 on its own, with many of these lone acts being as minor as issuing statements and positions. The majority of actions were undertaken with other British Jewish groups (7), with Palestine DIM groups (11) or with Israeli (8) and/or Palestinian
Different partners entailed different types of collaboration. So, collaboration with Israeli groups invariably promoted the Israeli group, whether it was the extensively organised refusenik tours, or the advert on 15 December 2006 in the *Jewish Chronicle* advertising the existence and websites of leftwing Israeli groups (http://domain1713663.sites.fasthosts.com/archive.htm). With Palestinian groups the actions were more commonly charitable donations. With British Jewish groups, there was quite close collaboration and attempts to build coalitions with European Jewish groups, such as issuing joint statements, or jointly organising events. In contrast, work with Palestine DIM groups was usually more distant, such as going along to demonstrations, rather than co-organising them. This changed somewhat with the Enough! Coalition of 2007 in which JfJfP was a fully involved member.

The range of JfJfP’s repertoire of contention is impressive. It has engaged in the usual social movement activities – participating in protests, organising public meetings and petitions. Protests were commonly undertaken with other groups (10) but sometimes in closer cooperation with specifically Jewish groups. The targets in the action were commonly wider society/the government, but occasionally specific Zionist and Jewish targets, such as a protest in the strongly Jewish residential area of Golders Green (2 November 2003) or the protest against an IDF (Israel Defence Force, the Israeli army) dance show organised by the Zionist Federation (28 April 2009).

As for public meetings, by far the most common types of meetings were promoting Israelis, especially refuseniks, and occasionally Palestinians. In this, it mirrors the PSC repertoire which customarily promotes Palestinians and ‘good Israelis’ from the region, to give itself and these groups legitimacy, as well as the exoticism and expertise/experience of the speaker being a means to attract an audience. Other activities include lobbying activities, often organised in collaboration with JAIPP, and into which JfJfP has invested a lot of effort (for example: JfJfP minutes, 23 March 2003; Annual Report April 2004-5; JfJfP mailout, 6 October 2005). While there are efforts to meet with diplomats and lobbying activities occurring on the European level, with EJJP; the main lobbying activity is directed at British politicians.

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44 The reason for the number adding up to over 40 is some overlap – for instance almost all actions organised with Palestinian groups also involved Israeli ones
45 This was a coalition of over forty groups, including Amnesty and War on Want established in 2007 to bring groups together to protest the 40th anniversary of the Israeli occupation.
An interesting part of its repertoire is the use of public letters or advertisements, sent equally to the Jewish press (*Jewish Chronicle*) and the national ones (*Times* and *Guardian*). A total of four ads/public letters were published in the *Jewish Chronicle* and five in national papers in six years. While this seems to be a classic expression of ‘expressive politics’ involving large numbers of Jews ‘coming out’ and ‘witnessing’ for their beliefs, it is also undertaken for expressively instrumentalist reasons, because these letters are seen as an effective means of attracting recruits and challenging Zionist hegemony among fellow Jews.

Turning to the actions of J-BIG; from February 2007 to June 2008 this group’s website lists 27 public activities ([http://www.bigcampaign.org/index.php?page=jbig](http://www.bigcampaign.org/index.php?page=jbig)). These range from sending a letter to Boots Pharmacy about their plans to buy more Israeli goods, to co-organising the protests outside Wembley stadium when the Israeli football team played there in September 2007. The amount of activities, no less than the type indicate the more confrontational, on-the-streets activist inclinations of the members which led participants to move away from JfJfP in the first place. The group was far more likely to directly confront Zionist and Israeli targets than JfJfP were. Twelve of the actions listed in this 17-month period were protests or pickets against targets like the JNF or Carmel Agrexco, Israel’s biggest fruit and vegetable exporter. The group has supported all aspects of the boycott through its actions - retail, academic, cultural – the one aspect it hasn’t concentrated on is divestment, possibly because this requires large-scale long-term campaigning, unfeasible for a small new group seeking to establish itself.

Ten of its activities were in issuing press releases, getting letters and articles published. These were directed at both Jewish (four cases) and non-Jewish media (six cases). This indicates that for all the confrontational approaches towards Zionist groups, this group has not abandoned the Jewish field. However it is more engaged with the wider pro-Palestinian field and indeed their slogan ‘It’s kosher to boycott Israeli goods’ is an attempt to provide legitimization to the pro-Palestinian boycott campaign. As indicator of this relationship, their webpage is hosted by the BIG (Boycott Israeli Goods) campaign, of which they see themselves as an integral part. In contrast and perhaps in reaction to JfJfP, most of J-BIG’s public actions are coordinated with and undertaken in tandem with non-Jewish Palestine DIM groups. Only once – JfJfP’s Bitter Herb’s campaign, calling for a labelling of settlement produce – has it worked solely with a Jewish group. Unsurprisingly, with its actions focused
firmly on affecting British consumer behaviour, J-BIG have not tried to develop links with groups in Palestine, still less with Israeli ones.

J-BIG doesn’t confine itself to boycott actions. Demonstrating the development of J-BIG’s corporate identity, members are comfortable in appearing under its banners at general pro-Palestinian demonstrations. In another interesting example, when Jenny Tonge of the Liberal Democrats was criticised in July 2008 by the Board of Deputies for her attack on Zionists and Israel, J-BIG rose to her defence, circulating a letter of support to the Jewish Chronicle, Board of Deputies and the Liberal Democrats, with 30 signatories (Message 23690, Just Peace UK list, 26 July 2008). This act also illustrates the prominence of the multi-signatory letter in this movement.

So what conclusions can we come to based on these empirical sketches? The dynamic and changing nature of the field, the multiplicity of groups and activities makes the history of British Israel-critical Jewish groups seem sometimes confusing. However, within this flux we can identify various broad trends which are sometimes complementary, sometimes in conflict – these are the diversification, expansion, radicalisation, and institutionalisation of the movement, trends which I examine below.

**Trends: expansion and diversification – not polarisation**

The first feature of this movement is its ongoing expansion. The expansion has happened less at the level of individual groups and more as a result of the formation of new groups. While a group like JfJfP has seen a continual gradual increase in the number of signatories, its 1500 signatories is a somewhat flattering portrayal of its actual strength. As with all social movement organisations the core of active members is considerably smaller and does not seem to have grown much since its formation. However, the small size of the groups in this movement should not blind us to the real expansion and development of Israel-critical activities they have enabled. The proliferation of groups indicates a diversification of activities over the last decade, allowing British Jews, particularly those based in London to engage with a variety of Israel-critical activity from public meetings with Israeli intellectuals to boycott pickets. Based on one of the key measures of a movement’s efficacy – whether it provides a comfortable home and means of mobilising for like-minded people, this

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46 For instance the numbers at its monthly meetings have not changed significantly since its establishment.
movement appears to have succeeded (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999). Along with diversification, there is also some convergence. Though various groups may have started from different positions they often experience goal drift and end up doing similar things (J-BIG commenting on the Board of Deputies, IJV marching against the war in Gaza). This is partly because of a similar political opportunity structure in a circumscribed field. It also indicates that what is at stake is externally given. Groups may wish to focus on Jewish identity, but often it is the Israel/Palestine crisis which guides and drives them.

If one uses the analogy of a home, the type of home provided by this movement is less a communal living space and more a house with many rooms. JfJfP conceived of itself as an ‘umbrella group’ rather than a ‘manifesto group’, a distinction which was adopted to ensure that JfJfP would become a broad church, able to represent different strands of opinion and different types of activity. Being an umbrella group was also JPUK’s original raison d’etre. However, the umbrella concept seems to have been more effectively realised by the plurality of groups that have emerged. The organisational forms of the counter-globalisation movement (which several participants had been involved in) and the importance it ascribes to plural, heterogeneous, multi-vocal networks is evident here. Such forms are not only a means of democratically organising a diverse heterogeneous group of people, they are also an important movement aim in itself, in this as in other forms of prefigurative politics (della Porta 2005; Lichterman 1996).

If this movement is a house with many rooms, it is an open plan one with groups and individuals in constant and generally civil contact. For all the diversification this remains a network with continual communication between the various elements which has managed to avoid damaging splits and polarisation. One should not automatically ascribe this to the constant presence of a common external enemy in Zionist groups – after all, other movements with far more implacable and hegemonic enemies have endured bitter splits (Irish republicanism for example). As Melucci says ‘The empirical unity of a social movement should be considered a result rather than a starting point, a fact to be explained rather than something already evident’ (1996:40). The presence of significant levels of unity and coalition within this heterogeneous movement should be seen as a consciously willed movement outcome (Levitsky 2007).

Most social movement organisers are aware that coalition-building fosters movement expansion (Murphy 2005) and so the muted criticisms some interviewees voiced about other
groups was far less significant than the sense of relief that they existed. Levitsky in surveying the Chicago GLBT movement calls the existence of many SMOs existing cooperatively in the same field, ‘niche activism’ (2007). She argues that such heterogeneous organisations within social movement fields are governed less by competition with each other than resource mobilisation theorists believe, nor can their existence be ascribed solely to the personal preferences of individuals as new social movement theory would seem to argue. The burgeoning of different groups with different competencies seems to be more a strategically desired movement outcome, a ‘structural interdependence among organisations in the movement’ that is interestingly more likely to exist in movement where identity forms a basis of movement grievances (Levitsky 2007: 282).

Levitsky talks of the structural components necessary to maintain ‘unity in diversity’, which includes maintaining strong communications between groups. The maintenance of a network of communication and provision of a forum for people from all groups to speak to each other may be the key contribution of the JPUK mailing list to the movement. The graph overleaf shows the quantity of messages 2001-2008. Along with a gradual slowdown in traffic after the initial increase in 2002, there has also been a movement from debate to information dissemination, indicating that the list is changing from a debating forum into a public noticeboard. Such a move does not mean a decline in the network, but a growing diversity as this network relocates to a variety of electronic fora.47

47 In addition, the fact that a few people who continued arguing with each other were banned from the list helps explain the decline in volume of posts.
I would also argue that it demonstrates a growing sense of agreement and shared focus among list members. This tendency can be illustrated by the example of a JPUK list debate from early July 2008. The debate started when two list members became embroiled in an argument over whether it was right and effective to disrupt the recently held Salute to Israel parade. Over the next few days other members, non-aligned as well as members of JAZ, JfJfP, J-BIG, Scottish PSC weighed in, not so much to take sides, but to steer the debate into a discussion about what constituted effective action. This indicates – at least on this occasion – the presence of a common collective purpose that transcended rivalries. More generally, the willingness displayed by list moderators to ban abusive people has helped keep debates civil, as has the willingness of those members left to stay civil and stay focused on organising constructive actions and engaging in movement-relevant theory production. An example of the latter was a discussion in April 2009 over the remembrance of the Holocaust, which went beyond denouncing Zionists for colonising Holocaust memories into questioning the social construction of such memory-practices, and the relevance of the Holocaust for the movement. Again this discussion started with angry comments which were ‘jumped on’ by others in a successful effort to move the discussion to constructive debate. Such ongoing communication in this and other fora has been crucial in ensuring that the very real political divisions among members have not spilled over into organised antagonism.

Conclusion: Radicalisation and institutionalisation
In this chapter I have outlined the factors within what I term a Jewish ethnic field which have led to the establishment of a Jewish Israel-critical movement in England. I have focused on the political opportunities accorded by a fragmentation of the field and the disintegrating control of hegemonic Zionist forces. I have also talked of the extant discourse of European Jewish revival which this movement has drawn on, and is now contributing towards. In the second part of the chapter I gave a brief outline of this movement, its main groups and historical development.

48 It is significant that all those with constructive comments ended up agreeing that effective action meant some form of boycott action, whether of settlement goods or all Israeli ones.
While talk of expansion and diversification is uncontroversial, it seems odd to speak of this movement as both becoming more radical against Israel and more institutionalised within the Jewish field, but these appear to be two key trends within the movement, with some people becoming more involved in the Jewish field while at the same time more critical of Israel and more willing to take actions against it. Kriesi and Giugni (1995: xxv) talk of the institutionalisation of instrumental movements and radicalisation of counter-cultural ones. It is perhaps appropriate that this movement, both instrumental and counter-cultural, exhibits a dual process. This process illustrates how this movement oscillates between the two poles of Palestine solidarity activism and the Jewish field, trying to affect both and in turn being affected by both.

What looks like radicalisation within the Jewish field can be seen as institutionalisation within the Palestine DIM one. While many in the movement would still criticise the PSC, the movement has moved a long way towards supporting Palestinian rights and in what it is prepared to do to support them. The radicalisation is starkly evident from the language used. Gone are the declarations of love for Israel or the agonising about whether putting ‘Palestinian’ into the name of a group will alienate people. The advancement of the radicalisation process goes beyond language, and can be seen in the increasing acceptability of boycott activity, which would have been unthinkable nine years ago. In chapter seven I trace the evolution of the boycott debate, and why I view it as a marker of radicalisation – essentially because it is a vote of no confidence in Israel’s ability to reform itself, willingness to cut oneself off from Israel, and conversely to ally with the Palestinians and the main campaigning tools of the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Such changes have happened both because some who opposed change have left the movement, and even turned into its critics, and also because those within the movement have changed through their ongoing involvement.

There has been a threefold reason for this radicalisation. Firstly there is the ongoing turning of ambient British (Jewish and non-Jewish) discourse against Israel, itself a result of the escalation of Israeli actions against Palestinians. Secondly, the enhanced knowledge that movement members have about Israel leads perhaps inexorably to a hardening of attitudes. This points to the transformative element of the knowledge acquired by movement participants about Israel/Palestine. Thirdly, the constitution and embodiment of this movement involves identifying enemies (both in Britain and Israel) and hardening of attitudes.
against those on the other side. Thus the radicalisation should be situated within the process of a movement constituting itself, as well as ambient discursive dynamics between Israel and the West, particularly among diaspora Jews.

A caveat; I speak as if the movement were an individual, capable of psychological and cognitive shifts. Such anthromorphisation of a movement serves to hide the actual dynamics that obtain (Benford 1997), such as the extent to which participation is a learning process for those involved. Yet despite the multiplicity of individual viewpoints, movements also have a collective corporate character. As those involved get more radicalised and educated by their knowledge of events in Israel/Palestine, they create an institutional pole within the Jewish field which those getting involved in criticism of Israel are orientated around. The process of radicalisation is thus both individual and collective.

As mentioned, this development is in part a process of institutionalisation within the Palestine DIM field. It indicates how the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (and other groups) has successfully framed action within this Palestine DIM field as being ‘action against Israel’, rather than supporting charities or dialogue groups, and moreover how they have created the repertoires of action that make undertaking such activities seem natural to those entering their field. The ‘naturalness’ of going on pre-organised demonstrations criticising Israel does not mean it has not been a contested process among members of the movement. Nor is it simply an uncritical adoption of PSC’s dialogic repertoire. It is also a conscious reaction against the efforts by ‘friends of Israel’ to depoliticise activism, and their focus on content-free peace and reconciliation initiatives as a channel for humanitarian impulses.

Any institutionalisation within the Palestine DIM field should be counterbalanced by the dynamics of institutionalisation within the Jewish field. This process is part of the lifecycle of successful movements, since most movements aim for their viewpoints to be accepted by wider society (Eyerman and Jamison 1991). As one JfJfP member pointed out, the alternative to institutionalisation is eventual irrelevance. After all, this movement was not just established to confront established Jewish institutions but also to influence them. An example of this is how JfJfP has for the past several years been seeking representation on the Board of Deputies.

However institutionalisation is not just a benign process. As Bourdieu (1993) points out, the discourses and silences of the field are reproduced and internalised by actors contesting it.
Orientating one’s actions towards the dispositions of an imagined Jewish community has resulted in an attentiveness to that community’s taboos which some within the movement find worrying. This is because it can lead to a minimisation of the rights accorded to Palestinians and an adoption of a minimalist repertoire of activities.

I explore this issue later as part when analysing distant issue movements. Here I merely wish to signal the tug of war that exists between the two main discourses working on this movement and those within it. On one hand there is the wish to bring along other Jews and thus remain within and attentive to the discourses of the Jewish field, and on the other the wish to remain attached (however autonomously) to mainstream criticism of Israel and therefore being influenced by this discourse. One activist spoke of herself as being akin to a juggler when discussing the varied demands on her. She expanded on the image by saying that she has had to learn how to take the brickbats thrown at her from various directions and juggle with them. It is an arresting image and the next chapters are devoted to analysing how and how well this movement and those involved in it have managed to juggle their positionalities and activities in these two often antagonistic fields they are trying to affect.
Chapter 6. The figure of the activist between civitas and community

In his book, *In Theory*, Aijaz Ahmad attacks the valorising of contingent hybridity undertaken by those like Homi Bhabha, claiming this to be a self-congratulatory discourse that leads nowhere (Ahmad 1992). In the real world, Ahmad argues, political agency is constituted in people who have a coherent sense of place and belonging and some stable commitment to their grouping, not in flux and displacement (also Dirlik 1998). This reality check chimes with the importance social movement theorists ascribe to collective identity (even if that identity is constituted in claims of heterogeneity and hybridity) in enabling movement actors and in determining their objectives (Melucci 1989; Polletta and Jasper 2001). As Melucci says, the collective identity of a social movement should be seen as a movement outcome which needs to be studied.

This chapter explores the processes of identity construction in this self-consciously heterogeneous movement and how they affect the goals and outcomes of this movement. My main argument is that it is necessary for movement members to build up a valorised sense of self to counteract Zionist stigmatisation and enable them to conduct activism. Activists construct themselves as rational universally minded people, some of whom are able to draw upon the tradition of Jewishness, but who have nevertheless transcended narrow ethno-nationalist tendencies. This process of identity construction is done through dialogic contention with Zionists and other Jews, as well as conversation with non-Jews, and directs the actions of activists in ways examined more fully in chapter seven.

I approach this process by firstly examining the need to create a positive sense of identity to counter Zionist misrecognition of and attacks on Jewish critics of Israel. I argue that activist identity is constructed as being between community and *civitas*, a word I take from Melucci to describe an imagined universal civic space as opposed to bounded communal spaces (Melucci 1996: 170). Next I examine these identities in more detail by discussing how narrations of involvement and action are used to paint a picture of the self, movement enemies and friends. I divide narratives of involvement between Damascene narratives of transformation, and those that place this activism as a continuum from previous positions. These two narrative types are not exclusive, but rather provide a way to view the issue from
an impartial universalist frame, as well as seeing the activist self as a carrier of these normative universal discourses.

In constructing identities, boundary and adversarial framing acquires especial importance, since those in the movement have to fight for legitimation against British Zionists. Thus I examine how the figure of the Israel-critical movement member is constructed in dialogic contradistinction to the figure of the Zionist, both of which, I argue should be seen as ideal types that serve to justify and provide reasons for involvement, and again, a belief in the universalist frame. I next discuss this frame and how it is used for cognitive liberation and negotiation with other Jews who remain Zionist. While movement participants adopt the universalist frame they do not abandon the Jewish field, and I next turn to how movement participants relate to and conceive the Jewish field. My argument here is that through their varied interpretations of the Jewish community, movement members are enabled and indeed motivated to criticise Israel, either in reaction against the community or in order to protect it from Zionist ideologues. For those involved in the community there is a self-ascription of themselves and this movement as existing between community and civitas, a collective identity that enables movement members to speak out on Israel, yet in a constrained way.

**Challenging Zionist misrecognition**

‘Jews for genocide’. Thus Daily Mail columnist, Melanie Philips characterised the moderate group, Independent Jewish Voices on its formation (Philips 2007). Here I examine such Zionist attacks and the necessity for Israel-critical Jewish groups to counter them by engaging in stigma reversal and transformation practices. Claims that Jewish critics of Israel are self-hating or antisemitic fellow-travellers who live in ‘alienation from Jewish life, Jewish values and Jewish communities’ are rife (Ottolenghi 2007: 174 [also Rosenfeld 2006; Alexander and Bogdanor 2006]. One American commentator refers to ‘Jewish quislings’, ‘renegades’, ‘apostates’, and ‘bigots’ who are ‘masking the syndrome of self-contempt as a quest for “justice”’ (Solway 2009). Criticisms in Britain, while usually less extreme, draw upon these transatlantic tropes. Such writers are angered by how Jewish critics of Israel draw upon Jewish traditions, and by the fact they are listened to by the ambient public. In Melanie Philips’ inimitable style:
One of the most insufferable characteristics of these Jew-hating Jews is that they claim to represent authentic Jewish morality as opposed to the supposed corruption of those principles by Zionism and Israel [...] they are lionised by an equally ignorant and bigoted intelligentsia (Philips 2009).

The argument that Jewish critics of Israel are self-satisfied people who ignorantly rail against Israel equally because they seek to ingratiate themselves with goyim and because they possess some psychological flaw is also made by Anthony Julius, a prominent British Jewish advocate for Israel. Julius’s polemical attack on critics of Israel relies, like others, on the imputation of evil motives – either self-satisfying vanity, craven desire to assimilate, or somewhat bizarrely, residual Stalinism (Julius 2008). 49 Julius’s failure to acknowledge what really motivates these critics, namely Israel’s actions, is a necessary misrecognition. It allows him to avoid the reality of Israeli crimes, and refuse to engage with these critics, but rather to dismiss them as contributing to antisemitism.

Regardless of the intellectual poverty of such Zionist attacks, and while these attacks may well indicate the insecurities of diaspora Zionists (Lerman 2008b), the charge of antisemitism remains serious and is understood by critics of Israel as an means to close down debate (Bourne 2004). This attempt to silence critics of Israel goes beyond the printed word into people’s everyday relations. Many interviewees reported of having to overcome fear of raising the issue of Israel/Palestine. This was partly because of worries about starting family arguments or being ostracised, but also because in the past Jewish communal institutions have attacked critics of Israel. Some of my older interviewees talked of being excluded from community events in the 1980s by the Community Security Organisation (now Community Security Trust or CST, an organisation that among other things, provides security guards for Jewish events)(see Rocker 1990). This harassment extended to being threatened and receiving silent phone calls in the middle of the night. Their families also received abuse, and so the consequences of stepping out of line on Israel meant more than disapproving looks and cold shoulders. Yet this fear has clearly been overcome by movement members, this stigma successfully challenged. Newer members reported no such attempts to intimidate them and fewer challenges to their criticism.

I seek to explain this shift in the following section, arguing that it has been achieved though a discursive construction of self and Zionists which has provided the space wherein people feel

49 Julius ascribes Israel-criticism to disgruntled ex-Stalinists traumatised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and now seeking a new cause to follow. This was a factor which, needless to say, none of my interviewees mentioned.
comfortable criticising Israel. Much effort has gone into building up the collective identity of this movement especially in its early days. For example one of the first things JfJfP did was to organise a conference about Jewish identity (JfJfP 2003), and some interviewees talked of how necessary such discussions were. Mitch Berbrier refers to this type of identity work as stigma transformation: ‘Rather than transforming the individual from a deviant to a nondeviant …stigma transformation involves the use of moral entrepreneurship strategies to change the meaning of the label’ (Berbrier 2002: 557). Thus people don’t deny who they are – Jews who criticise Israel – but try to ascribe different meaning to this identity.

Berbrier argues that stigma transformation involves claiming distance from stigmatised spaces – arguments that ‘we’ do not belong in that space, the categories of that space do not apply to us, and we are different to people in that space – as well as contiguity claims – that ‘we’ belong in the desired space because we are like the people in that space. This is not simply a cognitive process, emotional work is central in efforts to remove the stigmatisation of self (Taylor and Whittier 1995). Britt and Heise in discussing the use of anger in the women’s and gay liberation movement, argue that for some social movements it is vital that they succeed in efforts to ‘transform the emotion of shame into fear and anger, thereby creating activated and dominant participants disposed to join collective actions’ (2000: 265-266). Others have made an even stronger case for the importance of stigma transformation, Owens and Aronson (2000) note that it is those with high self esteem who get involved in political action, and argue that the disjunction between people’s own beliefs about themselves and socially dominant discourse about them is a major cause of involvement in social movements. It is the fact that the pariah status is not internalised which leads people to believe in the importance of combating it.

As Gowers (2008) delineates, there are three related claims made to stigmatise Jewish critics of Israel; they hate themselves, they aren’t really Jewish, and they irrationally hate the Jews or Israel. These claims are all challenged by this movement’s identity work. Indeed, one could not make sense of assertions by participants that they do not in fact hate themselves or other Jews without seeing them as efforts to challenge the stigmatised spaces they are assigned to. More effort however is put into showing what space they do belong to, partly because that also shows where opponents do not belong – a universalist, liberal and confidently diaspora space. This is what differs these subjects from those Berbrier studied – their primary identity work, even in the case of hate groups like US white supremacists, was
in making counter-claims about themselves rather than their critics. This was because their enemies weren’t trying to contest the same cultural terrain (white supremacists for example aren’t usually attacked for not being really white). However in this movement where the contestation with critics over the same cultural terrain is central, movement participants attack their critics as a central part of claiming their own identities.

Again this is not an unusual practice in social movements. The role of boundary framing and adversarial framing is an important ongoing part of all group identity, particularly the collective identities of social movements and particularly in periods of contention (Hunt and Benford 2004: 443; Silver 1997; Valocchi 2008). This can be related to Touraine’s concept of a social movement as inherently adversarial. As Touraine says, ‘A social movement is not an affirmation, an intention, it is a double relation, directed at an adversary and at what is at stake’ (Touraine 1981: 80).

By defining one’s enemy, one is also defining oneself, a truism of identity theorising, but one that should be emphasised. This is an inherently dialogical process; as Hunt, Benford and Snow say, collective identity emerges ‘in a dynamic, almost recursive fashion’ during boundary framing (1994: 203). Such boundary maintenance describes more than the way actors see themselves; it offers important clues as to the purpose and direction of their activism. In discussing the actions of a grant-making body in Chicago, Silver observed:

> during boundary framing movement actors construct both an instrumental and an expressive vocabulary of motives justifying their movement participation. They align identity claims with their goal-oriented actions, which means that identity claims continually shape the ‘social change’ actions of movements. (Silver 1997: 491)

This process is extremely relevant for movement participants. At times this identity work seems narcissistic, a way of trumpeting one’s own moral worth over demonised opponents. While critiques and calls to move beyond navel-gazing may be valid (Farber 2006), it is also important to recognise that if this identity affirmation is narcissistic, it is a necessary narcissism. By this I mean that it is programmatically necessary for movements to highlight their worthiness in order to constitute themselves as legitimate claimants (Tilly 1999). Such identity work explains how movement participants are now able to deal with Zionist attacks, since it discursively constructs the Jewish field and Israel/Palestine in a way that promotes personal activism and enables an effective critique of Zionism and Israel. As with other social
movements, it is primarily in the process of contention that identity is created (Melucci 1995), and I next examine this contention.

**Narratives of transformation and continuity**

As discussed in chapter three, narratives are a prime means by which identity in social movements is developed, since the act of recounting stories builds a sense of self: ‘As people tell their stories, they become these stories’ (Wuthnow 1996: 293). Stories don’t just recount the self; they become important political tools. As Polletta says, ‘Narrative’s endowment of events with coherence, directionality and emotional resonance provides an explanation for confusing developments at the same time as it provides rationales for participation’ (2006: 51-2). Below, I examine narratives of the movement as they help construct both the shifting identities and the goals of this movement. I begin with narratives of involvement, since the reasons people give for involvement justify their identity choices, declare what qualities are enclosed and excluded in this identitarian terrain, and signal the direction of their activism.

While there were many different narratives of engagement in this field, I examine below two key elements - narratives of transformation and narratives of continuity. Both of these narratives fixed the identity of the activists as working in the civic sphere, their enemies as parochial and ethnocentric and the issue of Israel/Palestine as a case of universal principles specifically applied.

Many interviewees had belonged to left-Zionists groups or Jewish youth groups which also promoted Zionism. Virtually everyone had visited Israel, with several having been there for several months, and three having gone through British Zionist groups to live there. In addition, most interviewees had relatives in Israel. In other words, virtually all of the interviewees had been former Zionists of some kind (generally critical, or left-Zionists), or had links with Israel. Their shift in allegiances offers a varied set of cases to explore the issue of transformation within a social movement and the importance of identity work to facilitate this transformation. Transformation was narrated in such a way as to contain a list of present day ‘others’ and enemies, English Zionists as well as Israel. It was also narrated as part of a process of stigma reversal.

For former Zionists the break with Israel was sometimes difficult, involving fundamental transformation, something which helps explain the amount of identity work undertaken. The
break with Israel was not always dramatic. Sometimes it was presented as a long and occasionally painful process, with multiple factors determining the interviewee’s change, before s/he had the authority and confidence to speak out. The following is Elaine’s account. Elaine is a young woman involved in her local community, who had been in a Jewish youth group, and had subsequently done human rights work in Israel/Palestine.

**Elaine:** I mean it took me a good, I would say it took me a good 6 or 7 years to be in a place where I felt confident enough to be active. To be able to go out and to say in public things like, you know, I think that Israel was founded in a very ugly way, that there’s terrible myths written about it, that it’s a very sick society, very racist - which I wasn’t able to say for a long time.

**David:** This process, it’s interesting you say it was a long process because, was it preceded by arguments and discussions among family and friends?

**Elaine:** I had a partner at the time who was non-Jewish and he was very adamant. I’d say things like, ‘oh, it’s really hard’, and he’d say things like, ‘it’s not hard, it’s obvious! It’s easy! It’s simple! They’re being oppressed, they’re occupied.’ And I was like, ‘oh but…you know, Jews need a home. I don’t understand, How can we reconcile these things?’

And I couldn’t even read the paper because I found it too difficult to absorb what was happening but I had a very, very good friend from Cambridge; she went with the ISM to Israel, and that gave me a lot of courage because she was great and she would talk to me and eventually, you know.

Possibly the refugee issue, because refugee issues are a lot about saying to people, ‘you know, you’re being lied to.’ I suddenly realised I had some confidence to be able to say, ‘Actually I can read these things now’. So I think a few critical friends, and that parallel politicisation about refugee issues, they were the key things.

The role of critical friends – Jewish or non-Jewish - was attested to by other interviewees, as was the importance of parallel or prior politicisation which led members to think of themselves as critically-informed people who got involved in activism. In discussing those who supported Latin American solidarity in the 1980s, Nepsted and Smith talk about how these were people who were already ‘subjectively engageable’ and had ‘cognitive accessibility’ to the message of the campaign and so they were prepared and able to react emotionally to the moral shocks presented to them, rather than to walk away, either in denial or disinterest (2001: 169). For these British Israel-critical Jews, their prior interest in Israel coalesced with a sense of themselves as critical, political people to ensure they too were ‘subjectively engageable’.
For some it was sometimes a single moment where the accumulation of evidence of Israeli wrongdoing finally burst the dam which previous emotional ties to Israel had erected. One interviewee, Alma, is a middle-aged woman previously active in feminist politics and alternative Jewish cultural groups, and who is now firmly anti-Zionist. She spoke of the ‘cognitive dissonance’ which she lived with for years, trying to reconcile her Zionism with her left-wing values. Alma dated her ‘coming-out’ to an intense all-night conversation in Israel with an anti-Zionist British Jew, by the end of which she was transformed – Zionist no longer. In the US, this process of coming out against the occupation or against Israel has been compared to, and sometimes experienced as more difficult than coming out gay or lesbian, indexing the emotional trauma and family rejection some experienced on acquiring this new identity (Steve Quester in Farber 2005: 47; Gelman 2002). These stories of transformation are akin to Polletta’s destiny stories, incomplete narratives which ‘contained without explaining the unexplainable point at which protest begins’ (Polletta 2006: 48). Polletta derives this category from the ‘moment of truth’ narratives told by those in the women’s liberation movement to signify that instance of enlightenment, or ‘the click of recognition’ (Polletta 2006: 48).

What precipitated this process for Alma was diaspora Jewish talk combined with Israeli experiences, rather than the arguments of Palestinians or left-wing Israelis. By singling out this element the speaker emphasises rationality and contrasts herself with confused Zionists (as she once was) still living in cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless this is not simply a cognitive process. One must also recognise the emotional energy put into admiring and then dismissing Israel, as well as the importance of this emotional work in mobilising and motivating movement actors (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001). Nepsted and Smith’s Latin American solidarity research points to a need people have to place themselves in structural situations wherein they can experience moral shocks (such as study trips to Israel/Palestine). This may be because participants need to engender an emotional crisis in situations in order to allow their repressed knowledge to become unrepressed. Cognitive awareness and accumulation of information, though important, isn’t enough.

Transformation narratives appear to be often in the form of a dramatic Damascene conversion rather than a slow process of accumulated cognition. And yet, one takes a road to Damascus, there is a journey to get to the moment of truth. Transformation may be less a simple moment of revelation than the uncomfortable acknowledgement of a dirty secret one knew all along.
(for more on the issue of denial: Cohen 2001). As such it is similar to the Damascene narratives many leftwing Israelis recount (Lentin forthcoming). For many it was revulsion at the actions or experience of Israel that provoked transformation. One long-term activist joked that every new war of Israel’s creates a fresh crop of recruits, supporting Jasper and Poulsen’s arguments about the importance of moral shocks in movement mobilisation (1995). This combination of long-term disillusion with short-term moral shock can be seen in Emma’s narration. Emma is a middle-aged, secular Jewish person, with no great interest in Israel or Zionism but has Zionist relatives and other relatives living in Israel. She spoke of a slow disillusionment with Israel deriving from the 1973 war and the Sabra and Shatilla massacres in 1982. However, her activism, which involved joining JHJ, was in response to the specific crisis of the intifada:

And I think it was really a moment of terrible passion and disillusionment the way that Israel, particularly under Sharon, was beginning to treat Palestinians as if they were sub-citizens, and commit some brutalities that we all know about. I mean horrors we can’t imagine. Could be in the history of any sort of tradition of Israel or the Jews. [...] It was really, to coin a phrase, the illusion falling out of one’s eyes. I just thought, no, this is a power that’s behaving heinously. Power in our name.

Not that war is required to effect such transformation. James’s Damascene conversion after a conference in Israel had to overcome his early leftwing Zionism, given concrete form in (unsuccessfully) volunteering for the Israeli army in 1967. His account of how this happened is presented dialogically, showing how transformation is simultaneously a moment of truth and a rejection of long-held beliefs.

And at the end of that conference I was invited to a barbeque by a very civilised English migrant scientist. To a barbeque in his house in Jerusalem. So I went along to this house. A very nice farmhouse.

And I said ‘what is this place’. It was a very nice barbeque in his garden, a lot of people there from the conference and so on. He said, ‘oh, it’s a farmhouse’. And I said, ‘who lived there before?’ And he said, ‘Palestinians’. And I said, ‘where are they?’ And he said ‘over the hills somewhere’.

And that was like a sort of moment when I suddenly realised that the belief that I’d been brought up with - that this was a land without people for a people without land - was a complete colonial fantasy. And then I decided I wasn’t ever going to go back to Israel until Israel was Palestine.
The totality of this rejection explains his subsequent involvement in wider pro-Palestinian groups, and in the Boycott Israel campaign. Such conversion moments often take place in Israel since the physical and sensual experience of observing casual Israeli racism or Israeli oppression first-hand is shocking for many diaspora Jews (myself included). In addition, accounts of such encounters lend greater force and authenticity to one’s narrative and starkly indicates what one is opposed to. It shows that participants have learnt from their experience, which places them at a dialogically superior position to supporters of Israel who have not. It also indicates the importance of information and cognitive processes in this identity transformation.

For others, it was not solely the disillusioning experience of Israel or Israeli actions that promoted transformation as much as revulsion at British Jewish support of these actions. Darragh, a middle-aged man who had grown up in a culturally Jewish household where ambient Zionism was present though not very strong, treated the subsequent Zionisation of the British Jewish community as a betrayal of this distant attitude to Israel. One can see this sense of betrayal in his story about the 1982 Sabra and Shatilla massacres in Lebanon, or rather, what actually affected him, the British Jewish response to the massacres:

   I went to shul [Yiddish term for synagogue] after it had happened with my mum, and the rabbi applauded what had happened. He said ‘we know what the PLO was after and the antisemitic press saying all these terrible things about Jews. Who are we in the Galut [exile] to lecture Israel.’ And I didn’t walk out, but I said to my mum, ‘I’m never going back there again’. And I never went back to shul again for anything. Apart from barmitzvahs, weddings and funerals.

The bathetic final line is less dramatic than James’s rejection and shows that Jewish communal life is not completely rejected, even while its Zionism is opposed. Despite his principle of non-involvement in the community, Darragh would now see himself as strongly Jewish, and equally strongly, anti-Zionist.

In many coming-out narratives, participants talk of coming out into the light of reason and morality, norms which govern their attitude towards other issues. These stories of transformation are not so distant from equally prevalent narratives of continuity. They narrate involvement in this movement as a natural continuation of previous activities. Such stories help participants normalise their activism and see themselves as members of a global civic space. One can see this with Annette, a person who had no Zionist background, but who did
have a long history of left-wing activism involving union activities and antiracist work, before getting involved in this movement. This is how she recounted the events preceding her recruitment to the movement.

**Annette:** Well, I was getting involved as an individual and just by always listening to debates on the radio and sending letters and talking to people. When the subject came up I always had my arguments out already. I was very concerned to point out that I’m not responsible for what Israel does by dint of being Jewish.

However, I am Jewish. So I was quite firm in my conviction. And the whole war thing. Like I said around the time when I was pregnant, and my husband and I were anxious about the whole war scenario – the clash of civilisations and this sort of thing that was starting to brew.

Her previous individual activism demonstrated her own autonomy. Such declarations of autonomy were also made by other interviewees, partly to bat away extant Zionist accusations that they had been duped by cunning Arabs (see also Ora Wise in Farber 2005: 104-5), and partly to show that one arrived at this position from an ongoing process of critical reflection; in this case in opposition to an increasingly dominant ‘clash of civilisations’ ideology. The complicating factor in this narrative is Annette’s Jewishness, which meant she needed to outline her position, claim her Jewishness, and distance this Jewishness and herself from Israel. In a way she was already involved ‘as a Jew’. Having framed her disposition, she next recounts precisely how she got involved.

It was in that sort of context that I started going to these Stop The War marches. And there was one in Trafalgar Square and I heard somebody speaking, and it took me a long time – I think it must have been [a leading figure in JfJP], but I couldn’t work out who it was. As a representative from a Jewish organisation, and saying - fantastically positive from our point of view - things about how we should relate to this conflict.

And I thought – this was like a revelation – fantastic, there are other Jews out there prepared to talk about this. And fortunately, JfJP had a stall in the square – participating organisations often do – and I signed up on the spot and started getting involved.

Annette’s other path to participation was her involvement with Jewish-Arab dialogue groups, which discuss matters relating to Israel/Palestine as well as inter-communal issues. She still thinks ‘it’s a bloody good idea’ and continues,
It’s just that it didn’t go far enough. I didn’t reject it. I just got involved in something that was more political, *more my style of thing* really. Because what I’m doing now is related much more to what I used to do. (emphasis added)

The fact that JfJfP, and subsequently J-BIG activism is her ‘style of thing’, that is, direct political activism, shows the importance of members’ previous ‘radical habitus’, in determining involvement and the type of involvement in this movement. One can compare her narrative to James’s who in talking of a circular letter on Israel/Palestine that he organised and sent to the papers, said ‘In the past we’ve circulated letters before, collected signatures, whatever – it wasn’t an unusual activity for us to do this.’ And elsewhere ‘And you write letters, you spend your life writing letters for political activities.’ By presenting involvement as being a natural extension of one’s way of life one can narrate this involvement as normal.

This also shows the significance of participants’ prior political involvement. As in other social movements, most members were professionals who had been involved in the political field and in other movements beforehand (Kriesi and Giugni 1995; Ray et al. 2003). Most interviewees mentioned activities in left-liberal political campaigns such as refugee or environmental organisations, or involvement in their trade unions. Particular mention should be made of involvement in the British-based Troops Out [of Ireland] Movement. Several participants were involved with this or with Irish republicanism, indicating that they had already adopted an anti-colonial mindset critical of the actions of the state representing their national/ethnic grouping, something which made them ‘subjectively engageable’ to the message of the pro-Palestinian campaign. While several of the older generation had been involved in far-left political parties in the past, there had been a drift to the centre-left. There were also several younger members active in the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. This ambient political activity might seem tautological – people got involved in this political activism because they are the type of people to get involved in political activity. I mention this because being such a person – civically inclined, critical and political - was a central self-image for participants and enabled them to see their involvement as a means of public civility.

In conclusion, narratives that stress continuity enable participants to present their movement activities as part of an ongoing politicised global consciousness, yet not necessarily divorced from one’s particularity. The narratives of continuity and of transformation are not
antithetical; the latter also allows members to re-cognise the Israel/Palestine situation in terms of ambient normative discourses of human rights and justice, and to place themselves within these discourses. They also provide a means to productively channel into political activism the emotional turmoil many feel at experiencing or understanding Israel’s actions towards Palestinians.

**Constructing movement identity through conversations and confrontations**

In this section I examine the dialogic confrontations and conversation within narratives of involvement in the movement. I argue that activists paint a picture of Zionists that justifies their own involvement and portrays themselves, in contrast to Zionists, as rational, honest, and universalist. The retelling of such stories helps fix activist identity as well as their commitment to the cause, thereby building group solidarity. Though the portrait of Zionists is starkest in accounts of pickets at Zionist rallies, they also exist in more peaceful contention. This portrait contains a certain homogenisation and demonisation of Zionists, which of course effaces the complexities of Zionist positions, and also effaces the complex understandings that British Israel-critical Jews have of Zionists and Zionism, outside of periods of contention. A dialogic construction of identity of self and others invariably involves a shifting view of these identities (Holland, Fox, and Daro 2008). Thus I do not argue for the validity of the portrayal of Zionists as violent and thuggish, or even that this is a view held by activists through time; simply that such a portrayal assists in the production of movement identities and aims in situations of contention. These stories of contestation are not the only ones undertaken; I also discuss how participant identities are also constructed in more friendly dialogue with ambient society and particularly with Muslims and Palestinians.

Zionists are dramatically confronted only by a small number of movement members in a small number of cases, primarily during counter-pickets at Zionist events. The main aim of this Jewish Israel-critical movement is to influence Jews and public opinion, rather than to serve as an antifascist group that disrupts Zionist rallies. The antifascist analogy is appropriate though, because in narrating these confrontations Zionists are equated with Israel and understood as violent thugs worth opposing, as the following extract shows.
We were corralled away from the crowds and protected by the police. Hot coffee was thrown at us. We were told that the wrong Jews died in Auschwitz and they tried to come into our space with the Israeli flag [...] When we protested in Golders Green against the wall, one of our number was physically attacked and needed hospital attention. I also protest against fascists. They use the same intimidatory tactics and often inspire the same fear. The behaviour of the people at the rally is indefensible and is a product of their world where force not reason rules the day (Recollections of two separate anti-Zionist demonstrations Message 18990, Just Peace UK list, 26 July 2006)

Activists in contrast are portrayed as reasonable and peaceful. Annette’s harrowing vignette of a counter-demonstration at the large Zionist demonstration in favour of the 2006 Lebanon War offers an example of this. She paints a picture of the protestors as peaceful and harmless, whose conduct displayed a certain English amateurism and reasonableness in contrast to the Zionists present:

Just the five of us took the JfJfP banner and we went off and x phoned the police in advance and said, we’re going to do this and we might have a bit of trouble. So the police were there ready for us, and they were terribly kind,

[...] And we had our JfJfP banner which says, ‘Peace with Justice. Time to negotiate.’ Oh dear, how revolutionary! You can’t possibly say that. ‘Jews for Justice for Palestinians.’ And we had little cardboard placards – very little handmade things that we’d made ourselves. Mine said – because at the time the Israeli army was splatting Lebanon and killing people willy-nilly. And mine said ’10 Arabs for every…10 dead Arabs for every Israeli. Are you happy with that?’ sort of thing. And people were spitting at me. ‘Yesss! We should kill 40 of them!’ and tearing at us and screaming and shouting.

[...]I’d never encountered Zionists en masse before. I was in tears at one point. Because of the hate. And I was talking to one of the friendlier people who’d tried to talk and he was sort of trying to comfort me. ‘Not all that bad’, sort of thing. But it was absolutely awful. They were just vile. Spitting and screaming and ‘we want to kill them all’.

This is a powerful story. Annette’s normality is underlined by showing how she could not cope with Zionist hate. While her story allows for ‘nice’ Zionists, they crucially do not try to understand. After all, the idea that anyone could think that people saying ‘we want to kill them all’ is ‘not all that bad’, is ridiculous. One should not reduce this action to an identity-building exercise. While participants needed to fashion a positive identity in order to cope with such confrontations, this does not mean the confrontations are undertaken to fashion this identity. They are undertaken primarily to show the world that Jews do not stand united behind Israel. In addition, the intolerance and violence of Zionists at these events are
presented to fellow Jews in what can be seen as a particularly confrontational form of ‘outreach’. Finally, these events force Zionists to acknowledge Jewish dissidence. As one participant at the July 2006 event put it:

I think it was worth it as they could see there is an opposition - anything to get them out of their ghetto and rattle their self-righteous, bigoted, racist, denial (Message 18955, Just Peace UK list. 24 July 2006).

Nevertheless such stories do build a sense of identity and group solidarity. They bind the group together and find an immediate target for activism, a necessary element in all successful social movements (Gamson 1992). These stories fit into Fine’s category of ‘horror stories’, affronts to the movement actor which are recounted to reveal a social problem to be confronted and to galvanise the injustice frame (Fine 1995). Placing the injustice frame around diaspora Jews, rather than Palestinians is problematic since it may lead to ignoring Palestinians, but it attests to the importance of viscerally experiencing wrongdoing, in this case the conduct of Zionists, as motivation for distant issue movement activists (Soule 2001: 162-3). The circulation of such ‘horror stories’ provides movement members with a very real enemy to focus against, one that is not impossibly large and 2000 miles away.

In addition, as the quote that opened this section showed, there is a conflation between the actions of Israel and English Zionists, so that Zionist thuggery is seen as analogous to Israeli brutality. One does not merely stand in opposition to thugs on the streets of London, but to the ideology behind them, centred on Israel. When saying that Zionists are portrayed as thugs, they are experienced that way too. There is real and justified fear of Zionist violence. This illustrates how identity construction in contentious situations is more than an instrumental framing strategy; it is sincerely felt and provides the activists themselves with an understanding of the situation and a strong motivation for activism. Despite some understandable fear, the difference between now and before is that through the narrative constructions of this movement, critics of Israel have been empowered to confront this Zionist opposition.

Demonstrations do not just consist of war stories. Accounts of connections and conversations with the ambient public, and with Muslims and Palestinians in particular are as important as contention with Zionists. Fine (1995) classifies these type of stories as happy endings, where

50 This experience may be growing with the increasing radicalisation of English Zionists. For instance, at a January 2009 rally for Israel outside their embassy, the Zionist chants included ‘death to the Arabs’ (personal communication).
the worth of the action is underscored. This can be seen in the following brief narrative where Dolores, previously a long-term and active left-Zionist, with a strong sense of Jewish identity, speaks of the first PSC march she attended, a march where she carried a Just Peace UK banner. She later recounted this event as a transformational moment.

I was tremendously moved by it, because all these Arabs and Palestinians kept coming up to me, and they kept saying ‘we thought the whole Jewish community supported Sharon’. And they said, and I was handing out leaflets for Just Peace UK and they said, ‘your voice is not heard, you’ve got to get your voice heard’.

One finds similar accounts of the demonstrations against the war in Gaza from Lynne Segal and others at the IJV site (Segal 2009). These stories provide instances of personal affirmation, that one is right in one’s activism, and therefore by extension this activism is right. They also help build up the activists’ sense of being connected to the wider world rather than in living in a self-imposed Jewish ghetto. Many participants had to overcome genuine fears about Palestinians when getting involved in this activism, and there is a sense of relief in being accepted and having overcome this perceived threat. This is especially the case for those who have gone to the Occupied Territories. For instance, despite being one of the few interviewees without a Zionist background, Frances freely admitted that she was scared before going to Palestine, which accounted for her sense of relief when she encountered Palestinians:

Ah, it was fantastic. That was the complete difference. People were so kind, so generous, so understanding, so interested, so keen that there was Jews there.

This ‘overcoming of fear’ narrative - that participants felt fearful of Palestinians before getting involved with this movement – is certainly not ubiquitous. However it is one way of portraying this movement as normative and as a means of enabling members to move beyond the irrational fears of anti-Palestinian Jews. This process of reaching out to ambient society can be seen as movement members aligning habitus formed in the ambient field with that displayed in the Jewish field, and thus overcome cognitive dissonance.

It is also a positive way of portraying Jews to ambient society. Melanie Philips (2007) is in fact correct when she observes that Jews who criticise Israel are feted by wider society and seen as ‘heroes’. This is partly because by doing so they are according to normative discourses in that society (less support for Palestinians as much as the wish to be fair to both
sides). It is also because that in the current climate of anti-multiculturalist discourse in Britain (Kundnani 2007) plaudits are accorded to those who dissent from claims of ethnic solidarity. Such support from ambient society undoubtedly makes the task of criticising Israel easier for Jewish dissidents. This can be seen as an example of how the more powerful ambient field patterns the less powerful Jewish one, through the actions of these dissidents in the Jewish field.

Civilised contention in the Jewish field - the role of universalist discourse

Few people actually protest against Zionist events, partly because of debates as to their productivity. Zionists are more likely to be encountered at the synagogue, internet or dinner table than the barricade. People engage in more complex characterisations of Zionists in these arenas, but they remain designations which also allow and indeed impel movement members to articulate their criticism of Israel. It is useful to distinguish between public and private encounters with Zionists. In the public sphere, Zionists are often characterised as emotional and tribal and criticised for their bad faith (i.e. lying to themselves), which was seen as contributing to a level of aggression and hysteria (see also Freedman 2009).

Frances, an active member of JfJfP, was never Zionist, and hence not motivated by a rejection of that background (she described her motivation in equal part as deriving from left wing universalism, reclaiming a European Jewish heritage, and her experience of Palestine). Nevertheless, her reaction to Zionists was sharp:

Talk about the tribalism! They can see it, they don’t want to see it, and that’s where the violence comes from.

The ‘it’ that they are in denial about is Israeli conduct. Similarly Charles, another member of JfJfP, while not an unequivocal supporter of boycott, characterised the anti-boycott campaign as follows:

You notice this hysteria about the boycott campaign. Some of it is because people feel the ground shifting under their feet. They want to believe it’s all due to antisemitism because that stops them from having to think about whether perhaps Israel is in the wrong.

The hysteria is seen as resulting from the insecurity and bad faith of supporters of Israel. Such Zionists were seen as fearful rather than fearsome, to be pitied and distrusted in equal
measure. One interviewee (not a supporter of boycott himself) was candidly contemptuous in describing David Hirsch, a public figure in the anti-boycott group *Engage*, telling me jocularly: ‘David Hirsch. He’s mad. Mad, lying, crazy, mad. You should definitely talk to him!’ For others the problem was less Zionists than Zionism. Here is Frances, expressing her bewilderment:

But the response, and the lack of logic in the response… I mean it’s all totally emotional. You’ve got people who are very intelligent people, who can put together any kind of logical argument and as soon as you mention Israel it’s just! Even Jonathan Freedland who can write it in the *Guardian*, but if anybody else says it he just goes berserk.

These quotes draw a dichotomy between Zionists’ emotional refusal to face the truth and the ability of movement members to do so. They also show how members feel no inferiority towards Zionists, evidence that the boundary and adversarial framing of the movement has been successful in dealing with public sphere Zionist attacks. Often the attitude to these attacks is derision or dismissal. This was the reaction to Melanie Philips’s label ‘Jews for genocide’, an epithet which was ridiculed and subsequently turned against those who supported the 2009 war on Gaza (Just Peace UK list, message 20476, 4 March 2007; message 25191, 15 January 2009; Elf 2009). 51

Private sphere contention is, as one might expect, muddier. Several interviewees reported disagreements with family and friends and saw this dissension as an important part of the field of contention. This shows how ethnic fields move beyond the merely publicly political and into the personal. Martin who had been a member of left-wing Zionist groups and been living in Israel when younger, described his encounter with a former friend as follows:

And I said, ‘why did we lose contact, why didn’t you contact me when you were in London?’ And he said, ‘well, when I did meet you which was in the eighties, even before, even in the seventies, when I did meet you, you were saying things that were challenging my whole existence and I just couldn’t take it’. So, you know, many people just won’t engage.

This indicates the sense of loss some participants feel at the failure to communicate with family or friends who are also Zionists. Some interviewees talked of the importance of these Israel-critical groups in providing a forum to discuss these familial problems with others with

51 In contrast to the laid-back approach of movement participants, Guardian journalist Jonathan Freedland, though a critic of IJV, responded with indignation and worry to Philips’s label, indicating that such smears still have an effect on Jews not involved in this movement (Freedland 2007).
similar experiences (see also Weiss 2009a). This process in turn built up participants’ sense of belonging to the movement and responsibility to each other (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Taylor and Whittier 1992).

For several interviewees their growing ability to speak proceeded hand-in-hand with the silencing of their erstwhile Zionist interlocutors. Key to this silencing process is the acquisition of knowledge. As Elaine said about her father,

He knows I’ve had a much broader education than him and I’ve gone to university. But he has very strong beliefs about it. But he has softened. But I think again, he doesn’t want to speak to me about it.

David. It’s an argument they avoid?

Elaine Well I know more than them. And it’s what they believe. My mum believes that Jews should have somewhere to go. What would happen to myself and my brother if the Holocaust happens again? And it’s like, well, (pause) maybe there are other human rights agreements we could work on, rather than take away people’s homes.

This excerpt shows that when it comes to family, one is not able simply to classify someone as a Zionist and disregard them. In other interviews a similar underlying dichotomy that Elaine recounted occasionally came up: the knowledge of the activist silencing the confused belief of the Zionist. This is not necessarily seen as a victory, sometimes it is a painful process: while subjects can now speak about Israel/Palestine, they can’t speak to their family about it. The idea that Zionists lack knowledge about Israel/Palestine may be projected rather than actual (after all, Zionists would regard themselves as the ones in charge of the facts of the case). It allows movement members a sense of comfort, and has as its corollary the idea that ‘if only they knew, they would change their minds’, thereby outlining a course of action which involves education and the transmission of knowledge to the Jewish community. Finally, this particular excerpt points to the use of human rights as a frame to contain the knowledge of participants.

In contending this ethnic field, the language of human rights, justice, anti-nationalism and peace is often deployed to transcend ethnonationalist Zionist discourse among Jews. This universalist language provides a framework to enable movement activists to ‘cognitively liberate’ themselves from Zionism and engage in social movement activism, as well as providing an acceptable and even attractive language for the target population. While this
discourse of universalism is constructed in dialogue with local interlocutors, it also provides activists with a framework to understand Israel/Palestine.

Doug McAdam (1988) proposed the term, ‘cognitive liberation’ to describe how white Northern students ‘freed their mind’ in the process of engaging in civil rights activities in Mississippi in 1964. McAdam emphasised the importance of viscerally experiencing the conditions of Southern black American life in this process. Without denying the importance of experience, it is clearly not sufficient. Part of the mechanism of cognitive liberation is the adoption of contextually relevant frames in order to overcome ‘informational haze’ and ambiguity about events (Futrell 2003). The use of the language of universalism, particularly human rights and anti-nationalism provides a means to enable activists transcend Zionism, especially important for those with a previous commitment to Israel. As Frances joked about these former Zionists,

“It’s all this stuff about ‘I believed in an Israeli state and I got there, and perhaps I don’t believe in any state’.

The ability to criticise Israel once one visits it shows the importance of experience for cognitive liberation, as well as the necessity of universalist discourses. Underpinning this ability to think critically is not another particularist national narrative, i.e. support for Palestinian liberation, but rather human rights and universalism. Frances did not dismiss this anti-nationalism, but also believed that the struggle was, in her words, ‘about tribalism as against cosmopolitanism’, echoing Lermans’s typology of ‘particularist’ vs. ‘universalist’ Jews contending for the soul of English Jewry (Lerman 2007a). This dichotomy places activists at a discursively superior level compared to Zionists they know, and indeed compared to the Zionists they often once were. On the individual level, the importance of universalist language can be seen where Elaine talks about her fear of being ostracised by other Jews.

Well I was just afraid that people would just totally avoid me. There are moments like when they play the Israeli national anthem at weddings. That’s really horrible for me. I don’t want to offend the people who are getting married and I also don’t want to stand up. I’m anti-nationalist anyway.

Whatever repugnance Elaine felt about the Israeli anthem being played, she couldn’t simply say, ‘I find this anthem repugnant’. She had to give reasons that she and others would find reasonable, hence her anti-nationalism. She admitted to my follow-up question that she
wouldn’t have reacted that way to the British national anthem and added, ‘but that’s not the point, is it?’ I would argue that it is precisely the point that people choose which aspects of the local they reject when deploying the language of universalism.

Campaigns everywhere use human rights, in Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) disapproving phrase, as ‘a trump card’ to buttress their claims. Kamenka speaks of rights as being a particular type of political claim, ‘presented as having a special kind of importance, urgency, universality or endorsement that makes them more than disparate or simply subjective demands’ (1988: 127). Thus lack of ‘rights’ are the most common form of grievances expressed by oppositional groups trying to appeal to a wider population (Gamson 1992). All European supporters of Palestinians have to justify ignoring or reinterpreting the powerful and ubiquitous Jewish story, seen as a narrative of a persecuted people who finally found sanctuary in their ancient homeland. The decontextualised language of human rights (Zreik 2004) offers the means to do so, a discourse and a knowledge (about Israeli human rights abuses) that makes Zionist narratives redundant.

The deployment of human rights rhetoric by this movement supports Tilly’s contention that the reasons one gives to take a course of action is above all a process of negotiation with others (Tilly 2006b). This language allows activists to discursively negotiate relationships with their Zionist friends and still maintain their commitment to action. British Jews find it hard to argue against human rights owing to their discursive normativity in Western European societies (Douzinas 2000; Finkielkraut 2000), and because of the importance of universalism in diasporist Jewish thought, discussed in chapter four. Focusing on human rights allows individuals to carry on with their activism and deflect pariah status, and enables Jewish groups to fulfil an important part of their mandate, recruiting other Jews and making criticism of Israel acceptable among them. The following interview offers an example of the tactical way human rights is deployed. Justin, a young man active in Israel-critical activities, involved with British Jewish life and concerned with Jewish spirituality, is describing some college activities:

We published a statement and it started off saying: ‘We believe in peace and human rights etcetera etcetera’ Liberal platitudes. And then we sort of said, ‘And the acts that Israel has been doing is against that’. So it was not so much that people objected to the specific accusations, but also that people were saying, ‘well you are saying that you believe in peace and human rights. That means you believe the rest of JSoc [university Jewish society] doesn’t believe
in peace and human rights.’ And well (pause) ‘Actually, that is the case!’ (laughter).

In this case the human rights frame appears mainly tactical, used both amongst and against other Jews. While human rights may undercut narratives of resistance for Palestinians (Brown 2004; Choudhury 2006; Zreik 2004), more immediately and importantly for Jewish activists, it provides them with a link to the normative discourses of ambient society and undercuts the narratives of their Zionist interlocutors. It also exposes the cognitive dissonance of diaspora Zionists who consider themselves in favour of peace, human rights and justice, yet have to square this with support for a militarised, racist state founded on ethnic cleansing.

The deployment of universalism also helps deal with the claim that critics of Israel ‘unfairly single out Israel’. Interviewees acknowledged the existence of this pressure while feeling able to dismiss it, owing to their self-construction as universal civic people involved in other human rights campaigns. Indeed they went further and used the Zimbabwe and Sudan analogies to turn the tables on Zionist critics and ask why not treat Israel like these places:

Even my family who - they’re not rightwing and they’re not close-minded - and if I was telling them about the situation in Zimbabwe, they would have got it. But I was telling them about a country that they believed in and they didn’t want to hear it was actually (pause) kind of rotten from the inside.

This statement came from Leslie, a young woman very close to her family, talking of the reaction she got when she returned from a trip to Palestine. Again the sadness in the story should be recognised. The story also shows how this activity is seen as part of a more general concern for global issues. It is not the critic of Israel who singles out Israel, but rather their defenders who don’t allow the same universal criteria to be applied to it.

When talking about how interviewees ‘deploy’ and ‘use’ human rights language, they do not reside outside this discourse, but inhabit and are inhabited by it. As a doxic discourse in ambient society it would be difficult not to be influenced by it, and their use of human rights to challenge Zionist pieties in the Jewish field can be seen as an example of how discourses imported from other fields exert influence on the local one.

Being universalist discourses, human rights and cosmopolitanism also impinge on people’s perception of Israel/Palestine. There is a danger that the decontextualising qualities in these discourses which allow participants to unfocus from Zionist narratives also cause a
corresponding blindness to Palestinian ones. Human rights have recently been criticised as a discourse that reduces its objects to decontextualised and individualised victims for the ‘civilised’ West to dispose of (Douzinas 2000, 2007; Rancière 2004). This allows human rights to be deployed to undercut the political aims of oppressed peoples and their struggles (Brown 2004).

Although human rights discourse empowers activists within the Palestinian DIM, there are problems when this discourse is applied to Palestinians without thought of the power imbalance between activists and Palestinians, or between Israelis and Palestinians, or how these concepts are used to victimise Palestinians and depoliticise struggle. In the West Bank and Gaza, human rights are used as a reason for intervention by all outside actors, including Israel (Weizman 2009). This is as we might expect in the absence of an actual Palestinian polity with actual citizens with civil rights (Agamben 1998; Arendt 1973), and perhaps reinforces the absence of this polity and Palestinian political rights (Bomsey 2006). Raef Zreik (2004) takes up the blindness to context inherent in human rights and talks of how rights discourse ‘dehistoricises and decontextualises the subject, cutting it off from its particularity’ (2004: 77). According to Zreik, Palestinians need the right to seek redress within the framework of their loss, not futile demands by outsiders that their illegal occupier acts legally. He argues that the core of the Palestinian solution lies in remedying loss, whereas ‘a rights discourse entails the renunciation of the frame, the historical context’ (Zreik 2004: 78). Thus, although those in this civic space speak the language of universalism, the biases in its architecture towards Western actors, and the possibilities that its concerns are not useful for Palestinians must be recognised.

**Movement participants and the Jewish field**

The previous sections delineated the process of dialogic contentions and conversations which has led to the construction of activists and this movement as existing in the flows of Western universalist discourse. At the same time, some interviewees highlighted the importance of their Jewishness to their activism, and here I examine where my interviewees place themselves in relation to the Jewish field, and how this relationship structures their understanding of their activism. Jewish identity was certainly important to many interviewees. As Leslie said, again discussing her trip to the Occupied Territories:
I haven’t been to Zimbabwe and I haven’t been to Burma and all the other places where bad stuff is happening, but it’s personal for me. I’m Jewish. It’s somehow on me.

Elaine developed this theme.

I do often ask myself, ‘why do I care more about it than other things?’ Terrible things happen in, of course, Africa. I was saying to Mum, ‘what can we do about Zimbabwe?’ 52 It’s appalling, just appalling. I can’t think my way through sometimes why I value this, this is so important. I’m sure it’s something to do with shame and to do with bystander ethics and the fear of being implicated in something where I should have taken action. I had a power and I didn’t use that power. I had a voice and I didn’t use that voice. Whereas I think in Zimbabwe I don’t have any special voice.

While Elaine doesn’t disavow an ethnocultural interest in Israel/Palestine, she doesn’t centre this when searching for reasons. Here the use of ‘shame’ does not just mean a sense of communal belonging and consequent shame at what other Jews are doing, but refers to a non-ethnocentric, yet paradoxically, specifically Jewish reason to get involved. If one can make a difference it would be shameful not to try. Her calculation of effectiveness provides a compelling reason to ‘care’, even if it is not sufficient to explain all the dimensions of caring. Elaine’s position was similar to other interviewees who said they got involved partly because they felt that they could use their ethnicity productively. Ultimately, the fact that activists see themselves as advancing a universalist discourse does not mean that they necessarily abandon the ethnic field.

Most interviewees considered themselves outside the community, yet nevertheless saw themselves as Jewish, with many participating in Jewish events. This speaks of Jewish identification as a process of self-ascription, rather than a role which the community grants or refuses to individuals, something which follows from the fragmentation of the Jewish field delineated in chapter five. This theorisation of Jewishness as self-ascription foregrounds the role of choice. It is not enough to be born Jewish and associate with Jews. One must choose to assume the persona of Jewishness, and allow oneself to inhabit and be inhabited by the field.

This contention is supported by the life histories of interviewees. Some who grew up in the community considered their Jewishness important, others didn’t. Some who grew up outside

52 The Zimbabwe analogy indicates how some British Jews are affected by dominant media discourse in Britain, where Zimbabwe’s problems are trumpeted as a reason for the former colonial master, Britain, to intervene.
communal institutions weren’t interested in Jewishness, others were. In addition, some were brought up Jewish, yet outside the community and so on. There was simply no pattern. Rather what emerges is that biography alone is not what affected whether interviewees felt or wanted to be part of the Jewish field. That was a choice made by each individual.

It is a commonplace of identity theory that ethnic identity is a choice, though one influenced by biography (Hall 1996; Bauman 2003). Although Bauman talks of identity as an elective pastime, he also maintains that these identity choices are presented as not being choices at all, a primordialism from which the rhetorical power of identity is derived (Bauman 2000: 173). However, in this case participants aren’t allowed to view their choice of being Jewish as a natural inheritance. Instead they are, sometimes uncomfortably, alive to the chosen aspect of identity. The contingency ascribed to diaspora identities is redoubled for participants since their Jewish identity is openly disputed by Zionists. One incidental result of hegemonic actors in the field denaturalising the identity claims of movement actors is that the identity claims of the field were in turn put into question by these actors.

This was done in two ways. Firstly, through the idea that the community was lacking in some way, that it was either too small or small-minded and so on. In other words the symbolic capital of the community was seen as not worth fighting over. This response accepted the validity of this ethnic capital, even when denigrating its value. The second approach was to embrace the contingency of diaspora Jewish identity and seek to influence it. This led certain activists to see the community as an opportunity and space to work within rather than a closed ghetto not worth bothering about. I look next at how involvement in this movement has helped construct participants’ relation to the Jewish field, and then investigate how their multiple takes on community has affected their activism.

**Strategy and beyond strategy: Coming out Jewish**

The instrumental value for movement members to identify as a Jew can’t be gainsaid (examined further in chapter seven). I use the term strategic Jewishness for the practice of deploying an external ascription of Jewish identity in order to forward political claims. Lynne Segal points out the paradoxes of this strategic Jewishness for critics of Israel.

So despite its strategic function, it is paradoxical for Jews like me who have always objected to the equation of Jewishness with Zionism (and indeed
questioned the existence of any specific ‘Jewish’ identity) to find ourselves now objecting to current events ‘as Jews’. Without wanting to be, we become ensnared in new cultural conflict over the nature of Jewish identity. We assert a Jewish identity only to be accused by other Jews of having already, shamefully, ‘lost’ it (Segal 2003).

I suggest that through engagement in the field, activists undertake more than merely strategic Jewishness (the manipulation of ascribed identity). What happens for some is a reclamation of Jewish identity. To illustrate this reclamation, I use a quote from Annette.

The first time in my life that I ever really found myself in a room with a lot of other Jews, because we were Jews, was when I went to a JFJP meeting. (emphasis added)

On first reading, this shows how these groups serve as a ‘coming out’ or ‘coming back’ forum for some people with respect to the Jewish field. I experienced a shock of recognition when reading the following account of a left-wing activist’s ‘return’ to Hinduism.

I am of Hindu background, but had actually thought I had erased this in my quest to forge a black, progressive and feminist identity for myself. But as more virulent nationalist reconstructions of Hindu identity took hold, both in India and in Hindu communities in this country, I found myself forced to acknowledge that part of my identity. This was not because of the need to return to religion, but in opposition to the appalling hate crime – killings, rape, looting and burning of homes – being committed against Muslims in India. I had to take responsibility for what was being done in my name. But the Hinduism I now found I had to assert as part of a wider resistance movement was like that espoused by Mahatma Gandhi, more tolerant, humane and respectful of other religions (Patel 1999: 123).

Substitute Hindu and India for Jewish and Israel, and one would find a declaration commonplace among Israel-critical Jews (for instance Adrienne Rich’s [1989] account of reclaiming her Jewishness in reaction to the 1981 Lebanon war). In fact the writer appears to be going through the same process as many Jews, as an English person who feels responsibility for crimes committed by their own ethnicity/religion in a distant Asian country, and deals with this through contending what that identity really means. What is ambiguous here is how internalised this ascribed identity, or this strategy of resistance is; it is probably also unclear to the writer herself.

It is ironic that Jewish Israel-critical groups might be performing an analogous service that Zionist groups traditionally did by offering a way of being Jewish, understanding Jewishness and being with other Jews (Landy 2005). Many interviewees reported an initial feeling of
relief at getting involved and finding likeminded Jews, something related to the stigmatisation some experienced. As Emma commented,

   It is very, very nice to meet fellow Jews who feel the same, because I’ve had a very bad time with some of the Jews I know. Really bad time you know. Lost friends over it.

Returning to Annette’s account, this was not actually the first time she had been in a room with other Jews. Feeling herself, as she said, ‘obviously Jewish’, and coming from a Jewish family, she had attended weddings, funerals and so on. The difference seems to be the public roles adopted. At a wedding she was a cousin or celebrant, at a family gathering she played the various roles accrued over a lifetime. Neither she nor others were at these events ‘because we were Jews’. Yet the rhetoric of Jewish community rests on this bedrock of everyday interactions. Paradoxically it is the occasions when one is not participating as a Jew that allows one to deploy Jewishness as a political claim. When one talks of coming out Jewish, it is an identity claim being staked rather than finding oneself suddenly surrounded by Jews. The claim is for a diasporic Jewish identity not centred around Zionism but on those elements which movement members wish to forward and believe (however programmatically) that they possess – a Jewish identity imbued with qualities of heterogeneity, peace, justice and universalism.

Unlike the ‘coming out activist’ narratives referred to earlier, this process didn’t happen at the beginning, but as an often unforeseen result of activist involvement. Lynne Segal has repeatedly argued this in relation to her own journey from deploying her Jewish identity strategically, to being more concerned with it (Segal 2003, 2005, 2007):

   Ironically, opposition to Israel’s intransigence towards recognising Palestinian rights has brought more than one lapsed Jew, myself included, back to affirming our Jewish heritage, in critical engagement with messianic Zionism (2007).

This recalls Patel’s engagement and also the process of institutionalisation within the field, a growing embeddedness that doesn’t just happen on the organisational level, but on the level of individual consciousness too. As one interviewee said:

   One of the things that have happened is that through being involved in this, people have changed. And that in turn has changed what they have wanted to do, so that maybe some people wanted to be solidarity activists at one point,
and now have more an interest in what it means to be a diaspora Jew and how to relate to other diaspora Jews.

The term, ‘institutionalisation’ doesn’t fully cover this dynamic, since this only refers to the one-way process of activists being taken over by the discourses of the field. I argue in the next sub-section that something more interesting and two-way is happening in this dialogic process. Activists are managing to reinterpret the meaning of community and place themselves in a semi-detached position to the Jewish field. This allows them to critique yet support the community against what is seen as a destructive Zionism, as part of their efforts ‘to relate to other diaspora Jews’.

Reimagining community: Community vs. Zionism

I earlier spoke of how community is used as a repressive discursive tactic. However, community, like other cultural values, is not merely an array of constraints on action, but ‘fluid and evolving, with multiple meanings and a variety of uses in interpreting events’ (Williams 2004: 100). This points to how my subjects deploy community; they are not simply constrained by it, but use it imaginatively to further their own subjectivity and positions. The varying meanings of community held by activists not only permits them to carry out their activities, but in cases where community is seen as heterogeneous and capable of change or in need of rescue from Zionists, is a spur to them. This re-imagining of community allows movement members to align their relations with the Jewish community with their universalist values.

Though there was some commonality between interviewees in understanding the term ‘community’ there were also divisions, especially between those involved and uninvolved with the structures in the Jewish field. However, even those members involved in local communities contrasted their autonomy to the merely communal figure seen as parochial and somewhat trapped. Equally, groups like JfJfP and JSG are seen as partially autonomous from the community. This is identified as a problem needing to be overcome and yet at the same time it is a quality which allows these groups to be productive of Jewish identity.

Interviewees used the word community when talking of global, national and local levels of Jewish existence. While the level varied, sometimes within the same sentence, either context or qualifying words usually indicated which level was talked about and so differing meanings
do not mean confusion. For instance, when one interviewee said: ‘I’m an involved member of the community, and I’m a non-Zionist, and that’s kind of known in a lot of communities’ he was talking of the two main registers of community used by interviewees, national and local.

Those more involved with their local synagogue tended to use the term ‘community’ to refer to that local grouping, something that almost corresponds with the more structural term, ‘congregation’, as local communities are certainly structured around synagogues. Those involved in Jewish life have a nuanced take on the community as multilayered, heterogeneous, and with a degree of internal freedom and discussion. For instance Elaine dismisses an acquaintance who told her ‘you shouldn’t use the word “Palestinians”. It scares the Jewish community’. She asserted instead that ‘awareness is shifting within certain parts of the Jewish community’. This presents the community as diverse, made up of parts, like a machine or organism.

For those uninvolved in Jewish life, such as Charles, a secular member of JfJfP, who was also involved in wider political life, ‘the community’ simply means an agglomeration of Jews:

> Well, I’m not speaking on behalf of the Jews so I wouldn’t put myself in a position where I am speaking on behalf of the Jewish community. Because I’m not, I’m not part of the Jewish community.

Although elsewhere Charles asserts his own hyphenated Jewishness, by being outside the community, he is also outside this collectivity called ‘the Jews’. This is an example of how those uninvolved in Jewish institutions are ironically more likely to take Zionist representation of the community at face value and see it as a unitary bloc, something that serves as a supplementary explanation for their non-involvement in the community.

Returning to the point about value and validity of ethnic capital, perhaps part of dismissing the value of the cultural capital of the field implies accepting the validity of hegemonic representations of it.

The use of community as national minority group, akin to the ‘Muslim community’ or the ‘Indian community’ is also fairly common. This particular use of community as being one national minority among others allows people to counter Zionist claims on such a community. Earlier I talked of how Jewishness is strategically invoked in ambient society to

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53 Only one of my older interviewees actually used the word congregation, indicating the term has fallen out of favour.
remove the conflation of Zionism and Jewishness. In like manner community is invoked to remove this conflation within the Jewish field, and to place the Jewish field in opposition to Zionist politics. This is not just a tactical means of staking political claims against Israel; such respect for the community contributed to some people’s Israel-critical activities. Some became involved in this movement out of respect for the community and a desire to participate in and improve this community. Neil, a member of JJfP, is a young man involved in wider political life, but also in his local Jewish community. He was not hugely interested in Israel, but very interested in Jewish culture and religion:

The thing that actually drives me more is that it is part of an attempt to remake a Jewish identity that’s not based on chauvinism. Or a Jewish identity – not that I’m saying a Jewish identity is inherently, that there’s some essential kernel of the Jewish identity – it’s something that’s remade every generation, but I don’t want to be remade in a very chauvinistic way. So I want to tackle that. And I freely admit that that drives me equally to my political concerns at the situation in the Middle East.

If community is the locus of Jewishness, which most accepted, it has the responsibility to act correctly. So even those antagonistic to the community’s vantage point feel it is important to fight for its soul. Dolores, though not affiliated to any synagogue, was very motivated by her Jewish upbringing in her activism. Describing her feelings after the large Zionist rally in May 2002, she says,

The Israel Solidarity Rally after Operation Defensive Shield [the invasion of the West Bank in April 2002]. I was so angry when I saw that 30,000 Jews had gone on it. I felt it was a day of terrible shame for the Jewish community. And I felt there some kind of rage.

From the emotions of shame and anger we can see Dolores placing herself inside, yet simultaneously outside the community. After all, she did not feel shame herself but an anger that spurred her to action, to try and to wipe out this communal shame. Dolores thinks it important, ‘to show and say that we are part of the Jewish community and our voice needs to be heard. That is important’. This is because others ‘will see that it’s ok. That there are other Jews speaking out. That it’s part of the, that it’s becoming an acceptable part of the community’.
By others, she refers to ‘other Jews’ rather than non-Jews. Thus her involvement in activism is at least in part born out of a desire to give voice and hope to more peace-loving people within a heterogeneous community. This shows how an interest in the local Jewish field, as with Neil, leads to Israel-critical activity.

Even those less interested in community had a diasporist appreciation of the damage that Zionism does to communities. Martin, the ex-kibbutznik talks of ‘the way in which Israel exploits every problem the Jewish community encounters’. Community here is another word for diaspora, extending beyond simply the realm of British Jewry, yet in concrete political terms, very much located within that realm. He thinks that if the community realised their interests did not lie with Israel, then Israel-critical groups would have better chances to penetrate these communities. This refers to diasporist concerns that Israel and Zionism are damaging for diaspora Jewish communities, and shows how building up diaspora identity is in part a strategic tool for some people in this movement. Underlying this strategic deployment of identity is the idea that there is a need to protect what should be a non-political open space from being taken over by right wing ideologues. As Carla, a feminist Jewish activist, who was interested in highlighting left-wing Jewish traditions says,

I think there’s a very similar thing going on in the Indian community, which is being, kind of Hinduised by some very right wing forces, which are putting an expectation on Indians here to send money back for quite nefarious causes in India, draining resources of all sorts – cultural, financial, political, social forces out of the community here and undermining it in order to strengthen some really unpleasant things back there.

While this maintains the image of the community as a respected repository of culture and resources, it also renders the community as passive. In fact, few referred to the community as an active agent, but more a precious item in need of protection. Neil for instance, reacted angrily to ‘these [pro-Israel] groups proclaiming to be non-political, speaking for the whole Jewish community’, as they are simply ‘pushing a partisan political agenda’. The problem is not simply with the agenda, but their claim to represent the whole community, thereby undermining its heterogeneity.

54 There might also be the wish to show non-Jews that there are some ‘good Jews’ as a prophylactic against antisemitism and to encourage them to protest against Israel in a more effective non-racist manner. I discuss this in chapter seven.
55 A kibbutznik is someone who worked on a Kibbutz, or Israeli communal farm. These were left-wing projects, and there was a lot of expectation among those in left-wing Zionist groups that they would work for some time on a kibbutz. Several of my participants, especially those who had been through such groups, had done so.
This raises an interesting point about the assertion of heterogeneity. On one hand, it is a means for empowerment, asserting that Israel-critical viewpoints must be respected as authentically Jewish, thereby empowering critics to speak (chapter four). It is equally a means of disempowerment, of draining politics out of the community by asserting that the political domain and the domain of community are distinct and that those who claim to represent the community in the political domain are necessarily lying as a result of the community’s diversity. In the words of Carla:

We need to go on emphasising that there’s huge diversity amongst Jews. And Zionists might want to say we’re all homogenous, and so might antisemites want to say we’re all homogenous. And you know, the mainstream Board of Deputies type of people would say we’re all respectable, but we’re not a political force if we don’t pretend this community has got a homogenous character and is the same as other communities.

Thus they need to be challenged for the sake of that diverse community and also for activists’ own Jewishness to be respected (see also Bard 1996). The importance of protecting the community from Zionism is bolstered by emphasising the local level of community. Neil told a story of how one of the ‘the great and good’ of the Jewish establishment wrote to him, accusing him of being a self-hating Jew for signing a public letter critical of Israel. He noted how this powerful person chose to attack him, the least powerful of the signatories. His reaction was to indignantly appeal to his community, identified as the shul (synagogue), for moral support. He received this support even from those who disagreed with him on Israel. This paints a picture of local community as a repository of common decency capable of being deployed against Zionist arrogance and bullying. Community here is used like ‘the grass roots’ or ‘the people’ and opposed to a non-local, arrogant elite.

**The relationship between the community and the activist**

Above I delineated how people constructed narratives about community which enabled and encouraged their activism, whether communities were seen as national minorities in need of rescue from Zionist ideologues who repress communal heterogeneity, or as more local groupings pitted against Israeli demands and unrepresentative Zionist elites. Such accounts seem to present my interviewees as possessing a rose-tinted vision of communities, specifically Jewish ones. Yet it is as much the failures, passivity and conservatism of communities which impel people to action. This view of community enables a justification of
this movement, positioned as semi-detached from the community, all the better to critique
and affect it.

On one level community is seen as a good thing. It is a repository of traditions and childhood
memories. One sees a certain idealisation when Justin talks about his work involving moving
‘towards a less materialistic, more grassroots community’. This also shows how it is perhaps
more in absence that the traditional positive image of community comes to the fore. When
used by many interviewees, it is a word often laced with nostalgia, loss, or simply hard-
headed realistic rejection. For instance, Ronnie, an older person with a degree of involvement
in the community and emotional attachment to Israel, contrasts the collectivity of community
with his own independently-minded left-wing attitudes.

The problem is that people like us who are progressive and have an attitude
about the Palestinians and what kind of Israel we want - a lot of us are ex-
kibbutzniks – is that we are not in the Jewish community. Yes, we don’t go to
synagogue and so on.

To an extent he blames these progressive individuals and ex-kibbutzniks for not being
involved in the community. However by being contrasted to these individuals (recalling also
that the figure of the kibbutznik is valorised among older leftwing Jews) the community is
implicitly condemned as parochial and conservative. This is reinforced when he contrasts his
capacity to visit places like Ramallah with the attitude of his community friends who can’t
believe he’s done such a thing. Elsewhere, Ronnie juxtaposes the Jewish community and
Jewish leftist students. While their non-involvement in the community is regrettable, he
implies that it is hardly surprising.

The idea that those fully within the community are scared and governed by a herd mentality
comes out in Neil’s accounts too. Neil speaks of communal figures who are unable to speak
their mind: ‘people who we [JfJfP] talk to, who say stuff to us sometimes that they couldn’t
possibly say in the wider community – communal figures’. JfJfP in this reading offers
liberation, not from community, but to community. While many interviewees think it
important to be within the community, it is equally important to maintain a degree of
independence. For instance, Justin sees himself as a semi-outsider and asserts that it is
possible to belong and yet criticise the community. Drawing on his own experience, he
argues that dissent and argument is part of being in a Jewish community, invigorating and
quintessentially Jewish:
[University] Jewish society, It was like I imagine being in inter-war Vilna! Something like that – you got this Jewish community with all Jewish ideologies fighting each other.

Referring to his college experience, he says,

that was quite influential about how interesting and how strong you have to be to take a stand against your community while trying to remain a part of it.

The word interesting may mean having something to say, being multifaceted, or simply being of interest to other Jews. It is also linked to the strength needed to sustain this critical belonging.

Another way that community can be challenged from a position of inside/outside is given by the switch between the two registers of community, national and local. This was done by Jeremy, who was involved with human rights activism in Israel/Palestine. He was also heavily involved in his local synagogue which he described as ‘only a small part’ of the national community, and indeed ‘fairly way out as far as the traditional Jewish community’ is concerned in that it has same sex marriages, a lesbian rabbi, mixed marriages (i.e. between Jewish and non-Jewish partners) and so on. Thus his local community, semi-detached from the wider community, offers a space for changing this community in more ways than on Israel/Palestine. While Jeremy belonged to a (very) Progressive synagogue, there were also respondents who belonged to more Orthodox ones. However, in general the linking of criticism of Israel with affiliation to progressive synagogue affiliations is a trend in this group, as with US Jews (Cohen and Kelman 2007).

In conclusion, by seeing themselves as a semi-detached part of the community, members are enabled to see the community as a realm of possibilities, however muted. Locating oneself as inside/outside this community is the ideal vantage point from which to critique and reform it. However, such interventions, as I discuss in chapter seven, is seen as something that should be done with respect. This may be the corollary of seeing Zionists as insensitive and unreasonable, and shows how engagement with the community constrains as well as enables Israel-critical activism.
Conclusion: A global civic space for the community?

And seek the welfare of the city to which I have exiled you and pray to the Lord in its behalf, for in its prosperity, you shall prosper (29:7 Jeremiah)

In this thesis I argue that activists determine the nature of their actions by constructing the objects of activism. In this chapter I concentrated on the first object of activism constructed – the identity of the activists themselves. I have argued that this identity construction, formed in the process of dialogic contention, has directed the movement’s discursive repertoire towards the human rights frame and to an extent towards a (detached) engagement with the Jewish field.

These human rights and universalist arguments are more than instrumental. Through seeing this activism as being in continuity with other political activity such as anti-war activism and refugee support work, I believe that movement participants see themselves as belonging to a global civic space or civitas or seek to create this space through their activities, similar to members of global solidarity networks (Olesen 2005; Thörn 2009). By global civic space I mean a political understanding of global belonging and reciprocity (Eterovic and Smith 2001). The sense of belonging means that civitas need not be reduced to a vague sense of cosmopolitanism. The problem with cosmopolitanism, recalling Ahmad’s criticism of Bhabha, is that it does not offer a vantage point, a sense of location from which people can become social actors. Yet, as we have seen, the infusion of universalism provided a very strong sense of location and motivation for these actors. Returning to the idea of emplaced sociality, these actors’ sociality is imagined on the global as well as communal level, while being emplaced in their specific social locations in the Jewish and other fields. If participants in this movement are cosmopolitan, they are rooted cosmopolitans, a concept I examine further in chapter eight.

Equally I talk of this civic space as political, rather than a site of altruism. In talking of civic altruism, Ranci gives the example of donating blood, since the donor does not expect an immediate payback for this. This is in contrast to actions involving ‘affective investment’ such as actions on the local communal level (Ranci 2001). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the payback blood donors receive is that they build and become part of a more civil and decent society, in accordance with their political universalism. The difference seems to lie in what level one places the expectation of reciprocity and sense of belonging – the ethnic communal or the global civic.
The concept of an imagined though emplaced civic space that participants are seeking to forward provides a thread to hold the local and global together and centres the political. By addressing these groups under the frame of civic action, I do not parcel internal Jewish identity issues away from Palestinian solidarity but see them as different aspects of civic space in which different movement actors place themselves. This concept also accords with what most of these actors are interested in, namely political questions rather than purely identitarian ones. In saying this I am not denying that some participants are centrally interested in reconstructing Jewish identity, but that this reconstruction also has a clearly political focus and universalist aims.

This addresses an important criticism of the movement, that participants are involved simply to ‘heal the Jews’ and that Israel/Palestine is simply a proxy argument to have communal fights over (Atzmon 2005; Elroy 2008). As evidenced by the continuity between this activism and other political work, participants are engaged in ‘seeking the welfare of the city’, meaning that although they are often operating in a Jewish context they are doing so as a means of building a public civitas rather than a particular community. Though few would disavow the idea that healing the Jewish community would be a pleasant effect of their work, even this healing takes the form of counteracting the particularist ethnic claims extant in the community for more universalist (if Jewish) aims. This is not necessarily civic virtue versus communal healing, but can be an attempt to import civic virtue into that communal space and open up the Jewish community to this civic space.

This still raises the question as to the nature of this civitas. Global civic space may be a site of reciprocity but not equality. For instance it may be conceived as a ghettoised city where those in one part (donors) interact with, but also exclude those from the other part (recipients) in order for donors to maintain their privileged position in this imagined civic society. This is a pertinent issue when discussing solidarity movements. In the following chapters I address the nature of the civitas by examining movement responses to Israel/Palestine and to the means adopted to challenge injustice there.
Chapter 7. Are all politics local? How the terrain of activism affects strategy and ideology

How does telling British people about Israelis who don’t serve in the military affect the Israeli government – one assumes the Israeli government is already aware of this phenomenon? Equally how does standing outside a warehouse of Israeli flowers affect anything whatsoever about Israel/Palestine? These are questions that detractors of social movements like asking - decontextualising movement actions in order to ridicule them. But these are also central questions for movement participants – are their actions effective and what constitutes effective action. Charles Tilly’s answer is that social movements deploy their repertoires of actions less to directly affect the course of events than to constitute themselves as claimants, specifically WUNC (worthy, united, numerous, committed) claimants, and conversely to expose their opponents’ lack of WUNC (Tilly 1999, 2006a). For Tilly, effectiveness is measured by how far the social movement is seen as a strong and legitimate political player, with the qualifier that one’s WUNC is positively affected by achieving intermediate campaign goals.

Thus groups promote refuseniks to discredit Israel’s worthiness and unity in fighting Palestinians, as well as to highlight their own side’s commitment. Standing outside the warehouse, preventing Israeli flowers from going on the market (thewallmustfall 2007) directly affects Israel and so complicates the claim that social movements primarily manipulate codes or are mainly engaged in cognitive work (Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Melucci 1996). And yet in answering the question Why Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions, the BIG (Boycott Israeli Goods) campaign offers primarily symbolic reasons: ‘It lets the Palestinian people know that they are not forgotten...It sends a signal to Israel...It exerts moral pressure on the British Government’ (BIG Campaign 2009). The actual boycott actions are also more symbolic than they first appear. Activists don’t seriously believe that their specific actions will stop Israeli goods coming onto the market, but that through constituting themselves as worthy social actors able to exert pressure on suppliers of Israeli goods they can achieve their end.

If social movements try to constitute themselves as WUNC claimants, who do they make their claims to? This is an apposite question for transnational social movements (TSMs)
facing nested political opportunity structures – local, national and international - to make claims within (Rothman and Oliver 1999). Most TSMs make claims on the national rather than international level, since this is where their political resources and opportunities are greatest (Tarrow and Imig 2001). This is certainly the case with this movement which, despite its international ties, primarily makes claims locally, demanding that either British Jews or wider British society change their attitudes and actions towards Israel/Palestine.

In this chapter I discuss how contending these two local terrains – the Jewish field and the ambient political field - determines how movement goals are arrived at. The central purpose of the chapter is to discuss the relationship between local terrains of action, actor subjectivity and the subjectivity of Israelis and Palestinians. I first argue that participants are guided in their actions by strategies of effectiveness rather than identitarian reasons. Although these strategic considerations are primarily determined by whichever local field they are contending – the British Jewish or ambient British one – this local contention (especially in the ambient British field) inexorably leads to consideration of the Palestinian field.

In examining these fields of contention, I first discuss those who prioritised the Jewish field, why they did so, and how this directed their activism. I use the debate over the boycott as a marker of political positions. Then I turn to those who prioritised the wider field, exploring how this stance served to combat antisemitism, and ‘queer’ Jewish identity (that is, to disrupt extant identity categories: Stein and Plummer 1994), as well as direct these activists towards the boycott campaign. While the primacy of the local seems to indicate that this campaigning, if only indirectly, is about the subjectivity of movement actors, I argue that those who supported boycott were motivated in part by their construction of Palestinians as political actors. Movement participants have both a particular interest in the universal and an interest in the Palestinian field through their local contentions. In the next section I argue that a similar process did not happen towards Israelis; while both pro- and anti-boycotters accepted Israelis as political actors neither were much guided by the views of Israelis. In conclusion I ask how this relationship towards local and transnational actors relates to Bourdieu’s notion of field and habitus. I advance a schema of transnational action as a field of tension between activist subjectivity, transnational objects of solidarity, and local fields of contention. This discussion is continued in chapter eight where I examine the relationship to Palestinian subjectivity both in the Palestine DIM and in this movement.
I first need to deal with the idea, or rather accusation, that participants are motivated primarily by identitarian impulses. Everyone has their own reason for being involved in activism, but once involved, I argue that *effectiveness* is the crucial determinant, with social movement participants choosing actions based on their perceived efficacy in achieving their aims (Jasper 1997; Snow and Benford 1988). By effectiveness, participants in this movement primarily mean how effective they are at promoting change in Israel/Palestine. It is clear when one looks through the minutes of JfJfP meetings, the online discussions or transcripts of interviews, that movement members are far more concerned with and direct their actions towards intervening to promote change in Israel/Palestine, rather than to ‘heal the Jews’. The statement that achieving the stated purpose of these groups – affecting change in Israel/Palestine is what guides the actions and aims of members, may seem uncontroversial (JfJfP 2009; J-BIG 2007; JPUK 2000). However it stands against the argument that movement members are mainly involved for solipsistic identitarian reasons (either to feel good about themselves on an individual level or to ‘heal the Jews’ on a collective one) rather than to affect the outside world. Such charges have frequently been laid against those engaged in prefigurative politics (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995) and in so-called altruistic movements (Filieule 2001) even by those who believe that such identity construction is a worthwhile goal in itself (Teske 1997).

When levelled against this movement the charge is distinctly unsympathetic, constructing the image of narcissistic movement members who use Israel/Palestine to advance their own subjectivity. At one extreme the claim forms part of the ‘dubious authenticity, dubious morality’ accusation Zionists level against this movement: that, ‘their crusade against Israel [...] is less about justice for the Palestinians and more about coming to terms with their tortured Jewish identity’ (Ottolenghi 2007: 171). At the other extreme this view asserts such bad faith among participants that they are ‘really’ back-door Zionists, mouthing pious platitudes about peace in order to prove their own goodness and the goodness of the Jewish people, thus indirectly trying to promote Jewish exceptionalism (Atzmon 2005). Yet it is not just those eager to accuse this movement of bad faith who claim that talk about Israel/Palestine is ‘really’ about contesting the nature of the Jewish community (Ellis 2003; Lerman 2008c), or even that it ought be about this (Kahn-Harris 2008).

I don’t discount the importance of local identity contestation in shaping and providing content to movement aims. However, seeing this movement only through this contestation
presents an incomplete picture. It is worth recalling how the goals of even ‘pure’ identity movements are rarely only about participants’ identities but also have political aims (Bernstein 1997, 2005; Bickford 1997). Furthermore, this is not a pure identity movement; but one that I argue prioritises external political change over internal identity aims. Since it is difficult for activists to answer what constitutes effective action, there is disagreement over tactics. These mainly centre on the issue of boycotting Israel and I use arguments relating to the boycott tactic to show how movement participants primarily measure their effectiveness in relation to Israel/Palestine rather than in relation to Jewish identity claims.

The boycott, divestment, sanctions (BDS) campaign, which for convenience I refer to as ‘boycott’, has grown in importance over the last five years and derives its legitimacy from the call by 171 Palestinian civil society organisations to boycott Israel (Various 2005). BDS is a the central political strategy of the PSC and other Palestine DIM groups and involves multi-field action, including pressuring people to boycott Israel, companies and pension funds to divest from Israel and from companies benefitting from the Occupation, and political bodies to place sanctions on Israel. The boycott tactic can in turn be divided into its component parts – the academic boycott campaign has possibly received most publicity, but there is also a cultural boycott campaign and a campaign against Israeli goods, whether all Israeli goods, or simply those produced in the Occupied Territories (Global BDS Movement 2009). The growth in the boycott campaign is partly due to the ability of activists to wage it on a number of levels in a number of fields, partly due to the failure of other avenues of activism, and partly because it is seen as a successful campaign that has already notched up victories (Barghouti 2009; Various 2008). The boycott campaign, at this stage, is a means of delegitimising Israel rather than a serious attempt to challenge its capacity to wage war against Palestinians (although it is beginning to have material effect: Wrobel 2009).

Though this is a central strategy for many groups in the Palestine DIM in Britain, it is divisive for people in this movement. 56 I argue that positions taken on the boycott are not centrally formed by closeness to Palestinians or affinity to Israel. For activists the question of local effectiveness is more important than emotional affinity, and by examining these positions in detail we can see how the terrain of activism directs movement goals. In

56 Of my twenty one interviewees, eight supported boycott, eight rejected it, and four offered critical support. One gave an indefinite answer. A questionnaire (Appendix 1) which 417 JlJIP members filled in following the May 2009 AGM, shows similar divisions within this group on whether boycott was an appropriate tactic, with 16-31% strongly opposing various forms of boycotts, and 23-38% strongly supporting them.
summary, arguments about the boycott reveal both the centrality of the notion of effectiveness in determining courses of action, and the dominance of the local terrain of contention in determining both strategy and ideology.

From choosing the Jewish field to rejecting the boycott

I feel very…I feel very odd about it [the boycott campaign]. Not ambivalent. I em…I think it’s been really badly discussed in the British press in the sense that they haven’t, they don’t seem to have been clear about what the people who tabled the motion were trying to do [referring to the UCU academic motion which had been in the news]. But I don’t think it’s ok to silence…I mean…the other thing is that I’m not really sure what different groups want. I don’t really know what the different parties are asking for. And em…I can’t really suss it out, it doesn’t seem to me that there’s a unified Palestinian voice, it sometimes doesn’t seem to me that there’s a unified anti-occupation voice on this either and I fe..Right I think academics who speak out against the occupation obviously, just because they’re Israeli, shouldn’t be boycotted. But nobody’s saying that. (Elaine)

Elaine’s disjointed response once I broached the subject of the boycott was not unique among interviewees who rejected it, irrespective of any prior articulateness. This can be explained as a result of discomfort at not supporting boycott yet not being able to offer convincing reasons why. In other words, there was a ‘real underlying reason’ they found impossible to articulate, an ethnonationalist one – either belief in Israeli exceptionalism (that allowances need to be made when it comes to Israel), or that supporting a boycott would cut them off from their Jewish relationships. However, I reject this explanation, believing it more credible that some participants were inarticulate about boycott because they were unconcerned with it rather than in denial about it. If people’s work was with the Jewish community they simply did not link boycott with political change. In this section I discuss this issue, beginning with why and how people worked to change the Jewish field. I then explain how, within this context, boycott was often dismissed as an irrelevancy or even hindrance to their political work, a self-indulgent form of posturing devoid of real political content. Those who rejected boycott did not do so primarily because of identitarian reasons, although one cannot totally dismiss identity issues. It was a practical rejection of a tactic, which underlines the importance of the local field of activism.
In chapter six I discussed the importance of reconstituting Jewish identity for many participants. However, such attitudes appear from both pro- and anti-boycott positions. The difference is that those who reject boycott think it important to contest collective Jewishness and prioritise the Jewish community as the field of activism. A Jewish community that does not support Israel is not simply an end in itself, it is also seen as a crucial element in the fight for Palestinian liberation. Many of the anti-boycott people were somewhat dismissive of ‘non-Jewish Jews’ disconnected from and not interested in the community, not because they were worse people, but because they were not deemed to be as effective in the struggle for Palestinian rights. Tommy, a long term member of the Jewish Socialist Group (JSG), with an active interest in secular, leftwing Jewish culture, says:

I think if there can be a challenge to Israel’s domination of world Jewry - that will assist the Palestinian struggle. And I think you can’t just do it through the ‘I am Jewish, but’ Jews. ‘I was born Jewish but I support Palestine’ and that’s it. You know, you need something more than that. Because those Jews can’t be dismissed as a phenomenon, but they can be politically dismissed within the Jewish community.

According to Tommy, one way to effectively campaign for Palestinian rights is to fight this dismissal from ‘the community’. Tommy declared the importance of undertaking such a fight was partly for these tactical reasons and partly because secular Jewish radicalism (the Jewish tradition which JSG explores and promotes) ‘has something to say to the Israel/Palestine conflict’. Frances of JfJfP also emphasised the tactical importance of contending within the community, contrasting an individualistic and hence less effective response of ‘not in my name’ to what she wished JfJfP to do - to be able to say ‘not in our name’ (as a Jewish collectivity), believing this would move the struggle for Palestinian rights forward. The reason people contest the Jewish field is at least partly because it is seen as an effective way of assisting the Palestinian struggle. To contest this field, activists must be collectively and recognisably Jewish so as they can’t be dismissed. And to do this, they need to pay heed to the community.

In trying to influence the community, there is a clear advantage to being a broad and moderate-sounding organisation; such groups are able to attract recruits from diverse sources
and command a level of respect by virtue of their size. 57 Formalised organisations have traditionally been ‘more successful at [...] sustaining ongoing interactions with diverse constituencies’ and with attaining recognition, compared to ad hoc informal groups (Caniglia and Carmin 2005: 203). JfJfP consistently tries to achieve broad-based respectability within the community. As Neil, an active JfJfP member, says, ‘Insofar as JfJfP has had some success, it’s because it’s kept on board a wide range of people’.

For Neil and for some other interviewees, the role of these Jewish Israel-critical groups is to provide support for the first hesitant steps of questioning diaspora Jews, and offer them a language to understand what’s happening in Israel/Palestine:

I think groups like the Jewish Socialist Group, JfJfP and even others - like Meretz-type of critical Zionists - are giving them a kind of language if you like. It feels like a language in which to start to question what’s happening there (Tommy).

These people are those ‘who know something’s a bit amiss but can’t quite speak’ (Elaine). Once again the figure of the inarticulate Zionist crops up, but this time as people who can be supported in overcoming their cognitive dissonance. In yet another example of shifting dialogic identities, they are seen as bystanders and possible supporters rather than enemies and enemy supporters (Gamson 2004). For instance, Neil’s respect for community, local and inviolable, means that he believes liberation must come from communities themselves in a small-scale slow process of change:

I think the most important thing that we can do is actually to support other people. To support bottom-up stuff. We can’t go into communities and say ‘this is what we think and you’re all very silly’. It’s got to be people within communities themselves. So what I try and do really is try and support people and give people confidence when they do contact us […] which is really the way that will change attitudes within the Jewish community.

Neil uses the image of JfJfP being ‘a sort of conveyor belt to help move people who are uneasy about what’s happening in Israel/Palestine to having a sophisticated critique about it, and being articulate about it’. He gives an example of such slow incremental activities:

57 Outsiders, on the other hand, don’t see this is an important criterion. For instance, Neturei Karta in England is a tiny group of strictly Orthodox Jews opposed to Israel’s existence on religious grounds (although it is larger in the US and Israel). The fact that the PSC champions this grouping and regularly has them to speak at public meetings indicates that size matters less than ascribed authenticity (and colourfulness).
So things like somebody at university who was involved with the Jewish society contacted us, and we, we, sent him a copy of the Iron Wall which he showed to some of his friends. So it’s that kind of bottom up… he was an Orthodox person, you know – fairly conventional Orthodox background.

Other interviewees also expressed this wish to engage with these people in order to achieve change within the community. Without doubt, this wish to relate to the community is undertaken, by some at least, from the wish to reconstitute Jewish identity. However, they see no incompatibly between doing this and campaigning for Palestinian rights. In contrast, they see such a reconstitution as playing a useful part in the struggle. In the next subsection I examine how this attitude directs their work.

**Boycott: ‘the middle-aged equivalent of wearing a Che Guevara t-shirt’**

We’re campaigning to win hearts and minds to support for Palestinians within the Jewish community, and I think that the boycott campaign has actually kind of undermined our work in that respect (Carla).

Neil acknowledges the criticism that being so attuned to the world of worried Jews stops Jewish critics of Israel from being an engine for change, when he says, ‘We’re frightened of frightening Jewish people’. He continues, ‘but when you’re kicking the door open, when you’re trying to nudge the door open, you can’t, you don’t nudge it open with some dynamite, you know’. This does not mean that these activists capitulate to Jewish community opinion. Their aim is to change this community, and they are often far more confrontational than images of nudging doors or conveyor belts convey.

While they are prepared to confront other Jews, advocating a boycott on Israel is seen as a bridge too far. It was less that boycott is bad for Israel and Israelis – interviewees on both sides of the question are almost equally unconcerned with this question – it is more that calling for boycott was no way to proceed within the community. Tommy and Carla offer a sophisticated theoretical argument against boycott, as follows:

**Tommy:** A boycott puts a line here – and you’re either this side of it or you’re that side of it. And there’s no gradation. And I think it’s politically very kind of…it doesn’t give you many options. And I think the best political

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58 The Iron Wall is a 2006 documentary directed by Mohammed Alateer and produced by The Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees and Palestinians for Peace and Democracy, about the effect of Israel’s settlements and the Separation Wall on Palestinians.
struggles are ones that give people options to access those struggles at different points.

**Carla:** Because that allows people to change their politics.

In other words, arguments that supporting Palestinians means supporting boycott place the bar far too high for many Jews. Within the Jewish field, boycott is seen in a negative light because of past antisemitic boycotts of Jews and because of the personal ties many have with Israel. For those concerned with bringing Jewish people along, the boycott appears to be a completely ineffective action. Neil offered a revealing anecdote which encapsulates this attitude. One morning as he was going to synagogue he noticed a sticker saying ‘Boycott Israel’ outside the synagogue. He took it down, wondering as he did so at the stupidity of whoever put it there. As he pointed out, Jews going to pray were hardly likely to be converted by such an action, rather they would be repulsed and threatened at its antisemitic implications. While Neil didn’t believe it was antisemitic, he characterised the action as crassly stupid, making his work much more difficult.

Support for boycott is, in this view, a purist affectation unconnected with trying to achieve real change. It is not so much that it is wrong in itself – as Frances bluntly said: ‘Listen, if I thought the boycott campaign would succeed, I would support it’ - rather it is alienating and divisive. This is especially a concern for those trying to maintain an organisation like JfJfP. Among interviewees it was precisely those more institutionally involved with Israel-critical Jewish groups (apart from J-BIG of course) who were most dismissive of the boycott. The leaders of JfJfP are aware that though some activists may wish to boycott Israel, swathes of their membership would not stand for it. For instance at the 2005 AGM, it was agreed to support the Association of University Teachers (AUT) boycott of Bar-Ilan university near Tel Aviv, indicating the importance of Palestine DIM discourse in affecting the direction of this movement. The vote was 17-0 in favour, with 11 abstentions. The small numbers involved meant that the decision was soon overturned by the leadership, who organised an online poll of members and found that a third of the 190 respondents were unhappy with the decision (JfJfP mailout, 9 June 2005).

A more recent example can be found in their May 2009 survey of their members, reported in the *Jewish Chronicle* (Symons 2009). The survey (Appendix 1) showed a qualified majority offering support to various forms of boycott tactics, but not to academic, cultural and sports boycotts, while a large minority strongly opposed any form of boycott. The supplementary
question was equally revealing, asking ‘Do you think adopting a broader boycott position would make the organisation more or less attractive to people who take issue with Israeli policy but have not yet joined JFJP’. Almost 60% agreed that it would make the organisation less attractive, an answer which the question was undoubtedly trying to elicit. Based on this result, the AGM agreed to ‘consider, on a case-by-case basis, smart boycotts but not restricted to the occupation’. However even this was not enough for the executive which recommended that JFJP restrict any boycott campaign to the occupation. The reason given was: ‘By targeting Israel’s policy of colonisation, this also avoids the accusation — important for an organisation like JFJP — of being anti-Israel’. Thus, it was the accusation (within the Jewish community) rather than the issue of whether they may be damaging Israel that was important for the executive. As the hostile reportage of the survey in the Jewish Chronicle showed, this proved a well-founded fear (Newmark 2009). It seems that for those trying to maintain organisational coherence and trying to affect the community, boycott is at best a narcissistic distraction from this work; ‘the middle-aged equivalent of wearing a Che Guevara t-shirt’ as Neil put it. At worst, as the opening quote from Carla indicates, boycott was seen as an active hindrance.

Rejecting the ‘affinity with Israel’ argument

Above I argued that rejecting boycott is a practical response to the local terrain of activism. We can recognise that ties with other Jews are important for rejectors of boycott, without reducing this rejection to an expression of ethnonationalist solidarity. The primacy of ‘effectiveness’ over ‘identity’ as a causal explanation for people’s attitudes is supported by examining similar attitudes to Israel from both supporters and rejectors of boycott, and how attitudes towards boycott are changing as the tactic of selective boycott becomes more acceptable in the Jewish community and ambient society.

Initially I hypothesised that those who rejected boycott would express greater affinity to Israel than those who didn’t. By affinity I mean emotional and cognitive attachments based on structural linkages such as time spent in Israel and having Israeli relatives. This is based on work highlighting structured emotional responses in determining movement aims (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Jasper 1998). While Jasper suggests that emotions ‘help explain, I suspect, not only continued allegiance but choices of tactics, organisational forms,
and outcomes such as schisms’ (Jasper 1998: 420), I believe this claims too much explanatory power for emotions, certainly in this case. True, some who rejected boycott said they felt more at home in Israel than in England, or felt the romance of working in a kibbutz. Yet there were similar sentiments expressed by those who supported boycott, so affinity to Israel is at best a supplementary reason for not supporting boycott. In addition almost all those who rejected boycott didn’t use affinity with Israel to disagree with the boycott. One who did so was Elaine. Initially her response to boycott was,

There’s a kind of unfortunateness of birth in being born Israeli and having you know... I kind of think what would I do if I was born in Israel and I was a scientist.

Yet Elaine’s emotions were more complicated than ‘I feel close to Israelis. I oppose the boycott’:

Sometimes I worry about having latent feelings for Israel (laughter) but I don’t think it is that. Yeah, I have to go to some Maoist camp and re-educate myself.

This self-irony presents her relationship with Israel as akin to someone getting over a messy affair. And although she spoke ironically about needing re-education, there was a sense that affection for Israel was something she’d have to move beyond. This encapsulated many participants’ attitudes. While some had fond memories of Israel, this combined with feelings of distance from present-day Israel and rejection of Israeli racism. Just as British Zionists are seen as forming a counterpoint to movement identities, so too were encounters with Israelis narrated as encounters with a frequently racist, right-wing other, even or perhaps especially when these were family members. Racist Israeli relatives were mentioned by several interviewees and can be seen as shorthand for the attitude many participants had towards Israel; not disavowing their connections with Israel, but nevertheless alienated from an Israeli worldview. Some went further and talked of how Israel had betrayed their sense of Jewishness, as one interviewee said; Israel ‘was letting us all down’. For these people it was important to draw a distinction between Israel and the Jews, both for other Jews, and for reasons discussed in the next section, for ambient society. Israelis were seen at best as people who lacked understanding, at worst as purveyors of racism. This happened both by those who rejected and supported boycott; thus the ‘affinity with Israel’ explanation does not hold.
Returning to Elaine, if her reluctance to support boycott isn’t because of a love for Israel, then what is the reason? She answered the question by referencing diaspora Jews.

I think this [boycott] is the issue that I do get most feedback about from Jewish people. I think they feel most strongly about it. I think they feel very concerned about boycotts, and I wonder if that’s a function of the amount of PR time that the Israeli embassy and Israel is putting into putting this as a freedom of speech issue. So I’m suspicious of the anti-boycott arguments from the outset.

This reintroduces the strategic argument, an argument centred around diaspora Jews rather than Israel. Though Elaine felt part of this Jewish collectivity, this is no straightforward ‘because it alienates the Jews, I oppose it’. It is also worthwhile noting that no-one else talked so straightforwardly of emotional attachment as a reason to reconsider boycott. Thus while emotions are important to explain movement mobilisation (Nepsted and Smith 2001; Barker 2001a), they don’t appear so useful in explaining subsequent movement trajectories.

Elaine’s comment about the Israeli PR machine playing up the fear of boycott indicates that as much as some disagreed with boycott as an effective campaigning tool, they saw themselves as being on the other side to anti-boycotters such as those in the group Engage. In fact, as part of the radicalisation of this movement, the boycott tactic is becoming increasingly acceptable. Rather than all-out boycott, people and groups in this movement are moving towards promoting selective or ‘smart’ sanctions, particularly on settlement goods, such as the joint JfJfP-J-BIG ‘bitter herbs’ campaign to persuade supermarkets not to buy herbs from the Occupied Territories. The survey alluded to above indicates that JfJfP is being pushed by activist elements within its membership towards a fuller support of boycott. What has allowed this shift is a growing ambient acceptability of selective sanctions, as indicated by the recent move by the British government to impose labelling on settlement produce (Macintyre 2008). The increasing visibility of the boycott tactic by the PSC has also contributed to its growing acceptability. As an interesting signal of possibly changing attitudes among Jews, in an online poll in the Jewish Chronicle, 69% of the 478 respondents indicated that they would not buy settlement goods (Jewish Chronicle 2008).
From widening the field of activism to supporting the boycott

Supporters of boycott are less interested in the Jewish community than those who rejected the tactic. I first examine how these people consider the terrain of worried inarticulate Jews a fairly barren landscape for effective activism, which explains why they feel justified in disregarding the main anti-boycott argument – that boycott alienates the community. I next examine how and why movement members choose to work in the outside world, talking about how this work is considered useful in combating antisemitism and rendering the Palestine DIM more effective. However, there is a paradox in speaking ‘as a Jew opposed to Israel’. On one hand this disposition, by drawing on the ascribed link between Jews and Israel, reinforces the link. On the other hand, by queering the ethnic category ‘the Jews’, participants seek to remove this ethnic element from discussions about Israel/Palestine. I end by discussing how supporting the Palestine DIM and the Palestinian call to boycott is linked in some cases to a greater recognition of Palestinian political subjectivity.

In attitudes towards the community, there is no firm division between supporters and rejectors of boycott; it is more correct to talk of a change of emphasis. Though most supporters of boycott care about Jewishness and the community, they tend towards the view that the Jewish community is not a fertile terrain of activism. I term this belief in the ineffectiveness of appealing to the Jewish community, ‘the argument from despair’. This argument also exists in relation to Israel, it is the belief that people are so close-minded in Israel that it is necessary to do something extreme to wake them up, and furthermore, the boycott is a means to do so:

    The main thing about boycott is not whether it would hurt economically. It’s whether you can make noise that would make people think. Because you know the famous Israeli expression, ‘Doesn’t matter what the Goyim think, it’s what the Jews do’. (Ronnie)

Ronnie, like some other supporters of boycott, has many ties with Israel, which undermines the argument that those supporting the boycott do so thoughtlessly or are ignorant about the country. For some, supporting boycott is uncomfortable, but politically necessary. A boycott campaign would make Israelis and other Jews realise that the world is starting to take Israeli abuses seriously. One finds a similar attitude from Emma, a member of JfJfP with a long history of left-liberal activism and involvement in a parliamentary political party:

    Jews for Justice is partly against the boycott, but I’m not totally convinced that we don’t need something like that. Because I think we need to do
something significant now. [...] If I remember, Europe gives Israel a special
deal economically and not Palestinians. We’re just giving them too much
support. So I’ve some sympathy with us doing some enormous gesture that
really makes a difference and really stands out.

For Emma, the transgressive nature and enormity of the boycott is precisely the argument in
its favour. Social movement participants continually debate whether moderate or disruptive
tactics are the most effective, with most research favouring the efficacy of disruption (Giugni,
McAdam, and Tilly 1999). Certainly Emma appeared to appreciate the importance of
dramatic as well as ‘responsible’ politics. Ronnie, with his opinions based on years of living
in Israel, was equally dismissive of Israeli self-awareness (though more positive about the
radical peace movement than Emma). As he said about Israelis’ state of denial (Cohen 2001)
- ‘it’s like most Israelis – we call it living in the bubble. They don’t want to know, they don’t
want to know’.

This position was echoed by Rose, an older Jewish woman, active in her synagogue. When I
asked about the boycott she responded,

I haven’t decided, but by and large I think now I am in favour. Because one
has to do something. It’s not a question of pricking their conscience, it’s more
a kind of wakeup call. I think somehow or other Jews in Israel are very
enclosed and don’t understand much of what’s going on.

While the idea of the boycott as a dialogue opener sounds improbable, for some it is a means
of talking to someone who would otherwise be deaf. The belief that more diplomatic appeals
to the Jewish community or Israelis are futile is only part explanation for why people thought
boycott appropriate. There are also positive reasons, based on the effectiveness of appealing
to the outside world. In the next subsection I discuss why people believe it is effective to
work in the ambient British field ‘as a Jew’, and the effect this has on their activism.

**Working in the outside world: effectiveness and paradox**

When interviewing participants, I asked several why they hadn’t joined the PSC. While some
talked of problems they had with the PSC (discussed in chapter eight), others replied that they
could be more effective within a Jewish group (or had also joined the PSC). Effectiveness
was seen in two ways, ways which are both complementary and contradictory – first, because
people felt it useful that Jewish criticism of Israel was recognised in the wider world, and
secondly to undermine the importance of Jewish ethnicity when talking about Israel/Palestine. Dealing with the first case; by speaking ‘as Jews’ movement members felt they were combating incipient antisemitism and promoting pluralism in the Palestine DIM, as well as increasing their own usefulness in the broader struggle for Palestinian rights. As with motivations for involvement in the Jewish field, the specifically Jewish motive and the wider political one were seen as complementary. I first examine this and then turn to the paradox of invoking yet queering Jewish identity.

By coming out as Jews opposed to Israel, activists can fight for the pluralism of the movement and counter any incipient antisemitism in pro-Palestinian activities. The dominant attitude towards the PSC is less that it is antisemitic but rather as Emma put it,

I slightly anticipate that they get muddled between what’s a Jew and what is Israel. And that’s the great fear that everyone had over here I think – that Jews are identified with Israel to such an extent.

Differentiating Israel from the Jews is a concern of some in this movement; it may derive from an emotional ‘not in my name’ approach towards Israel’s atrocities, but also from the understanding that ‘not in our name’ is an useful political stance, and from the need of all social movements to portray themselves as worthy, and hence removed from the increasingly stigmatised space that Israel represents. It may also derive from the wish to combat antisemitism. Groups in this movement often talk about doing so (IJV 2007; JfJfP 2006, 2009). I was thus surprised to find that no interviewee felt antisemitism to be an important threat. As Charles, an active member of both PSC and JfJfP expressed it:

If you look on the internet of course there are people who post on pro-Palestinian sites who are raving antisemites. I mean that’s obvious. Frankly what do you expect? But that’s quite different to assessing what the objective weight of this sort of thing is. This is a different question. Alienated Muslim youth in Britain and France often hate Jews in ways that are antisemitic, extrapolate from Palestine to antisemitism and that’s a real problem, but they don’t tend to be involved in the Palestine Solidarity Movement.

Participants’ unwillingness to prioritise antisemitism is perhaps not solely an objective appraisal as to its unimportance. It is also a response to a Zionist use of the threat of antisemitism to bind Jews together behind Israel and to smear opponents (Bourne 2004).

59 For instance: ‘Our signatories confirm that a visible Jewish/Israeli presence at anti-war demonstrations is proving a powerful tool for building bridges of goodwill and understanding with Muslim communities, essential when the events in the Middle East threaten to provoke an increase in antisemitism here’ (IJV 2009).
Participants have been willing to counter these slurs, such as opposing the attempt to brand the 2004 European Social Forum as antisemitic because it concerned itself with Israel/Palestine (JfJfP minutes. 14 November 2004). Though wary about branding people as antisemites and willing to combat unfair slurs on the Palestine DIM, participants still feel Jewish groups have a useful role in keeping antisemitism a marginal affair. This is not only seen as ‘good for the Jews’, but good for ambient society, and specifically good for the Palestine DIM not to be tainted by antisemites. Publicising the existence of a Jewish opposition to Israel (linked with an Israeli opposition) helps prevent a facile identification of the Israeli state and Jews, a tenet of antisemitism as much as of Zionism. Frances from JfJfP argued that even if antisemitism is not that important, it was still necessary to combat it because,

if you don’t you’re selling the pass on the issue, which is about accepting people as people rather than as the names you give. Looking at what they do rather than who they are. And I think we’ve done quite well. I actually do feel that we’ve achieved something, certainly in the PSC, in relation to antisemitism.

A constant target, especially among anti-Zionists in the movement, has been the Israeli jazz musician, Gilad Atzmon whose words, if not antisemitic, certainly border on it. He is targeted partly because of his own virulent attacks on participants in Jewish groups but mainly because he is involved in the Palestine DIM, with those attacking him believing that Atzmon is a hindrance to Palestinian solidarity work (JSG 2006; Greenstein 2007).

Entering the wider terrain of activism is not just about promoting pluralism in the Palestine DIM, but about fighting directly for Palestinian rights. People soon realise that their words carry weight in the outside world if they speak up ‘as a Jew’. This is because ambient society valorises the link between diaspora Jews and Israel, and more generally grants recognition to ethnic claims. Jewish criticism of Israel is certainly encouraged by the Palestine DIM, since it helps confirm the worthiness of their cause. Jewish activists’ presence in pro-Palestinian activism can give hope to Palestinians and other activists (Segal 2009), and the opinions of Palestinians that the outside world needs to hear Jewish criticism of Israel is a motivating

60 For instance, in a subsequently amended blog entry: ‘We must begin to take the accusation that the Jewish people are trying to control the world very seriously […] American Jewry makes any debate on whether the ‘Protocols of the elders of Zion’ are an authentic document or rather a forgery irrelevant. American Jews do try to control the world, by proxy’ (Atzmon 2003/7).
factor for some people. In addition, engaging in this terrain can be seen as cross-cultural dialogue by other means, undermining the clash of civilisations narrative.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that such practices strengthen the idea of a primordial link between Jews and the Jewish state, regardless whether the link is through criticism or support. Critics of multiculturalism often point to its limited success in encouraging pluralism, arguing that speaking from the position of particular identities hardens them and silences subaltern subjectivities within ethnic minorities (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Bhattachryya 1998; Goldberg 2002). In this instance there is the possibility that identifying ‘as a Jew’ doesn’t so much decouple diaspora Jews from Israel as reinforce the idea that Jews have a special role to speak out about Israel. This is a point made by Neve Gordon (2005), when reviewing two all-Jewish criticisms of Israel (Kushner and Solomon 2003; Shatz 2004). He acknowledged the political effectiveness of taking a ‘Jews only’ strategy in compiling these anthologies, but pointed out that this strategy encourages tribalism and ‘ends up reproducing some of the most basic biases regarding who can criticise Israel and legitimately discuss anti-Semitism or the connection between Israel and Judaism’ (Gordon 2005: 105).

Some people in the movement are keenly aware of this trap, and so the second reason that people speak as Jews is to remove ethnicity from the political field and encourage and enable non-Jews to talk of Israel/Palestine. Only one interviewee, James, disregarded the claims of ethnicity entirely, evincing complete disinterest in the views of the Jewish community, saying, ‘The Jewish community is a small minority and the issue about solidarity with Palestinians has to be taken out of that ghetto’. This view echoes that of the American activist, Esther Kaplan, who argued that it was a positive development that the Palestinian issue has now ‘broken free from its tribal ways’ (Kaplan 2003: 82).

However, James’s view is not shared by others. Cognizant of the power of ethnic claims, others believe it more effective to use their ascribed ethnicity to queer the categories of ethnicity. Speaking as a Jew can be used to disembed Zionist claims from Jewishness, thereby undercutting Zionist appeals to ethnic authenticity and normativity. As Annette said,

I think it’s really important to identify yourself as a Jew. So every letter I write, I don’t just say this is my opinion. I say ‘As a British Jew, I am appalled at Israel’s latest’ whatever it is, you know. [...] Jews don’t do this, Israelis do this because of the political situation in which they find themselves. That’s the whole point with something like JFJP existing. It’s for
people to be able to see that there is a political situation we’re talking about here.

Paradoxically then, some Jews identify as Jews in order to problematise and remove the ethnic element from the wider political field. They seek to create a discourse whereby the automatic equation of Jews and Israel is shattered, enabling others to speak about Israel/Palestine. Annette talks of those who

...use their Jewishness to try and do something good. To try and break through this kind of – well it’s like an iron wall really, that stops mainstream society tackling the question of Israel because they’re so afraid of, there’s such sensitivity. ‘You can’t criticise the Jews – look what they’ve been through.’ ‘You can’t criticise “the Jews”’ and we wanted to say ‘you may criticise. You have our permission – criticise Israel! It deserves to be criticised.’

Enabling non-Jews to switch from their position of ‘you can’t criticise “the Jews”’ to criticising Israel, questions the relevance of this unitary category ‘the Jews’. This does not just deploy Jewish identity; it is a programmatic queering of this identity. Both exploiting and disrupting identity are, as Joshua Gamson (1995) points out, reasonable tactics for social movements to take. He suggests the immediate political gains made by exploiting identity need to be weighed up against the long-term disadvantages of reifying identity categories. At the same time Gamson recognises that there may be times when ‘an ethnic maneuver loosens cultural categories’ and it seems that some in this movement are endeavouring to do precisely that (Gamson 1995: 403). I view arguments for the inherent heterogeneity of Jewish identity as another way to do so, a means whereby the power of Jewish identity claims are paradoxically both applied and restrained in relation to Israel/Palestine.

**The outside world and affinity with Palestinians: effect on boycott**

Both through publicly deploying and queering Jewish identity, the outside world is seen as a legitimate terrain of activities by activists. Those who view this as their primary terrain don’t worry so much about alienating the Jewish community and are more likely to support the ambient boycott campaign. For those in J-BIG, it was not the ‘purity’ of the campaign which appealed but this effectiveness. Indeed, one member, Dolores, was very critical of those organisations which fetishised ideological purity. At the same time she was dissatisfied with JFJP as a conduit for effective action, disagreeing with Neil about the benefits of a wide-ranging group:
But because it [JfJfP] is such a wide spectrum, they can’t agree on anything. So they can’t decide on any policies or really do very much.

Another J-BIG supporter, Rhuna, was frustrated with what she saw as JfJfP immobilisation and cravenness towards the community. In contrast, she portrayed J-BIG as useful in that at least it did something (for more on J-BIG’s activity-oriented approach, chapter five). Equally, for James, involved in the academic boycott campaign, effectiveness and not feel-good solidarity was the main justification for the campaign. He tolerantly dismisses sporting and goods boycotts as not measuring up: ‘I mean there’s been a Boycott Israeli Goods movement for some time. I mean it’s support, solidarity – the solidarity movement has been very involved with it, but actually it has marginal effect on Israel.’ In contrast, he saw the academic and cultural boycott as significantly affecting Israel. Support for boycott cannot then be accurately characterised as thoughtless, detached radicalism.

While solidarity with Palestinians may not be unthinking, nevertheless such solidarity is an important motivation for action and directs activists towards boycott. Several interviewees spoke of the positive feelings that resulted when Palestinians validated their activism. Such people are more inclined to understand that the terrain of activity lies at least partially in the Palestinian domain and to view Palestinians as political actors in their own right, with whom (and with whose struggle) they feel affinity – that is an emotional closeness based on networked ties. One example is Alma, whose experiences of Israel/Palestine helped radicalise her (chapter six). Here she describes a particular encounter with Palestinians there:

We were talking to Palestinians in refugee camps and they said ‘what are you doing here?’ And we told them why and the first reaction we got from a young man, a very nice young man: ‘Oh you’re Jewish!’ he said. ‘Oh we so much want to make nice with the Jews, because what we want is for you to go back. You can make a difference.’ [...] They knew the difference between Israeli Jews, diaspora Jews – more I would say than Jews in this country do – and they were very excited. They said, ‘Umm well you’re British, OK. Well we’re more keen on American Jews - they really make a difference (laughter). British are – yeah like, you’re number two’. They were talking about what makes the difference to the Israeli economy.

Alma’s encounter was one where Palestinians are seen as attractive individuals with politically savvy opinions, and where Jews are seen as objects rather than all-important subjects. Implicit in this narrative is the obvious need to take Palestinian opinions on board, and what they feel ‘making a difference’ means. With boycott increasingly promoted by
Palestinians due to the shutting down of other means of resistance, accepting their political subjectivity increasingly means accepting, or at least engaging with, their promotion of boycott.

We talked to an awful lot of people - very political people, Palestinians –who were saying you know, this [trade with Israel] is what supports the economy that’s fighting us. (Alma)

The key word here is ‘political’. As opposed to the human rights discourse that sees Palestinians as victims or recipients of largesse, this vantage point engages with their politics. It appears that identification with Palestinians as equals, which some do and some don’t, is a factor in determining political attitudes. For instance, Leslie described the importance of conveying to the outside world – including her Jewish friends – the reality of Palestinian experience, and the normality and common humanity of Palestinian people. For her, supporting the boycott is an obvious continuation of this practice. Returning to James, one reason he supports boycott is that such gestures of solidarity give hope to Palestinians. Recalling that his prime motivation is that boycott be effective, this particular argument for boycott is predicated on Palestinians and their actions and feelings mattering, on them being political subjects.

Not all supporters of boycott referred to Palestinians as political subjects. The argument from despair or acceptance of boycott as a useful weapon in the broader British terrain was sufficient for some. Key though is that nobody who rejected boycott appeared concerned with Palestinian political subjectivity. This indicates that though most actions and ideology are primarily based on local contention and that politics in this movement are mostly local, not all are. Or, as I argue in the conclusion, contention on the local field enables engagement with the distant fields of contention in Israel/Palestine (and, of course, vice versa). In the next chapter I deal more with actors’ relationship with Palestinians. Below I discuss their relationship with Israelis, asking what effect Israeli leftists have on the movement.
The role of the Israeli left

I have come to see that what many Jewish people want to celebrate is the existence of at least 'ten just Jews' living and working in Israel…What if there aren't ten just Jews in Eretz Yisroel? (Samuels 2003)⁶¹

Here, I argue that while Israelis do have political weight for this movement they have very limited political voice, and thus their weight modifies the importance of local contention, but does not significantly alter it. In arguing this, I firstly look at how the Israeli left is boosted by Jewish groups and what these groups seek from this connection. ⁶² I argue that promoting the Israeli left is *self-promotion* in a way, a way into the ‘Jewish community’, and of linking with activists’ own Jewishness. It is also a means to showcase Jewish dissidence to the wider Palestine DIM. These reasons can be examined under the heading ‘institutional appropriation’, the legitimation of domestic actors by international contacts, an important mechanism in transnational activism (Tarrow 2001, 2005). Beyond that, the existence of the Israeli left is an important part of these groups’ political imaginary. This does not indicate that participants (often quite critical of Israeli leftists) are centrally influenced by Israeli opinions and I draw on minutes of JfJfP meetings to argue that what is sought for is Israelis who agree with the prior political positions of British groups. In addition, the figure of Israeli leftists is used by some British activists to dampen down criticism of Israel. The different uses of Israeli leftists by British Jewish critics of Israel indicates their complex relationship with these leftists, as well as highlighting the fact that different members of this movement hold different opinions on how the movement should act in Britain.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Israeli left was very sparingly referenced by interviewees. The reason for my surprise is that support for Israeli leftists is one of the pillars of this movement. The JfJfP membership brochure claims that: ‘We support Israeli peace and human-rights organisations morally and financially’ (JfJfP 2009). Indeed, some of JfJfP’s most labour-

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⁶¹ The phrase ‘ten just Jews’ refers to the biblical story in which God failed to find ten just *men* in Sodom, following which he destroyed the city (Genesis 18).

⁶² By ‘The Israeli Left’, I mean Israeli groups that position themselves as critical of their government’s policies towards Palestinians. ‘The Israeli Left’ is a vague and somewhat inadequate collective noun, and it may be more accurate to refer to ‘the Israeli far left’, since there are only a few thousand people involved in these groupings and their views are far outside the established political consensus (Laor 2004). Nevertheless from my own observations, I find this label more useful—possibly because of its vagueness—than other formulations, such as ‘the Israeli peace movement’. I reject this term because many avowedly peace groups such as Peace Now support military action against Palestinians (ha-Cohen 2006). When referring to these groups I use the term ‘the official peace movement’. I also reject the term ‘the Israeli resistance’ since this term appears to be an appropriation from Palestinian resistance. While some Israeli leftists do engage in active resistance to the state, many don’t, and are content to engage in educational work or monitoring the effect of the occupation (Lentin 2008a; Resh 2007).
intensive activities have been to organise speaking tours of refuseniks and fundraisers for Israeli groups. JSG also regularly highlights the activities of Israeli left groups. Even IJV, though not established to deal directly with the Middle East, lists over a hundred Israeli groups on its website.

The minutes and internal correspondence of JfJfP show the vast amount of time and effort it expends on promoting Israeli leftist groups. This was perhaps at its height in 2002-04, with its refusenik tours. For instance, its autumn 2002 refusenik tour involved 27 meetings, with trade unions and other groups tapped for donations to refuseniks. Tours in 2003 and early 2004 were equally heavily promoted, raising several thousand pounds for the refuseniks. One reason this movement works with Israelis is to access other British Jews. As the minutes of the 2004 AGM meeting has it: ‘legitimacy in the diaspora [is] enhanced by links in Israel’, a prime example of institutional appropriation (JfJfP AGM minutes 9th May 2004. Section: ‘work in the community’). Some refusenik events were organised in Jewish spaces, such as the invitation passed along to JfJfP members to join refuseniks at both a Liberal and an Orthodox synagogue (JfJfP mailout, 24 October 2004). Promoting refuseniks may be seen as a way of joining the community, or at least of affecting it. Supporting this contention, a caution sounded about refuseniks in the November 2004 minutes of JfJfP was because they hadn’t attracted a Jewish audience, not that they hadn’t attracted any audience (JfJfP minutes. 14 November 2004). With people wondering as to its usefulness, refusenik work was scaled down without being eliminated completely.

As symbols, refuseniks and others on the Israeli left represent the figure of ‘the good Israeli’. This is a figure fundamental to Palestinian solidarity activists’ understanding of Israel/Palestine. The good Israeli is seen as a key to unlocking the conflict, analogous to the figure of ‘the rational Palestinian’. They are both figures constructed out of the necessary political optimism of social movements and their need to believe in the possibility of success. In addition the good Israeli is an analogue to the figure which some members of this movement are trying to cut in their own ethnic field, and so there are feelings of affinity. Promotion of good Israelis is also undertaken in the search for recognition from the Palestine DIM, and the promotion of pluralism within it. By showing Jewish Israeli activists suffering for their beliefs, this movement challenges what several interviewees saw as a tendency within the PSC to engage in a lazy, counterproductive demonization of all Israelis. Frances of JfJfP felt this promotion of pluralism had been successful:
When we go into Trafalgar square [at PSC demos], the whole of the square explodes in applause. When we talk about the Israelis there’s a fantastic response, which there wasn’t a few years ago. So we’ve achieved a recognition that there are Israelis who do sacrifice.

This melds the recognition that Israeli leftists achieve with respect for British Jewish opposition to Israel. This need not be seen as vainglorious self-promotion. As mentioned before, knowledge of Jewish activism can give hope to Palestinians and undermines the prevalent clash of civilisations narrative.

Despite the importance of the figure of the good Israeli, there was little reference to actually existing Israeli leftists by interviewees. This signals a certain underlying mutual contempt between Israelis and diaspora Jews. While some interviewees were in contact with the Israeli left, most didn’t mention having any contact with Israelis other than what Charles termed ‘radical Israeli expatriates in Britain’. Some of these radical expatriates are active in the Palestine DIM, but often at a certain distance to diaspora Jewish groups. While these leftwing Israelis had been involved in JPUK and some were in J-BIG, they weren’t particularly active in the larger groups trying to affect the Jewish community, JfJfP and IJV, having perhaps a different (often more anti-Zionist) agenda, or coming from a different social location.

The absence of expatriate Israelis does not really explain the distance between these British groups and leftists in Israel. To account for this, I draw on Yitzhak Laor’s (2004) argument that Western liberals try to find ‘moderate’ ‘reasonable’ Israeli intellectuals to mouth platitudes about peace and suffering, since such figures accord with their prior framing of the struggle. He argues that it is not the arguments or the ideas of ‘the good Israeli’ that is needed by Western liberals but their presence, as this presence sanctifies their pre-existing narrative about Israel/Palestine, namely that it is all about two equal sides squabbling over the same piece of land (Laor 2004. Also Gamson 1992).

Laor’s view that the ideas of the Israeli left aren’t required needs some qualifying with reference to this movement. I earlier talked about how some people in the movement identified with Israeli dissidents, and indeed some are expatriate dissidents. Recalling also the importance this movement accords to concrete knowledge and information, the constant reposting of articles from Israeli and Palestinian authors on the JPUK site or in JfJfP mailouts indicate that Israeli voices are important in enabling participants to understand conditions in Israel, just as Palestinian voices are required to understand their specific conditions.
Nevertheless, their actual opinions are often secondary. An example of this is how the Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling’s name was deployed by one interviewee. Though Kimmerling was anti-boycott (Kimmerling 2005), the interviewee talked of Kimmerling as agreeing with his own critical support for boycott. The presence was required, the ideas ignored. More common were interviewees who acknowledged Israeli leftists, while disagreeing with them.

The role of Israeli leftists, such as on the JPUK list or in JfJfP mailouts seems primarily to fill in the details of the horrors. With one solitary exception they were not referred to as motivating anybody into action. In fact one can go further and say that for some, the official peace movement was seen as a block to progress, or a stage they had to discard to reach a proper understanding of the situation. A distinction was made by some interviewees between what one called ‘the real peace movement’ and the moderate Zionist one, as encapsulated by Peace Now. Many interviewees were critical of Peace Now, both because its British affiliate was hostile to the rest of the Israel-critical network, and because of the increasingly hawkish positions it takes in Israel (Burston 2006). For some, Peace Now was a stage they grew out of. When Justin talks about his ‘loose Peace Nowish kind of anti-settler perspective - if I thought about it’, it is to juxtapose this with the actual political consciousness he now possesses. Equally Dolores, previously active in Peace Now UK, and with many connections to the official Israeli peace movement, eventually got disillusioned with them:

And in the end I came to think about Meretz and Peace Now was they were pretending to be very liber…they thought of themselves still as very liberal, very leftwing. But in effect they were defending what Israel was doing, they were defending the Israeli government, without really realising what they were doing.

Interviewees also expressed problems with refuseniks. While Leslie admired Israelis who refuse to serve, there was also a certain impatience.

I’m saying, ‘Ok, I believe that’s difficult. I believe you – that’s really difficult. You still choose to do it. You still don’t have to choose to go into the IDF, you’ve still got a choice no matter how hard it is.’ That’s not a good enough reason you know. Your life is not in danger if you don’t go in.

63 This was when the Israeli historian Benny Morris’s work was cited, Morris had uncovered many details of the Nakba and published them in an early Israeli expose of the events of 1948 (Morris 1987).
Thus, refusing to serve is praised but also demanded as the minimum acceptable. Likewise for Emma being a refusenik was the default position. It is perhaps less that the Israeli peacenik is heroic, more that he is normal, like us, against which the abnormality of Israeli society is measured. While Israeli leftists are seen as having useful things to say, several interviewees commented that even ‘good Israelis’ were so used to living in a racist state, that they had, unbeknownst to themselves, become corrupt. For instance, Darragh coming from a staunch anti-Zionist perspective, supported JAZ criticism of an ICAHD statement that said 95% of house demolitions weren’t done for security reasons (the criticism was that this statement implied that the other 5% were acceptable). Darragh’s comment was that ‘there’s far too much pandering to Israel’s security agenda’.

This scepticism explains why activists often disregard the opinions of Israeli leftists even while their informed critiques of Israel are circulated and appreciated. I next examine this process of selective hearing, before arguing that the figure of ‘the good Israeli’ still has an effect and functions to an extent as a deadweight on activism, deployed by some in the movement to block out uncomfortable Palestinian voices and give exaggerated weight to Israel’s concerns.

An illustration of the relationship between British Israel-critical Jewish groups and the Israeli left can be found in the way that JfJfP dealt with Israeli leftist opinion about sanctions. While the JfJfP leadership opposed the idea of general boycott, some advocated targeted sanctions as a form of action (JfJfP minutes. 14 November 2004), something the group has subsequently implemented. Having agreed to ask Israeli groups what they thought of sanctions, they discovered that although only two Israeli groups responded, the they were opposed to any sanctions (JfJfP minutes. 12 December 2004). This information was relegated to a terse note in the minutes, and not acted upon. While the two negative responses were dismissed, an indirect response to them came in an email in January 2005 where a long ICAHD statement in favour of selective sanctions was sent out by JfJfP in an internal email (ICAHD 2005). Not only was ICAHD’s point of view printed, JfJfP also sent a message of congratulations ‘for your very thoughtful and useful statement on sanctions’ (JfJfP mailout 31 January 2005). While it may appear from the email that JfJfP was taking its cue from ICAHD over sanctions and learning from this Israeli group, the significant issue was that ICAHD was selected as the group JfJfP would take its ideas from. Subsequently JfJfP’s relationship with ICAHD has deepened.
Two themes emerge from this. Firstly, British groups are able to pick and choose in the marketplace as to which Israeli group they promote (evident in their earlier patronage of refuseniks). Secondly, they still need Israeli groups for legitimation, the figure of ‘the good Israeli’ is too weighty to discard. Yet the need to valorise this figure does not mean a particularly close relationship with Israelis. Perhaps the strong institutional connection to the Israeli left can be compared to a similar connection the official community has with official Israel that papers over growing feelings of disconnection.

Nevertheless, this weight and connection has an effect. The figure of the Israeli leftist is sometimes deployed to strengthen the argument of people who wish to limit the scope of certain types of activism. Since the good Israeli plays an important role in enabling foreigners to believe that change is possible, activists play on and are influenced by the fear of alienating or isolating this fragile figure. The way this operates can be seen in this exchange with Jeremy, someone who was strongly influenced by the human rights discourse.

Me: If Palestinians themselves – Palestinian society - have called for boycott…should we be opposing it? That is the question

Jeremy: Yes, I don’t know. I still think it’s very dangerous because there’s a lot of admirable people in the Jewish academic movement who are fighting for the Palestinians.

Me: In the Israeli one?

Jeremy: Yes in the Israeli one – I mean inside Israeli universities. I went to see a very active woman at Tel Aviv University who is helping B’tselem [an Israeli human rights organisation] and things like that. I think it’s a very blunt instrument and I don’t really see it does any good. It just gets people’s hackles up and doesn’t do us any good.

Clearly for Jeremy, what Palestinians say isn’t the question, they are simply ignored. After the ‘very active woman’ in Tel Aviv University is used to block out Palestinians (notably she does not say anything either, her existence is all that’s important), then the usual political argument as to the divisiveness and ineffectiveness of boycott can be brought into play. It is unclear to what extent diaspora Israel-critical Jews hide behind the figure of the good Israeli and to what extent they feel constrained by it, in engaging in acceptable activities.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that this figure is deployed to restrain activism that may impinge on Israel. This has implications for the Israeli left since it appears to fulfil the role the Israeli government wishes - as ambassadors for Israeli tolerance and moderation that serve to
restrain anti-Israel action, irrespective of whether these Israeli leftists desire that particular role. 64

Conclusion: The transnational political actor as rooted cosmopolitan
This chapter has concentrated on different views of the boycott campaign to illustrate what movement participants feel is at stake and how this belief is created. Those who support boycott don’t do so because they wish to posture on the issue and become risk-free radicals, those who reject the tactic don’t do so because they believe in Israeli exceptionalism and are scared to take controversial positions. Instead positions on the boycott are determined primarily by what participants believe to be effective action on the political terrain they have chosen to contend.

This underlines the primacy of questions of political effectiveness for members of this movement - the position on the thorny tactic of boycott is taken in response to the question ‘what is effective action’. Not ‘what action makes you feel happy inside’. It is a point worth stressing; people are not simply involved in movements to feel good about themselves, to build up their identity, or to express themselves. People do all this in social movements, just as they do in other walks of life. But that is not why people get involved, stay involved or take the positions they do. They do so based on what they feel is at stake in the wider world and how they can affect it. This is a plea for the political, for centring the political consciousness of movement members rather than identity as determinants of their actions and as explanation of what differentiates one movement from another.

At the same time, actors are constrained by their identities, particularly their ascribed identities in whichever field they are contending. In this chapter I have argued that activist formation of their political understanding occurs primarily, though not exclusively, in response to local contention. It is legitimate to ask to what extent activists lose themselves in contending within these local fields, such as in the struggle to ensure the Palestine DIM stays

64 This process is not confined to Jewish groups. One of the most egregious examples I have encountered was observing an Irish anarchist group, the WSM, deploying the existence of Israeli groups like Anarchists Against the Wall (AATW) in Israel/Palestine to argue against boycott. This was despite the fact that AATW supports the Palestinian-led call to boycott. If an avowedly revolutionary group can be so influenced by the (dead)weight of the figure of ‘the good Israeli’ to ignore the demands of their Israeli comrades and Palestinians, small wonder that this figure also affects diaspora Jewish groups.
pluralist – a struggle, which as the Atzmon example shows, can quickly turn into infighting. Recalling Zygmunt Bauman’s comments (2001: 168) that when people can’t affect what’s important they turn to what is less important but which they can affect, this concentration on local fights may be related not only to contested notions of effectiveness but also to the perceived hopelessness of the situation in Israel/Palestine.  

However, this dynamic also accords with other studies of transnational activists which emphasise the importance of the local terrain of contention in forming activist identities and in providing a site for claims (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). In explaining this phenomenon, Tarrow refers to transnational activists (or at least those who prove effective) as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’, by which he means ‘people who grow up in and remain closely linked to domestic networks and opportunities’ (2005: xii). In defining the concept in such a narrow way, referring to the mechanics of activism, Tarrow simply argues for the effectiveness of linking domestic opportunities to transnational activism. Rooted cosmopolitanism has a deeper meaning though, beyond questions of effective strategy and in chapter eight I take a more detailed look at the concept, arguing that this description accords with the self-image of many movement participants as balanced between community and civitas.

Somewhat supporting Bourdieu’s argument about the primacy of field doxa, participant positions on the boycott show how the terrain of activism affects actor ideology. Yet it affects ideology, it does not determine it. Due to the overlapping of fields of contention and the fact that fields are only semi-autonomous, one can speak only of a tendency for actors within a particular field to accept the field doxa, rather than a direct correlation between actor habitus and field doxa. Fields are after all not total systems, and while the researcher may be tempted to treat them as discrete entities, this fails to take into account the multi-field contention that all social movements engage in. As I discuss in the conclusion, an approach that takes into account the permeability of fields highlights the importance of exogamic change.

This raises the question of why certain actors decide that either the Jewish community or the Palestinian people or the Palestine Solidarity Movement is the prime agent for change. In answering this question, issues of personal affinity, social position and identity choices undoubtedly play a part. However, this decision is also the result of considered political

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65 In this context it is worthwhile noting that infighting in the PSC and IPSC has been growing over the past several years (personal communications).
judgement - one cannot reduce these political positions to underlying identitarian choices. Such a reduction obscures what actors themselves consider at stake, and it is no coincidence that this reduction figures prominently in polemics by enemies of the movement, since it rejects the possibility of self-aware actors engaging in change and development, a possibility this movement promotes and relies upon.

Nevertheless it is legitimate to observe that by being influenced by and seeking to influence local fields – whether that of ambient society or the Jewish field – this activism is somewhat solipsistic, seeking to influence the actors’ own world, and only peripherally influenced by the object of activism, namely Israel/Palestine and its inhabitants. If participant construction of what is at stake is directed by their subjectivity within the local field, then it could be claimed that transnational objects of solidarity have no place in this construction. In contrast, I argue that even if politics begins at home, it does not necessarily end there. I discussed, for example, how boycott supporters are influenced by the Palestinian field and its demands. To an extent this development is inherent in the political choices these actors have already taken. Their criticism of domestic Zionists as not being universal or Israelis as failing to properly consider Palestinians necessitates them to consider these issues, and be influenced by the discourses in this field. In Bourdieu’s phrase, actors within certain fields (or taking certain positions in certain fields) have a particular interest in the universal. In addition, actors in DIMs have a particular interest in the distant field, which in this case I believe exerts increasing influence. I am not claiming a simple turning towards Palestinians, and in the next chapter I discuss this troubled and difficult relationship with the Palestinian field in more depth.

Nevertheless, I argue that the Palestinian field does have an effect. Returning to the diagram at the end of chapter three, it would be useful to apply the triangular tension I postulated between actor habitus, distant fields and local fields more specifically to this movement and their subjectivity. In chapter six I discussed actor interaction with local fields, both ambient British and Jewish ethnic. In this chapter I argued that actors’ attitude towards Palestinian subjectivity both depends on and directs where their primary field of contention is, and how they contend it. Thus the relationship works both ways, with Palestinian subjectivity affecting the local field of contention and actor subjectivity.
While choosing the Jewish field as the local field involves a degree of muffling Palestinian subjectivity, it would be false to draw a dichotomy between the Jewish and the ambient British political field of contention. The Palestine DIM as part of the ambient British field engages in similar selective framing, incorporating elements such as human rights discourse which silences Palestinians. The tendency that an attentiveness to local fields of contention might objectivise the object of solidarity clearly does not just apply to Jewish groups. More generally, the mechanism whereby one’s own dispositions and the object of activism is constructed through local contention and developed through tensions with that distant field may well be generalisable beyond the Palestine DIM to other DIMs. Such a framing of DIM purposes is useful in that it cuts through unsatisfactory altruist/self-interest and identity/instrumental dichotomies and allows us to study clear, overt processes of interaction.

Finally, actors’ understanding of Palestinian subjectivity is not only determined by the field of contention; the third element is the tension between the subjectivity of the social movement actor and Palestinians. Both the discursive repertoires that actors adopt to contend the terrain of activism and the need to grant themselves political subjectivity creates a certain tension with Palestinian political subjectivity. This is something many activists are well aware of and try to deal with. It is furthermore not a process confined to Jewish activists, but a general tendency in the Palestine DIM and may also be a general process of solidarity activism. In chapter eight I deal with this issue when studying how Palestinians have affected and been constructed in the processes of solidarity activism.
Chapter 8. Rooted cosmopolitans. The interaction between activists and Palestinians

‘The Palestinians want us to confess’. Thus Seth Farber glosses Marc Ellis’s words: ‘He says, the Palestinians want us to confess to them. He says we haven’t. It’s a mockery on Yom Kippur, all these rituals go on and not a word is said about the Palestinians’ (Farber 2005: 63).  

This statement reveals more of Ellis’s own beliefs that the Jews need to seek atonement rather than actual Palestinian desires. Such a statement was, in fairness, not expressed by any interviewee, and fails to recognise that rather than awaiting for Jews to confess, Palestinians seem barely aware of Jewish Israel-critical groups. This lack of awareness or interest is hardly surprising; it is a function of lack of contacts as well as the recent provenance and small size of these groups. The limited relevance of these groups to Palestinians is a salutary reminder and provides a useful contextualisation to the subject of this chapter, a discussion of how Palestinians figure in the political imaginary of Jewish Israel-critical groups and how this affects these groups’ activities.

I’ve characterised this movement as operating on both distant issues and immediate identity contestation, and now I focus on the former, on the relationship between the movement and the object of activism. The object of activism for this movement is not Palestinians as much as it is a political solution for Israel/Palestine based on some measure of justice for Palestinians (the vagueness of the term indicates disagreement as to whether this should include the right of return etc). Nevertheless, since Palestinians play the key role in ensuring such a solution (discussed in the introduction), the movement’s relationship with Palestinian subjectivities is of more than passing concern both to the researcher and to those within the movement, and this chapter discusses how this relationship or its absence affects the realisation of this movement’s goals. That this movement, in its DIM aspect, has a problematic relationship with the object of activism is undeniable. I examine these tensions in the context of similar tensions within the PSC, while situating them also within the specific discursive repertoire of this movement. My main argument is that while the Palestinian field is significant, movement actors’ self-conception as rooted cosmopolitans leads to a lack of

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Yom Kippur is the Day of Atonement for Jews, where Jews go to synagogue and seek atonement for their sins. Palestinians in the Occupied Territories would be aware of this day mainly because they are subject to a lockdown for the duration.
contact and denial of political subjectivity to Palestinians, and this hampers movement effectiveness.

First I examine the specific obstacles in the interaction between Jewish groups and Palestinians – practical and cultural issues as well as doubts as to the value of interacting with Palestinians. These obstacles are similar to those affecting the Palestine DIM and should not obscure the growing contact between Jewish groups and Palestinians.

Much of the chapter is devoted to investigating a primary site of these interactions – political tours to Israel/Palestine, since these tours are central in forming activist understandings of Palestinians and the situation in Israel/Palestine. They also offer a site of direct interactions between social movement actors and Palestinians, separate from the local field of contention and so provide a place to observe tensions between activist and Palestinian subjectivities. I argue that the default position of DIMs is to treat the object of activism as defenceless victims in order to enhance their own subjectivity as actors capable of understanding and getting involved in the political field. I next examine how Palestinians and participants on study trips manage to counter this ambient discursive imperialism, arguing that despite the problematics of such trips they allow some in the Palestinian field to affect activist consciousness and their local field of contention. This process is situated within a wider process in DIMs whereby change in the local field occurs through the importation by social movement actors of field-specific discourse of outside fields.

I conclude by looking at the specific political imaginary of this movement and how it relates to Palestinians. I contrast it to solidarity movements, drawing on how activists’ positions in the Jewish field have led many to take up a disposition of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ rather than solidarity. I question the validity of rooted cosmopolitanism as an effective motor for change. My argument is that by unfocusing from the Palestinian field, such a disposition hampers actors’ efficacy as agents for change and makes them more susceptible to the dominant discourses of the local fields they inhabit.

The problems of relating to Palestinians

We [JfJfP] have tried to search out a politics which allies with people on both the Israeli and the Palestinian side who support a certain kind of politics, rather than a blanket identification with the Palestinians or against the Israeli
government or whatever it is. [...] Not that we’ve necessarily done it adequately – certainly not on the Palestinian side. It’s difficult - communication is difficult, language is difficult, access is difficult. It’s much easier to see with the Israeli side and to find Israeli groups who, in a sense, act as mediators, which I think is fine, but is inadequate, and one of the areas where we ought to improve our actual intervention. (Peter)

The above quote is from a leading JfJfP member and taken from a JfJfP meeting in January 2008 where I presented a critique of their work, part of which was discussing the absence of Palestinians in their activities. The subsequent discussion largely focused on this issue, indicating this absence is real and is taken seriously. Few would disagree, when confronted with the argument, that Palestinians have an active role to play in bringing about a solution in Israel/Palestine; the problem is that Palestinians have little role in their activism. The quote summarises the reasons for this, which I categorise as a lack of desire for simple solidarity, the practical difficulties of contact with Palestinians, and the presence of Israelis as intermediaries. The feeling that JfJfP is not established to seek a ‘blanket identification with the Palestinians’ is linked to criticism of solidarity which I deal with later in the chapter. Here I address other practical and ideological obstacles to closeness with Palestinians in order to outline similarities and differences with other groups in the Palestine DIM. In this way I contextualise the direct interactions with Palestinians that occur in Palestine.

The problems that Peter talked of were attested to by several interviewees. Firstly there is a cultural divide, especially with Palestinians from Israel/Palestine, which leads to a certain formality. There is also a certain awkwardness with Palestinian exiles. As Dolores mused,

There’s a cultural difference. And we have found after meetings, we have gone off with Palestinians and had drinks with them. But somehow you’re very conscious that we are Jews and they are Palestinians. So it is a problem.

Dolores contrasted this awkwardness with the greater degree of comfort experienced with left-wing Israelis, an issue I also found on (non-Jewish) study trips to Israel (Landy 2008). A further difficulty with relating to Palestinian groups is the lack of cohesive Palestinian leadership in the diaspora. As Martin complained, speaking from his own experiences:

Part of the problem with working with Palestinians in the UK is that Palestinians are very badly organised in the UK. The Joint Committee for Palestine hardly ever functions, and when it does meet it doesn’t really do anything and very few bother turning up. The Palestine Community Association seems to be a social group more than anything.
Over the last number of years this situation has worsened, with the factionalisation of politics in the Occupied Territories mirrored in diaspora Palestinian organisations. There was genuine regret evinced by several interviewees that there is no coherent Palestinian leadership, nor any representative grouping in the Palestinian diaspora. As several interviewees said, there is no Palestinian ANC. The expectations that Palestinians should be united may be indicative of how the object of solidarity is seen as undifferentiated, but it may also stem from a practical desire to have an interlocutor, and from a wish that Palestinians offer more leadership to the Palestine DIM.

All DIMs related to Israel/Palestine face these practical problems. In addition, participants recognised that Palestinians might be justifiably suspicious of Jewish groups. At the JfJfP meeting in January 2008, Patricia, a J-BIG and JfJfP activist, offered a self-critical explanation for the lack of contact with Palestinians.

I think that JfJfP doesn’t support the right of return does alienate quite a few Palestinians, it does put some of them off. Having said that, I think they’d prefer there’d be some sort of group. But I think the more that JfJfP might be inclined to prioritise our working with the Jewish community, it might be minding its p’s and q’s because of the Jewish community – that also makes Palestinians a bit more suspicious, you know. From having spoken to them, thinking – ‘oh, its Jews talking about themselves again. Worrying about their needs, you know. Their own thing – being very precious.’ So that can put some Palestinians off.

Patricia added the intriguing question: ‘I think also, are we really the group they need to have dialogue with? Maybe they need to talk to more mainstream type Jews anyway.’ Neil, also at the JfJfP meeting, spoke of how he was ‘very worried and nervous when you start talking about us “as Jews” talking with Palestinians’, since that played into the clash of civilisations agenda. This indicates that the downsides of publicly deploying ethnic identity, discussed in chapter seven, affected the positions of some movement participants.

So there are valid political reasons why many in this group don’t see their job as talking to Palestinians, but to other Jews. In addition, the practical reasons the movement has for associating with Israelis are simply not there with regards to Palestinians. Palestinians are important on a personal level, but on a group level they aren’t needed to reaffirm the movement’s legitimacy in the same way Israelis are. In addition, as Peter indicated, the presence of these necessary Israelis as ‘intermediaries’ blocks people’s view of Palestinians. The terse minutes of JfJfP’s 2004 AGM talks of seeking areas of agreement with Israeli
peace groups including ‘human rights approach; the [separation] wall; identify with Palestinian suffering’ (JfJfP AGM minutes. 9 May 2004). By focusing on suffering as a lowest common denominator with Israeli groups, JfJfP are doing what members criticise solidarity movements of doing, and turning Palestinians into charity cases. I return to this issue later in the chapter.

Below is a schema of the relationships between the domestic fields, Israelis and Palestinians; comparing the PSM with this movement and with the British Jewish field. The overlap in the three fields is to show that the relationships those in this movement form are also informed by their role in the PSM and the British Jewish field. The depth of the arrows is rough indication of the depth of interaction, and the way that the arrow between the Israel-critical Jewish movement and Palestinians goes through the Israelis signifies their role as intermediaries.

![Figure 6. Relationship between local and distant fields](image)

While this movement isn’t characterised by undue closeness with Palestinians, one of the dynamics of activism has been to ensure increased closeness and recognition between activists and Palestinians. One way to explain this process could be through Bourdieu's idea of field homologies where weaker and less autonomous fields are patterned by the affective power of stronger ones. In this case it refers to how the Jewish field is impinging on by discourses in the ambient political field and the Palestine DIM. While undoubtedly an explanation for field change, it is, I argue, a very partial one, failing to recognise specific field dynamics as well as discounting the agency of social movement actors. In addition, the
view which sees this Jewish movement as providing a way for Jews to ‘catch up’ with ambient society reinscribes Jews as outsiders, slow learners in the process of grasping the normative orientations of society. Specific to dynamics in DIMs, this dichotomy, which sees Palestinian solidarity activism as the end station of Jewish activities, fails to problematise this solidarity activism. It locates the perceived deficiencies in Jewish solidarity groups as being due to their specific identitarian issues rather than to conditions which obtain in all DIMs. In the next section I examine this general tension that exists between the Palestine DIM and the object of activism, focusing on how it is evinced in political tourism. This allows contrasts and comparisons to be drawn between how the PSM and this movement relates to Palestinians.

Political tourism
In this section I examine how tensions between local fields and objects of activism and also between the subjectivity of actors and of objects of activism exist in all DIMs, specifically the Palestine DIM. I examine these tensions and interactions through research conducted on study tours to Israel/Palestine. ⁶⁷

I believe study trips to be demonstrative of these tensions partly because of the centrality of study trips within this DIM to form activist subjectivities and opinions. This is the case both for Jewish and non-Jewish activism, and while the study trip I base most my material on was non-Jewish, I argue that the emphasis on charity and Israeli left-wing discourse which occurred is also dominant in Jewish-organised study trips (Fox 2005; JfJfP 2004). Study trips offer an unparalleled opportunity to examine the interaction between social movement actors and Palestinians, with minimal influence of the movement actors’ local field of contention. This is not to argue that such interaction is pure and unmediated – far from it, study trips are heavily constrained by tourist and political discourses, and often mediated by Israeli groups – but by offering a site to study the interaction of activist and Palestinian subjectivities it ‘fills in’ the missing piece of the local field-activist-Palestinian triangle.

Well-funded Zionist political tourism to Israel is a long-established phenomenon (Cohen-Hattab 2004), and has been increased in recent years to counteract growing diaspora disillusionment with Israel (Kelner et al. 2000; Saxe et al. 2004). Alternative political tourism ⁶⁷ This section is based on research previously published as a chapter in an edited book (Landy 2008).
to Palestine is in part a counter-hegemonic response to this tourism (Bak 2006). It is a relatively recent phenomenon stemming also from the growth of alternative tourism and the recent popularity of Palestine as providing a locus for ‘the emblematic solidarity movement of our time’ (Bhattachryya 2008: 46). It can be further divided into activist tourism and study tourism, though there is considerable overlap. Both are organised by Palestinian solidarity or Israel-critical groups in Western countries in association with Palestinian alternative tourism operators and/or Israeli peace groups. The average duration of study tours is between a week and two weeks, that of activist tours – distinguished from study tours in that practical activism such as picking olives or monitoring checkpoints is the main purpose of the trip – is three weeks (Dudouet 2006). Both are intense experiences combining an exhausting schedule of meeting Palestinian and left-wing Israeli groups with tours of specific sites. These sites are seen as a means of framing and explaining the conflict from a pro-Palestinian point of view. Below I examine the reasons for this political tourism and how its framing of Israel/Palestine is affected by developmentalist discourse and tourist dynamics. I then examine how Palestinians and tourists counter these dynamics. Firstly I explain how I studied this tourism.

My research involved participant observation with one study trip, interviews with Palestinian organisers of trips, and subsequent interviews with those on a separate study trip. I also undertook documentary analysis of some of the many accounts of other trips and of the documents produced by groups that organise political tourism to see if the insights garnered by the trip I went on were generalisable. The trip I went on was a ten-day tour organised by a British group, Experience Travel Tours (ETT), in close association with Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) and had 16 participants, mostly non-Jewish and mostly from the UK but also from the US and Canada. The group stayed in Bethlehem in the West Bank and East (i.e. Palestinian) Jerusalem. There was a packed itinerary, in which we visited over twenty groups and toured various sites around Israel/Palestine, including walking tours of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron (see attached itinerary: Appendix 2).

I represented myself to fellow participants as going on the trip for both academic and activist reasons. My role as a semi-insider was accepted, allowing me to ask personal questions and integrate with the rest of the tour as a participant, not an outsider. Nevertheless, I face the same trap in relation to these study tourists which I later argue that study tours fall into in relation to Palestinians, that of situating myself outside and dialectically superior to those I am studying in order to have discursive mastery over them. The comparison between
sociologist and tourist is a valid one (Lentin 2004), and it is important to recognise the limited nature of the anthropological project. This is also an important epistemological point – the trips contribute to the habitus of Palestine DIM activists, but are not their sole determinant.

It is also for this reason that I investigated other trips through documentary analysis and through interviews with two participants of a solidarity trip from Ireland, as well as the Irish organiser. This Irish trip, run in association with the Alternative Tourism Group was a useful comparator to my British/Israeli-run tour. There were clear differences between the tours; the Irish tour showed far greater focus on politics and practical activism, while evincing little interest in Israel, charity, or in the spiritual side of the tour. From interviews with participants in Israel-critical Jewish groups it seems the trip I was on was more indicative of the experience of Jews who have visited Israel (for instance JfJfP 2004), partly because the ETT/ICAHD tour was co-organised by an Israeli group and visited many other Israeli groups. The Irish group in contrast only visited one Israeli group and was far more exposed to Palestinian points of view.

**The role of political tourism in the Palestine DIM**

These trips are important because of their role in knowledge production. One of the main purposes of distant issue movements (DIMs) is to act as knowledge conveyors to society at large, framing the situation abroad in accordance with their prognosis (Rucht 2000). Political tours are seen as providing alumni with authentic experiences to convey back home. Citing personal experience gives activists the authority to talk about the situation – one Irish participant spoke of going on a study trip because ‘I needed to arm myself with knowledge’. Tour participants seek the sense of experiencing ‘the situation’. While they attend many lectures and return with several kilos of reading material, the purpose of these trips is to enable participants to experience reality rather than just read about it.

Alumni are expected to be both powerhouses of activism and providers of knowledge/experience on their return. Participants in all trips I spoke to were aware of these expectations, with the result that these tours serve to either begin or strengthen their participation in political activism. These trips provide political tools as well as the certification that enables people to feel that they are competent to engage in this specific
political field (Ray et al. 2003). It is worthwhile recalling that despite any criticism of the
trips, the alternative to ‘going there’ is more likely to be ‘doing nothing’ rather than ‘doing
something better’.

The role of trips as rite of passage into this political field is strengthened by how they provide
participants with a means of showing commitment and proving their credentials within the
movement. This role underlines the trips’ centrality in actor/movement identity formation.
The customary representation by participants is of having been vaguely interested in ‘the
situation’ beforehand and committed to ‘the cause’ after the trip (see also Mueller 2005). This
is slightly disingenuous since in order to place oneself in a position where one is likely to be
affected by these trips, one needs a certain level of prior motivation (McAdam 1988).
Nevertheless, as several interviewees (as well as colleagues in the IPSC) attested, actually
visiting Palestine provides an important motivator for activists. This accords with the concept
of change as not coming from internal field contention as much as from the effect of external
fields on movement actors.

Both study tour organisers I spoke to emphasised the non-ideological nature of their tours –
their purpose was to let people form their own opinions through experience of Palestinian
life, unmediated by ideological concerns (see also ATG website: http://www.atg.ps/). While
this stance may seem to be ideology at its purest, it points to the importance attributed to
having an authentic encounter with Palestine and Israel. It is the perceived authenticity which
validates the experience; it enables the tourist to speak ‘as an expert’ upon return, and to
believe they possess knowledge which needs to be conveyed. I argue that this aura of
authenticity means that tourists are, to an extent, building up their subjectivity against
Palestinians and their political subjectivity. Two anecdotes illustrate this process.

The first concerns the treatment a Palestinian female speaker for a Jerusalem woman’s centre
received on the ETT/ICAHD trip. In her talk, she presented the difficulties women in
Jerusalem face owing to the occupation, drawing on her personal experiences, and expanding
this into a more general political critique. She was the only Palestinian speaker we
encountered who raised the right of return, yet in the question and answer session that
followed these political issues were ignored in favour of asking her for more personal stories.
While some of these questions, which the subject of the talk invited, were valid, the almost
exclusive concentration on her private life and sufferings was noteworthy. It invites
comparison with criticism of the way the experiences of blacks and migrants are mined and
their suffering highlighted in order to provide middle class theorists the raw material for their narrative constructions, which are then accorded the status of theory. As bell hooks says:

“No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own.” Re-writing you, I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still the colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the centre of my talk (hooks 1989: 151-2 cited in Goldstone 2000).

Politics intervened in the discussion after the speaker was asked several times about the dangers of Sharia law. Upon replying that this wasn’t a major issue in Palestine, some participants disagreed with her. Their instancing of having seen women being oppressed in other (Muslim) countries was both a way of claiming expertise she did not possess and a disturbing flattening of the Islamic world. It is ironic that in representing themselves as defenders of women, participants appeared to silence Palestinian women both by the demand these women subscribe to narratives of Western feminism and by the fact that the speaker was chiefly given authority to talk about women’s problems rather than wider political affairs. At the end of this particular talk we were asked to become ambassadors for the group. However, the status accorded to her information diminished the ability and willingness of our tour group to undertake this task. Instead, what participants promised to do, in this as in other cases, was to convey her stories.

The second anecdote concerns the absence of the right of return. The demand that Palestinian refugees have the right of return is central in Palestinian political discourse and was almost completely absent on the trip. The effacement of this demand during the trip may have been atypical, but it illustrates the wider issue that while such tours are effective in their central aim of rendering participants fit for advocacy work in Europe and America, this may be achieved at the expense of the subjectivity and political aspirations of Palestinians themselves. In order to explore this further I examine the specific dynamics of study trips using two theoretical prisms – tourist and developmentalist discourses.
Palestine as an authentic object of pity. Tourist and developmentalist discourses

Classically, sociologists have been extremely negative about the experience of tourism, viewing tourists as mindless consumers of sensations (Turner and Ash 1975), or as fantasists temporarily equipped with interpretative power (Fussell 1980). Tourism has been portrayed as a quintessentially inauthentic experience, where the tourists are encased in a small monotonous world consuming inauthentic simulacra which merely reflect their own impoverished image. By opposing inauthentic tourists to authentic ‘native concerns’, this position has been criticised for being based on a populist emotional hostility to tourism rather than on empirical research (Frow 1991; Crick 1996).

Such debates about authenticity are central to tourism since certain types of tourism require authenticity to provide it with meaning. Political tourism and other forms of volunteer tourism can be classed as forming a continuum with more conventional alternative tourism such as cultural and education tourism in that the object-related authenticity of this experience is crucial to its success (Wearing 2001). In this, it can be contrasted with mass tourism where the bodily experience of the tourist is foregrounded (Wang 1999). In alternative tourism one has a travel experience, which is supposed to transform the self (Desforges 2000), and what grounds this experience is the authenticity of the tourist object apprehended.

Seeing Palestine through a patina of authenticity draws a boundary between political tourists and locals. From its inception as a means which Rousseau used to describe the human condition, authenticity has been held to be a feature of primitive society, a mirror with which to critique modern inauthentic society. In tourism, a temporal watershed is established and the authentic is assigned to one side of the divide – where the present and the tourist is seen as representing the inauthentic, or at least fleeing from it (McCannell 1976). It is useful to see the alternative tourist experience as being mediated by the tourist gaze – an anthropological endeavour which seeks to establish discursive mastery over the destination country and which others that which is consumed (Urry 2002). As Ning Wang says,

 Authentication is thus a projection of tourists’ own beliefs, expectations, preferences, stereotyped images, and consciousness onto toured objects, particularly onto toured Others (Wang 1999: 355).
This suggests that the tourist experience by its very nature militates against it being a site for solidarity. What is seen – especially in alternative tourism - is veiled with an authenticity which denies it agency (Taylor 2001). 68

In addition, the prism of authenticity through which Palestine is seen is reinforced by these tours’ activist dynamic. Far from being occasions of guilt, common tourist acts such as the consumption of staged authenticity in the form of buying Palestinian textiles or eating a traditional Palestinian meal can be presented in political tourism as acts of resistance and solidarity. The attack on all aspects of Palestinian life by Israel makes this representation believable. 69 Both the activist and tourist aspects of these trips collude in placing the aura of authenticity upon Palestinians. The Bedouin in particular were counterpoised to our inauthentic modern ‘civilisation’. While this was done in order to compliment the Bedouin, certain Bedouin we talked to within Israel felt the need to challenge such representations, claiming that they did actually want development, if on their own terms. 70

The problem with the invocation of authenticity-in-others is that it requires a denial of that complexity which may confuse the extent to which they are not actually the perfect others of modernity. It leads to a process of stereotyping which, in Palestine, can draw upon pre-existent Orientalist framing and racialisation. It is no coincidence that the meaning-making process in tourism, whereby the particular is taken as representative of the whole, parallels that of Orientalism, with Urry’s description of the ‘tourist gaze’ similar to the more esoteric constructions of meaning Orientalists engage in (Said 1978). Orientalist discourses of the East as passive, primitive and in need of Western intervention are given fresh currency by Israel’s existential need to ‘other’ the people whose land it has taken and maintain its state of war against them. David Goldberg (2008) refers to this process as ‘racial Palestinisation’, whereby Palestinians are treated as pre-rational, primitive remnants of antiquity in order to

68 In similar manner, Spivak and Gunew (1993) talk of how authenticity is used to establish hegemonic control in situations of multicultural ‘othering’, a practice which indicates the link between authenticity and racialisation.
69 For instance the claim by a local Palestinian entrepreneur that she was committing an act of resistance by displaying Palestinian women in authentic native dress would seem overblown, but for her accounts of how she needed to smuggle her dresses out of the country for exhibitions abroad, exhibitions which the Israeli state and Western Zionists had tried to shut down.
70 In Zionist discourse, Bedouin are differentiated to an extent from other Palestinians, and considered harmless pre-modern and primitive ‘good Arabs’ (Habib 2004; Yonah, Abu-Saad, and Kaplan 2004). This indicates that Palestinians are not an undifferentiated body, and also how the racial categorisations of Israelis have an effect in differentiating them.
justify and advance Israeli praxis of treating them as ‘bare life’ stripped of any political essence or rights (Agamben 1998; Kimmerling 2003).

This discourse is, for study tours, connected with the intermittent use of women’s rights to construct a picture of Palestinian society as primitive, and with the tendency to present Palestinians as native informants rather than experts. Such practices draw upon Western feminism's 'discursive colonisation' of Majority World women (Mohanty 1992; Goudge 2003). Feminism, thus articulated, allows Western visitors to legitimise their otherwise troubling positionality and constitute themselves as dialectically superior actors. Among the group I was with, this Eurocentric feminism was evident among some and led to several troubling interactions with Palestinians including one incident where a woman in our group started lecturing a refugee about family planning in his house, in front of his family. \(^71\) However others on the trip – particularly some who had been to Palestine before - found such interventions embarrassing and disturbing. Such occurrences may then show the prevalence of such discourses in Western society rather than the role of trips in furthering this discourse.

The emphasis on sisterhood was sporadic and may well have been confined to our trip – though the ease with which some Palestinian groups took on the mantle of mediators of Western feminist norms to the locals indicates this was a pre-existent practice, encouraged by Israelis, foreign Zionists and development workers. The denial of full interpretative legitimacy to Palestinians seemed more ongoing and proceeded by demanding of our Palestinian interlocutors that they tell their stories as much as impart expert knowledge. For instance, when a US-born policy advisor of the negotiations support unit of the PLO gave a detailed powerpoint exposition of Israeli settlement policy, he was asked not only about this presentation, but also about his personal situation, and in the end was called a modern-day hero who should be praised for his sacrifices in living in Palestine and contrasted with, and thus separated from, comfortable Westerners.

Palestinians were not simply accorded the status of story-tellers. They were asked about specific political issues such as the Wall or the Occupation, although participants were less interested in hearing Palestinians present any overarching political narrative. This refusal to let Palestinians analyse was not a universal reaction – those on the Irish trip referred to how

\(^71\) Habib (2004: 76) recounts similar intrusive questioning of Bedouin women on Zionist tours. Such similarities indicate the normativity of such Eurocentric feminism among some Westerners (especially in relation to Bedouin), above any specific views on Israel/Palestine.
impressively Palestinians managed to link the local with the international and of having a keen awareness of precisely the type of politics they wanted the study-tourists to convey. The process I am discussing whereby Palestinians were accorded local interpretative control but participants retained general control of interpreting ‘the situation’ should simply be seen as a tendency, stronger in some tours than others. More particularly, it is reasonable to think that this tendency was stronger in tours such as mine, where Israeli organisations set the political agenda – an agenda which not only encouraged study-trippers to think of Palestinians as storytellers and Israelis as those to whom the stories needed to be directed, but also an agenda that appeared to concentrate on a human rights and even charity, rather than a political approach. I next discuss this agenda, and how it fits in with Western discourses of developmentalism.

Drawing upon post-development writers and their critique of how developmentalism constructs the relationship between westerners and non-westerners, I wish to examine the extent to which this frame is applied to Palestine by political tours. I argue that Israeli leftists help in establishing a dialectic where Palestine is constructed as a place of despair and Israel a place of hope, which ‘good Israelis’ and foreigners are granted agency to change.

Developmentalism – which I define as the praxis of developmental work in the majority world funded by minority world countries and organisations - has come under steady criticism (Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). Criticism of development’s effect on the recipient country has been so widespread that one expert in the field was moved to pose the significant question as being: ‘What do aid programmes do besides fail to help poor people?’ (Ferguson 1997: 231. Emphasis in original). In Palestine one answer would be that they give jobs and power to a Fatah-connected elite and to foreign aid workers, and that they legitimate and assist the daily practices of the Israeli military occupation (Bomsey 2006; Karmi 2005; Korn 2008). Another answer, specific to study trips lies in the critique of gap-year and other volunteer tourism. This approach argues that the only development promoted is the volunteer’s self-development; the destination country being reduced to a means by which the tourists can become enlightened (Griffen 2005). The legitimacy of the gap year as with other developmental work is ‘rooted in a concept of a ‘third world’, where there is ‘need’, and where European young people have the ability, and right, to meet this need’ (Simpson 2004: 682). While Simpson believes that long-term development workers have overcome these problems, similar criticism has been levelled at those working in this area –
that in order to see what one is doing as useful as well as to account for failure, it is necessary to construct an image of the self as active, rational and progressive in contradistinction to the passive, irrational and backward society where one works (Baaz 2005).

While post-development writers sometimes assert that solidarity work has avoided this dilemma (Sogge 1996) those who examine this solidarity work are more critical (Johnston 2003; Waterman 1998; Goudge 2003). Keck and Sikkink (1998) examine this process in detail, when discussing how Western feminists dealt with accusations of ideological imperialism in the 1990s. They responded by retreating and focusing on the victimhood of vulnerable bodies, framing the complex mechanisms of domination as one of violence against defenceless women and girls. This helps explain the focus on unprotected bodies in solidarity campaigns throughout history, the common factor in campaigns as diverse as anti-slavery, footbinding in China and even the suffragette campaign (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In addition, there is the need for social movements to have easily understandable problems which stir the emotions (Jasper 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001), an especially relevant issue for DIMs trying to explain complex foreign situations to a domestic population. This practice of finding a simple issue which translates across culture – treating vulnerable bodies fairly – is similar to that of human rights framing discussed in chapter six. And similarly, it is a process whereby victimhood is created. The admixture of these factors, as well as the historical record suggests that the default position for DIMs is to treat the object of activism as a victim.

Pitying Palestine as a victim denies Palestinians the ability to represent themselves and it locates the focus of activism among outsiders and justifies their interventions – both Israelis and international visitors. It is hardly surprising that Israeli peace groups are complicit in the construction of Palestine as a place to be pitied or that one of the messages of the tour I was on was that hope was located in Israel and specifically in those Israeli microgroups working to challenge the Israeli Occupation. The status accorded to Israeli groups allows them to maintain their position – for which they have been severely criticised – as gatekeepers of what action or political frame is acceptable to Western liberals (Laor 2001). One Palestinian activist referred to an effective Israeli peace group veto that Palestinian groups need to pass in order to access the Western world (personal communication). This locks Palestinians into a frustrating relationship of dependency with these tiny Israeli groups who largely do not see
themselves as answerable to these Palestinians (considered as political subjects), partly because there is no structural reason to do so (Bronstein 2005).

This may be one reason why the trip I went on, organised by an Israeli group, emphasised a charity discourse more than the Irish group. It also helps explain why the occupation was seen as the main political issue, to the virtual exclusion of the Nakba and the right of return. For Israeli peace groups, concentrating on the Occupation allows them to construct a comfortable dichotomy – on the one hand lies ‘normality’ and on the other lies ‘the Occupation’. Opposing the Occupation – seen in a semi-mystical sense as happening in some other place - can be seen as a way of claiming Israel as being a normal society, and claiming their part in normalising Israel (For example: Shulman 2007).

In critiquing developmentalism however, it is important not to fall into the trap of seeing the recipient countries as undifferentiated victims of development imposed from outside. The local, as Baaz (2005) reminds us, contributes to this developmentalist discourse, even if its role is that of subaltern partner. As example one can take one of the most disturbing aspects of Western activism in relation to Palestine, the sidelining of Hamas, the elected administrators of the PA. This is done because of the successful delegitimisation of Hamas by Israel and Western governments, because of Western activists’ discomfort with Islamism, and also because of the influence of the Fatah dominated Palestinian elite on these activists.

Also if one looks at the construction of Palestinians as victims, it is important to recognise the strong narrative of victimhood among Palestinians themselves, partly in counter-response to Israeli victimology. While some Palestinians regret this historical narrative of despair as destroying a Palestinian sense of agency (Khader 1998), this narrative can be seen as a reasonable response to the grim day-to-day experiences of living in the Occupied Territories. Characterising Palestine as a place of despair is then not merely an exclusive construct of foreign solidarity activists seeking to legitimate their position. The organisations that study trips visit are often complicit in presenting Palestine as prostrate and needing Western charity. Throughout the ETT/ICAHD trip, Palestinian groups were presented as ‘progressive’, a progressivism not necessarily contrasted with Israeli oppression, but often with the primitive society from whence they came. Again this fits into common practices of developmentalism whereby the Third World is represented as primitive and chaotic by local development agencies, for purposes of fundraising and of enhancing their own role (Griesshaber 1997).
Nevertheless, the most rampantly imperialistic elements of the development discourse – locals as primitives and as children, passively dependent on Western largesse, versus Westerners as rational heroes taking up ‘the White Man’s Burden’ - were largely absent from both our trip and the accounts of other trips. This may have been because we were not cast as activists able to indulge latent fantasies of heroism against a backdrop of passivity, but as students trying to learn from those more knowledgeable than ourselves. Also worth mentioning was the ever-present pedagogy for social justice on the trip, something which Simpson (2004) regards as essential in challenging the imperialist practices of development workers.

In addition, refusing to differentiate Palestinians is understandable in a context where their existence is put under erasure by Israel and its allies, and when Israel continually attempts to foster divisions among them. There is thus a clear political motivation to treat Palestinians as an undifferentiated body, a site of ‘truth and resistance’ against outsiders – a body moreover for whom ‘the situation’ works as an overarching explanation, in much the same way that ‘underdevelopment’ does for the Third World. As one tourist put it: ‘All of their stories end up talking about the situation. It underlies every aspect of their lives’ (Davie 2004). However this hampers understanding of the very situation one is describing. The way all aspects of Palestinian life are treated as explainable by reference to ‘the situation’ renders Palestinians as one-dimensional objects and victims of outside forces, illustrations of a political argument rather than fellow humans. The very vagueness of the term, ‘the situation’ indicates that it is deployed less for explanatory purposes, and more as a catch-all means of establishing interpretative control over that which the speaker may not understand. It is yet another example of how the production of identities of Palestinian Solidarity activists involves an almost necessary complicity with a discursive colonisation of Palestine.

**Alternative reading of interactions between movement actors and Palestinians**

Susan asked me for my reflections [on a trip to Gaza]. I told her I felt bad about my own prejudice against these people ahead of time, and for being so concerned with my own Jewishness, the Jewish future, and the Jewish image in the world. Here that concern feels stupidly selfish. The people of Gaza are persecuted. Full stop.

For me to agonize about my Jewishness when I know about the degree of persecution is actually indulgent and a dodge (Weiss 2009b).
Only by living what Palestinians experience all the time can a visitor come to recognize the injustices that are their daily bread. With this understanding comes a desire to try to help end the accumulated injustices in Palestine (Kassis 2004).

The previous section offered a grim reading of study trips, trapped within discourses of imperialist feminism, developmentalism and the tourist gaze, unable to establish meaningful relationships with Palestinians, who are seen as objects of despair so that study-trippers can turn themselves into weapons for activism. It must be understood as a partial reading, a drawing out of the problematics of political tourism, rather than a full description of these tours. Here, I offer an alternative reading, dealing firstly with how Palestinians use these contained tourist encounters for their purposes and projects, and secondly with how political tourists’ experiences are not solely contained within tourist or developmentalist understandings of the ‘other’, but that an experience of the Palestinian field of contention, however mediated, impinges on their consciousness and affects their future activism.

These trips help Palestinians counteract dominant Zionist narratives in the tourist industry. Fighting against dominant Israeli representations of Palestine that either renders Palestinians invisible or represents them as terrorists (Bowman 1992; Habib 2004) legitimates the concept that tourism can be a form of pro-Palestinian resistance. In addition, tourism is used to counter the ongoing Israeli onslaught on the Palestinian economy (Trainor 2006; Bernath 1999). Some Palestinian groups are not content with encouraging traditional pilgrimage tours, dismissed by one interviewee from ATG as ‘visiting stones’ and ignoring Palestinians. Alternative Palestinian tourism promotes personal contacts with Palestinians, sold to tourists as being a means of experiencing authenticity. This provides an income to Palestinians and presents foreigners and Palestinians with the opportunity for one-to-one contact, which affected many on ATG tours. While the ETT/ICAHD tour failed to establish such contacts with Palestinians, partly due to the punishing schedule of the trip, participants felt the need to challenge the lack of personal exchanges on the ‘free day’ of the trip by visiting Palestinians and simply hanging around in Palestinian areas.

The group tourist experience enables Palestinian tourist operators to establish a level of interpretative control over their country through the generation of new tourist/pilgrimage 

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72 Increasingly, Israeli-organised tours visit the West Bank merely to see the Christian or Jewish holy sites and then get out (Trainor 2006). This logical conclusion of this practice might be in the 2007 Christian Friend of Israel tour, an avowedly religious pilgrimage that managed to encompass the illegal Gush Etzion settlement block in the West Bank, yet ignore Bethlehem (CFI 2007).
sites. Such practices of sacralisation (McCannell 1976) were conducted through both tourist and political discourses – thus people were interested in seeing a West Bank village as representative of authentic traditional Palestine, and as an example of the encroachment of Israeli settlers on Palestinian land. Other sights included the dispossessed Bedouin in the middle of the desert, the nets in Hebron that protected Palestinians from missiles and garbage thrown by Jewish settlers above them, the Jewish-only roads, the half-demolished village reached through the affluent Jewish settlement and above all else – the image that serves as the new monument of Palestine and Israel – the Separation Wall. There were a few positive sights such as the University of Bethlehem as a site of cultural diversity and the Palestinian thirst for education. These were however outnumbered by sites of tourist pilgrimage that portrayed Palestinians as victims and which implicitly urged tourists to help these victims.

Seeing things as representations of something else and not for themselves serves to objectify Palestine and create semantic distance between tourists and the destination culture - when locals are there to represent The Local, it is difficult to establish a meaningful connection between them and tourists. Despite this flaw, the attempt by Palestinian tour operators to establish their status as interpretative authorities is largely successful within the particular ambit they are granted. The fact that nobody the ETT/ICAHD study tour met advocated or defended armed struggle, despite its centrality in Palestinian political life, indicates the efforts put into controlling the gaze of study tourists. Without exception, all the Palestinian groups that we met portrayed themselves and their society as ‘reasonable’, advocating peaceful change and forwarding moderate demands. As the trip progressed, participants increasingly internalised the ideas presented by the Palestinians they visited. This was seen in the adoption of key phrases by participants – at the beginning we were repeatedly enjoined not to forget Palestine, as the tour went on participants discussed what they could do so as not to forget Palestine.

This indicates a level of reciprocity absent in tourist experiences. While there are limits to such reciprocity (Goudge 2003), it would be equally false to portray North-South interaction as a simple process of domination, with Smith (2004) arguing that analysis also flows from the South to the North in DIM activities. It could be argued that by attempting to incorporate the everyday experience of oppression into one’s activities back home, these tours are

73 Although one of the sights we were taken to in the university was a hole in the library wall, carefully preserved behind glass, caused by Israeli shelling in 2002.
antithetical to other forms of tourism. Our group’s experience at Bethlehem University illustrates this point. Here, our mainly middle-class group encountered Palestinians as equals, with the political impact of the stories of occupation heightened precisely because we were made aware that this was being experienced by ‘people like us’, rather than objects of the classical tourist gaze.

One interviewee, Leslie, who had been on a study trip, recognised and approved of the didactic use of such encounters. She commented: ‘They [the study trip organisers] were saying, “Look this is not about people not like you. This is people, and there but for the grace of god, that could be you”. And I think they chose the people we stayed with very carefully. They chose intelligent, articulate people who we would identify with’. And so, just as people are not trapped in their ‘everyday’ fields of contention, nor are political tourists trapped in tourist fields, constantly trying to find the authentic to the exclusion of other modes of cognition. There are certainly discursive spaces within study trips to undermine the aura of authenticity and create relations of mutual understanding.

An alternative way of examining study trips is that what foreign visitors experience in Palestine can be so intrinsically disturbing that the tourist structure is needed to at least partially contain the encounter, so as the excess of experience won’t overwhelm them. Speaking personally, when returning home from the study trip I went through a disorientating period of outrage, frustration and disconnect with those around me. This is a common experience for political tourists in Palestine - constantly warned of on the ETT/ICAHD tour, and something other interviewees mentioned on their return from political trips. This indicates that tourist dynamics, whereby the destination country is placed in a comfortable ‘other’ zone, do not fully obtain. Equally while political actions back home help channel one’s experience, the fact that such activist narratives are contested indicates the difficulty of being unreflective, of merely keeping to the script in such situations. In addition, many political tourists return to Palestine and begin or maintain links with Palestinians.⁷⁴ This speaks of study tours being a ‘portal to Palestine’, a taster to enable deeper and less structured interaction with Palestine. Certainly this wish was expressed by both leaders of study trips and, along with home-country political activism, is a staple demand of Palestinian alternative

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⁷⁴ Several interviewees on trips to Palestine mentioned these effects, which were of course linked to their enhanced activism within the local field in Britain. In addition, in Ireland, many who have been on these trips have joined the IPSC and subsequently gone on further trips to Palestine, or engaged in interactions with Palestinians outside Israel/Palestine. Again, this is linked to their domestic field activism.
tourism (Kassis 2004; ATG 2007). This is not to say that continued interactions aren’t affected by developmentalist discourses, or by Israeli attempts to normalise the Occupation (Weizman 2008), but that the possibility of equality and reciprocity exists in such interactions.

Finally there is the importance of the potentially transformative knowledge acquired in Palestine. One can see transformation as a dual process - a function of the immediate encounter with Israel/Palestine that is at the same time, anticipated by prior politicisation in the local field. Taking the case of Philip Weiss, quoted above; his blog relates a journey from mild criticism of Israel and Zionism rooted in his concern for Jewishness, to more radical questionings (Mondoweiss: The War of Ideas in the Middle East http://mondoweiss.net/). Like many US Jews, the Israeli invasion of Gaza in January 2009 was a turning point, which led him to go on a trip to Gaza. This trip in turn led to further transformation. Key in these changes is the fact that he did not find what he already knew; that there was something about the destination culture which caused a re-evaluation of his point of view. Or in Bourdieu’s terminology it was through interaction with external fields (first Israeli, then Palestinian) and their separate habitus that the habitus of Philip Weiss changed. His positions on the domestic field of contention certainly made an antagonistic interaction with the Israeli field and a positive one with Palestinian field more likely, but this interaction and by extension, these distant fields, are of themselves important.

Continual encounters between DIM activists and Palestinians are, I would suggest, necessary so that Palestinian political subjectivity is not forgotten in the political schemes of activists and their need to sound reasonable to fellow Westerners. This seems to echo Lévinas’s (1989) claim of the importance of seeing the face of the other, and letting the other’s demand to be heard overwhelm the self, a view which appears to justify much of the dialogue and co-existence work done in Israel/Palestine (for example Krycka 2009). Yet Lévinas appears to speak of pure unmediated encounters, when the essential point about all encounters, and not simply the ones between Palestinians and DIM activists, is that there is no such thing. They are all mediated by actors’ habitus within the various fields they inhabit.

It is more useful to see these encounters in terms of how it is sometimes possible for actors in a particular field to make an ongoing response to the other’s demand to be heard, depending on their disposition in their field. Certain dispositions may leave actors more responsive, and it is both the responsiveness and how the response is undertaken and structured in the local
field that is important. Or returning to my concept of a triangular tension in DIMs, it is the dialogue between actor subjectivity and both the subjectivity of Palestinians and the local field which produces this movement. Specifically I contend that it is the ongoing acknowledgement of the Palestinian habitus which proves to be a continual agent of transformation of the local field of DIM activists. I say continual because encountering the Palestinian field is not limited to political tours but is something activists continually undertake in the process of becoming agents of transformation and being themselves transformed. In the next section I look more closely at how Jewish groups interact with Palestinians in the local field, arguing that the political imaginary of the movement actor plays an important role in determining the nature of the interaction, which in turn affects the ability of the actor to be an agent for social change.

The political imaginaries of solidarity and cosmopolitanism
Earlier I spoke of victimisation as being the default position of DIMs. However, this does not mean victimisation is inevitable. Owing to the reflexive nature of social movements, many participants are aware of this tendency and can fight against it. Returning to the local field of contention, I examine below how the political imaginaries of solidarity groups which construct (perhaps false) closeness and analogies between the activist and object of activism militate against victim narratives to an extent. This is in contrast to the political imaginary of Jewish groups, which is more inclined to treat Palestinians as undifferentiated victims and less likely to be affected by the Palestinian field. Thus while their criticisms of solidarity holds some validity, after examining this, I question the efficacy of the model of rooted cosmopolitanism, a stance held by many Israel-critical Jewish activists.

The problem with solidarity
Some in Jewish groups were involved in the PSC, others were deeply suspicious of them. Whatever the attitude towards the PSC, there was widespread agreement that Jewish groups were doing something somewhat different, and were not necessarily solidarity organisations. Nevertheless, outright criticism of solidarity organisations has diminished over the life of this movement. One sees this move clearest in the minutes of JfJfP. During its initial establishment there was outright hostility expressed to PSC. It was described by one member
in a discussion circulated around JfJfP as, ‘an alienating, divisive and frankly scary outfit’ (JfJfP mailout. 17 May 2003). However the rhythms of movement activism has ensured a growing closeness; the bitter arguments in JfJfP throughout 2003 and 2004 over whether to participate in PSC marches were eventually won by those in favour and the prickly relationship between the two organisations has given way to an understanding that JfJfP were more likely to influence PSC through involvement. To quote a discussion in mid-2005 about agreeing to participation in a PSC march: ‘formal involvement would enable us to ask PSC to observe some conditions’ (JfJfP mailout, 16 June 2005). This increased cooperation was not simply to serve, like Israeli leftists, as gatekeepers of acceptable activism; it was also based on an increased appreciation of the work of solidarity activists especially during times of crisis such as the 2006 Lebanon war. It has led to JfJfP affiliating to the Enough coalition (chapter five), and to advertising PSC and other Palestine DIM activities on their website.

However there is a limit to this cooperation – solidarity organisations were seen as inherently incapable of critical engagement by some interviewees. Not all were critical (as evidenced by the engagement of several movement participants in the PSC), however there was a general feeling that the role of Jewish groups, established after all in contradistinction to solidarity ones, was somewhat different. There was firstly a disquiet about the word solidarity, owing to participants’ experience of Zionist solidarity. When activists saw themselves as ‘escaping’ from one form of solidarity, they were naturally wary of being trapped in another. At the January 2008 meeting, one JfJfP activist referred to Zionists as comprising ‘the largest mindless solidarity organisation in the world’, and inserted this into a broader criticism of solidarity:

This [JfJfP] cannot possibly, anything like this cannot conceivably be a solidarity organisation, because its main purpose is to fight fiercely against the notion of solidarity, as mindless solidarity that the Jewish community feels for Israel - the largest mindless solidarity organisation in the world (laughter). Therefore anything like this cannot go down that path. It must be microcritical, because microcriticality is what it’s trying to show.

The main criticism of solidarity was its mindlessness. Elaine, speaking from her own experience with the local PSC group also cast doubt on members’ motives, characterising

75 In an interesting turnabout, Jewish groups such as JfJfP and JSG asked to speak at the 5 August 2006 demonstration in favour of a ceasefire in Lebanon. Despite this request being ‘wholeheartedly supported by the PSC’ (and according to an interviewee, Muslim groups) the Stop the War Committee (again according to interviewees, under the control of the far-left Socialist Workers Party) refused them speaking rights, something described as ‘a completely sectarian decision’ (JfJfP minutes, 19 August 2006).
them as motivated more by anger than a desire to do anything constructive. Veteran activist, Martin, though not in PSC was even more dismissive, referring to the tendency of solidarity movements to focus on victims and victimhood:

But my view of the PSC, certainly the London-based PSC is totally - they’re very good at organising, very good at getting people to carry banners. That they’re really not interested in any kind of analysis whatsoever. They just want to say how bad it is for the Palestinians […] They all seem to wallow in the suffering of the Palestinians.

Not that solidarity people are seen as stupid, though that did surface for some (for instance, Peter: ‘And the problem is how to be in solidarity with solidarity groups who are so bloody thick and stupid and so unresponsive to certain kinds of issues’). More fundamental is the idea that solidarity movements are not able to question things:

Frances: There’s a problem with solidarity movements which is, if you set yourself up as a solidarity movement, by definition you can’t ask questions about what’s going on, yeah?

David: What scope is there for critical solidarity?

Frances: There’s none. There really isn’t any

For Jewish groups, Palestinians are perhaps less objects of solidarity – they’re people who sometimes one works with, rather than for. The possibility is opened to the Italian feminist idea of transversal politics, a politics based on sustaining dialogues across differences of social positioning, culture, and identity (Yuval-Davis 1997). Such dialogues entail recognising the potential of imperfect communication between groups and entering into coalitions which benefit all groups. This in turn depends on participants retaining a strong sense of their own individual commitments as well as respect for those of others. Within this movement, the concept of coalitionism over altruism is certainly strong – they are not simply working for Palestinians or Israelis but with them, for their goals and also for the liberation of diaspora Jews from ethnocentric Zionism, which is seen as a complementary goal. However a problem with this transversalism, rooted as it is in a cosmopolitan mindset, is that it effaces the power differences between diaspora Jews and Palestinians. I argue next that a cosmopolitan disposition fails to fully acknowledge Palestinian subjectivity or to counter the specific way they are racialised, leading to Jewish Israel-critical groups reproducing dominant discourses about Palestinians as victims.
Rooted cosmopolitanism: Principles not Palestinians

In opposition to simple identification with Palestinians, seen as limiting the scope for critical thinking, some in the movement believe it is better to adhere to universalist values such as justice and human rights as a means of understanding and affecting ‘the situation’. At its extreme this political imaginary characterises Jewish activists as balanced between conflicting Israeli and Palestinian narratives, and transcending both positions. Such an imaginary derives from how this movement uses universalisms as unfocusing devices, means to enable individuals to tear their gaze away from Zionist narratives, and float above and critique these restricted standpoints. This, again, is a tendency in the movement, rather than a full description of it. In chapter seven I referred to actors’ rooted cosmopolitanism. Recalling my argument that movement actors conceive their identities as existing between community and civitas, I wish to advance ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ beyond Tarrow’s (2005) application of it to describe their effectiveness and use it to refer to their dispositions within their fields. I have argued that these actors have ‘a particular interest in the universal’ and now describe this interest and disposition as rooted cosmopolitanism (Bourdieu 2000: 123). 76

Cosmopolitanism, or a disposition towards the universal is a notoriously nebulous concept, but at its core is the idea that people ‘do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated’ (Kleingeld and Brown 2009). The dichotomy between local and cosmopolitan means of apprehending the world is perhaps valid, with cosmopolitanism causing an unfocusing from the local (Szerszynski and Urry 2006). Nevertheless, the universal is customarily constructed with reference to the actor’s particular field (Robertson 1992). The idea of rooted cosmopolitanism is a means of recognising the real sense of specificity in cosmopolitanism and liberal universalism. It is also used to counter the accusation of being a rootless cosmopolitan, a term Stalin used as an antisemitic codeword for Jews which subsequently has been deployed to characterise cosmopolitans as not having a real stake in the local field and therefore being of no relevance (recall Tommy’s description of non-Jewish Jews as Jews who ‘can be politically dismissed within the Jewish community’) (Ackerman 1994; Appiah 2005).

76 This alters Bourdieu’s meaning somewhat since he was referring to the field doxa as providing these actors’ interest in the universal, whereas I speak of these actors’ interest being formed in opposition to others in the field, who they declare not to be interested in the universal (chapter six).
The idea behind rooted cosmopolitanism is that while cosmopolitans move outside their origins, they continue to be linked to place (Tarrow 2005). They thus have the best of all worlds, a sense of community, and ‘the ability to stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community’ (Hall 2002: 26). I have examined how such cosmopolitanism is constructed by movement participants in opposition to the perceived particularism of Zionists in the Jewish field. Their sociality may be emplaced within the British or Jewish field, but is conceived in universal terms.

It would be inaccurate to characterise movement members as universal subjects concerned with affecting local realities but not concerned with or affected by Palestinians. Whether it is through promoting Palestinian trade fairs, film festivals, speakers, or through trips to Palestine, members of this movement are moving into the domain of Palestinian subjectivity as never before. This was exemplified by one participant who in a 2005 interview said he knew no Palestinians and ‘fucking hate[d] Islam’. Yet a few years later, in conversation, he was talking about how hanging around Palestinians was a corrective to a boring job since these were the only people he was having intellectual conversations with. What had changed in the meantime was his increasing involvement in the radical wing of this movement which allowed a deepening interaction with and respect for Palestinians.

Yet there seems to be a limit to these interactions. If we move beyond individual dispositions to the productions and collective identity of this movement, the rooted cosmopolitanism (rooted in a conception of the Jewish community) and consequent distance from Palestinians is more pronounced. Subtleties and affinities with Palestinians that individuals certainly demonstrate are somehow not translated into the movement’s public face. Or rather they are not given political form. I argue this is because the movement’s political imaginary centres on the importance of acceptability to British Jews and the ambient public, and so forces movement actors to engage in discursive repertoires acceptable to them. They incorporate the image of Palestinians current in the mainstream media and among the Israeli groups whose presence they are trying to forward. That image is Palestinians as victims.

The reduction of Palestinians into victims appears to be a more or less routine way of associating with Palestinians. An examination of the minutes of JfJfP reveals that though there are discussion of issues such as the right of return, Palestinians simply aren’t granted the same political status as Israeli groups, but treated as occasional objects of charity. The Palestinians that emerge in the continual demands for financial support are psychologically
disturbed children, Bedouin on rubbish dumps and cave-dwellers in the Hebron hills, truly ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). The way the cave-dwellers are characterised is emblematic: ‘We need the help of decent people from all over the world to prevent the threatened expulsion by Israel of a powerless community of herdsmen and farmers who live in caves in the Occupied Territories, with little connection to the outside world’ (JfJfP mailout. 5 September 2004). Thus we are decent and universal, Palestinians are powerless and local. Israel has no adjectives; it is a machine. 77

The above appeal is a direct reproduction of a Jewish Israeli petition from the peace organisation Gush Shalom, supported by 14 other Israeli organisations. It indicates the Israeli left’s fingerprints over the political imaginary of this movement, which in turn affects the way the movement sees Palestinians. This process can be further illustrated by examining two leaflets from the PSC and JfJfP, reproduced below (full text in Appendix 3). They were handed out at a demonstration protesting the siege of Gaza outside Downing Street in London on Saturday, 27 January 2008. The differences between these A5 leaflets illustrate how different political imaginaries – PSC attempts to build sympathy with Palestinians, and the Jewish group’s efforts to highlight leftwing Israeli actions – lead to radically different takes on Palestinian subjectivity.

Both leaflets - the professional-looking full colour JfJfP leaflet printed on glossy paper and the photocopied, text-heavy PSC one - have strikingly similar pictures at the front of the leaflet. They cover half the page and show massed Palestinians, with children foregrounded. The differences though are stark. The JfJfP picture plays on the theme of despair with a milling directionless crowd of Palestinians behind a fence, barbed wire in the foreground. Some of them have their heads bowed, while others are clutching despairingly onto the fence which separates them from us, the god’s-eye viewer slightly above them. In the PSC picture, the Palestinians are more immediate and their peaceful activism is highlighted. The Palestinians here have a purpose; they are on a demonstration similar to the one at which these leaflets were handed out. One aim of the picture is to efface differences and point out that these Palestinians with their Arabic banners are just like us. Significantly, the front children are holding up candles, the symbol of hope, and we the viewers (from the less raised view) are apparently being invited to join them.

77 For an analogous way these cave dwellers have been used by Israelis to construct the figure of the good Israeli vs. the bad settler - for international consumption - see Margalit (2007).
Turning to the back of each leaflet, the PSC one is full of information on Palestine and the siege, creating a narrative pregnant with impending catastrophe and despair, and the consequent injunction that ‘it is up to us to demand that the government renounces its shameful complicity in this crime’. The leaflet rejects aid in favour of political action, stating ‘More aid, although essential, will not resolve the political issue of the illegal Israeli occupation’. The means of resolving this political issue are then laid out in detail. People should contact their MPs with a list of questions on the leaflet, and there is also an invitation to ‘Help PSC campaign to change British government policy’ by joining or contributing. The aim of the leaflet is to target passers-by into becoming active. In this process it could be argued that Palestinians are still being portrayed as victims, despite the call for political change rather than aid. However it is difficult to see what else the PSC could do given that it is informing fellow Britons of the desperation of the Palestinian plight in order to impel them to act, and telling these Britons that it is they who can make a difference. This illustrates again the ubiquity of the victim narrative in DIMs.

Yet Palestinians are also portrayed as protestors, people and political actors like us, and one of the demands of the leaflet is to ‘Respect Palestinian democracy and engage with elected Palestinian representatives’ (code for dealing with Hamas), inscribing Palestinians as political actors. This rendition of Palestinians as politically active is necessary for the political imaginary of solidarity groups which sees a solution as coming from the successful mobilisation and representation of the group they are in solidarity with. This sets them apart from aid organisations, since even if they don’t and possibly can’t dispense with the ubiquitous construction of Palestinians as victims, they mitigate this by offering alternative readings of Palestinians as political.

The JfJfP leaflet—though in more moderate language—also calls upon the British government to change its policy. However this is not its central purpose. The leaflet suggests no mechanism to do so and does not even offer any information on how to get involved with JfJfP. This leaflet does not encourage British-based activism, but promotes Israeli groups as a locus for hope. The entire back of the leaflet is devoted to an account of Israeli efforts to break the Israeli siege of Gaza. Referring to the suffering of Israelis under Hamas rockets, it says that despite this the siege is an immoral act. It is thereby complicit in the Israeli left’s self-presentation as exceptional moral beings, able to rise above the constraints of narrow nationalism. By exclusively concentrating on Israeli actions, the leaflet transforms Israeli
activists as being the focus of activity, seen almost entirely in terms of giving aid to supplicant Palestinians. The role of the de-politicised Palestinians in this leaflet is to rally in support of the Israeli protest.

The leaflet’s purpose then is to boost Israeli peace groups in this pro-Palestinian demonstration, thereby presenting JfJfP as a support group for Israeli activists. It was done, according to a senior figure in JfJfP I talked to afterwards, so that the PSC people wouldn’t forget about the Israeli peace movement and its activities. While there are clear political reasons to promote Israeli and Jewish activities, this instance shows the glaring opportunity costs involved in emphasising Israeli subjectivity, a translation of colonial Israeli attitudes that treats Palestinians as voiceless extras in the political drama. This can also be seen as an example of how concentration on the local field of contention – in this case on the worthwhile task of promoting pluralism in the PSC - causes actors to lose sight of Palestinians.
The Israeli army has closed all border crossings of the Gaza Strip since June 2006. This total siege has created a humanitarian crisis, destroyed the economy and violates the basic human rights of the Palestinian civilian population, particularly the rights to decent living conditions, health and education. On 19 September 2007, the Israeli government declared the Gaza Strip “a hostile entity” and stepped up its collective punishment. A crime is being perpetrated against civilians in Gaza which violates international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Figure 7. PSC leaflet front

END THE SIEGE ON GAZA!
Freedom of Movement is a Basic Right!
Stop Collective Punishment of Palestinians!

The Israeli army closed all border crossings of the Gaza Strip in June 2006, and in recent weeks the closure has been intensified after Israel declared Gaza “a hostile entity”. Israeli policies have created an humanitarian crisis for Gaza’s 1.5 million residents, half of whom are children under 18.

As Jews, we join with Israelis, Palestinians and people of conscience worldwide in the belief that the only way to end the siege is to lift the blockade. Build peace, govern, move, and hope for the future as the people of Gaza are today. We call on the British government to act in line with international law to force Israel to end the siege now.

Figure 8. JfJP leaflet front
The siege is creating a living hell in Gaza:

Palestinians are suffering from hunger and malnutrition. Food rations cover only 50% of the minimum required, and many homes are not receiving drinking water. People who are seriously ill are being prevented from accessing essential medical treatment outside Gaza. Over 40 people have been reported as dead as a result of being denied medical treatment by the Israeli authorities and 20% of essential drugs and 37% of essential medical supplies are no longer available inside Gaza.

- Lack of electricity supplies, affecting essential health and water facilities.
- 250,000 people are unable to access drinking water for over 1.5 hours each day.

Whereas the Israeli army continues its attacks on the impoverished Palestinian people of Gaza, destroying homes, factories and agricultural land and carrying out protests. Feel free to criticize them and make them feel like they are not being heard. The blockade, imposed since November 2008, has caused great suffering to the Palestinian people.

Don’t allow our government to stand by while this happens:

It is up to us to demand that the government does its share to alleviate the suffering of the people. More effort, although essential, will not resolve the political issue of the illegal Israeli occupation. Despite Israel’s “strategic” motives behind the blockade, it remains an ongoing policy, not only of political pressure but also of economic and military sanctions. It is time to act now.

- Demand the immediate lifting of the siege and all collective penalties imposed on the entire population of Gaza.
- Demand the EU rejoin the 2005 European Union resolutions on Gaza.
- Support Palestinian democracy and engage with elected Palestinian representatives.
- Demand that the EU rejoin the 2005 EU resolution on the situation in Gaza.
- Support the suspension of the EU-Israel trade agreement until Israel respects its obligations.

Help PSC campaign to change British government policy:

- Write to your MP urging the British government to immediately:
  - Rejoin the 2005 EU resolution on Gaza
  - Remove all collective penalties imposed on the entire population of Gaza
  - Support Palestinian democracy and engage with elected Palestinian representatives

Israelis act to break the siege of Gaza

A convoy from cities all over Israel, will take water filters and basic foodstuffs – flour, rice, oil, salt, lemons, tomatoes – to distribute to residents of Gaza. The convoy is expected to leave on January 28, 2008.

The convoy will be a show of solidarity with the Palestinian people, and an expression of the desire of the people of Israel to see an end to the suffering of the people of Gaza. The convoy aims to break the siege of Gaza and to highlight the fact that the Israeli government is responsible for the suffering of the people of Gaza.

The convoy will consist of volunteers from different parts of Israel, who will be accompanied by representatives of the PSC and other organizations.

The convoy will be based on the conviction that the siege of Gaza is a violation of international law, and that the people of Israel have a moral and legal obligation to work towards its lifting.

The convoy will also serve as a demonstration of unity and solidarity with the Palestinian people, and a call for an end to the occupation and the agreements that have led to the current situation.

The convoy will depart from various locations in Israel, including Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, and will arrive in Gaza on January 28, 2008.

Participating organizations:

- Gush Shalom, Coordinating Council of Women for Peace (CWWP): The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
- Rabbis for Peace and Equality
- Gush Shalom, Coordinating Council of Women for Peace (CWWP)
- Physicians for Human Rights
- Alternative Information Center
- Psychosocial Mental Health
- Holy Land
- American Friends of Gush Shalom
- Gush Shalom
- Palestinian Women’s Association

The convoy will be accompanied by representatives of Gush Shalom and other organizations, who will be available for media interviews.

The convoy will be a demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinian people, and a call for an end to the occupation and the agreements that have led to the current situation.
Conclusion
Critics of solidarity are right on some points. As DIMs, solidarity groups tend to treat the object of activism as mere victims and deny them subjectivity in order to enhance their own. In the case of Palestine we have seen how alternative political tourism is affected by ambient developmentalism and orientalism, especially when the experience is filtered through Israeli perspectives and tourist dynamics. In addition the difficulty of critical solidarity creates the possibility that solidarity organisations don’t have a more sophisticated political analysis than shouting ‘hooray for our side’, an unthinking partisanship which reduces their ability to intervene strategically in local political contention. Yet when discussing the Gaza leaflets I have touched on how solidarity groups counteract the tendency to victimise through their specific political imaginary that constructs Palestinians as ‘people like us’ and providing political leadership. In addition this political imaginary promotes continuous contacts with Palestinians. This provides a corrective to the simplification of complexities which is a tendency, if not a default position of DIMs. This is not to obscure the failures in these relationships or the tensions between activist and Palestinian subjectivities but to contrast this disposition with that of Jewish Israel-critical groups.

Though individuals in Jewish groups are affected by and do have strong relations with Palestinians, on a group basis the interaction is occasional and problematic. I argue that this lack of interaction has led these groups into some DIM traps in their relationship with Palestinians. While this movement’s renunciation of simplistic solidarity opens up the possibility for it not to present Palestinians as despairing victims, there appears to be little effort in this regard. I suggest this is because Palestinians are not consulted as equals in this activism, and thus there is a tendency to reach for the most accessible images of Palestinians in the mainstream media and acquiesce in their portrayal of Palestinians as undifferentiated objects of despair. This also results from the Jewish Israel-critical groups’ relationship with Israeli organisations, which leads to a partial adoption of Israeli ways of viewing Palestinians and a downgrading of Palestinian political subjectivity in order for Jewish Israel-critical groups to highlight Israeli leftists as the people they support.

This speaks of a problem in the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism as a disposition for DIM actors, specifically how this disposition appears to deny the subjectivity of the object of activism. There is something evasive about using the phrase ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ to try and resolve, or more properly absolve the problematics of the cosmopolitan gaze, akin to the
tourist gaze which silences and tries to establish discursive mastery over what it sees. In this, it is similar to the problems with human rights as a discourse which, by allowing participants to unfocus from Zionist narratives, causes a corresponding blindness to Palestinian ones. Timothy Brennan’s criticism of cosmopolitanism is that it is a discourse of the universal that is inherently local, and its locality is always surreptitiously imperial (Brennan 2001). The problem is that such a universalistic discourse reinforces Palestinian invisibility, lack of political subjectivity and fixes their status as objects to argue about. Just as Brennan contrasts cosmopolitanism with internationalism so does Choudery (2006) recommend ditching the apolitical and decontextualised language of human rights in favour of developing a parallel universalism based on the struggles of subordinated people. In both cases the recommendation is to ground universalism in external fields of struggle, rather than to disavow such fields.

This returns me to the issue of exchange between social movement actors and the object of solidarity. I argue that it is at least partly through inter-field interactions and translations that social change occurs and thus for DIM actors to effect change they need to undertake the role of carriers and interpreters of these ongoing external intrusions. Rooted cosmopolitans engage well in the work of interpretation, since their interpretations often use human rights norms dominant in local fields, norms that are difficult to oppose and easy to accept. However such interpretations appear ever more legitimate within the local field the further from the intrusive, awkward foreign field they remain; specific to these local fields - the less Palestinian discourse is reproduced or acknowledged.

All DIMs, indeed all social movements navigate this course between interpreting and carrying a disruptive discourse. Herein lies the importance of constant interaction with an external field. The deeper the interaction – whether one disagrees or agrees with that field’s hegemonic concerns – the more one is inhabited by that field’s habitus and becomes a carrier of these discursive practices to the local field of contention. This is evident in the interaction these activists have with the Israeli field. While many in Jewish Israel-critical groups feel little affinity with Israelis, the necessary interaction with them bends the practices of this movement. Conversely the lack of interaction with Palestinians and the ongoing absence of the Palestinian field can only impact negatively on this movement’s ability to achieve change, since it detracts from the movement’s collective disposition towards change, a disposition which is needed to counteract the tendency towards field-specific institutionalisation. This
tendency towards ignoring the subjectivity of the Palestinians should be seen as an aspect of this movement rather than a full description of it. It is a dynamic that all DIMs, whatever their disavowal of solidaristic imaginaries or the imaginaries of a particular identity, are caught up in and illuminates the complexities of distant issue movements, contending as they do, in various distant and local fields.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

As I finish this dissertation, the latest arbitrary horror stories from Israel/Palestine are running around in the back of my mind, stories which demand attention. There are more local demands too – a Jewish woman in Belfast who wants me to help set up an Irish branch of J-BIG, a petition against the latest upgrade in Israel-EU relations, an IPSC stall on Saturday. These are the same forces exerting pressure on those within Jewish Israel-critical groups and the broader Palestine DIM. It is not just the horror, always electronically accessible, it is the possibility of action that impels participants and makes demands on them. Such demands prevent Jewish critics of Israel from sinking fully into identity traps inherent in a Jewish civil war. It also prevents the discomforts of their positions from engulfing them and making them draw back from action – however uncomfortable confrontations with families and friends may be, movement participants are aware of the triviality of this discomfort in comparison to Palestinian experiences. It is this awareness, these external fields continually exploding in their consciousness that provides the drive for action, however much this drive is directed by contention in their local field. Explaining and trying to generalise this interplay in Jewish Israel-critical groups has been the subject of this thesis.

In this conclusion I discuss my methodology, summarise my findings, relate them to the relevant literature and ask what implications they have. These findings consist of the specific analysis of this movement, theorising the relationship between identity construction and political projects, assessing the relevance of field contention for social movements, and highlighting the tendency of DIMs to engage in colonial practices. In line with my movement-relevant paradigm, I discuss the implications for both social movement theory and movement activists. I then discuss research questions that follow on from this work.

Firstly, are my methods and methodology sufficient to answer the thesis questions? Did I find out how this movement enables and directs Jewish criticism of Israel, and the outcomes of this activism, specifically how the distant object of their activism is constructed? Also can I generalise from this research? The answer is a qualified yes. The multiple methods I used – interviews, documentary analysis, and observation – have allowed me to provide a sufficiently accurate depiction and analysis of the movement, with the proviso that any description of a developing movement is necessarily provisional. Nevertheless, more work on the interactions with the Palestine DIM field and with Israel/Palestine would have helped describe outcomes, and one of my recommendations for future research is that research on
DIMs incorporates the subjectivity of the objects of activism in more depth than I managed in this thesis.

Methodologically speaking, I believe that my strategy of feeding back my research to participants was effective, though I could have done more of this. Any feedback I received from participants sharpened the accuracy of my dissertation, uncovered movement processes I hadn’t considered and helped me understand internal movement dynamics. I would have needed deeper participant observation and interaction to provide a more detailed description of the micro-processes of movement contention but I believe I engaged sufficiently deeply to answer the dissertation questions and describe the movement. At the same time I was careful to maintain a level of critical distance, important in allowing me to formulate a critical analysis of the movement. Viewed positively, being an insider/outsider can be seen as having the best of both worlds – the ability to access and understand a movement’s worldview without being trapped within it. Nonetheless, this position does come with its own responsibilities, which I identified as the need to produce research that was of some use to the people I was researching, with regard to their positions as social movement activists.

Though prepared to be critical of the movement, I would strongly defend the worth of the movement-relevant research paradigm (Cox and Barker 2002; Johnston and Goodman 2006; Bevington and Dixon 2005) and I believe this thesis has made a useful contribution to work in this field by establishing that such a paradigm is not incompatible with establishing a level of distance and criticality. This movement-relevant approach and my need to provide feedback to movement participants forced me to constantly ask questions about the relevance of my research and of the movement, rather than simply ascertain the extent to which it conformed to extant social movement theories. Theoretically speaking, this methodology was something of a gamble, since I didn’t begin with a specific theoretical framework within which to conduct my research. However, it proved to be theoretically productive, something which speaks of the benefits of using both grounded theory and movement-relevant methodologies in social movement research.

**Analytical description of British Jewish opposition to Israel.**

This thesis offers a description of this movement, its intellectual roots and routes, situates it within the British Jewish field and examines the problems it faces. It offers other researchers
on the Jewish field a useful analytical description of a growing tendency within the field. This description could also be valuable for those researching other ethnic minorities in Britain, particularly counter-hegemonic movements within these minorities, particularly how such movements exist within the interplay of identity and ideology. I describe this movement as operating in two local fields and affected by the demands of the distant Israel/Palestine field. While the movement draws on Jewish traditions, these traditions by definition are nothing new and cannot be seen as the trigger for this recent movement. Few in this movement would disagree that what has changed and what actually motivates them is changing diaspora Jewish understanding of Israel/Palestine. It is this changing understanding that has produced and is in turn produced by this movement in a process of positive feedback.

While drawing on Jewish intellectual critiques of Israel, (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993; Farber 2005; Karpf et al. 2008; Kushner and Solomon 2003; Rose 2005) I have argued the usefulness of viewing diaspora Jewish opposition to Israel as a social movement and governed by movement dynamics rather than analysing it with sole reference to its written productions. This may also be valuable to those researching parallel diaspora opposition to Israel in other countries. The advantage of doing so is that movement dynamics such as identity construction, framing, discursive repertoires and institutionalisation explain so much about the social processes that influence the political positions of Jewish critics of Israel. They are not just formed in response to Israel/Palestine or intellectual discussions about Jewishness but are situated social movement responses in the processes of field contention. As such, their actions are governed by what is acceptable and effective in these fields, constrained by field doxa, but also enabled through the contention and translation of field discourse.

Turning to movement outcomes, this movement provides a home for critics of Israel and encourages them to become active in opposition to Israeli policies. There had always been critics of Israel, but it was only with the establishment of the organisations and networks of a movement (often by these previously isolated critics) that so many Jews got involved with criticising Israel and solidarity with Palestinians. This emphasises the importance of actual organisations for movement activism. The confidence of movement participants is one indication of the success of this movement in countering pariah status and offering participants a positive way to be both Jewish and Israel-critical.
While the effect of the movement in galvanising Jewish people to question, criticise and oppose Israel can’t be gainsaid, the movement’s most important effect in the Jewish ethnic field might be negative. By establishing that it is (barely) acceptable to be Jewish and oppose Israel’s policies, the movement has loosened the automatic correspondence between Jewishness and Zionism. Those within the field have an overriding need to maintain field-autonomy. This helps explain the initial negative response to this movement’s actions, since it explicitly brought the political field into the ethnic. The subsequent failure to remove this group from the ethnic field entails a recognition of its claims, even if that recognition is in the form of opposition. Yet for Zionists, winning arguments about Israel is far less useful than not having them in the first place. Zionism, once a central point of unity in the ethnic field, once its position on the political axis has been emphasised both by critics of Israel and by its overt opposition to these critics, becomes disembedded from the ethnic. And as it becomes more overtly political to link with Israel, Zionism becomes more exogenous to the ethnic field – not a source of consensus but of contention. Using Bourdieu’s terms, Zionism may still be orthodoxy in the ethnic field, but it is no longer doxa, and the necessity to maintain field-autonomy may be leading to an ongoing distancing from Zionism by the British Jewish field.

It is easier to assess the movement’s effect in the Jewish field than in the Palestine DIM field or the distant Israel/Palestine field. One successful movement outcome could be a developing understanding in the Palestinian Solidarity Movement about the unacceptability of antisemitism and of equating Israel with Jewish people. However, whether this is the result of Jewish groups’ intervention is difficult to gauge. A deeper analysis of this field is necessary to assess this and other effects. In Israel/Palestine the effects of this group are limited because of its small size, and any impacts should be studied as part of the effects of the larger Palestine DIM. Here again a closer analysis of this field would be necessary to come to any firm conclusions.

**Implications**

By offering a description of the movement this thesis offers a necessary defence of it. The defence is not an apologia, it is an analysis of participants as rational actors motivated by universalist values who feel obliged to mobilise on the issue of Israel/Palestine, and to that end pursue their political objectives in what they feel to be the most effective manner. Such a characterisation recalls that of early resource mobilisation theorists in the 1970s who felt the
need to defend movement participants from collective behaviour approaches that saw these participants as irrational actors expressing alienation and personal frustration (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 20-24). Likewise a common picture of participants in this movement is of deviant hysterical Jews obsessed with Israel because of their self-hatred and tortured identities (Julius 2008, Ottolenghi 2007). The only analysis offered is psychoanalysis, designed to delegitimise their claims to political status. In fact, much of what I read had as much analytical value as a Ku Klux Klan pamphlet as a means of understanding the US civil rights movement, certainly revealing much of movement enemies, but of next to no use in understanding the movement itself. However, unlike the apocryphal Ku Klux Klan pamphlet, such texts are circulated as serious academic publications and occasionally treated as a genuine analysis of critics of Israel (for instance: Elroy 2008). This deeply problematic production of ‘knowledge’ is a contamination of academic autonomy which should be addressed, and is something this dissertation tries to redress.

The description I offer is not aimed only at academics. One aim of this dissertation is to give participants a useful analysis of their movement. This is partly in the form of critiques of their actions, such as highlighting the troubling effacing of Palestinians. It is also useful to highlight the very real achievements of this movement. In addition, I have encountered a certain mischaracterisation within this movement of opposing views on for instance, the boycott debate, which this thesis may help rectify. In the end though the thesis may be most useful as an artefact against which participants can form their own opinions on movement-relevant issues. Previously I have fed back my research to participants and received their feedback, which they and I found useful. I intend to continue the dialogue with movement participants by submitting my thesis and publications deriving from it to groups within the movement as well as interviewees. This is not simply an ethical imperative but an epistemological one, a necessary step in forming activist and academic knowledges (Johnston and Goodman 2006). While I believe the knowledge in the dissertation to be worthwhile for the movement, the portrait it paints is inevitably imperfect since it is trying to capture a developing and moving phenomenon. It should be seen as a discussion document, the continuation of a conversation rather than its summation.

78 for example The Institute for Global Jewish Affairs on ‘the new antisemitism’ http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&T MID=84&FID=624
Identity construction and political projects

This dissertation has centred on the importance of identity construction in a movement, its specific contribution being to apply the ideas of social movement identity theorists (Bernstein 2005; Gamson 1995; Melucci 1989) to examine the interaction of identity and politics in a distant issue movement. With Melucci (1989, 1995) and Berbrier (1998) I argue that identity contestation and construction is in part a process of combating pariah status and is necessary in allowing the movement to come into existence and enabling activists to engage in their work. In addition I claim that movement goals are arrived at in the dialogic process of identity construction with others in the field. This thesis argues strongly in favour of the idea of identity contestation structuring political projects and vice versa.

While participants speak ‘as Jews’, a more accurate term for their disposition is ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, a disposition rooted in the local process of contention as well as in the transnational scope of action (Tarrow 2005). In showing how cosmopolitan dispositions are created through contention in the local, this dissertation tries to bring cosmopolitanism down to earth. It describes the real existence of a cosmopolitan habitus, but also argues that it is as partial a habitus as any other rather than a way of encompassing other habitus.

This dissertation also contributes to the literature on identity in movements by highlighting the constraining role of identity construction. By being rooted, this identity directs participants to attend to the Jewish community and its fears, and steers participants into less contentious activism – focusing on the Occupation and on small-scale education projects. By being cosmopolitan, it encourages participants to unfocus from the local, including the point of view of Palestinians. While Gamson (1995) made a difference between queering and asserting an identity, it seems that the constraining aspect applies to all forms of local identity contention. This finding seems to echo Bourdieu’s comments that by engaging in the field of contention, actors need to adopt its illusio.

However, Bourdieu's position should be qualified. While people’s political positions are constrained by identity processes, that is far from claiming that this activism is merely a playing out of primordial identities onto the present-day political field. People do not take the positions they do because they are Jews but because they are contending on the Jewish field. The difference acquires significance once we note the many fields in which actors contend. Their identities or dispositions are not formed by one field – the Jewish ethnic one, but by a multiplicity. It is this multi-field contention which allows actors a measure of freedom from
the *illusio* in each field. One finding of this thesis has been how some people maintain a position of being both outsiders and insiders and thus manage to maintain a degree of autonomy from field doxa through their involvement in other fields. This modifies Bourdieu’s near-deterministic account of actor interaction with the local field, and may provide a more robust account that allows for a greater degree of actor agency.

At the same time it would be wrong to elide over the extent to which some in the movement are governed by the doxa of the Jewish ethnic field and are involved in order to ‘heal the Jews’ and renew diaspora Jewishness. There is a similarity between such dispositions and a form of antiracism concerned more with a desire for the activist’s own community to be a better place than with the demands of the racialised (Alana Lentin 2004). This is not necessarily a point of criticism. Recalling that many Palestinians would like nothing better than for diaspora Jews to stop interfering in their affairs, such a desire to pull back from involvement in Israel/Palestine may well link in with Palestinian liberation. Perhaps the implications are more general: when tracking the mechanics of contention between the heterodox and orthodox within fields, a degree of actor flexibility is possible, but researchers need to also be aware of how actors are customarily inhabited by the doxa of the field.

**Bourdieu’s theory of practice and social movements**

This leads to an important argument of the thesis, the applicability of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to understand the processes of DIMs and to account for field change. I found Bourdieu invaluable in providing a framework to analyse and explain the disparate processes of framing, discursive repertoires and identity formation within this particular movement, and so this work supports Crossley’s contention (2002) that this schema enables researchers to draw together different insights in social movement theory. It also offers a way of cutting through various false dichotomies in social movement theory. The first is the self-interest/altruism dualism exposed by Teske (1997). By arguing the salience of interest in disinterest, this thesis acknowledges the social movement actors’ own conception of what they’re doing and centres their political imaginary. Nevertheless, I don’t claim that such imaginaries exist outside the play of power, but rather that they are formed in response to local field contention. This helps refute the dichotomy established between discursive repertoires and framing. On one hand movement actors are governed by field discourse, with discursive repertoires offering a useful framework to study this; on the other they are
somewhat independent of this discourse since they inhabit multiple fields, with framing providing a means to explain the active and conscious processes of meaning making that participants engage in. In contrast to Steinberg (1999) I see the two processes as complementary, not contradictory.

The major way I adapted Bourdieu’s ideas was to highlight the salience of multi-field contention and outline a model of actors acting in and influenced by several local and distant fields. This enabled me to make sense in chapter seven of the tension in this DIM between the two local fields – Jewish ethnic and Palestine DIM – and show how this mapped onto political positions. I also examined the tension between local and distant fields, tensions which also shaped political imaginaries and revealed the extent to which the local fields are contaminated by ambient colonial attitudes.

This led to an understanding of the importance of the interaction with the distant field. Though there are problems when movement actors romanticise the Palestinian field as a site of resistance and purity, equally problematic is the cosmopolitan tendency to transcend it (Brennan 2001). The problem with either appropriating or silencing Palestinian discourse is less that it is morally wrong according to a value-scheme external to these Jewish Israel-critical groups but that it is counter-productive for their own goals and values – specifically their goal to contribute to change in Israel/Palestine and change diaspora Jewish attitudes to this issue.

I base this argument on a model whereby it is the ongoing interaction with distant fields by movement actors and their consequent role as carriers of external field discourse that allows them to become actors engaged in field transformation. I critique rooted cosmopolitanism as a way of trying to short circuit the process of achieving dispositions for field change by making the social movement actor’s cosmopolitan consciousness the substitute for the external locus for change. The problem is that by being unconnected to any particular external field to counteract local field doxa, there is a tendency for rooted cosmopolitans less to be a carrier for change than to regress into an echo chamber of the cosmopolitan self. This is not to discount the importance of successful manipulation of local field codes to achieve outcomes and the use of rooted cosmopolitanism for this end but to argue that this local field engagement on its own is not sufficient to achieve field change, and may lead instead to solipsistic identitarian contestation.
This model of field change is in response to a central conundrum in Bourdieu’s schema, which appears to provide no mechanism for the dominated within fields to *effectively* challenge, rather than strategise the best way of coping with field doxa (Jenkins 2002; Lovell 2000). Certainly the normal run of affairs is of fields successfully managing to reproduce themselves with the complicity of the dominated. However, change from below does occasionally happen and needs to be accounted for (Risseeuw 2005). My schema of activists being affected by external discourses which they translate to local fields explains how their activities are more than strategising the best way to maximise their positions with the limited capital the local field grants them. It also describes a mechanism by which fields interact and are affected by each other.

**Implications**

While a useful model, this is only one way of field interaction and transformation. There are dangers in building up the role of social movement actors as heroic carriers of change from abroad; this both exaggerates their role and places their habitus as the unique object of analysis, rather than the habitus that have affected them. In addition, the patterning of fields by dominant fields – change from above – remains important. Change from above in this case refers to the tendency of the Jewish ethnic field to accord to norms of ambient society as well as the tendency in this DIM to stress a normative human rights discourse which often works against Palestinian narratives of resistance. Change from above is thus both complementary to and in conflict with change from below.

This raises the question of how far the insights in this dissertation can be generalised to other DIMs. Firstly, viewing them in terms of fields highlights what differentiates DIMs from other social movements - the presence of the interests of others in distant fields within their activism, although their activism is not reducible to the interests of others (something which would argue for a pure altruistic stance). There is less a strict division between DIMs and other movements and more a continuum, with DIMs sharing many of the features of more conventional coalitions, where participants work for their own interests (sometimes seen as global political change) in tandem with the interests of others. Certainly participants in DIMs would recognise this portrayal as more accurate than a description of them as altruistic.
While this movement doesn’t disavow social location or identity the way solidarity groups tend to, the difference could be more apparent than real. The second way that field theory can contribute to understanding DIMs is the argument that even the purest solidarity movements are very much about the local field of the activist. In Ireland for example, one can see republicans becoming involved in Palestinian Solidarity, those on the far left expressing more interest in solidarity with Latin America, as well as a link between local Buddhists and the Burma Solidarity Campaign. This is not to say there is a simple mapping of local interests onto solidarity ones, but that the salience of local fields of contention in providing motivation and political content to DIM activities needs to be acknowledged by researchers. While solidarity movement actors tend to efface these local identities in the processes of constructing frames they believe would appeal to the general public, researchers should be aware of these local fields and examine how they structure the political imaginaries of DIMs.

Thirdly, DIMs are not simply about the local field, and this study calls for the importance of the distant field to be recognised and incorporated into researching DIMs. Such incorporation is difficult and illustrates the complexities of distant issue movements, based as they are in the nexus between local fields, actor subjectivities and object subjectivities. One could ask whether an understanding of this nexus would aid these DIMS build a programme of action which would enable them to balance between building their subjectivities, carrying the subjectivities of distant fields and affecting local fields. In this case it would involve acknowledging the importance of building up a self-confident diaspora Jewish identity, engaging with Palestinians as equals and at the same time being attentive to the field the activist is trying to change. In advancing such a programme, it is necessary to remember that social movements are practical knowledge-producers and that their work should already be seen as the situated exploration of these multi-field tensions, which many participants are certainly aware of. In any case, such an understanding of multi-field contention provides a useful research programme for DIMs as I discuss in the final section.

Another question is whether Bourdieu’s concept of fields is appropriate for other social movements. The existence of multiple, overlapping, contending, dominant and dominated fields is something Crossley recognised as problematic (2003: 62). There is a danger in becoming bogged down in mapping exercises, recounting the multiple fields of contention. This would be an analytically weak practice revealing little about movements beyond describing them at one point in their development. Rather than mapping, we should analyse
mechanisms that explain contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). In the case of this movement I was able to make the necessary simplification for analysis, making divisions between local fields of contention – the British Jewish, and the Palestine DIM, themselves embedded in the ambient British political field – and the distant Palestinian and Israeli fields. In other social movements it may not be so easy to identify local and distant fields or to simplify, and we should be cautious about the applicability of this model.

Another flaw in Bourdieu’s model is the very word ‘field’, implying a geographically discrete area, autonomous from others. Since the mechanism for change I advance is of fields being constantly affected by each other and inhabiting each other, there are deficiencies in a model that implies closure, stasis and the primacy of internal contention. While there are definite advantages in using field terminology for investigating social movements, the downsides should be noted and addressed.

**Tendency of DIMs to reproduce colonial mindsets**

My final finding concerns the reproduction of colonial discourses in DIMs. The way actors in this movement promote their own subjectivity and efface that of the object of activism may be necessary but is also problematic. In chapter eight I spoke of the possibility of transversal politics conducted between diaspora Jews and Palestinians (Yuval-Davis 1997). However this is only a possibility. Rooted cosmopolitan dispositions that view Palestine and Palestinians through a human rights frame makes the communication necessary for transversal politics more difficult. Equally, making claims relevant to the local Jewish field by talking for example about justice as a Jewish virtue, while enabling activism, may not be conducive to communication. Nor should transversal political dispositions be seen as offering a magic bullet for DIMs; colonial practice may be more structurally rooted in movement dynamics. It is revealing that problems similar to those I identify between this movement and Palestinians were also raised in a recent re-examination of transversal practices by Yuval-Davis (2006).

These are the difficulties of engaging in both ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ one’s perspective – the basic perquisites of transversalism – as well as the deployment of human rights discourse and the lack of accountability of NGOs.

The tendency of DIMs to engage in colonial practices has been noted before. However in opposition to post-developmentalists like Escobar (1995), I do not see this as a simple
application of Western colonialism, with the DIM worker playing the role of willing or unwitting collaborator for colonial regimes. While writers like Goudge (2003) and Simpson (2004) are certainly insightful about how development and solidarity activists are often carriers of Western racism and how these attitudes direct their activism, such insights do not tell the whole story. It is equally valid to centre the mechanisms of DIM activism (rather than the attitudes of DIM activists) in explaining how the subjectivity of distant objects of activism is effaced (Baaz 2005). Indeed, this is perhaps more troubling – what we have is not so much a process of racist Europeans being racist to non-Europeans, but a more inexorable process, whereby those fighting against colonialism and oppression elsewhere end up reproducing colonial mentalities *despite themselves*, in order to conduct effective action back home. At the same time this is not inevitable. I have noted how DIMs, especially solidarity ones which stress the primacy of the political, sometimes manage to qualify this tendency.

**Implications**

The issue whether colonial practices in DIMs are an unfortunate and necessary by-product of their activism or a reflection of actor mentalities is an important question for DIMs themselves, since many, though not all DIMs do seek to guard against this discursive colonialism. If it occurs mainly through processes of contention then engaging in membership education may not prove as effective a guard against such practices as other strategies, for example an audit of movement productions by the objects of activism, in this case by Palestinians.

This is a question for DIMs. For researchers, a salient question is less the extent that actors or their actions are influenced by ambient colonial attitudes than the degree to which such attitudes and actions change in movements. Certainly individuals in the Jewish Israel-critical movement (as well as the movement considered as a whole) exhibited change through time, with change partially a result of exposure to the foreign field. It appears more interesting to recognise that such changes do happen and to try and track them through time to see the extent to which social movements move, than to simply record the undoubted persistence of colonial and racist practices.
Future research questions

**Generalising this research**

I have outlined specific processes of contention and general frameworks to understand DIMs. It would be useful to determine whether this research offers insights into counter-hegemonic movements in other minority ethnic groups. Empirical research among these groups is needed to assess the generalisability of this thesis’s findings, such as the interaction of ethnic and political fields.

Being more specific, how useful are the processes described here to characterise Jewish Israel-critical groups outside Britain? Many of this movement’s discourses are transnational, even though the processes of contention are guided by national constellations of forces. Future research could examine the similarities as well as differences between various countries, and whether there is a transnational Jewish Israel-critical movement which is more than the sum of disaggregated parts. In such research, an exploration of the mechanisms and networks of transnational diffusion would help uncover the extent to which this activism can be called transnational.

Turning to frameworks. In the previous section, I outlined some of the theoretical frameworks which may be useful in studying DIMs. In the absence of empirical research, one can only make tentative claims as to the validity of treating DIMs as existing in the tension between local fields, actor subjectivity and foreign fields. It would be useful to test this framework with reference to the Palestinian DIM and indeed to other DIMs outside both Britain and Israel/Palestine.

**Researching Palestinian subjectivities**

While I have often referred to Palestinian subjectivities, I haven’t studied them except briefly discussing how Palestinians utilised study trips. In chapter two I outlined the difficulty and perhaps inappropriateness of studying Palestinians in this instance. However, as the study progressed the importance of the distant issue field became more apparent. Future research could fill this gap, perhaps not for this movement, because, as mentioned before, Palestinians don’t much consider it. But for the wider Palestine DIM, proper research on the Palestinian side of things would be invaluable. How do these DIMs impact on Palestinian subjectivities (or do they even?), and how do Palestinians use them in their own processes of contention? Indeed it would be a design recommendation for future DIM research to be multi-sited in
order to better map and analyse the mutual contamination of actor habitus – Palestinian and DIM activist. Such multi-siting would both centre the subjectivity of the object of activism, and centre the process of interaction with the foreign field in the formation of movement habitus.

**Extending field theory to other social movements**

The final direction of future research is to assess the usefulness of the theory of fields for social movements that aren’t DIMs. The specific way in which I advance Crossley’s use of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is to stress the salience of field interaction. More work needs to be done to see how far this helps describe processes in social movements. Specific questions would include asking how important is translation of distant field discourses by social movement actors as a mechanism of change? Also how important is this process in providing a meaning-making schema for actors? Without exaggerating the role of external field translation, it seems to provide an interesting avenue for future research. Both the ideas of framing and discursive repertoires remain useful explanatory processes for meaning-making but might be usefully supplemented by the idea of translation. Such research would not only provide information as to a specific mechanism of meaning making, but also help researchers decide on the robustness of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in accounting for change from below.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Options</th>
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<th>Somewhat Support</th>
<th>Somewhat Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
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<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>boycott of Israeli academic institutions</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sports teams</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>boycott of Israeli defense and security</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>development from Israel's economy and trade</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural institutions and events</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>boycott of state-sponsored tourism</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>suspension of all EU funds</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>investing in Israel</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development from computer companies</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>food products and produce</td>
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<tr>
<td>boycotting all Israeli products</td>
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Note: The data is from their May 2009 AGM.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Answered Question</th>
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<td>Any further comments? Do you have ideas on what we need to improve about Jif/j to enable us to fulfill our key purposes?</td>
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<td>9</td>
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Do you think adopting a broader boycott position would make Jif/j more or less attractive to Jews in Britain who take issue with Israeli policy but have not chosen to express that concern by becoming a Jif/j boycoster?
Appendix 2 ETT/ICAHD itinerary

Experience Travel Tours

The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions

STUDY TOUR TO ISRAEL & PALESTINE 20 – 29 October 2006

Oct 20 – Friday – Travel. Fly with Austrian Airlines leaving London at 15.50, going via Vienna. Arriving in Tel Aviv at 23:30. Transfer to the Bethlehem Inn Hotel, Bethlehem, for five nights accommodation.

Oct 21 – Saturday – Bethlehem area & Hebron. Begin with tour of the Separation Wall around Bethlehem. Drive to the conservative Muslim village of Wadi Fuqeen. Briefing in the kindergarten by the Future Vision Society on the history of the village including the growth of Beitar Illit settlement overlooking the village and how the Wall threatens the village. See olives being harvested. Proceed to Hebron for a tour with Breaking the Silence, former Israeli combat soldiers who served in Hebron. Also meet with the Christian Peacemaker Team (CPT) to hear about their non-violent work.

Oct 22 – Sunday – Jerusalem. Tour of the Old City in Jerusalem with ICAHD’s director, Jeff Halper. Meet a settler at a film presentation at the City of David Archaeological Museum. ICAHD tour of Greater Jerusalem and hear explanation of Israel’s Matrix of Control over the West Bank. Tour includes visiting Silwan and other areas of East Jerusalem, drive through the settlement of Maale Adumim. Evening at the Beit Arabiya Peace Centre meeting Salim Shawamreh whose family has had their home demolished four times. Meet other ICAHD staff at the meal.

Oct 23 – Monday – Bethlehem. Begin day at Bethlehem University. Meeting with staff and students to hear about education under the occupation. Visit the Badil centre to hear about Palestinian refugees and proceed to a walk through Dheisheh Refugee Camp. Afternoon visit with the Friends of the Earth Middle East Department to learn about water and the environment. See Manger Square and have guided tour of the Church of the Nativity. Tea at the Bethlehem Municipality. Evening talking circle.
Oct 24 – Tuesday – Ramallah. On way to Ramallah, meet with Jerusalem Link, a Palestinian women’s organisation. Proceed to meeting with the Negotiating Affairs Unit of the PLO. Lunch time meeting with Sam Bahour on the Palestinian economy. Meeting at the Muqata’a with government officials.

Oct 25 – Wednesday – Jerusalem. Meet with Sabeel Liberation Theology Centre to learn about the challenges of Christian Zionism. Meeting at the British Consulate to hear about British foreign policy. Afternoon at ICAHD’s Daila centre in West Jerusalem learning about their work into Israeli society. Here from Israeli women who are part of Maachsom Watch and perspectives from Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom.

Oct 26 – Thursday – Day off. Tour participants have a whole day to explore areas of their choice.

Oct 27 – Friday – Tel Aviv & Jaffa. Hear about the dangers of a militarised society from New Profile. Meet with Zachrot, Israelis who raise awareness about the Nakba, the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948 and Palestinian villages destroyed. Zachrot will guide us on a tour to Jaffa.

Oct 28 – Saturday – Negev. ICAHD’s Angela Godfrey-Goldstein will take us on a tour of the Negev Dessert as the situation regarding discrimination and displacement of the Bedouin community is presented.

Oct 29 – Sunday - Jerusalem. Political de-briefing by Jeff Halper followed by advocacy at home. Leave Jerusalem at 12:30 for 4:00 flight back to London’s Heathrow Airport arriving at 21.25.

Experience Travel Tours (ETT) and the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) invite you to participate in a study tour to Israel and Palestine. Rich in biblical history and steeped in traditions dating back centuries, it is one of the most fascinating places on earth. Here the prophets of the three monotheistic religions articulated through their holy books how mankind should live. Where one would expect justice, peace and harmony to prevail, man’s inhumanity to man are today the rule.

This tour guides participants in understanding the situation on the ground through our encounters with people on both sides of the divide – Israelis and Palestinians, Jews, Christians and Muslims. The tour looks at aspects of life today in Jerusalem, Palestine and Israel where participants will be exposed to fundamental disagreements amongst people who live in such close proximity. Many of the people you
will meet have put their lives on the line for their fellow human beings. Some are also founders of organisations which have become known internationally for their vision for the future as they declare that they 'refuse to be enemies'.

The tour facilitates a very practical way in which we can make a difference to people’s lives as we stand in solidarity with the Palestinians, in the Occupied Territories and within Israel who suffer great injustice, and with the Israelis who are marginalized by their own society for their stance on working for a just peace. Therefore participants are encouraged to raise around £100 in local fund-raising efforts in advance to donate to the various organisation that we visit. This humanitarian element of the tour allows you to involve your family, friends and community as you give them the opportunity to learn about displacement of the Palestinian people. Tell them what you are planning to do and encourage them to become involved by making donations. Then report back to them upon your return as you tell the stories about what you have seen.

**Cost per person sharing a twin-bedded room is £845** (subject to tax increase by AA), including flights from London Heathrow with Austrian Airlines, rooms with private facilities in three star hotels and half board, coach excursions, itinerary as detailed, all entrance fees, local government taxes and service charges, services of qualified English speaking guides, tour leader and tips for guides, driver and hotel staff.

The price does not include: lunches, supplement for single room accommodation £100, insurance premiums (please contact ETT for advice). Passports must be valid for a further six months after the return date (thus to 29 April 2007). Visas are not required for members of the EU or America but people of other nationalities should check with ETT. There is no need for special injections.

The tour will be led by Linda Ramsden, proprietor of Experience Travel Tours, which specializes in study tours to Israel and Palestine. Linda is the chair of ICAHD UK (see [www.icahduk.org](http://www.icahduk.org)) and has served as chair of ‘Rediscovering Palestine’ a group of 30 charities and organizations working in a variety of ways towards peace with justice in Palestine and Israel, (see [www.rediscoveringpalestine.org.uk](http://www.rediscoveringpalestine.org.uk)). Many recommendations for the tour are available upon request.

The itinerary has been formulated in conjunction with the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. Based in Jerusalem, ICAHD’s familiarity with the realities on the ground gives it unmatched authority in its frequent contacts with diplomats, politicians and the international media and ICAHD staff will play a significant role in the tour. Ground arrangements are by Golden Gate Tours & Travel, a Palestinian Tour Agency, based in Bethlehem. Please note that every effort will be made to complete the itinerary as seen, however flexibility is required.

“The tour had a profound effect on me and has rightly made me feel a heavy sense of responsibility to carry the many messages we received back to people here and the ripples have started already in my family, friends and work colleagues who are very interested to hear what is going on and what I have to say.” Adrian Briggs, Brighton, October 2004.

Our presence there will bring hope to those who feel so forgotten and misunderstood by the outside world and we will return enlightened and inspired.
Appendix 3. Text of PSC and JfJfP leaflets from Gaza demonstration 27th January, 2008

**Jews for Justice for Palestinians leaflet**

*Page 1*

End the siege on Gaza!

Freedom of Movement is a Basic Right!

Stop collective Punishment of Palestinians!

The Israeli army closed all border crossings of the Gaza Strip in June 2006, and in recent weeks the closure has been intensified after Israel declared Gaza “a hostile entity. Israeli policies have created a humanitarian crisis for Gaza’s 1.5 million residents, half of who are children under fourteen.

As Jews, we join with Israelis, Palestinians, and people of conscience worldwide in the belief that no one should be denied food, fuel, medicine, movement, and hope for the future as the people of Gaza are today. We call on the British Government to act in line with International law to force Israel to end the siege now!

**Jews for Justice for Palestinians** [www.jfjfp.org](http://www.jfjfp.org)

*Page 2*

Israelis act to break the siege of Gaza

A convoy from cities all over Israel, will take water filters and basic foodstuffs – flour, rice, oil, salt, lentils, beans – to distribute to residents of Gaza on 26 January 2008.

The filters are vital for purifying the water drawn from Gazan wells, which are now heavily polluted by brine, oil and sewage.

The Israelis point out: *However bad the suffering is of Israelis in the area under the barrage of Qassam missiles, the siege is an immoral act and a violation of International Law. Both*
residents of Sderot and Gaza are victims of a stupid and vicious policy of the Government of Israel.’

The Israeli groups aim to protest on the border of the Gaza Strip, simultaneously with a rally of Palestinian friends on the other side. These include peace and human rights activists of the Palestinian international Campaign To End The Siege such as the well-known psychiatrist Dr. Eyad Sarraj. Together, they will demand that Israel lift the siege of Gaza immediately.

Through their joint Israeli-Palestinian action on both sides of the border they hope to present a true alternative to the continuing escalation, the shooting and killing, destruction and suffering, missiles and tanks. An alternative offering peace and prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians.

**Participating organizations**
Gush Shalom, Combatants for Peace, Coalition of Women for Peace, ICAHD – The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Bat Shalom, Bat Tzafon for Peace & Equality, Balad, Hadas, Adalah, Tarabut-Hithabrut, Physicians for Human Rights, Alternative Information Center, Psychoactive-Mental Health Professionals for Human Rights, Active Stills, Student Coalition Tel-Aviv University, New Profile, Machsom Watch.

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**Palestine Solidarity Campaign leaflet**

**Page 1**

**End the Siege of Gaza – End Israeli Occupation**

The Israeli army has closed all border crossings of the Gaza Strip since June 2006. This total siege has created a humanitarian crisis, destroyed the economy and violates the basic human rights of the Palestinian civilian population, particularly the rights to decent living conditions, health and education.
On 19 September 2007, the Israeli government declared the Gaza Strip “a hostile entity” and stepped up its collective punishment. A crime is being perpetrated against civilians in Gaza which violates international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

www.palestinecampaign.org

Page 2

The siege is creating a living hell in Gaza:
Palestinians are suffering from hunger and malnutrition. Food imports cover only 41% of demand. 80% of Gazans receive food aid and 80% live below the poverty line.

People who are seriously ill are being prevented from accessing essential medical treatment outside Gaza. Over 40 Gazans have died as a direct result of being denied medical treatment by the Israeli authorities and 20% of essential drugs and 31% of essential medical supplies are no longer available inside Gaza.

Israel is cutting fuel and electricity supplies, affecting essential health and water facilities. 210,000 people are able to access drinking water for only 1-2 hours a day. UN (OCHA Special Focus December 07)

Meanwhile the Israeli army continues its attacks on the imprisoned Palestinian people of Gaza, demolishing homes, factories and agricultural land and carrying out arrests. Fatal bombing raids continue, killing Palestinian men, women and children.

The Israeli, EU, US and British governments hope to overturn the results of the last Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, declared free and fair by the international community. This siege is punishing Palestinians for simply exercising their democratic right to choose their own representatives.

But an even greater assault is on the horizon, with senior Israeli figures making clear that if their policy of imposing a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza does not succeed in forcing the Palestinians to submit to the will of the state of Israel, they are preparing for massive military action inside Gaza.

Don’t allow our government to stand by while this happens:
It is up to us to demand that the government renounces its shameful complicity in this crime. More aid, although essential, will not resolve the political issue of the illegal Israeli
occupation. Despite Israel’s “disengagement” from Gaza, it remains an occupying power, through its control of all points of entry and exit, and through continued military incursions and attacks.

Please write to your MPs urging the British government to immediately:

• Demand the Israeli government lift the siege and end all collective punishment imposed on the civilian population of Gaza

• Demand the EU restore funding to Gaza

• Respect Palestinian democracy and engage with elected Palestinian representatives

• Ensure Israel releases the Palestinian elected representatives it has abducted and imprisoned

• Support the suspension of the EU/Israel trade agreement until Israel ends its occupation.

Help PSC campaign to change British government policy.

☐ I wish to help PSC’s campaign and enclose ☐ £10 ☐ £25 ☐ £50 ☐ £… other
☐ I wish to join the PSC and enclose ☐ £24 waged ☐ £12 unwaged

Name.............................................................
Address..........................................................
Postcode.......................................................
Tel ...............................................................
Email..........................................................

Cheques payable to PSC. Return to: PSC, BM Box PSA, London WC1N 3XX. OR join online or by phone: 020 7700 6192