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RICHARD FITZRALPH

**SUMMA DE QUESTIONIBUS ARMENORUM BOOK XVI
AN EDITION AND TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION**

(TWO VOLUMES)

VOLUME TWO


JAMES GORMAN

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF M.LITT. UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN
SEPTEMBER 1999

RICHARD FITZPATRICK
SUMMA DE QUESTIONIBUS ARMEVICORUM BOOR XVI
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DEDICATORY LETTER

VOLUME TWO

PAGE

CHAPTER XII:

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DEDICATORY LETTER 1

CHAPTER XIII:

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF BOOK XVI 7

CHAPTER XII

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DEDICATORY LETTER

Reverend fathers in Christ Nerses archbishop of Manasgerd and brother Iohannes elect of Clat, Ricardus Radulphi, archbishop of Armagh, primate of Ireland, to thirst for justice through grace *till he draw waters in joy from the fountains of the saviour*. From the report of your holy devotion I have learnt that because of lack of sound knowledge of the sacred scriptures, certain ancient heresies, rejected by the holy fathers, and a number of fresh assertions erroneous and contrary to sacred scripture, have sprung up in your areas; and for the purpose of refuting them by means of Latin doctors, because their supporters do not admit the authority of the Roman church, judging that its authority cannot be proved from the sacred writings *zeal for the house of God* and the charity of Christ have led you to the Roman curia. And, since I have several times conferred with you there on these errors, you have devoutly stirred up my meagre powers to write to you on your questions, what God has designed to disclose to me, I dared not resist this desire of yours, so acceptable to God, fearing the exaction of a spiritual penalty if I neglected the duty of a tradesman regarding the gifts received from God, along with the promises of him who has pledged himself to give to the givers; yet ardently desiring because of this to receive more plentiful things so that I might abound. Nor should the elders be angry with me that I presumed to undertake such an arduous task, since those by whom it could have been better accomplished have completely neglected it. Like the widow in the gospel, I shall be be eager to bring the mites which I have to the house of the Lord in His presence, trusting in the approval of humble prayer more fully than in subtlety of intelligence to penetrate the difficulties of scripture. Nor do I refuse the correction of the elders, but actively seek it; and the work itself, the title of which

I wished to be *De questionibus Armenorum* (and which I have divided into 19 sections or books, putting before the individual books the subject of the book and its chapters), I submit in whole and in part to the approval and rejection of our most Holy Father Clement VI, supreme pontiff of the universal church.

In the first five books the principal question of the Armenians is examined: whether Christ had in himself two natures, namely divine and human; so that because of the union of the two natures in him the Lord Jesus was truly considered a person or hypostasis in both natures, namely true God and true man.

Accordingly the first book is against the Nestorian heresy introduced by a certain Nestorius who claimed that in Christ there was merely human nature, so that Christ was man and not God. Cherintus, Amerintus, Theodocio and also the Jews in their blindness and many of the eastern peoples have followed this heresy up to the present. Having firstly made clear what is to be considered the literal meaning of the sacred scripture, it shows from the new testament in its literal sense that Christ whom we worship is God.

Book 2 against particularly the Jews, proves from the old testament in its literal sense that Christ or the Messiah promised in its scripture, must be God.

Book 3 shows from the same old testament that our Christ whom we worship is or was he who was promised to the Jewish people in that testament.

In Book 4 the Jewish objections against the proofs in Books 2 and 3 are treated; and in it clear rules are given and proved for refuting those objections and all other Jewish objections.

In Book 5 the testimonies of sacred scripture are brought forward against the heresy of Arius and Apollinaris which claimed that in Christ there was not a human soul, but that godhead in place of a soul belonged to Christ; and against the heresy of Manicheus who said that Christ had not a true body but only an imaginary one; and consequently against the heresy which stated that the human body in Christ was a mere covering or garment for his divinity, as in the angels when they take on human bodies. And testimonies from both testaments are proffered against the heresy of Dioscorus who claimed that human nature in Christ had been changed to divine.

Book 6 shows from the scriptures of both testaments that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as from the Father, which is denied by the Greeks and by most Armenians.

Book 7 proves from the sacred scripture that the Roman church is the head and ruler of the whole Christian church.

Book 8 resolves more questions by the Armenians regarding the sacrament of baptism and its form.

Book 9 examines more of their questions regarding the sacraments of the body and blood of Christ, confirmation and unction.

Book 10 examines their questions regarding the unlawful ways of conferring, acquiring and withholding the free gifts of God and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Book 11 resolves their questions regarding a simple priest's power of absolution and regarding the punishment of the souls of wicked men before the final judgment.

Book 12 examines the Armenians' questions regarding the beatitude of the souls of certain just men and also regarding the purifying of some souls before the final judgment.

Book 13, which I added because of a certain Athanasius a Greek who denies purgatory, examines four articles regarding the satisfaction due for sins in life and also after this life.

Book 14 deals with the question of the Greeks and the Armenians regarding the simple and clear vision of the divine essence by the truly blest, which most of them deny.

The five remaining books, lest the proofs brought forward in the earlier books appear weak to some who have the law (or lacking the law but following reason) make clear the strength of the authority of Christian scripture by clear argument, sufficient for anyone willing to follow reason.

Book 15 raises an objection to the authority of our scripture by reason of the contingent nature of the future things foretold in it (which may not happen) and by the occasion of a certain fresh error which asserts that all future things happen by necessity or inevitability. Having produced nine fairly serious examples of the mental absurdity of this, it shows from natural as well as divine writings and also by manifold argument, the freedom of choice in the human will and the contingent nature of future things.

Book 16 poses regarding the objections previously touched on the three arguments accepted for the infallibility of divine scripture resulting from the divine unchangeable foreknowledge and from the divine, all-powerful, invincible and also effective will; and

resolves them from their own principles, showing clearly the contingent nature of future things and the human will's freedom of choice.

Book 17 poses the six remaining objections, namely regarding God's special cooperation with the active human will, the internal support of things by the almighty divine power, the general, even immediate divine co-operation with every created agent, the necessary occurrence of our external acts, scripture's assertion concerning the occurrence of all future things, and divine providence irrevocably and excellently arranging all things. And it resolves those six objections, affirming the proposition.

Book 18 poses other objections aimed at weakening the authority of our scripture and removes them, showing from the new law the authority of the old; and consequently it proves that from the law of the Saracens both testaments are strengthened; and deducing and showing that our law of the gospel excels the law of the Saracens in strength of authority; and along with this it affirms by manifold argument that our law handed down by Christ was not and is not corrupt in its major articles.

Book 19 compares our law to the Jewish law as to the sacraments and ceremonies; showing with sufficient argument based on the old testament that our evangelical and apostolic law is incomparably stronger, and that the Jews are to be condemned; and it examines a certain supposition in the preceding book and in this regarding the miracles of our apostles; and it also shows that our law has greater strength than has natural reason or any sect of the gentiles attacking it. And in this it sums up the whole work.

And because the method of delivery by means of question and answer seems to many easier even though longer, I have taken from among my pupils my favourite one,

debating as it were with me; so that Iohannes is understood to play the role of objector, and Ricardus the role of sententians or rather respondent. Therefore, reverend fathers, accept this work which you asked for; if it pleases paying me the reward of prayer for my labour. This work begins thus: Because from the literal sense of sacred scripture.

CONTENTS

In Book XVI three main topics are resolved: namely the fallibility of scripture, divine foreknowledge and the divine will, these are touched on at the beginning of the preceding book as showing the fallibility of all human acts. And the roots of those topics are traced and derived from their first principles. And it has 24 chapters.

CHAPTER 1 resolves the objection to the preceding book regarding the fallibility of sacred scripture, showing the manner of its fallibility; and it acquits the writers of possible falsehood in the scriptures.

CHAPTER 2 raises an objection to the answer in the preceding chapter and resolves it, discussing whether Christ's statement could have been false, and referring to Christ's manifold conscience.

CHAPTER 3 objects to the second, principally regarding divine foreknowledge; and it is shown by the example of a physical mirror that the availability of foreknown things does not prove the fallibility of divine knowledge.

CHAPTER 4 raises an objection regarding the knowledge of the future in the divine Word, notwithstanding which knowledge the blessed can be deceived; as it is deduced and concluded that it is so of God, and this objection is overcome by declaring as probable that neither Christ's soul nor any other creature foresees the future

CHAPTER XIII

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF BOOK XVI

CONTENTS

In Book XVI three main topics are resolved: namely the infallibility of scripture, divine foreknowledge and the divine will; these are touched on at the beginning of the preceding book as showing the inevitability of all human acts. And the roots of those topics are traced and derived from their first principles. And it has 24 chapters.

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CHAPTER 4 raises an objection regarding the knowledge of the blessed in the divine Word, notwithstanding which knowledge the blessed can be deceived; as it is deduced and concluded that it is so of God. And this objection is overcome by declaring as probable that neither Christ's soul nor any other creature foresees the future

intuitively in the divine Word. And nevertheless one further argument is added, proving that notwithstanding God's foreknowledge there can be avoidable things.

CHAPTER 5 raises an objection regarding the omnipotence of divine foreknowledge; and resolves it by showing that God's allpowerful knowledge requires that there be some avoidable things; and it shows that divine foreknowledge, insofar as it is such, is not the cause of foreknown things.

CHAPTER 6 objects to one earlier supposition; and resolves this by showing that the cause of things' avoidability is the cause of those things; and it also proves that inevitability, if posed, has in whatever way an efficient cause; it rejects the particular example of the inevitability of any prisoner being forced into prison by an officer of the law; and it contains three arguments.

CHAPTER 7 shows by a general argument drawn from the omnipotence of the divine will, that God's will in respect of human acts confers no inevitability on them; and, distinguishing the manifold divine knowledge, power and will, it shows the same thing more explicitly by the same argument.

CHAPTER 8 raises an objection, and refutes it by a clear argument that neither the divine will, nor an act proceeding directly from the divine will, can be the cause of those things not being producible which we call avoidable.

CHAPTER 9 raises an objection regarding the human will; it resolves it by showing that the human will can never be the cause of an act, naturally possible to it, not being producible; and it reaches the same conclusion regarding the divine will.

CHAPTER 10 objects that God's will, because it is the prior cause in time and also the eternal cause of things, cannot, through human act, not be or not have been their cause.

CHAPTER 11 clearly shows it to be possible that a prior cause in time may, through

the action of a later cause, never have been the cause of a particular effect; and it shows this by a clear example in our will and in its acts.

CHAPTER 12 shows the same thing from the words of the gospel, and by an argument taken from the just punishment of the damned: namely that their sin or its futurity, was the reason from eternity why God willed to damn the wicked, and not the contrary.

CHAPTER 13 shows from the manifold authority of scripture that human act or human will is often, in whatever way, the reason why God does and did many things and willed to do so from eternity. CHAPTER 14 argues against the avoidability of human acts by the fact that nothing can resist the divine will or render it ineffective or weak; and four objections are drawn from the last book of Genesis, from Ester 13, from Romans 9 and from Job 24.

CHAPTER 15 proves from God's omnipotence that some things willed by him can be avoided by a creature without the divine will being resisted or made ineffective.

CHAPTER 16 objects, from the avoidability of a thing willed by God, that the divine will can be shown to be weak; and it resolves this by showing that it is not less powerful by reason of this, nor is the human will; and it also brings in again a difficult objection, which it resolves by bringing in the argument from faith: that a thing which could be willed by God may never have actually been willed by him, just as a thing which could be foreknown by God may never have been foreknown.

CHAPTER 17 brings in as another argument a distinction regarding the manifold divine will: showing that God's will whereby he wills a thing to happen or to be in the future, insofar as it is such a will, is not the efficient cause of human acts.

CHAPTER 18 shows particularly: that neither the divine volitional power nor the divine volitional act of assent (which cannot properly be said to be either effective or

ineffective, powerful or powerless, strong or weak) can be shown to come from weakness, impotence or inefficacy, even though what it wills may be prevented.

CHAPTER 19 shows the same thing of every kind of divine volitive act operating towards the outside respecting human acts, namely that none can be shown to be ineffective, even if what it wills may be avoided by the creature.

CHAPTER 20 raises an objection and resolves it by showing more fully that no divine volitional act relating to human acts can be shown to be ineffective or weak, even if what it wills can be avoided by the creature.

CHAPTER 21 raises a counter objection regarding a conceivable divine volitional act, whereby it so wills human things to happen, that if the human will did not carry them out, it would itself immediately produce them; and it refutes this by proving succinctly that no such volitional act is or could be in God.

CHAPTER 22 raises an objection as to the fragility of the divine will, if it can be made conform to everything avoidable; and it resolves it by showing that this conformability of the divine will comes from the highest firmness and invincibility, as opposed to the conformability of the created will or power.

CHAPTER 23 resolves the objection in chapter 14 regarding the possible resistance to the divine will by its handiwork.

CHAPTER 24 shows, from a series of texts from the letter to the Romans, which had been adduced by way of objecting, that some human acts are avoidable. And it proves the same thing from the authority of the Apocalypse.

And thus ends Book XVI.

CHAPTER ONE

<RICARDUS >

I think you already see how your opinion destroys the Christian faith and human and divine learning. Lest however you should claim to be weighed down by the mass of authorities with your objections still unresolved, let us see with the Lord's guidance how your bonds may be loosened, how your opinion may be broken down, using your own principles, and how we may make a fresh start by resolving your objections.

IOHANNES

Would that you might match words with deeds and begin by resolving my first objection regarding the infallibility of scripture.

RICARDUS

You seem to yourself to argue cleverly from logic and yet offend in logic which shows various methods of arguing, namely demonstrative from cause or from effect, from authority and numerous other ways. In demonstrative argument you have rationally deduced that the contingent can never follow from the necessary nor conversely can the impossible follow from the contingent. But in argument from authority you wrongly claim that the contingent can never be inferred from the necessary or the impossible from the contingent, if we call necessary anything that cannot in any way be false, and impossible anything that cannot in any way be verified. For if we declare necessary only what neither can nor could be false, and call impossible only what neither can nor could be true, your objection is not advanced. For this or that thing stated in scripture is not necessarily true since it may have been false before the composition of scripture. Nor is this or that thing

impossible which is not or was not stated in scripture, as you have stated earlier since it equally may have been true before the composition of scripture. For if anyone is so worthy of belief that he never lies and this is firmly believed (I do not say known) of him, who is there having such belief in him, who does not accept an argument from his authority thus: he himself has said it, and therefore it is true? No one, I think. Yet everyone knows that the antecedent is necessary in the first way described above, and that the consequent is perhaps contingent; or if I may speak after your fashion, the consequent is contingent in the opinion of many if the consequent is about future things which depend on our decision; and everyone knows this who nevertheless accepts an argument from his authority. Nor because of this does he accept the argument because it is a necessary inference, but because he believes firmly that the antecedent is never in fact true without the consequent. Hence the argument from authority has not inferential necessity everywhere and always, but depends often on belief. Nonetheless scripture ascribes necessity to such inference not simply so called but it calls infallibility necessity insofar as its removal thus removes fallibility in act; so that a thing is called necessary which is so infallible that it never deceives, granted that it could deceive. For that possibility does not take away the authority of scripture in the eyes of one who firmly believes that scripture never lies. It is important to pay close attention to this way of accepting necessity in the scriptures, which quite often use these words in this sense regarding the future not simply for necessity or inevitability as will be shown more fully below. But, however, you try to argue the possibility of falsehoods in those contingents which are read as stated by the prophets and other authors of sacred scripture, and consequently you try to suggest the possibility of sins resulting from those falsehoods. This is an unwise inference because a lie does not exist without the intention of deceiving, which

intention you do not prove to be or as of now to have been possible in these authors, even though you may well show that some of the contingents they stated may have been false. For it does not follow that because those contingents which they stated in the sacred scriptures are or were then false, they therefore themselves spoke a lie; but it does indeed follow that they either lied or were deceived. And this second thing is sufficiently possible just as it is possible that the things which they said would happen will never happen, although we may in fact believe that they never were deceived in scriptural statements of this kind. Equally if you argued that they were possibly the doers (I do not say the authors) of deceptions in others, it would have to be acknowledged that this is true. Nor can you from this deduce the possibility of lying or sin. For it does not necessarily follow that because such a person has deceived others by unknowingly claiming falsehoods to be true, he was therefore a liar or sinner. For he could with good reason be excused from lying and sinning by the fact that God instructed him so to do, likewise by the fact that he did not mean to deceive and did not think he was deceiving them. This difficulty occurs also for you and for others promoting your thinking, as it is also for me who do not hesitate to affirm future contingents. For you will not deny, of what we call future necessities, that God can arrange that they never happen since God does nothing outside himself from necessity. From this you may infer all the conclusions which you have reached above. Hence you cannot deny that the unravelling of this complication is of common interest to us both. Say therefore how you free and absolve God from the possibility of lying and the authorization of sin. He himself, a true mortal existing man, declared many future things which we commonly call necessary. And he instructed the apostles to preach them diligently throughout the world; although he himself can in a moment destroy the whole world and arrange so that they never happen, namely neither the

resurrection of the dead nor the final judgment which we in faith await at the end of time, and through which faith we hope to be saved. Since from these things you could deduce, contrary to the claimant, what future contingents result, you may further deduce that it is possible with God that those already justified and saved did not believe in the predictions of the future, or that they had false belief, that in this false belief they are saved, and that God was the author of their false belief. For these things clearly seem to follow from the single fact that God can so arrange that the dead never rise again and the general judgment never takes place. He himself stated this principle in his scripture. *With God, he says, all things are possible*, Mt 19 and elsewhere, Lc2: *No word shall be impossible with God*. And he says many other like things.

CHAPTER TWO

IOHANNES

Here I admit I am confused, nor do I see how the possibility can be denied that God authorized false belief that many were saved in false belief, and that Christ stated a falsehood. Thus it appears possible that Christ told a lie and sinned.

RICARDUS

I acknowledge the first point and that I do not know how to escape the second point, on which from my first study of theology I desired to hear my teacher, and even to this day long to do so. But as I have said before the sin which you fear does not follow because a lie does not exist unless with the intention of deceiving, and if one is acquitted of the possibility of lying one is similarly acquitted of the possibility of all sin. For it now is impossible that Christ in making predictions intended to deceive, and thus it is surely impossible that he sinned in stating these things; though I think the possibility cannot on the basis of the foregoing evidence be denied that in making these statements he spoke an untruth. And what is all the more serious in the view of those who claim that Christ, according to his human soul, knew all that God knows (as the Master of the Sentences and other masters and holy doctors thought), I do not see that it must be conceded as possible that Christ knowingly spoke a falsehood. Let them therefore show how it is possible not only that he made a false statement contrary to his conscience, but also that if Christian lips were permitted so to admit, it is possible that Christ also spoke a falsehood in knowingly declaring an untruth. This I admit is most abhorrent to my ears. For supposing the previously stated principle regarding the knowledge of Christ's soul, a defence of these conclusions does not present itself to me unless someone now says it is possible that Christ never

made those statements. And how that can stand I do not see, when regarding expressions of this kind by him we read that he said: *And now I have told you before it come to pass: that when it shall come to pass you may believe.* John 14, and Matthew 14. *Behold I have told it to you beforehand,* and consequently he describes his future coming to judgment concluding: *Watch ye therefore because ye know not what hour your Lord will come.* These words convey a clear statement since to assert seems to be nothing other than to express something willingly so that someone else may believe it. It seems accordingly unavoidable that Christ made those statements just as it is unavoidable that he made those statements willingly to his disciples so that they might believe them. But I am less definite in thinking it is now possible to say that Christ according to his soul foreknew neither these writings nor their opposites in the divine Word, than I am in saying now that possibly, in speaking of those things, he either lied or spoke against his conscience and thus sinned. And would that I might hear someone who might avoid both of these statements and others like them. Indeed so that in this point on which I have quite often been troubled from my youth, I may say what I think needs to be said, I think regarding these past things, that the only things possible to God are those where things like them are possible to Him for the future. Consider therefore if for the future you dare claim it as possible that Christ may lie or state something against his conscience, or be ignorant of some future things or at least not know them (according, I understand, to his assumed nature) following Luke 2: *And Jesus advanced in wisdom etc.* and Isaiah's statement about him: *Before the child know to refuse the evil, and to choose the good, the land which thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of the face of her two kings;* and likewise of other things which in this matter give rise to the question which I have treated in the second of this. And what is possible to him for the future you will not deny as being

possible for the past, if this kind of argument leads you to this. Indeed because I do not see it as impossible that Christ was ignorant of many future things according to his soul (arising from which, with the union remaining as many consider, I think that God can take away the knowledge of creatures from his soul), I dare not deny the possibility that Christ unknowingly spoke a falsehood. By unknowing I mean the opposite of acquired knowledge which the holy father Augustine, with the approval of many, calls evening knowledge. And for this reason I do not accept that this cannot be stated of his past statements while excluding the possibility of his lying or saying anything against his conscience. I mean human conscience formed from acquired knowledge, because in the difficulty previously touched upon it follows as quite possible that he knowingly stated a falsehood, but with divine knowledge. For Christ must know all future things with divine knowledge because he is God. It cannot however be argued that either a lie or a sin arises from a false statement contrary to that knowledge or that conscience, since not it but rather acquired knowledge is the natural principle of the statement. Nor is the divine nature to which that knowledge belongs the proper principle of that statement, but human nature. Therefore such a statement is not to be called a lie and consequently a sin, unless it be contrary to the conscience of that nature which is the natural principle of that statement. Accordingly, leaving aside this difficulty, in which I would much rather accept my teacher than rashly affirm anything of my own accord (and this difficulty appears to me to be common to you and to us regarding the authority of scripture) I understand it to be infallible in the way already stated, namely that in fact it never deceives, and that an argument from its authority clearly is infallible in this way, not that it absolutely cannot deceive but that it never deceives. And this must be held as a matter of faith. And for this reason the faithful Christian must hold fast to such an

inference as an absolutely necessary one because he firmly believes that such an inference never lies. And you must understand thus the arguments of Christ and John which you contested above, and likewise those of others.

Tell me accordingly what other things you are contented enough to express against the ontological nature of future things.

QUAERITUR

We all hold and believe that God knows beforehand all future things, for otherwise He would unknowingly have created some things which as our Christian law or Heretic does claim. If therefore some things are not necessary it could be that they would not happen, and consequently would not be foreknown by God. From this it seems to me to follow that divine knowledge is changeable or variable like ours. For if any one of us foreknew something future of this kind and if it were possible for it not to happen, it would follow that our knowledge or idea could be led astray. On the contrary, therefore, the fact that God's foreknowledge cannot be misled means that everything foreknown by Him will inevitably and necessarily happen.

RESPONDETUR

This reasoning of yours can equally be used of every future effect. For we hold that all future things are contingent with God, who is still so far removed from us as we are that with the removal of these contingencies of which the world is full, which are disconnected from themselves you can be free to proceed on this question. I have not explicitly upon that, or I might have stated this question. But yes, so that the answer concerning you may be answered, here to state that that is the method of the world that is a contingent without itself. By this I mean a future which cannot be foreknown in any way, from which it follows that it cannot be decreed. The only objection is some kind of absurdity, if however there existed a physical cause, the

CHAPTER THREE

<RICARDUS>

Tell me accordingly what other things you are irritated enough to express against the contingent nature of future things.

IOHANNES

We all hold and believe that God knows beforehand all future things, for otherwise He would unknowingly have created some things; which no one, Christian, Jew or Saracen dares claim. If therefore some things are not necessary it could be that they would not happen, and consequently would not be foreknown by God. From this it seems to me to follow that divine knowledge is changeable or variable like ours. For if any one of us foreknew something future of this kind and if it were possible for it not to happen, it would follow that our knowledge or idea could be led astray. On the contrary therefore the fact that God's foreknowledge cannot be misled means that everything foreknown by Him will inevitably and necessarily happen.

RICARDUS

This reasoning of yours can equally be used of every future effect. For we hold that all future things are contingent with God, who is able so to prevent them as to arrange that with the removal of those contingents of which you speak (and which are distinguished from necessities) you are no less confused on this question. Hence you foolishly opine that contingents create this question. But yet, so that the reason compelling you may be removed, bear in mind that God is the radiance of eternal light and a mirror without blemish. By this I mean a mirror which cannot be blemished in any way, from which it follows that it cannot be deceived. For every deception is some kind of blemish. If therefore there existed a physical mirror, the

nature of which was so bright and so pure that any existing thing whatever would immediately shine in itself with its existence, then when that thing fell away to non-being it would cease to shine in itself, so that that mirror would receive absolutely nothing, just as a physical mirror would perhaps not receive anything as it reflects the various rays. There is no doubt that the mirror would not be changed; whether the physical thing appearing in or through it might or might not exist, the mirror would still remain unchangeable. Thus you can in some way understand the invisible things of God through what He has made, so namely as to understand that God is such a mirror, in which shine not only material things, but all material and spiritual things, all existing things, and all future and all possible things, which when they are under one condition namely existence thus shine in it. When they are under a difference of past time they thus shine; when they are future they appear thus to Him; and if they are possible not future they appear thus to Him; they thus become present to Him inwardly, from Himself and from His nature. Hence it is clear that in no way can He be deceived as we are often deceived and the angels can be deceived (whose nature is not thus representative of things). Nor because of this can God's knowledge be changed, even though it is possible for some future things not to happen and even not to be foreknown and never to have been foreknown by Him. For just as it is possible for them not to be in the future, so also in relation to being under that condition or under a difference in time, it is possible for them not to shine, and never to have shone in Him, following the example which I posed of the physical mirror. But if it were such as I have described above, if it were possible for an existing thing now not to be it would be possible for it now not to shine in that mirror, although it is quite impossible for such a physical mirror to exist. It cannot however be so regarding us, for our nature is not such nor can it be such, that a thing existing under any

difference of time can by that fact itself thus shine in us or appear to us. And for this reason we can be deceived though God Himself cannot be deceived.

IOHANNES

And so the scripture says: *For this is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent* (1st Jn. 3:7, and 3rd Jn. 1:9). These angels in heaven always see the face of my father who is in heaven. It must be believed that the souls of the saints and the angels continuously look upon this spiritual mirror with a clear and pure gaze. Therefore just as the mirror itself brightly shines on things as itself and through itself and since everything shines in it in the way already mentioned and described by you above (and this from the nature of the mirror itself), the consequence is that both the souls and the angels continuously look on everything in that mirror, just as God sees all things in or through it. Or at least it follows that this is thus possible of all things as it was said of these substances, which suffices for our purpose. However, if a creature were thus to see future things in that mirror it could be deceived and misled if it were possible for the things seen not to happen. Accordingly I do not see why God cannot be deceived if it is possible for the thing foretold by him not to be in the future. I am influenced even now by one thing which I have heard you debate several times. For if it is possible for a contingent that foreseen in that mirror by an angel or a blessed soul not to happen when the blessed soul wills it to be in the future as he foresees it, and as he sees God willing it to be in the future; it follows that just as it is possible for the soul or the angel not to foreknow it, so it is possible for him not to will it. For he does not will a thing to be in the future unless he foresees or foreknows it to be in the future; and the cause of any effect whenever being removed, the effect itself is removed. And thus since the act of will whereby an angel or blessed soul wills that thing to be in the future is one

CHAPTER FOUR

IOHANNES

And so the scripture says: *For this is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent* Io 17, and Mt 18. *Their angels in heaven always see the face of my father who is in heaven.* It must be believed that the souls of the saints and the angels continuously look upon this spotless mirror with a clear and pure gaze. Therefore just as the mirror itself brightly shines on them in itself and through itself and since everything shines in it in the way already mentioned and described by you above (and this from the nature of the mirror itself), the consequence is that both the souls and the angels continuously look on everything in that mirror, just as God sees all things in or through it. Or at least it follows that this is thus possible of all things or at any rate of future contingents, which suffices for our purpose. However if a creature were thus to see future things in that mirror it could be deceived and misled if it were possible for the things seen not to happen. Accordingly I do not see why God cannot be deceived if it is possible for the thing foreknown by him not to be in the future. I am influenced even more by one thing which I have heard you debate several times. For if it is possible for a contingent thus foreseen in that mirror by an angel or a blessed soul not to happen when the blessed soul wills it to be in the future as he foreknows it, and as he sees God willing it to be in the future, it follows that just as it is possible for the soul or the angel not to foreknow it, so it is possible for him not to will it. For he does not will a thing to be in the future unless he foresees or foreknows it to be in the future; and the cause of any effect whatever being removed, the effect itself is removed. And thus since the act of will whereby an angel or blessed soul wills that thing to be in the future is one

present effect, which also existed previously, that is from the time when the angel or soul thus willed, it follows that a thing which exists and existed is capable of not existing as of now and of never having existed; which is impossible. For all philosophers and all rational people agree in acknowledging that God cannot now cause a past thing not to have existed. Likewise it could be more strongly argued of other things, produced by such a will in conformity with foreknowledge, that it could be possible for those things not to exist and never to have existed, if it were possible for what was foreknown not to happen, which seems too absurd.

RICARDUS

These difficulties of yours apply to future necessities just as they do to contingents, because God could equally prevent future necessities (such as the next day and the following one, and other natural things which cannot be impeded naturally or willingly by a creature) from happening, just as He can make contingents not be in the future. But I do not see how these same difficulties can be removed by claiming that some creature, namely the soul of Christ or some other is able in or through the divine Word to see the future or foreknow it intuitively. Nevertheless I have on and off in the last twenty years struggled to understand this point. For you may argue thus of Christ (as of an angel or any blessed soul whatsoever): namely that the first time when he came to Jerusalem, before he spoke to his disciples of his forthcoming passion in Jerusalem (which we believe he went there to undergo) that it was possible that he would never suffer. If therefore Christ had foreknown his passion solely by foreknowledge in the Word (so that from that foreknowledge alone he would have wished to suffer and to go to the place of suffering), then just as it was possible when he came to Jerusalem that he would not suffer, so it was also possible that he did not foreknow his passion. For one thing follows from the other; and if it was possible

that he did not foresee his passion, it appears possible that he did not will it, and consequently it was possible that he did not go to the place of suffering; since once the cause is removed its effect is removed. But because as I have said this difficulty is common to those arguing for contingents and those denying them, it is not for this reason proper to discuss this difficulty here; but there is another more suitable place, if God grants it to us, of debating it. Indeed if it were said to you, as appears probable to many, that no creature can intuitively foresee the future but that this belongs solely to an infinite power, all your objections would be removed and also those which I have added regarding Christ. For all those things appear to suppose this foreknowledge in the angels and in the saints and in Christ's soul in the Word of God as if in a perfect mirror. Therefore I have returned to the other objections which you tried to make above; or in that point of yours regarding God's foreknowledge if you have any other objections bring them forward if you please.

IOHANNES

I do not see myself able from God's foreknowledge of future things to claim the necessary happening of voluntary things, just as I could not prove their inevitability because of my foreknowledge of them (if, that is, it were possible for me to foresee them). For God's foreknowledge no more imposes necessity on future things insofar as it is foreknowledge alone, than my foreknowledge would do. Accordingly my foreknowledge would truly be called foreknowledge in a like sense to His, apart from what I clearly see. If by an impossibility it were claimed as many claim that some future things are truly contingent, this claim has no relevance to the power of a foreknowing God and therefore nothing inconsistent will follow on His part from it. God would no less foreknow them and foreknow them as contingent; and they would thus happen contingently because they would be foreknown as contingent. And thus I

perceive that solely because of God's foreknowledge of things I cannot deduce any inevitability regarding them. Hence it can be just as consistent with foreknowledge that the foreseen thing be contingent, as that it be necessary.

But if anyone should say that God's foreknowledge brings in inevitability, and because it is foreknowledge alone, not because it is the creature's foreknowledge, I will not say how he can be refuted.

RECAPITULATION

That cannot stand up, because he does preserve and fix things whether he does them or contemplates. And thus, without doubt, that which which is apprehended encompasses not only existing or possible things but everything conceivable; otherwise it would not be allpowerful knowledge at all. For the power of wisdom by which it is properly and essentially said to be universal, has not to be outward operation but to be inward extension to factors included therein; and for this reason the allpowerful knowledge contains everything conceivable. Hence therefore contingencies are at least thinkable (which no man can deny since he is saying this to himself); it follows that the allpowerful knowledge comprehends them if not as future at least as thinkable; and with equal reason, if they were possible the allpowerful wisdom would by that fact know them as being possible. And with equal reason, if they were not only possible but future the allpowerful wisdom would know them as being future and that would foreknow them. Accordingly it is not repugnant to God's foreknowledge, inasmuch as it is allpowerful, to determine that, nay rather this pertains to it from the nature of allpowerful knowledge since some other reason be found why the contingencies themselves cannot exist. I want you moreover to pay particular attention to another thing: that although the knowledge of God, the maker of the whole creature, is the cause of all things, yet that's

CHAPTER FIVE

<IOHANNES>

But if anyone should say that God's foreknowledge brings in inevitability, not because it is foreknowledge alone, but because it is the Almighty's foreknowledge, I still do not see how he can be refuted.

RICARDUS

That cannot stand up, because the more powerful and the greater wisdom is the more it comprehends. And thus without doubt that wisdom which is allpowerful encompasses not only existing or possible things but everything conceivable; otherwise it would not be allpowerful knowledge at all. For the power of wisdom by which it is properly and essentially said to be powerful, lies not in its outward operation but in its inward extension to further knowable things; and for this reason the allpowerful knowledge contains everything knowable. Since therefore contingents are at least thinkable (which no sane man can deny since in denying this he thinks them), it follows that this allpowerful knowledge comprehends them if not as future at least as thinkable; and with equal reason, if they were possible the allpowerful wisdom would by that fact know them to be possible. And with much more or at least with equal reason, if they were not only possible but future the almighty wisdom would know them to be future and thus would foreknow them. Accordingly it is not repugnant to God's foreknowledge, insofar as it is allpowerful, to foreknow them; nay rather this pertains to it from the nature of allpowerful knowledge unless some other reason be found why the contingents themselves cannot exist. I want you moreover to pay particular attention to another thing: that although the knowledge of God, the maker of the whole creature, is the cause of all things, yet God's

foreknowledge insofar as it is such is not the cause of things; but rather the fact of its being foreknowledge is later in causal terms than the fact of things being future. For God's simple knowledge respecting things, His effective will respecting their future happening, their future happening and God's foreknowledge respecting them are seen to be placed in this order of causality: namely that in the first order of causality the future thing is known by God with simple knowledge, just as the artifact to be made is discerned with simple knowledge by the mind of the craftsman; in the second God, by His causative or effective will, wills the known thing to be in the future; in the third it follows that the thing is future; and in the fourth place it follows that it is foreknown by its craftsman or by God. For the thing's being future is prior in origin or causality, or at any rate in causal terms, to its being foreknown. For to foreknow a thing is nothing other than to know the thing to be future or to know its futurity. But the future thing's futurity is prior in causal terms to knowing its futurity. For if it is known to be future, it is itself future and not the contrary (unless, perhaps, as a matter of fact with God) and therefore in the causal sense the future thing's futurity is prior to the thing's being foreknown by God. And for this reason God's foreknowledge, insofar as it is of this kind is not the cause of anything, but is the conformity of the knowing God insofar as the thing is subject to that difference of time in relation to the future thing, or to the divine knowledge of the thing known. I do not consider that in these things there is any real distinction on God's part (nor should there be any in the Christian mind) but that these meanings or reasons place God and the creature in the order of reasons designating things by way of cause and effect. Nor do I think that a man of subtle understanding can deny what I have said; in which let no one reproach me before he examines that matter closely and as far as he can more deeply. For from this it follows immediately that God's foreknowledge

as such confers neither avoidability nor inevitability on anything; since the sole effective cause of a thing, namely what can produce the thing, produces its avoidability or inevitability as will be shown later. And God's foreknowledge insofar as it is foreknowledge has not this kind of causality in relation to things, as has become clear; so that those who look for the cause of the inevitability of voluntary things concern themselves in vain with God's foreknowledge; since God's foreknowledge as such could bring about no inevitability any more than yours, which is always later than the things foreknown. Nor can God's foreknowledge (if it is claimed to be omnipotent insofar as it belongs to an omnipotent being) bring any inevitability to things, but rather by reason of the fullness of its omnipotence. If in this way it can be said to be omnipotent, by reason that is of the divine omnipotent knowledge from which it derives, it encompasses both the avoidability and the inevitability of the creature or at least can be extended to them; otherwise it would not be omnipotent. For that foreknowledge would be more powerful which had subject to itself each difference, actual or at least potential, of knowable things and contained each one actually or potentially. Hence it is clear to you unless you hide yourself in a fog that the divine foreknowledge, although it may be called in whatever way allpowerful (namely because it can or could be dividedly in respect of any thinkable knowable thing), not only does not produce inevitability in all things; but moreover it is clear that God's foreknowledge itself in no way implies that there is inevitability in all things. For if that divine foreknowledge implied inevitability in everything foreknown by it, that divine foreknowledge would lessen or remove the fullness of its own omnipotent power, and would destroy itself; which is impossible. For if, from the fact that some things are foreknown by the divine knowledge, they are to happen necessarily or inevitably nothing unnecessary or avoidable can be

foreknown by the divine foreknowledge; and thus the foreknowledge itself will not be allpowerful but will be part-powerful foreknowledge, that is powerful towards some things which have not yet been or are and not towards all. And thus it would completely remove omnipotence from itself and would retain only part-power. Therefore the divine foreknowledge, although it be called allpowerful, neither confers inevitability on things nor implies it.

of a thing comes from its necessary cause, that is, from its essence, and is through its being deprived of the efficient; for the cause of any effect must precede its being and produce it. And it seems that in any effect inevitability can be understood to be entirely without an active cause. For instance a stone going to prison with its officer of the law goes willingly to prison and if he refused to go the officer of the law would force him to go there, not that he goes or walking to prison is inevitable, because it would be that either by force or by the officer of the law. However there appears to be no efficient cause of its inevitability, because neither the will of the prisoner according to God is its possible cause nor yet is the will of the officer of the law; and thus it seems to be inevitable, and thus it seems that the officer of the law seems to be the cause of it.

RICARDUS

You are wrong in your thinking about the cause of the inevitability of acts of will. For according to your Philosophus in 3 Ethics and 5 Metaphysics there is one cause of acting and not acting voluntarily, namely one rational essence capable of doing contrary things. And for this reason the effective cause of such an action is the cause of its inevitability, just as this kind of inevitability has a cause though it does not in fact produce its avoidance. And this also will be shown later in 4th below. Indeed you are wrong in your understanding regarding the inevitability that can be in any action.

CHAPTER SIX

IOHANNES

I do not know how I can resist the foregoing, unless perhaps in this that you suppose as established that only the cause of any effect produces its avoidability or inevitability; which does not seem to me sufficiently established. For the avoidability of a thing results from its non-cause rather than from its cause, that is through its being deprived of the efficient; for the cause of any effect never prevents its being but produces it. And it seems that in any effect inevitability can be understood to be entirely without an active cause. For instance a criminal going to prison with an officer of the law goes willingly to prison; and if he refused to go the officer of the law would force him to go there. And thus his going or walking to prison is inevitable, because it would be done either by him or by the officer of the law. However there appears to be no efficient cause of its inevitability, because neither the will of the goer (since according to you it is possible for him not to do it) nor the officer of the law does anything in fact relating to that walking; and thus neither does the officer of the law seem to be the cause of it.

RICARDUS

You are wrong in your thinking about the cause of the inevitability of acts of will. For according to your Philosopher in 3 Ethics and 9 Metaphysics there is one cause of acting and not acting effectively, namely our rational power capable of doing contrary things. And for this reason the effective cause of such an effect is the cause of its avoidability, just as this kind of avoidability has a cause though it does not in fact produce its avoidance. And this also will be shown more fully below. Indeed you are wrong in your understanding regarding the inevitability that may be in any act or

effect without an active cause. For inevitability, although by this name it is meant privatively is really something positive namely the necessity of coming. And therefore just as it is said in some way to be an effect it must have one or more efficient causes. Hence in your example the will of the officer of the law (by which he wishes to force the criminal if he wishes to desist from going) is, together with the will of the goer, the efficient cause of the inevitability of going if that is as you state inevitable. For according to you that inevitability follows from these two prime causes. But in truth if you examine more closely, that going cannot be inevitable because the going would not happen at all unless it resulted from the will of the goer. And therefore if the person to be imprisoned ceased to go willingly, he would avoid going to prison at all. For if his will did not act at all not he but someone else would move his limbs; he himself would not go, but would be driven or dragged or in either way be forced into prison. Thus you cannot show by this that the act of will is unavoidable for the person making it; and also you cannot infer that simply in itself that act is unavoidable. For the officer can desist from the will to force just as the criminal can by his will stop going; and thus neither the will of the goer nor the will of the officer is the effective cause of the inevitability of going to prison. And there is yet another philosophical subject for deep enough investigation which would have a place here, namely whether that movement of walking produced by the will of the goer could, on the cessation of that will, be continued in its movement by another numerical cause. For it seems probable that just as those causes are numerically distinct their effects must likewise be distinguished. For instance if two candles together were the light in a house or were separate lights from which one is made, then on the quenching of one candle one light, as we see, is spoiled to the sense namely the light that was made by that candle; and the light that was made by the

other remains, as appears to many and is the opinion of our great father Dionysius in his book *on the divine Names*, chapter 2. And for this reason it appears to them that each candle has its own effect which can in no way be maintained or produced by the other; otherwise when one candle is quenched it does not appear why one light rather than the other should be, as they say, spoiled. If therefore this be truly said as seems probable (which it is not suitable to discuss here), then it does not seem that that act of walking, produced by the will can be continued through the will of the officer on the cessation of the act of will of the person going to prison. And thus the will of the officer can in no way be the cause of the inevitability of that going to prison. There is as it happens another thing which weakens this objection of yours: that at a time or an instant in the case which you pose, there would not be a movement of walking that could be seen at all namely at the moment when the will of the goer ceased; in which instant if the officer began to force, he would not be the cause of a then existing movement but of one beginning externally. Nor would the will of the person previously going produce this movement, because his will (I mean the act of will) would not then exist at all; nor is there ever movement without an efficient cause. Hence it could be seen to be the case here, as your Philosopher in 8 *Physics* proves to be the case in reflex and contrary motions, namely that the privation of motion and its discontinuance necessarily stand in the middle. Hence many doubts occur in that case of yours, which you would have to clear up before the example which you bring forward would be confirmed; which I do not think you can do. And accept accordingly as established that the inevitability of the effect of the human will or its avoidability can result only from its effective cause. For it cannot exist at all without an efficient or effective cause, even if God willed so to attach inevitability to every act of the human will as you suppose regarding the officer of

the law. For then that will of God along with the will of the creature acting would be the causes, or as it were one cause, of the inevitability of producing the effect. This method is neither true nor possible nor relevant to this opinion, as will be proved below. Hence we can confidently conclude that God's foreknowledge neither bestows inevitability on human affairs nor implies it; and that whatever you have objected to the contrary is nonetheless entirely weak.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IOHANNES

Continue and see if you can arrive at the same conclusion regarding the divine will.

RICARDUS

It clearly follows from the things previously shown regarding God's foreknowledge that God's will brings no inevitability to things, although His will is an omnipotent cause; since both contingents and necessities would, if they existed, be subject to God's will just as they would be to His foreknowledge. And this follows especially if it be said that those same things are and can be absolutely subject to God's will and to His foreknowledge as many people suppose, saying that just as everything that God wills to be in the future is foreknown by Him, so everything that He foreknows He wills to be in the future. If however it be denied that those things that are evil are done by His will, it follows undoubtedly that His will alone (though I recognize that it is omnipotent) brings no inevitability to those effects. Nor do I think you are so foolish as to wish to suggest that good things are more inevitable than evil things. From this it certainly follows that the divine will, although it is allpowerful, brings no inevitability to things since avoidable as well as unavoidable things can be under it as much as they are under its foreknowledge. Therefore it is clearly most imprudent to say: God wishes me to will thus therefore I shall inevitably will thus; since, although I may thus will very contingently God by His omnipotent will wishes me to will thus, just as by His allpowerful wisdom He had foreknown that I would will thus. Hence it is clear that the allpowerful divine will no more confers inevitability on human affairs than does His allpowerful foreknowledge. You can easily observe also from the foregoing that the divine will does not imply or argue for inevitability

of this kind. For if I may speak in your fashion His divine foreknowledge, as a necessary consequence, brings in the will in this way: This thing is foreknown therefore this thing is willed by God to be in the future. But in truth this follows of all good things. And for this reason whatever follows necessarily as to the consequent follows necessarily as to the antecedent. If therefore it follows necessarily: This thing is willed by God to be in the future therefore it will inevitably be, it will follow equally necessarily: This thing is foreknown by God therefore this thing will inevitably be; or at any rate this follows of good things. Thus the divine will, although allpowerful, does not imply the inevitability of human acts any more than does His foreknowledge which is equally allpowerful. On the contrary rather as I deduced above regarding foreknowledge: from the fact that His will is allpowerful it has avoidable as well as unavoidable things subject to it. For if the will had only inevitable things subject to its power, it would be more powerful or at least nearer to allpowerful power if along with those things subject to it it also contained avoidables in its power. For through this something of power would be added to it even if it were already an infinite power. For it could not be denied that if there were <such avoidables> in infinites every whole is greater than its parts; even though it were denied what I say would be valid. For a thing is not said in the same sense to be of infinite power and to be omnipotent. For no one can be recognized as omnipotent unless he can produce at least separately every possible effect which any conceivable power could produce by acting powerfully, if it were something that can truly be appropriate only to a rational power. Indeed a naturally active thing could be understood to be of infinite power but by no means allpowerful as long as it could not accomplish every conceivable powerful act. From this it clearly follows that the power that had subject to it avoidables as well as unavoidable would be closer to

omnipotence than one to which only inevitables were subject. But so that the foregoing matters may shine out more clearly to you once the foggy obstinacy of your defence has been dispersed you should note that God's knowledge is not called allpowerful only because it encompasses everything knowable, but also because along with containing everything knowable it has truly within itself every manner of knowing, though more sublimely than has its handiwork. I recognize that just as a sensitive creature in its own sensible way sees, smells, hears, tastes and touches and by these means learns the natures of things, so God who is involved in all things sees, smells, hears, tastes and touches those same created objects in His own intelligible way closely similar to this, and thus gets to know them. For concepts of this kind could not be in things fashioned by God unless they presupposed similar things in the art of the fashioner. Hence very often seeing bodily things, hearing and the like are ascribed to God in the sacred writings. And there would thus be in animals neither imagination, memory or judgment nor, briefly, in rational things the arrangement and division of predicate with subject, nor the conjunction or disjunction or conditional linking together of things thus composite or divided, nor syllogizing or discourse, nor the recollection of things past, nor belief or foreknowledge of future things nor, in brief, any other act of reason unless in the primary art of carrying out these acts there had been, eternally, acts closely similar or one equivalent to all of those; which would thus virtually contain these things all together and singly. And if they all in one intelligible chaos were attached to it inwardly and essentially so that it could at its choice use the individual things separately as to external effects; this is the infinity or the allpowerful extent of the divine knowledge: namely that in the intelligible it comprises everything knowable in all conceivable cognitive ways, but in its own manner. Because of this infinite power of the divine knowledge it is in the scriptures

called thoughts in the plural, and called by other names also in the plural; and it is said that His wisdom is without number and that the spirit of wisdom is manifold. Equally you must observe of divine omnipotence as of all its knowledge that it is called omnipotence not only because every doable thing is, in whatever way, subject to its power but also because along with this it can accomplish doable things in every potentive manner, existing and conceivable; so that there cannot be conceived a powerful act of whatever kind of any existing or conceivable creature, but that God can accomplish it and in that manner. And He would have in Himself one abyss of really distinct intelligible powers wholly resembling all conceivable powers, of which He could use the individuals at His choice, just as created natures can use things like them. And hence God is said to be allpowerful and His will (which is the principle of action) is said to be an allpowerful will, because it has such omnipotence of operating (not as you could less wisely judge) namely that his power would be said to be omnipotent because it is more powerful than any existing or conceivable power, or because it can carry out actions above any conceivable finite power. For it is as fitting for a voluntary power to perform a smaller thing as a greater and more weakly as more strongly. And for this reason almighty God because He has almighty willpower can act in omnipotently as well as omnipotently, for He can carry out every action which we can think possible for a creature. And thus He can in such an action act in omnipotently or part-potently and by His almighty power, without in any way detracting from it; just as you can act less powerfully when you please while not taking away from the fullest extent of your power. Always understand sensibly the things I say and how I perceive them. Just as you see God's knowledge or foreknowledge and His omnipotence, so you must observe of the divine will that in all things it conforms to its foreknowledge; or at any rate it conforms to the

foreknowledge of all things and to the manner of production of those things which will not be wrongfully done; and it is as manifold as they. Hence in the scriptures it is often called wills in the plural; which will of God is called almighty because it has naturally attached to it God's omnipotence already described. Indeed because it is really the same as it, you will see clearly enough if you observe these matters without cunning and obstinacy, that the divine will (whether you mean the act of the divine will or its power) would not, as I have said before, be almighty unless it could perform avoidable things. For if it were unable to perform them at all a way of acting and even a conceivable act would be lacking to its power or would not be subject to it; and thus it would not be an allpowerful will, but only if I may say so a part-powerful or somewhat powerful will. If however it can perform avoidables in and through created power (for I mean such things are conceivable), the consequence is that it already performs such avoidables. For you cannot, I believe, think of anything more avoidable than the intrinsic acts of angelic or human freewill already performed. Or if you can think of any things more avoidable describe them in words if you please.

CHAPTER EIGHT

IOHANNES

These matters appear difficult to me. However I do not see that they can be invalidated because as far as appears to me I cannot think of anything more avoidable than the acts of will intrinsic to us or to the angels in the state of innocence. But what if I should say that such things are simply not doable but that including them is a contradiction? And, therefore declare indeed that the allpowerful divine will has not nor can it have them under its control, for your foregoing reasoning is valid only for doable things. How can I be refuted in that assertion?

RICARDUS

My foregoing deduction does not require that your statement be simply refuted but it does this only: it does not make the almighty divine will the cause as you claim of the inevitability of all future things. And therefore you must accept it as concluding that the omnipotence of the divine will requires avoidable creatures, unless there be some other reason why such things are entirely impossible. For this as you see is clearly deduced, unless <you think otherwise>. For neither the divine volitional power nor the act of that will's power (if you distinguish them by reason) would be allpowerful if it could not have such things subject to it; unless, I say, there be some other reason repugnant to the essence of things of this kind. But it is clear to you and to every trained mind that as I have already deduced regarding foreknowledge the allpowerful act of the divine will does not produce that repugnance. Following from this the omnipotence of that same will which is causally prior to the act requires the existence or at any rate the possibility of these same things. For the act of the divine will would thus destroy or diminish its cause by removing from itself the partial

power which it had by original causality with respect to that same will; which is quite unintelligible. For although the act of the divine will causally, so to speak, restricts or limits its prime omnipotence (so that it does not do or actually produce all but only some things that are subject to its almighty power), it cannot be understood at all how the act itself of the divine will so diminishes or restricts its omnipotence that the same power lacks the ability to do anything in every measure which that same divine will power would have if the act did not hinder it; as I discussed above regarding divine foreknowledge. Nor in your weak will can it be understood that your will has or would have the power of doing anything external unless the internal act of that power hindered it, although it is true that your will has the power for many things which the act of the power itself restricts or limits so that as a matter of fact it does not achieve them at all. For the order of nature requires that the volitional power does not emerge into an external act except by means of its internal act, as you have learnt in book 3 *De Anima* towards the end, in 9 *Metaphics* and in other books. And for this reason its internal act limits, bounds or confines its power, I do not mean forcibly but freely so that it achieves not all but some particular ones which it can. But as to other essentially possible things it does not restrict or confine its ability to act for some temporary measure. If you examine this theory which is clear enough in itself, you will not seriously doubt that the act of the almighty divine will or the Almighty cannot prevent the omnipotence of the same divine will from being able to perform avoidable things. Arising from this, from another and causally prior source the same omnipotence requires that it be able to produce things of this kind, as well as all other classes of conceivable things, unless hindered by some other cause of their improducibility. In vain therefore as I have already said, you seek the cause of the inevitability of human acts in the almighty divine will, the omnipotence of which

contains by essential necessity the possibility of such things, unless hindered by some other cause of their improducibility. From this it follows fully as I deduced above that things of this kind exist in us, since as I have already said no conceivable things can be perceived as more avoidable than acts intrinsic to the human or angelic will; and this if there is no cause of their impossibility except the divine will. From that same fact it is clearly deduced that the external action of the divine will cannot be the cause of the inevitability of human acts of this kind. For just as God's will cannot restrict or limit the almighty divine power (causally prior to the will itself) so that it cannot in any measure <accomplish> whatever things prior in origin <are> dividedly subject to it, neither with much greater reason can the proper operation of the divine will (whatever it may be, whether action produced by the divine will alone or action produced jointly by the divine will and by a created agent) restrict, limit or bound or diminish (or however else you may wish to call it) the same divine power respecting those same things prior in origin possible to that power, since it is the external effect of the divine power itself; and the effect of any power whatever can never thus restrict or diminish its own cause. Hence it clearly follows that no action of God directed outwardly is or can be the cause of the improducibility of contingent things; and nonetheless this same thing will be shown particularly later on through the divine will's single ways of acting. And by the same deduction it is proved that no created thing can be the cause of improducibility of this kind since every created thing is the effect of the divine will and of its almighty power.

CHAPTER NINE

IOHANNES

If my will produces an internal act respecting some external thing and through the act achieves a work, my will can never at another time produce any of those things which it doubtless could have produced before that moment of time; and thus its power is lessened through its own act. Moreover because my will performs external actions through bodily instruments (which natural instruments are doubtless continuously used up and weakened from the work like craftsmen's tools), it seems to follow that at that time the will has been able to perform a stronger bodily work than it will ever be able to perform after its passing. And thus it seems that its power is lessened due to its own act and as I said of the craftsmen's tools, the bodily instruments of my will are continuously weakened in acting.

RICARDUS

You do not grasp the point that I have made. For I did not say that the effect cannot restrict its cause at a particular future time; but I said that it cannot lessen or restrict its power for every measure namely that it has retained the capacity in any measure to achieve its effect whatever it may be, which suffices for our purpose. For it is clear from this that no effect of the divine power can ever be the cause of absolute improducibility, that is for every measure of contingent things (which from the nature of omnipotence are subject to the same divine power) unless they are improducible from another cause. Hence it cannot be otherwise in your will; for the weakening of your will's instruments, although it may perhaps lessen their power as to some future effects, does not accomplish that in such a way that those effects are and will be improducible by your will for every temporary measure. Likewise you cannot

maintain that God cannot for any future measure whatsoever, achieve everything possible to Him for one measure but not carried out by Him; not as is perhaps the case regarding your weak will the power of which depends on the time to which it is subjected. Hence you cannot through your previous objections and the like resist the fact that the divine power always has the capacity for any future effects whatever producible but not produced; so that neither its will nor its action nor any other external effect of it can restrict or diminish its almighty power; although as I have said it limits or bounds it as a matter of fact, so that it does not carry out all things subject to it; just as the craftsman's tool limits or bounds the craftsman's power so that he does not produce handiwork other than what he can accomplish with that tool.

It does not seem possible that a creature can bring it about that God's will respecting this contingent is not and never was a will respecting it; so that it does not appear how through a creature or its action this can be verified. God does not will and never willed that thing to be. This is seen firstly because the divine will is the first cause of all things and therefore cannot depend on what its foreknowledge on its creature produced by it. But God's will which is the cause would depend on the action of the creature if through the creature's action it was possible for it not to be and never to have been respecting creatures. Secondly because God's will relating to such an effect was God's will from eternity respecting it. But the eternal on any ground by which it is eternal can in no way have as cause a thing made in time. For the cause necessarily precedes in time the thing caused, never follows it. Hence the great philosopher Aristotle says in 12 Metaphysics that the efficient cause always precedes the effect. And therefore I cannot see that it can happen, through a creature or a creature's action or the omission of a creature's action, that the divine will never was a will respecting this or that particular thing (which as a matter of fact, through our

CHAPTER TEN

IOHANNES

It seems to me already that this third root of my opinion has been overturned out of its own <principles>. Hasten please, as you promised earlier, to cut back its branches as you did regarding foreknowledge. For although I can at least accept of God's foreknowledge that it is not the cause of things insofar as it is His foreknowledge, and I cannot therefore deny that God's foreknowledge of any future contingent is able through human act not to be and never to have been foreknowledge regarding it, it can appear otherwise and another thing regarding God's will. For it does not seem possible that a creature can bring it about that God's will respecting this contingent is not and never was a will respecting it; so that it does not appear how through a creature or its action this can be verified: God does not will and never willed that thing to be. This is seen firstly because the divine will is the first cause of all things and therefore cannot depend as does its foreknowledge on its creatures produced by it. But God's will which is the cause would depend on the action of the creature if through the creature's action it was possible for it not to be and never to have been respecting creatures. Secondly because God's will relating to such an effect was God's will from eternity respecting it. But the eternal on any ground by which it is eternal can in no way have as cause a thing made in time. For the cause necessarily precedes in time the thing caused, never follows it. Hence the great philosopher Aristotle says in *12 Metaphysics* that the efficient cause always precedes the effect. And therefore I cannot see that it can happen, through a creature or a creature's action or the omission of a creature's action, that the divine will never was a will respecting this or that particular thing (which as a matter of fact, through our

will is clearly future); or that through the action of a creature this can become true: God does not will this to be and never willed that to be. For the first of these follows from the second: for what can verify this can cause God not to will and never to have willed that thing to be.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

RICARDUS

You are correct in your thinking about foreknowledge; consequently you are less prudent in referring to the divine will. For you must suppose of the divine will as you observed regarding its foreknowledge that the divine will, the existing cause of such future things (but the cause preceding or first in time not present in act), is able not to be a cause of them and never to have been their productive cause; and that this can follow or be inferred from a secondary cause or from its action or from the omission of its action; and conversely that the eternal will of God can be the cause of some things through the action of a creature made by it. For this is no more inconsistent by reason solely of causality than if God were a finite cause of all things produced. For there would still be in it priority of causality as there is now in heaven and its mover in relation to human acts. Nor I suppose do you consider it impossible or inconsistent for the mover and the movement of heaven (which are the causes in whatever way of all future human deeds) not to be now and never to have been, causes of particular human deeds. For you do not doubt that at least God can do this; and hence there is no impossibility as you imagine in the fact itself in itself, namely that the first cause in time in respect of a future act is able not to be and never to have been a cause of it. Indeed you can easily observe why it is not impossible for this to follow from the action or from the omission of the action of a secondary cause or of a cause later in time: because the first cause in time relating to things to be done by other immediate causes, by the very fact that it is the first in time, depends on causes later in time for its being the actual cause of those things; or at least it has such a relationship to the secondary causes (not according to what it is in itself but

insofar as it is a cause of this kind) that it can be the actual cause of the things themselves only through the mediation of the later or secondary causes. And therefore it necessarily follows that through the privation of their action the prior cause itself can become a non-cause, and is able never to have been the cause of those things. Or at least it can follow from the privation of their action that the prior cause neither is nor ever was the cause of those things; although in fact it was and is their eternal cause - but a cause in potency only and not in act as I have said. You very often experience this in yourself, namely that your will whereby you instruct your servant or the will whereby you give him the power to provide you with certain foods on the table, is, in respect of the provision of foods, a cause prior in time to the will of the servant whereby he provides them. For your will is a partial cause of his will; and yet, whether your will is or was a cause of their provision depended and depends to an extent (if the provision is still in the future) on the will of your servant. For if your servant refuses to provide you with food of this kind, your will never has been a cause of making the provision. So that if you had prudently paid attention from what you bring forward as your opinion (namely that God's will respecting human affairs is a cause prior in time to the human will) the converse of that opinion clearly follows, namely that the divine will itself is able not to be and never to have been the cause of them. Nor from this can you infer as you try that things done or to be done are causes of the divine will (or that the effect is the cause of its cause) just as you cannot prove that they are the causes of its foreknowledge; as also you cannot in the previous example infer that your servant's will is the cause of your preceding will. But you can conclude that inferior causes, done or to be done, at least cause us to infer that the divine will is and was the cause of some things being done from later causes, and that it was their cause from eternity. Not only is this not inconsistent but

it has clearly been proved to be true, just as your servant's will at least causes us to infer as I have said that your will is or was a cause of the food being provided through him. However there is a difference in this, that your will cannot not will or not have willed that provision, granted that it is able not to be and not to have been the cause of the provision itself. But the divine will, just as it is able not to be and not to have been the cause of such a human act which in fact is future, is equally able not to will and not to have willed it. For one thing always follows from the other as I have quite often repeated above and for this reason whatever is or can be the cause of one inference is or can be the cause of the other inference.

CHAPTER TWELVE

<RICARDUS>

Christ expressed that thought elegantly when he said (Mt 26): *Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?* In this saying it is clear that God the Father could have willed to send twelve legions of angels, and yet did not send them. And thus it is certain that God the Father could have willed this since He would be unable to send them unless by willing. And likewise it is clear that Christ could have obtained this by an act of the human will namely through his prayer. Hence it clearly follows that it could have happened that through human will, or at least resulting from human will, the Father would have had the will then and even from eternity to send the twelve legions of angels and that the Father's will would then have been the cause and would have been the cause even from eternity of sending the twelve legions of angels; although in fact God the Father's will was not the cause of this sending. Consider therefore what answer you make in this matter and answer thus in all similar matters; or whether you say that it is not inconsistent or impossible that a secondary cause can by its action, bring it about that a prior cause is a cause of a particular effect, that it was even a cause of it from eternity, and that a secondary cause can through its action contrive that God's will is and from eternity was [a cause] of a particular effect. And what you posited above regarding this is not inconsistent; or at least you will say that a secondary cause can by its action be the cause (or the indispensable cause) of the inference that a prior cause is and was a cause from eternity of a particular effect; and that the human will can by its action at least cause us to infer that God's will is and was from eternity a will respecting a particular effect. And both can perhaps be fittingly understood if you follow reason. For to be a cause of something and to be

a will in respect of it not only include an act of will and an active power but convey a relation to the effect itself, which relation insofar as it is such appears capable of being achieved by a secondary cause, appears probable to many. As a result of this God wills and willed from eternity to damn the devil; and yet the devil before his fall could have acted so that God willed never to damn him but willed from eternity to save him. Say accordingly where the argument is from cause: is it when the argument is this: The devil was from eternity about to sin irremediably, and therefore God willed from eternity to damn him; or is it on the contrary when the inference is: God willed from eternity to damn the devil therefore the devil was from eternity about to sin irremediably?

IOHANNES

Why cannot it be said that the argument from cause is made in the second inference?

RICARDUS

Because God does not damn unless for the first offence, nor does He nor did He will to damn anyone unless for an offence such as a cause deserving of damnation. Therefore God on that account damned the devil and willed to damn him, because he sinned or was about to sin. Hence it follows that the evil action of the devil's will was from eternity the future cause in whatever way of God's willing the devil's damnation, and being the cause of it from eternity. For as I have said God does not prepare damnation for anyone unless for his future offence. The consequence therefore is that a creature can through its action be the cause of God's willing a particular act and willing it from eternity, and of the divine will's being from eternity the cause of it. And all these things are seen to follow because of the relation which these names *cause and will* convey, not because of the thing itself in which the relation is founded, of which thing the creature can in no way be the cause.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

<RICARDUS>

And now so that you may know that I do not bring this forward of my own accord without the testimony of scripture, see, it is read in the last chapter of the second book of Kings, and the same thought is narrated in 1 Paralipomenon 21, how King David caused the whole people to be numbered: *And the word of the Lord came to Gad the prophet and seer saying: Go and say to David: Thus saith the Lord: I give thee thy choice of three things. Choose one of them which thou wilt, that I may do it to thee. And when Gad was come to David he told him saying: Either seven years of famine shall come to thee in thy land; or thou shalt flee three months before thy adversaries, and they shall pursue thee; or for three days there shall be a pestilence in thy land. Now, therefore, deliberate and see what answer I shall return to him that sent me. And David said to Gad: I am in a great strait; but it is better that I should fall into the hands of the Lord (for his mercies are many) than into the hands of men. And the Lord sent a pestilence upon Israel, from the morning unto the time appointed, and there died from Dan to Bersabee seventy thousand men.* It is clearly expressed there that David's choice was the cause of God's sending the pestilence upon the people. *Choose* said He, *one of them which thou wilt, that I may do it to thee.* Nor would God have sent the pestilence unless David had chosen the pestilence. And if David's choice was the cause of God's doing that, the same choice or its futurity was the cause of God's willing to do it then and even willing from eternity to do it. For if David had not chosen it God would not have willed to do it following the sequence of this story. And yet from that fact God clearly supposes that David had free will whereby he could have chosen any one of the three and let the other two go. For God

says: *I give thee thy choice of three things*, which would have been <less> wisely said to him if he had not been freely able to choose any one of the three. Likewise in 3 Kings, chapter 3, it is written that God said to Solomon: *Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life or riches, nor the lives of thy enemies, but hast asked for thyself wisdom to discern judgment. Behold I have done for thee according to thy words, and have given thee a wise and understanding heart*, etc. There it is expressed that Solomon's request was the reason why God gave him wisdom. *Because*, He says, *thou hast asked I have done for thee according to thy words*. It is thus therefore inferred from cause: Solomon chose thus therefore God acted thus. And before Solomon asked that inference from cause was: Solomon will ask thus therefore God will act thus. But perhaps you will say that one does not argue from cause thus: Solomon was about to ask for this therefore God willed to do this or God willed from eternity to act thus. In this you are opposed by the fact that this saying *God acts thus* includes the will in God to act since God does no such thing without willing. Accordingly whatever besides God is the cause of God's doing this that is the cause of God's willing to do it and with equal reason it is the cause of God's willing from eternity to do it. For whatever is the cause of God's doing this, that is the cause of the eternal will of God respecting it and once that cause is removed that will is also removed. For once the future request is posited it follows that God willed from eternity to give wisdom, and if the future request is removed it follows that there never was in God the will to give. But not conversely namely that the request is not removed even if God's will to give may have been removed. Hence it seems that the request was the cause of God's willing from eternity to give. For the removal of the effect does not take away the cause but on the contrary. You will not as I have already said understand from this, that a creature can by its action be the

cause of the divine will; but that it can perhaps in some other way cause the divine will to be described as causing or willing a particular possible act. Indeed if it can at least be called the cause of the inference (the *causa sine qua non* as the logicians are accustomed to say) it should suffice as has been clear to remove your objections. And scripture says in innumerable places that the will of the creature can be the cause of the inference and even the *causa sine qua non*. For behold you can read thus in Deuteronomy chapter 28, and similarly in chapters 4, 8 and 11 of the same and in Leviticus 26: *Now if thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God, to do and keep all his commandments, which I command thee this day, the Lord thy God will make thee higher than all the nations that are on the earth; and these blessings shall come upon thee. Blessed shalt thou be in the city, and blessed in the field, blessed shall be the fruit of thy womb, etc. But if thou wilt not hear the voice of the Lord thy God, all these curses shall come upon thee and overtake thee. Cursed shalt thou be in the field, cursed shall be thy barn, and cursed thy stores, cursed the fruit of thy womb, etc.* Thus Isaiah chapter 1 reads: *If you be willing and will hearken to me you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not and will provoke me to wrath, the sword shall devour you, etc.* Thus in Jeremiah 17 it is written: *If you will hearken to me, saith the Lord, to bring in no burdens by the gates of this city on the sabbath-day etc., there shall enter in by the gates of this city kings and princes sitting upon the throne of David and riding in chariots and on horses, and this city shall be inhabited for ever etc. But if you will not hearken to me, to sanctify the sabbath-day etc., I will kindle a fire in the gates thereof, and it shall devour the houses of Jerusalem, and it shall not be quenched.* The same thing is read in Jeremiah 22. And this thought is expressed more clearly in Jeremiah 7 where not only is it read that God thus willed when He foresaw what the people were about to do, but moreover it is read that He

himself stated what the evil people committed, in this fashion: *If you will order well your ways and your doings, I will dwell with you in this place, in the land which I gave to your fathers from the beginning and for evermore, etc. And now, because you have done all these works, saith the Lord: and I have spoken to you, rising up early and speaking, and you have not heard: and I have called you, and you have not answered: I will do to this house, in which my name is called upon, in which you trust, as I did to Sylo: and I will cast you away from before my face, as I have cast away all your brethren etc.* Likewise in the book of Judges 2 it is thus written: *An angel of the Lord went up from Galgal to the place of weepers and said: I made you go out of Egypt, and have brought you into the land for which I swore to your fathers: and I promised that I would not make void my covenant with you for ever: on condition that you should not make a league with the inhabitants of this land, but should throw down their altars: and you would not hear my voice. Why have you done this? Wherefore I would not destroy them from before your face: that you may have enemies, and their gods may be your ruin.* Indeed these things and things like them clearly show that the people's will could have been and was as a matter of fact the cause of God's sending it punishments; and that the same will could have been the cause of God's not carrying them out at all or not willing to do so. For that last text and also the preceding ones express this. Accordingly it is vain for us here to investigate knotty points any further.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

IOHANNES

I willingly accept these things but I am still concerned regarding the divine will. For I do not see how anything can be except by God willing it to become; nor do I see how the thing that God wills to become can be prevented by any creature because His will is allpowerful unless I impiously say contrary to scripture that a creature can resist God's allpowerful will. For it is written in the last chapter of Genesis: *Can we resist the will of God?* And for the letter Joseph says this to his brethren regarding his exaltation in Egypt which doubtless was due to his will, for thus the letter stands: *He answered them: Fear not; can we resist the will of God? You thought evil against me but God turned it into good, that he might exalt me, as at present you see, and might save many people.* For thus it is written in Esther 13: *O Lord God almighty king, all things are in thy power, and there is none that can resist thy will, if thou determine to save Israel. Thou hast made heaven and earth and all things that are under the cope of heaven. Thou art Lord of all and there is none that can resist thy majesty.* There also the letter speaks of their bodily salvation which no doubt depended on their will and thus it follows that they could not prevent that although it depended on [their] will. Thus the apostle writes in chapter 9 to the Romans: *Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth. Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why doth he then find fault? For who resisteth his will? O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of*

wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory? Whom he hath called not only of the Jews but of the gentiles as he saith in Osee: *I call that which was not my people my people.* Not only is it shown there that no one can resist the divine will in saving or condemning although each depends on the will of the creature, but it seems from this to be hinted that the apostle being under pressure regarding the question of predestination did not know how to resolve it otherwise than by referring the whole thing to the divine will, just as he referred the works of the potter to the potter's will. But the apostle meant this namely that no one in such matters, although they depend on human will, can resist God's will. Thus in Job 24 it is said of God: *For he is alone, and no man can turn away his thoughts: and whatsoever his soul hath desired, that hath he done.* And many things likewise are said in the scripture which are seen clearly to show that no one can prevent God's will from being fulfilled through all things. For to resist His will is this namely to prevent the thing willed by Him. It is seen also to follow from the same thing that the divine will is ineffective and weak if the thing willed by it can be prevented by anyone.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

RICARDUS

It is not as you think but quite the contrary. For if the allpowerful divine will requires to have (through a creature, I understand) contingent things subject to it, the same divine will power requires as to things of this kind that the creature be able to prevent them; for this is what it means for them to be contingent creatures. And thus it clearly follows that the omnipotence of the divine will requires that things of this kind willed by it can be frustrated by the creature. For otherwise those things would not be such as the allpowerful will determined them to be, and thus that will itself would not be omnipotent; arising from which the things subject to it would not be as it willed. For you judge fairly superficially when you suggest that the thing willed by it cannot be prevented in any way by another. Hence it wills that thing so to be done by another that it can nevertheless be prevented by that other. However in no way does it follow from this as you inferred above, that a creature or even the Creator can resist the divine will. For this word *resist* includes two things, namely the divine will being in respect of something and likewise that will not being accomplished; which two things cannot stand at the same time. But these two things are not included together when it is said dividedly that the thing willed by God can be frustrated by the creature. Nor, also can any inefficacy of the allpowerful divine will be shown as you infer from the fact that the thing willed by it can be prevented by another, because its omnipotence requires this: just as that same will's inefficacy cannot be inferred from the fact that the thing willed by it can be frustrated by itself. Understand this always dividedly, for in the composite sense it is always false that a thing willed by God can be frustrated in the sense that something can at the same

time be willed by God and yet frustrated or not done. The reason for this you can see, for the divine will respecting any possible thing is always fulfilled: for whether things of this kind were done or not done the divine will regarding them would always be fulfilled. For since the allpowerful will of God enables certain contingent things to be done through the creature as was shown above, the same allpowerful will requires that respecting things of this kind it be able not to be and never to have been a will (just as the same allpowerful will requires respecting the same things that the divine foreknowledge be able not to be and never to have been foreknowledge). And accordingly just as it is possible for things of this kind willed by God not to be in the future, so it is possible for them not to be willed and never to have been willed by Him; just as they are able not to be foreseen and never to have been foreseen by Him. Hence it is clear that although a thing willed by God can be frustrated by a creature (I mean in the divided sense) yet it is always necessary in the composite sense that the divine will is fulfilled in all things willed by Him. For it cannot be the case at the same time that something is willed by God and avoided by the creature or even by the Creator; and for this reason the divine will if it is claimed to be effective is always effective. This or whatever is willed by it is always and everywhere accomplished; nor can it at the same time be not fulfilled and willed by Him. But how in these things you must distinguish the composite from the divided sense, the Master of the Sentences teaches you plainly and fully enough in Book I dist. 38 and in certain later ones, so that there is no need to deal here with such logicalities.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

IOHANNES

Although the divine will is rightly called effective because it always achieves its effect and never fails, nor is it possible that it should will something and that thing not be done as you have shown above, yet I do not see how a will is not weak when the thing willed by it (granted that as a matter of fact it is never and nowhere prevented) can nevertheless be prevented by someone. For if my will can be impeded by another as to the thing willed by it, who can doubt that my will is weaker than the will of him by whom it can thus be impeded? Hence I do not grasp that the divine will is not weak if it can thus be impeded as to the things willed by it.

RICARDUS

This mental fog comes over you because you always direct your mental gaze towards the will of God whereby He wills such contingent things to happen, not towards the will of God whereby He wills that the same things can be prevented by a creature. For if you considered that second will of God (by second I understand not really separate but mentally distinct) you would not experience the previously mentioned fog, but would descry in a clear light that the divine will is not thereby less strong and powerful because the thing willed by it can be frustrated (because that thing is willed by the almighty founder of all things to be capable of being frustrated) than if it were quite incapable of being avoided by anything. Likewise your will cannot be called weak in relation to the thing willed by it which you wish to be done by the will of your servant, if you so will and determine it to be done by him that he can deliberately omit and avoid it. I mean your volitional power not act, unless you imprudently say that in this your will becomes weak of itself. For your will decided

to will in such a way that the thing willed by it could be frustrated by its servant. If moreover, as you try to show, the fact that what is desired by the divine will can be prevented by someone truly means that the preventer would be stronger than the divine will: since no one doubts that what the divine will desires can be prevented by the divine will itself, it could be truly inferred that the divine will would be weaker than itself. But since you are clear that this does not follow, the wonder is that you consider that such argumentation is strong. However, regarding the act of your will it appears that it would be weak if what it willed could be forestalled by someone else. For since the act itself as long as it remained could not avoid being an act of willing in respect of that willed thing, it follows that if that act can be prevented by another, the thing willed can at the same time be willed by that act and yet not be done: from which its ineffectiveness and even its weakness seem to follow. If on the contrary your act like the divine volitional act was able while still remaining, not to be an act of willing that willed thing: and if along with this you willed by the same act that what you willed could be avoided by your servant; you could not argue for certain that your act was weak any more than your power because the thing willed by it could be prevented by another. You may however be uncertain whether it must be conceded that your act, insofar as it relates to the existence of the thing which you will to be done, is weak at least because it could be impeded as to that willed thing. For it can be seen to follow from this that the divine volitional act is a weak act: even if not absolutely yet at least insofar as it relates to such a contingent thing. But this by no means follows since there is thus positively ascribed to God, or to His will which is Himself, weakness of which He can have none such as you can have; and for this reason the conclusion regarding your will is the proper one in this case. But it can appear more doubtful if it is inferred negatively that the divine volitional act,

insofar at least as it relates to the existence of a contingent of this kind, is not omnipotent: but this uncertainty is immediately removed when the divine volitional acts are distinguished. Hence it appears to me useless for us to wear ourselves out too much in these logicalities, since from the foregoing it is clearly enough established that the omnipotence of the divine will requires that some things willed by it can be frustrated by the creature without its being ineffective or weak. But if you cannot grasp how a thing that God foreknows is able not to be and never to have been foreknown by God, or how something which the divine will wishes to be is able not to be and never to have been willed by it, you must pay attention to the weight of authority of sacred scripture and to the roots of the Christian faith, especially to the beginning of the Symbol: *I believe in almighty God*: so that from this omnipotence you may conclude without wavering that your God by free will produced the world and thus was able never to have produced it; and thus He was able not to have foreknown, and never to have willed, things foreknown and willed. Hence from this principle alone: *This will not be in the definite future*, all these things follow namely that God does not foreknow this, God never foreknew this, God does not will this, God never willed this. And for this reason, just as God can cause this not to be in the future, so He is able not to foreknow it and never to have foreknown it, and He is able not to will it and never to have willed it. And equally, if from any other cause besides God that thing could be verified namely: *This will not be*; just as it was evident above that this could be done by the act or by the omission of the act of a creature, all the other foregoing things which follow from that one thing can be verified by the same cause. For whatever can verify the antecedent can verify all its consequents.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

<RICARDUS>

There is likewise another thing which, if you consider it carefully, clears away your mental difficulty regarding the divine will. For you try to suggest that it is powerless, weak or ineffective by reason of the avoidability of human acts: namely that the divine will is accepted as potency and as act, and the act is claimed in scripture to be as manifold as its manifold ways of willing and as the thing willed by it is manifold. Accordingly you must distinguish the act whereby God wills to do a thing from the act whereby God wills the thing to be done by another through that other's own will, just as you distinguish these acts in yourself. For you do not will to produce one act by yourself and by the same act will another man to accomplish another act. But whenever you will something to be done by another this will of yours is not the cause of the act performed by him, but is assent or agreement to that act. For you thus will to be done all acts justly done or to take place in the world. Also just as the act of your will whereby you will something to be done by another is not the cause of that effect, so neither is the act whereby you will another to achieve such an effect the cause of it. For you can also thus will all those about to act justly to carry out their acts. And to express briefly what I mean no act of your will is the cause of a thing produced by another, even by your servant, except that act of your will whereby you have done something towards the production of that effect. For we are now speaking of the efficient cause which cannot be called efficient in respect of any result unless it accomplishes or accomplished something towards its production. However in relation to the act of your servant carried out with your authority, your will directing him to do that was the cause; or if you did not direct him but gave him by your will

the power to do such things, the will granting the authority was also the cause of the act of that servant. If you see these things you will not say that any will in God is the cause of contingent things, except that will which either carries or carried out something externally towards achieving their production through human free will. Not of this kind is the divine will whereby it wills such things to be, or whereby it wills such things to be done, or whereby it wills the human will to do such things, nor any other will of this kind belonging to it; of which wills none does or did or will do anything towards the production of these things; I mean insofar as it is of this kind. For every such divine will is called a will of assent rather than a will of efficiency: I mean divine wills distinguished always by reason alone.

Because the divine volitional power is allpowerful and because of this can act omnipotently or part-potently. Indeed it can act thus weakly just like any conceivable active power as the above things show; nor would it otherwise be allpowerful. Accordingly, whether it acts outwardly strongly or feebly, its power cannot because of this be argued as being weak or powerless. Just as the strength of the human will which, acting through its bodily instrument can struggle & flee, is not weakened or shown to be weak if it held a rabbit so weakly that the rabbit escaped from all its restraining instruments. Surely also you will not dare suggest that the volitional power of the Holy Spirit was weak because it is written that Stephen truthfully said to the Jews: You always resisted the Holy Spirit (Acts 7). There is accordingly nothing from which you can argue that the divine volitional power is weak because the thing willed by it can be prevented by another: since the almighty power can accomplish the thing willed by it in such a way that it, just like any other power, can easily be resisted. For it would not otherwise be omnipotent, nor could it by acting fill the place of any created agent whatsoever. Accordingly any will

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

<RICARDUS>

Accordingly if you understand that the divine will must be distinguished in this way I want you to express openly which of all these wills you are trying to suggest is powerless or weak or ineffective as a result of the contingent nature of human things.

IOHANNES

Why cannot I infer that the divine volitional power is weak if the thing willed by it can be prevented by another?

RICARDUS

Because the divine volitional power is allpowerful and because of this can act unomnipotently or part-potently. Indeed it can act thus weakly just like any conceivable active power as the above things show; nor would it otherwise be allpowerful. Accordingly, whether it acts outwardly strongly or feebly, its power cannot because of this be argued as being weak or powerless, just as the strength of the human will which, acting through its bodily instruments can strangle a lion, is not lessened or shown to be weak if it held a rabbit so weakly that the rabbit escaped from all its restraining instruments. Surely also you will not dare suggest that the volitional power of the Holy Spirit was weak because it is written that Stephen truthfully said to the Jews: *You always resisted the Holy Spirit* (Acts 7). There is accordingly nothing from which you can argue that the divine volitional power is weak because the thing willed by it can be prevented by another: since the almighty power can accomplish the thing willed by it in such a way that it, just like any other power, can easily be resisted. For it would not otherwise be omnipotent, nor could it by acting fill the place of any created agent whatsoever. Accordingly say more

clearly, I still ask, what divine will you are trying from the contingent nature of your acts to show is weak.

IOHANNES

I perceive that as you say I cannot argue from this contingent nature that the divine volitional power is weak or powerless; and for this reason I can say that the divine volitional power is powerless or weak if the thing willed by it can be prevented by anyone.

RICARDUS

Of all its acts set out above state which act you mean: whether an act not acting outwardly namely an act of agreement or assent only, or an effective or outwardly operating act.

IOHANNES

Why cannot I infer that the divine volitional act of assent or agreement is weak if the thing willed by it can be prevented by another?

RICARDUS

Because weak and firm as we at present accept, strong and feeble, powerful and powerless, effective and ineffective, are conditions or differences solely of active power: and for this reason an assenting or accepting act alone, since it can never do anything insofar as it is such, cannot as we say be called firm or weak, powerful or powerless, strong or feeble. For you will be unable to discover in yourself how an assenting act of your will solely respecting another's act can except improperly be called strong or feeble, effective or ineffective, since you cannot discover what this kind of act of yours can accomplish. If for instance you improperly call an act of agreement or assent strong or feeble namely in intensity of degrees or image just as one colour can be called stronger than another because it is more intense, you cannot,

as you try, infer that a divine volitional act of this kind is feeble, weak or powerless from the fact that the thing willed by it can be prevented by another: since through an act however powerful or powerless God could in this way will the weakest things whatsoever. All things weak and strong please Him, so that it is said to Him: *Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made*. For thus you yourself through an assenting act of this kind, will both weak and strong things equally; and in this way you often through a strong act will another person's weak deed and through a feeble act you will a very strong deed, perhaps the creation of the world. Accordingly you cannot conclude that a divine will of this kind is feeble, weak, powerless or ineffective, even though the thing willed by it can be prevented by a very weak active power. From these things also you perceive clearly that there is nothing inconsistent in stating thus negatively that a divine assenting will of this kind is not omnipotent, since it cannot properly be called either powerful nor powerless: which I had promised above to prove to you. Accordingly say still which divine act you are trying to suggest is weak from the fact that the thing willed by it can be avoided.

IOHANNES

I am forced to mean an act of the divine will operating outwardly. For as I see from the contingent nature of things willed by God, I cannot argue that any other will of God is weak or powerless.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

RICARDUS

Wipe your mind's eyes further and consider more closely which outwardly active divine will (I mean by means of act) you are trying from the contingent nature of human things to show as weak.

IOHANNES

Why cannot I say that God's will whereby He has made the whole world and established His creatures is weak because some things are contingent and can be frustrated by creatures?

RICARDUS

Because this will of God does not fall on human act, but only on natures originally established, none of which any creature can prevent. And therefore nothing willed by this will of God (insofar, always understand, as it is such) can be or could have been frustrated by a creature so that its weakness could thereby be shown. Just as you correctly understand that this divine act by which God has established His creatures cannot and could not have been called weak because of contingent angelic or human acts since it does not and did not relate to them, but only to their causes, you can also clearly see that no volitional effective divine act, which concerns only the cause of any such act which we call contingent, can be shown to be weak because of the contingent nature of that act: because that contingent act is not willed by that divine volitional act but only its cause is willed. Hence it cannot be inferred from the contingent nature of such an act that anything willed by such divine volitional act can be frustrated and that volitional act thereby inferred as being weak. Now as regards a divine volitional act directly operative or effective externally in respect of a human contingent act, surely it cannot be considered weak because of the contingent nature

of the thing willed by it. If let us say we suppose that God thus directly wills and accomplishes all human acts: since (as will become clear later when this manner of God's acting is discussed) God does not will to act thus except when the human will decides to act, it follows that the divine volitional effective act is conditioned in this way: if the human will decides to act that <divine> will cannot be considered weak in relation to what it wills, unless what it wills can under that condition be frustrated. This can never happen in our human will: namely that with the human will conditioning the divine act in relation to the human will's internal act, what it wills (which we suppose is also willed by God) cannot be frustrated. Because while this condition remains it cannot be true at the same time both that the human will should decide to perform its free act and that the same act (which you claim is also willed by God's volitional act directly effecting it) can be avoided by anyone. And thus it cannot be argued solely from the absolute contingency of such an act of the human will that there is any weakness in the divine volitional act directly effecting it, unless in addition its contingent nature with this condition or modification attached could be shown. This contingent nature cannot be shown beyond this: that, as will become clear later, it can be considered more probable that no such direct action of God, unless perhaps natural or supplementing the course of nature originally established, exists in relation to human acts which from free will we properly call free. And the same judgment must be made regarding the divine will, namely that there is no other divine volitional act directly effecting such a human act. You therefore are imprudent in claiming generally from the fact that the thing willed by God can be frustrated by the creature, that the divine will is ineffective, weak or powerless: since from that you cannot argue that either the divine volitional power or any volitional act of it is weak. If, however, you mean such a divine command will which is purely

CHAPTER TWENTY

IOHANNES

You do not yet by means of all the various volitional acts prove the conclusion which you reach. For as the above things show regarding the multiplicity of acts of the divine will, God has one common act in respect of all things and a particular act in respect of one. And equally so to speak He has acts in the middle between those and even an infinite series, namely one in respect of two, another of three, a third of four, and so to infinity. And following the theory which you put forward above I understand this of volitional effective acts as well as assenting acts, just as He has within Himself ideas or reasons or conceptions of this kind. Why therefore cannot I claim that such a common act is weak if the thing willed by it can be frustrated? For you have said nothing above regarding such a common act.

RICARDUS

You wrongly claim that I have said nothing above about such a divine volitional act. For if you mean a common act namely one effective in respect of several willed things, it cannot be argued that that common act any more than a particular effective one is weak because the thing willed by it can be frustrated. For there is one or a similar ground for both namely that they are conditional. And for this reason as I have already said it could not be argued that they were weak unless through that supposed condition the things willed by them could be frustrated. This cannot be in such a common will any more than in a particular one; together with this is the fact that as I have said before it must be considered more probable that (apart from the natural) there is no such effective, common or particular divine will in respect of human acts. If, however, you mean such a divine common will which is partly

effective and partly assenting, that will comes under the rule mentioned above namely that insofar as it is assenting it cannot as we say be called either strong or weak. But insofar as it is effective it carries the condition already touched upon, and comes under the rule also mentioned above regarding a particular volitional and effective divine act. But if you mean such a common volitional divine act which is totally assenting, it then comes under the rule mentioned above regarding a particular assenting volitional divine act. And thus, through the individual classes of this kind of divine volitional acts (only mentally distinct, I always understand) it is clear that you are quite unable to discover which divine will you can judge to be weak from the fact that the thing willed by it can be frustrated. For together with the divine will and its strength there remains the contingent nature of human acts.

If you suppose volitional acts of this kind in God, you exalt God more blasphemously than all rational creatures, and suppose Him to be very ready in His will, not only to consent the evil-doings of our perverse men, but even to perpetrate the crimes of all wicked men. There will be a fuller exposition of this later when we deal with God's cooperation in human acts. It is certain the divine will carried out such acts they would not impugn the contingent nature of human acts, as will be shown very clearly later on if God so grant.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

IOHANNES

What if I should say that some volitional effective divine act is of a kind whereby God wills to accomplish such a human act by Himself? What if His will wishes to carry out the act which I supposed above could be the cause of the inevitability of the human act, although it would actually not be its cause at all? And if consequently I infer that that divine act in respect of the human act is weak if the thing willed by it can be prevented by any creature? For this appears to follow clearly regarding such an act.

RICARDUS

If you suppose volitional acts of this kind in God, you make God more blameworthy than all rational creatures, and suppose Him to be very ready in His will, not only to commit the evildoings of one perverse man, but even to perpetrate the crimes of all wicked men. There will be a fuller discussion of this later when we deal with God's cooperation in human acts. If in addition the divine will carried out such acts they would not impugn the contingent nature of human acts, as will be shown very clearly later on if God so grants.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

IOHANNES

I admit that I do not know how to attack the foregoing. But continue with me here a little more slowly because I do not fully grasp all that has gone before. For although in the example of the mirror which you brought in at the beginning of this book, a mirror of this kind would always conform to things whether the things existed or not, no invincibility on the part of the mirroring power could be shown from this; but it appears to me that it could be inferred to be extremely fragile. As a result it would be shaped by every change and changeable thing as a reed is moved by the wind; hence when we speak on occasion of fragile power we compare that to the power of a reed. And for this reason the Lord, through Ezechiel the prophet in chapter 29 of his book, called Pharaoh the king of Egypt a staff made of reed because of the feebleness of his power; and likewise in Isaiah chapter 36. Accordingly just as my will would be of fragile power like a reed, if it was able not to be a will in respect of the thing willed by it and to be a will in respect of the opposite of that willed thing; so it equally appears to me to follow that nothing more fragile or weaker than the divine will can be conceived, if any fragile will whatever can make that conform to it, and its power would not be invincible, as those objections which I have made above regarding the scriptures seem to show. And indeed it appears that those objections of mine cannot stand along with your opinion.

RICARDUS

You are not so mad that you wish to deny that God has freedom of choice to act outwardly. And for this reason you cannot unless you are mad deny this possible conformation of the divine will to contingent things, even to non-future things which

God wills to accomplish and to make future. And therefore we are forced to examine together how this objection of yours can be resolved, though its resolution clearly appears from the foregoing. For a thing cannot be called fragile unless actively or passively: actively if it, the ultimate agent, can easily be resisted: passively if the thing acting on it easily injures it; in neither of which ways can the divine will truly be called fragile. For as has been made clear nothing can resist it when it acts ultimately and allpowerfully. Nor do you doubt that God cannot be acted on in the ways in which your will is fragile, and in which likewise the power of those kings whom you recalled earlier was fragile, so that the scripture with good reason compared them to a staff made of reed. The reason for this is clear: for this kind of readiness to conform comes from powerlessness or weakness of power, because the thing willed by them could have been restrained or frustrated against their will; and likewise the thing willed by you against your will. But the conformability or ready conformation of the divine knowledge and of its volitional power to all possible things, comes originally from the omnipotence of the divine nature or from the greatness of its power which as is shown above requires the same conformability. And for this reason it is proved from that natural and original conformability not to be fragile as you blasphemously suggest, but to be unbreakable and supremely loveable and unchangeable. For as to things doable by God's creatures, He established those creatures so that they could accomplish many things which in fact they will not accomplish: if such things were done they would please Him their author. He is of supreme love and boundless goodness whom nothing good can displease. And it belongs to the natural knowledge of the craftsman perceiving everything that possible things the possibility of which He himself established can be foreknown by Him, just as they can be accomplished through His establishment. Nor

can such a physical imaginable mirror of the kind we have described, from its natural conformability to any changeable things or changes whatever be called fragile as you suggest: but its mirroring power would as we have said be unchangeable and in its manner invincible, if you claim that invincibility or conquerability is appropriate to it namely as to the right and true representation of any knowable things whatever. Consequently it could do nothing which would present or show anything distortedly or untruly. In this mirror you can if you please see your foolishness in this argumentation. I want you nonetheless to observe closely that the divine will is not called invincible because of that conformability to any possible things through volitional actions of agreement or assent; though in the foregoing that conformability stands together with its invincibility. But it is called invincible because it can will so to act outwardly that no other thing can frustrate the thing willed by it. Or in other words the divine volitional power is called invincible because it can at its choice act outwardly and inevitably in all creatures.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

< RICARDUS >

Those objections which you made above regarding the words themselves not only carry but express a truthful meaning namely that there is no one who can resist the divine will: for to resist as I said before supposes that each of two things can exist at the same time, namely God's will in respect of something and its being frustrated. But because not imprudently it seems to you that not only is this meaning to be understood in those places in scripture and those like them where it is equally affirmed that nothing can obstruct the Almighty: but moreover it seems to you, and rightly, that the invincibility of the divine power is shown in such sayings, not only its conformity to things done or to be done; otherwise it could be fittingly said that nothing can resist the blessed angelic will. Consequently it is as a matter of fact blessed in such a way that it cannot make a thing be at the same time willed by it and avoided by any other person whatever. And God could grant this to your weak will that nothing except God could cause something at the same time to be willed by you and yet avoided by another creature. However scripture would not say of the angelic will or of yours that no one can resist your will: for it could not always fittingly convey its intention from that meaning. And therefore we are forced to look for another meaning in sayings of this kind: not so as to mean in such things only volitional power which can as we said before act unomnipotently as well as omnipotently because of its omnipotence: but to accept along with the volitional power the effective divine volitional act by which it wills something to be done inevitably (inevitably, understand as to opponents). How it has willed them to be done and in relation to what is mentioned in the authorities brought forward by you above.

For it is likely that Joseph wished to be exalted in Egypt, as he himself would have achieved if any other opponents or rivals whatever had resisted; and that statement is not for wellwishers. And therefore you object in vain that this exaltation of Joseph depended on his own will and that he himself could willingly prevent it. Thus you object in vain regarding the will of the people whereby it could frustrate its own salvation: since in that case it is not said because of them: *There is none that can resist thy will*. But that had been said because of Aman the rival of the Jewish people. You will understand in the same sense the objection you raised above from the book of Job, nor is the invincibility of the divine power any less deduced from these things. For just as opponents cannot avoid the thing willed by God, neither could wellwishers in a corresponding case affecting them; so that there is no one who opposing God's will or the thing divinely willed could resist it inevitably or omnipotently. For that chapter to the Romans which you in chapter 14 produced as an objection does not weaken our case. For if you please it can become clear to you that the saying: *For who resisteth his will*. (or according to another reading *who shall resist*) is not asserted by the apostle but is objected or brought forward by the apostle in the role of an objector for the sake of objection; hence it does not impugn our case. Indeed if we say as not unreasonably it appears to many that although the apostle in objecting poses that point, nonetheless because in objecting he says to himself: *Why does God then find fault?* and for cause adds: *For who resisteth his will?* he appears to approve that medium or that cause, for he seems to bring it in as one principle. If, let me say, we speak thus none of our proposition is weakened by this. For without an ampliative word and without a word of possibility it only as a matter of fact affirms that nothing resists the will of God, which we have proved above to be true. But if you still try to suggest to the contrary, namely that the

apostle there means that nothing can resist the divine will so as probably to conclude from this that God cannot find fault with the hardening of sinners which He himself wills, you are suggesting this of your own accord outside the text, and nonetheless you ascribe a great lack of knowledge or perversity of will to the apostle of Christ. For if he meant that there and did not know how to resolve it the first thing that follows is that he was lacking in knowledge. But if he meant it there, had known how to resolve it and did not resolve it he wished to confuse the Corinthians, putting a doubtful question to them for no reason and not wishing to resolve it. For in the whole course of this chapter and the two following ones which deal with this matter you find nothing said therein for the solution of this objection which you say the apostle has posed here, namely whether a creature can resist the divine will in such a way that, hardened, it can repent and consequently be saved. The apostle therefore did not intend in this place to discuss our present question but another one, namely whether the will of God whereby He justifies some and others equal to them He hardens is blameworthy or unjust. That he understands this uncertainty is clear from the fact that his reason runs to this, namely that the thing formed cannot say to him that formed it: *Why has thou formed me thus? and that the potter has the power to make from the same clay one vessel into honour and another unto dishonour.* For these answers by the apostle show that God is just in making men from a sinful lump, some for joy and others for punishment or destruction, without just occasion for complaint and without any injustice or injury done to man. Unless therefore we say that the apostle imprudently answered a question other than the one which he himself posed, it follows that he himself meant here to object that God's will which is never resisted is blameworthy or unjust when it wills to harden some men and to save others their equals, as he saved Jacob and condemned Esau: so that he posed an

objection aimed at showing the injustice of the divine will not at showing the contingent nature of the thing willed by God, and refuted it showing the justice of the divine will in hardening as in saving. For he saw this doubt rather than the one which you invent, namely whether a thing that God as a matter of fact wills to be done by a creature can be frustrated. For I think that the apostle did not think that this was the doubt among the Corinthians.

doubtful or at least pretend to be in chapter 11 as follows, when he says to the person saved from among the gentiles: But if thou dost thou hearest not the root, but the root thee. That will say thou: The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in. Well: because of unbelief they were broken off. But thou standest by faith: be not highminded, but fear. For if God hath not spared the natural branches, fear lest perhaps he also spare not thee. See then the goodness and the severity of God: towards them indeed that are fallen, the severity; but towards thee, the goodness of God, if thou abide in goodness; otherwise thou also shalt be cut off. And they also, if they abide not still in unbelief, shall be grafted in: for God is able to graft them in again. He clearly expresses here that the justified can be damned and not continue in goodness, and that the unbelieving are able not to continue in unbelief and that they can be grafted into the olive: namely into the assembly of the elect. But what he says: Otherwise thou shalt be cut off, does not stand out as saying otherwise than this: Let them be blotted out of the book of the living: so that we may understand in this way each of the two sayings and others like them, namely that it will be so done that they will never have been there. For one is to be blotted out or cut off just as not to be blotted out is always to have been there, although it would be possible not to be and never to have been there. This meaning is expressed in Apocalypse chapter 3 when it is said to the bishop of the church of Sardis: I know thy works, that thou hast the name of being alive: and thou art dead. Be watchful and

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

<RICARDUS>

And yet, before he ended the question which he mainly addressed, namely whether or not God's promise in saving the people of Israel had lapsed, he expressed plainly the matter on which you are doubtful or at least pretend to be in chapter 11 as follows, when he says to the person saved from among the gentiles: *But if thou boast thou bearest not the root, but the root thee. Thou wilt say then: The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in. Well: because of unbelief they were broken off. But thou standest by faith: be not highminded, but fear. For if God hath not spared the natural branches, fear lest perhaps he also spare not thee. See then the goodness and the severity of God: towards them indeed that are fallen, the severity; but towards thee, the goodness of God, if thou abide in goodness, otherwise thou also shalt be cut off. And they also, if they abide not still in unbelief, shall be grafted in: for God is able to graft them in again.* He clearly supposes there that the justified can be damned and not continue in goodness, and that the unbelieving are able not to continue in unbelief and that they can be grafted into the olive: namely into the assembly of the elect. But what he says: *Otherwise thou shalt be cut off*, does not stand out as saying otherwise than this: *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living*; so that we may understand in this way each of the two sayings and others like them, namely that it will be so done that they will never have been there. For this is to be blotted out or cut off just as not to be blotted out is always to have been there, although it would be possible not to be and never to have been there. This meaning is expressed in Apocalypse chapter 3 when it is said to the bishop of the church of Sardis: *I know thy works, that thou hast the name of being alive: and thou art dead. Be watchful and*

*strengthen the things that remain which had died.*⁵ *For I find not thy works full before my God. Have in mind therefore in what manner thou hast received and heard: and observe, and do penance. If then thou shalt not watch, I will come to thee as a thief, and thou shalt not know at what hour I will come to thee. But thou hast a few names in Sardis, which have not defiled their garments: and they shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy. He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.* Where, by not being blotted out, he is accepted as always having been there. For it is not possible that someone be sometimes written there and sometimes not written; and nevertheless it is shown there that a person not written there can be inscribed and that a person written there can possibly not be and never have been written there. For God exhorts that bishop to do penance lest, coming as a thief, He condemn him. Hence it is certain that God supposes the bishop was able not to repent and thus never to have been written in the book of life in which as a matter of fact he was inscribed. Likewise he exhorts him to strengthen others written in the book of life, who had died before. Hence he supposes them as a matter of fact to be weak so that they could fall and be damned and thus never have been in the book of life; and that great promise would not have been made to those who overcame: *I will not blot out*, etcetera, if they could not be blotted out. Indeed, if you pay close attention to the apostle's words which you produce as an objection it will become patently clear that God has freedom of choice for saving and damning, just as the potter has for making dishonourable and scandalous vessels. For he says expressly that the thing formed could not rationally complain to him who formed it: *Why hast thou formed me thus?* since the potter has the power to make vessels unto dishonour and also unto honour: wishing thus to suggest that God has such power, meaning the power of free will. Otherwise he

would not show God's justice in choosing one and from the same sinful lump rejecting another in no way unlike it. But from this chapter he shows the divine justice because without complaint and in one way or the other it can call each of them into being, just as the potter at his choice can thus produce different vessels from the clay. And for this reason, whether in one way or the other the potter from the clay makes a vessel or God from a sinful lump makes man no one can justly have a reason for causation, nor can anyone find another reason except that free power of choice, why God produced the world or any other creature whatever at one time and not before, so that from that chapter alone our proposition would be clear even if no other in support of it had been expressed in the scriptures. And so that we may finish the present debate accept, brother, for yourself the following saying: *Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.* Do not consider that you will inevitably be crowned, but rather believe firmly that you can lose the crown so that another may receive it. And for this reason hold fast what you have of charity and grace. Do not assume that to be inevitably bound to you lest perhaps God's wisdom exhort you in vain thus to hold it fast, and you lose it because of the fault of your presumption.

Book 16 ends.

