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Summa de Questionibus Armenorum
Book XVI
An Edition and Translation
with Introduction

Volume 1
RICHARD FITZRALPH

SUMMA DE QUESTIONIBUS ARMENORUM BOOK XVI
AN EDITION AND TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION

(TWO VOLUMES)

VOLUME ONE

JAMES GORMAN

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF M.LITT. UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN
SEPTEMBER 1999
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other University.

James Gorman

I also declare that the work herein is entirely my own.

James Gorman
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I acknowledge gratefully the careful attention and helpful comments of my supervisors Dr. Christine Meek, Professor of Medieval History, and Dr. W.E. Lyons, Professor of Moral Philosophy. I am much indebted to Dr. Katherine Walsh who welcomed me to 'the Richard FitzRalph club' and advised and encouraged me in the undertaking of this thesis. I thank also Dr. Aidan Breen for his assistance on certain points. The Library staff of Trinity College Dublin were more than prompt in meeting my various requests. Likewise, Father Fergus O'Donoghue, S.J. the Librarian and his staff in the Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy are to be thanked for allowing me the ready use of the Library. Lastly, I acknowledge the patience of Mrs. Mary Power in word-processing successive and difficult drafts of this thesis, and her many constructive suggestions in doing so.
SUMMARY

This thesis is textually based, its main components being an edition and translation of *Summa de Questionibus Armenorum*, the work of Richard FitzRalph (Armachanus), Archbishop of Armagh and one of the leading figures in the intellectual life of England, Ireland and the Continent in the first half of the fourteenth century. No edition of this important work has been produced except for an unsatisfactory edition printed in Paris in 1511. It appeared therefore worthwhile to make an edition and translation of at least part of the *Summa*. Book XVI was chosen, being one of three apparently introduced as an expression of his mature views on philosophical and theological topics which had preoccupied him and his contemporaries in his student and teaching years at Oxford some twenty years earlier.

The method adopted was to select six codices out of the 37 extant complete or nearly complete codices along with the printed edition, so as to produce from them a reasonable cross-section of the text resulting in a reliable edition. The manuscripts were chosen with advice from Dr. Katherine Walsh, author of the standard work on FitzRalph published in 1981. They were studied on microfilm. A full description of all the manuscripts and of the printed edition has been included along with the text and translation of the dedicatory letter with which the work begins. The critical apparatus attached to the Latin text records all significant variants and every effort has been made to ensure complete accuracy. The medieval spelling has been retained.
The Latin text being almost completely unpunctuated, some use has been made of modern punctuation as an aid to the modern reader. As a further aid, a precis has been included of the 24 chapters which comprise Book XVI. The English rendering of the biblical quotations, of which there are many, is from the Douay Bible. An Index Locorum Biblicorum and an Index Auctorum have been added.

The introduction examines the following topics: FitzRalph’s birth, education and career; his main written works; the relationships of the Armenian and Greek churches with the Latin church; FitzRalph’s part in the discussions which led to the composition of the *Summa*; some comments on the text of Book XVI; FitzRalph’s doctrine of dominion and grace and his influence on later thinkers; and the cult of ‘Saint Richard’ after his death.
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CHAPTER I
RICHARD FITZRALPH--HIS LIFE AND CAREER

1. Introduction

Richard FitzRalph, known throughout medieval Europe from the title of his see as Armachanus, was one of the leading figures in the intellectual life of the fourteenth century - reformer, scholar, litigant, administrator and ultimately holder of the highest ecclesiastical office in his native country. Whereas many others of his generation were shadowy figures of whom only scanty details have come down to us, FitzRalph's life and career have been recorded in great detail. In modern times, R.L. Poole has written quite a full account in the Dictionary of National Biography; Professor Aubrey Gwynn carried out much pioneering work in the Jesuit magazine Studies between 1933 and 1937, and in his study of the English Austin Friars. Katherine Walsh, who had been Gwynn's student, carried on his work and her life of FitzRalph is a most comprehensive study of the man and his thinking, superseding

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1While he is often called by this name A.B. Emden in B.R.U.O., vol.II (Oxford, 1958) p.692, lists at least 16 versions of his name.
all earlier accounts. I am indebted to her book and a 1990 article by her\(^6\) for much of the information in this chapter.

FitzRalph himself gives few details of his parentage and birth. It is clear from some remarks of his, and from a range of material used by Gwynn, that he was of Anglo-Norman burgess stock from Dundalk in the Northeast corner of the Pale. The annalist who recorded his death at the papal curia referred to his bones being transferred to Dundalk \('unde fuit oriundus'\).\(^7\) In the first sermon preached by him on his return as Archbishop in 1348, he remarked that he intended to carry the Saviour's message to those \('de sanguine meo'\).\(^8\) A year and a half later, preaching to the Franciscans in Avignon, he informed them of his childhood links with the Franciscan community in Dundalk; he recalled that at all times at least one of his relatives had been a member of that community since its foundation.\(^9\) It seems almost certain that one of them had died in a well-known episode during the Bruce invasion. In May 1315 in a disputation on the current situation, a Friar Simon, in the course of a heated argument, declared that it was not a sin to kill an Irishman and that if he had done so he would not hesitate to say mass the next morning. In retaliation for such sentiments, of which no


\(^7\) Quoted *FitzRalph* p.2.

\(^8\) *L.A.H.J.* p.112.

\(^9\) *FitzRalph*, p.1.
doubt they were aware, the Gaelic forces later that summer sacked the town of Dundalk, burned the Franciscan convent to the ground, and massacred the guardian and all twenty-two friars. Nearly forty years later, FitzRalph as Archbishop accused the Franciscans of Gaelic origin of abusing the confessional to condone similar crimes against his own people.

2. **Birth and early years**

While FitzRalph’s date of birth cannot be established precisely, it can be deduced from the known stages of his career that he was born around 1300. The condition of Anglo-Irish society at that period provided the background to his formative years. His native archdiocese of Armagh reflected the tensions and racial divisions existing in Irish society as a whole. Within a generation of the Norman invasion of Ireland almost half of this area had been occupied by the new settlers. Town life on English lines had developed in what is now County Louth, especially in Drogheda and Dundalk, and by the fourteenth century the archdiocese of Armagh had been divided into two irreconcilable parts - the Northern part Gaelic in speech, customs and law and ruled by the ancient kingly family of the O’Neills, and the Southern part dominated by the Justiciar. The diocesan administration was also divided. The primate lived near Drogheda, used the parish church of St Peter as his pro-cathedral and rarely ventured into his cathedral city of Armagh, which was ruled by a Gaelic dean and chapter. The tension between the two nations was evident in both the civil and

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11*FitzRalph*, pp.5-6.
religious spheres, even within the communities of religious, and divided Irish society irretrievably for the rest of the medieval period. For instance, in 1307 the Cistercian monastery of Mellifont was in chaos due to strife over the choice of the next abbot, the rival contenders being supported by private armies.\textsuperscript{12} The Franciscans, from their first arrival in Ireland, c. 1230, became deeply involved in the strife between colonists and native Irish, splitting themselves into two hostile factions. At one of their provincial chapters there was a pitched battle between the Irish and English Friars in which many were killed and wounded.\textsuperscript{13}

It is likely that FitzRalph got his elementary education from the Franciscans who, in a busy town such as Dundalk, could have facilities for this. During these disturbed years, the lack of any university in Ireland made it necessary for any Irishman in search of higher education to go elsewhere and from the thirteenth century onwards Oxford was the most usual choice of Irish students, both Gaelic and Anglo-Irish. FitzRalph, in his sermon to the Franciscans at Avignon in 1349, described his family as ‘\textit{de humili loco nati}’,\textsuperscript{14} but the family of Rauf to which he belonged was one of reasonable prosperity, connected with the more distinguished family of Douedale. It is clear that the Rauf family were well able to meet the cost of sending their younger members to a university and thus opening the way to careers of preferment. FitzRalph himself was well advanced in theology before receiving any benefice, and in later

\textsuperscript{12}ibid. p.8.
\textsuperscript{13}J. A. Watt, \textit{The Church and the Two Nations in Medieval Ireland} (Cambridge, 1970) p.182.
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{FitzRalph}, pp.13-14.
years he intervened to secure benefices for three nephews who were already studying at Oxford.

3. FitzRalph at Oxford as student and teacher

During the first half of the fourteenth century, when FitzRalph spent some twenty of the formative years of his life there, Oxford was one of the leading universities in Europe, rivalling the schools of Paris. William of Ockham's innovations in the realm of logic and the developments in natural science, especially physics and mathematics, emanating from the Mertonian school, led to new discoveries in various fields of scholarship. FitzRalph began his Oxford education around 1315, only a few years after the death of Scotus and just before Ockham began to lecture on the Sentences in the 1317-20 period. At Oxford, as at Paris, the theological course which he pursued was the longest and hardest of all the faculties and lasted up to fifteen years. It has been well described by W.J. Courtenay. The student had first of all to complete the seven year course leading to the degree of M.A. This course centred on the study of Aristotle. First there was a thorough grounding in his work in logic, followed by instruction in the three philosophies (natural, moral and metaphysical). In the studia naturalia, he studied the natural works (libri naturales); in the studia

\[15\] ibid. pp.15-16.

moralia were studied his Ethics and Politics; and the studia metaphysica required a full study of his Metaphysics.17

Having graduated as M.A., the student then entered the theological course at around age 21 or 22. He spent the next four years in study and attendance at lectures on the Bible and the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In the fifth to the seventh years, he was permitted to take part in debates as opponent and later as respondent. Having completed his seven years, he could be admitted to lecture on the Sentences which made him a bachelor of theology. A year or two later he began to lecture on the Bible which made him a 'formed bachelor' in which capacity he remained for a year or more of disputation before being eligible for inception as master, or doctor, of theology. He was then required as regent master to lecture on the Bible for two years and oversee the work of students under his direction. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, this course of studies could last fourteen or fifteen years, in addition to the seven-year M.A. course. It was gradually reduced in length so that by the middle of the century it could be completed in less than ten years. The stages of FitzRalph's academic career are well known and are well recorded in the Register of his patron Bishop Grandisson of Exeter.17 They show that he completed the theological course in about ten years. By 1325 he was master of arts and had already

17cf. Catto, J.I., History of University of Oxford II (1984) pp.1-5, 28-29. FitzRalph's disparaging comments on 'Aristotelica dogmata' in his autobiographical prayer at the end of the Summa de Questionibus Armenorum can be understood in the light of this long course.
resigned a fellowship of Balliol. He graduated as bachelor of theology in 1328, in which year he began to lecture on the Sentences. Three years later, in 1331, he attained his doctorate, and was regent master for another year.¹⁹

During his course, FitzRalph acquired a thorough grounding in philosophy, an impressive familiarity with the Bible and a capacity for competent theological inquiry. However on the evidence of the only complete work that survives from this period, his Commentary on the Sentences, he would not have merited more than a footnote in the pages of academic history. The commentary on the Sentences was a statutory exercise which every theological candidate had to perform. Whereas many of his contemporaries used such exercises for the expression of original ideas which influenced the direction of fourteenth century thought, FitzRalph’s contribution is said to show him as a conscientious, widely read but cautious and conservative thinker.²⁰

It will be referred to further in chapter II dealing with his written works.

4. Chancellor of Oxford

FitzRalph’s election as Chancellor in 1332, within a year of inception, shows that he was held in esteem by his seniors. This was, Walsh suggests, for qualities of soundness and orthodoxy, a commitment to university teaching and a readiness to undertake administrative duties, rather than for his intellectual achievements.²¹ He had

¹⁹FitzRalph, pp.3-5.
²¹FitzRalph, pp.70-84.
the unhappy experience of presiding over one of the most serious episodes in the history of the university. This was the Stamford schism, when at the beginning of the Michaelmas term 1333, a group of masters and students broke away from the university and established themselves in Stamford in Lincolnshire about a hundred miles to the Northeast. The indications are that the causes were twofold. In Oxford, as in almost every medieval university town, strife between the student population and the townspeople was common, due to the cost of living and exploitation by the shopkeepers. In addition, the university population of Oxford was divided into two ‘nations’, northern and southern. This division was the immediate occasion of the schism, sparked off by resentment among the northern masters who felt themselves discriminated against in the allocation of fellowships. As a result, northern masters and students seceded to Stamford, setting up an alternative university and rejoicing in the embarrassment of the Chancellor. A satirical poem by one of the Stamford students taunted him with his newfound social pretensions in changing his name to Filius Radulphi and for wagering his head that the school at Stamford would soon collapse. An indication of his over-reaction is provided by the sheriff of Oxford who complained that the Chancellor was daily ordering the arrest of students, when the jail was already full to bursting point. Authority had clearly broken down and crown intervention was inevitable. In September 1334, the matter came before a royal commission of inquiry in response to a petition from FitzRalph’s successor as Chancellor. The situation was finally resolved in July 1335, when the king ordered

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the dispersal of the dissidents and the confiscation of their property.\textsuperscript{24}

FitzRalph's hard line did him no harm. Far from damaging him, it appears to have added to his reputation, and he retained the confidence of the king and of the university authorities. He was, in fact, named as one of the envoys chosen by the university to lay the matter before Pope John XXII in late 1334, thus providing the occasion of the first of four extended visits to Avignon, where curial contacts and papal patronage were to have an important effect on his career. For ambitious clerics eager for promotion, success was influenced largely by circulation at the papal court and the ability to show one's learning in disputations and brilliant sermons. FitzRalph was fortunate that he arrived in Avignon while Pope John XXII was still alive, and found in progress a vigorous debate on the theory of the beatific vision developed by John XXII in 1331-33, and widely denounced as erroneous and unorthodox.\textsuperscript{25} FitzRalph acquitted himself with distinction in the most renowned pulpits and in the papal chapel before pope, cardinals and members of the curia in the debate, which continued also under Benedict XII. He also became familiar with the practice at Avignon of collecting, revising and polishing sermons with a view to publication; this was the origin of his Sermon Diary which will be discussed in chapter II dealing with his published writings.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24}FitzRalph, p.82.


\textsuperscript{26}L.A.H.J., pp.115-16.
Dean of Lichfield

Promotion came quickly, not least because of his definite stance on the orthodox side in the beatific vision controversy. In December 1335, Benedict XII appointed him Dean of Lichfield Cathedral, and he was installed in April 1336. In that post he showed himself active and energetic in supervising every detail of the management of the Cathedral and chapter. However, this period lasted only until August 1337, when he was required by the chapter to represent them at Avignon, where there were several cases which the chapter had brought before the curial courts. The chapter provided him with substantial funds for the journey, little realising that his absence would last seven years. His continued residence at Avignon and his constant requests for financial support long after he appeared in 1339-40 to have completed the principal part of his mission (a dispute between the chapters of Lichfield and Coventry on the election of the bishop) must have caused his chapter much impatience. He, however, claimed in a sermon preached before the pope in 1349 that he had spent the seven years battling his way through fifteen appeals before winning his case. The litigation on behalf of his chapter was by no means the only occupation during this lengthy stay in Avignon. He acquired experience in curial legal procedure, became known as a preacher of stature and participated in the debates between eastern and western Christians which resulted in his most important work, Summa de Questionibus Armenorum. He also became regarded as an Irish expert at the curia, and was not behindhand in obtaining Irish benefices for his three nephews then studying at Oxford.  

Returning to Lichfield in the autumn of 1344, he became once more the active dean and preacher until his appointment by Pope Clement VI, in July  

\[\text{FitzRalph, pp.107-29.}\]
1346, to his native see of Armagh. Thus he owed both his preferments - as dean and as archbishop - directly to papal favour.

6. **Archbishop of Armagh**

FitzRalph did not arrive in Ireland until Easter 1348, nearly two years after his appointment. In the fourteen years of his archiepiscopate, he spent less than half in his diocese. Despite his spending so much of his time outside the country, the record shows him as a diligent and conscientious pastor and prelate - administrator of a troublesome and divided ecclesiastical province, a reformer, a mediator between two bitterly hostile racial communities, a critical observer of the flaws which he perceived in Irish society and proposer of measures to remedy them.

(i) **The Temporalities**

The very first task facing him on his appointment was to deal with the temporalities of the see, which had been practically beggared for many years through the rapacity of local English officials. His predecessor, David O'Hiraghty, was in continual financial difficulties. Constantly in debt, he was unable to pay even the mild curial taxes imposed on his impoverished diocese. The problem was made particularly acute by the financial exactions of royal officials in those parts of the diocese which lay within the Anglo-Irish Pale, including the thriving commercial towns of Drogheda and Dundalk which should have been able to help him out of his difficulties. An Irish archbishop had trouble enough during his lifetime in protecting the property of his see.

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from the inroads of the king’s ministers; but his death was the signal for a wholesale attack on the temporalities, and the longer the vacancy lasted the better pleased were the ministers, who had few scruples in these matters. It was thus vitally important for FitzRalph to secure the properties of the see, and his journey from Lichfield to London in September 1346 was the first step towards this. He officially did homage for the temporalities in February 1347, having delayed his consecration until the matter was settled. The Irish officials still withheld the temporalities on the ground that he had not yet been consecrated, and he did not finally secure them until July 1348.

In addition to his current outgoings, FitzRalph had, in his relations with the Apostolic Camera, to take on the arrears of taxes which his predecessor had been unable to pay, and all through his episcopate he was struggling to pay these arrears as well as his own curial taxes. Against this background it is no wonder that from early on he sought to consolidate and rationalize the scattered properties of his see and safeguard and increase his precarious episcopal income. We can also readily understand his fulminations against the practice of tithe-evasion which in the case of the merchants of Drogheda led him in 1353 to place that town under interdiction.

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(ii) **The Black Death**

No sooner had he taken up residence in Ireland in 1348, than he had to contend with the suffering and desolation caused by the Black Death.\(^{30}\) This appeared in Drogheda in August 1348, the first town to be seriously affected. The Anglo-Irish colonists were much more seriously affected than the Gaelic Irish, due no doubt to the heavy concentration of population in or near the towns. The Friars suffered heavily because of their urban apostolate in the thick of the plague. Drogheda and Dublin were, according to Friar Clyn's account,\(^{31}\) virtually denuded of people within weeks. Although the worst phase of the plague in his area was over by the following year, FitzRalph’s petition at Avignon in that summer for the easing of the conditions of the Jubilee of 1350 was not only on behalf of Edward III, but was as much a special plea for Edward's subjects in Ireland, whose distressing circumstances made them least able to comply with the conditions of the Jubilee.

(iii) **The Primacy**

Another pressing problem which FitzRalph had to deal with on his installation was the primacy. His predecessor David O'Hiraghty had been faced with the attempt by Bicknor, the Archbishop of Dublin, to enforce for the first time in over a century, a claim to the title 'primas Hibernie'. Bicknor’s predecessors had resisted Armagh’s claims to the assertion of its primacy within the Dublin jurisdiction. In one such case

\(^{30}\)FitzRalph, pp.278-84; Gwynn, 'The Black Death in Ireland' Studies xxiv (1935), pp.25-29.

\(^{31}\)Annales Hiberniae, pp.35-38.
in 1313, the then Archbishop of Armagh had attempted to have his primatial cross carried before him when he landed at Howth to attend Parliament. The ensuing violent clash in which he was defeated deterred him from attending Parliament, to avoid such scenes. O’Hiraghty did not press his claim with the same determination as FitzRalph. Before even leaving for Ireland to take up his post, FitzRalph had engaged in negotiation with the government in London on the primacy, above all on the right to have his cross carried before him anywhere in Ireland, even within the city of Dublin, and Edward III, in April 1348, issued a mandate admitting the claim. This situation did not last, and when Bicknor died in July 1349 and a trusted royal agent was appointed to succeed him, Edward III revoked the mandate on the ground that it had been granted under false pretences, and that FitzRalph’s efforts to exercise his primatial authority in Dublin in the spring of 1349 had led to much dissension. Not deterred, FitzRalph set out via London for Avignon, where in addition to presenting Edward III’s petition regarding the Jubilee, he instituted a case on the primacy before the curia. There is evidence that a papal commission was set up to examine the matter and that the king was both writing to the curia defending the rights of Dublin and, at home, instructing his officials in Dublin to throw the full rigour of the law behind them. Furthermore, he ordered FitzRalph to return home where he would be better employed keeping the peace than stirring up trouble abroad. The final resolution of the case is unclear. While there are indications that the pope found in FitzRalph’s favour, there is no record of a formal decision and his successor

32 Robin Frame, English Lordship in Ireland (Oxford, 1982) p.306, mentions an impassioned plea in 1350 from John of St. Paul (Archbishop of Dublin 1349-62 and appointed Chancellor in 1350) to the English council for the protection of the rights of the see of Dublin against the encroachments of FitzRalph who was then in Avignon.
Sweteman in 1366 regarded the matter as still *sub judice*. In the event, the practical outcome is reflected in the designation of the two primates to this day, Dublin being *primas Hiberniae* and Armagh *primas totius Hiberniae*.

(iv) FitzRalph’s stewardship

Whatever about the king’s dissatisfaction with FitzRalph’s pressing of the primatial issue, the record of FitzRalph’s later dealings with the king regarding the properties of his see shows that by 1356 he was enjoying high royal favour and had carried out his duties in Ireland to the king’s satisfaction, ruling his lands in the interests of the Crown, and keeping the peace in the area under his control, in accordance with a mandate he had received in 1348 to negotiate for peace between the warring Gaelic and English nations. He left no doubt that he considered Edward III as ‘dominus Hibernie’ and the legitimate temporal authority. This did not mean that he viewed his commission through English eyes, thereby assuming that the Gaelic Irish, being guilty of rebellion, were solely responsible for the situation where Irish and English were opposed to one another in traditional hatred. On the contrary, he well knew the contribution of his own people, the Anglo-Irish colonists of the Pale, to the situation and held that loyalty to the Crown must not be accepted as an excuse for crime against the Gaelic Irish population. He spoke bitterly of ‘*legem marchie, sive dyaboli*’. He was careful to give no single group or interest a moral justification for violence and injustice.

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33FitzRalph, p.242 and pp.264-78.
34FitzRalph, p.345.
His sermons reveal him as acutely aware of the flaws in Irish society. In addition to the state of war *inter Anglicos et Hibernicos*, he denounced the general prevalence of theft and dishonesty. In his campaign against financial corruption and for fair dealing, justice and peace between the rival communities, he condemned the view that to kill, thieve or plunder was merely a minor offence if committed against a member of the other community (and both sides were guilty of this); he criticized the trade guilds which excluded the Gaelic Irish, and amongst other wrongdoers he attacked those who used the letter and devices of the law to defraud widows and orphans of their inheritance and minority groups of their property rights.  

(v) **St. Patrick’s Purgatory**

FitzRalph played a part in an unusual episode concerning St. Patrick’s Purgatory. In an undated fragment of a sermon-note, he refers to St. Patrick’s Purgatory and to the knightly pilgrim who for the love of God descended there. This appears to be the Hungarian knight Ritter Georg Grissaphan who made his pilgrimage in 1353; it could perhaps be an earlier knight Owein who was reported to have made his descent two hundred years earlier and whose story became very widely circulated. FitzRalph as Archbishop was more than ready to promote the cult of St. Patrick as founder and

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patron of his archdiocese and laid several petitions on the subject before Clement VI. George of Hungary made his pilgrimage in penance for crimes committed when in the service of King Louis of Hungary as captain of the garrison at Trani near Bari. The penance imposed by the papal curia not being severe enough for his conscience he set off for Lough Derg which for him was the very end of the Western world. Arriving in October 1353 he was refused entrance until he had got the permission of the Archbishop, who was eight days journey away in his diocese. Having got the permission he returned again to Lough Derg, made the pilgrimage and left carrying a variety of messages received in the 26 visions he claimed to have seen at the shrine. One such message was for FitzRalph whom he managed to meet again in early 1354. FitzRalph promptly ensured that a complete account of the affair was sent to Avignon, copied in full and widely circulated. The resultant fame of the Purgatory quickly resulted in attracting pilgrims from a number of countries and the cult continued until 1497 when it was closed down by Alexander VI who had heard and disapproved of the practice of charging an entry fee. This was not the earliest story of the Purgatory. In the late twelfth century the legend first appeared in several accounts including one by Geraldus Cambrensis, and became widely circulated in numerous continental manuscripts. The first Irishman to draw attention to the Purgatory was Philip of Slane (later Dominican bishop of Cork) who in 1324 brought news of it to Avignon in Libellus de descriptione Hibernie;\textsuperscript{37} the reference to Lough Derg is only part of the manuscript, which deals mainly with church reform and a

long defence of the rights of the English in Ireland. The only surviving Latin copy was written in Avignon and is now in the British Library.

(vi) The Mendicant controversy

The last four years of FitzRalph’s life were dominated by his controversy with the Friars - nominally against all four mendicant orders, but in practice against the Franciscans. From his childhood, throughout his career, and especially during his long years at Avignon, he had been in close and friendly contact with them. This situation changed after his appointment to Armagh, and he became their bitter opponent, obsessed in an attempt to undermine their privileges and way of life. The issues at stage are described in chapter II. All that need be said here is that his campaign against the Franciscans culminated in long drawn-out proceedings at the papal curia. For him they ended in failure. The pope in effect ruled in favour of the Franciscans by confirming their position and privileges. The curial proceedings were allowed to continue until, when FitzRalph died in 1360, they simply lapsed into oblivion.

(vii) The cult of Richard FitzRalph

After FitzRalph’s death there began, in his own area of Louth and Meath, a movement for the propagation of the cult of ‘Saint Richard of Dundalk’. His remains were returned to Dundalk about 1370 and re-interred in the church of St Nicholas there. The English Benedictine chronicler Walsingham refers to ‘countless miracles’ happening in his birthplace and adds in a later entry of 1377, ‘whereby, it is said the
friars are ill-pleased'. Urban VI shortly after his succession in 1378 set up a commission to inquire into his case, obviously because of the moves being made in Ireland. These inquiries continued under his successor Boniface IX. However, the result of these inquiries must have been unfavourable for there is no record of any further steps being taken in the matter. The Oxford theologians, especially the mendicants, were quick to point out the connection between FitzRalph's teaching and that of Wyclif, especially as Wyclif was calling him 'Sanctus Richardus' and 'Sanctus Armachanus', and the Lollards also were referring to him as the Lollard Saint. The collapse of the canonization process was no doubt due to the influence of the Wyclif connection and of the mendicant opposition to this most dangerous adversary. Despite this, the cult of 'Saint Richard' was celebrated at least up to the time of Henry VIII and there is evidence that the remains of his tomb were still standing in the early seventeenth century.

7. FitzRalph's influence in Europe

In the field of scholarship interest in FitzRalph continued long after his death. J.A. Robson mentions that he has long been recognised as one of the great personalities of the English church in the fourteenth century--a notable primate, a powerful 

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40 FitzRalph, pp.453-65.
controversialist and a determined litigant, familiar in Oxford, Ireland and Avignon.

W.A. Pantin describes him as one of the most important English theological writers of that century, many of whose writings survive, but of which very little has been published in modern times. Other commentators have spoken in similar terms.41

The wide circulation of his manuscripts in Europe and the range of topics covered, especially his Summa and his anti-mendicant polemics, made an impact on Europe unmatched by any other Irish scholar in medieval times.42 His influence continued up to modern times. Gwynn mentions that when he was a Jesuit student in the early part of this century, some of the theological textbooks still borrowed a few of FitzRalph’s unusual opinions on theology (he was, Gwynn says, to the end of his life over-fond of singular opinions). A phrase Gwynn recalled from one of these textbooks was ‘Armachanus extra chorum cantat, ut fere solet’.43

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42FitzRalph, p.460.

CHAPTER II
FITZRALPH'S WRITTEN WORKS

1. Circulation of manuscripts

FitzRalph’s main surviving written works are four in number:

1. Commentary on the Sentences
2. Summa de Questionibus Armenorum
3. De Pauperie Salvatoris
4. Sermon Diary

Before describing these in detail, it is worthwhile to record the circulation of the manuscripts. Walsh states that his sermons and his theological and polemical works had wide circulation, largely ‘because his campaign against the Friars helped to make him one of the most prominent and frequently quoted prelates of the later Middle Ages.’ At the time she wrote,\(^1\) 182 codices had been located in European libraries.

A large number of these manuscripts contained a single major work by him, either the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa, or De Pauperie Salvatoris. A smaller number contained collections of his sermons, including his anti-mendicant sermons and treatises. In particular, there were 84 copies of his Defensio Curatorum preached against the Friars on 8th November 1357 at Avignon. Apart from the Defensio, the Summa had the widest circulation of FitzRalph’s works, 37 complete or substantially

\(^{1}\) FitzRalph, pp.469-75.
complete texts and eight fragments having been identified, in addition to the edition by Johannes Sudoris printed in 1511. Two full texts of the *Summa* are in English collections, and Trinity College Dublin Library has two complete texts formerly in the library of Archbishop Ussher.

The *Summa* was a popular work in the major Paris libraries of the period; of the surviving number, roughly a quarter are either now in Paris or have emanated from there. A second major centre from which the *Summa* spread was the papal court where the attempts to re-establish union between the eastern and western churches led to a revival of interest, especially in the Greek views on the topics referred to in the *Summa*.

In Central Europe, the *Summa* was well represented in Krakow, Vienna, Prague and Lübeck. The main reason for this was FitzRalph’s image as greatly influencing Wyclif because of the doctrine of dominion and grace which achieved extraordinary prominence in the Hussite controversies, and because of the condemnation of the mendicants.

2. **Commentary on the Sentences**

The only surviving work (apart from a few determinations) from FitzRalph’s years of studying and teaching philosophy and theology at Oxford is his Commentary on

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2 Paris libraries contain 6 complete texts: Bibliothèque mazarine, MS 895 (440) and MS 896 (1174); Bibliothèque nationale, Lat. 12438, Lat. 14578 and Lat. 15974; Bibliothèque universitaire (Sorbonne), MS 225.
the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The text survives only in a few very imperfect manuscripts--seven more or less complete--and a few fragments and no printed edition; and there is great difficulty in obtaining reliable readings of the text. It was never completely revised and published as a definitive text.³

The Commentary originated as an academic exercise based on the Sentences (enunciations or explorations of doctrine) of Peter Lombard which, since its composition in the twelfth century, had become a standard theological textbook.⁴ The Sentences, in four books, were part of a widespread attempt to systematize the Christian faith and put it on an intellectual foundation. They were original neither in content nor in form and the questions dealt with were largely taken from St. Augustine. A commentary and oral exposition of the Sentences became a requirement for all theological students after they had completed their first seven years of study and debate. The commentary contained material of philosophical and other interest, as well as the theology one would expect to find there. W.J. Courtenay has given an account of the way in which a candidate would approach his task.⁵ The structure and content were to some degree conditioned by the rules established for its composition. As the work was the product of the writer’s student years, the requirements of the University and the expectations of his supervisors also had an influence. Controversy was required, but excessive innovation discouraged. The writer was expected to stay

⁴Leff, Medieval Thought (London, 1959) p.129.
⁵Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp.41-48.
within the bounds of accepted opinion, and to swear beforehand to say nothing contrary to faith or accepted opinion. As a result, the student aimed at being as creative as possible without incurring the suspicion of heresy or condemnation. The commentary, prepared just prior to the ‘reading’, achieved final form within a few years. The more frequent pattern, however, was to leave behind versions that were only partially corrected and which began to circulate in this form. This is what may have happened to FitzRalph’s commentary which shows, Courtenay says, signs of incomplete revision and arrangement.

Because no edition of FitzRalph’s Commentary has been produced, I have had to rely on secondary sources for a description of its contents. Walsh has given a fairly full account of the Commentary and mentions other modern authors who have dealt with it. J.A. Robson gives a description of it in the course of his study of Wyclif’s early philosophy and of the influences at work on it while he was a student and teacher at Oxford. Gordon Left’s analysis which he calls ‘a study in theological orthodoxy’ covers nearly 200 pages, dealing with FitzRalph’s work under four main headings: the divine nature, the mind and its faculties, the order of creation, and free will, grace and predestination. Walsh also refers to Annaliese Maier as using FitzRalph’s

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6FitzRalph, pp.36-64.


8FitzRalph Commentator; cf Left, ‘Commentary on the Sentences’, Bulletin of John Rylands Library, vol.45 no.2 (March 1963) pp.390-422. Left is a historian, not a philosopher.
views on creation, infinity and eternity to illustrate her ideas on the diversity of
opinions on problems of natural philosophy.⁹

In lecturing on the Sentences, FitzRalph would have followed the pattern which had
become established in Oxford. No comprehensive treatment of the various questions
raised by Lombard could be attempted in the one year then allowed for the lectures,
and instead he dealt with some major issues then being debated by his
contemporaries. Of special interest to them was the relationship between nature and
grace and man’s free will, God’s omnipotence and future contingencies. FitzRalph’s
main themes within this group were creation, the mind and its faculties, God’s
omnipotence and foreknowledge, future contingents and, particularly, the question of
free will. This topic, one of the most keenly discussed at Oxford, caused Thomas
Bradwardine, FitzRalph’s friend and later Archbishop of Canterbury, to compose De
Causa Dei Contra Pelagium,¹⁰ in which he laid great stress on extreme necessity
based on predestination, as opposed to the younger generation whom he called
Pelagians and who held a more positive view of man’s capacity to achieve salvation
by his own efforts. FitzRalph took the middle line between these two views, trying
to reconcile free will with a moderate acceptance of divine predestination, and
emphasizing the primacy and freedom of the will and the contingency of future
events.¹¹

⁹Die Vorläufer Galileis, Rome, revised ed. 1966, quoted FitzRalph, p.36.


¹¹FitzRalph, pp.30, 40, 49-51, 58-59; Leff, FitzRalph Commentator, p.18.
Leff takes a negative view of the Commentary which he considers safe, non-combative and conventional in its orthodoxy. Modern historians have indeed seen FitzRalph’s thought as less original and profound than that of his contemporaries, notably William of Ockham, who used their commentaries as vehicles for the expression of complex and original ideas. Considering the treatment Ockham received at the hands of the Curia, FitzRalph was probably wise not to show any signs of unorthodoxy.

3. **Summa de Questionibus Armenorum**

As this work will be examined in chapter V, it is not necessary here to do more than give a brief account of its origin and main features. It is a dialogue in nineteen books which is FitzRalph’s most important contribution to medieval theological literature. There is some debate as to the date of its composition: the dedicatory letter with which the work begins and in which he describes himself as *archiepiscopus Armacanus Hibernie primas* certainly dates it after 1347. The autobiographical prayer with which it ends contains references which might be construed as dating it as late as 1357. However, the indications are that it was composed in the early 1340s and completed and presented to Pope Clement VI during FitzRalph’s stay in Avignon in the period 1349 to 1351. The occasion which led to its composition was the arrival at the curia in about 1338 of the Armenian prelate Nerses Balientz. During the

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12Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars*, p.268.

pontificate of John XXII the papal correspondence with Armenia was full of the
danger of the Islamic threat to that little country, the decimation of the nobility in
constant warfare and repeated appeals to the West for help. The appeals continued to
be made to his successor Benedict XII, but he was perturbed by the growing criticism
of the Armenian church by the group of ‘Latinizers’ who had come to Avignon, and
he set up a commission of inquiry into their charges of doctrinal errors, bizarre
practices and superstitions attributed to that church. The most prominent of the
Armenian Latinizers were Nerses Balientz and another Armenian prelate John of
Kerna (who had arrived c.1337), both of them having been seriously discredited in
the Armenian church. FitzRalph was a witness at the inquiry and may well have been
employed as an expert on the Latin interpretation of some of the doctrines being
examined. The result of his attendance and of his lengthy discussions with these
Armenian prelates and with representatives of the Greeks was embodied in the Summa
de Questionibus Armenorum. Of the nineteen books, fourteen deal with the Armenian
disputes proper, a further three with theological problems long argued in the schools
and on which he had dwelt twenty years before in his Commentary on the Sentences,
and the final two with questions regarding the Muslims and the Jews.14

4. De Pauperie Salvatoris

Of FitzRalph’s third major work De Pauperie Salvatoris, the first four books were
published as an appendix to R.L. Poole’s edition of De Dominio Divino.15 The

14 FitzRalph, pp.144-45.

remaining three books (of which Poole provided a list of contents) have been edited in two unpublished doctoral theses by, respectively, Helen Hughes and R.O. Brock.¹⁶

A treatise *De Mendicate Fratrum*, one of a number which FitzRalph wrote during the course of the legal proceedings at the curia in 1357-60, has been added as an eighth book in two manuscripts in English libraries.¹⁷

The debate regarding the position of the mendicants and their privileges with which the work dealt was nothing new, having been the subject of controversy almost since the formation of the four mendicant orders. By the time FitzRalph came to write about it, criticism of the Friars was rife and they were widely satirized in the political literature of the time.¹⁸ The position in particular of the Franciscans had from the beginning been made possible by a variety of papal privileges and devices designed to protect them in their work. Criticism and complaint began and continued throughout the thirteenth century—the bishops complaining of the encroachment of the Friars on the position of the parochial clergy and the Friars arguing that they were not usurping but supplementing the work of the seculars. Eventually in 1300, Pope Boniface VIII issued the bull *Super Cathedram* which regulated the role of the Friars and their relations with the parochial clergy, and required them to pay to the parish


¹⁷Corpus Christi Cambridge MS 180; Lambeth Palace MS 121.

one quarter of their legacies, bequests and dues. This set down the conditions under which the mendicants might exercise a pastoral function with the minimum of friction. This was a workable solution for peace between them and the secular clergy, but to the Friars it appeared harsh and it provided no more than an uneasy truce.\footnote{FitzRalph, pp.350-55.}

To the bishops and secular clergy the justification of the mendicants’ privileges was still in dispute and the pope had to come to the Friars’ help by frequent re-issue of \textit{Super Cathedram}. The issue became more acute when in 1349 the Friars presented to Clement VI a \textit{proposicio} \footnote{No copy survives. Its existence is known only through FitzRalph’s reply to it. \textit{FitzRalph}, p.358.} for a review and mitigation of the terms of \textit{Super Cathedram}. This is when FitzRalph emerged as their principal antagonist.

As I mentioned in chapter I, FitzRalph from his earliest years, later at Oxford and especially during his years at Avignon, had been in close and friendly contact with the leaders of the mendicant orders. His change of heart, to the extent that he devoted the remaining years of his life to a campaign against their privileges and way of life, can be explained by his experience as Archbishop of trying to enforce his authority over religious who were exempt from it, and by his misgivings regarding the unsupervised presence of the Friars in pulpit and confessional and their apparent abuse of both.\footnote{FitzRalph, pp.349-59, 363; Gwynn, ‘Archbishop FitzRalph and the Friars’ \textit{Studies} xxvi (1937) pp.50-67; idem, \textit{English Austin Friars}, pp.80-89.} However, the immediate occasion was the coincidence of his visit to
Avignon at the time when the Friars’ petition was presented and his being commissioned by the English clergy to lay before Clement VI their well known complaints against the Friars. He executed this commission in his own proposicio Unusquisque of 5th July 1350, delivered before the pope and cardinals in full consistory. In it, he replied directly to the Friars’ petition, claiming to be speaking on behalf of the bishops and priests of the whole church and specifically for a number of his fellow prelates present. Years later, in his prologue to De Pauperie Salvatoris, he recalled that he had been commissioned with two other doctors to investigate certain topics of dispute among the mendicant orders and to examine the apostolic or evangelical poverty professed by the Franciscans. When the three-man commission failed to reach a conclusion, several cardinals suggested that he undertake a closer investigation of the whole question. Hence at their personal request, or so he claimed, he began to plan the systematic analysis of the doctrinal and legal basis for mendicant poverty which was embodied in De Pauperie Salvatoris.

In this work, he adopted the same dialogue form and between the same parties Ricardus and Iohannes as in the Summa. It is probable that he completed the first five books at Avignon before his enforced departure in 1351 at the insistence of Edward III. He managed to complete the work in Ireland ‘inter fluctus pastoralis officii’. The contents of the work may be described here briefly. The first five books contain an exhaustive discussion of the abstract problems relating to lordship, possession, use and property in the light of God’s gift of creation and grace. The remaining two books reflect his concern with the immediate and practical issues connected with Franciscan activities and status and with papal legislation. Walsh says that the work
as a whole is diffuse in conception and organization and contains a number of anomalies and contradictions. The first five books were planned with more care than the other two, which show a definite decline in order and coherence. These two chapters were the section of the work that was attacked by his critics, compelling him to respond in 1359 in the treatise De Mendicitate Fratrum. An important feature of De Pauperie Salvatoris was his use of the theory of dominion, whereby all dominion and jurisdiction was founded on God's grace to the individual soul, thus giving the argument about poverty a philosophical basis.

In the summer of 1356, FitzRalph left Ireland for London on business connected with the Church in Armagh and carrying with him the completed copy of his dialogue. According to the account which he laid before Innocent VI and his cardinals, he became involved in this phase of the controversy by accident. He found a dispute in progress on the degree of poverty practised by Christ and his disciples; his opinion was sought and he was invited to preach on the subject. He did so in the four anti-mendicant sermons preached by him from St. Paul's Cross. He had already, he said in the first of these, sent the final copy of his dialogue to the pope and the cardinals for their approval, at the same time making its contents known among his friends and colleagues in Oxford (where it soon became a topic of academic controversy). The procurators of the four mendicant orders lost no time in taking action against it in London and, what was more important, at Avignon. FitzRalph spent the last years of his life defending his position in an endless series of accusations and counter-

22 FitzRalph, pp.386-88.
accusations reflecting the course of the legal proceedings at the curia. He got very little financial or moral support from his fellow bishops in England 23 who were not prepared for a life and death struggle with the Friars in what was essentially a lost cause. FitzRalph was in any event considered to have taken the matter to Avignon on his own initiative.

It is hard to see how FitzRalph could have hoped to succeed against the Franciscans, whose resources, along with their influence at the papal court, made their position virtually impregnable. In the end, the decision at the curia went against FitzRalph, when in 1358 and 1359 the pope confirmed the Friars' pastoral role and their privileges, but without condemning FitzRalph's views or discrediting him. While the curial proceedings continued formally, his death in November 1360 followed soon after by that of several of the other participants meant that the controversy, or at least the litigation, was quietly allowed to peter out.

5. The Sermon Diary

The last of FitzRalph's major works is the *Sermon Diary*. Aubrey Gwynn has dealt with it in an extensive and scholarly study in which he has included much biographical material describing the circumstances in which many of the sermons were composed and delivered.24

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The work has come down to us in three complete manuscripts and a fourth which contains all but a few of the sermons. The three are: MS Bodl.144 in the Bodleian Library, MS 65 in St. John’s College Oxford, and Lansdowne MS 393 in the British Library. The fourth is MS 90 in New College Library Oxford. In addition there are various individual sermons or sets of sermons in miscellaneous collections. For instance, Trinity College Dublin Library MS B.4.1 contains ten miscellaneous sermons plus four panegyrics on St. Thomas Becket. The three complete manuscripts are so closely similar in their text as to indicate that they were all derived from a common archetype now lost. The fourth, MS 90, while identical in text, is somewhat inferior in spelling and grammar. Gwynn has listed all 92 items which comprise the Diary. All except 9 of the 92 are preceded by the preacher’s title and date and place of delivery. 54 of the 92 are described as delivered in vulgari or ad populum. These were delivered in his Lichfield period (24) and in Ireland (30) during the six years of his episcopate which he actually spent in Ireland.

The complete work is divided into two parts of which the title Sermon Diary belongs properly only to the first. This is the collection of sermon notes in Latin beginning in 1344 in Lichfield and continuing till 1357, and containing the sermons preached in the vernacular in England and Ireland. (They also include the four anti-mendicant sermons delivered in London in the winter and spring of 1356-57; these are really part of the anti-mendicant campaign and were revised and polished in Latin after delivery in the vernacular.) The internal evidence of the text indicates that FitzRalph wrote the Diary himself. In the notes he often spoke in the first person singular and there are frequent cross-references from one sermon to another and some reminders
for his personal use. Clearly the notes were not intended for publication but as a working document for an active prelate dealing with the day-to-day preaching tasks of a diocese. Some sermons were copied out virtually in full while others simply contained notes of time and place of delivery, the scriptural text and an indication of the contents of the sermon.25

One feature of the Diary as a whole has been examined by Gwynn and repeated by Walsh.26 The text is defective in the beginning. The first two sermon-notes show neither title, place nor date and appear to belong to the 1351-55 period and to have been misplaced. Likewise what should have been the last sermon of the series, preached at London in the spring of 1357, occurs in 1351, out of its true place. While the evidence is not conclusive, Gwynn suggests that the first and last folios were loose and had detached themselves from the original text and the error carried into the other copies of which it was the exemplar. All the extant copies made from the exemplar show blank spaces or other indications of lacunae at the points where misplacements occur. The speculation is that when FitzRalph began the diary in 1344 he did not use a single large volume in which to record it, but used quaternioni of 8, 10 or 12 leaves each, taking a new one as each was filled. In these circumstances some were bound to go astray and Walsh suggests that both the one relating to his pastoral duties in Exeter after his consecration and one or more quaternioni of his Irish sermons are missing.

25FitzRalph, pp.185-6.

In the case of his Avignon sermons which form the second part of the Diary, he obviously intended these formal Latin sermons to be published and circulated, but he never completed the task. He did not put them in chronological order and they appear in the Diary in much the same order as his friend and former fellow student Richard Kilwington found them when acting as his literary executor.

The Avignon sermons comprise only 24 of the 92, but they are the most important section of the manuscript, not only because of their subjects and the circumstances and places in which they were preached, but also because they are given in full and clearly presented in a form intended for publication. Four of them are not sermons in the accepted sense; one was the proposicio presented on behalf of Edward III in August 1349 pleading for the extension of the Jubilee of 1350, without the obligation of travel to Rome, to the people of Edward’s territories ravaged by the Black Death; in this case he was also speaking for his own faithful in Ireland devastated not only by the plague but by the constant warfare between the Gaelic Irish and the English settlers. The other three belong to his campaign against the Friars--his proposiciones of 1350 and 1357, and his response of 6th January 1359 to the objections raised to his proposicio of 1357. Of the remaining twenty, the largest number (fourteen) were delivered during his extended stay at the curia from 1337-44 when he was building up his reputation as a preacher and expert theologian. The venues in which the twenty were delivered were varied--four to the Franciscans in their church, several to the Dominicans and Carmelites, but mostly in the papal chapel or that of the vice-chancellor and in the Audientia Causarum.\textsuperscript{27} He was less fortunate in his final stay

\textsuperscript{27}FitzRalph, p.188.
from 1357-60 when his hostility to the Friars and his court case ongoing against them limited his sermons to two in the papal and vice-chancellor’s chapels.

Four of his Avignon sermons were preached on the feast of St. Thomas Becket, celebrated with special veneration by the English representatives at the curia and by FitzRalph himself who, like his friend and patron Grandisson Bishop of Exeter, looked on him as a special model. Becket’s firm stance on behalf of the prerogatives of his see and his secular clergy specially appealed to him; he perhaps modelled himself on him later, as the Becket of the Irish Church.\textsuperscript{28} Otherwise the subject matter, especially of the three Becket sermons delivered during the 1337-44 period, showed his preoccupation with the pursuit of perfection, the religious life, sin and the duties of restitution and of almsgiving, and his concept of the ideal prelate.

In the six years which he actually spent in Ireland during the fourteen years as Archbishop, he preached only 30 sermons. Their importance lies, as Walsh remarks, in the insight they give into his work as prelate, ecclesiastical politician and mediator, as pastor, reformer and administrator, and in the measures by which he tried to improve the conditions of Irish life as he saw them.\textsuperscript{29}

Except for his two synodal sermons of 1352 and 1355 and a sermon to the Carmelites in 1349, all delivered in Latin, the Irish sermons are, like his Lichfield ones,

\textsuperscript{28}FitzRalph, p.189.

\textsuperscript{29}ibid, p.233; cf. Walsh ‘Preaching and Pastoral Care’, pp.251-68.
preserved mainly as brief Latin notes in his own hand of sermons preached in the English speaking half of his diocese. He appears from the Diary almost never to have moved outside that half or to have made any serious attempt to do so. This would have been highly dangerous due to the bitter border warfare between the English settlers and their Gaelic enemies. It was safer for him to stay in the vicinity of Drogheda and Dundalk and leave the care of Armagh cathedral in the hands of his Gaelic dean and canons. Hence the roll-call of the places which he visited and where he preached contains familiar East coast names--Drogheda in which he used the Church of St. Peter as his pro-cathedral, Dundalk, Termonfeckin, Dromiskin and Ardee, to name but a few. An exception was the remote northern coastal town of Coleraine held by a small group of English colonists, which he visited on his voyage to Ireland as Archbishop in 1348.  

FitzRalph’s frequent denunciations of local abuses help us to realize the more pressing pastoral problems which he encountered. Gwynn remarks that especially in his last two years in Ireland his vigorous efforts at reform were countered and checked by an equally vigorous resistance by his subjects. He was especially hampered by the deliberate opposition of the exempt religious; this was shown by their more lenient view of the need for satisfaction and restitution as a condition of absolution, due Gwynn suggests, to a wider experience of local conditions than FitzRalph’s rigorous approach would show.  


FitzRalph early picked out two faults for special condemnation—firstly the civil war *inter Anglicos et Hibernicos*, and secondly general theft and dishonesty. In the former case, he pointed out to his hearers, most of them Anglici, that both rival communities were under the impression that it was lawful to rob, plunder and kill those of the opposing community; this, he warned, was gravely sinful, and it was not a valid excuse when such molesters were acting as agents of the Crown against the enemies of the Crown. On the subject of dishonesty, he condemned the manipulation of the law so as to seize land or property on a legal pretext and deprive widows and orphans of their inheritance. He made it plain that he was not prepared to use the institutions of the Church in the interests of his fellow-colonists at the expense of the Gaelic race. The same obligations of charity and justice applied to both sides equally.32

A high proportion of his sermons preached in Drogheda dealt with tithe-evasion, usury, fraud, land speculation, rent-evasion and interference with the process of ecclesiastical justice and with the testamentary rights of minority groups. He also turned his attention to the guilds or confraternities, condemning their oath excluding the native Irish from membership or advancement within them.

His concern to promote peaceful relations between the Gaelic Irish and the Anglo-Normans in his diocese, and his refusal to accept racial tensions as an argument for measures that would perpetuate them, must have been as unwelcome to his audiences in Dundalk and Drogheda as his denunciations of their greed, rapacity and fraudulent

practices. He condemned those who confessed but continued to rob and kill, encouraged by the leniency of their confessors.

In the five years between 1351 and 1356, he tried to apply the norms of ecclesiastical government which he had observed at work in England and on the Continent and were beginning to be adopted in Ireland. He held synods, visitations and preaching tours directed at his suffragan bishops, clergy and laity. In particular he held two synods at Drogheda in 1352 and 1355, where he was as severe to the clergy as he had been to the laity. His strictness of approach to moral questions affecting his clergy and flock must have caused them, both clergy and laity, to heave a sign of relief when he finally left the country in 1356.

In reviewing FitzRalph’s written works it is important to remember that three of the four were completed after he had left the relatively tranquil academic life of Oxford and embarked on an active and varied pastoral career. It must be a source of some wonder to a modern student how FitzRalph was able to compose and finish them under the stress of frequent travel in the conditions of his day and later under the constant pressure of work as head of a turbulent and divided diocese in which he combined the job of spiritual head and ecclesiastical politician, keeping the peace on behalf of Edward III while also acting as an active litigant and controversialist. He comes across as a versatile, capable and ambitious individual, equally at home in all


34The last two books of *De Pauperie Salvatoris* show the effects of this pressure.
of these roles. Posterity has linked him in particular with his long campaign against the Friars and with his reputation as the precursor of Wyclif, through his doctrine of dominion and grace. These two factors alone sufficed to make him one of the best known and most widely quoted prelates of his and succeeding generations, and a powerful link between the Ireland of his day and medieval Europe. He was indeed a formidable personality and his work deserves to be more widely edited and studied.

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35 FitzRalph, p. 465.
In order to appreciate how FitzRalph, a respected scholar but without special knowledge of Armenia, or indeed of Oriental matters generally, came to write his Summa, it is useful to review the political and religious history of Armenia at the time.

1. **General description of Armenia**

   Armenia,\(^1\) designated biblically as Ararat and known in classical times as Cilicia, is a mountainous region of Western Asia occupying a somewhat indefinite area to the South and East of the Black Sea. At its greatest extent, it stretched from 37\(^{\circ}\) to 49\(^{\circ}\) East longitude and from 37\(^{\circ}\) to 41\(^{\circ}\) North latitude, i.e. from the Mediterranean coast north of Cyprus to the Caspian Sea; bounded on the North by the Black Sea and the Caucasus, on the East by the Caspian Sea, on the South by the Taurus Mountains, and on the West by Anatolia. The ancient kingdom was never, through its long and troubled history, united under one king except for a brief period; and likewise its territory varied in extent throughout the centuries; it is now divided among Turkey, Iran and the Russian Federation. The present Armenia is the smallest republic of the Russian Federation and a tiny portion of the once extensive kingdom.

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Many centuries of domination by the Arabs, the Kurds, the Seljuks and the Byzantines led in the eleventh century to the collapse of the kingdom. A group of refugees fled westward and formed an 'Armenia in exile' in the area just north of Tarsus. This small principality, which gradually extended its limits, was acknowledged as the kingdom of Cilicia or Lesser Armenia with its capital at Sis, as a reward from the Crusaders for its help in the first Crusade. This Christian kingdom, in the midst of Moslem states and hostile to the Byzantines, had a stormy existence of three hundred years during which it gave valuable support to the leaders of the Crusades; but internal disorders, due to the attempts by its rulers to make their subjects conform to the Roman Church, weakened it and facilitated its conquest by Egypt in 1375.

The Armenians were converted to Christianity about 300 A.D. by Gregory the Illuminator.2 The early history of the Armenian church shows evidence of internal dissension but also of the spirit of independence and intolerance of foreign influence which was an important factor in its development. Religious autonomy began very early and its later history reflects the predominant influence in its theological doctrines of monophysitism, which was not repudiated until the fourteenth century. There were abortive attempts in the ninth and later in the twelfth century to unite with the Byzantines but these came to nothing. From the age of the Crusades on the Armenians, whose Catholicos had his seat at Sis, developed closer relations with Rome, leading to attempts to unite the two churches. However, the bonds of union

2L.MA. 4, col.1676.
which resulted from their shared experience of the Crusades gave way after the Egyptian conquest of 1375 and subsequently the Armenians had but spasmodic relations with Rome, sometimes in union, sometimes in schism and with constant struggle between the Catholics and the orthodox Armenians for predominance.

2. The Dominicans and Franciscans--their role in Rome’s missionary efforts

Apart from Walsh’s detailed account of the negotiations and discussions on reunion between the papacy and the Armenians, there are two somewhat shorter recitals which add to our understanding of the background. Aubrey Gwynn recounts that the Avignon papacy was noted for its active missionary interests. The crusading era was over, but the popes had not come to terms with this fact and worked constantly but vainly for a renewal of the old tradition; their missionary activities must be viewed in the light of these aspirations.

The foundation of the Franciscans and Dominicans was indeed fortunate for the papacy in the thirteenth century, in that the new orders not only carried on their mission in the growing cities and towns of Western Europe, meeting the demand of the urban laity for a style of piety suited to their circumstances, but were both essentially missionary orders in the sense in which we use this term today. For instance, the General of the Dominicans in 1255 told his colleagues that his heart’s desire was that as God’s witnesses they would bring salvation to the ends of the earth. Even as he spoke, the Franciscans had already reached the court of the Great Khan

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3 FitzRalph, pp.137-47.
in outer Mongolia. Their ability to move freely, unencumbered by personal property, from country to country in pursuit of their work was a great advantage to them. Their learning of languages, especially Arabic, reflected their initial preoccupation with the Islamic threat which they believed would be countered by conversion rather than by war. The papacy, while continuing to promote the Crusade, began also to realise that Islam would be overcome better by the word than by the sword; the popes also made great efforts for the return of the schismatic churches to obedience to Rome, using yet again the Dominicans and Franciscans as their instruments.

The sudden appearance of the Mongols in Eastern and Central Europe in 1240-41 spread terror and destruction wherever they went, as far as the gates of Vienna. but the death of their emperor, the Great Khan, in December 1241 caused them to retreat, leaving their conquered lands in the hands of their own subordinate Khans. Innocent IV, after initially calling another Crusade, abandoned war in favour of conversion and sent a variety of Franciscan and Dominican delegations to the Great Khan; all failed in their attempts at conversion. One of the envoys, the Franciscan Carpini, with great hardship got as far as the court of the Great Khan in Mongolia. A later expedition of


1289, led by another Franciscan Montecorvino, reached Peking to where the Great Khan had moved his capital. Montecorvino established in it a Catholic mission and Franciscan friary; he worked there successfully for some 25 years, during which he was appointed Archbishop of this colony of the Latin Church. These heroic missions of the Friars do not appear to have resulted in permanent success, but they brought, or sent back, a vast store of knowledge of those distant peoples and lands; and the incredible hardships which the missioners recounted that they had suffered must have added to their standing with the papal curia.

3. Armenians' attitude to reunion with Rome

Of the kingdoms that owed their origin to the first Crusade, only Lesser Armenia still survived in FitzRalph’s time and every year added to the dangers that threatened it. The Armenian Christians, Gwynn records, were divided into at least three parties: the vast majority who rejected reunion with the Roman see and wished to retain their independent religious tradition; those willing to accept reunion as long as they were free to worship as their fathers had done, according to Armenian rites and customs; and those who wished Latin Christendom to be imposed on the whole Armenian Christian population. The Dominicans were the leaders of this section—a small but very active party, who had founded the society of Fratres Unitores, as well as the

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congregation of *Fratres Peregrinantes*⁹ in order to foster very close union between East and West. The most active, and to the Armenians the most troublesome, of these United Brothers was Nerses Balientz, who had been bishop of Ourmiah in Lesser Armenia and claimed to have been elected Archbishop of Manazgard¹⁰ in Greater Armenia. He stirred up intense opposition to his activities and he was finally expelled as a disturber of the peace. He came west to Avignon where he posed as a victim of heretical intrigues against Roman orthodoxy. He was welcomed at first by the pope and his advisers and was believed by the Armenians to be the main instigator of the long list of 117 alleged Errors of the Armenian Church, which was drawn up by a commission set up by Benedict XII and which the pope sent to the Catholicos of Sis in 1341. This list was immediately submitted to a national synod by order of the king, who was alarmed at the prospect of losing the pope’s favour. The synod indignantly rejected the list of so-called errors as a travesty of their doctrine. On receiving their reply, the pope sent two special envoys in 1346 to treat with them, giving the envoys instructions much more acceptable to the Armenians. Perhaps by then the pope’s advisers realised, or should have realised, that Nerses was not a reliable witness on Armenian affairs.

A second overview is provided by W.R. Jones. He records that in the generation prior to the Mameluke conquest of 1375 the papacy’s efforts to bring the Armenian church into total conformity with Rome were supported by the pro-Latin royal family,

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¹⁰North of Lake Van--Malazgirt on modern maps.
desperately seeking Western assistance against the Seljuks and Mamelukes, and of course by the Latinizing element within the church. Although the union of the two churches under Roman sovereignty had been officially endorsed by the Armenians at the end of the twelfth century, the majority of the native Armenian clergy, aristocracy and laity still cherished the ancestral religion which by the fourteenth century became a symbol of nationalist aspirations.\textsuperscript{11}

During this later period of the European crusading movement, the papacy seized the opportunity of the appeals for help by the kings of Lesser Armenia to conduct negotiations for reuniting the two churches. Surrounded on every side by Moslems, the Cilician monarchy desperately needed Western assistance, and very little came: the papacy and Western states gave some money, encouragement and diplomatic support, but no military help. Despite the indifference of the Christian West the Armenian government remained convinced that salvation lay in close ties with the Europeans. The papacy exploited the critical military situation of the Armenians by insisting on total doctrinal and liturgical submission to Rome. Nothing came of all this, and eventually Cilicia succumbed to the Moslem assault as had Greater Armenia before it.

4. Nerses Balientz, John of Kerna and Fratres Unitores

Walsh, in her account,\textsuperscript{12} which covers the same ground as the two previous writers but in more detail, mentions that Nerses was in Avignon as early as 1338 when the pope made him Archbishop of Manazgard, consecrating him at his request according to the Roman rite, but only conditionally in case he might have been previously consecrated. He was aware that there had been some sort of election before and no doubt thought that he was merely giving effect to a popularly expressed and unanimous wish. This was indignantly denied by the Armenian clergy, who denounced Nerses as an intruder, a false claimant, who had been expelled as an instigator of dissension and who had shown himself abroad as an intriguer, hostile to the rights and traditions of their church. It is possible that he had been elected to the See of Manazgard by the Latinizing faction in Armenia and presented as if it were a unanimous choice.

The dedicatory letter with which FitzRalph’s \textit{Summa} begins addresses itself to ‘\textit{Reverendis in Christo patribus Nersi archiepiscopo Manasgerdensi ac fratri Iohanni electo Clatensi Maioris Armenie}’. Iohannes is the John Kernatzi (of Kerna) who was at least as prominent as Nerses, if not more so, in the deliberations which occasioned FitzRalph’s work. He was an orthodox monk who came under the influence of the

\textsuperscript{12}FitzRalph, pp.137-47.
Dominicans, and was the real founder of the society known as *Fratres Unitores* and their first superior. Kerna, where the society of the *Fratres* was founded, became the centre of the Latinizing movement which, under John, pursued its aims with more zeal than prudence, and the *Fratres* were expelled from the country. John found his way to Avignon around 1337, so that he and his followers were already there when Nerses arrived. He is recorded as having died in Armenia in 1348, which FitzRalph might not have known when he wrote his dedication and presented the work to Clement VI. No such episcopal see as *Clatensis* can be identified, and it may be one of the multitude of sees created in the East in those years, many of them having no practical effect.

5. **FitzRalph’s dealings with Nerses and John of Kerna**

It is clear from FitzRalph’s dedicatory preface that his principal dealings were with these two men whose views and personalities were anathema to the other native Armenian clergy who had ensured their expulsion. The topics discussed in the *Summa* included many which had preoccupied theologians at the curia during FitzRalph’s previous stay there in 1334-5.

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*Khelath on shores of Lake Van--Akhlat or Ahlat on modern maps. As in the case of Manazgard, the spelling varies in the Armenian, Turkish and Arabic versions of the name.*
The most prominent of these topics was that of the beatific vision enjoyed by the just --whether this took place immediately after death, or whether until the resurrection and last judgment the souls of the blest were able to enjoy only the humanity of Christ and not the full clear vision of God. It became a burning, not to say notorious, issue in the universities and in curial and even political circles, because John XXII put forward the second view in a number of sermons in 1332-33, 15 which view was widely regarded as erroneous and possibly heretical, so that there was a real prospect of a heretical pope. However, it was clear that there was a wide variety of opinions and reservations held by theologians of stature on both sides of the debate. FitzRalph, who conveniently arrived for his first stay of 1334-35, took an active part in the discussions on what turned out to be the orthodox side, and this had a major part in securing his preferment under Benedict XII. Benedict restored some stability after the years of heated debate by deciding in his bull Benedictus Deus of 1336 in favour of the view that the beatific vision was enjoyed by the blest immediately 'post mortem et purgacionem'.

The second topic, related to the first, was the question of the two natures of Christ. John XXII's view, if accepted, would have involved also accepting the Nestorian heresy of the divisibility of the divine and human natures of Christ. Hence it was that FitzRalph devoted the first five books of the Summa to that very topic of the dual nature of Christ.

15cf. Dykmans, 'Les Sermons de Jean XXII' pp.9-45 and Pour et Contre Jean XXII, pp.5-18, 40-57.
A third set of topics covered the questions of purgatory, the intercession of the saints, and whether the souls of the damned were punished immediately after death.

A fourth important topic, that of *Filioque*, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, which was the cause of so much bitterness in East-West discussions on reunion, was disposed of in a single Book VI, which included information about the Greek and Armenian views on the subject.

Finally, several Books were devoted to the sacraments, baptism and its form, the Eucharist, confirmation, extreme unction and the ordinary priest’s power of absolution. FitzRalph tried to cover all the points raised by the Armenians without following the same order as the list of 117 alleged errors and without necessarily accepting them at their face value.

Jones’s conclusion is that the *Summa*, the product of these discussions, did not stimulate further European speculation about the differences between Latin and Armenian Christianity. It was, he suggests, a purely academic exercise which had no apparent effect on resolving those differences. This view is hardly tenable. The theologians who took part in the Councils of Basle and Ferrara-Florence obviously thought otherwise; they acquired copies of the Summa, which was highly relevant to the Council’s attempts to re-establish union between the eastern and western churches. Cardinal Torquemada, who attended, owned a copy (Vat. Lat. 1035).

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An interesting footnote to the history of the *Fratres Unitores* is provided by Fortescue in his work on the Uniates. The name comes from the Latin *unitus* via the Slav *uniyatu* as *uniat* (anglicised to uniate), a term first used of the Ruthenians. A uniate is a member of any eastern church which is in communion with the Holy See, i.e. a Catholic of any Eastern rite. While accepting the authority of the pope, the uniate churches retain their own language, customs and liturgy. The to and fro of schisms, controversies and heresies resulted in a number of defections by groups from communion with Rome, while others remained faithful to Rome or, having fallen away, returned to union. There are today a number of uniate churches with a total of some six and a half million members including a number of Armenian Latins. Two features complicate the picture. Firstly, each uniate church has a mirror image in a schismatic church, using the same language and liturgy, but not recognizing the pope’s authority. Secondly, the various uniate groups, like the schismatics, are interlaced all over the Levant, each with its own hierarchy providing priests and bishops to serve them. The result can be two or more Catholic bishops of different rites in one place. In general, Fortescue describes the Roman attitude today to the Eastern rites as being much more liberal than appears to have been the case in FitzRalph’s time, when the mutual antagonism between East and West was still near its height.


18 ibid, p.42. Pope Leo XIII, in his encyclical *Praeclara gratulationis* of 1894, was very conciliatory towards the Eastern churches.
1. Schism of 1054

In the deliberations that led to the compilation of the list of 117 alleged errors of the Armenians, there were constant references to the Greek positions. The fact that FitzRalph entitled his work *de questionibus Armenorum* might convey the impression that these Greek questions were merely a side issue, incidental to the main theme of the work. However, it is clear that in parallel with the Armenian debates, the papacy was carrying on active negotiations with much more important bodies--namely the Byzantine patriarchate and emperor--in a yet further attempt to heal the bitter schism which had erupted in 1054, had been aggravated by the early crusades and made almost irreparable by the fourth crusade and the capture and sack of Constantinople in 1204.

When, in 1054, a papal mission was sent to Constantinople to try to resolve the differences in doctrines and practices which had long been recognized, it resulted instead in a bitter quarrel between the papal envoy Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida¹ and the Byzantine patriarch Michael Kerullarios.² This unpleasant episode, which was caused in part by mutual misunderstanding of each other’s languages--Latin and Greek--and of the meanings of the terms used, caused Christendom,

hitherto one, to be seriously divided. There were fundamental differences between East and West on points of doctrine, particularly on the addition of the word *Filioque* to the Creed by the West, without the endorsement of an ecumenical council, and on the use by the West of unleavened bread; much more important was the pope’s view of the Church’s infallibility and the apostolic see as the *mater et caput* of all the churches. This ran counter to the Eastern concept of ecclesiastical government through the pentarchy of the five old patriarchates and through general councils; according to this conception, doctrinal matters were to be settled by an ecumenical council. Added to the causes of dispute was the pope’s insistence that the Roman Curia was the supreme ecclesiastical court to which appeals could be brought from all over Christendom. Constantinople claimed that by ecumenical council it had been granted the same rights and privileges as Rome. The best, and perhaps the most polite, expression of the views of the Eastern church is contained in a speech in 1136 by Nicetas, Archbishop of Nicomedia in a debate with a Western envoy, Bishop Anselm of Haverberg:

My dearest brother, we do not deny to the Roman Church the primacy amongst the five sister Patriarchates; and we recognize her right to the most honourable seat at an Oecumenical Council. But she has separated herself from us by her own deeds when through pride she assumed a monarchy which does not belong to her office.... How shall we accept from her decrees that have been issued without consulting us and even without our knowledge? If the Roman Pontiff, seated on the lofty throne of his glory, wishes to thunder at us and, so to speak, hurl his mandates at us from on high, and if he wishes to judge us and even to rule us and our Churches, not by taking counsel with us but

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at his own arbitrary pleasure, what kind of brotherhood, or even what kind of parenthood can this be? We should be the slaves, not the sons, of such a Church, and the Roman See would be not the pious mother of sons but a hard and imperious mistress of slaves.

Most serious of all in deepening the animosity between the Greek and Latin peoples was the commencement of the Crusades. Begun with the noblest of intentions and savagely executed, they culminated, as far as the Greeks were concerned, in the fourth Crusade and the capture and pillaging of Constantinople in 1204, when an army which had been gathered for an attempt to relieve the Holy Land was diverted instead to the sack of that city and the establishment of a new Latin empire on the ruins of the Byzantine dominions.

2. Renewed negotiations--the Union of Lyons

D.M. Nicoll records that ever since, in 1074, the Byzantine emperor had proposed that the schism of 1054 might be healed if the pope could arrange for an army to defend Asia Minor against the Seljuks, the bait of the reunion of the Churches had been held out by successive emperors to successive popes. After the restoration of the Byzantine empire in 1261, the Emperor Michael VIII repeated this time-honoured proposal, in order to forestall the threat of a repetition of the fourth Crusade. The pope's reply was that the union could not even be discussed until every single item of the Roman faith had been accepted by the emperor and his Church and people.


This must precede any promise that the pope might make to protect or assist the
emperor. Under this duress, the emperor accepted the Union of Lyons in 1274--only to have it repudiated by his successor in 1282, in response to the outraged feelings of his subjects. For forty years thereafter there was no official contact between the two sides, each considering the other was the heretic and schismatic. Nonetheless, the concern of both sides for the rescue of the Holy Land and the protection of the Catholic powers in the Eastern Mediterranean led to a number of overtures, but in an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion on the side of the Greek theologians. They asked themselves why they should immerse themselves in arguments with the Latins which they, with their habitual arrogance, would simply turn to their advantage, distorting the truth so as to achieve a victory.

3. **Barlaam of Calabria--FitzRalph's guide to Greek theology**

On the papal side there was an attempt in the long pontificate of John XXII to achieve a better understanding of the problems of the Eastern Churches, along with increased interest in Armenian and Greek theology. This is the point at which the name of Barlaam of Calabria comes into prominence. He appears early in the *Summa* as FitzRalph's guide to Greek theology in the same way as Nerses and John of Kerna were his guides on Armenian doctrines and practices. He is quoted by name and with respect in Books VI and XIII. He was a South Italian monk of the Greek rite, born c.1298. After entering a Greek monastery in Calabria, he left in 1328 for Constantinople. In the course of a successful career as a teacher of philosophy, he

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became also the most eloquent upholder of the Greek Church and exponent of its point of view. When, in 1334, John XXII sent two bishops to Constantinople to discuss the possibility of reunion, Barlaam was commissioned by the emperor to engage in public disputation with them on the *Filioque* issue. He also composed a number of treatises against the Latin doctrine on this subject and on the primacy of Rome. His *Contra Latinos* is the best-known of these. He became, if anything, better known for his polemics against the Greek theologian Gregory Palamas on the subject of Hesychasm, of which Palamas was the principal supporter. Although he made himself generally unpopular with all shades of Byzantine theological opinion, he retained the favour of the emperor and continued to work for reunion. In 1337 and 1339, the emperor sent two embassies to the pope to initiate further discussions and on the second in 1339, the leader Stephen Dando was accompanied by Barlaam. The Latin record of their meeting with the pope and his cardinals at Avignon gives the full exposition of the Greek position, expounded in an address by Barlaam. He had, he

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8Andronikos III, whose wife, Anne of Savoy, was actively promoting the union; cf. D.M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Lady 1250-1500* (Cambridge, 1994) pp.82-95.

9Nicol, *Byzantine Requests*, p.76, but Hussey, *The Orthodox Church*, p.257n says there is controversy as to whether they refer to 1334-35 or to later discussions at Avignon in 1339.


admitted,

no mandate from the Byzantine church or people, but only from the emperor, and his purpose was to procure the military cooperation of the Western world against the growing menace of the Turks. It could not be advertised because otherwise the emperor’s life would be in danger. The emperor could not present himself to his subjects as an advocate of union unless help was first sent to his empire. It is not surprising, considering the wide difference of views between East and West as shown in the record of the discussions, that nothing came of Barlaam’s proposals. His work on behalf of the Orthodoxy passed unrecognized; his patron the emperor died in 1341 and, in the same year he himself was condemned by the patriarch and his synod for his attacks on the Hesychasts. He went back to Italy, Nicol records, in disgust at the extravagances of Hesychasm and, converted to the Roman faith, he was soon producing arguments in defence of the Latins, every bit as eloquent as those with which he had championed the Greeks. He settled in Avignon, earning his living as teacher of Greek and adviser to FitzRalph. He was made bishop of the uniate see of Gerace in Southern Italy in 1342 and died there in 1348.

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12Nicol, Byzantine Requests, p.77.
13ibid, p.81.
14FitzRalph, pp.156-57; cf. Boccaccio, G., ‘small in body, but very great in knowledge, so learned in Greek that he has testimonies from Greek emperors and princes and doctors. There has not been in our time, nor for many centuries past, any Greek filled with such famous or such great knowledge.’ Genealogiae deorum gentilium, ed. Vincenzo Romano (Bari, 1951) vol.II, lib.XV, cap.VI, p.761, ll.16-22. Barlaam is best known in the West as Petrarch’s Greek teacher.
CHAPTER V
BOOK XVI OF THE SUMMA

1. Object of this thesis

Thomas Hobbes\(^1\) had this to say about scholastic writings:

‘The writings of the Schoole-Divines are nothing else for the most part but insignificant trains of strange or barbarous words, or words otherwise used, than in the common use of the Latin tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and Varro, and all the Grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any man would see proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he can translate any Schoole-Divine into any of the modern tongues, as French, English, or any other copious tongue: for that which cannot in most of these be Intelligible, is not Intelligible in the Latine. Which insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false Philosophy; yet it hath a quality, not only to hide the Truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.’

While this might be considered an extreme judgment, it can produce a sympathetic response from a modern student trying to cope with a medieval manuscript of the scholastic period, due to the difficulty of the manuscript and the complexity of the content.

My object in writing this thesis was to provide a transcription, translation and a commentary on Book XVI of FitzRalph’s *Summa*. In this I was encouraged by the presence in the Library of Trinity College Dublin of two complete codices. As a basis for my task I had hoped to make use of some existing translation, at least in

manuscript form, of some acceptable Latin text. It turned out that neither a translation
nor an acceptable Latin text existed and I set about producing such a text and
translation.

2. Methodology

In handling this task, I selected from the 37 complete or substantially complete MSS
the six listed and described in my chapters VII and IX and worked on them using
microfilms. The two in the Trinity College Dublin Library were an obvious choice.
The two MSS in English libraries were chosen for their English provenance, relating
as they did to a work produced in England. The Krakow MS and that from the
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana were chosen on the advice of Dr. Katherine Walsh
as being among the better MSS. I hoped that these six MSS would form a reasonable
cross-section of the total range of MSS, and that from these, along with the printed
edition produced by Johannes Sudoris in 1511, it would be feasible to produce a
satisfactory sample edition. To produce a critical edition from the 37 complete MSS
would be obviously beyond the scope of a M.Litt. thesis. The six chosen MSS and
the printed edition have been carefully collated, and all significant readings have been
registered in the apparatus, in order to establish as far as possible a coherent and
intelligible text of this difficult and turgid medieval treatise.²

²The microfilm of MS 1599 was obtained from Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Krakow, with
difficulty and after some delay; the best it could provide was of poor quality.
Some specific features of my methodology should be mentioned:

(a) I have retained the medieval spelling of the c for the t (e.g. racio), and the e for the diphthong ae and oe (e.g. celum).

(b) Punctuation has caused some difficulty. Five of the six manuscripts and the printed edition are almost completely unpunctuated. The sixth, MS 158 in Lambeth Palace Library, is more fully punctuated. I have used a modest amount of punctuation in transcribing the Latin text, encouraged by observing that in modern editions of early and medieval manuscripts it has become normal to punctuate freely, while paying due attention to the differences between the Latin syntax and the English syntax.

(c) Abbreviations. All six manuscripts and the printed edition contain many abbreviations and these have been expanded. Any significant differences have been recorded in the apparatus.

(d) In the translation of biblical quotations I have used the Douay text.

(e) FitzRalph’s sources. Apart from his biblical quotations which have been noted and which except for some minor variations are based on the Vulgate with which he would have been perfectly familiar, it is not possible definitely to identify FitzRalph’s sources. He refers to Aristotle in a number of places in chapters 6, 8 and 10, and the question arises where he got those references. In Oxford a variety of translations, glosses and commentaries on Aristotle’s works had been circulating for a century or more up to FitzRalph’s time, and

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they included some bad translations from Greek or Arabic sources. However, the work of two outstanding translators must have been available. One was Robert Grosseteste (1175-1253) who was largely responsible for introducing the new Aristotle to the Oxford schools.\(^4\) Aided by assistants, he translated the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics between 1240 and 1249, and he promoted better translations of the Aristotelian treatises already in use. The other was William of Moerbeke\(^5\) (1215-1286), a contemporary and intimate of Aquinas, for whom he made a number of translations from the Greek. He was the most eminent and prolific translator of the thirteenth century. He revised earlier translations of Aristotle and added a number of translations of his own, giving scholars a careful literal version of virtually the whole Aristotelian corpus. These became the standard texts of Aristotle up to and beyond the Renaissance. All of his versions are published in *Aristoteles Latinus*.\(^6\) In addition to his work on translations, he was an enthusiastic promoter of union between the Greek and Latin Churches and, as a personal adviser to Gregory


X, participated in the Council of Lyons in 1274. FitzRalph’s Aristotelian references are probably from either Grosseteste or William of Moerbeke.

3. The theme of Book XVI

Perhaps the best way to describe the main theme of Book XVI is to say that in it FitzRalph, who as a Christian theologian accepted God’s omniscience and omnipotence, put forward a philosophical justification for the existence along with these of the contingency of created things and of human free will.7 The three Books XV-XVII have only a loose connection with the rest of the Summa and have no apparent relevance to the differences between the Latin Church and the Armenian and Greek Churches, which form the main subject of the work as a whole. The three Books in fact deal with problems which FitzRalph had examined in his Commentary on the Sentences some twenty years before. Walsh8 suggests that FitzRalph inserted these three Books so as to round off his work by attacking the enemies of orthodox Western Christianity, especially the moderni of the modern schools, whom he does not identify. These, she thinks, were the supporters of Bradwardine’s extreme predestinarianism. The evidence on which she constructs this theory is a remark in chapter 2 of Book XV: ‘soli vos moderni juvenes estis docti’ (only you youngsters of today know it all). Both in the Commentary and in these three Books he deals with God’s omniscience, future contingents and human free will. The coincidence between

8FitzRalph, pp.165-66.
this section and the Commentary is reinforced by its style. In the first fourteen Books he raises questions and disposes of them by reference to authority, but in Books XV-XVII he deals with their subject matter in scholastic language and method, using highly complex and subtle argumentation. His Latin is of high quality and very correct, but the text is often repetitive and not entirely logical, and the meaning is sometimes so obscure as to be opaque. I have found it necessary to include a precis of the 24 chapters so as to make the text more intelligible and his reasoning somewhat clearer.

4. Bradwardine and the Pelagians

The questions of predestination, future contingents, divine omniscience and foreknowledge and how to reconcile these with man’s free will were the subjects of lively debate among the Oxford masters and students in FitzRalph’s time there. J.A. Robson records\(^9\) that ‘there was propounded every extreme, from absolute scepticism to absolute fideism, from absolute free will to rigid predestinarianism, and from the natural and inalienable goodness of human nature to the total depravity of all men unsanctified by the gratuitous gift of grace.’ One extreme was the utter determinism and predestinarianism expressed by Thomas Bradwardine\(^10\) in his *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*, and the other extreme comprised the views of William of Ockham and his followers to whom Bradwardine attached the epithet ‘*Pelagii moderni*’. Both

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were active at Oxford when FitzRalph was a student and teacher and they were the most eminent and influential intellects of their day there.

Bradwardine (c.1290-1349), a fellow of Balliol (1321-23) and later (1323-35) of Merton, was a mathematician and astronomer of the highest repute, who abandoned these pursuits for theology, where he attained equal distinction. While still a fellow of Merton, he delivered a series of theological lectures (perhaps these were the lectures on the Sentences which he delivered in 1332-33) which he afterwards expanded into *De Causa Dei*, published in 1344. According to him, the whole church in his day had become deeply infected with Pelagianism. 'I myself', he records, 'was once so foolish and vain when I first applied myself to the study of Philosophy as to be seduced by this error. In the schools of the philosophers I scarcely heard a word said about grace, but we were continually told we were the masters of our own free actions, and that it was in our own power to do well or ill.'\(^1\) He tried to prove that human actions were totally devoid of merit: human nature, he maintained, was absolutely incapable of conquering temptation without divine grace, which was the free and unmerited gift of God. God\(^2\) had immutably ordained all that came about, with His will as the instrument in attaining his decrees, and leaving no autonomy or self-direction to men.

The original Pelagian heresy of the late fourth and early fifth centuries was one in which Pelagius denied the existence of original sin. He asserted that man could

\(^{11}\) D.N.B. II, p.1097.

achieve righteousness by his own efforts without the need of divine grace. The human will, he said, was completely free to do good or evil; grace was given in proportion to one’s merits and its purpose was merely to facilitate what the will could do by itself. He denied or explained away predestination. St. Augustine was the leader of resistance to the Pelagian heresy. He emphasized the weakness of man’s will as the result of original sin and the continuous need for grace which was the gratuitous gift of God. God alone was the cause of every movement towards good. He also developed a rigorous view of predestination with the elect chosen ‘before the foundation of the world”.

5. William of Ockham

Bradwardine adopted and developed the Augustinian opposition to what he considered the revival of Pelagianism. The target at which he aimed in particular was William of Ockham (1290-1349). A Franciscan, Ockham lectured on the Sentences at Oxford from 1317 to 1319, and thereafter till 1324 he spent his time in study and writing. He was a brilliant logician and metaphysician whose name is inseparably linked with the revival of nominalism and, in the minds of generations of undergraduates, with Ockham’s razor (the principle of economy). The full details of his theological views need not be set out here, other than to say that they were anathema to conservative

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masters, one of whom--Luttrell, former Chancellor of the University--arrived in Avignon in 1323 with a list of 56 propositions from Ockham's lectures on the Sentences which he wished to have condemned as 'doctrina pestifera' and the first five of which he specifically labelled Pelagian. Ockham was summoned to Avignon to answer the charges; the commission set up to examine the matter never came to a conclusion since before it could do so Ockham himself fled to start a new career as a polemicist. He lived in Munich along with Michael of Cesena\textsuperscript{15} and Marsilius of Padua,\textsuperscript{16} under the protection of Ludwig of Bavaria who was in dispute with the pope regarding the validity of his coronation as emperor in 1327. Ockham supported the emperor's stance and denounced the papal aggression and absolutism. He wrote also extensively against the papal condemnation of his fellow Franciscans' views on poverty, and for good measure he attacked John XXII's views on the beatific vision. He continued his anti-papal writings against John XXII's successors. However, after Ludwig's death in 1347, he made his peace with the papacy and died in 1349.

What must have particularly outraged Bradwardine was one aspect of Ockham's theology, namely his use of the concept of God's \textit{potentia absoluta}, whereby He could override His \textit{potentia ordinata}, that is the moral order actually established by God: so that, for instance, 'God could mislead, that Christ could be misled, that revelation could falsify, that the mortal sinner could be loved more than the man in


\textsuperscript{16}cf. p.74 n4.

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grace, that there was no inherent evil in one or goodness in the other, that God could order a man to hate him, that grace and mortal sin could co-exist. There could be no meeting of minds between the two opponents if this was accepted as a valid expression of the Ockhamist view of the liberty of man. On another aspect of Ockham's teachings, namely on God's foreknowledge of future contingents, it is possible to put forward a more benign interpretation, less in conflict with Bradwardine. The Christian faith requires that God knows all things--past, present and future--and therefore according to Bradwardine God knows every future decision and act of human beings; and since God cannot be deceived, it follows that what He knows will happen is inevitable. The Ockhamists accepted God's certain foreknowledge of future events; but to preserve the freedom of the human will and the genuine contingency of future events dependent on human choice, they would argue that propositions regarding such events are contingent, that God knows their truth or falsehood not by a knowledge that necessitates the events known, but by a knowledge that mirrors the outcome of human choice; that God knows what man will freely choose and knows these choices as determined by free will and not as predetermined by the divine will.

6. FitzRalph's position in Bradwardine-Ockham controversy

The precis which I have prepared as chapter VIII is of help in summarizing where FitzRalph stands in Book XVI on the issues raised in this controversy. He does not


discuss directly the question of divine grace which is so important to both Bradwardine and Ockham. He accepts predestination to a moderate degree. He uses his interlocutor Iohannes to put forward the views of Bradwardine in order to refute them. Even a cursory examination of the text shows that for Iohannes we could substitute Bradwardine, without being too far off the mark. In the various arguments which Iohannes is shown as proposing, he makes the case that the divine foreknowledge and the divine will carry with them the inevitability of everything foreknown or willed by God. The whole idea of contingency in human acts is a contradiction in terms. Since God knows all future things and His knowledge cannot be led astray, everything foreknown by Him will necessarily happen. Even if we were to accept that His foreknowledge is not the cause of things' inevitability, His will is another thing altogether. If it were possible for what God willed to be frustrated by His creature (and the will of God cannot be resisted), this would show His will to be weak and therefore not omnipotent, which is impossible.

Ricardus (FitzRalph) begins by repeating his defence of the authority of scripture (a main feature of the earlier Books) against the suggestion that it could deceive, and he defends Christ and the authors of the scriptures against the possibility of lying and sinning if what they foretold did not in fact occur. But his main objective is to defend the concept of free will, on which he feels most intensely, and the existence of contingencies in that all future things are contingent with God. Even those things that

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19 The Summa is in the form of a dialogue; FitzRalph explains in the concluding lines of his dedicatory letter that Iohannes, his favourite pupil, has been chosen to act as objector and FitzRalph (Ricardus) to play role of respondent.
we call necessary (natural phenomena such as the succession of days) or the resurrection of the dead and the last judgment preached by Christ can be prevented by Him. God's foreknowledge is not the cause of things, nor does it confer or imply inevitability. In fact, His omnipotence requires the existence or at least the possibility of contingents, otherwise it would not be omnipotent. Along, he says, with the divine will and its strength, there is the contingency of human acts. On the other hand, free human choice and free human action can cause God to act in a particular way in, for instance, punishing or rewarding. The divine will requires the possibility for the creature of preventing the occurrence of contingents, for this is what it means to be a contingent creature. God's will, it is true, cannot be resisted, but only in the sense that whether a thing happens or not the divine will is always fulfilled. In this way the existence of contingents implies no weakness on the part of God.

While the whole tenor of FitzRalph's argument is the defence of free will, he uses the actual term *libertas contradiccionis* sparingly. In chapter 13 (lines 21-22 of my Latin text) he refers to the existence of free will in David (in the same chapter he freely uses the terms *opcio, eleccio* and *eligere*). In chapter 16 he mentions (in lines 59-60 of my Latin text) that God produced the world by free will. In chapter 19 he refers in lines 44-45 to human acts which from free will we properly call free. Finally, in chapter 22 line 19 he says that God has free will to act.

While he has Iohannes quoting scripture to suit his purpose, Ricardus himself is astute in his use of the Old Testament. In chapter 13 all the cases he cites are practical examples illustrating the use of free choice by David, Solomon and the Jewish people.
My judgement of FitzRalph’s position is that his pursuit of the twin themes of the
contingency of human acts and human free will puts him firmly in the class of those
whom Bradwardine would label Pelagian or at least semi-Pelagian.

7. FitzRalph as philosopher and theologian

A final judgement on FitzRalph as a philosopher and theologian is difficult to make
in the absence of complete editions of his principal works. It is a matter for some
surprise that the *Summa* is the only one of them which has been edited, and that in
a very unsatisfactory form. The potential value to the world of scholarship of a
complete edition of the *Summa* would be substantial. It would help to consolidate
FitzRalph’s position as one of the leading figures of his day and would add further
to our knowledge of the relations between the Western church and the Armenians and
Greeks which remain an unresolved question to this day. It would place my partial
edition in its proper context and would enable a reader of it to evaluate the magnitude
of the task of editing the *Summa* as a whole. After a lapse of 600 years, it is perhaps
optimistic to hope that his *De Pauperie Salvatoris* would also be issued as a complete
edition. R.L. Poole has printed the first four Books as an appendix to his edition of
*De Dominio Divino*, but only as an introduction to Wyclif’s doctrine of lordship. The
other three Books which he did not consider relevant to his purpose have been studied
only in the two unpublished doctoral theses of R.O. Brock and Helen Hughes. It is
ture that the controversy about the position of the mendicants, of which *De Pauperie
Salvatoris* is the classical expression, has long since been laid to rest, but the work
remains an important record of this serious dispute between the two branches of the
clergy and deserves a serious treatment. This treatment should be the easier because of the work that Poole, Brock and Hughes have put into it.

All these works by FitzRalph are the products of a major scholar, administrator and controversialist and reflect many of the issues which the scholars of his day were debating. As such, they deserve to be dealt with in a manner respecting the status and reputation of FitzRalph.
1. **Genesis of doctrine and FitzRalph’s use of it**

FitzRalph’s doctrine of dominion and grace is the main philosophical foundation of his *De Pauperie Salvatoris*. The question was touched on briefly in Book X, chapter 4 of the *Summa*:

> 'so far as I can judge no man in the state of mortal sin has true lordship over other creatures in God’s sight. He ought rather be called a tyrant, a thief or a robber, though he may keep the name of king or prince or lord, by reason of possession or hereditary succession, or the approval of the people who are subject to him, or by some other human law. But he has no true lordship until he repents, and until the grace of penance has restored him to a state that is acceptable to God.'

FitzRalph did not develop this theory further at the time. The genesis of it was already to be found in *De Ecclesiastica Potestate*, written by Aegidius Romanus\(^2\) (Giles of Rome) in 1302. William of Cremona,\(^3\) when Prior-General of the Augustinians, employed Aegidius’ doctrine in defence of the papal *potestas directa in temporalia* against Marsilius of Padua and other supporters of Ludwig of Bavaria.

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\(^1\) *FitzRalph*, p.380.


\(^3\) cf. Wilks, p.558; *N.C.E.* 14, p.924; *L.MA.9*, col.170.
Marsilius⁴ (c.1280-1342) was the author of *Defensor Pacis* which attacked the whole theory of papal supremacy and of any hierarchical structure in the church. As Prior-General William was regularly in Avignon in the years 1326-52 and must have influenced FitzRalph to use the doctrine of dominion by grace which FitzRalph spent so many of his later years defending.⁵ According to this theory all earthly lordship was founded on God’s grace to the individual soul, and the sinner consequently lost any right to dominion in the eyes of God even if his rights were recognized by the civil courts. In other words there was a difference between legal rights enforceable in the courts and those which had moral justification before God. In this he may have been influenced by the situation which he denounced in Ireland when, especially after the Black Death, goods and land were seized on a legal pretext from the rightful owners in violation of conscience and the law of God. Such transfers, though sanctioned by the civil courts, did not truly transfer lordship. FitzRalph was here propounding a theory of the dominion of the just, a divinely approved title which could not be implemented because it lacked validity in civil law.⁶ It was also quite impracticable, as Betts the Marxist historian has pointed out, in that the title to the valid exercise of civil and ecclesiastical office and authority as well as to the enjoyment of property would be entirely subjective, i.e. dependent on being in a state of grace; the result would be a state of universal uncertainty in the whole of society.⁷

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⁵*FitzRalph*, p.164.

⁶ibid. p.286-87.

Both Aegidius and FitzRalph were fortunate that they were not called on to apply their theory in a practical situation.

While it was clear from R.L. Poole's edition of Wyclif's *De Dominio Divino*, with the first four books of *De Pauperie Salvatoris* attached as an appendix, that Wyclif had borrowed his theory of dominion from FitzRalph, Aubrey Gwynn was the first to trace the theory farther back to Aegidius, who used it in support of the spiritual and temporal power of the papacy. Aegidius could not have foreseen, nor could FitzRalph, that this doctrine, intended to support the claims of the papal monarchy, would be used three generations later by Wyclif to attack the papal jurisdiction and the institutional church. Only later, in 1949, did Gwynn learn from W. Ullmann that the basis of Aegidius' theory had been devised much earlier by the English or Welsh canonist Alanus in the time of Innocent III. When in 1350 FitzRalph spoke on behalf of the secular clergy in opposition to the mendicants' privileges, these did not concern ownership but the right to preach, hear confessions and bury the dead. It was, Gwynn says, by an unhappy chance that in settling down to a serious study of the matter he thought that he might clear his own mind by the application of the curialist theory (concerned with papal supremacy) to this entirely different controversy. Alanus and his fellow curialists wanted a principle that would enable them to argue that temporal authority had no validity without the sanction of the spiritual power—and also to

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9 Gwynn, *English Austin Friars*, pp.35-73; *FitzRalph*, pp.381-83.

justify the confiscation of the property of condemned heretics, defining heresy as a just cause for withdrawing ownership. Gwynn adds that FitzRalph’s thought suffers from the confusion arising from the unsuitable use of this theory of temporal and spiritual authority. Wyclif, as a young student of theology when *De Pauperie Salvatoris* first arrived in Oxford in 1356, absorbed the theory and used it in his later treatises for a purpose quite different from that intended by FitzRalph. It was an excellent example, Gwynn concluded, of the harm that can be done by wrong-headed theology.11

2. John Wyclif

In 1613 Bellarmine warned against FitzRalph’s errors, linking him with ‘the pernicious teaching of John Wyclif’. Bellarmine was quite right in that the individual thinker whom FitzRalph most strongly influenced was Wyclif.12

John Wyclif13 (c.1330-84) was a major figure as a theologian, an advocate of ecclesiastical reform and, in the eyes of the church authorities, a notorious heretic. Educated at Oxford, he received his doctorate fairly late, in 1372. He was among the most able of the Oxford teachers of the day when he was working as a scholar among scholars and his logical, philosophical and early theological writings were all


12FitzRalph, p.462.

completed by 1372. He openly stated that FitzRalph and Bradwardine were the two Oxford doctors of the previous generation to whom he owed most of his intellectual formation, as indeed did many other students by whom the *Summa* and Bradwardine’s *De Causa Dei* were the works most frequently cited. For him the *Summa* was the authority on free will, necessity and contingency and *De Causa Dei* the authority on predestination. When he turned later to write on ecclesiastical government he began to explore the implications of the doctrine of dominion and grace. About 1372 he was encouraged by John of Gaunt to join the royal service, for which he carried out a number of missions, and at the same time he became very active as a writer on a variety of subjects which got him into deep trouble with the ecclesiastical establishment. Firstly, by 1376 he had completed two major works—*De Dominio Divino* and *De Civili Dominio*; then by 1378 he had written *De Veritate Scripture*, defending the literal inspiration of the Bible and demanding that it be placed freely in the hands of the laity, and *De Officio Regis*, imposing on temporal rulers the duty of reforming the Church. In 1379 came *De Eucharistia* denying transubstantiation and *De Potestate Papae* which denied that the authority of Rome had scriptural justification. As if that were not enough, in later tracts he equated the pope with anti-Christ and welcomed the Great Schism which began in 1378 as leading to the destruction of the papal monarchy in the Church. Is it any wonder that he was attacked as heretical? There were several abortive attempts to silence him. Finally William Courtenay, an old opponent of his, became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1382 and, determined to root out Wyclif’s teachings, presented 24 propositions from his writings to a council of bishops and theologians in London. All the propositions were condemned—10 as heretical and 14 as erroneous. However the authorities
allowed him to live out his remaining two years in peace and only many years later were his bones dug up and scattered, after his writings had been condemned by the Council of Constance.

3. FitzRalph, Wyclif, Lollardy and the Bible

Wyclif is regarded as the father of Lollardy and FitzRalph as its godfather. The first Lollards consisted of a small group of Oxford scholars who supported Wyclif's views, specifically his attack on the Eucharist and on the authority of the Church but who, not long after the London council, were required to recant. The name Lollard was also extended to those who protested against the wealth, power and pride of the clergy and supported civil disorder in the form of the peasants' revolt.

One issue with which Wyclif's name is clearly linked is the translation of the Bible into English. He urged all classes to read the Bible in an English translation. One such translation was by his former secretary John Purvey. The same Purvey has a peculiar passage in which he says 'Ardmachan in the book of questions saith that the sacrament may well be made in each common language, for so he saith did the apostles.' The reference here is to Book IX of the Summa, which discusses 'that question raised by the Armenians according to holy scripture, whether namely any definite form of words is necessary for the consecration of the body and blood of Christ, and what that form is....No Christian doubts that the sacrament may be made as well in one tongue as in another, since the apostles did this, and since they handed on the tradition of doing this....Since the synoptists related different forms of the words of consecration, it is clear that no set

14 N. C. E. 14, pp. 1050-52.
form of words is needed but a certain intention, thus the sacraments may as well be consecrated in one tongue as in another.\textsuperscript{15}

Just as the apostles spoke in diverst tongues, so there was no reason why the modern followers should not do the same and have their Bible in English. This is an example of how FitzRalph, a conservative orthodox theologian, could take an adventurous and controversial attitude.

4. Wyclif and Hus

While Wyclif's writings did not arrive in Prague until the late 1370s, FitzRalph's views on dominion were available in Bohemia as early as 1366\textsuperscript{16} in the earliest extant copy of \textit{De Pauperie Salvatoris}. The arrival of both sets of views coincided with a powerful and rapidly spreading movement for reform.\textsuperscript{17} The principal causes were the wealth and power of the Church, the extravagance and immorality of the clergy, and Rome's excessive interference in the Bohemian Church's domestic affairs. However, a few zealous individuals, supported by the emperor and the Archbishop of Prague, effectively countered the general immorality. The man who emerged as the leader of this reform and made it widely known outside Bohemia was John Hus. A brilliant student of arts and theology, he was ordained priest c.1400 and at the same time was


\textsuperscript{16}FitzRalph, pp.458-9, 471, 475; The MS, now CVP 1430, is now in Vienna.

elected Dean of the Arts Faculty in Prague University; later in his career he was elected Rector of the University. His qualities as preacher and moralist earned him many friends at all levels of society. But his preaching for the improvement of morals and against the undisciplined clergy and the evils of the Church earned him the enmity of the Church authorities. Previous reformers had been conveniently accused of heresy and this is what happened to Hus; he was accused of showing signs of heresy from the time of his ordination, especially in his views on the Eucharist and on whether a priest in mortal sin had the power to consecrate the elements validly. Both these views were drawn from Wyclif, whose writings, when they arrived in Prague (c.1377), made a powerful impression on the masters of the University. The pattern already familiar in England followed there. As early as 1403, the Chapter of the Cathedral submitted 45 articles (including the 24 already condemned at the London conference of 1382 summoned by Archbishop Courtenay) to the University for its opinion, and by some astute manoeuvres their condemnation was secured. Hus was one who did not subscribe to this condemnation and who was greatly impressed by Wyclif’s attacks on the evils of the Church. As a result, he increased his own attacks on the scandals which he observed in the Bohemian Church. This, and later his campaign against the sale of indulgences promoted by John XXIII, led to a variety of steps being taken by the opponents of Hus and the Wyclifite doctrines. The Archbishop of Prague, in 1410, (for the third time in a few years) ordered Wyclif’s works to be burned and strictly forbade them to be read or elucidated, or even Wyclif’s name to be mentioned. At the Council of Constance, called in 1414 to deal with the Great Schism and to a lesser extent with various doctrines held to be heretical or erroneous, it was clear that Hus and his doctrines would be targeted as
well as Wyclif's. Hus arrived to defend himself before the Council, having been promised by Sigismund, king of Hungary (and heir apparent to the throne of Bohemia), a safe conduct to Constance, a public hearing by the Council and a safe return home. Instead he was arrested and imprisoned in cruel conditions. Sigismund vainly attempted to have him released, but the Council refused to permit any restriction on its right to pass judgment on a heretic. When he finally appeared before the Council, Wyclif's 45 articles had added to them 260 articles condemned at Oxford in 1409, along with 42 extracts from Hus's own writings. Hus refused to retract the allegedly heretical views of which he was accused, or to join in condemning the Wyclif articles. On 6th May 1415 both the Wyclif articles and those of Hus were condemned and he was sentenced to be degraded from the priesthood and as a heretic to be handed over to the civil power. He was burned at the stake that same day.18

While the serious differences of belief, some of which Hus supported, were a factor, the real cause of his death was widely held to be the hostility of the clerical establishment to his campaign against the corruption of the Church and the immorality of the clergy. In all of this, FitzRalph played a part in that he indirectly influenced Hus through Wyclif's use of the doctrine of dominion and grace; but it would be an exaggeration to suggest that FitzRalph had a part in what became the Protestant Reformation. It was Wyclif himself, by his extension of this doctrine into an attack

on the institutional Church and by his other doctrines, who enormously influenced Hus and through him the movement for reform which ended in the Protestant Reformation.
CHAPTER VII

MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTED EDITION OF SUMMA

1. Trinity College Dublin MS 190

Vellum, ff.177, 342x242mm. (13½x9¼ ins.), in several hands, of Irish or English origin, 15th century (first half), bound in brown leather. ff.1-161v *Summa de Questionibus Armenorum*, 2 columns of 60 lines. The original f.1 is missing. The upper part of what is now f.1 has been cut away on both sides, causing some loss of text for 8 lines of the left hand column and of part of one word (auctores) on the right hand. Line 1 and part of line 2 on the left hand are illegible so that it begins: *sunt diversi* <auctores scilicet assert>ores. *Sic insuper in tercio membro ... civitas amplissima spirituum bonorum que cum patre tuo ac spiritu tuo sancto unus es deus omnipotens vivens et imperans sine fine. Amen.*

162-177v *De Pauperie Salvatoris* (excerpt), 2 columns of 57x70 lines, in a hand very similar to that of the Summa; f.162 headed in a hand other than that of the scribe: *De dominio et pauperio* (Christo added in another hand).

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2Total text lost: dedicatory letter, table of contents, chapter 1 and most of chapter 2 of Book I.

3Books I-IV have been edited by R.L. Poole as an appendix to his edition of *De Dominio Divino* (London, 1890) pp.273sqq.
Incipit: Santissimo in Christo patri at domino nostro Innocensius divina providencia sanctissimae romanæ ac universalis ecclesiae summo pontifici, sue sanctitatis humilis creatura Ricardus archiepiscopus Ardmachanus, primas Hibernie, pedum oscula beatorum...illum intelligamus.

The manuscript was formerly in the library of Archbishop Ussher.⁴ Aubrey Gwynn, in a letter of 23rd February 1937⁵ to Dr. Wyly the College Librarian, suggested that with the loss of the original f.1 there was also lost the original note of ownership. He thought that the two texts were separate in origin and were bound together before they came to the library, there being no separate library mark on 161 (his numbering) nor any separate note of ownership. Elsewhere,⁶ noting that the manuscript carried the shelfmark B.B.B.50, he quoted Dr. Smyly as saying that there was good reason to associate this curious form of triple lettering with Ussher's manuscripts.

⁴FitzRalph, p.470.
⁵attached to MS 190.
⁶Sermon Diary, pp.8-10.
2. Biblioteka Jagiellonska Krakow MS 1599

Vellum ff 184 + ii, 305x205 mm. (12x8ins.), 2 columns of 46x52 lines each.

This manuscript, copied in Paris in 1375, contains no other work than the Summa and is the earliest dated text still extant. A note on the flyleaf reads: *Iste liber est datus per magistrum Laurencium de Rathibor,*\(^8\) professorem, pro libraria magistrorum, in quo continetur Armachanus Anglicus de questionibus Armenorum seu Ruthenorum. ff. 1-184v

*Reverendis in Christo patribus Nersi Manasgerdensi ac fratri Iohanni electo Clatensi maioris armenie Ricardus Radulphi...* ending illegible on microfilm.

At the end of the autobiographical prayer on folio 184v is written in another hand:

*Explicit armachanus de questionibus armenorum scriptus et finitus per manus gherardi busonis parisiis studentis anno domini mccccxxv in vigilia petri et pauli apostolorum. orate pro eo A.M.D.G. Amen.* Underneath it another hand, which added *anglicus* to the preceding inscription, has written: *et in certis punctis et locis est hereticus et*


\(^8\)Laurentius von Ratibor (1381-1448), among the most versatile and distinguished members of University of Krakow in first half of 15th century. Matriculated 1411; Master of Arts 1416; appointed Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy 1420. Served twice as Dean of Arts faculty; elected Rector of University 1428 and served two terms. Meanwhile began study of theology, and consequently had to resign professorship, but retained his interest in scientific matters. Became Bachelor of Theology 1426; incepted as Doctor much later; appointed 1440 as one of three professors of theology. Active as adviser to Council of Basel on matters connected with reform of calendar, and may have attended its sessions. Cf. K. Walsh 'Das Wissenschaftliche Umfeld des Laurentius von Ratibor: Astronom, Mathematiker, Theologe' in *Die Anfänge des Schrifttums in Oberschlesien bis zur Frühhumanismus*, ed. G. Kosellek (Frankfurt, 1997) pp.59-84.
condemnatus et post eius mortem incineratus per ecclesiam romanam tempore Bonifacii noni.

There is finally a long 33 line entry in yet another hand still to be deciphered. Katherine Walsh has recommended this as one of the better manuscripts; however, I have had to make to with a poor microfilm, illegible in many places.

The text of Sudoris and of this manuscript follow each other closely and the same variants appear again and again in each. The two may have been copied from the same exemplar; but Sudoris was not copied from MS 1599. A comparison in Book XVI of passages omitted from each shows several cases where sections omitted from 1599 appear in Sudoris. One such example is in chapter 7 lines 93-94 (my text), where 12 words eidem...derogando are missing from 1599, but appear in Sudoris. Another example is in chapter 11 lines 55-57 (my text), where 1599 omits a total of 15 words which appear in Sudoris.

Both MS 1599 and Sudoris deviate from the other MSS in the arrangement of chapters 4 and 5 (see later, p.95).

The reference on the flyleaf to the Ruthenians suggests that the Polish clergy found the Summa useful in dealing with the Ruthenian Christians who shared many of the views of

\[ FitzRalph, \text{p.130n4 and 473-4}. \]
the Armenians. The footnote\textsuperscript{10} to the *explicit* shows that the commentator was aware that passages from the *Summa* had been condemned as heretical and burned at the papal curia under Boniface IX, for whom a copy had been ordered in 1393.

\textsuperscript{10}ibid. and *L.A.H.J.*, p.124.
3. Lambeth Palace Library London MS 158

Vellum ff. 4+181+2, 11½x8½ ins., 2 columns of 47x52 lines each, 14th century neatly and closely written. Calf binding. Each book has a decent initial in gold on red and blue. The volume is very clean and has been little used. It and New College 90 are the only two complete texts in England. On the flyleaf is the name J. Winterus.

F. 1 has at the bottom, in a hand different from that of the scribe: memoriale fratris Willelmi bruscombe magistri kii, which is probably from a Franciscan convent.

Ff. 1-175. Incipit liber Ricardi Radulphi Archiepiscopi Armachani primatis Hybernie de questionibus armenorum. Reverendis in Christo patribus Nersi archiepiscopo Manasgerdensi ac ffratri Iohanni electo Clatensi maioris armenie Ricardus Radulphi archiepiscopus Armachanus Hibernie primas per graciam sitire iusticiam donec hauriatis aquas in gaudio de fontibus salvatoris...civitas amplissima spirituum beatorum que cum patre tuo ac spiritu sancto tuo unus es deus omnipotens vivens et imperans sine fine. Amen.

ff. 175-180v. Alphabetical index.

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12FitzRalph, p. 470.
J.R. Zenner\(^{13}\) (having criticised the printed edition of Johannes Sudoris) has an interesting comment:

'It was a great pleasure to find recorded in the manuscript catalogue\(^{14}\) of the Lambeth Library a parchment manuscript of the Summa Contra Armenos. To judge by the writing it belongs to the 14th century but the catalogue transfers it erroneously to the 13th. The rich production with painted, in part gilded, initials witnesses to the value that in the preparation was placed on the work. It could well be a gift from the Armachanus to an old friend in Oxford or to his colleague in London.'

\(^{13}\)Z.K.T. 15 (1891) p.351.

4. New College Library Oxford MS 90

Vellum ii + 276, 15 1/2 x 9 3/4 ins., of English origin, 14th century, 2 columns of 59 x 60 lines each, *bene exaratus et servatus*: formerly owned by William Aiscough, bishop of Salisbury\(^{15}\) (1437-50).

On back of flyleaf ii: *Volumen domini W. Sarum episcopi*

Ff.1-124: *Sermo venerabilis in Christo patris ac domini Richardi, divina permissione quondam primatis Hibernie, Archiepiscopi Armachensis, habitus in vulgari...fuit admonitus ter et fiebat finis cum indulgencia solita est.*

In another hand is inscribed: *Expliciunt Sermones domini Armachani tam de temporali quam de Sanctis, quasi per totum annum cum aliis materiis propositis coram papa contra fratres mendicantes in causa ecclesie.*

Ff.125-276v. *Reverendis in Christo patribus Nersi, archiepiscopo Manasgerdensi ac fratri Iohanni electo Clatensi maioris armenie, Ricardus Radulphi Archiepiscopus Armachanus Hibernie primas per graciam sitire iusticiam, donec hauriant aquas in gaudio de fontibus salvatoris ... civitas amplissima spirituum bonorum que cum patre tuo ac spiritu tuo sancto unus es deus omnipotens vivens et regnans sine fine. Amen*

Helen Hughes, who supplied the dimensions of the manuscript and the dates of Aiscough’s episcopate, describes the beautifully-illuminated initials, especially on folio 125 which begins with an elaborate capital. Aubrey Gwynn mentions that the manuscript seems to have been written originally for Richard Scrope, Archbishop of York (1398-1405) whose arms are worked into the initial letter of folio 1 and repeated on folio 125 in the initial letter of the Summa.

Coxe describes the Summa erroneously as libris viginti comprehensa and also dates the printed version 1612.

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17Sermon Diary, pp.8-10.
5. Trinity College Library Dublin MS 189

Vellum, ff.i+224, 358x232mm. (14x9ins.), of English or Irish origin, 15th century (first half), 2 columns of 69x70 lines each, in several hands; bound in brown leather.

f.i is a modern flyleaf with a note in English on the reverse in the hand of Sir Robert Cotton the famous antiquary: This Book containeth treatises mad by Richard Archbishop of Armagh in Ireland A famous learned man in the raigne of King Edw the third.

f.1 headed Ricardus Armachanus de Questionibus Armenorum with, underneath, in Cotton's hand: et altera opera eiusdem Archiepiscopi; another hand deleted et altera.

ff.1-173. Incipit liber Ricardi Radulphi archiepiscopi armachani hibernie primatis de questionibus armenorum. <R>Everendis in Christo patribus Nerfi archiepiscopi Manasgerdensi ac fratri Iohanni electo ... civitas amplissima spirituum beatorum que cum patre tuo ac spiritu sancto unus es deus vivens et imperans sine fine. Amen.

173rv has a 17th century list of contents.

174-224 Henricus Gandauensis (Henry of Ghent) Summa Theologica (excerpt). Two

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18Colker, pp.367-68.
19D.N.B. IV, pp.1233-1240.
columns of 55 lines in a single legible hand, headed in a hand different from that of the scribe: Iohannes Gandau and (on right) Iohannes Gandaui <E>Xpedito usque huc a liii articulo de pertinentibus in divinis ad relaciones proprias et racionales...sub racione proprietatis venam illarum.

Aubrey Gwynn, in a letter of 9th February 1937 attached to the MS, dated it to late XIVs. or more probably XVs. and identified the second text and its authorship. The Savile catalogue21 dates it ss.XIV-XV. It belonged to Henry Savile of Banke near Halifax (1568-1617) (cf Savile cat.no.34). W.O’Sullivan22 records that the antiquarianism of the 17th century was nourished on an abundance of medieval manuscripts from the wreckage of the monasteries. Ussher was collecting within a century of their dissolution and was in a strong position to acquire the large number of manuscripts which form the core of his collection. The largest source of them now identifiable seems to have been Savile’s library from which some 30-40 were acquired by Ussher when that library was sold after Savile’s death, and left by Ussher to Trinity College. Cotton’s library contained the finest collection of manuscripts in England, which became one of the foundation collections of the British Museum. He was a friend (Webb calls him an intimate23) of Ussher, to whom he freely lent books and manuscripts and from whom he also was a recipient. The inscription in Cotton’s hand on MS189 suggests that it could have come originally from him to Savile and thence to Ussher.


Vellum ff.169+2, 345x216mm. (13½x8½ins.), 50x54 lines of 14-18 words each, in an ornate hand with many flourishes. Book numbers shown at tops of pages and chapter numbers in margins. Initial letter of f.1 decorated in gold and various colours; beginnings of Books, of many chapters and of names of participants Ricardus and Iohannes in capitals.

F.1 Incipit liber armechani (and in another hand) de questionibus Armenorum. Reverendis in Christo patribus Neysi archiepiscopo Manasgerdensi ac fratri Iohanni electo Clatensi

maioris armenie Ricardus Radulphi archiepiscopus Armachani Hibernie primas per graciam sitire donec hauriant aquas in gaudio de fontibus salvatoris...in toto et in parte committo. After a list of the subject matter of the 19 Books and an explanation of the dialogue method adopted, the dedicatory letter ends (f 1v): Vos igitur reverendi patres opus accipite quod petistis oracionis si placet mercedem michi pro labore pensantes hoc opus incipit: Iohannes quia ex litterali sensu scripture sacre. The autobiographical prayer which forms the last chapter (35) of Book XIX ends: civitas amplissima beatorum que cum patre tuo ac spiritu tuo sancto unus es deus vivens et imperans sine fine. Amen.

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An inscription added at the end shows that it was written and completed in Perugia on 14th April 1393 by John Daniel of Antwerp, clericus, of the diocese of Cambrai. The back of the cover shows the arms of Pius VI and of the librarian Cardinal F.X. de Zelada. This copy was ordered for the papal library in view of the reservations about FitzRalph’s canonization process.\textsuperscript{26} The library has three other copies, all later acquisitions.\textsuperscript{27}

The Vatican catalogue describes the text of Books XV and XVI as \textit{lacunosus}. The lacunae are of two kinds. The first is where a word has been omitted or unfinished and a blank space left. The MS seems to have been copied from an exemplar written in double columns, as are all the other MSS examined; the blanks could be due to words being abraded at the margins of the exemplar and therefore illegible. There are 26 such blank spaces in Book XVI. The second kind of omission is per homoeoteleuton, where the scribe’s eye skips from a word on one column-line on the exemplar to a similar or identical word on a later column-line, resulting in the omission of one or more lines (a line being taken as about 7 words). There are 42 such cases in Book XVI. An example of this is on f.133v line 24 of MS (chapter 2 lines 50-52 my text) where after \textit{cognicionem} there are omitted 22 words or 3 lines also ending in \textit{cognicionem}. These lines appear in all the other MSS examined.

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{L.A.H.J.}, p.124 n.83.

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Codices Vaticani Latini}, II, ed. A. Pelzer (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1931) pp.541-544. One of them (Vat. Lat. 1035) was bought in Paris by Juan (later Cardinal) de Torquemada (1388-1462) when a theology student there. He took part in the Councils of Basel (1431-37) and Ferrara-Florence (1437-49) which discussed the reunification of the Eastern churches with Rome, and to which the \textit{Summa} was particularly relevant.
Johannes Sudoros printed edition of 1511

The only printed edition was produced by Jehan Petit, bookseller to the University of Paris, under a privilege issued by Louis XII on March 12th 1511. Added to it were four celebrated anti-mendicant sermons preached by FitzRalph at St. Paul’s Cross in London in 1356-57. The title-page describes the work as: *Summa Domini Armacani in Questionibus Armenorum noviter impressa et Correcta a magistro nostro Johanne Sudoris Cum aliquibus sermonibus eiusdem de Christi dominio*. Sudoris is identified in the prologue to the printed text: *Incipit summa domini ricardi radulphi archiepiscopi armachani totius hybernie primatis de erroribus armenorun correcta ac emendata a iohanne sudoris caletibescensi diocesis rothomagensis sacre militie doctore meritissimo gymnasi regalis navarre quondam bursario theolo*. James Farge lists him as Jean Le Sueur of the diocese of Coutances in the Archdiocese of Rouen, a teacher at the College de Navarre in Paris, where he had been made a bursarius theologus in 1507. This is his only publication. The work is dedicated to Guillermus Le Gras, dean of the cathedral in Rouen, whose pupil Sudoris had been. In the dedication he mentions the immense labour (*ingenti labore*) with which he produced the work. Appended to it is a set of complimentary verses containing many plays on the name *sudoris* (sweat) and attributed by Farge to Louis Lassere, the paranymph (orator) of 1512. The date of publication is

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usually given as 1512 but Katherine Walsh\textsuperscript{29} and others show it as 1511. Tanner\textsuperscript{30} mentions a second edition of 1612; but Zenner\textsuperscript{31} questioned this, saying that the British Museum and the Bodleian had only that of 1512. After the end of the text there is a further dedicatory message to \textit{iacobo hommet divi vvamdregisilli abbati} (of St. Wandrille de Fontenelle,\textsuperscript{32} founded 648 by St. Wandregisilus), from Sudoris as his pupil.

The text of Sudoris is heavily criticised by Zenner, Aubrey Gwynn and Katherine Walsh. Gwynn, in his letter of 23rd February 1937 attached to MS 190, says that it is almost useless owing to the large number of printer’s errors. Walsh\textsuperscript{33} describes it as a particularly bad specimen of early printing (and elsewhere as notoriously deficient); frequently it is possible to glean no more from the printed page than the general sense of the original text. Zenner writes that a comparison with Hody’s\textsuperscript{34} citations does not speak favourably for the immense effort which Sudoris claims to have put into his task, and is a bitter irony on the complimentary couplets to the editor, in a play on his name, which are attached to the preface. Almost on every page, he says, foolish misunderstandings, looseness of thought, the lack of any punctuation except for a full stop at the end of a chapter (and even this sometimes lacking), the frequent use of badly

\begin{footnotes}
\item[29] FitzRalph, p.130; D.N.B. VII, p.195; Poole, \textit{De Dominiio Divino}, p.xxxvi; L.MA.4, cols. 506-7.
\item[31] Z.K.T., pp.349-51.
\item[32] N.C.E., 14, p.997.
\item[33] FitzRalph, p.130; K. Walsh ‘Preaching and Pastoral Care’, p.257.
\item[34] H. Hody, \textit{De Bibliorum Textibus Originalibus} IV (Oxford, 1705) pp.295sqq.
\end{footnotes}
produced abbreviations and the small, narrow, gothic type make the edition quite
difficult, unpalatable and scarcely usable.

On the evidence of Book XVI these are unkind judgments. Of the two MSS which
Katherine Walsh describes as among the better ones (Krakow MS 1599 and MS Vat. Lat.
1033), Sudoris follows very closely the text of MS 1599, the two having apparently been
copied from the same exemplar; and it compares favourably with MS 1033 which has
numerous gaps and omissions and which the Vatican catalogue calls *lacunosus*.35

Sudoris and MS 1599 deviate from the rest of the MSS in that they end chapter 4 at line
57 (my Latin text), and embody lines 58-72 in chapter 5. This is possibly the correct
arrangement, but I have followed the majority. Sudoris also goes astray in his numbering
of the chapters. Although he says in his Tabula that there are 24 chapters and gives the
contents of each, he ends up with 22 by (a) running 13 and 14 together and (b) by
running 21 and 22 together. MS 1599 does not make this mistake.

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35 *Codices Vaticani Latini*, p.542.
CHAPTER VIII

BOOK XVI--PRECIS CHAPTERS 1 TO 24

The *Summa*, like many medieval treatises, is set in the form of a dialogue, in this case between RICARDUS and IOHANNES. Book XVI is divided into 24 chapters, the content of which may be summarised as follows.

**CHAPTER 1** deals with an objection raised in previous Book regarding the infallibility of scripture. RICARDUS discusses the concepts of necessity, impossibility and contingency and the sense in which the infallibility of scripture is to be understood. He justifies acceptance of the authority of scripture as infallible in relation to future contingents, even if in fact they do not take place; in such a case the writers of scripture are excused from possible falsehood or deception. He emphasises God's power to arrange that those things foretold infallibly in scripture do not in fact take place.

**CHAPTER 2** - IOHANNES claims it is possible that Christ may in the scriptures have spoken falsehood and therefore lied and sinned. RICARDUS admits that he has been troubled about this since his earliest studies and still has not heard the answer. However, he points out that a lie does not exist without speaking against one's conscience and with the intention of deceiving; and with Christ this is impossible. He accepts the possibility that the things that Christ foretold might not be true. But he reminds IOHANNES that whereas the Master of the Sentences and others held that Christ in his human soul knew all that God knew, the evidence of scripture is that he spoke with acquired knowledge.
within the limitations of his human nature and not with divine knowledge. He adds that scripture is infallible in that it never deceives, although in principle it is possible for it to deceive.

CHAPTER 3 - RICARDUS asks IOHANNES what further he has to say against the contingent nature of future things. IOHANNES says that God foreknows all things; but if some things are not necessary they might not happen, and therefore would not be foreknown by Him; thus divine knowledge would be changeable like ours and would be fallible. But because God's foreknowledge cannot be misled, everything foreknown by Him will inevitably happen. RICARDUS replies that all future things are contingent with God, who can prevent them from happening. God is eternal light and a perfect mirror in which everything material or spiritual, actual or possible, is reflected insofar as it exists. If a thing that could happen did not happen, it would simply not be reflected in or affect that divine changeless mirror, which cannot be misled.

CHAPTER 4 IOHANNES objects that, although the blessed and the angels see all things intuitively in the perfect mirror which is God, they could be deceived - and equally so could God - if what they foresaw did not come about. The claim that things foreknown can be contingent can lead to other absurdities. RICARDUS replies that these difficulties apply equally to necessaries, as God can prevent them also from happening. The difficulties are not removed by claiming that a creature, namely Christ's soul or another soul, can see all things intuitively in the divine Word. In the particular case of Christ who foretold his passion, the question arises whether he really knew or willed it, and whether it might actually not happen. These difficulties are removed if we accept that no
creature can intuitively see the future, but only an infinite power. IOHANNES accepts that God’s foreknowledge as such does not confer inevitability on things, and specifically on things which depend on our will. God could know contingent things as contingent, and they could happen contingently because foreknown as contingent. Thus God’s foreknowledge is just as consistently applied to contingents as to necessaries.

CHAPTER 5 IOHANNES claims that God’s foreknowledge, because of His omnipotence, makes inevitable all things foreknown by Him. RICARDUS denies this: God’s omnipotent knowledge encompasses not only existing or possible things but also everything conceivable, otherwise it would not be allpowerful. Contingents can be possible or future or conceivable, and there is nothing repugnant to His omnipotence in His knowing them as such. Furthermore while God is the cause of all things His foreknowledge as such is not their cause, if only for the reason that a thing’s futurity is prior in causal terms to its being foreknown, i.e. to be foreknown it must itself be future. Hence God’s foreknowledge confers neither contingency nor inevitability on them.

CHAPTER 6 - In a further discussion of inevitability IOHANNES denies the proposition that only the cause of an effect produces its contingency or inevitability. Contingency is due to a non-cause rather than a cause and likewise inevitability is entirely without an active cause. RICARDUS answers that inevitability is something positive, which needs an effective cause, and quotes Aristotle in support of this. IOHANNES’ example of a criminal being brought to prison by an officer of the law is discussed, along with the interplay of the decisions and acts of criminal and officer. RICARDUS continues to maintain that God’s foreknowledge neither bestows inevitability on things nor implies it.
CHAPTER 7 discusses the relationship of God's will to necessity and contingency in human acts. RICARDUS emphasizes, by various arguments, that God's will, like His foreknowledge, confers no inevitability on things. Indeed both His foreknowledge and His will encompass both avoidable and inevitable things; if this power and this foreknowledge were restricted to inevitables, this would be a limitation on His power. He can bring about contingent things through created power; and we can think of nothing more contingent than the intrinsic acts of human and angelic freewill.

CHAPTER 8 - IOHANNES still objects saying that contingents are a contradiction. RICARDUS insists that God's omnipotence requires the existence or possibility of contingents for the same reason as before, namely that otherwise His power would not be omnipotent. In a somewhat complex set of arguments he points out that while God's act of willing restricts the will's power, in the sense that it is directed towards a particular object, this does not mean that it cannot direct itself towards other contingent things. God's omnipotence requires the ability to produce acts of all kinds including contingent happenings. Likewise it follows that contingents exist in us and the angels (and we cannot conceive anything more contingent than these acts), and neither we nor the divine power can prevent their possibility.

CHAPTER 9 - IOHANNES claims that an act produced by the human will limits that will by preventing it from choosing any of the alternative acts which would otherwise have been open to it; also that the act of the will weakens the will, just as the craftsman's tool is weakened or worn out in use. RICARDUS points out that this is not so; the will retains the complete capacity to act and achieve its purpose. Likewise no act or effect of
the divine will restricts its power to carry out contingents, i.e. those things possible to it but not done.

CHAPTER 10 - IOHANNES accepts that God’s foreknowledge, as such, is not the cause of things, and that it is possible for God not to foreknow future contingent human acts. But God’s will is another thing altogether. He maintains by various arguments that God’s will, the eternal first cause of all things, can never be dependent on the action or inaction of its creatures produced in time. God’s will, therefore, can never be other than the cause of all things including contingents.

CHAPTER 11 - RICARDUS develops his view of the divine will. It is the first and eternal cause of all things but not their actual or productive cause in time. This eternal will can cause things, but only through secondary causes, that is through the action of its creature; if such action were absent the prior or primary cause in time could be a non-cause. The divine will is indeed the eternal cause of everything but in potentia not in actu. The example used to illustrate the position is that of a servant: when we instruct him or give him the power to provide food on our table we are the partial cause of that provision, but still dependent on the will of the servant. If he refuses to do what we order, we shall never have been the cause of providing the food; but we cannot not have willed it. The divine will, however, is free not to will and not to cause human acts.

CHAPTER 12 - In the previous chapter RICARDUS had discussed the way in which the first and eternal cause, the divine will, can cause things only through secondary causes. In this chapter he explores the influence of secondary causes on prior causes, the
relationship between cause and will, and the concepts of futurity and of predestination from eternity. He introduces two illustrative examples:

a) Christ before Herod: Christ the secondary cause could have asked God the primary cause to send him angels to assist him; and God could have willed and caused the sending.

b) The damnation of the devil: God, having seen from eternity the future sin of the devil, willed from eternity to punish him. The evil action of the devil was therefore the cause of his damnation; but he could have avoided punishment by not sinning.

It is clear, therefore, that a secondary cause can influence a prior cause, and that a creature, by its action, can cause God both to will and to cause a particular effect, and to do so from eternity.

CHAPTER 13 - RICARDUS produces an impressive series of Old Testament authorities supporting the proposition, continued from the previous chapter, that free human choice and human action can cause God to will and act in various ways. Pursuing the theme of futurity he says that God’s knowledge of man’s future choice or action can lead Him in turn to will His action from eternity.

CHAPTER 14 - IOHANNES, continuing his objection to the idea of contingency in human acts, still fails to see how God’s allpowerful will can be resisted or prevented by the creature; to do so would be to show the divine will as being weak and ineffectual. He quotes four scriptural authorities in his support.

CHAPTER 15 - RICARDUS refutes IOHANNES’ argument in the previous chapter by
pointing out that God's will requires that there be contingent things and that the creature be able to prevent them: otherwise God's will would not be omnipotent. He accordingly accepts that God's will cannot be resisted, but only in the sense that it is always fulfilled. In the divided sense it can be said that the thing willed by Him can be avoided by the creature; but in the composite sense this is not so, because whether things were done or not, His will is always fulfilled. For his omnipotence requires that things willed by it can be prevented by the creature because they are contingent. Hence the existence of contingents in no way renders the divine will weak or ineffective.

CHAPTER 16 - IOHANNES suggests that if what God wills can be frustrated by anyone, this shows that the divine will is weak. RICARDUS distinguishes the will whereby God wills contingent things to happen and that by which He wills that those contingent things can be avoided by a creature. The divine will is not less powerful because of this avoidance, because God wills these contingents to be avoidable. For example if we will something to be done by our servant but arrange it so that he can deliberately omit doing it, this does not make our act of willing weak. If what we willed were frustrated by our servant this would imply weakness on our part, but not if we deliberately willed that he could frustrate it. The omnipotence of the divine will requires that some things willed by it can be avoided by a creature without that will being weak or ineffective. Moreover from the authority of scripture and faith we can conclude that as God by free will produced the world and could have decided not to produce it, equally He was able not to foreknow and will things which were actually foreknown and willed.
CHAPTER 17 - RICARDUS discusses further the question of God’s will and human will. He distinguishes the act whereby God wills to do a thing from the act whereby He wills another to do a thing through that other’s will, just as we distinguish these acts in ourselves. When we will something to be done by another, our will is not the cause of the act but only assent or agreement. No act of our will is the efficient cause of something produced by another unless we have done something towards its production. However in the case of an act carried out by our servant with our authority our will directing or authorizing him is a cause of his act. In God’s case no will of His is the cause of contingent things unless it does something towards their production through human free will. His will is one of assent rather than efficiency.

CHAPTER 18 - This chapter discusses whether the contingent nature of human affairs results in divine will being, as IOHANNES suggests, weak or ineffective. RICARDUS asks which will does he mean: an internal act of agreement or assent or an effective outwardly operating act? he goes on to say that the terms weak or strong, effective or ineffective, are appropriate only to an active power, not to an assenting act of the will. The mere fact that God wills a thing that can be prevented does not mean that the divine will is weak. For example we humans can strangle a lion and allow a rabbit to escape from a snare: but this does not mean that in the first case our will is strong and that in other it is weak. The divine power can accomplish things willed by it, but in such a way that it can easily be resisted; otherwise it would not be omnipotent. It is not contradictory to claim that the divine assenting will is not omnipotent, because it cannot be called either powerful or powerless. IOHANNES finally accepts that these terms can be applied only to an act of the divine will operating outwardly.
CHAPTER 19 - RICARDUS asks which such outward act of the divine will IOHANNES considers weak; but IOHANNES persists in asking why we cannot call God’s will weak because of the existence of contingent acts. RICARDUS replies that this is because God made human creatures and their human nature. God’s act is in forming the creatures and not in causing their contingent acts. God does not act directly but only when the human will decides to act and His act is conditioned in this way. With the human will so conditioning the divine act and with the absolute contingency of the human act, the divine will cannot be considered weak except to the extent that what God wills can be avoided. No such divine act or will exists in relation to human acts, which we properly call free because of our free will. Hence we cannot show that the divine will or act is weak.

CHAPTER 20 - IOHANNES is not yet convinced. In the multiplicity, even the infinity, of divine acts of the will, God can have an act common to many things as well as a particular act in respect of an individual thing; why cannot we claim that at least such a common act is weak? RICARDUS replies that both types of divine act are conditional; and whether that act is effective or assenting or partly both, it cannot be shown to be weak because of its avoidability. For along with the divine will and its strength there remains the contingent nature of human acts.

CHAPTER 21 - What, asks IOHANNES, if God wills to Himself and thus to cause its inevitability? Would not the fact that the creature can frustrate such a will show that will’s weakness? RICARDUS replies that if God so willed this could make Him more blameworthy than any rational creature: for it would suppose that He would be ready to commit the crimes of an evil man or even of all wicked men.
Even if God so acted it would not impugn the contingency of human acts.

CHAPTER 22 - IOHANNES says that the extreme fragility of the divine will is clear if any fragile human will can make it conform to it. The divine will would be like the mirror mentioned at the beginning of the Book, which merely reflects or conforms to what appears in it; or like the reed moved by the wind. RICARDUS points out that God has freedom of choice to act in or towards external things, and therefore can conform to contingents. God's will is not fragile and nothing can resist it when it exercises its full power. The readiness of the divine knowledge and power to conform to all possible things comes from the omnipotence of its nature. God formed His creatures with the power to accomplish many things or to avoid them. He is indeed a mirror reflecting things but His mirroring power is unchangeable and invincible; unchangeable in that it truly represents all knowable things without distortion or untruth; invincible because nothing can avoid what He wills.

CHAPTER 23 reverts to the question raised in chapter 14: Who can resist the divine will? which IOHANNES says shows the divine will's invincibility. There is another sense, RICARDUS says, in this saying i.e. regarding God's effective power in willing a thing to be done inevitably, that is against opposition. For instance while Joseph in Egypt wished to be exalted this did not depend on his will, nor could the salvation of his people be avoided by its will. No one, opponent or wellwisher, can resist the divine will inevitably or omnipotently. In Rm 9 which IOHANNES quotes, the apostle did not so much assert this as put it forward in the role of objector. If we deduced from this that God does not find fault with the hardening of sinners which He himself wills, we would
ascribe to the apostle either lack of knowledge or perversity of will. He did not wish to discuss the question which IOHANNES posed: whether a creature can resist the divine will and, hardened, repent and be saved, but another: whether God's will is unjust in saving some and hardening others. He refutes the claim that God's will in doing so is unjust or blameworthy and shows God's justice in hardening as in saving. This was the real question which the apostle was addressing.

CHAPTER 24 - Finally Paul returns to the matter which he had raised in Rm 11 when he clearly suggests that the justified can be damned by not continuing in goodness, and the unbelieving cease their unbelief and become saved. RICARDUS quotes a range of sayings from him and from Apocalypse in support of the fact that some may be blotted out from the book of the living i.e. never be predestined for salvation or be cut off from it. People are weak and may fall and be damned and may thus lose God's promise to those that overcome. God has freedom of choice in saving and damning just as the potter has the power to make vessels for honour and dishonour. God's justice allows Him to choose one and reject another without our having just cause for complaint. Equally it is God's free choice that made Him produce the world and its creatures at one time rather than another. Our crown of salvation is not assured and we may lose it to another. Let us therefore take care not to lose it through our presumption.
CHAPTER IX
CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM
CODICES

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Js | Johannes Sudoris | Jehan Petit impressit |

Paris 1511

EDITIO

a.c. | ante correctionem |
del. | delevit |
homoeoarcton |
homoet. | homoeoteleuton |
mg. | in margine |
om. | omisit |
p.c. | post correctionem |
pr. | praecedit |
rep. | repetit |
s.l. | sub linea |
sup. 1. | super lineam |
~ | inversa verba designat |
< > | ab editore suppletum |
+ | addita verba aut litterae |
CHAPTER X

EPISTOLA--DEDICATORY LETTER

Reverendis in Christo patribus Nersi archiepiscopo Manasgerdensi ac fratri
Iohanni electo Clatensi Maiori Armenie\(^1\) Ricardus Radulphi archiepiscopus
Armachanus Hibernie primas, per graciam sitire iusticiam *donec hauriat*
aquas *in gaudio de fontibus salvatoris*.\(^2\) Ex relatione vestre sancte devocionis
accepi ob defectum exercitii in sacris scripturis antiquas quasdam hereses
a sanctis patribus reprobatas et nonnullas contra sacram scripturam novellas
asseriones erroneas in vestris partibus pullulasse; propter quas per doctores
Latinos ex sacris litteris convincendas eo quod earum patroni auctoritatem
Romane ecclesie non admittunt estimantes eius auctoritatem ex sacris litteris
probari non posse, ad Romanam curiam *zelus domus Dei*\(^3\) et Christi caritas vos
adduxit. Cum vero super ipsis erroribus vobiscum ibidem aliquociens
contulissem, meam exilitatem devocius stimulastis ut super questionibus
vestris illud vobis scriberem quod michi dignaretur Dominus aperire. Cui
vestro tam accepto Deo desiderio resistere non audebam exaccionem

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\(^1\) Melaskerd and Khelath: cf. Golubovich, t.IV ff 333-34
\(^2\) Is 12, 3
\(^3\) cf Ps 68, 10; Io 2, 17

1. Neysi V, Versi Js; Manasgardensis NJs
2. Richardus Radulphus Js
3. per graciam sitire iusticiam *om. K*; iusticiam *om. V*; donee Js; hauriat] hauriant
   NV, hauriatis LJs
4. relatione] revelacione KJs
7. pululasse NTV
8. convincendas] resecandas Js; earum] eorum V
11. vos] nos NJs
14. vestro] nostro NT, meo V
spiritualis usure formidans si de donis a Deo acceptis officium negligerem
institoris, et iuxta ipsius promissa qui dantibus dare sponpondit nichilominus
ardenter desiderans ampliora ob hoc recipere ut habundem. Nec debent
indignari michi maiores quod opus tam arduum aggredi presumebam, ex quo
ipsi per quos melius perfici potuit illud penitus neglexerunt. Et ego cum
vidua evangelica cupiam minuta que habeo in Domini domum offerre ipso
teste,\textsuperscript{4} confidens humilis oracionis suffragio amplius quam subtilitate ingenii
scripture difficilia penetrare. Nec maiorum correccionem reno sed affecto.
Et ipsum opus cuius titulum volui esse \textit{De questionibus Armenorum} quod in
XIX particulas sive libros distinxi singulis libris materiam libri et ipsius
capitula premittendo, approbacioni et reprobacioni nostri Patris Sanctissimi
Clementis VI universalis ecclesie summi pontificis in toto et in parte
committo. In quinque primis libris illa principalis Armenorum questio
pertractatur: numquid Christus habuit in se duas plenas naturas scilicet
divinam et humanam, ita quod propter unionem in ipso illarum duarum

\textsuperscript{4}cf Mc 12, 43; Lc 21, 1

\begin{itemize}
\item 15. Deo\textsubscript{om.}\ Domino Js; necgligerem T
\item 16. dare\textsubscript{non K} K; sponpondi\textsubscript{proviterat? L; dantibus...nichilominus} L; evang\textsubscript{evangelizantibus}
dat\textsubscript{verbum virtute multa Js; nichilominus] nis habentibus K}
\item 17. desiderans\textsubscript{desideratis Js} Js; habundem + magis Js
\item 18. quod \ldots presumebam om. Js
\item 19. necglexerunt T
\item 21. quam om. N, qua Js
\item 22. scripture om. Js
\item 24. libr\textsubscript{i} om. Js; et reprobacioni nostri Patris om. N; nostri] nostris N;
nostri + pape Js; Sanctissimi om. KJs
\item 27. \textit{~} om. quinque Js; \textit{~} questio Armenorum KJs
\item 28. pertractabitur K Js; scilicet pr. numquid L; \textit{~} in se habuit K
\item 29. divinam + scilicet L
\item 29-30. \textit{~} illarum duarum naturarum in ipso LJs
\end{itemize}
ypostasis in utraque natura, videlicet verus Deus et verus homo. Primus itaque liber contra heresim Nestorianam a quodam Nestorio introductam affirmantem in Christo naturam humanam dumtaxat, ita ut Christus homo fuerit et non Deus, quam heresim securi sunt Cherintus, Amerintus, Theodocio et eciam excecati Iudei et multe orientalium nacionum usque in presens. Patefacto primitus quis sensus sit litteralis sacre scripture censendus, ex scriptura novi testamenti iuxta sensum litteralem ipsius ostendit Christum quem colimus Deum esse. 2us liber contra ludeos specialiter ex veteri testamento iuxta litteralem sensum ipsius probat Christum sive Messiam in sua scriptura promissum Deum esse debere. 3us liber ex eadem veteri scriptura ostendit Christum nostrum quem colimus esse sive fuisse illum qui erat populo Iudaico in ipsa scriptura promissus. In 4o libro tractantur obiectus Iudaici contra ostensa in libro 2o et 3o. Et dantur et probantur in ipso certe regule istos obiectus et omnes alios obiectus Iudaicos dissolvendi. In 5o libro contra heresim Arrii et Appollinaris affirmantem quod in Christo anima humana non fuit sed quod deitas loco anime Christo erat, et contra heresim Manichei dicentis Christum non verum corpus humanum sed solum corpus fantasticum habuisse scripture sacre testimonia adducuntur. Et consequenter contra heresim ponentem corpus humanum in Christo fuisse divinitati nudum indumentum aut vestem sicut in angelis cum corpora humana assumunt, et contra heresim Dioscori affirmantis naturam humanam

38. ~esse Deum Js; contra om. N
43. obiectus] obiecta KJs; Iudaici + populi KJs
44. ~regule certe KJs; istos rep. K istos] illos LNV
45. affirmatatem Js
46. deitas] divinitas NJs; et + hoc Js
47. solum om. KJs
49. fuisse + et Js
50. divinitati] deitati LV, divinitatis Js; nudum] velud K (velut Js); aut] licet K, ac Js
in Christo in divinam fuisse mutatam, ex utroque testamento testimonia proferuntur. 6us liber ex scripturis utriusque testamenti ostendit Spiritum Sanctum a Filio sicut a Patre procedere quod a Grecis et ab Armenis plerisque negatur. 7us liber probat ex sacra scriptura quod Romana ecclesia sit capud et rectrix tocius ecclesie Christiane. 8us liber de sacramento baptismi et eius forma plures Armenorum questiones absolvit. 9us liber de sacramentis corporis Christi et sanguinis confirmacionis et unccionis plures questiones eorum pertractat. 10us liber de modis illicitis conferendi et acquirendi et detinendi dona Dei gratuita ac preposituras ecclesie eorumdem questiones pertractat. 11us liber de potestate absolvendi simplicis sacerdotis et de punicione animarum hominum impiorum ante finale iudicium questiones ipsorum dissolvit. 12us liber questiones Armenorum pertractat de beatitudine animarum quorumdam iustomur et de purgacione eciam aliquarum animarum ante finale iudicium. Liber 13us quem propter quemdam Athanasium Grecum qui negat purgatorium adieci, quattuor pertractat articulos de satisfaccione debita pro peccatis in vita et eciam post hanc vitam. Liber 14us tractat questionem Grecorum et Armenorum de visione nuda atque clara divine essencie a vere beatis quam negant plerique

53. ex + litteris V
56. et rectrix om. Js
58. sacramentis] sacramento Js
59. tractat Js
60. earumdem V, eorum Js
60-61. ~ questiones eorum Js
61. pertractat + et an requiratur gratia Dei ad habendum dominium Js
63. questionis Js
64. eciam] et NV
66. quendam om. Js
68. questiones Js
69. a] et N; a vere] et vero V
ipsorum. Quinque libri residui, ne probaciones adducte in libris prioribus aliquibus legem habentibus aut lege carentibus tamen sequentibus racionem videantur infirme, robur auctoritatis Christiane scripture aperta et cuilibet sufficienti racione volenti racioni acquiescere patefacit. Liber 15us obicit contra auctoritatem nostre scripture per contingenciam futurorum prenunciatorum in ipsa que possunt non fore et occasione cuiusdam novelli erroris asserentis omnia futura necessitate sive inevitabiliter evenire. Positis novem gravioribus mentis absurditatis illius ostendit libertatem contradiccionis in voluntate humana tam ex scripturis phisicis quam divinis et eciam multiplici racione et eciam contingenciam futurorum. Liber 16us ponit tres de pretactis obiectibus acceptos de infallibilitate scripture divine a divina presciencia immutabili et a voluntate divina omnipotente invincibili et eciam efficaci, et solvit eosdem ex propriis principii evidenter ostendens contingenciam futurorum et libertatem contradiccionis voluntatis humane. Liber 17us residuos sex ponit obiectus videlicet: de Dei cooperacione speciali cum voluntate hominis operante, de sustentacione rerum intrinseca ab omnipotente divina potencia, de divina cooperacione generali cum omni
agente creato eciam immediata, de necessitate eventus actuum extrinsecorum nostrorum, de assercione scripture divine super eventu omnium futurorum et de divina providencia irrevocabiliter et optime omnia disponente. Et illos sex obiectos absolvit affirmans propositum. Liber 18us alios ponit obiectus ad infirmandum auctoritatem nostre scripture, et tollit eosdem ostendens auctoritatem legis antique ex nova et consequenter probat utrumque testamentum ex lege Saracenorum firmari, inferens et ostendens legem nostram evangelii legi Saracenorum auctoritatis vigore preire; et cum hoc multiplici racione affirmat legem nostram a Christo traditam in suis maioribus articulis non fuisse aut esse corruptam. Liber 19us comparat legem nostram quo ad sacramenta et cerimonias legi Iudeorum; sufficienti racione fundata ex veteri testamento ostendens nostram legem evangelicam et apostolicam incomparabiliter firmiorem ac Iudeos esse damnandos; et supposicionem quamdam precedentis libri et huius libri de miraculis apostolorum nostrorum pertractat, et eciam legem nostram robur amplius habere ostendit quam habeat racio naturalis eam impugnans aut aliqua secta.

87. creato] causata K; eciam] et NJs; immediato N
87-88. ~ nostrorum extrinsecorum L
89. providencia + hoc K; irrevocabili Js; ~ disponente omnia K; illos] istos L
90. sex om. KJs
91. ~ scripture nostre Js; eosdem] eos Js
93. testamentum] misterium Js
93-94. firmari...Saracenorum om. KJs
94. nostram om. L; evangelii] evangelicam NV; auctoritatis] auctoritate et Js; prehire K
95. a Christo om. KJs; a om. L
97. nostram om. L; Iudeorum] antique Js; non pr. sufficienti K
98. racione] divisione Js; evangelica Js
99. apostoncam Js; Iudeus N; esse + omnes K
100. supposicionem quamdam] suppositum quoddam KJs; precedentis] preteriti N; libri om. Js; et huius libri om. L
101. eciam om. K
gentilium. Et in hoc totum opus consummat. Quia vero per interrogacionem et responsionem modus tradendi videtur multis facilior licet sit prolixior, unum de meis michi predilectum discipulum quasi mecum disputantem accepi; ita ut Iohannes vicem querentis et Ricardus intelligatur vicem gereresentenciantis vel pocius respondentis. Vos igitur reverendi patres opus accipite quod petistis, oracionis si placet mercedem michi pro labore pensantes. Hoc opus sic incipit: Iohannes quia ex litterali sensu scripture sacre.

103. et...consummat om. L; quia vero] et quia L
104. tractandi N; sit + aliquanto LNV (aliquantulum KJs,)
105. meis] nostris KJs; -discipulum predilectum Js
107. sentenciantis] docentis KJs; vel] licet Js
108. petistis] petentis K, petiistis Js
108-109. -pensantes pro labore Js
109. sensu] sentencia KJs; sensu litterali sacre scripture intendis etcetera L
110. sacre + etcetera K
CHAPTER XI

LATIN TEXT OF BOOK XVI

LIBER XVI TABULA

1 In XVI libro solvuntur tria prima motiva scilicet de infallibilitate scripture, de presciencia divina et de voluntate divina, tacta in principio libri precedentis pretendencia inevitabilitatem omnium actuum humanorum. Et investigantur radices motivorum illorum atque tolluntur ex eorum propriis principiis. Et habet XXIII capitula. PRIMUM capitulum solvit objectum precedentis libri de fallibilitate sacre scripture ostendens modum infallibilitatis illius, et excusat scriptores a mendacio possibili in scripturis. SECUNDUM capitulum obicit contra responsionem precedentis capitulo et solvit tractans de assercione Christi numquid potuit falsa fuisse, et de multiplici consciencia Christi. TERCIUM capitulum obicit secundo principaliter de divina presciencia, et ostenditur exemplo corporalis speculi quod evitabilitas prescitorum non arguit fallibilitatem divine sciencie. QUARTUM capitulum obicit de cognicione beatorum in verbo divino qua

1. in XVIIo libro] incipit liber 16us in quo K, incipiunt capitula libri decimisexti in quibus Js; motiva] nomina V; ~ tria prima nomina solvuntur V; fallibilitate T
2. et om. LV; de2 om. K; voluntate] prevoluntate Js
3. humanorum mg. K; et] eciam DK
4. motivorum] motuorum N; et pr. ex V; eorum rep. K
5. XXIII] vigesima quarta Js
6. fallibilitate] infallibilitate KL; sacre om. V
6-7. modum infallibilitatis] infallibilitatem V
7. in scripturis] scripture V
8. capituli] libri V
9. numquid] quod sup. l. nunquam K; de om. N
10. Christi] ipsius Js
11. ~ presciencia divina L; ostenditur] ostendit Js
12. sciencie] presciencie L
13. in om. DV; qual] contra V
non obstante possunt beati decipi, ut deducitur et concluditur ita esse de Deo et solvitur ipsa obieccio affirmando tanquam probabile quod nec anima Christi nec alia creatura previdet futura intuitive in verbo divino et nichilominus adicitur una racio probans non obstante presciencia Dei evitabillia posse esse. QUINTUM capitulum obicit de omnipotencia presciencia divine, et solvit ostendens omnipotentem Dei scienciam exigere aliqua esse evitabilia, et ostendit divinam prescienciam non esse causam rerum prescitarum in quantum talis est. SEXTUM capitulum obicit contra unum prius suppositum et solvit ostendens causam evitabilitatis rerum esse causam earum; et eciam probat inevitabilitatem si ponatur causam efficientem quoquo modo habere, reprobans quoddam exemplum de inevitabilitate cuiusquam capti ad carcerem impellente eum legis ministro; et sunt ibi tres raciones. SEPTIMUM capitulum ostendit generali racione sumpta ex omnipotencia voluntatis divine quod voluntas Dei respectu actuum humanorum nullam eis inevitabilitatem adducit, et distinctis multiplicibus sciencia et potencia et voluntate divina id idem ostendit eadem racione expressius. OCTAVUM capitulum obicit et dissolvit, ostendens aperta
racione quod nec voluntas divina nec accio a voluntate divina immediate procedens causa esse potest inproducibilitatis rerum quas evitabiles appellamus. NONUM capitulum obicit de voluntate humana et solvit ostendens quod nunquam voluntas humana causa esse potest inproducibilitatis actus sibi ex natura possibilis, et illud idem concludit de voluntate divina. DECIMUM capitulum obicit quod voluntas Dei quia est causa prior in tempore et eciam causa eterna rerum, non potest per actum humanum non esse aut non fuisse causa ipsarum. UNDECIMUM capitulum ostendit racione patenti quod causa prior in tempore per accionem cause posterioris potest respectu certi effectus nunquam causa fuisse, et per exemplum manifestum in voluntate nostra et eius operibus hoc ostendit. DUODECIMUM capitulum idem ostendit ex dictis evangeli et ex racione sumpta a iusta punicione dampnatorum: scilicet quod peccatum ipsorum sive eius futuricio ab eterno fuit causa quare Deus voluit malos dampnare non econtra. TERCIAMDECIMUM capitulum ostendit ex multiplici auctoritate scripture quod factum humanum sive humana voluntas sepe est causa quoquomodo cur Deus multa facit et fecit et ab eterno facere voluit.

QUARTUMDECIMUM capitulum obicit contra evitabilitatem actuum

31. nec om. D; nec...divina² om. per homoet. KJs
32. procedens] precedens DV; causa om. D; ~potest esse T
33. voluntate om. V
34. ostendens] osten L
35. producibilitatis V; ex om. Js; nulla V; illud] id DTLN; concludit] excludit Js
38. ipsarum] ipsa Js
40. posterioris rep. T; potest] prius D; cause pr. certi Js; certi] iusti N
41. hoc] hec KNVJs, om. T
43. dampnatorum] peccatorum K
44. non om. T
45. ~Decimum tertium Js
46. ~voluntas humana L; humana om. KJs
47. quoquomodo] quodammodo L; multa om. K; et² sup. ℓ. V
48. ~Decimum quartum Js
humanorum per hoc quod nichil potest divine voluntati resistere aut eam inefficacem aut infirmam efficere. Et sunt quattuor obiectus de Genesi ultimo Hester XIII ad Romanos IX et Iob XXIII. QUINTUMDECIMUM capitulum probat ex omnipotencia Dei quod aliqua eius volita possunt a creatura caveri absque hoc quod divine voluntati resistatur aut ipsa fiat inefficax.

SEXTODECIMUM capitulum obicit ex evitabilitate divini voliti quod voluntas divina argui possit infirma, et solvit ostendens quod non ob hoc minus est potens sicut nec voluntas humana; obicit eciam iterum difficulter et solvit adiciens rationem fidei quod volitum a Deo potest nunquam fuisse volitum ab eo, sicut et prescitum a Deo potest nunquam fuisse prescitum.

DECIMUMSEPTIMUM capitulum ut aliam racionem inducat distinguat de multiplici voluntate divina, ostendens quod nec voluntas Dei qua vult rem fieri aut qua vult rem fore in quantum talis est est causa operum humanorum efficiens.

DECIMUMOCTAVUM capitulum ostendit particulariter quod nec potencia volitiva divina nec actus volitivus divinus complacencie, qui nec dici potest.
proprie efficax aut ineffectax, potens aut impotens, fortis aut debilis, de
infirmitate aut impotencia aut inefficacia argui potest etsi volitum eius possit
caveri.

DECIMUMNONUM capitulum illud idem ostendit de omni genere actus
volitivi divini operativi ad extra respectu actuum humanorum, scilicet quod
nullus potest argui ineffectax etsi suum volitum possit a creatura caveri.

VICESIMUM capitulum obicit et solvit, ostendens plenius quod nullus actus
volitivus divinus respectu actuum humanorum potest argui ineffectax aut
infirmus eciam si suum volitum possit a creatura vitari.

VICESIMUMPRIMUM capitulum obicit contra de actu volitivo divino
cogitabili quo ita vult res humanas fieri, ut si voluntas humana eas non
ageret ipse eas immediate produceret, et dissolvit probans succincte nullum
actum talem volitivum esse aut posse esse in Deo.

VICESIMUM SECUNDUM capitulum obicit de fragilitate voluntatis divine
si potest omnibus evitabilibus conformari, et solvit ostendens hanc
conformabilitatem voluntatis divine ex summa firmitate et invincibilitate venire econtra conformabilitati voluntatis sive virtutis create.

VICESIMUMTERCIUM capitulum solvit obiectus XIII capituli de resistencia possibili voluntati divine per suam facturam.

VICESIMUMQUARTUM capitulum ostendit ex serie epistole ad Romanos, que obiciendo fuerat allegata quod sunt aliqui actus humani vitabiles. Et idem probat ex auctoritatibus Apocalipsis.

Et sic terminat librum XVI.
LIBER XVI PRIMUM CAPITULUM

<RICARDUS>

Iam vides ut estimo quomodo tua opinio fidem christianam destruit et scripturam phisicam et divinam. Ne tamen mole auctoritatum te premi affirmes stantibus tuis obiectibus non solutis, videamus Domino nos ducente quomodo solvantur tua ligamina et qualiter ex tuis propriis principiis tua opinio confringatur et a dissolucione tuorum obiectuum aliud faciamus exordium.

IOHANNES

Utinam dictis facta pensares, et inciperes a dissolucione mei primi obiectus de infallibilitate scripture.

RICARDUS

Videris tibi ex logica astute arguere et tamen peccas in logica que varios arguendi modos ostendit, scilicet ostensivum a causa aut ab effectu ab auctoritate ac alios modos quamplures. In ostensiva argumentacione racionabiliter deduxisti nunquam posse ex necessario sequi contingens necque ex opposto scilicet ex contingente sequi impossibile. In argumento vero ab auctoritate non recte affirmas nunquam ex necessario inferri posse.
contingens aut ex contingenti impossibile, si necessarium appellemus omne illud quodammodo falsum esse non valet et impossibile omne illud quodammodo verificari non potest. Quoniam si necessarium illud solum dixerimus quod nec potest nec potuit falsum esse et impossibile illud solum vocemus quod nec potest nec potuit verum esse tua obieccio non procedit.

Quoniam non est sic necessarium quod hoc vel illud sit aut fuit in scriptura assertum cum ante composicionem scripture illud falsum fuerit. Nec est impossibile quod hoc vel illud non est nec fuit in scriptura assertum sicut tu superius posuisti cum illud pariter ante composicionem scripture verum fuerit. Si enim quisquam ita fide dignus est ut nunquam menciator et hoc de eo firma fide teneatur - non disco de eo sciatur - quis est habens hanc fidem de ipso qui argumentum non recipit ab auctoritate ipsius sic: ipse hoc asseruit, ergo hoc verum est. Nullus ut estimo. Et tamen unusquisque novit quod antecedens est necessarium primo modo prescripto et forte consequens est contingens; aut ut secundum te loquar consequens est contingens iuxta opinionem multorum si consequens sit de futuris que pendent a nostro
arbitrio. Et hoc novit ille qui argumentum nichilominus sue auctoritatis acceptat. Nec ob hoc approbat argumentum quia est necessaria illacio sed quia firma fide tenet quod nunquam de facto est antecedens verum sine consequente. Unde argumentum ab auctoritate necessitatem illacionis non habet ubique et semper sed fidem aliquociens. Tamen scriptura tali illacioni necessitatem ascribit non simpliciter dictam sed necessitatem appellat infallibilitatem prout privacio ita inprivat fallibilitatem in actu, ita quod dicatur necessarium quod sic est infallibile quod nunquam fallit licet fallere posset. Quoniam illa possibilitas apud eum qui firma fide tenet quod scriptura nunquam fallit eius auctoritatem non tollit. Hunc modum accipiendi necessitatem acute expedit attendere in scripturis que hiis verbis ad hunc sensum sepius de futuris utuntur, non pro necessitate simpliciter sive inevitabilitate sicut inferius plenius ostendetur. Quod vero niteris ultra concludere possibilitatem mendaciorum in hiis contingentibus quae a prophetis seu aliis auctoribus sacre scripture leguntur asserta, et consequenter peccata ex mendaciis eis quoad possibilitatem conaris ascribere. Imprudenter hec infers cum mendacium non sit sine intencione fallendi qualem

31. auctoritatis om. V
32. acceptat[ acceperat K; approbat] reprobat T
34. ab] aut V; que pr. illacionis N
35. sed] secundum Js; illatione Js
37. prout[ ex V; ita] ista N; inprivat] non inprivat V, vi privat N Js; in actu] in actum Js; quod] ut V
38. fallibile D; licet] sed K; quod²] et Js
39. posset] possit Js
40. auctoritatem] necessitatem K
41. ~ expedit acute L; que] de V; hunc om. L
42. sive + pro Js
43. plenius KJs; vero om. KJs
45. prophetis om. V; seu] et K, om. Js; auctoritatibus Js
46. peccata ex] peccant K; possibilitatem] potestatem V
47. hec] hoc Js, om. K
intencionem non probas esse aut ex nunc esse potuisse in illis auctoribus, quamvis bene ostendas possibilitatem falsitatis in aliquibus contingentibus assertis ab eis. Quoniam non sequitur: illa contingencia que ipsi asseruerunt in sacris scripturis sunt falsa aut fuerunt tunc falsa ergo ipsi tunc dixerunt mendacium. Sed bene sequitur quod aut dixerunt mendacium aut decepti fuerunt. Et hoc secundum satis est possibile sicut est possibile quod illa que ipsi asseruerunt ventura nunquam evenient, licet de facto credamus quod in huiusmodi assercionibus scripture nunquam decepti fuerunt. Pariter tibi respondendum esset si inferres esse possibile quod ipsi erant actores, non dico auctores decepcionum in aliis scilicet quod hoc verum est. Nec ex hoc potes inferre possibilitatem mendacii aut peccati. Quoniam non est necessaria consequencia: talis decepit alios falsa ignoranter asserendo pro veris igitur fuit mendax aut peccator. Quoniam per hoc quod Deus hoc facere sibi indixit item per hoc quod non intendebat decipere nec putavit se illos decipere, posset merito excusari a mendacio et peccato. Habet eciam hec

48. non om. V; esse1 om. N; nunc] tunc K; in om. T; auctoritatibus Js
49. falsitatis] falsitatem D, fallibilitatis V
50. quoniam non] non enim L; ipsi] sibi ipsi Js, sibi K, ipse V
51. in sacris scripturis mg. L; scripturis om. T; aut fuerunt] aut erant sup. l. K; tunc1 om. T; ~ tunc fuerunt L; ergo] igitur KJs
52. sed...mendacium om. per homoet. V; bene + dixerunt quod Js; quod om. NJs; mendacium] falsum N
52-53. ~ fuerunt decepti L
53. est1 om. T
54. eveniret Js
55. decepti om. V; pariter] per idem K
56. possibile] impossible T; actores] auctores DKJs
56-57. non dico auctores om. K
59. consequencia] contra Js; deceperit D, decipit KJs; ergo DN
60. peccator] peccatorum V
61. induxit K; item] et L; quod non] quam V
62. posset + et KJs
62-63. ~ hec etiam difficultas habet L; eciam habet hec difficultas N; habet et difficultas V

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difficultas locum apud te et tuam sentenciam astruentes sicut apud me qui
non dubito aliqua futura contingencia affirmare. Quoniam non negabis de
hiis que nos futura necessaria appellamus quin Deus potest facere ut illa
nunquam eveniunt cum Deus nichil de necessitate agat ad extra, ex quo
potes inferre omnia que superius conclusisti. Unde huius involucionis
evolucionem ad nos et vos negare non valebis communiter pertinere. Tu
igitur dic quomodo Deum liberum reddis et absolutum a possibilitate
mendacii et auctorizacionis peccati. Ex quo ipse verus homo mortalis
existens multa futura asservit que nos communiter necessaria appellamus. Et
apostolis precepit ut per orbem illa cum diligencia predicarent cum ipse
possit in presenti totum mundum destruere et sic facere ut illa nunquam
eveniunt scilicet nec resurreccio mortuorum nec finale iudicium, que ex fide
in novissimo tempore expectamus et per quam fidem salvari speramus. Cum
ex hiis ea posses inferre que contra ponentem futura contingencia
consecurtur immo potes ultra inferre esse possibile apud Deum quod iam
iustificati et salvati fidem non habuerunt de predictis futurus, aut quod fidem

63. apud te] aperte Js
64. ~ contingencia futura Js;
64-65. contingencia...futura rep. per homoearcton K
65. nos] nobis V; ut] quod KJs
65-66. potest...Deus om. per homoet. T
66. evenient Js
67. inclusisti V; huiusmodi Js
68. vos] hos V; ad pr. vos K; ~ non valebitis (valebis Js) negare K; ~ pertinere
    communiter K, pertinere consequenter Christum Js
69. dic om. K Js; Deum om. KJs
70. actorizacionis V; verus] Christus K; homo + et L
71. multa] merita Js; nos] vos N
73. possit] posset Js; ut] quod KJs
73-74. ut...mortuorum om. V
75. in om. N; tempore om. L
76. illis pr. hiis K; possis Js; que] et K
77. secuntur K; quod] qui V
78. habuerunt om. V; aut quod] ostendit Js; quod om. V

¹Mt 19,26
²Lc 1,37

79. quod] qui V; falsa om. T; salvabantur Js
80. fidei] fide D; consequi K; Deus] Christus Js
81. ut] quod Js; nunquam¹ rep. T
82. quod…affirmat om. V
83. Mt XIX om. N; et alibi] et Lc primo L; omne] esse Js
84. Lc primo capitulo om. L; similia multa dicit L; et…similia om. KJs
LIBER XVI SECUNDUM CAPITULUM

IOHANNES

1 Hic fateror me involvi nec video quomodo negari posset esse possibile quod Deus falsam fidem auctorizavit et quod multi in falsa sunt fide salvati et quod Christus falsum asservit. Et ita videtur esse possibile quod Christus mendacium dixit et peccavit.

RICARDUS

5 Primum fateror et secundum me nescire evadere in quo a prima mea audicione theologiae cupiebam audire doctorem et eciam illud sicio in presenti. Peccatum vero quod times non sequitur ut predixi quoniam mendacium non est nisi cum intencione fallendi, et excusata possibilitate mendacii excusatur in eodem casu possibilitas omnis peccati. Impossibile est enim nunc quod Christus in predicta asservendo fallere intendebat et ita impossibile est iam quod in sic asservendo peccavit, quamvis ut puto negari non possit iuxta premissa quod possibile est quod in illa asservendo falsum asservit. Et quod gravius est secundum ponentes Christum secundum animam humanam omnia scire que Deus scit sicut Magister Sentenciarum sensit et

1. hic] hoc Js; fateor me involvi hic L; negari] necessario Js; possit] posset V; possibile] impossibile V
2. auctorizaverit Js; quod om. KJs; ~ fide sunt KLJs, in fide sunt falsa T
3. Christum pr. Christus1 N; et pr. asservit V; et om. D; ita] illa V; esse] est T
4. dixit] dicit Js; ~ dixit mendacium L
6. me pr. audire KJs; sicio] scio KJs
6-7. et scio...quod om. per homoet. D
7. predixi] que dixi K, quin dixi Js
8. intencione] timore V
9. possibilitas om. V
9-10. ~ enim est KL
10. in om. KJs; ~ asservendo predicta L
11. ~ quod iam KJs
12. possibile est quod mg. L; est om. K; ~ asservendo illa L
13. sicut Deus pr. scit V; sensit om. V; et] eciam T

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alii magistri et sancti doctores, non video quin oportet concedere esse possibile quod Christus scirent falsum aseurit. Ipsi igitur defendant qualiter non est modo possibile quod ipse contra conscienciam suam falsa aseurit. Et si labiis Christianis liceret promere sequi videtur quod possibile est modo quod Christus dixit mendacium scirent falsum affirman s, quod aures mee fateor nimis abhorrent. Quoniam harum conclusionum defensio supposito predicto principio de anime Christi sciencia non mihi occurrit nisi quis dixerit nunc esse possibile quod Christus illa nunquam aseurit. Quod qualiter stare possit non video cum de huiusmodi expressatis ab eo ipsum dixisse legitimus: Et nunc dixi vobis priusquam fiat ut cum factum fuerit credatis\textsuperscript{1} Io XIII; et Mt <X> XIIII Ecce prædixi vobis\textsuperscript{2}. Et consequenter descript futurum suum adventum ad iudicium concludens: Vigilate ergo, quia nescitis qua hora dominus vester venturus sit\textsuperscript{3}. Que dicta manifestam assercione m important cum asserere nichil aliud videatur esse quam aliquid voluntarie exprimeure ut alius illud credat. Igitur ita videtur necessarium quod

\textsuperscript{1}Io 14,29
\textsuperscript{2}Mt 24,25
\textsuperscript{3}Mt 24,42

\begin{itemize}
\item 16. si pr. scirent V; defendant] defendunt TV
\item 17. ipse] est K; falsa] falsum KJs
\item 18. promere om. V
\item 19. dixit] dicit Js
\item 20. nimis] minus Js; conclusionum] questionum Js
\item 21. supposito] supposta V, supponendo Js; principio] modo KJs; anime Christi sciencia] anima Christi N; ~ michi non Js
\item 22. quod] ut KJs; ~ nunquam illa L
\item 23. expressatis] prefatis K, ex prefatis Js
\item 24. ~legimus dixisse Js; legimus + Io 14 L; dixi] dixisse K; ut] et V; factum om. N
\item 25. Io XIII] Io 24 K, Io XIII (Io XIII mg.) T; Mt <X> XIIII] Mar.14K, Mar 24 Js, om. V
\item 26. ~suum futurum LJs; sic pr. concludens L
\item 27. quac] in qua V; sit] erit V; que] quia K
\item 28. aliquid] aliud V
\item 29. ut] et V; credat] creaturum TV; ita om. Js
\end{itemize}
30 Christus illa asseruit sicut necessarium est quod ipse voluntarie ea discipulis suis expressit ut illa crederent. Micius autem puto dicere nunc esse possibile quod Christus nec illa scripta nec eorum opposita in verbo divino secundum animam presciebat, quam dicere nunc esse possibile quod de illis loquens aut mentitus est aut contra conscienciam sit locutus et ita peccavit.

35 Et utinam illum audirem qui hec utraque et eis similia devitaret. Verum ut in hoc puncto in quo a iuventute mea sepius sum vexatus exprimam quod michi videtur dicendum, puto de hiis preteritis Deo esse possibilia ea sola qualibus similia pro futuro possibilia sunt eidem. Vide ergo si pro futuro audes affirmare esse possibile quod Christus menciatur aut contra conscienciam quicquam affirmet aut aliqua futura ignoret aut saltem non sciat. Intelligo secundum naturam assumptam iuxta illud Lc II: *Et Iesus proficiebat sapiencia* etcetera et illud Is VII dictum de ipso: *Antequam sciat puer reprobare malum et eligere bonum, derelinquetur terra quam tu detestaris a facie duum regum suorum*. Et sic de aliis que in hac materia faciunt questionem que in secundo huius tractavi. Et quod est sibi possibile

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*LC 2,52
Is 7, 15-16*
pro futuro non neges esse possibile pro preterito si ad hoc huiusmodi argumentacio te impellat. Verum quia non video non esse possibile quod Christus multa futura ignoret secundum animam (ex quo ab eius anima stante unione ut multis est visum potest, ut puto Deus creaturarum cognicionem auferre), non audeo negare esse possibile quod Christus falsum ignoranter affirmat. Intelligo de ignorancia opposita sciencia acquisite quam sanctus pater Augustinus cognitionem vespertinam ut multis placet appellat. Et ob hoc non accipio pro impossibili illud de ipso pro preteritis suis assercionibus affirmari, dum tamen ab eo excludatur possibilitas menciendi et quicquam contra conscienciam affirmandi. Conscienciam dico humanam formatam ex sciencia acquisita quoniam in difficultate pretacta sequitur omnino esse possibile quod ipse asseruit falsum scienter, sciencia tamen divina. Quoniam necessarium est Christum omnia scire futura divina sciencia quia est Deus. Non tamen potest argui aut mendacium aut peccatum ex falsa assercione contra illam scienciam sive contra illam conscienciam, cum illa non sit naturale assercionis principium sed pocius cognition acquisita. Nec divina natura cuius est illa cognition proprum est assercionis illius principium sed

46. neges] eges K; preterito] presenti Js; si ad hoc] sic adhuc Js
47. argumentacio] articulo Js; video] videre V
48. ignoret] ignorant Js; — anima eius Js; anima] ante K
49. cognitionem] cognition T
50. Iesus pr. Christus K; — ignoranter falsum Js
50-52. auferre...cognitionem om. per homoet. V
53. hec pr. non K
54. excludatur] excluditur KJs; ab eo pr. possibilitas K; quicquam] quicquid K
56. sciencia] consciencia V
57. non pr. sciencia L
58. omnia] omnino V; — sciencia divina T; est om. Js
59. tamen om. VJs; assercione] consercione V
60. illam] istam LT; scienciam...illam om. K; illam2] istam L; conscienciam]
   scienciam V; illa] igitur V
61. naturale] naturalis KJs
natura humana. Et ideo non est dicenda talis assercio esse mendacium et
consequenter peccatum nisi sit contra conscienciam illius nature que est
illius assercionis principium naturale. Hac igitur difficultate omissa in qua
multo gracios doctorem acciperem quam aliquid de mea temere affirmarem
(que nobis et vobis videtur michi communis quantum ad auctoritatem
scripture) intelligo quod est infallibilis modo predicto scilicet quod de facto
nunquam fallit et quod argumentum ab eius auctoritate est infallibile eo
modo non simpliciter quin fallere possit ut patuit sed est sic infallibilis quod
nunquam fallit, et hoc est tenendum ex fide. Et ob hoc fidelis christianus ita
adherere debet tali illacioni sicut illacioni necessarie simpliciter quia firma
fide tenet quod talis illacio nunquam fallit. Et sic debes intelligere
argumentaciones Christi et Iohannis quas superius obiecisti et aliorum
similiter.

63. ideo sup. l T; dicenda] dicendum KJs; talis assercio] talem assercionem Js
64. nisi] si non Js
65. hac] ac V; difficultate om. V
66. multo] merito Js; gracios] gravius TV; mea temere] mea temeritate Js
68. quod] quantum K, que Js; infallibilis] fallibilis V; quod² om. VJs
69-71. et quod...fallit om.per homoet. KJs
70. est om. V
71. hoc] hic K
72. sicut illacioni om. T; illacioni necessarie] illacio necessaria V
73. fide om. T
74. obiecisti] obiecestis T, obiecalliJs
<RICARDUS>

1 Dic igitur alia que stomacharis exprimere contra contingenciam futurorum.

IOHANNES

Omnes tenemus et credimus quod Deus prescit cuncta futura quoniam aliter ignoranter aliqua creasset, quod nemo Christianus aut Iudeus aut Saracenus audet astruere. Si igitur sint aliqua non necessaria possunt non evenire et per consequens possunt non esse prescita a Deo. Ex quo sequi michi videtur quod divina sciencia sit mutabilis sive variabilis sicut nostra. Si enim quisquam nostrum aliquid huiusmodi futurum presciret si illud posset non evenire consequetur quod nostra sciencia sive cognicio falli posset. Igitur econtro ex quo Dei presciencia omnino falli non potest inevitabiliter et necessario eveniet omne ab eo prescitum.

RICARDUS

Hec tua argumentacio eque potest fieri de omni futuro effectu. Quoniam tenemus omnia future esse contingencia apud Deum qui potens est ita ea impedire ut facere sic quod sublatis illis contingentibus de quibus loqueris que contra necessaria distinguenter non minus in hac questione involueris.

1. Dic] sic KV, hic Js; stomacharis] stomacha nec Js; contra] qua V
2. teneamus V; quoniam aliter] quia naturaliter T, quia aliter V, quia alias V Js
4. ~ aliqua sint Js; sint] sic sit K, aut V
5. ~ esse non K; michi om. L; quod] quia K
7. aliquid] ad V
8. posset] possit T
9. presciencia p.c. K
10. evenient (evenirent Js) omnia ab eo prescita KJs; omne] esse V
11. quoniam] quam V
13. impedire ut] impedirent V
14. que om. V; hac] quinta Js; questione p.c. T
Unde improvide opinaris contingencia hanc facere questionem. Verumptamen ut tollatur tuum motivum attende quod Deus est candor lucis eterne et speculum sine macula. Intelligo speculum quod non potest aliquatenus maculari unde consequens est quod decipi non potest. Omnis enim decepcio aliqualis est macula. Si igitur esset speculum corporale cuius natura tam esset clara tam pura, ut quecumque res corporalis existens in ipsa statim cum sua existencia reluceret et cum in non esse decideret in ipsa desineret relucere sic tamen quod illud speculum nichil omnino recipet sicut nec speculum corporale quicquam fortasse recipit, ut radios quosque reflectat. Non dubium quin non mutaretur speculum sive res corporalis apparens in ipso sive per ipsum esset sive non esset sed speculum nichilominus immutabile remaneret. Sic quoquo modo potes intelligere invisibilia Dei per ea que fecit, ut scilicet intelligas Deum tale speculum in quo relucent non tantum corporalia sed omnia corporalia et spiritualia omnia existencia et omnia futura atque omnia possibilia, que cum fuerint sub una condicione scilicet sub existencia sic in ipso relucent. Cum fuerint sub differencia
temporis preteriti sic relucent, cum sint future sic sibi apparent et si sint possibilia non futura sic sibi apparent. Sic sibi a seipso intrinsecus presentantur a sua natura. Unde constat quod nullo modo falli potest sicut nos sepe fallimur et angeli falli possunt quorum natura taliter representativa rerum non est. Nec potest propter hoc Dei cognitione variari, quamvis aliqua futura possint non evenire et eciam non esse ab eo prescita et nunquam fuisse prescita. Quia sicut possunt non fore sic possunt in eo quod esse sub illa condicione sive sub illa differencia temporis non relucere et eciam nunquam reluxisse iuxta exemplum quod posui de speculo corporali. Quod si tale esset ut supra descripsi si res aliqua existens posset nunc non esse illa posset in illo speculo nunc non relucere quamvis tale speculum corporale impossibile omnino sit esse. De nobis vero ita esse non potest. Quoniam natura nostra talis non est nec talis esse potest, ut res sub aliqua differencia temporis existens eo ipso sic in nobis reluceat aut nobis appareat.

Et ob hoc falli possumus licet Deus ipse falli non possit.
IOHANNES

1 Ex quo scriptura dicit: *Hec est autem vita eterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum*<sup>1</sup> Io XVII et Mt XVIII: *Angeli eorum in celis semper vident faciem Patris mei qui in celis est*<sup>2</sup>. Tenendum est quod anime sanctorum et angeli hoc speculum sine macula<sup>3</sup> continue intuentur et claro et puro intuitu. Sicut igitur ipsum speculumclare eis relucet in se et per se cum omnia predicto modo a te descripto superius in ipso reluceant et hoc ex natura ipsius speculi, consequens est quod et anime et angeli omnia in ipso speculo contuentur sicut Deus omnia intuetur in illo sive per illud. Aut saltem sequitur ita esse possibile de omnibus aut saltem de futuris contingentibus quod ad nostrum propositum sufficit. Et tamen si creatura sic in illo speculo futura videret decipi et falli posset si illa visa possent non evenire. Cur igitur Deus falli non possit non video si illud quod ab ipso prescitur potest non fore. Magis eciam moveor ex uno quod te audivi

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<sup>1</sup>Io 17,3  
<sup>2</sup>Mt 18,10  
<sup>3</sup>Sap 7,26

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1. dicit + Io XVII L; vita mg. K; ut *sup. l* K  
2. Christum *om. K V; Io XVII om. L; XVII om. D*  
3. vident] vide D  
5. claro et] clare Js; sicut] si L  
6. predicto *p.c. T; descripto] prescripto V*  
7-8. ~angeli et anime Js  
8. omnia in] et omnia que in K, omnia que in Js; contuentur] continentur T, continentur intuentur KJs  
9. sive per *om. V; ~possibile esse Js*  
10. quod ad] quo ad Js; sufficit] sufficierunt KJs  
12. cur] cum Js; possit] potest Js; non] nec V  
13. eciam] et T; uno] quo V; te audivi] a te audivimus KJs, te audivimus T
aliquociens disputare. Si enim contingens sic in illo speculo previsum ab
angelo aut anima beata potest non evenire cum anima beata velit illud fore
sicut illud prescit et sicut videt Deum velle illud fore, consequitur quod sicut
anima aut angelus potest illud non prescire ita potest illud non velle cum
non velit illud fore nisi quia previdet aut prescit illud fore. Et sublata causa
cuiuscumque effectus tollitur ipse effectus. Et ita cum actus voluntatis quo
angelus aut anima beata vult illud fore sit unus effectus presens et prius
fuit scilicet a tempore quo angelus aut anima sic voluit, consequitur quod
res que est et fuit potest non esse pro nunc et potest nunquam fuisse quod
esse non potest. Quoniam omnes philosophi et omnes habentes racionem
fatentur concorditer quod Deus non potest rem preteritam iam facere non
fuisse. Item posset forcius argui de aliis rebus factis a tali voluntate
conformi presciencie scilicet quod sequi posset quod ille res possent non
esse et nunquam fuisse si res ista prescita posset non evenire, quod videtur
nimir absurdum.
Difficultates iste ita habent locum de futuris necessariis sicut de contingentibus. Quoniam eque Deus potest necessaria futura sicut diem proximum et secundum et alias res naturales que naturaliter aut voluntarie a creatura impediri non possunt impedire ut non eveniant sicut potest contingencia facere non futura. Quomodo autem tolli possunt eadem difficultates ponendo creaturam aliquam scilicet animam Christi aut aliam posse in verbo sive per verbum divinum posse intueri futura sive intuitive ea prescire non video. Et tamen per vices iam XX annis illud intelligere laboravi. Ita enim de Christo potes arguere sicut de angelo aut anima cuiusquam beati scilicet primo tempore quo venerat Ierusalem priusquam dixerat suis discipulis suam passionem futuram in Ierusalem propter quam sufferendam illuc accessit ut credimus, quod fuit possibile quod nunquam pateretur. Si igitur sola presciencia in verbo Christus passionem suam presciverat ita quod ex illa sola presciencia pati voluisset et ad locum

4cf Lc 9,22; Mt 17,12

29. iste] ille V
30. ~Deus eque KJs; necessaria] necessario K, facere necessario Js; diem om. K
31. proximum] primum V; et2 om. Js
32. impediri] impedire TV; impedire] impediri T, om. Js; ut} et V
33. autem] igitur Js
34. difficultates om. V; ~aliquam creaturam T; scilicet] aut Js
35. verbum] verum V; posse om. L
36. XX annis] per annos L, per 20 annos Js
37. sicut] sic V
38. cuiusquam] cuiuscumque T; priusquam] postquam VJs
38-39. priusquam...Ierusalem om. K
39-40. quam sufferendam illuc] sufferendam illic passionem K, nos fuisse sufferendam illic Js
40. illuc] illud V; ut credamus L, unde credimus V; quod om. K; ~possibile fuit Js
41. igitur] ergo Js
42. ex om. K
passionis accedere, sicut fuit possibile cum venit Ierusolimis quod non pateretur, sic fuit possibile quod passionem suam non prescivit. Quoniam unum ex alio sequitur. Et si fuit possibile quod passionem suam non previdit fuit possibile quod illam noluit ut videtur et per consequens fuit possibile quod ad locum passionis non accessit, cum sublata causa tollatur eius effectus. Sed quia ut dixi hec difficultas est communis ponentibus contingencia et ea negantibus, ob hoc non oportet hanc difficultatem hoc loco discutere sed alius est locus apcior si Deus donaverit disserendi de ipsa.

Verum quia si tibi diceretur sicut videtur multis probabile quod nulla creatura potest intuitive prescire futura (sed hoc competit soli potencie infinite) tollerentur cuncta que obicis et eciam que ego de Christo adieci. Quoniam omnia illa hanc prescienciam in angelis et animabus beatis et in anima Christi in Dei verbo tanquam in speculo summo videntur supponere. Ideo redi ad alia que superius obicere affectasti. Aut in isto puncto de presciencia Dei si libet profer alia si qua habes.
IOHANNES

Ex presciencia Dei omnium futurorum non video me posse rerum voluntariarum eventum necessarium affirmare, sicut nec possem inevitabilitatem earum arguere propter meam prescienciam earundem si possibile esset me ea prescire. Quoniam non magis imponit necessitatem rebus futuris presciencia Dei in quantum est sola presciencia quam mea presciencia faceret. Ex quo mea presciencia simili sensu sicut et sua vere presciencia diceretur preter hoc quod clare intueor. Si per impossible poneretur aliquas res esse futuras ut multi ponunt veraciter contingentes, quod positum est potencie prescientis Dei omnino impertinens, et ob hoc eo posito nullum inconveniens ex parte illius sequetur non minus Deus eas presciret et eas contingentes presciret. Et ita contingenter evenirent quia essent contingentes prescire. Et ita pervideo quod propter solam prescienciam rerum a Deo nullam de eis possum inevitabilitatem concludere.

Ex quo presciencie eque convenire potest quod prescitur sit contingens sicut quod sit necessarium.

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58. ~ Dei presciencia L
59. voluntarium KJs; possem] possum T, posse KJs
60. prescire] scire V
61. mea] mera K, me V
62. mea] mera K; sicut et sua] et sicut una V
63-64. ~ prescientia vere KJs
64. diceretur] dicetur D; preter] propter KJs; inteor D; si per] quod si per K. propter quod si Js
65. multi] multa D; veraciter + et V
66. quod] et K; ~ prescientis Dei potencie K (possibile Js)
67. sequetur] sequitur K, sequeretur V, consequitur Js; ~ eas Deus L
68. et] ut T; et eas om. Js; presciret om. Js; presciret...contingenter om. V; ita + et ita per K, + per te Js
69. et ita om. K, ita om. Js; pervideo] per previdere K, prevideo T, previse Js; quod] et K, que T
70. eis] eo K; possum] possunt KT
<IOHANNES>

1 Si vero quisquam dixerit prescienciam Dei inevitabilitatem inducere non quia sola presciencia sed quia est presciencia omnipotentis non video adhuc plene quomodo possit refelli.

RICARDUS

Illud stare non potest, quoniam tanto est sapiencia potentior sive maior quanto plura comprehendit non dubium. Et ita ea que est omnipotens sapiencia omnia non tantum existencia aut possibilia sed eciam omnia cogitabilia comprehendit, alioquin omnipotens sciencia omnino non esset. Potencia enim sapiencie qua proprie et essentialiter dicit esse potens non est in operacione ad extra sed est in extensione intrinseca ad plura scibilia.

5 Et ob hoc sciencia omnipotens contendit cuncta scibilia. Cum igitur contingencia saltem cogitabilia sint, quod nemo sanus potest negare cum hoc negando ea cogitet, consequitur quod ista omnipotens sciencia comprehendit etsi non ut futura saltem ut cogitabilia. Et pari racione si essent possibilia omnipotens sapiencia eo ipso sciret ea esse possibilia. Et

10 multo magis aut saltem racione consimili si non solum essent possibilia sed

1. inevitabilitatem] evitabilitate N; inducere] ducere T
2. omnipotentis + seu in seipsa omnipotentis LNTV
3. possit] posset KN
5. est om. Js, est + eque N
7. sciencia] sapiencia L
8. enim] Dei Js; qua om. N
9. extensione + ad intra sive L; intrinseca] extrinseca D
10. et om. K; cuncta scibilia] plura scibilia et etiam cuncta Js
12. hoc] hec Js; ista] illa V; sciencia] presciencia T
14. ea om. KJs
14-16. eo ipso...sapiencia om. per homoet. V
15. aut] vel Js
futura omnipotens sapiencia ea cognosceret esse futura et ita ea presciret. 
Non igitur presciencie Dei repugnat in quantum omnipotens ea prescire, 
quin pocius hoc sibi competit ex natura omnipotentis sciencie nisi aliunde 
causa reperiatur cur ipsa contingencia esse non possint. Volo te insuper aliud 
acute advertere, scilicet quod quamvis sciencia Dei artificis creature tocius 
sit causa rerum omnium, non tamen est Dei presciencia in quantum 
huiusmodi causa rerum sed pocius ipsam esse prescienciam est posterius 
racione causali quam res esse futuras. Quoniam hoc ordine causalitatis, 
sciencia Dei simplex respectu rerum eis voluntas effectiva respectu 
eventus futuri ipsarum earum futurus adventus et presciencia Dei respectu 
earum se habere videntur, scilicet quod primo ordine causalitatis res futura 
est scita a Deo simplici cognizione sicut artificiatum faciendum simplici 
cognizione ab artificis mente dinozicitur. Secundo rem cognitam Deus 
voluntate causativa sive effectiva vult fore. Tercio sequitur quod res est 
futura, et quarto loco quod prescitur a suo artifice sive a Deo. Est enim prius 
origine sive causalitate aut saltem racione causali quod res sit futura quam 
prescita. Quoniam prescire rem nichil est aliud quam scire rem esse futuram

16. cognosceret] cognoscere DJ; ita] in V
17. Non est igitur presciencie Dei repugnans Js
18. ~sibi hoc Js; nisi aliunde] vel aliunde de Js
19. cur] cum Js, om. N; possint] possunt KLTJs; aliud om. V
21. ~omnia rerum K; ~tamen non Js.
22. huiusmodi] huius Js
26. se + earum V; ~videntur habere K
27. est] esse T; a Deo simplici] prima V
28. dinozicitur] cognoszicitur T, dinozicitur Js
29. causativa] creatura T, creativa V; sequitur om. L
30. quod om. L; a1 om. D; a1 + Deo sicut a L; sive a Deo om. L; est] a V
31. origine] ordine Js; causabilitate] causabilitate V; quod] quam L
31-33. quod res...scire om. V
32. ~aliud est KNJs
sive scire rem futuram fore. Prius autem racione causali est rem futuram fore quam eam scire futuram fore. Quoniam si scitur futura esse ipsa est futura non econtra ( nisi forte de facto apud Deum) et ideo racione causali prius est rem futuram fore quam eam a Deo presciri. Et ob hoc prescienza Dei in quantum huiusmodi nullius rei est causa sed est conformitas Dei scientis in quantum res subest illi differencie temporis ad rem futuram sive divine sciencie ad rem scitam. Non intelligo quod in hiis a parte Dei sit aliqua realis distinccio, absit ab animo christiano, sed quod hec intenciones sive raciones sic signant Deum et creaturam in ordine racionum signancium res per modum cause et effectus. Nec puto quod apud subtiliter intelligentem possit negari quod dixi, in quo nemo me reprehendat antequam rem istam acute et quantum profundius potest pertractet. Ex hoc autem statim sequitur quod prescienza Dei in quantum huiusmodi nec evitabilitatem nec inevitabilitatem cuiquam rei adducit, cum sola causa rei effectiva scilicet que rem potest efficere evitabilitatem aut inevitabilitatem eius efficiat, sicut inferius ostendetur. Qualem causalitatem respectu rerum non habet prescienza Dei in quantum prescienza ut patuit sic quod frustra...
circa prescienciam Dei versantur qui causam inevitabilitatis rerum voluntariarum inquirunt, cum presciencia Dei in quantum presciencia nullam inevitabilitatem pocius quam tua que semper est rebus prescitis posterior, posset inducere. Nec presciencia Dei in quantum est omnipotentis si asseratur omnipotentis aliquam possit inevitabilitatem rebus afferre, sed pocius racione amplitudinis suae omnipotencie. Si quomodo possit dici omnipotens, scilicet racione omnipotentis divine sciencie a qua pendent tam evitabilia creature quam creature inevitabilia comprehendit aut ad ea saltem potest extendi, nec alias esset omnipotens. Quoniam illa presciencia esset potencior que utramque cognoscibilium differenciam actu aut saltem potestate haberet sibi subiectam et utramque actu aut potencia contineret. Unde tibi, nisi tibi obducas caliginem, extat perspicuum quod divina presciencia, quamvis quoquo modo dicatur omnipotens scilicet quia potest vel potuit esse respectu cuiuscumque cogitabilis scibilis divisim, non solum inevitabilitatem rebus omnibus non inducit sed insuper clare lucet quod ipsa Dei presciencia inevitabilitatem esse in rebus omnibus omnino non infert. Quoniam si ipsa
divina presciencia inferret inevitabilitatem in omnibus ab ea prescitis, ipsa
presciencia divina amplitudinem sue potencie omnipotentis minueret sive
auferret et seipsam destrueret, quod esse non potest. Si enim ex hoc quod
alia que prescita a divina sciencia necessario sive inevitabiliter sunt
ventura, nulla non necessaria sive evitabilia possunt a divina presciencia
presciri. Et sic non erit presciencia ipsa omnipotens sed erit presciencia
partipotens, scilicet potens ad aliqua scibilia que nondum fuerunt aut sunt non
ad omnia, et ita ipsa a seipsa omnipotenciam omnino auferret et solam
partipotenciam retineret. Presciencia ergo divina quamvis dicatur omnipotens,
sicut inevitabilitatem rebus non affert, ita nec infert.
IOHANNES

1 Nescio in quo possum premissis resistere, nisi forte in hoc quod supponis pro firmo quod sola causa alicuius effectus evitabilitatem aut inevitabilitatem ipsius efficit, quod michi non satis firmum apparet. Quoniam evitabilitas rei pocius est a sua non causa scilicet ab efficiente per privacionem ipsius quam sit a causa ipsius. Quoniam causa effectus alicuius nunquam eam impedit esse sed efficit. Et de inevitabilitate videtur posse intelligi quod illa est in aliquo effectu omnino sine causa agente, sicut reus vadens ad carcerem cum ministro legis voluntarie vadit ad carcerem et si ire nollet minister legis ad eundem eum impelleret. Et sicicio sive ambulacio sua ad carcerem est inevitabilis quia vel fieret ab ipso vel a legis ministro. Nulla tamen videtur causa efficiens inevitabilitatis illius quoniam nec voluntas euntis, cum secundum te possit illam non facere, nec minister quicquam de facto agit circa illam ambulacionem et ita nec minister legis videtur esse causa illius.

RICARDUS

15 De causa inevitabilitatis actuum voluntatis non recte hic sentis. Quoniam
secundum tuum Philosophum tercio Ethicorum et IX Metaphisice una est causa operandi virtuose et non operandi scilicet nostra racionalis potencia agere potens contraria. Et ob hoc causa effectiva talis effectus est causa evitabilitatis illius sicut huiusmodi evitabilitas habet causam, quamvis de facto evitacionem eius non faciat. Et hoc eciam infra plenius ostendetur. De inevitabilitate vero quod possit esse in aliquo actu sive effectu sine causa agente non recte intelligis. Quoniam inevitabilitas quamvis significetur privative hoc nomine tamen est realiter aliquid positivum scilicet veniendi necessitas, et ob hoc sicut dicitur aliquo modo effectus ita oportet quod aliqua sit efficiens causa illius aut plures. Unde in exemplo tuo voluntas ministri legis qua vult reum impellere si velit ab eundo desistere cum voluntate euntis sunt simul causa efficiens inevitabilitatis icionis si ipsa sit inevibilis ut affirmas. Quoniam secundum te inevitabilitas illa ex illis duabus causis primis sibi consequitur. Verum si intimius perscruteris icio illa non potest esse inevitabilis quoniam icio omnino non esset nisi a voluntate

1Eth III.iii
2Metaphys IX.ix

16. secundum om. V; ~philosophum tuum DV; tercio] 4 KJs: una] vana T
17. virtuose] virtuosa D; et om. K; scilicet] sola K; racionalis mg. T, om. V
17-18. agere potens om. V
18. agere p.c. D; et pr. talis D
19. evitabilitatis] inevitabilitatis V; huiusmodi] huius DN
22. non] nec T
23. hoc] huius V; aliquid om. K
25. illius om. NJs
26. qua] qui Js; reum] rerum N, eum V
27. icionis si] communis scilicet V
28. ut affirmas] aut affirmans K; secundum] ex Js
29. primis om. V; sibi om. K
30. et pr. quoniam K; non] nunc K, om. V
euntis procederet. Et ob hoc si incarcerandus voluntarie ire desisteret icionem ad carcerem omnino caveret. Quoniam si sua voluntas omnino non ageret nec ipse membra moveret sed alius. Ipse non iret licet impelleretur aut traheretur aut utroque modo urgeretur ad carcerem sic quod per hoc non potes ostendere quod actus voluntatis sit inevitabilis agenti illum. Nec eciam potes inferre quod ille actus in se simpliciter sit inevitabilis. Quoniam ita potest minister a voluntate impellendi desistere sicut potest reus icionem voluntate omittere. Et sic nec voluntas euntis nec voluntas ministri est causa effectiva inevitabilitatis icionis ad carcerem. Et nichilominus est aliud philosophicum satis perscrutacionis profunde quod hic locum haberet scilicet numquid ille motus ambulacionis productus a voluntate euntis ipsa voluntate cessante movere posset ab alia causa idem numero continuari. Quoniam videtur probable quod sicut ille cause sunt numero distincte ita debent distinguui ipsarum effectus, sicut si due candele simul essent lumen in domo seu diversa lumina ex quibus fit unum extincta una candel a sicut videmus ad sensum corrumpitur unum lumen, scilicet quod fiebat ab ipsa candela et remanet lumen quod fiebat ab alia ut multis videtur et est sentencia magni

31. ob om. Js; carcerandus V
33. ipse] ipsa Js; membra om. T; moveret + se K; alius] aliter Js; licet] nisi Js; pelleretur DNTV
34. per] quod V
35. illum] illius K, illi Js
36. ~ simpliciter in se Js
37. reus om. N
37-38. impellendi...voluntate om. per homoet. V; sicut...nec om. T
39. ad carcerem om. V; et] eciam Js, om. V
39-40. est...perscrutacionis om. per homoet. V
40. ~ satis profunde perscrutacionis L; quod] et Js; hic] ad hic T
42. posset] possit Js; ab] ex V; alia] alio V, aliqua Js; idem] illum Js
44. ipsarum] ipsorum Js, earum L; essent] causet N; una pr. domo Js
46. scilicet om. Js
47. multis] michi KJs
47-48. ~ patris nostri magni K
patris nostri Dionysii in libro suo De divinis Nominibus\textsuperscript{3} capitulo II. Et ob hoc eis videtur quod utraque candela habet proprium effectum qui per aliam ipsarum conservari seu fieri omnino non potest, alioquin extincta una candela cur unum lumen pocius corrumperetur quam aliud non videtur ut dicunt. Si igitur hoc vere dicatur sicut videtur probabile de quo non concurrat hic tractare, tunc actus ille ambulacionis a voluntate productus non videtur per voluntatem ministri posse continuari cessante actu voluntatis euntis ad carcerem. Et sic voluntas ministri nullo modo esse potest causa inevitabilitatis illius icionis ad carcerem. Est aliud forte quod inficit hunc tuum obiectum quod tempore vel instanti in casu quem ponis motus ambulacionis omnino non esset ut posset videri, scilicet in instanti quo voluntas euntis desisteret in quo instanti si minister impellere inchoaret ipse non esset causa motus tunc existenter sed tunc extrinsece incipientis. Nec voluntas prius euntis hunc motum efficeret quia eius voluntas (actum voluntatis intelligo) tunc omnino non esset. Nec unquam est motus sine causa


\textsuperscript{48.} nostri om. V; nostri +sancti L; suo om. KJs; De divino Nomine DNTV, om. L
\textsuperscript{49.} eis om. Js; videtur om. V; quod] ex V; aliam] nullam K, aliquam Js
\textsuperscript{50.} conservari seu] conservatur sed Js
\textsuperscript{51.} hoc] hic V, om. Js; quo + tamen L
\textsuperscript{52.} hic] hoc KJs
\textsuperscript{53.} ~ potest esse K
\textsuperscript{54.} hunc om. K
\textsuperscript{55.} tempore] ipse non esset V; vel om. KJs; instanti] stanti L, instantis Js
\textsuperscript{56.} ~ posset ut videri N; in om. KN; instanti] stanti L
\textsuperscript{57.} omnino...voluntas om. per homoet. V
\textsuperscript{58.} voluntas] voluntatis T; instanti] stanti L; impellere inchoaret] impelleret non coartaret Js
\textsuperscript{59.} existentis] exeuntis V; incipientis] insipientis K
\textsuperscript{60.} prius...voluntas\textsuperscript{2} om. per homoet. Js; voluntas\textsuperscript{2} + qui K
\textsuperscript{61.} tunc] nec V; motus] crematus? V
efficiente. Unde videri posset hic esse sicut tuus Philosophus in VIII Phisicorum\(^4\) probat esse in motibus reflexis atque contrariis, scilicet quod privacio motus et discontinuacio necessario extat in medio. Unde multa dubia in isto tuo casu occurrunt que te ostendere oportet antequam exemplum esset firmum quod affers, que te facere posse non estimo. Et ideo pro constanti suppone quod inevitabilitas effectus voluntatis humane sive evitabilitas eius non nisi a sua causa effectiva esse potest. Quoniam sine efficiente seu effectiva causa nullatenus esse potest eciam si Deus sic ad omnem actum voluntatis vellet inevitabilitatem afferre sicut de legis ministro supponis. Quoniam tunc illa voluntas Dei cum voluntate creature agentis essent cause seu tanquam una causa inevitabilitatis producendi effectus: qui modus nec est verus nec possibilis nec opinionem hanc relevans sicut infra probabitur. Unde fidenter concludere possumus quod Dei presciencia nec affert nec infert inevitabilitatem rebus humanis et nichilominus totum esse infirmum quicquid tu e contrario obieciisti.

\(^4\)Phys VIII.v

63. videri + hic K; hic esse] hoc esset V, hoc esse Js, om. K; in om. V
64. scilicet om. K
65. extat] est KJs
66. tuo om. TJs
77. exemplum + tuum L; affers] aufers DKV; non posse D; estimo] existimo K
68. constanti suppone] instanti suppositione Js; effectus om. V
69. evitabilitas] inevitabilitas K, inevitabilitatis Js; non] ideo V; ~ causa sua K
69-70. sine efficiente seu] seu efficiente sine K
70. ~ causa effectiva L; eciam] et K, hec V; sic om. VJs
71. inevitabilitatem] inevitabiliter KJs; legis] leges D
73-74. seu...modus om. per homoet. V
74. nec rep. V; hanc om. K; relevant] revelans D, relevaris T
75. unde] ut KJs; fidenter] sufficierent Js; possimus] possimus KJs; quod + de N; nec] non L
76. affert] aufert KLVJs; ~ inevitabilitatem nec infert K; infert] effert Js; evitabilitatem V
77. quicquid] quicquam TJs; obieciisti] obiciisti K, obiectisti Js
IOHANNES

1 Perge ulterius et hoc idem effice de Dei voluntate si potes.

RICARDUS

Ex premissis de presciencia Dei ostensis clare consequitur quod voluntas Dei nullam rebus inevitabilitatem adducit quamvis eius voluntas sit causa omnipotens, cum ita voluntati Dei sicut presciencie ipsius contingencia sicut necessaria essent subiecta si essent. Et hoc maxime sequitur si dicatur quod eadem precise voluntati Dei et eius presciencie sunt et possunt esse subiecta ut plurimi opinantur dicentes quod sicut omnia que Deus vult fore sunt ab eo prescita sic omnia quae prescit vult fore. Si vero ea que mala sunt negentur eius fieri voluntate omnino consequitur quod illis effectibus sua voluntas sola, intelligo quamvis ipsa sit omnipotens, nullam inevitabilitatem inducit. Nec ita ut puto desipis ut bona magis inevitabilia quam mala velis astrarere. Unde omnino consequitur quod voluntas divina quamvis sit omnipotens nullam inevitabilitatem rebus affert cum evitabilia sicut inevitabilia eque sub ea sicut sub sua presciencia esse possunt.

1. ~Ulterius iam perge L; hoc] hec V
3. volumat] voluntates V
5. essent1] esset V; Et] ex L; hoc] hec V; sequitur om. K
5-6. maxime...precise om. V; dicatur precise quod eadem KJs (eadem Js)
7. sicut] quod K
7-8. ~ab eo sunt K; sunt...fore om. TJs
8. ea om. K
9. negentur] negantur K
10. nullam + omnino N
11. inducit + quam Js; magis] magna Js
13. affert] auffert K
13-14. ~inevitabilia sicut evitabilia K
14. possunt] possint DLN

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Inprudentissime igitur extat dictum: Deus vult me ita velle, ergo ego inevitabiliter ita volem, cum etsi contingentissime ita velim Deus velit omnipotente sua voluntate ita me velle sicut omnipotente sapiencia ita me velle presciverat. Under claret quod voluntas divina omnipotens non magis inevitabilitatem rebus humanis adducit quam eius omnipotens presciencia.

Quod eciam divina voluntas non inferat seu arguat inevitabilitatem huiusmodi ex premissis facile potes advertere. Quoniam ut secundum te loquar eius presciencia necessitate consequencie infert voluntatem hoc modo: hec res est prescita ergo hec res est volita fore a Deo. Secundum veritatem autem hoc de omnibus bonis consequitur et ob hoc quicquid necessario sequitur ad consequens, sequitur necessario ad antecedens. Si igitur sequatur necessario: hec res est volita fore a Deo ergo inevitabiliter erit pariter necessario sequetur: hec res est prescita a Deo ergo hec res inevitabiliter erit, aut saltem de rebus bonis hoc sequitur sic quod voluntas divina quamvis omnipotens non magis infert inevitabilitatem actuum humanorum quam presciencia eius que est eque omnipotens. Quin pocius e contrario sicut de

15. ~igitur inprudentissime L; igitur extat dictum] dicitur exstat Deus K, dictum extat Js
16. volem] vellem V; velim Deus velit] volui Deus voluit K
17. me om. K; omnipotente] omnipotenti KJs
18. claret] clarat V
19. adducit quam] adducis quod D
20. quod] et K; eciam] et TV; huiusmodi] eius V, huius KJs
22. necessitate] necessitatem KJs; consequencie] quam Js; voluntatem om. KJs
23. ergo hec res est rep. D; autem] ad D, aut Js
24. de pr. hoc1 V; et om. D; quicquid] quicquam D; sequitur] consequitur L
25. ~necessario sequitur VJs; sequatur] sequitur K
26. ~a Deo fore V; erit] esset Js
26-27. pariter...erit rep. D
27. sequetur] sequitur KJs, consequetur N; hec res om. Js
28. sequitur + hec voluntas divina K
29. infert] arguit Js
presciencia supra deduxi ex hoc quod eius voluntas est omnipotens habet evitabilia sicut inevitabilia sibi subiecta. Quoniam si qua voluntas sola inevitabilia in potestate haberet subiecta illa esset potencior aut saltem omnipotenti virtuti propinquior si cum illis sibi subiectis evitabilia eciam in potestate contineret. Quoniam per hoc sibi aliquid potencie adderetur eciam si esset prius potencia infinita. Quoniam in infinitis si essent negari non posset quin omne totum sua parte est maius quamvis eciam negaretur firmum esset quod dico. Quoniam non ex eodem sensu dicitur aliquid esse infinite potencie et esse omnipotens. Quoniam omnipotens non potest quisquam intelligi, nisi possit omnem effectum possibilem saltem divisim efficere quem aliqua potencia cogitabilis posset agere potenter agendo si esset quod soli potencie racionali potest veraciter convenire. Infinite vero esse potencie res naturaliter activa posset intelligi sed nequaquam omnipotens, cum non omnem actum potentem cogitabilem posset efficere.

Ex quo clare consequitur quod illa potencia esset propinquior omnipotencie que haberet sibi subiecta evitabilia sicut inevitabilia quam illa cui sola

31. deduxi] dixi V; ex hoc] ex quo D, et hoc TJs; ~ voluntas eius Js
32-33. quoniam...subiecta om. V
33. sua pr. potestate L; subiecta] substancia Js
34. si] que L, om. K; sibi om. N
34-35. evitabilia eciam in potestate] eciam in sua potestate evitabilia L, evitabilia in potestate Js
35. evitabilia pr. aliquid T; potencie] potentis T, possibile Js
35-36. eciam si] etsi TV
36. in] si K
37. omne s. l L
38. esse] esse KJs; quod...esse om. V; sensu om. KJs; aliquid] aliquis Js
39. est pr. potest N
40. possit] posset KJs
41. quem] quam KJs; potencia cogitabilis] posset cogitabilia Js
42. potencie racionali] potentia rationabili Js; infinite vero om. V
43. esse om. Js; ~ potencie esse L; res om. K
44. potentem] potencie LJs
45. esset om. D
inevitabilia essent subiecta. Ut autem premissa manifestius tibi illuceant
pertinacia tamen defensionis caliginosa depulsa, debes attendere quod
sciencia Dei non inde solum dicitur omnipotens quia comprehendit cuncta
scibilia sed eciam quia cum hoc quod omnia cognoscibilia continet modum
omnem cognoscendi veraciter penes se habet licet sublimius quam habeat
sua factura. Intelligo quod sicut creatura sensitiva suo modo sensibili videt
olfacit audit gustat ac tangit et hiis modis rerum naturas cognoscit, sic
Deus qui omnibus rebus inbibitur suo modo intelligibili huic consimili videt
olfacit audit gustat et tangit ista eadem creata obiecta et ita ipsa dinoscit.
Quoniam non possent cogniciones huiusmodi inesse rebus artificiatis a Deo
nisi similes presupponerent in arte factrice. Unde videre res corporales
audire et similia sepissime Deo in sacris litteris ascribuntur. Sic nec esset in
animalibus ymaginacio memoracio aut estimacio nec breviter in
racionalibus composicio atque divisio predicati cum subiecto, nec copulacio
sive disiunccio aut condicionalis colligacio sic compositorum sive divisorum,
nec sillogizacio sive discursus nec reminiscencia preteritorum, nec fides aut
presciencia futurorum nec breviter actus alius racionis, nisi in arte horum actuum operatrice primaria eternaliter fuissent actus consimiles aut unus equivalens omnibus illis qui sic hos omnes et singulos virtualiter contineret. Ac si omnes in uno chaos intelligibili interius et essencialiter sibi hererent ita ut singulis pro voto posset uti divisim quo ad effectus extrinsecos, hec est igitur infinitas sive omnipotens amplitudo divine sciencie scilicet quod omnia cognoscibilia modis omnibus cogitabilibus cognitivis sua tamen manerie1 in intelligibili comprehendit. Propter hanc potenciam infinitam divine sciencie ipsa in scripturis cogitaciones pluraliter et aliis nominibus eciam pluraliter appellatur, et dicitur quod sapiencie eius non est numerus2 et quod spiritus sapiencie est multiplex. Pariter debes advertere esse de omnipotencia divina sicut de omnia sciencia eius, scilicet quod non solum inde dicitur omnipotencia quia omnia factibilia sunt sue potestati quoquo modo subiecta sed eciam quia cum hoc omni modo potentifactivo existente

1maurie in text, possibly corrupt. Maneries a strange word, referring to genus and species as 'manners' of things. Maronbon, J., Early Medieval Philosophy, London 1983, pp.133-34
2Ps 146,5

64. operatrice] operatione K; fuissent] fuisset V; unus om. KJs
65. equivalens] equivalentes K; illis] aliis Js; hos om. V; ~ omnes hos KJs; et] sed D
66. uno] suo D; chaos] cahos V; intelligibili] intellectualiter K; hererent] inhererent KNJs
67. ita om. L; singulis] simul Js; hec] hoc Js
68. est om. KJs; infinitas] infinita K; sive] sic Js; amplitudo] aplicando Js
69. ~ omnibus modis K; cogitabilibus] cogitacionis K, cogitationibus Js; cognitivis] cognitis Js; sua] suo Js
70. manerie] manere KJs; in om. KvJs; et pr. propter L
71. sciencie] essentie Js; scripturis] scripturas Js; pluraliter om. L; in...nominibus om. T
72-72. et...pluraliter om. T
72. appellatur] appellantur KTJs
74-75. divina...omnipotencia om. per homoet. T
75. inde] enim Js; ~ dicitur inde K; factibilia] scibilia DV
76. eciam] et V; quia om. K; existente] existenti Js
atque cogitabili factibilia potest efficere, sic quod non potest cogitari actus potens alicuius creature existentis aut cogitabilis cuiuscumque sit modi quin Deus illum et illo modo potest efficere. Ac in se haberet unam abyssum

80 intelligibilium potenciarum realiter distinctarum similium in toto potenciis omnibus cogitabilibus quarum singulis pro voto uti posset, sicut possunt eis similibus uti create nature. Et inde dicitur Deus omnipotens et sua voluntas que est principium accionis esse voluntas omnipotens scilicet quia habet talem omnipotenciam operandi non sicut tu posses minus provide estimare,

85 scilicet quod ob hoc dicetur sua potencia omnipotens quia est potencior quacumque potencia existente aut eciam cogitabili aut quia supra omnem potenciam cogitabilem finitam opera potest efficere. Quoniam potencie voluntarie ita convenit agere minus ut maius et debilius sicut forcius. Et ob hoc Deus omnipotens quia habet potenciam voluntariam omnipotentem ita

90 potest agere inomnipotenter sicut omnipotenter. Quoniam potest omnem accionem efficere quam nos possimus cogitare possibilem creature. Et sic potest agere in tali accione inomnipotenter sive partipotenter et per potenciam omnipotentem in nullo derogando eadem sicut tu potes agere

80. intelligibilium] intelligitivam Js; rerum et pr. potenciarum L; realiter] moraliter K
81. quarum singulis] quibus simul Js; singulis pro voto rep. V; uti] ut D; posset sicut] possit si K; eis + in K
82. nature] negare Js; inde] enim Js
83. quia] qui Js
84. omnipotenciam] potenciam L; provide estimare] providere existimare K
85. scilicet pr. quia KJs
86. quacumque] qualiter Js; eciam om. Js; supra] super Js
87. finitam] finita Js; potencie] possibile Js
88. ut] et KJs, aut V; et om. Js
89. omnipotens + dicitur KJs
90. agere...potest om. per homoet. KJs; quoniam] quia L
92. inomnipotenter sive partipotenter] et omnipotenter V
93. eidem] eisdem V
93-94. eidem...derogando om. per homoet. K
minus potenter cum tibi placet non derogando maxime quantitati tue potencie. Sane semper intellige ea que dico et ut ego ea accipio. Sicut de sciencia sive presciencia Dei et eius omnipotencia prospicis sic de voluntate divina advertere te oportet, scilicet quod in omnibus est presciencie sue conformis, aut saltem est conformis presciencie rerum omnium et modo produccionis earum que iniuste non fient et tam multiplex sicut ille. Unde sepe pluraliter voluntates vocatur in sacris scripturis que Dei voluntas dicitur omnipotens quia habet omnipotenciam Dei predescriptam naturaliter sibi herentem. Ymmo, quia est idem cum ea realiter si hec sine astucia atque pertinacia voluntatis advertas perspicue satis videbis quod divina voluntas, seu actum divine voluntatis sive eius potenciam intelligas, non esset omnipotens ut predixi nisi evitabilia posset efficere. Quoniam si ea agere omnino non posset modus operandi et eciam actus cogitabilis sue potestatii deficeret seu illi non esset subjectus, et ita non esset voluntas omnipotens sed esset solummodo voluntas partipotens sive aliquipotens ut sic loquar. Si vero potest facere evitabilia apud et per potenciam creatam (intelligo

95. potencie] possibile Js; sane om. K; et om. Js; ~ ea ego KJs; ea accipio mg. L; sicut sup. l. N
96. omnipotencia] potencia KJs; prospicis] proprius Js 96-97. et...divina om. V
97. advertere] admittedere Js; scilicet] sic Js, om. N; ~ sue presciencia L; sue] sua K, seu N
98. aut saltem est conformis om. T
99. tam] tamen Js
100. vocatur] vocantur KJs; que ] quo K; ~ dicitur voluntas Dei LJs, dicitur voluntas Deus K
101. predescriptam] et prescriptam K, prescriptam L, descriptam non Js
102. herentem] inherentem K; quia] quod K; hec] hoc Js; sine] sive KJs
102-103. astucia atque pertinacia] astutiatur sive pertinencia Js
103. predixi] dixi KJs; posset] possit V; si sup. l. K
106. cogitabilis] cogibilis Js; potestati] potanti D, potestate V
107. deficeret] defueret Js; subjectus] similis Js
109. potest] potes KJs; facere om. T; apud + te KJs; et] eciam T

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110 quoniam talia sunt cogitabilia), consequens est quod talia evitabilia iam efficit.

Quoniam nulla magis evitabilia potes cogitare ut estimo quam actus intrinsecos libere voluntatis angelice aut humane iam factos. Aut si noster magis evitabilia cogitare verbis illa describe si libet.
IOHANNES

1 Difficulia michi ista videntur. Infirmari tamen ea posse non video, quia nec cogitare valeo, quantum michi videtur aliqua magis evitabilia quam actus voluntatis nobis aut angelis in innocencia statu intrinsecos. Sed quid si dixero talia simpliciter non esse factabilia sed repugnanciam includere ea esse? Et ob hoc affirmas vero quod voluntas divina omnipotens ea non habet nec potest habere subiecta quoniam de solis factibilibus racio tua premissa procedit. Quomodo possum in ista assercione refelli?

RICARDUS

Premissa mea deduccio non habet quod ista tua assercio simpliciter refellitur, sed hoc solum agit ut istam inevitabilitatem omnium futurorum quam fabricas causam non habeat omnipotentem voluntatem divinam. Et ideo ita deves eam accipere ut concludat quod omnipotencia voluntatis divine exigat evitabiles creaturas nisi aliunde sit causa aliqua quare tales res omnino esse non possunt. Hoc enim ut vides nisi <secus sencias> est aperte deductum. Quoniam nec potencia volitiva divina nec actus voluntatis illius potencie si

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1. ~ista michi K; ista] illa V; tamen] cum Js
2. videtur om. K; aliqua] aut N
3. in om. K; intrinseco V; quid] quod V; dixero] dico K
4. ~non esse simpliciter Js; esse1 om. V; factibilis] scabilia N, facilia K; ~esse ea KJs, eam esse V
5. affirmas vero] affirmando LTV; ea om. N
6. factibilibus] facilibus K
7. ista] illa V
8. ista] illa V; simplex refellatur KJs, refellit simpliciter L; refellatur om D
9. solum] solummodo L; istam] illam V
10. habeat] habeant et K; ita om. K
11. omnipotencia] omnis potentia Js; divine] divina N
12. nisi] non K; tales res] talis res K, talem rationes V
14. illius om. K

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15 eos racione distinguas esset omnipotens si non posset tales res sibi habere subiectas, nisi aliunde dico sit causa repugnans huiusmodi rerum essencie. Constat autem tibi et omni exercitato ingenio sicut de presciencia iam deduxi quod actus omnipotens divine voluntatis repugnanciam istam non efficit. Ex quo omnipotencia eiusdem voluntatis que racione causali prior est actu earumdem rerum existenciam aut saltem earum possibilitatem exigat. Quoniam sic actus voluntatis divine suam causam destrueret sive minueret sibi subtrahendo potenciam parcialem quam originali causalitate respectu eiusdem voluntatis haberet, quod omnino nequit intelligi. Quoniam quamvis actus voluntatis divine omnipotenciam eius primam causaliter ut sic loquar restringat seu limitet, sic scilicet ne omnia faciat seu actu producat sed solum aliqua que sue omnipotencie sunt subiecta tamen intelligi nequit omnino ut ipse actus voluntatis divine omnipotenciam suam sic minuat seu restringat, ut eadem potencia ad aliqua facienda potencia careat pro omni mensura quam non obstante actu ipsa eadem potencia divine voluntatis haberet, sicut de presciencia divina esse supra disserui. Nec in tua infirma voluntate valet intelligi quod tua voluntas habeat aut haberet potentiam
aliqua extrinseca faciendi nisi actus intrinsecus potencie eiusdem obstaret, quamvis verum sit quod voluntas tua ad multa habet potenciam quam actus ipsius potencie sic restringit seu limitat quod ea de facto nequaquam efficiat.

Quoniam hoc exigit ordo nature quod potencia volitiva non exit in actum extrinsecum nisi mediante actu suo intrinseco sicut tu in III libro De anima\(^1\) versus finem in IX Metaphisice\(^2\)et in aliiis libris didicisti. Et ob hoc actus suus intrinsecus limitat terminat aut cohibet potenciam non intelligo violenter sed libere, ne cuncta sed aliqua certa que potest efficiat. Sed eam quoad alia essencialiter possibilia non restringit nec cohibet quin possit in illa pro aliqua temporali mensura. Si hanc theoriam que satis in se extat perspicua vales perspicere nullatenus dubitabis quod actus divine voluntatis omnipotentis sive omnipotens causa esse non potest quod omnipotencia eiusdem divine voluntatis res evitabiles non possit efficere. Ex quo aliunde et prius causaliter eadem omnipotencia exigit ut huiusmodi res sicut et alia genera omnia rerum cogitabilium possit producere, nisi aliqua causa alia

\(^1\)De anima III.ix-x
\(^2\)Metaph. IX.i
inproducibilitatis earum obsistat. Frustra igitur, ut iam dixi causam inevitabilitatis actuum humanorum ex parte omnipotentis divine voluntatis inquiris cuius omnipotencia possibilitatem rerum talium essentia

necessitate continet nisi alia causa inproducibilitatis earum obsistat. Ex quo omnino consequitur ut supra deduxi quod huiusmodi res in nobis existunt, cum nulle res cogitabiles ut iam dixi magis evitabiles intelligi possint quam actus intrinsiceti voluntati humane sive angelice et hoc si preter voluntatem divinam nulla sit causa impossibilitatis ipsarum. Ex isto eodem clare deducitur quod accio extrinseca voluntatis divine causa esse non potest inevitabilitatis actuum humanorum huiusmodi. Quoniam sicut voluntas Dei non potest restringere aut limitare potenciam divinam omnipotentem racione causali priorem ipsa voluntate, ne pro aliqua mensura possit in quacumque divisim prius origine sibi subicta, sic a multo maior nec propria operacio divine voluntatis (quacumque sit illa sive sit accio a sola voluntate divina producta sive sit accio communiter a voluntate divina et ab agente creato producta) potest eandem potenciam divinam restringere limitare seu cohibere sive minuere (aut quomodocumque aliter vocare volueris) respectu
eorundem prius origine possibilium illi potencie, cum sit effectus extrinsecus
ipsius divine potencie. Et effectus cuiusvis potencie nunquam potest sic suam
causam restringere sive minuere. Unde aperte consequitur quod nulla accio
Dei ad extra causa est aut esse potest inproducibilitatis rerum contingencium
et nichilominus per singulos modos agendi divine voluntatis illud idem
inferius particulariter ostendetur. Et eadem deduccione convincitur quod
nulla res creatae causa esse potest inproducibilitatis huiusmodi cum omnis res
creata sit effectus voluntatis divine et eius omnipotentis potencie.

64. illi] isti Js
68. illud] id DL
70. creat] causata Js; cum om. V
IOHANNES

1. Si voluntas mea actum producat intrinsecum respectu alicuius extrinseci et per actum opus efficiat nunquam poterit mea voluntas pro alio tempore quicquam illorum producere que tamen non dubium ante illius temporis presenciam potuisset, et sic per actum suum proprium minuitur sua potencia.

5 Sic insuper quia voluntas mea agit extrinsecas acciones per corporalia instrumenta, que instrumenta naturalia non dubium continue consumuntur et debilitantur ex opere sicut instrumenta artificum videtur consequi quod pro illo tempore potuit voluntas opus forcius corporale efficere quam unquam poterit post lapsum illius. Et sic videtur quod propter actum proprium minuitur eius potencia. Ex quo sicut dixi de instrumentis artificum instrumenta corporalia voluntatis mee debilitantur continue in agendo.

RICARDUS

Non repetis quod assumpsi. Non enim dixi quod effectus non potest restringere suam causam pro tempore certo futuro, sed dixi quod non potest potenciam eius minuere seu restringere pro omni mensura scilicet quin ad quemcumque suum effectum pro aliqua mensura habuit facultatem, quod

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1. producat rep. T
2. nunquam] numquid Js; alio] aliumo Js
3. que] quam Js
5. extrinsecas rep. N
6. consumuntur] consumunt T
7. artificium om. K, artificium V
9. poterit] potuerunt K, potuit TJs; illius] ipsius K
10. sicut] illud KJs
11. ~continue debilitantur K
12. repetis] reperis Js
13. restringere suam] suam astringere Js
15. suum rep. N; ~effectum suum KJs
sufficit ad nostrum propositum. Quoniam ex hoc manifeste consequitur quod nunquam aliquid effectus divine potenciae causa esse potest inproduccibilitatis simpliciter, scilicet pro omni mensura rerum contingencium que ex natura omnipotencie eidem divine potenciae sunt subiecte nisi sint inproduccibles aliunde. Unde nec in tua voluntate aliter esse potest, quoniam debilitatio instrumentorum tuae voluntatis quamvis minuat potenciam quoad aliquidus effectus forsitan pro futuro, non tamen illud efficit ut illi effectus sint et fuerint inproduccibles a tua voluntate pro omni temporalis mensura. Item non poteris habere pro firmo quin Deus omnem rem sibi possibilem pro una mensura ab eo non factam pro quacumque mensura futura possit efficere, non sicut forte est de tua voluntate infirma cuius potencia pendet a tempore cui subicitur. Et ob hoc quoad divinam potenciam, per tuos objectus premessos aut similes non potes resistere quin semper ad quacumque effectus producibles non productos pro futuro habeat facultatem, sic quod nec eius voluntas nec accio nec alius effectus eius extrinsecus potest eius potenciam omnipotentem restringere sive minuere quamvis eam ut dixi limitet de facto seu terminet ne cuncta sibi subjicta efficat, sicut instrumentum artificis limitat seu terminat potenciam artificis ne agat alius artificium quam possit illo instrumento efficere.

16. consequitur] sequitur T
18. scilicet] sed K
19. eidem] eiusdem Js; divine] dive Js; sint] sunt V
20. debilitacio] debilitas KJs
22-23. sunt et fuerunt V
23. a om. D
25. futura + factam V
26. non om. KJs; ~ voluntate tua L
26-27. ~ a tempore cui subicitur pendet K
28. potes resistere] potest restringere KJs; semper om. L
29. inproduccibles T; eciam pr. pro L
30. alius] alterius K; eius om. N
31. cam] ea KJs 32. seu] aut KJs; ne] nec KJs
Iam michi videtur hec tercia radix meae opinionis ex suis propriis principiis esse subversa. Sicuti superius promisisti, ramos eius si placet sicuti de presciencia efficisti propera resecare. Ecce enim, quamvis de presciencia Dei quod non sit causa rerum in quantum presciencia eius dumtaxat capere valeam, et ideo quod presciencia Dei respectu alicuius contingens futuri possit per actum humanum non esse et nunquam fuisse presciencia respectu illius negare non possum, tamen de voluntate Dei aliter et aliud potest videri. Quoniam non videtur possibile quod creatura possit modo efficere quod voluntas Dei respectu huius contingens non sit nec unquam fuerit respectu huius voluntas, sic quod non videtur qualiter per creaturam aut actionem ipsius possit hec verificari: Deus non vult istud fore nec unquam voluit istud fore. Primo quidem hoc videtur quoniam divina voluntas est prima causa omnium rerum et ideo non potest sicut eius presciencia a suis creaturis ab eo productis pendere. Penderet autem Dei voluntas que causa est ab actione creature si per actionem creature posset non esse et nunquam fuisse respectu creaturarum. Secundo quidem quia

1. ~michi iam L; hec om. T; propriis] principiis Js
2. sicuti1] sicut L; sicuti2] sicut KL Js
3. de om. K; effecisti] efficisti K Js, om. V
4. eius] huius Js
7. aliter] arguitur Js
8. potest videri] potest dici et videri K, dici potest et videri Js; possit] posset K
9. huius + voluntas K, huius + voluntatis Js
10. fuerit] fuit LV; voluntas om. Js; ~quod sic K
11. hec] hoc Js; istud] illud KV Js
12. nec...fore om. Js; istud ] illud K
14. ab eo] a Deo Js
14-15. penderet...est rep. V
15. ~est causa K; causa om. T Js
voluntas Dei respectu talis effectus ab eterno erat voluntas Dei respectu
ipsius. Eternum autem nullo modo sub racione aliqua qua est eternum potest
habere pro causa rem factam in tempore. Quoniam causa necessario precedit
causatum in tempore nunquam ipsum sequitur. Unde Philosophus magnus
Aristoteles dicit XII Metaphisice1 quod causa efficiens semper precedit
effectum. Et ideo videre non possum quod per creaturam aut per accionem
creature sive omissionem accionis creature fieri possit quod divina voluntas
nunquam fuit voluntas respectu huius rei vel illius demonstrata re que de
facto per nostram voluntatem extat futura, aut quod per accionem creature
fieri potest hec vera: Deus non vult hoc fore nec unquam voluit istud fore.
Quoniam primum horum ex secundo consequitur, quod enim potest hanc
verificare potest facere Deum non velle nec unquam voluisse illud fore.

1Metaphys. XII.iv-v

17. talis...respectu om. per homoet. V
18. ipsius] illius L; autem] aut VJs
20. caus//tum Js; tempore + et L
21. Metaphisice om. N; causa] causam K; efficiens + per creaturam aut T; precedit] proecdit D
22. quod] aut T, om. Js; creaturam] creatam N
24. nunquam] non T; fuit om. D; demonstrata] demonstrate Js; re] rei V, om. Js; que
om. V
25. aut] nec Js; quod om. TV
26. istud] illud KJs
De presciencia recte sentis. De voluntate Dei consequenter minus prudenter advertis. Quoniam supponere debes de voluntate divina sicuti de eius presciencia advertisti scilicet quod divina voluntas existens causa talium futurorum (causa tamen precedens seu prima in tempore non presens in actu) potest non esse causa respectu ipsorum et potest nunquam fuisse causa productiva ipsorum, et quod hoc sequi seu inferri potest a causa secunda sive ex accionie ipsius aut ex omissione accionis eiusdem et econtrario quod voluntas Dei eterna potest aliquorum esse causa per actionem creature ab ea effecte. Non est enim hoc magis inconveniens modo racione solius causalitatis quam si Deus esset causa finita respectu omnium productorum. Quoniam adhuc esset in ea causalitatis prioritas sicut nunc est in celo et eius motore respectu actuum humanorum. Nec reputas impossibile ut suppono sive inconveniens de motore et motu celi qui sunt cause quoquo modo omnium futurorum operum humanorum, quod possunt nunc non esse cause et nunquam fuisse cause respectu operum humanorum certorum. Quoniam non ambigis quin saltem Deus potest hoc facere et ob hoc in facto ipso in se nulla est impossibilitas ut tu fingis scilicet quod causa prima in tempore

3. presciencia] potencia K Js; advertisti om. N; causa] causam K
4. non] necessario Js
6. hoc] hec D
7. ex...et om. T; eiusdem] ipsius L
9. effective] effective Js; racione om. KJs
10. quam] quoniam Js; finita] futura Js
11. sicut] sed Js
13. motore] morte Js
14. omnium futurorum operum] enim futurorum omnium Js
15. respectu om. L
16. saltem quin KJs; ipso] isto K
17. ut] et K; tu rep. T; scilicet om. KN; in pr. causa N; ~prima causa L
respectu actus futuri potest non esse et nunquam fuisse causa respectu illius.

Quod vero non sit impossibile ut hoc sequatur ex accionie sive ex omissione

accionis secunde cause sive cause posterioris in tempore racionem facilem potes attendere. Quia causa prima in tempore respectu rerum fiendarum ab aliis causis immediatis eo ipso quod est prima in tempore sic pendet quoad hoc quod sit causa in actu rerum illarum a causis posterioribus in tempore, aut saltem talem relationem habet ad causas secundas (non secundum illud quod est in se sed in quantum est causa huiusmodi) quod non potest esse causa in actu repectu rerum ipsarum nisi mediantibus causis posterioribus sive secundis. Et ideo necessario consequitur quod per privacionem accionis earum ipsa causa prior potest fieri non causa et potest nunquam fuisse causa respectu rerum illarum. Aut saltem sequitur quod potest ex privacione accionis earum sequi quod causa prior nec est nec unquam fuit causa respectu rerum illarum, quamvis de facto fuerit et sit causa eterna ipsarum. Causa tamen in potencia non in actu ut dixi sicut in teipso sepissime experiris, scilicet quod tua voluntas qua precipis tuo ministro aut voluntas qua sibi potestatem confers ut certos cibos tibi in mensa provideat est causa.
prior in tempore respectu provisionis ciborum quam voluntas tui ministri qua eos providet. Quoniam tua voluntas est causa parcialis voluntatis illius et tamen quod tua voluntas sit aut fuerit causa provisionis eorum quodammodo pendebat et pendet (si adhuc provisio sit futura) a voluntate tui ministri. Quoniam si minister tuus huiusmodi cibos tibi providere noluerit nunquam tua voluntas faciende provisionis causa fuit. Sic quod si provide attendisses, ex illo quod tu pro tua opinione inducis (scilicet quod voluntas Dei respectu rerum humanarum est causa prior in tempore quam voluntas humana) clare consequitur eiusdem opinionis contrarium scilicet quod ipsa voluntas divina potest non esse et nunquam fuisse causa ipsarum. Nec ex hoc potes inferre ut niteris quod res facte seu fiende sunt cause voluntatis divine aut quod effectus sit causa sue cause, sicut non potes probare quod sunt cause presciencie eius sicut eciam nec potes in exemplo premisso inferre quod voluntas tui ministri est causa voluntatis tue precedentis. Sed potes concludere quod cause inferiores facte sive fiende sunt cause saltem ilacionis quod divina voluntas est et fuit causa respectu aliquarum rerum a
causis posterioribus fiendarum et quod ab eterno fuit causa earum. Quod non
solum non est inconveniens sed verum esse manifeeste probatum est, sicut
voluntas tui ministri est causa illacionis saltem quod tua voluntas est aut fuit
causa provisionis faciende per ipsum ut dixi. In hoc tamen extat diversitas
quod tua voluntas non potest non esse aut non fuisse voluntas respectu illius
provisionis licet possit non esse et non fuisse causa provisionis ipsius. Divina
vero voluntas sicut potest non esse et non fuisse causa respectu talis actus
humani qui de facto est futurus, sic eque potest non esse et non fuisse
voluntas respectu ipsius. Quoniam unum ex alio semper consequitur ut sepius
iteravi superius, et ob hoc quicquid est vel esse potest causa illacionis unius
est aut esse potest causa illacionis alterius.

50-53. est...voluntas\(^1\) *om. per homoet.* V
52. esse *om.* Js; sicut\(^1\) sed K
53. aut\(^1\) et L
54. faciende\(^1\) fiende KJs
55. potest non *om.* L; non *pr.* voluntas\(^2\) D
55-57. aut...esse *om. per homoet.* K
55-56. voluntas\(^2\)...fuisse *om. per homoet.* V
56. licet...provisionis *om. per homoet* Js; ipsius *om.* V
57. non *pr.* causa T; causa\(^1\) tam D
58. sic\(^1\) sicut Js
59. ~respectu illius voluntas Js; ipsius\(^1\) illius Js; provisionis ipsius. Divina vero
voluntas sicut potest et non fuisse illius *pr.* quoniam K; unum *om.* N; consequitur
*om.* N; ut\(^1\) et K
60. iteravi\(^1\) tractavi KJs; hoc\(^1\) hec D
60-61. unius...illacionis *om. per homoet.* KJs
61. causa *om.* V
Eleganter sentenciam istam Christus expressit cum dicit Mt XXVI: *An putas quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit michi modo plusquam duodecim legiones angelorum?*¹ In quo dicto clare patet quod Deus Pater potuit velle exhibere XII legiones angelorum et tamen non exhibuit.

Et sic constat quod Deus Pater potuit hoc velle, cum non posset exhibere nisi volendo. Et similiter patet quod Christus hoc potuit impetrare per actum voluntatis humane scilicet per oracionem ipsius. Unde clare consequitur quod per voluntatem humanam fieri potuit aut saltem ex voluntate humana sequi potuit quod respectu exhibicionis XII legiones angelorum Pater voluntatem habuisset tunc et eciam ab eterno, et quod voluntas Patris tunc causa fuisset et eciam ab eterno causa fuisset exhibicionis XII legionum angelorum licet de facto Dei Patris voluntas causa huiusmodi exhibicionis non fuerit. Vide igitur quid in isto respondeas et sic responde in cunctis similibus, aut enim dicas non esse inconveniens nec impossibile ut causa secunda possit per suam accionem facere ut causa prior sit causa respectu certi effectus et

¹Mt 26,53

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1. dicit] dicit Js; Math. *pr.* an Js
2. quia] quod Js
4. potuit] potest KJs; ~ 12 legiones exhibuisse angelorum Js
5. potuit hoc velle] potest hoc velle sive potuit Js
6. patet] posset Js; hoc] hic K
8. sequi] fieri Js
9. voluntatem mg. T
10. habuisset *om.* N; tunc...fuisset *om.* per homoet. V
11. ~ etiam et Js; ~ fuisset causa Js; exhibicionis *om.* K
12. voluntas causa *om.* D
13. respond] respondeas et sic respondere V; enim *om.* K
14. dicas] dicis D, dices LNT; nec] aut K, neque Js
15. causa prior sit causa] voluntas Dei sit et ab eterno fuerit Js; certi *om.* V
quod fuerit eciam causa ab eterno respectu illius, et quod causa secunda potest per suam accionem facere ut voluntas Dei sit et ab eterno fuerit respectu certi effectus. Et non est incommensurabilis illud quod de hoc superius posuisti, aut saltem dices quod causa secunda potest per suam accionem esse causa illacionis aut causa sine qua non quod prior causa sit et fuerit causa ab eterno respectu certi effectus, et quod voluntas humana potest per suam accionem esse saltem causa illacionis quod voluntas Dei sit et fuerit ab eterno voluntas respectu certi effectus. Et forte utrumque potest apte intelligi si rationem sequaris. Quoniam esse causam respectu alicuius et esse voluntatem respectu illius non solum includunt actum voluntatis et potentiam activam, sed relacionem important ad ipsum effectum qui respectus in quantum talis est effici posse videtur a causa secunda quod multis videtur probabile. Pro quo facit quod Deus vult et ab eterno voluit diabolum damnare, et tamen diabolus ante casum suum facere potuit quod Deus voluit eum nunquam damnare sed quod voluit eum ab eterno salvare.

Dic igitur ubi arguitur a causa an cum hoc modo arguitur: diabolus fuit ab...
eterno peccaturus irremediabiliter ergo Deus eum ab eterno dampnare voluit, an cum econtra infertur: Deus ab eterno voluit diabóulum dampnare ergo diabolus fuit ab eterno peccaturus irremediabiliter.

IOHANNES

35 Cur non potest dici quod in secunda illacione fit argumentum a causa?

RICARDUS

Quia Deus non dampnat nisi pro culpa prima nec quemquam vult aut voluit nisi pro culpa dampnare tanquam pro causa meritoria damnnacionis. Ergo Deus ideo dampnavit diabolum et ideo voluit ipsum dampnare quia ipse peccavit aut quia fuerat peccaturus. Unde consequitur quod mala accio voluntatis diaboli ab eterno futura causa fuit quodammodo quod voluntas Dei fuit respectu damnnacionis diaboli et quod fuit causa ab eterno respectu illius. Quoniam ut dixi Deus non preparat cuiquam damnnacionem nisi propter futuram eius culpam. Consequens ergo est quod creatura per accionem suam potest esse causa quod Deus vult certum actum et quod ab eterno illum voluit et quod ab eterno divina voluntas fuit causa illius. Et hec omnia sequi

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32. eum om. V; ~ab eterno eum LTK
33. an] ante D; ~voluit ab eterno K
34. fuit] fuerit N; ab eterno om. KJs; ~irremediabiliter peccaturus KNJs; ab pr. peccatus N
35. potest] posset Js; ~dici potest K; quod om. KJs; quod pr. fit Js
36. quia] quod Js; quemquam] quemcumque T, quemquem Js
37. tanquam] tam L; ergo] igitur KJs
39. ipse pr. fuerat KJs
40. ~ab eterno diaboli K
41. respectu...eterno om. per homoet. T
42. cuiquam] alicui L
43. futurum om. K; ~est ergo V; ergo] igitur Js
44. ~actum certum T
45. et quod] quod etiam Js; ~causa fuit K; omnia] precedentia Js
videntur propter relacionem quam hec nomina *causa* et *voluntas* important, non propter rem ipsam in qua fundatur relatio cuius rei creatura causa nullatenus esse potest.

48. potest] posset V
LIBER XVI XIIIm CAPITULUM

<RICARDUS>

1 Ut autem scias quod hoc a meipso sine testimonio scripture non profero
ecce legitur II Regum$^1$ ultimo et similis sentencia quasi est primo
Paralipomeno XXI$^2$ capitulo narrato, qualiter David rex fecit totum populum
numerari. Et factus est sermo Domini ad Gad prophetam et videntem dicens:

5 Vade et loquere ad David: Hec dicit Dominus: Trium datur tibi opcio. Elige
unum quod volueris ex hiis ut faciam tibi. Cunque venisset Gad ad David
nunciat ei dicens: Aut septem annis veniet tibi famies in terra tua aut tribus
mensibus fugies adversarios tuos et illi te persequentur aut certe tribus
diebus erit pestilencia in terra tua. Nunc ergo delibera et vide quem
respondeam ei qui misit me sermonem. Dixit David ad Gad: Coartor undique
nimis sed melius est michi ut incidam in manus Domini multe enim
misericordie eius sunt, quam in manus hominum. Immisitque Dominus
pestilenciam in Israel de mane usque ad tempus constitutum et mortui sunt
a Dan usque ad Bersabee LXX milia virorum. Ubi clare exprimitur quod

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$^1$ II Rg 24, 11-15
$^2$ I Par 21, 9-14

1. ut| et KT; autem| aut K
2. legi|tur] loquitur K; II Regum] rege L; quasi quasi L; primo om. L
3. XXI| 12 K; capitulo om. L; narrat] narrate L; narrante K
5. opcio] occasio K; eligi] eligere Js
6. ex hiis om. Js; ad rep. D
8. persequen|tur] persequuntur DNT; persequuntur te KJs
9. diebus] annis N, om. K; in terra tua om. KJs; quem] quid KJs
10. me] hunc Js; dixit] dicit Js; autem pr. David L
11. est] et V
12. sunt eius misericordie KJs; eius om. T; immisitque] immisit Js
13. constitutum om. KJs
14. a Dan] ab Adam Js; ad om. DLTV; clare om. Js
eleccio David causa fuit quod Deus pestilenciam immisit in populum. Elige inquit *unum quod volueris ex hiis ut faciam tibi.* Nec Deus pestilenciam immisisset nisi David elegisset pestilenciam. Si vero eleccio David fuit causa quare Deus illud egit eadem eleccio aut eius futuricio causa fuit quare Deus illud agere tunc voluit et eciam quare illud agere voluit ab eterno. Quoniam si David non illud elegisset Deus illud agere noluisset iuxta seriem huius historie, et nichilominus ex isto facto patenter a Deo supponitur libertas contradiccionis in David qua potuit unumquodque de illis tribus eligere alios duobus omissis. Quoniam a Deo dicitur: *Trium datur tibi opcio,* quod minus improvide sibi dictum fuisset nisi indifferenter unumquodque illorum trium eligere potuisset. Item III Regum3 tercio capitulo scribitur Deum dixisse Salomoni: *Quia postulasti verbum hoc, et non petisti dies multos nec divicias aut animas inimicorum tuorum, sed postulasti sapienciam ad discernendum iudicium,* ecce feci secundum sermones tuos et dedi tibi cor sapiens et intelligens etc. Ubi exprimitur quod postulacio Salomonis causa fuit quare

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3 Rg 3, 11-12
voluntas dandi in Deo. Unde videtur quod postulacio fuit causa quare Deus
ab eterno dare voluit. Quoniam sublacio effectus causam non tollit sed
econtra. Non intelliges ex isto ut iam dixi quod creatura per accionem
suam possit esse causa voluntatis divine, sed quod possit forsitan aliquid
(dici causa quod voluntas divina dici possit causa sive voluntas respectu certi
actus possibilis. Verum si dicatur quod possit saltem esse causa illacionis
causa scilicet sine qua non ut logici solent loqui, debet sufficere ad
tollendum tuos obiectus ut patuit. Et quod voluntas creature possit esse causa
illacionis et eciam causa sine qua non scriptura exprimit locis innumeris.
Ecce enim Deuteronomio XXVIII\textsuperscript{4} capitulo et simile legere vales capitulis IV
VIII et XI eiusdem et Levitici XXVI capitulo isto modo: \textit{Si vero audieris
vocem Domini Dei tui, ut facias atque custodias omnia mandata eius que ego
precipio tibi hodie te faciet Dominus Deus tuus excelsiorem cunctis gentibus
que versantur in terra venientque super te benedicciones iste. Benedictus eris
in civitate benedictus in agro benedictus fructus ventris tui etc. Quod si
nolueris audire vocem Domini Dei tui venient super te omnes malediccciones
iste et apprehendent te. Maledictus eris in agro maledictum horreum tuum}

\textsuperscript{4}Dt 28, 1-4.15-18

45. videtur \textit{om.} V
46. dare \textit{om.} K
48. quod possit\textit{]} posset K
49. possit\textit{]} posset Js, \textit{om.} K
50. dicatur quod \textit{mg.} L
51. causa \textit{om.} KJs; logici\textit{]} soliti Js
53. eciam\textit{]} hec V; et hoc \textit{sup. l. pr.} exprimit K; innumeris\textit{]} multis L
54. capitulo \textit{om.} L; simile\textit{]} simili D, similem LN, simile K; capitulis\textit{]} capitulo D
55. eiusdem\textit{]} eius Js, \textit{om.} LN; vero\textit{]} autem L
56. Dei \textit{om.} DNTV
57. faciet\textit{]} faciat V; \textit{~} faciet te L; excellentiorem Js
58. venientque\textit{]} venietque T
59. quod\textit{]} et ibi prius quod L, et Js
60. nolueris\textit{]} volueris NV; tui \textit{om.} KJs
61. iste \textit{om.} KJs; apprehendunt\textit{]} apprehendunt K, apprehendant T

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et male dicte reliquie tue maledictus fructus ventris tui etc. Sic Ysaie primo capitolo legitur: Si volueritis et audieritis me bona terre comedetis quod si nolueritis et me ad iracundiam provocaveritis gladius devorabit vos etc. Sic Ieremia XVIIa scribitur: Si audieritis me dicit Dominus et non inferatis onera per portas civitatis huius in die sabbati etc. ingredientur per portas civitatis huius reges et principes sedentes super solium David et ascendentes in curribus et equis et habitabitur civitas hec in sempiternum etc. Si autem non audieritis me ut sanctificetis diem sabbati etc. succeedam ignem in portis eius et devorabit domos Ierusalem et non extinguetur. Idem legitur Ieremia XXII capitolo. Et hec sentencia dicitur clarius Ieremia VIIb ubi non tantum sic legitur Deum voluisse cum prescivit quid populus erat facturus, sed insuper legitur quod ipse expressit quid malus populus commisit hoc modo: Si bene dixeritis vias vestras et studia vestra etc. inhabitabo vobiscum in loco isto in terra quam dedi patribus vestris a seculo et usque in seculum etc. Et nunc quia fecistis omnia opera hec dicit Dominus: Et locutus sum ad

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5Is 1, 19-20
6Jer 17, 24-25.27
7Jer 22, 4
8Jer 7, 5.7
9Jer 7, 13-15

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62. maledictus...tui om. N; et pr. sic Js; sic] item L
63. et om. K; et audieritis rep. L; terre om. V; quod] quid V
64. nolueritis] volueritis TV; etc.] et K; sic] item L, sicut Js
65. Ieremia XVII] Ieremia VII Js; et] ut L
66. etc.] et N; egredientur L
66-67. in die...huius om. per homoet. KV
68. curribus] turribus KJs
70. idem] item KLJs
70-71. ~ Ieremia XXII capitulo idem legitur L
72. est pr. tantum K; sic om. Js; quid] quod K
73. quid] quod K; sit pr. hoc D
74. bene om. D; duxeritis Js (Vg direxeritis); studia] stadia T
76. etc. om. T; quia] que V; fecisti K; locutus] loritus D

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vos mane consurgens et loquens et non audistis et vocavi et non respondistis; faciam domui huic in qua invocatum est nomen meum in qua vos habetis fiduciam sicut feci Sylo et proiciam vos a facie mea sicut proieci omnes fratres vestros etc. Item Iudicum secundo capitulo sic scribitur: Ascendit angelus Domini de Galgal ad locum flencium et ait: Eduxi vos de Egypto et introduxi in terram pro qua iuravi patribus vestris et pollicitus sum ut non facerem irritum pactum meum vobiscum in sempiternum ita dumtaxat ut non feriretis fedus cum habitatoribus terre huius et aras eorum subverteretis et noluistis audire vocem meam. Cur hoc fecistis? Quamobrem nolui delere eos a facie vestra ut habeatis hostes et dii eorum sint vobis in ruinam. Hec enim et istis similia manifeste ostendunt quod voluntas populi potuit esse et fuit de facto causa quod Deus penas illi immisit, et quod eadem voluntas potuit causa fuisse quod Deus illas nullatenus effecisset nec efficere voluisset. Quoniam hoc exprimit iste textus ultimus et eciam precedentes. Frustra igitur hic amplius nodos inquirimus.
IOHANNES

1 Ista libenter amplector, sed adhuc de voluntate divina promoveor. Non enim video qualiter aliquid esse potest nisi a Deo volente illud fieri. Nec video qualiter illud quod Deus vult fieri ex quo sua voluntas est omnipotens per aliquam creaturam valeat impediri nisi nephaire dixero contra scripturam quod omnipotenti voluntati Dei potest creatura resistere. Scriptum est enim Genesis ultimo: Num Dei possimus resistere voluntati? Et ad litteram hoc dicit Joseph fratribus suis de exaltacione sua in Egypto que non dubium a voluntate sua pendebat, sic enim stat littera. Quibus ille respondit: Nolite timere; num Dei possimus resistere voluntati. Vos cogitastis de me malum et Deus vertit illud in bonum ut exaltaret me sicut in presenti cernitis et salvos faceret multos populos. Sic enim scribitur Hester XIII capitulo: Domine Deus rex omnipotens in dicione tua cuncta sunt posita et non est qui possit resistere tue voluntati si decreveris salvare Israel. Tu fecisti celum et terram et quicquid celi ambitu continetur. Dominus omnium es nec est qui

1Gen 50, 19-20
resistat maiestati tue.\textsuperscript{2} Ubi eciam ad litteram sermo fit de salute corporali ipsorum que non dubium pendebat a voluntate ipsorum, et sic consequitur quod illam quamvis pendentem a voluntate non poterant impedire. Sic scribit apostolus ad Romanos IX capitulo: \textit{Ergo cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat. Dicis itaque michi: Quid adhuc queritur; voluntati enim eius quis resistet? O homo tu quis es qui respondeas Deo: Nunquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Quid si volens deus ostendere iram, et notam facere potenciam suam, sustinuit in multa patiencia vasa ire apta in interitum, et ostendere divicias glorie sue, in vasa misericordie que preparavit in gloriam. Quos vocavit non solum ex Iudeis sed ex gentibus sicut dicit in Osee: Vocabo non plebem meam plebem meam.\textsuperscript{3} Ubi non solum ostenditur quod nullus potest Dei voluntati resistere in salvando aut in dampnando, cum tamen utrumque a voluntate

\textsuperscript{2}Est 13, 9-11
\textsuperscript{3}Rm 9, 18-25; cf Osee 2, 24
pendeat creature. Sed videtur innui ex hoc quod apostolus, coartatus in
questione de predestinacione, nescivit aliter eam dissolvere nisi ut totum ad
divinam voluntatem referret sicut opera figuli ad voluntatem figuli referebat.
Quod apostolus hoc intendebat scilicet quod nullus in talibus, quamvis
pendeant a voluntate humana, potest Dei voluntati resistere. Sic Iob XXIII
dictur de Deo: *Ipse enim solus est et nemo avertere cogitationes eius potest
et anima eius quodcumque voluit hoc fecit.*\(^4\) Et multa dicuntur similiter in
scripturis que videntur manifeste pretendere quod nullus potest voluntatem
Dei quin expleatur per omnia impedire. Quoniam hoc est eius voluntati
resistere scilicet eius volitum impedire. Ex eodem eciam sequi videtur quod
divina voluntas est inefficax et infirma scilicet si eius volitum potest ab aliquo

impediri.

\(^4\)Job 23, 13

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29. sed *om.* Js; innui *om.* V; pendeat...quod *om.* T
33. pendeant] pendeat K; sic] sicut Js; Iob XXIII] rebac K
34. Deo] eo Js; avertere] advertere DKJs; cogitationes *mg.* T
35. eius *om.* T; voluit] voluerit Js; hoc] hic K; similiter] similia KJs
37-38. quoniam...impedire *om.* *per homoet.* KJs
38. scilicet *om.* L; ~volitum eius *N*; et *pr.* eciam D; eciam] et V; sequi videtur]
   sequitur K; quod *om.* D
39. est...volitum *om.* *per homoet* Js; non *pr.* potest Js
RICARDUS

1 Non est ita ut estimas sed econtra. Si enim divina voluntas omnipotens exigit res evitabiles (per creaturam intelligo) habere sibi subiectas quoad res huiusmodi eadem potencia voluntatis divine requirit ut creatura eas valeat impedire. Quoniam hoc est eas esse creature vitabiles. Et sic manifeste consequitur quod omnipotencia voluntatis divine exigit ut huiusmodi sua volita possint a creatura caveri, quoniam alias res ille non essent tales quales omnipotens voluntas eas esse instituit et sic ipsa voluntas non esset omnipotens ex quo res sibi subiecte non essent ut vellet. Satis enim humiliter sapis cum astruis suum volitum nequaquam posse ab alio impediri.

5 Ex quo illud sic vult ab alio fieri ut tamen ab illo valeat impediri. Nequaquam tamen ex hoc sequitur ut tu superius intulisti quod voluntati divine possit creatura aut eciam creator resistere. Quoniam hoc verbum resistere duo includit scilicet voluntatem divinam esse respectu alicuius et similiter illam non perfici, que duo simul stare non possunt, sed non includuntur simul hec duo cum dicitur sic divisim: volitum a Deo potest a creatura caveri. Nec eciam potest argui aliqua inefficacia omnipotentis
voluntatis divine ut infers ex hoc quod eius volitum potest ab alio impediri, ex quo eius omnipotencia hoc requirit, sicut nec inefficacia eiusdem voluntatis potest inferri ex hoc quod volitum ipsius a seipso potest caveri.  

20 Semper divisim intellige quoniam in sensu composito semper est falsum quod possit volitum a Deo caveri, scilicet quod aliquid potest simul esse a Deo volitum et tamen cautum sive non factum. Cuius rationem potes advertere quoniam divina voluntas respectu ciuscunque possibilis semper impletur. Sive enim res huiusmodi fient sive non fient semper divina voluntas impleetur de eis. Quia ex quo omnipotens Dei voluntas hoc habet ut fiat res quedam per creaturam vitabiles sicut superius est ostensum, eadem omnipotens voluntas exigit ut ipsa possit respectu rerum huiusmodi non esse et nunquam fuisse voluntas, sicut eadem omnipotens voluntas exigit ut divina presciencia possit respectu earumdem rerum non esse et nunquam fuisse presciencia. Et ideo sicut volita huiusmodi a Deo possint non fore sic

16-17. ~voluntatis divine omnipotentis Js  
17. alio] aliquo DJs  
18. ~eiusdem inefficacia K  
20. intellige] intelligo KLJs; divisim...semper om. V  
21. potest om. V  
22. cautum] cautum sup. l vitatum K, vitatum Js  
23. impletur] impletur Js  
24. huiusmodi] eius Js; enim pr. sive² D; semper om. V; ~semper fient D; ~voluntas divina KJs  
25. impletur] impleter L; ~habet hoc T; res om. N  
25-26. quedam res L  
26. creaturam] creaturas Js; sicut] ergo K  
27. huiusmodi] habet D  
28. voluntas] omnipotens K; sicut om. T; omnipotens om. KJs; ut om. V  
29. earumdem] huiusmodi Js  
29-30. presciencia...fuisse om. V  
30-32. presciencia...fuisse om. T  
30. huiusmodi] huius Js; possint] possunt LJs; sic] sicut V  

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possunt non esse ab eo volita et nunquam volita fuisse ab eo, quomodo
possunt non esse prescita et nunquam fuisse ab eo prescita. Unde conстат
quod quamvis volitum a Deo possit a creatura caveri (in sensu diviso
intelligo), nichilominus semper est necessarium in sensu composito quod
divina voluntas impletur in omnibus volitis ab eodem. Quoniam simul esse
non potest quod aliquid est a Deo volitum et a creatura aut eciam a creatore
vitatum, et ob hoc divina voluntas semper est efficax si illa voluntas efficax
affirmetur. Que sive cuius volitum quodcumque semper et ubique perficitur,
nec simul potest esse non impletum et ab eo volitum. Qualiter vero in istis
sensum compositum a sensu diviso habes distinguere, satis plane et plene te
docet Magister Sentenciarum primo libro distinccione 38 et quibusdam
sequentibus, ut non opus existat huiusmodi logica hic tractare.

31. ~ab eo fuisse Js; ~ab eo volita fuisse K
31-32. quomodo...fuisse om. Js; quomodo...ab eo om. V
32. non del. K.
33-34. diviso...sensu om. per homoeot. N
34. intelligo] intellige V; ~est semper Js; est] esse V; in sensu om. V
35. eodem] eadem KJs
36. et om. K; aut eciam] et Js, et eciam K
37. si...efficax om. N
38. quodcumque] quodque Js
39. et om. K; volitum] nolitum Js
42. ~opus non Js; opus om. N; huiusmodi] huius Js
IOHANNES

1 Licet efficax recte vocetur divina voluntas quia semper suum effectum efficit et nunquam deficit, nec est possibile quod ipsa aliquid velit et illud non fiat sicut superius ostendisti, qualiter tamen voluntas illa non sit infirma cuius volitum licet de facto nunquam et nullibi impeditur, tamen potest ab alico impediri, non video. Si enim mea voluntas quoad suum volitum potest ab alio impediri, cui dubium quin mea voluntas infirmior est quam voluntas eius a quo sic poterit impediri? Unde quin voluntas divina sit infirma si sic potest quoad sua volita impediri non capio.

RICARDUS

Hec caligo mentis tibi contingit quia semper mentis tue intuitum dirigis ad voluntatem Dei qua vult tales res contingentes fieri, non ad voluntatem Dei qua vult ut eedem res a creatura valeant impediri. Si enim illam secundam Dei voluntatem attenderes (secundam non realiter diversam intelligo sed racione distinctam) non patereris premissam caliginem sed clara luce prospiceres quod divina voluntas non eo minus est fortis et valida quia suum

1. ~ voluntas divina vocetur Js
3. superius om. V; ~ illa voluntas Js
4. nullibi] nullibus D, ullibi T, alibi V
5. alico] alio V
6. alic] aliquo Js; voluntas om. T
6-7. ~ eius voluntas L
7. eius om. T; ~ poterit sic K; poterit om. V; unde] vide V
9. ~ contingit tibi Js
10. tales] ut eadem V; contingens vel pr. contingentes K
10-11. tales...vult om. per homoet. T
11. ut] quod sup. l K; eodem] eodem D; ~ res eodem Js; illam] in KJs
13. premissam om. N
14. eo] ea V; quia] quod KJs
volitum potest caveri, ex quo illud a seipsa omnipotente institutrice omnium est volitum posse caveri, quam si omnino a nullo posset vitari. Sicut nec tua voluntas dici potest esse infirma respectu sui voliti quod voluntate tui ministri vis fieri, si illud sic vis et instituis fieri ab eo quod ipse possit pro suo voto illud omittere et vitare. Potenciam tuam volitivam intelligo nunc non actum, nisi imprudenter dixeris tuam voluntatem in hoc infirmam fieri a seipsa. Quoniam tua voluntas se velle sic statuit ut suum volitum ab eius ministro possit caveri. Si insuper ut conaris ex hoc quod volitum a voluntate divina possit ab alico impediri posset vere inferri quod illud quod posset impedire esset forcius voluntate divina, cum nemo ambigat quin volitum a voluntate divina possit impediri ab ipsa voluntate divina vere posset inferri quod voluntas divina infirmior esset se ipsa. Cum autem non dubites illud non sequi mirum est quod talem argumentacionem reputas esse firmam. De actu tamen tue voluntatis videtur quod esset infirmus si eius volitum posset ab alio precaveri. Quoniam cum actus ipse respectu illius volitii non posset ipso manente non esse volucio respectu illius, consequens est de ipso si

15. illud] ipsum KJs; seipsa] seipso D, se L; institutrice] institute DV
16. ~a nullo omnino L; posset] possit KT
17. dici potest] fieri posset K
18. illud] istud KJs
19. omittere] obmittere KJs; ~tuam potentiam Js
22. ut om. T; conaris] cognaris Js
23. possit] posset T; ~impediri ab alicu Jo; non pr. posset\(1\) V; inferri] inferre T; quod] quid V; quod illud rep. N; posset\(2\)] possit K
24. divina] Dei Js; ambigat] ambigeret D, ambigam T, ambigit V
24-25. cum...divina\(1\) om. per homoet. K; nemo...divina\(1\) om. Js
25. impediri om. D; vero pr. divina\(1\) Js
26. ipsa + et eciam forcior L; ipsum pr. autem Js
28. tue om. V; voluntatis] infirmitatis K; posset] possit K
29. alio] alico DJs; precaveri] precaveere K; illius] ipsius K; voliti] voluntatis V; posset] possit KV
30. volucio] volicio KJs

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potest ab alio impediri quod simul potest illud volitum esse volitum per actum illum et tamen non fieri, ex quo consequi videtur eius inefficacia et eciam eius infirmitas. Verum si econtra esset de tuo actu sicut de actu volitivo divino scilicet quod tuus actus ipso manente ita posset non esse volucio respectu illius voliti sicut potest actus divinus, et cum hoc per eundem actum tu velles tuum volitum posse a tuo ministro caveri, pro constanti sicut nec in tua potencia sic nec in tuo actu posses infirmitatem arguere propter hoc quod eius volitum possit ab alio impediri. Numquid tamen concedere oportebit ex istis consequi quod actus tuus in quantum esset respectu existencie illius a te voliti fieri, dumtaxat ex hoc quod posset impediri quoad illum volitum sit infirmus fortassit fluctuas. Quoniam ex hoc consequi videri potest quod actus volitivus divinus etsi non simpliciter tamen ut est actus respectu voliti talis contingens, dumtaxat sit actus infirmus. Sed hoc omnino non sequitur, cum sic affirmative Deo sive eius voluntati que ipse est ascribatur infirmitas qualem nullam potest habere sicut tu potes habere, et ob hoc de tua voluntate in hoc casu sic apte

31. potest 1 potes V; alio] alico DJs
32. illum] istum V; ~ fieri non V; consequi] consequitur K, consequitur ut L
33. eius om. KJs; sicut de actu om. V
34. volitivo] volitiva T
35. volucio] volicio KJs
36. potest...tu om. T
36. velles] voles KJs, vales V; posse om. D; caveri] precaveri DKJs
37. ~ nec sic K
38. possit] posset KNJs
39. consequi] consequitur Js
41. infirmus] infirmius DT
42. consequi] sequi Js
43. ut om. T
43-44. dumtaxat...infirmus om. V
44. affirmative] affirmare Js
45. ascribatur] ascribitur DKTJs; sicut...habere om. L; sicut] sic K
46. in hoc casu] vel casu K, tamen nichil Js; apte] aperte KJs
concluditur. Sed numquid si negative inferatur quod actus volitivus divinus in quantum dumtaxat est respectu existencie huiusmodi contingentis non est omnipotens, magis dubitabile potest videri sed hec dubitacio statim tolletur cum distincti fuerint actus volitivi divini. Unde michi videtur frustra nimis nos in hiis logicalibus fatigari, cum ex premissis satis aperte constet quod omnipotencia voluntatis divine exigit ut aliqua volita ab ipsa possint a creatura caveri absque hoc quod ipsa sit inefficax aut infirma. Si vero non valeas capere quomodo res quam Deus prescit potest non esse et nunquam fuisse a Deo prescita, aut qualiter res aliqua quam divina voluntas vult esse potest non esse et nunquam fuisse ab ea volita, debes attendere ad pondus auctoritatis sacre scripture et ad radices fidei christiane, precipue ad inicium Simboli: Credo in Deum omnipotentem, ut ex hac omnipotencia sine fluctuacione concludas quod Deus tuus libertate contradiccionis mundum produxit et ita potuit eum nunquam produxisse. Et sic res prescitas et volitas potuit non prescivisse et eas nunquam voluisse. Unde ex hoc solo principio: hoc non erit demonstrato futuro omnia hec secunter scilicet quod Deus hoc non prescit, Deus hoc nunquam prescivit, Deus hoc non vult, Deus hoc

48. ~huiusmodi existencie Js
50. ~divini volitivi T; divini om. L
51. hiis] istis Js; constet] constat LJs, constet et T
53. hoc om. V
54. Deus om. T
55. a Deo] ab eo KJs
55-56. prescita...volita om. Js
56. ab ea] ab eo K, a Deo L; et nunquam produxisse et sic res prescitas et volitas potuit non prescivisse volitas pr. debes Js
57. precipue] et precipue KJs, presciencie V
58. Patrem pr. omnipotentem NJs; ut om. Js; sine] sive Js
59. concludas] concludatur V
60. potuit] potest V; ~nunquam eum V
60-61. eum...potuit om. per homoeot. K
62. secuntur] consecuntur K
63. Deus...prescivit om. KJs
nunquam voluit. Et ob hoc sicut Deus potest facere hoc non fore sic potest
hoc non prescire et sic potest hoc nunquam prescivisse et sic potest hoc
non velle et sic potest hoc nunquam voluisse. Et pariter si ex aliqua alia
causa preter Deum posset illud verificari scilicet \textit{hoc non erit} sicut patuit
superius hoc posse fieri opere aut omissione operis creature, per eandem
causam possent verificari omnia alia premessa que ex illo uno secuntur.
70 Quicquid enim potest verificare antecedens potest verificare omnia eius
consequencia.

64. Deus \textit{om.} K
65. hoc\textsuperscript{2} + non prescire et sic potest hoc T
66. potest\textit{i} potes T; aliqua \textit{om.} L
66-67. \textit{~causa alia} KNJs
67. scilicet\textit{i} si V; patuit\textit{i} potest V
68. hoc\textit{j} hac V; fieri \textit{om.} K
69. causam\textit{j} causatum T; possent\textit{j} posset KT; secuntur\textit{j} sequitur D
70. verificare\textsuperscript{2} \textit{om.} V
Est item aliud quod si acute consideres ligamentum animi tui de voluntate divina dissolvit. Quoniam impotentem seu infirmam sive inefficacem esse ex evitabilitate actuum humanorum conaris astraure scilicet quod divina voluntas pro potencia accipitur et pro actu, et actus tam multiplex in scripturis assitur quam multipliciter vult et quam multiplex est volitum ab eodem. Igitur debes distinguere actum quo Deus vult rem facere ab actu quo Deus vult rem ab alio fieri illius alterius propria voluntate, sicut hos actus in teipso distinguis. Quoniam non eodem actu vis aliquem actum producere per teipsum et vis alium hominem alium actum efficere. Cum autem vis aliquid ab alio fieri, non est hec tua voluntas causa actus ab eo effecti sed approbacio aut complacencia respectu actus illius. Quoniam sic vis fieri omnes actus iuste factos seu futuros in mundo. Sicut eciam actus voluntatis tue quo vis aliquid ab alio fieri non est causa illius effectus sic nec actus quo vis alium facere talem effectum est causa illius. Quoniam et sic velle
potes omnes iuste operaturos agere suos actus. Et ut breviter exprimam quod intendo, nullus actus tue voluntatis est causa rei producte ab alio eciam tuo ministro, nisi ille actus tue voluntatis quo aliquid effecisti ad produccionem illius effectus. Quoniam de causa efficiente iam loquimur que efficiens dici non potest respectu cuiuscumque facti, nisi aliquid ad eius produccionem efficiat aut effecit. Sic tamen respectu operis tui ministri tua auctoritate effecti tua voluntas illud sibi preci piensi causa fuit aut si non precepisti sed voluntate tua potestatem sibi dedisti talia faciendi voluntas concedens auctoritatem huiusmodi causa fuit eciam operis eiusdem ministri. Si hec vides non dices in Deo voluntatem aliquam esse causam rerum contingencium, nisi eam voluntatem que aut efficit aut effecit aliquid ad extra ad produccionem earum faciendam per liberam voluntatem humanam; cuiusmodi nec est divina voluntas qua vult talia fore aut qua vult talia fieri aut qua vult voluntatem humanam talia facere nec aliqua alia huiusmodi eius voluntas quarum nulla aliquid efficit aut effecit seu efficiet ad produccionem rerum huiusmodi, intelligo in quantum huiusmodi est. Quoniam
omnis talis divina voluntas voluntas complacencie pocius quam voluntas efficiencie appellatur, voluntates divinas semper sola racione distinctas intelligo.

31. talis] talia D; ~ voluntas talis divina K; voluntas² om. KJs
<RICARDUS>

1 Si igitur si pro quia quia divinam voluntatem hoc modo distinguendam intelligis, volo ut aperte exprimas quam voluntatem harum omnium impotentem sive infirmam sive inefficacem ex rerum humanarum evitabilitate conaris astruere.

IOHANNES

5 Cur non possum inferre quod volitiva divina potencia est infirma si suum volitum potest ab alio impediri?

RICARDUS

Quia divina potencia volitiva est omnipotens et ob hoc potest inomnipotenter sive partipotenter agere. Immo agere potest ita infirmiter sicut aliqua cogitabilis activa potencia ut superiora ostendunt, nec alias esset omnipotens. Sive igitur agat ad extra fortiter sive debiliter non ob hoc infirma seu impotens potest argui eius potencia, sicut nec voluntatis humane vigor minuitur aut infirmus arguitur que per corporalia sua instrumenta agendo potest iugulare leonem, si ita infirmiter teneret cuniculum ut

1. quia² om. KJs
2. intelligis] intelligas K; aperte] a parte Js; exprimas] exprimis D
3. infirmam] infirma D; inefficacem] efficacem Js; omnium pr. humanarum Js
4. evitabilitate] inevitabilitate KJs, om. N
5. volitiva] voluntas Js; − divina volitiva L
6. volitum om. L
7. potest om. D; inomnipotenter] omnipotenter K
8. partipotenter] potenter Js; potest pr. agere¹ V
9. cogitabilis] cogitabili K
10. igitur] sic V; ad mg. L; − debiliter sive fortiter Js
11. impotens] omnipotens Js; − humane voluntatis KL
12. minuitur om. V; aut] seu L; infirmus arguitur] infirmatur N; que] quo K; − sua corporalia L
13. potest iugulare] vigilare potest K; infirmiter] infirmatur Js
cuniculus se de omnibus eius instrumentis retentivis excuteret. Num eciam
15 audebis astruere volitivam potenciam Spiritus Sancti fuisse infirmam quia
scribitur Stephanum veraciter expressisse ludeis: **Vos semper restitistis Spiritui
Sancto** Actus VII capitulo. Non est igitur unde possis arguere divinam
volitivam potenciam esse infirmam quia suum volitum potest ab alio
impediri, cum omnipotens potencia suum volitum possit ita producere ut ita
faciliter sibi sicut et alteri cuicumque potencie possit resisti. Non enim alias
esset omnipotens, nec posset cuiuscumque creati agentis vices agendo
supplere. *Dic igitur adhuc queso expressius quam voluntatem divinam ex
evitabilitate tuorum operum infirmam conaris arguere.*

**IOHANNES**

Cerno quod non possum ut dicis potenciam volitivam divinam ex hac
20 evitabilitate infirmam seu impotentem arguere, et ob hoc dicere possum
actum divinum volitivum esse impotentem sive infirmum si eius volitum
potest ab alico impediri.

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1 Act 7,51

14. se om. K; retentivis] retentus Js, num] numquid Js, non LTV; eciam om. K
15. audebis] audiebis K
16. ~veraciter Stephanum T; dicens (de K) pr. Iudeis Js; restitistis] resistitis KNT,
resuitis DV
16-17. ~Sancto Spiritui restitistis L
17. capitulo om. KJs; possis] posses Js
18. potest] est D
19. omnipotens potencia] omnipotencia potens potencia D; potencia] potenciam Js;
suum] secum K, secundum Js; ~possit suum volitum L; possit om. T
20. sicut et] sic Js; cuicumque] cuique Js; potencie] possibile Js; enim om. K
21. ~esset alias K; cuiuscumque] cuiusque Js
22. supplere] suppleri K; adhuc om. K
23. arguere] astruere L
24. hac] hoc DV
25. seu pr. infirmam V
26. ~volitum divinum L; eius] est T
27. alico] alio L, aliqua V
RICARDUS

Expone quem actum intelligis de actibus eius omnibus supra expositis, an actum non operativum ad extra scilicet actum solius approbacionis sive complacencie an actum effectivum sive operativum ad extra.

IOHANNES

Cur non possum inferre actum volitivum divinum complacencie sive approbacionis esse infirmum si eius volitum potest ab alio impediri?

RICARDUS

Quia infirmum et firmum sicut in presenti accipimus forte et debile potens et impotens efficax et inefficax condiciones seu differencie sunt solius virtutis active, et ob hoc actus approbativus sive acceptivus solum cum nunquam possit efficere quicquam in quantum est talis, nec firmus aut infirmus potens aut impotens fortis aut debilis ut loquimur dici potest. Non enim in teipso reperiire poteris qualiter actus voluntatis tue approbativus solum respectu operis alieni fortis aut debilis efficax aut inefficax nisi improprite dici possit, cum nec valeas invenire quid actus tuus huiusmodi possit efficere. Si enim improprie voces actum approbacionis sive

28. quem] quid Js; ~ actum quem V; expositis] positis K
29. actum] actuum K; non om. T, mg. L; operativum] operacionum DKNV, opinionum T; scilicet] sed K
30. an] ante K, aut Js
31-32. ~ approbacionis sive complacencie L
32. si] quia Js; ab alio] ab alico D, in alio Js
33. et'] aut K; sicut] sic V
34. et'] aut K
35. actus om. KJs; approbativus] probativus D
36. nunquam] unquam K; efficere om. KJs; quicquam] quequam K; firmus aut om. Js; aut] nec K
37. loquimur] loquitur Js
38. approbativus] probativus T
40. possit] potest KJs; nec] non Js; huiusmodi] huius K, om. V
complacencie fortem aut debilem, scilicet in intencione graduum sive speciei
sicut color unus forcior alio dici potest quia intensor, non potes de actu
huiusmodi volitivo divino quod conaris inferre scilicet debilitatem aut
infirmatatem sive impotenciam ex hoc quod suum volitum potest ab alio
impediri, cum per actum quantumcumque potentem hoc modo ita sicut per
actum impotentem hoc modo si talem Deus haberet, posset infirmissima
queque velle. Cui omnia infirma placent ut forcia ut ei vere dicatur: Nichil
odisti eorum que fecisti.² Sic enim tu ipse per actum huiusmodi
approbativum, vis eque infirma et forcia, et per actum fortem hoc modo,
sepe vis opus infirmum alterius et per actum debilem vis opus fortissimum
creacionem fortassis mundi tocius. Non potes igitur huiusmodi voluntatem
divinam debilem infirmam aut impotentem seu inefficacem concludere, etsi
eius volitum possit a potencia actrice infirmissima impediri. Ex hiis eciam
cernis esse perspicuum quod nullum est inconvenientis affirmare taliter
negative quod huiusmodi voluntas approbativa divina non est omnipotens,
cum nec proprie dicatur potens aut impotens quod tibi superius firmare

²Sap 11, 25

42. scilicet om. Js; in om. KLV; intencione] intensione KJs; sive] sue DLTV;
speciei om. Js
43. alio] altero K; intensor] intencior L; potest] potest K
44. huiusmodi] huius KN
45. hoc om. K
46. quantumcumque] quemcumque Js; ita om. Js
47. hic pr. haberet Js
48. queque] quemcumque K
49. fecisti] perfecisti Js; huiusmodi] huius KJs
51. ~ vis sepe K; et om. Js; debilem + isto modo L
52. creacionem] creacionis D; fortassis] fortassem D; huiusmodi] huius KJs;
volutatem] voluntatis T
53. divinam om. Js; impotentem] omnipotentem Js; seu] aut K
54. actrice] accione K, acoce T
55. inconvenientis om. K
56. negative] negarem K; quod] quia V; huiusmodi] huius KN, eius T
57. et pr. firmare T; firmare] affirmare K, infirmare L, om. N
promiseram. Dic igitur adhuc quem actum divinum ex hoc quod eius volitum potest caveri infirmum conaris astruere.

JOHANNES

60 Compellor intelligere actum divine voluntatis operativum ad extra. Quoniam ut video ex evitabilitate volitorum a Deo non possum aliam Dei voluntatem infirmam aut impotentem arguere.

58. promiseram] provisiam D; divinum rep. K
62. aut pr. infirmam V; impotentem] omnipotentem Js
RICARDUS

1 Adhuc terge oculos mentis tue et attencius investiga quam voluntatem
divinam activam ad extra, actus modo intelligo, niteris ex rerum humanarum
evitabilitate infirmam arguere.

IOHANNES

Cur non possum dicere voluntatem Dei qua efficit mundum totum et creaturas
instituit esse infirmam quia aliqua sunt evitabilia et possunt a creaturis
caveri?

RICARDUS

Quia hæc voluntas Dei non cadit super actus humanos sed solum super
naturas primitus institutas quarum nullam potuit aliqua creatura impedire.
Ideo nec volitum aliquod ab hac Dei voluntate, in quantum talis est semper
intellige, potest aut potuit a creatura caveri ut ex hoc argui posset eius
infrmitas. Sicut autem apte intelligis de hoc actu divino quo Deus creaturas
instituit quod non potest nec potuit dici infirmus propter actus evitabiles
angelicos aut humanos, cum non sit nec fuerit respectu illorum sed solum
respectu causarum eorum, sic potes clara luce conspicere quod nullus actus

1. ~terge adhuc KJs
2. activam om. D; modo] vero L; niteris] in terris V
3. evitabilitate] immutabilitate Js; infirmam] infirma D
4. efficit] effecit1 N
5. infirmam] infirmas K; evitabilia] inevitabilia V; evitabilia + sunt T
6. supra V
7. ~creatura aliqua L; aliquam creaturam V; impedire om. K
8. volitum + impediri K
10. intellige] intelligi LN, intelligere KJs; argui posset] possit argui L
11. ~apte autem D, autem ante aperte K, autem ante apte Js; ~actu hoc D
12. nec] aut Js; ~dici potuit K
13. aut] vel L; fuerit] fuit TV; illorum] istorum KL, ipsorum Js
14. eorum] illorum D
15 volitivus divinus effectivus qui est respectu cause tantum alicuius talis actus quem vitabilem appellamus argui potest infirmus propter evitabilitatem actus huiusmodi, quia ille actus vitabilis non est volitus per actum illum volitivum divinum sed per illum actum divinum solum causa illius est volita. Unde propter evitabilitatem actus talis inferri non potest aliquod volitum a tali actu volitivo divino posse caveri, ut per hoc posset infirmus inferri. De actu autem volitivo divino effectivo sive operativo ad extra qui intelligi potest esse immediate operativus respectu actus humani quem vocamus vitabilem, numquid ille possit infirmus argui ex exitabilitate sui voliti? Si queramus et supposuerimus quod Deus immediate sic vult et efficit omnes actus humanos cum sicut infra patebit quando de illo modo agendi Dei tractabitur Deus non sic agere velit nisi cum voluntas humana vult agere, omnino consequitur quod ille actus divinus volitivus et effectivus si ita ponatur est condicionatus hoc modo: si voluntas humana hoc agere velit qualis voluntas nunquam potest argui esse infirma respectu sui voliti nisi suum volitum possit stante sua condicione caveri, quod in nostra voluntate nunquam

15. tantum] tamen T; alicuius om. Js; ~ actus talis Js
16. vitabilem] vitalem D, inevitabilem Js
17. huiusmodi] huius KNJs; ille] talis T, iste Js; ~ illum actum L
19. a om. L
20. ut] et Js; posset] potest V
21. ~ effectivus divino K
22. actum pr. vitabilem K
23. ~ possit ille K
24. ~ sic immediate KJs
25. sicur] sint J
26. ~ humana voluntas L; humana om. V; velit...agere rep. V
27. et pr. volitivus KJs
28. scilicet pr. si L; hoc] sic Js
29. nunquam] numquid Js; ~ infirma esse L; volit] volitu K; volitum om. KJs
30. sua om. Js; caveri] cavere Js
potest contingere scilicet quod stante voluntate humana respectu sui actus intrinseci condicionante actum divinum respectu actus eiusdem, possit suum volitum quod eciam est divinum volitum ut ponimus scilicet voluntatis intrinsecus actus caveri. Quia stante condicione huiusmodi scilicet quod voluntas actum suum liberum velit efficere, simul esse non potest quod actus ipse qui secundum te asseritur a Deo volitus actu divino volitivo effectivo immediate illius ab alico evitetur. Et sic ex sola absoluta evitabilitate talis actus voluntatis humane non potest argui infirmitas aliqua in actu volitivo divino immediate effectivo illius nisi insuper evitabilitas illius cum huiusmodi condicione sive modificatione posset ostendi, qualis eius evitabilitas ostendi non potest preter hoc quod sicut infra patebit probabilius dici potest nullam talem accionem Dei immediatam nisi forsitan naturalem sive supplentem currsum nature primitus institutum esse respectu actuum humanorum quos proprie libertate contradiccionis liberos appellamus. Et idem est de voluntate divina censendum scilicet quod nullus est actus alius divinus volitivus effectivus immediate talis actus humani. Imprudenter igitur affirmas in

31. potest] potes T
31-32. quod....intrinseci om. T; sui....respectu om. V
32. condicionante] condiconate K, condicionati Js; actum divinum] actus divinus Js; eiusdem] eius Js
33. volitum] volitam Js; ponimus] pocius K
33-34. ~ actus intrinsecus voluntatis L
34. humane pr. intrinsecus KJs; condicione huiusmodi] hoc Js; huiusmodi] huius KN
35. simul] similis Js
36. qui pr. a Deo D; volitivo om. T
39. huiusmodi] huius KJs
40. posset] possit V; evitabilitas ostendi] et evitabilitas posset ostendi T
42. immediatam om. L; supplentem] implentem V
42-43. nisi...institutum om. KTJs
43. primitus] primi DV; immediatam pr. esse L
45. censendum] cessendum K, consenciendum V; scilicet om. KJs; alius om. KJs
46. humani] humanam D; imprudenter] impendenter V
genere ex hoc quod volitum a Deo potest a creatura caveri quod voluntas
divina sit inefficax infirma aut impotens, cum nec potenciam volitivam
divinam nec actum eius aliquem volitivum ex illo possis infirmum arguere.

48. volitivam] nec volicionem Js
49. volitivum] volitum Js; possis] possit K
IOHANNES

1 Non adhuc per omnia genera actuum volitivorum divinorum conclusionem quam infers ostendis. Quoniam sicut superiora de multiplicitate actuum voluntatis divine ostendunt ita habet Deus actum unum communem respectu omnium rerum sicut habet actum proprium respectu unius. Et pariter habet actus ut sic loquar medios inter istos eciam infinitos, scilicet unum respectu duorum, alium respectu trium, tercium respectu quattuor et sic in infinitum. Et hoc intelligo de actibus volitivis effectivis sicuti de approbativis iuxta theoriam quam superius posuisti, sicuti habet penes se ydea san rationes aut cognitiones huiusmodi. Cur igitur non possum affirmare talem actum communem esse infirmum si eiusmod volitum potest caveri? Quoniam de tali actu communi nichil superius es locutus.

RICARDUS

Non recte affirmas me de tali actu volitivo divino nichil dixisse superius. Quoniam si actum communem scilicet respectu plurium volitorum effectivum intelligis, sicut nec particularis actus effectivus potest argui infirmus ex hoc quod suum volitum potest caveri sic nec ille communis.

1. Non adhuc per] nota adhuc quod K
2. multiplicitate] multitudine KJs
3-4. Deus...habet om per homoet. T
3. – unum actum L; uni communem V
4. proprium] primum T
5. eciam] et KJs; scilicet om. L, scilicet unum om. V
6. respectu] om. N; sic in] si V
8. approbativis] probativis K; quam] quod K; sicii] sicut Js; habet] habes T
9. huiusmodi] huius KJs, om. L; cur] cum V
11. communi] cur Js; es] est eis K
13. plurium] plurimorum Js
14. effectivum] actum K, effectuum Js
Quoniam una aut similis est racio de utrisque scilicet quod sunt
condicionata, et ob hoc infirma argui non potuerunt nisi condicione illa
supposita ut iam dixi volita earum possent caveri. Quod non magis in
voluntate tali communi esse potest quam in particulari, cum hoc sicut
predixi quod probabilius est dicendum quod nulla est preter naturalem talis
divina voluntas effectiva communis sicut nec particularis respectu operum
humanorum. Si vero intelligis talem voluntatem divinam communem que
partim est effectiva et partim approbativa, illa voluntas currit sub regula
supradicta scilicet quod quantum est approbativa nec firma nec infirma ut
loquimur dici potest. Quantum vero est effectiva habet condicionem
pretactam et currit sub regula eciam supradicta de actu divino volitivo
effectivo particulari. Si vero communem talem actum volitivum divinum
intelligis qui est totaliter approbativus, tunc currit sub regula supradicta de
actu approbativo volitivo divino particulari. Et ita constat per singula genera
huiusmodi volitivorum actuum divinorum (racione sola distinctorum semper
intelligo) quod omnino invenire non potes quam voluntatem divinam ex hoc
quod volitum est potest caveri infirmam possis concludere. Sed cum

16. racio] non K
17. condicionata] condicionati Js; infirma] infirmi Js; potuerunt] poterunt DLNJs
18. possent] possunt KJs
19. tali om. K; cum] quam Js
20. preter naturalem om. KVJs; naturalem om. D
21. nec om. K
22. intelligis] intellenciam D; que] quo K
23. est pr. approbativa T; regula] illa Js
24. nec] non Js; ~ infirma nec firma KJs
25. ~ eciam sub regula L; regula] illa Js; volitivo om. KJs
26. et pr. effectivo T; particulari] particularem K; vero om. KJs; ~ talem
communem K; divinum om. KL
27. potes] potest K
31-32. hoc quod] quo KJs
32. quod] quia T; est] eius L; caveri + et V (ut Js)
voluntate divina et eius vigore infinito stat evitabilitas actuum humanorum.

33. ex pr. eius Js
IOHANNES

1 Quid si dixero actum aliquem volitivum divinum effectivum esse huiusmodi quo Deus actum humanum talem vult agere per seipsum? Si voluntas velit ipsum efficere quem supra posui posse esse causam inevitabilitatis actus humani, licet actualiter causa actus omnino non esset? Et consequenter inferam illum actum divinum respectu humani actus esse infirmum si eius volitum potest a creatura aliqua impediri? De tali enim actu hoc videtur consequi manifeste.

RICARDUS

Si huiusmodi actus volitivos in Deo posueris Deum vituperabiliorem reddis cunctis racionalibus creaturis, quem non tantum ad unius perversi maleficia committenda sed eciam ad omnium iniquorum scelera perpetranda supponis in voluntate promptissimum. Super quo infra cum de cooperacione Dei in actibus humanis tractabimus plenior fiet sermo. Si insuper tales actus haberet divina voluntas, non impugnarent evitabilitatem actuum humanorum sicut infra clarissime si Deus donaverit ostendetur.

1. Quid] quod K; ~ aliquem actum Js; effectivum] effectum DTKJs; huiusmodi] huius KJNJs
2. velit] debet Js
3. supra posui] supposui L
6. dicitur sive pr. videtur Js
8. volitivos in Deo posueris] volitivus sit in Deo ut ponis L
9. racionibus] racionibus V; quem] quoniam KJs
10. ad om. Js
11. in2 om. K
13. impugnarent] purgarent Js; actuum om. T
IOHANNES

1 Fateor me nescire impugnare premissa. Sed hic aliquanto tardius perge mecum quia non plene capio cuncta premissa. Quoniam iuxta exemplum quod in principio libri huius de speculo adduxisti, quamvis speculum huiusmodi semper esset conforme rebus sive res essent sive non essent non posset ex hoc argui aliqua invincibilitas ex parte potentie specularis, sed ut michi videtur summa eius posset inferri fragilitas. Ex quo quibuscumque mutacionibus et mutabilibus conformaretur sicut arundo vento movetur, unde cum potentiam fragilem loco exprimitus illam arundinee potentie comparamus. Et ob hoc Dominus per Ezechilem\textsuperscript{1} prophetam XXIX capitulo sui libri Pharaonem regem Egypti propter debilitatem sue potentie baculum arundineum appellavit. Et simile est Ysae XXXVI capitulo\textsuperscript{2}. Sicut igitur mea voluntas esset fragilis potentie ut arundo si posset respectu sui voliti non esse voluntas et respectu oppositi ipsius voliti esse voluntas, sic pariter sequi michi videtur de voluntate divina scilicet quod nichil ea fragilius sive

\textsuperscript{1}Ez 29,6
\textsuperscript{2}Is 36,6

2. \textemdash; premissa cuncta KJs
3. in principio\textsuperscript{pr} primo K; \textemdash; huius libri L
4. scitis pr. sive\textsuperscript{1} L; non om. D
5. ex hoc om. V; invincibilitas\textsuperscript{2} immutabilitas L, inevitabilitas Js
6. posset\textsuperscript{1} possit K; \textemdash; posset inferri eius L
7. cum om. K; loco exprimimus illam om. D; loco\textsuperscript{1} hoc loco Js, om. LV; exprimimus\textsuperscript{1} exprimitur V; arundine\textsuperscript{1} arundine D, arundinem KJs
8. comparamus\textsuperscript{1} operamur T; Dominus + propterea D; prophetam om. L
10. sui libri om. L
12. si posset\textsuperscript{1} ut possit K
13-14. non esse…voliti om. per homoet. D
13. esse\textsuperscript{1} esset Js; oppositi\textsuperscript{2} appositi N; ipsius\textsuperscript{2} sui L; sic om. Js
13-14. \textemdash; michi sequi K
14. vel pr. ea Js; fragilis pr. fragilius K; sive om. Js
infirmius potest intelligi, si ipsam potest quecumque fragilis voluntas sibi conformem efficere, et non erit eius potencia invincibilis sicut ea que ego supra obieci de scripturis videntur pretendere. Immo nec ea que ego obieci videntur posse stare cum ista tua sentencia.

RICARDUS

Non ita deliras ut Deum velis negare habere libertatem contradiccionis agendi ad extra. Et ob hoc hanc possibilem conformacionem voluntatis divine cum rebus evitabilibus eciam non futuris, que Deus potest efficere et facere esse futura, nisi insanias negare non potes. Et ideo communiter investigare compellimur qualiter hoc tuum sophisma dissolvitur licet eius dissolucio clare luceat ex premissis. Quoniam fragile dici non potest quicquam nisi active aut passive: active si facile ei ultimate agenti posit resisti, passive si agens in illud faciliter illud ledat, quorum modorum neutro potest divina voluntas fragilis vere dici. Quoniam ut patuit nichil potest sibi ultimate aut omnipotenter agenti resistere, nec ambigis impassibilem Deum esse quibus modis tua voluntas est fragilis et erat fragilis similiter potestas illorum regum quorum superius meministi, ut scriptura eos baculo arundineo merito

15. infirmius] infirmus D; Si ipsam potest] firmius si ipsa potest vel Js; ~potest ipsam V; fragilis] firma N; voluntas om. T
16. erit] esset Js; invincibilis] immutabilis L
17. obieci] posui V; ea que ego] omnia que KJs
18. ista] illa V; ~cum ista tua sentencia stare K
20. possibilem] possibilitatem V, om. K; voluntatis om. T
21. ~potest Deus K; facere esse] posse facere K
22. communiter] incommuniter V
24. ~non potest dici L
25. aut] et K; ei] illud Js, om. T; agenti] agente K
26. illud2] ut T; ledat] ledit K
27. nichil] michi Js; aut] ut V
28. nec pr. impassibilem V
29. tua om. T; similiter] simpliciter Js, sic K
30. meministi] invenisti D; ~baculo arundineo eos K; merito om. L
compararet. Racio huius est clara quoniam huiusmodi conformacionis promptitudo ex impotencia provenit aut ex infirmitate potencie, ob hoc scilicet quia illis invitus potuit ipsorum volitum cohiberi sive caveri et tuum te invito similiter. Conformabilitas autem sive promptitudo 35 conformacionis cognitionis divine et eciam sue potentie volitive cunctis possibilibus fieri, primordialiter provenit ex omnipotencia divine nature sive ex magnitudine sue potentie que exigit conformabilitatem eandem ut superiora ostendunt. Et ob hoc ex illa naturali et primordiali conformabilitate non fragilis ut blasphemas, sed infringibilis et summe amabilis et immutabilis esse convincitur. Quoniam quod res factibles a suis creaturis, quas creaturas Deus ita instituit ut possent efficere multa que tamen non facient, si tales fieren sibi auctori placerent. Est summi amoris et bonitatis immense cui nullum bonum poterit dispricere. Et quod res possibles quarum possibilitatem ipse instituit possunt ab eo prescri siuti possunt per 45 eius institutionem effici, ad artificis pertinet naturalem sciencia cuncta cernentis. Sic enim nec speculum tale corporale ymaginabile quale descripsimus, sic quod esset ex conformabilitate naturali quibuscumque mutabilibus et mutacionibus fragile dici posset ut fabricas. Sed esset

31. compararet] comparat K, comparet Js; confirmacionis DKNTJs
32. impotencia] omnipotencia Js; ob] ab Js
33. quia] quod KJs; ipsorum] illorum L; cohiberi sive om. KJs
35. ex impotencia provenit aut ex infirmitate potencie ob hoc sibi quod illis invitis pr. conformacionis K; divine om. T
36. fieri] sunt Js
37. ut] que K
38. ob] ex K
39. summe] sive Js
40. factibles] fragibiles T, scibiles V; suis] Dei L
42. si] sed V; sibi] si V; est] si Js; amoris] auctoris DKNTV, actoris Js
46. nec om. V
47. descripsimus] describimus Js; sic] si TNV, sicut K; conformabilitate] formabilitate Js
immutabilis eius potencia specularis ut diximus et invincibilis suo modo si
invincibilitatem aut vincibilitatem ei affirmaveris convenire, scilicet quo ad
rectitudinem et veritatem cognitionis cognoscidilibium quorumcumque,
ex quo nihil posset efficere quod distorte sive non vere rem aliquam
presentaret sive ostenderet. In hoc speculo potes si libet tuam fatuitatem in
hac argumentacione conspicere. Volo te tamen acute advertere quod non
dicitur divina voluntas invincibilis propter istam conformabilitatem rebus
possibilitibus quibuscumque per actus volitivos complacencie sive
approbacionis, licet cum eius invincibilitate stet ista conformabilitas iuxta
premissa. Sed invincibilis dicitur quia sic potest agere velle ad extra quod
suum volitum nihil aliud possit cavere, aut ut sub aliis verbis eloquar
invincibilis dicitur divina volitiva potencia quia inevitabiliter omnibus
creaturis agere potest pro voto ad extra.
LIBER XVI XXIIIm CAPITULUM

<RICARDUS>

1 Que vero superius obiecisti iuxta verba ipsa sensum veracem non tantum habent sed exprimunt, scilicet quod nullus est qui voluntati divine potest resistere, quia resistere ut predixi utrumque simul posse esse supponit scilicet voluntatem Dei respectu alicuius et illud caveri. Sed quia non imprudenter tibi videtur quod non solum hic sensus intelligendus est in illis locis scripture et sibi similibus ubi pariter affirmatur quod omnipotenti nichil potest obsistere, sed insuper tibi videtur et recte quod invincibilitas potencie divine in talibus dictis ostenditur non tantum eius conformitas ad res factas sive fiendas, alioquin congrue dici posset quod angelice voluntati beate nichil potest resistere. Ex quo de facto sic est beata quod nichil poterit facere ut aliquid sit simul ab ea volitum et ab alio quovis vitatum. Et Deus posset tue voluntati infirme illud concedere scilicet quod nichil preter Deum posset facere, ut aliquid simul esset a te volitum et tamen ab alia creatura vitatum. Non tamen diceret scriptura de voluntate angelica aut de tua quod tue voluntati nullus resistere potest, quoniam nec semper ex illo sensu posset
congrue suum inferre propositum. Et ob hoc alium sensum in huiusmodi
dictis artamur inquirere, non ita ut solam potenciam volitivam intelligamus
in talibus que potest ut iam diximus propter eius omnipotentiam
inomnipotenter sicut omnipotenter agere, sed cum volitiva potencia
accipiamus actum volitivum divinum effectivum quo vult rem aliquam
inevitabiler fieri (inevitabiliter intellige quo ad adversantes). Quomodo
voluit ea fieri de quibus in auctoritatibus per te supra adductis fit mencio. Sic
enim ut est verisimile, voluit Ioseph exaltari in Egypto ut hoc ipse
perfecisset si quivis alii adversarii seu emuli restitissent, nec pro benevolis
est illud dictum. Et ideo frustra obicis quod illa exaltacio Ioseph a sua
propria voluntate pendebat et quod eam ipse voluntarie poterat impedire. Sic
frustra obicis de voluntate populi qua poterat suam salutem cavere cum non
propter eos in eo casu sit dictum: Non est qui possit resistere tue voluntati,\(^1\)
sed propter Aman emulum populi Judeorum fuerat illud dictum. Pariter
intelliges quod de libro Job\(^2\) superius obiecesti nec minus ex hiis concluditur
invincibilitas divine potencie. Quoniam sicut nec adversantes possunt divinum

\(^1\)Est 13,9
\(^2\)Job 23,13
volitum evitare, sic nec benevoli possent in casu eos contingente consimili, ita ut nullus sit qui adversans Dei voluntati sive divino volito, inevitabiliter sive omnipotenter posset eidem resistere. Capitulum autem illud ad Romanos quod tu superius XIII capitulo obiecisti nostrum propositum non infirmat. Quoniam si libet clarescere tibi potest quod illud dictum: *Voluntati enim eius quis resistit*, sive secundum aliam litteram *quis resistet*, non est assertum ab apostolo sed obiectum aut vice obicientis ab apostolo pro causa obiectus adductum et ob hoc non impugnat nostrum propositum. Verum si dixerimus sicut multis non irrationaliter visum est quod quamvis apostolus obiciendo illud ponat, tamen quia ipse sibi obiciendo dicit: *Quid adhuc conquerit* Deus et pro causa adiungit: *Voluntati enim eius quis resistit*, videtur illud medium sive illam causam approbare, quoniam videtur eam inducere tanquam unum principium. Si inquam ita dixerimus non infirmatur per hoc quicquam nostri propositi. Quoniam sine verbo ampliativo et sine verbo possibilitatis de facto tantum affirmat voluntati Dei nichil resistere, quod nos verum esse supra probavimus. Si vero adhuc coneris

\[3\text{Rm 9,19}\]
\[4\text{Rm 9,19}\]

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32. sic\] sicut Js, *om.* L
33. consimili\] consimiliter K; qui\] quia V; adversans\] adversariis D
35. Romanos...obiecisti *om.* T
36. non infirmat\] affirmat D
37. resistit\] resistet V Js; resistet\] resistit Js
38. assertum\] asseratum V; et *pr.* sed D
39. ob hoc *om.* Js
40. ~si dixerimus verum T; irrationaliter\] irrationabiliter L Js
41. apostolus\] apostolis D; ponat\] potest Js
42. eius\] est TV
43. resistit\] resistet V; videtur *om.* V
45. per hoc *om.* T; quicquam\] quicquid K; apostoli activo *pr.* ampliativo T; ampliativo\] ampliando Js
47. coneris\] conaris KJs
47-48. ~coneris econtra adhuc L
econtra astruere scilicet quod apostolus ibi intelligit quod voluntati divine
nichil potest resistere, ut ex hoc concludat probabiliter quod Deus conqueri
non potest de induracione peccatorum quam ipse vult a teipso hoc astruis
preter textum et nichilominus magnam inopiam sciencie aut voluntatis
pravitatem apostolo Christi ascribis. Quoniam si illud inibi intellexit et illud
nescivit dissolvere primum consequitur scilicet quod in sciencia inops erat.
Si vero illud intellexit idibem et sciverat illud dissolvere nec dissoluit
Corinthios volebat involvere, gratis movens eis questionem ambiguum nolens
eam dissolvere. In tota enim serie illius capituli et duorum sequencium que
sunt de illa materia nichil penitus reperis dictum pro solucione huius
obiectus quem tu affirmas hic apostolum posuisse scilicet numquid divine
voluntati possit creatura resistere ita ut obdurata possit penitere et
consequenter salvari. Non igitur intendebat apostolus nostrani presentem
questionem hoc loco tractare sed aliam scilicet numquid voluntas Dei qua
aliquos iustificat et alios eis equales indurat sit vituperabilis aut iniusta.
Quod hanc dubitacionem intelligat patet ex hoc quod racio eius ad illud
currir scilicet quod figmentum suo factori non habet dicere: *Quare me sic*

48. divine] Dei L
49. hoc] hac sentencia L
50. induracione] iniuracione D; hoc om. KNJs
51-52. ~ pravitatem voluntatis L
52. si illud] cum T; inibi] ibi KTJs
53. consequitur scilicet om. Js; sciencia] consciencia D; in sciencia om. N
55. volebat] voluit L
57. illa] ista L; reperis] repeperis DTN; huius] illius KJs
59. possit] posset T
61. qua] quia V, que Js
62. eis] ei Js
63. et pr. quod1 L
64. factori] factori KJs; non om. T; habet] haberet V
64-65. ~ finxisti sic Js
finxisti? et quod figulus habet potestatem, ex eodem luto facere vas unum in honorem, et aliud in contumeliam.  

Hec enim responsa apostoli ostendunt Deum iustum in faciendo homines ex massa peccatrice quosdam ad gaudium et alios ad penam sive interitum absque increpacionis occasione iusta et absque omni iniusticia aut hominis facti iniuria. Nisi igitur dixerimus apostolum imprudenter ad aliam questionem respondisse quam ad illam quam ipse movebat, consequitur quod ipse intendebat hoc loco obicere quod voluntas Dei cui nunquam resistitur est vituperabilis sive iniusta cum vult homines aliquos indurare et alios eis equales salvare sicuti Jacob salvavit et Esau condemnavit, ita quod ad concludendum inuiusticiam divine voluntatis non ad concludendum evitabilitatem divini volitii movit objectum et eum dissoluit ostendens iusticiam divine voluntatis in obdurando sicuti in salvando. Hoc enim dubium videbat pocius quam illud quod tu fingis scilicet numquid illud quod Deus de facto vult fieri a creatura possit caveri. Hoc enim ut puto non putabat apostolus dubium apud Corinthios ipsos fuisset.

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^5Rm 9, 20-21
^6cf Rm 9, 13

65. fecisti Vg; et om. V; facere om. K
67. homines] hominem K; massa om. V
68. increpacionis] occupacionis a.c. K; occasione] accione L
69. aut om. V; nisi] ubi K
71. movebat] monebat LN; consequitur...intendebat om. Js; hoc] hic K
72. cu] tui Js
72-73. ~ homines aliquos vult KJs
74. condemnavit] damnavit Js; quod om. K; ut videtur pr. inuiusticiam L
74-75. inuiusticiam...concludendum om. per homoet. K L
75. movit] movet KJs
77. videbat] videbatur L; illud] illam T, intendebat et K; tu fingis] infingis D
78. hoc] hic K
79. ~ apostolus non putabat L; ad pr. apud D, apud rep. K
<RICARDUS>

1 Et tamen antequam finem fecit illius questionis quam ibi principaliter intendebat scilicet numquid promissio Dei in populum Israel salvando exciderit an non, illud in quo ambigis aut saltem te fingis ambigere plane expressit in XI capitulo hic sequente cum dicit ad salvatum ex gentibus:

5 Quod si gloriaris, non tu radicem portas sed radix te. Dicis ergo: Fracti sunt rami ut ego inserar. Unde propter incredulitatem fracti sunt: tu autem fide stas. Noli altum sapere sed time. Si enim Deus naturalibus ramis non pepercit, ne forte nec tibi parcat. Vide ergo bonitatem et severitatem Dei: in eos quidem qui ceciderunt severitatem; in te autem bonitatem Dei si permanseris in bonitate, alioquin et tu excideris. Sed et illi, si non permanserint in incredulitate inserentur: potens enim est Deus iterum inserere illos.\(^1\) Ubi manifeste supponit iustificatos posse damnari et non permanere in bonitate et incredulos posse non permanere in incredulitate et posse inseri in olivam\(^2\) scilicet in ecclesiam electorum. Quod autem dicit: Alioquin

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\(^1\) Rm 11, 18-23  
\(^2\) cf Rm 11, 24
tu excideris\(^3\) non aliter extat dictum quam illud: Deleantur de libro vivencium, ut intelligamus hoc modo dictum utrumque et eis similia scilicet quod ita fieret ut nunquam ibi fuerint. Hoc est enim deleri sive excidi sicut non deleri est ibi semper fuisset licet posset ibi non esse et nunquam ibi fuisse. Qui sensus exprimitur Apocalypso III capitulo cum dicitur ad episcopum Sardis ecclesie:\(^4\) Scio opera tua, quia nomen habes quod vivas et mortuus es: esto vigilans et confirma cetera que mortua erant;\(^5\) non enim invenio opera tua plena coram Deo meo. In mente ergo habe qualiter acceperis et audieris, et serva et penitenciam age. Si autem non vigilaveris, veniam ad te tamquam fur, et nescies qua hora veniam ad te. Sed habes pauca nomina in Sardis que non inquinaverunt vestimenta sua, et ambulabunt mecum in albis quia digni sunt. Qui vicerit sic vestietur vestibus albis, et non delebo nomen eius de libro vite. Ubi per non deleri semper ibi fuisse accipitur. Quoniam esse non potest quod quisquam ibi aliquando sit scriptus et aliquando non scriptus, et nichilominus ostenditur ibi quod ibi non

\(^3\)Ps 68, 29  
\(^4\)Apoc 3, 1-5  
\(^5\)Douay has: which are ready to die; Vgēhas: moritura
scriptus potest inscribi et quod ibi scriptus potest ibi non scriptus semper fuisse et esse. Quoniam illum episcopum hortatur Deus ad penitenciam ne ut fur veniens eum condemnaret. Unde constat Deum supponere episcopum potuisse non penitere et sic nunquam scriptum fuisse in libro vite qui tamen de facto erat inscriptus. Item alios scriptos in libro vite qui ante mortui erant ipsum confirmare hortatur. Under supponit eos ita de facto infirmos quod poterant cadere et damnari et ita in libro vite nunquam fuisse, nec promissio illa vincentibus facta magna esset: Non delebo etcetera si ipsi deleri non poterant. Immo si acute apostoli verba attendas que obicis aperte clarescit quod tam in Deo ad salvandum atque damnandum quam in figurlo ad faciendum vasa contumeliosa atque probrosa, est contradiccionis libertas. Quoniam dicit expresse quod figmentum fingenti se non potest racionabiliter dicere conquerendo: Quid me finxisti sic? eo quod ipse figulus habet potestatem facere vasa in contumeliam et eciam in honorem, volens per hoc innuere Deum talem potestatem habere de potestate contradiccionis

\*cf Rm 9,20

30. inscribi] scribi Js; \sim semper scriptus K
31. fuisse *om. Js*
31-32. \sim ut ne V
33. qui] quoniam TV
34. erat + ibi L; ante] Deum K
34-35. scriptos...erant mg. T
35. \sim de facto ita T
37. vincentibus] viventibus KJs
38. \sim verba apostoli K
41. quoniam] quando T; fingimentum] fingimentum D; fingenti] fignenti T
42. conquerendo] querendo D, *om. K*
43. in *om. D*; volens] valens T

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Intelligens. Alioquin non per hoc ostenderet Dei iusticiam in eligendo de eadem massa peccatrice unum alium reprobando in nullo sibi dissimilem. Sed ex hoc capite arguit divinam iusticiam quod utrumque illorum sine increpacione potest uno modo aut altero inesse producere sicut figulus pro voto suo de luto diversa vasa sic potest efficere. Et ob hoc sive uno modo sive altero vas de luto efficiat figulus aut hominem Deus de massa peccatrice, nullus potest iuste causacionis causam habere nec aliam causam potest quisquam reperire cur Deus mundum aut aliam quamvis creaturam aliquando produxit et non ante nisi istam contradiccionis liberam potestatem, ita quod ex hoc solo capitulo clareret nostrum propositum si aliud pro eo non esset in scripturis expressum. Et ut finem faciamus questioni presenti tu frater accipe tibi dictum quod hic sequitur: *Tene quod habes ut nemo accipiat coronam tuam.*\(^7\) Noli considerare quod inevitabiliter coronaberis sed pocius fide tene quod poteris coronam perdere ut alter eam accipiat. Et ob hoc tu tene quod habes caritatis et gracie. Non dicas illud tibi

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\(^7\)Apoc 3,11

45. *alioquin* D; ~per hoc non L; potenciam aut *pr.* iusticiam Js
45-46. de eadem] deadem D
46. peccatrice] potestate D; dissimilem] dissolucionem N
47. capite arguit] arguit capite arguit T
48. altero] alio modo Js; sicut] seu D
49. voto] uto D
50. vas *om.* N; efficiat] efficiet N
51. peccatrice] peccatum recte D; iuste causacionis] inferre causacionis D, iuste creacionis V, iustificationis Js; nec *om.* D; aliam] aliquam K; aliciar*pr.* causam DL
52. quamvis] aliquam L
53. ante] vicit D, aperte T; liberam] liberrimam KNJs; liberam + libertatem seu L
54. hoc *om.* K; solo *om.* N; clareret] claret KLJs
55. pro eo *om.* L; esset] esse D; ~in scripturis non esset L
56. tu *om.* V; frater] super Js; hic] hoc KJs; sequitur] consequitur Js; tene] tenes K
57. considerare] considere DLNTV
58. ut *om.* D
59. tu] ut D, *om.* KJs
inevitabiliter alligari, ne forte sic frustra ad tenendum illud te Dei sapiencia hortaretur et tu illud propter culpam tue presumpcionis amittas. Explicit liber sextusdecimus.

60. alligari] allegari KJs
61. explicit liber XVI] explicit N, om. DKTVJs
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ABSTRACT

JAMES GORMAN

SUMMA DE QUESTIONIBUS ARMENORUM BOOK XVI

AN EDITION AND TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION

Richard FitzRalph (Armachanus) was one of the leading figures in the intellectual life of England, Ireland and the Continent in the fourteenth century—controversialist, scholar, litigant, administrator and, finally, as Archbishop of Armagh, holder of the highest ecclesiastical office of his native country. Of his written works the one which may be considered his most important and most influential is his *Summa de Questionibus Armenorum*, an account of debates with members of the Armenian and Greek churches on their doctrinal differences with the Latin church and his defence of the Latin position on these topics. He composed it mainly in the period 1337-44 during a long stay at the papal court in Avignon, and finally presented it to the pope at some time between 1349 and 1351.

It is a matter for some surprise that no edition of this work has been produced except for an unsatisfactory edition printed in Paris under a royal privilege of 1511, and a modern edition of the autobiographical prayer which forms the final chapter of the work. Because of the importance of the work and of its author (one of the most widely quoted prelates of his time), it appears of value to provide an edition and translation of at least part of it. Book XVI was chosen, one of three (XV-XVII) apparently inserted by him as a mature expression of his views on topics which had preoccupied him and his contemporaries in his student and teaching days in Oxford some twenty years earlier.

This thesis, being textually based, presents as its main components an edition and translation of Book XVI and also of the dedicatory letter with which the work begins and which explains the circumstances in which it was undertaken. A full description has been provided of the six manuscripts and the printed edition studied in the preparation of the text. The critical apparatus accompanying the text records all significant variants and every effort has been made to ensure complete accuracy. The medieval spelling has been retained. The originals being almost entirely unpunctuated, a modest degree of punctuation has been applied to the Latin text as an aid to the modern reader; and as a further aid, a precis has been introduced of the 24 chapters of the Book. The English rendering of the biblical citations, of which there are many, is from the Douay Bible. An Index Locorum Biblicorum and an Index Auctorum have been added.

The introduction deals with: FitzRalph’s birth, education and career; his main written works, the relationships of the Armenian and Greek churches with the Latin church; FitzRalph’s part in the discussions which led to the composition of the *Summa*; some comments on the text of Book XVI; FitzRalph’s doctrine of dominion and grace and his influence on later thinkers; and the cult of ‘Saint Richard’ after his death.