Europe is undergoing considerable demographic, economic, cultural and socio-political change. Many European countries have become culturally diverse societies and, at the same time, the increasingly supranational context in which political and educational systems are operating has challenged national identities. As Turkey gets politically closer to Europe and entered membership negotiations on 3 October 2005, the debate where the eastern boundaries of the continent of Europe lie has intensified and is likely to impact on the ways in which Turkish youth negotiate their identities. In Germany, for instance, the Social Democratic-Green government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) argued strongly in favour of full Turkish EU membership whereas the new grand coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel has adopted a more pragmatic approach given that the conservative Christian Democrats prefer a so-called ‘privileged partnership’. The Turkish Muslims are also a particularly under-researched and disadvantaged community. Enneli, Modood and Bradley (2005), for instance, argue that England’s young Turkish Muslims are even more disadvantaged in housing, employment and education than the Bangladeshis, who were hitherto often regarded as the least integrated community in England (Modood et al., 1997).
This article explores how Turkish youth in Germany and England relate to Europe; and analyzes how their identities are shaped by macro-level policies, school dynamics (e.g. ethos) and social class. The Turkish community within Europe has always had a very complex history. The Turkish Muslims were physically brought into the European project as ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) by the Germans who increasingly needed labour after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The 31 October 1961 bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey stated that Turkish workers should return to their home country within two years (Şen and Goldberg, 1994). However, because of the need of workers beyond the initially agreed date, many of these young men continued to stay in Germany and were joined by their families in subsequent decades (Şen, 2002). By 1980, the Turkish Muslims formed the largest minority ethnic community in Germany (1,462,000) and, because of family reunions, their number increased to more than two million by the late 1990s (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002). Many fifteen-year-old Turkish youth in Germany are now in their second generation.

In England, however, it was mainly for political reasons that mainland Turkish people, Turkish Cypriots and Kurds sought refuge. As a result of the British occupation of Cyprus between 1878 and 1959, the Turkish community is much more heterogeneous here and some of the refugees had British passports. The first wave of mainly male Turkish Cypriots fled their increasingly politically unstable island to seek refuge in England in the 1950s and 60s, when the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters fought for union with Greece (Sonyel 1988). The wave of migration from mainland Turkey only gained momentum after the military coup by General Evren in 1980 (Mehmet Ali 2001). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most of the Kurds arrived in England as refugees. As a result of this migration, many young Turkish Cypriots are now in their second generation whereas most first-generation mainland Turkish people were born in Turkey. Despite different histories of migration, Turkish Muslims have faced enormous conflict and
marginalisation in both European countries in terms of employment and education (e.g. Kagitçibasi 1991) and have often been the victims of racism and Islamo-phobia (e.g. Archer 2003; Dodd 2005; Wilpert 2003).

**Theorising and Researching Identity**

This paper draws upon post-structuralist notions of a fragmented society, in which identities are multidimensional, hybrid and shifting (e.g. Hall 1992; Caglar 1997; Mac an Ghaill 1999; Dolby 2001; Tizard and Phoenix 2002) to explore how contemporary Turkish youth in Germany and England perceive Europe and how they negotiate their identities. The advantages of a post-structuralist approach to the study of youth identities were that it opened up the possibility of a non-unitary subject with multidimensional identities and also reflected the shifting nature of society. Crucially, in a post-structuralist framework, identities are not fixed, static and of a binary nature (e.g. white/black) but discursively negotiated and renegotiated. The notion of performativity (Butler 1997) was important for the design of the broader study because, from a deconstructionist position, performativity suggests that ethnic and political identities are a continual establishment and articulation of binaries. The linking of techniques of the self (Foucault 1988) and performance opens up an exploration of the ways in which the social context (e.g. schools, governmental policies) mediates how subjects deal with the lived realities of specific institutional locations (Mac an Ghaill 1999).

The concept of *identity/identities*, meaning the communities young people felt they belong to, was also crucial for the conceptualisation of this study. In contrast, the notion of *identification* refers to the reasons and discourses students employed to identify with a particular community (e.g. Europe). It is also important to differentiate between *hybrid* (e.g. Hall 1992; Mercer 2000; Tizard and Phoenix 2002) and *hyphenated* identities (e.g. Caglar 1997). Hybrid identities, according to Bhabha (1990), can be understood as
‘mixed’ identities which emerge as a result of the interconnections between diasporic or ethnic affiliations and political identities such as ‘being European’. In contrast, the notion of hyphenated identities, as understood by Caglar (1997), relates more to territorial or political identities, such as African American, rather than the emergence of a new identity. The fact that many young people in this study constructed their identities along ethnic and political dimensions, rather than mediating between two territories, suggests that the notion of hybrid identities is perhaps more accurate when analysing contemporary youth identities. One of the theoretical implications of this article is thus the need for researchers to re-conceptualise the way we think about identity formation and to consider the interconnections between ethnic and political identities.

The empirical data this article draws upon derives from a larger comparative case study of fifteen-year-old native youth and youth of Turkish descent, located in two English and two German secondary schools (Faas, 2007). The main part of the fieldwork was carried out in 2004 in London and Stuttgart. In each school, I distributed a questionnaire to about 100 students to obtain broad insights into their identities. Then, I conducted six focus groups of four to five students (single-sex and mixed-sex groups) and I interviewed eight students (four boys and four girls) to listen to the discourses students employed when talking about Europe and their identities. The main reason for including single-sex groups in the research design was to explore whether or not the topics and group dynamics between the two sexes were different. However, the data analysis revealed that many of the student discourses around identity cut across gender divisions, unless specifically stated in the article. Additional interviews with the Head, the Citizenship Education coordinator, Head of Geography and Religious Education were conducted to gain insights into the role schools play in shaping identities. The names of all schools, teachers and students were protected from outsiders by using pseudonyms.

In this article, I draw mainly on the qualitative data obtained from student focus groups and semi-structured interviews with
students and teachers. I chose four schools (two inner-city multi-
ethnic secondary schools in Stuttgart and two comprehensives in
an Inner London bor-ough) that had some attempt to relate to the
European project. The schools had some simi-larities and differ-
ences in relating to Europe, as summarised in Table 1 below:

Table 1: A summary of the school profiles of the two German
and English secondary schools

The Turkish youth therefore will have experienced quite con-
tradictory and different messages about multiculturalism and
Europe in the four secondary schools. The school approaches em-
phasise either diversity or commonality. Not only is the history of
migration different between Germany and England, but so too are
the school approaches as a result of the different priori-tisation of
European and multicultural agendas at national government level.

Young Turks in German Schools
Germany was a founding member of the European integration
project and, as a result, schools and the curriculum throughout the
1980s and 1990s were used to construct a ‘Europeanised national
identity’ (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002). Building on various
earlier initiatives to implement a European dimension in German
schools (e.g. the 1978 ‘Europe in the Class-room’ document), in
1990 the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education (KMK)
published the revised document ‘Europe in the Classroom’ (Europa
im Unterricht). The document stated that the goal of education
must be ‘to awaken in young people the con-sciousness of a European identity; to prepare them to be aware of their responsibil-
ities as citi-zens of the European Community; and to promote mutual learning with young foreigners to foster the ability to feel mutual solidarity’ (KMK 1990). In 1992, the KMK published a further review of progress and recommendations. The particular areas for development were identified as foreign languages as part of vocational qualifications; political and cultural edu-cation; school exchanges; school links; and teacher exchanges. Several German federal states subsequently overhauled their curricula to implement a European dimension.

At the same time, Germany was reluctant to respond to the presence of ‘guest workers’ and fitting minority ethnic communi-
ties like the Turkish Muslims into its Europeanised concept of nationhood. ‘Integrating guest worker children’ into the German school system while prepar-ing them for a possible return to their country of origin, known as ‘foreigner pedagogy’ (Ausländerpädagogik), was the guiding principle of education in the 1960s and early 1970s (Luchtenberg 1997). Despite mass immi-
gration, it was not until the 1980s that a concept of multicultural education was developed in response to the presence of ‘guest worker children’ and it was only in 1996 that the KMK published the guideline ‘Intercultural Education at School’ (Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule), stating that the federal states should ‘overhaul and further develop their curricula and guide-
lines of all subjects with regard to an intercultural dimension; develop teaching materials which address intercultural aspects as an integral part of school and education; and only allow school text-
books that do not mar-ginalise or discriminate against other cul-
tures’ (KMK 1996). However, during the past ten years, schools like Tannberg Hauptschule and Goethe Gymnasium in Stuttgart con-
tinued to promote Europeanness over and above German identities and multicultural agendas, albeit with different emphases. This sets the context for the responses of Turkish youth.

Goethe Gymnasium, located in a predominantly middle-class
area with 54 per cent of students having professional middle-class and routine non-manual parents, promoted European values alongside multicultural values. The school prospectus stated that ‘the ethos of our school is characterised by mutual respect and tolerance towards other people. Our students learn the manifoldness of European languages, cultures and mentalities and can thus develop their own identities within our school. (...) Europe as a cultural area is one of our guiding principles’. The teachers I interviewed had a deeply ambivalent relationship towards German national identity and referred to Germany’s Europeanised national identity. The concept of ‘multicultural Europeanness’ shaped Turkish students’ political discourses and the ways in which they perceived their identities. Unlike in the other three schools, where young people preferred national governments, a majority of Turkish respondents argued for more European integration. Nerhìm alluded to the notion of a family arguing that ‘I find the EU, the unification of all these countries, a good thing. It’s just the same within a family; for example, when you have a problem then you discuss that amongst four or five people and so; and I find it good that Europe is doing the same generally speaking’. Other examples which were suggestive of Turkish students’ positioning within national and European discourses emerged from the discussions I had with Melik and the group of four Turkish boys. Melik argued that if there was further European integration, ‘the language would have to be the same too’, thus alluding to the status of English as a ‘lingua franca’ for Europe. When asked about Germany’s relationship with Europe and the EU, the group of Turkish boys argued from a German perspective that Germany is at the heart of Europe and an important and powerful country:

DF: How would you describe Germany’s relationship with Europe and the EU?
ZAFER: Well, I’d say Germany is a very powerful country; one of the big countries. You can see that with the European Central Bank which is in Frankfurt. It’s just in the middle of Europe.
YENER: Germany is the driving force in Europe and the EU was founded by Germany and the European Central Bank’s in Germany. They’ve close political ties with other European countries, like France.

SEVILIN: I think that if Hitler hadn’t existed, Germany would today lead Europe and so. They had a few historical problems but I think they’d lead Europe, although it would still be called Europe. Germany would have the say, but now they have to be cautious and hold back. Germany is at the heart of Europe and without Germany today’s Europe wouldn’t be what it is.

The school’s interpretation of ‘Europeanness’ to include multiculturalism and students’ privileged backgrounds allowed many Turkish students to relate positively to Europe, to think of Europe as being part of their multidimensional identities. Many students I interviewed engaged in a discussion about Europe rather than just listing concepts that came to their mind when they heard the word Europe. For example, Semra alluded to the European Union’s official motto United in Diversity and the girls also compared and contrasted the current political structure of Europe with that of America, thus referring to the decade-long debate amongst policymakers and politicians about the future structure of Europe:

DF: What comes to your mind when you hear the word ‘Europe’?

SEMRA: Well, Europe consists of countries that have got together, a community with the same currency. But you can’t say that that’s a giant country cos there are different languages and you can’t say that Europe is one culture. The people are kind of similar but there are nevertheless other cultures and France isn’t like Germany and it’s different in England. Europe just has the same currency but not the same language and culture.

NILGÜN: For me, Europe is more geographical. It’s also more simple that you can move from one country to anoth-
er. There’s the Euro, but I don’t really like it. I mean, people think that all Europeans are the same but, in reality, there are quite different cultures. I’ve got relatives in France and when we crossed the border it looked quite different. It’s not one country.

SEVILIN: You can’t change the cultures, only the laws. I don’t think there’ll ever be something like a United States of Europe. That’s somehow not possible. Maybe it’s just a term cos in America each state has its own laws too but the language and culture is the same, and that’s not the case in Europe.

ZEYNEP: They all see themselves as Americans.

Despite engaging in European political discourses, most students made identification with Europe dependent on stays abroad (e.g. ‘I only know Germany; if I was living in Spain for a few years, then I’d more say that I’m European cos I’d be familiar with different countries’), parental influence (e.g. ‘my parents experienced a lot and tell me a lot about other countries and culture; Europe plays an important role for me too cos I’m interested in getting to know these other countries’), and the school curriculum (e.g. ‘we learn a lot of European languages here in school and talking in Italian, English and French makes me feel partly European’). The following excerpts indicate that the young people felt positive about Europe:

DF: To what extent do you see yourself as European?
ALI: Erm, of course I’m European. Europe is very big and is getting bigger and bigger. And when Turkey joins the EU it’ll be even bigger. Europe is getting more and more important to me cos of Turkey. […]
MARIAM: I feel European because of the Euro. The Euro impacts on your life and that’s why Europe is important. I mean, in the newspaper they always talk about the Euro, Eurozone, Europe and I’ve noticed that the countries are getting closer and closer and not every country has its own policy. And the economy has grown together too. And you can
travel to other countries without any problems at the borders.

Whilst Europe was part of young people’s multidimensional and hybrid identities at Goethe, a majority of Turkish students I interviewed emphasised their German identities over and above Turkishness. They based their national identification upon notions of birth and residence. Zeynep (a Turkish girl) thought that ‘I’d say more German than Turkish. My dad works here, I plan to study here after school and work here as well’ and Nilgün (another Turkish girl) also prioritised her German identity saying that ‘I was born here and that’s why I feel more German’. Melik’s remark in the following excerpt that he feels like a Turkish Stuttgarter, a German-European Turk or a Turkish German was suggestive of the multidimensional and hybrid nature of young people’s identities at Goethe:

DF: Where do you feel you belong to?
MELIK: I feel as a Turkish Stuttgarter so to speak, a German-European Turk or a Turkish German, but not Swabian. I don’t know the Swabian culture and, I think, I’d have to be German for that with my ancestors being Swabians too.
NURHAN: You’d have to experience the culture at home but we can only see our Turkish culture and, I mean, I wouldn’t want to lose that. I don’t really know the Swabian way of life. Sometimes, teachers make Swabian jokes and stuff.
ISMET: (imitating the Swabian dialect) Gel.
NURHAN: We don’t really know much Swabian stuff.
ISMET: I’d like to add that I don’t see myself as a Swabian either, more as a Stuttgarter. It’s also easier to get to know the German culture, just here generally by living here, but the Swabian culture is more at home and I’m not around that. Sometimes I don’t really
know whether something is particularly Swabian.

NURHAN: Perhaps Stuttgart is the Swabian world and it appears to me like a German world but maybe I don’t fully grasp the contrast; I should go to Berlin or so for a while and see what the differences are.

Time and again, Turkish students such as Nurhan also spoke of being afraid of losing their Turkish identity as a result of integrating (or assimilating) into the German society. Their Europeanised German identities had become so prevalent in the lives of these Turkish boys and girls that they felt their Turkishness was marginalised.

In contrast with the Gymnasium, Tannberg Hauptschule, located in a predominantly working-class residential area of Stuttgart with 57 per cent of students having skilled and unskilled parents, mediated national and citizenship agendas through a dominantly European and arguably, at times, a Eurocentric approach. For example, while eating with the students in the canteen, I witnessed cultural insensitivity amongst some Tannberg Hauptschule teachers towards Turkish Muslim students. On that particular day, there was pork and beef sauce available for the students and the teachers on duty told a male German student who wanted to help himself to some beef sauce that this is ‘Muslim sauce’ (Moslemsoße) and that he should rather take some ‘non-Muslim sauce’ and when the German student asked why he shouldn’t eat beef sauce the supervising teacher replied that ‘you will get impotent from that’. Besides this lunchtime remark, I sat in some lessons where teachers occasionally spoke German with a foreign accent (Ausländerdeutsch), and thus either intentionally or unintentionally ridiculed some minority ethnic, particularly Turkish, students in class. In addition, during an interview, Miss Klein (the Head of Religious Education) referred to the white Christian roots of Germany and Europe and established a racial/religious hierarchy which privileged the Christian cross over the Muslim hijab (‘I think that we are still Christian Occidental [i.e.
white and European] here with our basic values. I am of the opinion that if a religious symbol was allowed in class then it should be the cross and not the hijab). These examples indicated the ways in which some teachers marginalised and oppressed Turkish students.

Arguably, the Eurocentric approach of some of the teachers and the predominantly working-class background of Tannberg students made it very difficult for Turkish teenagers to relate positively to Europe. The Turkish interviewees mostly adopted a German perspective when talking about the possibility of a Turkish EU membership, which was not only suggestive of their familiarity with national socio-political debates but also indicated the ways in which they brought together ethnic identities with national identities. A similarly distant approach was adopted by both Sema and Zerrin, who thought of Turkey as a largely backward country and not only distanced themselves from those Turkish people who live in Turkey and who, according to them, know little about life in Germany, but also rejected some of the customs associated with the Muslim religion, as shown in the following passage:

DF: How do you feel about Turkey joining the EU?
SEMA: I don’t want Turkey to join the EU.
ZERRIN: Me neither.
SEMA: Germany, Turkey is bankrupt anyway. What do they want in the EU? In Turkey, they think that everything is fine in Germany. There, Turkish people approach me and ask me where I was from and when I say ‘from Germany’ they...
ZERRIN: (interrupting) They want to marry you, want to follow you to Germany and lead a better life here. That was the case with my brother-in-law too. Well some things are better here (…)
SEMA: Some Germans also think that the Muslim religion is a bit stupid. I find it stupid too. The fact that you can’t eat pork or have a boyfriend, which is the case amongst Turks, I mean you are only allowed to have a boyfriend when you’re
engaged. That’s just nonsense.

Although Turkish students engaged in a discussion about the possibilities of a Turkish EU membership, their general knowledge about Europe seemed rather limited despite the school’s promotion of strong European agendas and identities. The young people in this school listed some concepts including ‘the euro’, ‘the EU’, ‘western world’ and ‘advanced rich countries’, but were unable to engage in a wider discussion about Europe. Tamer alluded to the ‘united in diversity’ motto of the EU and Ugur referred to the EU’s peace-keeping role:

DF: What do you know about Europe, about the European Union?
TAMER: It’s a community.
YELIZ: That’s what I think too.
UMAY: I don’t know. I’m not so sure.
TAMER: It’s a community of different countries.
CARI: EU, countries that belong together; they talk about politics of different countries; they have negotiations and debate what they can do. It’s a strong, political team.
YELIZ: If a country needs help then the other EU countries will help. They have treaties with each other.
UGUR: The European Union is a good thing; we don’t have war today.

Given Germany’s commitment to Europe and European politics, it was not surprising that nearly all Turkish students I interviewed in Tannberg Hauptschule thought that Germany should get closer to Europe. For example, Tamer thought that ‘Germany belongs to Europe, we are the EU, Europe, I think’ whereas Cari was slightly less emphatic saying that ‘the US is fierce. I think it’s ok the way it’s right now’. Tamer used the inclusive first person plural form we to describe Germany’s relationship with Europe, thus revealing his level of integration and the extent to which he adapted to the German way of life and thinking.
Paradoxically, despite having some knowledge about Europe and being able to talk about Germany’s role in Europe and the possibilities of a Turkish EU membership, the Turkish students I interviewed did not see themselves as ‘European’. Most Turkish youth seemed to identify with Germany, which was more important for them than Turkey. It was fascinating to listen to the ways in which the group of Turkish girls balanced their identities. The following quotation shows the dilemma Sema and Zerrin face as a result of their hybridised ethno-national (i.e. Turkish German) identities. In Germany, they are positioned as ‘foreigners’ and in Turkey people refer to them as Germans, which is precisely what Auernheimer (1990: 201) referred to as individuals acquiring a marginal identity and positioning in relation to both cultures of reference:

DF: Where do you feel you belong to?

SEMA: As a citizen I feel I belong to Germany. But when people ask me, I mean, when I am here then people call me ‘foreigner’. When I go to Turkey, they call me ‘German’ there.

ZERRIN: Yes, I don’t feel I belong to anything. I don’t think that I am German and I don’t think that I am Turkish. I don’t know. When I go to Turkey, then they say ‘Oh, look at the German’; and here I am a foreigner. Great. So, who am I? Where do I belong to?

SEMA: As a citizen, I can say I belong to Germany.

ZERRIN: I can say that I’m a German citizen but I’m not German. German citizen, I think, means that I have to adapt to this country, I try to adapt myself, and then I think about the laws and everything. I know a lot more about Germany so that I’m a German citizen, but I’m not German. But, I’m not Turk-ish either.

SEMA: I know Germany better than Turkey. I could never ever imagine living in Turkey.
Zerrin’s questions ‘Who am I? Where do I belong to?’ highlight the ongoing processes of identity formation, the struggle between ‘being a German citizen’ which is based on residence and ‘being German’ which is based on blood and ‘race’. Other Turkish interviewees also had hybrid identities. For example, the group of boys argued that they felt slightly more Turkish than German because ‘although we were born in Germany, our origin and family background is in Turkey’. Arguably, the tendency that some boys identified more strongly with Turkey than girls might have to do with their different roles in the Turkish society where women often have a more domestic role while men carry on their family name, and thus their honour and identity. These findings suggest that Turkish students who privileged their Turkishness over German national identity had no connection to Europe whereas those who prioritised the German part of their hybrid identities were able to feel European.

**Young Turks in English Schools**

Turning now to the English example, where multicultural agendas are strong and the concept of Europe is marginalised in political and educational discourses, it seems unlikely that (middle-class) Turkish youth have the same access to Europe. There was little reason why the country should reconceptualise her national identity in European terms and the processes of European integration have not seriously affected policy-makers. The Europeanisation of British national identity was undercut by the special relationship with the United States; the geographical detachment from continental Europe; and England’s post-war role in the Commonwealth (Geddes 1999). Europe did not appear amongst the cross-curricular themes of the 1988 National Curriculum. The Department of Education and Science (DES) responded to the 1988 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Education on the European dimension in education (Council of Ministers of Education 1988), stating that the government’s policies were aimed at ‘promoting a sense of European identity; encouraging interest in and improving compe-
tence in other European languages; and helping students to acquire a view of Europe as a multicultural, multilingual community which includes the UK’ (DES 1991). However, advice and curriculum guidance on precisely what content and form the European dimension should assume has not matched official British concerns with multicultural issues.

Unlike Germany, England had to develop approaches to migration-related diversity after the 1948 arrival of the Empire Windrush from the Caribbean because it recruited labourers on who initially had the right to reside permanently in the host country. Although both countries initially developed assimilationist approaches (i.e. ‘foreigner’ pedagogy in Germany; assimilation and integration in England), the integrationist approach in England attempted to recognize, albeit to a limited extent, cultural and ethnic differences within the concept of British-ness. In 1988, multicultural education (unlike European education) became one of three cross-curricular dimensions of the English National Curriculum. The anti-racist movement was also far stronger in England where schools, particularly in inner-city areas, were deeply implicated in the development of multicultural and anti-racist initiatives. The murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993 marked a new stage in the already decade-long anti-racist movement. The Race Relations Amendment Act required all schools, colleges and local education authorities to draw up a race equality policy before May 2002, exemplifying the Blair government’s aim to achieve equal access to knowledge and opportunity. Unlike in Germany, the concept of nationhood mediated through multicultural values was primary in England.

The ethos of Darwin School in London, for example, suggested that young people were encouraged to think of themselves as liberal democratic British citizens living in a multi-ethnic international community. ‘The school strives to be a high-performing inclusive community school, fully committed to active citizenship and academic excellence; we value all who learn and work here; promoting a strong sense of community within and beyond the
school’ (School prospectus). The promotion of national agendas (i.e. Britishness) in a school which celebrates similarity made it difficult for most Turkish students to relate to the European agenda. Consequently, Turkish students, particularly second-generation Turkish Cypriots but also first-generation mainland Turks, identified with both Britain and their country of origin:

DF: What role would you say does your Turkish Cypriot background play in your life today?

SAFAK: Well, it plays a big part cos that’s my origin, but I don’t think of it as a big part where everything I do is revolved around that. I think cos, you know, I don’t live there and I don’t know people - I do know some people but they’re not like the people I know here, that I like, all my friends are here, and my close family’s here, so obviously I care more about them than I do distant family who I only see once a year. But it plays a big part as to who I am, because of the way, cos that’s just who I am, cos I am Turk-ish-Cypriot, but I don’t make my whole life go around that. I kind of just try to stay in between and care about both things just as much, like, just as equally, but obviously that’s harder cos I do a lot of things here, like watch British TV, that makes me learn more about England and London, than I do about Turkish, because, well, I watch Turkish TV less.

Safak tried to balance her various identities by attempting to stay ‘in-between’ and care about both societies. She tried hard to keep herself equally well-informed about the two countries by watching television but she had to realise just how difficult it is ‘to care about both things’. Also, Safak directly referred to notions of proximity and distance, arguing that she cares more about her close friends and family in England than about distant family members in the Turk-ish part of Cyprus whom she only sees once a year. This new hybridised Turkish British identity was also clearly expressed by the first-generation mainland Turks at Darwin School although they still saw their ethnic background to be more important to them than Britain.

171
In contrast, despite the mild pro-European approach of the Blair government in recent years, the processes of Europeanisation continued to receive little, if any, attention in schools. Consequently, in their discussions about Europe and the EU, many Turkish youth had difficulties to engage in European political discourses. Some students referred to ‘power’, ‘opposition to America’ and ‘community of countries’. Typically, however, Turkish interviewees neither knew the purpose of the EU nor how European institutions work. This can be seen in the following quotation from the discussion with a group of male and female students:

DF: What do you know about the European Union or Europe actually?
ADEM: It happened after World War Two; France and Germany, they like made an agreement, and then loads of other countries joined or something.
NEYLAN: What happens when you’re in the EU anyway?
AFET: Nothing, you’re just
ADEM: No, you get to, the United Nations.
NEYLAN: What do you get?
NEYLAN: So what, who cares? Why can’t the whole world be in it? That’s not fair.
ADEM: Cos they’re not.
[one of them speaks indecipherably]
NEYLAN: It’s just stupid!

Arguably, the limited coverage of European issues in the British mass media as well as the ignorance of British educationalists and schools to promote a European dimension in the National Curriculum were all responsible for this partial and confused political view of students. In contrast, Turkish students I talked to frequently drew on national political discourses when talking about England’s role in Europe and within the wider world. In the following excerpts, both Mustafa and Mehmet (Turkish Cypriots) talked
about monetary issues while Safak (Turkish Cypriot) focused upon
England’s geo-political relation with Europe:

MEHMET: Britain should be in the EU but I don’t think they
should change the currencies, cos that would affect Britain
dramatically, you know, because the British pound is, you
know, really valuable and if this happened, yeah, the econo-
my of Britain’s going to drop, so it’s not going to be good for
us. […]

MUSTAFA: Yeah, I think they’re more distant cos, erm, like
firstly they wanted to keep the pound here. Everyone wants
to keep the pound. But if we did actually take like, the Euro,
our economy would be stronger, and it would help other
countries as well because it would make our economy work
because we’ll have a stronger force, because the whole of
Europe is our working force. […]

SAFAK: I think they’re kind of part of it, but in a way they’re
not they’re just kind of ‘are’ with Europe as in, because,
they’re like, they’re in the EU and stuff, and you know,
Britain is in the continent of Europe, so they should be
involved with their own continent instead of going off some-
where else.

As a result of England’s lukewarm approach to the EU, young peo-
ple’s Turkish British identi-ties did not easily fit with Europe so
that this political identity played a less important role in the lives of
students I interviewed. However, (first-generation) mainland
Turkish and (second-generation) Turkish Cypriot students were
able to identify with Europe so long as Turkey was included in the
notion of Europe. Typically, respondents argued that ‘if Turkey
was in the European Union, then I would see myself as more of a
European’ and ‘I see myself wherever Turkey belongs in Asia or
whatever’. A number of Turkish Cypriot interviewees, such as
Mustafa and Safak, referred to British insularity and separateness
from Europe arguing that ‘I am European ‘cos I’m in Europe, and
I’m in Britain which is in Europe and part of the Euro-peon society;
but I don’t see myself as a European because Britain is separate from Europe'. Here, Mustafa and Safak tried to position themselves within the British national discourse. These discourses were suggestive of students’ Turkish British identities.

Mustafa analysed fully England’s position within Europe, alluding to the referenda on the single currency and the proposed Constitution and evaluating the consequences of a ‘no’ vote for England. His explanations could just as easily come from a British student:

DF: To what extent would you see yourself as European?
MUSTAFA: I don’t really see myself as European, because, erm, I don’t know, I just, erm, I’m not sure because I’d sort of be like failing my argument now if I said that, erm, I don’t count myself as European because if I was born in Europe, I’d count myself as European, but I’m not born there so I guess I call myself British, cos I was born here and, like growing up here, since day 1. That’s it.

DF: That’s interesting that you are saying that, because you were born in England, and England has been part of the EU for decades, and now you were just saying “I’m not born in Europe”?

MUSTAFA: But the thing is, I don’t see England being a strong ... I know they’re quite strong in Europe, but I guess like I think like Europe’s sort of latching onto England, and I think England’s more distant from Europe, even though they’re quite strong contenders in the European Union. Now if you’ve seen the news, they’re actually thinking to vote not to be key contenders in the European Union, so they’ll be more of the people that’s on the marginal lines of Europe, instead of the core players like Germany or France.

The fact that first- and second-generation Turkish students at Darwin (especially compared with the other London school in the study, Millroad School) appeared to be receptive of the notion of Europe may have to do with their socio-economic background
which enabled them to travel much more within Europe. Other evidence for this came, for instance, from the Head of Geography at Darwin, who argued that ‘we’re a bit more privileged in terms of the [travel-ling] experiences some of our kids have had’.

In contrast with Darwin School, Millroad School mediated national identities through the politics of cultural and ethnic diversity whilst offering only limited acknowledgement of the processes of Europeanisation. The school prospectus reveals that the school ‘recognises that the social, cultural and linguistic diversity in our community is an important resource and an aspect of our ethos we seek to promote and celebrate. (…) We give our young people the knowledge and personal strength to be good citizens in a multicultural world’. Although the Modern Foreign Languages Department displayed a number of posters with the different languages the school teaches (i.e. French, German, Turkish, Spanish) and posters regarding the eastern enlargement of the EU, the multicultural agenda is the dominant one in Millroad School and favoured over the concept of a European educational dimension. Nevertheless, some teachers were more receptive of the need to educate for, and about, Europe. The Head of Geography was keen to stress that ‘I’m actually developing a change in the schemes of work that we teach and the structure I’ve had, (…) it needs a European dimension’ but so far ‘well, we’ve [only] touched on Europe’. The challenge for Millroad School thus appears to be how to combine the politics of cultural diversity with the new European agenda.

The Turkish youth faced substantial conflict at Millroad and were subject to verbal (e.g. ‘fucking Turk’) and physical abuse including gang fights with the African Caribbean community in their struggle for power and control of the school. When I observed some of the lessons, I noticed that students sat along ethnic lines in almost all classrooms, with some tables of only African Caribbean students and other tables with only Turkish students. The Turkish students had few cross-ethnic friendships and formed an ethnic solidarity group on the basis of common religion, language, culture and physical appearance. The identity formation processes were
deeply affected by the ethnic experience. Many Turkish respondents deployed concepts of birth and pride to identify with their ethnic background, arguing that ‘I feel I belong to Turkey, but, because of the economy of Turkey, it forces us to come to England’ and ‘your background’s there [in Turkey] and all your grandparents, and, grandmas have been living there, so you have to follow’. In contrast, the sample of Turkish Cypriot students, in addition to their ethnic identity, drew upon the concept of residence to partially also identify with Britain. For example, Harika and Jihan seemed to have developed hybrid identities although the following discussion shows that they, too, privilege their Turkishness:

DF: So you would say you feel you belong to both Turkey and England?
HARIKA: Yeah.
TULIP: No, I don’t think so.
JIHAN: But still isn’t it, cos you were born here, yeah, and you been living here, yeah, and you go over to like Turkey and Cyprus once in your life, yeah, you don’t know nothing.
TULIP: But if you’re someone and your parents are Turkish, that’s what you are.
NAGIHAN: No, I’m Turkish but-
JIHAN: I didn’t say you’re not, but-
HARIKA: But you shouldn’t say “oh, I’ve got nothing to do with England”
TULIP: No, like my stepparents are English that’s it, you can’t say you’re English or half-English.
JIHAN: Or you can say - you were born there, innit?
HARIKA: No but when someone asks you you’re not going to say “I’m English”, it’s just that you’re going to able when something happens, when there’s a war, when there’s a football match, and lets say England’s playing against Brazil or something then you would have to support England but when England’s playing against Turkey you can support Turkey cos that’s your race.
The ethnically charged school context thus made it extremely difficult for first- and second-generation Turkish students to identify with England or Britain, let alone Europe. Consequently, Turkish respondents struggled to talk about Europe and the EU in political terms, as the following quotation from the discussion with four boys and girls underlines:

DF: What do you know about the European Union or Europe?
BARIS: European Union, what’s that?
SARILA: Well, nobody knows nothing about it basically.
BARIS: What’s the European Union?
SARILA: You think I know?
BARIS: I heard about it, but I don’t know what it is.
SARILA: Me neither.
HALIL: Is it the power?
BARIS: I’m asking you.
SARILA: I don’t really know, no.
BARIS: The Union’s a bunch of people that decides something, but I don’t know.
HALIL: It’s the only power.

Other students in the sample, such as Olcay, referred to the Turkish EU membership bid when asked what they know about Europe in political terms, thus seeing Europe through a Turkish national (i.e. familiar) lens. Those who argued against membership typically said that Turkey’s laws and morals do not meet European standards and that the country is very poor with a great deal of people being homeless. Also, respondents pointed towards the financial costs, saying that a membership would mean ‘improving their [Turkey’s] economic conditions at the expense of the rest’. Those students who wanted Turkey to join the EU pointed towards the societal changes that have taken place in Turkey (e.g. more rights) or the fact that a large number of Turkish people already live in Europe.
The concept of Europe as a political identity did not easily fit with Turkish national identities at Millroad School. The group of four Turkish boys construed the notion of Europe in monocultural terms, arguing that Europeans are essentially white Christian people:

YILDIRAN: Let’s say I go to India or something, or I don’t know, I’m just giving Egypt or America or any other Canada, Canada or something then I would say “ah, I’m coming from Europe”, basically that’s about “I’m coming from Europe” but I’m not like, you know European or anything.

MUHAMMAD: I wouldn’t even say Europe, you can’t say I’m European.

DF: Why not?

MUHAMMAD: Unless your races country is a European country as well … like where you’re from, whether your first country is in Europe cos basically we’re used to seeing white people, white people as European, so basically-

YILDIRAN: English people.

MUHAMMAD: I would say I live in Europe but I’m not European.

ONAN: Yeah same, because you’re not living all around Europe, you’re just living in one country.

KHAN: Erm, the thing is that if you was Europe, yeah, you’d like understand that, you know, I come from Europe, cos you know yeah, but I can’t say I’m European cos I’m not Christian.

MUHAMMAD: I don’t say I’m Christian, I say I believe in Christianity but I don’t say I’m Christian, that’s the same as saying I’m from Europe but I’m not European.

The notion of ‘being European’ did not sit comfortably with any of the Turkish boys in this group, most notably Muhammad, for
whom identification is based upon the concept of ‘race’ rather than residence. The use of the word ‘race’ is particularly interesting here as it underlines that the students were aware of the racial differences in society. The explicit use ‘race’ as a means of distancing themselves from white Christians might be linked to the school dynamics and the ethnic conflict there; it was not used by any of the Darwinian students.

The Hybrid Identities of Turkish Youth in Europe

This article suggests that Turkish youth had no singular identity but employed hybrid ethno-national, ethno-local and national-European identities as a result of their national location and, especially, schooling and social class positioning (rather than migration histories). By looking at four different school settings in two European countries, we have also learnt that there were far greater tensions and frictions in the two working-class localities, which contributed to students’ privileging the ethnic dimensions (e.g. Turkishness) over and above the political dimensions (e.g. Britishness) of hybridity. In contrast, there was much greater homogeneity in the two middle-class schools. The Turkish youth in the two higher-achieving schools benefited to a greater extent from their privileged environment than their counterparts at Tannberg and Millroad. The labour market chances of those students in the two working-class dominated schools are likely to be much worse due to their relatively lower educational qualifications (Hauptschule and GCSE) compared to Goethe and Darwinian students. Because of their socio-ethnic marginalisation, they were more likely to be caught up in ethnic tensions and, in the case of Millroad, tended to have their own ethnic solidarity groups. Table 2 summarises what was learnt about the ways in which Turkish youth forged their identities:
The ways in which social class worked within these different school contexts could also be seen in the extent to which students related positively to the political dimensions of the concept of hybridity, including Europe, rather than the ethnic dimensions. Turkish youth at Goethe Gymnasium in Stuttgart, which promoted European alongside multicultural values, had the best opportunities of relating to Europe as a political identity. Their privileged socio-economic background allowed them to take part in European school exchanges and to travel across Europe and thus benefit from the opportunities associated with Europe. Turkish students at Darwin School in London also benefited from their socio-economically advantaged background and the school’s promotion of an inclusive multi-ethnic national identity. However, as a result of England’s lukewarm approach to Europe, the Turkish middle-class students I interviewed had much more limited opportunities than their German counterparts. In contrast, as a result of their predominantly working-class backgrounds, Turkish youth at Tannberg Hauptschule did not seem to gain the same access to the opportunities associated with Europe than their peers at Goethe despite a similar curriculum emphasis on Europe. Turkish youth at Millroad

**Table 2:** The identities of Turkish youth in different school contexts

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIDDLE-CLASS LOCALITIES</th>
<th>WORKING-CLASS LOCALITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goethe Gymnasium</td>
<td>Darwin School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tannberg Hauptschule</td>
<td>Millroad School</td>
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<tr>
<td>School approach</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multicultural Europeanness</td>
<td>Multicultural Britishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eurocentric Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth identities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National-European</td>
<td>Ethno-national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish students: Stuttgart or German-European</td>
<td>Turkish students: Turkish British</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ethno-national and local</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Turkish students: Turkish German/Turkish Stuttgarter</td>
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<td>Turkish students: Turkishness</td>
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</table>
seem to have lost out on both the European and multicultural agendas and as a result, the students I interviewed privileged their Turkishness.

The article also showed that when schools constructed an inclusive multi-ethnic concept of Europe, like Goethe Gymnasium, Turkish youth engaged with Europe as a political identity and developed national-European identities. If however, Europe is conceptualised as an exclusionary monocultural (i.e. white, Christian) concept, as it was the case in Tannberg Haup-tscheule, then Turkish students will struggle to relate positively to Europe as a political identity. Politicians, policy-makers and educators are therefore presented with the challenge of constructing and promoting an inclusive, multi-religious model of Europe – one which addresses the issue of marginalised Muslim communities and promotes multicultural alongside traditional European values. Given that the regional (Swabian and English) identities were not favoured by any of the Turkish students (with Germanness being considered as problematic by many native German students), there is potential not only for the nation-state but particularly for the concept of Europe to act as a common bond holding together the ethnically different school communities if, and only if, Europe is reconceptualised in multicultural terms.