Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship.*

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This book is a welcome scholarly work on Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism and the way it relates to other aspects of Kant’s legal and political theory. It provides a valuable historical background for understanding Kant’s position by engaging with the work of some of Kant’s contemporaries such as Wieland, Cloots, Forster, Herder, Fichte and Novalis. Although the book is intended as a full length treatment of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, each chapter can be read as a thematic unity.

An important part of Kleingeld’s project is to dispel common misunderstandings of Kant’s theory in contemporary debates. Among these are the views that Kant’s cosmopolitanism was indifferent to personal relations and to duties to one’s own country; that Kant was a “consistent inegalitarian”, tacitly excluding non-white peoples from personhood status throughout his philosophical development; that Kant defended a *laissez faire* attitude to international trade and a minimalist conception of the state. Kant also seems extremely naive concerning the possibility of realizing his cosmopolitan ideal. Although primarily Kant exegesis, the book also situates Kant’s theory (as reconstructed by Kleingeld) within the contemporary debate in political philosophy and political theory (chapter 7).

Kleingeld convincingly argues that Kant not only defended cosmopolitanism, but that his cosmopolitanism can be understood as a requirement of *patriotism* (conceived by Kant as a duty to promote the political institutions in one’s state). The idea that patriotism and cosmopolitanism are compatible was shared by many earlier cosmopolitans, from the Stoics to Wieland in the eighteenth century. Understanding the theoretical potential of alternative cosmopolitan positions can help us overcome the paralysing dichotomy between cosmopolitanism and personal relations often present in contemporary debates (chapter 1).

In chapter 2, Kleingeld tackles the question whether Kant’s theory of right commits him to endorsing a state of states with coercive powers (*Völkerstaat*) and if so, how this can be reconciled with the fact that Kant ends up defending a league of states with no coercive powers (*Völkerbund*). She does a good job at reconciling the ultimate ideal of the state of states (more precisely, a republic of republics) with coercive powers with the claim that one must nevertheless *start* with a voluntary league of states given the constraint to respect the autonomy of states, a restriction which is absent in regard to individuals in the state of nature.

Instructive (although disappointingly short) is also her discussion in Chapter 3 of the connection between Kant’s notion of “common ownership of the earth” and cosmopolitan right. Although
the notion seems to play a role only in allowing individual acts of first acquisition of land and things and to lose its significance once all parts of the earth have been acquired, it has a bearing on Kant’s argumentation for the duty of hospitality. Kleingeld endorses the position of Johann Heinrich Tiefrunk in his 1798 commentary to the Doctrine of Right in which common possession of the earth (expressed in the form of a right to present oneself for interaction) is necessary for the possibility of derived acquisition (that is, acquisition from others after first acquisition has taken place). She argues that both innate right to freedom and the idea of original community of land are the normative foundations of cosmopolitan right (p. 85). These are interesting theses worthy of further elaboration.

Another significant contribution of the book is her thesis in chapter 4 that Kant’s account of cosmopolitan right is an innovation resulting from his revised attitude towards race from the mid 1790s. Useful is also her discussion of the charge of anti-Semitism, which is rarely discussed in the secondary literature.

Chapter 5 concentrates on Kant’s views on trade and justice at domestic and international levels. Kleingeld’s tentative reconstruction of Kant’s position relies on her interpretation of the controversial passage of the Doctrine of Right in which Kant discusses the right of states to tax the wealthy (die Vermögenden) to provide poverty relief (MdS VI: 326). She argues that Kant is talking about the duty of the ideal republic to preserve its citizens (p. 140). Does this mean that only republics (in Kant’s sense of the term) and not every state would have a duty to maintain citizens who cannot provide for themselves? Since the republic is an ideal that might never be achieved but that ought to be constantly approached, it is hard to see what Kant’s views on poverty relief concerning actual (imperfect) states would be. The same difficulty applies to her extension of the argument to international trade. Kleingeld argues that “when republics establish a republic of republics for the sake of justice (...) the international federation ought to relieve the poverty of those member states that are not able to maintain themselves” (p. 146). As Kleingeld herself acknowledges, there can be no analogous argument for poverty relief at the international level, unless the republic of republics is in place (Ibid.). The problem is that even at the domestic level the republic remains an ideal; and there is no textual evidence for the claim that the right to redistribute only applies to the ideal republic. Focusing on cosmopolitan right would be a more plausible candidate for a Kantian account of international just trade.

Kleingeld offers a scholarly reconstruction of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right which is both appealing and promising, even if certain aspects of her interpretation remain tentative and speculative. It is a fine work of scholarship which will be useful to students, Kant scholars, political philosophers and theorists alike.