On the Sociology of Ethnicity and Social Change: A Model of Rootedness and Rootlessness*

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I INTRODUCTION

In the light of mounting interest in, and manifestations of, ethnicity in most of the world today, it becomes important to work on the broader meaning of ethnicity from the comparative, historical and theoretical perspectives. The sheer persistence and the re-emergence of ethnic identities, and the relationship of ethnic movements and developments to economic and political realities, are certainly major research issues. In this context, we might be able to learn more about ethnicity per se, if we ask questions about the alternatives and opposites to ethnicity. Just as we can better understand the social meaning of conformity by examination of the variations of deviance, so may be treated the sociology of ethnicity. Furthermore, this approach, if valid, may differentiate not only between ethnicity and its absence, but also distinguish among degrees of ethnicity as well. It is, of course, a traditional approach in sociological theory, that of deviant case analysis, or of examining one kind of phenomenon in order to understand its mirror image or images. In this paper, then, it is proposed to define ethnicity, ethnic culture and structure; and then proceed to examine the theoretical possibilities which emerge from a proposed four-fold classification of attachments to cultural and structural entities.

II THE MEANING OF ETHNICITY

The substantive ethnographic description of subcultural ethnic values, attitudes, behaviour, and community life, within diverse polities and societies, has been a long-standing interest in the social sciences. Within the United States, for example,

*This article was written whilst the author was Visiting Professor 1975–76, Department of Social Theory and Institutions, University College, Cork, and is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Sociological Association of Ireland, Trinity College, Dublin, April 23–24, 1976. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Damian F. Hannan, J. Patrick O'Carroll, and Hilary Tovey, all colleagues in sociology at University College, Cork, and the support of a research grant from the Ford Foundation.
there have been many perceptive studies of religious groups (e.g., communities of Mormons, Jews, or different Protestant denominations in regions of the country), racial groups (e.g., communities of American blacks, of native American Indians), nationality origins (e.g., communities of the French-Canadians, Italians, Irish, or Chinese), and even the quasi-ethnic regional affiliations (e.g., the white Southerners, the New England conscience) and the quasi-ethnic occupational subcultures somewhat isolated over generations from the rest of society (e.g., the miners in Appalachia, the fishermen in Maine, or even intellectuals in academe).

Only recently in the 1960s and 1970s, however, have the persistence, the changing nature, and the meaning of such subcultural communities become matters of investigation, as different works suggest. (See, among many, Glazer and Moynihan, 1963, 1970, 1975; Gordon, 1964; Barth, 1969; Schermerhorn, 1970; Greeley, 1971, 1974; Abramson, 1973; Enloe, 1973; Newman, 1973; Hechter, 1975; Francis, 1976). The focus in all of this work is ethnicity, and although definitions of the concept vary, the term can be said, after Gordon's (1964, pp. 23–30) elaboration, to be a property of distinctive culture based on a differential race, religion, and/or nationality origin, which property produces a "sense of peoplehood" among those who share it.

More elaborately, there is the six-point definition of ethnicity which was offered by a recent conference report of the Social Science Research Council in New York (Bell, 1974). The first point suggests that ethnicity "involves a past-oriented group identification emphasising origins." To this may be added a more dynamic and less static notion, that while the group identity is based on the historic past, it is interpreted for the present, and in fact is oriented as well to the future. In sum, this first point refers to intergenerational continuity, bridging relationships from grandparents to grandchildren.

The second point refers to the idea that ethnicity "includes some conception of cultural and social distinctiveness." Again, here, one can extend the definition to the notion of physical or quasi-physical distinctiveness as well. The problem is raised by the difficulty of separating cultural from physical distinctiveness, not in the subjective eyes of the outsider but in terms of ethnic group beliefs themselves. Van den Berghe (1967), for example, distinguishes clearly between race and ethnicity, arguing that the former is a social category based on physical criteria and the latter is such a group based on cultural criteria. Van den Berghe concludes then that American blacks are a racial group and not an ethnic group, not only because they are physically different in skin colour but because, he says, they share the same predominant culture as American whites. This latter idea may be contested, because one of the effects of historic segregation between blacks and whites in the United States has been the development over time of distinctive black culture, in music, religion, language, politics, and other areas of social behaviour. Thus, different races which coexist within the same larger culture and society can, if segregated long enough, develop variants of that culture which respond to their own experience and can be said to be "ethnic" in meaning. Conversely,
again if segregation is maintained over generations and if conflict and competition are intense enough, two groups sharing the same racial background, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, become visible to each other, or more importantly, are thought to be visible after initial encounters, on the basis of quasi-physical gestures, accents, badges, body language, and even physique. In brief, this second point includes the constellation of cultural, social, and/or physical distinctiveness, the components varying with given ethnic groups.

The third point relates ethnicity "to a component unit in a broader system of social relations." This becomes an important and strategic part of the definition, relating the idea of ethnicity to the notions of diversity and pluralism. Ethnicity in a closed and culturally homogeneous system is without meaning. Implicit in this point is that the ethnic factor is meaningful only in a social and political context where there is more than one culturally distinctive background. On the assumption that all of the polity and society of Denmark is racially white, religiously Lutheran, and nationally Danish, the ethnic factor makes no sense. Include Greenland in the system and it now becomes valid to speak of Danish ethnicity and Greenlander ethnicity. If Western Europe becomes the broader context, then the Danish way of life becomes decidedly "ethnic."

Similarly, the English culture is ethnic only when contrasts and interaction emerge in a plural context. It makes less sense to speak of English ethnicity in Canterbury than it does in Liverpool or London, where the native English have competed with the immigrant Irish, Jews, West Indians, and Pakistanis. In the United Kingdom, certainly, being English is as ethnic as being Welsh or Scottish. In the framework of historic English colonialism, whether internally as with English centre and Celtic peripheries, as Hechter (1975) has written of it, or externally in Asia and Africa, English ethnicity is clearly presumed.

It is in this perspective that we see ethnicity as not merely a property of the cultural minority, although sociologists and laymen alike have so often spoken as though it were, but thus also typically as a characteristic of the dominant majority group in a diverse society. The reason we so often fail to appreciate this is two-fold. In the first place, ethnicity may be more visible among the relatively poor and powerless of the cultural minority, for the poor have little else with which to identify. So, in the eyes of the society (which often means the dominant culture), the poor and the powerless are not quite seen as poor, but rather they are seen as Irish Catholics, as Jews, as Sicilians, as "natives," as blacks, as Southern rednecks, with stereotypical opprobrium and whatever cultural distinctiveness they share. At best, such a minority is deemed "exotic" and at worst, and of course more commonly, such groups are subject to varying degrees of repression. It is inevitable, in such circumstances, that the minority is clearly felt to be "ethnic."

But, secondly, and more invisibly, we fail to recognise that the dominant culture is essentially ethnic too because this is the culture which is presumed and presupposed. In the United States, speaking English is normative; thus the Spanish speaking Puerto Ricans and Mexicans are deviant. The law is derived from the British codes; thus the Mafia style is deviant. The family system is nuclear and
dictates low fertility and the absence of grandparents; thus Catholic family size is deviant and so is the presence of Jewish grandparents. These are the contrasts of ethnicity, the facts of cultural power and cultural presupposition as opposed to cultural marginality. Given such a context, it should be obvious that the use of the English language, the traditions of British law, the development of the nuclear family, and the Protestant Ethic in economic behaviour, are all characteristic traits and symbols of English ethnicity.

A fourth point argues that ethnicity goes beyond territoriality and kinship: "ethnic groups are larger than kin or locality groups and transcend face-to-face interaction." The Romany, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Irish, and the overseas Chinese, are all diaspora peoples, subject at different times to the vicissitudes of dispersal, migration, and collective exile. They may, or may not, have a homeland or territorial base, but they represent ethnic groups in their distinctiveness abroad.

The fifth point suggests the diversity which is always present within any given ethnic group and the different interpretations of the meaning of a particular ethnicity: "ethnic categories have different meanings both in different societal settings and for different individuals." Thus, being Jewish in Ireland is not at all the same as being Jewish in New York City, or in Israel, in post-war Germany, or the Soviet Union (for the different historical experiences and social environments prevent uniformity). Furthermore, different individuals who share the same ethnic background may well disagree on the meaning, for them, of an ethnic issue in their lives. The diversity of opinion on ethnic group goals, as Wirth (1945) outlined them, is also quite evident in the American black community's movements of the last two decades.

Last is the sixth point, that “ethnic categories are emblematic, having names with meaning both for members and for analysts.” To this, may be added that ethnic categories are symbolic, not only for members and for analysts, but for all others outside the ethnic group as well. The symbolism carries weight and influence all the way from benign and curious interest to prejudice and discrimination and genocide. One can say that there are three levels of meaning: the meaning or meanings which ethnic group members carry subjectively for themselves; the interpretation, one or more, which all others place on the given ethnic category; and the analytic, more studied, and presumably more objective meaning which is based on some form of scholarship or on one of the arts.

III ETHNIC CULTURE AND ETHNIC STRUCTURE

Having discussed, rather briefly, a working definition of ethnicity, it is now proposed to extend the meaning of ethnicity to its sociological base and examine the generic concepts of ethnic culture and ethnic structure. Gordon’s (1964, pp. 60–83) analysis of the different levels of ethnic change and assimilation provides a useful way to begin. Gordon distinguishes quite clearly between cultural assimilation and cultural pluralism, on the one hand, and between structural assimilation and structural pluralism, on the other. In this model, ethnicity is maintained and
preserved if the ethnic culture persists and the ethnic structure is retained. If either one changes, Gordon presumes that particular level of assimilation to be operating. By cultural assimilation, this schema means a change from the ethnic culture of the group involved to the culture of the dominant group or the culture of the larger host society. And by structural assimilation, the model portrays the increasing and large-scale shift in involvement, on the primary-group level, from the networks of associations and institutions of the ethnic structure to those of the dominant group or the host society.

Ethnic culture and ethnic structure, also termed ethnic subculture and ethnic substructure to denote their place within a larger social and political system, are of course microcosms of the ideas of societal culture and societal structure. They are particularly useful concepts because they tend to be more graphic, stand out in greater relief, and yet share the same characteristics and qualities of what social scientists and laymen so often take for granted.

Ethnic subculture refers to the shared past orientations, shared present values, and shared future aspirations, of a given ethnicity. These are all integrated with an ethos, a distinctive world-view or Weltanschauung. Such a culture is bound together, as in Spicer's (1971) discussion, by a persisting identity system which affiliates members by the means of symbols. The symbols, myths, and legends, are the emblems of the past, even if they are newly created symbols, such as the clenched fist of the black movement in the United States. The keystone to the meaning of the ethnic subculture is historical continuity, that first and essential definitional property of ethnicity.

Land and language are often the most powerful emblems of an ethnic culture, but as Spicer indicates, they are not always necessary conditions for the survival of a people. Indeed, the sociology of diaspora and the sociology of language, in the history of the Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Irish, Welsh, Navajos, Cherokees, and many other groups, account for important variations on these themes. The symbolic weight of the phrase, “next year in Jerusalem,” spoken by Jews during centuries of collective exile, even when there was no real inclination or preparation made to move to Jerusalem, should not be underestimated. Similarly, the Black Muslims in the United States have as a goal and platform the creation of a new land of their own, to be developed out of their historical experiences, in areas now called Alabama and Mississippi. Land and territory, then, become a state of mind.

The mystique of language is even more complex; for languages can be lost, regained, and even replaced by new ones. As Spicer (1971, p. 798) reminds us: “The Irish, at the very time that independence sentiments reached their highest intensity in the late 19th century, had just reached the point at which one could say that English had finally replaced Gaelic. Thus, the loss of the language coincided precisely with a high point in intensity of sentiment about Irish identity. The less and less frequently used Gaelic language became in itself a symbol of primary importance in the identity system, as indicated by the Gaelic League and many other efforts to keep the language in existence.”
But, furthermore, language like land can become a state of mind. And language, with its infinite flexibility and adaptability, provides still more variations on a theme. Code words, alternate meanings, argot, dialect, and accent—these can provide special significance for boundary maintenance between ethnic groups, even among those all nominally speaking the same formal tongue. The Irish and the Anglo-American blacks and Jews can, and do, speak English, but this does not turn them all into inevitable copies of the Anglo-Saxon. It may, but it itself is not sufficient. It is an interesting development to note efforts to carry an ethnic identity, particularly by those of higher social class and status and those whose use of English may well be closer to the presumed Anglo-Saxon model; thus, we see the Irish of this class turn more and more to the appropriate words and phrases of Irish, American blacks of Frazier’s “black bourgeoisie” class employing more variants of black English, and Jews using more Yiddish or Hebrew in their conversations. In all these cases, ethnic culture is retained through language symbolism, and is expressed as identity and projected to the listener.

Finally, we return to a third key concept, that of ethnic structure, or the ethnic subsociety. Here we refer, following Gordon (1964), to the primary-group involvement of ethnic members in their networks of associations and social institutions, their clubs, organisations, and friendships, particularly those beyond the immediate family and lines of kinship. Spicer (1971, p. 799) has called these associations the “spheres of participation,” and one could argue, such spheres must be definitionally characterised by all the properties of primary, rather than secondary, relationships. Some of one’s friends, if not all, are of the same ethnic background. Interaction which is emotional, more lasting, less instrumental, personal, informal, and which involves the whole personality, is the key to the ethnic structure. The context for this interaction varies according to social institutions. The world of work, the community of the neighbourhood, the religious participation, political activity, economic behaviour, leisure and recreation—all of these may, in degree, be tied to ethnic allegiances and ethnic attachments.

Above all, the ethnic structure is the visible and manifest arena which reflects the ethnic culture. It is in the spheres and networks of such primary relationships that the values and symbols and ethos of the ethnic culture may be seen to operate. The gang, perhaps, is one of the clearest illustrations of this connection, as Suttles (1968) shows for Italians, blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans, in Chicago neighbourhoods. The ethnic structure, too, is the representation of the moral sphere, as Spicer links it with persisting ethnicity and culture. Spicer (1971, p. 799) defines the moral sphere as “a people’s set of values regarding ideal behaviour.” It is not merely a system of religious ethics or a theology of conduct, for it is secularist as well. The sociological import of the moral code suggests the actual development of relationships and behaviour, the realities of normative attachments, and the empirical guidance of unwritten legitimacy. It is the meaning of community, in both a structural and cultural sense, and it is the absence of anomie in Durkheim’s usage.
Having defined ethnicity for the purposes of this paper, it may be pointed out that it is not the *kind* of ethnicity or ethnic culture or ethnic structure that is central to these concerns. Rather, it is the *extent* of community, the degree of attachment to such a subcultural and substructural world that is relevant here. Previous research in the social sciences has naturally been concerned with questions of social distance, the issues of prejudice and discrimination and divisiveness, and the polarities involved in social and cultural conflict. Previous research has also been interested in the substantive ethnographic nature of each subcultural community, and whether or not there are meaningful differences on any given behaviour or attitude between the different races, religions, and nationality origins, which have ethnic meaning.

This paper takes another step, and deals quite directly with the presence and absence of subcultural communal bonds, regardless of what they are. In so doing, it is proposed to develop the meaning of certain *ideal types*, in the sociological sense, to examine more closely the phenomenon of ethnic rootedness and the alternative variations of ethnic rootlessness which may be said to emerge as consequences of social change. To clarify the possibilities involved, the socio-cultural categories are shown in Figure 1 as a four-fold typology.

**Figure 1: Model of Rootedness and Rootlessness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcultural Symbols and Culture of Ethnicity</th>
<th>Present (+)</th>
<th>Absent (−)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Present (+)</td>
<td>Socio-cultural Traditionalist (+, +)</td>
<td>Socio-cultural Convert (−, +)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcultural Relationships and Structure of Ethnicity</td>
<td>Absent (−)</td>
<td>Socio-cultural Exile (+, −)</td>
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Theoretically, one can be rooted in any given ethnic group in two possible ways: through adherence to and internalisation of the distinctive set of cultural *symbols*, i.e., the culture of the group itself, with its corresponding values, myths, ethos, language, religion, and history; and through involvement on the primary-group level in the distinctive networks of subcultural *relationships*, in a word, the structure of the group itself, with its constituent associations, organisations, friendships, and institutions. Ethnic identity, the identity with a particular group of people, stems from persisting cultural symbols and values as well as, analytically, from persisting spheres of participation and relationships.
i. The Socio-cultural Traditionalist

The baseline in any given diverse society or political system with different sub-cultural communities is the Socio-cultural Traditionalist (+, +), as noted in Figure 1. The behaviour of the Traditionalist reflects persisting and present attachments to both symbols and relationships. Such behaviour shows continuity and consonance, for the ongoing networks and associations of the traditional structure respond to the corresponding cultural values and ethos of prior socialisation and acceptance. The Traditionalist is following his own distinctive background, irrespective of what it is. Thus, there is a persistence to his world-view, the kind of continuity which Spicer (1971) discusses. Obviously, this is the most frequent and common configuration in the model, and it purports to be the essence of rootedness.

We hasten to point out here that it is particularly important not to identify “traditionalism” as used here with merely Gemeinschaft ideology, primordial instincts, and the tribal mind (Shils, 1957). There is no essential and inevitable association of Traditionalism with economic development or political philosophy. Traditionalists can be populists in the Middle West of the United States, initiating and following progressive traditions; intellectuals and language revivalists in Ireland, Wales, and Cornwall; reformers and radicals of different ethnopolitical stripes. The new movements of nationalism and decentralisation in Western Europe show us clearly that this is the case. So do some of the various ethnic movements in Canada and the United States, those seeking progressive social and economic change but not at the expense of one minority group or another. Traditionalists can indeed be provincial or even reactionary, but there is no determinism that mandates a political bias.

As a baseline in society, Socio-cultural Traditionalism offers its members different ways of interpreting the past, present, and future. The baseline is one of continuity, but the continuity has its own dynamics and its own potential for change. Socio-cultural Traditionalism evolves; it is never quite the same all the time, despite the continuity of symbols. The symbols remain, but their interpretation for behaviour changes with different generations, socio-economic conditions, political environments, and societal epochs. Perhaps the best way of seeing this is to consider migration, and the transplanting of cultures in different societies. Immigration to America by the Irish, as a response to famine and economic and political adversity, did not break or thwart Irish ethnicity. It simply introduced another variant, which developed under different political and social circumstances. The Irish in the United States do not experience their Traditionalism in quite the same way as the Irish do in Britain or the Irish in Ireland. They are all somewhat different from each other, but still variants of the Socio-cultural Traditionalism that evolved in the home country.

On selected aspects of diversity in the United States which affect ethnic behaviour—diversity of history, diversity within a group, diversity of social structure, and diversity of ethnic backgrounds—see Abramson (1975).
And further, given their new environment and experiences in the United States, the Irish in America interpret their Irishness in different ways. Shannon (1963, pp. 295–326) has shown how disparate and yet Irish two American priests were, Father Charles Coughlin and Monsignor John Ryan. In the Depression of the 1930s, the former came to symbolise reaction and bigotry, the latter was a leader in social reform and social justice. The political conservatism of Louise Day Hicks and the Irish lower middle class of South Boston is only one theme of contemporary politics in the United States. It receives more publicity than the progressive and liberal efforts of Paul O’Dwyer of New York or Father Robert Drinan of Boston. The Irish in the United States are today quite divided over the politics of Senator Edward Kennedy and Mayor Richard Daley, but given Traditionalist capacity for political involvement and innovation the Irish have always been represented in all shades of American political ideology. Predominantly Democrats, some Irish are now Republicans and conservative Wallace supporters, but Irish Americans have also been leaders of the American Communist Party (William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn) and contemporary socialism (Michael Harrington). This is not meant to argue that the Irish in the United States (or any other ethnic group for that matter) are always responding in social behaviour as Irish. It is, of course, much more complicated than that. What is pointed to here is simply the empirical distribution of Irish American leaders in the different political areas of American life. The explanation of motivation, and the question of what economic, cultural, and psychological factors which people assert in their political and social behaviour, are other issues beyond the scope of this paper.

Similarly, Jewish traditionalism in the broad sense used here includes not only the different variants of religious practice and affiliation, ranging from Hasidic orthodoxy to Reform Judaism to Ethical Culture and Humanism, but also the secularist innovations as widely disparate in economic behaviour as capitalism and socialism. These too can all be said to be interpretative aspects of Jewish Traditionalism, for they are all responses to distinctive symbols and networks of thought and behaviour in the ethnic group.

There is an innovative quality to Socio-cultural Traditionalism which is often unmarked and unsung. This may best be appreciated when the Traditionalist ethnic group is itself a cultural minority within a multi-ethnic system, and experiences a kind of marginality to another and more dominant style of life. Scots in the British Empire, Jews in Christian worlds, Parsees in India, Armenians and Greeks as diaspora merchants, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia—these groups have long been associated with innovation, perhaps out of proportion to their numbers. Riesman (1954), among others, points up the possible innovative creativity which may be linked to the Traditionalist as outsider.

The crucial factors in the maintenance and evolution of Socio-cultural Traditionalism are the existence of the community and the persistence of prior symbols. Rootedness, whether in the original locality or in transplantation abroad, depends on both conditions. As Spicer (1971, p. 796) acknowledges, however, the persist-
ence of culture is not absolute. "Identity systems are subject to total disintegration, just as they are subject to being built up through processes of integration." Kinds of rootlessness, therefore, result from the lack of one or both of these factors, prior symbols and present relationships.

2. The Socio-cultural Convert

The second type emerging from the four-fold table is the Socio-cultural Convert (−,+), whose behaviour reflects a set of strong attachments to a subcultural network, but one that is different from any symbols or ethos with which he was raised. In other words, the Convert shares with the Traditionalist a bounded system of subcultural associations and primary group relationships, but does not share his internalised culture. The Convert, in fact, has abandoned (voluntarily or involuntarily) the prior symbols of his past. He may be in the process of identifying with, or achieving the ethos of, the culture he has joined, but he has no rooted ascribed attachment either to it or to the cultural symbols of his prior socialisation. Both the Traditionalist and the Convert are the types who are responsible for the maintenance of subcultural life styles and structures in a diverse world.

Just as it was important to emphasise that the Traditionalist is more than just the "noble savage" and the primordial mind, so it is equally so to point out that the Convert is more than literal religious conversion, although of course this form is valid and illustrative. More broadly, the Socio-cultural Convert is one who has yielded, through force or his own volition, to a new set of relationships and a different network of primary associations. Former, historic, and traditionalist memories, symbols, and values, no longer play a role for the Convert. At the same time, however, the Convert has not yet internalised the ethos and symbolism corresponding to the group to which he has become attached. Converts, then, are in a kind of limbo in their own lifetimes, not always sure of themselves in everyday life. They experience a quality of marginality, not the marginality of the ethnic minority (which can be secure in its identity and traditionalism but insecure and at sea as a minority in some other group's dominant culture), but the marginality of the newcomer and outsider admitted to the fold.

Park's (1928) essay on marginality includes this kind as well. He wrote of the marginality of the emancipated, stepping forth from the ghetto of historic traditionalism, and converting (not always religiously) to the different norms and what was seen as more sophisticated associations of other groups or the larger dominant order. Writing on the Irish in Britain, Jackson (1963, pp. 152-163) points up this distinction as well: marginality for the minority of the Irish in British cities (living as Irish communities, but who feel their alien position all the more because they are so close to Ireland), and, marginality for those from the minority who wish and are able to leave their communities. The former is a Traditionalist marginality, the latter is a Conversionist marginality.

Socio-cultural Conversion is another way of drawing attention to the sociology of assimilation, or more specifically in Gordon's (1964) usage, structural assimilation. Cultural assimilation, without structural assimilation, may be another
variant of transplanted Traditionalism; in the United States, Jews, blacks, Italians, and Poles, all learn English and Anglo-American ways, without necessarily losing their own respective ethnic identities. The bigger problem is the difficulty of imagining someone, in his own lifetime, converting to another ethnic structure (i.e., becoming structurally assimilated) without first absorbing and experiencing the corresponding cultural values and symbols associated with it. Intermarriage between those of different races, religions, and nationality backgrounds, could of course include such a Socio-cultural Conversion on the part of one of the spouses.

It is easier to grasp the meaning of this kind of Conversion when the contexts are more dramatic and graphic. Some religious converts, for example, as in the episodes described by William James (1902, pp. 186–253), abandon the psychological securities of former cultural symbols in their excitement over the newer religious attachment. What changes for them is the network of their relationships, and the private meaning of religion. They change their former symbolism of God and Belief, but at the same time, it is difficult to argue that they are able to share their newly found religious fervour with most of the people to whom they are now attached. (They might be able to do so, if they joined a community of new believers, a religious commune, or some similar sect or cult, but these would not be ethnic communities with historic traditions, at least not in the first generation.)

Another kind of conversion, which is curiously analogous, is the response of conversion which some inmates make to the stresses and strains of total institutions. Goffman (1968) shows how these individuals also abandon their former norms and symbols and become fiercely dedicated to the norms of the staff and the institution itself. In so doing, these inmates incur the wrath and contempt of most of the other inmates; the new converts are not to be trusted, for their identities have changed. Self-righteousness, intense moralism, a new discipline, these are the hallmarks of this extreme case. There is a marginality that comes with this kind of behaviour as well. The marginality becomes apparent when we consider that the converted inmates have abandoned their former identities, either as inmates or as individuals, and are not attached to old symbols or old relationships. They now derive their primary relationship gratifications from the staff of the institution, but they are hardly in a position to digest and experience the same cultural symbols which are shared by the staff. Thus, their behaviour is all the more extreme, caricatured, and bigger-than-life. Ethnicity is not an aspect of the total institution, but the analogy of conversion is valid.

Socio-cultural Conversion, as a form of ethnic rootlessness, is also better understood in the history of vicissitudes: diaspora, mass exile, persecution, genocide, and other profound examples of social change. Given the stresses of traumatic experiences, perhaps not unlike that of the total institution, ethnicity itself responds in fairly predictable ways. Some Jews, as a result of the Nazi Holocaust, responded by being militantly Jewish or even passively Jewish; they fought as a community in the Warsaw Ghetto, or they searched for God in the concentration camps.
These are examples of Traditionalism, where symbolism and relationships persevere. Other Jews responded as Converts. Some converted literally to Catholicism and Protestantism, particularly under the circumstances of Christian aid and assistance. The more pathological response is the Socio-cultural Conversion of some Jews in the Nazi camps, where under the double pressures of ethnic genocide and total institution confinement some became “Kapos” or quasi-SS Guards (Cohen, 1954).

In another context, Irish ethnicity responds in similar ways. One response and always the most prevalent one, is the Traditionalist response of being militantly or passively Irish in the face of English control, during the Penal Code, the Famine, and the Troubles. But Conversion was a distinct possibility too. In literal religious terms, there was the probable conversion for food and for survival, as in the Souperism of the Famine. In less literal and more frequent behaviour, there was the phenomenon of some Irish Catholics who would emulate the ways of the English Protestants, and in some cases would forego their prior cultural symbolism and subscribe to new networks of ethnic relationships. Names such as “castle Catholics” and “squireens” tell of this response to the pressures of social mobility.

3. THE SOCIO-CULTURAL EXILE

The logical third result from this model is that type which represents a polar opposite of the Convert. This configuration is the individual who does retain the symbolic traditions and ethos of the subculture into which he was born and raised, but who, again voluntarily or not, has no rootedness in this or any other subculture by way of primary relationships and social bonds. We designate this type the Socio-cultural Exile (+,−), for the only identity involved here stems from the symbolic past. There is no development of this past because there are no networks of friendships to sustain the memories. The Exile has no rooted structural primary bonds of any kind with any subculture.

As with popular connotations of Traditionalism and Conversion, it may be pointed out that Exile is not necessarily just political or ideological, but more inclusively socio-cultural in scope. Exile is also not to be confused with collective emigration or refugee movements, for these latter terms usually mean large numbers of people in search of a home where they can re-establish their communities. In other words, the focus is communal, and presumably the transplanting of ethnic culture and structure is a variant of Traditionalism, as described above. Exile, on the other hand, is an isolating and individual experience, regardless of where it takes place; for whatever circumstances, the individual finds himself alone with his past and no one to share it with.

As with Conversion, Exile is another but more extreme form of rootlessness and marginality. Given its dramatic and unusual features, we find many examples of Socio-cultural Exiles in fiction, and many empirical examples as results of sweeping societal change and anomic situations. The Nazi Holocaust caused some of its victims to be Exiles in the sense used here. Most notably, the Anne
Frank family, as an individual family, exiled itself in an Amsterdam attic for a period of two years and confined itself to its memory as a family, away from networks of sustaining relationships.

Irish history as well has had its Socio-cultural Exiles, as results of the Famine and episodes of systematic oppression. More contemporary and less political is the exile of James Joyce as himself and the exile of Bloom in *Ulysses*. Both are good illustrations of the type, and both are more or less voluntary. Joyce as an adult had his symbols, memories, and Irish distinctiveness, but he lacked persisting Irish relationships in community. In this sense, Joyce was rootless and marginal. He knew it of course, and this was part of his genius, for he developed the character of Bloom in essentially the same way. Indeed, he exaggerated it, by having the Jewish Bloom rootless through conversion as well as exile. The drama of *Ulysses*, as sociology, lies in the ambiguity and marginality of author and protagonist.

Fiction dramatises the exile’s situation, but reality in past and present life shows many examples at different levels of the class system. The isolated Chinese laundryman or restaurant owner, the navvy or labourer alone in some foreign land, the Court Jews in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany, and the American black who is the only Negro in some small town in New England or the Middle West, are all illustrations of the Socio-cultural Exile, thrown by economic circumstances into situations where they have no primary ethnic bonds. If they do develop such attachments with existing structures, they become Socio-cultural Converts and abandon their former memories and symbolism. Just as likely, they may remain Exiles throughout their own lifetime.

4. THE SOCIO-CULTURAL EURUCH

Lastly, there is the Socio-cultural Eunuch (—,—), who experiences like the Traditionalist, his polar opposite, a consonance but one of discontinuity. As in his namesake, the Eunuch is one with little or no memory of any cultural past, no symbolic meanings, and his present life as well is void of any systematic relationships constrained by a culture. The Eunuch may have been wrenched away from a subculture, or less likely, given the extreme conditions, he may voluntarily have perceived no use for it. Unlike the Convert, he substitutes no subcultural attachments or ties to replace what has been. And like the Exile, his present life is not sustained by any on-going structure of which he is an integrated part.

The sexual eunuchs of Eastern courts in Oriental despotism are classic examples of this type, but eunuchism has like the other types some broader implications. The Ottoman Empire, particularly during the first three hundred years from about 1300 to 1600, is an excellent example of a political system in a polycultural world which successfully manipulated and even institutionalised sub-

*Ellmann (1959, p. 238) writes that “Joyce’s interest in the Jews was growing as he recognised his own place in Europe to be as ambiguous as theirs”. The difference lies in the fact that European Jews were predominantly Traditionalist, however marginal as a distinctive cultural minority, while Joyce experienced the marginality of the Exile.
cultural rootlessness and ethnic identities. Coser's (1974) study of "greedy institutions" which demand and receive the complete loyalties of those who serve them is relevant to this point.

The eunuch in the Harem, the Janissary in the military, the kavass in the foreign consulates, and the many examples of Christian renegades who assumed powerful positions at the court in Istanbul and as viziers throughout the far-flung empire, are all examples of this form of rootlessness and marginality. The Ottomans gathered these subjects through the institution of Devshirme, or the periodic and systematic tribute and levy of slave children in regions under Ottoman dominion. These individuals were wrenched from their childhoods and they were aware of their outsider status, despite forced conversion to Islam and a rigorous Spartan educational training at the Palace School. The lack of sexual identity, as in the literal eunuch of the Harem, is not central to this configuration, although of course it is part of it. The lack of any subcultural identity through past symbols and present ethnic relationships, as in cultural eunuch or political eunuch, is more fitting here.

Many histories of the Ottoman period tell the story of Devshirme, the creation of eunuchism. See, among many, Lybyer, (1913) Miller, (1941) Itzkowitz, (1972) Inalcik, (1973). It is sociology and fiction, however, which spell out more dramatically the implications of eunuchism. Drawing on the work of Simmel (1950) and Wittfogel (1963), Coser (1974) shows how the social rootlessness of the sexual eunuchs, not only in Ottoman Turkey but also in the various Chinese dynasties and the ancient civilisations of the Near East, makes them ideal servants and trustees of power. They have no loyalties to anyone or any group, save their master. The Socio-cultural Eunuch is the prototypical alien or stranger. Of the four kinds of marginality found among traditionalist minorities, converts, exiles, and eunuchs, the latter is the most marginal and alien of all. Like exiles who serve in positions of power, the eunuchs are without territorial attachments and ties to kinship and ethnicity. But unlike the exiles, the eunuchs are also lacking in symbolism and cultural pasts. They are shorn of any kind of constituency, present or past, of relationships or of memories.

The Ottoman Empire is fascinating with respect to ethnicity, because of the sheer diversity of peoples brought together into one political system. But furthermore, and unlike other empires perhaps, the Ottoman period is characterised by the diversity of ethnic response as well as the actual number of different ethnic groups under control. The Millet system of flourishing "national" units, for the Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and other ethnic peoples within the Ottoman Empire, actually enhanced and facilitated stable Sociocultural Traditionalism (Cahnman, 1964). Given the recurrent vicissitudes and military and political changes which were characteristic of Ottoman Turkey, forms of rootlessness prevailed as well, in Conversion, Exile, and of course, Eunuchism. Part of the sociological reality of the Ottoman system, as curious as it may be, is that both extremes of ethnicity response were major phenomena; the Millet system in which traditionalist ethnicity persisted and evolved, and the Devshirme system in which traditionalist
ethnicity disintegrated and died. Rootedness and deracination were hallmarks of the Ottoman Empire, in six hundred years of co-existence.

V CONCLUSION

We have suggested some of the dimensions of each type of ethnicity response, which individuals can make and have made to the societal pressures around them. All of the types relate to individual behaviour, not unlike the individual responses to the goals-means schema of Merton's (1968) model of deviance and conformity, and not unlike the individual responses which inmates can make to the stresses and strains of confinement in total institutions, as shown by Goffman (1968). In the typology presented here, two of these individual responses are group-connected and group-constrained, the Traditionalist and the Convert. The remaining two individual responses are isolating and without relationships, those of the Exile and the Eunuch. Two of the responses are guided and constrained by symbolism, the Traditionalist and the Exile. And the other two function without ethos and symbolism, the Convert and the Eunuch.

With a model of this kind, one can suggest several potential levels of hopeful significance. First, there is the need for clarification and description of different stages or kinds of social change involving ethnicity and ethnic relationships. Given rapid social developments, not only in the newer nation-states of the world, but also in the more technological areas of the West, we find increasing evidence of ethnic persistence. Despite the age of instant communication, or perhaps because of it or related to it, ethnicity in the forms of tribalism in Africa, of neo-nationalism in Europe, and of pluralistic social movements in most continents, becomes an increasingly vital phenomenon.

Traditionalism then, as used here in this model, becomes one of the possible responses or avenues in a complicated world. Stresses and strains within a given political and social system induce other kinds of adaptation as well, as we have tried to show. One might examine diversity to see how viable, how frequent, or how shaped the different individual and group responses are. Critics of the issue of ethnicity often charge it with a provincial, reactionary, and unprogressive character. When ethnic movements re-emerge, as well as persist, ethnicity assumes a dynamic of social change, and there is an evolutionary quality which can be described and interpreted, along with the alternative phenomena of Conversion, Exile, and Eunuchism.

Secondly, there is the value of doing comparative research, comparative not only between societies and larger cultures, but comparative also with different sources of ethnicity, that is, race, religion, and nationality origin. It is valid, furthermore, in the social sciences to ascertain what is ethnically unique and that which is more culturally universal, not only between different groupings and categories, but between different historical ages and environments as well. A framework such as the one described in this paper may be useful for different kinds of ethnicity,
particularly because the conceptual emphasis is placed on extent of ethnic attach­
ments rather than on the kind of ethnic symbols and relationships. Thus, the
perspective is not culture-bound and is not culture-specific; there is facility for the
comparative analysis of the different experiences of racial ethnicity, religious
ethnicity, and nationality or tribal ethnicity, in given social and political systems.

Thirdly, the approach introduced here may help to bridge the gap between
micro-analysis and macro-analysis, or the emphasis on group phenomena as
opposed to the larger society. Traditionalists, Converts, Exiles, and Eunuchs,
can all be examined on the individual level with the focus on their relationships
to a given group, as in ethnography. Given the same experience of societal
change, what factors help to explain why some individuals remain attached to
their ethnic group, while others from the same background show variations of
rootlessness in their adaptation? Or alternatively, these four types can be studied
as elements within the same political or economic structure of a larger society.
What are the roles, for example, of each of these four types within the Ottoman
Empire, the British Empire, and the United States? More basically, are there
differences in the prevalence of ethnic rootedness and rootlessness in Oriental
despotism, British absolutism, and American democracy? In this manner, one
can link individual, group, and society, in a variety of political and economic
contexts.

Finally, one can hope that the development of research into ethnicity may lead
to different levels of predictive ability. Durkheim provided the term anomie to
describe the conditions of normlessness and rootlessness in the human group.
In a recent paper (Abramson, 1974), it was suggested that some instances of modern
social and political behaviour might be partially explained in the sociological
context of community roots, organic attachments, and subcultural ethnic
norms, their absence and loss, or degrees of anomie. We are raising the possibility
that ethnicity and subculture are important and relevant ideas in a heterogeneous
society, not only as sources of differentiation per se and as correlates of conflict,
but also as anchors of identity and as reservoirs of constraint.

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