Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2012
The cover image shows Irish immigrant construction workers take a lunch break on a steel beam atop the RCA Building at Rockefeller Center, New York, Sept. 29, 1932. In the background is the Chrysler Building.

The photograph depicts men eating lunch, seated on a girder with their feet dangling 256 meters (840 feet) above the New York City streets. The men have no safety harness, which was linked to the Great Depression, when people were willing to take any job regardless of safety issues.
Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2012

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and while the report was reviewed in both The Integration Centre and the ESRI, the views do not necessarily represent those of either body or the Geary Institute.

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Welcome to the third annual Integration Monitor published by The Integration Centre, and written by an excellent team of researchers at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and the Geary Institute. We are glad to note that the Monitor has become a well-regarded resource for policy makers, researchers, service providers and community groups in Ireland as well as in Europe.

This series offers a bird’s eye view of integration in Ireland, not only for a specific year but also as the situation evolves over time, through the lens of four indicators: employment, active citizenship, social inclusion and education. It is important that the findings and possible policy implications receive the necessary attention as failure to address issues of integration may have serious long-term consequences for Irish society.

Some of the key findings and policy recommendations of the 2012 Integration Monitor are considered below.

**Employment**

In the last four years employment among non-Irish nationals fell by 23 per cent, compared with a fall of 13 per cent for Irish nationals. In 2008, 6.6 per cent of non-Irish nationals were unemployed; by 2012, this figure had risen to 18.4 per cent. Unemployment among Irish nationals rose to 14.4 per cent in 2012.

We know that migrants show an interest in training and up-skilling opportunities but their needs are not always met. Language provision is particularly important, especially for vulnerable groups.

**Recommendations**

- Review the effectiveness of activation programmes such as community employment schemes to ensure that only those producing tangible outcomes will be funded and replicated.
- Monitor subsidised education training programmes (Springboard, Back to Education, Momentum) with a view to assisting the immigrant population effectively.
- Reverse the decision to close down the Adult Refugee Programme (an intensive language and integration programme designed mainly for refugees).

**Active Citizenship**

An increasing number of non-EU nationals receive citizenship through naturalisation: 4,969 in 2010, 9,529 in 2011 and an estimated 23,200 in 2012. This increase is due in part to improved waiting times and a lower rejection rate.

Citizenship enables migrants to vote and stand in national elections (residents who are not citizens can take part in local elections). Although, regrettably, the level of participation remains low, there are positive signs. The Opening Power to Diversity project managed by Crosscare has successfully matched migrant interns with TDs. In addition, The Integration Centre has begun working with political parties, migrant organisations and academic institutions in a European project that aims at helping parties engage, recruit and retain more migrant members, voters and candidates.

**Recommendations**

- Re-launch voter registration drives by local authorities in collaboration with community groups.
- Design programmes to help political parties to reach migrant communities.

**Social Inclusion**

Poverty is increasingly affecting immigrants: one-third are deprived of basic needs such as affording a morning, afternoon or evening out or replacing worn-out furniture. Inability to afford to socialise outside the home affects the ability of non-Irish nationals to participate in society.

Non-EU nationals are far more disadvantaged than other groups: around 6 per cent were affected by consistent poverty (a combination of income poverty and lacking basic needs) in 2008. This rate went up to 10 per cent in 2009 and 12 per cent in 2010.

**Recommendations**

- Adopt a more flexible approach to help immigrants with young children, particularly single parents, to re-enter the labour market through training and tailored employment skills courses and affordable childcare.
- Extend the use of trained mediators to all areas when offering services for migrant communities, particularly for vulnerable groups.

**Education**

It was shown in previous Integration Monitors that children who do not speak English at home often perform poorly in school. This Monitor points out that a significant one-third of migrant pupils in secondary schools received the lowest scores in reading. Despite this, money spent on English language support for children decreased by 19 per cent in 2012.

On a more positive note, The Integration Centre welcomes the transfer of school patronage in 23 towns, which creates more choice in schooling. However, with migrant pupils being concentrated in specific schools, reforming enrolment policies and dealing with over-subscription in urban areas remain important tasks.

**Recommendations**

- Encourage closer collaboration among secondary schools (e.g. summer camps, sharing teachers, after-school programmes) with the help of the new Education and Training Board to achieve a more resource-efficient solution in language support.
- Remove waiting lists for school places.
- Outlaw the use of religious preference in admission policies.

**Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration**

The special focus of this Monitor clearly illustrates worsening attitudes towards migrants in recent years. The fact that attitudes have deteriorated to a greater extent than is the case in other countries experiencing a similar recession is telling. Discrimination across a variety of life situations, ranging from shops, housing, pubs and transport, is a serious issue that needs to be addressed.
**Recommendations**

- Communicate the economic benefits of migration to the wider public.
- Promote existing anti-racism initiatives in schools and create a nationwide resource that can be used in the classroom.
- Continue to support local integration and intercultural forums that bring together local community groups and services.

**Conclusion**

On the whole, while there have been positive steps taken, we believe that the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration should be funded and empowered to play a more active role in the co-ordination of integration in Ireland. This role would include advising on policy and measures affecting the migrant population, and co-ordinating dialogue between government departments, as well as between government departments and migrant organisations. Most importantly, the Government needs to name integration as an important objective of its economic and social policies, rather than deferring dialogue until such a time as large-scale problems evolve.
This Integration Monitor benefited from the comments and assistance of a number of people, and we would like to take this opportunity to thank them.

We owe a particular debt of gratitude to Brian Ring from the Central Statistics Office for providing data from the Quarterly National Household Survey for Chapters 2 and 3; Kieran Walsh also supported this process.

Officials from the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration and the Department of Education and Skills provided information and very useful comments on the draft report.

Staff from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service supplied the data on citizenship and long-term residence permits, and gave observations on the final draft. Fidèle Mutwarasibo from the Immigrant Council of Ireland also provided useful input.

ESRI colleagues gave very helpful comments on their specific areas of expertise, in particular Corona Joyce, Bertrand Maître and Dorothy Watson. The report was also improved following the constructive comments of an anonymous ESRI reviewer. Thanks, too, to Jennifer Armstrong, who copy-edited the report.

Finally, we are grateful for the support of The Integration Centre throughout the research process.

While others have given generously of their time and comments, responsibility for the contents of the report rests with the authors.
# Contents

Preface, The Integration Centre..........................................................1
Authors’ Acknowledgements............................................................3
List of Tables and Figures..................................................................6
Glossary: Abbreviations and Irish Terms..........................................7
Executive Summary...........................................................................8

Chapter 1 Introduction, Policy and Context......................................12
1.1 The Challenges of Measuring Integration................................2
1.1.1 Defining Integration..............................................................2
1.1.2 The Integration Monitor........................................................2
1.1.3 Challenges of Monitoring Outcomes Among Immigrants.......4
1.2 Overview of Main Trends in Migration in Ireland......................14
1.3 Overview of Irish Migration Policy and Legislation.....................20
1.4 Integration Policy.......................................................................24
1.4.1 EU Integration Policy: Update.............................................24
1.4.2 Irish Integration Policy..........................................................24
1.4.2.1 Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI)...25
1.4.2.2 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD)...26
1.4.2.3 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission.................26
1.4.2.4 ECRI Report on Ireland – Fourth Monitoring Cycle 2013....26

Chapter 2 Employment and Integration..........................................27
2.1 Employment, Unemployment and Activity Rates......................28
2.2 Self-Employment.......................................................................31
2.3 Summary of Employment Indicators........................................32

Chapter 3 Education and Integration..............................................34
3.1 Educational Outcomes for Adults in Ireland............................34
3.1.1 Highest Educational Attainment..........................................34
3.1.2 Early School Leavers Among Adult Immigrants..................36
3.2 Immigrant Children in Irish Schools .......................................36
3.3 Summary of Findings on Educational Attainment.....................38

Chapter 4 Social Inclusion and Integration.....................................41
4.1 Income and Poverty....................................................................41
4.1.1 Household Income................................................................41
4.1.2 Poverty Rates.......................................................................42
4.2 Health Status............................................................................44
4.3 Home Ownership.....................................................................45
4.4 The Experience of Discrimination............................................46
4.5 Summary of Inclusion Indicators..............................................47

Chapter 5 Active Citizenship.........................................................49
5.1 Citizenship...............................................................................49
5.1.1 Recent Changes to Naturalisation in Ireland.......................49
5.1.2 Citizenship Indicators...........................................................51
5.1.3 Profile of Naturalised Citizens 2011...................................52
5.2 Long-Term Residence...............................................................54
5.2.1 Long-Term Residence Indicator..........................................54
5.3 Voting and Elected Representatives........................................55
5.3.1 Political Participation Indicator............................................55
5.4 Summary of Findings on Active Citizenship.............................57

Chapter 6 Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants? Evidence from the European Social Survey 2002–2010..............................58
6.1 Changing Ireland........................................................................59
6.2 Irish Attitudes: Change Over Time...........................................61
6.2.1 Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration 2002–2010...........61
6.3 How Does Ireland Compare with Other Countries in terms of Attitudes to Immigrants in 2010?..........................67
6.4 Variation in Attitudes by Personal Characteristics – Education, Age and Citizenship..........................71
6.5 Conclusion................................................................................75

Chapter 7 Issues for Policy and Data Collection.............................76
7.1 Policy Issues.............................................................................76
7.2 Issues for Future Data Collection.............................................76

References.......................................................................................78

Appendix 1 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union.........................................................82

Appendix 2 Definition of Indicators..................................................83
# Tables and Figures

## Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table A1</td>
<td>Employment (working age) 2012</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table A2</td>
<td>Education 2012</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table A3</td>
<td>Social inclusion 2010</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table A4</td>
<td>Active citizenship end-2011</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table A5</td>
<td>Key indicators at a glance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.1</td>
<td>Outline of core indicators, broadly equivalent to those proposed at Zaragoza</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.2</td>
<td>Overview of recent policy/legislative developments</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.3</td>
<td>Beneficiaries of OPMI funding 2008–2012</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Key employment indicators by national groups Q1 2012</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.2</td>
<td>Key employment indicators by age group Q1 2012</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.3</td>
<td>Key employment indicators by gender Q1 2012</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.4</td>
<td>Self-employment rates by nationality Q1 2012</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Highest educational attainment by nationality</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Share of early school leavers by nationality</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.3</td>
<td>Mean reading and mathematics scores in PISA 2009 by immigrant/language status, 15 year olds in Ireland</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>Household income and household equivalised income 2010</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2</td>
<td>At risk of poverty, deprivation and consistent poverty rates 2010</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.3</td>
<td>Consistent poverty rates by nationality 2009 and 2010</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.4</td>
<td>Self-assessed health status 2010</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.5</td>
<td>Home ownership by households 2010</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Annual citizenship indicator (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over); rate of naturalisations to resident non-EEA population</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.2</td>
<td>Cumulative citizenship indicator (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over): ratio of non-EEA nationals who ‘ever’ acquired citizenship to the total estimated immigrant population</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.3</td>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship during 2011</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.4</td>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship during 2011 by age group</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.5</td>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship by naturalisation during 2011 by nationality of applicant</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.6</td>
<td>Non-EU population aged 15 and over by nationality 2006</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.7</td>
<td>Long-term residence indicator (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.1</td>
<td>Share of foreign-born population among the total population in selected OECD countries 2010</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.2</td>
<td>Immigration, emigration and net migration 1987–2012</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.3</td>
<td>Nationality breakdown of immigration flows 2000–2012</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.4</td>
<td>Nationality breakdown of emigration flows 2006–2012</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.5</td>
<td>Breakdown of GNIB (police) residence permissions, year-end 2008–2011 (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.1</td>
<td>Key employment indicators by Irish and non-Irish 2011 and 2012</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Students at each reading proficiency level in PISA 2009, 15 year olds in Ireland</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>Unemployment rates (ILO) in Ireland 2000–2010</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.2</td>
<td>Immigration flows to Ireland 2000–2010</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.3</td>
<td>Mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on the economy 2002–2010</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.4</td>
<td>Mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on cultural life 2002–2010</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.5</td>
<td>Mean scores in attitudes to whether immigrants make Ireland a better or worse place to live 2002–2010</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.6</td>
<td>Overall attitudes to immigration scale 2002–2010</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.7</td>
<td>Overall attitudes to allowing immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as majority to come and live in Ireland</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.8</td>
<td>Overall attitudes to allowing immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority to come and live in Ireland</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.9</td>
<td>Overall attitudes to allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live in Ireland</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.10</td>
<td>Overall openness to immigration scale</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.11</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live 2010</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.12</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on cultural life 2010</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.13</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on the economy 2010</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.14</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: overall attitudes to immigration scale 2010</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.15</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: proportions who say ‘allow many’ from same ethnic group as majority to come and live here 2010</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.16</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: proportions who say ‘allow none’ from same ethnic group as majority to come and live here 2010</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.17</td>
<td>Cross-country comparison: openness to immigration scale 2010</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.18</td>
<td>Mean scores in attitudes to immigration by education level</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.19</td>
<td>Mean scores in attitudes to immigrants by age group</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.20</td>
<td>Mean scores in openness to immigration by age group</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.21</td>
<td>Mean scores to question on cultural life by citizenship</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.22</td>
<td>Overall attitudes to immigration by citizenship 2010</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary: Abbreviations and Irish Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIT</td>
<td>Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Garda Síochána</td>
<td>Police force of Ireland</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dáil Éireann</td>
<td>Lower house of parliament (house of representatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate general</td>
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<td>EAL</td>
<td>English as an additional language</td>
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<td>ECI</td>
<td>European Commission against Racism and Intolerance</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area, which comprises the EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association, which comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMN</td>
<td>European Migration Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPIC</td>
<td>Employment for People from Immigrant Communities</td>
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<td>ESRI</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>'Old' EU15 Member States excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUDO</td>
<td>EU Democracy Observatory on Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-SILC</td>
<td>EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAC</td>
<td>Free Legal Advice Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardaí</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNIB</td>
<td>Garda National Immigration Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEA</td>
<td>Higher Education Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Habitual residence condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSE</td>
<td>Health Service Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC/05</td>
<td>Irish Born Child Scheme 2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCRI</td>
<td>Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX</td>
<td>Migrant Integration Policy Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPS</td>
<td>National Anti-Poverty Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCRI</td>
<td>National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oireachtas</td>
<td>Parliament, which comprises the President, Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPMI</td>
<td>Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration</td>
</tr>
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<td>ORAC</td>
<td>Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISA</td>
<td>Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSN</td>
<td>Personal public service number</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSI</td>
<td>Pay-related social insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QNHS</td>
<td>Quarterly National Household Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seanad Éireann</td>
<td>Upper house of parliament (Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>Member of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>VEC</td>
<td>Vocational education committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This is the third in a series of annual Integration Monitors that measure migrant integration in four life domains: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. The core indicators closely follow those proposed in the Zaragoza Declaration; they are comparable across European Union Member States, based on existing data and focused on outcomes. Most indicators are derived from the latest available survey data and compare outcomes for Irish and migrant populations in each domain. This report also contains a special theme: ‘Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants’, which is based on original analysis of data from the European Social Survey.

Producing nationally representative indicators means we have valid, reliable indicators that allow monitoring of change over time. However, it should be noted that there are some drawbacks:

- As the report is largely based on statistical indicators, it does not measure how people experience integration, or indeed the lack of it.
- A range of different nationalities are combined for many indicators, so variation within groups may be hidden.
- Relying on existing data sources that are not specifically designed or intended to measure migrant integration poses challenges to adequately representing migrant groups.
- Some differences between Irish and non-Irish groups in these indicators are the result of other differences between the groups such as age, gender, educational background or experience, rather than differences in nationality. Accounting for this by using multivariate statistical models is beyond the scope of this Monitor, although the possible role of these factors is generally acknowledged, where relevant, in the text.

Throughout the report we refer to different groups of EU countries. EU13 refers to the ‘older’ Member States, prior to enlargement in 2004, excluding Ireland and the UK. EU12 refers to the ten Member States that joined the EU in 2004, plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007.

Integration Monitor: Key Findings

Employment Indicators

The chapter on employment presents core labour market indicators for the working-age population in early 2012: employment, unemployment and activity rates (see Table A1).

In early 2012 employment rates were similar among Irish and non-Irish nationals, although immigrants had somewhat higher labour market activity rates than the Irish population due to their smaller share of inactive groups such as students, retired people or people with home duties.

| Table A1 Employment (working age) 2012 |
|-----------------|--------|--------|
|                  | Irish  | Non-Irish |
| Employment rate  | 58.2   | 58.9    |
| Unemployment rate| 14.7   | 18.5    |
| Activity rate    | 68.2   | 72.3    |

Source: Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), Quarter 1 (Q1) 2012, for employment indicators.

Ireland is currently in a deep and prolonged recession. Overall, immigrants have been harder hit by the recession, and the unemployment rate for non-Irish nationals is higher than for Irish nationals. African immigrants have the highest rate of unemployment, followed closely by UK nationals, and then immigrants from the ‘Rest of the World’, including non-EU Europeans. Among non-Irish nationals, the unemployment rate is lower for EU13 nationals and North American and Australian nationals.

The youth (15–24 years) unemployment rate is higher for Irish nationals, compared with non-Irish nationals. For prime-age and older workers, the unemployment rate is higher for non-Irish nationals. For both Irish and non-Irish groups, the unemployment rate is considerably higher for men than for women, which reflects higher job losses in sectors where male employment has traditionally been predominant.

Education Indicators

The first part of the chapter on education compares educational qualifications among adults (see Table A2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A2 Education 2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 age group with tertiary educational attainment (degree level or higher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education (20–24 age group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in English reading (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of students achieving Level 1 or lower in English reading (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: QNHS Q1 2012; achievement scores are based on PISA 2009 data.

1. EU13: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
2. EU12: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
Comparing the proportions with tertiary education among 25–34 year olds in 2012, a higher proportion of non-Irish nationals have third-level education. Comparing educational disadvantage, a higher proportion of young non-Irish adults have left school before finishing second-level education than young Irish adults (20–24 age group); this is particularly true of EU12 nationals.

Turning to academic achievement scores of 15 year olds in 2009, one striking finding from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is that while 15 per cent of Irish nationals achieve Level 1 or lower in reading, this is true of 31 per cent – almost one-third – of first-generation immigrants.

**Social Inclusion Indicators**

We use income, poverty, home ownership and health as core indicators of social inclusion (see Table A3).

### Table A3 Social Inclusion 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>Non-Irish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median annual net income (needs adjusted)</td>
<td>€18,709</td>
<td>€17,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘At risk of poverty’ rate</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent poverty rate</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population (aged 16 and over) perceiving their health as good or very good</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households that are property owners</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EU-SILC 2010.*

Once income is adjusted for household needs (the number of children and adults in the household), the median income of non-Irish nationals was slightly lower than that of Irish nationals in 2010.

The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and the consistent poverty rate were both somewhat higher for non-Irish nationals than for Irish nationals. The consistent poverty rate is 12.4 per cent among non-EU nationals – over twice the rate for Irish nationals – and this gap has increased since 2009. Non-Irish nationals report better health, on average. This is at least in part due to their younger age profile. UK nationals do not differ from Irish nationals, but all other groups report better health outcomes. Rates of home ownership are much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals, as was the case in previous Integration Monitors.

**Active Citizenship Indicators**

Three indicators were proposed at the Zaragoza ministerial conference to assess active citizenship: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives (see Table A4). Constructing these indicators has been challenging in an Irish context because of data constraints, and the results should be seen as tentative.

During 2011, 9,500 non-EEA nationals acquired Irish citizenship. This number represents 7 per cent of the adult non-EEA population at year-end 2011. Taking a longer term perspective, 34,500 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship between 2005, when records began, and year-end 2011. This represents 21 per cent of the estimated adult immigrant population of non-EEA origin, resident at year-end 2011. The estimate assumes that those naturalised in this period did not leave Ireland, and also excludes naturalisations pre-2005 as no data are available.

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence status, although one is expected in the forthcoming revised Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill. Under the current administrative scheme, an estimated 6 per cent of non-EEA nationals held long-term residence permits at year-end 2011.

### Table A4 Active citizenship end-2011

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual naturalisation rate (aged 16 and over)</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of non-EEA nationals who ever acquired citizenship to estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin (aged 16 and over)</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over with ‘live’ residence permissions who hold long-term residence</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected local representatives</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Citizenship and long-term residence indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS), Eurostat. Political participation indicator: Immigrant Council of Ireland.*

The special theme in this Monitor is ‘Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants’. The best available European attitudinal data (European Social Survey) were used to examine the attitudes to immigrants and immigration of the majority Irish population in the period 2002–2010. The analysis suggests significant changes in Irish attitudes to immigrants and immigration between 2002 and 2010. Views on the contribution that immigrants make to the economy changed more than those on their contribution to cultural life or making Ireland a better place to live. The combined index of attitudes to immigrants shows a clear rise in positive attitudes from 2002 to 2006, before they become more negative in 2008 and again in 2010. In terms of openness to immigration (measured through three separate questions about willingness to accept immigrants of the same race/ethnicity, a different race/ethnicity and from poorer countries outside Europe), openness was higher in the early years of the decade, then fell in 2008 and again in 2010. These changes are statistically significant, although modest.

The evidence suggests that the economic recession and associated rise in unemployment played a role in changing attitudes. Positive evaluations peaked in 2006 before falling in 2008 and again in 2010, at a time when unemployment was rising rapidly. The suggestion that attitudes become 3. The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, which refers to the percentage of a group falling below 60 per cent of median equalised income, is the official poverty threshold used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and agreed at EU level. Consistent poverty combines ‘at risk of poverty’ with enforced deprivation of at least two of a range of 11 items.
more negative as the number of immigrants rises receives less credence, at least during the economic boom. It is perhaps more plausible that the growth in the immigrant share of the total population followed by the economic recession resulted in increased concerns about, and resistance to, immigration. Investigating in more depth the role of recession, immigrant flows and the changing composition of the population on attitudes to immigrants would require further detailed analysis using statistical modelling.

Turner (2010), in his analysis of ESS data from 2002 and 2004, found that Irish attitudes to immigrants were among the most liberal in Europe. Our brief comparison of Irish attitudes to those in four other countries (Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK) in 2010 reveals a different picture: in terms of both attitudes to immigrants and resistance to immigration, Ireland shows some of the more negative attitudes among the five countries considered, albeit no more negative than the UK.

There is a marked variation in attitudes within the Irish population. The highly educated, particularly those with a university degree, tend to have more positive attitudes to immigrants and immigration. Other education groups are less positive in their attitudes. Younger adults – those under 45 years of age – tend to show more positive attitudes to immigrants and immigration, whereas the over 65 group have the most negative attitudes.

Policy Issues

The Integration Monitor is primarily concerned with assessing outcomes for immigrants. In Chapter 7 of this report we discuss a number of issues for policy emerging from the analysis of outcomes. These policy issues include:

- As unemployment is substantially higher among non-Irish nationals, it is important that labour market programmes are implemented to ensure the integration of vulnerable groups.
- Given that almost one-third of first-generation immigrants are below the basic Level 1 proficiency in English reading, continuing cuts in the education budget for supports for English language provision may have damaging long-term consequences.
- There has been a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised population since 2010. Notwithstanding ongoing issues such as the absence of administrative appeal and wide-ranging ministerial discretion on decisions, recent progress in processing applications is very positive.
- A clearly defined, widely accessible long-term residence status would ensure naturalisation is not the only way for long-term migrants to achieve security of immigration status. Yet, continued delays in the enactment of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill mean that Ireland remains without a statutory long-term residence permission.
- There was a substantial decline in the level of funding allocated to the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration for 2011 and 2012. Budget cuts have hit most government departments, with consequences for mainstreamed integration initiatives. In addition, philanthropic foundations are likely to wind down funding in the medium term. The loss of this important source of funding for non-governmental organisations that support migrant integration through a range of measures and advocacy activity is likely to have negative implications for the integration of migrants.

At both EU and OECD levels, the issue of monitoring the integration of immigrants has received increasing prominence, with some work focusing on implementing indicators that monitor integration. The value of such monitoring indicators will only be as good as the data on which they are based.

The adequate representation of non-Irish nationals in social surveys is crucial for a monitoring exercise of this nature. In the short term, it is very important that continued efforts be made to encourage the participation of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC and QNHS surveys. In the medium term, immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples would go a long way to addressing the persistent issue of small sample sizes. The sizeable group of immigrants who now possess Irish citizenship means that measuring integration on the basis of nationality will miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens, and strengthens the case for including ethnicity in social surveys.

In terms of recording immigrants in official statistics, the fact that non-EEA nationals aged 16 and under are not required to register with the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service or Garda National Immigration Bureau is an ongoing problem. It means that the registration data on the non-EEA population is incomplete (i.e. only for the adult population). It is hoped that the revised Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill will address this issue.

Table A5 brings together the core indicators in the domains of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship.
### Executive Summary

Notes: This table summarises data presented in Chapters 2 to 5. The data sources are diverse and vary in quality and coverage. The relevant section of the report should be consulted for further details of measurement and definitions. Note the small sample of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC data used for social inclusion indicators.

Sources: QNHS Q1 2012, for employment and education indicators (except achievement scores, which are based on PISA 2009 data); EU-SILC 2010 for social inclusion indicators. Statistics from the Department of Justice and Equality for active citizenship indicators (except elected representatives estimate, which is based on data supplied by the Immigrant Council of Ireland). See Appendix 2 for further details of sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A5 Key indicators at a glance</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>Non-Irish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Employment (working age) 2012</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Education 2012</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25-34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education (20–24 age group)</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in English reading (2009) | 501.9 | With English: 499.7  
With other language: 442.7 |
| Share of students achieving Level 1 or lower in English reading (2009) | 15% | 31% (first generation) |
| **3 Social inclusion 2010**        |       |           |
| Median annual net income (needs adjusted) | €18,709 | €17,731 |
| ‘At risk of poverty’ rate           | 14.5% | 16.4%     |
| Consistent poverty rate             | 6.1%  | 7.8%      |
| Share of population (aged 16 and over) perceiving their health as good or very good | 82.6% | 89.7% |
| Proportion of households that are property owners | 77.9% | 28.0% |
| **4 Active citizenship end-2011**  |       |           |
| Annual naturalisation rate (aged 16 and over) | | 7.4% |
| Ratio of non-EEA nationals who ‘ever’ acquired citizenship to estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin (aged 16 and over) | | 21.2% |
| Share of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over with ‘live’ permissions who hold long-term residence | | 6.0% |
| Share of immigrants among elected local representatives | | 0.2% |
The integration of immigrants is high on the policy agenda of many OECD countries (OECD, 2012b) and has gained increased prominence among EU policy concerns in recent years. Integration allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, political and cultural life of the host country and is crucial for social cohesion. Integration is also important for facilitating acceptance of immigrants by the host country population; this challenge becomes greater during periods of economic recession, such as that currently experienced in Ireland, when access to jobs and resources becomes more limited.

This series of annual Integration Monitors aims to measure the integration of immigrants into Ireland in four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. This report is the third in the series and updates core indicators from the 2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors as well as presenting a special theme on ‘Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants’.

This chapter provides an introduction to and context for the indicators. In Section 1.1 we discuss the challenges of measuring and monitoring integration. Section 1.2 outlines the main trends in migration in Ireland. Section 1.3 presents an overview of Irish migration policy and legislation, and Section 1.4 examines integration policy in Europe and Ireland. In addition, Box 1.1 presents selected results from Census 2011 and Box 1.2 considers access to family unity and family reunification.

### 1.1 The Challenges of Measuring Integration

#### 1.1.1 Defining Integration

Defining integration is not easy. At a very basic level, when immigrants move to a country they have to find a place in that society in the practical sense (e.g. a home, a job and income, and access to education and health services) and also in the social, cultural and political senses. Integration might thus be defined simply as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, both as an individual and as a group (Penninx, 2010).

Most commentators agree that a number of aspects of life need to be considered. For example, while recognising that the needs of immigrants vary significantly with the length of time they have lived in Ireland and their personal experiences, ‘The Integration Centre defines integration as achieved when immigrants enjoy economic, political, social and cultural equality and inclusion.’

In July 2011 the European Commission proposed a new European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants. This policy focus has been accompanied by an awareness of the need to monitor integration, and this series of Integration Monitors is in keeping with, but independent of, that development. One of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy (see Appendix 1) is that developing clear indicators is necessary to adjust policy and evaluate progress on integration. These indicators should be based on existing and comparable data for most Member States, limited in number, simple to understand and focused on outcomes. This series of annual Integration Monitors follows the recommendations for key indicators, with some adaptations for Ireland.

### 1.1.2 The Integration Monitor

This Integration Monitor series aims to provide a balanced and rigorous assessment of the extent of integration of immigrants in Ireland using the most up-to-date and reliable data available. The framework for that assessment is based on the set of integration indicators proposed at the fourth EU Ministerial Conference on Integration held in 2010, known as the ‘Zaragoza indicators’. A number of key principles guided the choice of the Zaragoza integration indicators. Here we consider some of their strengths and limitations.

First, the indicators are focused on outcomes. For each indicator, outcomes for immigrants are compared with those for the native population, in this case the Irish population, which means that the focus is on the difference between the Irish and the immigrant populations. The two exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and opportunities for integration rather than measure empirical outcomes.

Second, there are a limited number of indicators, which are largely based on nationally representative data sources that already exist and are comparable. This approach makes them cost-effective and, in principle, highly comparable, but it does have some disadvantages:

- The existing comparable data sources may not be designed to represent and measure outcomes for immigrants. This is discussed further in Section 1.1.3.

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4. See [www.integrationcentre.ie/getattachment/180044718-9b30-4c50-a93f-fc230c69bd33/Executive-Summary.aspx](http://www.integrationcentre.ie/getattachment/180044718-9b30-4c50-a93f-fc230c69bd33/Executive-Summary.aspx)
6. Council of the EU (2004), adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States.
7. Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies, proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, Spain (April 2010). Hereafter these indicators are referred to as the Zaragoza indicators.
(ii) Attention is primarily given to the structural dimensions of integration, i.e. labour market participation and educational attainment. Cross-national data does not exist for many subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging, so these are not included in this core Monitor. However, the Zaragoza Declaration does suggest the use of additional indicators, and in this Monitor we present detailed analyses of attitudes to immigrants in Ireland over time.

(iii) The focus on quantitative, nationally representative data means that we miss out on elements of the lived experience of integration ‘on the ground’. This is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies. This Monitor measures integration at a national level, although it is clear that integration often takes place at a local level and the experiences of immigrants at local level may vary across the country.

**Third**, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time. The focus is not on comparing the change in an individual’s circumstances over time, but on changes for groups in the population. This emphasis on change is important for two reasons: from a policy perspective, the direction of change in indicators is important; and from a research perspective, comparing change over time can overcome some of the limitations of the indicators. An indicator might underestimate the proportion of an immigrant group leaving school early, but if it does so consistently over time, it will still pick up changes in that proportion.

**Fourth**, the indicators should be simple to understand, transparent and accessible. Basing indicators on familiar concepts such as unemployment and poverty means that they should have resonance for both policy makers and the general public. This transparency requirement also means they need to be defined clearly (see Appendix 2). The publication and dissemination of a report such as this should increase the accessibility of these indicators, at least in Ireland.

The clear focus on outcomes distinguishes this Integration Monitor from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The MIPEX tool aims to assess, compare and improve integration policy indicators by providing ongoing assessment of policies. That said, policy forms the context for those outcomes and will be discussed briefly in this report, particularly in the access information in Boxes 1.2, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. These boxes are not intended as a statement of entitlements, and readers should refer to the relevant official bodies for further information (some additional sources of information are also noted in the boxes).

Table 1.1 sets out the indicators presented in this Integration Monitor, which draw on those proposed at Zaragoza. See also Appendix 2 for definitions and details of indicators not in the core Monitor but included in this report.

### Table 1.1 Outline of core indicators, broadly equivalent to those proposed at Zaragoza

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Employment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education and training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean reading and mathematics scores for 15 year olds</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of students achieving Level 1 or lower in English reading</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Social inclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median net income (household income and equivalised income)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘At risk of poverty’ rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Active citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population (best estimate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected local representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In some instances the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2).

In addition to these core indicators, each annual Integration Monitor includes a different special thematic focus. This year the focus is on ‘Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants’ and Chapter 6 examines how attitudes to immigrants and immigration in Ireland changed between 2002 and 2010, using evidence from the European Social Survey.

The primary task of this Monitor is to present the integration indicators using the most recent data available. In most cases, this is new data released since the 2011 Integration Monitor. This report will not present figures in detail from the 2011 Monitor, but instead will draw
Chapter 1 - Introduction, Policy and Context

1.1.3 Challenges of Monitoring Outcomes Among Immigrants

Monitoring outcomes among migrants is a challenging exercise. This is related to the use of survey data, how immigrants are defined, shifting populations and monitoring change over time. This Integration Monitor aims to cover all immigrants but some are not captured in the available data sources.

Aside from the active citizenship indicators, most of the indicators in this Monitor draw on survey data. Survey data need to be examined to determine how effectively information was collected on immigrants. These large, nationally representative, excellent datasets are not designed to represent and record details of immigrants. One key concern is the tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data due to, for example, poor language skills. There is also a very diverse range of nationalities among immigrants to Ireland. Small numbers in particular national groups may mean they need to be combined into larger nationality groups, thus losing detail about the experience of specific nationalities.

A second challenge is how to define immigrants. The general definition of immigrants in this Monitor is based on nationality. Where relevant, various sub-groups, such as refugees, migrant workers or family members, are discussed separately. The nationality definition misses second-generation immigrants and naturalised citizens, who are not typically identified using general social surveys. Most immigration into Ireland is relatively recent and the numbers are not large, but this is an area of change (see Chapter 5). In general, there are no breakdowns by ethnicity for the core integration indicators because the main social surveys do not collect information on respondents’ ethnicity.

EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they have very different rights and freedom of movement in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett et al., 2006) has indicated that the experience in Ireland of people from the United Kingdom differs from other EU nationals, we have distinguished UK nationals separately, where possible. EU13 nationals and EU12 nationals are also distinguished separately. In this Monitor, for the first time, where data permit, we distinguish non-EU nationals into the following groups: ‘Africa’; ‘North America, Australia and Oceania’; ‘Asia’, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; and ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’.

A third challenge with monitoring the situation of immigrants is the shift in population size and composition each year, so that the year-on-year comparisons are not of the same groups. This is particularly true in Ireland in the current context of rapid labour market change. Recent migration flows to and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand stimulate emigration. At such times of change the impact of immigration policy on migration flows is important – this is discussed in the next section.

1.2 Overview of Main Trends in Migration in Ireland

This Monitor benefits from the publication of detailed tables from Census 2011 along with revised population and migration estimates. These provide a more complete and accurate picture of migrants and migration in Ireland than has been available for some years. In this section we discuss how patterns of immigration have evolved in recent years and what is now known about the resident immigrant population. Figure 1.1 presents the share of the foreign-born population in selected EU countries in 2010. The share of the foreign-born population, who are typically first-generation immigrants, is high in Ireland in 2010, compared with the other countries shown. At 17 per cent, those born abroad represent a significant proportion of the population of Ireland. In 2010 almost half of the foreign-born population in Ireland had arrived over the past five years (OECD, 2012a).

Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change over the past two decades, linked to changing economic conditions. Prior to the mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net emigration, but a period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted returning Irish emigrants and other immigrants. The 2004 EU enlargement resulted in particularly strong net inward migration, which peaked in the year to April 2007. Economic conditions deteriorated and Ireland entered into recession in 2008. Immigration declined as a result and since 2010 Ireland has re-entered a phase of significant net emigration. As Figure 1.2 shows, the emigration flow in 2012 was almost one and a half times the size of the flow in 2006. Overall emigration is estimated to have reached 87,100 in the year to April 2012, an increase of 17,900 (26 per cent) on the 69,200 estimated for 2010.

12. The one exception is Box 1.1, where data from the 2011 Census are used to discuss the proportion of minority ethnic groups in Ireland.
13. EU13 comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU12 comprises the EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007, i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
14. Following the publication of the 2011 Census results the population estimate for 2011 was revised upwards by 90,600, with smaller revisions in the years 2007 to 2010. Immigration and emigration estimates were also revised for the period 2007–2011. The CSO creates its population and migration estimates using data from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and the Census. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the number of personal public service numbers (PPSN) allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/renewed and the number of asylum applications. See Box 2.1 for further information on immigrant mobility.
15. ‘Born abroad’ can include both foreign and national citizens. Census 2011 showed that approximately 241,200 of the 766,770 foreign-born residents in Ireland are Irish nationals. (Over 54,000 of the total foreign-born population were born in Northern Ireland.)
**Figure 1.1 Share of foreign-born population among the total population in selected OECD countries 2010**

Notes: This graph is indicative only. Foreign-born people are typically first-generation immigrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. For France, the data source is Census of Population; for Ireland, it is the Central Statistics Office (CSO); for the UK, it is the Labour Force Survey; and for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Spain, it is the population register.

Source: OECD (2012a), Figure 1.11.

**Figure 1.2 Immigration, emigration and net migration 1987 - 2012**

Note: Year to April of reference year.

Box 1.1 Selected Results from Census 2011

In April 2011 there were 544,357 non-Irish nationals from 199 different nations living in Ireland. The non-Irish share of the population had doubled in under a decade, growing from 6 per cent in 2002 to 12 per cent in 2011 (comprising 3.5 per cent EU15 excluding Ireland, 5 per cent EU12 and 3.5 per cent non-EU). Census 2011 revealed much about the immigrant population in Ireland, including:

- Some 708,300 persons recorded on Census night were born outside the island of Ireland, representing 16 per cent of the usually resident population.
- Over 241,200 of Irish nationals (6.1 per cent) were born outside the State. The vast majority (178,945 or 4.6 per cent of the total Irish population) were born in the UK.¹⁷
- Polish nationals were the largest non-Irish nationality grouping recorded in 2011. The size of this group almost doubled between 2006 and 2011 from 63,276 persons (15 per cent of the non-Irish population) to 122,585 (23 per cent of the non-Irish population). UK nationals were the second largest group with 112,259 living in Ireland in 2011.
- Non-Irish nationals were more likely to be of working age, with 60 per cent in the 22–44 age group, compared with 32 per cent of Irish nationals.
- There were 268,180 non-Irish nationals at work in Ireland (15.1 per cent of the total workforce) in April 2011. The top five non-Irish nationalities at work were: Polish (69,473), British (46,902), Lithuanian (19,753), Latvian (10,782) and Indian (8,397).
- There were 49,915 non-Irish students and pupils over the age of 15 living in Ireland in 2011.
- Almost 90 per cent of Irish nationals identified themselves as Roman Catholic in the Census, compared with 52 per cent of non-Irish nationals. Just over 48,000 persons identified themselves as Muslim (1.1 per cent of the total population).
- Almost 74 per cent of non-Irish nationals identified themselves as being of White ethnicity; compared with 7 per cent of Black and 12 per cent of Asian ethnicity.
- Almost 40 per cent of people of Black ethnicity and 25 per cent of people with Asian ethnicity are Irish nationals.
- Almost 364,000 non-Irish nationals speak a language other than English or Irish at home.
- Of the non-Irish nationals who arrived in Ireland in 1990, over three-quarters indicated that they spoke English very well in April 2011. In contrast, for those non-Irish nationals who arrived in 2010, just over one-third (37 per cent) spoke English very well, while 23.7 per cent could not speak English well or at all.

Spatial distribution of non-Irish nationals

In terms of the geographical distribution of non-Irish nationals in Ireland in 2011, Dublin City, Fingal and Cork County were the local authority areas with the highest numbers of non-Irish nationals. Leitrim and Longford had the lowest numbers of non-Irish nationals. Non-Irish nationals were more likely to live in urban areas.

As a proportion of its resident population, Galway was the most multicultural city, with 19.4 per cent of its residents recorded as non-Irish. Of these, Polish nationals were dominant. Just over 18 per cent of the resident population of Fingal were non-Irish, with Polish, British, Nigerian, Lithuanian and Latvian nationals making up more than half of these persons in 2011. One in six of Dublin City's residents was a non-Irish national, with Polish, British, Romanian, Indian, Chinese and Brazilian nationals combined accounting for 45 per cent of these.

Donegal had the smallest proportion of non-Irish nationals (8.1 per cent) in 2011, more than half of whom were UK nationals.

Looking at the nationalities of residents living in towns in April 2011, Ballyhaunis in County Mayo had the highest proportion of non-Irish nationals at 41.5 per cent. This compared with an average rate of 14.9 per cent for all towns in 2011 (CSO, 2012c).

Changing non-Irish household structure

The composition of private households headed by non-Irish nationals in 2011 showed significant change since 2006: families with children increased from 41 per cent of all households in 2006 to 50 per cent in 2011 (CSO, 2012c). Lunn (2012) analysed Census 2011 data and found that, despite the ongoing recession, Ireland experienced ‘further net inward migration’ between 2006 and 2011. He argues that ‘young families were either less likely to leave Ireland, more likely to arrive, or both, compared with the rest of the population’. OECD data for 2009 indicate that a higher proportion of immigrant households in Ireland have children than the average for immigrant households in OECD countries (OECD, 2012b).

¹⁷ UK includes Northern Ireland.
There has been a dramatic drop in immigration flows since the peak of 151,000 was reached in the year to April 2007. The flow remained fairly stable in 2011 and 2012, at around 53,000. As Figure 1.3 shows, the largest changes have been seen in the EU12 immigrant flow, which has fallen from over 85,000 in 2007 to just over 10,000 in 2012. The share of EU12 nationals in the total immigration flow decreased from 57 per cent in 2007 to 20 per cent in 2012.

Figure 1.4 shows that the EU12 population in Ireland responded quickly to the economic downturn. In 2008, 35 per cent of emigrants were EU12 nationals, rising to 42 per cent in 2009. Since 2010 Irish nationals represent the largest group among emigrants, accounting for 53 per cent of the emigrant flow in 2012. Unlike other nationality groupings, the outward flow of non-EU nationals has remained relatively stable during the downturn, between 9,000 and 11,100 non-EU nationals emigrated per year in the period 2008–2012. This may reflect the fewer opportunities for onward migration available to this group.

Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) registrations, or residence permissions, of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over from 2008 to 2011. The most recent confirmed data relate to year-end 2011, when there were 128,104 ‘live’ registrations recorded, representing a 10 per cent decline since 2008. The provisional 2012 year-end estimate of non-EEA nationals with permission to remain in the State is approximately 115,000, representing a 10 per cent drop in

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18. The European Economic Area comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
19. Non-EEA nationals who wish to stay in Ireland for more than 90 days must register with An Garda Síochána and on registration are issued with one of several immigration permissions or ‘Stamps’, depending on their particular circumstances (e.g. work permit holder/student). There are currently 11 separate categories of Stamp issued in Ireland, some more clearly defined than others.
Figure 1.4 Nationality breakdown of emigration flows 2006 - 2012

Note: Year to April of reference year.
just one year. This decline could in part reflect the recent increase in the number of migrants who have acquired citizenship (see Chapter 5). Interestingly, the Minister for Justice and Equality attributed the decline in permissions to remain in the State in 2012 to the increase in the number of people acquiring citizenship, which has impacted very significantly on the number of people who are required to hold a residence permission (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013a). Recent developments regarding processing applications for citizenship are discussed in Chapter 5.

Figure 1.5 shows that the share of ‘live’ residence permissions issued for the purpose of work fell between 2008 and 2011, from 35 per cent to 23 per cent of all ‘live’ residence permissions. The number of residence permissions issued to family members grew from 12 per cent to 17 per cent.20

Year-end 2012 provisional data released by the Department of Justice and Equality (2013a) indicate that the top six nations, which together account for over half of all persons registered, are India (11 per cent), Brazil (10 per cent), Nigeria (9 per cent), China (8 per cent), USA (8 per cent) and Philippines (7 per cent).

### Figure 1.5 Breakdown of GNIB (police) residence permissions, year-end 2008–2011 (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Other reasons</th>
<th>Refugee status</th>
<th>Remunerated activities reasons</th>
<th>Education reasons</th>
<th>Family reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Data are not available for refugee status in 2008 and 2009. ‘Other reasons’ includes family members and siblings who qualify under the Irish Born Child Scheme.

**Source:** Eurostat.

20. A detailed breakdown by category of Stamp is only available on the total number of such Stamps issued within the year. These data were supplied in Appendix 3 of the 2010 Integration Monitor. Although the data are relatively detailed and available back to 2004, they have the problem of being ‘throughput’ rather than ‘snapshot’, i.e. the same person could be counted twice. Since 2009 Eurostat has produced a breakdown of a ‘snapshot’ of ‘live’ Stamps at year-end at a more aggregated level, which Eurostat terms residence permits; these data are presented here. A drawback of these data is the large ‘other’ category and the fact that data are available only from 2009.
There have been several policy and policy-related developments relevant to immigrants in Ireland since the 2011 Integration Monitor. An update of recent developments relating to four main groups of migrants – migrant workers, students, family members and protection applicants – is supplied in Table 1.2. Some of the developments, regarding immigrant entrepreneurs and patronage of primary schools for example, have been positive. However, during 2012 the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 was again withdrawn, in part due to a large number of proposed amendments. A revised Bill, incorporating amendments, is expected in 2013. In November 2012 the fee charged in respect of each immigration registration certificate (issued by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service to non-EEA nationals who wish to remain in Ireland for periods longer than three months) was doubled from €150 to €300.

Where possible, an indication is given of the size of each group in Table 1.2; however, data are often available only on non-EU immigrants. A similar table was included in the 2011 Integration Monitor and a more detailed discussion of policy relating to migrants can be found in the 2010 Integration Monitor. The access of immigrants to employment, education, social welfare, citizenship and voting will be discussed in Boxes 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

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21. This Bill constitutes a single piece of proposed legislation for the management of both immigration and protection in Ireland and has been in preparation for several years. The previous Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 also failed to complete the legislative process.

### Table 1.2 Overview of recent policy/legislative developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant workers</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overview:</strong> Labour migrants in Ireland include: work permit/spousal or dependant permit/green card holders; intra-company transferees; certain non-EEA students; holders of an alternative immigration registration that allows access to the labour market without a permit, such as the non-EEA spouse of an EEA national; and EEA nationals.</td>
<td><strong>Overview:</strong> Non-Irish students comprise EEA plus non-EEA students in primary, second-level, third-level and further education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent trends:</strong> Unemployment remains high and the National Skills Bulletin 2012 found no labour shortages and evidence of limited skills shortages in Ireland (Expert Group on Future Skills Needs, 2012). Work permit allocations have declined sharply in recent years, falling by 23 per cent since 2011 to 4,007 in 2012.</td>
<td><strong>Recent trends:</strong> The number of ‘live’ residence permissions held by non-EEA students remained stable from year-end 2009 to year-end 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy update:</strong> Since April 2012, under the new immigrant entrepreneur scheme, a non-EU national may apply for residence in Ireland to pursue a high-potential start-up business provided he or she has €75,000 in financial backing and meets a number of additional requirements. Significantly there are no initial job creation targets or requirement to employ Irish/EEA nationals. Residence may be issued for an initial two-year period, renewable for three years after which the entrepreneur may then apply for long-term residence. An immigrant investor scheme was also introduced in 2012 and offers similar residence terms for third-country nationals who make investment of at least €500,000 in Ireland. The business permission scheme remains in place for more traditional start-up businesses in areas such as retail or hospitality.</td>
<td><strong>Policy update:</strong> A new immigration regime for international students took effect from 1 January 2011. During 2012 a ‘student probationary extension’ was announced to allow students who had been continuously residing in Ireland since 2004 to transition to the new immigration regime. The extension allows eligible students to remain in Ireland for a further two years. No enrolment in a course of study is required and students are permitted to work for a maximum of 40 hours per week without requiring a work permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of group: migrant workers (non-EEA)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Size of migrant group: students (non-EEA)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In July 2012 the Irish Government opted to cease restrictions on labour market access in respect of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 2012). In October 2012 the Minister for Social Protection established the Migrant Consultative Forum to examine issues related to welfare that are of particular concern to migrant workers. In November 2012 the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation announced plans to amend current employment permits legislation in early 2013. Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) was established under the Qualifications and Quality Assurance (Education and Training) Act 2012, enacted in July 2012. The new authority has a range of responsibilities among which is to facilitate the recognition of qualifications gained outside Ireland – an ongoing challenge for non-EEA workers and potential employers in Ireland. In December 2011 there were 29,693 ‘live’ residence permissions held for work-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over; 23 per cent of ‘live’ immigration residence permissions issued to non-EEA nationals had been issued for work-related reasons.</td>
<td>In December 2011 there were 35,493 ‘live’ residence permissions held for education-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over (Eurostat). This represented 28 per cent of ‘live’ immigration permissions at that time. During 2011, 37 per cent of international students were pursuing higher education (degree) programmes, 22 per cent were taking language courses, 32 per cent were pursuing further education (non-degree) courses and 9 per cent were in the ‘other’ category (e.g. accountancy, secondary school) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2012a).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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23. A national of a country or territory other than one within the EU.
26. See www.qqi.ie.
27. It is not possible to estimate the size of these groups for EEA nationals.
29. It is not possible to estimate the size of these groups for EEA nationals.
30. A breakdown of students in Higher Education Authority institutions by domicile of origin is available, however, these statistics do not cover all non-EEA students, only those who are registered in HEA institutions, i.e. all national universities and institutes of technology; the data do not include a breakdown of students in private education institutes.
Family members

Overview: Recognised refugees have a statutory entitlement to family reunification in Ireland, based on the Refugee Act 1996. Such applications are made to INIS but investigated by the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC). Non-EEA family members of EU nationals also hold family reunification rights and such cases are assessed by INIS. An administrative scheme exists for the unification of family members with other groups of migrants but no data are available on the numbers admitted to Ireland under such schemes.

Recent trends: The number of residence permissions held by non-EEA nationals for family-related reasons has grown steadily in recent years, up by 30 per cent since 2008 to 21,906 in 2011. Almost 1,700 new residence permissions were issued to non-EEA family members of EU citizens during 2011. INIS received applications for family reunification from 501 persons with refugee status during 2011. Approvals were issued in respect of 560 persons (Joyce, 2012a).

Policy update: See Box 1.2 for information on access to family unity and reunification and recent policy developments. The Minister for Justice and Equality intends to publish a detailed policy document, including guidelines, on family reunification.

The Court of Justice of the European Union’s ‘Zambrano’ judgment (March 2011) has the effect that an EU Member State may not refuse a parent who has minor dependent children, who are EU citizens, the right to reside and work in the Member State of residence and nationality of those children. INIS examined all cases before the courts involving Irish citizen dependent children to which the Zambrano judgment was relevant, along with cases of non-EEA nationals seeking to remain in Ireland, and by July 2012, 764 such parents had been granted Irish residency rights (Department of Justice and Equality, 2012b).

Size of group: family members

In December 2011, 21,906 ‘live’ residence permissions (17 per cent of all permissions) were held for family-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over (Eurostat). However, the data on the size of this group are problematic.32 Family members and siblings who qualify under the Irish Born Child (IBC) Scheme are not included in the ‘family reasons’ category. Instead, those who qualify under the IBC Scheme and who have not naturalised are included in the ‘other’ category.

Protection applicants and protection status holders

Overview: A person seeking international protection in Ireland must first seek a declaration of refugee status from ORAC. A negative decision may then be appealed to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. If the appeal is refused, an applicant may then seek subsidiary protection. In the event of refusal of a subsidiary protection claim, the Minister for Justice and Equality will consider whether to make a deportation order or to grant leave to remain.

Recent trends: Provisional figures indicate that 950 applications for asylum were submitted to ORAC in 2012. The equivalent figure for 2011 was 1,290 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013a). The overall refugee recognition rate (comprising first instance plus appeal stages) during 2011 was 4.9 per cent. During 2012, 889 applications for subsidiary protection were made and 13 persons were granted the status (Joyce, 2012a).

Policy update: Ireland does not have a single procedure for protection claims, whereby all protection claims (refugee, subsidiary protection and leave to remain) would be assessed at once. This was proposed under the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010, which was withdrawn in 2012. One anticipated impact of such a single procedure is a reduction in the number of judicial reviews reaching the Irish courts. The Courts Service’s Annual Report 2011 noted that 59 per cent of the 1,193 applications for judicial review in the High Court during 2011 related to asylum, immigration and refugees (703 cases) (Joyce, 2012a).

At the end of 2012 state funding for the Adult Refugee Programme ceased. This programme offered intensive language courses and integration courses to recognised refugees. In answer to parliamentary questions on the matter, the Minister for Education and Skills stated that there are alternative education services available for refugees within existing further education programmes such as the Adult Literacy and Community Education Scheme and the Back to Education Initiative.

Size of group: protection applicants/status holders

In December 2011 there were 2,288 ‘live’ residence permissions held for protection-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 or over. Provisional figures for year-end 2012 indicate that there were approximately 4,750 persons seeking international protection accommodated in direct provision centres, some 650 fewer than at the end of 2011 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013a). Ireland joined the UNHCR-led resettlement scheme in 1998 and 1,043 persons were resettled as ‘programme refugees’ between 2000 and 2012.34

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32. Non-EEA members tend to hold Stamp 4, Stamp 4 EUFAM or Stamp 3 immigration permissions, depending on the status of the principal person. Stamp 4 is issued to a broad range of non-EEA nationals (including family member of refugees, parents and siblings of Irish-born children), while EUFAM is given to family members of EU nationals. Stamp 3 is granted to family members of employment permit holders. 33. Minister for Education and Skills, response to parliamentary question, Dáil Éireann, 13 November 2012.
Box 1.2 Access to family unity and family reunification

Third-country nationals require permission to reside in Ireland and, ordinarily, this permission entails no right to be joined by family members. Statutory provisions exist that regulate family reunification for certain groups, including persons granted refugee status as set out in Section 18 of the Refugee Act 1996. The Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) investigates such applications and prepares a written report for the Minister for Justice and Equality to consider before deciding upon the application. Non-EEA family members of EU nationals also hold family reunification rights under the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations 2006 (S.I. No. 656 of 2006) as amended by the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (Amendment) Regulations 2008 (S.I. No. 310 of 2008) (Joyce, 2012b).

Ireland does not have a statutory family reunification scheme available generally to third-country nationals. Becker et al. (2013) highlight the challenges facing migrants applying for family reunification, including a lack of information and long processing times. The Minister for Justice and Equality intends to publish a detailed policy document, including guidelines, on family reunification. Along with the UK and Denmark, Ireland has opted out of the Family Reunification Directive. Permission to remain in Ireland may be granted under administrative schemes to dependants of employment permit holders. In the case of work permit holders, the sponsor must have been working in Ireland for at least 12 months before applying to be joined by family members and must have an income above a certain threshold. In the case of green card holders, an immediate application for family unity may be made. Alternatively, family members may accompany the sponsor on admission into Ireland, or join later, subject to normal immigration rules.

Under Irish and EU law, EU citizens may live and work in Ireland for three months without any requirement that they register their presence. After three months, an EU citizen is permitted to remain in Ireland as long as he or she is employed, self-sufficient or in education. EU citizens have a right to family unity, meaning that they are entitled to be accompanied by their spouse/partner, their children and their dependent relatives. Non-EU family members of EU citizens resident in Ireland may submit an application to INIS for residency on the basis of ‘EU Treaty Rights’. If successful they will be given an EUFAM residence permission. Accompanying non-EU family members may need an entry visa if they are moving within EU borders, but this should be granted free of charge.

The right of non-EU family members to move and reside in the EU is derived from the EU citizen’s right to freedom of movement under EU law. These rights do not extend to Irish citizens resident in Ireland who may wish to be joined by non-EU family members. The High Court has held that an Irish citizen resident in Ireland is not entitled to rely on any right to family unity derived from EU law because he or she, being resident in Ireland, is not exercising his or her right to freedom of movement. An Irish citizen’s right to family unity is recognised by the Constitution and by the European Convention on Human Rights. This right is not absolute and the State is entitled to exclude non-Irish family members under certain circumstances or to effect their removal.

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35. Becker et al. (2013) note that the question of whether recognised refugees who subsequently naturalise retain family reunification entitlements provided for under the Refugee Act 1996 is under consideration by the Attorney General.
38. See also Court of Justice of European Union Case C-434/09, McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which it was ruled that EU citizens who have never exercised their right of free movement cannot invoke EU citizenship to regularise the residence of their non-EU spouse.
1.4. Integration Policy

1.4.1 EU Integration Policy: Update

The role of the EU in relation to integration is to incentivise and support the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States (Article 79.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]). Harmonisation of integration laws and regulations is still explicitly excluded and integration remains a Member State competence. The European Commission Directorate General (DG) for Home Affairs is responsible for facilitating and supporting the promotion of integration. The DG Employment and Social Affairs and the DG Education and Culture also have a role in promoting integration. The National Contact Points on Integration are a network of designated Member State officials through which information and experience is exchanged at EU level. The EU does not define integration, but rather uses the Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration (see Appendix 1) to frame the debate.

In July 2011 the Commission proposed a new European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. The new agenda follows from, and builds on, the 2005 Common Agenda for Integration, which is discussed in the 2010 Integration Monitor. The Commission proposes that an effective integration process should ensure that migrants enjoy the same rights and have the same responsibilities as EU citizens. Emphasis is placed on migrants’ full participation in all aspects – economic, social, cultural and political – of ‘collective life’. The new agenda identifies a number of challenges that need to be addressed if the EU is to benefit fully from migration, specifically: low employment levels of migrants, especially of migrant women; rising unemployment and high levels of ‘over-qualification’; increasing risks of social exclusion; gaps in educational achievement; and public concerns with the lack of integration of migrants. Consistent with the EU’s role of facilitation and support, strategies rather than legislation are proposed. The importance of the monitoring of results of integration policies is noted. Examples of good practice and knowledge exchange are listed in the agenda’s accompanying Commission staff working paper.

The two main EU funds currently operational and relevant to integration are the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals and the European Refugee Fund. Both are administered in Ireland by the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI). The European Social Fund, administered by the Department of Education and Skills, is also used to fund integration activities in Ireland. The Commission plans to reorganise funding in the Home Affairs area for the period 2014–2020. Under the new system the number of Home Affairs funds and programmes will be reduced from six to two: the Asylum and Migration Fund and the Internal Security Fund. Integration would fall under the former. The ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund’ states that the fund should promote the effective integration of third-country nationals (including asylum seekers and holders of international protection) and that the achievement of this objective should be measured by indicators. A more targeted approach is recommended in support of integration strategies implemented at local and/or regional level.

1.4.2 Irish Integration Policy

Migrant integration touches on a whole range of policy areas. Ireland’s first targeted migrant integration strategy statement, Migration Nation, was published by the (then) Office of the Minister for Integration in 2008. Ireland pursues a policy of ‘mainstream service provision in the integration area while, at the same time, recognising the need for targeted initiatives to meet specific short-term needs’ (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013b). There have been a number of relevant developments in recent years. As a result of significant improvements in implementing policy on citizenship by naturalisation, a substantial proportion of migrants in Ireland are now Irish citizens (see Chapter 5). Naturalised Irish citizens share the same rights and responsibilities as Irish citizens by birth or descent, with clear positive implications for integration. There have also been some policy developments in relation to school patronage (see Chapter 3), which are likely to mean that school patronage in the future will be more reflective of the diversity of the Irish population.

The initial time frames for targeted initiatives such as the National Intercultural Health Strategy (2007–2012) and An Garda Síochána (National Police) Diversity Strategy (2009–2012) have now ended, and follow-up at a strategic level is not yet clear. The Intercultural Education Strategy (2010–2015) is ongoing, however, a reorganisation of resource allocations (resources for special needs education and language support have now been combined, see Box 3.1) means that future monitoring of progress under that strategy will be challenging. The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, which, among a range of measures, should clarify long-term residence status, has been in preparation since 2007 but has not yet been enacted. A Ministerial Council on Integration was established in 2010 and convened by the then Minister for Integration. The position of Minister for Integration ceased to exist in 2011 and the future of this council is unclear.

39. Prior to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 there was no legal basis for EU involvement in Member State integration policy. A new legal provision to the TFEU, introduced by way of the Lisbon Treaty, changes this position.
43. Certain actions under the Intercultural Health Strategy continue to be progressed, for example implementation of the ethnic identifier and the development of a database of health-related translated materials. A Garda diversity strategy is currently being discussed.
44. There has also been organisational restructuring in the Department of Education and Skills, namely subsuming of the Integration Unit into the Social Inclusion Unit within the department.
45. Minister for Justice and Equality, response to parliamentary question, Dáil Éireann, 14 February 2012.
The strain on public finances in Ireland is evident across government departments. Budgetary constraints noted in previous Integration Monitors remain evident in the funding of OPMI. More generally, budget cuts across departments have impacted on integration-related activities such as intercultural training for gardaí, the Adult Refugee Programme, and The Integration Centre's drop-in clinic for refugees, all of which have been discontinued. There have also been successive cuts in the budget for English language tuition in schools. The activities of OPMI and other integration-related policy developments are discussed below.

1.4.2.1 Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI)

OPMI is located within the Department of Justice and Equality and has a ‘cross-Departmental mandate to develop, drive and co-ordinate integration policy across other Government Departments, agencies and services’. Overall responsibility for the promotion and co-ordination of integration measures for legally resident immigrants rests with OPMI, while the delivery of integration services is mainstreamed.

OPMI provides funding to local authorities, sporting bodies and other national, regional and local organisations to promote the integration of immigrants. It also co-funds the EPIC (Employment for People from Immigrant Communities) project with funding from the European Social Fund. Funding has also been made available to promote the uptake of citizenship among migrants in Ireland. OPMI is the responsible authority in Ireland for the administration of the European Refugee Fund and the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. OPMI also acts as Ireland’s National Contact Point on Integration.

OPMI co-ordinates Ireland’s participation in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee Resettlement Programme, working with UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration, Consular Services, Irish Aid and the Department of Foreign Affairs. During 2012, 49 persons (including medical cases and their families) were resettled. OPMI participates in the Annual Tripartite Consultations on resettlement, which is a forum for discussion between the Government, NGOs and the UNHCR and the UNHCR Working Group on Resettlement.

The 2013 budget allocation for OPMI is €2.502 million. This figure is unchanged from 2012 and this stability follows a significant cut in 2011, as reported in the 2011 Integration Monitor. In addition to the core budget allocation, €1.5 million is allocated from the Irish exchequer to co-finance projects funded under the European Refugee Fund and the European Integration Fund in 2012. This allocation is the same as it was in 2011.

Table 1.3 shows a significant decline in the funding awarded by OPMI to groups and projects in the period 2008–2011, but that the funding remained stable from 2011 to 2012. Some of this decline is linked to the overall fall in funding allocated to the Office. In February 2012 the Minister for Justice and Equality indicated that OPMI funding (not co-financed by the EU) to local authorities, national sporting bodies and other national organisations is continuing on a ‘limited scale’ and that there was ‘little or no scope’ to take on new projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: OPMI (<a href="http://www.integration.ie">www.integration.ie</a>).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Table 1.3 Beneficiaries of OPMI funding 2008–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2008 (€)</th>
<th>2009 (€)</th>
<th>2010 (€)</th>
<th>2011 (€)</th>
<th>2012 (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National sporting organisations</td>
<td>505,000</td>
<td>429,500</td>
<td>398,000</td>
<td>253,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City/county councils</td>
<td>817,019</td>
<td>967,200</td>
<td>1,219,573</td>
<td>181,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based groups/other</td>
<td>2,867,695</td>
<td>1,657,363</td>
<td>1,232,790</td>
<td>806,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,189,714</td>
<td>3,054,063</td>
<td>2,850,363</td>
<td>1,241,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46. See OPMI website: www.integration.ie.
47. See www.integration.ie.
48. During 2012 OPMI also participated in the ‘Linking-in’ EU-funded resettlement project, involving the International Organization for Migration, International Catholic Migration Commission and UNHCR. The project aims to strengthen the expertise of practitioners in the resettlement and integration process and to support new and emerging EU resettlement states as they begin the process of resettlement.
49. Minister for Justice and Equality, response to parliamentary question, Dáil Éireann, 21 February 2012.
Chapter 1 - Introduction, Policy and Context

1.4.2.2 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD)

Ireland was examined by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) in February 2011. Ireland was requested to provide information to the committee, within one year of the adoption of the Concluding Observations, on any follow-up to four of the recommendations contained within. This report was prepared by OPMI and sent to UNCERD in early May 2012. It stated that funding allocations to the Equality Authority and the Human Rights Commission budgets were ‘largely protected’ in the 2012 budget and that the Human Rights and Equality Commission will strengthen Ireland’s infrastructure to protect both equality and human rights. It also gave an update on relevant legislative developments in Ireland, explained that consideration of recognising Irish Travellers as an ethnic minority was ongoing, and supplied reasons why the Convention had not been incorporated into domestic law (OPMI, 2012).

1.4.2.3 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission

The heads of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Bill were published in May 2012. The Bill is intended to establish an Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, merging the functions of the Irish Human Rights Commission and the Equality Authority.

In July 2012 the Minister for Justice and Equality announced the panel to select members of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (Department of Justice and Equality, 2012d). However, the members of the selection panel subsequently stood aside following concerns about the heads of the Bill voiced by the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights.50 In October 2012 the Minister for Justice and Equality stated that the concerns had been addressed. A call for applications for membership of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission was then issued in November 2012. In April 2013 the Commission was appointed, although at the time of writing the chief commissioner has not been appointed.

1.4.2.4 ECRI Report on Ireland – Fourth Monitoring Cycle 2013

The fourth report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI),51 published in February 2013, recommends that Irish authorities should monitor the application of the Immigration Acts 2003 and 2004, in particular as regards allegations of racial profiling, and that they should consider adopting legislation prohibiting racial profiling. The review states that efforts should be intensified to ensure that the education system guarantees all children of immigrant origin equality of opportunity in access to education, including higher education. The report also recommends that Ireland adopt as soon as possible a single procedure for dealing with applications for asylum and subsidiary protection, and introduce a long-term residence status as well as procedures for registration of non-Irish national minors under 16 years of age. It is also recommended that Irish authorities should set out clear rules on the application of the habitual residence condition and publish the decisions of the authorities on appeals against negative decisions (ECRI, 2013).

51. ECRI is an independent human rights monitoring body that analyzes racism and related intolerance at five-yearly intervals in each of the Member States of the Council of Europe. The report examines the extent to which ECRI’s main recommendations from previous reports have been followed, and includes an evaluation of policies adopted and measures taken.
Chapter 2 Employment and Integration

Employment is central to the process of economic integration and social inclusion. In the Common Basic Principles for Integration Policy outlined by the European Commission, employment is regarded as ‘an important way for immigrants to make a visible contribution to Member State societies and to participate in the host country’. Employment leads to financial independence, and allows a person to contribute to society and avoid the risk of poverty and social exclusion in their host country. Job loss can be associated with poverty, psychological distress and more general social exclusion. Through employment, legal residents can also build networks, develop their language skills and increase participation in society. However, the economic crisis has meant that labour market conditions have deteriorated in many countries and in Ireland in particular. In general, immigrants are more exposed to the consequences of economic downturns, and this is clearly the experience in Ireland during the ongoing recession.

Box 2.1 Immigrant mobility in the recession

New data from the CSO changed our interpretation of the impact of recession on immigrants in Ireland. We had thought that substantial job losses among non-Irish nationals were followed by a sharp contraction in the immigrant population. However, Census 2011 discovered that the population in that year was 90,600 higher than had been previously estimated. Following this, revised estimates of population and migration by nationality for the years 2007 to 2011 were published by the CSO, in line with the results of the 2011 Census. Estimates of both immigration and emigration have also been revised upwards. Revised estimates of labour force data for the adult population (over 15 years) were subsequently published (CSO, 2012a; QNHS Q3 2012).

The new data show that the decline in the immigrant population has been quite limited, largely because substantial out-migration was offset by continued immigration.

Previous accounts of the impact of the recession, for example in the 2011 Integration Monitor, based on then-available QNHS data, suggested a substantial decline in the immigrant population. For example, it was thought that employment among non-Irish nationals fell by about 143,000 between the end of 2007 and the start of 2011, and that this coincided with a decline of 128,000 in the non-Irish adult population (aged over 15), suggesting that most of those who lost jobs had left the country. These data appeared to suggest that immigrants were more vulnerable to employment losses during a recession, and that immigrants who lost their jobs would move on or back to their home countries.

The revised QNHS data, published in December 2012, indicate that for non-Irish nationals, over the four-year period between Q1 2008 and Q1 2012, employment fell by 81,000, unemployment increased by 35,000 and the adult population contracted by 20,000. The recession resulted in higher rates of both job loss (employment fell by 23 per cent among non-Irish nationals, compared with 13 per cent among Irish nationals) and unemployment (reaching over 18 per cent among non-Irish nationals in early 2012, compared with 14.4 per cent among Irish nationals). However, while immigrants were hit hard by the recession, this does not appear to have resulted in a substantial decline in the immigrant population in Ireland.

The revised ‘Population and Migration Estimates: April 2012’, published by the CSO in September 2012, describes both stocks and flows of all persons in the population, rather than just those aged over 15, as in the QNHS. The total non-Irish population in Ireland declined from 575,600 in April 2008 (13 per cent of the total population) to 550,400 in 2012 (12 per cent), a decline of 25,200; this is consistent

Continued overleaf

52. It should be noted that the differences observed between population sub-groups refer only to the Q1 data, and would not necessarily represent differences in the other quarters of 2012.
Chapter 2 - Employment and Integration

Box 2.1 continued

with the scale of population decline indicated in the QNHS. However, these stock numbers conceal substantial flows. Between April 2008 and 2012 a total of 172,000 non-Irish nationals emigrated, but this was offset by inward migration of 140,000, resulting in net out-migration of 32,000 non-Irish nationals over the four-year period, or a modest 8,000 per annum. Over the same period, 136,600 Irish nationals emigrated and 81,100 immigrated, resulting in net outward migration of 55,500 or almost 14,000 per annum. So, underlying the modest decline in the population is substantial mobility, both inward and outward.

Analysis by the CSO (2013a) on the allocations of personal public service numbers (PPSN) to non-Irish nationals in 2010 and 2011, found that of the 1,148,800 foreign nationals aged 15 and over who received PPSNs in the period 2002–2011, 310,400 recorded some employment in Ireland during 2011. The falling numbers of immigrants have meant a decline in PPSN allocations since 2006 and the contraction in employment resulted in only 21,800 new non-Irish nationals gaining employment in 2011. This number represents a small increase on both 2009 and 2010 results when the figures were 20,800 and 21,200 respectively, but still remains well below the 120,700 new allocations in 2006 that recorded employment activity. Of the 204,000 non-Irish nationals aged 15 and over who were assigned PPSNs in 2006, only 27 per cent had employment activity at any time during 2011 (CSO, 2013a). Overall, these figures suggest that there is substantial mobility of the migrant population.

The impact of recession has varied across different immigrant groups. At the beginning of the recession, in 2008, there were almost 250,000 EU12 nationals resident in Ireland, accounting for 43 per cent of all immigrants and over 6 per cent of the total population. Members of this group are known to have been in particularly unfavourable labour market situations prior to the recession, with higher unemployment, lower pay and less likelihood of finding jobs that matched their qualification levels. They were hit particularly hard by the recession. Employment of EU12 nationals dropped by over 50,000, or almost 29 per cent, between 2008 and 2012, unemployment rose to well over 18 per cent throughout 2012, and the adult population declined by over 27,000. There was substantial out-migration among EU12 nationals: over 30,000 emigrated in the year to April 2009, and over 78,200 emigrated in the period 2008–2012, but this was offset by immigration of over 50,000 EU12 nationals, so net out-migration amounted to about 27,000 over the four years. Non-EU nationals had similar experiences in the labour market: employment declined sharply and unemployment shot up, but, in contrast to EU12 nationals, their population size increased somewhat, mainly because their emigration did not increase during the period.

These differing migration patterns make sense in a wider context of migration policies and institutions. EU citizens enjoy a substantial bundle of rights to move, reside and work across the common European travel area and thus exhibit substantial mobility in response to national labour markets. Non-EU citizens are a great deal more restricted with respect to residence and work, and are therefore less mobile (see Box 2.2 for further details on access to employment).

2.1 Employment, Unemployment and Activity Rates

The continuing recession, which has affected Ireland since 2008, has led to a dramatic deterioration in the labour market. Total employment fell by 321,000 (15 per cent) between the first quarter of 2008 and the beginning of 2012. The contraction in employment has been much greater among non-Irish nationals, where the number employed fell by 23 per cent, than among Irish nationals, for whom total employment fell by 13 per cent. As noted in Box 2.1, the overall unemployment rate for all age groups in Ireland rose by ten percentage points between Q1 2008 (5 per cent) and Q1 2012 (15 per cent). Non-Irish nationals have been hit harder by unemployment: their unemployment rate increased from 6.6 per cent in Q1 2008 to 18.4 per cent in Q1 2012. The unemployment rate among Irish nationals increased from 4.7 per cent to 14.4 per cent in the same period.

Figure 2.1 presents the rates of employment, unemployment and activity for Irish and non-Irish nationals for the first quarters of 2011 and 2012. Employment rates fell for the Irish group and rose marginally for the non-Irish group between 2011 and 2012, while activity and unemployment rates increased for both groups. The employment rate is measured as the proportion of working adults in the working-age population (15–64 years). The average employment rate among non-Irish nationals is virtually identical to that among Irish nationals. The unemployment rate of non-Irish nationals in the 15–64 age group has risen to 18.5 per cent of the labour force, much higher than the 14.7 per cent rate among Irish natives.

54. While the QNHS data have been revised by the CSO in line with the Census data (see Box 2.1), rates of employment and unemployment have remained largely stable, so the differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals reported here in respect of 2011 are very similar to the patterns reported in the 2011 Integration Monitor.
In 2012 non-Irish nationals accounted for 14.7 per cent of the total adult population, 14.8 per cent of total employment and 18.7 per cent of total unemployment. These figures suggest that immigrants are particularly vulnerable during prolonged economic downturns, and it is clear that the economic crisis has affected immigrants in the labour market more severely (Barrett and Kelly, 2012).

The labour force activity rate is calculated as the proportion of working-age adults who are in the labour force, which consists of the number of people employed and unemployed. Figure 2.1 shows that the 2012 activity rate among non-Irish nationals, at 72.3 per cent, is higher than that of Irish nationals, at 68.2 per cent. However, the activity rate within age groups is actually very similar for Irish and non-Irish nationals (see Table 2.2), so differences in the activity rate are mainly due to age composition. Compared with 14.7 per cent of the total adult population, immigrants accounted for 15.4 per cent of those economically active.

New data from the QNHS allow us to distinguish a wider range of nationalities than has been possible in previous editions of the Integration Monitor, enabling us to explore differences between non-EU national groups that had heretofore been aggregated as a single category.56

Table 2.1 shows that there are important differences in employment and economic activity between immigrant groups. In Q1 2012 nationals of the pre-enlargement or ‘older’ EU Member States (EU13) have the highest employment rate at 67.7 per cent, and the second lowest unemployment rate at 9.9 per cent. Africans have the lowest rates of employment (41.9 per cent) and activity (57.5 per cent) and the highest unemployment rate (27.1 per cent). Previous research on immigrants in the Irish labour market in 2010 suggests that the main concentration of labour market disadvantage occurs among the Black African national-ethnic group (Kingston et al., 2013). However, UK nationals are also characterised by extensive labour market disadvantage, with low employment (49.9 per cent) and activity (65.7 per cent) and high unemployment (24.0 per cent) rates.57 Their unemployment rates have risen markedly in recent years, a trend that merits further research.

EU12 nationals report the second highest employment rate at 66.2 per cent, but also a high unemployment rate (18.4 per cent). These migrants from the newer, post-enlargement, EU Member States are

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55. The QNHS classifies as ‘unemployed’ persons who, in the week before the survey, were without work and available for work within the next two weeks and who had taken specific steps, in the preceding four weeks, to find work.

56. The classification is based on the country codification in the EU Labour Force Survey from 2011 onwards. The non-EU groups are: ‘Africa’; ‘North America, Australia and Oceania’; ‘Asia’, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; and ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of World’, which comprises Candidate, EFTA and Other European countries, Central America and the Caribbean, South America and the Near and Middle East.

57. A larger proportion of UK nationals are retired compared with other national groups.
over-represented in particular sectors and occupations, such as in manufacturing, retail and hospitality, which have been hard hit by the recession.

Asians report relatively low employment (57.8 per cent) and activity (65.9 per cent) rates, but also comparatively low unemployment rates. This pattern may reflect the fact that many Asians come to Ireland to study rather than to work, and a notable number are also engaged in home duties. Those from the ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of World’ combine low employment and activity rates with high unemployment, a pattern that may reflect the diversity of this group.

Table 2.2 reports the key employment indicators by age group. Unemployment rates among young people, aged 15 to 24, are extremely high.58 High youth unemployment rates reflect the difficulties faced by young people in finding jobs. In most OECD countries, unemployment among immigrant youth is higher than among native youth (OECD, 2012b). In Ireland, however, youth unemployment is higher among Irish nationals (30 per cent) than among non-Irish nationals (27.2 per cent), although unemployment among the latter appears to have risen sharply between 2011 and 2012. In the other, older, age groups, Irish nationals report lower unemployment rates than non-Irish nationals.

Employment and activity rates among young people are substantially lower than among older age groups, irrespective of nationality. Low activity rates among younger Irish nationals reflect the fact that many are still in the educational system and are therefore neither working nor looking for a job (so they are not part of the labour force). Many young non-Irish nationals are also engaged in education, but a significant proportion come to Ireland to work. Lower activity rates in the older 46–64 age cohort may be explained by retired people, or people engaged in home duties, who are not part of the labour force.

Turning to prime-age workers, aged 25 to 44, unemployment is substantially higher among non-Irish nationals (16.7 per cent) than among Irish nationals (14.6 per cent). The contrast among those aged 45 to 64 is stark: 10.3 per cent of Irish nationals in this age group are unemployed, compared with 21.9 per cent of non-Irish nationals.

Table 2.3 presents the key employment indicators by gender. In general, the recession has had a much greater impact on men than on women: the decline in male employment was greater, as was the increase in male unemployment. This situation is largely due to the rapid decline in construction work and, to a lesser extent, manufacturing, in which male employment is concentrated.

### Table 2.1 Key employment indicators by national group Q1 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group</th>
<th>Employment rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Activity rate (%)</th>
<th>Total population (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>2,601.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>447.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>189.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America, Australia and Oceania</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe and Rest of World</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>3,049.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2012 (15–64 age group).

58. There is a larger proportion of unemployed Irish nationals in the 15–24 age group, a substantial share of the unemployed non-Irish nationals in this group have left the country.
In 2012 the employment rate was somewhat higher for non-Irish males than for Irish males, and marginally lower for non-Irish females than for Irish females. The highest unemployment rate occurred among non-Irish males (21.1 per cent, compared with 18.1 per cent among Irish men). There is a substantial gap between the unemployment rate among Irish females (10.5 per cent) and non-Irish females (15.3 per cent), which may be due to the decline in accommodation and food services, in which non-Irish female employment was concentrated, and to the low share of non-Irish national employment in the public sector, which is a substantial employer of Irish women.

### 2.2 Self-Employment

In some countries, self-employment constitutes a key factor influencing the economic progress and integration of immigrant minorities (Guerra and Patuelli, 2010). However, aside from the stringent immigration requirements faced by migrant entrepreneurs wishing to move to Ireland (see Box 2.2), there are many structural barriers to migrant self-employment, such as language differences, access to local business networks, difficulties in accessing finance and lack of previous financial history in the country. Power and Salovik (2012) argue that the level of self-employment is lower among foreign nationals in Ireland than it is among foreign nationals in other OECD countries.

Table 2.4 provides a breakdown of self-employment rates (the proportion of employed persons who are self-employed) by nationality groups. The self-employment rate of Irish nationals (17.2 per cent) is significantly higher than the average for non-Irish nationals (8.5 per cent), although, as we shall see, there are substantial differences between different groups of non-Irish nationals. A major share of self-employment among Irish nationals is in farming, so excluding agriculture facilitates a clearer comparison of self-employment patterns between Irish and non-Irish nationals. Even by this measure, however, there is still a higher proportion of Irish nationals reporting self-employment, at 14.1 per cent, compared with 8.3 per cent among non-Irish nationals.

The rate of self-employment is particularly low among EU12 nationals (4.5 per cent) and Asians (5.3 per cent). UK nationals report the highest rate of self-employment at 16.4 per cent, or 15.3 per cent without agriculture and in this they are matched by the self-employment rates among Africans. The high self-employment rate among UK nationals may be due to them living in Ireland for a longer duration, whereas the self-employment rate among Africans may reflect difficulties in accessing wage-dependent employment due to higher rates of labour market disadvantage or discrimination (Kingston et al., 2013).
Chapter 2 - Employment and Integration

Table 2.4 Self-employment rates by nationality Q1 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-employment rate overall (%)</th>
<th>Self-employment rate excluding agriculture (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America, Australia and Oceania</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe and Rest of World</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data refers to population aged 15 and over in employment. The self-employment rate is the proportion of employed persons who are self-employed.

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2012.

2.3 Summary of Employment Indicators

Ireland is in a deep and prolonged recession, which has entailed a sharp contraction in employment and a dramatic rise in unemployment. This chapter shows that non-Irish nationals have been harder hit by the recession than Irish nationals. The contraction in employment has been much greater among non-Irish nationals, where the number employed fell by 23 per cent, than among Irish nationals, where total employment fell by 13 per cent. All nationality groups have experienced a rise in unemployment, and Africans have the highest rate of unemployment, followed closely by UK nationals. There has been a marked increase in the unemployment rate of UK nationals, and a drop in their employment rate in recent years. EU13 nationals report the highest employment rate and the lowest unemployment rates.

Overall, the number of non-Irish nationals declined by about 25,000 between the start of 2008 and 2012, but this conceals substantial movements of emigration and immigration over the period. The youth (15–24 age group) unemployment rate is higher for Irish nationals, compared with non-Irish nationals. For prime-age and older workers, the unemployment rate is higher for non-Irish nationals. The unemployment rate is significantly higher for males than for females, and this is the case for both Irish and non-Irish nationals. The self-employment rate is low for non-Irish nationals, apart from UK and African nationals.
Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2012

Chapter 2 - Employment and Integration

Box 2.2 Access to Employment

All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) may migrate to Ireland to take up employment without restriction. Non-EEA nationals who hold a Stamp 4 registration certificate (including refugees, people with leave to remain and other resident non-EEA nationals) enjoy rights equivalent to Irish citizens with regard to seeking employment. Non-EEA students who hold a Stamp 2 registration may also access the Irish labour market for up to 20 hours during term time and full time during vacations. Applicants for protection may not work while their case is pending.

Managed labour migration policy relates to workers from outside the EEA. Policy is developed and administered by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation in co-operation with the Department of Justice and Equality. Most non-EEA workers hold a Stamp 1 registration certificate and an employment permit. There are four main types of employment permit: green cards, work permits, spousal or dependant permits, and intra-company transfer permits.59

Green cards are issued to non-EEA workers earning more than €60,000 per year. Workers who have held green card permits for two years (or former green card permit holders granted a Stamp 4 for 12 months) may be granted a Stamp 4 permission for a further two years. Green card holders may have their spouses and families join them immediately. Work permits are available for occupations with an annual salary of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations with salaries below €30,000. The permit is granted for two years initially, and then for a further three years. A labour market needs test is required with all work permit applications. Work permit holders must have been in employment for at least 12 months before applying for family reunification and must satisfy certain income conditions.

Spousal permits are issued to the spouses/dependants of green card holders and/or work permit holders provided the original work permit holder made his/her first application before 1 June 2009.

In general, employment permit holders may only change employers after 12 months and must apply for a new permit to do so.

In light of currently high unemployment, it is the Irish Government’s policy to limit permits issued to non-EU workers to those in niche occupations and to reduce permits issued to lower paid workers. There are increased fees levied on employment permit applications, the length of the labour market needs test has been extended and the list of occupations eligible for green cards in the below €60,000 per annum category has been further restricted.

Employment permits now account for a very small proportion of immigrant workers in Ireland. In 2012 a total of 4,007 employment permits were issued, including 2,912 new permits and 1,088 renewals. This represented just 1.5 per cent of total employment of non-Irish nationals and 0.2 per cent of total employment.

Self-employment

Non-EEA nationals who wish to be self-employed in Ireland may apply for a business permission.60 However, to qualify they must transfer capital of at least €300,000 and provide employment for a minimum of two EEA nationals. The number of business permissions issued is low. An immigrant entrepreneur scheme, introduced in 2012 for ‘high potential start-ups’, has a lower capital requirement (€75,000) and there are no initial job creation targets.61 An immigrant investor scheme has also been introduced. The business permissions scheme remains for more traditional business areas such as retail or hospitality.

Support with accessing employment

Several support organisations may be accessed by migrants in Ireland, including: the National Employment and Entitlements Service (formerly FÁS); the Local Employment Service; and the EPIC programme in Business in the Community Ireland. Each may be accessed by EU citizens and non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission. Other migrants who are entitled to work may use centres for the unemployed/resource centres.62

Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) has a range of responsibilities including facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State. An online international qualifications database is maintained, which lists certain foreign qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may apply to the qualifications recognition service, part of QQI, to have their qualification recognised.63

60. See www.inis.gov.ie/en/INS/Pages/WP09000012.
62. For detailed information for migrants on how to find employment, see The Integration Centre (2012a).
63. See www.qualificationsrecognition.ie.
Chapter 3 Education and Integration

Education plays a very important role in immigrant integration, for both social and academic outcomes, and ensures that immigrant children have an equal chance in access to the labour market in the future. A recent OECD report argues that ‘the education of the native-born children of immigrants, raised and educated in the country of residence, is a major integration outcome and can be considered a benchmark for integration at large because of the broader implications of education’ (OECD, 2012b). The cost of educational disadvantage may manifest itself at the individual level through lower occupational attainment and lifetime earnings and higher poverty and crime rates, as well as at a societal level through lower social cohesion (see, for example, Bell and Machin, 2013).

In 2000 the immigrant share of the population in Ireland was well below the average for OECD countries; by 2010, it was well above (OECD, 2012b). The fact that immigration into Ireland is relatively recent is important for assessing educational outcomes. Most non-Irish adults were not educated in Ireland – they came to Ireland as adults, having completed their education abroad. The significant minority of non-Irish nationals who come to Ireland to study are an important exception here. In general, the Irish case differs from European countries that have a substantial second-generation immigrant population, although this will change in Ireland as the second-generation immigrant population grows.

Educational outcomes for Irish and non-Irish adults are considered in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 looks at the performance of 15-year-old immigrant children in Irish schools, as one indicator of how well the education system is integrating immigrants. It also discusses evidence on the performance of younger children. Box 3.1 describes access and supports to education for children and adults in Ireland, including policy updates since the 2011 Integration Monitor.

### 3.1 Educational Outcomes for Adults in Ireland

#### 3.1.1 Highest Educational Attainment

Table 3.1 presents the highest educational attainment by nationality for the working population (15–64 years) according to ONHS Q1 2012 data. The table distinguishes Irish and non-Irish nationals, as in previous Integration Monitors. It also distinguishes the non-EU group, according to the classification described in Chapter 2. For the Irish/non-Irish distinction, there are four education levels: no formal to lower secondary, upper secondary, post-leaving certificate and third level. For some groups, the upper secondary and post-leaving certificate categories are combined, due to small numbers in the latter. Note that, as discussed in previous Monitors, immigrants in Ireland are mainly grouped within the younger age cohorts. There is a strong age gradient in educational attainment in Ireland, with older Irish people in general being less qualified than younger Irish people. This should be considered when comparing third-level attainment between Irish and non-Irish nationals.

Table 3.1 shows that a higher proportion of non-Irish nationals have third-level qualifications (46.4 per cent) than is the case for Irish nationals (32.8 per cent). The Irish group has the highest proportion of low educational achievers, with 29.7 per cent of Irish nationals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No formal to lower secondary (%)</th>
<th>Upper secondary (%)</th>
<th>Post-leaving certificate (%)</th>
<th>Third level (%)</th>
<th>Total (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>2,578.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>403.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>164.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America,</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe and</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>2,981.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Proportions exclude ‘other/not stated’; this proportion is negligible for Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish nationals. The number of cases is too small in many cells for ‘post-leaving certificate’, so for some detailed national groups, this category is combined with upper secondary. ‘Third level’ includes non-honours degree and honours degree or above.

**Source:** Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2012 (15–64 age group).
having no formal/lower second-level qualifications, compared with 15.4 per cent of non-Irish nationals; again, this could be related to the age gradient in the educational attainment of Irish nationals. The proportion of Irish and non-Irish nationals with upper secondary and post-leaving certificate education is very similar between both groups.

When analysing a breakdown of national groups we see that, for most non-Irish groups, the proportion with third-level education is higher than it is among Irish nationals. Among EU groups, for example, just under half of the UK nationals (48.1 per cent) and nearly two-thirds of EU13 nationals (64.4 per cent) have third-level education — this is much higher than the proportion of Irish nationals (32.8 per cent). The only group with a similar proportion with third-level qualifications is the EU12 group (33.3 per cent), but EU12 nationals have higher rates of post-leaving certificate qualifications (16.3 per cent). As noted in previous Integration Monitors, this may partly reflect the education systems and trends in EU12 countries such as Poland, where vocational qualifications play a greater role than they do in Ireland.

Non-EU nationals in general have high rates of third-level education. This finding may reflect Irish immigration policy, which is designed and implemented to attract highly skilled immigrant workers (see Box 2.2). However, Table 3.1 also shows variation in the non-EU group. The Asian group is particularly highly qualified, with 72.6 per cent having third-level qualifications; this group includes a substantial proportion of nurses and other medical workers. So too is the ‘North America, Australia and Oceania’ group, with 65 per cent of this group having third-level education. The African (41.6 per cent) and ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of World’ (48.6 per cent) groups have lower proportions with third-level qualifications than other non-EU nationals, although these proportions are still higher than that of Irish nationals.

Figure 3.1 presents the proportion of the 25–34 age group with tertiary education. Focusing specifically on the younger age cohort helps to overcome some of the difficulties of comparing the educational attainment of young immigrants with that of the working-age Irish population.64 Because the numbers are smaller, the non-EU category is combined. Overall, just under half (49 per cent) of this age group have third-level qualifications, compared with one-third of the working-age population (Table 3.1). In Figure 3.1 we see that a somewhat higher proportion of non-Irish nationals have third-level education (53.5 per cent) compared with Irish nationals (48.1 per cent). The difference is much smaller among this age group than for the working-age population (Table 3.1), although still statistically significant. In general, these patterns are similar to those presented in the 2011 Integration

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**Figure 3.1 Share of 25–34 age group with tertiary education**

![Graph showing the proportion of 25–34 age group with tertiary education by nationality]

**Notes:** Proportions exclude ‘other/not stated”; this proportion is negligible for Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish nationals. The difference between the proportion of Irish and non-Irish nationals with tertiary education, and between the Irish and the UK, EU13, EU12 and Non-EU groups is statistically significant (p<0.05).

**Source:** Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2012 (25–34 age group).

64. It is not possible to calculate rates for the 30–34 age group using the public version of the QNHS, as recommended in the Zaragoza indicators. The proportion with third-level education would be somewhat higher for the 30–34 age group than for the 25–34 age group.
Monitor. While in Ireland a larger proportion of immigrants aged 25 to 34 have a third-level degree compared with natives, in most OECD countries the reverse is true: immigrants are less likely to hold tertiary degrees than natives (OECD, 2012b).

There are substantial differences between the non-Irish groups in their levels of tertiary education. Almost three-quarters of EU13 nationals in the 25–34 age group have third-level education (72 per cent). A very high proportion of non-EU nationals have tertiary education too (70 per cent). EU12 nationals are the group with the lowest proportion of any national group with tertiary education (42 per cent), as was the case in the 2011 Integration Monitor. Note that it can be difficult to classify the qualifications of non-Irish nationals, and a greater proportion of non-Irish nationals have qualifications classified as ‘other/not stated’ than Irish nationals.

3.1.2 Early School Leavers Among Adult Immigrants

Early school leaving is a key measure of educational disadvantage. Early leavers in Ireland are found to experience disadvantages in relation to access to further education/training, employment chances, employment quality and also broader social outcomes such as health, lone parenthood and imprisonment (Smyth and McCoy, 2009). Table 3.2 focuses on the share of early school leavers by nationality group in the 20–24 age group. Early school leavers are defined as the proportion of the population aged 20 to 24 who have progressed no further than lower second-level education and who are not engaged in further education or training at present.65 While most non-Irish adults were not educated in Ireland, this is less true of the 20–24 age group, which comprises young adults who were educated abroad and those who completed their education in Ireland.

In this age group (20–24), non-Irish nationals have a higher rate of early school leaving (16.8 per cent) compared with Irish nationals (10.5 per cent). Therefore, although a higher proportion of non-Irish nationals have a university degree (Figure 3.1), it is also the case that a higher proportion of this group left school early. A slightly higher proportion of non-EU nationals are early leavers (11.8 per cent), but the highest rate of early school leaving recorded is among the EU12 group (22.9 per cent), which reflects the lower educational attainment of this group compared with the others (see also Figure 3.1). Further research is required to establish when these non-Irish early school leavers came to Ireland and to get a sense of whether they left the Irish education system early, or whether they came to Ireland as adults with low qualifications. In a qualitative study of early school leaving in post-primary schools in Ireland, Byrne and Smyth (2010) find that one-fifth of non-Irish students leave school early, which is almost twice as many as Irish students (11 per cent).66

This indicator has changed since the 2011 Integration Monitor as a result of the revisions to the QNHS data described in Box 2.1. In the 2011 Monitor findings there was very little difference in the proportion of early school leavers between Irish and non-Irish nationals: in 2012 we find that there is. This change suggests that the revised data may be recording a larger number of young, disadvantaged non-Irish nationals than the previous version of the QNHS used in the 2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors. There are two implications of this. One is that the higher rate of early school leavers is a cause for concern. The second is that it highlights the importance of ensuring that national data are representative of the migrant population.

### 3.2 Immigrant Children in Irish Schools

International research highlights the crucial role of schools in the integration of children and young people into a new society (OECD, 2006). Research focusing on academic achievement has also identified migrant–native gaps in performance (OECD, 2010a; Heath and Brinbaum, 2007). The Irish education system has experienced a rapid increase in the number of immigrant students since the late 1990s, but, has little previous experience of national diversity (Byrne et al., 2010). A number of studies highlight the challenges faced by Irish schools in dealing with this recent change (Smyth et al., 2009; Gilligan et al., 2010; Darmody et al., 2011). Given the recent increase in national diversity, school patronage has come under criticism from international and national sources (e.g. the Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, The Integration Centre in Ireland). Over 90 per cent of primary schools and over 50 per cent of secondary schools are under the patronage of the Catholic Church. Smyth et al. (2009) also report a number of common school admission criteria that disadvantage immigrant students, such as pre-enrolling children from birth and giving preference to children whose parents attended the school. Box 3.1 describes access to education for non-Irish nationals, and resources to support them, the most significant of which is €69 million for English language support.

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65. The recommended Zaragoza indicator is 18–24 years, the QNHS microdata provide a different age breakdown and we have kept with this for consistency with previous Integration Monitors.

66. The authors note that further research is required to establish the reasons for this higher rate of early school leaving among non-Irish nationals.
How do immigrant students compare with Irish students in terms of academic achievement? This section uses data from the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international survey of 15-year-old students that takes place every three years. PISA assesses students’ literacy in science, mathematics and reading. ‘Literacy’ is used to emphasise the ability to apply knowledge, rather than simply to reproduce facts that have been studied in a curriculum. Fifteen year olds are the target group because this age marks the end of compulsory schooling in many countries. PISA 2012, the fifth cycle of the PISA study, has been carried out in 67 countries, including Ireland, but the results had not been released at the time of writing. As in PISA 2003, mathematics was the major focus of the 2012 assessment. PISA 2012 will provide some information about student performance in reading and science. The 2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors presented data from the 2009 survey and thus, because this is an important indicator of migrant integration, Table 3.3 replicates the findings from the 2010 Integration Monitor. Figure 3.2 presents additional information on low-achieving students not previously discussed, and some discussion about age of arrival and reading achievement.

Of the 3,937 15-year-old students participating in Ireland in the 2009 PISA study, 8 per cent had an immigrant background. A key point is that immigrant student performance in Ireland varies according to the language spoken at home (see Table 3.3). English-speaking immigrants have similar scores to their Irish peers in both reading and mathematics, whereas the scores of non-English-speaking immigrant students are significantly lower than their Irish peers.

The gap between immigrants who do not speak English at home and non-immigrant Irish students is larger for English reading than for mathematics in PISA 2009 (see Table 3.3). In fact, for younger students other tests show little or no difference in mathematics scores. For example, national assessment tests show no significant difference between non-English speakers and Irish students in mathematics at age 11–12, although there is a difference for English reading (see 2010 Integration Monitor, Table 3.5). An analysis of the Growing Up in Ireland Survey in the 2011 Integration Monitor also shows that among nine year olds, the proportion of immigrant children in the lowest mathematics quintile does not differ from the proportion of Irish children in this quintile, regardless of language spoken at home.

Similar to the PISA 2009 study, these tests show no difference overall in either mathematics or English reading for children who speak English at home, and both studies find lower performance in English reading for immigrant children who do not speak English at home.

While distinguishing immigrants according to language spoken at home is very important in the Irish context, the proportion of students displaying very low levels of reading and maths proficiency at the age of 15 is also of interest. In fact, the indicator proposed at Zaragoza is the ‘share of immigrant students achieving Level 1 or lower in reading and mathematics’. This proportion is not available for mathematics, but Figure 3.2 shows proportions of first-generation immigrant students and native Irish students at each of the six reading proficiency levels in PISA 2009.

The chart ranges from Level 1 (problems with reading) to Level 6 (highly skilled readers). Level 2 is typically considered a baseline level of proficiency, at which students begin to demonstrate reading competencies that will enable them to perform effectively in life (OECD, 2010b). Thus, Level 1 identifies students below this baseline of reading proficiency. Figure 3.1 shows that 31 per cent of first-generation immigrant students achieved Level 1 reading proficiency compared with 15 per cent of Irish students. Evidence from the mean scores in Table 3.3, and further evidence from the 2011 Integration Monitor, suggests that this proportion is likely to be higher for first-generation immigrant students who do not speak English at home. Note that students’ ability in reading was the focus of the PISA 2009 analysis, although students who are struggling with reading are likely to have difficulties in other subjects where proficiency in English is required, as well as subsequent difficulties in the labour market.

Table 3.3 Mean reading and mathematics scores in PISA 2009 by immigrant/language status, 15 year olds in Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reading score</th>
<th>Mathematics score</th>
<th>% of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>501.9</td>
<td>491.7</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant with English or Irish</td>
<td>499.7</td>
<td>485.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant with other language</td>
<td>442.7</td>
<td>457.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bold indicates significantly different score from Irish natives.
Sources: Perkins et al. (2010), reading scores extracted from Table 4.4; Shiel et al. (2010), mathematics scores from Table 4.
Chapter 3 - Education and Integration

The OECD (2010a) also generates reading proficiency scores for first-generation immigrants by age of arrival, distinguishing students as to whether they arrived in the country at 5 years of age or younger; between 6 and 12 years; or 12 years and older. The survey focuses on students aged 15 and measures how long they have been in the host country. In Ireland, first-generation immigrant students who arrived at age 5 or under do not differ significantly in average reading score from those who arrived between 6 and 12 years of age, but those who arrived at 12 years or older performed significantly worse on average (OECD, 2010a). This is not surprising, given the role of language in reading proficiency. Students from non-English-speaking countries benefit from more time in Ireland in acquiring English language reading skills.

3.3 Summary of Findings on Educational Attainment

The majority of non-Irish nationals have achieved their educational qualifications outside Ireland. Comparing the whole adult population, non-Irish nationals have considerably higher qualifications than Irish nationals (Table 3.1). However, this is partly a function of the age profile of both groups – non-Irish nationals tend to be young, and older Irish people tend to have lower educational qualifications than younger people. Comparing the proportions of tertiary education in the 25–34 age group (Figure 3.1), we find the proportion of non-Irish nationals with tertiary education is still somewhat higher than that for Irish nationals, but the gap is much smaller. Non-Irish national groups vary considerably in their educational attainment, with EU12 nationals having the lower proportion with third-level education, and both EU13 and non-EU nationals having the highest rates of third-level education, among the working-age population and particularly among 25 to 34 year olds. Table 3.2 shows that 10.5 per cent of Irish nationals aged 20 to 24 were early school leavers, compared with 17 per cent of non-Irish nationals; the rate of early school leavers is particularly high among EU12 nationals (almost 23 per cent).

Figure 3.2 Students at each reading proficiency level in PISA 2009, 15 year olds in Ireland

![Figure 3.2](https://example.com/figure32.png)


Section 3.2 considers the achievement of non-Irish children in Irish schools. While their parents may be more highly educated overall, mean test scores of 15 year olds suggest that children from non-English-speaking backgrounds are performing worse in reading and mathematics vis-à-vis their Irish peers, particularly in reading. Immigrants from English-speaking backgrounds perform similarly to their Irish peers. In terms of students who are struggling with English reading, the proportion with a very low proficiency of reading (Level 1) is much higher among first-generation immigrant students than among Irish students. There is some evidence to suggest that, at least in the PISA study, students who have resided in Ireland longer score higher in reading (although still worse than Irish students) than those who have recently arrived. Whether these patterns of achievement are replicated in the next wave of PISA will be an interesting question for the 2013 Integration Monitor.
Chapter 3 - Education and Integration

Box 3.1 Access to Education

The Irish education system is made up of primary, second-level, third-level and further education. State-funded education is available to Irish citizens at all levels and to non-Irish citizens at primary and second levels, or until they are aged 18. The situation of access to tertiary education is different. First, asylum seekers are not entitled to free third-level (university or college) education, and the children of international students are generally not allowed to access state-funded education. Second, while the majority of non-Irish nationals may access third-level and further education, most must pay fees to do so. Non-EU nationals often pay a substantially higher rate, which may be prohibitive for many. Information on grants and financial assistance is often complicated for both applicants and grant-awarding authorities, leading to confusion on eligibility (Darmody et al., 2012; The Integration Centre, 2012b). A new centralised application process was introduced for grant applications for the academic year 2012/13 to ensure the harmonisation of criteria across the country.

Within the Irish primary and secondary school system, schools are largely privately owned and controlled by patron bodies and for the most part publicly funded through the Department of Education and Skills. Over 90 per cent of primary schools are under the patronage of the Catholic Church. The remainder are generally under the patronage of the Church of Ireland, other religions, Community National Schools or ‘Educate Together’ (an organisation administering a growing number of multidenominational schools). Around 50 per cent of secondary schools are under Catholic Church patronage, with a significant minority under state patronage through the VEC (vocational education committee) sector.

The Report of the Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector was published in April 2012. The report recommended that where there is a cluster of denominational schools and parental demand for different school patronage, the transfer of patronage should be achieved with assistance from the Department of Education and Skills. The advisory group cautioned against a ‘big bang’ approach and advised that a change of patronage should happen in a phased way, through the adoption of a catchment area approach, taking account of the preferences of parents (Coolahan et al., 2012). In June 2012 an action plan was launched in response to this report, including new criteria and arrangements for the recognition of new schools and the establishment of an independent advisory group on the patronage of the new schools (Department of Education and Skills, 2012). To date there have been two surveys of parental preferences in primary schools and the results show a demand for a change in patronage in 23 out of 38 areas. At second level, the Minister for Education and Skills awarded the patronage of 14 post-primary schools in July 2012. One of these schools will be the first second-level school in Ireland to have Educate Together as a school patron.

In June 2011 the Minister for Education and Skills launched a discussion paper on school enrolment (see 2011 Integration Monitor). The ‘Discussion Paper on a Regulatory Framework for School Enrolment’ contains suggestions on how to make the process of enrolling in schools more open, equitable and consistent. The paper sought to lead and provoke debate on enrolment policies and practices, and feedback from the subsequent consultation would help inform the nature and scope of a new regulatory framework for school enrolment. The Minister

Continued overleaf

73. See www.education.ie for information on the education system in Ireland; www.inis.gov.ie for information on immigration requirements; and www.citizensinformation.ie for more general information.

74. For further details, see 2010 Integration Monitor.

75. EU students may be eligible for free tuition fees for third level once they meet the criteria of the free fees scheme. Certain non-EU nationals, such as people with protection status, including refugees, may also be eligible under the scheme.

76. The extent of state funding is more diverse at secondary than at primary level.


79. Other successful patrons include one of a Catholic ethos, one with a Church of Ireland ethos, VECs and Gaelcholáistí (Irish-medium secondary schools). See www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2012-Press-Releases/PR12-07-25.htm#hash=VzcOKE8i.dpx.
Chapter 3 - Education and Integration

intends to bring forward legislative proposals in 2013 to reform school enrolment, the primary aim of which will be to ensure that every child is treated fairly and that every child has a place at school.80

Supports for immigrants in schools

The Intercultural Education Strategy was launched in September 2010 and is relevant to all levels of education, from pre-school to higher education (Department of Education and Skills, 2010a).81 Among the specific resources devoted to the strategy (academic year 2011/12) was €69 million for ‘English as an additional language’ (EAL) in schools.82 This compares with circa €85 million in the academic year 2010/11.83 The Intercultural Education Strategy states that a number of bodies will monitor its effectiveness, but, without specific targets, it is not entirely clear how the progress will be assessed.

A key support for migrant children in Irish schools is the provision of English language tuition for those who do not speak English as their first language. Most of this support is delivered through specialised EAL teachers, on the basis of the number of students who need support. The system of allocation of language support was reformed in 2012. The reforms to the allocation system for the 2012/13 school year involved combining resources available for special needs education and language support into a single allocation process, with schools having autonomy on how to deploy resources between language and learning support.84 The new arrangements also provide for additional permanent teaching posts to be given to schools with higher concentrations of pupils requiring language support. It is not clear how this will impact overall funding for English language tuition. What is clear is that it will no longer be possible to distinguish EAL spending from learning support, thus monitoring spending on English language tuition in schools will no longer be possible. This will be a problem for the 2013 Integration Monitor. It is also an issue for monitoring the Intercultural Education Strategy, given that spending on EAL is a large part of spending on this strategy. Other supports for migrant children include the distribution of language assessment kits to primary and post-primary schools, in-service provision for language support teachers, and a booklet on intercultural education in both primary and post-primary schools.85 Migrant children can benefit from existing supports in schools on the same basis as other children, for example pastoral care, guidance counselling, learning support and resource teachers (Smyth et al., 2009).

English language provision for adults

VECs provide a substantial number of English courses through a variety of programmes funded by the Department of Education and Skills (exact spending figures were not available). English as a second language (ESOL) is provided by the VECs as part of the adult literacy services. In 2011 over 11,000 participants availed of tuition free of charge.86 VECs also provide English language tuition under the Back to Education Initiative. In 2011 almost 1,500 participants availed of this. At the end of 2012 state funding for the Adult Refugee Programme ceased, although refugees can avail of mainstream provision. This programme offered integration courses to recognised refugees (see Table 1.2 for further details). Annual funding from the Department of Education and Skills was in the region of €2.5 million.

Another programme providing English classes to migrants is the Fáilte Isteach project, run by Third Age Foundation, which involves older people volunteering their time to teach conversational English to new migrants. Fáilte Isteach, which receives some financial support from OPMI, offers a service to over 1,000 migrant students every week.87

81. A regularly updated comprehensive website on accessing intercultural materials has also been developed, see www.education.ie.
82. Based on the equivalent of 924 full-time teaching posts at primary level, costing €55.4 million and 209 at secondary level costing €13.4 million. Figures supplied by the Department of Education and Skills.
83. Assuming needs (i.e. the number of pupils who require English language tuition) remained constant, this represents a fall in funding of around 19 per cent since the previous academic year.
85. See www.ncca.ie/uploadedfiles/Publications/Intercultural.pdf.
86. Information supplied by the Department of Education and Skills. Total funding for adult literacy in 2011 was circa €27 million, based on over 50,000 participants. It is not possible to estimate spending on English language based on the number of participants, given that courses vary in length and intensity.
87. See www.thirdageireland.ie/what-we-do/15/failte-isteach/.
Chapter 4 Social Inclusion and Integration

This chapter examines social inclusion, comparing indicators of income, poverty and deprivation, health and home ownership. Social inclusion is understood as the ability of an individual to participate fully in society. Income, particularly low levels of income, is commonly used as an indicator of an ability or inability to participate in society, as is material deprivation. Health is strongly related to quality of life, and health problems may limit participation in society and social integration. For migrants, home ownership is sometimes seen as a measure of long-term integration and an intention to stay in the receiving country.

Most of these indicators come from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).88 The EU-SILC is the survey used by the CSO to provide annual estimates of household income and poverty in Ireland, and is indeed the only ongoing survey data that can be used to accurately estimate income, poverty and deprivation for non-Irish nationals living in Ireland. An advantage of this survey is that it is harmonised across Europe and therefore is a useful source of comparative data on these indicators. A disadvantage for monitoring integration is that, while it is an excellent survey of income and living conditions, the survey was not designed specifically to reach, record details of and represent non-Irish nationals.

In the 2010 Integration Monitor we discussed the extent to which the 2008 EU-SILC sample under-represents migrants. The sampling frame was changed for the 2009 and subsequent surveys and the 2009 sample does not under-represent migrants to the same extent as the 2008 sample (see 2011 Integration Monitor). In any case, given concerns about the sample size, for all the indicators in this chapter we ran statistical tests to provide a robust test of the differences between non-Irish nationals and Irish nationals.89 The number of cases in the sample is also indicated in each table.

The overall proportion ‘at risk of poverty’ and the deprivation rate rose in Ireland between 2009 and 2010, in the context of the economic recession (CSO, 2013b). This chapter examines whether the same is true for non-Irish nationals and whether particular national groups differ in their experience. Note that the latest available EU-SILC data are from 2010, relating to the 12 months prior to the interview, while the labour market indicators reported in Chapter 2 are from 2012. Section 4.1 presents income and poverty measures by nationality. Section 4.2 considers health status, and Section 4.3 home ownership. Section 4.4 describes recent research on the experience of discrimination in Ireland. The conclusion summarises and reflects on data needs in the area. Box 4.1 describes access to social services.

### 4.1 Income and Poverty

#### 4.1.1 Household Income

This chapter applies the same method of estimating income poverty as the CSO. Following this method, the estimates pool all income in each household in the 12 months prior to the date of interview, from each person and from various sources (e.g. employment, social transfers, interest on savings), and then assign this aggregated household income to each individual. This means that all members of the same household are treated as having the same standard of living. The individuals are from the whole population, including children, and adults aged over 65. What this Integration Monitor adds to the CSO analysis is the estimates of the median income for Irish nationals and non-Irish nationals, and then by national group according to the nationality reported by the individual.89 The median income or income midpoint is the value of income that divides the sample in half once it has been sorted into increasing order.89 The estimates for median disposable household income by nationality group, the first Zaragoza indicator in this chapter, are presented in Table 4.1.

Different households have different needs, depending on the number of adults and children living in them, so household income is routinely adjusted to take account of this variation. This adjustment is called an equivalence scale. Here the national equivalence scale is adopted, which assigns a value of 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for any additional household members aged 14 and over and 0.33 for any children under 14. The disposable household income is divided by the equivalence scale value to calculate the equivalised income for each individual. This is the standard CSO adjustment for measuring poverty in Ireland and has been adopted in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) poverty measure.82 Estimates of the median equivalised income for Irish and non-Irish nationals and for different national groups are presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 clearly shows that the median disposable household income for Irish nationals, at €42,252 per year, is higher in 2010 than that for non-Irish nationals (€37,642). In fact median disposable household income for non-Irish nationals is almost 90 per cent of that of Irish nationals, which is very similar to the proportion reported in the 2011 Integration Monitor, although disposable income has fallen for the whole population. The overall figure for non-Irish nationals hides considerable variation within this group. The median household income for the EU13 nationals is actually higher than the Irish level of median

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88. For a detailed description of the EU-SILC, see CSO (2013b).

89. Nationality is defined by the individual in response to the question ‘Are you an Irish citizen?’; then, if the response is no, ‘What is your nationality?’ See Section 1.1.3 on the use of nationality and its strengths and limitations.

90. Note that individuals in multinational houses may have the same income but be assigned to a different national group in the table. An alternative would be to assign all individuals to the nationality of the household head, but this would under-represent some nationalities.

91. The median income is not as sensitive to outliers (very high and very low incomes), which is why it is presented instead of the mean income.

92. See www.socialinclusion.ie/poverty.html for further details.
income. The median disposable income for the non-EU group is very similar to that for Irish nationals. Both the UK group and the EU12 group have significantly lower median income than the Irish nationals: the lowest median disposable income is for the EU12 group.

After adjusting income for the needs of the household, the median equivalised income for non-Irish nationals is still significantly lower than for Irish nationals. As was the case for disposable income, EU13 median equivalised income is higher than that for Irish nationals, and this difference is significant: EU12 and UK median equivalised income is also lower than for Irish nationals. For the non-EU group, the needs-adjusted income is again similar to that of Irish nationals.

Comparing 2009 and 2010 data, there has been a noticeable decline in median incomes for all the groups. In 2009 the median needs-adjusted income for EU12 nationals did not differ from that of Irish nationals. However, in 2010, median needs-adjusted incomes are significantly lower among UK nationals and EU12 nationals, compared with Irish nationals. The group that really differs is the EU13 group, which now has a higher median needs-adjusted income than the Irish group.

4.1.2 Poverty Rates

We now shift focus from median income to those at the bottom of the income distribution. The two recommended indicators are the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and the consistent poverty rate. The ‘at risk of poverty’ measure is the official poverty indicator used by the Irish Government, as well as at EU level. The poverty threshold that identifies the population ‘at risk of poverty’ is set at 60 per cent of median equivalised income. This is a relative income poverty measure, as the threshold is set as a proportion of all the incomes in the sample. The threshold changes each year, depending on incomes: for 2010 this was €11,155 per year (CSO, 2013b), which is lower than in 2009 as the median equivalised income has fallen (see Section 4.1.1). Table 4.2 presents the proportion of different national groups whose income falls below this threshold.

Researchers on social inclusion have argued that income poverty measures alone can provide a misleading picture about families and individuals most seriously affected by lack of income (Whelan et al., 2003). In response to this, results from a measure of deprivation are also presented (measuring the enforced lack of items such as food, clothing and heat, as well as being unable to participate in family and social life). Individuals count as deprived if their household lacks two or more of the 11 items measured. Proportions deprived for different national groups are presented in Table 4.2.

The deprivation index has been incorporated into the NAPS to supplement the income poverty measure. Combining income poverty and this deprivation measure gives a measure of consistent poverty. Those individuals in consistent poverty are defined as those who are (1) ‘at risk of poverty’ and (2) living in households with an enforced lack of two or more of these basic items. Table 4.2 also presents estimates of consistent poverty.

Table 4.2 shows that the overall ‘at risk of poverty’ rate is 14.7 per cent of the total population in 2010, as estimated by the CSO (2013b). The

---

93. Median equivalised income is presented here. We estimate the same mean equivalised income per individual as the CSO, €22,138 (CSO, 2013b).

94. Note that the Irish ‘at risk of poverty’ measure uses a different definition of household income and a different equivalence scale from used by Eurostat.

95. The deprivation index comprises 11 basic items: unable to afford two pairs of strong shoes; unable to afford a warm waterproof overcoat; unable to afford new (not second-hand) clothes; unable to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish (vegetarian equivalent) every second day; unable to afford a roast joint or its equivalent once a week; going without heating at some stage in the last year through lack of money; unable to afford to keep the home adequately warm; unable to afford to buy presents for family or friends at least once a year; unable to afford to replace any worn-out furniture; unable to afford to have family or friends for a drink or meal once a month; unable to afford a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment (see Watson et al., 2012).
The differences between the Irish ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and the rates for UK, EU13 or EU12 nationals are not statistically significant. It should be noted that the groups are too small to allow us to be confident about these differences. The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate for the non-EU group, at 22.5 per cent, is high, and is significantly higher than that of Irish nationals.

Turning to deprivation and consistent poverty, which are more enduring measures of social exclusion due to lack of resources, Table 4.2 shows that 22.6 per cent of the population in 2010 were deprived, in the sense of lacking two or more basic items (described above). A markedly higher proportion of non-Irish nationals are deprived (31 per cent), and this is significantly different from the deprivation rate for Irish nationals (21.8 per cent). There is variation in deprivation rates between national groups: a lower proportion of EU13 nationals are deprived (11.8 per cent) than Irish nationals. In contrast, much higher proportions of UK, EU12 and non-EU nationals are deprived than the Irish group. Further investigation reveals that, as with Irish nationals, the most commonly reported indicators for deprivation are: ‘unable to afford to replace any worn-out furniture’ and ‘unable to afford a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment’. People experiencing financial difficulties cut down on these items before they cut down on heating and food.

Table 4.2 shows that the proportion of the population who are consistently poor, i.e. both ‘at risk of poverty’ and deprived, was 6.3 per cent in 2010 (see also CSO, 2013b). The rate of consistent poverty for non-Irish nationals (7.8 per cent) is higher than for Irish nationals (6.1 per cent), and this difference is statistically significant. As noted above, consistent poverty, which includes deprivation, is a more durable measure of command over resources, and does not fluctuate as much as income poverty (Whelan et al., 2003).

While relatively high proportions of UK and EU12 nationals were deprived in 2010, rates of consistent poverty, combining both income poverty and deprivation, are not significantly higher than for the Irish group. This is partly because income poverty rates are not significantly higher than for Irish nationals, but also implies that the overlap between poverty and deprivation is not so great, in particular that many deprived UK and EU12 nationals are not ‘at risk of income poverty’. Note that consistent poverty was not significantly higher for UK and EU12 nationals than it was for Irish nationals in 2009 either, as reported in the 2011 Integration Monitor. See Table 4.3 for a comparison of 2009 and 2010 figures on consistent poverty.

Table 4.2 ‘At risk of poverty’, deprivation and consistent poverty rates 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At risk of poverty (under the 60 median poverty line) (%)</th>
<th>Deprivation (enforced lack of 2 or more items) (%)</th>
<th>Consistent poverty (at risk + deprived) (%)</th>
<th>No. of individuals (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>n.s. 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>n.s. 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>n.s. 366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>* 334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11,587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at (p<=0.05); n.s. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant in this sample.

Sources: Own calculations from the 2010 EU-SILC, weighted.

Rate is higher for non-Irish nationals (16.4 per cent) than it is for Irish nationals (14.5 per cent) and the difference is significant. The OECD (2012b) found that in all OECD countries for which data are presented, the immigrant poverty rate is higher than that of the native-born population. By international standards, the gap between the immigrant and native income poverty rate in 2010 in Ireland is lower than average, although there are considerable differences between OECD countries in the composition of their non-native populations.96

Notes:
96. This is also based on a slightly different poverty threshold and method of assigning nationality.
97. UK nationals also showed high rates of deprivation in 2009 (see 2011 Integration Monitor).
The story is different for the non-EU group. Consistent poverty was higher for this group in 2010 (12.4 per cent), and is significantly different from the Irish sample. This finding tells us that a higher proportion of this group are both deprived and income poor. This finding was also reported in the 2011 Integration Monitor, using the 2009 EU-SILC data, but the proportion experiencing consistent poverty has risen since then. The higher rate of consistent poverty for this group is likely to be related to a greater proportion of students, and those on home duties, resulting in a lower labour market participation rate in 2010 (see 2011 Integration Monitor). There are also more likely to be children living in non-EU households (just over 80 per cent of non-EU nationals live in households with at least one child under 18, compared with 57 per cent of Irish nationals).98 Watson et al. (2012) note that households with children are particularly vulnerable to poverty and deprivation in the current recession. It should be remembered that the non-EU group is diverse, comprising many nationalities, and there is certainly variation within the group, as their median disposable and equivalised income is not very different from that of Irish nationals (Table 4.1).99

4.4 Health Status

This section compares health status between Irish and non-Irish nationals. The analysis is based on a self-assessed measure of health status – ‘How good is your health in general?’ with five possible responses ranging from very good to poor – which is frequently used in research in the area and has been found to be a good predictor of mortality and use of health care (Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001). However, individuals from different socio-economic groups may vary in how they assess their health, as may those from different parts of the world (see Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004).

In Table 4.4 ‘very good or good health’ refers to the share of the population perceiving their health status as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, and is a key Zaragoza indicator. Around four-fifths (82.6 per cent) of the population reported their health to be very good or good, non-Irish nationals (89.7 per cent) recorded significantly better health than Irish nationals. This was also the case using the 2008 and 2009 data (2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors).

UK nationals living in Ireland are, once again, an exception to the general pattern of better health among non-Irish nationals: the self-assessed health of UK nationals was not significantly different from Irish nationals in 2010 (see Table 4.4). These group differences are very similar to those found in previous analyses using EU-SILC data (2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors), and in the 2007 Survey of Lifestyle, Attitudes and Nutrition (SLAN) (Nolan, 2012). One factor that is likely to be linked to better self-reported health among non-Irish nationals is age. With the exception of the UK nationals, non-Irish nationals tend to be considerably younger than Irish nationals (see Table 4.4). Another explanation is the ‘healthy immigrant’ effect, based on findings from Canada and the USA, where the health of immigrants, particularly recent immigrants, is better than comparable native-born individuals (Nolan, 2012). Most non-Irish nationals, with the exception of UK nationals, are recent immigrants. It will be interesting to see if this pattern remains if these non-Irish nationals stay in Ireland longer. Nolan (2012) highlights that the effect of immigrant status in her study is relatively small: age, gender, education and household income play a much greater role in determining health outcomes than country of origin. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this Integration Monitor.

98. Note household structure is also related to age. Of Irish nationals under 50 years of age, around 75 per cent live in households with at least one child under 18.
99. People seeking protection living in direct provision are excluded from this survey. While it would be difficult to include the group in measures of income poverty (as their income takes the form of an allowance, and food and accommodation are provided directly), it seems reasonable to assume that if they were included with non-EU nationals the income poverty rate of this group would be somewhat higher, even though those seeking protection only made up about 5 per cent of non-EU nationals at this time.
On average across OECD countries, 70 per cent of immigrants reported having good health or better in 2009 (OECD, 2012b). The report argues that in Ireland, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the fact that immigrants tend to be healthier than their native-born counterparts may reflect the fact that recent migrants, who tend to be younger on average than the rest of the population, represent a large proportion of the immigrant stock.

### 4.3 Home Ownership

The share of migrants owning their home is one of the indicators of integration proposed at Zaragoza. This section presents variation in home ownership by national groups. House prices in Ireland grew very rapidly during the economic boom (Fahey and Duffy, 2007): the average price of a new house in Ireland was just under €72,000 in 1994 and €332,000 in 2007, an increase by a factor of 4.7.100 Late 2006/early 2007 saw house prices peak, before falling rapidly as the market collapsed. By Q2 2010, during the time of the 2010 EU-SILC, the average price for a new house in Ireland was €227,000 (Department of the Environment and Local Government, 2010).

Table 4.5 presents home ownership rates for private households in 2010. Home owners include both those who own their home completely and those who own their house with a mortgage. Other types of tenancy include private rented, voluntary or local authority housing. Following convention, home ownership rates are presented at household level, with nationality being assigned on the basis of the person who answered the household questionnaire.101 Because of the small number of households, figures for the EU13 group are not shown.

Table 4.5 shows very substantial differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals in terms of home ownership: 77.9 per cent of Irish household respondents owned their homes in 2010, compared with 28 per cent of non-Irish household respondents – this difference is statistically significant. There is considerable variation in home ownership across national groups. While UK household respondents were more likely to own their own house than other non-Irish household respondents, the proportion (62.8 per cent) is still significantly lower than for Irish household respondents. The lowest rate of home ownership in 2010 was among EU12 nationals (3.3 per cent). The pattern of group differences in home ownership is broadly similar to that observed in the 2011 Integration Monitor using 2009 EU-SILC data.

These figures from EU-SILC are broadly in line with those from the 2011 Census, which shows that approximately 77 per cent of Irish nationals and around 28 per cent of non-Irish nationals owned their homes in 2011 (CSO, 2012b, Table 9). Approximately 60 per cent of UK nationals, 5 per cent of EU12 nationals, 16 per cent of African nationals and 20 per cent of Asian nationals owned their homes (CSO, 2012b). These rates are somewhat lower than in the 2006 Census (see 2010 Integration Monitor), where 80 per cent of Irish nationals and 33 per cent of non-Irish nationals owned their homes. The difference is likely to be related to the Irish housing market and economic recession, and also the composition of the non-Irish groups.

From a comparative perspective, the OECD (2012b) noted that large differences between immigrant and native-born populations in tenure status are found in Ireland, Finland, Greece and Italy – reflecting the fact that recent immigrants represent a relatively large part of the immigrant stock. In

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101. We assume there to be negligible differences between the nationality of the household head and the person who answered the household questionnaire, whom we call ‘household respondent’ in the discussion.
Germany the percentage of owners among the native-born is low and differences with immigrants are relatively small.

Previous Integration Monitors discussed possible explanations for lower home ownership among non-Irish nationals. Relevant factors include: preferences for rental property – home ownership rates among immigrants may reflect home ownership rates in the immigrants’ country of origin; and high property prices in Ireland, making home ownership access even more difficult. Socio-demographic factors are also important. These figures compare relatively young non-Irish households with older Irish households (see also Section 4.2). A greater proportion of non-Irish nationals are also single. Given that younger and single people are less likely to own their houses than coupled household heads aged over 50, this may partly explain the differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals.

Some individuals may view their stay in Ireland as temporary, and may not want to make a long-term commitment such as buying a house. Evidence from the Getting On: Migration to Integration study suggests that EU nationals and students are more likely to view their stay as temporary than others because of, for example, their gender, family status, age, disability, ethnicity/nationality (Bond et al., 2010; OECD, 2012b). Measuring discrimination is challenging, and surveys of the experience of discrimination form a different kind of evidence to objective measures of disadvantage such as poverty and home ownership, but are nonetheless useful indicators. There is a growing body of research analysing the experience of discrimination of Irish and non-Irish nationals (Bond et al., 2010), including two recently published reports that are relevant to migrants (McGinnity et al., 2012; Kingston et al., 2013). The surveys used in these Irish reports followed best practice to minimise bias: questions were limited to specific contexts and referred to a particular time period.

### The Experience of Discrimination

One possible source of persistent disadvantage for immigrants and minority ethnic groups is discrimination. Discrimination takes place when one person or group of persons is treated less favourably than others because of, for example, their gender, family status, age, disability, ethnicity/nationality (Bond et al., 2010; OECD, 2012b). While one might expect home ownership rates to rise as non-Irish nationals stay in Ireland longer, constraints on mortgage lending since the banking crisis have made it more difficult to secure a loan in Ireland, and this may be particularly true for migrants. The NCCRI (2008) found that the requirement to demonstrate credit and employment history poses greater difficulty for immigrant mortgage applicants. Affordability constraints may also play a greater role in a recession. If some groups of immigrants have higher levels of unemployment, job/ income insecurity and poverty, they may not be/feel able to afford expensive homes in Ireland. To the extent that migrants view their stay in Ireland as temporary or are unsure how long they will stay, they may not wish to purchase a house in a falling market.

### Table 4.5 Home ownership by households 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home owners (%)</th>
<th>No. of households (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates statistically significant differences. EU13 estimates are not presented as the number of households (35) is too small. The questions on home ownership were answered by the person who answered the household questionnaire, and that respondent’s nationality is used.

Sources: Own calculations from the 2010 EU-SILC, weighted.

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The Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) first included a special module on Equality in 2004, and a follow-up module was conducted in 2010, repeating the questions on a large, representative sample of the population. The surveys asked individuals whether they had experienced discrimination in a number of social situations over the previous two years. In their analysis of the overall experience of discrimination in Ireland using the 2010 module, McGinnity et al. (2012) found that people of Black ethnicity are almost four times more likely to report experiencing discrimination than White Irish people and over five times more likely than White Irish people to report experiencing serious
discrimination, even after controlling for a range of other factors. Higher reported discrimination among the Black ethnic group occurred across a whole range of situations, including shops, pubs, housing and transport, and had risen since 2004.

In further analysis of the 2010 Equality module, Kingston et al. (2013) examined ethnicity and nationality, focusing specifically on the Irish labour market. The authors found that immigrants did not fare as well on average as nationals in the Irish labour market in 2010, with the results varying according to nationality and ethnicity. The research shows that Black African, Ethnic Minority EU and EU12 groups fare worse than other national-ethnic groups in terms of both objective labour market outcomes (e.g. employment and unemployment) and in their experience of discrimination. The results revealed that all national-ethnic groups, apart from White UK and White EU13 individuals, reported substantially higher rates of discrimination in the workplace than the White Irish group. The study also found that migrants who arrived in Ireland during the recession (i.e. in or after 2008) were found to be more likely to report experiencing discrimination when looking for work than those who had arrived during the boom.

Evidence on the experience of discrimination is difficult to compare cross-nationally, mainly because many European countries do not conduct large-scale surveys of this nature. The European Social Survey (ESS) asks respondents if they consider themselves members of a minority group that is discriminated against, although this is a slightly ambiguous measure because it blurs the boundaries between individual experience and general perceptions of discrimination (OECD, 2012b). Evidence from the ESS shows that, across European OECD countries, immigrants from Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, are more likely to report such discrimination than immigrants from other countries (OECD, 2012b). This outcome is consistent with Irish findings on the experience of discrimination. On this measure of the share of immigrants who consider themselves members of a minority group that is discriminated against, although this is a slightly ambiguous measure because it blurs the boundaries between individual experience and general perceptions of discrimination (OECD, 2012b).

Another Europe-wide survey, the Eurobarometer, carried out a special survey in 2009 and 2012 investigating attitudes and perceptions of Europeans towards discrimination, based on different grounds: gender, ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, age, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity. In terms of discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, across the EU, 56 per cent of respondents said they perceived widespread discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin; 37 per cent felt such discrimination was rare. In Ireland, 35 per cent perceived widespread discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin; 51 per cent felt such discrimination was rare.

### 4.5 Summary of Inclusion Indicators

In 2010 non-Irish nationals as a whole had a lower median disposable household income and lower median needs-adjusted income. The ‘at risk of poverty rate’ was somewhat higher for non-Irish nationals than for Irish nationals. The rates of deprivation and consistent poverty were higher for non-Irish nationals, and here the gap was greater than for income poverty.

Two groups differed from this general pattern. EU13 nationals had higher median incomes and lower income poverty and deprivation rates than Irish nationals. In contrast, the consistent poverty rate was quite high among the non-EU group and significantly different from the Irish rate.

Comparing 2009 and 2010, differences in disposable incomes between Irish and non-Irish remained similar, yet the gap between the median equivalised income of Irish and non-Irish was slightly larger in 2010 than in 2009, and poverty rates had changed. In 2009 the ‘at risk of poverty rate’ did not differ between Irish and non-Irish nationals, whereas the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate is somewhat higher for non-Irish than Irish nationals in 2010. Deprivation and consistent poverty were also higher among Irish and non-Irish nationals in 2010, to a somewhat greater extent than in 2009.

Changes were not so noticeable in health and home ownership. Non-Irish nationals in general continued to report better health outcomes, with the exception of UK nationals, who reported similar health outcomes to Irish nationals. The patterns of self-reported health are very similar to those observed in 2009. Rates of home ownership were much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals. Home ownership in 2010 was particularly low among EU12 nationals, and was also low among non-EU nationals. With home ownership, the gap was similar to that found in 2009 and that reported in Census 2011.

Based on evidence from two reports recently published in Ireland on discrimination, the experience of discrimination in the labour market and services has not risen significantly for most national-ethnic minority groups, but this is not the case for the Black ethnic group. People of Black ethnicity were much more likely to have experienced discrimination in a range of domains in 2010 than in 2004. This finding is consistent with evidence from other European countries on perceptions of discrimination (McGinnity et al., 2012; Kingston et al., 2013).

Measuring income and poverty is an important component of monitoring integration. The EU-SILC is potentially an excellent, cross-national dataset for comparing income and poverty rates among immigrants across Europe. The small sample size is a considerable constraint for monitoring integration. Oversampling immigrants in the EU-SILC data would improve the reliability of the findings and also allow researchers to conduct more in-depth analyses, for example by distinguishing groups of non-EU nationals. Additional resources would need to be invested to fund oversampling but would be extremely useful for monitoring integration.

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104. The share of immigrants from lower income countries who consider themselves members of a group that has been discriminated against is slightly higher than the average for OECD Europe (see OECD, 2012b, Figure 9.1). Rates pool estimates from surveys between 2002 and 2010.
Chapter 4 - Social Inclusion and Integration

Box 4.1 Access to social services

Social welfare

The social welfare system is administered by the Department of Social Protection. It is divided into: social insurance payments, social assistance (or means-tested) payments and universal payments. To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary number of social insurance (PRSI) payments for the scheme in question and must satisfy certain conditions. Social assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social insurance-based payments.

EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in regard to accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of the habitual residence condition (HRC) to social assistance payments and to child benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in, and have a proven close link to, Ireland.

The Department of Social Protection assesses length and continuity of residence in Ireland, length and purpose of any absence from Ireland, nature and pattern of employment, applicant’s main centre of interest and intentions to live in Ireland as it appears from the evidence. The evidence used for each factor depends on the facts of the individual case and the final decision reached is to some extent subjective.

There have been some criticisms of the subjectivity of the decision-making process, for example the Free Legal Advice Centre (FLAC) reports that the HRC does not afford a fair, efficient and effective procedure or remedy (FLAC, 2012). A recent report by an umbrella group of NGOs entitled ‘Person or Number?’ found a variety of unfair and avoidable barriers that immigrants face when they try to access social protection (NGO Coalition, 2012). In light of the report’s findings, the Minister for Social Protection established a Migrant Consultative Forum in October 2012 to examine issues of particular concern to migrant workers.105

A paper on welfare receipt by immigrants shows that in the years preceding the recession, immigrants were less likely to be in receipt of welfare payments (Barrett et al., 2013). The recession, and the consequent job losses among immigrants, gave rise to a possible surge in the numbers of immigrants receiving welfare benefits. While this seemed to happen at the outset of the recession, more recent trends in the numbers receiving payments suggest that the numbers of non-Irish nationals stabilised, even as the number of nationals claiming payments continued to rise.

Health services

In Ireland there is universal access to public health care, although costs may apply, for example for GP services. Medical card holders may access certain public health services free of charge in Ireland. Entitlement to a medical card is means tested regardless of nationality. Asylum applicants living in direct provision are entitled to a medical card. Refugees and those with leave to remain are also entitled to a medical card.

The Health Service Executive’s National Intercultural Health Strategy (HSE, 2007) finished at the end of 2012. The HSE has stated that it is planning to undertake a review of the strategy, and envisages that its outcomes will inform all ongoing work in the area of Intercultural health. This review will fall under the remit of the HSE National Intercultural Health Governance Group (HSE, 2012).

Housing services

Local authorities in Ireland are the main providers of social housing for people who need accommodation and cannot afford to buy their own home. Local authority housing is allocated according to housing need, and rents are based on the ability to pay. Rent supplement is available for those in private rented accommodation who cannot afford to meet their housing costs.

The Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government has reviewed access to social housing for immigrants, and issued revised guidelines in 2012 on access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals.106 Generally speaking, a non-EEA national with at least five years’ reckonable residence and a valid current Stamp, or with any length of reckonable residence and a current valid Stamp extending to potentially permit five years’ residence, is eligible on residence grounds to be considered for social housing support.

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New asylum applicants are housed under the direct provision arrangements, where they receive food, accommodation and a payment of €19.10 plus €9.60 per child per week. There are also asylum and other protection applicants living in private rented accommodation. Asylum applicants may not receive rent supplement.

106. Circular Housing ‘Access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals – including clarification re Stamp 4 holders.’
Chapter 5 Active Citizenship

The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration (CBP) stress the importance of equal access by immigrants to institutions, goods and services, as well as their active participation in the democratic process (see Appendix 1), all of which is facilitated by the acquisition of citizenship of the Member State. Naturalised Irish citizens share the same rights and responsibilities as Irish citizens by birth or descent.

Between 2005 and year-end 2011 almost 35,000 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship. Provisional data indicate that almost 23,800 certificates of naturalisation were issued to non-EEA adults during 2012. The size of the naturalised population has increased particularly rapidly since 2010, due to increased applications as more and more people build up their required residence to apply, as well as improvements in the processing of applications (discussed below). The immigrant population in Ireland has therefore changed significantly since publication of the Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2010 and now comprises a sizeable group of migrants who have committed to making Ireland their long-term home.

Citizenship cannot, of course, be a prerequisite for integration. The provision of a long-term residence status with ‘transparent rules, clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding immigrants’ is of critical importance in creating adequate conditions for access and participation for migrants (CBP). While there have been very significant improvements made to the naturalisation system in Ireland in recent years, little progress has been made on defining a more widely accessible long-term residence status.

Three indicators for the purpose of measuring integration in the active citizenship domain were suggested at the Zaragoza ministerial conference: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This chapter presents the calculation of these indicators based on the best available national data. It should be noted that the citizenship and long-term residence indicators do not allow us to directly compare outcomes between Irish and non-Irish nationals; instead they describe the context and the opportunities for integration.

In order to take account of the speed of change in the policy and practice of naturalisation in Ireland, we have included a new ‘annual naturalisation rate’. We also report the annual share of persons with ‘live’ residence permissions who hold long-term residence. A cumulative share of non-EEA adults who have acquired citizenship provides a longer term view of how the population of Ireland is changing. We also present a gender and age breakdown of those who have acquired citizenship in 2011 and, to give a sense of the countries of origin, we show the top ten nationalities of people who acquired citizenship during the year. The indicators are contextualised with a discussion of policy and administrative practice in the active citizenship domain since the 2011 Integration Monitor was published. Box 5.1 presents details on access to citizenship, Box 5.2 on access to long-term residence and Box 5.3 on access to political participation.

5.1 Citizenship

Ireland was the last EU Member State to move away from a system that granted citizenship to anyone born in the territory. Since 1 January 2005 any child born to non-Irish parents is not automatically entitled to Irish citizenship unless one of the parents was legally resident in Ireland for at least three out of the four years preceding the child’s birth. (Census 2011 showed that there were 25,198 non-Irish nationals usually resident and present in Ireland, who were born in Ireland. Prior to 2005 this group would have automatically become Irish citizens.) There are three main modes for the acquisition of Irish citizenship: acquisition by jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent); acquisition by jus soli (referring to a constitutional entitlement to citizenship now limited to those who have, at the time of birth, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or is entitled to be an Irish citizen); and naturalisation, which is the mode of acquisition that is of particular interest here.

5.1.1 Recent Changes to Naturalisation in Ireland

More than 25,000 citizenship applications were processed to a decision during 2012, compared with 16,000 in 2011 and fewer than 8,000 in 2010. This represents a more than threefold increase in three years (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013a). The increase in applications processed results, in part, from a rise in the number of applications received by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) as more and more people have become eligible to apply: approximately 19,900 valid applications were made during 2012, whereas the number was 18,300 in 2011, and 12,500 in 2010.

Ireland has entered a phase of the migration cycle in which more and more migrants are becoming eligible for naturalisation. The OECD (2012b) reported that the number of naturalisations in the EU hit a new record of 756,000 in 2010. This increase is attributed in part to...
the fact that large numbers of migrants to the UK and Spain in the preceding decade have become eligible for naturalisation. It was noted that in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK in particular, the number of naturalisations has increased substantially.

The processing of naturalisation applications has also improved, resulting in a reduction in the backlog of applications, which had reached 23,000 at the end of 2011. Improvements in the quality of applications received since 2011 have also played a role in the increase. In 2009 almost half of the 25,500 applications for naturalisation were rejected as invalid (on technical issues with the application) and a further 24 per cent were deemed ineligible (the eligibility criteria were not met). The introduction in June 2011 of clearer application forms, available online with an associated online residence checker, has contributed to fewer invalid applications being made. During 2012 OPMI continued to fund the New Communities Partnership to assist migrants to fill in applications for citizenship. This initiative, along with the ongoing support work of other NGOs, has helped to reduce the error rate among applications.

Processing times have fallen, with accelerated procedures put in place for certain types of application. In 2009 an application for naturalisation took approximately two years to process (and could take much longer). In May 2012 the Minister for Justice and Equality reported good progress towards the target six-month processing time for the ‘generality’ of new applications for naturalisation.

Citizenship ceremonies were introduced in 2011 and 38 such events were held in 2012 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013a). These ceremonies have been widely welcomed as an appropriate way of marking a very significant event in the lives of new citizens.

The Minister for Justice and Equality has absolute discretion in deciding whether or not to issue a naturalisation certificate. Applicants are required to be of ‘good character’ and this requirement is not currently defined in legislation. The lack of transparency regarding the good character requirement has led to some applicants being declined citizenship on the basis of very minor offences (Cosgrave, 2011). Concerns regarding the good character requirement have been somewhat mitigated by the fact that the revised application form requires more detailed information to be provided on, for example, criminal convictions (including for traffic offences), criminal charges or indictments and police investigations. New questions on the receipt of social assistance or other state support and the reasons behind such receipt also help to address concerns that applications have been declined to persons with strong reasons for accessing state support (Handoll, 2012).

In January 2012 the Minister for Justice and Equality stated that a key priority for 2012 is completion of work on the development of an English language/civics test for naturalisation applicants (Department of Justice and Equality, 2012c). However, there have been no developments reported in this regard since the 2011 Integration Monitor.

Notwithstanding the recent improvements made to the naturalisation applications system in Ireland, a number of issues remain:

- There is a high cost associated with becoming an Irish citizen by naturalisation. The standard, non-refundable application fee is €175. A further €950 is paid by successful adult applicants (€200 in the case of minors and for widows/widowers of Irish citizens). Certain groups, including refugees and those recognised as stateless persons, are exempt from paying the fee. The fee payable for a citizenship certificate is among the highest in Europe (WALLACE GOODMAN, 2010).

  - No clear obligation exists on the Minister to give reasons when refusing an application for naturalisation, although the issue continues to be debated in the courts (Handoll, 2012).

Becker and Cosgrave (2013) further argue that the Minister’s discretion should be curtailed by way of a right to naturalisation on fulfilment of statutory eligibility criteria, and that some of those criteria could be waived by the Minister on humanitarian or particular vulnerability grounds.

The EU-DO CITIZENSHIP project Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT) has the goal of increasing understanding of how law, implementation and other factors affect citizenship acquisition and how citizenship affects integration processes across Europe. Results indicate that Ireland has relatively favourable laws (such as relatively short periods of residence required, and provision for dual nationality) that are undermined by administrative obstacles (such as the absolute discretion of the Minister, procedural obstacles and high costs).

111. Data derived from the following Parliamentary Question, subsequently updated by INIS: Minister for Justice and Equality, response to parliamentary question, Dáil Éireann, 8 May 2012.
112. See www.newcommunities.ie.
114. The requirement has been interpreted by the High Court to mean that ‘the applicant’s character and conduct must match up to reasonable standards of civic responsibility as gauged by reference to contemporary values’; Hogan J in Hussain v. Minister for Justice [2011] IEHC 171, High Court. Referenced in Handoll, 2012.
115. In the USA, for example, an administrative review process exists with a possible appeal to the US District Court (Cosgrave, 2011).
116. Project funded under the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals and conducted by the Migration Policy Group in partnership with the European University Institute’s EU Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (EUODO). See www.migpolgroup.com/projects_.php?id=60.
117. The ‘Citizenship Law Indicators’ part of the ACIT project (CITLAW) involves the development of 57 indicators to compare specific aspects of citizenship regimes, and the ‘Implementation of Citizenship Procedures Indicators’ (CITIMP) involves the development of 38 citizenship implementation indicators that look at issues such as: how easily applicants can prove they meet the conditions for citizenship; how much discretion authorities have to interpret conditions; how easy it is for authorities to come to a decision; and how strong judicial oversight is of the procedure. Presentation of ACIT results for Ireland by Isaac Hanohan (University College Dublin) and Jasper Dag Tjaden (Migration Policy Group), 16 January 2013.
5.1.2 Citizenship Indicators

At the time of publication of the suggested indicators at Zaragoza it was noted that there was 'currently no unified view among Member States on indicators in the area of active citizenship. Member States' views differ in relation to the different views, goals and regulatory frameworks of integration policies in the respective Member States.'

One suggested indicator was the share of immigrants to have acquired citizenship.

In this Integration Monitor series we take advantage of the most accurate available annual data on the stock of migrants in Ireland: administrative data collected by INIS and the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB). Calculation of this indicator is limited to the population aged 16 and over, of non-EEA origin, because it is this group that is required to register with INIS/GNIB. There are few incentives for EU nationals resident in Ireland to adopt Irish nationality and the naturalisation rates of mobile EU citizens are generally low. However, it is regrettable that non-EEA children cannot be included in the calculation of the indicators. During 2011, 590 citizenship certificates were issued to non-EEA children aged 15 and under.

In this third annual Integration Monitor we report two indicators:

1. An annual rate showing the number who acquired citizenship by naturalisation in the reference year over the number of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ residence permissions. This rate allows for direct year-on-year comparisons to be drawn. It is also aligned to the methodology used by Eurostat (2011) in the pilot study on integration indicators.

2. A cumulative ratio of non-EEA nationals who have ‘ever’ acquired citizenship, expressed as a proportion of the total estimated immigrant population. In order to gain a sense of the overall changes in the population, this ratio takes a long-term perspective and is consistent with the approach used in the 2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors. We estimate the total immigrant population to be the number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who hold ‘live’ residence permissions, plus the number of non-EEA nationals who ‘ever’ acquired Irish citizenship (i.e. from 2005 until reference year).

As Table 5.1 shows, the annual naturalisation rate doubled between 2010 and 2011 from 3.7 per cent to 7.4 per cent, reflecting increased applications as well as the significant improvements made to the processing of naturalisation applications in recent years, as discussed above.

The cumulative indicator provided in Table 5.2 shows that the ratio of the adult immigrant population in Ireland that has acquired citizenship to the estimated adult population of non-EEA origin grew from 12.9 per cent to 21.2 per cent between 2009 and 2011. Such a considerable increase over a short time period is consistent with Ireland’s recent migration history (see Chapter 1). This ratio reflects a rapidly changing immigrant population: greater numbers of immigrants are now eligible to apply for naturalisation, with the result that a large proportion of immigrants have made a strong commitment to Ireland. As in the 2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors the following caveats apply: it is not known how many people acquired citizenship prior to 2005 as reliable records do not exist, and it is not known how many people who acquired citizenship subsequently left Ireland.

### Table 5.1 Annual citizenship indicator (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over): rate of naturalisations to resident non-EEA population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who naturalised in reference year</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4,969</td>
<td>9,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding ‘live’ residence permissions</td>
<td>134,549</td>
<td>133,232</td>
<td>128,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual naturalisation rate</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † provisional data; ‡ excludes 217 cases in respect of which nationality is not readily available; NA data not available.

Sources: INIS, Eurostat.

118. Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies, proposed at the ministerial conference in Zaragoza, Spain (European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, April 2010).
119. Based on data received from INIS.
120. Data received from INIS.
121. Due to these built-in assumptions the figures will always increase.
122. The stock figure used includes certain groups of non-EEA nationals (such as students, intra-company transferees and trainees) whose residence in Ireland does not count as ‘reckonable residence’ when applying for naturalisation. Such groups are included in the estimate because it is a matter of national policy whether their residence counts towards eligibility for naturalisation. To exclude them would conflate the ‘policy outcome’ with ‘policy output’ within the indicator. A similar approach was adopted in the Eurostat (2011) pilot study.
5.1.3 Profile of Naturalised Citizens 2011

Tables 5.3 to 5.5 provide additional information on people who acquired citizenship through naturalisation during 2011. Marginally more males than females acquired citizenship in the period, as shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship during 2011 by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No. who acquired citizenship</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4,691</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4,838</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,529</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS.

Table 5.4 shows that non-EEA nationals in the 16–39 age group who acquired citizenship during 2011 substantially outnumber those in the 40 and older age group.

Table 5.4 Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship during 2011 by age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>No. who acquired citizenship</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16–39</td>
<td>5,908</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,529</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS.

Table 5.5 shows the top ten nationalities of adult non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship by naturalisation in 2011. The top three countries – Philippines, Nigeria and India – accounted for over one-third of all non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship by naturalisation in the year.

Table 5.5 Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship by naturalisation during 2011 by nationality of applicant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>No. who acquired citizenship</th>
<th>% of non-EEA population (aged 16 and over)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese (incl. Hong Kong)</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovan</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,058</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,529</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS.

Table 5.6 supplies available data from Census 2006 on the non-EU population aged 15 and over. Many of the non-EU nationals recorded in Census 2006 left Ireland in the following years, but many of those who remained would have reached sufficient reckonable residence to become eligible to apply for naturalisation in 2011.123 Accordingly, a comparison of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 can inform us about which nationality groups choose to, and succeed in, naturalising. This comparison shows that some nationalities are over-represented among those who naturalised in 2011: Filipinos accounted for almost 17.5 per cent of those who naturalised in 2011: Indians are also slightly over-represented. The Chinese, in contrast, appear to be under-represented among naturalisations, accounting for 4.1 per cent of those naturalised in 2011, but 8.9 per cent of the non-EU population in

123. All other conditions of eligibility would have to be met.
2006. Americans are also under-represented in naturalisation data. The proportion of Nigerians who naturalised in 2011 is broadly reflective of the proportion of this group in the 2006 Census.

Note that there are a range of reasons for such variations, for example national groups may comprise different proportions of students whose residence does not count as reckonable towards a citizenship application. In addition, differences in the sending country’s citizenship laws may have an impact. China, for example, does not recognise dual citizenship whereas the Philippines permits its citizens to hold another country’s citizenship without giving up their Filipino citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>2006 Population</th>
<th>% of Non-EU Population (Aged 15 and Over)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>12,149</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>10,749</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American (USA)</td>
<td>8,940</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>7,976</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>7,298</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian†</td>
<td>6,672</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>4,477</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>4,046</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>3,942</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>3,842</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50,062</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-EU</td>
<td>120,153</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † Romania acceded to the EU in January 2007.
Source: CSO, Census 2006.

In terms of year-on-year changes, almost four times as many nationals of the Philippines naturalised in 2011 as in 2010. This possibly reflects the fact that increased numbers of non-EU nurses moved to Ireland in 2005 and 2006 (Humphries et al., 2008), many of whom would be eligible to apply for naturalisation in 2010 or 2011. The number of Nigerian nationals naturalised in 2011 increased by 30 per cent year-on-year, while the number of Indian nationals more than doubled. As mentioned in the 2011 Integration Monitor, some of the increase in the number of non-EEA nationals who naturalised in 2010 and 2011, as well as the large representation of the Nigerian nationality group, may be as a result of the Irish Born Child Scheme introduced in 2005. Some persons who had permission to remain under IBC/05 on the basis of parentage of an Irish child and who have been resident in Ireland since 2005 should have reached sufficient reckonable residence to apply for naturalisation by 2010, with additional people becoming eligible in 2011.

### Box 5.1 Access to citizenship

#### Citizenship through naturalisation

An application for a certificate of naturalisation is considered under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, as amended. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for Justice and Equality to become an Irish citizen if they are either aged over 18, or are a minor born in Ireland after 1 January 2005. The applicant must ‘be of good character’ and have had a period of one years continuous reckonable residence in Ireland immediately before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence in Ireland amounting to four years. The applicant must intend in good faith to continue to reside in Ireland after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. Applicants are usually required to have been ‘self-supporting’ (i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application). Periods spent in Ireland as an asylum applicant or student are not considered when calculating reckonable residence.

There is no mechanism for challenging a refusal of an application for naturalisation and there is currently no legal obligation to provide reasons for such a refusal. Irish citizenship may be withdrawn no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen (although not if it would make them stateless).

#### Citizenship through birth or descent

The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 provides that only children born to Irish citizen parent(s) automatically become Irish citizens. A child born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 is entitled to Irish citizenship if they have a British parent, or a parent who is entitled to live in Northern Ireland or the Irish State without restriction on their residency. Other foreign national parents of children born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 must prove that they have a genuine link to Ireland (evidenced by being resident legally for at least three out of the previous four years) in order for their child to claim Irish citizenship.

Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.

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124. All other conditions of eligibility would have to be met.
125. If children are born outside Ireland their parent or grandparent must have been born in Ireland for them to qualify automatically for citizenship. See www.inis.gov.ie for further information.
Long-term residence is a secure migration status offered to migrants who have legally and continuously resided in the host country for a requisite period of time, often five years. Typically the status offers migrants more equal treatment with citizens of the host country, without requiring them to adopt the nationality of the country. EU Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents states that the integration of ‘third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion’. Ireland has not opted into Directive 2003/109/EC and in the absence of a statutory scheme an administrative long-term residence is open to employment permit holders and their dependent spouses and scientific researchers only. See Box 5.2 for a description of access to long-term residence in Ireland.

The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010, which included provision for the first Irish statutory long-term residence status, was withdrawn from the legislative process in 2012. It is expected that a revised Bill will be published later in 2013. The Integration Centre (2012b) has called for the existing administrative long-term residence scheme to be made more widely available to immigrant groups other than employment permit holders and for the possibility of permanent residence to be introduced. The EU Long-term Residents Directive provides that participating states must recognise the long-term resident status of all after five years of continuous legal residence. Long-term residents receive a permanent residence permit, which is valid for at least five years and is automatically renewable. Under the Directive, long-term residents can expect the same treatment as citizens with regard to access to, and conditions of, employment, education, welfare benefits, social assistance, etc. Long-term residents also enjoy enhanced protection against expulsion.

The Immigrant Council of Ireland (2013) has criticised the existing Irish administrative scheme as discretionary and poorly defined in terms of rights and entitlements: the impact of temporary departure from the State for example is not clear. Ireland scores poorly on long-term residence in MIPEX 2011 (Huddleston et al., 2011) due to the lack of a generally accessible long-term residence scheme.

### 5.2.1 Long-Term Residence Indicator

The share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence was agreed by the EU Member States as a core indicator of integration outcomes. In this Integration Monitor we report the share of non-EEA nationals with ‘live’ residence permissions in 2010 and 2011 who hold long-term residence.

Table 5.7 shows that the share of non-EEA nationals holding a long-term residence permit among all non-EEA nationals with a residence permission to be in the State has fallen slightly year-on-year from 6.3 per cent to 6 per cent. (This calculation excludes persons granted ‘permission to remain without condition as to time’, see Box 5.2.) The decline may reflect the fact that some former long-term residents were naturalised in the period. Fewer long-term residence permits were issued in 2011 than in 2010 (1,978 and 3,706 respectively). INIS indicated that the decline in the number of long-term residence permits issued partly reflects the fact that certain resources have been redeployed to deal with the backlog of citizenship applications.

### Table 5.7 Long-term residence indicator (non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding long-term residence in reference year</td>
<td>8,367</td>
<td>7,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over with ‘live’ residence permissions in reference year</td>
<td>133,232</td>
<td>128,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over with ‘live’ residence permissions in reference year who hold long-term residence</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat.

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127. Under the terms of the Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts into the measure. Ireland has given an undertaking to opt into measures that do not compromise the Common Travel Area with the UK. See http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_13055_519941744.pdf.

128. In previous Integration Monitors we reported a cumulative rate that in 2011 cannot be sufficiently disaggregated to exclude renewals.

129. Between 2005 and 2009, 7,671 long-term residence permissions were issued. The long-term residency scheme started in 2004 and data do not exist on the number of people granted this status in 2004 (Quinn, 2011).

130. Information received directly from INIS.
Ireland does not yet have a statutory long-term residence status. The current administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in Ireland for a continuous period of five years or more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses) or scientific researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residency scheme is available to those who are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five years’ work, have been made redundant.

The green card as introduced (see Box 2.2) was intended to lead directly to the granting of long-term residence status. Given the delays in enacting the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, the Department of Justice and Equality introduced an interim administrative scheme in August 2010, whereby the holders of green cards for two years, or former green card holders who were granted Stamp 4 for 12 months, may be granted a Stamp 4 permission for a further two years. The Stamp 4 issued entitles the holder to work in Ireland without holding an employment permit. This is subject to the applicant complying with previous immigration and employment permit conditions and being ‘of good character’.

Non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who are of ‘good character’ may be permitted to remain in Ireland ‘without condition as to time’. They receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010). The status is not available to non-EEA nationals without passports. Although they are not eligible for long-term residence, family members of EU nationals may, upon successful application, receive a five-year residency permission.

5.3 Voting and Elected Representatives

Ireland’s political system is generally deemed to be inclusive and to offer favourable conditions for migrant integration. See, for example, MIPEX 2011 (Huddleston et al., 2011). Irish citizenship is required in order to stand or vote in general elections, but all residents in Ireland, regardless of nationality, may stand and vote in local elections. Within the EU, 14 other Member States allow foreign nationals to vote in local elections. Some of these countries impose a residency condition: in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, for example, the residency condition is five years. The UK and Ireland do not impose any such residency condition (Mutwarasibo, 2012). Rules on voting and standing in elections in Ireland are discussed in more detail in Box 5.3.

Despite the relatively favourable conditions for migrants’ access to voting in Ireland, certain concerns exist. Non-EU migrants may vote in Ireland, but many do not register to do so. Reliable national data on registered electors by nationality group do not exist. However, in an analysis of the Dublin City Council register of all eligible voters, Słóvková and McCafferty (2012) found that just 8,068 non-EU nationals in Dublin City were listed on the 2010/11 Register of Electors. Census 2011 showed that 32,659 non-EU nationals aged 18 and over were usually resident and present in Dublin City. This indicates that only approximately 25 per cent of potential non-EU voters had registered to vote. Among EU nationals, almost 6,400 were registered to vote out of a Census population of 39,028, indicating that just one in six of potential EU voters had registered. The approximate proportion of UK nationals resident in Dublin City who had registered to vote was much higher at 74 per cent, or three in four. These findings underline the importance of local-level awareness-raising campaigns (reported on in the 2011 Integration Monitor), such as the ‘Count Us In!’ campaign run by the Immigrant Council of Ireland, the Migrant Voter Education Campaign led by Dublin City Council and the ‘Our Vote Can Make a Difference’ Campaign managed by the New Communities Partnership and the Africa Centre.

In contrast, a recent survey of naturalised citizens found a high degree of political participation. Of those surveyed, 72 per cent (85 out of 118) were on the electoral register. Just over 80 per cent had voted in local elections, 59 per cent in referenda and 54 per cent in general elections. Almost half (49 per cent) stated that they had voted in every possible election, while 27 per cent stated that they had never voted.

The Integration Centre (2012b) and the Immigrant Council of Ireland (2009) have called for long-term residence holders to be granted full voting rights. Almost half of TDs polled in November 2012 on behalf of The Integration Centre believed that immigrants should have voting rights after three years in the country.

5.3.1 Political Participation Indicator

The recommended Zaragoza indicator of integration in this domain is the share of immigrants among elected representatives. As local

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133. In order to apply for long-term residency as a spouse/dependant, the applicant must be legally resident in Ireland as a spouse/dependant for the required five years. Long-term permission does not exempt the spouse/dependant(s) from employment permit requirements.
134. These are: Belgium, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
135. See http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/count-us-in/.
elections last took place in June 2009, the political participation indicator is unchanged from previous Integration Monitors. Four immigrants were elected in the 2009 local elections, originating from Nigeria, Netherlands, Russia and Lithuania. There are 1,627 local authority members in Ireland,138 making the proportion of immigrants elected just 0.2 per cent. A total of 37 migrant candidates stood in the 2009 local elections (including 14 who originally came from Nigeria and eight from Poland), which means that 10 per cent of immigrant candidates were elected. The general election, in which only Irish and UK citizens may vote, last took place in February 2011. Out of 564 candidates nationwide,139 one candidate was originally from Libya, one from Cameroon and two from Nigeria (Mutwarasibo, 2012). All four stood as independent candidates and none were elected.140 In May 2011 Katherine Zappone, formerly a US citizen, was appointed to the Seanad Éireann.

MIPEX 2011 scored Ireland at 100 per cent on electoral rights and political liberties, but more poorly on consultative bodies.141 There is continued uncertainty over the future of the Ministerial Council on Integration, which was established and active for a brief period in 2010. The Integration Centre (2012b) recommends that an expert migrant consultative group should be established to provide advice and to migrant-proof legislation/policies. One recent positive step was the setting up in October 2012 of a Migrant Consultative Forum by the Minister for Social Protection. This forum was established to examine issues related to social welfare that are of particular concern to migrant workers.142 Local-level initiatives continue to be important in increasing migrant political participation. The Crosscare Migrant Project scheme ‘Opening Power to Diversity’, for example, aims to encourage migrant participation in, and understanding of, politics in Ireland by placing migrants to ‘shadow’ TDs or senators over a six-month period. Migrants who are ‘on a path towards citizenship’ or recently naturalised, attend committee meetings and Dáil sessions and assist with constituency work.143

Box 5.3 Access to political participation

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy. The two houses of the Oireachtais (parliament) are Dáil Éireann (the house of representatives) and Seanad Éireann (the Senate). Each of the Dáil’s 166 members is a Teachta Dála (TD) directly elected by the people through general elections. General elections take place at least once every five years; the most recent one was held in February 2011. By-elections are held if a TD (member of parliament) dies or resigns. Only Irish and UK citizens may vote in general elections. UK nationals may do so by virtue of reciprocal voting rights in Ireland and the UK. Only Irish citizens may stand at general elections or vote in referenda. European citizens may vote in European elections if they first de-register in their home Member State.

Local elections are held at maximum five-yearly intervals to elect councillors to local authorities. There are 114 local authorities in Ireland, comprising 29 county councils, 5 city councils, 5 borough councils and 75 town councils. All residents (Irish, EU and non-EU) may vote or stand in local elections. At the end of 2012 the Government published Putting People First, which sets out a plan for rationalisation of the local authority system (Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012). Proposals include: a reduction in the number of local authorities (from 114) to 31 city and county councils with integrated areas called ‘municipal districts’ and a reduction in council seats from 1,627 to no more than 950. The members elected at local level will also represent the district at county level.

In order to vote, an individual’s name must have been entered on the electoral register. The city and county councils compile a register of electors every year. In order to be included in the register a person may have to provide proof of identity.144

140. It is difficult to be definitive on whether candidates in the general election had a migrant background. It depends on whether a candidate wants this to be known or not, as all are Irish or UK citizens. Some candidates may also be second-generation migrants.
143. See www.livinginireland.ie.
144. See www.checktheregister.ie.
5.4 Summary of Findings on Active Citizenship

Since the publication of the *Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2010* the immigrant population in Ireland has changed significantly. Perhaps the most striking change has been in the growing size of the naturalised population. This increase reflects the current migration phase (more and more migrants who were attracted to the country during the economic boom are becoming eligible to apply for naturalisation), as well as significant improvements in the processing of new and backlogged applications.

The provisional 2012 year-end estimate of non-EEA nationals with permission to remain in Ireland is approximately 115,000, representing a 10 per cent drop since 2011. This decline was recently attributed by the Minister for Justice and Equality to continuing efforts to reduce the backlog of citizenship cases (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013a).

Ireland’s immigrant population now comprises a sizeable group of migrants who have committed to making Ireland their long-term or permanent home. The integration of these migrants is facilitated by their naturalised status and the fact that they now share the same rights and responsibilities as Irish citizens by birth or descent. Notwithstanding these positive developments, certain issues regarding access to citizenship remain, including high fees, a lack of administrative appeal and the fact that there is no clear obligation on the Minister for Justice and Equality to give reasons when refusing an application for naturalisation.

The continued absence of a statutory long-term resident status, which is widely accessible to all legal migrants after a certain period of residence, is also a cause for concern. Security of immigration status and associated equality of access are necessary for integration. However, not all migrants may wish to adopt Irish citizenship, and to do so, some migrants may be required to give up citizenship of their country of origin. Arguably, the significance of acquiring Irish citizenship through naturalisation, deemed to be a privilege and an honour, could be compromised by the fact that it remains the only long-term immigration status, accessible to all, with clearly defined rights and entitlements attached. 145 In relation to the political participation of migrants in Ireland, the low percentage of the non-Irish population on the electoral register and standing as election candidates, as well as the continued uncertainty surrounding the future of the Ministerial Council on Integration, are ongoing concerns.

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Chapter 6 Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants? Evidence from the European Social Survey 2002–2010

The increase in immigration has led to considerable change in the composition and population of Ireland. This chapter investigates how attitudes to the population have changed too. Attitudes of the host population to immigrants are an important measure of the context for social integration. From an integration perspective it is important to investigate the various dimensions of economic, public and private life that individuals feel are affected by immigration, as this may affect immigrants’ experience of life and how welcome they feel overall. Immigration is an increasingly important topic in public policy debate, and public attitudes may play a role in influencing the decisions of politicians, policy makers and other decision makers. The scale and pace of immigration in Ireland in the past two decades, following a long history of emigration, raises questions about attitudes of the Irish population to immigration.

Two arguments dominate previous international literature on this topic. One is that the more immigrants come to a country and settle there, the more resistant to immigrants and immigration the host population becomes. The other is that as the economic position deteriorates and unemployment rises, attitudes to immigrants become more resistant. In Ireland in the period 2002–2010 both these factors were at work, albeit with some variation in timing, which makes this a very interesting period in which to examine attitudes. Turner (2010) argued that attitudes to immigrants in Ireland in 2002 were among the most liberal in Europe. This chapter uses the best European data available to ask whether this is still the case.

Measuring attitudes to immigrants and immigration is challenging (Bond et al., 2010). One issue is that some public opinion surveys may record attitudes of a particular group of people, for example young adults living in urban areas, but this may not be broadly representative of the total population. This is an important limitation, as attitudes often vary depending on people’s age, education, nationality, where they live and other characteristics. Even in surveys that are representative of the population, responses to attitudinal questions can be subject to ‘social desirability biases’, where respondents are reluctant to express attitudes or opinions that are seen as undesirable, for example expressing racist attitudes (Al Ramiah et al., 2010). Responses can be sensitive to question wording, and even the position of the questions in the questionnaire (Blank et al., 2004). Best practice in the area uses carefully worded, balanced questions and combines items to form indices that measure a latent belief or attitude, thus overcoming some of the wording effects and increasing reliability. Another strategy is to compare identical questions over time – even if there is some desirability bias in responding, if one assumes this does not change, then it does not affect the examination of change over time. Finally, comparing questions across countries can help evaluate responses to attitudinal questions, placing attitudes in Ireland, for example, in the context of similar countries.

For the analysis of attitudes, this chapter uses data that combine many elements of best practice in measuring attitudes. The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial survey that was specially designed to measure and interpret aspects of public opinion, and changes over time in people’s values and in cultural changes in the social, political and moral climate in 30 European countries. The first round was fielded in 2002/3, and the latest available data (round 5) was fielded in 2010/11. The survey contains a core module that takes place every round and typically replicates questions, and a rotating module that changes for each round. The ESS is an academically driven interview-based survey, with a standardised sampling methodology, uniform translation from the same questionnaire and uniform execution of field work and file construction in all participating countries (Blom, 2010). There may still be variation in how respondents understand and interpret terminology such as ‘immigrants’, but the survey is designed to reduce such differences in interpretation. It is ideally suited to comparing attitudes over time and between countries, and allows us to examine the attitudes of the native population to migrants in a comparative framework. It is not longitudinal (i.e. it does not ask the same people about their attitudes in each year), but it provides rigorous, representative, cross-national data about shifts in long-term perceptions and attitudes.

In this chapter we use the ESS data from 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 to look at the change in the Irish population’s attitudes to migrants and immigration in the period 2002–2010 (Section 6.2). The chapter considers responses to six specific questions on attitudes to immigration and migrants. The first three questions tap into overall attitudes to immigrants in terms of their contribution to the economy, cultural life and quality of life. The second three measure support for, or openness to, immigration by asking about accepting immigrants of the same race/ethnicity, immigrants of a different race/ethnicity and immigrants from the poorer countries outside Europe. As well as presenting individual items to illustrate patterns, indices are constructed to reduce potential wording effects. Significance tests are also applied so that we can be
sure that any change is statistically significant and not related to sample variation.

We also compare both overall attitudes to immigrants and resistance to immigration between Ireland and selected EU countries in 2010 (Section 6.3). Previous research has found that attitudes are shaped by personal factors such as educational level, occupation and the individual’s basic beliefs and values (Turner, 2010), therefore, in Section 6.4, we consider variation in attitudes by age, education and citizenship. We focus on the responses of Irish citizens, the majority population, for most of the analyses, as used in Coenders at al. (2004). This is an important point in a country like Ireland, where the proportion of immigrants is changing over time. If non-Irish citizens or those outside Ireland were included, i.e. the whole population, any observed changes might be due to changes in the proportion or national origin of migrants in the population. 148 Attitudes of ‘non-citizens’ to immigration differ from those of the native population; this is explored briefly in Section 6.4.

6.1 Changing Ireland

Attitudes may be sensitive to the social, economic and political context. In his analysis of attitudes towards immigrants at a national level, Turner (2010) compared the mean attitudinal scores for 13 countries and found that in 2004 Ireland ranked as the most liberal of the European countries regarding the positive impact of immigrants on the economy. However, Turner attributed the Irish liberal attitudes to a benign economic and labour market environment. Turner based his analysis on 2002 and 2004 data, when the economy and labour market were growing. Authors examining other countries have also found evidence of this. Coenders et al. (2004) found that the higher the unemployment rate, the more widespread the resistance to a multicultural society in EU Member States and (former) candidate countries. Economically vulnerable people feel economically threatened by immigrants, even when there are very few of them (Schneider, 2008). Others argue that there is no simple deterministic relationship between structural factors and attitudes to immigrants when aggregated to the national level (Turner, 2010). Coenders and Scheepers (1998) analyses indicate that a large increase in unemployment led to more widespread support for ethnic discrimination. The authors found that the actual level of unemployment did not affect perceived ethnic competition, whereas rapid changes in this level did affect support for ethnic discrimination.

There have been considerable changes in Ireland between 2002 and 2010, both in the size and demographics of the population and in the labour market. Between 2000 and 2007, Ireland experienced extremely

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148. By 2010, the last year in which we analyse attitudes, a proportion of non-EU immigrants had acquired Irish citizenship (see Chapter 5). However, in a sample of this size, with circa 270 non-Irish nationals overall in 2010, the numbers would be too small to affect the results.
strong economic growth: construction boomed, standards of living were at an all-time high and the unemployment rate averaged at a modest 4.5 per cent per annum (see Figure 6.1). However, the global financial crisis and the collapse of the construction and banking sectors meant that the Irish economy entered a very deep recession in 2008. Job losses were coupled with dramatic cuts in public expenditure and large tax increases. With the onset of recession, the level and rate of unemployment increased substantially. By 2010, the year of the final survey, 14 per cent of the labour force in Ireland was unemployed. If a rapid rise in unemployment is associated with attitudes to immigration, we would expect attitudes to become less liberal and openness to immigration to decline in 2008, with a further decline in 2010.

Others have highlighted the role of immigration flows. Coenders and Scheepers (1998) found that among the indigenous Dutch population, support for ethnic discrimination, i.e. support for a disadvantageous treatment of ethnic minorities in the housing and labour market, is more widespread in times of high levels of ethnic immigration, and when the level of ethnic immigration has risen sharply. When migratory flows increase, some key concerns of natives relate to immigrants’ impact on and/or integration into the receiving societies (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Semyonov et al. (2006) found that in the early period of immigration alarmist fears may lead to a sharp rise in anti-foreigner perceived threat, but that over time these perceptions become more realistic and the sentiments towards outsiders, although negative, level off and become more stable.

Figure 6.2 presents overall immigration flows into Ireland between 2000 and 2010. In this time period Ireland moved from being a country of net emigration to one of net immigration. Due to the accession of the EU12, and return emigration, there was a sharp increase in immigrant inflows between 2004 and 2007. Compared with an annual inflow of around 60,000 in 2002, immigration was around 150,000 at its peak in 2007, around 113,000 in 2008, falling to just under 42,000 in 2010. The bulk of the population increase was due to immigration from the EU’s new Member States (Barrett and McGuinness, 2012). If the size of the immigrant inflow is associated with attitudes towards immigration, then we would expect a fall in openness to immigration in Ireland in 2006, with attitudes perhaps becoming stable or more open in 2010.

It may be that it is the proportion of immigrants in the labour force, rather than immigration flows per se, that influences attitudes. Whilst inflows subsequently declined with the start of the recession in 2008, the growth in the proportion of non-Irish nationals continued. The 2002 Census included a question on nationality for the first time, and found that just under 6 per cent of the total population were non-Irish.
nationals. In 2006 the results of the Census showed that the proportion of non-Irish nationals had increased to 10 per cent of the total population. By Census 2011 the non-Irish population represented 12 per cent of the total population. The population of non-Irish nationals living in Ireland grew from 224,261 persons in 2002 to 544,357 in 2011, an increase of 143 per cent over the nine-year period (CSO, 2012d). In this case, we might expect openness to immigration to decrease between 2006 and 2008, and then to remain stable between 2008 and 2010.

Of course, it could be that both factors – the economic recession and the number of immigrants – operate together to influence attitudes. Economic recession may not be so relevant if the number of immigrants is very low, as was the case in Ireland in the 1980s. Similarly, high immigration may not have a significant impact on attitudes if the economy is growing and unemployment is very low, for example in Ireland in 2006. Attitudes to immigrants may be resistant to the changing context of either immigration or the economy. Or attitudes may follow a longer-term trend that began before 2002 and is unrelated to either factor.

6.2 Irish Attitudes: Change Over Time

This section looks at change over time in attitudes in Ireland. We mostly examine attitudes in Ireland using all five rounds of the ESS, i.e. from 2002 to 2010. For the sake of parsimony, some analyses focus on 2002, 2006 and 2010 rather than covering all years.

6.2.1 Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration 2002–2010

The first three questions ask ESS respondents about the contribution of immigrants to the economy, cultural life and whether they make the country a better or worse place to live. Respondents were asked:

- Would you say it is generally bad or good for [Ireland’s] economy that people come to live here from other countries?

  **00 Bad for the economy** on a scale to **10 Good for the economy**

- Would you say that [Ireland’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

  **00 Cultural life undermined** on a scale to **10 Cultural life enriched**

- Is [Ireland] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

  **00 Worse place to live** on a scale to **10 Better place to live**

The response is given as a score on an 11-point scale, where 0 is a negative response and 10 signifies a positive response. For ease of interpretation it is useful to think of responses as 0–1 (relatively strong negative opinion); 2–4 (somewhat negative); 5 (the midpoint response); 6–8 (somewhat positive) and 9–10 (relatively strong positive) (Card el al., 2012). Figure 6.3 shows the mean score on an 11-point scale in attitudes over time as to whether respondents feel that immigration is good or bad for Ireland’s economy. Figure 6.3 demonstrates that there has been considerable change in attitudes between 2002 and 2010, with positive attitudes towards immigration increasing until 2006 and then subsequently decreasing in 2008 and again in 2010. In light of the change in Ireland’s economy in this time frame due to the demise of the Celtic tiger and the recession, we would expect to find some change over time in attitudes to immigration and the economy. This chart shows that attitudes were most positive in 2006, before becoming more negative; therefore, proportionally fewer people felt that migrants were good for the economy in 2010 than did in 2002.

Figure 6.4 presents the overall attitudinal responses to direct questions on how immigrants impact on the cultural life of the country and demonstrates that, again, there has been a change in attitudes over time. From 2002 to 2008 there was a positive change in attitudes, with more respondents believing that Ireland’s cultural life was enriched by immigrants. Interestingly, this coincides with the period when the proportion of immigrants was rising rapidly, and indicates that there was not, at least initially, a negative response to this. However, attitudes were more negative by 2010, with more respondents reporting that they feel that the country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants. Dustmann and Preston (2007), in their analysis on racial and economic attitudes to immigration using the British Social Attitudes Survey, found that cultural alienation and fear that immigrants will undermine the traditional language, religion, political power or way of life of the native population are all cited as reasons to oppose immigrants.

Figure 6.5 looks at whether respondents feel that immigration makes the country a better or worse place to live. We find that positive attitudes towards immigrants increase from 2002 to 2004, and then decrease after 2006, reaching an all-time low in 2010, with more respondents reporting that immigrants make the country a worse place to live than did in 2002.

An ‘overall attitudes to immigration’ scale is created by combining the three questions into a single scale of pro-immigrant/anti-immigrant stance. We do this by combining the above questions – immigration bad or good for country’s economy, country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants, and immigrants make country worse or better place to live – and calculating a mean score. The results are shown in Figure 6.6.\(^{149}\)

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149. Tests show that the scale has good internal consistency and the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .84, suggesting that the scale is very reliable.
**Chapter 6 - Irish Attitudes to Immigrants**

**Figure 6.3 Mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on the economy 2002–2010**

Source: ESS Ireland; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.

**Figure 6.4 Mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on cultural life 2002–2010**

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
Chapter 6 - Irish Attitudes to Immigrants

Figure 6.5 Mean scores in attitudes to whether immigrants make Ireland a better or worse place to live 2002–2010

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.

Figure 6.6 Overall attitudes to immigration scale 2002–2010

Notes: Scale is created as a mean score combination of the three ESS questions: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [Ireland’s] economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ ‘Would you say that [Ireland’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’ and ‘Is [Ireland] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
Reflecting patterns in the results of the single attitudinal scores, Figure 6.6 demonstrates that overall attitudes towards immigrants became more positive from 2002 to 2006 before becoming more negative and, again, reaching a low in 2010. Most responses are in the intermediate range and overall results for all individual items and the combined scale show that attitudes towards immigrants were most positive in 2006. Statistical tests show that in the overall attitudes to immigration scale, there were significant differences between all years when compared with 2010.150

A booming economy with high prosperity could partially, if not wholly, explain positive attitudes to immigrants in 2006. In the years of rising immigration, attitudes to immigrants became more positive, although only until 2006.

We now present the results of the variables that refer to attitudes towards immigration into the country, and attitudes towards types of immigrants. For ease of presentation we consider variations in response in three time frames: 2002, 2006 and 2010. These are based on the following three ESS questions:

- How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [Irish] people?
- How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

Respondents were provided with four responses for each of these questions, presented on a showcard: ‘allow many to come here’, ‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, ‘allow none’.

Figure 6.7 shows that in all time periods analysed the majority of respondents would allow some immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the majority. Reflecting the patterns in the attitude responses, attitudes towards immigration have become more negative over time, with 4 per cent of respondents answering ‘allow none’ in 2002, compared with 15 per cent in 2010. The proportion who responded ‘allow many’ to come and live here decreased from 23 per cent of respondents in 2002 compared to 15 per cent in 2010.

Figure 6.8 presents attitudes towards migrants of a different ethnic group to the majority, and we find that, again, attitudes have become more negative over time. While the largest proportion of people across all time periods report that they would ‘allow some’ immigrants, this decreased with time, falling from 54 per cent in 2002 to 42 per cent in 2010.

150. A one-way analysis of variance between groups was conducted to assess whether there were significant differences between Ireland’s mean scores in different rounds. In order to assess where the differences between rounds lie, a Dunnett’s two-tailed post hoc analysis test was conducted. In the overall attitudes to immigration scale, there were significant differences between all rounds compared with the 2010 round (p<0.00 in all cases). There was also a significant difference between rounds one and two.
2010. In 2010 a larger proportion (19 per cent) of respondents would allow no immigrants of a different race/ethnic group than would allow no immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as majority (15 per cent; Figure 6.7).

In their analysis of racial and economic factors in attitudes to immigration, Dustmann and Preston (2007) found that cultural and racial concerns are an important channel that is associated with opinion towards further immigration, and are more important for immigrant groups that are ethnically more distant from the majority population. Schneider (2008) found that the higher the percentage of non-Western immigrants, the higher the country’s average level of perceived ethnic threat of immigration.

Figure 6.9 shows the responses of people when asked about allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to come to Ireland. The majority of respondents would ‘allow some’ immigrants from poorer countries, with attitudes becoming more negative between 2002 and 2010. The proportion who would ‘allow many’ to come and live here increased between 2002 and 2006, before decreasing to 9 per cent in 2010. The proportion of respondents who would ‘allow none’ increased from 6 per cent in 2002 to 22 per cent in 2010, an increase of 16 percentage points. Fear of job loss or wage competition and concerns over the costs of social programmes are often cited as reasons to oppose immigration (Card et al., 2005), respondents may be fearful that immigrants would be a burden on the country’s welfare system. Dustmann and Preston’s (2007) findings suggest that welfare concerns are most relevant when individuals assess the overall impact that immigration has on the economy.

We combined the above variables to create a scale to measure overall ‘openness to immigration’. The scale combines agreement/disagreement with three statements relating to allowing immigrants from the same race/ethnic group as the majority, from a different race/ethnic groups from the majority and from poorer countries outside Europe to come and settle in Ireland.151

For ease of interpretation we have rescaled all responses so that, like the attitudes questions, one is equal to a negative response and four is equal to a positive response. We found that between 2002 and 2010 the mean score decreased, meaning overall openness to immigration decreased and attitudes became more negative over time. When testing for

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151. We tested the scale for reliability to ensure that the variables measure the same underlying construct, and to ensure that the scale is reliable with the sample. We found that the scale has good internal consistency, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .90, and therefore the scale is highly reliable.
**Figure 6.9 Overall attitudes to allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live in Ireland**

![Bar chart showing overall attitudes to allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live in Ireland.](image)

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.

**Figure 6.10 Overall openness to immigration scale**

![Bar chart showing overall openness to immigration scale.](image)

Note: Scale created as a mean score combination of the three ESS questions: ‘To what extent do you think [Ireland] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [Irish] people to come and live here?’, ‘How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?’ and ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [Irish] people?’

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
statistical differences in mean scores, we found a significant difference on the mean scores of the resistance scale between 2010 and all the other years presented.\textsuperscript{152} This means we can be confident that there has been a change in resistance to immigration over the time period, even if the extent of change is modest.

6.3 How Does Ireland Compare with Other Countries in terms of Attitudes to Immigrants in 2010?

We now look at how attitudes towards immigrants in Ireland compared with attitudes in other countries in 2010. This is not a comprehensive analysis, in terms of either the number of countries or change over time in other countries. It is intended to illustrate how Irish attitudes compare with those in the selected countries: Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. The UK was chosen as it shares a somewhat similar culture to Ireland, both in terms of language spoken and the structures of the political system and labour market. Spain was selected as, like Ireland, it is in a recent and severe recession, and is also a relatively new country of immigration. Germany and the Netherlands were selected for comparative reasons as they both have a long history of immigration (Scheepers et al., 2002; Blom, 2010).

As noted above, the ESS is excellently suited to cross-national research as the theoretical concepts of the study are measured in a comparable manner in different countries at the same time point (Coenders et al., 2004). When comparing cross-country results, it is important to note that the countries we have chosen all had very different economic and demographic experiences in the time frame of the ESS. With the exception of Spain, the recession has not impacted as severely on the economies of the other countries included in this analysis. Ireland and Spain are also the only countries included to experience such rapid levels of immigration, and such increases in the immigrant population.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Figure 6.11 Cross-country comparison: immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live 2010}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure611.png}
\caption{Cross-country comparison: immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live 2010}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: ESS 2010; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.}

\textbf{152. Results from a one-way analysis of variance between groups, using a Dunnett’s two-tailed test to check group differences. There was no significant difference between rounds one and two for the resistance scale, in round one (M=2.78, SD=.67), in round two (m=2.80, SD=.75); t=−.965 and p=0.33 (two-tailed).}

\textbf{153. See Figure 1.1 for proportion of foreign-born population among the total population in Ireland and Spain.}
Chapter 6 - Irish Attitudes to Immigrants

Figure 6.13 compares the mean scores in 2010 across countries for attitudes to the impact of immigration on the country's economy. Germany and the Netherlands share the most positive attitudes to immigrants’ impact on the economy. Ireland reported the lowest mean score, therefore displaying the most negative attitude towards immigrants’ impact on the economy. This low score may be influenced by Ireland’s relatively negative economic situation in 2010 in the middle of a severe economic recession. However, as Spain was hit even harder by the economic recession and its unemployment rate in 2010 was 20 per cent (Eurostat, 2013), we cannot conclude that it is definitely economic recession that influences a country’s attitudes towards immigration.

How do the countries compare if we combine responses to these questions to create a scale measuring overall attitudes to immigration? Figure 6.14 presents the mean scores for the overall attitudes to immigration scale across countries in 2010. The Netherlands had the most positive attitudes to immigration,154 with Germany reporting the second most positive attitudes. The UK reported the most negative attitudes towards immigrants. Statistical tests showed that in terms of the overall perceptions of immigration scale there is significant differences in mean scores between Germany and Ireland, Spain and Ireland and the Netherlands and Ireland, but no significant difference between perceptions of immigration in the UK and Ireland.155

Turning to openness to immigration, Figure 6.15 shows that Germany reported the largest proportion (30 per cent) of respondents who feel that policy should allow many immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the majority to come and live in the country. Irish respondents are the second most positive at 15 per cent. Only 10 per cent of UK respondents feel that many immigrants from the same race/ethnic group as the majority should be allowed to come and live in the country.

The picture changes somewhat if we look at the proportion of respondents who would allow no immigrants of the same ethnic group as the majority (see Figure 6.16). Irish respondents reported the most negative response to this question, at 15 per cent. German respondents were the least negative, with only 4 per cent believing that none should be allowed. Germany has a long history of immigration and its population is accustomed to a large number of labour immigrants. Interestingly, Schneider (2008) argues that when a country has a long history of immigration, people are used to having people from different areas of the world around and can more easily deal with cultural diversity without feeling threatened. Germany’s economic situation was also very different from that in Ireland in 2010.

154. Attitudes in the Netherlands are not particularly negative overall compared with other EU countries. The intolerant sector of the population is, however, very well mobilised and has a large influence on the political climate (Gijsberts and Lubbers, 2009).

155. We carried out a one-way analysis of variance between groups to assess whether there were significant differences between countries in their mean scores in overall attitudes to immigration in 2010. We conducted a Dunnett’s two-tailed post hoc analysis test to assess where differences between countries’ mean scores lie.
Figure 6.13 Cross-country comparison: mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on the economy 2010

![Bar chart showing cross-country comparison mean scores in attitudes to impact of immigration on the economy 2010. The chart compares Germany, Spain, UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands.]

Source: ESS 2010; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.

Figure 6.14 Cross-country comparison: overall attitudes to immigration scale 2010

![Bar chart showing cross-country comparison overall attitudes to immigration scale 2010. The chart compares Germany, Spain, UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands.]

Note: Scale is created as a mean score combination of the three ESS questions: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country’s] economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ ‘Would you say that [country’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’ and ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’

Source: ESS 2010; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
Figure 6.15 Cross-country comparison: proportions who say ‘allow many’ from same ethnic group as majority to come and live here 2010

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.

Figure 6.16 Cross-country comparison: proportions who say ‘allow none’ from same ethnic group as majority to come and live here 2010

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
Combining attitudes to all three questions – about people from same/different ethnic group and poorer countries outside Europe – Figure 6.17 shows the results of the mean openness to immigration scale. Again, Germany recorded the most positive attitudes to immigrants and seems to be the most liberal of the countries in terms of attitudes to immigrants in 2010, although this differs between questions and is not consistent. The UK reported the most negative attitudes in terms of openness to immigration and Ireland reported the second most negative views. There is significant difference between the mean scores of Germany and Ireland, and Ireland and the Netherlands. Both Germany and the Netherlands scored higher and therefore more positive mean scores in the openness to immigration scale in 2010. Results of the tests show that Ireland does not differ significantly from the UK or Spain in 2010 in this scale.

6.4 Variation in Attitudes by Personal Characteristics – Education, Age and Citizenship

In this section we examine whether respondents’ personal characteristics are associated with their attitudes to immigrants. Specifically we look at whether attitudes towards immigrants in Ireland differ by age group, education level and citizenship.

Semyonov et al. (2006) found that, other things being equal, negative attitudes towards foreigners are more pronounced among socio-economically vulnerable and weak populations (i.e. those with low education and the unemployed). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) found that more educated respondents are significantly less racist and place far greater value on cultural diversity in society, and they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for their

156. A one-way analysis of variance between groups was conducted to assess whether there was significant differences between countries in their mean scores in openness to immigration in 2010. In order to assess where the differences between groups lie, a Dunnett’s two-tailed post hoc analysis test was conducted.

Figure 6.17 Cross-country comparison: mean scores in openness to immigration scale 2010

Note: Scale is created as a mean score combination of the three ESS questions: ‘To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?’ ‘How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?’ and ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?’

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
national economy as a whole. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) report a strong relationship between education and more favourable attitudes to further immigration.

Figure 6.18 explores how results differ by education level for the question on whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy. Education is classified into four groups and the results illustrate a clear difference in attitudes according to educational attainment. Those with tertiary education displayed more liberal attitudes and were more positive that immigrants are good for Ireland’s economy. Respondents with no formal to lower secondary education reported the most negative attitudes towards immigrants’ contribution to the economy.

The response pattern is similar for the two other questions on culture and overall attitudes to immigration. The fact that the highly educated are more liberal in their attitudes may reflect their less vulnerable labour market position, however, it could also be due to the strong association of education with attitudes to welfare or to culture (Dustmann and Preston, 2007). Respondents with lower levels of education are more vulnerable to the negative impact of recession and their attitudes may change more than those of the better educated. However, Kunovich (2004) argues that attitudinal differences between educationally advantaged and disadvantaged groups are ‘washed away’ in challenged economic circumstances. Initial analysis of mean attitudes by education suggests that the pattern of change – whereby attitudes became more positive until 2008 and then became more negative – is true for all education groups. A more detailed analysis of the extent of change among different educational levels is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Age is likely to affect attitudes as it is a direct measure of life experience and marks the position of the individual in their economic cycle (i.e. education, early working career, later working life, retirement) (Dustmann and Preston, 2007). Figure 6.19 presents mean scores in attitudes to immigrants by age group, the 25–44 age group expressed the most positive attitudes to immigrants’ contribution to the country, the 65 and over age group reported the most negative views towards immigrants. In Ireland, as elsewhere, the more highly educated and younger people are more likely to exhibit more tolerant attitudes towards migrants (Hughes et al., 2007).

Figure 6.20 reports the means scores in openness to immigration by age group. The 15–24 age group reported the most positive attitudes to immigrants and, again, the 65 and over age group reported the most negative attitudes to immigrants. Card et al. (2005) found that older people have stronger anti-immigrant views. It could be that older cohorts in Ireland hold less tolerant views because they grew up in a less multicultural environment and have lower educational qualifications, on average, or it could be that people get less tolerant of immigration as they grow older, or a combination of both. Disentangling the role of these effects would require further investigation.
Chapter 6 - Irish Attitudes to Immigrants

Figure 6.19 Mean scores in attitudes to immigrants by age group

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.

Figure 6.20 Mean scores in openness to immigration by age group

Note: Scale is created as a mean score combination of the three ESS questions: ‘To what extent do you think [Ireland] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [Irish] people to come and live here?’; ‘How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?’ and ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [Irish] people?’

Source: ESS; calculations are based on proportions of the citizen population only.
Chapter 6 - Irish Attitudes to Immigrants

Figure 6.21 Mean scores to question on cultural life by citizenship

![Bar chart showing mean scores for cultural life by citizenship (Non-Citizen vs. Irish Citizen).]

Source: ESS 2010.

Figure 6.22 Overall attitudes to immigration by citizenship 2010

![Bar chart showing overall attitudes to immigration by citizenship (Non-Citizen vs. Irish Citizen).]

Note: Scale is created as a mean score combination of the three ESS questions: “To what extent do you think [Ireland] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [Irish] people to come and live here?” “How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” and “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [Irish] people?”

Source: ESS 2010.
Figure 6.21 demonstrates the mean scores of Irish citizens’ and non-Irish citizens’ responses to the question: ‘Is the country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants?’ Not surprisingly, non-Irish citizens reported a much more positive response about immigrants’ contribution to Ireland’s cultural life, and citizens had a more negative response. Dustmann and Preston (2004) found that not only do immigrants have a more positive view about the overall effect of immigration than natives, but they also evaluate the impact of migration on other concerns more positively.

Figure 6.22 presents overall attitudes to immigration by citizenship in 2010, again non-Irish citizens showed more positive attitudes to immigration than Irish citizens. Given these differences, and the rising proportion of non-Irish nationals in the population, if non-Irish citizens are included in the analysis of change in attitudes over time, the trend will change somewhat.

6.5 Conclusion

Our analysis of data from the European Social Survey suggests significant changes in Irish attitudes to immigrants and immigration between 2002 and 2010. While attitudes to the contribution immigrants make to the economy have changed more than those to their contribution to cultural life or making Ireland a better place to live, the overall index shows a clear rise in positive attitudes to 2006 and a clear fall in 2010. In terms of openness to immigration, openness was higher in the early years of the decade and fell in 2008 and then again in 2010. These changes are statistically significant, although modest.

Without more sophisticated modelling and, ideally, attitudinal measures from the same people over time, we cannot say definitively, but this evidence, consistent with research from other countries, suggests that the economic recession and rapid rise in unemployment have played a significant role in changes in attitudes. Positive evaluations peaked in 2006 and fell in 2008 and further in 2010, at a time when unemployment was rising rapidly. The suggestion that attitudes become more negative as the number of immigrants rise receives less credence, at least during the economic boom, as attitudes were becoming more positive when immigration was rising rapidly in the period 2002–2006. There may have been some time-lag in the response to rising immigration, although this is inconsistent with the change between 2008 and 2010.

It is perhaps more plausible that the growth in the immigrant share of the total population followed by the economic recession resulted in increased concerns about, and resistance to, immigration. Without the recession, there might not have been such a negative change in attitudes. Similarly, without a rapid rise in immigration, the recession might not have affected attitudes to immigrants.

In a comparative international context it is evident that there was a significant increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants in Ireland. The comparison in 2010 is rather different from that in 2002 and 2004. In 2010, both in terms of attitudes to immigrants and resistance to immigration, Ireland shows some of the more negative attitudes of the five countries considered, albeit no more negative than the UK. A more comprehensive comparative analysis would consider many more countries. It should also be noted that attitudes change – as demonstrated by this chapter – and, particularly to the extent that economic conditions are playing a role, a comparison in four or ten years’ time may reveal a different comparative position.

As has been found in other countries, there is marked variation in attitudes within the Irish population. The highly educated, particularly those with a university degree, tend to have more positive attitudes to the contribution of immigrants. Other education groups are less positive. Younger adults – those aged under 45 – showed more positive attitudes in general. The 25–44 age group had the most positive evaluations of immigration overall, and the under 25 age group was the most open to immigration in 2010. In both overall attitudes and openness to immigration, the over 65 age group reported the most negative attitudes. Finally, but not surprisingly, non-Irish citizens (immigrants themselves) have more positive evaluations of immigrants than Irish nationals.

It is clear that there is a lot of potential in these data for further analysis, and there are many questions worthy of further analysis. One obvious next step would be to use statistical modelling to disentangle some of the patterns found in Ireland and to investigate changes over time in more depth. A more ambitious analysis would use a broader range of countries to model change over time and explore patterns concerning unemployment, immigration and attitudes; the focus of this analysis was Ireland.
Chapter 7 Issues for Policy and Data Collection

The primary function of this report is to assess integration outcomes. This chapter discusses, in brief, some of the policy issues to emerge from this Integration Monitor and reflects on some implications for future data collection.

7.1 Policy Issues

In the employment domain (see Chapter 2), once again a key issue of concern is the much higher rate of unemployment among non-Irish nationals when compared with the rate among Irish nationals. Although Ireland is currently in a deep recession and experiencing mass unemployment, it is important that programmes are implemented to ensure that vulnerable groups are integrated. Targeted labour market and education programmes that focus on providing equal employment opportunities and that offer retraining, education, and language and cultural supports are vital for ensuring that legally resident immigrants have an equal chance to participate in the labour market and avoid long-term unemployment.

Given the very low rate of self-employment among non-Irish nationals, the implementation of an immigrant investor programme and a start-up entrepreneur programme for immigrants could represent a helpful development, although the overall potential impact will depend on take-up.

Chapter 3 discussed the achievement gap in English reading for 15 year olds who are not from an English-speaking background. It also showed that almost one-third of immigrants are below the basic Level 2 proficiency in reading. Given these findings, continuing cuts to the budget allocation for teaching English as an additional language are of concern. The merging of the allocation process for English language tuition and learning support in 2012 means that monitoring spending on English language tuition in schools will no longer be possible. The lack of a clearly defined strategy for English language provision for adults is also problematic, given the role of language in labour market integration and integration more generally.

There have been a number of developments on the issue of school patronage. In keeping with recommendations of the Advisory Group to the Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector, any change will be slow, but it is likely that patronage of schools will become more diverse and more reflective of different groups within the population of Ireland.

Chapter 4 reported a higher rate of consistent poverty (which combines income poverty with material deprivation) among non-EU nationals for 2010. Although the EU-SILC sample of non-Irish is small, this consistent poverty rate had already risen in 2009 and rose further from 2009 to 2010. This increase in poverty is a cause for concern.

Chapter 5 documented a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised population since 2010, due to increased applications as well as improvements in the processing of applications. Notwithstanding ongoing issues, for example in relation to the absence of administrative appeal and the lack of a clear obligation on the Minister for Justice and Equality to give reasons when refusing an application for naturalisation, the recent progress in processing naturalisation applications is very positive.

To build on this progress, a clearly defined, widely accessible long-term residence status for legal migrants would ensure that naturalisation is not the only way for long-term migrants to achieve security of status, with transparent entitlements and obligations attached. Yet, continued delays in the enactment of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 mean that Ireland remains without a statutory long-term residence permission. The problems regarding limited access to the current administrative scheme, identified in the 2010 and 2011 Integration Monitors persist, as do uncertainties about the exact nature of conditions attached to the status.

Support from philanthropic foundations has been an important source of funding in the area of integration of immigrants in recent years. However, we understand that these foundations are likely to wind down their activities over the medium term. This is a cause for concern as, in a context of the fiscal constraints of the Irish State, it is not clear how such essential activities and services to vulnerable groups will be resourced. Chapter 1 documented a significant decline in the funding of the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration for 2011 and 2012, and an associated decline in funding to the organisations OPMI supports. The Minister for Justice and Equality has indicated that ‘little or no scope’ exists for OPMI to take on new projects, unless co-financed by the EU.157

7.2 Issues for Future Data Collection

The adequate representation of non-Irish nationals in social surveys is crucial for a monitoring exercise of this nature. If we are to be confident that we are representing the experience of non-Irish nationals accurately and monitoring change over time, we need to be sure that non-Irish nationals are appropriately represented in the surveys we are using, however challenging this may be.

In the short term, it is very important that continued efforts be made to encourage the participation of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC and the QNHS, which are the major sources of information on income, poverty and the labour market in Ireland. In particular, any future changes in methodology, such as moving from face-to-face interviews to telephone surveys, must be cognisant of the potential impact on migrant response rates, particularly migrants with poor language skills. It is to be welcomed that surveys such as the Workplace Surveys and the Sports Monitor in Ireland now collect data on nationality/country of birth, and allow researchers to expand the range of integration indicators. However, it would be even more useful if samples could be adjusted to be representative of migrant populations, using information from larger surveys.

A major challenge in monitoring integration is small sample sizes. In the medium term, immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples would go a long way to addressing this issue. These could be in ongoing large-scale surveys such as the QNHS or the EU-SILC, or in surveys like the European Social Survey. This would be of considerable benefit to the monitoring of integration in Ireland, although boost samples do have resource implications.

As noted in Chapter 5, the immigrant population has changed significantly, even since the 2010 Integration Monitor, with a sizeable group of immigrants now having Irish citizenship. This means that measuring integration on the basis of nationality will miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens. It strengthens the case for using ethnicity to measure integration, to include both naturalised citizens and second-generation immigrants. This does not just apply to survey data; the widespread use of an ethnic identifier by service providers will become increasingly necessary in the Irish context. As more and more migrants naturalise and substantial numbers of second- and third-generation migrants emerge, nationality becomes an increasingly unsatisfactory means of identification.

In terms of recording immigrants in official statistics, the fact that non-EEA nationals aged 16 and under are not required to register with INIS/GNIB is an ongoing problem. It means that registration data on the non-EEA population is only for adults and therefore incomplete.

As noted in Chapter 1, at both EU and OECD levels, the issue of monitoring the integration of immigrants has received increasing prominence. The value of such monitoring indicators will only be as good as the data on which they are based.
References


Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2012


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Appendix 1 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union

1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.

2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.

3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.

4. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.

5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.

6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.

7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.

8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.

9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.

10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.

11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.
## Appendix 2 Definition of Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Employment†</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>The proportion of the population of working age (15–64) who are employed.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>The proportion of the labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15–64) who are unemployed.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>The proportion of adults of working age (15–64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed).</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment rate</td>
<td>The proportion of the employed population who are self-employed (i.e. working in own business, professional practice or farm for the purpose of making a profit).</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest educational attainment</td>
<td>The share of population aged 15 to 64 with third-level, post-leaving certificate, upper secondary and no formal/lower secondary education.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment†</td>
<td>The share of 25 to 34 year olds with tertiary (third-level) education.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education and training†</td>
<td>The share of population aged 20 to 24 with no more than lower secondary education and not currently in education.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics‡ (PISA)</td>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics by immigrant status using PISA test scores.</td>
<td>PISA 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median net income</td>
<td>Median net income – the median income is the income that divides the income distribution into two equal groups</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘At risk of poverty’ rate</td>
<td>The share of persons with an equivalised income below a given percentage (usually 60 per cent) of the national median income.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent poverty rate</td>
<td>Individuals are defined as being in consistent poverty if they are identified as being ‘at risk of poverty’ and living in a household deprived of two or more of 11 basic deprivation items.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good</td>
<td>The share of population aged 16 and over perceiving their health status as good or very good.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population</td>
<td>The percentage of property owners among immigrant and Irish household respondents.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Active citizenship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship (best estimate)</td>
<td>The share of the estimated non-EEA immigrant population who have acquired citizenship (best estimate).</td>
<td>Department of Justice and Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits</td>
<td>The share of the estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted long-term residence (best estimate).</td>
<td>Department of Justice and Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected representatives†</td>
<td>The share of immigrants among elected local representatives.</td>
<td>Immigrant Council of Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
† employment and unemployment are defined here and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour Organization’s (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey interview for one hour or more, or if they were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview, but were available to start work in the next two weeks and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the live register of unemployment and from the individual’s own self-assignment of their principal economic status.
‡ indicates that the definition of the indicator differs slightly from that proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. The share of 25 to 34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment instead of 30 to 34 year olds with tertiary educational achievement. The share of early leavers from education and training aged 20 to 24 instead of 18 to 24. The mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics instead of the proportion of 15 year olds achieving Level 1 or under in the PISA assessment tests. The share of immigrants among elected local representatives instead of among elected representatives.
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